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Full text of "Hearings relating to H.R. 352, H.R. 1617, H.R. 5368, H.R. 8320, H.R. 8757, H.R. 10036, H.R. 10037, H.R. 10077, and H.R. 11718, providing for creation of a Freedom Commission and Freedom Academy, Eighty-eighth Congress, second session"

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HEARINGS RELATING TO H.R. 352, H.R. 1617, H.R. 5368, 

H.R. 8320, H.R. 8757, H.R. 10036, H.R. 10037, H.R. 



Part 2 






FEBRUARY 20, APRIL 7 AND 8, AND MAY 19 AND 20, 1964 

Printed for the use of the 
Committee on Un-American Activities 


DEC ,4 ^964 

30-471 WASHINGTON : 1964 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 
Wastiington, D.C., 20402 - Price $1.25 


United States House of Repbesentatives 

EDWIN E. WILLIS, Louisiana, Chairman 

JOE R. POOL. Texas DONALD C. BRUCE, Indiana 



Francis J. McNamara, Director 
Feank S. Tavenner, Jr., Oeneral Counsel 
Alfred M. Nittlb, Counsel 
William Hitz, Counsel 



February 20, 1964: Statement of— Paet 

Hon. Richard S. Schweiker 1243 

Hon. W. Averell Harriman 1249 

Hon. Robert Taft, Jr 1271 

Gerhart Niemeyer 1274 

Afternoon session: 

Lev E. Dobriansky 1279 

Hon. Robert R. Barry 1300 

William R. Kintner 1305 

Hon. Bob Wilson 1313 

April 7, 1964: Statement of— 

Hon. Robert C. Hill 1316 

Robert Finley Delaney 1319 

H. Stuart Morrison 1342 

Christopher Emmet 1351 

Afternoon session: 

H. Stuart Morrison (resumed) 1360 

Herbert Philbrick 1365 

Clarence H. Olson 1378 

Daniel J. O'Connor 1379 

April 8, 1964: Statement of— 

Michael C. Conley 1385 

Hon. Charles S. Gubser 1411 

May 19, 1964: Statement of — 

Hon. Dante B. Fascell 1417 

John Richardson, Jr 1419 

Reserve Officers Association of the United States 1420 

Adm. Arleigh A. Burke 1420 

Hon. John O. Marsh, Jr 1450 

Paul Jones 1454 

May 20, 1964: Statement of— 

Hon. Don H. Clausen 1457 

Hon. Adolf A. Berle 1465 

Dickey Chapelle '. 1485 

James Robinson 1494 

Afternoon session: 

Walter Joyce 1509 

Louis Dona O'Hara for Taxpayers League of Blackstone Valley, 

Providence and Providence Plantations 1514 

Index— Parts 1 and 2 i 


Public Law 601, 79th Congress 

The legislation under which the House Committee on Un-American 
Activities operates is Public Law 601, 79th Congress [1946] ; 60 Stat. 
812, which provides : 

Be it enacted hy the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States 
of America in Congress assembled, * * * 


Rule X 


17. Committee on Un-American Activities, to consist of nine Members. 

Rule XI 

* * * » * * * 

(q) (1) Committee on Un-American Activities. 

(A) Un-American activities. 

(2) Ttie Committee on Un-American Activities, as a whole or by subcommit- 
tee, is authorized to make from time to time investigations of (i) the extent, 
character, and objects of un-American propaganda activities in the United States, 
(ii) the diffusion within the United States of subversive and un-American propa- 
ganda that is instigated from foreign countries or of a domestic origin and attacks 
the principle of the form of government as guaranteed by our Constitution, and 
(iii) all other questions in relation thereto that would aid Congress in any neces- 
sary remedial legislation. 

The Committee on Un-American Activities shall report to the House (or to the 
Clerk of the House if the House is not in session) the results of any such investi- 
gation, together with such recommendations as it deems advisable. 

For the purpose of any such investigation, the Committee on Un-American 
Activities, or any subcommittee thereof, is authorized to sit and act at such 
times and places within the United States, whether or not the House is sitting, 
has recessed, or has adjourned, to hold such hearings, to require the attendance 
of such witnesses and the production of such books, papers, and documents, and 
to take such testimony, as it deems necessary. Subpenas may be issued under 
the signature of the chairman of the committee or any subcommittee, or by any 
member designated by any such chairman, and may be served by any i)erson 
designated by any such chairman or member. 


Rule XII 


Sec. 136. To assist the Congress in appraising the administration of the laws 
and in developing such amendments or related legislation as it may deem neces- 
sary, each standing committee of the Senate and the House of Representatives 
shall exercise continuous watchfulness of the execution by the administrative 
agencies concerned of any laws, the subject matter of which is within the jurisdic- 
tion of such committee ; and, for that purpose, shall study all pertinent reports 
and data submitted to the Congress by the agencies in the executive branch of 
the Government. 


House Resolution 5, January 9, 1963 

****** ^ 

Rule X 


1. There shall be elected by the House, at the commencement of each Congress, 


(r) Committee on Un-American Activities, to consist of nine Members. 


Rule XI 


18. Committee on Un-American Activities. 

(a) Un-American activities. 

(b) The Committee on Un-American Activities, as a whole or by subcommittee, 
is authorized to make from time to time investigations of (1) the extent, char- 
acter, and objects of un-Ammerican propaganda activities in the United States, 
(2) the diffusion within the United States of subversive and un-American prop- 
aganda that is instigated from foreign countries or of a domestic origin and 
attacks the principle of the form of government as guaranteed by our Constitu- 
tion, and (3) all other questions in relation thereto that would aid Congress 
in any necessary remedial legislation. 

The Committee on Un-American Activities shall report to the House ( or to the 
Clerk of the House if the House is not in session) the results of any such investi- 
gation, together with such recommendations as it deems advisable. 

For the purpose of any such investigation, the Committee on Un-American 
Activities, or any subcommittee thereof, is authorized to sit and act at such times 
and places within the United States, whether or not the House is sitting, has 
recessed, or has adjourned, to hold such hearings, to require the attendance 
of such witnesses and the production of such books, papers, and documents, and 
to take such testimony as it deems necessary. Subpeuas may be issued under 
the signature of the chairman of the committee or any subcommittee, or by any 
member designated by any such chairman, and may be served by" any person 
designated by any such chairman or member. 


27. To assist the House in appraising the administration of the laws and in 
developing such amendments or related legislation as it may deem necessary, 
each standing committee of the House shall exercise continuous watchfulness 
of the execution by the administrative agencies concerned of any laws, the subject 
matter of which is within the jurisdiction of such committee ; and, for that 
purpose, shall study all i)ertinent reports and data submitted to the House by 
the agencies in the executive branch of the Government. 


5368, H.R. 8320, H.R. 8757, H.R. 10036, H.R. 10037, H.R. 

Part 2 


United States House of Representatives, 

Committee on Un-American Activities, 

Washington^ D.G. 
public hearings 

The Committee on Un-American Activities met, pursuant to recess, 
at 10:10 a.m., in the Caucus Room, Cannon House Office Building, 
Washington, D.C., Hon. Edwin E. Willis (chairman) presiding. 

Committee members present: Representatives Edwin E. Willis, of 
Louisiana; William M. Tuck, of Virginia; Joe R. Pool, of Texas; 
Richard H. Ichord, of Missouri; August E. Johansen, of Michigan; 
and Henry C. Schadeberg, of Wisconsin. 

Staff members present : Francis J. McNamara, director, and Alfred 
M. Nittle, counsel. 

The Chairman. The committee will please come to order. 

We are pleased to have with us as our first witness this morning Mr. 
Schweiker of Pennsylvania, an author of one of the bills we are 
presently considering. 

Mr. Schweiker, we are delighted to have you, and look forward to 
hearing your statement. 


Mr. ScHWEiBLER. Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee : I ap- 
preciate the opportunity to appear before the committee this morning 
in support of legislation creating a Freedom Commission and a Free- 
dom Academy. 

I sponsored such legislation in the first session of the 87th Congress 
and reintroduced this proposal as H.R. 8757 in the current Congress. 
I am particularly pleased to note that this idea has received wide- 
spread sponsorship within both parties and throughout the broad 
spectrimi of political philosophies. 

Few today would question the fact that the Communist bloc is 
waging total political warfare against the United States and other 
peoples of the free world. Unfortunately, in many instances the Com- 



munists have won important battles because they have so adroitly 
fashioned propaganda and political skills into weapons equally as 
dangerous to our freedom as bombs and missiles. Using an elaborate 
network of training schools, the Communists have developed their 
version of political warfare into a highly effective operational science. 
Every citizen, every economic, cultural, religious, or ethnic group is a 
target and may come mider direct or indirect Communist attack. 

For several decades the forces of communism have carefully pre- 
pared their conspirators with the means to engage in new forms of 
struggle using the techniques of political, ideological, and psy- 
chological assault. They have employed an elaborate research and 
training system and have succeeded in imparting this knowledge to 
their followers. Their success, it seems to me, is due in large measure 
to the careful preparation and training which they have given to their 

If the peoples of the free world are to defeat the Soviet political 
warfare offensive, they must understand the true nature of the inter- 
national Communist conspiracy and the dimensions of the global strug- 
gle between freedom and communism. Only with such an under- 
standing of the scope and nature of the threat can people be expected 
to know how to participate in the continuing struggle in an effective, 
sustained, and systematic mamier. 

This Nation has been careful to prepare adequately for military 
conflict with the forces of communism. But our preparation to win 
the cold war through other than military means has been woefully 
inadequate. We have properly devoted great efforts and developed 
our service academies to achieve hot war capabilities, but we have 
neglected to develop the expertise and facilities needed to wage and 
win the cold war. 

The bills under consideration today would create a nonpartisan 
seven-member Freedom Commission and, under its jurisdiction, a Free- 
dom Academy, an advanced research, training, and development cen- 
ter. The Freedom Commission and Freedom Academy would fill the 
current void in United States cold war efforts. Members of the Com- 
mission would be appointed by the President and not more than four 
could be members of any one political party. H.E>. 8757, which I have 
introduced, would provide that one member of the Commission would 
be selected from the higher echelon of the State Department. 

The Freedom Academy would provide Government personnel, pri- 
vate citizens, and foreign students with professional training in the 
political, economic, ideological, psychological, and paramilitary as- 
pects of the cold war. The program would include study of our na- 
tional purpose and objectives, as well as the development of proposals 
for coordinating various methods into strategy for victory. Students 
at the Freedom Academy would be educated in all aspects of com- 
munism, the nature of the worldwide struggle between communism 
and freedom, and the science of counteraction to the Red conspiracy. 
They would be selected from diverse groups within the United States 
and in other countries, where trained leadership and informed public 
opinion are most needed. 

I hardly need point out to my colleagues that the Communists have 
been most active in providing such training for thousands of persons 
from other nations. I think it important that we remember the fan- 


tastic success which the Communists have achieved in recruiting the 
young elite in the developing nations. It is difficult for us in the 
United States to fully comprehend the extraordinary ambition within 
the youth of these countries. The strong nationalistic forces which 
prevail impart to the young people a great sense of urgency about the 
need for modernization and reform. They desire to lead. The Com- 
munists have been eager to teach them the deceitful Red tecliniques of 
leadership and power acquisition. 

Under H.R. 8757, the Freedom Commission would be authorized to 
make grants to Academy students, to pay expenses incident to their 
training, and to provide financial assistance to their dependents dur- 
ing the training period. The Commission could also establish an in- 
formation center to distribute publications and other materials de- 
signed to assist people in better understanding the Commmiist threat 
and the means to combat it. 

Representatives from the private sector — labor, business, colleges, 
and schools — could attend the special classes at the Freedom Academy. 
In this connection I think it is appropriate to note the outstanding 
work which the AFL-CIO has been doing in Latin America. Through 
the Institute for Free Labor Development, American labor is pro- 
viding Latin American workers with the knowledge to develop stable 
and democratic organizations. Representatives in this private orga- 
nization are working with members and officers of the Latin Ameri- 
can unions who are engaged in the desperate struggle against the re- 
sourceful Communists, who seek to subvert and destroy legitimate labor 
organizations, as they did in Cuba. What could be better than to 
have available t<3 such officials a training ground such as the Freedom 
Academy would provide. Then, too, I believe the Freedom Academy 
could make an important contribution to the field of business, particu- 
larly with those representatives of business who would be working 

I would envision the Freedom Academy providing traming of vary- 
ing duration and intensity for professional and officer persoimel 
throughout Government who serve in positions related to foreign af- 
fairs and security activities. Officers at the lower echelons might be 
trained between 6 months and 1 year, while those at midcareer and in 
top-echelon posts would be trained for longer periods, ranging per- 
haps up to 2 years. 

Creation of a Freedom Academy would meet the first important 
test in winning any struggle: know your enemy. In many ways, the 
Communist forces are a imique enemy relying on total warfare, with 
political, economic, ideological, and psychological measures organized 
as systematically and as efficiently as military power. Primary weap- 
ons are lying words; deception; infiltration into educational, religious, 
labor, and farm groups; and political subversion. One of our chief 
difficulties in the cold war has been that we have not mastered, or 
even fully recognized, this unorthodox form of warfare. Obviously, 
our moral standards will not permit us to employ many of the tactics 
used by the Communists. But our Nation can launch a crusade for 
freedom in the minds of men, using the "big truth" as often as the 
Communists use the "big lie." The Freedom Academy would be- 
come "the West Point of the cold war," permitting us to send pro- 


fessionals rather than amateurs into the battle against communism 
and helping to avoid more Cubas, 

I would like to emphasize my strong belief that the Freedom Acad- 
emy, to accomplish its purposes, must be a first-class academic institu- 
tion. It must be able to attract the top minds in our country, among 
them some of our leading university scholars. 

One reservation which has been raised by some persons not enthu- 
siastic about the Freedom Academy proposal is that such a school 
could conceivably be used by an administration for its own partisan 
purjDoses as a political propaganda school. I feel that the independ- 
ence of the Freedom Commission and its bipartisan nature provide 
adequate protection from such an occurrence. As a matter of fact, 
this is one of the distinct advantages which I find in the Freedom 
Academy and Freedom Commission proposal as contrasted with the 
proposal to create a National Academy of Foreign Affairs. The Na- 
tional Academy of Foreign Affairs would be much more closely asso- 
ciated with the administration in power and, I fear, would suffer from 
an ingrown viewpoint serving primarily the interests of one depart- 

In pressing for creation of a Freedom Academy, I express my con- 
viction that the United States must develop an extensive program for 
nonmilitary conflict. The Communists already have such an effective 
program, and it has become evident that nonmilitary action often is 
the decisive factor in international conflict. The United States has 
done little to train its governmental officials, let alone its private citi- 
zens, in this nonmilitary conflict. 

I see the Freedom Academy as an essential addition to our weapons 
system in our arsenal of peaceful means to curb and set back the Com- 
munist challenge. It is to be not an operational agency, but rather a 
valuable research and training institution. 

The Chairman. Thank you very much, JVIr. Schweiker. We cer- 
tainly are indebted to you for your clear and enlightening statement. 
We will, of course, give an ear to you and to all other witnesses in 
trying to find a solution to the problem we are faced with. 

Are there any questions ? 

Mr. Pool. I do not believe so. 

Mr. IcHORD. Mr. Chairman, I have one question. 

Mr. Schweiker, the criticism has been made of all four of these bills 
that there is danger in the establishment of such an institution in that 
it might fall in the wrong hands. Do you consider there to be any 
validity to that criticism ? 

Mr. Schweiker. I think the fact that you are putting it directly 
under the President in terms of the appointments, the fact that it is 
bipartisan in nature, and the hope that we would pick the highest 
caliber men for this Commission would negate that viewpoint. I will 
admit it might be a danger, but I think it is a very remote one and I 
think it is one risk we should take because we have done very little in 
this area. 

Mr. IcHORD. Now your bill was the last one to be introduced on this 
subject. I notice that you have omitted the Advisory Committee, nor 
have you provided for a Joint Congressional Freedom Committee as 
one of the other bills provides. Don't you think that there would be 
some necessity for an Advisory Committee to coordinate the activities 


of the various agencies involved in this problem of fighting com- 
munism ? 

(At this point Mr. Schadeberg entered the hearing room.) 

Mr. ScHWEiKER. I can see some logic for an Advisory Committee, 
Dick. My reason for omitting it was that I just did not want to see us 
follow the stereotyped departmental approach of the past. 

I think that too often this has been our thinking, that we channel 
our thinking into either the diplomatic field or the military field. 
And my contention is that this dichotomy is what has defeated us in 
the cold war up to this point, that we think of dealing with the So\det 
Union through diplomacy or through military might, and these fields 
are not where we are getting behind. We are doing all right in these 
two fields. 

The area in between the diplomatic field and the military field is the 
new, uncharted ground, and I have a little concern about putting all 
these formal organizations back into the picture in that maybe we will 
revert to one or the other type of thinking. However, I am not 
strongly opposed to it. 

Mr. IcHORD. Of course, the members of the Commission would be 
independent appointees of the President. 

Mr. ScHWEiKER. That is right. I mean in terms of the Advisory 
Committee, might — in other words, I am trying to get away from 
some of our past departmental thinking, because I feel that this brings 
us back to what I call an inadequate approach through either military 
or diplomatic channels, which the Communists have long ago aban- 
doned and now use any means to gain their ends in the cold war. 

That is why I want to see the Commission independent and why_ I 
did not put that provision in the bill. However, there is some merit in 
the provision. 

Mr. IcHORD. That is all, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. Mr. Chairman, I have one question. 

I think I am correct in the observation that you have omitted the 
paragraph which was found in section 13 of Congressman Herlong's 
bill, which provides that the Committee shall transmit to the Presi- 
dent and to the Congress in January of each year a report containing 
a comprehensive description of plans, programs, and activities of 
the Commission and Academy during the preceding year and its 
recommendations for the improvement of those programs and 

(At this point Mr. Tuck entered the hearing room.) 

(At this point Mr. Willis left the hearing room.) 

Mr. JoHANSEN. I wonder if there was a reason that you omitted 
this annual report requirement, particularly to the Congress? 

Mr. ScHWEiKER. No, sir; I will say if it was omitted it was an 
oversight. I would certainly concur that this should be in there. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. I am glad to hear you say that, because I think 
there is a very important overseeing role for the Congress and I 
think that is the safeguard, one safeguard, against the concern my 
colleague expressed. 

Mr. IcHORD. Well, I believe — if the gentleman will yield — Mr. 
Johansen, he omitted the entire Advisory Committee, and Mr. Her- 
long had the Advisory Committee reporting to Congress rather than 
the Commission, itself. 


Mr. JoHANSEN. Well, and I share your question as to the advisabil- 
ity of omitting the Advisory Committee but, regardless of that, it 
would seem to me imperative, as I am sure is the case with those other 
commissions or independent agencies, that the requirement of the 
report to the Congress be included. 

I think that is a safeguard against the kind of misuse Avhich the 
gentleman has expressed. 

Mr. IcHORD. Definitely so. 

Mr. ScHWEiKER. I w^ould certainly concur with that. This was an 
omission that should be included; a report from the Commission to 

Mr. JoHANSEN. Thank you. 

Mr. Tuck (presiding) . Any further questions, gentler.ien '. 

Mr. ScHADEBERG. No questions. 

Mr. Tuck. We thank you. Do you have anything further to say ? 

Mr. ScHWEiKER. Sir ? 

Mr. Tuck. Did you have any further statement ? 

Mr. ScHWEiKER. Just one or two observations that were not in my 
statement. I think it is significant that there have been approximately 
20 revolutionary overthrows of governments since 1945, and with one 
exception, which I think was Czechoslovakia, in each case the gov- 
ernment in power had the preponderant military power. So here is a 
case where they had the renis of government. They had the military 
power, and yet the Communists through the methods that we are not 
familiar with were able to overthrow 20 governments. 

There has never been one instance of a Communist government being 
overthrown. So I think just the score to date would indicate we have 
a tremendous void and that we have really wasted our efforts by not 
filling it. Also it has been estimated — I am not sure of the reliability 
of this figure — that the Communists have about 100 schools of political 
warfare throughout the world. I do not know if that is quite accurate 
but I am sure it is somewhere in that area. It is rather ironic that they 
have 100 schools to do what we have not yet done and that we, with all 
our schools and universities in the United States, do not yet have one 
school in this field. Maybe that is why we have lost the cold war so 
far as the 20 revolutions are concerned. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. Mr. Chairman, may I just ask one further question? 

Mr. Tuck. Yes, sir. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. One of the things that concerns me is whether this 
can be truly an independent Commission and agency to the point that 
it will carry on its function without the charge by the State Depart- 
ment that it is running contrary to national })olicy. And to put it in 
the simplest terms, if this Commission is developing evidence and 
promulgating the fact that the designs of international communism 
remain unchanged and the State Department decides that this is con- 
tributing to tensions, I think it is tremendously important that this 
agency not be subservient to the current line of the agency to the point 
that it has to say that, after all, communism is getting mellower and 
mellower and we do not want to have tensions anyway, so that it be- 
comes subordinate to the official propaganda line of the Department. 

Mr. Sciiwt:iker. I would certainly concur with you, Mr. Johansen. 
I think that is very important and why the independent nature of this 
Commission is so important. I want to say, though, that we should 


not lose sight of the fact that this is basically a training and research 
group and not operational. 

Mr, JoHANSEN. I understand that. That is important. 

Mr. ScHWEiKER. I think that State might be a little bit unjustified 
in claiming this, because it is not an operational agency, but I agree 
there is a danger that exists here and I certainly concur. 

Mr. JoiiANSEX. Well, we have the distinguished representative of 
the State Department, who has just arrived, so we will let him respond 
to that question. 

Mr. Tuck. Well, we thank you very much, Congressman 

Mr. ScHWEiKER. Thank you. 

Mr. Tuck. ■ — ^f or appearing before this committee. 

Mr. ScH^\^EIKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Tuck. I noticed the arrival of Secretary Harriman and I 
believe he is next on the list. We will be delighted to hear from the 
Secretary at this time. 


Mr. Harriman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the 

If I may speak personally for one moment, this is the first op- 
portunity that I have had to express to you the great sorrow that I 
share in the loss of your former chairman. Congressman Walter. I 
knew him over the years and considered him a friend and shared the 
loss with you. I appreciate the opportunity of recording that in the 
record of your minutes. He was a great patriot. 

Mr. Tuck. Thank you very much. We miss him greatly here on 
this conunittee, not only a very fine patriotic person, but one of the 
most distinguished members in our entire work. 

Mr. Harriman. Mr. Chairman, I have been asked to appear before 
your committee and speak for the Department of Commerce. I 
have a brief statement, a copy of which has been furnished to you 
and the members of the committee, which I shall read, if I may. 

Mr. Tuck. You said the Department of Conunerce. I believe you 
meant the Department of State ? 

Mr. Harriman. The Department of State. I beg your pardon. I 
used to speak for the Department of Commerce. 

I appreciate this opportunity, Mr. Chairman, to present the views 
of the Department of State on the bills pending before this commit- 
tee relating to the establishment of a Freedom Commission and Free- 
dom Academy. 

As the committee knows, the administration last year proposed 
establishment of a National Academy of Foreign Affairs — a proposal 
aimed primarily at improving education and training of many thou- 
sands of officers and employees of the Federal Government who are 
already engaged in work directly affecting foreign affairs and national 

We believe the National Academy of Foreign Affairs proposal is 
the more appropriate and more effective way to accomplish what we 
understand to be the basic objectives which we share with the pro- 
ponents of the Freedom Academy. The administration feels this is 


the better way to help win the cold war and advance our interests 

I have been concerned over the dangers of communism since the 
Bolshevik revolution in Russia. I have had direct experience in deal- 
ing with Cormnunist imperialism — in many forms and m various in- 
ternational and domestic situations — since the twenties. Chairman 
Khrushchev told me when I was in Moscow last summer that "there 
can be no coexistence in ideology; that conflict goes on." Mr. Gro- 
myko confirmed this in his recent speech at the United Nations when 
he said there could be no compromise in ideology. 

We all know that the Communist effort against the free world is 
conducted in many ways, that the developing countries are particu- 
larly vulnerable to Communist penetration, and that these pose a 
massive set of problems for the United States. It is clear that we 
need to train people throughout the Government who can meet these 
problems, indeed all our national security problems, with all the tools 

However, the administration believes the Ffeedom Cormnission 
proposal would not be an effective answer to our present training re- 
quirements. Moreover, it would not provide a practical administra- 
tive setup, in our judgment. 

Wliile the objectives which have moved the sponsors of the Freedom 
Commission are certainly worthy, I would not be helpful to this com- 
mittee if I failed to pinpoint some of our differences in viewpoint and 

First, the Freedom Conunission proposal places great stress upon 
the mobilization of private citizens — domestic and foreign — to fight 
the cold war and upon the systematic indoctrination of our citizens 
against communism. It contemplates that both tasks be undertaken 
on a large scale by the executive branch of the Government. 

The administration believes that in certain circumstances it is useful 
to train U.S. citizens who are not in the Government, as well as foreign 
nationals. But what we need first and most is to improve in all possi- 
ble ways training of Government personnel involved in the conduct 
of foreign affairs. This training should be conducted on an inter- 
departmental basis and should be directly connected with research in 
depth into past successes and failures and possible future courses of 
action in foreign affairs. 

This, the administration now seeks to do, with limited resources at 
the Foreign Service Institute of the State Department and in other 
ways. Establishment of a National Academy of Foreign Affairs 
would greatly improve our current efforts to give advanced training 
to officers of the State Department and the many other Government 
agencies involved with foreign affairs. 

Much of this training, of course, depends on the use of classified 

Certainly, any effective research requires, or is very much assisted 
by, the availability of classified materials. This creates another prob- 
lem with regard to the training of outsiders. 

I think it is obvious that the use of classified materials would be 
impossible if private citizens or noncitizens were to be trained on any 
sizable scale. It is also likely that the freedom of discussion within 
the classroom would^ — and properly should — ^be inhibited by the pres- 
ence of students from even the most closely allied countries. 


Even if this were not a problem, the training of foreign nationals 
on a large scale by the United States Government in a Federal institu- 
tion could be self-defeating. If such students returned home and 
organized anti-Communist movements — as I believe the Freedom 
Academy proponents contemplate — they would be instantly labeled 
"Yankee stooges." In those rare but inevitable cases where they 
returned home and joined the ranks of anti- American subversion, the 
propaganda possibilities for the Communists would be even richer. 

In this respect, let us not forget the Soviet failures to win the minds 
of many of the African students they have tried to indoctrinate at 
Patrice Lumumba University. And, incidentally, I may say they 
have failed in the indoctrination of their own university students, if 
my information is correct — at least, the overwhelming majority of 

Unquestionably, the American educational system is a magnificent 
tool with which to develop an understanding of the fundamental 
hmnan value of freedom. There are 50,000 foreign students now in 
the United States, taking training in a wide variety of specialties, 
in all kinds of American schools. The same is true of the military 
personnel that are over here in our military schools. It is surely 
better to have foreign students in our schools and homes and see 
the way we live, rather than try to indoctrinate them in a Govern- 
ment institution. In this way, freedom has been allowed to speak 
for itself to these people. And freedom is, by definition, its own best 
advocate. That is our strength. It is always a mistake, in my 
opinion, to adopt the methods of the enemies of freedom. 

We have, however, a strong interest to help increase the knowledge 
and capacity of governments and peoples on how to deal effectively 
with Communist tactics in their own countries. These efforts are 
being expanded. In Latin America, for example, we are helping to 
improve the capacity of governments and peoples to deal with gen- 
eral and local Communist infiltration and subversion, both through the 
Organization of American States and through bilateral measures. 
Students and other peoples in that region are becoming increasingly 
able to deal with Communist efforts to control and manipulate them, 
altliough the problem is still unsolved. 

All over the world, we are also helping to strengthen free labor 
unions against communism. In the same way, we are attempting to 
strengthen the youth movements against Communist infiltration. 

If we consider solely the training of private U.S. citizens, the prob- 
lems are somewhat different in nature, but they are equally great. 

The United States Government should and does maintain informal 
links with all sectors of our society. The Department of State, in par- 
ticular, brings leaders from business, labor, and the academic world 
together to discuss foreign policy problems. In these efforts, the 
learning process is an invaluable two-way thing. 

In addition, the Department of State and other agencies of Govern- 
ment produce a steady flow of pamphlets, reports, and other educa- 
tional material which is of great value to the general public. 

Another question raised by tlie bills before you today involves Fed- 
eral control. The Freedom Commission, to quote from PT.R. 852, 
would he "authorized to prepare, make, and publish textbooks and 
•other materials, including training films, suitable for high school. 


college, and community level instruction." The bill further provides 
that the Commission can distribute such material on "such terms and 
conditions as the Commission shall determine." 

This seems to me to be a drastic departure from our traditions of the 
Federal Govermnent's role in the field of education. In all the far- 
ranging controversies over Federal aid to, and responsibility for, edu- 
cation, I have seldom heard even the most zealous proponent of such 
aid recommend that the Federal Government enter the field of text- 
book preparation. I can think of no aspect of education more uni- 
versally regarded as outside the province of the Federal Government 
as the preparation of textbooks. 

It is not the business of the Federal Government to indoctrinate our 
citizens. I fear that such a Freedom Commission would be charged 
with being a tax-supported, federally managed effort at mass indoctri- 

One other aspect of this proposed legislation also disturbs me — • 
the organization of the Freedom Commission. As I read the bills, 
the Commission would be an independent agency of the Government 
with no operational responsibilities. Yet, even training cannot be 
completely divorced from operations, particularly in the crisis-ridden 
field of foreign affairs. Training has to be realistically geared to 
actual day-to-day problems and the needs of the Government, and 
our personnel must have access to classified materials in order to ac- 
complish their job. 

That is veiy briefly, sir, the statement which I have prepared to 
submit to your committee. 

Mr. Tuck. Thank you veiy much, sir. 

As I understand your proposal for the National Academy of For- 
eign Affairs, the principal difference between that and the bills we are 
considering here is that you propose to train people who are already in 
the governmental service, or who are going into the governmental 

Mr. Haeriman. Yes. 

Mr. Tuck. You are opposed to the training of people who are not 
in the Govermnent service or the people who come from foreign 
countries ? 

Mr. Harriman. Of course the admission of specially selected for- 
eign government personnel has not been fully considered in our War 
Colleges. However, in our War Colleges, foreign military students 
from countries who are our allies are admitted and have special train- 
ing, but the principal purpose of the academy that the State Depart- 
ment proposes is to train the Foreign Service officers in the State De- 
partment and officers of all other departments of the Government who 
have contact with foreign affairs. 

They would have access, of course, to classified material and expert 
instruction on the specific problems in which they are engaged and also 
on the specific problems of the day as we face the changing world scene. 
They would have other advantages, of course, in addition to the fight 
on communism, but I, for one, believe that the fight with international 
communism is our major foreign policy problem and attention should 
be given of the highest priority. 

We have also problems of the bringing together the free countries 
for common action, the problems of how to solve issues between na- 


tions that are friendly to us, and the strengthening of the free world 
is an important aspect of the fight against communism. 

We are not the only country fightmg communism. We are one of a 
group of countries that are dedicated to preserve their own freedom 
and to protect freedom in the world. 

Mr. Tuck. To comment on other aspects of your statement, in 
stating my views on it, I might say that I wholeheartedly believe in 
one statement that you made, and that is that I am opposed to the 
Federal Government preparing textbooks to be used in the States. I 
thuik that that is a matter for the States to interpret. I believe that 
it is better to leave the education of our children in the public schools 
to the people of the States. 

Mr. Pool. Mr. Chairman, may I interrupt right along there ? 

Mr. Tuck. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Pool. That is all true, and I agree with you, but on the other 
hand, as I view this problem, we are deciding whether or not we will 
have professionals in the field of political warfare. Of course we do 
have ROTC in the high schools, and things like that. We do have 
the Federal Government that trains our officers in military warfare. 

As I see this problem, it is a little different fi^om the average prob- 
lem on Federal control of education, which I am opposed to. 

I am really kind of surprised at the State Department bringing up 
the argument of Federal control of education, because in most cases 
they would be pushing for more Federal controls. I just wanted to 
make that comment. 

JVIr. Tuck. Do you have any questions ? 

Mr. Harriman. Well, this is only one side. I am glad to hear what 
you say and I am sure you would have felt that way. This is only one 
aspect of the bill which I mention in passing, but it does relate to the 
whole principle of the Federal Govermnent attempting to have an 
indoctrination course for its citizens. It takes on the methods of the 
Soviet Union. They have indoctrmation of all of their citizens, and 
I am very glad to say that the more recent reports indicate that they 
are not able to brainwash this present generation of young people who 
are now in the universities of the Soviet Union. 

Our information may not be accurate, but all we have indicates that, 
although there are some very ardent Communists, there are a great 
many of them who are not impressed and are longing for the kind of 
freedoms that our system provides — the right to read, the right to 
debate, the right to write what they feel like writing, and above all,, 
the right to travel. 

(At this point Mr. Schadeberg left the hearing room.) 

Mr. Pool. Mr. Chairman, may I reply to that ? 

I think that we certainly are not doing all that we can in the field 
of political warfare and I think that is the main purpose of this bill. 
Certainly we are going to have to use revolutionary and new ideas, and 
if we copy the Soviets on this point, it is all right with me. 

I will copy them or add to it or use our own imagination to try to 
improve on it and come out with a better system, but I think it is so 
important that we do get into this problem and come up with some- 
thing that is a practical approach. 

Mr. PIarriman. Well, Congressman Pool, I fully agree that we are 
not doing everything we can do. There is great room for improve- 

30-471— 64— pt. 2 2 


ment. I have been involved in this thing since I came back from the 
Soviet Union in 1945. I said we were going to have problems with 
the Soviet Union. In fact, I said our objectives were irreconcilable. 

At that time, there was a wave of enthusiasm in the country for our 
allies and I was considered an outcast. I have been considered an out- 
cast on many occasions and if this committee considers me one, I am 
soriy, but I am a professional in this business and I have been at it 
for many, many years. And I do not think, sir, that this Freedom 
Academy is the right way to go about fighting communism. 

(At this point Mr. Schadeberg returned to the hearing room.) 

Mr. Harriman. We have a series of programs to train individuals 
for particular purposes, and also foreign individuals. I talked yes- 
terday to our Police Academy, which brings the heads or senior men 
of police forces from different countries. Not only do we train them 
on how to organize and maintain law and order in a democracy, but 
also how to deal with internal subversion. It is a very effective 

I am only mentioning that as one case. There were 30-odd senior 
men in the police departments of a number of different countries in 
the group yesterday, and they are gaining a great deal from the course. 

I think you have got to shoot with a rifle on specific problems, 
particularly because Communist methods are changing. They are 
learning from their own mistakes, and I am satisfied, myself, that the 
competition between Peiping and Moscow will lead to greater effort 
on the part of the two of them in order to make an impression upon 
the Communist international movement. 

So, sir, I do not bow to anyone in my determination to do every- 
thing I can as an individual, or to sponsor anything the Government 
can do, which I think contributes to the battle against communism 
in the world. 

Mr. Pool. If this Freedom Academy bill is passed and it becomes 
a fact, what would you say would be the attitude of the State De- 
partment about cooperating with the Freedom Academy ? 

Mr. Harriman. Well, the State Department works for the United 
States Government. There is no group of men and women in the 
United States Government service that works more loyally for the 
Government of the United States than the Foreign Service. They 
work as loyally for Kepublicans as for Democrats. They are trained 
that way. I have worked with them intimately, although I have 
never been part of the Foreign Service. 

I have worked intimately with the State Department Foreign Serv- 
ice and I do not know any group of Americans in the United States 
that is any more loyal to the decisions of the Government. Obviously, 
when you are working for the Government, you have to accept deci- 
sions the Government makes. You may not always agree the decisions 
are a hundred percent in accordance with what you would like to see 
done. But you learn, before you work very long in Government serv- 
ice, that you can contribute and be loyal to the Government only if 
you conform not only to the laws but also to the direction of the Presi- 
dent of the United States and whomever he delegates to have charge 
of the work that you are doing. 

So, you need not question, need not give a moment's thought about, 
the loyalty with which the State Depa.-tment will carry out laws that 
are passed. 


Mr. Pool. Well, we must have that cooperation or there would not 
be any point to passing the bill, and I appreciate what you have just 
said. I think it is very commendable that the State Department has 
that attitude. 

Mr. Harriman. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. Mr, Chairman. 

Mr. Tuck. Mr. Johansen. 

Mr. Johansen. I notice, Mr. Secretary, you point out that the 
State Department in particular brings leaders from business, labor, 
and the academic world to the Government to discuss foreign policy 
problems. I notice you testified that the Department of State and 
other agencies of Government produce a steady flow of pamphlets, 
reports, and other educational material which is of great use to the 
general public. I notice you also referred to the activities of the 
Department m cooperation with the labor unions in some of the Latin 
American countries and you refer to their work with youth groups. 

Now, I also notice your repeated references to the fact that it is 
not the business of the Federal Government to indoctrinate our citi- 
zens. Mr. Secretary, what is indoctrination ? 

Mr. Harkiman, Well, indoctrination, I would define it — I have not 
given it the widest thought and I hope you will not try to trip me up 
on it 

Mr. Johansen. Nobody is trying to trip you up, Mr. Secretary. 

Mr. Harkiman. Indoctrination would be that what the Communists 
do is to get a gi'oup of people together and try to instill into them pre- 
conceived ideas. I believe that our system in America, the strength of 
our system, is freedom of discussion. To bring together a group of 
private citizens of a f ormable age and attempt to indoctrinate them in 
particular Government ideas and methods is improper. We do not 
know who these five men running the Freedom Commission would 
be. They would be five people who would decide what courses would 
be given. I seriously question whether any five men should be given 
the right to determine what the Government uses. 

Mr. Johansen. Well, let me say, Mr. Secretary, that I know of 
nothing in this bill that says that this Connnission is to engage in in- 
doctrination. It is to engage in infonnation and in training regarding 
Communist methods, Communist ideology, Communist goals. 

I just reject the premise that the purpose of this is indoctrination. 
I also reject the premise that the State Department does not ever 
attempt to sell its viewpoints and its position through these various 
media which you yourself testified to. I fail to see where the concept 
of indoctrination gets into this discussion at all. 

Mr. IIarri3Ian. Well, sir, don't you think it is quite a different thing 
to bring free people of different gi'oups together here and have 50, 100. 
200, or 300 sit down and spend 1 day, 2 days, sometimes a week here, 
seeing everybody? They have a free discussion, they ask questions, 
and there is an exchange among themselves as well as with Government 
officials. They are people who are in one way or another interested in 
foreign affairs. 

()bviousl3^ in a democracy, foreign affairs policies must be based on 

popular support, and the only way you can get that support is by or 
through the normal democratic processes — the statements of the Presi- 
dent, the speeches, the statements of members of the Cabinet, the state- 


ments of the Members of the Congress who are in support, and the us& 
of the press, radio, and television. 

But these are discussions in a most democratic way. The people are 
not brought behind closed doors with a group of high-powered instruc- 
tors attempting to indoctrinate them in any particular line of action. 
The problems are put before them along with the manner in which the 
State Department is attempting to deal with them. I find that, by and 
large, the discussions are useful, and, as I have said in my testimony, 
it is a two-way street. Although I think that the members of the 
Foreign Service are very well versed by and large on international 
affairs, they live abroad, I think contact with the American public is 
one of the most important aspects of their continuing effectiveness. 

Mv. JoHANSEN. Well, Mr. Secretaiy, is there any reason why in the 
functioning and operations of the Freedom Academy there would not 
be opportunity for free discussion and for questions and the veiy type 
of process you are describing ? 

Do you regard it, Mr. Secretary, as indoctrination to infonn and 
document to the students of this Academy the declarations of the Com- 
mmiist program and objectives, the pronouncements of Marx and 
Lenin and Mr. Khrushchev as to their objectives ? 

Do you regard that as indoctrination ? 

Mr. Harriman. No, I do not. I have been rather advanced in the 
idea. You know, there was a time when we took all Marxian works out 
of all the school libraries. At least, some people attempted to do it, 
and I was utterly opposed to it. I thought that there was nothing more 
un-American than to censor our libraries. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. Well, do you 

Mr. Harriman. Let me just finish, sir. I have listened to you, sir. 

I have stated vei-y strongly that I thought high schools should be 
encouraged to have courses to explain to the students what the objec- 
tives of communism are by teachers who understand their evil and 
danger to freedom and I think that is the way to get an informed 
public opinion. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. Couldn't that Academy help train the teachers to 
become qualified instructors in that veiy area ? 

Mr. Harriman. Well, you can set up any school for the training of 
teachers, but I feel it is not the United States Government's job to train 
teachers in this country. I think our educational system should not 
be directed by the Federal Government. 

I was very strongly for Federal aid to education as Governor of the 
State of New York and I know something about the educational prob- 
lems of even a rich State like New York. I also think very strongly 
that nothing the Federal Government could do would advance the 
interests of our country more than by helping all the States, particu- 
larly the States that have limited means, to improve the educational 
system. But I very strongly am for not only leaving the curriculum 
to the States but leaving it, as far as is practical, to the local school 
boards. I think that is the strength of our democracy, sir. 

And I would not be in favor of an institution which tried to train- 

Mr. JoHANSEN. I understand, and I am just anxious to get your 
thinking in the thing, and appreciate it, but would you feel differently 
about this Academy if it were totally a nongovernmental operation 
enlisting the aid of 


(At this point Mr. AYillis returned to the hearing room.) 

Mr. Hawuman. No, I think it would not be a Federal Government 
affair if it were attaclied to one of the great universities, or if the Gov- 
ernment encouraged this type of research and this type of study in 
other universities around the country. 1 would think that would be 
helpful to education throughout the country. 

But I would not like to see such an academy directed by the 

Mr. JoHANSEN. I want to be sure I understand you, Mr. Secretary. 
You would not oppose this program if it were vokmtary or if it were 
connected with a university or something of that kind. 

Mr. HARRiarAiS". If it was part of the general aid to institutions of 
learning around the countr}^ and if it was left to the local authorities 
in those institutions to develop the program. 

]\Ir. JoiiANSEN. Now, I have one other question, Mr. Chairman. 
Am I to understand that you think it is important to Americans and 
to all free peoples to have a greater diffusion of knowledge with regard 
to the literature and the ideology of the Communist leaders, such as 
Lenin and Stalin and Khrushchev ? 

Now, before you answer that, I ask you the question particularly 
because of a statement attributed to you by Time magazine August 
2 of last year, in which j^ou said, or are reported to have said — and 
I will be glad to have it corrected if it is in error — 

I'm not a great Kremlinologist ; I don't go off in a padded cell and read the 
literature. I can't tell you what Lenin or Stalin or Khrushchev said on a given 
date. But I think I have a certain feeling for the place and for what goes on. 

Now, do you feel it is important that there be a thorough familiar- 
ization of the free peoples and of their civilian leadership in this 
country and in other free nations with the teachings and doctrines 
of Lenin and Stalin and Khrushchev just as it was important, and 
mifortunately was not done, that there was a full understanding of 
Mein Kam-pf and what Mr. Hitler prounomiced? 

Mr. Harriman. Mr. Congressman, may I comment on that state- 
ment that you read from Time? 

Mr. JoHANSEN. Surely. 

Mr. Harriman. I recall making some statement of that kind at some 
press conference or when some correspondent came and interviewed 
me, and I have often said it. A fellow who is a Kremlinologist is 
a man I respect very much, such as some of the university profes- 
sors who are dedicating their lives to, or others conducting research 
toward, a thorough understanding of the ideological developments 
in Moscow and at Peiping and the differences that develop. 

These studies are very important, and so is the literature the scholars 
produce ; and, as far as I can, I try to keep in touch with it. But I 
think I said it a little bit more humbly than I am alleged to have 

I am not a Kremlinologist. I have not spent my life trying to 
analyze eveiy statement that is made and to show the detailed de- 
velopments. But since the early twenties I have been very much in- 
volved in a study of the Communist movement in the world. I have 
a feeling for it and I think that has been the reason why I have been 
right in many of the positions that I have taken, in indicating how 
we ought to fight the developments of the Communist movement. 


This movement is not monolitliic. It is not rigid. It is a changing- 
scene with developments, and if we attempt to deal with it in a rigid 
way, we will miss the target. 

Now, the other side of your question related to the question of 
whether the American people should be informed about commmiism. 
I feel very strongly that they should. As I have said, I have ad- 
vocated — at a time when it was thought to be unwise to have even 
Karl Marx's books available to students— that our high school stu- 
dents should be taught by competent teachers who are opposed to 
Marxist philosophy, m order that they may be able to deal with it. 

But I am very much impressed, sir. I followed some of these youth 
meetings, you know. There have been several in the last few years, 
and our American youngsters have stacked up with the Communist- 
indoctrinated yomigsters at those meetings and taken them over the 
coals and, I thought, had the best of the debate. 

Now, they developed that knowledge through our American free 
educational system and they were not indoctrinated by the Govern- 
ment, and I thought they did a job. I was very proud of them. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. Well, I just want to say in conclusion that I again 
reject the premise that this program calls for indoctrination. I think 
it calls for the most vital form of information. 

Mr. ScHADEBERG. Will the gentleman yield ? 

Mr. JoHANSEN. That is all. I yield the floor. 

Mr. Harriman. Well, may I simply say, I am not going to argue 
about the word "indoctrination." I am just against the Federal Gov- 
ernment in direct charge of the education of our people. I think that, 
in our free society, education ought to be disseminated and be a re- 
sponsibility which should be carried on in the American tradition, sir. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. "Education," in quotes. 

Mr. SoHADEBERG. Mr. Chairman, sir. 

The Chairman. All right. 

Mr. ScHADEBERG. I would like to make it clear, Mr, Secretary, that 
it is not a matter of whether you or any other member of the State 
Department or the Congress is more interested in fighting communism 
than the others. I work on the premise that we are all Americans, and 
we have had, and I am sure that we do have, a difference of opinion as to 
how to best serve the cause of freedom. I think it is good that we 
should be able to discuss it. Now, I am interested in this word "in- 
doctrination." You suggest that we should not indoctrinate. Would 
you not think that the Communists indoctrinate ? That the Conmiu- 
nists have free discussion in their indoctrination schools ? 

Mr. Harriman. No. 

Mr. ScHADEBERG. They allow a discussion? 

Mr. Harriman. They have a certain amount of discussion, but it is 
not free in our sense. They argue about their ideology much in the 
same way as it used to be in the early days of the development of 
religion as to how many anglels could dance on the head of a pin. 

I do not mean to be facetious about it, because I have great respect 
for the religious development of our country and tlie free world and I 
believe that religion is one of the strongest forces against commu- 
nism. Th€y do have ideological discussions, but no one is allowed 
to question the fundamental doctrme. 


Mr. ScHADEBERG. Woiild jou suggest, Mr. Secretaiy, that in dis- 
cussing these matters or in the schools, whether it be in the Freedom 
Academy or any other place, that we should not put stress on and try 
to indoctrinate people for the cause of freedom? 

Mr. Harriman. Well, I think it is a question of whether you are 
talking about education or indoctrination. Perhaps I misused the 
word "indoctrination." I haven't a dictionary here, but we generally 
use it — or at least I have been accustomed to using it in terms of a 
type of brainwashing. Perhaps that is too extreme — ^but I mean the 
type of effort that the Communists make to impose upon their students 
thought control by constant repetition, constantly keeping away from 
the discussion the various other influences, and attempting to achieve 
a prescribed and preconceived objective. 

Our educational S3^stem has a freedom about it, and Ave do not believe 
the system of indoctrination which the Soviets follow and the other 
Communist states is the kind of thing that we want to adopt. 

Now, on the word "indoctrination." I haven't looked it up in the 
dictionary. I will be glad to submit a little memorandum on the sense 
in which I use it. I do not know that we need quilDble so over a word, 
because I am sure that we both have the same objective of fighting 
communism. Of course, the problem is how you do it. 

(Secretary Harriman's letter clarifying his use of the word "indoc- 
trinate" follows:) 

Undeb Secretary of State 

FOR Political Affairs, 
Washington, March 4, 196 'f. 
The Honorable Edwin E. Willis, 
Chairman, Committee on Un-American Activities, 
House of Representatives. 

Dear Mr. Chairman : When I testified before your committee on February 20, 
I promised to clarify my use of the word "indoctrinate." I find that the Web- 
ster's International Dictionary gives the following definitions : 

(1) To instruct in the rudiments or principles of learning, of a branch of learn- 
ing ; to instruct (in) , or imbue ( with) , as principles or doctrines ; 

(2) Sometimes, in a derogatoi"y sense, to imbue with an opinion or with a 
partisan or sectarian point of view. 

Obviously I was using the term in the secondary dictionary sense. I think 
you will agree that this is the accepted usage in international politics. 
With my kind regards. 

/s/ W. Averell Harriman, 
W. Averell Harriman. 

Mr. ScHADEBERG. I liavB uo doubt of that, Mr. Secretary, but 

Mr, Harriman. And the question is whether you have a place 
where there is concentrated attention, in the Federal Government, or 
whether you leave the job of education of our public to the non- 
Federal educational system. 

Now, when it comes to educating the servants of the American 
Government, the people who work for it in the field of foreign affairs, 
why, I believe that tliere should be instruction in fighting commu- 

I also believe that we should do all we can, and we are doing it in 
many ways, through our AID organization and in many other ways. 
Through our embassies and in other ways, we are atternpting to 
bring the right kind of infonnation to the people of foreign coun- 


tries. We do this through our USIA and through special courses of 
training; for example, as I mentioned, training police officials who 
have the responsibility for developing a police system which not only 
can keep law and order in a democracy, but also can rout out the 
rats that are involved in the subversive activity in these coimtries. 

Now^, these are hitting the problem with a rifle shot rather than a 
shotgun blast. What I don't like about this bill is the general ap- 
proach to try to have the Federal Government — I don't know a better 
word than indoctrinate — but try to get the Federal Government to 
enter the held of education. I would much prefer to see the energies 
of the Government develop the right kind of education for those who 
work for the Govermiient, both on the civilian and the military end, 
and also to contribute to our educational system so that it may give a 
rounded education in the whole range of subjects which will produce 
effective citizens. 

I earnestly believe, sir, as you do, that a knowledge of communism 
is an important aspect of the education of young people and is an 
important part of the training that they need in order to understand 
the problems of the day. 

Mr. ScHADEBERG. Where we may have a little difference of opin- 
ion is the fact that if we consider the hot war as a means by which 
the Government — as you say, the police, it would be military — teaches 
them how to use the tools in fighting a hot war, are not ideas weapons 
in the hands of people to fight the cold war ? 

And why should we not also have an opportunity to teach these, to 
put these tools in the liands of our people ? 

Mr. Harriman. I would rather see it, sir, done by a normal educa- 
tional institution, rather than of a special Academy here to teach our 
American youth. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. Who is going to train the teachers? 

Mr. Harriman. Well, we have universities that have extremely 
good departments which are extremely well versed in eveiy aspect of 
Communist activity in the Soviet Union and other countries. The 
trainmg of teachers in communism can be readily achieved through 
existing institutions, particularly if those institutions are given 
enough money to expand their activities in all fields of education. 

Mr. Schadeiberg. I would like to make this one comment, Mr. Chair- 
man, for the record, and that is that it seems to me — and, of course, I 
am a layman in this, too — that one of our failures in fighting effectively 
against conunmiism is that we, under the guise of so-called tolerance 
or academic freedom or whatever you want to call it, that we give 
communism equal status with freedom and I think that communism 
does not have it. 

They say that Leninism, the Marxist state is certainly a superior 
state. I cannot personally see anything wrong in saying that freedom 
is right and it has a greater status than Marxism. 

Mr. Harrimaist. I hope I was responding to what Congressman 
Johansen was saying. Obviously, we do not want to teach communism 
as a virtue. We want to expose it in our educational system. But you 
know, it is an interesting thing. I believe I am right in saying that 
the educational system in Russia has failed in one of its most important 
objectives. We have got to recognize it has been extraordinarily effec- 
tive in taking a nation that in 1917 was 80 or 85 percent illiterate and 


educating the people so there is now a veiy low rate of illiteracy in the 
Soviet Union. They have developed, as you know, very skillful sci- 
entists and technicians, but with it all, throughout all that system, they 
practice indoctrination of the Communist ideology and that is ham- 
mered, hammered, hammered, into the youth. 

And it was supposed to be that when this new generation emerged, 
it would be so indoctrinated with communism that it would be amen- 
able to the leaders. Now, I am told — I cannot give you convincing 
evidence — that among the universities there are, of course, certain 
people who are very, very vigorous Communists, but that the rank 
and file of the students are interested in the broad educational subjects. 
They want to have the freest kind of discussion. They resent the fact 
that books from the free world are not available, that they are not able 
to write as they wish and discuss things as they wish. And above 
all, as I say, they want to travel. Now, this is the type of indoc- 
trination that I think is a failure. 

Now, I think our freedom, freedom itself, use of the free system, 
is the way to convince people that that is the proper system to be 
adopted. But I have been constantly fighting what some people call 
"taking on the face of the enemy," adopting the methods of total- 
itarianism in order to fight totalitarianism. 

Mr. ScHADEBERG. Well, I would agree with vou, Mr. Secretary, on 

Mr. Harriman. I w^ould hope that this committee could concentrate 
on ways and means to help our general educational system reach all 
of the people in our country and have them understand communism. 
I do not think that there would be such opposition to foreign aid if 
the people understood where the Communist movement was going. 

Wlien I was in Moscow in 1945, I reported to the Government, to 
the President of the United States, that I did not think UNERA 
was enough. I said Stalin would take over Western Europe if we did 
not give the people living there in the chaos of the postwar period 
a chance to have working capital to buy raw materials and get their 
factories moving. 

I did not realize at that time, of course, that the Marshall plan 
would be as ambitious a program as it was, or that we would go on 
and develop NATO, but I did point out that Stalin wanted to take 
over Western Europe. In my opinion, if it had not been for the 
Marshall plan and NATO, Western Europe would be dominated by 
communism today, just as Eastern Europe is. 

We were successful in turning Stalin back. Now it is perfectly 
plain from what Mr. Khiiishchev says that the new battle against 
communism is in the undeveloped countries. And yet there are strong 
opinions held by people in some quarters, including Capitol Hill, that 
our foreign aid program is not the way to fight communism. Well, 
I believe it is, and I think that should be stated very firmly and 

It is not the only thing. Our political policies, the way we treat our 
friends and allies around the world, our information service, the 
manner in which we exchange students — the way we bring them 
over here and how we deal with them, are vitally important. But 
unless the people of the world can get some improvement of their 


lot, can move toward freedom, there is an evidence that they will 
turn to the false promises of communism. 

I would like to see the widest discussion of the foreign aid pro- 
gram and what its objectives are, and I would hope that this com- 
mittee would see that there was wider discussion of the program. 

I would be very glad to testify before the Un-American Activities 
Committee and discuss what countries should get support for the 
battle against communism, in which I have been involved since 1945. 

The Chairman. Well, Mr. Secretary, I am sorry I had to be 
away when you appeared — and I apologize for that — so I cannot 
undertake too much examination on your statement, which I did 
not hear. But two questions occur to me. I have been impressed 
and have listened carefully to your argument against indoctrination. 

Actually, I have before me here the bill we are considering and 
also the National Academy of Foreign Affairs proposal introduced 
by Mr. Hays, on request, which is known as H.R. 3668. The 
bill we are considering contains the language that the Conunission 
"shall establish under its supervision and control an advanced re- 
search, development, and training center." 

The language of the National Academy of Foreign Affairs bill 
provides for "the establishment of an institution at which training, 
education, and research * * * may be undertaken." 

I do not find such vast difference in language. Why would one be 
indoctrination, using the term as you have used it, and the other 

Mr. Harriman. I do not fully understand your question, sir. I 
am a little bit deaf, sir, and so I did not quite hear your question ; but 
if I understood it correctly, the National Academy which has been 
proposed is the result of a very prominent group of people studying 
the need for it. Dr. James A. Perkins was chairman of the group. 
He was with the Carnegie Foundation and now is the president of 
Cornell. A committee headed by former Secretary of State Herter 
made similar recommendations. The National Academy of Foreign 
Affairs, which the Perkins and Herter committees and the administra- 
tion proposed, we believe, is the best place to carry on research and to 
concentrate on training those people working for the Government 
who have contact with international problems. 

The Chairman. Well, my question was why, from any point of 
view, would one be indoctrination and the other not, when . the 
language in the two bills is practically the same ? 

Mr. Harriman. Well, this is a question of indoctrination of the 
public, rather than taking mature people and training them to deal 
with the problems that our Government faces m its relations abroad. 
The manner in which we can concentrate our research in this 
Academy would be of greater value. They would have access to 
classified material. They could study the past mistakes and the past 
successes and what can be achieved. 

The Chapman. But that would be indoctrination, though, in the 
same context; would it not? 

Mr. Harriman. Wliat ? 

The Chairman. My question still remains the same: Wliy, the 
language of the bills being practically the same, can it be said that, 
under one approach, we would have indoctrination and, under the 


other, we would not? I do not think you have faced that issue. I 
am not pressing you, you understand. 

Mr. Harriman. Well, before you came in. Chairman Willis, we 
had an interesting, perhaps academic, discussion of the meaning 
of the word "indoctrination." I was using the word "indoctrmation" 
in the form in which the Communists attempt to indoctrinate their 
people. That I think we all understand. 

They indoctrinate their people. Maybe the word "indoctrination" 
is the wrong one, but, sir, we believe that to achieve the objectives 
that you have in mind, one of the steps is to support the proposal 
for a National Academy of Foreign Affairs. 

Now, that is not the only answer. It is only one more of the po- 
tential activities of the Government, and I think there are other activ- 
ities of Government which could help the educational system of our 
country. But I would not like to see private citizens brought here 
in large groups to deal with communism as one subject at an Academy 
bemg run by five men who are not part of the Government machinery. 
And I would much prefer to see our educational system of the public 
be left in the hands, as it now is, of the local authorities. 

The Chairman. Well, of course, what you say there is incon- 
testible. I have not been an advocate of even Federal aid to educa- 
tion, so I am not in disagreement with you on that. 

Mr. Harriman. I am, sir, if I may say so. I am very strongly for 
Federal aid to education. 

The Chairman. I know, and I also vote for a lot of things that 
you are probably for, too. 

Mr. Harriman. I respect your views. 

The Chairman. But I was trying to find out, very honestly, in m n- 
swer to the second question: Why could one be characterized and 
labeled "indoctrination" and not the other? 

Mr. Harriman. Well, shall we drop the word "indoctrination" and 
try to paraphrase it ? I feel that the education and training of Govern- 
ment employees is a perfectly appropriate function. We have military 
men who train experts in their field and we should have civilian per- 
sonnel in our Government trained in all aspects of our foreign prob- 
lems and particularly with the most important of all, which is how 
to deal with the cold war. 

The Chairman. Well, let me say, sir 

Mr. Harriman. But the other question is, as I understand the pro- 
posal, the emphasis on the Government's getting into the business of 
educating private citizens. And that is what I am expressing opposi- 
tion to. 

The Chairman. Yes, I understand, and a while ago you used the 
words "people of maturity" as compared to those of immaturity. I 
do not know that that is justified, but I am quite sure at least the intent 
of the authors of these bills is to use quite mature people as a student 

Mr. Harriman. When I was 17 years old, I thought I was mature, 
so perhaps we had better not go into that. 

The Chairman. But you see, you have been using the word "stu- 
dents." I think we should talk about participants. Those could be 
very mature — labor leaders, management, professionals. We are not 
talking about high school students or even college students in the 
sense that I think you have been referring to them. 


Mr. Harriman. Mr. Chairman, I did not come here to attempt to 
score debating points on members of the committee and I don't care 
whether debating points are scored on me, as long as I can attempt to 
get across what my basic convictions are. 

I think the National Academy, as contemplated by the proposed 
legislation which was the resnlt of a studious group, would be an im- 
portant addition to our training of men — and when I use the word 
"mature," I am talking about men in the middle of their careers — in 
making them more effective in this fight. 

There are other things that should be done, other educational activi- 
ties which should be expanded, but I do not agree w^ith the idea that 
it is the Government's job to bring in private citizens and have them 
trained by — let's forget the word "indoctrinated" — trained by a Com- 
mission which is not responsible to our Government, nor is it respon- 
sible to the local communities. 

The Chairman. I want you to understand, sir, that I am not an 
author of the bill. I am trying to get the facts. My mind is com- 
pletely open on this proposal. 

May I suggest this? Would it remove any of your opposition if the 
student body would be limited to Government employees and foreign 
nationals ? 

Mr. Harriman. Well, I think the Government employees can be 
better dealt with through the proposal that we have made, that has 
been made after a considerable study by distinguished citizens who 
are skilled in education, including the former Secretary of State, Mr. 
Herter. I think that it is a better formula. I think that manj^ of the 
objectives as described in the Freedom Academy bills are more or 
less parallel with the objectives that are specified for the National 
Academy of Foreign Affaire, so it is a question of machinery. And 
I think that the general setup, the manner in which the National 
Academy of Foreign Affairs would be operated, is wiser than the 
setup that is proposed by these four bills, all of which, I under- 
stand, provide for an independent group. 

Mr. Ichord. Will the chairman yield ? 

The Chairman. Well, I understand your views. I am not debat- 
ing. I just want to read from the record — since you included a num- 
ber of people Avho played a part in the formulation and final language 
of the National Academy approach — the authors, on the Senate side, 
of one of these Freedom Academy bills. They cut across political 
lines and their views toward foreign aid obviously vary. 

For instance, among the authors are Senators Mundt, Douglas, Case, 
Dodd, Smathers, Goldwater, Proxmire, Fong, Hickenlooper, Miller, 
Keating, Lausche, and Scott. 

So there is quite an array of responsible ])eople behind this ap- 
proach, too. And I myself do not want to belabor the point, Mr. 
Secretary, or debate with you or cross-examine you. I just wanted 
to have these facts in the record. 

Mr. IcHORD. Will the chairman yield for a question on that ? 

Mr. Harj^iman. Mr. Chairman, may I bring out the fact that 
the bill which the Department has testified in favor of is proposed 
also by a cross section of members of both parties. May I read them, 


The Chairman. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Harriman. Mr. Syming-ton, Mr. Saltonstall, Mr. Bayh, Mr. 
Boggs, Mr. Byrd of West Virginia, Mr. Clark, Mr. Engle, Mr. Gruen- 
ing, Mr. Humphrey, Mr. Inouye, Mr. Long of Missouri, Mr. Mansfield, 
Mr. McGee, Mr. Moss, Mrs. Neuberger, Mr. Kandolph, Mr. Kibicoff, 
Mr. Smathers, Mr. Williams of New Jersey, Mr. Yarborough, Mr. 
Monroney, Mr. Fong, Mr. Hart, Mr. Mclntyre, Mr. Brewster, Mr. 
Javits, and Mr. Camion. 

The Chairman. It looks like Mr. Smathers is on both sides, which 
shows, I suppose, that we are all trying to get at the same thing. 
And that is why we are having these hearings — to get at it. 

Mr. Harriman. Yes. Of course, sir, I came here to express my 
strong belief that this committee can make a contribution to this 
all-important question, and I only hope that it will direct its efforts 
in the direction which I think will be most effective. But it is up to 
this committee, in its wisdom, to decide what it wants to recommend ; 
and as I had testified before you came in, the State Department will 
conform to, and work with, whatever Congress passes and the Presi- 
dent approves. 

Mr. IcHORD. Would the chairman yield for a question on that point ? 

The Chairman. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Ichord. As to the matter of why the Secretary thinks one would 
be indoctrination and the other would not be, I would like to point out 
that on page 7 of the National Academy of Foreign Affairs bill, there 
is also permitted the authority to — subsection (c) reads on page 7, 
line 16, "permit other persons, including individuals who are not 
citizens of the United States, to receive training or education or to 
perform research at the Academy," so apparently the National Acad- 
emy of Foreign Affairs would also permit the training of private 
citizens as well as foreign nationals. 

Mr. Harriman. Yes, sir. 

Mr. IcHORD. So I do not see 

Mr. Harriman. Yes, sir, that is true. In our National War Col- 
leges — as you know, we have six War Colleges — we have carefully 
selected the men from other countries who would gain by the partici- 
pation. At the National Academy, presumably, there would be care- 
fully selected foreign personnel who would profit from the general 

Mr. IcHORD. Then I take it the objection 

Mr. Harriman. Now, may I say that the National Academ^^ would 
be primarily for Government employees and not for private citizens in 
large numbers, whereas I understood that under the Freedom Academy 
proposal there would be very large numbers of private citizens from all 
countries. The bill we have been supporting would relate to Govern- 
ment employees and would make it possible, therefore, to deal with 
classified material. 

Mr. IcHORD. Then I take it the objection of the Secretary is to who 
is going to nm the Academy, or the Academy of Foreign Affairs, 
rather than the training. You yourself would object to the training 
of private citizens in large numbers. 

Mr, Harriman. In large numbers, yes. I would rather leave it to 
the States, to our normal educational system. You know, there was 
a general impression at one time after the war that it was a mistake to 


let any young people read Karl Marx or any literature that related to 
communism. I am glad to see that that idea is waning and that it is 
now recog-nized as important for the young people of our country to 
imderstand the Commmiist menace by becoming more familiar with it. 

Mr. IcHORD. Well, I would point out to the Secretary, Mr. Chairman, 
that under the terms of the Boggs bill and the Taft bill and one of the 
other bills only foreig-n nationals would be admitted that have been 
approved by the Secretary of State. 

Mr. Harriman. That is correct. And carefully screened. 

Similarly, we have six military colleges, specializing on different 
problems, and all of them have a certain number of carefully selected 
foreign officers and also nonmilitary Government officers. 

Mr. Pool. Mr. Chairman, I have one question. 

The Chairman-. All right. 

Mr. Pool. Was the National Academy bill that you are in favor of 
proposed after the Freedom Academy idea first came forth ? 

Mr. Harriman. Well, I have forgotten how long ago it started, but 
I do know that this committee that Dr. Perkins was chairman of 
worked for several months. There was another committee which 
former Secretary Herter was chairman of. The idea has been studied 
over quite a number of years, but I can't tell you for exactly how long. 
I will be glad to find out just when these studies in the State Depart- 
ment began and put it in the record. 

(The information furnished by Secretary Harriman follows:) 

The State Department subsequently reported that plans for creation of a 
National Academy of Foreign Affairs to improve upon and supersede the Foreign 
Service Institute were first formalized early in 1962. The President's Advisory 
Panel on a National Academy of Foreign Affairs headed by Dr. James A. Perkins 
was created in June 1962. Dr. Perkins' panel submitted its report to President 
Kennedy on December 17, 1962. 

The Committee on Foreign Affairs Personnel, of which Secretary Herter was 
chairman, was established in August 1961. The Committee submitted its report 
to the Secretary of State in December 1962. 

Mr. Harriman. Incidentally, the State Department has today a less 
adequate form of trying to achieve the same objective in its present 
Foreign Service Institute. We have also a brief course for senior 
officers and middle-level officers, specifically in counterinsurgency. It 
lasts 4 to 5 weeks. I have spoken to it on four or five occasions and 
have followed it very carefully. That is a new, more recent addition 
to the training. They concentrate on countersubversion, believing 
that that activity is increasing in a number of the underde\^eloped 
coimtries and that our Foreign Service officers should be thoroughly 
schooled and trained in that field. 

This Institute includes officers from the Military Establishment as 
well as officers from the State Department, from AID and USIA, 
all those that are involved in the cold war in the field. 

Mr. Pool. The point has been made that 

Mr. Harriman. And these are courses that go on, sir, month after 
month, with TO to 90 officers at a time taking those courses. _ It is very 
effective, I think, and a useful addition to the normal training they 
have had, bringing them up to date with the changing Communist 
methods and the changing Communist scene. 


Mr. Pool. The point has been made that the National Academy bill 
was introduced as a defensive way of fighting this Freedom Academy 
bill. Do you have any comment on that ? 

Mr. Harpjman. I wouldn't think that was true at all, sir. I think 
it was a development over a period of years which finally found its 
shape in this bill which was introduced by the members of the Senate 
and House that I mentioned. 

The Chairman. May I ask one final question, sir? Because I do 
not know what direction this committee will go in the handling of 
this legislation. 

The Freedom Academy bill, as you probably know, contains provi- 
sion for an Advisory Committee to the Academy, and that Advisory 
Committee would be composed of a representative of the Department 
of State ; the Department of Defense ; the Department of Health, Edu- 
cation, and Welfare; the Central Intelligence Agency; the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation; the Agency for International Development; 
and the United States Information Agency. And it goes on to provide 
that this Advisory Committee will itself have a chairman and meet 
periodically with the Commission, and make recommendations and 
consult with the Commission, and I paraphrase the bill, with regard to 
plans, programs, and activities of the Commission, and so on. That, 
at least, is a good provision ; is it not ? 

Do you feel that we have to go in that direction? Could you en- 
large on that, perhaps? Would that be a proper linkage with the 
Federal Government, I mean, the State Department, and so on ? Be- 
cause the very purpose of the Advisory Committee, as stated in that 
section, is "to assure effective cooperation between the Freedom Acad- 
emy and various Government agencies concerned with its objectives." 

Mr. Harriman. Well, I am opposed to the purpose of the Freedom 
Academy. Therefore, I do not think that it is wise for any of these 
agencies of Government to be involved in the education of large masses 
of private citizens. It is appropriate for them to control the educa- 
tion of those in Government service, but I do not think it is appropri- 
ate for a Federal Government body to control the education of masses 
of private American citizens. 

The Chairman. Any questions ? 

Mr. IcHORD. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I have several questions. 

Mr. Secretary, when this bill was first brought to my attention, I was 
inclined to be against it because I thought it was not necessary, that 
there would be overlapping of duties and duplication of functions 
with the State Department, but after hearing the testimony, I have 
changed my mind. 

Now, have you had the opportunity to read the statement of Mr. 
Grant, a charter member of the Orlando Committee, who originated 
the idea of the Freedom Academy and who testified before the com- 
mittee Tuesday, I believe ? 

Mr. Harriman. No, I haven't had that privilege. I don't know 
who Mr. Grant is. 

Mr. IcHORD. Well, Mr. Grant, in his statement to the committee, 
referred to a speech made by Senator Yomig of Ohio last September, 
who had the same idea that I had when this bill was originally pre- 
sented to me. Senator Young in his speech pointed out that we 
already had a Foreign Service Institute, five War Colleges, a Special 


Warfare School at Fort Bragg, and a Russian Research Center at 
Harvard, and various otlier areas of study at universities, so he asked 
the question : Why do we need a Freedom Academy ? 

Then Mr. Grant in his statement pointed out that the committee 
made a study of the training offered in these various institutions and 
he made what I consider several serious charges against the training 
that is provided in these institutions, and I think these charges should 
be presented to you and you given a chance to answer the same in 
the record. 

First of all, he stated that the Orlando Committee found, No. 1 : "In 
general, the training, especially as it deals with nonmilitary conflict, 
tends to be skimpy, superficial, or nonexistent and provides the stu- 
dent with little motivation." 

I would like to have you comment upon that statement, Mr. Secre- 
tary, if you would, please. 

Mr. Harriman. Well, Mr. Congressman, I haven't had the oppor- 
tunity to read this, it is just in my hand now. I wouldn't want to 
comment about it. This is a free countiy, everybody has got a right 
to express his opinions, and I applaud Mr. Alan G. Grant, attorney 
at law, of Orlando, Florida, who is interested in this very important 
subject of battling the cold war. I applaud all private citizens' inter- 
est in it. I just don't happen to believe that his judgment in this 
thing is right, really. 

I am entitled to my opinion, sir, as well as he his, but I don't know 
what particular expertise Mr. Grant has. I have no knowledge of 
who he is or what he is and I don't think he has had the experience, 
for instance, of either former Secretary of State Herter or Dr. Perkins, 
who was the head of the Carnegie Foundation and now is president of 
a very great university in my State, the State of New York. 

Mr. loHORD. Mr. Secretary, I am just trj^in^ to get enough facts 
on which I can base what I think to be a valid judgment of the legis- 
lation, but you indicated in your statement that you thought that the 
Freedom Academy would be considering communism in a vacuum. 

As I read the various bills, I think that they will offer a broad 
spectrum training in foreign affairs, but will also concentrate on 
nonmilitary conflict. I believe that the Freedom Academy bill covers 
everything that the National Academy of Foreign Affairs bill covers 
and a little more. But Mr. Grant states that the committee was unable 
to find a single Government or university training program that deals 
with the difficult and sophisticated subject of Communist political 
warfare, insurgency, and subversion in depth, much less the means of 
defeating it, and certainly I think we should have institutions where 
the availability of study in those things is there and it is very im- 
portant that we study Commimists' warfare, political warfare, and 
insurgency, and the means of defeating it. 

I hope that that statement is not justified. 

Mr. Harriman. If that is the statement he makes — I haven't had the 
privilege of reading it — I don't agree with him. I have spoken to 
each one of the six of our militaiy colleges. I know in a general way 
what their curriculum is and all of them, in addition to what their 
particular activity may be in training for combat, are also involved 
in the general aspect of the cold war and how to deal with specific 
subjects. As a matter of fact, the talks that I have given at tlie War 
Colleges were in that field of the cold war. 


We also, as I said, have a training course of 4 or 5 weeks, specifically 
directed at counterinsurgency. Communist insurgency is one aspect 
of the conflict. 

Now, the point that I think perhaps Mr. Grant doesn't realize is 
that to do real research and to have real discussions you have to have 
access to classified material. Now the Freedom Academy couldn't 
have access to classified material because it would not include Govern- 
ment employees. It would be, I gather, 10,000 or so private citizens, 
and classified material would not be available to them. 

I believe that a more concentrated course in how to fight and carry 
on and win the cold war — incidentally, I think we are winning it — 
can better be done by training Government officers and leave the gen- 
eral training of private citizens to our universities. 

You speak of Harvard University. I know I have spoken at many 
of the universities in our country. I am very much encouraged to 
find that there are an increasing number of institutions of learning 
that are giving very great attention to the subjects which would be 
covered by the Freedom Academy and I think it is better done that 
way. I think the Government should train its own employees and 
bring to its own school Government employees, either military or non- 
military, as it sees fit. We have found that selected foreign students 
who have come here have been very well trained and have gone home, 
in most cases, weU inspired by our methods in tliis country. But I 
think the general public from abroad should be allowed to have access 
to all of our nongovernmental institutions of learning. Some 50,000 
foreign students are here in the country. 

I think our institutions of learning are improving all the time in 
the manner in which they attempt to give the foreign student the 
maximum value in the period of his studies in this country. 

I would not like to see it publicized in the world that the United 
States Government had a Government institution for the pui-pose of 
training great numbers of foreign students. I fully agree with Chair- 
man Willis that our private institutions and our State institutions 
should carry on the general educational work in our country. 

If this committee wants to encourage our private institutions or 
feels that it is wise to do that, I would welcome it. I would also wel- 
come including in the support for education the encouragement of the 
whole area of study of Communist activity. Communist philosophy, 
and manner in which to deal with communism. But I earnestly be- 
lieve that it is better in our American system to leave that education 
to our private institutions, sir. And I would hope that you would 
encourage the Government to round out and expand its activities not 
only in the United States, but through the various means that we now 
have of encouraging the training and education in free countries which 
are our friends and allies. 

Mr. IcHORD. You have objected to the training of private citizens 
in large numbers in an Academy of this sort. Has the State Depart- 
ment made any study of the role that private citizens could be play- 
ing in helping to solve our local problems ? 

Mr. IL\RRiMAN. I don't know that the State Department has ever 
had a project, or money for a project, to study or make a complete 
study of what is done in this field. If the Congress directed the 
Department to do it, I think it would be a very healthy thing. But 

30-471— 64^-pt. 2 3 


I do know that the State Department is, in one way or another, in very 
close touch with many of the universities and colleges that are particu- 
larly interested in foreign affairs, and particularly interested in the 
subject which is being directly discussed now. Members of the State 
Department staff do go and lecture to them, and we ask the universities 
to come down and consider with us projects which are important. In 
fact, some of the officers of the Department are drawn from the uni- 
versities, and they come and work for the Government and then they 
go back to their academic fields. It is stimulating to the academic 
field. But I don't know of any study. If there is one I will let you 
know, sir. If this committee wishes such a study to be made, I am 
sure the State Department would be only too glad to do so, and it 
might be of use and illuminating to all of us. I am not sure whether 
the Perkins committee made such a study. 

Mr. IcHORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Harriman. May I just say, sir, that I am very heartily in sym- 
pathy with the idea that more knowledge should be disseminated in our 
country, that more people should be stimulated to study and under- 
stand, and that those in our Government who are charged with carry- 
ing out our policy and conducting the battle that is going on — both 
militarily, unfortunately, in some areas of the world, but also on a 
civilian basis — should have more education. I say again that, al- 
though we are having setbacks, fundamentally and as I have watched 
the world develop since 1945, gravely concerned about Communist 
takeover, I think we are by way of winning the cold war. If we con- 
tinue to have the determination which increasingly our people are 
showing and the stimulation this committee is giving, I hope will con- 
tribute to that. 

Mr. IcHORD. Well, I might say, Mr. Secretary, that the only differ- 
ence that I see in these two proposals is that the Academy, Freedom 
Academy, j)uts emphasis upon the training of private citizens, both of 
them permit the training of foreign nationals, even the Academy of 
Foreign Affairs permits the training of private citizens. However, 
you have objected to them, in training in large numbers, and the Free- 
dom Academy does permit the establishment of an information center, 
which you are opposed to. But really, I think your opposition, other 
than the information center and the training of private citizens in 
large numbers, goes to the fact as to M'ho is to run the institution. 
You feel that it should be run by the Department of State, while the 
sponsors of the bills want an independent agency. 

Mr. Harriman. Well, sir, I am afraid the word "only" is rather a 
broad word. It covers quite a considerable area. 

The objectives of the two bills, as you read the preambles, appear to 
be generally in agreement, but the methods are quite different. 

Mr. ScHADEBERG. Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ScHADEBERG. I would like to thank the Secretary for being 
here. I know it has been helpful for me, at least, but in view of the 
fact that the Secretary has commented several times on the fact that 
he thought that we ought not to burn books on Marxism and com- 
munism and so forth, and I agree with him, I would like at least to be 
on the record that I have always contended that we ought to teach 
about communism. 


Mr. Harriman. Good. 

Mr. ScHADEBERG. But I would feel that I would like to see it taught 
by professors who are oriented toward freedom and a free society and 
not oriented toward the Marxist way. 

Mr. Harriman. That is one statement, sir, that I agi'ee with 1,000 

The CHAiRMAisr. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. We ap- 
preciate your appearance. 

Mr. Harriman. Thank you. I am grateful to you, Ciiairman Willis, 
for the privilege of appearing. 

The Chairman. Let me make a suggestion that you might counsel 
with your aide, here. Would yoa care to offer a rebuttal, explanation, 
or enlargement on what you had to say, vis-a-vis the criticisms by 
Mr. Grant, of the Foreign Service Institute and the War Colleges? 

Mr. Harriman. If I may take this copy, I would be very glad 
to take it and I would be very glad to 

The Chairman. I am not asking for it. 1 said perhaps you might 
care to do this. 

We want a record as complete as possible. 

Mr. Harriman. Could I read it first, sir, and then see whether 
we are ready to take up your very courteous offer 'I It is a question 
of making a general comment on it or a detailed comment on it. 
I think that depends upon it. We have to read it first.^ 

The Chairman. Yes, sir. 

Mr, Harriman. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I wish 
you well in your objectives. 

The Chairman. Thank you. 

I think one of our colleagues is here. 

Mr. Taft? Glad to have you, sir. 



Mr. Tapt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the commit- 
tee. I shall not take long for this statement. I realize that the com- 
mittee has heard a great deal about this subject. I am sure that many 
members are more familiar with the background of the proposal than 
I am. 

I gave this bill some study before introducing it and I have listened 
with great interest to the testimony of Secretary Harriman here 
this morning. 

My interest in sponsorship arises from the conviction that we are 
engaged in an ideological battle for the minds of men that is bound 
to determine the future course of this country and of mankind. While 
the basic differences between our system and the Communist systeipi 
(the contrast of individual freedom and responsibility, as compared 
to authoritarian direction and submission) may be clear to all Ame^^- 
cans (I am not so much worried about the matter of indoctrinatiqn 
that has been discussed here this morning, because I feel that most 
Americans do not need indoctrination in knowing which direction. t]p,ey 
want to go), I am concerned with laying bare and exposing soni;^,pf 

* No further communication was received from Mr. Harriman on this point. 


the techniques, methods, and stratagems that have been developed 
in spreading communism. These are extremely complex and extremely 
subtle and have not been adequately revealed. I think the record of 
progress in recent years for Communist ideology in much of the 
world stands as mute but mighty testimony to our lag in these areas, 
despite the superiority of military force that we have held and 
despite our complete conviction, I am sure, that our system offers 
far more to mankind. 

I do think that a few points might be specifically examined by the 
committee in the determination as to what direction it may want to 
go on the various proposals that are before it. I don't say that either 
one of these proposals, mine or the National Academy as proposed by 
the Secretary, or others, are the only answers, but I think certain 
things should be considered and taken into consideration as back- 
ground for the decision that you are going to be called upon to make. 

First of all, I think we have to admit that the need for some activity 
in this area is pretty clear. Recent history, I think, shows the spread 
of Communist subversion and our complete failure to check the in- 
creased growth of Communist subversion, and its effect evidenced in 
many areas of the world is in itself enough to prove this. 

Secondly, I think we have to recognize that research as well as train- 
ing is vitally important. Of course, national security provisions must 
be observed, but there are many governmental functions and activities 
to which security provisions offer no complications. A public body 
has the advantage of ready access to the information necessary to do 
the job. Our private universities may attempt to get this kind of 
information, they may attempt to draw conclusions from it, but in 
the last analysis they don't have the same access. There are some 
notable exceptions in specific areas. The Hoover Institution, for in- 
stance, out in California, is doing a wonderful job of getting basic raw 
material in this area, and in the entire area beyond this, of the whole 
nature of revolution. 

But I think that there is a real need for governmental activity here. 

I think next we have to recognize that it must not be — it must not 
be — partisan, and it must not be a witch hunt by any particular group 
of one sort or another. I think that would certainly defeat the pur- 
pose of it very quickly. But I think, therefore, that having a bipar- 
tisan Commission (not having it under any particular department of 
the Government) offers a great deal more hope for the chances of suc- 
cess than having it under the Secretary of State or having it under 
anyone else. I think we have to face the fact that private universities 
and existing public bodies have not been able to do the job. The 
record is such that I think this is clear. 

I think that we also have to admit that in a very real sense, perhaps 
not broadly through their people, but in the very real sense of having 
a real trained cadre or core of subversives, that the Communists have 
been doing this job. I do not think we have to adopt their methods to 
succeed or to oppose them ; I think we can develop our own methods 
consistent with our ideas of freedom and of proper activity. 

Finally, I think that this area of private concerns and private indi- 
viduals is extremely important. It is becoming more important all the 


I have had a few connections in the past with American organiza- 
tions doing business overseas. Many of those organizations very 
frankly simply will not deal through the regular American channels, 
the American State Department representatives. They say they are 
only a handicap. They are no help. These organizations, many of 
them, are not called upon, ever, by the State Department or by anyone 
in Government for the information that they do have available. This 
is becoming more and more true for the information that is available, 
I think, is becoming broader all the time. For instance, we have the 
whole question of trade fairs. We have had Americans going into 
joint trade fairs in Europe, that some of you gentlemen may know 
about. We have sent over private citizens who have not been trained 
as to what the problems may be. I think they should have been trained, 
and the enactment of my bill would see that such training was 

I think the same thing is true of many joint ventures. We find 
many nations now require a certain amount of stock ownership among 
nationals in those particular countries. (This is true in many Latin 
American comitries, and the contacts that we are making here and 
the problems of Communist subversion ui those nations are vital to 
these businesses.) If U.S. businessmen are going to invest in those 
areas, they are going to have to be arriving at conclusions, anyway. 
But are they going to be arriving at sound conclusions in making the 
decisions that will affect what happens to America in these areas? 

I cannot share with the Secretary the idea he has that clearance 
is a real problem, and security is a matter here that is of great, great 
importance. I do not think that any of us really believe that the 
Freedom Academy proposal is to train the broad mass of people in 
this country; it is to train people who are directly concerned here 
and who can take an important part in it, and many of these are 
private individuals, many of them have security clearances, as you 

The military continuously is taking civilians on indoctrination trips, 
giving them security clearance before they do it. 

The same thing, it seems to me, could be true here. 

These are just a few of the ideas that I have. 

The information center proposal is, of course, a little controversial, 
but I would point out to you that we are doing exactly the same 
thing overseas with USIA. 

I would point out to you also that insofar as, for instance, EOTC 
courses or the FBI school, agricultural extension colleges, various War 
Colleges, I am sure that we are presently preparing textbook informa- 
tion and other basic information, where the Government is the only 
body that has the proper information for preparation for these courses, 
and that would be true here. There is nothing compulsory in this 
bill compelling anyone to use the information that is prepared. It 
is merely an authorization to prepare the information, so that if 
some group wants to use it, and it is proper for them to use it, it will 
be available. 

These are some of my views, and I would just like to conclude by 
saying that I strongly agree with the position that has been taken 
by Congressman Schweiker. I feel that it is extremely important 
that this committee report out a bill and get us moving toward the 


solution of these problems. The bill won't be perfect. No bill, the 
first time around, ever is. It may not even succeed. But at least we 
will know that we have taken a shot at it and tried. 

Thank you. 

The Chairman. Thank you very much. 

Mr. SoHADEBERG. I have no questions. 

Mr. Tuck. Mr. Chairman, I would like to commend the distin- 
guished gentleman from Ohio for making such a fine statement. 

As I understand it from your testimony, this is not a matter of 
ideology as it is informing the people as to methods by which the 
Communists undertake to infiltrate this and other countries. 

Mr. Taft. That is my feeling. Governor Tuck. 

Mr. Tuck. And that people would be left free to enjoy the ideologies 
which they already have. 

Mr. Taft. Yes, indeed. I do not think this is an attempt to 

The Chairman. Indoctrinate? 

Mr. Taft. — indoctrinate, or propagandize I think was the word I 
was looking for, Mr. Chairman, the American people in any sense. 

Mr. Tuck. I take it also from your testimony that you believe — 
which undoubtedly is true — that private and State universities and 
schools do not have the means to supply the information which it is 
necessary for them to have in order to train teachers and others who 
are engaged in educational work. 

Mr. Taft. That is my feeling. 

Mr. Tuck. That is all. 

The Chairman. Thank you very much, sir. 

Is Dr. Niemeyer with us? 

Dr. Niemeyer. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Off the record. 

(Discussion off the record.) 

The Chairman. Proceed, Dr. Niemeyer. 


Dr. NiEMETER. Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee : This bill 
proposes a new agency for research and training in order to enhance 
the political warfare capabilities of the free world. 

The Chairman. Mr. Niemeyer, may I interrupt? 

I wonder if you could give a thumbnail sketch of your background 
for the record. 

Dr. Niemeyer. Indeed. I am professor 

The Chairman. I have something here handed to me. Let^ me 
read it and see. Well, give it in your own words, in thumbnail fashion ; 
will you? 

Dr. Niemeyer. I am a professor of political science at Notre Dame, 
one time member of the State Department, one time member of the 
faculty of the National War College, and one time consultant to your 
committee, sir. 

The Chairman. Yes, I know. Didn't you also teach at Princeton ? 

Dr. Niemeyer. Indeed. At Yale, a1 Columbia University, at Ogle- 
thorpe University. 

The Chairman. Well, I think you are tlie autJior of a book entitled 
An Inquiry Into Soviet Mentality? 


Dr. NiEMEYER. Right. 

The Chairman. And I think you collaborated with our committee 
in connection with a volume put out, Facts on G ommnMnisvif 

Dr. NiEiviEYER. Right. Also editor of A Handbook on Convmunism. 

The CiiAiRMAisr. And then, way back in 1958, the committee pub- 
lished a consultation with you on the subject of The Irrationality of 
C om,mAinisnh, 

Dr. NiEMEYER. Indeed, sir. 

The Chairman. Now, you said something about being connected 
with the State Department for a while. 

Dr. NiEMEYER. Yes. 

The Chairman. In what area ? 

Dr. NiEMEYER. In the Office of United Nations Affairs. I was 
a planning adviser in the Office of United Nations Affairs from 
1950 to 1953. 

The Chairman, Proceed. 

Dr. NiEiMEYER. Thank you. 

I submit that a new agency of this type as outlined in H.R. 5368 
is called for, because the conflict itself is of a new type unprecedented 
in the history of this Nation, a type of conflict for which we are very 
poorly organized. 

We have been conducting the cold war as if it were a traditional 
conflict between great-power interests. This type of conflict, with 
which the 19th century has made us familiar, turns on territories, 
boundaries, and the imponderables of a nation's position among other 
nations. Its ultima ratio is a military test of strength, for which 
nations prepare through armaments and alliances. In this kind of 
conflict, one tries to protect one's interests while avoiding war as much 
as possible. If war breaks out, though, one fights it until a peace 
treaty is achieved, after which the contestants continue as nations, albeit 
in different political circumstances. 

The cold war appeared to be that kind of a conflict because the Com- 
munist Party obtained control of Russia, a great power, and has used 
Russia's manpower and other resources for its strategic purposes. The 
cold war, nevertheless, has not arisen from a clash between the na- 
tional interests of Russia and those of the United States. It has arisen 
out of the ideological obsession of Communists with the destruction of 
what they call the bourgeois society or, as they now term it, the world 
system of imperialism. Although our country is located at the op- 
posite side of the globe from Russia, the Communists have identified 
the United States as their main enemy because they see in us the core 
of capitalistic imperialism. They are fighting us with the power means 
of Russia, but what fights us is not Russia. Rather, it is the ideologi- 
cal enterprise of communism aiming at the total destruction and sub- 
version of our society. 

In the cold war, it is not boundaries and territories, spheres of in- 
fluence and relative power which are at stake, even though all these 
play a certain role. Nor is war the ultima ratio of this struggle. Nor 
is a peace treaty the prospective outcome if war should break out. The 
Communists are fighting to dissolve, decompose, disintegrate, and de- 
stroy our society, institutions, authorities, and habits of thought and 
heart. We are fighting to free our society from this kind of assailant. 
The Communists do not look on war as their chosen means to obtain 


their ends. In all their history, they have opted for a minimum of 
force when coming to power, and for a maxuniun of force and terror 
only after they had secured full control of the public means of com- 
pulsion. They have gained access to these means mostly with the help 
of allies with whom they were united in coalitions and whom they de- 
stroyed as soon as they had become public officials. 

Internationally, the same is true. We have armed ourselves and 
successfully maintained a formidable alliance. We have deterred the 
enemy from any large-scale military attack on us. But in the Middle 
East, Africa, South Asia, and Latin America the Communists have 
established new positions of strength without military attack. Our 
military ramparts are still strong. But the enemy has moved under- 
neath and around them, even in our midst, creating a neutralist move- 
ment directed against the possession or use of nuclear weapons. These 
are not the methods of conventional great-power conflict. We are 
fighting an enemy who controls a nation and often looks like that na- 
tion's representative, but has aims and moti^^es quite different irom 
those of a national government. We are threatened by an intent that 
assaults not merely our power but our way of life. And we are con- 
fronted by methods of persuasion, manipulation, and subversion the 
like of which no great nation has faced before. 

I am saying all of this in order to establish to some extent the rea- 
son why we have done poorly in the cold war so far. 

I believe that this is not due to any "softness on commimism" in 
leading circles, as has been often alleged, but simply to a confusion of 
the cold war with a traditional great-power conflict. And that con- 
fusion I do not think stems from sinister motives. The truth is that 
our Government is now organized in its external capabilities to meet 
the kind of threat that is involved in a traditional great-power conflict, 
the only kind of power conflict with which we have been familiar. 

For mstance, the State Department is organized by regions and 
countries. To this day, it does not have a single office which is devoted 
to the problem of communism, as such, or to the problems of fighting 
communism on a global scale. Its capabilities in general are mainly 
in the field of diplomacy, that is, dealing with other nations' govern- 
ments. The enemy we are facing may have a power base in one coun- 
tiy, but it is an enterprise with a worldwide organization and a global 

We have no Government agency geared to world communism as 
such. The Psychological Strategy Board, which functioned for a 
while, has ceased to operate as a cold war agency. The regional or- 
ganization of the State Department is reflected in the regional or area 
studies in our universities. Again, countries, languages, cultures, and 
governments are the focus of our efforts there. We do not train any- 
where experts in communism or experts in the methods of communism. 

The Freedom Academy bills are designed to remedy at least one 
aspect of this deficiency. The Academy is, as the State Department 
acknowledged, designed as a cold war agency. 

Creation of such an agency would mean that we would at long last 
begin to adjust to the kind of conflict in which we are. So far, we 
have created only one other agency directly geared to cold war re- 
quirements, Radio Free Europe. Significantly, it is an agency work- 
ing in, and with the help of, the private sector in order to attain tlie 


flexibility which the Government officially could not have in this 

This acknowledges the fact that the official organization of our 
Government is not geared to the medium and the methods through 
which the cold war is largely fought. Not only can a government 
through its official agents not penetrate into all the nooks and crannies 
where cold war operations are going on, but even if it could, it would 
not be to the nation's best interest that its government should be en- 
gaged in power contests with forces which appear in private garb. 
In many countries in the world, local Communist and pro-Commu- 
nist elements confront directly the official representatives of the 
United States. It would be far better if battle against the Commu- 
nists were done equally by forces operating in the private sector with 
local organizations and local means of influencing opinion and alle- 
giances. The Communists have a network of party organizations 
throughout tlie world. We have nothing like a pro-American Party 
or a pro-Freedom Party anywhere in the world. Slaybe it is good that 
we have nothing of that kind. I think it might be a great danger if 
we would aim at a party to match the totalitarian Communist Party. 
It would not destroy freedom, though, if people willing to fight Com- 
munists in other countries received training and information, finan- 
cial and moral support from a cold war agency equipped with the best 
human resources we have. It does not take a totalitarian party to 
fight the Communist Party and it does not take Communist methods 
to frustrate the Communists in their designs. It does take, however, 
people and organizations and methods other than we are employing 
now. The cold war is so unprecedented that we still have to learn how 
to fight it. The Freedom Academy would be an institution where this 
learning could be done. 

