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THE
RHETORIC OF ARISTOTLE
COMMENTARY
BY THE LATE
EDWARD MEREDITH COPE, M.A.
FORMERLY SENIOR FELLOW AND TUTOR OF TRINITY COLLEGE
REVISED AND EDITED FOR
THE SYNDICS OF THE UNIVERSITY PRESS
JOHN EDWIN SANDYS, M.A.
FELLOW AND TUTOR OF ST JOHN S COLLEGE,
AND PUBLIC ORATOR IN THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE.
VOLUME II.
OTambrfoge:
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I
CONTENTS OF VOLUME II.
[ AGES
TEXT AND COMMENTARY, BOOK II i 335
APPENDIX (D).
On av with the optative after certain particles . . 33^ -34
APISTOTEAOYS
TEXNH2 PHTOPIKHZ
B.
Z12KPATHS. AT)\OV apa. &TI 6 Qpa<rv/j.ax6s re Kal 6s av #XXos
v Stdif, TrpwTov irdar] aKpifieiq. ypd\fset re Kal TrotTjcrei ^V XTJV ifielv, irdrepov v
Kal 8jj.oiov ir<f>VKev TI /card crw/xaros (j.optfiTjv TroXveiSe s. TOVTO ydp <J>a/j.fi> tpvffiv elvcu.
SeiKvvvai. 4>AIAPOS. IlavraTraai fj.v o$v. 212. Ae^repov 5^ 76, 6 ry rl iroieiv
r) jra.Oe iv VTT& roO Trt<j>VKev. $AI. Ti nfy , 20. Tpirov 5 5rj Stara^a/xeyoy ra
\6yuv re Kal ^VXTJS ytvr) Kal TO. TO^ITUIV TraOri/J-ara, Slficri rcis alrlas, Trpoaapn^rruv
(Kaarov e/cdcrry, Kal SiSacncwi o ia oficra vfi o iuv \6yuv Si 1 rjv airlav IS- avdyKys TJ fj.h
trelOerai, ij de dTrftOet. $AI. KaXXitrra yovv &i>, cus <-OIK\ ?x OVTUS. Zfi. Odroi
fj.kv odv, c3 (f>i\e, fiXXws evSfiKvvntvov rj \ey6fj.fvov Tf"Xy^l "" T ^ \f\0-qafrai. fj ypatpr/-
<TfTai otire TI a\\o cure TOVTO. PLATO, P/iaedrus, p. 271.
A P I S T O T E A O Y S
TEXNHS PHTOPIKH2 B.
E/c Tivaiv fJLev ovv e? Kai TrpOTpeTreiv Kcti
Kai eTTaiveiv KCII ^eyeiv Kai KdTiyyopeiv Kai
\oyel(r6ai ) Kai Trolai So^ai Kai Trpordcreis
CHAP. I.
In the following chapter we have a very brief account of the second
kind of rhetorical proof, viz. the ethical, the ydos *v r<5 \fyovri. The
treatment of it is cursory,; .and we are referred backwards to the analysis
of virtue moral and intellectual in Book I c. g 1 , for further details of the
topics from which are to be derived the enthymemes whereby the speech and
the speaker may be made to assume the required character of (ppovya-is,
apeTtj and tvvoia; and forwards to the chapter on cptXi a and ./nlo-or (II 4),
in the treatise on the iraSri, where the indications of these affections are
enumerated, which will enable the speaker to convey (always by his
speech} the good intentions and friendly feeling by which he is affected
towards his audience. As supplementary and auxiliary to the direct
logical arguments this indirect ethical mode of persuasion is indispen
sable to the success of the speech. People are hardly likely to be con
vinced by a speaker who sets them against him.
On the order of the subjects of the work in general, and the connexion
of the contents of this Chapter, I refer as before to the Introduction [p. 245].
I. EK Ttvav. . .ravr fcrriv] This is a confusion of two constructions :
the grammar requires either C K rivatv eTpqrai (or something similar), or
else e coi> TCIVT eori. The n-oTat in the second clause shews that the first
of the two was the one predominant in the writer s mind, which is care
lessly varied at the end.
8<jat KOI Trporacreis] These two are in fact the same. The current
popular opinions are converted by the artist into premisses of rhetorical
enthymemes. They are united again, c. 18 2, comp. Topic. A 10,
104 # 12, fieri 8e irpOTaareLS SiaAe/crt/cat Kai ra rols V&6oiS ofjioia...Kai ocrai
8oai Kara re^vas fieri ray fvprj^evas- And C. 14, illit. raff piv rrporao-fts
en.\eKTfuv...Ka\ ocrai 86ai Kara T(\vas dcriv.
1 Now the sources from which we must derive our arguments in
1 The connexion of this chapter with the subject of the Rhetorical JjOos is
marked at the opening of the chapter itself: <ri>/i/3ijcrerai yap a /xa irepl TOUTUV
\tyovras /cd/ceci/a 8t]\oui> ^ (Si* woiot rives viro\r)fp!)ri(T6^.6a Kara, rb f[dos, TjTrep r\v
dtvTfpa TiffTis K rwc O.UTUV yap T7/xas re Kai efXXoc d^TTtffTov dwt]a6/j.0a. irotfii>
irpos aptTrjv.
AR. II. I
Bekkcr
P. 1377 b
quarto
edition
1831.
P- 54
octavo
edition
18/3-
2 PHTOPIKHS B i i, 2.
TT/)OS ras roJrwi/ TTIO-TCK, Tavr eVrriV Tre^ 7^ roJ-
Twy KUI 6K TOVTOJV TO. ^6ufJLt]/uLara t w s Trepi e
2 etVeZi/ lUa TO yeW TWI/ AoyfcJi> . eW 3 ei//ca
ecrriv r\ pnropiKJ ( K al yap ra? <riyju/3ov\as Kpivovcri
KCtl 1J SiKfi Kpio-tS 60T/1/), dva^Kr] W HOVOV TTjOOS TOI/
Xayoy o>ai/,. OTTWS aVoSet/tTiicos eWat /ca/ TTKTTOS,
a AAa ica/ auVoi/ TTOXOI/ r/i/a W TOJ/ ic^fTf/i/ Karaa-Kevd-
exhorting and dissuading, in panegyric and censure, in accusation and
defence, and the sort of opinions and premisses that are serviceable for
(rhetoncal) proof in them, are these: for these are the materials and
sources of our enthymemes, specially, so to say, in each kind of speeches -
i.e. using a special treatment according to the kind of speech on which
we are engaged. If the text is right here, * nep i ? Ka(rTOV tVeZj/ M/fl ^
yevos TO,* Aoyw^-Bekker retains it unaltered, and SpengeH accepts it
m his last edition, though he formerly proposed c&ro/^this must be the
translation of it. *S V /, so to speak , (^ ^ os -, ^ T(5 ^j
TtHwpao-dai, Plat. Phaedr. 230 B, et sim.).
2. The commencement of this section is repeated and dwelt upon
at the begmning of c. 18, where, after the parenthetical account of the
Tradr] and the six special flfy, a break occurs, the subsequent contents of
the work are enumerated in their order, and the logical part of Rhetoric
resumed.
nrl?? ^ 6XtenSion f / the Unification of Kp i vfiv , Kp[(ris , KplT ^ to
include decisions or judgments of all kinds, moral, political, (as in
atfiag upon a course of policy to be pursued), literary, (criticism in
matters of taste, works of art, written compositions, and such like) as
well as the ordinary application of it to the judicial decisions of the
judges in a court of law, compare I i. 7, p.io, and Introd. p. 137 note i
AroftctKmrf*] demonstrative , improperly applied to rhetorical proof
bee note on I i. n, p. 19.
r p.r^ KaracTKet^] (or the audience in general) Quint, v 12 o
Probation*! qua* ,ra<V vacant, ductas ex affectibus. There is a sort
of &ypa in the application of ,#,, to a ^r^ mt fr rtva, and a-ain
o TOVKP^. In both cases it means to establish or constitute \ut
is applied in two slightly different senses; in the first it is to make him
self out to be, to establish a certain character in and by the speech and
r dis P sition in the minds of
1 In his treatise on the Rhetoric in Trans. Bav. Acad. ,851, p. , Q note he
translates the passage thus : * man je&s g enus <ler reden fur **
u
undersanchng WJ rf & , lf I do not mistake him, in the sense of fc S rf,> (,
^iccordmg as we have to speak , which seems to me to be hardly allowable
can, I think, in conformity with ordinary Greek usage, have no other
sense than that which [ have attributed to it. See, for illustrations of ^ thus used
with an infinitive, Matth. Gr. Gr. 545.
PHTOPIKHS B i 3, 4. 3
3 j[tt>* TTO\V yap $ia(f)epei irpos 9TI0TIF, /uLaXicrra pev iv
TOLS (rv/mfiovXals, eira Kai ev TOILS SIKCUS, TO TTOIOV
Tiva (paive&Oai TOV XeyovTa Kai TO TTQOS avTOvs uVo-
\ajULJ3dveiv e%eiv TTIDS avrov, Trpos $e TOVTOIS eav Kai
4 avTOi SiaKeijuevoi TTCOS Tvy^avcocriv. TO JULGV ovv TTOIOV
Tiva (paivecrBai TOV XeyovTa xpti<rtfJU0TpOV els
(ru/uL/3ovXds e(TTiv y TO 3e $taKe ia 6ai TTWS TOV
els Tas 3//COCS* ov yap raura (j)alveTai (biXovcri
3. TroXu yap 8ia(f)epei irpos TT KTTIV K.T.X.] Comp. I 2. 4, 5. Quint.
IV 5. 6, interim refugienda non modo distinctio qiiaestionum est, sed
omnino tractatio: affectibus perturbandus et ab intentione auferendus
auditor. Non enim solum oratoris est docere, sed plus eloquentia circa
movendum valet. This goes beyond Aristotle : Ouintilian however is
speaking rather of the irddof, of the TOV Kpirfjv TTOIOV nva Karaa-Ktva^fiv,
than of the TJdos. He sets the irddos above the r}6os in point of its im
portance and value to the orator as a means of persuasion ; Aristotle,
admitting this in forensic speaking, takes the opposite view in the deli
berative kind ; 4 1 . But compare I 2. 4, where a decided preference for
the qdos is expressed.
For the assumption of a certain character by the speaker himself,
and the supposition (of the audience) that he is disposed in a particular
way (has certain feelings towards themselves), makes a great difference
in respect of the persuasive effect of the speech, first and foremost in
counselling or deliberation, and next in legal proceedings (r)6os) ; and
besides this, whether they (the audience) are themselves in some parti
cular disposition (feeling, frame of mind) (towards him) (irdQos} .
fv rais trv/i/3ovXatj] consultations . Plat. Gorg. 455 A, orav crrpaTTj-
yv>v oupeVews Trepi...crvn^ov\f] 77.
4- TO 8e 8iaKf"i<r0ai irats TOV a.K.poaTr)v fls Tas 5t Q$] Comp. I 2. 4> Sta
5 T<av d.KpoaT<ov...ov yap 6/j.oicos a7ro8t &o/iei/ ra? Kpitreis XuTrcw/ievoi Ka\ %ai-
povTfs...rrpos o Kat /j,6voi> TTdpacrdai (pafiev rrpayfiaTfiifcrdat. TOVS vvv Tf^voXo-
yovvras, who wrote only for the use of pleaders in the courts of justice,
i i. 9, 10.
ov yap TavTa (paiveTai c^tXovo-t Ka\ fiicrova-i, *c.r.X.] Cic. de Orat. II 42.
178, nihil est enim in dicendo mains quam ut faveat oratori is qui audiet,
utique ipse sic moveatur nt impetu quodam animi et perturbatione magis
quam iudicio aut consilio rcgatnr. Plura enim multo homines indicant
odio aut amore aut cupiditate aut iracundia aut dolore atit laetitia aut spe
1 The reason of this is, that when a man has to recommend or dissuade a
certain course of action, his character and the opinion entertained of it must give
great weight to his advice : and it is not in the law-court, but in public life, in
quelling the seditious riot, that Virgil s vir pietate gravis ac meritis (in the famous
simile, Aen. I. 149) exhibits his authority : whereas in a court of justice, where
facts are in question, the speaker s assumed character has either no weight at all,
or in a far less degree.
I 2
4 PHTOPIKHS B i 4.
fun(rov(riv, ov& opyify/uLevois Kctl Trpaws 6%ov<nv, d\\ r] p - 3
TO 7ra.pa.7rav eTpa rj /caret TO jJieyeQos erepor Tto fj.ev
yap <pi\ovvTi, Trepi ov TroielTai Tt]V Kpicriv, r] OVK dci-
Keiv j) fjiLKpd SoKet dSuceTv, TOJ c)e JULKTOVVTI TOVVUVTLOV P- 55-
KO.L TW fJieV eTTlQvfJLOVVTl KUl U6\7Tl^l OVTl, O.V *} TO
aut timore aut errore aut aliqua permotione mentis quam veritate ant
praescripto aut iuris norma aliqua aut iudicii formula aut legibus. And
on this importance of eSvoia, that is, the conciliation of it in the audience
by making your own good will apparent in the speech, compare Demosth.
de Cor. 277, p. 318, Kdndvo 8 ev oltf, on TTJV f^r/v 6tf*6rtfTa forto yap
KatToi eyco-y opeo rfjs ra>v \fyovru>v 8vvdfj.fa>s TOVS aKovovras TO TrXtlcrroi/
fttpos Kvplovs ovras to? ynp av v[j.(1s a.Tro8(r)cr()f KOI irpos eKacrrov fx r ) r
vvoias, OVTU>S o Xryvf eSoe (ppovelv K.r.X.
TO napd7raveTfpa...To peytdos ?Tepa] ( either altogether different , differ
ent in kind; or in magnitude and amount , different in degree?) This
clause (to rovvavriov) is explanatory of the effect of the Trddrj upon the
audience, (not of the tfdos,) as appears from the example chosen, (f>i\ia
and [juo-os being iraGrj, II 4 : and it belongs especially, though not exclu
sively for in such cases as the public speeches of Demosthenes and
Aeschines it might be usefully, and in fact was, employed to forensic
practice ; the result being in this case either complete acquittal from a
charge (OVK aSiKetv) or a lenient construction of it, and a mitigation of the
penalty (17 piKpa do iKelv). The next (after Tovvavrlav) refers principally to the
deliberative branch of Rhetoric, as is shewn by the future time the time
of the deliberative speaker is the future, I 3. 2 TO faro^tvov, KOI eo-eo-dai KOI
dyadov (o-fo-0ai ; and accordingly for the use of speakers in this branch
the emotions appealed to must be different and adapted to a different
purpose. The two which will be most serviceable to the public speaker
are desire (firidvpid) and hope (eXn-t j): those who are under the excitement
of such feelings will be more likely to assent to the course of policy pro
posed, and so ensure the success of the speaker who recommends. It is
singular however that neither of these is found in the list of irddr) which
follows: fTridvfjLia occurs amongst them in Eth. Nic. II 4; and hope may
possibly be included under ddpcros, as the opposite of $o/i?oj, in the ana
lysis of TO 6appd\fov and 0dpo-os, Rhet. II 5. 16, to the end. This is par
tially confirmed by II 5. 16; after telling us that confidence is the oppo
site of fear, he adds wore /xera (pavTavias 77 f\irls TU>V trtmjpuni coy eyyvs
ovrav, as if the hope of near approaching safety were convertible with,
or the ground of, confidence, and therefore a Trddos opposed to (poftos.
In the same way tvvoia, in the three ethical 1 virtues to be exhibited in
the speech, is included in tpiXla.
1 And to one who feels a desire for anything, or is in a sanguine
frame of mind, the future result (announced by the speaker), if it be
pleasant, appears to be both certain and good ; whilst to any one who
has no (such) feeling, or is in a bad humour, the contrary (is true,
is the case) .
PHTOPIKH2 B i 5, 6. 5
S> \ *> A ** /3 j. /
tiovj Kai ecretrvai Kai ayauov e&eo uai (paive-
TCCI, TW S diraueT teat %vG"%epaivovTi Tovvavriov.
r roi; fjiev ovv UVTOVS eivai 7rrroi)s TOI)?
ra aiTia Tocravra yap ecTTi Si a
dpert} Kai evvoia ^la^-ev^ovrai yap Trepi tibv \e-
rj crv/u(3ov\evov(ni> r} Sid Trdvra Tavra r] Sia
6 TOVTWV TI ij yap Si* d(ppo(rui r]v OVK opQias ^o^a^bf-
<riv, n (Ho^d^ovTes opOws Sid fAO%8fipiav ov ra ^o-
5- fern 5e raCra (ppovrja-is Kai aper?) KOI fvvoia] On Whately s Com
parison (Rhetoric, c. 2] of these three qualities as constituting the ethical
character of the speech, with the character of Pericles, as drawn by him
self, in Thuc. II 60^ see Introd. p. 246, note i. The explanation of them,
and the reason of their selection, are there given, (ppovrja-ts is the intel
lectual virtue of practical wisdom , essential above all to a statesman;
apf.TTj is moral virtue, of character and conduct ; evvota is required in the
speaker himself (or rather in his speecJi) as part of the rjdos, and in the
audience as a jrados. In the Politics VIII (v) 9, init. the correspondence
is exact, and the three same qualities or virtues are selected as the
special qualifications of the statesman : rpia 8e nva xPV ^X flv T vs /*X-
Aoiray ap(iv ray Kvpias dp^ay, irptarov p.ev (piXiav irpos TTJV KaGfcrTaxrav
TToXireiav (this is something rather different from the evvoia of the Rhe
toric : but the pjirpose of Rhetoric and of Politics is different), eneira
SvvafjLiv fj.(yi<TTr]v r<H>v fpyatv rrjt opx js (this is ability , corresponding to
<f>p6vr)ais in Rhet. and the combination of knowledge and eloquence in
Thucyd.), rpirov 8 aptrrfv KOI SIKCUCHTVVTJV ev fKaarr) TroXirda rfjv Trpos rrjv
iroXiTfiav. It seems not unlikely that Arist. may have borrowed this
from Thuc., altering however and perhaps improving the classification
and the expression, and adapting it to his immediate purpose in the
Politics and the Rhetoric.
8ia^fv8ovrai] (the speakers) make mistakes, or false statements ,
whether intentionally or unintentionally; ^evdea-dat can bear either sense.
In the Nic. Eth. where it occurs several times, VI 3, 1139 b 18, ib. c. 6,
1140^4, c. 13, 1 144 #35, 1x3, 1165 b 8, and in the ordinary usage of
other authors, it appears to be always to be deceived , implying an
unintentional error, accordingly here also the mistakes and false state
ments must be represented as unintentional, so far as the word is con
cerned ; though the alternative 8ia p.o^6r]p iav the second case, when
dpen; is lacking shews that it is also possible to make them inten
tionally and with intent to deceive. The fact is that here again is a sort
of (vyna, and 8ia\lsev8f(rdai (as interpreted by the ordinary usage of it)
will only apply properly to the first of the three cases ; in the other two it
requires some modification. The concluding observation, dionfp ev8c-
^(Tai...yLyv(aa-Kovras, it is possible to do this with one s eyes open , looks
as if it was meant to supply this.
PHTOPIKH2 B i 68.
Kovvra \eyov(riv, rj (f)p6viju.oi fjiev Kcti eTrieiKeis eurlv
a AA, OVK evvoi, SioTrep ev^e^erai jULrj ret /3e\ri(7Ta
yiyvuxTKOVTas. Kai Trapd TOVTCL ov$ev.
apa TOV airavTa SoKOvvTa TCIVT s^civ eivai
7 TO?S aKpOWfJLeVOLS TTKTTOV. o6ev fJLV TOLVVV fypOVlfJLOl
Kai cnrouSaloi. <pave iv av, e/c TWV Trepi ras operas $ir]-
ptlfteVWV \t17TT60V K TWV aVTWV yap KO.V Tp6v TiS
KO.V iavrov KctTaarKevda-eie TOLOVTOV Trept & evvoias
3 Kai (j)i\ias eV TO?? Trepi TO. 7rd6rj XCKTCOV vvv.
^e Ta 7ra6r] Si ocra ^uera/3a\A.oj/T6s $ia<pepov(ri
6. 8m jj.oxdr)plav ov ra SOKOVVTO. X.e youo-ti ] i. e. from corrupt motives
do not state their real opinions. Whately s parallel from Thucydides, above
referred to, though not precisely corresponding to the three virtues of the
speech here described, is yet sufficiently close to serve as a commentary
on this passage of Aristotle ; and as pourtraying, in terse and vigorous
language, the character of an upright and independent statesman, such as
were rare at Athens, it is sufficiently striking in itself, to deserve quota
tion on its own account, /crn rot e /zoi TOIOW TW dvBpl opyiea0e, says Peri
cles, os ov8evos oiopai Tjtrcrw eivai yvutvai re ra Se oi/ra ical ep^vevcrai ravra
(^I\OTTO\IS (Aristotle s evvoia) re KOI xpl^orcov /cpeio-crcoi . (This illustrates
the poxdrjpia, the mains animus, of the other, which consists in suppress
ing your convictions or making false statements from corrupt or inter
ested motives.) o re yap yvoiis Kai p.rf aa(f)cis dt8das fv ur< KOI et p.r/ eW-
Bv^rfdr] o T f\a>v d/jifporfpa, rfj 8f TroXei 8v<rvovs, OVK av ofioios ri obuittt
(ppaoi irpocrovTos 8e Kai rovSe, ^p^/xacrt fie j/tfcw/ieVou, ra i p.7ravTa TOVTOV
fvos av TrcoXoTro, Thuc. II 60.
7. < TO>V Trept raff operas StT/pT/^eVwi ] from the analysis of the
virtues , in I g. Trepi evvoias feat (pi\ias, in II 4.
(K TO>V a\>To>v yap K.r.X.] /caracrKeua^eij/ here again has the same double
sense and application as before, 2. It is to make oneself out, make to
appear, in the speech; and to put others in such and such a frame of
mind. Both of these can be done, he says, by the use of the same topics,
namely those of I g. The topics there applied to panegyric under the
epideictic branch, can be here transferred to the representation of the
speaker s own character in and by his speech.
8. ra irddrj] Of the various senses and applications of nddos, and
also of its special signification in Aristotle s ethical system, an account is
given in the Introduction, p. 133 seq. ; together with a comparison of the
two lists here and in the Nic. Ethics. These two it will be seen differ
materially. I have further referred (p. 246, note i, on the summary of
this chapter) to Mr Bain s work On the Emotions and the Will for a
complete and scientific explanation of the actual facts of those which are
also included in Aristotle s lists, either here or in the Nic. Eth., viz.
anger, resentment, righteous indignation, terror and confidence or cou
rage, love and hatred.
PHTOPIKH2 B I 9. 7
Ta<s Kpicrets, ols eVerou \v7rti Kal ri^ovri, olov opyrj
eAeos (pofios Kal ocra a\\a TOiavTQ, Kal ret TOVTOIS
9vavTta. Set &e Staipelv ret Trepl eKacrrov els Tpia-
\eytt) & oiov Trepi opyijs, TTOJS re StaKei/uLevoi 6p<yi\oi
eiari, Kat T KTIV eiu>6a(riv opyi^ecrdaiy Kal ewl TTO IOIS el
yap TO fj.ev ev rj ret Svo e^ot/zei/ TOVTWV, airavTa e
jU^7, a&vvarov av e ir] Triv opyriv efJiTroieiv d/iOtois 3e
What is here said of them, that they are characterised, as parts of our
moral nature, by being always attended by pleasure and pain one or
both, as anger is found likewise in Eth. N. II 4, sub init. Xyco 8e iradrj
fi.iv firidvuiav opyrjv (p6ftov dpaa-ot (so written here ; more correctly ddpaos,
II 5- 1 6,) tpdovov \apav <j>i\iav /xtcros rrodov ^Xov e\eov, o\a>s vis enfrat
i]8ovfi rf XVTTIJ. In Eth. Eudem. II 2, 1220 b 12, it is said of them, \(ya> 8e
iradr) peis rotavra, 0vp.ov (poftw cuSoS (mdvp.iav, (this is of course not in
tended for a complete list : alSas and tvtfopia come from the Nic. Eth.,
the former from the end of Book IV., where it appears with vt/jifcris as an
appendage to the list of virtues ; it is found likewise in the Rhet. II 6, un
der the name ala-xvvrj. iividv^ia is absent in the Rhetoric), oXwy ols
<os firi TO TTO\V (this is a modification of Aristotle s statement) 77 al
(this also is an addition) ijSovrj rj Xv-rrr] KO.& avra. In Magn. Mor. A 7, 8,
there is a summary account, borrowed directly from Aristotle, of the three
elementary divisions of man s moral nature, -n-ddrj 8wdfj.eis feis. Of the
first we find, Trddrj /ie> ovv tariv opyf) (poftos p.l(ros Trodos f^Xos eXfoy, ra
Toiavra, ols *1u>6e TrapaKoXovddv \virr) KOI ^ovij, 1 1 86 a 12, which is after
wards thus modified, C. 8, Il86 a 34, ra 8e iraQr) rjroi \vnai dcriv f) ijBovai,
r) OVK avfv \vTTT)s % jSovfjs. These Trddrj proper are therefore distinguished
from other rrddrj, feelings or affections of like nature, such as the appetites,
hunger and thirst (which are also attended by pleasure and pain), not
by pleasure and pain in general, as seems to be implied in the above
statements, but by the particular kinds of pleasures and pains that seve
rally accompany them ; bodily in the one case, mental and moral in the
other. So that the appetites belong to the body or material, the emotions ,
as they are now called, to the mind and the moral, immaterial, part of
man ; and feeling (the general term) and emotion (the special term) are
thus distinguished : all emotions are feelings, all feelings are not emotions.
pfTaftaXXovTes dicxpepovo-i] (differ by change) are brought over to a
different state of mind or feeling , npos ras Kpio-eis in respect of their
decisions , of all kinds; but especially judicial decisions and those of
national assemblies on questions of policy or expediency.
9. For rhetorical purposes we must divide the examination of
each TTO^OS into three parts ; the nature of them, what the disposition is
in one who feels the emotion ; the ordinary objects, against whom the
emotion is directed (as the ordinary objects of anger); and the ordinary
conditions, the occasions and circumstances which give rise to them.
Without the knowledge of all three in each case, it is impossible to excite
in the mind of anyone the feeling or emotion required.
PHTOPIKH2 B i 9 ; 2 i.
i T(av a\\(av. wcnrep ovv KUI iirt TWV Trpoeipn-
ras TrpOTacreis, OVTW Kai GTTI TOV-
Kai SieXw/uiev TOV elprj/nevov Tpoirov.
ecrrw $r] opyri ope^is /utera Avirrjs Tijucopias (paivo- CHAP, n
Siaypcxpeiv, de-scribere, de-lineare, to describe, lit. draw in detail, with
all the divisions (8m) marked : comp. dtdypapfia, of a mathematical dia
gram : applied to a descriptive analysis of a subject.
On this part of Aristotle s Rhetoric, the treatise on the -rradij, Bacon
has the following remarks, de Augm. Scient. VII 3, Vol. I. p. 736, ed.
Ellis et Spedding : Et hie rursus subiit nova admiratio, Aristotelem,
qui tot libros de Ethicis conscripsit, Affectus ut membrum Ethicae prin-
cipale in illis non tractasse ; in Rhetoricis autem ubi tractandi inter-
veniunt secundario (quatenus scilicet oratione cieri aut commoveri pos-
sint) locum illis reperisse; (in quo tamen loco, de iis, quantum tarn
paucis fieri potuit, acute et bene disseruit) . I quote this with the more
pleasure, as one of the few fair statements of Aristotle s merits to be
found in Bacon s writings.
CHAP. II.
i. eo-ro) 89] said of a provisional definition, suitable for rhetorical
purposes, but without scientific exactness. Comp. I 5. 3, and note, 6. 2,
7. 2, 10. 3. On rhetorical definitions, see Introd. p. 13.
opfis fifTa XVTTTJS /j.rj Trpocr^Kovros] This definition of anger occurs
likewise in the Topics, 156 a 30, 77 opyj) up(is eivai rt/xcopias 8ia
<j)aivop.evrjv dXiycoptav, as an average specimen of a dialectical defini
tion ; whence no doubt it was imported into the Rhetoric. Another
definition similar to this is again spoken of as popular and dialec
tical, and opposed to a true physical definition, de Anima I, 403^:29,
8ia(pp6vra>s 8 av opicrati/ro (pvcriids re KOI StaAefcriKos f<acrrov avrwv, oiov
opyrj TI e ariV 6 fifv yap opeiv dpriAvTT^crecos TJ n Toioirov, 6 8e ^eaiv TOV
jrepi xapdiav atfiaTos KOI Qcppov ; the latter is the appropriate form of
definition. And Plutarch, de Virt. Mor. p. 442 B, speaks of ope^is avn\v-
irrja-eas in terms which seem to imply that Aristotle had himself employed
as his own definition. This, says Seneca, de Ira, I 3. 3, very nearly corre
sponded with his own, (cupiditas iniuriae ulciscendae l 2. 4,) ait enim
(Arist.) tram esse cupiditatem doloris reponendi; which appears to be a
translation of opei? dj>TiXu7n? o-e<By. A passage of the Eth. Nic. VII 7,
1149 a 30, will illustrate some points of the definition of the Rhetoric.
6 6vp.os 8ia 6epfj.oTTjTa Kai TaxvTfJTa...6pp.a Trpbs rf/v Ti^wpiav, o p.fi> yap
Xoyo? rj 77 (pavracria OTI vftpis rj oXtywpi a e Sr/Xwcrei , o S (ncnrep cruA.Xoyt(ra-
/j-fvos OTI Sfl TO) TOIOVTW TfoXffif iv ^aXfTTatWi 8rj fvdvs rj 8 fTTidvp.ia, tav
(uaunt tiny OTI rj8u 6 \6yos fj r; atcr^^m?, op/j.a irpos TTJV aTruXavcriv. Here
two elements of anger are distinguished. And the pain lies in the strug
gle which the dvpos undergoes, whilst the pleasure is caused by the
satisfaction of the f7ridvp.ia, the appetite or desire of satisfaction or com
pensation for the injury inflicted, which is the object of the rt/xwpia. Vic-
torius quotes the Stoic definition of anger, ri/xajpia? linQv^ia TOV So/cowro?
i ov Trpoo-rjK<jvTti>v, which is derived probably from this of Aristotle.
PHTOPIKH2 B 2 i. 9
Sia (paivoiuevrjv 6\iyu)piav TWV ets CLVTOV r]
opfgis as a general term denotes a class of dpeei?, instinctive and
impulsive faculties of the soul or immaterial part, intellectual as well as
moral, the ultimate origin of all action in the human subject. Sir \V.
Hamilton, Lect. on Metaph. I p. 185, laments the want of any corre
sponding word in modern psychology, and proposes to supply it by the
term conative faculties. The optgts, so far as it is described at all, is
noticed in de Anima II 3, sub init., and afterwards more at length in ill
9 and 10; compare also Eth. N. VI 2. The first of these passages enu
merates the ascending stages or forms of life which characterise and
distinguish the ascending orders of plants and animals. The first, TO
^dpfTTTiKov, the life or principle of- growth and nutrition, is the lowest form,
and is characteristic of plants, which have no other. The second stage in
the development of life is TO alo-dqTiKov, with which ro opfKTt<6v, the ulti
mate origin of motion in the living animal, is inseparably connected ;
(sensation implies impulse) both of them being instinctive and both toge
ther constituting animal as distinguished from plant. But the lowest
animals have no power of motion; consequently the next stage in the
upward course is TO KIVTJTIKOV, local motion, or locomotion in space, Kara
TUTTOV. The last, which is peculiar to humanity, is TO StavotiTiKov, the
intellectual element, divided into vovs and Sidvoia. The opfK.riK.ov is here
divided, 414 b 2, into three classes of faculties, cVtdv/ua (the appetites, or
sensual desires) 1 , Ovpos (the passions, anger, love, hatred, and all the
more violent and impetuous emotions, the angry passions especially the
word is as old as Homer, a relic of antiquity, and as a psychological
term very vague and indistinct), and lastly poiiXrja-ts, which seems here to
include will as well as wish . The will is more directly implied,
though never disengaged and distinctly expressed, in the Trpoaipea-is
the moral faculty of deliberate purpose : this consists of an intellectual,
and also of an impulsive element, the spontaneous origin of moral action
which it is the office of the intellectual part to direct aright ; the irpoai-
peo-is accordingly is opeis fiov\evTiKij, Eth. N. VI 2, 1139 a 24, or again,
opeKTiKos vovs % opfgis diavorjTiK^, ib. b 4. These two elements in com
bination, (the Trpoaipfo-is}, are the dpx^ Trpageus, ib. a 32, of which the
optgis (and so de Anima ill 9. 2, 3, ev 8fj TO KIVOVV, TO optKTiKov,) is the
1 This reference of tTri0v/j.ia to the class of 6pteis indicates, as Plutarch, de
Virt. Mor. c. 3 (ap. Heitz, Verier. Schrift. Arist. p. 171), has pointed out, a
change in the Aristotelian psychology, from the Platonic tripartite division of the
human nature, intellectual and moral, which he originally held ws 5ij\6v larw e
uv (ypa\l/fv, i. e. in the lost dialogue irfpl 5iKa.u>(TiJvi)s, according to Heitz : the
eu/Moeides and eTri6vfj.i)Tii<6v are actually distinguished, Topic. B 7, 113 a 36 3,
and AS, 1 26 a 8 13, where we have the three, TO fm0v/j.i)TiK&v > ri> Ov^oeiS^, TO
\oytffTLKov (in both passages Tit 6vf*.ofio& is assigned as the seat of 6py/i); and the
division is certainly implied in Polit. iv (vn) 7, 1327 b 36, seq., where the
author is criticising the Republic to the views expressed in the de Anima, in
which the Platonic division is criticised, condemned, and rejected. Plutarch, 1. c.,
p. 442 B, after the statement above quoted, continues, Hffrepov dt rop.lv Ovpociois
T ewievTiK woatveip., us firi.eutJ.iav nvb. rov Ovp.ov OVTO. KO.I opf^iv WTI\U-
trews.
10 PHTOPIKHS B 2 i.
original moving agent : and this, though not expressly so called, is in
fact the will. In de Anima in cc. 9, io, are repeated the statements of
11 3, with the addition of further details. Of the three component ele
ments of opegis, the second, Gvpos, is omitted : and the five stages cf life
.of the former passage still remaining five, the intellectual is now divided
into two, TO VOTJTIKOV, and TO /BovXevTiKov (the speculative and practical
reason), and the KIVTJTIKOV Kara TQTTOV has disappeared. How this division
of the fyvxni sou l or life? s to ^ e reconciled with that of the Ethics II 4,
into iradri dwaptis eets, Aristotle has not told us, and no one I believe
has yet discovered. Of the three sets of 6pefis above mentioned opyij
must belong to the 0vp,6s.
P.CTCI XUTTIJS] all the iradr] being attended by pleasure or pain; or some
times both, as opy>?. Note on c. I. 8.
(paivoptvrjs and (paivopevTjv] are both emphatic; not merely apparent
and unreal, but manifest, conspicuous, evident . (paivo/Mevr) Ti/iwpia, a
punishment of which the effect can be perceived , (comp. II 3. 16, and note;
114.31, oiaQeudai yap K.T.X.) and 8ia (paivopcvrjv oXiywpmc, due to a
manifest slight ; a slight which is so manifest that it cannot escape ob
servation ; and therefore because it has been noticed by everybody, requires
the more exemplary punishment in the way of compensation. It is
because anger is an impulse towards this punishment or vengeance that
can be seen, and accompanied with pain until this impulse is quieted by
satisfaction, that we are told in I 11.9, that no one is angry with one
who appears to be beyond the reach of his vengeance, or with those who
are very far superior to him in power .
With <paivonfiv)s,for<l>avfpas, comp. I 7. 31 (note), 8. 6; 9. 32; II io. I ; 1 1. i ;
III 2. 9, Sia TO TrapaXX^Xa TO. evavria /naXicrra (paivf<r6ai, compared with II
23. 30, where the same phrase occurs with <j>avepa elvat for 0mWo-#at.
Topic. H 3> *53 a 3 1 OTTOIOU av nakiara tpavf) 6 Ivavrios opttr/ioy. Eth.
Nic. Ill 7, 1113 b 19, t 8e ravTa (paivfrai, KOI p-)j fxop.fv K.T.\. Parv. Nat.
de Long. Vit. c. 5, sub init. t^aiverai yap ovras. Compare also, alike for
the sense and the expression, Eth. Nic. v io, 1135 b 28, eVi (fiaivopivrj yap
dSiKia rj opyri l<mv. and Top. B 2, 109 b 36, the parallel case of envy, el
yap 6 (frdovos e ffTi \VTTT) eVt (fraivo/jLevy tvnpayla. TKIV enifiKwv Tivus. Plato
Phaedo 84 C, d Sampan;?, my Idelv tyaivero, (as plainly appeared in his face
and gesture). Eth. Eudem. ill i, 1229 b 12 (quoted in note on n 5. i), is
a good instance.
oXiycopiW] slight esteem or regard , slight . The cause of anger is stated
so nearly in the same terms in Rhet. ad Alex. 34 (35). u, dpyfjv 8e (f
(rofj.ev), eav firi8fiKvva>fj.fv Ttapa. TO Trpocr^/coi toXtycopij/xeVov? rj
r) TOIV <pi\a>v (Keivtov, rj avrovs r/ a>v KTjSo/j.ei oi rvyxavowiv avroi, that one
might almost suppose that the two explanations are derived from some
common source, perhaps a definition of anger current in the earlier trea
tises on Rhetoric, Thrasymachus eXeot (Rhet. ill I. 7, Plat. Phaedr. 267 c),
and the like.
A valuable commentary on this explanation of the cause of anger, the
coincidence between the two being manifestly accidental, is to be found
in Prof. Bain s work on The Emotions and the Will, p. 166, ch. ix. 3, on
the irascible emotion . "These two facts both pertain," he says, "to the
nature of true anger, the discomposure of mind from the circumstance of
PHTOPIKH2 B 2 i, 2. n
2 avTOVy TOV oXfywpelv /mrj 7rpO(T}]KOVTOs. el $rj TOUT
another man s intention in working evil against us, and the cure of this
discomposure by the submission or suffering of the agent." I will only add
one remark upon this interesting subject ; that when Aristotle assigns oXt-
ycopia, the contempt and indifference to our feelings and sense of personal
dignity implied in the notion of slight , as the main cause of the emotion
of anger, he is thinking only of the angry passion as excited against a fellow
man. Yet we are angry with a dog that bites, or a cat that scratches us 1 ,
and here there cannot in all cases be any sense of undeserved contempt
or indifference to provoke the angry feeling ; though perhaps sometimes
it may be increased by such an act of aggression, if the animal happen to
be a pet or favourite, in which case we may extend (by analogy) human
feelings to the brute, comparing him unconsciously with a friend who has
injured us, and forgetting the intellectual and moral differences of the
two, which aggravate the offence in the human subject. Seneca denies
the capacity of anger to all but man: de Ira, I 3. 4, dicendum est feras
ira carere et omnia praeter hominem.
Ttov ds avrov ( him i.e. avrov, himself ) 77 TO>V av roO] This phrase,
which is unusually elliptical even for Aristotle must it seems be thus
filled up and explained. r<av fly avrov means rS>v d8t,K.T)6evTow or simply
jrpaxdfvTcov ds avruv, offences or acts committed against oneself, and
oXtyaplav TV>V is, slight or contemptuous indifference of, i. e. shewn in,
evidenced by, offences &c. ; in supplying the ellipse in the other part of
the phrase, fj ra>v avrov, we are guided by a similar expression, c. 8 7,
77 aurw (so the MSS here) f/ rwv aiirov, r) e ATriVcu ytvitrdot 17
77 TO>V auToC; in both of them the indef. pronoun is omitted, rj TWO.
TU>V avrov in c. 2. i, and nvi in the two other places.
TOV o\iya>pflv /ir) TrpoaijKovTos 2 , the last term of the definition, adds to
1 On the manner in which anger vents itself upon all sorts of objects indis
criminately, see Pint, de cohibenda ira, p. 455 D, 6v/j.$ 5 adiKrov ovotv ov8 dveiri-
%ttprjToi> d\\ 6pyt.$[J.t&a Kal iro\f/j. iois Kal 0iXou /cat rfe ots /cat yovevvi, Kal fleets
vrj Ala, Kal Bripiois, Kal dtyvxpis ffKeveffi, which is further illustrated by some
examples.
2 This appears likewise in the Stoic definition quoted above. I believe it has
not hitherto been noticed that the four terms usually employed in Greek to express
the notion of duty or obligation may be distinguished as implying four different
sources of obligation, and represent appeals to four different principles by which
our actions are guided. The four are irpoa-fiKei, Set, XOT;, irptirei. The first, TO
TrpoafjKov, expresses a natural connexion or relationship, and hence a law of nature,
the prescriptions of $i/<rts ; as ol Trpo<r-f)KovTes are our natural relations. This,
therefore, is the form of obligation that nature imposes upon us, or natural pro
priety. The second, Sfi, is of course connected with detv, to bind , and Secryuo s,
and denotes the binding nature of an Q\>-ligation\ which is equally suggested by
the Lat. obligatio. TO Stov is therefore the moral bond, the binding engagement,
by which we are bound to do what is right. The third, x/"7> r XPtuv, appeals to
the principle of utility or expediency, x/^cr^ Uj XP e a > by which human conduct
is directed as a principle of action, and accordingly expresses the obligation of
a man s duty to himself, and the necessary regard for his own interest which the
law of self-preservation requires. Besides these, we have irp^rrfi, TO irptirov;
decorum, quod decet, Cic. de Off. I. 27, y0</aptum est in omni vita; the befitting,
12 PHTOPIKH2 B 2 2.
e.(TTLV t] opyriy dvcvyKn rov dpryi^o/mevov 6pyi^e(r6ai del
the offence at the slight which provokes anger the consciousness or feel
ing that the slight is something which is not our due: by a slight the
sense of personal dignity is offended : we know that we do not deserve it,
and are the more enraged. This is a necessary qualification a <rvfj.fif-
PTJKOS Kad* WTO, and therefore added to the definition because there may
be cases in which an insult or injury arouses no angry feeling, when the
person insulted is very far inferior in rank and condition to the offender
or of a very abject and submissive temper, or if the power of the
aggressor is so great and imposing, that the injured person is terrified
and daunted instead of angry, n 3. 10. So at least Aristotle : but I am
more inclined to agree with Seneca on this point, who to a supposed
objection to his definition, cupiditas ulciscendi, replies thus, de Ira, I 3. 2,
Primum diximus cupiditatem esse poenac exigendae, nonfacultatem: con-
cupiscunt (intern homines et quae non possunt. Deinde nemo tarn humilis
est, qui poenam vel summi hominis sperare non possit: ad nocendum
potentes sumus. And anger is apt to be blind and unreasonable. This
is an answer to I 11.9, already referred to.
The definition therefore of anger in full, is as follows : an impulsive
desire, accompanied by pain (and also pleasure, as is afterwards added),
of vengeance (punishment of, and compensation for, an offence) visible or
evident (in its result), due to a manifest (and unmistakeable) slight (con
sisting, or shewn) in (insults, indignities, wrongs) directed against our
selves, or (any) of our friends, when (we feel that) the slight is unde
served ; or literally, is not naturally and properly belonging to us , not
our due, in consideration of our rank and importance or of our personal
merits and qualifications.
Bacon s Essay, Of Anger, has one point at least in common with Ari
stotle s delineation of it. " The causes and motives of anger are chiefly
three. First to be too sensible of hurt; for no man is angry that feels
not himself hurt... The next is, the apprehension and construction of
the injury offered to be, in the circumstances thereof, full of contempt;
for contempt is that which putteth an edge upon anger, as much or more
than the hurt itself." "For raising and appeasing anger in another; it is
done chiefly by choosing of times r when men are forwardest and worst
disposed, to incense them. Again, by gathering all that you can find out
to aggravate the contempt."
2. Anger is- directed against the individual, not the genus or spe
cies (comp. c. 3. 1 6): that is, it is excited by a definite, concrete, single
individual, and by a distinct provocation, not by a mere mental abstrac
tion, or a whole class of objects. This is one of the characteristics which
distinguish it from plo-os or f\0pa , infra c. 4, KOI J fj.fv opyfj <m Trtp\ TO. Kaff
the becoming; which represents the general notion of fitness or propriety: that
principle of ap/j-ovta or /COO^UOTT/S (and the /cocr/xos), of harmony and adaptation,
which Dr Clarke selected as the basis of all morality, and styled the fitness of
things . Our English words ought and duty, expressive of moral obligation in
general, are both of them borrowed from the notion of a debt, which is owed*
in the one case, and due* from us in the other, to our neighbour; comp. d<pei\fw t
u<pe\ov. " Owe no man any thing, but to love one another."
PHTOPIKHS B 2 2. 13
TU)V KCt6 eKCLCTTOV TlVl, OLOV KAeoW d\\ OUK dvOptOTTO),
Kdl OTL O.VTOV n TWV CtVTOU TLVO. TL TTeTTOi^/cej/ /; r ]/UL6\- P. 13/
Xev, Kai Tracrri opyrj CTrecrQai Tiva ijdovtjv TIJV aVo T^S
TOV Ti/ULwprj(raa 6ai q$u fjiv yap TO o ieo~6ai
vaTtav 6<i6Tai ai/rw,
&o /cccAws eiprjTai Trepi BUJULOU
8<s T6 TroAi) -yXvKiwv
dv^piav eV (TTriQecrcnv de^erac
(Kaara, OLOV KaXXt a rj 2Kparft, ro Se pficros KOL TTpos ra yevrj rbi> yap K\t7rrr]V
fjLio-f t KOI TOV (ruKoffrdvrrjv anas. [For KXeam, sec III 5. 2.] Add to these,
national antipathies, family feuds, class prejudices, religious and political
enmities, the odium theologicum, &c. On the ordinary objects of anger,
Prof. Bain says, Emotions and Will, p. 163, "The objects of irascible
feeling are chiefly persons ; but inanimate things may occasionally cause
an imperfect form of it to arise." Aristotle omits this. Mr Bain, more
correctly than Aristotle, includes under the same head, the irascible emo
tion , hatred, revenge, antipathy and resentment, or righteous indignation
(vefj.f(Tis) with anger, as mere varieties of the same iraQos or emotion.
Again, it is provoked by any injury (or insult) committed or intended,
f) ij-fjroi^Ke TIS T) r/^eXXei , either against ourselves, or any of our relations,
friends, dependants, anyone in whose welfare we are interested.
Thirdly, (as we gather from the terms of the definition, optgis Tt^w-
pias,} every angry emotion is accompanied by a feeling of pleasure, that,
namely (TTJV Bekk. rfjs A c ), which arises from the hope of vengeance upon,
or of punishing (both are included in rt/icopi a), (the person who has offended
us) . First of all revenge is in itself pleasant : /eat TO rt/ia>pe la-dai Tj8v uv
yap TO fir/ Tvy\dvfiv \vTrrjpov TO Tvy\avtiv ^8v ol 8 opyt6fj.fvoi \vTrovvrai
dvvTT(pP\T]T<ii>s /iij rt/xwpov /xei/oi, t\TTiovTfs 8e xai pouo-tc. Coinp. Eth. Nic. IV
II, 1126 a 2, TI yap r4/ia)pi a Travel Trjs opyrjs, rj8ovf/v dvrl TTJS \VTTT)? e /iTroi-
oG<ra. TOUTOV 8e pr) yevopevov TO /Sapor e^ovcriv, For it is pleasant to
think that we shall attain to the object of our desire , (the pleasure
of hope or anticipation, I n. 6, 7,) and no one ever aims at what is
evidently impossible for himself (to attain), and the angry man s desire
always aims at what he (believes to be) possible for himself. He always
supposes that he shall obtain the object of his desire, the punishment of
the offender, and therefore even in his anger he feels pleasure in the pro
spective satisfaction. The first of the two following lines of Homer, II. 2
109, has been already quoted in illustration of the same topic, the plea
sure of anger in the prospect of revenge, I II. 9. In the passage quoted
above from Seneca, de Ira, I 3. 2, what is here said, ovfteis TO>V (pati/o/^ei/cui/
dSwaTuv tyifrai OVTW, may seem at first sight to be contradicted. The
two statements are however different : Seneca says that a man may wish
for what is quite beyond his reach; Aristotle says that he never aims
at it, never uses any exertion to attain to that which he knows to be
14 PHTOPIKHS B 2 2, 3.
aKO\ov6eT yap Kal ySovri TIS Sid re rouro KCLI Start
Ctarpifiovariv ev rw rt/uLcopela-dat ry Stavoia tj ovv
rore >yivofj.evn (f)avraa-ia qSovtjv e/xTrote?, cacTTrcp 77 rwv
3 evvTTVtwv^ 67ret $ r\ oXtywpia e<rrlv evepyeta
^attainable : which is equally true. No one ever deliberates about things
which are not under his own control. (For a list of such things see Eth.
Nic. in 5, sub init.)
But this anticipation of the /#///>? is not the only source of the plea
sure which we feel in an angry mood : it as accompanied by yet another
pleasure, the present pleasure of dwelling in the mind on the prospective
vengeance : it is the fancy that then arises (presents itself) that produces
the pleasure in us, just like that of dreams . On the pleasures of the <t> av -
raa-la, and the fyavTaala itself, see again I ii. 6, 7, and the notes there.
Schrader refers to an excellent illustration of this pleasure of dwelling
on the prospect of vengeance, in Terent. Adelph. in 2. 12, seq. beginning,
me miserum, vix sum compos animi, ita ardco iracundid*-.
3. eWi 8 ] has either no apodosis at all which is highly probable
in itself, and seems to be Bekker s view, who retains the full stop at vn-o-
Xap^avojMr: or else we may suppose with Vater that the apodosis is rpia
$ eWf...; in which case Se may be added to the examples of the apo-
dotic Se in note on I i. n, or omitted with MSS Q, Y b , Z b . According to
Vater s view the connexion will be, that whereas (JXiyap/a is an expression
of contempt for somebody or something supposed to be worthless, whe
ther it be so or not in reality, there are accordingly three kinds of eftiyco-
pla each expressing contempt, but in three different forms, or modes of
manifestation. To the three kinds of S\ iyo >pia here distinguished aW
1 See also on the pleasure of irascible emotion, Bain, Emotions and Will,
c. ix. 4. Mr Bain acknowledges, though he regards it as anomalous, the painful
fact that pleasure at the sight of suffering inflicted, especially under circumstances
of violent excitement when the passions are already inflamed, as at the sack of
a captured town, is in reality a phenomenon of human nature. Other examples
of this are the notoriously cruel habits of children in their treatment of animals,
and in their ordinary sports; the pleasure found in gladiatorial combats, bull
fights, bear baiting, cock and quail fights, and all the other cruel exhibitions
which have amused the most civilized as well as barbarous spectators. He traces
this to three sources, of which the principal is the love of power. I will venture
to add three more possible elements of the emotion, which may contribute,
without superseding the others, to the production of it. First, the sense of con
trast between the suffering which we are witnessing in another and our own
present immunity : this is the principle implied in Lucretius Suave mart magno,
and is illustrated in I n. 8, of this work. Secondly, it may be partly traced to
curiosity the pleasure of learning, as Aristotle calls it and the stimulus of sur
prise or wonder which we feel at any exciting spectacle; another source of
pleasure mentioned by Aristotle in the same chapter. And thirdly, perhaps
a distorted and perverted sympathy (this is an ordinary source of pleasure), which
gives us an independent interest in the sufferings of any creature whose feelings,
and consequent liability to suffering, we share that is, of all animated beings
with inanimate objects there can be no sympathy.
PHTOPIKH2 B 2 3, 4. 15
Trepi TO /nrjSevos a^tov (paivo/uLevov KCU yap TO. KCCKO.
KCCI Tctyada a^ia oiojj.e6a crTrcivSfjs eivai, KCII TO.
Teivovra irpo s avTct ocra $e /uri^ev TI i] fJLiKpov, ou
a^ia v7ro\ajm]3avojuLev* Tpia etrriV e l^rj 6\iy capias,
4 Kara(f)p6vri<ri i s TC KCII eTrrjpeaarjULo^ KCU vfipis* o T6 yap
Kara(f)povu)V oXiywpel (ocra yap oiovrai jULtidevos
KaTa(ppovou<riv 9 TUIV 3e Kara(j)povou-
(rx vvT ia i g added in c. 6 2. In Dem. de F. L. 228 it follows emuSe/a
as its ordinary companion (compare Shilleto s note).
eWpyeta Sogrjs] represents the opinion, hitherto dormant or latent, as
roused into active exercise as a realised capacity, a Swapis become an
fvtpyeia. The mere opinion of the vvorthlessness of so and so, has now
become developed into oXiywpi a, and assumed the form of an active or
actual expression of the contempt by the outward token of slight regard .
oXtywpi a therefore shews indifference , as to something that we do
not care for at all, or regard as something so contemptible, so devoid of
all positive character, that it is not worth forming an opinion about :
what is positively good or bad is always worthy of earnest attention , or
serious anxiety. On a-novSj earnest , as opposed to TrmSta sport (Plat.
Phaedr. 276 D, compared with E, Rep. x 602 B, alibi), and on a-irovdnlos
serious , earnest , of solid worth or value , opposed to <f)av\os light ,
trifling , frivolous , unsubstantial , worthless , and hence morally
good and bad , see note on I 5. 8.
KOI TO. o-vvrdvovra] as well as everything that has that tendency ;
viz. to good and bad. There are three kinds of slight, or contemptuous
indifference, contempt, spite and wanton outrage . First, contempt
involves oXtyupm ; because people despise men and things that they
regard as "worthless, and 6\iya>pia, slight esteem, contemptuous indiffer
ence, is directed to the same objects , whence it appears that they have a
common element, and that KaTa(pp6vr)ans is oXiycopia ris, a kind of slight.
4. A second kind of o\iy<opia is fjrr]peaa-[i6s, spiteful opposition to,
"wanton interference with, the plans and wishes (ralj @ov\ij<rt<n) of others,
in order to thwart them, where you gain no advantage to yourself by
doing so ; where the motive is the mere malicious pleasure of disconcert
ing some one, and thereby shewing your power over them : which is the
root of the wanton love of mischief inherent in human nature : comp.
6. This is an inclination to thwart or interfere with the wishes of
another, not for any advantage that you expect to derive from it yourself,
but merely for the mischievous satisfaction of depriving him of it. The
slight regard therefore is shewn in the wantonness of the offence ; for it
is plain that there is no intention (lit. supposition) of injury in a slight
that would imply fear, not merely indifference nor of doing him any
service, none at least worth speaking of (oXiywpi a excludes the notion of
good as well as bad, it is mere indifference; 3, KCU yap ra KUKO. ical
rdyada aia oio^e<9a <nrov8qs elvai K.T.X.); for this (doing him service)
would imply care for him, solicitude for his welfare, and that again
16 PHTOPIKH2 B 2 4,
fjievwv oXiyiapovcriv) Kai 6 eirtjpeafyv [(fraiverai
<ppovelv\. ecrTi yap 6 eTT^jOeacryUO? e /iTrocW/xo? TCUS
friendship, ///. for (in that case) he would have shewn that he cared for
him, and therefore (so that wore, it would follow) that he was his friend .
The argument of eVet ovv <f)[\os flvai is this. The wantonness of the
mischief which is the effect of fTrrjpfaa-fios, (spiteful interference with your
neighbour s inclinations,) shews that oXtywpia enters into it in this, that it
must proceed from a contemptuous indifference as to the person and cha
racter of the victim ; for the very wantonness of the act, that it is done
for mere amusement, and without any prospect of advantage, shews the
slight regard that the perpetrator has for the sufferer ; that he neither
fears him as he must have done if he wished to hurt or injure him by
thwarting his schemes, nor esteems and respects him as a friend, as
would necessarily be the case if he intended to interfere with and oppose
his plans and inclinations for the other s benefit : and therefore the indif
ference that he does manifest must be indicative of contempt.
eTTTjpeaa-fj.6s] appears to be almost a avral \eyop.evov ; only two ex
amples are given in Steph. Lex., one from Diodorus and the other from
Pollux no great authorities. [It is also found infra c. 4 30.] The
usual form of it in the ordinary language is enr/peia, which occurs in
much the same sense; as also fTrrjpedfciv frequently in Demosthenes,
and less frequently elsewhere, as in Xenophon and the Comic Poets.
Thucyd. I 26 is a good instance as a commentary upon Aristotle s
text, and illustrative of his interpretation : of the Corcyreans, during
their war with the Corinthians, it is said that after the surrender of
their colony Epidamnus to the Corinthians, they took this to heart, and
despatched a force of 25 ships, to demand amongst other things the
restitution of the Epidamnian exiles ; and this they did KOT- enripeiav,
1 they bade them out of mere spite and wantonness without any prospect
of benefit to themselves, merely for the purpose of annoying the others.
Comp. firT)peafiv, Dem. c. Mid. p. 519, of Midias vexatious annoyance,
(nrjpfia ib. p. 522 ult. where it is distinguished from vfBpis, the wanton out
rage on the sacred person of the choragus. See also de Cor. p. 229, lines
8, 14 in both of which it is applied to spiteful, wantonly offensive language;
whereas in Aristotle it is e /iTroSur/Lios rats fiovKrja-fo-iv, and in Plut. Reip.
Gcr. Praec. p. 816 C, it is applied to acts of this character, fj Trpdecriv
fXovvais tfn\oripUuf (rrrjpedfais; as in Ar. Pol. Ill 16, 1287 a 38, TroXAa
Trpos fnripfiav KOI x<ipiv eluidacrt Trpdrrftv , which also marks the
wantonness characteristic of it by the addition of Trpoy x"P lv - I n Plut.
Coriol. 334 D, OVK eVi Kcpdetnv ciAAa 8t vftpiv KOI Trtpxppovrjcriv rols irtvrjcriv
e-mipfdfav, which marks the wanton character of the acts of oppression.
These passages from Plutarch with some others from the same author
are to be found in Wyttenbach s note on Plutarch, p. 135 D. He renders
it vexantes, infestantes, per invidiam et contumcliam. The only other
instance that I will refer to, occurs in Herod. VI 9, where the word seems
at first sight to bear a different meaning, threatening : rdde a<pi Xeyere
f-rrrjped^ovTft ra Trep afpfas Kare , (and SO Schweighauser s Lexicon
minitari }. But by comparing the word as here used with its use and
explanation in other authors, we see that the sense of the threat is only
PHTOPIKH2 B 2 4, 5. 17
ov% iva TI avrca d\\ iva /mr] e/ce/Vw. ewel
ovv ov% iva avTw TL, 6\tyt*)pi $t]\ov yap OTI oi/re
0\d\jseiv V7ro\a[ji{3dvei, 6(pofielTO yap av Kai OVK to\i-
ycopei, OVT u><p6\r]orai av ovdev d^tov \oyov 9 i<pp6vTi^e
5 jap av wcrre <pi\os elvai. Kai 6 vppifyov & oXt-y co-
pel e(TTi yap vfipis TO j3\a7TTeiv Kai XvTreiv 6(> ois
alor^vvr] etrri Tto TraV^ot/Tf, jULt] it/a TI yevqrai avTto
d\\o i} on eyevero, d\X OTTOJS tjffOfl oi yap dvriTroi-
implied, and that the prominent and characteristic signification is, as else
where, insult or spite them by telling them the fate that will overtake
them .
wore c^iXos e?i/ai] is an instance of a not unfrequent attraction of a
substantive or adjective, ordinarily in the accusative, within a gramma
tical bracket, as it were, to the subject of the verb without it here e$poi>-
nt and hence expressed in the nominative. Plat. Euthyd. 273 A, vftpt-
(rrrjs 8ta TO j/e o? elvai. Arist. de part. Anim. IV 8. 2, ^p^crip.ai npos TO
Xu/3o{!crat 7r/3ocr0pecr^at rfjv Tpofyijv. Plat. Phaedo 83 D, fS<rrf...Kai acrntp
(riTfipofjiiirri (fj.(pvT0aj., teal fK TOVTOV a/jioipos flvai K.T.\.
5. v/3piy] which corresponds with the preceding in some points,
while it differs in others, is an injury or annoyance inflicted, involving
disgrace to the sufferer ; for no benefit that is expected to accrue to the
aggressor except the mere fact of its having been done, in other words
the pleasure of doing it : for retaliation is not wanton outrage but ven
geance or punishment . This is the locus classicus for the explanation of
vftpis. so important in the Orators and the Athenian law. See note on
112. 26, where it is examined from this point of view. The outraged per
sonal dignity, the wounded honour, which gives its special sting to an
act of vftpis, and distinguishes it from a mere assault, atVi a, is noted in
the text by the phrase t<p ots al<rxvvri tori rw naa-xovri, and the rest of the
definition describes the wantonness of the aggression, which Cfipis has
in common with eV^peao-^or, and in which the oXiycop/a is shewn. Com
pare 113. 10, where the two same characteristics of {J/3pi? reappear; oiJ
yap ei eVdrae Trairtar vftpicrfv, aXX el eWra TOV, olov rov ariyiatrat fK.tivta> %
avros riaBrjvai. vjBpis therefore is wanton outrage, an insult or injury
which disgraces and humiliates its victim, and is prompted by no motive
but the mere momentary gratification of humiliating another and therein
indulging the love and the sense of power. Some illustrations of acts of
vfipis are to be found in Polit. vm (v), 10, 1311 033. Personal outrage,
cVt TO o-c5/ia, is one of the causes of conspiracy and revolution, rfjs 8
v/Spfcoy ovarrjs noXvp-tpovs, eKatTTov aiiratv CUTIOV yivfrai rr)s dpyfjs T<0>v 8
opyio[i.ev<j>v crxtftov oi TrXetoroi ripupias X^P IV fTrtrt^eirat, aXX 01)^ vrrepo^y,
olov K.T.\. and then follows a number of examples. It is plain however
from a comparison of this with what immediately follows in the Rhet.
6, where vftpis is traced to the love of vTrepoxJ, that the vftpts here
spoken of is confined to insults or outrages of a particular kind, offered to
the person, els TO o-w/xa.
AR. II. 2
1 8 PHTOPIKHS B 2 6.
6 OUVTCS ov% v/3pi(ov(riv d\\a TijULtopovvTai. aiTiov c)e
Trjs vSovfjs TO!? vfipifyvcriv, OTL o tovrai /ca/cws SpaJvres
avrovs VTrepe^eiv /uLa\\ov. $10 ol veoi Kcti ol TrXovcriot
6. The cause or source of the pleasure which men feel in wanton
outrages is that they think that by the illtreatment of (by doing mischief
to) others they are shewing in an unusual degree their superiority over
them . fj.aX\ov more than they otherwise would . Superiority, or
excess in merit and good qualities, is a mark of virtue, I 9. 39, ?/ 6 vTrtp-
0^17 TU>V Kakwv. ...77 inrfpo^rj 8oKfl pr/vvfiv aperrfv ; and a source of plea
sure, I 11.14, T VIK.O.V r]8v.,.(pavTao~ia yap vnfpo^fjs yiyverai, ov rravrfs
e^ovcriv fTridvfiiav rj rjptfia 77 paXXuv, and the corollaries of this, 15- T O
ap%eiv TJ8i<TTov, ib. 27. On the emotion of power and its ramifications,
the various modes in which it exhibits itself, see Mr Bain s excellent
chapter (vin), Emotions and Will, p. 145 seq. and the quotation from
Dugald Stewart in the note at the commencement [chap. x. p. I92,ed. 1875].
810 ol veoi. i5/3picrrai] Comp. II 12. 15, *al ra dStKr;/nara d8iKov<riv els
vftpiv KOI ov KaKovpyiav. This character and tendency of youth is also
expressed in one of the two opposite senses of the derivatives veavia?,
veavievtadai, vtaviKos. The two last convey, in different contexts, the two
sides of the youthful character, and the good and bad qualities by which
it is specially distinguished. On the one hand, they represent the
gallant, spirited, vigorous, impetuous, nature of youth (tS KOI ytwaiuas,
are veos v, Plat. Soph. 239 B), on the other the petulousness, wantonness,
insolence, which sometimes characterises itprotervtts, fcrox, superbus,
Ast, Lex. Plat. s. v. vtaviKos. Both senses are abundantly illustrated in
Plato. I will only quote Soph. 239 D, ri TLS rw veavia (this audacious, im
pertinent, youngster) npbs TO e pa>rw/iei/oi> cnroKpivfiTai. See Heindorf ad loc.
who refers to Eur. Suppl. 580, Arist. Vesp. 1333, and interprets the word
de homine feroci insolentique ; and veavieveo-0ai, as exemplified in Lysias
speech (Phaedr. 235 A), which ran riot , passed all bounds of modera
tion in the endeavour to shew, &c. ; and (according to Callicles, Gorg.
482 c) in that of Socrates, who had been talking like a mob-orator,
running riot, luxuriating in language full of exaggeration, extravagance.
So that to play the youth, act like a young man , sometimes means rash
and arrogant, wanton, insolent, overbearing, extravagant, licentious
conduct. The examples of both these words in Demosthenes display a
leaning towards the more favourable view of the youthful character.
Plat. Euthyd. 273 A, v^piarfis fie fita TO vfos flvai (Gaisford).
01 TrXoiItriot] II l6. I, rco 8e TrAovTto a eTrerat i ]8r} eViTroA^? earlv iSfTv
an-ao-ii/ v/3piarat yap KOI vTTfprjfpavoi, and the reason of this. And again
4 like the pcot, SiK7;/iaTa dSiKovo-iv ov KciKovpyuta tzXXa TO. p.fi> vj3pio-TiK(i ra
5e aKpaTfVTiica. In applying the doctrine of the mean to the various
orders of population, with the view of determining the best form of
government, Aristotle makes the following remark, Polit. VI (iv) ir, 1295
b 6, all excess and defect is injurious ; vnepKaXovo e fj inrfpio- xvpov TJ vTrfpev-
yfvfj f) inr(pTr\ovcrtoi>, r/ ravavria TOVTOLS, inrepTTT<f>xoV fj vTrfpacrSfffj kal o-(p68pa
^aX?roj TO) Xoya) a/(d\ovd(li>> yiyvovTai yap ol p.tv vfipio~Ta\ /cni
PHTOPIKH2 B 2 6, 7. 19
( VTrepi^eiv yap GIOVTOLI v/Spi^ovTes. is/Spews
; aTifJiia, 6 S aTifJiat tov 6\LycvpeI TO yap p.t]$evos
-LOV ou$e[j.iav ^X eL Tl l Uir l l/ > OVT dyaQov OVTC KUKOU.
6 \eyei 6pyi(^o/u.evos 6 A^tAAei/s
eXtov yap e^ei yepas ai/ro? aTrovpas r- 57-
KCtl
MS 61 TLV aTlfJLtlTOV
7 ok Sid TavTa opyi^ojuevos. TrpocrriKeiv o iovrai TTO-
rcov ra pev yiyverai Si vppiv TO. be Sia KaKovpyiav: where we have again the
same distinction of crimes as in the two passages of the Rhetoric already
quoted, II 12. 15, and 16.4; and a third time 13. 14, where the opposite
fls KaKovpyiav, OVK ds vftpiv is said of old men. Crimes are hereby
divided into two classes, crimes on a great and on a petty scale; high-
minded crimes of violence and audacity, outrages which imply a sense
of power and superiority in those who commit them ; and sneaking,
underhand crimes, of fraud and low villany, which are the crimes which
the poor and mean are especially inclined to.
inrepexeiv yap o iovrai vfipiovres] This, as we have already seen, is a
general tendency of human nature: but besides this general inclination,
there is in the case of the young a special desire and a special inclination
to assert their superiority to others, which is shewn in the love of victory,
or getting the better of an opponent in the mimic combats and contests
of their games ; and also in their love of honour or spirit of ambition ;
VTrepox^jS yap e7TL0VfJ.fi ij veorrjs, ij 8e VIKTJ uTrfpo;^ Tty, II 12. 6.
Again, vftpis is a mark of disrespect, inflicts disgrace or indignity,
and this again is a mark of slight esteem ; and this feeling of disrespect,
and the disgrace and dishonour to the sufferer that accompany it, shew
that the object of them is considered of no worth or value, because he has
no honour (but the contrary), which is as much as to say that he is of no
value (TI^T; having the double sense), worth nothing either for good
or for evil , and therefore is the object of the contemptuous indifference
which is the sting of oXtycop/o-
This disgrace and indignity is then illustrated by two lines of Homer
II. A 356, repeated in I (ix) 367, and I (ix) 648 (644), in which the angry
Achilles expresses his indignation at the slight put upon him by Agamem
non, who had taken and kept for himself (avros ?x ft ) ^ ie P r sent (gift of
honour, one of the peprj Tiprjs; see note on yepa, I 5. 9, p. 85) of which he
had deprived him ; and had treated him like some despised alien or
vagabond . peravdaTT]?, comp. II. n (xvi) 59, where the line is repeated,
properly a settler in a foreign land , like the peToiKoi at Athens, a despised
class without civil rights, and therefore dr/^rot; Ar. Pol. Ill 5, 1278 a 36,
a><T7Tfp KOL "OfJLTjpos eTToir](rev "wcrfi rw dri^rov fjLeravdcrTrjv" axnrep fj.eToi.Kos
ydp ea-riv 6 ru>v n^v prf ^erex^v. And Herod, vii 161, where the Athe
nians boast that they are p.ovvoi ov fieravda-rai EXXrjvav.
