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HERESIES  OF   SEA  POWER 


HEKESIES  OF  SEA  POWEK 


FEED.    T.   JANE 


AUTHOR  OF 
'  FIOHTINQ  SHIPS  '  ETC.  ;     INVENTOR  OF  THE  NAVAL  WAR  OAME 


WITH  MAPS  AND  ILLUSTRATIONS 


1  9082 


LONGMANS,     GKEEN,    AND     CO. 

39    PATEBNOSTEK    ROW,    LONDON 
NEW  YORK  AND  BOMBAY 

1906 


All    right*    reserved 


PEEFACB 

THIS  book  is  intentionally  suggestive  only.  Though 
it  seem  to  be  all  that  its  title  can  imply,  it  has  not 
been  produced  with  a  view  to  casting  doubt  upon  the 
labours  of  great  men  who  have  made  a  special  study 
of  Naval  History,  but  only  in  order  to  suggest  the 
possibility  of  some  great  principle  underlying  all  Naval 
History,  as  capable  of  reinforcing  theories  of  Sea 
Power  as  of  destroying  them. 

I  would  only  ask  those  whose  first  attitude  towards 
the  book  may  be  that  of  hostile  criticism  to  read  it  to 
the  end  before  forming  too  definite  an  opinion  as  to 
the  thesis  advanced,  assuring  them  that  the  final  con- 
clusion has  not  been  arrived  at  without  very  careful 
thought,  earnest  study,  and  every  effort  to  avoid  the 
role  of  the  mere  iconoclast. 

FEED.  T.  JANE. 

PORTSMOUTH,  April  1906. 


CONTENTS 


PAOl 

PREFACE v 

INTRODUCTION.        .....  1 


PAET  I 

SEVEN  GREAT  NAVAL  WARS  AND  THEIR 
PARADOXES 

I.    THE  PELOPONNESIAN  WAR 24 

II.    THE  FIRST  PUNIC  WAR 40 

III.  THE  SECOND  PUNIC  WAR 60 

IV.  ACTIUM  AND  LEPANTO 72 

V.    THE  SPANISH  ARMADA 77 

VI.    THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  WAR  .  87 


PAKT  n 

PROBLEMS  THAT   'SEA  POWER'   DOES  NOT  SOLVE 

I.    SOME  TACTICAL  AND  STRATEGICAL  PROBLEMS       .        .  110 

II.    BASE  POWER 126 

III.  THE  GUERRE  DE  COURSE 145 

IV.  COLONIES  AND  SEA  POWER 179 

V.    INTERNATIONAL  LAW 190 

VI.    THE  INVASION  OF  ENGLAND 215 

VII.    SECRECY  AND  SEA  POWER 238 

a 


viii  HEEESIES  OF   SEA  POWER 

PAET   III 
THE  TBEND  OF  THINGS 

PAQB 

I.    ETERNAL  PRINCIPLES 254 

II.    THE  EVOLUTION  OF  NAVIES 277 

III.  THE  DIMENSIONS  OF  WARSHIPS    .....  296 

IV.  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  THE  BATTLESHIP  ....  310 
V.    '  FITNESS  TO  WIN  '.......  321 

INDEX  385 


MAPS    AND     ILLUSTRATIONS 


PAGE 

MAP  TO  ILLUSTRATE  PELOPONNESIAN  WAR        .        .        .    .  27 

MAP  OF  SYRACUSE  TO  ILLUSTRATE  PELOPONNESIAN  WAR       .  35 

MAP  TO  ILLUSTRATE  PUNIC  WARS 41 

ONE  OF  THE  VENETIAN  GALLEASSES  AT  LEPANTO     .  to  face  75 

MAP   TO   ILLUSTRATE    THE   COURSE   OF  THE    SPANISH   ARMADA  79 

SHIP  OF  THE  SPANISH  ARMADA        ) 

\      .                        to  face  81 
SHIP  OF  WILLIAM  THE  CONQUEROR) 

BRITISH  SHIP  AT  THE  TIME  OF  THE  SPANISH  ARMADA     „  83 

MAP  TO  ILLUSTRATE  KUSSO- JAPANESE  WAR  ....  89 

MAP  OF  PORT  ARTHUR to  face  91 

MAP  SHOWING  PRINCIPAL  BRITISH  TRADE  EOUTES           „  166 

MAP  TO   ILLUSTRATE   CAMPAIGN   OF   1805   AND   EARLIER       .      .  217 

EGYPTIAN  SHIP  ABOUT  2500  B.C 278 

LARGE  EGYPTIAN  SHIP  IN  THE  BED  SEA  circa  1200  B.C.      .  279 
EGYPTIAN  WARSHIP  IN  ACTION  1000  B.C. 


280 
ASIATIC  WARSHIP  IN  SAME  BATTLE          ) 

PHOENICIAN   WARSHIP   OF   circa  700  B.C.     FROM  NINEVEH 

MONUMENTS 281 

THE  GREAT  HARRY to  face  302 

CYCLOPS— EARLY  PADDLE  WARSHIP                                    „  310 
FRENCH  FLOATING  BATTERY  IN  THE  CRIMEAN  WAR      .        .311 

THE  OLD  TURRET  SHIP  BOYAL  SOVEREIGN        .        .        .    .  313 

THE  ROYAL  SOVEREIGN to  face  313 


HERESIES   OF  SEA  POWER 


INTBODUCTION 

WITH  the  general  vague  definition  of  Sea  Power  as 
a  factor  influencing  the  course  of  events,  no  reasonable 
man  can  quarrel.  But  is  that  influence  on  a  par  with 
and  of  the  same  nature  as — say — the  weather,  military 
equipments,  and  so  on  and  so  forth,  or  is  it  a  peculiar 
and  predominant  factor  as — to  a  certain  extent — it  is 
claimed  to  be  by  Captain  Mahan,  and  very  loudly 
asserted  to  be  by  his  imitators  and  disciples?  In 
other  words  :  Was  Sea  Power  the  sole  cause  that 
such  and  such  a  nation  beat  another  in  a  war 
involving  maritime  interests ;  or  was  it  that  the 
winning  nation  happened  to  make  use  of  the  sea  in 
winning  ? 

Kegarded  in  one  way  this  question  may  be  held 
merely  to  embody  a  distinction  without  a  difference : 
regarded  in  another  the  difference  may  be  found 
enormous.  For  the  question  may  then  resolve  itself 
into  this :  Is  the  possession  of  Sea  Power  a  guarantee 
that  the  nation  possessing,  using  (and  needing)  it  will 

B 


^ ;     .    ,    HERESIES   OF   SEA  POWEE 

wfn  ?•  '  If  'history  be  found  to  answer  Yes ;  it  can  also 
be  found  to  answer  No. 

An  examination  of  Captain  Mahan's  standard  work 
will  make  the  position  clearer,  though  it  should  be 
definitely  understood  that  this  examination  is  con- 
ducted with  a  view  to  elucidating  and  illustrating  the 
special  points  made  above,  and  not  in  a  captious 
attempt  to  nullify  the  arguments  of  that  great  naval 
historian. 

In  his  preface  to  '  The  Influence  of  Sea  Power  on 
History,'  Captain  Mahan  brings  forward  two  distinct 
illustrations — the  Punic  War  and  the  Napoleonic 
wars.  Dealing  with  the  first  he  says  : — 

*  The  Roman  control  of  the  water  forced  Hannibal 
to  that  long,  perilous  march  through  Gaul  in  which 
more  than  half  his  veteran  troops  wasted  away ;  it 
enabled  the  elder  Scipio,  while  sending  his  army  from 
the  Rhone  on  to  Spain,  to  intercept  Hannibal's  com- 
munications, to  return  in  person  and  face  the  invader 
at  the  Trebia.  Throughout  the  war  the  legions  passed 
by  water,  unmolested  and  unwearied,  between  Spain, 
which  was  Hannibal's  base,  and  Italy ;  while  the 
issue  of  the  decisive  battle  of  the  Metaurus,  hinging 
as  it  did  upon  the  interior  position  of  the  Roman  armies 
with  reference  to  the  forces  of  Hasdrubal  and  Hannibal, 
was  ultimately  due  to  the  fact  that  the  younger  brother 
could  not  bring  his  succouring  reinforcements  by  sea, 
but  only  by  the  land  route  through  Gaul.  Hence 
at  the  critical  moment  the  two  Carthaginian  armies 


INTRODUCTION  3 

were  separated  by  the  length  of  Italy,  and  one  was 
destroyed  by  the  combined  action  of  the  Eoman 
generals.' 

Now  it  may  equally  well  be  advanced  that  the 
Carthaginians l  selected  their  '  long  march  through 
Gaul '  because  Spain  was  the  base  they  drew  their 
best  troops  from  and  because  they  proposed  extending 
their  Spanish  empire  down  into  Italy.  All  through 
this  Second  Punic  War  Carthage  was  as  able  to  use 
the  sea  as  Rome,  and  Hannibal's  brother  Mago  took 
his  reinforcements  to  Spain  by  sea.  He  took  them  to 
Spain  for  military  reasons,  though  they  were  destined 
for  Italy  direct,  and  the  influence  of  Sea  Power  in  the 
war  was  often  trifling  save  in  so  far  as  both  sides  had 
full  use  of  the  sea  as  a  highway  whenever  inclined. 

Captain  Mahan  is  at  some  considerable  pains  to 
answer  this  possible  objection  by  a  process  of  in- 
ferences2 and  the  assumption  that  such  over-sea 
expeditions  as  Carthage  undertook  were  of  the  nature 
of  those  raids  which  no  kind  of  Sea  Power  can  entirely 
suppress.  If  this  be  granted,  then  of  course  the  rest 
of  his  argument  must  be  accepted  ;  but  can  it  be 
granted  ? 

The  deductions  of  Captain  Mahan  are  that  Sea 
Power  saved  Home.  It  is  to  be  urged  that  Rome  was 
saved  only  by  those  political  intrigues  of  party-ridden 
Carthage  which  kept  Hannibal  short  of  reinforce  - 

1  See  Chapter  on  '  The  Punic  War.' 
2  The  Influence  of  Sea  Power  on  History,  p.  14  et  seq. 

B  2 


4  HEEESIES  OF   SEA  POWEK 

ments  and  of  that  support  which  could  have  been 
supplied. 

Thus  far  one  particular  case ;  but  if  we  allow  it 
too  much  weight,  if  we  seek  too  carefully  for  similar 
instances  in  which  the  accepted  influence  of  Sea 
Power  may  perhaps  have  only  an  imaginary  value,  we 
are  undoubtedly  in  danger  of  forming  conclusions  as 
dangerous  as  if  we  accept  blindly  such  dogmas  as  '  Sea 
Power  won  the  Second  Punic  War/  or  that  '  The  ships 
of  Nelson  at  Trafalgar  won  the  battle  of  Waterloo.' 
Eather,  is  it  essential  that  we  keep  ever  before  us  the 
fact  that  where  an  island  is  concerned  Sea  Power 
assumes  a  totally  different  meaning  and  importance  to 
that  which  it  possesses  where  continental  issues  are  at 
stake.  The  Second  Punic  War  was  in  sum  and  sub- 
stance an  entirely  military  campaign,  and  therefore  is 
totally  distinct  from  any  war  in  which  the  British  or 
Japanese  empires  could  be  concerned,  or  (save  in  the 
case  of  operations  against  Mexico  and  similarly  negli- 
gible affairs)  the  United  States.  Between  these  Powers 
and  all  possible  enemies  the  water  lies.  Because  that 
water  exists,  they,  both  for  attack  and  defence  of  com- 
merce require  Sea  Power  to  a  degree  not  experienced 
by  most  of  the  sea-empires  of  the  past. 

With  nations  that  have  controlled  the  sea  in  the 
past, — Athens,  Phoenicia,  Eome,  Carthage,  Genoa,  and 
even  the  island  Venice — the  same  conditions  never 
obtained.  Because  they  never  obtained,  may  it  logi- 
cally be  argued  that,  even  were  the  teaching  of  history 


INTRODUCTION  5 

a  certain  recipe  for  future  victory,  even  were  the 
*  facts '  of  history  unassailable  truths,  nothing  in  the 
history  of  these  sea-empires  can  be  of  practical  value 
to  the  two  great  Island  Powers  of  to-day  ?  That  ruin 
followed  the  neglect  of  their  naval  forces  by  these  by- 
gone sea-empires  may  prove  nothing  of  much  moment 
to  the  islanders,  for  had  that  neglect  been  compensated 
for  by  an  efficient  military  force  and  a  diversion  of 
trade  from  sea  to  land,  they  should  have  continued  to 
exist  comfortably.  The  geographical  sea-empires,  on 
the  other  hand,  are  in  quite  different  case ;  and  it  is 
patent  that,  pending  the  arrival  of  flying  machines, 
any  neglect  of  Sea  Power  is  for  them  a  surrender  of 
everything.  Under  no  conceivable  conditions  can  an 
island  State  remain  a  Power  without  being  in  posses- 
sion of  its  own  waters.  The  United  Kingdom,  for 
instance,  might  have  five  million  of  the  finest  troops  in 
the  world  but,  without  a  fleet,  without  command  of 
the  sea,  she  would  be  an  absolute  cypher,  and,  not 
being  self-supporting,  in  a  position  to  be  dictated  to 
by  any  third-rate  power  with  a  few  ships. 

Japan,  being  self-supporting  at  present  is  not  in 
quite  the  same  condition;  without  a  fleet  starvation 
would  not  face  her.  But  her  influence,  her  progress 
and  her  expansion  would  decline  instantly.  An  invin- 
cible army  would  maintain  her  integrity,  but  no  more. 

Of  the  three  geographical  sea  nations  the  United 
States  has  the  least  need  of  a  very  strong  fleet  at 
present.  The  immense  area  of  the  Atlantic  is  as  yet 


6  HEEESIES  OF  SEA  POWEK 

a  sure  bulwark  to  her,  and  supposing  an  invincible 
army,  she,  with  her  vast  unexpanded  areas  inside  her 
borders  could  continue  to  grow  in  peace,  though  at  war 
with  all  the  world.  With  a  system  of  strategic  rail- 
ways far  removed  from  the  sea  she  could  uphold  the 
Monroe  doctrine  intact  so  far  as  her  own  portion  of 
the  American  continent  is  concerned.  Below  the 
Isthmus  of  Panama,  however,  no  United  States  army, 
no  matter  how  invincible,  could  control  the  destinies 
of  South  America  without  a  fleet  to  aid  it.  A  hostile 
fleet  could  so  easily  land  enough  men  to  cut  communi- 
cations at  the  Isthmus,  and  supposing  any  force  en- 
trenched there  to  be  overwhelmed  by  the  American 
military  power,  it  would  only  be  driven  away  to 
establish  itself  elsewhere  at  its  own  choice.  So  the 
Monroe  doctrine  necessitates  a  fleet :  but  it  is  a  senti- 
ment and  not  a  necessity  all  the  same.  The  cost  of 
the  United  States  fleet  is  the  price  of  ithis  particular 
sentiment. 

It  is  patent,  that  the  needs  of  these  three  empires 
vary  considerably ;  and  that  the  variable  factor  is  in 
each  case  the  question  of  food  supply  and  the  power  of 
internal  support.  So  great  is  the  variation  here  that 
we  may  well  pause  to  ask  ourselves  whether  it  is  not 
sufficiently  immense  to  render  the  past  history  of  any 
one  nation  valueless  to  the  other  two,  even  were  past 
history  an  asset  of  value  for  formulating  the  strategy 
of  the  future ? 

Does  the  past  hold  lessons  for  the  future  ?     Yes — 


INTKODUCTION  7 

if  the  teachings  of  history  be  properly  applied,  has 
answered  Captain  Mahan,  and  the  same  answer  has 
been  given  by  the  great  body  of  his  disciples  in  every 
nation.  But  each  and  every  writer  of  importance  be- 
longing to  this  school  has  laid  down  that  history  must 
be  read  aright.  So  much  has  this  been  insisted  on 
that  before  questioning  the  main  thesis  we  may  be  dis- 
posed to  ask  whether  we  can  read  history  aright  ?  If 
we  cannot,  then  the  other  question  is  rendered  to  a 
great  extent  superfluous. 

Those  who  '  make  history  ' — individual  combat- 
ants— rarely  have  anything  but  the  haziest  impressions 
as  to  the  general  facts,  as  they  are  seen  by  subsequent 
ages.  What  they  desired  to  do,  or  hoped  to  do,  is 
always  inextricably  mixed  with  what  they  actually 
accomplished.  The  exact  designs  and  aspirations  of 
the  enemy  were  of  necessity  unknown  to  them,  sur- 
mise had  to  replace  certainty,  and  finally  their  field  of 
vision  was  of  necessity  focussed  on  the  acts  in  which 
they  personally  took  part.  Their  accounts  must  always 
be  open  to  being  criticised,  and  history,  therefore,  has 
had  to  be  written  by  others,  who,  after  hearing  and 
sifting  the  evidence  on  both  sides,  have  accepted  that 
version  or  compromise  of  versions  which  appeared  most 
credible.  So  difficult  is  this,  so  hard  is  it  for  the 
historian  to  eliminate  totally  any  tendencies  to  un- 
conscious bias,  that  no  trustworthy  full  history  l  can  be 

1  Histories  of  the  Russo-Japanese  war  compiled  while  the  smoke 
had  hardly  cleared  are  very  unlikely  to  hold  their  ground  a  score  or 


8  HEKESIES  OF   SEA  POWEK 

composed  till  many  years  after  the  events  dealt  with. 
Till  time  has  elapsed,  correct  perspective  is  impossible. 
Can  we  ensure  that  even  after  the  lapse  of  time  it  will 
be  correct  ? 

All  are  familiar  with  incidents  such  as  miscarriages 
of  justice.  An  absolutely  impartial  judge,  an  unbiassed 
jury  with  all  the  machinery  of  the  law  to  help  them 
get  at  facts,  have  more  than  once  or  twice  gone  astray. 
Who  then  shall  claim  infallibility  for  the  infinitely  more 
complicated  task  that  is  the  historian's,  even  when 
free  from  bias  ?  Few,  too,  are  the  unbiassed  historians  ; 
the  type  of  mind  that  can  throw  over,  not  only  all 
national  sentiment,  but  also  all  national  bent  of  thought, 
is  rare.  The  spell  of  a  great  personality,  of  a  Nelson 
or  a  Napoleon,  does  not  die  with  him.  Be  the  historian 
never  so  honest,  is  his  relatively  lesser  individuality 
absolutely  able  to  dissociate  itself  from  the  spell  of 
the  great  man?  In  a  word,  is  the  ideal  historian 
possible  ?  Bather  must  not  every  historian  fall  short 
of  the  truth  in  places  ?  Can  he  possibly  be  en  rapport 
with  both  Napoleon  and  Wellington  ?  l  Can  he  possi- 
bly avoid  an  unconscious  bias  for  the  one  or  the  other, 
can  he  possibly  give  us  all  the  truth  even  when  he 
aims  most  sincerely  at  doing  so  ? 

so  of  years  hence.  It  will  probably  be  twenty  years  before  the  whole 
facts  relating  to  the  Baltic  Armada  are  unearthed. 

1  An  instance  in  point  is  afforded  by  the  late  O'Connor  Morris'  Life 
of  Wellington.  The  judge  was  so  fascinated  by  the  greatness  of 
Napoleon  that  Wellington  appears  to  have  received  less  than  just 
treatment.  Yet  his  honesty  cannot  be  doubted. 


INTRODUCTION  9 

We  are  compelled  to  answer  that  he  cannot  always, 
compelled  to  confess  that  the  very  best  he  can  do  is 
to  give  us  what  may  be  but  relative  truth.  Only 
of  late  have  historians  attempted  to  do  this ;  and  the 
historian  of  to-day,  labour  as  he  will,  is  compelled  to 
give  credence  to  such  internal  evidence  as  most  appeals 
to  his  sense  of  fact. 

As  a  base  for  modern  naval  history  there  is  also  the 
official  despatch  ;  but  who  that  has  seen  official  reports 
in  the  making  will  allow  infallibility  to  them  ?  To 
take  a  great  and  a  small  case  :  If  there  were  one  thing 
that  seemed  more  certainly  established  than  another  it 
was  the  formation  of  the  British  fleet  and  its  plan  of 
action  at  Trafalgar.  Yet  a  few  years  ago  a  great  naval 
authority  produced  a  deal  of  evidence  to  show  that  our 
accepted  version  of  that  attack  was  entirely  incorrect. 
He  failed  to  convince  many  that  his  theory  was  the 
true  one,  but  unquestionably  he  left  the  matter  in  a 
doubt  from  which  it  has  never  emerged.  Official 
reports  by  the  yard  are  available ;  but  absolute  certainty 
as  to  British  tactics  on  that  memorable  day  is  not  for 
us.  An  historian,  too,  may  yet  arise  to  show  that  the 
importance  of  the  victory  was  far  less  than  the  world 
has  so  far  held  it.  Dumanoir  may  appear  in  a  new 
light :  even  quite  a  plausible  case  may  be  made  out  to 
show  that  the  British  victory  was  a  triumph  of  luck  over 
bad  dispositions.  This  is  a  very  extreme  case,  and  it 
is  not  suggested  that  the  tendencies  of  many  modern 
historians  will  have  such  an  apotheosis  ;  but,  supposing 


10  HEKESIES  OF   SEA  POWEK 

any  writer  to  have  the  will,  he  would  have  no  great 
difficulty,  by  a  little  judicious  selection,  in  making  out 
such  a  theory.  Convinced  himself,  he  could  draw  proof 
enough  to  convince  some  others.  And  certainly  there 
are  very  many  students  who  would  grant  that  the  Nile 
was  a  greater  achievement  than  Trafalgar.  They  would 
grant,  too,  very  possibly,  that,  but  for  the  detail  that 
the  great  admiral  died  that  day,  Trafalgar  might  never 
have  ranked  with  the  Nile  in  the  category  of  famous 
victories. 

Who,  too,  shall  define  exactly  the  parts  played 
respectively  by  Lady  Hamilton  and  by  high  strategy 
in  those  days  when  Nelson  laid  the  foundations  of  the 
British  Mediterranean  fleet  ?  Who  shall  say  that  no 
one  will  ever  *  prove '  that  had  the  fair  Emma  l  not 
appeared  on  the  scene  to  keep  Nelson  in  those  waters, 
his  strategy  there  would  never  have  been  attempted  ? 
The  day  may  yet  come  when  it  is  proved  that  our 
present  appreciation  of  the  great  admiral  is  due  to  un- 
conscious selection  of  evidence  ;  and  his  real  greatness 
may  be  shown  to  have  lain  entirely  in  his  magnetic 
personality  and  marvellous  gift  of  organisation — greater 
qualities  maybe  than  the  more  showy  qualifications 
for  which  his  memory  is  reverenced  to-day.  It  is 
possible. 

Thus,  a  great  instance  ;  on  a  matter  that  even  those 
who  doubt  the  truth  of  a  great  deal  of  accepted  history 

1  See  remarks  as  to  Lady  Hamilton  and  Trafalgar  in  the  final 
chapter  of  this  book. 


INTKODUCTION  11 

would  not  generally  quibble  about.  So  are  the  most 
accessible  naval  '  facts '  differentiated  from  the  pro- 
positions of  Euclid. 

When  versions  disagree  we  have  to  ask  which  side 
had  the  largest  motive  for  untruthfulness,  which  had 
the  best  or  worst  reputation  that  way,  and  so  on  and 
so  forth.  Enquiries  in  that  direction  necessitating 
endless  research,  produce  a  perfect  enough  balance  of 
evidence :  and  points  cannot  really  be  cleared  up. 
History,  as  required  for  naval  purposes,  is  a  mass  of 
similar  instances ;  probabilities  are  the  most  we  can 
depend  on  at  the  best,  and  probabilities  are  far  removed 
from  absolute  facts. 

To  prove  the  immutability  theory  of  the  great 
principles  of  war,  we  have,  too,  to  dip  into  ancient 
history,  to  take  authorities  who  were  avowed  partisans, 
and  as  likely  as  not  only  one  side  comes  down  to  us. 

What,  for  instance,  was  the  Persian  version  of  the 
battle  of  Salamis?  We  know  the  Greek  tale  well 
enough,  but  there  are  possible  improbabilities  in  it. 
The  Athenians  had  no  very  special  naval  skill  at  that 
period  :  they  were  certainly  not  technically  superior  to 
some  of  the  Persian  auxiliaries — the  Phoenicians  and 
Egyptians,  for  example.  No  doubt  there  was  a  battle 
of  Salamis,  no  doubt  the  Greeks  won ;  but  a  Persian 
version  of  it  would  probably  tell  of  two  or  three  of 
their  ships  overwhelmed  by  the  Greek  fleet ! l 

1  Such  a  version  in  the  light  of  subsequent  events  would,  of  sourse, 
appear  incorrect:  it  is  referred  to  only  to  show  the  possible  Persian 


12  HEEESIES  OF   SEA  POWER 

This,  of  course,  would  be  evidence  of  the  immuta- 
bility of  Nelson's  *  only  numbers  can  annihilate/  an 
expression  that  is  an  improvement  on  the  equally 
familiar  '  God  is  on  the  side  of  the  big  battalions,'  and 
a  variant  on  Sir  Cloudesley  Shovel's  '  Where  men  are 
equally  inured  and  disciplined  in  war,  'tis,  without  a 
miracle,  number  that  gains  the  victory.'  History  is 
full  of  evidence  of  these  sayings  ;  but  it  is  equally  full 
of  evidence  to  the  contrary.  At  the  battle  off 
Naupaktis,  in  the  Corinthian  Gulf,  the  Peloponnesian 
fleet,  vastly  superior  numerically,  was  presumably 
equal  to  the  Athenian  squadron  in  courage,  endurance 
and  many  other  things,  except  that  the  genius  lay  all 
with  Phormio,  and  the  fitness  to  win  with  his  crews. 
Assuming  Thucydides  to  be  accurate  (he,  of  course, 
may  not  be),  at  this  battle  tactics  were  born.  The 
Peloponnesians  adopted  the  defensive,  forming  them- 
selves into  a  circle,  bows  outwards — a  seemingly 
impregnable  formation.  Phormio's  few  ships  rowed 
round  and  round  them,  till  the  morning  breeze  began 
to  upset  the  Peloponnesian  formation.  Then  the 
Athenian  ships  dashed  into  gaps  in  the  line,  to  win 
a  complete  victory  over  far  superior  numbers.  From 
the  time  of  Gideon  onward  history  can  supply  in- 
numerable instances  of  similar  happenings — even 
supposing  the  accounts  to  be  only  moderately  true. 


version.  The  subsequent  history  of  Persia  shows  that  either  Salamis 
was  a  great  victory  for  the  Greeks,  or  else  that  Persian  decline  under 
Xerxes  was  already  considerable. 


INTKODUCTION  13 

But,  what  can  we  deduce  therefrom  ?  First  we 
must  know  for  certain  whether  our  data  are  correct. 
We  must  know  exactly  the  relative  efficiencies  of  the 
combatants — a  thing  that,  of  course,  we  cannot  be 
certain  about.  Assuming,  however,  for  the  sake  of 
argument  that  in  some  mysterious  way  we  have  all 
essential  facts,  can  we  in  any  way  apply  the  battle  of 
Naupaktis  to  modern  naval  warfare  ? 

To  a  limited  extent  we  can.  We  can  or  could  say 
that  it  is  hereby  shown  that  genius  may  in  certain 
circumstances  neutralise  superior  numbers.  Alongside 
this  we  may  as  certainly  put  '  Only  numbers  can  anni- 
hilate/ or  any  similar  proverb  also  based  on  the 
teachings  of  history. 

More  than  this  we  cannot  do.  We  cannot  assign 
any  factor  to  skill  in  relation  to  numbers,  even  if  exact 
data  from  history  were  procurable ;  since  they  are 
not  to  be  procured,  we  are  more  helpless  still.  This 
particular  battle  off  Naupaktis  can,  in  fine,  be  made 
to  prove  or  controvert  any  modern  theory  according  to 
the  taste  of  the  user,  and  the  same  thing  to  a  greater 
or  less  extent  is  true  of  all  past  warfare.  The  current 
dogma  runs  to  the  effect  that  '  tactics  alter,  but  the 
main  principles  of  strategy  alter  not.'  This,  of  course, 
will  be  denied  by  none  in  a  general  sense  ;  but,  directly 
we  begin  to  apply  it,  are  not  pitfalls  innumerable  ? 
Does  not  a  weak  point  lie  in  the  fact  that  there  is 
nothing  to  prevent  any  faddist  from  selecting  his  own 
incidents  to  prove  any  theory  he  may  wish  ?  Is  it 


14  HEKESIES   OF   SEA  POWEK 

possible  to  prevent  the  selection  of  incidents  to  head 
off  any  other  set  of  incidents  selected  to  prove  anything 
else  ?  Thus,  in  the  first  case,  by  dwelling  upon  the 
resemblances  in  the  tactics  at  Naupaktis  and  the  Yalu, 
and  fortifying  it  with  other  instances,  might  not  a 
man  prove  (with  plenty  of  show  of  reasoning)  that 
tactics  do  not  change,  and  that,  by  studying  history 
carefully,  a  modern  admiral  would  be  fully  equipped 
for  war  ?  The  case  is  extreme,  of  course :  still  in  both 
battles  there  was  the  stronger  force  on  the  defensive, 
and  defeat  was  brought  about  in  either  case  by  the 
loss  of  cohesion  in  this  formation.  More,  the  statement 
would  have  truth  enough  in  it,  but  he  who  would 
propose  our  study  of  modern  tactics  to  be  based  on 
history  would  be  swiftly  accused  of  landing  us  into 
quagmires.  And  if  this  be  true  of  tactics,  what  assur- 
ance have  we  that  it  is  not  true  of  strategy  also — 
strategy  that  fades  imperceptibly  into  tactics  ?  Take 
the  main  objections : 

(1)  Our  history  may  be  incorrect. 

(2)  Our  theorist  may   select  his  instances  by   a 
process  of  eliminating  any  facts  that  go  to  contradict 
his  pet  theories,  and  it  must  be  borne  in  mind  that 
the  average  naval  officer  has  neither  the  time  nor  the 
qualifications  to  study  history  for  himself  enough  to 
say  whether  this  method  has  been  followed  or  not. 

(3)  There  is  no  theory,  based  on  history,  that  cannot 
be  plausibly  upset  by  a  judicious  selection  of  contra- 


INTEODUCTION  15 

dictory  facts.     Again,  the  naval  officer  cannot  weigh 
the  facts  without  an  enormous  library. 

This,  it  may  be  suggested,  reduces  the  value  of  all 
theories  based  on  history  to  our  individual  appreciation 
of  the  theorist.  And  this  means,  either  that  his  argu- 
ments as  placed  before  us  commend  themselves  to  us 
on  our  own  imperfect  knowledge  of  the  facts,  or  that 
the  theorist  has  a  plausible  style  that  carries  us  away. 
Are  either  of  these  things  rocks  on  which  to  build? 
And  if  we  are  without  a  bed-rock  of  absolute  truth, 
may  we  not  be  building  on  sand  ? 

Consequently  in  this  work  no  attempt  is  made  to 
go  into  the  details  of  past  history.  Only  the  main 
facts  are  selected  for  comparison  with  accepted  theories 
of  Sea  Power,  and  thence  is  deduced  a  new  theory  as 
to  what  history  really  does  teach. 

A  preference  for  the  battles  of  the  days  of  the  oar 
will  be  noted.  This  is  due  to  a  conviction  that  these 
wars  more  clearly  resemble  modern  ones  than  those  of 
the  middle  period  when  sail  was  the  supreme  motive 
power.  Oar  and  steam  have  one  great  feature  in 
common — independence  of  the  wind.  In  the  sailing 
days  wind  was  the  essential  factor.  The  British  ships 
blockading  Brest  in  the  great  war  could  now  and 
again  go  away,  knowing  full  well  that  till  the  wind 
changed  the  French  could  not  leave.  On  this  fact 
schemes  were  laid  which  to-day  could  have  no  counter- 
part. In  the  oar-age,  however,  there  were  no  such 


16  HEKESIES  OF   SEA  POWEK 

limitations  and  fleets  were  liable  to  be  confined  by 
nothing  but  bad  weather,  which,  though  to  a  far  lesser 
degree,  is  still  a  restraining  influence  on  steam  opera- 
tions. 

Again  :  the  oarsmen  needed  frequent  rest ;  so  to-day 
the  steam-ships  need  frequent  replenishing  of  coal. 
The  radius  of  action  of  the  galley  was  about  one  day, 
whereas  the  modern  warship  endures  from  one  to  three 
weeks  or  more ;  but  the  time  now  taken  to  get  from 
one  point  to  another  has  so  decreased  that  some  rough 
sort  of  scale  is  discernible  so  long  as  we  remember  that 
the  area  of  operations  has  extended  in  proportion. 
The  world  of  the  wars  of  the  ancients  was  a  small  and 
curtailed  one,  and  so  the  tardiness  of  their  movements 
is  balanced  by  our  enormous  increase  of  area.  Com- 
pare, for  instance,  the  once  gigantic  over-sea  expedition 
of  Athens  to  Syracuse  and  its  modern  equivalent — so 
far  as  distance  is  concerned — the  sailing  of  the  Russian 
fleet  from  the  Baltic  to  the  Sea  of  Japan.  The  relative 
difficulties  were  not  so  very  dissimilar — greater  speed 
has  meant  a  greater  distance.1 

The  sailing  ship,  however,  was  more  self-contained 
and  had  to  a  remarkable  degree  the  power  of  proceed- 
ing immense  distances  without  much  difficulty.  To 
this  has  been  attributed  the  fact  that  the  sail  replaced 
the  oar  even  as  steam  replaced  sail.  A  careful 

1  It  is  of  interest  to  note  in  this  connection  that  we  have  now 
reached  the  limit  of  the  world  in  our  operations.  See  chapter  on 
'  Eternal  Principles.' 


INTEODUCTION  17 

examination  of  facts  fails,  however,  to  warrant  this  very 
exactly.1  The  oar  as  '  motive  power '  was  essentially 
the  product  of  the  Mediterranean,  where  seas  were 
comparatively  calm  and  distances  moderate.  As  in 
process  of  time  sea  empire  travelled  west,  its  chief 
centre  shifted  from  the  Mediterranean  to  the  Atlantic 
and  contiguous  water  in  which  rougher  seas  made  the 
oar  a  far  less  reliable  instrument.  In  the  Mediter- 
ranean the  ships  of  the  ancients  were  oar-propelled 
with  auxiliary  sail  power  :  in  the  north  even  the 
earlier  vessels  depended  upon  sail  with  auxiliary  oar- 
power. 

As  habitude  with  sails  grew,  a  natural  tendency  to 
discard  the  auxiliary  oar  arose.  This  may  be  compared 
with  the  gradual  abandonment  of  the  auxiliary  sails  by 
steamships  of  a  later  age.  Northern  nations  found 
themselves  able  to  do  more  and  more  with  sails  and 
needing  oars  less  and  less. 

Then  came  the  introduction  of  cannon,  for  which 
the  sides  of  ships,  hitherto  occupied  by  oars,  were 
required.  To  obtain  the  advantages  of  artillery,  which 
was  the  better  of  two  alternatives,  oars  were  sacrificed. 
The  galley,  however,  survived  for  a  long  period,  and 
practically  into  the  steam  age,  as  a  subsidiary  craft  for 
special  purposes.  It  could  move  against  the  wind  and 

1  This  statement  is  made  with  all  due  deference  to  the  main  thesis 
in  Mr.  Julian  Corbett's  England  in  the  Mediterranean.  This  is  that 
the  superior  mobility  of  the  sailing  ship  caused  the  change.  With  this 
I  can  only  agree  if  mobility  be  translated  as  '  radius,'  and  then  only 
partially,  for  the  reasons  stated. 

0 


18  HEEESIES  OF   SEA  POWEK 

manoeuvre  in  a  fashion  denied  to  sailing  ships;  but 
these  qualities  were  not  necessarily  all-important.  To- 
day we  accept  a  limited  speed  for  battleships,  finding 
in  their  greater  power  and  radius  something  more 
utilitarian  than  the  much  greater  speed  but  restricted 
radius  of  the  torpedo  vessel.  So  the  galley  lived  on 
under  various  names,  fulfilling  the  role  of  the  modern 
torpedo  boat.  As  gunpowder  and  sailing  aptitude 
increased,  its  importance  diminished  nearly  to  vanish- 
ing point.  Its  ram  ceased  to  be  a  serious  danger.  So 
— were  means  found  to  neutralise  torpedoes — the 
present-day  destroyers  would  soon  fall  into  disuse, 
no  matter  what  speeds  they  might  make  over  short 
distances. 

In  the  Mediterranean  different  influences  were  at 
work,  and  the  oar  long  maintained  a  predominance. 
The  advent  of  artillery  and  the  necessity  of  carrying 
many  guns  on  the  broadside  eventually,  however, 
brought  in  the  sailing  ship  pure  and  simple,  though  it 
is  interesting  to  note  that  *  sweeps '  long  persisted. 

Steam,  when  it  first  made  its  appearance,  did  so  as 
a  species  of  substitute  for  or  revival  of  auxiliary  oars. 
The  integral  idea  of  the  oar  may  indeed  be  found  in 
its  adoption.  Its  superior  power  and  endurance  soon 
caused  it  to  make  headway,  though  its  still  restricted 
radius  in  the  early  days  led  to  the  retention  of  sails 
for  a  long  time.  Kadius  of  action  was  more  highly 
esteemed  than  the  power  to  move  against  the  wind 
for  limited  periods— a  point  that  it  is  well  to  under- 


INTRODUCTION  19 

stand,  because  it  indicates  that  in  all  naval  history 
one  ideal  has  remained  a  constant,  one  ideal  has 
animated  the  evolution  of  construction — the  desire  for 
radius.  It  is  not,  probably,  the  constant  that  anyone 
would  first  name  offhand:  yet  it  appears  to  have 
dominated  all  others  in  all  time.1 

Now  the  sailing  ship  differed  from  the  vessels 
propelled  by  oar  or  steam  in  two  important  particulars. 
It  was  in  the  first  place  far  more  self-supporting ;  in 
the  second  it  was  considerably  more  *  intermittent.' 
With  oar  and  steam  an  admiral  could  plan  strategies 
to  take  effect  at  definite  times  with  nothing  save  bad 
weather  in  his  way.  With  sail  bad  weather  was  not 
the  only  drawback,  contrary  winds  were  as  bad  or 
worse.  Timed  operations  were  hardly  possible :  they 
were  rarely  attempted  and  still  more  rarely  did  they 
succeed.  Napoleon's  great  scheme,  for  instance,  would 
have  had  far  more  chance  of  success  had  he  been  able 
to  time  operations.  Per  contra,  had  there  been  no 
contrary  winds  Nelson's  pursuit  of  Villeneuve  to  the 
West  Indies  might  have  had  a  different  result. 

From  this  it  might  be  argued  that  a  counterbalance 
existed ;  which  is  no  doubt  true,  but  at  the  same 
time  strategical  operations  based  upon  the  concerted 
action  of  separate  forces  at  a  given  time  did  not  and 
could  not  have  with  the  sail  the  meaning  they  could 
have  had  with  the  oar  and  actually  have  with  steam. 
In  fairness,  however,  it  should  be  pointed  out 

1  See  chapter  on  '  Eternal  Principles.' 

c  2 


20  HEEESIES  OF   SEA  POWEE 

that  there  is  little  record  of  the  ancients  having 
attempted  timed  strategies  on  a  par  with  those 
attempted  to-day,  and  it  is  also  of  course  true  that 
the  certainty  of  steam  is  relative  rather  than  absolute. 
Still  there  remains  the  fact  that  with  sail  a  contrary 
wind  told  the  blockaders  that  there  was  no  fear  of  the 
enemy  stealing  out :  while  with  both  oar  and  steam 
exit  was,  and  is,  nearly  always  possible ;  and  exit  in 
any  direction  instead  of  in  one  only.  Furthermore, 
the  limitations  of  sail-power  necessitated  a  technique 
not  required  by  the  ancients  or  by  the  moderns ;  and 
the  result  of  this  was  to  make  the  righting  man  sub- 
ordinate to  the  *  seaman.'  It  was  sheer  fine  seaman- 
ship that  enabled  the  English  fleets  to  maintain  their 
weary  blockades  of  the  French  in  the  Great  War.  In 
our  admiration  of  these  qualities  we  are  apt  to  over- 
look the  fact  that  the  purely  military  labours  of  the 
blockaders  were  comparatively  easy  :  owing  to  the 
wind,  they  had  but  a  few  points  of  the  compass  to 
consider,  where  the  ancients  and  the  moderns  had, 
and  have,  most  of  the  thirty-two.  The  purely  military 
problem,  therefore,  of  blockades  like  those  of  Santiago 
and  Port  Arthur  are  more  likely  to  echo  incidents 
of  ancient  history  than  of  the  era  of  sails.  A  Togo 
in  the  days  of  sailing  ships  would  surely  have  found 
little  difficulty  in  preventing  Bussian  sorties  from  Port 
Arthur. 

In  the  following  chapters    certain    incidents    of 
ancient  history  in  the  days  of  the  oar  are  examined, 


INTRODUCTION  21 

and  then  some  of  the  more  recent  steam  wars.  In 
both  cases  the  attempt  is  made  to  see  how  far  different 
conditions  would,  with  due  regard  to  the  difference  of 
radius  of  action,  have  affected  the  issue ;  and  to  trace 
with  an  open  mind  how  far  the  generally  accepted 
principles  of  Sea  Power  were  upheld  or  negatived  by 
these  incidents. 

The  term  '  generally  accepted  principles  of  Sea 
Power '  is  used  advisedly  and  of  set  purpose.  The  strictly 
academical  definition  of  Sea  Power  matters  little  or 
nothing.  In  the  restricted  and  actual  sense — that  is  to 
say  a  navy — it  is  defined  by  Captain  Mahan1  as 
'  necessary  from  the  existence  of  a  peaceful  shipping, 
its  extent  and  its  existence  governed  by  that  factor. 
Otherwise  it  exists  as  a  branch  of  the  usual  military 
establishment.' 

This,  practically,  is  all  the  definition  of  Sea  Power 
to  be  drawn  from  the  writings  of  Captain  Mahan.  It 
is  since  the  publication  of  his  famous  book  that  Sea 
Power  has  become  a  sort  of  occult  term,  eluding  exact 
definition  and  perhaps  meaning  different  things  to 
different  people.  It  required  definition,  and  the  best 
and  most  general  is,  perhaps,  the  most  common  con- 
ception of  it :  '  A  naval  force  sufficient  to  defeat  any 
naval  force  of  the  enemy.' 

This  implies  all  else  that  need  be  included. 

There  are  two  general  and  existing  conceptions,  of 
which  the  first  is  a  vague  understanding  of  an  idea, 
1  Influetice  of  Sea  Power  on  History,  p.  26. 


22  HEEESIES   OF    SEA  POWEK 

sufficiently  old  to  be  found  in  Gibbon,  or  for  that 
matter  even  so  long  ago  as  Thucydides,  that  a  power 
controlling  the  sea  in  a  war  in  which  both  land  and 
sea  are  concerned  will  control  the  land.  More  briefly 
it  may  be  put,  '  Who  rules  the  sea  rules  the  world.' 

A  prime  object  of  this  work  is  to  examine  this 
theory  as  applied  to  history,  questioning  whether  it 
may  be  accepted  as  a  certain  rule  without  limitations. 

The  second  general  conception  is  that  Sea  Power  is 
embodied  in  a  navy  of  tried  skill,  power,  and  general 
efficiency  by  means  of  which  the  certainty  of  victory  is 
to  be  assured  ;  and  so  a  second  purpose  of  this  book  is 
to  show  why  doubts  are  permissible  as  to  whether  this 
may  be  accepted  as  a  principle. 

At  the  present  time,  chiefly  through  gradual  growth 
and  the  natural  desire  of  all  to  make  a  plausible  theory 
square  with  facts,  both  the  above  conceptions  are 
accepted  by  the  majority  of  people  as  dogmas.  It  is 
proposed  to  show  in  these  pages  that,  although  the 
dogmas  may  in  a  great  number  of  cases  lead  no  one 
astray,  yet  that  there  is  in  them  just  sufficient  alloy  to 
make  trust  in  them  undesirable,  and  that  Sea  Power 
has  more  often  been  the  means  to  rather  than  the 
cause  of  victory.  On  the  other  hand,  once  we  attempt 
to  find  it,  one  eternal  principle  will  be  found  a  charac- 
teristic of  every  war  that  has  ever  been,  and  that 
characteristic  is  the  one  which  is  in  these  pages 
described  as  '  Fitness  to  Win.'  Neither  Sea  Power  nor 
anything  else  is  a  substitute  for  this. 


PAKT  I 

SEVEN  GREAT  NAVAL  WARS   AND  THEIR 
PARADOXES 

THIS  section  deals  with  certain  well-known  wars  in 
which  accepted  theories  of  Sea  Power  were  either 
actually  or  apparently  ignored  by  the  victors.  Each 
war  concerned  the  birth  or  fall  of  a  great  sea  empire. 
For  reasons  advanced  in  the  Introduction,  only  the 
general  features  and  main  strategies  of  these  wars  are 
touched  on,  as  it  is  desirable  to  concentrate  upon  the 
main  principles  involved.  The  Napoleonic  and  other 
great  conflicts  immediately  preceding  it,  upon  which 
the  '  dogma  of  Sea  Power '  generally  rests,  are  omitted, 
as  their  chief  features  and  the  lessons  usually  adduced 
therefrom  will  already  be  sufficiently  familiar  to  the 
reader  to  need  no  references  beyond  such  as  may 
casually  be  made  in  the  following  text. 


I 

THE   PELOPONNESIAN  WAR 

KEVIEWED  generally,  the  Peloponnesian  war,  which 
involved  practically  the  entire  Grecian  world  and  lasted 
twenty  years,  was  as  follows : 

Athens,  the  maritime  state,  with  enterprise,  ex- 
pansive skill  and  genius,  stood  the  leader  of  a  great 
confederacy  stretching  from  Zante  to  Phaselis.  The 
zenith  of  her  power  was  reached  ahout  B.C.  456,  but 
when  the  war  broke  out  (B.C.  431)  she  was  still 
mistress  of  the  islands,  and  the  almost  unquestioned 
owner  of  the  world's  Sea  Power.  Whatever  else  she 
had  lost,  Sea  Power  was  unquestionably  hers. 

Her  principal  rival  was  Sparta,  the  leading  mili- 
tary state,  unenterprising,  slow,  and  tenacious.  With 
Sparta  was  Corinth,  a  maritime  state  whose  commercial 
greatness  had  fallen  as  Athenian  Sea  Power  rose. 

The  east  of  Greece  was  a  species  of  Athenian 
lake,  on  the  west  coast  the  Peloponnesian  power  was 
the  greater. 

In  the  war  that  followed  both  sides  adhered 
tolerably  faithfully  to  one  general  idea — to  hold  the 
side  already  controlled  and  to  seek  extension  on  the 


THE   PELOPONNESIAN  WAE  25 

side  controlled  by  the  enemy.  Hence  Athens  engaged 
in  defensive  war  on  the  east  and  offensive  on  the  west 
coast ;  the  Peloponnesians  reversed  this. 

Parallels  could  be  found  in  the  map  of  the  world 
to-day,  or  in  the  map  of  Europe  of  a  hundred  years 
ago ;  but  it  should  always  be  borne  in  mind  that  in 
this  old  Greek  war  there  were  two  elements  not  to  be 
found  in  many  other  wars.  In  the  first  place,  there 
was  in  each  belligerent  confederacy  an  element  politi- 
cally favourable  to  the  other  side.  In  every  '  allied  ' 
state  there  was  a  party  which,  being  out  of  power, 
favoured  the  '  other  side  '  as  its  own  hope  of  returning 
to  power.1  The  sentiment  is  one  that  after  the  lapse 
of  over  two  thousand  years  is  just  beginning  faintly  to 
assert  itself  again. 

So  in  the  Anglo-Boer  War  there  was  in  England  a 
party  whose  sympathies  were  in  some  measure  with 
the  Boers,  and,  more  markedly,  in  the  Kusso-Japanese 
War,  we  have  seen  in  Russia  sections  of  the  population 
seeing  in  Japanese  victories  their  own  political  salva- 
tion. Though  for  different  reasons,  this  situation 
existed  acutely  in  the  Peloponnesian  war,  and  the 
strategies  of  both  sides  were  coloured  with  it. 

The  war  began  in  B.C.  431.  Up  to  B.C.  424  it  was 
chiefly  in  favour  of  Athens ;  then  the  tide  of  fortune 
turned,  and,  despite  Athenian  naval  victories,  ended 
ultimately  in  the  destruction  of  the  entire  Athenian 

1  So  much  was  this  the  case  that  when  the  oligarchy  in  an  '  allied 
state  '  favoured  Athens,  the  democratical  party  sympathised  with  Sparta. 


26  HEKESIES  OF   SEA  POWEE 

fleet  at  JSgospotami  and  the  consequent  surrender  of 
Athens.  A  second  feature  of  the  war  is  that  it  saw  the 
birth  of  naval  tactics. 

At  the  outbreak  of  the  Peloponnesian  war,  '  Sea 
Power  '  seems  to  have  been  as  well  recognised  by  the 
Greeks  as  it  is  a  recognised  force  to-day.  The  early 
pages  of  Thucydides  indicate  this  very  clearly ; l  the 
references  to  the  naval  power  of  Agamemnon,  to  the 
fleet  of  Polycrates,  to  the  lack  of  *  decked  vessels  '  in 
the  Athenian  fleet  at  Salamis,  all  show  that  there  was 
a  very  distinct  recognition  of  the  ship  as  a  war  force. 
The  platitudes  of  to-day  were  platitudes  then ;  and  *  Sea 
Power '  is  in  no  way  a  modern  idea.  Call  '  Sea  Power  ' 
the  use  of  a  fleet,  and  it  has  always  existed.  But  it  has 
existed  just  as  the  bow  existed  beside  the  sword,  or 
to-day  the  rifle  beside  the  field-piece,  the  torpedo  beside 
the  big  gun.  It  was  used  as  a  weapon  beside  other 
weapons,  or  as  the  most  convenient  weapon. 


1  Thucydides,  1. 4-5, 8,  for  the  navy  of  Minos  ;  I.  9,  for  Agamemnon ; 
I.  13,  for  maritime  progress  after  the  Trojan  war;  I.  14,  Athenian  navy 
at  Salamis;  I.  15,  for  the  importance  attached  to  Sea  Power.  As 
showing  the  importance  attached  to  naval  power  by  the  Greeks,  two 
passages  from  Thucydides  may  be  noted ;  the  first  deals  with  the 
reason  why  Agamemnon  was  able  to  assemble  so  strong  a  force  for  the 
attack  on  Troy.  After  alluding  to  his  hereditary  position  as  the  first 
reason,  the  historian  continues,  2  fioi  Soice?  'Ayanepvuv  vapaXa^v  Kal 
vavriKcf  T«  8,/jia  fal  ir\fov  rwv  &\\tov  iffxvffas,  r^v  arparfiav  ov  \apni  rb  v\f7ov 
fl  $6Btp  Swayaykv  -noi^ffaaQai)  (Thucydides,  I.  9).  The  gist  of  this  is  that 
he  owed  his  position  to  his  hereditary  power  and  to  his  naval  power 
more  than  to  anything  else.  The  second  passage  points  out  that  in 
early  Greece  the  only  important  wars  were  maritime  (Thucydides,  I. 
15). 


28  HEKESIES  OF   SEA  POWEK 

Of  sea  tactics,  few,  if  any,  ideas  seem  to  have  pre- 
vailed before  the  Peloponnesian  war.  Salamis  was 
not  characterised  by  anything  that  could  be  dignified 
with  the  name  of  tactics  as  we  understand  them ;  in 
substance  it  was  a  land  battle  fought  on  shipboard. 
Incidentally  as  ship  crashed  into  ship,  there  may  have 
been  born  then  ideas  as  to  concerted  tactical  action  with 
ramming  as  the  objective,  but  these  ideas  bore  no  fruit 
till  the  Peloponnesian  war. 

1  Cutting  the  line  '  existed  as  a  battle  object,  just  as 
indiscriminate  ramming  existed  ;  but  in  both  cases  only 
because  such  things  were  the  nearest  analogy  to  land 
warfare. 

At  the  same  time  tactical  ideas  were  evidently 
being  evolved,  and  in  the  Athenian  navy  concerted 
action — the  first  necessity  of  tactics — was  fully  recog- 
nised. In  a  battle  between  the  Corinthians  and 
Corcyreans  which  preceded  the  great  war,  the  Athenian 
ships,  hanging  on  the  outskirts  of  the  fight,  acted 
together  in  their  evolutions  with  the  distinct  object  of 
affecting  the  Corinthian  movements,  and  it  goes  without 
saying  that  this  efficiency  could  not  have  been  acquired 
without  very  considerable  practice  towards  a  definite 
end ;  and  so,  when,  war  having  broken  out,  Phormio 
with  his  fleet  of  twenty  ships  was  in  the  Gulf  of  Corinth 
off  Naupaktis,  it  was  but  natural  that,  having  the 
power  to  use  his  ships  as  one,  he  should  think  out  a 
means  of  doing  so  in  order  to  win  a  victory. 

The  Peloponnesian  fleet   consisted  of  forty-seven 


THE  PELOPONNESIAN  WAK  29 

vessels  of  various  sizes.  They  were  emphatically  a 
fleet  of  the  old  regime,  and  they  made  their  first 
acquaintance  with  the  new  order  of  things  when  they 
found  that,  as  they  coasted  along  out  of  the  gulf,  they 
were  *  watched '  by  Phormio,  who  wished  to  attack  in 
the  open  sea.1 

As  the  Peloponnesians  coasted,  the  twenty  Athenian 
ships  kept  in  line  with  them,  observing.  A  battle  was 
not  expected  by  the  Peloponnesians,  who  lay  to  during 
the  night  in  hopes  of  evading  the  watching  fleet. 

This,  however,  failed  in  its  object,  and  some  action 
seeming  inevitable,  they  ranged  themselves  in  a  circle, 
prows  outward,  with  their  small  craft  inside,2  also  the 
five  fastest  ships,  which  were  intended  to  issue  out, 
and  support  the  circle  at  whatever  point  it  might  be 
attacked.  These  dispositions  show  very  clearly  that 
nothing  was  anticipated  save  a  fight  on  classical  lines. 

Phormio,  his  ships  being  in  line  ahead,  rowed 
round  and  round  the  Peloponnesian  circle,  and  by 
keeping  very  near  gave  the  impression  that  he  pur- 
ported to  attack.  This  narrowed  the  circle,  and  pre- 
sently, as  he  had  foreseen,  this  and  the  morning  breeze 
flung  his  enemy  into  confusion.  Then,  seizing  the 
favourable  moment,  he  attacked  and  destroyed  in 
detail,  while  the  Peloponnesians  broke  and  fled. 

1  For  Phormio's  tactics  see  Thucydides,  II.  c.  81,  where  it  is  stated 
that  Phormio  declined  to  assist  the  Acarnanians  because  he  was  obliged 
to  watch  the  Peloponnesian  fleet ;  cc.  83-84  for  tactics  leading  up  to  the 
battle  and  the  battle  itself. 

2  Compare  this  general  idea  with  the  battle  of  Tsushima,  1905. 


30  HERESIES  OF   SEA  POWER 

This  battle  of  Naupaktis  is  a  clear  instance  of  a 
victory  won  by  tactical  ability. 

It  was  the  direct  result  of  training.  It  teaches  us 
that  most  tactical  ideas  are  as  old  as  the  hills — and 
that  (as  ever)  the  best  man  will  win. 

Much  interest  attaches  to  the  addresses  delivered 
after  the  fight.1  On  the  Peloponnesian  side,  the 
situation  was  rightly  grasped :  '  Against  their  greater 
skill  set  your  own  greater  valour,  and  against  the 
defeat  which  so  alarms  you  set  the  fact  that  you  were 
unprepared.  But  now  you  have  a  larger  fleet ;  this 
turns  the  balance  in  your  favour ;  and  you  will  fight 
close  to  a  friendly  shore  under  the  protection  of  heavy 
armed  troops.  Victory  is  generally  on  the  side  of 
those  who  are  more  numerous  and  better  equipped. 
Even  our  mistakes  will  be  an  additional  advantage, 
because  they  will  be  a  lesson  to  us.' 

Except  for  the  *  friendly  shore '  piece,  this  address 
might  be  used  as  a  free  translation  of  a  portion  of 
Captain  Klado's  articles  in  re  the  Russian  Baltic  Fleet, 
1904-5. 

Phorniio's  address  gives  us  his  tactical  principles : 
'  If  I  can  help  it  I  shall  not  give  battle  in  the  gulf  or 
even  sail  into  it.  For  I  know  that  where  a  few  vessels 
which  are  skilfully  handled  and  are  better  sailers 
engage  with  a  larger  number  which  are  badly  managed, 

1  Thucydides,  II.  87,  speech  of  Lacedemonian  admirals,  c.  89, 
speech  of  Phormio.  The  translation  in  the  text  is  (except  for  one  or 
two  technical  phrases)  that  of  Jowett,  Thucydides,  vol.  i.  pp.  154-156. 


THE  PELOPONNESIAN  WAB  31 

confined  space  is  a  disadvantage.  Unless  the  captain 
of  a  ship  see  his  enemy  a  good  way  off,  he  cannot 
advance  or  ram  properly ;  nor  can  he  retreat  at  need 
when  pressed.  The  manoeuvres  suitable  for  fast  vessels, 
such  as  breaking  the  line  or  circling  under  the  enemy's 
stern,  cannot  be  practised  in  a  narrow  space,  for  here 
the  sea  fight  must  of  necessity  be  reduced  to  a  land 
fight,  in  which  numbers  tell.  In  the  moment  of  action 
remember  the  value  of  silence  and  order,  things  always 
important  in  war,  especially  at  sea.' 

There  is  any  amount  of  sound  principle  in  either 
address,  and  plenty  of  regard  for  the  science  of  killing 
the  enemy — which  was  the  business  in  hand.  But  is 
there  visible  here  any  conception  of  the  theory  that  the 
ancients  bothered  about  grand  principles  of  strategical 
results  elsewhere  to  follow  from  their  operations  as  a 
distinct  sequel  ? 

We  can,  by  judicious  selection,  build  up  such  a 
theory  even  out  of  the  fragments  here  quoted.  We 
can  take  Thucydides'  opening  remarks  about  ships  and 
without  any  imagination  say  :  This  indicates  that  the 
general  sentiment  among  the  educated  Greeks  was 
that  Sea  Power  had  won  the  war  against  Troy,  conse- 
quently it  was  recognised  by  those  in  authority  at 
Athens  that  the  '  steady  silent  pressure '  of  Athenian 
Sea  Power 1  would,  properly  applied,  bring  Sparta  to 
her  knees.  The  long  walls  to  Piraeus,  the  only  ex- 
penditure on  *  bricks  and  mortar '  sanctioned,  show 

1  See  The  Punic  War. 


32  HEKESIES  OF   SEA  POWBE 

that  Athens  was  felt  to  rely  on  Sea  Power  alone.  In 
fighting  the  battle  of  Naupaktis,  Phormio  was  in- 
fluenced by  the  same  principles,  the  same  ideas,  that 
animated  Nelson  when  at  the  Nile  and  Trafalgar  he 
fought  to  render  possible  the  battle  of  Waterloo,  etc. 
We  can  say  it  all  very  plausibly,  and  absolutely  correctly 
as  regards  the  opening  sentences. 

But  what  have  we  to  omit  to  say  the  rest  of  it  ? 

For  one  thing  we  have  to  omit  that  the  Athenian 
soldiers  were  quite  unequal  to  the  Spartan  ones,  that 
they  built  the  long  walls  so  as  to  avoid  having  to  fight 
superior  soldiery,  because  these  walls  enabled  them  to 
neglect  the  tilling  of  Attica  and  subsist  instead  on  food 
brought  to  them  over-sea.  They  needed  ships  to 
bring  that  food  ;  they  needed  warships  to  collect  the 
unwilling  contributions  of  their  island  allies,  and  to 
fight  any  hostile  warships  likely  to  interfere  with  the 
food  ships.  But  what  dreams  had  they  of  ships  used 
with  the  distinct  objective  of  affecting  military  issues 
on  land?  What  ideas  had  Phormio,  an  obviously 
great  admiral,  beyond  killing  as  many  Peloponnesians 
as  possible  with  the  minimum  loss  to  himself  ? 

We  may  now  follow  the  result  of  the  defensive 
tactics  adopted  by  the  Peloponnesians.1  Four  deep 
these  skirted  the  coast,  their  twenty  fastest  ships 
leading.  Thus  they  made  a  feint  upon  the  town  of 
Naupaktis  and  their  scheme  was  so  successful  that 
they  easily  drew  the  Athenians  after  them.  Turning 
1  Thucydides,  II.  90-92. 


THE  PELOPONNESIAN  WAK  33 

suddenly,  they  came  down  upon  the  Athenians  and  cut 
off  nine  ships.  Eleven  others  escaped  into  the  open 
sea  pursued  by  the  twenty  in  disorder.  Ten  reached 
Naupaktis,  but  the  eleventh  lagged  behind.  Hotly 
chased  by  one  of  the  Peloponnesians,  this  ship  dodged 
round  a  merchant  vessel  and  rammed  her  pursuer. 
Inspirited  by  this  success,  the  Athenians  turned  and 
defeated  their  enemy,  and  eventually  recovered  most 
of  the  nine  ships  which  had  been  lost. 

After  which  nothing  in  particular  happened  for 
some  while. 

To  follow  this  war  through  its  entire  length  would 
be  as  tedious  as  it  is  unnecessary.  There  are,  how- 
ever, certain  portions  of  it — the  Athenian  expedition 
to  Syracuse,  the  battle  of  Cyzicus  and  the  battle  of 
^Egospotarni  which  deserve  some  close  attention. 

The  Syracusan  expedition  in  the  seventeenth  year 
of  the  war  was  briefly  as  follows : 

Seeking  expansion,  the  Athenians  sent  an  armada 
to  Syracuse  which  blockaded  the  port  and  besieged  the 
town  by  land  (414  B.c).  In  the  Grand  Harbour  in- 
decisive actions  were  fought— the  Syracusans  making 
great  use  of  soldiers  afloat.  A  second  Athenian  arma- 
ment was  sent,  but  succumbed  to  the  methods  adopted 
by  the  Syracusans.  Thus  the  bare  outlines. 

The  Syracusan  expedition  was  undoubtedly  an 
example  of  the  use  of  Sea  Power,  insomuch  that  the 
Athenians,  having  command  of  the  sea,  used  that 
command  to  invade  Sicily.  But  there  was  no 

D 


34  HEKESIES   OF   SEA  POWEK 

'  profound  determining  influence  of  maritime  strength 
upon  great  issues '  in  the  matter  for  them,  since  they 
lost  their  fleets  fighting  in  the  harbour  with  Syracusans 
who,  lacking  aptitude  for  grand  sea  fights,  extemporised 
barge-like  warships  filled  with  heavy-armed  soldiery 
and  turned  the  sea  into  land  for  the  occasion.  They 
had  neither  command  of  the  sea  nor  Sea  Power,  but 
they  were  completely  victorious. 

Should  one  use  this  as  an  argument  that  Sea 
Power,  as  generally  understood,  is  useless  ?  Hardly : 
but  it  is  a  fair  inference  that  well-trained  seamen  and 
ships  are  not  alone  factors  of  determining  importance, 
unless  the  conditions  are  otherwise  suitable.  At 
Syracuse  they  were  not  suitable ;  but  that  does  not 
affect  the  deduction,  of  which  this  is  a  most  remark- 
able instance,  that  Sea  Power  is  an  illusive  thing  and 
not  a  universal  weapon.  It  is  only  of  service  in  the 
hands  of  the  better  man,  and  without  it  he  will 
probably  find  some  other  means  to  win. 

In  a  fight  in  the  open  sea  Athenian  skill  would 
have  annihilated  the  Syracusan  barge  fleet,  but  the 
Syracusans  did  not  give  the  opportunity.  They 
waited  to  be  attacked  by  Sea  Power  under  their 
own  conditions,  conditions  which  neutralised  the 
value  of  Sea  Power,  and  made  it  of  no  account. 
They  used  their  barge  ships,  it  is  true ;  they  used 
them  to  crash  into  the  light  Athenian  vessels  in 
that  constricted  harbour  of  Syracuse,  where  seaman- 
ship availed  nothing :  their  men  were  '  soldiers  at 


THE  PELOPONNESIAN  WAK  35 

sea,'  and  the  primary  use  of  their  ships  to  carry  these 
soldiers  to  destroy  the  sailors  of  Athens.  They  hit  on 
the  right  antidote,  and  being  the  better  men,  they 
won.  The  end  of  the  '  silent  pressure  of  Sea  Power  ' 

MAP   OF    SYRACUSE  TO   ILLUSTRATE    PELOPONNESIAN  WAR 


iv         r 

X          Athenian         )       P    L    £  'M   M  Y   R   I   0    N      \ 
,':>vNaval  Station  j&fA. 


on  this  occasion  was  the  Athenian  navy  prisoners  in 
the  stone  quarries. 

Can  we  draw  further  deductions  or  press  any  already 
made  further  home?  Of  what  avail  is  it  to  do  so? 
There  is  no  call  to  make  points  beyond  showing  that 
for  instances  of  Sea  Power,  influencing  military  and 

D  2 


36  HEEESIES  OF   SEA  POWEE 

general  history,  we  may  find  other  instances  of  military 
affairs  profoundly  influencing  Sea  Power. 

The  battle  of  Cyzicus l  is  of  special  interest  from 
the  tactical  standpoint.  It  took  place  in  the  twenty- 
second  year  of  the  war  (B.C.  410).  The  Athenians 
under  Alcibiades  were  inferior  in  numbers,  and  by 
no  means  sure  of  victory.  They  resorted,  therefore,  to 
tactics  almost  identical  with  those  adopted  by  Togo 
off  Port  Arthur  in  the  Eusso-Japanese  war. 

The  Athenian  fleet  was  divided  into  three  squadrons, 
of  which  only  one  showed  itself.  This  squadron  under 
Alcibiades  being  attacked,  presently  retreated  till  the 
Peloponnesians  were  drawn  a  long  way  from  their  base. 

Then  at  a  given  signal  Alcibiades  turned  on  his 
straggling  pursuers,  while  the  other  two  squadrons 
cut  off  the  retreat.  A  complete  victory  was  the  result. 
Incidentally  it  may  be  mentioned  that  Sparta  there- 
upon sought  peace,  but  the  Athenians  refused  to 
accept  the  offers. 

From  the  previous  Syracusan  disaster,  however, 
Athens  never  fully  recovered,  although  fresh  ships  sub- 
sequently won  battles  such  as  Cyzicus  over  opponents 
unduly  flushed  with  the  Syracusan  victory.  But  the 
Athenian  naval  prestige  was  gone,  destroyed  by  what 
was  after  all  a  military  operation,  even  as  the  Athenian 
fleet  was  finally  so  destroyed  at  the  battle  of  JEgos- 
potami.  Here  the  Athenian  fleet,  deceived  by  a  clever 
but  fairly  obvious  strategy,  was  lulled  into  a  false 
1  Xenophon,  Hellenica,  i.  1.  Cf.  Diod.  Sic.  XIII.  50-51. 


THE   PELOPONNESIAN   WAK  37 

security  by  the  still  non-naval  Peloponnesians.  Their 
ships  drawn  up  on  the  beach,  the  Athenian  crews  went 
inland  to  procure  food,  and  while  they  were  thus 
scattered  their  enemies  rowed  across  the  Hellespont  and 
captured  or  destroyed  on  land  an  armada  that  they  could 
never  have  successfully  faced  upon  the  water. 

Lysander,  the  Peloponnesian  admiral,  had  a  large 
fleet,  but  Sea  Power  was  in  no  way  his.  All  that  a 
superior  navy  could  confer  belonged  to  Athens — better 
ships  and  better  sailors.  And  it  gave  her  ^gospotami ! 

Her  administration  was  bad,  of  course,  or  the  fleet 
would  never  have  been  so  caught  napping  by  a  ruse  ; 
but  this  in  no  way  affects  the  fact — clear  here  as  at 
Syracuse — that  the  greatest  sea  empire  of  the  period 
was  utterly  extinguished  by  those  who  only  partially, 
and  with  ill  success,  met  Sea  Power  with  Sea  Power, 
but  very  successfully  annihilated  it  in  *  other  ways.' 

Of  course,  as  ships  were  concerned  in  those  '  other 
ways,'  it  is  possible  to  ergue  that  they  embodied  Sea 
Power,  but  such  an  argument  will  be  academical  rather 
than  aught  else.  Sea  Power  as  understood  to-day 
means  battleships  and  accessory  craft  and  the  full 
ability  to  handle  them.  One  may  argue  that  the 
Athenian  fleet  was  the  equivalent  of  a  cruiser  fleet  and 
that  the  Syracusan  vessels  were,  relatively,  battleships. 
The  Syracusan  battleships  destroyed  the  Athenian 
cruisers  as  the  Merrimac  destroyed  the  frigates  of  the 
Northerners  in  the  United  States  Civil  War.  If  one 
admits  that,  Syracuse  must  be  regarded  as  a  normal  affair 


38  HEEESIES   OF   SEA  POWER 

enough,  and  it  may  be  legitimate  so  to  look  upon  it. 
Again,  JEgospotami  may  be  regarded  as  a  huge  in- 
stance of  what  was  a  common  war  object  in  those  days, 
catching  the  enemy  on  the  beach. 

Yet  still  the  '  other  ways '  remain,  still  to  Athens 
belonged  the  splendid  navy,  the  well-trained  crews,  the 
competent  seamen  and  all  the  things  that  go  to  make 
up  Sea  Power  ;  to  her  victorious  opponents  an  inferior 
navy,  incompetent  seamen,  less  proficiency  in  every 
branch. 

Viewed  in  any  light,  it  is  hard,  indeed,  to  find  fault 
with  Athenian  strategy.  Were  any  student  of  Sea 
Power,  ignorant  of  the  history  of  the  war,  given  its 
conditions,  the  forces,  and  shown  the  Athenian  move- 
ments, the  last  thing  he  would  prophesy  would  be  the 
thing  that  befel.  Except  the  Syracusan  expedition 
hardly  anything  could  be  criticised,  and  even  that 
expedition  has  much  to  be  said  for  its  wisdom.  It 
transferred  the  war  from  Attica  to  Sicily,  it  promised 
the  essential  expansion  and  refilled  coffers  ;  it  was 
precisely  the  sort  of  operation  that  command  of  the 
sea  is  valuable  as  permitting.  Even  the  landing  at 
^Egospotami  is  excusable :  since  it  was  the  invariable 
custom  and  necessity  of  the  time. 

The  war  is  a  little- studied  war ;  ^gospotami  is 
seldom  mentioned  like  Lepanto  and  Trafalgar  :  if 
mentioned  at  all,  the  lessons  drawn  only  concern  in- 
competent strategy,  careless  neglect,  and  other  hard 
criticisms  such  as  the  actual  conditions  scarcely  merit. 


THE  PELOPONNESIAN  WAK  39 

Its  real  suggestiveness  is  in  the  limitation  of  Sea 
Power  evidenced  by  it,  but  most  of  all  should  it  be 
remembered  and  compared  with  more  recent  campaigns 
from  which  deductions  are  drawn. 

It  is  not  argued  that  this  war  negatives  the  general 
principles  of  Sea  Power  as  laid  down  by  Captain  Mahan, 
but  it  sorts  ill  with  the  elaborations  of  some  of  his 
more  ardent  disciples.  It  clearly  suggests  that  besides 
Sea  Power  and  Land  Power  there  is  a  greater  power 
still — a  power  which  has  as  yet  no  name,  though  we 
have  seen  its  action  in  1904-1905  1  as  clearly  as  in  the 
Peloponnesian  war.  It  is  called  nameless ;  but  perhaps 
it  may  be  characterised.  And  its  characterisation  is 
this — Fitness  to  win. 

1  See  chapter  on  the  Russo-Japanese  war. 


II 

THE   FIEST   PUNIC   WAR 

IN  many  ways  the  state  of  affairs  at  the  outbreak 
of  the  first  Punic  war  recalls  the  situation  at  the 
beginning  of  the  Peloponnesian  war. 

Carthage  was  the  mistress  of  the  Western  Mediter- 
ranean. Absolute  Sea  Power  was  hers.  Her  ships 
were  many,  her  crews  well  trained  and  practised. 
Born  of  the  sea,  she  lived  by  it. 

A  Phoenician  colony,  the  Carthaginians  preserved 
to  a  large  extent  the  Phoenician  characteristics.  The 
Phoenicians  were  ever  a  peculiar  people.  National 
feeling,  as  possessed  by  other  races  of  their  time,  they 
had  none :  they  cared  nothing  for  politics,  and  what- 
ever military  power  was  in  the  ascendent,  to  that 
they  willingly  became  tributary  so  long  as  they  were 
allowed  to  retain  their  existence  upon  the  seas. 

Of  this  sea  existence  Carthage  was  a  pied  a  terre ; 
and  being  the  best  harbour  in  Africa,  it  rapidly  rose  to 
great  importance. 

The  pressure  of  circumstances  and  the  rivalries  of 
trade  brought  about  a  consolidated  empire,  and  the 
nations  round  about  her  were  enrolled  as  subjects, 


42  HEEESIBS  OF   SEA  POWEK 

paying  tribute  and  furnishing  troops,  the  officers  of 
which  were  Carthaginians. 

The  system  by  which  in  the  present  age  the  British 
have  soldiers  of  Indian,  Egyptian  and  other  nationali- 
ties, drilled  and  officered  by  British,  grew  at  Carthage 
from  similar  small  beginnings  till  it  became  practically 
the  only  dependable  system.  A  Carthaginian  citizen 
was  regarded  as  too  valuable  a  man  to  make  a  ranker 
of,1  and  the  world  was  searched  for  the  best  material 
that  Carthage  could  purchase.  From  the  Balearic 
Islands  came  the  best  slingers,  from  Liguria  the  best 
infantry,  African  tribes  made  ideal  light  cavalry  and 
the  pick  of  all  served  in  the  fleet.  When  any  military 
operations  were  in  progress  the  commander-in-chief 
was  invested  with  supreme  command  for  no  fixed 
term;  and  invested  with  almost  dictatorial  powers. 
But  he  was  carefully  subjected  to  the  civil  authority,2 
and  always  accompanied  by  a  civil  commission  which 
had  the  sole  power  of  making  treaties  and  so  forth. 