Now, it seems to me that between the two possibilities which have 
been discussed this morning, the Fi*eedom Academy is better designed 
for its purpose for three reasons: It is meant to devote intensive 
study to communism for a period long enough to produce results; 
it would be set up within the Government, but sufficiently apart from 
the existing agencies to allow the development of new ideas of cold 
warfare; and the inclusion of the private sector in the range of its 
competences will make it possible to mobilize forces for the cold war 
which alone can meet the Communists on the ground where the tell- 
ing battles are fought. 

Among tliose who for many years have fought Communists abroad, 
in other countries, often alone, ijiostly without support, quite fre- 
quently against resistance of our foreign personnel, and entirely 
without our guidance, the proposed Freedom Academy has inspired 
hopes that finally the free world will gird its loins for political war- 
fare. Our best hope for countering Communist advances is to mobil- 
ize this latent strength, to close the ranks of all potential victims of 
communism, and to unite the already existing centers of resistance. 
If the Communists can extend their influence by nonmilitary means, 
under the cover of the mutual atomic deterrent, so can we, and with 
better chances of success. 

The Freedom Academy is significant as a mute declaration that we 
are out to win (he cold war without an atomic holocaust. 


The Chairman. You have heard Secretary Harriman testify this 

Dr. Neemeyer. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Are there any comments you would care to maKe 
on some of his objections? 

Dr. NiEMEYER. I think the questioning of the committee has 
brought out quite rightly that there are no substantial differences 
in the purposes of the two bills and the two training institutions ; and 
Congressman Ichord, I tliink, has come to the conclusion here, in 
questioning Mr. Harriman, that therefore the essential difference 
which the State Department must see is in the control of these in- 

As I see it, the State Department wants to have an enlarged For- 
eign Service Institute, whereas the Freedom Academy bill foresees 
an agency which is sufficiently separate to be novel and, therefore, 
flexible enough to develop new methods and new insights into cold 
war operations. 

Now, it seems to me that to the extent to which our training and 
information on communism has been deficient — and the course of 
the cold war suggests that it has been deficient in more than one 
way — ^to this extent a simple enlargement of the Foreign Service In- 
stitute does not promise any improvement over the previous perform- 
ance, and I would say that an improvement over the previous per- 
formance could only be hoped for by the establishment of something 
that is new and to some extent — not wholly, but to some extent — 
separate from the existing State Department agencies and State De- 
partment controls. 

The Chairman. Off the record. 

(Discussion off the record.) 

(At tliis point, Mr. Tuck left the hearing room.) 

Mr. Pool. Governor Tuck had this question, and he had to leave. 
But we were discussing it here in private. We wondered if limiting 
the studies and the work to anti-Commimist problems would defeat 
the argument that it is a Federal control of education. What would 
be your comments on that ? 

Dr. NiEMEYER. I don't see this as a public education project on a 
large scale. I see it as a project to train and inform people who are 
willing or in the business of fighting communism, and it has been said 
before that these may be trade union officials or they may be jour- 
nalists or they possibly may also be public teachers who would come 
there for a particular purpose. 

I see it also, however, largely as a training ground for foreign stu- 
dents, and maybe this would turn out to be the most important func- 
tion of this institution. 

It has been said that citizens and functionaries, both foreign and 
domestic, could receive their training at the universities. Well, I am 
in university training and I teach a course on Coimnunist ideology, a 
whole year course at Notre Dame University. I am not aware of any 
imiversity where people could be trained for purposes of cold warfare 
and for purposes of that kind of thorough information on all aspects 
of the Communist enterprise that would enable them to go out and 
fight the cold war. There simply is no such program at any university, 
and I don't see that any university is set up for such a program. 

(At this point, Mr. Ichord left the hearing room.) 


Mr. Pool. My question is, Would you limit tlie purposes to research 
ill communism and methods to fight communism ? 

Dr. NiEMEYER. Yes, I would, sir, because I believe this, the negative 
purpose is the purpose on which all people can unite. As soon as one 
introduces a positive purpose there indeed might be an element of in- 
doctrination which would be dangerous. 

Mr. Pool. Thank you. 

Mr. ScHADEBERG. I just Want to thank you for a very fine statement. 

Dr. NiEMEYER. Thank you, Congressman. 

The Chairman. The session will resume at 2 o'clock, and the hear- 
ing room will be the District of Columbia Room. 

(Whereupon, at 12 : 30 p.m., Thursday, February 20, 19G4, the com- 
mittee recessed to reconvene at 2 p.m., the same day.) 


(The committee reconvened at 2 p.m., Hon. Joe R. Pool presiding.) 

(Committee members present: Representatives Pool, Ichord, and 

Mr. Pool. The committee will come to order. We will go ahead with 
the testimony. It is a few minutes after 2 and some of the members 
could not be here. But I will go ahead and start the hearing. I am 
sure some of the others will come in, in a moment. Dr. Lev E. 

Before you start, Dr. Dobriansky, I notice you have a statement 
about your background. If you want to enlarge on that slightly, it 
will be all right with me. 


Dr. Dobriansky. Fine. Mr. Chairman and distinguished Mem- 
bers : My name is Lev E. Dobriansky. I am a professor of economics 
at Georgetown University and formerly taught at New York Univer- 
sity. I am also privileged to serve as the president of the Ukrainian 
Congress Committee of America, the chairman of the National Cap- 
tive Nations Committee, and as an editor of the American Security 
Council's Washington Report. I was formerly a faculty member of 
the National War College and have been a lecturer at many of our 
sei'vice schools. 

At the outset of my formal statement, I express my deepest appre- 
ciation for this opportunity to testify on the five resolutions calling 
for the creation of a Freedom Commission and the establishment of 
the Freedom Academy. Both for the organizations I head and for 
myself, we are in complete favor of the passage of this extremely 
important measure that all five resolutions substantially embrace. 
The tremendous and pressing need for this independent agency and 
the special educational institution cannot be too strongly emphasized. 

In order not to duplicate some of the thoughts and ideas of other 
proponents of the measure, I should like to clevelop somewhat unfa- 
miliar avenues of reasoning that justify the existence of a Freedom 
Commission and Academy. For your studied consideration and also 


in rational support of the affirmative position taken by us on this far- 
seeing measure, we offer the following concise observations, all of 
which can be readily and extensively documented. 


(1) The necessity for the passage of this measure is inextricably 
tied up with the basic issue of the very survival of our Nation. This 
statement is no exaggeration. When one soberly considers how much 
has been lost since World War II, he can with considerable validity 
caption his thoughts with the constant and foreboding question, 
""Wlio's next in the long string of captive nations — South Vietnam, 
Laos, Venezuela, Zanzibar?" The pessimistic overtones of this 
gnawing question, which will be answered in the latest chapter of our 
cold war failures, particularly with regard to the Russian base of 
global cold war operations, need not, of course, be necessarily ac- 
cepted for the long future. But in our present state of free world 
cold war disintegration, who can reasonably deny that it rests on firm 
grounds of near probability ? 

Had we, over 10 years ago, in operating existence what is sensibly 
designed in these five resolutions, we as a nation would have main- 
tained our clear-cut superiority in world leadership without the phan- 
tasms of a Soviet Russian contender. Lest we be mistaken, this is not 
entirely an observation from hindsight, even though such an obser- 
vation should in itself draw respectful attention. The plain fact is 
that the fundamental nature of the imperialist Soviet Russian enemy 
had been clearly revealed many, many years before the outbreak of 
hostilities in 1939. Those of us who understood this then and, later 
at the beginning of the fifties, advocated a policy of liberation were 
in truth proposing the development of a cold war strategy to defeat 
the Russian enemy in the only area he's capable of winning, that of 
paramilitary conquest. Regrettably, even those who gave official 
lipservice to the policy of liberation failed to understand what it 
meant in essence and content. 

Hampered by all the trimmings of a cultural lag, this measure, over 
10 years later, still points to the most essential course open to us in 
combating successfully and decisively the propagandistic, psycho- 
political, conspiratorial, and subversive inroads made by Moscow in 
the free world. In fact, it is hyperessential today ; more than it was 
over a decade ago when we enjoyed complete military superiority, air 
supremacy, and atomic monopoly power. With the relatively declin- 
ing longrun importance of military might and power as our chief 
source of deterrence against both the further expansion of Moscow's 
empire and the horrendous outbreak of a global hot war, the critical 
area of the foreseeable future will be that of vigorous and imaginative 
cold war activity. The sheer adequacy of imperial Russian arms and 
industrial capacity has produced a formidable power of influence that 
shifts the points of comparative advantage to operations within the 
cold war area. 

Vested with complete futural significance of the most crucial sort, 
the measure under consideration here aims to equip us with the neces- 
sary means of coping adequately with the devious cold war operations 
of Moscow and now also Peiping, twin sisters in established imperio- 


colonial practices. These practices include a whole range of psycho- 
political infiltration and subversion, from which no sphere of human 
existence is excluded, even entailing "peace," "peaceful coexistence," 
"disarmament," "lessening of tensions," "coexistence or codestruc- 
tion," and other Russian cold war shibboleths. In short, it is an 
illusion to believe that so long as the Russian and Chinese imperial 
systems continue to exist, the cold war would or could be terminated 
by trade, appeasement, wishful thinking about "mellowing processes," 
and even the self-disintegration of the captive world. The long truth 
is that the cold war is an institutional coefficient of these systems. The 
sooner we come to grips with this fundamental truth, the sooner we'll 
be contributing to our own survival. 


(2) The passage of this measure and its full realization would 
make possible, at long last, concentrated studies of Russian cold war 
operations in terms of indispensable historical perspectives which 
would deepen our insights into the basic nature of the enemy. Careful 
analyses along these and primarily substantive lines would reveal 
that what we classify today as Moscow's cold war techniques and 
methods are essentially traditional to totalitarian Russian empire- 
building. Contrary to general opinion, they are not the created prod- 
ucts of so-called Communist ideology and tactics. Except for acci- 
dental refinements and considerable technologic improvements, many 
of the techniques manipulated by the rulers of the present Russian 
empire, and also applied by their Red Chinese competitors, can be 
systematically traced as far back as the 16th century. Indeed, over a 
half century before Marx, the Russian ambassadors of Catherine the 
Great utilized class-division techniques to prepare for the partitions 
of Poland. Countless other examples of striking comparative worth 
and value can be cited. 

In a real sense, such specialized studies conducted by an independent 
agency set up to concentrate on political warfare stand to have more 
comparative value for our national security and defense than literally 
the billions spent on military hardware and economic foreign aid. 
These fashioned techniques and methods of Moscow are relatively new 
to us because of our historical unfamiliarity with them. Yet, sig- 
nificantly, they are old and tried to all the captive nations in Eastern 
Europe, in the U.S.S.R., in and about the Caucasus and central Asia. 
In sharp contrast to the ways and means of past Western imperialism 
and colonialism that throve on oversea possessions, the methods of 
Russian imperio-colonialism were forged to extend an overland em- 
pire, with all their borderland implications. By these methods and 
techniques, an unprecedented empire was built over the centuries and 
in 1918 revived and enormously expanded by the present Soviet Rus- 
sian rulers. 

Of conspicuous note concerning the past, as well as contemporary, 
Russian expansion in power, control, and influence is the outstanding 
fact that the polyglot, multinational military forces under Moscow 
have played essentially a secondary role. With patience and in time, 
the primary role has consistently been played by Russian conspiracy, 
propaganda, diplomatic duress, and subversion. And this includes 


our latest period, from World War II to the present, with Khrushchev 
as the master player in this <^rand enterprise. Our understanding of 
these rulers over the centuries is indispensable to adequate prepara- 
tions and ability on our part to cope with phenomena of intensive 
revolutions and conquests from within in independent and also emerg- 
ing states and nations of the free world. Here too, in short, we are 
confronted by a cumulative experience not of only 47 ^ears but rather 
of centuries, and the Soviet Russian heirs of this experience possess an 
enormous advantage that few of their predecessors had — that of tech- 
nology and science. The objectives envisaged by the five resolutions 
point in the direction of such major study. Along these lines there is 
a terrible gap in our knowledge, both in the official and private sector; 
indeed, even rudimentary facts about the chief enemy are not prop- 
erly mierstood or even Imown — again in many official and private 

Mr. JoiiANSEN. Will you let me interrupt at this point to ask this 
question so that it will be associated with this comment? 

Dr. DoBRiANSKY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. Incidentally, I am happy to see you here today. 

Would the gentleman feel that supplying of this information both 
to those in Government and to those who are private citizens or 
leaders in the private sector constitutes indoctrination ? 

Dr. DoBRiANSKY. Not at all, sir. I will come to that point if I may. 
I didn't have a chance to incorporate some of it — let us put it, some 
of the observations made by the Secretary this morning, but I will 
allude to them. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. I won't interrupt further. 

Dr. DoBRiANSKT. This gap in our knowledge is an obvious, gratui- 
tous advantage to Moscow's cold war experts. 


(3) In the light of swift-moving developments in the past decade 
and more, this measure and its passage are actually long overdue. 
The essential ideas of this measure were approvingly considered by 
the Select House Committee to Investigate Communist Aggression 
some 10 years ago. It is noteworthy that through this committee 
Congress' made its substantial contribution to our developing knowl- 
edge of the imperialist Soviet Russian menace. It was at the initiative 
of, and by the vision of. Congress that this tremendous stride was 

Now, the present resolutions in more elaborate and adequate form 
crystallize the thoughts and vision of the many who have given serious 
consideration and study to the nature and scope of cold war operations 
under the contrived conditions of "neither peace nor war." Based on 
much precedent thought and the intensive investigations of previous 
congressional committees, the embraced measure promises to lay the 
necessary foundations for us to meet intelligently and competently 
the cold war thrusts and maneuvers of Moscow and Peiping. 

The spectrum of cold war ideas and engagement is a most extensive 
one. However, let me briefly cite a few concrete examples in which 
congressional initiative, as against routinous executive inertia or 
myopia, contributed to our cold war posture. One, in 1958, if Congress 


hadn't acted in time, the vital VOA non-Russian language broadcasts 
into the Soviet Union would have been systematically eliminated, and 
much to the satisfaction of Moscow. Two, the passage of the Captive 
Nations Week Resolution in 1959 demonstrated to the world how 
deeply vulnerable Moscow is with regard to the captive non-Russian 
nations in the Soviet Union alone. The typical, mythical image that 
millions throughout the world have of the Soviet Union could be easily 
transformed if we even began to implement that resolution. On this 
I should like to submit as part of my statement an article I have 
written on "The Next Move," which appeared in the Januaiy 6, 1964, 
issue of the American Security Council's Washington Report. 

Mr. Pool. Is that just a page or two there ? 

Dr. DoBRiANSKY. Yes. 

Mr. Pool. Without objection then it may be admitted. (See pp. 

Dr. DoBRiANSKY. A third example, with which most of our people 
are unfamiliar, concerns Congress' passage of legislation in 1960, pro- 
viding for the erection in our Capital of a statue of Taras Shevchenko, 
the Ukrainian poet and freedom fighter. The ramifications of this 
action would amaze any close student of cold war operations; in 1961 
we thwarted Moscow's perversion of this historic figure and just a few 
months ago, given what they considered an opening wedge provided by 
several obtuse editorials of a local newspaper, Moscow and its puppets 
slickly attempted to destroy the project here. On this seemingly 
minor action I should also like to submit as part of the record this 
recently published booklet, /Shevchenko, A MonuTiient to the Libera- 
tion, Freedom, and Independence of All Captive Nations, and be- 
cause of its voluminous nature, Mr. Chairman, I will just make it 
available to the members of the committee, then. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. If I may interrupt, but the newspaper that the wit- 
ness refers to is the Washington Post, and I would like to have it in the 
record that it is. 

Mr. Pool. Put that in the record. 

Dr. DoBRiANSKT. I would raise no objection to that. 

Mr. Pool. We appreciate the pamphlet. We will not print it in the 

Dr. DoBRiANSKT. It is 119 pages in length and it can be supplied 
to each member if he is is interested, as a concrete case. 

But I would appreciate the printing of this material, a most inter- 
esting docmnent distributed by the Russian Embassy to our wire 
services and newspapers concerning, again, this seemingly minor 
Shevchenko affair. 

Mr. Pool. Identify it for the reporter. 

Dr. DoBRiANSKT. The document is a propaganda appeal with a cover 
letter written by Yuri I. Bobrakov of the Press Department of the 
Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. This is the Washington Embassy ? 

Dr. DoBRLVNSKY. Yes. The matter was obviously considered in 
Moscow and Kiev ; they got into the act. This is dated December 30, 

Mr. Pool. It may be admitted without objection. (See pp. 1298- 

Congress cannot, of course, be expected to take such initiative con- 
tinually along the entire spectrum of commonsense cold war challenge. 


Some opportunities, as those cited, have been won; there are many 
that have been lost. In the area of the Olympic Games, for instance, 
which also has cold war significance with the emerging myth of the 
pliysically supreme "Soviet man," we again have lost the opportunity 
of smashing this myth by not insisting that non-Russian participants 
from the U.S.S.R. be properly identified as representatives of their 
respective national republics. By no means are all the medal victors 
Russians. However, as in the last decade, so m this one. Congress can 
make a monumental contribution to our eventual victory in the cold 
war by passing this Freedom legislation in this session. In brief, it 
would be creating a sorely needed generator of ideas and proposals 
along the entire spectrum of the titanic cold war challenge. 


(4) Without perhaps incurring the wrath of one of your colleagues 
who isn't on this committee but on the banking committee, I would say 
that by analogy, and a rough one at that, the existence of a Freedom 
Commission and a Freedom Academy is as necessary to our national 
being today as is the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys- 
tem. In like manner that the latter is purposed to achieve stability and 
balanced development in our economy, the former would strive to ac- 
complish the same in our undertakings under the indefinite condi- 
tions of "neither peace nor war." It is safe to say that because our 
people have not, by and large, understood the nature, scope, and depth 
of Moscow's cold war operations, they have been constantly subjected 
to wide fluctuations of mood and sentiment, giving way at times to dan- 
gerous complacency and even seeming indifference toward the vital 
force of their treasured heritage and values and, at other times, to 
near hysteria. 

Dispersed and much- frittered thinking, as now exists, in cold war 
dimensions will guarantee a continued instability in popular reactions 
and a safe passivity in official determinations. With the Russians and 
Chinese operating in virtually every quarter of the free world, even 
endemic developments rapidly assume a broad cold war stigma. They 
require continuous, studied assessment leading to recommendations 
for not only adequate counteraction but also an effective offensive, and 
this is the one place that the Russians are most vulnerable; namely, 
the captive non-Russian majority in the U.S.S.R. itself. The only 
practical apparatus for this type of concentrated and totalistic think- 
ing is the proposed Commission and Academy, which veritably would 
become institutional instruments of enlightenment and stability. 


(6) The argument and counterargument on this most vital issue 
should receive on the part of the committee the most exacting and 
scrutinous type of internal analysis. I submit that upon such analysis 
the negative and inconsistent responses to the measures at hand from 
certain executive agencies constitute in themselves a negative support 
of the proposals. Behind the usual, verbally graced generalities they 
reflect an uncertainty of position, misstatement of facts, and an appar- 
ent incapacity to grasp the structure of cold war thought, which finds 
easy confirmation in our record of the past 20 years. 


Viewing first the concise, positive arguments on the measure, I 
repeat that to meet satisfactorily the tasks and requirements indicated 
above, an independent agency devoted exchisively to the content of 
cold war operation is indispensable. There is no existing agency or 
department in our Government that is equipped by intent or resources 
to meet these tasks. No existing governmental body is designed to 
treat and study Russian cold war phenomena in all their interrelated 
parts and aspects. Administratively, there is no principle of coordi- 
nation and integration represented by any body in this intricate and 
complex field. More, there is no principle of crystallization and con- 
servation of thought represented, as one department vies with another 
in a "play it by ear" mood to determine whether even food has a cold 
war weight. 

The creation of a Freedom Commission would correct these grave 
defects and fill in the gaps that currently exist. It would, at long last, 
provide us with a functioning apparatus, free of the routinous day-to- 
day operational responsibilities in the existing agencies, to deal with a 
foremost challenge in a totalistic, continuous, and coordinated way, 
rather than the piecemeal, sporadic, and essentially defensive ways that 
have prevailed up to the present. Similarly, there is no educational in- 
stitution maintained by our Government or any private body that is 
capable of conducting these necessary and continuous studies and in- 
struction on this new plane of comprehensive cold war thought. The 
intended Freedom Academy would satisfy this basic need. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. Mr. Chairman, may I break my promise to ask this? 

Are you in a position to comment on what resources we have in this 
coimtry at the Hoover Library at Stanford ? Are you familiar with 

Dr. DoBRiANSKY. Yes, I am, sir. I would say that actually you have 
what might be called an embryo in the field of empirical cold war re- 

Mr. JoHANSEN. And raw materials. 

Dr. DoBRiANSKT. And raw materials; but still raw materials that 
require a great deal of refining. Again this is in the compartment of 
research. It doas not go into that of methodic instruction and, beyond 
this, in what one might call cold war operations via organizations and 
other media, which I shall allude to in a moment, sir. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. Thank you, sir. 

Dr. DoBRiANSKY. Now for a few negative arguments. Of course, 
Mr. Chairman, I did not have time to incorporate some of the things 
that Mr. Harriman said, although in my statement I tried to deal with 
all the major points that have been raised in the past. 

However, I would like at this point to address m5^self to what I 
consider the verbal tactics of Mr. Harriman. 

First, the matter of indoctrination. Having been a student of philos- 
ophy myself, I do not see any intellectual dirt involved in the word 
"indoctrination." I think he himself revealed the hollowness of his 
position when he practically synonymized what he meant by indoctrina- 
tion with brainwashing. 

There is no attempt here to brainwash anyone, let us say, in an estab- 
lished curriculum of the Freedom Academy and the like. The fact is 
that if students are studying Communist doctrine and if I were the 
teacher in a classroom, I would make sure that they understood that 

30-471—64 — pt. 2 4 


doctrine thoroughly. Thus on a conceptual, abstractive level I would 
be indoctrinating them in order for them to grasp the systematic fea- 
tures of someone else's thought. 

This does not necessarily mean that I would be imposing an accept- 
ance on their part or an intellectual assent by them to that doctrine. 
So, in communicating intellectually with them, it would be not just a 
matter of informing, but also actually of illuminating the thought 
structure — the doctrinal edifice. When we deal with concepts and 
their interrelationships, even in economics it is necessary to build up 
these conceptual structures in the minds of the students and, as a 
consequence, you do get into the process of indoctrinating ; again, for 
sheer, objective imderstanding, if nothing else. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. If you were doing the same thing, either with a 
group of visiting foreign students or even a group of American stu- 
dents, and I think some of them can stand it, if you were doing it in 
the matter of the Constitution of the United States, you would be doing 
the same thing. 

Dr. DoBRiANSKY. That is correct. It is a matter of systematic, 
methodical inculcation. 

Mr. Pool. Would you limit the field of research and education to 
communism and fighting communism ? 

Dr. DoBRiANSKY. It is considerably more than communism. I think 
my subsequent remarks will show that, sir. 

Mr. Pool. How far afield would you go? What I am thinking 
about is the argument made by Secretary Harriman this morning that 
this bill would tend to give Federal control over education. I am 
wondering, should we limit it to what we are interested in mainly, the 
fighting of the Communists? 

Dr. DoBRiANSKY. Ycs, but it addresses itself not simply to com- 
munism; there are many other elements in this cold war opponent. 
I made reference, for example, to Russian imperio-colonialism, which 
is a most vulnerable point with Moscow. This could be easily docu- 
mented to show the element working in combination with the ideology 
of conununism. 

Now there are proponents of the measure who feel that the enemy 
is purely communism. As many know, I have looked upon commu- 
nism chiefly as a tool of ideologic deception. Although it is such a 
tool, it is nevertheless an instrumental menace because there are people 
who could be deceived by it and are being deceived by it in the free 
world, as well as some behind the Iron Curtain. 

Mr. Pool. Is the purpose stated in the bill too broad or should it be 
cut down to what we are really after ? 

Dr. DoBRiANSKY. I do not think it is broad at all. As a matter of 
fact, I think the "whereas" provisions afford this more expanded in- 
terpretation without misleading us into the area that Mr. Harriman 
and others have in mind, that is, the purely academic exercises such as 
we have at Georgetown and elsewhere with regard to foreign affairs. 

These bills address themselves specifically to cold war thinking, po- 
litical warfare, and if you will allow me to continue, you will see what 
I am referring to. 

Another thing, of course, that Mr. Harriman brought out was the 
matter of classified material. 


When I was in the National War College I had considerable access 
to such classified material. However, all I can say here is that, as a 
matter of fact, there is enough material with regard to the ways and 
means, the content, the scope of Kussian political warfare that even 
1 year of intensive training, whether you restrict it to Government 
officials or, preferably, you also invite private citizens, would not be 
enough actually to cover the breadth of unclassified material. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. In other words, you could do a good job of re- 
educating the State Department totally with declassified information. 

Dr. DoBPiiANSKY. I am convinced of that, sir. This is as far as I 
would like to go on the subject of classified materials, although I could 
discuss in appropriate circumstances specific projects, including, for 
example, Mr. Kersten's amendment to the Mutual Security Act at the 
beginning of the fifties, when we attempted to set up, in implementing 
the Kersten amendment, free national battalions integrated into 
NATO. I am not impressed by what I would call the overstress of 
fright on this matter of classified material by Mr. Harriman. 

If I may continue with the negative arguments that I have extracted 
from the responses of the executive agencies, over the years we have 
been told, ( 1 ) that confusion with and a duplication of work of existing 
agencies would occur; (2) that the Foreign Service Institute, the Na- 
tional War College, and other public and private institutions already 
furnish instruction on Communist strategy; (3) that a formulation of 
cold war strategy and tactics into an "operational science" is a delu- 
sion; (4) that training of operational elements (perhaps a dynamic 
Freedom Corps as against our essentially defensive Peace Corps) 
should not be publicized; (5) that the Russians would perhaps be ais- 
concerted by what they may regard as a cold war institute and a train- 
ing course for espionage; (6) that educational pluralism must be up- 
held; and (7) that we are already making positive progress in eco- 
nomic buildups in the underdeveloped countries and, in the fashion of 
a passive model, in self-improvement at home. 

Taking these major counterarguments in toto, it is evident that their 
proponents either have no conception of total cold war or, if they do, 
are desperately seeking any rationalization to safeguard the sanctity 
of their respective jurisdictions against an inevitable subsumption to 
the totality of cold war thought and performance. 

Their first argument is specious because there is much confusion and 
also frittered thought that requires integration and rounded 

The second fallaciously magnifies a dearth of study and instruction, 
meaning at the National War College or Foreign Service Institute or, 
for that matter, at any of our private institutions, and indicates, in 
itself, a dearth of understanding of what is involved in the Freedom 

The third argument reinforces this comment. The fourth one is 
strange for an open society that should never cease in espousing and 
working for universal freedom. 

The fifth borders on stupidity as to the Russians being disconcerted 
about this. 

The sixth partakes of philosophical sophistication but, aside from 
our perilous gap in cold war education, one wonders what happened 
to pluralism with the new proposal last year of a National Academy 


of Foreign Affairs, which from all indications would be an egregious 
and wasteful duplication of existing educational institutions, whether 
at Georgetown, Pennsylvania, or elsewhere. 

The seventh point can best be answered by just observing the slow 
collapse of our policy of patched-up containment as evidenced today 
in Cuba, tomorrow perhaps in Venezuela, South Vietnam, Laos, or 
some other point on the terrain of the free world. We have a greater 
breed of economic determinists in Washington than one can possibly 
find in Moscow. 

In conclusion, the Freedom CJommission and the Freedom Academy 
would become valuable and highly effective media for both our pub- 
lic and private institutions as concerns a general enlightenment and 
understanding of the constant, dangerous threat that has penetrated 
the free world. Their very existence and work would bar indiffer- 
ence, complacency, naivete, or even hysteria toward this persistent, 
totalitarian peril which is centered in Moscow. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. Insofar as there is valid criticism of the so-called 
extreme right in this area of communism, is this not the best antidote 
there is for it, this type of program? The best antidote for the 
excesses of extremism ? 

Dr. DoBRiANSKY. There is no question about that. I certainly 
would agree with that. Having followed this, with Mr. Grant and 
others leading it, I would say that these people have contributed 
solid thought and firm support for these jDroposals, by and large 
people who have continually manifested a unique stability and a 
great deal of perspective when it comes to the treatment of cold 
war problems. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. I agree with you. 

Dr. DoBRiANSKY. There is no doubt about it. 

I would like to stress this, that total cold war thought, in our case 
necessarily oriented toward universal freedom, instrumentalizes every- 
thing — diplomacy, economics, science, culture, propaganda (in which 
we are next to pitiful), the military, even, among many other things 
in life, athletics — in an integrated, aggregative whole for positive 
action and successful performance. 

Moscow has schools for this, and they haven't been established for 
reasons of eternal contemplation. We have no such schools, and to 
refer to any in this country as comparable to theirs is the height of 
either ignorance or reckless foolery. Consider what you will, the 
National War College, Harvard, Georgetown, or the Foreign Service 

In short, the service of the Freedom institutions in this specialized, 
macro-psychopolitical field would be in fundamental service to our 
own survival as an independent nation. 

On grounds of national survival, we cannot afford to risk the pro- 
spects of psychopolitical attrition or isolation as the dikes of patched- 
up containment begin to fall about the world, not to mention other 
paramilitary avenues of national reduction. 

Mr. Pool. Mr. Ichord. 

Mr. IcHORD. Yes, I wish to compliment you for a very informative 


It has been brought to the attention of the committee that this 
proposal has been opposed by the far right. Do you know the basis 
of that contention ? 

Dr. DoBRiANSKY. Has been opposed by the far right ? 

Mr. IcHORD. By the far right. The statement was made in the 
committee the other day by Mr. Senner, I believe, that this bill was 
opposed by the John Birch Society. Do you know anything about 
their opposition ? 

Dr. DoBRiANSKY. No, I do not, sir. 

Mr. IcHORD. Do you know of any opposition from the far right ? 

Dr. DoBRiANSKY. I havc not really come across any opposition. I 
am trying to recall. Of course, back in 1960 there were some who 
actually took the position that a Freedom Commission and a Free- 
dom Academy, should they be established, would be targets of Com- 
munist infiltration and, therefore, if anything, to fill in this truly 
educational gap in our system, it would be better to have it, let us 
say, at a private imiversity dealing with political warfare in its 

That is about the only type of opposition that I have heard from 
the far right. 

My answer to this would be, then, that we might as well fold up 
everything if we fear Communist infiltration. 

Mr. IcHORD. You heard the Secretary of State or the Under Secre- 
tary of State, Mr. Harriman, testify this morning? 

Dr. DoBRiANSKY. Ycs, I did. 

Mr. IciiORD. He is opposed to the training of large numbers of 
private citizens in an academy, in the Freedom Academy or the Na- 
tional Academy of Foreign Affairs. I would like to hear you com- 
ment upon his objection. 

Dr. DoBRiANSKY. I listened rather closely and if I'm not mistaken, 
he failed to offer any justifying reasons for what appears to be simply 
a comment. I mean a rational feeling on his part, other than bringing 
up the matter of classified materials. But let me handle this matter 
in this fashion. It is curious to me that many of our service schools — 
you take, for example, the Army War College and to some degree at 
the National War College and I am sure even in the State Depart- 
ment — public seminars are conducted perhaps for an entire week and 
with what purpose? Wliom do they bring in ? They bring in movie 
producers, journalists, educators, people who have one degree of 
influence or another, let us say, in media of public opinion through- 
out our country. Wliy do they bring them in if not to some extent 
inform them. 

Then the other curious aspect of all this is that many a commander 
or, let us say, a general at a given post who has been conducting the 
study, oftentimes expresses regret that there are not enough re- 
sources, not enough time to really impart what is necessary, not to 
mention the problem of incorporating many others in such under- 

Now the point here is that we are attempting to impress through 
these very meager means some of this information on people who 
affect public opinion in this country. 


I would say that even on the level of imparted information the 
Freedom Academy would really overcome the limitations of these 
gestures, these attempts on the part of our many service institutions. 
When it comes to classified data, I cannot see that, let us say, a respon- 
sible editor of a newspaper, whose background has been thoroughly 
investigated, would necessarily be a person subject to question even 
for the treatment of classified material, no more or less so than anyone 
being in the armed services and eligible for instruction over a 10- 
month period at the National War College. 

Mr. IcHORD. In addition to operating the Freedom Academy the 
Commission will also have the duty of operating the information 

Do you think this additional duty of operating the Information 
Center might overburden the Commission ? 

Dr. DoBRiANSKY. No, I do not believe that at all. I think the 
Freedom information center M^ould be a very important and efficient 
operational instrument at the disposal of the Freedom Commission. 
Also, I have no fear concerning the supposed matter of indoctrination 
because on the basis of my own experience — lecturing at various uni- 
versities, being as I indicated in these service schools — I would say 
that we are even pretty deficient in our rudimentary knowledge as 
concerns the environment, the conditions surrounding the immediate 

I could go into specifics. We even have it displayed on the highest 
levels of Government when, for instance, the chairman of the Senate 
Freedom information center would be a very important and efficient 
sians being in the Soviet Union. I do not think I am too intellectually 
sensitive or picayune, but my reaction immediately is that there is some 
deficiency in his understanding. I could go right down the line. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. Would ^ou say why, because I would like the record 
to show why there is a deficiency in knowledge. 

Dr. DoBRiANSKT. There is this deficiency because of these points; 
that actually even in our private institutions — and I for one have 
many graduates from the Russian Centers, whether at Columbia or at 
Harvard — students have almost no comprehensive, historical knowl- 
edge of Eastern Europe or central Asia. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. Doctor, I think you misunderstood me. You re- 
ferred to the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee referring 
to 200 million Russians. 

Dr. DoBRiANSKY. Whicli there are not, even in the world at large. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. I want you to state the misinformation you referred 
to so that it will be clear as to the point you are making. 

Dr. DoBRiANSKY. The point I was malring is that certainly if you 
get this matter of political warfare, the presumption is that you are, 
or will quickly become, familiar with the historical background of 
and the conditions that prevail about your enemy. 

Mr. JoHANSEN". I am not making myself clear. What is in error 
about the statement that there are 200 million Russians? 

Dr. DoBRiANSKY. The error is that, in fact, there are only about 100 
million Russians in existence. 


Mr. JoHANSEN. That is what I wanted in the record to buttress your 
point that that kind of misinformation was peddled by the chairman. 

Dr. DoBRiANSKY. Eight. We have a good deal of that. I would 
jiot want to take the time nor am I trying to put on a performance 
pointing out such deficiencies in our working knowledge. But I 
would like to say that for this kind of operation it will require a very 
intensive research that we have not had. Oftentimes I feel rather 
depressed when, as I said, I get students or address audiences who do 
not even have a rudimentary grasp of the data you would presume 
before embarking on a systematic study and instruction in what is 
totalistic cold war thinking. 

Mr. Pool. Do you have any further questions ? 

Mr. JoHANSEN. Yes. On page 11, item No. 5, you cited one of 
these arguments that the Russians would perhaps be disconcerted by 
what they may regard as a cold war institute and a training course for 

I did not hear the very last of the testimony of Secretary Harriman. 
I did not know whether you were referring to a point he had made or 
what the source is of that sort of suggestion. 

Dr. DoBRiANSKY. All seven points are actually taken from responses 
made over time by various agencies when this measure was considered 
over on the Senate side. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. I would like to pursue this one just a bit more, 
because it goes to my belief as to one of the main sources of opposition 
to this, to wit, that if we have this type of program and they started 
peddling the facts out of this Freedom Academy that it is going to 
disrupt the State Department's program of not having any tensions 
,with our enemies; that one of the main objections is that when the 
Department decides that we must now be on an amiable mood with 
them and we must underwrite wheat or we must do some other fool 
thing, that having a Freedom Academy saying they are still our ene- 
mies isn't going to fit in with their propaganda line. 

That is the point that concerns me. 

Dr. DoBRiANSKY. Congressman, I will agree with you that that may 
be the motivation, but actually in looking at this issue objectively I 
think that our whole attitude should be this : Whether that motivation 
exists or not, let us view clearly the objectives and the values of the 
institutions being proposed here. 

Now Mr. Harriman can come before us and say that we have com- 
mon objectives. But the cardinal point is this: that this whole issue, 
as I understand it, hasn't to do with objectives. The issue has to do 
really with an instrument that we want, a tool that we want. And to 
use the argument that because the Communists have political warfare 
schools, therefore we should not have them, is plainly specious. One 
could turn that about and say the Communists have missiles, ergo, we 
should not have missiles. 

The chief point is that the Freedom Commission and the Freedom 
Academy would actually be institutional tools that we do not now 
have. I think that opponents to the measure — when they tell you that 


there is sufficient instruction across the Potomac or down at Fort 
McNair or at any of our Russian Centers at Harvard, Fordham, Colum- 
bia, or the institution I am with, Georgetown— are attempting to 
hoodwink you. Either, as I stated before, they do not understand 
what composite cold war thinking is — where diplomacy and eveiy 
other area, what USIA does, what the military has, what the State 
Department considers, are all looked upon as instruments in, if you will, 
this totalistic disposition of thought — or they are rationalizing in 
behalf of their respective present precincts of activity, narrow and 
scattered as they are in this vital field. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. I have one final question, Doct-or. 

Do you feel there is any correlation between the reasons or alleged 
reasons for opposition to this program and the kind of thinking 
which prompted the Fulbright memorandum and prompted the cur- 
tailment of the type of activities that were being carried on by Colonel 
Kintner and some of the others prior to the promulgation of that 
nefarious document? 

Dr. DoBRiANSKY. Well, you are pressing me. I would say, of course, 
that there is no question about it. I tried to use language here which 
I think is diplomatic and tactful when I spoke of them desperately 
seeking any rationalization to safeguard the sanctity of their respec- 
tive jurisdictions against an inevitable subsumption. No question 
about it, they do not wisli to face this kind of necessary subsumption 
in thought and constructive practice. I am certain that there would 
be a great deal of generation of imaginative and productive thought 
from the Freedom Academy and the Freedom Commission ; and that 
surely would be totally in line with our whole American tradition. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. Thank you. 

Dr. DoBRiANSKY. I also wish to suggest that there are many con- 
crete instances that could be offered along these lines. 

Let me give you one experience I had — to be sure, looked upon 
perhaps by many as limited and many even opposed it in thought. 
But when Congressman Lawrence Smith of Wisconsin was alive we 
worked together on a concrete, cold war measure for the establishment 
of diplomatic relations with Ukraine and Byelorussia. Favorable 
hearings were held on this subject by the Foreign Affairs Committee. 

Inevitably, we were drawn into a tug of war with people on the 
other side of town. I mention this because it is significant for the 
issue at hand. When Mr. Murphy was Under Secretary of State, I 
met with him often on this subject and he readily admitted that they 
have no operational arm in the Department to consider adequately 
such specific, concrete projects. Now I maintain this is significant 
and true because our people in State don't have the time, they don't 
have the resources, over and beyond what we call the rituals of dip- 
lomatic concourse and foreign affairs obligations. Indeed, there isn't 
any precinct that can seriously attend to problems or projects or 
thought of this nature. 


Mr. JoHANSEN. If I might make an observation, Mr. Chairman — 
this is not stated by our witness — there seems to be an enthusiasm on 
the part of the State Department for some do-it-yourself diplomacy 
when it comes to providing tractors or drugs for Castro but not in this 

Mr. IcHORD. Mr, Chairman, I want to make a statement for the 
record. I disagree with my colleague, at least that was the inference 
that I got from the gentleman from Michigan, that this issue had to 
do with the sale of wheat to Russia. I disagree entirely with my col- 
league from Michigan on the matter of sale of wheat but, simply put, 
Doctor, is your position on this bill that in order to effectively fight 
an enemy you have to know what he thinks, how he fights, and how 
effectively to combat him, and that both inside and outside of Govern- 
ment there is no institution or place where a private citizen or even a 
governmental employee can go to get that type of knowledge and 
training ? 

Dr. DoBRiANSKY. That is correct. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. I will agree with my friend and colleague on that 

Mr. IcHORD. I am glad we agree in that respect. 

Dr. DoBRiANSKY. And I might say this : The perspective that I am 
expressing here may perhaps be different, but the fact is that there are 
people in this country who are graduates of military schools in the 
Russian Empire under the czars. 

Now, to be sure, less perfect, less refined, the type of course work 
that was given in these imperial Russian war colleges, whether down 
in the Caucasus or up in St. Petersburg, is essentially the type of coui^e 
work I am speaking of here, in the modes of cold war thinking. Such 
thought is fundamentally not new. It is not a mode of thought that 
began, let us say, in 1917. But I will admit this : as I indicated in my 
presentation, with science, with technology there has been an enormous 
improvement, an enormous investment of resources in the Soviet Union 
in this kind of preparation. For any one to saj^ that we have any in- 
stitutions that compare in kind, I am not mincing words when I say 
that any such statement or utterance is simply farcical. 

Mr. Pool. We certainly appreciate your appearing before the 
committee. Your testimony has been very thorough and has been very 
helpful to the committee. On behalf of the committee I want to thank 
you for being here. 

Dr. DoBRiANSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

(At this point Mr. Schadeberg entered the hearing room.) 

(The material submitted l^y Dr. Dobriansky follows :) 


Wasiiington, January 6, 196 4 


In response to the Communist" "peac^" offensive; we first, c'oTnproinised, technologi- 
cally jpith^, nuclear 'test ban treaty; then we relented economically in the wheat deals. 

What's ;ip>M; ip the name of "peaceful coexistence"? Khrushchev now desperately 
wants our politico-moral acquiescence' fo his empire of captive nations,, and he seeks 
to obtaiti. it .througl^ a. Soviet -styled non-aggression pact. 

At th^ very pioment of signing the test ban treaty -- significantly the Treaty of Mos- 
cow -- the Russian leader was" in rrlany ways m'akingtwo points perfectly clear: (1) 
the coi,d w(ari.s a permanent _^enterprise and (2) a non-aggression pact is a high priority 
Russian objective. At that time, his U. N. spokesman, Fedorenko, was attacking 
Portuguese jcplijnial policies. and equating these policies with U.S. and Western 
European policies in an attempt to influence Africa agaipst NATO. As to the second, 
shortly, thql-eafier, at the Inter -Parliamentary Meeting in Belgrade. Khrushchev's 
representatives hammered away at the "n'eed" for a non -aggression pact between the 
WarpawtPact Nations and NATO if international tensions are to be relaxed. These 
are just two of many exariipl'es of the' Soviet Russian pattern. 

In the meantiine, reacting as usual to M'oscbw's maneuvers, we have been content- 
ing ourselves with the mirage, of "progressive steps toward a genuine peace." In 
government and elsewhere many believe tliatthe next step should' bp a ^'confidence- 

>building" non-aggr-es.sion, pact with the world's foremost aggressor. This brand of 
naive thinking is a' natural off shodt ofDur self-defeating policy Of "containment" and 

■'all its qtcauterments of accommodation, coexistence with totalitarian puppet and 
satellite regimes, and the unrealistic hope for a structural fragmentation of Mos - 
cow's colpnialempire. , 

Editor's Note: Dr. Lev El' Dobrian'sky~is'-a professor af.,ecoapmic§ .at Georgetown 
University. He is the author of the Captive Nations Week Resolution (Public Law 
85-90) which was passed by Congress ih 1959-. 'This, resol-utlon provides that the 
third week of July be set aside each year to remind the world of the nations held in 
bondage by Russian imperialism. Dr. DobrianSky is also a member of the American 
Security Council's Strategy Staff. 



Khrushchev has his troubles, of course. Contributing to his present troubles was 
a whole decade of unrest and uprisings among his captive nations, viz. to mention 
a few, Ukraine in '50-51, Slovakia '52, East Germany '53, Turkistan '54, Georgia, 
Poland and Hungary '56. (Many people do not realize that nationalistic, anti -Soviet 
uprisings have occurred within the Soviet borders as well as within the East Euro- 
pean satellites. ) Back in 1955 the power center of the world Communist conspiracy 
recognized that it couldn't afford such perpetual opposition if its global cold war 
ambitions v/ere to be satisfied. Moscow launched its massive campaign for "peace- 
ful coexistence" and, profiting from the fear induced by its military and space tech- 
nology from 1957 on, it has succeeded in preventing most Western governjTients from 
concentrating on the core of the world's primary problem, Soviet Russian imperio- 

Historically, the Russians have always been masters in capitalizing on their troubles 
as well as tlieir strength. Most Americans would be horrified to learn hov/, both 
officially and materially, we have aided the Russian imperio-colonialists in recreat- 
ing and expanding their empire from 1918 to the present, particularly in periods of 
"Russian troubles. " Whereas these periods, including the present o ne, should have 
been seized as our opportunities for the advancement of world freedom and thus 
genuine peace, they invariably have turned into phases of Russian power consolida- 

We are going through such a phase now, abetting it, as before, with our wishful 
hope for fragmentation of Moscow's empire, an erosion of its totalitarian power, 
and the weaning of its supposedly nationalist puppet regimes. The continued ab- 
sence of an affirmative cold war strategy and the succession of compromises are 
now being eloquently rationalized as conscientious endeavors for peace, to be 
balanced against the horrendous prospect of thermonuclear co-destruction. The 
irony of it all is that this course paves the way for the outcome we all seek to avoid. 
A po litico -moral acquienscence to the Soviet Russian Empire will take us a long way 
on this disastrous course. 

Aside from the sticky problem, oi allied NATO consent, the chances for such acqui- 
escence via a non-aggression pact depend on two contrary forces in the United States. 
One is the accommodationist spirit which is growing because of the above mentioned 
poorly founded hope and illusions . This spirit is based on a persistent inability to 
profit from the lessons of history. Even on the highest levels of our government it 
is marked by a serious lack of understanding in regard to the empire -state nature 
of the Soviet Union, the long tradition of Soviet cold war policy and techniques, and 
the means for defeating the Soviets in the cold war without precipitating a -hot one. 
Common expressions of this force are "don't irritate the bear, " "the less said 
about the captive nations the better, " "we must relax tensions". 

If the spirit of accommodation is spread by further euphoria or plain fear, it wi 
virtually guarantee the pact and our politico -moral acquiescence to Moscow's f£ 

I' ill 
^ ^ , , J ._ .far- 
flung empire. Countering this force is a second one based on the moral objectiv i? 
liberating the captive nations and clear understanding of the strategic im p ortance 
of thcLiO nations in the cold war. 


Aiding the totalitarian overlords of these nations on the basis of a "weaning" 
theory fortifies the unwanted regimes , not the peoples in their struggle for free- 
dom. Indeed, it undermines the struggle which in essence is a cold war between 
the people and their Communist governments. The net result is a weakening of 
our own posture in the cold war. A non-aggression pact would be a crushing blow 
to that struggle. 

- The Lessons of Captive Nations Week - 

On these major points, the lessons of Captive Nations Week in this country are both 
revealing and instructive. Millions of Americans know them; others have yet tii 
grasp them. Many misconceptions of both the Captive Nations Week Resolution and 
the Week itself still circulate, but once they're dissolved the reasons why Khrushchev 
wants acquiescence to his empire become crystal clear. Also, it is an open secret 
that accommodationists seeking a pact with the constant aggressor would have the 
observance eliminated. 

Khrushchev and his satraps have never opposed anything any more vehemently and 
for so long as the Captive Nations Week Resolution (Public Law 86-80) v/hich Con- 
gress passed in July, 1959. His unprecedented explosion at that time is a matter 
of historical record. Here scores of officials were ben'ildered by the reaction. As 
he testifies in his book Six Crises , former Vice President Nixon, who was then in 
the USSR, found the resolution to be "the major Soviet irritant throughout my tour. " 

Why this unusual Russian opposition to the resolution, then and since? Before 1959 
our leaders had often spoken in behalf of some captive nations. Actually, thei-e are 
several answers to the question. First, it was the first time that our government re- 
cognized the numerous captive non-Russian nations in the USSR itself, such as Georgia, 
Armenia, Ukraine and others. Khrushchev instinctively understood the meaning of 
this for the false image of the USSR in the world at large. Second, being self-renew- 
ing annually, the resolution could always be implemented to combat Moscov/'s cold 
war operations. That this will in time be done is a source of apprehension for the 
Russian cold war instigators. And third, as perpetual reminders of the slave half 
of the world, both the resolution and the Week (3rd week in July) are stumbling blocks 
to Moscow's deceptive campaigns for "peaceful coexistence" and a non-aggression 

Just review these few highlights of Moscow's sensitivity to the law and Week. Still 
in 1959, Khrushchev scorned the law in his Foreign Affairs article "On Peaceful 
Coexistence"; at Camp David, according to Pennsylvania's Governor Scranton, "he 
inveighed against it at a greater rate almost daily"; in October, before the Supreme 
Soviet in Moscow, the Russian leader again denounced the law. In 1960, similar 
denunciations flowed during the Week's observance and new tactics were employed 
by Moscow to deflect world attention from the captive status of nations both within 
and outside the USSR, viz., the sudden Moscow-sponsored publication in London of 
pamphlets titled The Fifteen Soviet Republic, Today and Tomorrow - a "Potemkin" 
version of their 'independence and prosperous growth" - and also Khrushchev's 
tirade in the U.N. against "Western colonialism. " The November 20, 1960 issue 


of the Neue Zurcher Zeitung gave a vivid report of how this maneuver almost back- 
fired when Canada's John Diefeabaker broached the subject of the captive non -Russian 
nations in the USSR, even producing a furor there. 

Similar evidence grows for 1961-63. In '61, for instance, Khrushchev again violent- 
ly attacked the resolution in the October Communist Party Congress, using the age- 
old Russian diplomatic gimmick of "no interference in internal affairs. " Though 
Western diplomats fall for gimmick, the fact that numerous non-Russian nations 
in the USSR itself were originally conquered by Soviet Russian imperialism reveals 
the myth of this argument. The Week's observance in 1962 received similar treat- 
ment. Then, in 1962, UNESCO aided Moscow's efforts immensely by publishing 
the fraudulent Equality of Rights Between Races and Nationalities in the USSR. On 
January 2 3, 196 3, Moscow's weekly T he New Tijnes asked "Is it not liigh tiine to 
discontinue the 'Captive Nations Week' in the United States?" On July 8, Pravda 
beraxed the President for proclaiming the Week and "losing his sense of reality" 
on July 14 Izvestia painted the Week as "a propagandistic trick of the American 
enemies of the freedom and independence of nations." There is lots more. 

The 1963 Captive Nations Week observance surpassed all others. The Week's Fifth 
Anniversary in '64 holds high promise for both public non-acquiescence to a Russian- 
styled non-aggression pact, and for a Special House Committee on the Captive Na- 
tions. Or, as other peoples have found to their tragic regret, would you prefer to 
follow Pavlovian Dr. Khrusnchev's advise: relax, be less tense about basic truths, 
agree with our "truth", and you'll have "peace"? 



Dr. Ste'Jan Possony 

Frank I. Jchnson 

Dr. lames O.Atkjn'JCn 

Or Lpv E, DobrigiTsky 

Abn.ral 'Chester C. Ward, 

USN (Rel.) 
Chief, Washmslon Bureau 
Lee R, Pennington 
Researcii Director 
William K. Lamt/iF, Ir. 
Karl Baarslag 
Or Ahlhony T Bouscarcn 
Anthony Hanigan 
©aplatr J H Morse 

USN (Bet ) 
Edgar Ansel Mowrer 
Dr. Gerhart Niemeyer 
Duane Thorin 
Stanley J Tracy 


USA (Ret ) 
Admiral Ben Moreell. USN (Ret ) 
Dr. Robert Morris 
Or. Stelan Hossony 
Admiral Felm B Stump, USN (Ret) 
Dr. Edward Teller 

General Albert C Wedemeyer, USA (Ret ) 
Admiral Chester C Ward, USN (Ret ) 

This report nay be quoted in 
whole or in part it context is 
preserved, credit given and copy 
ol quote furnished. 


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Peess De:paktment 

Embassy of the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. 

1706 18th Street NW., Washington, D.C., 

Decembku 30, 1963. 
Enclosed is a message by 36 prominent Ukrainian public figures to all Ukrain- 
ians in the U.S.A., to the Committee on the Monument to T. G. Shevchenko, 
received by us from the Novosti Press Agency, Moscow, U.S.S.R. It may be 
published as a whole or in part as you deem best. 

We will appreciate your giving this consideration and, if publistied, giving 
a credit line to Novosti. 
Yours sincerely, 

/s/ Y. Bobrakov, 

Yuri I. Bobrakov, 
Press Department. 


Message to Ukrainians, to all Ukrainians in the U.S.A., to the Committee on the 
Monument to T. G. Shevchenko 

Dear fellow-countrymen who live outside the Motherland : 

It is with a feeling of profound respect and love for the genius of the Ukrain- 
ian people, for the great poet, and revolutionary democrat Taras Grigoryevich 
Shevchenko that we address to you this heartfelt message from the banks of 
the Dnieper, from our dear Soviet Ukraine, from the sunny capital of our 
republic — ancient and every-young Kiev. 

Mankind includes the name of the great son of the Ukraine, Taras Grigorye- 
vich Shevchenko, among its finest names. Peoples of the world know him as an 
implacable fighter against slavery and injustice, against social and national 

Shevchenko's strong and passionate voice has, through time and distance, 
found its way into the minds and hearts of millions of people in the world. 

In paying tribute to Shevchenko mankind pays tribute to a great humanist, 
to a singer of friendship among peoples, to a champion of freedom, happiness 
and progress. 

The significance of Shevchenko and his work in the life of our people is excep- 
tional. The image of the poet, his titanic creative and public activity, lent 
inspiration in the past to generations of fighters against autocracy, his rebel- 
lious poetry called people to the barricades of revolution, his poetic and artistic 
heritage has become an invaluable national treasure for us. The name of 
Shevchenko is a symbol of honesty, truth, unflinching courage and ardent love 
for the working people. Even today the poet's fiery lines strike cold fear in 
the hearts of tyrants and butchers, holding up to shame tlie enslavers of every 
kind, and rallying millions of people to the struggle for a bright future. 

A patriot and a true sou of his people, Shevchenko always showed deep love 
and respect for other nations, being a consistent internationalist. Everyone 
knows of Shevchenko's dreams of "all Slavs becoming kind brothers," his friend- 
ship with the Negro, Aldridge, and with Polish progressives and his profound 
esteem for the men of Russian culture who bought him out of serfdom, his love 
and brotherly feelings for outstanding Russian revolutionary democrats. 

Shevchenko devoted all his powerful talent to his people, to the struggle for 
their happiness. This is what makes his titanic figure stiU more imposing, the 
feat of his life still more majestic and his rich creative legacy truly inestimable. 
This is why he is understandable by, and dear and near to, all peoples of our 
multi-national motherland. In the Soviet Union there is no city, town or village 
where you can not hear the beautiful poetic lines of the great poet. Shevchenko 
celebrations have long become a notable occasion not only for the Ukrainians, 
but also for all Soviet peoples in our "great, free and new family." 

Facts speak eloquently of the affection and admiration Soviet people feel for 
the great son of the Ukraine. More than a hundred monuments to the poet have 
been erected in the land of Soviets, and five museums have been set up. Over 
three hundred populated areas, nine theaters and four institutions of higher 
learning, including Kiev University, bear the name of Shevchenko. 

His name has been given to plants, collective and state farms, palaces of cul- 
ture, cinemas, stadiums, streets, parks and so on. The poet's works in our 
country have been printed in millions of copies. Shevchenko's poems have been 


translated into aU the languages of the fraternal peoples of the Soviet Union. His 
Kobzar is particularly popular. During Soviet years it has been published 53 
times in the Ukraine vfith a total printing of about two million copies. Shev- 
chenko's famous Zapovit has been printed in 45 languages of the world. 

In honor of the great poet's memory, the Ukrainian Government has instituted 
state prizes named after Shevchenko. These are awarded every year to authors 
of the best works in Ukrainian literature and art, which have won wide recog- 
nition and have been highly appraised by our people. 

Together with the other fraternal i)eoples of our country, the working people 
of the Soviet Ukraine are preparing widely to mark a memorable date in lOfiJ — 
the 150th anniversary since the birth of Taras Grigoryevich Shevcheuko. Last 
year a Ukrainian delegation at a UNESCO session sponsored a proposal, which 
was approved by the session, to commemorate that glorious anniversary through- 
out the entire world. 

Expressing the desire of all Soviet peoples to give the great poet his due, the 
government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has decided to erect in 
Moscow, the capital of our country, a monument to Shevchenko, which will be 
unveiled during the celebrations of his loOth birth anniversary. 

Thanks to the concern shown by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 
thanks to the triumph of the Leninist ideas of friendship and brotherhood, the 
literary and artistic heritage of Shevchenko has been made available to the 
entire country and has become part of the world's golden fund of culture. Just 
as the Dnieper carries its waters past Taras' grave into one world ocean, so do 
Shevchenko's creations like so many streams join the ocean of the human spirit, 
introducing our bold Prometheus to ever-new generations. 

The poet's creative genius is so vast that not only his contemporaries, not 
only we, but also forthcoming generations will feel the strength of his fervent 
poetry. This noble influence of the great singer of the people's lot is found 
not only in Ukrainian literature, but also in the literature of other peoples as 
well. Shevchenko has become an immortal poet of freedom, a poet of world 
significance, an exponent of the aspirations of all peoples. In our day Shev- 
chenko's poetry harmonizes with the desire of all oppressed and colonial peoples 
and calls them to struggle for liberation from the capitalist yoke. Every heart 
will respond to Taras' words about universal happiness and peace : 

. . . There will be no enemy 
On our renewed land. 
But there will be sou 
and mother and people on 

Our dear fellow-countrymen in distant lands : 

Any news about the memory of Taras Shevchenko being honored beyond the 
borders of our Motherland fills us with sincere joy as a manifestation of love 
of the Ukrainians abroad for their great poet. 

We think that you will be pleased too at the preparations which have now 
begun on a wide scale in the Ukraine and the entire Soviet Union in anticipation 
of the 150th anniversary of his birth. It is the sacred duty of every Ukrainian, 
wherever he may be, to commemorate the great poet in every way and to dis- 
seminate among other peoples Schevchenko's ideas of humanism, brotherhood 
and friendship of peoples on earth. 

We know money is being raised to erect a monument to Shevchenko in Wash- 
ington, the capital of the United States of America. 

We regard the erection of the monument to the great poet in Washington as 
proof of the esteem shown to Shevchenko by the Ukrainians who live in the USA, 
as a sign of profound respect on the part of the American people for the great 
son of the Ukraine, to the whole Ukrainian people. 

It is gratifying to us men of culture of the Ukraine, to all Ukrainians in our 
native land, to learn that a monument will be erected to our poet in the United 
States of America. We want this monument to become for you. our fellow- 
countrymen, a piece of the Motherland. We propose to send to the American 
continent some sacred soil from the Chernechya hill where Taras sleeps the 
eternal sleep. We would gladly take part in the unveiling ceremony of your 
monument, because Shevchenko and the Ukraine are inseparable. We favor 
this worthy tribute to the great poet. 

But we are resolutely against the malicious attempts of the enemies of the 
Soviet Union to use the poet's works against our country, against the cause of 
all humanity — the struggle for peace. We vigorously come out against the at- 
tempts of some unprincipled people to employ his good name for their dirty po- 


litical ends. Their efforts to spend the hard-earned money, collected by the 
Ukrainians living in the USA for a monument to Shevchenko, on propaganda 
against the Ukrainian people and against the Soviet Union are causing anger 
and indignation in us. 

The working people of the Soviet Ukraine are confident that you, our distant 
fellow-countrymen, share our anxiety. It is clear to everybody that the erection 
of a monument to Taras Shevchenko on American soil must not become a means 
for whipping up enmity towards our country, towards our people, but most facil- 
itate mutual understanding between peoples, the preservation and consolidation 
of peace throughout the world. An unbiased person will come to this conclusion. 

Preparations for Shevchenko's memorable jubilee coincided with an event of 
great significance for the strengthening of universal peace : three great powers — 
the Soviet Union, the United States of America and Great Britain — concluded a 
treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under 
water, a treaty which was fully supported by all peoples in the world. Already 
this historic document has been signed by the governments of more than a hundred 
countries. This fills all honest-minded people of the world with hope and 

The life and works of Taras Schevchenko, a staunch advocate of unity and 
friendship of peoples, inspires us to struggle for peaceful coexistence, for general 
and complete disarmament, for lasting -peace in the whole world. 

Dear fellow-countrymen : 

In his friendly message, "To My Fellow-countrymen in and out of the Ukraine," 
the great Taras solemnly bequeated the lines : 

Learn from others. 

But don't forget what you have. 

iMay Shevchenko anniversaries become days from disseminating the poet's grand 
ideals and promoting cultural relations between other countries and the Soviet 

We are thoroughly convinced that by paying tribute to Shevchenko mankind 
pays tribute to the mighty talent and fond memory of the great poet and revolu- 
tionary democrat. We believe that Shevchenko's image will always call for 
sincere friendship, accord and cooperation among all nations of the globe. 

M. Rylsky, P. Tychina, A. Korneichuk, B. Paton, L. Revutsky, V. Sos- 
yura, N. Bazhan, O. Gonchar, Y. Smolich, M. Stelmakh, A, Maly- 
shko, I. Vilde, L. Dmiterko, P. Kozlanyuk, I. Yura, N. Uzhviy, V. 
Kasiyan, K. Dankevich, P. Virsky, I. Bokshai, N. Tamovsky, G. 
Maiboroda, B. Antonenko-Davidovich, P. Maiboroda, M. Bozhiy, 
E. Kirilyuk, B. Gmyrya, V. Ivchenko, D. PavUchko, D. Gnatjoik, 
A. Pidsukha, V. Korotich, L. Kostenko, L. Rudenko, V. Chekanyuk. 
Novosti Press Agency ( APN ) 

Mr. Pool. Representative Barry of New York. 



Mr. Barry. Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, Ladies and 
Gentlemen: Within the past month the outward calm that prevailed 
on the world scene was shattered in a half dozen places. Revolts or 
mutinies took place in Zanzibar, Kenya, Tanganyika, Uganda, and 
Gabon. There was another coup in South Vietnam, and Castro acted 
up again. De Gaulle recognized the Red Chinese, and the British 
and ourselves agreed to disagree on trade with Cuba. 

Now I do not contend that each of these events could have been 
prevented, nor that all disagreements with our allies are necessarily 
fatal. Wliat I do say, however, is that the machinery of United States 
foreign policy is not geared to anticipate or prevent these outbreaks, 
nor to exploit them to our advantage when they do occur. You will 
note that as soon as this wave of mutinies hit Africa the tremor was 
felt throughout the West — will Africa go Communist? Yet why 


should this be? If there are areas of the world that are admittedly 
unstable, why is it that the West, and the United States in particular, 
must always be on the defensive, must always display anxiety at every 
change in the status quo, lest it signalize a new gain for the Commu- 
nists. Yet all too often these fears are justified, as seems to be the 
case with Zanzibar, for example. 

Newspaper reports indicate that the hard core of the revolutionary 
military forces were Cuban- trained guerrillas, probably no more than 
50 in number. Two of the leaders in the new government have long 
pro-Communist records and affiliations, and pro-Communist subordi- 
nates backstop the President and the Minister of Communications. 

What a sad commentary this whole affair is. What a revealing 
light it casts on the failure of the United States to deal effectively with 
our Communist adversaries. Outmaneuvered once again, and not 
even by the Russians or Chinese, but by the Cubans. 

Even a cursory study of the world Communist apparatus will reveal 
the reason for this. It lies in the fact that the Communists work at 
revolution all the time, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year. 
Political warfare is taught as a matter of course by all Communist 
Party schools, at all levels, both within the Soviet bloc and in the free 
world. Direction of all political warfare is coordinated through the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. Now, 
perhaps, the Chinese Communists may run a similar effort. At any 
rate, the Soviet Union still runs a centrally directed effort, which 
supervises a whole series of schools. These schools teach a party line 
that reflects the thinking of Communist leaders as to the best ideology 
to use at a particular time in a particular place. Various institutes, 
such as the Institute of World Economics, analyze the economic sit- 
uation of foreign countries with a view to exploiting any economic 
difficulties for the benefit of the Communist movement. The Soviet 
Academy of Sciences operates directly under the Council of Ministers 
and is used for purposes of political warfare. All of the apparatus 
of Soviet scholarship is essentially an instrument of Communist po- 
litical theory and political penetration. And we are all familiar with 
the Communist-front organizations, the peace societies, the friendship 
committees, the art associations, and so forth, through which the 
Communists seek to manipulate the gullible and convert the ignorant. 
Students who go to Communist countries may find themselves used as 
a source of intelligence. The Communists, in sliort, leave no stone 
unturned. They are masters of "conflict management." They know 
when to turn on trouble and how to exploit it and when to turn it off 
if it serves their interests. 

Contrast this with the American effort. True, thousands of foreign 
students are in residence here. And AID trains thousands of foreign 
technicians, while the Defense Department does the same for thousands 
of foreign military personnel. But this effort, both public and private, 
is conducted with no real coordination from the point of view of polit- 
ical warfare. 

Nor is it only foreign personnel who need instruction in this area. 
We Americans are too often found wanting when we are asked sharp 
questions about the defects in our own society or when we have to 
explain democracy. When confronted by trained Communists we 
are often ineffective, at times embarrassingly so. 

30-471— 64— pt. 2 5 


There is one obvious remedy for this situation, one that Congress 
lias considered before and one that deserves legislative approval. 
That is the Freedom Academ;^. What would the Freedom Academy 
be? It would be an institution that would offer a systematic and 
complete curriculum on the theory and practice of the Communist 
conspiracy and teach men and women how to defeat communism's 
destinictive tactics and how to build strong, free societies. Courses 
on communism are offered in some universities, but many offer little 
or nothing in this area. If we are to conquer this enemy, we must 
know him. 

All of the social sciences would be brought to bear in the curriculum 
of this Academy. A complete exposition and analysis of the Com- 
muist system would be given. Then the problems of our own so- 
ciety might be analyzed in equal depth, showing how we plan to make 
it function better. This should be particularly useful to foreign 
students, whose image of American democracy and free enterprise is 
too often colored by the most narrow and outdated misconceptions. 
The ethics and morality central to the democratic way of life would 
be studied in depth. The ideological and organizational history of 
the world Communist movement would be subjected to the closest 
scrutiny. The problems that particularly concern emerging nations 
would be given thorough consideration. 

In addition to these theoretical studies, the Academy would be con- 
cerned with the most practical questions. There would be courses 
in the methods of combating international communism in the organi- 
zational sense. The use of domestic political movements for our 
purposes, rather than theirs, might be one subject of study. The tech- 
niques of conflict management might be another. 

In short, there is no reason for us to sit back and bewail the fact 
that the Communists always seem to have the initiative on the world 
scene. We need to go out and take the initiative. One instrument 
for that purpose is surely the Freedom Academy. From it we should 
be able to send forth a stream of young men and women from the 
United States, from all the free world, and even (or perhaps especi- 
ally) refugees from the world behind the Iron and Bamboo Curtains, 
better equipped to explain our way of life, to defend the bases of our 
society from intellectual attack, and, most of all, to advance the in- 
terests of freedom in a positive, vigorous manner in those areas of 
the world where the ultimate choice between freedom and slavery is yet 
to be made. 

Mr. Chairman, I would like to read the conclusion of the remarks 
made in an article by Professor Hook entitled "Wliy The U.S. Needs 
a Freedom Academy," which appeared in IBM magazine called Think., 
in September 1963. 

Mr. Pool. Would you just as soon insert that in the record ? 

Mr. Barry. I can insert it in the record. I would like to make refer- 
ence to this article for the record, that if someone who is making a 
further study of this issue would refer to page 10182 of the Congres- 
sional Record of the 1st session of the 87th Congress. 

Mr. JoHANSEN, This is Sidney Hook, is it not ? 

Mr. Barry. This is true. 

Mr. Pool. Mr. Barry, that was put in the record by Mr. Herlong? 
Is that the one that you are referring to ? 


Mr. Barry. It was a speech by Senator Mimdt. 

Mr. JoHANSEN". It has been put in the record of these hearings al- 
ready by Mr. Herlong.^ 

Mr. B.VRRY. Then my emphasis is merely to the last paragraph, but 
since it is already in, I think that covers it sufficiently. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. For the record, Mr. Chairman, you are a member 
of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House, Mr. Barry ? 

Ml". Barry. Yes, sir. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. I thinlc that is important to have as to the weight 
of your support of this legislation. 

Mr. Barry. Mr. Johansen, you might be interested to know that 
this morning there was a hearmg in a subcommittee of the House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, and I put to one of the Assistant Sec- 
retaries of State the question as to whether or not he felt there had 
been a sufficient indoctrination of State personnel in the ideological 
offensive that we as a people should conduct in order to win the cold 
war. He said that there had been some improvement made during 
the past few years since he had been an Assistant Secretary of State 
having to do with this type of thing but he wished more could be 

Mr. Johansen. I wonder if he cleared his answer with Secretary 

Mr. Barry. I, of course, would not want to get into personalities 
on the matter with him. I have no knowledge whether he did or did 
not. I think we are going more to the substance of the situation 
rather than getting into any conflict, but I do think this: that from 
him I learned that there was a great deal of room for improvement 
within the State Department itself, inculcating within tliose peo])le 
who are out fighting the cold war the need for us to have an ideologi- 
cal offensive which we can only achieve through a concentrated study, 
first, in knowing what we are up against and, secondly, establishing 
something ourselves which we are positive about and selling it. This 
is what we have to do in order to take a more aggressive role in the 
ideological war. We have heard of a series of schools where the Com- 
munists learn how to fight us, and we sit here without any concrete 
course in how to effectively fight them. You call this a cold war. We 
have a military establishment to train our Army. We have a mili- 
tary establishment to train our Navy. We have one to train our Air 
Force. We have nothing to train us in the field of fighting the cold 
war. I do not mean to demean the fine educational institutions which 
we have in the United States that do offer courses in explainmg what 
communism is and in teaching what it does and how it has worked its 
influence over the years. There is nothing to my knowledge in the 
academic world that teaches a course in how to actively and successively 
combat communism and its encroachment upon the free societies of the 

Mr. IcHORD. Mr. Barry, I wish to commend you for a very fine 
statement. Is the bill introduced by Mr. Hays providing for a Na- 
tional Academy of Foreign Affairs pending in your committee ? 

Mr. Barry. I think it is, yes. 

Mr. IcHORD. What is the status of that bill ? 

1 See part 1, pp. 955-961. 


Mr. Barry. We haven't reported it out. It has not come before the 
full committee. 

Mr. IcHORD. For the record, you approve of this Freedom Academy 
approach rather than the approach called for in the Hays bill ? 

Mr. Barry. Let me say this : Since I am not on the subcommittee I 
have nothing to do with that bill ; I only have a preliminary view 
which I am willing to give you now but which would not necessarily 
be my final view after I heard all the testimony from the subcom- 

Mr. IcHORD. I would like to have your views on it. Really, I don't 
think there is too much difference in the thinking of the proponents 
of this bill and the thinking of the people in the State Department 
who are pushing the National Academy of Foreig-n Affairs. Secre- 
tary of State Harriman objected to the Freedom Academy on the 
ground that we would be training, in his words, too many private citi- 
zens. However, it was pointed out to him that private citizens could 
also be trained in the National Academy of Foreign Affairs. Do you 
think that is a valid objection ? 

Mr. Barry. I would rather come forth with my own views rather 
than commenting upon what testimony has been given today. 

Mr. IcHORD. Before this committee, just general ideas about the 
Freedom Academy. 

Mr, Barry. Not having heard the gentleman this morning, I prefer 
not to have to comment on his views, except to say this with respect to 
the question you posed to me : One of the basic oppositions to the for- 
mation of the Freedom Academy, as I understand it, has been that it 
would conflict and cut into education. 

Mr. IcHORD, That is right. Overlapping duties. 

Mr. Barry. That is right. In my view, they would be nothing in 
comparison to what they would be like if this other bill came out. 

The other bill takes in the whole spectrum of foreign policy and has 
that as its content. Wliereas, this bill is limited at least to the crea- 
tion of an Academy to combat communism rather than in the general 
field of foreign policy as such. To this extent, I have a preliminary 
view but after the analysis and report comes up from the subcom- 
mittee I feel that it may well be my considered judgment at that time. 

Mr. IcHORD. What do you think about the informational center pro- 
vided for in this bill ? 

Mr. Barry. My view is that for this bill to succeed it should be 
designed to stay out of the hair of a lot of agencies and have almost a 
single purpose, namely, to educate people to combat communism. 
When you get into the business of information centers, it presupposes 
that it might represent the official policy of the United States and that 
it might therefore interfere with State Department public affairs or it 
might get into conflicts with CIA. 

I am just not student enough of this phase of the bill to comment 
specifically, but I would be fearful that if too much were made over 
this phase of it that it would lose some of the effect that it has in 
being a place where public officials or those aspiring to be public 
officials, and especially those engaged in aid agencies. State Depart- 
ment or CIA or anything having to do with security or information, 
could go for a good, solid education in how to combat communism, how 
to create an ideological offensive of our own that could win the cold war. 


Mr. IcHORD. Now this school could be run by the State Department, 
or then it could be run by an independent agency as contemplated in 
this bill. I take it that you are in favor of an independent agency to 
have the responsibility of running the Academy. 

Mr. Barry. I think that the bill would have to get further along 
before I would know whether it should be an independent agency or 
not. West Pomt is not an independent agency to the extent that the 
Department of the Army does have some say over it. I would think 
that this would have to be correlated to our State Department or it 
would have a rough time. 

Mr. IcHORD. I think there is a correlation in that we have the Advi- 
sory Conimittee and members of the State Department or a member of 
the State Department can be on the Advisory Committee. There 
would be correlation to that extent. 

Mr. Barry. My belief is that there must be real agreement here and 
where you have too wide a disparity of opinion on this issue, where 
those who don't want it at all and those who want it very, very much, 
that somewhere down the middle may lie where this legislation will 
ultimately rest. In that vein I would like to be a proponent of a 
Freedom Academy to teach how to combat communism. If I had to 
give up part of the bill in order to please someone, it would be the 
information side of it that I would be willing to sacrifice. That does 
not mean that it does not have good features, because I know tliat it 

Mr. Ichord. That is all. 

Mr. Pool. Mr. Schadeberg. 

Mr. Schadeberg. I have no questions. 

Mr. Pool. Congressman Barry, we appreciate your appearing be- 
fore this committee and giving us the benefit of your views. Particu- 
larly since you are a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, it is 
especially helpful to us. 

Mr. Barry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It has been a pleasure for 
me, and I greatly appreciate this opportunity. 

Mr. Pool. Our next witness will be Dr. William Kintner. 


Dr. Kintner. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Pool. Doctor, will you give us a thumbnail sketch of your 
background ? 

I believe it will be helpful for the record. 

Dr. Kintner. Thank you. 

I think my background is pertinent to this investigation. I retired 
from the Army after 21 years service in the grade of colonel in Septem- 
ber lOfil. Prior to that time I had a range of duty both in the Army 
and other departments of the Government which gave me, I think, a 
fairly good ringside seat in how to wage the cold war. I had an o})por- 
tunity to get a doctor's degree from. Georgetown University in 1948, 
taught 2 years at Command and Staff College at Leavenworth. Sub- 
sequently I was chief planner for a major activity in the Central In- 
telligence Agency. I then went to the Korean war. I was infantry 
commander at Pork Chop Hill. Later on I was negotiator at the 
Panmimjon armistice negotiations after the truce was signed. I came 


back to Wasliiiigton and served in various capacities in the Army 
Staff and as a Planning Board assistant to the National Security 

In 1955 I was on the staff of Nelson Eockefeller when he was Spe- 
cial Assistant to the President of the United States. I was head of 
political and psychological activities in the office of Mr. Rockefeller. 

Subsequently I was with the Operations Research Office, then served 
in France with our military headquarters — liaison with the French 
Government, and then came back to the Army General Staff. My 
last assignment was chief of long-range plans in the Office of Chief 
of Staff of the United States Army. I served at a fairly high level 
and in fairly sensitive positions under three administrations, the last 
2 years of President Truman's, during President Eisenhower's, and 
the first year of President Kennedy's. Any remarks I am going to 
make are completely nonpartisan in character. 

In addition to my military career, I am a writer. I have written a 
few books, the first is The Front Is Everywhere^ a study of Commu- 
nist organization and technology; coauthor of Protracted Conflct^ 
and the recently published Neiu Frontiers of War, in collaboration 
with Joseph Kornfedder, who is since deceased, a student at the Lenin 
School for 3 years from 1928 to 1931. I point this out because some 
people regard me as a little bit of an expert on communism. I would 
like to disclaim that. The work I have done has only touched the 
surface. I have never had the opportunity to have the type of research 
support and backing, the totality of information w^liich would be 
needed to do the job thoroughly. I will not mention the world situa- 
tion, which in my opinion is not necessarily worki)ig out to our advan- 
tage. Yet the purpose of such an Academy has to be responsive to our 
understanding of which way the conflict is going. There are several 
sciiools of thought: that we are on top or that the Comm.unists are 
mellowing. The school of thought to which I belong contends that we 
have a long, tough struggle ahead of us. 

As I see the proposed Freedom Academy, it serves essentially three 
major purposes: The first is that of research; secondly, is that of 
training; and, thirdly, some kind of public dissemination of its 

Now, on the research side I would like to point out and confirm what 
other people have suggested that it is very difficult even w^hen you 
are working in a university — I am currently professor of political 
sciences at the University of Pennsylvania, deputy director of a re- 
search institute there — to obtain specific infonnation on subjects that 
are very pertinent to what we are trying to study. How are the 
policies of various governments changing? What were the policies, 
say, of Brazil 10 years ago, w^hat are they in '64? Wliat are the 
influences that are brought to bear? One possible influence is the 
Communist organization in that country, to cite just one country. 
Do we know right now, among the 111-odd nations which have legal 
Communist parties, what their strengths are? Wliat is the ratio of 
visits from that countiy to the United States or some other free 
world coimtry and to, on the other hand, the Soviet Union or Com- 
munist China ? This type of information is very difficult to get hold 


The last world survey on the Communist party strength is, I think, 
3 or 4 years old. It is hard to obtain this information from the 
Government. What is the newspaper situation on a worldwide basis ? 
"What is the line which important papers in various countries follow ? 
"W^iat news services do they use ? 

For example, when Kenya became independent she subscribed to 
Tass, why ? Because it is free for one thing — or because she wanted 
to get a balance between, let us say, Reuters and the British service? 
I don't know whether they could afford to subscribe to our two com- 
mercial news services. This type of information is very pertinent to 
an understanding of foreign policy and to our understanding of what 
actions one might take. 

Let us take a look at the Cypiiis development. I was in Cyprus in 
'57. At that time it was evident that there was some connection 
between the Cypriot movement and certain groups of Greek Com- 
munists who were operating there. They had control of a very 
powerful labor union, they also had the mayors of five major cities. 
Tlie developments that have taken place in the last month or so 
there are not the type of developments which could have been alto- 
gether unanticipated. 

I am not saying that anything could have been done better than 
it has been done; I appreciate the efforts of Under Secretary of State 
Ball to settle the issue, but there is something deeper in the Cypriot 
situation than merely the Greek-Turkish antagonism. And the man- 
ner in w^hich Mr. Khrushchev has moved in on the United Nations 
discussions is indicative of that. The real question you have to face 
on research material is. Does this information exist in the Govern- 
ment? If so, can the private citizen obtain it if he needs it for his 
own purposes? 

Last year, for example, I tried to find out, in this case from the State 
Department, a list of the training agencies of the Communist activiti- 
ties inside Russia, Communist China, and the satellites, the type of 
information which has been bandied about in this discussion. I asked 
a very good friend of mine there. He said frankly this information 
was not available in a concise form. Yet, to my mind, this is the kind 
of operational information that I would at least have at my fingertips 
if I were planning a strategy to deal with the people trained by these 
Commimist institutions. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. In other words, it wasn't unavailable because it was 
classified ? 

Mr. KiNTNER. No, they just had not thought this particular type of 
information was particularly pertinent to their activity. They knew 
a number of the Communist institutions. I am not suggesting they 
were complet-ely ignorant about it, but to go aft-er this as a package 
of information just had not been requested by any high officials. 
Intelligence agencies generally respond to requests of officials whether 
they are in the State, CIA, or the Defense Department. 

I would also suggest that the private institutions in this country 
really are unable to do the job. 

I am fairly familiar with the university structure in this country. 
I am familiar with most of the so-called think centers, and this par- 
ticular area, namely, studies on the cold war or the nonmilitary aspects 


of our foreign policy, does not get the stress and backing that it sliould 

In the first place, there is a little matter of funding and financing. 
Very few major foundations will put too much money into this activity. 
They will put it into related activity, research studies, and matters of 
that kind. But if you get down to saying you really want to explore 
the cold war it is hard to get the money. This is a point, I believe, 
that Mr. Harriman made, that there should he, backing in the private 
research side. 

As of now, in ni}^ opinion, the backing is inadequate. I do\il)t very 
much if the private side, however, should take the responsibility for 
this major area of conflict. I believe that it is interesting to note that 
people in the other parts of the world feel somewhat the same way. 

I have here a little statement called "Principles on Which the For- 
eign Affairs Research Is Founded." This was published in London 
by a group of private citizens. They made this statement : 

It is regrettable that sucb a highly complex and controversial subject as 
international political warfare should have to be left to private individuals and 

Now on the research side I would like to suggest that there has been 
a basic need inside the Government to spend more time on what some 
of the issues are that we are confronted with in the cold war. There 
has been a reluctance sometimes to deal head on with these issues. I 
helped to organize the structure of the Psychological Strategy' Board 
in 1951. I was a member of something called the ideological panel. 
We met for quite a long series of sessions. One project that we sug- 
gested that might be developed was a study of the life of Stalin, to 
show tliat he was pretty much the sort of person that Mr. Khrushchev 
told the world he was in a speech to the Presidium in 1956. 

This was shot down either because it wouldn't do any good or it 
might be considered disruptive. 

Mr. JoHANSBN. Might be disruptive? 

Dr. KiNTNER. Yes. 

Mr. JoHANSBN. Of what? 

Dr. KiNTNER. Disruptive of the general approach to international 

Mr. JoHANSEisr. Aggravate tensions, in other words. 

Dr. KiNTNER. That, I think, is a fair summation of it. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. Thank you. 

Dr. KiNTNER. In the ideological panel, the issue of a positive Ameri- 
can ideology never got off the floor. The story being that since oars is 
a pluralistic society, it is very difficult for us to proje(^t the range and 
complexity of our society. There happen to be a few principles in 
our pluralistic society which, in my opinion, are worthj^ of at least 
presentation to the rest of the world, the Declaration of Independence 
and our form of constitutional Government. Nevertheless, it is argued 
that it is difficult to develop a positive presentation of our ideology in 
words and terms that would be meaningful abroad. 

On the training side of the activity, we should recognize that the 
Government agencies do undertake a significant amount of training. 
I have lectured at all the War Colleges, the National, the Indr.strial, 
the Army, NaA^y, Air Force, and so forth. I talked to the State 
Department Foreign Service Institute, including the Senior Officers 


Group. There is a good deal of work which does take place in tlie 
field under discussion, but primarily these schools are designed to 
produce professionals in their respective areas whether it happens to 
be information, diplomacy, or the military arts. And what comes up 
in this area is often treated marginally because it is not directly 
germane to the central core of their activities. 

I believe that was what Mr. Grant discovered when he took a look 
at the key Government curriculum. There is a lot of good work there, 
but on this particular held I would say it is relatively minimal com- 
pared to the size and scope of the problem. 

Now the private sector also conducts training. Perhaps you are all 
familiar with the American Free Labor Institute in Wasliington, 
run by the AFL-CIO, concentrating particularly on Latin America. 
I happen to know the man who is running it. He is doing a first-rate 
job, but it is very small compared to the problem. It only touches one 
field of our numerous sets of relationships with Latin America. It 
does not touch the educational field, business field, or other activities 
of the private sector. There is in Costa Rica an outfit called the 
Institute de Educacion Politica, which was set up by Jose Figueres 
and supported by Betancourt. It was designed to do two things: 
political actions against Communist subversion and, on the positive 
side, the positive defense of prodemocratic principles. Some grad- 
uates of this school were very helpful in Betancourt's successful defeat 
of the Castro subversive terrorists during the recent election campaign. 

In other countries you have the same issue. They tried to set up 
political warfare training in Korea and the Philippines. There is a 
committee on political warfare in France headed by Suzanne Labin, 
a ver}^ professional group with no ax to grind. Yet none of these orga- 
nizations receives public or private financing from their own countries 
or the United States. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. Would you see any objection to their receiving finan- 
cial support from the United States ? 

Dr. KiNTNER. I would see no oibjection whatsoever, but more im- 
portant is the research support from the United States. We are deal- 
ing with a global phenomenon and the phenomena we face in Venezuela 
or Brazil or Zanzibar are pretty much the same. If there were one 
central, higlily skilled, disciplined group trying to analyze this puzzle, 
making it available to these groups, their own work could be enhanced 
and we, of course, would get playback from them. 

This raises the issue of the subject of training foreign personnel — 
I believe, as it has been presented, it is a rather false issue. We are 
training foreign personnel. We train them at our military schools, 
not at the senior War Colleges but at the command and staff schools 
level and down the line. These personnel do have access to classified 
information. We are also training under the AID program; 5,766 
participants from overseas were trained by AID in the United States 
at the end of the last fiscal year and 2,127 were trained in the other 

Mr. JoHANSEN. What area was that training in ? 

Dr. KiNTNEH. In the AID program I assume. It is in economic 

Mr. JoHANSE^\ I mean the subject matter of the training. 


Dr. I^JNTNER. The subject matter, I assume, would have something 
to do with irrigation projects, help to education, the secondaiy schools, 
and so forth. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. Not communism ? 

Dr. KiNTNER, No, it is not in this field. I am pointing out that we 
are training foreign personnel in other fields. I have been to the police 
academy set up in the Canal Zone, again under AID auspices, where 
we are training their military officers and police officers there in tech- 
niques to combat subvei'sion that Mr. Harriman was discussing today. 
In certain instances if the information is not classified at least we 
have to tell them techniques to which we alone may be privy. So I be- 
lieve if we can train foreign personnel in other activities that there 
perhaps is a legitimate basis for training them in an area which may 
be equally critical to our national survival. 

Now on the public information question, there is no doubt in my 
mind that the Government does have an obligation to tell the citizens 
who are interested concerning important activities. There are hand- 
outs put out by all the Government departments and agencies — De- 
fense Department, State Department, Agriculture Department, and 
what-have-you. In the foreign policy areas, I personally like to turn 
to the Senate and House investigations, tlie Foreign Kelations Com- 
mittee or the Foreigii Affairs Committee, one or the other, and the 
Armed Forces Committee, because I find these committees provide the 
most objective information you can get from the Government. The 
bipartisan nature of a Freedom Academy would guarantee that you 
would get the same degree of objectivity in the information it pro- 
duced. I don't envisage a tremendous flow of handouts there, but 
there ought to be a place where a person who is seriously interested 
in the subject can go and have the information on which he places 
credence — just like people in the academic world place credence in the 
reports and findings of the congressional committees; they are highly 
respected. I believe the same thmg should be done here. 

Now another matter that is important is what the public needs to 
know in order to sustain the will to fight on in this very difficult con- 
flict. When the will is lost the battle turns against you. I was read- 
ing today, for example, about the situation in Vietnam. Four ye^rs 
ago, according to this article, when the American soldier went out in 
the countryside the Vietnamese kids would wave at them and say 
hello. Now, according to this article, appearing in today's Philadel- 
'phia Inquirer^ the kids sometimes turn their backs. That to my mind 
IS a psychological setback, assuming that the article is a valid report, 
which is very, very disconcerting. 

I would like to mention a type of problem which a Commission like 
this could study, namely, the meaning of the sustained 3- to 4-year 
campaign which the Communists have been conducting to degrade 
the attitude of the American people toward their security agencies. 
I am referring now to the Defense Department, the Central Intelli- 
gence Agency, the State Department, and the FBI, for example. 
There has been a series of books, I will cite a few, on the Defense 
Department, the last year or so, which are rather interesting. The 
latast one is Dr. Strangelove, or Flow to Fall in Love with the Bomb. 
There are Seven Days in May., Fail-jSafe, and The Bedford Incident. 
Interestingly enough, most of these books have a plot pretty nuicli the 


same. Our civilian officials are portrayed as rather psychotic and our 
military officials are outright l)arbarians. I do not know the motiva- 
tion ol" the people who wrote the books or produced the movies, but I 
do know that in 1959 Mr. Khrushchev stated that "\Ye (the Com- 
munists) will learn to use the prudent representatives of the bour- 
goisie." I think with careful research one might possibly find some 
relationship between Mr. Khrushchev's thinking and certain of these 
"end products" I liave mentioned. The Worker dated February 18, 
1964, stated : " 'Dr. Strangelove' Blueprints Ultras' Push to Annihila- 
tion." I do not know whether any department or agency of the Gov- 
ernment is investigating this kind of issue. I haven't checked to find 
out, but if this campaign erodes the subconscious attitude of millions 
of American people toward the responsible security agencies of the 
Government we will be in trouble. 

I should point out that Seven Days in May sold 2 million copies. 
That is a pretty good sale for a book. Now that the film is out, prob- 
ably about 20 million Americans at least will see it. If Khrushchev's 
campaign does have a purpose and if this security harpooning activity 
does reflect his campaign, then if I were concerned with planning and 
the defense of the United States I would like to look into it very 
thoroughly. That, however, requires a very skillful type of analysis. 
It requires a great deal of work before you can reach an objective con- 
clusion on the matter. 

There has been discussion during these hearings on the Government 
attitude toward a Freedom Academy. I covered a few points of it. 
One is that, of course, the pluralistic society really should not en- 
gage the official instruments of Government to study something which 
may be very controversial. There are very controversial aspects of 
our attitude toward the conflict. Personally, however, I don't see how 
we can avoid it. 

The objection has been presented that if a cold war institute were 
created and the Communists automatically dubbed the Freedom Acad- 
emy as such, it would be very dangerous. The graduates of it w^ould 
be branded as agents of the United States if they ever operated in a 
foreign country. But that charge is now made against almost any 
American-trained person if he goes back into a partially hostile en- 
vironment, whether he simply "went to one of our universities or 
whether he went to some Government-sponsored program. 

The size of the program is of some interest. The State Department 
proposal calls for a budget of some $6.5 million. The AID program 
has an annual budget of some $40 million. Most of our big univer- 
sities in this country which cover a multiplicity of subjects have budg- 
ets anywhere ranging from 35 to 40 up to 100 million dollars. What 
I am suggesting is that if the State Department proposal is designed 
<-o fulfill the same purpose as the Freedom Academy, the scope of the 
activity must be much larger than the degree of financial support re- 
quested by State, 

In summation, I would like to make these points. One is that the 
Communist governments train operators to work in the private sec- 
tors designed to erode the support of United States or other pro-West- 
ern elements in a given country. The U.S. Government trains its 
own personnel almost exclusively to work at the official level. The 
U.S. private training in this field is, in my opinion, totally inadequate 


and the United States Government up to the present time does not 
wish to engage in the private training. 

Aft^r these general remarks I shall be very happy to respond to 
any questions you may care to ask, 

Mr. Pool. Dr. Kintner, it has been very helpful to the committee 
for you to appear today. We appreciate it. 

Mr. Ichord, do you have any questions ? 

Mr. IcHORD. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman, but I do want to 
commend Mr. Kintner for a very interesting and informative presen- 

Dr. Kintner. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. Colonel, I have a couple of questions. 

You made reference to a proposal that was offered, and you were 
interrupted at the time, which you said was shot down and rejected 
because it was felt that it might be disruptive. Is there a possibility 
that some of the opposition from certain quarters to this proposal, to 
this proposed Academy and to the information center, is that some of 
the information which it might promulgate might also be deemed to 
be disruptive? 

Dr. Kintner. I think tliere is a possibility of that. We have vari- 
ous schools of thought on how to go about waging this struggle, and 
there are some with genuinely good motivations who think it is best 
to seek, as far as they can, some 7rhodu8 vivendi with the other side. 
Consequently, they would not encourage any course of action which 
might be regarded as provocative. I am not saying that is the official 
position of the Government. I am merely indicating that some people 
in the Government may have that attitude. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. Now may I ask you if by any chance you are famil- 
iar with, I think, the 1960 book, Cuba: Anatomy of a Revolution? 

Dr. Kintner. Who is the author of that ? 

Mr. JoHANSEN. Huberman and Sweezy. 

Dr. Kintner. That was not the Reader's Digest article? 

Mr. JoHANSEN. No. A pro-Castro book. 

Dr. KiNTNEiR. I am not familiar with that. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. Then I won't pursue it. 

Mr. ScHADEBERG. Coloncl, I want to express my appreciation for 
your being here. I ha\'e one question. 

Would it be your considered opinion tliat if we had the Freedom 
Academy that all of the agencies that would send our Government 
personnel from this country to other countries should have some train- 
ing in the Academy ? 

Dr. Kintner. I don't think all personnel. As I suggested, there is 
a very broad Government- wide training program for Government 
personnel. Tliere is also what you might call a general orientation 
training for Government personnel in this field. " I suspect that in 
view of the pipeline requirements, the people being rotated from place 
to place, that not all people could participate, particularly in a very 
long program of training. Rut I would suspect that a high percent- 
age of them might attend such an Academy were it established. 

Mr. Schadeberg. You do not have to answer it if you don't want to. 
Do you think our Pence Corps members, for instance, would be more 
adequate in their type of work if they had some sort of training and 
background ? 


Dr. KiNTNER, I can't answer that question for the simple reason 
tliat I know of no comprehensive review of the Peace Corps activities. 
I am personally in favor of the Peace Corps idea, but I don't Imow 
of any one who has really looked into it to see whether the Peace Corps 
people in the field were able to handle themselves well against the type 
of situations they would face. This might be another held of study 
which an Academy such as proposed in this bill might undertake. 

Mr. ScHADEBERG. Naturally, I think if anyone is working they are 
working with people, and this might be a very helpful background for 
someone working intimately with them. 