7. Now men think they have a natural claim (rpo<r/; /<fti/, note on II.
i p. 1 1, IJLT] tTpoo-rjKovTos) to especial respect and consideration (7roAvo>peZrr$ai)
2 2
20 PHTOPIKHS B 27, 3.
\va)pel(r6ai VTTO TWV r\TTOVWV Kara yevos, Kara
fj.iv, Kar dpeTYiv, Kai oAws ev ta av ravrio VTrepe^ P. 13
7TO\Vj o!ov ev xpti/uacriv 6 TrXoi/Vios TreV^ros Kai ev
TW \eyeiv ptyropiKos a&vvarov eiTrelv Kai ap^wv dp%o-
fj.evov Kai ap^eiv a^ios oiop.evos TOV dp^ecrBai d^iou.
$10 eiprjTai
Kai
d\\d ye Kai /aeTOTTKrOev e^ei KOTOV*
8 dyavaKTOvcri yap $ta Tt]V vTrepo-^rjV. eVi v(j) u)V
o lerai ev Trdcreiv (HeTv OVTOI 3 eicriv oi/s ev
(and therefore are all the more angry, the slight is felt more deeply, when
they fail to receive it) from their inferiors in birth, power, virtue (i.e.
merit), and generally in anything in which they far surpass (him who
slights them) when it is of the same kind (falls under the same ytvos or
class) (as that in which they themselves excel) ; as in money the rich man
(claims respect) from the poor, the accomplished orator from one that has
no faculty for speaking, the governor from the governed, or one who
thinks he has the right to bear rule from one who only deserves to
obey .
TToXncopeTv, a rare word, found once in Aeschin. c .Timarch. 50. in a copy
of evidence, to pay attention to , but chiefly in later writers, (TroXvcopt a a
Stoic term). It is opposed to, and formed upon the analogy of oAtyco-
pt iv, and therefore appropriate here.
pqropi/cos] "uocantur prjTopiicoi diserti et eloquentes homines. Isocr.
Nicocl. 8, Kai prjropiKovs fjitv KaXovfifV TOVS Iv T<W TrXijda dwapfvovs \eyfiv.
Victorius.
This is illustrated by two more lines of Homer, II. B 196, great is the
wrath of divine-bred kings ( in Homeri II. B 196, singulare Atorpecptos
/Sao-tAjJoy legitur. Sed cum haec sententia in proverbium abiisset, universe
pronuntiandum erat plurali numero. Vater) ; and, II. A 82, Yet it may be
that even hereafter he keeps a grudge here the endurance of the wrath
indicates its original violence and the magnitude of the slight that
provoked it (dXXa ye KOI, the vulg., is retained by Bekker. MSS
A c , Y b , Z b have re, as also Mr Paley s text). ayavanrovcn yap K.T.\. For
the lasting vexation (this is in explanation of the ^eron-to-tfei/ KOTOV of the
last quotation) is owing to their superiority .
8. Another aggravation of anger and the sense of slight arises,
when the insult or injury proceeds from those from whom, as he con
ceives, kind and courteous treatment is due; such are those who are
indebted to him for benefits past or present, bestowed either by himself
or on his account (such as are due to him) or by one of his friends, or
those to whom he wishes well (wishes to benefit) or ever did (wish well) .
For the antecedent to v< d>v, and the supplement of the context, we may
PHTOP1KH2 B 2 S, 9 . 21
TTOtely i] avros / / & avrov TIS i] TWV CIVTOV r*s, $
rj efiovXtidtj.
(pavepov ovv e/c TOUTCOV ifif] TTWS r e^oi/res opyi-
Tai avTOi Kal Ticri Kai did irola. avTOi fJLev yap,
OTCIV \V7TtSvTCtl 6(bl6TCtl *yap TLVOS 6 \V7TOVfJ.ZVOS OtV
T6 ovv KUT evBuwpiav OTLOVV avriKpovcrn T*?, oiov TW
understand (as I have done) opylfovrai p.aX\ov from what has preceded, or
possibly ayavoKTovtrw from the immediately preceding clause : otherwise
repeat olovrat iro\va>pflo-6ai from the beginning of 7.
9. From what has been said it is by this time clear (we may now infer
from the preceding statements) what the angry disposition or state of
mind is, what sort of persons it is directed against or provoked by,
and (what sort of things it is due to) what sort of offences or acts
provoke it .
As to the first, we are angry when we are vexed or annoyed ; be
cause one who is vexed is always aiming at, eagerly bent on, something ;
if then he be directly crossed or thwarted (eai> avriKpova-rj TIS) in anything
whatsoever, a thirsty man, for example, in his effort to drink, or not (i.e.
if he be crossed, not directly, but indirectly), the act in either case appears
to be just the same (the act in its effect or in the intention is the same ;
the act itself is not the same) ; or again if any one offers any opposition,
or refuses to help, or troubles, bothers, throws obstacles in the way of,
a man in this state of mind (i.e. in a state of eager desire, and aiming
at something , e(j)t(fjifv6v TWOS}, with all these he is angry .
KOT fvdvvplav] is in a straight line , -capflv, -capos (this must be a
mere termination in this word, as in decapos, Ti/jnopos, a-ivdficapos, and the
Latin -orus and -osus, plagosus, generosus, animosus, bellicosus ; a>pa, as
in Hv\<ap6s, can form no part of the derivation). The phrase, which is
equivalent to | ev6fias or K.O.T (\i6f1av (ypap.^v), occurs elsewhere, in
Plat. Rep. IV 436 E, rfjv evOvcopiav (in a straight line, or straight) is
opposed to a.7roK\ivfiv, and Kara TO ntpxptpts KVK\CJ>. Ar. Metaph. A 2, init.
in a straight line , (see Bonitz ad loc.), de part. Anim. II 8.7, TT^V 8t
(T^Lcnv f\fi TTJS (rapKos ov KCIT fvdviopiav d\\a /caret KtlicAoDj ^laiperrfv (Viet.).
Ib. C. IO. l6, a/covet -yap ov p.6vov /car fvdv&piav aXXa TravTodfV, fj & o^ns tls
TO (fj.Trpoo-6fv, opq yap /car evOvuipiav (directly forwards, in a straight line)
(Gaisford), Probl. XI 58, fv6v<t>pflv, Eth. Eudem. vn 10, 1243 ^ J 5> Tolr
fir] Kar* evdvupiav ($i Amc), of indirect friendships, where the two friends
are not of the same kind, but associated from different motives; Fritzsche,
note ad loc. (who refers also to Tim. Locr. p. 94 B, r<5 /X^TTCO /car (vdvupiav
vofla-dui dXXa /car dva\oyiav, and to this passage of the Rhetoric). Add
Arist. de part. Anim. IV 9. 6, 77 fv8va>pia r<av ivroo-d&ittv, and de Anima a 3,
406 b 31, rf]v tvmmpUv fls KVK\OV KortKapfytv. irtpl EvvTrvi&v C. 2. 5j KOT
fvdv<aptav TJ crvfj-f^aivd. TTJV o\lsiv opav.
dvTticpovfiv, to strike or knock against , to come into collision with ,
hence metaphorically, to interfere with, interpose an obstacle, to hinder or
thwart a man s designs or efforts. The word is not common : it occurs in
Dem. de Cor. 198, and dvTiKpovvis (a check, sudden stoppage), Rhet. in
22 PHTOP1KH2 B 2 9, 10.
os TO Trielv, edv re [MI, OJULOLCO^ TO.VTO (pai-
TTOLeiv Ka v re vTnrpaTTrj TJS eav T6 fj.r)
edv re a\\o TL eVoA OUTWS
IO TOiS TTO.G LV pyiTCU. (LO KafJLVOVT6<$,
\efjLOvvTe<iy , epwvTes, Si^lswvTes, oAws e
fjiri KctTOpBovvTes opjiXoi eicri Kai evwctpopfJLrjTOi, /md-
Xicrra fj.ev Trpos TOI)S TOL/ irapovros oXiywpouvTas,
KCtfJLVCOV fJieV TO?S 7T|OO9 T>]j/ VOOTOV, TTevOjJievOS ^6
TOJ/
epwv e TO? TTjOO? TCI/ epwra" ofJLOiws
aXXoLS Trpooo^OTToirjTai yap e/c(TTOs TT^OS Trjv
g. 6. In the neuter sense in which it is here employed it follows the
analogy of crwyKpoveiv, TrpocrKpovtiv, and hundreds of other transitive verbs
which by the suppression of the reflexive pronoun pass from active to
neuter a process common, I should suppose, to most languages, and
certainly found in our own.
eVo^Aeti , to mob (o^Xos), only once in Plato: but frequent in Demosth.,
Xenoph., Aristoph.; applied to troublesome and vexatious annoyances and
to vexatious conduct in general ; to trouble, annoy, bother .
10. And therefore in sickness, in poverty (and distress), in love,
thirst, or any appetite and desire in general, which is unsatisfied (in the
satisfaction of which they are unsuccessful /xi) Karopdovvrfs ev rfj firidvpia),
men are irascible and easily excited to passion (provoked) especially
against those who shew a contemptuous indifference to their present con
dition (who wantonly obstruct them in the efforts they are making to
obtain the immediate object of their wishes, or in the gratification of this
particular appetite or desire of which they are under the influence at the
moment) as a sick man against those who slight and thwart him in his
efforts to cure his disease , oiov na^vaiv opyikos ecrn TOIS (o\iya>poi:cnv UVTOV)
rrpos TJJI> v6<rov(Trpos, in respect of, those who direct their obstruction
and annoyance to his disease, i.e. to interference with the progress of his
cure : and the same explanation may be applied to the remaining cases):
a poor man when his poverty (and efforts to relieve it) is at stake, and
a man in a battle against those who interfere with his fighting (or if
a general, with his manoeuvres and warlike operations), or if in love, with
the affairs of his love, and so on for all the rest : for in each case the way
is ready prepared beforehand for the anger of the individual by the exist
ing affection (passion, or state of feeling) .
dpyi Xos, irascible , eari 8e Kai irep\ opyr^v VTrep/3oAi7 KCU eXXet^tf Kai
p.ecror^j...rQ)i 8 aKputv o fj.fi> VTrepfiaXXatv opyi\os e <7TO>, rf 8( KCIKLU opyiXorrjs,
Eth. N. II 7, 1108 a 40, IV 11, 1125 b 29, and 1126^ 13, oi ^ev ovv opyi\oi
V opyi^ovrai Kai ois ov Set KOI t(p ois ov 8ft Kai /n.aXXoi 17 Set, Travovrai
Ov f)(ov(Tiv K.T.A.
See note on oSoTroiftp, I I. 2. irponcmrtiv, Eur. Hippol.
PHTOPIKH2 B 2 n. 23
I I eKCKTTOV Opyt]V V7TO TOV V7Tap^OVTO<S TTaOoVS. Tl S
eav TCLvavTia. TV^T] Trpocr^e^ojtJLevo^ \VTrel yap ]ULa\-
\oi> TO 7TO\u Trapd ^oj^av, (JocrTrep Kai Tepvrei TO TTO\V
Trapa dofav, iav yevtiTai 6 j3ou\6Tai. $10 Kai copat
Kai ^povoi Kai SiaBecrei s Kai qXiKiai e /c TOVTWV (ba-
Trolai euKiv>]TOi TTjOOS opyriv Kai TTOU Kai Trore, p- 58.
23 (and elsewhere), to advance by clearing away (KOTrrfiv), before an
advancing army, wood and other obstacles to its progress, presents the
same metaphor in a somewhat different form.
ii. Disappointed expectation is also provocative of anger: if a
man happen to have expected the contrary (to that which does actually
occur) ; for the pain of disappointment is increased in proportion to its
unexpectedness, just as the joy in the opposite case is increased by an
unexpected success. And so, by applying these principles to the differ
ent seasons, times, dispositions, and ages (in which anger chiefly
manifests itself), it will be easy to see what sorts of them (the two last
named) are easily moved to anger, and in what places and at what times,
and also that the more they are under these circumstances (in these
conditions) the more easily they are moved . That is, the nearer they are
to the critical moment in the times and seasons and to the central point
or acme in the age of life, and the more they are under the influence
of the particular dispositions which prompt the angry feeling the
higher the degree in each case the greater will be the proneness to anger.
Schrader supplies a very apt illustration of the wpat from Theocr. Id. I
15: ut cibi et somni horae ; caprarius ap. Theocr. Ot! Qepts, w Troifiav, ro
Hfcrap-fipivov, ov dffUS afjLp.iv Svplff&cv TOV Ylava SeSotKa^ie? rf yap a?r aypas
Tafi /ca KeKfJLaKuis a/aTraverat eVrt 8e TTiKpos, Kat 01 del 8pip.fla X^*l TT 01 " pivl
KaOrjTai. Of the three ij\iKiai, II 12. 2, Seneca, on the contrary, de Ira I 13,
ult., iracundissimi infantes senesque et aegri sunt, et invalidum omne
naturae querulum est (Schrader). vforrjs is the one which is most liable .
to anger, Ib. 5, com. 9. As regards times and seasons, one man might
be more inclined to be angry in hot, and another in cold, weather
though perhaps this should rather be referred to the diadeo-fis or bodily
temperaments ; constitution, or habit of body or mind, comes under the
denomination of diadea-ets the 8id6ea-is or passing temporary disposition
being apparently not here distinguished (as it ought to be, Categ. 8, p. 8 b
27, comp. ii a 22) from the confirmed, settled, permanent, ?is or state .
On the diadfo-eis Schrader notes, Affectiones animi corporisve : ut
morbus, maeror, pudor, metus. Sen. de Ira n 19, vinum incendit iram,
quia auget calorem. ill 10, vetus dictum est, a lasso rixam quaeri
(fatigue). Acque autem et ab esuriente et a siticnte, et ab omul homine
quern aliqua res urit : nam uti ulcera ad levem tactum, deinde etiam ad
suspicionem tactus, condolescunt (this describes a state of irritation or
inflammation) ; ita animus affectus minimis ojfenditur. Adeo ut qitosdam
salutatio, epistola, oratio, et interrogatio in litem evocenf. Eveiy
situation or condition of pain, discomfort, malaise, constraint, &c. makes
a man irritable.
24 PHTOP1KHS B 2 u, 12.
Kctt OTI ore juaXXov ev roJrot? eicri, /ma\\ov
12 aUTOl JUL6V OVV OVTCOS ^OJ/TS CVKWIJTOl TTjOOS
re KctTaeXuxri K.al
v(3pL^
OV(Tl yap. KCtl TOl<S TO. TOiaVTO.
12. So far of the subjects of anger ; next of its objects.
First, anger is provoked by ridicule (contempt expressed in laughter),
mockery, jeering ; all of which imply vftpis, a wanton unprovoked attack
upon a man s feelings and personal dignity.
X\(vdiv, probably connected with ^eiXor or x/Xos (^ f \vvr]} the lip (so
Valck.), to shoot out the lips in mockery and derision. Compare the analo
gous epeo-^tXeu which may possibly be epeaaftv xe Xos expressing the same
action. xXfua^Vtf, ^Xevatr/ioy and ^Xevao-i a, appear frequently in Demosth.
and occasionally in other authors : in Rhet. II 3. 9 we find x^ fvaa " ri l f -
In Top. Z 6, 144 a 5> we have Kadcnrep ol TOV TrpoTr^Xa/atr/xoi Zftpiv fj.era
pifo/iei/ot ij yap ^Xeuaata vfipis TIS, cUar ov 8ia<popa aXX* ei So? q
x^ fva<T ^ a therefore is a kind of vftpis, which exactly corre
sponds with the view of it taken here.
o-KvnTfiv, is not easily distinguished from the preceding, except by the
greater frequency of its occurrence. It expresses an ill-natured joke,
sneering, taunting, gibing at, another, for the purpose of bringing him
into ridicule. This is the scornful jest , which, as Pope says, is most
bitter . <jK<S^/za or O-KW^IS is therefore opposed to evrpaTreXia, the easy
well-bred pleasantry which distinguishes the conversation and compo-
position of the accomplished gentleman. The ill-natured intention im
plied in o-KcoTrretj/ appears incidentally in the phrase Xwretj/ TOV <rKo>7rro/if-
vov, which indicates that it is always attended with pain to the object of
it, Eth. N. IV 14, 1128 a 7: and again this its ordinary character appears
Ib. line 25, seq. norepov ovv TOV tS o-KcortTovTa opurriw TO> Xe yfii/ a TrpeVet
t\evdep[a>, fj ru> fj.rj \vneiv TOV UKOVOVTO r) Kal Tep-rreiv ; (neither of which
evidently belonged to the ordinary character and operation of the <r/cw/i^a),
and again, line 30, TO yap O-KW/^UI XoiSop^/za TI la-riv. I suppose that the
difference between this and ^Xtvao-p-or must be something of this kind :
X^fva^iv mockery may be conveyed by the gesture or tone of voice
or the manner as well as by the actual words, and is therefore the more
general expression of contempt as conveyed by language or manner : in
o-fcw/z/xa the contempt is conveyed or embodied in a joke or taunting
phrase. It occurs, as might be expected, constantly in Aristophanes, who
dealt more largely in the commodity itself than most other writers. An
examination of the passages where it is used by this author will help to
confirm what I have said of the ill-natured use of it ; for instance, Pac.
740. er ra paiaa crKanrTovras dtl ical rots <fr&fip<r\v TroXtfiovvras, Nub. 540,
ov" fo-KunrTt TOVS <paXarpovr, and so of the rest.
A second class of persons who are special objects of angry feeling,
are those who inflict such injuries as bear upon them the marks of wanton
outrage. These must be such as are neither in retaliation (for an injury
already inflicted on the aggressor) nor beneficial to those who inflict them ;
PHTOPIKH2 B 2 1214. 25
p\a7TTOV(riv bcra vfipecos (rrijULela. dvdyKtj Se TOiavTa
eivai a //?;re dvrl TLVOS /UH IT co(p\ifj.a rols TTOLOVO-IV
n^n V^P $OKel & vfiptv. teal TO?S KaKco s Xeyovcri
KaTa(ppovou&i Trepl a avTol /maXicrra (nrov^
olov ol iwl <pi\ocro(pia <pi\OTi/ULOvfj.evoi edv TIS els
ol S 67TL Trj l$ea edv Tts Tr\v
t / <N ^ \>\ ^ x -v " ^ * >. -V ^ ~x
i4o/moia)s ce KO.L errt TWV a\\<av. Tctvra oe TroAAw /uLa\-
\ov, eav inroTTTeva uxTL fj.rj V7rap%eiv aJroi?, i] o\ta<s ij
for when this is the case (by this time, now at length ; note on 178?;, I r. 7)
then (and not till then) they are thought to be due to a wanton, malicious,
unprovoked, intention to offend vfipif, the worst of the three kinds of
oXiyapia by which anger is provoked ; 3, 5.
13. A third are those who revile and express contempt for things in
which the aggrieved parties are themselves most interested (or, to which they
are earnestly devoted, or in which they most desire to distinguish themselves,
or in which they most value themselves ; the last of the four referring to
such things as tSe a, personal beauty, the second example) ; as those who
are eager and ambitious of distinction in the pursuit of philosophy are
especially indignant at any slight, any slur cast upon their favourite
study ; or those who value themselves upon their personal appearance, if
that be called in question ; and similarly in all other cases . This topic
expresses the specially angry feeling that is called forth by any ridicule or
contempt directed against a man s profession, his studies, his order,
any class or society to which he belongs, and is carried even to the extent
of a national feeling : any reflexion, in short, upon what he is particularly
interested in and attached to or values himself upon, any association with
which he is bound up, and on whose credit his own credit and importance
in some measure depend. " Je me suis souvent despite, en mon enfance"
says Montaigne (du Pedantisme, Livre I Ch. 24), " de veoir en comedies
italiennes tousiours un Pedante pour badin, et le surnom de Magister
ri avoir gucres plus honorable signification par my nous : car leur estant
donne en gouvernemcnt, que pouvois-je mains faire que d estre jaloitx de
leur reputation ?"
rfi iSe ct] the form , the primary sense of the word 1 , Plat. Protag.
315 E, TTJV ifttav Ttavv KaXdy, Phaed. 73 A, ev roirro) rw avdpunrivo) f"8fi, Ib. D,
ro tl8os rov TratSo?, 76 C, tv dvdpatirov e lSet, 109 B, Trepi rf]v yfjv TroXXa KoTXa
/cat Trai/roSana Kai ray t Se ay Kai TO. fj.fyfdrj, Pind. Olymp. IO (ll). 123, ^ a
/caXor, et alibi. So fldos, Arist. Pol. I 2, 1252 b 26, aa-rrtp 8e KOI TO. etS?/
eauroiy a<j)op.oiov(Tiv ol avdpcaTroi, OVTU> nai rows jSi ovs TCOI/ Gtcov.
14. But this angry feeling is much aggravated, if he suspect that
this, whatever it may be, on which he prides himself, does not really
belong to him, either not at all or in no great force (I<TX V P^ S ^) or tnat if it
does, at all events other people don t think so (// /. it does not appear so,
1 The following is Buhle s note on I5ta, Cogitandum est de ideis Platonicis !
and this is quoted by Gaisford without a remark.
TOLL
26 PHTOP1KHX B 2 14 1 6.
,\ \ <v ^ 5^\ \ J_ "!> >
j t] /mrj OOKELV ZTreioav yap cr(poopa oiwv- P. 1379
\eV TQL/TOis] 1 61 OlS (TKiaTTTOVTai, OV (j)pOV-
15 Ti^oucriv. Kal ro?9 <pi\ois [JLa\\ov rj TO?S jury <pt\ois
oiovrai yap Trpo&riKeiv {JLO.\\OV Tracr^en ev VTT avTwv
16 n {J-n- Kcti Tols ei8i(Tj(JLi>ois Ti^av i] (ppovTt^eiv, edv
ev TOVTOIS sine itncims.
fj,f) SoKelv) : for whenever people have a strong conviction that they really
possess the assumed advantage (supply, virap-^eLv avrols e(p <u (f)i\orifjLovvTai
from the last , or o o iovrai e^ety, or vnap^eiv auroTs, from o lavrai inrnp-^fiv)
in those particular things (studies, personal qualities, accomplishments,
rank and position, before enumerated) at which the taunt is levelled , (ev ols
l in which , represents the sphere, or circumstances, the locality as it were
of the joke in which it resides), they care nothing about it . A very acute
observation. F. A. Wolf has a note upon eV TOVTOIS, for which he pro
poses to substitute eavrols or avrols. He insists upon connecting a-(f)o8pa
i - v i an d pronounces that to be bad Greek or unintelligible. cr^oSpa
ai, if it required any justification, would be sufficiently defended by
Phaedo 73 A, <r0o8pa fj.ep.vrifj.ai. I think that the translation above given
shews that the vulg. is correct, and there is no manuscript authority for
any alteration. cn^oSpa and iV^vpaS? (above) are used here in the same
sense, in a high degree . Wolf s conjecture is supported by Brandis
Anonyimis, in Schneidewin s Philologus IV i p. 46.
la-xvpcos] i fortiter\ strongly , vigorously , means here in a high
degree . " iVxvpwy, strongly, very much, exceedingly, Herod. IV 108,
fdvos p.eya KOI 7roAAoi>, y\avK.6v re TTO.V la^vpws K.r.X. Ib. 183, eBvos ^ey a
Xen. Anab. I 7- l?> <pv^ tcr^vpw? /3o^ela; tcr^vpws rjdecrdai,
i, (popeladcu, Ib. Cyr. VIII 3. 44, &c." Liddell and Scott s Lexicon.
15. Again anger is more readily excited against those who are dear
to us, than against those who are not ; because we think we are naturally en
titled to expect from them kind treatment rather than the reverse (rj fifj tv).
Comp. Polit. IV (VIl) 7, 1328 a I, o-rj^dov 8e Trpos yap TOVS avvr]deis KOI
(piXovs o dvp.is mperai p.a\\ov rj Trpos TOVS ayvcoray, oXtycopetcr^ai vojj.icras.
8to Kal Ap^iXo^o? K.T.X. Aristotle adduces this as a proof that (in the
Platonic psychological division) the seat of (piAi a, love, is the dv^os or
TO 0vfj.oei8es, the passionate element of the human composition, in which
all the noble, generous impulses, zeal, enthusiasm, righteous indignation,
resentment, courage, and with them anger, reside. Aristotle is here
criticising Plato s scheme, while he recognises its general validity, who
assigns (Tim.) (pt\ia to the belly, with the other eVi^i;/xt at. A few lines
further on the author adds, ToCro 8e fj,aX\ov eri Trpos TOVS o-vvrjGfis Tracr^ov-
triv, OTrep e iprjrai Trportpov, av d&iK.(l.o~dai vop:io~(a(TiV Kal TOVTO arvfJ^aivfL KOTO.
\oyov Trap ois yap o(pei\rdai 8e1v TTJV evepyecrlav VTroXa/^/3dyovcrt, Trpos TW
J3\aj3ei Kal ravTrjs aTroarepeicr^ai vop.iov<riv. 06 ev ( ipr/Tai "^aXeyroi yap TTO-
Xe/uot doe\<pav \ (this line is more correctly given by Plutarch, de Frat.
Amor. 480 D, xaXeTrot TroXejuot yap a&eXcpcoi/, cos ~Evpmi8r]s f iprjKfv, Dind.
Eur. Fr. Inc. 57: it is in fact a paroemiac verse, the proper vehicle for
proverbs ), KOI "ot rot rrepa o-rep^ai/rej, ol 8e KOI irepa fjna-ovtriv."
1,6. And similarly against those that have been accustomed to pay
PHTOPIKHS B 2 1 6 18. 27
7ra\iv /Jit] o uTias 6/uu\w(riv KO.I yap VTTO TOVTUIV o iov-
17 TOLL KaTcKppovelo-Oai TUVTO. yap av Troielv. Kal rois
juirj avTiTTOiovcTLV ei), prj^e Ti}v i<rt]v avTairo &L&ova-iv.
Tols Tava-VTia TTOIOVCTIV avTols, eav IJTTOVS woriv
povelv yap TravTes ol TOLOVTOL (paivovTai, Kal o l
rjTTOVtav ot 3 ws Trap 1 IJTTOVCOV. Kal rots eV
Xoya) ovtriv, av TL oXiycopcoo i, /uaAAof VTTO-
respect and attention to them, if they afterwards cease (to associate or
live with them on the same terms) to treat them in the same way : for
from such, this seems to imply contempt, otherwise (if their feeling
towards them had not changed) they would have gone on doing as they
used to do .
KaTatppovf urdai] passive, see Appendix B, on I 12. 22 [at the end of
Vol. i].
17. rf]v i <n?i/] sc. fjio ipav, Bos, Ellips. pp. 306 7, cites many instances
of the omission of this subst. with various words, as numerals, SfKarrj,
rpiaKoarr) (Dem. c. Lept. 32), r^ia-eia. Analogous to T^V tvr^v here, we
have eV icrris, eVi 1077, e itrr)s, ex. rfjs icrrfs, fr/v ofj-oirfv (Herod. IX 78), rt TTJ
opoiq, f< rfjs ofioias. With 7rf7rpo0/*<=V?7, it is a still more frequent ellipse.
With this word polpa is sometimes expressed ; as it is likewise in Horn.
II. I (ix) 3!8, ICTTJ /xoTpa ptpovri KOI d fia\a TIS TroXe/it ^ot. At the same time in
23, we have rols x^P LV M airottiltavaw ; and Bos himself in a subsequent
article on xP ls (P- 5 2 3) refers to this, Herod. VI 21, OVK. direftoirav rr)v
opalrjv Sv/SapTrai; to which Schafer adds, IV 119, rf/v oftobjv vp.lv dirodt-
Sova-i. However potpav is just as natural a supplement as the other, and
the more numerous analogies, by shewing that the ellipse of it was more
usual than that of x^P lv ^ are m favour of the former explanation.
Kal rols ravavria Trap TITTOWV} And against those that do things con
trary to our interests, if they are our inferiors (from inferiors opposition was
not to be expected, from equals or superiors it might be ; therefore in the
former case it is more provoking); for from all such, opposition seems
to imply contempt ; either because (in opposing us) they seem to regard
us as inferiors (guts enim contra potentiores sponte contendit praelia-
turque, Victorius; with as JTTOVWV repeat KaTatypovdv <f>aivovTai) ; or else
as if (these benefits had proceeded) from inferiors (and therefore need
not be repaid ; either not at all, or not in full). These belong to the
class described in the preceding topic, those who do not repay a benefit
at all, or inadequately ; from which the ellipse in as itap IJTTOVOV must
therefore be filled up ; by this non-repayment or inadequate repayment of
the benefits received they shew their contempt.
Those who fail to repay benefits received, altogether or in part, seem
to express contempt for their benefactors as inferiors ; for they would not
neglect such a manifest duty, or do what they know must give offence,
unless they thought that it was not worth while to keep on good terms
with them. So Victorius. With Trap qrrovcav, fvepyfrov^voi, or ev TTOIOV-
p,(i>oi, is to be understood.
1 8. The angry feeling is aggravated against those who are of no
28 PHTOPIKH2 B 2 18, 19.
Keirai yap ?) opyri rs oXfywpas Trpos TCWS fj. Trpocr-
t lKOVTaS, 7TpO(Tr]K6l $6 TOt9 t]TTO(Tt fJ.fi oXlJUIpeiv . TO?S
3e <pi\ois, iav re /^} eiy \eyuxriv $ Troiaicriv, /ecu ert
e ai/ TavavTia, Koti eav fj.rj alcrGdvccvrai ceo-
, uxTTrep 6 AvrKptovTOs YlXtl^nnros rw MeAea-
account,no repute at all, if they are guilty of any slight, any contemptuous
indifference, to us and our pretensions . This topic goes a step beyond
the preceding. In that the offenders were only relatively contemptible,
inferior to ourselves. Here they are absolutely contemptible and worth
less, of no repute at all in any one s estimation For anger is assumed to
be (referring to the definition, i) provoked by the slight against those
who have no natural claim (to treat us in this way) : the natural duty of
inferiors is not to slight (their betters) .
On Trpoa-riKeiv, and the several kinds of obligation from which the
terms expressive of duty are derived, Set, \P^ ifpeirei^ irpoa-^Kfi, see on
p.?i jrpocnjKoirwy, II 2. i, note 2 on p. 1 1.
19. rois (pi Aoty] Comp. 15, and note, We are angry with friends
if they dorft speak of us, and treat us, well, and still more if they do the
contrary ; and if, when we are in want of anything, they don t perceive it
(don t find it out before we tell them of it) this manifests their indiffer
ence to us and our wants, which is a kind of contempt, and the sting of
oXtycopt a - as Antiphon s Plexippus was (angry with, o>pyi ero) with his
(ro>) Meleager : for this want of perception (or attention) is a token of
slight ; because, when we do care for any one, (things of this kind) don t
escape us . <av yap (ppovrL^op-fv (ravra) ov \av6avei. This is expressed
in the abstract neuter of all things; meaning of course persons. There were
two poets named Antiphon: one a writer of the New Comedy, (Meineke,
Fragm. Com. Gr. I 489, Troirjrrjs Kaivfjs Kco/M(u8iW Ai/ri0o)i> Adrjvalos,
Bockh, Corp. Inscr. I p. 767): and the other, a tragic writer, mentioned
by Athenaeus as a Tpa-ywSoTroioj, together with his character, Plexippus,
xv 673 F. This second Antiphon is again referred to, Rhet. n 6. 27,
A.vTi(pa>v 6 TrotrjT^s, and his play Meleager, Ib. 23. 20, where two lines are
quoted from it. Besides Antiphon s play, there were several others with
the same title, and on the same subject, the Calydonian boar-hunt and its
tragic consequences, by poets comic as well as tragic, Sophocles, Euri
pides, Sosiphanes, (Wagner, Trag. Gr. Fragm. in 179,) Antiphanes,
and Philetaerus, Mein., u. s., 1315, 349. (The Meleager of Antiphanes is
doubtful, the names of Antiphon and Antiphanes being often inter
changed, Mein.) See also Wagner, Trag. Gr. Fragm. in 113.
Victorius notes on this allusion: Plexippus was brother of Althea,
Meleager s mother, and with his brother Toxeus was put to death by Me
leager, because they expressed indignation at his bestowing the prize, the
bearskin, which he had received for the destruction of the Calydonian
boar, upon his mistress Atalanta. Perhaps it was this very circumstance
that Antiphon indicated: he may have represented Plexippus as express
ing his vexation at Meleager s insensibility to his want, to his great
anxiety, namely, to possess the boarskin, which his nephew (Meleager) had,
PI1TOPIKH2 B 2 20, 21. 29
w oXiycopias yap TO /mrj alarQdvea Qai (rri/uelov (av
20 jap (ppovrifyiuev, ou \av6dvei. Kat TCHS e7ri%aipov{ri
TCUS aTV%iaK Kai oAws 6v6v[j.oviuLvois eV TCUS ai)ro)i/
dtTi/^/ats 1 ?/ 7jO e^Opov n oXiycopovvTos o-ri^elov . /ecu
TO I S jurj (f)povTi^ov(riv e aV AfTrr/crwcnir &o /ecu TO??
21 KCCKCC ayyeAAcwo-fi/ opyi^o vrat. Kat rols */ o/coi/oi/O"/ P- 59-
7T|0/ avTtav n GewfJievois TO. avTtov <pav\a O/ULOLOI yap
elcriv i] 6\i<ycopovcriv rj 6^6pol < s ol yap (J)I\OL (rvva\-
regardless of the claims of consanguinity, bestowed nevertheless on Ata-
lanta . (I have altered the second sentence for the sake of clearness.)
The story of Meleager and the Caledonian boarhunt, is told by Ovid,
Metamorph. vill. The offence of the Thestiadae, Toxeus and Plexippus,
and their death by the hand of their nephew, are described in 428 444 :
from which Victorius apparently derived his account.
20. We are angry also with those that rejoice at our misfortunes or
in general maintain a cheerful demeanour in the midst of our distresses :
for this is a mark either of downright enmity or of contemptuous in
difference . oXwr, without any special indications of joy, yet maintain a
most provoking air of serenity and indifference whilst they cheerfully
contemplate our vexations and annoyances everyone who has ever had
experience of this (and who has not?} knows well how provoking it is.
And with those who don t care (who exhibit no solicitude, or sympa
thy; comp. infra 21, 01 yap $1X01 o-vi/aXyoiJo-u/) when they give us pain;
and this is why we are angry with the messengers of evil tidings (inge
nious solution). Or the explanation might be, that the first surprise
and annoyance at the unwelcome intelligence associates the bearer with
his news. That messengers of unwelcome news are liable to a rough
reception from those to whom they communicate them, is noticed also by
Aesch., Pers. 255, w/iot KOKOV fj.(v Trpcorov dyyeXXetv Ka<d, Soph. Antig. 277,
OTtpyei yap ov8( \s ayye\ov KOKWV (ircOiv.
Shakespeare, Henry IV. Pt. II. Act I, sc. i. 100, Yet the first bringer
of Tinwelcome news hath but a losing office. Antony and Cleop. 1 1 5,
Though it be honest it is never good to bring bad news. Macbeth, v 5,
Liar and slave (to the messenger, who comes to announce the moving
of Birnam wood).
21. And with such as stand quietly, calmly, listening to an account
of (n-ept), or looking on at (any painful exhibition of) our faults and weak
nesses (TO epaCXa), (without offering either help or sympathy); this looks
like either contemptuous indifference, or actual enmity: because friends
sympathise with us (feel pain as we do ourselves), (and these do not) ; and
every one feels pain at the spectacle, the contemplation, when he wit
nesses the exposure, of his own infirmities the friend, being erepop
avros or oXXos O.VTOS, a second self (Eth. Nic. IX several times repeated),
must regard the exposure of his friend s weaknesses just as he would of
his own.
30 PHTOPIKHS B 2 22, 23.
yovcriv, QewjJievoi 5e TO. OLKela (pavXa Travres dXyov-
22 <TIV 6TI TOiS 6Xl e y(*)pOU(ri TTjOOS TTEVTe, TTjOOS OUS (f)l\O-
Tl/ULOVVTCtl, TTjQOS OI/5 OaVfJia^OVCTLV, V(p UIV
6avj(JLd^(r6ai, i] ov<s alar-^vvovTai, i] ev rols
vois avTOvs iv TOVTOIS edv TI<S oXiywprj,
23 /uLaXXov. Kai TO?S el<s TO. ToiavTa oXiyw poverty vnep
(av avTols ai&xpov jmrj fionOeiv, oiov yoj/ets, T6Kva 9
yvvalKa<s, dp%o/jievov<s. /ecu
22. And further, with those who shew slight to us before (in
respect of) five different kinds of persons; (i) to those whom we are
ambitious of rivalling 1 (in the race for distinction; (friXoTip.flcr6ai expresses
the ambitious views, and Trpoy ovs the competition, comp. c. 4.24, 6.15,
10. 5, &c.); (2) ivpos (TOVTOVS) ovs, to those whom we respect and admire ;
(3) those by whom we wish to be respected and admired ; (4) those of
whom we stand in awe ; (5) tj (TO!? oAtywpouo-tv fm&v, or O.VTO>I> as Ar.
writes it,) or, (we are angry with those who slight us) when in the com
pany of (eV) those who hold us in awe. In the society of any of these, a
slight offered is provocative of a greater degree of anger (than it would
be elsewhere) .
alcrxvveo-dai, with the accus. of the person, means to be ashamed in a
man s presence, or before him ; to be afraid to look one in the face, from
reverence; to stand in awe of him . Soph. Phil. 1382, ov Karato-^vVet
Bfovs; TOV Trpoa-TpoTraiov TOV iKerriv; The accusative is the local accus.,
an extension of the cognate accus., the person, whose presence causes the
shame or awe, being represented as the seat of it, as when we say dXyeu/
TTJV Kf(f>a\T]v. Matth., Gr. Gr. 441, has given a few examples of this use of
alcrxiivfo-dai and al8el(rdai four from Eur. Ion, 353, 379, 952, and 1093,
al(T-)(\ivo^aL TOV -no\vvij.vov deov, and one from Xen. de Rep. Lac. II 11.
Add Horn. II. A 23, aiSet<r#at 6 iepfja, Z (Vl) 442, atSeo/ncu Tpcoa? KOI TpwaSar
eXKeortTreVXouf : so alSfla-dai iKTrjv,a.s Horn. II. x(xxil) 124. Aesch. Agam.362,
(Dind.), Ai a TOI ev<av peyav aidovfj.cu.. Aristoph. Thesm. 848, 903, Eccles.
381, Plut. 1077. Plat. Theaet. 183 E, M<Ducro-of...7jrToi alcrx^vo^ai. Symp.
2l6 B, 2l8 D, Protag. 312 A, OVK av alcrxvvoLO O-CLVTOV ; Rep. VIII 562 E,
alo-)<yv(o-6ai rovs yovfas, K.r.A. Comp. Lat. pudcrc, siippitdere, aliqucin
alicuhiSj Cic. Ep. ad Fam. IX i sed quod eorum me suppudebat. Orator 155
Patris mei, meumfactum (i.e. meorum factorum) pudet?
23. And those whose slight is offered to such objects as it
would be a disgrace to us not to help and protect, such as parents,
children, wives, rulers and governors , such as have a natural claim upon
our help and protection. And those that have failed to make a due
return (for a benefit received) ; for in this case the slight (neglect, con
temptuous indifference to moral obligation) is a violation of the natural
1 The phrase has been otherwise understood, those whom they are anxious
to stand well with . But to say nothing of its not properly representing the Greek,
this interpretation leaves no difference between this first class and the third.
PHTOPIKH2 E2242?. 31
.
24. ffiv Trapa TO TrpocrriKOV yap r l ofay top tot* Kai rots
eipwvevofj.tvoi s Trpos cnrov^d^ovTa^ KaTa<ppov)iTiKoi>
2$ yap r\ eipwveia. Kai Tots TUJV d\\a)i>
eav fjLr} Kai. avTiav Kai yap TOUTO Ka
26 TO jULt] d^LOVV cav TrdvTas Kai avTOV. TTOL^TIKOV
opytjs Kai r\ \t]6r}, oiov Kai >/ TCOV oVo^uaVwi/
T \ \ f \ ^ ~ \ < i f n
ovaa Trepi /uiiKpov o\iy(apias yap COKCL KUL r] \rjun
(Tv/me iov eivai $i dfJL\eiav [JLev yap r\ \n\Qr\ yiyverai,
t] S d/uL\eia 6\iywpia earTlv.
T>TJ/^ \ < >r \ *. \
27 Of? fjiev ovv opyi^ovTcti KUI ws e^oi/re? Kat eta
f, a/ma eiprjrai <)ri\oi> 8 on 8eoi av
claim, duty, or obligation. The nattire at fitness of things requires (under
this theory, which is that of justice, the lex talionis] such a compensation,
or the repayment of the favour.
24. And those (are provoking) who use irony to (Trpoj, in reply to,
or conversation with) us when we are in serious earnest (whether merely
talking, or engaged in some serious pursuit : either of these is provoked
by untimely levity ; which is construed as a kind of contempt), for irony
is expressive of contempt . This characteristic or construction of irony
is not noticed in the analysis of it in Eth. Nic. IV 13, 1127 b 22 seq. In
IV 8, 1124 b 30, it appears as a trait in the character of the fttya\6\^vxos,
and is part of the contemptuous bearing (1124^ 5 6 de /xe-yaX6\^v^oj 8tKaiW
Karcxfrpovfl) to the vulgar which is suitable to his dignity, ( ipwva 8e Trpls
TOVS TroXkovs. On irony and its uses in Rhetoric, besides the passage
from the Ethics already quoted, see Rhet. ad Alexandrum 22. i, Cic. de
Orat. II 67. 269 seq., ill 53. 203, Quint, vill 6. 54, IX 2. 44 seq. Socrates
was probably one of those whose constant use of eipavet a was construed
as contempt, and contributed to his unpopularity.
25. And (again we feel ourselves slighted) by those who are
naturally or habitually disposed to acts of kindness, if they don t extend
their kindness to ourselves : for this has the air of contempt, to consider
us (avTov is an individual opposed to -navras) unworthy to be treated
in the same way as every one else .
26. Forgetfulness too is provocative of anger, even, for instance,
forgetting your friend s name, though it be (shewn) in such a mere trifle :
for even forgetfulness (trifle though it be, *ai ) is construed as a sign of
contempt : because this oblivion is due to neglect, and neglect is slight .
Falconbridge, in King John, Act I, sc. i. 187, And if his name be George,
ril call him Peter ; For new-made honour doth forget meifs names.
27. So the objects, dispositions, and provocatives of anger have
been all treated together . On the grammar of ols.. fipiyrai, see note, II 9.
1 1 (at the end).
The following sentence is a note upon the mode of applying the fore
going analysis to the conduct and management of the speech, for the
32 PHTOPIKH2 B 2 27; 3 i.
ai/ TO) oyw To/oroi s oot oi/res
KCti TOl)s eVCtVTLOVS TOVTOIS eVO%OVS OVTOtS 6(j) OiS
i, K.a.1 TOLOUTOVS O IOLS opyi^ovTai.
c)e TO opryl^ecrdai ivavriov TW 7rpavvcr6ai CHAP,
TrpaorriTi, Xr^Trriov TTWS e^oyres Trpaoi eicri
benefit of the student of Rhetoric : how, namely, to excite and direct this
passion in conformity with the interests of the speaker, and it is plain
that what is required is, to bring the audience by the speech into such a
state of mind as men are in, when they are irascible (so that their anger
may be brought to bear upon the opponent) ; and to represent the adver
sary as liable to the imputation of such feelings and acts as provoke men
to anger, and of such character or disposition as men are angry with.
KaTa<TKfvd(t.v has the same double meaning, or at least application, as we
noticed on n i. 2, q. v. In the one case, it is to establish , or produce
the feelings in the minds of the audience; in the other, to produce in
their minds by the speech an impression of the state of feeling of the
adverse party, to establish, i.e. to represent in the speech, avrov after S/ot
ar, the reading of most MSS, is rightly omitted by Bekker with A c .
CHAPTER III.
Analysis of irpaoTr/s, patience ; the opposite of opyi, as it is here
stated. In the Nic. Eth. IV 11, init. the statement is different. Trpaorr):
is there the mean state, or virtue, lying between opyiXorrjs irascibility, the
excess of angry emotion, and aopyrjcria want of spirit, insensibility (to pro
vocation or wrong), the defect; TO 8e T!-poTrr]\aKi^6fj.fvov ave^ta6ai KCU TOVS
oiKflovs irepiopav ai SpaTroStaSey. opyij is the basis of the whole, the
Trddos in general, the natural emotion in respect of provocation, capable
of modification so as to assume three different forms : its three igeis are
TTfpl TT/V opyriv, c.i 2 init. Trpaorrjs then, here, as a Trains in the Ethics
it is a ft-is or virtue is this instinctive affection, feeling, emotion, in a
mild, calm, subdued state (opposed to opyij an emotion in a state of ex
citement) ; placidity of temper. As a virtue (in the Ethics) it is as described
by Grant (Eth. Nic. Plan of book, iv p. 150, first ed.) the virtue of the
regulation (or control) of the temper . In the de Anima, I i, 403 a 16, it
is still only a Trados, together with $u/zos-, <o/3oj, eXeoy, 6dp<ros, x a P&&gt; <iX/a,
and /JU<TOS. Again Trpadrrjr, the feeling, stands in the same relation to
irpdvixrts, the quieting, calming, lowering process of the excited, angry
emotion, as opyrf does to opyifcffdai, (and would to opyuris if the word
were in existence). And lastly, as opyij is a Kivr)<ris (setting in motion in
the way of stirring up and exciting) de Anima, I i, 403 a 26, TO 6pyiT0ai
Kivrjcris TIS rov rotovSt trw/iaroj rj pepovs K.r.X., SO irpdvvfris is a KuraoTacris, a
process of settling down, and jpfprjcris, a passing to a state of rest
ijpffiflv the regular opposite of Ktvela-dai. The fifth book of the Physics
is on these two opposites, KIVTJCTIS and qpffnia ; see especially ch. 6. And
whereas growing angry is opposite to growing calm, and anger to calm
ness, (and we rhetoricians are bound to be equally acquainted with both
sides of even 1 question), we must now proceed to ascertain the several
PHTOPIKH2 B 3 25. 33
Kal TTjOOS TLVCtS TTjOCtW? 6^OV<TL Kal Sid TLVO)V TTpavVOV-
2 Tar ecTTO) &/ Trpavvcris Kara<TTa(ri<s Kal tjpefJLtj(rK 6p-
3 yr]<s. el ovv opyityvTai TO!<S 6\i f ycapov(riv, oXiyiapla
e<TTii/ KOV(Tiov, (pavepov on Kal TO!? jULrj(!>ev TOVTCOV
Troiovariv /; a/coi cr/ws TTOLOVCTLV rj fyaivop-evois TOIOVTOIS
4 TrpaoL eicriv. Kal TO?S Tavavria cov i7roit](rav fiov\o-
Kal oaroi Kai avTOi ek avTOus TOLOVTOL ov-
5 Sets >ydp avros aurou $OKel oXiycapeTv. Kal rols o /xo-
Xoyova L Kal fJLerafjLe\ofj.ivoL^\ w yap e^oj/re? CU KT/I/ TO
XvTrelcrBai ITTI TO?? TreTroo/yuej/Ofs TravovTai i-fis opyrjs.
(rrjfJLelov (He eirl Trjs TWV OLKCTCOV KoA.a crws* TOI)S fjiev p. 60.
yap dvTi\e<yovTas Kal apvovfjievovs fj.a\\ov KoXa^o-
dispositions of calmness (in the subject}, the states of mind (in the objects)
which are regarded with calmness (sang-froid], and the means of bringing
them into this state .
2. eo-rco] See note on I 5. 3, 6. 2, &c. Let it be assumed then (as suffi
cient for our purpose) that the process or growth of this even and indifferent
state of mind is a subsiding or settling down, and a process tending to
rest (a quieting process) of the motion (i.e. excitement, ferment, ebullition)
of anger . " In V. Nat. Ausc. [(^VO-IKTJS aKpoaa-tuts, E p. 230 a 4,] (32, <q yap
fls avro K VTJO-IS fv <a eoTT/jcei/, qp(fJU]<ns fJ.a\\6v fOTlV) valet Aristoteli lype/iqo??,
via progressusque ad qiiietem ". Victorius.
3. If then anger is roused by slight, and slight is voluntary (i.e.
intentional), it plainly follows that to those who do none of these things
(the various kinds of o Xtycopi a enumerated in this last chapter) or do it
unintentionally, or have that appearance (though they may in reality
have intended a slight), men are calm (quiet, placable, take no offence) .
4. And to those who offer a slight without intending it (with
the contrary intention). And to those whose feelings or dispositions and
conduct (both included in TOIOVTOI) are alike to themselves and to the
others (lit. who behave in the same way themselves to themselves) ; for
no one is ever supposed to slight himself.
5. And to those who offer a slight, and then repent of it ; for, accept
ing as a sort of satisfaction the pain felt at what has been done, their
anger ceases. A sign of this is what happens in the punishment of slaves;
for those that answer, or contradict us, and deny the fault, we punis.
more severely, whilst we cease to be angry with those that admit the
justice of their punishment .
HfTan(\ofifvois] OKOVCTIOV 8e TO (Tri\vrrov Kal tv fi(Tap.t\dq ...... TOV &T] &i
ayvotavo ^.fv ev /iern/zeXe/et O.KU>V 8oxtl <c.r.X. Eth. Nic. Ill 2 init. p. 1 1 IO b 1 8.
So that repentance is a sign that the act was unintentional, and from
ignorance of the probable effect.
avriXfyovras] Arist. Ran. IO/2, XaAiai KO\ trrtap.v\iav fj ^^futvaxTtv ray
rt ira\ai<TTpaf, Kal rovs jrapaXovs avfTTticrtv dvTayopcufiv rois ap^ovtriv-
AR. II. 3
34 PI1TOPIKH2 B 3 5, 6.
IU.6V, Trpos $6 TOVS 6 {JLoXoy ov VT as $iKaiu)s KO\a(^ecr6ai,
Travo/meOa 6vfj.ovp.evoi. a lriov o OTL dvaiG-yyvTia TO
TO. (pavepa dpveia-Qaiy r; c) dvaicr xyvTLa oXiycopia Kai
KaTa(ppovn(Tts iav yovv TTO\V KarcMppovov/uiev, OVK
6 al(T)^vv6/uLe6ct, Kai TOiS TaTreivovjuevois irpos
KCCI /u.ri dvTiXeyovcriv (paivovTai yap o/moXoyelv TJ
? <N) t/ _L /D ~ ^ /O ^ * ^ ^
ewai, OL o f/rrof? (popovvrai, (popov/uevos ce ouoets
r/<\\\\ / r
OTI ce TT^OS TOWS TaTreivovjJievov^ TraveTai
TOVS op.oXoyoui 7-ar] Schrader refers in illustration to Tcrent.
Andr. in $.\$^&ttx$a..annondixiessehocfuturum$ Dav. dixti. Pamph.
quin meritus s? Dav. cntcem ..... Pamph. (who is mollified by the admission)
hei mihi, cum 11011 habeo spatium ut de te sumam supplicium, ut volo.
Jul, C&sar, IV 3, 1 1 6, Brut. When I spoke that, I was ill-tempered too. Cass.
Do you confess so much ? Give me your hand. The cause of this (of the
heavier punishment of those that aggravate their offence by denying it),
is that to deny evident facts is effrontery (dvaicrxwria is a want of respect
for the opinions and feelings of others), and effrontery implies slight
regard and contempt at all events we feel no respect for (al<rxvvt<rdai
rwa, note on II 2. 22} those whom we greatly despise . This is an argu
ment in support of the assertion that avater^vvrta implies dXcycopt a and
Kara(f>p6vi](ris. avaurxvvrla is disrespect ; now as experience shews that
we do treat with disrespect those whom we very much despise, it follows
from this that disrespect, effrontery, impudence, must carry with it, as its
outward expression, the feeling of contempt. Comp. c. 6 2, 17 5
dvaKrxvvTia oAtytapm TIS.
avaKTx vvT ia T O T " fyavepa apvtlvQai} The sausage- (or black-pudding-)
monger in the Knights (296) is a perfect model of this kind of effrontery.
Cleon, who is represented as not overburdened with modesty, candidly
admits his thefts, o/noAoyw K\enreiv a-v 8 ov^t. The other lays his hands
upon something under the very eyes of the bystanders, and then swears
that he never touched it : vrj TOV Ep/jt.rjv TOV dyopalov, Kairiopum ye j3\(7r6i>Ta>v.
6. What follows, though put forward as an independent topic, may
also be regarded as the explanation of the second member of the alterna
tive, the mitigation of the penalty consequent upon the admission of the
offender.
And to those who humble themselves before us, and do not answer
or contradict us ; for in doing so they seem to admit their inferiority, and
(conscious) inferiority implies fear, (not contemptuous indifference), and
no one in that state of mind is ever guilty of a slight . (Fear and anger
cannot coexist, 10.) That our anger does cease towards those who
humble themselves before us, is shewn also by the habit which dogs have
of not biting those that sit down (when they attack them) . This fact in
the natural history of dogs is attested not only by Homer Od. 26
t^anlvrjs 8" OSvcrfja iov Kuveg vXa/co/xcopot ol fj,fi> KfK\i]yovTts circdpa^tov, avrap
OSvcrcrfir eero K(p8o(riivr], crKTJTrrpov 8e 01 e KTrecre xipdr but also by the
experience of modern travellers in Albania [see esp. Mure s Tour in Greece
PHTOPIKHS B 3 7 10. 35
n opyt l, KUI ol Kvve? $ti\ov(riv ov SaKvovre? rot)? K a6-
Kal TO?? o-TrovSagovcn 777)0? rows
i. Ka TO?S yotecfw KexaptarfULevoK. K ai TO??
9 eoyues /ca/ TrapaiTOVjmevois TaTreivorepoi yap. K ai
TDK w vftpiffTctK w$e x^fvaa-raK prf* 6\iytapOK 9 //
6s /ij/Sei/a // ^; et s x^o-rovs /xr/8 eis Totovrovs olo/
I07T6/) ai/ro/. oAws 5 e /c rw// evavr uov Sel (TKOTreiv ra
vrpavrriKa. K al ov<s (pofiovvrai $ ala-^vvovrai eo)9
I 93-100 or DeQuincey s review xin 301-9]. I myself heard of it there
In illustration of K adi WT a S , sitting as a suppliant posture, Victorius cites
Soph. Oed. R. mit. rivas iroff ^pa s racrSf *c.r.A. Arist. Plut. 382, (5pc5 nv
sm\ TOV /377>aro9 Kadedov^mw, inenjpiav e X ovra. Demosth. de Cor. 107 OU K
eV Movvnxt ? f*d6f{tro (took sanctuary at the altar of Artemis in Munychia).
7- And to those who are serious with the serious (earnest in any-
thmg-the opposite of those who joke vaifrvrcs, or use irony, when YOU
are disposed to be serious, which makes you angry ; c. 2 24) < because
then you consider yourself to be treated seriously (which implies revtect
that you are worthy of serious consideration), and not with contempt
the other case, in which people seem to make a joke of you)
oro&ifccrAu and ira0pom<r0a*] On this formation of the passive
ee Append. B on I 12. 22 (at the end of the notes to Book i).
8 And to those who have done us more kindness and service (than
they have received from us) . The explanation of this is not given
because it 1S too clear to require one. It is that this superiority in con
ferring favours constitutes a debt and an obligation on the part of the
inferior in this social commerce, whose account is on the debit side in the
)oksofthe other; who is therefore obliged to him, and disinclined to
real ^ Sl PPOSed ffence: the S ratitude overpowers the sense
And those who beg for anything and deprecate our wrath or resent-
-both of these are confessions of inferiority, we acknowledge that
we are m want of something, a deficiency which they can suppfy, and
this shews superiority- for they are humbler (than they would otherwise
be, if they didn t want anything).
9- ^ And those who are not given to wanton outrage, or to mockery,
or slight the opposite dispositions and conduct being of all the most
provocative of anger, C. 2 3, 5, 12- either such as never indulge them
against any one, or never against the good and worthy, or never against
those who are like ourselves .
10. And as a general rule, the things (words or deeds) that arc
productive (in our intercourse with others) of a calm temper (a quiet,
indifferent, unexcited state of feeling; Trpao^s is purely negative ; I believe,
strictly speaking, that it is no true Trddos at all, and is better represented
is a virtue or mean state in the Ethics) may be ascertained from their
36 PHTOPIKH2 B 3u, 12.
yap av ouTtos e^facriVj OVK opyityvTai aZvvaTov yap
11 a/ma (j)oj3eIcr6aL Kai opyi^ecrdai. Kal TO?? St opyrjv
TTOiricrao iv r} OVK opyi^ovrai y) JTTOV opyt^ovTai ov
yap Si 6\LywpLav (paivovTai Trpa^at. ou$i<s yap opyi-
o/xei/os 6\iytop6L t] fJiiv yap oXiycopia aXvTrov, t] c>
12 opytj /UTa \V7rtjs. Kai TO?s aicrxwojuievois avrovs.
i t^oi/res e evavTioos TW opyi^ecrBai &//\oi/ on
opposites (viz. the exciting topics of opyij in c. 2). Buhle objects to this
clause, oXwr e TG>V fvavrlw as interrupting the analysis and out of place,
and pronounces it an interpolation. It is however a not unnatural
observation to make here. Up to this point Aristotle has been going
over very nearly the same ground as the topics of the last chapter ; when
he has got thus far, the resemblance strikes him, and he says by way of
a note: "but in fact this is true as a general rule, all the topics of
Trpaorrjs may be derived by merely reversing them from those of opyrj".
I do not mean to say that he was previously unaware of this fact, but
only that it struck him more vividly at the moment, when he had the
preceding examples written down on his parchment or papyrus (probably
the latter) before his eyes!
After this little digression we return to the topics of irpaorrjs.
The presence of those that we are afraid of, or stand in awe of, makes
us calm : for as long as we are in this state of mind we cannot feel
anger; because fear and anger cannot coexist in the mind .
it. At offences committed under the influence of passion we
either feel no anger at all, or in a less degree ; because in this case the
offence appears not to be due to slight; for no one when angry with
another can feel indifferent about him and his proceedings ; because a
contemptuous and indifferent state of mind, or slight, implies the absence
of pain, whereas anger is always accompanied by it , opyrj opfgis (ifTa
XvTTTjy, defin. II 2.1. "Eodem argumento Eth. Nic. in (4, nn b 17,)
distinxit Trpoaipea-iv a cupiditate : KU\ 77 /ueV iiridvpia ijdeos Kal tniXvirov, ;
t$ Trpoaipe<rif ovre \vnrjpov ov6 JSeos". Victorius.
Tolr fit* 6pyf]v iroirjcraari.v] As here the influence of passion mitigates
the offensiveness of an act, and the amount of provocation caused by it,
so in Eth. Nic. V. IO, 1135 ^ *9> orav tl&bs fuv //.i) TrpoftovXeixras &t, ddiKrjfj.a,
olov ocra re Sta dvfj-ov Kai. aXXa Tradrj, ocra avayKala fj tpvo-iKa, <rv/ij3cu fei -rotf dv-
6pa>noLs, it diminishes its criminality. The supposition is, that a man who
kills another, for instance, in a fit of passion, is blinded by it, deprived
thereby of the knowledge of the particular circumstances of the case, which
is necessary to constitute guilt, Eth. N. ill 2, and the want of which
exempts in some degree from responsibility ; there is no malice prepense
which makes the complete crime. The question of the degree in which
acts of this kind can be properly called in-voluntary is briefly discussed in
c. 3 of the same book.
12. Again, an offence from one who stands in awe of us , does not
provoke us to anger, because we know or guess that from one who
PHTOPIKHS B 3 12, 13. 37
TTpaoi .i(TLV, oiov iv TraiSia, ev yeXcoTt, eV eo^orry, eV
-, evrjjJLgpia, tv KaTopQuxrei, ev TrXtipcoorei, 6\ws eV a/\i/-
/ > <f> *- x f /o ^ > > ^ > -
Taa /cca tioovti fjii] vppi(TTiKr] KCCI ev e\7rioi eirieiKei.
13 6T /ce^iOOi/iKores teat fj.r] viroyvioi Trj opyrj oi/res* Travel
habitually regards us with awe or reverence the offence is unintentional,
being inconsistent with his ordinary feeling toward us. Also it is plain
that men are calm and placable when they are in any state (in any con
dition or circumstances, internal or external) which is antagonistic to
angry feeling, as when engaged in any sport or amusement, when they
are laughing, at a feast, in fine weather (or in a prosperous state), in
success, in a state of repletion or satisfaction ; in short, in any condition
of freedom from pain (negative pleasure), or (positive) pleasure except
that of wanton outrage (vfipis is always owcas rjffSrj, n 2. 5) and of
virtuous, good hope . Of f-rrifiKTjs it is said, Eth. N. v. 14, init. p.era0epo-
/zec dvrl TOV dyadov. It can be substituted, by metaphor, for dyados. The
bad state of mind implied by a vicious hope does not exclude the feeling
of anger.
fvrjufpia} It is hard to say whether this is meant for a fine day ,
fine weather , like tvSia, which certainly tends to placidity of temper,
and general (v6v(j.ia and evjcoAia (in which sense it is actually used in
Hist. Anim. VI 15-6, orav tvptpias yevofifvrjs dvadep^aivriTai. 77 yrj, and
again 7> orav tvijfiepia ]/, and Xenoph. Hellen. II 4. 2, KOI /^a\ evrj/jifpias,
ova-rjs, Soph. Aj. 709, \evKov cua^epov (pans) or metaphorically, for a
state of prosperity, health and happiness , in which sense evif/ifpor,
fvrjfiepflv and ev^epi a are employed. See again Hist. Anim. vm 18. I,
(vrjp.fpova-1 8e (are in a flourishing condition) TO. <aa Kara ray wpay K.r.A.
VII. 5,wpos TTJV aX\r]v TOV ww/zaro? evijfuplav. Pol. Ill 6, 1278 b 29, s fvovays
TIVOS fVT)p.epias fv avrw (r<u Qv] /cat y\VKvrr]Tos (pva-LKrjs. IV(VIl) 2, 1324 d 3^>
(fjiTTodiov rfj irfpl avrbv evrjuepia (of the prosperity of a country). VII
(VI) 8, 1322 b 38, fvrjfj.epov(Tais iro\f(riv, VIII (v) 8, 1308 b 24, TO evr][jLepovi>
rfjs TroAeo)?. And in the same sense fverrjpias yivopfvqs 8t flprjvrjv K.r.A., of
estate, as before, vm (v) 6, 1306 ^ n. De Gen. An. iv 6. 16, evrjfj.epe iv
TOIS a-apcta-iv. Eth. Nic. I 9, sub fin. rfjs Toiavrrjs fvijptpias, including all
the elements of happiness or prosperity, according to the vulgar notion.
In Aristotle at all events the preponderance of usage is decidedly on the
side of the metaphorical application.
13. Further (men are brought to a calm or placid state of mind)
by lapse of time when they are no longer fresh in their anger (when their
anger is no longer fresh) ; for time brings anger to an end .
xpovieiv is to pass or spend time , KexpoviKores, men that have
already passed some time , since the angry fit came on. For examples
of the use of the word see the Lexx. vnoyvioi, fresh, recent , of things
still under the hand of the workman. See note on I 1.7.
Gaisford quotes in illustration of the topic, Thucyd. ill 38, (Cleon) &n>-
fj-dfa nev TCBI> irpoQfvruv audis Trepl MvrtAjpaiW Aeyetv, KOI xp v v Siarpi^rj^
f[uroiij(rdvT<i>v o ecrn Trpos ra>v tf8iKT]K6Ta)i> paXXov. 6 yap -iva6<av rw dpeuravri
duftXvTepa TTJ opyrj eirei-fpx*Tai. And Eustath. ad II. Q, p. 1342. 46, o Sia
fif(rov Kaipos paXaTTd rrjv iv rots 6vfJ.ovp.fvois iriikijponjTa, Strrt \r]0fvfii> TOV
38 PHTOPIKHS B 3 13.
7jO opyriv 6 xpovos. Trcwei Se KUL eTepov opy^v
)) Trap a\\ou \t]fpBlcra TtfJLwpia TrpOTepov $10 eu
fylXOKpCCTIjS, eiTToVrOS TLVO^. Opyi^O/ULEVOU TOU $r ][J.OV "ri
OVK aTToXo-ye? ; " "OVTTGO 75" efyrj. " d\\a Trore ;
, , t/ >/.. -. ,f^. ^ /I /) -v *5 ** *
Ci OTO.V a\\ov tow oiapGp\ti[J.6VOV. Trpaoi yap <yi<y-
vovrai brav ets a\\ov TIJV oynv dvaXuxTtaoriv, oiov
tijrovra OTI (Soph. Electr. 179) xpovos evfiapffs 6e6s. Virg. Aen. V 781,
lunonis gravis zra, nee exsaturabile pectus, qitam nee longa dies pietas
nee mitigat ulla (Victorius), describes the implacability, the lasting
nature, of Juno s anger, which is the direct opposite of TrpaoTrjs- This
is iriKpoTTjs : 01 Se iriKpol Suo-StdXuroi KOI troXiiv XP VOV opyiovTai t Eth. N. IV
1 1, 1 126 a 20: likewise KOTOS, rancorous, vindictive wrath, said of one who
iTfTTfi rrjv opyrjv, (nurses his wrath to keep it warm. Burns,) Ib. line 25.
And opposed to these are the opyi\oi (irascible), oeir, d/cpo^oXot, (ita Bekk.)
Ib. line 18 ; these ra^eW opyifrvrai and Travovrai ra^ccoy, lines 13, 15.
And again a more violent animosity conceived against one person is
appeased by punishment previously exacted from another (who may not
have excited it so strongly) : and therefore the saying of Philocrates was
to the point, when some one asked at a time of popular excitement
against him, why do not you defend yourself? No, not yet , he replied.
4 Well, but when? As soon as I have seen some one else under accu
sation , (or under a similar suspicion : 8ia/3aAXeiv, to set two people at
variance , being specially applied to calumny ). For men recover their
calmness and evenness of temper, as soon as they have expended their
anger upon another object . So Eth. N., u. s., 1 126 a 21, TraCXa 5e yiWrat
oruv ai/ra7roi8a> 77 -yap ri/^copt a rraiift rfjs dpyfjs, ijbovrjv avrl rfjs XVTTTJS
t /xTj-oiouo-a. " Tanta enim est primi impetus in ira vis, ut cupiditatem
fere omnem effundat." Schrader. He also cites from Plutarch s Life of
Alexander the case of Alexander the Great, who expended his anger
against the Greeks on the destruction of Thebes, and afterwards spared
Athens. Victorius supplies a very pertinent passage from Lysias, Or. xix
inrep TUIV Apiarrocpdvovs xP r lt JL( ^ Ta v 5 6, OKOUO) -yap e-ya>ye...ori travr^v
fteLvoTciTov eori 8ia/3oXjj juaXtara Se TOVTO fX oi ** v ris detvuTarov, orav TroX-
Xoi 7rl rrj avTrj aiTi a (Is aywva Karocrrtocrti coy yap eVt ro TTO\V ol
Kpivop-evoi o~a>ovTai ntTravfJitvoi. yap opyfjs avruv dxpoacrdf, Kai TOVS f Xt
rjdrj idf\OVT(S d.TTo8e^eo-0f.
On Philocrates, of the Attic dome Hagnus ( Ayvovaios}, a contempo
rary and political rival of Demosthenes, see two columns of references
from the Orators, chiefly Demosthenes and Aeschines, in Baiter and
Sauppe s excellent Index nominum, appended to their edition of the
Greek Orators, ill 137 seq. [See also Arnold Schaefer s Demosthenes und
seine Zeit, II 345 and elsewhere. S.]
As happened in the case of Ergophilus ; for though they (the Athe
nian assembly) were more indignant with him than with Callisthenes,
they let him off, because they had condemned Callisthenes to death the
day before . Callisthenes and Ergophilus were both of them Athenian
generals commanding in the Chersonese, B. C. 362. See Grote, Hist, of
PHTOPIKH2 B 3 13-16. 39
67Ti Epyo<pi\ov. p.d\\ov yap ^aXeTraivovTe^ p- 6r.