1  The  Carthaginians  were  essentially  traders  and  merchants,  and  so 
not  physically  fitted  to  be  men  of  war.     The  government  made  consis- 
tent efforts  to  induce  the  citizens  to  embark  upon  military  service,  but 
failed  to  do  so.    The  lesson  is  obvious,  and  one  as  clear  to-day  as  then. 
There  was  a  nominal  army  of  400,000  Carthaginians,  but  it  was  not  of 
the  best  material,  for  the  reasons  stated. 

2  In  the  second  war,  Hannibal  himself  was  so  hampered  directly 
failure  began  to  appear. 

As  the  parliamentary  candidate  for  the  Navy  in  the  1906  General 
Election,  who  went  to  the  poll  at  Portsmouth,  avowedly  against  much 
of  the  present  British  system  of  civil  control  at  the  Admiralty,  I  cannot 
but  emphasise  the  vivid  proofs  of  the  danger  of  party  control  of  a 
national  service  as  evidenced  in  the  tragedy  of  Carthage  and  the  fall  of 


THE  FIRST  PUNIC  WAR  43 

Carthage,  her  own  citizens  being  indisposed  to 
military  service,  had  a  weak  point  in  her  mercenary 
troops,  who,  devoid  of  any  national  interest  in  her 
campaigns,  were  reliable  only  while  victory  and 
plunder  were  to  be  secured  upon  the  Carthaginian  side. 
If  defeat  were  toward,  there  was  no  race  feeling  in  the 
rank  and  file  to  compel  the  continuation  of  war : l  but 
history  shows  that  the  Carthaginians  were  not  ignorant 
of  what  might  be  done  to  mitigate  this  peril  by  means 
of  discipline. 

Kome  was  essentially  a  military  power.  Wherever 
the  Roman  arms  penetrated  there  a  miniature  Rome 
was  set  up,  bound  to  Rome  by  ties  of  self-interest,  and 
gradually  all  Italy  had  fallen  under  her  sway.  Her 


her  sea  empire.  The  same  lesson  may  be  found  in  the  fall  of  the 
Athenian  sea  empire.  Theoretically,  and  actually  perhaps  in  peace 
time,  for  the  fleet  to  be  an  arm  of  the  body  politic  may  be  a  sound 
system  ;  but  the  almost  inevitable  conflict  between  civil  and  naval 
control  of  the  fleet  in  war  time  may  have  most  disastrous  results.  It 
is  almost  absolutely  certain  that  in  the  next  great  naval  war  in  which 
the  British  fleet  is  engaged,  the  civil  element  will  demand  (either  of  its 
own  accord  or  from  pressure  of  public  opinion)  that  the  fleet  protects 
trade  first  and  attempts  to  destroy  the  enemy  afterwards.  Similarly 
the  certain  naval  attitude  will  be  '  Destroy  the  enemy  and  thus  put  it 
out  of  his  power  to  injure  trade.'  The  chief  result  of  the  conflict  of  the 
two  theories  will  probably  be  that  neither  object  is  effectually  accom- 
plished— a  heavy  price  to  pay  for  asserting  the  principle  of  Parliamentary 
control  of  the  navy. 

1  On  the  whole  question,  cp.  the  following  criticism  of  Pelham  : 
1  The  chief  dangers  for  Carthage  lay  obviously  in  the  jealousy  exhibited 
at  home  of  her  officers  abroad,  in  the  difficulty  of  controlling  her 
mercenary  troop",  and  in  the  ever-present  possibility  of  disaffection 
among  her  subjects  in  Libya— dangers  which  even  the  genius  of  Hanni- 
bal failed  finally  to  surmount.'— Pelham,  p.  109. 


44  HEEESIES  OF   SEA  POWEK 

troops  were  all  Roman  citizens  or  allies  cheerfully 
fighting  for  her. 

Eome  is  supposed  by  many  to  have  had  no  navy 
whatever  when  the  war  began.  This  is  not,  however, 
true.  She  had  a  few  ships :  thus  in  E.G.  282  ten 
Roman  ships  which  had  broken  a  treaty  under  which 
they  might  not  appear  east  of  the  Lacinian  promon- 
tory, were  attacked  at  Tarentum.  She  had,  therefore, 
some  naval  power  and  a  large  mercantile  marine ; 
though  Roman  ignorance  of  the  sea  was  such  that 
her  strength  in  this  direction  was  a  negligible 
quantity. 

Carthage,  among  her  many  over-sea  interests  had 
concern  with  Sicily,  and  here  she  came  first  into  con- 
tact with  the  Romans.  In  B.C.  264  the  war  began,  the 
national  clash  of  two  powers  with  conflicting  interests  : 
Rome  was  expanding  her  interests,  and  in  her  way 
stood  Carthage.  The  precise  nominal  causes  of  the 
war  are  immaterial ;  the  real  cause  was  that  there  was 
no  longer  room  for  both.  This,  it  may  be  remarked, 
has  been  the  real  origin  of  all  life-and-death  wars :  it 
was  with  Rome  and  Carthage  in  B.C.  264  as  with 
Japan  and  Russia  in  A.D.  1904. 

Appius  Claudius,  the  Roman  Consul,  representative 
of  the  nation  without  Sea  Power,  crossed  the  Straits  of 
Messana  and  invaded  Sicily,  and  for  some  time  had 
things  entirely  his  own  way  inshore.  On  the  coast  the 
Carthaginian  navy  operated  after  a  time.  Speaking 
generally,  the  operations  of  the  Carthaginians  were 


THE  FIEST  PUNIC  WAE  45 

much  what  they  might  have  been,  had  some  prototype 
of  the  present-day  '  Blue  Water  School '  been  amongst 
them.  Secure  in  their  Sea  Power  they  troubled 
comparatively  little  about  the  Eoman  invasion  and  the 
failure  of  their  army  in  Sicily.  In  these  years  the 
interior  of  the  island  was  practically  in  Eoman  hands, 
but  the  coast  towns  were  all  at  the  mercy  of  Cartha- 
ginian ships — so  too  the  coast  towns  of  Italy,  despite 
the  fortified  ports  specially  established  against  naval 
raids. 

Then  it  was  that  Eome  suddenly  turned  attention 
to  the  sea.  Stories  of  the  ignorant  Eomans  building  a 
fleet  upon  the  model  of  a  wrecked  Carthaginian  war- 
ship1 are  probably  not  fiction,  for  though  they  had 
ample  numbers  of  naval  architects  in  the  Greeks2  and 
Etruscans  on  their  own  shores,  they  had  not,  howeve^ 
any  practice  in  building  such  efficient  warships  as  were 
the  Carthaginian  vessels.  Few  trained  seamen  were 
available,  and  '  shore  establishments  '  were  instituted 
in  which  rowing  was  practised.3 

The  first  effort  was  a  sufficiently  dismal  failure. 
One  hundred  quinqueremes  and  thirty  triremes  were 
constructed,  and  seventeen  of  these  ships — a  trial 
squadron  under  C.  Cornelius  Scipio — encountered  the 
Carthaginians  under  Boodes  off  Messana  in  superior 
force. 

The  Carthaginians  to  the  number  of  twenty  ships 

1  Polybius,  I.  20-21.  2  Livy,  16,  39,  36,  42. 

3  Polybius,  I.  21. 


46  HEEESIES  OF   SEA  POWEE 

blockaded  the  Eoman  fleet  in  harbour,  and  Scipio 
surrendered  after  his  crews  had  landed  and  fled.1 

The  Eomans  in  their  aspirations  for  Sea  Power 
recognised  as  clearly  as  the  Syracusans  in  the  Pelopon- 
nesian  war,  the  nature  of  their  limitations  and  the 
existence  of  '  other  ways/  As  the  Syracusans  invented 
a  species  of  battleship  for  their  needs  in  order  to  over- 
come Athenian  skill,  so  the  Eomans  evolved  a  type  of 
warship  designed  to  let  their  soldiers  fight  at  sea. 
They  invented  the  corvi,2  a  species  of  drawbridge,  each 
thirty-six  feet  long  by  four  feet  wide,  with  a  hook  at 
the  far  end,  secured  to  a  twenty-four-foot  mast  and 
designed  to  be  let  down  in  battle  the  moment  close 
quarters  were  reached.  Thus,  all  the  accepted  naval 
tactics  of  the  time  were  made  of  no  account,  for  over 
these  boarding  bridges  the  Eoman  soldiers  rushed  to 
victory. 

Duilius,  the  Eoman  Consul,  so  soon  as  the  corvi 
were  fitted,  went  to  sea  to  meet  the  Carthaginians 
under  Hannibal.3  These,  full  of  contempt  for  their 
unnautical  opponents,  advanced  to  the  attack  in  no 
particular  order,  with  the  result  that  thirty  ships 
alone  began  the  battle.  These  were  destroyed  and 
Hannibal's  attempts  to  repair  his  error  failed.  In 

1  Polybius,  I.  21.  Zonaras,  VIII.  10,  gives  a  story  of  victory  caused 
by  Carthaginian  treachery,  but  it  is  obviously  merely  a  pro-Roman  ex- 
planation of  a  «  regrettable  incident.' 

*  Polybius,  I.  22.    The  exact  method  of  working  is  not  very  clear. 

3  Not,  of  course,  the  great  Hannibal,  whose  exploits  were  in  the 
second  war. 


THE   FIRST  PUNIC  WAE  47 

the  end  he  took  to  flight  with  the  remnant  of  his 
fleet.1 

He  reached  Carthage  before  the  news  of  the  battle. 
According  to  a  French  historian,2  suppressing  the  in- 
telligence, he  sent  an  officer  who  told  the  Senate  that 
the  Romans  were  at  sea  with  a  fleet.  *  Their  ships,' 
said  he,  '  are  like  merchant  ships.  It  is  their  first 
attempt ;  they  have  no  nautical  experience.  On  the 
bows  of  their  ships  they  have  certain  machines,  the 
use  of  which  we  cannot  ascertain.  Would  it  be  rash 
to  attack  them  and  preserve  our  sovereignty  of  the 
seas,  or  shall  I  allow  them  to  ravage  our  coasts  ? ' 

Orders  to  attack  were  given :  then  he  announced 
the  defeat,  adding,  '  Hannibal  thought  as  you.  What 
you  have  ordered  he  has  attempted :  and,  if  Fortune 
has  not  smiled  upon  his  enterprise,  does  that  make 
him  a  criminal  ? ' 

Thus  diplomatically,  if  the  story  be  true,  he  avoided 
the  consequences  of  defeat :  but  his  diplomacy  was 
more  than  a  clever  excuse.  Negligent  as  he  had 
shown  himself,  his  assumption  of  certain  victory  when 
he  encountered  Duilius  was  at  any  rate  natural.  His 
contempt  for  his  opponents,  however  unwise,  was 
exactly  the  contempt  that  would  be  felt  in  any  efficient 

1  Polybius,  I.  23. 

2  Histoire  de  la  Marine.    A.  du  Sein,  professeur  de  1'ecole  navale  en 
retrait  (vol.  i.  p.  248).    His  authority  is  not  given.    The  story  is  not  in 
Polybius,  Livy,  or  Zonaras,  nor  is  it  mentioned  by  Mommsen,  Ihne, 
Arnold,  Niebuhr,  or  Liddell.    It  is  probably,  therefore,  a  very  late  story, 
but  deemed  worthy  of  reference  here  because  the  line  of  argument  is  so 
very  natural. 


48  HEEESIES   OF   SEA  POWER 

navy  matched  against  a  notoriously  untrained  sea 
force.  Yet  always  in  history  most  danger  has  come 
from  the  despised  untrained  force — a  lesson  England 
learned  in  her  war  with  the  Americans  in  1812. 

After  this  victory  of  Duilius  the  newly  acquired  Sea 
Power  of  Rome  was  used  to  press  the  Sicilian  campaign 
and  for  operations  against  Corsica  and  Sardinia. 

Hannibal  with  what  was  left  of  his  fleet  went  from 
Carthage  to  Sardinia  which  was  being  attacked,  and 
here  in  a  certain  harbour  the  Romans  found  and 
blockaded  him.  His  crews  fled  to  the  shore  and 
abandoned  their  ships.  He  himself  escaped  only  to 
fall  into  the  hands  of  some  of  his  own  men,  who 
signalised  their  view  of  his  second  failure  by  crucifying 
him  forthwith.1 

The  loss  of  the  fleet  of  Hannibal  did  not  exhaust 
Carthaginian  naval  resources,  for  in  the  following  year 
(B.C.  256)  they  had  a  fleet  off  Tyndaris 2  under  Hamilcar 
which,  passing  in  bad  order,  was  sighted  by  the  Roman 
Atilius  who  lay  at  anchor  in  the  harbour.  He  rushed 
to  the  attack  with  ten  triremes  leaving  the  rest  of  his 
fleet  to  follow.  These  ten  were  surrounded  and  nine 
of  them  destroyed;  when  the  rest  of  the  Romans 
arrived  and  captured  or  destroyed  eighteen  Cartha- 
ginians. 

To  the  ancient  historian  this  action  was  an  example 
of  Roman  temerity  and  over-confidence  that  culminated 

1  Polybius,  I.  24,  and  Livy,  Ep.  17. 

2  Polybius,  I.  25. 


THE  FIBST  PUNIC  WAE  49 

in  victory  only  by  luck :  but  it  is  to  be  argued  that 
Atilius  had  a  clear  tactical  design,  and  did  what  in  all 
ages  since  others  have  done  or  advocated.  Flinging 
his  fast  craft  upon  the  enemy  he  held  them  with 
these  till  his  main  body  arrived  and  secured  the 
victory. 

The  following  year  was  marked  by  great  naval 
efforts ;  each  side  putting  over  300  ships  into  com- 
mission.1 The  Komans  under  Kegulus  collected  at 
Messana,  designing  an  invasion  of  Africa,  and  leaving 
Messana  went  south,  doubling  Cape  Pachynum  (Cape 
Passaro)  and  thence  coasted  westward. 

The  Carthaginians,  meanwhile,  under  Hamilcar 
and  Hanno,  had  crossed  to  Lilybaeum  and  then  gone 
east  seeking^he  Roman  fleet,  which  they  encountered 
off  Mount  Ecnomus — the  Komans  being  inshore  in  the 
formation  of  an  inverted  wedge  A  supported  by  lines 
astern  of  it.  The  Carthaginians  to  seaward  faced  the 
A  with  a  long  line  indented  on  the  left  to  envelop 
the  wedge.2  Upon  the  Koman  attack  the  Cartha- 
ginian centre  imitated  those  tactics  by  which  in  the 
past  Alcibiades  had  secured  a  victory.  Feigning  re- 
treat, until  the  pursuing  enemy  were  in  disorder,  at  a 
signal  they  turned  suddenly  upon  their  pursuers. 

This  plan  very  nearly  succeeded,  but  in  the  end  the 
Carthaginians  failed  and  were  defeated  with  the  loss  of 

1  Home,  330  ships,  Carthage  350.    Cf.  Polybius,  I.  26  for  details. 
Romans  averaged  420  men  per  ship,  of  whom  300  were  rowers,  and  120 
fighting  men. 

2  Details  of  the  battle,  Polybius,  I.  26-28. 

E 


50  HEKESIES  OF   SEA  POWEE 

thirty  ships  sunk  and  sixty-four  captured.  The  Eomans 
lost  twenty-four  ships  sunk. 

Eegulus  after  refitting  proceeded  to  Africa  and 
a  landing  having  been  effected  and  Clypsea  taken  he 
was  left  with  forty  ships,  the  remaining  vessels  being 
recalled  by  the  Senate.  The  surviving  Carthaginian 
vessels  made  no  attempt  to  intercept  him,  and  every- 
thing seemed  open  to  Eoman  victory.  The  '  Blue 
Water  School '  at  Carthage  had  controlled  matters  to 
the  extent  of  an  entire  absence  of  '  bricks  and  mortar.' 
Defence  lay  entirely  with  the  fleet ;  and  so  what  was 
left  of  the  fleet  was  concentrated  at  Carthage  itself  for 
'  harbour  defence/ 

Eegulus  advanced  to  within  ten  miles  of  Carthage, 
and  it  was  a  matter  of  the  purest  luck  that  his  army 
was  defeated  by  Xanthippus,  a  Spartan  mercenary 
who,  when  all  seemed  lost,  conceived  the  idea  of  using 
elephants  on  land  in  a  sense  much  for  the  same  reason 
that  the  Eomans  had  used  the  corvi  at  sea.  Eegulus 
was  captured,  his  army  scattered,  and  the  Carthaginian 
fleet  held  the  sea  off  Cape  Mercurius  in  order  to  cut  off 
the  retreat  of  the  few  survivors. 

Matters  were  at  this  stage  when  a  huge  Eoman 
fleet  of  350  ships  made  its  appearance.1  It  destroyed 
the  Carthaginian  fleet,  and  the  renewal  of  the  invasion 
was  discussed,  but  the  land  upon  which  they  might 


1  Polybius,  I.  36.  According  to  Zonaras  the  forty  ships  of  Eegulus 
effected  a  diversion  which  caused  the  victory,  but  this  is  probably 
fiction. 


THE  FIRST  PUNIC  WAE  51 

have  lived  had  already  been  ravaged  by  Regulus  in  his 
advance  on  Carthage,  and  the  dread  that  over-sea 
supplies  would  be  intercepted  by  Carthaginian  ships  led 
to  the  re-embarkation  of  the  entire  Roman  force. 

They  sailed,  therefore,  toward  Sicily,  and  all  but 
eighty  of  the  464  ships,  which  including  transports  the 
fleet  numbered,  were  lost  in  a  storm.1 

A  new  fleet  of  200  ships  took  the  Carthaginian  post 
at  Panormus  in  Sicily :  but  on  its  way  back  to  Italy, 
being  attacked  by  the  Carthaginians,  lost  all  its  trans- 
ports. In  the  next  year  (254  B.C.)  this  fleet  again 
operated  against  Africa,  but  ignorance  of  navigation 
got  the  ships  aground  and  necessitated  throwing  over- 
board the  spoils  of  the  raid,  and  subsequently  all  but 
sixty  ships  were  wrecked  and  lost.2 

Upon  this  the  anti-Sea  Power  party  in  the  Senate 
gained  the  upper  hand  :  maritime  expeditions  were 
decided  against,  and  the  fleet  reduced  to  sixty  vessels 
for  coast  defence. 

Carthage  got  together  a  new  fleet;  but  the  army 
which  it  carried  to  Sicily  being  defeated,  peace  over- 
tures were  made.  Thus  encouraged  Rome  once  more 
made  a  bid  for  the  mastery  of  the  sea,  and  equipping 
240  ships  besieged  Lilybaeum 3  (Marsala)  and  Drepanum 
(Trapani) — the  only  two  Carthaginian  strongholds 
left.  Here  Carthaginian  seamanship  displayed  itself. 
Another  Hannibal  took  a  fleet  to  the  Agates  Islands 

1  Polybius,  I.  37.  2  Polybius,  I.  38. 

3  For  these  and  subsequent  operations,  Polybius,  I.  39-54. 

E  2 


52  HEEESIES  OF   SEA  POWER 

and  waiting  a  favourable  wind  sailed  into  Lilybseum 
and  revictualled  it  right  in  the  faces  of  the  Eomans. 
After  remaining  a  few  days  he  slipped  out  at  night  and 
went  to  Drepanum. 

The  Eomans  after  a  futile  attempt  to  block  the 
harbour  of  Lilybseum,  sailed  under  Claudius  for 
Drepanum.  Warned  of  Claudius'  move,  the  Cartha- 
ginian Adherbal  stationed  his  fleet  among  the  rocks  at 
the  entrance,  fell  suddenly  upon  Claudius  and  totally 
defeated  him. 

The  Eoman  blockade  of  Lilybseum  was,  however, 
maintained,  and  a  fleet  of  120  warships  accompanied 
by  800  transports  was  despatched  to  aid  in  the  siege 
and  blockade.  This  fleet,  as  usual,  collected  at  Messana, 
called  at  Syracuse  and  thence  coasted  towards  Lily- 
bseum, where  it  met  a  Carthaginian  squadron  off  Cape 
Pachynum,  which  being  in  inferior  force  contented  it- 
self with  observing  the  Eoman  armada. 

A  gale  was  coming  up.  The  experienced  Cartha- 
ginians ran  for  shelter  ;  the  Eomans,  suspecting  no- 
thing, encountered  the  full  force  of  the  storm  and  lost 
many  ships,  while  after  the  gale  the  Carthaginians 
easily  captured  the  dispersed  remnants. 

Thus  Carthage  secured  once  more  the  control  of 
the  sea.  Eome  crushed  under  the  double  disaster 
abandoned  fleets,  and  relied  upon  a  species  of  guerre  de 
course  in  which  small  Carthaginian  detachments  and 
storeships  were  occasionally  overpowered.  Carthage, 
however,  had  the  command  of  the  sea.  Eome  chiefly 


THE   FIEST  PUNIC  WAK  53 

confined  herself  to  purely  military  operations,  Carthage 
to  naval  ones  conducted  by  the  famous  Hamilcar 
Barca — father  of  the  still  more  famous  Hannibal. 
Hamilcar  steadily  raided  the  Italian  coast,  and,  of 
course,  easily  kept  supplied  the  two  strongholds  which 
the  Kornans  vainly  besieged  in  Sicily. 

In  B.C.  251,  the  Romans  realising  that  only  by 
defeating  the  Carthaginian  ships  could  Drepanum  and 
Lilybaeum  be  taken,  equipped  a  fourth  fleet  by  means 
of  private  enterprise ;  the  State  undertaking  to  recoup 
the  cost  only  if  success  were  met  with.  This  fleet  of 
200  quinqueremes  was  put  under  the  command  of 
Lutatius  and  it  sailed  for  Sicily  after  the  Carthaginians 
had  been  allowed  to  command  the  sea  for  five  years. 
In  the  interval  these  had  realised  their  need  of  an  army, 
without  which,  they  were  equally  helpless  to  raise  the 
sieges.  Hamilcar  was  ashore,  conducting  military 
operations  in  Sicily,  and  the  fleet — the  pressing  need 
for  it  being  now  passed — had  sunk  to  the  status  of  a 
secondary  arm.  Off  Sicily,  no  ships  were  stationed, 
and  Lutatius  reached  the  neighbourhood  of  Lilybaeum 
without  encountering  any  opposition.  Here  he  es- 
tablished himself  and  spent  his  time  in  constant  evolu- 
tions. 

The  Carthaginians  hearing  of  this  blockade  of 
Lilybaaum  collected  250  ships  which  they  sent  under 
Hanno  to  Sicily.  The  ships  were  laden  with  stores, 
the  crews  apparently  more  or  less  raw,  and  the  old 
technical  skill  conspicuously  absent.  The  Romans  on 


54  HEEESIES   OF   SEA  POWEE 

the  other  hand  exhibited  superior  tactical  qualities, 
and  their  victory  was  of  the  easiest  description. 
Hanno's  fleet  was  annihilated. 

Communications  with  Sicily  cut,  her  mercenaries 
almost  in  a  state  of  revolt,  Carthage  surrendered 
Lilybseum  and  Drepanum  and  made  peace. 

Few  wars  are  more  interesting  and  instructive  than 
this — the  first  Punic  War.  The  bone  of  contention 
was  an  island :  but  that  island  was  invaded  with  con- 
siderable success  by  a  military  power  which  had  practi- 
cally no  fleet  at  all. 

It  may  be  said  that  the  Carthaginians  should  have 
been  able  to  stop  the  invasion  by  Sea  Power  ;  and  gross 
laxity  would  seem  the  only  explanation  of  their  failure 
to  do  so.  But  on  examination  it  will  be  found  that 
Carthage  did  not  desire  war,  and  the  invasion  was  of 
the  nature  of  a  political  surprise — in  some  ways  not 
very  dissimilar  to  that  invasion  of  Korea  which  began 
the  Kusso-Japanese  War  in  February  1904.  A  nation 
resolved  on  war  can  always  undertake  a  military 
operation  to  open  that  war  against  a  nation  less  eager 
to  fight.  A  Continental  ideal  for  the  defeat  of  England 
is  the  declaration  of  war  by  the  landing  on  British 
shores  of  the  hostile  army.  Whether  practicable  or  not 
in  these  days  of  telegraphs  and  steam,  the  idea  is  not 
at  all  a  novel  one,  and  something  of  the  sort  is  to  be 
found  in  the  Kornan  invasion  of  Sicily.  Japan's  in- 
vasion of  Korea  in  1904  is  not  on  a  par  with  projected 
invasions  of  England,  since  Japan  had  the  conviction 


THE   FIRST  PUNIC  WAK  55 

that  her  fleet  was  the  better  one,  and  her  torpedo 
attack  on  the  fleet  at  Port  Arthur  was  planned  and 
expected  to  produce  considerably  more  results  than  it 
actually  achieved.  Rome  apparently  had  no  idea  of 
using  such  ships  as  she  had  for  any  purpose  save  as 
transports. 

Let  us  now,  as  on  a  previous  occasion,  suppose 
some  one  conversant  with  all  the  theories  of  Sea 
Power  and  deductions  therefrom,  but  entirely  ignorant 
of  the  actual  results  of  this  Roman  invasion  of  Sicily. 
Let  him  be  given  the  conditions  and  requested  to  fore- 
cast the  results.  In  how  far  would  his  forecast  agree 
with  what  actually  happened  ?  Would  he  prove  that 
communications  being  cut  (as  they  were)  the  Roman 
army  would  accomplish  nothing  ?  Would  he  foresee 
the  '  silent  steady  pressure  of  Sea  Power  '  driving  the 
Romans  inland  till,  recognising  the  inevitable,  they 
surrendered  at  discretion?  Would  he  foresee,  the 
actual  result,  the  over-running  of  Sicily  by  the  Roman 
soldiers  ;  Carthaginian  Sea  Power  doing  no  more  than 
rendering  insecure  Roman  tenure  of  coast  captures, 
and  permitting  raids  on  the  Italian  coast — wearying 
Rome  it  is  true,  but  achieving  nothing  towards  defeating 
her  ?  Or  would  he  predict  Carthage,  having  complete 
command  of  the  sea,  pouring  troops  into  Sicily  till  the 
Romans,  however  superior  in  individual  courage,  were 
annihilated  by  force  of  numbers  ? 

Carthage,  as  already  stated,  was  for  purposes  of 
defence  and  offence  managed  essentially  on  *  Blue 


56  HEKESIES  OF   SEA  POWEK 

Water  School '  principles.  She  had  but  a  comparatively 
small  army  of  moderate  efficiency  available  for  military 
operations  :  and  even  of  this  she  made  no  great  use. 
She  was  content  to  leave  things  to  her  navy  and  trust 
to  the  '  silent  pressure  of  Sea  Power.'  That  silent  pres- 
sure might  have  stood  her  in  fairly  good  stead  perhaps, 
had  Kome  not  turned  her  attention  to  '  other  ways.' 

The  Syracusan  ships  and  the  Eoman  ships  with 
corvi  show,  as  later,  Greek  fire,  cannon,  steam,  shells 
and  armour,  were  to  show,  how  unstable  a  thing  is  Sea 
Power  even  at  its  best.  On  land,  once  in  a  way,  as 
with  the  phalanx,  with  elephants,  possibly  (but  not 
certainly)  with  cannon,  new  inventions — '  other  ways  ' 
— have  neutralised  skill,  courage,  and  practice :  but  the 
sea  is  full  of  incidents  whereby  high  efficiency  has 
been  made  a  mere  cipher  through  the  raw  man  having 
some  new  invention,  some  new  idea,  placed  in  his 
hands.  Given  the  necessary  fitness,  Fate  seems  ever 
to  have  supplied  the  necessary  weapon.  Yet  Sea 
Power  as  a  definite  factor  is  assessed  as  though  such 
incidents  had  never  been,  and  '  Fitness  to  win '  is  never 
included  as  one  of  its  factors. 

Confident  in  the  corvi,  the  Romans, — without  sea 
practice  be  it  noted,  for  they  even  learned  to  row  in 
'  shore  establishments,' — sallied  out  and  easily  defeated 
the  foremost  seamen  of  the  age.  Is  not  a  true  ap- 
preciation of  this  worth  a  dozen  realisations  that  '  it 
was  the  ships  of  Nelson  at  Trafalgar  which  won  the 
battle  of  Waterloo  '  ? 


THE   FIKST  PUNIC  WAK  57 

In  the  events  that  followed,  the  trained  seaman 
once  in  a  way  asserted  himself.  When  Lilybaeum 
and  Drepanum  were  closely  beleaguered,  the  skilled 
seamen  of  the  Carthaginians  succeeded  in  running 
through  the  blockading  fleet  and  overcoming  the 
obstacles  placed  by  the  Romans  to  prevent  their 
ingress.  At  Drepanum,  too,  the  skill  of  Adherbal  and 
his  sailors  made  short  work  of  Claudius's  *  soldiers  at 
sea,'  though  even  here  the  folly  of  Claudius  in  entering 
a  hostile  harbour  without  any  precautions  is  sufficient 
to  account  for  his  defeat.  Storms,  too,  wreaked  upon 
the  Romans  disaster  such  as  never  befell  the  more 
experienced  Carthaginians.  In  the  end,  however,  by 
virtue  of  the  corvi,  or  by  virtue  of  being  the  fitter  to 
win,  the  Eomans  gained  the  victory. 

The  war  was  won  by  Power  of  some  sort — no  war 
was  so  surely  won  by  Power  as  this.  But,  if  we 
examine  that  Power,  what  was  it  ?  What  was  behind 
the  corvi,  the  particular  weapon  that  overthrew  the 
Carthaginian  fleets  ?  Nothing  assuredly  that  Cartha- 
ginian seamen  could  not  have  copied  structurally. 
They  apparently  made  no  attempt  to  do  so.  This 
may  have  been  due  to  the  conservatism  so  inherent 
with  nautical  men  l  who  as  a  class  are  averse  to  going 
either  forward  or  backwards,  and  also  partly  due  to 
the  fact  that  behind  the  corvi  were  the  Roman 
*  soldiers  at  sea.'  We  lack  the  necessary  details  to 

1  Compare  the  unanimity  with  which  the  great  majority  of  retired 
Admirals  decry  any  new  invention  introduced  into  Navies. 


58  HEEESIES  OF   SEA  POWEK 

show  which  of  these  two  was  the  principal  reason,  but 
we  do  know  that  the  Eoman  was  the  better  man,  com- 
pared with  the  Carthaginian  fighting  man,  when  it  came 
to  a  hand-to-hand  struggle.1  How  much  better  the 
Eoman  was  we  cannot  say.  On  land,  however,  the 
Carthaginian  forces  fought  well  enough  to  suggest  that 
the  disparity  was  not  insuperable,  at  any  rate,  hardly 
enough  to  account  for  the  crushing  nature  of  the  naval 
defeats  inflicted.  All  that  the  Eomans  with  the  corvi 
did  was  to  turn  the  sea  into  land  for  the  purposes  of 
the  battle,  even  as  the  Syracusans  did  when  they 
defeated  the  Athenians,  and  this  was  simply  a  reversion 
to  past  methods.  The  ship  originally  was  nothing  but 
a  machine  whereby  soldiers  could  fight  soldiers  on  the 
water  as  well  as  on  land. 

We  are  compelled,  therefore,  to  imagine  that  over 
and  above  the  question  of  fitness  between  the  com- 
batants, there  was  also  the  fact  that  the  Carthaginian 
sailors,  either  from  pure  conservatism  to  the  best 
existing  methods  when  they  were  trained,  or  from  the 
numbing  effect  of  being  suddenly  faced  with  novel 
conditions,  found  their  very  proficiency  in  naval  war 
CL  la  mode,  fatal  to  war  by  unorthodox  methods.  How- 
ever, the  point  of  interest  is  that  the  Eomans,  like  the 
Syracusans,  despairing  of  equalling  their  enemies  in  a 
special  technical  field,  reverted  to  old  conditions  in 
which  no  technical  skill  was  necessary. 

1  Hamilcar  Barca's  subsequent  selection  of  the  tribes  inhabiting 
Spain  and  Gaul  for  the  soldiers  of  the  second  Punic  War  possibly 
suggests  dissatisfaction  with  the  personnel  previously  available. 


THE   FIRST   PUNIC  WAR  59 

Now,  can  we  condemn  the  '  Blue  Water  School '  of 
Carthage  ?  Omitting  the  corvi,  it  is  difficult  to  do  so. 
Carthage  could  only  be  attacked  by  sea,  and  her  sea 
efficiency  was  superior  to  that  of  any  other  nation. 
Yet  she  failed.  The  cause  of  that  failure  was  surely 
her  lack  of  '  Fitness  to  win.'  Had  that  been  hers,  she 
would  surely  have  found  the  means  of  retaining  her 
empire.  As  it  was,  though  by  a  combination  of  luck 
and  skill,  she  succeeded  once  in  recovering  her  Sea 
Power,  yet  her  unfitness  to  win  led  her  into  a  neglect 
of  efficiency,  so  great  that  in  the  final  fight  she  was 
proved  inferior  to  the  Romans  in  purely  nautical 
ability.  Here  at  least  is  a  lesson  from  history  to  stand 
throughout  all  time. 


Ill 

THE   SECOND   PUNIC   WAR 

IN  the  seventeen  years  that  followed  the  peace, 
Carthage  had  first  to  cope  with  revolted  mercenaries, 
whose  rebellious  instincts  had  led  largely  to  peace 
being  made.  Those  at  home  were  eventually  crushed, 
but  others  in  Sardinia  transferred  their  allegiance 
to  Borne,  and  the  expostulations  of  Carthage  led  to 
nothing  but  a  threat  of  renewed  war  and  the  exaction 
of  a  still  further  indemnity.  Hamilcar  Barca,  now  at 
the  head  of  affairs,  was  instrumental  in  this  demand 
being  complied  with,  and  Sardinia  was  ceded ; l  but 
the  exaction  was  never  forgiven  by  him.  From  that 
day  onward  he  steadily  prepared  for  a  renewal  of  the 
war,  and  he  made  his  son  Hannibal,  then  but  nine 
years  old,  swear  an  oath  of  eternal  hatred  against  the 
Bomans.2 

Hamilcar  was  a  man  of  genius.  Seeing  that  war 
was  inevitable  he  cast  about  for  the  best  means  to 
conduct  that  war  with  success,  when  it  should  come 
about. 

1  Polybius,  I.  79-80;  Appian,  VI.  1 ;  Polybius,  III.  10,  28. 

2  Polybius,  III.  11 ;  Livy,  XXI.  1. 


THE   SECOND  PUNIC  WAB  61 

As  one  who  had  seen  the  successful  use  of  Sea 
Power  in  the  late  war,  he  might  have  been  expected 
to  concentrate  all  efforts  upon  a  powerful  navy.  This, 
however,  he  did  not  do.  Either  from  lack  of  con- 
fidence in  Carthaginian  naval  prowess,  or  from  a  recog- 
nition of  the  uncertainties  of  sea  warfare,  or  because 
he  recognised  that  it  was  impossible  to  equal  Home  in 
a  shipbuilding  contest  he  directed  comparatively  few 
Carthaginian  resources  to  naval  use.  Instead  he  made 
a  plan  in  which  Sea  Power  had  very  little  part.  In 
Spain  he  saw  a  compensation  for  the  loss  of  Sicily  and 
Sardinia,  and  free  action  for  himself  in  a  rich  and 
as  yet  unexploited  country,  with  Celtic  and  Iberic 
inhabitants  eminently  suitable  for  soldiers.  Invested 
with  dictatorial  power,  he  began  to  build  up  a  new 
empire  in  Spain  and  upon  his  death  the  work  was 
carried  on  by  his  son-in-law  Hasdrubal,  and  then  by 
the  great  Hannibal  himself,  now  twenty-eight  years 
old.  Always  the  aim  was  the  conquest  of  Home  and 
when  all  was  ready  Hannibal  threw  down  the  gage 
and  began  that  famous  campaign  which  will  live  in 
history  through  all  time. 

He  commenced  operations  by  allowing  Carthaginian 
interests  to  clash  with  Koman  ones,  as  they  had  clashed 
on  the  eve  of  the  first  war.  This  time,  however, 
Carthage  was  alive  to  the  need  of  action  and  Hannibal 
moved  forward  so  swiftly  that  Eoman  troops  sent  by 
sea  to  dispute  his  passage  of  the  Khone,  arrived  too 
late.  These  forces  went  to  Spain  and  carried  on 


62  HEKESIES   OF   SEA  POWEE 

operations  behind  his  back.  There  is  every  indication 
that  he  had  allowed  for,  and  perhaps  courted  this. 
His  objective  was  Eome;  the  more  soldiers  Eome 
dispatched  to  Spain  or  Sicily,  the  fewer  would  she 
have  to  defend  the  heart  of  her  empire. 

With  heavy,  and  perhaps  unanticipated,  loss, 
Hannibal  crossed  the  Alps.  It  has  been  surmised  that 
he  expected  to  find  friends  there  instead  of  the  enemies 
that  he  actually  encountered:  since  his  whole  plan 
rested  upon  appearing  as  the  saviour  of  Italy  and 
adjacent  lands  from  Eome.  Certainly  in  Italy  he  ex- 
pected to  find  recruits,  and  his  failure  to  do  so  con- 
siderably hampered  him.  Still,  with  his  well-trained 
army  he  easily  inflicted  crushing  disasters  upon  the 
Eomans. 

Lack  of  troops  and  siege  engines  prevented  him 
from  attempting  to  take  Eome :  instead  he  passed  to 
the  south  and  communicated  with  Carthage  by  sea, 
asking  for  reinforcements.  These  he  failed  to  secure. 
Their  non-arrival  is  attributed  by  Captain  Mahan  to 
the  influence  of  Eoman  Sea  Power,  but  the  evidence 
of  this  is  entirely  negative.  On  the  other  hand  it  is 
a  known  fact  that  a  party  in  Carthage  regarded  him 
with  jealousy  and  suspicion,  and  opposed  his  being 
reinforced. 

Before  the  battle  of  Cannae  also  he  had  not  had 
reinforcements  for  certain  definite  reasons : 

1.  He  was  in  no  pressing  need,  the  Spanish  army 
was  strong  in  it p  elf  and  he  hardly  asked  for  more 


THE   SECOND  PUNIC  WAE  63 

troops.  The  fleet  of  Carthage  was  employed  to  keep 
Africa  free  from  invasion  and  so  leave  him  a  free 
hand. 

2.  A  party  at  Carthage  were  opposed  to  making 
Hannibal  too  strong,  for  political  reasons. 

3.  Uncertainty  as  to  his  whereabouts  and  the  risk 
of  reinforcements  landed  in  Italy  being  cut  off  before 
they  could  join  him. 

Before  the  battle  of  Cannse,  the  only  effect  of 
Koman  Sea  Power  is  to  be  found  in  the  last  difficulty, 
and  that  can  more  easily  be  attributed  to  military 
causes  than  to  naval  ones. 

After  Cannae,  Hannibal  needed  men,  for  since  Italy 
failed  to  join  him  it  became  necessary  for  him  to 
annihilate  Kome  with  his  own  army.  To  this  one 
party  in  the  Carthaginian  Senate  demurred. 

Eventually,  however,  12,000  men,  a  quite  insufficient 
reinforcement,  were  collected  by  his  youngest  brother 
Mago,  and  these  were  under  orders  to  proceed  by  sea 
to  Italy,  when  events  in  Spain  necessitated  the  diver- 
sion of  the  force  thither.  Success  was  achieved  and 
the  brothers,  Hasdrubal  first  and  Mago  subsequently, 
proceeded  to  Italy  by  way  of  the  Alps,  neither  meeting 
with  much  loss  on  the  march.  At  the  Metaurus 
Hasdrubal  was  out-manoeuvred  and  entirely  defeated 
Hannibal  was  then  left  isolated  pending  the  arrival  of 
Mago. 

The  Koman  victory  on  the  Metaurus  is  attributed 
by  Captain  Mahan  to  the  fact  that  Scipio  sent  some 


64  HEKESIES  OF   SEA  POWEE 

troops  from  Spain  by  sea  to  reinforce  the  army  oppos- 
ing Hasdrubal :  but  the  more  reasonable  version, 
surely,  is  that  the  large  force  detached  from  the  army 
confronting  Hannibal  was  responsible  for  the  crushing 
nature  of  the  Carthaginian  defeat.  Rome  also  had  the 
good  fortune  to  intercept  the  messengers  between  the 
Carthaginian  brothers,  and  so  was  able  to  make  the 
necessary  arrangements.  It  is  surely  improbable  that 
Scipio's  12,000  men  sent  by  sea  from  Spain  would  of 
themselves  have  contributed  much  to  the  victory  of 
the  Metaurus.  Indeed  nothing  seems  clearer  than 
the  impotence  of  Roman  Sea  Power  in  affecting  the 
issues.  The  real  causes  appear  to  be  :— 

1.  The  success  of  the  Scipios  in  Spain,  thus  '  con- 
taining '  Hasdrubal. 

2.  The  delay  in  the  completion  of  the  Macedonian 
alliance  and  Philip's  subsequent  inactivity. 

3.  The  action  of  the  peace  party  at  Carthage  in 
restricting  reinforcements. 

4.  The  activity  of  Roman  troops  in  Sicily,  which 
kept  Hiero  of  Syracuse  occupied. 

Lack  of  reinforcements  and  the  demoralisation  of 
his  army  at  Capua  reduced  Hannibal  to  severe  straits 
and  he  ceased  to  be  a  danger.  Then,  and  not  till  then 
was  Rome  able  to  consider  the  invasion  of  Africa.  As 
soldiers  and  sailors  were  to  some  degree  convertible, 
the  fact  that  this  obvious  '  counter-irritant '  was  not 
earlier  employed  negatives  the  theory  that  Rome  had 
much  available  Sea  Power  in  this  war.  Any  important 


THE   SECOND  PUNIC  WAK  65 

sea  force  could  have  been  turned  into  an  army  to 
harass  Africa.  Yet  Africa  save  for  a  very  early  raid 
was  left  untouched  till  the  battle  of  the  Metaurus  broke 
the  Carthaginian  power  in  Italy.  Then  Scipio  sailed 
in  Etruscan  ships,  and  attacked  Utica  and  Tunis. 
Here  his  fleet  was  defeated  by  the  Carthaginian  ships, 
though  his  invasion  was  not  affected  thereby,  since 
he  subsequently  defeated  the  Carthaginian  home  army. 
This  led  to  the  recall  of  Hannibal  and  his  veterans 
who  returned  by  sea. 

In  the  following  year  Hannibal  in  command  of  a 
mixed  force  of  his  veterans  and  raw  levies  was  defeated 
in  the  battle  of  Zama,  and  by  his  advice  Carthage 
subsequently  secured  the  best  peace  terms  she  could. 

Let  us  now  examine  the  action  of  Sea  Power  on  this 
war. 

The  entire  series  of  naval  operations  was  as 
follows : — 

At  the  outbreak  of  war  Eome  had  a  fleet  of  160 
quinqueremes.  Of  these  sixty,  under  Sempronius,  were 
sent  to  raid  Africa :  and  sixty  under  Scipio  to  Spain. 
The  Carthaginians l  meanwhile  sent  twenty  ships  to  raid 
the  Italian  coast,  but  these  were  dispersed  by  a  tempest 
off  Messana.  Some  of  them  were  captured  by  Hiero 
of  Syracuse  who  was  then  at  Messana,  and  he,  sus- 
pecting that  Lilybaeum  was  the  Carthaginian  objective, 


1  Carthage  had,  according  to  Livy  (XXI.  49)  twenty  ships  to  raid  Italy, 
nine  at  Lipari,  eight  at  Stromboli,  three  off  Messana ;  Hiero  had  twelve 
ships  at  Messana. 


66  HEKESIES   OF   SEA  POWEE 

hastened  thither  with  some  ships  of  his  own  and  some 
Eoman  vessels.  When  the  Carthaginians  arrived  they 
found  Lilybseum  on  guard,  so  drew  up  in  battle  order 
off  the  harbour.  Here,  attacked  by  Eomans  using  the 
corvi,  they  lost  seven  ships :  the  rest  gained  the  open 
sea. 

Meanwhile  the  main  Carthaginian  fleet  of  seventy 
ships  was  ravaging  the  coast  of  Bruttium  (Calabria). 
Sempronius  was  preparing  to  deal  with  these,  when 
the  news  of  Hannibal's  descent  into  Italy  arrived,  and 
he  was  at  once  recalled,  leaving  only  a  few  ships  for 
the  defence  of  Sicily, — an  instance  of  the  influence  of 
Land  Power  on  naval  history. 

At  Carthagena  in  Spain  l  the  Carthaginians  had 
forty  ships,  which  the  Eomans  under  Scipio  surprised 
while  the  crews  were  ashore ;  and  shortly  afterwards 
a  Eoman  fleet  a  hundred  strong  dispersed  the  main 
Carthaginian  fleet  off  Italy,  compelling  it  to  retire  to 
Africa.  This,  however,  does  not  seem  to  have  incon- 
venienced Hannibal. 

In  B.C.  214  Eome  raised  150  ships,  but  found  some 
difficulty  in  manning  them.  The  defection  of  Syracuse 
to  Carthage  occupied  the  attention  of  these  vessels  till 
the  famous  siege  was  over.  Naval  operations  on  a 
small  scale  were  also  conducted  against  Macedonia; 
but  nothing  further  of  importance  occurred  till  Scipio 
invaded  Africa,  after  the  battle  of  the  Metaurus. 

At  the  time  of  Scipio's  invasion  the  Eoman  fleet 

1  Polybius,  III.  95-96. 


THE   SECOND  PUNIC  WAR  67 

consisted  altogether  of  about  160  important  warships, 
disposed  as  follows  : 

Forty  ships  defending  Sardinia. 

Forty  cruising  off  Sicily. 

Eighty  coastguard  service  off  the  Italian  coast. 

Of  how  the  Carthaginian  fleet  was  disposed  we  know 
very  little.  At  least  a  hundred  ships  were  at  Carthage 
or  thereabouts  :  while  the  defensive  dispositions  of  the 
Eomans  suggest  that  many  more  Carthaginian  vessels 
were  engaged  in  raiding  the  coast  of  Italy  or  at  the 
service  of  Hannibal  at  Tarentum.  There  is  much  to 
suggest  that,  at  any  rate  at  this  period,  Carthage  had 
the  sea  command  rather  than  Rome.  In  any  case 
Scipio's  fleet  contained  only  twenty  large  warships  to 
defend  his  fleet  of  transports.  As  there  were  a 
hundred  warships  at  Carthage,  Scipio,  at  any  rate, 
displayed  a  fine  disregard  for  the  '  fleet  in  being  '  and 
all  present-day  conceptions  of  Sea  Power. 

Scipio  reached  Africa  and  landed  quite  unopposed. 
He  besieged  Utica  and  had  advanced  on  Tunis, 
before  the  Carthaginian  ships  appeared.  His  naval 
position  was  then  so  desperate  that  he  chained  his 
transports  together,  crammed  them  with  soldiers,  and 
put  his  warships  behind  them, — certainly  not  the  action 
of  dominant  Sea  Power. 

Through  this  defence  the  Carthaginians  ultimately 
broke  and  destroyed  half  the  Roman  fleet — after  which, 
for  reasons  unknown  they  retired  to  Carthage,  allowed 
Tunis  to  surrender,  and  never  more  appeared  in  the 

F  2 


68  HEEESIES   OF   SEA  POWEK 

war.  To  know  why,  would  be  invaluable  to  us,  but 
no  reason  is  vouchsafed.  It  is  to  be  presumed  that 
they  subsequently  co-operated  in  the  return  of 
Hannibal's  army  to  Carthage — a  task  accomplished 
without  any  interference  from  Roman  ships — but 
their  failure  to  take  the  offensive  is  inexplicable, 
unless  it  be  that  the  Carthaginians,  having  in  mind 
the  invasion  of  Regulus  in  the  first  Punic  War,  antici- 
pated that,  with  Hannibal  in  command,  a  land  victory 
would  be  easy,  and  kept  their  ships  in  hand  against 
the  arrival  of  Roman  reinforcements,  and  for  cutting 
off  all  retreat  when  the  anticipated  rout  of  Scipio 
should  occur. 

Roman  Sea  Power  landed  troops  in  Spain,  intended 
to  cut  off  Hannibal.  This  it  failed  to  do,  but  under 
the  two  Scipios  it  carried  on  war  in  Spain  behind 
Hannibal's  back  and  delayed  his  overland  reinforce- 
ments. This  action  had  another  result  also.  Mago, 
Hannibal's  brother,  who  was  sailing  with  12,000  troops 
to  Italy  to  reinforce  his  brother  directly  from  Carthage, 
was  ordered  to  land  in  Spain  instead.  In  a  word  the 
Carthaginians  were  able  to  use  the  sea  when  they 
chose.  Hannibal,  too,  was  in  constant  communication 
with  his  home  government  and  had  his  demands  for 
reinforcements  been  complied  with,  no  Sea  Power  that 
she  possessed  could  have  saved  Rome.  Carthage 
Having  elected  to  make  the  issue  a  land  one,  Rome 
did  the  like,  and  neither  nation  relied  much  upon 
Sea  Power.  Indeed,  when  Scipio  invaded  Africa, 


THE   SECOND  PUNIC  WAE  69 

Etruscan  ships  were  chiefly  employed ;  and  the  only 
instance  of  a  naval  action  in  the  final  stages  was  the 
defeat  of  the  Eoman  fleet  by  the  Carthaginian  vessels. 
Such  Sea  Power  as  existed  at  the  time  of  the  invasion 
was  Carthaginian.  Hannibal  when  recalled  had  no 
difficulty  whatever  in  returning  to  Africa  with  his 
army  by  sea,  being  molested  neither  when  he  embarked 
nor  when  he  landed  in  Africa,  and  there  is  no  evidence 
whatever  that  Eome  won  by  use  of  Sea  Power.  By 
the  absence  of  it  Carthage  was  unable  to  repel  the 
Roman  invasion  by  blockade  of  the  Italian  coast, — but 
blockades  of  that  nature  were  impossible  in  those  days. 
She  also  made  no  attempt  to  defeat  the  force  of  Scipio 
while  on  the  sea,  but  here  the  difficulties  of  inter- 
cepting the  force  and  the  lack  of  certain  knowledge 
as  to  his  destination  may  have  been  the  reason  why. 
Ancient  fleets  were  quite  unfitted  to  cruise  *  observing.' 
Also  it  may  well  be  that  Carthage,  adhering  to  the 
military  policy  laid  down  by  Hamilcar  Barca,  decided 
to  await  the  issue  on  land,  much  as  the  Eussians  so 
decided  in  the  Crimean  War  of  1854.  There  is  no 
doubt  that  in  that  war  the  Eussian  squadron  should 
have  been  able  easily  to  annihilate  the  allied  fleet, 
crowded  as  it  was  with  troops  and  hampered  with 
transports  and  store-ships.  Eussia  preferred  the  land, 
and  Sebastopol  fell.  As  when  fifty  years  later  Japan 
invaded  Korea,  so  also  in  the  Crimean  War  certain 
cardinal  doctrines  of  Sea  Power  were  to  all  appearance 
ignored,  but  the  ignorers  won. 


70  HERESIES   OF   SEA  POWER 

Such  evidence  as  there  is  points  to  the  fact  that 
Scipio,  so  far  from  being  an  example  of  the  use  of  Sea 
Power  is  an  example  of  complete  ignorance  of  it — also 
without  suffering  for  it.  It  is  true  that  luck  was  with 
him :  it  was  a  series  of  misfortunes  rather  than  Scipio's 
genius  which  compelled  Carthage  to  recall  Hannibal 
and  his  veterans — for  the  incidents  that  led  to  the 
defeat  of  Syphax  and  the  contest  with  the  whole  force 
of  Numidia  could  hardly  have  been  anticipated. 
Otherwise,  and  had  Hannibal  been  properly  reinforced 
before  the  invasion  of  Africa,  the  pressure  of  the  Car- 
thaginians outside  Eome  would  probably  have  rendered 
Scipio's  invasion  abortive.  Zama  made  it  completely 
successful,  but  no  ships  of  Scipio  or  of  anybody  else 
contributed  to  the  victory  of  Zama. 

We  may  note,  then,  two  salient  facts  in  these  Punic 
Wars. 

In  the  first,  Eome,  having  Sea  Power,  invaded 
Africa  and  met  disaster. 

In  the  second  she  had  probably  not  got  the  Sea 
Power.  She  invaded  and  succeeded  completely. 

In  the  first  war  the  defeat  of  the  Carthaginian 
fleet  and  the  consequent  isolation  of  Lilybaeum  and 
Drepanum,  may  be  cited  as  an  instance  of  Sea  Power 
and  its  effects :  but  even  here  it  is  well  to  remember 
that  the  Carthaginian  ships  were  cumbered  with  stores 
and  apparently  not  expecting  attack.  That,  however, 
is  somewhat  of  a  side  issue :  Home  had  the  ships  to 
win  with  and  she  won. 


THE   SECOND  PUNIC  WAR  71 

In  the  second  war  Sea  Power,  despite  Captain 
Mahan's  classical  instance,  surely  had  no  part ;  and 
such  sea  advantage  as  there  was  lay  with  the  side  that 
was  defeated  by  over-sea  operations.  Unpalatable  as 
the  fact  may  be  to  the  due  recognition  of  pretty 
theories,  should  it  not  be  frankly  recognised  ?  It  may 
not  be  well  to  deduce  therefrom  that  Sea  Power  theories 
are  '  merely  theories ' ;  yet  it  is  surely  fair  to  deduce 
from  these  wars  that  neither  numbers  of  ships  nor 
ability  to  handle  them  can  alone  confer  victory.  The 
real  secret  of  success  must  be  sought  in  other  and 
more  intangible  things — things  that  can  only  be 
vaguely  classed  under  the  general  heading  of  '  Fitness 
to  win.'  This  fitness  is  neither  ships  nor  skill  at 
handling  them,  neither  great  leaders  nor  willing 
obedience,  but  the  sum  of  the  sentiment  of  each 
individual  combatant. 


IV 

ACTIUM  AND   LEPANTO 

THE  battle  of  Actium  was  one  of  the  decisive  battles 
of  the  world.  Since  it  was  a  naval  fight,  it  is  always 
thought  of  as  an  instance  of  the  use  of  Sea  Power. 
The  water  was  between  the  rival  claimants  for  the 
empire  of  the  world;  and  they  met  in  conflict  upon 
the  water.  But  that  the  fight  was  a  sea  one  depended 
primarily  on  the  fact  that  both  Antony  and  Octavianus 
had  elected  to  move  by  water  against  the  other — just 
as  in  the  second  Punic  War  both  sides  chose  to  decide 
the  issues  on  land. 

The  fleet  of  Antony  was  by  far  the  larger,  not  only 
in  numbers  but  also  in  its  individual  units.  Its 
efficiency  was  poor  :  the  fidelity  of  many  crews  doubt- 
ful and  Antony  its  leader  more  interested  in  Cleopatra 
than  in  war.  The  fleet  of  Octavianus  on  the  other 
hand,  though  its  units  were  smaller  vessels,  was  under 
a  competent  leader,  Agrippa,  the  men  were  all  well 
disciplined  and  each  man  sure  of  his  companion. 

In  Antony's  fleet  dissatisfaction  was  so  great  that 
a  retreat  to  Egypt  was  contemplated,  and  only  because 
of  a  gale  was  it  not  put  into  execution.  Cleopatra 


ACTIUM  AND  LEPANTO  73 

wished  to  go,  and  in  the  heat  of  the  action  she  fled 
with  sixty  ships.  The  love-sick  Antony  followed  her  in 
a  light  galley  leaving  his  large  vessels  to  fight  as  best 
they  could.  Even  so  the  issue  was  long  in  doubt,  the 
smaller  ships  of  Agrippa  made  little  impression  on 
their  monstrous  antagonists  and  not  till  fire-ships  were 
employed  was  much  effect  secured.  Towards  nightfall, 
however,  the  entire  fleet  was  captured  or  destroyed. 

Of  this  fight  the  lessons  are  obvious  enough  in 
some  ways.  There  are  some  details  not  so  obvious: 
for  instance  the  exact  influence  that  Cleopatra's  flight 
had  upon  the  issue.  The  accepted  story  is  that  she 
fled  about  noon ;  and  that  her  defection,  followed  by 
Antony's,  led  to  the  subsequent  defeat,  which  else  had 
not  been.  Every  defeat  in  history  has  some  plausible 
reason  to  account  for  it,  and  Cleopatra's  flight  was  the 
most  satisfactory  explanation  to  the  vanquished. 

There  is,  however,  nothing  unreasonable  in  the 
supposition  that  her  flight  may  equally  well  have  been 
the  result  instead  of  the  cause  ;  and  that  by  noon  the 
larger  fleet  was  in  such  confusion  that  the  final  issue 
was  no  longer  in  doubt  to  the  technical  eye.  Thus 
regarded,  Actium  stands  out  as  a  battle  in  which  per- 
sonnel shows  markedly  superior  to  mere  materiel. 
Yet,  in  so  far  as  Sea  Power  could  be  reckoned  as  a 
tangible  thing  it  belonged  to  Antony  with  his  large 
fleet  of  almost  unassailable  warships.  His  were  the 
big  battleships  of  the  period  ;  the  ships  of  Octavianus 
were  but  the  equivalent  of  cruisers  at  the  best.  Can 


74  HEEESIES  OF   SEA  POWEE 

one  base  on  this  a  theory  that  cruisers  well  handled 
are  sufficient  to  meet  battleships  ?  Scarcely :  since 
the  difference  in  personnel  was  so  marked.  Yet  at  the 
battle  of  Yalu  in  the  Chino-Japanese  War  the  condi- 
tions were  in  many  ways  not  dissimilar,  cruisers  fought 
comparatively  successfully  with  a  fleet  containing  two 
(relatively)  monster  battleships.  On  the  battleship 
side  there  was  no  leader — for  Ting  was  out  of  action 
through  the  concussion  of  the  first  gun  fired.  At  least 
one  Chinese  ship  fled  ;  whatever  the  moral  effect  of 
such  an  incident  may  be  worth,  it  was  present.  Of 
course,  Yalu  was  a  trifling  affair  compared  to  Actium, 
the  issues  being  narrower;  still  the  comparison  is 
profitable,  the  teachings  of  history  being  worth  little 
except  when  applied  to  some  modern  conditions  to 
enable  us  to  seek  for  eternal  principles — if  they  are  to 
be  found.1  And  what  do  we  find?  That  the  fittest 
to  win  were  victors  despite  the  inferior  materiel  with 
which  they  were  handicapped.  All  other  details  and 
conditions  are  mere  embroidery. 

After  Actium  it  is  natural  that  we  should  consider 
Lepanto.  Here  after  an  interval  of  hundreds  of  years 
the  issue  was  fought  on  very  much  the  same  spot,  and 
the  territories  involved  were  much  the  same.  The 
Christians,  like  Antony,  trusted  in  monster  ships,  six 
mastodons  being  in  the  fore  front  of  the  fight.  The 
Turks  had  the  smaller  and  handier  vessels  and  the 
Turks  were  hopelessly  defeated. 

1  See  Chapter  on  '  Eternal  Principles.' 


ACTIUM  AND  LEPANTO  75 

What  again  does  history  teach  save  the  victory  of 
the  fittest  to  win  ?  Antony's  mastodons  and  the  Vene- 
tian mastodons  at  Lepanto  were  relatively  the  same 
thing, — they  embodied  the  same  reliance  upon  the 
practically  invulnerable. 

If  we  examine  Actium,  we  find  Antony's  big  ships 
proving  as  invulnerable  as  ever  the  Venetian  galleons 
at  Lepanto.  They  ceased  to  be  invulnerable  only  when 
the  ships  of  Octavianus  began  to  ram  so  as  to  disable 
the  steering  gear  and  then  brought  fire  to  their  aid — that 
is  to  say  just  so  soon  as  the  superior  fitness  to  win  of 
the  crews  enabled  them  to  devise  a  means  of  over- 
coming the  barriers  between  them  and  success. 

Speculatively,  we  may  apply  this  reasoning  to  the 
Busso-Japanese  War  and  the  destruction  of  the  Baltic 
Fleet.  Suppose  the  rival  sides  to  have  changed  ships, 
and  Togo  and  his  men  to  have  been  caught  on  board 
the  Eussian  ships  in  the  formation  in  which  Koges- 
tvensky  was  caught.  Can  anyone  doubt  that  the  Kus- 
sian  squadron  manned  by  Japanese  would  not  easily 
have  extricated  itself,  and  easily  annihilated  the  enemy 
in  detail  ?  Yet,  since  things  were  the  other  way  about 
the  tactics  of  Togo  will  go  down  to  history  as  the  ex- 
cellent thing  to  be  studied  and  imitated,  and  the  tactics 
of  Kogestvensky  as  the  hall-mark  of  the  maximum  of 
badness. 

Again  :  suppose  Nelson  and  his  men  to  have  changed 
ships  with  the  Allies  at  Trafalgar.  Is  there  any  reason- 
able doubt  that  British  ships  would  have  been  aught 


76  HEEESIES  OF   SEA  POWEE 

but  annihilated,  and  then  history  would  have  been  full 
of  the  feeble  tactical  intelligence  displayed  by  Villeneuve 
in  giving  victory  to  his  enemy  by  his  crass  folly  in 
attacking  an  immense  line  of  guns  by  impinging  on 
them  single  ships  barely  able  to  reply  on  account  of 
their  feeble  bow-fire ! 

Such  the  main  consideration  that  any  comparative 
study  of  the  battles  of  Actium  and  Lepanto  must  sug- 
gest ;  and  yet,  just  because  each  has  been  regarded 
separately  and  on  its  own  merits  it  is  the  one  suggestion 
that  has  never  been  put  forward.  Either  battle  gives 
the  lie  to  the  other  in  all  deduction  as  to  materiel,  but 
both  combine  to  indicate  the  supreme  importance  of 
Fitness  to  Win,  and  show  how  trifling  are  all  other 
things  beside  it. 


V 

THE   SPANISH   AKMADA 

THE  incident  of  the  Spanish  Armada  falls  somewhat 
into  line  with  the  Athenian  expedition  to  Syracuse, 
with  the  invasions  of  Africa  in  the  Punic  Wars  con- 
ducted by  Eegulus  and  Scipio,  the  invasion  of  the 
Crimea  in  1854,  and — though  to  a  limited  extent — with 
the  effort  of  the  Baltic  Fleet  in  the  Kusso-Japanese 
War. 

Conditions  and  details  naturally  vary — thus  the 
Baltic  Fleet  carried  no  military  force ;  but  in  each 
case  there  was  the  same  underlying  principle;  the 
aggressors  advanced  trusting  in  a  naval  superiority. 
Some  of  the  instances  mentioned  have  been  used  to 
illustrate  the  doctrine  that  invasion  is  impossible  in 
face  of  an  unbeaten  fleet,  but  success  or  failure  would 
seem  to  have  rested  more  upon  the  actual  power  of  the 
aggressors  as  opposed  to  their  presumed  power.  The 
Spanish  Armada,  had  it  possessed  the  superiority  that 
its  sender  believed  it  to  possess,  need  not  necessarily 
have  failed  because  English  ships  held  the  narrow 
seas.  Its  cardinal  error  lay  rather  in  Philip's  inability 


78  HEKESIES   OF   SEA  POWEE 

to  realise  the  magnitude  of  his  task,  and  his  neglect  to 
provide  the  power  necessary  to  accomplish  it. 

The  invasion  of  England  was  at  the  time  of  the 
Armada  a  classical  idea  in  Spain.  First  mooted  by  the 
Duke  of  Alva  in  1569,  it  was  revived  by  the  Marquis  of 
Santa  Cruz  in  1583  after  the  battle  of  Tercera.  Some 
ships  which  ran  away  in  this  action  were  believed  to 
have  been  English,  and  the  impression  was  general 
that  the  English,  whether  on  land  or  sea,  were  easily 
to  be  defeated  by  a  firm  front. 

When  the  Armada  idea  first  completely  materialised 
in  1586  Santa  Cruz  had  formed  very  complete  plans 
which  allowed  of  the  employment  of  556  ships  and  a 
total  of  94,222  men.1  Whether  this  force  would  have 
succeeded  need  not  here  be  discussed,  because  Philip 
did  not  put  the  plan  into  operation.  The  plan  actually 
adopted,  though  extensive,  was  on  a  considerably 
smaller  scale.  In  brief,  Santa  Cruz  was  to  take  into 
the  Channel  a  fleet  sufficient  to  destroy  the  English 
fleet,  and  under  cover  of  this  Parma  was  to  transport 
the  Spanish  army  in  the  Netherlands  to  England  in 
flat-bottomed  boats.  Substantially  the  scheme  was 
not  very  different  from  that  of  Napoleon  at  a  later  era, 
nor  did  it  differ  so  very  materially  from  the  successful 
invasion  of  William  the  Conqueror  in  1066.  In  each 
case  naval  superiority  in  English  waters  was  under- 
stood to  be  a  necessity  to  success. 

The  invasion  was  delayed  by  the  operations  of 
1  La  Armada  Invincible,  Duro. 


BAY 

O  F 
B  1  S    C  A    Y 


MAP 

to  illustrate 
THE  COURSE  OF  THE 

SPANISH  ARMADA 


80  HEKESIES   OF   SEA  POWEK 

Drake,  who  destroyed  many  Spanish  ships  while  they 
were  yet  unequipped,  and  early  in  1588  Santa  Cruz 
died.  Medina  Sidonia  was  appointed  in  his  stead, 
despite  his  protestations  of  lack  of  the  necessary  ex- 
perience. 

He  sailed  at  the  end  of  May  with  130  ships  and  a 
total  of  30,493  men,  a  force  far  inferior  to  the  original 
Santa  Cruz  estimate,  though,  so  far  as  soldiers  were 
concerned,  troops  from  the  Netherlands  were  destined 
to  bring  it  up  to  something  like  the  Santa  Cruz  figure. 
The  lessened  number  of  troops  to  be  transported  from 
Spain  reduced  the  number  of  ships,  for  the  original 
estimate  embodies  150  '  great  ships  of  war ' l  besides 
many  lesser  warships,  whereas  the  whole  total  of 
Medina  Sidonia' s  force  was  only  about  130  ships  of  all 
sorts,  and  of  these  several  came  to  grief  on  the  way. 
Professor  Laughton  estimates  the  outside  numbers 
that  reached  the  Channel  as  under  120  ships  and 
24,000  men.  Of  these  not  more  than  sixty-two  were 
fighting  ships,  several  of  which  were  but  very  lightly 
armed.  The  Annunciada,  for  instance,  carried  but 
three  18-pounders  and  three  9-pounders  in  the  way  of 
medium-sized  guns,  and  several  others  were  pro- 
portionately feeble.2  The  same  authority  places  the 
English  fleet  at  forty-nine  vessels,  a  few  of  them  quite 
as  large  as  the  Spaniards  in  tonnage,  though  of  less 
freeboard.  The  English  ships  carried  many  more 
heavy  guns  than  the  Spaniards  as  a  rule,  had  altogether 

1  Duro.  2  Laughton. 


8 


SHIP    OF    THE    SPANISH    ARMADA. 


SHIP    OF    WILLIAM    THE    CONQUEROR.        (See  p.  282). 


THE   SPANISH  AEMADA  81 

better  gunners,  and  (an  important  point)  ports  that 
admitted  of  far  better  training  of  the  guns.  The 
English  were  also  altogether  better  seamen,  and  their 
ships  infinitely  more  handy,  so  that,  despite  the 
numerical  inferiority  of  the  English,  the  Spaniards 
never  had  that  certain  naval  superiority  which  was  a 
cardinal  feature  both  of  Santa  Cruz's  first  plan  and 
of  the  modified  plan  finally  adopted.  The  Spaniards, 
indeed,  had  nothing  in  their  favour  except  bulk  and  the 
prestige  of  Spain.  There  is  no  reason  to  believe  that 
this  prestige  had  the  slightest  effect  upon  the  18,000  men 
odd  who  manned  the  English  fleet,  whatever  opinions 
may  have  obtained  on  shore.  Drake  and  his  fellows 
were  well  used  to  conflicts  with  the  Spaniards. 

The  Spanish  fleet,  though  it  carried  a  very  inade- 
quate supply  of  ammunition  and  stores,  was  not 
altogether  so  ill  prepared  as  its  fate  might  suggest. 
Medina  Sidonia's  instructions  specially  referred  to 
the  English  superiority  in  guns  and  gunnery  and 
directed  him  to  engage  at  close  quarters.1  In  this 
way  the  high  poops  and  forecastles  could  be  used  to 
deliver  a  deadly  small-arm  fire  upon  the  English  decks, 
and  upon  this  the  Spaniards  seem  to  have  relied,  as  in 
the  first  action  on  Sunday,  June  21,  all  their  efforts 
were  directed  to  a  vain  attempt  to  close. 

1  Duro.  ...  It  is  of  interest  to  note  here  that  Kogestvensky  appears 
to  have  received  '  special  instructions  '  with  a  view  to  neutralising 
Japan's  salient  known  superiorities.  '  Keep  everything  together  '  seems 
to  have  been  the  one  great  maxim  (perhaps  the  only  one)  of  the  Baltic 
Armada. 

G 


82  HEKESIES  OF   SEA  POWER 

But  if  the  Spaniards  failed  in  this,  their  bulk  saved 
them  from  any  very  serious  loss,  and  when  the  Armada 
reached  Calais  on  the  27th  it  had  only  lost  three  large 
ships. 

At  Calais  communication  was  opened  with  Parma, 
who,  however,  was  unable  to  co-operate,  since  his  flat- 
bottomed  craft  were  all  blockaded  at  Dunkirk  and 
Newport  by  the  Dutch.  This  fact  rendered  the  in- 
vasion of  England  impossible ;  as  the  Spaniards  could 
in  no  way  raise  the  blockade  in  face  of  the  English 
fleet  without  first  beating  that  fleet. 

The  next  night  fireships  were  sent  into  the  Spanish 
fleet  and  on  the  following  morning,  June  29  the 
battle  of  Gravelines  was  fought.  It  lasted  from  nine 
till  six  at  night,  at  which  time  the  Armada  mauled 
and  shattered  bore  away  to  the  northwards,  pursued 
by  the  victorious  English.  Its  exact  loss  of  ships  in 
the  battle  was  not,  however,  very  great — only  some 
seven  ships  being  actually  destroyed.  The  remainder, 
unable  to  return  by  the  Straits  of  Dover  essayed  a 
course  home  by  the  north  of  Scotland,  where  the 
majority  of  them  perished  by  wreck  and  storm. 

Stripped  of  its  romance,  the  failure  of  the  Armada 
is  no  conclusive  proof  that  its  conception  was  a  great 
strategical  error.  Had  it  been  on  the  lines  first  con- 
ceived by  Santa  Cruz,  carrying  all  the  necessary 
soldiers  instead  of  having  to  go  to  the  Netherlands  for 
them,  it  is  difficult  to  prove  from  the  results  of  the 
early  fights  in  the  Channel,  that  it  could  not  have 


THE   SPANISH   AKMADA  83 

occupied  the  Isle  of  Wight  or  effected  a  landing  at  a 
dozen  other  spots  upon  the  south  coast  of  England. 
From  what  we  know  of  Santa  Cruz  there  is  no  reason 
to  believe  that  he  would  have  attempted  to  use  it  so 
ill-found  as  it  actually  was ;  and  had  it  been  less  ill- 
found,  had  it  not  run  out  of  ammunition,  had  it  been 
properly  handled,  the  English  plight  would  have  been 
undoubtedly  serious.  Its  own  utter  failure  is  proof 
that  it  failed ;  but  it  is  less  clear  that  it  proves  invasion 
in  face  of  a  fleet  to  have  been  impossible  in  the  six- 
teenth century  when  invaders  lived  upon  the  country 
invaded  in  ways  impossible  to-day.  Scipio  Africanus 
invaded  Africa  and  reduced  Carthage  to  sue  for  peace 
in  face  of  a  defending  fleet  which  once  at  least  attacked 
him  with  some  success.  Coming  to  more  recent 
events  the  Allies  invaded  the  Crimea  in  face  of  a  fleet 
which,  had  it  only  acted  as  the  English  acted  against 
the  Armada,  might  or  might  not  have  reproduced  the 
Elizabethan  tragedy.  It  made  no  attempt  to  do  so 
— Kussian  imagination  being  overwhelmed  by  the 
magnitude  of  the  oversea  expedition  of  the  Allies,  or 
else,  as  has  been  suggested  elsewhere  in  this  book, 
because  the  Eussians  elected  to  fight  the  issue  on  land. 
In  any  case,  an  oversea  operation  bearing  a  remarkable 
likeness  to  the  Spanish  Armada  in  its  general  concep- 
tion— that  is  to  say,  attack  by  a  very  powerful  naval 
force  without  any  previous  attempt  to  secure  the 
command  of  the  sea,  was  undertaken  and  succeeded. 
The  conception  involved  in  the  move  of  the  Baltic 

G   2 


84  HEKESIES   OF   SEA  POWEK 

Fleet  to  the  Far  East  in  the  war  of  1904-5  was  very 
like  that  of  the  Spanish  Armada  as  it  actually  occurred. 
The  Kussian  fleet  was  numerically  very  powerful. 
Unlike  the  Spanish  Armada  it  had  no  transports  with 
it,  hut  its  many  store-ships  formed  something  of  an 
equivalent. 

It  had  more  conceptions  as  to  the  orthodox  theory 
of  Sea  Power  than  had  the  Spaniards :  that  is  to  say  its 
definite  object l  was  to  defeat  the  Japanese  fleet,  cut  off 
the  invading  army  in  Manchuria  and  so  reduce  it  to 
defeat  or  surrender  from  lack  of  supplies,  and  then  at 
some  future  date  convey  an  invading  army  of  Kussians 
to  Japan.  In  this  last,  its  objective  was  very  similar 
to  Medina  Sidonia's — an  army  was  to  be  picked  up 
near  the  scene  of  conflict,  and  a  defending  fleet  existed 
— conditions  which  have  obtained  in  countless  wars, 
in  fact  in  every  war  in  which  both  sides  have  had  ships 
and  either  has  attempted  oversea  operations. 