Dr. KiNTNER. There has not been any private study that I know 
of attempting to evaluate the Peace Corps. Of course it is fairly 
young in life. 

Mr. ScHADEBERG. Ycs, I Understand that. 

Mr. JoiiANSEX. Mr. Chairman, without usurping your prerogatives 
at all I would like to offer this observation, and direct it to the staff 
of the committee, Mr. McNamara and the others as well as to our 
chairman, Mr. Willis, that I think the witnesses that have been here 
before this committee, almost without exception, have been the finest 
aggregation of authorities in this field that I have been privileged to 
hear in my 6 years of service on the committee. 

Mr. Pool. I certainly do agree with the gentleman's observation. 

Doctor, I want to thank you again for appearing here today. 

Dr. KiNTNER. You are entirely welcome. 


Mr. JoHANSEN. Mr. Chairman, our colleague. Congressman Bob 
Wilson of California, who is a member of the Committee on Armed 
Services, has submitted a statement. I ask that it be incorporated 
at this point in the record of these hearings. 

Mr. Pool. Without objection, it is so ordered. 

(Congressman Wilson's statement follows :) 



Mr. Chairman, I am pleased that the committee has under consideration 
several proposals to establish a Freedom Academy. I endorse this idea and 
hope the Congress will pass the necessary legislation this session. 

As you may be aware, Mr. Chairman, suggestions for a Freedom Academy were 
first proposed in 1959 by our former colleague. Congressman Walter Judd of 
Minnesota and by Congressman A. S. Herlong of Florida. Similar legislation 
was introduced in the Senate at that time and has been reintroduced since 

In 19G0, the Senate passed a Freedom Academy bill shortly before the adjourn- 
ment of the 86th Congress. When that bill was reported from the Senate 
Judiciary Committee, it was enthusiastically supported by the committee, which 
declared in a statement at the time : 

"The committee considers this bill to be one of the most important ever 
introduced in the Congress. This is the first measure to recognize that a con- 
centrated development and training program must precede a significant improve- 
ment in our cold-war capabilities. The various agencies and bureaus can be 
shufiled and reshuflled. Advisory committees, interdepartmental committees, and 
coordinating agencies can be created and recreated, but until they are staffed 
by highly motivated personnel who have been systematically and intensively 


trained in the vast and complex field of total political warfare, we can expect 
little improvement in our situation." 

Mr. Chairman, I think that statement wraps up the need for this legislation 
very well and in just a few sentences. We need, in our Government, an inde- 
pendent, dedicated group, whose sole mission is to meet the challenge of commu- 
nism head on. We do not need any more interlaced bureaucratic committees 
and commissions. 

Unfortunately, in spite of that strong endorsement from the Judiciary Com- 
mittee and in spite of the fact that the bill did pass the Senate, the Congress 
has yet to approve legislation for the establishment of a Freedom Academy. 

I am aware that there is some opposition to this project by several of the de- 
partments and agencies of our Government. I am sorry that they feel it neces- 
sary to express their opposition. I am sorry, too, that we find it necessary 
here to point up the deficiencies that exist in a complete attack on the philosophy 
of communism. But I am convinced that there is a deficiency in our approach 
to this enemy and I find it hard to understand that others, in positions of re- 
sponsibility, don't see it. 

As a member of the Armed Services Committee of the House, I am close to 
much of the planning for the military defense of this country. I think, how- 
ever, that there is more to our overall defense picture in these days of cold, 
rather than hot, war than guns and missiles. For this reason, I am anxious 
that this legislation be given a full and complete hearing and strongly urge the 
committee to send it to the floor as soon as possible. 

I am sure that it will receive the support of the overwhelming majority of our 
colleagues at that time. 

Mr. Pool. If there are no other witnesses and no other testimony, 
we will adjourn. This will not complete the hearings; we will prob- 
ably have some hearings at a later date. 

(Wliereupon, at 3 : 50 p.m., Thursday, February 20, 1964, the com- 
mittee recessed, subject to the call of the Chair.) 

HEARINGS RELATING TO H.R. 352, H.R. 1617, H.R. 5368, 
H.R. 8320, H.R. 8757, H.R. 10036, H.R. 10037, H.R. 10077, 

Part 2 


United States House of Representatives, 

Committee on Un-American AcTivmES, 

Waskington^ D.G. 


The Committee on Un-American Activities met, pureuant to recess, 
at 10 :10 a.m. in Koom 304, Cannon House Office Building, Washing- 
ton, D.C., Hon. Edwin E. Willis (chairman) presiding. 

Committee members present : Edwin E. Willis, of Louisiana ; Wil- 
liam M. Tuck, of Virginia; Joe R. Pool, of Texas; Richard H. Ichord, 
of Missouri ; August E. Johansen, of Michigan ; Donald C. Bruce, of 
Indiana; and Henry C. Schadeberg, of Wisconsin. 

Staff members present : Francis J. McNamara, director ; Frank S. 
Tavenner, Jr., general comisel ; and Alfred M. Nittle, counsel. 

The Chairman. The committee will come to order, please. 

Today, the Committee on Un-American Activities resumes hearings 
begun on February 18 of this year on various bills to create a Free- 
dom Commission and Freedom Academy. 

In my introductory remarks to the February 18 hearings, I pointed 
out that five such bills, H.R. 352, H.R. 1617, H.R. 5368, H.R. 8320, and 
H.R. 8757, introduced repsectively by Representatives Herlong, Gub- 
ser, Boggs, Taft, and Schweiker, had been referred to the committee. 

Since that time, three additional Freedom Academy bills have been 
introduced by Members of the House and referred to the committee. 
They are H.R. 10036, by Mr. Ashbrook, a member of this committee, 
introduced on February 20; H.R. 10037, by Mr. Clausen, also intro- 
duced on February 20 '; and H.R. 10077, by Mr. Schadeberg, also a 
member of this committee, on Februaiy 24." 

Mr. Clausen's bill is substantially the same as the Boggs and Taft 
bills. Mr. Ashbrook's and Mr. Schadeberg's bills are identical with 
the Gubser bill. 

The primary difference between the Boggs-Taft-Clausen and the 
Gubser- Ashbrook-Schadeberg bills is that while the former provide 
an Advisory Committee to the Freedom Commission made up of rep- 

1 For copies of above bills see Appendix A, part 1, pp. 1111-1174. 



resentatives of executive branch departments and agencies, the latter 
provide for a Joint Congressional Freedom Committee to advise and 
oversee the operations of the Commission. 


The Chairman. The Honorable Robert C. Hill, former Assistant 
Secretary of State for Congressional Relations and Special Assistant 
to the Under Secretary of State for I^Iutual Security Affairs and 
also former U.S. Ambassador to Costa Rica, El Salvador, and 
Mexico, was to be the first witness this morning. Unfortunately, 
unforeseen business matters have made it impossible for him to be 
here. He has therefore written a letter to me which I will now read 
for the record. 

The letter is dated April 3, 1964. It reads as follows : 

My dear Mr. Chairman : I appreciate very mucli the invitation to testify before 
your Committee on April 7. 1964, in behalf of the important legislation which 
would establish a Freedom Academy. Unfortunately, since accepting your invita- 
tion, business commitments make it impossible for me to be in Washington for the 
hearing. I am, therefore, asking you to submit my letter to your Committee, and 
hope that it will be incorporated in the records of the Committee in support of 
the Freedom Academy. 

As you may know, Mr. Chairman, I have had ten years of government service. 
I began in India as a Vice Consul, was later Clerk of the Senate Committee on 
Banking and Currency, and from 1953 through 1960 served as United States 
Ambassador to Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Mexico, and as Assistant Secretary 
of State for Congressional Relations. During that time, I have observed the 
lack of knowledge of government officials, and private citizens, with regard to 
understanding communism and its dangers to our democratic way of life. I 
have also noted the lack of understanding on how to deal with the communist 
problem once it has developed. 

Today, four years after leaving government service, my office in New Hamp- 
shire has continuous inquiries from friends in foreign countries, as well as from 
private citizens in the United States, asking for advice on how to inform and 
prepare people for the struggle against communism. A case in point has been 
the recent turmoil of communist activity in Brazil, which fortunately has led 
to the ousting of Goulart. Recently, I made appointments for two friends of 
mine from Brazil to meet with Thomas Mann, the able Assistant Secretary of 
State for Inter-American Affairs. I knew that from this Foreign Service 
officer they would receive advice and not be brushed off or discouraged. 

This is not always the case, as shown by my own experience when the Em- 
bassy in Mexico tried vainly to warn the government of the United States, from 
1957 until 1960, of the dangers of Castro and his association with communism. 

You may say that these two instances are far afield from the legislation be- 
fore you. I do not think so. In my opinion, if the Freedom Academy had 
been in existence, and the opinions of experts had been used to analyze the 
developments in Cuba, Castro would be elsewhere today, and Goulart would 
have been spotted long before he assumed power in Brazil. As your Committee 
well knows, the Federal Bureau of Investigation had repeatedly warned the 
Department of State about Castro and his communist associations long before 
he came into power. With the support of the Freedom Academy, in alerting 
the United States, the present hemispheric tragedy could have been averted. 

I support wholeheartedly the concepts of the Freedom Academy. I congratu- 
late the authors of the bill, and your Committee for its continued interest in 
winning the struggle against communism. 

/s/ Robert C. Hill. 

Mr. Tuck. Mr. Chairman, I know that there has been quite a bit of 
favorable editorial comment in regard to the subject of our studies at 
this time, but there appeared an editorial favorable to the establish- 


ment of a Freedom Academy in the Richmond T iines-Bispatcli of 
Richmond, Virginia, mider date of March 25, 1964. 

In view of the prominence and importance of that paper and in 
view of the distinction that the learned editor, Mr. Virginius Dabney. 
has attained in the literary world as well as in other facets of our life 
more important to the Nation, and in view of his high standing all 
over the country, I would like, if it is not inappropriate, to offer this 
editorial as a part of the record, and I do so offer it. 

The Chairman. I read that editorial and was very much impressed 
with it. I am glad that you offer it for the record, and it will be 
received at this point. 

(The editorial follows :) 

[From the Richmond Times-Dispatch, Mar. 25, 1964] 
To Win the Cold War 

Establishment by the federal government of a Freedom Academy which would 
be charged with training Americans In the vitally important non-military aspects 
of the cold war, thus matching the Communists at their own game, is once more 
a real possibility. 

Legislation to set up such an institute wherein to teach the strategy of propa- 
ganda and the tactics of political warfare died in the House last year, after pass- 
ing the Senate. Similar bills have recently been reintroduced in both branches. 

Sponsorship of the Senate bill illustrates the nonpartisan character of those 
advocating a Freedom Academy. Among the conservative sponsors may be men- 
tioned Senators Dodd, Goldwater and Lausche, while from the liberal camp come 
such men as Senators Douglas, Scott and Keating. 

The lack of such an academy may be a major cause for the steady advance of 
the Communists across the face of the globe in the past few decades. The Soviets 
and the Red Chinese have been at the business of stimulating "nationalistic 
revolutions" and overthrowing governments through guerrilla warfare, rather 
than by frontal attack, for some 40 years. 

If we are to have any real hope of checkmating them, we should embark upon 
some such counteroffensive as the Fi*eedom Academy provides. 

The newly introduced bill is phrased, necessarily, in fairly general terms. The 
title reads as follows : 

"To create a Freedom Commission and the Freedom Academy, to conduct re- 
search to develop an integrated body of operational knowledge in the political, 
psychological, economic, technological and organizational areas to increase the 
non-military capabilities of the United States in the global struggle between 
freedom and communism, to educate and train government personnel and private 
citizens to understand and implement this body of knowledge. . . ." 

The Freedom Commission would be composed of seven full-time appointees of 
the President, subject to Senate confirmation. They would be charged with the 
duty of establishing and supervising the Freedom Academy. "Such- sums as may 
be necessary" are authorized to be appropriated. 

If we had had such an academy yeai-s ago, we might not be on the defensive 
today before the Communist guerrillas and saboteurs in so many areas of the 
world. Establishment of this institution, or something like it, would seem to be 
essential to final victory for the West in the desperate struggle in which it is 

The Chairman. And along the same vein, the cartoon from the 
Nexo York. Herald Tribune of Wednesday, February 12, 1964, was 
called to my attention, and although it was not intended to have any- 
thing to do with these hearings, yet it is, I tliink, a good illustration 
of the success achieved by Communists through their political war- 
fare schools — training in tactics, and so on. 

The cartoon is titled "Hail Alma Mater." It was published at the 
time of the pro-Communist takeover in Zanzibar. A fire, labeled 
"Chaos in Africa," is portrayed as haAdng been set in the background. 

30-471— 64— pt. 2 6 


In the foreground are two men, shaking hands. One, bearded, is 
holding a torch that apparently was used to set the fire. He says to 
the man whose hand he is shaking: "I was trained in Cuba, Class 
of '64!" The other character, holding a suitcase of dynamite in his 
left hand, says about his Alma Mater: "I'm Moscow '63 !" 

So, here they are; they are taking credit for the chaos in Africa. 
That is the meaning of preparation, from their point of view and for 
their purposes, in agitation, and so on. We don't seeni to have any 
active countermeasures here, or certainly no institutions where we can 
get expert instruction on their techniques and how to defeat them. 

Would it be possible to reproduce this in the record at this point ? 

Mr. McNamara. It would, Mr. Chairman ; yes. 

The Chairman. Well, I offer it. 

(The cartoon follows:) 

iiaii Aima xiiater 




i, ~/ 

r L WAS TRAi;4SP ; "< ^' ~'^ 

CLAssopt^j iU/AOSCOW 

.i«a iifii u ^jft>.ig)^ 

'~ *'" _ ( ^ " , 


The Chairman. Our first witness this morning is Mr. Eobert F. 
Delaney, former USIA official. 

Mr. Delaney ? 

Mr. Delaney. Yes, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Mr. Delaney, we are delighted to have you, and as 
the usual point of beginning, I wish you would give a thumbnail ex- 
planation of your education, your background, and your experience 
and employment, in a general way. 

Mr. Delaney. Yes, sir. 


Mr. Delaney. I attended Dartmouth and Holy Cross Colleges, and 
did my graduate work at Boston University, Harvard, Catholic Uni- 
versity, and the University of Vienna, concentrating in the fields of 
political sociology and international relations. 

I have served in the United States Navy on active duty over a period 
of 6 years. I am currently a commander in the U.S. Naval Reserve. 

My professional experience includes some 12 years in the U.S. For- 
eign Service, both within the Department of State and the U.S. Infor- 
mation Agency. 

I have served in our Embassy in Rome, Legation in Budapest, 
Embassies in Vienna and in El Salvador, Central America. 

At the present moment, I am engaged in writing and lecturing on 
international affairs. 

I have also served as a public affairs adviser to industry. 

At the moment I am a resident of Miami, Florida, although I spend 
much of my time in Latin America. 

The Chairman. I think you have contributed to a paper Studies 
in Guerilla Warfare? 

Mr. Delaney. Yes, sir. 

My experience, in terms of the international Communist conspiracy, 
has been directed toward unconventional warfare. I have written 
several books that bear on this subject, among them : This is Convmunist 
Hungary^ The Literature \of G ommunism in America^ A Training 
Manual on Unconventional Warfare, and Studies in Guerilla War- 

The Chairman. Now, we are glad to receive your comments on the 

Mr. Delaney. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen: I have prepared a statement this 
morning, which I hope will be enlarged with questions from the com- 
mittee upon its completion and, if I may, I should like to read it at 
this time. 

I appear before you today as a private citizen and ex-Government 
official to support passage of the Freedom Academy bill. Since 1949, 
I have been engaged in exposure of the Communist conspiracy, first in 
Europe and more recently in Latin America. 

I feel a particular moral commitment to testify before this com- 
mittee, since I was one of the officials in the Operations Coordinating 
Board who confronted Mr. Alan Grant in July 1954 and found no 
particular merit in his original plan. 

I am here today 


The Chairman. What was that plan ? 

Mr. Delaney. That was the original idea of the Freedom Academy, 
drawn up by the Orlando Committee, stated in 1954. 

The Chairman. All right. 

Mr. Delaney. I am here today to tell you that 10 years and two 
continents later, I urgently agTee with the necessity for the establish- 
ment of an Academy dedicated to the needs of a national program in 
teaching, training, and research in order better to comprehend the 
spectrum of Communist weaponry which opposes and, seemingly, so 
often befuddles us. 

I have served both in the public and the private sectors. I am, I 
believe, the first witness to testify with extensive experience in both 
areas. I would like this morning to limit my remarks to two prin- 
cipal considerations, since earlier witnesses, notably Mr. Grant and 
Dr. Possony of the Hoover Library, have expressed, significantly bet- 
ter than I, many of my present ideas drawn from my overseas ex- 

The first area I would touch on is the matter of the need for a com- 
mon national institution as envisioned by this proposed legislation 
for a Freedom Commission and Freedom Academy. 

My second concern involves inclusion of the private sector in the 
training and research aspects of the Academy. 

Permit me, gentlemen, to touch on my first point: The need for 
a common, umbrella-type institution. Earlier testimony has alluded 
to official opposition to this bill, notably from the Department of State, 
on the gTOunds that the work was being done already or that it was 
a dangerous initiative which might infringe on our relations in the 

Let me be very blunt. It is my observation that the main reason 
for official opposition is basically jurisdictional. No official executive 
agency enjoys being told it is deficient. No official agency enjoys being 
charged with outmoded thinking. Yet, this, in effect, is what the Free-, 
dom Commission concept is suggesting. And it is correct in its as- 

Our line agencies of foreign policy developed their methodology 
out of an era long departed. Commimist conflict management, as Pro- 
fessor Possony so aptly describes the Soviet system of international 
relations, finds no counterpart in the conventional and formalized 
attitudes and techniques of our traditional service. 

Nonetheless, the Department of State must, properly so, maintain 
its primacy, in our system, in the conduct of foreign affairs. Here is 
the rub. This primacy is being carried out without sufficient regard 
for change. We live in a revolutionary world. We deplore the ill- 
mannered and wholly unconventional diplomatic practices of the Sino- 
Soviet bloc. 

But, gentlemen, as we all laiow, these tactics exist, and we are 
forced — I repeat, forced — to deal with them. It may be unfortunate, 
but it is true. 

As a result, the primacy of State has slowly eroded over the years, 
since 1948. Propaganda, intelligence, narcotics, trade, fiscal manipu- 
lations, and now counterinsurgency have all entered the semantics 
of diplomacy. History tells us these techniques exist, but tradition 
tells us, "isn't it a shame?" 


Agencies liave sprung up to cope with the emergencies of cold war — 
and properly so. They have tilled a vacuum. All of these ellorts 
represent pioneer attempts to fight the Communist threat. To these 
developments State has agreed, realizing its right of policy control. 

Now comes another idea, fostered by the demands of the age in which 
we live — the Freedom Academy. The concept is practical. Let us 
train people in and out of Government to a fuller realization of what 
we are up against. Ten years ago, I thought the idea was farfetched. 
Today, after witnessing Hungary, Cuba, attempted coups in Latin 
America, and massive naivete in our own society, I plead for the 
Academy concept. 

State, perhaps naturally, sees this idea as further erosion of its 
prerogatives by a group of the uninitiated. It does not wish to accept 
further bureaucratic encroachment. After all, do we not, as testi- 
mony has indicated, possess sufficient training academies throughout 
the Government? 1 know; I have been to most of them. I can say 
this : We lack coordination ; we lack conmiunality. We lack perspec- 
tive and completeness. 

An attache is trained; a diplomat is schooled; a propagandist is 
equipped. Each in his own specialty, each as a "necessary waste of 
time" before proceeding to his post. 

Because this field of the Communist unconventional approach 
happens to be my experience, I have been fortunate. But I have 
heard officers complain about the "cops and robbers," waste-of-time 
internal security courses. I have heard diplomatic officers criticize 
colleagues who were trying to fight the Communists with the new 
techniques. I have seen our officials care more for protocol than for 
labor, more for form than content, and more for the system than the 
fight we face, unorthodox though it may be. Indeed, it may very 
well be that this unorthodoxy is the key. Change comes slowly to 
foreign policy. The "Maginot Line" mentality is comfortable, and 
the way up assured. But, gentlemen, the opposition thinks otherwise, 
and it is they, unfortunately, who force the pace. 

Now, the Department feels negatively about an independent admin- 
istration of this Academy. My experience has been that the strong 
point of the act rests in its quasi-autonomy. It will be subject, thus, to 
the common good of the United States, and not to the fears, negativism, 
and inflexibility of established, jurisdictionally minded executive 

For once, gentlemen, let us take the word of the Communist move- 
ment at its worth. Let us give the American people the benefit of the 
doubt. Let us show our own appreciation of the Communist method- 
ology and study it objectively and fully with this the object in view, 
rather than to create another watered-down monument to incomplete 
training for bored Government officials. 

I don't mean to denigrate Government officials. On the contrary, I 
was a very proud member of the club myself. I am simply commenting 
that it is insufficient training to which they have been exposed. 

My second point is this: The United States of America, not just a 
cadre of foreign policy officials, is in competition with the world Com- 
munist movement. In fact, the free world is its target, as the bloc so 
frequently and honestly indicates. 


Yet for every moderately trained U.S. official conscious of the threat, 
there is a private-sector counterpart who, through ignorance or lack 
of training, often undoes the good "our man in Country X" may be 
attempting to accomplish. 

How often have you seen or heard, Mr. Chairman, of an xlmerican 
teacher or an American businessman or an American expatriate abroad 
or, for that matter, an American official who confuses the local national 
with "a Commie, Socialist, pinko"? Even worse, I can relate ex]H'ri- 
ence upon ex[)erience of Americans abroad who hate their Embassies, 
who rant at U.S. policy, and who have not the vaguest idea of the 
•aison d'etre for the revolutionary ferment sweeping the developing 
nations, not to mention their simplistic views of the Communist 

These men are basically good Americans. They serve well and faith- 
fully, but they need assistance. They have never been given the true 
opportunity quietly to listen, study, question, and read about the 
Communist forces at work in their world of business, commerce, en- 
trepreneurship, or academic life. 

For these men, as well as for the men coming up — the overseas- 
bound manager, the newly rotated expatriate, the inquisitive jour- 
nalist, the international engineer- — this Academy and its curriculum 
could be invaluable. 

This country needs these men who are on the international front 
lines. "VVe should not waste them. The Freedom Academy, contrary 
to criticism, will not breed conformity or party line in such training. 
Rather, it is to be hoped it will provide this country with a reservoir of 
intelligent, knowledgeable men who will understand the forces at work 
attempting to subvert and ultimately destroy the world that they, the 
overseas Americans, now numbering close to 2 percent of our national 
population, are trying to build. 

Finally, may I allude briefly to examples of the unconventional tech- 
niques with which we are faced today by the Communists — techniques 
which would surely be included in the Academy's curriculum, as Dr. 
Possony outlined in his testimony. 

For the past 4 years, I have lived and traveled in Latin America, a 
subcontinent under frantic Communist pressure. 

I have seen universities completely dominated by a handful of pro- 
fessional Communist students, who have paralyzed the normal col- 
legiate functions. Now, this technique, once understood, is easily 
countered if the university officials are fully appreciative of what is 
going on and what is at stake. 

By the same token, I have seen U.S. Army officers trained in civic 
action antagonize nationalistic university officials whom they were sent 
to help, by inexcusable lack of tact and prudence. Proper training 
could have avoided this type of situation. 

In Latin America today, the Communists are employing every 
teclinique possible. During the Panama riots, for example, docu- 
mented evidence indicates the provocative role played by Communist 
street agitators, even to the apparent extreme of Panamanians shoot- 
ing their fellows in order to provide a convenient, exploitable martyr 
who could be buried amidst suitable antigringo harangues. 

Now, \'.here do these trained Communist agents come from? We 
all know I hat Cuba, Communist China, and the Soviet satellites share 


the burden. In Cuba, we have the word of an official publication, 
Cuha Sockd/sta, wliich admits to more than 269 cadre training schools 
on that small island, designed to, in the review's words, "train tech- 
nical and cultural cadres who will be with the revolution and for the 
revolution, all the way." 

Mr. Pool. Pardon me just a second there. 

How many did you say there were in Cuba ? How many schools 'i 

Mr. Delaney, Two hundred sixty-nine. 

Now, that is probably an outdated figure, but it gives you some 
idea of the scope and immensity of their approach. 

I would like, incidentally, to submit as part of the record, if I may, 
Mr. Chainnan, the complete article from which I extracted this in- 
formation, called "Revolutionary Training Schools and the Training 
of Cadres," by Lionel Soto — S-o-t-o — translated from Cuha Social- 

The Chairman. The document will be received for our files, and 
we will decide whether to incorporate it in full in the record later.^ 

Mr. Delaney. The Chinese Communists, not to be outdone, have 
since 1958 operated a "school for training special agents," a school, 
cynically enough, under control of the Minister of Social Affairs 

The Chairman. Where is that school ? 

Mr. Delaney. It is located in mainland China, sir. 

This school, according to U.S. Government sources, has sent three 
quarters of its graduates to Latin America: Havana, Mexico, Vene- 
zuela, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay. 

At the end of the line, the Chinese have been very carefully prepar- 
ing the groundwork and have, to date, formed some 22 so-called friend- 
ship associations, which can feed potential cadre material into this 
revolutionary people's school system. 

Now, mind you, I think one of the most interesting points is the 
fact that the Chinese Communists do not enjoy diplomatic relations, 
generally speaking, in Latin America, and yet they are able to estab- 
lish this system of unconventional diplomacy, if you will, or warfare, 
more probably, and we are not effectively able to counter it, primarily 
because our approach is more formalized than our opponent's. 

The Chairman. Let me ask you two questions in one. 

Mr. Dei^ney. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Accepting, of course, the complete accuracy of 
your last two statements, is it an easily established fact that these 
schools in Cuba exist and that one in China exists ? 

Is that known to the Government? 

Mr. Delaney. Yes ; it is known to the Government. 

The Chairman. I was about to ask you the source, unless you don't 
want to say. 

Mr. Delaney. Perfectly free. 

This is a U.S. Joint Publications Research Service, Photoduplica- 
tion Service of the Library of Congress, the translator and repro- 
ducer of the article. 

The Chairman. And the other? 

Mr. Delaney. The other is taken from a USIA publication. 

1 For text of Soto article, see pp. 1333-1341. 


The Chairman. Oh, so that source is USIA ? 

Mr. Delaney. For the Chinese friendship associations ; yes, sir. 

The Chairman. All right. 

Mr. Delaney. I ask you to note one dominant aspect of this training 
in proletarian diplomacy. It is coordinated. It functions for the bene- 
fit of supporters, both public and private; and, according to Cuban 
Communist Lionel Soto, the author of this previously cited article, 
"The schools must constantly incorporate the live materials and docu- 
ments that reflect our development * * * ." 

History in the making. 

These schools are not confined to Commmiist-controlled countries. 
As far back as 1958, the Argentine police uncovered a completely 
equipped propaganda and subversive training academy in Buenos 
Aires, known as the Aurora Latin American Training School for 
Communist Party Cadres. This will shortly be exposed in popular 
print in the form of a book to be published by Readers Digest 
Editor Gene Methvin. 

Discovered in attendance at this school were Latin Americans, Ital- 
ians, Spaniards, and a Pole; among them lawyers, professors, blue- 
collar and white-collar workers. 

Now, I cite these examples not to suggest that we set up a clandestine 
operation. I cite these examples to bring home the necessity for a 
research training institute which will prepare our officials and our 
business and academic men in the unorthodox and unconventional 
methods of our enemies. 

It is precisely because the Communists are nonconventional in their 
nonmilitary tactics that we need a high-level, nondiplomatic school. 

Mr. Johansen. May I interrupt you at that point ? 

Mr. Delaney. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Johansen. Am I to understand that, as of now, there is no 
countereffort directed by our Government against these activities? 

Mr. Delaney. No, sir ; there are efforts directed against these activi- 
ties by the professionals within the executive branch. The informa- 
tion obviously collected exposing these Communist activities is 
generally subjected to scrutiny and analysis and, I dare say, to what- 
ever efforts can be worked against them to blunt their effectiveness. I 
think that the great gap lies in the general public awareness and 
consciousness vis-a-vis this assault that is being directed against us. 

We must not overlook the strength inherent in our own noncon- 
ventional sector — the private one. In Colombia, in Peru, in Venezuela, 
American businessmen today, for example, have joined together to 
launch community development projects, miiversity civic action pro- 
grams, and well-conceived scholarship plans designed to reach these 
groupings of campesino,^ students, and intellectuals who are them- 
selves the object of Communist subversion. 

-T believe that Mr. Morrison will be speaking to you a little later 
this morning on one other aspect of the private sector's contribution, 
"Operation Amigo." 

By bringing individuals together into a Freedom Academy, we can 
increase our knowledgeability, our effectiveness, and our sense of 
prudent action ; and I am emphasizing prudent action, because there 

1 Peasant farm laborers, nonlandowning farmers. 


are many people who fear this concept of a Freedom Academy, 
because they think that if passed, if brought into being, it will end 
up as an extremist institution with everybody running off at the 
mouth, declaring war, or interfering in the due and orderly processes 
of the executive branch of Government. 

Not at all. This is not the intention, as I read the bill, nor must 
it ever be, or we sow the seeds of our own destruction. 

We do not have an across-the-board response today. Of this, there 
is no doubt. Creation of a well-concei^-ed Freedom Academy would, 
in my opinion, be the catalyst which would restore ingenuity, in- 
ventiveness, and sense of belonging to our own efforts to cope with 
Communist unconventional activities. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen. 

The Chairman. Well, I would sa}' you made a very splendid state- 
ment and I congratulate you. 

Gentlemen ? 

Mr. Tuck. Mr. Chairman, I would like to commend Mr. Delaney 
for his fine statement and for the very helpful information which 
he has brought to the committee. 

Mr. Delaney. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Pool. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask him one question. 

In the Chinese situation, do you have any information on how 
many of these schools they have in China ? 

Mr. Delaney. No, sir; I can't quote you an accurate figure, un- 
fortunately. I think we can be sure that there are literally hundreds 
of them, however. 

Mr. Pool. You have 269 schools in Cuba, and these are mainly used 
for training propagandists, guerrillas, agitators, and for softening 
up of students who, let's say, would not be called Communists as of 
the point they arrive on the island. 

Did I understand you a while ago to say in your testimony that 
three fourths of the graduates of this Cliinese school for training 
special agents that was under the Ministry of Social Affairs, that 
three fourths of those graduates go to South American countries? 
Is that what you said ? 

Mr. Delaney. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Pool. Do you have a basis for that? Is that in this USIA 
report ? 

Mr. Delaney. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Pool. You don't know the number of that, do you? 

Mr. Delaney. The only documentation-cited number that would 
be able to label it is USIA 1961. I suspect that this is probably the 
year in which this documentation was first issued. 

Mr. Pool. Thank you. 

The Chairman. Mr. Ichord. 

Mr. Ichord. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Now, you say, Mr. Delaney, that you were opposed to the original 
concept as advanced by the Orlando Committee. 

I would like to ask you whether the concept of the Orlando Com- 
mittee has changed, or whether your thinking has changed? 

Mr. Delaney. My thinking, sii-. I think the concept is 

Mr. Ichord. You said "the original concept." The concept is still 
the same. 


Mr. Delaney. Yes; so what I actually meant was that — there have 
been certain details that have been modified over the years, but it is 
basically my own thinking that has changed, rather than that of 
the Orlando Committee. 

Mr. IciiOED. A number of years ago, Senator Young from Ohio 
made a speech on the Senate floor wherein he ridiculed the Freedom 
Academy on the ground that we already had enough institutions 
teaching essentially the same thing that would be taught in this 

Are you familiar with the speech that he made? I would like 
to have your comment. 

Mr. Delaney. I have no doubt but what there are sufficient schools 
in the Government as of the present moment that, spread out over geog- 
raphy and continent, at one point or another, partially cover the field. 
But it is fragmented and isolated, and to my knowledge the school 
system does not give a coherent, complete, and accurate picture, nor 
does it give training in depth, such as you might find in one of the 
service academies devoted exclusively to the staff training of military 
officers, where they are able to spend 6 to 9 months or more training 
specifically in depth for higher command. 

Mr. IciiORD. How do you envisage this institution working ? 

Mr. Delaney. I envision this as a graduate program of instruc- 
tion — let's just confine it to instruction at the moment — whereby people 
may be assigned for a definite period of time, and there to study, to 
the exclusion of everything else, the nature, the antecedents, the tech- 
niques, and the tactics of the world Communist movement. 

Mr. IciiORD. Won't they even go farther than that — and also means 
of combating ? 

Mr. Delaney. Yes, sir ; and I would tie that aspect of the question to 
the research function. It is in the research function that you would 
develop the counter ideas, where you would develop the necessary 
knowledgeability for pushing expert individuals out into the main- 
stream of our public and private sectors to combat the enemy. 

Mr. loHORD. Wliat is your objection to having the Academy operated 
by one of our existing institutions of Government, for example, the 
State Department? Why do you object to the State Department 
operating such an agency ? 

Mr. Dei^ney. I think, basically, that the State Department, because 
it is the State Department and responsible for the traditional and for- 
mal channels of communication in our diplomatic sphere, would be put 
in an embarrassing position, in terms of the world at large, in setting 
up such a training academy. 

Secondly, I believe that the State Department would be beset by 
pressures within its own organization to wat^r down the training and 
the courses so offered. I think there would be a lack of, shall we say, 
nonconformity. I think there might be — I can conceive of situations 
where academic freedom might be restricted for particularly practical 
reasons of statecraft, and I think that, over a period of time, there 
would be a great deal of pulling and tugging within the executive 
branch for control of this or that aspect of the Academy. 

What I am suggesting is that it would be easier to create an Academy 
outside the framework of established executive agencies. It would be 
a new departure and would not inherit the various difficulties, fights, 


and squabbles that might very well be transplanted to an Academy 
m State's jurisdiction. 

Mr. IciiORD. Of course, this will be another executive agency. The 
mere fact that it is independent doesn't remove it from the executive. 

Mr. Delaney. No ; that is quite true, but it will come to its functions 
with a clear mind and with a will to be one in terms of its legislative 
function, and I believe that it will have a better chance to do the job 
as indicated in the legislation. 

Mr. IcHORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Well, let me ask one question. 

As the other side of the coin that you have just been referring to, 
you don't envisage, do you, that this Academy would have anything to 
do with, or supplant, the State Department in matters of foreign 

Mr. Delaney. Not at all, sir. That would be a grievous mistake. 
It has no function in that area. 

The Chairman. Well, now, accepting that, because that is our 
understanding— the only acceptable function would be in that direc- 
tion — would there be involved some danger that is real, that despite 
the fact that such would not be the objective of the Academy, that it 
miglit be portrayed as such to foreign countries and that, therefore, 
efforts would be made to create turmoil and quarrels between State and 
the agency, and could the agency survive that? 

Perhaps efforts would be made in our own country to "take the 
side" of the Academy as against State and, therefore, even though it 
isn't so as a matter of law, the people would think so and, therefore, 
the very existence of the Academy might be used as a lever for more 

What is your thought as to that ? 

Because I assume this is the sort of thing — and I'm attributing 
nothing but sincerity to people — that might be troubling the State 
Department in its objection to this proposal. 

Mr. Delaney. To answer your first question first, Mr. Chairman, 
I think that if the legislation passes and is enacted into law, we can 
absolutely count on a barrage of propaganda directed against its 
existence on the part of the Commimists. You will recall that the 
same type of massive attack was launched against the United States 
escapee program when it first came into being, a program which was, 
through its entire history, a humanitarian effort, and yet it was sub- 
jected to the strongest possible attack by the Communists. The Corn- 
munists don't want the Academy established, obviously, because it 
means people will be more alert. 

Insofar as our own country is concerned, I am also quite sure in my 
own mind that it would be subject to attack, perhaps misconceived or 
ill-conceived, both within and outside the Government, by people fear- 
ful that it would impinge on executive authority or, conversely, would 
impinge on some vague idea about freedom of thought, that we would 
be training party-line-type individuals, which is, of course, not the 
intent of the act at all. 

My only solution to this would be that great care would have to be 
exercised "in the establisliment of the Academy and particularly in the 
naming of the hierarchy, members of the Commission and the various 
Academy officials, because they would be expected to bear the brunt of 


this attack, and much of their ability would flow from their well- 
established reputations and from the fact that their responses would 
be couched in reasonable terms, rather than extremistic terms. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. Mr. Delaney, in both the bill introduced by our col- 
league on the committee, Mr, Ashbrook, and the bill introduced by 
Mr. Gubser of California, there is the provision for the establishment 
of a Joint Congressional Freedom Committee. 

I would like to have your conunents on that proposal and on the 
possible role of such a joint committee in helping to establish and 
maintain a degree of independence for the Commission. 

Mr. Delaney. Frankly, I think that the establishment of a com- 
mittee with congressional representation is a terribly important con- 
sideration. I also think that such a joint committee, if at all pos- 
sible — and I f ranldy don't know whether it would be — should include 
representation from the executive branch. 

I say that for this reason : The presence of Congressmen on the com- 
mittee can go a long way toward maintaining the balance and the 
integrity of the institution, from the mere fact that they are Congress- 
men of the United States. 

The presence of the executive agency officials on such a coromittee or 
as advisers to such a committee would go a long way, it seems to me, 
to wear off any of the negativism or fears that might emanate from 
the executive departments coincidental with the creation of the Acad- 
emy, that working and interrelating together, these officials and the 
Congressmen might very well, and indeed must, set the tone for the 
successful operation of this training establishment. Otherwise, I am 
afraid the idea might tend to be extreme. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. Well, then, your suggestion would seem to be that 
rather than a separate joint congressional committee comprised ex- 
clusively of Members of Congress, there should be some type of an 
advisory committee to the Commission which would include congres- 
sional representation and advisers — in other words, something in the 
general pattern of the Hoover Commission type of setup. 

Mr. Delaney. Yes, sir ; exactly. 

Mr, JoHANSEN, Where the President or the executive designate non- 
congressional members, along with those selected by the Vice President 
from the Senate and by the Speaker from the House ? 

Mr, Delaney, Yes, sir. 

Mr, JoHANSEN, Thank you. 

Mr. Bruce. Mr, Delaney, may I congratulate you, first of all, upon 
the thorougliness of your paper, 

Mr. Delaney. Thank you, Mr. Congressman. 

Mr. Bruce. May I ask you this question ? 

Who sets the State Department policy ? Well, I mean in the final 

Mr. Delaney, In the final analysis — I will have to give you a two- 
part answer. 

In the fuial analysis, the President of the United States is respon- 
sible. On the working level, policy is made in any number of ways. 
Today it might be a desk officer. Tomorrow, it might be a committee. 
The next day it might be an Embassy. It depends, really, on the 
specific question. 


Mr. Bruce. But in the final analysis, as far as the goals and the 
objectives, this rests primarily with the President of the United States. 

Mr. Delaney. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Bruce. Now, how would the Freedom Academy exist if its 
analysis and studies led them to the conclusion that there were basic 
errors in policy ? ^Vhat would happen ? 

Mr. Delaney. Politically speaking, there would probably be one 
terrific fight, but from the point of view of how you reconcile this, I 
would hope, personally, that we would never reach that impasse where 
this sort of a situation arose, which is one reason why I would argue 
strongly for a high-level commission being appointed. 

But if the situation should ever arise where there would be a con- 
flict based, let's say, on the research of the Academy, which I suppose 
is theoretically possible, then I believe, strictly speaking, it is not the 
function of the Academy publicly to make an issue of this; it is not 
within its scope ; it would be ruinous of the Academy and its future, 
and that if there are private misgivings, then they should be conveyed 

Mr. Bruce. Well, reading one of the bills, the bill put in by Mr. 
Herlong, the Advisory Committee that he recommends would be the 
heads of the following agemcies, and from officers and employees there- 
of : Department of State; Department of Defense; Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare; CIA; FBI; ICA; and USIA. 

Is it conceivable, from your experience as an official of the Federal 
Government in some of these areas, that this Advisory Committee 
would mider foreseeable circumstances go contrary to the established 
policy in their relationship with the Freedom Academy ? 

Mr. Delaney. No. Certainly my experience is such that I could say 
very simply "No," but I think here we have a question of just how you 
define the scope of the Academy. 

I think. Congressman, you are perhaps suggesting that the Academy 
has a policymaking role, but it doesn't — or it shouldn't. 

Mr. Bruce. No; I am not suggesting that. I am suggesting that 
when their research reaches conclusions, such as their — that would be 
at variance with what appears to be established policy, that under any 
form of academic freedom at this point, they would be almost duty- 
bound in their instruction, in their training, to teach what they thought 
from their research was the correct analysis of the nature of the world 
Communist movement. 

Now, if this turned out to be at variance with, for instance, State 
Department, how would you settle this ? Or would, without some ef- 
fective barriers, the executive agencies of Government at this point 
squash the independent research and the academic freedom, as it were, 
of the Freedom Academy ? How would you solve this ? 

Mr. Delaney. I would avoid it, if at all possible, which may not be 
a straightforward answer. 

Mr. Bruce. Well, realistically 

Mr. Delaney. But it seems to me that once you get into this area, 
where research in the Academy is pointed at possible criticism of the 
Government, the executive branch of Government in the handling of 
its foreign affairs, you have overstepped the bounds, that this is ex- 
actly the sort of thing that the Academy must stay away from. 

Mr. Bruce. Well, now, let me give you a specific example. 


Suppose a Govemment-financed study came up with a conclusion 
such as this, and I quote it : "Whether we admit it to ourselves or not, 
we benefit enormously from the ability of the Soviet police system 
to keep law and order over the 200-million-odd Eussians and the many 
additional millions in the satellite states. The breakup of the Russian 
Communist empire today would doubtless be conducive to freedom, 
but would be a good deal more catastrophic for world order than was 
the breakup of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1918." 

Now, let's assume that Dr. Possony, or whoever you had on the 
faculty and doing research with the Freedom Academy, would come 
up with something diametrically opposed to this, or diametrically op- 
posed to the five-volmne study known as the Phoenix Papers^ would 
there be any liberty to teach within the Freedom Academy contrary to 
these things, if, by chance, these happened to be a dominant thought at 
State Department level ? 

Mr. Delaney. Yes ; I would thinli so. Very definitely, it is within 
the context of the purposes of this Academy to expound all reasonable 
points of view— reasonable, documented points of view. 

Mr. Bruce. Right. 

Mr. Delaney. We have that today in our various service schools, 
where you will find on one platform someone advocating the recogni- 
tion of Red China as an argument, and someone following them deny- 
ing the efficacy of this argument. I believe our people must know of 
the existence of these two things. One would hope that they have the 
good sense to make a reasonable judgment based on knowledgeability, 
but, as you have stated this, I see no essential conflict at that stage. 

I would suggest that if a man comes up with a well-documented, in- 
teresting, provocative argument, it should be very definitely a part of 
the instruction. 

Mr. Bruce. Well, I don't want to belabor this, but to me it is a very 
important point. 

How could you conceive that the Freedom Academy would remain 
free of coercion, when our Ambassador to Cuba under a previous ad- 
ministration was ignored because it Avas contrary to State Department 
policy ? 

]Mr. Delaney. Congressman, I would hope that you gentlemen in 
your foresight and wisdom would write cautions into the legislation. 
You, after all, are the individuals concerned with the proper assem- 
blage of legislation for the United States ; and if this is a genuine con- 
cern — and I think, perhaps, it definitely merits study and attention — 
then, after consideration and deliberation, something should be in- 
cluded to take care of these cautions, these questions, before any bill 
goes before the full House for passage. 

Mr. Johansen. Will the gentleman yield at that point ? 

Mr. Bruce. Yes. 

Mr. Johansen. Doesn't that go to the very point of the oversight 
role of a joint committee of Congress, either separately or as part of 
an Advisory Committee ? 

Mr. Delaney. I would say, sir, that it certainly does, because know- 
ing the Congress of the United States, I feel certain that if a gentle- 
man feels so inclined to get up and criticize, he will, rightfully so, and 
if the situation arises, that perhaps quiet consultation with members 


of the congressional commission to the Freedom Academy might 
smooth the way for the existence and success of the work of the school. 

Mr. Bruce. Well, I will confess, I have the same concern that 
you do, and we have talked before on the necessity or the need for 
some type of Freedom Academy, but I have to personally see clearly 
that it can't become just another agency, that it can't be controlled 
by policymakers who have their own pet theories — devoid of reality — 
of the nature of the world Communist movement. If it does this, it 
becomes a harmful thing, instead of a good creation, and I have been 
pondering this before I even came to the Congress, and frankly haven't 
come up with an answer that satisfies me. How can you create this 
Freedom Academy dealing with this highly controversial subject, with 
the President making the appointment, subject, of course, to confirma- 
tion by the Senate — such as we have in the Herlong bill — with the 
heads of all the executive branches, practically, on the Advisory Com- 
mittee. How this can serve the function that we envisage baffles me, 

Thank you very much. 

Mr. Delaney. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ScHADEBERG. Mr. Delaney, would you care to comment on how 
the recruiting is done for these schools in Cuba ? 

Mr. DeIoAney. It takes many and varied forms, Mr. Congressman. 

I have seen several of their approaches. They vary all the way 
from sizing up, let's say, within university context, students who 
seem to have a potential for leadership or for studies or seem to be 
embittered against society for one reason or another. 

They are generally identified, fii*st of all; watched by the profes- 
sional students or other cadre members; and at some point are ap- 
proached, either with a scholarship offer to study in Cuba or Moscow 
or Peiping, or perhaps if their assessment of the man's character is 
such, they will offer him a subsidy, a dole. They will put him on 
the payroll for a w^hile within the university context or the local 
context and in this way compromise him, and, at a later date, as he 
is drawn slowly into the web, then they might decide this man is 
worth developing, this man is worth keeping, and then send him 

Then again, they might take someone who is, let's say, socialistically 
inclined and hit him cold with an offer to travel. 

A third type of possibility would be, within the general labor con- 
text, to pick laborers who might one day turn into labor union 
leaders and to, by flattery and the offer of travel, by some financial 
remuneration, slowly bring them in and then send them off. 

Then there is also always the wild-eyed fellow who is against 
everything, who would snap up an opportunity like this for op- 
portunistic reasons and move off to one of these training camps. 

Mr. Schadeberct. Are there any U.S. citizens in these schools? 

Mr. Delaney. To my knowledge, no; but it seems highly unlikely 
that there aren't Americans. 

The Chairman. That there are not ? 

Mr. Delaney. There must be Americans. It would stand to reason, 
within the context ; but to my knowledge, I am not aware of any. 

Mr. Schadeberg. The next question that comes to my mind is: If 
that is the way they are trained and recruited, how do they go through 


the process of the Government, State Department, with respect to 
State Department, or whatever it is, the agencies, saying this is for 
the purpose of study ? 

Mr. Delaney. No ; they evade the controls, by and large. 

Mr. ScHADEBERG. Then it is clandestine. 

Mr. Delaney. Yes; in 9 cases out of 10, their travel is now 

Mr. ScHADEBERG. Directly to the school. Not under the idea that 
they are trying to go and study under a uni^^ersity, and then take this 
as a side. 

Mr. Delaney. By and large, they will utilize both approaches. If 
the only way they can get there conveniently is by announcing, let's 
say, that they are going to study at the University of Paris, they will 
so announce, and when tliey get to Paris or ^hen they get to the Con- 
tinent, oti' they go in another direction. 

Or, where they are going completely covertly, then there is obvi- 
ously no need, because there is no need for documentation. 

The Chairman. Thank you. 

Mr. Tuck. Mr. Chairman, as I understand the legislation we are 
considering, the concept of this legislation is to make studies and to 
ascertain the truth, in conformity, and that the Connnission would 
have no power to issue any orders or directives or anything else that 
would be binding in any way upon any of the agencies of the Govern- 
ment. Is that true ? 

Mr. Delaney. That is my understanding ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Tuck. And do I understand also — and referring particu- 
larly to the Herlong bill, in which he provides for certain agencies 
to be represented as advisers — that they are purely advisers, or con- 
sultants, and that they would have no power under the proposal to 
impinge upon the liberties of the Freedom Academ}^ or the Commis- 
sion constituting that Academy ? Is that correct ? 

Mr. Delaney. Except as so established within the advisory frame- 
work. And I might add, Governor, cynically, I would hazard a guess 
and suggest that they would serve as buffers. 

The Chairman. They would what ? 

Mr. Delaney. Serve as buffers between the outside critics and the 
integrity of the institution. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. I would like to just amend my comments. 

When you mentioned the bills that include this joint congressional 
committee, that Mr. Schadeberg's also includes that provision. 

Mr. Delaney. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Bruce. Mr. Chairman, an observation on that. 

As I read the Herlong bill, I believe this committee plays a little 
more vital role than just that, because they are charged with review 
of the plans, programs, and activities, transmitting to the Commission 
recommendations, meet with the Commission, to consult, transmit to 
the President and to the Congress the report containing — I think their 
influence is going to be a little bit more than just sort of an advisory 
committee, because they apparently are part of the liaison between 
the executive branch and the Congress, as well. 

The Chairman. He used the word "buffer." 

Mr. Johansen. But am I correct in the understanding that the Ad- 
visory Committee proposed in the Herlong bill does not include con- 
gressional membership? 


Mr. Delaney. That's right. 

The Chairman. That inclusion is contained only in what bills? 
A shbrook, Schadeberg, and Gubser. 

The advisory concept, I think, is included in all the bills, not only 
the Herlong but in the Boggs-Taf t bill. 

Mr. Bruce. Yes, sir. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. Do you see any reason why there can't be a wedding 
of the two ? 

Mr. Delaney. No, sir. My personal opinion is that I believe there 
should be a wedding of the two. 

Mr. IcHORD. May I interrupt at that point ? 

And the wedding you contemplate, or you would recommend, is put- 
ting Members of Congress on this Advisory Committee? 

Mr. Delaney. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Delaney. Thank you, sir. 

(The Soto article submitted by Mr. Delaney follows :) 

JPRS: 12398 
8 February 1962 


— Cuba— 

By Lionel Soto 

Photocopies of this report may be purchased from : 

Photoduplication Service 
Library of Congress 
washington 25, d.c. 

U.S. Joint Publications Research Service 

1636 Connecticut Avenue, NW. 
Washington 25, D.C. 


This publication was prepared under contract by the UNITED STATES JOINT 
PUBLICATIONS RESEARCH SERVICE, a federal government organization 
established to service the translation and research needs of the various govern- 
ment departments. 

JPRS : 12398 
CSO : 6511-D 

Revolutionaky Training Schools and the Training of Cadres 

— Cuba— 

[Following is the translation of an article by Lionel Soto in the 
Spanish-language periodical Cuba Socialista (Socialist Cuba), Vol. I, 
No. 3, Havana, November 1961, pages 28-41.] 

One of the general diflSculties of the Revolution is the shortage of cadres in 
all areas of revolutionary endeavor. 

First of all, we need political cadres everywhere. 

In the economy, for instance, there is a major shortage of technical cadres. 

This is the legacy of our semicolonial backwardness; and this legacy is ag- 
gravated by the treason of groups of engineers, architects, and others who, be- 
cause of class origin or corruption and lack of conscience, preferred the "boister- 
ous and brutal North," as Jose Marti put it ; they preferred emigration /to the 
U.S./ to staying in our beautiful and liberated homeland. 

30-471— 64— ,pt. 2—7 


The selection of cadres and their theoretical training is however of truly deci- 
sive importance to the Revolution. 

Our tasks here are vast : 

We must train an integrated corps of revolutionary cadres, both old and 

We must train technical and cultural cadres vi'ho will be with the Revolution 
and for the Revolution, all the way. 

We must educate, reeducate, and win over the old intellectuals, the technical 
men of yesterday, the professors and teachers who do not yet understand what 
this is all about. 

Finally, we must step up and develop revolutionary education. 

Lenin taught that it is men, cadres, who decide everything, who are the 
pillars of the Marxist Party. 

The breakup of the machinery of the bourgeois-landowner government con- 
fronts us with the necessity of filling vacant slots with tens of thousands of 
revolutionary men and women who are not familiar with their new functions. 

Today, we have hundreds of thousands of revolutionaries, but there are far 
less revolutionaries who have the necessary theoretical or political training. 

Revolutionaries without political and theoretical training and without techni- 
cal knowledge will have to learn as they go along and they will have to learn in 
the schools of the Revolution. 

Experience has shown that missions can be accomplished where capable and 
conscientious cadres are assigned. 

On 2 September 1960, the people of Cuba approved the "Havana Declaration" 
in its National General Assembly ; this is a program for national liberation and 

Following the nationalization of foreign companies, the laws on the nationaliza- 
tion of large domestic companies were decreed on 13 October 1960; thus our 
Revolution definitely entered its Socialist phase. 

This created new problems for us. 

One of these concerns the creation of a Socialist consciousness, without which 
we cannot build Socialism. 

To meet this need, we have our Schools of Revolutionary Education. 

Earlier Cadre Schools 

Schools of this kind have glorious antecedents in Cuba. Under various forms, 
they have been operating since the establishment of the first Marxist-Leninist 
party of Cuba, the Communist Party, in 1925. 

The form of these schools varied with the times, of course. Sometimes, they 
were located in the home of a militant ; others were located in a specially selected 
building ; at times, even prison cells served as class rooms. 

The conscientious revolutionaries always paid careful attention to questions 
of theory, to the formation of a Socialist awareness, as a means to strengthen 
revolutionary action and steer it in the right direction. 

In view of semicolonial, imperialist rule, the Marxist-Leninist education 
effort was a hard task. 

Only a very small group of men and women could go through these schools. 
Persecutions, financial difficulties, and the environment in general constituted 
serious obstacles here. 

During the last 5 years of tyranny,^ for example, we operated the small, though 
highly important National Cadre School of the Popular Socialist Party; we 
were completely outlawed at the time, but for 3^ months this school trained 
groups [of] 15-20 selected cadres in the fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism. The 
school was a boarding school which lasted for a 3^-month cycle ; no one left 
the premises until the end of the course. In the specially equipped premises, 
students lived in cramped quarters ; this required strict discipline ; everyone 
had to talk softly and had to keep away from windows. 

Despite these enormous difficulties, the school continued operating in the same 
locale for more than 4 years ; more than 200 cadres graduated from it and its 
existence was never revealed ; there was not the slightest carelessness or indis- 

We must also mention the Tumbasiete School which operated near Mayari, 
the center of the 2d Eastern Front "Frank Pais," founded by Major Raul Castro 
during the national liberation war. The Tumbasiete School was the forerunner 

iThis was during the years 1954-1959 [committee footnote]. 


of the ideological training effort in the schools for the comrades who were 
fighting in the mountains. 

Long before the armed struggle against Batista was started, Fidel and Raul 
and their comrades, jailed for the Moncada incident, were studying the history 
of Cuba and the classical books of Marxism which were smuggled into the prison 
on Isla de Pinos [Island]. 

We also had various kinds of provincial schools. Also, many study circles 
were organized, including circles for supervised individual study. 

Origin of Schools of Revolutionary Education 

The system of Schools of Revolutionary Education was launched on 2 Decem- 
ber 1960 at the meeting of the directors and assistant directors, who had been 
appointed for the first 12 provincial schools and the National Schools, as well 
as leaders of the 26 July Movement and of the Popular Socialist Party; this 
meeting was chaired by Fidel Castro. 

The schools received instant and warm welcomes from the revolutionary 
administrations. However, their adequate implementation i-an into two major 
obstacles : 

the shortage of cadres with sufficient Marxist-Leninist theoretical training, 
for assignment as teachers ; 

the vice of practicism, that is, the tendency toward exclusively practical 
work, relegating study and theory to a secondary position. 

These are the obstacles the schools faced in their activities. 

The schools did well in this effort and we can say that we have made great 
strides here. 

We improved the theoretical training of thousands of cadres and activists and 
we now have outstanding cadres as teachers. 

We have made our modest contribution to the creation of a study-fever, the 
fever to study the science of Marxism-Leninism, which today fires the spirit of 
the cadres and activists of the Integrated Revolutionary Organizations — and the 
heat from that fire is now reaching the working people. 

Of course, when the EIR ( Escuelas de Instruccion Revolutionaria— Schools of 
Revolutionary Education) were set up, the ORI (Organizaciones Revolucionarias 
Integradas — ^Integrated Revolutionary Organizations) did not exist as yet. This 
created additional obstacles in the effort of making an adequate student selection. 

Besides, the system of the EIR had to concern itself with the changes re- 
quired in view of the direct threats of invasion from the US in December 1960 
and January 1961 ; the EIR had to mobilize in order to crush the counterrevolu- 
tionaries in the Escambray Mountains in February and March 1961 ; they had 
to beat back the invasion of imperialist mercenaries via Zapata Swamp on 17 
April 1961 ; in a word, the EIR system had to help meet all the urgent needs of 
the Revolution. 

Following a firm policy, our National Directoi-ate successfully defended its 
viewi)oint that classes should not be suspended on account of all this. 

The official proclamation of the Socialist character of the Revolution on 16 
April, on the eve of the Zapata Swamp invasion, prepared the way for the 
interpretation of the Revolution and for the outlining of its prospects ; this is 
a problem of prime importance to the teaching effort in our schools. 

The subsequent integration of the revolutionary movement into the Integrated 
Revolutionary Organizations and their affirmation that Marxism-Leninism is the 
ideology of the Revolution served to eliminate difficulties that had existed at the 

The EIR were the first officially integrated organizations of the Revolution 
and played an equal role in the subsequent integration. 

What Is the System of Schools of Revolutionary Education? 

The national system of Schools of Revolutionary Education is a school system 
that is relatively uniform at its various levels and that is under a National 
Directorate, called the National Directorate of the ORI. 

In its work, the National Directorate of EIR works in close cooperation with 
the ORI in the provinces, on whose education and propaganda commissions it 
rests. The provincial officials of the EIR are the provincial leaders of the ORI. 

The schools in the provinces function as study centers for the ORI. 

However, overall school policy and internal regulations as well as the budget 
are handled by the National Directorate which works on the basis of opera- 
tional experience gathered throughout the country. 


The fiscal autonomy of the National Directorate enables the latter to operate 
with a great degree of flexibility. In addition, it can pay our all expenses for 
directors, teachers, officials, subordinate personnel, equipment, transportation, 
books, etc. ; through the EIR it can also handle directly the payment of wages 
and salaries to students during the time they spend away from their places of 
work in order to attend parttime or fuUtime classes. 

The fulltime students can devote their time to their studies without any other 
preoccupation or distraction and they may continue in school only so long as 
they make progress in their studies. 

The "Nico Lopez" National School and other national schools are directly 
under the National Directorate of EIR. 

The EIR instruct tbe cadres and activists which perform their functions both 
in the ORI proper and in the social or mass organizations or in the government 
The Teaching of Marxism-Leninism 

As of now, these schools are the principal and most effective means the Rev- 
olution has for the study of Marxism-Leninism. 

The fundamentals of dialectical and historical materialism and of Marxist 
economic theory are being studied there at various levels. 

We said 'fundamentals' because Cuba has not yet arrived at a stage where it 
could make a scholarly, profound, and extended study of the complex science of 
Marxism-Leninism ; this is a phase which we have set as our goal, beginning 
within a period of 2-3 years, with the help of the establishment of a Higher 
Institute of Marxism-Leninism. 

For the moment, we are counting on the fraternal help of the other Socialist 
countries in training our higher-level cadres, our scholars of theory, who will 
train the instructional and research cadres at this institute and its various 

The schools must offer theoretical instruction, though the latter must be in- 
timately linked with events in Cuba and the world ; they must at the same time 
ofl^er instruction in methods of practical leadership. 

The schools must constantly incorporate the live materials and documents 
that reflect our development in their curricula. 

For example, the draft of the CFSU program was included in the lesson plan 
as discussion material. The following items were similarly included : the speech 
of Fidel Castro on 26 July ; the articles by Raul Castro on the subject of 26 July 
1953 and by Bias Roca on the new ethics of the working class and the aid this 
class is giving to the Revolution ; the documents on the progress of the economy, 
etc. The students also discuss the daily press in class. The magazines Cuba 
Socialista and La Revista Internacional (International Magazine) are highly 
valuable aids in this respect. 

Admission to these schools is not subject to passing an entrance examination. 
The instructors are not the old type of professors, but revolutionary cadres. 
And nobody but Marxists are graduated. 

The schools make men and women more aware that it is their struggle, their 
daily activities and practices that make them stand out, more than anything 
else. They do not give the students any pat formulas ; they offer them guidance 
and open new vistas to their graduates. 

Though group study in these schools is very Important, we think that it cannot 
replace individual study, which is the most important method of learning what 
theory is all about. 

The revolutionary must become accustomed to studying Marxism-Leninism 
ceaselessly ; the classics of Marxism-Leninism, the books and pamphlets, the 
articles and theses — these are his study materials. 

We salute all those who are making a determined effort to study individually. 
The PRI must organize assistance for those comrades. 

National Schools 

The "Nico Lopez" EIR has 60 students and is currently the national cadre 
school. It is the highest rung on the ladder of our system. 

Students attend classes on a boarding-school basis for 6 months and may leave 
the premises once a week. 


The program includes the complete study of the Manual de Economia PoUtica 
(Political Economy Manual) put out by the Academy of Sciences USSR; this is 
supplemented by references to Capital by Marx, and Imperialism — Capitalism.' s 
Highest and Last Phase by Lenin, as well as other Marxist classics and modern 

The students also take up the essential elements of Fundamentos de la Filoso- 
fia Marxista (Foundations of Marxist Philosophy) published by the Academy of 
Sciences USSR, along with references to other classical works, especially 
Materialism and Empirioeriticism by Lenin, On Contradiction and About Prac- 
tice by Mao Tse-tung, as well as the Manual of Marxism-Leninism by O. 
Kuusinen, and others. 

The students furthermore study the Cuban Revolution; revolutionary organ- 
izations ; the international situation ; interpretation of Cuban history ; the ex- 
periences of the Russian Revolution and of the Chinese Revolution, etc. 

The study of economics is closely tied in with the economic history of Cuba 
and the economic means for the transition to Socialism. 

We also set up a National Teachers School (3-month course) and we are in 
the process of organizing a National Labor Union School (4-month course), a 
National Fisheries School (60 students), and a National People's Farmer School 
(600 students every 3 months) ; all of these schools will have or now do have 
different levels of instruction. 

The Labor Union School, for example, will operate on a provincial level and 
the fisheries and farmer schools will operate on the base level. 

Provincial Schools and Base Schools 

The provincial EIR are conceived as boarding schools for provincial, munici- 
pal, and regional cadres. 

For the moment, they are teaching accelerated 3-month courses offering in- 
struction in program that is generally the same as that of the national school, 
though less intensive. 

As in the national schools, the nerve center of education is political economy 

This is rooted in an undeniable fact : we are in charge of the country's economy 
and we are building Socialism. Economic buildup is the decisive factor in the 
triumph of the new social system. 

On the other hand, Marxist philosophy offers general principles of life and 
struggle ; in particular, it offers the concept of the movment, of eternal renewal, 
and of contradiction as the motive forces for vital processes. 

Without a knowledge of the fundamentals of Marxist philosophy, one can- 
not gain a deep understanding of revolutionary changes. 

The history of Cuba reveals the historical roots of our economy and the form- 
ative elements of our nationality, as well as the vast struggles of the Cuban 
people for its liberty. 

Right now, the provincial EIR constitute a consolidated system of 16 schools ; 
starting with the third cycle, on 1 September, they will have more than 1,028 

The Base Schools of Revolutionary Education are centers intended for the 
training of the revolutionary cadres at the base. 

The EBIR (Escuelas Basicas de Instruccion revolucinonaria — Base Schools 
of Revolutionary Education) are either fulltime (45-day) schools or parttime 
schools ; in the latter case, the students work on their jobs for 4 hours a day 
and then attended school for 8 hours for a period of 60 days. 

The EBIR are set up in big factories, sugar plantations, various industrial 
centers, people's farms, cooperatives, or in cities and regions. There are worker 
school, farmer schools, or mixed schools. 

The basic program of these schools is constituted by La historia me aisolvera 
(History Will Vindicate Me) by Fidel Castro and Los Fundamentos del Sociah 
ismo en Cuba (The Foundations of Socialism in Cuba) by Bias Roca. The 
curriculum also includes works on the labor movement, the agrarian revolution, 
and elements of political economy, as well as political materials from current 
national and international publications and sources. 

The EBIR developed as the result of initiative from the ranks. The workers 
at the La Rayonera textile factory in Matanzas, in cooperation with the pro- 
vincial EIR, devised this basic type. At the 3d National Conference of EIR on 


26 April, this project was launched and the program for it was worked out. 
The first schools opened in Havana and Oriente on 15 May. At the 4th National 
Conference of EIR from 21-22 July, there were 169 of these basic schools 
throughout the country. 

This shows that this initiative was correct. 

Here is the current status of the EBIR system. 

No. of Base 

No. of 


Oriente . _ _ _ _ _ 







2, 976 

Caniaguey _ _ 


Las Villas - _____-_-_ __ ___ 

2, 516 

Matanzas _ _ _ ._ _ 


Havana _. _ _ _ . _ _ 

2, 835 

P. del Rio 




The EBIR are in the process of consolidation ; until December 1961, they will 
be in the phase of planned expansion. The National Directorate of EIR is 
making a careful study of this new activity. 

The situation will look as follows in December, on the basis of plans and 
budget grants. 

No. of Base 

No. of 


Oriente (see Note) _ 





Camaguev _ _ _ 


Las Villas.- ._ _ 

3, 500 



Havana __ 


P. del Rio. _____ _ _ 




(Note. In Oriente Province, the current 100 base schools will be combined 
into 84 schools with greater capacity and better quality ; these consolidated 
schools will be located in the key centers of the province.) 

We want to emphasize that we have important EIR which are not directly 
involved in the activities of the National Directorate, though they are tied in 
with the latter and are under the political direction of the ORI. 

The "Osvaldo Sanchez" EIR of the armed forces has just graduated 750 in- 
structors for battalions and companies in its first training cycle. 

The schools of the Association of Young Rebels teach youth cadres. 

The Federation of Cuban Women is in the process of creating its own national 
school for women's leaders. 

Similarly, we have economic cadre schools (such as the school for industrial 
managers) and others of various types which offer instruction on the basis of the 
same principles as the EIR, in conjunction with their own specialized subject 

Academic and Discipline Aspects of the Schools 

Our program and our available resources are not enough to implement this 
objective. We must also take up the subject of the internal disciplinary manage- 
ment of the schools and their activities. 

Discipline is a factor that is highly important in political success. 

The external forms of discipline — e.g., military training — supplement the 
cadres' and militants' attitudes which are rooted in political awareness. 


For the students, the decisions of the director or the executive board con- 
stitute orders to be obeyed. This does not imply a lack of democracy, since it 
is the students who elect their own student representatives who, in cooperation 
with the director and the assistant director, make up the executive board. 

Class schedules and lesson plans play a major role in these schools ; these 
schedules and plans must be followed without change once they have been 

The school must endeavor to stimulate Socialist conduct. It must inculcate in 
the student a spirit of responsibility for the collective, a spirit of concern for his 
comrades, a spirit of help for his slow comrades, etc. 

In this respect (in addition to serious pedagogical reasons), we have a combi- 
nation of formal individual study, which is the principal method, plus group 
study, which is handled in groups of 8-12 students in a i-ational and well pro- 
grammed manner. 

Group study serves to help the slow students and makes for group spirit. 

In some schools, we have to fight hard against the lack of understanding on 
the part of some directors who fail to see the pedagogical advantages and moral 
aspects of group study. 

General meetings and assemblies are called periodically or whenever a problem 
arises ; this is a means for developing criticism and self-criticism and this in 
turn makes out of each school a living cell of the Revolution. Quite a few peo- 
ple learn in this manner the meaning of these principles of revival in Socialist 
thought and action. 

Volunteer work inside and outside the school (on days of rest) tests the real 
qualities of the student. AVith the help of the students, schools tackle repair 
jobs, plant crops, take care of children in nurseries, and build. Some students 
fan out to the factories, people's farms, and cooperatives to volunteer theijr 
manual labor for Socialism. 

Much attention is being devoted to Socialist emulation in each school and to 
competition between schools. In this competition, schools are graded on such 
points as academic class levels, qualifications, educational and practical activi- 
ties, savings, cleanliness, number of graduates, fulfillment of class schedules, 

We must emphasize once again that the students must realize what a tremen- 
dous effort the Revolution is making in keeping so many thousands of cadres 
and militants out of the production process and assigning more than 500 valu- 
able cadres to revolutionary instruction. 

This effort must be repaid through the powerful and effective work of com- 
rades who are graduated from these schools and take their place in the produc- 
tion effort and in political action. 

Selection of Students 

This is a problem of major importance. 

We said often that the students must be selected from among revolutionary 
cadres and activists, i.e., from among those who distinguished themselves in 
the struggle. Of those, we now have tens of thousands and we are getting more 
every day. 

This applies of course to selection for all types of schools we mentioned. 

It is a sad error to think that a school of theory is going to "hatch" activists 
and cadres. This may happen in isolated cases, but it is not the rule. 

We must say that, during the first cycle, a considerable proportion of students 
should not have been picked in the first place ; but we are correcting this mistake. 

Sometimes, we were able to observe that some regions and provinces did not 
send the best cadres with the most experience to these schools. There are two 
general reasons for this : 

the particular cadres "cannot" be spared from their duties ; 

fear that the National Directorate might pick these men after graduation for 
assignment to different duties, thus preventing them from returning to their 
original duties. 

This reasoning is false. The more responsibility the cadres have, the more 
they need to go to school. As for the transfer of cadres from one duty to 
another, from provincial to national duty slots, that is something that may hap- 
pen in view of the great nationwide needs of the ORI and of the government 
for trained cadres. But to oppose this, to look out only for one's own bailiwick 
indicates rigidity and reveals a localist spirit among certain comrades. Every- 
body must understand that the Revolution is a compact whole ; there is no such 
thing as a series of "local revolutions." 


The selection process itself is a yardstick for the school and for the selection 

Sometimes, women are automatically barred from consideration. This hap- 
pened, for instance, during the first provincial courses in the Province of Las 
Villas and during the second provincial course in Matanzas. 

This constitutes a concession to old prejudices and, though this is not a gen- 
eral phenomenon, it does crop up in other places. 

The failure to select women as students is an injustice and a bad mistake. 
The women are fighting on all fronts of the Revolution, including that front 
which is the toughest for them : /national/ defense, Why, then, this concession 
to prejudice? 

The Prohlem of the Faculty and the Directors 

The creation of a teaching body and of directors and assistant directors has 
been and is one of the most complicated problems we are facing in these schools. 

To run classes in theory in a political cadre school, we must have teachers who 
not only know their textbooks but who have also been or are revolutionary cadres. 
This is the key point here 

In the first school cycle, the schools were run with the help of teachers drawn 
from the revolutionary organizations which, without cutting back on their daily 
work, made tremendous efforts to teach in these schools for a certain period 
of time each day or for a certain continued period of instruction. 

The increase in the complex and urgent tasks of the Revolution as well as 
the rapid growth in the revolutionary schools themselves confronted us with 
the need for pulling out dedicated cadres and assigning them exclusively to teach- 
ing duties. 

It is interesting to note that some good cadres with practical revolutionary 
experience but little or no prior education, were able to assimilate their Marxist 
texts so rapidly that they could be assigned as directors and assistant directors 
of provincial schools and as directors and teachers of Base Schools. 

Many people are surprised that the majority of the directors and assistant 
directors of these schools are so young in years and that their experience in Marx- 
ist militancy is of such recent origin. We know that it takes years to master 
Marxist theory adequately. However, the extremely rapid advance of the Revo- 
lution and the need for cadres who are dedicated to the effort of teaching do not 
allow us to make any compromises here ; this is indeed the only solution to our 
great cadre problem. 

We believe that these young cadres are doing their duty with dignity and skill 
and that, as time goes on, they will improve their knowledge more and more. 

These cadres have everything it takes to advance: intelligence, willpower, 
the necessary books, adequate subsistence, the vigor and courage of the Socialist 
Revolution and, above all, a nucleus of Marxist-Leninist revolutionaries who 
guide and aid them. 

Practical experience teaches us that this bold method of promoting cadres is 

We are making a major effort to group teachers, directors, and assistant di- 
rectors in study circles where they can round out their knowledge. 

As far as the directors and asistant directors are concerned, we have learned 
some interesting lessons. The director — and, in his absence, the assistant di- 
rector — is the top-ranking officer of the school. 

This is why we must select our directors very carefully. 

Experience has shown that the director must meet the following essential 
requirements : 

capacity for leadership, flexibility, and pleasant disposition ; 

knowledge of all subjects taught at the school and inclination toward study. 

The director's qualities are directly reflected in the school as a whole ; we must 
not forget that he lives together with the 60 students of his school. 

The daily life of the school at times reveals difficulties arising out of subjective 
or objective factors. 

A situation in which 60 students with differing personalities, though united 
by a common ideal, live closely together, is almost bound to produce occasional 
friction and misunderstandings. But this is no cause for despair. These inci- 
dents are opportunities for Socialist education through the exercise of criticism 
and self-criticism. 


Directors who do not underestimate the "details" of education and daily life — 
such as the quality of the menu, hygiene, comportment, care of the library and 
of books ; strict compliance with schedules, beautiflcation and care of premises, 
etc. — contribute not only to the maintenance of order in the school but also 
contribute to the education of the comrades. 

The ORI and Their Relations to the Schools 

Until now, some organizations of the ORI have failed to give due consideration 
and attention to the provincial schools. The ORI have fallen down chiefly in 
the respective education and propaganda commissions. 

This lack of attention is negative. We do not mean to say that the leaders 
of the ORI are permanent teachers, but we do believe that they should at least 
help present the summaries at the end of each of the most important class cycles 
and direct conferences and maintain lively exchange of ideas with the students 
at the cadre schools. 

If we assume that the ORI should merely select graduates for placement in 
specific job slots, how could they accomplish this without close liaison with the 
school, without knowing all about the cadres? 


The EIR are in full development. Some things remain to be corrected, modi- 
fied, and improved within the EIR. 

From the 1st National Conference, held in December 1960, to the 4th, on 
21-22 July 1961, a period of about 8 months, we can register a tremendous ad- 
vance in the creation of schools and in the expansion of theoretical studies. 

Some 1,175 students have taken courses in the provincial schools and more 
than 4,000 attended the Base Schools. 

The practical effect from the assignment of graduates of these schools have 
already made themselves felt in the work of the ORI. The results are encourag- 
ing. According to the opinions of the provincial ORI and the organization where 
these graduates were placed, we can say that elementary, intermediate, and 
higher theoretical studies have been converted into material strength. 

The revolutionary enthusiasm of the students is indescribable. Each theo- 
retical lesson acts as stimulus for their behavior and conduct. We can now 
see graduates of these students in many positions of responsibility. We find them 
in the leadership organs of the ORI, in factory managements, in farm and 
cooperative managements. One hundred of them are now active in the field 
of education and we have 100 additional directors of schools who emerged from 
the EIR. We also meet them in the government agencies, in the militia, and 
in the Rebel Army. 

We can find graduates of these schools holding down responsible key jobs al- 
most anywhere. Our front of Socialist revolutionary instruction penetrates 
everywhere ; in production, in defense, in culture. 

We have placed major emphasis on these schools. However, we are also 
involved in other academic initiatives. 

In Havana, for instance, we now have a wide network of elementary evening 
schools, with 2 hours of study per day ; here we have more than 7,000 students 
in 200 schools. 

In Havana and Oriente, we have practical schools (2 or 3 weeks), run by 
ORI, where young cadres learn the functioning of the different sectors of labor. 

And thousands of graduates are being assigned to leadership of study circles 
at various levels. 

We cannot even begin to count all the discussion groups. The number of 
discussion group members has increased by thousands. 

The effort of political education is very important. The Revolution requires 
that this effort be intensified and improved constantly. 

The^ Chairman, The next witness is Mr. Stuart Morrison of the 
Miami Herald. 

Mr. Morrison, we are delighted to have you. We know of your 
work but, for the record — this record will be printed — and would 
you please give us your background ? 

Mr. Morrison. My personal background, sir? 

The Chairman. Yes, sir. 



Mr. Morrison. Yes, sir, I have no prepared statement; I will speak 
for the record, but off the cuff. 

Personal backo^round is as follows: I am 38 years old, have been 
employed by the Miami Herald for the past IT years. Initially I was 
a printer in the composing room and during the next 10 years of my 
employment worked in all phases of the mechanical and production 
areas of the newspaper. Since that time I have been exposed to all 
other areas of production and management. 

I was appomted director of the Operation Amigo program in 1961 
at the time of its birth. 

I have four children, served in the United State Navy during World 
War II, attended the University of Miami at night. 

Present position would be national director for Operation Amigo 
for the Knight, Copley, and Scripps-Howard newspapers. 

Operation Ajnigo is a nonprofit organization established mider the 
proper Florida statutes. 

I would like to make it clear that I don't pretend to be an expert 
in anything other than the director of Operation Amigo. 

The first time that I set foot in Latiri America was approximately 
?> years ago. I know how the people feel and react. I think I know 
their individual desires and understand what the public can do, both 
in the United States and in Latin America, if given the opportunity 
to expand their vision. 

I am here to testify for the Freedom Academy bills, because in 
concept, as I understand it, they go into the area of research and 
development, of the private sector, as opposed to strictly a branch 
of the Government. 

I think, first, we will start with Operation Amigo, and it would 
fall into three categories — the how, the why, and the results of it. 

The previous witness testified to the actions that the Communist 
bloc nations are exerting in Central and South America. Amigo 
relates only to Central and South America. For years, especially 
since the war, the Communists in Latin America have had an ac- 
celerated program of indoctrination, chiefly at the youth in this 
hemisphere ; and it was the editors of the Miativi Herald who thought 
that we have not set up a defense against this, nor launched an ef- 
fective counterattack against this movement. 

If we in the United States believe in our way of life, then why 
shouldn't someone get up and fight for it ? 

The Communist bloc nations spend millions of dollars in Central 
and South America, sending propaganda to the high schools and 
the universities, paying professional scholars at the university level, 
professional students, just waiting to prey on the young students 
coming up from the high school level. 

They are transporting, as the other witness said, students to Com- 
munist bloc nations and sending them back into Central and South 
America as fully fledged diplomats. 

We in America, or the United States, have left the difficult art of 
diplomacy solely to the Government. It is a very difficult task, and 
we as individuals in the United States have failed in promoting 
ourselves as the individual diplomat. 


The Communist countries have, under the significance of political 
warfare as opposed to hot warfare, some 40 years ago; and they are 
beating us, and they are beating us badly. They are unorthodox; 
they are effective. They are in the unions ; they are in the schools ; they 
are in the professional staffs of the universities; they are eveiywhere 
that you can conceivably think they would be. 

Operation Amigo is completely subsidized through private enter- 
prise. We thought that if we brought some of these future leaders of 
the Latin American countries to the United States to give them a 
firsthand look at the way we operate, at what makes our system tick, 
at our tax structure, without any whitewash at all — we attempt to show 
them the good and the bad — then these future leaders could go back 
to their local high schools and communities and tell them the truth. 
Jose Gonzales, who has been selected to come to the States, has seen for 
himself; they are going to believe Jose Gonzales and not Communist 

Operation Amigo was initiated by the Miami Herald 21/^ years ago, 
and we now have the support of the Copley newspapers and the 
Scripps-Howard newspapers. 

Operation Amigo was a giant at its start, actually. We intended 
to bring 40 students up in the first group, let them live with our own 
high school students, and send them back. In the first 3 months, 
we brought some eight groups up, about 300 students. 

Then we said, "Well, if it works in Miami, why can't it work upstate, 
somewhere around Cocoa, Cape Canaveral area ?" 

And we sent the first group of students up to Cocoa High School — 
that was completely out of our jurisdiction — to see if it would work ; 
and it did. 

The Chairman. You mean students from 

Mr. Morrison. From one of the countries in Central and South 
America. One of these groups of students ; yes, sir. 

The next year, Mr. Knight offered it to other jurisdictions, and 
we now find that we have sent students to Fort Worth ; Houston ; to 
Denver; to San Diego, to Santa Rosa, California; Charlotte, North 
Carolina; Flint, Michigan; Louisville, Kentucky; Akron, Ohio — 
18 States. 

It has a twofold purpose. 

Mr. Pool. Let me interrupt right there, please, sir. 

Mr. Morrison. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Pool. You mentioned before Houston. They are in my district. 

Mr. Morrison. Sir, these boots I'm wearing are from Fort Worth, 
by the way. 

Mr. Pool. "Where did you send them in Texas ? 

Mr. Morrison. The Fort Worth Press^ a Scripps-Howard news- 
paper, with Delbert Willis, took them at the Fort Worth High School, 
and I frankly don't know the name of the high school ; and in Houston, 
Texas, they went to Bel Air High School, and I believe the other 
high school was Lamar. What is it? Lamar? I may or may not 
be correct there. 

]Vf r. Pool. Do you know how many went there ? 

Mr. Morrison. Yes, sir; approximately 120 students have gone to 
the State of Texas already. 

Mr. Pool. Thank you. 


Mr. Morrison. Yes, sir. 

I will show you the clippings from the newspapers. 

It has a twofold purpose. We tell our students, "Wliy can't you 
get out and do something for your country ? " Well, what can they do ? 
They can buy war bonds ; they can join the Navy, as I so foolishly did 
20 years ago. But, that's not the extent of it, but the Amigo program 
gives each and every student in the United States who participates an 
opportunity to appoint himself as an individual diplomat. 

Now, the exposure of this doesn't only deal with the student who 
is involved in taking a Latin American into his home. It involves the 
entire school, entire school jurisdictions. It involves an entire city 
and entire States. 

The student that is selected from Latin America is selected in this 
fashion, much like the Communists select their students. We go to a 
Latin American city and we explain the program to the principals of 
all the public high schools. This is where the core of the cancer lies, in 
the public schools, the lower income family groups. And we ask them 
to submit, based upon proven academic ability, those students who have 
excelled themselves with a fine scholastic record over the last 2 or 3 

We then set up a committee for the selection of the students. This 
committee would consist of one or two newspaper people, Eotarians, 
civic leaders, and an educational man, and then these students would 
come before this committee — and possibly at times we have had as 
many as 700 students apply for 30 scholarships — and, based upon 
questions that we ask these students, they are selected to come to the 
United States. 

The Chairman. At this point, may I ask you to clarify something 
for me ? 

Mr. Morrison. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. This screening process you explained— where may- 
be you have 700 applicants, from which you would choose 30 — is it done 
in Central America ? 

Mr. Morrison. Oh, yes, sir ; in the city. 

The Chairman. These leaders you are talking about are leaders 

Mr. Morrison. Correct ; they are nationals. Correct. 

The Chairman. And the newspaper ? 

Mr. Morrison. They are national newspaper people ; correct. 

Mr. Ichord. Are you confining it to students coming from lower 
economic levels? 

Mr. Morrison. We bring 85 percent from the public schools, 15 
percent from the private schools. 

Mr. Ichord. Are you looking into their social and economic back- 
ground, though, before you accept them in the program ? 

Mr. Morrison. Yes, sir. In each and every group, we get four or 
five students whom you could not call Communists, but I could say 
that they have a tendency to lean that way. These are the students 
who would be most acceptable to the offers made by the university- 
level professional students. 

They come to the United States, and we put them in school for a 
period of only 2 weeks. They attend classes with the local high school 
students, and on 4 of the 10 days, we take them out on tours to our 


governmental establishments, to our Federal Housing developments, 
slum areas, city commission meetings, in an attempt to answer any 
questions that they might have had in their mind — or that they might 
have had put there — honestly and frankly and justly. 

We send them back to the Latin American city, and this is a story 
again in itself that I will tell you a little later. 

There is a tremendous amount of cost involved in this program, 
and not 1 cent has come from the Federal Government, and 50 per- 
cent of the funds that go into this program come from Latin nations. 
This was not true the first year, but we made them believe that we 
are trying to help them in their own fight against communism. 

The Operation Amigo program does not stop once they go back 
to their own country. This is not a 2-week vacation, and what I 
am about to tell you is not very well known here, but I can tell you 
this: that the Operation Amigo program in many areas of South 
America has more impact than Alianza Para Progreso ^ or the Peace 
Corps combined. I am not attacking either one of those areas. The 
Peace Corps is fine. The Peace Corps has one fallacy that I know of. 
The hot political areas of the universities and the unions are not, to 
my knowledge, infiltrated by Peace Corps members. This is where 
your trouble is. But you take a Latin American student who has been 
trained in the United States, and you send him back into this area, 
and you have got an effective worker for our side. 

Let's speak about the Operation Amigo clubs. When the students 
return to their own country, we don't let them sit idle. We have 
established Operation Amigo clubs in 14 countries. We have approxi- 
mately 4,000 students. These are Latin students in Operation Amigo 
clubs in Central and South America. 

This magazine is published in Call, Colombia, published by Latin 
students, not gringos going down there showing them how to do it. 
Supported by private industry. This explains the program of 
Alianza Para Progreso. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. Private industry in the Latin American country or 
in the United States? 

Mr. Morrison. Private industry in Latin Amercia. 

Now, let me clarify that just a minute. We have Goodyear down 
there and we have IBM and we have Goodrich. We don't believe 
that the funds for this program should come from Goodyear, U.S., 
and their Goodyear branch in Venezuela, for instance. The funds for 
the program come from Latin American industry in Central and 
South America. 

We have 4,000 students in the clubs, in 14 to 16 countries. Now 
these are — in Peru alone we have 600 students, in eight of the major 
cities. These students hold meetings regularly; they have typing 
classes, political science classes; they work in the slums. The first 
time in the histoi-y of P(iru where you get Peruvians working for 
Peru in the slums, not gringos going down there with dollars. 

They have their own clubhouse. In many areas, we do not work 
with U.S. Cultural Affairs Officers in Central and South America, 
but with — for example — the Colombo-American school. It is di- 
vorced from the U.S. State Department. In Peru, we continued with 

^ Alliance for Progress. 


our operation although at that time the United States had broken 
relations with Peru. We took students out of Guatemala when our 
own State Department told me to get out, don't take students, it would 
be sure death for me. 

There is a tremendous potential for the training of the private indi- 
viduals, lawyers, doctors, cabinetmakers, newspaper people. Inci- 
dentally, we started to bring up only school teachers as chaperones, 
but now we have made it a policy to bring up newspaper reporters, 
who maybe before were not too "friendly toward the United States. 

I want to show you, very briefly — and I certainly don't want to take 
up any more of your time — the complete acceptability of this pro- 
gram in Latin America, because it is aside from the U.S. Government 
[flipping pages of large scrapbook containing newspaper and other 
items]. "Front page, Novedades; front page, Lima newspaper; front 
page, Tegucigalpa newspaper. 

An interestnig letter from Tom Mann. This is a little city outside of 
Bogota, called Niacombi, where about 5,000 students paraded by that 
day, just to be selected. 

This is interesting. This is an impact to — it is an editorial written 
in the LaPrensa Grafica^ and it says : 

Operation Amigo is now coming to Salvador as the rest of Latin America, and 
from this newspaper's viewpoint, there will be more fruits and benefits derived 
from Operation Amigo than the now famous and already started Alianza Para 

I have this editorial translated in English. I would like to submit 
it as a document. 

The Chairman. You want to insert that at this point ? 

Mr. MoRRisoisr. Sir? 

The Chairman. Do you want it inserted ? 

Mr. Morrison. No, sir. These are some of the first Operation 
Amigo letterheads that were printed by the students in some of the 
countries. Nicaragua, Peru, Colombia. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. Let me interrupt you at tliis point. As I understand 
it, it is a 2-week period that these students are in the United States. 

Mr. Morrison. Two to three weeks ; yes, sir. 

Mr. JoHANSEN, How do you overcome the language barrier prob- 
lem ? 

Mr. Morrison. I don't think there is much of a language barrier, 
sir. There is a people barrier. 

I don't mean to evade the question. We find that approximately 40 
percent of all Latin American students will be able to speak some Eng- 
lish. Approximately 80 percent will be able to understand it. We do 
have Spanish-English dictionaries, simple phrases, that we issue to 
each student. Usually, you will have one or two students in the group 
that can act as translators. 

tit^aV^^^*^^* ^^' Chairman, at this point, may I make a request that 
Mr. Morrison be permitted to submit to the committee, subject to the 
review of the committee, whatever documents he desires in support of 
this presentation. 

The Chairman. Yes, sir, following his statement. 

Mr. Morrison. Mr. Pool, are you from Texas? 

Mr, Pool. Yes, sir. 


Mr. Morrison [still flipping scrapbook pages]. These items are 
from Houston. This is all Houston. 

Mr. Pool. May I interrii pt here ? Do you have this going in Panama 
and Venezuela? 

Mr. Morrison. Yes, sir — excuse me. We have not liad it in Panama. 
"We have not had it in Chile, so far, and of course the three Guianas. 
It is merely because we have not had time to get around to it. We will 
take students from Panama this year; yes, sir. We have taken about 
160 students from Venezuela. 

Mr. Pool. During the crisis we had several weeks ago in Panama, 
did you have any students that had gone back to Panama ? 

Mr. Morrison. I say we had not. Panama has not been included. 

Mr. Pool, I see. It would have been quite interesting to have had a 
report on their activities during that crisis, if we had had them dow^i 

Mr. jVIorrison. Yes, sir. 

I would like to — would you read this? This is an editorial printed 
in the Occidente, and it pretty well reflects the feeling of the news- 
paper and the Latin public that have been exposed to the Operation 
Amigo, and remember that this is printed in Colombia, please, sir. 

Mr. McNamara [reading]. Operation Amigo, a Bulwark. 

One of the fundamental aspects of good relationships among the inhabitants 
of the world is people-to-people contact: a friendly interest in others and the 
feeling of solidarity and mutual esteem that such relationships propagate. 

An extraordinary cultural exchange has been taking place recently between 
the students of Latin America and the United States. This kind of socializing 
undoubtedly will have widespread influence on the future generations of all 
our countries. 

One of the most important of these programs is the so-called Operation Amigo, 
which was initiated by the newspaper, the Miami Herald, and which today has 
the support and collaboration of 28 Scripps-Howard and Copley newspapers. 
In the development of their plans, numbers of Colombian students have visited 
the United States and hundreds of North American youngsters have come down 
to learn by direct experience about life as it is lived in Latin America. 

Recently, Mr. H. Stuart Morrison, general coordinator for Latin America, 
returned to Call where Operation Amigo has already found a generous and 
enthusiastic welcome, to organize another Colombian-American student exchange. 

This strengthening of ideological and cultural ties among nations defending 
the same principles and belonging to the same system of free democracies is of 
incalculable value to us all. A brand new force thus appears on the continent 
to guard against the Castro-Communist avalanche trying to destroy the bonds 
that have been our hope for the future in our struggle for progress. 

To these young students— already so well versed in objective knov/ledge — will 
fall the job of carrying on the preaching and the teaching of whatever we learn 
from those who join with us in the defense of the ideal of social reform in this 

The accomplishments of the Peace Corps, of the People-to-People campaign, of 
Operation Amigo and others, are the solid bulwarks on which the friendship of 
the nations of America rests. We need them today more than ever before as we 
confront the dangers that threaten the free world. 

Mr. Morrison. Mr. Pool, you asked about Venezuela. I was in 
Venezuela shortly before the election. We took students as far south 
as Puerto Ordaz, which is on the Orinoco Kiver in the eastern part 
of Venezuela, Barcelona, Santa Thomas, every nook and cranny of 
eastern Venezuela ; and the bombings that you heard about were not 
performed by adults. They were 16-, 17-, 18-year-old kids working in 
Commie cell blocs who went out and bombed the oil lines and bombed 
this and machinegunned trains, and then they retreat back into the 
universities, where they have a certain amount of immunity. 


It was open season on Yankees in Venezuela. There is no question 
about that. But the Venezuelan people certainly are to be congratu- 
lated for going out in force and voting during that election. 

It is these kids that need our help, and they were just crying for 
leadership, just crying for it. Won't somebody stand up and fight ? 

I don't know the particulars about legislation, but I do know that 
through private enterprise we had a theory that was reduced to prac- 
tical application, without a lot of red tape, and we know it works. We 
are not going to stop here. I have in the other brief case a proposal 
to expand Operation Amigo. Right now we are working with me and 
a secretary. That's our staff. I expect that next year we will be able 
to bring up 2,000 students, with the unlimited resources that the United 
States has, and the unlimited cooperation that you can get in Central 
and South America — because we are one people in one hemisphere with 
a common tie ; there is no doubt in my mind that news of the Freedom 
Academy bill will certainly help hold this hemisphere together like it 
should be. 

I will answer any questions that I am capable of answering at this 

The Chairman. Well, I have two or three. 

In 1960, or thereabouts 

Mr. Morrison. Sir? 

The Chairman. In 1960 or thereabouts, the AFL-CIO created the 
American Institute for Free Labor Development Avith their own funds, 
with headquarters in Washington, and apparently, according to my 
understanding of its functions, this institute is doing the identical 
work that you are doing — in the labor world, I am talking about — 
namely, bringing labor leaders here from Latin America, teaching 
them free, democratic imionism and Communist strategy and tactics, 
and thereupon the graduates go back and, as I understand, have done 
a magnificent job in preventing the takeover of the unions by the 
Commimists, and perhaps recapturing some that were seized. 

Anyway, we see the parallel, and apparently the few experiments 
that have come to our observation are working. 

Now, we have heard that the Academy concept would be better han- 
dled through these private concepts, private undertakings; then, on 
the other hand, we hear from the State Department that it should be 
left alone ; and then we have heard from mighty knowledgeable peo- 
ple that there must be some central source, some uniform research, and 
studies that would be available to those engaged, such as you are, in 
this effort, without displacing you in any way, and it would be avail- 
able also to foreign nationals, not only from Latin America but else- 
where, leaders in the labor world and business world and the manage- 
ment world, and so on. 

Now, I wish you would address yourself to how the Academy would 
be useful in the areas I have described, and whether the idea of this 
establishment should be left alone or should be left to private enter- 
prise or private efforts. I wish you would comment on that. 