^/ Ka\\tcr6evei d<pe iorav <$id TO Ka\\i<T6evovs TY\ Trpo-
J 4 Tepata KaTayvwvai 6a.va.TOV. Kai edv eXewcriv, Kai
eav /uiei^ov icaKOV TreTrovQoTes axriv ij ol opyi^ojuevoi
dv edpacrav w(T7rep ei\r](pvai yap o lovTai Tijuuapiav.
\ > \ 9^. ~ >f 5 \ \ <N / / J
i$-Kai eav aoiKeiv oiwvTai avTOi Kai oiKaiws Tracr^eiv ov
yiyveTai yap t] opytj Trpos TO SiKaiov* ov yap GTI
Trapa TO TrpocrfJKOv o iovTai Trdcr^eiv, r\ S opyn TOVTO
riv. cio ceT TCO Xoyw TTpOKoXafeiv dyavaKTOVGL yap
16 rjTTOv KoXa^ojmevot Kai ol $ov\oi. Kai edv l^n aicrO
oiwvTai OTL Si avTOvs Kai dv& <av eiraQov
Gr. x 508, 511, and the references in Baiter and Sauppe, u. s. pp. 45 and
73 [also A. Schaefer, Demosthenes, I 134]. The former is to be distin
guished from Callisthenes the contemporary Orator. Of Ergophilus,
Demosthenes says, de Fals. Leg. 180, KOI oa-oi Sia TO.VT (corruption
and treachery in the exercise of military command) dn-oAwXao-i irap v^lv,
ol Se xpr)[jLaTa Tra/HTroAX (a(p\TJKacriv nv ^aXeTToi Sel^at, Epyo0iXoy, K?7<^)icro-
BOTOS, TLn6fj.axos, K.r.X. To reconcile this passage with that of Aristotle,
we must suppose that Ergophilus was one of those that were fined, but
acquitted on the capital charge ; which is not quite accurately expressed
by a^fTcrai/ : or possibly the two cases may be distinct.
14. Sympathy or compassion calms angry feeling ; and if the
offence (which has aroused their indignation) has been visited by a hea
vier punishment than those who are thus angry would themselves have
inflicted (their anger is appeased) ; for they think they have received a
sort of (woTrep) satisfaction (for the injury) , or exacted as it were a
penalty (for the offence) .
15. Or again, if they think that they are themselves in fault, and
are suffering no more than they deserve ; for justice, reciprocity , or
fair retaliation, excites no anger : and so they no longer think that the
treatment they receive is in violation of their natural rights, and this, as
we said, is essential to (or the notion of) anger , r^v was when we said
it : that is, in the definition II 2. I. On Trpoa-fJKov, the appeal to nature
as the basis of obligation, see note on /ii) Trpoa-rjKovTos (on II 2. i at the end).
And therefore punishment should always be preceded by the (appro
priate, TW) explanation (of the nature of the offence and the justice of the
punishment) ; for even slaves are less vexed at being punished (when
treated in this way) . This is Muretus interpretation, against Victorius.
It is no doubt the natural and correct explanation. [ Decet verbis casti-
gare, antequam puniamus. Spengel.]
1 6. (And men in anger are more easily pacified) if they think that
(those that they desire to punish) will never find out that the punishment
is due to them (that they are the authors of it) and that it is in compen
sation for their own injuries ; (this is the Qaivoptvij o\iya>pia of the clcfi-
40 PHTOPIKH2 B 3 16.
yap opyt] Ttov KotO eKacrrov Icrnv Sr/Aoi/ 3 e/c TOV
(J)do~6ctL
ws ov TTL}jLU>p nfJiivos el /at] i icr6eTO Kai v<p ov
dvd OTOV. WO~T6 OVT6 TCUS GfAAOiS OO~OL fJit] CtlCrOa-
VOVTO.I opyifyvrai, oi/Ve TO?S TeQveuxriv en, ws TT-
7rov6oo~i re TO ecr%ctTOV Kai ovK dXytjorovoriv ov()
ala6t]cro{jieiOL < Sj ov ol opyi^ojuevoi efpievrai. $10 eu
Trepi TOV ^EfCTOjOOs d iroitjTfc, Travcrai f3ov\o/u.evos TOV
yaia.v
nition: see note on p. 10,) for anger is always directed against individuals,
(n 2. 2, infra 4. 31, where this is made the characteristic of anger, as
opposed to hatred,} as appears from the definition . This inference from
the definition is drawn from the ^ettvopevr) rip.o>pia which is the object of
the angry man. If the punishment is to be such as can be actually seen,
the anger cannot be directed against abstractions like classes or kinds,
but must have a single, palpable, concrete, and also animated object ;
something that can^v/, and shew that it is hurt.
And therefore (the trait of character, the representation, in) the verse
(of Homer, Odys. IX 504) is right and true (to nature, rightly conceived
and expressed), " Tell him that it is Ulysses waster of cities (that blinded
him)" as though his revenge was not complete (i. e. the revenge of
Ulysses, or of the character in Homer; which is the suppressed nomin.
to TrexoirjTat, and with which rerijuapr^fVof agrees : lit. the character is
rightly represented in the verses as not fully avenged) unless the other
(the Cyclops) was aware by whom and for what (the blindness was
inflicted).
The passage runs thus : Kv/cXco^, at <ev ris <re Kara6vr^ru>v dvdpoonuv
6<pda\fj.ov eipqrat deiKcXti}i> dXawrtV, (fracrdai O8v<rcrfja TTTO\nr6pdiov ea-
Xao3<rai, vibi> Aaeprta), ldd<r) evi OIKI" e^orm. So that men are not
angry with all the rest (all besides those who are actually within reach),
who are out of sight (far away, for instance), nor any more with the dead
(?rt, they do not retain their anger beyond the grave) as with those who
have endured the last extremity, and are no longer susceptible of pain,
nor indeed of any feeling, which (to give the other pain and to make him
feet) is what the angry man aims at. And therefore the poet (Homer,
Iliad, Q 54) has well said of Hector, wishing to represent Achilles as
ceasing from his anger against the dead (///. wishing to put a stop to his
anger, i. e. represent it as ceasing] : " For in truth it is but dumb (sense
less) earth that he is outraging in his wrath." Or rather, irava-ai /3onXo-
fjifvos means to suggest or assign a reason or motive for Achilles ceasing
from his anger : the words being those of Apollo, who is haranguing the
PHTOPIKH2 B 3 17. 41
17 $}]\ov ovv OTI TO?S KaraTrpavveiv /3ov\op.6voi^ e /c
TOVTWV TU)V TO7TUIV \6KT60V, CtVTOVS JJ.V 7Tapa(TKvd-
^ova-i TOIOVTOVS, ots $ opyityvTctif i] (pofiepovs r]
Gods on the propriety of permitting Hector s body to be buried, and
concludes his speech very emphatically with this line.
TraCcrat /3ouXo/iefoj] These words, applied to the poet himself instead of
the character Apollo, represented in the poem, are an instance of a not
unfrequent confusion in expressions of this kind. It is the substitution
of the author himself for his personage or character ; or the conversion of
the doctrine of a given philosopher or school into the philosopher or
school that holds it. Plat. Rep. II 363 D, roiis 8e dvoa-iovs...KaTopvTrovo-iv
eVAtSov, KOI KOCTKIVCJ) uScop dvayKa^ovari (pepeiv, of Musaeus and the Orphics,
who represent them as buried, and compelled to carry... Theaet. 183 A,
Iva /LU) or^aaifjLev avrovs rw A(/yo>, the Heracliteans to wit, that we may
not represent them as stopping 1 contrary to their doctrine of the uni
versal flux. Similarly the Eleatics, Ib. 157 A, are called ol to-ravrfs, the
stationers , meaning those who represent every thing as stationary or at
rest. So Soph. 252 A, the opposition school, of Heraclitus, receives the
name of oi peovres, the fluent philosophers , the flowing gentry , instead
of their theory: and compare Theaet. 181 A, ra>v ra a/ci ^ra KIVOVVTCW.
A good example is Thuc. I 5, ol TraAcuoi TU>V TTOITJTCOV rat KIIO-TCIS TO>V /cara-
Tr\(6vTa>v...(p<dTu>vTts fl Ararat ela-iv, making their characters put these
questions. Arist. Ran. 15, if the vulg. be retained (Meineke omits it),
Ib. 833) fTtpUTtvtTpf 911 (Aeschylus), TrpcuVtara /xeV yap fva TLV av Kadiafv
(introduced in a sitting position) (yK.aXv\^as. In Aristotle it is still more
common: de Gen. Anim. 722 b 19, KaQanep Efj.TT(8oK\fjs ytvva. Metaph.
A 8, 989^ 34, ot IIt;^ayopetot... yej rc5a-i rov ovpavov, de Anima I 2, 405 a 25,
KQ! Hpa/cAetros...f^ 775 raXAa o-wi(TTri<Tiv, of which he represents, holds
theoretically, everything else to be composed . Ib. 404 b 16 and 24, (certain
philosophers) TJJV ^vx ! 7 J/ a-vvia-raa-tv. De Gen. et Corr. I I, 314 a 9, o<roi
irarra e^ tvos ytw&ffiv } and b I, ro is e tvos iravra KaTavKtvd^ovaiv, De
part. Anim. I i. 21, 640 b n, ovrcos rov Kua-pov ytvvuxriv, and 22, 640 b 17,
e /c TCCV ToiovTcav crco/iarwi crvi tcrracrt rf^v (pvaiv TrdvTfs. See Dr Lightfoot s
notes on Ep. ad Gal. vi 13, ol irfpiTf^vo^fvoL, the Circumcisionists , the
advocates of Circumcision. Similarly in Latin, Juven. vil 151, quum
perimit saevos classis numerosa tyrannos. Hor. Sat. II 5. 41, Furius
hibernas cana nive conspuet Alpes.
17. It is plain therefore that those who want to soothe a man
down (bring him down to a placid state from the exaltation of his pas
sion) must derive their propositions (or the traits of character) from these
topics, presenting themselves in such a light assuming such a character
themselves (as is represented in the foregoing analysis), and the objects
of their anger as either formidable, or worthy of high respect, or bene
factors, or involuntary agents, or as excessively afflicted at what they
have done . cu<rxv"? here is the feeling of reverence or awe which is
felt in the presence of any one who is entitled to unusual respect or admi
ration (see note on c. 2. 22) ; and ala-xvv^s d{-iovs is equivalent to TOIOVTOVS
irpos our alaxvvtcrdai 8(1: and vntpa\yo\i vra s is the representative of
the fj.fTap.f\o^.fvot of 5-
42 PHTOPIKH2 B 3 i/J 4 i, 2.
v$ r] Ke^apior/uLevov^ r] O.KOVTO.S rj
TO? ireTroitifjievois.
Se (j)i\ova-t Kai fjiiarovori, Kai $ia ri, T^I/CHAP. iv.
<pi\iav Kai TO (piXeli* opiardjULevot Xeyw/xep. ecrra)
TO (iXelv TO f3ov\ecr6ai TLVL a o lerai dyaBd, eKeivov
I have already hinted a doubt in the notes on the preceding chapter
whether Trpaor^y is properly ranked amongst the irdQrj. I think that it can
be made plainly to appear that it is not. It is introduced no doubt for
the purpose of giving the opposite side to the topics of anger, because
the student of Rhetoric is in every case required to be acquainted with
both sides of a question. And this purpose it may answer very well
without being a real opposite of opyr/ or indeed a irddos at all. If we
compare Trpaorrjs with the other irddrj analysed in this second book, we
find that it differs from all of them in this respect that the rest are
emotions, instinctive and active, and tend to some positive result;
whereas Trpaor^j is inactive and leads to nothing but the allaying, subdu
ing, lowering, of the angry passion, which it reduces to a particular state,
the right or mean state of temper. It seems plain therefore that it is
in reality, what it is stated to be in the Ethics, a egis, not a nddos, of the
temper ; an acquired and settled state of one of the Trddij, viz. opyrj, in the
mean state (or due measure) of which (the Trddrj} all virtue resides. It is
accordingly represented in the Ethics as a virtue, the mean between
irascibility and insensibility, the due measure of the passionate element or
emotion of our nature ; and as a virtue it is the control or regulation of
our temper. The true iraQos is the opyrj, the instinctive capacity of angry
feeling, which may be cultivated by habit and education and developed in
either direction, for good or evil; till it becomes opyikorrjs irascibility, or
dopyr]a-ia insensibility if it take a wrong direction or else settles into
the mean state of a calm and placid temper. And this is the view that
is taken of it in Nic. Eth. IV 1 1, init. Trpaorrjs is fjLea-oTrjs irepl opyds ; Ib.
1125 ^30, TO p.ev yap Ttddos ftrrlv opyij ; line 34? ftovXerai yap 6 npaos
drdpa^os elvai KOI pr) ayecrOai VTTO TOV irddovs, dXX" (as av o \6yos Tag ouro>
KOI eVt TOVTOIS Kai eVi TO<TOVTOV xpovov xd^erratvetv. This is doubtless the
correct view ; and the other, though no doubt subsequent to that of the
Ethics, is adopted in the Rhetoric merely for convenience, philosophical
accuracy not being required. Compare the introductory note to this
Chapter.
CHAPTER IV.
i. Let us now proceed, after having first denned love and loving, to
analyse its objects, motives or occasions^.
2. or<o] as usual, in OCA popular Rhetoric. See note on I 5. 8, &c.
Let love then be assumed to be, the wishing to another whatever we
think good, for his sake, not for our own, and the inclination to do such
things (to do him good) to the utmost of our power . Eth. Nic. vm 3,
sub init. 01 Se <f)i\ovvT(s aXX^Xovs /SouXotrai raya$a aXXjfXois ravrrj y (piXov-
<TIV. This makes the nearest approach to a regular definition of $iXi a in
the Ethics, and is constantly recognised as the principle of love through-
PHTOPIKHS B 4 2, 3. 43
tt/e/ca a AAa JUM] avrov, Kal TO Kara Suvctfjuv TrpctKTiKov
dvai TOVTMV. <pi\os & e cmV 6 (piXwv Kal di>ri(f>iXou- i\ 1381.
/uei/os. oiovTai Be (piXoi eivai ol oirrws e^eti/ oio/uevoi
7T|ods dXXtjXovs. TOVTWV oe vTTOKeifJievitiv dvdyKr] (piXov
eivat TOV cruvn^ofjievov TCHS d<ya6ois Kal <rvvaX>yovvTa
TO?S Xvirtipols fjiri Sid TI erepov a AAa cY eKeivov.
yap wv fiovXovTai ^aipovcri Trdvres,
Be XvTrovvrai, wcrre T^S /3ov\f7<rea>s CT^JULE LOJ/ P . 62.
out the treatise on $iX/a, in Books vm and IX. It represents the desire
or the inclination of doing good to the object of your affection, which
is naturally, or has become by habit, instinctive, and therefore a nddos.
In both definitions ftovXeo-dai is prominent and characteristic. Love is a
feeling, a sort of appetite, the wish to do good ; the power and the means
of doing good being alike accidental and non-essential, though it is true
(which is here added to the definition) that the inclination is always
present, and will be gratified when the means are forthcoming. The
words fKfivov ZiffKo. oXXa fj.rj au rou express the unselfishness, the disinterested
character, of the emotion, o 8e /SotAo/iei/os riv tvirpaytlv e\nLba e^av
tvTTopias 81 (Kfivov, OVK. coin f vvovs e fceiVo) eiVai, tzXXa JJLO\\OV eaurw, KaOairep
ovde (j)i\os, fl dtpcnrevti avrov did nva xpfi<riv (Eth. Nic. IX 5 sub fin.).
Cicero, de Nat. Deor. I ult. (quoted by Schrader), has the same remark.
He adds, Prata et arva et pecudum greges diliguntur isto modo quod
fructus ex iis capiuntur. Hominum caritas et amicitia gratuita est.
And a friend is one that loves, and is beloved in return. And those
that have this disposition, or entertain this feeling to one another .
tvvoiav yap ev dirnrtTTovdocri, (ptXiav aval. Eth. N. VIII 2, 1 155 ^ 34-
3. From this assumption the necessary consequence is that a
friend is one who sympathizes with us in our joys and sorrows, rejoicing
at the good that befals us, and grieved at that which gives us pain, not
with any ulterior motive ; but solely on our friend s account. For all
feel joy in obtaining the object of their wishes, and pain at the reverse, so
that the pleasures and pains that they feel are an indication of the nature
of their wish . The pleasure or pain felt on the occasion of a friend s
good or bad fortune is the test of the nature of their wishes, and therefore
of their friendship or hatred. And also, as every one feels pleasure at
his own success and pain at disappointment, so by the rule (piXos
uXXos avros, erepos avros, a friend is a second self, (Eth. N. IX 4, 1166
a 31, 9, sub init. et 1170 b 6), the test of friendship is this community of
pleasure and pain between friend and friend. Idem velle atque idem
nolle ea demum firma amicitia est, says Sallust. This same principle of
fellow-feeling as the basis of friendship (which is here principally in
question) runs through the following sections to 7. Zeno, the
Stoic, epomytfeis, ri e ori (piXos ; aXXoy, tyr], ya>. Diog. Laert. VII I,
(Zeno) 23. 1
1 The reverse of the medal is presented by the cynical La Rochefoucauld,
MaximeSi, " A ous ne poitvons rien aimer qn( par rapport a nous, et nous ne
44 PHTOPIKH2 B 4 4, 5.
4 at \v7rai Kai at tjfiovai. Kal cus ^y 1 rat/ret dyaOa
KOIKCC, Kal ol TO?S ai/TOts (j)i\OL, Kai ol TO??
e%6poi TavTa y^j TOUTOis (3ov\ecr6ai dvayKt], axrre
a Trep avTio Kai aAAw fiovXo/mevos, TOUTM (paiveTai
$ (f)i\o$ elvai. Kal TOVS TreTroirjKOTas ev <pi\ov<riv, t]
I/TOI)S rj liov KtjdovTai rj el fJieyaXa^ r] el TrpoOv/mtos, t]
4. And those who have now (by this time, ^77) learnt to regard the
same things as good and bad (to each) , id est, qui eandem fortunam
subiere, et in eum statum ac conditionem vitae venere, ut quod aliis
molestum sit ipsis quoque incommodet, et quod alios iuvet eodem pacto
ipsos sublevet (Victorius) ; and those who have the same friends and
the same enemies ; for between such there must needs be a community
of wishes, (good to the common friend, harm to the common enemy,) and
therefore, by wishing for another the same things that he desires for
himself, a man plainly shews that he is that man s friend . See the illustra
tions from the Eth. N. quoted in the preceding note. For Kal ols 817
(A c and Bekker), O, Y b andZ b have ^817, which is the reading of Victorius,
and is supported by Vater. The latter notes (as I had myself observed)
that ST; you know , to be sure , to attract attention, is not at all in
Aristotle s manner (it is Platonic, not Aristotelian) in a mere enumeration
like this. I doubt if there is another instance of it in the Rhetoric.
ijdr) on the contrary, which Victorius has represented in his explanation,
is quite in point, and in fact adds something to the sense.
5. And men love their benefactors in general, (those who have done
good) either to themselves or to those whom they care for; or those who
have done them great and important services, or have shewn forwardness ;
readiness, in doing them ; or if they were done on similar, i.e. great,
occasions (when the need was urgent, or the benefit signal), and for their
sakes alone; or those whom they suppose to wish to do- them good :
the manifest inclination, TO Kara 8wap.iv irpattTiKov elvai rovrcov, 2, being,
as a test of friendship, equivalent to the actual performance. For rj ols
av, Muretus, Wolf, and Brandis Anonymns (in Schneidewin s Philo-
logus iv. i. p. 46) read KOI ovs, as the commencement of a new topic.
faisons que siiivre notre go&t et notre plaisir quand nous preferons nos amis nous-
memes ; c esl neanmoins par cette preference seule que Vamitie pent lire vraie et
parfaite" and 83, " Ce qite les hommes out nomine amitie n esf qu une societe, qu un
management reciproque d intertis, et qifun echange de bans offices ; ce n esf enfin
qtfun commerce ou V amour propre se propose toujours quelque chose a gagner."
The author of the Leziathan takes an equally low view of human nature, and
derives from self-love, in some form or other, all our emotions and desires. They
are all reducible to appetite or desire . "That which men desire they are also
said to love: and to ~Tiate those things for which they have aversion. So that
desire and love are the same thing ; save that by desire we always signify the
absence of the object; by love most commonly the presence of the same." Hobbes,
Leviathan, Pt. I. ch. 6. For a philosophical analysis of the Tender Emotion,
its origin and varieties, see Bain, Emotions and Will, Ch. VI [Ch. vil, ed. 1875].
PHTOPIKH2 B 4 6 8. 45
el iv TOIOVTOIS Kaipols, Kai avTtav eVe/ccr // oi)s av
6 oiwvTai (3ou\6<r6ai Troieiv eu. Kai rot)s TCOV <pi\(av
(j)i\ov$ Kai (piXovvTas ovs avToi <pi\obcriv. Kai TOI)S
7 (piXov/uLevovs VTTO TOJV (piXovneviav eavTols. Kai TOI)S
rots auToIs e^Opovs Kal fjucrovvras oi)s avToi jULKrovcnv,
KCCl TOL/5 JULKTOV/UIGVOV^ V7TO TCOV aVTOLS jmi(TOVlUL6VU)V
Tracri yap TOVTOIS TCtVTa dyaQd (paiveTai eivai Kai
eavToTs, W<TT (3ov\e(r6ai TO. ai/ToIs d i ya6d t o Trep r]v
8 TQU (f)i\ou. 6Ti TOUS euTroirjTiKOvs ek xpti/uiaTa Kai
TOIOVTOIS] such as, similar to the before-mentioned, i.e.
With this use of TOIOVTOS comp. PI. Phaedo 59 A, 67 A, 79 C, 80 c, edv ns
Xaptevrois fxcov TO <rc3^a KCU ev roiavrjj a>pa, at a similar period of life , like
the preceding, i.e. ^apieW?;. (See Stallbaum s note.) Thuc.in 58, navo-aia ar
fdanrfv avToiis vopifav ev y>j re <$>i\[q ridevai Kai Trap* dvSpdcri TOIOVTOIS and
amongst men of the same sort , i.e. 0t\/otr. Demosth. de F. Leg. 103,
Kal Tovvavrlov opyijv, av roiaCra (f)aivr)Tai TTfTTOirjKcas, SC. opyfjs ata. Arist.
Pol. I 8, 1256 a 36, ol S a^) aAtei ar, otroL \ip.vas Kal ehr) Kal Trorajuouy rj
QaXarrav Toiavrrjv -rrpoaoiKolcnv, who live by a sea of the same kind , i.e.
of the same kind as the before-mentioned lakes, marshes, rivers, in
whichyf^ are to be found. Ib. II 4, 1262 b I, yrrov yap eorai (piXia ......
8d 8f TOIOVTOVS flvai rovs dpxopfvovf, SC. yrrov (f>i\ovs. Ib. VIII (v) IO,
1310 b 12, TI KaB 1 vTTfpoxtjv TOIOVTOV ytvovs a. similar family , to the
preceding.
6. And friends friends, that is (KOI) the friends of those whom we
love ourselves. And those who are beloved by those that are beloved
by ourselves . If friendship is mutual, surely this is a vain repetition .
7. And those who have the same enemies, or hate the same people
that we ourselves hate, and those that are hated by the same people as
we are hated by : for all such persons suppose the same things to be
good as we do ourselves, and therefore they wish the same things as
we do; which was the definition of a friend . 2, fiovXea-dat TIVI a ot erat
dyaGd. These common hatreds, founded on the principle of idem velle
atque idem nolle, and expressed in the proverb KOIVO. TO. (piXav, are one
of the strongest bonds of union by which religious and political parties,
for example, are held together. On KOIVO TO. ^tXcov, see Plat. Legg. v
10, 739 C, a passage worth comparing on this subject of communism :
Rep. IV 424 A, v 449 C, Arist. Eth. NIC. vni n sub init. and the entire
chapter, on this topic; /ecu 7? Trctpoi/zi a " KOIVO. ra <i Xa>i/" opQats, tv Koivcoviq
yap J <pi\la, 1159 b 32. And on the same, IX 8, Il68 b 6, Kal at rrapot/u at
fie Trao-ai 6p.oyv(>>p.ovov(nv, olov TO "/ua V^X 1 ?" * a * " K0lva Ta 4 t ^ tav " * a *
"iVor?;? (pi\oTT]s" Kal "yovv Kvriprjs fyytov" K.r.X.
ToO rpiXov] Anglice, l a friend ; on the generic use of the Greek
definite article see note on 31 of this Chapter.
8. Again, those who are capable of and inclined to (both of which are
contained in the termination -IKOS) do service to others in the way of assist-
46 PHTOPIKHS B 4 9, 10.
ets crwrrjoiav Sio TOt>s eXevdepiovs K.O.L TOI) dv^peiovs
9 TlfJiMCTL KCtl TOIVS SlKCllOVS. TOIOVTOVS C> U7TO\a/UL^a-
vovcri TOII^ fJLri d<p eTepcav wj/Tcrs* TOIOVTOL 3 ol O.TTO
TOV epya^ecrdaij KO.I TOUTWV ol CLTTO yeiapryias KUI TWV
10 a\\tav ol auTOUpyot jULa\L(TTa. KCCL roi) <Tti)(j)povas 9
OTL OVK afiiKOi. KCII TOV$ aTTpay fjioi as Sia TO ai/ro.
ance, either pecuniary, or tending to their personal safety : and this is why
the liberal, and brave, and just are held in honour . The liberal aid them
with money; the brave defend them from personal injury (els o-mTrjpiav) ;
and the just are always ready at least to pay their debts, and if they
don t do them any positive service, at any rate can be depended upon to
abstain from fraud and wrong. This is the utilitarian view of virtue,
which we have had already very prominently brought forward in I 9 ; see
for instance 4, 6. Comp. I 6. 6.
9. The connexion between this topic and the preceding is thus
given by Victorius. The truly just are not easy to recognise, and we
are apt to be deceived by the outside show and to mistake unreal
for real justice. Consequently, in default of better evidence of justice in
men, they assume (inro\an$avov<Tiv) those to be just who mind their own
business, and live upon their own resources or labour, and do not
prey upon others, /J.TI dtp {repair a>vras. Such are those who work for
their bread, and amongst these especially, those who live upon (from the
produce of) agriculture; and of all the rest 1 (or else), those most of all
who labour with their own hands .
ol O.TTO yfcopyias avrovpyoi] See note on I 12.25- Hesych. avTovpyot,
6 Si eavrov fpya6[j.evos- In the Oeconomics, attributed to Aristotle, I 2,
1343 a 25, agriculture is described as the first (in the natural order),
and the greatest and most virtuous of all employments, KTijaeas Se
ejrt/itXeta ) Kara (pvcriv Kara (pvaiv &e 77 yeaipyiKrj Trporepa, KOI
otrai OTTO rrjs yrjs, olov /xeraXXeurtAC)) xal ei TIS a\\rj roiavrrj. 77 5e
/iaXiora ort SiKaia ov yap aV avdpunrcav ovd fKOVTW, mcrTrep
KQTnyXfi a Kal at piadapviKai, OVT aKovrcov cocrTrfp ai TroXe/ztKat. This ex
plains the P.T) dcfS fTepoov <avras of the text. Agriculturalists do not
make their profit of men, but of the land which they cultivate.
10. And the temperate (those who exercise self control), because
they are not inclined to wrong . Being temperate, and their passions
under strict control, they are not tempted by any licentious and ill-
regulated desires to gratify these by wrong doing. The import and
extent of the virtue of a-oxppoa-vvr) are best set forth by Plato in the Gorgias.
It is the principle of order and moderation in the human composition,
and is hardly distinguishable from the conception of fii/ceuotrwr;, the
virtue that regulates the entire human machine, in the Republic.
1 This redundant oAXos with the superlative the superfluous union of the com
parative with the superlative may be illustrated here by two parallel examples
from Shakespeare. Mids. Nighfs Dream, V. i. 250, This is the greatest error of
all the rest. Jlfa^ef/i, V. 8. 4, Of all men else I ft are avoided thee.
PHTOPIKHS B 4 u, 12. 47
11 Kai cus fiovXo/uLeda (j)iXoi eivat, eav (baivaivTai fiovXo-
/uevoi elcri e TOLOVTOL di T d<ya6oi KUT dpeTiiv Kai
f
ol evSoKifj-oi // eV airacriv t] eV TO?S ficXricrTois t] iv
TO?S Bavima^o/Jievois v<p avrutv r] ev TO?S
12 avTOV S. Ti TOWS f/Sels (rvv^Layayelv Kai
TOIOVTOI ol evKoXoL Kai L
Dr Whewell in his Transl. of the Gorgias thinks that the character
assigned to it by Plato is best expressed by the term self-control .
And those who abstain from business , lead an easy quiet life, and
don t meddle with other people s business, for the same reason .
drrpayfjuov is opposed to TroAuTrpay/xwi , a meddler, or busy-body.
11. And those we should (otherwise, on general considerations) like to
be friends, provided they manifest the same inclination make it clear
(<j>aiva>i>Tai emphatic,) that they wish it (on their side); and such are the
good in respect of moral virtue , (men may \>egood or excel in other things,
as the fior]v ayados MtveXaos excellent in shouting, and irv dyados IIoAu-
SevKTjs in boxing) ; and men who are held in repute, either by every one,
or by the best, or by those whom we ourselves admire and respect, or
by those who respect and admire us . If we read eV ols dav^a^ovcriv avrovs
(Bekker retains rotr) with A c , Q, Y , Z , which Spengel adopts, these
four last particulars will be all neuters. And those who are distinguished,
either in every thing ( admirable Crichtons ), or in the best things
(qualities, pursuits, studies, accomplishments, or rank, wealth, power,
according to taste), or in things which we ourselves respect and admire,
or in those things which they admire in us (lit. in those things in which
they admire us) .
12. And further, those who are pleasant to pass our life, or spend
the day, with ; such are men who are good-tempered and cheerful , (e (coXor
contrasted with SvovcoXoy, transferred from good and bad digestion KO>\OI>,
to the temper and character ; Arist. Ran. 82, of the good-tempered, genial
Sophocles), and not inclined to find fault with any accidental error or mis
take (not critical and. censorious), and not quarrelsome, or contentious : for
all such are combative, pugnacious ; and people that contend with one (in
word or act, by contradiction, or interference with and opposition to our
tastes and wishes) appear to have wishes contrary to ours and as to have
the same wishes is characteristic of friendship, 4, it is plain that people of
this sort cannot be our friends. Comp. Eth. Nic. vill 6, 1157 b 15, ovMs
Se bvvarai (ruvrj^epfi/tiv rw \vnrjpcf ovfie ra> prj ydel. These two words are
joined together again in Eth. Nic. vill 6, 1157 b 21, Ib. c. 15, 1162
b 14, 16.
vvvbiayaytiv, (rvv^^tpevtrai] This form of verb, principally with the
prepositions eV and avv also in two or three cases with eW which
assumes for its explanation the dative of the indefinite pronoun, avrcp or
avrrj, avrols or avrals, as the case may be, (the repetition of some sub
stantive immediately preceding in which the person or thing resides,
or with which it is associated,) as understood after the preposition,
is expressed in our idiom by adding the preposition at the end
48 PHTOPIKHS B 4 12, 13.
dfj-apravofjiivtov Kcti fJLt] <pi\oveiKot
jap ol TOLOUTOL /ULa^t]TLKoi t ol $e fj.a-%0fj.ev 01
13 rdvavria (aivovrai (3ov\ea-6ai. Kai ol e
of the phrase. Thus, the two verbs here in question are represented
in English by to pass one s life with , to spend the day with ,
the phrase at full length being, TOVS rjBfls ware riva crvvSiayayeiv avrols,
avrois being the persons previously mentioned. Person, Advers. p. 265,
has referred to notes of various Commentators, who have illustrated this
idiom, and Elmsley has supplied four examples, on Eur. Bacch. 508,
(t>8v(rrvxf)o-ai Tovvop eVmJSeior ft Add the following, Soph. Oed. Col. 790,
xdovos XaxetV TOO-OVTOV, evdavdv p.6i>ov, earth enough to die in . Phoen.
727, eVSuaru^aai ftfivov ev(f)p6vr]s Ki>((pas (comp. Shaksp. Lear, III 4. 116,
a naiighty night to swim in}. Ib. Erecth. Fragm. XX v 22 (Dind.) rjdrj,
Xa/i7rpa wyyiXav fj.6vov. Arist. Nub. 4 22 > eTTtxaXKeueii/ ifopfjfotfi ai>, I
would lend myself to be forged on (irapex 01 ^ " supply e /nauroi , as Aj.
1146, naTflv Trapse TW deXovTi vavTiXav, lent himself to be trodden on );
Id. Equit. 616, ai6v ye nd<riv eVoXoXv|ai, to shout at , Pac. 1127, ap. Elms.
Thuc. Ill 23, ov /3e/3atoj coare fne\6f ii>, ice, not firm, unsafe, to tread on .
And the false antithesis in II 44> Ka fr ivfvftcupovf)O ai re 6 ftios oftolos Kai
(VTe\VTT)(raL ^vvf/JifTp^drj. II 74> yfjv...(v[j.fvf) evaya>vL(raar6ai rotj "EXX^crt v a
land propitious for the Greeks to fight in . I 2, ocrov dnofji>, enough to
live off. or on . Xenoph. Symp. II 18, oi^/za eVtSpcGo-at, Ib. ill 8, (yrfv}
iKavas yfvoiro fyKovicracrdai. Memor. Ill 8. 8 (oiKt a) ^Si crrr; eV8iaira<7$ai.
Plat. Polit. 302 B (TroXiret a) ^Ktcrra ^aXeTr?) (rvrjv, by no means hard to live
with . Ib. E, /3apt)rar?7 vvoiK.r)crai. Phaedr. 228 E, e /xaurdi/ crot e /
Trape ^eii . Phaedo 84 A, TrapaStSwai lavrrfv (TTJV ^vx^y) TraXiv av e
Herod. VII 59? o xP os ortTijdeos eVSiara^ai re Kai fvapidpfjcrai. Comp. VI
102, IX 7, quoted by Elmsley. Arist. Pol. IV (vn) 12, 1331 b 12, dyopa
ij/ a market-place to lounge in . Lucian, Ver. Hist. 131, ixavov
rroXet IvoiKtiv. Aelian, Hist. Anim. VI 42? <rr(/3aSa tyKadftdftv.
Dem. de Cor. 198, ra rcoi/ EXX^fcoi/ aru^rj/iara evevdoKifJtf iv aTreKfiro. e y/ca-
Ta\fiit(iv, passim. Matth. Gr. Gr. 533, obs. 2.
13. *cal ot eVt Se^tot] Arist. has changed his construction from the
accus. to the nomin., from the objects to the subjects of liking for love is
here out of the question: these are men who are popular and agreeable in
society. We may supply (piXovvrai, or pafiuaj <f)i\oi yiyvovrai. And those
who are dexterous at replying and submitting to raillery who can take,
as well as give, a joke, gibe (for here again there is community of
sentiment, another instance of fellow-feeling TOVTO (paiverai ayadov, the
foundation of friendship) for the mind of each party is set upon (their
efforts are directed to, o-TrevSovo-i) the same thing (mutual amusement, a
friendly reciprocity in amusing each other) as (that of) his neighbour,
fche opposite in the wit-combat or jesting-match), and each of them is
equally capable of taking a joke, and returning the taunt, but neatly,
gracefully, with propriety .
ri8e ior is one of those adjectives compounded with eVi , in which
the preposition expresses either the tendency or inclination (// /. direction),
or the liability to anything, which is defined in the second part of the
PHTOPIKHS B 4 13. 49
Tw6a(rai Kcti v7rojUL6li^ai^\ eiri Tai/Vo yap
compound. eVi& ior is a man that has a tendency to the use of his right
hand, the sign of skill and dexterity; the right and left hand being
severally the symbols of dexterity or cleverness and awkwardness ; dexter,
laevusj Sector, 8fioTr]s, cr/caior, dpKTTfpos , gauche.
Another secondary notion, propitious and unpropitious, belonging to
these terms, is derived from the observations of augury, according as
the omens appear on the right or left hand : but in Latin, at all events,
the notion of awkwardness conveyed by laeinis, and the opposite by
dexter, cannot have been suggested by this, because in their practice
omens on the left, laeva, sinistra, were favourable.
f-mdf^ios is therefore one who has a tendency to Se^ior^r, and follows
the analogy of frnKivdwos, t-niQavaros (liable to danger and death), tV-
ainos, ejrtdiKOfj eiriHaipos or eV tic tup tor, cVtXijcr/ifiH , eVifrj/uos, eTrt/ioju^oy, eiri-
AUTTOS, tnivo&os, eViKAoTToy, eVi^A^y, fVijaa^oy, firavayKqs, firifutys, eVi8oof
( one who is expected to ... liable to that expectation, Isocr. Arcop. 48).
tV6 in comp. has very nearly the same signification, derived from the
subjection which it implies. So inrevdwos (subject or liable to a scrutiny),
vTToftiKos, vTroXoyos (amenable to an account, accountable, responsible), by
metaphor from the analogy of VTTOO-KIOS under the shade of, woa-pos,
Arist. de Anima, II 9, 421 b 12. vn-oo-reyoy, vnaiOpios, vTrop-flpos, V7rc>(popos,
Ta)6deiv is a variety of o-KcoTrreti , to gird at, mock, jeer at, some one in
particular; both of them (as well as others of the same class) being dis
tinguished from other forms of wit or pleasantry by their personal direc
tion, or personality. The word occurs in Plato and Aristophanes, Vesp.
1362 and 1368, and once in Herodotus [il 60). It is plain from the appli
cation of it, for instance in the passages of Aristophanes, that its special
meaning is what we now call chaffing or poking fun at , the repartees, or
witticisms, mostly of a highly personal character, which pass between the
combatants in what is also nowadays called a slanging match . This is
confirmed by the use of the word in Arist. Pol. iv (vn) 17, 1336^ 17. The
author is there condemning the practice of atVxpoAoyt a, indecent lan
guage , which should not be tolerated in a model state. An exception
however is made in favour of certain seasons of especial licence, as at
the Eleusinian mysteries, and the orgies of particular deities to whose
worship this Ta>6a<rp.6s licentious raillery was appropriate, and permitted
by law, ofr KOL rbv rodda-p-ov aTroSidaxriv 6 i/o/zor" such were Dionysus
during the celebration of the Bacchanalia, Aphrodite, Priapus, Herm-
aphroditus, Ilythia, and others; see Schneider ad loc. Comp. Addenda
p. 509, and Eaton.
All this is abundantly illustrated in the Chorus of the Ranae, 316
430. It is descriptive of the wild license that prevailed, and of the
indecent language of the r#ao>ior that was then allowed see particu
larly the application of the radaa-p-os, in the shape of indecent personali
ties, 416 430; and the -rutQaapos is there represented by various phrases
indicative of its character, rav duoXaarov <pi\a7raiyp,ova Tip.dv, 334; /3eo/ioAo-
Xots firea-i, scurrilous phrases, 358; Kdirio-KanrTcov (cat Traifav Acai ^Xeua^a)",
375; TratVai/ra /ci craui^favTa ; and finally (as already mentioned) by the
AR. II. 4
50 PHTOPIKH2 B 4 14, 15.
(TTrev^ovcTL TW irXticriov, ^vvdfjievoi re o"KU)7rT6cr6ai /ecu
14 ejUL/meXcos a-KWTrrovTes. Kai TOI)S eiraivovvTas ra vTrap-
XOVTO. dyaOd, Kai TOVTWV /aaXicrTa a (pofiovvrai JULJ]
15 V7rap%eiv avrols. Kai TOI/S KaOapiovs Trepi b^siv, Trept
specimen given at the end. Comp. Vesp. 1362, *v avrov rco^ao-
olois TToG" ovros f[j.e Trpb ru>v ^.uor^ptcoi/. This license of language, allowed
during the celebration of the Eleusinian mysteries, reached its height at
the bridge over the Cephissus, which was crossed and recrossed by the
initiated on their way to and from Eleusis ; where they were doubtless
also awaited by a very numerous mob quite ready to take part in the fun.
Hence y((f)vpleiv and -yecpvpKr/zo?, e afj.d^rjs \eyeiv. Bentl. Phal. I p. 335,
Monk s Ed. [p. 307, ed. Wagner]. See on this also Miiller, Hist, of Gk.
Lit. c. XI 5, p. 132, Engl. Tr.
A similar license of language and conduct was permitted at the
Roman Saturnalia, the slaves holiday : and was also illustrated by the
Fescennina, or Fescennine verses (Liv. VII 2), in which the countryfolk
(and afterwards the townsfolk) assailed and ridiculed one another in
extemporaneous verses. Fescennina per hunc inventa licentia morem,
versibus alter/us opprobria rustica_/>/^zV, Hor. Ep. II i. 145; pro cax Fes
cennina locutio, Catull. 61. 124 ; Victorius ad Arist. Pol. IV (vil) 17, u. p.
quotes Athenaeus, XIV 622 E, of the (paAXo<opot, eira Trpoo-rpe ^ovres eVa)-
6aov oiis TrpoeAoti/TO.
14. We like also those that praise our virtues and accomplish
ments (the goods we have, and those in particular of which the posses
sion is doubtful (which we are afraid we do not possess) . Praise is the
test of virtue, (l 9, and Introd. Appendix B, p. 212,) and the acknowledg
ment of others that we do actually possess the excellences of which we
are ourselves in doubt. This confirmation of our hesitating opinion as
to our own merits must of course be gratifying, and we accordingly like
those that praise us.
15. Cleanliness and neatness in the face and general appearance,
and in the dress, and in fact (as it is exhibited) in the whole life ; in a
man s habits, and all that he does in his daily life. "Cleanliness" is
said to be "next to Godliness"; and there is no doubt that neat and
cleanly-habits and appearance in person and dress, some of which also
heighten personal attractions, are prepossessing, and apt to inspire a
liking for a man. We (English) also apply the same terms to the build
or frame of the body of men and animals to denote the absence of all
impiirity and imperfection, the superfluities, excrescences, deformities,
which, like the dirt that overlies and disguises and deforms the true sur
face underneath, mar the symmetry and harmonious proportions of the
body clean built , clean made , neatly built and made . This form
of cleanness is also prepossessing, and an element of comeliness, which
tends to liking. It is the apta compositio membrorum quae movet oculos,
et delectat hoc ipso, &c. Cic. de Off. I 28. And besides this, cleanliness
of person and neatness in dress, implying a regard for personal ap
pearance, imply also thereby attention (o and regard for the opinion of
PHTOPIKHS B 4 16, 17. 51
16 afjnre%ovt]v, Trepi o\ov TOV (3iov. KCCI roik /UD} oVa- r. 1381 b.
Surras fj.r]T6 riav d/mapTri/jLaTcov fj.t]T6 TWV evepyeri]- p. Jj.
17 juaTtav dfJL(poTpoi yap eXeyKTiKoi. Kai TOJ)S /u>; fj.vi]-
v\aKTlKOVS TU)V i^KXtJ/maTUtV, d\\
o tovs yap av vTroXa/mfBdvwariv eivai
others whereas a solitary or savage would never think it worth while
and thus establish a sort of claim upon our regard. The excess of this
attention to the person, shewn in the coxcomb and the petit ntaitre, is a
sign of egotism and vanity, and consequently displeasing.
Kcidapios is Lat. mtmdits. Of personal appearance, KaQdpios OKO\OV-
6ia-Koy, a. neat little footboy , Posidon. ap. Ath. xn 550 A; TJ o-Kfvruria
Ka&dptos, Menand. Fr. Phasm. ap. Meincke, Fr. Comm. Gr. IV 218, de
coquorum artibus dicens , Meineke ad loc., neatness and cleanliness in
dressing and serving a dinner . In two Fragments of Eubulus, TiY&u,
Fr. i, (Meineke, u. s. m 258,) and Ephippus, Obeliaph. Fr. i (Meineke
it. s., in 334), in both of which the same verse is found, pf) TroXureXcor,
n AXa K.a6apfia>s on av )J, ovias fvexa, Kadapdas (another form of K.a6apia>s)
is applied to cleanliness in a religious sense. The subject is the pur
chase of fish. The same opposition of Kadapflas and TroXvrcXco? occurs
again in Nicostr. Antyll. Fragm. 3 (Meineke, ill 280) where Meineke
notes, "His locis Kadapelvs fere munditiae cum frugalitate coniunctae
notionem habet, ut apud Strabonem in p. 154 a, Kndapimf KO\ Xtr5j." In
Athen. in 74 D (ap. Liddell and Scott), naGaptios /3/or has the sense of a
frugal life , opposed to TroXvreXTyy, as in the Comic Fragments, and in
Diod. v 33 (ap. eosclem), Kaddpios TJ/ Stai ra. Xenoph. Memor. 1 1 i. 22, of
virtue, in Prodicus apologue, Ktno<r[uril** vr l v r M*" frw^ta KaOapiu-rriTi (to
make her attractive] TO. 8 o/z^iara ai SoZ. Herod, n 37 of the Egyptian
practice of circumcision for cleanliness sake , Ka6apiorr]Tos (tvtKf. Such
are the examples of this attractive Kadapior^s, in habits of life, manners,
dress and personal appearance, as they appear in the ordinary language
and in common life.
16. And we like those who are not inclined to reproach us either
for trifling faults and errors, or for the benefits (they have conferred on
us) ; for both of these are censorious, (faultfinders).
17. And those who don t bear malice (this is one of the character
istics of the ^.fyaXo-^i/^or, Eth. Nic. IV 9, 1125 a 2, oi Se p.iir]criKaK.os ov yap
fj.fya\o^i>xov TO aTro/ii/^/ioi/evfii/, aXXws Tf Ka\ Ka<d, dXXa fj.a\\ov napopav),
and are not retentive (if cpv^aTTfiv be to guard, keep in possession , as
Xen. Mem. 1114.9, ad servandum idoneus, Sturz, Lex.; or observant ,
on the watch for , if to be on the look out for ; so Xen. Mem. ill 1.6,
<pv\aKTiKov KOI K\TTTT]V. opposed to a(pv\aKTos, and d<pv\aia, Hier. VI 4)
of complaints and accusations, but easily reconciled . Instead of keeping
in mind the complaints and accusations to which our errors and faults,
though perhaps trifling, will give rise, and so prolonging the estrange
ment and the quarrel between the two friends, these are ready at any
moment for a reconciliation. And this is, because they think themselves
equally liable (to these faults and errors, and equally requiring forgive-
42
52 PHTOPIKHS B 4 1821.
1 8 TTjOos rofs a\\ovs, Kctl Trpos avTOvs oiovrai. Kal TOI/S
jjiri Ka/coAoyofs fjLtj^e eiSoras /u*fre T TWJ/ irXricrLOv
KctKa fJirjTe TO. avTuiv, a /\/\a TayaOd 6 yap d<ya6os
19 TOVTO $pa. Kal TOI)S /Lirj dvTiTeivovras TO?S d|0 yfo-
] cnrov^a^ova LV fJia^riTiKOi yap ol TOLOVTOI.
rof? Trpos avrovs cnrov^atcos TTWS
vras avrovs Kal CTTrovSaiovs
20 Kai ^aipovTas ai/rots, Kai TauTa /u.a\i<TTa
OoTas Trepi a fj.aXio Ta j3ov\ovTai avTol r] 6ctVfJia-
21 ecrBai r] orirov^aloi coKelv eivai i] reel s. Kal TOI)S
ness) with the others ,///, because such as they suppose themselves to be
to the rest of mankind, (i. e. such as is their liability to give unintentional
offence to others,) such they think others are to them : that others are no
more liable to them than themselves.
1 8. And those who are not inclined to evil-speaking , (those who
are constitute a topic of opyt], c. 2. 13,) and don t know (don t notice) what
is bad in their neighbours, nor in themselves, but only what is good (all
their good points) ; for this is the conduct of the good man . Comp.
Plat. Theaet. 173 D, of the wise man, e* 8e rj KOKUS TI yt-yovev ti> TroXn, r\
TI TO) KO.KOV eaTiv (< TTpoyov&v jfyovbs rj Trpo? avbpwv fj yvvaLKa>v, p.a\\ov
O.VTOV \e\T]6ei> t) ol 6a\arTr]s Xeyo/xei/oi x ef - -^ n indisposition to evil-speak
ing is also a characteristic of the nya\o\l/vxos, Eth. N. IV 9, 1125 a 8,
SioTrep ouSe KUKo\6yos, ov8e TGOV l^6pu>v. (This is from no wish to avoid
offence, but because he is so supremely indifferent to all others, that he
abstains from blaming, as from praising, them.)
19. And people are liked who do not strive against, try to thwart,
offer opposition to, those who are angry, or in earnest (earnestly, seri
ously, occupied with anything); for all such are pugnacious . Comp.
12, navTfs yap ol TOIOVTOL fui^riKoi, ol 8e /na^o/ievoi ravavria cpaivovrai
ftov\(vdai, which is the opposite to friendly feeling. And we have a
liking for any one that has a good feeling of any kind towards us, such as
admiration, and respects us ; and thinks well of us, and delights in our
society ; and this most especially when it happens in the case of any
thing for which we wish to be admired ourselves, or thought well of, or to
be agreeable . The first of the two is also a topic of opyrj, 2. 17.
21. And those who resemble one another (have a mutual liking), and
those who are engaged in the same pursuits ; (the pleasures of similar
ity are noticed and illustrated in I 11. 25, see the notes there); provided
their interests don t clash , (they don t trouble or annoy one another. eVo-
X\( lv, see note on II 2. 9 ; irapd in the compound here, expresses an aggra
vation of the annoyance, the going still further astray from the right path,)
and they are not competitors for their livelihood, (as all tradesmen are ;)
whence the proverb (of rival artists or tradesmen) K(pa/j.fvs Kepa/ieZ , two
of a trade , Hesiod, Op. et D. 25. On this and the opposite proverbs,
see note on I n. 25.
PHTOPIKHS B 4 2 1 24. 53
^
OyUcuoi/s Kai TavTa eTrfT^oefoyras,
Xwcrt /mr]0 O.TTO TUVTOV i] 6 /3/os* r yL e yveTai yap OVTCO
22 TO Kfpa/u.ev s Kepa/uLtl. Kal TOI)S TWV avruiv 6 ,
a/uLa /meT6Y6iv avTOws ei ce /xi/,
23 TauTo Kal euro) crviuSaivei. Kal TT/OOS 01/9 OVTWS
Trpos
wcrre /mt] aia xvvea Oal TO. Trpos $6j~av 9
24 KaTcKppovovvTes. Kal irpos oi/s aia")(yvovTcu TO.
22. And those who desire the same things, so long as there is
enough for them to share them together: otherwise, the case is the same
here again . Here again, as in the preceding topic, the competition is
fatal to friendship.
23. And those (we like) with whom we are on such terms as to
feel no shame in betraying our (apparent) conventional faults before them,
provided, however, that this does not arise from contempt ; provided
that they are not so far our inferiors that we totally disregard their
presence. That is, those who are so intimate that we can afford to take
liberties with them. Such are the members of a domestic circle, or any
very intimate friend, who knows our ways, and from habit has learned to
overlook any slight mark of disrespect. Schrader has illustrated this
by an epigram of Martial, x 14, which though rather coarse is too appo
site to be passed over : Nil aliud video quo te credainus amicum Qnam
quod me coram pedcre, Crispe, soles \
al(rxvvfcrdai] See note on II 2. 22.
ra rrpos &oat/] opposed to ra irpos d\ij8fiav ( = Ta Ka0 ai5ra) in the next
topic, the apparent or conventional faults which violate the rules of
society and good-breeding and the real , moral and legal offences,
Rhet. II 6. 23, 12. 10. TO irpos So|ai> in this opposition is defined, Topic, r
3, IlS a 21, opos 8e TOV Trpos 8oav TO /irjSej as crweiSoro? pr) av <T7rouSacra
vTrdpxfiv, which is an exact description of the conventional and unreal, TO
8ia -rr)v Sot-avalpfTov. The same distinction of the conventionally and really
disgraceful occurs in Eth. Nic. IV 15, 1128 b 23, et 5 e ori ra fj.ev KCIT
aXydfiav alcrxpa ra Se Kara 86av, ovdev 8ta0/pet, ovftfTepa yap TrpaKTta. The
conventionally disgraceful is illustrated by Aspasius ad locum, (as TO e v
dyopa ta-difiv (and this by Theophr. Char. XI 6 @Sf\vp6s, who goes in full
market, Tr\i]6ovai]s TTJS dyopas, to the fruit-stalls, and stands chattering
with the vendor, and eating the fruit). Dancing was another of these
conventional solecisms. See the story of Cleisthenes and Hippocleides in
Herod. VI 129, which gave rise to the proverb ov (ppovrls lTrnoK\f{r) (8ia
Trjv opxf)<riv Kal TTJV dvaiSdrjv): and of Socrates in Xenoph. Symp. II 17,
see note 6 p. 152 of Cambridge Journal of Classical and Sacred Philology,
Vol. I No. 2 on The Sophists .
Compare also I 7. 36, where TO Trpos 86gav is defined much as in the
Topics, 6 \av6avtiv n.f\\a>v OVK av eXoiro. See note ad loc.
24. And the reverse, those before whom we are ashamed to exhibit
our real faults . Those whom we respect and stand in awe of, and whose
good opinion we value.
54 PHTOPIKHS B 4 24 27.
d\r ]6eiav. Koti TTpos ovs (piXoTi/movvTai, rj v<p wv
tyj\ovcr6ai fiovXovTat Kal /mrj <f)6ovelcr6ai, TOVTOVS /
25 (j)i\ov<nv rj /3ov\oi/Tai <pi\oi eivai. Kal ok civ T
crvjunrpaTTcoo-iv, lav jur] /ULeXXtj avTols ecrecr^cu
26 KdKci. Kal Tols OfJLoitos Kai TOI)S aVoVras Kal TOI)?
TTapOVTUS <pl\OV<TlV SlO Kal TOl)s TTGpl TOl)s Te6l/eO)Ta<S
TOIOVTOVS Trdvres (j)i\ov(Tiv. Kal oAws TO)s (T<p6$pa
(pi\o(pi\ovs Kal juir} eyKaTaXeiTrovras /maXurTa yap
27 (piXovcri TWV dyaOtov rot)? <pi\eiv dyaOovs. Kal TOI)S
^u^} 7rAaTTO//eVoL 5 TTjOOs eai/TOys* TOIOUTOL $e Kal ol TO.
<pav\a TO. eavTwv XeyovTes. eipriTai yap on
And those with whom we vie (in friendly rivalry, for distinction;
see note on I 2. 22.), or by whom we wish to be emulated not
envied (which is destructive of friendly feeling) we either love (already
from the very first sight of them) or conceive the wish to become friends
with them .
25. And those whom we help to secure any good for themselves
(so Victorius) provided in so doing we do not ourselves incur greater evil .
The joint efforts are a bond of sympathy, and fellow-feeling (a-vfjiiradfta)
makes men friends: but this community of feeling would be destroyed if
we were to be losers by our help ; for then the other s feeling would be
pleasurable but our own painful.
26. Another amiable quality which secures regard, is the remem
brance of and continued affection to friends absent as well as present ;
and this is why everybody likes those who extend this feeling to the
dead. And in general, all (are liked by others) that shew a strong
affection for their friends, and never leave them in the lurch, never desert
them in distress and difficulty ; for of all kinds of good men those are
most liked who shew their goodness in the strength of their affections .
Eth. Nic. VIII i, sub fin. rovs yap <pi.\o(pi\ovs fnaivov pev ; and c. 10, init.
fj.a\\ov 8f TTJS (j)C\ias ovcrrjs tv rw <j6iAeti>, Kat TUV <pi\o<pi\a>v tiraivovftfintf^
(j)i\a>v aptTj) TO (jbtXetP toiKf, UHJT lv ols TOVTO yivtrtu /car at ac, OVTOI /JLOVI-
P.OI ff)i\oi KOI rj TOVTUV <pi\ia. Victorius refers to Terent. Phorm. Ill 3. 30,
solus est homo amico ainicns, and Apollodorus, from whom Terence
translated it, ^ovos rfriXe iv yap TOVS </>t Aov? eVi orarai ; (this is Apollodorus
of Carystus in Euboea, a poet of the New Comedy, to be distinguished
from another of the same name, of Gela ; his play Eiri8iKa6fj,(vos is
represented in Terence s Phormio, Prolog. 25}. Meineke, Fragm. Com.
Gr. Hist. Crit. Vol. I 4646, Vol. IV 447.
27. And those who don t assume an artificial character in
their intercourse with us ; (who are open, sincere, frank, straight
forward : this is the social or conversational virtue of dXrjdeia,
Eth. Nic. iv 13, the mean between d\aov({a and tlpatvfia. 6 8e /xe croy
TIS a>v dX^evriKOi- /cat TW /3aa /cat rw Aoyw, ra \iirapxovTa. opo\oyu>v
PHTOPIKHS B 4 27-29. 55
TOWS (pl\OVS TO. 7T|OOS So^CtV OVK aiCT^VVOfAeOa El OVV 6
aicrxyvofj.evo<; (JLtj (piXel, 6 /*) cao-^iyi/o^ej/os (J)L\OVVTL
toiKev. Kal TOVS pri <f>o{3epovs, Kal ols 6appov}j.ev
28 ov^eh jap ov (poftelrai (f>i\eT. eiorj e (pi\ias eraipeia
29 oiKeiOTtjs arvyyeveia Kai oa-a TOiavTa. TroinnKa e p. 64.
<pL\ias %/}i5, Kal TO fjir] SerjBevTos Troifi&ai, Kai TO
firj $rj\(rar auTOu jap OVTCOS eVe/ca (j)ai-
Kai ov did TI eTepov.
avai TTtpl avrov, Kai ovre pelfa oZre Aarrco. 1127 a 24. The f ipcav of the
Ethics, the self-depreciator like Socrates who affects humility, is here
7rAarro/ii/o? of the example) ; and such are those who are always talking
about their own weaknesses and failings .
TrXarreti/, properly said of a sculptor, who moulds a clay model, is
extended to moulding or fashioning in general, and hence to any arti
ficial production; artificiose fingcre: and so here. It is hence applied to
the training of the body, o-w^ara TrXarroirer, Plat. Phaedo 82 D (Heindorf
ad loc.), Tim. 88 c, and of the mind, Rep. n 377 c, Kal TrXarraf ras
^ii^as avTo>v TTO\V paXXov fj TO. o-co/zara rals x f P a lv - Ib. V 466 A, of a society ;
VI 509 D, of general education ; Gorg. 483 A, of moral training.
For it has been already said that in the company of friends we are not
ashamed of any little violation of conventional propriety ( 23) : conse
quently, if one who is ashamed is no friend, one who is not ashamed
in such cases is likely to be a friend .
And those who are not formidable to us, and in whose society we feel
confidence ; for no one loves one of whom he is afraid . I Ep. St John iv
1 8, "There is no fear in love; but perfect love casteth out fear ;
because fear hath torment. He that fcareth is not made perfect in
love" gives the reverse ; no one can fear one whom he perfectly loves 1 .
28. The kinds of friendship are, (i) companionship (the mere fact
of being often together, implying no high degree of friendship sodalitas
eorum qui saepe una versantur, Schrader), (2) intimacy, familiarity, (con
stant and intimate, domestic , association, like that of members of the
same family, oiKeiorijs from <HKOS; a higher degree of friendship, confirmed
by habit and long association), (3) actual relationship, and all other
connexions, relations, of the like nature . These are three degrees of
association ; and, Iv Koivvvla Traaa (pi\ia eVri, Eth. N. VIII 14, init. The
whole chapter is upon the various degrees and relations of friendship or
love, of marriage, of parent and offspring, the several bonds of con
nexion, and the foundations of them. The same principle lies at the
root of all, a-vv(xfi TO KOIVOV.
29. Affection and love are produced by a favour or benefit con
ferred, and conferred without solicitation, and never disclosed, by
the benefactor: under these conditions the recipient construes it as
1 A striking contrast in the point of view between the Philosopher illustrating
a rhetorical topic, and the Christian Apostle illustrating the love of God.
56 PHTOPIKH2 B 4 30, 31.
30 Trepi e%6pas Kai TOV juLKreiv (pavepov ws t /c T&V P. 1382.
evavTiwv e? Qeiapelv. TroiririKa 8 e^Bpas opytj, eVr;-
3 1 jOeao / ao5, Sta/3oA>;. 0^77} jUey cwi/ ecrrlv 6K TCOV irpos
eavrov, e^Opa e /cat aWf TCW Trpos eavTOV ectv yap
conferred for his sake alone, and from no other motive ; which is the
definition of <j)i\la, 2. The plural Tro^rtxa includes the x<*P ls an d its
two qualifications.
30. The affections of enmity and hatred may plainly be studied
from the opposites (of the preceding topics of 0iAta) . On jrepl exdpas
Ofupflv, see note on I 9. 14. Productive of enmity are anger, spite,
calumny . [On eV^peatr/iioj-, see note on II 2. 3.]
31. Now anger is excited by personal offences, but enmity without
personal offence as well ; for if we suppose a man to be of such and such a
character we hate him. And anger always deals with individuals, as
Callias or Socrates (opyrf is here made to govern the same case as its
verb 6pyif<rdai l . With the statement comp. II 2.. 2}; but hatred is
directed also against classes; for every one hates a thief or an informer .
On TOV K\fTTTT)v, the def. art. denoting a member of a class, which we
render by the indefinite, see note on I 7. 13. And the one is curable
by time, the other incurable. And the one is desire (ffao-is subst. of
((piT0ai to aim at 2 ) of (inflicting temporary) pain, the other of (perma
nent) mischief; for the angry man wishes to see (the effect of his ven
geance), to the other this makes no- difference (whether he see it or not) .
1 Compare PI. Phaedo 88 C, dwia-Tiav rots wpaetpij/j.ei>ois X<$7oiy; Euthyphr. 130,
T! larpois vwr/pfTiKiri; 15 A, TO. Trap i]fJL&i> SZpa. TOIS Oeois ; Theaet. 177 A, rr/v O.VTOIS
6/j.oioT-rjTa; 176 B, 6/xoi oxns 6e<f ; Soph. 752 D, aAX^Aots tTriKoivwvia. ; ; Gorg.
622 D, fio-rjOeia. ea.VT$; Parmenid. 1280, poijffeia. T$ Hap/jLeviSov Xcfyy (Arist. Polit. VII
( VI ) 5> r 32O a 32, i) ffoydfia rocs diropois) ; Syrup. 182 D, i) irapaK&fVffis r epwvn
irapbi. TrdvTWV ; Rep. VI 493 D, woXet didKoviav ; Ib. 498 B, VTrripeaiav efiiXoffcxfity ;
Aesch. Agarn. 415, Trrepots <57ra5ors virvov Kt\tvdois; Soph. Oed. Col. 1026, TO. So Xw
T<Ji /JLTI SiKaiifj KT-^/j-ara; Trach. 668, TWV awv Ilpa.K\eL Swpij/zaTaw ; Aj. 717, 6ufj.uv
ArpetSats fj,tyd\ui> re veintwv ; Eur. Ion 508, ra BeoOtv TKVO. Ovaro is; Iph. T.
1384, ovpavov x-tcrrifj.a (i.e. TO an- ovpavov TtfirTUKos). On a similar constr. of
vwo and other prepositions with the genitive after a passive substantive (instead of
rerb) see Stallbaum on PI. Phaedo 99 c, SivTfjv vwo TOV ovpa.vcv. Add to the examples
there gi en the following: Eur. Here. Fur. 1334, ffTd<pai>os l\\iivwi> viro ; Thuc.
VI 87, firLKovplas o.4> TJ^.WI> ; PI. Protag. 354 A, ras vwo TUV laTpuv OepaTreias ;
Gorg. 472 E, rvyxdveiv biV?;s vwo Ofuiv re Kal dvdpuwwv; Rep. II 378 D, "Hpaj 5
Seff[.iovs vwo vleos KO.I Il^a/crroi; pt ^ets vwo Trarpo s ; Arist. Eth. Nic. X 9, 1179 a
25, twi(Jie\eia. TUV di Opwwlvuv vwo dtuv; Categ. 8, 8 b 32, /xera/SoX 1 )? LITTO voaov; de
Anima II 8. II, 420 b 27, ?j w\T)yrj TOV dva.wvf0jj.tvov depos vwo TTJS tv TOVTOIS
fiopiois tyvxrjs.
2 0e<rts, a rare word. It occurs twice in Plat. Legg. iv 717 A, where the
metaphor is thms illustrated; CTA-OTT^S ft.lv ovv rj/uuv OUTOJ, ov 5ei ffroxd^effOac /SeXij
5e aJroO KO.I olov ij To~ts ^eX-ecriv tycffis K.~.\. Ib. IX. 864 B, e\Tri5wv 5 Kal So ^s
rr/s d\r)6ovs irepl TO dpicrTov ^ecrtj. Defin. 413 C, j3ov\t]ffis ^^ecris fteTa \6yov
tpOou. [So also in Eth. Nic. in 7, 1114 b 6, ?$e<7is TOV rtXovs. For its legat
sense, appeal , see Dem. Or. 57, t(p(ffis irpbs EvpovXiStjv, 6, TT]V eh tyxas t(j>ni >
and Pollux 8. Gz and 126. s.j
PHTOPIKHS U 4 31. 57
eivai roioVSe, /uKrou/JLev. Kai t]
del Trepl TO. KaB eKaffTa, oiov Ka/\/\/a i]
Ci, TO e /micros Kai Trpos TO. yevr] TOV yap
fjucrel Kai TOV cruKOfpdvTrjv cnras Kai TO fJiev LO.TOV
TO S dviaTOV. Kai TO /ULEV \t/7njs e<pea i<s ) TO
aia~6e(r6ai yap (3ov\Tai 6 opyi^ofJievos, TW
e TO. /uev \v7rtipd
Kia Kai d(j>pO(ruvr} oydev yap Xvrcei t] Trapoucria
KaKias. KOI TO fj.ev /ULETO. \I/TT^S, TO 3 ov,
Xi/TTf/s* o /uei/ 7|0 opyityfjievos XuTrelrai, d ^e
oi>. Kai b p.ev TTO\\U>V av yevoftevtav e\6t]<reiv t o
Comp. def. of opytj II 2. I, opeis Tipapias (f)aivo/j.evris, and the note. Now
^.painful things (all things that give pain) are things of sense, (pain
is conveyed to us only by the senses,) but the most evil things are least
perceptible, wickedness and folly ; for the presence of evil (of this kind)
causes no (sensible) pain. And the one is accompanied by pain (in the
subject of the affection, by definition), but the other is not : for one who
is angry feels pain himself, but one who hates does not. And the one
might under many circumstances feel compassion (for the offe-nder, and
remit the punishment), the other never ; for the angry man only requires
compensation (for his own suffering) in the suffering of the object of his
anger, but the other his utter destruction (annihilation) .
With ro i*ev p.fra Xvirrjy K.r.X., compare Pol. VIII (v) 10, 1312 b 32,
dXXa /iSXXov TO /utros 17 p.ev yap opyr) /xera XVTT^S napta-riv, uare ov paftiov
Xoyi e(T$at, rj 8 e)(6pa avev XvTTJjy.
f\fij(Tfifv] Victorius refers in illustration to Soph. Aj. 121, where
Ulysses says of Ajax, eVowcrei po) de viv Svarrjvov efJ,Trr]s Kaiirep ovra 8v<rp.(vr).
This shews that the feeling by which he was affected towards his rival
was not a long-standing grudge or hatred, but a temporary animosity
arising out of the contest for Achilles arms.
Plutarch in his little treatise, nepl tp66vov /cat p,itrovs,p. 536 D, Wytten-
bach, Vol. Ill p. 165, gives an account of fua-os from which something
may be added to Aristotle s description. In c. 2, it is said that hatred is
due to a sense of injury either to oneself, or to society at large, and sense
of wrong to oneself: /ucros eVc (pavraa-ias TOV ort irovrjpos fj KOIV&S rj rrpos
avrov (TT\V o fj.iaovp.fi os KCU -yap dStKfZcr^at 86avrtg avrot irf<pvKa<ri /JLia-flv
K.T.\. In c. 3, the author remarks that hatred may be directed against
irrational animals ; some people hate cats, or beetles, or toads, or snakes ;
Germanicus could not abide either the sight or the crowing of a cock,
and so on ; envy however arises only between man and man. This is
not the case with anger ; which is sometimes excited even by inanimate
objects Bain [quoted on p. 13]. c. 5 ; Hatred may be praiseworthy, as
58 PHTOPIKH2 B 4 32 ; 5 I.
5 oi/ei/oV o [Jikv yap avrnraQelv /3ov\erai M opyi-
erca, o e /mt] eivcu.