The  end  of  the  Baltic  Fleet  was  destruction,  more 
complete  and  absolute  than  that  of  the  Spanish  Armada, 
but  in  both  cases  the  most  obvious  cause  of  destruction 
was  that  the  force  employed  was  insufficient  for  the 
particular  task  before  it.  Had  Eogestvensky  been  a 
Scipio  Africanus,  had  the  Japanese  fleet  been  no  more 

1  Presumably  its  object — Admiral  Nebogatoff  (Fighting  Ships,  1906) 
proves  clearly  that  had  evasion  been  desired  there  was  nothing  to 
prevent  the  La  Pe"rouse  passage  being  selected;  whence  it  is  to  be 
inferred  that  Eogestvensky  selected  the  Tsushima  passage  with  a  view 
to  fighting  there.  Nebogatoff  proves  quite  clearly  that  the  idea  that 
coal  scarcity  compelled  Tsushima  is  purely  fanciful, 


THE   SPANISH  AEMADA  85 

enterprising  than  the  Eussian  ships  in  the  Crimean 
War  success  was  quite  possible — in  the  light  of  these 
parallels  nothing  was  wanting  save  fitness  to  win. 

With  sufficient  fitness  to  win,  that  is  to  say  with 
crews  individually  superior  to  the  Japanese,  Eoges- 
tvensky  would  have  won  with  the  ships  at  his  disposal, 
and  Medina  Sidonia,  had  he  and  his  men  been  all  that 
they  were  not,  would  also  have  won  in  all  probability. 
The  causes  of  defeat  surely  lay  elsewhere  than  in  the 
ships  or  strategies  :  or  how  shall  we  explain  the  success 
of  Scipio  Africanus's  armada  against  greater  odds? 
In  all  the  history  of  such  failures  is  written  the  way 
that  might  have  led  to  success,  or  rather  the  things 
without  which  success  is  impossible.  It  is  a  platitude 
to  say  that  the  Spanish  Armada  would  have  succeeded 
had  it  been  the  fitter  to  win,  but  history  conveys  very 
little  lesson  beyond  that  its  failure  was  due  to  lack  of 
this  fitness.  Whatever  its  relative  inferiority  in  heavy 
guns  cost  the  Spanish  Armada,  its  inability  to  use 
effectively  such  guns  as  it  had,  and  to  secure  sufficient 
ammunition  for  them — both  personnel  matters — cost  it 
a  great  deal  more.  Whatever  Spanish  ships  lost  from 
being  unable  to  close  with  the  English,  technical 
inability  to  manoeuvre  to  do  so — a  personnel  thing  again 
—cost  still  more.  In  the  Great  War  with  France 
slower  English  ships  time  and  time  again  brought 
swifter  and  handier  Frenchmen  to  battle ;  and  Drake's 
men  in  the  Spanish  ships  fighting  Sidonia's  in  the 
English  ones  would  in  all  probability  have  succeeded 


86  HEEESIES   OF   SEA  POWEK 

in  compelling  close  quarters  by  virtue  of  fitness  to  win. 
Indeed,  the  probabilities  are  that  they  would  have 
destroyed  the  English  fleet  far  more  effectually  than 
they  destroyed  the  Spanish.  If  this  be  admitted  (and 
to  avoid  admitting  it  is  difficult)  how  can  we  trace  the 
defeat  of  the  Spanish  Armada  to  anything  having  to 
do  with  ships  or  strategies  or  any  of  that  ignoring  of 
these  '  principles  of  war '  of  which  it  is  always  made 
an  object  lesson  ? 


VI 

THE   RUSSO-JAPANESE   WAR 

WHEN  the  war  began  the  two  active  fleets  were,  on 
paper,  not  unequally  matched,  while  in  the  matter  of 
reserves  the  advantage  lay  entirely  with  Russia.  The 
Japanese  fleet  consisted  of  four  first-class  and  two 
second-class  battleships,  six  armoured  cruisers,  one  old 
battleship,  and  a  number  of  small  protected  cruisers 
eminently  suited  for  minor  operations.  There  was  also 
a  very  considerable  torpedo  division.  At  sea,  en  route 
for  Japan,  were  two  armoured  cruisers,  (Nisshin  and 
Kasuga,)  which  had  been  purchased  just  before  war  was 
declared.  A  few  small  craft  were  in  hand  in  Japanese 
dockyards,  but  nothing  was  building  there  likely  to 
affect  the  war.  The  entire  existing  fleet  was  in  com- 
mission, well  trained  and  ready  for  war,  and  the  whole 
was  under  the  command  of  Admiral  Togo,  who,  as 
captain  of  the  Naniwa,  had  earned  laurels  in  the  war 
with  China  ten  years  before.1 

The  Russian  Pacific  fleet  consisted  of  two  first- 
class  and  five  second-class  battleships,  two  armoured 

1  See  chapter  on  International  Law. 


88  HERESIES   OF   SEA   POWER 

cruisers,  two  belted  cruisers — of  which  one,  the  Rurik, 
was  obsolete, — a  few  protected  cruisers  individually 
more  powerful  than  the  corresponding  Japanese 
vessels,  but  numerically  fewer,  and  a  torpedo  force 
considerably  inferior  numerically  to  the  Japanese  one. 
There  were  also  at  least  one  submarine  and  some  gun- 
boats. This  force  was  divided,  in  that  four  cruisers  were 
at  Vladivostok  and  one  with  a  gunboat  at  Chemulpo — 
a  condition  necessitated,  so  far  as  the  Vladivostok 
division  was  concerned,  by  the  smallness  of  Port  Arthur 
harbour.  The  fleet  was  under  the  general  command  of 
Admiral  Alexieff,  with  Admiral  Stark  as  commander-in- 
chief  at  Port  Arthur.  At  sea,  on  the  way  out,  was  a 
reinforcement  under  Admiral  Virenius,  consisting  of 
one  second-class  battleship,  one  protected  cruiser, 
some  details  and  some  destroyers.  Owing  to  trouble 
with  the  destroyers  this  squadron  never  got  beyond 
the  Red  Sea.  At  home,  building  or  completing,  were 
five  first-class  battleships  and  some  destroyers.  There 
were  also  two  old  battleships,  several  obsolete  belted 
cruisers,  and  three  modern  fast  protected  cruisers. 
Russia,  then,  had  a  force  that  on  paper  was  one  fleet 
on  the  scene  slightly  inferior  to  the  Japanese  and 
another  fleet  slightly  inferior  at  home.  In  the  matter 
of  bases  Japan  was  most  adequately  provided  for, 
while  Russia  had  at  Port  Arthur  and  Vladivostok  only 
two  second-class  dockyards,  though  directly  war  was 
declared  she  sent  to  the  former  the  pick  of  her 
mechanics. 


THE   KUSSO-JAPANESE*  WAB  89 

Japan's  first  move  was,  in  appearance  at  any  rate, 
a  defiance  of  the  Mahan  principles  of  Sea  Power, 
because  in  the  face  of  an  almost  equal  hostile  fleet  she 


MAP 
to  illustrate 

RUSSO-JAPANESE 
WAR 


embarked  an  army  in  transports  and  sent  this  force 
with  a  small  escort  to  Chemulpo.  Here  a  Kussian 
cruiser  was  encountered,  and  blown  up  by  her  captain 
after  a  short  action  that  was  not  particularly  creditable 


90  HEEESIES  OF   SEA  POWEE 

to  either  side.  Had  Captain  Roudineff,  of  the  Variag, 
been  a  man  of  genius  there  is  little  doubt  but  that,  in 
view  of  the  lack  of  caution  displayed  by  the  Japanese 
Admiral  Uryu  in  his  attack,  he  might  have  accom- 
plished something.  As  it  was,  he  seems  never  to  have 
attempted  anything  serious. 

Before  this  event  occurred  Admiral  Togo  had  acted 
elsewhere.  On  the  night  of  February  8-9th,  he  sent 
his  destroyers  to  attack  the  Russian  fleet  lying  outside 
Port  Arthur,  a  dangerous  place  to  lie  in,  but  necessi- 
tated by  the  fact  that  the  Port  Arthur  entrance  was 
so  small  and  the  fleet  so  inefficient  that  it  had  to  collect 
outside  because  it  could  not  emerge  on  a  single  tide. 
War  had  been  officially  declared  about  six  o'clock  on 
the  evening  of  the  8th,  but  this  information  was  (so 
it  is  said)  suppressed  by  Admiral  Alexieff,  and  many 
Russian  officers  were  on  shore.  Only  one  Russian 
ship,  the  cruiser  Bay  an,  appears  to  have  been  in  any 
way  prepared  for  war. 

Owing  to  mishaps  incidental  to  torpedo  attacks, 
only  one  division  of  Japanese  destroyers  delivered  an 
attack.  Two  first-class  battleships  and  one  cruiser 
were  hit,  and  the  surprise  was  so  complete  that  the 
Russians  never  even  fired  till  the  Japanese  boats  were 
gone.  It  now  seems  established  that  the  surprise  was 
effected  through  the  Japanese  destroyers  being  taken 
for  Russian  boats — Russian  signals  being  imitated,  a 
perfectly  legitimate  war  ruse  concerning  which  the 
Russians  subsequently  protested  very  unreasonably. 


T00:  SHAN    22 
Torpedo  Boat  Canal 


PORT    ARTHUR,    DIVIDED    INTO    SQUARES    OF    ONE    SEA    MILE. 


THE   RUSSO-JAPANESE  WAR  91 

On  the  following  morning  Togo's  main  fleet  appeared, 
and  a  desultory  battle,  chiefly  remarkable  for  the  bad 
shooting  on  both  sides,  followed.  The  Russians  were 
supported  by  their  land  batteries,  and  it  appears  that 
such  slight  advantage  as  there  was  rested  with  them. 
The  Iwate  was  very  badly  hit,  and  so  were  one  or  two 
battleships,  chiefly  from  the  fire  of  the  forts.  The 
Russian  cruiser  Novik  got  within  torpedo  range  of 
Togo's  flagship,  the  Mikasa,  and  missed  her  only  by 
extraordinary  bad  luck  for  Russia  or  good  luck  for 
Japan.  Most  of  the  damage  by  ship  fire  was  inflicted 
by  the  Bayan,  and  practically  Captains  Wiren  and  Von 
Essen  of  the  Bayan  and  Novik  fought  the  battle.  As, 
counting  the  shore  defences,  Russia  had  the  advantage 
on  her  side,  her  fleet,  had  it  been  properly  handled, 
ought  to  have  done  far  more  than  it  did. 

After  this  engagement  nothing  of  any  great  im- 
portance happened  for  some  while.  The  Japanese 
expended  many  old  merchant  ships  and  many  valuable 
lives  in  futile  attempts  to  block  the  Russian  fleet  inside 
Port  Arthur.  These  operations  were  conducted  with 
fanatical  bravery,  but  were,  it  is  now  known,  complete 
failures  in  every  case.  As  an  instance  of  the  bravery 
exhibited,  it  may  be  mentioned  that  it  was  quite  a 
common  thing  during  these  incidents  for  half-a-dozen 
Japanese,  unable  to  escape  to  seaward,  to  try  to  carry 
some  Russian  ship  or  fort  by  boarding l  or  rushing. 

1  Three  Japanese  so  attempted  to  capture  the  *  Retvizan '  on  one 
occasion. 


92  HEEESIES   OF   SEA  POWEK 

Meanwhile,  Admiral  Stark  had  been  replaced  by 
Admiral  Makaroff,  an  officer,  who,  in  early  life,  had 
earned  considerable  renown  for  torpedo  exploits  in  the 
war  with  Turkey.  His  first  task  was  the  Herculean 
one  of  attempting  to  organise  his  fleet ;  his  plan  being 
to  skirmish  till  all  ships  were  repaired  and  then  fight 
a  big  action.1  The  Eussian  destroyers  at  this  time 
made  many  attempts  to  find  Togo's  fleet,  but  Togo 
was  far  too  good  an  admiral  thus  to  be  caught.  All 
the  attempts  were  failures,  and  but  for  the  cover 
afforded  by  the  Bayan,  most  or  all  of  the  Russian 
torpedo  craft  would  have  been  cut  off  by  Togo's  light 
craft  acting  inshore.  In  one  of  these  affairs,  the 
Japanese  battle  fleet  suddenly  appeared,  attempting 
to  cut  off  four  cruisers,  but,  curiously  enough,  sustained 
more  losses  than  it  inflicted.2  In  April  the  Bayan 
was  all  but  cut  off  again,  and  Makaroff,  coming  out  to 
the  rescue  with  the  battle  fleet,  was  very  nearly  inter- 
cepted by  Togo.  Retreating,  his  flagship  Petro- 
pavlosk  ran  on  to  a  mine,  and  the  admiral,  with  almost 
all  his  crew,  perished.  Another  battleship  was  also 
damaged. 

Within  a  month  Russia  recouped  herself  from  this 
reverse.  In  one  day,  the  Japanese  lost  the  battleships 

1  '  A  Voice  from  the  Russian  Navy,'  Fighting  Ships,  1906. 

2  The  damage  was.of  course,  trifling  on  either  side  ;  but  the  inciden  t 
suggests  that  fast  cruisers  are  more  able  to  run  the  gauntlet  of  battle- 
ship fire  than  has  sometimes  been  supposed.    The  use  of  battleships 
for  attempt  to  cut  off  enemies  is  interesting . 


THE   EUSSO-JAPANESE  WAK  93 

Hatsuse  and  Yashima,1  and  the  cruiser  Yoshino  was 
also  sunk.  The  incident  is  remarkable  for  the  skill 
and  patriotism  with  which  the  Japanese  concealed 
much  of  the  disaster,  and  for  the  crass  inability  of  the 
Eussians  to  follow  up  their  advantage.  Victory  was 
then  within  their  reach,  or,  at  least,  nearer  than  at  any 
time  before  or  since.  At  one  blow  the  Japanese  had 
lost  one-third  of  their  battle  fleet,  whereas  the  Eussian 
definite  loss  stood  at  one- seventh  of  the  battle  fleet 
only.  Nothing,  however,  was  attempted  until  the 
Japanese  had  been  given  time  to  adapt  themselves  to 
the  changed  conditions.  Not  till  July  did  the  Eussians 
make  a  feeble  sortie.  They  met,  and  repelled  without 
loss  to  themselves  a  vigorous  torpedo  attack;  then 
returned  ingloriously  to  harbour.  Meanwhile,  the 
ships  at  Vladivostok  had  attempted  a  guerre  de  course. 
Fishing-boats  and  other  small  fry  were  equally  accept- 
able to  them  as  more  important  ships,  and  they  accom- 
plished nothing  of  moment  beyond  compelling  Togo 
to  detach  four  armoured  cruisers  to  deal  with  them 
(which  however  was  a  distinct  result).  They  were 
eventually  defeated  off  Tsushima  on  August  11.  At 
Port  Arthur,  the  Bay  an  ran  on  a  mine  and  was 
totally  disabled.  The  rest  of  the  fleet  under  Admiral 
Witgeft  went  out  on  August  10  with  orders  to  go  to 

1  On  this  day  or  about  this  time  the  Mikasa  hit  a  mine  which  did 
not  explode,  and  another  mine  actually  exploded  against  the  Asahi 
without,  however,  inflicting  any  injury  worth  mention. 


94  HEEESIES  OF   SEA  POWEK 

Vladivostok — where,  it  may  be  suggested,  they  should 
have  been  all  along.  The  fleet  had  not  gone  far  when 
Togo  appeared  and  the  battle  of  Kound  Island  took 
place.  The  ships  engaged  were  : — 

Japanese  Russian 

1st  class  battleships 3  2 

2nd    „  „  ......        1  4 

3rd     „  „ 1  0 

Armoured  cruisers 4  0 

Both  sides  had  some  light  craft  and  torpedo  vessels 
with  them.  The  proportions  in  line  of  battle  in  fighting 
value  were,  reducing  all  ships  to  the  value  of  first-class 
battleships,  approximately  as  6*6  Japanese  to  5*2 
Russian,  but  as  many  of  the  Russian  ships  were  but 
partially  repaired  the  Japanese  superiority  was  really 
greater  in  materiel,  and  it  was,  of  course,  infinitely 
greater  in  personnel.  Japanese  shooting  was  good, 
the  Russian  gunnery  has  been  described  as  '  excellent 
but  unlucky.'  Witgeft  manoeuvred  his  ships  well 
enough,  and  the  first  part  of  the  battle  was  quite  in- 
decisive. About  a  quarter  to  six  Togo,  who  had 
drawn  out  of  range,  closed  in  again.  Witgeft  was 
killed,  and  his  flagship,  injured  but  not  totally  dis- 
abled, crept  away  to  Kiao  Chau.  Togo's  flaghip,  the 
Mikasa,  equally  injured,  kept  the  line.  The  death  of 
the  admiral  threw  the  Russians  into  confusion,  and 
Prince  Ukhtomsky,  the  second  in  command,  ordered  a 
retreat.  The  ships,  except  a  few  that  interned  them- 
selves in  neutral  ports,  crept  back  to  their  base  seriously 
injured,  but  with  the  relatively  small  loss  of  81  killed 


THE   EUSSO-JAPANESE  WAE  95 

and  420  wounded.  The  Japanese  lost  77  killed  and 
148  wounded.  Togo,  attacked  by  the  Russian  destroyers, 
and  compelled  not  to  hazard  his  battleships,  did  not 
pursue,  and  during  the  night  both  fleets  appear  to  have 
steamed  hard  away  from  each  other.1 

Witgeft  dead,  Wiren,  the  former  captain  of  the 
Bayan,  was  made  admiral  of  what  was  left  of  the 
Eussian  fleet.  He  was  the  only  man  among  the 
Eussian  captains  who  had  ever  done  anything  ;  indeed, 
all  the  foreign  attaches  inside  Port  Arthur  speak  of 
him  as  constituting  the  entire  effective  Eussian  force. 
The  rest,  excepting  Captain  Von  Essen,  were  more  or 
less  incompetent,  and  many  of  them  suffered  badly 
from  '  nerves.'  The  Japanese  land  bombardment  made 
it,  however,  impossible  for  Wiren  to  repair  his  ships, 
and  both  men  and  guns  were  taken  for  shore  service  by 
General  Stoessel.  He  lay  inactive,2  therefore,  after 
telegraphing  to  the  Tsar  a  request  for  the  Baltic  Fleet 
to  be  sent  at  once.  In  December  Stoessel  surrendered 
Port  Arthur,  and  for  nine  days  was  a  popular  hero. 
It  was  then  discovered  that  the  fortress  was  well 
supplied  still  and  might  have  continued  to  resist  for 

1  In  this  retreat  the  Mikasa  is  said  to  have  dropped  astern  and  to 
have  been  taken  for  the  Tssesarevitch  by  a  Japanese  destroyer  which 
fired  a  torpedo  at  her.    The  story  has  never  been  officially  admitted, 
but  is  more  probably  true  than  false. 

2  There  seem  to  have  been  some  Russians  anxious  to  go  out,  and 
a  majority  holding  the  view  that  to  remain  inside  in  addition  to  being 
safer  would  better  assist  the  defence  of  the  base.    At  no  time  do  any  of 
them  appear  to  have  realised  that  a  base  when  not  serving  as  a  base  to 
a  military  fleet  has  no  value. 


96  HEEESIES   OF   SEA  POWEE 

months,  and  the  capitulation  must  ever  remain  as  a 
disgrace  to  the  Russian  arms. 

After  the  capture  of  Port  Arthur,  nothing  was  done 
by  the  Japanese  except  to  await  the  arrival  of  the 
Baltic  Fleet  under  Rogestvensky.  The  fleet  merely  lay 
in  Tsushima  Straits.  It  drilled  industriously  for  battle, 
but  it  certainly  did  not  contribute  to  carrying  on  the 
war.  The  Baltic  Fleet  was  badly  officered,  though 
Rogestvensky  himself  was  a  capable  man,  and  accord- 
ing to  his  lights  tried  to  drill  it  into  efficiency.1  No 
one,  however,  seems  to  have  realised  what  war  meant, 
the  genius  of  Togo  and  the  capability  of  his  men  were 
not  at  all  understood.  The  result  was  a  foregone  con- 
clusion— at  the  psychological  moment  it  was  found  that 
the  Russians  could  not  shoot  in  bad  weather,  and  some 
ships  seem  to  have  been  in  a  state  akin  to  mutiny. 
Mostly,  however,  the  Russians  fought  bravely  enough, 
as  they  lay  in  a  muddled  circle  with  the  Japanese 
around  them.  The  affair  was  almost  a  battue,  as  ship 
after  ship  came  up  and  crumbled  away  under  the  well- 
directed  Japanese  fire  and  then  succumbed  to  equally 
well-directed  torpedo  attack.  Four  ships  surrendered. 
The  Japanese  sustained  no  damage  worthy  of  the  name. 
And  so  the  naval  war  ended. 

It  is  the  fashion  to  attribute  Japan's  success  to 
Togo's  genius  and  Japanese  nautical  skill,  but  these 
reasons  are  hardly  the  real  ones.  Togo's  genius, 

1  He  did  much  tube-cannon  practice,  but  big  guns  were  never  once 
fired  all  the  way  out.—'  With  the  Baltic  Fleet.'   Fighting  Ships,  1906. 


THE   RUSSO-JAPANESE  WAK  97 

though  of  a  high  order,  was  nothing  out  of  the  way, 
nor  was  Japanese  efficiency  anything  specially  remark- 
able. The  real  cause  of  victory  lay  rather  in  the 
splendid  patriotism  of  all  ranks,  the  readiness  of  every 
Japanese  to  die  for  his  country.  Every  single  man  in 
the  Japanese  fleet  contributed  his  full  share  to  the 
result.  Of  not  a  single  Kussian — save  perhaps  Cap- 
tain Wiren — can  that  be  said.  Many  Eussians  fought 
bravely  enough,  and  the  story  of  the  Oushakoff 
and  Borodino  at  Tsushima  which,  by  all  accounts, 
went  down  firing  to  the  end,  is  a  story  of  which  any 
nation  might  be  proud ;  but  such  cases  were  rare.  For 
the  lack  of  patriotism  the  Russian  Government  is  to 
be  blamed ;  but  equally,  too,  the  Russian  people.  A 
nation  which  places  its  political  salvation  before  its 
success  in  war,  no  matter  how  justified,  is  bound  to  go 
under  in  conflict  with  a  nation  like  Japan.  Japan  had 
political  malcontents,  but  with  war  each  one  became 
silent.  The  political  situation,  the  fruit  of  corrupt 
government,  made  itself  felt  in  the  Russian  fleet.  A 
Japanese  killed  in  the  war  died  for  the  salvation  of  his 
country,  died  for  something;  but  the  Russians  who 
died,  died  for  nothing.  There  is  no  doubt  that  this 
told  in  battle.  Consequently  the  Russians,  apart  from 
their  natural  deficiencies,  were  handicapped  in  this 
matter  also.  For  the  ignominious  defeat,  the  Russian 
Navy  has  perhaps  been  unduly  blamed.  Free  from 
blame  it  certainly  was  not ;  but  the  contemptible  attitude 
of  the  Russians  as  a  nation  was  to  blame  as  much  or 

H 


98  HEKESIES   OF   SEA  POWEE 

more.  To  everyone  in  Japan  the  war  was  a  thing  of 
life  or  death  :  the  object  of  all  Japanese,  victory.  The 
Russian  nation  contained  an  enormous  number  of 
people  who  more  or  less  openly  avowed  a  desire  for 
defeat  because  thereby  the  political  situation  at  home 
might  be  improved.  The  conditions  which  made  men 
capable  of  holding  such  views,  allowing  the  war  to 
have  been  totally  unjust,  the  conditions  which  per- 
mitted the  expression  of  such  views  whatever  they  may 
have  indicated  ethically,  emphatically  indicated  'un- 
fitness  to  win.'  Never  perhaps  in  history  has  there 
been  so  marked  an  instance  of  a  nation  earning  and 
deserving  defeat. 

We  may  now  proceed  to  examine  in  somewhat 
fuller  detail  certain  of  those  incidents  of  the  war  which 
will  be  valuable  for  all  time.  Of  these  the  invasion  of 
Korea  in  face  of  an  unbeaten  and  nearly  equal  fleet 
especially  demands  attention.  The  situation,  as  has 
elsewhere  been  remarked,  was  in  some  ways  not  very 
dissimilar  to  the  invasion  of  Sicily  by  the  Eomans  in 
face  of  the  existence  of  the  Carthaginian  fleet.1  An 
extremely  important  point  is  that  Eussia,  despite 
political  bluff,  was  obviously  not  anxious  to  go  to  war. 
Carthage  was  in  exactly  that  condition  in  her  first 
conflict  with  Eome.  Owing  to  this  Eome  was  able  to 
invade  Sicily  with  impunity ;  and  so  it  is  perhaps 
wrong  to  accept  her  success  as  bearing  on  the  question 
whether  invasion  in  face  of  a  hostile  fleet  is  possible. 

1  See  Chapter  II. 


THE   RUSSO-JAPANESE  WAE  99 

Japan's  ignoring  of  the  *  cardinal  principle  '  must  also 
be  put  in  the  same  category.  The  official  Russian 
correspondence,  published  just  about  the  time  that 
peace  was  agreed  on,  indicates  this  very  clearly.  For 
by  the  correspondence  before  the  war  it  is  plain  that 
Japan  was  entitled  by  Russian  agreement  to  land  troops 
in  Korea,  and  Chemulpo,  where  a  landing  was  actually 
effected,  was  particularly  specified.  Consequently  an 
invasion  of  Korea  was  not  a  warlike  act  in  itself. 
More,  it  is  clear  that  those  Russians  who  expected  war 
were  anxious  rather  than  otherwise  to  see  the  Japanese 
land,  hoping  this  to  prove  to  their  ultimate  advantage. 
The  Russian  orders  were  not  to  interfere  with  the 
Japanese  unless  they  attempted  operations  against 
northern  Korea :  otherwise  the  Japanese  were  to  be 
allowed  to  commit  the  first  act. 

Exactly  what  Russia  really  intended  will  probably 
never  be  known  with  certainty.  Presumably,  (as  the 
Japanese  undoubtedly  believed,)  the  Russian  plan  was 
to  temporise  and  evade  until  such  time  as  the  Russian 
force  should  be  sufficiently  superior  to  crush  Japan  by 
menace.  However,  this  is  a  point  of  minor  impor- 
tance :  the  essential  fact  is  that  Japan's  preliminary 
invasion  was  not  a  defiance  of  Sea  Power  principles  in 
itself.  It  became  so,  only  with  the  threats  to  the 
Variag  and  the  torpedo  attack  at  Port  Arthur — 
after  which  Japan  felt  herself  strong  enough  to  con- 
tinue invading. 

Her  invading  army  never  seems  to  have  been  in 

H  2 


100  HEKBSIES   OF   SEA  POWEK 

any  serious  danger.  The  Vladivostok  cruisers  now 
and  again  had  a  slight  and  very  temporary  effect  on 
communications  :  but  generally  speaking  it  was  found 
that  the  *  fleet  in  being'  of  Kussia  was  a  negligible 
quantity.  But  the  lessons  to  be  drawn  from  this  are 
rendered  doubtful  by  the  fact  that  Russia  in  the 
Crimean  war  pursued  identical  tactics  in  the  matter  of 
not  using  her  fleet  to  attack  an  oversea  invasion.  We 
know  then,  that  this  was  a  matter  of  definite  policy. 
How  far  a  similar  policy  was  in  force  in  the  war  under 
review  we  cannot  yet  ascertain.  Till  it  is  known,  we 
cannot  assign  a  cipher  to  the  '  fleet  in  being '  remedy 
against  invasion,  on  the  grounds  that  the  Eussian  fleet 
to  all  intents  and  purposes  was  innocuous  to  the  invading 
army  of  Japan. 

Perhaps  one  of  the  most  prominent  features  of  the 
war,  certainly  the  most  novel  was  the  large  use  made 
of  floating  mines.  These  were  used  promiscuously 
by  both  sides :  indeed  most  of  the  so-called  Eussian 
floating  mines  destroyed  in  the  Gulf  of  Pechili  were 
Japanese. 

Strictly  speaking  the  laying  of  mines  outside  the 
three-mile  limit  is  illegal ;  but  in  these  days  the  three- 
mile  limit  is  obsolete  and  illogical.  If  mines  have  any 
object  at  all,  that  object  is  the  prevention  of  bombard- 
ments. Bombarding  range  is,  however,  at  least  any- 
thing up  to  five  miles  or  so,  hence  the  absurdity  of 
expecting  any  belligerent  to  observe  strictly  a  rule 
which  would  render  his  mines  half  useless.  From 


THE   EUSSO-JAPANESE  WAE          101 

this,  it  is  an  easy  step  for  him  to  go  far  out  to  sea : 
indeed  to  be  effective  blockade  mines  must  be  laid 
where  they  are  least  expected.  In  this  war  they  were 
frequently  so  laid. 

The  most  was  not,  however,  made  of  them.  For 
instance  after  the  first  torpedo  attack  the  captain  of 
the  Yenesi  wished  to  go  and  lay  mines  off  all 
Japanese  harbours,  but  permission  was  refused  him ; 
and  though  the  Japanese  laid  mines  off  Vladivostok 
they  did  not  lay  them  in  effective  places. 

Though  a  good  many  ships  were  sunk  by  mines,  it 
was  in  no  case  clear  that  the  fatal  mines  were  hostile 
ones. 

As  regards  the  Japanese  losses,  some  of  course  are 
not  proved  to  be  by  mines  at  all.  The  Takasago,  for 
instance,  which  *  struck  a  mine  one  dark  night  off  Port 
Arthur '  may  very  possibly  have  been  torpedoed.  If 
not,  the  mine  is  just  as  likely  to  have  been  Japanese 
as  Eussian.  The  loss  of  the  Hei-Yen  may  also  have 
been  by  torpedo  :  at  any  rate,  the  ship  was  within 
easy  radius  of  Eussian  torpedo  craft.  More,  then, 
may  have  been  attributed  to  mines  than  was  due  to 
them ;  and  of  the  authentic  cases  the  nationality  of 
the  mine  is  often  doubtful. 

On  the  whole  it  may  be  said  that  this  was  the 
first  war  in  which  the  mine  appeared  as  an  impor- 
tant factor,  although  ships  had  been  destroyed  by  it 
in  the  past,  especially  in  the  U.  S.  Civil  War  in 
estuaries  and  rivers.  Neither  side  can  be  said  to  have 


102  HEKESIES   OF   SEA  POWEK 

utilised  the  '  new  arm '  to  the  best  advantage,  and — 
the  nationality  of  those  mines  which  were  effective 
being  in  doubt — it  cannot  be  shown  that  either  side 
gained  to  any  great  extent  by  their  use.  It  is  quite 
possible  that  if  the  Japanese  had  used  no  mines  at  all 
they  would  have  been  a  ship  or  two  better  off. 

The  uncertainty  of  mines  was  also  demonstrated. 
Undoubtedly  many  broke  adrift  by  accident  or  stress 
of  weather  :  there  are  also  cases  in  which  ships  passed 
uninjured  over  mine  fields.1 

The  torpedo  hardly  came  up  to  expectation  in  this 
war.  Except  in  the  doubtful  cases  of  the  Mikasa 
all  torpedo  attacks  on  ships  in  motion  were  failures 
till  the  last  battle,  and  in  that  only  ships  already 
disabled  by  gun  fire  seem  to  have  suffered. 

The  limited  radius  of  torpedo  craft  was  heavily  felt 
by  both  sides.  Thus,  the  Russian  boats  were  never 
able  to  go  far  enough  to  encounter  the  Japanese  fleet. 
Japanese  boats  were  remarkably  ubiquitous,  but  for 
four  days  work  they  had  to  have  eight  days  rest,  during 
which  time  their  defects  and  injuries  were  made  good. 
Repairs  were  effected  at  a  phenomenal  rate,2  and,  what- 
ever is  to  be  said  upon  the  limits  of  torpedo  craft  utility 
or  the  success  of  Japanese  torpedo  attack,  there  is  no 

1  Mikasa,  Shikishima,  and  Asahi  got  on  to  a  mine  field  just  after  the 
loss  of  the  Hatsuse  and  Yashirna.    The  flagship  hit  a  mine  which  failed 
to  explode,  the  Shikishima  avoided  it,  finally  one  hit  the  Asahi  and 
exploded  but  did  no  harm,  as  it  was  floating. 

2  One  destroyer  was  entirely  rebuilt  from  amidships  within,  it  is  said, 
three  weeks. 


THE   RUSSO-JAPANESE   WAE          103 

question  that  no  nation  could  have  got  more  work  out 
of  the  boats  than  did  the  Japanese. 

Whether  Japanese  torpedoes  hit  or  missed  is  a 
comparatively  unimportant  detail  ;  there  is  probably 
no  lesson  for  the  future  in  their  percentage  of  misses. 
The  point  of  historical  importance  is  how  often  or 
how  seldom  were  the  Japanese  able  to  have  their 
boats  at  the  necessary  spot  at  the  necessary  moment. 
On  this  matter  we  know  that,  as  boats  served  only 
one-third  of  their  time,  66  per  cent,  of  the  force  was 
useless  at  any  given  moment.  From  this  it  may  be 
argued  that  three  boats  on  paper  means  one  boat 
actually  and  continually  in  service — a  proportion  not 
at  all  likely  to  be  exceeded  in  any  future  war.  But, 
on  the  other  hand,  there  is  the  evidence  of  Bound 
Island  and  Tsushima  to  show  that  at  psychological 
moments  the  whole,  or  nearly  the  whole  of  the 
Japanese  torpedo  force  was  available.  This  would 
suggest  that  torpedo  craft  are  a  complete  force,  acting 
intermittently,  rather  than  a  partial  force,  acting 
constantly.  On  the  whole  it  must  be  admitted  that 
the  influence  of  torpedo  craft  on  the  result  of  the  war 
was  small,  even  though  the  torpedo  paralysed  the 
Kussian  fleet  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  and  gave  the 
coup  de  grace  to  it  after  Tsushima. 

In  the  first  case  the  conditions  that  obtained  were 
altogether  abnormal ;  in  the  second,  as  the  Russians 
had  only  a  trifling  torpedo  force  (and  that  apparently 
not  detailed  for  torpedo  work)  special  conditions  also 


104  HEEESIES   OF   SEA  POWER 

obtained,  as  between  the  Japanese  boats  and  their 
objective,  there  was  none  of  that  counter-attack  which 
may  be  depended  on  to  neutralise  the  operations  of 
torpedo  craft  in  the  majority  of  instances.  At  Bound 
Island,  where  torpedo  craft  figured  both  sides,  the 
results  secured  were  negative.  In  the  general  night 
attack  on  the  Port  Arthur  fleet  in  the  previous  sortie, 
no  ships  were  torpedoed  though  attacks  were  pressed 
home  all  night.  Only  at  Tsushima  were  hits  secured, 
and  here  apparently  only  after  several  attacks  upon 
demoralised  and  damaged  vessels.1  Certainly  the  opera- 
tions cannot  be  said  to  substantiate  most  of  what  the 
advocates  of  the  torpedo  claimed  for  it  ere  the  war 
broke  out. 

Of  gunnery,  as  of  torpedo,  it  must  be  said  that  the 
war  taught  nothing  new.  Every  lesson  corresponded 
with  the  result  of  experiment  or  the  experiences  of 
former  wars.  Ships,  indeed,  sank  more  easily  under 
gun  fire  at  Tsushima  than  had  been  expected,  but  it 
was  subsequently  shown  that  the  conditions  were 
artificial.  The  Russian  battleships — none  of  them 
triumphs  of  the  ship  builder's  art — were  overloaded 
and  unduly  submerged.  Consequently  the  thin  upper 
belts  were  in  actual  result  their  water-line  belts,  so 
that  to  all  intents  and  purposes  the  Borodinos  were  no 

1  The  statement  of  Admiral  Nebogatoff  (Fighting  Ships,  1906)  still 
further  discounts  the  torpedo,  for  according  to  this  account  only  ships 
that  burned  searchlights  got  torpedoed.  All  Nebogatoff's  own  ships — 
though  hampered  by  '  quick  firers  '  that  fired  one  round  a  minute  and 
unprotected  by  light  craft — survived  the  night  attack. 


THE   KUSSO-JAPANESE   WAK          105 

better  protected  than  the  Japanese  armoured  cruisers. 
All,  too,  appear  to  have  had  a  fore  and  aft  bulkhead 
down  the  centre  line. 

The  career  of  the  Baltic  Fleet  was,  perhaps,  the 
most  interesting  feature  of  the  campaign.  Its  modern 
ships  were  hastily  completed ;  its  old  ships  obsolete 
units  more  detrimental  than  assisting.  Its  officers 
were  mostly  either  cadets  hastily  promoted  or  military 
officers  pressed  into  the  sea  service.  Its  men  were 
chiefly  raw,  and  in  some  ships  mutinous  as  well.  Sea 
experience  was  lacking  to  all  the  personnel,  and  the 
coal  problem  was  acute. 

Yet  by  the  time  the  fleet  reached  Singapore  it  kept 
station  well  enough  to  excite  remark,  and  in  several 
other  matters  it  was  found  to  be  at  least  superior  to 
what  had  been  anticipated.  The  credit  of  this  belongs 
entirely  to  Admiral  Eogestvensky  whose  abilities, 
owing  to  the  defeat  of  Tsushima  have  not  perhaps 
been  properly  recognised.  The  task  he  faced  was 
undoubtedly  a  great  one.  When  all  things  are  con- 
sidered impartially  the  wonder  is  rather  that  his  men 
shot  as  well  as  they  did  than  that  they  shot  so  badly, 
that  his  ships  offered  so  much  resistance  as  they  did 
rather  than  that  they  were  so  easily  defeated. 

So  far  as,  so  soon  after  the  event,  the  truth  can  be 
got  at,  it  appears  that  Bogestvensky's  scouts  sighted 
what  they  took  to  be  the  main  Japanese  fleet  off  For- 
mosa. Either  the  Japanese  had — as  Kussians  assert 
—a  dummy  fleet  lying  there,  or  else  Kogestvensky's 


106  HEEESIES   OF   SEA  POWEK 

scouts  were  peculiarly  imaginative — a  quality  for 
which  the  Baltic  Fleet  was  generally  distinguished. 
In  any  case  it  appears  that  the  Baltic  Fleet  when  it 
entered  the  straits  of  Tsushima  believed  the  bulk  of 
the  Japanese  navy  to  be  behind  it,  and  the  way  to 
Vladivostok  barred  only  by  a  certain  number  of 
torpedo  craft  and  cruisers,  through  which  in  the  fog 
it  had  a  fair  chance  of  passing  unobserved.  Boges- 
tvensky's  formation  in  two  battle  lines  was  a  sound 
enough  one  in  view  of  attacks  from  small  craft  only : 
it  was  so  hopelessly  bad  against  a  battle-fleet  attack 
that  it  is  almost  in  itself  evidence  that  he  never 
expected  to  meet  Togo  when  he  did.  Meeting  him 
thus  it  is  probable  that  a  considerably  better  fleet 
would  have  been  annihilated  with  equal  ease. 

It  is  said  by  the  Kussians,  probably  truly,  that  the 
sudden  discovery  that  they  were  faced  with  a  fleet 
action  overwhelmed  them  completely.  Whether  this 
be  so  or  not,  it  speaks  much  for  the  Kussians  that 
they  were  able  during  the  night  that  followed  to  act 
in  unison  sufficiently  to  beat  off  two  of  the  torpedo 
attacks  :  the  wonder  is  that  they  held  together  so  long, 
not  that  they  scattered  so  soon.  Once  scattered,  of 
course  their  destruction  was  very  simple.  Even  at  the 
end  only  four  ships,  the  division  of  which  Admiral 
Nebogatoff  was  in  command,  were  sufficiently  demora- 
lised to  surrender. 

Of  Admiral  Nebogatoff 's  surrender  two  views  may 
be  taken.  There  is  first  of  all  the  humanitarian  view 


THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  WAR          107 

that  to  continue  fighting  was  only  a  needless  sacrifice 
of  life.  This  view  was  true,  but  few  naval  officers  will 
question  that  it  was  also  wrong,  and  the  degradation 
inflicted  on  Nebogatoff  by  the  Russian  Admiralty 
justified  by  expediency.  We  know  perfectly  well  that 
Japanese  similarly  circumstanced  would  never  have 
surrendered.  We  know  that  the  Oushakoff  similarly 
circumstanced  refused  to  surrender,  and  sank  still 
firing.  So,  too,  the  Rurik  in  an  earlier  fight  near  the 
same  spot.  '  Death  or  victory '  is  a  melodramatic 
phrase  ;  but  it  is  also  a  necessity,  and  the  leader  who 
is  prepared  to  accept  the  latter  alternative  is  not 
properly  prepared  for  it  (or  likely  to  attain  it)  unless 
he  is  equally  ready  to  accept  the  former.  However 
useless  the  deaths  of  those  who  went  down  in  the 
Oushakoff  may  appear,  their  deaths  were  at  least 
almost  as  useful  to  the  Russian  Navy  of  the  future  as 
if  they  had  died  in  the  course  of  a  victory.  Once  the 
principle  of  justified  surrender  be  admitted,  it  is 
impossible  to  draw  the  line,  and  the  slightest  sug- 
gestion of  force  majeure  becomes  a  logical  excuse  for 
capitulation.1  This  may  be  ethically  defensible ;  but  a 
navy  with  such  ethics  is  quite  useless  for  the  purpose 
for  which  it  is  created.  The  action  of  the  Russian 
Admiralty  in  its  merciless  degradation  of  Nebogatoff 
and  his  captains  is  perhaps  its  one  strong  action 
during  the  war.  Alongside  it  we  may  lay  the  action 
of  the  Chinese  authorities  who  executed  every  man 
1  The  process  was  witnessed  at  one  stage  of  the  South  African  war. 


108  HEEESIES  OF   SEA  POWEK 

left  alive  after  the  surrender  of  Wei-hai-wei  in  the 
Chino- Japanese  war:  an  action  of  great  barbarity 
but — making  due  allowance  for  peculiar  Chinese  ideas 
and  customs — not  altogether  to  be  blamed.  Or  we 
may  go  back  to  the  Carthaginians  and  their  cruel  but 
probably  useful  practice  of  crucifying  the  defeated 
leader.  It  did  not  insure  victory ;  but  it  was  certainly 
a  safeguard  against  defeat  wherever  victory  was 
possible.  So  were  the  Chinese  and  Eussian  regula- 
tions on  the  matter. 

The  Eussian  ones  were  very  clear :  that  in  the 
event  of  defeat  a  captain  was  to  destroy  his  ship. 
This  was  done  by  the  captains  of  the  Varaig  and 
Korietz :  it  was  done  (not  very  thoroughly)  when 
General  Stoessel  surrendered  Port  Arthur :  it  was 
done  by  most  of  the  captains  of  the  ill-starred  Baltic 
Fleet,  and  ought  to  have  been  done  by  Admiral 
Nebogatoff,1  so  that  his  omission  to  do  so  indicates 
better  than  any  list  of  sunken  ships  the  completeness 
of  the  Tsushima  victory. 

1  It  may,  however,  be  noted  that  the  final  reason  given  by  Admiral 
Nebogatoff  in  his  article  in  the  1906  Fighting  Ships  gives  a  justification 
outside  the  naval  standpoint. 


PAET   II 

PROBLEMS  THAT   'SEA  POWER'   DOES  NOT 
SOLVE 

THIS  section  deals  with  incidents  selected  from  various 
wars  of  ancient  and  modern  times,  which  either  afford 
examples  of  minor  paradoxes  or  else  indicate  problems 
that  are  no  nearer  solution  now  than  they  were  in  the 
past. 


I 

SOME   TACTICAL  AND   STRATEGICAL   PROBLEMS 

THERE  are  two  problems  the  solution  of  which  has 
always  been  before  belligerents  in  all  ages. 
These  are  as  follows  : — 

(1)  A  fleet  is  between   two   hostile   forces,   each 
inferior  to  it,  but  which  combined  are  superior.     What 
is  its  right  course  of  action  ? 

The  other  is : — 

(2)  How  can  the  weaker  succeed  in  beating  the 
stronger  ? 

These  questions  have  always  existed  ;  and  they  are 
just  as  near  to  or  as  far  from  solution  now  as  they  were 
five  thousand  years  ago  when  Nile  boats  were  battleships 
and  the  sea  an  untra versed  unknown  tract.  It  may  be 
profitable  and  should  certainly  be  interesting  to  take 
a  few  historical  instances  of  these  problems,  and  see 
whether  the  answer  in  one  age  was  the  same  as  in 
another. 

The  first  problem  confronted  the  Japanese  to  some 
considerable  extent  in  1904.  There  were  Kussians  at 
Port  Arthur  and  Vladivostok,  with  a  trifling  force  at 
Chemulpo  in  between.  Nominally  at  any  rate  these 


PKOBLEMS  111 

forces  combined  were  slightly  superior  to  the  Japanese  : 
divided  they  were  inferior.     Japan's   solution  of  the 
problem  was  to  annihilate  the  intermediate  unit  with 
a  detachment  and  then  fling  her  whole  force  on  the 
Port  Arthur  fleet.     At  a  later  date  she  modified  this  : 
first  making  a  considerable  show  off  Vladivostok  and 
then  lying  between  with  two  divisions,  each  facing  a 
Russian  division,  and  these  fought   separate   actions 
each  with  its   own  enemy  in  the  affairs  of  August, 
1904.     The  loss  of  the  Bayan  at  Port  Arthur  and  the 
Bogatyr  at  Vladivostok  (both  matters  of  chance)  gave 
the  Japanese  a  better  force  than  they  would  otherwise 
have  had  at  both  points,  but  this  paper  advantage  was 
not  very  great  and  Togo's  fleet  at  Bound  Island,  for 
reasons  hereinafter  stated,  was  hardly  superior  to  the 
Russian  Port  Arthur  fleet  under  Witgeft.     Kamimura 
had  a  distinct  superiority  in  his  division ;  but  he  had 
it  at  Togo's  expense. 

The  results  were  in  favour  of  both  Japanese  divisions, 
though  fully  conclusive  in  neither  case. 

This  is  the  only  instance  of  the  problem  (except  in 
naval  manoeuvres)  since  Captain  Mahan  wrote l : — 

*  A  position  .  .  .  threatened  with  attack  from  two 
quarters,  presents  one  of  the  subtlest  temptations  to 
a  commander.  The  impulse  is  very  strong  to  meet 
both  by  dividing  his  own  numbers  .  .  .  but  unless 
in  possession  of  overwhelming  force  it  is  an  error, 
exposing  both  divisions  to  be  beaten  separately.' 
1  Inflwnce  of  Sea  Power  upon  History,  p.  113. 


112  HEEESIES   OF   SEA  POWEE 

Togo  disregarded  this  dictum.  He  was  not  in  over- 
whelming force,  and  in  view  of  the  fact  that  he  had  to 
preserve  his  battleships  at  all  costs  he  became  to  that 
extent  the  more  inferior  so  far  as  the  division  facing 
Port  Arthur  was  concerned.  If  Eussian  stories  be 
true — and  they  are  borne  out  to  some  extent  by  the 
fact  that  the  Eussian  casualties  were  not  much  heavier 
than  those  of  the  Japanese — it  was  somewhat  a  matter 
of  luck  that  Togo's  fleet  at  any  rate  was  not  '  beaten 
separately.'  On  the  other  hand,  Togo  certainly  claimed 
Eound  Island  as  a  victory,  and  the  fact  that  the  Eussians 
never  came  out  again  stands  by  way  of  proof  to  his 
claim.  Kamimura,  being  two  to  one,  had  of  course  no 
great  difficulty  in  settling  the  Vladivostok  cruisers, 
although  for  reasons  not  made  clear  he  failed  to 
complete  his  victory. 

Let  us  now  turn  to  the  past.  Instances  of  the 
inferior  force  splitting  itself  to  meet  the  attack  from 
two  quarters  are  not  very  numerous.  The  English 
fleet  did  it  in  the  time  of  the  Napoleonic  wars,  but  it 
was  (save  in  one  instance)  in  *  overwhelming  force  '  off 
both  Toulon  and  Brest  and  so  cannot  be  cited.  The 
instance  of  division  without  overwhelming  force  in 
both  parts  occurred  with  Cornwallis.  Villeneuve  with 
twenty-seven  ships  had  returned  from  the  West  Indies, 
having  given  the  pursuing  Nelson  the  slip  and  got  away 
from  Calder's  fifteen  ships  which  tried  to  intercept  him. 
Off  Brest  was  Cornwallis  with  thirty-five  ships  which 
he  split  into  two  fleets,  one  to  watch  Villeneuve  near 


PKOBLEMS  113 

Ferrol,  the  other  to  watch  Brest.  Had  Villeneuve 
gone  towards  Brest  he  would  have  met  one  of  Corn- 
wallis's  division  with  superior  force  :  however,  unaware 
of  the  division,  he  went  to  Cadiz — so  nothing  came  of 
Cornwallis's  splitting  up. 

For  a  good  instance  of  division  at  all  like  Togo's 
we  have  to  go  back  to  the  second  Anglo-Dutch  war 
Here  in  the  strategy  preceding  the  Four  Days'  Battle 
(1666)  the  English  detached  about  a  quarter  of  their 
force  under  Prince  Rupert  to  meet  a  French  fleet  to 
the  westward  and  the  remainder  under  Monk  to  meet 
the  Dutch  fleet  coming  east.  Practically  Eupert  was 
in  Kamimura's  position  and  Monk  in  Togo's.  The 
force  encountered  by  Monk  was  not  very  greatly 
superior,  but  he  was  compelled  to  retreat  before  it  and 
but  for  the  return  of  Rupert  would  have  been  hand- 
somely beaten.  As  things  were  he  suffered  severely. 

Here  there  are  three  instances :  in  the  first  and 
most  modern,  splitting  led  to  no  disaster  but  victories : 
in  Cornwallis's  case  nothing  happened :  in  Monk's, 
defeat  was  the  result. 

Other  instances  might  be  sought,  but  they  would 
not  sensibly  alter  the  above  ratio  and  they  are  not 
very  plentiful.  As  a  rule  splitting  has  not  been  in 
favour. 

Now  comes  an  important  consideration.  In  splitting 
his  force  was  Togo  split  in  the  sense  that  Monk  and 
Cornwallis  were?  Split  he  certainly  was,  but  speed 
and  wireless  telegraphy  made  his  divisions  far  nearer. 

I 


114  HEEESIES   OF   SEA  POWEE 

Had  he  been  defeated  at  Round  Island  he  would  far 
more  easily  have  been  able  to  fall  back  on  Kamimura 
than  were  the  others  who  in  the  past  essayed  the  same 
thing.  This,  of  course,  is  another  way  of  saying  that 
conditions  have  altered,  and  that  it  is  much  more  easy 
to  decentralise  or  spread  now  than  formerly. 

The  trend  towards  decentralisation  is  now,  indeed, 
great.  In  the  war  with  Japan  we  have  seen  Eussia 
disposing  part  of  her  fleet  at  Port  Arthur  and  part  at 
Vladivostok.  It  is  difficult  to  assert  that  this  division 
was  bad — that  is  to  say  concentration  at  Port  Arthur, 
had  the  harbour  admitted  of  it,  would  assuredly  not 
have  led  to  a  Eussian  victory :  it  would  merely  have 
simplified  Togo's  task.  It  was  bad  in  that  the  division 
of  forces  might  have  been  better  made — all  cruisers 
might  have  been  at  Vladivostok,  for  instance.  It 
was  bad  in  that,  being  divided,  the  Eussians  made 
subsequent  attempts  to  unite, — for  no  better  reason 
apparently  than  that  the  uniting  of  two  separated 
forces  is  the  pet  problem  of  naval  manoeuvres.  Being 
divided  they  had  better  have  remained  so,  and  reaped 
such  advantage  as  compelling  the  Japanese  to  divide 
also  conferred.  They  were  the  wrong  people  to  evolve 
a  new  thing  in  warfare  out  of  divided  squadrons  ;  but 
it  is  well  on  the  cards  that  in  some  such  feature  the 
Nelson  of  the  future  will  make  his  mark.  Supposing 
a  brilliant  leader  at  Port  Arthur,  backed  up  by  an 
efficient  fleet,  and  a  similarly  brilliant  and  efficient 
squadron  at  Vladivostok,  the  difficulties  before  Togo 


PEOBLEMS  115 

would  have  been  very  great.  He  could  have  blockaded 
Port  Arthur  only  with  his  entire  force  and  then  with 
great  difficulty,  leaving  the  Vladivostok  division  free 
to  cut  the  communication  of  the  invading  army.  The 
Eussians  did  things  badly  and  failed,  but  this  is  no 
proof  that  the  brilliant  possibilities  alluded  to  did  not 
exist ;  or  that  in  some  such  division  in  the  hereafter 
unexpected  power  may  not  be  found. 

Tactically,  the  '  divided  squadron '  is  usually  put 
under  the  head  of  a  twentieth-century  idea.  It  is  an 
idea  somewhat  difficult  to  define,  but  in  essence  it 
embodies  decentralisation  as  a  means  for  truer  con- 
certed action.  To  take  the  case  in  a  simpler  form  it  is 
easier  for  two  squadrons  of  six  ships  each,  properly 
placed,  to  concentrate  the  guns  of  twelve  ships  on  a 
portion  of  the  enemy  than  it  is  for  twelve  ships  in  one 
long  line  to  do  so.  It  rests  also  on  the  fact  that 
whereas  each  broadside  had  an  equal  value  in  the  old 
days  so  that  one  ship  between  two  others  could  give 
each  her  full  power,  in  these  days  the  principal  arma- 
ment being  mounted  to  bear  on  either  broadside  a  ship 
can  put  full  power  upon  one  side  only.  And  since  in 
a  line  of  twelve  ships  there  are  bound  to  be  some  at 
one  or  other  end  of  the  line  unable  to  deliver  an 
effective  fire  at  the  psychological  moment,  it  follows 
that  the  divided  ships  may  have  greater  chances  of 
securing  a  '  two  to  one '  advantage.  On  the  other  hand, 
unless  well-handled  they  may  be  separately  engaged  and 
lose  more  than  they  gain.  Only  a  very  efficient  fleet, 

i  2 


116  HEEESIES  OF   SEA  POWEE 

with  units  well  used  to  acting  together  is,  therefore, 
likely  to  succeed  with  such  tactics. 

Whether  divided  squadron  tactics  are  really  a  new 
thing  is  open  to  debate. 

Alcibiades  at  the  battle  of  Cyzicus l  did  something 
of  the  sort  when  he  divided  his  fleet  into  three.  Again 
in  the  first  Punic  War  Atilius  off  Tyndaris  flung  ten 
triremes  on  the  Carthaginians,  and  held  them  thereby 
till  his  main  body  arrived.  In  neither  case  were  the 
operations  very  akin  to  those  of  the  modern  divided 
squadron,  but  the  integral  idea  of  securing  victory  by 
using  the  fleet  in  detachments  instead  of  as  a  whole 
was  equally  present.  Again,  Togo  off  Port  Arthur  was 
continually  more  tactically  divided  than  was  academi- 
cally desirable.  As  already  stated  his  tactics  were 
more  than  once  those  of  Alcibiades,2  and  the  results 
were  satisfactory  to  him.  Nelson  at  Trafalgar  em- 
ployed a  species  of  divided  squadron  3  of  set  purpose 
and  with  a  definite  ohject,  and  Togo  was  divided  at 
Tsushima,  though  for  some  time  apologists  with  views 
of  their  own  as  to  what  he  should  have  done,  attempted 
to  prove  that  he  was  not.  The  man  who  did  not 
divide  was  Eogestvensky — who  of  all  men  ought  to 
have  done  so,  in  order  not  to  hamper  his  few  good 
ships. 

On  the  whole  it  may  be  argued  that  history  has 

1  See  '  Peloponnesian  War.' 

2  See  '  Peloponnesian  War.' 

8  As  both  were  on  the  same  bearing  the  application  is  of  course 
only  partial. 


PKOBLEMS  117 

nothing  conclusive  to  teach  in  answer  to  the  first 
question ;  but  that  something  may  be  surmised  of  the 
existence  of  a  law  of  evolution  in  the  matter  tending 
towards  greater  division  in  the  future  than  was  safely 
to  be  attempted  in  the  past. 

The  second  problem  '  How  can  the  weaker  succeed 
in  beating  the  stronger '  was  answered  by  that  Pelo- 
ponnesian  leader  who,  after  the  battle  of  Naupaktis 
finding  himself  the  weaker,  except  numerically,  said : — 
'  Against  their  greater  skill  set  your  own  greater 
valour/  and  by  the  Athenian  Phormio  on  the  same 
occasion  when  he  appealed  to  skill  against  numbers. 

It  was  answered  by  Alexander  the  Great  when  he 
made  his  historical  remark  'It  matters  not  to  the 
wolf  how  many  the  sheep  number.'  It  was  answered 
by  Hannibal  when  he  beat  the  Romans  at  Cannae ;  by 
Drake  and  Effingham  when  they  fought  the  Spanish 
Armada,  pitting  against  bulk  and  many  guns,  efficient 
gunnery  and  heavier  pieces.  Times  without  number 
has  it  been  answered,  but  never  in  quite  the  same  way, 
and  because  the  way  has  always  been  different  the 
question  has  continually  remained,  and  will  go  on 
being  asked — not  always  with  an  answer — whenever 
any  man  with  a  few  ships  encounters  a  fleet  of  double 
his  force. 

Supposing  three  cruisers  met  six  of  the  enemy,  all 
units  being  about  equal.  Common  sense  suggests  that 
the  three  run  for  it ;  but  this  may  not  always  be 
possible.  History  tells  that  often  three  have  beaten 


118  HEEESIES   OF   SEA  POWEE 

six,  but  no  study  of  history  will  teach  how  it  is  to  be 
done  except  by  being  doubly  fitter  to  win.  Once  there 
were  days  when  by  passing  under  the  sterns  of  the 
enemy  the  three  might  have  a  very  good  chance, 
supposing  the  manoeuvre  to  succeed — to-day  such  a 
manoeuvre  would  almost  certainly  lead  to  the  three 
being  torpedoed.  Once,  as  at  Lissa,  where  the  weaker 
Austrian  fleet  rushed  the  stronger  Italians,  victory 
was  won  by  daring  valour — to-day  the  torpedo  would 
probably  intervene  long  before  the  terror  of  the  ram 
could  create  any  confusion.  Cutting  the  line  in  the 
past  accomplished  much — to-day  the  torpedo  again 
intervenes. 

Yet,  to-day,  if  the  three  can  c  cross  the  T '  by 
passing  across  the  bows  of  the  six  they  may  do  a 
great  deal  and  destroy  in  detail.  It  is  possible ;  but 
possible  only  to  very  efficient  ships  and  to  a  leader  of 
remarkable  skill.  It  is  harder  than  it  was,  and  as 
years  go  on  is  likely  to  become  harder  still. 

This  indeed  is  the  tendency  of  all  tactics,  though 
probably  cycles  obtain.  Take,  for  instance,  the  case 
of  a  fleet  lying  in  battle  order  in  a  bay — a  situation 
which  has  obtained  off  and  on  continually  throughout 
history. 

In  ancient  times  it  was  a  very  favourite  formation 
to  adopt.  The  Greeks  were  so  disposed  at  Salamis, 
and  emerged  the  winners.  In  the  Peloponnesian  war 
the  Peloponnesian  fleet  took  up  a  very  similar  position 
behind  the  island  of  Sphakteria;  but  the  Athenians 


PEOBLEMS  119 

who  attacked  them  there  did  so  quite  successfully. 
The  Komans  under  Scipio  Africanus  so  lay  at  Tunis, 
and  the  results  were  indecisive,  with  the  balance  of 
success  to  the  attacking  Carthaginians. 

The  Octavian  fleet  so  lying  off  the  Campanian 
coast  was  defeated  by  the  ships  of  Pompey ;  and  at 
Actium  the  fleet  of  Antony  very  similarly  disposed 
was  defeated. 

Coming  to  more  modern  times  we  find  that  in  the 
eighteenth  century  it  was  a  tactical  axiom  with  the 
French  that  a  fleet  moored  in  battle  order  with  its 
flanks  protected  by  batteries  was  immune  from  attack. 
For  this  they  had  immediate  historical  warrant.  Pro- 
fessor Laughton l  cites  a  variety  of  instances  of  this 
doctrine  in  action.  D'Estaing  twice  declined  to  attack 
an  inferior  British  fleet  so  lying  and  was  beaten  later 
at  St.  Lucia  when  he  did  attempt  it — his  twelve  big 
ships  being  beaten  by  seven  smaller  English  vessels.2 

Guichen  and  Cordova  with  thirty-six  ships  feared 
to  attack  Darby  so  placed  with  twenty  at  Torbay; 
and  De  Grasse  attacking  Hood,  anchored  at  St.  Kitts, 
failed.  Suffren  with  twelve  ships  off  Madras  declined 
to  attack  Hughes  with  nine  anchored  and  supported 
by  batteries. 

So  when  the  French  fleet  thus  lay  before  the  battle 

1  Nelson,  by  Professor  Laughton. 

2  On  this  occasion  Suffren,  then  one  of  D'Estaing' s  captains  tried 
to  persuade  him  to  attack  by  anchoring  on  the  English  buoys — tactics 
very  similar  to  those  employed  by  Nelson  at  the  Nile.    D'Estaing  how- 
ever refused  to  do  so. 


120  HEEESIES  OF   SEA  POWEK 

of  the  Nile  they  had  plenty  of  warrant  in  the  study  of 
recent  history  to  support  their  belief  that  they  were 
quite  safe.  A  study  of  ancient  history  would  have 
told  them  that  such  positions  had  sometimes  been  safe 
and  sometimes  not,  and  perhaps  impressed  Brueys 
with  the  fact  that  the  real  teaching  of  history  is  that 
'  there  is  nothing  to  be  learned,  save  that  "  the  im- 
possible "  may  always  occur.'  It  was  left  for  Nelson, 
in  the  signal  victory  of  Aboukir  Bay  to  shatter  all 
theories  as  to  the  immunity  of  a  fleet  anchored  in  a 
protected  bay.  Yet  at  Alge9iras,  not  so  very  long 
afterwards,  Sir  James  Saumarez  with  six  ships  was 
handsomely  beaten  by  four  French  ones  lying  in  the 
bay.  At  Navarino  on  the  other  hand  the  Turkish 
fleet  found  no  safety  in  a  bay. 

If  we  select  the  Nile,  Navarino,  Actium,  Sphakteria 
and  other  similar  instances  a  fleet  lying  in  a  bay  is 
doomed  to  destruction :  but  if  we  turn  our  attention 
to  Alge9iras,  and  many  an  action  between  that  and 
Salamis,  the  exact  opposite  is  to  be  proved.  Obviously 
then  it  is  unsafe  to  draw  any  deduction  from  history 
in  this  matter  other  than  that  '  it  is  the  unexpected 
which  happens.' 

Modern  history  does  not  supply  much  in  the  way 
of  instances  of  battles  in  this  particular  situation. 
The  Russians  on  February  9,  1904,  inferior  in  ships 
but  supported  by  forts  were  to  some  extent  so  situated 
in  Port  Arthur  Bay  when  attacked  by  Togo  with  a 
superior  force  of  ships.  Togo  never  pressed  home  his 


PEOBLEMS  121 

attack,  but  generally  speaking  it  may  be  said  that  such 
results  as  there  were  pointed  to  a  possible  sequel 
more  akin  to  what  befel  Saumarez  at  Algegiras  and 
D'Estaing  at  St.  Lucia,  than  Nelson  at  the  Nile. 

As  a  corollary  to  the  second  problem  there  is  the 
question  of  battles  between  equal  or  very  nearly  equal 
forces.  A  consideration  of  the  question  leaves  us  in 
doubt  just  as  do  the  others  already  discussed. 

In  the  decisive  battle  between  Suffren  and  Hughes, 
April  12,  1782,  the  French  concentrated  on  and 
severely  injured  two  of  the  English  ships,  while  the 
English  fire  was  so  distributed  amongst  the  French 
that  though  the  sum  total  of  damage  was  about  the 
same  in  both  squadrons,  yet  the  English  were  minus 
two  ships  for  a  long  time,  while  all  the  French  were 
able  to  make  good  their  defects  at  sea.  This  is 
perhaps  the  best  historical  instance  of  the  effects  of 
what  we  now  describe  as  '  fire  control.'  Something  of 
the  sort,  of  course,  has  always  been  an  objective, 
whether  in  those  innumerable  battles  in  which  one 
fleet  concentrated  on  a  portion  of  the  other  by  contact, 
or  in  fights  such  as  that  of  Round  Island,  where  the 
Russians  had  hardly  fired  a  shot  at  anything  except 
the  Mikasa,  and  the  Japanese  till  late  in  the  day 
devoted  themselves  to  the  Tsarevitch.  The  highest 
pitch  was  reached  in  those  British  peace  manoeuvres 
in  which  a  fleet  was  umpired  as  defeated  because, 
when  results  were  being  assessed,  it  was  found  that 
every  ship  in  the  defeated  squadron  had  during  the 


122  HEEESIES   OF   SEA  POWEE 

entire  action  fired  only  at  one  and  the  same  vessel  in 
the  opposing  fleet — that  is  to  say,  done  pretty  much 
what  the  Russians  did  at  Bound  Island. 

Here,  then,  we  have  two  distinct  results  of  the 
application  of  the  doctrine  of  concentration  of  effort. 
Suffren  by  employing  it  secured,  despite  an  indecisive 
action,  moral  and  material  results  equal  almost  to  a 
victory,  since  for  over  a  month  he  had  two  units  less 
to  contend  against.  This  incident  of  Suffren's  concen- 
tration, figuring  as  it  does  very  largely  in  the  pages 
of  Captain  Mahan's  'Influence  of  Sea  Power  upon 
History,'  was  undoubtedly  known  to  the  Eussian 
admiral  Witgeft  and  to  the  Japanese  admiral  Togo. 
Both,  no  doubt,  fully  recognised  how  advantageous  it 
had  proved  to  Suffren,  and  evidently  ordered  a  similar 
thing.  As  a  result,  the  Mikasa  was  very  consider- 
ably knocked  about,  sustaining,  in  addition  to  other 
bad  hits  which  reduced  her  gun  fire,  a  water  line 
penetration  which  might  well  have  served  as  an  excuse 
for  her  leaving  the  line,  though  as  a  matter  of  fact 
she  did  not  do  so.  As  for  the  rest  of  the  Japanese 
fleet,  it  might  for  all  the  harm  it  sustained  from  the 
Eussians,  never  have  been  in  action  at  all.1 

The  Japanese  fire  was  directed  almost  solely  at  the 
Tsarevitch  till  that  vessel  left  the  line;  thereafter, 
with  the  exception  of  a  concentration  upon  the 

1  It  is  true  that  some  of  them  had  big  guns  out  of  action,  but  this 
was  due  to  premature  explosion  of  their  H.E.  shell,  not  to  the  Bussian 
fire. 


PEOBLEMS  123 

Ketvizan  in  special  circumstances,  it  distributed  its 
attentions,  and  every  Russian  ship  was  more  or  less 
damaged.  The  resources  of  Port  Arthur  dockyard 
were  not  sufficient  to  put  these  ships  into  fighting 
trim  again,  and  so,  though  they  sank  no  ships  and 
captured  none,  the  Japanese  reaped  a  material  advan- 
tage. Of  course,  Port  Arthur  might  have  been  a  first- 
class  dockyard,  in  which  case,  after  some  two  or  three 
months,  the  Russians  might  again  have  emerged  ;  but 
taking  all  things  into  consideration,  it  seems  apparent 
that  a  policy  of  general  damage  rather  than  an  attempt 
to  destroy  one  unit  absolutely  paid  best  in  this  particular 
case. 

Now,  out  of  these  two  battles  is  it  possible  to  draw 
any  deductions  likely  to  be  of  future  use  ?  We  can 
draw  from  Round  Island  the  lesson  that  too  much 
concentration  may  be  worse  than  too  little,  from  the 
Suffren  action  the  exact  reverse.  Had  some  of  the 
Russian  hits  on  the  Mikasa  been  on  some  other 
vessels  the  sequel  might,  it  may  be  argued,  have  been 
different.  The  Mikasa  was  hit  amidships  around  the 
funnel  bases  several  times.  The  first  hit  did  all  the 
possible  mischief,  and  the  others  were  to  that  extent 
wasted.  Similarly,  the  Japanese  wasted  some  effort 
on  the  Tsarevitch,  though  later  they  gave  attention 
to  other  vessels. 

Here,  then,  is  another  case  interesting  to  compare 
with  those  already  mentioned.  Taken  by  itself  it 
might  well  be  used  to  show  that  the  first  statement 


124  HEEESIES  OF   SEA  POWEK 

of  '  Tactics  alter  while  strategies  do  not '  is  correct. 
That  is  the  obvious  lesson.  But  is  it  necessarily 
correct  ? 

If  we  accept  such  an  explanation  we  must,  to  be 
logical,  say  that  Nelson  won  the  battle  of  the  Nile 
because  *  tactics  had  altered '  since  experience  had 
shown  that  a  fleet  anchored  like  that  of  Brueys  was 
safe  from  attack.  Yet  both  before  and  after  the  Nile 
similar  attempts  were  failures :  and  so  we  are  driven 
to  confess  that  the  Nile  was  probably  a  victory  just 
because  Nelson  and  his  men  happened  to  be  the  men 
fittest  to  win  in  such  a  conflict,  and  that  tactics  were 
a  secondary  matter. 

Pursuing  this  train  of  thought,  we  may  ask 
whether  results  would  have  been  materially  different 
had  the  Japanese  at  Bound  Island  elected  to  destroy 
entirely  the  Tsarevitch  and  Retvizan,  or  the  Russians 
attempted  a  scheme  of  general  damage,  instead  of 
trying  to  annihilate  the  Mikasa  ? 

The  only  conceivable  answer  is  surely  in  the  nega- 
tive ;  and  a  similar  answer  results  from  any  other 
battle  being  considered  in  the  same  light. 

The  same  reasoning  may  be  applied  to  strategy. 
We  may  supply  Eogestvensky  with  the  best  possible 
strategy,  but  who  will  contend  that  had  he  adopted 
the  best  possible  to  be  derived  from  a  study  of  history 
he  would  have  fared  any  better  than  he  did?  His 
defeat  would  not  perhaps  have  been  in  Tsushima 
Straits,  but  would  there  have  been  any  other  material 


PKOBLEMS  125 

difference  ?    If  Togo  had  led  the  Eussian  crews  would 
any  strategy  of  his  have  produced  victory  ? 

He  would  be  a  bold  man  who  would  contend  that 
any  strategical  genius l  could  have  led  the  Eussian 
personnel  to  victory.  But  if  the  contention  cannot  be 
maintained,  of  what  value  or  purport  is  it  whether  the 
principles  of  strategy  be  eternal  or  not?  However 
academically  interesting,  of  what  value  is  the  principle 
to  victory  ?  Is  it  not  clear  that  Fitness  to  Win  is  an 
infinitely  more  important  asset  ? 

1  On  the  other  hand,  Nelson  (who  was  no  particular  genius  in 
strategy  or  tactics)  possibly  could  have  done  so,  because  he  possessed 
to  so  extraordinary  a  degree  the  power  of  producing  and  cultivating 
Fitness  to  Win,  and  was  great  rather  than  merely  '  able.' 


II 

BASE   POWER 

TOGO'S  action  in  Port  Arthur  Bay  on  February  9, 
1904,  alluded  to  in  the  last  chapter,  draws  attention  to 
the  whole  question  of  arsenals  and  bases.  The  '  Blue 
Water  School '  lays  down  as  a  general  theory  that  fortifi- 
cations, save  to  a  few  arsenals  and  bases,  are  undesirable. 
Extremists  tend  to  carry  this  a  considerable  distance, 
but  the  extremist  school  is  not  worth  consideration 
here.  What  may  be  termed  the  '  limitations  of  passive 
defence '  school, — those  who  admit  the  desirability  of 
fortifying  arsenals  strongly,  and  outlying  posts  more  or 
less  slightly  demand  attention.  These  are  they  who 
assign  the  first  and  second  places  to  the  fleet ;  the  shore 
and  the  shore  forces  come  but  a  bad  third.  The 
advocates  of  naval  command  of  naval  bases  may  be 
found  amongst  these. 

That  an  important  place  like  Portsmouth  must  be 
heavily  defended  is  accepted  as  an  axiom  by  practi- 
cally all  schools  and  parties.  Forts  able  to  repel  any 
kind  of  bombardment  are  usually  admitted  as  quite 
necessary. 


BASE  POWEK  127 

The  extremists,  perhaps,  would  argue  that  provided 
the  fleet  is  intact  and  victorious,  no  serious  attack  on  a 
main  base  is  to  be  expected  or  indeed  possible ;  and  it 
is  difficult  to  argue  that  this  is  untrue.  To  those  who 
contend  that  '  the  fleet  might  suffer  a  reverse,'  the  ex- 
tremists reply  '  All  the  more  reason  why  money  should 
be  spent  entirely  on  ships  and  not  be  devoted  to  bricks 
and  mortar.  Build  enough  ships,  and  your  contem- 
plated reverse  cannot  occur.' 

Undoubtedly  there  is  a  very  great  deal  in  this  argu- 
ment, and  it  might  be  accepted  as  conclusive  were  it 
not  that  base  attack  is  likely  to  be  recognised  sooner  or 
later  as  the  main  objective  of  naval  warfare,  and  to 
leave  bases  open  to  attack  would  court  such  a  state  of 
affairs.  If  the  base  be  weak  then  a  fleet  must  be  tied 
to  it  to  protect  it,  and  so  the  extreme  opponents  of 
1  bricks  and  mortar '  would,  were  they  given  rein,  pro- 
bably defeat  their  own  ends. 