Mr. Morrison. Well, if I understand your question, I think that 
the Freedom Academy should be set up separate from the State 
Department. Wliat I am about to say may not be popular, but I am 
going to say it anyhow. There are many good people in the State 
Department in Central and South America, but there are many people 


in the State Department who are reluctant to make a decision. I know 
from my own experience that, in some countries, if a person who is 
attached to the Embassy dares to mix with the nationals, he would 
be set aside by the official American colony, and this is what the 
people in Central and South America resent. I think that if the 
Freedom Academy or any institution was set up under the State De- 
partment, it would lose its effectiveness in Latin America. 

Does this answer your question ? 

The Chairivian. Well, yes, partly ; but then, do you see the necessity 
for it? 

Mr. Morrison. For a central office ? Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. As distinguished from universities, and that area. 

Mr. Morrison. Yes, sir. And again I say, I don't know the rami- 
fications of these bills or the differences in them. I know the basic 
differences. Yes, there should be some central office where informa- 
tion could be obtained, where training and research of specific prob- 
lems in a trouble area could be examined. Yes, I do ; and I think that 
the Latin student or the Latin professional, once you establish that 
this office only attempts to tell the truth about the two systems or our 
way of life, aside from party-line policy — if this is the correct ter- 
minology — that once you establish that, then it becomes effective. And 
this is only based upon my experience with Operation Amigo, because 
when I first went to Central and South America, they thought I was 
an arm of the U.S. Government; they did not believe me. They 
thought I was another Yankee coming down there to trick them, but 
we have proved our point, and now they say, "Welcome home, Mr. 

The Chairman. Well, now, the Sate of Louisiana, the Legislature 
of Louisiana, passed a bill making it compulsory to teach a course in 
Democracy versus Communism. Those may not be the words, but 
that's about it. 

Mr. Morrison. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. And that same concept has taken root in other 
States. In your own State of Florida. 

Mr. Morrison. Florida, yes, sir. 

The Chairman. And a high school teacher testified before us, and 
he made it easy for me, because he said, rather than having me say, that 
the trouble with these courses is that there is so little known by the 
run-of-the-mill high school teacher as to what to teach and how to go 
about it, that most of the time — and that coincides with my experi- 
ence — the teachers from the whole State of Louisiana, particularly 
from my congressional district, because I happen to be chairman of 
this committee, the type of information they want is a short-range, 
do-it-day-before-yesterday type, such as "How many Communists are 
there in my town, and how do we get rid of them?" 

Mr. Morrison. You don't go about it that way ; no, sir. 

The Chairman. Well, I know, but that is what convinces me or leads 
me to the conviction that you and the high school teacher are right ; 
that we need some central, reliable agency that will tell the truth and 
make an objective judgment of what's going on. 

Mr. Morrison. Yes, sir ; that is absolutely right. 

The Chairman. Now, how to set it up — we have not reached that 

30-471— 64— pt. 2 8 


Mr. Morrison. That's your business, but what we need is that agency. 
The people in Latin America, as I say again, are crying for this in- 
formation. I have had people say, "Well, I have written to the Cul- 
tural Affairs Officer of this Embassy. He has not gotten any action." 
There is evidently no central information office, and the Communists 
are out working day and night. This is a 24-hour job with them. 

Mr. Bruce. May I interrupt ? 

The Chairman. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Bruce. I have been acquainted with what your newspapers are 
doing. They are doing a tremendous job. 

The Chairman. Well, so have we all. 

Mr. Bruce. We have watched with gTeat interest. Why can't the 
publisher's association, nationally, the newspapers, who have so much 
at stake, as we all do, take a cue from what you have done on your 
Amigo program and, on their own, establish a Freedom Academy ? I 
am concerned. I am concerned about — frankly, I am an ex-newsman. 

Mr. Morrison. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Bruce. And I am concerned about the lack of knowledge in the 
news media of the full nature of the Communist movement. I sug- 
gested to a publisher not too long ago that they could set up, working 
together in the newspaper alliance, whatever it is, a school, so that 
the men in the working press can have more than just the surface 
impression of a struggle between the Communist empire and the 
Western World, because it is much deeper than that, but nothing has 

Mr. JMoRRisoN. Yes, sir. We have — of course, I can't speak for John 
S. Knight nor Mr. Copley nor Charley Scripps nor Jack Howard. 
This would be an excellent idea, of course. I think that the news- 
paper industry is finally — well, let me not say "finally" — is awakening 
to this point and, in their own way, are trying to spread the gospel to 
some of our Midwestern States that sort of don't even Iniow Cuba is 
down there. You know, we are 90 miles away from Communist Cuba 
in Florida. 

Mr. Bruce. Well, I want to amend your statement. I think the 
Midwestern States are quite alert to that, 

Mr. Morrison. Okay, fine. 

In the Miami Herald^ as well as other newspaper offices, they are 
holding seminars pertaining to the newspaper industry periodically, 
sir, and are attempting to get into this area. 

Now, about as far as establishing a school, I can't answer that. 

Mr. Bruce. But would not this give much more freedom to the 
Freedom Academy if it were set up under private sponsorship with 
all the conflict that inevitably is going to come between the executive 
branch and the Freedom Academy? I just don't see how you can do 
this without having this impasse reached when they begin to hit pay 
dirt in the Freedom Academy. 

]\Ir. Morrison. Yes. 

Mr. Bruce. They begin to upset the status quo, then the pressures 
come back on, and it is an embarrassment. I just don't know. 

The Chairman. May we go off the record ? 

C Discussion off the record.) 


The Chairman. At this ]:)oint, Mr. Christopher Emmet will appear. 

Mr. Emmet, we are glad to have you with us. And for the record, 
I wish you "would give a thumbnail description of your background 
and your occupation and education, and then proceed. 


Mr. Emmet. Well, I am very happy and honored to be allowed to 
give my support to the Freedom Academy bill. I have been aware 
and active in some way in connection with the Communist problem 
mostof my life. 

I personally first observed the diabolical treacherous nature of the 
Communist movement when I was a student in Germany. I saw that 
the Communists directed their campaign against Democrats and indi- 
rectly, and in some cases directly, helped the Nazis against the German 
Republic. There were certain strikes which they made in common. 
There were key elections where the Communists threw their votes to 
the same candidates as the Nazis, in their common hatred of democracy. 
And, of course, they hoped that the Nazis would be a passing phase. 

I perhaps should have said that I am a free-lance writer, I have 
written on politics in many publications. I have a radio program in 
New York which I have been moderator of for the last 25 years, the 
Foreign Affairs Round Table. I have been correspondent for a Ger- 
man weekly newspaper in New York and I have been active in many 

During the thirties, because of my experience with the Nazis in 
Germany and my fear that Hitler would surely go into the aggression 
which he did, I was active in the anti-Nazi movement. I founded one 
of the boycott committees, a committee called the Volmiteer Chris- 
tian Committee to boycott Nazi Germany, and we cooperated with 
Jewish boycott organizations and with the American Federation of 
Labor, which had a labor boycott against Nazi goods because of their 
oppression of the labor unions. 

The Chairman. Was that during the regime of AFL President 
William Green ? 

Mr. Emmet. Yes. I then had a personal experience with Communist 
treachery. Wlien the Hitler-Stalm Pact was formed, there were many 
anti-Nazi organizations which cooperated loosely. My committee 
never cooperated with any Communist committee, but secretly, there 
were Communists in some of the anti-Nazi committees with whom we 
did cooperate in connection with the boycott and in our exposures of 
Nazi propaganda. Wlien the Hitler-Stalin Pact was signed, immedi- 
ately some of these organizations were paralyzed by key Communist 
personnel who had been infiltrated. There was one very big commit- 
tee that was headed by the late Senator Lehman, Walter Damrosch, 
and other wonderful names. I think it was called the Council Against 
Nazi Aggression. It had large funds and was very active. 

Wlien the Hitler-Stalin Pact was signed, that committee was para- 
lyzed. They never issued another statement — and, of course, the war 
started right after the pact was signed. Some of the people who had 
been most active, most effective, most militant in the anti-Nazi organi- 
zations, and some that I personally worked with in the secretariat 
level, turned out to have been Communists, because they turned against 


US overnight and began screaming about British colonialism in India : 
"Do you want us to get into a war to help enslave the Indian people?" 
You see, all of a sudden, from having been talking about nothing but 
Nazi atrocities, there was a reversal, just like that. 

So although before the war I was mainly engaged in exposing the 
danger of Nazi and Japanese aggression, I was conscious of the Com- 
munist danger. Therefore, during the war, I headed an informal 
opposition to the Communist agitation for a second front. If you re- 
member, the Communists during the war were screaming for a second 
front, demanding that the U.S. and Britain make a premature land- 
ing in France to take the heat off Russians, even though the American 
Armies and the British Armies might have been destroyed. Thus, the 
Communists risked a Nazi victory just to take the heat off Russia a 
little earlier. Stalin even attacked the British for failure to invade 
Europe in October 1941, which was only a few months after the fall of 
France. He demanded that the British invade with their wretched 
little army. 

Then in 1943 Stalin attacked the U.S. when we invaded North 
Africa instead of the Continent. The Communists sucked in peo- 
ple like Wendell Willkie to enter this agitation, many well-meaning 
citizens, who said, "The brass hats, the America generals, don't want 
to risk their troops, so they are delaying the second front," and "the 
Russians are dying for us." It was an elaborate Communist opera- 
tion. Well, I had my radio program and I was permitted by the 
station, WEVD, to combat this agitation, and I wrote letters to papers 
and got up a joint statement, and so on. 

Then after the war, I founded the Committee Against Mass Expul- 
sions, which attempted to publicize the mass deportations by the Com- 
munists of German-speaking people, regardless of whether they were 
Nazi or anti-Nazi, when they came into Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hun- 
gary, Rumania, and Yugoslavia. There were large German-speaking 
minorities in those countries, mostly solid citizens, small businessmen, 
shopkeepers, skilled workers. Their deportation was part of the Com- 
munist plan to exacerbate national hatreds between Germans and Slavs 
and thus help them to communize the Slavs because of fear of the Ger- 
mans. They also hoped that the mass of refugees would help com- 
munize Germany. So when the Russian Armies occupied all of those 
countries of Eastern Europe, they encouraged and forced the expul- 
sion of every one of these German-speaking citizens. The total 
amounted to somewhere in the neighborhood of 14 million — if you in- 
clude the German citizens in the eastern part of Germany which was 
taken over by Poland. There were nearly three million of them ex- 
pelled from Czechoslovakia, half a million from Hungary and so on. 

Because this was a neglected issue, we knew very little about it 
here; it was hard to get the information from behind the Russian 
Armies ; only the churches, the Quakers, and a few relief organizations 
could get in, so that we formed this committee to try to publicize that 
monstrous Soviet crime which was occurring at the same time as the 
Nuremberg trials. While we were trying the Nazi leaders — and in my 
opinion, rightly so — for some of their crimes, including that of depor- 
tation, the Soviet Union was carrying out an even greater deportation 
than Hitler had even been able to cari-y out, right at that very 


Sidney Hook was one of the members of that committee, a profes- 
sor of philosophy in New York University, a great American educa- 
tor, a great American philosopher, and he was the one who inspired 
me and helped to organize that committee with me. He did not 
want to be chairman, so I was the chairman of it. Norman Thomas, 
Dorothy Thompson, the Reverend John Haynes Holmes, and Father 
John LaFarge were among its members. 

Then we began to get news of the forced repatriation of DP's. This 
had nothing to do with the Germans. The displaced persons were 
defined as citizens of Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union or members 
of the Jewish minority in Germany, who were deported from their 
homes and used as slave labor after the Nazi occupation of their home- 
lands. Among them were citizens of the Baltic States — Lithuania, 
Latvia, and Estonia — whose countries had been annexed by the Soviet 
Union and enslaved by communism. The Soviets regarded them as 
Soviet citizens. Other anti-Communists among the DP's who did not 
want to return were members of minority nationalities in Russia, such 
as the Ukrainians. But there were also an enormous number of 
Russians themselves, including soldiers who had been prisoners of 
the Nazis, who did not want to return. 

We will never know how many were forcibly repatriated through 
one form of pressure or another, but we do know that thousands 
resisted forcibly and that there were even tragic cases of mass suicide. 

Well, we formed a committee called the Refugee's Defense Commit- 
tee, which General Donovan was the chairman of, and of which David 
Martin, who is now assistant to Senator Dodd, was the secretary. I 
was the treasurer of it. We tried to expose these Communist crimes 
which were occurring and which our Government and the Allied Gov- 
ernments were unconsciously collaborating with, under the momentmn 
of the wartime alliance and agreements with Russia. Naturally the 
U.S. Army assumed that the Soviet DP's wanted to go home. The 
UNRRA organization was set up to help these people to go home, and 
the U.S. Army was instructed to return the prisoners of war who had 
been captured by the Germans, yet many of the Soviet prisoners of 
war in Germany did not want to go back. Hundreds of thousands of 
Soviet prisoners of war had volunteered to join General Vlasov's army. 
General Vlasov had been an able Communist general, who had been 
captured by the Nazis. He asked the Nazis to let him raise volunteers 
among the Russian prisoners to fight for freedom in Russia, and Hitler 
originally promised to let him do that. But when Vlasov saw what 
the Nazis were doing in Russia, the deal was off. He did not col- 
laborate in the Nazi crimes. Nevertheless, he and his followers were 
forcibly delivered to the Soviets by the U.S. Army for execution under 
the wartime agreements. 

Then the fact that I have worked in the writing and radio fields, 
gives me a special interest, of course, in the question of propaganda 
and information. I have been warmly and enthusiastically support- 
ing the Freedom Academy bill since I first heard of it from Mr. Alan 
Grant about 11 years ago. At that time, after elaborating this plan 
with his friends in the Orlando group and having gone to Washington 
with it and having run into delays in Washington, Mr. Grant came to 
New York. He first wrote to a number of people who were interested 
in the anti -Communist movement, and among others, Sidney Hook and 


Leo Cherne uiid one olhoi- rriond of mine, Arthur McDowell of the 
Upholsterers' Union, who is here (oday, and many others. We met 
at that lime in New York in an eiVort to see ii' we coidd not carry out 
this plan on a pi-i\ate basis with the support of foundation money. 

Congressman JU'uce asked wdietlier it would not be ideal if this 
Freedom Academy could be set up entirely as a private enterj^rise. At 
that time, we attempted to do that and we had the support of some 
very distinu^uished citizens, includino; General Clay, former Governor 
Dewey, and IFeni'v Luce, of 7'hne-Lifr, but we failed. In my opinion, 
the diflicullies of linancin<^ an o])eratioii of this sort privately are 
insuperabU\ because of the vast area of responsibilities which private 
hnancinii,' nnist take care of. 

For that reason, I endorse wholeheartedly ih(\ bill introduced by 
Representative Bo^j^^s, antl the same bill that Senator Douo;las and 
Senator Mundt have introduced in the Senate. I am convinced that 
this would bo a ^reat step forward in increasinf^ knowledf^e of com- 
numism and efl'ective resistance to conununism and, in my opinion, 
increasin<ii; American national unity. 

We all know one of i]w problems which you mentioned, Mr. Chair- 
man — the school ])rincii)al's question: "ITow do we teach commu- 
nism?" — which is based on the enormous complexity of the issue and 
the impingement of controversial questions, such as how far does com- 
munism connect with socialism or with })acilism? 

The distiiiiifuished (\>minission of experts and authorities, appointed 
by i\w I'resident. and confirmed by the Senate under this bill, would 
undoubtedly serve to unify and reduce tlie areas and the confusions 
about this issue and to satisfy a <i^reat deal of io;n()rant, frustrated, 
and well-meanin<i^ anticommunism expressed by peojde who can't be 
expected to know. 'Jliey see things going wrong, and therefore some- 
times they express their anticommunism in unwise, gullible, naive, 
extreme forms. 

Well, now, if there Mere an active, independent U.S. Government 
agency under this bill, which was promoting education and training 
on (^ommunist methods of subversion, obviously the Commission 
would have to be very careful in its statements on current events. 
It would have to be unanimous in exi)ressing statements in a con- 
troversial area. However, the mere flow of factual information from 
such a soiirce, the training of people, the collecting of the real experts, 
of whom there are thousands in this country now on comnuniism, 
from the Kand Corporation School, the uni\ersities, and the War 
Colleges, would be a great ach'ance. 

The CiiAiniMAN. Well, assuming there is some sort of a division be- 
tween the Kremlin and Peiping, that does not erase the necessity for 
the Academy ; or does it ? 

Mr. EiNiMET. No, I don't think it does. Which isn't to say that the 
difference between Moscow and Peiping is not real. In the long run, 
it is obviously something that we should welcome, but the ell'ect of it 
now, the initial effect, is simply to make us complacent for the reasons 
outlined in my ]irepared statement. 

We get the ])icturo that Khrushchev is the milder of the two great 
Communist leaders, that Mr. Khruschev is being attacked by Mao 
Tse-tung because he is too mild. Therefore, Mr. Khrnshchev is one 
of the good guys, and Mao Tse-tung is the bad guy. Yet this ignores 


two things : It ignores the fact that Mao Tse-timg is weaker today than 
he was 5 yeiirs ago, when Russia was giving hiiu aid. His military 
establishment has deteriorated because of the lack of Russian aid. He 
depends on Soviet oil. Mao Tsc-tung can't light a big war; he prob- 
abl}' used up all his oil reserves when he attacked India in a 3-week 
blitz on the frontier, a blulf to make himself look great against a weak 
and neglected Indian Arm3^ 

Khrushchev is the uian who has 1,000, 10,000 times the power of Mao. 
He is the man with the power, yet the eft'ect of the Sino-Soviet conflict 
is to make us look at Mao as if he were the only danger. Of course, 
he is a danger in the sense of his ability to help the Vietnamese, but it 
was Khrushchev who nuiinly contributed to the danger in Laos. With- 
out Laos, w^e would not be having the trouble in Vietnam today. Day 
after day U.S. observation planes reported that it was the Soviet trans- 
port planes which were flying arms into Laos. Repeatedly the State 
Department I'onfirmed this. 

If I may, I will just read one paragraph from my prepared state- 
ment. It omits Khrushchev's bloody record as one of Stalin's most 
faithful henchmen, and looks only at the record since Khrushchev 
came to power. The record is more aggressive than Stalin's. I quote : 

Who was the butcher of Budapest, who hninched a new Soviet military iuva- 
siou on November 4tli after announcing that Soviet Armies would be evacuated 
from Hungary? Who ordered the kidnaping of General Maleter, who was 
negotiating with the Russians under a Hag of truce, and of Premier Nagy, who 
was traveling under a "safe conduct" whicli the Communists had granted to the 
Yugoslav Embassy? Who laum'hed the Berlin ultiiuatum in 1958 and renewed 
it with greater pressure in 1SH>1, when President Kennedy had to worsen our 
dollar deficit by the enormous military buildup? Who broke up the Paris con- 
ference with his wild denunciation of President Eisenliower l>ecause of the 
U-2 nights, when the Soviet Union itself boasted that it had known about these 
U-2 flights for years l>efore the Paris conference was called? Who supplieti and 
transiH>rted the arms for Communist subversion and aggression into Laos, 
according to tlie State Department? 

Wiu) tritHl to put the missiles in Cuba under cover of a doublecross of President 
Kennedy by Khrushchev's private promises that Tiothing of the sort would ever 
be done? Who blockwl the Autobahn last summer, and then lied about which 
side had surrendered when his bluff was called? 

You remember the American businessmen and INIr. Keith Funston, 
president of the New York Stock Exchange, were sickened by having 
to listen to tliese Soviet lies. Yet apparently the othei'^ felt it was 
impolite to contradict them. 

Who gave the order which led to the repeated shooting down and killing of 
iinarmed American airmen, while the West has permitted innumerable Soviet 
overtlights without any retaliation? Instead, we talk alx)ut punishing our own 
llyers for having gone astray. 

The Chairman. May Ave go oil' the record'^ 

(Discussion oflf the record.) 

The CuAiRiMAN. I want to get your views on two questions. 

Oin' (Constitution being what it is with reference to the conduct of 
foreign policy, do you see any objection or any wisdom in tlie Freedom 
Academy having an advisory group drawn from these agencies that 
were mentioned, CIA, State iVpartment, FBI, and so on? 

Mr. Emivikt. No sir; I think that, as far as I am concerned, the bill 
seems to me to be A-ery Avell thought out to deal Avith the problem of 
coordination. The independence, I approve a hundred percent, its 


being an independent agency. It seems to me that the other bill pro- 
posed by Senator Symington would be totally inadequate. You know 
the State Department wanted control of foreign aid, they wanted 
control of USIA. They naturally would like to control any U.S. Gov- 
ernment activity which affects foreign policy. Diplomats are trained 
to want to play their cards close to their vests, and not to complicate 
matters. The State Department has its own tremendous job, but psy- 
chologically, diplomats are unqualified to engage in any form of propa- 
ganda. The training of a diplomat and the training of a propagan- 
dist is a complete opposite, so I think it is simply important that the 
Academy should be completely independent. But there should and 
would be close liaison tlirough the Advisory Committee of Govern- 
ment agencies provided under the bill. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. Should Members of Congress be included in that 
Advisory Committee? 

Mr. Emmet. That would be fine as far as I am concerned, if it is 
practicable. But in any case, the Commission, as an independent 
agency, would have to report to Congress as well as the President; 
would it not ? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Mr. Emmet. So that it seems to me that the plan of the bill is 
magnificently constructed. 

The Chairman. Mr. Johansen? 

Mr. Johansen. I have just one question. I don't raise this to get 
into a controversial area, but to try to illustrate the very realistic prob- 
lems that might arise. Supposing we had a statement of the very con- 
troversial character of that of Senator Fulbright and supposing we 
had in existence this Freedom Academy, what contribution or what 
role might this Academy have in relation to statements and pronounce- 
ments of the type of Senator Fulbright's regarding the inevitability 
of communism and all the rest that we are going to have to live with ? 

Mr. Emmet. Well, it would simply reinforce the situation we have 
now — I mean, the Freedom Commission would not interfere with Sen- 
ator Fulbright. And presumably would not assay the speech. But 
they would have already released information which would contradict 
his thesis that Castro is only a nuisance, etc., just as other U.S. Gov- 
ernment agencies have released information which answers Senator 
Fulbright. For instance. Secretary Rusk has contradicted Fulbright's 
theory about changed Soviet intentions, as well as about Castro. Rusk 
and Governor Harriman have repeatedly stated that Soviet aims have 
not changed. Now, Senator Fulbright said Soviet intentions have 
changed. He also attacked U.S. policy on Panama and was answered 
by McGeorge Bundy. Mr. Bundy also said on Sunday he did not think 
anything would be more dangerous than to encourage the impression 
that Cuba was not a menace to the United States. If you had your 
Freedom Commission, you would simply have much more information 
which would back up that sort of thing. It would not be necessary 
for the Freedom Commission itself to indulge in such debates on U.S. 
policy, but it would provide the backup of facts. 

In other words, if Fulbright was right, fine; but the facts don't 
indicate that he's right, and the Freedom Commission could help prove 
that he was not. 

The Chairman. In that particular case. 


Mr. Emmet. Yes, in that particular case. 

The Chairman. Wliereas, vis-a-vis other statements, they might 
J) rove they were right ? 

Mr. Emmet. That's right. 

The Chairman. Off the record. 

(Discussion off the record.) 

The Chairman. I think, sir, that you have made a great contri- 
bution to these hearings. 

Mr. Emmet. I think, sir, that I can submit a statement Later, and 
then you don't need to listen to me further. 

Mr. Bruce. I commend you on your analysis of the Sino-Soviet 
so-called split. It is excellent, excellent. 

Mr. EiNiMET. Thank you. 

The Chairman. Thank you. 

(Mr. Emmet's prepared statement follows :) 


I am happy and honored to have this opportunity to join the many dis- 
tinguished men who have endorsed the Freedom Academy bill. 

I have been interested in the Freedom Academy jilan for 11 years, together 
with several close personal friends, including Leo Cherne, Professor Sidney 
Hook, Eugene Lyons, and Arthur McDowell of the Upholsterers' Union. At 
that time we and others were approached in New York by the Orlando Commit- 
tee, which created the plan. Recent events in Latin America, Africa, and 
Southeast Asia show that establishment of the Freedom Academy is more neces- 
sary than ever; hence, I strongly urge passage of H.R. 5368. 

The basic need of the bill and the reasons for its siTecific provisions have all 
been exhaustively discussed before this committee. I do not want to take up 
your time by going over the gromid already covered by highly qualified exjterts. 
It will be most useful, with your permission, to confine myself here to answering 
a few of the main arguments against it. 

One argument advanced against the Freedom Academy bill suggests passing 
the bill for the National Academy of Foreign Affairs in its place. This pro- 
posal is thoroughly answered by Mr. Alan Grant in Supplement No. 1 to the 
"Green Book," which compares the two bills. 

Another argument is presented by the distinguished head of the State De- 
partment Planning Section, Professor Walt Rostow, who has shown himself 
sympathetic to some of the objectives of the Freedom Academy bill in the past. 
Mr. Rostow said : 

"As I read the literature and read the testimony of the Freedom Commission 
advocates, I sometimes feel they are somewhat out of date. Our private insti- 
tutions are now committed to work abroad on a very large scale, in every quar- 
ter of the globe." 

This argument has been well answered in the "Green Book" I have before 
me, especially pages 38-54, including the quotations from Allen Dulles, C. D. 
Jackson, Stefan Possony, and President Kennedy. 

This argument of Professor Rostow's connects up with another argument, 
which is that our situation vis-a-vis communism has not only improved because 
of our greater present knowledge about Communist methods, but also because the 
Communist danger itself has been greatly weakened by developments within 
the Communist world — therefore, the Freedom Academy plan is no longer urgent. 

It is true there has been a great and welcome increase in studies of com- 
munism over the past decade. However, university-type studies of communism 
and "Kremlinology" tend to focus attention on the cJmnges in the Communist 
world and the differences between Communist countries, rather than on the 
continuation and perfection of the Communist apparatus and its subversive 
operations abroad. 

Of course, the changes have taken place; they are important and should be 
studied. However, the emphasis on Communist changes, the anticipation that 
they will continue, and the speculation as to the effect on Soviet foreign policy 
all tend to obscure the record of the hard facts about the past actions of 
Khrushchev and Mao. Thus their effect is to substitute speculations about 


changed Communist intentions for the study of Communist capabilities for 
subversion and aggression. Even pi'esent Communist operations in Latin Amer- 
ica, Africa, and Asia tend to be obscured. This is the impact of Kremlinology. 
Still less is there any education or training in methods of combating Communist 
subversion, except in the purely military field of guerrilla warfare. 

All of the above tendencies in the work of some academic experts on com- 
munism are aggravated and distorted by the attitude of the free world's press, 
because novelty has news value. Change or alleged changes and splits within 
the formerly monolithic Communist bloc have news value, so the press and 
magazines automatically play them up for the same reason they play up differ- 
ences between the U.S. and its NATO allies. 

Thus a new image begins to emerge of Khrushchev as an enlightened Com- 
munist, almost a friend of the West, who is threatened by the belligerent Mao. 
This, in turn, creates the kind of complacency and overconfidence which was 
expressed in Senator Fulbright's speech, in which he ridicules those who still 
believe in the danger from Khnishchev and from the majority of Communist 
countries whose policies he still largely controls. 

The record of democratic alliances against aggressive states throughout 
history shows that complacency leads to unwillingness to continue the required 
sacrifices. It was so with the British-led alliances against Louis XIV and 
against Napoleon. It was true in the erosion of the alliance against Hitler in 
the 1930's, and it threatens to prove true of our alliance against Soviet and 
Chinese communism today. 

Think of Khrushchev's actual record, shown by the hard facts of recent 
history, compared to the image of him we see today. Omitting Khrushchev's 
bloody record since he came to power as one of Stalin's most faithful henchmen, 
it is more aggressive than Stalin's. Who was the butcher of Budapest, who 
launched a new Soviet military invasion on November 4th after announcing 
that Soviet Armies would be evacuated from Hungary? Who ordered the kid- 
naping of General Maleter, who was negotiating with the Russians under a flag 
of truce, and of Premier Nagy, who was traveling under a "safe conduct" which 
the Communists had granted to the Yugoslav Embassy? Who launched the 
Berlin ultimatum in 1958 and renewed it with greater pressure in 1961, when 
President Kennedy had to worsen our dollar deficit by the enormous military 
buildup? Who broke up the Paris conference with his wild denunciation of 
President Eisenhower because of the TJ-2 flights, when the Soviet Union itself 
boasted that it had known about these U-2 flights for years before the Paris 
conference was called? Who supplied and transported the arms for Com- 
munist subversion and aggression into Laos, according to the State Depart- 

Who tried to put the missiles in Cuba under cover of a doublecross of Presi- 
dent Kennedy by Khrushchev's private promises tliat nothing of the sort would 
ever be done? Who blocked the Autobahn last summer, and then lied about 
which side had surrendered when his bluff was called? Who gave the order 
which led to the repeated shooting down and killing of unarmed American 
airmen, while the West has permitted innumerable Soviet overflights without 
any retaliation? Instead, we talk about punishing our own flyers, for having 
gone astray. 

There has been no progress in the disarmament field, despite the hopes aroused 
by the test ban treaty. Also, Khrushchev's efforts to divide NATO by reviving 
fears of German militarism have been stepped up, not diminished, in recent 
months. Lastly there is increasing evidence of a real and only thinly dis- 
guised anti-Semitism in the U.S.S.R. 

It is also worth remembering that the Castro attack on Venezuela, which 
has .lust been exposed by the Organization of American States, was only made 
possible by Khrushchev and that the Brazilian revolution only prevented at the 
last minute a Goulart dictatorship in Brazil, while Goulart had become increas- 
ingly dependent on the Communists. 

The greatest danger in all this optimism about the Sino-Soviet split is that 
Khrushchev, who is emerging as a hero of the Western free press, is infinitely 
more powerful than Mao Tse-tung with his "horse and buggy" economy, his anti- 
quated military machine, and his lack of nuclear weapons. 

We must also remember that insofar as Khrushchev wishes to prevent Mao 
from capturing the allegiance of more Communist parties he must compete with 
Mao by proving that the Soviet method of coexistence, plus subversion, produces 
greater Communist advances in subverting the free world. In short, the effect 


of Mao on Khrushchev, if any, must be to step up the pace of Soviet subversive 

As regards Khrushchev's capabilities, U.S. superiority in most nuclear weapons, 
plus the Soviet economic crisis, have at least temporarily reduced Khrushchev's 
willingness to risk nuclear war. as well as his capacity to wage aggressive 
economic warfare, as in his oil offensive. However, he has not given up a single 
power base, nor agreed to any infringement of Soviet secrecy by inspection. Yet 
only elaborate inspection would hamper Soviet capacity to launch a sneak attack 
or to resume missile-threat diplomacy. 

The belief that relaxation of police-state rule in Russia and Eastern Europe 
weakens the Soviet capacity or desire for aggi-ession is another fallacy. We must 
remember that Hitler's Nazi regime was far less totalitarian in its economic con- 
trols and general police-state control of free speech, etc., than Khrushchev's 
empire is today. Yet that increased rather than diminished Hitler's capacity 
to wage war against nearly all the world. The relaxation in Russia today, as 
formerly in Nazi Germany, tends to reduce hatred of the totalitarian regime and 
increase cooperation by scientists and military leaders with the regime, without 
affecting the secret decisions in the Kremlin on war or peace. 

We are also told that we should be nice to Khrushchev and help him solve his 
economic troubles by East-West trade and credit, lest Khrushchev lose his power 
to allegedly more militant forces in the Kremlin, such as Marshal Malinovsky. 
But whether there is any such danger to Khrushchev and whether his opponents 
or successors would really be more militant, is wholly unproved. Even Mao has 
actually been more cautious than Khrushchev, in deeds though not words ; and 
even if it is true that Khrushchev is the "best" Communist, how do we know that 
he will win? How do we know that we will not be solving the economic crisis 
for the benefit of Khrushchev's aggressive successors? 

In connection with the Freedom Academy bill, it is clear that both the Soviets 
and the Chinese have perfected and refined their weapons of subversion and 
guerrilla warfare. The Viet Cong is a more efficient guerrilla operation than was 
ever mounted by Mao Tse-tung in China, according to experts in this field. The 
coup in Zanzibar, the riots in Panama, and the drift toward communism in Ghana 
and elsewhere in Africa, testify to the extension of Communist subversion. 

We have tried to prevent the conditions which prepare the way for communism 
in Latin America and Africa by the Alliance for Progress, foreign aid, and the 
Peace Corps. But the economic difficulties in Latin America and the growing 
chaos in Africa show how impossible it is to get quick results by economic and 
humanitarian help alone, especially in view of the population explosion and the 
flight of capital. To gain time for economic aid and political reforms to suc- 
ceed, we must be able to hold the line in the political battle with the Communists. 
How else can we hope to do this except by new methods of training to combat 
the Communist perfection of political conflict? 

The emphasis placed on the training of foreign students and on American 
private citizens in the Freedom Academy bill would be justified by recent develop- 
ments in Latin America and Africa alone. The chief Communist troublemakers 
there were local people, trained in Communist schools in Russia, China, Cuba, 
and/or the satellites. They can only be successfully blocked and exposed by local 
people who have been given anti-Communist training by us. 

May I stress one more reason for recommending the establishment of the 
Freedom Academy with all possible urgency? As stressed in the text of the 
bill itself, everything which will be taught by the Freedom Academy must be 
in harmony with our Western allies. Even if we establish the Freedom Acad- 
emy, the Soviets will still have many weapons which we will lack — such as their 
capacity to launch war of aggression by secret sneak attacks, their ability to 
break solemn agreements, their power to coerce their so-called allies by military 
and economic pressure, their ability to intimidate small countries by threaten- 
ing aggression, their capacity to bribe politicians and newspaper editors on a 
lavish scale, their willingness to kidnap and assassinate key anti-Communist 
leaders where they can safely do so. 

Therefore, the least we can do is to use the power of education and technical 
training to the greatest conceivable extent in our fight for freedom's survival. 

The Chairman. We will stand in recess until quarter to two. 
(Whereupon, at 12 :30 p.m., Tuesday, April 7, 1964, the committee 
recessed, to reconvene at 1 :45 p.m. the same day.) 



^The committee reconvened at 2 p.m., Hon. Joe Pool presiding.) 

(Committee members present : Representatives Pool, Ichord, Johan- 
sen, Bruce, and Schadeberg.) 

Mr. Pool. The committee will come to order. 

Mr. Morrison, I believe some of the committee members would like 
to ask you some questions if you don't mind. 

Mr. Morrison. Yes. 


Mr. JoHANSEN. I had one question. Did I understand correctly that 
this Operation Amigo is a two-way street? In other words, you are 
sending some United States students to Latin American countries 
as well as the other way around? Is that corect? 

Mr. Morrison. As it turns out, that is correct. Operation Amigo 
is a private organization chartered to bring Latin American students 
to the United States. Operation Amigo, Inc., does not sponsor di- 
rectly the return of U.S. students to Latin America. However, we 
have seen to it that they are indirectly helped. 

Now, the other portion of that question could be answered in this 
way. The clubs that we have established in Central and South Amer- 
ica, to the tune of about 4,000 students, through our direction invite 
these students down and perform the same tasks that we do here. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. That cleared up the point. That is all I have. 

Mr. Pool. Mr. Bruce? 

Mr. Bruce. Mr. Morrison, repeat again, if you would, the cost per 
student of Operation Amigo. 

Mr. Morrison. This is a little hard to determine. There are direct 
contribution costs. You can say it cost x-number of dollars to do 
this. Then there are certain donations that you can't put your finger 
on, such as the housing of the student by a U.S. family. It costs 
x-number of dollars to do this plus community response, and so forth. 

The actual transportation cost could be broken down to about 
$225 per student. I would say that the cost in programing this 
particular student through one phase of Operation Amigo would 
come close to approximately $350. 

Mr. Bruce. The operation is on the basis of a tax-exempt founda- 

Mr. Morrison. Yes. 

Mr. Bruce. How long has it been operating ? 

Mr. Morrison. Since 1962. 

Mr. Bruce. How many States have you entered ? 

Mr. Morrison. We now have entered approximately 16 to 18 States, 
but this is not a true reflection of its acceptability because we do have 
on file approximately 200 school jurisdictions within the United States 
wanting to receive students. 

Mr. Bruce. Now mainly, the direction of this has been through 
newspaper operation and cooperation ? 

Mr. Morrison. The control of the program remains within the 
newspaper industry, yes. We have had, certainly, collateral partici- 
pation from different civic groups, Kiwanis, Rotary, Lions, B'nai 


B'rith. In fact, B'nai B'rith has adopted the program on a nation- 
wide program. International Kiwanis wants to come into sponsoring 
it, International Rotary, International Lions, and the YMCA. 

We have had tremendous commmiity response. 

Mr. Bruce. As I understand your testimony earlier, the greatest 
value is the fact when you move into the city you do not regard it as 
an agent of the United States Government, but rather an interested 
American citizen ; is this an accurate approach ? 

Mr. Morrison. Correct — who has an honest intent and desire to 
exchange ideas on an equal basis with the countries and students of 
Central and South America. 

Mr, Bruce. Are you dealing in this program directly with the 
ideology of communism or is it more on the exposure of the free 
system as a counterbalance? 

Mr. Morrison. It is more on the exposure of this free system in 
comparison to the Communist system. 

Mr. Bruce. Do you keep in touch with the Latin American stu- 
dents after they go back ? 

Mr. Morrison. Through these Operation Amigo clubs, yes. As a 
matter of fact, I told you about the committee for the selection of the 
students which were composed of national leaders, newspaper people, 
et cetera. Since the Operation Amigo clubs have been established, in 
order to retain their interest in the program, we also let the clubs 
elect a representative to sit in on the future selection of any other 
Latin American student. 

Mr. Bruce. How do you propose 

Mr. Morrison. One other point while I think of it, approximately 
65 percent of the students who participated in the program in 1962 
and 1963 are now at the university level. 

Mr. Bruce. Where they are needed? 

Mr. Morrison. Yes. 

Mr. Bbuce. How do you propose to take a successful operation like 
Amigo and coordinate it with a Freedom Academy, or do you ? 

Mr. Morrison. I had not really seriously given any thought to this 
before you asked the question. It would appear to me that the Free- 
dom Academy, if established — and I am sure that some method should 
be established or some area of responsibility — would first of all need 
students from Latin America to participate. It seems to me that 
Operation Amigo with its tremendous contacts in Central and South 
America has a readymade organization to select some of these partici- 
pants from. This is my offhand opinion, 

Mr. Bruce. Now taking that, which is the point I was coming to, 
you point out that you think one of the great assets of Operation 
Amigo is its lack of a tie with an official agency. 

Mr. Morrison. Correct. 

Mr. Bruce. Would you not then blunt some of this great value you 
have under your present operation? 

Mr. Morrison. You mean, if you were to select some of the students 
in the Operation Amigo clubs ; is that what you are talking about ? 

Mr. Bruce. Yes. 

Mr. Morrison. I feel like I am on the proverbial spot, but this would 
greatly be determined by the method in which the Freedom Academy 
would be set up. I think it would be completely separate from any 


State Department affiliation. It would be wonderful to set a Freedom 
Academy up, and I think it should be set up. but you would not want 
to spend all this money and yet have it inelfectual. 

JNIr. Bruce, I am just wondering, though, if the very thing that you 
have found to be your great asset, the freedom of operation, would 
not be jeopardized somewhat by Govermnent entering into the picture? 

Mr. Morrison. I don't know how close Government would enter into 
the Freedom Academy. 

Mv. Bruce. It would be a Government operation as I understand it. 
I think all of these bills are as a Government operation. Am I correct 
on that? 

Mr. JoHANSEN. Yes. 

JNIr. Bruce. It would be total Government, and I am just wondering 
if you would not perhaps blunt this great asset that you have of a free 
American citizen united with a Government agency projecting it? 

Mr. Morrison. Well, you might; but as you know, the politicians 
in Latin America are as free as the winds. There are many ways of 
accomplishing what you want, not necessarily to the direct approach. 
I think that the correct type of student could be obtained from an 

Mr. Bruce. Thank you, very much. Your testimony has been ex- 

^Ir. JoHANSEN. ]May I make this observation regarding your tes- 
timony, and I agree with 1113" colleague that it has been excellent. One 
of the enigmas to me, and this applies to the Peace Corps and some 
of these other programs, is how we exemplify private enterprise or 
free enterprise, or whatever you want to call it, nongovernmental ac- 
tivity, in these other countries by doing it under Government S])onsor- 
ship. It seems to me that is the pitfall that you avoided in this 

Mr. INIoRRisoN. Yes. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. I am tremendously interested and impressed with 
it. I don't think that whatever is Government-sponsored is necessarily 
automatically bad. I do think that in a mortal combat with totali- 
tarianism if we can't be the missionaries for the nongovermnental ap- 
proach, we are missing the whole point of the conflict. 

Mr. ]\IoRRisoN. That is right. Your Communist approach to this 
problem in a very logical way, their embassies, ambassadors are just as 
much government as yours could be only they are smart about it. 
They bring them to Russia and go to a particular school, but they are 
also sent over to this specialized school in this area and they don't 
come back as attached to the Russian Government, but yet they have 
been there and they know and they work hard when they get back. 

Mr. Bruce. May I interject here for a moment ? 

Don't you think the very basic difference is in goal and in method 
of operation? The Communist is determined to conquer the world, 
whether he is a Chinese Communist or a Russian Connnunist, operat- 
ing on a clearly outlined scientific pattern, whereas the United States 
and the Western World in general is a polyglot without any central di- 
rection by any nature of the free society ? 

Mr. Morrison. Correct. 

Mr. Bruce. Then, does it not come down to the fact that private 
groups basically are going to have to take the initiative? 


Mr. Morrison-. I think tlie private groups certainly have a part, a 
definite part, a very decided part, and we have got to fight this com- 
munistic onslaught in the way they direct it. We have got to take the 
initiative and not sit back and say, "Well, everything is going to be 
all right." 

Mr. Bruce. Thank you. 

]\Ir. Pool. I want to second what the gentleman said. We appre- 
ciate your testimony. It has been very excellent, and your experience 
has been very helpful to the committee. 

Mr. IcHORD. Mr. Chairman, I came in late. I don't know whether 
I followed all of the answers to Mr. Bruce's question. 

Let me ask you again. How do you understand the Freedom Acad- 
emy will tie in with an operation such as you are carrying on ? 

Mr. MoRRisox. How do I understand how it could possibly tie in ? 

Mr. IcHORD. Yes. 

Mr. MoRRisox. I am not advocating it be tied in, but the question was 
asked. I think first you would need recruits, would you not, for the 
Freedom Academy ? 

Mr. IcPiORD. Under the terms of the bills, and I presume I know, 
most of them have the provision that, if the Secretary of State agrees, 
foreign nationals may be trained in the Academy. 

Mr. Morrison. Then you would need some method of obtaining these 
recruits ? I merely state that the Operation Amigo program has al- 
ready built into it a source of recruits for the Freedom Academy if you 
so desired. 

Mr. IcHORD. Yes, from the countries in which you have been work- 
ing, but I see no way in which the Freedom Academy would infringe 
upon your operations except it may be that an official of your organiza- 
tion may want to attend the Freedom Academy to study ways and 
means of combating communism, how to detect it. 

Mr. Morrison. I didn't mean to imply that it would infringe upon 
our program. 

Mr. IciiORD. I see no way that it would. I thought Mr. Bruce in- 
ferred that in the question that he asked you. 

Mr. Morrison. I didn't think that he did. 

Mr. Bruce. Xo ; my inference was that if they merged their opera- 
tion completely with the Freedom Academy, on the basis of his testi- 
mony earlier their greatest asset was to go in and say, "We have no 
connection with the Government agency," that this was the open door, 
and that if they merged with it, why then it would become, in effect, 
a part of a Government operation which could negate that advantage. 

Mr. IcHORD. I don't see how it conflicts with his operation. 

Mr. Bruce. Xo, the Operation Amigo and the Freedom Acad- 

Mr. JoHANSEN. But could not the Freedom Academy provide educa- 
tional facilities which Operation Amigo could avail itself of? 

Mr. MoRRisox. Certainly. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. That would be the independent operation. 

Mr. Morrison. Certainly, completely independent operation. 

Mr. McXa:mara. I think from the testimony of some previous wit- 
nesses who have done a great deal of work on this bill that the setup 


that might be contemplated here would be that the Operation Amigo 
officials would be able to contribute quite a bit to the Academy. They 
might well come up to give lectures at the Academy, explaining to 
other persons in the private sector what they can do in Asia and Africa, 
perhaps, based on your experiences in Latin America, and also some 
of the pitfalls to avoid, as well as some of the things you found most 

Mr. Pool. Mr. Morrison, earlier in your testimony also, I believe;— 
I don't know whether it was your testimony or one of the other wit- 
nesses, I believe it was the previous witness — in many cases the Ameri- 
can colony in these Latin American countries would not get out and 
mix with the people of the different countries. 

Mr. Morrison. I said that. 

Mr. Pool. Did you say that ? 

Mr. Morrison. Yes. 

Mr. Pool. And that the Academy would be helpful to these, say, 
Government officials down there ? It would be helpful to train them in 
knowing what they should do in the way of getting information and 
mixing with the people and knowing what the score was ? 

Mr. Morrison. I don't mean to imply that all our personnel are that 
way, but it only takes one bad one out of a group of 100 to mix it up 
for the 100. Someone mentioned Venezuela. They are overcoming 
this in Venezuela in the mining companies and oil companies by having 
housing complexes where they put a mining man here and a nationalist 
here and an oil company man here and a nationalist here. There is 
a certain trend through the private sector to overcome this, so then 
why should not governmental circles overcome this too? 

Mr. Pool. This Freedom Academy could be very helpful in educat- 
ing the people that are going down there to take jobs ? 

Mr. Morrison. I am most certain. 

Before closing, I think we ought to pay tribute to those thousands 
of persons who have contributed to the success of the Operation Amigo 

Special tribute should be paid to Mr. C. N. Shelton, general manager 
of Peruvian Airlines, who has believed in the Amigo program from its 
start. He was the first man to initiate special low student rates be- 
tween South America and the United States. The cost item was of 
tremendous importance, and under his leadership we obtained the same 
cooperation through many Latin American carriers. 

Mr. Pool. Any other questions ? 

Again the committee thanks you for appearing. 

Mr. Morrison. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Pool. Mr. Philbrick. 

Mr. Johansen. Should we wait for the second bell before we begin ? 

Mr. Pool. We will take a 20-minute recess. 

(Whereupon, a brief recess was taken.) 

Mr. Pool. The committee will come to order. 

Now, Mr. Philbrick, you go ri^ht ahead. 

I believe you better give us a little background. I think most people 
know you, but you better put it in the record. 



Mr. Philbrick. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I am here today by virtue of the fact that for 9 years I was a mem- 
ber of the Communist Party in the United States serving, of course, as 
an informant for the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It was through 
that experience inside the Communist apparatus that I learned a few 
things whicli I tliink have direct application to the measure being 
considered by the committee today. 

I might add that I am pleased and honored to testify before this 
distinguished committee. I use the word "distinguished." Certainly 
this committee has been distinguished in a number of ways. It is 
obviously distinguished by the violence and the vehemence of the at- 
tacks against it. 

I think no other committee in the Congress has suffered as much 
vehemence as this one, but I know the members consider this to be a 
badge of honor, because that attack is directed by the Communist 
criminal conspiracy, the international apparatus that hopes to destroy 
the freedom of all free nations. 

The fact that this committee should be singled out by the enemies 
of America and of free men everywhere is indeed a mark of distinc- 
tion and moot testimony to the effectiveness of this committee in com- 
bating the Communist conspiracy. 

I believe sincerely that this committee is also furthermore distin- 
guished by the fact that, not only among its members on the congres- 
sional level, but on the staff level as well, are some of the most astute 
and knowledgeable men we have in Washington today, not only rela- 
tive to knowledge of the history and scope of Soviet activity in the 
United States in the past, but also relative to the tactics and strategy 
and goals and programs of the Communists as of this moment. 

Certainly this committee, along with its counterpart in the upper 
House, the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, has produced for 
the American people more factual, accurate infonnation regarding the 
Communist Party than any other single source in the United States 

In reviewing the very best books on the subject of commimism, it is 
surprising to note in what large measure competent authors and 
writers in the field have depended upon this committee for their source 
of information and factual data. 

Therefore, I can think of no better qualified committee in the House 
of Representatives to conduct the hearings concerning the Freedom 
Academy bill, H.R. 5368. 

This is an extremely important measure. Its implications are far- 
reaching. It opens doors into a relatively unexplored area which 
many people today do not even know exists. Its impact in the struggle 
against the common enemies of freedom, if enacted, will be enormous. 
It is truly a revolutionary bill in that nothing else quite like the Free- 
dom Academy now exists. 

Indeed, the matter under consideration by this committee involves 
not only the making, but quite possibly the changing, of history. I 
believe that the future of the free world as we know it today may very 
well depend upon the decision made by this committee and by the Con- 
gress relative to the measures under discussion. 

30-471— 64— pt. 2 9 


Gentlemen, we have in this country today two great bastions of 
freedom, two of the greatest in the world insofar as training and 
equipping dedicated men who are willing to devote their very lives to 
the defense of this country. Indeed, as we meet here today, the prod- 
uct of one of those training institutions is being honored and remem- 
bered by men and women and, yes, even children, all over the world. 
The hearts of men everywhere who love freedom and who cherish 
liberty are today experiencing the sad but grateful pain of grief and 
of proud memory of one man who contributed so much to whatever 
measure of freedom we enjoy today. 

The man, of course, of whom I speak is the late General Douglas 
MacArthur, whose body will lie in the rotunda of the United States 
Capitol tomorrow, scarcely more than a stone's throw from the room 
in which we meet today. General MacArthur will always be held in 
the memory of men and on the pages of history as an example of what 
one man can do and what service he can render to his Nation and to 
his God, given the proper measure of instruction, background, and 
training to match his dedication. 

I know that General MacArthur was always the first to give due 
credit to that background and training which he received in one of the 
institutions of learning I have in mind. Tliey are, needless to say. 
West Point and Annapolis. General MacArthur, of course, is just one 
of many graduates of those schools whose names shall be engraved for- 
ever in the honor tablets and memorials which are the very building 
blocks which have made this Nation the greatest and the strongest in 
the world today. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. May I interrupt just to keep the witness and the 
committee out of trouble on the record ? 

I assume the witness did not deliberately omit the Air Force 

Mr. Philbrick. No, sir, that was inadvertent. 

I believe it would not be an exaggeration to say that, as one reviews 
the history of our country over the years and as one recalls the great 
perils and the serious threats posed against the United States of 
America by the forces of despotism, one finds it very difficult to con- 
ceive that this Nation would exist at all had it not been for the train- 
ing institutes of West Point, Annapolis, and the Air Force Academy. 

Here were men provided with the very exacting and demanding 
science of military and naval warfare, and because men were provided 
with that highly technical knowledge to match their dedication, we 
have survived. 

But today, gentlemen, we are involved in a new kind of war. It is 
an undeclared war. It is an undefined war. It is a war in a com- 
pletely new dimension. As yet, we don't even have an adequate name 
for it. It has been called "protracted conflict." It has been called 
"fourth-dimensional warfare." It is often, but completely errone- 
ously, referred to as a "cold war." 

I believe, as Captain Eddy Rickenbacker stated some time ago, 
"There is no cold war; there is a hot war, literally as hot as the 
hinges of hell itself, and we are losing it because we refuse to admit 
we are in it." 

It is unnecessary, of course, to remind this committee of the disas- 
trous course of recent history or to recall for this committee the fact 


we are losing the war. This is not a matter of opinion ; it is a matter 
of record, and it is a record which this committee has already pub- 
lished in comitless volumes and transcripts and reports. 

The question today is not whether we are losing, but why. 

One prime example we might take out of tlie many, perhaps because 
it is the closest, is the island of Cuba, which has been captured and 
occupied by the Communist enemy. 

Now, our military might is unquestioned. We have the world's 
best trained and equipped Army ; we have the world's toughest Marine 
Corps ; we have the world's greatest Navy ; we have the world's most 
powerful Air Force. 

Despite all of this, the Communists captured Cuba with ease, not 
with third-dimensional weapons, but with fourth-dimensional weap- 

Senator Tom Dodd, speaking of this disastrous defeat for the forces 
of freedom, had this to say : 

How were the Communists able to capture a popular revolution so quickly 
and so completely? Why were the Cuban people so naive about Communist 
operational methods? Why were the anti-Communists so disorganized and so 
inept when the showdown came? Why were they outthought, outplanned, out- 
organized, and outmaneuvered by the Communists from the very beginning? 
Why was the large middle class in Havana, which w^as solidly behind Castro, 
unable to cope with the Communist cadres? Where were their leaders? Why 
were they not better trained? To what extent was our own negligence respon- 
sible for this catastrophe? 

And, said Senator Tom Dodd : 

Once again I ask the question : Why must the dedication and know-how so 
often predominate on the Communist side? Why does it always seem to be well- 
trained professionals versus disorganized amateurs? 

Well, gentlemen, this is the war that we are losing. I know in 
reading the Congressional Record^ which I try to read faithfully, 
that the Members of Congress spend many, many hours discussing 
our military problems and our military budgets. The records of these 
important discussions fill many pages. Yet we could double the size 
of our military forces today and still lose the war we are in, because 
we are being outflanked. 

This is the gap in our defenses that the Freedom Academy would 
plug. Tills is the vital leak in the dyke that the Freedom Academy 
would block. 

I think it is important at this point that I should make it clear that 
mention of our Naval and Military and Air Force Academies does not 
mean that the Freedom Academy would be a "West Point in the cold 
war." The bill specifically sets forth, first, that the Freedom Academy 
would be established "to conduct research to develop an integrated 
body of operational knowledge in the political, psychological, eco- 
nomic, t^clinological, and organizational areas * * *, to educate and 
tram Government personnel and private citizens * * * and * * * 
foreign students * * *." It is important to stress that such education 
and training would be provided not only on an undergraduate levej. 
as at West Point or Annapolis or the Air Force Academy, but the Com- 
mission would establish, under its supervision and control, an "ac?- 
vanced'''' research, development, and training center known as the Free- 
dom Academy. 


Hence, the Freedom Academy would not only provide basic train- 
ing, but also intermediate training and advanced training, in the art 
and the tecluiiques of so-called cold warfare. 

The Freedom Academy bill furthermore sets forth that this shall be 
done not only in terms of educating and training Government per- 
sonnel, but also private citizens and foreign students, as well. 

Now, I cannot testify as an expert insofar as the need of the bill for 
Government personnel. Neither can I pretend to be an expert in the 
field of international relations or on the foreigTi level. But I certainly 
can testify from personal knowledge and background and experience 
insofar as the need for this bill in the private sector- 

This has been obvious to me from the very beginning of my expe- 
riences with the Communist criminal conspiracy. I liave already testi- 
fied to some extent before this committee concerning some of the things 
I learned in those experiences. One of the things I have already testi- 
fied to is the fact that I first became involved with the Communist 
criminal conspiracy by being trapped, by being victimized, through 
joining a Communist- front organization without the slightest idea 
that it was a Communist front. This group was the Cambridge Youth 
Council in Cambridge, Massachusetts. 

I furthermore testified before this committee that not only myself 
but that over 300 young people joined that one subversive Communist- 
front organization. I have pointed out at some length how we were 
used, how we were exploited, how we performed like puppets on a 
string. We yoimg people were no more equipped or prepared to cope 
with the Commmiist-trained agents than a 5-year-old boy is prepared 
to fly a jet airplane. 

And it was not just ourselves who were not prepared, but our teach- 
ers were not prepared. They had nothing to offer. They had nowhere 
to go themselves to get adequate information and knowledge concern- 
ing the tecliniques and methods of communism. 

Our textbooks were inadequate and did not provide the necessary 
knowledge or information. Our libraries were inadequate, and we 
could not tuni to them at that time to find adequate information. 
There was no place that we could turn to or go for what we desperately 

Well, now, this was just my first recognition of how ill-prepared our 
youths were to cope with the Communist methods. As I went on 
through my 9 years in the Communist Party, I saw the Communists 
spin rmgs not only around young people, but adults as well. 

We watched the Communists, for example, capture the political 
campaign of a man who was a candidate for this very Congress. I 
watched the Communists move into that candidate's campaign, take 
it over, and operate it without his knowledge that it was being done. 
Needless to say, he was defeated in his attempts to become a Member 
of Congress. 

I watched the Communists move into the Progressive Party, which 
in its beginning was a legitimate political party. I watched the 
Communists destroy the Progressive Party as a legitimate political 
movement and I watched them destroy Vice President Henry Wallace, 
as well ; it was a disaster. 

In so many areas, I have seen the Communists move in, distort, 
subvert, destroy, sabotage, and get away with it. The reason they 


got away with it over and over again is because they were competing 
with insufficient knowledge, background, and training on a part of its 

Now the question is. Why? Why were the Communists able to 
do this? Why are they still able to do it today in many areas of 
American life? 

The reason is made plain in the Freedom Academy bill itself on 
page 3: 

Recognizing that nonmilitary conflict makes extraordinary demands upon its 
practitioners, the Communists, for several decades, have intensively trained 
their leadership groups and cadres in an extensive network of basic, intermediate, 
and advanced schools. 

I can certainly testify to the accuracy of that section of the bill 
because I myself have attended, as a student inside the Communist 
Party, some of these special training schools, and, believe me, these 
training schools are good. There is no question but that by applica- 
tion in this field the Reds have developed advanced techniques in 
fourth-dimensional warfare, for which we have not yet i:)repared suf- 
ficient countermeasures. 

The Connnunists are never allowed to forget the importance of 
ability to wage this type of war. I am a regular reader of the World 
Marxist Revieio^ which goes to good Communists all over the world, 
and Political Affairs^ the theoretical organ of the Communist Party, 
U.S.A. I find that never an issue goes by that the Coinnumists do not 
remind their members of the importance of skill and ability in the art 
of so-called cold warfare. 

In July, for example, this past summer, the World Marxist Review 
had this to say to their Communists around the world: 

It would be wrong to say that peaceful coexistence implies that the colonial 
peoples should renounce their struggle for independence or that the proletarians 
in the capitalistic countries and the peoples of the socialist camp should refuse 
to support that struggle. "The example of Cuba * * * speaks against this 
point of view." 

* >i< >i> * * * * 

The Central Committee denounced those who claim that the Communists in 
working for peaceful coexistence are ready to bargain with the class 
enemy ♦ * *. 

In August of last year, in Political Affairs^ the Communists told 
their members why this was necessary. Again quoting from their 
publication : 

There have been no retreats by the forces of socialism ♦ * *. To put the with- 
drawal of missiles from Cuba into this category is to make a defeat out of 
what was actually a "victory * * * it is only world imperialism that has been re- 
treating and will be compelled to retreat further and further until it is finally 
driven from the world scene. * * * 

So, the Communists know exactly what they intend to do. 
In September of this past year, during the test ban treaty, the 
Communists were told this in Wo7'ld Marxist Review : 

The world revolutionary process is developing today in conditions of the 
most complex interplay of different forces * * *. The nature and the content of 
this process are determined by the merging into one powerful current of the 
anti-imperialist struggle of the peoples building socialism and communism, 
the revolutionary movement of the working class in the capitalist countries, 
the national liberation movement of the oppressed peoples and the general 


democratic movement. The world revolutionary process is accompanied by a 
bitter economic, political and ideological struggle against imperialism, and first 
and foremost against U.S. imperialism, the bulvpark of world reaction. 

Now, note that the Communists are warned that this is taking place 
in "the most complex interplay of different forces." This is indeed 
true. Indeed, this committee recently published an important volume, 
a report on how today the Communists are giving special attention to 
the interplay, the combination of parliamentary and extra-parliamen- 
tary metliods in their war against the free nations. 

Now, to meet this challenge on the private sector today, there is 
absolutely nothing in existence. One of the groups I work with quite 
closely, for exam])le, is the Ail-American Conference to Combat Com- 
munism. Now, this group is composed of some 40 or more of the finest 
national organizations across the United States : the Lions and the 
Kiwanians and the Red Men and various veterans groups and organi- 
zations, civic gi'oups. They meet together periodically to try to see 
what they can do as national organizations to provide some real help 
in this area of cold warfare. But we are inadequately financed; we 
don't have the j^roper resources; we have to get by with volunteers and 
part-time employees. It simply does not fill the bill, much as the 
various groups wish to help and despite their dedication. 

Well, subsection IV of section 2 of H.R. 5368 would specifically fill 
that need in stating: "The private sector must understand how it can 
participate in the global struggle in a sustained and systematic man- 
ner." The bill further states: "There exists in the private sector a 
huge reservoir of talent, ingenuity, and strength which can be de- 
veloped and brought to bear in helping to solve many of our global 
problems. We have hardly begun to explore the range of possibil- 

Indeed, this is true, and I can see a Freedom Academy established 
whereby the representatives of these various national service organiza- 
tions could be provided with scholarships or with grants, could attend 
Freedom Academy courses, for 3 or 4 or 5 or 6 months, during which 
time they could be given at least a basic understanding and a good 
grounding in the nature of the Communist enemy, the tactics and 
strategy and methods of communism ; provided with very real and 
helpful knowledge and information as to what they can do in tlie war 
in which we are engaged. 

Now, I don't mind confessing before this committee that I am one 
of those Americans who believes that our United States Government, 
in some areas, has become involved in matters which do not rightfully 
belong within the Government province but which, in fact, should 
remain in the private sector. 

In this instance, however, I believe wholeheartedly and thoroughly 
that this is one area wherein our Government does have a responsi- 
bility, where our Govrenment can play a rightful role. Certainly it 
is a proper role of Government to be concerned with the national secu- 
rity and it is a proper role of Goverment to be concerned with the 
national defense. It is this area in which this bill would apply itself 
and would fill an extremely dangerous and critical gap in our national 
defense picture today. 

I want to thank the gentlemen for this opportunity to testify before 
the committee. 


Mr. Pool. We want to thank you for appearing. It is very wonder- 
ful to have a man of your background and character to be a citizen 
of the United States and to appear here and give us the benefit of your 

I will ask the committee: Would you like to ask questions? 

Mr, IcHORD. Yes. 

Mr. Philbrick, there is one aspect of the bill that you did not coni^ 
ment upon and that is the provision establishing an information center. 

I would like to hear what you w^ould think about this provision of 
the bill. 

Mr. Philbrick. Yes, sir. 

As I have already indicated, at the present time, this committee as 
a matter of actual fact is one of the major sources of information for 
the people of the United States. Certainly, this committee knows this 
from the number of requests for information coming to you constantly 
and continuously ; but I am also sure you are aware this is not enough. 

For example, I think it ridiculous that Herb Philbrick should have 
been retained by the Department of Education for the State of New 
Jersey to speak to every teachers' college in the State of New Jersey 
on the subject of communism, to give the teachers in training a mere 
1-hour lecture on communism. This is ridiculous. The Department 
of Education in the State of New Jersey should have a known source 
of liigh-caliber, well-prepared, well-thought-out infoniiation that in 
turn could be used eifectively in the State of New Jersey. Right now, 
they knew not where else to turn so they hired Herb Philbrick to come 
up there. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. Did I understand that was for 1 hour only? 

Mr. Philbrick. That's all, plus a question-and-answer period. The 
question-and-answer period went on for 2 or 3 hours. These young 
people who were training to be teachers wanted information, but they 
knew not where to turn, you see. There is a serious lack of adequate 
textbooks to use in our schools and colleges right now\ 

Now, why that should be, I don't know, but I can testify to the fact. 

Three years ago, I spoke in the State of Iowa to the State Teachers 
(convention. There were 12,000 teachers there at that State Teachers 
Convention; and after I had finished my talk on communism, I don't 
know how many teachers came up to me to the platform and said : "Do 
you know that in the entire State of Iowa we teachers do not have a 
single, solitary' textbook to use in our schools to teach our children 
anything about communism ?" 

The teachers at that time told me that on their own, using their own 
meager resources and on their ow^n time, they went out scrambling 
about, picking up whatever they could bring in to their students; but 
they confessed they knew it was not adequate to do the job that they 
wanted to do. 

So, yes, indeed, preparing a library of information would be enor- 
mously valuable for schools, for colleges, as well as for other groups, 
as a continuing source of information. 

Mr. IciiORD. Thank you. 

Mr. Pool. Mr. Johansen. 

Mr. JoiiAxsEN. I am not sure whether you were here this morning 
or not, Mr. Philbrick. 

Mr. Philbrick. I missed most of the testimony this morning. 


Mr. JoHANSEN. The reason I mention that, I think most of the wit- 
nesses have been questioned on the point and I would like your com- 
ment as to the desirability or value — and I hope the answer will be 
frank and not of the type that I might be seeming to invite — as to the 
desirability and importance, or otherwise, of an Advisory Committee 
or some type of setup in which representatives of the Congress, as well 
as other related agencies of the executive branch, would be membere 
who occupy an oversight role or a liaison role between the Freedom 
Academy and the executive and legislative branches of the 

I wonder if you would comment on that. 

Mr. Philbrick. Yes. 

I am familiar with section 13 of H.E. 5368 which, in its present 
form, establishes an Advisory Committee. I am also aware of the 
fact that, as the bill is now written, this Advisoiy Committee would 
include representatives only from the Department of State; from the 
Department of Defense; from the Department of Health, Education, 
and Welfare; from the CIA; from the FBI; from the AID; and 
from the United States Information Agency. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. May I interrupt right there to say, however, in the 
Schadeberg and Ashbrook and Gubser bills there is a provision for a 
congressional committee to act at least in an advisory, if not an o\'er- 
sight, role? 

Mr. Philbrick. Yes, sir; and I believe that would be valuable — to 
include such a provision. Indeed, I am not quite certain whether any 
one of these bills as tliey are now written, as they are now formed, 
would be quite that which this committee might want to bring before 
the Congress. 

I think there are many questions w^hich need to be raised and dis- 
cussed. There may be some improvements that can be made in the 
way the measure has been formulated and written. I do believe that 
that would be one of the improvements. 

Because of the fact that both the House and the Senate already have 
done exploratory work, have done much of the vanguard work in 
obtaining knowledge and information about the Communist activities, 
I believe that representatives from the House and the Senate should 
be part of the Advisory Committee, 

Mr. IcHORD. Will the gentleman yield at that point? 

Mr. JoHANSEN. Yes. 

Mr. IcHORD. I believe the Schadeberg bill and the Ashbrook bill 
and the Gubser bill omit the Advisory Committee altogether from 
the executive branch, do they not ? 

Mr. JoHANSEN. I think so. 

Mr. Ighord. And substitute therefor a Senate-House watchdog 

Mr. JoHANSEN. As I suggested this morning, it may be that the 
answer would be a wedding of the two — for want of a better compari- 
son, of the Hoover Commission type of setup, which represented the 
two Houses and the executive branch or the public. 

Mr. Philbrick. Yes. Yes; I had previously jotted down in my 
notes a reminder to mention the Hoover Commission ; I had that very 
much in mind. The Hoover Commission arrangement might very well 
serve as a prototype for the Freedom Academy. 


Mr. JoiiANSEN. Now, the one concern tluit we have is how do we 
develop this proo-ram under the Freedom Academy in a w^ay that it 
will be an objective presentation of the facts both as to the nature of 
the enemy and the methods of combating him and what it is we are 
fighting for and, at the same time, obviate the objection which Secre- 
tary Harriman made, and which I challenged somewhat severely and 
which 1 reject at least from that source, that this would be a program 
of indoctrination in an objectionable sense? 

Mr. PuiLBRiCK. No. In think that all precautions should be taken, 
that in no sense would the Freedom Academy be involved at all in 
indoctrination in an objectional sense, but that it be strictly proscribed 
and limited to providing information; that, insofar as indoctrination 
is concerned, the only commonly held goal and purpose and aim of the 
Freedom Academy would be to help peoples to establish freedom and 
to maintain freedom. 

I think that insofar as being indoctrinated, yes, we would want to 
make it clear that freedom would be the aim and purpose and goal, 
but beyond that it should be strictly for the purposes of information 
and not for indoctrination. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. Before I yield, I want to express my appreciation 
of having you here and having your excellent testimony with the back- 
ground that you have, sir. 

Mr. PiiiLBRiCK. Thank you very much, sir. 

Mr. Pool. Mr. Bruce. 

Mr. Bruce. First, I would like to take this opportunity on the rec- 
ord to commend Mr. Philbrick for his services to this country, for the 
risks that you took for a period of 9 years, and I suspect in some de- 
gree have taken even greater risks since in your efforts to speak the 
truth as you know it to be. 

I gathered from one of your remarks that you might have some 
other suggestions that might be incorporated in this bill. Do you ? 

Mr. Philbrick. No; I have no further suggestions as such except to 
give emphasis to one section of the bill which is included in H.R. 5368. 

In H.R. 5368, on page 17, there is included a section 11, subsection 
(3), "To conduct such research, studies, and surveys as the Commis- 
sion may deem necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act." 

I would certainly want to emphasize that section. It must be 
admitted that there is a great deal today that we need to know that 
we don't know. It must be admitted that we are years behind the 
Communists in developing techniques in this kind of warfare. 

So I would hope that whatever measure is finally enacted, and let 
us hope one will be enacted, that it would include a strong provision 
for a great deal of research and study (o develop the necessary tools 
and weapons and background knowledge and information we need in 
the war in which we are involved. Today, we simply have not begun 
to tackle this subject. 

Mr. Bruce. I am still somewhat baffled as to how a Government 
agency is going to establish a Freedom Academy with the design of 
education, training, providing information on how to win the cold 
war — and in essence I believe this is the purpose. 

Mr. PfiiLBRiCK. Right. 

Mr. Bruce. Some members of the committee undoubtedly wnll chal- 
lenge this, pe rhaps rightly so, but I have yet to see a determination of 


policy on the part of the Government to try to win the cold war. I 
mean I can't get through my head how we are going to set up a Free- 
dom Academy with this goal under Government sponsorship which 
negates policy. This just baffles me. I am all for it, but I don't 
know how we are going to do it. 

I am a minority of one almost on this, I guess, but it just completely 
baffles me. I mean it seems to me that our priority is a goal of 
policy and the other things fall into line. 

Mr, Philbrick. Well, it may be a question of which comes first, the 
hen or the egg. It may be that at least embarking upon a program — 
as stated in H.R. 5368 — a program of research and development 
toward "preventing Communist penetration while seeking to build 
viable, free, and independent nations" — possibly just the very business 
of discussing this and working on it will have its salutary effect in other 
areas of the Government. I would hope so. 

Mr. Bruce. I would hope so, too. 

I thank you very much. 

Mr. Pool. Mr. Philbrick, a while ago I think you testified that we 
could double our Armed Forces and still lose the cold war, or the hot 
war, I believe you described it. I agreed with you. 

Also, isn't this statement also true, that if we don't do something in 
this area of propaganda and political warfare that we are going to 
lose the war anyhow ? 

Mr. Philbrick. I am convinced of that entirely, sir; yes. 

Mr. Pool. So this Congress and men here have a real responsibility 
to do something and try to do the right thing; and even if we don't 
come up with the right idea, at least we can make an effort to come 
up with the proper vehicle and then we can change it if it does not 
work out perfectly? 

Mr. Philbrick. I believe so. I believe that we must enter into 
this field admitting that there is a lot we don't know and confessing 
that in the beginning it may not be quite what we would want in the 
end. But at least some place we have to make a start. Yes, I believe 
that a very grave responsibility rests with this committee and with 
the Congress to at least make the initial move; to arrive at a starting 
point, and then from that time on, and here again confirming your 
view, that there should be a congressional watchdog committee, to- 
gether with the other advisers, to make sure that the Freedom Acad- 
emy does precisely what we want it to do. And that is to provide 
information about the nature of the enemy, the methods and tactics 
used by the enemy, and to provide the necessary countermeasures and 
counterweapons, to seek not only to preserve the freedom of our 
Nation but to seek in the long run to reestablish freedom in so many 
areas of the world today which are enslaved. 

Mr. Pool. We have a great product to sell. We have the greatest 
system of government that has ever been devised. There is no reason 
why we cannot do it if we work at it and come up with the right 

Mr. Philbrick. I agree. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. Mr. Philbrick, I would like to take advantage of 
your presence here to make an observation regarding the grow- 
ing impression I have and then ask you to comment on it. 


I noticed in the testimony, particularly of witnesses who deal with 
the anti-Communists or countermeasures in Latin America, for in- 
stance, I notice in the statements even of some of our officials in the 
State Department and in Government, the frank acknowledgment 
of the factor, the frank acknowledgment of subversion as a fact of 
life in Latin America, for example, and in these other countries. 

Yet, I have a feeling that there is a sort of schizophrenia — a para- 
dox — and I am not referring now to the witnesses who have been 
before the committee, but some of those who do acknowledge the 
fact of subversion in Latin America belittle and tag as McCarthyism, 
or whatever bad name they want to use, any recognition of subversion 
of the domestic variety. 

Now, am I wrong that there is sometimes a seeming contradiction 
in that respect ? Out of your own experience is subversion at least as 
a potential any less real in the United States than it is in these other 
countries? I say as a potential at least? 

JNIr. Philbrick. No, indeed, internal subversion is not any less 
real. There is a great deal of confusion in this area, I agree, and 
why some people in America should be so confused is beyond me. 

I know there are those who say, "Well, communism may be a danger 
in China or it may be a danger in Vietnam or it may be a danger con- 
veniently a good many thousand miles away, but communism is 
no danger here in the United States." Well, I simply cannot under- 
stand how anyone can be that ill-informed or misinformed, particu- 
larly when it should be quite obvious that, first of all, there is no such 
thing, teclinically speaking, as an external danger separated from 
or different from or isolated from an internal danger; it is all part 
of the same package. 

There is only one Communist International ; there is only one Com- 
munist apparatus; there is only one Communist aim and goal and pur- 
pose, and that is to ultimately destroy the United States. So, by that 
token, the danger of communism internally to the people of the United 
States is just as dangerous as the Communist International is to the 
people of the United States. 

So, from a purely technical point of view, you cannot say it is of 
no danger here ; it is very grave danger and is becoming more so every 

Another area that we did not touch on — you spoke of this strange 
schizophrenia. This is true. Congressman Bruce has already com- 
mented concerning the seeming lack of goal or purpose or aim to win 
the cold war. There are many contradictions today, contradictions 
in our State Department. 

For example, one of the texts I quote quite frequently in my lectures 
on commmiism is an excellent State Department dociunent. State 
Department Publication 6777. This was published in March of 1959 
concerning The Communist Economic Threat. In the opening para- 
graph of this document, the United States State Department says: 

International communism — inspired, spearheaded, and financed by Moscow — 
persists in wanting to communize the world. 

By use of bluster, subversion, blackmail, brainwashing, military force, and the 
threat of using such force. Communists have taken control of one-quarter of the 
world's land surface and about one-half of the world's population. 


It is important for Americans to know of the new and subtle device which 
the Communists are employing, in addition to their other tactics, in attempting 
to achieve their goal of world domination. This new weapon is economic pene- 
tration. And it can be the most dangerous of all the weapons in the Communists' 
varied arsenal. 

Well, in the light of this statement and in the light of much that 
we are doing and not doing in the field of economic warfare, we find 
some incredible contradictions. 

Again, a very important part, it seems to me, of the Freedom Acad- 
emy would be to come up with accurate information and study and 
knowledge of the Communist use of economic warfare. Certainly 
many of our leading businessmen, especially those dealing with for- 
eign trade, sliould have that kind of information so that they know 
what kind of a ball game they are playing in. It is a dangerous 

Mr. JoHANSEN. I expressed just recently some misgivings as to how 
much enlightenment and factual information the Soviet Ambassador 
to the United States gave the Economic Club of Detroit, where ho 
spoke last month, and I have been severely criticized for raising the 
question. I am not just sure how well equipped some of that audience 
was to recognize what they are getting. 

Mr. PiiiLBRicK. My guess is that many of our leading, foremost, 
most successful businessmen in this country today are very poorly 
equipped to cope with the Communist economic threat. This alone 
could spell disaster for our country in the long run. This is almost 
as though we were to take a nice, pipe-smoking, slippered, smoking- 
jacket-robed, poker player and sit him down at a card table with a 
bunch of dishonest, shrewd, conniving cardsharks. Now, he is going 
to lose his shirt. By the same token, some of our businessmen today 
simply do not begin to understand the criminal minds, the criminal 
intent, and the criminal purpose of those Communists with whom 
they are dealing. 

Mr. Bruce. "Wlien we pass legislation which finances a fight against 
the Communists and helps to finance their internal problem — I am 
talking about the foreign aid bill, I mean both sides are aided here. 
I mean I cannot just quite compreliend this. 

Mr. Philbrick. This is wherein I believe the Freedom Academy 
can provide a great service in developing the kind of factual infor- 
mation which even Congressmen and Members of tlie Senat-e can use 
to great advantage before casting their very important votes on legis- 
lati^-e matters before the Congress. 

Mr. Poor.. No other questions ? 

Mr. IcHORD. I have one more question. 

Mr. Pool. All right. 

Mr. IciiORD. Well, now, the Freedom Academy is not necessarily 
going to be advancing the immediate objectives of freedom in several 
instances, as I understand it. Certainly, the subversion of the Com- 
munists in tliis country will take a different form than the subversion 
in a poor, undeveloped country, say in South America, living under 
a dictatorship. 

Mr. Philbrook. True. 

Mr. IcHORD. Now, there vour Freedom Academy is going to be 
training people how to check communism — that is the immediate ob- 
jective, stop it. 


Mr. Philbrick. Tliat is true. 

Mr. IcHORD. You are certainly going to fight it differently there 
than you would here. 

Mr. PiiiLBUooK. Yes, this is indeed true. This is an element of po- 
litical warfare I learned in my own experience in the Comnmnist 
training cadres here in the United States. We were told over and 
over and over again that although we operated, as Communists, under 
the general overall broad direction and control of Moscow, and al- 
though all Communists throughout the world had the same objectives 
in mind, that the specific tactics we would use in any given circum- 
stance would depend, number 1, on the time; number 2, on the place; 
and, number 3, on the circumstance. 

We were to Aery carefully analyze and weigh each situation in each 
area before determining the very best thing we could do to strengthen 
the Soviet Union and the very best we could do ultimately to weaken 
and, we hoped, ultimately destroy the United States. "The time, the 
conditions, and the place." Over and over again, the Communists 
pointed that out to us. 

Mr. IcHORD. Tlie people of Cuba were comparing Castro with Ba- 
tista, not Cuba with what we have to offer. 

Mr. Philbrick. That is right; and, by the same token, in develop- 
ing count ermeasures, you see, we must also in time take into considera- 
tion vei"y carefully the circumstances, the background, the history 
of the people, the terrain, the economy, and all the rest before we 
can come up with any effective answers. In e\'ery instance we would 
have to determine what measures would most effectively strengthen 
the forces of freedom and weaken the forces of communism. 

Mr. Bruce. If the gentleman will yield. 

Isn't the first and the major step in anything like this a complete, 
thorough understanding of dialectical and historical materialism? 
Isn't this the right foundation ? 

Mr. Philbrick. That is right. 

Mr. Bruce. Before we can understand the techniques of a play in the 
United States or in different countries, we must miderstand that foun- 
dation first. 

Mr. Philbrick. We must understand the theory first; yes. 

Mr. Bruce. And then the faith. 

Mr. Philbrick. And then the faith and then from that go on to 
understand how the theory is actually put into practice. 

Mr. Bruce. The application varies. 

Mr. Philbrick. Yes. 

Mr. Bruce. But the basic premise is the same. 

Mr. Philbrick. Always. 

Mr. Pool. Any other questions ? 

We certainly thank you for appearing and answering our questions 
and supplying us with the information you have. 

Mr. Philbrick. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much. 

Mr. Pool. Mr. Olson, director of the American Legion's National 
Legislative Commission, will introduce our next witness, Dan O'Con- 
nor of the American Legion. 

Mr. Olson. 


Mr. Olson. My name is Clarence H. Olson. I am director of The 
American Legion's National Legislative Commission. 

Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, I sat back here and listened to the 
gentleman who preceded us (Mr. Philbrick) and I agree that it is most 
fortmiate that we have such a man in our country who is willing and 
able to participate in this great fight against the communistic con- 

I would also like the record to show that I share with him the great 
regard he has expressed for the late General MacArthur, with whom I 
had the pleasure of serving in the southwest Pacific during World 
War II. His passing is a great loss to our country ; he has left a mark 
that I doubt will ever be equaled by another military leader. 

Mr. Pool. I think the members of the committee would also like to 
join you in that remark. 

Mr. Olson. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Chairman, I have a brief introductory statement which I would 
like to make. I regi'et that I am one of the great many in this comitry 
who know very little about communism. Consequently, I am not 
qualified to discuss it in any detail. I see it only on the surface as you 
w^ll understand. 

Before presenting our principal witness, Mr. O'Connor, I wish to 
thank this committee for the courtesy shown The American Legion 
by permitting its representatives to come before you today in support of 
legislation proposing the creation of a Freedom Academy and the 
establishment of a Freedom Commission. We favor the bills intro- 
duced by Messrs. Boggs and Taft; that is, H.K. 5368 and H.R. 8320, 

Why does the American Legion believe such a Commission and 
Academy are necessary ? Because it fears the encroachment of com- 
munism and we believe that, for the most part, our soldiers of freedom, 
active and potential, are not sufficiently knowledgeable in the area of 
political warfare and all that it entails to effectively thwart the Com- 
munist conspiracy. We have too many voices in the wilderness, with- 
out concert or direction, that need orientation and knowledge such as 
contemplated in the preambles to the bills cited earlier. 

The destructive force of subversion must be met with knowledgeable, 
steadfast determination equal to the requisites for successful military 
operations. A Freedom Academ}^, as we see it, would be the nucleus 
of a force for freedom, the fountainhead of knowledge that would in- 
spire its activity. At a time when political wars destroy the will and 
minds of men, it seems only logical that we have a Freedom Academy 
to support this new arm of defense to serve as a corollary to our service 

I am privileged, Mr. Chairman, to be associated today with the 
chairman of The American Legion's National Americanism Commis- 
sion, Mr. Daniel J. O'Connor, whose official address is 50 Pine Street, 
New York City. Dan has an illustrious background in his chosen 
profession, the law. He is presently secretary of the New York City 
Department of Investigation. During the years 1954 to 1959 he was 
counsel of the Bureau of Internal Security of New York City. He 
received his A.B. and LL.B. from Fordham University and his LL.M. 


from New York Lfiw School. He is a veteran of World War II and 
tlie Korean war, having served as enlisted man and an officer. I feel 
sure he is qualified to testify before your committee, iS[r. Cliairman. 
I am proud indeed to introduce Mr. Daniel J. O'Connor, 
Mr. Pool. Thank you, Mr. Olson. We are fjliid to have you both 

Mr. O'Connor, we turn it over to you now. 


Mr. O'Connor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee : As the distinguished 
members of this committee know. The xVmerican Legion has, since its 
very beginning, been cognizant of the Communist menace. In fact, the 
militancy of Americanism expressed by the founders and early or- 
ganizers of The American Legion drew such wrath from the advance 
guard of communism in this country — the Industrial Workers of the 
World — that the latter shot down, in cold blood, American Legion- 
naires marching in the first Armistice Day parade in Centralia, Wash- 
ington. That was in 1919, even as the young American Legion was 
l)erfecting its organization at its first National Convention in Min- 
neapolis, Minnesota, November 10-12, 1919. 

Forty-five years ago the basic tenets of communism may have been 
generally understood by a considerable portion of our population. 
Today, however, the complexities of Communist plans and activities 
have grown to such proportions that scarcely one in a thousand Amer- 
icans have a mental grasp of Communist machinations. Of course, all 
of us, through the news media of the Nation, are familiar with the 
kjiown Communist successes, such as in Cuba and elsewhere. But how 
to thwart communistic encroachments, before the fact, is a problem 
wh ich we seem unable to solve. 

While I feel certain the members of this committee recognize the 
long hard-fought battle which The American Legion has waged 
against communism since the Centralia massacre, there can be no 
denial that there have been changes in the techniques of political and 
psychological warfare. Centuries ago a question was posed to the 
brilliant scholar, Francis Xavier, namely: "What doth it profit a 
man if he gains the whole world and suffers the loss of his own soul?'' 
Might I paraphrase that question in pointing to the tremendous armed 
might of our country, the greatest Nation on earth, and say, "What 
doth it profit the United States of America to have the greatest 
atomic power for both peace and war if the LTnited States of America 
is robbed of its own soul ? " 

In the past 17 years, millions have been encircled and their lives 
regimented under the yoke of Moscow or Peiping because of a poison 
that has been administered in slow, measured, but lethal, doses to 
humankind in all part of the globe. The incontrovertible but sad 
reality is that, without firing a single weapon, the masters of Com- 
munist propaganda have been proliferate not only in the Far East, 
but in our own hemisphere. 

There is no committee of the Congress that has performed a greater 
public service than the House Committee on Un-American Activities 
in marshaling the various sources of information reflecting the pat- 


teni of infiltration not only in Latin America, Panama, and Cnba, 
but also within the confines of our own geography. There is no task 
more painstaking or more difficult than the burden shouldered by this 
committee in probing the influence of communism in our own society. 
Your committee and staff labor under constant threat of liquidation, 
not by members of the Communist Party alone, but by Americans who 
recognize the congressional power of inquiry for every subject under 
the sun except the expose of the Communist conspiracy. What I 
would like you to understand and appreciate is that we in The Amer- 
ican Legion, who have consistently supported the creation of a Free- 
dom Academy, have also supported the duly constituted committees 
of the Congress whose findings and publications serve to spotlight the 
uncanny aggressors for the minds of men. 

In giving our wholehearted support, for the creation of the Freedom 
Academy, we cannot help but emphasize that the greatest care must 
be exercised that this new beacon of liberty shall never become, in 
even the smallest part, a haven for anyone who professes a belief iii 
our way of life and yet performs brilliantly for the proponents of world 

Lest you think for one moment that I have introduced a strange 
note amid splendid testimony offered to your committee by the Honor- 
able Hale Boggs, majority whip from Louisiana; Dr. Lev E. Dobri- 
ansky, Georgetown University professor; and many other distin- 
guished Americans, please understand that we in The American Legion 
share the dismay and disappointment of many who believe the 
cold war has achieved some measure of success in the LTnited States. 

We have also witnessed the replacement of a program dedicated 
to the men of our Armed Forces on Veterans Day 1962 with comment 
and appraisal by a convicted perjurer, passing judgment on the po- 
litical fortunes of a man who served as United States Senator and 
Vice President of the United States. "V^Hiile the producers of the 
program are not accused of having Communist sympathies, leftwing 
leanings, and so forth, there can be no question about the bad taste 
exercised in that decision. Why do things like this happen ? Why 
was America's fighting man relegated to oblivion ? 

What is there on the American scene which causes the cancellation 
of a tribute to the American fighting man and substitutes instead an 
attack on a war veteran who held high public office by a pei^jurer who 
is given a television podium in a vain effort to restore his respect- 
ability. This is only one example of the erosion of patriotism. Only 
last week at a public school in East Williston, Long Island, American 
boys and girls from upper middle-class families refused to salute the 
flag of the ITnited States. Xo accusation is made against the faculty 
of the school, but what has happened in the fabric of American educa- 
tion which causes this debasement of our traditional salute to the flag 
and our love for that for which it stands? Perhaps the "cross-fer- 
tilization of ideas" pursued in a division of research for the private 
sector of our society will, in the Freedom Academy, give some clue to 
the problem. 

In my experience as a lawyer who handled the security-risk inquiry 
in the city of New York, I feel that I can make a personal observa- 
tion on this program that terminated about 6 years ago. If it was 
shocking to learn that engineers and others educated in our colleges 


and universities had joined the apparatus of the Communist Party 
and their activities remained undetected for years, then is it not of 
paramount importance that the greatest possible security measures be 
taken to insure against the possibility of the Freedom Academy itself 
being infiltrated by anyone tutored by the great masters of deceit? 
In Congressman Boggs' presentation, he pointed out, quite properly, 
that the work of the Freedom Academy in no way preempts the work 
of the FBI or the CIA. He stated that what is intended is the "use 
affirmatively of the great reservoir of talent that we have in the United 
States to show what the free system and what a free society can do,'' 
but also remarked, "I have no preconceived notions of how this 
Academy should be set up." Concededly, however, this is a most 
important corollary to the passage of this legislation, namely, the 
staffing of the Academy. 

Willie The American Legion is deeply concerned about the compe- 
tence of Americans who officially represent the United States, both 
here and abroad, our support of the Freedom Academy would also 
embrace the area of research for the vast sector of Americans engaged 
in the war of ideas who are not on the public payroll. We believe the 
many who are engaged in stemming the tide of Communist propa- 
ganda which has poured into this country by the ton must be en- 
couraged, enlightened, and strengthened. Finally, w^e commend the 
Freedom Academy to your consideration. We believe its success will 
be measured by its service to God and country in a recognition of the 
basic discipline and spiritual values which have made the United 
States the greatest nation on earth. 

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I ask that the attached American 
Legion 1963 Convention Resolution, No. 178, be made a part of the 
record following my statement. 

Mr. Pool. That may be done. 

Mr. O'Connor. In behalf of the American Legion, and myself 
personally, I thank you for the opportunity given us today. 

(The resolution follows:) 

Forty-Fifth Annual National Convention of the American Legion, Miami 
Beach, Florida, September 10-12, 1963 

Resolution No. 178 
Committee: Americanism. 

Subject : Supports establishment of the Freedom Academy. 

Whereas, The time has come to acknowledge the need of an institution to 
prepare Americans to wage the kind of non-military warfare at which the 
Communists excell, in that they have long been experts in using political, 
psychological, economic, and technological weapons in their ambitious plan for 
world conquest ; and 

Whc7-eas, In the strictly military field our resources are superior and greater 
to theirs, though in non-military areas they have a network of organizations 
and tactics that have been active for years ; and 

Whereas, It is necessary that we mobilize ourselves more effectively the 
need for which is increasing every year to meet the many pronged challenge 
of Soviet political warfare, and calling for more effective techniques to combat 
this Soviet menace ; and 

Whereas, Tlie State Department and the present administration has recog- 
nized the deficiency in governmental training programs for personnel who must 
deal with the Communists and formulate our policies toward them ; Now, there- 
fore, be it 

30-471— 64— pt. a 10 


Resolved, By The American Legion, in National Convention assembled in 
Miami Beacli, Florida, September 10-12, 1963, that The American Legion sup- 
port and favor legislation seeking the establishment of a government institution 
to be known as The Freedom Academy, to help Americans, primarily government 
employees, to develop the professional competence and experience necessary to 
combat the extraordinary variety of techniques employed by the Communists 
throughout the w^orld. 

Mr. Pool. Questions? 

Mr. IcHORD. Mr. Chairman, I have one question. 

The incident, Mr. O'Connor, in East Williston, Long Island, was 
not reported in the Midwest newspapers Last week, or at least I did 
not catch it. Could you elaborate on what happened in East Williston ? 

Mr. O'Connor. Well, in a school in East Williston, Long Island, 
which I believe is called the Wheaton School, there were approxi- 
mately 20 students who indicated to the headmaster or the principal of 
the school that they w^ould not salute the flag of the United States. 
The State commander of The American Legion jjrotested this course 
of conduct and even went so far to recommend that those students 
be expelled, in a television interview. 

Mr. IcHORD. Are these children members of a certain religious 
denomination ? 

Mr. IcHORD. No; I would say they were of different religious 
denominations. This is a public school, as I understand it, open to any- 
one regardless of race, color, or creed. The objection to salute the flag 
was not based upon religious grounds such as that, for example, you 
have in the case of Jehovah's Witnesses. This was based upon a belief 
that we should salute a United Nations flag. 

The principal (in answering Mr. Goddard, I believe was the TV 
interviewer) stated that he thought that we should not take any hasty 
action on a situation such as this, but that we ought to give the students 
a chance to reevaluate their conclusions and perhaps give them a 
chance to see that they might be in error. He did not go as far as I 
have quoted, but I think that is what he meant, 

Mr. IcHORD. Was this a public high school ? 

Mr. O'Connor. Yes, sir. 

Mr. IcHORD. How many students were enrolled in the school ? 

Mr. O'Connor. They did not indicate, but looking at the school on 
the TV program I would say that it would probably have a capacity 
of 500. 

Mr. IcHORD. Thank you very much for your testimony. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. Just SO even the most obtuse cannot have any doubts 
as to what the gentleman is talking about in his very fine statement, the 
reference made previously to the "convicted perjurer" is of course a 
reference to Alger Hiss ; is that not correct ? 

Mr. O'Connor. Yes, sir, that is correct. 

Mr. Pool. Mr. Bruce. 

Mr. Bruce. All I can say is I share your determination to be sure 
that the faculty of the Freedom Academy be free of the background 
or the indoctrination about which you expressed concern here, too. It 
is one of the reservations I have pending in the final version of the 
bill. I want to be sure that in our determination to do something good 
and helpful that we do not create a monster that can come back upon 
us. I am for the idea, but I think that the proper safeguards have to 
be written in specifically and categorically so that the control is clear. 


Mr. O'Connor. On that score, Congressman, I would just like to 
remark that I feel, and I know Mr. Olson feels with me wholeheart- 
edly, thiit a concept of an Advisory Committee from both Houses of 
Congress should replace an Advisory Connnittee consisting of repre- 
sentatives who are under the jurisdiction of an administrative officer. 

]Mr. Bruce. I concur. 

Mr. O'Connor. I think it would be more responsive to the people 
and to the Congress of the United States. 

Mr. Pool. Mr. Schadeberg. 

]Mr. Schadeberg. I have no questions. 

Mr. Pool. No questions. 

I want to say this, that I am a member of The American Legion and 
have been since I was a veteran in World War II. I have been very 
proud to be a member of it because they have always been for America, 
and their patriotic programs have helped a great deal in defending 
this country against communism and other ideologies that are alien to 
our philosophy. 

I want to thank both of you for appearing here today as the mem- 
bers of a great organization. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. If the gentleman will yield, before we excuse the 
witnesses, as a nonmember of the American Legion for chronological 
reasons — I was not a veteran — I want to express my admiration for 
the organization and particularly the pride I have in the fact that 
one of your past national commanders. Judge Addington Wagner, 
comes from my hometown. 

Mr. Pool. I was talking to one of the organizers of the American 
Legion the other day, a very patriotic man from my hometown. 