32 (pavepov ovv e /c TOIATWI/ OTI eV^e^erai e^$|0o0s KO.L
(pi\ov<s Kai QVTO.S a.Tro &eiKvvvai Kat jut] oWccs TTOLelv KCti
(pdcrKOVTcts StaXveiv, /cat & opyriv n Si e^Gpav d/UL(pt-
<jfti}TO\jvTa.<z e(p OTTOTep civ TTpoatpfJTai Tts ciyeiv.
i Trola (He (fiofiovvTai /ecu TIVO.S Kat TTWS e^oi/res, wS CHAP. v.
eVrai (pavepov. eo-rw ^ (J)6/3o ( s \v7rrj TL<S f] Tapa^rj
IK (pavracrias ^eAAo^TO? KaKOu (p6apTiKOu rj \V7rrjpov
ov yap iravTct TO. KUKO. (po/3ovvrai, oiov el
ia as also anger, in the shape of venecris, righteous indigna
tion, or of moral disapprobation envy never can. In the last chapter,
538 Dj he thus defines it; tcrri Se JJUCTOVVTOS fifv Trpoaipevis Ka/ctSj 7roifj(rai
(Arist. e(f)t<ris KUKOV) KOI TT)V 8vvafj.iv ovrats npi^ovrai, Siddfaiv riva (cat Trpoal-
ptaiv fTriTripTjTLKriv roii KaKcoy TToiijcrai (on the watch to do him mischief)
rw (pdovoi de ToOro yovv aTreo-ri. The distinction between envy and
hatred, in respect of the amount of mischief which they would do to their
respective objects, is then described, and the treatise ends.
32. This section points out the application of the contents of the
preceding chapter to the purposes of Rhetoric. It is plain from all this
that it is possible, in respect of enmity and friendship, either, when men
are enemies or friends, to prove it ; or if not, to represent them as such ;
or if they assert or maintain it, to refute their assertion ; or, if there be
a dispute (about a feeling or an offence), whether it be due to anger or
enmity, to refer it, trace it, to either of the two which you may prefer .
SiaXv eiv] sc. rr\v (pdaiv, dili/erc, dissolvcre, argumentum, obiecta,
argumentationem, to break up, dissolve , and so metaph. answer, re
fute an opposing argument. See Introd. on Xveiv, p. 267, note. This
seems the most natural interpretation of <fra.a-K.ovT as SiaXvav. However,
in U 11.7, it is applied to the breaking up, dissolution, or extinction of
the emotions themselves : so that it is possible I think, not probable
that here also it may be meant in case of their asserting that they are
friends or enemies to proceed to destroy those relations in them only,
I don t quite see the use of this for rhetorical purposes ; and the other is
certainly not only easier to effect in itself, but also more to the point
here. If they assert that they are friends or enemies, and you wish to
shew the opposite, you must refute their arguments, or destroy their case,
which the preceding analysis will enable you to do.
CHAP. V.
On Fear. Compare Bain, on the Emotion of Terror ; Emotions and
Will, c. 5 [c. vin, ed. 1875].
i. What sort of things, and what persons, are the objects
of fear, and how it is manifested, will be plain from what follows .
as before ; see note on I 5. 3.
PHTOPIKHS B 5 i. S9
j) {3pa$u<$, d\\ oora XVTTCIS /uLeyd\a<s tj <p6opas
uvarai, KUI TUVT idv /ULY] Troppco d\\a <rvve>y<yv<s (hui-
vi]Tai wcrTe {Jie\\eiv. TO. yap Troppto crfboSpa ou (bo-
Let fear be defined, a pain or disturbance arising from a mental
(presentation or) impression ((pavraa-ia, note on I ir.6) (a vivid presenti
ment) of coining evil, destructive or painful : for it is not all evils that
men are afraid of, as for instance of the prospect of being wicked or dull
(slow, stupid), but only those that amount to great pain or ruin : and this
too only if they appear to be no t far off, but close at hand, so as to be
imminent or threatening. For things very remote are not subjects of
alarm : for every one knows that he must die, but by reason of death not
being actually impending, people care nothing at all for it .
It is the proximity of danger that causes fear. Gaisford quotes a
poetical illustration from Find. Nem. VI 94, TO 8e wap TTOOI vaos f\io-o-6p.fvov
tlfl KvpaTcov \eytrai iravri /xaXtcrra 8ovelv 6vp.6v.
On fear, and its proper objects, see Eth. Nic. in 9. At the commence
ment of the chapter it is said, (pofiovpfda 8e 8fj\ov on ra <po/3epa, ravra 8
tariv to? aTrXcSy tlirtiv KO.KO. 8io KOI TOV (poftov oplovrai TrpocrftoKiav KOKOV. But
of evil in general, all moral evil is to be shunned, and the fear of// is right,
and to be encouraged: in the control of this kind of fear, courage is not
shewn. It is in overmastering the sense of danger, in controlling the
fears that interfere with the exercise of our duties, and especially the
dread of death (the most fearful of all things) in battle, that true courage
resides oXwj fi.ei> ovv (po/3pa Ae yerai ra TroiTjTina <po/3ov. roiavra 5 e crrli/
ocra (paiVerai iroirjTiKa. \VTTIJS (f)dapTiKf}s it is not the anticipation of pain
of all kinds, as the pain of envy, of rivalry, of shame, that is entitled to the
name of fear , aXX iirlfJLovtUS rals roiavrats <paivofj.(i>aisfa-f(rdai \inrais (frofios
yiverat, ocratv ij (pixns dvaipfTiKT) TOV fjv o yap Kivftvvos eVl rots rotovroiy
Xtyerat p,6vois TMV (po(3(p<i>, orav Tvkrjtnov 7; TO TTJS TOLO.VTTJS (pdopas TroirjTiKov.
(putWrai 8e K.iv8vi>os OTO.V TT\r)<Jtov (fraivrjrai. Eth. Eudem. Ill I, 1229 a 33,
which is in exact conformity with Aristotle s definition. Comp. infra 2,
TOUTO yap fcrTi Kiv&vvos, (pofiepov ir\T)o-iao~fj.os.
8vva<rdai, to have the capacity, power, the force, and hence value, of;
to amount toj becomes thus equivalent to l<rxvftv or o-dfvtiv, Elmsley
ad Med. 127, ov8tva Kaipov OVVOTCII BvrjTols. Thuc. I 141, TI) OVT^V Svvarai
SovXcoo-tj/. VI 40, Xoyoi epya Swdpevoi. Similarly it denotes the value of
money, Xen. Anab. I 5. 6, 6 o-iy\os 8vvaTai errra 6p6\ovs KOI fouofioXtw
ATTIKOVS : or the general force or effect or amount of anything. Rhet.
Ill 14. 5, TO. TOV BiKavtKov irpooifjua TOVTO dvvaTai oirtp TU>V Spap.arwi/ ot
irpoXoyoi, amount to much the same , have much the same effect . It
also expresses in particular the value or meaning, signification, of a
word, or anything else (like the Latin valere\ Herod. II 30, Swarai TOVTO
TO tiros oi f dpio-Tfpas x.tipos irapi<ndjj.evoi jSao-iXei*. Ib. IV 192, TO ovvopa
dvvaTai /cara EXXaSa yXt5o-<rai/, jSoui/ot. Ib. VI 98. Thuc. VII 58, SiWat 8e
TO vfo8an<Z8es fXtvdtpov rj8r, elvai. Aristoph. Plut. 842, TO rpiftaviov T[
bvvaTai; (What s the meaning of this thread-bare cloak?). Plat. Protag.
324 A, Crat. 429 D, apa TOVTO aoi SiWat o Xoyo?; Euthyd. 286 C, fivi/arat
o Xoyos. Xenoph. Anab. II 2. 13. Dcmosth. de Cor. 26, 8i TOVT
60 PHTOP1KHS B 5 26.
pouvTai LO~acrL yap TrdvTes OTL airoQavovvTai^ a AA.
2 OTL OVK eyyvs, oudev (ppovTi^oucriv. el $rj 6 <po/3os
TOUT (TTiv 9 dvdyKri TO. TOiauTa (po/3epd eivaL ocra
/3/\a/3as ek \v7rt]V fJLya\tjv (rvvTeivovo~as. GLO p. 6=
KCLI TO. cnifjieia TtJov TOIOVTWV (pofiepa* eyyvs yap <pai-
veTai TO (fiofiepov TOVTO yap e&TL /aVcWo?, (pofiepou
3 TrXncriacrfjios. TOtavTa e e^Opa re K.al opyt] Svva-
jdevwv Troielv TL $rj\ov yap OTL fiov\ovrai, wcrre ey-
4 <yus elcri TOV Troieiv. Kal ctStKta ^vvafjuv e^o^cra* TOJ
5 7rpoaipe1(r6ai ydp 6 aStKOS aSiKOs. Kai dpCTr] vfipi- r - r
tb/ueifj ^vvafjiiv e^ovcra $t]\ov yap OTL TrpoaipelTaL
6/ieV, orai/ vfipityiTai, del, SvvaTcu $e vvv. Kal (pofios
What did this mean? Arist. Metaph. r 6, ion a j,
6 at aTTopiai at rotavrai Tracrai TO OUTO.
2. This being the definition of fear, fearful things, the objects of
fear, must needs be such as appear (fear being e< (fravrarrias) to have a
great power of destroying, or doing mischief, all kinds of mischief, that is,
which tend to, take the direction of, great pain , crvvreivetv is to send
together , said properly, of several things which conspire or converge to
one focus or centre of attraction ; or metaph., which have a common aim
or tendency. And therefore the signs or indications of such things
(the symptom of the approaching fever or death, the clouds gathering
before the storm, the first threatenings or indications of any great calamity,
as impending ruin, the death of a dear friend, and so forth) are themselves
fearful: because they announce the proximity of the object of dread, that
it is near at hand; for this is the meaning of danger the near approach
of anything that is dreaded .
3. Examples of such things are the enmity or anger of those that
have this power of doing mischief: for as it is quite clear that they desire
it, it follows that it must be close at hand . That they desire it, we know
from the definitions of opy?/ and exdpa : the former being an opetj Tipcopias,
the other an e$fo-is KCIKOV, II 4. 31.
4. A second is wickedness or vice armed with power ; for it is the
inclination, the deliberate purpose, the evil will, which is characteristic,
is involved in the very notion, of vice or wickedness (as of virtue) . And
therefore injustice, the desire of unfair advantage, or any other vice, when
it has the power will be certain to exercise it, in order to gratify this
constant inclination.
5. Again, outraged virtue, if it have the power (of avenging the
wrong: revenge is a virtue, I 6. 26, I g. 24), is formidable; for it is plain
that she has always the inclination when outraged (to right herself by
retaliation, TO avnmnovQus Si /caio^}, andjwui she has the power .
PHTOPIKHS B 5 7, 8. 61
TL 7roncrar ev Trapa&Kev yap
7 eivai Kal TOV TOLOUTOV. eTrel & ol TTO\\OI %eipovs
/TTOfs TOV KepSaiveiv Kai cei\oi ev TO!S
(f>o/3epov ok 7ri TO 7ro\u TO eV a\\M avTov eivai,
uj<TT6 ol <TW6iSoTS 7T7roifiKOTi TL Seivov <po(3epoi t]
8 KaTenreiv fj eyKaTaXiTrelv. Kai ol Svvct/mevoi ddiKelv
^ / ^/3 < \\\ -\ x ^
ouvafjievois aoiKeiaruai w? ^a^o 67T* TO TTOAL/ aoi-
6. And fear in those that have the power of doing mischief ((frnftepos
eVrt, is to be dreaded) ; because any such also (as in the two preceding
cases) must always be on the watch, ready to act in a state of prepara
tion . He is always prepared to anticipate the attack of others, which
he dreads, by attacking them as a precautionary measure ; but he also has
the power of executing his designs against them ; his fear therefore is
formidable.
7. And as the majority of mankind are no better than they should
be (inclined to the worse ; ^ft povs TOV SCOPTOS, worse than they ought to
be , or TOV eludaros, below the mean standing of morality , rather bad ),
and slaves to their own interest, and cowardly in all dangers, it is for the
most part a formidable thing to be dependent upon any one else (at the
mercy of, in the power of; ejri^wies, see note on I i. 7, eVi TO IS Kplvova-i) ;
and therefore the accomplices in any deed of horror are to be feared as
likely either to turn informers (if they are Arrows TOV KipSaiveiv, especially ;
though cowardice might have the same effect), or to leave their com
rades in the lurch (eV rolr Kivtiwols namely, in which their cowardice is
shewn); run away and leave them to bear the brunt of the danger.
That the majority are worse is proverbial; 01 ir\fiovs KOKOL.
ryjearaXtTrcIv] See note on o-wSiayaydv KOL tn>ydti?fz<pn!<rai, 114. 12,ib. 26.
8. So are those that have the power of doing wrong, to those who
have the capacity of (are particularly liable, or exposed to) being wronged;
for, for the most part, men do wrong whenever they can . With the doc
trine of man s fallen nature we have here of course nothing to do. But
the imperfection and frailty of man, his weaknesses and liability to error,
are recognised by the popular philosophy of the multitude and confirmed
by the proverbs that convey it, ol n Xfiovs KUKOL, crrare hnmatium est, and
the like. Compare the observations on equity, the merciful or indulgent
consideration of these human infirmities, in I 13. 15 17, and the ordi
nary language on the subject illustrated in the note on the atn ai dvdpa-
irinai, I 2.7 all of which belongs properly to Rhetoric. Victorias quotes
Arist. Plut. 362, ws ovBff a.T%vdJs vyis ioriv ovSewy, d\X etcri TOV Ktpdovs
d-n-avTfs i]TTovts. Plato seems to be nearer the truth on this point, OVTU>S
av j/y^craro, TOVS jj.fi> jfpijorout KOI novrjpovs crc^oSpa 6\iyovs thai fiaxrepovs,
TOVS 8e fi(Tai> n\f t crrour.
And those who have already been wronged, or think they are
wronged at the time ; for these are always on the watch for an opportu
nity (of avenging the wrong received). And those that have already
done a wrong, if they have the power (of doing an injury), are to be
62 PHTOPIKHS B 5 8 IT.
Kovariv ol av6po)7roi orav ^vvwvrai. Kai oi
fj vofJiifyvTes d$iKeL<r6af del yap Ttipovo-i Kaipov.
ol vSiKtiKOTes, eav Suva/uiv e^tocn, (pofiepoi, Se
TO dvrnraQelv vireiceiTO yap TO TOIOVTO (frofiepov.
9 Kai ol Tfiov auTtSv dvTaytoVKTTal, ocra p.rj eVSe^ercrf
a/JLct VTrdpxetv d^olv del yap 7ro\efj.ov<ri wpos TOVS
IOTOLOVTOWS. Kai Giro?? KpeiTTOcTiv avTtov (pofiepoi
/ud\\ov yap av SvvaiVTO (3\a7TTeiv avTOws, ei Kai TOfs
KpeiTTOvs. Kat ov<s (po/3ovi>Tai ol KpetTTOVs avTcov,
ii Sid TavTO. Kai ol TOI)S KpeiTTOVs avTwv
o TO?S i]TTOoriv avTov eTTiTiefJievoi ] yap
(f>o/3epoi tj avri6evT$. Kai TWV rj^iKrumeviav Kai
dreaded, because they are afraid of retaliation (TO dvTnrf7rm>66s, Eth. N.
v 8, init.); for it was previously laid down that anything of that kind is
to be feared . 6, *a! 0o/3oy ru>v Suva/xeVwy TI iroir^aai. Proprium humani
ingenii est odisse quern laeseris, Tacit. Agric. c. 42. Seneca, de Ira, II 23,
Hoc habcnt pcssimum animi magnafortuna insolentes: quos laeserunt et
oderunt (Lipsius ad locum). Ennius ap. Cic. de Off. II 7, Quern metuunt
cderunt; quern quisque odit periisse expetit.
9. And rivals in the same pursuits, for the same objects, (are
afraid of one another) rivals, I mean, for those things which they cannot
both enjoy together; for with such, men are always at war .
10. And those who are evidently formidable to our superiors
(must necessarily be so to us ; the a fortiori argument, or omne mains
continet m se minus), because they must have more power to hurt us, if
they have it also to hurt our superiors. And also those who are feared
by our superiors (must also be formidable to us) for the same reason .
The difference between these two cases lies in the <o/3epoi and (froftovvrai.
The first are those who are evidently and notoriously objects of dread by
reason of their rank, power, station on the one hand, and their manifest
hostility on the other : the second are secret enemies, men of no apparent
resources for mischief, whose real character and designs are known to
our superiors, though not to the world at large. This is the substance
of Victorius explanation.
n. And those who have ruined or destroyed our superiors ; again
the a fortiori argument ; and those who assail our inferiors ; for they are
either already formidable to us, or (will be so) when their power has
increased. And of those that have been injured (by us), and our
acknowledged enemies, or rivals, not the quick-tempered and out-spoken ,
(the pcyaXo ^vxos is Trappt](na(TTTJs, one who freely and frankly speaks his
mind to and about his neighbours, without mincing his language, Eth. N.
IV 9, 1 124 b 29 ; Trapprja-ia frankness , between friends and brothers, Ib. IX
2, 1 165 a 29), but the calm and composed, and dissemblers, and cunning ;
PHTOPIKH2 B 5 IT, 12. 63
i] dvriTTaXwv ov% ol o^uOujuoi Kai Trappticriaa-TiKOi, d\\
01 Trpdot Kai eipwves Kai iravovpyoi d$ri\oL yap el
12 771 ?, wVr ovStirore (pavepoi OTL Troppco. iravTa
de rd (fiofiepa (pofiepajrepa ocra, av diudpTcoa-iv, eVay-
opQiaa-aaQai /uLt] eV^e^erat, d\\ /} o/\w? dlvvara,
V fj.rj 6(f> eavTols d\\ eV/ TO?? evavriois. Kai (av
itl eicriv t) juj) pddiai. ws 5 aVAws
for these leave us in doubt whether their attack is imminent, and conse
quently never make it evident that it is remote . Cf. definition, in i.
Trpaot, such as hide under a calm exterior resolution and a deliberate
vindictive purpose: still waters that run deep .
tipuvfs] is here employed in its primary and proper sense, of dissimu
lation or cunning, Philemon. Fab. Inc. Fragm. ill 6, OVK W dAwn^ 17 pen
flpav TTJ (frvo-fi ; 8 avdfKao-Tos, Meineke, Fr. Comin. Gr. iv 32 ; not in the
special meaning which Aristotle has given it in Eth. N. n 7, and iv 13,
sub fin., where elpavfia stands for the social vice or defect in Trpoo-iroirjo-i?,
(pretension) self-depreciation , undue remissness in asserting one s
claims ; and is opposed to aXagovtia, excessive self-assertion, braggadocio
and swagger.
a8rj\oi, <j>avepoi] attracted to the subject of the sentence, instead of
adr]\6v eori pr] etVat. The participle is used instead of the infinitive in
most of these cases, SijXoy el pi iroiutv. Other adjectives follow the same
rule ; Aristoph. Nub. 1241, Ztvs ye\olos opvvpfvos, PI. Phaedr. 2360, yfAotoy
fa-opai, civToorxfftiafav, Arist. Eth. N. X 8, 1 178 b 1 1, ot 6to\ yeXoloi (pavovvrai
o-waAXarroire? K.T.\. Comp. IV 7, 1123 b 34. Thucyd. I 70, agioi vopi-
op(v fivat rols 7T(\as ijsoyov fTrevtyittlv. Other examples are given in
Matth. Gr. Gr. 279, comp. 549. 5. Stallbaum, ed. Gorg. 448 D.
12. And all fearful things are more fearful, in dealing with which
(Victorius) any mistake we happen to make cannot be rectified, i. e.
remedied when the consequences of an error of judgment in providing
against them are fatal, and can never be repaired where the remedy (of
the error and its consequences) is either absolutely impossible, or is not
in our own power but in that of our adversaries . When we are threat
ened with any formidable danger, from the machinations (suppose) of an
enemy, if we make any fatal or irreparable mistake in the precautions we
take to guard against it, the danger is greatly aggravated : our precau
tions and defences have failed, and we lie unprotected and exposed to the
full weight of the enemy s blow. And those dangers which admit of no
help or means of rescue, either none at all, or not easy to come by. And,
speaking generally, all things are to be feared which when they happen in
the case of others, or threaten them, excite our pity . Comp. c. 8. 13, ocra
f(p y avraiv 0o/3oDprat, raCra eV aXAcoj/ yiyvo^fva tXeovcriv.
Such then are pretty nearly, as one may say, the principal objects of
fear, and things that people dread : let us now pass on to describe the
state of mind or feelings of the subjects of the emotions themselves .
64 PHTOPIKH2 B 5 12, 13.
(pofiepd iffTLv ocra e(p ereptav yiyvofjieva i] fj.e\\ovra
eXeeiva ecmv.
Ta /mev ovv (pofiepd, KO.L a (pofiovvTaij o-^eSof tos
t nrelv TO. /mejicrra TCLVT e cr-nV ok Se <$iaKip.voi
auTOi (pofiovvrai, vvv Xeyw/uLev. el $n eornv 6 <pofio<s
fj.6Ta Trpoa-fioKia s TOV Treicrecrdai TL (pOapTiKov 7ra$os,
(pavepov OTL ovfieis (pofielTai TWV oiofjievcov juufiev av
TraOelv, ov$e TauTa a jmr] oiovrai TraQeiv, ovSe TOVTOVS
v<p iav JJ.TI oiovraiy oufie TOTE ore JUL^ OIOVTCLI. dva
IXecivos, as Aristotle, according to the MSS, is accustomed to write it,
violates Person s rule, Praef. ad Med. p. viii, that eXewos and not iheeivos
is the Attic form of the word.
13. If then fear is always accompanied with the expectation of
some destructive suffering : the necessary alternative 77 \vTrrjpov of the
defin. I is here omitted and left to be understood: as it stands, the
assertion is untrue ; fear can be excited by something short of absolute
ruin or destruction. A general who had seen hard service replied to one
who was boasting that he had never known the sensation of fear, TJicn
sir you have never snuffed a candle with your fingers ($DAS was in the days
of tallow): it is plain that no one is afraid who thinks that he is not
likely (av) to suffer anything at all, (that he is altogether exempt from the
possibility of suffering,) or of those (particular) things that they think
themselves unlikely to suffer; nor are they afraid of those (persons)
whom they think incapable of doing them harm , (yj\ oiovrai, sc. -xaBflv av:
and v < aiv is allowed to follow Tradelv, because a passive sense is implied
in it, to be hurt or injured by 1 ,) nor at a time when they don t think
them likely to do so .
As an illustration of vfi <av ^17 otoz/rat, Victorius quotes Homer Od.
t (ix) 513, where the Cyclops expresses his disgust at having been blinded
by a contemptible little fellow, < weak and worthless like Ulysses : vvv
8( fj. ftiiv oXi yos re /cat ovTiftavos Kcii UKIKVS o0$aA/xoC aXaaicrfv eirei ^C eSa-
/xacrtraro oiva>.
1 This is one of the very numerous varieties of the a"x.rjfj.a. irpbs TO 0-rjfj.aivo-
fjtvov, and is especially common after neuter verbs, but also occurs with transi-
tives, or indeed any verb which is capable of being interpreted in a passive sense.
Such are Oaiew, Eur. Ion 1225, <f>vyeiv to be banished , avaa-Trjvai, yeyov&ai,
G r g- 515 E, irdo x (very common), {KTriwreiv, (K-rrXelv, Dem. c. Aristocr. 678, fffrdvai
(to be stopped) vwt>; Arist. Top. E 4, 133 b 4, KtlaOai; Herod. I. 39, vn. 176^
Te\eurfi>, irapelvai ; Plat. Rep. VI 509 B, TTJV apxy 1 dwuXtaev virb MijSwp; Ib.
Legg. 695 B, LITTO tj>oj3ov re Seiffavrts , Rep. Ill 413 C, oloovaai VTTO /co,u7ra(r/xdrw^ ;
Arist. Ran. 940, &c. &c. And so with K, dirb, irpos, especially in the Tragic
poets: Soph. Oed. Rex 37, 429, wpos TOVTOV K\vfiv tivfidig e 060.1 ; 516, Trpo s 7 t/xoO
ireirovQevai; 854, iraiSds e e/xou 6a.vt?v; 970, 1454, IV e" tKflvuv...6a.v<j3,
Aj. 1253, Pvs v^o fffUKf-as t>.dcrTiyos...{ls odov irppfvfTou, and 1320, ov K\
i<T^fv...70\jS UIT dvSpos dprius.
PHTOPIKHS B 5 14. 65
TOIVVV (pofielaOai TOVS olo/uLevows TI 7ra6c ti> aV, KCII
14 TOUS VTTO TovTcav Kai Tavra KO.I Tore. OUK O LOVTCU r. 1383.
c)e 7ra6eli> dv oi/Te ol eV evTV%iais fjLeyd\ai<s oVxes Kai
$OKOVVTs, $10 vppiCTTal Kai oXirycopoi Kai Qpacreis
(-. <\\ r . > \ -v ,t. -\ ^
TTOiet 06 TOIOUTOVS TTAOUTOS iCT^fS 7TO\V(pl\ia OVVa-
IULIS), ovT6 ol t l^r] TreTTOvOtvaL irdvra vofJiityvTes TO.
^v>i / ^^ -vv */
0j/a Kai cnre YVyjJLevoi Trpos TO /ueAAoi/, uxTTrep OL
d\\d Se? Tivd e\wi$a vweivai
Fear therefore necessarily implies, or is a necessary consequence of,
the expectation of probable suffering in general (the opinion that they
might suffer, of the likelihood of suffering), and (suffering) from particular
-persons (roimoi ), and of particular things, and at particular times .
14. Consequently also, the following classes of persons are not
liable to fear.
Exempt from (not liable to) the expectation of probable suffering are
those who are, or think they are, in a condition of great prosperity , (the
plural of the abstract noun indicates the various items or kinds of success,
prosperity, or good luck, represented by evrv^ta,) and therefore they are
insolent (inclined to wanton outrage) and contemptuous (prone to slight
contemptuously indifferent to the opinions and feelings of others) and
audacious or rash men are made such by, (such characters are due to),
wealth, bodily strength, abundance of friends, power and (on the other
hand) those who think that they have already endured all the worst
extremities- (all that is to be dreaded, iravra ra Scivu) and have been thus
cooled down (frozen, their sensibilities blunted, all the animal heat, and
its accompanying sensibility, has been evaporated) (to apathy and indiffer
ence) as respects the future (possibility of suffering) like those who are
already under the hands of the executioner (r*8^, in the very act of under
going the sentence of death) ; but (that fear may be felt) there must be
at the bottom (of Pandora s box, as a residuum; or underlying, as a
fasts or ground of confidence, virdvai,) a lurking hope of salvation re
maining, (iff p\ ov about which is concerned) to prompt the anguish (of
the mental struggle, dyo>c, implied in fear). Romeo and Juliet, v i. 68,
Art thou so base and full of wretchedness, and fear st to die? and foil.
King Lear, IV I. 3, To be worst, The lowest and most dejected thing
of fortune ...... lives not in fear,
d-rroTvinravi^iJifvoi] Tv^Travi^eiv denotes a punishment often capital, as
it is here of somewhat uncertain signification. It is generally under
stood to mean flogging or beating, sometimes to death, with cudgels ;
so much is certain ; and the Tii^navov, the drum, or instrument made to
resemble it, probably served as the block. So Alford explains it, note
on Ep. to Hebr. xi. 35, q. v. "an instrument like a wheel or drumhead
on which the victim was stretched and scourged to death." (It was not
scourging, but beating to death with sticks). It is sometimes called rpo^oy,
Schol. ad Arist. Plut. 476, w rv^irava Kai Ktfjxovts- rv^TTava v\a </> ot s
AR. IT. 5
66 PHTOPIKH2 B 5 14.
Trepi ov dywviutcriv. (TYifJielov e* 6 yap
/3ou\evTiKovs Troiei, /carrot
pcSiro yap ravTrj rfj rt/icop/a. "Non infrcquens verbum"
: it is common only in Plutarch ; Wyttenbach supplies seve
ral instances ; and it appears in the Septuagint, Maccab. ill 3. 27, iv 5. 32,
9.20, where the instrument is called rpoxos, in the Epist. to the Hebrews, I.e.,
and in Josephus) "nee tamen eadem ac diserta significatione ; nam uni
verse est verberare, ut rvp,iravifiv, sed addita praepositio adfert notionem
ad fincm vcrberare ; quod est vel eiusmodi ut verberatus inter verbera
moriatur, fustuarium: vel ut vivus dimittatur, quae fustigatio quibus-
dam dicitur :" and then follow some examples. Wyttenbach, ad Plut. Mor.
170 A de Superst., item ad 60 A. Hesych. Tvp.7ravieTai, la-xvpms ruirreTai.
v, ddos Tifj.a>plas- Phot. Lex. rvftTravov, TO rov fi^/zi ou uXoz/, w roiis
ie^e/pi^ero. Comp. Bretschneider, Lex. Nov. Test.
s.v.
dno-Tvfj.rravieiv, as Wyttenbach observes, denotes the fatal character
of the beating, OTTO off ; that the punishment was finished off , brought
to an end . So aTrepya^eo-Qai to complete a work , aTroreXeli/, anoKa^veLv,
aTTO/xa^eo^at ( to fight it out , Lysias, Trpoy 2i/ncova 25), aTroTTftpacr&u, eiTro-
ro\p.av, aTro6vri<TKfiv (to die off, die away), aTTOKvaieiv (grate away), d7rorpi /3eii>
(rub away, to an end), aTroXXvo-ftu and aTroXXwat. The same notion of carry
ing out, or completion, is conveyed by e /c in composition, as eKreXeZi>,
f^iKecrdai, KJ3aii>eiv, and others ; the difference between the two prepo
sitions being, that OTTO is from a surface , off , e /c is from the inside ,
out of, out . The verb airo-rv^ivavi^fiv in this form denotes the aggra
vation of an ordinary beating ; and corresponds to the Roman fustu-
arium, which is confined to capital punishment by beating with sticks
for desertion in the Roman army ; Cic. Phil, ill 6, Liv. V 6 ult. Fustu
arium meretur qui signa deserit aut praesidio recedit; and is opposed,
in its seventy and fatal termination, to the ordinary flagellatio or verbera.
The verb is found in Lysias, KO.T Ayoporov, 56, ( Ayoparoj/) rw fijjjui a)
TrapeSore, KCH aTrfTvpTravicrdr], 57 and 58. Demosth. Phil. F 126. 19, avr\
TOU TW /iff f3or/0(lv TOVS Se aTroTvp.7ravi(rai. Rhet. II 6. 27.
arjp.f iov ovSeiy /3ouXei)frat Trfpl rav dveXiricrTaiv] an indication (a
sign, not an absolute proof, or conclusive sign, aTroSei^is or TSK^PIOV) of
this is, that fear inclines men to deliberation, and yet no one deliberates
about things that are hopeless , or beyond the sphere of expectation. On
the objects of /3ovXfv<ris, see Eth. Nic. in 5. We do not deliberate about
things eternal and unchangeable ; or about the constant motions of the
heavens, or of the processes of nature ; or about things that are con
stantly varying; or about things accidental and due to chance. We
deliberate only about things which concern ourselves and human affairs
in general, and of these only such as arc in our own power, in which the
event can be controlled by our own agency : and this is repeated through
out the chapter. Comp. VI 2, 1130 a 13, ov6ds 8e [BovXeveTai Trept TVV fj.ij
tvdexppevov aXXw? ?x fl " things necessary and invariable ; over which
therefore we have no control. It is plain therefore that these things
which we do not deliberate about are dufKinara ; they are beyond our
PHTOPIKH2 B 5 1517. 67
15 Trept Tdov dve\7Ti<TT(av. cocrre del TOIOVTOVS Trapa-
CTKevafav, orav i\ (3e\riov TO (pofielordai avrovs, OTI
TOLOVTOL ela-LV oioi TraBelv Kai yap a\\OL [j.ei^ovs
tTTClBoV Kai TOVS OfJiOLOVS SeiKVVVUl TTaV^Ol/TaS >/ 7T6-
7rov6oTa<s, Kai VTTO TOIOVTCOV v(p wv OVK MOVTO,
TavTa Kai TOTE ore OVK COOVTO.
16 ewei e Trepi (poftov (pavepov ri ecm, Kai
(pofiepav, Kai ws e/cao-rot e^oi/res SeSiacri,
6K TOVTCOV Kai TO 6appelv TL i<TTL, Kai Trcpi Trola Gap-
pa\eoi Kai TTWS 3>iaKeLfj.evoi 6appa\eoi eicriv TO re
yap flapa-os evavriov TW (pofiw Kai TO QappaXeov rw
ttj iocTTe /uieTa (pavTaorias r\ e\7ri<s TWV crw-n/-
ft)5 771)? OVTWV, TU>V $6 (pofiepWV i] jULt] OVT(*)V f]
> f >> ^^/1 -v *k ^ /
17 TTOppw OVTWV. ecrTi ce uappa\ea Ta re ceiva Troppco
knowledge and control, and cannot therefore be the objects of future
expectation.
15. This is now applied to the practice of the rhetorician. And
therefore they (the audience) must be made to think, or feel, whenever
it is better (for you, the speaker) that they should be afraid, (when the
occasion requires you to excite this emotion in your hearers,) that they
are themselves liable to suffering ; for in fact (as you suggest) others
greater than they have suffered (and therefore a fortiori they are liable to
it) ; and you must shew that their equals and those like them (in position,
character, and circumstances) are suffering or have suffered, and that
from such as they never expected it from, and in the particular form, and
at the particular time, when it was unexpected .
7rapa<TKfvnfiv] to bring into a frame of mind, or excite a feeling
is used here as above, II i. 2 and 7. See the notes there.
16. From this explanation of the nature of fear and things fearful,
and of the several dispositions that incline us to fear individually, we may
plainly gather what confidence is, and the sort of things that inspire
confidence, and the dispositions or habits of mind that incline us to con
fidence : because confidence is the opposite of fear, and that which
inspires the one, the object of the one, is opposite to that which inspires,
the object of, the other : and therefore, the hope (which dapcros implies, ifs
hope) of what is conducive to security, is attended by a fancy (or mental
representation, or impression, derived from and connected with sense, sec
on I 1 1. 6) of their being close at hand, and the expectation (IKiris in its
alternative, general, sense) of things to be dreaded by a fancy of either
their non-existence or remoteness . This latter fancy being characteristic
of fear, defin. i, we may infer that the opposite fancy is characteristic
of confidence.
68 PHTOPIKH2 B 5 17, 18.
OVTCL Kctl TO. 6appa\ea eyyvs. KO.L eTravopduxreis iav
OHTI KO.L fioTjdetai, i] 7ro\\a\ rj jueyaAai /; a/UL(p(*), icai
/uj/Ve ri^iKtifJLevoi fj.t]re qfiiKriKOTes UHTIV, dvTa>yiavi(TTai.
T6 i] /uri tacTiv 6 A.ftK, i] jurf e^coari SuvafMV, r]
e^oj/T6 taGL (pi\Oi r\ TreTroj^/coTes 6v t] 7T67r
t] eav TrXeiovs axriv oi<s TO.VTO. <TVfj.(j)epei, f} Kpe tTTOVS,
18 tj cijUL(J)a). avrol c)e OVTCOS e^ovTes 6appa\eoi eicni/, p. 67
eav 7ro\\a Ka.T(ap6(*)Kevai OUAVTCII KCLI /mrj 7re7rov6evai y
t$ eav 7ro\\aKL<s e\ri\v6oT6s WCTLV ek rot Ceiva
17. Things that inspire confidence are (therefore) things dreadful
or dangerous when at a distance it is the remoteness of them, not the
things themselves as the text seems to say, that inspires the confidence
and things that embolden us (cheering, inspiriting) when close at hand.
And if there be means of rectifying, setting right again, repairing, reme
dying, the mischief we dread (after it is done), or of helping, defending
ourselves against it, rescuing ourselves from it, (before it is done ; comp.
12, where Schrader thus distinguishes the two, corrcctio viali prae-
tcriti, auxilium mail imminentis,} numerous or effective, or both, and
we have neither been already injured ourselves nor injured others the first
on the principle on which the proverb is founded, "the burnt child dreads
the fire," what we have already suffered we fear to suffer again; and the
second, because when we have done no injury we fear no retaliation
or again if we have either no rivals and competitors at all, or such as we
have are powerless ; or, if they have power, are our friends or benefactors
or indebted to us for services . All these are topics opposite to those of
fear, comp. 8, 9, 10, 12 ; from which it appears that the rivalry of the
di>Taya>vi<Trai consists in the competition for the same things, where there
is not enough of them for both the competitors ; the rivalry, which naturally
engenders ill-feeling, makes you afraid of some injury from your com
petitor, a fear which is exchanged for confidence, as far as the other is con
cerned, when there is no rivalry between you. Or if those who have the
same interests are more numerous or more powerful, or both, (than
those whose interests are different, our rivals or competitors) .
1 8. This is an answer to the question TTWS StaKei /zffoi 6appa\toi elcriv
16. The feelings and dispositions in ourselves indicative of confidence, .
are, the opinion which we entertain of great success in our previous
undertakings, and of having hitherto been exempt from injury, or if we
have often run into danger and escaped : all of these are apt to make
men sanguine as regards the future. Comp. Virg. Aen. I 198, O socii,
ueque enim ignari sumus ante malorum, O passi graviora, dabit dens
his qnoquefiticm. Vos et Scyllaeam rabicm... relocate animos maestum-
que timorcm mittitc, forsan et haec olim meminisse iuvabit.,.illic fas
regna resiirgcre Troiae. Dttrate et vosmet rebus seri ate secundis. Hor.
Od. I 7. 30, fortes, peioraque passi mccum sacpe viri, nunc vino
PHTOPIKH2 B 5 iS, 19. 69
(Htxws yap aTraQeis yiyvovrai ol avOpto-
TTOI, i] TW fj.t} TreTreipacrOat // TW fioriOeias ex
eV TO?S Kara BaXaTTav KLV^VI/OLS 0*1 re aTreipoi
//wj/os 6appov<ri TO. /uLe\\ovra KCII ol {3ot]6eias e
19 &a Tt}v efjLTreiplav. /ecu orav ro?s OfJLOiois ?i JULI] <po-
rcus ijTrocri KCII <av KpeiTTOVs O IOVTOU
o iovrai c)e, uiv KeKpaTi iKacriv tj avTwv *j TCOV
fiepov,
pellite cnras, eras ingens itcrabimus aeqnor. For there are two things
which make men insensible (to danger), either never to have ex
perienced it (from ignorance, which inspires confidence) or to have
plenty of helps, resources, means of defence, to resist and overcome it ;
as in dangers at sea, those who have never had experience of a storm are
confident as to the future, and those who have derived from their ex
perience plenty of resources . What is said here of the inexperience of
men at sea tending to confidence seems to be contradicted by the
observation in Eth. Nic. Ill 9, 1115 b I, ov\ OVTO> 8e o>$ ot tfaXarrioi 01 p.ev
yap aTreyi coKacri TTJV <ra>rripiav KOI TOV davarov rov TOIOVTOV Sucr^fpcuVovcrii , 01
8 fve\7ri.8ts tlai Trapa TTJV epireipiav. Victorius thus reconciles the appa
rently conflicting statements : in the passage of the Ethics the brave
men, who have had no experience, do keep up their courage though they
despair of safety, and are indignant at such a death as that of drowning;
the death which they covet being death on the field of battle : the sailors
on the contrary are sanguine by reason of the resources which their
experience has taught them. Still the contradiction is not removed by
this explanation; for in the Rhetoric the inexperienced are confident, in
the Ethics they are in despair, though their courage may not fail. In
fact the two cases are not identical, nor intended to be so. In the Ethics
the virtue of courage is displayed in the extremest danger, in the
other there is no virtue at all ; the ignorance of the danger inspires
confidence not courage and that is all. The passage of the Rhetoric is
explained by another in Magn. Mor. I 21, quoted by Schrader, (<TTI yap
Acai /car Cfiirtipiav TIS dvSpflos, oiov ol crrpariwrat OVTOI yap oi Sacrt dt ffj.nfi-
piav, on ev ToioiiTco TOTTW ;} ev TOIOVTCO /caipw 77 OVTWS fxovrt abiivarov TI
iradflv...7rd\iv ovv flcnv avSpeloi e /c TOV tvavnov rfjs e/i7retpias oj yap aTreipoi
TU>V aTrolBrja-ofievcov ov (poftovvTai dia rrfv drreipiav.
8iX<x>? yap dnadfis] Tritum apud Graecos proverbium a priore horum
modorum pendet, quo affirmatur, suave esse belhim inexperto: yXuxu?
tzTreipo) TroAe/xoy. Victorius.
19. Comp. 10. And whenever (the danger apprehended) is not
an object of apprehension to our peers (those resembling us in rank,
station, wealth and resources), or to our inferiors, or to those whose su
periors we suppuse ourselves to be ; this opinion (of superiority) is enter
tained toward those whom we have overcome (in some previous compc--
tition, or contest for the mastery), either themselves, or their superiors or
equals .
70 PHTOPIKH5 B 5 20, 21.
/ <J O O
20 Kpeirrovcov /; TWJ/ o/moitov. Kai eav iiTrdp-^eiv
oicovTai 7r\eiw Kai /me ifa}, ots virepe^ovTe^ (po/3epoi p -
ecriv Tavra ea"Ti 7Trios ^prjfjiaTwv Kai
(TcofJLaTWV Kai (pi\wv Kai xwpas Kai TUIV irpos TTO\/ULOV
21 TrapacrKevcov tj Tra&utv t] TMV /u.e yia Tcov. Kai eav JULT]
cocriv r] /m.ri$eva /; /uLt] TroAAofs rj /mrj TOIOU-
Trepi wv <po(3ovvTai*. Kai oAws V ra Trpos 6eovs
a aVo
20. Another ground of confidence is, the supposition that we possess
in greater quantity or in a higher degree those points of superiority which
make (our enemies) formidable : such are wealth, bodily strength , (carry
on ir\fjdos and Icr^vs to the three following genitives,) number and power
(force) of friends, of territory^ of military provision, (the last) either of
every kind, or the most important and valuable.
21. And if we have done no injury, either to no one at all, or to
few, or if those few are not the sort of persons that are feared . Compare
8, which supplies the reason : it is, because they don t fear retaliation.
On Trepi coi/ ( = ovs) (poftovvrai, see note on I 9. 14.
And, in general, if our religious relations are in a favourable state
(our account with Heaven stands well), and especially (TO. re &\\a Kai,
not only in everything else, but especially in this : comp. aXXco? re
Kai, Kai df/ KO./) in the communications of (ra OTTO, what proceeds from
the intimations as to our future conduct derived from them) omens (sigtis
from heaven, to direct us) and oracles . Victorius quotes Cicero (who
calls a-rjfjiela sometimes notae, indications, sometimes signa), and Plutarch
to shew that Adyta means oracles , \6yiov and xPW^s are used indiffer
ently by Herodotus for oracle , and the word is also found, though rarely,
in other writers; Thucydides, Aristoph. Eq. 120, Eurip. Heracl. 405.
For the angry feeling is accompanied with confidence, and to abstain
from wrong oneself and yet to be wronged by others is provocative of
anger, and the divine power is supposed to aid (side with) the injured .
The argument is this, Innocence of wrong is a ground of confidence : but
this may be extended to the general (oXws) case of the divine favour, and
the feeling of confidence is heightened if we believe that we have heaven
on our side, which we argue from favourable omens and oracles. This
divine authority strengthens our conviction of our innocence, of our
having right on our side (so Victorius), and therefore our confidence.
Another reason for this increase of confidence is the angry feeling which
is excited in us by the sense of unjust treatment from others to whom we
have done no wrong, for anger always implies confidence ; and at the
same time we feel ourselves under the protection of heaven, which, is
always supposed to take the part of the innocent and injured, dappa-
Xe oj/ r) opyij. Comp. Cic. Acad. Pr. II 44. 135, ipsam iracundiam fortitu-
dinis quasi cotem essc diccbant (vcteres Acadcmici), referred to by Victo
rius and Majoragius.
PHTOPIKH2 B 522;6i. 71
Kat \oyia)v QappaXeov yap r\ opyrj, TO e JJL^ dSiiceiv
d\\ dSiKelcrOat 6pyi]<s TTOIYITLKOV, TO Se Oeiov v7ro\a/uL-
22 fidveTcti fioriQeiv TO?S dfiiKOV/uLevois. Kai OTCXV evn-
-^eipovvTe<s r} jULri^ev av TraQelv /x^e Treio-ecrdai r} KctTOp-
f\ ,!
vuxreiv ouavTai.
Kai Trepi fJLev TWV fyofiepiiov Kai 6appa\ewv eiprjTai-
i Trola S aia"XVVOVTai Kai dvai(T^(yvTO\j(Tiv, Kai irpos CHAP. \-i.
22. The last ground of confidence is the thought or opinion, in
undertaking any enterprise, that we are not likely to, or (certainly) shall
not, meet with any disaster, or that we shall succeed. And so much for
objects of fear and confidence .
CHAP. VI.
On shame or modesty, and shamelessness or impudence and
effrontery.
Prof. Bain s remarks on shame Emotions and Will, p. 142 are so
brief that they may here be quoted entire. It falls under the general
head of Emotions of Self, and in the subordinate division under that of
self-love. " The feeling of shame is resolved by a reference to the dread
of being condemned, or ill- thought of, by others. Declared censure and
public infliction, by inviting the concurrent hostile regards of a wide
circle of spectators, constitute an open shame. One is also put to shame
by falling into any act that people are accustomed to disapprove, and
will certainly censure in their own minds, although they may refrain from
actually pronouncing condemnation. This is the most frequent case in
common society. Knowing the hard judgments passed upon all breaches
of conventional decorum, it is a source of mortification to any one to be
caught in a slip ; they can too easily imagine the sentence that they do
not actually hear. The character of the pain of all such situations exactly
accords with the pains of expressed disapprobation." [Chap, xi 16,
ed. 1875.]
i. The exciting causes of shame and shamelessness, the objects of
them, i. e. the persons to whom they are directed, and the dispositions or
states of mind that they represent, will be clear from the following ana
lysis . Trola here is generally expressed by eVt iroioiy, of the exciting
causes, which occurs in 3.
On aldcos, as a Ttddos, the sense of shame, see Arist. Eth. Nic. II 7, and
more at large, IV 15. There, as here, no distinction is made between atScos
and ala-xwr). On the distinctions which may and may not be made be
tween them, see Trench, N. T. Syn. [ Xix] p. 73; and on mSw s contrasted
with a-axfrpoo-vvri, ib. XX. p. 76. They differ as the Latin verecundia (aldcos),
andfotdor (atV^uw?): the first is a subjective feeling or principle of honour,
Germ, scheu ; the second presents this in its objective aspect, as the fear of
disgrace (from others, external) consequent on something already done,
Germ, schaam and schande. Doderl. Lat. Syn. Vol. ill. p. 201. m Sws
precedes and prevents the shameful act, alax^ reflects upon its conse-
72 PHTOPIKH2 B 6 2.
2 TLVCLS Ko.1 Trcus e^oj/res, e /c Twvfie Sijhov. eVrw
quences in the shame it brings with it. This latter conception of alc
corresponds to Aristotle s definition here, and in Eth. N. IV 15 init. <p6jBos
TLS d8ogias. On al8u>s, as a principle of action, and veaetns, the two pri
mary notions of duty, duty to oneself, and duty to others or justice, see
an interesting note of Sir A. Grant, on Eth. N. u 7. 14. In Soph. Aj.
1073 1086, the two fundamental principles, by which human conduct
should be regulated, the foundations of law, justice, and military disci
pline, are cuScoy or CUT^UM/, and $(6s or (pu^os. fttos yap a> irpocrecrTiv
al<rxyvr) & dyxoO cru>Trjpiav t^ovra rovS eViVracro. See Schneidewin s note
on line 1079.
Aristotle both here and in the Ethics represents al8u>s or atV^u^, and
consequently the opposite, as Trddrj, instinctive emotions ; and Bain by
classing shame amongst the emotions takes the same view. Eth. N. iv
15, init. Trepi 8e al8ovs to? TWOS dpfrfjs ov Trpo(TTJKi \eyeiv Ttddfi yap p,aX\ov
tOLKfv rj eei, upitTai yovv (pofios (which is a Trd6os) rfjs d&oias, cnrore-
XeiTat Se raj Trepl TO. 8fivd <o/3a> 7Tapair\rjcriov tpvOpalvovrai yap ol ai<r\vv6-
fj,fvoi, ol 8e TOV Qavarov (pofBovfievoi a>)(piu><Tiv. crco/zanm 8?) (paiverai TTOS
flvai afjifpuTfpa, onep boK.fi iradovs fj.aX\oi> rj feas eiVai. This view of
shame or modesty as a Trddos and not a e, an emotion and not a
moral state or virtue, is commented on and criticized by Alexander
Aphrodisiensis in his an-opou xal Xvo-ts, Bk. A c.Ka (21), ire.pl aldovs. The
chapter opens with a reference to the two passages of the Nic. Ethics in
which the subject is treated, and after an examination and criticism of
the definition, he proceeds thus ; ? -yap cuSaW OVK foucev ra-Xws flvai (pofios
doias, aXXa TroXu irporepov dXXorptor^y Trpbs TO, awr^pd, fit ffv ol OVTWS
f^ofres (po&ovvrai TTJV eV avrols ddofciav, fl 8e fcrri TOIOVTOV ij alBws, OVK er
av ov8e Trades dn\<os tyj t dXX ets TH Kal Siddfcris, ?J ro wpotiprjfuvov eVrerai
The character of the avcuirjcwTos, as depicted by Theophrastus, Cha-
ract. c. ff. Trepl dvaio-xwrias, has not much in common with the analysis of
Aristotle. One common feature appears in 6 of this chapter, ro KtpSai-
vfiv dnu uixpaiv f; an atcr^pcov; Theophrastus definition of dvaiuxvvTia
being Karacppovrja-is 8ot]s altrxpnv eveica icepoovs. But the completest por
trait of the dvaitrxyvros that Greek antiquity has bequeathed to us, is
doubtless the dXXaj/roTrcoXqs of Aristophanes Knights. In this character
the ideal of shameless impudence seems to be reached, and human
nature can go no further.
2. ecrroj] marking the popular nature of the definition, which may
be assumed for the occasion, though perhaps not strictly exact and sci
entific, has been already noticed several times, and will occur again in
the definitions of the next two chapters.
Let it be assumed then that shame is a kind of pain or disturbance
(of one s equanimity, or the even balance of the mind, which is upset for
the nonce by the emotion) belonging to (irtpi, arising or manifested in)
that class of evils which seem to tend to discredit (loss of reputation
0o,3os rijs ddota$, the popular definition, in Eth. N. iv 15, init.) present
past or future (this marks the confusion or identification of CU&OH- and
yvT), see above), and shamelcssness a kind of slight regard of, con-
PHTOPIKH2 B 6 25. 73
a\<jyyv\] \VTTIJ TLS t] Tapa^t] Trepi TO. els d$oiav (pai-
vo^va (pepeiv TWV KCIKWV, tj TrapovTwv i) yejovoTwi/
? / /me\\ovTwv, tj S dvaKT^yvTia. 6\iy<apia rts KCII
ctTrcideia Trepi TCI aura Tavra. el Sij ea~Tiv aitr^i/j/^
3 t] 6pL(r6eTcra, dvayKrj ala ^vvea Bai CTTI TO?? TOIOVTOK
TWV KctKcov bcra alcr^pd oKe? eivai rj avTw // cov (ppov-
Ti(Ji TOiai/To. c) 6(TTiv b(Ta O.TTO /ca/c/as epya
oiov TO aVo/SaAeiV d(Tiri$a f) (pwyetv diro
4 K/as 7|0. /<:/ TO X (rvyyeveffBai ois ov del f} OTTOV ov
5 ^e? /y ore /uLtj Set aV a/coAa(T/as 7|0 Kai TO Kep-
temptuous indifference to (on oXiyojp/a, note on II 2. i, comp. n 2.3), and
an insensibility to these same things . On the connexion of dvaia-xwria
and 6\iya>pia, comp. Demosth. de F. L. 228, riva T&V eV 777 ?roXet 07y<ratr
ay /SSeXvpcorarov cti/at Acal TrXejfanjs dvaibtias KOI 6\iya>pias fieorov (see
Shilleto s note); adv. Conon. 1268 and 9, 38, 39, o roivvv ndi/rav dvai-
Se crrarof...r^i fit TOUTOW Trpos ra rotai)r o\iyapiav K.r.X.
3. From this definition of shame it follows of necessity that we
are ashamed of all evils which are of such a kind as are thought to bring
disgrace either on ourselves, or those we care for: and of this kind are
all deeds or acts that proceed from any form of vice, throwing away one s
shield for instance, or running away ; for these proceed from cowardice.
Or to defraud (a friend) of a deposit, for this proceeds from injustice .
dnoa-repfli , as distinguished from other varieties of the confusion of
ineujn and tuitm, is applied to the meaner vices of cheating and defraud
ing, as opposed to robbery and theft accompanied with violence. It is
particularly appropriate to withholding a deposit, from the preposition
with which the verb is compounded : you not only deprive your friend of
his loan, but you keep back from him something which is his due: as OTTO
in diraLTflv, diro8t86vai, aTrove^eiv, et sim. Comp. I 7.5 and note (i). Cic.
Tusc. O. ill 8, Sed quia nee qui proptcr metuin praesidium reliquit, quod
est ignaviaej nee qui proptcr avaritiain clam deposition non reddidit,
quod est tniustitiae... "Victories*
4. And sexual intercourse with forbidden (improper) persons, or
in forbidden places (as a consecrated building), or at forbidden times ;
for this proceeds from licentiousness , oirov ov Set, ore /ii) Set. This
variation of the negative, where no difference is intended, is by no means
unusual. If translated strictly, ov denotes particular places, and p.ij
times in general, any indefinite or hypothetical times ; ///. at times, if
any, when it is forbidden .
5. And to make a profit of mean and trifling things, or of things
base and vile, or from the helpless and impotent, as the poor or the
dead; whence the proverb to rob (even) a corpse of its winding-sheet;
74 PHTOPIKH2 B 6 5.
OLTTO fJLLKptav r] avr alor^pcov fj air dSwarcov, p-
TrevriTcov r) TeQvecoTwv oQev /ecu r\ TrapoijULLa, TO
K.O.V CCTTO veKpov (pepeiv OLTTO alcT^pOKep^eia s yap
for this arises from sordid greediness and meanness . Hor. Ep. I I. 65,
AVw facias j rem Si possis recte; si non, quocunque modo rein.
KfpSaivfiv dir aiV^pcoi/] is illustrated by the well-known story of Ves
pasian, Sueton. Vesp. c. 23, Reprehendenti filio Tito, quod etiam urinae
vectigal commentus esset, pecuniam ex prima pensione admovit ad nares,
sciscitans, num odore offenderetur? et illo negante, at qui, inquit, e lotio
est . Erasm. Adag. p. 199, ( e turpibus, velut ex lenodnio quaestuque cor-
poris Another illustration of profit derived from a disgraceful source
was (in the opinion of the Athenians of the 4th cent. B.C.) the practice of
the Aoyoypckpos, or 8iKoypd<pos, (diKoypafpia, Isocr. dvridotris 2, ) the rheto
rician who wrote speeches for the use of parties in the law-courts. The
amount of discredit which this employment brought upon those who
practised it may be estimated from the following passages. Antiphon
commenced this practice (Miiller, Hist. Gr.-Lit. c. xxxiii. i. Wester-
mann, Gcschichte der Beredtsamkeit, 40. 10), and thereby brought upon
himself the assaults of the Comic poets ; KaddirTerai 8 TJ Kco/xwSta rov Av-
TKpavros cos... Aoyouj ^ara roC SiKaiov (rvyKfi/JLevovs aTroStSo/neVou TroXXcoi/ XPI
fidrcov. Plat. Phaedr. 257 C, 8ia irdarjs rfjs AoiSop/ay exaXet \oyoypdfyov.
Stallbaum ad loc. In Legg. XI 937 D ad fin., it is solemnly censured and
denounced: a prohibitory law is enacted, and the penalty is death to the
citizen, and perpetual banishment to the alien, who shall presume thus to
pervert the minds of the administrators of justice. See also Stallbaum,
Praef. ad Euthydem. p. 46. Dem. de F. L. 274, \oyoypd<j)ovs roLvw /cat
o-otpia-Tas aVo/azAcSi/ ; where Shilleto cites other examples from the Orators.
Isocrates, irepl dvri86a-fa>s, is obliged to defend himself from the imputa
tions of his enemies and detractors, who charged him with making
money by this employment, 2, jSAao-^ry/noOn-ar Trepi TTJS ffj.ijs Starpt/3^y /cat
\tyovras cos eari irepl 8iKoypa<>iav which is much the same, he continues,
as if they were to call Phidias a dollmaker, or Zeuxis and Parrhasius
signpainters. And again 31, e < de TTJS irepl 8i<a(mjpia TTpayp.aTeias els
opyfjv KCU fua-os i/fjias K.a-racrTT]<Tei.v. Lastly, the author of the Rhet. ad Alex.
36 (37), 33, has this topic, for meeting a calumnious charge, lav de 8ia-
/3aAAco(rij> rjfjias us yeypap,p.evovs \6yovs Xfyopev rj \eyeiv /ieAerco/zei r) cos eVt
p.itr6(p TLV\ (Tvvr^yopovfiev KT.\. I will only add that this sense of the word
is not to be confounded with the other and earlier one -of prose writers
and especially of the early chroniclers , antecedent to and contempora
ries of Herodotus; in which it is employed by Thucyd. I 21 and Rhet. 1 1
11.7, ill 7.7, 12. 2.
KUV diro veKpov (pepuv] Prov. "contra avaros ac sordidas artes exer-
centes dicebatur." Victorius.
Other proverbs of the same tendency are quoted by Erasmus,
Adagia, p. 199. Avaritia et rapacitas. dirb veicpov fyopoKoytlv to take
tribute of the dead . aiVelv rovs dvbplavras aXfpira, to beg of the very
statues , Kua/j,(/rpo>, Aristoph. Equit. 41, a skinflint . And Appendix to
Adagia, s. v. avaritia, p. 1891.
PHTOPIKH2 B 6 6 8. 75
6 dveXevBepicc s. Kai TO /mtj ftoi}6eiv cvvdfjievov ets vm/-
para, r] I]TTOV (3oti6elv. Kai TO fiori6elcr6ai Trapd
7 TWV r\TTOV evTropwv. KO.L oavei^ecrOai ore So^ei
aiTev ore aTraiTev, KUL iraiTeiv ore aiTev, Ka
eirawev va. 1 aiTev, Ka TO
8 i]TTOv TrdvTa <ydp dve\eu6epias TavTa crr}/j.e1a. TO
ala-xpoKfp8flas...dvf\fvd(pLas] Eth. N. IV 3, 1 122 a 2, 8, 12 ; dve\fvdfpia,
Ib. c. 3, is the extreme, in defect, of the mean or virtue in the expendi
ture of the money, the excess being da-aria, reckless prodigality : it is
therefore undue parsimony, meanness, stinginess in expense. aiVxpoKfpSei a
is one of Theophrastus Characters, X .
6. And either to lend no assistance at all when you have the
power or too little . (JJTTOV sc. rod deovros). Or to receive assistance
from those who can less afford it .
7. And borrowing when it will look like begging, to ask a favour
under the guise of a loan (begging is a sign of impudence) ; or begging
when it will bear the appearance of asking for a return (of a favour: the
shamelessness of this consists in the pretence that you have a claim
upon the person from whom you are in reality begging : a favour, even
supposing that your claim is well founded, ought never to be conferred
from any expectation of a return: comp. I 9. 16, and 19, also II 4. 2, on the
unselfishness of friendship), and asking for a return (repayment or com
pensation) when it will have the appearance of begging . (If you have
really done the other a favour, and so have a claim to compensation, still
you must not put it in such a way as to seem to beg for it ; begging is a
sign of impudence.) The borrowing propensities of the di/aio-^vi^roy
appear in Theophr. Char. & , ov aTrocrrepel, irpos TOVTOV a7rf\6a>v daveifccrdai :
and also near the end. Victorius interprets the three cases differently.
He understands the 86gfi otthe other party in the transaction ; the first case
is to anticipate the other by asking for a loan, when yott fancy he is
going to beg of you V the second is that of the poorer party who begs when
the other is going to demand repayment, and so stops his mouth ; the
third is that of the richer of the two, who has often assisted the other on
former occasions, and being tired of lending him money, when the other
comes to renew his solicitations stops his mouth by asking for repayment.
This I allow to be just as good, perhaps better, in point of sense, cer
tainly more amusing, than my own interpretation: but as far as I am
able to judge, the latter is more naturally suggested by the Greek, and
more in accordance with precedent, as collected from the language of the
previous topics of these chapters on the iradrj. The first of these three,
according to Victorius s interpretation, is well illustrated by Timon of
Athens, 1112. 49, What a wicked beast was / to disfnrnish myself against
such a good time...! was sending to use Lord Timon myself, &c.
And to praise (your friend, from whom you want to get money) in
order to induce him to suppose that you are begging, and after a failure,
repulse, rebuff, to go on all the same this is the shamelessness of
importunity 1 for all these are signs of illiberality or meanness .
76 PHTOPIKHS B 6 8 10.
S eTraivelv TrapovTa [KoXaKetas] , KUI TO TayaBd fj.ev
vTrepeTraivelv TO. e (pavXa (rvva\ei<f)eiv 9 K.CLI TO inrep-
aXyelv dXyovvTi Trapovra, Kat TaXXa TrdvTa ocra
qToiauTcf KoXaKeias yap cr^fiem. Kat TO /at) VTTO-
[Jieveiv TTOVOVS ous ol Trpe&fivTepoi t] ol TpvfpaJVTes ;/ P- 1384-
ol ev efcoucria pdXXov oWes ij 6/\o)s ol d^vvaTWTepoi.
10 TravTct yap /uLaXaKtas orrj/mela. Kat TO v(p eTepov ev
Kat TO TroXXctKts, Kat a ev e7roir](rev ovei-
w /miKpo^v%ias yap TravTa Kat TaTreivoTtiTOS crrj-
1 /coXa/cetas sine zincinis, Bekk. ed. Bcrol. i&$i,eted. Oxon. 1837; item
Spmgd cd. 1867.
8. To praise a man to his face is flattery (subaudi a-^elov} Tercnt.
Adelph. II 4. 6, Ah vereor coram in os te laudare amplius, nc id asscn-
tandi magis quam quod gratnm habeamfacere existimes (Victorius) as
is also overpraising a man s good qualities, and disguising (by smearing
over and so obscuring, as a writing, or blotting out) all his bad points
(all his peccadilloes and weaknesses) ; and excessive sympathy with his
distress (exhibited) in his presence, and everything else of the same
kind ; for they are all signs of flattery , ot rcmfivol KoXaKes, Eth. N. IV
8, 1125 a 2, Ib. VIII 9, 1159 a 14, virfpfxonevos yap (pi\os 6 /coXa, rj irpo<j-
Troitlrai TOiovros eivai KOI /jLaXXov 0iXeiV rj (fjiXeladai. A distinction is taken
between apeo-Kos and /coXa| in Eth. Nic. IV 12, sub fin., which is here
disregarded. The apevKos, the over-complaisant , is what we usually
understand by *oXa or flatterer ; but KoXa is here confined to interested
flattery ; els xpW aTa Ka " a &" XPIP^Tav, and is in fact equivalent to
the ordinary irapacriTos. Theophrastus, Char. /3 , e , maintains the dis
tinction. One of the characteristics of /coXa/ce/a ts Kat eVau/eVai de
OKOVOVTOS : this appears also in the apea-Kos, Ch. e .
9. And the refusal to undergo labours which older men (than
ourselves are willing to endure) ; or men brought up in the lap of luxury,
in luxurious habits (which engender tenderness, and delicacy, and ef
feminacy, and in general tastes and habits averse to labour) ; or those
who are in higher authority (if they condescend to undertake them, we
are a fortiori bound to do so : or rather perhaps, in consideration of
the naXaKia which seems intended to include all the preceding, for the
same reason as the last mentioned, that they have not been inured to
labour); or in general, those who are weaker, less capable of undertaking
them, than ourselves ; for all these are signs of softness, delicacy, or
effeminacy . The ol ev egova-ia p.a\\ov may be illustrated by the case of
a commanding officer on a march dismounting from his horse, and walking
on foot by the side of his men. Such an example would certainly shame
any of the men who complained of fatigue. [Xen. Anab. ill 4. 46 49.]
10. And receiving favours from another, either once or fre
quently, and then reproaching him with the service he has done : all
signs of a mean spirit and a low, grovelling, mind and temper . On
ia littleness of mind , see Eth. N. iv 9.
PHTOPIKHS B 6ii, 12. 77
11 jjieia. Kat TO Trept avTOv Trdvra Xeyeiv K.O.I eTrayyeX-
Xe&Bai, Kcti TO TaX\OTpia avTOU (pd&Keiv
veias yap. OJULOICOS Se Kat diro TWV aXXwv eKa
TWV TOU i ldovs KctKioov TO. epya Kal TO. (nijULeta Kat TO.
12 b/ULOta aicr^pa yap Kat ala")(yvTLKa. Kat GTTI TOVTOLS
TO Ttiuv KaXwv t*)v irdvTes /UL6Te^ova~LV f] ol O/ULOIOI
rj ol TrXelcrTOi, JULJ] /zere^eij/. ojuioiovs e \ey(o
, Tro/Xira?, ^At/ca?, crvyyeveis, oAw? TOI)? e ^
>> \ ^ J/^N \ \ t -? ^
KTOV aLO"%pov yap tjorj TO jar] fieTe^eii/, oiov Traioev-
crews LTTL TOCTOVTOV KO.L TCJOV d/\\a)v 6fJ.oio)S. iravTa
$6 TavTa fjLa\\ov 9 av i eavTOV (paivrjTat OVTW ydp
ii. And saying any thing about yourself, making any kind of
boast or profession about yourself, no expression, however exaggerated,
of self-laudation that you abstain from ; no profession of any art or
science that you do not lay claim to and taking the credit of, appro
priating, other people s merits and advantages , symptomatic of quackery,
undue and unfounded pretension or assumption. The worthiness of
praise distains his worth, If that the praised himself bring the praise
forth. Troilus and Cressida, I 3. 241.
eVayye AAe<j$cu] to announce or proclaim to the world in the way of
profession in general, or especially the profession of any art, science, or
practice ; and almost technically (by Plato) applied to the magnificent
profession without corresponding performance of the Sophists. Rhct.
II 24. ii, of Protagoras profession, what he undertook to do, viz. TOV
fJTTco \oyov KpfLTTco TToiflv.On. d\aov(!.a see note on I 2. /
And in like manner the products or results of each of all the va
rious vices of the character, and the outward signs of these (inward
vices) and every thing that resembles them ; for they are disgrace
ful (base and therefore to be shunned, in themselves), and provocative of
shame (in us) .
12. And besides all these, the want (absence) of any of these
estimable things of which all our peers, or most of them, have
a share. By peers I mean clansmen (members of the same race or
tribe), fellow-citizens, equals in age, relatives, or, in general terms,
those who are on an equality (on a level) with us ; for now (that we have
reached this stage, not perhaps before), it is shameful not to participate in
advantages, such as education, or anything else in the same way, to so
high a degree as they do. And all these disadvantages are still more dis
graceful if they appear to be due to ourselves, and our own fault ; for by
this it does appear that they result rather from (internal) vice (of character,
the bad irpoaipea-is which stamps them with the vicious character), if we
ourselves be to blame for the introduction (pre-existence), the actual
(present) existence, or future growth of them .
;8 PHTOPIKHS B 6 13, 14.
tfitl CLTTO KctKias /ua\\oi>, av avros i] ULTIOS TWV
T 3 avTwv i] vTrap^oifTcav 77 fjieXXovrutv
TreTTOvQores i] TreivofJievoi TCL roiaura
o<ra ek drifjiiav (pepei KO.L oveifirj TavTa S IffTi TO.
ek V7rtjpeTij(reK n orajjuaTOS rj epjtav aicrxpwv , wy etrrt
TO vfipi&crOai. KO.I TO. ju.ev ets dKO\aoriav KOI e/coWa
KO.I a/coj/ra, Ta S els /3/ay aKOVTCf 1 aVo dvav$pia<s
<y/o >/ SeiXms ; vTTOfjiOvri Kcti TO fj.ri dfJivveo Bai.
14 a ftey o^ aicr^i/Voi/raf, TGLVT e<TTi Kai TO. TOL- p . C 9 .