Long  custom,  rather  than  logical  reasoning,  has 
created  a  system  of  first-class  bases,  secondary  bases 
and  so  on  down  to  minor  bases  of  the  fifteenth  rank  or 
thereabouts  protected  by  a  couple  of  six-inch  guns  '  to 
keep  off  a  hostile  cruiser.'  How  or  why  the  hostile 
cruiser  should  come  to  such  a  place  as — for  instance — 
Lough  S willy,  in  order  to  test  the  six  inch-guns,  and 
what  harm  the  guns  would  do  to  a  modern  armoured 
cruiser  are  questions  that  have  not  apparently  entered 
into  the  scheme  of  things  to  any  extent.  Custom  has 
decreed  that  '  moderate  fortifications '  should  exist  at 


128  HEKESIES  OF   SEA  POWEE 

certain  places,  and  there  is  no  doubt  a  pious  hope  that 
the  hostile  cruiser  bent  on  destroying  a  mercantile  port 
defended  by  a  few  six-inch  guns  will  be  sufficiently 
obliging  to  fire  at  the  fort  instead  of  at  the  docks  and 
shipping  that  it  'protects.'  The  cardinal  and  obvious 
axiom  that  the  enemy  will  not  come  unless  in  force 
calculated  to  make  the  defence  of  no  account  is  invari- 
ably ignored  altogether.  Our  forefathers  put  up 
martello  towers,  and  the  enemy,  for  lack  of  anything 
better  to  do,  used  now  and  again  to  attack  them.  On 
these  classical  grounds  we  have  erected  the  martello 
towers  of  our  own  age. 

Now,  bearing  in  mind  the  axiom  that  the  attack 
will  only  be  delivered  in  force  sufficient  to  overcome  all 
opposition — unless  we  presuppose  the  enemy  insane  he 
will  attack  under  no  other  conditions — it  would  seem 
essential  to  have  all  fortifications  of  the  very  strong 
order,  and  at  least  able  to  defy  anything  except  perhaps 
a  very  considerable  battle  fleet.  In  theory,  perhaps, 
such  a  principle  is  accepted  :  in  practice  the  prohibitive 
expense  is  in  the  way.  It  would  cost  altogether  too 
much. 

A  recognition  of  this  fact,  coupled  with  the  idea  of 
being  able  to  use  the  defence  elsewhere  as  offence  is 
undoubtedly  the  origin  of  'coast-defence  battleships.' 
These  in  the  original  idea  of  them  were  to  be  scattered 
around  the  different  harbours  to  take  the  place  of  forts, 
while,  the  need  for  such  defence  being  past,  they  could 
be  used  for  various  offensive  purposes  as  ships. 


BASE  POWER  129 

Gradually  it  was  perceived  that  coast-defence  ships 
thus  scattered  were  an  attraction  to  an  enemy  and  an 
invitation  to  him  to  destroy  them  in  detail ;  and  so 
the  idea  of  concentrating  defence  squadrons  came  into 
being. 

At  the  same  time  it  was  found  that  coast-defence 
ships  were  poor  sea-boats  and  practically  useless  with 
a  sea-going  battle  squadron,  and  on  such  grounds  every 
navy  now  has  dropped  them  in  favour  of  ships  able  to 
act  anywhere  in  all  weathers.  Thus,  by  a  process  of 
cycle  we  have  returned  to  the  equivalent  of  the  martello 
tower  and  batteries.  As  a  result  big  bases  are  crammed 
with  guns  rarely  if  ever  likely  to  be  fired  at  an  enemy, 
and  lesser  places  are  supplied  with  a  few  guns  that  if 
attacked  at  all  will  be  overwhelmed.  The  situation  is 
on  the  face  of  it  illogical ;  but  it  is  also  the  result  of  an 
attempted  evolution  of  something  better. 

If  the  fort  system  be  wrong,  then  there  is  probably 
some  error  in  the  course  of  that  evolution  which  took 
us  from  forts  to  ships  and  then  back  to  forts  again. 
Examined,  one  is  inclined  to  imagine  that  perhaps 
the  coast-defence  ships  idea  was  not  wrong  save  in  its 
application. 

Its  application  may  have  been  wrong  in  this  wise. 
The  coast-defenders,  even  the  early  American  monitors, 
were  always  primarily  ships.  They  were  bad  ships  in 
the  matter  of  nautical  qualities,  but  they  were  still 
always  more  ships  than  floating  forts.  The  floating 
battery  proper  hardly  survived  its  first  inception,  when 

K 


130  HEEESIES  OF   SEA  POWEK 

the  needs  of  the  Crimean  war  produced  it  for  offence 
against  land  fortifications.  In  the  Crimea  the  floating 
batteries  were  eminently  successful,  and  at  Kinburn 
accomplished  in  a  short  time  what  no  battle  fleet  of 
those  days  could  ever  have  done  in  any  time.  Un- 
fortunately, perhaps,  the  idea  then  fell  into  the  hands 
of  the  *  seaman,'  and  there  emerged  things  with  masts 
and  yards — palpable  imitations  of  the  old  steam  ships- 
of-the-line.  Compromise  was  immediately  sought  and 
the  first  idea — save  in  so  far  as  protection  was  con- 
cerned— went  by  the  board,  never  to  be  revived.  For 
though  a  later  age  built  coast-defence  monitors,  these 
were  always  the  ship  rather  than  the  fort,  and  the 
equivalent  of  the  marfcello  tower  was  constructed  on 
land  as  heretofore. 

Now  suppose  instead  of  the  compromise  the 
armoured  ship  had  been  evolved  as  the  armoured  ship, 
and  the  floating  battery  as  the  floating  battery.  Let 
us  imagine  floating  batteries  on  raft  bodies,  or  some 
other  species  of  monitor  in  which  speed  is  sacrificed  for 
invulnerability.  Ability  to  move  is  all  that  is  required, 
their  heavy  guns  fitted  for  high-angle  fire  would  mainly 
constitute  their  radius,  which  would  be  the  horizon. 
The  primary  defensive  use  of  such  monitors  would  be 
against  long-range  bombardments. 

A  long-range  bombardment  may  be  defined  as  an 
attack  from  below  the  horizon.  Comparatively  few 
ships  can  as  yet  use  the  necessary  elevation,  but  most 
modern  gun  mountings  are  designed  with  an  eye  to 


BASE  POWEK  131 

such  application  ;  and  almost  all  ships  can  be  inclined 
to  admit  of  it.  A  bombardment  of  this  kind  is,  of 
course,  absolutely  aimless,  and  little  likely  to  do  harm 
save  by  a  lucky  shell — unless  continued  for  a  con- 
siderable time.  A  dockyard,  however,  covers  a  very 
large  area,  and  that  area  can  be  exactly  located  by 
chart.  The  futility  of  bombarding  land  towns  is  held 
to  be  proved  by  the  Boer  bombardment  of  Ladysmith 
in  the  South  African  War,  but  such  bombardments 
were  carried  out  with  little  intelligence:  had  the 
British  bombarded  Pretoria,  it  is  probable  that  bom- 
bardments would  occupy  a  higher  place  in  the  scale 
than  they  now  do.  At  Ladysmith  no  special  area  was 
selected,  had  the  Boer  guns  taken  the  town  piece  by 
piece  they  would  certainly  have  razed  it  in  time,  even 
as  Port  Arthur  was  being  razed  when  it  surrendered. 
A  dockyard,  moreover,  is  infinitely  more  vulnerable  than 
a  town,  and  there  is  little  or  no  comparison  possible 
between  the  destructive  effects  of  big  naval  shell  and 
those  of  shore  guns  which  average  a  hundred  pounds 
at  the  very  most,  and  are  apt  to  be  much  nearer  twenty 
pounds.  The  big  high-explosive  shell  is  a  fait  accompli 
now  and  one  such  shell  dropped  into  a  dockyard  would 
if  it  fell  anywhere  near  shops,  slips  or  docks  do  inde- 
scribable mischief.  Probably  a  big  common  shell 
would  do  little  less  harm.  It  is  true  that  Santiago  de 
Cuba  was  subjected  to  a  bombardment  from  the 
dynamite  guns  of  the  Vesuvius  (which  simulated  a 
long-range  bombardment  fairly  well)  and  the  Vesuvius 

K   2 


132  HEKESIES  OF   SEA  POWEE 

seems  to  have  done  no  harm  at  all ;  but  against  this  it 
must  be  remembered  that  the  American  vessel  dis- 
charged very  few  projectiles  all  told,  and  had  no  large 
dockyard  to  aim  at.  Of  the  few  that  she  did  fire  one  fell 
near  a  destroyer.  It  might  as  well  have  been  a  ship, 
and  that  ship  would  undoubtedly  have  been  injured  or 
destroyed. 

Port  Arthur  is  another  story.  Here  there  is  no 
doubt  that  the  bombardment  caused  a  cessation  of 
repair  work  in  the  dockyard,  destroyed  many  important 
shops  in  the  yard  and  generally  contributed  largely  to 
the  inability  of  the  Russian  fleet  to  repair  damages  after 
the  battle  of  Round  Island.  This  result  was  mostly 
achieved  by  land  batteries,  the  naval  guns  afloat  took 
little  part  in  the  affair.  But  it  is  a  matter  of  some 
wonder  that  the  Japanese  never  managed  to  originate 
armoured  floating-batteries  with  which  to  attack  Port 
Arthur  by  sea.  It  could  have  been  done ;  and  it  would 
surely  have  been  effective  to  a  degree. 

Supposing  merely  twelve  guns  to  be  engaged  in 
bombarding  an  arsenal  from  beyond  the  horizon,  and 
assuming  a  rate  of  fire  per  gun  of  one  round  every  five 
minutes,  in  four  hours  only  no  less  than  250  projectiles 
will  be  discharged.  Each  gun  would  be  laid  on  the  big 
area  of  dockyard,  and  probably  a  balloon  would  be  em- 
ployed to  locate  the  hits.  It  is  certainly  conceivable 
that  from  ten  to  thirty  projectiles  would  fall  in  the 
aimed-at  area,  and  they  would  very  probably  accomplish 
damage  that  it  would  take  at  least  a  month  to  remedy. 


BASE  POWEB  133 

Each  ship  having  fired  48  rounds  per  gun  would  have 
some  ammunition  left  to  fight  with  in  the  event  of  an 
attempted  counter  attack,  even  if  they  did  not  (as  they 
in  all  probability  would)  carry  a  special  extra  supply  for 
bombarding.  Unless  within  a  hundred  miles  at  the 
time,  no  friendly  fleet,  however  powerful,  would  be  of 
the  slightest  utility  against  this  attack.  The  defensive 
capacity  of  a  fleet  is,  therefore,  limited  by  its  ability  to 
blockade  the  enemy  in  his  own  harbours,  or  annihilate 
him  on  emerging. 

For  the  present  it  is  obvious  that  if  a  fleet  is  able 
to  slip  out,  it  is  certainly  able,  and  might  certainly 
attempt,  to  conduct  a  long-range  bombardment :  no 
sane  commander  would  attempt  directly  to  engage  forts 
on  the  chance  of  silencing  them ;  he  would  be  silenced 
himself  first,  given  any  efficiency  on  the  part  of  the 
shore-gunners.  But  if  he  keeps  below  the  horizon  the 
forts  cannot  hit  him.  They  may  locate  him  with  a 
balloon,  or  even  see  him  from  high-site  forts ;  but  at  a 
distance  of  some  miles  a  ship  is  an  infinitesimal  speck. 
She  averages,  say,  400  by  75  feet,  less  than  ToVo"  °f  ^ne 
target  offered  by  a  square  mile  of  dockyard.  Be  range- 
finders  never  so  perfect,  the  chances  of  a  damaging  shell 
from  the  ship  on  to  the  Yard  are  infinitely  greater  than 
the  chance  that  the  ship  is  hit,  even  if  stationary.  By 
damaging  a  main  dockyard  a  fleet  ensures  that,  if  it  be 
subsequently  defeated  in  a  naval  battle,  its  opponents 
will  be  unable  to  repair  damages  and  so  be  heavily 
handicapped.  Considerations  such  as  these  may 


134  HEEESIES   OF   SEA  POWEK 

induce  a  losing  action  which  otherwise  would  not  be 
attempted.  In  other  words,  this  means  that  the  course 
of  affairs  may  be  governed  by  the  conditions  of  the 
bases  of  the  other  side  and  the  ease  with  which  damage 
can  be  done  to  them.  A  realisation  of  this  fact  gives 
bases  an  added  importance. 

Bases — not  fleets — will  surely  eventually  be  the  aim 
of  all  naval  warfare,  a  truth  all  will  incline  to  admit 
in  principle  even  now,  though  few  may  clearly  recog- 
nise it  in  detail.  To  destroy  a  base  is  worth  far  more 
risk  and  far  more  loss  than  to  defeat  a  fleet,  which, 
like  the  Kussians  at  Port  Arthur  between  February 
and  August  1904,  may  retreat  to  the  base  for  repair 
and  then  come  out  again.  That  base  attacks  are 
always  the  ultimate  end  of  a  guerre  de  course  is 
generally  ignored  by  those  who  affect  to  despise  the 
jeune  ecole. 

France  is  the  home  of  guerre  de  course  theories, 
and  her  naval  policy  is  always  tinted  by  these  theories. 
Hence  the  long  adherence  to  coast-defence  battleships 
which  are  small  and  cheap,  little  able  to  engage  big 
sea-going  battleships,  but  eminently  fitted  for  long- 
range  bombardments  and  coast  operations  generally. 
In  the  Siegfried  class  Germany  imitated  these  ships 
without  embodying  or  perhaps  understanding  their 
raison  d'etre;  for  the  German  coast-defenders  have 
short-range  guns. 

The  objection  to  coast-defence  ships  is  that  their 
range  and  utility  are  limited,  and  that  they  are  relatively 


BASE  POWEK  135 

more  vulnerable  than  large  ships.  Hence  the  advocacy 
of  floating  batteries  in  which  speed  is  entirely  sacrificed 
to  invulnerability.  Such  craft  are  probably  best  armed 
with  something  very  superior  to  the  best  modern 
12-inch  and  a  strong  battery  of  4*7  or  4-inch  against 
torpedo  boat  attack,  though,  as  they  would  have  to 
carry  little  that  any  ordinary  ship  needs,  it  should  be 
possible  so  to  build  them  that  torpedo  attack  is  little  to 
be  feared.  They  could  safely  move  a  few  miles  out 
to  attack  a  fleet  attempting  a  long-range  bombardment, 
while  their  moral  menace  would  probably  prevent  such 
a  bombardment  being  attempted  by  an  enemy  liable  to 
be  interrupted  by  a  defending  fleet  coming  up.  To 
close  them  would  be  a  very  grave  risk— from  afar  off 
they  could  not  be  hurt. 

Garrison  Artillery  would  well  serve  to  man  such 
batteries,  with  possibly  a  naval  warrant  officer  as 
*  master,'  and  a  navigator,  locally  employed  in  general 
command  of  the  masters.  There  would  be  no  need 
for  other  sailors  on  board  them,  let  alone  that  it  would 
be  a  long  day  before  sailors  could  be  spared  for  such 
duties.  As  things  are  at  present  Garrison  Artillery 
are  in  a  great  measure  a  wasted  force,  or  rather  so 
much  sunk  and  unemployed  capital.  In  mobile 
batteries  they  would  not  only  be  better  able  to  defend 
their  harbours  against  attack,  but  they  would  also 
(a  most  important  point)  be  eminently  able  to  attack 
the  forts  of  the  enemy. 

It  is  surely  the  enemy's  bases  not  his  fleets  that 


136  HEEESIES  OF   SEA  POWEE 

must  be  attacked.  If  a  stronger  power  wars  with  a 
weaker,  and  the  weaker  battle-fleets  remain  in  harbour 
declining  combat  on  the  sea,  the  stronger  battle-fleets 
have  but  a  limited  utility  and  will  come  to  represent 
sunk  capital  that  cannot  be  realised  save  in  bad 
weather,  when  monitors  and  the  like  would  have  to 
make  harbour. 

It  is  of  the  nature  of  a  digression,  but  one  may 
well  pause  here  to  inquire  whether  the  battleship  is 
really  logical,  or  really  needed  save  to  oppose  other 
battleships.  The  '  ironclad  '  was  born  in  the  American 
civil  war.  The  combatants  there  were  ill-matched, 
the  South  had  not  the  building  resources  of  the  North. 
Had  things  been  otherwise,  had  the  combatants  had 
equal  resources  in  the  construction  of  monitors,  it  is 
at  least  permissible  to  speculate  as  to  whether  the 
battle-fleets  of  to-day  would  ever  have  grown  into 
existence.  The  Thunderer,  the  Kearsage,  and  the 
Trisvititelia  would  perhaps  seem  the  line  along 
which  ship-building  would  have  proceeded,  and  naval 
warfare,  realising  the  spirit  as  well  as  the  substance 
of  modern  times,  would  have  become  solely  a  matter 
of  attack  on  bases.  As  things  are  we  would  seem  to 
have  taken  the  substance  without  the  spirit.  Nothing 
is  so  conservative  as  the  sea  service,  and  as  already 
noted,  directly  almost  that  the  ironclad  was  formulated, 
efforts  were  made  to  harmonise  it  with  old  conditions. 
The  most  modern  ironclad  is  merely  the  three-decker 
redivivus,  controlled  and  directed  chiefly  by  the  spirit 


BASE  POWER  137 

of  the  old  days.  This  may  partly  be  attributed  to 
the  existence  of  '  seamen.'  When  the  ironclad  idea 
first  entered,  the  seaman  appeared  likely  to  be  super- 
seded by  the  '  soldier  at  sea ' — the  integral  idea  of 
the  earliest  ages.  Fleets  and  sailors  represented  an 
immense  amount  of  sunk  capital, — so  much  '  stock  '  as 
it  were. 

The  true  inwardness  of  this  may  perhaps  be  made 
clearer  by  a  reference  to  an  incident  of  every-day  life. 
A  publisher,  let  us  say,  prints  2,000  copies  of  a  book 
upon  some  subject  that  quickly  grows  out  of  date. 
Having  sold  1,000  of  his  first  edition,  he  finds  that 
the  book  is  out-of-date,  new  facts  having  come  into 
existence  since  the  work  was  published.  To  reprint 
an  up-to-date  book  means  practically  a  new  book,  and 
it  certainly  entails  the  sacrifice  as  waste  paper  of 
half  the  first  edition.  Business  instinct  forces  the 
publisher,  first  to  postpone  any  new  edition  as  long 
as  possible,  so  as  to  sacrifice  as  little  as  may  be  of 
his  stock,  secondly  all  his  efforts  are  directed  to 
utilizing  the  stock  to  bring  it  to  date  by  adding 
addenda  pages  to  the  original  book. 

This  is  exactly  what  happened  with  the  navies  of 
the  world :  all  nations  that  had  large  fleets  of  un- 
armoured  ships  avoided  the  ironclad  as  long  as  they 
dared,  and,  forced  to  adopt  it,  sought  to  do  so  as 
cheaply  as  possible.  It  was  grafted  on  to  the  old 
navies  and  evolved  to  suit  the  old  navies.  Thus 
masts  and  yards — bound  up  with  the  existence  of 


138  HERESIES  OF   SEA  POWER 

seamen — were  adhered  to  as  long  as  possible,  and  the 
mastless  ship  only  very  slowly  evolved.  The  very 
existence  almost  into  the  twentieth  century  of  a  school 
which  claimed  the  utility  of  mast  and  yard  work  as 
sound  training  for  bluejackets  who  would  never  have 
to  apply  their  knowledge ;  is  a  proof  of  how  the  new 
navy  was  grafted  on  to  the  old.  Long  before  the 
ironclad  appeared  it  was  obvious  that  steam  alone 
was  fully  sufficient  as  a  motive  power.  A  hundred 
million  pounds  were  expended  to  avoid  the  wasting 
of  less  than  ten  millions  of  '  invested  capital.'  To 
create  a  modern  navy  in  the  early  sixties  would  have 
entailed  heroic  sacrifices,  the  sweeping  away  of  all 
the  naval  service  and  the  substitution  of  the  oldest 
sea  warrior,  the  soldier  at  sea.  It  has  taken  the 
nations  nearly  forty  years  to  realise  and  accomplish 
that  fact ;  even  to  a  partial  extent.  It  has  needed, 
in  fine,  a  new  generation  of  sailors  who  are  not 
'seamen/  sailors  still  in  name,  but,  in  actual  fact, 
compounds  (in  the  wide  sense)  of  engineers  and 
marines.  Such  an  assertion  is  hardly  received  afloat ; 
but  that  is  because  men  forget  that  this  is  what  the 
great  early  sailors  were.  The  '  seaman,'  though  such 
famous  names  as  Nelson  are  enrolled  in  his  lists,  is 
simply  the  rower  of  the  past  put  to  do  the  fighting 
as  well  as  the  moving.  The  process  of  a  similar 
evolution  to-day  would  be  to  eliminate  all  except  the 
naval  engineers  and  put  them  to  do  the  fighting ;  the 
opposite  alternatives  to  convert  the  military  ranks 


BASE   POWEE  139 

into  engineers.  Most  nations  have  adopted  a  com- 
promise whereby  the  engineer  partially  replaces  the 
old  time  seaman,  and  the  deck  officer  and  his  men  the 
old  time  soldiers-at-sea. 

Ancient  history  has  only  a  relative  bearing  on 
modern  practice.  Learned  professors  have  evolved 
wonderful  histories  of  military  strategy  in  the  early 
and  middle  ages  and  in  past  centuries,  the  study  of 
which  is  supposed  to  help  the  modern  soldier.  But 
such  modern  soldiers  as  are  out  of  the  rut  of  ordinary 
progress  seem  to  pin  little  faith  in  the  Past  as  a 
criterion  for  the  Future.  Its  utility  is  a  classical  idea, 
and  in  great  measure  bounded  by  the  fact  that  the 
enemy  has  the  same  fancy.  It  was  the  modern  idea 
not  the  Past  that  enabled  Germany  to  beat  France  in 
1870-71. 

On  the  sea  greater  changes  have  been  at  work. 
On  the  land  there  has  been  a  steady  and  constant 
evolution,  nothing  approaching  a  complete  revolution 
has  occurred.  On  the  sea  the  revolution  has  been 
immense,  and  if  there  has  not  been  a  complete  volte 
face,  it  is  due  only  to  the  retarding  influences  alluded 
to  above.  'Tactics  alter,  but  principles  of  strategy 
do  not,'  says  the  gospel  of  the  day.  It  is  not  true. 
Tactics  remain  much  as  they  were,  because  the  old 
idea  of  a  warship  still  remains — strategy  on  the  other 
hand  has  completely  changed.  The  destruction  of 
bases  by  Sea  Power  in  the  days  of  the  great  French 
war  was  impossible — to-day  it  is  fully  possible  to  the 


140  HEEESIES  OF   SEA  POWEE 

nation  that  chooses  to  avail  itself  of  modern  advance, 
and  has  the  power  to  carry  it  through.  Substantially 
it  is  what  Japan  did  do  at  Port  Arthur  in  1904,  though 
her  policy  was  hampered  by  traditions  and  the  means 
for  effective  warfare  against  a  base  were  not  hers.  A 
respect  for  tradition  caused  Togo  to  make  the  Port 
Arthur  fleet  his  objective ;  but  those  much-condemned 
bombardments  of  his  show  that  he  also  had  a  clear 
conception  that,  the  base  destroyed,  the  fleet  would 
matter  nothing.  This  is  where  strategy  has  so  altered  : 
in  the  old  days  the  fleet  not  the  base  was  the  heart  of 
things :  to-day  the  base  is  the  heart  pure  and  simple 
and  the  ships,  whatever  their  radius,  are  but  arms  of 
the  base.  Admiral  Togo's  real  claim  to  immortality 
is,  perhaps,  not  that  he  won  the  battle  of  the  Sea 
of  Japan,  but  that  he  bombarded  Port  Arthur,  did 
enough  damage  to  retard  the  repair  of  ships  and  sub- 
sequently landed  a  naval  brigade  whose  shore  battery 
made  it  out  of  the  question  for  the  Kussians  to  repair 
their  damaged  vessels. 

Still  Togo  (or  Japan)  imperfectly  understood  base- 
attack,  since  the  Japanese  Fleet  lay  inactive  till  Eoges- 
tvensky,  after  many  delays,  drew  near.  It  then  took 
the  unnecessary  hazard  of  a  naval  battle  which  it  could 
have  avoided  had  it  taken  Vladivostok  in  the  months 
of  waiting.  The  brilliant  success  of  the  battle  in 
which  the  Baltic  Fleet  was  annihilated  is  a  detail 
and  a  side  issue.  Had  Eussian  shooting  been  good, 
had  Eogestvensky  had  a  proper  supply  of  torpedo  craft, 


BASE  POWEK  141 

victory  might  have  been  his.  It  was  always  possible 
that  he  might  win.  Hence  the  risk  of  the  sea  fight 
upon  which  Japan  staked  everything — because  of 
tradition. 

The  army  of  Nogi,  transferred  to  the  front  after 
the  fall  of  Port  Arthur  very  probably  contributed  to 
the  victory  of  Mukden ;  but  Mukden  was  relatively  a 
useless  victory.  Oyama,  with  half  as  many  men  as 
he  had,  entrenched  anywhere  in  Korea,  would  have 
served  to  occupy  Kuropatkin  enough  for  Nogi  to  begin 
investing  Vladivostok.  Vladivostok  is  a  far  superior 
base  to  Port  Arthur,  but  Japan  after  the  fall  of  Port 
Arthur  could  certainly  have  installed  a  land  battery 
capable  of  destroying  the  dockyard,  and  Togo's  ships 
by  long-range  firing  could  have  assisted  that  end. 
Without  a  base  before  him  Eogestvensky  would  never 
have  come  to  the  Far  East  at  all.  Thus  Kussia  would 
have  preserved  her  Baltic  Fleet ;  but  that  would  have 
been  immaterial  to  Japan.  If  the  base  be  destroyed, 
it  is  immaterial  whether  the  fleet  belonging  to  it  floats 
or  lies  under  the  waves — it  has  ceased  to  be  a  weapon. 
With  Vladivostok  taken  or  rendered  untenable,  six 
months  of  the  war  would  have  been  saved,  for  Japan 
would  then  have  been  supreme  upon  the  water  and  in 
possession  of  all  for  which  she  fought.  By  delaying  the 
attack  on  Vladivostok,  she  left  the  taking  of  that  place 
dependent  on  the  chance  of  Kussia  being  prepared  to 
make  peace  or  else  upon  a  siege  begun  six  months 
later  than  it  need  have  been.  And  six  months  in  a 


142  HEEESIES   OF   SEA  POWEE 

modern  war  costs  a  very  great  deal.  To  Japan  it 
meant  that  Vladivostok  remained  Eussian. 

A  remarkable  illustration  of  the  importance  of 
bases  has  been  afforded  by  Eussia  herself.  When  the 
crew  of  the  Kniaz  Potemkin  Tavritchesky  mutinied 
(1905)  and  declared  'war/  what  possibilities  might 
have  seemed  to  be  theirs.  They  had  nothing  to  fear 
from  the  remaining  Eussian  battleships,  coal  was  to 
be  had  for  the  seizing  of  Eussian  colliers,  food  for  the 
demanding.  And  the  ship  did — nothing.  Lack  of 
agreement  amongst  the  mutineers,  some  for  the  bold 
course,  some  for  the  safer,  might  account  for  this  in 
part,  but  by  no  means  wholly.  They  had,  however, 
no  base,  and  so  drifted  to  a  neutral  harbour  and  in- 
glorious surrender.  This  the  Eussian  Admiralty, 
which  had  had  ample  opportunity  to  realise  the 
importance  of  the  base  question  probably  recognised : 
hence  the  casual  official  acceptance  of  the  situation 
when  the  mutiny  began. 

It  may  be  urged  that  had  the  Japanese  invested 
Vladivostok  and  so  prevented  Eogestvensky  from 
coming  East,  the  Baltic  Fleet  would  have  been  left  to 
damage  Japanese  commerce  in  the  Indian  Ocean  or 
around  the  Straits  of  Malacca.  Its  lack  of  a  base, 
however,  would  have  prevented  this,  even  supposing 
appreciable  commerce  to  have  been  open  to  attack. 
Eogestvensky  could  have  done  nothing  except  morally ; 
and  moral  menaces  do  not  long  bring  forth  fruit.  The 
failure  to  destroy  or  neutralise  Vladivostok  was,  there- 


BASE   POWER  143 

fore,  surely  a  grave  error,  condoned  only  by  the  lucky 
chance  that  Bogestvensky  proved  easy  to  defeat  at 
Tsushima.  Is  not  the  hostile  base  rather  than  the 
hostile  fleet  the  true  objective  of  modern  naval  war  ? 

The  importance  of  bases  is  usually  fully  recognised 
afloat :  indeed  it  is  afloat  that  all  the  apostles  of  what 
— for  want  of  a  better  term — may  be  called  *  Base 
Power  '  are  to  be  found. 

In  the  days  of  sailing  ships  the  base  was  almost 
non-essential.  Six  months'  stores  were  carried,  and 
the  base  was  necessary  merely  for  powder,  shot  and 
spars.  Powder  and  shot  were,  however,  easily  to  be 
found  anywhere  and  did  not  need  frequent  replenish- 
ing, while  any  forest  almost  was  able  to  supply  spars. 
In  the  matter  of  spare  sails  any  merchant  ship  could 
be  commandeered,  consequently  a  fleet  was  able  to 
extemporise  bases  anywhere.  Orthodox  bases,  at  the 
same  time,  were  easily  defended  and  made  impregnable 
and  liable  to  no  dangers  save  that  of  blockade — tedious 
work  for  which  few  navies  were  fitted.  The  hostile 
fleet  was  the  only  objective.  Base  attacks  were  rarely 
if  ever  attempted  later  than  the  seventeenth  century — 
practically  they  ceased  to  be  made  long  before  that 
except  in  exceptional  circumstances.  Generally  speak- 
ing the  base  was  impregnable. 

To-day  hardly  an  impregnable  base  exists,  though 
by  courtesy  nearly  all  bases  are  so  styled.  Actual 
impregnability  is  conferred  only  by  the  existence  of  a 
fleet,  which,  in  its  relation  to  a  base  exactly  reproduces 


144  HERESIES  OF   SEA  POWEE 

the  conditions  of  the  members  in  relation  to  the  belly 
in  the  fable.  Fleet  and  base  are  inter-dependent, 
except  that  whereas  the  fleet  cannot  exist  without  a 
base,  the  base  can  go  on  existing  for  a  considerable 
period  without  a  fleet.  While  it  exists,  unless  in- 
vested, it  is  a  constant  danger  because  of  its  ability  to 
create  fresh  ships.  It  must  be  taken  or  neutralised. 
Surely  the  cheapest  way  to  take  it  is  with  monitor- 
batteries  which  can  go  in,  invulnerable,  to  victory ; 
and  the  most  economical  way  to  create  such  floating 
batteries  would  seem  to  be  to  build  them  instead  of 
forts.  If,  however,  they  are  built  as  of  old  as  adjuncts 
of  the  sea-going  navy  then  presumably  the  old  cycle 
will  be  imitated  with  the  old  results. 


Ill 

THE   GUEEEE   DE   COURSE 

To  every  nation  with  a  sea-borne  trade  the  defence 
of  commerce  is  an  acute  question.  So  difficult  and 
complicated  is  it  that  there  is  a  general  conspiracy 
now  and  again  to  shelve  it. 

Let  us  first  examine  the  attack.  Attacks  on  com- 
merce are  part  of  the  programme  of  the  guerre  de 
course,  that  much  scorned  system  which  has  far  more 
method  in  its  madness  than  most  authorities  are  wont 
to  allow.  It  is  very  easy  to  take  history  and  prove 
therefrom  that  the  side  which  adopted  the  guerre  de 
course  did  not  win.  Therefore,  it  is  argued,  the  guerre 
de  course  is  a  bruised  reed  on  which  to  rely. 

The  facts  are  correct,  but  the  deduction  is  often 
unwarranted.  To  appreciate  the  question  we  must 
ask — which  we  never  do — how  else  could  that  side 
have  won  ?  If  we  go  into  the  matter  a  little  from  this 
point  of  view,  we  shall  see  that  it  never  had  a  chance 
of  winning  by  the  '  grand  war.'  The  guerre  de  course 
is  not,  and  perhaps  was  never  intended  to  be,  a  recipe 
for  victory,  but  is  simply  the  scheme  which  promises 
best  to  the  weaker  side  which,  accepting  '  grand  war,' 

L 


146  HEKESIES  OF   SEA  POWEK 

would  accept  inevitable  and  rapid  defeat,  whereas  by  a 
guerre  de  course  it  prolongs  operations  very  consider- 
ably and  knows  that  before  going  under  it  will  do 
some  damage.  Can  we  conclude,  therefore,  that  the 
guerre  de  course  is  other  than  logical  for  the  weaker 
side? 

The  best — being  the  simplest  and  least  confused — 
instance  of  the  application  of  a  guerre  de  course  is  to 
be  found  in  the  Chili-Peruvian  War  of  1879-1881.  In 
this  conflict  the  two  principal  Peruvian  ships  were 
entirely  unfitted  to  meet  the  two  principal  Chilians — a 
'  grand  battle '  would  have  been  a  foregone  conclusion. 
The  possibility  of  taking  the  Chilians  in  detail  offered 
no  prospects,  since  the  two  Peruvians  together  were 
barely  equal  to  one  Chilian.  Also,  one  of  them,  the 
Independencia,  was  lost  at  once,  and  so  the  effective 
Peruvian  force  was  reduced  to  the  turret-ship  Huascar. 
Peru,  therefore,  in  adopting  the  guerre  de  course 
did  the  only  thing  that  promised  a  prolongation  of  the 
naval  war.  The  Chilian  coast  was  harried,  a  Chilian 
army  in  the  north  cut  off  from  its  base  through  the 
interception  of  transports,  and  generally  damage  was 
inflicted  almost  as  though  no  Chilian  Fleet  existed. 

Of  course  the  end  came  at  last.  The  Huascar  was 
caught  in  Angamos  Bay  and  after  a  fine  fight  captured. 
But  what  would  it  have  availed  Peru  had  she  accepted 
that  battle  in  the  beginning  instead  of  at  the  end? 
As  things  were,  much  mischief  was  inflicted,  and  once 
at  least  the  Huascar  in  her  depredatory  course 


THE  GUEKKE  DE  COUESE  147 

secured  an  opportunity  to  torpedo  one  of  the  opposing 
battleships.  She  failed,  because  the  torpedo  did  not 
run  truly,  but  this  is  in  the  chapter  of  bad  luck 
rather  than  anything  else.  Had  she  succeeded,  the 
advantages  of  a  guerre  de  course  would  have  been 
patent.  The  '  might  have  been '  is,  however,  as  valuable 
to  our  purpose  as  anything  else,  since  it  indicates  the 
possibilities  of  the  strategy  adopted  by  Peru. 

The  Huascar  was  further  hampered  by  Chili  making 
what — without  dogma — may  be  called  the  correct 
reply.  There  was  very  little  in  the  way  of  splitting 
up  to  protect  commerce  and  coasts,  the  Chilians  kept 
together,  having  the  definite  objective  of  cornering  their 
antagonist  always  in  view. 

This  war  then  indicates  the  intelligibility  of  the 
guerre  de  course  as  the  refuge  of  the  weaker  power. 

It  is,  curiously  enough,  the  only  instance  of  it  in 
the  ironclad  age.  In  the  Austro-Italian  war  of  1866 
the  Italian  fleet,  which  was  the  stronger,  wasted  its 
efforts  on  other  objects  than  the  hostile  fleet,  but 
hardly  sufficiently  for  the  operations  to  be  called  guerre 
de  course.  The  Chino- Japanese  war  and  the  Hispano- 
American  conflict  were  of  the  nature  of  ships  fighting 
each  other,  and  so  also,  except  partially,  was  the  Kusso- 
Japanese  War. 

The  exception  was  the  action  of  the  Vladivostok 
squadron,  which  unfitted  to  fight  successfully  with 
the  Japanese  cruisers,  attempted  raids  and  commerce 
attack.  In  this  it  had  some  success,  and  had  it  not 

L  2 


148  HEEESIES  OF   SEA  POWEE 

been  burdened  by  the  company  of  the  slow  Eurik,  and 
the  loss  by  grounding  of  the  fast  Bogatyr  it  might 
have  accomplished  more.  Yet  Eussia  never  attempted 
a  properly  thought  out  guerre  de  course.  Her  Port 
Arthur  fleet  acted  with  the  grand  battle  in  view,  and 
the  Vladivostok  cruisers  at  the  time  of  their  defeat 
by  Kamimura  were  apparently  engaged,  not  on  a 
guerre  de  course,  but  in  trying  to  join  the  Port  Arthur 
ships  for  a  grand  battle.  Moreover,  when  upon  guerre 
de  course  cruises,  fishing  boats  seem  to  have  been  as 
acceptable  to  them  as  Japanese  transports :  there  was 
little  design  in  their  operations  and  still  less  intelli- 
gence. 

The  guerre  de  course,  as  a  danger  to  the  stronger 
Sea  Power,  cannot  be  gauged  from  the  Eussian  travesty 
of  it.  Let  us,  however,  consider  what  Eussia  might 
have  done,  had  she  frankly  recognised  inferiority  after 
the  first  torpedo  attack.  She  had  at  Port  Arthur 
the  Bayan,  Askold,  Diana,  Pallada,  and  Novik — 
all  ships  not  easily  caught  and  the  Bayan  at  least 
moderately  powerful,  and  efficiently  handled.  What 
might  not  have  been  accomplished  by  these  vessels? 
Sooner  or  later,  each  would  have  been  destroyed ;  but 
certainly  they  would  have  done  considerable  mis- 
chief, which  as  certainly  is  what  they  never  accom- 
plished in  the  war  as  it  was  actually  conducted. 
There  was  always  the  chance  at  least  that  depredations 
upon  the  Japanese  communications  might  have 
seriously  impeded  Oyama's  armies  and  perhaps  raised 


THE   GUEEKE   DE   COUESE  149 

such  excitement  in  Japan  that  Togo  would  have  been 
compelled  to  split  his  fleet  to  hunt  for  them ;  in  which 
case  the  Eussian  battleships  might  have  found  some 
opportunity.  Of  course,  this  splitting  would  have  been 
rather  in  the  category  of  things  hoped  for  than  things  to 
be  expected :  still  it  is  a  possibility  of  a  vigorous  guerre 
de  course,  and  Japanese  *  Fitness  to  win '  would  have 
been  the  only  bulwark  against  it. 

There  is  a  reverse  side  to  the  shield.  The  Eussians 
may  have  desired  to  attempt  some  such  strategy  but 
failed  to  see  any  prospect  of  getting  out  on  account  of  the 
Togo  blockade ;  certainly  the  answer  to  it  was  a  rigor- 
ous blockade.  But  to  force  Togo  into  accepting  the 
dangers  and  risk  of  a  close  blockade  would  certainly 
have  been  more  effective  than  allowing  him  to  main- 
tain a  loose  blockade  such  as  sufficed  to  meet  the  actual 
situation. 

However,  there  was  no  guerre  de  course  proper, 
and  the  only  modern  instance  of  it  is  the  Chili-Peruvian 
War  already  mentioned.  Let  us  now  investigate  the 
past  and  see  whether  history  has  anything  that  bears 
upon  the  matter. 

Ancient  history  does  not  record  any  characteristic 
guerre  de  course :  the  grand  battle  sufficed  for  the 
ancients'  simple  aspirations.  Combatants  of  those 
days  were  fully  persuaded  of  the  advisability  of  that 
doctrine,  of  which  Captain  Mahan  has  been  the  modern 
apostle,  that  all  sea  dominion  depends  upon  the  issue 
of  the  grand  battle.  The  Peloponnesians  beaten  by 


150  HEEESIES   OF   SEA  POWEK 

the  Athenians,  simply  collected  another  fleet  and  tried 
again.  Komans  and  Carthaginians  almost  always  did 
the  like;  aud  it  is  only  to  the  Koman  operations 
against  the  Illyrian  pirates  that  we  can  turn  to  find 
any  conspicuous  conflict  between  the  grand  war  and 
the  guerre  de  course. 

In  this  conflict  the  seas  about  Illyria  were  infested 
with  ships  carrying  on  a  general  career  of  piracy — 
between  which  and  the  guerre  de  course  the  difference 
is  not  excessive,  however  different  the  motives  may  be. 

Apparently  the  whole  piratical  fleet  numbered  but 
twenty  ships.  Against  these  Rome  dispatched  two 
hundred  and  a  considerable  army.  Each  Illyrian  base 
was  invested  and  the  ships  in  it  captured  or  destroyed 
— in  a  word,  the  policy  of  '  stopping  the  earths  '  was 
carried  out.  It  is  worthy  of  note  that  Rome  appears 
to  have  done  little  in  the  way  of  convoys,  and  nothing 
in  the  way  of  attempted  suppression  by  the  system  of 
sending  individual  ships  to  *  protect  trade  routes.' 

It  is  to  the  sailing  ship  days  that  we  must  look  for 
all  other  instances — saving  always  the  famous  Alabama 
campaign,  which  will  be  dealt  with  further  on.  The 
most  remarkable  war  from  the  amount  of  commercial 
interests  involved  was  the  Anglo-Dutch  conflict  of 
1665-1667.  Both  sides  had  great  commercial  interests, 
indeed  the  destruction  of  commerce  was  an  objective 
to  both  to  a  degree  that  has  never  been  witnessed 
before  or  since,  though  it  may  one  day  come  between 
England  and  Germany. 


THE   GUEKEE  DE   COUKSE  151 

Commercial  rivalries  produced  the  war ;  and  in 
England  this  cause  was  avowed  in  Monk's  'What 
matters  this  or  that  reason  ?  What  we  want  is  more 
of  the  trade  which  the  Dutch  now  have.' 

The  usual  sea  fights  occurred  with  varying  results, 
but  on  both  sides  trade  suffered  heavily — so  heavily 
that  both  English  and  Dutch  were  growing  exhausted 
and  anxious  for  peace.  Then  it  was  that,  worn  with 
the  expense  of  maintaining  great  fleets,  the  English 
resolved  to  make  the  war  into  a  war  upon  commerce 
alone,  seeing  in  this  the  surest  way  to  attack  the  Dutch 
pocket  and  resisting  power.  The  Dutch  kept  their 
fleets,  and —there  being  nothing  to  oppose  them — went 
up  the  Thames  so  far  as  Gravesend ;  England  then 
signed  peace. 

This  war  is  a  favourite  text  for  those  who  preach 
the  uselessness  of  the  guerre  de  course,  and  the  failure 
of  the  English  in  it  is  used  as  an  illustration.  Yet  it 
is  necessary  to  beware  of  drawing  false  conclusions. 
We  have  always  to  remember  that  the  guerre  de  course 
is  ever  of  the  nature  of  a  device  for  making  the  best  of 
a  poor  cause  and  delaying  defeat,  rather  than  a  bid  for 
victory.  It  is  naturally  an  absurd  strategy  for  the 
stronger  side  to  adopt. 

Nominally,  the  English  were  the  stronger :  when 
they  adopted  commerce  attack  as  their  chief  object 
they  had  just  emerged  from  a  successful  fight.  Their 
resources,  however,  were  very  strained,  and  the  Great 
Plague  was  heavy  upon  London.  The  guerre  de  course 


152  HEEESIES  OF   SEA  POWEE 

conducted  was  a  mild  sort  of  affair ;  at  any  rate  not 
the  most  serious  that  a'  nation  might  encounter. 
Whatever  it  was,  the  Dutch  met  it  by  proceeding 
to  the  English  Coast  and  the  Thames.  They  wasted 
little  or  no  strength  in  chasing  the  English  commerce 
destroyers — the  '  Earths  '  were  their  objective. 

A  more  serious  guerre  de  course  was  carried  on  by 
the  French  in  their  war  with  England  in  1702-12. 
The  Channel  and  North  Sea  were  covered  with 
privateers,  which,  however,  were  unsupported  by  big 
fleets  and  so  very  liable  to  capture.  Yet  the  damage 
done  to  British  shipping  was  very  great  indeed.  Again 
in  a  later  war  the  same  policy  was  pursued.  In  the 
four  years  ending  in  June  1760,  2,500  English  mer- 
chantmen had  been  captured  with  the  loss  of  242 
privateers.  Approximately  the  '  life '  of  a  privateer 
was  ten  British  ships. 

It  has  been  shown  by  Captain  Mahan  that  under 
these  conditions  British  trade  prospered  and  increased : 
and  when  the  war  ended,  it  was  to  England's  advan- 
tage in  both  cases.  But  in  neither  instance  can  the 
French  system  be  fairly  described  as  guerre  de  course 
proper.  This  should  be  borne  in  mind :  because  the 
essential  to  a  successful  or  partially  successful  guerre 
de  course  is  that  its  infliction  of  greater  losses  than 
have  been  anticipated,  shall  so  break  up  and  disconcert 
the  stronger  sea  Power  trying  to  overcome  it,  that  the 
weaker  naval  Power  shall  be  able  to  use  its  battle  fleet 
with  some  prospect  of  success.  That  is  the  dangerous 


THE   GUEKEE   DE   COUKSE  153 

guerre  de  course,  for  which  history  affords  no  object 
lesson  unless  it  be  that  incident  in  the  Chili-Peruvian 
War  when  the  Huascar,  but  for  sheer  bad  luck,  would 
have  destroyed  half  the  serious  naval  force  arrayed 
against  Peru. 

A  final  instance  of  partial  guerre  de  course  remains 
to  be  quoted— the  careers  of  the  Confederate  Alabama 
and  her  consorts.  A  total  of  261  Northern  merchant 
ships  were  captured  and  American  trade  practically 
destroyed.  This  was  done  on  purely  piratical  lines, 
that  is  to  say  there  was  no  guerre  de  course  having 
subsequent  action  by  an  inferior  battle  fleet  as  its 
objective,  but  a  guerre  de  course,  bent  only  on  sheer 
mischief,  and  consequently  less  dangerous.  Yet  it 
annihilated  the  American  merchant  marine. 

From  this  it  is  very  easy  to  draw  deductions, 
plausible  in  themselves,  but  considerably  more  obvious 
than  accurate. 

In  the  first  place,  beyond  some  coasting  corsairs, 
only  two  of  the  Confederate  cruisers  issued  from  Con- 
federate Ports.  Of  these  the  Tallahasse  (subsequently 
named  Olustee)  came  from  Wilmington  and  after 
making  some  prizes  was  turned  into  a  blockade  runner. 
She  was  subsequently  seized  in  England  and  handed 
over  to  the  Northerners. 

The  Sumter,  commanded  by  Semmes,  slipped 
through  the  Northerners'  blockade,  and  was  chased 
afterwards  by  various  Northerners  which  attempted  to 
block  her  earths — and  finally  did  so  at  Gibraltar. 


154  HEEESIES   OF   SEA  POWEE 

The  other  vessels  were  fitted  out  at  British  ports, 
and  though  they  occasionally  ran  the  blockade  into 
Confederate  harbours  they  chiefly  subsisted  on  the 
good  offices  of  neutrals.  British  islands  supplied  coal 
contrary  to  the  neutrality  laws,  but  as  Northern  vessels 
were  similarly  accommodated,1  the  main  issue  was 
perhaps  not  affected. 

The  career  of  the  Florida  ended  in  Bahia  Harbour, 
Brazil,  where  she  was  captured  by  a  Northern  vessel 
in  defiance  of  existing  neutrality  laws — an  act  quite 
morally  justifiable.  The  Florida  had  practically  lived 
on  neutral  ports.  When  neutral  remonstrances  ensued, 
she  was  ordered  to  be  returned  to  Bahia,  but  the 
Northerners  wisely  saw  to  it  that  she  sank  in  Hampton 
Roads. 

The  Alabama,  the  most  successful  of  the  commerce- 
destroyers,  was  fitted  out  in  England.  Under  Semmes 
she  had  a  long  run,  but  was  finally  earthed  at  Cher- 
bourg, though  here  perhaps  she  might  have  escaped 
had  she  not  elected  to  fight  the  Kearsage. 

The  Shenandoah,  also  fitted  out  in  England,  was 
never  captured  and  continued  to  the  end. 

The  Georgia  ran  for  a  year  and  was  then  sold  out 
of  the  Confederate  Service. 

The  total  number    of    commerce-destroyers    was 
11  steamers  and  8  sailing  ships.     The  steamers  des- 
troyed or  captured  about  215  ships,  the  sailers  46, — 
always  small  craft  in  the  latter  case.     The  captures 
1  Bulloch.    Secret  Service.    Instances  nine  cases. 


THE   GUEKKE   DE   COUESE  155 

of  the  steamers  varied  from  69  to  2  per  ship,  of 
which  13  were  recaptured,  so  they  averaged  about 
19  per  ship — which  is  nearly  double  the  average 
'  life '  of  the  French  privateers  in  the  war  previously 
referred  to. 

The  most  serious  effect  of  the  Southern  corsairs 
was,  however,  that  the  terror  of  them  laid  up  American 
commerce  in  neutral  harbours  or  drove  it  under  a 
neutral  flag :  and  this,  it  must  be  remembered,  was 
practically  accomplished  by  half  a  dozen  steamers,  for 
a  full  half  of  the  corsairs  did  very  little  harm  indeed. 
Six  ships,  therefore,  belonging  to  an  absolutely  minor 
naval  power  (the  Confederate  States),  accomplished  a 
practically  permanent  destruction  of  the  mercantile 
marine  of  a  relatively  very  strong  naval  power  (the 
Northerners).  So  far,  however,  as  the  main  issues  of 
the  war  were  concerned,  this  commerce  destruction 
accomplished  nothing,  that  is  to  say  it : — 

(1)  Entirely  failed  to  shake  the  grip  of  the  Northern 
blockade  (a  thing  it  was  perhaps — probably  indeed, — 
designed  to  accomplish). 

(2)  In  no  way  affected  the  victorious  march  into  the 
Confederate  States  of  the  Northern  soldiers. 

In  our  examination  of  the  situation,  this  second 
consideration  need  not,  however,  be  given  much  atten- 
tion. Indeed,  it  demands  none,  save  in  so  far  as  the 
action  of  the  Northern  Fleet  in  bringing  about  the  end 
of  the  war  is  concerned,  and  this  overlaps  the  first  con- 
sideration. 


156  HEEESIES   OF   SEA  POWEK 

The  Northern  Fleet  accomplished,  or  is  credited 
with  having  accomplished,  two  things  :— 

(1)  Its  blockade  reduced  the  food  and  war  material 
supply  of  the  South,  and  by  checking  imports  and  ex- 
ports very  effectually  damaged  Southern  commerce. 

(2)  By  penetrating   the   Mississippi  the  Northern 
Fleet  cut  the  Southern  Confederation  into  two. 

The  first  operation  was  in  its  results  not  very  dis- 
similar to  the  ideal  results  of  a  guerre  de  course,  that  is 
to  say  it  ruined  Southern  trade  very  effectually.  The 
situation  here,  it  will  be  observed,  reproduces  tolerably 
closely  (despite  such  differences  as  the  fact  that  the 
South  was  not  self-supporting  and  England  in  those 
days  was)  of  the  Anglo-Dutch  War  in  the  time  of 
Charles  II.  when  England  abandoned  grand  war  for 
commerce  war.  England  was  then  much  in  the 
position  of  the  Southerners,  and  Holland  of  the 
Northerners. 

The  second  operation  of  the  Northern  Fleet  is  more 
of  a  compliment  to  the  Northern  Navy  than  the  state- 
ment of  a  serious  fact.  For  though  all  that  is  alleged 
is  true  enough ;  yet  it  could  all  have  been  accomplished 
purely  by  land  power  in  a  somewhat  longer  time. 
Incidentally,  so,  perhaps,  could  the  first  operation. 
Once  Northern  soldiers  had  got  inside  a  Confederate 
port,  they  became  more  effectual  at  preventing  Con- 
federate ships  using  the  harbour  than  any  number 
of  Northern  ships  outside,  since  they  destroyed  the 
base. 


THE   GUEEEE  DE   COUESE  157 

This  consideration  tends  to  depreciate  the  value  of 
Sea  Power  in  the  campaign  :  but  it  is  not  to  be  denied 
on  that  account.  Northern  Sea  Power  accelerated  the 
end  of  the  Confederate  States:  it  did  not  cause  it, 
because  the  war  was  primarily  a  land  war.  Except, 
therefore,  in  so  far  as  the  Northern  Fleet  contributed  to 
the  destruction  of  bases  or  the  earthing  of  Southern 
corsairs  its  part  in  the  war  was  merely  of  the  nature  of 
an  auxiliary  force  to  the  Army. 

In  attacks  on  bases  it  was  not  very  effectively  used  : 
more  might  have  been  done  in  this  respect  had  it  been 
well  supplied  with  soldiers  to  form  landing  parties  in 
force. 

In  its  operations  against  the  commerce  destroyers, 
its  task  was  in  many  ways  peculiar. 

(1)  The  fitting  out  of  corsairs  in  England  was  a 
situation  which  could  hardly  have  been   anticipated 
effectively.     The  laxity  of  the  British  Government  has, 
perhaps,  been  exaggerated ;  but  still  laxity  existed.     It 
was  to  have  been  met,  however,  once  the  situation  was 
realised,  by  the  stationing  of   a   strong  force  in  the 
Channel  to  intercept  any  corsairs  issuing  from  British 
ports.     This,   of  course,   would   have   weakened    the 
blockade  of  the  Southern  coast ;  but  that  blockade  was 
(in  the  circumstances)  less  essential  than  the  suppres- 
sion of  the  corsairs. 

(2)  Throughout  the  war  both  sides  were  granted 
extraordinary  facilities  by  neutrals.     As  already  men- 
tioned, coal  for  the  express  purpose   of    carrying    on 


158  HEKESIES  OF   SEA  POWEK 

depredations  or  for  checking  depredations  in  certain 
waters  was  to  be  had  for  the  asking  almost  anywhere. 
In  addition  docking  facilities  were  equally  easy  to 
obtain — thirteen  Northerners  and  eleven  Confederates 
being  repaired  in  British  ports  alone.1 

(3)  The  ships  actually  preyed  upon  were  mostly 
sailing  vessels :  the  transition  from  sail  to  steam  being 
just  then  in  process  of  accomplishment.  It  is  infinitely 
easier  for  a  steamer  to  intercept  sailing  vessels,  than 
for  steamers  to  intercept  steamers. 

Now  these  three  peculiarities  will  not  occur  in  any 
future  war :  nor  are  any  of  them  to  be  found  in  any 
past  one  to  an  appreciable  extent.  Consequently  the 
task  of  the  Northerners  was  unusually  hard. 

On  the  other  hand  it  was,  in  another  respect,  re- 
markably easy,  in  that  the  corsairs  were  :— 
(a)  Few  in  number. 
(6)  Of  small  account  as  warships. 
Therefore,  on  the  grounds  of  absolute  fairness  and 
on  the  grounds  that  in  examining  this  matter  it  is 
better  to  over-  than  under-estimate  the   danger   of 
commerce  attack,  we  may  perhaps  with  logic,  hold  that 
a  and  b  did  much  to  neutralise  the  peculiar  conditions 
set  out  under  the  head  of  1,  2,  and  3 — certainly  those 
under  heads  1  and  2. 

The  matter  then  still  resolves  itself  into  this  :— 
The  few   corsairs   of    the  insignificant   naval  power 
ruined  the  sea-borne  trade  of  the  strong  naval  power — 
1  Bulloch,  Secret  Service,  II. 


THE   GUEKEE   DE   COUESE  159 

a  loss  America  was  far  better  able  to  stand  than  England 
would  be,  for  such  a  destruction  of  commerce  would  be 
absolute  ruin  to  the  British  Empire,  and  war  won  at 
the  cost  of  commerce  would  be  worse  than  a  Pyrrhic 
victory. 

In  the  Anglo-French  wars  cited  English  commerce 
survived  the  depredations  of  French  privateers  which 
had  lives  of  approximately  10  merchant  ships  per 
corsair.  Nineteen  ships  per  corsair  destroyed  American 
commerce  altogether.  Why  was  this  ? 

The  possible  reasons  may  perhaps  be  given  as 
follows  : — 

1.  Luck. 

2.  The  greater  attractions  of  over-sea  trade  to  the 
British  than  to  the  Americans. 

3.  The  existence  of  other  causes  which  naturally 
tended  to  the  decline  of  American  merchant  shipping. 

4.  Better  anti-corsair  dispositions. 
Let  us  examine  them  in  detail. 

1.  Luck.    The  question  of  luck  is  one  that  cannot 
easily  be  examined.     It  was  probably  an  important 
factor  :  but  this  is  all  that  can  be  said  about  it ! 

2.  Trade  Adaptability.     Trade  was  more  essential 
to  the  English  than  to  the  Northerners.     This  especially 
acted  as  regards  ships  laid  up.     The  inducements  to 
put  to  sea  and  take  risks  were  greater  with  the  English. 
In  the  Northern  States  these  inducements  did  not  obtain : 
further,  of  course,  there  was  the  additional  disruption 
of  a  Civil  War  almost  at  the  door  as  it  were — for  when 


160  HEEESIES  OF   SEA  POWER 

there  is  nothing  but  land  between  a  man  and  the  hostile 
armies,  he  is  very  apt  to  forget  the  extent  of  the  distance 
or  his  own  armies  barring  the  way. 

3.  Decline  from  other  causes.     This  should  by  no 
means  be  forgotten.     The  change  from  wood  to  iron 
was  of  itself  sufficient  to  greatly  dislocate  the  American 
shipping  industry. 

4.  Anti-corsair  dispositions.     The  English  in  the 
war  with  France    carried  on   a  vigorous    campaign 
against   the  privateers  with   little   mercy  and  much 
hate.     This  tended  to  render  the  corsairs  nervous,  and 
if  one  eye  was  still  on  attack,  one  was  also  always  on 
escape. 

To  the  Confederates  '  escape '  was  less  ever  present. 
If  captured  the  crews  had  no  barbarous  treatment  to 
dread,  they  were  recognised  'naval  men,'  and — the  war 
being  a  civil  one — many  of  them,  inspired  in  their 
career  by  the  desire  of  gain  as  much,  or  more,  than  by 
any  convictions,  probably  had  in  mind  that  sides  could 
be  changed  if  the  worst  came  to  the  worst.  Such  con- 
siderations were  of  some  assistance  to  them.  Then, 
too,  the  principal  Northern  effort  was  concentrated  in 
the  blockade  of  the  Southern  Coasts  :  the  ships  devoted 
to  dealing  with  the  corsairs  were  neither  many  nor,  as 
a  rule,  well  suited  to  the  task.  The  general  dispositions 
were  poor.  Individual  ships  wandered  blindly  about 
seeking  individual  corsairs  :  only  a  portion  of  effort 
was  devoted  to  '  stopping  the  earths.'  The  inordinate 
number  of  these  '  earths  '  has  already  been  alluded  to  : 


THE   GUERRE   DE   COURSE  161 

also  the  error  made  in  not  stopping  egress  in  the  first 
place  from  neutral  harbours.  Had  the  North  devoted 
greater  attention  to  this  question,  it  is  probable  that 
the  Southern  campaign  would  have  been  less  successful 
than  it  was. 

All  this  has  been  said  before  to-day :  indeed,  points 
have  been  strained  to  show  that  commerce  attack 
besides  being  incapable  of  anything  save  negative 
results  so  far  as  the  success  or  otherwise  of  the  war 
is  concerned  is  not  necessarily  serious  in  its  effects. 

On  the  whole,  even  though  history  shows  the 
American  Civil  War  to  be  almost  the  only  instance  of 
really  disastrous  results  following  commerce  attack,  it 
is  probably  extremely  dangerous  to  under-estimate  its 
danger — certainly  for  a  nation  situated  as  the  British, 
whose  over-sea  trade  constitutes  the  means  of  existence. 
Always  it  must  be  remembered  that— save  in  the  very 
small  case  of  Chili  and  Peru — the  real  guerre  de  course 
has  never  been  attempted.  A  corsair  war  having  results 
such  as  the  Southern  War  against  commerce  would  be 
absolutely  fatal  to  the  United  Kingdom — and  nothing 
is  gained  by  attempts  to  minimise  it. 

The  guerre  de  course  must,  therefore,  be  prepared 
against :  and  that,  too,  not  a  partial  and  immature 
attempt  such  as  history  only  records,  but  a  really 
scientific  guerre  de  course  based  on  the  fact  that  this 
form  of  war  is  the  best  for  the  weaker  Power,  and  that 
it  may  be  definitely  adopted  to  split  the  stronger 
Power's  fleets  and  efforts,  because  the  result  of  things 

M 


162  HEEESIES  OF   SEA  POWEK 

is  so  felt  that  an  uninformed  and  non-technical  public 
insists  upon  such  naval  dispositions  as  appeal  to  its 
crude  judgment.  Here  lies  the  most  serious  danger 
of  all. 

In  strict  International  Law  a  captured  merchant 
ship  must  be  taken  to  a  port  of  the  capturer,  where 
lawyers  will  argue  at  great  length  as  to  the  exact 
definition  of  the  word  contraband,  the  legality  of  the 
capture  and  half  a  dozen  other  things.  Were  there 
any  guarantee  that  all  such  formulae  would  be  strictly 
observed,  then  lawyers  would  be  almost  as  useful  and 
valuable  as  cruisers,  and  the  problems  of  commerce 
defence  much  simplified.  There  is  not,  however,  the 
slightest  prospect  that  any  nation  at  war  is  going  to 
tie  its  hands  with  legal  questions  more  than  it  is 
absolutely  compelled  to  do.  When  Monk,  on  the  eve 
of  the  Anglo-Dutch  war  made  his  famous  remark, 
'  What  matters  this  or  that  reason  ?  What  we  want 
is  more  of  the  trade  that  the  Dutch  now  have/ — he 
uttered  an  eternal  verity,  capable  of  wide  application. 
In  any  future  war  in  which  the  British  are  likely  to  be 
engaged  and  in  which  British  trade  is  imperilled,  the 
enemy  will  undoubtedly  '  want '  that  trade.  And  the 
want  will  exceed  any  respect  he  may  have  for  Inter- 
national Law  that  is  likely  to  interfere  with  his  aims. 

Consequently  the  legal  aspects  of  the  question  may 
be  dismissed  as  not  worth  consideration — Might  alone 
will  make  Eight.1  Probably  only  the  threat  of  the 
1  See  Chapter  on  '  International  Law.' 


THE  GUEEEE  DE   COUKSE  163 

British  Fleet  will  prevent  every  neutral  harbour  being 
used  as  a  corsair  base  when  convenient :  certainly  no 
belligerent  will  be  sufficiently  foolish  to  try  and  take 
prizes  into  his  harbours  through  British  cruisers 
certain  to  recapture.  He  will  sink  them  first — just  as 
the  Kussians  (quite  soundly)  sank  everything  that  they 
captured  and  could  not  take  away  in  their  war  with 
Japan. 

In  a  well-conceived  guerre  de  course  the  capture 
of  British  merchant  ships  for  gain  will  be  quite  a 
secondary  object.  The  destruction  of  British  com- 
merce in  order  to  produce  financial  straits  and  popular 
agitation  will  be  the  prime  objective — and  if  there 
exists  any  Eternal  Truth  about  the  strategy  of  this 
form  of  war  the  prospects  of  British  commerce  going 
the  same  way  as  American  commerce  would  be  very 
strong. 

Fortunately  there  is  no  Eternal  Verity  in  this 
matter :  and  the  teachings  of  history  to  the  effect  that 
provided  you  can  escape  the  enemy  you  can  destroy 
his  merchant  ships  with  impunity  is  no  longer  a 
truth. 

With  the  advance  of  civilisation  two  entirely  new 
things  have  arisen  to  interfere  with  the  full  success  of 
commerce  attack : — 

(1)  Public  opinion. 

(2)  International  complications, 

(1)  Public  opinion.  This  has  gradually  become  a 
source  of  grave  inconvenience  to  the  corsair.  In 

M  2 


164  HEEESIES  OF   SEA  POWEE 

ancient  times  there  was  no  problem  about  the  crew  of 
the  captured  ship.  Unless  they  were  worth  keeping  for 
sale  as  slaves  and  so  in  the  same  category  as  '  specie,' 
their  throats  were  cut  and  they  were  thrown  over- 
board. 

Then  a  consensus  of  public  opinion  declared  against 
these  primitive  methods :  the  merchant  sailors  must 
not  be  injured  to  this  extent.  They  could  still,  how- 
ever, be  quickly  disposed  of  by  shutting  them  down  in 
the  hold  or  they  could  be  set  adrift  in  a  boat  to  take 
their  chance. 

Again  public  opinion  gradually  intervened,  and 
to-day  the  captured  crews  must  be  sumptuously 
treated,  allowed  to  retain  their  private  property,  and 
generally  as  little  inconvenienced  as  possible. 

The  net  result  of  all  this  is  that,  whereas  in  ancient 
times  the  actual  capture  was  a  matter  of  two  or  three 
minutes,  it  is  now  an  operation  extending  over  several 
hours,  during  all  of  which  time  the  risk  of  interference 
from  a  hostile  warship  is  great.  Yet  public  opinion  is 
so  strong  on  the  matter  that  the  corsair  must  prefer  to 
risk  this  to  risking  seeing  his  name  coupled  with  an 
'  Inhuman  Outrage '  in  very  large  capitals  on  the 
Contents  Bills  of  the  World's  press. 

As  time  goes  on  these  difficulties  will  continue  to 
grow  and  increase.  Public  opinion  cannot  be  defied 
like  purely  legal  opinions  can.  Consequently  the 
meaning  of  private  property  and  effects  will  be  ever- 
extending,  till  there  will  be  so  much  to  remove  before 


THE   GUEEEE   DE   COUKSE  165 

sinking  a  capture  that  the  task  will  entail  a  day  or 
two's  work  even  to  a  belligerent  entirely  without 
regard  to  International  Law.  In  the  Eusso-Japanese 
War  it  seems  to  have  taken  the  Eussians,  with  the 
minimum  of  regard  for  public  opinion,  something  like 
six  hours  to  dispose  of  a  ship  after  they  had  overhauled 
her. 

There  is,  too,  the  question  of  the  merchant  ship 
that  refuses  to  stop  when  overhauled.  What  is  to  be 
done  ?  Suppose  British  merchantmen  made  a  rule 
of  still  going  on.  The  enemy,  after  the  necessary 
number  of  '  blank  shots  across  the  bow '  demanded 
by  public  opinion,  is  entitled  to  put  a  shot  into  the 
machinery  or  otherwise  wing  the  escaping  vessel.  He 
does  it  and  someone  gets  killed  or  injured.  Public 
opinion  will  have  headlines  about  the  '  Brave  Britisher ' 
and  describe  the  death  of  the  man  who  got  killed  as  a 
'  Eegrettable  necessity.'  But  it  will  probably  compel 
the  man  responsible  for  firing  the  fatal  shot  to  go  out 
of  his  way  to  express  much  sorrow  and  grief  for  having 
done  what  he  was  perfectly  justified  in  doing,  and 
generally  he  will  have  a  species  of  stigma  on  him  for 
doing  it. 

There  the  incident,  if  a  solitary  one,  will  end. 
But  supposing  the  refusing-to-stop  tactics  are  continued, 
and  more  people  continue  to  get  hurt.  Public  opinion 
will  get  very  excited.  The  Eussians — the  least  sensitive 
nation  to  public  opinion — were  most  heavily  censured 
for  firing  into  the  Japanese  transport  which  gave  them 


166  HEKESIES  OF   SEA  POWEK 

this  problem,  and  it  hampered  them  afterwards  to  some 
degree.  A  nation  more  sensitive  to  public  opinion 
would  be  hampered  a  great  deal  more.  Probably 
those  responsible  would  be  censured  by  their  own 
authorities  seeking  a  placebo. 

As  a  result  some  of  the  non-stop  merchantmen 
might  escape  altogether :  the  corsair  fearing  to  take 
the  responsibility  of  firing.  Then  some  strong  man — 
determined  to  check  a  system  that  rendered  war  on 
commerce  null  and  void — might  be  expected  to  arise 
and  fire  too  well. 

The  world  would  have  its  head-lines  on  the  matter, 
and  the  British  press  would  to  a  certainty  be  very  free 
with  such  epithets  as  *  Murder,'  *  Piracy/  and  so  forth. 
It  would  undoubtedly  demand  that  'Piracy  shall  be 
treated  as  such ' :  it  is  quite  possible  that  British 
opinion,  duly  inflamed,  would  force  the  Government  to 
make  such  a  declaration.  The  position  of  the  wretched 
corsairs,  blamed  and  threatened  on  all  hands  for  doing 
what,  after  all,  they  were  entitled  to  do  and  the  only 
thing  they  could  do,  would  then  become  extremely 
awkward,  and  commerce  attack  practically  killed. 

Between  the  present  state  of  affairs  and  this  there 
is  only  the  improbability  that  any  merchant  captains 
would  so  act.  But  men  with  great  risks  at  stake  are 
apt  to  be  obstinate  on  occasion,  and  the  knowledge 
that  such  a  non-stop  policy  would  swiftly  lead  to  im- 
munity might  outweigh  its  dangers,  especially  if  the 
corsair  was  reducing  the  nation  to  desperate  straits. 


THE   GUEEEE  DE   COUKSE  167 

The  reward  of  escape  would  be  so  high  that  the 
temptations  to  brave  dangers  would  be  correspondingly 
great. 

Such  a  death  of  war  against  commerce  is  not 
necessarily  probable,  but  it  is  in  the  possibilities  none 
the  less. 

(2)  International  Complications. — In  ancient  times 
the  neutral  was  very  little  inconvenienced  if  his  trade 
got  mixed  with  the  designs  of  the  belligerents.  No 
one  lived  to  give  the  neutral's  version  of  the  matter : 
and  piracy  was  so  common  that  the  disappearance  of 
a  merchant  ship  more  or  less  evoked  no  surprise.  In 
later  times  the  neutral  ship  had  learned  complacency 
before  the  belligerents,  and  its  status  was  in  any  case 
that  of  a  blockade-runner.  Unless  the  case  was  very 
flagrant,  interference  with  neutrals  provoked  no  com- 
ment ;  it  was  accepted  as  part  of  the  eternal  order  of 
things. 

To-day  this  is  in  no  way  accepted,  and  in  addition, 
countries  are  knit  by  trade  relations  of  an  intimacy 
that  is  of  quite  modern  origin.  For  instance,  Great 
Britain  and  America  are  connected  by  innumerable 
commercial  ties,  so  interwoven  in  many  cases  that  it  is 
almost  impossible  to  disentangle  them.  An  enormous 
number  of  Americans  earn  their  daily  bread  by  grow- 
ing food  and  raw  material  for  the  British  market,  and 
any  interference  with  British  over-sea  trade  would  dis- 
locate any  number  of  American  interests.  Instantly 
the  scene  would  bristle  with  delicate  international 


168  HEEESIES   OF   SEA  POWEE 

complications — a  terrible  handicap  upon  any  power 
warring  against  British  commerce.  The  incessant 
clashing  with  the  interests  of  a  powerful  neutral  would 
be  a  most  serious  handicap — how  serious  it  is  impossible 
to  determine  until  it  is  attempted.  At  its  mildest,  it 
could  never  be  neglected  :  at  its  greatest  it  might 
render  war  on  British  commerce  abortive.  This  is  a 
matter  upon  which  history — save  the  most  recent— 
has  nothing  to  teach.  But  there  are  not  wanting  in- 
dications that  neutral  powers  will  only  submit  to  the 
existence  of  a  war  on  commerce  in  view  of  the  fact 
that  they  may  one  day  require  to  carry  on  such  a  war, 
or  that  they  are  gaining  by  it. 

There  is  the  case  of  the  Russian  Volunteer  cruisers 
for  instance.  The  matter  was  complicated  by  some  legal 
technicalities  about  exit  from  the  Black  Sea ;  but  the 
main  issues  were  on  more  common  grounds  than  that. 

The  Russians  had  very  good  reason  to  believe  that 
on  board  the  Malacca  was  some  machinery  intended 
for  Japanese  destroyers.  They  intercepted  the  ship, 
and  found  the  suspicious  articles  marked  with  the 
British  broad-arrow.  These — if  the  Russian  story  be 
true — were  cheek  by  jowl  with  some  consignments  for 
Hong  Kong  dockyard.  The  Russians  were  practically 
given  two  alternatives  '  international  complications  '  or 
to  give  up  the  Malacca  without  any  enquiry  as  to 
whether  she  had  anything  on  board  her  other  than 
consignments  for  Hong  Kong  dockyard. 

Now  whether   or  no    the   Malacca   actually   had 


THE   GUEEKE   DE   COURSE  169 

contraband  on  board,  the  Russian  undoubtedly  believed 
that  she  had,  also  there  is  no  doubt  whatever  that  any 
amount  of  contraband  was  sent  to  Japan  as  Dutch 
cheeses,  agricultural  instruments,  etc.,  etc.  It  was 
important  to  Russia  to  stop  these  things,  but  to  have 
gone  on  doing  so  practically  meant  war  with  Great 
Britain. 

Now  the  Russian  war  on  commerce  was  a  very 
mild  and  half-hearted  affair ;  the  sum  of  it  all  being 
more  indignation  amongst  neutral  ship  owners,  loss 
and  inconvenience  to  neutrals,  than  worry  or  loss  to 
Japan.  Yet  it  aroused  a  great  deal  of  neutral  indigna- 
tion. A  war  against  British  commerce  to  accomplish 
anything,  would  have  to  be  on  an  infinitely  larger  scale, 
and  the  interests  of  neutrals  involved  would  be  infinitely 
larger  than  in  the  few  cases  Russia  managed  to  make 
for  herself. 

Taking  these  two  new  conditions  together  there  is  no 
denying  that  commerce  war  is  not  what  it  was,  and 
the  nation  that  undertakes  it  on  the  grand  scale  will 
be  embarking  on  an  enterprise  the  limits  and  dangers 
of  which  it  can  never  measure.  All  this  augurs  half- 
hearted operations,  which  would  be  comparatively 
innocuous  even  if  not  interfered  with  by  the  British 
Fleet.  Probably,  therefore,  against  any  one  nation 
British  commerce  is  in  far  less  danger  to-day  than  it 
was  in  the  old  wars  with  France. 

It  is  not,  however,  possible  to  act  on  that  assump- 
tion :  because  the  attitude  of  the  neutral  powers  might 


170  HEKESIES  OF   SEA  POWEK 

be  sufficiently  unfriendly,  or  they  might  see  sufficient 
gain  to  themselves  in  the  destruction  of  British  com- 
merce to  waive  their  more  immediate  interests.  This 
is  at  least  a  possibility.  So,  too,  is  a  combination,  and 
always  the  real  guerre  de  course  is  the  danger  to  be 
guarded  against — that  is  to  say  a  war  against  commerce 
supplemented  by  occasional  action  or  attempted  action 
of  battleships. 