Mr. Olson. Thank you very much, gentlemen. 

Mr. Pool, Thank you. 

Mr. O'Connor. Thank you, gentlemen. 

Mr. Pool. The committee will recess until 10 a.m. tomorrow when 
we will have other witnesses here. 

(Whereupon, at 4 p.m., Tuesday, April 7, 1964, the committee re- 
cessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Wednesday, April 8, 1964.) 

HEARINGS RELATING TO H.R. 352, H.R. 1617, H.R. 5368, 
H.R. 8320, AND H.R. 8757, H.R. 10036, H.R. 10037, H.R. 

Part 2 


United States House of Representatives, 

Committee on Un-American Activities, 

Washington^ B.C. 


The Committee on Un-American Activities met, pursuant to recess, 
at 10:05 a.m., in Room 304, Cannon House Office Building, Wash- 
ington, D.C., Hon. Edwin E. Willis (chairman) presiding. 

Committee members present: Representatives Edwin E. Willis, of 
Louisiana; William M. Tuck, of Virginia; Joe R. Pool, of Texas; 
Richard H. Ichord, of Missouri ; August E. Johansen, of Michigan ; and 
Henry C. Schadeberg of Wisconsin. 

Staff members present: Francis J. McNamara, director; Alfred M. 
Nittle, counsel ; and Donald T. Appell, investigator. 

The Chairman. Tlie committee will come to order. 

Our first witness this morning is Dr. Michael C. Conley. Doctor, 
we are glad to have you. 

For the record, please identify yourself and give a short resume of 
your background, education, and experience, as a basis for your 
qualification in making a case for or against the pending legislation. 


Dr. Conley. Yes, sir, I would be pleased to. 

I was born in 1926 in Dayton, Ohio; went to the public schools 
there and to the north in Sidney, Ohio; served 2 years in the Army 
from 1944 to 1946; and thereafter attended Ohio State University, 
receiving all of my degrees from that university, my B.A. in 1950, 
my M.A. in 1951, and my doctorate m 1960. 

My inclinations during my university days were a bit exotic. I 
wrote my master's thesis on Egyptian History, my dissertation for 
my doctorate on Dutch Colonial Policy in the 19th Century. 

I have taught for the University of Maryland's Overseas Program 
for over 2 years, in Germany and France, and I have visited just 
about every significant city and nation in Europe, including Berlin, 
and I spent a month sojourning in Yugoslavia. 



I joined the Intelligence Department of what was known, at that 
time, as the United States Army's Military Police Intelligence and 
Special Weapons School in Oberammergau — joined that department 
in 1957 — and was concerned with strategic intelligence until 1961 — • 
'57 to '61. I was responsible for extensive lectures on Russian history, 
East European history and Balkan history, surveys of Soviet foreign 
policy in western Central Europe and South and Southeast Asia, and 
I have lectured for a number of years on Communist ideology. 

In 1961, when the United States Army in Europe decided to begin a 
program of counterinsurgency training in Europe, I was designated 
by the commander of the United States Army School, Europe, in 
Oberammergau, southern Germany, to draw up a table of organiza- 
tion for a unit to teach counterinsurgency and to prepare a program of 
instruction for such a unit — that coming after 3 years of experience in 
the Intelligence Department, where I concerned myself broadly with 
the nature of communism and the foreign policies of the Soviet Union. 

I have been intimately and veiy closely attached to this general busi- 
ness of counterinsurgency from the summer of 1961. Then, and I in- 
deed, perhaps more than any other person in Oberammergau, was 
responsible for the kind of product that came out, the course of in- 
struction that we give there, and the philosophy, in which lies the 
crux of what we are doing there. We from the very outset defined 
counterinsurgency and insurgency in very broad terms, so as to permit 
us to examine many of the nontraditional areas in which conflict is 
taking place. 

I also had a great deal to do with the fact that the department was 
so organized that perhaps 50 to 55 percent of our personnel were not 
American, but were selected from all over the world for their ability 
to provide us with specialized knowledge in this or that area. I saw 
to it, as an example, that we had a fluent Chinese researcher available, 
an Iraqi — that was by chance, but we needed someone from the Middle 
East who coidd use Arabic, in several dialects, preferably. I saw to it 
that one with Russian experience in the Second World War period, a 
Yugoslav, was provided, and a multiplicity of other people, including 
I'urks, Iranians, and what-have-you. I wanted that department to 
have the capacity to draw upon an unlimited amount of information, 
irrespective of language source, with no problem of language. And I 
think witli this kind of an organization behind us, it was possible for 
us to develop and find out information which is, for the most part, not 
well known in the United States. I would like to present in the course 
of my testimony some of the information which we came up with. 

This has been my impassioned concern : this general field of ir- 
regular warfare for 3 years, the general field of the Communist phe- 
nomenon for something like 6 years. 

Does this provide you with adequate background ? 

The Chairman. Yes, fine. Proceed. 

Dr. CoNLEY. Shall I turn, then, to the material I have ? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Dr. CoNLEY. All right, thank you. 

Let me identify myself here at the outset as belonging to the most 
fervent supporters of the proposed Freedom Commission and Freedom 
Academy. My studies, to which I have just made reference, have led 


me to believe very strongly that we have neither the know-how nor the 
doctrine for the type of organization necessary to respond effectively 
to the form of irregular warfare in which we are involved. 

I have concerned myself, together with a research staff that w^orks 
nnder me, with the nature of this phenomenon, and we are now 
hesitantly, as time permits us, concerning ourselves with what kind of 
things we have to do to respond effectively to the insurgent specifically, 
to the cold war in general. But to put my understanding of insurgency 
and counterinsurgency in its proper perspective, I would like, if I 
could for just a moment, to give you my personal views on what the 
cold war is. 

I think I can best provide you with a precept of what I mean by 
cold war if I draw a contrast between the thing we faced in Stalin's 
time and the thing we face now under Krushchev. I am concerned then 
with the period 1945 to 1955, let us say, or '54, as opposed to the period 
from 1954 to the present. 

Now, what was the situation when Stalin was in the seat of power in 
the Soviet Union? He relied in the post- World War II period pri- 
marily upon his international party organization and, through it, he 
carried out that portion of his foreign policy which was most important 
to him. He supported the activities of this international party orga- 
nization, which was essentially a covert and subversive organization, 
with a limited exploitation of the official machinery of the Soviet 
Government. In Mr. Stalin's time, the primary areas in which the 
official government of the Soviet Union expressed itself were in the 
areas of traditional diplomacy and in the areas of limited trade with 
the free world, at least the non-Communist bloc world. 

All right, now what happens after 1954, particularly after 1956? 
Mr. Krushchev has retained every trick in the book written by Lenin 
and Stalin. As in Stalin's time, the party apparatus and the provoca- 
tive techniques available to it still provide the Kremlin with a powerful 
base from which to conduct the subversion of other countries. But 
Mr. Krushchev is conducting his foreign activities much more effec- 
tively than did Stalin before him, because he does not rely exclusively 
upon party channels and, secondly, has adjusted his policies to take 
full advantage of the situation in the world in which we are confronted 
with a multiplicity of new countries with inexperienced administra- 
tors, no historical traditions, and no balanced budgets. 

Aside from the party apparatus, which is still operative and which 
still plays the game the way it did in Stalin's time, you now have com- 
ing out of the Soviet Union a stepped-up trade and aid program, a 
rapid expansion of diplomatic relations with other countries around 
the world, a technical assistance effort, a foreign student training pro- 
gram, a grossly expanded foreign military aid support, and a cultural 
offensive that ranges from everything from ballet and orchestra to 
astronauts and trade union delegations. 

Mr. Krushchev has exploited to the fullest every conceivable devel- 
opment that can be played through the official government of his coun- 
try, and thus what you have today is — as I would understand cold 
war — is this : the combined, integrated, external activities of the two 
channels, party and state. And this is what we are concerned with. 
Cold war is what you get when you play to the maximum everything 
you can get out of state channels and party channels. 


Now, I would say that cold war, if it is understood in this sense, 
has two portions. Wars of national liberation, or what we call insur- 
gency movements, are the ultimate produce of what comes when you 
work through party channels, and "peaceful coexistence'' is what hap- 
pens when you work through state channels. Cold war, then, is a com- 
bination of insurgency and peaceful coexistence. Insurgency, work 
through a clandestine apparatus of disciplined subversives; peaceful 
coexistence, the combination of programs that proceed through the 
official government of that country. 

You see, then, that I have cut out from this field with which I have 
directly and immediately concerned myself for the last years one half 
of the total spectrum of activities. Insurgency has nothing to do with 
guerrilla warfare. Guerrilla w arf are is a line on a spectrum ; insur- 
gency is half of the spectrum, and the other half of the spectrum is 
there to provide a cover for the subversive activities that proceed 
through party channels and also, where possible, to set up possible 
third countries from which insurgent activities can be more effec- 
tively carried out. 

Now, this is the context, then, in which I would like to examine 
the subject of insurgency proper. But before I go to that point, I 
would like to present yon with a chart that I prepared — unfortunately 
quite hurriedly last week — to point up the relationship between this 
total offensive of the Soviet Union and its bloc allies and our response 
to it. May I, Mr. Chairman, give you copies of this ? 

There are copies of this attached to the back of the paper you have, 
sir. This should also be added. The second page which you are re- 
ceiving should be placed beneath the first page. When properly 
placed together^ — and I am only too ready to admit that this is an \m- 
perfect training aid — you should have a diagram something like this 

The sheet that says "Organized Religion" up in the corner should be 
the second of the two sheets. It should be actually a single continuous 
chart, starting with "Diplomacy" at the top, and ending with "Coordi- 
nated Militant Subversion" at the bottom. 

The Chairman. All right. 

(See "Chart A," opposite this page.) 

Dr. CoNLEY. Now, what I have done on the left-hand side is to list 
as on a spectrum, in which intensity increases toward the bottom, all 
of the principal areas in which the Soviet Union expresses itself in- 
ternally, that is, through its formal government and through its sub- 
versive apparatus. And, on the opposite side, I have listed those areas 
in which American foreign policy and foreign activities respond. 
Now, I think a moment's glance at this chart- points up the inadequacy 
of our response. The width and the length of the arrows is determined 
by objective information wdiich is available. This is no attempt to 
force the facts, but to represent statistical norms. 

I would like to make this point. On the Soviet side, in the activi- 
ties they are involved in, from diplomacy and trade through technical 
training, organized religion, mass organizations, external cadre orga- 
nizations, and down to coordinated militant subversion, you will notice 
that there is only a single break— that is to say, there is only one point 
where the lines are not contiguous one to the next, and that is following 
the politico-military bloc item. But, otherwise, the Soviet offensive, 



Mil Bloc 

Fconoiiic Jid 
Tech Tng 

Cul ExclBrge 


Org IfeL 

Nan -Com 
Spt Sup 







Traditional Diplomacy 

Diplomatic and Milita ry Espionage 

Unilateral Pronouncements 

Support of Subversion 


Traditional Diplomacy 

"^ Dipl & Mil Espionage 

Traditional Trade 

'?-rgHi t.T pnal Trarlp 

Trade Espiohage 

Support of Subversion 

Satellite countries & Warsaw Bloc 

$ &Eauip 

Mil Adv 
Tng Pe 



Trade Espionage 



Money and Eguinment 

Training of Personnel 

Military Advisers 

T.nana g-nfl arar\tFt 

PI aOaEtr > \^ 
Sub A*/ 

Planning and Construction 

Legitimate Technological Training 


i Tech 5 Tng 

P nlitical Ttidn ctrination 

Training for Subversion 
Cjiltural _Ex£iiange_IiQgrams_ 

Ideologica l and Political Propaganda 

Penetration for purposes of Subversion 

Cultural Exchange 

Id eo logical and Political Propaganda 

Ideological Propaganda 

Political Propaganda 



lltical Propaganda 

■JtoH Penetr 


Creation, participation & Domihation of international mass organizations 

ShamelpRs eypi 9 itatipri of popular needs and de sires _^ 

£utY£X3ive Ac tivi ty 

V_^ ^Itep Kan-C 

Persis tent contacts ft proselyting of Socialists 
Exploitation socialistic inclinations West masses 
Pnlitinal utili zatinn nf Voliintarv Pel Trav 

Fellow Tra veler as intelligence source 

Fellow traveler as instrument of subversion 

global system of 'national' Com Parties 
Covert 'national' party Intel collection 
E-ytp-ryinlly ^'^^f^-i g-|iipn'l,° pnrty /'pit/Prop 



Foreign Sup of American interests 



* ^ In-i 

Coun try C ounter -espionag e 

Indigenous Psrty'R inf iltration multiple in-country social strata 

Demon Rtrriit ions, Rtrikea^aad _Sabjitage ^ 

'Terrorism _&J^ntimidat ion 'T~ 

. Assistance to non-Commu n iat insurs;ency against "external _intere"sts" 
Assistance to n on-Communist insurgency betwe en ethnic groups 
COK' cnnt.rn lled sub insurgency ~ J 


•ASpo ntaneous C amE.. 



Coimter insurgency 


A tj:ai-:o 












^ a9X'i-i-.:;;jo::- s'*- 







from top to bottom, is an integrated phenomenon, totally opportunis- 
tic, but totally integrated. Our response to it, you will see, is full of 
holes. In many of the areas in which we are being challenged, we are 
not responding at all, and in other areas, we are responding weakly, 

This chart suggests that there is a need for a response at every level. 
Either we must have a program equally as good as the Soviets or we 
must have a program to thwart their efforts in that particular area, 
and we also need integration. We need a program that is integrated, 
balanced, and total. 

Now, one half of the things with which the Soviet Union is con- 
cerned here, and which I attempt to represent by diagraniing, are 
directly related to the question of insurgency proper. And it is in this 
framework that I would like to turn, then, to the question of insurgency 
itself, seeing it by my definition as one half of the total foreign activities 
of the Soviet I'f'nion. 

All right. Now, in Oberammergau, where Ave are concerned with 
this question of insurgency, we are primarily preoccupied with two 
periods in the development of an insurgent movement, which we call 
respectively the clandestine and the military operational phases. 
These correspond to what the special group counterinsurgency under 
the President would call Phase One and Two programs in insurgency 
and counterinsurgency. 

Now, we would define the clandestine phase as having its beginning 
at that point when organizational work begins; when the first party 
cadre arrives in virgin territory and begins organizational work, the 
clandestine phase of insurgency has begmi. 

The ultimate mission of the clandestine phase is a power seizure 
through means short of the use of military force. That is to say, 
ideally, where possible, the seizure of power would come through a 
coup d'etat or an election victory in which the party works behind a 
front federation that actively engages in open politics. 

Now, if it is not possible to seize power in this fashion, then you may 
resort to what we can call protracted revolutionary warfare, or the 
military operational phase of insurgency movements. If possible, 
they would prefer to take over through clandestine means alone, 
simply because it is cheaper and it requires less discipline; but they 
have shown themselves admirably capable of resorting to protracted 
techniques involving military units, and I would like to turn my atten- 
tion here primarily to that second period, when the guerrilla appears. 

Now, we in the West have been so impressed with the fighting ca- 
pacity of the guerrilla that we have tended to overlook tlie fact that 
he is only one small part of the phenomenon of insurgency, which is 
a much greater story. I would like to examine what, in fact, happens 
when a country like South Vietnam finds itself gradually drawn into 
a period of military operational insurgency. The story starts, of 
course, back in the clandestine period. Imagine, if you will, a party 
organization, Communist party organization in a country — the Polit- 
buro at the top supported by a central committee of executors and 
supervisors, and a national organization proceeding down through 
the provinces to the regions, to the districts, and to local units, between 
which the agglomerate of cells are organized. 


One other body I might mention at this point would be attached 
at the local or district level of the party organization, the so-called 
strong-arm squads. Now, these groups may have any of a variety 
of names, depending upon the country in which they are operating. 
They can be called, as an example, the Vanguard of the People, the 
People's Peace Corps, or any of a number of names, but their func- 
tion is to provide the tacticians w^ho know how to redirect a street 
demonstration until it ends up in front of the America house. In- 
cluded here would be the ones who employ physical persuasion where 
ideological persuasion proves not to be enough. These would be 
strong-arm groups in the lower reaches of the party in the country in 

All right. Now, once it has been decided that the party will partici- 
pate in subversive insurgency movement, the Politburo at the top of 
the party organization will send mobilization orders down through its 
party structure from the province to the region to the district, and the 
local district party organization will receive the order, "Send 'Actives' 
out into rural areas where adverse terrain exists." 

Now, the "Active" will be a group of 6, 7, 10 people. These will be 
highly select party members who are thoroughly experienced in one or 
another form of irregular activity. There will be a man who is an 
expert on political work, on ideological training, on youth groups, and 
so on. This will be a small, compact group of men sent out into a rural 
area. They will constitute the nucleus of a future regional force and 
also, at the same time, the command stmcture for a regional force. 

Once the "Active" is in the countryside, well placed, then there 
will be a call on the party organization in that district of the country 
to provide volunteers to work under the "Active," and at least a por- 
tion of the people who will join the "Active" now will be members of 
strong-arm groups and will come out of urban areas. 

Gradually, under the direction of that "Active," a force of perhaps 
50 men will develop out there, which will receive military training 
and which wnll be capable of military action, such as raiding isolated 
police posts and the like. 

When that force, which we will call regional, is operational and 
the party organization has decided that it is indeed time to go into 
the military operational phase of their instructions, then the follow- 
ing things will happen. 

First off, the political base of the Politburo organization will re- 
name itself "Supreme Headquarters of the Peoples' Liberation Army." 
Now, this is a critical juncture. The Communist knows that he will 
not be able to rouse up popular support among the population at 
large if he fights in the name of communism. But if he fights as the 
liberator from this, that, or the other thing, you can draw support, 
so the members of the Politburo simply rename themselves "Supreme 
Headquarters of the Peoples' Liberation Army"; and the party ap- 
paratus below it — provincial, regional, district, local level — renames 
itself "Territorial Military Organization of the Supreme Headquarters 
of the Peoples' Liberation Army." 

That is to say, the Communist stops calling himself a Communist 
and adopts an alias. The regional forces come under the control of 
the Supreme Headquarters of the Peoples' Liberation Army, which is 
the Politburo, but operate functionally at the regional level with the 


party organization, and the reg;ional party organization becomes the 
Regional Territorial Military Organization headquarters. 

Now, this does not in any way constitute a subordination of the 
political leadership of the party to military leadershi}:) — not one bit. 
It is simj)ly a change of name for tactical and psychological purposes. 

Now at that stage, then, two things begin. The regional force, an 
organization of 50, possibly 60 or 70 men — depending upon how fast 
they have effected their work there^ — begins small unit action. But 
concurrent with this, the "Active" starts sending organizers out to 
the villages. 

Now the Communist has a comprehensive doctrine, step by step, on 
what you do to the village population. And, if I may, I would like 
to submit to vou here this following chart. 

(See "Chart B," p. 1392.) 

Dr. CoNLEY. Sir, I am just beginning an examination of the precise 
step-by-step procedures employed by the Communist when he has 
become militarily operational in an insurgency movement to organize 
village population, to mobilize them. You will see up in the upper 
left-hand corner, "District Committee" of the party organization, 
which is now operating under the name, "Territorial Military Or- 
ganization," the TMO. 

The Chairman. At this point, may I interrupt you ? As I under- 
stand, you are presenting your personal views. 

Dr. CoNLEY. Wliat I am presenting here now is not a personal view, 
but docimaented information. 

The Chairman. Yes, but there is none of the information you use 
as the basis of the testimony which carries a classification ? 

Dr. CoNLEY. Oh, no, sir. No. I might — indeed, sir, thank you 
for this point. There are two things I should stress here : First, that 
I am speaking as a private citizen 

The Chairman. That is what I mean. 

Dr. CoNLEY. — and secondly, that I am using exclusively unclas- 
sified materials. 

The Chairman. As an individual, you have presented documented 
evidence, but it is your individual belief. 

Dr. CoNLEY. Yes, indeed ; and it is exclusively drawn from unclas- 
sified materials. 

The Chairman. All right. 

Dr. CoNLEY. Now associated with the District Committee, which is 
the TMO here, is the regional unit of 50 or 60 persons who developed 
out of the "Active" sent to the countryside in the clandestine phase, 
and then you see immediately below it two organizers who are sent 
out to the villages. 

If I may, let me concern you with the material in the very middle of 
the diagram, first off. The organizers appear in a village area, let us 
say a village of 500 persons to a thousand persons or a group of hamlets 
closely associated. Using persuasion, in which they are well schooled, 
plus the terrorism implicit in the fact that a regional unit is not too 
far off, they will organize the peasant population into w^hat I would 
call functional groups, that is to say, they will organize them according 
to sex, age, occupation. The peasants will be grouped together into 
a mass functional organization, the women, the children, the youth. 
Over each of these elements of the rural population, a secretary will 


















































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o 1 

















FH 1 











f-i CO 



(« 1-4 


^ o 


EH fd 



M M 



^ O 


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be designated, and the number of these organizations will be expanded 
as the possibility arises and as the organizational work begins. 

Once the peasantry has been duly organized into mass organizations, 
or functional groups, the two organizers will then see to it that elec- 
tions occur among the village population. Now the Communist is 
very eft'ective in using the devices of Western democracies in a per- 
verted form. The election phenomenon which is to take place now 
in a rural area is for this purpose. The Communist would see to it 
that, by voting, the rural population commits an act of symbolic and 
de facto revolt, sedition, against the government of their country. By 
conducting independent elections locally without the slightest refer- 
ence to the formally established government of the country, they have 
in fact rebelled. It is an act of sedition, and they compromise them- 
selves to that extent. Now out of the elections that come, there de- 
velops two bodies : a Peoples' Court, supposedly elected 

The Chairmax. At this point, let me ask you this question: Thus 
far, apparently, nothing has happened in the local machinery of gov- 
ernment, there has been no enactment of authority through municij^al 
action, state action, district action of the existing regime 

Dr. CoNLEY. Yes. 

The Chairman — authorizing the election? I mean, what has hap- 
pened, meantime? Is somebody dissatisfied that an election is being- 
called contrary to, or not in accordance with, local machineiy for con- 
ducting the government? Or will you develop that later? 

Dr. CoNLEY. Well, no. First, I would say this: there are many 
areas of the earth's surface where there is no local machinery of gov- 
ernment, or it is so ineffective that it does not have a meaningful pur- 
pose in the daily life of the peasant. There are areas 

The Chairman. Well, maybe that is my difficulty. Things such as 
you are describing would hardly happen overnight here. 

Dr. CoNLEY. In the United States, you mean. Yes. 

The Chairman. It would require legislative action to conduct the 
election, but you are talking about other areas. 

Dr. CoNLEY. Yes, sir; that is true. My remarks are primarily 
directed toward the situation in the so-called modernizing countries of 
the earth. 

The Chairman. I see. 

Dr. CoNLEY. And then, of course, in other areas of the earth where 
a government of sorts does exist at the local level, it will be the function 
of the regional unit to see to it that it disappears. This itself is an 
alternate. The regional unit has primarily not a military but a polit- 
ical function. It provides the organizer, who is mobilizing the village 
population, with the potential of terror and the fact of liquidation 
where it is necessaiy ; and it is a force which, also on the side, involves 
itself in small unit actions against military forces, but its essenial pur- 
pose is political and not military. 

The Chairman. All right. 

Dr. CoNLEY. Now you develop a Peoples' Court, five- or six-man 
body, on the one hand, and you develop a Peoples' Liberation Com- 
mittee or Council on the other hand. Now the court will be a small 
body, five or six persons, possibly; the committee, a large bod3^ will 
represent supposedly the traditions of legislative as opposed to judicial 
powers, and one person will be picked out as a secretary to head up the 


Peoples' Liberation Committee, representing in Western tradition an 
executive authority. 

Now that is the situation that is shown on the chart that I have just 
provided you, the third chart I have given you there. 

(See "Chart C," p. 1395.) 

Dr. CoNLEY. The facade presented by the organizers, now working 
in the name of the Territorial Military Organization, is that the people 
now have taken their future in their own hands and are acting demo- 
cratically.'' In fact, how^ever, it rapidly develops that the two orga- 
nizers have seen to it that they become, respectively, the president of the 
Peoples' Court and the associate justice. They also see to it that the 
supervision of all future elections is a function of the Peoples' Court 
and they very quickly call under their own de facto control the Village 
Guard, which is theoretically attached to the secretary of the council. 
That is to say, that the Peoples' Court, including the two organizers, 
assumes control over election procedures and control over the armed 
force locally available, with which enemies of the people are to be 
executed. Now, he who controls these two powers in society is indeed 
the leader of society. There is your source of executive authority 
in society, he who controls these powers. Consequently, the diagram 
which I have given you is not in itself the end ; it must be reorganized. 
This is the facade that that Communist will use in his propaganda. 
This diagram represents de facto authority and power. 

Now in an attempt to represent functional channels, I put the 
president of the Peoples' Court at the top of the chart. He, in fact, 
calls the shots; and he is functionally, now, the man who has moved 
the Territorial Military Organization into the village, to the grass- 
roots level. Beneath him function two men, his associate justice and 
the secretary of the PLC. The secretary of the PLC and the Libera- 
tion Coimnittee 

The Chairman. What is PLC? 

Dr. CoNLEY. Peoples' Liberation Committee. The secretary of the 
PLC and the PLC itself, the Peoples' Liberation Committee, are the 
rubberstamp legislature, which is effectively controlled through tlie 
president of the People's Court. The associate justice controls the 
rest of the justices in the court system, plus the Village Guard. There 
is the situation that actually develops in a country like, let us say, 
Vietnam today. The names used have nothing to do with the function 
fulfilled. The facade of direct democratic action by the people is kept, 
but the fact of party control under assumed names is there. 

Now, it is interesting to note, gentlemen, that this kind of organiza- 
tional step requires only two men, the two organizers who are sent in, 
plus the general knowledge of the population that not too far off, 5, 10 
miles away, is a regional unit. And when elections are held, of course, 
there will always be a provision that those members of the regional 
units who came from that particular area where the election is to be 
held will return home to participate in the election — carrying rifle over 
shoulder, of course. 

Now, imagine this kind of a department, step by step, in many dis- 
tricts in the country, not in just one, with many organizers going out 
to one village after the other and creating that farcical process of so- 
called democratic election. If you use this technique long enough and 






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broadly enough, you can produce out of it a new government in the 
country at large, which is in open rebellion and conflict against the duly 
constituted government. 

Let me give you the last of my diagrams, after which I will not bother 
you with additional paper here. 

(See "Chart D,' J). 1397.) 

Dr. CoNLEY. This last diagram which I give you attempts to repre- 
sent the tragedy of what is happening in too many countries in the 
world today in which insurgencies are in process. You see on this chart 
three parallel echelons, all of them proceeding down from the Polit- 
bureau of the party organization. In the center of the chart is the 
party organization itself, which now operates under the name of the 
Territorial Military Organization, as we referred to it before, and 
which has available to it, where it faces severe opposition, a regional 
unit, capable of terror and liquidation. This party organization does 
not work in the name of the party any longer, but in the name of 

To the left of tlie party oro;anization, you will see the Supreme Head- 
quarters of the Peoples' Liberation Army — which is the Politbureau, 
once again, by a different name, under which regular units develop. 
As you make this process work more and more effectively, you draw 
out of your regional units, where you have men with field experience, 
increasing numbers of persons for the kind of training you need to 
produce a more or less quasi-regular military organization. 

And to the right-hand center of our diagram, you see the system of 
Peoples' Liberation Committees developing, now, from the village, 
which we have talked about, to tlie national level — the top, the Execu- 
tive Committee of the Peoples' Liberation Front, which is controlled 
by the Politbureau, but imder still another name. The election proc- 
ess, as indicated here, is controlled by the TMO, through commissions 
that operate at the village and higher levels. The list of names put up 
by the commission is also approved by the villagers in question, since 
they know that behind the commission there stands the power of the 
party, and behind the power of the party stands the regional unit. 
You can see, then, the very strong political content of the activities of 
that unit. 

Now gentlemen, I have been very brief here; I have attempted to 
be as brief as I can. In the prepared statement I have brought with 
me there is a bit more information on this. But I would say this about 
this thing, however. This way in which to go about, step by step, ra- 
tionally and by preconception, organizing the population for subver- 
sive warfare — this concept was fully organizational and well known 
amon,g international Communist leaders at the latest by 1939 — that is 
to say, before World War II began. 

The original work in the direction of developing this comprehensive 
doctrine on how to give the appearance to the outside world that a 
spontaneous democratic process is taking place — the original work 
began about 1900 by Lenin himself. By 1939. all of the techniques 
necessary to conduct this form of active war had been developed. And 
during the World War II period and the immediate post -World War 
II period, we see this practice, which I have briefly outlined here, 
repeated time and time again. There is no meaningful difference 
between what happens in my diagram here and what happened under 









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30-471— 64— pt. 2- 



Tito in Yugoslavia, what happened under Mao Tse-tung in China, what 
happened in the Philippines with the Hukbalahaps, what happened 
in Greece in the immediate post- World War II period. All of these 
movements were conducted almost with slavish adherence to the simple 
procedure that I have outlined here. 

In principle, the Communist is certain how to do this. He has been 
able to modify his material on the basis of practical experience. Thus, 
to the techniques I have previously discussed here, you can add the 
technique of the infiltrated terrorist unit, which was developed by the 
Soviet Union on the basis of her World War II guerrilla experience ; 
and then with this modified form, these techniques are again used in 
the era of the 1950's and 1960's. 

The warfare with which we are confronted today in South Vietnam 
is developed essentially in accordance with these principles, and every 
one of the organizational blocs indicated on the last of the four charts 
I have given you can be identified in Vietnam. The whole thing is 
there and functioning exactly in accordance with the procedures I 
have suggested. 

Thus far, I have attempted to do two things : One is to give you a 
concept of a personal view of what cold war is, the combining of the 
state and party channels, and secondly, more specifically, what an 
insurgency movement is, subversive style. It is one half of the total 
picture and it is developed and escalated according to precalculated 
organizational plans, which combine terrorism with military acts and 
military acts with politics and sociology. 

Now how do we go about responding effectively on the total level 
and on the specific level to the subversive insurgent movement? Can 
we go to the various agencies of our Government and tell them that 
they should step up their activity, that each of them should expand its 
operations, be more original in its thinking ? 

I don't think this is an answer. I think that to fill in the gaps that 
appear on the chart here and respond to the political organizational 
work of the insurgent in countries like South Vietnam, we need a kind 
of response and an approach which is comprehensive. To tell each 
agency of Government independently, "Well, do something more about 
it," is in my mind an unprofessional approach to the question. I think 
that to tell each agency of the Government to act independently in 
its own sphere is like telling a division commander that each of _ his 
battalions should work out its own independent plan for its participa- 
tion in the divisional effort to take hill 201. The only conditions under 
which the division commander might be tempted to relinquish control 
in favor of his battalion commanders is when his forces are hopelessly 
encircled and he can think of nothing but retreat. 

Why doesn't the division commander surrender control to his bat- 
talion commanders? Well, for several reasons: First, from the very 
beginning of his professional career, he has been taught that the 
effective orchestration of his operation is more than half of the battle 
in itself. Now, obviously, he won't use the word "orchestration," 
but what he is thinking about is that ingenious integration of the 
total resources and effectiveness of each of the multiple battalions 
under him. The fact that he is able to meaningfully and artistically 
integrate the roles of the representative battalions, is in itself a sub- 
stantial improvement of his chances of winning, so he is an orches- 


trator, but he is something else too. He is a man who can rely upon a 
detailed, articulated doctrine which provides him with guidelines on 
what are the best possibilities under these given circumstances. These 
are doctrines, and he also has available to him men who have been 
trained in discipline, who have specialized knowledge and physical 
capacities. The commander, then, of the division is an orchestrator, 
conscious of the capabilities of his trained specialists, who operates in 
accordance with a doctrine. 

Now in the context of the total cold war situation, the problem 
facing the commander, namely, the President of the United States, 
is decidedly more complex than that of the division commander. 
But, nevertheless, I would suggest that these three factors still are 
definitive: the ability to orchestrate, to use disciplined and trained 
personnel, and to w^ork in accordance with doctrine. 

Now in the United States, the concept of orchestrating is widely 
acknowledged today. Within the various agencies of our Govern- 
ment, we also have highly trained, responsible, and disciplined staffs. 
They are encouraged to think somewhat narrowly in terms of the 
interests of their agencies of Government, but still, they are a cadre. 
What we don't have is the doctrine. Think of the range of tech- 
niques — psychological, terroristic, political, military — that figure in 
the organization of a village, that figure in the organization of this 
comprehensive national apparatus, and think of all the gaps in the 
first two diagrams I gave you, where we don't respond. 

Now we have to have answers; we have to have written, black on 
white answers, on what to do about the insurgents' activities at stage 
one, stage two, stage three, and we have to fill in all the gaps on our 
chart here. We are not responding politically to the offensive against 
us. We have got to fill those gaps in with our own positive programs, 
where our Christian ethics permit it, and we have got to work out 
other programs that thwart the activities of the Communists where 
our Christian ethics won't allow us to be dragged down into the muck 
from which they operate. 

We need, with respect to this specific question of insurgency and 
with regard to the broad subject of the cold war in general, compre- 
hensive doctrine which provides us with a basis for integration, bal- 
ance, and totality in our response. 

Now just to give you an example of some of the things we don't 
know, let me mention some of the areas in which we can't respond to 
this thing as yet. 

We don't have a doctrine on how to proceed from an information 
program to an organizational program. Let me say this : Not to at- 
tempt to convince other peoples of the righteousness of the stands we 
take, not to do that would be treachery, but to do it, and then not pro- 
vide the local people with the means through which they can organi- 
zationally express themselves and participate in this effort, that is to 
be an amateur. We must have some way whereby we can proceed 
from programs in which we convince people to programs in which 
they are provided with organizational means of expressing their con- 

Another thing : This is a crying necessity today that the free world 
be provided with a vocabulary of terms to replace the ones the Com- 
munists have fabricated for us. On the psychological level, we allow 


the Communist victory too cheaply, and this is indeed morally repre- 
hensible, because we let him win by default. How strong can our 
position be in the eyes of the Vietnamese citizenry when we refer to 
guerrilla base areas of the Viet Cong as "liberated zones?" 

We need to develop a doctrine. It must be a conscious program. 
We need a vocabulary which is distributed to every newspaper, every 
magazine and radio station in the United States, for their use as they 
so desire. More technically, we need a doctrine on how to integrate 
military and police functions. We do not have a comprehensive doc- 
trine on the relative function, the representative functions of police 
and military groups, as they are blended together for a response in an 
insurgent situation. We need a careful reexamination of our AID 
program in the light of its psychological content and we have to con- 
sider the possibility of supporting it with a political aid program, not 
only an economic aid program. 

We need, as an example, a doctrine on how to motivate, on the 
formulation of a mission, and the assignment of command responsi- 
bility over paramilitary forces of a civilian part-time character, which 
we don't have. We do not have a doctrine on how to handle para- 
military forces, part-time civilian soldiers, in a counterinsurgency sit- 

We need a doctrine on how to offset the subversive propaganda con- 
tent of the Soviet Union's economic and technical training programs in 
modernizing comitries which pollute the atmosphere in such countries 
and make positive work difficult. 

We need a doctrine on precisely how to make a system of civil-mili- 
tary counterinsurgency councils at all levels of government work. 

Now these are only a few of the many areas in which we need fund- 
amental doctrinal statements. Now, can we farm out these questions 
to the agencies of Government which come closest to the area we are 
concerned with, and let them answer them? I would say no. I say 
that it would be unprofessional. If you want answers to questions 
like this, which are essential to fight, then you turn this whole problem 
over to a Freedom Academy, and you provide that body with every 
conceivable assistance possible, so that it can begin its work at the 
earliest possible moment. 

If you turn this kind of question over to an established agency of 
Government, then they will answer the questions in terms of their 
specialized knowledge and their current operational capacities. If you 
turn these kinds of questions over to a Freedom Academy, they will 
answer in terms of the totality of the cold war and they will turn the 
question of implementation over to the President. 

A^Hiile the knowledge of every agency of Government should be 
available to the research and instructing staff of this organization, it 
should not be subordinated to any of them. We want answers to the 
totality of the threat before us today, which is real and urgent. We 
need not more specialized thinking in areas that are not integrated. 

Let me add just one last word here, in reference to that matter of 
making the specialist's knowledge available to the Freedom Academy. 

Now in much of the literature of the friends of the Freedom Com- 
mission and the Freedom Academy, there are references to the neces- 
sity of studying the nonmilitary aspects of this global conflict. I would 
just like to add a word about this. I think I understand what the 


friends of this bill mean by this, and if I might permit myself, I sug- 
gest they mean this: When they talk about the nonmilitary aspects of 
the conflict, they are talking about those areas and activities not tradi- 
tionally considered relevant to the principal mission assigned to profes- 
sional armed forces in Western countries. 

Now if we can live with that definition, then I would say that the 
United States Army, as an example, is very much concerned with the 
nonmilitary part of the global conflict. If you think for a moment 
about organization of a village — what part of that is a military effort 
and what part of that is a nonmilitary effort ? And can you meaning- 
fully separate these things? 

I think not. And since the Army must fight at that level, it must 
concern itself, then, with nonmilitary aspects of the global conflict. 
The Army can't solve this problem by itself. But I would also sug- 
gest that to exclude the Army from the faculty of the Freedom Acad- 
emy would be to read ourselves out of the problem. If the Army can't 
solve the problem by itself, then I would suggest that it is still true 
that the problem is insolvable without the Army. So preoccupation 
with nonmilitary aspects of the global conflict is not the same thing as 
preoccupation with programs in which the Army is not involved. 

Gentlemen, I don't know how successful I have been, but I hope that 
I have brought to your attention some facts that may not have con- 
cerned you previously about the nature of the conflict in its totality 
and our response to it and, more in detail at the grassroots level, 
the nature of what happens in a little village, stuck up on the hills of 
tlie central Annamite areas of South Vietnam or in the back woods of 
Venezuela or in the mountainous areas of eastern Colombia or in a 
multitude of other countries where the same thing is being done again 
with such absolute conformity to pattern that it is not really interest- 
ing to investigate new cases any more. We know in such detail what 
they do the first month, the second month, the third month. Wliat we 
don't know is what to do about them, but these are questions and prob- 
lems that are amenable to rational solution. All we have to do is pro- 
vide a place and an atmosphere and a context conducive to approach- 
ing the totality of the problem rather than its bits and pieces, and 
that's the Freedom Academy. This would be a major breakthrough of 
the most urgent necessity. 

Let me read you here very briefly something that Mr,- Lenin once 
wrote : 

A man who is weak and vacillating on theoretical questions, who has a narrow 
outlook, who makes excuses for his own slackness on the ground that the masses 
are awakening spontaneously * * * who is unable to conceive a broad and 
bold plan, who is incapable of inspiring even his enemies with respect for him- 
self, and who is inexperienced and clumsy in his own professional art * * * such 
a man is * * * a hopeless amateur. 

Gentlemen, to strengthen the territorial integrity of the United 
States and the free world is a moral act. To abstain from performing 
this act is not to rise to a higher ethical level, in which you place a 
code of morality above your personal security. Not to do this is to 
surrender the battlefield to immorality by default. 

Thank you. 

The Chairman, Thank you. I think we might have time for a 
few questions. 


I appreciate your very penetrating discussion of the cold war and 
actual operations in areas, foreign areas with which you are familiar, 
and that is the area I know you expected to cover. 

Coming to the operation and effectiveness of the proposed Academy, 
as it would apply — but first I should say that the facilities of the 
Academy would be used, utilized, in the areas that you have described 
in many ways, through foreign nationals who would be attending it. 
But how do you visualize the usefulness of the Academy, the Com- 
mission, which is the thing we have to sell to the Congress, as it 
affects not these villages you are talking about — because it is incom- 
prehensible to many people, unfortunately, that it could happen 
here — how would you visualize the usefulness of the Academy to people 
right here at home — people in labor, in management, in all segments 
of our society? 

Dr. CoNLET. Well, sir, I would say, first of all, it could happen 
here — I profoundly believe. 

Secondly, it seems to me that the essence of the form of government 
we have is that the programs we conduct in the foreign policy area 
be supported by a consensus of public opinion which is well over 50 
percent. We must make available to the general public the knowl- 
edge that would convince it of the correctness of foreign policy, and 
I don't see how else we can do it. It strikes me as being perfectly 
logical that you take what our psychological operations officers would 
call the key communicator from the labor union, from the women's 
group, from the Aquinases, and what-have-you, and make available 
to him a course of instruction — a few weeks, a couple of months, it 
depends— simply make the information available to him. I think 
that to know is to be motivated, and it seems to me that this is pre- 
cisely the technique for producing that groundswell of support behind 
an aggressive foreign policy, which is the crying necessity of our pe- 
riod. I consider — I say, myself — I consider absolutely indispensable 
that this Academy teach the civil population of the United States, 
the professional Government employee in every service, and foreign 
students; to exclude any of these three groups, in my mind, would 
be to misunderstand the intent of the whole program. What you 
would expect from the foreign student would be different from what 
you would expect from the American civilian, but both of them need to 
be informed. One of them to provide that support in the population 
of the United States ; the other, the know-how of what to do next. I 
think there must be this. To exclude any of these tliree categories is 
to misunderstand its intent. 

The Chairman. Oh, we don't mean to exclude. 

Dr. CoNLEY. Yes. 

The Chairman. You are arguing for it ? 

Dr. CoNLEY. Oh, very strongly. Yes. 

The Chairman. I was referring to practical operations and useful- 
ness from the point of view of internal security here, applicable now. 
People expect more of this phase of the bill, I suspect, than of the 
other phases of it bectuise, you must understand, foreign policy under 
our Constitution is left up to the executive department, the President 
and the Secretary of State, through their vast operations. But cer- 
tainly, if this Academy were required to make foreign policy, I am 
afraid that you just couldn't sell it. 


Dr. CoNLET. Yes, sir. May I add this word here ? 

I would draw a very sharp distinction between doctrine and policy. 

The Chairmax. Yes. 

Dr. CoNLEY. Whether you attack hill 201 is policy. That group of 
techniques which are most likely to produce a successful operation, 
should you attack, is doctrine. 

Now policy is the selection of one of a series of alternate courses of 
action which are possible in any situation. Such a decision is exclu- 
sively a matter of the State Department, and not of the Freedom 
Academy. The Freedom Academy is to provide a comprehensive 
doctrine on what are the alternatives available, what courses of action 
are possible, what blendina^, what weapons systems may bo used. 

Mr. Tuck. That is the third bell. 

Mr. Pool. I have one question. 

Quickly answer this, if you can. 

You mentioned terror in the re2:ional units. Do you have hopes 
that we can counteract that by some doctrine or some policy? 

Dr. CoxLEY. Yes, very definitely, sir. 

Mr. Pool. We don't go for that ourselves, so what would you say ? 
Have you got an idea on that ? 

Dr. CoNLEY. Well, very quickly, yes, I have a couple of ideas. But 
secondly, it is precisely these kinds of questions — How do we counteract 
this without doing simply the same things ourselves? — it is precisely 
these kinds of questions on which we must have an exhaustive exami- 
nation. The fact that there is no answer to that is a reason for the 
Freedom Academy. 

Myself, I woul(i suggest very briefly that one of the responses to it 
is through the use of paramilitary forces. If you can convince the 
people that you are right, organize them so that they can express 
themselves, and then put them to some task, you can generate a reac- 
tion against this kind of activity of a terroristic nature. I think there 
are definitely alternate programs, but we need someone who will sit 
down and work this out. 

Mr. Pool. That is encouraging. I thank you. 

Dr. CoNLEY. I most definitely think there is an answer, yes. 

(Dr. Conley-s prepared statement follows:) 


Gentlemen, to identify myself at the outset, I belong among the most fervent 
supporters of the proposed Freedom Commission and Freedom Academy. My 
studies in the field of Soviet history and politics and the international Communist 
apparatus during the last 6 years have made increasingly apparent to me that we 
have neither the know-how nor the organizational means to stop the further 
encroachments of the Communist bloc, let alone initiating an offensive "rollback". 
I have been strengthened in this conviction by the somewhat more specialized 
studies I have conducted or directed during the past 3 years, specifically in the 
field of insurgency and counterinsurgency. 

In the Paramilitary Actions Department of U.S. Army School, Europe, in 
Oberammergau, I have associated myself with a unique group of persons, and 
together vpith them we have been able to identify in detail the manner in which 
Mr. Khrushchev's "Wars of Liberation" are imloosed upon one country after 
the other about the globe. To the extent that our means permit, we are now 
grappling with the construction of an integrated doctrine on what we must be 
realistically capable of doing in order to thwart the calculated designs which we 
have identified. I should like to turn my attention to the facts we have established 
regarding the insurgent, and then— in the light of my findings — take a second 
look at wliy it is that the present proc(Klures followed by our Government — even 


with the improvements from the period of the Kemiedy administration — still 
remain inadequate in the face of the challenge that faces us. 

But first, I would like to put this matter of Communist-inspired subversive 
insurgency in context by briefly giving you a personal view of the essential 
features of what we call cold war. I believe we can most readily grasp the nature 
of the current cold war by contrasting the foreign activities of the post- World 
War II Stalin era, from 1945 to 1953, with the Khrushchev-Mao Tse-tung epoch 
after 1954. 

In carrying out his external policies, Stalin relied primarily upon the CPSU 
and the system of so-called national Communist parties about the world, em- 
braced in his international Communist apparatus. He supported the efforts of 
this organization, which were essentially covert and subversive, with the tools 
of diplomacy and limited international trade. For the rest, the official machinery 
of his government was not significantly utilized to support the foreign policies 
implemented through party channels. His approach was — in terms of the current 
situation — crude, unimaginative. His stratagems were readily identifiable. His 
efforts frequently counterproductive. 

Now what happens after 1954, particularly after 1956? Khrushchev has 
retained every trick in the Lenin-Stalin book of subversion. As in Stalin's time, 
the party apparatus and the provocative techniques of international communism 
still provide the Kremlin with a base from which the subversion of other countries 
is commenced. But Khrushchev is conducting this program with inestimably 
greater professional competence for two reasons. First, he does not make Stalin's 
mistake of relying almost exclusively on party channels. Secondly, he has 
realistically oriented his strategy to exploit to the fullest the distinctive situation 
which has developed in the post- World War II world. He, unlike Stalin, realizes 
the potentials consequent upon the appearance of a vast number of new countries 
without experienced administrators, historical traditions, or balanced budgets. 

Alongside the international party apparatus, he pushes a grossly expanded 
public program, implemented through official government channels. Khrushchev, 
much the better strategist, has combined party and state channels. And to an 
unprecedented effect ! Let us look for a moment at what he has done through 
the agency of the Soviet Government. 

He has expanded the number of countries with which the Soviet Union has 
diplomatic relations. The U.S.S.R. is now engaged in a stepped-up trade pro- 
gram with non-Communist countries. It has undertaken an expansive aid pro- 
gram, a farflung technical assistance effort, and a relentless cultural offensive, 
ranging from ballet and orchestra to astronauts and trade union delegations. 
The result? The legitimate presence of large numbers of Soviet citizens in a 
majority of nations of the world has provided the subversive apparatus with 
vantage points from which to undertake operations previously denied it, while 
the successes of the party's activity are opening ever-new fields for penetration 
via the agencies of the U.S.S.R.'s formal government facade. By integrating 
party and state, Khrushchev has grossly expanded his fields of operation and the 
likelihood of the success of his endeavors. 

The cold war in which we today are engaged is to be understood in this frame 
of reference. It is made up, broadly, of two elements : subversive insurgency 
movements, handled through party channels, and "peaceful coexistence," the 
program conducted through the governmental agencies of the bloc countries 
and which embraces diplomacy (to include military assistance), trade, aid, 
technical assistance, foreign student programs, and cultural exchanges. 

If we think in terms of this conceptual framework and consider the cold war 
as the sum total of the external activities conducted through the combined 
resources of party and government framework, we are justified already at 
the outset of our investigation in drawing certain conclusions regarding the 
competence of the United States currently to respond to the challenge. Let me 
turn your attention to the first of the charts which have been distributed to you. 
It attempts to identify the essential multiple elements in the U.S.S.R.'s foreign 
activities and contrasts them with our appropriate responses. You will notice 
that the weapons systems available to Khrushchev constitute, with one excep- 
tion, a continuous band of instruments for an integrated offensive. The length 
of the several arrows indicates the relative strength of the respective efforts. 
The American response, as is immediately apparent, is sporadic, piecemeal, and 
lacks integration. The only areas in which we are producing a superior effort 
are the military and economic sectors, but the lack of thoroughgoing Integra- 


tion means that we must necessarily blunt the effectiveness of such major posi- 
tive operations as we do conduct. 

It is in this context that I would have you view what I now wish to say 
about subversive insurgency. On the one hand, I claim a very important place 
in the sun for the business with which I have concerned myself for some 3 years. 
It's not just one of the lines on the spectrum of techniques available to the 
Communist in the cold war ; it is one half of the total offensive. For this reason, 
I would suggest that there is a world of difference between a subversive in- 
surgent and a guerrilla. One half of all the foreign activities listed on the Soviet 
side of the chart are directly relevant to insurgency, and the other half provide 
such subversion with the prerequisite of a favorable international climate of 
opinion and third-country bases for support, whether official or unofficial. 

On the other hand, I would alert you as to the weakness of our response to 
the totality of the cold war before I proceed to examine our more specific inade- 
quacies with respect to subversive insurgency. 

Having said this, let me now analyze some of the central elements of sub- 
versive insurgency, stressing its organizational aspects. We in Oberammergau 
concentrate our attention on two periods in the development of a subversive 
insurgency movement which we identify, respectively, as the clandestine phase 
and the military operational phase and which correspond with what Special 
Group (CI) identifies as Phase One and Two. We recognize no sharp demar- 
cation between these periods, teaching that subversive insurgency is a con- 
sciously preconceived and directed cumulative phenomenon which intensifies 
step by step. It progresses from activities below the level of detection to 
operations beyond the indigenous government's capacity to control. During 
both periods a multiplicity of highly sophisticated techniques and procedures 
are employed 

The clandestine phase commences when party members begin their first orga- 
nizational work within the population of a country. At this point, there is no 
blaze of battle, no guerrillas, and even street demonstrations will commence 
only sometime after organizational work is well under way. The goal of this 
phase is the seizure of power by means other than the resort to protracted mili- 
tary force. It may consequently be successfully concluded with a coup d'etat 
or an election victory carried by a front federation which is effectively under 
party control. This is the pi'eferred plan since it costs the least and involves 
a minimum of coordination and discipline. 

But today, gentlemen, I would like to concentrate our attention on the less 
understood second phase during which the guerrilla does put in his appearance. 
We in the West have been impressed with the fighting ability of this chap so 
long that we have not fully appreciated that he is only a small part of the effort 
which unfolds in the course of revolutionary warfare during its military opera- 
tional phase. Let me try to give you a feel for the bigger story. 

We begin with the Communist party organization, which was developed dur- 
ing the clandestine phase of activities. At its top is a Politburo of national 
party iwlicymakers headed by a general secretary. This body is assisted by a 
larger central committee of hard-core party members. And beneath this level, 
the organization stretches out across the country through provincial, regional, 
district, and local committees with their subordinated conglomerate of 3 to 20 
men cells. Within these committees are the men who will take over the coun- 
try's administration and government if their efforts are successful. In other 
words, they constitute a shadow government. At the local level the party will 
also organize specialized strong-arm squads which may be identifed for tactical 
reasons with any of a number of names. They organize crowds, protest meet- 
ings, and demonstrations and also deal physically with opposition. 

Once it has been decided to enter into open armed confiict, the Politbureau 
of the central committee will send mobilization directives through the party 
organization down to district committees, instructing them to select party 
members to form "Actives." An "Active" will consist of some 8 to 10 people, 
highly specialized in one or more fields. They will locate in a region of adverse 
terrain and begin the training of individuals, at learst partially drawn from the 
strong-arm squads. The preparations in the countryside will be supported by 
stepped-up mass demonstrations, riots, strikes, and violence against the police 
in urban centers. 

At this juncture, if the party considers the situation to be favorable, it will 
take on a new nomenclature to give itself a military "look." Aware that many 
people who would not fight for communism will indeed support "liberators," the 


Politburo now calls itself the Supreme Headquarters of the Peoples' Liberation 
Army. The provincial and lower bodies, in turn, identify themselves as the 
various levels of authority in the Territoral Military Organization. But it is 
important to keep this matter clear : The change in name is no subjugation to 
military leadership. The change is a tactical step calculated for psychological 
and propaganda purposes. 

Once the "Active" has organized a group of up to 50 effective fighters, it 
undertakes two programs : it begins to attack, isolated police stations, and it 
sends out organizers with the mission of mobilizing rural villagers to support 
the regional units. It is to this latter phenomenon that I would turn my 

For a village or collection of hamlets of 500 to a thousand persons, the party 
sends two mobilizers. Relying upon persuasion and the intimidation provided 
by the presence of the regional force, they will organize the rural inhabitants 
into functional groups according to age, sex, occupation, or education. As they 
achieve control, they expand the number of these mass organizations and see 
to the appointment of secretaries for each group. The organizers will work 
diligently to see to it that the various groups are constantly occupied in fulfilling 
some specifically assigned mission and that every spare moment of each member 
of a mass organization is completely taken up in group activities. In this fash- 
ion, propaganda of the word is transformed into propaganda of the deed. 

Once this activity is well underway, the organizers will arrange for local 
"democratic" elections intended to establish two "popular"' bodies : a "Peoples' 
Liberation Council" and a "Peoples' Court," the first body with a strength of 
possibly 20 persons, the second to have around 5 or 6 members. Both bodies 
are advertised as coequal, representing, respectively, legislative and judicial 

Wishing to remain out of the limelight, the organizers will arrange to be 
elected to the "Peoples' Court," not to the more attention-gathering "Liberation 
Council" with its "Peoples' Secretary." They will occupy the oflices respectively 
of president and associate justice of the Peoples' Court. They will see to it 
that the secretary of the PLC is a pliable individual whom they can easily 

To further guarantee control, the organizers will arrange that the peasantry 
do not determine which candidate will head up each of the elected bodies, but 
that they leave this matter to be decided among those elected after the voting 
has been finished. In this fashion, the population, organized in a series of mass 
organizations, will select persons who will occupy legislative offices. 

Now the conduct of these elections is the decisive, the all-critical step in the 
process of building control over the peasantry in any given area. To participate 
in the elections is ipso facto an act of both symbolic and de facto rebellion 
against the duly constituted government of the country. While the peasantry is 
politically unsophisticated and quite possibly naive as to the direction in which 
they are being led by the organizers, still resistance may well be expected at 
this point by the organizers, and they may call upon the assistance of the 
regional units, locall.v deployed, to intimidate as needed and eliminate the 
"enemies of the people" among the peasantry. 

What appears superficially as a federation of three different echelons of au- 
thority, becomes in fact a control apparatus of the organizers. The lasting con- 
trol of these bodies and of future elections— which may be held as often as every 
3 or 4 months to keep the population constanly engaged and participating, i.e., 
to make them accomplices to the crime — is assured by the ruling that a committee 
of the Peoples' Court will superintend all elections. 

A second power which is very quickly assumed by the court is that of de facto 
control over the Village Guard, supposedly controlled by the secretary of the 
PLC. The fact of village organization becomes quite unlike the fiction of 
democratic determination once the organizers are provided with control of (1) 
election procedures and (2) the armed element of the village population. They 
now use this authority to establish a local insurgent commissariat. 

Ever anxious to give the semblance of legality and uniform popular support 
to each new policy as it is announced, the organizers will arrnge to have it 
adopted by the PLC, a rubberstamp legislature. The recalcitrant, the maverick 
is no longer a problem, and the party is not dependent upon spontaneous or 
voluntary support from the peasantry, for the rural population is under com- 
prehensive poli(,'e control. 


At this juncture, our district representative is in a position to provide both 
the "regional" and the later "regular" units of the Peoples' Liberation Army 
with all of the support services essential to military operations ; i.e., food, 
recruits, and intelligence. 

Reflecting the technique of provoking cooperation and support via compro- 
mise, the village priest or teacher — a key communicator — will be co-opted into 
the "Judicial" system as "Clerk of the Court," on the pretext that since he is 
one of the few literate persons in the village his services are needed by "the 
people." Thereafter he is quickly identified in the eyes of the peasantry with 
the court ; he becomes an "accomplice" to the decisions of the Peoples' Court 
and finds himself obliged to defend its policy decisions. 

For all practical purposes, at this juncture the president of the Peoples Court 
has become the local commander of the TMO, and the District Party Com- 
mittee — which also refers to itself as an element in the TMO — has embedded 
its authority at the grassroots. It did this by (1) organizing a regional guer- 
rilla unit and (2) sending out mobilizers among the rural peasantry. 

By continuing such political organizational work, while building larger and 
more numerous regional units, the Communist Party can gradually set up a 
complete new state in the state. It will contain three distinct echelons of 
authority: (1) The party organizations operating as the TMO and supported 
at the subprovincial level by regional forces; (2) the system of Peoples' Libera- 
tion Committees building up from the village level where it is supported by 
the technique of Village Guards (identified in Chart D as "Popular Units") ; 
(3) Regular Army Units drawn from the regional forces, given more thorough 
training and commanded by party personnel with extensive experience in ir- 
regular warfare. 

The technique for the building of the higher ofiices in the Peoples' Liberation 
Committee system is worthy of attention. The "Peoples' Court," or TMO, 
appoint a commission which in turn prepares a list of candidates, drawing upon 
those local inhabitants who have proven to be the most responsive during the 
preceding months. Once tlie list has been set up, a conference of the village 
population is called together to vote. Since everyone knows that the commis- 
sion is backed up by the TMO and that the TMO is backed up by the regional 
unit, whose local members are required to be on hand for the elections, no one 
will dare suggest an alternate list. The same process is then repeated at the 
next highest level and so on up to the "roof" on the PLC system in the form 
of a "front." This latter body will play a major role in the effort to get the 
subversive insurgency legitimized by seeking diplomatic recognition from other 

But we should not overlook the decisive role played by the PLC system inside 
the country. The organization of the PLC's should be considered as the posi- 
tive side of revolutionary warfare. While the party, with the PLA/TMO 
organization, has the task to destroy the old administration, the old political, 
economic, and social structure, the task of the PLC's is to build a new one. 
For the accomplishment of this task, the PLC's will act in three different ways : 

1. PSYCHOLOGICALLY. The PLC's must be an evident sign for all the 
population that the old governmental administration will be replaced by a 
new, revolutionary one. The sole presence of the PLC's on controlled and 
marginal territory will have a tremendous psychological and propaganda impact 
on the population. 

2. POLITICALLY. The PLC's must be largely represented bodies. On all 
administrative levels, from the villages up to the provinces or state level, the 
members of the PLC's will be selected so as to represent multiple social, ethnical, 
religious, and political groups. By bringing persons from many walks of life 
together in the PLC's, the impression is created that a large part of the popula- 
tion is behind the Peoples' Liberation Army and the revolutionary struggle, 
not only the Communist Party. International public opinion and foreign powers 
will believe the same or, even better, the national leaders of other countries 
will conclude that the liberation army and the revolutionary struggle are ele- 
ments in a democratic movement simply because of carefully organized, quasi- 
democratic elections for the PLC's. 

3. ORGANIZATIOIVALLY. In fact the PLC's are the nucleus of a future, revo- 
lutionary government. And this nucleus, from the outset, will act as a de facto 
government. The PLC will build up an administration, primitive of course, but 
very efficient. In insurgent-controlled territory, it will take over all of the 
functions and activities which fall within the competence of any normal govern- 


mental administration. It will organize and control economic production, trade, 
education, medical care, traflBc, collection of money and food for the PLA. For 
the execution of all these tasks, the PLC's can call upon the Village Guard, 
made up of part-time PLA insurgents. Of course, the PLA will be continually 
subject to strict control by the party or TMO in conducting these multitudinous 

With this brief sketch, gentlemen, I have attempted to indicate the skillful 
blending of destructive and creative operations which come into play wherever 
subversive insurgency reaches the Phase Two level of intensity. I think you will 
agree that in this context it is quite difficult to separate the political/sociological 
strains from the military/terroristic ones. For the Communist, this is no recent 
innovation. Work to the end of achieving this synthesis was begun at the turn 
of the century by Lenin. Essentially every step in the process was elaborated 
before the beginning of World War II in Europe. And by then the kind of cadre 
needed to implement these tactics bad been developed. Today that cadre has some 
50 years of experience behind it ! 

The revolutionary wars in China, Yugoslavia, Greece, Indochina, and the Philip- 
pines (i.e. Hukbalahaps) were conducted with almost slavish adherence to this 
plan. But the Communist has shown himself capable of modifying this scheme 
in points of detail on the basis of his World War II and immediate post-World 
War II experience. The Soviet-developed infiltration and terrorist units for 
operations among indifferent or hostile rural populations, which time does not 
permit me to describe in detail here, are a case in point. And with such altera- 
tions, the plan is now being implemented in South Vietnam — where warfare is 
approaching a Phase Three level — in Venezuela and in a number of other 
countries. This is indeed a concept of operations well calculated to test our 
individual and national staying powers ! 

We are, under the present rules of the game which the Communists have im- 
l>o.sed and we have accepted, extremely vulnerable to strategic attrition. Stra- 
tegic attrition of not only material resources but something much more impor- 
tant — strategic attrition of will. 

To illustrate my point with unofficial figures provided me by my research 
staff: The French during the period of 1950 to 1962 suffered 94.000 French forces 
killed during peace time, fighting Communist influenced or directed insurgency. 
This figure, gentlemen, is 14% of the entire civilian and military deaths suffered 
by the French during the entire period of World War II. During the period 
194(5 to 1956, France spent $11 billion and the U.S. $5 billion in trying to cope 
with wars of national liberation. Gentlemen, the issue was not decided by mili- 
tarv means as we know them in WW II . . . the lives were sacrificed and the 
money was sacrificed to TOTAL WAR AS WE HAVE NEVER KNOWN IT. 

Fighting insurgency is not a question of spectacular defeats or campaigns^ 
it is not essentially military. We teach our students that insurgency is 70% 
political (as testified to by the insurgent) and only 30% military. We document 
this ratio with testimony from insurgent leadership and with case histories. 
The student then asks, "WHAT ARE WE DOING ABOTTT THIS 70% OF THE 
THREAT?" Gentlemen, I must say that we have a difficult time telling them. 
In the fall of 1961. the late President Kennedy stated to Mr. Alsop words to the 
effect that what they were doing at Ft. Bragg, i.e., the Special Warfare Center, 
was really great, but that what was needed in the final analysis was a political 
effort. But this observation applies not alone to our Armed Forces. We teach 
peoi)le how to be administrators, how to rotate crops, and even how to use 

When you can get an adversary to commit 20, 30, or even 50 resource units, 
be they dollars or men, to your one, you are in a most favorable position — you 
can afford to drag the battle out indefinitely, and indeed quick victory may even 
be less desirable than a long, protracted war. 

How do we resolve this situation? Can we meet the threat by demanding 
from each agency of Government that it step up its activity, expand its opera- 
tions, be more original? No! this is no answer. This would be about as 


unprofessional as a division commander telling each of the battalions under 
his command to work out its own independent plan for its participation in the 
divisional effort to take possession of hill 201. The only condition under which 
a division commander might be tempted to relinquish control in favor of hia 
battalion commanders is when his forces are hopelessly encircled and can think 
of nothing but retreat. 

What keeps the division commander from allowing the success of his opera- 
tion to depend upon the independent spontaneity of his several battalions? From 
the very beginning of his professional career, he has been taught that the effective 
orchestration of his operation is more than half of the battle. He may not use 
this word to express himself, but he is talking about the same thing. However, 
there are two additional factors here which not only encourage him to retain 
direction over the course of eventi<, but also give him an odds-on likelihood of 
being able to carry it off'. The division commander can rely on (1) a detailed, 
carefully articulated doctrine which provides him with guidelines, and (2) he 
knows that beneath him are men who have been trained and disciplined. The 
commander, then, is an orchestrator, conscious of the capabilities of his highly 
trained, specialized units, who operates in accordance with a doctrine. 

Confronted with the totality of the cold war, it must be granted that the 
problem of the commander, i.e., the President of the United States, is decidedly 
more complex. Nevertheless, these three factors remain imperatives inherent 
to the solution of the problem. 

The concept of "orchestrating the offensive" is widely acknowledged today 
among responsible American policymakers. Within the various agencies of 
Government we also have highly trained, responsible, and disciplined staffs of 
specialists. They are encouraged to think narrowly in terms of their own 
agency's interests, but even so, they do provide us with a cadre. 

What we do not have is a comprehensive doctrine! Think of the range of 
techniques employed by the subversive insurgent in organizing a rural village 
or building a national political and military organization. Think of the chart 
to which I referred at the outset of my statement, which pointedly indicates 
areas in which our response either falls short of the enemy's threat or is totally 
missing. We must fill in those gaps, where Christian ethics indicate, with posi- 
tive programs as effective as those of international communism. And to prevent 
ourselves from eventually being compromised and drawn down into the quagmire 
of the Communist's immorality, we must devise means of thwarting his remaining 
efforts. To tight the cold war, we need a doctrine which will give us : Integra- 
tion, balance, and totality. 

More specifically, with respect to the inseparable political content of revolu- 
tionary warfare, we must develop a doctrine which stops this snowball from 
rolling and then goes on to dry it up. To indicate some of the areas in which 
answers must be provided posthaste, we need to know : 

1. The objective steps which can be taken to maximize our international in- 
formation program by following up our efforts to convince people with steps to 
provide them with organization. To have convinced others of the propriety of 
our policies and the righteoiisness of our stand is no end in itself. We must make 
it possible for the advocates of our cause to do something about it — and that is 
possible only through organization — yet we have no policy, no operational pro- 
cedures to be followed. Not to attempt to convince is treachery, but to convince 
and not organize is to be an amateur. 

2. A crying necessity is the provisioning of the free world with a new vocabu- 
lary of terms to replace the ones which the Communists have fabricated for us 
and which we use unthinkingly with heavy cost to ourselves. In the psychologi- 
cal field we allow them their victories too cheaply, and this is morally reprehen- 
sible because they win by our default. How strong is our position in the eyes of 
the Vietnamese peasantry when we employ the Viet Cong's term "liberated 
zones" in referring to their guerrilla base areas? With a free world vocabu- 
lary developed, we should turn to all the media of mass communication — 
newsjoapers, magazines, radio — with a petition that they employ it. 

3. We need a doctrine for the integration of military and police functions. 

4. We must undertake a penetrating study into the pliilo>sophy behind our 
U.S. AID programs and consider the feasibility of supporting programs of eco- 
nomic investment with complementary efforts to help free world policymakers 
find their political identity. 

5. A doctrine must be evolved on the motivation, mission, and assignment of 
command responsibility for paramilitary (part-time civilian) forces during 
Phase One insurgency, during Phase Two insurgency. 


6. A most painstaking study must be made of the techniques and principles 
required to implement systems of civil/military couuterinsurgency councils at 
all levels of government in countries threatened by Phase Two insurgency. In 
this crucial area — to vphich the matter of paramilitary forces is also closely 
tied — we must develop operational doctrine which pays due attention to ethnic, 
geographic, and political variations from one region of the globe to another. 

7. A set of opei'ational principles is also needed to liquidate the subversive 
icontent of bloc economic and technical assistance programs which, together with 
the system of friendship societies organized by every Soviet Embassy through 
its VOKS organization, pollute the social atmosphere in modernizing countries. 

8. To the end of generating an eventual Western offensive in the cold war, we 
must be provided with weapons systems and doctrine with which to inhibit and 
<;ollapse the system of Communist-dominated international mass organizations, 
replacing them with new associations of global significance, organized around the 
achievement of positive goals. We need an Internal Bank of Construction and 
Rehabilitation for the masses. The subversive Afro-Asian Solidarity Union, as 
an example, which is currently training insurgents, should be forced to compete 
with a Western-oriented organization in seeking the allegiance of the peoples 
in modernizing countries. 

9. The system of civil/military couuterinsurgency councils is once again im- 
portant to us in developing the intelligence collection and processing capability 
of battalion-size military units confronted with insurgency situations. 

10. There must be a close reexamination of the format and reasoning process 
which determines the content and organization of an "Internal Defense Plan,'' 
the "IDP," which represents our Government's best efforts to date on a con- 
ceptual plane to integrate our total resources in a third country for a response 
to subversion. 

11. We must develop a system of political advisers at grassroots level in 
countries faced with revolutionary warfare to parallel and complement our U.S. 
standard operating procedure of assigning military advisers to units which 
occasionally may even be smaller than company size. 

Who is to answer these questions and still many more? Shall we farm them 
out to the most appropriate agencies of Government, acknowledging that in 
several cases the problems raised fall outside of the recognized traditional juris- 
diction of any one specific agency? No! We turn the whole problem over to 
the Freedom Academy, and we provide that body with every conceivable as- 
sistance so that it can begin to work at the earliest possible moment. 

An established agency of Government will answer questions in the context 
of its own specialized knowledge and its current operational capabilities. 

The Freedom Academy will answer in terms of the totality of the cold war 
and will turn over to the President the issue of implementation. But of greater 
importance, the Freedom Academy's bias will be simply the desire to win. 
While the knowledge of every agency of Government will be available to it, 
it will be subordinated to none of them. 

Regarding this matter of making the specialist's knowledge available, I would 
like to add a word on the contribution to be made by the military. In the 
literature of the friends of the Freedom Commission and Freedom Academy 
bill, there is frequent reference to the "nonmilitary aspects of the global con- 
flict." I would add a word of caution. 

By "nonmilitary," I trust that the authors of the bill and its friends mean : 
Areas and activities not traditionally considered relevant to the principal mis- 
sions assigned professional Armed Forces in Western societies. 

If this is what is intended, then, it must be asserted that the U.S. Army, as 
an example, is directly engaged in the "nonmilitary part of the global struggle" 
at the present day and will have to remain directly concerned. Given the nature 
of the threat I .sketched previously, one simply cannot separate out military 
and nonmilitary aspects for independent examination. 

If we exclude traditional military concerns, we do not consequently exclude 
our modern American Military Establishment. It cannot be expected to solve 
the problem alone. But to exclude members of the professional Army from the 
research faculty of the Freedom Academy is to read ourselves out of the 
problem. If the U.S. Army is not enough by itself, then it is still true that the 
problem is insolvable without the Army. If we place the emphasis on the 
nonmilitary factors, then this cannot mean that we are turning away from 
those aspects of the problem which concern the U.S. Army. 


I hope, at this juncture, that I have provided the committee with some com- 
pelling reasons for favorably endorsing the passage of the Freedom Commission 
and Freedom Academy bill. I have attempted to indicate the nature of our 
failings with respects to both the cold war, in general, and subversive insurgency 
in particular. Before us there is much work to be done. But the problem is 
amenable to rational solution. We need not be advocates of what Lenin con- 
temptuously identified as Khvostism, Tailism. 

I would call your attention to some very important words that Lenin wrote 
in his pamphlet, What is to be done: 

"A man who is weak and vacillating on theoretical questions, who has a narrow 
outlook, who makes excuses for his own slackness on the ground that the 
masses are awakening spontaneously * * * who is unable to conceive a broad 
and bold plan, who is incapable of inspiring even his enemies with respect for 
himself, and who is inexi>erienced and clumsy in his own professional art * * * 
such a man is * * * a hopeless amateur !" 

Gentlemen, strengthening the territorial integrity of the United States and 
the free world is a moral act. To abstain from or oppose the unavoidable in- 
vestigation which must be undertaken, on the grounds that our national ethics 
might be compromised, is no appeal to a higher code of morality which places 
righteousness above personal security, rather such a stand leads to our sur- 
render of the battlefield to immorality by def ault_ 

The Chairman. We are being called. I suppose we will be back 
in about 15 minutes. 

("VVliereupon at 11 :15 a.m., a short recess was taken.) 

(The committee reconvened at 11 :56 a.m. Present at time of re- 
convening : Representatives Willis and Pool. ) 

The Chairmax. The committee will come to order. 

We have our colleague, Mr. Gubser, who I remember asked to be 
heard at this time. We are glad to have you, Mr. Gubser. You are 
an author of one of the bills. 



Mr. Gubser. Yes; I am an author of H.R. 1617. Thank you, Mr. 
Chairman. If I may, I will read my short statement and ask that it 
be included as presented in the record. 

The Chairman. All right. 

Mr. Gubser. I deeply appreciate the opportunity to appear before 
you to testify in behalf of my bill, H.R. 1617. 

There is no doubt that communism is spreading and that the terri- 
tory of this planet which remains exclusively dedicated to freedom is 
diminishing. Though wishful thinkers may say to themselves that 
test ban treaties, wheat sales, and other apparent improvements in 
East-West relations signal a permanent thaw in the cold war, a simple 
look around the globe reveals otherwise. The truth is that we are 
losing the cold war. 

On December 18, 1963, I inserted a chart into the Congressional 
Record which I had prepared with the cooperation of the Library of 
Congress. The chart shows that in 1917, 10.1 percent of the world's 
population lived in 8,603,000 square miles of Communist territory. 
The growth and spread of communism has been gradual since that 
time, until today 31.99 percent of the world's population (1,109,500,- 
000 people) lives in a Communist world which includes 13,761,000 
square miles. I will submit this chart for inclusion in the record at the 
end of my testimony.^ 

1 See p. 1415. 


The world map is a seething blot of Communist-inspired trouble. 
Laos is lost, casualties mount in Vietnam, Americans are thrown out 
of Cambodia and Zanzibar; Cuba and Panama are festering, Vene- 
zuela reels before Castro terrorists, Tanganyika wavers, so does 
Kenya, and the Congo seems ready to boil again. 

The Chinese are building new roads in North Korea, undoubtedly 
for the purpose of moving troops southward. Japan's Ikeda moves 
closer to trade with Red China, and Italian President Segni drafts 
new oil contracts with Russia. 

De Gaulle recognizes Red China, and Britain sells buses to Cviba. 
Sukarno unleashes his guerrillas against Malaysia. Our trusted friend 
Ayub of Pakistan moves closer to Red China. We retreat from our 
hard-and-fast decision to sell wheat to Russia for cash only, while she 
sends cash to support Castro's communism in our backyard. Even 
while President Lopez Mateos of Mexico chats amiably with our 
President, he works closely with Castro and prevents concerted ac- 
tion against him. 

Can any rational man look at the globe and say we are not losing 
the cold war ? 

In searching for a reason, it is easy to fall into the trap of over- 
simplification. Undoubtedly there are many reasons, but certainly one 
of the most significant is our failure to win the war of propaganda. 
Time after time the free world has responded with militaiy action to 
combat communism. But almost always the forces of subversion have 
done their work so effectively that military action has come almost too 

Southeast Asia is the perfect example. Laos' fall to the forces of 
subversion gained such a head start that the military response has 
been placed at almost an impossible disadvantage. The same thing 
is happening in Cambodia, Malaysia, Africa, Venezuela, and other 
points in the Western Hemisphere. 

It should be obvious by now that the Communist system of subver- 
sion is working and that our response has been of the wrong kind and 
is too late. In the battle for men's minds an initial advantage is fre- 
quently decisive, particularly in backward and impoverished areas. 

In view of our consistent failure to match Communist propaganda, 
does it not seem wise that w^e take stock of what has produced the 
success of our enemies and meet it on the ground of that success ? 

When Lenin and his followers captured Russia, they established a 
training system that has grown to 6,000 special schools which teach the 
tactics of espionage, subversion, infiltration, agitation, and prop- 

Admittedly, this is not a proper free world tactic, nor would we 
want it to become our practice. The basis of freedom is freedom of 
choice, and we do not wish to impose our choice upon others. To do 
so would be to defile the very essence of freedom. But to allow a vacu- 
um into which Communist propaganda can move is to create an envi- 
ronment where the Communist way can win without opposition. This 
is not freedom of choice. 


Our State Department hastily employs the cliche of "indoctrination" 
to mdict any suggestion from non-State Department sources favoring 
f. propaganda effort to influence people in favor of freedom as opposed 
to communism. This reaction is a carryover from the modern intel- 
lectual's proper and justified respect for "academic freedom." But it 
employs a basic fallacy. 

Academic freedom exists in an academic environment where knowl- 
edge is freely available. But in the target areas for Communist prop- 
aganda, only Communist knowledge is available unless we present 
the other side. It is not indoctrination when one side presents its case, 
knowing full well that the other side will do likewise. To reject our 
propaganda mission, then, is to promote indoctrination rather than 
renounce it. 

Our long and consistent record of failures to meet the Communist 
propaganda offensive proves that it is time to break the diplomatic 
monopoly which seems to consider any public relations or educational 
program that it does not suggest and control as "indoctrination." 

Psycliological warfare, public relations, propaganda, or whatever 
you choose to call it, is a science and a definite technique which must 
be learned through specialized instruction. Our diplomats have 
failed because they have not been trained in a highly skilled tech- 
nique. It is time we recognize that Communist propagandists have 
filled the vacuum catised by the inactivity of freedom's proponents 
and are winning the war for men's minds. 

The purpose of my bill is to fill this vacuum and give our overseas 
personnel the training which will enable them to recognize Communist 
propaganda for what it is and resist it on the spot. By so doing I am 
convinced we can avoid the inevitable military action which always 
comes too late. 

Mr. Chairman, there are other features of my bill which could be 
discussed, for example, the provision for training foreign nationals. 
But the basic argument for tliis important provision is the same. We 
must recognize the fact that the Communist propagandist is succeed- 
ing because he is allowed to operate in a vacuum and we must present 
a counterforce which denies him his advantage. 

This legislation is certainly not perfect and perhaps needs amend- 
ment. Perhaps an entirely new bill needs to be written. But the basic 
idea that we need a Freedom Academy is a sound recognition of the 
reality that freedom is losing to slavery and there is no present indica- 
tion that the trend will change. 

I thank the chairman and I would be delighted to try and answer 
any questions. 

The Chairman. I just have one or two questions. As I recall, your 
bill would provide an advisory committee or group composed of Mem- 
bers of Congress, rather than composed of heads of agencies — State, 
FBI, CIA, and so on. 

Mr. GuBSER. That is correct, the presumption being that heads of 
agencies would of course be consulted. 



The Chairman. I understand that, and that unquestionably will 
cause some concern to the committee. Would the answer possibly be — 
you may answer now if you wish — some of both ? 

Mr. GuBSER. Yes, it could possibly be, Mr. Chairman, and with all 
due respect to the good intentions of many people in our departments, 
the main thrust and the main effort of my bill is to inject something 
new into this system which has consistently failed. 

They say you can't argue with success. I think, by the same token, 
you can't argue with failure, and we have failed. 

The Chairman. I am glad to see that attitude on your part. If we 
start with the premise that something needs to be done, it would be 
unfortunate if we couldn't find ways to accommodate varying views 
and approaches. 

Mr. GuBSER. Of course. 

The Chairman. And of course we will wrestle with that question. 
Mr. Pool ? 

Mr. Pool. I just want to say about the same thing that you said, 
Mr. Chairman. I think, in view of the testimony we have had so 
far, there is a great necessity that we do have people on the Advisory 
Committee who are representative of the various departments as well 
as Members of Congress. I think that they can all be helpful being 
on the Committee. I have come to the conclusion we are going to 
have to do something like that to have a successful and a practical 
Freedom Academy. 

The Chairman. Pardon me. I am not convinced either way, but 
I can see trouble 

Mr. Gubser. Yes. 

The Chairman. — or disadvantage or perhaps embarrassment in 
having Members of Congress on it. I have come to no conclusion, 
but it is a question. 

Mr. GuBSER. It would be a hot potato, there is no question about 

The Chairman. Not for the Members, but perhaps for the Con- 
gress, the right to inquire, be on the sideline, but we certainly will give 
that very careful consideration. 

Mr. Gubser. Mr. Chairman, as I stated in the last paragraph of my 
statement, undoubtedly a brandnew bill has to be written. The only 
thing I hope, and I hope this with all the sincerity in my being, is 
that you do report out a bill for a Freedom Academy. I don't know 
what it has to be or what it should be, but I think this is the most 
imperative need in the fight for freedom. 

The Chairman. If we do report one out, we will solicit your views 
and we are glad to know we have your aid. 

Mr. Gubser. I will speak for you or against you, whichever will 
help the most. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 


(The chart submitted by Mr. Gubser follows:) 

Connminist ejcpansion since 1917 

Dale ' 

Nov. 7,1917 
Nov. 26, 1924 
Am?.. 3, 1940 
Aug. ,■), 1040 
Aug. 6, 1940 
Nov. 29, 1945 
Jan. 10, 194G 
Sept. 15, 1946 
i:>cc. 30,1947 
June 9,1948 
Sopt. 12, 1948 

Aug. 20,1949 
Sept. 21, 1949 
Oct. 7, 1949 
Apr. 19, 1950 
Bcc. 29,1954 
Dec. 2, 1961 





Latvia - 

Estonia - 

Yugoslavia-- -. 



Rumania - 


Korea (Deiiiocratic People's Re- 


China (People's Republic) 

Germany (Democratic Republic)... 


Vietnam (Democratic Republic).... 
Cuba - 

At time oi communi- 
zation 2 

Population ' 

7 182,182,000 


s 2, 879, 000 

i" 1, 950, 000 

11 1,126,000 

15, 600, 000 
6, 993. 000 

16, 530, 000 
12, 339, 000 

9, 291, 000 

463, 493, 000 
24, 977, 000 
16, 632, 000 

6, 933, 000 

Percent of 
total » 






Percent of 




224, 700, 000 














8, 100, 000 




14, 000, fJOO 


8, 900, 000 




730, 800, 000 


17, 200, 000 


30, 800, 000 


17, OOO, 000 






Area in 

8, fK)3. 000 




99, COO 

36, 000 
120, 000 
63, (XX) 

12 13,761,000 

I Dale given is that on which the country declared itself a People's Republic, was incorporated into the U.S.S.R. 
(Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) or, as in the case of Cuba, when Castro announced he would lead Cuba "to a people's 
democracy." East Germany excludes Berlin in all colurmis. 

» Because It is extremely difTicult to obtain reliable demographic data for the years prior to 1955, most of the popu- 
lation statistics has been synthesized from the foUovviug sources: "Statesman's Yearbook," 1917, 1940, 1941; "U.N. 
Demographic Yearbook," 1955, 7th issue, table 3, pp. 117-127; "U.N. Demographic Yearbook," 1962, 14th issue, 
"World Summary." p. 124. 

3 In most cases the population given is quite close to the date of communization. In certain cases, however, the 
data available was several years distant from the date of communization. 

* The availability of world total population upon which the percentages nuist be based is even more difficult to obtain 
The following world figure^ taken from U.N. sources were used: 1920, 1, 811,000,000; 1930, 2,015,000,000; 194C, 2,249,000,- 
000; 1945, 2,423,000,000; 1950, 2,609,000,000; 1955, 2,750,000,000; 1960, 3,008,000,000; 1961, 3,069,000,000. 

'"World Population, 1963," Population Bulletin, vol. XIX, No. 6, October 1963. (Percentage tor 1963 based on 
world total of 3,180.000,000 persons.) 

« Total world area, excluding Antarctica: 52,409,000 square miles. Coiniuunist nations constitute 26.25 percent of 
this figure. 

' 1915. 

' 1939. 

' Prcsentlv included in all U.S.S.R. statistics. 

i» 1935. 

II 1934. 

" 26.25 percent. 

The Chairman. The committee will stand in recess until 2 o'clock. 
(Whereupon, at 12:07 p.m., Wednesday, April 8, 1964, the com- 
mittee recessed to reconvene at 2 p.m. the same day.) 


(The committee reconvened at 2:10 p.m., Hon. Joe R. Pool pre- 

(Committee members present: Representatives Pool and Ichord.) 

Mr. Pool. The meeting is called to order, and I believe the witness 
we had, Mr. Walter Joyce, has been delayed, I suppose on account of 
bad weather. Due to the fact that there are no other witnesses, the 
meeting will be recessed, subject to call of the Chair. 

(Whereupon, at 2:16 p.m., Wednesday, April 8, 1964, the committee 
recessed, subject to the call of the Chair.) 

HEARINGS RELATING TO H.R. 352, H.R. 1617, H.R. 5368, 
H.R. 8320, H.R. 8757, H.R. 10036, H.R. 10037, H.R. 10077, 

Part 2 

TUESDAY, MAY 19, 1964 

United States House of Representatives, 

Committee on Un-American Activities, 

Washington, D.C. 


The Committee on Un-American Activities met, pursuant to recess, 
at 10:15 a.m. in the Caucus room, Camion House Office Building, 
Washington, D.C, Hon. Edwin E. Willis (chairman) presiding. 

Committee members present: Representatives Edvrin E. Willis, of 
Louisiana; Joe R. Pool, of Texas; Richard H. Ichord, of Missouri; 
August E. Johansen, of Michigan; and Plenry C. Schadeberg, of 

Staff members present: Francis J. McNamara, director; Frank S. 
Tavenner, general counsel; Alfred M, Nittle and William Hitz, 

The Chairman. The committee will please come to order. Today 
the Committee on Un-American Activities resumes hearings begun on 
February 18 of this year on eight bills which have been referred to it, 
which would create a Freedom Commission and Freedom Academy. 



The Chairman. At this point, I insert in the record the statement 
of our colleague, Congressman Dante B. Fascell, of Florida, in sup- 
port of the legislation. 

(Congressman Fascell's statement follows :) 



Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee : 

Ever since 1959 we have been trying to establish the Freedom Academy. 
Nearly a dozen bills have been debated over that span of time, but none 
has ever passed both Houses in the same session. Now we have another chance 
to adopt this legislation. 



As chairman of the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Move- 
ments and as onetime sponsor of a bill to establish a University of the Ameri- 
cas, I have been greatly concerned with vrhat one writer has labeled "the 
propaganda gap." In the relentless struggle which goes on with the Com- 
munist world behind the facade of peaceful coexistence, the United States has 
held its own in the military and economic spheres. Our deterrent nuclear power 
has prevented a major Communist thrust in the West, and our economic as- 
sistance not only has been instrumental in restoring Europe to booming economic 
health, but also in launching and sustaining the economic advance of many of 
the world's underdeveloped nations — some of them a good deal less than friendly. 

But in the nonmilitary and noneconomic spheres, the realm of ideas, some- 
thing is lacliing. The American message doesn't get across with the kind of 
hard-hitting impact it ought to have. All too often we get caught off guard by 
unexpected developments on the world scene and appear to flounder. All too 
often we permit the Communists to convert some meaningless catch phrase, like 
"general and complete disarmament," into the kind of propaganda weapon that 
achieves a bloodless victory. 

In a way it is not surprising that the United States should have considerable 
difficulty in these nonmilitary confrontations with the Communist bloc, for our 
Communist antagonists have made a science of revolutionary strategy and tactics 
for over 40 years. The Soviet Government alone devotes something like $5 bil- 
lion a year — that's 5 billion — to operate approximately 6,000 schools which train 
members of the Russian Communist Party, as well as Communist activists from 
around the world, in the techniques of infiltration, subversion, sabotage, agita- 
tion, and propaganda. When these agents return to their home countries, or in 
the case of Soviet nationals when they are sent abroad, they are fully trained and 
prei>ared to exploit any opening for revolutionary activity. These opportunities 
are plentiful, particularly in the underdeveloped areas of the world, where the 
people are new to self-government, where the leadership class is often ill-trained, 
and where economic conditions are frequently chaotic. 

But the United States, and indeed the entire free world, has no similar appa- 
ratus. We have no central agency for the coordination of anti-Communist 
strategy and tactics. We have no facility where our Government officials and 
private citizens and their counterparts from other non-Communist countries can 
receive a thorough exposure to the types of nonmilitary techniques — to the 
political and economic methods which can be used to counter the Soviet and 
the Red Chinese campaign to undermine both the free nations and the uncom- 
mitted world. And make no mistake about it. The Soviet Union and Communist 
China may be seriously, even bitterly, divided at this time, but their basic 
hostility to free institutions is implacable. We must better equip the United 
States, and indeed the entire free world, to cope with, and successfully counter, 
the cut and thrust of the world Communist movement in the field of political and 
psychological warfare. 

A thoroughgoing analysis of Communist techniques can be made from open 
sources. Furthermore pro- Americans in any country run the risk of being called 
"Yankee stooges" especially by those whose first allegiance is to communism. 
We should not let that deter us at all. As for the publication of materials by 
the Freedom Commission, I notice that this is not a feature of H.R. 8320, nor of 
some of the other bills under consideration. 

In espousing the Freedom Academy, I do not mean to suggest for a moment 
that we should in any way curtail the public and private exchanges under which 
more than 50,000 foreign students enroll annually at American universities. In 
the main these exchanges have been most valuable in presenting a true picture of 
America. By putting freedom on display, by affording these students the oppor- 
tunity to see how Americans live, to hear how Americans debate, to comprehend 
what Americans value, we unquestionably deepen their understanding of us and 
their attachment to free institutions. Nor do I suggest that we should not take 
any other action to upgrade the knowledge and education of our State Depart- 
ment personnel. 

But the question remains — Is this enough? Are all our activities in the field 
of psychological persuasion enough? Certainly those efforts can go for naught 
if they are not coupled with a tightly formulated and broadly coordinated cold 
war strategy. Our friends abroad need more than assurances of American 
sympathy and support when they are faced by trained agents of Communist 
revolution. They need to know how these agents think, what tactics they will 


employ, and how to exploit the vulnerabilities which our opponents possess as 
well as ourselves. 

This is supremely important, for if we are ever to win through in the relentless 
struggle with world communism — win through in the nonmilitary sphere — we 
and our followers must be able not only to meet and defeat the psychological 
offensives of communism, but we must be able to put forward and implement 
positive democratic proposals of our own. 


The Chairman. The statement of the president of the Free Europe 
Committee, Inc., Mr. John Richardson, Jr., favoring this proposal, 
will also be incorporated in the record at this point. 

(Mr. Richardson's statement follows :) 

Freedom Academy Bill— H.R. 5368 ; H.R. 8320 

For the past 3 years I have been president and a member of the board of direc- 
tors of the Free Europe Committee, Inc., a private organization which engages 
in commimications activities designed to promote the cause of individual freedom 
and national self-determination. The primary focus of our efforts is on the 
Communist-ruled countries of East-Central Europe. The committee's most im- 
portant instrument is Radio Free Europe. 

Prior to assuming my present responsibility and following active service in 
Europe in World War II as a junior oflBcer in the Parachute Artillery, I prac- 
ticed law in New York with the firm of Sullivan & Cromwell and thereafter en- 
tered the field of investment banking, becoming a general partner in the firm of 
Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis in New York. For many years I have had an 
active interest in world affairs, and especially in the problems of the cold war. 
My experience prior to coming to the Free Europe Committee included five trips 
to East Europe in connection with a medical relief program in Poland which I 
organized. I am also a former president and director of the International Rescue 
Committee (a private organization which provides resettlement and other as- 
sistance to political refugees), a director of the Foreign Policy Association, a 
director of Freedom House, and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. 

The following are my individual views with respect to the Freedom Academy 
bill ; they do not necessarily represent the views of the Free Europe Committee 
or of its board of directors : 

This legislation promises a major increase in the effectiveness of our efforts 
to build a more peaceful world. 

Its most important result would be the development of a body of knowledge, 
expertise, and doctrine in the fields of political persuasion and political develop- 
ment abroad. It is a tragedy that no such body of knowledge, expertise, and 
doctrine exists today anwhere in the free world. The failure so far to organize 
the necessary research and the dissemination of the fruits thereof are in my 
opinion at the root of most of our failures in planning and carrying out foreign 
operations, including enormous waste of human and material resources. 

The graduates of the Freedom Academy, as envisaged in this legislation, could 
be expected at the very minimum to increase rapidly and significantly the eflB- 
ciency and effectiveness of the foreign operations of existing governmental and 
private instrumentalities. They would be trained not only in a knowledge of 
historical and existing conditions abroad, as at present, but also in the knowledge 
of how the processes of political change abroad can be influenced by a free coun- 
try utilizing honorable means. No such training is available today. And yet 
peace can be secured ultimately only through the responsible actions of respon- 
sible governments in many areas of the world where they do not now exist. 

The arguments that such matters cannot be usefully researched, studied, and 
taught are reminiscent of the attitude many businessmen once had toward the 
first business schools in this country. Their attitude is different today. 

I am convinced that passage of the Freedom Academy legislation is the most 
important step that can be taken to increase the capacity of the United States 
to influence events abroad. Both freedom and peace may well depend on that 



The Chairman. We will also incorporate in the record the resolu- 
tion of the Resem^e Officers Association of the United States, also in 
support of these bills. 

(The resolution follows :) 


The Freedom Commission Act 

Whereas, Reserve OflBcers Association of the United States recognizes that 
the Communist nations are waging a total political war against the United 
States of America and against the peoples and the governments of all other 
nations of the free world ; and 

Whereas, Communist conspirators are invariably more dedicated, better 
trained and have more operational "know-how" than their opponents, and 
taking full advantage of this, have influenced a series of political warfare de- 
feats on the free world, the total sum of which amounts to new disaster for the 
United States and other countries of the free world ; and 

Whereas, if the present trend continues there is grave peril that the 
United States of America will stand substantially alone in a world that has 
become Communist or pro-Communist neutral ; and 

Whereas, if we are to tvirn the tide in the cold war it is essential that we 
develop coimteraction to the international Commimist conspiracy into an opera- 
tional science that bespeaks and benefits the values and methods of free men 
ami that we train men and women in large numbers who can combat the 
Communist conspiracy with an equal or greater degree of "know-how" and 
dedication ; and 

Whereas, there have been introduced in the House of Representatives of 
the Congress of the United States by A. S. Herlong, Jr., of Florida, and Walter 
.Tudd, of Minnesota, a bill (H.R. 3880) and in the Senate by Karl Mundt, of 
South Dakota, and Paul Douglas, of Illinois, a bill (S. 1689), entitled "The 
Freedom Commission Act," which this association believes set forth the training 
and development program necessary to insure the long-term survival of this 
Nation and the other nations of the free world ; 

Notv, therefore, he it resolved, that the Reserve OflBcers Association of the 
United States go on record as endorsing the passage of The Freedom Com- 
mission Act. 

Adopted, 34th National Convention New York City, 1 July 1960. 