(14) avra eTrei ^e Tre/)/ c$otas (pavracria ecrriv rj ala"xyvri )
1 &KOVTO. (TO. 5 els (Stew &KOVTO. )
13. And the endurance, present, past, or future (in the anticipa
tion) of any such things as tend to dishonour and reproach, men are
ashamed of; and these are all acts of service or subservience of person
or shameful deeds, under which head comes wanton outrage (meaning
here that particular kind of vftpis which lies in an outrage on or violation
of the person ; inrrjpeTf iv is equivalent to xapi eo-$at, sui copiamfacere, the
surrender of the person to the service or gratification of another).
TO. (Is aKoXatrta?] sc. (pfpovra, awreivovta ; qticie spectant ad incontinen-
tiam. Turpe est ea pati quae ab intemperantia alterius proficiscuntur .
Schrader. And of these, all that have a tendency or reference to (all
that subserve) licentiousness (the reckless and indiscriminate indulgence
of the appetites) are disgraceful, whether voluntary or involuntary ; the
involuntary being such as are done under compulsion (forza maggiore);
(even these are disgraceful) because the submission to, tame endurance
of, them, and the non-resistance (not defending oneself against the
violence), proceed from unmanliness or cowardice . Inordinary cases,
compulsion, any superior external force which cannot be controlled,
absolves a man from responsibility for his actions Eth. Nic. in I, on
the voluntary and involuntary but in these cases if the force be not
absolutely overwhelming he is bound to offer all the resistance in his
power: to refrain from this shews cowardice or an unmanly spirit, and
therefore such acts are still disgraceful, though not for the same reason
as the voluntary. TO. 8 els fiiav anovra is added as an explanatory note
to cLKovra: it interrupts the reasoning, and should therefore be separated
from the context by some mark of a parenthesis.
14. This concludes the first branch of the analysis of shame and
its opposite, Trom altrxyvovTcu KOI aratcr^wroCcrti , I, shameful things. We
now proceed to consider the second, irpos rivets, \he persons, namely, before
whom, in whose presence, this feeling is especially excited (///. to whom
the feeling is, as it were, addressed}. These two divisions exhibit the two
ndOtj in their objective aspect, things and persons. The third, commenc
ing at 24, gives the subjective view of them, shewing how the persons
who feel shame and the reverse are themselves affected by them, and what
in them are the signs of its manifestation.
PHTOPIKHS B 6 1418. 79
ai/rs XP LV
GUCCIS $6 Tt]S So |^79 <ppOl>Tl(^6l Of /\\ // Sid TOVS
fyvTas, dvdyKtj TOVTOVS alo"^vvea 6ai dov Aoyoj/ e
15 Aoyoy 5 e^et rwy Oav/ma^ovTcov, Kai oi)s BavfJLCt^ei,
Kai v(p> wv /3ov\6Tai 6av/ULd^6cr6ai, Kai Trpos ovs (J)i\o-
16 Ti/uLelraij Kai tav fj.ri KaTa(ppoveT TJ/S So^s. 6avp.d~
JJLCV ovv fiov\ovrai VTTO TOVTWV Kai 6av{jid-
TOVTOVS b(roi Ti e^ovcTiv dyaSov TWV TI/ULLCOV,
t) Trap ciov Twyx^dvovcri SeofJievoi cr(p6<$pa TWOS u>v
17 eKelvoi Kvpioi, oiov ol epiavTes (j)i\OTi[j.ovi>Tai Se Trpos
rof? ofjioiovs, (ppovTi^ovcri $ cos d\t]6ev6vTU)V
(f)povi[j.a)v, TOIOVTOI & ol T TrpeorfiuTepoi Kai ol
evoi. Kai TO. ev 6<p6a\iao i<s Kai TCL ev (f)avepw
Such and such like are the things that men are ashamed of. And
as shame is a fancy or mental impression about discredit or loss of re
putation (def. 2), and this on its own account, with no reference to any
ulterior results or consequences (of the loss of it), and no one cares for the
opinion except on account of those who entertain it, it follows of necessity
that the persons to whom shame is addressed are those whom we hold
in account (take account of, regard and esteem) .
15. We take account of those that admire and look up to KS, and
those whom.w^ admire and look up to (comp. I 6. 29), and by whom we
wish to be admired, and those whom we are ambitious of rivalling (n 2.
24, note, 4. 24), and those whose opinion we don t despise .
16, 17. Now the persons whom we wish to be admired by, and
whom we ourselves look up to, are those who are in possession of any
good of that class which is highly valued (which confers distinction), or
those from whom we have an excessive desire to obtain something that
they are masters of, as lovers ; those that we vie with, or strive to rival,
are our equals ; and those that we look up to as authorities on any
question (regard as likely to speak, or rather see, the truth in any dis
puted question on which their opinion is asked) are the men of practical
wisdom; and such are men advanced in life and the well educated .
1 8. In the first clause of this section, as Schrader has noticed, there
is a momentary transition from the persons who feel shame to the things
which produce it ; in the second, a return is made to the masculine.
Supply aurxyvovrai. And of things that take place, of acts done, under
our very eyes, and openly (in broad daylight, or very prominent and
conspicuous in position} men are more ashamed : whence also the pro
verb, the seat of shame is in the eyes. And the shame is deeper in the
presence of those who will be always with us (constantly in our society,
as members of our family, intimate friends ; and the closer the intimacy
the deeper the shame), and those who pay attention to, take particular
8o PHTOPIKH2 B 6 18, 19.
/ud\\ov oOev Kai tj TrapoifAa, TO eV 6<p6a\jULoI < s eivai
al^w. diet TOUTO TOV<S del Trapea-OjULevovs p.a\\ov
ala")(yvovTaL Kai TOVS Trpoore^ovTas avTols, $ia TO eV
ocpBaX/uLoTs djULCpoTepa. Kai TOVS /mr] Trept TavTa eYo- r. 1384 .
?v-.v V t/ >/.*/ \
19 X OV ^ cif/Aov yap OTI TavavTia COKCI TOUTOIS.
notice of us (study our character and actions) ; because both these are
cases of special observation .
dpfpoTepa] the abstract neuter; both the preceding things, or cases ;
these two facts, or observations on the manifestation of shame, that it is
more felt in the presence (i) of intimate associates and (2) curious ob
servers, are confirmed by the proverb that the scat of shame is in the eyes;
when we are very much ashamed of anything we turn away our eyes,
and dare not look our friend in the face. So Sappho to Alcaeus, supra
I 9. 20 whatever the true reading may be directly expresses this in the
phrase aiSms "x fl up-puTa.
The principal organ by which the emotion is expressed or manifested
is naturally regarded as the seat of that emotion : and this is by no means
confined to shame, but is extended not only to other emotions, but even
to justice by Eurip. Med. 219, 1*77 -yap OVK eWcrr ei> o(pda\p.o1s PpOTotv.
the eyes are in this case represented as the organs of injustice, not discern-
zV/gright and wrong. So Eur. Hippol. 246, KOI eV al<rxvvrjv ofx/za rerpaTrrat.
Id. Ctesph. Fr. XVIII (Bind.), al8a>s lv o<j(>$aA/io7crt ylyverai TCKVOV (apud Sto-
baeum). Arist. Vesp. 446, aXXa TOUT-CIS y OVK ei>i ov8 ei> o^daX/jLolcrLV aldms
T<av TrnXaiaJj/ e p,,3(iSa>i/. Athen. XIII 564 B (Gaisford), KOI o AptororeX^y de
e(pr] TOVS epacrras els ovftev a\Xo TOV <T(Ofj.aTos ra>v fpa>nfi>a>v rtTro/SXeTreti rj
TOVS o^daK/Jiovs, ev ols rrjv al8a> KaroiKflv. Theogn. 85, otcrtv firl y\cocr(rrj
T KOL o<p$aX^oio-iz> eTre<TTiv al8cas. Theocr. XXVII 69, o/x/ia(rti> al8ofj.fi>T).
(Paley ad Suppl. 195, Latin ed.) Apollon. Rhod. ill 92 (Victorius). Suidas
S. V. al8cas. Kai frepa 7rapoi.fj.ia "aiScos ev ofpdaXfj.ols," Trap ocrov ol KeKaKcu/j.ei Ot
TOVS o($>da\iJLovs OVK al&ovvrai, rj OTI TOVS TrapovTas opcavTes alftovvTai /xaXXoj/
ol avdpunroi rj TOVS anovras. Eustath. ad II. N 923. 1 8 (Gaisford), Aptoro-
Te \ovs yap (j)L\ocro(f>(i)TaTa Trapa^o/jLtvov oiKrjTijpLov al8ovs flvai TOVS o(pda\fjiovs.
Id. ad Odys. 1754- 39> AptororeXous (papevov rrjv aiSca Iv ofpda^p.o is eiVat,
...... oia TU>V al^rmovaiv Kai e avrrjs o^fias x a P (lKTr ]pi-C o l J -^ va v > e>< p is albtlcrdai
Xpr) ^aXcocrt ra /3Xe(papa Kai fBXeiretv aTeves OKVOVUIV. In Probl. XXXI 3,957
b 1 1, this is directly stated as a matter of fact without any reference to
the proverb or to vulgar opinion, Iv o</)$aAp.cij yap aiSw ?, as an explanation
of something else.
So of love, the eye is the medium or channel by which it is con
veyed; Eur. Hippol. 527, f pas, epcas, 6 KOT o/z/zaYwz oTa^Vts 770^01-. Aesch.
Agam. 4^; onnaraiv 8 tv d^viaif eppei TTHCT A(ppoi ra, on which see
Donaldson, New Crat. 478. Ib. 742 (Bind.) paXOaKov d^aTcov fieXos
8ii^i6vfj.ov epcoTo? livdos. Plat. Phaedr. 251 B, TOV Ka\\ovs T^V a-iroppH^v 810.
TU>V ofj.fj.a.Ta)v the Emanation theory which is afterwards explained, ib.
251 C, Cratyl. 420 B, e pws 5e, OTL eVpeT 3(n6fV...ireta aitTOS 8ia TOIV opfjiciTcav
...fKoXelTo. Arist. Eth. Nic. IX 12, init. uxjirep Tols epuai TO opav ayaiTr)To-
TUTOV to~Ti KOI /zaXXoj/ alpovvrai TavTrjv TTJV aiV^r/crtv rj TUS XOITTIIS coy Kara
PHTOPIKH2 B 6 19, 20. Si
] (rvyyv(i)fJiovi.KOvs TO?S (paivojmevois fJLapTa-
veiv a yap TL<S CWTOS Trcue?, TavTa Aeyercu TO!?
TreAas ov vefjiecrav, cocrre a jut] Tro/el, $fj\ov on
20 ye/xecra. Kal TOI)S e^ayyeXTiKOvs TroAAoIs* ovfiev
yf> $ia<bepi fJit} ^oxeiv tj IUM] e^cvyyeXXeiv. e^ay-
Tavrrjv p.aXi(TTa rou Ipwros OVTOS KOI yevopevov K.r.X. Heliodorus III 8,
quoted by King, Gnostic Gems, p. 113 4, on fia.crK.avla the envious or
evil eye . In the same passage love is described as a kind of ophthalmia,
or infection by the eye. Similarly fytiovos, the evil eye , Aesch. Agam.
947 (Dind.), ^ TIS irpoa-adev ofifutrcav /3aXoi <$66vos where Paley quotes
Eur. Inus Fragm. II, lv ^epo-iV, 77 (rrrKdyxvoia-iv, r) Trap o/i/xara e<rd THUV
(6 <f>66vos). 0o/3oy, Aesch. Pers. 168 (Dind,), dfxfrl 8" dc^aX/iois 0o/3os.
n%os, Soph. Aj. 706, fXvcrev alvov uxos an o[j.p.dTa>i> Apris. S. Petr. Ep. II ii.
14, o(f)6aXp.oi>s exovres pea-rovs /zoi^aXi Sor, S. Joh. Ep. I ii. 1 6, j (iridv/jLta rmv
o(f>6a\na>v. x a pu, tears of joy , Soph. Electr. 894, 1304, 1231, ytyrjdof
SaKpvov o/z/iarcoj/ arro. Aesch. Agam. 261, \apd p v(f)eprrfi Bdupvov
]. Ib. 527. Prov. vi. ij, haughty eyes are an abomination to
the Lord. Isaiah v. 15, the eyes (i. e. pride) of the lofty shall be humbled.
Ezekiel v. ii, neither shall mine eyes (i.e. either mercy or justice) spare.
Habak. i. 13, thoii art of purer eyes than to behold evil. All these various
examples shew, what may also be inferred from our own ordinary lan
guage, in which we speak indifferently of the eye of mercy and of pity on
the one hand, and of the eye of anger, of envy, of scorn, of hatred, of jea
lousy on the other, that the eye may be taken to represent in language
any emotion whatsoever, good or bad, of which it is in nature the most
prominent organ of expression.
19. Again, in the presence of those who are not liable to the same
imputations (as we lie under for some shameful act); for it is plain that
(in this matter) their feelings and opinions must be contrary to our own.
And of those who are not inclined to be indulgent, to make allowance for,
apparent faults; for things which a man does himself he is generally
supposed not to find fault with in others, and therefore (the converse
must be true) what he does not do himself he is plainly likely to condemn
in others . Such as according to Hudibras Compound for sins they
are inclined to, by damning those they have no mind to [i i. 215].
pc /ico-tv is righteous indignation, moral disapprobation or reprobation ;
the opposite of eXeos and a-vyyvamrj, which take the indulgent and mer
ciful view of human frailty. Infr. cc. 8, 9. Comp. 9. i.
20. And of those who are inclined to gossipi>ig (to telling tales,
betraying secrets, publishing, divulging them to their acquaintance in
general) : because there is no difference (in regard of the effect upon the
other) between not thinking (a thing wrong) and not publishing it to the
world . That is, as far as the effect upon the person who has done some
thing wrong is concerned, and the amount of shame which it causes him,
it makes no difference whether the other really thinks it wrong, or merely
says so, to the world. In no other sense are not thinking and not
telling the same. Tell-tales are, such as have received an injury, for
AR. II. 6
82 PHTOPIKHS B 6 20.
je\TiKOi e OL TC niKtjfJ.et/ot ia TO TrapaTripelv K.CLI
ol KctKoXoyoi eiTrep jap KCCL TOI)S /mr) dfjiaprdvovTas,
ert /ULCC\\OV TOI)S djULapTctvovTas. KCCI ots r] $iaTpi/3rj
eni rats TWV TreAas d/mapriais, oiov xXevaa-raTs teal
KutfJua^OTTOiols KaKO\ojoi jap TTtos OVTOL Ko.1 e^aj-
je\TiKoi. Kal ev ok jmrjSev dTTOTeTV^Kacriv uxnrep
jap 6av[j.a(^o/uL6voi SiaKeiVTai. $10 Kai TOI)S
these are always on the watch, lying in wait (napd lurking in the neigh
bourhood) (for an opportunity of retaliation) and those who are cen
sorious and inclined to evil-speaking in general : for the latter, (supply
KaKoAoyoCo-i, or Ka/c<Sy X/youo-t,) if they speak evil of the inoffensive or inno
cent, a fortiori are likely to do so of the offenders or guilty.
TrapaTrjpflv] infr. in 2. 15. Xen. Mem. ill 14.4, with an evil design, to
lie in wait for , Polyb. xvn 3.2, ap. Liddell and Scott. Add Arist. Top.
011, l6l a 23, orav o dnoKpivufj-evos rdvavria T<U fpa>T<avri TrapaTrjpfj irpocr-
tirrjptdfav, of one, who in a dialectical discussion wantonly (irpos, in
addition to his proper functions, as a work of supererogation) and spite
fully or vexatiously ((Trrjpedfav) lies in wait to catch his opponent in
some logical trap or other.
And those whose occupation or amusement (8iarpi/3r? , passe-temps)
lies in finding fault with their neighbours, such as the habitually sarcastic
(busy mockers, Ps. xxxv. 16), and comic poets or satirists in general:
for these are in a sense (in some sort may be considered as) profes
sional evil-speakers, and libellers of their neighbours . To the readers
of Aristophanes, and indeed of Comedy especially ancient Comedy
in general, this satirical and libellous character, which has become
identified with their art (i<a>nq>8t iv, Aristoph., Plato, &c.), needs no illus
tration. Hor. A. P. 2814.
X\tva<rrais] See II 2. 12, and note. II 3. 9.
4 And those with whom we have never before met with a failure (in
curred reproach or damage, sustained a repulse, lost credit explained by
TJSo&KOTH infra} ; for we are to them as it were objects of admiration and
respect (Sidxeivrai, lit, we are to them in such a disposition, or position,
attitude, posture) they have never yet had occasion to find fault with us,
we have hitherto not lost caste in their estimation and this is why we
feel ashamed in the presence of (are reluctant to refuse) those who ask a
favour for the first time, because (on the supposition that) we have never
yet lost credit in their eyes (and this respect which they have for us we
should be loth to impair) .
eoo-TTfp davp.a6p.voi] Objects of shame (ovt alcrxvvovTai) are those
before whom men feel ashamed of any offence against virtue or propriety:
comp. 77 aura ff <av <ppovrifi, 3 : also 15, 24.
And these are either such as have recently conceived the wish to be
friends with us for they have hitherto seen only the best of us and
hence the merit of Euripides answer to the Syracusans or, of acquaint
ances of long standing, such as know nothing against, know no ill of us ,
PHTOPIKH2 B 6 20, 21. 83
L aa")(yvovTai ws ovev TTCO qor]KOTes v
TOIOVTOL S o l T6 CtpTl (3oV\O{JLVOl (f)l\Ol 6tl/ai
(TO. yap /3e\Ti<TTa TeOeavTai, $10 ev e^e* 77 TOV Ey-
pnriSov aTTOKpicris Trpos TOI;S ^vpctKOcriovs) Kat TWV
21 7rd\ai yvwpifjuav ol p.r]^ev (rvvei$OT6S. alar^yvovTai $
ov JJLOVOV avTa Ta prjBevTa alor^WTr]\d d\\d Kctl TO. p. 70.
a-rj/mela, olov ov JULOVOV d(j)po$icriaovTes d\\d
TO. crrifjela avrov. /ecu ov fj.6vov TroiovvTes TO.
(are privy to, conscious of, no vice or misconduct in us,) whose good
opinion of us is unimpaired.
The answer of Euripides to the Syracusans is given invented say
some by the Scholiast, in these words : Evpnrlfys Trpos rovs SvpaKoa-iovs
Trpeo-ftvs dnoa-ToXfls Kal irepl flprfvr]S KOI (piXias Sfo^ej oy, cos fitelvoi avtvfvov,
fiTTfv e8fi, avSpes 2upaKO(rtoi, ei /cat Sia firj8fv a\Xo, dXXa ye 8ta TO apri
v[j.(av fttfcrdai, al<Txvv(rBai Tjfj.as cos davpa^ovTas. We know nothing from
any other source of Euripides having ever been employed on any other
occasion in any public capacity ; but as Aeschylus fought at Marathon,
and Sophocles was one of the ten generals who conducted the exhibition
against Samos under Pericles, there seems to be no a priori objection to
the employment of another tragic poet in a similar public service. That
Euripides could speak in public we learn from a reference of Aristotle to
another answer of his, Rhet. in 15. 8. Nevertheless the objection has
been held fatal to the soundness of the reading, and Ruhnken, Hist.
Crit. (ap. Buhle), has proposed to substitute YTTfpi Sou for Evpnri8ov in our
text, the one name being constantly confounded by transcribers with the
other. Sauppe Orat. Att. Vol. in. p. 216, Fragm. Oratt. xv argues the
question, and decides (rightly, I think) in favour of the vulgate. There
is in fact no reason whatsoever, except our ignorance, for denying that
Euripides could have been sent ambassador to Syracuse. Sauppe thinks
that the occasion probably was the negociations carried on between
Athens and Sicily from 427415, previous to the Sicilian expedition.
His note ends with an inquiry whether another Euripides, Xenophon s
father, Thuc. II 70, 79, may possibly be meant here. The extreme appo-
siteness of the answer to Aristotle s topic, which seems to have suggested
the suspicion of manufacture for the special occasion, tells in reality at
least as much in favour of its genuineness ; it is because it is so appro
priate, that Aristotle remembers and quotes it.
21. And not only the things already mentioned cause shame, but
also the signs and outward tokens and indications of it (a o-^etoi/ is, in
logic, the ordinary accompaniment of something the existence of which
it indicates j the invariable accompaniment, a certain proof of the exist
ence of it, is a rfKwpiov), as in the case of sexual intercourse, not merely
the act itself, but the signs of it. And similarly, people are ashamed not
merely of shameful acts, but also of shameful words, foul language .
Quod fact u foedum est, idem est et dictu turpe. Soph. Oed. R. 1409, a AV
62
84 PHTOPIKH2 B 6 22 24.
22 d\\a Kal XeyovTes. ojULOiays e ou roik
fjiovov alar xyvov Tai, d\\d Kal TOVS ^riXuxrovTas av-
23 TO??, olov deponrovTas Kal <pi\ovs TOVTWV. oXws o
OVK aicrxyvovTai ov6 cov TTO\V KarcKppovovcri
oAjs TOU dXrjBevew (oi/c)e/V yap Tratfiia KUI
oure Tavrd rot)s yvcbpij/JLOV^ Kal TOWS
, d\\d rot)? /mev yi/wpifJLOWS TO. Trpo^ dXt]6eiav
T0t)s c)e ctTrwOev Ta Trpos TOV vofj.ov^
24 aJro* ^e code $iaK6ifJievoi ala ^vvde tev av, irpwrov
fj.ev el vTrap-^oiev Trpos ai/rofs e^oyres OVTCO Tive s O LOVS
efba/ULev elvai oi/s alo")(yvovTai. i]crav S -ourot n 6av-
yap avSav e<r# a /z??Se Spaz/ KaXw. Isocr. ad Demon. 15, a
raGra vo^i^f fir]8e \tyeiv eivai KaXov-
22. And in like manner we are ashamed (of any disgraceful
action) before those who will reveal or betray it to them (viz. the before-
mentioned rots Bavpa^ova-iv and the rest: avrols is due to Victorius for
varia lectio avrols); as servants, and their friends .
23. And in general, people are not ashamed in the presence of
those for whose opinion, in respect of perceiving the truth and forming a
sound judgment on it, they have a very great contempt for no one feels
shame in the presence of children or brutes nor of the same things (ravra
cogn. accus. after ala-xyvovTai understood) in the presenqe of persons well
known to them and of strangers ; but in the presence of intimates they
are ashamed of things which are considered (SoKovvra) really and essen
tially, in that of the remote (from them in connexion), of what is only
conventionally, disgraceful . On this distinction of Trpbs aXrjdetav and
irpos doav = Trpbs TOV vopov, see note on ii 4. 23 : and on uTrccdev (the ter
mination) note on I u. 16.
24. This section is the commencement of the third division of the
analysis of shame and its opposite; the subjective view of them, shewing
how they appear in the persons themselves who are affected by them.
The likely subjects of shame themselves are, first of all men of such
a disposition, or in such a state of mind, as if they had certain others
standing to them in the same relation as those of whom we said they
stand in awe . Such are persons whom they respect and admire, whom
they regard as authorities, whose judgment and opinions they look up to.
A somewhat complicated assemblage of words to express this simple
meaning, that the disposition to shame is the same state of mind as that
which has been before described as felt in the presence of certain classes
of persons of whom we stand in awe; which are immediately specified.
These were (i. e. are, as we described them, <i> TIS rrjs fid^r <f>povTiti,
r<5i> 6avp.dovra)v, Kai ovs davpdfai K.T.\. ante 14, 15) either those that we
admire, or that admire us, or by whom we wish to be admired, or those
from whom we require any aid or service which we shall not obtain if we
PHTOPIKH2 B 6 24, 2$. 85
6avjj.d(^ovT6<$ i] v<p <av fiovXovrai 6aufj.a~
rj tov Ceovrat Tiva ^pelav tov /mr] Tev^ovrai
oWes, Kal OVTOI r] opOovTes, uJonrep Kv^ia<s Trepl
fjLOV K\ripov^ia<s e$rjp.ri yap nereis (ijiov yap OTTO-
Xafieiv TOV<S ABtivaiovs Trepie<TTa.vaL KVK\W TOI)S EA.-
\r]vas, do s opcovras Kal fJLr\ JJLOVOV a /couo o/aeVoi s a aV
\j/ri(picrwvTai), // aV 7r\t](riov UHTIV ol TOLOVTOI, r\ /uLe\-
alo-6t](reor6ai. SiO Kal opacrdai dTV^ovvre^ VTTO
]\ovvTcov 7TOT6 ov /3ov\ovTai" QavfJLacTral >yap
2$ ol V/Aa>Ta/. Kal orav e^caa-LV a KaTaLcr^vvovoriv r. 1385.
lose our credit with them ; and these either as actually looking on, actual
spectators (of what we say or do), of which Cydias harangue on the
allotment of Samos furnishes an example for he required them to ima
gine the entire Greek people to be standing round the Athenians in a
circle, as actual spectators, and not mere (future or expectant) listeners,
of the decree they are about to make or if such be near at hand, or
likely to be listeners (to what we have to say : this especially for the
deliberative speaker).
The 2a/zou K.\T]povxia here referred to is not the allotment of the
Samian lands amongst Athenian citizens after the revolt of the island
and its subsequent reduction by Pericles in 440 B.C. Thucydides, who
gives an account of the treatment of the Samians after their defeat, I 117,
makes no mention of any such allotment. It is referred by Ruhnken,
Hist. Crit., and by Grote, Hist, of Gr. x 407 and note, 408, to Timotheus
conquest of Samos in 366, and the subsequent Athenian settlement there
in 352 ; of the former of which Cornelius Nepos speaks, Vit. Timoth. c. I,
ap. Clinton F. H. sub anno 440.. It was againstthis allotment of Samos that
Cydias (of whom nothing seems to be known beyond this notice, his
name does not even occur in Baiter and Sauppe s list of Orators,) made
his appeal to the Athenian assembly, and invited them to decide the
question of spoliation, as though all Greece were standing round them
looking on. Isocrates, Paneg. 107, is obliged to defend his country
men from the reproach (ovfiftifav) of this and similar practices, not spe
cially named, by the plea that the appropriation of the territory was not
due to rapacity, but solely to the desire of securing the safety of the
desolated properties by planting a colony to defend them.
And therefore also men in misfortune don t like (are ashamed) to be
seen by their quondam rivals or emulators, because these are admirers ;
and therefore, by the rule previously laid down, they are ashamed to
appear before them in this undignified and melancholy condition.
25. And men are disposed to feel shame, whenever they have
attached to them any disgraceful deeds or belongings, derived either
from themselves or their ancestors, or any others with whom they are in
near relation , dy^urrtla, nearness of kin , gives the right of succession
86 PHTOPIKHS B 6 25 27.
epya Kai TrpdyiuaTa i] avrcov i] Trpoyovwv rj a\\wv
TLVWV Trpos ov<s V7rdpx et ^ToIs dy% L(Tre ia Ti> Kai
o\co<s VTrep <av aicr^vvovTai avroi el(ri OUTOL 01
eiptjfjievoi Kai ol els ai/TOik dva(pep6[J.evoi, u>v ctoacrKa-
\OL % (rv/uLj3ov\OL yeyovacTiv, r\ edv cucriv erepoi
26 TTjods oi/s (f)i\OTifJ.ouvTar 7ro\\d yap a.\a"x\)vont
27 TOl)s TOIOUTOUS Kai TTOIOVCTI Kai oJ TTOLOVCTLV.
/UL6\\OVT6S 6pdcr6ai Kai ev (pavcpw
TO?? (rvvei^ocriv alo-^vvT>i\oi /za/XAoi/ eicriv. b6ev Kai
AvTt(bti)V 6 TroitjTri S jULe\\tt)i/ aTTOTUjULTrai i^ecrOai VTTO
Aiovvcriov e nrev, i$u>
under the Attic law. Victorius quotes Eur. Hippol. 424, SouAol yap
avftpa, KUV dpacrvcni^ay^vos TIS r;, orav avveiSfj fJirjTpos TJ Trnrpos *caica.
a KaraLo-xwovcriv epya] The subject of the neut. plur. with verb sin
gular, and the exceptions, is well treated in Jelfs Gr. Gr. 384, 385.
Person, Addenda ad Eur. Hec. 1149, had restricted the exceptions to per
sons or animate objects : Hermann, ad Soph. Electr. 430, corrects this too
limited statement. Lobeck, Phrynichus, p. 425. On Aristotle s use of this
licence, see Zell ad Eth. Nic. vol. II. p. 4, Waitz ad Organ, vol. I. p. 535.
And, as a general rule, those on whose behalf (account) we our
selves feel ashamed (when they are guilty of any shameful act). These
are such as have been just named (sc. irpoyovoi TJ a XXoi nvfs K.r.X.) as well
as all such as fall back upon us (dvafapopevoi, re-lati, who refer to us, as
patrons or authorities), those, that is, to whom we have stood in the
relation of instructors or admirers ; or indeed if there be any others, like
ourselves, to whom we look up as competitors for distinction : for there
are many things which out of consideration for such we either do or
avoid doing from a feeling of shame .
27. And when we are likely to be seen, and thrown together (dva-
orpe <peo-0at, versart, conversarij of converse, conversation, in its earlier
application) in public with those who are privy to (our disgrace), we are
more inclined to feel ashamed . Comp. Thucyd. I 37. 4, ndv rovr< TO
(VTrpfTTfs acnrovftov ov% tva p.rj vva8iKrjcra><rit> ertpois Trpo/Se /SX^i/rat, dXX OTTWS
KOTO. fj.6vas dSiKwcrt, Kai onats fv <a p.fv av Kparuxri /3iaa>i>rai, ov 5 av \a6axri.
frXcop f^axnv, TJV 8e TTOV TI 7rpocrXa/3co<Tii/ avaKT^yvTuxri. " May be spared
their blushes, as there are none to witness them." According to the pro
verb, Pudor in oculis habitat. Arnold ad loc.
* To which also Antiphon the poet referred (Sdtv, from which princi
ple he derived his remark) when, on the point of being flogged to death
by Dionysius, he said, as he saw those who were to die with him (his
fellow-sufferers) covering their faces as they passed through the gates (at
the city gates, where a crowd was gathered to look at them), " Why hide
your faces? Is it not for fear that any one of these should see you
to-morrow?"
PHTOPIKHS B 6 27 ; 7 i. 87
ok qecrav diet Ttav irvXtav, <<f ri eyKct-
t( n pn avptov -ns 0/xas i$rj TOVTCOV ," s
Trepl fjiev ovv al(y)(yvr]<s Taura Trepl e dvaia")(yv- p. ?
$ij\ov cJs e /c Ttav evavTiotv eviro^crofjiev. TICTL CHAP. vn.
On Antiphon the tragic poet, see II 2. 19; and on diroTvfjLTravifcrdai,
c. 5 14. ^
fyKoXinrTeo-Oai, l to hide the face especially for shame. Plat. Phaedr.
243 B, yvpvri rfi Ke(pa\rj, Kai ovx axnrfp rare VTT alax^ 1 "! 5 eyKfxa\vp.p.evos. In
Phaedo H7C, Phaedo covers his face to hide his tears, daraKrl f xupfi ro
Sa/cpua, wore fyKaXi>\^dfi.fvos aTTficXaov epai/rov. Stallbaum refers to Dorville
ad Charit. p. 274. Aesch. c. Tim. 26, (Timarchus) yv/j.vbs firayKparia^v
...OVTOI KOKMS KOI alcrxp&s 8ia.KfiiJi.fvos TO 0-aip.a viro [ifdrjs KOL /35eXvpt ay, wore
TOVS ye ev (ppovovvras fyKa\v\j/acr()ai., aicrxwdevras vTrep rfjt TroXfats K.T.\.
In the 3rd of the letters attributed to Demosthenes, 1485.9, TTJS Apio-ro-
yeiTovos KptVewy dvafivrja-devrfs fyKa\v\}sao~de (hide your faces for shame).
Also for fear, Arist. Plut. 707, /nera raiir e -yco p.tv tvdvs eVeaXv\^czp.rji
dfiaas, Ib. 714.
Plutarch, X Orat. Vit., AvTicfxav, relates this story of Antiphon the
orator. He was sent on an embassy to Dionysius tyrant of Syracuse ;
and, at a drinking party, the question arising, which was the best
bronze in the world, ris apioros ta-n XO\KOS; Antiphon said that was the
best of which the statues of Harmodius and Aristogiton were made.
Dionysius interpreting this as implying a similar design upon himself
ordered him to be executed. Others say that the order was given in a fit
of passion brought on by Antiphon s criticism of his tragedies.
TJ p.ri TIS 1877] The alternative r/ prefixed to the interrogative sentence,
expresses the opinion of the writer or speaker, It is so isn t it? You do
think so, don t you? and is most familiar in the Platonic dialogues ; also
very frequent in our author. The alternative, which conveys this, refers
to a suppressed clause or clauses, " Is it so and so, or so and so, or
rather, as I myself think and suppose that you do also, is it not thus?"
In order to express this, in translating we supply the negative. Socrates
r\ ov ; You think so, don t you? , which occurs so constantly (in Plato) at
the end of his arguments, may seem to contradict this. But it really
amounts to the same thing. Socrates, meaning to imply that he expects
the other s assent, says (literally) or not? ; which is, being interpreted,
You surely don t think otherwise ? Dionysius fj fjnj consequently mean
when expressed at full length Is it anything else, or is it not rather as I
suppose, lest ...
So much for shame : of shamelessness, the topics may plainly be
derived from the opposites of these .
CHAP. VII.
Xapis, the Trddos, or instinctive emotion, of which this Chapter treats,
represents the tendency or inclination to benevolence, to do a grace,
favour, or service, spontaneous and disinterested ( 2, 5) to another, or
to our fellow-man. It also includes the feeling of gratitude, the instinct
ive inclination to return favours received.
88 PHTOPIKHS B ;2.
avrol
2
Ka6 r}v 6 e
O.VTL TIVOS, /UL1]& ll/a TL CIVTO) TW VTTOVpyOVVTL d\\
i. The objects of benevolence, the circumstances and occasions
(on which it is exercised), and the dispositions, characters, and moods
of mind (of those who exercise it), will be evident when we have
defined benevolence .
2. Let us then assume benevolence to be that, in accordance with
(under the influence of) which he who has the feeling is said to do a service
to one who is in want of it, not in return for anything (as a compensation
or payment) it must be spontaneous as an instinct nor for his own
benefit, but for the advantage of the other party (to the transaction,
fKfiva>) : the favour is great if it be (conferred on) one who is in extreme
need of it, or if (the benefit it confers) be of great value or difficult (of
attainment), on occasions of the like kind (peyaXois KO\ ^aXen-ois), or if
it be unique (a solitary instance of such a service, the only time it ever
was conferred : supply rj av (JLOVOS 6 virovpyutv inrovpyrjcrr) or simply ^aplcnj-
rai), or the first of its kind or the most important of its kind (///. more
than any one else has ever done) .
A passage of Cicero, de Invent, xxxvm. 112, will serve as a com
mentary on this. Beneficia ex sua vi, ex tempore, ex animo eius qui
facit, ex casu, considcrantur. (The character of acts of benevolence is
gathered or determined from these four considerations.) Ex sua id
quaerentur hoc modo : magna an parva, facilia an difficilia, singtdaria
sint an vulgaria, vera an falsa, qnanam exornatione honestentnr : ex
tempore aittem, si turn quum indigeremus, qnum ceteri non possent,
aut nollent, opitulari, si ium quum spes deseruisset : ex animo, si
non sui commodi causa, si eo consilio fecit omnia ut hoc conficere
posset: ex casu, si non for tuna scd indu stria factum "videbitur aut si
industria fortiina obstitisse. From this close resemblance I should
infer, not that Cicero had Aristotle s work before him when he wrote
the de Inventione, but rather that it had been handed down, perhaps
from him in the first instance, as a common-place in the ordinary books
of Rhetoric.
It was a disputed question, says Ar. again, Eth. Nic. vin 15, 1163
a 9, seq., whether the magnitude of a favour or benefit is to be measured
by the amount of service to the recipient, or by the beneficence 1 of the
doer of it : the former being always inclined in the estimate of its
value to underrate, the latter to overrate it. 01 plv yap TrndovTfs Totavra
(facial Xa/3eii napa TU>V tvfpyfTuiv a p.iitpa f)v enfivois KOL f^rjv nap eVe pcoy
Aa/3ai/, Karaa-^JUKpi^ovrfs ot dvanaXiv ra yue -yiora TU>V nap avTols KOI a Trap
ui OVK f)v, KOI ev KivSvvois r) roiavrais ^pft ats.
1 TTJ TOV Spdffavros cvepyetrtQ. The amount of pains, labour, risk, or sacrifice
incurred by the conferrer of the benefit here seems to be regarded as the measure
of his beneficence .
PHTOPIKHS B 7 2, 3. 89
rr /uc*ya\j 5 aV // cr(p6^pa ^eo^ueVa), 77
KO.L ^aAeTrau , /; ey Kaipols TOLOVTOI<S, rj /uovcs i]
3 TO? i] jULa\i(TTa. e*/crets 3 etcr/V a* ope^eis, Kat TOV-
al .6Ta \v7rt]s TOU
TOiavToti e Oi eTriuiuai, oov epws. K.a a e
TOV crw /xaros Ka/caurecrt Kal ev KLV^VVOW Kat yap 6
M dvri TIVOS] This might seem at first sight to exclude gratitude
from the notion of x^P ls < but this I believe cannot be intended ; though
gratitude and ingratitude are not distinctly noticed in the chapter.
The case is this. x^P LS ^ n t 1 ^ 3 chapter is employed exclusively in its
subjective sense (see the Lexx.), to denote one of the instinctive feelings :
when therefore it is applied to express gratitude, it is the feeling only,
and not the actual return of the favour, which is taken into account.
This is expressed by the words /XT) ami TIVOS, which signify that it is in
dependent of the actual requital of the benefit conferred : and, indeed,
gratitude may be equally felt when the receiver of the favour has no
means of repaying it in kind. This independent or subjective feeling
of gratitude is therefore opposed in the words ^ dvri TIVOS to the notion of a
fjucrdos, the payment or wages which a workman receives in fulfilment
of an implied contract ; where there is no feeling of gratitude or obliga
tion remaining on either side after the work is done and paid for. Whereas
gratitude is a permanent feeling, and the sense of obligation still remains
after the requital or repayment of the service. The opposite to this is
on dn-e ScoKai/ aXX CWK e ScoKai , 5. It may be argued in certain cases
that what appears to proceed from gratitude or spontaneous benevolence,
is in reality nothing but the repayment of an obligation, with which xP
is not concerned.
3. All our natural impulses are wants, and of these those especially
which are accompanied by pain at the non-attainment (/ni) yiyvo^evov) of
their object : such are the appetites and desires, as love . On upegis see p. 9,
note on n 2. i. The connexion of this remark is with the Seo^eVo) of the
preceding definition. The feeling (and the consequent act) of benevolence
always implies the satisfaction of some want in the recipient of the
favour ; if he did not want it, it would be no favour. And besides this,
the magnitude of the want is a measure of the magnitude of the favour
and of the benevolence that prompts it. Aristotle therefore proceeds to
notice some of the principal wants, in the satisfaction of which x^P iS
is manifested in the highest degree. All our natural impulses imply
wants the opet-eis, the conative or striving faculties, all aim at some
object which they desire to attain. To the impulsive element of our
nature, TO opeKTiKoV, belong the appetites and desires such as love (the
animal passion). (Besides these the opeis includes 6vp,6s, and /3ovX^crt?
the will .) These appetites and desires, being always accompanied with
pain when thwarted or failing to attain their object, are for this
reason wants in the highest degree , /zaXio-ra Str/Veiy.
KQI at (firidvpiai) eV rai? TOV crco/xaTos KaKtacrecrt, KOI tv Ktvftvvois (/xaXio-Ta
8}<ms eio-iV)] Also those (desires) that occur in (belong to) bodily
90 PHTOPIKH2 B 7 3, 4.
Kiv^vveviav eTTiBvfjiei KCCI 6 \VTTOV fj.evo<s. $10 ol ev Trevia
7rapi<TTa/u.evoi KCCI (pwyals, KO.V /miKpa vTrripeT^o iaa iv,
Sid TO fueyeBos T^ ^e^/crews KO.I TOV Kaipov Ke^api(rp.e-
4 VOL, oiov 6 ev AvKeiw TOV <popfj.ov Sous. dvayKrj ovv
/v \ > \ v \ / > \ r
/uLa\io~Ta /mev ets TavTa e^eiv TY\V VTrovpyiav, ei oe fij.rj,
ek /era t$ jU6to>. UHTT errei (pavepov Kai ore Kai e(p
TOVTWV TrapacTKevacTTeoVy TOI)S ]uiev SeiKVVTas rj bvTas
sufferings or injuries (are wants of a high degree) : for in fact (this a note
on the preceding) every one that is in danger or in pain feels desire .
For f7ri6vp.fl 6 \v7rovp.fvos compare supra c. 4 3, yiyvop.fi>a>v a>v fiovXovTai
Xaipovcri rravrfs, rail/ fvavricov df \vnovvrai, ware TTJS /3ovX?y crea)f crrjfj.f lov
at XvTrat Kai al TJSovai.
KaKoxrif, in its ordinary use, and especially in its legal application,
denotes a particular kind of injury or suffeiing, viz. ill-treatment. It
also however bears the more general sense, at least three times in
Thucydides, II 43, where KaKacris is a repetition of KanoTrpayovvrfs, and
implies ill-fortune, disaster, suffering : VI I 4, and 82, rots re rpau /iao-i /cat
TTJ aXXfl KaKwVei, where the sense is unmistakable, and coincides exactly
with the use of it here.
And therefore it is, that those who stand by (assist or succour,
Trapicrra/iei/ot) a man in poverty or exile, however slight the service they
render, by reason of the magnitude of the want and the occasion, confer
a great favour (or, are very agreeable, acceptable . The word seems to
include both senses); like the man who lent the mat ev Av/cet w . A
friend in need is a friend indeed.
I have not attempted to translate the word Av/cet w. We do not even
know whether it is the name of a man or a place : it might also be the
title of a play or a speech, from which the instance was borrowed.
Victorius says, historia ignota mihi est; Schrader, quis, cui, quando
dederit, incertum (rather ignotuin) est. The meaning is plain enough:
it is a case like that of Sir Philip Sidney s cup of cold water, in which cir
cumstances of time and place enormously enhance the value and im
portance of something which in_ ordinary circumstances is trifling and
worthless [cf. Vol. I. pp. 84, 144].
4. Accordingly, the service that is received (by the recipients,
which seems to be the subject of e^eiv) must be especially directed
to these same things (viz. the satisfaction of the more urgent wants and
desires. I have followed Bekker in retaining raCra. MS A c has raura,
and Q,Y b ,Z b rotavra, which is adopted by Victorius), or if not, to
things equal or greater. And therefore, now that the times, circum
stances, and dispositions of mind, which give rise to benevolent feeling,
have been pointed out, it is plain that it is from these sources that we
must provide our materials (for producing it in our audience), by
shewing that the one party (the recipient in the transaction) either is
PHTOPIKHS B 7 4, 5- 91
ev TOiavTn Seiftre/ Kcti \v7rri, TOI)S e
e TOiavrt] XP e l( ? TOIOVTOV TI // VTrrjpe-
5 Touvras. (pavepov Se /cot/ o0ei/ d(j)aipelcr6ai eySe ^e-
Ka * ^oieiv dxapi(TTOV<s ij yap OTL P. 1385
eveKa v7rr]p6TOV(riv rj vTrtiperrjcrav (TOUTO OVK
or has been 1 in want or pain such (as has been described), and the
other either has done or is doing a service in a case of need, the service
and the need being each of the kind mentioned .
5. It is plain too from what sources (or topics) may be derived
the materials for depriving (those who have conferred a favour) of (the
credit of) this kindly and benevolent feeling, and making them (and
their act appear, representing them as) devoid of all such feeling and
intention . This is Victorius interpretation, and I think more consistent
with what follows than that of Schrader, who understands it of the
audience, and not of the benefactor; and explains it, "facere ut affectu
illo, qui ad gratiam habendam referendamve fertur, vacui fiant audi-
tores." dxapia-Tos and axdpiros, without grace , stand in the first instance
for unpleasing, disagreeable , so in Homer, Theognis, Herodotus
and express the opposite of /cexaptayuVor, supra 3 : and this, with the
substitution of the special sense of x<*P ls as a irados for the general sense
of grace, beauty, favour, is the meaning given to the words by Aristotle
here: without grace is here to be understood without this kindly
feeling . The ordinary use of the word for ungrateful is founded upon
a third sense of X^P IS J Vlz - gratitude.
For (we may argue) either that the (boasted) service is, or was, done
from motives of self-interest, and this, as we said, (rjv, by definition,
2,) is not benevolent feeling, or that the service was an accident of
coincidence, or done under constraint, or that it was a payment and
not a free gift, whether the party was aware (of his obligation to the
other, so Victorius) or not 2 : for in both cases (whether conscious or
unconscious) it was a mere barter or exchange, and therefore again in this
respect no benevolence .
1 yeyei>7][j.{vovs. There seems to be no intelligible distinction here made
between elvai and ytyvecrdai ; at least, none that is worth expressing in the transla
tion. What again is the difference intended between the two verbs in this
passage, yft>6/j.ei>a TJ ea6jj.fi>a, II. 8. 13? It may be supposed that Aristotle has
only used the latter verb in default of a perfect of the former. And it is certain
that the Greek writers do occasionally employ forms of ylyvfcrOai where our idiom
requires the substitution of the simple to be . If the word here be translated
literally, the notion of becoming must be rendered by having come to be in,
or fallen into, such want .
2 If I understand Aristotle aright, I cannot see how the alternative efre /UTJ
et S^Tes can be fairly and properly included in this topic ; though it might of course
be employed by an unscrupulous speaker to delude an unintelligent audience.
It seems to me that the forgetfulness or ignorance that anything is due to the
person who receives the favour does alter the character of the transaction ; that
the gift in such a case may be a free gift, and the feeling that prompts it
disinterested benevolence, and that the rl avrl TWOS does not here fairly apply.
92 PHTOPIKH2 B 7 5, 6.
r\v xpis), t OTL UTTO Titans (rvveTrea-ev
crBijcrav, t] OTL direSwKav d\\ OVK e &wKav, eiT
e /re JUL^ d^fyoTepias <yap TL O.VTL TLVOS, COCTT ov&
6 OVTWS av eu] ^apis. KCLL Trept diracra.^ ras KctTryyopias
(TKeTTTeov r\ <yap X^P^ e " T 1 n OTL TO(Hi 1} TOCTOVOL n
TOIOV^L rj 7TOT6 t] 7TOV. (TtJfJieloV $6, L tXctTTOV fJ.T]
avv, as in <rv^7rTa>/na and avpfpopa, marks the coincidence.
rja-av] The <rvv in this compound compare Lat. cogere,
compcllere conveys the notion of bringing close together, squeezing,
crowding, and hence of compression, constraint; and thus enforces the
avayxri of the verb with which it is combined. Compare crvp.Trif(ii>
and avfj.TTiXf ii (Plat. Tim.).
In illustration of the topic d-rrfScoKav dXX OVK e&oKai/, Victorius very
appositely cites the case of Demosthenes and Halonnesus referred to by
Aeschines Kara I<.Trja-i<pa>i>Tos 83. AXovvrjo-ov e Si &ow (Philip offered togtve,
make us a present of Halonnesus), o S (Demosthenes) anrjyopeve p-fi Xa/u,-
ftavfiv, fl 8i8u><Tiv aXXo jjtfj a7rot 8coo-ti> (if the offer is to be regarded as a free
gift instead of a repayment), Trept <rv\\a!3a>v Sta^epo/iefos : and (in Athen-
aeus Yl 223 D 224 B) by the orator Cothocides ; and the Comic Poets,
Antiphanes (lv Neorrt St), Alexis (ev SrpanwrT; and eV ASeX(poTs), Anaxilas
(fv Euai/Spt a), and Timocles (eV "Hpaxnv}, who ridicule the objection
as a mere verbal quibble. The phrase seems to have passed almost into
a proverb. Victorius truly observes, " maioris tamen ponderis res erat
quam videbatur, ut ex hoc quoque loco intelligitur." Demosthenes seems
to have advised his Athenians to refuse the offer as a gift, and only to
accept it as a repayment of an outstanding obligation. The argument
derived from Aristotle s topic when applied to the case would be different.
This offer is prompted by no x"P ls or kindly feeling, as Philip represents
it ; for it is no free gift but the mere payment of a debt. Consequently
he is d^aptcTTOf, and we owe him no x^P LS > or gratitude, in return.
oJS ovTats] neither in this way . Neither in this way (i.e. in the
two last cases of intentional or even unintentional repayment, included
as one under the head of repayment}, is it true ^opty, any more than in
the two preceding, where the act is (i) not disinterested, or (2) accidental
or compulsory.
6. And (in estimating the value of the feeling or act of benevo
lence) we must examine it under all the Categories ; for x^P ls mav t> e
referred to that of substance (the fact) or quantity, or quality, or time,
or place . Schrader has illustrated the first three of these, but examples
are hardly necessary where they so readily suggest themselves. Brandis,
in the tract so often cited \_Philologus iv ij, p. 26, observes on this
passage, that though there can be no doubt that when Aristotle wrote
this he had the list of categories lying before him, whether or no the
book was then written cannot be decided.
And it is a sign (of the axapiaria, the absence of benevolent feeling,
that there was no intention of obliging us, and that we therefore owe
PHTOPIKH2 B 76; 8i, 2. 93
Kai e TO? e^po^ t] TavTa r era r
fj.ei!jw $t]\ov yap OTI ov$e TctvTa VJULCOV eveKa. rj el
<pav\a et^wV ovdeis <yap o^oXoyel Sela-Sai <pav\tav*
Kcti Trepi /mev TOV ^api^eorBai Kai d^apicTTeTi^ e lprj-
Trola 3 eXeeiva Kai Tivas e\eovori, Kai TTWS avTOt CI
/mev. ecrrw $t} eAeos XVTTTI Tis eVJ <pai- p>
vofj.f.v(a KaKw (pdapTiKM i] \V7Ttipqt TOV dva^iov Twyxd-
them no thanks), if people have previously refused a smaller service 1 ,
because it is clear that they must have had some interested motive in
conferring the greater, which destroys the favour : or if they have done the
same or equal or greater to our enemies ; for it is plain that here again
the service was not disinterested , was not done for our sake. Or if the
service was worthless, and the doer of it knew it to be so ; (like the
Calabrian host and his pears, porcis comcdenda, which he tries to force
upon his unwilling guest ; Hor. Epist. I 7. 14 seq. Prodigus et stultus donat
quae spernit et odit} for no one will admit that he wants things worthless .
Having thus dispatched the subject of favours bestowed from feel
ings of benevolence and the reverse, let us now pass on to things piti
able, the objects of pity, and the states of mind or dispositions in which
it resides .
CHAP. VIII.
2. Pity, according to the popular definition, which is all that Rhe
toric requires, is a feeling of pain that arises on the occasion of any evil,
or suffering, manifest, evident (apparent, to the eye or ear), deadly or
(short of that) painful, when unmerited ; and also of such a kind as we
may expect to happen either to ourselves or to those near and dear to us,
and that when it seems to be near at hand : for it is plain that any one
who is capable of feeling (///. is to feel) the emotion of pity must be such
as to suppose himself liable to suffer evil of some kind or other, himself
or his friends ; and evil of that kind which has been stated in the defini
tion, or like it, or nearly like it.
On (j)aivofj.eva = (f>avfpm, evident, unmistakable, see note on p. 10 (n 2. i).
Victorius understands it to mean " quod nobis malum videatur : possemus
enim in hoc falli, atque earn miseriam esse iudicare quae minirne sit."
But this surely would be expressed by doxe iv, not 0aiWo-$ai : and to say
nothing of the numerous examples by which the other interpretation is
supported, (some of which are given in the note above referred to,) this
seems to be more appropriate to what follows, and to the nature of the
irados itself: for the feeling of pity is strong in proportion to the vivid
ness with which the suffering is brought home to us 2 . The actual sight
of it, when we see the effect of the injury (and perhaps also a graphic
description of it from an eye-witness), gives it a reality and a force which
1 Toup, quoted by Gaisford, very unnecessarily conjectures d ^a-rrov /*&/,
si minus dederint quam par esset.
2 A remark of Lessing, at the end of the first section of his Laokoon, will serve
as a commentary on Aristotle s (paivo/j-evif. " Allt s stoischc ist untheatralisch
94 PHTOPIKH2 B 8 2.
veiv, o KO.V avros Trpoa-SoKrjcreiev av TraQeiv n
intensify our sympathy. That this is Aristotle s meaning appears most
clearly from a subsequent passage, 8, where these painful things are
enumerated, and are found to be all of them bodily affections : and still
more perhaps from 14, where the effect of npo o/x/xarcov Troieli/ is
described. Aristotle has omitted, designedly or not, all mention of
mental suffering: perhaps he thought that not being actually visible it
was incapable of exciting pity. See further on this in note on II 8. 8.
Again, this view of the meaning of the word is in exact agreement
with a preceding observation upon pain, II 4. 31, that all painful things
are objects of sense, (that is, all feelings which can properly be called
painful are excited by sensible objects,) 1 and the greatest evils, as wicked
ness and folly, are the least sensible ; for the presence of vice causes no
pain . Victorius, who however does not refer to this passage, has
pointed out that the kind of evil which excites pity is distinguished and
limited by the epithets <p$aprtK *cai \v7rrjpm ; which upon the principle
laid down in c. 4. 31 excludes the greatest evils, moral and intellectual,
as objects of pity.
With TOV dvaiov rvyx^veiv comp. II 9. I, avr uteiTai T&&gt; tXeeii/. ..o
KaXovcri vfjjiea-qv roi yap Au7rei<r$ai eVi rats dva^iais KaKo-rrpayiais K.T.A.
When a bad man suffers we look upon it as a deserved punishment, and
feel no pity, unless we deem the punishment to be excessive. Alas ,
says Carlyle, of the end of the Girondins, whatever quarrel we had with
them, has not cruel fate abolished it? Pity only survives. French Re-
vohition, Pt. III. Bk. iv. c. S, ult.
The last clause of the definition, 6 KO.V avros K.r.X., expresses the com
passion, sympathy with the sufferer, the fellow-feeling, implied in pity.
Haud ignara mali miseris succurrere disco. It is only in this form, as
compassion , that the emotion enters into Mr Bain s list; Emotions
and Will, p. 112, [chap. VII 22, ed. 1875], Compassion, according
to him, is one of the benevolent affections, a group subordinate to
the family of Tender Emotions. This appears to be a juster view
of the nature and connexion of the feeling than the account given
by Aristotle. The fact is, as I have elsewhere stated 2 , that the con
ception of general benevolence and love and duty to our fellow-crea
tures, is of modern and Christian origin, and finds no place in Ari
stotle s Ethical System : the x^P ls f the preceding chapter includes but
und unset- mitleiden ist allezeit dem leiden gleichmdssig welches der interessirende
gegenstand dussert. Sieht man ihn sein elend mit grosser seele ertragen, so wird diese
grosse seele zwar wiser e bewunderung erwccken, aber die bewunderung ist ein halter
affekt, dessen tinthdtiges staunenjede andere war mere leidenschaft , so wie jede andert
deutliche vorstellung, ausschliesset."
1 This however seems to require some qualification : it is true of course of all
bodily pain ; but are not certain mental states, as doubt, suspense, uncertainty,
disappointment, also painful ? In the case of ?Xeos, Ar. probably means that at
least some sensible image, a mental representative, or (fiavTaffia, proceeding from
some object of sense, is required to excite the painful feeling. But surely we can
pity the mental as well as the bodily sufferings of a friend, provided he makes
them sufficiently distinct and intelligible to us.
2 Review of Aristotle s System of Ethics, 1867, p. 52.
PHTOPIKHS B 8 2, 3. 95
Tivd, KCII TOUTO orav 7r\t](riov (baivrjTCti* $fj\ov
yap OTL dvayKt] TOV /meXXovTa 6\t](reiv vTrap^eiv TOI-
OUTOV olov o tecrOai TraQelv av TI KCIKOV // avrov t}
aVTOV TlVa, KCtl TOIOUTO K.O.KOV OLOV eiptlTCtl 6V TO)
3 i] OfJLOLOV i] 7rapa7r\t]O iov.] $10 oi/re oi Trai^reAws aVo-
v x x *" / > ^ x * * J/ /3- >
Aw/Veres e\eov(Tiv (ovoev yap av eri Traueiv OLOVTUL
ireTrovOacTL yap) 01/T6 oi inrepev^aifjiovelv oio/uLevot, a AA
v{3pijov(TtV el yap airavTa oiovrai vwap^eiv Tciyadd,
a small part of it, being in fact confined to doing a service to a friend
in need. Again the limitation of pity to those sufferings to which
we ourselves or our friends are exposed, ascribes a selfishness to the
emotion which seems not necessarily to belong to it. In fact if this were
true, the God of the Christian, and the gods of the heathen would be
alike incapable of it. Hobbes, in accordance with his theory of uni
versal selfishness, goes beyond Aristotle in attributing the feeling solely
to self-love. Leviathan, Pt. I. c. 6, Grief for the calamity of another is
Pity ; and ariseth from the imagination that the like calamity may befall
himself; and therefore is called also Compassion, and in the phrase of
this present time a Fellow-feeling. And therefore (he continues, another
point of contact with Aristotle,) for calamity arising from great wicked
ness the best men have the least pity ; and for the same calamity those
have pity that think themselves least obnoxious to the same. [Hobbes,
as is well known, analysed Aristotle s treatise in his Brief of the Art
of Rl^etorick, first printed with date in 1681. The Leviathan was pub
lished in 1651. S.]
The Stoic definition, quoted by Victorius from Diog. Laert., Zeno, VII
i, is in partial agreement with that of Aristotle, but omits the last clause;
e\f6s ecrri \vrrrj cos (Jfl dvaia>s KaKOTraQovvri. Whence Cicero, Tusc. Disp.
iv 8. 1 8, misericordia est aegritudo ex miseria alterius ininria laborantis.
But the Stoics, though they thus defined pity, nevertheless condemned
the exercise of it : Diog. Laert., u. s., 1 23, e\eij novas ^ em
T *X ftv M 7 ? el/ M 7 yP Ifafuevcu TO.S f< TOV
eVei TO y fi<fiv KOI 6 eXeos avrr) 6" 77 nrteueeia ovdeveid e ori ^VXTJS irpbs
KO\d(Tfis Trpocrnoiovfj.evTi ^p^crrorijra fj.rjS o lfcrQai crK\r)poTtpas avras fivai.
" Pity, anger, love all the most powerful social impulses of our nature
are ignored by the Stoics, or at least recognised only to be crushed."
Lightfoot, Dissert. 1 1 on Ep. to Philip, p. 320.
3. And therefore, neither are those who are utterly lost and
ruined inclined to pity for they suppose themselves to be no more liable
to suffering, seeing that their sufferings are all over (their cup of suffering
has been drained to the dregs) nor those who deem themselves trans-
cendantly happy ; on the contrary, they wax wanton in insolence. For,
supposing themselves to be in possession of every kind of good, it is
plain that they must assume also their exemption from all liability to
evil ; which in fact is included in the class total of goods .
-i] See note on flprja-0a>, in. 29, and the examples of the
96 PHTOPIKHS B 8 3, 4.
$rj\ov OTI Kai TO fJin ev^e-^eardai TraQeiv juj;ei/ KCIKOV
4 Kai yap TOVTO TCOV dyadwv* etcn e TOLOVTOL oioi
TraQeiv av ol re TreTrovOores fjfiri Kai $ia7re(p6v-
, Kai ol Trpe&fiuTepoi Kai $ia TO (ppoveiv Kai $i
e/ULTreipiav, Kai ol ao^ei/els, Kai ol SeiXoTtpoi fj.a\\ov,
indicative perfect there collected. Cf. Troia fuit. Fuit Ilium et ingens
gloria Teitcrontm.
4. Persons inclined to think themselves (especially) liable to
suffering are such as the following; those who have already suffered
some disaster from which they have made their escape (i. e. were not irav-
reAws aTToAwAorf?, completely ruined by it), and men advanced in years,
by reason of the prudence (or wisdom) and experience 1 (which belong to
advanced age), and the weak (in body; who are powerless to protect
themselves against aggression and injury), and those who are of a rather
more timid disposition than ordinary (this is weakness of mind}, and men
of study and cultivation, for these are men who can accurately calculate
(the chances of human life ; by the experience and knowledge which their
studies have taught them. So Victorius).
/cat 8t,aT7(f)fvy6res] This is a remarkable exemplification of that rule
of Rhetoric, that every question has two sides, of which either may be
maintained indifferently according to circumstances, and that all its
materials and reasonings are confined to the sphere of the probable.
Here we have a flat contradiction of the statement in the chapter on
<6/3oy and 0dp<ros, II 5. 1 8, where we are told that repeated escape from
danger is a ground of confidence. The fact is that it may give rise to
either, according to the temper and turn of mind of this or that indi
vidual : the sanguine will derive confidence from repeated escapes ; the
anxious and timorous, and the student or philosopher, the Solon, who
has learnt by bitter experience that no one can be accounted happy
until the end has come, the second class, the ireirtuSevpevoi, [will- be
affected in exactly the opposite manner], for the reason given by Aristotle
himself, evAoyioroi yap. There can be no doubt that he had two different
kinds of characters in his mind when he made the opposite statements.
ot SeiAorepot /laAXoi/j It is quite possible to find a distinct meaning
for both these comparatives and not regard them as mere tautology.
The comparative in Greek, Latin, English, when it stands alone, with
the object of comparison suppressed, has two distinguishable signi
fications ; p,a\\ov, for example, is either (i) /iaAXoi/ TOV ddovros, too
much , (lie quid nimis), more than it ought to be ; or (2), what we express
by rather , (itself a comparative of rathe early -comp. Ital. piutosto,
1 By these they have been taught the instability of all human fortunes; TO.V-
Opdnriva, their constant liability to accident and calamity and all the ills that
flesh is heir to. /3^/3cua 5 ovdeis Ovrjros eu ruxe? yeyus. Eur. Fragm. ap. Stoh.
p. 562 (Fr. incert. 44 Dind. [fr. 1059, ed. 5]). OvyTos yap &v Kai Gv-qrd ireiaeaOai
56m 1 0eoii filov ^jjv d^iois avdpuiros wV; Ibid. p. 568 (No. 45 Dind. [fr. 1060,
cd. 5]).
PHTOPIKIIS B 8 5, 6. 97
5 Kal ol TreTraiSevjUievot eu\6yt<TTOi yap. Kal ots uTrdp-
^OVCTL yoveis r; TSKVO. n yvvalKes avrov re yap
6 Tavra, Kal ola TraQelv ra elpnfj.va. Kal ol fu^re ev
dvSpias 7rd6ei oWes, oiov ev 6pyr\ r] Odppei (d\6yi<rra
yap rov ecro/ULevou ravra], JH^T ev vfipicrriKrj SiaOecrei
(/ecu yap ovroi d\oyi(rroi rov TreicrecrBai ri), d\\ ol
juera^v rovrcov. /LWJT av fyoftovfjievoi tr(J)6Spa ov yap
e\eov(Tiv ol eKTreTrXriy/mevot Sia ro elvat Trpos rta OIKE IM
piutosto grasso rather fat ), i.e. more than ordinary, jzaXXoi/ row eio>0oror,
a little in excess, rather more than usual. Hence 01 SeiXorfpot /^iaXXov may
be rendered rather too timid , more in a slight degree than men usually
are, and also unduly timid , more so than they ought to be. Examples of
this double comparative it being assumed apparently that it is in all
cases a mere tautological reduplication are given by Victorius ad I 7. 18,
and by Waitz (from Aristotle) on Top. r I, 116^4, Vol. II p. 465. I have
shewn on I 7.18, that /xaXXoi/ KaXXtoi/ there is not a case in point, both
of the words having each its own meaning. Of the reduplicated com
parative and superlative, some examples are given in Matth. Gr. Gr.
458, 461, and of the latter, by Monk, Hippol. 487.
fv\6yi(TTos, opposed to dXoyioror 5> rneans one that tv Xoyi^trai,
is good or ready at calculating, or reasoning in general : and marks
the reflecting, thoughtful man, as opposed to the careless and un
reflecting, who does not look forward or take forethought at all.
5. And those who have parents or children or wives (are inclined
to pity), because these are one s own (part and parcel of oneself) and
at the same time liable to the accidents before mentioned .
6. And those who are neither in a state of feeling implying
courage, as anger or confidence, for these (ravra, ra naOrj) take no
thought for ( are devoid of calculation or reflexion , as before) the future
nor in a temper of insolence and wantonness for these also never
reflect upon the possibility of future disaster, but those who are in a
state of mind intermediate to these. Nor again those who are in excessive
terror, for people who are startled (frightened out of their wits) have no
pity for others because they are absorbed by their own emotion (or
suffering) . oiKe/a> that which is their oivn\ or proper to them at the
moment, and so does not allow them to think of the suffering of others,
opposed to TW dXXoTp/o). Comp. infra II, TO yap 8eivov ertpov TOU
fXeeivov, ical fKKpov<TTiKov roC e Xe ou *.r.X., and King Lear, V 3. 230. Albany.
Produce their bodies, be they alive or dead. This judgment of the heavens,
that makes us tremble, touches us not with pity. Compare also, I 14. 5,
o ot dxovovres (po/3otWai fj.aX\ov fj f\eov<riv, and Cic. Tusc. Disp. Ill 27,
quoted by Victorius on that passage.
irpos TO> oiKfia> Tfddfi.] From the primary, physical, sense of irpos with
the dative at, by, upon , (/3aXXe> TTOTI yairj, Horn. II. A 245,) and so
resting upon , is immediately derived, by an obvious metaphor, that
AR. II. 7
98 PHTOP1KH2 B 8 7.
TTciOei. K.UV o lwvTai rti^a? eivai eTTieiKels 6 yap /
cuo/zei/os iravTo.^ OLtjcreTai dj^iovs eivai KUKOV. Kai oXws P. 1386.
/} OTUV e\ri OVTWS wcrr dvajj,vti(r6f}vai TOiavTa crvp.-
of mentally resting upon, fixed upon, devoted to, busily engaged in (as a
pursuit) , or as here, absorbed in ; generally with tlvai but also with other
verbs signifying a state of rest. The usage is very inadequately illustrated,
in fact, hardly noticed, in most of the grammars and lexicons that I
have consulted, with the exception of that of Rost and Palm : I will
therefore add a few examples that I have noted, though some of these
are to be found in the lexicon above named. Wyttenbach, on Plut.
de ser. num. vind. 549 D (Op. vn p. 328), and on Plat. Phaedo 84 c
(p. 223), has supplied instances chiefly from Plutarch and still later writers,
to which Heindorf refers in his note on a passage of the Phaedo. Plat.
Rep. VI 500 B, irpos rois oven, rr/v faavoiav e^oirt (with the mind, i. e. the
attention fixed upon), Ib. VIII 567 A, Trpos TO> nad yp-epav (j8i w i- e - r P 0ff)
dvayKafavrai flvai, Ib. IX 585 A, Trpos irXripaxrfi re Ka\ rjftovfj yiyvtO oai,
Critias, 109 E, Parmen. 126 C, irpos nnriKfj TO. TroXXa tarpi /3. Phaedo 84 C,
Phaedr. 249 C, rrpo? fudvois dd fcrri ^vijfj.rj, D, irpos ro> 6da> yiyvop.fi/of.
Demosth. de Cor. 176, fji/...irpos r<5 a-Koirdv. . .yevrjade (seriously occupy
yourselves in the consideration... give your serious attention to it). Id.
de Fals. Leg. 139, oXos irpos ro> X^ ppari %v. Aesch. c. Timarch, 74,
irpos Trj dvayKYj ravrr] yiyvecrdai. Ib. adv. CtCS. I9 2 > Trpof eVepw riri
TTJV yvd>[j.r)v *x fiv - Arist. Pol. VIII (v) 8, ter. 1308 b 36, wpos rols I8iois
cr^oXafeti/ (to have leisure to attend to their private affairs), 1309 a 5, Trpor
rolf ISiois elvai, Ib. line 8, 8iarpi[3eiv Trpos TOLS epyotv. Ib. C. II, 1313 ^ 2O >
Trpoj ro) Ka6 ijptpav ovres ao-^oXot <acnv fTriftovXfVfiV. Ib. VII (Vl) 4>
1318 b 13, jrpbs rols e pyois diaTpifieiv. Similarly in Latin: Cic. de Or.