It  has,  further,  to  be  borne  in  mind  that  the 
platitude  '  Commerce  destruction  cannot  win  a  war,'  is 
useless,  when  no  British  victory  can  atone  for  the  loss 
of  the  world's  carrying  trade  which,  once  lost,  is 
hardly  likely  to  be  regained.  Hence,  therefore, 
commerce  must  not  only  be  protected  from  destruc- 
tion: it  must  also  be  so  defended  that  it  can  be 
carried  on  with  comparative  impunity. 

There  are  two  ways  by  which  this  end  may  be 
sought — the  first  by  a  vigorous  offensive  on  the  hostile 
fleet  and  a  blockade  so  severe  that  very  few  commerce 
destroyers  or  cruisers  can  get  out  and  fewer  still 
return.  The  objective,  however,  would  not  be  the 
commerce  destroyers  but  the  enemy's  fleet  in  general, 
by  the  destruction  of  which  a  still  more  vigorous 
blockade  would  be  assured  and  the  number  of  possible 
corsairs  very  materially  lessened.  If  necessary,  even 
commerce  should  be  sacrificed  for  the  single  end  of 
destroying  the  enemy's  fleet.  Combined  with  this 
system  a  few  powerful  cruisers,  easily  able  to  destroy 
any  corsair  met  with,  would  perhaps  be  stationed  off 


THE   GUEEEE  DE   COUESE  171 

certain  points  upon  which  the  trade  routes  converge, 
but  there  would  be  no  patrols  stationed  along  the  trade 
routes  and  the  minimum  of  division  of  forces. 

This  approximately  embodies  the  modern  naval 
view  of  how  commerce  attack  should  be  met.  It  is, 
incidentally,  how  the  Dutch  successfully  met  the 
English  attempt  to  fight  a  commerce-destroying  war 
in  the  time  of  King  Charles  II.  It  is  how  the  Eomans 
successfully  met  the  Illyrian  pirates.  It  is  also  in  part 
—how  the  Northerners — very  unsuccessfully  for  their 
trade — met  the  Southern  war  on  commerce. 

A  perception — an  over  perception — of  this  last 
point  is  the  characteristic  of  the  popular  view  of  how 
commerce  should  be  protected.  It  should  be  under- 
stood that  the  popular  realisation  of  all  that  commerce 
attack  might  mean  is  in  all  probability  greater  than 
the  naval  realisation  of  it :  and  probably  the  popular 
estimate  of  this  danger  is  better  to  accept  than  the 
naval  one,  certainly  that  naval  one  which  bases  any  of 
its  arguments  upon  the  old  platitude  that  war  against 
commerce  cannot  bring  victory. 

Now,  in  the  popular  view  there  is  only  one  way  in 
which  commerce  can  effectively  be  protected.  This 
way  consists  in  covering  the  seven  seas  with  cruisers 
'  patrolling  the  trade  routes.'  These  cruisers,  we  are 
told,  do  not  need  to  be  very  powerful  or  very  fast ;  a 
fairly  good  speed  and  numbers,  especially  numbers,  will 
suffice. 

This  idea,  is  on  the  surface,  fairly  plausible ;  and 


172  HEEESIES  OF   SEA  POWEB 

many  years  ago  at  the  time  of  the  Naval  Defence  Act 
it  was  god-fathered  by  many  distinguished  retired 
admirals  who  had  the  old  wars  with  France  in  mind, 
and  failed  to  realise  that  the  conditions  which  then 
obtained  will  never  be  reproduced  in  the  future. 

The  future  will  see  no  more  little  privateers  :  letters 
of  marque  cannot  be  resuscitated.  Public  opinion  will 
not  sanction  the  privateer;  and  all  corsairs  will  be 
either  orthodox  cruisers  or  else  armed  liners — the 
supply  of  which  is  by  no  means  very  numerous.  The 
'  any  moderately  fast  vessel '  days  are  over — a  fair  speed 
and  a  good  coal  supply  are  essential  to  a  corsair. 

It  is  doubtful  also,  whether  many  fast  liners  are 
available  as  corsairs.  In  the  first  place  few  Powers 
have  many,  in  the  next  such  vessels  are  likely  to  be 
found  very  excellent  and  much  needed  as  destroyers  of 
destroyers,  since  they  can  be  so  much  more  safely  risked 
than  cruisers. 

However,  if  the  swifter  be  used  as  corsairs,  the 
popular  '  cruiser  patrols  *  are  not  likely  to  concern  them 
much ;  as  little  cruisers  will  never  catch  a  liner  designed 
always  to  travel  at  top  speed. 

Supposing  the  hostile  armoured  cruisers  to  be  utilised, 
again  the  popular  cruisers  do  not  promise  well.  They 
can  do  little  save  get  sunk  with  a  loss  of  men  that  will 
entail  in  pension  funds  about  as  much  money  as  the 
value  of  any  mercantile  shipping  that  they  are  ever 
likely  to  protect. 

What  in  fine  can  they  do  at  all  ? 


THE  GUEEKE  DE   COUKSE  173 

When  we  come  to  consider  it— nothing,  except 
with  great  good  luck.  Weak  units — and  numbers 
must  mean  relatively  weak  units — cannot  even  act  as 
scarecrows.  Spread  over  the  ocean  they  would  be 
merely  so  many  attractive  prizes  to  armoured  corsairs. 
Grouped  at  strategical  points  they  would  be  little  more 
dangerous — a  single  large  hostile  cruiser  with  moder- 
ately large  guns  could  steam  round  and  sink  them  out 
of  range  of  their  pop-guns.  Protected  cruisers  on 
the  trade  routes  would  benefit  no  British  traders  at 
all,  unless  it  were  the  makers  of  monuments  to  the 
departed. 

Consequently  armoured  cruisers  must  be  employed. 
These  are  necessarily  few :  and  to  send  them  scouring 
the  ocean  on  the  off  chance  of  meeting  an  enemy  would 
be  wasting  them  completely.  They  are  much  better 
employed  from  bases,  whence  they  can  observe  hostile 
harbours  and  run  down  anything  that  issues  out  and 
catch  anything  trying  to  return. 

The  rub  is  that  something  now  and  again  is  sure  to 
get  out ;  and  having  got  out,  to  do  some  mischief.  It 
will  be  difficult  to  convince  the  British  public  that  a 
corsair  getting  out  is  hardly  likely  to  average  one  prize 
a  day  and  hardly  likely  to  be  able  to  go  more  than  a 
week  without  coaling.  Wherever  it  goes  to  coal  will 
be  its  'earth,'  and  there,  ere  it  can  reissue,  a  big 
armoured  cruiser  with  a  large  coal  endurance  ought  to 
be  able  to  get  and  wait  for  it  coming  out. 

Supposing  the  '  earth '  to  be  a  neutral  harbour,  it 


174  HEKESIES   OF   SEA  POWEB 

must  in  most  cases  be  left  within  twenty-four  hours  on 
pain  of  internment ;  and  a  big  cruiser  outside  is  likely 
to  make  internment  accepted  easily.  On  the  whole, 
therefore,  provided  only  the  British  public  can  keep  its 
head  and  accept  a  few  losses  as  inevitable,  the  system 
of  stopping  earths  is  almost  bound  to  succeed  reasonably 
quickly ;  whereas  the  alternative  system  of  patrols  and 
ocean  hunting,  promises  no  success  whatever,  besides 
being  a  system  which  allows  a  totally  unnecessary 
number  of  hostile  cruisers  to  get  out  on  the  high  seas. 
Those  who  advocate  the  small  cruisers  on  patrol  are 
really  no  more  logical  than  he  who  would  suggest  that 
instead  of  destroying  the  nest  individual  hornets  should 
be  slain  on  the  wing. 

On  the  whole  there  is  only  one  really  serious 
danger.  This  is  that  some  large  corsair  might  manage 
to  slip  out  crammed  with  prize  crews  and  small  guns, 
and,  with  a  gun  and  some  men  convert  every  tramp 
captured  into  an  armed  tender.1  It  is  the  kind  of  thing 
that  some  power — Germany  for  instance — might  think 
of  attempting.  The  commerce  war  would  then  be  on 
a  species  of  snowball  system,  and  incalculable  mischief 
might  be  done.  In  such  a  case  only  drastic  measures 
could  save  British  trade.  There  would  probably  be 
nothing  for  it  but  to  declare  all  commerce  attack  except 
by  proper  warships  '  Piracy '  and  to  treat  it  as  such. 

Of  course,  all  commerce  attack  is  really  legalised 
piracy  :  and  the  old  system  of  commerce  defence  which, 
1  In  the  U.  S.  Civil  War  there  were  one  or  two  mild  cases  of  this. 


THE   GUEKKE  DE   COUKSE  175 

if  not  avowing  the  letter  of  this,  accepted  the  spirit  and 
acted  on  it,  had  much  to  recommend  it.  Only  very  great 
necessity,  however,  would  allow  of  such  action  being 
taken  now-a-days.  I  once  at  the  Koyal  United  Service 
Institution  read  a  paper  in  which  it  was  tentatively 
suggested  that  if  we  declared  that  for  every  merchant 
ship  captured  we  should  destroy  some  unfortified  town 
of  the  enemy,  the  mere  threat  of  this  would  ensure 
perfect  safety  to  commerce.  A  number  of  distinguished 
admirals,  however,  rose  one  after  the  other  and  with 
perfect  unanimity  condemned  the  scheme  in  most 
scorching  terms  on  the  grounds  that  it  was  brutal  and 
inhuman.  Public  opinion  would  no  doubt  say  the  same 
about  the  hanging  of  corsairs'  crews.  At  the  same  time 
both  remain  as  England's  derniers  ressorts — and  might 
seem  more  reasonable  in  the  stress  of  war  than  when 
calmly  discussed  in  peace. 

Still  there  is  every  reason  to  believe  that  such  a 
necessity  ought  not  to  arise,  if  only  the  British  public 
representing  the  interests  concerned  can  be  persuaded 
that  whatever  defence  scheme  may  be  organised  by 
the  Navy,  and  whatever  seeming  failures  may  result, 
the  really  serious  failures  would  arise  over  a  scheme, 
half  naval  and  half  designed  to  satisfy  popular  notions 
as  to  what  is  most  likely  to  constitute  safety. 

If  past  history  of  Parliament  is  any  criterion 
Members  of  Parliament  are  probably  the  most  dan- 
gerous menace.  Compelled  by  the  nature  of  things  to 
voice  any  popular  clamour,  however  '  engineered,'  they 


176  HEEESIES   OF   SEA  POWEE 

are  in  the  habit  of  reading  up  whatever  subject  is  to 
the  fore.  Such  hasty  cramming  tends  to  produce  an 
intellectual  pate  de  foie  gras :  and  the  better  the 
intentions  the  worse  the  result. 

Compare,  for  instance,  the  anti-Belleville  agitation 
of  a  few  years  ago.  With  the  introduction  of  Bellevilles 
there  were  the  troubles  incidental  to  any  new  departure 
— they  may  fairly  be  compared  to  the  losses  that  our 
commerce  would  sustain  in  war.  The  judgment  of 
the  Navy  was  set  aside,  and  a  tribunal,  practically 
civilian,  appointed  to  re- judge  the  matter.  In  the 
result  the  Navy  was  fitted  with  five  alternatives  of 
which  three  failed  at  once  and  the  other  two  burn  far 
more  coal,  cannot  be  repaired  upon  board  ship  if 
damaged  in  action ;  and  are  generally  un-equal  to  the 
discarded  boilers  of  naval  choice.  For  this  travesty  of 
efficiency  Members  of  Parliament,  perfectly  well  in- 
tentioned,  were  mainly  responsible.  In  due  course  the 
Navy  may  reassert  itself  and  the  Belleville  type  be 
returned  to — but  what  has  happened  in  the  mean- 
time? 

The  danger  is  acute  that  were  we  involved  in  a 
commerce  war,  a  similar  display  of  lay  as  against  pro- 
fessional judgment  would  be  witnessed,  with  results 
more  deplorable  than  it  is  possible  to  estimate. 

Right  or  wrong,  the  scheme  for  defence  of  com- 
merce must  be  left  to  the  Navy  alone,  and  the  naval 
plan  of  a  vigorous  offensive,  of  '  stopping  earths,'  of 
acting  as  the  Bomans  against  the  Illyrians,  as  the 


THE   GUERRE   DE   COUESE  177 

Dutch  against  the  English,  has  far  more  to  re- 
commend it  than  any  scheme  resting  on  a  negative 
defence. 

A  final  word  may  be  added  about  convoys.  These 
in  the  old  days  were  rarely  very  successful :  the  prin- 
cipal problem  being  the  difficulty  of  keeping  the  mer- 
chantmen together.  That  difficulty  would  probably 
be  still  greater  to-day.  Moreover,  unless  the  enemy's 
ports  are  sufficiently  blockaded  to  prevent  the  egress  of 
anything  but  isolated  ships,  a  convoy  merely  offers  in 
these  days  of  telegraphs  and  full  information  a  splendid 
prize  already  prepared  for  the  enemy.  The  trade  loss 
of  waiting  for  convoy  is  also  probably  considerable — 
convoy  must,  therefore,  be  regarded  as  a  very  heavy 
insurance. 

National  insurance  is  probably  a  better  system ;  as 
under  it  the  suffering  shipowner  would  have  no  cause 
to  rouse  plaints,  and  so  there  would  be  nothing  to 
interfere  with  the  maintenance  of  that  vigorous  offensive 
by  the  Navy  in  which  the  surest  salvation  lies.  It 
cannot  too  frequently  or  emphatically  be  laid  down 
that  for  success  the  Navy  must  be  unhampered  with 
popular  plans,  and  it  must  be  free  to  leave  commerce 
to  look  after  itself  for  a  while  should  the  need  and 
occasion  arise. 

For  a  nation  to  exhibit  the  necessary  patience  and 
confidence  in  such  circumstances  (on  a  small  scale 
Japan  in  1904-5  is  an  example)  requires  the  existence 
of  that  quality  which  elsev/here  has  been  described  as 

N 


178  HEKESIES  OF   SEA  POWEE 

'  Fitness  to  win/  and  perhaps  in  this  Fitness  to  win 
may  be  found  the  surest  security  of  the  survival  of 
commerce  in  war. 

Japan  did  it  without  '  national  insurance,'  but  her 
trade  ran  no  great  risks  and  in  no  way  compared  with 
British  trade  in  importance.  Also  '  public  opinion ' 
was  less  of  a  factor.  She  cannot  therefore  be  accepted 
as  a  criterion.  Arguments  against  national  insurance 
are  easily  found,  but  the  matter  is  not  to  be  settled  by 
nicely  balanced  pros  and  cons.  It  is  broad  generalities 
that  are  at  issue.  And  these  really  whittle  down  to 
one  thing  :  to  whether  the  Navy  is  to  be  given  a  free 
hand  to  do  as  it  thinks  best  or  whether  it  is  to  be 
hampered  in  its  operations  by  popular  fancy  raised  to 
fever  heat  by  mercantile  losses.  If  the  naval  system 
of  '  earth  stopping  '  be  correct,  national  insurance  will 
be  a  very  small  burden :  if  it  be  wrong,  national  in- 
surance becomes  a  duty.  Eight  or  wrong,  it  is  an 
insurance  against  Parliament  interfering  with  naval 
strategy ;  that  is  to  say  an  insurance  against  certain 
disaster. 


IV 

COLONIES   AND   SEA  POWER 

COLONIES  and  Sea  Power  are  supposed  to  be  closely 
connected :  it  is  to  be  proved  that  Colonies  are  only 
born  of  Sea  Power,  and  also  that  Sea  Power  is  born  of 
Colonies. 

The  natural  birth  of  colonies  is  admirably  described 
by  Captain  Mahan.  As  a  nation  sent  out  commercial 
shipping  it  felt  the  need  of  distant  stations — com- 
mercial bases — and  these  grew  into  colonies.  '  A 
foothold  in  a  foreign  land,  a  new  outlet  for  what  it 
had  to  sell,  a  new  sphere  for  its  shipping,  more  em- 
ployment for  its  people,  more  comfort  and  wealth  for 
itself.' l  This  was  the  old  idea  of  colonies  when  the 
world  was  vast  and  mostly  unexplored.  So  were 
founded  those  Phoenician  colonies  which  developed 
into  states  like  Carthage,  in  no  way  bound  to  the 
mother  state,  but  sympathetic  in  many  matters  from 
ties  of  self-interest,  chiefly  through  a  supreme  distrust 
of  other  nationalities.  Those  who  went  forth,  how- 
ever, went  always  to  found  a  new  empire,  not  to  create 
a  foreign  possession. 

1  Influence  of  Sea  Power  on  History. 

K   2 


180  HEEESIES   OF   SEA  POWEK 

In  later  times  the  colonising  instinct  manifested 
itself  in  a  variety  of  ways.  Thus  the  Dutch  colony  in 
Japan  never  aimed  at  possessing  Japan  or  in  securing 
anything  save  a  pied  a  terre  for  the  convenience  of 
trade :  the  '  imperial  idea '  was  totally  absent  here 
though  present  elsewhere.  Spain  on  the  other  hand 
colonised  imperially  only,  the  colony  was  a  foreign 
possession  out  of  which  to  extract  wealth  as  tribute l 
and  the  spoils  of  war.  Then  came  the  English 
colonising  era,  which  had  a  good  deal  of  its  birth  in 
a  desire  to  steal  from  Spain  the  good  things  which 
Spain  had  stolen  from  others. 

Other  colonies  were  founded  in  emulation  with 
other  nations.  Speaking  generally  the  British  colony 
was  imperial  in  the  sense  that  it  was  always  a  piece 
of  England  set  down  on  foreign  soil  (as  in  Virginia, 
where  the  squire  with  his  country  mansion  was  an 
early  feature) ;  but  it  was  primarily  a  commercial 
undertaking.  Then  there  were  colonies  taken  from 
other  nations  by  force  of  arms,  like  South  Africa  ; 
huge  colonies  like  Australia ;  colonies  that  came  near 
to  being  independent  allied  nations,  like  India  in 
the  days  of  John  Company;  and  colonies  established 
purely  as  military  posts,  like  St.  Helena  and  many 
another  island.  Each  colony,  in  fine,  had  something 
different  in  its  inception  and  probably  only  one  thing 

1  Cuba  was  so  regarded  by  Spain  up  to  the  last.  The  Spaniard 
who  went  there  invariably  regarded  the  Cubans  merely  as  something 
out  of  which  he  could  make  a  fortune  to  take  back  to  Spain. 


COLONIES  AND   SEA  POWEE         181 

was  common  to  them  all  and  this  that  they  never  had 
about  them  any  notions  as  to  '  Sons  of  Empire '  or 
(saving  perhaps  Virginia  which  is  a  British  colony  no 
more)  any  poetical  idea  about  '  founding  a  new  England 
across  the  seas.'  The  settler  went  much  as  he  might 
have  migrated  from  Northumberland  to  Cornwall  be- 
cause he  considered  that  he  would  better  himself  by 
doing  so.  It  has  been  reserved  for  the  present  age  to 
discover  the  '  Sons  of  the  Empire,'  '  Britain  beyond 
the  Seas,'  '  the  men  who  can  ride  and  shoot,'  and  all 
those  other  phrases  which  sound  so  big  and  mean  so 
little  because  the  day  of  them  is  passing.  When  the 
colonies  were  peopled  by  emigrants  from  home  there 
was  no  occasion  to  Create  sentiments  on  imperial  lines, 
the  colonist  was  an  Englishman  and  had  no  more 
need  to  proclaim  the  fact  than  the  man  in  Cornwall. 
His  descendants,  however,  are  not  Englishmen,  they 
are  Australians,  Canadians,  South  Africans,  or  what- 
ever the  colony  may  be,  with  essentially  different 
interests.  A  stream  of  fresh  emigrants  serves  to 
preserve  something  of  the  Old  Country  sentiment,  but 
the  native-born  Australian  is  Australian,  reared  under 
a  different  climate  and  different  conditions.  He  is 
'  Britain  beyond  the  Seas  '  when  sensible  of  advantages 
to  be  derived  therefrom,  but  quite  ready  to  '  cut  the 
painter '  and  cease  to  be  a  '  Son  of  the  Empire  '  when 
his  material .  advantages  run  in  that  direction.  And 
it  must  be  confessed  that  he  could  hardly  be  a  good 
colonist  or  a  logical  one  without  being  so.  He  may 


182  HEKESIES   OF   SEA  POWEE 

appreciate  the  very  flattering  descriptions  of  himself 
to  be  found  in  the  verses  of  Kipling,  he  may  in  some 
cases  be  wrought  up  to  the  Imperial  Idea  so  far  as  the 
sentimentality  of  it  goes,  but  despite  Kipling  and  a 
Navy  League  Envoy  he  does  not  contribute  his  share 
to  the  maintenance  of  the  British  Navy.  An  attempt 
to  make  him  do  so  would  probably  result  in  something 
akin  to  the  tea  chest  incident  in  Boston  Harbour  in 
the  days  of  George  III.  From  the  standpoint  of  the 
British  Imperialist  this  is  deplorable ;  but  from  any 
independent  standpoint  it  is  really  quite  reasonable. 
The  English  are  a  Teutonic  race,  but  this  never  led 
them  to  bother  about  their  German  fatherland  in  the 
past,  simply  because  they  had  become  of  another 
nationality.  So  the  colonials  must,  by  the  nature  of 
things,  drift  into  other  nationalities  if  they  have  any 
stamina,  unless  their  interests  and  those  of  England 
are  identical — an  unlikely  event. 

Interests,  indeed,  are  tending  to  do  anything  except 
converge.  Each  colony  has  its  own  problems.  Aus- 
tralia for  instance,  and  British  Columbia  can  never 
regard  the  advent  of  Japan  as  a  world  power  as  that 
advent  is  regarded  in  England.  The  problem  of 
Japanese  immigration  will  never  be  felt  in  England, 
but  it  is  even  now  a  real  thing  both  in  Australia  and 
British  Columbia.  If  Australia  shuts  out  Japanese 
and  Japan  objects  to  any  marked  extent,  what  is  Eng- 
land's position  ?  Australia  has  a  perfect  right  to  shut 
out  Japanese,  Japan:  has  an  equal  right  to  demand 


COLONIES  AND   SEA  POWEE         183 

admission,  merely  following  the  practice  of  nations  in 
the  past.  Supposing  matters  to  become  acute,  is  it 
England's  duty  to  fight  Japan  if  necessary  on  the 
question  at  her  own  expense  for  a  matter  that  concerns 
only  Australia?  It  is  obviously  not  to  England's 
interest  so  far  as  Japan  is  concerned,  but  of  what  use 
is  England  to  Australia  unless  she  is  ready  to  do  this  ? 
Australia  by  herself  certainly  could  not  offer  any  military 
resistance  to  Japan  worth  the  name. 

Again,  there  is  the  case  of  Canada  and  the  United 
States.  A  dispute  in  which  England  must  fight  the 
United  States  or  sacrifice  Canada  is  quite  possible.  It 
is  palpably  not  to  England's  interest  to  fight  the  United 
States  for  the  sake  of  retaining  Canada  as  a  piece  of 
red  upon  the  map ;  but  the  chief  use  of  the  Mother 
Country  to  Canada  is  as  a  safeguard  against  American 
expansion  northward.  Of  course  did  Canada  desire 
to  unite  with  the  States  the  Mother  Country  would 
offer  no  military  objection;  but  the  question  is:  In 
what  way  does  the  Canadian  colony  benefit  the  Mother 
Country  ?  This  is  a  hard  question  to  answer,  except 
on  the  grounds  of  sentiment.  Corn  comes  thence,  it 
is  true ;  but  corn,  wherever  it  comes  from,  is  sent  by 
people  who  wish  to  make  money  by  selling  it. 

The  policy  of  knitting  the  colonies  closer  to  the 
Empire  by  drawing  fighting  material  from  them  has 
much  to  recommend  it ;  but  equally  so  has  that  policy 
of  gradual  dissociation  which  contemplates  the  eventual 
establishment  of  the  colonies  as  independent  republics, 


184  HEEESIES  OF   SEA  POWEE 

and  of  the  two  it  is  the  more  logical,  because  the 
tendency  of  colonies  to  become  independent  units  is 
an  historical  fact. 

The  best  argument  for  the  retention  of  the  colonies 
so  long  as  possible  is  that  if  independent  to-day  they 
would  become  the  property  of  Germany  or  some  such 
nation  to-morrow.  Were  England  to  renounce  all  ties, 
South  Africa  would  become  German  South  Africa, 
Canada  part  of  the  United  States  and  Australia  a 
portion  of  the  Japanese  Empire.  What  England 
would  actually  lose  thereby  is  difficult  to  assess.  She 
would  certainly  not  lose  financially,  for  the  colonies 
represent  no  income  while  they  do  represent  a  loss  in 
the  expenses  of  their  naval  defence.  On  the  other 
hand  it  is  probable  that  trade  outlets  would  be  re- 
stricted thereby  through  tariff  walls  created  by  the 
new  proprietors — all  of  whom  would  rule  with  heavier 
hands  than  England.  Canada  as  a  portion  of  the 
United  States  might  continue  to  flourish;  but  South 
Africa  and  Australia  would  alter  very  considerably  and 
the  present  inhabitants  become  something  like  '  hewers 
of  wood  and  drawers  of  water '  to  their  German  and 
Japanese  conquerors.  Therefore  these  two  at  any  rate 
are  very  considerable  gainers  by  the  existing  state  of 
things — a  point  by  no  means  sufficiently  recognised. 
The  question,  indeed,  is  far  more  whether  the  Mother 
Country  can  afford  to  continue  owning  them,  than 
whether  they  should  demand  sacrifices  from  England. 
It  is  they  who  are  the  chief  gainers  by  things  as  they 


COLONIES  AND   SEA  POWEE         185 

are ;  since  except  in  the  matter  of  trade  they  are  of  no 
value  at  all  to  England. 

The  general  colonial  ideal,  and  one  that  will 
eventually  be  accomplished,  is,  however,  to  be  self- 
supporting  entirely.  This  is  a  perfectly  natural  and 
legitimate  ideal,  having  nothing  to  do  with  the  subject 
of  this  chapter  except  in  so  far  as  it  may  be  regarded 
as  evidence  towards  the  theory  that  British  colonies 
are  or  will  be  luxuries  rather  than  necessities  to  the 
nation. 

From  the  naval  standpoint  the  colonies  represent 
nothing  worth  consideration  in  the  way  of  assistance 
financial  or  otherwise.  The  colonies  are  simply  some- 
thing to  be  defended. 

Colonial  defence  is  proposed  to  be  conducted  on 
two  lines : — 

(1)  By  the  Imperial  Navy  acting  on  its  own  general 
lines. 

(2)  By  local  colonial  defence. 

This  last  is  the  one  more  in  favour  with  the  colonials 
who,  far  removed  from  any  conception  of  war  prepara- 
tions and  so  forth,  appear  totally  unable  to  realise  that 
they  can  only  be  attacked  at  all  should  the  Imperial 
Navy  fail  to  operate  effectively  nearer  the  centre  of 
operations. 

It  is  furthermore  little  recognised  that  whatever 
colonial  defence  may  exist,  if  anything  is  sent  against 
a  colony  it  will  assuredly  be  a  force  amply  sufficient  to 
annihilate  any  defence  force. 


186  HEKESIES   OF   SEA  POWEE 

It  should,  however,  be  borne  in  mind  that  a  colonial 
defence  force  of  ten  ships  would  necessitate  a  more 
powerful  attack  than  would  one  consisting  of  two  ships, 
and  therefore  colonial  aspirations  towards  colonial 
navies  are  not  so  altogether  unreasonable  as  some 
might  imagine. 

Yet  the  point  is  of  small  importance  owing  to  the 
fact  that  the  Imperial  Navy  bars  the  way  to  any  hostile 
expedition.  Consequently  the  only  possible  conditions 
under  which  a  colonial  local  naval  force  could  be  used 
would  be  after  the  defeat  of  the  Imperial  Navy:  in 
which  case  it  would  be  used  merely  to  experience 
annihilation  at  the  hands  of  a  superior  force.  Thus 
regarded  the  best  colonial  defence,  and  the  only 
feasible  one,  is  in  direct  contribution  to  the  Imperial 
Navy,  to  the  upkeep  of  which  the  colonies  ought  to 
contribute  the  same  sum  per  head  of  population  as  is 
contributed  by  the  people  of  the  British  Isles. 

Were  such  a  contribution  made  there  would  pro- 
bably be  a  not  unreasonable  demand  for  a  voice  in  the 
distribution  of  the  Imperial  Fleet.  The  question  of 
the  distribution  of  the  fleet  is  one  that  demands  an 
appreciation  of  great  generalities  possessed  by  few 
men:  for  however  self-evident  it  may  be  to  the 
thinker  that  to  be  in  superior  force  wherever  the 
enemy  may  be  is  the  surest  defence,  an  enormous 
number  of  people  are  firmly  convinced  of  the  possi- 
bility of  '  raids  conducted  by  forces  which  have  evaded 
the  defending  fleet' — a  condition  possible  only  when 


COLONIES  AND   SEA  POWEK         187 

that  fleet  is  inadequate.  One  of  the  strongest  of  popular 
conceptions  is  that  local  defence  is  a  sovereign  remedy 
—and  there  is  every  reason  to  suppose  that  colonial 
influence  upon  the  question  of  fleet  distribution  would 
be  almost  entirely  made  up  of  demands  for  local 
defence.  As  the  population  of  the  colonies  is  so  small 
in  proportion  to  the  area  to  be  protected  it  would  thus 
follow  that  either  totally  inadequate  and  useless  local 
defences  were  provided,  or  else  undue  calls  would  be 
made  upon  the  Imperial  fleet  to  its  detriment. 

The  naval  defence  of  Australia  for  instance  is 
probably  best  assured  by  a  fleet  some  ten  thousand 
miles  or  so  away  from  Oceania ;  but  it  will  be  a  long 
day  before  Australians  as  a  whole  will  realise  this  and 
a  still  longer  day  before  its  people  will  be  satisfied  to 
pay  their  share  to  an  invisible  navy.  The  demand  on 
the  faith  of  the  colonial  man  in  the  street  is  too 
great. 

Consequently  the  colonies  are  likely  to  remain  a 
tax  upon  an  Imperial  Fleet  to  which  they  contribute 
practically  nothing ;  and  this  may  be  the  lesser  of  two 
evils. 

The  nightmare  of  colonials — when  such  matters 
enter  their  thoughts  at  all — is  that  some  large  hostile 
cruiser  may  *  get  through '  and  devastate  their  coasts. 
In  actual  fact  the  devastation  so  caused  by  a  ship 
far  from  a  base  would  be  trifling,  and  would  certainly 
be  unlikely  to  remunerate  the  enemy  for  the  loss  of 
the  cruiser's  services  nearer  home,  nor  is  it  probable 


188  HEKESIES  OF   SEA  POWEK 

that  it  would  equal  in  many  cases  the  loss  to  the 
Imperial  Fleet  caused  by  the  detachment  of  ships 
beforehand  in  contemplation  of  such  an  eventuality. 
It  may  be  taken,  however,  that  the  colonial  view  of 
the  matter  would  be  in  different  perspective  to  the 
English  view  of  it. 

On  the  whole  it  may  be  said  that  colonies  whether 
born  of  Sea  Power  or  not,  are  assuredly  a  drag 
upon  it. 

The  colonies  of  other  nations  are  of  considerably 
lesser  extent,  and  also  of  still  less  utility.  Of  what 
value  for  instance  are  the  Philippines  to  the  United 
States?  They  may  some  day  indirectly  swell  the 
national  revenue ;  but  they  represent  also  a  very 
probable  cause  of  future  friction  with  Japan,  for 
which  there  is  no  commensurate  advantage.  Kiao 
Chau  again,  is  probably  nothing  but  an  expensive  toy 
to  Germany,  despite  its  nominal  reputation  as  a  trade 
base.  It  is  certainly  a  tax  on  the  German  navy  just  as 
the  Philippines  are  on  the  United  States  fleet.  In  the 
case  of  war  between  any  two  countries  it  is  clear  that 
all  over-sea  possessions  will  fall  into  the  hands  of  the 
nation  with  the  superior  fleet.  This  patent  fact  is 
used  as  an  argument  of  great  power  by  naval  expan- 
sionists, but  whether  such  over- sea  possessions  really 
benefit  a  nation  has  never  been  altogether  determined. 
It  is  in  no  way  clear  that  a  big  mercantile  marine  is 
the  child  of  colonies,  or  depends  upon  the  existence 
of  colonies  for  its  own  existence.  England  has  much 


COLONIES  AND   SEA  POWEK         189 

the  largest  mercantile  fleet  in  existence  and  she  has 
much  the  largest  colonial  empire.  But  Norway  with 
no  colonies  at  all  has  about  one  and  a  half  million 
tons  of  mercantile  marine  to  a  population  of  about 
two  and  a  quarter  millions.  The  British  mercantile 
marine  is  somewhere  about  ten  and  a  quarter  million 
tons  and  about  one  and  a  half  million  more  for  the 
colonies,  &c.,  with  a  population  for  the  United  King- 
dom of  about  forty-two  millions :  that  is  to  say  the 
United  Kingdom  with  an  immense  colonial  empire 
has  about  -25  of  a  ton  of  shipping  per  head  of 
population  where  Norway  without  any  colonies  at  all 
has  -66  of  a  ton  of  shipping  per  head  of  population — 
or  a  good  deal  more  than  double  as  much  !  The  two 
cases  are  extreme,  but  still  undoubtedly  suggest  that 
there  is  no  necessary  connection  between  the  possession 
of  colonies  and  a  large  mercantile  marine. 

It  is  not  the  purport  of  this  chapter  to  try  to 
prove  that  England's  colonies  are  useless  to  her— 
apart  from  other  considerations  the  question  is  outside 
the  scope  of  the  book.  But  it  is  certainly  to  be 
suggested  that  colonies  are  of  no  advantage  whatever 
to  the  Navy,  and  that  there  is  a  good  deal  of  scope 
for  someone  to  convince  colonials  that,  instead  of  the 
empire  depending  upon  them  for  its  existence,  it  is 
they  that  owe  their  existence  to  the  empire.  It  is 
a  point  which  colonial  opinion  is  often  unaware  of. 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW 

INTERNATIONAL  law  has  been  defined — nautically  at 
any  rate — as  '  a  series  of  rules  drawn  up  by  a  number 
of  learned  pedants,  and  agreed  to  by  a  number  of  other 
learned  pedants,  for  the  conduct  of  operations  of  which 
the  said  pedants  have  no  practical  conception.' 

This  definition  is,  of  course,  a  more  or  less 
humourous  generalisation;  though  for  practical  pur- 
poses not  always  so  very  inexact.  For  whereas  with 
individuals  Common  Law  is  enforced  by  the  power 
behind  it,  where  nations  are  concerned  no  such  power 
exists.1  A  belligerent  will  break  as  many  laws  as  he 
pleases  without  fear  of  interference  from  any  nation, 
so  long  as  his  law-breaking  does  not  cause  incon- 
venience. Should  it  do  so  he  is  then  liable  to  be  met 
by  protest  or  force  according  to  the  circumstances  of 
the  nation  concerned.  He  is  nearly  always  able  to 
count  the  exact  risk,  and  to  reason  out  where  he  must 
be  careful  and  where  he  can  break  the  law  with 
impunity. 

1  This  general   principle  is,  of  course,  recognised  by  the  jurists 
themselves. 


INTEENATIONAL  LAW  191 

For  instance,  when  the  Japanese  seized  the  Eussian 
destroyer  Eetchitelni  at  Chefoo  in  the  Eusso-Japanese 
war,  there  was  a  clear  breach  of  International  Law 
so  far  as  the  sanctity  of  a  neutral  port  is  concerned. 
China,  however,  if  she  had  the  will,  was  totally  unable 
to  enforce  the  law,  and  no  other  nation  was  sufficiently 
interested  to  concern  itself  in  the  matter.  On  the  other 
hand,  Eussian  vessels  which  took  shelter  at  Kiao  Chau 
and  Saigon  were  not  interfered  with  by  Japan,  and  law 
was  operative.  But  it  would  not  have  affected  results 
had  there  been  no  law  on  the  subject  at  all,  for  the 
simple  reason  that  it  was  not  to  the  interests  of  either 
Germany  or  France  to  see  Eussia  suffer  too  severely  at 
the  hands  of  Japan  or  to  have  conflicts  in  their  har- 
bours, while  it  was  not  to  Japan's  interests  to  attempt 
the  capture  of  the  Tsarevitch  at  Kiao  Chau  as  she 
seized  the  Eetchitelni  at  Chefoo.  Yet  we  know  very 
well  that  had  the  Tsarevitch  been  at  Chefoo  no 
respect  for  International  Law — other  than  the  fear  of 
international  complications — would  have  prevented  the 
Japanese  from  capturing  the  battleship.  We  know 
further  that,  however  technically  illegal,  such  an  action 
would  have  been  perfectly  sound  and  rational. 

Indeed,  the  right  of  sanctuary  in  a  neutral  harbour 
is  an  altogether  illogical  law.  It  is  unfair  to  the 
victor  that  the  vanquished  should  be  able  to  evade 
the  consequences  of  defeat,  and  easily  suggests  intoler- 
able situations  in  the  case  of  a  neutral  half  inclined  to 
enter  the  war.  Had  Germany,  for  instance,  joined 


192  HEEESIBS  OF   SEA  POWEK 

forces  with  Kussia  at  any  time  after  Bound  Island 
there  would  have  been  an  important  battleship  added 
to  Japan's  enemies — a  battleship  which  would  have 
been  sunk  or  captured  to  a  certainty  but  for  the 
existence  of  a  law  on  the  question  of  internment  and 
Japan's  need  for  observing  the  law. 

Legal  moralists  have  enlarged  upon  Japan's  crimi- 
nality in  seizing  the  Eetchitelni  at  Chefoo,  but  in 
point  of  common-sense  it  was  quite  the  correct  course. 
In  the  matter  of  a  destroyer  it  was  of  minor  im- 
portance, but  had  the  Tsarevitch  been  the  ship  in 
question,  the  uncertainty  as  to  China's  attitude  in  the 
war  would  probably  have  rendered  her  capture  impera- 
tive as  a  mere  measure  of  self -protection. 

Had  the  incident  occurred  it  is  clear  that  no  nation 
would  have  taken  action  against  Japan  on  account  of 
regard  for  the  laws  of  neutrality  as  Law :  any  action, 
whatever  its  nominal  cause,  would  have  been  dictated 
solely  by  self-interest  or  a  regard  for  '  precedent.' 
Nations  able  to  conceive  a  similar  state  of  affairs  in 
connection  with  their  own  ships  at  some  future  date 
might,  on  the  score  of  precedent,  have  protested  ;  but 
even  so  the  measure  of  the  protest  would  have  been 
entirely  determined  by  the  strength  of  Japan  in  rela- 
tion to  themselves.  The  law  in  this  particular  matter, 
therefore,  is  in  substance,  a  theory  which  belligerents 
agree  to  observe  when  observance  would  be  necessary 
without  any  law  on  the  matter  at  all. 

The  neutral  harbour  and  its  sanctity  was  the  bane 


INTEKNATIONAL  LAW  193 

of  Japan  throughout  the  war.  The  outcry  about 
Eussia's  misuse  of  French  harbours  in  the  voyage  of 
the  Baltic  Fleet  was  (so  far  as  the  legal  aspect  of  the 
matter  is  concerned)  probably  based  to  some  extent  on 
misconceptions  bound  to  occur  through  the  vagueness 
of  French  rules  upon  the  subject  of  belligerents  visiting 
French  harbours.  Japan  as  the  interested  party  pro- 
tested to  the  full  extent  of  which  she  was  capable,  but 
no  other  nation  interested  itself  on  the  legal  points 
involved  in  France's  benevolence  to  her  ally. 

The  chief  trouble  that  neutral  harbours  caused  to 
Japan  was,  however,  in  connection  with  the  fugitives 
from  Eound  Island.  The  Tsarevitch  and  the  other 
runaways  were  ethically  Japanese  prizes.  Being  sepa- 
rated from  their  fleet  they  would,  in  a  wider  ocean, 
have  fallen  into  Japanese  hands  or  have  been  sunk  by 
Japanese  ships ;  but,  owing  to  the  existence  of  neutral 
harbours  near  at  hand,  they  were  able  to  escape  the 
full  consequences  of  defeat  by  internment  in  places 
where  it  would  not  have  paid  Japan  to  follow 
them. 

Then  there  is  the  Chemulpo  affair.  Here  the 
Japanese  took  up  positions  so  that  the  Eussians  were 
liable  to  immediate  annihilation — torpedo-boats  being 
placed  ready  to  discharge. 

The  Variag's  captain  then  appealed  to  the  neutral 
warships  present,  and  on  the  grounds  that  neutral 
(British)  property  might  be  damaged  did  an  action 
take  place  in  the  harbour,  the  Japanese  agreed  to 

o 


194  HEEESIES  OF   SEA  POWER 

withdraw,  if  the  Russians  would  agree  not  to  interfere 
with  the  Japanese  troops  being  landed. 

Next  day,  February  9,  the  Russians  were  informed 
by  the  Japanese  that  they  would  be  attacked  where 
they  lay  unless  they  came  out  to  destruction  before 
4  P.M.  The  captains  of  the  neutral  warships  signed  (so 
it  is  said)  a  protest  against  this,  but  this  protest  was 
apparently  not  received  by  the  Japanese  admiral  until 
after  the  Russians  had  left  the  anchorage  and  were 
just  about  to  engage  in  the  battle  which — it  is  im- 
portant to  note — still  took  place  in  Korean  territorial 
waters. 

None  of  the  neutral  ships  protested  against  this 
action,  which  from  the  legal  standpoint  was  quite  as 
improper  as  an  attack  at  the  anchorage  would  have 
been.  They  were  concerned  simply  with  the  property 
of  their  fellow-countrymen  which  might  get  injured  in 
a  fight  at  the  anchorage,  and  there  are  no  indications 
of  the  slightest  real  regard  for  the  law  of  the  matter  as 
Law  on  the  part  of  any  one  concerned.  Were  Inter- 
national Law  a  living  force  the  Russians  would  have 
lain  at  their  anchorage  free  from  molestation.  The 
only  actual  law  was  expediency.  It  was  expedient  for 
the  Japanese  to  destroy  the  Russians  and  they  con- 
sequently did  so.  It  was  expedient  for  the  Russians 
not  to  involve  neutral  property  in  their  own  destruction, 
so  they  steamed  clear  of  this  neutral  property.  It  was 
expedient  for  the  neutral  warships  to  guard  the  interests 
of  their  own  people — so  they  did  so.  For  all  the 


INTEENATIONAL   LAW  195 

bearing  that  it  had  on  results  in  this  case  International 
Law  might  never  have  existed  at  all. 

The  attitude  of  any  naval  officer  so  circumstanced 
would  have  been  the  same  as  that  of  the  Japanese 
Admiral  Uryu,  whose  prime  duty  was  to  destroy  the 
Russians  rather  than  to  work  out  the  exact  legality  of 
his  action.  Incidentally  it  may  be  mentioned  that  the 
exact  legal  aspect  of  the  question  almost  defies  working 
out.  Korea  was  a  *  neutral  state,'  but  in  how  far  did 
the  landing  of  Japanese  troops  make  Chemulpo  a 
Japanese  harbour?  In  how  far  is  the  question  affected 
by  the  fact  that  Eussia  had  allowed  Japan's  right  to 
land  troops  in  Korea  and  specifically  mentioned 
Chemulpo  ? l 

As  a  nation  the  Japanese  have  probably  more 
regard  for  International  Law  than  any  other.  For 
instance  in  their  war  with  China,  Professor  Takahashi 
was  embarked  in  the  flagship  Matsushima  as  legal 
adviser  to  the  admiral  commanding.  Yet  that  war 
gave  us  the  Kowshing  affair,  in  which  this  neutral 
British  vessel  chartered  by  the  Chinese  Government  to 
convey  eleven  hundred  soldiers  to  Korea,  was  sunk 
by  Togo,  then  captain  of  the  cruiser  Naniwa.  The 
Kowshing  had  left  Taku  before  war  broke  out  and 
Togo's  action  in  capturing  her  was  quite  illegal.  But 
on  the  other  hand  what  would  his  action  have  been  had 
he  allowed  her  to  proceed  ?  He  would  have  been  an 
admirable  example  of  a  law-respecting  citizen,  but  a 
1  See  Chapter  on  Basso-Japanese  War. 

02 


196  HEKESIBS   OF   SEA  POWEK 

singularly  bad  naval  officer.  That  he  sank  the  Kowshing 
and  allowed  the  Chinese  soldiers  to  drown  without  any 
attempt  to  save  them  was,  as  it  turned  out,  merely  a 
necessary  sequence  of  the  really  illegal  act  of  stopping 
the  vessel  at  all.  Both  acts  were  dictated  by  expediency. 
With  the  best  will  in  the  world  it  would  have  been 
quite  inexpedient  for  him  to  have  bothered  about  the 
legal  position  of  the  Kowshing  and  her  cargo  of 
Chinese  soldiers,  and  it  is  to  be  observed  that  the 
British  Government  allowed  the  Kowshing  incident  to 
slip,  though  there  was  no  Japanese  alliance  in  those 
days  and  little  if  any  partiality  for  Japan.  Togo's 
entirely  illegal  act  was  sanctioned  as  sound  common- 
sense. 

Questions  of  contraband  are  those  which  most 
nearly  affect  naval  officers.  In  actual  practice  things 
work  out  to  the  effect  that  a  belligerent  by  declaring 
an  article  contraband  is  able  to  seize  neutrals  carrying 
it  to  the  enemy  without  risk  of  remonstrance  from  the 
neutral's  government.  When  in  1904  Kussia  declared 
coal  contraband,  there  is  much  reason  to  believe  that 
she  hoped  thereby  to  solve  some  of  her  own  coal 
problems.  At  a  pinch  it  would  have  been  possible  to 
seize  any  neutral  collier  destined  for  a  neutral  port  on 
the  plea  of  '  contraband  intended  for  Japanese  use/ 
burn  the  coal,  and  pay  compensation  afterwards  for  the 
'  mistake.'  No  such  incident  appears  to  have  occurred, 
but  there  were  valuable  possibilities  in  declaring  coal 
contraband.  Something  akin  to  this  actually  happened 


TNTEENATIONAL   LAW  197 

at  Vladivostok  where  much-needed  neutral  steamers 
were  seized,  declared  confiscated  and  used,  compensa- 
tion being  paid  at  some  subsequent  date  in  some  cases 
when  the  '  judgment '  of  the  Vladivostok  Court  was 
reversed.  This  action  was  obviously  illegal:  but  it 
was  one  that  no  naval  officer  would  hesitate  to  take, 
given  the  need  of  the  vessels.  The  demands  of 
expediency  must  override  any  legal  considerations 
agreed  to  in  time  of  peace. 

Then  there  is  the  question  of  neutral  waters, 
referred  to  in  the  case  of  the  Chemulpo  affair.  It  is 
quite  illegal  for  a  warship  to  enter  neutral  waters  for 
the  purposes  of  advantage  in  an  action,  but  saving  the 
presence  of  a  neutral  force  to  ensure  the  sanctity  of 
such  waters  what  ship  would  hesitate  to  ignore  all 
laws  on  the  matter  if  it  had  anything  to  gain  thereby  ? 

It  is  quite  illegal  for  submarines  to  lie  in  neutral 
waters  awaiting  victims,  and  at  the  close  of  the  Eusso- 
Japanese  war  proposals  to  frame  some  regulations 
under  this  particular  head  were  mooted.  Some  day 
they  are  likely  to  take  shape  and  be  agreed  to  by  every 
nation;  but  what  submarine  will  be  deterred  from 
entering  unwatched  neutral  waters  on  that  account  ? 

It  is  illegal  to  lay  mines  in  the  high-seas  or 
anywhere  outside  the  three-mile  limit.  The  knowledge 
of  this  is  an  almost  direct  incentive  to  laying  them 
further  out  to  sea,  where  they  might  be  less  expected. 
A  mine  laid  where  the  enemy  expects  to  find  one  is  a 
perfectly  useless  weapon.  It  may  be  that  in  any  case, 


198  HEKESIES  OF   SEA  POWER 

on  the  ground  that  it  is  likely  to  break  adrift  and 
damage  its  own  side ;  but  the  obvious  thing  to  do  with 
it  if  laid  at  all  is  to  lay  it  on  some  illegal  and,  therefore, 
less  to  be  expected  spot. 

From  all  of  which  it  is  abundantly  clear  that 
International  Law  is  an  effective  law  only  so  far  as 
the  weaker  is  concerned — the  strong  nations  obeying  it 
or  enforcing  it  only  so  far  as  such  action  suits  their 
necessities  or  the  expediency  of  the  case. 

In  theory  International  Law  rests  for  its  action 
on  public  opinion.  In  practice,  the  value  of  public 
opinion  is  a  small  factor.  If  the  United  States  Fleet 
— for  instance — outraged  International  Law  in  war, 
public  opinion  in  the  United  States  would  be  with  the 
Fleet  and  not  with  the  Law.  Similarly  opinion  in 
England — assuming  that  sympathy  with  the  United 
States,  which  would  exist  in  almost  any  war  in  which 
America  might  be  engaged — would  be  a  considerably 
more  powerful  factor  than  any  regard  for  the  letter  of 
the  Law.  Throughout  the  world  generally  only  those 
nations  which  were  anti- American  to  commence  with 
would  possess  a  public  opinion  at  all  in  favour  of  the 
enforcement  of  the  Law.  It  would,  in  fine,  be  simply 
a  vehicle  for  the  expression  of  self-interest. 

An  interesting  example  of  this  sort  of  thing  in 
operation  was  afforded  by  the  Russo-Japanese  war. 
Coal  was  shipped  to  either  belligerent.  The  illegality 
of  supplying  coal  to  Russia  was  much  discussed,  but 
nothing  was  said  about  coal  supplied  at  the  self-same 


INTEKNATIONAL  LAW  199 

time  to  Japan.  Public  opinion  was  concerned  not 
with  the  Law  in  the  matter,  but  with  its  self-interest 
—the  success  of  Japan. 

Again,  there  was  the  case  of  the  Malacca.  Had 
the  Black  Sea  been  Japanese  is  it  likely  that  anything 
would  have  been  heard  in  England  about  the  illegality 
of  warships  passing  the  Dardanelles  ?  Would  it  not 
have  been  an  expedient  (and  therefore  justifiable)  act  ? 
In  Germany,  however,  instead  of  being  '  reasonable 
enough,'  as  it  was  in  the  case  of  Eussian  ships,  it 
would  have  been  a  gross  violation  of  treaties  and  so 
forth  ad  lib. 

There  is  a  good  deal  of  reason  to  believe  that  the 
Eussian  story  of  the  Malacca  incident  is  substantially 
true  on  several  points.  This  story  in  full  is  as 
follows : — 

The  Malacca  was  watched  by  a  Eussian  agent  who 
saw  on  the  wharf  a  number  of  cases  believed  to  con- 
tain machinery  for  destroyers  building  in  Japan  and 
other  war  requisites.  Observed  watching,  he  retired. 
The  next  morning  a  broad  arrow  was  upon  each  sus- 
pected case :  though  the  official  broad  arrow  should 
only  have  been  put  after  the  cases  were  received  on 
board. 

Hence  the  Malacca  incident — the  capture  of  the 
vessel  and  her  subsequent  release  upon  imperative 
British  demands.  Had  the  Japanese  captured  her 
under  corresponding  circumstances  as  suspected  of 
carrying  essentials  for  the  Eussian  fleet  would  British 


200  HEEESIES   OF   SEA  POWER 

public  opinion  have  so  eagerly  supported  International 
Law  on  the  matter  ? 

Then  there  are  affairs  like  the  Dogger  Bank  incident 
where  the  Russian  Baltic  Fleet  opened  fire  and  sank  or 
injured  some  British  fishing  vessels.  Public  opinion 
rose  to  fever  heat  and  more.  Supposing  a  British  fleet 
going  to  a  distant  war  to  have  sunk  some  Russian  fish- 
ing vessels  under  similar  circumstances  would  British 
public  opinion  have  viewed  the  incident  in  the  same 
way? 

International  Law  of  course  hardly  legislates  for 
incidents  like  that  of  the  Dogger  Bank,  but  it  will 
probably  have  to  do  so  ere  many  years  have  passed. 
Whatever  views  were  entertained  by  the  civil  popula- 
tion there  is  no  doubt  that  naval  opinion  was  slow  in 
condemning  the  Russian  admiral,  probably  because  it 
had  in  view  precedent  and  the  possible  framing  of  some 
inconvenient  law  on  the  matter — inconvenient,  because 
were  the  Baltic  Fleet's  offence  to  become  a  duly  recog- 
nised offence,  very  awkward  and  dangerous  situations 
might  result  in  certain  cases. 

Briefly  the  facts  were  as  follows : — 

The  Russian  Baltic  Fleet  before  leaving  for  the 
Far  East  was  warned  to  be  on  its  guard  against  a 
possible  attack  in  the  Baltic  or  North  Sea.  Near  the 
Dogger  Bank  the  first  division—out  of  its  direct  course, 
either  from  bad  seamanship  or  of  set  design,  passed 
through  a  British  fishing  fleet.  A  little  later  the 
second  division  came  up  and  suddenly  opened  fire  on 


INTERNATIONAL   LAW  201 

what  the  Russians  alleged  to  have  been  two  torpedo 
boats,  but  which  others  have  asserted  were  the  Aurora 
and  Dmitri  Donskoi.  In  the  firing  damage  and  loss  of 
life  were  sustained  by  the  fishing  fleet.  The  Eussians 
proceeded  on  their  course  without  stopping  to  aid  the 
victims. 

Now  it  is  immaterial  whether  the  Russians  fired  at 
their  own  ships  or  not,  the  main  point  is  that  they 
believed  themselves  to  be  attacked  and  at  once  opened 
fire  without  regard  to  anyone  else  in  the  neighbour- 
hood who  might  get  hurt.  This  was  an  absolutely 
proper  act  from  the  naval  standpoint — '  Fire  at  any- 
thing suspicious  '  is  the  only  possible  order  for  a  fleet 
that  believes  itself  to  be  in  danger  of  torpedo  attack ; 
to  wait  to  ascertain  may  be  to  court  destruction. 
Similarly,  an  admiral  believing  an  attack  to  have  been 
delivered  would  commit  a  more  than  error  by  waiting 
to  save  any  innocent  victims  of  his  fire. 

These  points  were  evidently  borne  in  mind  by  the 
Commissioners  whose  full  report  was  as  follows : — 

1.  The  Commissioners,  after  minute  and  prolonged 
examination  of  the  whole  of  the  facts  that  have  come 
to  their  knowledge  concerning  the  incidents  submitted 
to  them  for  investigation  by  the  St.  Petersburg 
declaration  of  November  12/25,  1904,  have  in  this 
report  proceeded  to  give  an  analysed  statement  of  those 
facts  in  their  proper  order. 

In  communicating  the  principal  opinions  of  the 
Commission  on  each  important  or  decisive  point  of 


202  HEEESIES  OF   SEA  POWEK 

this  summary,  they  believe  that  they  have  thrown 
sufficient  light  upon  the  causes  and  the  consequences 
of  the  incident  in  question,  and  at  the  same  time  upon 
the  responsibilities  resulting  therefrom. 

2.  On  October  7/20,  1904,  the  second  Eussian 
squadron  of  the  Pacific  Fleet,  under  the  chief  com- 
mand of  Vice-Admiral  Aide-de-Camp  General  Eoges- 
tvensky,  anchored  near  Cape  Skagen  with  the  intention 
of  taking  in  coal  before  continuing  its  voyage  to  the 
Far  East. 

It  appears,  according  to  the  deposition  made,  that 
from  the  time  when  the  squadron  left  the  roadstead  of 
Keval,  Admiral  Kogestvensky  had  caused  the  vessels 
under  his  command  to  adopt  minute  precautions,  with 
the  object  of  placing  them  fully  in  a  position  to  repel 
an  attack  by  torpedo-boats  during  the  night,  either  at 
sea  or  when  anchored. 

These  precautions  seem  to  be  justified  by  the  infor- 
mation frequently  sent  by  the  agents  of  the  Imperial 
Government  respecting  hostile  attempts  that  were  to 
be  apprehended,  and  which  in  all  probability  would 
take  the  form  of  attacks  by  torpedo-boats. 

Furthermore,  during  his  stay  at  Skagen,  Admiral 
Eogestvensky  had  been  informed  of  the  presence  of 
suspicious  vessels  off  the  Norwegian  coast.  Besides, 
he  had  learned  from  the  captain  of  the  transport 
Bakan,  who  had  come  from  the  north,  that  on  the 
night  before  he  had  seen  four  torpedo-boats,  which 
had  only  a  single  light  at  the  masthead. 


INTEKNATIONAL  LAW  203 

This  news  caused  the  Admiral  to  leave  twenty-four 
hours  earlier  than  he  had  intended. 

3.  Consequently  each  of  the  six  different  sections 
of  the  squadron  steamed  off  separately  in  turn,  and 
reached  the  North  Sea  independently  of  each  other  in 
the  order  mentioned  in  Admiral  Kogestvensky's  report ; 
this   general   officer   commanding  in  person  the  last 
section,  composed  of  the  four  new  battleships,  Kniaz 
Suvaroff,   Imperator  Alexander  III.,  Borodino,  Orel, 
and  the  transport  Anadyr. 

This  section  left  Skagen  at  10  P.M.  on  October 
7/20. 

The  first  two  sections  were  ordered  to  proceed 
at  a  speed  of  12  knots  and  the  following  sections  at 
10  knots. 

4.  Between  1.30  and  4.15  on  the  following  after- 
noon, October  8/21,  all  the  sections  of  the  squadron 
were  passed  in   succession  by  the  English  steamer 
Zero,  the  captain  of  which  vessel  examined  the  differ- 
ent  units  closely  enough  for  them  to  be  recognised 
from  his  description  of  them.     Moreover,  the  results  of 
his  observations  are  in  general  agreement  with   the 
indications  given  in  Admiral  Kogestvensky's  report. 

5.  The  last  vessel  passed  by  the    Zero   was  the 
Kamchatka,  according  to  the  description  which  the 
captain  of  the  Zero  gave  of  her. 

This  transport,  which  at  first  formed  part  of  the 
same  group  as  the  Dmitri  Donskoi  and  the  Aurora, 
was,  therefore,  at  the  time  alone  and  about  ten  miles 


204  HERESIES   OF   SEA  POWEK 

behind  the  squadron,  having  been  obliged  to  slacken 
speed  owing  to  a  machinery  defect. 

This  accidental  delay  was  perhaps  incidentally  the 
cause  of  subsequent  events. 

6.  Towards  eight  o'clock  in  the  evening  this  trans- 
port   met    the   Swedish  vessel   Aldebaran   and   other 
unknown  ships,  which  she  fired  upon,  doubtless  owing 
to  the  apprehensions  aroused  in  the  momentary  cir- 
cumstances   by    her    isolation,   the    damage    to    her 
machinery,  and  her  slight  fighting  value. 

However  this  may  be,  at  8.45  P.M.  the  captain  of 
the  Kamchatka  despatched  to  his  commander-in-chief 
by  wireless  the  statement  respecting  this  meeting  that 
he  was  '  attacked  on  all  sides  by  torpedo-boats/ 

7.  In  order  to  understand  the  influence  which  this 
news  might  have  had  upon  the  subsequent  decisions  of 
Admiral  Kogestvensky  it  must  be  remembered  that  in 
his   anticipations   the   attacking  torpedo-boats  whose 
presence  had  thus  been  announced  to  him,  rightly  or 
wrongly,  as  being  some  fifty  miles  astern  of  the  section 
of   ships   under  his  command,   might   overtake    him 
towards  one  o'clock  in  the  morning  in  order  to  attack 
him  in  turn. 

This  information  decided  Admiral  Kogestvensky  to 
signal  to  his  ships  towards  ten  o'clock  at  night  to  re- 
double their  vigilance  and  to  expect  an  attack  from 
torpedo-boats. 

8.  On  board  the  Suvaroff  the  Admiral  had  deemed 
it  indispensable  that  one  of  the  two  senior  officers  of 


INTEENATIONAL   LAW  205 

his  staff  should  be  on  duty  on  the  bridge  during  the 
night,  in  order  to  superintend  in  his  stead  the  progress 
of  the  squadron,  and  let  him  know  immediately  should 
any  incident  occur. 

Moreover,  on  board  all  the  ships  the  permanent 
orders  of  the  Admiral  prescribed  that  the  chief  officer 
on  duty  was  authorised  to  open  fire  in  case  of  a  mani- 
fest and  imminent  attack  of  torpedo-boats. 

If  the  attack  were  made  from  ahead  he  was  to  do 
so  on  his  own  initiative,  and  in  the  contrary  case,  much 
less  pressing,  to  refer  to  his  commanding  officer. 

With  regard  to  these  orders,  the  majority  of  the 
Commissioners  considered  that  they  involved  nothing 
excessive  in  time  of  war  and  particularly  in  the  cir- 
cumstances which  Admiral  Kogestvensky  had  every 
reason  to  consider  very  alarming  in  view  of  the  im- 
possibility he  found  of  verifying  the  accuracy  of  the 
warnings  that  he  had  received  from  the  agents  of  his 
Government. 

9.  Towards  one  o'clock  in  the  morning,  on  October 
9/22, 1904,  the  night  was  semi-obscure,  somewhat  over- 
shadowed by  a  slight  and  low  mist.  The  moon  only 
showed  itself  at  intervals  through  the  clouds.  The 
wind  blew  moderately  from  the  south-east,  raising  a 
long  swell,  which  made  the  vessel  roll  five  degrees. 

The  course  followed  by  the  squadron  towards  the 
south-west  necessarily  led  the  last  two  sections,  as  was 
eventually  proved,  to  pass  in  the  neighbourhood  of  the 
habitual  fishing-ground  of  the  flotilla  of  the  Hull 


206  HEKESIES   OF   SEA  POWER 

fishing-boats,  consisting  of  some  thirty  small  steamers 
and  covering  an  area  of  some  miles. 

It  is  proved  from  the  consistent  depositions  of  the 
British  witnesses  that  all  these  boats  carried  their 
regulation  lights  and  trawled  according  to  their 
customary  rules  under  the  lead  of  their  '  admiral,'  and 
pursuant  to  the  indications  conveyed  by  conventional 
rockets. 

10.  According  to  communications  received  by  wire- 
less telegraphy  nothing  unusual  had  been  signalled  by 
the  sections  which  preceded  that  of  Admiral  Boges- 
tvensky  in  traversing  these  regions. 

It  subsequently  transpired  that  Admiral  Folkersam 
in  particular  having  skirted  the  flotilla  on  the  north, 
very  closely  examined  the  nearest  trawlers  with  his 
searchlights,  and  having  recognised  them  as  inoffensive, 
proceeded  quietly  on  his  way. 

11.  It  was  shortly  afterwards  that  the  last  section 
of  the  Fleet    led    by  the   Suvaroff,  flying    Admiral 
Bogestvensky's  flag,   arrived    in    its    turn    near   the 
trawlers'  fishing-ground.     The   course   taken   by  this 
section  carried  it  nearly  into  the  midst  of  the  flotilla  of 
trawlers,  which  it  would  have  been  obliged  to  skirt, 
but    to  the  southward,    when  the    attention   of    the 
officers  on  the  watch  on  the  bridge  of  the  Suvaroff 
was  attracted  by  a  green  rocket,  which  put  them  on 
their  guard. 

This  rocket,  fired  by  the  '  admiral '  of  the  trawlers 
according  to  their  conventions,  indicated  in  reality  that 


INTERNATIONAL   LAW  207 

the  trawlers  were  to  trawl  on  the  starboard  side  to 
windward. 

Almost  immediately  after  this  first  alarm,  according 
to  the  depositions,  the  observers  on  the  bridge  of  the 
Suvaroff  who  were  scanning  the  horizon  with  night 
glasses,  discovered  '  on  the  crest  of  the  waves  in  the 
direction  of  the  starboard  cathead '  and  at  an  approxi- 
mate distance  of  eighteen  or  twenty  cables  a  vessel  which 
appeared  to  them  suspicious,  because  they  saw  no  light 
and  the  vessel  seemed  to  be  coming  straight  towards 
them. 

When  the  suspicious  vessel  was  lit  up  by  a  search- 
light the  men  of  the  watch  believed  that  they  detected 
a  torpedo-boat  steaming  at  high  speed. 

It  was  for  these  reasons  that  Admiral  Eogestvensky 
opened  fire  on  the  unknown  vessel. 

The  majority  of  the  Commissioners  express  on  this 
point  the  opinion  that  the  responsibility  for  this  act 
and  the  results  of  the  cannonade  sustained  by  the  fishing 
flotilla  rests  with  Admiral  Kogestvensky. 

12.  Almost  immediately  after  opening  fire  on  the 
starboard  side,  the  Suvaroff  perceived  ahead  a  small 
boat  barring  her  course,  and  was  obliged  to  turn  to 
port  in  order  to  avoid  colliding  with  it.  But  this 
boat  lighted  up  by  a  searchlight  was  recognised  as  a 
trawler. 

In  order  to  prevent  the  firing  of  the  vessels  from 
being  directed  against  this  inoffensive  boat,  the  axis  of 
the  searchlight  was  immediately  raised  45  degrees. 


208  HEKESIES   OF   SEA  POWEE 

Thereupon  the  Admiral  signalled  to  the  squadron 
the  order  '  Do  not  fire  on  the  trawlers.' 

But  while  the  searchlight  illuminated  this  fishing- 
boat,  according  to  the  depositions  of  the  witnesses,  the 
observers  on  board  the  Suvaroff  perceived  on  the  port 
side  another  vessel  which  appeared  to  them  suspicious 
because  of  its  resemblance  to  that  at  which  they  were 
firing  on  the  starboard  side. 

Fire  was  at  once  opened  on  the  second  object,  and 
was  thus  carried  on  from  both  sides,  the  line  of  ships 
having  by  a  retrograde  movement  returned  to  its 
original  course  without  having  modified  its  speed. 

13.  In  accordance  with  the  permanent  orders  of 
the  squadron  the  Admiral  indicated  the  object  on  which 
the  fire  of  the  ships  was  to  be  directed  by  fixing  the 
searchlights  upon  them,  but  as  each  ship  swept  the 
horizon  in  every  direction  around  it  with  its  own 
searchlights  in  order  to  guard  against  a  surprise  it  was 
difficult  to  avoid  confusion. 

This  firing,  which  lasted  from  ten  to  twelve 
minutes,  caused  serious  damage  to  the  trawler  fleet. 
Two  men  were  killed,  six  others  wounded  ;  the  Crane 
sank,  and  the  Snipe,  the  Mino,  the  Moulmein,  the  Gull, 
and  the  Majestic  suffered  more  or  less  serious  damage. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  cruiser  Aurora  was  hit  by 
several  projectiles. 

The  majority  of  the  Commissioners  declare  that 
they  lack  precise  elements  to  identify  on  what  object 
the  ships  fired,  but  the  Commissioners  unanimously 


INTERNATIONAL   LAW  209 

recognise  that  the  boats  of  the  flotilla  committed  no 
hostile  act,  and  the  majority  of  the  Commissioners, 
being  of  opinion  that  there  was  no  torpedo-boat  either 
among  the  trawlers  or  on  the  spot,  the  fire  opened  by 
Admiral  Rogestvensky  was  not  justifiable. 

The  Russian  Commissioner,  not  believing  himself 
warranted  in  concurring  in  this  opinion,  stated  his 
conviction  that  it  is  precisely  the  suspicious  vessels 
that  approached  the  Russian  squadron  for  a  hostile 
purpose  which  provoked  the  firing. 

14.  Respecting  the  real  objects  of  this  nocturnal 
firing,  the  fact  that  the  Aurora  was  hit  by  a  few  3-pounder 
and  12-pounder  projectiles  would  seem  to  be  of  a  nature 
to  give  rise  to  the  supposition  that  this  cruiser,  and 
perhaps  even  other  Russian  vessels,  delayed  on  the 
track  of  the  Suvaroff  without  that  vessel  being  aware 
of  it,  may  have  provoked  and  attracted  the  first  firing. 

This  error  may  have  been  caused  by  the  fact  that 
this  ship  seen  from  astern  showed  no  visible  light,  and 
owing  to  a  nocturnal  optical  illusion  experienced  by 
the  observers  in  the  flagship. 

In  this  connection  the  Commissioners  declared  that 
they  lack  important  information  enabling  them  to 
ascertain  the  reasons  which  brought  about  the  con- 
tinuation of  the  firing  on  the  port  side.  In  presence 
of  this  conjecture  certain  distant  trawlers  might  have 
been  confounded  with  the  original  objects,  and  thus 
directly  fired  on.  Others,  on  the  contrary,  may  have 
been  hit  by  a  fire  directed  on  objects  further  off. 

p 


210  HERESIES   OF   SEA  POWEE 

These  considerations,  moreover,  are  not  in  con- 
tradiction with  the  impression  of  certain  trawlers  who, 
finding  themselves  hit  by  projectiles  and  remaining 
lit  up  in  the  radius  of  the  searchlights,  might  have 
believed  themselves  to  be  the  object  of  direct  aim. 

15.  The  duration  of  the  firing  on  the  starboard  side, 
even   from  the   standpoint   of    the   Russian    version, 
seemed  to  the  majority  of  the  Commissioners  to  have 
been  longer  than  appeared  necessary. 

But  this  majority  considered  that  it  is  not  sufficiently 
informed,  as  has  just  been  said,  with  regard  to  the 
continuation  of  the  firing  on  the  port  side. 

In  any  case,  the  Commissioners  willingly  acknow- 
ledge unanimously  that  Admiral  Rogestvensky  person- 
ally did  all  he  could  from  beginning  to  end  to  prevent 
the  trawlers,  recognised  as  such,  from  being  the  objects 
of  the  fire  of  the  squadron. 

16.  However  that  may  be,   the   Dmitri  Donskoi 
having    eventually  made    her  number,   the  Admiral 
decided  to  give  the  Cease  Fire  signal.      The  line  of 
his  ships  then  continued  its  route  to  the  south-west 
without  having  stopped. 

In  this  connection  the  Commissioners  are  unani- 
mous in  recognising  that,  after  the  circumstances 
which  preceded  the  incident  and  those  which  gave 
rise  thereto,  there  was  at  the  Cease  Fire  sufficient 
uncertainty  as  to  the  danger  incurred  by  the  section 
of  the  ships  to  decide  the  Admiral  to  proceed  on  his 
way. 


INTEKNATIONAL  LAW  211 

At  the  same  time  the  majority  of  the  Commissioners 
regret  that  it  did  not  occur  to  Admiral  Rogestvensky, 
while  going  through  the  Straits  of  Dover,  to  inform 
the  authorities  of  the  neighbouring  maritime  Powers 
that,  having  opened  fire  in  the  vicinity  of  a  group  of 
trawlers,  those  boats  of  unknown  nationality  required 
assistance. 

17.  The  Commissioners,  in  closing  this  report 
declare  that  their  appreciations  formulated  therein  are 
not  in  their  spirit  of  a  nature  to  cast  any  discredit 
either  on  the  military  value  or  the  sentiments  of 
humanity  of  Admiral  Kogestvensky  and  of  the  per- 
sonnel of  his  squadron. 

SPAUN. 

FOUENIEE. 

DOUBASSOFF. 

LEWIS  BEAUMONT. 

CHAELES  HENEY  DAVIS. 

The  report  was  not  over  well  received  by  public 
opinion  in  either  England  or  Eussia,  and  in  concen- 
trating attention  upon  this  actual  incident  rather  than 
in  regarding  it  as  a  case  for  a  '  precedent,'  the  civil 
population — which  indirectly,  by  the  constant  expres- 
sion of  opinion,  has  much  to  do  with  the  framing  of 
International  Law — showed  itself  singularly  unable 
to  grasp  the  importance  of  the  problem. 

The  heated  imagination  of  the  captain  of  the 
Kamchatka  most  probably  produced  the  entire  incident, 

p  2 


212  HEKESIES  OF   SEA  POWEE 

but  there  is  nothing  to  show  that  similar  imaginations 
will  not  exist  in  the  next  war.  Hence  the  grave  im- 
portance of  the  subject. 

Supposing  a  war  between  England  and  Germany, 
what  will  be  the  exact  status  of  French  fishermen 
who  get  mistaken  for  torpedo-boats,  as  assuredly  they 
will  if  they  are  out  at  night  anywhere  in  the  paths  of 
belligerents  ?  The  Paris  Commission  on  the  Dogger 
Bank  Incident  could  not  deal  with  all  the  possibilities 
opened  by  the  subject.  Kussia  paid  lavish  compensa- 
tion to  the  injured,  but  nothing  has  been  heard  as  to 
compensation  for  interference  with  normal  work,  due 
to  the  risk  of  being  shot  at  by  mistake,  which  will  be 
the  neutral  fisherman's  lot  in  the  next  naval  war.  It 
is  quite  conceivable  that  this  question  will  involve 
grave  complications  at  some  future  date. 

The  incident  is  mentioned  as  indicating  another  of 
the  problems  (one  of  a  series)  that  bristle  around 
International  Law.  It  is  practically  impossible  to 
frame  anything  to  meet  the  case  :  no  sane  admiral 
or  captain  would  obey  a  mandate  about  inspecting 
before  firing  at  a  suspicious  object  at  night,  and  the 
incident  will  probably  turn  out  to  have  put  a  premium 
on  disguising  torpedo-boats  as  fishing  craft — a  favourite 
peace-manoauvre  device  at  all  times. 

Certain  other  matters  of  International  Law  involve 
less  abstruse  problems,  usually,  however,  because  they 
hardly  need  a  law  on  the  matter  at  all.  In  this 
category  may  be  placed  the  bombardment  of  unfortified 


INTEKNATIONAL   LAW  213 

towns  without  notice  for  non-combatants  to  withdraw. 
Common  humanity  would  compel  such  a  course  in 
forty-nine  cases  out  of  fifty  ;  in  the  fiftieth,  a  cruiser- 
captain,  undeterred  by  humanity  in  a  chance  to  wreak 
destruction  with  no  time  to  wait,  would  hardly  be 
deterred  by  any  law  upon  the  matter. 