The Chairman. This committee is indeed honored to welcome Ar- 
lei£:h A. Burke, former Chief of Naval Operations, as the lead witness 
of this morning's session. 

Admiral, we are always glad to have you with us, and I don't sup- 
pose there is anybody who does not laiow you, and it is rather odd to 
ask you to give any part of your background, all of which is good. 
But in an effort to relate it to your interest in this bill or what experi- 
ence prompts you to favor it, as a beginning in your presentation, we 
will be very gratified to receive a brief resume of your background. 

Admiral Burke. Thank you, sir. 


Admiral Burke. Yes, sir. First, Mr. Chairman, I would like to 
state that I appreciate very much appearing before this distinguished 
Committee on Un-American Activities on these bills. I have no 
written statement, but I do have some notes that I would like to speak 


You asked about my background. My background in connection 
with this activity, or with communism, started seriously during the 
Korean war. 

At the beginning of the Korean war, I was ordered by Admiral 
Sherman, as soon as the war started, to go to the staff of Commander, 
Naval Forces, Far East. When it looked like it was possible to negoti- 
ate an armistice, I was appointed to the Armistice Negotiating Com- 

We had about 10 days in which to prepare ourselves to negotiate 
with the Communists. During those 10 days, we picked up every 
book that we could get in the libraries in Japan and in our armed 
services there, to determine how the Communists negotiated, what 
they might do, and I might say that the books that we were able to 
get were very few. There was only one good one. I think it was 
Operations of the Polithureau or sometliing like that. 

When we started negotiating with the Communists, it became very 
apparent in the first few minutes that they were taking advantage of 
us. They were skillful propagandists. They were using the occa- 
sion to show the whole world that we had been defeated. 

For example, there was preliminary negotiation as to where the 
negotiations would be held, and it was finally determined that they 
would be held in Kaesong, and our team, five of us, went up to Kaesong 
in helicopters. We landed at the Missionary Field of the Methodist 
University, which had been destroyed. 

We were met by North Korean and Chinese troops, and there was 
a thick cordon of troops around the landing field, white flags all over 
it. We were put in jeeps, and the jeep that I was assigned to was 
a captured American jeep, as they all were; a bullet hole through the 
windshield, blood on the seat, the name "Lucy" on the jeep. 

I don't know whether this was American blood or not, but it was 
quite obvious that the impression they wanted to give was that they 
had captured this jeep, killed the driver, and it was their jeep. A great 
big white flag — no other identification — a great big white flag on the 
front of the jeep, and we went up with an escort, a military escort 
of the Communists, through, again, a cordon of troops clear to the ne- 
gotiating building, which was a teahouse in Kaesong. 

When we arrived there, we had to walk perhaps a hundred yards, 
again through a cordon of troops, with submachineguns^ following 
each man as we came up, and, for example, one young Korean was 
standing in front of a bush, and he had to be out in the path a little 
bit. He was perhaps 15 or 16 years old, and as I was walking up there, 
he put the machinegun muzzle in my stomach. It was just a little bit 
more than I could take at that time, because I was fed up with this, 
and I took the machinegun away from him and handed it back to 
him. which was a foolish thing to do, but fortunately, his finger wasn't 
on the trigger or his automatic reaction would have been bad for 

But this was an example of the propaganda — movie cameras grind- 
ing all the time, with Americans coming up to surrender at this 

During the negotiations, we soon found that the Communists could 
lie, did lie, and it did not bother them a bit. They could be caught 
in lies and they could pass probably a polygraph test, because they 


didn't feel guilty about anything, about lying. It is something that 
an American just can't realize, that there is no moral base to negotiate 
on — with people like that. 

And this was when I first decided that we had to do a tremendous 
amount of studying. We sent back for books and data from which 
to study past negotiations. We got a big pile of data, but very little 
data which would do us any good. 

Well, the results of those negotiations are well known. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. May I internij^t at that point, Admiral ? What was 
the date of this episode you have just described ? 

Admiral Burke. I believe it was July 10, 1951. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. Thank you. 

Admiral Burke. The next thing that concerned me, again the result 
of the Korean war, was our prisoners. When they returned, we found 
that a few of our troops had accommodated themselves to communism 
in the prison camps, and a very few of them had sold their brother 
soldiers' lives for a cigarette or for special treatment. This was, of 
course, a shock to all of us in the military services, and we started to 
examine why. 

Later, I was Chief of Naval Operations, and as soon as I became 
Chief of Naval Operations, I asked for an examination of our recruits 
to determine what their moral standards were, and it was a surprising 
thing that we found that a great many of our recruits didn't have any 
moral standards. 

They weren't unmoral, they were just amoral. They had no con- 
victions concerning their God or their church or their community or 
their State or their school or anything. Nothing meant very much 
to some of the^e boys. Their standard was "what is good for me." 

Now this wasn't because these youngsters were bad youngsters. 
They weren't, and they very eagerly picked up the instruction that 
we gave them on what this United States stands for, what God stands 
for, and various simple things, and these lads eagerly picked up that 
instruction. They just simply hadn't been instructed before. This 
was a shock. 

Later on, as Chief of Naval Operations, I had a great deal to do 
for 6 years with operations against the Communists or operations 
which were the result of Communist actions. When I retired from 
tlie Navy, I wanted to do something that might help my country a 
little bit, so I decided that I would like to become associated with 
three general types of activities. One is energy, because the Com- 
munists, or any nation that wants to become powerful, must have 
sources of energy. And without sources of energy, it is so dependent 
upon other countries that it probably will never become a really 
powerful nation. 

And the next one was communications. Communications and trans- 
portation, the whole communication bit; and the third one is educa- 
tion. And those generally are the areas of the commercial companies 
with which I am now associated, and it is true that I have found since 
retirement, as well as before, that the Communists are working to try 
to get control of communications, to try to get control of energy, and, 
above all, to try to get control of education ; and it is the educational 
part that is important here, sir. 


Mr. JoHANSEN. How long did you serve, Admiral, in the United 
States Xavy ? 

Admiral Burke. 42 years, sir. And would it be all right for me to 
read my notes ? 

The Chairman. Proceed. 

Admiral Burke. The first point that I would like to make, sir, is 
that of all the people in the United States, this committee, you your- 
selves are probably the most familiar with the Communist goals and 
objectives and their past actions, the Communist intentions, the Com- 
munist techniques, and their falsehoods, their lies. 

You know, I don't want to repeat the Communist intentions, but cer- 
tainly it is true, because they have said so over and over and over 
again, that they intend to dominate the world, and every action that 
they have taken, even the backward steps that they have had to take 
sometimes, have had that goal in mind, and they never deviate from 
that goal. This is true with all the Communists in every area. They 
have a clear outline. Every Communist has a clear outline of where 
the Communists intend to go and, in general, how to get there, and the 
Communists are well trained. 

Xow, there is no such clear outline of our intentions. Sometimes, 
the reactions of this countrj' and other free world countries are very 
forceful, and sometimes we act as if we were powerless and helpless. 

There has been a cold war ever since World War II. It is unconven- 
tional, it is psychological, it is subversive, it is political, and it is prop- 
aganda warfare; and we seem never to realize that this is a continuous 
proposition. We take action when things appear to be bad, and when 
things appear to slacken off, then we forget all about it. And we don't 
take action in all the fields, even when we do take action. 

The Communists use every means that they possibly can to get sup- 
port for their ideas, and particularly ideas which will weaken our 
moral stamina, which will weaken our will to resist, and which will 
weaken such things as our belief in God, our beliefs in our Govern- 
ment. There are quite a few innocent, gullible people in the United 
States who are led to support causes which further the undermining 
of our character. They do this, unknowingly, for the benefit of 

The Comrnimists know what they are doing. They are well trained. 
There are many schools in many Communist countries t-o train thou- 
sands of people, and they have trained thousands of people in political 
warfare, in journalism, in ideology, and guerrilla warfare, m all the 
aspects of the power play that the Communists are putting on. Of 
course this started with the Lenin School of Political Warfare in 
Moscow many years ago. 

And our people are not trained. The best trained people in the 
United Statas are self-trained people, and as a result of our lack of 
training, even though we act with the utmost goodwill, we frequently 
act without any very clear idea of what the Communists may be trying 
to accomplish or how they are trying to accomplish it. 

Our actions are unconcerted. We don't act in all areas, and we don't 
act in all fields toward a single goal. Because of this, we frequently 
play into the enemy's hands. In other words, we are amateurs, and 
the Communists are professionals. 


But in spite of this, I would like to pay tribute to those amateurs. 
There are a lot of them. There are academicians in many miiversities 
and colleges who have devoted, when they once became aware of the 
danger, a great deal of time to studying the problem, and they are 
doing quite a bit of good. 

There are labor unions who are taking the lead, because of all the 
classes of people in this country who miderstand communism the 
best, it is probably the labor people, because they have gone into 
foreign countries they reahze what has happened in foreign coun- 
tries. They know that there is no such thing as a labor movement in 
any Communist country, and they have taken some veiy laudable 

The Chairman. I am glad you mentioned that. Admiral, and on 
this point, I was pleased to be advised quite some time ago that the 
AFL-CIO, through George Meany, at its own expense, had created 
an Institute for Free Labor Development here in Washington to fight 

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. And they have students from Latin America who 
come here to learn about free trade unionism and also communism. 
Some of them have gone back home to Latin America and disseminated 
the information they have gathered here and have averted Communist 
takeovers of the unions and, in some instances, regained control of 
unions from the Commmiists. I am glad of the compliment you have 
paid to the free labor movement. 

Admiral Burke. That is a very laudable thing, sir, and they are 
trying very hard, but even the people who are teaching here are 
themselves self-taught. 

The Chairman. Well, you are absolutely right, and to put it in a 
different way — the way I frequently put it in connection with what 
you said to the effect that we act when things are hot, and relax when 
they cool off — we have tended too long to fight the cold war on the 
basis of instinct and emotion rather than knowledge, and what we are 
trying to do here is to have an institute with knowledge about these 
things which you have experienced over your long career. 

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Particularly in connection with your negotiations 
in Korea. 

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Johansen. The fact of the matter is — and I think I have 
mentioned this on the record before — but probably the first docu- 
mentation of Communist infiltration, of the attempt to take over in 
this countiy was made in the. labor field. 

That first documentation was made under Mr. William Green, back 
in 1933, as I recall it, at the time that the recognition of Soviet Russia 
was being considered. 

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir; that is, of course, the first thing; the first 
institutions the Communists want to try to infiltrate are the labor and 
educational institutions. And they do a very good job at it. 

And then there are a lot of industrialists, particularly the big con- 
cerns, who have realized what happens to a country when it becomes 


The Chairman. You are so right, Admiral — and we don't want to 
interrupt you — you liave i)ut your finger on it. It is the fact that 
although they make laudable and noble efforts, they are so scattered 
in this country. There is no central area where people in labor, Gov- 
ernment, business, foreign countries, can come and get a working 
knowledge of the techniques, ideology, doctrines, and tactics, all the 
machinations of the Communist conspiracy. And they haven't done 
too badly, have they, the Communists, along the line of attempted 
domination? In the short space of my and your generation, we have 
seen them take over and dominate maybe one third of the land mass 
of the earth and one fourth of the population of the world, and that's 
not too bad. 

Admiral Burke. No, sir. Well, in spite of the efforts, sir, of in- 
dividuals, there are a lot of people in this country — the fact is, I sup- 
pose, most of the people in this country — who don't really realize the 
danger of communism at all. There is a great deal of apathy, and 
most of this apathy is caused because people don't know. 

They think the Government will take care of it. The Government 
hasn't informed them, and so they don't know very much about it. 
People have not been told by the Government as much about commu- 
nism as a farmer is told about how to fatten a beef or the dangers 
of a boll weevil. 

A person can obtain from the Government a great deal of informa- 
tion about the dangers from insects, but he can't obtain from the Gov- 
ernment very much about the dangers from communism, even though 
the FBI does try mightily. 

Our people, including people in Government positions, are not well 
informed and they are not knowledgeable on Communist procedures 
Or techniques, or even the differences in the meaning of the words when 
they are used by the Communists and when they are used by us. 
I am sure that there is a need for an educational institution similar 
to the one that is proposed in these bills, and particularly in the ones 
that Mr. Boggs and Mr. Taft sponsored. 

There is need for such an institution to conduct research on Com- 
munist techniques, to instruct, and to inform. Private institutions 
can't do it, although there are a lot of private institutions which are 
trying; they can help. The reason is largely that a policy must be 
clearly approved by the Government — and one is not clearly approved 
now — and it must also be clearly understood that this is the intent 
of Congress, and this is not clear now, either. 

In addition to that, there are many Government officials who need 
training which a private institution would not be able to give. There 
are foreign people who should have access to the leadership of the 
leader of the free world, and now there is no place for them to go, 
as you pointed out a moment ago. 

Then it takes time for a private institution to get these things 
started, lots of time, and I don't think we have that kind of time 
left anymore. 

It has also been proposed that perhaps the State Department could 
expand their schools, and this would have been possible. But if the 
State Department had intended to expand their schools, it would have 
been done a long time ago, and it hasn't been done, so I don't think 
that they could take it over. 


I favor H.R. 5368, and if I were permitted to make some comments 
on the bill, I would like to make 

The Chairman. We would like very much to have the benefit of 
your material. This bill may not be final. It is subject to im- 

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir. In this bill, there is a Committee, an 
Advisory Committee to advise the Commission, and I would suggest 
that that Committee should meet at least monthly. The reason for 
that is that this Committee must know thoroughly what is being done 
by the Conmiission and within this institution. 

It must assist the Commission. The Commission is going to be 
under fire. It is going to be a most difficult job to be on that Com- 
mission, and this Committee can help the Commissioners a great deal, 
if it really knows what is involved. The Committee members must 
know intimately the status of the research, the type of teaching, the 
quality of the teachers, and everything there is about the school. 

This is particularly true because once such an institution is estab- 
lished and if it starts to function well, it will certainly, itself, be a 
prime target for subversion and distortion. It will be viciously at- 
tacked, and there will be attempts to discredit the institution and the 
Commission. The Government, and especially the Congress, will need 
to rely on people who are not in the direct management of the institu- 
tion, but people who nevertheless are thoroughly familiar with all the 
aspects of the institution and the persomiel connected with it, and who 
are charged by the Congress to keep Congress informed of the possible 
difficulties which the institution may have before those difficulties be- 
come acute, or become insurmountable, as they might. 

And perhaps even monthly meetings are not enough. This institu- 
tion is of sufficient importance to warrant careful and continuous 

I would like to go back a moment, sir, to training. And I have here 
two recent newspaper articles. One of them was written for the Neio 
York Times on 31 March; the other, for the Washington Post on May 
16, 1964. They are about South Vietnam. The Times article says: 

The South Vietnamese Government started today an emergency training pro- 
gram for young army officers who have the task of bringing effective government 
to the people of the villages. 

Special courses for the country's district chiefs marked an important first 
step * * *. 

I would like to insert these two articles in the record, if I might, sir, 
because it is about starting today, and then — 

The Chairman. The articles will be incorporated in the record. 

(See pp. 1439-1441.) 

The Chairman. At that point, do you find that whatever effort is 
being made in Vietnam and elsewhere places sufficient, or too much, 
or not enough, reliance on people themselves, the villages, and so on ? 

Admiral Burke. Well, I have been in the Orient quite a bit in my 
life, sir, and the people in the Orient, the villages, are very poor peo- 
ple, and they are very simple people and they are also very gullible 
people in lots of ways. They have been misruled sometimes, sometimes 
for generations in the past, so that the instruction that has to be given 
to them has to be started from the ground up — in sympathy with their 
conditions and trying to help them out, but at the same time, the most 


important thing that any man can have, whether he is rich or poor, is 
a philosophy, is an ideology, and something in which to believe, some- 
thing that he can do about what he believes, and this is what I think is 
mostly lacking in our training. We don't convince. 

We help them out materially and we show them how, sometimes, to 
grow better crops, but we don't furnish them a belief, a conviction, 
which the Communists do. 

The Chairman. In that connection, it has been expressed as a the- 
oi-y, and let's assume it to be completely sincere, always — that is my 
approach, anyway — that the establishment of this Commission outside 
of the State Department might place these problems in the hands of 
amateurs who are liable to want to indoctrinate, and so on. 

Wliat are your views on that? Don't you think the Commission, 
assuming the appointment of outstanding men, will certainly have 
sense enough to operate within our Constitution? With respect to 
the proposition that the Sate Department, with its constitutional for- 
eign policy prerogatives, might not like every part of what the Aca- 
demy teaches, and the fact that the President must determine foreign 
policy — can't all this be done without injecting the Academy into the 
field of foreign policy, keeping it aside of that, clear of that, even while 
it provides knowledge ? 

Do you fear indoctrination, amateurism, and all that stuff ? 

Admiral Burke. No, sir. 

(At this point Mr. Pool entered the hearing room. ) 

Admiral Burke. In the first place, this institution is an educational 
institution. It is not an operating institution and it doesn't deter- 
mine policies. 

The Chairman. I am glad you said that. It needed to be said, to re- 
move honest fear. 

Admiral Burke. And there are many institutions that do indoctri- 
nation. A church does indoctrination. The State Department itself 
does indoctrination. The Executive of the United States indoctri- 
nates. Political parties do indoctrination. There are hundreds of 
groups in this country who indoctrinate for one thing or another. 

A farmer, who is in an agricultural school, is indoctrinated in the 
advantages of farming. He is proud of being a farmer. 

This is true in everything, but what is needed here is knowledge of 
communism. The greatest danger that faces this country is the Com- 
munist danger, now, and we don't have the knowledge, and where are 
we going to get that knowledge ? We don't have any institutions. A 
lot of institutions are trying very hard to give a little bit of knowledge. 

They are insufficient. They are inadequate. They certainly can't 
train governmental officials, they can't train foreign officials, they can't 
instruct them. There is no information that comes from the Govern- 
ment on a continuing basis, or that is very deep. When an academician 
wants to start a course on communism there is no place he can write to 
in the Government and get such data. He can get data on how to grow 
wheat, but he can't get it on communism. 

The Chairman. Now I would like the benefit of your experience 
and views and for you to pass judgment — without any sense of casti- 
gating or criticizing what we have today — on these courses we are all 
familiar with, for officers, and so on. Are they thorough enough? 

Admiral Burke. In Government, sir ? 


The Chairman. In Government. In other words, we would have 
to face the fact that it would be said that we are making a finding, 
whether we are making it or not, that what we have is not sufficient. 

Admiral Btjrke. Then the finding, I think, would be correct, sir. 

The Chairman. Well, I would like to have you say a few words 
about that, because the opposition, such as it is, to the bill says we 
already have that, and that if we need something more, then there is 
the counterproposal, countering our thinking on the possibility of pas- 
sage of this bill, that we should instead have a school of foreign — what 
is the name of the proposal ? 

Mr. McNamara. National Academy of Foreign Affairs. 

The Chairman. A National Academy of Foreign Affairs within 
the State Department as a substitute or counter to this proposal. 

Admiral Burke. In the first place, sir, I would like to 

The Chairman. So we can't avoid talking about what we have to 

Admiral Burke. To start with the military. I am on the advisory 
board of the National War College and I am fairly familiar, even 
since I have been retired, with what the other War Colleges do, and 
they give a few courses on communism. They are not exactly super- 
ficial courses, but they do not really explain Communist techniques. 
They make the students aware that there are techniques, that there is 
such a thing as propaganda, and they teach them a little bit about se- 
mantics, but the courses are not in depth at all. 

It is even less than that, unless they have changed a great deal in 
the last year or so, in the Foreign Service's school. There are a few 
lectures, and those lectures are not coordinated. There is no real 
instruction, not nearly as much instruction in the Foreign Service's 
school as there is in the War Colleges, but the War Colleges are ex- 
tremely inadequate. 

The Chairman. We have had testimony based on teaching experi- 
ence here — and on my own, I have always said that I am glad some- 
body else said this, rather than myself, because some State legislatures, 
including my own, in Louisiana, by statute, require a course on Com- 
munism versus Democracy — but the testimony indicates that the trou- 
ble in these courses is that there is so little knowledge on the part of 
the public school teacher as to what to teach, what to say, and their 
source material is so scanty. 

Admiral Burke, Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. It is very discouraging. 

Admiral Burke. That is true. I have been asked by Florida and by 
other States to help them in their curricula. A little bit I have been 
able to do, not very much, but when they ask me, I am an amateur. 
There is nobody, or very few people in this country who have really 
studied this in depth. 

The Chairman. Well, taking you at your humble word, would 
your "amateur" experience in this area be available to the Commission ? 

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir; anything that the Government wants 
me to do, I do, because I came into the service for a lifetime and I 
haven't quite expended it yet, sir. This training that we have, com- 
pared to the techniques of the Communists, is really fantastically 
poor, sir. I have here an article that is called "Population Control 
Techniques of Communist Insurgents." It appeared in the Australian 


Army Jmii^nal^ in January of 1964, and it explains in detail how a 
few Communists, two or three Communists, come into a village and 
work with that village, never saying anything about communism until 
they get the villagers' confidence and support. 

They help the villagers. Later on they organize a few people, two 
or three people, and then later on, they take over, and that village, 
then, is a Communist village. It became that way because it was 

It was instructed by Communists, and we have no counterpart to 
that. We have nobody who knows how to do that, and the techniques 
are different for each country. This is the reason why the Communists 
have hundreds of different schools, or lots of different schools, to train 
different people in different techniques in different countries, but all 
for the same goal. 

The Chairman. Would that article be available for the record? 

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. The article will be inserted following your testi- 
mony. (See pp. 1442-1449.) 

(At this point Mr. Willis left the hearing room.) 

Mr. Pool (presiding). Proceed, Admiral. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. I don't think the Admiral had finished his state- 
ment, had he 1 

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir, I have. 

Mr. Pool. Let me ask you. Admiral, you are familiar with the na- 
tional defense budgets, and do you think that maybe a staggering 
sum would be needed to accomplish this job that the Freedom Acad- 
emy encompasses? Do you think that the money would be well 
spent ? 

Admiral Burke. It will take quite a bit of money, sir, because it 
will be started late, and the buildings will have to go up, should go 
up, fairly fast, so I should imagine that it would probably be in 
the neighborhood of $30 or $40 million. 

Mr. Pool. You think that that would be money well spent? 

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir, because the Communists have made in- 
roads in all parts of the world. We have not. The expansion has 
been on the Communist side, not on our side, so something is wrong 
with our instruction. We are not convincing people, and I believe 
our system of government, our social order, our whole concept of 
civilization is good, and I think the Communist concept is evil, but we 
aren't instructing people about what is good. 

Mr. Pool. The work that this Academy would accomplish, would 
be almost as important as the work that is accomplished by the Naval 
Academy and West Point and things like that ? 

Admiral Bltrke. I think at that stage of the game, sir, it would 
be even more important, because there is a big lack in such educa- 
tion now, and I don't mean to decry my Naval Academy or the other 
service academies, either. 

Mr. Pool. Well, I wasn't pinpointing any particular academy. 

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Pool. It is just as important, then, as the other schools. In 
fact, in your opinion, it is more important at this stage. 

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir. 

Mr, Pool. I agree with you. And I thank you, sir. 

30-471 O— 64— pt. 2 13 


Mr. Ichord? 

Mr. Ichord. Admiral, the function of the Commission is threefold : 
To conduct research into communism, how it operates, how it fights, 
and how you can best combat it ; to train Government personnel, pri- 
vate citizens, and foreign citizens at the institution ; and also to oper- 
ate the information center. 

The State Department has criticized the bill on the ground that 
the Freedom Academy will here be functioning as an overt institu- 
tion, while it should operate as a covert institution. Do you feel 
that criticism is well founded ? 

Admiral Burke. No, sir. I think that what is needed 

Mr. Ichord. Would you elaborate upon that, sir ? 

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir. What is needed most is an overt opera- 
tion. This, so that our people and the Communists and everybody 
knows that this is the way the Communists operate. This is what they 
do, these are the proofs. This is what happened in Zanzibar. This is 
the way they handle the press in various countries. This is the line 
that they start in Moscow or Peking, and this is the trace of that line of 
propaganda, from one position to another, until finally, its origin is 
lost, and it is repeated in free world countries as honest news. These 
things are very important. 

Now there should also be some covert operating institution that 
trains people not only to study the techniques, but to train people in 
the countertechniques, but that would be an operations school. This 
is not an operations institution. The Communists themselves have a 
great many overt schools and a great many covert schools, and some- 
times they have elements in the same school in which one is overt and 
one is covert, but I think this overt school is needed first. 

Mr. Ichord. Do you think that it is necessary to train private citi- 
zens at this institution ? 

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir; not every private citizen, of course, but 
certainly it is necessary to train academicians who are teaching in 
miiversities, the social sciences, for example. It is important they 
know the techniques of commmiism and to give them a source of 

It is necessary to give, and they should have, a very thorough course. 
They should have thorough knowledge of these data. It is necessary, 
also, for industrialists, for example, to come down and get a short 
course in aspects which will affect them and which they can do some- 
tliing about. It is necessary that the labor unions, labor people, be 
instructed so that workers Imow what they are up against, what this 
country is up against. It is extremely necessary. 

There are three types of people who need the instruction. There is 
the private citizen, the governmental officials, and foreigners. Per- 
haps the instruction might be a little different for the three, but much 
of the instruction should be similiar or identical. 

Mr. Ichord. How do you feel we can go about selecting foreign 
citizens for training at the Academy ? 

Admiral Burke. It is ^oing to be very difficult, sir, and you will cer- 
tainly get some Communists in here, no matter what you do. I mean, 
the Communists will try to penetrate this school, this institution, 
every way that they possibly can, and one of the ways is to send Com- 
munist students so that they can get as much information as they 


possibl}?^ can in order to sabotage the school. The best way of getting 
people is on the recommendation of their own government, and we 
know a lot of f oi'eign people, too, who can check. 

I mean, there are foreign people who are mature, who are usually 
pretty well known by some Americans, or at least, for example, a 
Frenchman is known to other Frenchmen whom Americans know, and 
his reputation will be pretty well known. But certainly there will be 
some Communists that will go through the school. 
Mr. IcHORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
Mr. Pool. Mr. Johansen? 

Mr. Johansen. I am going to yield for a moment to Mr. Schadeberg, 
and then I will come back. 

Mr. Schadeberg. Thank you. 

Admiral, you don't have to answer this if you don't wish to, and 
you may not want to. If our foreign policy should be, either now or 
at some future date, that we must not do anything to create tensions 
between ourselves and the Soviets, and this Academy might be inter- 
preted as creating such a tension, what would be the argument that we 
could use then ? 

Admiral Burke. The truth. The first thing that should be taught 
in this institution is the truth. If the Communists object to the truth, 
let them. If they say, "This is not true," let them try to disprove it. 
For example, after this institution was started, and they say, "This 
teaches that we do so and so, and that's not true," and we will say, 
"Well, these are the facts. What's wrong with those facts?" And if 
the truth hurts, if an institution is going to be objected to because it 
teaches the truth, then we are in a very bad way indeed. 

Mr. Schadeberg. I agree with you in that, but the question that 
might be involved is that we are working at odds and at ends with our 
State Department policy, if such a policy were stated. 

Admiral Burke. Well, if two commercial concerns want to better 
their relationships for any reason at all, maybe to have a merger, the 
first thing that each concern has to do, is to look at the books and to 
find out what are the facts, and .then you have to confront the manage- 
ment of the other concern and say, "These are the facts," and "This 
is what I believe the facts to be." 

And those facts never hurt anybody. Because if you don't base a 
relationship upon facts, upon what is true, then your relationship is 
very tenuous, and so the Communists would have no grounds for 
objection, and should have no objection, to the teaching of facts. 

Now there is another aspect of this. Certainly in all of their 
schools^they have hundreds of schools which teach wrong things 
that are absolutely false about our institutions, about what we do. 

They teach the destruction of our social order and how to do us in. 
If it is important that we have a detente with the Soviets or with the 
Communists, then it is also important that they stop teaching what 
is not true, before we stop teaching what is true. In other words, 
the onus is on them, not on us. 

Mr. Schadeberg. There I agree with you. I have a suspicion that 
if we ever had the Academy, we probably would never arrive at a posi- 
tion in which we had that policy. 

Admiral Burke. Well, perhaps not, sir. 

Mr. Schadeberg. Thank you. 


Mr. JoHANSEN. Admiral, there is some degree of parallel between 
what is proposed in this Commission and the Freedom Academy and 
some of the things that were attempted some years back in the Armed 
Forces in the way of instruction regarding communism and Com- 
munist activities. 

And isn't it true that a great many of those efforts, following the 
Fulbright memorandum, were suspended so far as the military is 
concerned ? 

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir. And it is true this would be very similar 
in some respects to that instruction given to the military services, but 
the primary emphasis in the military services was on what this 
country stood for, upon our traditions, and what it took to be a good 
United States citizen. There was a lot of mstruction on what you do 
to support this man alongside of you, so that when you find yourself 
in a foxhole and the going gets pretty rough, you can depend upon 
him staying there. You have no fear deep down in your heart that 
he is going to do what they call in Korea "bug out on you" and 
leave you there to face a bayonet charge, or whatever, all by yourself. 
He is going to be there. You can depend on him. Those are the 
things that we primarily try to teach in the military services. Now 
also, there are things such as good citizenship, that you work for your 
community, that you work for your country. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. Well, am I correct in the impression that, unfortu- 
nately, a great deal of that type of activity has been suspended or 
terminated ? 

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir. That is true, but in fairness to the peo- 
ple who had it stopped, there were times when people went too far. I 
mean, when they said things which were not quite correct, and that 
will always have to be watched in any institution ; but, in general, it 
seems a very sad thing to me when you can't teach that our history 
is a glorious thing and that the people who went before us and who 
created this country did some pretty good things in their lives, and 
that we are up against an enemy who says, and says repeatedly, and 
have throughout their entire existence, that they intend to destroy us 
and that they intend to destroy us not just by war, but by every other 
means, and that they subvert. 

We have many examples every year of subversion and attempts at 
subversion. Every 2 or 3 months we go through another lesson, and 
it is very important, I think, that our people know this and know 
where it stems from. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. Well, it seems to me that the fact that this program 
in the military ran into difficulty is all the more reason why we need 
the type of program contemplated in the Freedom Commission and 
the Freedom Academy. 

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir; and this institution would give instruc- 
tion in much greater detail and real depth, which they could not pos- 
sibly do in the military. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. Well, now, we had testimony before this committee 
by a very high-ranking spokesman of the State Department, who ex- 
pressed unqualified opposition to it. He said that it involved, or im- 
plied that it involved, instilling into the people who were brought 
to the Academy preconceived ideas, that it involved indoctrination, 
that it involved employing the very methods of totalitarianism. 


I happen to disagree very strongly about that, but it is a matter of 
great concern to me that there is opposition from some spokesmen, at 
least, in the State Department on these flimsy and, I think, invalid 

Now what happens to this Commission and to the Academy and its 
program if the official policy of the United States Government as 
expressed by the State Department, is that all communism isn't alike, 
that commmiism in Soviet Russia is getting more and more mellow, 
that the real objectives of world conquest are being modified, and as 
my colleague said, on top of that, we must not say or do anything 
that creates tension ? 

My great concern is, if we have that kind of a conflict between the 
facts as developed in the Academy and the official policy of the State 
Department, what happens to the Academy and to its program? 

Admiral Burke. It will never be built, sir. It will never be built, 
or if it is built, then it won't function. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. And then we are in deep trouble. 

Admiral Burke. Then eventually, if you have an aggressive hard- 
hitting, dedicated enemy, and he intends to do you in, and you don't 
intend to resist and to fight back, then eventually he will get you. And 
in this case, if it is that we believe that the Communists are changing, 
and they are, in fact, not changing, and they mislead us, and we don't 
do anything to resist their attacks, we will eventually succumb. We 
will eventually become a Communist state. 

Now, I don't think that that is what they mean. What some people 
believe is that the Communists are going to become mellow and not 
ti*y to dominate the world. But a man can't be a Communist and 
follow the Communist doctrine unless he intends to have commimism 
take control of the world, to dominate the world. That is their belief — 
their creed — their doctrine. 

But there is evidence in the Soviet Union that there are a lot of 
people who do not believe in communism, and that is true. I mean, 
there are farmers in Kazakstan, for example, who sabotaged a tre- 
mendous amount of fertilizer. They didn't grow the wheat that they 
should have grown — some of it due to nature, but a lot of it also due 
to sabotage by Soviet fanners. 

Now these people, some day, if there are enough of them and if there 
is enough conviction, may destroy communism within. Russia, but it 
won't be that the Communists have changed. It will be successors to 
the Communists who will have revolted against communism. It won't 
be the softening of the Communists or the changing of ideas of the 
Communists, it will be the changing of the ideas of the Russian people 
who will overthrow communism. This is possible but not very prob- 

Mr. Johansen. But in essence, they, therefore, would be anti- 

Admiral Burke. Exactly. 

Mr. Johansen. And it is not moderating of communism, it is an 
offsetting of communism. 

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir. So that is why they had purges in Ka- 
zakstan in the last year or so. Why the Kremlin sent troops in to 
control these elements. 


Mr. JoHANSEN. Well, I couldn't agree with the argument more, the 
statement he has made. 

Mr. Pool. I have one other question. Do you think that our posi- 
sion in South Vietnam would be better today if we had had this 
Academy 10 years ago ? 

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir ; I think so, because I think that we would 
have understood thoroughly the techniques of the Communists in 
saying, "Let us have a peaceful coexistence in this particular area, and 
let us get along together" — until they build their cadres in various 
villages and take over, as in Laos. Instead, we didn't understand. 
We didn't know that we were being conned. We took them at their 
word, and now we are in a very bad shai>e, because they have built 
their strength up in southeast Asia, and we have not. 

We haven't been able to convince enough people in South Vietnam 
or Laos or Cambodia that their freedom is important to them and to us. 

Mr. Pool. This Academy — we can envision that it would have 
taught the Communist technique ; therefore, we would have been alert 
and we would have the intelligence and also the antidote for their 
propaganda, if we had had an Academy like this. 

Admiral Burke. I think so, yes, sir, although there would have to 
be additional schools in addition to this Academy for the operating 
people, and that would have to be under some governmental depart- 

Mr. JoHANSEN. One further question, Mr. Chairman. 

Against the background of your military career and j^our service as 
Chief of Naval Operations, would you envision the military utilizing 
and benefiting from the facilities of this Freedom Academy ? 

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. And in what way, just for the record? 

Admiral Burke. Well, I believe that there should be some military 
people who would go through this Academy to become knowledgeable, 
thoroughly knowledgeable, but that there wouldn't be a large number 
of military people who would take the course. It would be similar 
to the reason why I took courses in and became a chemical engineer, 
so that I could operate as a liaison officer between the chemical engi- 
neering profession and the Navy. 

I knew what the chemical engineers were talking about and I could 
explain to my associates in the Navy what was meant, what this new 
explosive was, how it was built, and what the advantages and dis- 
advantages of it were. The same thing would be true with this 
Academy, sir. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. In other words, hoping that we don't have any 
further repetitions of the experience you described in connection with 
the Korean armistice, but in any situation of that kind, involving deals 
with the Communists, you would not have to be prowling through 
limited libraries in Japan, you would have access to the information 
and material that would make persons in that situation knowledgeable 
before they went into them. Isn't that correct i 

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir; and there would also have been staff 
people who could be sent out — like lawyers, for example, are available 
when legal problems arise. You can't conduct any sort of a legal 
proceeding without a lawyer being there, an expert, and he is at your 


hand to advise you on what to do, and the same thing could be true 
in dealing with or negotiating with Communists. 

(At this point Mr. Pool left the hearing room.) 

Mr. JoHANSEN. One final question. Recognizing that — and I am 
paraphrasing the statement of Churchill's that weakness is not treason, 
but it can be just as fatal, isn't it true that lack of knowledge and 
lack of skill and lack of know-how, which leads to ineptness and 
blunders and mistakes, however well intentioned, can be just as fatal 
as disloyalty ? 

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. And that that's the very reason we need the kind 
of training for persons in key positions in education or business or 
labor or Government, who will know the nature of the enemy that we 
are confronted with ? 

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir. You are exactly correct, sir. 

Mr. Johansen. Thank you. 

Mr. IcHORD (presiding). Admiral, Mr. Grant, the founder of the 
Orlando Committee which originated this idea, testified before the 
committee and made some very serious charges concerning the inade- 
quacy of the training offered along this line by the existing institutions. 
We gave the State Department an opportunity to answer those 
charges. However, I don't think there is anything in the record re- 
futing the charges that he did make. 

You are, of course, familiar with the War College. What was your 
comment about the courses offered at the War College? 

Admiral Burke. Well, the War College courses are good, but they 
aren't very thorough and they are not very deep. They are not super- 
ficial, either, they are of value, but there are just a few weeks spent on 
this subject, and you can't learn this in a few weeks. 

(At this point Mr. Pool returned to the hearing room.) 

Admiral Burke, You can't learn anything that is important and 
complex in a few weeks. It takes months and months of study, and 
they simply can't devote the time to that. There are a great many 
people in the State Department, I am sure, who have studied this 
themselves and who realize the tremendous effort it takes to get a 
knowledge of communism and Communist techniques. 

But there is no formal education, there is no formal way of getting 
anything real. If somebody from, say a commercial concern, feels 
that perhaps he would like to put a plant, say, in Chile, at the moment, 
and he knows that there is a big Communist element in Chile and he 
wants to know as much as he can about the Communist techniques, 
where does he go to get it ? 

He has got to read a tremendous number of books and put a couple 
of staff people on that for a long time before he gets those techniques. 

Mr. IcHORD. The reports of the State Department in the committee 
files all state that the objectives of this legislation are praiseworthy 
and laudable in their words, but they are all opposed to the establish- 
ment of the Academy, and I might point out that the committee has 
developed that President Kennedy was very interested in this pro- 
posal of the Orlando Committee and prompted the State Department 
to move in regard to it, and they, in turn, came forth with the National 
Academy of Foreign Affairs as a substitute for this measure. I think 


their main objection to the bill is that it will get over into the juris- 
diction of the State Department. 

Do you think that this institution can function and give us some- 
thing that we do need without conflicting too greatly with State 
Department work ? 

Admiral Burke. I don't think it will conflict at all with the State 
Department work so long as this institution stays out of operations, 
and it is not the intent of the institution to be in operations. 

The State Department controls our foreign policy, or the President, 
and they do the operating. They take the results ; they take the prod- 
uct of this institution, or some of the product of this institution, and 
use those people, but they direct their operations, not this Freedom 

Mr. IcHORD. In that respect, then, the Academy would work pretty 
much like Annapolis or West Point or the Air Force. 

Admiral Burke. Or like the National War College. The State 
Department sends a great number of people, and is very eager to get 
more people, into the National War College. It has no control over the 
National War College at all, except there is one member of the State 
Department on the National War College advisory board. Those 
people get very good training in the overall things that are given to 
the military, and it is very important to them. People who have 
graduated from the National War College find that it is extremely 
useful, because they have greater knowledge of what the military as- 
pects are. 

Well, what they need in addition to that is greater knowledge of 
what the Communist techniques are, and many of them do not have 

Mr. IcHORD. Admiral, this concept has been opposed by both the ex- 
treme right and the extreme left. Some of the extreme right seem to 
think that this Academy might fall into the wrong hands, and some of 
the extreme left apparently think that this might be too bold a step. 

I would like for you to comment on that rather strange opposition 
coming from those two quarters. 

Admiral Burke. Well, that is not unnatural, sir, because the far 
left and the far right have very many similar characteristics. They 
are convinced that their extreme views are absolutely correct and 
they listen to nothing that doesn't accord with their views. 

And this is true with both sides. Now there is a possibility, of course, 
that the Communists will try to subvert this place. They certainly 
will try. They will try to get people in, both as instructors and as stu- 
dents. There will be heavy attacks on this Academy — not seemingly 
stemming from the Communists, but still against the Academy, to 
soften its curriculum, to change its curriculum, all sorts of things. 

So it is possible, of course, that this Academy can be taken over 
either by a Communist group or by people who advocate that all we 
need to do is to just stand fast on everything. 

There is that possibility, but it is not more great a danger than in 
any other institution being taken over by a group of people who would 
really work to destroy the effectiveness of the institution, and that. 


as I understand it, is why you have established, or why this bill estab- 
lishes, a Committee to help the Commission to make certain that this 
institution is run in accordance with the intent of Congress, and not 
to get distorted and not to be taken over. 

I don't think there is a very great chance of it, if you have a Commit- 
tee that is active and knowledgeable and works at the job and if the 
Congress itself continues to take an interest in it. 

Mr. IcHORD. Do you have any further questions ? 

Mr. JoHANSEN. What would be your feeling as to either represen- 
tation of the Congress on this Committee or some type of oversight 
relation on the part of Congress for the Commission ? 

Admiral Burke. Well, Mr, Johansen, first, I would not have a 
Committee that is composed solely of Congressmen. The reason for 
that is that Congressmen are very busy. You have very many jobs 
and you can't tend to all of these jobs now and, in many of them, 
you have got to make choices as to which is most important to do, and 
some of them you have got to let go and rely on somebody else advising 
you what to do, and you follow his advice pretty blindly, sometimes, 
and that is necessary, 

Mr. Johansen. The Admiral has a very discerning knowledge of 
the problems of Congress, I will say. 

Admiral Burke. I have been on the other end of it a pretty long 
time, sir. But a Congressman wouldn't have time enough to study the 
problems thoroughly enough if the board were composed solely of 
Congressmen. But several Congressmen on such a board would be 
very good, perhaps a couple of Senators and a couple of Congressmen, 
who could devote some time to it and who could know the rest of the 
Committee and know who is expert, on this particular aspect and who is 
not, and who not only know the Committee, but the Commission, I 
think it would be a good thing. Also, it would show that the Con- 
gress does have a great interest in this. 

Mr. IcHORD. The proposed legislation establishes an independent 
Commission, consisting of six members and a chairman, and then an 
Advisory Committee consisting of State Department; Defense De- 
partment; Health, Education, and Welfare; Central Intelligence 
Agency ; and other agencies of the Government. Do you think, then, 
that that is a pretty good way to handle that problem ? 

Admiral Burke. Tliat is sound, sir. I think it would be helpful, 
perhaps, if some Congressmen were on it, and perhaps people who 
were not directly connected with the Government, It might, I don't 
think that is nearly so important as having two to four Congressmen 
on it, 

Mr, IciiORD, Of course, the Congress will have control of it, through 
the appropriation process. They will have to come before the Con- 
gress each year to get their appropriation. 

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir; but once a year is not going to be often 
enough, I am afraid. I think the Committee is going to have to have 
intimate knowledge of this whole institution, not to interfere with 
the management of it, but just like a board of directors in a com- 
mercial concern, to know what happens. 


Quite a few commercial concerns have gotten themselves into seri- 
ous trouble when things happened that were done by the management 
which the board of directors did not know about, and finally the 
company finds itself in extremis, and then the board of directors has 
to step in fast and learn very fast and take very drastic action, usually 
cleaning out the old management and putting in new management. 
This is something that is avoided when the board of directors knows 
what is going on, but still keeps itself out of any direct management. 

Mr. IcHORD. You feel, then, that Congress should be represented on 
this Advisory Committee ? 

Admiral Burkiq. Yes, sir; I think it would be advisable. 

Mr. IcHORD. Both from the House and the Senate ? 

Admiral Burke. Yes, sir ; I don't think it is necessary. I think it 
would be advisable. 

(At this point Mr. Pool left the hearing room.) 

Mr. ScHADEBERG. I have no further questions. 

Mr. IcHORD. Any further questions ? 

Mr. JoHANSEN. Nothing further. 

Mr. IcHORD. Well, Admiral, on behalf of the committee, I want to 
thank you for your appearance before the committee today. All 
Americans, of course, are aware of your great and your tremendous 
service to your country. I was talking to you prior to the committee 
meeting, and I am very happy to hear as an American that you are 
still offering your very competent and devoted service to your country. 

Admiral Burke. Thank you very much, Mr. Ichord. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. I want to associate myself with the chairman's state- 
ment, just 100 percent. 

Adiniral Burke. Thank you, Mr. Johansen. 

Mr. Johansen. Very nice to have you, sir. 

Admiral Burke. Thank you, sir. 

(The material submitted by Admiral Biirke follows :) 


[New York Times, Mar. 31, 1964, pp. 1, 15} 

Vietnam Starting to Train 
Men to Govern Districts 

Forty Officers Begin Course to Learn 

How to Keep Recaptured Areas — 

Lodge Praises People's 'Servants' 


Special to The New York Times 

SAIGON, South Vietnam, 
March 30 — The South Viet- 
namese Government started to- 
day an emergency training pro- 
gram for young army officers 
who have the task of bringing 
effective government to the 
people of the villages. 

Special courses for the coun- 
try's district chiefs marked an 
important first step in Maj. 
Gen. Nguyen Khanh's "clear 
and hold" program to wipe out 
Communist in.surgcncy. 

Strongly endor.scd by Secre- 
tary of Defense Robert S. Mc- 
Namara in his recent visit, the 
sti-ategy calls for efficient ad- 
ministrators in the areas cleared 
of guerrillas by military action. 

"You are the 'hold' in 'clear 
and hold," Ambassador Henry 
Cabot Lodge told the opening- 
day classes. 

The Ambassador addressed 
40 military district chiefs who 
will attend the two-week 

"You epitomize the idea of 
government as the sei-vant of 
the people," Ambassador Lodge 
said. "The old idea of the arro- 
gant official, looking down on 

the people, is a thing of the 
past. You should be trusted and 

"After the enemy have been 
driven out, it is up to you 
to govern the community with 
the help of the local militia so 
that the Vietcong won't come 
right back.'* 

In Vietnamese governmental 
structure, the country's 237 dis- 
tricts constitute the first level 
of the central government above 
the village level. For military 
reasons, the district chiefs are 
army officers from lieutenant to 
major who may have had no ex- 
perience in civilian administra- 

The training prrgram in- 
cludes courses in the conduct 
of local elections, finance and 
accounting, district economic 
and social development and local 
political activity. 

A major recommendation 
made by Secretary McNamara 
in his report to President John- 
son was that the local govern- 
ment administration should be 
strengthened to make the cen- 
tral authority more real and 
beneficial to the people of the 
Vietnamese countryside. In 
many parts of the country now 
it is Vietcong gucn illa.s thai 


seem to be the government with 
the Saigon forces and represen- 
tatives the intruders. 

Ambassador Lodge told the as- 
sembled district chiefs, "It is 
up to you to create a civilized 
human community where the 
people have security and can 
sleep at night, where their chil- 
dren can be educated, where 
their health can be cared for, 
where they are kept informed, 
where they can own their own 

"It is up to you to bring about 
the social revolution which the 
people want. Do not let the 
Communists bring about the so- 
cial revolution. You must do it." 

To Be Repeated for All 

The training program, being 
given at Saigon's National In- 
stitute of Administration, is to 
be repeated at monthly intervals 
until all country's district chiefs 
have passed through. 

Under consideration for three 
months, the training plan was 
given Impetus by Premier 
Khanh's national pacification 
plan and the McNamara visit. 

Similar training will also be 

given to 800 graduates of South 
Vietnam's Resei-ve Officers' 
Training School, thereby supply- 
ing a pool from which future 
district chiefs may be chosen. 

A third step taken by Pre- 
mier Khanh to bolster the dis- 
trict administration is assign- 
ment of an entire graduating 
class from the National Insti- 
tute of Administration — about 
70 — to jobs as deputy district 

After their three-year course: 
in the national institute, thi 
graduates should be able tc 
handle most of civil admini 
stration in difficult districts 
freeing the district chiefs fq 
more specific military respon 


[From the Washington Post, May 16, 1964, p. A-l] 

IJ,S, to Rush Training 
Of Viet Administrators 

By John Maffie 

The Washington Post Foreign Service 

SAIGON, May 15— The first 
group of 15 South Vietnamese 
will begin training next month 
in the United 'States and Can- 
ada in an effort to meet the 
desperate shortage of civil ad- 
ministrators in rural Viet-Nam. 

I The introductory part of the 
3V2-month, course — taught in 
iPrench — will be offered in 
Washington's U.S. Agency for 
Inter national Development 
JGenter stai*|,ing in mid-June. 
Then the group will take field 
training in French-speaking 
communities in northern New 
England and in the province 
of Quebec, which Is 85 per 
cent French-speaking. 

The course was planned 
months ago by AID. It was ex- 
pedited following the just- 
ended visit of Secretary of De- 
fense Robert S. McNamara, 
after critical reports that the 
rural pacification plan was 
bogging down because of cha- 
atic administration and short- 
ages of trained personnel. 

Usually, U.S. -bound trainees 
are given English training be- 
fore departure but because of 
the uigcncy this was bypassed. 

Candidates are mostly dep- 
uty provincial chiefs of admin, 
istration with some experience 
under the bygone French colo- 
nial regime. 

French remains the ma.jor 
European language of this 
group, although English is 
growing in importance among 
yd'unger officials! 

It is expected that two other 
groups of 15 will follow the 
first in what sources admitted 
was a "crash program." 

One senior Vietnamese offi- 
cial acknowledged recently 
that "90 per cent of the local 
administrators do, not know 
how to do their jobs." 

Training also h a.s been 
stepped up at Saigon's Na- 
tional institute of Administra- 
tion to produce officials com- 
petent in the basics .pi village 
administration. It js hoped 
that over 100,000 will be 
trained at the lower echelons 
this year., 

One official said the objec- 
tive is shirtsleeve workers ca: 
palple o{ 463ling with local 
probleiTfis I'^ther than "white- 
coated Saigon bureaucrats 
who talk at people instead of 
with them." 


[From Austritlian Army |ournal. No. I 76, January 1964, pp. 12-18] 





Franklin Mark Osanka 
Copyright reserved by the Author. 

It is now 

generally recognised that gueril- 
las cannot operate nor exist for 
long without the active support 
of a small portion of the popula- 
tion and the passive indifference 
of a large portion of the popula- 
tion. It Is also recognised that 
the guerillas actually represent 
only a small segment of the in- 
surgents. The larger segment 
consists of a covert underground 
apparatus within the civilian 
population. In brief, the guerillas 
carry out overt actions on the 
basis of timely intelligence in- 
formation from the population 
about the movements of govern- 
ment forces. The population fur- 
ther aids the guerillas by pro- 
viding food, shelter, medical 
care, labour and recruits. Most 
importantly, the population 
imder insurgent control denies 
information to the counter- 
insurgency forces concerning the 
hideouts of the guerillas and the 
identities of underground ap- 
paratus personnel within the 

The purpose of this paper is to 
examine some of the control 
measures employed at the village 
level by Communist insurgents 
to ensure population loyalty 
during the pre-guerilla and 
early-guerilla stages of in- 
surgency. This paper does not 
pretend to cover all the factors 
involved nor does it address itself 
to any specific past or current 
insurgency. However, it should 
be noted that it is the author's 
contention that Chinese-Com- 
munist-style insurgency is the 
archtype for most insurgencies 
in the under-developed areas of 
the world, and that insurgency 
is the principal export item of 
Red China. 

Operational Environment 

It is dangerous to generalise 
about geographic areas, but it is 
now commonly recognised that 
most rural areas of the under- 
developed nations manifest cer- 
tain environmental character- 
istics which insurgents can ex- 

Copyrtght (g) Franklin Mark Osanka 1964. 


ploit in order to achieve their their lives and who are fre- 
own ends. In many of these rural quently exploited by the land 
areas, living conditions are owners. They are often mis- 
intolerable: illiteracy, disease, treated by the representatives of 
hunger, poverty, inadequate the government that they en- 
housing, a low crude-birth rate, counter (e.g., security forces and 
a high early death rate, definite tax collectors) and as a result 
levels of social stratification, and are extremely suspicious of all 
tribal animosities are the rule strangers. Probably their great- 
rather than the exception. The est desire is to own their own 
peasants are usually a simple land. 

people, primarily farmers, who They are politically unsophis- 

do not own the land they (as ticated an^ their opinions and 

have "probably their fathers attitudes are formed on the basis 

before them) have worked all of what they see and hear in 

Franklin Mark Osanka, Special Warfare Consultant, 
Naval Ordnance Test Station, China Lake, California, 
holds both a B.S. in Ed., and M.A. in Sociology /Anthropology 
from Northern Illinois University. He has held several U.S. 
university positions. He served with the U.S. Marine Corps 
special "Force Recon" companies. For the last ten years he 
has been actively engaged in both research and operational 
aspects of special warfare. His formal special warfare train- 
ing includes completing the U.S. Army's "Airborne and Jump 
Master", "Special Forces Officers' ", and "Counter -insurgency 
; Officers' " courses, the U.S. Navy's "SCUBA" school, the U.S. 
Marine Corps' "Communist Guerilla Warfare" and "Am- 
phibious Reconnaissance" courses, the U.S. Information 
Agency's "Counter-insurgency" orientation, and U.S. Air 
Force Air University "Counter -insurgency" courses. He has 
served as a lecturer and/or consultant for most of these as 
well as many other civilian and military schools and agencies. 

His written works have appeared in both military and 
civilian publication. His book. Modern Guerilla Warfare, 
(reviewed in Australian Army Journal, July 1962), 
is considered to be the international standard text and 
; reference work on the subject. He is currently working on a 
! manuscript entitled "Revolutionary Guerilla Warfare" which 
will be published in the new International Encyclopaedia Of 
The Social Sciences. 
; This study is based on the author's analysis of unclas- 

sified documents and diaries captured during the Chinese 
Civil War, the French Indo-China War, the current struggle 
in Viet-Nam, and discussions with veterans of these three 



















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their own immediate area rather 
than being influenced by ma^s 
media. 1 Communications from 
the ruling class (which is tradi- 
tionally locat'jd in the urban 
areas) is usually poor at best. 
The ruling powers seldom view 
the peasants as an important or 
powerful political threat. Insur- 
gents, and particularly Com- 
munist insurgents, take the 
opposite view! 

The Insurgent Organisers 

Long before the first insur- 
gency shot is heard, Communist 
Insurgent Organisers (hereafter 
mentioned as Organisers), infil- 
trate the sparsely populated 
regions of the target country. 
These men are natives of the 
target country and very often 
were born in or near the area 
they have been assigned to con- 
trol. They speak the local dialect, 
are of the same ethnic origin, 
and blend easily into the popula- 

The organisers have had at 
least three years of intensive 
revolutionary training in a com- 
munist country with heavy em- 
phasis on the political-military 
doctrine as expressed in Selected 
Works by Mao Tse-tung.= Al- 
though the organisers are dog- 
matic in purpose, they are ex- 
tremely practical and flexible 
operationally. They realise that 
each target area has its own 
social dynamics and that they 
must adapt their methods ac- 
cording to the norms, folkways 
and mores of the region. They 
are hard-cored communists who 
sincerely believe that their creed 
is just. 

They believe, as do their 
Chinese Communist mentors. 

30-471 O— 64— pt. 2 14 

that thought determines action. 
Therefore, if one can control 
the thoughts of people, one can 
dictate the actions of the people. 
Their mission is to establish an 
effective underground apparatus, 
and they are prepared to die 
rather than fail. Their method of 
area penetration will follow 
three phases: identification, 
propagation, organisation. 

Identification Pliase 

A team of two organisers enters 
a village and requests an 
audience with the village leader. 
The organisers are very polite 
and humble men. They say, "We 
have come to tell you of the 
things that we have seen. But 
first, as we can see that it is 
harvest time, we would like to 
help you gather in your life- 
sustaining crops. We shall have 
plenty of time to talk later." The 
organisers labour in the field and 
continually talk to the villagers, 
In the evening, the organisers 
entertain the villagers with folk- 
songs and stories of the wonder- 
ful countries they have seen. 
Countries where "everyone" owns 
land; all farmers have a good 
mule and a fine house; where 
children wear fine clothes and go 
to fine schools and live a long 
life; where no one is ever 
hungry because the people work 
together for the benefit of all; 
and where the government's 
function is to serve the people. 

The organisers never mention 
communism nor the pending in- 
surgency. Political terminology 

* For an iUuminating view of one peasant's 
outlook see: Pierre Marchant. "A Colum- 
bian Peon Tells His Moving Story", 
Realities, September 1962, pp. 65-68. 

* The Ave volumes are published in the 
United States by International Publishers, 
New York. 1954. 


is avoided, "plain talk" is the 
vogue. The organiscM's' songs, 
folk-tales, and conversations are 
always designed to have some 
meaning to the immediate lives 
of the villagers. The objectives 
of the identification phase are 
to: establish rapport by identify- 
ing with the lives of the vil- 
lagers; determine the basic needs 
and aspirations of the villagers; 
discover the weaknesses of the 
social norms that dictate the 
accepted reaction to problems; 
and slowly plant the seeds of 

Propagation Phase 

The propagation process is 
both destructive and construc- 
tive in nature. Destructively, the 
organisers must aggravate all 
the existing social ills and raise 
them to the surface, then trans- 
fer the cause of the ills to the 
existing government. Construc- 
tively, the organisers must con- 
vince the villagers that through 
co-operation, united action, and 
loyalty to "each other, all social 
ills can be eliminated and 
individual aspirations can be 
realised. Sociologically, the pro- 
cess is one of inducing an aware- 
ness of definite in-group/out- 
group relationships, the in-group 
being the people and the out- 
group being the government. The 
organisers know that stories of 
the corruptness of the ruling 
group in the capital city will 
have little impression on the 
villagers. In many cases the vil- 
lagers do not realise there is a 
capital city, much less an 
established government. To 
establish credibility and mean- 
ing to their propaganda theme, 
that government is the source of 

all social ills, the organisers most '; 
often use the indirect approach. [ 

The organisers' propaganda as 
transmitted in folk-tales, songs, 
and conversations all has the 
same general theme: "the rich 
get richer while the poor get 
poorer." For example, a conver- 
sation with a tenant farmer 
might sound like this: "You have 
been working this same plot of 
land for 20 years. Before you, 
your father worked it and before 
him, his father worked it. And 
what, my friend, do you have to 
show for an accumulated 70 
years of sweat and labour? Of 
the seven children you have 
created, four died at birth, two 
never lived to enjoy their second 
birthday, and one has survived 
to do what you, your father, and 
his father have done — sweat 
and labour so that the landlord 
can live in comfort in his fine 
house and watch his healthy 
children grow up to exploit your 
son. Is that right? Is that just? 
The answer, of course, is that it 
is not just. Did God create some 
men to live in comfort by the 
sweat of other men? The answer 
is no! How then has it occurred 
that a small minority of men can 
legally exploit the larger 
majority of men? The answer is 
organisation. Many years ago, a 
small group of men discovered 
that by working together and co- 
operating with each other, they 
could enjoy the fruits of the 
peoples' labour. Using various 
devious methods, they acquired 
all of the land. They knew that 
in order to rule they would need 
a permanent police force and an 
army, otherwise the people would 
take back the land. So you see, 
my friend, your landlord is the 


grandson of one of these men 
who originally stole the land. He 
is able to exploit your labours 
because he has organised a police 
force and an army in order to 
suppress the peoples' ability to 
acquire what is justly theirs 

"How then can the people 
attain what is legally and 
morally theirs? The answer, my 
friend, is organisation. The 
minority can exploit the majority 
because they are organised. Does 
it nol follow then that if the 
people who are the majority 
organise, they will be stronger 
than the minority landlords? All 
over this country, the people are 
beginning to organise. Men like 
yourself are preparing to acquire 
what is justly theirs. These men 
know that some will die but they 
say, 'Is it not better to die quickly 
and honourably for one's rights 
than to suffer a living slow death 
at the hands of the exploiters?' " 

Perhaps Roucek best sums up 
the propagation phase when he 
writes, "At the core of their 
activities lies the argument that 
the . . . oppressor has no legal 
or moral right to exercise power 
. . . and that the members and 
leaders of the secret societies are 
the expression of the 'legal' will 
of the . . . people. The leaders 
must generate in their followers 
a readiness to die and a proclivity 
for united action."^ 

Organisation Phase 

Once three villagers have been 
won over, the organisers can 
establish the first cell of the 
underground organisation within 
the village. As more recruits join 
the organisers, they are sent off 

to previously established training 
camps. Here their training is 
75% ideological and 25% mili- 
tary. Most of these individuals 
return to their village and form 
the nucleus of the underground 
apparatus, and can serve as a 
reserve force for the guerillas. 
Others receive further military 
training and later form into 
small bands which will establish 
camps in rugged areas near the 
village. A few receive further 
ideological training and serve as 
assistant organisers to penetrate 
other villages in the area. One 
or two will be sent to a com- 
munist country for a year and 
undergo intensified ideological 
and military training. 

The organisers encourage and 
direct the establishment of a 
village medical clinic as well as 
an elementary school. A variety 
of civic activities are performed 
by the underground organisation. 
The organisers' purpose here is 
to enhance village solidarity 
behind the insurgents. Tactically, 
the village medical clinic will 
prove useful once the guerilla 
stage of the insurgency is under 
way. Psychologically, the school 
provides the organisers an ad- 
ditional opportunity to propa- 
gandise the young. If the 
government troops, in an 
effort to weaken the insurgents' 
organisation, requisition the 
medicines of the clinic and out- 
law the school, the insurgents 
have won a psychological victory. 
The orgarysers can attribute the 
government's action to a desire 
to suppress the people by keeping 
them ignorant and weak with 

' Joseph S. Roucek. "Sociology of Secret 
Societies", The American Jouma/ of 
Economics and Sociology, Vol. 19, No. 2, 
January 1960, p. 164. 


diseases. The organisers' propa- 
ganda theme will be, "the 
government knows that an 
educated and healthy people 
cannot be exploited!" 

lasurgency Population Control 

The successful completion of 
the identification, propagation, 
and organisation phases at the 
village level, results in four 
principal conditions of control. 
They are: in-group loyalty, in- 
surgent terror tactics, personal 
commitment, and government 
terror tactics. 

The in-group loyalty condition 
is the result of. acceptance by 
the majority of the villagers, of 
the idea that the insurgent 
activities are just and that the 
government is unjust. Insurgent 
terror tactics are directly related 
to the in-group loyalty condition. 
Those who aid the enemy are 
traitors and harmful to the 
people and, therefore, must be 
eliminated. The penalty for 
, traitors, while not often quick, is 
final. Here, the in-group loyalty 
condition is reinforced by the 
underground's spy system which 
keeps the organisers informed of 
everything that is happening in 
the village. 

Personal commitment is 
probably the most effective 
condition of control. The or- 
ganisers make every effort to 
involve in one way or another, 
a member of every family. Con- 
sequently, families are reluctant 
to betray the insurgency thereby 
directly or indirectly increasing 
the possibility of prison, and 
most likely death, for a member 
of their family. The personal 
commitment condition is also 

operating in those individuals 
who have made large contribu- 
tions to the insurgency and 
expect to be rewarded when the 
insurgents win. 

Being unable to locate and 
annihilate the guerilla forces, 
many governments have resorted 
to terroristic methods in an 
attempt to secure the support of 
the population. Government 
terror tactics such as burning 
villages, slaughtering innocent 
people, and generally mistreating 
the population, are well- 
documented in the annals of 
guerilla warfare history. It is 
equally well documented that 
such tactics tend to reinforce 
the solidarity of the people 
behind the insurgents. The 
communist insurgents are well 
aware of the population's reac- 
tion to such action and very 
often provoke the government 
into committing drastic actions. 
Indeed, one noted specialist 
maintains that, "the greatest 
contribution of guerillas and 
saboteurs lies in catalysing and 
intensifying counter - terror 
which further alienates the 
government from the local 
population. "^ 


What has been discussed 
occurs during the pre-violence 
stage and the early stage of 
guerilla action in an insurgency. 
As the insurgency escalates into 
country-wide guerilla warfare, 
and later regular warfare, new 
population control conditions are 
born. These new conditions can 
be favourable to either the insur- 

• J. K. Zawodny. "Unconventional Warfare", 
The American Scholar, Vol. 31, No. 3, 
Summer 1%2. p. 292. 


gents or counter - insurgents, 
depending primarily upon the 
actions and attitudes of the 
counter - insurgents. If the 
counter-insurgents react to the 
wide-spread guerilla violence 
solely with traditional military 
and police repressive measures, 
they will simply reinforce the 
validity of the insurgent propa- 
ganda and insure continual 
population support to the insur- 
gents. If, on the other hand, the 
counter-insurgents incorporate 
into their pacification pro- 
gramme at the village level, the 
"psychological action", "civic 
action", and "population secu- 
rity" principles pioneered pri- 
marily by the U.S. Army's Civil 
Affairs and Special Warfare 
Schools, they will destroy the 
very foundation on which the 
insurgency rests. For it is only 
when the counter - insurgents 

demonstrate by attitude and 
action their desire and ability to 
eliminate the basic social ills and 
legitimate personal grievances, 
as well as to protect the people 
from the insurgents, will the 
population transfer its loyalty. 
As the insurgents lose the sup- 
port of the population, they will 
be forced to depend solely upon 
increased terroristic methods of 
population control and then it is 
only a matter of time before the 
insurgents are either eliminated 
or rendered ineffectual. 

When the immediate threat of 
the insurgency is eliminated, and 
a positive "nation - building" 
programme is implemented, the 
country can be on its way to a 
state of socio-political stability 
which greatly reduces, the pos- 
sibility of the recurrence of in- 

F.M.Osanka,503A Saratoga, China Lake, California 

Col. E.G.Keogh, Editor, AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL, Army Head' 
qy^arters , Alberjj Park Barracks, Melbourne, Australia 

Major Jim Ewan (The Black Watch), was back in peace-time 
Scotland applying for the job of Recruiting Officer in Dundee. He was 
called to Highland House in Perth for intervie>\ by the GOC Highland 
District — General Colvillc at the time. "No>v, Jim," said the General, 
"if I were to come as a potential recruit into your Dundee ofTicc and 
say I wanted to join the Scaforths — what would you do?" 

"I'd say 'Right laddie, I'll fix you up'," replied Jim. 

"But remember Jim," the General went on, "you are in Dundee 
and in the heart of The Black Watch recruiting area." 

"Ay sir — but I'd still do as he asked." 

"Why that?" said the General scarchingly. 

"I didna like his face," came the reply. 

— From ^'The Red Hackle" 


Mr. IcHORD. The next, witness to be heard is our colleague, the dis- 
tinguished gentleman from Virginia, Congressman John Marsh. 

Congressman Marsh, the committee is very happy to have you ap- 
pear before our committee in the interests of this legislation. I know 
that you have a very great interest in the Freedom Academy, and we 
will be very glad to hear you at this time. 



Mr. Marsh. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate 
the opportunity to be here and appear in support of the legislation 
envisioned along the lines of the Freedom Academy bill. I have a 
statement, if I might read it. 

As we move rapidly through the last half of the 20th century, the 
present decade takes on ominous proportions. Truly a decade of 
challenge, it is even more a decade of decision. The die for the 
image of society when we close the second millennium might well 
be cast in the sixties. 

Caught up in the revolutionary times in which we live, America 
has yet to bring to bear the full resources of its society to the prob- 
lems of a changing world. Far surpassing the early patriot's dream 
in either its material wealth or institutions of freedom, America 
seems at times to be swept along in the currents of a changing world 
rather than directing them. Yet, we are the true revolutionaries. 
Communism is reactionary — not revolutionary. It is feudalism at 
its worst. The feudal lord was master of all he could rule or defend 
with the sword, and within that domain his will was law. To him 
belonged man's labor and its fruits. Today in the Sino- Soviet em- 
pire we find not a change in the system, but in the methods of opera- 
tion. Scientific and technological advances in communications and 
weaponry have for the feudal lord's counterpart in the Kremlin 
extended the domain — the present-day fiefs, Hungary, Poland, are 
simply larger. 

If there is anything revolutionary in communism, it is the man- 
ner in which is waged a total conflict — militarily, economically, 
psychologically, and politically in a never-ending struggle to enslave 
man. Through careful coordinated control by brute force and terror 
of the governmental, economic, and social resources of a nation, the 
regime is able to launch its devastating thrusts. A coordinated 
thrust must be met by a coordinated response, and in this we have 
largely failed. Particularly when the thrust comes in an area of 
our society that is beyond the scope of governmental endeavor. The 
dynamics of American society thus far has not included the mechanics 
to incorporate into national strategy the skills, talents, and abilities 
of our citizens, as well as our economic wealth, to defend, perpetuate, 
and enlarge our way of life. 

Within the broad framework of American institutions, we must 
formulate new strategic concepts based on a voluntary cooperative 
effort between governmental and nongovernmental areas. The 
proper effort must combine leadership and local action. At the 
higher levels of society there must be the type of leadership that 
not only will cause our people to shake off apathy and complacency, 


but will insure their efforts are properly directed. Also, in policy 
echelons, particularly governmental, there must be greater receptivity 
to local ideas originating eithei within or without the governmental 
structure — a willingness to experiment in a search for new ap- 
proaches. Frequently, there is a tendency on the part of individuals 
in the power structure of any organization, because of experience, 
better sources of information, and technical knowledge, to treat 
rather lightly effort originating either at a lower level in the struc- 
ture or outside the structure entirely. 

The most priceless thing that we can give our country and mankind 
in this decade is our time, our skill, our energy, our talents. Not 
only do these next few fateful years require it — but duty demands it. 
This contribution to the national effort must not be limited to only a 
few people, but must give an opportunity to incorporate into such 
effort the vast skills and talents available in our society in the private 

What are some of the broad purposes that might be accomplished in 
the national effort by an institution such as you are considering today ? 
To list some, I would set out : 

1. To provide better coordination and communication between the 
public and the private sector to meet the challenges of the cold war. 

2. To better utilize in the national effort the skill, talents, and re- 
sources of a free citizenry. 

3. To encourage private cooperative endeavor in the national 

4. To create a new dimension in the strategy of a free people. 

As i view the establishment of such an institution, I am not think- 
ing in terms of an Academy in the nature of one of our service acad- 
emies, but rather of a training institution whose student body would 
be composed principally of individuals who have already completed 
certain educational requirements and who now occupy positions of 
authority and responsibility who might be able to implement into 
those positions new insights derived from the training they might 

I might point out that an objection made to the Freedom Academy 
is that such an institute should be limited to the governmental sector, 
rather than the private sector, because of the use of classified materials, 
intelligence reports, and related data. However, a great deal of the 
type of material that I would envision to be considered at such an 
institute i? predominantly unclassified. 

The writings of Marx,'Lenin, Mao, and analyses of them, are clearly 
in the purview of unclassified documents. Many case studies of the 
methods of operation of the Communist apparatus are matters of 
current events and historical record which can be gleaned by the care- 
ful reader or listener from radio, news, and other sources of public 

Many of the lecturers at such institutions as the National War 
College, the Army War College, the Foreign Service Institute, and 
other centers of learning are recognized scholars in the field of na- 
tional security. The books, articles, and other treatises of these in- 
dividuals have been widely published and disseminated at home and 
abroad. Their subjects cover the entire spectrum of the cold war 
conflict which some have described as the "protracted conflict." 


The pronouncements and statements of such individuals as Khru- 
shchev, Kadar, Gomulka, and Mao, as well as Tass dispatches and such 
publications as Pravda and Izvestia^ are not only unclassified but are 
available to the free world. 

Finally, in summary, in appearing here in support of legislation of 
this type, I think it is well to point out the broad spectrum of support 
that it enjoys on the domestic political scene, with sponsors and spokes- 
men who represent a broad cross section of American political and eco- 
nomic thought. Individuals who on the domestic scene are frequently 
at loggerheads on national domestic policy have joined ranks without 
regard to the arbitrary classification of "conservative" or "liberal" be- 
cause of their recognition of a problem that must be met in a nonparti- 
san sense in what is really a search for common ground. There is a 
need to search for this common ground in our efforts to come to grips 
with the problems that confront us in a changing world and the tlireat 
that is posed to the institutions of this Republic by the ideology and 
aggressive actions of the Communist states. 

In the final analysis, notwithstanding our differences, the things 
which unite us are far greater than the things which divide us. 

That concludes the written statement. 

Mr. IcHORD. Thank you. Congressman Marsh. 

Mr. Johansen? 

Mr. Johansen. I appreciate having your statement very much. I 
understand you have a constituent here, a counsel of this committee, 
Mr. Ta vernier. 

Mr. Marsh. He is one of the most distinguished constituents not 
only in the 7th District, but indeed, in our State of Virginia. 

Mr. Johansen. I congratulate you on your constituent, and he on 
his Representative. 

Mr. Marsh. I think that I am benefited more by my associations 
with him than he by his associations with me. 

Mr. Johansen. I will stay neutral on that issue. 

Mr. IcHORD. Mr. Schadeberg, do you have some questions ? 

Mr. Schadeberg. I just want to state that I appreciate the fact that 
you have taken the time to come and testify. I appreciate having you 

Mr. Marsh. I appreciate the opportunity, sir. 

Mr. IcHORD. Mr. Marsh, I have one question. You were a little 
hesitant about training private citizens along with the governmental 
personnel, as I understand. 

Mr. Marsh. I didn't mean to give that impression. I think that the 
private sector must be incorporated into this effort. The point I was 
trying to make is that in some previous testimony here in opposition to 
this type of legislation the point has been made that you can't bring 
the private sector in because of the use of classified materials, which I 
do not think is a valid argument, because much of the subject matter 
and the courses that would be taught would be taught from what are 
substantially unclassified sources, either to governmental or to private 

Mr. Iciiord. Well, the classes would be separated, or else the private 
citizen could be approved for viewing classified material. 

Mr. Marsh. Exactly. There could be certain subcourses or ad- 
vanced courses or several separate hours of instruction for those that 


enjoy sensitive positions in Government that they could attend, and 
members of the private sector would not attend. 

Probably in all events this information would not even he helpful on 
a "need to know" basis to members from the private sector, but I think 
the private sector is the area where we must do our greatest work, and 
I think in the mechanics of training there are several precedents that 
the committee might well look at in the field of management training. 

For example, the very fine courses in the American Management 
Association, which are designed to reach and train middle manage- 
ment — and it is this middle management who are the people that we 
need here, because they are in positions of policy and influence in the 
private sector — in the corporations, and what has been done by the 
American management in a series of seminars and training institutes, 
it would seem to me, would offer certain guidelines. 

Mr. IcHORD. It would also be very valuable to train private citizens 
who are going overseas and have overseas business. 

Mr. Marsh. Exactly. And high school teachers and others who 
would be engaged in teaching. The American Bar Association has 
made some great strides in this field of instruction in the high schools 
on the difference between totalitarianism, as represented in the Soviet 
State and, of course, the Chinese state, as compared with the demo- 
cratic society, with institutions of government that are representative 
of the Western World. 

There is an excellent example in what has been done at the National 
War College in the summer session, where individuals not in Govern- 
ment and from "the private sector come in for a training program. 

I would see that a beginning might well be perhaps the use of some 
of these facilities during times that they are not being used, to begin 
with a modest effort. I do not see the 4-year type of Academy, but 
perhaps the use of other facilities that are now available during the 
summertime and at other periods, as a beginning. 

Mr. ScHADEBERG. Would you feel that the private sector also should 
be included in the governing board of directors? 

Mr, Marsh. I think that there are individuals in the private sector 
that should be represented there. I think we have gone out on many 
other governmental institutions and selected people from the private 
sector to serve on commissions and boards. There are many people, 
for example, Admiral Burke is now in the private sector, and he 
would be an individual I think would be extremely well qualified to 
serve on such a board. 

Mr. ScHADEBERG. That is all. 

Mr. IcHORD. Thank you very much. Congressman Marsh, I ap- 
preciate your very valuable contribution to the committee. 

The next witness is Mr, Paul Jones, Mr, Jones, it is a pleasure to 
have you with us today. I might state for the record that Mr. Paul 
Jones is a columnist for the Philadelphia E'vening Bulletin, a former 
professor of history and a former emplovee of the Office of War In- 
formation, He has spent some time in South Vietnam several years 
ago and, at that time, did forecast some of the events that have since 
taken place in South Vietnam. 

I think, for the record, Mr, Jones, before you get into your testi- 
mony, we would appreciate some elaboration upon your background. 



Mr. Jones. Well, actually, I was not with OWI. I was with the 
Office of Inter- American Affairs, which performed the function of 
OWI in Latin America. OWI did not operate in that area. I took 
my three degrees at the University of Pennsylvania. I taught there 
for 8 years and then I resigned to do magazine writing. 

For the past 25 years, I have been a columnist and editorial writer 
for the Philadelphia Evening Bulletin. In that capacity, I went out 
to Saigon as an exchange journalist and lectured on journalism to 
Vietnamese newspapermen. I speak French well enough to lecture in 
French, and that was a prerequisite. 

I have also worked as a correspondent in South America, in Chile 
and Brazil, in almost every country in South America, and in Mexico. 
My chief interest is in seeing something like the Freedom Academy 
established for the private sector, particularly teachers and news- 
papermen who get assignments abroad. My first experience abroad 
was in Chile in 1941, which was just at the time when the popular 
front, a Communist-Socialist-Radical coalition, was collapsing, and 
I found it very difficult to understand just what the political picture 
was within Chile. 

Now I think it is fair to say that the Embassy and our own office, 
the OIAA, and the various operational agencies there were only too 
anxious to help, but they are busy people. They can't devote the tiiiie 
to briefing thoroughly every newspaperman that comes into a 
country. It seems to me that if a course of a month or 6 weeks, which 
would bring together all the information, let us say, that this committee 
and the Senate committee in the same area has amassed over more 
than 25 years, if that could be concentrated and an idea given to the 
newspapermen going abroad or to the teachers, particularly in this 
country, that things are not always what they seem and that, let us say, 
a cry for land reform doesn't necessarily mean merely a liberal or 
an agrarian reformer. In other words, to give them some kind of 
sophisticated attitude. 

I think that to a large degree, the reports that we — and when I say 
"we," I speak as a newspaperman who has worked abroad — ^that what 
we send back has often a capital influence on public opinion, and fre- 
quently, from the more remote areas, it is the only information that 
comes. Knowing a great many of my colleagues, I haven't the slight- 
est idea that they are infiltrated, or I don't deny that some of them 
may be, but in the large degree, it is due to ignorance. 

I don't mean that they are ignorant men in the sense of general 
information, but they are ignorant of the sophisticated process of 
Communist management in politics within the teachers' unions, within 
the students' unions, within the labor unions, in government itself, in 
politics, sometimes infiltrating even the church, in some of these areas. 

Now this is my chief interest. Obviously, I am in the private sec- 
tor, and we have made some mistakes. We made one very bad mis- 
take in Cuba. I think we made, in my opinion, another very bad one 
in Saigon, largely because the reporters who were out there weren't 
sophisticated enough to go behind the outward appearances and pene- 
trate to the actual inspirers of these movements. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. May I interrupt? 


Mr. Jones. Certainly. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. WavSn't that also the case with regard to China and 
the agrarian reformers ? 

Mr. Jones. Yes, it certainly was. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. A great deal of the so-called journalistic reporting 
that came out of there ? 

Mr. Jones. I agree. It was really a kind of naivete which made the 
even perfectly honest reporters, with very few exceptions, take at 
face value the statements of a Chou En-lai or around the press head- 
quarters in Chungking. That is basically my point, of course, and in 
this country, it is equally important, I think, for teachers to be aware 
actually how these things operate. 

For many years, I have read the printed hearings of this commit- 
tee, for example, and the amount of information actually buried in 
your publications is astounding, if it could only be brought together 
and simply presented for the information of teachers, newspapermen, 
businessmen, people who go abroad, even missionaries would benefit, 
I think, in some cases, not by indoctrination, but by information. Just 
as you have to take an anticholera shot, I think it is a good idea to 
leam something about what you are bound to come up against. 

Mr. IcHORD. What years were you in South Vietnam, sir? 

Mr. Jones. I was there in 1959. There was bad trouble then, but 
it really didn't begin to heat up until the beginning of 1961, or the 
middle of 1961. 

Mr. IcHORD. Well, what do you think the reporters could have done, 
or should have been doing, or what did they do over there that could 
have been improved upon ? 

Mr. Jones. There were two classes of reports from Vietnam. Sai- 
gon is not a very attractive post. It is not very easy to get in and 
out of. Hence the veteran correspondents, some of whom, like Keyes 
Beech and Margaret Higgins, had gone through Korea and, before 
that, had been in China, were sophisticated enough not to take at 
face value the idea that a simple Buddhist monk would have the bat- 
tery of mimeograph machines and the facilities for public relations 
that had never been seen in Vietnam before. 

When they came down from Tokyo or Hong Kong, where they 
made their base, their stories were not quite the same as those of the 
young reporters who were in Saigon. That is, I would say. this: That 
the experienced reporters who came in suggested more of what was 
actually revealed by the printed testimony of the U.N. Commission, 
the fact-finding commission that went out there to Vietnam. Of 
course its report, came after the coup d'etat, but reading that testimony, 
it seemed to me perfectly clear that it was a managed thing. I am 
f ranklv imperfectly acquainted myself with this whole New Buddhism 
operation of the Communists in the Far East. I am partially ac- 
quainted with it, as far as I can get hold of the information, but it is 
obvnously a very potent weapon. 

Mr. IciioRD. Do you feel, then, that it would be very valuable for 
all of the newspapers to send their war correspondents for training 
such as this, to recognize ? 

Mr. Jones. I think so. Of course, it would be on a voluntary basis, 
but I would think that the i)ublishers or the heads of the organizations 
involved would be only too glad to send their men, rather than just 


plunge them, without any background whatever, into very complex 
situations in remote areas of the world — which, of course, is precisely 
where the Communists are making their best time. 

Mr. IcHORD. Do you have any further questions, Mr. Johansen ? 

Mr. Johansen. I have no further questions, but I think you have 
testified to a very practical potential value and a very practical need 
for this type of institution. 

Mr. Jones. I certainly think so. 

Mr. IcHORD. Mr. Schadeberg ? 

Mr. Schadeberg. Would you care to comment by saying that per- 
haps the difference between the Freedom Academy as suggested to be set 
up and the academy that would be set up in the State Department, the 
National Academy of Foreign Affairs, is that one would address itself 
to the pure facts and research and the other would apply to foreign 
policy ? 

Mr. Jones. Yes, I would say so. From reading the testimony, I am 
aware that the State Department believes that they can cover this 
through their Foreign Service Institute or Foreign Affairs Academy. 
Certamly, speaking as a private citizen, I welcome the idea that State 
would improve its own institute, as it seems to feel the need to do, but 
I don't think that an operational agency like Stat© or CIA or USIA 
or AID, that that is the proper place for a general Freedom Academy 
open to the private citizen. 

(At this point, Mr. Willis returned to the hearing room.) 

Mr. Schadeberg. It wouldn't address itself to the same end. Thank 

That is all the questions I have, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. IcHORD. Do you feel, then, Mr. Jones, that the nature of the re- 
porting that comes out of a given foreign country might be more in- 
fluential upon the course of events than even some of the operations 
of the State Department people? 

Mr. Jones. That is entirely possible. In certain critical situations, 

Mr. IcHORD. Thank you. 

Mr. Johansen. Particularly, if I might interject, particularly when, 
as evidently was the casCj State Department people were instructed to 
get their background traming in regard to Cuba and Castro from the 

Mr. Jones. Yes, that was a reversal. That is just the reverse of 
what I had in mind. 

The Chahjman (presiding). Thank you very much sir. 

The committee will stand in recess until tomorrow morning at 10 

(Whereupon, at 11 :55 a.m., Tuesday, May 19, 1964, the committee 
recessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Wednesday, May 20, 1964.) 

HEARINGS RELATING TO H.R. 352, H.R. 1617, H.R. 5368, 
H.R. 8320, H.R. 8757, H.R. 10036, H.R. 10037, H.R. 10077, 

Part 2 

WEDNESDAY, MAY 20, 1964 

United States House of Representatives, 

Committee on Un-American Activities, 

Washington^ B.C. 


The Committee on Un-American Activities met, pursuant to recess, 
at 10:25 a.m., in the Caucus Room, Cannon House Office Building, 
Washington, D.C., Hon. Edwin E. Willis (chairman) presiding. 

Committee members present: Representatives Edwin E. Willis, 
of Louisiana ; Richard H. Ichord, of Missouri ; August E. Johansen, 
of Michigan; and Henry C. Schadeberg, of Wisconsin. 

Staff members present: Francis J. McNamara, director; Frank S. 
Tavenner, general counsel ; and Alfred M. Nittle, counsel. 

Mr. Johansen (presiding) . The committee will come to order. 

Today the Committee on Un-American Activities continues hear- 
ings on eight bills which have been referred to it and which would 
create a Freedom Commission and Freedom Academy. We are very 
happy to welcome as the first witness this morning, our colleague 
from California, Congressman D. H. Clausen. 

Mr. Clausen, you may proceed as you wish. 



Mr. Clausen. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased 
to be able to appear before your committee on a subject that is of 
great interest to myself, and I am sure to the Nation as well. It is 
conceivable that these hearings will bring forth a program that could 
change the tide of history. 

Mr. Chairman, I welcome the opportunity to appear before your 
committee in support of the Freedom Academy concept. Your com- 
mittee is to be complimented for initiating these hearings in the in- 
terest of developing interest and testimony on behalf of a program 
urgently needed to combat the well-organized economic, political, and 
ideological offensive of the Soviet Union and other advocates of the 
Communist doctrine. 



In my judgment, the salvation of our system of government, our 
American way of life, the hopes of and aspirations of people through- 
out the world who desire to be or remain free could rest on the de- 
cision this committee makes with respect to this legislative recom- 

(At this point Mr. Willis entered the hearing room.) 

Mr. Clausen. It is my personal opinion that the Freedom Academy 
should be sponsored, staffed, and guided by the leadership of the pri- 
vate sector of our system. Cooperation with the executive branch, 
State Department and other agencies, is absolutely essential to main- 
tain the necessary security provisions. However, I do believe the 
Congress, the legislative branch, which is the most responsive to the 
electorate, must establish full control of the program — offering the 
necessary guarantee of liaison between Government and the private 
sector. The Freedom Academy' must, at all times, have as its major 
objective the full development and utilization of people familiar with 
the workings of our private enterprise system. 

Further, I want to recommend vigorously recognition of the vital 
role cities, towns, counties, school districts, and special service district 
organizations will play in offering a guideline to developing countries 
throughout the world interested in the adoption of our Federal system. 
Should the Freedom Academy and the Commission be established, I 
would recommend early consultation with organizations such as we 
have in California — the League of California Cities, the County Su- 
pervisors Association of California — and other municipal organiza- 
tions throughout the country. The National Association of County 
Officials has an outstanding action program through their recentl}' 
formed "Home Rule Congress." The overwhelming demand for 
political stability requires our giving prompt attention to these impor- 
tant factors. Additionally, we in the United States must strive to 
retain the basic concept of our three levels (local, State, and Federal) 
of government, assuring that each level has clearly defined areas of 
responsibility and the available tax sources to meet demands for serv- 
ice responsively and responsibly. 

In the April 17 issue of Life magazine, Ambassador Henry Cabot 
Lodge set forth, in a very forthright and provocative article, a detailed 
analysis of the problems facing the United States in Vietnam. It is 
timely, and I would recommend the article to anyone desirous of 
factual information on the world's "hot spot." All Americans should 
be familiar with the Ambassador's comments because Vietnam is the 
only place in the world where Americans are under fire from Commu- 
nist guns. 

Mr. Lodge has offered some very significant points that I believe to 
be worthy of note, and I quote : 

South Vietnam is a Iteystone for all of Southeast Asia, the hub of an area which 
is bounded on the northeast and east by Formosa and the Philippines, on the 
south by Indonesia and on the west by Burma. Control of South Vietnam would 
put the Communists squarely into the middle of Southeast Asia — whence they 
could radiate all over. 

The conquest of South Vietnam would immediately disturb Cambodia and 
Laos, and bring strong repercussions farther west in Thailand and Burma. It 
would shake Malaysia to the south. It would surely threaten Indonesia. Then, if 
Indonesia were unable or unwilling to resist, the Chinese Communists would be 


on the doorstep of Australia. Finally, eastward, the repercussions for the 
Philippines and for Formosa would be severe. 

Therefore, when we speak of Southeast Asia, we are not talking of some small 
neck of the woods but of an area about 2,300 miles long from north to south and 
3,000 miles wide from east to west — with about 240 million people. 

Mr. Lodge continues : 

There is vivid recognition that the Vietcong campaign is, above all, a political 
affair; that we must organize for the political conflict as carefully as we have 
organized for military success ; and that there must be a true civil-political 
organization to go hand in hand with the military. 

In this paragraph, I believe we have a briefly defined statement of 
foreign policy recommendations that will be required now and long 
into the future, as we continue the struggle between freedom and 
communism. It is to this end that I shall address my remarks. 

The cold war is not merely a confrontation between the U.S. and 
the U.S.S.R., as Soviet propagandists would have the world believe. 
It is a war between communism and every nation outside the Red 
bloc. It is a war that must be fought by citizens of all nations of the 
free world who desire to remain free. 

The so-called cold war should be properly recognized as political 
war. The battlefronts are many and varied and will continue to be so 
as the Soviets create chaos and controversy in the many comers of 
the world — most of which stem from the well-organized activities of 
the nearly 300,000 trained subversive agents operating in the free 
world. The arms race, the competition in space and trade, are all part 
of the Marxist master plan. However, the political battlefronts are 
the most serious, because they are the ones on which the Conmiunists 
pin their greatest hopes for world domination. 

Unfortunately, it is on the political fronts that they are the strongest 
and we are the weakest. 

On November 13 of last year, during the debate on the Peace Corps, 
I submitted remarks which, in view of Mr. Lodge's comments, you 
may find interesting. These remarks, I believe, Mr. Chairman, were 
made a part of my February 18 testimony before this committee. 
(See parti, p. 1032.) 

During this past year, I have attended the regular State Depart- 
ment briefings available to Members of Congress. I studied all 
available material that I could get my hands on; I participated 
in study groups with some of my colleagues; I interviewed and 
exchanged ideas with people considered to be experts in their fields, 
including diplomats, ambassadors, military men, international law- 
yers, bankers, labor leaders, and economists, missionary volunteers, 
as they returned from such stations as Laos, India, the Congo, 
Borneo, Brazil, PeiTi, Mexico, Central America — to name a few. 

With this background of information, I have joined some of my 
colleagues in promoting the Freedom Academy concept — a concept 
with a sole objective of winning the cold war— designed to take ad- 
vantage of the unlimited material and human resources available in 
the private sector. A plan that places more emphasis in the private 
sector and less emphasis in the public sector — as we advance this 
proven concept of foreign policy. 

The United States Government, in its efforts to stem the Communist 
tide, has poured billions of dollars annually in military, economic. 


and technical aid to foreign nations. Anyone who has followed inter- 
national problems closely will immediatey conclude that the funda- 
mental problem is a lack of political stability brought about primarily, 
in my judgment, by inadequate systems of government. Compare any 
of these to the system of government we have been able to enjoy under 
this great ConsLitution of ours. A Federal system that provides a 
maximum opportunity for political participation by its electorate — a 
system that only functions at the will of the people or by consent 
of the governed. 

Without question, these nations' greatest need is political aid — we 
must export knowledge and know-how in this vital field. This type 
of political aid could be made available to the present and future 
leaders of those nations who are currently living under the "umbrella" 
of our military and economic security. 

A Freedom Academy could train such leaders in techniques for 
counteracting the propaganda of the Communists. These same leaders 
could be trained on how to transmit knowledge in behalf of legitimate 
constitutional government, freedom of thought, freedom of expression, 
freedom of economic opportunity, the right to assemble peaceably, full 
religious liberty, and other basics of the free society — as opposed to 
the totalitarian state. 

In California, much to our credit, the County Supervisors Associa- 
tion has initiated an intern fellowship training prograjn, financed 
through private capital, for young men interested in local government. 
With local government being virtually nonexistent in many countries, 
thereby restricting participation in a unit of government close to the 
people, I would urgently recommend that this program be expanded 
in our own country and further be included in the curriculum of the 
Freedom Academy. Consultation with our city, county, and school dis- 
trict organizations throughout this great Nation would provide a large 
pool of information urgently needed in these developing nations. 

As previously stated, in this rapidly changing world, a defense 
posture by itself is not enough. Many of you in this room, I am sure, 
are former athletes. Let me ask you, "How many ball games did you 
win by devoting all of your time and attention to defense strategy?" 
Let's face it, you didn't win unless you had a better offense. 

The challenge to America and indeed the free world is really the 
development of an ideological offensive of our own. Some of this is 
already going on, but not enough. 

In its endeavors to penetrate the West, the Soviet Union's hierarchy 
is constantly preoccupied with strategems designed to exploit the con- 
tradictions in Western society. This required the utilization of ele- 
ments which, although non-Communist, are ideologically at odds with 
the open society. These include the more doctrinaire Socialists, statist- 
liberals, pacifists, extreme rightwing conservatives, and some of the 
nationalists in underdeveloped countries. 

A primary justification for large Soviet Embassies in many coun- 
tries of the free world is the alleged possibility of Soviet trade. The 
possibilities could be immense if trade with the Soviets were not 
conducted by government monopoly and determined largely by politi- 
cal consideration. 

The Kremlin does not buy what the people need or want, but rather 
what is essential from the point of view of building its power ma- 


chine, mostly industrial capital goods and essential raw materials. 
As these needs are satisfied, trade declines. Thus, we have the phe- 
nomenon that as the Soviet empire grows, the area under its juris- 
diction is increasingly withdrawn from existing world trade. 

Soviet trade and their tactics in political warfare is one of the chief 
weapons in the arsenal. Their economic offensive is being felt in all 
quarters of the world. The newspapers are filled with their activi- 
ties — the most recent of which were Algeria and Egypt, 

We, in America, must step up our offensive. The question arises — 
How? Should the Government do this? In my judgment, the Gov- 
ernment is the least equipped to carry out a successful program be- 
cause of limitations placed on it. 

Government-to-government programs have failed miserably in for- 
eign aid. The major talents of this country lie in the private sector. 

We must step up the people-to-people effort — an expansion designed 
to promote the joint- venture concept between investors of our coun- 
try and investors of interested developing nations. 

"We must rededicate ourselves to capitalist principles. Private en- 
terprise is substantially better qualified than Government to sell cap- 
italism abroad. Acts, not words, will counter communism. Many of 
our economic ideas and ideals can be exported. 