I 8. 34, studium in quo estis. Hor. Sat. I 9. 2, totus in illis, Epist. I
I. 1 1, omnis in hoc sum.
7. We pity also any of those that we deem men of worth: for
if there be any one who thinks that there are none, such will believe that
every one deserves to suffer .
6 ynp fjL7j8eva olopfvos (tlvai fTrifiKrj} K.r.X.] Such as Timon of
Athens , o nio-avdpanros, Viet, and Schrad. ; of Timon, see Arist. Av.
1549, Lysistr. 808 seq., Phryn. Com. Moi/orpoTro?, Fr. I., Lucian, Tim.
Hemsterh. ad Luc. I p. 99. Plut. vit. Anton, c. 69 ult, 70. Meineke,
Hist. Com. Gr. I p. 327. Cic. Tusc. Disp. IV u. 25, (odium) in hominum
universum genus, quod accepimus de Tiinone, qui fj.ia-dvdpo)7ros appellatur,
Id. de Amic. XXlll. 87. Schrader cites also Mamercus, in Martial.
Ep. v 28, which concludes thus ; Hominem malignum forsan esse tit
credas : ego esse miserum credo cut placet nemo.
And indeed in general, (a man is inclined to pity) whensoever he
is in such a mood as to call to mind things similar that have happened
either to himself or to one of those he loves, or to anticipate the possi
bility (yeveadai without av) of their happening either to himself or
his friends . On the ellipse in TI> avrov see the note on the parallel
case, II 2. I, */ ru>v avrov.
dvanvrjtrdqvai] Victorius quotes Virgil s Dido, haud ignara malt miseris
succiirrere disco ; and Theseus, Soph. Oed. Col. 562.
PHTOPIKHS B 8 7, 8. 99
c rj avTto i] rutv UUTOU, fj e\7ri<rai yevearOai
t] avTw /; TWV avrov.
ok /XfcV ovv e^oj/re? e\eou(riv, eiprjrai, a 5 e Ae-
ovariv, e /c TOU optcr/mov SfjXov o<ra re yap TWV \u-
KO.I o^uvrjptiov (fidapTLKct, TravTa e AeeW,
f\iri<rai] eXm? and f\rrifiv, like o/ei8oy, <Tv/jL(popd, TOCTOIITOS (which
is sometimes used for so little ) and others, are -voces mediae,
i. e. have in themselves a middle or indifferent sense, to be determined
either way by the context. eXn-t s is expectation or - anticipation ,
and becomes either hope or fear, according as the expectation is of good
or evil. Find. Nem. I 32 (48), Koivdi yap ep^ovr eXiri Sej 7ro\vnov(av dv6pu>-
7r<ov (Dissen ad loc ). Plat. Legg. I 644 c, 86gas neXXovruv, olv KOIVOV /V
ovop.a rXrrtt, idiov df (pofios ptv ij npo \inrrjy f\nis, Gdppos 8f TJ Trpa TOU
tvavriov (Stallbaum ad loc.). It occurs in the sense of simple expectation,
and of anticipation of evil, two or three times in Sophocles. In the
former, Trach. 721, rf)i> e\iri8a rfjs rv^rjs Kpii/eiv ndpos, Aj. 600, Ka<ai>
eXjrt S ex&v. In the latter, Oed. R. 771 (quoted by Victorius), KOV pr)
tTTCpT)0jjs y, es TOCTOVTOV f\iri8<ov f/JMV /36/3oorof. Ib, 1432, eXjri Soj p. dnt-
(nraa-as (the expectation of evil}. So spes and sper are. Virg. Aen.
IV 419, hunc ego si potut tantum sperare dolorem (apud Victorium), Cic.
de Or. in 13. 51, quoniam haec satis spero vobis...molesta et putida videri.
Juv. Sat. iv 57, iam qjtartanam sperantibus aegris: with which Ruperti,
in his note on the passage, compares the German, Ich will nicht hoffen
dass dieses geschche. Sallust, Cat. 20, mala res, spes multo asperior.
eXn-tVat yevtadai] See note on I 4. 9, Vol. I. p. 65.
8. We have now stated the moods of mind in which men are
inclined to pity ; what the objects of pity are, is plain to be seen from the
definition : that is, of things which cause pain and suffering all are piti
able that are also destructive, and (in fact) everything that is destructive
and ruinous; and all evils of which chance is the cause, provided they be
of sufficient magnitude .
On \v7rrjpd Kal 68vvrjpd, Victorius and Schrader are agreed, that XvTnjpc r
represents mental, and oSwypos bodily, pain or suffering. But it is cer
tain that in ordinary usage either of them can be applied to both. That
XVTT?/ and Xvnrjpos include bodily pain appears from the regular opposition
of 77oi/7 and XUTTT; expressing pleasure and pain in general: equally so
in Aristotle s psychology, where ijftovrj and XVTTIJ are the necessary accom
paniments of sensation in all. animals ; and in Plato s moral philosophy
(Gorgias, Phaedo, Philebus, &c.), where they most unmistakably include
all kinds of pleasures and pains. 68vvTj and oSwrjpos, though most fre
quently perhaps applied to pain of body (as especially in Homer, also in
Plato and in Soph. Phil. 827, ddvvr) bodily, opposed to aXyos mental, pain ,
can also be used to express mental suffering, as may be seen by consult
ing Rost and Palm s Lexicon. o8vi>Tj, proprie corporis ...... transfertur ad
animi dolorem (Ellendt, Lex. Soph. s. v.). The derivation of d8vvr} from
a root ed eat , efito, to-dico edo, and of Xwn; from a root lup to break ,
(Curtius, Crundz. der Gr. Etym. I. pp. 218, 240,) throws no light upon
72
ioo PHTOPIKHS B 8 9, 10.
ocra vaipeTiKa, Ka ocrwv tj TV^YI ara KaKtov
n > >i ^ >^> ^ ^ ^^/
9 yectos .-)^OVT(JOV. ecrTi o ocvvripa {j.ev KUL (p
6ava.TOi Kal atKLai (rco/maTcov Kai /ca/cajO"e(? Kctl <yfj-
l vooroi Kal Tpcxprjs ei/Seia, wv 5 t] rv^n a >- ~ La
, d<pt\ia, 6\i<yo(j)i\ia (Sio Kal TO ^leo-iraa-Qai
airo TU>V (pi\a)v Kai orvv^Qiav \eiv6v) t ct/cr^o?, acrOe- p. 73-
the distinction between them : both, according to the natural growth of
language, have a physical origin, and are transferred by metaphor to the
expression of mental affections. But, read by the light of the explanatory
8, the difficulty is at once cleared up. Only odwrjpd is repeated, which
shews that the difference between this and \vrrr)pd is here at all events
one of expression merely and not of conception. This is confirmed by
the details of things painful which are enumerated in 8, all of them
evils affecting the body alone. And this is in fact an explanation of the
meaning of (paivoiJ.fva> KOKW in the definition, that being most evident or
palpable which is presented immediately to the sense. Comp. note on
(paivo/jifVto I.
Of dvaiperiKa. Victorius says that it is not in itself precisely distinguish
able in sense from (pdapTiicd, but (as I have expressed in the translation)
the latter term applies only to some particular cases of \virr]pd and oSu-
vrjpd, whilst avaipt Tiicd is extended to all things destructive.
9. Painful and destructive are, death (in its various forms, plur.
sundry kinds of death} and personal injuries (such as wounds or blows
inflicted in an assault 1*07 alidas is an action of assault and battery
under the Athenian law) and all bodily suffering or damage (of any kind,
see ante II 7. 3, and note), and old age, and disease, and want of food .
10. The evils which are due to chance (accident or fortune) are the
entire lack, or scarcity, of friends and therefore also to be severed
(parted, divorced, torn away, divelli, distrahi, ab aliguo, Cicero,) from
friends and familiars is pitiable personal ugliness or deformity, weak
ness of body, mutilation (or any maimed crippled condition of body,
which prevents a man from taking an active part in the service of the
state, and discharging his duties as a citizen).
The three last of the evils mentioned, cuo^oy, aV$eWta, dvan-qpla, occur
again, as Victorius notes (without the reference, which is also omitted by
Gaisford who quotes him), Eth. N. ill 7, 1 1 14 a 22, seq., in a passage (which
will serve as a partial commentary on the text of the Rhetoric) in which
the distinction is drawn between defects and injuries bodily and mental
as misfortunes, due to nature or accident, and the same when we have
brought them on ourselves by carelessness or vice. Thus ala-xpoTTjs or at-
<rxos may be due to nature , 8id (pvo-iv, or to the neglect of athletic exer
cises, dyvpvacriav, or carelessness in general, dpeXfiav : in the former case
it is the object not of censure but of pity ; in the latter it is to be blamed.
The same may be said of dadevfia, and Trrjp&xrtv, the equivalent of dva-
iripia in the Rhetoric ; the instance of the mutilation or crippled condi
tion there given is blindness; no one would reproach a man blinded
either by nature or disease or a blow, but would rather pity him ; but if
PHTOPIKH2 B 8 10, ir. ror
i/em, dvaTrrjpia. Kai TO oQev 7rpoa-f]Kev dyaQov TI
Trpd^ai, KO.KOV TI arvfjifirivai. Kai TO 7ro\\aKt<s TOL-
ii OVTOV. Kai TO 7re7rov6oTOs yeveadai TI dyaQov, oiov
the blindness proceeded from drunkenness or any other form of licen
tiousness every one would condemn it . We have here the necessary
qualification supplied which limits and distinguishes the cases in which
ugliness, weakness and mutilation are really pitiable.
And when an ill result follows from what might naturally have been
expected to lead to good , i. e. when in any enterprise or course of action,
we have done everything that seemed likely to ensure success, and yet
fail (or come to grief) in spite of all our endeavours, this again is a mis
fortune, or piece of ill-luck: and the frequent repetition of accidents of
this kind .
With dyadov TI irpdai comp. xpTjcrroi/ TI TTpaTrcov, Arist. Plut. 341.
Victorius refers in illustration of this disappointed expectation to Ari
adne s complaint in Catullus, Epith. Pel. et Thet. 139, certe ego te in
media versantcm turbine leti eripui, et seq.
n. And the occurrence or accession of some piece of good for
tune after a calamity (or disaster which prevents one from enjoying it ;
as when a man succeeds to an estate in his last illness), as the present
from the Great King did not reach Diopeithes till after his death .
This is illustrated by Schrader from Veil. Paterc. II 70, Deciderat Cassii
caput cum evocatus advenit nuncians Brtttum esse victorem.
ircrrovdoTos yevtcrOai] for TrfnovdoTi, the genitive absolute being sub
stituted for the proper case after the verb. This irregularity occurs more
frequently in Aristotle than elsewhere. Comp. Rhet. II 23. 7 (this is a
doubtful instance), Ib. 24, V7rof3fp\rifi:(vr)s Tivos...f8oKfi. Ib. 30, dpa
dprj[j.fi>u>v yi>a>pi(iv. Polit. II II, 1273 ^ 7> ftf^TtOV 5f...dAA dp^ovrcov yt
eVi/ieAficT&H rfjs crxdXrjs. Ib. c. 2, 1 261 b 5, apxovrotv eWpoi irepas ap%ov-
(rtv dpxds. De Anima I 5, 410 b 29, <pr)cr\ yap TTJV ~^rv^fjv (K rov 6 Aov
fluifvat dvanvfovTuiv (for the ordinary dvairveova-tv). Ib. II 8, 420 b 26,
dvayKolov etcreo dvairvfo/JifVOv cl<Tivai TOV depa. Phys. VI 9. 7, 240 a 9, a-vp,-
fiaivfi 8r) TO B fivai ical TO F Trap aXAr/Aa Kivov^fvatv (for Kivovficva^. De
Gen. Anim. II 2. 8, 735 b 34, ce\66i>Tos de OTO.V diroirvfiHrr) TO 6fpp.6v *c.r.A.
In Rhet. I 3. 5, us xelpov, an absolute case, nomin. or accus., is probably
an example of the same irregularity. The same usage occurs not unfre-
quently in Plato, but generally with the addition of <BJ. See Phaedo 77 E,
94 E, toiavoovfitvov ws dpfiovias OIKTTJS. Rep. I 327 E, ias pr) aKova-Ofj.ei cav
ovT(o Siavoflo-Of. V 470 E, VII 523 C, as \fyovros pov Siavoov. Cratyl. 439
C. Theaet. 175 B, ye\a ov Svvap-fvcov \oyif(rdai. This is further illus
trated by Matth., Gr. Gr. 569.
Somewhat similar is the very common transition from dative to
accusative, and especially when the adjective or participle is joined with
an infinitive mood as the subject; in which case it may be con
sidered as a kind of attraction: so Sympos. 176 D, ovr UVTOS (de\rj-
av TTiflv, o*Tf aAAo) <rv/i./3ouAeucrat//t, aAAwr Tf Kai KpauraXtavTa
TTJS TrpoTepaias ; where the participle is attracted back to
Ib. 1 88 D, where Swanevovs is similarly attracted to ojuAflz/ from
102 PHTOPIKH2 B 8 11.
AiOTreiOei TO. Trapa (3a(ri\ew$ TeQvewn KaT67rep.(p6ri.
KO.I TO t] /mr^ev yeyevfjcrOctt dyaQov, i] yevo^evcov pt}
eivai d7r6\avcrLV.
e(p ols {Jilv ovv eXeovcn., ravra KUL TO. TOiavra
the preceding ijp.1v, with which it ought strictly to agree. Instances of a
change (without such attraction expressed, but apparently derived from
it by analogy,) from dative (or genitive) to accusative may be found in
Elmsley s note on Eur. Heracl. 693. Two of these are, Aesch. Choeph.
408, fjiol K\vov(rai>, and Soph. El. 479, VTreari pot 6pdcros...KXvov(rav. Add
Plat. Rep. Ill 414 A, Ti^as doreov fwiri... ,\ay^avovra, V 453 D, rnj.lv vevareov
Kal 7TfipaT(ov...e\TriovTas. The opposite change occurs in Rhet. I 5. 13,
where /zet fow is substituted for fj.fiova after v-rvfp fxfLv.
AioT7ei $ei] This reference to the death of Diopeithes, commander of
the Athenian troops who defended the Thracian Chersonese against the
incursions of Philip, B.C. 342 341, see Grote,Hist. of Gr. [Chap. 90] Vol. XI
p. 622 seq., furnishes one additional item of evidence, hitherto I believe
unnoticed, as to the date of publication of the Rhetoric. Demosthenes
defended Diopeithes and his conduct against the Philippizing party at
Athens in the speeches TTfpi ratv lv Xeppo^o-w and the third Philippic,
both spoken in the last half of 341. Grote, u. s., p. 624. The earliest
date assignable to the death of Diopeithes is consequently 340 B.C. This
may be added to the passages, which go to fix the date of this work, cited
in the Introd. p. 37 seq. Little more is known of Diopeithes : the refer
ences to him in Demosthenes are collected by Baiter and Sauppe, Oratores
Attici ill. Ind. Nom. p. 40. Most of them occur in the two speeches
above mentioned: he is referred to again in the letter attributed to Philip
(Orat. 12), and de Cor. 70, as the author of a certain ^(pio-p-a together
with Eubulus and Aristophon. In the Schol. on Demosth. (Baiter and
Sauppe, u. s., ill p. 72 b 17) Trepl TO>V lv Xtppo^ crw, we have the following
notice, OVTOS 6 Aion-ei ^^y (there are three others named in the Orators)
Trarrip TJV M(vdv8pov TOV Kca/LUKoC o Se MevavSpos <J)i\os Jf &r]fj.ocrdfvovs,
St ov vrrep Aioireidovs PovXtverai. [See however A. Schaefer s Demosthenes
II 422, where the father of Menander is identified with Diopeithes of
Cephisia and not with Diopeithes of Sitnium, the general referred to in
the text.] Compare also Clinton, Fasti Hellenici n 144.
Trapa /3a<riXes] The Great King , the king of Persia, as unique
amongst sovereigns, and standing alone, far above all the rest who bore
the title, appears consequently as ftacn Xfvs, without the definite article.
Being thus distinguished from all other kings, his title, like proper names,
and some of the great objects of nature where there is only one of the
kind, requires no additional distinction, and consequently the article is
omitted. The reigning king of Persia was at this time Ochus, who took
the name of Artaxerxes (Artax. III.). Diodorus apud Clinton, Fasti
Hellenici, p. 315: on Ochus, ib. p. 316.
And (it is pitiable) either never to have attained to any good at all
(i. e. desired good or success) or after having attained to lose the enjoy
ment of it .
PHTOPIKH2 B 8 12. 103
12 eCTTlV 6\60V(TL $6 TOVS T6 yVCOpl/ULOV^) O.V fJLYI (T(p6^pa
eyyvs axnv OLKCLOT^TL Trepl Be TOVTOVS cocrTrep Trepl
avTOvs /ue AAoi/ras e-^ovorLV. dio Kal A/iacns liri p.ev
TO) vlel dyop.ev(a ETTL TO drroQavelv OVK e<$dKpv(rev, ws
(paa-iv, e7rl $6 TO) (pi\w TrpocraiTOvvTC TOVTO fj.ev yap
e\eeivov, e /ceu/o Be Seivov TO yap Seivov eTepov TOV
e\eeivov Kal eKK.povcrTiK.6v TOV e\eov Kal 7roA\a/as TW
12. These and the like are the things (the ills or sufferings) that
we pity : the objects of pity (persons) are our friends and acquaint
ance provided they are not very closely connected with us ; for in
regard of the latter we are in the same state of mind (have the same
feelings, i. e. in this case the feeling of anxiety and alarm) as we are
about ourselves when threatened with (the like disaster) , p.eX\ovras
(ravra nelo-ecrdai). And for this reason it was that Amasis, as is reported,
wept, not at the sight of his son led away to death, but of his friend beg
ging : for this is a spectacle of pity, that of terror : for the terrible is dis
tinct from the pitiable, nay, it is exclusive of pity, and often serviceable
for the excitement of the opposite feeling .
The king of Egypt, here by an oversight called Amasis, was in
reality Psammenitus, his successor on the throne. The horrible story
of Cambyses ferocious cruelty here alluded to is told by Herodotus
in 14, with his accustomed naivete", as if there was nothing in it at
all extraordinary or unusual. It will be sufficient to quote in the
way of illustration Psammenitus answer to Cambyses inquiry, why he
acted as Aristotle describes, which will likewise serve as a commentary
on oiKfioTr]Ti in our text, co ?rai Kvpov, TO. pen OI K^UI ^v /xe o> KUKO. rj wcrre
^xpcucXaiCiP, TO &f TOV fTaipov Trtvdos aiov TJV baKpvwv os tK TroAAoSf Kal
euSut/iwcui/ (K.ntcra>v d 7rra)^r;u;j drrinTai enl yrjpaos ovSw. ra ot/cry i a are,
his son s death, and his daughter s humiliation. As to the substitution of
Amasis for Psammenitus, Victorius and Buhle think it may be explained
either by a slip of memory on Aristotle s part, or by a variation in the
story in the account given by other authorities. I have no doubt myself
that the true explanation is the former. We have already seen that
our author is very liable to misquotation, as I believe to be the case
with all or most of those who, having a wide range of reading and an
unusually retentive memory, are accustomed to rely too confidently
upon the latter faculty. The vague K>S tyacriv confirms this view. If
Aristotle had remembered as he set down his example that he had
it from Herodotus, it seems to me quite certain that he would have
mentioned his name.
6KKpovo~riK6i>] prop, expulsive , inclined to strike or drive out (hav
ing that nature or tendency], the metaphor being taken, according to
Victorius, from two nails, one of which being driven in after the other
forces it out, or expels it. He quotes Eth. Nic. ill 15, sub fin., (at
(Tr id v piaC) av jueyaAai Kal cr(f)o8pal oocriv, Kal TOV Aoyior/xov iKKpovovcriv.
Plut. p. 1088 A, non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum c. 3, (TTOVOS]
VTT oAAcoi/ Troj coi , cacnrfp rjiAcoi (T<pn$poTspa>v, (KKpovufjievos OTraAAiTTfTm. and
io 4 PHTOPIKH2 B 8 13.
13 evavTita xpt icrt/mov. en e\eovcriv eyyvs avrols TOV
Setvov 6vro<s. Kai rovs 6/ULoious eXeovcn Kara j/
Kara r]6ri, Kara eas, Kara d^ico/mara, Kara
ev TracTi yap rovrois ^accA/Voi/ (paiverat Kai aura) av
t / c. t/-v v \ > ~/\ $. ~ -v /> - / /
VTrapfai CAWS YttjO KCU evravva cei \apeiv ori, ocra
Cic. Tusc. Disp. IV 35. 75, r//Vz;/z novo qnldem amore veteran amorem,
tanquam clave clavum, eiciendum putant. fj\ov ^Xw tKKpovtiv is a
proverb, occurring three times in Lucian, de mere. cond. c. 9, Vol. I.
p. 716, ed. Hemst., pro lapsu inter salut. c. 7, I 733, Philopseudes, c. 24,
III 39, JjAw, (paaiv, (KKpoveis rov TJ\OV. fvavrica] SC. tradei.
^p?;o-i/iov] seems to refer to the rhetorical use of the topic, rather than
to the promotion of the feeling itself, to which the word is less appropriate.
On the mutual exclusiveness of terror and pity compare I 14. 5 (note),
and 5 of this chapter. The pity and terror therefore, which it is the
object of tragedy to excite and purify, Poet. VI 2, can never be simul
taneous.
I will just observe here in passing that these two emotions are
appealed to in that branch of Rhetoric which was collectively called
affectus and divided into indignatio and miseratio, technically SeiVa>-
eriy and eXfoy; dfivaxris is otherwise called a-^frXtaa-/ioJ (Rhet. II 21. 10).
Though they might be scattered over the whole speech, the proper place
for them is the conclusion, the eViXoyos or peroratio, because the impres
sion is then most vivid and intense, and is left behind , like the bee s
sting, in the minds of the audience, TO Kevrpov e-yKareXetTre rolj ai<po/i-
j/ois (Eupolis, of Pericles).
The importance of these to the rhetorician may be estimated by
the fact that Thrasymachus, one of the most celebrated of the early
writers on Rhetoric, gave his work the title of e Xeot (Cicero, miserationcs)
referred to by Aristotle, Rhet. in i. 7, and ridiculed by Plato, Phaedr.
267 c. The eXeoi certainly had a wider scope than their name would
indicate (Thompson s note ad loc.), for Aristotle expressly mentions in the
passage quoted that they included remarks upon language and style.
See further on this subject, Introd. p. 367, and 368 note 3.
13. Further (returning to the last term of the definition, KOI
TOVTO orav TrXr/a-iov <paivr)Tai) men are pitied when danger or suffering
is impending and close at hand . (8fiv6v is any object of deos or dread ;
derived from 8tos as eXeeivos from eXeoj, xXfivos from K\fos.) We pity
also those who are like us, in age, or character, or habits of mind (moods,
states of mind, moral and intellectual, virtuous and vicious), in repu
tation (of various kinds, expressed by the plural), or in blood (race and
family) : for in all these cases there seems to be a greater likelihood of
the same misfortune occurring to oneself as well as the others (/cat
atVai) : for here again (eWai$a, Kai as well as in the case of fear, referring
to n 5. 12, "the same things that we dread for ourselves, we pity in
others") in a general way we must suppose (Xa/3eu> to take up, receive ,
an opinion; to assume or believe ; or perhaps to gather as the result
of observation, and sc form an opinion of conclusion) that all things
PHTOPIKHS B 8 14. 105
e(j) avrwv <j)o(3ovvTai, Tavra eV u\\a)V yiyvo^eva
I 4e\6ovcriv. eiret 3 6771)9 (pawo/ueva TO. TraOrj e\eeiva
TO. e fJivpLOdTov eros yevo/uLeva r] eorojueva OUT
OVT6 jJiejJ.V11fJiVOL tj 6 A.WS OVK e\eoV(TLV t]
i (fiwvals Kai eadricrei Kai oAws rfj VTTOKpicrei e
Tepovs eivai eyyus yap TTOIOVCTI (f)aiv6(r6ai TO KO.KOV
TTpO OUJLjULClTCtiV TTOtOUI/Te?, Y] WS /UL\\OV fj ftfc
that we dread in our own case, the same we pity when they happen
to others .
14. And seeing that all calamities and sufferings are (especially)
objects of pity when they appear close at hand, and yet things that
either have happened ten thousand years ago, or will happen ten
thousand years hence, neither in expectation or recollection do we ever
pity equally, if at all, (o/*oto>?, as we do things close at hand, whether
past or to come,) it necessarily follows from this (that pity is heightened
when the object is brought near us) that those (orators) who aid the
effect of their descriptions (lit. join with the other arts of Rhetoric in
producing e Xeo?) by attitude (gestures, action in general), by the voice,
and dress, and the art of acting in general, are more pitiable (i.e. more
successful in exciting pity) : because, by setting the mischief before
our very eyes (by their graphic representation of it) they make it appear
close to us whether as future or past .
irpo 6fjLfjidT<ov] which is almost technical in Rhetoric, is again used
to denote a vivid, graphic, striking representation, in 2. 13, Ib. 10. 6,
and in in n. i, seq. is explained and illustrated. Cornp. Poet. c. xvn
I, 8el 8f TOVS fivOovs crvvi<TTavai. /cat rfj Xegf.i <Tvvairfpyafv6ai (aid the
effect by the language) ort /xaXiora rrpb ofj-fiaraiv TiSffUVOV ovrat yap av
(vapyea-raTO. opcoi/, coo-Trep Trap avTo"is yiyvofiivois TOLS 7rparro//ei/oty, tvpicrufi
TO irpfirov KOL TJKHTT av \avQavoira ra vrrevavrta. Ib. 3 we have the
same phrase that occurs here, rois ax^aa-i a-vvantpya^ofifvav. Com
pare also Poet. XIV I, TO (pofffpov Kai fXffivbv oc rtjs o^l/ews yiveadai
K.T.X., de Anima III 3, 427 b 18, jrpb ofi^arcov yap ftm Trotr/craa-dai, (Scnrfp
ol fv TOIS /J.VTJIJLOVIKOIS Ttdf^fvoi Kai e^ScoXo7^o^o{!^r6s 1 . Cicero expresses this
1 Referring to mental pictures, in aid of the memory as a kind of memoria
technica, such as that of a large house-front with various windows, or the plan of
a building, or any other divisions, occurring in a regular order, in which the topics
of a speech or argument may be lodged as it were ; the plan of this is retained in
the mind, and will suggest the topics in their proper order. These mnemonic
artifices TO /uj^oci/ca, "mnemonics" are described in Auct. ad Heren. III.
xvi. 29, seq. Such aids to the memory are of two kinds, loci and imagines ; the
former are the places , or compartments, the sequence of which suggests the
order or arrangement of the imagines, which are the "forms, marks, images, of
the particular things which we wish to remember, such as horse, lion, eagle, &c."
The same subject is treated by Cicero, de Orat. n 86. 351 360, from whom the
author of the other treatise has manifestly borrowed. The invention of this
io6 PHTOPIKHS B 8 15, 16.
15 Kcti TO. ryeyovoTa dpTi i] fj.e\\ovTa (Hid Ta-^eiav eAeet- P. 1386 .
16 vorepa $ia TO auro. Kai TO. cnifj-eia Kat ras Trpd^eis,
olov e&OfJTds TC TU)V TreTrovOoTwv Kai oa~a TOiavTa,
Kai \6yovs Kai bcra a/\/\a TWV eV TM TrdOei O
olov f]^n Te\evTU)VTiav. Kai p.d\i(TTa TO (
tivai eV TO?? TOIOUTOIS Katpols OVTCIS e\eivov a
by the equivalent phrase, stibicere oculis, Orat. XL 139. Auct. ad Heren.
IV 47.60, ante oculos ponere (de similitudine] j hoc simile. ..sub aspectum
omnium rent subiecit. Quint. Vlll 6. 19, translatio...signandis rebus ac
sub oculos subiciendis reperta est. Ern. Lex. Techn. Gr. s. v. op.p.a.
15. And things that have happened recently, or are about to
happen speedily, excite more pity for the same reason ; i. e. because the
recent occurrence or immediate anticipation makes almost the same
impression upon us as if the suffering or disaster were actually present,
and enacted as it were before our eyes.
1 6. And all signs (of any tragic event), and acts (of the sufferer,
represented in narrative or description), (the exhibition) for example
(of) the dress of the sufferer and everything else of the same kind, or
his (last) words, or anything else connected with those who are in
the very act of suffering, for instance such as are actually dying (in
articulo mortis). It is hardly necessary to mention the use that is made
by Mark Antony of this sign in exciting the people after the murder
of Caesar by the exhibition of his mantle , "you all do know this
mantle" pierced by the dagger of his assassins, in Shakespeare s
Julius Caesar, ill 2. 174, since it must be fresh in everyone s recollection.
The incident and accompanying circumstances and the effect of Antonius
speech are related by Plut., Vit. Anton, c. 14, from whom Shakespeare
may have derived it ; and referred to by Quint., VI i. 31. Suetonius,
Jul. Caes. c. 84, gives a very different account of what passed on this
occasion. See also Appian, Bell. Civ. II 146 (Schrader). Another
example occurs in Aesch. Choeph. 980, where Orestes after the death
of Clytemnestra holds up to the spectators the bathing robe in which
his father was murdered, i Sea-$e...ro fn]x^ v 1f JLa ) ^(T/JLOV ddXim irarpi K.T.\.
982, f<Tfivar avrov, which is also referred by Hermann to the display
of the robe.
And most pitiable of all is the case when men have borne themselves
bravely (worthily), at such critical moments, because all these things
intensify our commiseration (in three ways), by the appearance they
have of being close upon us, and by the suggestion (or impression, a5y)
of unmerited suffering and by the vivid representation of it (as though
it took place before our eyes) . The gender and construction of dvagiov
ars memoriae is there attributed to Simonides, 351 353. The theory of the
art and practice is, that as of all mental impressions those derived from the senses,
of which the sight is the keenest and most powerful, are the most distinct, vivid
and intense; quare facillime animo teneri posse ea quae perdperenttir auribus ant
cogitationc, si ctiani ociilomm commendations animis traderentur,
PHTOPIKHS B 8 16; 9 r. 107
yap TavTct Sid TO eyyvs QaLvecrdai /u.d\\ov Troiei TOV
e\eov, Kai ok dva^iov OVTOS Kai ev 6<p6a\iu.ols (baivo-
fj.evov TOV 7ra6ovs.
dvTiKeiTat $e TO) eXeew fj.d\i<TTa fj.lv o Ka\oucri
are both uncertain ; it may be either masc. or neut. ; and may be made
to agree either with iraQovs if neut., or, as I rather think, used as masc.
and construed thus ; KOI cos TOV nddovs OVTOS dva^lov ( being that of one
who did not deserve it ; whose sufferings were unmerited because he
was (rTrovSatos) *ai tv o$$aA/Ltoi? (pa.ivop.fvov : and so I have rendered it. Or
again, if dva^iov be considered as neut., it may be interpreted with TOV
Trddovs OVTOS, unworthy of the sufferer, in the sense of undeserved by
him though this is rather a non-natural explanation of the word. Or
thirdly, a comma may be placed after OVTOS, and dvaglov will then be mas
culine with TOV iradovTos understood.
CHAP. IX.
The subject of the following chapter, ve^ecris, is briefly noticed by Ari
stotle, Eth. Nic. n 7 sub fin., together with alScos, as a nd6os, an instinct
ive emotion, which approaches nearly to a virtue, and may therefore be
included in a list of virtues. The detailed description of it, which ought
to have followed that of m Sws in IV 15, is lost, together probably with
some concluding observations leading up to the separate discussion of
justice in Bk. v., and justifying its connexion with the other virtues and
conformity to the law of the mean , which is barely mentioned in the fifth
book as it stands at present, ve^ais is defined in Eth. N. n 7, as here,
o vtfj.fo-r)TLKos Aun-elrat eVi Tols dvaglas ev irpaTTovcriv, and is placed in the
scheme as a mean, or virtuous state of feeling, between <p06vos the excess,
and firixatpeKaKia the defect, of indignation. Of this we shall have to
speak further in the explanation of 25, which reads like a criticism
and retraction of the misstatement of the Ethics, and very much
strengthens the evidence of the later composition, as well as publication,
of the Rhetoric. See Introd. p. 48. A definition of j/e /zt aty and (frdovos
is found likewise in Top. B 2, 109 b 36, (f>66vos eWi \vnr) eVl <j>aivonfvri
(virpayiq TCOV eVieiKcoj/ TWOS, and again, p. IIO a I, $6ovtpos o \VTTOV fj.evos
eV! TOLS TU>V ayada>i> tvirpayiais, fffj,f(rrjTiKos 5 o \VTTOV ptvos eVi TOIS TCOV
KCIKCOV fvnpayiais. Fuller and better than all these is that of Eudemus,
Eth. Eud. Ill J. 2, o VffJLfcrrjTiKos, KOI o fKti\ovv ol dpxaini TT/V Vffj.fo-ii , TO
AVTTflcroai p.tv eni. Tals irapa TTJV diav KaKOTrpayiais Kai fVTrpayims, x a>l P flv
fi fTri rat? deals 810 KOL 6eov O IOVTCU elvai Trjv Vf/j.fcriv. Comp. 2 of this
chapter, 810 KOI TO!S deals aTroS/So/zej/ ro ve^ftrav.
Of the earlier notion of ve^ecris, alluded to in the foregoing passage,
viz. that of divine vengeance or retribution, or the power that exercises it,
a good description is found in a fragment of Euripides, Fr. Inc. 181
(Dind.), orai/ 8 "i8rjs npos v\}sos ypnevov Tivd, Aa/ii7rpa> re TT\OVTCO Kai yevei yav-
povpevov, o(ppvi> Tf /Xft fo) TTJS Ti>xis eV^pKora TOVTOV ra^etai/ vep.fcriv tvdu
npoo-doKa eVat perat -yap fiel^ov tva pflfrv TTfcrr) \tolluntur in altlini, ut
lapsn graviore ruant. Claudian, in Rufinum, I 22.].
This doctrine of the dp%aloi is well illustrated by two stories in Hero
dotus, that of the interview between Solon and Croesus, I 29 33, and
io8 PHTOP1KHS B 9 i.
i/6jue<rai/ TO) <yap \V7re1(r6ai eiri rcus dvajZiais
what followed it C. 34, pera Se SoXcwa olxopevov, eXa/3e (K deov
fjifyaXr) Kpoi<rov (as eiKauat, on eVo/xi^e eaivrov flvai avOpanratv airavTwv oA/3ico-
raroi/: and the story of Polycrates, in 39 43. On these two stories see
the remarks in Crete s Hist, of Gr. IV 263, and 325 [Chap. XI and XXXIll].
Compare also Horn. Od. XIV 283, Atoy ani(To pfjvtv fiviov, oo-re
^uiXtcrra ye/if o-0-aTcu KUKO. epya. Herodotus says in another place, VII 10,
ov yap ea <f>pov(fiv aXXoi/ fjLtya o Qebs fj tavTov. Aeschylus (Fr. Inc. 281,
Dind.) has presented ve^fcris in its human aspect as the natural indig
nation which is felt at undeserved good fortune, KOKOI yap ev irpaacrovTfs
OVK dj/acrxfToi. Fr. Inc. 243, line 3, tffJLQJv ye pevroi Ne /ietnr eV$ inreprepa, KOI
TOV Qavovros TI 8iKr] TTpdcra-fi KOTOV.
According to Aristotle s definition of ve /zeo-i? a feeling of pain at
undeserved good fortune , it represents the righteous indignation ,
arising from a sense of the claims of justice and desert, which is aroused
in us by the contemplation of success without merit, and a consequent
pleasure in the punishment of one who is thus undeservedly prosperous.
It is no selfish feeling, 3 ; if it had any reference to oneself and one s
own interests it would be fear of evil consequences arising to us from the
other s prosperity, and not indignation. It implies also its opposite, the
feeling of pleasure at deserved success or prosperity. In this narrow
sense it is treated in the present chapter. It is in fact one form in which
moral disapprobation , founded upon the distinction of right and wrong,
shews itself in our nature. Aristotle, in classing it with the 7ra$7?, makes
it instinctive ; not therefore a virtue, nor necessarily requiring moral
cultivation. Of moral approbation and disapprobation see the account
given by Butler, at the commencement of his Dissertation on the Nature
of Virtue. He also seems to regard these two as natural instincts, when
he says of them, " we naturally and unavoidably approve of some actions
under the peculiar view of their being virtuous and of good desert ; and
disapprove others as vicious and of ill desert." See also Serm. VIII. On
deliberate anger or resentment. Prof. Bain, Emotions and Will, p. 321,
[Chap. XV 22, ed. 1875], in treating of moral disapprobation , expresses
himself thus ; " the feeling that rises up towards that person (a guilty
agent) is a strong feeling of displeasure or dislike, proportioned to the
strength of our regard to the violated duty. There arises a moral re
sentment, or a disposition to inflict punishment upon the offender," &c.
But such an instinctive sense of right and wrong has a much wider
scope and sphere of action than Aristotle s ve^to-is, which is confined to
one particular class of cases upon which this moral instinct or faculty
operates.
I. The nearest opposite to pity is what is called righteous indigna
tion ; for to the feeling of pain at undeserved misfortunes is opposed in
some sort (or sense), and proceeding from the same temperament, the
feeling of pain at undeserved good fortune .
paXiora fj,(v] seems to have for its correlative 8oeif 8/, 3, and the
sense is this: Pity is most opposite to righteous indignation 1 , though
1 I find, on looking through a very long note of Victorins, after writing the
above, that he has so far anticipated me in this observation.
PHTOPIKH2 B 9 13. 109
d^TtKei/ULevov e&Ti TpOTrov TWO. KO.I O.TTO rou
tjBovs TO XvTreiarQai ITTI rcus dva^iaK evTrpa-
2 y/cas. Kai dfjL(J)(jO TO. Trddn fjBovs ^pr}(TTOV del yap
7ri fjitv TO?? dva^iws TrpaTTOVcri KUKCOS (rvvax@ecr6cti
\ > A <>, \ T >/*> \ \ >
KCII \66lV t TOL<S 06 V V6fJ.(TaV CtCLKOV <yap TO TTClpCt
TY\V dQav yiyvofjievov, $to Kai TO?? 0eo?s ocTroSu^OyUef
3 TO vefjiecrdv. c)oete <T av Kai 6 (pOovos rw eAeetV TOV
avTOv dvTiK.eia Qai TpOTrov ws (rvveyyvs wv Kai TCLVTOV
envy seems to be as much so, but is not. I have therefore substituted a
period after TO vtpivav for the comma of [Bekker s Oxford edition of 1837.
The punctuation given in the text is also found in Bekker s Berlin
editions and in Spengel s].
2. And both of these feelings are indicative of good character
(i. e. of a good disposition of mind shewing itself outwardly in the cha
racter): for it is our duty to sympathise with unmerited misfortune and
pity it, and to feel indignant at unmerited prosperity : because all that
happens to a man (TO yiyv6fivov, Victorius, l quod _/?/ , all that is done ;
meaning I suppose whenever the rule of justice is violated , in any case,
generally. But I think happens , which includes the injustices of nature
and fortune; as well as those of man, is more to the purpose here) not in
conformity with his deserts is unjust, and this is why we ascribe (or
assign, render as a due; see note on I 1.7) righteous indignation to the
gods as well as to men (K.OI roTs deals) .
Trupa rr)i> dgiav] i. e. in violation of the principles of distributive justice.
ai a is the value of anything, by which its worth or merits or deserts
are measured. It is the principle and basis of distributive .justice, and
should determine the assignment of power and property in the state. It
does in fact regulate the distribution of them ; only the standard of a
citizen s value, his ai a, varies with the constitution under which he lives ;
for in a democracy the principle of distribution is founded upon liberty,
in an oligarchy upon wealth or birth, in an aristocracy upon virtue. See
the passage of Eth. N. v 6, 1131 a 24 seq. from which I have been quot
ing. Quarrels and factions and complaints always arise out of the undue
apportionment of civil rights and power in the state, OTO.V rj tcrot ^ laa fj
fjif/ aroi tcra e ^axri Kai vefj,a>vTai. But the true standard by which the share
of the individual citizen should be measured is virtue or merit and the
power of doing the state service, Pol. Ill 9 ult. Justice in this sense is a
Proportion, ert eVc TOV KCLT" diav TOVTO drj\ov TO yap dinatov cv TOIS diavo-
fials oiJLoXoyovcri TrdvTfs KUT d^iav Tiva 8dv elvai, rrjv ftfVTOl ov TTJV avrrjv
\fyova-t Tfdvrfs vndp^fiv. Compare Ib. vin 12 on the three forms of con
stitution, 1160 b 13, the change from aristocracy to oligarchy is due Ka<ia
TWI/ dp^ovToiv, ot vefjLovcri. TO Trjs TroXfcor Trapa TTJV d^Lav ; and in family life
KQT d^lav 6 dvqp ap\(i, KOI Trept TCLVTO. a 8ft TOV av8pa. If he encroaches on
his wife s rights his government becomes an oligarchy, napa TTJV d^lav yap
avVo Troiei, /cat ov% y dfieivav. On the same subject of political justice see
Pol. ill 9, from the beginning.
3. But it may be thought that envy as well (as vepfa-ts, KOI) is
i ro PHTOPIKH2 B 9 3, 4.
TU> V{JL(raV) tCTTL B ETCpOV \V7Tt] fJitV ya^
Kal 6 <p@6vo<$ icrTL Kal eis evTrpaytav, d\\ ou TOV dva-
^iov a AAct TOV L(rov Kal 6fj.oiov. TO Be /ari OTL avTta TL
(7V/UL/3t]G eTaL TpOV 9 d\\a $1 aVTOV TOV
cnraariv o/moitos Be? vTrdp^eii^ ov yap CTL eVrat TO
vefjLecris TO Be <l>$oVo?, a AAa <po{3o<s, eav Bta TOVTO T]
\v7rrj VTrdpxrj Kal r\ Tapa^r], OTL avTu> TL tcrrai <pau-
4 \ov aVo Ti]S eKeivov evTrpa^ias. (pavepov B OTL aKO\ov-
6r](T6i Kal Ta ivavTia TrdOr] TOVTOLS 6 JULCV yap XVTTOV-
opposed in the same way to pity, on the ground that it is very closely
connected, or indeed identical, with righteous indignation, though it is in
fact different ; for though it be true that envy is also (KOI as before) a
pain causing perturbation of mind and directed against good fortune, yet
the good fortune is not that of the undeserving, but that of an equal
and one like himself. Compare with this Poet. XIII 1453^4, of pity and
fear, o /*fV yap Trtpl TOV avd^iov tcm Suortr^oOiTa, o 8e Trepi TOV opoiov, e Xfor
fjiev TTfpl TOV dva^iov, <po/3o? 8e rrepl TOV ofioiov. \Vith dXXa TOV icrov *cai
o^ioi ov comp. c. 10 I, <pQovos, XUTTT; Trept TOVS 6fj.oiovs.
The absence of all selfish, interested motive, distinct from (indepen
dent of) the feelings themselves, (and their direct objects, supply T>V
Tra6au>,) these emotions, on the contrary (aXXa), being entirely on our
neighbour s account, must be common to them all (common to all men
who have the feeling) ; for they are now no longer the .one righteous
indignation and the other envy, but (both of them) fear on the suppo
sition namely that the pain and perturbation are due to the expectation
that some evil consequence to ourselves will follow from the other s good
fortune.
TO fj.fj OTI K.T.X.] The grammar of this sentence is to be explained
by regarding all the words OTI auYw TOV TT\TJO-IOV as one collective abstract
notion, which- would be commonly expressed by a verb in the infinitive
mood, and therefore neut., TO ; this notion being negatived by pij the
non-existence, want, absence of it . The usage is by no means un
common, but occurs generally in much shorter phrases, from which
this differs only in the number of words included. Matth., Gr. Gr.
272 c, and Jelf, Gr. Gr. 457. 1,2, 3, will supply sufficient examples.
Aristotle s formula descriptive of the Xo-yos or eldos the formal cause ,
TO TI r\v elvai, the what it was (designed) to be , is a good illustration.
ov yp eri] On en in a negative = rjSr) in an affirmative sentence, see
note oh {]8rj, 11.7.
4. Plainly too these will be accompanied by the opposite feelings
also (in addition, /cat) ; for one who feels pain at unmerited ill fortune,
will feel either pleasure or no pain at the misfortunes of those who do
deserve them (evavrias = dtW) ; for example, no man of worth would
feel pain at the punishment of parricides or murderers, when it befalls
them, for at the sufferings of such we should rejoice, as in like manner
PHTOPIKH2 B 9 4, 5. in
a\V7ros kcTTai 7ri Tols evavTLtos KaKOTTpayovcriv OLOV
TOI)? TraTpaXoias Kai [MctKpovovs, orav TU^COCTI Tifjua-
pias, ouSeis av \V7rrj6eiri ^p/crroV del yap %aipeiv GTTI
TOiS TOIOVTOLS, WS 8 aUT(t)<S KCtl 67TI TOiS 6V 7TpaTTOV(TL
> > <~-> / j. * ^- / ^ ~ x
/car a^iav ajuKpa) yap CLKaia, Kai TTOICI ^atpeiv TOV
eTTieiKrj dvayicri yap etwifaiv virap^ai av, cnrep TW
6/ULoia), Kac avru). Kai ecrri TOU avTOu r\Qowi airavTa
TO. & evctVTia TOU evavTiov 6 yap
at the prosperity of such as deserve it : for both (the sufferings of the
one and the prosperity of the other) are agreeable to justice and give
joy to the good man (ore p-tv TO firuiKes eVau/o{)/xfi/...Kcu.../zera^>epo/zi
dvrl TOV dyaOov, Eth. Nic. v. 14, 1137 b i), because (being a good man
himself) he must needs hope that what has fallen to the lot of his like,
may fall also to his own .
TOVS TrarpaXoi ay Kai piaKpovovs \vnT]6fir}] Vater explains the accus. after
the passive verb by supposing a change of construction, Ar. having intended
to write, ovSfls av f\e^afi (sic) xP T ) a " r os. This is quite unnecessary. The ac
cus. after passive and neuter verbs, indicative of the local seat of any affec
tion, an extension of the cognate accus., is common enough fully to justify
the construction of the text. At the same time there is a difference be
tween such an expression as this, and the ordinary case of the local accus.,
such as aXyeTi/ T^V K.j)a\rjv. The accus. K(pa\ijv directly and properly
expresses the seat of the affection as in the subject who himself feels
the pain : and this is the ordinary case. But in our text the seat of the
pain 1 is transferred from subject to object, the feeling migrating, as it
were, and taking up its temporary residence in the parricides and
murderers who are the objects of it. But whatever the true explanation
may be, there are at all events several precisely parallel instances
some of which may be found in Matth. Gr. Gr. 414, and Jelf, Gr. Gr.
549 c quite sufficient to defend this particular use of the accus.
Comp. for instance Soph. Aj. 136, o-e \LIV tv Trpaafrovr enixaipoi- Eur.
Hippol. 1355) TOVS yap (vcrfflfls dtol Sv^crKovras ov ^mpoucrij , where the
dying are just as much the objects of the joy (or the absence of it)
as the murderers are of the pain in the passage before us. Similarly
alo-xvveo-Qat, (frequent in the Rhet. and elsewhere,) as in Eur. Ion 1074,
where ala-xvvonai TOV Trokiiv^vov 0e6v, is to feel awe m the presence of the
god; who is the object of this feeling of shame, just as the murderers are
of the painful feeling. Victorius thinks that the prepos. Std is understood,
as it often is in the Attic writers, such as Thucydides, Lysias, Aristo
phanes ! He contents himself however with the general assertion, and
quotes no example.
5. And all these (raCra is explained by o yap, namtic/i , K.T.\.) be
long to the same kind of character (or disposition), and their opposites
1 It is in fact not the pain, but the absence of it, that is here in question : but
as this would make nonsense of the illustration, nonentities having no local habita
tion, I must be allowed to substitute the positive for the negative conception.
ii2 PHTOPIKH2 B 9 5-
ecrriv eTrixaipeKctKOS KO.I <povepos e<p w yap TIS P. 138-.
\V7T6LTai yLyvofJiivu) Kai VTrdp^ovTi, dvayKalov TOVTOV
67Tt TY\ (TTpt](T6L KCtl TtJ (pdopO. TV] TOUTOV %aipLV.
10 KtoXuTiKo. fjiev t\eou Travra ravra e crr*, $t.a(pepet
to the opposite temper; that is to say, it is the same sort of man
that takes a malicious pleasure in mischief and that is given to envy ;
for whenever the acquisition or possession of anything (by another)
is painful to a man (envy), he must needs feel pleasure at the privation
or destruction of the same (emxaipfKaKia) .
a-rep^a-is, Categ. 10, is one of the four kinds of opposites, relative
opposites, contraries (as black and white), state and privation (eir,
o-Ttprjo-Ls), affirmation and negation, a-reprja-is is denned ib. 12 a 26 seq.
It is the absence or want of a state which is natural and usual to that
in which the state resides, as sight to the eye : rv(p\bv ov TO /x?) f x "
o\lsiv, d\\a TO pr) f%(iv ore rr((f)VKfv e^eiv. A man s blindness is a
a-Tfprja-is, because with him sight is natural : the term is not applicable
to animals born without eyes, e* yeveTrjs OVK otyiv e%ovTa : these cannot
properly be said to be deprived of sight, which they never had. crrfftqa-is
therefore in the present passage implies a loss of some good which
had been previously gained or possessed, and is distinguished from
(pdopcij as privation or loss from ruin or destruction. Victorius under
stands (pdopa of destruction, decay, as opposed to -yeveaei which is
implied in yiyvo^fv<a ; a man may be deprived of or lose a possession,
that which grows may decay and come to nothing, Interitus manifesto
generation: alicuius rei contrarius est. I cannot think this interpreta
tion as appropriate as the other : yiyvea-dai, to come to the possession of
something, to gain or acquire it, is properly opposed to vrrapxtw, to have
it already in possession, long-standing and settled.
And therefore all these feelings (r/e/^eo-tr, (f>66vos, tnixaipfKaKia) are
obstructive of pity, but different (in other respects) for the reasons
already stated ; so that they are all alike serviceable for making things
appear not pitiable .
The introduction of these episodical remarks, 3 5, upon the
connexion and distinctions of the three Tradrj above mentioned, otherwise
not easy to explain, may possibly be accounted for, as I have already
suggested, by referring them to the statements of Eth. Nic. II 7, 1108
b 4, which Ar. now sees must be retracted. There they are reduced to
the law of the mean by making ve^ais the mean state of the pleasure
and pain felt at our neighbour s good or ill fortune ; of which fydovos
is the excess, the pain being felt at all good fortune deserved or un
deserved, and fTrixaipeKaKia the defect because the feeling falls so short
of pain that it is actually pleasure . The words of 5, KCU eort roO
fjdovs...6 yap avTos ecTTiv eVt^atpeKaKo? KOI (pdoffpos, K.r.X. are, whether they
are intended for it or not, a correction of the blunder made in the Ethics.
It is plain enough, as we are here told in the Rhetoric, that the two
jradrj in question are but two different phases of the same jdos or mental
disposition : the same man who feels pain at his neighbour s good fortune
PHTOPIKHS B 9 6 8. 113
e Sta ras eiptifjicvas alrias warre Trpos TO /z)} 6\eeti/a
TTOLeiV aTTCLVTCt 6/ULOlU)S ^^CTiyUOf.
6 TrptoTOv fjiev ovv Trepi TOV vejueorav Xeyw/uLeVj TICTL
re ve/mevwcri K.ai eirl TICTI Kai TTOJS e^o^re? avTOi, elra
7 /uL6Ta TavTct Trepi TWV a\\uov. (pavepov 3 eK TWV p. 7:
el yap icm TO vefjiecrav \UTrel(r6ai ITTI TW
evto dva^iws evTrpayeiv, TrpwTov /mev $fj\ov OTI
8 ov% OLOV T eTTi Tracri TOLS dyaOo is vep-ecrav ou yap
will feel pleasure at his misfortunes, and the two cannot be opposed as
extremes. Again, the description of emxaipeKaKia as a defect of ve^fa-is and
opposite of <p6wos cannot be sustained : the objects of the two feelings
are different : envy is directed against the good fortune of another, the
malicious pleasure of the other is excited by his ill fortune. See also
Grant s note on the above passage of the Ethics.
After this digression we return to the analysis of vf^ea-if.
6. Let us begin then with an account of righteous indignation,
who, that is, are the objects of it, the occasions that give rise to it, and
the states of mind of the subjects of it, and then pass on to the rest (of
the vadrj, to what remains to be said of them) .
7. The first of these is plain from what has been already said,
for if righteous indignation is (as it has been defined) a feeling of pain
which is roused against any one who appears to enjoy unmerited pros
perity, it is clear first of all that this indignation cannot possibly be
applied (directed) to every kind of good ; (virtue for example and the
virtues are exceptions.)
8. For no one is likely to feel indignant with one who becomes
just, or brave, or acquires any virtue in general , (that is, one who by
exercise and cultivation attains to any special virtue, or to a virtuous
character in general) nor indeed is compassion (the plur. ZXtoi in
dicates the various acts, states, moments of the feeling) bestowed
upon (applied to) the opposites of these (vices, namely, which ought to
be the case, if the others were true) but to wealth and power and such
like, all such things, namely, to speak in general terms (without men
tioning possible exceptions, djrXais opposed to icaff e/caorov), as the good
(alone) deserve .
So far the meaning is clear ; the good as a general rule are entitled
to the enjoyment of wealth and power and the like, and when they
do acquire them we feel no indignation because we know they deserve
them ; it is upon the undeserving that our indignation is bestowed.
But as the text stands, and as far as I can see there is no other
way of understanding it, there is another class of persons, viz. those
who are endowed with natural or personal advantages, such as birth
or beauty, which, being independent of themselves and mere gifts
of nature, cannot be objects of moral indignation, though they may
be of envy, who are coupled with the morally good as deserving
AR. If. 8
1 14 PHTOPIKH2 B 9 8, 9.
i ciKaios ajO?os, e pernv \r)/erai, vefj.eori]crei
TOVTU) (OV$6 yap Ol \OL 7Tl TO?? CVaVTlOlS TOVTWV
elcriv), d\\ CTTI TrXovrw Kai <Wa/xet Kai TO?S TOI-
OVTOL<S, oGUiv ols aVAws eiTreiv d^ioi elcriv ol djaOoi
Kai ol TO, (pvo ei %OVT$ dyaBd, oiov evryeveiav KCII
r^ x \ <r ~ >\^.v\s - J!
9 Ka\\os KCU ocra Toiavra. eirei ce ro a^aiov e
TI (paiveTat TOU (pucrei, dvayKfj TO?S Tavro e
d<ya6ov, eav vewcfTi e%ovT6<s Tvy^avuxn Kat cia TOVTO
ev7rpa>ya>(ri, fj.d\\ov vc/mecrdv /uLa\\ov <ydp XVTTOVCTLV
ol veaxTTi TrAoi/rot/j/Tes TWV 7rd\ai Kal (Hid -yeVos*
/^\ \ >r \ ^ r \ ^ ^^^
O/ULOLWS 06 Kat ap^ovTes Kai cuvct[j.evoi Kai 7ro\v(pi\oi
euTCKvoi Kai onovv TWV TOIOVTWV. KOLV ftid
of wealth and power. This however cannot possibly be Aristotle s
meaning : birth and beauty certainly have no claim per se fo any other
advantages. When a bad man makes his way to wealth or power,
we infer that they have been acquired by fraud or injustice, and thence
that he is undeserving of them, which excites our indignation ; but no
such inference can be drawn from the possession of birth or beauty, there
is no such thing as illicit, or undeserved possession of them. Aristotle
seems to have meant, what Victorius attributes to him, that, besides
moral excellence, natural gifts and excellences are also exempt from
righteous indignation, for the reason above given that they are gifts
of nature, and the possessors are in no way responsible for them : and
this is fully confirmed by the connexion of what immediately follows.
Bekker, Spengel, Buhle and the rest are alike silent upon the difficulty,
and Victorius, though he puts what is probably the right interpretation
upon the passage, has not one word to shew how such interpretation
can be extracted from the received text.
9. And seeing that antiquity (possession of long standing) appears
to be a near approach to a natural gift or endowment (i. e. to carry with
it a claim or right, nearly approaching to that conferred by nature), of
two parties, that have possession of the same good, the one that has
come by it recently, and thereby attained his prosperity, provokes the
higher degree of indignation : for the nouveaux riches give more offence
than those whose wealth is transmitted from olden time and by right of
family (of inheritance) : and the like may be said of magistracies (offices
of state), of power (in general), of abundance of friends, of happiness in
children (a fair and virtuous family), and anything else of the same sort.
Or again, any other good that accrues to them, due to the same
causes ; for in fact in this case again the newly enriched who have
obtained office by their wealth (been promoted in consequence of their
wealth) give more pain (or offence) than those whose wealth is heredi
tary. And the like in all similar cases . Comp. II 16.4.
PHTOPIKH2 B99 ii- US
a\\o TL d yaQov yi yvriTai avTols, wcrauTWS* Kai <ydp
evravQa fj.d\\ov XVTTOVCTIV ol veoTrXovjoi ap%ovTes <)ia
TOV TT\OVTOV tj ol dp^aLOTrXovTOL. o /zo/ws ce Kai dirt
a\\wv. aiTioi/ OTI Oi fjiev COKOVCTI TO.
o i o ov TO <yap del OUTIO (pait/o/aevov
1 1 d\ri6e<s SoKel, wcrre ol erepoi ov TO. avTtav e%eti/.
i eKCKTTOv Tu>v dyadwv ov TOV TV^CVTOS a
dpTLTT\ovTos, vf6fr\ovTos, all occur in other authors. The first in Aesch.
Agam. 1043, Blomf. Gloss. 1010, Soph. El. 1393, and Lysias [Or. 19 49]
ap. Blf. Gl. dprinXovTos as a synonym of the third is found in Eur. Suppl.
742, and vfonXovros twice in Rhet. II 16. 4 ; as a term of contempt,
Demosth. irepl ra>v irpos A.\eav8pov (rvvdr]Ka>v 23, p. 2I8 1 ; Arist. Vesp.
1309, vforikovTto rpvyi.
10. The reason of this is, that the one seems to have what is his
own (that which natiirally and properly belongs to him), the other not ;
for that which constantly presents the same appearance (shews itself in
the same light) is thought to be a truth (or substantial reality), and there
fore it is supposed that the others (ol ertpot 8oKovaiv} have what does not
really belong to them. Here we have a good example of the distinction
between (paiveaQai and SoKflv. The former expresses a sensible presenta
tion, a (f)avTa(rla, an appeal to the eye or other senses : SoKeii/ is an act of
the understanding, an operation and result of the judgment, a da an
opinion or judgment, appealing to the reasoning faculty or intellect, con
sequently ro (paiveo-dai represents a lower degree of certainty and author
ity than doKflv. Eth. Eud. VII 2, 1235 b 27, rots p.ev yap So^et, roly de
(palvfTai K.O.V fj.rj 8oKrj ov yup ev ravTM rfjs ^v)(rjs 77 (pavTao~ia Kai rj 86a.
The distinction appears again in irepl evvirviw c. 3, 461 b 5, (paivsrai p.fv
ovv Travrais, SoKet Se ou irdvrms TO (^aivofievov, aXX lav TO eTTLKplvov Kare ^r^rat
TI prj KivfJTai TT/V olntiav KivrfCTLV. Ib. 462 a l } ov fjiovov (pavfiTat, dXXa KOI
86fi flvat $vo TO ev, av 8e fjijj \avdeurff, tftaveiTCU p.ev ov 8ul-ei 8e, K.T.X. See
also Waitz ad Anal. Post. 76 b 17, II p. 327.
ii. And whereas every kind of good is not to be indiscriminately
assigned to any one at random, but a certain proportion and fitness
(appropriateness) is (to be observed in the distribution or assignment of
the one to the other) as for instance arms of peculiar beauty (high
finish) are not appropriate to the just man but to the brave, and dis
tinguished marriages (i. e. the hand of a lady distinguished for beauty,
virtue, accomplishments, high birth and so forth, TTJV al~iav 8d yafj.eli> TOV
S.iov, in 11.12) should not be contracted with men recently enriched,
but with members of noble houses then as I say (ovv) if a man being
worthy fails to obtain what suits him (is appropriate to his particular
sort of excellence) it is a case for indignation .
TOV TVXOVTOS agiov] The good that is worthy of a man, here seems to
1 The use of the word ve&Tr\ovToi is assigned to the author of the argument as
one of the reasons for ascribing the speech rather to Hyperides than Demosthenes.
82
ii6 PHTOPIKH2 B 9 ii.
a\\d Tis ea Tif dva\oyia KO.I TO dp/uiOTTOV, oiov
Kcr/\AO9 ov TO) SiKaiu) dpiaoTTei d\\a TCO dv-
KOtl ^dfJLOL ()ia<ppOl>Te<S OV TO?? V6UKTTI 7T\OV-
Tovariv d\\d ro?s euyevecriv*. idv ovv dyaQos wv JJLI]
TOV dp/uLOTTOVTO<s Tvy^dvr]^ ve/uLecrtiTov. Kal TOV ^TTCO
TO) KpeiTTOvi d]ui(j)ior(3i]T6lv, fJid\icrTa /u.ev ovv TOV<S ev
mean that which suits, befits, is appropriate to him: non omne bonum
cnivis honiini congruit, Victorius. Similarly a^iov with a dat. of the
person is used to signify worth his while , meet , fit , as Arist. Ach. 8,
a^iov yap EXAaSt, ib. 205, rf/ TroXei yap a^iov uXXa/3et> TOV avdpa, and
Equit. 6 1 6, aioi> ye naa-iv eVoXoXv^at.
lav ovv K.r.X. after /cat eVei eKaovov is an Aristotelian irregularity of con
struction. The apodosis of eVei is i/e/^fo-jyroi/ at the end of the second
paragraph. The unnecessary o*v has crept in like the apodotic 8e, in the
resumption of a previous statement, (on which see I i. u, note on SijXow
Se, Vol. I. p. 20) after the parenthetical illustrations; the protasis is
forgotten, or overlooked in the writer s haste, and a new sentence intro
duced by ovv terminates with the apodosis. I have collected a number of
examples of similar irregularities from our author s writings. I will here
only quote those that illustrate this particular form of oversight, end 8e...
ra n*v ovv, Top. 6 8, 1 60 a 35. eVfi dvayKalov ... and after five lines, TTJS /xeV
ovv 6vpa8fi>, de Somn. et Vig. c. 3, sub init. eVet &e...dt>ayKT) ovv... Rhet. II
II. I. ft yap, ...dvdyKrj 8ij, Phys. VI 4 init., 234 b IO, 15. eVet 8f...oTrov fj.ev
ouv, Pol. VII (vi), 5, 1320 a 17, 22. The remainder are cases of et 8^
oJcrre, eVft coorf, ft ovv coorf, eVet 8e Std (!), eVet SijXoi/ de, which may
be reserved for a future occasion. Meanwhile see Zell on Eth. Nic. vn
14, II p. 324. Spengel in Trans. Bai>. Acad. 1851, p. 34. Bonitz, Arist.
Stud. Pt. II. p. 129 seq. One example cited by Bonitz, p. 131, from de
Anima III 3, has a parenthesis of nearly 20 lines between its eVet 8e and
on fiev ovv. On ovv in resumption, after a parenthesis, well then, as I was
saying , see Klotz on Devar. de Partic. p. 718. Hartung, Partikellehre, II
22 seq.
It is matter of indignation also (subattdi ve^fa-^rov from the foregoing
clause) for the inferior to compete with the superior, nay and especially
where the inferiority and superiority lie (or manifest themselves) in the
same department, province, study or pursuit . With TOVS ev TW airrw must
be understood yjrrovas <a\ Kpeirrovay from the preceding. The case here
described is that of an indifferent artist, painter or sculptor, setting him
self up as the rival of Apelles or Phidias; of Marsyas and Apollo; of the
frog and the ox in the fable.
/xdXiora fj.(v ovv] The /j.ev in this phrase is the ordinary correlative of
8e in the next sentence, et 8e pij 1 . The other particle, ovv, though its
1 I will venture here to express my conviction that Dr Donaldson is right in
the account he gives of these two particles, A r ew Crat. 154, 155; that /xe> viz.
PHTOPIKH2 B 9 ii. 117
precise meaning in this context may not be quite certain, and it is some
what unusual in this collocation, is nevertheless fully justified by similar
examples to be quoted immediately. The origin of the particle is, as it
seems to me, as yet unexplained. It has been traced to various roots, as
may be seen by consulting Donaldson, New Cratylus\ 189, Klotz on Devar.
de Partic. p. 717 seq., Hartung, Partikell. II 8, Doderlein, and Rost, in Rost
and Palm s Lex., but in none of these derivations have I been able to find
any intelligible connexion with the actual senses of the word. Yet until
we know the root of the word and its affinities, we shall hardly be able to
trace historically the various senses which diverge from its primary
meaning. It is a connective particle, which draws an inference or con
clusion from something preceding, then, accordingly , (i) logically in an
argument, and (2) in the continuation of a narrative, the consequence pri
marily implied having passed into the mere notion of what is subsequent,
that which follows 1 , in both its senses. Hence in all Greek authors pev
ovv is habitually employed in this second sense, like the French or , and
our now or then , to impart a slight degree of liveliness and animation
to a continuous narrative or discussion. From the first or inferential
signification, it acquires this intermediate sense of, so then , well then ,
accordingly , which lies halfway between the logical and the temporal
application; just like our then , which has both these senses, only
derived in the reverse order, the particle of time in the English then ,
passing from the temporal to the logical use. For this pet/ ovv at the
commencement of a new paragraph the orators Demosthenes in parti
cular, with whom pev 0^ is comparatively rare, Aeschines in a less
degree often substitute roivvv or piv roivuv, which is used precisely in the
same way. "pev ovv, in continuando sermone cum quadam conclusions
significatione usurpatur." Hermann ad Viger. note 342.
The other prevailing signification of pfvovv when used in combination,
which, though by no means confined to them, is found chiefly in dialogues
as those of Plato and Aristophanes in the former most frequently in the
familiar iravv pev ovv has a negative corrective sense conveying an em
phatic assertion, sometimes to be rendered by a negative ; being employed
to correct, in the way of strengthening or heightening, a previous statement
or assertion ; and while it assents to a proposition indicates an advance
beyond it. Dem. de Cor. 316, fita ras fvtpyto-ias, ova-as vTrepptytdeis,
ov ptv ovv f tnoi TIS av TjAiKay. Ib. 13* o\jse yap Trore 6\lse Aya> ; x^ r
(lev ovv /ecu TTpcprjv K T.X. Aesch. Eum. 38, 8fio-no~a yap ypavs ovSer, avrinais
pev ovv. Eur. Hippol. IOI2, paralos up r^v, ov8apov pev ovv <ppev<av. In all
these cases it may be translated nay more , or nay rather . Similarly in
answers it expresses a strong assent, jrdvv pev ovv, pakivTa pev ovv, KopiSf)
pev ovv, just so , quite so , exactly so . In all these cases it may be
rendered /;;;? , nay rather . Herm. ad Vig. n. 343. In the same
is the neut. of an older form pets, pla, pev, of which pla. alone remains in the
language, the numeral one ; and 8t connected with dvo two ; though as far as
I know he stands alone in the opinion ; the origin usually assigned to it being
that it is a weaker form of Sri. Donaldson s view of the primary meaning and
derivation of these particles is so completely in accordance with all their actual
usages, and is so simple and natural, that it seems to me to carry with it its own
evidence, and to need no further proof of its truth.
uS PHTOP1KHS B 9 ii.
TCO avTw bdev Kai TOVT elptjTai, P. i3 8 7^-
A. lavTO<s c) dXeeive p.d%riv TeXa/mwviaoao
Z,6vs yap ol veju.(raorx, OT d/meivovi (pwTi /ULU^OITO.
1 $6 /ULr), KO.V OTTfaCTOVV 6 IjTTWV TO) KpClTTOVl, OLOV 61
6 /ULOVfriKOS TO) c*iKaia) (3e\Tiov ydp rj SiKaioa-uvr]
ovv vefjieGtocri Kai i , K TOVTWV
sense it appears in the Aristophanic e /toC fj.ev ovv, Ipov ^ev ovv, no, mine ;
no mine , in answer to Cleon s nauseous offer to the Demus, Equit. 911 ;
and elsewhere. TTOW p.ev ovv is to be explained thus ; I not only assent to
what you say, but I go farther, I am absolutely convinced of it; nay
more (or nay rather), absolutely so . The ovv in all these instances, and
others like them, conveying thus a strong emphasis, at the same time
may be considered to retain its consequential sense, conclusionis signi-
ricationem , indicative of what follows, something else, accordingly ,
which is contained in the assent to the preceding statement, and thus the
two usages of it are connected. The /ze f in the combination of the two
particles is explained by Dr Donaldson, New Cratylus 1 54 rightly I think
by a tacit reference to some suppressed sentence with the correlative
fie, u.ev being always opposed to 8e expressed or understood, iravv fiec ovv
would imply aXXcoy Se ov. (Donaldson supplies ri 8 emira ; but what
then? ) Following this explanation we may render /ioXiora p.tv ovv in our
text nay more, most of all, in the highest degree .