And  so  all  through.  In  practically  every  case  laws 
as  to  the  conduct  of  naval  war  are  superfluous  either 
because  ordinary  humanity  already  forbids  or  else 
because  expediency  would  in  any  case  counsel  a 
similar  course.  Laws  may  now  and  again  be  useful 
perhaps  in  enabling  an  officer  of  the  skilful  sea-lawyer 
type  to  know  exactly  how  far  he  can  impose  upon  a 
neutral  without  creating  a  casus  belli,  but  the  stronger 
man  may  be  relied  upon  to  guide  his  actions  only  by 
expediency,  like  Togo  in  the  Naniwa  when  he  sank 
the  Kowshing.  He  will  be  a  very  poor  naval  officer 
who  throws  away  any  chance  of  damaging  the  enemy 
on  account  of  legal  considerations.  The  enemy  may 
esteem  his  moral  rectitude,  but  that  is  about  all  the 
esteem  that  he  will  earn.  Even  if  complications  are 
likely  to  follow  upon  his  performing  an  illegal  act  in 
order  to  destroy  the  enemy,  his  duty  demands  that  he 
shall  still  proceed  to  destroy.  If  the  worst  comes  to 
the  worst  his  country  can  always  '  disavow  the  action 
after  its  accomplishment.'  He  may  or  may  not  be 
punished  for  it,  but  in  any  case  he  will  have  done  his 
clear  duty  to  his  country  by  destroying  the  enemy, 
which,  had  he  been  more  law-abiding,  he  would  not 


214  HEEESIES  OF   SEA  POWER 

else  have  done.  The  predicament  is  an  awkward  one 
for  any  naval  officer  to  be  placed  in,  perhaps ;  but  the 
man  who  acts  upon  the  definition  set  forth  at  the 
beginning  of  this  chapter  will  never  fail  at  serving  his 
country  whatsoever  else  he  may  be  deficient  in.  The 
nation  fittest  to  win  is  that  which  with  a  single  eye 
takes  every  opportunity  to  win.  It  may  be  bad  law, 
but  it  is  sound  common  sense. 


VI 

THE   INVASION   OF   ENGLAND 

THEORETICALLY,  so  long  as  the  British  Fleet  maintains 
command  of  the  sea,  an  invasion  of  England,  other 
than  a  trifling  and  purely  local  raid  is  impossible. 
Against  this  theory,  military  men  are  now  and  again 
wont  to  urge  that  the  fleet  *  might  be  decoyed  away,' 
but  this  particular  hypothesis  hardly  needs  refutation. 
Whether  *  decoying  away  '  was  possible  in  the  old  days 
is  a  matter  open  to  dispute :  in  the  present  day  it  may 
be  dismissed  as  impossible.  The  incident  of  Nelson 
'decoyed  on  a  wild  goose-chase  in  the  days  of  the 
Great  War  ' — a  decoy  which  incidentally  led  to  nothing 
—can  hardly  be  paralleled  in  these  days  when  ship 
movements  are  far  more  certain  and  touch  far  more 
easily  maintained.  Even  were  it  possible,  wireless 
stations  like  that  of  Poldhu  render  recall  easy 1  should 
the  dreaded  *  invasion  during  the  absence  of  the  fleet ' 
take  place,  so  that  a  fleet  to-day  half-way  across  the 
Atlantic  is  really  considerably  nearer  the  scene  of  action 
than  was  a  fleet  at  Milford  Haven  in  the  old  sailing 

1  Poldhu  messages  are  continually  taken  in  the   Mediterranean 
2,000  miles  or  more  away. 


216  HEKESIES   OF   SEA  POWER 

days.     The  modern  increase  of  radius  is  a  preponder- 
ating factor. 

This  being  so,  historical  analogies,  even  were  they 
applicable  to  the  '  invasion  during  the  absence  of  the 
fleet '  theory,  can  hardly  be  said  to  bear  upon  the 
matter  although  compensations  may  exist,  as  so  many 
assert.  The  supposed  working  of  the  theory  of  com- 
pensations may  be  put  as  follows : — 

To-day,  owing  to  wireless  telegraphy  and  the 
absence  of  any  delaying  effect  from  contrary  winds, 
a  distant  fleet  is  relatively  comparatively  near,  and 
though  it  be  a  thousand  miles  away,  it  is  only  four 
days  or  so  off.  But  against  this  the  compensating 
factors  are  that  invading  troops  can  be  conveyed  across 
infinitely  more  surely  and  quickly  than  in  the  days  of 
sail,1  also  the  torpedo  craft  of  the  invader  have  a 
prospect  of  dealing  with  the  defending  fleet  on  its 
return  far  greater  potentially  than  any  vessels  had  in 
the  old  days. 

Hence  the  tendency  to  balance  things  and  to  say 
that  when  the  new  and  balancing  conditions  are  sub- 
tracted from  both  sides,  the  resultant  is  much  what  the 
resultant  was  in  the  days  of  sailing  ships.  Napoleon's 
attempted  invasion  of  England  is  then  taken  ;  its 
failure  demonstrated,  and  the  deduction  drawn  that 
invasion  (other  than  a  raid)  is  impossible  so  long  as 

1  Napoleon's  row-boats  in  the  beginning  of  the  nineteenth  century 
could  hardly  have  made  an  average  of  three  miles  an  hour  at  the  best. 
Twelve  knots  is  a  low  average  for  a  modern  transport  fleet  bent  on 
getting  across  quickly. 


THE   INVASION   OF   ENGLAND        217 

a  British  fleet  holds  command  of  the  sea.     To  which 
those  who  may  loosely  be  termed  the  military  party 


respond  that  all  this  may  be  true  and  obvious,  but 
Napoleon's  was  not  a  surprise  invasion. 


218  HEKESIES   OF   SEA  POWEE 

The  details  of  Napoleon's  attempt  are  very  well 
known.  In  bare  fact  they  are  usually  described  as 
follows : — 

On  the  northern  shores  of  France  an  army  was 
openly  massed  and  flat-bottomed  boats  for  its  transport 
collected  at  all  available  ports,  towards  the  end  of  the 
first  war.  In  the  second  war  more  boats  were  collected. 
At  a  pre-arranged  time  the  three  fleets  blockaded  at 
Brest,  Eochefort,  and  Toulon  were  to  break  out  and 
rendezvous  at  Martinique,  return  en  masse  and  hold 
the  Channel  while  the  troops  crossed  in  the  flat- 
bottomed  boats. 

The  plan  so  far  as  it  existed  failed  because  for  one 
thing  only  the  Rochefort  squadron  arrived  to  time. 
The  Toulon  fleet  under  Villeneuve  arrived  after  long 
delay,  to  find  the  Eochefort  ships  already  returned  to 
France,  while  the  Brest  fleet  never  got  out  at  all. 
Nelson  followed  the  Toulon  fleet,  but  he  was  certainly 
not  *  decoyed  away '  by  it,  since  the  sole  and  only 
object  of  the  fleet  he  commanded  was  to  bring  Ville- 
neuve to  battle ;  and  so  long  as  he  '  contained ' 
Villeneuve  the  locale  mattered  little.  Napoleon's 
object  was  simply  an  attempt  so  to  mass  his  ships  that 
the  British  fleet  should  be  defeated,  after  which,  of 
course,  he  could  deal  with  the  small  craft  opposed  to 
his  boats  and  then  invade  at  leisure,  if  he  wished. 

Much  of  the  reality  of  the  proposed  invasion  is, 
however,  open  to  doubt.  What  Napoleon  actually  did 
and  what  he  really  intended  to  do  are  not  necessarily 


THE   INVASION   OF   ENGLAND        219 

one  and  the  same  thing.  England  believed  absolutely 
in  the  invasion  threat :  it  is  not  impossible  that  the 
threat  was  his  chief  purpose, — the  invasion  to  be 
materialised  only  in  the  somewhat  unlikely  event  of 
his  fleets  succeeding  in  combining  and  in  winning  a 
big  battle  at  sea. 

The  reasons  against  the  Napoleonic  invasion  being 
a  really  serious  project  are  numerous.  In  the  first 
place,  Napoleon  was  undoubtedly  a  marvellous  genius, 
a  man  little  likely  to  make  miscalculations,  and  alto- 
gether unlikely  to  fail  at  profiting  by  past  experience. 
Past  experience  in  Egypt  cannot  but  have  convinced 
him  that  to  attempt  over-sea  operations  in  face  of  a 
superior  and  unbeaten  fleet  was  dangerous ;  therefore 
it  is  extremely  unlikely  that  he  contemplated  any 
replica  of  the  invasion  of  Egypt,  or  any  imitation  of 
the  Spanish  Armada  such  as  was  believed  by  the 
people  of  England.  It  is  infinitely  more  probable 
that,  as  suggested  above,  his  design  was  to  try  to  win 
command  of  the  sea,  and  after  that  materialise  his 
invasion  project.  His  scheme  if  taken  thus  was,  of 
course,  sound  enough. 

As  for  the  boats  intended  to  convey  the  invaders, 
they  first  became  a  factor  in  1801 — that  is  towards  the 
end  of  the  first  war.  Those  collected  were  then 
altogether  inadequate  for  any  invasion.  When  Nel- 
son was  put  in  command  in  the  Channel  to  defend 
against  the  dreaded  invasion,  almost  the  first  thing 
he  did  was  to  demonstrate  that  the  invasion  was 


220  HEKBSIES   OF   SEA  POWEE 

impracticable.  He  estimated  that  at  least  two  hundred 
boats  would  have  to  be  collected  about  Boulogne,  and 
as  many  in  the  Dunkirk  district.  But  the  total  he 
actually  found  at  Boulogne  was  about  sixty,  and  these 
could  not  sail  and  seemed  extremely  unlikely  to  be 
able  to  row. 

'  The  information  respecting  the  number  of  troops 
assembled  at  Boulogne  cannot  be  true.'  .  .  . 

*  Whenever  it  [the  invasion]  comes  forth  it  will 
be  from  Flanders ;  and  what  a  forlorn  undertaking ! 
Consider  cross-tides,  etc.  As  for  rowing,  that  is  im- 
possible. It  is  perfectly  right  to  be  prepared  against 
a  mad  government ;  but  with  the  active  force  your 
lordship  has  given  me,  I  may  pronounce  it  imprac- 
ticable.' 

f  I  am  certain  that  in  the  towns  of  Boulogne  and 
the  surrounding  hills  the  total  number  (of  troops)  could 
not  exceed  two  thousand  men.  .  .  .  The  boats  collected 
at  Ostend  and  Blankenberg  may  amount  to  sixty  or 
seventy ;  .  .  .  they  could  not  carry  more  than  fifty  or 
sixty  men  each.  .  .  .  Where,  my  dear  lord,  is  your 
invasion  to  come  from  ?  ' 

So  Nelson  wrote  about  the  invasion,  and,  having 
investigated,  proved  it  to  be  an  affair  of  quite  a  few 
thousand  men  at  the  most. 

Following  upon  this  he  made  an  attempt  upon  such 
boats  as  there  were  at  Boulogne :  an  attempt  which 
proved  a  disaster,  since  they  were  all  found  to  be 
specially  protected  against  any  possible  attack.  All  of 


THE   INVASION   OF  ENGLAND        221 

which  suggests  that  Napoleon  may  have  collected  the 
boats  with  a  view  to  their  being  so  attacked,  so  as  to 
occupy  the  British  fleet  and  British  public  opinion,  with 
the  possible  idea  of  using  the  boats  as  a  nucleus  for 
some  effort  in  the  future  if  several  other  plans 
succeeded. 

When  war  broke  out  again,  the  invasion  question 
once  more  came  to  the  fore.  More  boats  were 
collected :  but  the  boats  were  never  so  plentiful  nor  the 
army  at  Boulogne  so  large  as  was  believed  in  England, 
and  it  is  even  possible  that  to  the  end  the  whole  thing 
was  merely  a  mask  for  Napoleonic  intentions  which 
found  their  expression  later  on  at  Austerlitz.  Indeed, 
Napoleon  himself,  despite  his  explicit  instructions  to 
Villeneuve,1  spoke  of  the  boat  flotilla  as  a  sham  and 
told  Metternich  that  the  Boulogne  army  *  was  always 
an  army  assembled  against  Austria.'  ...  *  I  could  not 
place  it  anywhere  else  without  giving  offence/  he  is 
reported  by  Metternich  to  have  said  when  in  conversa- 
tion with  the  prince.  Whatever  Napoleon  said  or  wrote 
never  revealed  to  a  certainty  his  plans  and  intentions, 
so  this  alone  need  not  go  for  too  much  ;  but  equally  it 
may  well  have  been  that  in  impressing  upon  Villeneuve 
the  necessity  of  coming  off  Boulogne  he  was  only  taking 
steps  to  insure  a  battle  in  the  Channel  which  Villeneuve 
might  otherwise  be  disposed  to  evade. 

1  '  The  principal  end  of  the  whole  operation  is  to  give  us,  for  some 
days,  a  superiority  before  Boulogne.  Masters  of  the  Straits  for  four  days 
150,000  men  embarked  in  2,000  vessels  will  entirely  complete  the  expedi- 
tion.'— Draft  instructions  to  Villeneuve. 


222  HERESIES   OF   SEA  POWEK 

The  victory  of  Trafalgar  rendered  impossible  any 
invasion  that  may  have  been  contemplated,  because  it 
destroyed  a  large  number  of  the  ships  which  in 
Napoleon's  design  (if  it  existed)  had  to  destroy  the 
British  fleets  before  successful  invasion  was  in  any  way 
possible ;  but  the  successful  blockade  of  Brest  also  did 
the  same  thing.  There  is  no  reason  to  suppose  that 
Napoleon  contemplated  any  invasion  in  face  of  the 
unbeaten  British  fleet.  If  this  be  granted,  then  we 
must  say  that  the  fleet  saved  England  from  invasion 
mainly  by  the  fact  that  Napoleon  did  not  believe  in 
attempting  any  over-sea  operation  without  having 
command  of  the  sea.  And,  therefore,  whatever  lessons 
it  may  convey,  Napoleon's  '  projected  invasion '  is 
not  evidence  as  to  what  would  befall  an  attempt  at 
invasion  to-day  or  to-morrow  in  face  of  a  superior 
fleet. 

Everything  that  can  be  brought  forward  points  to 
the  fact  that  Napoleon,  in  holding  the  doctrine  that 
invasion  without  having  command  of  the  sea  was  not 
possible,  was  right :  though  historical  examples  to 
show  that  invasion  in  face  of  a  superior  fleet  is  doomed 
to  failure  are  rare,  because  hardly  ever  in  history  have 
such  attempts  been  made.  The  Romans  did  it  when 
they  invaded  Sicily  in  the  First  Punic  War, — but  they 
met  with  success.  All  other  serious  invasions  have 
been  either  with  superior  naval  force  or  with  a  force 
believed  to  be  superior,  as  in  the  case  of  the  Spanish 
Armada. 


THE   INVASION   OF  ENGLAND        228 

Of  course  the  Roman  invasion  was  over  a  very  small 
space  of  water,  and  the  Carthaginian  fleet  was  some- 
where else.  It  was  also  not  expecting  the  invasion  or, 
at  any  rate,  not  on  the  spot  to  try  to  prevent  it. 

These  conditions  were  peculiar ;  but  this  invasion  is 
of  infinitely  more  importance  to  Great  Britain  than 
anything  attempted  or  believed  to  have  been  projected 
by  Napoleon.  Assuming  Napoleon's  projects  to  have 
been  as  serious  as  Englishmen  of  his  day  believed,  the 
action  of  the  British  fleet  spells  no  more  than  the 
obvious  moral  which  needs  no  historical  demonstration 
whatever,  that  the  defending  fleet  must  be  discounted. 
The  fate  of  crowded  transports  with  a  few  hostile 
cruisers  among  them  is  too  certain  to  need  discussion. 
The  essential  of  success  is  to  discount  the  defending 
fleet. 

There  are  two  ways  in  which  this  can  be  done  :  the 
first  by  the  obvious  and  historical  method  of  beating 
it;  the  second  by  the  Roman  method  against  which 
the  fleet  is  of  very  small  avail,  because  surprise  landings 
in  force  being  once  effected,  it  is — at  any  rate  if  the 
invading  troops  be  good  enough  material — relatively 
easy  to  run  over  stores  and  fresh  troops  in  individual 
ships,  as  the  Japanese  did  in  1904  when  the  Vladivo- 
stok cruisers  threatened  communications.  By  '  rela- 
tively easy,'  something  that  looks  sufficiently  possible 
to  cause  it  to  be  attempted  should  be  understood.  The 
problem  of  an  invading  army  once  landed  in  England 
being  solved,  other  risks  would  be  faced  cheerfully 


224  HEEESIES  OF   SEA  POWEB, 

enough  in  the  certainty  that  the  invaders  would  make 
themselves  felt  even  were  their  communications  cut. 

The  invasion  of  England  is  a  common  continental 
problem,  both  as  a  mental  exercise  and  as  something 
more  serious.  Its  possibility  is  a  constantly  recurring 
nightmare  to  the  English  people,  who  are  as  periodi- 
cally soothed  with  official  statements  that  '  in  face 
of  the  Fleet  invasion  is  impossible.'  This  statement 
is  usually  sufficiently  obvious  to  allay  any  qualms. 
It,  however,  takes  no  account  of  an  invasion  not  in 
face  of  the  Fleet. 

Eightly  or  wrongly  possible  invasion  is  always 
looked  for  from  Germany  ;  and  undoubtedly  Germany 
is  the  country  in  which  its  possibilities  have  been 
most  carefully  considered,  certainly  Germany  is  the 
nation  with  most  ability  to  plan  and  accomplish  such 
a  thing.  It  may  be  taken  for  granted,  too,  that  ample 
consideration  is  given  to  the  point  of  view  of  that 
general  who  said,  or  is  supposed  to  have  said,  that  he 
*  could  think  of  twenty  ways  of  throwing  an  invading 
army  into  England,  but  not  one  way  for  getting  it  out 
again.'  More,  it  may  be  taken  that  any  definite  plan 
does  not  presuppose  necessity  for  the  '  getting  it  out 
again '  save  on  the  conclusion  of  peace.  If  disaster 
befel  the  invaders,  an  army  of  100,000  men  would 
be  no  serious  loss  to  a  military  power  of  Germany's 
rank. 

Let  us  now  take  one  of  these  German  possibilities 
and  examine  it.  The  effective  German  fleet  can  be 


THE  INVASION   OF  ENGLAND        225 

roughly  put  for  the  immediate  future  at  from  15  to 
20  battleships  of  medium  power,  about  a  dozen  old  or 
small  coast-defence  ships,  a  few  very  moderate  armoured 
cruisers,  a  dozen  or  so  of  small  cruisers,  and  about 
100  effective  destroyers  or  torpedo-boats. 

The  British  fleet  on  the  immediate  scene  may  be 
put  at  12  or  more  battleships  in  the  Channel  Fleet, 
about  as  many  again  in  the  Keserve,  an  ample  supply 
of  cruisers  and  very  nearly  a  hundred  torpedo  craft  of 
one  kind  and  another ;  in  fine  a  fleet  large  enough  with 
ordinary  luck  to  defeat  the  Germans  without  aid  from 
the  Atlantic  Fleet  of  eight  very  superior  battleships  or 
the  Mediterranean  Fleet  of  more  battleships,  cruisers, 
and  a  large  torpedo  force.  Roughly,  it  may  be  said 
that  the  Atlantic  and  Mediterranean  squadrons  com- 
bined would  form  a  fleet  quite  capable  of  annihilating 
the  German  fleet  even  were  all  the  ships  in  British 
home  waters  destroyed. 

This  being  the  situation :  it  stands  approximately 
that  there  are  two  British  fleets,  either  of  which  is 
capable  in  the  ordinary  way  of  destroying  the  German 
Navy,  so  there  is  very  little,  if  any,  scope  whatever  for 
a  German  invasion  after  war  has  been  declared. 
Though  individual  transports  might  get  through  the 
British  fleet,  it  is  impossible  to  suppose  that  enough 
would  do  so  to  form  an  effective  invasion.  The 
absolute  minimum  of  invaders  would  have  to  be 
100,000  sure  of  early  reinforcement;  and  probably 
200,000  might  be  nearer  the  necessary  mark.  If 

Q 


226  HEEESIES  OF   SEA  POWEE 

20,000  ran  through  a  blockading  British  fleet  to 
various  points  they  would  be  most  extremely  lucky. 

The  German  fleet  might  of  course  plan  to  sail  for 
some  apparent  destination  such  as  Canada  in  order  to 
'  draw  the  British  fleet  after  it ' ;  but  since  to  sail  it 
would  have  to  break  the  blockade,  it  would  be  brought 
to  action  long  before  it  reached  any  distant  point, 
and  in  any  case  the  lighter  blockading  vessels  would 
still  remain  in  the  way  of  any  fleet  of  transports. 
The  'decoyed  away5  idea  is  altogether  and  in  every 
way  an  absurd  one  to  any  careful  student  of  naval 
problems. 

From  all  of  which  it  is  abundantly  clear  that  a 
German  invasion  would  have  to  be  accomplished  as 
a  <  bolt  from  the  blue '  in  time  of  peace.  The  landing 
of  the  invaders  on  English  shores  would  have  to  be 
the  first  sign  that  a  state  of  war  existed  or  could 
possibly  exist.  That  is  to  say  : — 

(1)  Nearly  100,000  men  would  have  to  be  massed 
on  the  German  coast  without  exciting  suspicion. 

(2)  The  necessary  vessels  to  carry  them  and  their 
supplies — something  like  two  hundred  ships  at  least — 
would  also  have  to  be  collected  without  exciting  any 
suspicion. 

(3)  The  British  fleet  would  have  to  be  disqualified 
from  arriving  on  the  scene  too  immediately  after  the 
disembarkation. 

(4)  The  invading  army  would  have  to  march   on 
London  (or  the  naval  bases)  carrying  all  before  it. 


THE   INVASION   OF  ENGLAND        227 

Now,  none  of  these  four  things  is  absolutely  im- 
possible. There  are  always  a  good  many  ships  in  and 
about  German  harbours  and  by  the  aid  of  some 
imaginary  manoauvres  it  is  just  possible  that  troops 
could  be  collected  in  transports  without  exciting  sus- 
picion across  the  North  Sea  or  bringing  it  about  that 
a  British  army  also  chanced  to  be  doing  manoauvres 
not  far  from  some  of  the  likely  landing  places.1  In- 
vaders with  their  paths  blocked,  even  by  considerably 
inferior  forces,  would  probably  have  each  day's  un- 
opposed advance  altered  into  a  week's  slow  progress. 

A  large  army,  no  matter  how  well  drilled  and 
efficient,  cannot  be  landed  in  an  hour  or  so  upon  a 
strange  beach.  Even  if  the  transports  are  successfully 
beached,  nothing  but  men  are  to  be  got  ashore  that 
way.  Where  there  are  convenient  docks  so  that  a 
transport  can  come  alongside,  quick  disembarkations 
may  be  made,  but  a  hundred  thousand  men  are  not 
going  to  be  landed  in  a  few  hours,2  however  carefully 
the  disembarking  transports  are  spread  along  the 
coast.  It  is  pretty  safe  to  assume  that  British  war- 
ships upon  the  scene  any  time  within  twelve  hours 

1  It  may  be  pure  coincidence,  but  the  1905  British  army  manoeuvres 
took  place  in  the  east  of  England  just  after  German  military  manoauvres 
began. 

a  In  the  Crimean  War,  with  primitive  appliances  60,000  men  weie 
landed  in  twelve  hours.  There  was  no  opposition.  Eecently  it  took  36 
hours  to  land  12,000  men  and  3,000  horses  at  Clacton,  but  the  Crimean 
incident  of  fifty  years  before  indicates  that  this  Clacton  landing  must 
have  been  managed  very  badly.  It  is  probably  not  unreasonable  to 
accept  the  Crimean  record  as  a  quite  possible  minimum— that  is  to  say 
5,000  men  an  hour. 

Q  2 


228  HEEESIES  OF   SEA  POWEK 

would  make  sad  havoc  of  the  invasion ;    and  quite  a 
large  number  should  arrive  before  that. 

Consequently  the  Fleet  would  have  to  be  provided 
against,  even  in  a  surprise  invasion,  A  time  would 
have  to  be  selected  when  the  Channel  Fleet  was  west 
of  Dover  and  refitting  in  its  home  ports.  Of  course, 
much  could  be  done  here.  In  profound  peace  it  would 
probably  not  prove  impossible  to  block  Sheerness,  and 
consequently  Chatham,  by  destroying  lightships  and 
buoys,  and  by  merchant  ships  sunk  at  the  convenient 
moment.  'Blocking'  in  war  has  so  far  proved  im- 
possible both  at  Santiago  and  Port  Arthur — each 
ideal  harbours  for  the  operation — but  without  the 
confusion  of  gun  fire  and  searchlights  the  operation 
might  be  feasible  and  everything  inside  the  Medway — 
except  perhaps  torpedo  craft — shut  in.  It  might  be 
possible  to  do  the  same  thing  at  Portsmouth ;  at  any 
rate  it  is  tolerably  obvious  that  some  such  action 
would  occur  together  with  the  first  landing  or  im- 
mediately before  it.1  Outside  both  places  and  outside 
Plymouth  mines  could  also  be  dropped.  Finally  the 
Straits  of  Dover  would  have  to  be  held  by  the  entire 
German  fleet. 

1  Torpedo  craft  unsupported  could  do  little  harm  to  beached 
transports.  Torpedoes  would  be  ineffective  and  the  invaders'  light 
craft  would  be  in  the  way  of  even  such  attempts  as  might  be  made. 
It  is  likewise  conceivable  that  those  who  contemplated  a  surprise 
invasion  would  also  be  able  to  contemplate  the  annihilation  of  the 
Channel  Fleet  by  a  surprise  torpedo  attack  while  on  cruise.  This, 
however,  would  only  be  possible  when  no  serious  '  strained  relations  ' 
existed. 


THE  INVASION  OF  ENGLAND        229 

This  is  practically  the  only  scheme  that  offers 
prospects  of  a  successful  German  invasion ;  and 
though  success  must  be  admitted  as  possible,  the 
difficulties  in  the  way  of  securing  the  necessary  con- 
ditions are  very  considerable  indeed.  Its  best  chance 
of  success  would  lie  in  the  seeming  wild  impracti- 
cability of  it  all :  that  fact  alone  would  allay  the 
suspicions  that  any  large  collection  of  ships  in  German 
harbours  would  otherwise  arouse. 

The  question  is  essentially  a  military  rather  than 
a  naval  one.  If  means  were  found  to  discount  the 
Fleet  for  the  first  few  days,  it  is  easier  to  assert  than 
to  prove  that  the  presence  of  the  fleet  later  on  would 
save  the  situation,  especially  as,  were  the  bulk  of  ships 
in  home  waters  destroyed  or  shut  in,  the  combined 
Mediterranean  and  Atlantic  fleets  would  not  very 
greatly  outmatch  the  German  navy.  They  could  not 
force  the  Straits  of  Dover  without  delays,  difficulty, 
and  perhaps  heavy  loss,1  and  even  having  forced  them 
and  destroyed  the  German  fleet,  their  influence  upon 
the  land  operations  would  for  some  days  be  infini- 
tesimal. They  would  certainly,  having  forced  Dover 
Straits,  stop  the  bulk  of  supply  ships,  and  cut  sea 
communications,  but  it  is  easy  to  overestimate  the 
value  of  these  to  a  powerful  army  marching  through 
a  prosperous  country  to  the  no  distant  goal  of  London, 

1  The  German  fleet  would,  however,  have  to  meet  submarine  attack: 
to  repel  which  the  Straits  of  Dover  are  hardly  ideal. 


230  HEEESIES  OF   SEA  POWEE 

especially  indeed  as  it  might  have  reached  London  ere 
the  British  fleet  had  passed  Dover  Straits. 

The  military  question  is  whether  the  fall  of  London 
would  be  the  fall  of  England.     The  capture  of  the 
capital  is  always  regarded  as  a  sort  of  checkmate  in 
the  game  of  war,  and  undoubtedly  the  loss  of  Wool- 
wich Arsenal  would  be  a  blow  of  tremendous  import- 
ance.    Chatham  also  would  either  fall  with  London 
or  be  rendered  harmless  by  investment ;   but  Ports- 
mouth and  Devonport,  certainly  Devonport,  could  not 
be  seized  as  part  of  the  main  surprise.     Portsmouth, 
perhaps,  may  be  more  really  the  capital  of  the  Empire 
than   London,   being    the    metropolis    of    the  Navy. 
Supposing  the  army  able  to  defend  these  two  great 
naval  bases — which  is   not   supposing   anything  un- 
reasonable, crude  though  the  actual  land  defences  of 
Portsmouth   are — it  may  be   allowed  that   the  fleet, 
if  handled  by  a  sufficiently  merciless  leader  might  do 
a  good  deal  towards  discounting  the  German  success 
inside  England,  because  devastated  coasts  and  ruined 
trade  would  mean  much  to  Germany.     Everything, 
therefore,  turns  upon  whether  London  is  the  real  as 
well  as  the  nominal  heart  of  the  Empire,  or,  to  put  it 
another  way,  on  whether  the  Navy  could  continue  to 
exercise  its   functions  unimpaired   by  the  loss  of  all 
that  internal  machinery  which  has  its  seat  in  White- 
hall.    If  it  could  not  so  continue,  then  a  successful 
surprise  invasion  should  be  fatal :  if,  however  it  could 


THE  INVASION   OF   ENGLAND        231 

continue  to  function,  then  a  surprise  invasion  would 
probably  be  expensive  rather  than  fatal,  since  invaders 
permanently  cut  off  from  their  supplies  would  be  doomed 
to  certain  ultimate  failure. 

The  thing  is,  of  course,  unlikely,  apart  from  its 
difficulties.  Also,  once  the  principle  of  surprise  wars 
is  admitted,  what  nation  could  consider  itself  safe? 
Still  the  'bolt  from  the  blue'  school  are  somewhat 
unduly  characterised  as  vague  alarmists,  because  after 
all  the  main  object  of  all  wars  is  success,  and  that 
hesitation  which  usually  precedes  all  wars  is  probably 
a  deal  more  due  to  reckoning  up  chances  than  to  moral 
restraints  felt  by  the  contending  governments.  And 
the  mere  existence  of  the  idea  that  every  war  must  be 
preceded  by  a  long  series  of  diplomatic  discussions, 
is  a  temptation  to  every  virile  nation  to  seize  on  the 
obvious  advantage  of  a  sudden  and  unexpected  action. 
In  a  small  way  Japan  did  this  in  1904,  and  secured 
valuable  initial  advantages.  Her  preparations  for  the 
blow,  however  plain  they  may  now  seem,  went  prac- 
tically unheeded  by  the  Russians.  Negligence  may 
count  for  something  here,  but  the  Eussian  conviction 
that  there  would  be  no  war  counted  a  great  deal  more. 
This  element  of  belief  that  all  war- talk  will  end  with 
words,  is  one  of  the  factors  that  lead  to  surprises  being 
possible.  And  so  a  surprise  invasion  of  England  is 
quite  possible  enough  to  give  ample  reason  to  those 
who  demand  that  some  military  should,  like  the  navy, 


232  HEEESIES  OF   SEA  POWEK 

be  always  on  a  war  footing  :  for  the  possible  situation 
is  one  in  which  the  limitations  of  Sea  Power  are  very 
apparent.  To  succeed  against  Britain  Germany  must 
invade :  since  she  cannot  invade  in  face  of  the  fleet, 
if  she  does  anything  at  all  she  must  act  by  surprise, 
and  unable  to  discount  the  fleet  by  ordinary  war 
methods  have  recourse  to  '  other  ways.' 


VII 

SECBECY  AND   SEA  POWER 

IN  the  modern  philosophy  of  Sea  Power  secrecy  is 
coming  to  bulk  more  and  more  largely,  and  indications 
are  not  wanting  of  a  tendency,  in  the  mere  exercise 
of  the  means,  to  lose  sight  of  the  ends  which  it  is 
supposed  to  attain. 

Secrecy,  though  the  fact  is  generally  unperceived, 
is  on  the  same  plane  as  '  evasion/  and  may  indeed  be 
termed  the  mother  of  evasion.  A  fleet  anxious  to  evade 
can  do  so  only  by  the  exercise  of  the  greatest  possible 
secrecy,  and  the  failure  of  evasive  tactics  is  usually 
brought  about  through  a  failure  in  secrecy  of  move- 
ment. 

Evasion  is  the  handiest  weapon  of  the  weaker. 
That  '  evasion  '  cannot  win  a  campaign  is  a  common- 
place so  general  that  it  scarcely  needs  discussion.  The 
mere  act  of  evasion  is  only  another  form  of  flight,  the 
evading  fleet  is  for  all  practical  purposes  running 
away,  and  seeking  to  stave  off  that  defeat  which  on 
account  of  its  inferiority  looms  ever  over  it. 

Of  course  there  is  evasion  of  a  more  logical  nature 
than  that  which  is  generally  understood  by  the  term — 


234  HEEESIES   OF   SEA  POWEK 

for  instance  the  evasion  of  two  inferior  squadrons 
attempting  to  form  a  combined  fleet.  The  needs  of 
secrecy  in  evasions  so  designed  are  too  obvious  to  need 
discussion,  since  it  is  evident  that  A  seeking  to  avoid 
the  superior  C  till  he  has  joined  B,  will  be  destroyed 
by  A  should  his  whereabouts  be  known.  Secrecy  on 
such  lines  is  perfectly  intelligible.  It,  however,  by  no 
means  covers  the  general  modern  application  of  secrecy 
— a  growing  official  tendency  to  shroud  everything 
under  the  mask  of  '  strictly  confidential.' 

Examples  of  this  are  on  every  hand.  For  instance, 
the  British  battleship  Dreadnought  was  made  a  con- 
fidential construction.  Newspapers  were  requested  to 
publish  nothing  in  the  way  of  descriptions  of  the 
vessel  and  the  public  generally  was  kept  quite  in  the 
dark  about  her.  The  intention  was  excellent  enough — 
to  keep  rival  powers  from  building  something  of  the 
same  sort  at  the  same  time.  Yet  it  needs  a  very 
robust  faith  to  believe  that  the  secret  was  really  kept 
from  those  most  interested  in  knowing  all  about  the 
matter.  On  the  other  hand  the  curiosity  of  rivals  was 
deliberately  excited,  and  it  is  difficult  to  imagine  that 
any  real  result  was  obtained  beyond  enabling  a  certain 
number  of  Admiralty  officials  to  experience  that  sensa- 
tion of  security  enjoyed  by  the  pursued  ostrich  when 
its  head  is  hidden  in  the  sand. 

France  with  her  submarines  made  frantic  efforts 
after  secrecy.  The  mere  photographing  of  the  ex- 
terior of  a  submarine  was  made  a  penal  offence,  and 


SECEECY  AND   SEA  POWEK          235 

every  possible  precaution  was  rigidly  adopted.  To  a 
certain  extent  temporary  success  was  obtained;  but 
there  is  now  every  reason  to  believe  that  the  mere  fact 
of  the  secret  submarines  reacted  disadvantageously  on 
their  possessors.  From  observing  the  secrecy  to  be- 
lieving that  mechanism  so  jealously  guarded  must  be 
very  near  perfection  was  no  very  long  step,  and  after 
five  years  of  the  system  the  French  submarine  service 
awoke  to  the  fact  that  in  contemplating  its  own  per- 
fections it  had  forgotten  the  progress  of  rivals  ;  while 
it  was  also  suspected  that  the  jealously  guarded  secrets 
had  leaked  out  one  by  one  and  been  so  improved  upon 
by  rivals  that  the  originals  were  no  longer  of  much 
value. 

Germany  became  a  convert  to  secrecy  with  her 
1905-6  naval  programme.  Previous  to  1905,  though 
the  destined  names  of  ships  were  secrets  locked  in  the 
Kaiser's  heart,  everything  else  was  made  public.  In 
1905  it  was  decreed  that  no  details  of  new  ships  should 
be  made  known  until  the  vessels  were  launched — a 
replica  of  the  British  Dreadnought  case.  The  net 
result  must  stifle  that  public  interest  in  the  Navy 
which  German  policy  had  for  so  long  laboured  to 
create.  Public  interest  in  things  naval  always  centres 
in  the  latest  new  ship  and  rarely  survives  her  launch. 

The  country  par  excellence  for  naval  secrets  is  or 
was  Kussia.  Eussian  secretiveness  has  been  known 
to  go  the  length  of  keeping  guns  covered  in  the 
presence  of  foreign  ships  and  the  rigging  up  of  dummy 


236  HEKBSIES  OF   SEA  POWEK 

armour  to  batteries  when  foreign  officers  were  visiting 
on  board.  This  was  actually  done  on  board  the  Kossia 
when  she  was  a  comparatively  new  ship.  No  civilian 
Kussian  ever  took  interest  in  the  Navy — to  have  done 
so  even  in  a  general  way  would  almost  have  risked  his 
liberty.  The  Navy  was  a  secret  machine ;  and  the 
war  with  Japan  very  clearly  indicated  that  secrecy  had 
been  a  splendid  cloak  for  incompetence. 

Other  instances  could  be  cited,  but  these  suffice. 
The  trend  of  official  ideas  everywhere  is  to  '  secrecy,' 
and  the  advocates  of  this  particular  panacea  invariably 
cast  their  eyes  upon  the  Press  as  the  chief  obstacle 
between  them  and  their  desires. 

At  frequently  recurring  intervals,  notably  in  such 
cases  as  that  of  a  paper  l  by  Lord  Ellenborough  at  the 
Eoyal  United  Service  Institiition,  on  the  possibility  of 
our  fleets  and  harbours  being  surprised,  and  the  sub- 
sequent discussion  on  it,  very  great  prominence  is 
given  to  the  subject  of  the  Navy  and  the  Press.  At 
the  lecture  in  question  speaker  after  speaker  devoted 
his  attention  to  the  probability  of  the  enemy  being 
assisted  unintentionally  by  learning  in  newspapers  of 
projected  movements.  This  opinion,  sometimes  veiled, 
was  in  other  cases  openly  enunciated,  and  a  wealth  of 
compliment  passed  upon  the  Japanese  press  laws. 
Some  law  to  muzzle  the  British  press  was  advocated, 
as  it  has  been  advocated  elsewhere. 

The  case  for  it  may  be  briefly  put  as  follows. 
1  Journal  of  the  Royal  United  Service  Institution^  July  1905. 


SECEECY  AND   SEA  POWER          237 

recy  is  the  essential  to  success  in  naval  strategies. 
In  the  rush  to  be  first  with  any  important  news  few 
editors  will  consider  the  result  of  the  news  becoming 
known  to  the  enemy,  and  supposing  a  certain  number 
to  be  sufficiently  patriotic  and  self-denying  to  with- 
hold publication  of  news  of  movements,  one  here  and 
there  may  be  depended  upon  to  lay  bare  important 
secrets  without  hesitation.  This  and  more  is  the  case 
for  the  introduction  of  a  muzzle. 

In  support  of  it  Japan's  reticence  is  quoted,  also  a 
Russian  statement  to  the  effect  that  in  the  Crimean 
war  Russian  movements  were  always  governed  by 
intelligence  as  to  Allied  intentions  gleaned  from  British 
and  French  newspapers.  The  fact  that  Kamimura 
learned  from  newspapers  whenever  the  Russian  Vladi- 
vostok ships  put  to  sea  in  1904-5  is  also  instanced  and 
dwelt  on :  so  also  incidents  of  the  South  African  War. 
Altogether  an  almost  perfect  case  is  made  out — till  we 
come  to  examine  it. 

To  take  the  principal  case — Japanese  secrecy  in 
the  war  with  Russia.  By  means  of  that  secrecy  the 
news  of  the  loss  of  the  Yashima  at  the  time  of  the 
Hatsuse  disaster  was  concealed  from  the  Japanese 
public  and  most  of  the  rest  of  the  world.  The  thing 
was  done  with  unexampled  thoroughness :  long  after 
the  Yashima  was  at  the  bottom  official  references  were 
continually  made  to  '  a  detachment  from  the  Yashima,' 
and  when  rumours  of  the  disaster  got  into  foreign 
newspapers  it  was  shown  that  'the  ship  could  not 


238  HEEESIES   OF   SEA  POWEK 

have  been  lost,  because  it  would  have  been  impossible 
to  conceal  so  momentous  an  event/ 

So  far  so  good.  It  is  possible,  though  not  very 
probable,  that  non-concealment  of  the  loss  of  the 
Yashima  might  have  caused  some  abstentions  from  a 
Japanese  Loan,  but  it  is  absolutely  certain  that  no  war 
gains  resulted  from  it.  The  Russians  were  perfectly 
aware  that  the  ship  was  hors  de  combat  if  not  sunk, 
and  if  the  concealment  had  any  military  value  at  all 
the  Russians  were  the  gainers,  since  they  may  well 
have  argued  that  the  secrecy  was  an  effort  to  hide  from 
them  that  they  were  getting  the  better  of  the  naval 
war.  Certainly  it  could  never  have  conveyed  to  them 
the  impression  that  they  were  being  worsted. 

It  was  no  benefit  to  Japan  for  her  people  to  feel 
that  they  were  told  only  of  victories  and  nothing  of 
defeats — the  logical  result  of  rumours  which  could  not 
be  suppressed.  In  the  case  of  Japan  such  suppression 
seems  not  to  have  been  actually  injurious,  though  the 
public  disappointment  at  the  peace  terms  which  mani- 
fested itself  in  some  rioting,  may  suggest  that  Eussia 
was  popularly  supposed  to  be  more  crushed  than  was 
actually  the  case.  A  press  ignorant  of  the  exact 
progress  of  the  Japanese  arms  was  perhaps  by  its 
comments  the  first  cause  of  the  riots. 

The  ill  results  of  secrecy  were,  however,  in  this  case 
not  really  serious  to  Japan ;  but  suppose  her  to  have 
suffered  serious  reverses  and  other  losses  which  were 
concealed,  sufficient,  let  us  say,  to  make  it  necessary 


SECKECY  AND   SEA  POWEB          239 

for  her  to  take  the  first  chance  of  peace  at  almost  any 
price.  In  such  a  case  the  policy  of  press-muzzling 
during  the  war  might  have  had  very  serious  results 
indeed,  for  how  could  a  public  fed  on  long  tales  of 
victory  have  been  induced  to  accept  the  consequences 
of  defeat  ? 

Coming  nearer  home  it  is  easy  to  see  both  sides  of 
the  question  in  bolder  relief.  The  Japanese  navy 
neither  in  size  nor  importance  can  be  compared  with 
the  British  or  American  navies.  The  number  of  people 
directly  interested  in  the  fleet  in  England  is  very  much 
larger — at  least  a  million  people  coming  under  the 
heads  of  relatives  or  close  friends  of  naval  men.  The 
operations  of  a  Press  Censorship  would  seriously  affect 
this  considerable  section  of  the  community  were  the 
censorship  anything  but  a  sham.  Any  official  censor 
of  news  may  be  depended  upon  to  go  on  the  principle 
1  When  in  doubt  cut  out.'  *  Newsy  scraps '  and  ex- 
cellent stuff  for  headlines  mean  nothing  to  him, 
nothing  has  any  meaning  except  that  should  anything 
but  the  baldest  and  most  useless  information  leak  out 
he  is  likely  to  get  into  trouble  over  it.  Hence  many  of 
the  censor's  vagaries.  His  superiors  behind  him  have 
probably  an  inherent  dislike  for  publicity  of  any  sort, 
at  any  rate  for  that  publicity  which  is  attained  through 
being  criticised.  The  whole  training  of  an  admiral — 
the  most  necessary  training  in  all  probability — is  to 
place  him  on  a  pedestal  even  to  himself,  and  criticism 
of  any  kind,  merited  or  unmerited,  strikes  him  as  pure 


240  HEKESIES  OF   SEA  POWEE 

impudence  or  something  on  a  par  with  blasphemy. 
The  average  admiral  has  this  feeling  not  only  as 
regards  himself  but  also  as  regards  all  his  brother 
admirals.  Once  the  principle  of  a  Press  Law  is 
established  it  may  be  taken  for  granted  that  the 
nation  will  have  the  foggiest  notions  as  to  what  is 
going  on. 

This,  we  may  be  assured,  will  be  resented  by  the 
million  already  referred  to,  and  the  question  might 
quite  possibly  become  a  political  one.  Becoming  that 
there  are  ample  probabilities  that  the  censorship  might 
be  suddenly  abolished ;  with  the  result  that  a  tale  of 
losses,  natural  and  incidental  to  a  naval  war  would 
come  upon  the  public  with  cumulative  and  unreason- 
ably depressing  effect. 

This,  of  course,  is  an  extreme  case,  purposely  put- 
selected  on  that  very  account.  A  far  more  probable 
result  would  be  a  lack  of  public  interest  in  the  war- 
about  as  fatal  a  thing  as  can  well  be  conceived.  And 
just  as  the  Russians  at  Port  Arthur  knew  quite  well 
about  the  lost  Yashima,  so  probably  the  enemy  would 
have  full  cognisance  of  every  disaster  that  it  was 
sought  to  keep  secret. 

Eeal  secrecy,  indeed,  is  probably  an  impossible 
thing.  It  is  doubtful  whether  the  '  confidential 
secrets  '  of  any  navy,  jealously  guarded  from  all  save  a 
few  officers  concerned,  are  not  as  good  as  public 
property  in  every  possibly  hostile  navy.  The  British 
public,  and  most  of  the  British  Navy  also,  are  quite 


SECBECY  AND   SEA  POWEK          241 

unaware  of  the  exact  abilities  of  British  submarines, 
but  probably  the  Germans  know  everything  there  is  to 
know  for  practical  purposes  ;  and  can  assess  the  fight- 
ing value  of  them  to  a  nicety.  Similarly  there  are 
plenty  of  jealously  guarded  German  secrets  that  are 
common  knowledge  in  the  British  Navy.  Ordinary 
naval  secrets  are  indeed  more  suggestive  of  the  hidden 
head  of  the  ostrich  than  aught  else ;  and  it  may  be 
taken  for  granted  that  the  concealment  of  losses  or 
blunders  in  war  will  be  impossible  where  the  enemy  is 
concerned.  It  may  be  successful  at  home ;  but  such 
methods  of  bolstering  up  the  leader  who  is  a  failure 
(for  in  sum  that  is  what  it  amounts  to)  can  never  win 
wars  and  may  conceivably  help  to  lose  them. 

Of  course  the  hypothetical  press  muzzle  would 
chiefly  be  used  (in  theory  at  any  rate)  to  conceal 
movements  and  prevent  the  enemy  discovering  the 
whereabouts  of  the  fleet.  This  was  done  by  the 
Japanese;  who  saw  nothing  ludicrous  in  the  intelli- 
gence that  *  a  certain  squadron  left  a  certain  place  on  a 
certain  date  to  arrive  at  a  certain  place  at  a  certain 
date,  as  "prearranged.'  Such  a  policy  may  do  for  a 
time ;  but  the  resulting  loss  of  public  interest  in  a  war 
is  a  heavy  price  to  pay  for  it.  Wars  are  won  by 
the  fittest  to  win,  by  the  fitness  of  the  nation  rather 
than  by  the  fitness  of  a  few  individuals ;  and  a  nation 
that  is  bored  over  its  war  news  is  not  well  in  the  way 
to  exhibit  those  staying  qualities  so  necessary  for  the 
successful  conduct  of  a  great  war.  Here  is  the  crux  of 


242  HEKESIES   OF   SEA  POWEE 

the  whole  question— the  man  in  the  street  at  home 
does  contribute  to  victory  or  defeat.  His  letters  to  his 
friends  who  are  fighting,  the  tone  of  the  newspapers 
which  reflect  his  thoughts,  the  effect  of  his  determina- 
tion to  go  on  fighting  or  not — all  these  things  are 
inseparably  connected  with  the  results  in  the  fighting 
line. 

In  the  past  secrecy  has  rarely  led  to  any  definite 
results.  Old  time  leaders  were  wont  to  send  out 
trusted  agents  with  misleading  reports,  a  system  much 
used  by  Nelson  in  the  Mediterranean  in  the  great 
French  war.  But  Nelson  at  one  and  the  same  time 
diligently  studied  French  and  Spanish  newspapers  to 
glean  intelligence,  without — so  far  as  we  can  gather — 
reflecting  that  other  newspapers  were  carefully  sup- 
plied by  him  with  false  news  of  his  own  movements 
and  intentions.  He  employed  secrecy  also  when  he 
joined  his  fleet  before  the  battle  of  Trafalgar,  ordering 
no  salutes  to  be  fired  lest  the  enemy  should  suspect 
his  arrival.  Here  he  had  a  definite  object  in  view,  his 
desire  was  for  Villeneuve  to  come  out  and  be  beaten, 
and  he  imagined,  rightly  or  wrongly,  that  the  know- 
ledge that  he  was  in  command  would  keep  the  enemy 
in  harbour.  But  even  here  it  is  permissible  to  wonder 
whether  containing  the  enemy  in  harbour,  as  Corn- 
wallis  did  off  Brest,  would  not  really  have  been  a 
sounder  step.  Due  allowance  must  be  made  for  the 
moral  effect  of  a  glorious  victory  upon  both  the  vic- 
torious and  vanquished  sides ;  but  even  when  that  is 


SECKECY  AND   SEA  POWEK          243 

considered,  the  bloodless  victory  is  possibly  the  more 
economical  and  more  scientific  exercise  of  power. 

Supposing  Nelson  to  have  joined  his  fleet  heralded 
by  all  the  usual  signs  of  a  new  admiral's  arrival,  and 
supposing  this  to  have  detained  the  French  in  har- 
bour ;  there  would  have  been  no  Trafalgar.  There 
would,  however,  have  been  forced  and  fatal  inactivity 
on  the  part  of  the  Franco- Spanish  fleet  at  no  cost  of 
British  ships  and  lives.  An  exercise  of  secrecy  pro- 
duced Trafalgar,  ifc  gave  us  dramatic  results  at  a 
certain  cost.  To  estimate  exactly  after  the  lapse  of 
a  hundred  years  whether  this  was  a  best  possible  is  a 
task  beyond  human  power,  because  completely  accurate 
data  are  not  available  as  to  whether  an  indefinite 
blockade  could  have  been  maintained.  In  a  general 
way  we  can  surmise,  but  beyond  surmise  we  can 
hardly  go.  We  cannot  say  exactly  how  far  the  ques- 
tion of  maintaining  the  blockade  entered  into  Nelson's 
calculations ;  and  so  here  the  matter  must  be  left, 
since  it  is  only  in  flights  of  imagination  that  we  can 
conceive  of  the  ideal  war  in  which  every  man  is  so 
perfect  that  the  enemy  is  brought  to  his  knees  without 
a  single  battle. 

Supposing  secrecy,  or  rather,  strivings  after  it,  to 
be  abolished,  it  in  no  way  follows  that  ideal  war  will 
be  produced.  Indeed,  paradoxical  as  it  may  seem,  real 
secrecy  is  probably  only  to  be  found  in  the  abolition  of 
secrecy.  For  instance,  it  is  relatively  easy  to  conceal 
any  particular  detail  when  there  is  a  general  show  of 

R   2 


244  HEBESIES  OF   SEA  POWEE 

publicity  of  hundreds  of  other  details.  When  there  is 
apparently  nothing  to  find  out,  curiosity  is  disarmed, 
and  of  half  a  dozen  conflicting  reports  any  one  may  be 
true  or  false.  If  a  fleet  puts  to  sea  in  war  time,  it  is 
the  simplest  thing  in  the  world  to  conceal  the  actual 
destination  and  allow  everyone  to  mention  the  goal 
that  he  happens  to  believe  in.  In  a  multiplicity  of 
destinations  the  right  one  may  be  given,  but  there  will 
be  nothing  to  indicate  that  it  is  correct.  Similarly, 
the  policy — till  recently  pursued  by  the  British 
Admiralty  and  the  American  Navy  Board — of  allowing 
everything  in  the  dockyards  (with  reservations)  to  be 
public  property  was  an  essentially  sound  idea.  Ideal 
secrecy  is  not  to  be  decried  or  disputed,  for  it  is  the 
duty  of  every  fleet  to  neglect  nothing  that  may  contri- 
bute to  victory  :  the  deleterious  secrecy  is  that  which 
is  apparent  rather  than  real,  and  effective  only  with 
those  who  are  not  possible  enemies. 

The  advantages  to  be  gained  from  secrecy  of  the 
ideal  sort  in  certain  cases  are  too  obvious  to  need 
dwelling  on  and  the  fact  that  they  are  not  mentioned 
here  in  detail  is  not  to  be  construed  as  an  ignoring 
of  their  existence.  But  unnecessary  and  superfluous 
secrecy  whether  on  small  issues,  such  as  that  which 
by  labelling  certain  works  '  strictly  confidential '  pre- 
vents naval  officers  from  studying  the  subjects  dealt 
with,  from  such  as  this  to  larger  issues  as  exemplified 
by  the  theatrical  secrecy  employed  by  the  Japanese  in 
their  war  with  Kussia  are  to  be  condemned.  The  gain 


SECEECY  AND   SEA  POWEB          245 

at  the  best  is  slight ;  but  far  other  than  slight  is  the 
loss  in  public  interest,  in  the  necessary  stimulation  of 
public  effort,  in  confidence,  and  in  half  a  dozen  other 
things  essential  to  victory  in  war.  Irritating  as  half- 
informed  press  criticism  upon  war  events  may  be  to 
the  principal  actors  concerned,  it  is,  however  bad,  an 
earnest  of  that  public  interest  which  is  an  absolutely 
essential  concomitant  to  a  successful  national  war. 
And  it  is  difficult  to  lay  a  finger  on  any  form  of  secrecy 
that  can  be  found  entirely  free  from  an  official  desire 
to  avoid  criticism. 

Criticism  of  individual  leaders  is,  however,  more 
altogether  bad  than  aught  else.  It  is  bad,  because  the 
effect  upon  a  fleet  of  reading  hostile  criticisms  on  its 
admiral  can  only  be  deleterious,  can  only  tend  to  shake 
confidence  without  supplying  any  substitute.  This 
was  just  the  one  thing  that  the  much-admired 
Japanese  Press  Laws  failed  to  touch.  When  Kami- 
mura  was  unable  to  find  the  Vladivostok  cruisers  in 
a  thick  fog,  Tokio  criticisms  ran  high  and  violent. 
Kamimura's  house  was  either  actually  burned,  or 
threatened  to  be  burned,  by  an  angry  mob,  and  the 
news  of  such  a  proceeding  cannot  have  fortified  the 
confidence  of  his  men  in  him.  Again,  because  the 
Japanese  were  Japanese,  no  very  serious  danger 
resulted — but  it  might  have.  Partially  informed 
civilian  criticism  is  in  this  respect  a  grave  possible 
danger,  and  a  law  forbidding  criticism  of  admirals 
until  some  while  after  the  event  might  prove  very 


246  HEEESIES   OF   SEA  POWEE 

advantageous — the  most  dangerous  criticism  being 
ever  that  which  is  based  on  a  bald  knowledge  or 
results  without  any  information  as  to  details  and 
special  circumstances. 

On  the  other  hand  it  is  well  to  remember  that  the 
dread  of  hostile  criticism  is  always  a  safeguard  against 
an  incompetent  man  becoming  a  leader  in  war,  and  to 
take  a  case  bristling  with  suitable  points, — the  British 
Press  and  the  Boer  War — we  find  that,  despite  the 
absence  of  restrictions,  criticisms  on  '  regrettable 
incidents '  were  in  the  main  moderate,  restrained  and 
such  as  exhibited  a  sound  grasp  of  the  main  necessi- 
ties. 'You  must  either  succeed  or  make  way  for  a 
man  who  can '  was  the  gist  of  what  the  British  Press 
hurled  at  defeated  leaders  in  that  not  very  glorious 
campaign. 

Let  us  now  turn  to  another  campaign  still  more 
inglorious,  still  more  plentifully  scattered  with  '  regret- 
table incidents ' — the  Russian  part  of  the  Russo- 
Japanese  war.  Most  things  point  to  Kuropatkin  as 
an  able  man  swamped  by  incompetent  inferiors  about 
him.  A  Russian  press  free  to  speak  its  mind  would 
probably  have  laid  its  hand  on  that  sore.  To  some 
degree  despite  all  censorship  it  did,  but  only  to  a  very 
curtailed  extent  and  carpet  warriors  held  the  destinies 
of  the  nation — to  be  more  correct  failed  to  hold  them. 
Is  it  not  probable  that  a  free  Press  would  have  made 
for  valuable  reforms — too  late  to  achieve  victory, 
perhaps,  but  certainly  not  too  late  to  better  things? 


SECKECY  AND   SEA  POWEE          247 

Would  not  a  free  Press  have  voiced  that  large  section 
of  Eussian  opinion  which — despite  the  pro-Japanese 
revolutionary  element — did,  (so  those  who  know 
Eussia  best  all  assure  us,)  hold  the  view  of  that  '  We 
must  muddle  it  through,'  which  saved  England  in  the 
S.  African  war. 

In  contemplating  the  victorious  Japanese  we  are 
apt  to  forget  that  only  in  defeat  can  the  real  strength 
of  a  nation  be  assessed.  Only  an  unrestricted  press 
can  show  the  nation  what  its  real  sentiments  are,  and 
this  fact  is  a  heavy  thing  to  put  in  the  scales  against 
the  palpable  enough  dangers  of  having  leaders  who 
have  failed  criticised  to  the  men  under  them.  Eeally 
perhaps  the  answer  rests  with  *  Fitness  to  Win.'  If 
Fitness  to  Win  is  a  matter  of  leaders  only,  then  a 
muzzled  press  is  desirable ;  but  if  it  be  an  affair  of  all 
the  nation,  of  the  nation  as  a  whole,  then  freedom  of 
the  Press  despite  all  the  obvious  disadvantages  in 
specific  cases  is  surely  more  desirable.  Just  as,  what- 
ever advantages  Protection  may  convey,  a  Free  Trade 
nation  exposed  to  fierce  competition  must  of  necessity 
have  a  hardier  trade,  so  the  protection  afforded  by 
muzzling  the  Press  is  apt  to  produce  *  hot-house' 
leaders.  Terrible  though  the  responsibility  on  an 
admiral  in  war  may  be,  greatly  as  this  may  be 
increased  by  his  being  the  target  for  half-informed  and 
at  times  perhaps  unjust  criticism,  a  strong  man  is 
likely  to  be  all  the  stronger  for  having  to  weather  the 
additional  storm.  In  all  public  careers  such  storms 


248  HEKESIES  OF   SEA  POWEB 

have  to  be  weathered  to  the  advantage  of  the  man 
who  succeeds  and  to  the  strengthening  of  his  followers. 
The  weaker  go  to  the  wall  thereby,  but  that  is  the  best 
place  for  the  weaker  to  go  to  in  any  affair  of  life  or 
death. 

There  is  danger,  of  course,  that  admirals  inclined 
to  play  to  the  gallery  may  be  evolved  by  unlimited 
Press  freedom,  but  playing  to  the  gallery  is  an  evil  that 
can  be  overrated.  Nelson  undoubtedly  did  it ;  but  his 
own  ships'  companies  were  part  of  the  gallery  and  their 
devotion  to  him  served  to  make  his  deeds  possible. 
Togo  the  Silent  by  his  very  silence  did  something  of 
the  same  'sort,  though  the  Japanese  Press  Laws 
rendered  such  action  unnecessary.  '  Playing  to  the 
gallery '  is  after  all  only  another  way  of  expressing  a 
man's  becoming  a  vivid  reality  to  his  nation  and  to  the 
men  of  his  fleet ;  and  the  gallery  which  will  applaud 
an  actor  who  successfully  plays  to  it,  will  hoot  him 
quickly  enough  if  his  performances  are  not  equal  to  his 
promises.  And  finally,  whatever  Nelson  accomplished, 
it  is  hardly  possible  to  deny  that  had  he  not  been  a 
popular  figure,  had  a  Press  law  been  able  to  muzzle 
all  popular  comment,  he  would  have  had  to  pay  for  a 
certain  early  laches  to  the  extent  of  never  rising  above 
the  rank  of  captain.  There  is  surely  no  doubt  that 
some  of  his  superiors  would  have  broken  him  had 
convenient  Press  laws  enabled  them  to  do  so  without 
publicity.  Whether  Collingwood  could  have  won 
Trafalgar  is  perhaps  a  moot  point,  but  it  is  clear 


SECEECY  AND   SEA  POWEK          249 

that  he  could   not  have  won  it  as  Nelson  did  by 
'  personality.' l 

And  so,  obvious  though  the  advantages  of  secrecy 
and  a  muzzled  Press  may  be  in  certain  cases,  it  is 
hard  to  believe  that  these  can  outweigh  the  less  obvious 
but  far  more  weighty  advantages  that  come  from  an 
unmuzzled  Press  and  throwing  upon  the  nation  itself 
the  responsibility  for  successful  war.  Togos  may  be 
produced  by  the  first  system,  so  may  Collingwoods ; 
but  never  Nelsons  or  Hannibals.  On  England's  fitness 
to  win  Nelson  flew  from  victory  to  victory,  while 
because  Carthage  was  unfit  to  win,  its  unmuzzled 
opinion  led  to  the  neutralising  of  all  Hannibal's 
successes.  Had  he  and  his  supporters  possessed  a 
means  of  muzzling  hostile  opinion  in  the  Carthaginian 
senate  it  is  possible  that  Hannibal  might  have  carried 
his  victories  further.  He  might  even  have  taken 
Home.  But  the  lack  of  fitness  to  win  in  Carthage 
itself  would  still  have  borne  its  fruit,  despite  all  the 
efforts  of  perhaps  the  greatest  man  who  ever  lived. 
Had  Carthage  been  fit  to  win,  its  own  public  opinion 
would  soon  have  made  short  work  of  Hannibal's 
detractors  and  party  opponents.  No  muzzling  of 
opinion  will  ever  keep  the  unfit  long  in  power,  and 
there  is  only  one  fate  deserved  by  the  unfit  nation. 
Victory  by  Press  laws  can  never  be  achieved,  and  it 
may  even  be  argued  with  some  show  of  plausibility 

1  Compare  Nelson,  Laughton,  XI.  pp.  209-211,  where  the  wonder- 
ful effect  of  Nelson's  personality  is  very  clearly  set  forth. 


250  HEEESIES  OF   SEA  POWEE 

that  every  effort  after  secrecy  is  a  symptom  of  decaying 
fitness.  Possibly,  indeed,  it  may  be  said  that  (for 
reasons  indicated  earlier  in  the  chapter,  or  as  a 
sequence  to  those  reasons)  Japan's  relative  failure 
against  Russia  at  the  last  was  partly  due  to  the  fact 
that  its  Government  feared  to  take  the  nation  into  its 
confidence. 

This  however  is  carrying  the  argument  farther  than 
is  necessary.  The  point  is  that  every  war  should  be 
an  absolutely  national  affair,  conducted  by  strong  men 
who  have  forced  their  ways  to  the  top  in  face  of  every- 
thing and  who  hold  their  positions  by  the  confidence 
of  the  nation — a  war  of  All  for  All.  Press  muzzling 
laws  do  not  contemplate  war  on  such  lines,  they  con- 
template wars  conducted  by  a  committee  sitting  in 
camera.  If  two  nations  otherwise  equally  fit  come 
into  conflict,  surely  the  national  determination  to  win 
will  lie  with  those  who  are  All  for  All.  The  men  at 
home  in  England  surely  contributed  to  the  victory  of 
Trafalgar  just  as  those  in  France  contributed  to  its 
failure.  So  far  as  a  muzzled  or  unmuzzled  Press  had 
to  do  with  the  course  of  events,  it  was  Napoleon  who 
best  understood  the  art  of  muzzling  the  Press. 

More  than  this  it  is  difficult  for  one  in  the  ranks  of 
journalism  to  say,  lest  he  be  suspected  of  special  plead- 
ing. Yet  no  special  pleading  is  intended  or  desired ;  the 
case  resting  rather  on  the  fixed  conviction,  empha- 
sised throughout  this  book  and  indeed  its  very  raison 
d'etre  and  its  main  'heresy'  against  conventionally 


SECKECY  AND   SEA  POWEK          251 

accepted  '  axioms  of  Sea  Power,'  that  victory  rests 
with  the  nation  rather  than  with  any  individual. 
Press  muzzling  must  rest  upon  the  opposite  conviction 
—that  victory  depends  upon  individuals  and  not  upon 
the  nation  as  a  whole.  The  general  conviction  of  the 
individuals  concerned  is  that  this  is  so,  but  the  fact  of 
the  conviction  is  not  proof  of  its  correctness. 

At  the  same  time  it  may  be  well  to  record  the 
opinion  that  press  correspondents  should  be  absolutely 
barred  from  accompanying  fleets  in  war  time.  The 
reason  lies  not  with  the  risks  of  movements  being 
prematurely  disclosed  and  all  the  other  stock  arguments, 
but  with  the  fact  that  '  incident '  is  the  breath  of  life  to 
the  journalist,  whereas  absence  of  incident  is  probably 
the  more  essential  to  successful  naval  war.  Those 
weary  days  of  the  endless  blockade  without  any 
incidents  to  relieve  broke  the  back  of  France  in  the 
Great  War  against  Napoleon.  The  recording  of  such 
weariness  may  be  the  means  of  transmitting  a  similar 
weariness  to  the  nation. 


PAKT  HI 
THE   TREND  OF  THINGS 


ETEENAL   PEINCIPLES 

MUCH  is  written  and  spoken  about  the  eternal  principles 
and  grand  truths  of  warfare.  The  general  idea  has 
been  crystallised  into  an  apt  phrase  that  'though 
tactics  alter,  the  great  principles  of  strategy  remain  the 
same.' 

This  is  very  generally  accepted  as  an  axiom.  Un- 
doubtedly it  embodies  a  truth ;  but  is  it  all  the  truth  ? 
Are  the  eternal  principles  no  more  and  no  less  than 
those  we  generally  have  in  mind  ?  What  indeed  have 
we  in  mind?  And  what  is  the  dividing  line  if  any 
between  strategy  and  tactics  ? 

For  convenience,  rather  than  that  any  such  line 
can  be  drawn,  we  are  apt  to  define  the  two  to  ourselves 
by  characterising  as  strategical  moves  everything  that 
takes  place  before  the  hostile  squadrons  sight  each 
other,  as  tactical  operations  all  that  they  do  when 
within  sighting-distance. 

It  is,  of  course,  merely  a  convenient  convention  : 
else  the  addition  of  top-gallant  masts  to  our  ships 
and  the  fitting  of  crows'  nests  thereto  would  suddenly 
make  strategy  into  tactics  !  An  academical  definition 


ETERNAL   PRINCIPLES  255 

matters  not ;  though  the  two  merge  even  as  day  and 
night  merge,  though  there  is  a  time  when  it  is  neither 
day  nor  night,  yet  all  have  a  clear  conception  as  to 
what  day  means  and  what  night  means,  and  do  not 
get  confused  by  the  sunset  gun  which  officially  separates 
the  two. 

Apply  this  to  strategy  and  tactics  :  is  the  generality 
'  the  principles  of  strategy  (translated  by  most  into 
"  strategy  "  pure  and  simple)  alter  not,'  a  statement 
that  any  gain  by  accepting  too  fully  ?  At  any  rate 
before  doing  so  it  is  well  to  try  to  discover  what  those 
eternal  principles  are. 

Strategy  has  been  defined  by  someone  with  a  taste 
for  neat  definitions  as  '  The  art  of  overwhelming  a 
portion  of  the  enemy  with  a  superior  force  ' — which  is 
excellent,  save  for  the  difficulty  of  defining  the  *  superior 
force.' 

Can  we  define  it  as  superior  numbers,  saying  '  Only 
numbers  can  annihilate '  ?  At  Actium  Antony  had 
numbers  both  in  individual  units  and  in  the  superior 
power  of  each  unit.  Whatever  his  tactics  may  have 
been,  his  strategy  in  bringing  his  forces  to  the  essential 
point  was  excellent  enough.  His  portion  was  complete 
defeat.  There  were  reasons  for  it,  of  course,  but  this — 
and  a  dozen  other  instances  that  anyone  can  recall — 
indicate  that  '  two  to  one '  is  not  of  itself  enough 
to  ensure  victory. 

Is  it  to  be  defined  as  superior  skill  coupled  with 
superior  numbers  ?  The  Carthaginians  under  Hannibal 


256  HEKESIES   OF   SEA  POWER 

the  admiral  had  both  in  their  first  big  sea  fight  with 
the  Eomans,  and  they  sustained  total  defeat.  Defeat 
was  the  direct  result  of  the  Eoman  corvi  perhaps,  the 
flying  bridges  over  which  the  hordes  of  unexpected 
soldiers,  men  of  fierce  courage  and  discipline,  poured  on 
to  the  relatively  unprotected  decks.  A  new  invention, 
which  the  Carthaginians  were  powerless  to  anticipate, 
powerless  to  train  against,  rendered  worthless  all  their 
skill,  naval  efficiency  and  sea  aptitude.  Yet  as  they 
sighted  the  Eoman  fleet  they  had  every  logical  reason  to 
expect  an  easy  victory  and  the  wisest  and  cleverest 
among  them  could  have  foretold  no  other  result. 

Of  course  the  Eoman  fleet,  thanks  to  its  corvi, 
was  infinitely  the  superior  in  power,  and  what  really 
happened  was  that  Carthaginian  strategy  sent  a  totally 
inadequate  force  to  meet  the  enemy.  By  no  possible 
means,  however,  could  they  understand  this  before- 
hand. The  truth  that  the  stronger  and  in  every  way 
superior  would  defeat  the  inferior  remained  eternal : 
but  all  that  they  could  have  regarded  as  eternal  in 
the  way  of  principles  proved  an  unstable  Will-o'-the- 
wisp. 

Suppose  Captain  Mahan  to  have  lived  in  that  age 
and  that  he  had  employed  himself  in  writing  criticisms 
of  the  operations,  full  of  all  knowledge  of  what  history 
has  had  to  teach  since  so  far  as  strategical  operations 
are  concerned,  could  he  have  written  otherwise  than  to 
suggest  that  the  move  of  the  Eomans  would  be  as  the 
move  of  Eogestvensky  in  A.D.  1905  ?  By  all  the  canons 


ETEENAL  PRINCIPLES  257 

of  naval  art  as  then  known  the  Carthaginians  were  not 
merely  two  to  one  but  ten  to  one. 

That  '  two  will  beat  one,  other  things  being  equal ' 
will  ever  remain  an  *  eternal  principle  ' ;  but  where 
the  sea  is  concerned  can  any  man  ever  say  with 
certainty  what  makes  '  two,'  or  c  other  things  equal '  ? 
If  not,  what  workable  eternal  principle  is  left  to  us  ? 
That  the  x  superior  will  beat  the  x  inferior — x  being 
the  unknown  quantity.  The  superior  if  he  be  superior 
will  beat  the  inferior ;  but  he  cannot  be  sure  of  his 
superiority  till  the  battle  is  lost  and  won. 

In  tactics  as  in  strategy  the  same  thing  obtains — 
we  cannot  eliminate  x  any  more  than  we  can  exactly 
define  it. 

All  men  will  concede  that  the  existence  of  an 
eternal  principle  would  be  extremely  useful;  indeed, 
many  are  so  convinced  of  this  that  they  stretch  points 
to  create  eternal  principles,  for  their  own  convenience 
and  the  comfort  of  feeling  that  there  is  some  sure  rock 
upon  which  they  can  plant  their  feet  in  the  quagmire 
of  uncertainty  suggested  by  a  contemplation  of  future 
naval  warfare.  To  do  so  is,  of  course,  very  dangerous ; 
to  rely  upon  a  rock  that  is  no  rock  all,  but  merely  a 
stone  lying  in  the  swamp,  is  a  sure  prelude  to  disaster. 
It  were  better  to  lay  down  as  an  eternal  principle  that 
all  is  luck  and  blind  chance ;  but  here,  too,  we  may 
also  be  little  less  wrong,  since  there  has  never  been 
a  war  the  results  of  which  can  be  so  attributed. 

Why  was  Athens  beaten  in  the  Peloponnesian  war  ? 

S 


258  HEEESIES  OF   SEA  POWEE 

Why  Carthage  ?  Why  Antony  ?  Why  the  Spanish 
Armada?  Why  France  in  the  Trafalgar  campaign? 
Why  Eussia  in  her  naval  conflict  with  Japan  ?  In  these 
and  a  hundred  other  wars  we  can  definitely  say  that 
there  was  no  blind  chance  in  the  matter.  Eeading  the 
history  of  any  of  these  wars  we  can  find  many  a  reason 
why,  but  every  possible  strategical  or  tactical  reason 
that  we  can  think  of  applies  to  some  and  not  to  others. 
To  be  wise  after  the  event  is  easy :  but  could  we,  given 
the  conditions  known  to  either  side,  have  forecasted 
accurately  any  result  where  the  combatants  were  fairly 
equal  on  paper  by  means  of  any  eternal  principle  of 
strategy  or  tactics  ? 

If  we  collect  all  the  facts  of  all  the  wars  and  spend 
years  in  tabulating  them  the  utmost  we  are  likely  to 
produce  will  be  a  paradox.  We  shall  find  the  startling 
underlying  fact  that  in  the  majority  of  cases  when 
there  has  been  the  nearest  apparent  approach  to  equality 
the  results  have  usually  been  far  more  decisive,  far 
more  annihilating  to  the  vanquished  than  when  a  con- 
siderable obvious  disparity  has  existed  ! 

Eussia  and  Japan,  by  all  calculations  that  could 
be  made  beforehand  on  paper,  were  comparatively 
equal, — considerably  more  so  than  America  and  Spain 
a  few  years  before  or  England  and  France  in  the  Great 
War.  Yet  Eussia  was  hopelessly  beaten  at  sea. 
Why? 

The  relatively  equal  Peloponnesians  and  Athenians 
produced  a  far  more  annihilating  result  than  did  the 


ETEENAL  PEINCIPLES  259 

(as  it  proved)  greatly  superior  Komans  over  the  Car- 
thaginians.    Why  ? 