One of our major problems is, of course, the problem of education. 
Many of our schools of business and public administration can help. 
The* Agricultural Extension Service, which has worked so success- 
fully in this country, could be implemented as we work to raise their 
educational facilities and their literacy rate. 

The correspondence school idea should certainly be recommended 
as a program to promote worldwide education. 

The many great service clubs operating internationally, such as the 
Rotary, Kiwanis, Lions, can and must expand their sphere of in- 

The Boy and Girl Scouts of America, the4^H Clubs and the various 
church missionary volunteer programs are but a few of our great 
voluntary organizations dedicated to the improvement of our fellow 

I spoke recently in Fort Worth, Texas, before the Junior Chamber 
of Commerce. I observed the great effort over the weekend of the 
Sonoma County Junior Chamber people in an outstanding commu- 
nity promotional effort. These young men can change the world if 
we have the program to properly channel their efforts. 

There are four forms of American activity — cooperatives, small 
business, trade unions, and voluntary agencies — that can hold the key 
to solving the problem of how and what to communicate to others, 
the things that brought America to its position of leadership and 

The cooperative, the nonprofit corporate association, as it is usecf 
in North America, is something that fascinates overseas leaders. To 
name a few of the corporations who provide service without entity 
profit, but with profit to the members who use and own it^ — the Associ- 
ated Press, Sunkist, Railway Express Agency, our larrce mutual in- 
surance companies, credit" imion finance companies, and agricultural 
purchasing associations, and so forth. 

30-471— 64— pt. 2 15 


Small business is a facet of American life that is devastating to 
the promoters of Soviet communism. The word "capitalism" is under 
worldwide attack. The words "small business" are the end of the 
rainbow for many millions of people. The fact that we, as a nation, 
have recognized small businesses as a vital part of our economic life 
and have shown governmental interest in them is revolutionary to the 
thinking of those who have condemned America as being materialis- 
tic and dominated by big business. 

Nothing will appeal to people in distant lands more than to be 
brought face to face with the fact that small business is a vital part 
of America. We have an "atomic bomb" here in the world of ideas 
that for some reason has never really l>een tried. Nothing is more 
American than private small business. 

Labor unions, through their free labor movement, have done a bet- 
ter job of interpreting America overseas than has business. 

Highly organized American labor is part and parcel of our present- 
day capitalistic society. Our laborers are in many cases stockholders. 
Together with business and agriculture, labor has made possible the 
great revolution of the past 50 years, whereby we have achieved uni- 
versal participation in capitalism by all segments of our society. 

The fact is that they, as free trade unionists, believe enougli in our 
system to fight for it. If the trade associations of the companies for 
which labor works expand their interest in this international program, 
we can turn the tide of history— this, we can and must do. 

Voluntary agencies are as representative of American capitalism 
as any other contemporaiy institution. There are hundreds of trade 
associations here that might well apportion a part of their income 
to send true businessmen abroad, without Government subsidy, to do 
a better job of interpreting America. 

There are many examples of voluntary agencies — from profit-entity 
business, the supermarket organizations, nonprofit corporate associa- 
tions, savings and loan associations, finance and managerial organiza- 
tions are just a few examples of what can be done. 

If just a few more organizations would light their own candles, 
study the situation, and find where their members' particular talents 
and resources fit, world tensions would be considerably eased. 

Again quoting Ambassador Lodge: 

We should also be sure that we are making full use of the things in which 
we excel and in which the Communists are deficient. For example, we probably 
cannot, as a general rule, surpass a young Oriental guerrilla fighter, who doesn't 
mind the heat, who can get along on a daily handful of rice, and who can lie 
under water for hours at a time breathing through a straw. But we can do 
better in other things, such as : the use of airplanes, the art of medicine, im- 
proved farming and education, the development of an energetic political system 
based on justice. 

I believe those last few recommendations, Mr. Chairman, are cer- 
tainly to be considered as we develop this Freedom Academy concept. 
I think they are fundamental, they are something that can work in 
these foreign lands, and I have been in these areas and worked with 
these very fundamentals in mind. 

Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, for letting me appear before 

The Chairman. We certainly are grateful to you, sir, for your 
splendid presentation. 


Now I have just compared your bill, H.R. 10037, with the Boggs 
and Taft bills, and I find that they are almost word for word identical ; 
are they not ? 

Mr. Clausen. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Wlien this was initially set up, 
I wanted to join in this effort. In the matter of finance, however, it is 
up to the committee, I think, to evaluate the testimony. I tend to lean 
toward establishing the private- fhiance concept. 

The Chairman. I understand. But I want to follow the structure 
of 3'our bill. 

Mr. Clausen. Yes. 

The Chairman. It is exactly like the Taft bill and with one ex- 
ception, identical to the Boggs bill. 

Mr. Clausen. Yes. That is correct. And my reason for this, Mr. 
Chairman — at the time that I introduced the bill, I visited with Mr. 
Grant and some of the other fellows who had done substantial re- 
search. I found no great difference in our mutual objectives. So I 
used the same language suggested by these gentlemen to fulfill the 
objectives. The only thing that I am concerned about, of course, is 
how we would finance this. It is possible we will have to amend the 
original bill as it applies to financing the program. 

Some people have said that it can't be financed in the private sector. 
I am personally not convinced that everything has been done that 
could have been done, because I think that we have experienced great 
change in our times. I think there is more emphasis and more con- 
sideration being given to this concept now than in any previous time 
in history, and I do know this, that the gentlemen who worked on 
this legislation at the outset felt in their own minds that they would 
rather have it financed through the private sector, so that they could 
control it, but here again I am not concerned about the method of fin- 
ance for the moment. I think we need to have a strong endorsement 
of the concept, and then it is up to you gentlemen to decide where we 
should place our emphasis on finance before the final draft of the 
bill is voted on. 

Tax incentives, however, could be a very important vehicle to pro- 
mote the concept. 

The Chairman. Well, under the structure of your bill, the financing 
end i s the same as the other bills. 

Mr. Clausen. That is right. 

The Chairman. And by the way, along your thoughts, although 
this — or to start with, anyway — would be a Government-financed oper- 
ation, at least your bill and the Boggs and Taft bills do provide for 
authority to receive loans, gifts, and so on. And there would be an 
avenue of soliciting private financing. 

Mr. Clausen. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. But the availability of private financing is with- 
in the structure of your bill. 

Mr. Clausen. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Through that provision, as it is through the pro- 
vision, the similar provision of the Boggs-Taft bill. 

Mr. Clausen. Yes. This is correct, Mr. Chairman. 

As we progress, I would think at the proper time I would be in- 
clined to offer amendments to this end, but without the full benefit 
of testimony such as you gentlemen have heard before your commit- 


tee, I wouldn't feel as though 1 were as qualified to advocate such 
amendments, as would the committee. Plowever, I am convinced in 
my own mind, with the integrity of this great connnittee, that you 
will be evaluating that possibility, because I have talked to you in- 
dividually and I am convinced that you yourselves want to make 
sure that w^e retain the control in the Congress. Also, control, if it 
is at all possible, by the private sector. 

The Chairman. Thank you very much. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. Am 1 correct in my understanding, Mr. Clausen, 
that you have put rather more emphasis on the privat-e sector than 
possibly some of the other proposals do ? 

Mr. Clausen. Yes, sir; and as a source, now that I have had an 
opportunity to study this, I would recommend, for instance, that the 
gentlemen on this committee call together some of the leaders of our 
foundations; call together the leadership of our labor organizations 
and some of our major trade associations, the U.S. Chamber, some of 
these people, and put the recommendation flat on the table and say, 
"Gentlemen, can you meet this responsibility? Will you get behind 
us? Will you help to publicize this concept, if the committee comes 
forth with a strong recommendation ? Let's see if we can't come up 
with a method of finance alternatives to the Federal financing first." 

Mr. JoiiANSEN. Well, that leads to my next question. The major 
difference in the legislation you would recommend, between what 
you do recommend and what is in the other approaches, would be in 
this area of nongovernmental financing. Is that correct ? 

Mr. Clausen. That is correct. And I am sure that, down dee]) in- 
side, each and every one of us would agree that our major problem 
here in advancing this concept is going to be one of finance. The only 
reason, I am sure, that the members of the committee that have worked 
on this for a long period of time are even considering Government is 
because they are not certain whether or not they can raise the money in 
the private sector. 

Well, here again, I would like to see a major concentration of effort 
in this field, because more people are thinking this way. Just recently 
in the Wall Street Journal^ for instance, there was an article that ex- 
j^ressed this very point of view, that there is in formation now an 
executive, private peace corps. I think you could bring in a number 
of our leaders of the various international church missionary vol- 
unteer programs. They could give yon some ideas in this area. 

I think the most important thing that I could recommend to this 
committee is that you vigorously endorse this Freedom Academy con- 
cept. Whether it be by concurrent resolution or whether it be by a 
bill, this is up to you to decide, but here again, there are two funda- 
mental points that T am concerned about. 

One, I don't have quite the confidence in what the State Department 
has been doing internationally, so I tlierefore would like to have some 
agency that is concerned about international problems be responsive 
to the Congress, to the legislative branch, if it is at all possible, and 
in the matter of finance, I say again, we must convince the leadership 
of our private sector that they have a new role in helping to provide 
for our security, as we continue the economic and political warfare 
with the Soviet Union. The Congress might consider broadening tax 
incentives to motivate this effort. 


Mr, JoiiANSEN. I believe in Admiral Burke's testimony yesterday 
he stated that there would, of course, be an effort to infiltrate this type 
of organization. Commission or Academy. Would you feel that — if 
this is a fair question — that the hazards of such infiltration would be 
greater if it were strictly under Government auspices or ^eater if it 
were under private auspices? 

Mr. Clausen. Well, there is no question in my mind but that it 
would be greater if it were financed by Government. This is the rea- 
son that I ]:)laced this emphasis in the private sector. I think that we 
again could go out and experiment. We would have a lot more flexi- 
bility if it were financed and promoted by the private sector, but our 
key to this, Mr. Johansen, is to motivate the private sector to recognize 
that they have a new responsibility for providing for our security. 

We have reached this point of no return in the so-called nuclear 
stalemate and, in my judgment, we have to educate these people to the 
fact that they have an entirely new responsibility. These people are 
the only ones that are familiar with the private enterprise system. 
These are the onJy ones that can actually sell the American private 
enterprise system overseas. 

I would not want to see them inhibited by a Government organiza- 

Mr. ScHADEBERG. I have no questions. I just want to thank you. 
Don, for coming. 

Mr, Clausen. Thank you. 

Mr. ScHADEjjERG. And giving your testimony, and certainly we will 
be discussing it often, 

Mr. Clausen. Thank you very much, Mr, Chairman. 

The Chairman. Is Mr. Berle with us ? 

We are delighted to have you, sir. We know of your service to 
Government in the past, but for the record, I wish you would give us 
a capsule resume of your background and your experience. 


Mr. Berle. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, it is a privilege to appear 
here. My name is Adolf A. Berle, I am a lawyer practicing in New 
York. I am professor emeritus and also lecturer in law at the Law 
School of Columbia University, and I have a variety of other connec- 
tions which perhaps are less interesting here. 

I was on the expert staff of the American commission to negotiate 
peace with Germany in 1918-1919 and first encountered the Soviet 
thrust then. 

Later, I was on various diplomatic missions for the LTnited States 
from 1933 on. From 1938 through 1944, 1 was Assistant Secretary of 
State, and at various times Acting Under Secretary of State and 
Acting Secretary of State during World War II. 

Thereafter I was Ambassador to Brazil. More recently, I served a 
turn in the Department of State in 1961 as head of President Ken- 
nedy's task force on Latin America. I have maintained my contacts 
with two areas, notably the groups proceeding out of the Iron Curtain 
countries in Eastern Europe, and in Latin America, connections which 
continue up to as late as last night. 

(At this point Mr, Schadeberg left the hearing room.) 


Mr. Berle. I have prepared a statement here, which, if the commit- 
tee will permit, I will not read, but merely put into the record. I don't 
think that you need it read. 

The Chairman. Well, it is always more desirable to us, if satis- 
factory to the person making a presentation, to have him talk from 
rather than read a statement, so that would be fine, but you may do 
either one. 

Mr. Berle. No, I should rather talk from it, if I may, and offer this 
statement into the record. 

The Chairman. The statement will be included in the record. (See 
pp. 1480-1483.) 

Mr. Berle. The statement, I may add, was prepared, so far as the 
textual comments are concerned, with relation to the old bill, the 1961 
bill, the Herlong bill, so-called. Some of the comments which I make 
in this statement have already been taken care of in the Taft-Boggs bill 
and in Representative Clausen's bill, so that perhaps we can talk more 
generally about the conception, and if some of the textual comments 
here are inapposite, it is because the recent redrafting of the bill makes 
them now umiecessary. 

The Chairman. Well, you have been partly responsible for the new 
draftsmanship at this time. 

Mr. Berle. I am very much aware of that and, may I add, I think 
that the revised bills are a great improvement over the old bill. 

The Chairman. Incidentally, with great humility, Sid Herlong, 
Congressman Herlong, said the same thing — that he preferred the 
Boggs-Taft draft. 

Mr. Berle. Well, I am very sure of that, because many of the 
changes result from a change in the international and diplomatic situ- 
ation since 1961. In fact, it is to that that I want to address a few 

At the time when we began considering the conception of the Free- 
dom Academy, there was a single, united Communist push. It was 
described as "the international Commmiist conspiracy." I have never 
liked the word, because what really existed was an undeclared war, 
carried on without bothering to declare it in a great many parts of the 
world. But today there is no longer a single Communist conspiracy, 
nor even a single undeclared war. 

In the past year, some of the forecasts many of us had made were ful- 
filled. The Soviet-Chinese break became not only complete but prob- 
ably, for the time being, irreparable, so that the Communist drive split 
into two parts, and they are different. 

In addition to that, there were a couple of smaller dissident elements, 
notably the Titoist movement, which now emerges as a third force. Let 
me give, if I may, a specific illustration which isn't contained in my 

Six weeks ago, actually on March 31 of this year, there was a revolu- 
tion in Brazil. This happens to be a subject which I have the pleasure 
of knowing something about. Specifically, there were three distinct 
Communist movements mixed up in the attempt to create a dictator- 
ship behind the facade of the Goulart government. One of them was 
National ist-Titoist. This was relatively^ small in power — largely a 
group of intellectuals plus some politicians who thought they could 
make profit out of it. 


There was a second, which was much more powerful, though gradu- 
alist. This was the Soviet Communist group. There was a third, 
highly activist, the Chinese Communist group, which was pushing for 
an immediate takeover. It was that last push, I think, that caused the 
then President Goulait to undertake a series of measures looking to- 
wards making him a variety of Brazilian Castro. It was at that point 
that Brazil, 90 percent of which wanted no part of any of this, pulled 
itself together, changed its government, and got away on a new tack, 
a tack which I personally think is very much more hopeful. There 
had been, you see, two main Communist movements and a third dis- 
sident element, all working somewhat at cross-purposes. However, 
they were all against the United States and all for a temporary Gou- 
lart dictatorship, all against democracy as we know it in BrazU. 

I happened to have followed the progress both of the Communist 
plans and of the proposal to resist them, for a good many months 
prior to the time when the climax came on March 31. 

Splitting up the Communist movement means that your Freedom 
Academy no longer would be working out a strategy against a single 
master plan, which was the phrase Representative Clausen used, but 
must meet a variety of shifting situations with all kinds of cross- 
alliances. Its problem will be infinitely more complex, even, than 
the older one. Whether more or less dangerous, I don't know. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. May I interrupt just at that point ? 

Mr. Berle. By all means. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. Just to ask you : In your judgment, is the fact of 
this diversity and even conflict within the Communist world 

Mr. Berle. It is a real conflict, sir. 

Mr. JoHAXSEN. Yes, but is that a source of potential advantage or 
comfort or benefit to us? Does it make the Communist threat any 
less critical ? 

Mr. Berle. No; it may make it more dangerous. It will depend, 
now, on the area in which each situation happens to emerge. I mean 
by that, in some places, the movements may paralyze each other. In 
still others, it may mean that the intensity of competition between 
them will force more drastic action. In certain areas where one or 
the other group has the complete mastery of the situation, it may make 
the difficulties for ns more intense. 

I think you can't answer that question in general, Mr. Congressman. 
I should like to give one, but I have been too long in this to think that 
there are easy answers. Perhaps that is the best I can do. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. Well, then, it would be at least an attempt at an 
easy answer to assume that it is automatically beneficial to us ? 

Mr. Berle. That is entirely too easy an answer. In point of fact, 
I think that the actual dangers from the situation as they are looming 
up are probably greater than they were before, though I hope they 
are not. That may be the technical answer. I hope that the phrase 
will not be used, "Communist conspiracy," nor the "Communist master 
plan," but use what is the fact, "Communist imperialism," or "im- 
perialist communism." 

Let me say something here that I hope will not shock the committee 
unduly. If a country, of its own accord and minding its own business, 
decides to build a situation not based on private property and not 
unfriendly to the United States, I do not think the United States 


would have any real right to object, nor perhaps should it object. We 
may take a pretty dim view of the success of such an experiment, but 
if internally a country of its own free will decides to try something of 
that nature, and I think it may be tried in Latin America in one coun- 
try, I personally wouldn't see that it made any particular difference 
to us. 

It is when these movements first have as their primary objective 
enmity to the United States and, second, to conquer their neighbors, 
that we get into the act. 

I spoke of one country in Latin America. I was thinking particu- 
larly of Bolivia. That is a 95 percent Guarani and Aymava Indian 
country, where the tribes have never had private pro]:)eriy in our sense 
of the term. Their property, as they know it, is primarily owned by 
Indian villages. And indeed, in some parts, a he-man does not interest 
himself in private property ; that is for women and children. In other 
words, they have the tribal conception, and if they have to build on 
that conception instead of on ours, this is perfectly all right with me, 
and I think with most Americans. This is their privilege, if they 
want to try it. We may not think that it will be very successful in the 
modern world, but that is their affair. For that reason, I suggest that 
we are not fighting to impose a system we have on someone else, but 
to try to prevent the conquest of perfectly peaceful countries by im- 
perialism, using a Communist idea as their primary point of attack. 

I trust that point of view does not shock the committee. There are 
people who feel they want to fight socialism anywhere. 

The Chairman. Not at all. 

Mr. Berle. And I personally have no interest at all in fighting it, 
providing it minds its own business, observes international law, can 
be reasonably friendly to the United States, and does not undertake 
to conquer its neighbors. 

Now the situation is a little more complex, even, than we made out 
here, and I am glad to see that the Taft-Boggs bill recognizes that 

Senator Fulbright recently made a widely publicized speech, and 
he suggested that the world was no longer polarized into two blocs. 
Of course he was right about that. I could not agree with him that 
Cuba was a nuisance, rather than a menace. The fact is that as long 
as Cuba is held by a major overseas Communist imperialist power, 
it will be a menace, and nobody can make it anything else. Qua Cuba, 
he is right. But if, and as long as, it is held by Russian troops — 
Soviet troops, I should say — and influenced primarily by Soviet po- 
litical initiative and is an instrument of the Soviet Union in its im- 
perialism, it is a menace, and we can't make it any' hing eke. 

At the moment, my information is that the inti igues are beginning 
as between the Soviet group and the Chinese group in Cuba. The 
arrangements, tacit or otherwise, arranged after the confrontation of 
1962, have never been published. I have no knowledge, and could 
not have any loiowledge, of the arrangements on the balance, at least, 
worked out between the United States and the Soviet Union at the 
time that the missies were supposedly removed. 

But even without them, as long as Cuba remains in control of an over- 
seas imperialist power, there is no question that there is a menace 


Where Senator Fulbright was everlastingly right, however, was in 
pointing out that no longer was it a two-sided operation. The Soviet 
bloc has broken up, as we have seen. One of their objectives, un- 
questionably, the objectives of both Soviet and Chinese Communist 
political strategy, would be to break up the Western bloc. They will 
intrigue with any member of the NATO bloc that is willing to work 
with them. President de Gaulle, indeed, had a flirtation with Com- 
munist China a while ago. We don't know where that will wind up. 

It would be logical for the Soviet Union to attempt a similar flirta- 
tion, if it could possibly find an opening with some other member 
of NATO. Meanwhile, we have dissident Communist countries in 
between, who will be vibrating backwards and forwards. Both the 
Chinese bloc and the Soviet bloc will be endeavoring to absorb 
weakly held territory wherever they can, notably in Africa and in 
Latin America — Latin America, at the moment, is as it seems to me 
the major theater — and we are thus really back to a situation of fluid 

This means in substance that we shall be in a situation very like 
that in which we were just prior to World War I. Then, as you will 
recall, there were alliances and counteralliances, balance-of-power 
politics, leading to a point at which a tiny incident (in that case the 
murder of an archduke) blew up the whole situation. We are not too 
far from that now, in my judgment, as witness the growing danger 
of a tiny affair in Cyprus. Of itself, this aifair is of no great im- 
portance, but is intentionally used by the Soviet Union (as witness 
a speech of Mr. Khrushchev only 3 days ago) to create as much ten- 
sion as possible between the Greeks and the Turks. These are two 
NATO countries, and there is possibility that we might have an ex- 
plosion there, just as before World War I the Balkan tensions were 
used to create the situation that finally led to World War I. 

I suggest, therefore, that the task of this Freedom Academy must 
be more positive than negative. That is to say, its primary task is 
to lay out a standard of possible organization and action and social 
approach to which the countries and the populations of the world 
can repair, rather than merely undertaking to say, "We are fighting 
the Communist bloc," there being no single Communist bloc to fight. 

I would like, if the committee will permit me, to tell one story, 
which perhaps indicates the possibilities of this sort of a situation. 

For some 10 years, beginning in 1948, there was in Europe what 
was called the College de I'Europe Libre, the Free Europe College. 
This was established by Americans, and was • 

The Chairman. Where was that located ? 

Mr. Berle. That was located near Strasbourg, in France. It had 
an old cliateau outside of Strasbourg. There we tried to educate the 
youngs sons and daughters of the exiles from the Iron Curtain coun- 
tries who had been displaced when the Russians seized those countries 
at the close of World War 11. 

In 1956, the Hungarian revolution came along, and we picked up 
a couple of hundred of the students that had been forced out of Hun- 
gary as a result of the Soviet occupation of that country. We didn't 
try to do the whole job, and maybe the Freedom Academy, when 
constituted, can use this technique. 


We gave them some short orientation courses and a permanent home 
in Europe. Then we arranged fe^o^Ysllips for them to be educated 
at various European universities, they coming back to spend their 

The Chairman. If you will pardon be, didn't we have a witness 
Avho testified on this bill who was familiar with that very institution? 

Mr. McNamara. I don't recall that, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Berle. I think I can claim to be familiar with it, because 1 
was chairman of the board of tmstees of that. 

The Chairman. I am told it is a different school. 

Mr. Berle. I was chairman of the board of trustees of this one. 
I think that Mr. Christopher Emmet, who may have testified before 
this committee, may have talked about it himself. 

The Chairman. That is right. 

Mr. Berle. Well, what happened — the reason for telling is merely 
to show the possibilities of such an Academy. We took these Hun- 
garian students. These were boys who had never known anything ex- 
cept Communist training, the youngsters, but they had revolted against 
the Communist regime. Through our school, one of them got his 
training in economics. Tliereafter, he had to get a job and obviously 
couldn't get one in Hungary. He got a job teaching economics at the 
former French school in French Congo, what is now the state of the 
Congo. Thereafter, came the Congolese revolution, and he stayed 

The Congolese state pulled itself together, after a fashion, in due 
time, and was admitted to the United Nations. Exactly 6 years after 
we had picked him up, without a shirt on his back and given him a 
start at the College de I'Europe Libre, he turned up as the economic 
adviser to the Congolese delegation in the United Nations and was, 
perhaps, as sound and as effective a cooperating influence as one could 
have in a difficult situation. 

I could duplicate that story 20 times, but this perhaps gives you 
the possibilities of the situation. 

My first suggestion, therefore, is that we can use this institution to 
train the endless numbers of foreign boys who want to find out what 
the United States is all about — how it works, why it is successful, how 
far our methods can be adapted to theirs, and to establish those con- 
tacts and connections by which they can be useful to their own coun- 

Now, of those students, there are a gi'eat many. There are a great 
number of young men who talk to me when I am in Latin America, as 
I am, usually, once or twice a year. These boys, if they were pro- 
Communist, would have no difficulty in getting their training at once. 
There is always a quiet individual from the Russian Embassy, where 
there is one, or a Cuban Embassy, or the like, who will pick him up, 
even in the late high school stage. He can then, after a reasonable ap- 
plication, be sent to some institution — the Lenin Institute, if he is 
pretty well up. The Friendship University in Moscow, which is not, 
I believe, quite as successful at it, but still is very active. There are 
similar institutions with which I am not equally familiar in Peking. 

These young men would like to knoAv what makes the Conununist 
system tick, how it is done, how you work it out, and there is no dif- 
ficulty in gettmg an immediate aiTangement where they can go and 


get trained. One of my worries today — this is off our line of march — 
is that a number of tliose men have been regl^Larly going from parts 
of Central America, through Cuba, to Moscow, and now they are com- 
ing back. A contingent of about 30 will be coming into Haiti. May 
I say this is not classified information. I don't have any. Sometimes 
I am not sure that my own information in the areas I do know about 
isn't a little better than the classified information the administration 
may get here, though this may be vanity on my part. Thirty such 
men are said to be returning to Haiti in about a month, and those are 
men who have been educated at the Moscow universities. 

The Chairman. And they were from Cuba ? 

Mr. Berle. From Haiti. 

The Chairman. From Haiti. They are coming back. 

Mr. Berle. They were taken, and now they are coming back. Now 
I surmise that those men will be heard from later. 

But if a boy wants to come to the United States, the best we can do 
is to arrange a scholarship for him, bring him to the United States, say, 
"Here is a great, wide, beautiful country. Go ahead and rove." Which 
is not bad as far as it goes, but it would be a great deal better if you 
could take him, put him in some one place, give him whatever turned 
out to be the necessary period of orientation and training, so that he 
knew what to look for, he knew how the system was run, what we were 
all about, and then, if he wants to go to some other college and take a 
course or to do some observation or something of the kind, we can do 
a very useful job. But if we toss a man whose language is different, 
with only a minor Imowledge of English, into an American institution 
and say, "Here is all of Columbia University ; it is a splendid univer- 
sity but it does not do orientation ; it is not there for that,'' and add, 
"Help yourself," he is apt to be, unless he is very brilliant, rather a 
confused man. He wastes a lot of time and at the end he will come 
back to some of us whom he happens to know and say, "Now, will you 
please give me a short course in what this is all about ?" 

For that reason, I do suggest that a Freedom Academy would have, 
on the foreign side, a very real role to play. 

Finally — and then I will quiet down — the Americans who go abroad 
need a good deal of orientation themselves. I am not talking about 
the State Department men. They have their Foreign Service Insti- 
tute, for one thing, and if they don't find that sufficient, they have a 
variety of excellent technical organizations in foreign affairs, includ- 
ing the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, 
doVn here, another excellent Institute of International Kelations at 
Columbia, as well as the Fletcher School of Diplomacy near Cam- 
bridge, and three or four others around the United States. 

But the men who go abroad on foreign aid projects or for the Alli- 
ance for Progress in Latin America or who take technical assignments 
here, there, and elsewhere, and (as Congressman Clausen said a mo- 
ment ago) a good many businessmen who go abroad, have to learn as 
best they can. They learn on the job. It^is a good way of learning, 
but it takes a long time, and they may make some mistakes. 

I think if this orientation had been done, we would have avoided 
some of the mistakes that the United States Government made. Let 
me take two. 


As you are aware, we had a disaster at the Bay of Pigs. Paren- 
thetically, I myself thmk it was in some respects not as disastrous as 
people suppose. If we had not reacted then, I think the United States 
would have been fighting on the mainland in the Caribbean area now. 
I think that the Bay of Pigs made possible the later confrontation in 

(At this point, Mr. Schadeberg returned to the hearing room.) 

Mr. Berle. But let us leave that aside. After that, the Commimist 
push was centered on Venezuela, as I think you know. This was not 
merely ideological, though it was that. It was strategic, and the 
Cuban and Soviet propaganda made no bones about it. They said, 
"If we are able to take that piece of ten-itory with its resources of 
oil, steel, and developed wealth, we will be able to conquer Latin 
America." I am not sure that they weren't right. 

The man who really defended the country was President Romulo 
Betancourt of Venezuela, a very old and dear friend of mine. Earlier 
he had l>e.en systematically hunted out of the hemisphere by the United 
States Government as a Communist or an ex-Communist, during the 
days of the Venezuelan dictatorship, Perez Jimenez. At one time, 
I think I am right in saying that there was no house in the United 
States to which he could come, except mine. I happened to know 
him from the old days. He had been a student, had joined a Com- 
mimist club m the Univei-sity of Costa Rica when he was in exile 
there, had learned the game, disliked it, resigned and got out. And 
knowing what they w^ere up to, knowing what the Commmiist at- 
tackers wanted, he was able to score the greatest single victory we 
have had in Latin America — unless the Brazilian victory may be 
equal — up to now. 

If we had been well enough instructed in these matters as we should 
be, we never would have made the mistake of systematically trying 
to hunt Betancourt out of the hemisphere. We should not have relied 
only on a few private American friends to see that he got asylum, 
which he finally got in Puerto Rico. Tliere he and Munoz Marin 
worked out the social plans which have made Venezuela the most 
brilliant social, economic, and political victory in this hemisphere. 

I think perhaps that is enough, together with my statement, and 
perhaps I have talked too long already. It is time to stop telling 

The Chairman. Please go on and tell us some more. 

Mr. Berle. Well, I will tell you another one. Pepe Figueres, Jose 
Figueres, fought the first war against the Communists in Latin Amer- 
ica. This was in 1947, in Costa Rica. Then an invasion force — backed 
first by the then dictator of Nicaragua, Luis Somoza, and second, by 
the Communist organization in Costa Rica — it seems like an odd 
combination, but these little Hitler-Stalin pacts are quite usual in 
Latin America — endeavored to displace the duly elected Costa Rican 
President, a man named Ulate. 

Jose Figueres decided that he would resist this movement, which 
he did. It finally climaxed, after a 6 weeks' small war, in a pitched 
battle on the plains behind Cartago — and Jose Figueres won it. The 
armistice was dictated on a drumhead. The provisional government 
which was organized then reestablished the duly elected President of 
Costa Rica. In the election which came a few years later, Figueres 


presented himself and became President of Costa Kica. But during 
that period, eveiy kind of propaganda was made against him up here, 
and it was a very difficult period for him. 

He also was attacked as a Communist. Actually, he was the best 
friend we have had in Central America. It was he who kept Betan- 
court's head above water when he was exiled from Venezuela. Later, 
Figueres gave asylum to Ramon Villeda ]\Iorales, also a good friend 
of the United States and of his own country, who later became Presi- 
dent of Honduras. I resented the fact, gentlemen, that there were only 
a few of us, and we private men — I was not at the time in public life — 
who were endeavoring to hold together the best elements in the situa- 
tion and who were accused of communism by people who didn't know 
the difference between a Communist and an honest-to-Gocl reformer. 
We were under attack because we said, "That man claims to be a social 
reformer. He is really in Communist pay." 

The United States can't afford that kind of foolishness, and there 
ought to be some place in the country where they really know the dif- 

I think perhaps I have said enough to indicate that while I feel that 
Freedom Academy has a place, both for training Americans and for 
training foreigners, I rather feel, possibly in opposition to Mr. Clau- 
sen, that it would have to be financed by the Government. I am rather 
doubtful as to whether private financing w^ould work in this. I think 
if you are going to do this job, it ought to be well done. 

The Chairman. Well, we have received testimony from quite a few 
witnesses along that line, who, while agreeing with Congressman 
Clausen as to the major role that the private sector must make, yet 
concluded that this must be financed by the Government, that no single 
college, university, combination of them, is big enough and equipped 
well enough to handle this, and it must be through the vehicle of this 

Mr. Berle. Besides which, they have their own job to do. The uni- 
versities are pretty well taxed now and are going to be worse taxed 
next year. I have had a full schedule at Columbia this year and will 
next, so I know this of my own knowledge. I really feel that if this 
task is to be done, it will have to be done with Government financing. 

The Chairman. Now, may I ask a question at this time ? 

Mr. Berle. Please. 

The Chairman. Referring to such facilities as we have now the 
War College, and so on, in what way do you think that — I wouldn't 
say they are deficient, but not well enough equipped or not broad 
enough — why can't they do the job ? We have to make a record along 
that line, we must demonstrate it. We would like your comments on 

Mr. Berle. I do not wish to criticize the War Colleges. For one 
thing, I am a lecturer at the Air War College and occasionally at the 
National War College, myself, but these institutions are primarily to 
train profevssionals in some particular specialized aspect. 

At the Air War College, they are training professional officers in the 
Air Force. At the National War College, they are training profes- 
sional officers for foreign assignment. This means, and should mean, 
high emphasis on military technique and on politics only as an adjunct 
to it. 


This is one thing. It is right, and it is proper that they should. 
But we do not expect Army officers to make political policy abroad. 
We have always had the civil arm as prevalent. Unless he is detached 
from the Army and becomes either the head of an occupying force or 
a quasi-diplomat, the Amiy officer does not have primary political 
jurisdiction. He needs to have political orientation, but the work of 
these institutions is highly professional, as indeed it should be. It 
would not do for nonprofessional officers. 

I speak from some experience, 15 years' experience or more, as lec- 
turer at the Air War College. 

Again the Foreign Service Institute is primarily professional train- 
ing for diplomats. I think some of them could have benefited by the 
possibilities of an institution like the Freedom Academy, but most of 
them have had a great deal of experience themselves and perhaps don't 
need it. That question I respectfully refer to my former colleagues 
in the Department of State. 

We are thinking here, I believe, of two levels. First, there is need 
of a variety of intellectual general staff in this problem, which I hope 
the Freedom Academy men could furnish. This would mean men 
who knew various areas. For example, men who knew the Middle 
East and knew the interrelation of the Soviet imperialist drive with 
this, that, or the other of the Arab movements ; men who knew Latin 
America and knew the impact of this, that, or the other group on 
specific parties or groups in the various 20-odd countries. (I say 
"odd" because there are a few more about to come in ; there are actually 
20 independent countries in Latin America now.) These men could, 
therefore, explain the lines and the methods of attack used in these 
various countries. This is on the intellectual side. 

Second, when men come in for training, planning to go to one or 
another part of the world, the trainees could have both the general 
orientation and some immediate knowledge of who meant what in the 
area to which they were going. This is the knowledge that some of us 
have accumulated in various areas through a lifetime of experience. 
This is hard to get and hard to learn on the ground. 

We are thinking, therefore, of this double stratum of a Freedom 
Academy faculty, if you wish to call it that, and of men who go there 
for orientation training. There you have, perhaps, the picture. No 
institution now offers that anywhere. 

The Chairman. Now there is some honest, sincere feeling of mis- 
understanding, and I suppose I must use the word "suspicion," that 
this institution could on the one hand be dominated — and that is a 
strong word — by the State Department or, on the other hand, could 
interfere witli the State Department's proper conduct of foreign af- 
fairs. I personally think that both can be avoided. What are your 
views on that? Can we have both an independent, effective Academy 
and an independent, effective State Department ? 

Mr. Berle. I share your feeling. I think those evils can be avoided. 
I can perfectly understand, having sj^ent many years of my life in 
the Department of State, the dislike of the State Department to have 
other groups barging in where they have the primary responsibility. 
That is perfectly understandable. 

On the other hand, I can't feel that the technical diplomatic ap- 
proach is the primary approach or even the only approach in these 


matters. The State Department does not have control over the United 
States Information Agency. It does not have primary control ov^er 
the Army. The centralized control ought to be a matter of policy, 
which should, of course, be centered in the White House. There "is 
no other place that I know of that it can be. 

The views of the State Department as to what ought to Ije done at 
any given moment of time are one thing. The view as to the overall, 
continuing intellectual, and may I use an old-fashioned word, "spiri- 
tual" drive, is something else. That can never be the property either 
of the State Department or of the War College or, for that matter, 
of the Freedom Academy. But the attempt to state what is the na- 
tional point of view, or at least the national consensus, I think, has 
to lie outside any department that I know yet. 

I do not mean that there are not men in the State Department 
who could do it; there are. I do not mean that there are not men 
in the Army who could do it ; there are. Or any of the other agen- 
cies. But when it comes to meeting issues, the State Department pri- 
marily is the avenue of contact with other governments. They have 
a terrible time when the government to which their Ambassador is 
accredited and which they recognize is intriguing with, let us say, 
a Communist power, and they can't, within diplomatic proprieties, 
state a point of view to the people of the countiy, because that would 
be improper diplomatic intervention. That has to be done outside 
formal diplomacy. 

You see, this is the great beauty of the Communist system. They 
have embassies which may, perhaps, be as correct as yon could possibly 
imagine. Somewhere else in the country they have different institu- 
tions which operate outside the whole diplomatic milieu. Now your 
diplomat is always unhappy when anything interrupts his contact 
with the palace. He is right about that. It's his business to get what 
he can through that kind of contact. Building up of ideological pres- 
sure or, if you choose, outside influence, is not his business, as a general 
rule. Occasionally, an extremely able Ambassador can do that, but 
the Foreign Service diplomats are rather trained not to do it. It is 
not often that we get men as brilliant as, let us say, my friend Kenneth 
Galbraith, formerly Ambassador to India, who was able to go outside 
diplomatic channels and appeal to public opinion in India. He could 
do so largely because he was a professor even more than he was an 
Ambassador. Though this happens from time to time, it is rare. And 
even when a diplomat does make the attempt, he is entitled to some 
help from somewhere, and that kind of work really falls outside the 
technical diplomatic area. It is primarily educational in its main 

The Chairman. Another question that I would like the benefit of 
your mature judgment on is this: There has been some expression, 
minority expression, before this committee — for these hearings have 
been going on for some time — to the effect that the kind of an institu- 
tion the bill envisages would engage in "indoctrination," and so on, 
and that would be dangerous. 

I have never been able to completely understand the argument. 
What are your views on that ? 

Mr, Berle. Well, I am not quite sure. 


The Chairman. Well, I can't explain it better, because I am afraid 
he didn't make it very clear — the witness I refer to, without naming 

Mr. Berle. I share your confusion. I can underetand this : There 
is always a fear that indoctrination will be used to try to induce agree- 
ment witii some single ideological system in our own country, which 
may not be the whole story. 

There are many who believe as I do in free enterprise, but many 
who also believe that any governmentally owned enterprise is auto- 
matically bad. Therefore, the fear is that indoctrination might be 
used, let us say, to influence men against, well, the Tennessee Valley 
Authority in our own country or the possible establislmient of equiv- 
alent experiments abroad. Yet there are many countries abroad where 
that kind of operation is the only way the job is likely ever to be done. 
We have to be flexible about economic method. 

I think there is a fear lest indoctrination would commit the institu- 
tion, the Government, and the men trained by it to some unduly nar- 
row form of approach. Given the kind of world we have — I have lost 
count now, but I think there are 125 governments in the world, and 
more coming up, with every kind of a social situation from that of semi- 
primitive tribes to highly developed countries of great capacity — 
clearly our doctrine can't exclude the kind of approach which in cer- 
tain areas would be the only approach possible. 

I have thought, therefore, there might be danger that indoctrination 
might lead to commitment to too narrow a doctrine. 

Actually, there is a common denominator behind all American think- 
ing. Indoctrination in that might be a good idea. 

We do l>elieve in personal freedom. We do believe in the significance 
of the individual. We don't like the police states and miscellaneous 
killing and attempts to enslave whole populations. We don't believe 
in it, whether done in the name of "people's states" by Communists or 
in the name of pure, personal dictatorships like the kind that made 
Trujillo, prior to his assassination, one of the richest men in the world. 
Neither can it be squared with American doctrine. All Americans do 
agree on the general premise of freedom. We do agree on governments 
responsive to the will of their peoples, primarily aimed to serve their 
peoples and primarily aimed at doing so without that continuous in- 
vasion of human rights that is gradually accomplishing the failure 
of the Communist and Fascist experiments. 

I personally don't feel that we need to be afraid of indoctrination 
in its real sense. I can, of course, see the possibilities of abuse. 

The Chairman. Two more questions, and the first might lead to the 
second. What are some of the provisions in the Taft-Boggs bill that 
improved the Herlong bill, and then, after you answer that, would you 
have any further recommendations to make ? 

Mr. Berle. I would want to study a little more than I have the Taft- 
Boggs bill and the Clausen bill, which appear to me on a very casual 
go-over as about the same, barring the question of financing. 

A good many of my textual quarrels — I won't say "quarrels," but 
"suggestions" — with relation to the old Herlong bill seem to have 
been clarified or cleaned up. 


I think, for example, that the phrase "international Communist con- 
spiracy" has generally been eliminated right through. I am not sure it 
has not already been done. 

I should like, if I may, perhaps to save the time of the committee, a 
chance to go over the bills more closely textually. 

The Chairimlvn. We would appreciate that. 

Mr. Berle. If I have any bright ideas as to the text, I would be glad 
to send them to the committee. 

The Chairman. I think that would be valuable, not now, if you 
wish, but in the same paper, if further improvements come to your 
mind, I wish you would set them out. 

Mr. Berle. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I have assumed 
that the Taft-Boggs bills had carried forward a good deal of the 
thinking of the various men who worked on it, and perhaps of this 
committee as well, and that the ultimate form of this bill Vv'ill be draft- 
ed in committee on this base. I assume the bill isn't frozen, so that 
anyone could say, "Because I want this changed, 1 am against the 

The Chairman. Well, we want as much in the record for that pur- 
pose as we can, if you will give some thoughts to that. 

Mr. Berle. I will be glad to do so. I don't consider myself ade- 
quately prepared to make a textual conunent on H.R. 10037, wliich is 
the Clausen bill, or H.R. 8320, which is the Taft bill and, I gather, 
the same as the Boggs bill ; and if I may, I will submit any textual sug- 
gestions that occur to me. 

The Chairman. I should have said the Taft-Boggs-Clausen bill. 

Mr. Berle. They are substantially the same. They are an improve- 
ment, in my judgment, of the original Herlong bill. 

Mr. Johansen. Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Berle, I would like to ask a question or two that may seem afield 
from the subject that you are testifying to, but I think I can relate it in 
a moment, and this is said to lay the background. 

Am I correct in my understanding that Mr. Herbert Matthews of 
the New York Times was a leader in developing not only certain pub- 
lic impressions with regard to Castro and his regime in Cuba, but 
was also a source, by instruction, of certain guidance or misguidance 
of the State Department in the early stages of that takeover ? 

Mr. Berle. As to the first, you are right. As to the second, I hap- 
pen to know the facts, and I think that that is somewhat of a mis- 

Mr. Matthews had visited Castro when he was starting his revolution 
in the Sierra Maestra and had returned to New York. An Ambas- 
sador-designate of the United States was going to Havana. My 
foraier public relations officer, who has been very unjustly accused in 
this business, Mr. William A. Wieland, was then in charge of Cuban 
affairs. He was asked by a famous United States Senator to direct the 
new Ambassador to New York and to suggest that he talk with Mr. 
Matthews. Mr. Wieland passed on that suggestion. 

May I add the Senator in question w^as perfectly honest in doing it ; 
so was Mr. Wieland. Further, it was a perfectly intelligent thing 
to do. If you are going to a country, and there is a revolution, to 
talk to the man who has firsthand knowledge of that revolution, before 
you get there, is a perfectly sane, sensible thing to do. 

30-471 — 64— pt. 2 ^16 


Wieland. did not ask the Ambassador to agree with Mr, Matthews 
or to accept his estimate or his views or anything else, but merely 
to inform himself about the situation. Ambassadors, before they go 
to their country, commonly do connect with the individuals in the 
United States who know most about it, as a part, of their briefing. 

That, I think, is all that happened. 

Later, an attempt was made — first, let me add that, in my judgment, 
Mr. Matthews, whom I know and whom I believe to be a perfectly 
honest man, was entirely deceived as to the real nature of the Castro 
revolution. I think he was honestly deceived, in his defense. Though 
I have no call to defend him, I may add that a great many first-rate 
Cubans who were associated with Castro were equally deceived. If 
Mr. Matthews got it wrong, so did a great many Cubans as well. In 
fairness to Mr. Matthews, with whose views I do not agree, I think 
that ought to be stated. I see absolutely nothing improper in suggest- 
ing to an American Ambassador about to go down there that he talk 
to the last man on the ground. It is an Ambassador's business to make 
up his own mind. 

To represent this as a plot to try to steer an American Ambassador 
into the Castro movement, I think is mijust to everybody concerned. 
These are my own views on the matter. 

It is true that Mr. Castro turned out to be, if not a member of the 
Communist Party, at least for all practical purposes, a Communist 
agent. It is true that he claims now that he was so all along and that 
that perhaps should have been discovered at the time. 

May I add that I speak here with a clear record myself. In early 
1959, I thought the Communists were taking over Cuba and I wrote 
an article for The Rejyorter magazine in which I said so. In 1960, I 
wrote a very careful article in the Foreign Affairs, which is a rathei- 
blue-ribbon journal of foreign afi'airs, saying that I thought Cuba was 
already a Soviet satellite. 

By consequence in defending anyone who was deceived, I do so al- 
though I held a contrary view at the time, and the record is there to 
show it. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. Now, my purpose in raising these questions was not 
to pillory Mr. Matthews. 

Mr. Berle. I want to say something about Mr. Wieland, because he 
got the roughest ride and the rawest deal of any man I know. He was 
my public relations man when we had a similar situation in Brazil. 
There couldn't have been a more loyal opposition to Communist at- 
tacks on the United States than Bill Wieland. His career was wrecked 
by the attacks on him, and I would like to put into this record an hon- 
orable attempt to set the record straight. 

Excuse me. 

Mr. JoHiVNSEN. That is all right. My purpose in raising the ques- 
tion, and for the sake of developing my pomt, let us assume that Mr. 
Matthews was perfectly honest in his intentions, there was no sinister 
motive or purpose in his advocacy, but the question that I am coming 
to is : To what extent might there be a danger that, either through hon- 
est error or through sinister design, the Freedom Academy might be- 
come the vector for misinformation or misguidance or misinterpreta- 
tion of current developments in this whole vast area, complex area of 
Communist imperialism ? 


Mr. Berle. There is a certain danger in it. I do not consider the 
danger great. The difticidty in the Cuban situation was the fact 
that there was not enough coverage, whereas the Freedom Academy 
is proposing more coverage. One of the great difficulties in Latin 
America is that there have been only two or three sources of journalistic 
information and ox)inion in the entire United States. 

The NeiD York Times is one of them. Time magazine is another 
one. I think there are two or three others now. When there is so 
slender coverage as that, the honest mistake or, as you say, possibly 
the sinister design of any one source of information can make an im- 
mense amount of trouble. 

One of my hopes is that the Freedom Academy would spread out 
the amount of information we have, so that the mistake of any single 
source, be it of news or opinion, could be corrected. 

Obviously, if the Freedom Academy undertook to centralize all of 
them, the danger of abuse would be greater. 

As it is set up here, I do not think that the danger of abuse is very 
great. Clearly, if you assume that any Government mechanism can 
be subverted, you assume danger. But I think we all of us know 
that while this possibility exists, and always has existed since spies 
were first sent into Canaan by Joshua, it also corrects itself rather 
rapidly in our system. I am certain that correction would be promjit 
in the Freedom Academy. 

One of the reasons why I believe in a free press is that the widest 
possible coverage, with all its difficulties and disadvantages, is the 
best corrective. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. Because it tends to be self -correcting ? 

Mr. Berle. Yes. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. To what extent — and I ask this final question in 
view of the opinion expressed by Admiral Burke yesterday — to what 
extent would you feel that the Freedom Academy would be a target 
of attempted infiltration, exploitation, and abuse by sinister forces? 

Mr. Berle. Well, I think it would, but then I think everyone and 
every agency who stands up for a free government is going to be the 
target of abuse, possibly infiltration, by the forces in opposition. 

I think all of us have, at one time or another, either been approached 
or have been abused — in my case, both have happened — by someone 
who thinks that some tiny fragment of influence can be absorbed, 
abused, or removed, as the case may be. 

That is part of our times. That is what a cold war is. I concede 
the danger, but I think that the same danger probably attaches to 
any position of influence, whether it is a job on the New York, TiTnes 
or a job in the Department of State or in the United States Army or on 
a congressional committee. That is exactly what this kind of situ- 
ation implies. So, while I think Burke is perfectly right in what he 
said, I don't consider the danger here any greater than it is in another 
key spot in the United States administration. 

Mr. Schadeberg. I have no questions. 

I would just like to apologize for having had to be absent for the 
first part of your testimony. I would have liked to have been here, 
and I am sorry that I had to leave. 

The Chairman. Off the record. 

(Discussion off the record.) 


Mr. Clausen. Mr. Chairman, I simply Avonder if I could be afforded 
the same privilege of offering some possible recommended changes on 
my bill. 

The Chairman. Surely. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Berle. We are very appreciative of your 
willingness to cooperate. 

Mr. Berle. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

(At. this point Mr. Willis left the hearing room.) 

Mr. Berle. No more questions ? 

I apologize for having taken up so much time. 

Mr. JoHANSEN (presiding). We solicited it, Mr. Berle. 

(Mr. Berle's formal statement follows :) 


I appear in favor of the bill to create a Freedom Commission and a Freedom 
Academy. It bas been before tbe 87tb Congress as H.R. 8935. It requires modi- 
fication in the light of present conditions, but the proposed institution can serve 
a very useful purpose. Since the bill was introduced in 1961 the international 
scene has altered. I think the congressional findings embodied in section 2 were 
a not unfair statement of matters as they stood in 1961, but the situation has 
now altered. 

The organized international Communist movement was in unity in 1961. Now 
it is split into a number of opposed factions. The two principal sectors are, 
respectively, the Communist movement as promoted by the Soviet Union on 
the one hand, and a more extreme version of it promoted by the Commvmist 
regime in mainland China. In addition to these, there are smaller dissident 
fragments, one of which is sponsored by the Government of Yugoslavia, and a 
second which may be in formation, revolving around attempts by Rumania par- 
tially to detach herself from the Soviet bloc and become, if not neutral, at least 
mediator between the Chinese and Soviet blocs. The final lineup is not yet fixed 
though it may occur if, as is discussed, a world Communist Congress is called 
by the Soviet Union or Red China this year. 

Each of the two principal Communist factions — that sponsored by the Soviet 
Union and that of Communist China — is, I think, less doctrinaire than straight 
nationalist-imperialist. In each case, the real objective appears to be that of 
bringing additional territories under the conquest of, or vrithin the political or 
military sphere of influence of, the sponsoring power — China or the Soviet 
Union, as the case may be. Properly speaking, they thus are "imperialist," and 
their ideological objectives are subordinated to nationalist and expansionist 
goals of the two powers. Instead, therefore, of calling this "the international 
Communist conspiracy" — the phrase used in the bill — I should recommend 
abandoning the phrase and using consistently the phrase, "imperialist com- 

Senator Fulbright, in a recent widely publicized speech, suggested that the 
world was no longer polarized between the Communist bloc and the free world 
bloc and that the United States should recognize that fact. I think he was 
right in that respect, though I did not agree with his belief that Cuba was a 
nuisance, rather than a menace. The implications of this breakup, however, are 
not happy. We may be coming into a very fluid diplomatic situation. 

Each of the two major Communist powers will be seeking alliances and 
counteralliances against each other — and, of course, against the United States. 
Either one may develop an interest in bringing about a state of war between the 
United States and the other Commimist power, leaving itself "neutral," intending 
to pick up diplomatic plunder at the close. This was what Stalin intended in 
1939 by making the famous Hitler-Stalin Pact, and what he did do later with 
some effectiveness as the United States and Japan fought out the war in the 
Far East. The Soviet Union could profit by war between the United States and 
Communist China ; Communist China could profit by war between the Soviet 
Union and the United States. 

Meantime, both will endeavor to work out alliances, counteralliances, and 
balance-of-power politics, combined with attempts to absorb weakly held ter- 
ritory — as, apparently, the Chinese are endeavoring to do in Africa today and 
as the Soviet Union has been attempting to do in the Caribbean up to a few 


months ago, if indeed she is not still attempting to do so. And, of course, either 
side will make as much capital as they can out of any opening they may find 
for alliance or eounteralliance in Western Europe or the Middle East. 

This resembles the situation before World War I. It will be a period of 
very complex and very uneasy diplomacy and will be intensely difficult to 
meet. It will not be, as the language of the bill under review here says, a "care- 
fully patterned total aggression * * * of the Communist bloc." It is more 
likely to be a shifting collection of major and minor Communist-imperialist diplo- 
matic moves, chiefly inspired by opportunism. 

Obviously one objective will be the weakening of the United States and of 
the NATO combination, wherever and whenever possible. 

This means that the central conception of the Freedom Academy must be posi- 
tive rather than negative — must build around the objectives, ideals, capacities, 
and goals of the United States, rather than merely opposition to a central Com- 
munist plan. 

Let me add that I do not relish the emerging diplomatic pattern. It will be 
diflScult at best and dangerous all the time. 

My own interest in an institution of this sort comes from two sources. I 
have been active in the Free Europe Committee and, among other things, in 
the attempt to rescue the young men and women exiled from the Iron Curtain 
countries after World War II. I have also been deeply interested, as well as 
involved, in the endless struggle for progress in Latin America. As you are 
aware, Latin America is a major theater in the cold war. This is also the 
area in which the United States is most steadily and most bitterly attacked. 
Perhaps that would have been true in any case. But with the seizure of the 
Cuban bridgehead a readymade staging ground fell into Russian Communist 
hands, though there is reason to believe Chinese Communists are intriguing 
to secure control of it now. From this bridgehead, not only political warfare 
but paramilitary and direct military actions have been launched and in greater 
or less degree are progressing now despite the major defense victory in Ven- 
ezuela. As Secretary Rusk observed the other day, several Latin American 
countries are in direct line of fire at the moment. 

Many of my Latin American friends ask me where in the United States they 
can go to have concise, direct instruction as to how the American system 
work.s — and why it works^and what it has achieved — and how far it can be 
adapted to the customs of other countries. I know of no such place. Yet the 
embassy of any Communist country knows exactly where to send its friends. 
There is the Lenin Institute and the Friendship University in Moscow, and 
reportedly there are training centers in Cuba. There are equivalent institu- 
tions in Communist China. About all the United States can do is to invite 
students here, give them liberty to rove the vast United States, and find out 
what they can. 

Actually, the American system is a highly integrated combination of ideas 
on the one hand and direct government machinery on the other. I endeavored 
to describe it last year in a book entitled The American Economic Republic, 
a copy of which I now offer to this comittee as an exhibit. I hope it is merely 
the outline of more serious studies to be made later on. In any case, it ought 
to be possible for a competent group to take men, Americans and foreigners, and 
explain with reasonable clarity how the United States works and why it has 
been, everything considered, one of the most successful forms of government 
in the world. It ought to be possible to explain how this form of government 
has produced brilliant results within the ambit of our economic system — as in 
Puerto Rico — and how cooperation with it has assisted other countries as in 
Venezuela. It ought to be increasingly possible to work out means by which 
American methods can be adapted to conditions in other countries though of 
course these are usually different from ours. 

It ought also to be possible to enable men to see almost at a glance what 
social movements are sincerely intended to benefit the less fortunate mem- 
bers of society and what movements are merely intended to use grievances — 
perhaps legitimate grievances — as a means of recruiting personnel for Com- 
munist imperialist purposes. Those of us who have lived with this problem a 
long time — I myself have since the time of the Treaty of Versailles — have learned 
the technique, and the technique of involving perfectly innocent people with 
tainted movements. Organizations are produced in which entirely loyal citizens 
can enroll to right social wrongs. The tainted organizations conceal the fact 
that their real intent is not to redress social wrongs, but to build subversive 


movements, subversive propaganda, sometimes even guerrilla force, all di- 
rected by some Communist imperialist intelligence or political warfare chief. 
Americans as well as foreigners ought to learn how to protect themeselves 
against this sort of thing. 

Finally, the object of a Freedom Academy of this kind need not and cannot 
be merely defensive. We are beginning to know a good deal about the technique 
of redressing social wrongs — as well as a good deal about the failures of the 
Communist system in this regard. 

The United States Government has recently proposed, and in the next decade 
will carry through, an antipoverty campaign. It will succeed in this cam- 
paign — as nearly as it is possible to succeed, given the frailties and inequalities 
of human beings. It should be possible to adapt the ideals and the methods 
used in this campaign so that they can be opposed, as an alternative, to pro- 
grams put forward whose ultimate result seems merely an extension of im' 
perialist communism with very little advantage to the poor, the underprivileged, 
and the workers. 

The kind of institution envisaged by this bill ought to begin rather modestly, 
dealing with specific situations, and should not endeavor to cover the entire wide 
world in its first activities. It should build its theoretical and its practical 
side soundly and well, and expand as experience shows it is useful. 

If, in any country, communism were not imperialist — if it did not seek to con- 
quer, seize, or draw into its orbit other countries — necessity for a Freedom 
Academy would be far less. Countries do have a right to endeavor to build a 
civilization not based on private property — if that is what their people want. As 
long as they observe international law, mind their own business, and do not seek 
to conquer or subvert other countries, the United States has not, I think, any 
real reason to object — though we may take a dim view of the success of these 
experiments. When, however, they finance, first, subversive propaganda, then 
guerrilla movements, and finally build up and foment civil wars in other coun- 
tries, aiming to take over power themselves, we do have a right to object and, of 
course, doubly so when attempt is made to attack the United States abroad or 
to interfere in the internal affairs of the United States. It is the linking of the 
Communist propaganda organization and arms with imperialism in the true 
sense of that term — an endeavor to seize power over other countries— that en- 
dangers world peace, as well as the lives and welfare of many millions of people 
w ho are involved. 

I venture to suggest some textual revision. 

I suggest the change, throughout, of the words "international Communist con- 
spiracy" to "imperialist communism." 

Section 2 ought to be revised in the light of current developments in the diplo- 
matic world. 

Paragraph 3 of the findings ought now to be deleted. A couple of "neutralist 
Communist parties" are emerging whose ideology does envisage "neutrals" in 
the struggle between capitalism and communism. 

I oppose inclusion of subparagraph (4) of the findings. We did suffer defeats 
in the cold war, and we all know it. More recently we have scored a couple 
of notable victories, albeit defensive. I would mention particularly the brilliant 
success of free democratic government in Venezuela under the presidency of Ro- 
mulo Betancourt and the defeat by Venezuela of a Russian-supported attempt to 
seize that country by Castro terrorist and guerrilla attack. Also I believe the 
events of April 1964 in Brazil represented a wholesale resistance by that great 
country against the intrigues both of the Soviet Union and of Communist China 
looking toward seizure of the Brazilian Government. Communist efforts in 
Brazil were not, however, united. Both the Soviet Union and Communist China 
wished to increase their power over Brazil. But their organizations were also 
maneuvering against each other and apparently still are though my own in- 
formation on the subject is incomplete. Both, however, were defeated, and I see 
no reason why we should insist on the finding of disaster in paragraph (4) . His- 
tory is moving too fast. 

Some textual changes can be made in paragraph 5. 

I should advocate striking out paragraph 6, or rephrasing it by striking out the 
first full sentence in that paragraph and rephrasing the second sentence. 

I do not see the necessity of maintaining subparagraph (c) of paragraph 7. 
The need that Federal officials engaged in foreign affairs should understand the 
problem should, I think, be taken for granted without putting it in a legislative 


I should likewise delete subparagraph 8 of this section. The objectives un- 
happily will not be accomplished by a crash program. This is going to be a long 
pull as President Kennedy repeatedly observed. 

In section 6 I suggest some minor changes in phraseology. Subparagraph (1) 
of that section could be improved. 

Brought up to date, I believe this bill offers a useful addition to the Ameri- 
can collection of foreign policy tools. 

Mr. JoHANSEX. Mrs. Chapelle. We are happy to have you here. 
Before we proceed, the stall' has handed me two biographical and in- 
formational items regarding the witness, in the New York Times of 
February 1, 1962, and April 14, 19G2, and without objection, we will 
incorporate them in the record. 

(The two newspaper articles follow:) 

[The New York Times, Thursday, February 1, 1962] 

Books of the Times 

(By Charles Poore) 

Women are decidedly men's equals. We all know that — vive though we may 
the differences. Also, they come under the infinite province of Orwell's Law ; 
many women are much, much equaler than others. 

As prime example we have today Dickey Chapelle's exuberant new book, 
"What's a Woman Doing Here?" * the story of her adventures as a combat 
reporter in our feverishly truculent world. Put it on your reading list now. 

Mrs. Chapelle deplores war. Yet she feels that if sheltered people are going 
to spend so much time talking about it some of them should go out and see how 
it is conducted. 

Those w ho write current history have an obligation, in particular, to do original 
research from time to time — an arduous discipline, no doubt, and not one that 
will commend itself irresistibly to pundits who from prudent distances become 
authorities on the havoc of carnage. Yet Mrs. Chapelle has followed it from 
World War II in the Pacitic to Algeria, Hungary, Cuba, and, among other places, 

She went mainly to take pictures of men in battle. Her photos are splendid. 
So is her capacity to supplement them with words. 


In fact, she occasionally reverses the weary argument about words versus pic- 
tures with considerable force. How many photographs, for example, do you 
suppose it would take to equal her analysis of Fidel Castro, based on his first 
sweep to power? These are the crucial sentences : 

"The overwhelming fault in his character was plain to see even then. This was 
his inability to tolerate the absence of an enemy ; he had to stand — or better, rant 
and shout — against some challenge every waking moment." 

However, I .suppose we should give the picture advocates their due in this case. 
Much of the ranting and shouting these days comes to us from performances be- 
fore television cameras of what history may identify as the first dictator com- 
pletely wired for pictures as well as sound. One of the first, anyway. And on the 
threshold of being presented in livid color. 

Mrs. Chapelle is a Milwaukee girl who arrived on the photographic scene 
long after the camera's widest-angle-giving tripod — the airplane — had proved 
it was here to stay. Her interest in taking pictures developed from an early 
passion for airplanes. Late in the Ninteen Thirties she worked for barnstorming 
aerobatics shows. Today, while she is not one of our foremost pilots, she is a 
parachute jumper of exceptional daring. 

You can usually tell that a war is either under way or about to start when- 
ever she comes down from some moving point in the sky. 

*WHAT'8 A WOMAN DOING HERE? By Dickey Chapelle, Illustrated with photographs 
hy the author. 285 pages. Morrow. $5. 


The most searing ordeal in her book is her account of being held incommuni- 
cado in a Hungarian prison. She had gone to report the attempted delivery of 
medical supplies to Hungary's heroic young rebels behind the Iron Curtain. 

The secret police caught her. In their cells she half froze, half starved and vpas 
completely surrounded by terror. Death stalked the cells, death lay behind 
her interrogators' endless, numbing questions. "We will not hang you today. 
The papers in your case are not complete," she would be told. She was 
threatened with several kinds of torture. 

reds' aims described 

"What the Reds were trying to do," she says with amazing fortitude, "was 
to peel back my will like the layers of an onion. My will was to go on being 
a woman journalist from America named Ohapelle, a member of a loving family, 
above all a human being. Their will was that I become a tool and nothing 

Nothing more? Only those who have endured such an ordeal without breaking 
have won the right to judge. She fought hard enough to win. And, she says, 
"if you fought hard enough, whatever was left of you afterward would not be 
found stripped of honor." 

[The New York Times, April 14, 1962] 

Woman Honored for War Reports— Overseas Press Club Gives Annual 

News Awards 

Dickey Chapelle, a freelance correspondent, received the highest award of the 
Overseas Press Club of America last night for her reports on the fighting in 

At the club's annual awards dinner at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel she received 
the $.500 George Polk Memorial Award, named in honor of George Polk, the 
Columbia Broadcasting System correspondent who was slain in Greece in 

Miss Chapelle. the second woman to get the award, covered Vietnam on assign- 
ment for Reader's Digest. She wrote a book on her experiences entitled, "What's 
A Woman Doing Here?" 

Others receiving annual awards and citations for achievements in reporting 
or interpreting foreign news in 1961 were : 

Robert Considine, Hearst Headline Service, award for his series, "We Will 
Bury You. Mr. K." Sydney Gruson of The New York Times and Gaston Cob- 
lentz of The New York Herald Tribune, citations for reporting from Berlin. 

Marvin Kalb, Columbia Broadcosting System, award for his radio reports 
from Moscow. Joseph C. Harsch, National Broadcasting Company, citation. 

Helen G. Rogers and William Hartigan, American Broadcasting Company, 
award for their television program, "The Remarkable Comrades." Robert Young 
and Charles Dorkins, National Broadcasting Company, citations. 

Peter Leibing, Associated Press, award for his photograph, "Leap to Freedom." 

Leonard Stark and Nobuo Hoshi, National Broadcasting Company, award for 
film report, "Japan— East is West." William K. McClure, Columbia Broadcast- 
ing System, citation. 

Charles J. V. Murphy, Fortune magazine, award for his article, "Cuba : The 
Record Set Straight." Robert S. Elegant, Newsweek, citation. 

Phil Newsom, United Press International, award for "best consistent inter- 
pretation of foreign news developments." George Chaplin, the Honolulu Adver- 
tiser, citation. 

Howard K. Smith, American Broadcasting Company, award for "best radio 
interpretation of foreign affairs." Phil C. Clarke, Mutual Broadcasting System, 

David Schoenbrun and George Vicas, Columbia Broadcasting System award 
for the program. "The Trials of Charles de Gaulle." Eric Sevareid and Stephen 
Fleischman, Columbia Broadcasting System, citations. 

John Toland. award for "best book on foreign affairs," "But Not In Shame." 
Maurice Hindus, citation. 

Juan de Onis. The New York Times, the .$.500 Ed Stout Award for "best article 
on Latin America." Robert Hartman, the Los Angeles Times, citation. 


Edwin L. Dale, Jr., The New York Times, the ?500 E. W. Fairchild Award for 
"best business news reporting from abroad." 

The awards were presented by William L. Laurence, science editor of The New 
York Times. Edward R. Murrow, director of the United States Information 
Agency, spoke. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. And you may proceed now as you wish. 


Mrs. Chapelle. Thank you, sir, I am very honored to be here today. 

It is as a proponent of this legislation that I speak, and further to 
the point that its passage is critically long overdue. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. Before you proceed, Mrs. Chapelle, and although 
we have it in this written record, will you just give us a little back- 
ground on yourself and your own experience ? 

Mrs. Chapelle. I think that is the next paragraph, sir. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. Fine, then you proceed. 

Mrs. Chapelle. It has been my privilege to serve as a reporter and 
photographer for American news media, most recently The Readefs 
Digest and The National Geographic magazine, in areas of conflict 
overseas for most of the 20-odd years since, in May of 1942, 1 was first 
recognized by the then War Department as a war correspondent. 

In the past 8 years, I have been a professional eyewitness to the 
uses of force over the intermittent no man's lands between Communist 
and free world fighting men in Hungary, Algeria, Lebanon, Cuba, 
Korea, Formosa, India, Laos, South Vietnam, and the Straits of 

Each time I have reported how I saw our side lose — that is, emerge 
from the crisis weaker, smaller, or denigrated with an according 
increase in the strength, size, or potential of the Communist side. 
Yet the reasons obvious to me for our astonishingly poor performance 
in our own defense have not been combatant failures. They have been 
failures of extramilitary elements, primarily, in my judgment, of the 
will at the supporting and diplomatic levels. 

As an example, I would cite the fighting I saw in Laos. 

The scores of superbly trained military personnel with whom I was 
privileged to live and work as an observer on several active fronts for 
38 days had been ordered to advise Royal Laotian troops on how to 
fight the Communist Pathet Lao armies. They obeyed those orders 
eifectively. Wliere they were enabled to remain on duty long enough 
to perform in their assigned role, I saw the troops under their practical 
leadership repeatedly win local actions. This was accomplished in 
spite of the equipment with which the United States had furnished 
them — mortars dating from the First World War and aircraft obso- 
lete during the Second. 

Yet, as you recall, these American personnel shortly were withdrawn 
on the excuse that military victory was impossible because "the Laos 
just won't fight." Today, as you know, the Pathet Lao troops, ably 
led by personnel from the Communist country of North Vietnam, are 
macerating the Royal Lao armies and, incidentally — since 9 out of 10 
of the Pathet Lao are Laotians — disproving the claim that people of 
this nationality Avon't fight. Obviously, under motivated leadership, 
they can be and are being victorious combatants. 


Thus I judge the free world failure in Laos not as a military one, but 
in large part due to the tardy emplacement and hasty withdrawal of 
too few U.S. advisers — a failure at the supporting and diplomatic 

In the case of Laos, 1 reported that the objectives of the Departments 
of State and Defense appeared almost mutually exclusive; while one 
was trying to conciliate Keds, the other was trying to kill them. Both 
efforts failed and even the simple will to destroy a Communist threat 
was negated by the resultant confusion. 

Other failures of the non-Communist world — paralysis in the face 
of the Hungarian revolution, apathy toward the tragedy of Algeria, 
ignorance about pre-Red Cuba, to name three — have, in my judgment, 
rested on similar confusions of intent. 

The free world simply does not possess a body of leadership person- 
nel prepared, committed, and working to counter the Communist ef- 
fort to take over the earth by means other than all-out war. 

Parenthetically, the fact that the Communist leaders have been 
forced to use means other than ultimate violence in this effort should 
reassure us that our capability for victory by this method is conceded 
by the Communists. But I believe they are winning by thoughtfully 
chosen alternate means, simply because we have no command group 
to direct the countering of these alternate efforts ; we lack even stra- 
tegic and tactical know-how to counter the "war of liberation" and 
other extramilitary gambits. Lacking the know-how or even a leg- 
islative machinery to try to learn its harsh arts, we lack confidence 
and, increasingly, even the will to struggle. 

The gi'eatest single step proposed, of which I am aware, is the cre- 
ation of the Freedom Commission with its concomitant Academy to 
develop tlie body of knowledge and leadership from which a victorious 
extramilitary capability can be forged. 

Mr, JoHANSEN. Thank you very much. 

Mrs. CiiAPELLE. Yes, sir. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. Has your experience, particularly as it relates to 
Cuba, given you personal knowledge of tlie Communist counterpart of 
training activities in that system? 

Mrs. Cptapelle. Yes, sir; on two occasions. In 1958, when I was 
the last of the 13 American correspondents to go through Batista's 
lines to eyewitness the fighting under Castro's leadership, I spent 3 
days in a building being used as a headquarters for teachers, victims 
of the Batista terrorism who had fled out there to the mountains. 

This was commanded by a major known as Red Beard, and I under- 
stand Pineiro is his name. Much of the talk at that time among that 
group of people was about a higher degree of government control of 
education tlian you would normally encounter in a democratic society. 
But they did not, at that time, use any of the Communist jargon. 
Perhaps I didn't recognize it. 

On the other hand, in the institution in Havana — which I have iden- 
tified in the course of my coverage for the article I was finally expelled 
from Cuba for writing — it was headed by Major Pineiro, and at the 
time that it had emerged there, there seemed to be very little doubt 
that this was the stepchild, so to speak, of the institution — well, not 
institution, the gathering of people that I had originally known dur- 
ing the fighting. 


The second time that I thought that I had some jiersonal knowledge 
of this matter was most recently. I have worked for the ])ast 8 months 
with the refugees — exiled freedom fighters in Miami. Much of that 
work has included interviews with people who have just come from 
Cuba. The statement I am about to make is based on face-to-face 
interviews with two men recently from Cuba. I can give you their 
code names. I do not know, nor have I ever known, their correct 
identification, I am sure for reasons you vrill understand. 

Both of these men claim to have been at one time the number two 
individual in a Communist subversive training institution in Cuba. 
The}^ have stated — and as a reporter I would liave no hestitation to 
put my name on this report; I find it completely plausible in the light 
of what I know — that there are now 19 training bases or ports of 
embarkation for subversive agents leaving for various parts of Latin 
America. (Zanzibar was a surprise to me. I had not heard about 
that until it broke from the news.) Through those institutions 9,300 
people had passed as of, let's see — the boat got blown up January 5 — 
it must have been Christmas of 1963. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. As a result of your travels and observation and ex- 
perience, do you have personal Iniowledge of the need of Government 
personnel for the type of training envisioned in the Freedom 
Academy ? 

Mrs. Chapelle. I would say that I have observed a very great need. 
I think I am doing no injustice to the personnel, either military or 
diplomatic, with whom I worked overseas to say that my profession, 
the press, would be in a difficult position were we to depend on official 
briefings. The material that I was given — to give a specific example, 
I remember being officiallv briefed, in this city of course, for a visit 
that I was making to India — by a very earnest young man from one 
of the departments, wearing a uniform, who assured me that, within 
the same gross national product, it was going to be necessary for the 
Indians to increase their industrial potential and to push China oif 
their soil. 

I would certainly suggest that as a simple proposition of logic, this 
sort of thing, there is no point in wasting anybody's time on it, not a 
reporter's nor the briefing officer's. I think we have also been misled 
at times, abroad, and it would be my hope that the Freedom Academy 
would produce people with whom those of us who go overseas to deal 
with information would not be either wasting their time or subject- 
ing themselves to misleading and coercive statements of that kind. I 
don't think we would have any trouble in getting the press to say, 
"Yes, we need a Freedom Academy." 

Mr. JoHANSEN. Has your experience in South Vietnam led to the 
same conclusion as to the need on the part of our personnel? 

Mrs. Chapelle. I think my experiences in every country would 
lead me to that conclusion, but I would cite particularly the Laotian 
misadventure that I referred to in my prepared statement, and I 
would say that the generalization that it was very difficult to get 
information from official sources in Laos would certainly apply over 
to Vietnam. I cannot imagine that, in the presence of a Freedom 
Academy, reporters would be as misled and misadvised by intent and 
desiim as we have been. 


Mr. JoHANSEN. Would you feel that this need is also substantial 
with respect to foreign personnel, particularly in this country ^ Visi- 
tors in this country ? 

]\Irs. CiiAPELLE. It has been my privilege to know a great many, 
probably 50, personnel, both military and diplomatic, whose passports 
are different from mine, who have come to this country for military 
training. I knew some of them at Ft. Bragg and at Ft. Campbell. 
I knew some of tliem abroad. I think if you gentleman were privi- 
leged to eavesdrop on their private conversations — and because I have 
been parachute jumping with them. I think tlie conversations are 
conversations of great confidence — I think you would be interested 
to know what they talk about. 

They talk about how we eat ; they talk about how we live physically ; 
and they find it very, very difficult to understand when I tell them 
that if I go back to Washington, and I am privileged as I am today, 
it will probably be possible for me to appear here and speak to you 
w^ithout any particular fear of being called anything but a fool. These 
are the conversations that they have ai'ound the campfires in Vietnam, 
as well as on our field problems in their training. 

The degree of curiosity, the degree of interest, the degi'ee of a 
genuine desire to identify, not with us, but with the freedoms that 
we enjoy, is tremendous, and we are not exploiting it. 

T would answer on behalf of my South Vietnamese and Laotian 
doughboy buddies — ^yes, the need is there, and the rewards could be 
accordingly very great. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. I may have some further questions in a moment. 

INIr. Schadeberg? 

Mr. Schadeberg. Well, first of all, I would like to say I appreciate, 
and it is a privilege to have you here to give us the benefit of your 
experience, and it is certainly appreciated by me and I know the rest of 
the committee. 

Mrs. Chapelle. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Schadeberg. Coming back to this country itself, do you have 
any personal knowledge of the need for training of the private sector 
of our citizenship ? 

Mrs. Chapelle. With your permission, sir, I would like to answer 
that in terms of my own profession. Correspondents are being sent 
abroad in multiples, perhaps even of a different magnitude than they 
were being sent abroad before. The age of the correspondent who 
should at this time, I think, particularly in covering armed conflict, be 
of great concern to us is — it is not the old retreads from World War 
II, of which I am one. It is not even the correspondents particularly 
who covered the Korean action. We are sending, because there has 
not been a great deal of armed conflict to cover, people who have not 
had the experience of covering combat before. 

Some of the consequences of sending younger people without ex- 
perience in the harsh realities of combat have resulted in situations 
that are primarily ridiculous. They are funny. I did not believe that 
any correspondent had actually sent a wire to Saigon, and I insisted 
on being shown a wire, which read : '"Arrive 10 tomorrow morning. 
Please arrange battle." 

Mr. JoHANSEN. Arrange what ? 

Mrs. Chapelle. "Please arrange batlle." 


This is not a joke. I laugh, but I would prefer not to believe it, and 
yet I assure you it is true. I don't know that the youth and relative 
inexperience of some of the correspondents who are being sent on for- 
eign assignments result in quite such funny questions in diplomatic 
conferences as the attitude or such a tragic attitude as the one that I 
cited to you, but I think it represents a tremendous problem. I am 
speaking' in sympathy with those younger correspondents. I am not 
speaking in criticism of them. 

I tliink it is a tremendous problem for a yomig person to undertake 
the interpretation of news from a distant country with the 30 minutes, 
""Hey, boys, are your shots and passports in order? You are heading 
for Timbuktu," that is a fact of life with our profession: and I 
interpret the Freedom Academy, potentially, as a situation where we 
will be helped with solving our problems, or when we get overseas, at 
least, there will be better trained people to help us solve them. 

I would certainly say that the information media would stand 
solidly behind an exiucational principle on the simple grounds that we 
both need it. I mean, both sides need it ; yes. 

Mr. ScHADEBERG. Fine. Do you have anything in your personal 
knowledge that would lead you to believe, for instance, that the U.S. 
press has been influenced by the Reds? Or rather, manipulated. I 
don't mean influenced. 

Mrs. Chapelle. Right. I think, again, if I may, I would like to 
cite the situation in Laos. "With your indulgence, I would like to pre- 
tend for the moment that I am the Communist person in charge of 
planning what can be done in Laos. I think what I would have said 
to myself is, "Above all, we don't want to trigger a Korea-like reaction 
in the United States. Now how can we take over this country by mili- 
tary or other methods without triggering that reaction? Well, ob- 
viously that reaction would be triggered only by the press. How can 
we make sure they don't get in the act ?" 

I would have said to myself, "Let's see. That's not much of a prob- 
lem. Most of the people of Laos live beyond the jeepable trail. Most 
of the people of Laos live beyond the end of the telegraph wire. There- 
fore, if it is my job to take over the country, those are the people whom 
I would control. That is the ground I want to walk over. 

"And yet, because there is such tremendously little interest in the 
United States about Laos — well, Laos is as far from the United States 
as you can get" — you are even on geographically sound ground there — 
"it happens that Laos is not of very much interest to the American, is 
not very important to him. There are probably not ever going to be 
more than, or until things get very, very hot, there won't be more than 
three or four correspondents that will be covering it. and most of 
these people have the handicap that they have to report every 24 hours. 
That's just fine. We can win the war, as long as we fiirht it beyond the 
jeep trail, beyond the end of the telegraph wire, and for the American 
people, it -^^ill be like a hand before their face, because it simply won't 
be ]:)jiyp)cally possible for them to see. Eyewitness coverage of what 
we are doing simply will not be physically possible. The disinterest 
of the American people cuts down the number of people available in 
this country, and those people obviously have to report." 

I don't think we have been manipulated directly to anywhere near 
the extent that I have heard, including here. No, I don't; but cer- 


tainly in a case where part of one of the Communist conspiracies looks 
to how we can be used or how the gaps in our coverage can be used to 
serve their ends, they have been manipulating it very cleverly. 

May I suggest that there are weaknesses in the Communist infor- 
mation system, but because there isn't any Freedom Commission and 
there isn't any Freedom Academy, we are not only not exploiting those, 
but we cannot even imagine them, and again I would like to turn that 
into an answer. 

Their information system is much worse than ours. If we are going 
to talk about how to exploit the weaknesses of an information system, 
for goodness' sakes, let's find out what the weaknesses of their infor- 
mation system are and manipulate them on those weaknesses. 

Mr. ScHADEBEEG. My next question doesn't sound like it is too much 
related to it, but it actually is. We hear reports — at least I do, of 
course — that those who visit — you were in Vietnam, were you not ? 

Mrs. Chapelle. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ScHADEBERG. That those who visit in Vietnam, official visitors, 
not necessarily Government, but perhaps some Government and 
others — and this would go for the reporters as well 

Mrs. Chapelle. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ScHADEBERG — liave a sort of a lack of communication with the 
people of South Vietnam, and that seems to be one of the difficulties. 
The Communists, because of the type of war in which they are engaged, 
have this communication. Do you think that the Freedom Academy, 
for instance, would make up, at least in part, for this lack ? 

Mrs. Chapelle. Well, I suggest tliat you put your finger most nearly 
on the reason why I think we are sustaining the tremendous list of 
losses that I said that I have seen. Yes, they do have communication. 
No, we do not have communication, and if you have to make it a "yes" 
or "no" business — which is not a proper answer in either case — it 
would be that way. 

Let me point out some of tlie difficulties of communication. Let's 
say you come into Saigon with a great desire for communication with 
the people of South Vietnam. And let's assume that you are not 
satisfied that your taxi driver, your press officer, your postal clerk, the 
people that you run into, are in communication with the Vietnamese 
people. Were you to move — and it has been my privilege to spend — 
well, I have covered 19 ambushes between Laos and Vietnam, so I 
think it has been my privilege to do this, but the minute you propose 
moving to where the people of Vietnam live, the villagers, way beyond 
the end of the jeep trail or the telegraph line, the minute you propose 
that, the first place you have to sell on the idea is the Government of 
the United States. Because, obviously, the Government of the United 
States is going to say, "Well, gee whiz, it isn't safe out there." Well, ft 
sure isn't. 

And the second point is, whether this is a reporter or a representative 
of a private concern, what are we doing to control this? We can't 
get you out. Obviously, they don't like to say that, and yet in the 
5 weeks that I spent 40 miles beyond the Communist lines, in the village 
of Binh Hung, I can understand what they mean. If there is combat 
and the Communists are winning, they have to say, no, you can't get 
that American out. If the village falls, obviously, the American life 
is forfeit, the same as any other free world life on a fighting line. 


Whether or not, when you asked how is the Freedom Academy 
going to help, that depends on the composition. That depends, I 
would think, on the orders from the Freedom Commission, and cer- 
tainly, if I had anything- to do with those orders, to those that go, 
I would say, "If you want communication with tliem, you have to 
share their danger." If you do share their danger, your presence 
will be ultimately convincing that you really meant it, you really 
wanted tliat communication. 

But the people who go out there under the kind of orders which 
frequently civilians, and even until the past year military personnel, 
were under were unable by the nature of their orders to establish 

At the time that I was jumping with the Vietnamese airborne, 
there were four American advisers and myself doing it. I made 
six jumps with them, and that was one year when I really felt that 
I had earned my right to carry that wonderful passport that I carry — 
not because of the work that I was doing as a reporter; sure, I was 
proud of it; but simply because my country had been saying, "We 
are backing you in the fighting," and nothing in the world had con- 
vinced the paratroops that we meant it. Not their parachutes which 
were marked "Made in U.S.A." and not their equipment which was 
marked "Made in U.S.A.," but the fact that there were five of us who 
were jumping with them. This was the thing that made the differ- 
ence, all the difference in the world. 

They then felt that our country, that our communication with them 
was on a practical human being to human being level, and that our 
country's pledge could be honored, and I might add that not any of 
those jumps were as hairy as some that I made in training or even 
one that I made a year ago on a training maneuA^er here. 

The fact remains that communication is a problem and that the way 
to do it, I say, must be a primary concern of the Freedom Commission 
and the Freedom Academy. We have to sum up the objective, how 
could we attain communication with these people, and that ought 
to be it. 

Mr. ScHADEBERG. One other question, and this may not warrant an 
answer. In regard to the military personnel, do you think that they 
might be — ^I don't loiow whether there is any lack of understanding 
for the reason for being there, and so forth, but do you think that if 
military personnel were trained, somewhat, through this type of Free- 
dom Academy before they were sent in a situation like this, in this 
case it isn't really a declared w\ar, that there might be a better under- 
standing of the commission and a better understanding of what 
really is involved ? 

Mrs, Chapelle. I would like to qualify the witness in this case be- 
fore I answer the question. There is probably no area of war cor- 
responding that has interested me more than the coverage of the 
training of American personnel in uniform. I have spent at least, I 
mean, more time in the last 20 years on that subject than on any other 
single one. 

Less than a year ago, it was my privilege to ]um]:>, to which I re- 
ferred a minute ago, on Exercise Water Moccasin, which I am sure 
you gentlemen know is the final examination for military personnel 
w^ho will bear abroad the really vast responsibility of being com- 


pletely cut off from any physical support and advising, and I say in 
practice, leading — and I am proud of them when they do tliis, as I 
say, this is no apology — foreign troops. 

It is not my feeling that the increase in training, the most obvious 
point to mvest in their training is that of political awareness. I have 
been amazed and delighted, and I guess I am completely prejudiced, 
because I have participated in it, in the degree of political awareness 
that has come to many of these people in the course of preparing to 
bet their lives on a situation in a foreign country. They do learn a 
great deal about it. 

I could certainly feel that a certain amount of ground work for 
Freedom Academy courses has already been laid by the military, in 
the absence of the Freedom Academy, having to teach tliese folks 
before they go over there. They have brought in people from all over 
to give a series of lectures which, were there a Freedom Academy, it 
would seem to me it would be part of their curriculum, so I would 
like to turn that one around and say that, yes, additional political 
training is highly desirable. Highly motivated and skilled people are 
ready to get it, they are getting a little bit now, which is quite interest- 
ing to an observer. And I would certainly feel that there would be 
everv' reason to include them in the program, with the extension of 
many of the things that they are doing. 

Their primary need, we will tell you, however, is in, well, language 
and psycholog}\ If you ask them themselves, "What do you want 
to know more about?" that would be their answer. I certainly think 
that is part of it. I am just anxious not to be critical of what they 
have been doing, because it doesn't deserv^e criticism. 

Mr. ScHADEBERG. Thank you very much. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. May I ask you one question off the record ? 

(Discussion off the record.) 

Mr. JoHANSEN. Do you want to ask any questions ? 

Mr. Clausen. Yes, Mrs. Chapelle. You were here during my 
testimony ? 

Mrs. Chapelle. I was. I was delighted to be here, sir. 

Mr. Clausen. And then also in recognition of our comments, I am 
certainly pleased to hear your point of view, and I think that is as fine 
a testimou}' as I have ever heard. 

Mrs. Chapelle. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Clausen. For a number of years, I have held the conviction 
that communication and transportation are the only vehicles with 
which we can resolve some of our world's problems. You have more 
or less substantiated this. 

To carry this out, I found that communications by themselves are 
supremely restricted. Number one, because of the language barrier 
and, secondly, because they don't have the media, so then I come back 
to the fact that transportation by itself, possibly, is the real key to get 
back into these areas, so that you can implement any kind of a program 
that you want to put over. 

As a consequence, for some 15 years, I have had a flight training 
program in a high school. I have expanded this now to a different 
college, and I have a number of colleges, associated with a missionary 
volunteer effort, that are going to be interested in this type of thing, 
all designed to add to the ability of people that are going to be working 


in these fields, the mobility and flexibility that only aircraft, be it rotary 
wing or fixed wing, can use. 

Now with your experience in these various areas, do you think that 
I am on the right track ? 

Mrs. Chapelle. Well, I am delighted to say that not only am I per- 
sonally glad to know about this, but I would like to share, to speak 
with you later about sharing some of it with my readers. 

I would like to comment, however, that there have been times abroad 
in recent years when I have come to exactly the opposite conclusion 
about transportation. It has been my privilege to ride U.S. heli- 
copters, on one assignment or another, into places which had never 
seen any evidence of the United States before that chopper came in. 

I am thinking of Lebanon and Vietnam, for example, and it has been 
my privilege to work very closely with, and I hope to glorify the 
tremendous bravery of, American fliers all over the world who have 
gotten me out of more trouble than is imaginable, and yet I hesitate 
to give you an unqualified affirmative, for this reason : 

One of the barriers to communication that seems so tremendous to 
me is this dependence on any kind of mechanical device. It is the 
mere fact that you came into a village on an airplane or a helicopter 
that sets you so far apart from the villagers that you have got a 2- 
week — you are going to liave to live there for a couple of weeks before 
you get to be their friend, whereas, if you just walked in— and on my 
old legs, gentlemen, that gets to be kind of a problem every now and 
then— if you just walked in, if you didn't come in related in their 
minds to this godlike device, it would be easier. So let me go this far : 
Wlien it comes to landing that aircraft 5 miles away from the village, 
I am with you, sir. When it comes to letting me walk that last 5 miles, 
it is worth it; and I would hope that the Freedom Academy would 
evolve a method whereby we could have the virtues of the transporta- 
tion without the barriers of mechanical devices. 

Mr. Clausen. Well, along these lines, of course, I might add — and 
this, of course, is for the record, and this is making a record on this — 
part of our program is to see that those peoj^le who are going to be 
fliers also have the ability to maintain the aircraft. 

Mrs. Chapelle. No unimportant point. The photographs — the last 
photograph I made in Vietnam, of which I am extremely proud, was 
made because we didn't have proper maintenance. The' engine quit 
over enemy territory, and the only reason I kept on taking pictures all 
the way down was "because I thought I would be less frightened that 
way. The fact that one of the pictures is good is a net gain for our 
side, so to speak. 

I think the maintenance abroad and the extension of the simplified 
aircraft which can be maintained abroad is very important. 

Mr. Clausen. Well, I am not talking about jets, believe me. I am 
talking about something in the way of the Super Cub. 

Mrs. Chapelle. Right. Nor am I, sir; nor am I. The word, the 
jet — we don't have an extramilitary tactic yet, but I am sure when these 
are evolved, as I am sure they will through the Freedom Commission 
and Freedom Academy, that the jet will have very little part in the 
critical flying abroad. 

Mr. Clausen. Mr. Chairman, I was just going to say — well, if we 
have no more time, I will conclude on this. I will be looking forward 

30-471— 64— ,pt. 2 17 


to visiting with you on this; and, Mr. Chairman, I, too, would like 
to visit with some of the members of the committee about some ad- 
vanced ideas that I have. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. Mrs. Chapelle, we have a quorum call and we are 
going to have to cut this short. 

Mrs. Chapelle. Yes, sir. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. We appreciate your appearance, and your testimony 
is very, very helpful to the committee. 

Off the record. 

( Discussion off the record. ) 

Mr. JoHANSEN. The committee will recess, subject to the call of 
the Chair. 

(Wliereupon, at 12 :25 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 
the call of the Chair.) 

(The committee reconvened pursuant to call at 12 :60 p.m.) 

Mr. JoHANSEN (presiding). The committee will come to order. 

The Keverend James Robinson. We are happy to have you here, 
Mr. Robinson. We are sorry for the delay and the inconvenience we 
caused you. 

Will you give us a little bit of a background about yourself, your 
education, and your current activities ? 


Mr. Robinson. I will, sir. I was educated at Lincoln University 
in Pennsylvania and at Union Theological Seminary in New York. 
I was ordained into the ministry of the Presbyterian Church in 1938. 
I founded a church in Harlem and, along with it, summer camps for 
underprivileged children in New Hampshire, a credit union, and a 
co-op store, and I have been vitally involved in social welfare work 
and agencies in the city of New York. 

The background out of which I come to testify on this occasion 
before this committee is the following: Because of the work I have 
done with students here in the United States for over a period of 10 
years on almost 600 or 700 campuses of prep schools and colleges and 
universities and what I have been able to get them to do in building 
this camp and in undertaking many other important activities, I was 
asked by the Presbyterian Church to go around the world in 1951 and 
loaned to anybody who wanted my services, such as the Minister of 
Defense in those days in the Philippines, Ramon Magsaysay ; Chester 
Bowles, who was our Ambassador recently in India; and to James 
Flint, the religious affairs officer of the occupation forces in Berlin 
in 1951, when the first great German youth conference. World Youth 
Conference of Commimist young people, supposedly, was organized 
in August of that year. 

Since that time, I have kept up this worldwide interest and have 
now developed an organization known as Operation Crossroads 
Africa, which since 1957 takes a carefully selected group of tough- 
minded young people to the African Continent, with the hope of mak- 
ing an impact of faith and freedom. This year we will be going to 
21 countries, and there will be 310. These were selected out of more 
than 4,000 who applied, 3 of whom will be from the Military Academy 
at West Point, who every year selects 3. They had 67 who api)lied. 


Now next year, they would like us to take five or six. We are not 
sure that we can give them the increase, because everybody else wants 
an increase, although we would certainly give them preference, if 
we can. 

This experience also led me to have many activities with Commu- 
nists, or people who were related to Communists. In Berlin, my task 
was to go over the Eastern Zone border into the East, as far as I could, 
and get back safely. I went up to the Polish border. I talked to hun- 
dreds of young people, some of whom mistook me for a Commmiist, 
which I didn't mind, because that was the only way I could get the 
information I sought. 

I reported this back to James Flint. One evening in Eastern Berlin, 
I stayed in the basement of St. Marian's Church, on what was to be 
a good, safe conduct in case we were there at night and would have 
been arrested by the German secret police. And in a confrontation 
with about 75 young Communists, along with a number of other people 
who were with me, my colleague was a young German Communist who 
taught me a lesson. He carried a Communist Party card, but he actu- 
ally was working for James Flint of the occupation people. That was 
the first time I found some people who had learned to fight commu- 
nism skillfully, because I said to him, "How come you have this card, 
and you are also working for the Studentegemeinde, the Student 
Christian Program, and James Flint?" And he said a very interest- 
ing thing, a very simple thing, to me : "How do you know what you are 
against if you don't know what it is?" He said, "This is one of the 
troubles with you Americans. You try to fight communism with heat 
and anger, rather than with light and intelligence." 

He introduced me to hundreds of young Communists. After our 
meeting in St. Marian's Church, 25 young people who had come to 
that conference came over to the Western Zone, renounced their com- 
munism and sought asylum. 