I will now conclude this long note on a phrase" which I have" never
seen fully explained, with a few examples parallel to that of our text. Soph.
Ant. 9 2 5 XX d jj-fv ovv raS tcrriv ev deo is KoXd ...... el 8 otS dfuipravovcri
K.T.X. Plato, Phaedo 9 E, av&pivreov KOI jrpodvfujTeov vyiios fX (Lv i
fiiv ovv Kai rols a XXot? K.r.X., on which Stallbaum, not. crit., observes,
o*i Jttpote dc I itio snspectum seclusinius. With what reason, we have
seen. Eth. Nic. VI 7, init. evTnuda pev ovv, where ovv, as here, seems
to be superfluous, and is certainly unusual. Ib. vn 9, 1151 a 14, ticclvos
(JLV OVV fV/JifTilTTflCTTOS, 6 S O*. Polit. I 2, 1252 b 2(), yiVOfltVT} fJ.V OVV TOV
fjv ZvtKtv, ovtra fie TOV ev f]i>. Ib. IV (vn) lo, sub init., TO fj.ev ovv irtpl
AiyvTTTOV Sfcruxrrpios, cas (pacriv, ovrco vojj.o6fTi ]o-avTos, MtVw fie ra Kepi
K.p^TT)v. De Soph. El. 6, 16911: 19, ol ptv ovi> Trnpa TTJV \egiv. ..oi 8" aXXoi
K.r.X. Hist. Anim. v 16, 548 a 25, 01 pkv ovv...al fie /c.r.X. De part. Anim.
IV ii. 10, 691 a 28, avOpaiTTos /lev olv...ol 8 i^Oves Kai upvides... Magn. Mor.
ii 3) 1199^ r > MS $ o^i"o>s o 86iKOs.-.oi&tv dXX et avT<... Ib. c. 6, 1203 a 16,
TOV p.tv ovv dKpciTovs...Tov be d.<oXao"TOu Ka/cc3f.
Whence also this saying . Here follow two hexameter lines as an
illustration of the foregoing topic; Cebriones, who knew that the divine
vengeance falls upon those who attack their superiors, avoided the
encounter of Ajax son of Telamo-n . II. xi 542. This is followed by
a line which is rejected by the recent editors from the text of Homer,
but appears again in the Life of Homer, attributed to Plutarch. See
Paley s note ad loc. (Chiefly in the same art, profession, or pursuit),
PHTOPIKH2 B 9 ^, 13. 119
12 TCtVTO. yap Kal TO. TOldVTCt (TTIV. CLVTOt 3e Ve/UL6(nj- p. 76.
TIKOI 6Lcrii ) eav dioi Tvy^avwcTiv bvTes TU>V fjieyicTTtav
dyaQwv Kal TavTa fce/cr^/xeVor TO yap TWV o/moicav
13 ti^icoa Qai TOVS jut] 6/Jioiovs ou ^ LKULOV. ^evTepov , av
dyadoi Kal (nrovfialoi Tvy^aviacriv Kpivovcri T6
or if not in the same, any case whatsoever of competition of inferior with
superior (understand o/i0to-,3^r^) ; of a musician, for instance, with a just
man (" ut si musicus cum iusto viro de dignitate contendat." Victorius) ;
because justice is better than music . The claims of the two are
unequal, of which the inferior ought to be sensible. So now from all
this it is clear what are the objects and occasions of righteous indigna
tion; such they are (as we have described them) and such-like .
olsK.ni 5i a,...8fj\ov] There is an inaccuracy here in the language, 8fj\ov
should be S^Xot or 8ij\a in agreement with one or other of the antecedents
to the relatives ; or else ols should be ria-iv, and 81 a, 8ia rtva or TroZa.
Aristotle, when he wrote 8f)\ov, seems to have had in his mind his usual
formula for designating these two departments of inquiry, in the irddrj,
viz. TiVt KOI enl TTOIOIS. The same oversight occurs again e. 2 27, where
ols &c. is followed by et/jijrai, which is impersonal, and cannot supply
an antecedent to ols. The mistake is again repeated, c. 10 5, and,
reading ols, in c. 10 1 1.
12. We now pass to the third division of the analysis of vf^ea-is ;
the subjects of it, the characters, tempers, states of mind which are
especially liable to it. Those who are inclined to this kind of indig
nation in themselves are, first, such as happen to be deserving of the
greatest blessings and at the same time in possession of them ; because
it is unjust that, those who are unlike us should have been deemed
worthy of (should have been enabled to attain to) the like advantages .
This is against the principle of distributive justice above described,
which assigns honours and rewards, &c. KQT- dgiav. See on 2, above.
The actual possession, as well as the right or claim to these good things,
is necessary to the excitement of the indignation provoked by this
comparison. The mere claim without the satisfaction of it would be
rather provocative of envy or anger than of righteous (disinterested)
indignation : when a man is satisfied himself, he is then ready to take
a dispassionate view of the successes and advantages of his neighbour.
When under the influence of personal feeling he is not in a state of
mind fit to measure the comparative claims of himself and the other.
13. And secondly, such as chance (have the luck) to be good
and worthy men, because they both decide aright, and hate all injustice .
They have both the faculty and the feeling necessary for the occasion ;
the intellectual faculty of discernment, and the hatred of all that is
wrong, which are both essential to the excitement of righteous indig
nation. On o-TTouSaloj and its opposite 0aGXor, see note on I 5. 8.
14. Or again, such as are of an ambitious temper, and eagerly
striving after certain actions (irpdgtis, modes of activity, such as public
employments in the service of the state ; these are also objects of
120 PHTOPIKH2 B 9 1416.
\ T \ \ > <\ ~ \ 5 \
14 7|0 ev, Kai TO. aciKa JULKTOVCTII/. KCII eav
Kai 6pey6fJ.evoL TLVWV Trpd^ewv, Kai jULa\i(TTa Trepi
TCtVTO. <pl\OTl/ULOl OHTIV COV 6T6pOl dva^lOL 6Vr65 TVy-
15 %dvov(riv. Kai o\ws ol d^iovvTes avTol avTOvs tiv
GTCpOVS JJ-n d^lOVCTl, ve/JLeVIITlKOl TOVTOIS Kai TOVTWV.
Cio Kai ol dv$pa7ro<!)(a$ei<s Kai <pav\oi Kai dcpiXoTtjULOi
ov v6[j.crtiTiKoi ovSev yap ecrriv ov eavTOvs o tovTai
d^iovs eivai.
1 6 (pavepov & e /c TOVTWV CTTI TTOIOIS drv^(OV(n
KaKOTrpayovcriv ij /mrj Tvy^dvovfri %aipeiv r]
er e/c yap TUIV eiptijUEViov TO. dvTiKei/mevd ecrri
ambition, as giving scope for the exercise of special excellences, for the
attainment of distinction, of honours, and the like) ; and especially when
their ambition is directed to such objects as the others happen to be
unworthy of. The greater a man s ambition, and the stronger his
desire of the honours and distinctions which he feels to be due to him
self, the deeper his resentment at the unfairness of their attainment by
those whom he knowsj by comparison with himself, to be undeserving
of them.
15. And in general, all such (besides the really meritorious) as
think themselves deserving of things (honours, rewards, emoluments),
of which they deem others undeserving, are inclined to feel indignant
with them and for (on account of) them (for the honours, &c. which they
have unworthily obtained). And this also is the reason why the servile,
and mean-spirited, and unambitious, are not inclined to feel indignation ;
because, that is, there is nothing which they think they do deserve .
1 6. From all this it is plain what sort of men those are at whose
misfortunes, and calamities, and failures, we are bound to rejoice, or (at
any rate) to feel no pain : for from the statements already made, the oppo-
sites (i.e. opposite cases and circumstances) are manifest : and therefore
if the speech put those that have to decide (npiveiv applicable to all three
branches of Rhetoric) in such and such a frame of mind (namely, such as
have been described), and shew that those who claim, appeal to, our
compassion as well as the things (the occasions and circumstances) for
which they claim it are unworthy to meet with it (in the particular
case), or of such a character and reputation in general as to repel it
altogether, it is impossible (for the judges or other audience) to feel
it . The persons here meant are, according to Victorius, rei et adversaiii,
the prisoner under trial, in a criminal, the opponent in a civil case :
but besides these the other K-pirai, the audiences of public as well as
panegyrical orations, must be included, who are equally liable with the
judges in a court of law to be unduly influenced by an appeal to the
feelings on the part of an unscrupulous advocate or declaimer.
PHTOPIKHS B 9 16; 10 i. 121
<)//Aa, UHTT eav roJs re Kpirds TOIOVTOVS Trapao-Keudtrrj
6 \oyos, Kal TOV<S d^iovvras eXeelcrdai, Kal e<p ols
e\eel(r6ai, $ty dvajZ tovs (JLZV oWas rvy^dveiv dQovs
Se ft?) rwyxdvetv, aSvvarov eXeeiv.
I ofj\OV $6 KUL 67TI TL(TL <p6oVOV(Tl Kal TLCTL Kal 7TWS CHAP. x.
e^oi/res, eirrep ecrrlv 6 <p66vos XvTrtj ns iirl evTrpayia
CHAP. X.
Envy, the next of the iradr) that comes under consideration, is here
defined a painful feeling occasioned by any apparent (i. e. palpable, con
spicuous] good fortune, the possession, namely, (or acquisition) of any of
the good things before mentioned most likely the good things enume
rated in i cc. 5, 6 which falls to the lot of (ntpl, lit. in respect of, in the
case of,) those who are like us*, (in various ways, detailed in the next sec
tion) not for any personal consequences to oneself (understand yf vrjrai or
o-vuPalvrj), but solely on their account , because they are prosperous or
successful, and it pains us to see it; usually (not always) because some
comparison, some feeling of rivalry or competition, is involved in it, when
we contrast our own condition with theirs ("rival-hating envy",
Shakesp. Richard II. Act I. sc. 3. 131) and therefore it is jr t pl rovs
opoiovs; commonly has reference to, i.e. is directed against, those like
us , with whom, that is, we come into competition in anything. 81 eW-
vovs is further explained in c. 1 1. i, d fie (fydovepbi) Trapao-icfvafri rbv TrXjo-iov
M extiv (TO. dyada} Sia rbv fyQovov. Such seems to be the meaning of the
definition. [For a consecutive translation of i, see p. 123.]
Victorius, here as before, and again on c. 11. i, renders ^aivo^vr, or
that which appears to be so in the more ordinary sense of the word. But
here at all events it cannot have this meaning, for there is no alternative in
Aristotle s text; and without it he is made to say, that it is only seeming
prosperity that gives rise to the feeling. See note on n 2. i. Again he
and Schrader both understand ^17 iva TiavTa[st c], not from any dread of loss
or danger, or prospect of advantage to oneself, from the other s good
fortune , the second of which only is contained in Iva TI aurw ; the first
would require ^77 instead of iva ; and also is contradictory to what was
said in c. 9 3, TO fie ^77 ort avrcp n o-u/z/3r)crerat ertpov, ov yap en forai TO
[lev Vffiffris TO fie (pdovos, a\\a 0o/3oy, eai> Sia roDro r; \vrnj inrap^r] Kal r;
Tapani?, ort aurw n ecrrai (f>av\ov ana rljs e.<fivov finrpa^las.
The definition limits the objects of the pain, and is thus a second
correction, in addition to the criticism of c. 9 3 5 (on which see
note), of the erroneous language applied to <0oW Eth. Nic. II j, sub
nn., o fie 0^ovepoy...eVt Train Xv/rftrat.
Envy seems to have been regarded by the ancients as the worst and
most distressing of all the painful emotions. Invidia Siculinon invenere
tyranni maius tormeritum, says Horace, Epist. I 2. 58. Sw^parr;? rbv
($>6ovov t(pr) if/vxrjs eivai Trpiova ; and Menander, o fie TO KaKtorov ran KOKMV
TTUI/TWI/ (pdovos, Men. Fr. Inc. XII 6, ap. Meineke, Fragm. Com. Gr. iv 235
(quoted by Orelli ad loc. Hor.). " Of all other affections (envy) is the most
importune and continual It is also the vilest affection and the most
122 PHTOPIKHS B 10 i.
(paivojjLevt] Ttav eipri/uevwv dyctOcov Trepi TOVS OJ
fju] *iva TL avrttj, d\\a & eKeivovs <p6ovi](rov(ri p.ev
depraved; for which cause it is the proper attribute of the devil," &c.
Bacon, Essays, Of Envy, sub fin.
&doi>ov fie (TKOTriav (o SwKparrjs) o ri elrj, \v7rrjv fiev Tira e ^fvpicrKev avrov
ovra, ovre /xeWot rf/v eVt <pi\a>v drtr^t au ovre TJ)I/ eV f%6pa>v fVTV\iais yiyvop.evr]v
aXXa /ioi/our f(f)rj (pdovelv rovs errl rats TCOI> <f)i\a>v einrpa^iais dviw/zeVovy. Xen.
Mem. ill 9. 8 (quoted by Gaisford). Socrates defends this view of envy in
the next sentence against the charge of paradox, by asserting that the
fact is true, however paradoxical it may appear: still none but simple
tons, rj\i6[ovs, are liable to the feeling, no wise man, (ppovip-os, is capable
of it. This is in accordance with the doctrine that virtue is nothing but
knowledge. However it is plain that it is a mistake to confine the feel
ing to the good fortune of friends or those we love ; and Aristotle has
doubtless improved upon it by substituting his TOVS oftoiovs. The so-called
Platonic Spos runs thus, following Socrates, \VTTT) eVi $>i\a>v ayaQois fj
ova-iv fj yf-yfvr]p.fi>ois. "Opoi, 416 D.
The Stoic definition, \inrrjv eV aiXXorpiois ayadols, Diog. Laert., Zeno,
Vii in, which does not define the objects of the feeling, seems to have
been the prevailing form of it. It is repeated by Cicero as Zeno s with
additions, Tusc. Disp. IV 8. 17, Invidentiam esse dicunt (Stoici) aegritu-
dinem siisceptam propter alterius res secundas, quae nihil noceant invi-
dcnti. Nam si quis doleat eius rebus secundis a quo ipse laedatur, non
recte dicatur invidere; ut si Hectori Agamenino : qui autem cut alterius
commoda nihil noceant tamen eum doleat his frui, is invidet profecto.
This leaves the objects of the iraQos unlimited, which seems to be the
true account of it. So Horace, Ep. I 2. 57, Invidus alterius macrescit
rebus opimis.
I will conclude this note with two or three more modern definitions.
" Grief for the success of a competitor in wealth, honour, or other good,
if it be joined with endeavour to enforce our own abilities to equal or
exceed him, is called Emulation : but joined with endeavour to supplant
or hinder a competitor, Envy." Hobbes, Leviathan, Of the Passions,
Pt. I, ch. 6. Envy and Emulation, V)Xor, aemulatio, usually go together
in a classification of the nady, being evidently closely connected. See the
passages in Diog. Laert. and Cic. above quoted ; and so also Aristotle.
This definition very nearly approaches to that of Ar., only omitting the
(J.TI Iva TI avTu.
"Envy", says Locke, Essay, &c., Bk. II. Ch. 20, Of modes of pleasure
and pain, " is an uneasiness of the mind, caused by the consideration of
a good we desire, obtained by one we think should not have had it before
us." Here again the notion of competition enters into the definition.
Lastly, Bain, Emotions and Will, Ch. vil, classes this under the
general head of emotions of self, and connects it, like his predecessors,
with Emulation, 9 [p. 105, ed. 2, 1865]. Comparison and the desire of
Superiority, lie at the bottom of both Emotions. "The feeling of Envy
is much more general in its application. Referring to everything that is
desirable in the condition of some more fortunate personage, there is
PHTOPIKH5 B 10 2. 123
yap ol TOLOVTOI ols el(TL Tives O/ULOIOL r] (paivovrai.
2 6/moiovs e \eya) Kara "yeVo?, Kara (rvyyeveiav, KaO
oav KO.TO. TO.
combined a strong wish for the like good to self, with an element of
malevolence towards the favoured party." This differs from Aristotle in
the introduction of the selfish and the malevolent elements, and removes
the unnecessary restriction to cases of competition, by which he has
limited its objects and scope. It is I believe a much truer and more
philosophical account of the Emotion.
Bacon s Essay, Of Envy, has some points in common with Aristotle.
Bacon places the sting of envy in the want of something which another
possesses. "A man that hath no virtue in himself, ever envieth virtue in
others. For men s minds will either feed upon their own good or upon
others evil; and who ivanteth the one will prey upon the other; and
whoso is out of hope to attain to another s virtue will seek to come at
even hand by depressing another s fortune." This introduces Aristo
tle s principle of rivalry and competition as the foundation of envy.
Again, with 2 and 5, may be compared, " Lastly, near kinsfolk and
fellows in office and those that have been bred together, are more apt to
envy their equals when they are raised. For it doth upbraid unto them
their own fortunes; and pointeth at them, and cometh . oftener into
their remembrance, and incurreth likewise more into the note of others :
and envy ever redoubleth from speech and fame." This arises from their
constant association, which gives frequent occasion to envy. "Again, envy
is ever joined with the comparing of a man s self; and where there is no
comparison, no envy; and therefore kings are not envied but by kings;"
compared with the end of 5.
i. The occasions, objects, and mental dispositions, that give rise
to envy may be clearly gathered from the definition of it ; that it is, viz.
a feeling of pain occasioned by manifest or conspicuous good fortune,
the accession, that is, of any one of the good things previously mentioned,
(chiefly) in the case of any one of those like us, for no personal advan
tage or gain to ourselves that is likely to accrue from it, but simply
on their account : for such as have, or think they have, any like them,
i. e. persons similar to themselves, in such things as are likely to bring
them into rivalry and competition, will be most subject to the feeling
of envy .
2. By like or similar I mean, those who are of the same race (or
are alike in stock), of the same family (relatives), alike in age, in states ,
mental and bodily (virtues of all kinds, accomplishments, acquirements,
and excellences of mind and body, when developed, confirmed and per
manent are egeis : qui artibus scientiis et huiusmodi rebus pares sunt,
Victorius : this may be included in the other, more general, meaning),
in reputation, in property or possessions (of any kind, patrimonio ac re
familiari, Victorius). This is well illustrated by a passage of Cic. Brutus,
c. XLII 156, quoted by Victorius on 5. Simul illud gaiideo, quod et
aequalitas vestra, et pares honorum gradus, ct artium studiorumque
finitima vicinitas, fan/urn abest ab obtrectatione invidiae, quae solet
124 PHTOPIKH2 B 10 2, 3.
Kai ok /uLiKpou e\\ei7rei TO /nt] Travra V7rap%iv* $10
ol jueydXa TrpaTTOvres KUI ol evTW%ovvTe<s <p6ovepoi
3 CKTIV TTCtVTCtS ct o lOVTUL TO. O.VTWV (bettlV. KCtl OL
lacerare plerosque, uti ea non modo exulcerare vcstram gratiam sed etiam
conciliare videatur.
In reality envy is not confined, as Aristotle seems to say, to these
classes of people as objects ; nor even to those with whom we are likely
to come into competition ; it seems rather that there is no limit, within
the circle of humanity, to the objects on which it may be exercised. A
man may envy a baby its innocence, its health, its rosy cheeks, or the
poorest and meanest his health and strength : the feeling of pain which
belongs to envy no doubt proceeds from an involuntary comparison of
oneself with another, who has some valuable possession which we happen
to want; and the unsatisfied desire, contrasted with the gratification of
it in some one else, friend or foe, good or bad, high or low, in a male
volent disposition not in the wise man, as Socrates has it breeds the
feeling of pain. Aristotle s definition may be thus summed up : envy is
a feeling of pain, excited, usually if not always, by the successful com
petition of a real or supposed rival. Those also are disposed to it
who (have nearly attained to) want but little of complete satisfaction (of
possessing every thing desirable) . A long and uninterrupted course of
success and prosperity, and the attainment of nearly all that is desirable,
seems to give them a right to what still remains deficient; and the envy
which they would in any case feel of the possession of it by another,
gains strength by the contrast with their own deficiency. Here again it
is the competition and the comparison of our own condition with that of
another, the want and the inferiority, that add a sting to envy.
/LtiKpoO] like oX/you, adv. nearly , within a trifling distance of, is a
genitive with 8eov understood.
TO (/my) if eXXetVet is impersonal, as it usually is, is redundant as
far as the sense is concerned; if not, TO /m) vnapx fLV ^ s i ts subject. In
illustration of the former case, see Hermann ad Aj. 114, eVeiS?) Ttp^is ta-ri
O-OL TO 8pav, who (unnecessarily, I think 1 ) distinguishes two senses of the
phrase, and exemplifies it by several instances all taken from Sophocles
the great storehouse of Greek idiom. Add these two from prose authors,
Dem. de F. L. 180, p. 392, OVK apvrjcris f&Tiv avT<ns...To pr] Trparrfiv, Plat.
Tim. 20 c, irpo(pa<ris TO p.?/ 8pqv(vid. Stallbaum ad loc.), and the present pas
sage. Examples from Thucydides are to be found in Shilleto s note, ad
Dem. de F. L. 92. See also Matth. Gr. Gr. 541, 542.
And this is the reason why those who undertake great enterprises
engage in great actions and the successful are envious : because they
think that all such are carrying off what properly belong to themselves ,
i. e. the profits, honours, and distinctions to which they are entitled.
The difference between this feeling and that of vt^fa-is is confined to
this, that the latter distinguishes between the deserving and undeserving,
the former does not. Comp. II 9. 3.
1 Indeed he allows it himself, qui KSUS, specie magis quam re, a priore illo
diversus est.
PHTOPIKHS B 10 3, 4. 125
7TL TLVL <$ia(pp6l>TtOS, Kttl {J.d\l<TTa 67TI
crcxpia fj ev^aifjiovia. Kal oi (piXon/uLOi (p6ovepu)Tepoi
d(pi\OTijui(t)i>. Kal oi ()ojZo_oro(poi (j)i\OTifJLOi yap
I (ro(pia Kal oAws oi (piXoSo^oi Trepi TL (pOovepol
Trepi TOVTO. Kal oi iuuKpd\fsv%oi Travra <ydp /u.eyd\a
4$OKe i ai/ToTs eivai. e<p ok c)e (pGovovcrii 1 , TO.
d*ya6d eipt]Tai*[ e <p ocrois yap (pi\O()oovcri Kat <pL\o- P. 13
P- 77
3. And those who have a pre-eminent reputation for anything-,
and especially for wisdom or happiness . The latter, says Victorius, on
account of its extreme rarity. These three classes, desiring to engross
all the success, credit, good fortune, themselves, grudge the acquisition
or possession of them by their competitors, or any others. And the
ambitious are more prone to envy than the unambitious : because they
set a higher value upon honours and distinctions. And the pretenders
to wisdom and learning (like the Sophists, o o-ocpia-ri}? xP T lP aT <- a " r n s <*TO
<paivopfVTjs cro(pias d\\ ou/c oCarfs, de Soph. El. I, 165 a 21), owing to their
ambition of this kind of reputation, because they are ambitious of the
credit of wisdom . Plat. Phaedr. 275 B, Sooo-o$ot yeyovores O.VT\ o-o(pa>v
("the conceit of wisdom instead of the reality." Thompson). And
as a general rule, all those who are covetous of distinction in anything
(art, study, pursuit, accomplishment, acquirement), are in this envious
(of the distinction of others). Also the little-minded (mean-souled),
because to them everything appears great (by comparison) ; and there
fore an object of desire, which when unsatisfied breeds envy. /utKpo\^^ia,
opposed to /iifyaXo^v^ta, is defined in Eth. Nic. II 7, 1007 b 22, jrtpi ri^v
Kal art/uav e AXet^a? : again IV 7, 1123 b 10, the /it/cpo^u^oy is described
as o e A.arrdi coi rj uios eavrov d(c3f, one who rates his claims to honour
and distinction too low : and further, Ib. c. 9, sub init. o /ztitpo^^or agios u>v
ayadiav eavTov aTrocrrfpfl u>i> ai6s e cm. Having this mean opinion of
himself and his own merits and deserts, and no power of appreciating
what is really great, he is of course likely to over-estimate in others the
gifts and advantages which he supposes himself to want, and so becomes
indiscriminate in his envy. In I 9. u, 12, fUKpo^rvxia. occurs in a some
what different sense, that of meanness in general, and especially in the use
of money. Some Latin equivalents of p.t*:po\^t>xia and p.eyaXo\^u^/a are
cited by Heindorf on Hor. Sat. 12. 10, Sordidus atque animi quod parvi
nolit haberi. Schrader quotes from a little treatise, irepl dper^r KOI Ktmay,
attributed (most improbably) to Aristotle, which gives a very different
account of /xtKpo^v^t a from that which we find in his genuine works.
It occurs c. 7, 1251 b 16, but is not worth transcribing.
4. The kinds of good things which give occasion to envy have
been already mentioned (that is, they may be inferred from the pre
ceding enumeration of the classes of persons who are most liable to
envy).
Ta p.fv dya&i] according to Donaldson s rule, Afe . Crat. 154 (see note
126 PHTOPIKH2 B 10 4, 5.
epyois t] KTtj^acn KUL opeyovrai So /s, K al
^ ward e<rr<, <r x ^ov wept Travra <p66vos
i, Kal p.a\L(rra uv avrol tj opeyovrai tj oiovrai
SeTv aurovs e^i/, r] uv rrj KTt urei /uuKpu VTrepexovcriv
5 5 ftiKpw eXXeiTrova-iv. fyavepov e KUL ok <p6ovov(riv
yap eipnrai- TO?? 7 ap 6771)5 Kal X pov<? Kal
on peV Sv, U g. 1 1), tacitly refers to a correlative clause rA & 3\\ a K.T X
on the other occasions of envy, which has been forgotten and omitted
For everything of which men covet the reputation, or of which
they are ambitious-be they deeds done or possessions acquired-
striving after fame (the credit of the achievements and acquirements)
and every kind of good fortune (successes and -acquirements due to
fortune, and not, like the others, to a man s own exertions), with all
these, as one may say, envy is concerned ; and most of all, the objects
of our own aspirations, or whatever we think we have a right to our
selves, or things of which the acquisition confers a slight superiority or
a slight inferiority . A very great superiority or inferiority places a
man beyond the reach of envy. It is when the competition is close
and the difference between the competitors small, that the apparent
value of the good competed for is greatly enhanced, and the envy excited
by the success of the opponent proportionately strong.
<rx*Mv ] (i) near at hand , (2) pretty nearly , is familiarly used, especially
by Plato and Aristotle, to modify too general an assertion: signifying
that your words in the general expression that you have, inadvertently
t were, let fall, are not to be construed strictly and literally but
room must be left for possible exceptions ; that the statement is pretty
nearly exact, but not quite. Hence it becomes equivalent to <S S rf&
o)f error ff v , as one may say , so to speak , which similarly qualifies
what may be an over-statement of the case, demanding a fair latitude
)f construction. Plato sometimes writes o-^Mv , Aristotle (I believe)
ra T^ F^uT; [ r T S " * Tl > * V(riK * dKp6a > G 3 2 53 b 6, sed om.
cocld. E F H K. Index Aristotelicns .]
5- (pavtpov MS] See note on n 9. n, at the end.
It is plain too who are the objects of envy, from the mention that has
?en already made of them incidentally ( a > simultaneously ; with
something else, another subject, to which it did not properly belong
2, namely, as an appendix to the definitions); those, namely who
e near to us in time, and place, and age, and reputation, are the
ordinary objects of envy .
roll ^yy^...-f,\ lli ia...^eo VO v ( T lv } Victorius illustrates X/ a by the
instance of Fabius Maximus defence of himself against the suspicion
f having opposed himself to Publius Scipio out of envy : docuit enim si
nulla* ahaeresab ea cul P a ipsum vindicarent, aetatem saltern liberare
deberej quod nnlla aemulatio seni cum P. Scipione esse posset, gut nefilio
qnidem #s,us aequalis foret [paraphrased from Livy XXVIII. 40, where the
defence is given in oratio recta}.
PIITOPIKHS B 10 5, 6. 127
O) Kal tj\iKia Kai So^y (pQovovcriv. oQev eiprjrai
TO (Twyyeves yap Kal C^Qovelv eTricrTarai.
KUL Trpos ovs (piXoTijuovvTai" (piXoTi/movvTai /ULGV yap
7T|OOS TOUS lptJIJ.eVOV$ 9 TTpOS Be TOUS jmVplOCTTOV TO5
ovras rj Trpos TOVS ecro/uevovs i] Te6WwTcrs oi/Sets, ovSe
Trpos TOI)S e<p HpaKXeiais (TTt]\ai<s. ov& cav TTO\V
oiovrai Trap avrols i] Trapa rots aAAois Ae/7re<r0ca,
ov& cov TTO\V vTrept^eiv, cocravTcos Kal Trpos TOVTOVS
6 Kal Trepi Ta TOLavTa. errel Be Trpos rot)?
Kal dvTepa(TTas Kal o/\ws TOI)S
Whence the saying , (of doubtful authorship : attributed by the
Scholiast to Aeschylus, apud Spengel) " Kinship is well acquainted
with envy too." And those whom we are ambitious of rivalling
(on Trpo? ovs ^iXorifiovi Tai, see note on II 2. 22); which occurs
towards those just mentioned (rots eyyvs K.T.\. opposed to the follow
ing, who are all Troppw, ajru>6ev, far off in place or time) ; but
towards those who were alive ten thousand years ago (lit. to whom it
is now the io,oooth year since they were, from the time of their exist
ence), or those who are yet to be (yet unborn), or already dead , (differs
from the first in the length of time the dead may be recently dead),
never: nor towards those who are at the world s end .
rovs e(j) Hpu/cAfuiiy oTTjAaty] The columns of Hercules , the
limits of the known world, stand in the place of our antipodes to
express extreme remoteness all beyond them being a mystery. Arist.,
Meteor. II i. 10, assigns it as the extreme boundary of the Mediterranean
sea, TI evros HpaK\fi(av arrfKcav (6a\a<r(ra); the Mediterranean itself being
i) ecrco, ; tvros, ddXaao-a, mare t/iternum, intestinum. See the article in
Smith s Diet, of Geogr. Vol. II. p. 57, Internum Mare : and Vol. I. p. 1054,
Herculis Columnae. With Aristotle s metaphor in the Rhet. comp. Find.
Ol. Ill 79> 6>7PW arrrerai Hpa/cAeos crraAai/. TO Tropcnw fi ecrri <ro(f>ols aftarov
aftarov Kacrofyois, and again, Nem. Ill 35, OVK/TI Trpoaco dfidrav aXa KIOVOOV
vTTfp HpaKAeos TTfpav ei/jiapes. Isthm. IV 2O. In Nem. IV 112, TaSeipa
takes its place.
Nor (do we attempt to rival) those to whom, either by our own
judgment, or that of everybody else, we are brought to the opinion that
we are far inferior , (this is the general case of superiority and inferiority,
dignitate atqne opibus, Victorius,) or superior; and the same is true with
regard to similar things as to these persons , i. e. the same that has been
said of these persons, may be applied equally to the corresponding
things for which men compete (this is the special case of competition in
some particular art, pursuit, or excellence ; the case for example of an
ordinary mathematician and Sir Isaac Newton, or in any other art or
profession the distinguished and the undistinguished practitioner).
6. And seeing that this ambition of rivalry is (especially) directed
123 PHTOPIKHS Bio 6-9.
e<pie/ULevovs (piXoTLfj-ovvraL, dvdjKri
(pQoveiv odev etprjTat
Kat Kepajuevs Kepa/j.e i
KCII -rots T a X^ L $ f~ioXi<s Tf^oWes rj
8 d)6ovov(TiV Kat lav r] KeKTrj/mevcov r] KaTopQovvrwv
avToTs elcrt $e Kat OVTOI 771)9 /ecu ojuoior
yap OTI Trap avTOvs ov Tvy^dvovcn TOU dya-
Q 6oV, O)(TT6 TObTO XVTTOVV TTOiel TOV tyQoVOV. Kat TOls
i] e^oucrt TavTCt rj KCKTii/ULevots bcra avrols TrpocrrjKev
against (pointed at) our competitors in some struggle or encounter (i. e.
any dycov, in which there are dyoworai or combatants : law- suits, battles,
games, and such like), or in love (rivalry proper), or generally against
those who are aiming at the same things, these must necessarily be the
chief objects of envy : whence the saying "two of a trade". See supra ir
4. 21, III. 25. Hesiod. Op. et D. 25, KOI Kepa/xei)? Kfpa/xei Kortei KOI
TCKTOVL renTOtv.
7. Such as have attained a rapid success are objects of envy to
those who have either succeeded with difficulty, or not at all .
8. And those whose possession (of any coveted object), or success,
is a reproach to ourselves : and these too are near us and like us (in the
senses defined in 5 and 2. The meaning is, the attainment of some
thing which is the object of competition, or success, on the part of a rival
is a reproach to us, when the other is not greatly our superior, but
nearly on the same level, and in our own sphere, eyyvs <al opotos ; we
argue that if he could attain to it, it ought to have been within our
reach) ; for it is plainly our own fault that we fail to obtain the good
thing, and so the pain of this produces the envy .
Trap aJroi s] along of ourselves, see Arnold on Thuc. I 141. 9 and
"Dem. Phil. I 11, p. 43 (quoted by Arnold) where it occurs twice,
irapa rfjv avrov ptu^c, Trapa rfjv rj/xer/pai/ dp,f\(iav, in both, by
the agency, or cause, of... so that the prepos. with the accus. is u*5ed in
two diametrically opposite senses. Arnold s parallel English vulgarism
seems to explain very well this meaning of the word; the notion of
travelling alongside of, readily suggests the notion of constant accompa
niment, and that of consequence, as in the two logical usages of ore<r&u
and dudKovdeiv, to accompany as well as to follow . Otherwise, the
sense of constant companionship may give rise to the notion of friendly
aid in producing some effect or consequence, and so it passes into the
signification of 8ia, or nearly so.
9. And we are apt to envy those who either have now in their
possession, or have once possessed , (so I distinguish Covert and KCKTT]-
pfvois, which however ordinarily express the same thing. Victorius
translates habent possidentque ; which not only conveys no distinction
at all, but mistranslates the alternative ^, which clearly shews that
PHTOPIKHS B 10 10, n. 129
^ \
10 n KCKTrjVTO 7TOT6 CIO TTpeCTpUTepOl V(*)TepOt<S. KCtl
ol 7ro\\a ^cnravricravTes ets TCIVTO rots 6\l<ya (j)6o-
s / ~\^ x ^ < i ~ >
11 vowiv. cri\ov 06 Kai ois xaipovcriv OL TOLOUTOL KCCI
ITTL TICTI KO.I TTOJS e^oi/res* ws yap OVK e^oj/res Af-
1 e<j> o?s infra,
Aristotle flfrV/ mean two different things,) anything to which we ourselves
had a natural claim or had once possessed (subaudi o<ra avrol KfKrrjvTai) ;
and this is why seniors are prone to envy their juniors . Victorius recurs
here to the case of Q. Fabius Maximus and Scipio, already cited on
5. Maximus in his old age was naturally suspected of envy in the
opposition he offered to Scipio s command in Africa : people thought he
was jealous (this is nearer to jealousy than envy) of the reputation that
the young general was rapidly acquiring, which interfered with his own
earlier claims to similar distinction. The case of a similar jealousy of
a younger rival, in any science, art, or profession, is too notorious to
need special illustration.
10. And those that have laid out large sums (for the attainment
of any object) envy those who have obtained the same success at a
small expense . Here again the envy arises from having been beaten in
the competition, rots oXi ya (SaTrai/^tracri).
II. In this last section there are two or three points requiring
consideration which it will be as well to dispatch before proceeding to
the translation. The first is, whether we are to read e(J> ols or ofy with
out the prepos. ; and then, what do e$ ols or ols and eVl T KTI, severally
represent. Spcngel, following MS A retains e ols; Bekker in his
third ed., for once departs from that MS and reads ols, although, as it
seems, none of the MSS give any various reading. It seems therefore on
this ground preferable to retain e ols if we can ; and we have next to
consider how it is to be interpreted, and how distinguished from enl run.
e< ols and ols are equally irregular after df/Xov (see note on II 9. 11, at the
end), and the grammar therefore throws no light upon the reading. As
far as the grammar and interpretation are concerned there seems to
be no objection to retaining ri.
We* have then to decide whether ols or riat stands for persons
or things ; either of which is possible. However if the choice is to be
made between them, rlo-i seems the more natural representative of persons,
and ols of things ; and so in general, throughout these analyses of the
feelings, Aristotle is accustomed to designate the persons who are the
objects of them by the pronoun rives.
Thirdly, there is no objection to r! n crt x a l P ova lv m tne sense of at or
by whom they are pleased (lit. upon whom their pleasure is bestowed or
directed), in whom they find pleasure , though the bare ricri is more
usual (possibly this may be Bekker s reason for his alteration [of e ols !) ;
and if there were any doubt about it, it would be sufficiently supported
by eVt TTOIOIS (what sort ot persons) xaipeiv, c. 9. 1 6. Consequently, as I
can see no sufficient reason for altering the text contrary to all manuscript
authority, I have retained l<$> ols, understanding it of things, the occasions
of joy or delight; and eVi riai of the persons who excite the feeling in us.
AR. II. Q
1 3 o PHTOPIKH2 B io u.
TTOVVTCtt, OVTCOS ^OI/TCS 67TI TO?? eVCtVTLOlS t](r6t](TOl -
The next clause, cos -yap OVK f\ovTfs \vnovvrai, K.T.\. presents
some difficulty, and Muretus and the Veins Translatio^ followed
by Schrader and Wolf, reject the negative OVK (or ^ as it stood
in the MSS employed in the older editions). This however would
make the two opposite feelings of pleasure and pain the same state
or disposition of mind, which I think could not possibly have been
Aristotle s meaning. Victorius takes what I believe to be the right view
on the point. The meaning will then be, that the negative, the contra
dictory, of pain, i. e. pleasure (the two never co-existing), is excited by
the opposite circumstances to those which are productive of the pain
of envy ; if pain under particular circumstances is excited by the sight of
the good fortune of another, substitute the opposite, ill fortune for good
fortune in each case, and you will have the appropriate topics for giving
rise to the feeling of pleasure in your audience. This, says Victorius, is
fmxaipeKaKia, wanton malice, malevolent pleasure in the misfortunes of
others. The above interpretation is at all events free from the objection
to which Schrader s is liable, namely that it makes Aristotle say that the
same mental state or disposition is painful and pleasurable. The choice
between the two depends mainly upon the interpretation of 01 TOIOUTOI
and TTCOS fx VTes - I understand by the former the (pdovtpoi, the common
character of all the classes distinguished in the analysis ; Schrader of the
members of the several classes, the ambitious, the prosperous and suc
cessful ; and in his view these classes must fall under the several ( states
of mind designated by Treuy, cos, OVTCOS, exovres, such as ambition ; though
how it can be applied to others, such as the prosperous and successful ,
his second instance, he does not inform us. If by the state of mind
the Trddoy or emotion is meant 1 (which seems to be Spengel s view), it is
quite impossible that two such states, one pleasurable and the other
painful, can be the same. Schrader, however, appears to take the TTCO?
f xfiv in a different sense, for the character or habit of mind, the mental
constitution, which tends to produce such and such feelings ; and in this
point of view, though ambition (his first instance) may fairly enough be
called a disposition of mind, yet I cannot see how the second, the pros
perous and successful men, or prosperity and success, can well be
included in the designation.
In conclusion I will transcribe part of his note, that the reader
may have the opportunity of deciding for himself; merely adding
that manuscript and editorial authority is against his omission of
the negative, and that though his interpretation is very plausible at
first sight, I doubt whether it can be right, for the reasons stated.
"Veritas autem huius lectionis e re ipsa quoque fiet manifesta, si per
TTporacrets a 2 ad 9 transeas, et hue illas applices. Ambitiosi e. g.
dolent honore alterius, iidem, sive eodem modo affecti, gaudent alterius
opprobrio. Qui res magnas gerunt, et fortuna utuntur prosperrima, dolent
1 This is certainly so. Take, for instance, the first words of the following
chapter, TTWS 5 ?x oj/res fijXot/<, the state of mind in which 77X0$ is shewn, or resides :
which identifies l$\os with the state in question.
PHTOPIKHS B ioii; ni. 131
Tr wVre av avrol {lev TrapavKevacrQuHTiv OI/TW?
eX eiv 9 <L ^ eA.ee?<r$cu q Tvy^dvetv TWOS dya6ov d^i-
ovfjevoi UHTLV OLOL ol eiptifJLevot, $ij\ov ws ou
e\eov irapa TUIV
i 7ro)5 o evovTes (j}\ov(ri KCII TCI Tcoia Kai eiri CHAP. xr.
r r. i f v-~ P* ^
Ticriv, ivuevo e&Ti cfjXov ei yap ecrTi ^V/Xos \VTrrj
TIS erri (paivo/ULevn Trapovcria a^aQiLv evrifJitav Kai ev-
si alium ad eundem fortunae gradum cernant evectum : iisdem vcro illi
gaudent cum alios longe infra se relinqui conspiciunt."
And now to proceed with the translation :
It is plain too what are the occasions, the objects, and the states of
mind of such (the envious) ; that is to say, that the same state of mind
which is absent in the painful feeling, will be present in the joy that
is excited by the opposite occasions (or thus, whatever may be the state
of mind the absence of which manifests itself in, or is accompanied by,
pain, the same by its presence on the opposite occasions will give rise to
pleasure ). Consequently, if we ourselves (i. e. any audience) are brought
into that state of mind (envy or jealousy), and those who lay claim to
(think themselves deserving of) compassion from us, or any good that
they want to obtain from us (as Kpiral, judges of any kind, in a dis
puted claim; but it is equally true of men in general), be such as the
above described (i. e. objects of envy), it is plain that they will never
meet with compassion (which will apply to rvyxaveiv TIVOS dyadov as
well as to e Xfe7cr0at) from the masters of the situation (those who have the
power to bestow either of them, those with whom the matter rests).
irapa(TK.fvafiv, to prepare the minds of the judges or audience, said of
the speaker who puts them into such and such a state of mind or feeling,
is rendered by Kara<Ticevdciv, supra II I. 2 (see note ad loc.) and 7, where
it is applied in two somewhat different senses.
CHAP. XI.
With envy, as we have seen, is closely connected (r\\os or emulation ;
both of them originating in the desire of superiority, which manifests
itself in rivalry and competition with those who so far, and in that
sense, resemble us (irepl TOVS ofioiovs}, that we are necessarily brought
into comparison with them. Both of them are painful emotions the
pain arises from the unsatisfied want which they equally imply and
the difference between them is this, that envy is malevolent ; what
the envious man wants is to deprive his neighbour of some advantage
or superiority, and do him harm by reducing him to his own level ; the
pain of emulation springs from the sense of our own deficiencies and
the desire of rising to a higher level of virtue or honour : conse
quently the one is a virtuous, the other a vicious, feeling ; emulation
leads to self-improvement, and the practice of virtue ; the object of
envy is nothing but the degradation or injury of another : or, as Aristotle
expresses it, emulation aims at the acquisition of good things, envy at
92
1 32 PHTOPIKH2 B 11 i.
aura) \afieiv Trept TOWS opoiovs TY\ Qvcret,
on a\\q> d\\ on ovxi Kai avru> eWtV &o Kai
eo-riv 6 j/\os Kai eTrieiKwv, TO e)e (pdovelv
the deprivation of them in another, the infliction of harm and loss on
one s neighbour.
Such is Aristotle s account of emulation ; according to him the feeling
is one, and that virtuous. The Stoics however, as interpreted by Cicero,
Tusc. Disp. iv 8. 17, distinguished two kinds of aemulatio: utetin laude
et in vitio nomcn hoc sit. Nam et imitatio virtutis aemulatio dicitur :
et est aemulatio aegritudo, si eo quod concupierit aliuspotiatur ipse careat.
And again, c. 26. 56, aemulantis, angi alieno bono quod ipse non habeat.
The two definitions differ also in this, that in Ar. s all emulation is
painful and all virtuous ; in that of the Stoics, one form of it is virtuous
but not painful, the other painful but not virtuous; and in fact it
is difficult to distinguish the latter form of it from envy.
The Stoic definition of Zeno and (apparently) Chrysippus, Diog.
Laert, Zeno, vil in, gives only the painful and vicious form of 7X0?,
Xfop e Vi TW 5XXo) Trapeuxu &v avrbs IviQv^l. Cicero attributes his double
definition also to Zeno.
Hobbes and Bain s definitions of the affection I have already quoted
in the introductory note to Ch. x. Locke, in the chapter there referred
to, does not include emulation in his list of Passions , or Modes of
pleasure and pain .
Stewart, Outlines of Moral Philosophv, Pt. n. Sect. in. 5, has some
remarks upon emulation, which he classes with the desires, and not (as
Aristotle and others) with the affections. " It is the desire of superiority
which is the active principle ; and the malevolent affection is only a
concomitant circumstance." Here he is in accordance with Aristotle.
"When emulation is accompanied with malevolent affection, it assumes
the name of envy."
"Emulation," says Butler, Sermon I., On Human Nature, note 4,
"is merely the desire and hope of equality -with, or superiority over
others, with whom we compare ourselves. There does not appear to
be any other grief in the natural passion, but only that want which is
implied in desire. However, this may be so strong as to be the occasion
of great grief. To desire the attainment of this equality or superiority
by the particular means of others being brought down to our own level
or below it, is, I think, the distinct notion of envy. From whence it is
easy to see that the real end which the natural passion, emulation, and
which the unlawful one, envy, aims at, is exactly the same; namely
that equality or superiority ; and consequently, that to do mischief is not
the object of envy, but merely the means it makes use of to attain
its end." At all events, the malevolent feeling is a constituent element
of the emotion of envy, without which it would not be what it is : though
the actual doing mischief may not be essential to it.
I. The dispositions of emulation (the states of mind which exhibit
it, in which it resides), its occasions and objects, will be clear from what
follows , ra 7ro?a here stands for the sort of things which excite emu-
PHTOPIKHS B ii i, 2. 133
(pav\ov K.a.1 <pav\tov o fjiev <ydp avrov TrapacrKevd^ei
$ia TOV ZfiXov Twy^dveiv TU>V dryaButv, o e TOV
criov fjit] ex eiv ^ L( * TOV <p66vov at/ay/a; ^r\ (^/Xw
fjiev eivai TOVS dfciovvTcts avTOVS dyaOaJv a>v /mrj e^Of- P. 13883.
i<> \ v ) c. ^ \ , / >^ < ^^
2 (Tiv ovceis <yap a^ioi TO. (paivo/ULeva aovvara. cio 01
veoi Kai ol aeaXovOL TOLOUTOL. Kai ok
lation, usually expressed in these analyses by eVi TTOIOIS : eVt rio-i for the
persons or objects , upon whom it lights, i.e. against whom it is
directed, which again is more usually conveyed by the simple rurt. See
however c. 10 11, eVt ria-i, and the note there ; and eVl rroiois x a ^P ftv
c. 9 16. If, namely, emulation is a feeling of pain on the occasion of
the manifest (unmistakable) presence of good things, highly valued and
possible for ourselves to acquire, (rre/n in respect of, in the case of, i.e.)
belonging to, or acquired by, those who have a natural resemblance
to ourselves (in temper, faculties, powers, gifts and accomplishments
natural or acquired, or anything which brings them into contrast with
us); not because another has them (which is envy) but because we
ourselves have them not (and so, feeling the want, are anxious to obtain
them, in order to raise ourselves to the level of our assumed rival)
and accordingly, (the latter,) emulation is virtuous and a property of
virtuous men, envy on the other hand vicious and of the vicious : for
whilst the one is led by his emulation to procure (contrive, manage) for
himself the attainment of these goods, the other is led by his envy to
manage merely that his neighbour shall not have them : (This is mere
malevolence, the desire of harm or loss to another, without any corre
sponding advantage to oneself. The sentence from Sto to (frdovov, is a
note on the distinction of f;\os and fyQwos : the argument is now re
sumed, and the apodosis commences with the irregular 8/7, introduced
unnecessarily, more Aristotelio, after the parenthesis as correlative to the
el of the TrpoTavis, see note on II 9. 11,1 i. u) then, I say (if emulation
be such as it has been described), those must be inclined to emulation
who think themselves deserving of good things which they do not possess ;
(sc. Svvaraiv avrols OVTO>V, provided they are possible for them to attain.
This connecting link, omitted by Aristotle, is supplied by Muretus and
Victorius, and doubtless explains the connexion of the reasoning,) for no
one lays claim to things manifestly impossible .
2. And this is why the young and the high-minded are of this cha
racter . With ol vfoi comp. c. 12.6 and n. The latter of these two
passages gives the reason why the young are inclined to emulation, it is
8ta TO a^iovv aiirovs /zeyaXwi/ ; which also makes them /LteyaXoi/ v^ot. Emu
lation in the fj,eya\6^f u^ot must be confined to rivalry in great things, if it
is to be consistent with the character assigned to them in Eth. Nic. IV 8,
1124 b 24, Koifly TO. ei/ri/ict pr] uvai, 7} ov TrpuTfvovo i.v aAAot /cat apyov flvai
Kai fj.f\\rjTT]i> aAV 17 OTTOU TI/JTJ ntyaXrj 77 epyov, /cat oXt ycoi p-fv irpanriKov,
fjLfydXvv Se /cat ovoii.a<nu>v. In fact self-sufficiency is characteristic of the
fjLeyuXo-^vxos, 6 n(yd\(0i> avruv a^i.a>v a|tor u>v, who therefore is devoid
of all vulgar ambition, 8ia TO oXt ya n.^av.
i 34 PHTOPIKH2 B u 2.
TOICLVTCL dyaOa a rav evTi/mMV agio. e&Tiv dvtipwV
e(TTi yap Tavra TrXovros nal 7ro\v(j)i\ia Kal dp%ai
Kcti oa-a roiavra- ok yap 7rpoarr]KOV avrol-s dyadols
Also, those who are in possession (themselves, opposed to ovs ol
oXXot dgiovtriv, in the following sentence) of such good things as are
worthy of men that are held in honour: such are, namely (yap) 1 , wealth,
abundance of friends (an extensive and powerful connexion), state offices,
and all the like. For, on the supposition that they have a natural claim
to goodness, because the good have a natural right to these things
[5rt Trpocr^e rots dyaS^s ? X ov<n], good things of this kind they emulously
strive after . That is to say, they start with the assumption that then-
natural character is virtuous, and then, because wealth and power and
such like have a natural connexion with, i.e. are the proper rewards of,
virtue, they are eager to obtain them, and vie with their competitors in
the pursuit of them-. The meaning of this sentence is further elucidated
by comparison with what is said in 7. We are there informed that
some kinds of good things, such as those that are due to fortune, or mere
good luck, without merit, may be the objects not of emulation but of con
tempt. dya6a a rav evripuv aia eanv dfSpcSi/ are consequently confined
to those good things the acquisition of which implies merit.
irpofffjite] imperf. is properly had a natural claim . The past tense,
precisely as in the familiar use of the imperf., so and so is as I said ,
referring back to a past statement, here signifies, /ias a claim, as they
were in the habit of believing . I have not thought it worth while to
express this in the transl., as the phraseology is Greek and not English.
Muretus, approved by Vater, writes Trpoo^ /cfi, overlooking the force of
the imperfect.
In dyadas f xov(ri, dya(9cSs for ev is as abnormal as goodly would be,
used as an adverb for well . It occurs once again, Top. E 7, 136 b 28,
OVK eo-ri ToC SIKQUOS *8iov TO dyudas. Amongst the Classical Greek writers,
Aristotle appears to enjoy the monopoly of it [but the present passage
and the parallel just quoted from the Topics are the only instances given
in the Index Aristotelians}: it is found also in the Septuagint (Stephens
Thesaurus s. v.), and apparently nowhere else.
And also (opposed to the preceding), those whom everybody else
1 Here and elsewhere I have followed Schleiermacher, who in his Translation
of Plato, invariably renders yap nant&/i. The same word in English, though
not so usual as in the other language, is perhaps the nearest equivalent to the
Greek ydp. It is used thus in a specification of particulars, videlicet, that is to
say, in confirmation of, assigning a sort of reason for, a previous statement.
3 Brandis, in the tract on the Rhet. in Schneidewin s Philologus, IV i. p. 46, ^
following apparently the opinion of Muretus and Vater, calls the passage a vcr-
derbte Stelle, for which I can see no foundation whatsoever. The sense and
connexion are perfectly intelligible, the imperf. irpoffrJKe has been explained, and
dyaetis defended by the use of it in the Topics. Bekker, Ed. in., retains the
v. 1. The version of the Anonymus (apud Brandis) fr?Xo?oi yap rd TOMATO. dya6d
Sid Td cfertfai ai)roi>s dyaOovs flvai Kal 5td roCro txeiv TO. dya8d a vpoff-riKei f^ew TOVS
dya6ofa, seems to me to be sufficiently close to the received text to be intended for
a paraphrase of it, and not (as Brandis thinks) to suggest a different reading.
PHTOPIKHS B 1 1 3-5- 135
etvai, I OTL a TrpocrtJKe TO?S dyaOols e^ouari 1 , tn\ov(Fi TO.
(2) TOiavTa Tcav dyaQwv. Kai oi/s ol d\\oi d^iovcriv.
3 Kal lav Trpoyovoi r] crvyyeveis tj outeloi r} TO e$i/os r\ >/
7roA.fS evTLfJLOLj fy\(i)TiKoi 7Tpt TavTa. CLKela yap
4 QLOVTOLI avrols elvai, Kal d^ioi TOVTCOV. el cT ear*
fyXcoTa TO. evTifJta dyaOd, dvayKtj TOES TC dpeTas
elvai TOtavTas, Kal oora TO?S aAAots ta(f>\ifjux, KCLL evep-
yeTLKa TIJULWCTL yap TOI) evepyeTOvvTas Kal TOWS
dyaQovs. Kal ocrwv dyadcov aTroXaucris rol? 7rXf/cr/oj/
5 e(TTLV y olov TrXovTOS Kal /ca/\A.O9 fjid\\ov uyieias. (pa-
\ ^\ \tV.^ \/ r\ *- \\
vepov 06 Kai 01 ri\toTOi Tives OL yap TavTa Kai Ta
1 Coniecit Vahlen. 6 rt irpofffJKe rots dya.6tis ^xoi/cri, JlfSS.
thinks worthy of them . They are stimulated to exertion by the praises,
and exhortations, and encouragement of their friends.
3. Any distinction acquired or enjoyed by one s ancestors, or-
kinsmen, or intimate friends, or race, or nation (the city in Greece is
represented by the nation in modern language), has a tendency to excite
emulation in those same things (in which the distinction has previously
manifested itself) ; the reason being, that in these cases people think
that (these distinctions) are their own (properly belonging, appropriate,
to them), and that they deserve them . Supply, KOI (olovrai avrol eiVcu)
aioi TOUTUV. On npoyovoi, Victorius aptly quotes Cicero, de Off. I 35,
quorum vero patres aut maiores aliqua gloria praestiterunt, ii student
plerumque eodem in genere laudis excellerej et seq.
4. And if all good things that are held in honour are objects of
emulation (i. e. of emulous exertion, what we vie with others in trying
to acquire), all the virtuous must needs be of this same kind (cVrt ftovs),
and everything that is profitable and productive of benefit to the rest
of the world, because all benefactors and good men in general are held
in honour. And especially those good things of which the enjoyment
(particularly sensual enjoyment : see the account of the three kinds of
lives, the drrdXavcrTiKos, TrpaKTiKos, and 8eapr]TiK.6s, Eth. Nic. I 3: compare
III 13, IIl8 a ^l,rfj dnoXavcrti, 77 yivtrai Traua 81 a0f;s Kal ev orrt oiy *<u
ev 7TOT019 KO rols a0poSi(Tiotf Xeyo/ieVoiy, VII 6, 1148 a 5, (ra>/icmKa!
ajroXavaetj) can be shared by one s neighbours, wealth for instance, and
personal beauty, more than health . The enjoyment of beauty may no
- doubt be shared by one s neighbours , because the sight of it is always
agreeable ; but how it, or health, can be called an object of emulation ,
I own I am at a loss to see. No help is given by the Commentators. Did
Aristotle, absorbed in his distinction, forget for a moment that the
instances selected were inappropriate to the topic he was employed in
illustrating ?
5. It is plain too who the persons are, that are the objects of
emulation : they are, namely, those who possess these and similar
136 PHTOPIKHS B ii5 7.
KeKTti[j.evoi /wro. eo"n e TavTa TO.
eipr)fj.eva, oiov dvSpia (ro(J)ia dp%t] ol yap dp-^ovres
TroAAoOs ^vvavTcu eu Troielv, (TTpctTiyyoi, pt]TOpe$ } irdv-
6 res ol TO. TOiavTa ^vvdfjievoi. Kctl cus 7ro\\ot o/moioi
fiovXovTcti eivai, rj TTO\\OI ryvcapi/moi, t] (pi\ot TTO\\OL.
fj oi>s TTO\\OI davjud^ovo iv, i] ous avTot BavjULci^ovcriv.
7 Ko.1 wv eTraivoi Kai eyKuj/uia \cyovTCti /; VTTO TTOLYITWV //
cdv. KctTacppovovcri $e TMV evavritav ivav-
advantages. These are those already mentioned, such as courage,
wisdom, power : the last class, men in power, are objects of emulation
in virtue of their frequent opportunities of doing service, conferring
benefits ; examples are generals, orators, and all that have the like
power or influence . The power that orators have of doing service is
exemplified in Crassus eulogium on Rhetoric, Cic. de Orat. I 8. 32,
(referred to by Victorias) : Quid tarn porro reghtm, tarn liberate, tarn
munificuin, quam opein fcrre snpplicibus, excitare afflictos, dare salittem,
liberare pcricultS) retincre homines in civitate?
6. And again, those whom many desire to resemble, or to be
acquainted with, or their friends . These, according to Victorius, are
three classes of possessors of an ayaQov ei>Ti/j.ov which makes them objects
of emulation. Or those who are admired by many, or by ourselves .
7. And those whose praises and panegyrics are pronounced either by
poets or speech-writers (i.e. especially, writers of panegyrical speeches).
On the distinction of enaivos and eyKcapiov see Introd., Appendix B, to
Bk. I. c. 9, p. 212 seq.
\oyoypd<poi. This word is used in two distinct senses. In its
earlier signification it is applied to the Chroniclers, the earliest histo
rians and prose writers, predecessors and contemporaries of Herodotus ;
of whom an account may be found in Miiller, Hist. Gr. Lit. c. xvm, and
Mure, Hist, of Gk. Lit. Bk. IV. ch. 2, 3, Vol. IV, and Dahlmann, Life of
Herodotus, Ch. vi. sect. 2, and foil. In this sense it occurs in Thuc. 121,
upon which Poppo has this note : "Aut solutae orationis scriptores uni-
versi,aut historic! vel etiam/*v#o-ypci$oi" (this early history was often of a
mythical and legendary character), "denique orationum panegyricarum
auctores hoc ambiguo vocabulo significantur." (The later, and most
usual, meaning of the word is here omitted.) As this was for some time
the only prose literature in existence, the Xoyoypac^ot might well be con
trasted with the poets, so as to signify prose writers in general. And
this, according to Ernesti, Lex. Technologiae Graecae s. v., is the sense
that it bears here, Dichter und prosaische Schriftsteller. Isocrates also,
Phil. 109, has the same contrast, oZre -r&v 7rot?rcSi> ovre TO>V Xoyo-
7TOICOI .
The later and commoner signification, which appears so frequently
in the Orators (see examples in Shilleto s note on Dem. de F. L. 274),
dates from the time of Antiphon, who commenced the practice, which
PHTOPIKH2 B ii 7. 137
became common, and was pursued for instance by Isocrates and Demo
sthenes, of writing speeches, for which he received remuneration, for the
use of parties in the law-courts. Public feeling at Athens was very
much against this supposed prostitution of a man s talents and special
knowledge (which may be compared with Plato s horror, expressed in
the Phaedrus, of making a trade of teaching), and Xoyoypn<poy became
a term of reproach. Perhaps the earliest example of this application is
the passage of the Phaedrus, 257 c, where Lysias is said to have been
taunted with it by a political opponent, Sia ird(rr)s rfj? \oi8opias exaXei
Xoyoypdcpoi/. Aeschines applied it very freely to his rival Demosthenes.
On this import of the word Gaisford (ad hunc locum) quotes Schol. Plat,
p. 63, Xoyoy pdfpovs fKccKovv 01 TraXatol TOVS eirl p.icrda> \6yovs ypd<povras, Kal
irnrpduKuvTas avrovs els diKacmjpia pr/ropcis 8e TOVS 8C iavTaiv Xeyovrap.
But besides this special sense, Xoyoypacpm and Xoyoypmpo? are said of
speech-writing and speech-writers in general (so PI. Phaedr. 257 E, 258 B),
and especially of panegyrical speeches, like those of Isocrates, and of
speeches written to be read in the closet, and not orally delivered in the
law-court or public assembly : and as this is the most appropriate to the
present passage of Aristotle, who is speaking of eulogies in poetry and prose;
and is likewise the sense in which it is used in two other passages of the
Rhetoric, in 7. 7, 12. 2, 1 have little doubt that it is to be so understood here.
Hermogenes irepl i&eoSi/, /3, chap. IO, Trepi TOV TTO\ITIKOV Xoyou, Rhctores
Graeci, Vol. II. p. 405, 6, and again chap. 12, Trepi rou cnrXwj TravyyvpiKov,
ib. p. 417, in treating of the iravr]yvpu(.os Xoyoy, the name by which he
designates Aristotle s eViSeumKoi yeVoy, seems to divide all literature into
three branches, poetry, spoken and written speeches ; distinguishing
ptJTopes and Xoyoypdcpot, and both of them from Troi^rai ; apicrros ovf Kara
TTO.VTUIV Xoycoz/ f iSrj KCU Troir)Ta>i> anavroiv Kal prjTopatv Kal \oyoypdcpcov "0/j.rjpos
(p. 406, 9, and elsewhere). And (in the second passage above referred to)
he includes foropt a under the general head of Xoyoypacpt a, ovfte p.rjv ij Xoyo-
ypcxpia dXXa /cat y toropt a, p. 417, and still more expressly icrroplas re Kal
rfjf a\Xr]s Xoyoypa^>i ay, p. 418. Rhetoric, when treated as the art of com-
positio)i, Xe tr, may no doubt be considered to embrace all prose litera
ture, which will so fall into two divisions (i) public and forensic
speeches, orally delivered, and (2) all written compositions. ["The rela
tion between ancient oratory and ancient prose, philosophical, historical
or literary, is necessarily of the closest kind." Jebb s Attic Orators r.
p. Ixxi.] In Rhet. in 12. 2, the written style, \ct? ypa(f)iKij, is opposed to
the ayavKTTiKij, which has to be employed in actual encounter, spoken
and acted, not (necessarily) written ; and the a-v^ovXevTiKi] and SIKUVIKI]
to the eiri8fiKTiKT]. The art of composition therefore, and prose compo
sition in general, may properly be referred to this third branch of
Rhetoric, the declamatory or panegyrical, as Hermogenes expressly, and
Aristotle tacitly, do refer it : and so Xoyoypd<poy may mean either a speech-
ivriter (as opposed to p^ rcop), or a writer Uprose (as opposed to poetry).
The opposites of all these (the foregoing classes of persons) are
objects of contempt : for contempt is the opposite of emulation, and the
notion of the one to the notion of the other (the substantive in -is denotes
the process, or operation of the feeling; the infin. with TO the abstract
conception of it). And those who are so constituted as to emulate others,
i 3 8 PHTOPIKH2 B ii /; 12 i.
TLOV yap (//Aw Kara(j)p6vt]a-L S ecrri, Kai rip tyXovv TO
dvaytwi Se TOI)S OI/TCDS e^oi/ras wcrre
eivai p- 79-
T6 KCtl C7TI TOVTOIS OCTOL TO. CVaVTia KUKa
T(JOV dyaQuiv TU>V &\toTuJv. $LO 7roA/\cc/as
i o
,-, ,-. , I tf > <- t /
KctTawpovovcri Tiav 6UTV%ovvT(*)v, QTO.V avev TCOV evTL-
fjiwv dyaQwv VTrapxy avTois n TV%ri.
Si u>v nev ovv TO. TrdBrj eyyiyverai Kal StaXverai,
i e wy al Tr/crreis ylyvovTai Trepi avrcuv, eiprjrai rot CHAP, x
or themselves to be the objects of emulation, must necessarily be inclined
to feel contempt for all such persons and on such occasions (an unne
cessary parenthetical note, which interrupts the construction) as lie
under the defects and disadvantages opposite to the good things which
are the objects of emulation. Hence contempt is often felt for the
fortunate, when their luck comes to them without those good things
which are really valuable (i. e. which depend in some degree upon merit
for their acquisition) .
Here ends the account of the means (///. channels, media) by which
the several emotions are engendered and dissolved, (furnishing topics or
premisses) from which the arguments (modes of persuasion) that belong
to them may be derived .
SiaXwerai] is here applied to the dissolution, breaking up, and so
bringing to an end, of the TrdOr) themselves. In a former passage on a
similar subject, c. 4 32, it seems rather to have its logical sense of
breaking up, or refuting an argument.
f ipr]Tai] it has been stated, and is now over [Vol. I. p. 225, note].
CHAP. XII.
We now enter upon the consideration of the second kind of rfdrj,
which may be employed as a subsidiary proof or instrument of persua
sion, to assist the cogency of the logical arguments. This occupies the
six following chapters from 12 to 17; in which the salient features or
characteristics of the three ages, youth, old age, and manhood or the
prime of life ; and of the three social conditions of noble birth or family,
wealth, and power, are set forth in detail. The import of these chapters,
and their connexion with the main subject of the entire work, which
explains and justifies their position here, has been already treated in the
Introduction, pp. 110112, to which the reader is referred. The study
of these characters will enable the speaker to accommodate his lan
guage and arguments to their several tastes and dispositions.
The four stages of human life, as described by Horace, Epist. ad Pis.
156 seq., have much more in common with Shakespeare s seven ages ,
(As you like it, Act II. sc. 7 [lines 143 166],) than with Aristotle s
analysis. Horace writes with a view to the use of the poet, and describes
them as they should appear in the drama or the Epic poem : his cha-
PHTOPIKH2 B 12 i. 139
racters are the dramatic characters : Aristotle writing for the rhetorician
applies his analysis to the purposes of argument; reserving the dramatic
expression of character for the third book, where it naturally falls under
the treatment of style and expression. Horace s object appears in the
lines, Ne forte seniles mandentur invent partes pueroque viriles, semper
in adiunctis acvoque morabimur aptis [176].
Bacon s Essay, Of Youth and Age [XLII], is too well known to need
more than a mere reference. Two such observers as Aristotle and Bacon
must of course agree in the general outline of the two contrasted
characters; but Bacon s is a. brief sketch, presenting the leading fea
tures of both more particularly as they exhibit themselves in the con
duct and management of business, and in public life : Aristotle fills in
the details of the picture in a much more complete and comprehensive
analysis.
Plutarch, in the treatise de virtute morali, c. XI, discussing the moral
constitution of the human subject, illustrates his material theory of the
origin of the Trddrj by reference to the characters of the young and old,
which he thus describes ; 810 veoi p.ev *al ogds KOI ira/ioi (headlong, hasty,
precipitate,) itfpi TC raj 6peets du nrvpoi Acal oiVrpwSets ai/mros 7rXr?$et *at
deppoTrjTi, TO>V 8e TrpecrftvTcov ij npos TO ffTrap ap^ 1 ) TOV tiri&uprjTiKOV *ara-
crftfvvvTai, Kal yiWrai fimpa Kal acrdfv^s Icr^va Se fj,d\\oi> 6 Xoyoj TOV
jradrjTiKov T<B <7<u/n.ari <TvvaTvo}jLapaivop.f.vov. Compare with this Rhet. II 12.8,
o>(T7rp yap ol olvcap-fvoi, OVTOO diddep/jLOL flcriv ol veoi VTTO rrjs (f>vo~eu>s . and
J 3- 7; 7rpecr|3vTfpoi tvavrioos 8ia.Keii>Tai rots veois KaTC^vyp.fvoi yap elcnv,
01 8f 0ep/j.OL. uxTTf Trpoa>8uTroiT]K TO yfjpcis rrj 8(i\iq Kal yap 6 (/)o/3oy /cara-
v//-ui y TIS ea-Ti. The curious correspondence of the metaphors in the two
authors description of the hot impetuosity of the one and the cold
phlegmatic temper of the other, is accounted for by similarity of theory
as to the origin of the -rradr}. With both the explanation is physiological,
and in the spirit of modern inquiries in the same department. Ari
stotle s views may be gathered from the de Anima I I, 403 a 3, seq.