The  answer  is  not  so  plain  as  is  the  glimmering 
suggestion  of  some  eternal  principle,  that  'equality 
means  the  annihilation  of  one  ;  disparity,  the  survival 
of  both ' — about  as  crude  a  paradox  as  can  be  conceived. 
Yet  the  answer  is  to  be  perceived  on  careful  examina- 
tion. When  something  of  the  nature  of  equality  exists 
both  sides  are  more  confident,  more  eager  to  engage, 
more  prepared  to  take  chances.  The  Russians,  for 
instance,  were  never  convinced  of  their  inferiority  to 
the  Japanese,1  as  were  the  Spaniards  against  the 
Americans.  Hence  the  Russians  were  ready  to  fight 
great  fleet  actions,  while  the  Spaniards  convinced  of  the 
hopelessness  of  things  kept  many  ships  at  home  and 
made  peace  before  they  lost  them.  Similarly  in  the 
Great  War,  convinced  by  Trafalgar  of  the  hopelessness 
of  the  sea-struggle,  France  attempted  no  more  grand 
battles  and  so,  when  the  war  ended,  had  many  fine 
ships  left  to  her.  It  was  French  Naval  Power,  not 
the  French  navy,  that  was  annihilated  at  Trafalgar ; 
the  bulk  of  the  French  ships  still  existed  at  the  close 
of  the  war,  blockaded  in  their  harbours  by  the  over- 
whelmingly superior  British  fleet.  The  Carthaginians 
in  their  worst  troubles  always  had  ships  left  to  them, 
their  fleet  was  never  annihilated  like  the  fleets  of  Russia 
in  1904-5  ;  while  the  Athenians,  convinced  of  equality 

1  The  mere  fact  of  the  despatch  of  the  Baltic  Fleet  is  proof  of 
this. 

s  2 


260  HEEESIES  OF   SEA  POWEE 

to  the  last,  had  practically  their  entire  fleet  annihilated 
as  well  as  their  naval  power. 

On  this  it  is  possible  to  build  a  theory  and  make 
of  it  an  eternal  principle  that  *  only  equality  can 
annihilate  '  !  It  clashes  with  '  only  numbers  can  an- 
nihilate '  and  clashes  badly.  But  this  last  has  obvious 
limitations  when  we  come  to  think  the  matter  out.  If 
one  side  has  too  many  numbers  (assuming  numbers 
here  to  mean  superiority)  the  other  will  decline  to  risk 
annihilation  in  the  material  sense.  He  will,  of  course, 
experience  it  in  the  moral  sense,  for  declining  the 
combat  is  an  acknowledgment  of  defeat,  but — there 
is  a  good  deal  left  with  which  to  try  again  some  other 
day  or  in  another  war.  Ships  always  can  be  and 
always  have  been  replaceable :  the  fatal  thing  in  an 
annihilation  has  been  the  loss  of  trained  men  who  can 
only  be  created  in  long  time-spaces.  It  takes  a  very 
appreciable  part  of  a  lifetime  to  make  a  trained  admiral 
or  captain  :  raw  material,  however  enthusiastic,  cannot 
supply  the  deficiency.  Russia,  after  the  battle  of  the 
Sea  of  Japan  could  at  once  have  laid  down  a  con- 
siderable battle  fleet,  and  raised  men  for  the  crews. 
But  where  were  officers  of  experience  to  come  from  ? 
The  absence  of  these  was  the  full  sum  of  the  annihila- 
tion of  her  navy.1 

Spain,  on  the  other  hand,  had  plenty  of  officers 

1  One  cause  of  the  utter  defeat  at  Tsushima  was  that  Eogestvensky 
was  short  of  trained  officers.  In  several  ships  military  officers  were 
carried  for  naval  duties. — See  chapter  on  Eusso-Japanese  War. 


ETEENAL  PKINCIPLES  261 

left,  and  the  existence  of  these  and  a  few  ships  prob- 
ably counted  for  something  to  her  advantage  in  the 
terms  of  peace.  They  represented  some  kind  of 
menace — a  weak  one  no  doubt,  but  still  something. 
It  is  probably  better  to  be  distinctly  inferior  than 
nearly  equal — the  loser's  fleet  is  more  valuable  so. 

There  have,  of  course,  been  exceptions  to  the  rule 
that  equality  rather  than  disparity  means  the  annihila- 
tion of  one  without  much  loss  to  the  other,  but  such 
exceptions  are  few.  Peru,  for  instance,  was  very 
inferior  to  Chili  and  her  fleet  was  annihilated,  and 
Austria  and  Italy  in  the  Lissa  campaign  though 
balanced  fairly  evenly  did  not  end  by  one  fleet  only 
being  left.  But  in  all  such  cases  some  obvious  reason 
is  to  be  found.  The  first-mentioned  campaign  had  so 
few  units  engaged  that  it  is  rather  out  of  count ;  also 
before  the  ironclad  Independencia  was  wrecked  Peru 
probably  considered  herself  '  nearly  equal '  to  Chili,  in 
which  case  the  war  would  illustrate  the  eternal  principle 
rather  than  negative  it.  As  for  the  Lissa  campaign  ; 
this  war  ended  too  soon  for  the  principle  involved  to 
have  any  real  opportunity  of  demonstrating  itself. 
Had  the  war  continued,  by  all  we  now  know  of  it, 
there  is  every  reason  to  believe  that  it  would  have 
ended  with  the  annihilation  of  practically  all  Italy's 
warships  and  the  loss  of  few  if  any  Austrian  ones.  To 
any  other  exceptions  that  can  be  brought  forward 
some  similar  answer  is  always  or  nearly  always  to  be 
adduced,  and  of  course  the  situation  is  really  a  logical 


262  HEEESIES  OF   SEA  POWEK 

sequence.  So  long  as  bases  are  impregnable  or  nearly 
so,  so  long  will  the  greatly  inferior  shelter  there  and 
survive :  so  long  as  something  of  an  equality  appears, 
so  long  will  each  side  imagine  that  it  possesses 
advantage  enough  to  take  the  chances  of  victory. 
Then  the  fitter  to  win  is  certain  to  win — '  x '  will 
operate. 

It  may  be  noted  that  in  all  big  battles  (in  which  a 
real  or  fancied  '  nearly  equal '  must  have  existed  or  else 
there  had  been  no  battle)  one  side  has  been  practically 
annihilated  and  the  other  little  hurt.  In  the  battle  of 
the  Sea  of  Japan  the  Russians  lost  almost  everything, 
the  Japanese  were  practically  unhurt.  The  Nile  and 
Trafalgar  were  equally  one-sided  in  result,  so  were 
Lepanto,  Actium,  JEgospotami  and  any  number  of 
other  naval  fights.  There  have  been  indecisive  con- 
flicts like  Yalu,  Lissa  and  others ;  but  in  these  neither 
side  had  much  hurt  the  other  and  that  determination 
to  fight  to  a  finish  characteristic  of  the  grand  battle 
was  absent.  None  of  these  were  '  grand  battles/  they 
were  more  of  the  nature  of  '  engagements ' — skirmishes 
and  a  feeling  of  the  other's  strength  on  each  side.  In 
grand  battles  the  eternal  principle  has  always  obtained 
and  one  side  has  always  suffered  entirely  out  of  pro- 
portion to  the  other. 

It  is  logical  that  this  should  have  been.  With 
fleets  in  contact  strategy  is  at  an  end  and  tactics  in 
operation.  The  bases  which  interfere  with  strategical 
operations  are  absent :  the  fight  is  in  the  open,  there 


ETERNAL   PEINCIPLES  263 

is  no  shelter.  With  forces  of  10  to  9  engaged  there  is 
no  deducting  one  from  each  till  1  is  left  one  side  and 
0  the  other.  The  winner  has  always  won  by  the  eternal 
practical  principle  of  two  to  one,  the  '  whole  of  his  force 
on  part  of  the  enemy's  ' — tactics  have  always  been  the 
eternal  and  unchanging  thing,  simple  and  unobscured, 
and  at  Tsushima  as  at  Trafalgar  two  (that  is  '  two  '  in 
every  way)  has  annihilated  one  (that  is  in  every  way 
'  one  '  only)  and  continued  to  do  so  in  ever-increasing 
superiority  up  to  the  end.  If  9  fight  10  and  the  9  (or 
the  10)  are  concentrated  on  5  for  a  little  while,  the 
result  is  obvious. 

But  whether  the  eternal  principle  of  the  past  that 
'  nearly  equal '  is  an  essential  to  annihilation  of  one 
side  is  an  eternal  principle  of  the  future — and,  there- 
fore, an  eternal  principle  at  all — is  another  matter. 
Men  now  fight  with  two  weapons — gun  and  torpedo  ; 
in  the  past  they  had  virtually  but  one.  In  the  early 
days  of  the  gun,  the  ram  co-existed  with  it  but  gun 
and  ram  were  virtually  very  akin.  It  is  easy  enough 
to  draw  a  parallel ;  to  say  the  ram  being  of  shorter 
range  represented  the  torpedo,  and  the  galleys  which 
used  to  ram  sailing  ships  torpedo-boats.  Really  the 
galley  had  little  in  common  with  the  torpedo-boat — 
neither  had  the  fire-ship  which  has  also  been  likened 
to  the  torpedo-boat.  It  is  easier  to  see  the  likeness 
than  the  difference,  but  the  difference  exists.  It  exists 
in  the  fact  that  the  torpedo-boat  does  not  have  to 
make  actual  contact  as  the  galley-ram  and  the  fire-ship 


264  HEKESIES   OF   SEA  POWEE 

did.  Torpedoes  have  been  avoided — but  rarely ;  whereas 
the  history  of  the  ram  is  the  history  of  its  being 
avoided.  The  fire-ship  had  not  the  mobility  of  the 
ship  it  attacked  :  the  torpedo-boat  and  the  torpedo  have 
both  a  speed  advantage.  These  differences  are  every- 
thing. Many  learned  articles  have  been  written  to 
prove  that  the  torpedo  menace  is  much  exaggerated ; 
but  the  writers  have  not  had  to  face  torpedo  attack. 
The  torpedo  menace  kept  Ito  from  following  the 
Chinese  fleet  after  the  Yalu ;  it  drove  Togo  away  at 
the  battle  of  Bound  Island,  it  rendered  Kogestvensky 
helpless  at  Tsushima.  *  The  sea  was  full  of  torpedo- 
boats.  We  might  sink  one,  two  or  three,  but  of  what 
avail  with  dozens  more  to  come?'  Thus  wrote  a 
Kussian  of  that  great  battle.  Of  course  the  Eussians 
lacked  boats  of  their  own  with  which  to  neutralise  the 
Japanese  boats,  due  perhaps  to  their  having  lent  too 
ready  an  ear  to  those  who  preached  that  the  torpedo 
menace  was  exaggerated,  and  the  situation  may  have 
been  to  that  degree  unique.  But  still  the  torpedo 
menace  exists.  It  colours  all  ideas  of  strategy,  it  is 
remembered  in  all  tactical  plans,  so  that  academical 
discussions  as  to  its  exact  actual  value  matter  very 
little.  There  still  remains  the  fact  that  to-day  two 
weapons  exist  where  practically  only  one  existed 
before  and  that  the  navies  of  all  nations  recognise  the 
existence  of  two  weapons,  and  either  hold  or  are  cogni- 
sant of  the  belief  that  a  battleship  fleet  may  be  anni- 
hilated by  a  lucky  torpedo  attack.  How  often  in 


ETEENAL   PKINCIPLES  265 

torpedo  exercises  have  fleets  been  torpedoed  or  ever 
they  sighted  the  boats.  There  is  nothing  to  stop 
this  happening  in  war  sooner  or  later ;  and  nothing 
can  render  an  admiral  impervious  to  such  a  possibility. 
A  splendid  strategical  move  may  end  in  nothingness 
thereby ;  after  a  grand  battle  the  torpedo  may  anni- 
hilate all  that  floats. 

How  does  this  affect  the  eternal  principle — well 
established  from  history — that  there  must  be  virtual 
equality  to  render  possible  annihilation  of  a  navy  ?  It 
affects  it  largely.  It  means  that  this  new  factor  of  the 
torpedo  of  the  small  craft  being  potentially  able  to 
annihilate  the  big  ship,  necessitates  a  reserve  of  big 
ships  and  trained  crews  for  them  to  an  unprecedented 
extent.  It  was  Japan's  luck  rather  than  aught  else 
which  saved  her  fleet  from  being  torpedoed  after 
Bound  Island — luck  and  strategies  which  the  old 
days  had  no  need  for.  Kussia  had  her  oppor- 
tunities despite  all  Togo's  precautions.  She  made 
little  of  these  opportunities ;  but  that  is  no  criterion 
for  what  future  belligerents  may  attempt.  Conse- 
quently, though  it  was  an  eternal  principle  in  the  past 
that  too  great  a  preponderance  of  force  was  a  dis- 
advantage for  the  annihilation  of  the  enemy's  navy : 
it  is  a  useless  verity  now.  An  immense  preponderance 
is  now  essential  to  guard  against  new  chances  of  loss 
or  paralysis  by  the  torpedo  menace,  also  no  fleet  is 
absolutely  safe  against  being  sunk  in  error  by  its  own 
torpedo  craft — certainly  an  absolutely  new  condition, 


266  HEEESIES  OF   SEA  POWEK 

Wherefore  it  is  now  true  that  '  Only  numbers  can 
annihilate.5 

Every  reader,  ere  he  has  got  so  far  as  this  will 
perceive  that  these  and  the  remarks  preceding  them 
are  altogether  contradictory.  Such  a  method  of 
arguing  round  the  circle  has  been  purposely  adopted, 
for  it  is  the  strongest  proof  of  how  unreliable  any  so- 
called  eternal  principle  may  be. 

Of  course  the  torpedo  menace,  once  it  is  fully 
realised  will  be  met.  The  constructional  problem  of 
the  unsinkable  big  ship  will  be  solved,  and  then  the 
eternal  principle  of  Equality  of  number  to  secure 
annihilation  will  reassert  itself.  Meanwhile  however 
a  transition  stage  has  to  be  passed  through. 

Now  it  is  manifestly  absurd  to  regard  as  eternal  a 
principle  that  is  even  to  a  small  degree  intermittent : 
we  are  far  better  without  it.  Wherefore  we  are  left 
with  no  eternal  principle  at  all  save  the  one  enunciated 
earlier  in  this  chapter  that  the  x  superior  will  defeat 
the  x  inferior,  x  being  the  unknown  quantity — a 
principle  far  too  vague  to  be  of  service  to  anyone 
unless  we  can  solve  the  mystery  of  x. 

Cases  have  been  cited  in  which  it  has  not  been  sea 
habitude,  tactical  skill,  general  efficiency,  courage  or 
enthusiasm.  It  may  be  the  sum  of  these,  but  it  is  not 
any  particular  one  and  rarely  the  same  one. 


ETEKNAL  PKINCIPLES  267 

The  fact  that  radius  has  been  sought  by  Sea  Power 
in  all  ages  has  already  been  remarked  upon  briefly. 
To  increase  their  radius  the  early  Egyptians  and 
Greeks  supplemented  the  oar  by  the  sail.  At  a  later 
period  the  sail  supplanted  the  oar,  because  it  gave  an 
increased  radius,  and,  finally,  steam  did  not  replace 
the  sail  until  the  use  of  it  conferred  a  radius  at  least 
sufficient  for  all  practical  needs.  The  early  steamers 
were  masted  so  that  radius  should  in  no  way  be  reduced 
by  the  limitations  of  bunker  capacity  ;  the  masted 
warship  though  a  wretched  sailer  only  died  out  when 
it  became  clear  that  by  the  establishment  of  coaling 
stations  and  increased  bunker  capacity  there  should  be 
no  loss  of  needful  radius  to  counterbalance  the  gain 
which  steam  conferred  in  other  directions.  Here, 
then,  appears  a  principle  which,  having  controlled 
all  the  past,  may  confidently  be  expected  to  affect  the 
future. 

As  regards  the  immediate  future  we  have  seen  the 
law  in  imperfect  operation  in  the  adoption  of  water-tube 
boilers,  all  types  of  which  increase  effective  radius  by 
conferring  the  ability  to  raise  steam  quickly  and,  in 
most  types,  to  maintain  high  powers  over  extended 
periods.  These  two  facts  made  the  abandonment  of 
the  old-type  cylindrical  boilers  certain  ;  and  those  who 
fought  for  the  retention  of  cylindrical  clearly  ignored 
the  trend  of  history  throughout  all  time. 

As  things  are,  the  universal  adoption  of  the  water- 
tube  boiler  must  be  said  to  rest  chiefly  on  its  advantages 


268  HEEESIES   OF   SEA  POWEK 

due  to  the  increase  of  radius  through  quick  steam  raising 
and  the  consequent  saving  in  ability  to  lie  at  a  base 
consuming  no  coal. 

In  the  war  with  Russia  it  was  found  that  Japanese 
ships  with  cylindrical  boilers  consumed  five  times  the 
coal  burned  by  those  with  water-tube  generators,  owing 
to  the  fact  that,  having  to  be  ready  for  sea  at  two  hours' 
notice,  they  had  to  keep  fires  going  while  the  Belleville 
boilered  ships  were  able  to  let  fires  out. 

At  some  time  in  the  future  steam  is  destined  to  be 
replaced  by  some  other  motive  power,  possibly  some 
form  of  the  internal  combustion  engine,  but  this  can 
only  come  about  by  a  further  increase  of  radius  or 
some  great  advance  in  speed  which  shall  be  equivalent 
to  an  extension  of  radius.  Finally  electricity  is  looked 
upon  as  the  eventual  motive  power,  and  this  will  no 
doubt  endure  for  a  considerable  while. 

History,  however,  shows  us  that  motive  power 
when  it  was  the  oar,  was  profoundly  affected  and 
finally  displaced  by  the  necessity  of  adopting  artillery. 
The  relative  merits  of  oar  and  sail  were  comparatively 
nicely  balanced  when  artillery  demanded  the  space 
occupied  by  the  oars.  Artillery  also,  from  its  ability 
to  strike  over  a  relatively  great  distance  where  previous 
weapons  had  had  a  very  small  radius  of  action  made 
itself  more  important  than  motive  power.  Masts  and 
sails,  oars  and  rowers  were  alike  at  its  mercy  tactically, 
and  the  need  of  motive  power  declined.  At  Lepanto, 
for  instance,  the  six  great  galleons  which  won  the  day 


ETEENAL  PRINCIPLES  269 

for  the  Christians  were  relatively  floating  fortresses, 
their  tactical  radius  instead  of  depending  upon  the 
speed  with  which  their  rams  could  crash  into  the 
enemy  was  governed  by  the  range  of  their  heavy 
artillery  and  the  general  impossibility  of  assailing  it.1 

Now  it  is  conceded  by  all  that  progress  in  weapons 
does  not  stand  still ;  hence  it  is  surely  quite  permissible 
to  imagine  that  at  some  future  date  there  may  be 
evolved  a  weapon  of  extreme  potency,  as  superior  to 
the  gun  as  the  gun  was  to  the  catapult,  and  of  which 
we  can  no  more  conceive  than  could  the  Athenians 
dream  of  the  gun.  It  is  also  quite  permissible  to 
imagine  that  this  weapon  might  require  the  space  now 
occupied  by  motive  power  just  as  the  gun  did  in  the 
case  of  the  oar.  If  so,  and  if  its  powers  are  so  great 
both  in  destruction  and  in  range  (which  might  well  be 
that  of  wireless  telegraphy),  motive  power  will  become 
a  secondary  consideration.  Thus  were  there  a  choice, 
as  in  the  past,  between  the  weapon  and  the  motive 
power  the  latter  would  go,  even  if  it  meant  that  sails 
had  to  be  reverted  to.  Such  a  return  to  sails  is,  of 
course,  extremely  unlikely,  but  it  is  an  inference  from 
the  old  struggle  between  the  oar  and  the  sail — which 
was  a  conflict  between  the  radius  of  the  weapon  and 

1  In  these  days  when,  after  a  period  of  the  reverse,  there  is  a  tendency 
to  regard  motive  power  as  all-important  and  its  manipulators  as  the 
principal  figures  on  shipboard,  it  is  well  to  remember  that  its  real 
importance  is  of  a  changing  nature,  that  it  is  and  must  ever  be  an 
adjunct  to  and  a  means  of  using  more  effectively  the  weapons  for  which 
alone  the  ship  primarily  exists. 


270  HEEESIES  OF   SEA  POWEK 

the  radius  of  the  ship.  The  reasons  that  led  to  the 
adoption  of  steam  were  essentially  those  which  made 
men  cling  to  the  oar  as  long  as  possible.  Sail  replaced 
the  oar  because  it  left  room  for  the  weapon:  steam 
came  into  use  because  it  did  not  interfere  with  the  use 
of  the  weapon.  It — or  some  similar  motive  power — 
can  remain  only  so  long  as  no  weapon  needs  the  space 
occupied  by  it. 

It  is  also  possible  that  this  potential  weapon  will 
have  so  great  a  radius  that  motive  power  will  become 
entirely  superfluous.  Suppose  it — as  is  likely  rather 
than  otherwise — to  partake  of  the  nature  of  the  vril 
of  the  Coming  Bace.  Ships  then  might  become  entirely 
useless  for  its  application,  because  the  ship  exists  and 
has  always  existed  only  to  enable  men  to  reach  op- 
ponents who  were  otherwise  not  to  be  reached.  It 
has  been  shown  that  the  radius  of  activity  of  warships 
has  increased  from  a  small  portion  of  the  world  to  the 
entire  world,  and  every  increase  of  speed,  by  demolish- 
ing distance,  must  now  tend  to  reduce  the  area  of 
operations.  In  the  past  speed  increases  were  met  by 
increasing  the  area ;  but  the  world's  limits  are  now 
reached.  The  almost  daily  increase  in  the  range  of 
artillery  is  slowly  contracting  the  area.  Every  increase 
of  speed  contracts  it.  In  other  words  we  have  reached 
and  passed  that  limit  of  geographical  expansion  which 
in  the  past  met  and  neutralised  the  increase  of  radius 
in  range  of  weapons  and  speed — which  are  convertible 
terms.  For  instance,  the  galleons  at  Lepanto  already 


ETEENAL  PKINCIPLES  271 

referred  to.  Or  let  us  imagine  a  modern  warship  at 
the  disposal  of  the  ancient  Greeks  in  any  of  their 
naval  fights.  Motive  power  would  have  been  of 
relatively  small  importance  to  her  because  of  the 
radius  of  her  artillery — the  former  would  have  been 
cheerfully  sacrificed  for  the  latter  had  only  one  of  the 
two  been  possible  to  possess.  It  is  very  important  to 
realise  this. 

To  resume:  the  geographical  area  expanded  to 
meet  certain  conditions,  therefore  many  or  most 
strategical  problems  are,  or  till  quite  recently  were, 
the  same  thing  over  and  over  again  upon  a  larger 
scale.  But  now  that  the  geographical  expansion  has 
ceased  with  the  limits  of  the  world,  now  that  owing 
to  increased  speed  and  radius,  it  is  daily  contracting 
in  its  relation  to  belligerents  and  destined  to  go  on 
being  contracted,  is  it  certain  that  the  great  principles 
of  strategy  remain  eternal  ?  Will  they  exist  at  all  when 
the  radius  of  the  weapon  shall  in  the  distant  future 
have  been  so  increased  that  the  radius  of  the  ship 
has  become  of  no  account  ?  Will  there  then  be  any 
scope  for  strategical  genius,  or  scope  for  anything  save 
the  original  brute  courage  to  face  death  more  readily 
or  more  often  than  will  the  enemy :  the  fighting 
requisite  of  the  Homeric  age — the  integral  factor  of 
Fitness  to  Win  ? 

It  may  be  argued  that  so  long  as  merchant  ships 
plough  the  seas  and  war  exists,  there  will  be  hostile 
vessels  to  attack  those  merchant  ships  and  friendly 


272  HEKESIES   OF   SEA  POWEK 

ones  to  defend  them — a  condition  necessitating 
strategies.  But  it  does  not  follow.  To-day  a  fort 
protects  to  a  great  extent  anything  within  its  range 
of  vision.  Both  range  of  vision  and  range  of  the 
weapon  may  be  indefinitely  extended  by  some  at 
present  inconceivable  means.  Then  what  room  for 
strategies  of  any  kind?  Or  will  there  still  be  room 
for  scientific  combinations,  for  the  annihilation  of  one 
wonderful  weapon  by  the  concentration  on  it  of  two 
others  which  are  situated  at  two  different  points  and 
so  cannot  be  simultaneously  destroyed?  Or  will 
radius  have  so  increased  that  there  is  no  room  any- 
where for  two  points  sufficiently  far  apart  ? 

Such  speculations  and  questions  may  seem  the 
idlest  of  idle  dreams.  But  this  is  merely  a  superficial 
view.  If  we  use  the  history  of  the  past  to  aid  us  in 
the  present  and  in  preparing  for  the  immediate  future, 
it  is  not  safe  to  accept  a  '  law '  unless  it  is  applicable 
to  any  reasonable  conditions  of  evolution  that  we  may 
conceive.  Otherwise  we  may  find  ourselves  in  the 
same  error  as  the  Carthaginian  admiral  Hannibal 
when  he  found  himself  faced  by  the  Koman  corvi. 

The  Carthaginians  must  assuredly  have  been 
familiar  with  the  history  of  the  Athenian  expedition 
against  Syracuse,  and  the  collapse  of  Athenian  Sea 
Power  before  the  '  other  ways '  of  the  Syracusans. 
They  were  familiar  with  crash  tactics  as  opposed  to 
the  more  scientific  ramming  tactics — pecking  tactics — 
that  might  be  employed.  They  were  familiar  with 


ETEKNAL  PKINCIPLES  273 

the  carrying  of  soldiers  at  sea  for  definite  destructive 
purposes.  The  lessons  of  the  past  could  teach  them 
what  dangers  crash  tactics  might  imply,  and  enable 
them  to  think  out  replies.  It  is  probable  that  all 
this  was  considered.  But  they  did  not  carry  their 
researches  into  the  future  as  well  as  the  past. 

Had  they  done  so,  they  would  not  necessarily  have 
divined  the  advent  of  the  corvi.  They  might  have  to 
a  certain  extent,  because  the  corvi,  like  everything 
else,  were  an  evolution  and  part  of  a  cycle  reverting 
to  past  methods — they  might  have  anticipated  or 
they  might  not  have.  But  the  mental  exercise  of 
speculating  as  to  whether  at  some  future  date  their 
present  methods  would  be  equally  efficacious,  whether 
such  principles  as  then  obtained  were  eternal  faced 
with  imaginary  but  logical  conditions  of  the  future, 
would  undoubtedly  have  rendered  them  fitter  to  meet 
the  terrible  surprise  of  the  corvi  when  it  came,  and 
fitter  to  evolve  an  answer  to  it.  Hence  the  wisdom  of 
testing  every  eternal  principle  by  the  future  as  well  as 
by  the  past. 

By  the  corvi  the  Eomans  extended  the  striking 
radius  of  their  soldiers  at  sea — they  extended  it  from 
their  own  decks  to  the  decks  of  the  enemy. 

It  is  an  eternal  principle  founded  on  the  past  that 
progress  is  always  on  the  lines  of  extended  radius  of 
ship  or  weapon.  For  geographical  reasons  it  can  no 
longer  be  counterbalanced  strategically  by  extending 
the  ship  area ;  but  we  have  seen  it  counterbalanced 

T 


274  HEEESIES   OF   SEA  POWEE 

tactically  by  a  great  and  steady  increase  of  the  weapon 
radius.  The  tactical  area  is  expanding  as  the  strate- 
gical one  relatively  contracts.  It  has  gone  from  inches 
to  feet,  from  feet  to  yards,  from  yards  to  miles.  To- 
day it  averages  three  to  four  miles  or  more ;  but  this 
seems  nothing  in  the  12,000  mile  half-circumference 
of  the  world,  which  is  the  maximum  available  limit. 
Yet  as  to-day's  fighting  range  is  30,000  times  the 
original  maximum  range  and  the  present  range  can 
only  be  multiplied  by  less  than  3,000  to  reach  absolute 
finality,  it  may  be  said  that  no  weapon  of  the  future 
can  be  more  inconceivable  to  us  than  ours  of  to-day 
would  have  been  to  the  earliest  aquatic  fighters. 

The  strategical  area  was  once  less  than  a  hundred 
miles.  It  did  not  exceed  a  few  hundreds  for  nearly  two 
thousand  years.  Then  it  went  up  rapidly  till  it  covered 
the  world.  Its  contraction  has  been  brought  about  by 
speed  and  endurance  making  different  points  relatively 
nearer  than  they  were.  The  increase  of  tactical  radius 
for  which  men  seek  eternally  is  producing  this. 

We  may  assume  then  that  radius  will  go  on  in- 
creasing. Eventually — unless  wars  cease  first — it 
must  reach  near  its  limit  either  some  form  of  vessel 
with  a  speed  which  almost  annihilates  time  for 
practical  purpose  or  a  weapon  of  practically  unlimited 
range.  Neither  of  these  radii  limits  is  appreciably 
near  as  yet,  nor  can  we  properly  conceive  of  their 
being  so.  But  the  cycle  can  be  perceived :  also  the 
end  of  it — the  expansion  of  radius  till  there  is  no  more 


ETEENAL  PEINCIPLES  275 

room  to  expand  and  the  earliest  conditions  are  repro- 
duced in  a  new  form.  Expansion  of  radius  is,  there- 
fore, an  eternal  law.  But  it  is  a  law  the  existence  of 
which  has  been  little  perceived ;  perhaps  not  perceived 
at  all. 

But,  however  expanded,  what  advantage  can  it 
confer  if  Fitness  to  Win  be  absent  ?  What  advantage 
does  '  two  to  one '  confer  without  this  factor  ?  What 
gain  is  there  in  anything  without  this  essential  quality  ? 

Naval  efficiency  qua  naval  efficiency  cannot  replace 
it.  Athens  and  Carthage  had  that,  but  the  Fitter  to 
Win  found  ways  to  overcome  them.  Superior  weapons 
cannot  accomplish  it — Eussian  guns  were  as  good  or 
better  than  the  Japanese,  nor  was  the  Eussian  gunnery 
bad  had  it  had  a  chance.  The  Fitness  to  secure  the 
chance  was  lacking.  Genius  in  the  leaders  cannot 
necessarily  confer  it :  surely  Hannibal  was  as  great  or 
greater  a  genius  than  Scipio,  Napoleon  than  Welling- 
ton. Nelson  was  no  greater  tactical  or  strategical 
genius  than  many  of  his  opponents.  Personal  courage 
does  not  supply  it ;  the  Eussians  fighting  the  Japanese 
lacked  nothing  in  the  way  of  courage. 

In  daily  life  how  often  do  we  see  a  man,  without 
advantages,  hampered  often  in  innumerable  ways, 
enter  some  profession  and  rise  over  the  heads  of  others 
with  infinitely  superior  advantages.  Why  does  he  so 
rise  ?  It  is  not  blind  chance.  We  call  it  '  ability,'  but 
we  know  that,  in  nine  cases  out  of  ten,  whatever  the 
profession  adopted  the  result  would  have  been  the 

T  2 


276  HEEESIES   OF   SEA  POWEB 

same.  It  is  general  superiority — Fitness  to  Win.  It 
is  with  nations  as  with  individuals.  And  so  the 
destiny  of  every  nation  does  not  primarily  reside  in  its 
Sea  Power  or  its  Land  Power  or  any  of  these  things, 
but  in  the  individual  fitness  of  its  units,  and  in  this 
collective  average  superiority  to  the  collective  average 
of  the  enemy. 


II 

THE   EVOLUTION   OF  NAVIES 

THE  root  idea  of  the  warship,  as  has  already  been 
suggested  in  these  pages,  was  the  evolution  of  a  means 
whereby  soldiers  could  fight  each  other  on  the  water  as 
well  as  on  the  land.  In  the  course  of  many  thousand 
years  that  idea  has  often  been  almost  entirely  lost  sight 
of,  but  it  has  nearly  always  been  reverted  to  in  times 
of  great  stress  and  of  life  and  death  struggles.  It  is 
lost  sight  of  to-day,  but  sooner  or  later  is  bound  to  re- 
appear as  the  integral  factor. 

The  elementary  ship  has  often  been  pictured  as  a 
log  of  wood  used  by  prehistoric  man  to  cross  rivers  that 
were  wider  than  his  bridging  appliances  and  too  deep 
to  ford.  The  hollowing  out  of  the  tree  trunk  and  the 
shaping  of  it  into  rude  boat  form  were  early  and  natural 
evolutions,  so  early  that  the  most  ancient  historical 
records  show  us  the  ship  in  a  comparatively  late  stage 
of  development. 

Egyptian  monuments  dating  from  B.C.  2500  or 
thereabouts  show  boats  propelled  by  several  rowers, 
fitted  with  some  species  of  sail  and  steered  by  paddles 


278  HEKESIES  OF   SEA  POWEK 

aft.1  The  existence  of  ornamentation  in  the  form  of  a 
snake  figure-head  indicates  that  the  type  had  been 
brought  to  some  considerable  state  of  finish  and  that 
the  boat  was  already  an  evolved  article. 

By  B.C.  1000,  judging  by  the  relative  sizes  of  men 
and  ships,  considerable  advance  had  been  made  in  size, 
lateen  sails  were  in  vogue,  and,  in  the  case  of  warships 
the  fighting  top  (or  else  a  look-out  station)  had 
appeared,  as  well  as  an  armoured  breastwork  to  protect 


EGYPTIAN  SHIP  ABOUT  2500  B.C. 

the  rowers.  These  last  two  features  may  be  presumed 
to  be  the  result  of  experience  gained  in  unknown  sea 
fights.  A  glance  at  the  illustrations  taken  from  the 
monument  which  records  the  first  historical  naval 
battle  gives  us  the  warship  qua  warship,  already  some- 
thing that  had  differentiated  from  the  every-day 
merchant  vessel  for  a  specific  purpose. 

1  I  am  indebted  to  Mr.  Cecil  Torr  M.A.  for  permission  to  reproduce 
the  first  four  illustrations  in  this  chapter  from  his  Ancient  Ships 
(Cambridge  University  Press). 


THE  EVOLUTION   OF  NAVIES         279 


280 


HEEESIES   OF   SEA  POWEK 


By  B.C.  700  the  Phoenicians  had  evolved  a  warship 
in  which  the  oars  were  in  two  banks,  presumably  so 


1.  EGYPTIAN  WARSHIP  IN  ACTION  1000  B.C. 

2.  ASIATIC  WARSHIP  IN  SAME  BATTLE. 

arranged  in  order  to  secure  increased  motive  power  in 
a  limited  length.1     Over  the  heads  of  the  rowers  appears 

1  To  increase  the  length  has  always  been  the  main  problem  in  war- 
ship construction.  See  chap.  '  Dimensions  of  Warships.'  The  two 
and  three  decks-ships  1600-1800  all  had  the  duplicated  or  triplicated  gun- 
decks  on  account  of  the  difficulty  of  satisfactorily  increasing  length. 


THE   EVOLUTION   OF   NAVIES         281 

a  flying  deck  protected  by  shields  for  the  fighting 
members  of  the  crew  and  finally  a  distinct  ram  bow  is 
to  be  observed. 

Now  this  warship  besides  marking  an  advance  in 
attack  and  defence  also  marks  some  kind  of  return  to 
the  original  conception  of  the  warship  as  an  instrument 
for  enabling  soldiers  to  fight  each  other  on  the  water 


PH(ENICIAN  WABSHIP  OF  circa  700  B.C.    FROM  NINEVEH 
MONUMENTS. 

as  well  as  upon  the  land.  The  Egyptian  warships  of 
three  hundred  years  before  lack  this  feature  to  a  con- 
siderable extent — defence  is  to  be  found  in  them  in  the 
breastwork  to  protect  the  rowers,  but  the  offensive  and 
military  feature  so  conspicuous  in  the  Phoenician  war- 
ship is  absent. 

This  type  of  vessel  long  survived,  but  it  eventually 
gave  way  to  the    Athenian   trireme,   of  which    the 


282  HEKESIES  OF   SEA  POWEK 

exact  form  is  still  a  matter  of  some  conjecture. 
We  do  know,  however,  from  the  evidence  of  con- 
temporary historians,  that  the  Athenian  trireme  was 
essentially  a  'naval'  vessel.  The  idea  of  a  craft 
primarily  destined  to  enable  soldiers  to  fight  each 
other  on  the  water  was  gradually  lost  in  the  idea  of  a 
ship  especially  designed  to  fight  and  destroy  other  ships. 
This  object  was  sought  and  secured  chiefly  by  speed 
and  handiness,  and  to  obtain  these  qualities  the  military 
element  on  board  was  considerably  reduced  and  light- 
ness of  construction  gone  in  for.  What  may  be 
described  as  the  '  heavy  and  clumsy  battleship  idea ' 
was  abandoned  in  favour  of  the  <  cruiser  idea,'  *  the  light 
swift  craft  able  to  strike  sudden  blows.'  The  crews  of 
the  Athenian  warships  were  principally  '  sailors '  in  the 
narrow  meaning  of  the  term.  After  a  career  of  con- 
siderable success  1  the  Athenian  navy  vanished  before 
the  heavier  *  battleship-craft '  of  the  Syracusans  and 
Peloponnesians. 

When  Carthaginian  Sea  Power  became  predominant 
in  the  Western  Mediterranean  the  cruiser  idea  had, 
however,  again  worked  itself  into  favour,  The  Cartha- 
ginian sailor  was  a  '  seaman '  rather  than  a  '  soldier  at 
sea.'  Sea  aptitude  was  his  main  characteristic  and  if 
hand-to-hand  fighting  were  not  lost  sight  of,  it  certainly 
did  not  occupy  the  sole  prominent  position. 

This  navy  was  annihilated  by  the  Koman  soldiers 
at  sea,  by  craft  that  essentially  embodied  the  battleship 
1  See  chapter  of '  The  Peloponnesian  War.' 


THE   EVOLUTION  OF  NAVIES         283 

dea,  which  carried  men  bent  upon  killing  other  men 
in  ships  and  relied  nothing  at  all  upon  skilful  tactics 
or  the  sea-aptitude  necessary  to  manoeuvre  ship  against 
ship. 

Thereafter  for  a  long  time  the  *  seaman '  disappeared 
as  a  factor  of  importance.  Ships  increased  in  size  and 
soldier-carrying  capacity,  Antony's  ships  at  Actium 
were  little  removed  from  floating  fortresses.  Their 
opponents  to  a  certain  extent  relied  upon  the  Athenian 
and  Carthaginian  ideals,  their  ships  were  small  and 
handy  and  the  men  who  propelled  them  were  the 
fighting  men.  As  on  previous  occasions  the  result  was 
obscured  by  other  issues  than  that  of  specialists  against 
*  all-round  men/ 

The  all-round  seaman  did  not  recover  his  old  status 
to  any  very  appreciable  extent,  and  with  a  few  excep- 
tions for  centuries  the  warship  carried  soldiers  to  do  the 
fighting  and  seamen  in  the  subordinate  capacities  of 
rowers  or  managers  of  the  sail  motive  power.  Battles 
were  chiefly  decided  by  the  military  element  right  on 
to  the  days  of  Drake  and  his  fellows,  when  there  was 
again  evolved  the  all-round  seaman  able  to  sail  his  ship 
and  fight  it  too. 

The  defeat  of  the  Spanish  Armada  which  was 
manned  upon  the  specialist  system  soon  brought  the 
all-round  man  into  vogue.  As  ever,  there  were  other 
issues  involved  than  the  specialist  problem,  but  these 
were  either  not  perceived  or  else  not  considered  worthy 
of  appreciation  against  the,  at  that  time,  obvious 


284  HEEESIES   OF   SEA  POWEE 

advantage  of  having  '  every  man  on  board  a  com- 
batant.' 

Not  so  very  long  afterwards  the  mutinous  condition 
of  the  seamen  necessitated  the  creation  of  soldiers  on 
shipboard  in  a  new  role, — that  of  marines.  The  marine, 
however,  appeared  distinctly  as  a  police  force  and  that 
he  participated  in  the  fighting  was  mere  utilitarianism. 
The  seamen  fought  the  guns  and  in  no  way  reverted  to 
the  old  position  of  specialists  in  motive  power. 

In  the  Nelson  era  the  seaman  was  supreme  and 
seamanship  won  the  battles.1  This  endured  till  the 
advent  of  steam  introduced  entirely  novel  conditions, 
and  a  new  body  of  men,  engineers,  who  gradually  took 
over  the  old  seaman  duties  of  control  of  motive  power, 
while  the  seamen  slipped,  almost  imperceptibly  at  first, 
into  the  specialist  position  of  the  soldiers  at  sea. 
There  has  been,  however,  one  important  distinction 
between  this  change  and  similar  changes  in  the  past. 
The  seamen  changed  into  soldiers  at  sea  retained  the 
old  navigating  duties  in  a  more  complete  form  than 
in  previous  revolutions,  though  this  of  course  may 
mean  nothing  more  than  that  we  are  now  in  the 
transition  stage.  Here  it  is  of  interest  to  note  that  the 
Eussians  about  the  time  that  steam  came  in  or  a  little 
before — it  is  difficult  to  trace  any  more  exact  date— 

1  The  interesting  fact,  however,  of  Nelson's  '  hammer  and  tongs ' 
system  should  be  kept  well  in  mind.  It  suggests  that  Nelson  at  any 
rate  had  some  conception  of  the  old  root  idea  of  the  ship  as  a  means  of 
carrying  men  to  fight  other  men  as  opposed  to  the  ship  as  an  instrument 
intended  to  fight  other  ships. 


THE   EVOLUTION   OF   NAVIES         285 

introduced  into  their  warships  a  corps  of  artillery, 
gunners  who  had  no  naval  training  whatever.  The 
Marine  Artillery  of  the  British  Navy  may  also  be 
mentioned.  In  both  one  can  detect  the  germ  of  a 
return  to  the  old  idea  of  strict  specialisation.  The 
Russian  Artillery  Corps,  however,  ceased  to  exist  as  a 
distinct  body  several  years  ago,  and  there  are  some 
indications  of  a  similar  ending  to  the  British  Marine 
Artillery. 

At  the  same  time  there  is  a  tendency  in  all  navies 
to  merge  the  executive  and  engineering  branches. 
Consequently  the  present  position  may  be  put  down  to 
an  attempt  to  return  to  the  Drake  conception  of  '  every 
man  able  to  fight  the  ship  and  work  it  too.'  As  already 
noted  this  conception  was  destroyed  through  the  chance 
arrival  of  steam  as  a  motive  power. 

'  Engineer '  is  of  course  a  term  that  to-day  has  the 
same  effective  meaning  that '  seaman  '  had  in  the  days 
of  Drake,  saving  always  that  the  engineer  has  in  the 
present  transition  stage  no  concern  with  the  steering 
and  manoeuvring  of  the  ship.  In  the  future — given 
evolution  upon  the  lines  at  present  projected — he 
probably  will,  and  presumably  also  in  the  process  of 
time  he  will  take  over  control  of  guns  and  torpedoes, 
the  present  military  branch  being  merged  into  him, 
and  he  into  them.  That  would  be  the  Drake  idea 
returned  to. 

In  the  old  days  the  military  branch  was  in  a  great 
measure  dispensed  with  by  being  put  on  shore.  At 


286  HEKESIES   OF   SEA  POWEK 

the  present  time,  owing  to  the  vastly  increased  com- 
plication of  and  the  general  adoption  of  machinery, 
torpedo  officers  (almost  entirely)  and  gunnery  officers 
(to  a  very  great  extent)  are  in  sum  and  substance 
members  of  the  engineering  profession  in  its  widest 
sense.  Out  of  these  and  the  engineers  proper  the 
navies  of  the  early  future  will — with  evolution  follow- 
ing its  present  course — be  compounded.  As  hinted 
above,  the  tremendous  complication  of  modern 
machinery  is  a  difficulty  in  the  way  of  return  to  the 
all-round  man  and  many  people  question  its  possibility. 
However,  it  is  probable  that  in  the  days  of  Drake  it 
was  hotly  debated  as  to  whether  a  seaman  could  ever 
acquire  proficiency  in  handling  guns,  or  a  soldier  in 
the  proper  management  of  ropes  and  sails — very  diffi- 
cult problems  to  the  lesser  intelligences  of  the  men  of 
those  times.  Still,  whatever  difficulties  present-day 
critics  may  see,  this  is  the  thing  that  is  likely  to  come 
about,  and  with  it — if  history  goes  for  anything — some 
modification  of  the  warship  to  suit  the  new  order  of 
things,  and  that  modification  probably  in  the  direction 
of  the  big  cruiser. 

History  does  not  tell  us  of  the  internal  naval  argu- 
ments if  any  which  preceded  the  evolution  of  the 
Athenian  trireme.  But  we  may  take  it  for  granted 
that  arguments  were  plentiful  enough  before  the  bulk 
of  the  heavy-armed  fighting  men  were  put  on  shore, 
before  the  heavy  protection  for  these  men  was  dis- 
pensed with,  before  the  ship  emerged  light  and  swift, 


THE  EVOLUTION  OF  NAVIES         287 

trusting  for  victory  to  her  speed,  her  manoeuvring 
qualities  and  her  ram. 

It  may,  and  indeed  has  been  argued  that  the 
rowers  merely  moved  the  ship  and  did  not  fight  it. 
Academically  this  is  true,  but  otherwise  it  is  incorrect. 
The  free  Athenian  citizens  who  toiled  at  the  oars  knew 
perfectly  well  that  with  those  oars  they  propelled  the 
ram  upon  which  they  trusted  for  victory, — the  ram 
was  their  weapon  and  it  needed  oars  being  pulled  to 
use  it  just  as  a  gun  needs  loading  for  use.  They,  using 
the  oars,  replaced  the  bulk  of  the  fighting  men  who 
added  weight  to  hostile  warships.  The  end  of  this 
Athenian  seamanship  was  disaster.  They  had  built 
their  ships  too  light  in  the  pursuance  of  their  ideal, 
and  the  day  came  when  weight  told.  Incidentally  of 
course  fitness  to  win  had  passed  from  them  to  their 
enemies,  also  the  circumstances  were  peculiar,  so  that 
it  is  hard  or  impossible  to  say  how  much  their  defeat 
was  due  to  the  failure  of  the  cruiser  idea  opposed  to 
the  battleship  idea  and  how  much  to  lack  of  fitness  to 
win.  At  JEgospotami  the  latter  was  painfully  in 
evidence ;  but  there  still  remains  the  fact  that  the  fitter 
to  win  relied  on  the  battleship  idea  and  the  specialisa- 
tion necessitated  by  carrying  out  what  constituted  the 
battleship  idea  in  those  days. 

The  Carthaginians  failed  in  exactly  the  same  way. 
Different  conditions  obtained,  but  still  there  was  the 
main  fact  that  the  fitter  to  win  relied,  like  the  Pelo- 
ponnesians,  upon  the  military  as  opposed  to  the  purely 


288  HEEESIES   OF  .SEA  POWEK 

sea-aptitude  qualities  of  their  crews.  Then  once  more 
there  came  a  time  when  the  military  element  being 
unduly  exaggerated  it  fell  before  sea-aptitude.  The 
working  of  a  cycle  is  apparent,  so  apparent  that  the 
thing  right  for  one  age  may  be  the  thing  quite  wrong 
for  another.  And  yet  it  is  difficult  to  avoid  some  ink- 
ling of  a  thought  that  the  military  idea  is  the  really 
right  one,  that  though  sea-aptitude  and  intelligence 
may  win  naval  battles,  the  brute  force  and  weight  of 
the  soldier-at-sea  idea  is  the  more  likely  to  triumph  in 
the  long  run.  The  besetting  danger  of  the  '  seaman ' 
appears  ever  to  have  been  a  tendency  to  lose  sight  of 
the  end  in  the  means,  gradually  to  concentrate  upon 
details  and  skill  at  those  details  for  the  sake  of  the 
details  alone.  The  sin  of  the  '  military '  element  on  the 
other  hand  was  usually  to  forget  and  neglect  the  means 
in  seeking  the  end. 

The  probable  course  of  future  naval  warfare  may 
at  least  be  suspected  upon  these  lines,  once  the  all- 
round  man  asserts  his  predominance.  In  the  post- 
Nelson  days  the  all-round  seaman  took  to  '  spit  and 
polish/  the  neat  orderliness  which  assisted  his  work 
became  a  fetish  as  important  to  him  as  the  work  itself, 
once  there  was  a  period  of  peace;  the  absence  of 
specialists  each  interested  in  the  predominant  import- 
ance of  his  own  particular  line  told.  The  all-round 
navy  of  the  immediate  future  is  not  likely  to  fail  from 
'spit  and  polish,'  because  there  is  nothing,  or  very 
little,  in  the  modern  warship  to  cause  a  re-birth  of  it 


THE   EVOLUTION   OF  NAVIES         289 

for  legitimate  use.  That '  spit  and  polish '  was  merely 
a  really  essential  thing,  overdone  in  the  course  of  long 
years,  cannot  be  too  clearly  kept  in  mind  in  these 
days  of  its  decline  as  a  naval  accomplishment.  The 
machinery  of  the  far  future,  whether  explosion  engine 
or  electric,  will  no  doubt  be  kept  beautifully  clean,  and 
this  will  increase  its  efficiency.  But  it  is  hardly  likely 
to  go  short  of  oil  on  the  grounds  that  '  lubrication  is 
dirty,' — the  odds  are  all  against  a  slavish  imitation  of 
the  days  when  guns  were  not  fired  for  fear  of  damaging 
the  paintwork.  Spit  and  polish  is  the  overgrown  child 
of  seeking  after  efficiency,  but  it  is  not  the  vice  to 
which  those  who  handle  machinery  are  prone.  Kather 
the  errors  of  the  navy  of  the  future  are  likely,  when 
they  come,  to  take  the  form  of  an  undue  respect  for 
speed.  It  is  sure  to  be  a  good  thing  overdone  that 
brings  the  decay,  not  a  bad  habit  acquired.  And  so 
very  possibly  the  decaying  navy  of  the  future  will,  just 
before  that  decay  becomes  obvious,  make  a  fetish  of 
speed  at  any  price.  It  will  probably — especially  if 
the  times  are  peaceful — sacrifice  armour  to  increase 
speed.  It  will  very  possibly  sacrifice  a  good  deal  of 
seaworthiness  and  stability  to  the  same  ideal.  It 
will  strive  hard  after  the  lightest  possible  form  of 
construction,  spend  its  energies  perhaps  in  seeking 
to  reduce  superflous  pounds  in  a  40,000-ton  ship. 
Stores  will  be  cut  down,  the  supply  of  fuel  kept 
meagre,  and  speeds  undreamed  of  to-day  become  the 
ordinary  thing. 

u 


290  HEKESIES   OF   SEA  POWEB 

Very  probably  a  marvellous  precision  of  tactics 
will  be  arrived  at  for  the  sake  of  the  means  without 
much  thought  of  the  end.  The  suggestion  of  this  is 
already  to  be  noted  in  the  wedge-shape  formation, 
destroyer  almost  touching  destroyer,  evolved  by  the 
Germans  and  copied  by  the  Americans.  It  may  con- 
ceivably become  the  pride  of  future  navies  to  do 
this  and  kindred  things  at  fifty  knots  with  50,000-ton 
ships. 

Target  practice  is  another  very  probable  form  of 
dry-rot.  Already  gun-layers'  competitions  have  been 
elevated  to  a  position  altogether  out  of  proportion  to 
their  utility.  The  target  practice  of  the  future  is  toler- 
ably sure  to  be  wonderful.  Trick  shooting  can  be  fore- 
seen already.  Some  gun  of  special  precision  will  appear, 
not  perhaps  at  all  the  largest  possible,  but  one  in 
which  one  or  two  qualities  are  sacrificed  to  a  splendid 
precision.  With  perfect  range  finders,  perfect  speed 
indicators,  and  a  more  or  less  perfect  propellant, 
hitting  the  target  will  be  absolutely  certain  be  it  still 
or  in  motion,  and  the  only  uncertainty  as  to  whether 
the  hit  is  in  the  centre  of  the  bull's-eye.  Torpedoes 
will  probably  reach  a  similar  certainty,  and  speed  trials 
and  target  practice  be  done  with  a  precision  to  evoke 
unstinted  praise.  And  little  by  little  things  will  be 
introduced  that  will  aid  these  practices  to  become 
still  more  perfect  and  some  small  war  may  serve  to 
demonstrate  the  perfection. 

And   then   a  war    with    some    nation    hopelessly 


THE   EVOLUTION   OF   NAVIES         291 

inferior  in  these  arts,  China  l  perhaps,  or  Russia.  And 
this  other  nation,  because  of  its  very  incompetence  in 
the  trick  nautical  exercises  of  the  future  will  be  driven 
to  fall  back  on  some  type  of  ship,  slower,  heavier, 
unable  to  execute  beautiful  manoeuvres,  but  carrying, 
may  be,  some  heavier  gun  absolutely  annihilating  when 
it  hits,  and  heavily  defended  with  armour  because  the 
gun  specialists  want  to  take  care  of  themselves.  It  is 
all  too  conceivable  that  such  a  fleet  might  go  forth, 
controlled  by  people  with  no  notions  about  pretty 
tactics  or  target  practice,  but  full  of  the  crude  old  idea 
of  killing  the  enemy,  and  attain  the  victory  which  has 
usually  followed  the  whole-souled  pursuit  of  that 
simple  idea. 

If  this  be  not  the  true  picture  of  the  future,  it  is  at 
least  the  picture  most  fully  in  accord  with  past  history, 
with  the  fall  of  the  Athenian  and  Carthaginian  navies. 

This  should  not  be  taken  as  implying  that  sea- 
aptitude  may  be  of  no  avail.  Undoubtedly  it  is  the 
most  valuable  thing  so  long  as  it  remains,  as  it  should 
remain,  a  means  to  an  end.  Once  it  becomes  the  end 
only,  danger  is  very  near  at  hand.  To  cultivate  the 
means  without  ever  losing  sight  of  the  one  and  only 
main  objective,  the  killing  of  the  enemy,  is  the  ideal  to 
which  no  Sea  Empire  has  yet  succeeded  in  reaching, 
and  the  doom  of  every  once  important  Sea  Empire  has 

1  It  may  be  noted  that  there  is  a  tremendous  latent  naval  possibility 
in  Chinese  sailors,  judging  by  the  reports  of  those  who  have  had  full 
opportunity  of  studying  them . 

u  2 


292  HEKESIES   OF   SEA  POWEK 

lain  in  its  losing  sight  of  the  primary  reason  for 
which  navies  exist.  The  difficulties  of  the  case  lie 
in  the  fact  that  danger  lurks  not  in  imported  vices  but 
in  the  overdoing  of  things  of  themselves  good  and 
useful.  And  this  is  so  true  that  no  Sea  Empire  can 
endure  for  more  than  a  space  any  more  than  summer 
greenery  can  last  beyond  the  autumn,  or  the  fruit  that 
has  ripened  to  perfection  long  resist  the  ravages  of 
decay. 

It  is  in  perfection  that  danger  lies.  An  imperfect, 
inefficient  navy  has  always  a  possible  future  before  it. 
That  is  why  the  Kussian  Navy  will  probably  exist 
long  after  the  British  and  Japanese  Fleets  have  sunk 
into  relative  non-existence, — the  Kussian  Navy  being 
very  singularly  far  from  ripeness.  This  doctrine  of 
decay  through  perfection  is  a  pessimistic  one;  it  is 
also,  perhaps,  in  some  degree  dangerous,  in  that  taken 
too  literally  it  may  suggest  that  it  is  dangerous  to  aim 
at  perfection,  and  that  badness  is  the  true  test  of  ulti- 
mate merit !  Fortunately,  however,  there  are  modify- 
ing qualities.  So  long  as  powerful  rivals  exist  no 
navy  is  very  likely  to  reach  a  stage  of  perfection.  It 
is  the  Navy  which  is  supreme  beyond  all  possible 
question  that  goes  in  danger  of  decay.  The  rivalry  of 
other  Powers  is  the  breath  of  life  to  a  Fleet.  Nothing 
for  instance  could  be  better  for  the  British  Navy  than 
Germany's  avowed  ambition  to  challenge  the  sove- 
reignty of  the  seas.  Germany's  decision  in  1905  to 
build  monster  battleships  of  the  very  first  rank  was 


THE   EVOLUTION   OF  NAVIES 


293 


(or  should  have  been)  a  better  tonic  for  the  British 
Fleet  than  all  the  reforms  and  improvements  internally 
introduced  over  a  period  of  five  or  six  years.  So  true 
is  this,  that  the  worst  blow  Germany  could  strike  at 
the  British  Navy  would  be  to  declare  war  and  have 
her  entire  fleet  easily  and  completely  annihilated  !  It 
was  probably  the  fact  that  French  ships  remained  in 
harbour  as  a  standing  menace  which  saved  the  British 
Navy  from  going  to  seed  after  the  striking  victory  of 
Trafalgar — that,  and  the  excellent  fight  made  by  a  few 
of  the  French  ships  at  Trafalgar. 

The  navies  which  at  the  present  day  are  in  the 
greatest  danger  of  going  to  seed  are  the  Japanese  and 
United  States — the  former  especially.  The  ease  with 
which  they  annihilated  the  Spanish  Fleet  did  the 
Americans  no  good ;  but  the  dangers  to  which  they 
are  liable  are  nothing  to  the  dangers  threatening 
Japan,  after  her  two  signal  victories  over  China  and 
Eussia.  She  was  saved  after  the  war  with  China  by 
having  to  bow  to  the  superior  naval  power  of  Bussia, 
France  and  Germany.  But  the  very  ease  with  which 
the  Baltic  Fleet  was  annihilated  must  ever  be  a  terrible 
danger  to  Japan's  future  efficiency.  The  most  deadly 
blow  that  Russia  struck  was  when  Admiral  Nebogatoff 
with  a  squadron  of  little-injured  ships,  including  one 
first-class  vessel,  surrendered  after  Tsushima  without 
firing  a  shot.  He  surrendered  to  the  mere  menace  of 
some  distant  battleships, — the  actual  surrender  being  to 
some  mere  cruisers.  Had  he  fought,  his  annihilation 


294  HEEESIES  OF   SEA  POWEE 

was  certain,  but  it  would  have  been  well  for  Japan  had 
he  done  some  harm  before  going  under. 

Had  there  been  the  faintest  grounds  for  believing 
that  Nebogatoff  surrendered  with  the  idea  of  creating 
a  moral  rot  in  the  Japanese,  then  the  situation  might 
have  been  saved.  But  it  was  perfectly  clear  to  all 
concerned  that  he  surrendered  from  sheer  despair 
before  the  triumphant  fleet  of  Japan.  It  was  the  flag 
he  surrendered  to,  rather  than  to  any  particular  ship 
or  ships. 

The  British  Fleet  is  Japan's  firm  ally,  the  United 
States  Fleet  in  no  way  appeared  as  a  possible  enemy. 
France  and  Germany,  though  more  or  less?  hostile, 
both  gave  indications  that  their  navies  were  afraid  of 
the  Japanese.  Some  form  of  '  swelled  head  '  was  the 
inevitable  result — victory  was  secured  so  very  easily. 

Japan,  no  doubt,  may  fight  yet  another  successful 
naval  war,  but  her  future  is  bound  up  in  the  details  of 
that  war.  If  she  wins  with  the  same  ease  that  she  won 
against  China  and  Kussia  her  decay  will  probably  be 
the  immediate  sequence.  A  hard-fought  fight  will  save 
her;  but  the  dangerous  sequelae  of  easy  victory  are 
thick  about  her.  Efficiency  can  only  be  maintained 
when  menace  exists ;  when  there  is  no  danger  there 
will  not  long  be  any  efficiency. 

There  is,  however,  one  thing  which  tends  to  arrest 
naval  decay,  and  that  is  the  advance  of  invention. 
The  ever-present  danger  that  some  new  form  of  weapon 
will  be  sprung  upon  the  naval  world  tends  to  keep  all 


THE  EVOLUTION  OF  NAVIES         295 

fleets  on  the  qui  vive.  The  terrible  celerity  with  which 
the  most  powerful  ship  in  the  world  becomes  an 
1  obsolete  old  crock '  hardly  worth  consideration,  the 
uselessness  of  old  guns  and  torpedoes— these  facts  are 
bound  to  cause  continual  uneasiness  and  render  difficult 
any  arrival  at  perfection.  After  the  Great  War  the 
sailing  ship  remained  much  as  she  had  been  under 
Nelson,  till  steam  came  and  worked  its  revolution.  In 
such  conditions  perfection  was  easy.  None  could  feel 
the  danger  of  falling  behind,  ideal  perfection  was  visible 
to  all.  To-day  there  is  a  different  ideal  every  year,  and 
it  is  a  blessed  thing  that  it  is  so. 


Ill 

THE    DIMENSIONS    OF   WAESHIPS 

No  theory  has  relied  more  upon  'the  teachings  of 
history '  than  the  theory  of  moderate  dimensions.  It 
is  a  known  fact  that  in  the  days  of  the  Great  War  the 
seventy-four  was  found  to  be  the  handiest  ship  and  the 
best  compromise.  Using  mostly  the  seventy-four-gun 
ship,  Nelson  and  his  compeers  used  to  beat  opponents 
whose  larger  ships  they  overwhelmed  with  superior 
numbers.  Nelson  also  once  made  a  remark  to  the 
effect  that  '  only  numbers  can  annihilate.'  With  these 
facts  as  a  base,  history  has  been  searched  for  examples 
to  prove  that  moderate  dimensions  and  numbers  are 
better  than  larger  dimensions  and  fewer  numbers. 

The  'moderate  dimensions'  advocates  have,  how- 
ever, always  been  careful  to  explain  that  they  mean 
moderate  dimensions  and  not  small  dimensions — which, 
examined,  will  be  found  to  be  but  another  way  of 
saying  that  they  advocate  a  size  smaller  than  the 
largest  possible.  This,  they  say,  won  battles  in 
the  past.  Undoubtedly  it  did:  but  before  the  argu- 
ment can  be  accepted  it  is  necessary  to  ask  two 
things : — 


THE  DIMENSIONS  OF  WAKSHIPS    297 

1.  Were  the  'two  to  one'  tactics  necessitated  by 
the  existence  of  moderate  dimensions  ? 

2.  Is  any  reasoning  from  the  old  wars  with  short 
ranges  applicable  to  the  present  days  of  long  ranges  ? 

As  regards  the  first,  '  two  to  one,'  though  practised 
by  Nelson,  was  certainly  not  invented  by  him.  To 
overwhelm  a  part  of  the  enemy  with  the  whole  of  your 
own  force  has  always  been  a  principle  of  war,  eternal 
because  obvious.  It  is  hard  to  find  a  period  when  it 
did  not  exist  as  the  ideal  objective.  Alcibiades  used 
it  in  the  Peloponnesian  war,  and  so  has  every  winner 
since,  and  so  will  he  go  on  doing  till  the  end  of  time. 
But  the  '  two '  (by  which  the  superior  force  is  meant) 
need  not  be  a  numerical  superiority — it  is  a  matter  of 
indifference  whether  the  superior  power  be  made  up  of 
greater  numbers  of  ships,  superior  skill  in  gunnery, 
superior  courage,  superior  leadership,  or  superior  any- 
thing else,  so  long  as  the  sum  of  these  things  is 
superiority  to  the  enemy. 

Of  all  factors  in  war,  superior  gun-fire  is  one  of  the 
most  important :  to  secure  it — that  is  to  say,  to  secure 
concentration  of  fire — those  with  the  moderate-sized 
ships  had,  in  the  old  days,  to  concentrate  vessels. 

Obviously  it  is  begging  the  question  to  argue 
therefrom  that  moderate-sized  ships  gave  victory — 
Trafalgar  would  have  been  won  equally  well  with  half 
the  number  of  ships  of  double  the  power,  or  one  third 
the  number  of  ships  of  thrice  the  power,  supposing 
such  ships  to  have  existed. 


298  HEKESIES  OF   SEA  POWEE 

They  did  not,  however,  exist.  As  has  been  pointed 
out  by  Sir  Philip  Watts,1  in  the  days  of  wooden  ships 
it  was  almost  impossible  to  increase  length  to  any 
extent  in  order  to  get  more  power,  because  of  certain 
technical  difficulties  of  construction.  Consequently 
increased  power  was  only  to  be  obtained  by  adding  an 
extra  deck,  and  this  entailed  a  loss  of  handiness,  a  loss 
of  speed,  a  loss  of  seaworthiness,  and  such  general 
disabilities  that  for  all-round  work  the  seventy-four 
was  almost  the  largest  unit  practicable.  Bigger  ships 
were  built,  but  they  were  always,  to  some  extent,  ex- 
perimental, and  never  fully  satisfactory.  That  is  the 
real  reason  why  the  bulk  of  the  British  fleet  in  the 
Great  War  consisted  of  seventy-fours. 

There  is  now  the  second  point  to  consider.  In  the 
old  days,  moderately  effective  range  was  a  matter  of  a 
hundred  yards  or  so  and  really  effective  range  was 
ship  touching  ship.  Concentration  of  power  was, 
therefore,  necessarily  the  concentration  of  ships. 

To-day  these  conditions  have  entirely  vanished. 
The  gun  radius  is  so  extended  that  any  number  of 
ships  can  concentrate  effectively  on  one  after  another 
of  the  enemy,  without  ever  approaching  inside  a 
couple  of  miles.  It  is,  however,  far  easier  to  handle 
six  big  ships  than  twelve  smaller  ones  of  equal  total 
power,  because  the  twelve  will  be  occupying  about 
double  the  space  and,  therefore,  less  easily  able  to  act 
as  one  in  the  matter  of  concentrating  on  a  single  unit. 
1  Institute  of  Naval  Architects,  July,  1905. 


THE   DIMENSIONS   OF   WAKSHIPS    299 

Furthermore,  size  now  entails  no  loss  of  speed  or 
handiness,  but  instead  means,  if  anything,  more  of 
both,  and  certainly  entails  superior  endurance,  sea- 
worthiness and  ability  to  receive  heavy  blows.1  There 
is,  in  fine,  no  single  argument  against  the  *  mastodon  ' 
except  that  her  loss  is  more  heavily  felt  than  the  loss 
of  a  smaller  unit. 

Even  this,  however,  is  mostly  an  imaginary  draw- 
back, since  there  is  no  evidence  of  five  moderate-sized 
ships  ever  having  been  built  instead  of  four  larger 
ones.  Thus  Germany  has  adhered  strictly  to  her  five- 
battleships-a-class  rule,  as  much  with  the  Kaisers  as 
with  the  larger  Deutschlands. 

The  United  States,  acting  under  the  influence  of 
one  of  the  most  extraordinarily  illogical  fits  that  ever 
seized  men  responsible  for  Naval  construction,  did 
in  the  Idaho  and  Mississippi,  construct  two  moderate 
ships  as  part  of  a  programme  consisting  mostly  of  big 
units.  But  it  is  clear  that  these  two  moderates  were 
built  instead  of  two  monster  ships,  so  that  the  net 
result  was  the  loss  of  a  knot  speed  in  two  fighting 
units,  also  a  loss  of  power  both  for  offence  and  defence. 
And  what  was  gained  ?  Nothing,  save  the  triumph  of 
a  principle  which  has  nothing  to  recommend  it,  and 
the  establishment  of  the  fact  that  certain  Americans 
are  unable  to  read  history  except  through  their  own 
glasses. 

It  would  be  little  more  illogical  to  demand  sails 

1  Also,  relatively  smaller  cost  of  upkeep. 


300  HERESIES  OF   SEA  POWER 

and  smooth-bores  because  Nelson  won  using  sails  and 
smooth-bores  than  to  demand  moderate  dimensions 
because  his  ships  were  seventy- fours !  The  processes 
of  reasoning  applied  to  the  one  can  equally  well  be 
applied  to  the  others.  Let  us,  however,  suppose  for 
a  moment  that  a  nation,  instead  of  determining  to 
build  so  many  ships,  determine  instead  (which  no 
nation  does)  to  build  so  many  thousand  tons  of  ship- 
ping and  decided  to  have  five  moderate  ships  instead 
of  four  more  monstrous  ones.  Suppose,  for  instance, 
Japan  had  constructed  five  Fujis  instead  of  four  Shiki- 
shimas,1  then  the  loss  of  the  Hatsuse,  instead  of  being 
the  loss  of  one  sixth  of  her  battle  fleet,  would  have 
been  the  loss  of  one  seventh ;  but  would  a  Fuji  have 
survived  the  hammering  that  the  Mikasa  took  at  the 
battle  of  Round  Island  ?  The  Hatsuse  struck  by  one 
mine  kept  afloat  (it  was  pure  chance  that  another 
struck  and  caused  her  to  sink),  whereas  the  smaller 
Yashima  was  totally  disabled  and  finally  sank  from 
the  effect  of  one.  We  cannot  logically  base  an  argu- 
ment on  the  fact  that  the  Hatsuse  was  struck  twice 
— yet  this  is  what  the  moderate  dimensionists  un- 
consciously do.  They  ignore  that  big  ships  are  much 
better  fitted  to  survive  damages  which  will  assuredly 
sink  smaller  ones. 

Tsushima   occasionally  resolved  itself  into   duels. 

1  Shikishima,  Asahi,  Hatsuse  and  Mikasa — the  Mikasa  being  the 
same  as  the  other  three,  except  for  the  dispositions  of  her  secondary 
battery. 


mu~. 


THE   DIMENSIONS   OF   WAKSHIPS    301 

There  was  a  duel  between  the  heavy  Asahi  and  lighter 
Borodino,  entirely  in  the  former's  favour.  The  result 
could  not  have  been  otherwise  unless  the  Russians  had 
possessed  some  considerable  superiority  of  personnel, 
for  the  Asahi  being  heavier  was  so  much  better  fitted 
to  take  punishment.  Some  fifteen  per  cent,  heavier 
she  had  more  than  a  fifteen  per  cent,  advantage,  ship 
to  ship. 

The  most  absurd  thing,  however,  about  the  '  plea 
for  moderate  dimensions  based  on  history '  so  continually 
set  up,  is  that  only  the  shallow  thinker  can  possibly 
find  historical  warrant  for  his  ideals.  In  all  ages  the 
tendency  has  been  to  increase  size,  else  we  were  still 
in  the  stage  when  men  fought  battles  mounted  on  logs. 

We  may  go  right  back  so  far  as  Thucydides.  In 
his  opening  pages  the  great  historian  of  the  Pelopon- 
nesian  war  refers  to  the  absence  of  '  decked  vessels  '  in 
the  Athenian  fleet  and  their  gradual  introduction. 
These  '  decked  vessels  '  were  the  '  mastodons '  of  those 
days,  the  undecked  ones  '  moderate  dimensions.'  It 
was  the  former  that  came  into  general  use,  presently 
to  become  moderate  dimensions  because  triremes  ap- 
peared. In  the  Punic  wars  the  trireme  gave  place  to 
ships  with  six  or  more  banks  of  oars,  and  by  the  time 
of  Actium  ships  of  fifteen  banks  had  become  the 
standard.  These  were  defeated  by  the  smaller  ships  of 
Octavianus,  but  dimensions,  as  history  clearly  shows, 
had  nothing  to  do  with  the  matter.1  The  fitter  to  win 

1  See  chapter  on  Actium  and  Lepanto. 


302  HEEESIES   OF   SEA  POWEE 

overcame  the  opposition  of  the  mastodons,  but  it  was 
the  inferiority  of  his  personnel,  not  the  dimensions  of 
his  materiel,  that  lost  to  Antony  Actium  and  the  world. 
At  Lepanto  size  had  gone  up  again,  and  the  mastodon 
proved  itself  eminently  all-powerful  and  ideal  as  a 
fighting  machine. 

When  King  Alfred  founded  the  British  Navy  in  the 
ninth  century,  the  special  feature  of  his  galleys,  built 
to  compete  with  the  Danish  raiders,  was  that  they  were 
bigger  than  the  Danes. 

In  the  time  of  the  Crusaders,  much  of  the  Saracen 
Sea  Power  rested  on  big  dimensions.  Now  and  again, 
of  course,  these  big  ships  were  captured.  The  more 
moderate  dimensioned  ship  of  King  Eichard  himself 
captured  one,  but  owing  to  the  size  of  the  Saracen  his 
men  were  several  times  repulsed  and  only  succeeded  in 
the  end  when  the  King  assured  them  that  death  by 
torture  would  be  the  fate  of  all  if  the  Saracen  got 
away.1 

The  Harry  Grace  a  Dieu,  the  Great  Michael,  the 
Great  Harry  and  all  such  ships  were  strivings  after  the 
mastodon.  Uniformly  successful  they  were  not,  but 
they  soon  became  the  moderate  dimensions  of  a 
succeeding  age.  In  the  Spanish  Armada  the  Spanish 
mastodons  did  not  win  against  the  smaller  ships  of 
England,  but  no  thoughtful  student  can  see  in  that 
an  argument  for  moderate  dimensions.  Would  the 
Spaniards  have  won  had  the  two  sides  changed  fleets  ? 
1  See  account  of  this  fight  in  Nicholas. 


THE   DIMENSIONS   OF   WARSHIPS    303 

Assuredly  not.  They  failed  for  other  than  construc- 
tional reasons  :  their  size  indeed  helped  them  in  their 
battles  in  the  Channel,  since  relatively  little  impression 
was  made  upon  them  by  the  English  vessels.  Had 
the  galleons  been  of  moderate  dimensions  few  probably 
would  ever  have  passed  the  Straits  of  Dover. 

In  the  Nelson  era  and  thereabouts,  size  many  a  time 
proved  advantageous,  despite  the  already  stated  draw- 
backs that  the  mastodon  then  suffered  from. 

There  is,  for  instance,  the  well-known  case  of  the 
Eevolutionnaire,  110,  in  Lord  Howe's  battle  of  28th 
May,  1794.  She  was  first  engaged  by  the  Bellerophon, 
74,  for  an  hour  and  a  quarter.  She  was  then  engaged 
in  succession  by  two  other  seventy-fours,  but  survived 
all  three  attacks  of  ships  aggregating  just  double  her 
gun  fire,  coming  in  succession  against  her.  '  The  con- 
centration upon  her/  says  Captain  Mahan,  '  though 
eminently  judicious,  served  to  bring  out  vividly  the 
advantage,  which  should  never  be  forgotten,  of  one 
heavy  ship  over  several  smaller,  though  the  force  of 
the  latter  may,  in  the  aggregate  be  much  superior.' 