I also learned that there were thousands of young people there who 
weren't Communists. This was the first time they had a free trip any- 
where. This was the first time they had been to a big city, and I said to 
myself, "Wliat an opportunity if we had young people trained and 
skilled who just came to a conference like this and did our own work." 
When I came back and talked to many people in the United States 
about this, I was shocked at the attitude that if you had anybody who 
went to do that, they might be won over, instead of converting some- 
body else. Now if that is true, then we ought to give it up right now, 
because if that's true, they are going to win it anyway. I don't believe 

Well, when I came back, I worked with a good many people on a 
number of projects. I protested strongly when we took away the pass- 
ports of 41 young people who went to Moscow and Peking, not because 
we took them away, but because that's all we did. We should have 
known that every 4 years, just like right now, there is a big Commu- 
nist World Youth Conference. It seems to me the smiple thing to do 
is if you could send some people who are trained and skilled, you 
could do a whole lot of work, because you could take advantage of a 
lot of people who come who are no more Communists than you and I 
are, but it is some kind of fear, for example, that kept us from making 
a bold, creative strategy. 


When I came back from my world trip in 1952, I did two things. 
One, for the old Mutual Security Agency, under Donald Stone, now 
head of International Affairs of the University of Pittsburgh, I drew 
up a little pamphlet with ei^ht other Negroes to help make a document 
available for Americans gomg abroad on race relations. I saw people 
from our Government, from education, professors from big univer- 
sities, businessmen, whom you would call tycoons, ignorant, and I 
must use the word "stupid," but the first thing anybody does is try to 
corner them on American race relations. And it seems to me that the 
simplest thing for us to have done would have been for every person 
in the diplomatic corps, every businessman, every student, every pro- 
fessor, even every missionary, since race relations is one of the great 
tools used against us by the Communists, and to be sure, we give them a 
lot of the racial failures on which to attack us, but on the other hand, 
we haven't done our homework on the things that we could do to put a 
simple document in the hands of every person going abroad which he 
could be trained to use and which would help them to be intelligent 
about the problem of American race relations historically and what is 
happening now, constructively as well as destructively. 

The thing that amazed me was I didn't find many people who were 
constructive about this. All they did was to get angiy. I remember, 
for example, at the University of Delhi, with the American consul 
sitting down in the front seat, answering questions, for more than 3 
hours, with more than 5,000 students crowded into that place, on com- 
munism to be sure, but many more not on communism, but on race 
relations — which partly had been inspired by Communists, using this 
as a tool to embarrass us. The same thing in Lahore, Pakistan, but 
worst of all, I heard a colonel in the American occupation forces in 
Japan, at the University in Sendai, Japan, trying to answer these 
questions, and literally booed off the platform. And I thought that was 
a needless loss, and a needless victoiy for the young people who were 
pushing him around like that, partly because nowhere did I find any 
simple document, say a hundred or 200 pages, where they could have 
had the basic material and information to use on the more positive 
aspects of interracial achievement. 

I wrote a little pamphlet called. Love of This Land^ which USIS 
later had translated into about seven languages for distribution in 
various countries. Then I wrote a little book called Tomorrow is 
Today ^ which was published in 1954, in which I had a chapter on com- 
munism dealing with our need to have a more creative, adventurous 
thrust against it, instead of being defensive, waiting for it to win in 
some area, and then trying to defeat or coimter it, or being entirely 
negative and fearful about it. 

Among the things I pointed out was that we really ought to be teach- 
ing Marx and Engels, so that people who are going abroad can both 
know it and fight it intelligently. I didn't find many missionaries, for 
example, who Imew much about this. In the Cameroons, I saw our 
mission young people and older people, too, defeated roundly and 
soundly by young Africans who had come back from France, whose 
minds had been captured by the leaders of Communist-dominated 
French labor movement, the Committee Central de Travail, which 
was Communist dominated, and which had a plan to win the mind of 
every African student whom the French were taking to universities 


in France. They got at them first, even though the government was 
spending the money to take them there. 

And one of the things I talked about when I came back was that 
there was nobody among our missionaries or in our colleges that 
we had built, or high schools, who knew enough about communism to 
meet these young people intellectually on their own level. I speak 
mainly of the Presbyterians, although at the time I'm sure most, if 
not all, of the denominational and faith missions were no better. 

As a result of that, I gave a sermon in the church of which I was 
the pastor, and one young man, a graduate of MIT, decided that he 
and his wife would go out and undertake that job. Their father — 
this has no bearing on the record — did not speak to me since that day, 
although he was the president of the board of trustees of the church, 
because he said that I had destroyed his family and "sent them out to 
God-forsaken Africa," but this young man and his wife went because 
when the Communist group had tried to take over some of the young 
engineers at Farmingdale, N.Y., at Republic Aviation, he organized 
the group against them. They did a lot of study and prepara- 
tion, and he was the right man to go, because he was a young man, he 
knew youth, and who wins the youth and has the biggest influence upon 
the minds of young people in Africa and the rising youth of Africa 
are going to have the biggest influence in the long run of the future on 
that continent. 

Well, in that chapter, 1953, I pointed out a lot of these things that 
I thought could be done, but there was no organization or agency to 
do this. So when I started Operation Crossroads Africa, I knew from 
my experiences that our yoimg people, when they got to Africa, were 
going to run into this question again and again and again, and they 
were going to meet with some of these yoimg people. Therefore, one 
of the things we do in Crossroads is, when we select a young person, 
we put them in a training course. Even though it is this semester with 
all their school work, they have to work with approximately 25 books 
on Africa. We indicate what books on Communist strategy they 
should read and what books on race relations. They have to write a 
15-page term paper for us that is due the 15th — that was just last 
week — of May; otherwise, we don't take them. Nobody flmiks his 
regular schoolwork because of this additional work. As a matter of 
fact, they get better grades. They even take a language, learn a 
dialect, so they can meet people at their own level. 

We have had good success with this. It is a nonprofit group. We 
raise all the money for it, but our big problem is we can't project a 
program over a 5- or 10-year period, because a foundation will give 
you money for 1 year, 2 years, 3 years, and you don't know if you are 
going to get anymore money, and you need a good solid backlog of 
assured funds to do this, which brmgs me to my own point of view 
about how are you going to finance something like this. 

I want to give my firm assent to the need for a separate Freedom 
Academy, and not because the Army or the Navy or the State Depart- 
ment give some orientation about and against communism in all their 
institutions, but because the biggest asset this is going to have on 
the thousands of non-Government people who go abroad. Every per- 
son who goes out of this country is an unofficial diplomat, an unofficial 
ambassador, and they are the people who can do a good deal more 


in the disarming way to get ideas of a faith and freedom across, for 
example. But the big problem is who is going to train them and of 
what will that training consist. 

'V'Vlien the Presbyterians sent me out, they didn't give me any train- 
ing. The first couple of months, I got beat all over the lot but I 
learned, as a result of the experience, as to who was who, what was his 
background, what was his strategy, how he tried to cleverly take over 
the audience which came to hear me, and I could begin to spot that 
pretty soon in meetings. 

Their strategy was very clever. They would let me speak, and then 
they would get the floor, and there might be as many as 4,000 students 
there, but the Communists would get the floor first, and they would 
pass me around between them like a football, and I kept saying to 
myself, "Wliere are the Christians?" or "Where are the other young 
people?" or "Who knows something about this?" So what we need is 
an agency by which we can expose people to some kind of training on 
various levels, and do this for Government personnel abroad. I am 
more concerned, because this is my field, about the large number of 
private groups. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. Now may I interrupt right there at that point, so 
that we have it in sequence? You have mentioned Operation Cross- 
roads Africa. Would you just fill in at this point — and then resume 
what you were headed toward — the basic purposes, objectives, and 
operations of Operation Crossroads ? 

Mr. RoBiNSON". Its objectives are several-fold. First, it is to make 
a good impact and a good image for the United States in the new 
countries of Africa. Secondly, it is to build a bridge of friendship 
and understanding and to provide the young people who go with the 
basis of new desire to educate themselves about the African Continent 
in the hopes that we will build a reservoir out of which State Depart- 
ment, the USIS, ICA, missions, anybody else, business, at work in 
Africa can begin to draw a group of young people who have an under- 
standing of Africa — not just some hearsay, but a feeling, who de- 
veloped friendships, and who can go back after they have gotten their 
education and work more effectively rather than just picking up 
almost anybody as we have had to do before 1957. 

We have opened 29 new embassies in Africa. We didn't have people 
who understood or had a positive feeling about Africa, or who had 
been there at the grassroots level to man all these engagements. Our 
idea in Crossroads is that if we can get young people in their formative 
years to go and build friendships, to get an understanding, and then 
begin to pursue that — it is a long-range program of preparing a 
capable, skilled leadership for America in Africa, and, needless to 
say, we are way behind. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. Let me stop you right there. Are these persons 
who participate in this program persons from Africa in this country, 
or is it done in Africa ? 

Mr. Robinson. These are young people from the United States who 
go to Africa on a short-term program on their vacation period, for 
9 weeks. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. I see. These are Americans that go to Africa. 

Mr. Robinson. That is right. 


Mr. JoHANSEN. Now is the purpose of the program primarily for 
their enlightemiient and education, or for that of the peoples in Africa 
with whom they have contact, or both ? 

Mr. Robinson. It is both, equal. One, that they have to say to 
Africans, "We believe in you. We want to help you. We would like 
you to see what we know and believe about the democratic way of life, 
about individual initiative and responsibility." 

Secondly, as a result of the experience, of learning and helping, 
lasting friendships are made, a better impression of America is given, 
and substantial assistance provided. Incidentally, we don't say it, 
but the greatest benefit comes to us, to the United States, because when 
they get back, they must make 50 talks each year for 2 years about 
their experiences. Each one becomes an innocent, but unofficial, am- 
bassador here at home. Over 70 of them are now in graduate schools 
of African studies preparing for a lifetime of service in African- 
American relations. 

Peace Corps, which I sometimes humorously say ought to pay us 
for building a reservoir, now has 100 former Crossroaders. Mr. 
Shriver has a telegram at the door of every person who leads one of 
our units when they return, saying, "Won't you come down for an 
interview about service in Peace Corps after your experience in 

Eleven of them have gone back. I say over 100 are back in Africa 
already, with Peace Corps, USIA, missions, ICA, the Columbia- 
London University teachers program in East Africa, and so on. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. Are the Americans wdio participate in this program 
biracial ? Are they both Negro and white ? 

Mr. Robinson. They are both Negro and white. The trouble is 
we don't get enough Negroes. The main reason is that eacli person 
who goes has to raise a part of his own money, and the average Negro 
student, if he can't work this summer, can't get back in school, let 
alone to raise money to spend on Crossroads. 

We have to go out and get more scholarship money to get help for 
them, and also help to get them back in school, because it would serve 
no purpose if they couldn't get back in school and continue their 

Mr. JoiiANSEN. But your foundation and other funds that you 
raise go in part to subsidize those who can't pay their own way. Is 
that correct ? 

Mr. Robinson. That is correct. The students themselves raise about 
$180,000 a year, as evidence of what they believe is their responsibility, 
and then secondly, I and the members of the board of directors, we 
raise about $310,000 a year, to supplement what they raise. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. Is this basically a Presbyterian project, or is it 
interdenominational ? 

Mr. Robinson. It is nonreligious. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. I see. 

Mr. Robinson. We take everybody. Even an atheist who can con- 
vince us that he believes in people and believes in us, and is not trying 
to convert somebody, can go. We have a number of Catholics. For 
example, at Georgetown is one of our cooperating institutions, the 
rector. Father Bunn has provided $1,000 for the students, and the boys 
at Georgetown have washed cars on Saturdays to raise money to help 


themselves go, so we are a broad, inclusive program, with no religious 
test. I happen to be la Presbyterian minister, but we have Jews, 
everybody in it who is devoted to freedom, democracy, and better 
world relations. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. I didn't mean to divert you. This is a fascinating 

Mr. KoBiNSON. Well, our other aim and objective is that we will 
make such an appeal to young people in Africa that they will ask 
us back to share in the development of their programs, because they 
feel this kind of confrontation with what we have to give can help 
them to develop whole democratic understanding, and can also help 
both us and them to outmatch what Communists do. 

The Communist goes to these countries to try to make people believe 
they are their real friends, that they have come to share with them, 
that they alone want to see them advance. But we have to outmatch 
that. We can outmatch it. We have more invitations than we can get 
money to send students. We have invitations this year for 47 groups. 
We can only take 26 groups, because there just aren't enough funds 
to do it. 

Now our other aim and objective is that it is our hope that these 
young people, as I indicated before, when they are through college, 
will have laid a foundation upon which they will be better witnesses 
for the United States in carrying out policy and developing friends, 
and communicating the whole democratic structure, and being able 
to combat communism intelligently and effectively when they come 
to their maturity. 

We feel we have to start now. 1 wish, for example, that if there 
were a Freedom Academy, that they could help us in the training of 
our young people each summer in the aspect of what do you do about 
commimism; what is it? How do you determine who is a Commu- 
nist, skillfully ; how do you deal with Communist strategy, etc. ? 

How do you answer their questions? How do you keep a little 
handful of them from taking the audience away from you? That 
is what happened to me in northern Italy, for example, in the begin- 
ning, and in France. When I first went out for the Presbyterians 
who were naive about this for they gave me no preparation and my 
Communist opponents took the audience away. Till I learned their 
ideology, the content, and their strategy, I couldn't even begin to 
operate, or they would ask a question, for example, if I may take the 
time, like in the University of Tokyo, Japan, "They sent you out here, 
you must be an important man. Could you be President?" 

Well, I had to say, "No, I don't think I could in the foreseeable 
future. It is not likely that a Negro would be President now." If 
I answered the other way, I was sunk. They had me trapped. This 
is what they were expecting me to do. But then once I could isolate 
who they were, then I would know how to answer, and finally, after 
some jockeying, I would say, very simply, "No, I don't think I could 
be President, but sometimes, I have seen Presidents elected in my 
country that I was sorry for, because I think I could have done a 
better job," and the whole audience laughed and they laughed at 
them, because then they saw the ridiculous nature of the question, 
and then I could be much more constructive about this, and it was 
only because I had begun on that 7 months facing them so often. 


trying to take my meetings away, or when I couldn't speak any of the 
languages in India, sometimes a Communist was my interpreter. 
That is a great act of faith, because after you get through, you 
don't know what he has said, but I found out what he was saying, 
but then I couldn't do anything, because that whole audience was 
gone, you see, and it made me look bad. 

Well, it is in this area that we need some agency that can help 
all of us with these problems and, may I add, opportunities. More 
Americans are going abroad. Most of them are naive about com- 
munism. They get these questions, they get angry, and you lose the 
audience when you get angry, and that isn't what you want to do. 
You want to win the audience, or you want to make as much capital 
as you can to get your point of view across, but you have to be 
skilled and trained to do this, because we are combating a whole new 
kind of unrelenting, ideological war. 

And this is why it needs to be on its own. It does not need to be in 
the State Department. They have got their problems. It can be 
helpful to the State Department in some of the things they do, and 
some of the people they send. It could be helpful to the Army, the 
Navy, the Air Force, or to any agency representing the United States 
abroad. But it needs to be an independent organization, so it can be 
flexible and it can change its policy and its strategy as the time and 
situation demands, and shouldn't have to go all the way up to the top, 
for example, in an echelon of a secretary who is not basically concerned 
about this problem, and take all that time, because we don't have a 
whole lot of time. 

I had hoped that back in 1953 and 1954, we could have gotten some 
things done. What exactly ? In 1952, we didn't have any program in 
America for the education of any considerable number of African 
students. Down on East 17th Street, in New York, just east of Fifth 
Avenue, there was a house known as the Council on African Affairs. 
This organization used to get about $200,000 a year from Communist 
sources. Its job : get a hold of every African student who came here 
by mission, boards, or college and get a hold of his mind. Know 
what his basic needs are; supply them in order to ingratiate him; 
win him ; and if you can't win him — ^neutralize him. ^ 

I helped a lad' from Sierra Leone to go to the University of Denver. 
The university gave him a full scholarship. I didn't know that Den- 
ver was 5,000'feet elevation. Oh, I knew it, but it didn't make much 
difference to me ; I didn't think too much about it. He comes out of a 
country with a hot climate, and in the winter Denver is a cold climate. 
He didn't even have an overcoat. Nobody else thought about it. But 
the Communists did. Nor, for example, think much about the facts, 
how lonely he was going to be and how desperately he'd latch on to any- 
one who gave him friendship. Everybody else on the campus was too 
busy. But not the leftists and the Communists ; they gave him friend- 
ship and an overcoat. We've got a gold mine with foreign students 
here, over 70,000 every year. If we don't make an impact on these 
who are here 4 to 10 years, we deserve to lose them. 

Mr. JoiTANSEN. And we are defeating the purpose of encouraging 
them to come over here. 

Mr. Robinson. Yes. And sometimes we spend the money and bring 
them, and then somebody else wins their minds — like this young man. 


He became a Communist, and a part of it was that the Communists 
were skillful enough to know, first, he needs an oA^ercoat, and they 
gave it to him and, second, that he was lonely. Everybody else is 
too busy, all the student organizations and the faculty, and here was 
a guy who was lonely, and it is as simple as that, sometimes, and that 
is what I have seen Communists do abroad. 

The simple technique of getting to the people where they are, and 
then getting inside them and winning their minds and making them 
feel we are the people who really care, who want to be friends and 
partners with them for a better country — a better world. 

Well, it is in this sense that it would seem to me an Academy like 
this could do great good for all the people in the United States, and 
especially that great group increasingly who are going abroad, as well 
as for the increasing number coming here. 

Mr. SoHADEBERG. One question. Based on your experience with Op- 
erations Crossroads Africa, do you think that the Negroes of Amer- 
ica — are they any better accepted in Africa than the white personnel 
who are sent over there ? 

Mr. Robinson. I talked about that yesterday to a conference of 
30 African cabinet members and staff functionaries up at Corning, 
New York, who were brought here by Corning Glass. I talked 
about it, because they asked me, first of all, and this was the question 
the Africans were raising, "Why don't you send more Negroes ?" And 
over and over again I have to say, as I have written on many occasions, 
that we have in the United States with a highly color-conscious world, 
not only Africa but Asia, a gold mine in American Negroes that 
we haven't used very well. But more American Negroes would be 
a great asset to American policy and aims abroad. 

I serve on the advisory committee of the State Department on the 
search for Negro personnel, and the last time we met was just about 
3 weeks ago down here for 2 days. My point was that everywhere 
Crossroads goes, if I don't have a good percentage of Negroes in 
Crossroads in Africa, we have got trouble in that community. 

Now we just need to have more money to get them. 

Mr. ScHADEBERG. Why, why do you have trouble ? 

Mr. Robinson. We have trouble because the first question they ask 
is — and they are asking me this, this is what makes it so funny — "You 
mean to tell me you are one of those people who doesn't want to bring 
our people out here ? Do you discriminate against Negroes ? " 

Mr. ScHADEBERG. Aren't they discriminating if they think only in 
terms of their own ? I don't want to get into an argument but 

Mr. Robinson. No, they are not thinking that for Negroes alone, 
but you see, they have a great empathetic relation to American 
Negroes- — who came from their coasts and they know our race prob- 
lem and wonder why we don't use more of our Negro citizens — and 
again and again, when leadership people are brought here by the 
State Department, they are often very unhappy because we often fail 
to associate them with the Negro community. Crossroads, in coopera- 
tion with the Department of State, is bringing a group of 10 leadership 
students from four countries in Africa this summer, and we asked 
a Negro lad, a former Crossroader, to help take care of them. 

If it is successful, we will make it 50 or 100 next year. The young 
Negro who wrote me, whom I had asked to join my staff, would he be 
one of the two leaders to take these around, because he speaks French, 


and we have some French-speaking Africans, he can't go, but he said, 
"For heaven's sake, please have at least one of the two people who take 
this group around be a Negro," because I have run into so many groups 
who are brought here by State Department, and they never have a 
Negro to work with them or get to Negro homes. In our office, we get 
Africans saying, "Look, we want to see some Negroes." This really 
is ridiculous because most of the escorts are people who don't know 
a thing about the Negro community or have no contacts with Negro 
Americans. They are handicapped, and these people go back disen- 
chanted with us because of this failure. 

If I might just say one more tiling, I had to spend $75 of my own 
money to cable back here from Kenya (where I was a guest of the 
Kenya Government, of Jomo Kenyata, himself, because of the work 
of our young people, which was why he invited my wife and myself), 
because their Kenya delegation was coming to the United States 
to become a member of the U.N., and Prime Minister Kenyata said, 
"We need your help in seeing that this group gets to go to Atlanta 
and to some other places where they can have some relationship with 
Negroes and get to know more about the race problem and what is 
being done about it." 

So I took it upon myself to cable back to Roy Wilkins and Philip 
Randolph and some other people, Whitney Young, to say that one of 
the greatest things you can do, now that Kenya is independent, is to 
make some good contacts of Negroes who can be of help to them, be- 
cause they have this great interest. We have this reservoir of Negro 
people, but we ought to make better use of them. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. Mr. Clausen. 

Mr. Clausen. Along this point, I was one of the Members of the 
Congress that wrote the civil rights bill, sir, so that you know ex- 
actly where I stand, but I have always felt in my own mind the very 
point that you have just made here is that we could use this as a great 
relief valve for the Civil Rights problem as it now exists in this par- 
ticular country, if we were to take advantage of this so-called gold 
mine of human resources that is available. Would you comment on 

Mr. Robinson. Well, this is one of the great problems among Ne- 
groes, their desire to serve America in the world on the interna- 
tional scene. 

Mr. Clausen. I mean, couldn't we expand and take advantage of 
this ? Couldn't we expand the opportunity for the Negro, not only in 
Africa, but also South America ? 

Mr. Robinson. South America and in Asia ? 

Mr. Clausen. Yes. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. And in Asia? 

Mr. Robinson. And in Asia. 

Mr. ScHADEBERG. I Want to ask a question that is directly related to 
this Freedom Academy. You said something about you being in- 
volved in two areas, the private and the governmental sector, inso- 
far as Crossroads Africa and the Peace Corps, which is somewhat the 
same work. Wliat would you consider to be the relative value of a 
governmental agency for the Freedom Academy as opposed to a pri- 
vate agency for the Freedom Academy, or a second part of that ques- 
tion is: Who could you think should be sponsoring it, or should be 


Mr. EoBiNSON. Well, right off the top of my mind, I have to say- 
that inasmuch as you have a Defense Department because sometimes 
you have to defend the survival of the countiy by military actions, 
you have now a worldwide attempt to remake the world m tlie very 
evil image of what Archibald MacLeish once defined as, "Communism 
is the fraudulent justification of the most heinous of means to achieve 
the most despicable of ends." 

That is a big thing; it is a worldwide thing. I don't think any- 
body can do that, can be big enough and have the support that it 
needs, but the Government, because we can be defeated more resound- 
ingly ideologically tlian we can even by military action, which is what 
I don't think the Communists want to try to do now. 

Mr. SciiADEBERG. Would there be any advantage in having a pri- 
vate sector contribute ? 

Mr. RoBiisrsoN. I think very definitely. I would hope that private 
organizations that are concerned would have a very real part in this, 
because, after all, they are the majority of the people going abroad all 
the time. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. What you say, then, when you speak of the impor- 
tance of Government support, doesn't close the door or preclude the 
role of the private sector ? 

Mr. Robinson. Absolutely not. I would hope that it would be a 
real large place for private organizations to share in such a program. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. I mean, your o-svn dedication to Crossroads is proof 
that you are committed to the private-sector approach very strongly. 

Mr. Robinson. Yes. I think we need both. I am committed to the 
private structure, because sometimes the private organization can 
move with greater speed, less suspicion, and greater depth. When 
there are difficulties between our nations and some other, that door 
doesn't keep us out. For example, our best relationship is in Ghana. 
We don't have to pay for room, board, or transportation in Ghana. 

Now, everybody thinks this is odd, and I wonder about it myself, 
too, but they know what we are and who we are, and when they are 
difficulties with our Government and Ghana, for example, we don't 
have any at all. 

And I think if the door is open, keep your foot in it. That is why, 
when the newspapers came out like the Dally News and said, and I 
quote them, "We should pull our Peace Coi-ps people out of Ghana 
before they are killed, stewed, and eaten," that doesn't win friends for 
us anywhere in the world, and newspapers sometimes could use a little 
understanding of how you fight this battle. It wasn't what the Ghan- 
ians thought about this that disturbed me. It was what the Nigerians 
thought, who are strong friends of us, and they resented that, for ex- 
ample, although they knew it wasn't our Government policy. 

Well, I don't share with that. I think if the door is open, you keep 
your foot in there and you keep somebody in there. No matter how 
high the price or how hard the difficulties, somebody has got to stay 
in there with the ideas that we believe are worth standing for, also 
worth dying for — although I want to see more people stand for than 
die for them. 

Mr. JoriANSEN. Let me ask this question : Wliere the Peace Corps is 
obviously a Government agency and is, therefore, open to the attack, 
however baseless, that, after all, this is an arm of State Department 


policy or United States policy, is the organization such as you repre- 
sent, because it comes from non-Government background and with 
nongovernmental support, less subjected to the charge, particularly 
by Communists in tiiese countries, or is it more difficult for the Com- 
munists to pin the tag of agents of imperialism or capitalism for the 
United States Government on the private enterprise type of group? 

Mr. Robinson. It is more difficult for them, although I must admit 
they try to do it, to pin a label on Crossroads. They try to do that to 
us, for example, try to make people believe that we are really are a back- 
door Government-sponsored organization and that all this business 
about private support doesn't avail very much, but we have been able 
to effectively counteract their attempts. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. The truth doesn't bother the Communists. 

Mr. Robinson. It doesn't bother them. What we have to do is to 
convince the people they are trying to convince, and we have been 
able to convince the people they are trying to con. There is no 
country we have been in, although in Uganda and Ghana they tried 
to make it look as though we were CIA agents or an organization 
trying to subvert their youth, but we were able to defeat them at it, 
and in both countries, they have asked us to bring two or three groups 
a year. 

We can only take one group to each country despite all they did, 
so it is those people, the masses of people whom we want to convince, 
and we can keep doing that, and when you say to people, these stu- 
dents raised this money, this Kiwanis Club, this temple or synagogue, 
this church, this Rotarian Club, this group of students help make our 
work possible out here, that speaks for democracy with a witness that 
nothing else can controvert. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. What specific type of activities do these groups of 
yours pursue in these foreign countries ? 

Mr. Robinson. We use the work camp technique as a vehicle to 
be able to talk, to live with, and to get people to listen to us. This 
year, for example, we are going to build eight little two- to five-room 
schools in a village where there has been no school. 

We are going to do a rural health project in preventive medicine, 
with three doctors and eight nurses in eastern Nigeria ; and from Tufts 
University, we are taking 12, at least, students to do a youth and 
sports and physical education program. 

Everybody wants athletics. They want to train for their African 
games and the Olympic games. In Mali, which has just admitted us 
for the first time — Mali never let us in before because they didn't be- 
lieve we were a private organization — we have a project this summer; 
we have convinced them. They want, for example, four coaches and 
a basketball team. Five countries wanted a basketball team. Some 
people we go to for money laugh at me, and they say, "It's a waste 
to send a basketball team," 

Look, you send a basketball team, you will be having an opportunity 
to talk to every youth in the country, and you are not playing basket- 
ball all day; you are sitting around the fireside of the evening and 
communicating ideas of democracy, faith, and freedom. 

You are going to look at a new dam site, for example, or you are 
going to talk to a chief of the village or the head of the political 
party or the opposition leader, and this is where we get our chance to 


get across our ideas, and then they come back again and again with 
questions, and the discussion deepens. 

I would say, sir, that over 10,000 letters a year flow now between 
the young people in this country and young leaders in the African 
countries, so we use this as a vehicle, you see. 

We give a service, we say, "We have come to serve you. This is 
what the democracy is. It comes from within committed people, who 
are not sent, but who believe this is their duty and responsibility, and 
then it comes outside, and it changes other people, because they begin 
to believe in you. This is our greatest opportunity." 

Now, out of that, we have gotten yoimg African leaders to begin 
to take responsibility they never took before. When we first went, 
we had 62 in five countries. We got less than 30 African students to 
come and work with us. 

They would folk dance with us, talk about Little Rock, argue about 
race relations, about labor, but they wouldn't work, because they were 
the elite. If they were in high school and college, and you didn't 
touch anything with your hands. That was beneath them. But it in- 
terested them, why students would come all the way from the United 
States, pay their own money, give up their vacations, and live in a 
village under primitive conditions and avoid the cities. 

We take them out into the villages, under the most primitive con- 
ditions, and we tell them, "If you're not tough enough, you can't go 
with us, because we promise you dysentery, we promise you some 
malaria. It won't hurt you if you follow our rules, but you are going 
to get all of these things. Sometimes, you are going to say to your- 
self, 'Why did I ever let that fellow Robinson get me out in a place 
like this?' " But we also promise you will be there at what Tillich 
calls the Kairos, where time enters eternity, and they are a part of 
the forces helping make good history of a better, more secure, more 
peaceful, and a more democratic world. 

Mr. Clausen. You have made a very key point here, I think, and 
that is that we have the maximum flexibility, because of the fact that 
you are operating in a private sector. Could you comment on the 
restrictions that anyone associated with the public sector will have, 
in operating in this same environment ? 

Mr. RoBiNSON". Yes, I can. 

I would say, let's take Peace Corps. I serve as a member of the 
Advisory Committee, the National Advisory Committee — in fact, as 
one of the four vice chairmen of the National Advisory Committee — 
and I did a survey for Peace Corps, to see what was the reaction of 
Europeans, expatriates, the Government people, the opposition party 
people, the Communists, student leaders, and so on, 2 years ago, 
which I sent back to the headquarters here in Washington. 

Now, the difficulty with most Government agencies working abroad 
is that they have to get an appropriation from Congress. If I may 
be completely frank 

Mr. JoiiANSEN. That is why we value your testimony. Be perfectly 

Mr. Robinson. And it has got to be set up, and rules have got to 
be set for it, and then I find so many people have to say, "What is 
Congress going to think?" First, let me give you an example. The 
United States Foreign Service made a film for us, beautifully done. 


They took some scenes of our students talking about politics with 
Jomo Kenyata ; Julius Nyerere, the Prime Minister of Tanganyika ; 
and with Tom Mboya about race relations, and they are making this 
film, in color, on which they spent thousands of dollars, translating 
it into French, Arabic, and Swahili, as well as English, to show that 
dynamism of American democratic young people, but they took all 
of the conversation on politics and the confrontations on race rela- 
tions out, rightly or wrongly, because they said, "This might be an 
offense to Congress." 

Now, I think this is stupid, myself, that they even think this. I 
said, "Why don't you put it in, and let's see what comes afterwards?" 
Because you can't talk to African groups unless you talk on these terms. 
Wliat did the film turn out to be, a beautiful travelogue in color, girls 
carrying cement blocks on their heads, but we wanted to show them we 
were concerned about their future, and that is where they are now, 
deeply involved in political development and independence and vitally 
concerned about American race relations. 

Mr. JoHANSEN. Now, a private program could have done that. 

Mr. Robinson. Yes. We did do that, CBS, the first time we got 
into Guinea in 1960, when our Government had bad relations with 
Guinea, they didn't like us and we didn't like them, but we got in. 

CBS then promised them $4,000 to help build a building so that 
they could get in, and Ed Murrow's last "CBS Reports" was ^'-Opera- 
tion Crossroads Africa^ Pilot Project for Peace Corps,''^ but in that 
film, there was confrontation with the villagers about race relations, 
confrontation with Sekou Toure about American relations with 
Guinea, for example, which we could do, and they did, and it is a very 
powerful film. 

Mr. Clausen. What you are saying, then, sir, is that there are al- 
ways going to be limitations in any program associated with Govern- 
ment, whereas, you have a minimal amount of limitations if the 
emphasis is placed in the private sector. Is that correct ? 

Mr. Robinson. That is correct. But the big problem here is that 
no private agency can raise the money necessary to do the job that has 
to be done. 

Mr. Clausen. All right. Will you yield on that point? After 
hearing your testimony, and I think we have hit, Mr. Chairman, on a 
very key point. It is conceivable that we will have to develop a part- 
nership program between Government and the private sector with 
incentive for the leadership of our private sector to move out and do a 
better job than they have been doing, but in the meantime, show the 
Government interest and a matching program, possibly. 

Mr. Robinson. I think we can be creative enough to get the maxi- 
mum amount of using both Government and private agencies. Wlien 
President Kennedy, former President Kenned}^, announced the Peace 
Corps, he said, "There will be a place for the Government service, 
there will be a place for Crossroads, there will be a place for colleges 
and universities." My biggest quarrel with Peace Corps is that it 
became another bureaucracy, and didn't leave enough room to do pri- 
vate contracts. I want to add, however, the Peace Corps is doing a 
magnificent job. 

If it is going to do an educational project, for example, why not get 
the education department of a school of education to do it in a coun- 
try ? They are beginning to do a little of that now. 


They had a whole section on contract with private agencies, but that 
has been pulled in, until it is almost nothing now, so that they could do 
creative things in a more reflective way if they could set the standard 
and the rule and say to this agency, "You do this job. We will not 
supervise it, but we will check you every 6 months or a year." 

Mr. JoHANSEN. Off the record. 

(Discussion off the record.) 

Mr. JoHANSEN. I would like to express my appreciation and, I am 
sure, of my colleagues for your appearance here and your testimony. 
I hope some of us can avail ourselves of the opportmiity of talking 
with you personally when you are in Washington. 

Mr. RoBiisrsoN. I will be delighted. 

Mr. JoHANSEN". And possibly there may be further opportunities to 
appear before the committee, but we do thank you for appearing. 

Mr. Clausen. Mr. Chairman, could I ask one question for the rec- 
ord, before the gentleman leaves ? 

Mr. JoHANSEN. Surely. 

Mr. Clausen. Because I have been developing the matter of utiliza- 
tion of aircraft. I don't know if you were here or not when I made the 
point with the previous witness about the implementation of, or the 
use of, aircraft in these remote sections of Africa. Could you use 
this in your program to expedite the Operations Crossroads in Africa ? 

Mr. Robinson. I don't want to be ambivalent about that. Our larg- 
est expenditure is getting 310 people to Africa. We sometimes have 
thought about the possibility, and the superintendent of the West Point 
Military Academy actually took it up with somebody in the Air Force 
about the possibility of their flying us over. The $220,000 we spend 
on flying them out by jet, even though it is cheaper than commercial 
fare, could double the number of people we are working with in many 

Mr. Clausen. The point that we are making is that transportation 
of qualified people into the area is one of the greatest needs. 

Mr. Robinson. Absolutely. It is the biggest expense. 

Mr. Johansen. We will release you now to take your own aircraft. 

Mr. Robinson. Thank you. Thank you verj^ much, sir. 

Mr. Johansen. The committee will stand in recess subject to the 
call of the Chair. 

(Whereupon, at 1:40 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 
the call of the Chair.) 


(The committee reconvened at 2:25 p.m.. Representative Richard 
Ichord, of Missouri, presiding.) 

Mr. Ichord. The meeting will come to order. 

This meeting is a continuation of the hearing on the Freedom 
Academy bills. 

The next witness is Mr. Walter Joyce. 

Mr. Joyce, it is a pleasure to have you before the committee. I wish 
to apologize that the other members are not here to hear your testi- 
mony, but we do have some important legislation on the floor of the 
House today, and a vote is expected at any time. I do hope that we can 
conclude with your testimony before the bell rings. 


I would ask, sir, that you give us a brief sketch of your background 
for the reporter before you get into your testimony. 


Mr. Joyce. Mr. Chairman, I am managaing editor of Printers'^ Ink 
Magazine.^ the weekly news magazine of marketing and advertising, 
and I am also the author of a recently publislied book called The 
Propaganda Gap. A continuing analysis of the media of communica- 
tions and the use of persuasive communications in the world of busi- 
ness is my vocation. 

A continuing study of the use of the persuasive communications in 
the international conflict of ideologies is my avocation. 

My testimony will be brief. 

Because of my specialized background and experience, however, I 
trust I can cast a little light from a slightly different angle on the need 
for the Freedom Academy. 

Knowledge in a vacuum is like an unopened telephone book. Ap- 
plied knowledge gives birth to new intelligence. That is why every 
major enterprise today is, first of all, a consumer of ideas and facts. 
Business draws its operating knowledge from virtually every intel- 
lectual discipline. It employs sociologists, anthropologists, econo- 
mists, psychologists, semanticists, philosophers, researchers, and 
practitioners of all of the creative arts. 

It is the meshing of these disciplines that adds much to the dynamics 
of business today. 

Until this century the meshing was accomplished on a haphazard 
basis. Then came the business school and the era of the management 
generalist, who orchestrates the many disciplines into an operational 
approach, knowledge is converted into something. There is a con- 
stant quest for more and more knowledge, and there is a continuous 
feedback on the effects of the operational approach so that it can be 
refined and refined. 

This is not being done in the ideological struggle. There is no 
repository of pertinent knowledge from all of the disciplines. There 
is no faculty interpreting that knowledge in terms of the needs of the 
cold war, as the faculties of business schools interpret knowledge in 
terms of the needs of the business world. There is no school turning 
out the generalists, who orchestrate the bits and pieces of knowledge 
into an approach that fits the needs of the immediate situation. 

During World War I there was concern because we were training 
some of our soldiers with broomsticks instead of guns, but we did 
arm them with guns before we sent them to battle. Now we send 
out our cold warriors to the battlefront armed figuratively with 
nothing more than broomsticks. If our military academies can turn 
out well-prepared warriors for a hot war, there is no reason we cannot 
have an academy to turn out fighters for the only war we are in. 

At this point may I make a special plea that the training be extended 
to as many citizens of other countries as possible. Common sense, 
of course, would tell us that nationals can influence their fellow citi- 
zens to a greater degree than outsiders can, but the differences may 
be more pronounced and more variated than is appreciated. This 
has been learned through hard practice by the United States adver- 

30-471— 64— pt. 2 18 


tising agencies that have expanded abroad. Our advertising 
techniques are effective in other countries, but tliey are most 
effective when adapted by tlie nationals of those countries. That is 
why most foreign branches of U.S. agencies are staffed from top 
to bottom with nationals or near-nationals. 

I believe you have been hearing a sufficient number of arguments in 
favor of training Government foreign affairs personnel in the Freedom 
Academy, but that bill also provides for special courses for people 
from the private sector of our society. Let us give full weight to 
the value of such courses. 

Some 35,000 American businessmen work in other countries. That, 
I believe, is more than the total number of State Department, US I A, 
and AID personnel abroad. These businessmen generally remain 
in the host countries longer than Government personnel. For ex- 
ample, the minimum tour for USIA personnel in one country was 
changed from 2 to 3 years just recently. 

American businessmen often have a wider range of direct contact 
with local businesses, local citizens, and can do more by word and 
deed to influence attitudes. These men now must learn on the job 
how to cope with the conflicting ideological forces. 

Many go abroad without the background needed to meet the chal- 
lenge, yet imagine what exponents of our economic system and our 
total society American businessmen abroad could be. 

The anthropologist, Ethel J. Alpenfels, has observed that the travel- 
ing salesman has been the most effective builder of civilizations. She 
has recalled that in the Aztec kingdom the traveling salesman rated 
a special heaven alongside of women who died in childbirth and 
men who died in battle. 

"If we look at the West," she has said, "it is not the Government 
official who most changes people, nor is it the missionary, it is the 
trader, traveling salesmen, businessmen who followed. The ideas 
of our country come through the products we sell." 

Yet, it was not until 1961 that the USIA took the first halting 
step toward enlisting the help of U.S. business; through its office 
of private cooperation, the USIA distributes kits of background 
information on our Government's positions to some 450 international 
firms, which in turn distribute the kits to their overseas employees. 

Wliile this, of course, is an admirable effort, it is just a halting step 
by an agency that was not even established to do a training job in the 
private sector. 

American businessmen abroad are generally keenly conscious of our 
engagement in the ideological struggle and many think that Govern- 
ment is falling down on the job. To take up the slack to some degree 
they have formed such organizations as the Business Council for In- 
ternational Understanding, the U.S. Inter- American Council, the Na- 
tional Foreign Trade Council, the Pan American Society, the Latin 
American Information Committee, and innumerable others. Their 
activities vary, but their objectives all include a deeper commitment 
to the ideological conflict. Some are outright propaganda organiza- 
tions. The Information Council of the Americas in New Orleans, for 
example, tapes programs on Communist perfidy and distributes them 
to Latin America. With Government guidance and endorsement, 
highly significant programs can be developed in the private sector. 


We already have CARE, the Congress for Cultural Freedom, the 
International Rescue Committee, and the People-to-People Program. 
Then there is religion, another antithesis to communism. The Na- 
tional Council of Churches reports there are some 33,000 U.S. mis- 
sionaries in 146 foreign countries and territories. American church- 
goers support them with $170 million a year in contributions. 

Private corporations and foundations are also active. Overseas, the 
Ford, Rockefeller, Near East, and other foundations are spending 
some $40 million a year on research, scholarships, and economic de- 

It can be said without much contradiction that these efforts are not 
tied in with the ideological objectives of free men as closely as they 
could be with enlightened guidance. We don't have the enlightenment 
because we have not applied our resources to the problem. 

The appalling fact is that the resources and the talents are avail- 
able but there has been no real move to conscript them. 

At the heart of the question are ideas and the ability to win true be- 
lievers in those ideas. We, our country, has just a few basic ideas, 
primarily that the freedom and dignity of each individual are in- 
violate and to recognize that principle is to benefit all mankind. It 
has worked for us and for many others in the free world. Yet those 
ideas are seriously challenged by fraudulent promises. It need not be. 
This Nation possesses the resources of persuasive communications in 
such quantity and quality that we could turn the Communist siren 
song into an ineffectual moan. Our technology in transmitting sound, 
pictures, and printed word is unmatched. Our capacity for producing 
communications media is without parallel. Our command of the 
methodology is unchallenged. 

Thanks to our leadership in the field of electronic computers, our 
capability to assemble information and process it to meaningful com- 
munications ends is unlimited. And thanks to our open, competitive 
society our fund of creative talent in the art of persuasion and the use 
of all media is abundant. 

While Government, through the Freedom Academy, could provide 
guidance, it could also employ the services and other elements of the 
private sector. 

For example. Government could engage one of the great organiza- 
tions in international communications to conduct intense studies of 
political attitudes throughout the world — and to analyze the facts, 
concepts, and ideas that have shaped, and could reshape, these atti- 

Government and business together could conduct studies to deter- 
mine the most progressive and promising policies, in the terms of cold 
war objectives, for business in each area of the world. 

Government could turn over the findings of the attitudinal studies 
to one or more of our major communications agencies for the devel- 
opment of special projects. One special project could be the initiation 
of ideas and approaches for dramatizing to the people of Latin Amer- 
ica the treacheries of communism in Cuba. 

Government could engage private-sector communications specialists 
to analyze in depth the magazines, exhibits, motion pictures, radio 
broadcasts, television programs, and other efforts by Government to 
influence the peoples of the world. 


During the past few years few have delved more deeply into all of 
the hearings, reports, analyses, speeches, and news stories on the ideo- 
logical struggle than I have. Two impressions are predominant: 
There is wide agreement that we have not really begun to commit our- 
selves to the ideological struggle and there is endless haggling over 
the kind of commitment because parochial preserves will be challenged. 

You have the opportunity now to make the commitment. You also 
are sophisticated enough to know that, if you do, if you enact the 
Freedom Academy bill, a new balance in our foreign affairs structure 
will be achieved. The striped-pants diplomat, with his polite govern- 
ment-to-government charade, will enjoy less stature. Our aid pro- 
gram will be administered with more attention to positive objectives. 
It will be a new kind of foreign affairs, and some entrenched interests 
will not like it. But I think I am speaking for the majority when I 
urge, commit us. 

Thank you. 

Mr. IcHORD. Thank you very much, Mr. Joyce, for your very fine 

I was not present at the meeting this morning but I understand 
that one of the witnesses advanced the thought that perhaps the Free- 
dom Academy could be financed by private funds rather than by gov- 
ernmental appropriations. 

I rather believe that that idea was probably advanced by Represent- 
ative Clausen, whom I had talked to earlier and he was in favor of a 
private-financing approach. 

For the record I would like to ask. Do you believe that that would 
be feasible, that is, that fomidations and corporations could be relied 
upon to furnish sufficient funds for the operation of a Freedom 
Academy ? 

Mr. Joyce. I think it is feasible to get funds, but it is probably an 
unrealistic way to get funds. 

I do not think that is the resolution of the problem right now. 1 
think this should be an official Government program and it should 
belong to all of the people. It should not be identified with business ; 
it should be identified with all of us. 

Mr. IcHORD. You are not advocating the Government set up the 
Academy and then finance it out of private appropriations or private 
funds, are you? 

Mr. Joyce. No, I am not. I advocate that this be supported by tax 

Mr. IcHORD. You would prefer that it be supported by tax money 
to make it a project of all of the American people? 

Mr. Joyce. Yes, sir. 

Mr. IcHORD. One more question. Do you believe that there is suf- 
ficient awareness in the business community to insure that it could 
be comited upon to support the Freedom Academy and take full ad- 
vantage of all of its facilities ? 

Mr. Joyce. I am convinced there is. One reason that I wrote the 
book or started research for the book — my book. The Propaganda 
Gap — was the increasing number of criticisms we got at Printers^ 
Ink of the United States position as a persuader abroad. As you 
know, more and more business has gone abroad since World War II, 
and particularly our communications agencies, our advertising agen- 


cies, our marketing organizations. These are people sophisticated 
in commnnications and inevitably they think our Government is doing 
a poor job. A number of them have approached the USIA and offered 
their assistance. 

Mr. IcHORD. It is your feeling then that these people could attend 
the Academy and be prepared to help their Government when they 
are abroad? 

Mr. Joyce. I am convinced they would ; yes. 

Mr. IcKORD. The reason why I was not at the hearings this morn- 
ing was that I am a member of the Conmiittee on Armed Services 
and we heard Secretar\^ of Defense, Mr. McNamara, on the South 
Vietnam situation and the Secretary at the hearing this morning— 
of course, I cannot relate all that went on at the hearing, but he did 
go over essentially the same thing that he went over in his speech 
of March the 28th to the effect that we essentially had four alterna- 
tives in South Vietnam ; he only mentioned three, but I could tell from 
his testimonv pretty well what the fourth alternative was. 

One, would be to go all out to win the war in South Vietnam; 
second, would be to get out altogether; third, would be to do as we 
are doing now; and the fourth, would be some kind of a neutrality 
arrangement much like that in Laos. Of course, that would be out be- 
cause we, in effect, have already had division in Vietnam, division of 
North Vietnam and South Vietnam. 

We cannot imder any circumstances pull out, I believe, because it 
would open up Malaysia, the Philippines, Australia, all down the 
line there to Communist advancements. 

Of course, the Freedom Academy operating on a situation like 
South Vietnam is too late. 

Mr. Joyce. Yes. 

Mr. IcHORD. Do you feel this Academy would have helped us in a 
situation, say, 10 or 12 years ago in Vietnam ? 

Mr. Joyce. If the concept worked, presumably we would have lead- 
ership in South Vietnam — knowledgeable, free-world style leadership 
that would have recognized the Communist threat a long time ago and 
would have confronted it headlong. 

I think also a commitment to the whole idea of the Freedom Acad- 
emy would have meant that not only would South Vietnam be on con- 
tention as it is now, but North Vietnam, too. 

If we commit ourselves to the principles of freedom, we cannot ac- 
cept the idea that what's theirs is theirs, and what's ours we will strug- 
gle over. I think there is a conflict of ideas and our ideas would have 
invaded North Vietnam. Our ideas would be more alive behind the 
Iron Curtain than they are now. 

Mr. IcHORD. You are thinking then in terms of a counteroffensive 
rather than being on the defensive all of the time ? 

Mr. Joyce. It inevitably would have to be that. 

If we commit ourselves to the ideological struggle, it has to be that. 
The Communists are totally committed to it; there is no letup, al- 
though there might be an accommodation on the diplomatic level, there 
is no letup to their commitment on the ideological level. 

Mr. IcTiORD. Thank you very much, Mr. Joyce, for your testiniony. 

The meeting will stand adjourned until further call of the Chair. 
(Wliereupon, at 2 :45 p.m., Wednesday, May 20, 1964, the committee 
adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.) 



(Subsequent to the May 20 hearings, the following statement was 
received by the committee from Mr. Louis Dona O'Hara, president of 
the League. It is hereby made a part of the record :) 

P.O. Box 777 
Pawtucket, Rhode Island 
June 9, 1964 
Honorable Edwin E. Willis, Ch. 
Committee on American Activities 
House of Representatives 

Dear Sir : 

iThe recent death of Douglas MacArthur brings to light the value of dedicated 
service gained for the nation. What motivated Douglas in his tasks? Wasn't 
it the fidelity which emanated from his soul in early manhood during the con- 
structive period of his life when he received the bounty of special talents from 
Uncle Sam at West Point? Like other men such as Washington, Custer, Roberts, 
Pershing, Bradley, Patton, Grant, Sherman, Bowie, Eisenhower, and many others, 
he was expressing the sustaining force of his vitality to fulfill America's role 
of leadership. In some of these cases, the aptitude is quiet and in others it is 
vocal. The navy also has its heroes such as Dewey, Nimitz, Halsey, King and 
others. The air has its men such as Arnold, Vandenberg, Spaatz, and Mitchell. 
The list is long but it started in 1802 with a first national school through the 
urgings of Washington and Jefferson. Long may it continue. 

In analysis we compare what these men have done for Western Civilization 
in the American sense in comparison to other nations when they wore the mantle 
of leadership. We can say that Uncle Sam's investment in breeding special 
talent has advantages beyond measure in the tally of history. 

In all this there is one flaw and that is that the success gained was with mili- 
tary arms with blood as the price. A true American sense has a separate quality 
in that although we have victories for our flag, the measure of our glory was 
blended with compassion as was ably expressed by Grant in returning Lee's 
sword along with his horses. The Marshall plan was a form of compassion. 
MacArthur's success in Japan after VJ Day was also the revelation of a com- 
passionate heart. 

Military might is necessary for it was fear of Caesar that brought forth the 
200 years of peace for the Roman Empire. We, as Americans seek to duplicate 
such an achievement of peace over a longer and indefinite term. We are seeking 
an infinite tenure of peace. Atomic potential dictates the wisdom of such a 
course. If such be the case, the leadership will come to "cold war" leaders 
rather than leadership by force of arms. Caesar was fortunate in that the 
weapons then were limited whereas now the weapons are infinite and limitless. 

It is in the power of Americans to create a world of love that will bring forth 
a grandeur and splendor greater than Rome. Prosperity could be achieved 
without war economies. To create a world of love and charity which is dis- 
ciplined towards mutual acceptance of dependency on one another without 
avoiding responsibility. America now seeks unsung heroes. The challenge of 
such a program is equal to victory in war. In this work, the glory is Jiot per- 
sonified as it must be in the military art, but the achievement comes closest to 
the great message of the Messiah who took advantage of Caesar's peace to do 
his work. The christian message of our Messiah has lasted long and remains 
with us. 

You, the members of your committee have the opportunity to create civilian 
heroes of peace and for these men the tunic of service shall be plain cloth as is 
usually worn by civilians rather than the public image which the uniform must 
represent. America needs both uniforms and tunics in the performance of its 
future missions. 


To create such talent, the Freedom Academy has been proposed. In my con- 
sidered judgment, in the era of 1999, a graduate of this Freedom Academy will 
probably perform a service for the Congress that will prove the merit of its 
decision in creating same, and I recommend the bill's immediate passage. 

My regards to all the members of your committee although I had a lot of 
statistics to submit, I chose rather to submit this prepared statement for the 
I recommend immediate passage in this session of the Congress. 
Respectfully submitted, 

Louis Dona O'Hara, P.E. 





Acheson, Dean 1052 

Albertson, William 1062 

Almond, Edward M 1297 

Alpenfels, Ethel J 1510 

Alsop 1408 

Antonenko-Davidovich, B 1300 

Arnold, Hap (Henry Harley) 966 

Atkinson, James D 1082-1086 (statement), 1297 

Ayub (Kahn), Mohammed 1412 


Baarslag, Karl 1297 

Bakunin (Mikhail) 1058 

Ball, George B 958. 991, 1022, 1307 

Barry, Robert R 1300-1305 (statement) 

Batista y Zaldivar (Fulgencio) 907, 1048, 1335, 1377, 1486 

Bavh, Birch E 1265 

Bazhan, N 1300 

Beech, Keyes 1455 

Berle, Adolph A 1465-1483 (statement) 

Betancourt, Romulo 1038, 1309, 1472, 1473, 1482 

Biemiller, Andrew J 1056, 1063, 1064 

Bobrakov, Yuri I 1283, 1298 

Boehm 1071 

Boggs, Hale 935 

938, 967, 969, 1001, 1035, 1041-1046 (statement), 1056, 1071, 1265, 

1315, 1354, 1378, 1380, 1425. 

Bokshai, I 1300 

Boone, Joseph 949 

Bouscaren, Anthony T 1297 

Bowles, Chester 1494 

Bozhiy, M 1300 

Braddock (Edward) 1230 

Brandt, Willy 1038 

Brewster, Daniel B 1265 

Brundage, Avery 1073 

Bryant (Farris) 965 

Bukharin, (Nikolai I.) 1194' 

Bnndy, McGeorge 1356 

Bunn (Edward) 1499 

Burke. Arleigh A 938. 942, 1022, 1082, 1420-1449 (statement), 1453, 1479 

Butler, Edward S., Ill 1045 

Byrd, Robert C 1265 


Cabell, O. P 1198, 1199, 1207 

Cannon, Howard W 1265 

Cantril, Hadley 1211 

Carey, James 962 

1 Spelled Bukarin in this reference. 



Case, Clifeord P 936, 954, 1046, 1055, 1264 

Castro, Fidel . 997, 

1042, 1045, 1048, 1076, 1084, 1293, 1300, 1309, 1316, 1335-1337, 1356, 
1358, 1367, 1379, 1412, 1456, 1477, 1478, 1483, 1486. 

Castro, Raul 1334-1336 

Chamberlain (Neville) 1060, 1073, 1075 

Chamberlain, William Henry 966 

Ohapelle, Dickey 1483, 1484, 1485-1494 (statement) 

Chaplin, George 1484 

Chekanyuk, V 1300 

Cherne, Leo 938, 1354 

Chiang Kai-shek 997 

Chou En-lai 1455 

Churchill, Winston 1059, 1435 

Clark, Joseph S., Jr 1265 

Clarke. Phil C 1484 

Clausen, Don H__ 937, 1031-1033 (statement), 1101, 1107, 1108. 1315, 1457-1465 
(statement), 1467, 1473, 1480, 1492, 1493, 1503, 1506-1508. 1512 

Clausewitz, Karl Von 1059 

Clay (Lucius) 1354 

Coblentz, Gaston 1484 

Conley, Michael C 1385-1411 (statement) 

Considine, Robert 1484 

Copley 1350 

Cunningham, William J 1087-1098 (statement) 

Cutler, Robert T 948, 949, 966 


Dabney, Virginius 1317 

Dale, Edwin L., Jr 1485 

Damrosch, Walter 1351 

Dankevich, K 1300 

Dawson (George Geoffrey) 1073 

de Gaulle, Charles 996, 1300, 1412, 1469 

de Jaegher (Raymond) 1196.1197 

Delaney, Robert Finley 1319-1341 (statement) 

de Leon, Daniel 1057, 1064 

de Madariaga, Salvador 1038 

de Musset, Alfred 1018, 1030 

de Onis, Juan 1484 

de Tocqueville, Alex 1059 

Devine, Dwight 966 

Dewey (Thomas E.) 1354 

Dmiterko, L 1300 

Dobriansky, Lev E 1279-1300 (statement), 1380 

Dodd, Thomas J 936, 954, 963, 1055, 1264, 1317, 1353, 1367 

Donovan (William) 1353 

Dorkins, Charles 1484 

Douglas, Paul H 936, 937, 945, 952, 954, 963, 1055, 1056, 1058, 1264, 1317, 1354 

Drummond, Roscoe 941, 1053 

Dulles, Allen 1235, 1357 

Dutton, Frederick G 1053, 1181, 1187 


Einaudi 1197 

Eisenhower, Dwight D 952, 1306, 1355 

Elegant, Robert S 1484 

Emmet, Christopher 1351-1359 (statement), 1470 

Engels, Friedrich (Frederick) 1062. 1084, 1496 

Engle, Clair 1265 

Ewan, Jim 1449 

INDEX iii 



Fabian, Dr 1086 

Fairchild, E. W 1485 

Fall, Bernard F 1213 

Fascell, Dante B 1417-1419 (statement) 

Fedorenko 1294 

Feuerbach (Ludwig Andreas) 1058^ 

Figueres, Jos6 953, 1037, 1038, 1309, 1472 

Fisber, Jobn M 1297 

Fleiscbman, Stephen 1484 

Flint, James 1494, 1495 

Fong, Hiram 936, 954, 1055, 1264 

Fulbrigbt, J. William 1046, 1051, 1356, 1358, 1468, 1469, 1480 

Funston, Keith 1355 


Gailbraith, Kenneth 1475 

Gallup, George 1242 

Gitlow ( Benjamin) 1194 

Gmyrya, B 1300 

Gnatyuk, D 1300 

Goddard 1382 

Goldwater, Barry 936, 945, 954, 1055, 1264, 1317 

Gompers, Samuel 1057, 1064 

Gomulka ( Wladyslaw) 955 

Gonchar, O 1300 

Gonzales, Jose 1343 

Goulart (Joao) 1316, 1358, 1467 

Grant, Alan G., Jr 941, 943, 945, 948-952, 

954, 965-1003 (statement), 1044, 1051, 1052, 1097, 1098, 1102, 1106- 
1108, 1191, 1267-1269, 1271, 1288, 1309, 1319, 1353, 1357, 1435, 1463 

Gray, Gordon 1226 

Green, William 1074, 1351, 1424 

Gromyko (Andrei A.) 1250 

Grose, Peter 1439 

Gruening, Ernest 1265 

Gruson, Sidney 1484 

Gubser, Charles S 935,938,967,1056,1315 1328 1333,1411-1415 (statement) 


Halleck (Henry W.) 1061 

Harrigan, Anthony 1297 

Harriman, W. Averell 1060, 1249-1271 (statement), 

1278, 1282, 1285, 1286, 1289, 1291, 1303, 1304, 1308, 1309, 1356 

Hart, Philip A : 1265 

Hartigan, William 1484 

Hartman, Robert 1484 

Hays, Wayne 1262, 1303 

Hegel (Georg Wilhelm Friedrich) 1058,1229 

Herling, John 962 

Herlong, A. Sidney, Jr 935, 936, 937-965 (statement), 967, 969, 

976, 993, 1001, 1042, 1043, 1056, 1247, 1302, 1313, 1315, 1329, 1466 

Herter (Christian A.) 1184, 1188, 1190, 1262, 1264, 1266, 1268 

Hevi, Emmanuel John 1079,1080 

Hickenlooper, Bourke B 936, 954, 1055, 1264 

Higgins, Marguerite 1455 

Hill, Robert C 1316 (statement) 

Hillsman, Roger 1054, 1060 

Hindus, Maurice 1484 

Hiss, Alger 1382 

Hitler, Adolf 966, 1058, 1059 

1071, 1073, 3075, 1351, 1358 

^ Misspelled Feurbach. 



Holmes, John Haynes 1353 

Hook, Sidney 940, 955, 1302, 1353, 1357 

Hoover, Herbert 1005, 1027 

Hoover, J. Edgar 1197 

Hoshi, Nobuo 1484 

Howard. Jack 1350 

Huberman ( Leo) 1312 

Huffman, Rex 966 

Humphrey, Hubert H 1265 


Ikeda (Hayato) 1412 

Inouye, Daniel K 1265 

Ivchenko, V 1300 


Jackson, C. D 1046, 1053, 1227, 1357 

Jackson, Henry M 1052 

Jagan, Cheddi 1102, 1103 

James, Daniel 1195, 1196 

Javits, Jacob K 1046, 1265 

Jimenez, Perez 1472 

Johnson, Frank J 1297 

Johnson, Lyndon B 1439 

Jones, Paul 1453, 1454-1456 (statement) 

Joyce, Walter 1415,1509-1513 (statement) 

Judd, Walter 937, 938, 952, 962. 963, 1001, 1056, 1313 


Kadar ( Janos) 1452 

Kalb, Marvin 1484 

Kasiyan, V 1300 

Keating, Kenneth B 936, 954, 1039, 1264, 1317 

Kennan, George 1016 

Kennedy, John F 953, 1039, 1046, 

1052, 1088, 1266, 1306, 1355, 1357, 1358, 1408, 1435, 1483, 1507 

Kennedy, Robert 953, 957, 976, 1051 

Kenyata, Jomo 1503, 1507 

Keogh, E. G 1449 

Kersten 1287 

Khanh, Nguyen 1439, 1440 

Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich 955, 

964, 1009, 1021, 1026, 1039, 1059, 1060, 1070, 1084. 1209, 1210, 
1214, 1216, 1240, 1250, 1256, 1257, 1261, 1282, 1294-1297, 1307, 
1308, 1311, 1354, 1355, 1357, 1358, 1387, 1403, 1404, 1452, 1469 

Kintner. William R 1098,1106,1110,1206,1207,1292,1305-1313 (statement) 

Kirilyuk, E 1300 

Kissinger, Henry 1223, 1226 

Kitchen, Robert W., Jr 987 

Knight, John S 1343, 1350 

Korneichuk, A 1300 

Kornfeder, Joseph Z 1194, 1203, 1207, 1306 

Korotich, V 1300 

Kostenko, L 1300 

Kozlanyuk, P 1300 

Kuhn (Irene Corbally) 1197 

Kuusinen, O. (Otto V.) 1194,1337 


LaFarge, John 1353 

Lambie, William K., Jr 1297 

Laurence, William L 1485 

Lausche, Frank J 936, 945, 954, 1264, 1317 

Lawrence, T. E 966 

Lee Kuan Yew 1038 


Lehman (Herbert H.) 1351 

Leibing, Peter 1484 

Lenin, V. I. (Nicolai) 950, 

962, 964, 966, 1005, 1021, 1057-1059, 1062, 1064, 1065, 1069, 1077, 
1084, 1191, 1193, 1194, 1198, 1204, 1212, 1213, 1215, 1226, 1256, 1257, 
1334, 1337, 1387, 1396, 1401, 1408, 1411, 1412. 

Leonhard, Wolfgang 1195 

Lewis, John L 1057 

Lodge, Henry Cabot 1439, 1440, 1458, 1459, 1462 

Long, Edward V 1265 

Long, Huey 1060 

Lovett, Robert 1226 

Lubin, Suzanne 1309 

Luce, Henry 1354 

Lyons, Eugene 966, 1357 


MacArthur, Douglas 1366, 1378, 1514 

MacLeish, Archibald 1504 

Macomber, William B., Jr 1176 

Mafifre, John 1441 

Magsaysay, Ramon 1494 

Maiboroda, G 1300 

Maiboroda, P 1300 

Maleter (Pal) 1355, 1358 

Malik, Charles 1038 

Malyshko, A 1300 

Mann, Thomas (Tom) 1316,1346 

Mansfield, Michael J 1265 

Manuilsky,' (Dimitri Z.) 1194 

Mao Tze-tung 949, 955, 

966, 1059, 1200, 1226, 1337, 1354, 1357, 1358, 1398, 1445, 1452 

Marchant, Pierre 1445 

Marin, Munoz 1472 

Markezini, Spyros 1047 

Marsh, John O., Jr 1450-1453 (statement) 

Martin, David 1353 

Marx, Karl 962, 1058, 1059, 

1062, 1071, 1077, 1084, 1198, 1229, 1256, 1258, 1266, 1281, 1337, 1496 

Mateos, Lopez 1412 

Matthews, Herbert 1477, 1478 

Mayers, Henry 998, 1035-1041 

(statement), 1046-1055 (statement), 1098-1102, 1105, 1106 

Mboya, Tom 1507 

McClure, William K 1484 

McCone, John l 1044 

McDowell, Arthur Gladstone 1055-1081 

(statement), 1102-1105, 1108, 1354, 1357 

McGee, Gale W 1265 

McGiffert, David E 1189 

Mclntyre, Thomas J 1265 

McKee, Fred 1058, 1265 

McNamara, Robert S 1439-1441, 1513 

McNaughton, John T 1183 

Meany, George 992, 1046, 1424 

Methvin, Eugene H 940, 948, 1324 

Meyer, Frank S 1193, 1201-1203 

Mikoyan (Anastas) 962, 1084 

Miller, Jack 936, 954, 1055, 1264 

Milton, (John) 1030 

Mitchell (William) (Billy) 998,1053 

Molotov, Vyacheslaw M 1194 

Monroney, A. S. Mike 1265 

Morales (Jose) Ramon Villeda ( See Villada Morales (Jose) Ramon) 

^ Spelled Manuelsky in this reference. 



Moreell, Ben 1297 

Morris, Robert 1297 

Morrison, H. Stuart 1324, 1342-1350 (statement), 1360-1364 (statement) 

Morse, J. H 1297 

Morse, Wayne lt>^^ 

Moss, Frank E 1265 

Mowrer, Edgar Ansel 1297 

Mundt, Karl E 936, 937, 945, 952, 

963, 1055, 1056, 1242, 1264, 1303, 1354 

Murphy, Charles J. V 1484 

Murphy (Robert Daniel) 1292 

Murrow, Edward R 1188. 1485, 1507 

Mussolini, Benito 1060 


Nagy (Ferene) 1355, 1358 

Neuberger, Maurine B 1265 

Newsom, Phil 1484 

Niemeyer, Gerhart 1274-1279 (statement), 1297 

Nixon, Richard M 952, 1296 

Nkrumah, (Kwame) 1020, 1079 

Nowell, William Odell 1194 

Nyerere, Julius 1979, 1507 


Ochsner, Alton 1945 

O'Connor, Daniel J 1377, 1378, 1379-1383 (statement) 

O'Hara, Louis Dona 1514-1515 (statement) 

Olson, Clarence H 1378-1379 (statement) 

Orrick (William H, Jr.) 989 

Osanka, Franklin Mark 1442-1449 

Oshanin (D. A.) 1209 

Oswald (Lee Harvey) 1102 

Oswald (Marguerite) 1102 

Panov (D. Yu) 1209 

Papandreou (George) 1039, 1047 

Paton, B 1300 

Pavlichko, D 1300 

Pavlov, Ivan 1204, 1205, 1210 

Pennington, Lee R 1297 

Perkins, James A 953, 

989, 991, 1184, 1188, 1190, 1262, 1266, 1268 

Philbrick, Herbert 938, 1365-1377 (statement) 

Pidsukha, A 1300 

Pineiro (Osada) (Manuel) (also known as Red Beard) 1486 

Pliny 1030 

Polk, George 1484 

Poore, Charles 1483 

Possony, Stefan T 951, 

964, 966, 975, 986, 992, 1003-1031 (statement), 1067, 1106, 1195, 

1223, 1228, 1297, 1320, 1322, 1330, 1357 

Predmore, Lewis 1089 

Proxmire, William 936, 945, 954, 1055, 1264 


Randolph, Abraham A 1265 

Randolph (A.) Philip 1^'>03 

Red Beard (See Pinero Osada, Manuel) 

Reuther, Walter 962 

Revutsky, L 1300 

Ribicoff, Abraham A 1265 

Richardson, John Jr 1419 (statement) 

Rickenbacker, Eddy 1366 

INDEX vii 


Robinson, James 1494-1508 (statement) 

Roca, Bias 1336, 1337 

Rockefeller, Nelson 1039, 1306 

Rogers, Helen G 1484 

Romualdi, Serafino 1076, 1077 

Rooney, John J 977, 983 

Rostow, Walt W 991, 992, 994, 1052, 1053, 1098, 1101, 1357 

Roucek, Joseph S 1447 

Rubinstein, Alvin Z 1208 

Rudenko, L 1300 

Rusk, Dean 991, 1054, 1186, 1356, 1481 

Rylsky, M 1300 


Saltonstall, Leverett 1265 

Sandburg, Carl 1074 

Schiro, Victor H lOio 

Schlesinger, Arthur W 1039-1041 

Schoenbrun, David 1484 

Schweiker, Richard S 935, 

938, 967, 1001, 1043, 1056, 1243-1249 (statement), 1273, 1315 

Scott, Hugh 936, 954, 1264, 1317 

Scranton (William) 1296 

Scripps, Charley 1350 

Segni, Antonio 1412 

Selznick, Philip 962, 1202 

Sevareid, Eric . 1484 

Shelton, C. N 1364 

Sherman (Forest) 1421 

Shevchenko, Taras Grigoryevich 1283, 1298-1300 

Shriver, Sargent 978, 1499 

Silliman, Charles V 966 

Smathers, George A 936, 954, 1055, 1264, 1265 

Smith, Howard K 1484 

Smith, Lawrence 1292 

Smolich, Y 1300 

Somoza, Luis 1472 

Sosyura, V 1300 

Soto, Lionel 1323, 1324, 1333 

Staats, Elmer 952 

Stalin, Josef— 952, 1004, 1059, 1194, 1198, 1226, 1257, 1261, 1355, 1387, 140i, 1480 

Stanton (Edwin M.) 1061 

Stark, Leonard 1484 

Stelmakh, M 1300 

Stone, Donald . 1496 

Stout, Ed 1484 

Strausz-Hupe, Robert 1003, 1206 

Stump, Felix B 1297 

Sukarno (Achmed) 955, 1412 

Suslov (Mikhail A.) 1083 

Sweezy (Paul M.) 1312 

Symington, Stuart 992, 1265, 1356 


Taft, Robert, Jr 935, 

938, 967, 969, 1001, 1043, 1044, 1056, 1071, 1271-1274 (state- 
ment), 1315, 1378, 1425. 

Talcott, Burt L 937, 1111 

Tarnovsky, N 1300 

Teller, Edward 1297 

Thomas, Norman 1353 

Thompson, Dorothy 1353 

Thorin, Duane 1297 

Tillich (Ernst) 1506 

Tito 955,1398 

viii INDEX 


Toland, John 1484 

Toure, Sekou 1507 

Tracy, Stanley J 1297 

Trotsky (Lev, Leon) 1194 

Trujillo (Rafael Leoidas) 1476 

Truman, Harry S 1306 

Tucker, Robert C 1210 

Tychina, P 1300 


Ulate (Otilio) 1472 

Urey, Harold 1078 

Uzhviy, N 1300 


Vance, Cyrus R 1177 

Vicas, George 1484 

Vilde, I 1300 

Villeda Morales (Jose) Ramon 1473 

Virsky, P 1300 

Vlasov (Audrey A.) 1353 

Von Clausewitz, Karl. {See Clausewitz, Karl Von.) 


Wagner, Addington 1383 

Wallace, Henry 1057, 1368 

Walsh, Lawrence E '•, 1175 

Ward, Chester C 1297 

Wedemeyer, Albert C 1297 

West, Rebecca 1071 

Weyl, Nathaniel 1003 

AVhitman, Walt 1029 

Wieland, William A 1477, 1478 

Wilkie, Wendell 1352 

Wilkins, Roy 1503 

Williams, Harrison A., Jr 1265 

Willis, Delbert 1343 

Wilson, Bob 1313-1314 (statement) 

Wilson, Donald M 1190 

Wilson, Woodrow 1064 

Woltman, Frederick 1062 

Wright, Loyd 1297 

Wriston (Henry M.) 990 


Yarborough, Ralph W 1265 

Young, Robert 1484 

Young, Stephen M 969, 1267, 1326 

Young, Whitney 1503 

Yura, I 1300 


Zawodny, J. K 1448 


AFL. ( See American Federation of Labor. ) 

AFL-CIO. (See American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial 

AID. (See U.S. Government, State Department, Agency for International 




Academy of Red Professors 1195 

Academy of Social Sciences (Soviet Union). (See Russian Academy of 
Social Sciences. ) 

Afro-Asian Solidarity Union 1410 

Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala 1011, 1221 

Air War (DoUege 1473 

Alexis de Tocqueville Society. (See Council Against Communist Aggres- 
sion. ) 
Alianza Para Progreso. {See Alliance for Progress. ) 

All American Conference to Combat Communism 1370 

Alliance for Progress (Alianza Para Progreso) 1345,1346,1359,1471 

American Bar Association 1236, 1453 

American Federation of Labor (AFL) (see also American Federation of 

Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations) 1064,1074,1351 

American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations 
(AFL-CIO) (see also American Federation of Labor and Congress of 

Industrial Organizations) 952 

976, 1063, 1064, 1076, 1077, 1109, 1238, 1245, 1348, 1424 

American Institute for Free Labor Development, AFL-CIO 995, 

1046, 1059, 1067, 1070, 1108, 1109, 1245, 1309, 1348, 1424 

Legislative Department 1056, 1064 

American Free Labor Institute. (See AFL-CIO American Institute for 
Free Labor Development.) 

American Legion 1377-1383 

First Annual National Convention, Minneapolis, Minn., November 

10-12, 1919 1379 

Forty-Fifth Annual National Convention, Miami Beach, Fla., Sep- 
tember 10-12, 1963 1381, 1382 

National Americanism Commission 1378 

National Legislative Commission 1377 

American Management Association 1453 

American Olympics Committee 1061, 1074 

American Security Council 1294-1297 

American Society of Nevpspaper Editors 1239 

Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) 1057,1058 

Armistice Negotiating Commission, Korean war 1421 

Army Special Warfare School, Fort Bragg 976, 1408 

Army War College 1221, 1289, 1451 

Asian People's Anti-Communist League 1060 

Association for the United Nations (see also League of Nations Associa- 
tion) 1058 

Association of Young Rebels School, Cuba 1338 

Aurora Latin American Training School for Communist Party Cadres 

(Argentina) 1324 


B'nai B'rlth 965, 1360, 1361 

Bolshevik Party. (See Russian Social-Democratic Labor Party, Bolshe- 
viks. ) 

Brown University (Providence, R.I.) 990 

Business & Professional Women's Club (Orlando, Fla.) 952 

Business Council for International Understanding 1510 


CARE (Cooperative for American Remittances to Europe) 1511 

CBS. ( See Columbia Broadcasting System. ) 

CIA. (See U.S. Government, Central Intelligence Agency.) 

CIO. (See Congress of Industrial Organizations.) 

California County Supervisors Association 1460 

Cambridge Youth Council 1368 

Cargnegie Foundation 989 

Central University (Caracas, Venezuela) 974 

Chamber of Commerce, U.S. Junior 950, 952, 1461 

30-471— 64— pt. 2 19 


China, Government of ^^s* 

Communist Government 968, 

972, 976, 982, 997, 1057, 1066, 1199, 1281, 1418, 1442, 1480 

Nationalist Government 1047 

Cold War Council 1036, 1037, 1046, 1047, 1053, 1054 

College de I'Europe Libre. {See Free Europe College.) 

Colombo- American School 1345 

Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) 1507 

Columbia University (New York City) 1038,1223,1224,1290 

Institute of International Relations 1471 

Comintern School, Soviet Union 1195 

Committee Against Mass Expulsions 1352 

Committee on Cold War Education of the Governor's Conference, 

Florida 965, 1089, 1093 

Committee on the Monument to T. G. Shevchenko 1298 

Communist International. (See International, III.) 

Communist Party, Argentina 1197 

Communist Party, China 1195, 1196, 

1199, 1200, 1301, 1317, 1323, 1362, 1445, 1458, 1467, 1469, 1480 

Ministry of Social Affairs 1323, 1325 

Communist Party, Cuba. {See Popular Socialist (Communist) Party, 

Communist Party, France 1027, 1197 

Communist Party, India : 

Chinese wing 1006, 1027 

Soviet wing 1006, 1027 

Communist Party of the United States of America 956, 1365 

Communist Party, Soviet Union 1044, 1199, 

1299, 1317, 1336, 1362, 1404, 1418, 1467, 1469, 1480 

Central Committee 1083, 1301 

Higher Party School 1195, 1199, 1216 

Communist Youth League. {See Young Communist League, Soviet 

Congress for Cultural Freedom 1511 

Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) 1057 

Cornell University (Ithaca, N.Y.) 953,989 

Corning Glass Co 1502 

Costa Rican Institute of Political Education. (See Institute of Political 

Education, Costa Rica.) 
Council Against Communist Aggression (Alexis de Tocqueville Society). 1056, 

1058, 1070, 1071 

Council Against Nazi Aggression 1351 

Council of African Affiairs 1501 

Countv Supervisors Association, California 1460 

Cuba," Government of 997, 1083, 1456, 1480, 1486 

Embassies : 

Moscow, Russia 1084 


Daughters of the American Revolution (DAR) 972 


EIR. {See Schools of Revolutionary Education, Cuba. Escue de Instruc- 
cion Revolutionaria. ) 

Economic Club of Detroit 1376 

Escue de Instruccion Revolutionaria (EIR). {See Schools of Revolution- 
ary Education, Cuba.) 


FBI {See U.S. Government, Federal Bureau of Investigation.) 
Far Eastern University. {See Sun-Yat Sen University.) 

Federation of Cuban Women, Cuba 1338 

Fight Communism, Western Europe 1104 

Fletcher School of Diplomacy 1471 

Florida Center for Cold War Education 1089 



Florida State Department of Education 1094 

Ford Foundation 1511 

Fort Gulick, Canal Zone 976 

Frank Pais School, Cuba 1334 

Free Europe College (College de I'Europe Libre) (Strasbourg, France) _ 1469, 1470 

Free Europe Committee, Inc 1419, 1481 

Friendship University for the Friendship of the Peoples. {See Patrice 
Lumumba University for the Friendship of the Peoples. ) 


Georgetown University (Washington, D.C.) 1020,1038,1223,1228,1286,1294 

Governor Bryant's Conference on Cold War Education. (See Committee 
on Cold War Education of the Governor's Conference, Florida.) 


Harvard University (Cambridge, Mass.) 949,969,1107,1223,1290 

Herter Committee. \{8ee U.S. Government, Committee on Foreign Affairs 
Personnel, Herter Committee.) 

Hoover Commission. {See U.S. Government, Commission on Organization 
of the Executive Branch of the Government, Hoover Commission.) 

Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace (Stanford Univer- 
sity) 986, 1005, 1007, 1027, 1030, 1272 

Howard University (Washington, D.C.) J078 

Industrial College of the Armed Forces 1011. 1221, 1229 

Industrial Workers of the World 1379 

Information Council of the Americas (INCA), New Orleans, La 1045, 1510 

Institute de Educacion Politica, Costa Rica. {See Institute of Political 

Education, Costa Rica.) 
Institute for Free Labor Development (AFL-CIO). {See AFL-CIO, 

American Institute for Free Labor Development.) 

Ilistitute for the Propagation of the Faith 1065 

Institute for the Study of Latin American Relations 1196 

Institute of American Strategy 1089 

Institute of International Labor Research, Inc 1039 

Institute of Marxism-Leninsm, Soviet Union 1216 

Institute of Political Education, Costa Rica 953, 

1037, 1039, 1040, 1046, 1048, 1309 

Institute of World Economics, Soviet Union 1301 

International, I (International Workingmen's Association) 1058 

International III 1375 

First World Congress, March 1-16, 1919, Moscow 1057 

International Confederation of Free Trade Unions — 1057, 1103 

International Congress of Orientalists, Twenty-fifth, Moscow, 1960 1208 

International Olympics Committee, Chile 1061, 1073 

International Publishers 1445 

International Rescue Committee 1511 

International Workingmen's Association. {See International, I.) 


John Birch Society 944, 945, 1055, 1289 

Johns Hopkins University (Baltimore, Md.) 989,1038 

School of Advanced International Studies 1471 

Junior Chamber of Commerce. {See Chamber of Commerce, U.S. Junior.) 


Kaplan Foundation 1039 

Karl Marx Academy (East Germany) 1195 

Kiwanis (International) 1360, 1361,1370 

Knights of Columbus 965 

Knights of Labor 1057 

xii INDEX 



Latin American Information Committee 1510 

League of Nations Association (see also Association for the United 

Nations) 1058 

Lenin Insttiute of Political Warfare 964, 1194, 1203, 1306, 1423, 1470. 1481 

Leningrad University 1207 

Lincoln Civil War Society in Philadelphia 1102 

Lions (International) 1360, 1361, 1370 


Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) (Cambridge, Mass.) 989 

Mine Workers of America, United 1057 

Ministerial Association 965 

Moscow University 1207 


NATO. (See North Atlantic Treaty Organization.) 

Naples Civic Association 1089 

National Association of County Officials, California 1458 

National Cadre School, Cuha 1334 

National Captive Nations Committee 1279 

National Council of the Churches of Christ in the U.S. A 1511 

National Fisheries School (Cuba) 1337 

National Foreign Trade Council 1510 

National Institute of Administration (Saigon, Vietnam) 1440,1441 

National Labor Union School (Cuba) 1337 

National People's Farmer School (Cuba) 1337 

National Teachers School (Cuba) 1337 

National War College 980, 

981, 1014, 1018, 1221, 1228, 1286, 1289, 1435, 1436, 1451, 1453, 1473 

Naval War College 1107, 1221 

Near East Foundation 1511 

New Council for Coordination of Scientific Work on Africa 1206 

Nico Lopez National School (Cuba) 1336 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 1294,1295 

Notre Dame University (South Bend Ind.) 1038,1278 

Novosti Press Agency (APN) 1298-1300 

OAS. (See Organization of American States.) 

ORI. (See Organizaciones Revolucionarias Integradas — Integrated Rev- 
olutionary Organizations, Cuba.) 

Operation Amigo 1342, 1343, 1345-1349, 1360, 1361, 1363 

Operation Crossroads Africa 1494, 1497, 1498, 1502, 1503, 1508 

Organizaciones Revolutionarias Integradas — Integrated Revolutionary 

Organizations (ORI), Cuba 1335,1336,1339,1341 

Organizatton of American States (OAS) 1214,1251,1358 

Orlando Committee 940, 941, 948, 949, 951, 952, 965, 967-969, 971, 972, 977, 

989, 990, 993, 994, 996, 1044, 1070, 1097, 1108, 1224, 1237, 1325, 1326 


Pan American Society 1510 

Patrice Lumiunba University for the Friendship of the Peoples (formerly Friend- 
ship University for the Friendship of the Peoples) (Moscow) _ 1251, 1470, 1481 

Pennsylvania State Department of Public Instruction 1071 

People-to-People Program 1511 

Perkins Panel (or Committee). {See U.S. Government, President's Ad- 
visory Panel on a National Academy of Foreign Affairs) (Perkins 
Panel or Committee. ) 

Popular Socialist (Communist) Party, Cuba 1334,1335 

Prague University 1207 

INDEX xili 

President's Advisory Panel on a National Academy of Foreign Affairs 
(Perkins Panel). (See U.S. Government, President's Advisory Panel on 
a National Academy of Foreign Affairs.) Page 

Princeton University (Princeton, N.J.) 1242 

Progressive Party 1368 


Radio Free Europe 1276, 1419 

Rand Corporation 1202, 1220, 1354 

Red Men (Improved Order of) 1370 

Refugee's Defense Committee 1353 

Republic Aviation, Farmingdale, N.Y 1497 

Reserve Officers Association of the United States 1420 (resolution) 

Reuters Nevps Agency 1307 

Rockefeller Foundation 1511 

Rotary (International) 1360, 1361 

Russian Academy of Sciences 1301, 1337 

Russian Academy of Social Sciences 1206. 1216 

Russian Social-Democratic Labor Party, Bolsheviks 1057 


Saigon National Institute of Administration. (See National Institute of 

Administration, Saigon, Vietnam. ) 
Schools of Revolutionary Education, Cuba (Escue de Instruccion Revolu- 

tionaria, EIR. ) 1333-1341 

First National Conference, December 1960 1341 

Third National Conference, April 26, 1961 1337 

Fourth National Conference, July 21-22, 1961 1337 

Socialist-Labor Party 1057, 1064 

Socialist Trade and Labor Alliance 1064 

South Vietnam Reserve Officer's Training School 1440 

Student Christian Program, Germany (Studentegemeinde) 1495 

Studentegemeinde. (See Student Christian Program, Germany.) 

Sun Yat-Sen University (also knovpn as Far Eastern University) 1194, 1195 


Tass News Agency 1083, 1307, 1452 

Taxpayers League of Blackstone Valley, Providence and Providence Plan- 
tations 1514-1515 (statement) 

Teachers Union of Japan 964 

Tumbasiete School, Cuba 1334 


UNESCO. (See United Nations, Educational Scientific, and Cultural 

Organization. ) 
UNRRA. {See United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administrat- 

Ukrainian Congress Committee of America 1279 

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Government of 965, 

968, 972, 976, 982, 1032, 1070, 1207, 1253, 1281, 1284, 1293, 1296, 
1297, 1301, 1404, 1418, 1433, 1460, 1480. 

Council of Ministers 1206, 1301 

Embassies : 

Washington, D.C 1283, 1298 

Politburo 1226 

Propaganda Ministry 1065, 1067 

United Nations 1060, 1069 

Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 1299 

Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary 1069^ 

United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration ( UNRRA )_ 1353 
U.S. Government : 

Atomic Energy Commission 986, 1078 

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 974, 

996, 1013, 1051, 1066, 1222, 1223, 1310 

» Referred to as "Special Commission for Investigation of the Hungarian Events." 

xiv INDEX 

U.S. Government — Continued 

Commission on Organization of The Executive Branch of The Govern- Page 

ment (Hoover Commission) 1372 

Committee on Foreign Affairs Personnel (Herter Committee) 1188, 

1190. 1262, 1266 

Defense, Department of 936. 943, 946, 951. 

966, 967, 974, 980, 1051, 1177, 1182, 1189, 1301, 1310, 1486 
General Services Administration : 

National Archives 1007, 1017 

House of Representatives : 

Armed Services Committee 1 1314, 1513 

Foreign Affairs Committee 1292, 1303, 1310 

International Cooperation Administration (ICA) 1013 

Justice, Department of 936, 937, 989, 1175 

Federal Bureau of Inv^tigation (FBI) 1013,1222,1310,1316 

Library of Congress 989, 1005-1007 

Mutual Security Agency 1496 

National Security Council (NSC) 952,967,980,1054 

Office of Inter- American Affairs (OIAA) 1454 

Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) (Old Psychological Warfare 

Board) 951, 966, 967, 1319 

Peace Corps 944, 974, 978 

1032, 1042, 1242, 1313, 1345, 1347, 1359, 1499, 1503, 1504, 1507 
President's Advisory Panel on a National Academy of Foreign Affairs, 

The (Perkins Panel or Committee) 989, 

990, 1182, 1188, 1190, 1262, 1266, 1270 

Psychological Strategy Board 1276, 1308 

Senate, United States : 

Foreign Relations Committee 936, 990, 992, 994, 1032, 1056 

Judiciary Committee 940 

952, 963, 969, 987, 1056, 1058, 1070, 1241, 1313. 1314 
Internal Security Subcommittee— 936. 937. 940, 967, 969, 1055. 1056 

State Department 936, 943-945, 951, 953. 954, 971, 

973, 974, 980, 988, 990, 991, 994-997, 1009, 1013, 1014, 1022, 
1040, 1051-1055, 1061, 1068, 1072, 1078, 1093, 1100. 1106, 1176, 
1178. 1184, 1244, 1251. 1254, 12.55, 1266, 1269, 1276, 1291, 1293, 
1307, 1316, 1326. 1356, 1375, 1413, 1425, 1433, 1435. 1456, 1486 

Agency for International Development (AID) 967. 

969, 974, 980, 987, 989, 1109, 1301, 1309, 1311, 1359, 1441 

Foreign Service Institute (FSI) 936, 965, 971, 

973. 981, 988-991. 993, 1014, 1052. 1219, 1222, 1225, 1228, 
1250, 1266. 1278. 1287. 1289. 1428. 1451, 1471. 1474 
National Academy of Foreign Affairs (NAFA)__ 936, 943, 946, 953, 954. 
960 969, 978, 988, 990-992, 1013, 1052, 1182-1188, 1190, 
1249, 1252, 1264-1266, 1270, 1288, 1289, 1304, 1311. 1428, 

Police Academy 1254 

U.S. Information Agency (USIA)__ 936. 967. 969, 974, 980, 989, 1013, 1024. 
10.36, 1046, 1047, 1051, 1100, 1188, 1190, 1212, 1217, 1222, 1242. 
1273, 1510, 1513. 

U.S. Information Service (USIS) 1047, 1048, 1496 

Voice of America 974,1066,1283 

University of Chicago (Chicago, 111.) 1102 

University of Costa Rica (San Jose, Costa Rica) 1472 

University of Delhi (Delhi, India) 1496 

University of Denver (Denver, Colo.) 1501 

University of Florida (Gainesville, Fla.) 950,986 

University of London (London, England) 1105 

University of Pennsylvania (Philadelphia, Pa.) 1038,1306 

University of Pittsburgh (Pittsburgh, Pa.) 1062 

University of Sendai (Japan) 1496 

University of Southern California (USC) (Los Angeles, Calif.) 1038,1237 

University of Tokyo (Tokyo, Japan) 1500 

University of Vienna 1319 

Upholsters' International Union of North America, AFL-CIO 1055, 

1056, 1058, 1063, 1064 
U.S. Inter-American Council 1510 




Volunteer Christian Committee to Boycott Nazi Germany 1351 


WEVD (radio station) 1352 

WFTU. ( -See World Federation of Trade Unions. ) 

Warsaw Pact Nations 1294 

World Federation of Teachers Unions 1085, 1086 

World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) 1057,1084 


Young Communist League, Soviet Union (Komsomol) 1080 

YMCA. ( See Young Men's Christian Association. ) 

Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA) _ 1361 



American Economic Republic, The (Berle) 1481 

American Scholar, The 1448 

An African Student in China (Hevi) 1079 

An Inquiry Into Soviet Mentality (Niemeyer) 1274 

Assigment in Utopia (Lyons) 966 

Australian Army Journal 1429, 1442, 1449 


Bedford Incident, The (book) 1310 

Belmont Books 1210 

Big Red School House (Time) 1197 

British News Service 1307 

Capital, Das (Kapital) (Marx) 1337 

Century of Conflict, A (Possony) 1003, 1223, 1228 

Child of the Revolution (Leonhard) 1195 

Christian Science Monitor 1224 

Collected Works (Lenin) 1021 

Columbia Peon Tells His Moving Story, A (Marchant) 1445 

Communism in Western Europe (Einaudi, Domenach and Garosci) 1197 

Communist Economic Threat, The (State Department Publication 6777)— 1375 

Communist Psychological Warfare (Strausz-Hupe) 1206 

Copley Newspapers 1343, 1347 

Cuba, Anatomy of a Revolution (Morray) 1312 

Cuba Socialista (Socialist Cuba) 1323,1333,1336 

Dr. Strangelove, or How to Fall in Love With the A-Bomb (book) 1310 

Enemy Within, The (de Jaegher and Kuhn) 1197 


Fail-Safe (book) 1310 

Foreign Affairs 1016, 1478 

Fort Worth Press 1343 

Forward Strategy for America, A (Possony) 1228 

Foundations of Marxist Philosophy 1337 

Foundations of Socialism in Cuba (Los Fundamentos del Socialismo en 

Cuba) (Roca) 1337 

Green Book 967-969, 972, 973, 981, 1097, 1191-1241, 1357 




History Will Vindicate Me (La Historia Me Absolvera) (Castro) 1337 

Human Element in Automation Systems, The ( Soviet Survey) 1209 

Imperialism — Capitalism's Highest and Last Phase (Lenin) 1337 

Internal Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences 1443 


Kennan Memorandum 1076 

Khrushchev's Mein Kampf (Belmont Books) 1210,1215,1216 


LaPrensa Grafica 1346 

Left Wing Communism, An Infantile Disorder (Lenin) 1192,1193 

Life magazine 941, 1458 

Los Fundamentos del Socialism© en Cuba. (See The Foundations of So- 
cialism in Cuba, Bias Roca. ) 
Love of This Land (Robinson) 1496 


Manual of Marxism-Leninism (Kuusinen) 1337 

Manuel de Economia Politica (Political Economy Manual) 1337 

Masters of Deceit (Hoover) 1197 

Materialism and Empiriocriticism (Lenin) 1337 

Meaning of Treason, The (West) 1071 

Mein Kampf (Hitler) 1060, 1073 

Miami Herald 1088, 1342, 1343, 1347, 1350 

Modern Guerilla Warfare (Osanka) 1443 

Moulding of Communists, The (Meyer) 1193,1197,1202,1203 


New Frontier of War, The (Kintner, Kornfeder) 1207,1209,1215 

New Republic 945 

New York Herald Tribune 1317 

New York World Telegram 1062 

New York Times 1060, 1076, 1426, 1439, 1477, 1479, 1483, 1484 


Occidente (newspaper) 1437 

On Contradiction and About Practice (Mao Tse-tung) 1337 

Organizational Weapon, The (Selznick) 962.1202 

Orlando Sentinel 1242 


Pall Mall Press 1079 

Philadelphia Evening Bulletin 1453, 1454 

Philadelphia Inquirer 1310 

Phoenix Papers 1330 

Pravda 1084,1297 

Protracted Conflict (Strausz-Hupe) 1206 


Reader's Digest 940, 948, 969, 995 

Realties 1445 

Red Design for the Americas (James) 1196 

Reporter, The (magazine) 945,1478 

Russia's Iron Age (Chamberlain) 966 



Saturday Evening Post 941,963,964 

Scholarship & Cold War in Moscow (Orbis) 1208 

Scripps-Howard Newspapers 1343, 1347 

Seven Days in May (book) 1310 

Shevchenko, A Monument to the Liberation, Freedom, and Independence 

of All Captive Nations (booklet) 1283 

Sing Along AVith Khrushchev (Fabian) 1086 

Sociology of Secret Societies (Roucek) 1447 

Soviet Leaders and Mastery Over Man (Cantril) 1211 

Stalin and the Uses of Psychology (Tucker) 1210 

Street Without Joy (Fall) 1213 


Think (magazine) 940,955, 1302 

Time magazine 1479 

Time OfE (newspaper), Kenya 1079 

Times (of London) 1073 

Tomorrow Is Today (Robinson) 1496 


Wall Street Journal 1464 

Washington Post 945, 1283, 1441 

Washington Report (American Security Council) 1279, 1283, 1294-1297 

What Is To Be Done (Lenin) 1191,1411 

What's a Woman Doing Here (Chapelle) 1483 

Whole of Their Lives, The (Gitlow) 1194 

Why the United States Needs a Freedom Academy 940, 1302 

Worker, The 1311 

World Marxist Review 1369 

World Politics 1210