Again,  in  the  battle  of  Cape  St.  Vincent,  the 
Santissima  Trinidad,  130,  though  she  bore  the  brunt 
of  the  British  attack,  was  neither  captured  nor  destroyed 
in  the  defeat  sustained  by  the  Spanish  Fleet.  Her 
dimensions  saved  her. 

The  teaching  of  history,  therefore,  is  surely  that, 
though  men  in  ships  of  moderate  dimensions  have 
succeeded  at  times,  in  defeating  men  in  big  ships,  the 


304  HEEESIES   OF   SEA  POWEK 

fact  of  big  opponents  has  always  rendered  their  victory 
more  difficult,  and  at  times  half  neutralised  it.  Nelson's 
'  Only  numbers  can  annihilate '  surely  meant  very  clearly 
'  Since  the  bulk  of  available  ships  are  of  moderate  size 
there  must  be  plenty  of  them  to  secure  victory,'  or  more 
baldly  still,  '  Since  you  cannot  give  me  quality,  give  me 
quantity.' 

Those  who  wish  to  do  so  will  always  go  on  seeing 
in  the  victory  of  the  Japanese  ships  at  Yalu  a  triumph 
for  moderate  dimensions  in  modern  days ;  but  the 
thoughtful  will  remark  the  defects  of  personnel, 
ammunition  and  leadership  from  which  the  Chinese 
suffered,  and  remember,  too,  that  the  big  battleships 
held  out  to  the  end  of  the  day  and  covered  the  retreat 
of  the  beaten  Chinese.  Also  that  the  Japanese  sub- 
sequently ordered  mastodon  battleships  in  preparing 
for  the  war  with  Kussia,  though  advised  not  to  by  all 
the  advocates  of  moderate  dimensions.  The  Kussians, 
on  the  other  hand,  went  in  for  moderate  dimensions. 

Of  the  mastodons,  and  the  modern  trend  towards 
having  nothing  but  monster  ships  with  quite  small 
auxiliaries ;  history  can  say  nothing  except  that  to 
strive  after  the  mastodon  has  been  the  invariable 
tendency;  though  in  all  ages  there  have  been  those 
whose  voices  have  been  raised  against  it.  When  ships 
were  of  100  tons  there  were  many  who  advocated  75 
instead;  just  as  when  in  the  future  100,000  tons 
is  reached  there  will  be  men  to  argue  for  75,000 
tons.  In  dimensions  there  is  no  finality,  to  plead  for 


THE   DIMENSIONS  OF  WAESHIPS    305 

moderation  can,  therefore,  hardly  be  logical,  since  in 
essence  it  resolves  itself  into  an  attempt  to  hold  back 
the  clock  of  time.  As  science  progresses,  so  will  de- 
mands upon  dimensions  increase,  the  best  offence  and  the 
best  defence  must  ever  demand  more  and  more  bulk  to 
carry  them.  Moderation  is,  therefore,  of  the  nature  of 
a  handicap,  which  certain  excellencies  of  personnel  have 
to  be  used  to  overcome. 

The  application  of  this  question  of  dimensions  to 
the  future  is  important ;  though  in  all  ages,  till  quite 
recently,  the  tendency  has  been  to  overlook  the  point. 
Thus  the  dimensions  of  big  ships  have  been  kept  down 
by  the  fact  that  docks  have  always  been  built  for  the 
present  rather  than  for  the  future.  The  docks  initiated 
in  the  twentieth  century  have  been  more  wisely  planned : 
allowances  for  increased  dimensions  in  the  future  have 
been  made,  and  so  the  prohibitive  expense  against 
normal  increase  will  no  longer  exist  so  acutely  as  in 
the  past. 

A  very  few  feet  of  beam  added  to  the  plans  of  any 
existing  ' mighty  cruiser'  would  give  a  battleship  of 
at  least  30,000  tons,  therefore,  it  may  confidently  be 
expected  that  30,000  tons  will  come  in  a  few  years. 
Such  a  size  might  well  be  nearly  torpedo  proof,  it 
would  certainly  admit  of  an  armament  capable  of 
blowing  any  present  day  18,000-ton  ship  out  of  the 
water,  certainly  render  the  mastodon  difficult  to  injure 
by  any  gun  now  existing.  There  have  been  those  who 
have  foreseen  the  advent  of  explosives  so  powerful  that 

x 


306  HEEESIES   OF   SEA  POWER 

a  single  hit  will  be  decisive  and  from  this  they  hai 
argued  that  a  return  to  small  units  is  bound  to  come 
Temporarily  such  a  thing  is  in  the  possibilities,  but  tl 
chances   are  against  it ;  the  immunity  of  sufficient 
large  dimensions  will  always  be  obvious  and,  therefor 
probably  always  be  sought  in  the  future  as  in  the  pas 
Constructional   problems   grow   less  and  less  serioi] 
only  those  connected  with  seamanship  and  so  forl 
promise   to  remain.     These,   in   matters    relating 
draught,  may  possibly  remain  constant,  but  this  is 
no  way  certain,  since   all   objections  as  to   increas< 
draught   limiting  utility  are  to  be  met  by  an  appe 
to  history.     In  ancient  times  six-foot  draught   or 
represented  fche   utmost  possible  maximum ;    mode: 
navies,    though    they  have    multiplied    this    by    fh 
are  still   quite  suitable  to  their  environments.     It 
rash,   therefore,   to   assume    limits    in   this    directic 
just   because   such   limitations  most   naturally   occ 
to  us. 

In  any  case  length  and  beam  admit  of  gre 
expansion  without  much  difficulty ;  increased  bu 
must,  therefore,  be  looked  for  as  a  factor  in  tl 
natural  order  of  things.  Economy  acts  as  a  drag  a] 
a  retarder  of  increase,  but  size  will  obviously  go  < 
expanding.  Whence  the  only  logical  course  of  eai 
and  every  Admiralty  seeking  sea  dominion,  is  to  bui 
every  new  warship  a  little  larger  and  consequently 
little  more  powerful  than  its  possible  opponents. 
1  The  Maxims  have  been  associated  with  such  a  theory. 


THE   DIMENSIONS   OF   WAKSHIPS    307 

cannot  cry  a  halt  and  adhere  to  moderate  dimensions 
without  giving  hostages  to  fortune. 

The  best  known  modern  examples  of  moderate 
dimensions  are  the  Swiftsure  and  Triumph  of  12,000 
tons  odd.  Designed  about  the  same  time  were  the 
Lord  Nelsons  of  16,760  tons,  so  that  approximately 
seven  of  the  former  could  be  built  for  the  tonnage 
(not  the  cost)  of  five  of  the  latter.  Let  us  compare 
the  total  of  guns.  We  get : — 

5  Nelsons  1  Swiftsures 

20  12-inch.  28  10-inch. 

50  9-2-inch.  98  7'5-inch. 

12-inch  belts.  7-inch  belts. 

On  the  question  of  attack  all  the  power  is  with  the 
five,  the  seven  have  numbers  only.  In  defence  the 
five  are  practically  invulnerable  at  the  water  line,  the 
seven  are  vulnerable  at  almost  any  range.  What 
chance  is  theirs  ?  The  only  possible  chances  reside 
in  extremely  superior  personnel  (a  matter  outside 
dimensions)  and  the  chance  of  using  the  extra  torpedo 
tubes,1  which  would  hardly  be  theirs  except  by  virtue 
of  luck  and  very  superior  handling.  Is  not  this  but 
a  way  of  saying  that  to  advocate  relatively  moderate 
dimensions  is  to  advocate  leaving  everything  to  luck  ? 

It  is  argued,  of  course,  that  whereas  five  successful 
torpedoes  would  annihilate  the  one  squadron  they 
would  leave  two  ships  afloat  in  the  other.  This  is  so : 

1  The  larger  dimensions  of  the  Lord  Nelsons  would  also  easily  admit 
of  fitting  more  torpedo  tubes  if  deemed  necessary. 

x  2 


308  HEEESIES   OF   SEA  POWEK 

but  the  constructional  error  would  rather  be  of  too 
little  bulk  than  too  much — in  sufficient  bulk  protection 
against  the  torpedo  is  certainly  to  be  found.  Also, 
since  no  weapon  is  without  its  antidote,  the  argument 
is  to  be  met  by  the  statement  that  if  the  Lord  Nelsons 
are  to  be  so  disposed  of,  it  simply  means  that  the 
antidote  has  not  been  sufficiently  sought  for  in  them. 
At  the  same  time  this  is  undoubtedly  the  strongest 
argument  advanced  by  the  'moderate  dimensionists,' 
and  one  that  would  demand  more  examination  were  it 
possible  to  believe  that  five  or  six  medium  ships  would 
ever  be  built  instead  of  four  larger  ones.  The  money 
for  building  ships  is  found  by  a  public  which  reckons 
battleships  by  numbers  and  by  numbers  only,  and  in 
these  days  when  powerful  voices  cry  out  against 
'  bloated  armaments '  it  would  be  very  difficult  to 
secure  sanction  for  the  additional  ships  necessary  to 
produce  the  same  tonnage  total  as  the  four  large  ones. 
This  particular  point  is  one  generally  overlooked, 
but  it  is  going  to  be  an  extremely  important  one  in  the 
future,  as  Members  of  Parliament  prepared  to  argue 
against  the  vote  for  New  British  Construction  increase. 
In  the  United  States  men  with  similar  ideas  have 
arisen  also.  These  advocates  of  economy  have  one 
invariable  method :  they  take  the  number  of  battle- 
ships existing  (without  regard  to  age  or  size)  and 
therefrom  deduce  that  the  need  for  increase  in  numbers 
is  comparatively  small.  Their  arguments  are  directed 
on  those  who  hold  the  national  purse  strings,  and  in 


THE  DIMENSIONS  OF  WAKSHIPS    309 

the  United  States  they  already  carry  enough  weight  to 
have,  once  at  least  already,  reduced  the  number  of 
ships  to  be  built.  The  direct  result  of  such  influences 
must  be  a  desire  on  the  part  of  those  responsible  for 
naval  construction  to  embody  the  maximum  of  power 
in  each  unit.  Such  a  policy  will  tend  to  increase 
dimensions  rapidly,  and  render  abortive  any  attempt 
at  the  building  of  medium-sized  ships,  even  could  the 
advantages  of  so  many  small  and  relatively  weak  units 
be  proved. 


IV 

THE  EVOLUTION  OF  THE  BATTLESHIP 

IN  a  previous  chapter  reference  has  been  made  to 
the  tendency  of  navies  to  evolve  themselves  in  cycles. 
A  similar  tendency  is  to  be  found  in  warships  besides 
their  eternal  tendency  to  increase  in  dimensions.  It 
is  the  cycle  tendency  which  retards  that  increase  in 
dimensions  which  would  otherwise  probably  be  swifter 
than  it  is. 

Old-time  navies  are  not  of  much  interest  in  this 
connection  :  the  principle  involved  is  also  better  to  be 
seen  in  the  warships  of  the  last  forty  years  or  so. 

The  first  warship  that  belonged  distinctly  to  the 
present  era  was  the  American  Monitor.  She  embodied 
an  absolutely  new  principle :  the  employment  of  a  few 
of  the  heaviest  possible  guns  against  a  larger  number 
of  lesser  pieces.  She  also  embodied  an  attempt  at 
invulnerability  as  opposed  to  partial  armour  protection. 
Another  integral  idea  may  be  said  to  have  been  the 
employment  of  all  the  guns  on  either  side  instead  of 
having  only  half  the  guns  available  for  use  against  any 
one  target  at  any  given  moment. 


.  I 
:  J 


• 


EVOLUTION   OF  THE   BATTLESHIP  311 

Here  it  may  be  observed  that  all  the  old  wooden 
battleships  were  in  a  sense  *  armoured.'  Specially 
thick  sides  were  employed  for  the  specific  purpose  of 
keeping  out  projectiles,  and  it  was  rare  for  harm  to 
be  done  save  by  shots  that  entered  portholes.  The 
Crimean  floating  batteries  and  the  early  broadside 
ironclads  like  the  Gloire  and  Warrior  were  lineal 
descendants  of  the  steam  line  of  battleships  that  pre- 
ceded them.  They  were  built  of  iron  instead  of  wood 


FRENCH  FLOATING  BATTERY  IN  THE  CRIMEAN  WAR. 
(Contemporary  print.) 

and  so  had  iron  instead  of  wood  armour  (their  armour 
being  nothing  but  an  increased  thickness  of  the  side, 
with  wood  backing). 

The  Monitor  was  not  in  any  way  a  lineal  evolution 
of  past  efforts.  She  was  not  a  new  idea  in  the  matter 
of  years,  because  so  far  back  as  the  Crimean  War, 
Ericsson,  her  inventor,  had  submitted  plans  of  her  to 
the  French  Emperor.  At  the  same  period  Captain 
Cowper  Coles  of  the  British  Navy  actually  produced 
a  raft  which  carried  on  it  a  species  of  turret,  and  in 
I860  he  had  lectured  at  the  Koyal  United  Service 


312  HEEESIES   OF   SEA  POWEK 

Institution  upon  a  proposed  '  cupola  ship.'  This  ship 
was  to  carry  no  less  than  nine  turrets  each  with  a  pair 
of  guns  in  them.  Ericsson's  idea  was  not  made  public 
till  a  year  later. 

Each  has  been  accused  of  plagiarising  the  other, 
and  Coles  especially  has  been  so  attacked  ;  but  pro- 
bably each  was  working  ignorant  of  the  other.  A 
quite  novel  idea,  it  has  been  noticed,  usually  occurs 
to  two  or  three  different  people  about  the  same  time. 
Not,  however,  that  the  turret,  except  qua  turret,  was 
an  absolutely  novel  notion,  because  the  *  swivel  gun  ' 
and  the  '  pivot  gun  '  were  existing  ideas  ;  and  so  long 
ago  as  the  sixteenth  century  something  of  the  nature 
of  a  turret  had  been  proposed.  Coles  and  Ericsson 
were,  however,  the  first  to  build  turret  ships.  The 
American  Civil  War  gave  Ericsson  the  benefit  of 
a  battle  test  and  the  resulting  advertisement. 

The  Monitor  quickly  developed  into  the  double 
turret  ship  with  four  heavy  guns  and  there — so  far  as 
America  was  concerned — progress  ceased.  Improve- 
ments in  detail  were  effected,  but  no  further  advance 
was  made  in  the  direction  of  evolution  of  the  original 
idea. 

The  British  at  the  time  of  the  Monitor  were 
building  broadside  ironclads  armed  with  medium  guns 
of  only  12^  tons,  but  large  numbers  of  these  guns 
in  each  ship.  At  the  same  time,  however,  there  was 
evolved  a  vessel  which  in  many  ways  was  nearly  forty 
years  ahead  of  her  time. 


EVOLUTION   OF  THE  BATTLESHIP   313 

This  was  the  Koyal  Sovereign  completed  in  1864, 
an  old  three  decker  turned  into  a  turret  ship.  Being 
a  comparatively  small  and  experimental  vessel  she 
only  carried  guns  of  12^  tons,  but  none  the  less  one 
general  idea  embodied  in  her  was  not  touched  again 
till  the  Dreadnought  was  designed  in  1904-05. 

The  Koyal  Sovereign  had  no  less  than  four  turrets, 
all  in  the  centre  line.  The  foremost  turret  carried  two 


THE  OLD  TUBRET  SHIP  KOYAL  SOVEREIGN.    (From  a  contemporary 
print  in  l  UArt,  Naval.') 


guns,  the  others  only  carried  a  single  gun ;  so  she  was 
a  long  way  behind  Captain  Coles's  ideal  of  1860  ;  but 
still  the  '  ideal '  remained  an  ideal,  whereas  here  was 
a  ship  actually  built  able  to  use  all  her  guns  on  either 
broadside,  in  other  words  representing  the  ideal  maxi- 
mum of  broadside  power  for  the  power  available.  It 
was  always  obvious  that  all  her  guns  could  be  paired . 
About  the  same  time  the  four-turreted  Prince  Albert 
was  built.  From  the  1860-64  Eoyal  Sovereign  design 
to  the  1904-05  Dreadnought  design  is  not  a  very  great 


314  HEBESIES  OF   SEA  POWEB 

step.  An  evolved  Royal  Sovereign  would  have  pro- 
duced something  very  akin  to  the  Dreadnought  in 
quite  a  few  years. 

The  idea,  however,  was  not  evolved  for  forty  years. 
The  Monarch  and  Captain,  masted  turret  ships,  were 
produced,  and  finally  the  Devastation,  which  was  the 
original  Monitor  idealised  to  the  full.  No  vessel  so 
perfectly  adapted  to  the  battle  conditions  of  the  day 
had  ever  been  conceived. 

Meanwhile,  everywhere  the  masted  broadside  battle- 
ship, the  evolution  of  the  old  wooden  ships,  continued 
to  be  built.  In  some,  as  in  the  Sultan  and  the  later 
Alexandra,  two  decks  of  guns  were  frankly  adopted 
and  probably  only  a  change  in  fashion  prevented 
three  decks  from  coming  in,1  once  that  the  central  box- 
battery  of  limited  extent  became  the  custom.  The 
question  as  to  whether  it  were  better  to  build  ships 
carrying  a  few  of  the  heaviest  available  guns  or 
ships  carrying  a  larger  number  of  lesser  pieces  was 
left  quite  undetermined  by  the  construction  of  both 
types. 

The  principal  naval  powers  of  the  period  1870- 
1880  were  England,  France,  Turkey,  Spain,  Eussia 
and  to  a  mild  extent  Germany. 

Of  these  France  displayed  the  most  originality. 
She  never  attempted  any  imitation  of  the  British 
Devastation,  but  evolved  a  way  of  carrying  the  heaviest 

1  The  Alexandra,  at  the  time  she  finished  her  career,  was  a  three- 
decker,  as  4-inch  quick-firers  were  mounted  above  the  double  battery. 


EVOLUTION   OF   THE   BATTLESHIP   315 

guns  in  broadside  ships.  The  heavy  gun  stood  for 
everything  in  those  days.  In  the  Amiral  Baudin  and 
Devastation  types  France  mounted  heavy  guns  in 
small  barbettes,  carried  high  up  for  the  express  pur- 
pose of  being  used  in  all  weathers  and  for  a  plunging 
fire  on  to  the  decks  of  ships  of  lesser  freeboard.  She 
also  mounted  in  the  Baudin  a  number  of  small  guns, 
for  no  more  definite  reason  apparently  than  that  space 
chanced  to  be  available  for  them,  because  at  the  date  of 
her  design,  1872  or  before,  there  were  none  of  those 
ships  with  huge  unarmoured  areas  such  as  became  so 
conspicuous  later  on. 

Turkey  purchased  broadside  or  box-battery  iron- 
clads in  England,  so  also  did  Germany.  Originality 
was  only  to  be  found  in  Russia,  where  the  amateur 
spirit  of  imitation  led  to  the  building  of  some  coast 
defenders  with  three  turrets,  and  then,  towards  the  end 
of  the  period  were  designed  some  distinct  improvements 
upon  past  efforts  in  the  Tchesma  class,  with  six  heavy 
guns  as  the  main  armament.  These  vessels  took  so 
long  to  build  and  were  begun  so  long  after  their  con- 
ception that  they  never  attracted  the  attention  that 
they  deserved.  The  earliest  of  them  was  not  com- 
menced till  1883,  but  the  design  is  believed  to  date 
from  1880  or  before. 

Italy  took  to  the  turret  ship,  and  vied  with  Eng- 
land in  building  vessels  which,  while  nominally  im- 
provements upon  the  Devastation,  really  fell  away 
from  that  ideal  except  for  their  more  powerful  guns. 


316  HEKESIES   OF   SEA  POWEK 

It  was  the  day  of  big  guns :  Italy  ran  to  100  tons, 
England  to  81  tons,  and  France  to  75 — all  pieces  of  16 
to  17  inch  calibre. 

The  situation  was  thus : — 

(1)  France  mounting  a  number  of  small  guns  in 
addition  to  the  heavy  pieces,  in  high  freeboard  ships. 

(2)  England  and  Italy  concentrating  armour  amid- 
ships in  low  freeboard  vessels  with  unarmoured  ends 
after  France  had  adopted  the  secondary  battery. 

(3)  Russia,  the  amateur  of  all  naval  constructing 
nations,  evolving  a  type  that  foreshadowed  the  Dread- 
nought of  1904-5. 

(4)  Other  nations  marking  time  or  copying  more  or 
less  obsolete  plans. 

Then,  suddenly,  Italy  startled  the  world  with  the 
Italia,  designed  about  1877-78,  an  enormous  vessel 
without  any  side  armour  whatever,  with  the  four  most 
powerful  guns  in  existence  and  speed  as  a  tactical 
feature  of  the  design — a  cruiser  with  a  battleship's 
armament. 

No  nation  followed  up  the  idea,  though  England  in 
the  Collingwood  has  been  accused  of  exaggerating  its 
defects  without  securing  its  advantages. 

The  ease  with  which  the  Italia's  unarmoured  sides 
could  be  attacked  by  small  guns  was  so  obvious  that 
the  small  gun  immediately  began  to  have  a  universal 
vogue.  Though  British  design  reverted  to  the  Devas- 
tation idea  in  the  Victoria  and  Trafalgar,  both  designs 
had  small  guns  as  a  feature  and  the  cult  of  the  quick- 


EVOLUTION   OF  THE   BATTLESHIP  317 

firer  of  six  inches  or  thereabouts  was  supreme  for  the 
rest  of  the  century. 

France  in  1889  laid  down  the  Brennus  which  was 
really  a  Trafalgar  of  higher  freeboard ;  and  Germany 
in  1890,  as  the  '  blundering  amateur,'  laid  down  four 
Brandenburgs,  ships  with  six  big  guns  and  no  secondary 
armament  worth  the  mention.  Both  types  were  regarded 
unfavourably,  and  the  Brandenburg  with  her  six 
heavy  guns  was  more  or  less  an  object  of  derision  —so 
derided  that  Germany  followed  with  a  type  of  ship  in 
which  everything  was  sacrificed  to  a  huge  quick-firing 
armament.  England  alive  to  the  dangers  of  low  free- 
board evolved  the  present  Koyal  Sovereign  type  about 
1889 — ships  which  when  all  is  said  and  done  were  no- 
thing but  large  Devastations,  more  built  up  and  carry- 
ing ten  secondary  guns  for  which  the  Devastation's 
armoured  ends  were  sacrificed. 

The  Majesties  differed  by  embodying  a  wide  belt  of 
medium  thickness  amidships  instead  of  a  narrow  thick 
one.  More  protection  was  introduced  for  the  quick- 
firers,  which  were  advanced  to  a  dozen,  and  right  away 
on  to  the  Queen,  Majesties  were  built  without  any 
radical  change  beyond  the  introduction  of  a  mild  belt 
forward. 

Every  nation  copied  the  1889  Eoyal  Sovereign  idea 
in  its  own  way.  France  did  so  by  keeping  the  belt 
complete,  but  otherwise  adhered  to  the  idea  of  a  couple 
of  heavy  guns  fore  and  aft  and  small  secondary  guns 
in  between, 


318  HEEESIES   OF   SEA  POWER 

The  United  States,  just  beginning  to  build  sea- 
going ships,  did  at  first  succeed  in  evolving  a  novelty  in 
the  Indiana,  an  effort  after  carrying  something  better 
than  the  four  heavy  and  many  light  guns.  Intermedi- 
ate guns  were  mounted,  but  the  idea  was  not  developed 
and  subsequently  American  versions  of  the  Majestic 
were  built.  Germany  like  America  preferred  a  con- 
tinuous battery  to  casemates  for  the  secondary  guns, 
but  the  likeness  between  the  Majestic,  Wittelsbach, 
Alabama  and  Maine  is  very  clear.  France  after  some 
experiments  with  guns  mounted  singly  in  lozenge 
formation  reverted  to  that  Brennus  idea  which  fore- 
shadowed the  Majestic,  and  the  Suffren  is  little  but  the 
Majestic  with  a  complete  waterline  belt.  In  every 
ship  it  is  only  the  Devastation  with  higher  sides 
and  a  number  of  little  guns  added,  and  as  a  rule  the 
less  the  likeness  to  the  Devastation  the  poorer  the 
ship. 

At  the  end  of  the  century  the  6-inch  gun  was  para- 
mount ;  and  Yalu,  in  the  Chino- Japanese  war,  was 
proved  (as  all  battles  usually  are)  to  indicate  the  ex- 
cellence of  current  ideas.  Only  the  more  or  less 
amateur  designs  of  America  showed  a  hankering  for 
some  secondary  gun  superior  to  the  6-inch.  The  8-inch 
returned  to  American  ships  and  Italy  copied  in  the 
Benedetto  Brin  the  idea  of  three  calibres.  So  did  the 
British  in  the  King  Edward,  which  as  originally 
designed  was  intended  to  carry  four  12-inch,  eight  7*5- 
and  ten  6 -inch.  The  7*5  were  to  be  paired  in  turrets 


EVOLUTION   OF  THE  BATTLESHIP   319 

replacing  the  upper  deck  casemates  of  the  Majestic, 
though  at  a  later  stage  of  construction  a  9-2  was  put  in 
place  of  each  pair  of  7 -5.  Italy  and  Germany  evolved 
ships  with  something  heavier  than  the  6-inch  as 
secondary  gun,  while  France  reverted  to  her  early 
ideas  and  in  the  Kepublique  produced  a  ship  with  all 
guns  high  up  as  the  main  feature. 

When  the  King  Edward  was  laid  down  the  6-inch 
fetish  was  well  under  suspicion,  and  the  Lord  Nelson 
type  was  evolved  as  a  King  Edward  without  any  6-inch 
and  with  more  9*2  on  the  deck  above. 

The  conception  of  a  ship  with  nothing  but  12-inch 
guns  belongs  to  Colonel  Cuniberti,  the  distinguished 
Italian  naval  architect,  who  in  1903  aroused  a  certain 
amount  of  derision  and  a  good  deal  of  suspicion  as  to 
flightiness  by  his  '  Ideal  Battleship  for  the  British 
Navy  '—published  in  '  Fighting  Ships '  of  1903.  This 
ship  was  of  17,000  tons,  carried  twelve  12-inch  guns, 
had  a  12-inch  belt  and  24-knot  speed.  She  was  an 
enlarged  Vittor  Emanuele.  The  following  year  (1904) 
some  Italian  officer  writing  in  the  *  Eivista  Marittima ' 
discussed  the  idea  and  suggested  that  to  be  fully 
efficient  the  ship  should  abandon  the  old  idea  of  some 
guns  firing  on  one  side  only.  The  Cuniberti  ship  bore 
seven  12-inch  of  her  twelve  on  the  broadside.  The 
Italian  officer  suggested  four  turrets  in  the  line  of  keel — 
the  oldKoyal  Sovereign  and  Prince  Albert  idea.  He  put 
two  guns  in  each,  and — to  keep  the  turrets  small — 
placed  one  gun  on  top  of  another,  it  being  apparently 


320  HEEESIES  OF   SEA  POWEK 

impossible  to  squeeze  the  four  turrets  in  in  any  other 
way. 

Early  in  1904  came  the  Kusso- Japanese  war  and 
the  swift  discovery  that  only  big  guns  were  of  much 
use  in  war.  All  nations  at  once  abandoned  the  small 
gun  idea  (it  is  to  be  noted  that  they  had  begun  to  do 
so  before  the  war  began).  The  first  new  type  warship 
to  be  laid  down  was  the  British  Dreadnought— 
practically  the  old  Kussian  idea  of  the  Tchesma  with  a 
couple  of  extra  big  gun  positions  fore  and  aft  in  place 
of  the  Tchesma's  secondary  pieces.  A  bit  of  the 
Brandenburg  may  also  be  found  in  her. 

The  Dreadnought  era  marks  the  first  real  step 
(except  isolated  efforts)  since  the  Devastation.  Naval 
architects  beyond  taking  advantage  of  improved  guns, 
armour  and  speed  had  been  working  back  while 
seeming  to  go  forward,  or  rather  they  have  now 
returned  to  the  main  line  from  which  they  had  been 
diverted. 

At  the  end  of  1905  all  nations  were  preparing  to 
lay  down  Dreadnoughts,  ships  easily  able  to  sweep  the 
seas  of  earlier  models. 

Eventually  no  doubt  the  Dreadnoughts  will  pass 
before  some  type  of  ship  (probably  a  Devastation) 
carrying  infinitely  heavier  guns  than  obtain  to-day  and 
therefore  fewer  of  them.  And  then,  presently,  by  dint 
of  increases  in  dimensions  the  old  cycle  will  be  worked 
out  again. 


V 

'  FITNESS   TO  WIN 

IN  concluding  this  book  some  definition  of  '  Fitness  to 
Win  '  should  perhaps  be  attempted,  though  it  must  be 
confessed  that  it  is  a  singularly  elusive  thing  to  define. 
So  elusive  indeed,  that  it  was  originally  intended  not  to 
make  the  attempt, 'but  to  leave  it  at  that  vague  con- 
ception which  most  of  us  hold  of  the  qualities  entailed. 
This,  however,  is  hardly  satisfactory,  consequently  an 
attempt  is  here  made,  if  not  to  define  very  exactly 
what  it  is,  at  least  to  indicate  to  some  extent  what  it  is 
not. 

It  has  been  shown  throughout  this  work  that  in 
every  war  almost  the  only  solid  fact  common  to  all  is 
that  '  the  fittest  to  win '  were  the  eventual  victors.  It 
has  been  shown  that  these  victors  often  lacked  technical 
skill  equal  to  that  of  their  opponents,  or  were  tactically 
inferior,  strategically  inferior,  or  had  not  such  good 
ships  or  weapons.  But  they  always  had  the  '  fitness 
to  win'  quality  which  made  up  for  every  other 
deficiency  and  brought  certain  victory  at  the  last. 
The  *  fittest  to  win '  have  never  gone  under  before 
superior  materiel  or  before  superior  weapons. 

Y 


322  HEEESIES   OF   SEA  POWEE 

Sometimes,  as  in  the  case  of  the  Bomans  against 
the  Carthaginians,  their  original  deficiencies  in  matSriel 
have  been  enormous ;  sometimes,  as  in  the  case  of  the 
Japanese  against  the  Eussians,  they  have  started  with 
a  superiority  (more  or  less)  in  materiel,  but  the  eternal 
verity  of  '  fitness  to  win '  is  at  once  obvious  if  we 
imagine  sides  to  have  been  changed.  We  can  be  quite 
sure  that  the  Russians  would  never  have  won,  would 
never  have  had  any  more  success,  had  they  changed 
fleets  and  positions  with  the  Japanese.  We  can 
produce  nothing  to  show  that  the  invasion  of  Korea 
would  not  then  have  been  the  invasion  of  Japan,  and  the 
siege  of  Port  Arthur  the  siege  of  Sassebo,  and  the 
voyage  of  the  (Japanese  manned)  Baltic  Fleet  one  long 
demonstration  of  the  *  silent  resistless  pressure  of  Sea 
Power.'  This  we  know,  because  with  the  best  will  in 
the  world  we  cannot  logically  conceive  of  any  other 
result.  But  if  we  ask  ourselves  Why?  we  certainly 
cannot  give  a  clear  and  direct  answer,  we  can  do  little 
if  anything  more  than  answer  '  Because  the  Japanese 
were  Japanese — because  the  Russians  were  Eussians.' 

Allowing  that ;  can  we  draw  any  real  lessons  of 
value  from  what  the  Japanese  did  with  Japanese 
ships  ?  As  suggested  in  an  earlier  chapter,  if  Togo 
and  his  men  had  changed  fleets  and  positions  with 
Eogestvensky  and  his  men  the  lessons  of  Tsushima 
would  be  the  exact  opposite  of  what  they  now  are ;  and 
in  similar  case  the  lessons  of  Trafalgar.  No  one  can 
prove  this  logically,  but  no  one  is  likely  to  try  to 


1  FITNESS   TO  WIN'  323 

prove  it  otherwise.  It  might  indeed  be  argued  that 
Togo  would  never  have  been  caught  in  the  formation 
in  which  Rogestvensky  was  discovered,  but  this  is  not 
easy  to  prove.  Rogestvensky's  formation,  supposing 
(as  there  is  every  reason  to  suppose)  that  he  expected 
torpedo  attack  only,  was  not  a  bad  formation  at  all  and 
it  is  not  easy  to  conceive  of  Togo,  with  Eogestvensky's 
general  orders  and  with  Rogestvensky's  special  problems 
to  be  solved,  doing  anything  very  materially  different 
up  to  the  hour  of  battle. 

Yet  we  cannot  conceive  of  his  losing  the  fight, 
simply  because  we  cannot  throw  away  our  conception 
of  Japan  as  the  'fittest  to  win.'  We  can  arrive  at  that 
conclusion  in  two  ways — 

(1)  By   an  unprejudiced  study  of   all   past  naval 
history. 

(2)  By  the   mere  exercise   of   ordinary   common- 
sense. 

And  so  with  any  other  war.  While  a  war  is 
actually  in  progress  we  frequently  see  a  dozen  reasons 
why  the  losing  side  '  might  win.'  Every  careful 
student  saw  ways  in  which  on  paper  Rogestvensky 
and  the  Baltic  Fleet  might  possibly  win.  It  is  often 
impossible  while  a  war  is  in  progress  to  estimate  the 
'  fitness  to  win  '  factor  correctly—  in  part,  because  it  is 
so  intangible  a  thing  even  at  the  clearest — in  part, 
because  it  involves  qualities  that  only  war  brings  to  a 
head. 

Now  as  to  these  qualities.     A  crude  desire  to  'kill 

Y  2 


324  HEEESIES   OF   SEA  POWEE 

the  enemy '  seems  ever  to  have  been  a  most  valuable 
asset.  Nelson,  when  he  said  that  a  good  English 
officer  should  *  hate  a  Frenchman  like  the  devil '  was 
very  crude,  but  very  far-seeing.  However  shocking 
ethically,  to  hate  the  enemy  with  a  living  personal 
hatred  is  undoubtedly  a  most  valuable  practical  asset. 

The  Japanese  had  this  quality  to  a  marked  degree 
in  the  war  with  Kussia — to  kill  Eussians  was  perhaps 
the  main  objective  present  to  every  man  of  them. 
The  Eussians  undoubtedly  disliked  the  Japanese,  but 
the  very  contempt  for  the  Japanese  affected  by 
Eussian  officers  prevented  them  from  hating  properly. 
As  for  the  Eussian  men,  there  are  no  indications  that 
they  hated  the  Japanese  at  all.  They  tried  (very 
ineffectually  as  a  rule)  to  kill  them  when  ordered  to, 
but  there  the  matter  ended.  The  Japanese  tried  to 
kill  with  a  definite  object,  and  the  whole  Japanese 
nation  was  behind  them  urging  to  kill. 

An  instance  of  the  value  of  the  killing  spirit  is  to 
found  in  the  South  African  War,  which  would  pro- 
bably have  ended  in  a  compromise  had  there  been  no 
Majuba  before  it.  Some  genius  raised  the  *  Eemember 
Majuba  '  cry  and  created  a  bloodthirstiness  that  had 
previously  been  lacking.  The  cry  was  greatly  deplored 
by  arm-chair  moralists,  but  it  won  the  war.  The 
memories  of  I6na,  so  carefully  worked  up  in  Germany, 
probably  stood  the  Prussians  in  as  good  stead  as  any 
of  the  dispositions  of  the  great  Moltke;  he  might 
plan,  but  the  factor  of  Prussian  hate  and  desire  for 


'FITNESS  TO   WIN'  325 

vengeance  was  most  valuable  in  the  carrying  out  of 
his  designs.  If  France  ever  beats  Germany  in  the 
future  la  revanche  will  go  further  than  any  military 
genius.  What  Nelson  did  with  hate  we  know,  though 
we  seek  the  secret  of  his  genius  in  other  and  more 
showy  qualities.  It  is  easier  and  pleasanter  to  rouse 
admiration  for  his  tactical  and  strategical  qualities,  or 
sentiment  over  Lady  Hamilton,  than  to  lay  a  finger 
on  that  crude  elemental  quality  of  hate  and  desire  to 
kill  the  enemy. 

To  go  further  back — back  to  perhaps  the  very 
greatest  man  who  ever  lived — Hannibal.  Hannibal 
was  reared  from  early  childhood  to  hate  the  Eoman 
with  all  his  strength.  In  the  power  of  that  hate,  over 
obstacles  and  difficulties  of  the  most  tremendous 
nature,  Hannibal  marched  to  the  ruin  of  Kome  and 
never  met  with  failure  till  the  attractions  of  a  petticoat 
swamped  the  single-mindedness  of  his  hate,  and  he 
was  no  longer  able  to  infuse  into  his  legions  the  desire 
to  kill  the  enemy  as  the  mainspring  of  their  action. 

Capua  spelt  ruin  to  Hannibal  and  his  army.  Had 
Lady  Hamilton  been  an  ordinary  woman  there  is  little 
doubt  that  Trafalgar  might  not  have  been.  It  chanced 
that  she  was  a  woman  of  far-seeing  ambition — perhaps 
the  story  of  Capua  was  not  unknown  to  her  and  she 
had  the  brain  to  read  its  lessons.  In  any  case  she 
never  came  between  Nelson  and  his  fervent  desire  to  kill 
the  enemy,  but  had  the  wit  to  accentuate  it.  Those 
'  services  to  the  country '  in  connection  with  which 


326  HEEESIES   OF   SEA  POWEK 

her  claim  was  so  scornfully  denied  were  greater 
perhaps  than  has  yet  been  realised;  certainly  she 
was  better  able  to  have  prevented  Trafalgar  than 
Villeneuve.  Scores  of  books  have  been  written  on 
the  strategies  and  tactics  of  the  Trafalgar  campaign, 
scores  of  lessons  have  been  drawn  therefrom,  yet 
never  a  one  has  sought  to  pierce  through  the  tactical 
embroidery  and  see  that  the  Trafalgar  campaign 
resulted  as  it  did,  because  a  clever  woman  accen- 
tuated instead  of  diminished  Nelson's  fitness  to  win 
and  through  Nelson  the  fitness  to  win  of  the  British 
Navy. 

It  is  probable  that  Fitness  to  Win  embodies  little 
else  besides  the  fixed  desire  to  kill  the  enemy.  Good 
seamanship,  good  gunnery,  good  torpedo,  good  en- 
gineering— all  these  things  may  aid  it,  but  apparently 
all  are  not  absolutely  essential.  If  essential,  or  in 
so  far  as  they  are  essential,  the  desire  to  kill  the 
enemy  will  produce  them.  If  good  gunnery  be  essen- 
tial to  fitness  to  win,  the  fittest  to  win  will  of  necessity 
be  good  practical  gunners,  compelled  thereto  by  instinct, 
though  good  gunnery  will  not  of  itself  make  them  fit 
to  win.  Russian  target  practice,  before  the  war  was 
as  good  as  or  better  than  the  Japanese. 

For  instance,  a  few  years  before  the  war  Russian 
gunners  trained  by  Admiral  Eogestvensky  fired  under 
weigh  at  12  knots  at  targets  towed  at  10  knots 
through  the  gaps  of  a  squadron  that  steamed  between 
them  and  the  target  at  full  speed  in  the  opposite 


< FITNESS   TO  WIN'  327 

direction.  The  thing  would  seem  incredible,  were  it 
not  vouched  for  by  any  number  of  German  officers 
who  witnessed  it.  Nothing  done  by  the  Japanese 
could  compare  with  this. 

Capua,  and  its  share  in  the  ultimate  ruin  of 
Hannibal  and  his  army,  has  already  been  referred  to. 
Capua  spelt  ease,  comfort,  and  relaxation — all  things 
to  negative  fitness  to  win.  The  danger  lies  there 
to-day  as  much  as  ever  it  did.  Modern  warships  tend 
to  become  floating  hotels  chiefly  by  the  advent  of  very 
rich  men  into  the  officer  class.  As  officers  at  one 
and  the  same  time  efficient  and  very  wealthy  are  to 
be  found,  the  matter  is  somewhat  complicated  ;  but  as 
a  general  principle  the  outlook  of  any  navy  depends 
much  upon  how  few  rich  officers  it  may  have. 

Moreover  the  existence  of  rich  yet  efficient  officers, 
in  the  British  Navy  at  any  rate,  is  to  be  explained  by 
certain  facts  that  recently  came  to  light,  when  a  mid- 
shipman whose  father  was  sufficiently  foolish  to  allow 
him  six  hundred  a  year  or  so  pocket  money,  was  sub- 
mitted to  a  process  of  basting  till  he  should  come  to 
realise  that  wealth  did  not  make  him  different  from 
his  poorer  messmates.  In  this  particular  case  the 
midshipman  sought  vengeance  with  a  revolver.  An 
Admiralty,  presumably  ignorant  of  the  existence  of 
such  a  thing  as  fitness  to  win,  weakly  gave  in  to  an 
hysterical  public  agitation,  allowed  the  wealthy  mid- 
shipman to  retire  unpunished  for  his  attempted  murder 
and  punished  those  who,  however  brutal  their  methods, 


328  HEEESIES  OF   SEA  POWEE 

were  unquestionably  acting  so  as  to  preserve  the  '  fitness 
to  win  '  quality  in  the  Fleet. 

Turning  to  foreign  navies,  the  French  Navy  is 
as  eaten  into  as  any  by  the  '  steam  yacht '  element. 
Perhaps  because  France  is  a  republic  it  takes  its  own 
peculiar  form.  A  wealthy  junior  officer  of  good  family 
in  a  French  warship  is  by  far  the  most  important 
person  on  board  :  even  his  captain  being  subservient 
to  him.  Ease  and  luxury  are  the  first  considerations 
in  the  French  fleet.  It  is  often  difficult  to  discern 
fitness  to  win  or  its  absence  in  the  days  of  peace,  but 
it  is  hard  to  see  any  use  for  French  warships  save 
for  the  giving  of  balls  and  acting  as  mark  boats  at 
regattas.  There  is  not  the  slightest  doubt  in  the 
world  that  in  a  war  between  France  and  Germany  the 
French  fleet  would  be  crumpled  up  and  destroyed  far 
worse  than  were  the  French  armies  in  the  war  of 
1871.  There  are  brave  and  brilliant  officers  in  the 
French  Navy  but  the  '  steam  yacht '  swamps  them 
utterly. 

As  the  French,  so  the  Eussians  were  and  are. 
Charming  hosts,  delightful  companions,  with  here  and 
there  a  brilliant  man,  but  '  steam  yachtsmen '  almost 
every  one.  Exceptions  do  not  count :  it  is  the  mass 
that  tells. 

The  Italians  are  not  much  better.  Lissa  ended 
their  last  naval  war  and  another  Lissa  is  likely  to  end 
their  next.  Yet  the  percentage  of  individual  genius  in 
Italy  is  perhaps  higher  than  anywhere  else, 


' FITNESS   TO   WIN'  329 

The  United  States  Navy  is  in  a  somewhat  different 
state,  but  its  difference  is  of  degree  rather  than  aught 
else.  The  men  have  little  to  bind  them  to  the  Service, 
and  a  man  who  is  a  bluejacket  this  year  may  conceive 
that  he  had  better  be  a  dentist  the  next.  The  officers 
are  mostly  too  old  to  have  energy,  they  tend  to  be 
fond  of  ease  and  comfort  and  thoroughly  self-satisfied. 
There  are  men  among  them  distinctly  otherwise. 
There  are  fine  ships  but  they  do  little  war  training. 
There  is  very  little  fitness  to  win  to  be  perceived.  Yet 
America  is  a  young  nation,  and  one  takes  it  for 
granted  that  there  is  latent  fitness  somewhere  unper- 
ceived.  This  may  be ;  America  at  any  rate  rests  con- 
fident that  it  is  there. 

Of  the  Austrian  Navy  not  much  is  known,  but  what 
little  there  is  is  suggestive  of  fitness.  The  same  applies 
to  the  Swedish  and  Norwegian  navies. 

The  Japanese  Navy  is  absolutely  free  from  the 
'  steam  yacht '  element.  It  is  extremely  doubtful 
whether  it  excels  in  anything,  certainly  before  the  war 
it  had  no  very  excellent  gunnery  or  torpedo  men  and 
the  percentage  of  genius  is  lower  than  in  any  navy. 
Even  Admiral  Togo  never  did  much  to  merit  the  term 
of  '  genius ' :  no  one  else  was  even  conspicuous.  Only 
its  high  average  was  remarkable.  Yet  its  fitness  to 
win  was  made  evident,  as  clear  as  noonday. 

There  remains  the  German  Fleet.  In  the  matter 
of  ships  the  German  Navy  is  of  no  great  account :  it 
probably  occupies  the  fifth  place — that  is  just  below 


330  HEKESIES  OF   SEA  POWEK 

the  Japanese.  There  are  few  if  any  *  steam  yachts- 
men' in  the  German  Navy,  and,  like  the  Japanese, 
German  officers  have  few  interests  outside  their  pro- 
fession. They  are  great  people  for  '  spit  and  polish/ 
but  this  is  just  an  instance  of  how  '  spit  and  polish ' 
is  not  of  itself  necessarily  bad.  A  German  engine- 
room  is  as  clean  almost  as  the  gun  deck  of  the  ships  of 
any  other  navy,  but  German  steaming  is  invariably 
good. 

There  is  next  to  no  genius  in  the  German  Navy : 
indeed  indications  of  its  absence  have  been  conspicu- 
ous features  of  German  manoeuvres.  There  is  indeed 
nothing  remarkable  except  a  steady  plodding  thorough- 
ness, obtained  to  some  extent  at  the  expense  of  initia- 
tive. But  it  is  ' thorough'  to  the  core.  There  is  a 
peculiar  business-like  spirit,  impossible  to  explain,  but 
of  the  existence  of  which  there  is  no  question.  The 
Japanese  have  something  of  the  sort,  but  not  quite  of 
the  same  nature,  not  quite  the  same  thing  as  the 
German  naval  spirit.  It  is,  so  far  as  one  can  judge  in 
peace,  the  victorious  spirit ;  certainly  it  savours  much 
of  fitness  to  win,  though  German  guns  are  weak  and 
German  ships  are  poor. 

As  an  instance  of  German  thoroughness  a  visit  of 
a  German  fleet  to  Plymouth  may  be  mentioned.  In 
that  fleet  every  bluejacket  knew,  not  only  the  forts 
and  the  guns  in  them,  but  the  arcs  of  fire  of  all  those 
fort  guns  and  their  dead  angles.  They  knew  every- 
thing there  was  to  know.  It  was  useless  knowledge 


' FITNESS  TO  WIN'  331 

perhaps ;  but  the  spirit  which  led  to  its  study  was 
anything  but  useless.  The  knowledge  of  what  is 
inside  carefully  guarded  forts  is  of  course  common 
to  the  Intelligence  Departments  in  all  navies  and  to 
any  officer  who  takes  the  trouble  to  read  the  matter 
up.  The  German  officers  not  only  read  it  up  but 
lectured  on  it  to  the  petty  officers  who  in  turn  lectured 
on  it  to  the  men. 

Knowledge  is  not  fitness  to  win,1  but  the  spirit  sug- 
gested by  the  men  seeking  after  knowledge  suggests  the 
fitness.  It  suggests  a  very  keen  desire  to  'kill  the 
enemy  '  in  the  day  of  battle. 

These  views  about  various  navies  perhaps  seem  to 
have  been  put  down  with  a  candour  that  may  in 
several  cases  be  unpleasing  to  many.  But  they  are 
not  so  much  a  matter  of  the  navy  concerned  as  of  the 
race.  The  dividing  line  between  fitness  and  the 
absence  of  it  is  rarely  fully  visible  till  there  is  a  war, 
because  fitness  is  made  up  of  national  qualities,  which 
may  in  some  cases  atone  for  and  in  others  negative  the 
symptoms  or  lack  of  symptoms  of  fitness  exhibited  by 
the  navies  only. 

In  attempting  to  define  Fitness  to  Win  I  feel  like 
one  groping  for  a  fact  in  the  darkness.  Narrowed 
down  to  a  '  desire  to  kill  the  enemy '  it  is,  as  already 


1  The  Russian  officers  were  quite  au  fait  with  most  details  of  the 
Japanese  Navy,  while  in  the  land  operations  Russian  maps  were  always 
used  where  possible  by  the  Japanese  as  being  far  more  accurate  and 
thorough  than  their  own. 


332  HEEESIES  OF   SEA  POWEE 

observed,  crudely  elemental.  Carried  to  its  logical 
sequence  it  robs  many  great  men  of  the  past  of  the 
tactical  genius  with  which  history  has  invested  them. 
It  makes  waste  paper  of  all  teachings  about  the 
strategies  and  tactics  that  have  led  to  victory  in  the 
past ;  for,  the  theory  accepted,  it  matters  nothing  that 
Eodney  cut  the  line  on  the  day  that  made  his  name. 
Had  his  line  been  cut  instead  victory  would  still  have 
been  his,  because  he  was  Eodney  and  able  to  infuse 
fitness  to  win  into  his  men,  and  because  those  men 
had  it  latent  in  them.  How  Nelson  went  into  action 
at  Trafalgar  becomes  no  longer  of  significance  or  even 
of  interest,  because  the  way  he  placed  his  ships  is  a 
trivial  detail  beside  the  fact  that  the  fitness  to  win  lay 
with  him  and  his  men.  Having  the  ships  and  guns 
he  won  as  he  did;  had  he  not  had  them,  could 
Villeneuve  have  won?  Yes — in  so  far  as  the  possession 
of  the  necessary  ships  and  guns  is  part  of  the  fitness, 
but  otherwise  No.  Eome  devoid  of  any  Sea  Power 
succeeded  in  beating  a  great  sea  empire  upon  the  sea ; 
and  so,  Nelson  and  his  men,  suddenly  robbed  of  all  their 
battleships  would  probably  have  succeeded  still.  They 
would  have  anticipated  the  shell  or  the  torpedo,  or 
resuscitated  the  Eoman  battleship  idea,  so  only  the 
nation  were  sufficiently  fit  to  win. 

So  wild  the  fancies  to  which  a  logical  thinking  out 
of  the  'Fitness  to  Win*  theory  may  lead.  It  is  a 
great  deal  easier  to  sit  down  and  say  'Because  he 
made  certain  moves  he  obtained  an  advantage,  because 


'FITNESS  TO   WIN'  333 

ie  made  (or  is  believed  to  have  made)  certain  others, 
he  obtained  more  advantages,  these  led  to  others  yet 
again,  and  so,  step  by  step,  to  victory.'  It  is  all  so 
simple  and  clear,  and  there  is  the  analogy  of  the 
chess-board  to  make  it  clearer  and  simpler  still.  It  is 
so  simple  to  point  out  the  obvious  road  to  victory,  to 
say — *  Here  is  the  road  to  future  victory  for  those  who 
will  study,  not  precisely  in  the  same  details  but  along 
the  same  general  lines  and  by  the  observance  of  great 
truths  that  do  not  alter.' 

Though  history  teem  with  incidents  in  which  the 
selfsame  path  that  led  to  victory  with  one  led  to 
defeat  with  another,  it  is  easy  to  get  over  this  by 
believing  in  the  exception  that  proves  the  rule.  It  is 
easy  to  overlook  that  of  two  trees,  though  the  branches 
of  both  be  trimmed  identically,  one  will  weather  the 
winter  gale  and  the  other  not ;  though  both  have 
rooted  equally,  one  is  in  stronger  soil.  No  doctrine 
as  to  the  training  of  branches  will  save  the  tree  that 
fell. 

This  book  was  begun,  some  ten  years  ago,  princi- 
pally with  the  object  of  differentiating  between  the 
relative  value  of  materiel  and  personnel  in  various 
naval  wars.  Only  gradually  did  it  take  its  present 
form,  only  gradually  appeared  the  idea  that  under  all 
the  strategies  lay  the  main  root  truth  of  the  '  survival 
of  the  fittest  test,'  that  in  all  ages  men  have  owed 
victory  only  to  just  what  prehistoric  man  trusted  to 
for  victory,  and  that  all  strategies  and  tactics  are 


334  HEKESIES  OF   SEA  POWEK 

merely  embroidery  about  this  primal  fact.  Save  in 
so  far  as  he  develops  in  his  men  and  nation  this  fitness 
to  win,  the  leader  is  of  little  more  account  than  his 
officers,  his  men,  and  the  mass  of  the  nation  whence 
they  all  come.  And  the  great  men  of  history  have 
been  not  those  who  have  planned  the  most  brilliant 
strategies  but  those  who  have  been  able  to  carry  out 
what  they  have  planned  through  those  below  them 
being  also  inspired  with  the  single-hearted  desire  to 
destroy  the  enemy.  The  full  possession  of  that  desire 
has  implied  caution  where  caution  was  required,  rash- 
ness when  rashness  was  the  better  way,  cunning  when 
cunning  was  needed ;  but  always  because  of  the  fulness 
of  the  desire.  It  is  the  secret  of  victory  in  the  world 
of  Nature  and  was  as  fully  in  evidence  with  battleships 
and  destroyers  in  the  Sea  of  Japan  as  with  triremes 
round  the  Islands  of  the  ^Egean  in  the  centuries  long 
since  dead.  It  was  as  great  a  power  then  as  now,  no 
greater  and  no  less,  since  it  alone  is  the  eternal  verity 
in  the  struggle  to  control  the  seas. 


INDEX 


ABILITY,  275 

Aboukir  Bay,  battle  in,  120 

Actium,  battle  of,  72  et  seq.,  119, 

255,  262,  283,  301 
Adherbal,  57 
Admirals :  — 

Adherbal,  57 

Agrippa,  73 

Alcibiades,  36,  49,  116 

Alexieff,  88 

Antony,  72,  255,  258,  283 

Boodes,  45 

Calder,  112 

Collingwood,  248 

Cordova,  119 

Cornwallis,  112,  242 

Darby,  119 

De  Grasse,  119 

D'Estaing,  119 

Drake,  80,  117,  275,  283 

Duilius,  47 

Dumanoir,  4 

Effingham,  117 

Guichen,  119 

Hanno,  53 

Hasdrubal,  61 

Hood,  119 

Howe,  303 

Hughes,  119,  121 

Kamimura,  114,  245 

Lysander,  37 

Makaroff,  92 

Medina  Sidonia,  80 

Monk,  113,  162 

Nebogatoff,  104,  108,  293 

Nelson,  2,  4, 11,  32,  75,  114, 116, 
121,  124,  138,  215,  219,  242, 
248,  254,  275,  284,  295,  324, 
332 

Octavius,  73,  301 


Admirals : — 

Phormio,  11,  29,  32,  117 

Pompey,  119 

Kegulus,  49 

Rodney,  332 

Rogestvensky,  75,  84,  116,  124, 
140,  143,  202,  256,  260,  264, 
322,  326 

Saumarez,  120 

Scipio,  63,  83,  275 

Shovel,  Sir  Cloudesley,  11 

Stark,  92 

Suffren,  119,  121 

Togo,  20,  36,  75,  87,  112,  116, 
120,  140,  195,  213,  264,  322, 
329 

Uryu,  90 

Villeneuve,  19,  76,  218,  221,  242 

Wiren,  92,  95,  97 

Witgeft,  93,  122 
j-Egentine  Islands,  battle  of,  51 
^Egospotami,  battle  of,  26,  33,  36, 

262,  287 
Agamemnon,  26 
Agrippa,  73  et  seq. 
Alabama,  the,  150 
Alcibiades,  36,  49,  116 
Alexander  the  Great,  117 
Alexandra,  the,  314 
Alfred,  King,  302 
Algeciras,  120 
Americans,  48,  101,  167  (and  see 

United  States) 

Amiral  Baudin,  guns  in  the,  315 
Anglo-Boer    War,    25,    131,  246, 

324 

Anglo-Dutch  War,  113, 150 
Anti-Belleville  agitation,  the,  171 
Antony,  72,  255,  258,  283 
Area,  15,  273 


336 


HEKESIES   OF   SEA  POWEE 


Armada,  the  Spanish,  77,  117,  219 
Armchair  moralists,  324 
Armour,  289,  308,  311,  328 
Artillery  Corps,  the  Kussian,  285 
Athenians,  11,  24  et  sea.,  34,  149, 

257,  286,  291,  301 
Atilius,  48 
Atlantic,  16 
Australia,  180,  187 
Austrians,  261,  329 
Austro-Italian  War,  147,  261,  328 


BALTIC  FLEET,  the,  15,  75,  77,  83, 

140,  200,  322 
Base  Power,  126  et  seg[. 
Battle  of  Aboukir,  120 

Actium,  72, 119,  255,  262, 283, 

301 

^Egentine  Islands,  51 
^Egospotami,  26,  33,  36,  262, 

287 

Algeciras,  120 
Angamos,  153 
Cannse,  62,  117 
Cape  St.  Vincent,  303 
Chemulpo,  88,  193 
Cyzicus,  33,  36,  116 
Ecnomus,  49 
Kinburn,  130 
Lepanto,  38,  74,  262,  268, 270, 

302 

Lissa,  118,  261,  328 
Metaurus,  63,  66 
Naupaktis,  11,  29,  117 
Navarino,  120 
Nile,  4,  120 
Bound  Island,  94,  112,  121, 

123,  192,  264 
St.  Lucia,  119 
Salamis,  10,  118,  120 
Santiago  de  Cuba,  131,  229 
Sphakteria,  120 
Trafalgar,  3,  93, 116, 143, 260, 

264,  293,  296,  322,  325 
Tsushima,  93,  116,  143,  260, 

264,    293,    300,    322,   324, 

334 

Tyndaris,  48 
Utica,  65,  67 

Yalu,  13,  74,  264,  304,  318 
Zama,  70 
Battleships,  282,  305,  310 


Bayan,  the,  92  et  seq, 

Belleville  boilers,  176,  268 

Belt  protection,  307 

Benedetto  Brin,  the,  318 

Blockades,  19 

Blocking,  91 

Blue  Water  School,  the,  45,  50, 

56,59 

Boer  War,  see  Anglo-Boer  War 
Bombardments,  131,  212 
Boodes,  45 

Borodino,  the,  97,  104,  301 
Box  batteries,  314 
Brandenburg,  the,  317,  320 
Brennus,  the,  317 
Brest,  111  et  seq.,  244 
'  Bricks  and  Mortar,'  50 
British,  75,  77,  121,  150,  167,  240 

244,  302,  308,  326 
British  press,  246 
Broadside  fire,  115 
Broadside  ships,  312 
Bulk,  306 


CALDER,  112 

Canada,  180 

Cannae,  battle  of,  62,  117 

Cannon,  introduction  of,  17 

Cape  St.  Vincent,  battle  of,  303 

Captain,  the,  314 

Capua,  325 

Carthaginians,  39  et  seq,  83,  98, 

149,  179,  249,  255,  258,  322 
Caution,  334 
Chance,  275 

Chemulpo,  battle  of,  88,  193 
Chili-Peruvian  War,  146,  153,  161, 

261 

Chinese,  the,  291,  304 
Chino-Japanese  War,  74,  304 
Civilisation,  its  effects  on  war,  163 
Claudius,  52 
Cleopatra,  73 
Clypsea,  50 

Coaling,  157,  173,  198,  268 
Coles,  Captain,  311 
Collingwood,  248 
Colonies,  179  et  seq. 
Commerce,    attack    and    defence, 

142,  145,  154,  161 
Complications,  international,  163 
Concentration,  122 


INDEX 


337 


Confederate  States,  the,  155 

Confidential  matters,  244 

Construction,  299,  308 

Contraband,  196 

Convoys,  186 

Corbett,  Julian,  17 

Cornelius  Scipio,  45 

Cornwallis,  112,  242 

Corsica,  48 

Corvi,  the,  46,  56,  272 

Courage,  275 

Crash  tactics,  272 

Crimean  War,  69, 130, 227, 237, 311 

Cruisers,  use  of,  170,  282,  305 

Crusaders,  302 

Cuniberti,  Colonel,  319 

Cunning,  334 

Cupola  ship,  Coles's,  312 

Cutting  the  line,  332 

Cycle  tendency,^274,  288 

Cylindrical  boilers,  267 

Cyzicus,  battle  of,  33,  36,  116 


DANES,  the,  302 

Defence,  299 

D'Estaing,  119 

De  Grasse,  119 

Deutschland  class,  the,  299 

Devastation,  the,  314,  320 

Devastation,  the,  315 

Dimensions,  296  et  seq. 

Divided  squadron,  the,  115 

Docks,  305 

Dockyards,  131 

Dogger  Bank  affair,  the,  201  et  seq. 

Drake,  80,  117,  275,  283 

Dreadnought,  the,  234,  313,  316, 

320 

Drepanum,  51  et  seq.,  70 
Duilius,  47 
Dumanoir,  4 
Dutch,  113,  151,  180 
Dynamite  gun,  131 


ECNOMUS,  battle,  49 
Efficiency,  289 
Effingham,  117 
Egyptians,  277 
Electric  motive  power,  268 
Elementary  ships,  277 
Elephants,  50 


Engineering,  326 

Engineers,  285 

English,  19,  77, 198,  212,  218,  239. 

See  British 
Ericsson,  311 
Eternal  verities,  163,  334 
Evasion.  233 
Evolution,  277,  285 


FEBBOL,  112 

Fetishes,  288,  289 

Fighting  tops,  278 

Fire-ships,  17,  263 

Fitness   to  win,  22,  71,  125,  149, 

275,  287,  321,  326,  334 
Fleet  in  being,  67 
Floating  batteries,  129,  311 
Forts,  128  et  seq. 
French,  the,  19,  121,  139,  193, 234, 

242,  250, 258,  293,  294, 311,  314, 

328 
Fuji  type,  the,  300 


GALLEYS,  17,  263 

Garrison  artillery,  135 

Genius,  275,  329 

Germans,  134,  150,  183,  191,  212, 

224,  235,  241,  292,294,315,  317, 

329 

Gibbon  and  Sea  Power,  21 
Gibraltar,  153 
Gloire,  the,  311 
'  Grand  War,'  145 
Great  Harry,  the,  302 
Great  War,  the,  19,  85,  112,  139, 

169,  172,  215,  251 
Greek  fire,  56 
Greeks,  11 

Guerre  de  course,  134,  145,  161 
Guichen,  119 
Gun-layers,  290 
Gunnery,   81,  104,  117,  132,  140, 

263,  275,  290,  296,  326 


HAMILCAB  Barca,  53,  61,  69 
Hamilton,  Lady,  4,  325,  326 
Hannibal  (Admiral),  46,  272 
Hannibal  (Second  Admiral),  51 
Hannibal  (the  Great),  53, 61  et  seq., 
249,  255,  325 


338 


HEEESIES   OF   SEA  POWER 


Hanno,  53 

Harry  Grace  &  Dieu,  the,  302 

Hasdrubal  (the  Just),  61 

Hasdrubal,  63 

Hate,  value  of,  324,  325 

Hatsuse,  the,  93,  300,  304 

Hiero,  64 

High  explosives,  131 

History,  lessons  of,  59,  118,  145, 

267,  286,  303,  306,  323,  333 
Hood,  119 
Howe,  303 

Huascar,  the,  147, 153 
Hughes,  119,  121 


IDAHO  class,  the,  299 

Ideal  battleship,  the,  319 

Illyrian  pirates,  176 

Inferiority,  259 

Influence  of  Sea  Power,  20,  33,  55, 

62,  68, 70,  99, 148,  238,  251, 272, 

276,  322,  332 

Intelligence  Department,  331 
Internal  combustion  engines,  268 
International  complications,  167 
International  law,  162,  190  et  seq. 
Invasions,  49,  66,  98,  215 
Ironclads,  136 
Italia,  the,  316 
Italians,  the,  147,  261,  315,  328 


JAPANESE,  he,  15,  84,  121,  132, 
147,  165,  191, 223,  231,  238, 244, 
258,  275,  293,  322,  329 


KAISEB  class,  the,  296 
Kamimura,  Admiral,  114,  245 
Kiao  Chau,  191 
Killing  the  enemy,  291,  324,  331, 

334 

Kinburn,  bombardment  of,  130 
King  Edward,  the,  318 
Klado,  Captain,  30 
Korea,  54,  69, 195 
Kowshing  affair,  the,  196 
Kuropatkin,  246 


LADY  HAMILTON,  4,  325,  326 
Ladysmith,  131 


Laughton,  Professor,  80,  119,  249 
Lepanto,  battle  of,  38, 74,  262,  268, 

270,  302 

LilybsBum,  49,  51,  65 
Lissa,  battle  of,  118,  261,  328 
Long-range  bombardments,  131  et 

seq. 

Lord  Nelson,  the,  307 
Lutatius,  63 
Lysander,  37 


MAGO,  63,  68 

Mahan,  Captain,  1,  20,  39,  62,  63, 

111,  149,  152,  179,  256,  303 
Majestic  class,  the,  317 
Malacca,  the,  168,  199 
Marine  Artillery,  285 
Martello  towers,  128,  130 
Mastodons,  304,  305 
Masts  and  yards,  137,  268 
MaUriel,  321 
Medina  Sidonia,  80  et  seq. 
Mediterranean,  16 
Members    of     Parliament,     their 

menace,  175,  308 
Mercantile  ports,  128 
Merchant  ships,  165 
Mercurius,  Cape,  50 
Merrimac,  the,  37 
Messana,  45,  49 
Metaurus,  battle  of  the,  63,  66 
Metternich,  Prince,  221 
Mikasa,  the,  121,  300 
Military  branch,  the,  283,  285,  288 
Mines,  97,  100 

Moderate  dimensions,  296  et  seq. 
Moltke,  324 
Monarch,  the,  314 
Monitors,  129,  310 
Monk,  113,  162 
Motive  power,  269,  271 


NAPOLEON,  2,  78,  216,  249,  275 
National  insurance,  177 
Naupaktis,  battle  of,  11,  29,  117 
Naval  construction,  299 
Navarino,  120 
Navy  League,  182 
Nebogatoff,  104,  293 
Nelson,  2,  4,  11,  32,  75,  114,  116, 
121,    124,   138,   215,   219,   242, 


INDEX 


339 


248,  249,   275,   284,    295,   304, 

324,  332 

Nelson,  the  Lord,  307 
Neutrals,  157,  192 
Nile,  battle  of,  4,  120 
Non-technical  public,  162 
Northerners,  the,  153  et  seq.,  156 
Norwegians,  the,  329 
Numerical  superiority,  296 


OARS,  14  et  seq.,  267,  270,  277 
Octavius,  73,  301 
Offensive,  the,  176,  299 


PACHYNUM,  Cape,  52 

Parliamentary  interference,  178 

Parma,  78 

Passaro,  Cape,  49 

Passive  defence,  126 

Patriotism,  97 

Peloponnesian  War,  11,  24  et  seq., 

46,  118,  149,  257,  282,  287 
Perfection,  dangers  of,  292 
Persians,  10 
Personnel,  305,  307 
Peruvians,  146 
Philip  of  Spain,  37 
Phoenicians,  10,  39, 179,  288 
Phormio,  11,  29,  32,  117 
Piracy,  150,  166,  174 
Piraus,  31 
Pivot  guns,  312 
Playing  to  the  gallery,  248 
Polycrates,  26 
Pompey,  119 
Port  Arthur,  20,  87  et  seq.,  110, 

120,  131,  140, 148,  228,  240,  322 
Portsmouth,  126,  230 
Press  laws,  236 
Prince  Albert,  the,  313 
Public  opinion,  163 
Punic  War,  39,  98,  230,  287,  301 


QUEEN,  the,  317 
Quick  firers,  316 


RADIUS,  267,  273 
Raids,  186 
Ram,  17,  269 


Eange,  274 

Rashness,  334 

Regulus,  49 

'  Remember  Majuba  '  cry,  324 

Re"publique,  the,  319 

Richard  I.,  302 

Rich  officers,  327 

Rodney,  332 

Rogestvensky,   75,   84,    116,    124, 

140,  143, 202,  256,  260,  264,  322, 

326 
Romans,  39  et  seq.,  98,  117,  149, 

171,  222,  256,  322,  332 
Round  Island,  battle  of,  94,  112, 

121,  123,  192,  264 
Rowers,  270,  277 
Royal  Sovereign,  the,  313,  319 
Russians,  5,  20,  69,  83,  120,  148, 

165,   192,   235,   238,   240,   258, 

275,  291,  304 
Russo-Japanese  War,  20,  25,  54, 

75,  87  etseq.,U7,  202,  223,  258, 

275 


SAIL,  16,  267,  269,  299 

Salamis,  battle  of,  10,  118, 120 

Santa  Cruz,  78 

Santiago  de  Cuba,  131,  228 

Saracens,  302 

Sardinia,  46,  60 

Sassebo,  322 

Saumarez,  120 

Scipio  Africanus,  63,  83,  275 

Sea  aptitude,  288 

Seamanship,  81,  284 

1  Seamen,'  19,  138,  282,  288 

Sea  Power,  20,  33,  55,  62,  68,  70, 

99,  148,  238,  251,  272,  276,  322 

332 

Seaworthiness,  289 
Secondary  guns,  316 
Secrecy,  238  et  seq. 
Sevastopol,  69 
Seventy-fours,  298 
Ships:— 

Alabama,  150 

Alexandra,  314 

Amiral  Baudin,  315 

Annunciada,  80 

Asahi,  301 

Askold,  148 

Aurora,  202 


340         HEEESIES  OF   SEA  POWEK 


Ships  :— 
Bayan,  92,  148 
Bellerophon  (old),  303 
Borodino,  97,  104,  301 
Captain,  314 
Deutschland  class,  299 
Devastation  (British),  314,  320 
Devastation  (French),  315 
Dreadnought,  234,  313,  316,  320 
Dmitri  Donskoi,  201 
Fuji,  300 
Georgia,  154 
Gloire  (old),  311 
Great  Harry,  302 
Great  Michael,  302 
Harry  Grace  a  Dieu,  302 
Hatsuse,  93,  300,  304 
Huascar,  147,  153 
Idaho,  299 
Independencia,  261 
Italia,  316 
Iwate,  299 
Kaiser  class,  296 
Kamchatka,  203 
Kearsage,  136 
Kniaz  Potemkin   Tavritchesky, 

142 

Kowshing,  196 
Malacca,  168,  199 
Merrimac,  37 
Mikasa,  121,  300 
Mississippi,  299 
Monarch,  314 
Monitor,  37,  129,  310 
Naniwa,  87 
Nelson,  307 
Novik,  91 
Olustee,  153 
Oushakoff,  97,  107 
Petropavlosk,  92 
Prince  Albert,  313 
Republique,  319 
Eetchitelni,  192 
Revolutionnaire,  303 
Royal  Sovereign,  317 
Boyal  Sovereign   (turret),    313, 

319 

Rurik,  107 

Santissima  Trinidad,  303 
Shenandoah,  154 
Souvaroff,  204 
Suffren,  319 
Sultan,  314 


Sumter,  153 

Swiftsure,  307 

Talahasse,  153 

Tchesma,  315,  320 

Thunderer,  136 

Trisvititelia,  136 

Triumph,  307 

Tsarevitch,  121,  191,  193 

Variag,  193 

Victoria,  316 

Warrior,  311 

Yashima,  93,  240,  300 

Yoshino,  93 

Shovel,  Sir  Cloudesley,  11 
Six-inch  guns,  127,  .317,  318 
Skill  v.  numbers,  12 
Small  guns,  316 
Soldiers  at  sea,  273,  288 
Southerners,  the,  155 
Spain,  180 

Spanish-American  War,  258 
Spanish  Armada,  77, 117,219,  283, 

302 

Spanish  sea  power,  61,  283,  302 
Specialists,  283 
Speed,  289 
Sphakteria,  120 
Spit  and  polish,  288,  289,  333 
Stability,  289 
Stark,  92 

Steamers,  early,  267 
Steam  power,  18,  268,  285,  295 
'  Steam-yacht '  element,  328 
Stoessel,  95 
Strategy,  124,  139,  254,  262,  272, 

333 

Submarines,  197,  241 
Suffren,  119,  121 
Sultan,  the,  314 
Swedes,  329 
Swiftsure,  the,  317 
Swivel  guns,  312 

Syracusans,  15,  33,  35,  46,  56,  66, 
272,  282 


TACTICS,  13,  28,  32,  36,  124, 139, 

254,  268,  290,  297 
Tchesma,  the,  315,  320 
Three-mile  limit,  100 
Thucydides,  11,  21,  301 
Timed  operations,  18 


INDEX 


341 


Ting,  74 

Togo,  20,  36,  75,  87  et  seg.,  112, 

116,  120,  140,  195,  213,  264,322, 

329 
Torpedoes,  17,  101,  140,  228,  263, 

290,  323 
Toulon,  111 
Trade,  159 
Trafalgar,  3,  38,  75,  116,  242,  258, 

293,  296,  322,  325 
Trick  shooting,  290 
Triremes,  286,  301,  334 
Triumph,  the,  307 
Tsarevitch,  121 
Tsushima,  battle  of,  93,  116,  143, 

260,  264,  293,  300,  322,  334 
Turks,  6,  120,  315 
Turrets,  312,  319 
Two  to  one,  297 
Tyndaris,  48 


UNFORTIFIED  towns,  213 

United    Service   Institution,    236, 

311 
U.S.A.,   167,   183,   198,  239,  244, 

294,  299,  308,  318,  328 
U.S.  Civil  War,  37,  101,  136,  161 
Uryu,  Admiral,  90 
Utica,  65,  67 


VICTORIA,  the,  316 
Vittor  Emanuele,  319 


Villeneuve,  19,  76,  218,  221,  242, 

326,  332 

Vladivostok,  88  et  seq.,  110 
Vladivostok    squadron,    88,    140, 

147,  223,  245 
Volunteer  cruisers,  169 
Von  Essen,  91,  95 
Vril,  270 


WARRIOR,  the  (old),  311 
Warships,  277 
Water-line  belt,  307 
Waterloo,  32 
Water-tube  boilers,  267 
Watts,  Sir  P,  298 
Weak  units,  309 
Weapons,  294,  321 
Wedge  formation,  290 
Wellington,  3,  275 
William  the  Conqueror,  78 
Wiren,  92,  95,  97 
Witgeft,  93,  122 
Wittelsbach  class,  the,  318 


XANTHIPPUS,  50 
Xerxes,  11 


YALU,  battle  of  the,  13,  74,  264, 
304,  318 


ZAMA,  battle  of,  70 


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