He there describes them as inseparable from the body and its matter
and functions ; with the possible exception of ro voelv thought and
intelligence , which is there included with the Tradrj as a property of life ;
and they are ranked with sensation in general : (paiVerai 8f rwi/ pev TrXfi-
<TTCI)V the independent existence of the intellect, or part of it, being left
an open question ovQtv nvev TOV crmfiaros Trdcr^eiv ovde TroietV, oiov opyi-
ecr$cu, Oappflv, fTridvp.f iv, oXco? alcrddveadai. See further, ib. line 16; and
ib. line 31, a physical definition of anger (which he seems to accept as cor
rect as far as it goes) is given, f<ris TOV nepl xapd/av a"p.aro? Kal deppov :
this is the definition of the v\r] of the irados. Eth. N. IV 15, 1128 b 14,
(rco/iariKa fj (fraiverai TTO>S eivai d/i^drepa (aiSoS Kal Vfjj.e(rt.v) oirep 8oK(l
nddovs fj.d\\ov rj efa>s tlvai. Near the end of the i2th chapter Plutarch
further assigns as the irdQr] TWV vea>v, alaxyvr] (comp. Eth. N. IV 15, 1128 b
l6 seq.), eiri&vftia (Aristotle, fnidvfJirjriKoi, C. 12.3), fj.fTa.voia (Ar. euy^erd/^o-
Xat, c. 12. 4), Tj Sow; , XUTTJ; (meaning of course that they are excessively
susceptible of these two feelings), <ptXorjp,i a. .(Ar. ib. 6.)
Against Spengel s view of these rfdrj viz. that they are the analysis
of the tfdos proper, eV rw Xe yovrt, taken by Aristotle out of the order of
treatment, which he had originally laid down for the three great divi-
1 40 PHTOPIKH2 B 12 r.
e r]6n TTOLOL Tives Kara TO. Tradn K&
ras tjXiKias KUI ras Tiy%as, SieXdaojULev fj-era Tavra.
sions of rhetorical proof, nia-reis, ydos, Trddos ; and placed after, instead of
before, the Trddrj I will here add to what I have already said in the
Introd. p. 112 (and p. no on the real difference between the two kinds of
r,6os described in II i and here), that, whereas in II i reference is made
for details to the analysis of the virtues in I 9, the political characters of
I 8, and the characters of the three ages and conditions of life, are not
noticed at all ; and for the best of reasons ; because they in fact belong
to a different class of rjdos ; the object of the first, rjdos proper, being to
impress the audience favourably as to your own character and good
intentions ; that of the second to adapt your tone, sentiments and lan
guage, to the tastes and feelings of certain special classes whom you
may have to address; you study their characters for the purpose of
introducing into your speech what you know will be acceptable to each
of them. And precisely the same thing may be said of the political
characters.
i. The varieties of men s characters in respect of their instinctive
feelings and developed states and of their several ages and fortunes
(conditions of life), let us next proceed to describe . 2. By feelings or
emotions I mean anger, desire, and such like of which we have spoken
before (ll 2 u), and by settled states, virtues and vices : these too have
been discussed before, as well as the objects of individual choice, and of
individual action (what sort of things they are inclined to do, or capable
of doing, TrpaKTiKoi ) . The second reference is to I 9, and probably also
to i 5 and 6, on good absolute and comparative, as the object of human
aspiration.
On Trddrj, dvi>d[j.fis, eei?, see Eth. Nic. II 4; and on the import of
rjdos and its relation to edos, Introd. p. 228, Appendix C, to Bk. I. c. 10.
Vater raises a difficulty about the connexion of the above passage
with the concluding sentence of the last chapter, which he says he can
not understand. " How could Aristotle after stating that he had con
cluded the description of the irddr) immediately add, as though nothing
had been said about them, nunc autem qui mores aut animorum motiis
expliccmus" ? My answer is that he does not say so : the two sentences
have reference to two totally different things: at the end of c. n, he tells
us that he has now finished the analysis of the Trddrj, and shews by the
analysis how they can be applied to the purposes of the rhetorician, how
to excite and allay them. What he says at the opening of c. 12, is that
he is now going to treat of the application of these irddrj and the eety
which grow out of them to the characters of certain ages and conditions
of life. The Latin words quoted are a mere mistranslation : the Kara is
overlooked, and the sentence rendered as if it were TO. 8e rjdrj KO.\ rd Trddrj
...^LeXdco^fv. Vater accordingly on this ground, and also on that of the
passage of Ouintilian (immediately to be noticed), supposes that some
thing is lost here.
The passage of Quintilian, V 10. 17, presents a real difficulty. In
referring to Aristotle /;/ secundo de Arte Rhetor ica libro which can only
PHTOPIKHS B 12 2 4. 141
2 Ae yfo) Be Tra6rj fj.ev 6p<yr\v eTridv/miav Kal TO. TOiavTa,
Trepl wv eip/jKa/uiev Trporepov, e^eis Be dperds KOCI
KaKias" e lpt]Tai Be Trepl TOVTWV TrpOTepov, Kal Trola
Trpoaipovvrai eKa&Toi, Kal TTOLCDV TrpaKTLKoi. q\iKiat
B elcrl veoTrjs Kal ciK/uri Kal yfjpas. TV^Y\V Be Ae yw p. 1389.
evyeveiav /cat TT\OVTOV Kal $vvd/meis Kal Tavavria TOV-
TOL<S Kal oAws euTV%iav Kal ^varTV^iai/.
3 ol fj.ev ovv veoi TO. ij6rj elcrlv eTridv/uitiTiKOi, Kal oioi
Troieiv (iov av eTTidufj.ria coa ii . Kal TWV Trepl TO crco/ma
eTriOv/uLiuJv fjiaXitrra aKO\ov6i]TiKol eicri ra?s Trepl TO.
4 d(ppo^i(ria, Kal aKparels Tavrrjs. ei/yuera/3o/\oi Be KOL
mean this place he adds to what we actually find in Aristotle several
other characters of which no trace is now to be found in his text, " ut
divitias quid seguatur, aut ambitum, aut superstitionem ; quid boni pro-
bent, quid malt petant, quid milites, quid rustici; quo quaeque modo res
vitari vel appeti soleat" Both Victorius (Comm. ad II 17. 6, p. 358,
ed. 1548), and Spalding (ad loc. Quint.), attribute the discrepancy to a
lapse of memory on Quintilian s part, who was here quoting without
book. The former, in a sarcastic note, thinks that it is much more pro
bable to suppose that Quintilian, without referring to the text of his
author, added de suo what he thought ought to be there, than that any
thing has been lost in a book which presents no trace of any hiatus. To
which Spalding adds, "non uno quidem loco vidimus videbimusque Quin-
tilianum memoriae vitio e libris afferentem, quae in iis non plane eadem
legerentur. Cf. IV 2. 132." In this explanation I think we must acqui
esce. Spengel also, in his tract ilber die Rhet. des Ar. (Trans. Bav. Acad.
1851) p. 43, attributes this want of coincidence to a mistake of Quin
tilian.
2. ij\iKiai, K.T.X.] The ages are youth, prime of life (manhood), and
old age. By " fortune" I mean, birth, and wealth, and power of various
kinds (plural], and their opposites, and in general good and bad fortune .
3. Now the youthful in character are prone to desire, and inclined
to do (to carry out, put in practice or execution) anything they may
have set their hearts upon. And of the bodily appetites lust is that
which they are most disposed to follow (to give way to, or obey), and in
this (sc. rrjs f7ridvfj.l.as, this particular appetite) they are incontinent . If
rats is right (some MSS have r^?), ravrrjs is a piece of careless grammar,
denoting lust as a single appetite, of which the plural preceding repre
sents the varieties, or moments. Comp. Eth. Nic. I i, 1095 a 5, seq. eVt
8e (o pe oy) rots irade<nv aKoXovdrjTiKos wi> it will be in vain and unprofit
able for him to study moral philosophy, which is a practical science,
whereas he has as yet no sufficient control over his own actions oJ yap
Trapa TQV xpovov T; e\Aet\^tf, <iXXa 8ia TO Kara nddos fjv Kal 8i<oKfiv ocatrra.
142 PHTOPIKH2 B 12 4.
d\jsiKp()Oi TTjOos Tas eTTiBujULta^, Kcti (r(po$pa fJtev eVf-
OvfjiOvcTL ra^ew? e TraiWrar o^elai yap al fiov\t]-
creis Kai ou jULeyctXai, cocrTrcp al TWV
4. Changeable too and fickle are they in respect of their desires
and appetites, and these are violent but soon subside : for their wishes
and volitions (i3ov\.r)o-is includes both) are sharp (keen, eager) and not
strong or enduring (non firma, non perdurantia, Victorius), like the
hunger and thirst of the sick (the plural of the abstract nouns, here, as
usual, the various or successive moments, accesses of the two appetites).
Comp. Eth. N. IV 15, 1128 b 16, ov 770077 8 ^Xt/a a TO irados dp/zo^ei, dXXa
TTJ vea olop-eda yap delv TOVS Trf\movTovs atS^/zoi/as elvai $ia TO nddei
e3i/Tas TroXXa d/xapraWtv, uVo Trjs aldovs e Ka>\vfcrdai. Horace, A. P. 160,
(puer) mntatur in ho ras (tiJ/xera/SoXof) ; 165, et amata relinquere pernix
(a^fiKopos) , 163, cereus in vitium flecti.
d\lsiKopos. As this word is not explained nor sufficiently illustrated
in the Lexicons, it will be well to supply the deficiency by a few exam
ples. This appears to be its earliest appearance in the extant Greek
literature. It does not become at all common till Plutarch s time.
Hesychius and Suidas supply the derivation. d\l/iKopov airXrjcr^ov. rj apa
TW a-^aadai. KOpevvvpevov Ta^ecoy. d^LKOpos Kavparivos (Kafj.arr]p6s, Salma-
sius), ra^fcos oXiycopcoi/, KOL Kupov \afi(3dva>v. a^iKopws 6i;/x6ra/3Xr;r&)y
(Hesychius s. v.). d^iKopos ev/xerd/3X?;Tos ^ o ra^/wy Koi a/xa ra> a\//-acr$ai
Kopevvvpevos. " 8td re ryv (j)V(TiK.r)v T<V No/idSa)j/ d\lsiKopiav" (fickleness)
K.r.X. (Polyb. XIV 1.4; the quotation in Suidas is inexact), KOI avdis
(M. Anton. I 16, Bekker ad loc.) " O-VVT^PTJTIKOV 8fl elvai rrpbs TOVS (pi Xovs
Kai fj.^8afj,ov d\^iKopov" (Suidas, s. v.). Thus the primary meaning of the
word is, one that is satiated by a mere touch, a-^ei Ke/copecr/ieVos, Kope-
adfis, easily satisfied with anything, soon tired of it ; fickle, changeable,
fastidious ; fastidiosus, ad mutationem proclivis (Ast s Lex. Plat. s. v.) ;
"quern cito omnis rei fastidium capit, ac simul atque attigit satiatus ilia
cxpletusque est" (Victorius ad hunc locum). It is found in the Pseudo-
Plat. Axiochus, 369 A, as an epithet of the fi^os. Once in Lucian,
Calumniae non temere credendum, c. 21, TrpwTov pev TO <pi\oKai.i>ov, o (pvo-n
TTCUTIV dvdpanrois inrdp^fi, /cat TO d^iKopov. Once in Polybius, the passage
quoted by Suidas. More frequently in Plutarch, nfpl TrauW dywyrjs,
c - 9> P- 7 B, TOV IIOVOK.U>\OV \oyov... Trpos TTJV ao~Kr]o~iv dtyiKopov (tiresome,
speedily producing weariness or disgust) /ecu iravrrj dveTrl^ovov. Id. TTCOJ Sel
TOV veov TroirjpdTtov aKovfiv c. 4, p. 20 B, it is coupled in the same sense
with f^fjLfpov and dfieftaiov, with which it is almost synonymous. Id. Trepi
TroXwtpiXi ay, c. 2, p. 93 D, Sto TO <pi\oKaii>ov KM d^iKopov (praesentium fas-
tidio, Lat. Transl. ap. Wyttenbach). jrepl d8o\ea-^ias, c. 5, p. 504 D, /JLOVOS
"Ofjirjpos Trjs TK>V dv6pa>na>v d\jsiKopias Trepiyeyovev. EpcoTt/cos, C. 5j 75^ ^>
"Epcor ^copl? A(ppo8iTT)S...Kal TrXijo fJ.i.ov KCU d^ iKopov. Ib. C. 16, 759 F > "OTt
ovdt fjv$(mv rjo ews KCIT* "ErriKovpov, C. 3, p. 1088 B, TO treofjui. . ,ev Tavrais (TO.IV
TJbovais} dffdevts TI /cat d^ mopov (satietati,fastidio obnoxium).
o-fpoSpa eniffvp-ovaiv] Victorius refers in illustration to Caesar s
saying of Brutus, quidquid vult valde vult [Cicero, ad Att. Xiv i. 2];
which Plutarch renders, jrdv 8 o /SovXerat o-0oSpa /3ouXeTai [Brutus, c. 6].
PHTOP1KHS B 12 5 7. 143
5 Kai Trelvai. Kai Bu/ntKOt Kai 6j~v6ujmoi Kai oioi UKO-
XovQelv Tt] opjuf]. Kai IJTTOVS elcri TOU BVJULOV. Sid
yap (pi\OTi[j.iav OVK dve^ovTai oXiycopovfJLevoi, d/\\
6 dyavaKTOvcriv dv o ltovTai dSiKtlo-Bai. Kai (j)i\OTi]u.oi
fj.tv elorij /u.d\\oi> Se <pi\oviKOi inrepo xn^ yap
n veoTqs, r\ Se V IK.Y\ inrepo^r ] Tt5. Kai d[jL(p(a
p.d\\ov v] <pi\oxptiiuLaTor fyiXoxpnfJ-aTOi Se
Sid TO /ULrjTrii) eVSetcrs TreTreipdcrBai, wcnrep TO YliT-
7 TUKOU ex L dTrofydeyima 6ts Afj.(piapaov. Kai ov KOKO-
d\\ evrjOeis Sid TO /UL^TTM TeBewp^Kevai 7ro\\ds
5. And passionate and quick-tempered (hasty), and apt to give
way to their impulses. And under the dominion of (slaves to) their
passion (6v^6s, here the angry passions : on the more technical sense of
6vp.6s, as one of the three divisions of the opegeis in a psychological
classification, see in note on II 2. i) ; for by reason of their love of
honour they cannot brook (put up with) a slight, but always resent any
thing which they suppose to be a wrong . Hor. A. P. 159, puer...iram
colligit ac ponit temere ct mutatur in horas.
6.- And fond as they are of honour, they are still fonder of vic
tory : for youth is desirous of superiority, and victory is a kind of supe
riority . The 0tXonjLu a of youth seems to be represented in Horace s
cupidus, A. P. 165, desirous , that is, of honour and glory; not, of course
of money, covetous or avaricious. Comp. II 2.6; and I u. 14, 15, on the
pleasures of victory in competitions of all kinds, founded on the natural
desire of superiority which is an instinct of humanity. Victorius quotes
Cic. de Fin. v 22. 61, (de pueris) Quanta studio, decertantiiim sunt:
quanta ipsa ccrtamina : ut Hit effcmntur laetitia cum vicerint, ut pudct
I ictos :...quos illi labores non pcrferunt ut aequalium principes sint.
And both of these they are fonder of than of money : in fact for money
they have no fondness at all (///. in the very least degree), owing to their
never yet having had experience of want ; to which Pittacus pithy saying
(or dir6<f)6fyna II 21. 8) of Amphiaraus is in point . Until we know what
the saying was dictum hoc Pittaci intertidit, says Buhle we cannot
decide whether els is to be interpreted against Amphiaraus or merely
applied or addressed to him; [perhaps simply on ; with aTro^Qfy^a els
i/, compare in this sense Pindar, Ol. VI. 13, ati/oy, ov "Adpaaros ts
7. And not ill-natured but good-natured, because they have as yet
had but few opportunities of observing the (prevalent) wickedness (of
society) , -n-ov^pias, plural, the acts or cases of villainy which meet us so
frequently in the experience of life.
The meaning of evr/dds here may be determined by its opposite KUKO-
ijOfis, which is thus defined in c. 13. 3 ; KaKorfQeia TO eVt TO x f ~ L P ov wroXa/i-
fiavtiv iravra. It therefore denotes the simple, innocent, artless, candid
turn of mind which thinketh no evil , and puts a favourable interpreta
tion upon any doubtful act or expression. This is of course the primary
144 PHTOPIKH2 B 12 8.
. Kai eUTTKTTOt $10. TO JULJ]7TM 7TO\\a
Kai ei/ e/\7nSes* w<T7rep yap ol oivia/uLevoi, OVTCO
l<TLV ol veoi viro Ttjs ^)i/Vew* a/ma e Kai
and proper sense of the word, and so it is employed by Thucyd. Ill 83,
Kal TO evrjdes, ov TO yevvalov Tr\(icrTov fierc^et, KaTayf\acr6ev ^(JMVicr&ij, sim
plicity, the chiefest ingredient of a noble temper, was laughed to scorn
and disappeared ; namely, in that degeneration of character, and conse
quent perversion of language, which are ascribed by the author to the
factious quarrels then prevailing in Greece.
In Herod, in 140, there is a doubtful instance, 81 fvrjdirjv, which
Schweighauser explains by animi banitas, though the more unfavourable
signification is equally probable. And in Demosth. c. Timocr. 717. 2, TTJS
vp.Tepas evi^deias certainly bears the same sense as Aristotle gives to the
word here. But in its ordinary application even in Herodotus and the
tragedians ; in Plato, with whom it is very frequent, almost invariably
simplicity has degenerated into silliness or absurdity, by that process
of deterioration, common in language, which Trench, Study of Words,
Lect. II. On the morality in words , has abundantly illustrated. He
refers to evijdrjs without naming it, p. 46. Bonhomie and Einfalt have
precisely the same double sense. [Cf. Vol. I. p. 175.]
I must however add that it is equally possible that Ar. may have
meant here that youth are simple-minded , i.e. prone to a simple and
literal interpretation of everything as they see it, without penetrating
beneath the surface, inclined to think well of everything and so
Victorius, ingenii simplicis et fatui, bene de omnibus existimantes
especially as Ar. himself has twice used the word in the disparaging
sense, in 1.9; 12. 2. Comp. Plat. Rep. ill 409 A (quoted by Victorius),
Sto Sfj Kal fvrjdfis veoi ovTfs ol enifiKfls (paivovTai, Kal fVfairaTr)Toi VTTO TCOV
dStKcoy, are ov< e^ovres V eavToi? TrupaSft y/xara 6/j.oLOTradfj rots irovrfpols-
[Martial, XII. 51, Tarn saepe nostrum decipi Fabullinum Miraris, Aide?
Semper homo bonus tiro est.~\
Kal ev-mo-Toi, K.T.A.] And credulous (easy of persuasion), owing to their
having been hitherto seldom exposed to deceit .
8. And sanguine ; for youths, like men when in a state of drunk
enness, are pervaded by a heat due to their nature (i. e. their physical
structure) ; and also at the same time because they have not as yet had
much experience of failure . The first is the physical, the second the
intellectual or logical, explanation of the phenomenon.
oii/cB/ifvot] This is one of the verbs beginning with ot which " seldom
or never receive the augment", as ola-Tpav p.p. oiVrpr^eVo?, "compounds
of ol a and oia>i/os, ot^coKa Aesch. Pers. 13, Soph. Aj. 896." Matth. Gr. Gr.
168 obs. "This seems," he adds, "to have originated from the old
orthography, in which a> was as yet unknown." ol^yy.fvov, Eur. Bacch.
1284. Similarly, tv for rjv, in evpflv, fvprjKtvai, Kadevde, fv\6yrjcra. See
Ellendt s Lex. Soph. s. v. oiVoco, Elmsley ad Bacch. 686, who (following
Porson) writes <ov<afitvos, though the manuscript authority is against him.
See his note ad loc., and on evpelv see Lobeck ad Phrynichum, p. 140.
otVw/xei/os occurs no less than five times in Eth. N. vn, from c. 5 to 15.
With did-dfpp.oy > as a compound, hot or heated all through , pervaded,
PHTOPIKHS B 12 8. 145
TO /ULr iTTW 7ro\\a aTTOTeTVXtjKevai. KCII faffi TO.
eATTiSf t] p.ev jap e\7rh TOU jueAAoi TOS P- 8o -
^ \ / ~ / ^ ^ v / \
de {jLvnfJLri TOU 7rapoL%o/uLevou, TOi<$ oe veois TO
fj.e\\ov TroAi) TO 3e 7rape\r]\v6os (3pa%u TY\ yap
olov re,
saturated, with heat, compare SiaXcvKo? Ar. Probl. XXHI 6. 2,
Arist. Nub. 160, Hermann (bia AfTrrov, Dindorf and Meineke),
vfiv Plut., 8iafj.v8a\fos Aesch. Pers. 538, Person, Sidgrjpos, Siairpvcrios, 8id-
Trvpos Plutarch, de virtute morali, XI (p. 403) [quoted supra on p. 139],
Xenoph., Eurip., &c.
With the statement comp. Plutarch (already referred to), and the
rest of the preliminary note on c. XII. The heat in youth is supposed
to be caused by the boiling of the blood, this being the physical
origin of the iradrj, (as anger, de Anima I I, 403 a 31, already cited,)
which are specially characteristic of the young, see note supra 3.
The young are again compared to drunken men, Eth. Nic. VII 15,
^ Io > o/ioi o>? 8" (V fj.ev rfj vforrjTi dia rrjv avq<riv acnrep ol olixa-
BiaKfivrai, KCU rjdv 77 vto-njs. The physical explanation of both
these comparisons is given in Probl. XXX i. 27, TO Se fapubv TO Trept
TOV TOTTOf < (ppOVOVp-fV K.O.I fKtTlfafUV JTOlfl f.v6u[JLOVS KOI dia TOVTO TTftOS
TO TTiitiv fls fJ.edr]v -rrdvTfs e^ovcrt Trpo6vfj.a>s, OTL irdvras o oivos o TroXur
e i>\7ri8as Troie?, KaQciirfp ij veoTrjs TOVS TratSay (cited by Zell) : which not
only serves as a commentary on the present passage, but also proves
that ZelPs, and not Fritzsche s (ad Eth. Eudem. Z 15, 1154^ 9 11), inter
pretation of the second is the true one. " Inde igitur iuventutis et ebrie-
tatis affinitas, quia utraque corpori calorem impertit." (Fritzsche in alia
omnia abit: q. v. si tanti est.) That Siddcpnoi here and dtp^oi c. 13. 7,
are to be interpreted literally as well as metaphorically will further
appear by a comparison of the passage referred to in the note on II
13- 7 [P- 154].
And their lives are passed chiefly in hope ("cam sibi propositam
habent in vita ac sequuntur ut omnium suarum actionum ducem." Vic-
torius) ; for hope is of the future, but memory of the past, whilst
to youth the future is long but the past short ; for in their earliest
years (so Victorius ; comp. TJJ TfXeirrma rj^epq, c. 13.8) it is impossi
ble for them to remember anything (i. e. they have nothing or
hardly anything to remember), whilst everything is to be hoped for 1 .
I have adopted (as also Spengel) Bekker s conjecture olov re for
oioirat, which has little or no meaning. TTJ Trpwry TJfj.tpa may also very
well be interpreted literally on the first day of their existence , the
extreme case being taken for the purpose of illustration. With this
interpretation otoi/rat may be retained ; for it now will have the meaning,
that on the very first day of their existence, even then, they suppose
they can t be sure that they remember nothing, &c.
The phrase S>o-iv IX-iriSi, which recurs in 12, T<B r/Qfi c3cri paXXov fj
TM XoyiCT^w, and c. 13. 12, expresses the same thing, viz. living in the
exercise or practice of, as fiji/ Kara rrddos and roTr nadfaiv nKoXovdrjTtKoi,
AR. II. IO
146 PHTOPIKH2 B 12 911.
ecn ia TO
9 e\irifjov<rt yap paSiws. Kai dvSpeiorepoi
yap Kai ve\7Tt$es, tav TO IULEV fJirj <J)o(3eTo 6ai TO ce
Bappelv Troiel OVTC <yap 6pytft)fJLvos ovdeis (fiofi
10 TO T6 e\7rieiv dyaQov TL 6appa\eov icrTiv.
al(r^vvTt]\oi ov yap TTCO Ka\a tTepa vTroXaju
11 cnv y dXXa TreTraiSevvTai VTTO TOV VOJULOV JJLOVOV.
OUTC yap VTTO TOV {3iov TTIO T6Ta7rei-
Eth. Nic. I I, 1095 a 5 and 9, comp. infra 13. 14, and l-
riKoi, supra 3. It is otherwise rendered by Qv irpos TI, c. 13. 9; 14. 2,
3, wpos TO Ka\bv gaivTes K.T.\. Victorias quotes Probl. XXX (11), 6 peis
ovv avdpanos TO> KB rot TrXeiora fj, ra Se Qrjpia opt^ei KOI 6vfj.u> KOI fmdvfjiiq.
And easy to deceive for the reason already mentioned, that is, the
readiness with which their hopes are excited .
9. And rather inclined to courage (di/Spciorepot roC eioo^oro?, or TWI>
u\\(ov); for they are passionate and sanguine, of which the one produces
the absence of (or freedom from) fear, the other positive confidence : be
cause on the one hand fear and anger are incompatible (n 3. 10, ddvvarov
a/ia <f>oflf i(Tdai KOL opyi^eaQai, 5. 21, dappa\OV yap ij opyij), and on the Other
hope is a sort of good thing that inspires confidence .
10. And bashful, sensitive to shame; because they have not yet
acquired the notion of (inrdXappaveiv) any other standard of honour and
right, but have been trained (schooled) by the conventional law alone .
o v6fj.os is here the law established by society, the conventional usages in
respect of honour and conduct, the traditions and customary observances
of good breeding, any violation of these calls a blush to the cheek of
youth. Old age, the opposite, has lost this quick sense of shame ; 8ia
yap TO fj.rj (ppovTi^eiv o/zoi tor TOV KciXov KOL TOV o-vfjifjifpoiiros o\iya>pov<Ti TOV
Fii)K.flv, C. 13. Id. irpfo-ftvTfpov 8 ovdf\s av tnaivfa-fifv OTI alcrxvvTT)\6s, Eth.
N. IV 15, 1128 b 20. No/xoy in this sense is opposed to (pvo-is, as in the
famous antithesis, the abuse of which is one of the principal sources of
paradox and sophistry (TrXeToros TOTTOS TOV TTOKIV TrapaSo^a Ae -yeiv), TO /cnrci
(f)vo~ii> Kai Kara TOV v6fj.ov. r]i> 8e TO pev Kara (pvo-ii> avTols TO aXrjBes, TO 8e KOTO.
vofjLov TO Tols TroXXoTs SoKovv. Topic. IX (de Soph. El.) 12, 173 a 7 seq.
In this more comprehensive application of the term, however, the posi
tive laws, of human origin, enacted in the various states and cities, are
included amongst the social conventions . On the similar antithesis of
TTpos Sogav and vrpoy aXridtiav, see note on II 4. 23, comp. c. 6. 23. In the
former case truth or reality is opposed to popular opinion and its results ;
in the latter reality and right are represented as the natural law or
order of things. In this passage the dX^eia has a moral character; TO
Ka\6v, the true is here the right or noble , the ultimate end of the
moral action. On this sense of KaX6i>, see my Review of Aristotle s System
of Ethics, 1867, p. 14.
ii. And high-minded (having lofty thoughts and aspirations) for
PHTOPIKH2 B 12 i r, 12. 147
vcovrat, d\\a TU>V dvayicaitov ctTreipoi elcriv, Kal TO
d^iovv avrov fjLe<yd\cov fJLe<ya\o^V)(ia TOVTO eue\-
12 7T{os. Kal fj.d\\ov alpovvrai TrpctTTeiv TO. Kct\d TWV
TW yap e6ei (^wcri /ad\\ov r] TW \o-
two reasons : first, because they have not yet been humiliated by (the
experience of) life their thoughts and aspirations have not yet been
checked and lowered by the experience which life gives of the impos
sibility of realising them but are as yet without experience of the force
of circumstances (TO di>ayKaovTa, things that constrain and compel us
against our will, control our actions, and thereby check and prevent the
carrying out of lofty designs, of high and generous purposes : enforced
actions , says the Rhet. ad Alex. c. i 10, ra dvayKain, TO. ny e $ THJ.IV
OVTO. TrpdrTfiv, aXX coy e dvdyiajs Selas TJ di>0pa>Trivr]s ourcoy oira) ; and
secondly, because highmindedness is characterised by the consciousness
of high desert (thinking oneself deserving of great rewards and successes),
and this belongs to the sanguine temper : and therefore may be inferred
from 8. The definition of /zeyaXo^^os , Eth. N. IV 7, sub init., is o
/zeyaAcoi/ auVoi/ aicui> atov a>v. The two last words, essential to the defi
nition (as may be seen from what immediately follows), are omitted in
the Rhetoric as not required for the occasion. The consciousness of
exalted merit, which does form a part of the definition, is sufficient here
for the purpose aimed at, namely to connect highmindedness with the
sanguine temperament, Hor. A. P. 165, sublimts, full of high thoughts
and aspirations.
12. And in action they prefer honour to profit titilium tanius
provisor, Hor. A. P. 164 for their conduct in life is rather due to the
impulses of their character, than guided by reasoning and calculation ;
the latter being directed to profit, whereas honour and the right are the
aim of virtue . The intellect and its calculations are here distinctly
excluded from any participation in virtue, which is assigned solely to the
moral character; the impulses, cpt^tis and Trddrj, duly cultivated and
regulated, pass into virtues. This is in direct contradiction to the
doctrines of the Ethics, which give to the two virtues of the intellect,
o-o0i a and (frpovrjcris, wisdom, speculative and practical , even the pre
eminence over the moral virtues; identifying true happiness with the
exercise of the former. But our author is here departing from his
Eudaemonistic ethical system, which makes happiness (in a transcen
dental sense no doubt) the end of all human action ; and substituting for
it the more popular and higher view of the TXoy, which represents it as
the abstract good and noble, or the right, TO KaXov ; a standard and an
end of action independent of all sordid and selfish motives or calculation,
with which it is here brought into contrast. This view of the re\os
appears incidentally, as an excrescence upon the systems (to which it is
opposed), in the Nic. Ethics, as in 7, sub init. Ib. c. 10, 1115 b 24, and
especially IX 8, p. 1169^4, et seq. With what is said in our text, comp.
Eth. N. IX 8, 1168^34, 6 8 fTTifiKfjs (irpdrrfi) <a TO KaXoV, Kal oa-co av
jSfXrt ajj/ ?} /naXXoy ia TO Kn\6i>.
IO 2
148 PHTOPIKH2 B 12 13, 14.
ytCTjUW, (TTl & 6 fJLCV AoytCTyUOS: TOU (TVjUL<pepOVTO<S 1] $6
13 dperr] TOV KaXov. Kai (j)i\o<piXoi Kai (j)iXoiKetot Kai
(friXeTaipoi juaXXov TWV aXXuov vXiKiwv (Hia TO xaipeiv P. 1389 b.
Tip (rvj^ijv Kai fJLt]7T(D Trpos TO a~VjUL(j)pov Kpiveiv /x^3eV,
14 fc)(TT /mrj^e TOI)? (piXovs. Kai aTravTa ITTI TO pd\Xov
crfpo^oTepov d/JLapTai/oucri Trapa TO XiXwveiov
On Xoyto>ioff, the discursive, reasom#g r or calculating faculty or pro
cess,, opposed to the vovs, and identical with Stdvoia in its lower and
limited sense, see Eth. NIC. vi 2, 1139 6seq.; where the entire intellect
is divided into two faculties, (i) the vovs, or pure reason, <u 6ea>povfiev, the
organ of speculation, and of a priori truth, TO (TTKTTIHJLOVIKOV, and (2) the
Stdi/oia (in its special sense) the understanding, the organ of reasoning,
and of deliberation or calculation in practical matters, TO \oyurTiKov.
The exact opposite of all this [ 8 12] appears in the character
of old age, c. 13 5, 9, 10, 11, 14. Old men are Svcre XTnSey, avaiaxvvToi,
fj.LKpo\l^v)(oi, u>cri Trpos TO crv[j.<j)epov and Kara Xoyicrpov,
13. And they are more fond of their friends and companions than
the other ages (prime of life, and old age), owing to the pleasure they take
in social intercourse ( their liking for company ), and to their not yet
having learnt to measure everything by the standard of profit or self-
interest, and therefore not their friends (either) . Of the three kinds of
friendship, Eth. N. vm 2, 3, 4, founded severally upon (i) good (i.e. real,
moral, good, the only basis of perfect friendship or love), (2) pleasure,
and (3) profit or utility, that of young men belongs to the second. Of
these it is said, C. 3, 1156^ 13, o/xotwy Se KOI ol 81 r/Sovrjv ov yap TW
TTOLOVS Tivas tivai (by reason of their moral character) aycnraxri TOVS evrpa-
Tre\ovs, aXX on T^Sels avrols.
14. And all their errors are in the way of excess and undue
vehemence, contrary to Chilon s maxim (/j^SeV ayav, ne quid nimis); for
everything that they do is in excess ; for their love is in excess, and their
hatred in excess, and everything else in the same way. And they think
they know everything, and therefore are given to positive assertion,
which (this confidence in their own knowledge and judgment) in fact
accounts for their tendency to excess in everything . pr]8(i> ayav airfvfttiv
tempos & tVl Tracrii/ apicrro? ZpyfiacriV dvdpconutv (Theognis, 4 OI > Bergk).
" Cum enim omnia sibi nota esse putent, nee se labi posse credant, nihil
timide tractant," Victorius, who also quotes, in illustration of a positive
assertion , Hist. Anim. VI (21. 3), evtoi Se 8tto-xvpt oi>rai S/a /J.TJVOS
KVO.V rjpfpdKfySov (to the very day counting the days throughout the
month till you come to the very end). The word occurs again in the
same sense Ib. c. 37. 5, and indeed is common enough in other authors.
Of Chilon, to whom is ascribed the famous proverb which inculcates
moderation in all things the earliest hint of the doctrine of the mean
an account may be found in Diog. Laert. I 3. 68, seq., and in Mure s Hist,
of Gk. Lit., Bk. in, c. 6 16, Vol. in, p. 392. He was a native of Lace-
daemon, and }\vs, floruit is placed in 596 B.C. " Dubitatur quis sapientium
PHTOPIKHS B 12 1416. 149
Trdvra yap dyav TrpaTTOVcriv (piXovcri re yap dyav
Kal fjiKTOvariv dyav Kal ra/XAcc iravra ojuoiws. Kai
el^evai Trdvra c iovTai Kal ^ucr-^vp i^ovraL TOVTO yap
15 aiTtoV ECTTI Kal TOU TTuvTa dyav. Kal TO. a &fcr/juara
aOLKOvcTLV eis v(3piv KUI ou KaKOvpyiav. Kal \et]TiKoi
$ia TO Trdvras xpncrTOvs Kal {3e\Tiows v7ro\ajULj3dveiv
Trj yap avTcov aKUKia TOVS 7re/\as /ueTpoucriv, OXTT
1 6 dvdfcia Trdcr^eiv VTroXafji^dvovtTLV avTOvs. Kal (pi\o-
auctor esset sententiae, u^bev ayav. Palladas in Anthol. II 48. r, ^SeV
aynv TWV eVra cro<pa>v 6 cro^wraros eiTtev. Alii tribuunt Chiloni, alii Sodamo,
teste Scholiasta nostro, qui epigramma laudat quod in Tegea exstabat,
raiir t\fyev SwSa^ios ETrrjpaTov , os /* dvtdrjKfi , p,r]8tv ayav, Kaipco Travra
irpoaeo-Ti Ka\d." Monk, ad Eur. Hippol. 265. See also Valckenaer on
the same passage. Diog. Laert., I 41, quotes the following epigram:
TIV AaKedaifjiovios XftAwv ffo(j)6s, os rdS eXf^e [trjftev ayav Kinpo) iravra
irpoa-fcm Ka\d. Chilon and Sodamus are alike omitted in Smith s Dic
tionary of Biography.
15. The offences they commit incline to insolence or wanton
outrage, not to mean or petty crimes and mischief. Their crimes, when
they commit them, are rather those of open violence, outrage of personal
dignity, wanton aggression and the like, than of that mean and low form
of wrong-doing manifesting itself in all underhand dealings, as fraud,
cheating, calumny, and other similar offences, which work their mischief
secretly and insidiously, as it were underground, or in the dark : the
former being directed more especially against the person, v/3pecoj dripia,
II 2.6: the latter against a man s property, fortune, character. Compare
II 2. 6, which gives the reason for this distinction, Sio oi veoi ical ol TrXovcrioi
vftpio-Tai v-rrepexfiv yap o iovrai (they think to shew their superiority)
vftpi&vTfs. Of vfipis, al<ia is given as an instance II 16.4, where this kind
of offence is again attributed to the TrAotViot : as it is also in Polit. VI (iv)
u, 1295 & g. Excess in personal beauty, or strength, or birth, or wealth,
and their opposites, weakness and poverty and meanness of condition,
give rise severally to two different orders of offences : ylvovrai yap ol fj.ev
vfjpurral Kal fieyaXoTrovripoi. paXXov, ol 8e KaKovpyoi Kal p-iKporrovr^poi Xiav
Ttoi 5 dSiK^/itzrcoi ra /j.tv yiverai di" vfiptv TO. 8f 8ia Kanovpyiav. Compare
Plat. Legg. V 728 E, cos 8" avr<as y TU>V xP T IP- aTU>1 Ka KTr/fUtreav KTTJO-IS Kara
TOV atrov pv6fj.ov e%ei TO. /xei> vntpoyKa yap CKaOT<0V TOVTU>V e%6pas Kal o~TO.(r(is
aTTfpyd^fTai rats TroAetrt Kal I8iq, ra 5 fXAeiTTOvra 8ovXf ias toy TO TTO\V.
And disposed to compassion, because they suppose every one to be
good (absolutely) or better (comparatively, than they really are ; so
Victorius); for they measure their neighbours by their own harmlessness
(or freedom from malice and the love of mischief), and therefore assume
that their sufferings are unmerited : which is the occasion of e Xfoy, n 8. i.
16. They are also fond of laughing (mirth, fun), and therefore
disposed to pleasantry or facetiousness ; for pleasantry is wantonness
ISO PHTOPIKH2 B 13 i.
ri <yap
v{3pi<s
i TO fjiev ovv Ttov vewv TOLOLTOV ecrriv i]6os, ol OCHAP.XIII.
TTpecrfivTepoi Kai TrapiiK/maKores cr^eSci/ e /c TWV evav-
schooled by good breeding . From the description of ej/rpa7reAi a given
in Eth. Nic. II 7, 1108^23, and jv 14, ab init., it results that it is easy,
well-bred (roO 7rfTrai8fvp.evoVj roiavra \tyeiv KOI OKOVfiV ola TO> eVtfiKft Kai
eXfvOepicp appoTTfi} pleasantry in conversation, of which it is the agree
able mean 1 , lying between /3a>^oAox/a, buffoonery the excess, and
aypoiKta, rusticity, boorishness , the inability to see or give or take a
joke. It is a social virtue (one of three), and one of the accomplishments
of a gentleman. It forms part of the relaxation of life, dj/cwraio-fw? tv r<5
jSi o), which includes diayuyfjs utra TraiSias, all the lighter occupations of
which amusement or relaxation is the object and accompaniment, op
posed to the serious business of life, and corresponds exactly to the French
passe-temps; (on diayayrj, which may include even literary pursuits, or
studies, anything in fact that is not business, compare a^akr], and is so in
some sense opposed to TratSia, which is therefore inserted here to qualify
it, see Bonitz ad Metaph. A I, 981 b 18). 1 128 a 10, ol 8 f/^ieX<3j -rraigovTcs
evrpaTTfXot TTpocrayopfvovrai, oiov evrpoiroi. (from their versatility). The
two terms are exactly represented by Cicero s facetus and facetiae. Wit,
sales, takes two forms, dicacitas and facetiae; the first, raillery, pungent
and personal, o-K</i/xa, o-KaTrreiv the second, easy and agreeable, giving
grace and liveliness to conversation or writing. Utetur utroque; sed
altero in narrando aliquid venuste, altero in iaciendo mittendoque ridi-
culo, et seq., Orat. xxvi 87. Compare de Orat. n 54. 219, where the dis
tinction is somewhat different, or at all events expressed by different
terms, de Off. I 30. 104, genus iocandi elegans, urbanum, ingeniosum,
facetum, et passim. Cowper s John Gilpin furnishes a good specimen of
fuVpaTTfAi a : Now Gilpin had a pleasant wit, and loved a timely joke.
Such then is the character of the young .
CHAP. XIII.
The character of age we have already seen, and shall further find, to
be in almost all points the exact opposite of that of youth. Victorius
thinks that the desire of bringing out this contrast was Aristotle s reason
for departing from the natural order in his treatment of the three ages.
The authors quoted at the commencement of the last chapter will again
serve for illustrations of the topics of the present. Aristotle, as well as
Horace, confines himself almost exclusively to the delineation of the un
favourable side of the character of old age, suppressing its redeeming
features^ Horace represents his opinion at the opening of his sketch
(A. P. line 169), Multa senem circumveniunt incommoda which he pro
ceeds to describe.
i. Elderly men, and those who have passed their prime, have
most of their characters (formed) of the elements opposite to these ;
for from their long experience of life, its frequent errors and failures
PHTOPIKII2 B 13 14. 151
> -v ~ > n ^ \ \ \
TOVTOIS TO. 7T\6i(TTa e^ovonv i}(j)y cia yap TO
7ro\\a 6Tt] fiefiiwKevai Kcti TrXeito 6^r]7raTt](r6ai Kai
rifj.apTriK6vai, Kai TO. TrXeiw <pav\a eivai T<JOV Trpay-
jULaTtov, OVTE SiafiefiaiouvTai ov$V 9 TJTTOV re ayav
2. awavTa r] 3e?. Kai OLOVTCU, icracri S ovdtv, Kai d/u-p.Si.
<pi(rl3iiToui>T6<s TTpocTTiOeaoriv del TO ftrajs Kai rcr^a,
3 Kai TrdvTa \eyovonv oi/TO), gra<yu0s e) ovftev. Kai Ka-
Korjueis eicr tv ECTTL yap KaKOt\6eia. TO e?ri TO ^eipov
V7TO\afJLJ3av6iv TravTa. LTL ^e Ka^vTroTTTOi eicrt Cia
\ I >/ r> V ^ 5 > / \ >l
4 T)]V a7ri(TTiav, arria-TOL oe 01 e/unreipiav. KUL OVTC
(from having lived many years and often been deceived or imposed
upon by others, and fallen into error by their own fault), and from their
observation of the inherent vice of all human things (everything turns
out ill, nothing can be depended upon, and so they lose all confidence,
and), they refrain from all positive assertion and are in excess in the
undue rcmissness shewn in whatever they do . Muretus, et sunt in
omnibus rebus remissions. As the young carry everything they do to
excess, ayav, so on the contrary the old are in excess too (uyav...fj 8t i)
but this is manifested in want of spirit and energy and activity in all
that they do undertake ; supply nparrova-iv. It is doubtful whether ayav
should be taken before or after TJTTOV. If $TTOV ayav, as the order is
in the text, it will be everything they do is "less in excess" (referring to
the proverb, and the application of it to the young in the preceding
chapter) than it ought to be . If the order is ayav ^rrov, the meaning
is, everything they do is excessively too little (inferior in vigour and
energy) to what it ought to be .
2. And they only say they think, never "I know". And when
in doubt (or, when they are arguing or disputing a point), they always
add "perhaps" and "possibly", constantly expressing themselves in this
way (doubtfully), never with certainty (or decidedly, nayios, fixed, firm,
solid, and hence certain, irayiats \yeiv, certo affirmarc, Plat. Rep. iv
434 D, jrayias vofjcrai, Ib. V 479 C, Theaet. 157 A).
3. And they are ill-natured, for ill-nature is the tendency to put
an unfavourable construction upon everything (to attribute, for example,
every indifferent act to a bad motive, in deterius, in peius, interpretari.
Comp. c. 12. 7, of youth). And prone to suspicion by reason of their
incredulity, and incredulous from their experience . Kp^i Tron-ros is other
wise written KaxvnoTOTros in Plat. Phaedr. 240 E (Zurich Editors, and
Thompson ad loc.), though in Rep. in 409 c, it appears as Aristotle
writes it, and according to the Zurich Editors without varia lectio.
inroroTTflv and -fla-dai occur in Herod., Thucyd., Aristoph. and Lysias.
4. And for the same reason neither their love nor their hatred is
ever deep, but according to the precept of Bias, their love is such as may
hereafter become hatred, and their hatred love . This famous and often
152 PHTOPIKH2 B 13 4, 5.
(j)i\ov(ri <T(p6$pa ovre /u.i(rov(ri $ta Tavra, ct\\a Kara
Tr\v B/ai/ros viroQriKnv Kai (j)i\ovcriv ws /mtor/jcrovre^ Kai
5 fJnarovcTLV ws fyi\ria ovTe<s. Kai fjiiKpo^-v^oi Sid TO
quoted saying of Bias of Priene, the last of the seven sages (585 540 B.C.)
on whom see Diog. Laert. I 5, 82 seq. and Mure, Gk. Lit. ill 393, is
again referred to, without the author s name, II 21. 13. I will give two
or three of the most important references. Soph. Aj. 678 (Lobeck s Ed.),
a well-known passage of six lines, concluding with the reason or expla
nation of the precept, rols TroXXonn yap fipormv OTTIOTOS ecrd eraipeias \IJJ.TJV.
Comp. Lobeck ad loc., and to the same effect Oed. Col. 614, rols nev yap
rjdrj, rols 8" tv v(TTfpq> xpovto, ra reprrva iriKpa ycyvtrat Kavdis (piXa. Diogenes,
u. s., 87 (in the same chapter several more of his apophthegms are quoted),
eXe-ye re TOV fii6v OVTO> ^.erpflv (as Kai TTO\VV Kai oKiyov xP^vov /3to>cro/ie vouj-,
Kai (piXelv tag /j.ia"^(rovTas TOVS yap TrXeurrous dvai KUKOVS, and again 88,
aTre(p6tygaTo ol TrXflorot KOKOI, which gives his reason for the rule. A
similar sentiment is found in Eurip. Hippol. 253, xpfjv yap perpias els
aXXfjXoii? (friXias Qvrjrovs dvaKipvacrdai K.T.\, Cic. de Amic. XVI. 59, Nega-
bat (Scipio) ullam vocem inimiciorem amicitiae potuisse reperiri, quam
eius, gut dixisset ita amare oportere nt si aliquando essct osurus : nee vero
se adduci posse tit hoc, qiiemadmodum putaretur, a Biante esse dictum
crederet, qui sapiens habitus est unus e septem, sed impuri cuiusdam aid
ambitiosi, aut omnia ad suam potentiam revocantis,esse sententiam. Pub-
lius Syrus apud Cell. Noct. Att. xvn 14 (ap. Schneidewin ad loc. Aj.), Ita
amicum habeas, posse nt fieri hunc inimicumputes. Bacon de A ugm. Scient.
viil c. 2, Works, Ellis and Sped, ed., Vol. I. p. 788, "Septimum praeceptum
est antiquum illud Biantis ; modo non ad perfidiam, sed ad cautionem et
moderationem, adhibeatur : et ames tanquam inimicus futurus, et oderis
tanquam amaturus. Nam utilitates quasque mirum in modum prodit et
corrumpit si quis nimium se immerserit amicitiis infelicibus, molestis et
turbidis odiis, aut puerilibus et futilibus aemulationibus." Comp. Adv.
of Learning, II xxiii. 42. La Bruyere, Caract. c. 4 (in Ellis note).
" Vivre avec nos ennemis comme s ils devoient un jour etre nos amis,
et vivre avec nos amis comme s^ils pouvoient devenir nos ennemis, ti est
ni selon la nature de la haine, ni selon les regies de Vamitie : ce riest
point une maxime morale mais politique. On ne doit pas se faire des
ennemis de ceux qui mieux connus pourroient avoir rang entre nos amis.
On doit faire choix d amis si surs et d une si exacte probite que venant
a cesser de Fetre Us ne veuillent pas abuser de notre confiance, ni se faire
craindre comme nos ennemis? (on which Mr Spedding has another
commentary, too long to quote). Finally, Demosthenes, c. Aristocr.
122, p. 660 (quoted by Gaisford), expresses his approbation of the
maxim as a rule of action. He refers to it as a current precept, without
naming the author, and sums up in conclusion, aXX dxpl TOVTOV Kai
(piXflv, ot/xat, )(pf) Kai fj.icrc~ii>, fjiT]8eTfpov TOV xaipov vnepfiaXXovTas, that is,
neither friendship nor enmity should be carried too far, and so interpreted,
as to exclude the possibility of a subsequent change of feeling.
5. And they are little-minded, because their spirit has been
humbled by life (the experience which they have had of life and its
PHTOPIKHS B 1 3 5-7- iS3
T6Ta7reiva}(r6ai VTTO TOU jSiov oufievos yap
ovSe TrepiTTOv, d\\a TWV Trpos TOV ft iov eTrL
6 Kai dveXevdepOL ev yap TL TWV dva<yKaitav r] oixria,
tf <^^^<^^\) r >f c -v^ ^
a/uLct ce KUL cia Tt]V efjLTreipiav icracrii/ w<$ -^aXeTrov TO
7 KT}]O~a(r6aL Kai pa&iov TO aTrofiaXelv. Kal SeiX
7rpo<poj3tiTiKoi tvavr uas yap SictKeiVTCti
delusions and disappointments has taught them how little they can
do, and thereby lowered their aims and aspirations, and deprived them
of all spirit of enterprise and high endeavour) ; for they (now) desire
nothing great or extraordinary (standing out from and above all others
of the same class, TreptrTov, singular, striking, extra-ordinary, above the
common herd, and the ordinary level ; note on I 6. 8), but only what
tends to (the uses, or the ease and comfort of) their life . This again
is in direct opposition to the character of youth, c. 12. 11.
6. And (for similar reasons) illiberal (in money matters; mean,
parsimonious : this is because they have known want ; whereas their
opposites, the young, who have never known it, are inclined to liberality,
fJKi<rra fpiXoxpwaToi, c. 12 6); for property is one of the necessaries
of life ; and at the same time they know by (their) experience how hard
it is to get, and how easy to lose , as, of course, may also be that ;
and the literal translation is that gain or acquisition is hard, and loss
easy . Hor. A. P. 170, Quaerit et inventis miser abstinet et timet uti.
Comp. Eth. Nic. IV 3, II2I b 13, 8oeT yap TO yfjpas KOI Traera a&wa/Lu a
dve Xfvdt povs TToiflv. Pericles (in the funeral oration, Thuc. II 44, ult.)
disputes this, though he allows that it is a prevailing opinion ; 00-01
8 av 7rapr][3riKaTf...Kal OVK Iv rw a^peiw rfjs ijXiKias TO KfpBaivfiv, coarrep
Tivts (pci(Ti, p,a\\ov r/prrei, dXXa TO Tipacrdai. Byron, on the other hand
accepts the Aristotelian view. So for a good old-gentlemanly vice
I think I ll e en take up with avarice (Don Juan).
7. And cowardly, and in everything (always) inclined to dread,
in anticipation of coming danger (or, always inclined to anticipate
danger and evil), their disposition being the reverse of that of the young :
for they are cooled down (chilled by age), the others hot . Hor. A. P.
171, res omnes timide gelidegue ministrat, the gelide being manifestly
taken from Aristotle. On dv(\(vdtpoi, Gaisford cites Bacon on this topic.
The passage which he refers to in the Engl. Vers. occurs in de Augm.
Scient. Lib. VII c. 3, Vol. I p. 734, Ellis and Spedding s ed., " Videmus enim
Plautum miraculi loco habere, quod senex quis sit beneficus ; Benignitas
huius ut adolescentuli est" (Mil. Glor. in I. 40). Bacon has misquoted :
the line runs, Nam benignitas quidem huius oppido adulescentulist
(Ritschl). Bentley on Hor. A. P. 172 has made use of this characteristic,
irpofpofirjTiKoi, in support of his emendation pavidus for avidus. Orelli
observes on this that it contradicts spe longus which occurs just before.
But the two are not absolutely contradictory ; a man may look far forward
in his hope of a long life, and yet be fearful and anxious about what that
future may bring. This physical theory of heating and cooling as
154 PHTOPIKH2 B 13 7 9-
veois KaT6\l/wy/jivoi yap elcm*, o l $e 6epfj.oi, oxrre
7rpott)^O7rott]Ke TO yiipas Ttj $ei\ia Kat yap 6 (pofios
8 KaTct\l/v^i<s TJS e cTTiV. Kai (fiiXofaoi, Kai /ULa\i(TTa
/uepa ta TO TOV drrovros elvcu TV}V
ov e eVee?s, TOVTOV p.d\icrTa eTTiBv-
9 (J.iv. Kat <J)i\avTOi /ULCI\\OV t] $el /miKpo^v^ia yap
applied to human character and passions is illustrated by Probl. XXX
I. 22, wore (pofifpov TI orav flcrayyt\6f/, (av /j-tv ^vxpOTepas oucrrj? TTJS
Kpdcrffos T^x?7 SetXof Trotfi TrpocofioTTfjro/^Ace yap rw 0o)3a), Kfii o (pofios Kara-
^v^fi. 8r)\ovo-i 8e ol TTfpi(po^oi rpe/xouo-i yap. See the same, 29. 30.
Aio /cat ot fj-ev Tra18fs evdvpoTtpoi, ol fie ytpovTes Sva-dvfJioTfpoi. Ol fJLtv yap
Qfpiwi, ol Se ^vxpoi TO yap yfjpas Kara^v^is rts. 3 2 qdoiroiov TO 6fp/j.oi>
nal \lsvxpov p-aXia-ra ra>v lv rip.lv eoriV. Victorias refers to de Part. Anim.
II 4, 650 b 27, o yap (pofios Kara^u^ei 7rpoa)So7roi r;rat ouy rw Travel ra
TOLavrrfv e^oi/ra TJJP eV r^ KapSia upacrw (of the blood). On this physical
or physiological account of the irddrj, and their connexion with the con
dition of the blood and muscles, and their different degrees of heat and
cold, see further in the remainder of the same chapter. 6fpp.6rr]T05 yap
TTOITJTIKOV 6 6vp.os (passion produces heat as well as heat passion), ra 8e
orepea OfpyLavdtvra p.a\\ov 6epp.aiveL ru>v iiyp&v at S ives (the muscles)
(TTfpebv Kai yea>8(s, aurre yivovrai olov Trvpiai (vapour-baths) eV r nt/xart
Kai ecriv Trotoucrti/ ei> rols Ovfiols. Ib. 650 b 35 TroXXcoi fi earlv airt a
TI TGV at/iaro? <pv<ns KOI Kara TO fjQos TOIS (oois /cat Kara TTJV a i(r6r)(riv, K.T.X.
651 a 12.
And therefore old age prepares the way for cowardice (on TrpooSo-
7roieTi>, see note on I 1.2); in fact fear is a kind of cooling down . Comp.
Horace s gelide, A. P. 171, already quoted. " Virg. Aen. I 69, extcmplo
Aeneae solvuntur frigore membra. Servius, frigore, i.e. timore, et cst
reciproca translatio, naiu et timor pro frigore, ct frigns pro tinwre
ponitnr? Schrader.
8. And fond of life, and more than ever in their last days (not,
their very latest day\ Victorius ad c. 12. 8, rfj irpcoTrj r^epa.. So also
Bentley, in note on A. P. 172, translates, sub supremo vitae die 1 }, because
all desire is of the absent, and therefore what they (most) want (are
deficient in), that they most desire . Orelli, on Hor. A. P. 170178, com
pares $iXoo>oi with avidus fittitri, which he retains; (also Bentley, on
verse 172). He also quotes Soph. Fragm. 64 (Dind.), TOU gfjv yap ovdds
a>S o yrjpd(TK(ov epq.
9. And they exceed the due measure in self-love, this again (as
well as illiberality and cowardice) being a kind of little-mindedness
(which is characteristic of them, supra 5). The connexion of /Lu*po-
\jsvxia and <pi\avria [a word used in late Greek only] seems to be this :
Little-mindedness (Eth. N. iv 9, init.) is the undervaluing of oneself,
and one s own advantages. This narrows and cramps the mind, which
is consequently incapable of lofty aims and aspirations. A form of
this is selfishness, or self-love, which is thus described, Eth. N IX 8,
PHTOPIKH2 B 13 9i i. 155
KCti auTrj. Kai Trpos TO a"v/uL(j)epov ^cocriv, d\\ ou
TO KdXov, fjidXXov i] Sel, Sia TO (piXavTOi eivac
TO p.ev yap (ru/uL(pepci> avTW dyaOov IOTTI, TO e Ka\ov
f -v ** \ 9 f ^NN J\> -\ ^ ^
iOa7rAa>9. Kai avaicr^vi/TOi ^uaAAoi/ */ aia"%WTri\oi cia P. 1390.
yap TO /mi] (ppovTi^eiv d/xo/ws TOV Ka\ou KUI TOU (rv/UL-
ii (pepovTOs oXiytopoucrL TOU ^o/ceo . Kai $u(re\7ri$e<s Sid
Tr,v e/uLTreipiav Ta yap TrAe/w TWV yiyvojuievcov <pav\d
sub init. cos tv aicrypw <pi\ai>Tovs airciKciXovcriv, SoKet re 6 pev (frav-
Xoj eavTov x^P LV TTUVTO. Trparrfiv, Kai ocra uv /jo^dnporepos y, rocrovTut
paXXov i-yKaXovcn fir/ avrcp art ov6fv d<j) eavrov (" away from himself",
without reference to himself, and his own interests) 7rparr. But when
all a man s aims and desires are centred in himself, they must of
course be very mean and confined as compared with the lofty aspira
tions of the /j.(ya\o-*l/vxos, or even of the average man, and the wide
sphere in which they range ; and therefore self-love when excessive is one
form in which narrow-mindedness shews itself.
Their rule in life is profit, not honour, more than it ought to be,
which arises from their selfishness : for profit, self-interest, is a man s own
good, whereas honour (or the right) is good absolutely . Orelli quotes this,
and dXXa KOTO. TO Kepftos, in illustration of Horace s quaerit et inventis
miser abstinet et timet uti, A. P. 170. On the distinction of auYco the
individual, and air\ais the general notion or the absolute, see note on TO
airrco rj aTrXcoy, I 7- 35-
On ro Ka\6v in its two aspects, see I 7. 24, and I 9. 3, and notes. We
are here presented with the two opposing views of good, the ideal and prac
tical. The ideal form represents good as the fair and right, the aim and
end of our hopes and aspirations, and the rule of life, in the shape (it may
be) of honour or glory (la Gloire), or some immaterial, high and noble
object, apart from all considerations of self, and one s own interest. The
practical view of good regards it as something useful and serviceable for
the uses and purposes of life, and for one s own interest and advance
ment; it is TO xPW l t jLOV an d r ^vpfyepov, the useful and profitable.
Socrates in Xenophon s Memorabilia argues in favour of this view of
good .
10. And they are rather inclined to insensibility than to sensibility
to shame (comp. 12. 10) ; for in consequence of their caring little for
honour as compared with profit, they pay slight regard to (treat with
contempt) other people s opinions of them (how they seem to others) .
They only care for solid and substantial advantages, and disregard all
mere empty seeming and opinion . Trpea-fivTepov 8 ov8e}s av (Traive-
a-fifv on al<rxvi>TT)\6s (Eth. N. IV 15, 1128 b 20). If he were keenly sen
sitive to shame, he would get no credit for it ; ovOev yap nlo^f&a belv avrov
TrprTfiv oty cortv cu
ii. Also they are given to despondency, in consequence of their
(unfavourable) experience (of life and its fortunes) ; for most things that
156 PHTOPIKH2 B 13 12, 13.
i<TTiv d7ro/3aivei yovv TO. 7ro\\d ITTI TO ^elpov KCIL
12 6Ti Sid Tr\v $i\iav KOCI w<n Trj ^vr]^n fj.d\\ov rj TY\
e\7ri$i TOU yap fiiov TO p.ev \OLTTOV oXiyov TO Se
7rap6\ti\v6os 7ro\v, eo"TL $e r\ fj.ev e\7ri<s TOV /meXXov-
t <x \ r ~ tf ,/ \
TO<5 t] 06 fmVt]/UL}J TUtV TTapOL^OfJLeVUlV . O 7Tp ULTLOV K.O.I
Tt]s ccc)oAe<r;/as avTols ^LaTeXovcn yap TO. yevofj.eva
13 Aeyoj/re? dva/uLi/j.vticn<6imevoi yap ifiovTai. Kai ol
BVJJLOI o ^e?s fJiev eicrtv da-Bevels Se, KCtt al eTridv/uiiai ai
fj.ev eK\e\oi7ra(riv afi $e dcrdevels etcnV, wcrre OUT eV^-
6vfJ.YITLK.OL OUT6 TTpaKTLKOL KaTa TOTS eTTlBu/ULia^j d\\d
happen are bad (full of defects) at all events the results are mostly dis
appointing (things mostly turn out for the worse) ; and besides this,
owing to their cowardice. Aesch. c. Timarch. 24, OVK tfyvoei o vo/j.odtTr]s
on ol Trpto-fivTepoi rw /j.fv ev tfrpovfiv aK^jLa^ov(nv, ij de To\fj.a jj8rj avroiis
apteral eniXfiTTfiv 8ta rfjv f/JLTruplav T<Hv Trpayp.a.Tu>i>.
12. And they live by (their) memory rather than by hope (comp.
c. 12. 8, and the note there, or? HHTIV e XTri St), for what remains to them of
their life is short, but that which is past long ; and hope is of the future,
but memory of the past. Which is also the reason of their garrulity
(habit of chattering or prattling 1 ); for they are continually talking about
what has happened, their delight being in recollection . The aged
Cephalus says of himself, Plat. Rep. I 328 D, v 10-61 on epnyf Saov al
aAXat ai Kara TO wco/ia TJ8ova\ aTro^apaiVoprat, rocroCroi/ av^ovrai al ntpl TOVS
\6yovs eiridvfueu re Kal ijSovai (Gaisford). " With seats beneath the shade
For talking age and whispering lovers made" Goldsmith, Deserted
Village.
13. And their fits of passion (dvpos, as before, the passionate,
angry impulses ; one of the three opcgeis, with frnQvpia. and /3ouXi;o-ts) are
sharp, but feeble, (neither strong nor lasting,) and of their appetites, some
have failed altogether, others become enfeebled, so that they are not
prone either to the feeling of desire or to act under its impulses, but only
according to the dictates of self-interest. Accordingly men at this time
of life are thought to have the disposition to temperance, or self-control,
besides (sc. the preceding); not only because their appetites are relaxed
(slackened, avitcrdai contrasted with eVtrcti/ccr&u, met. from stringing the
lyre, note on I 4. 1 2), but also because they are slaves to their own interest .
auffrpoa-vvT] being the acquired and fixed habit, or virtue, of self-control,
o-a)<pcoi/ the possessor of the virtue, and trun^poviKoi those who are inclined
or have a tendency to it ; those men, whose .desires and passions are so
feeble as to require no control, gain credit in the eyes of the world for the
disposition to (termination -IKO?) the virtue itself.
1 d5oAe<7xi a. Eth. N. Ill 13, 1117 b 35, TOI)J irepl TUV TVX&VTUV K
PHTOPIKHS B 13 1316. 157
\ \ / ^> ^ ^ V J. \ _L
Kara TO Kepoo s. cio Kat crcoCppoviKOi (paivovrai ot p. 82.
TfjXiKOVTOi cti T6 yap eiriBvfJLicu di/eiKacrij Kai SovXev-
14 ouori TW Kepdei. KUI juaXXov wo"t Kara Xoyicr/uLoi r]
KUTO. TO t i6os 6 fj.ev yap Xoyi(r/uios TOU crv/uKpepovTOS
^ ^.> f/-\ " ~ i / \^- >^^
TO o 7/C7OS Tf/s apETrjs e&Tiv. Kai TaoiK^/maTa aciKOV-
15 <riv ets KaKOVpyiav, OVK ek vfipiv. e\erjTiKOi $e Kai ol
yepovTE s ei&iv, aX\ ov Sia TavTO ro?9 veow ol fj.ev
yap Sid (piXai/dptOTTiav, oi Se Si ctcrOeveiav TrdvTa
yap oioi/Tai 771)5 eivai avTols TraOeiv, TOVTO 3 t]v
i\er]TiKov. b6ev o^vpriKoi eicri, Kai OUK evTpa7re\oi
ovSe (J)i\oye\OLOL ivavTiov yap TO 6$vpTiKov TW
1 6 TUIV fJiev ovv vecov Kai TOJV TrpecrfiuTepwv TO.
OXTT itrel aTro^eo^Tai TraVres TOI)S
o-axppoviKoi recurs in Eth. N. vi 13, 1144 b 5, and is found in Xeno-
phon and Plato, and the adverb in Aristophanes.
14. And their course of life is directed rather by calculation than
character : for calculation is directed to one s own interest, whereas
character is indicative of virtue . The opposite of this, c. 12. 12.
rjdos] is the impulse of character , as before. Virtuous dispositions
or characters are natural to us, Eth. N. VI 13, u. s. TTOO-I yap So/cei e/catrra
rav T]dii> inrdpxfiv (frixrei na>s Kai yap dixaioi Kai traXJtpoviKoi /cut avdpfloi
Kai raAXa e^o/nei/ tv6vs eic ytvfTrjs. These however are not virtues Eth.
N. II I, sub init., ouSe/Lu a TU>V fjQiKaiv dperwv <f>vcrei tjii.lv iyyivtTOt but
dispositions or tendencies to virtue, Swa^eis, which may be developed
into feis, of which a-afppoviKos (having a tendency to a-euppoorvvij) is an
individual instance.
And the offences which they commit incline rather to petty knavery
and mischief than to insolence and wanton outrage . See c. 12. 15, and
the passages there referred to.
15. Old men also (as well as young, c. 12. 15) are inclined to com
passion, but not for the same reason as the young ; in the one it is from
humanity, in the other from weakness ; for all calamities that happen to
others seem to be near at hand, impending over, themselves (near at
hand to themselves to suffer, wore avrovs iraffelv avra), and this is what
was said (Tjv, viz. c. 8 i) to incline men to pity. And hence it is that
they are querulous (difficilis, guerulus, Hor. A. P. 173) and not given
to pleasantry nor fond of mirth; for a querulous disposition (habit of
complaining, bemoaning oneself) is opposite to love of mirth .
1 6. Such are the characters of the youthful and elderly; accord
ingly, since language conformable to their own character, as well as
persons similar to themselves, are acceptable to every one, it is plain
158 PHTOPIKHS B I3i6; 14 i.
cr(p6T6pa) i]6ei \eyofjievovs Xo-yoys KCII TOJ)S OJULOLOWS, OVK
a^tjXov 7TW9 ^ptojULei/OL TOIS \oyots TOLOVTOL (pavovvrai
i Kotl avTOi KCII ol Aoyoi. ol fie O.K /ma ROUTES (pavepov bri CHAP. xiv.
[JL6Tav TOVTCOV TO 1]6o$ eCTOVTCtl, KaTp(l)V CtfpaipOVV-
enough how we are to use our words in order that we and our speeches
may assume such and such a character . The study of the tempers, and
manners and habits and modes of thought of these two ages and the rest,
will enable us without difficulty to assume the tone and language which
are in conformity with the taste of any particular kind of audience which
we have to persuade : everybody likes to be addressed in his own style,
to hear the sentiments and language which are habitual to himself.
TOVS roi o-</>eT/pw fjdfi \(yofj.evovs Ao youj] Orationes quae dicuntur ad
proprios mores, Vetus Translatio ; Quae ingenio moribitsque ipsorum
convenientes habentur, Victorius ; Quae siiis ipsorum moribus conveni-
entes habentur orationes, Riccobon. No notice has been taken of the
difficulty of explaining the force of the dative r\6ti after Xeyopfvovs. In
the above translations the first evidently understands it in the sense of
spoken to, addressed to, the direct dative. But although Atyetv TLV L, to
say unto, tell, or bid anyone is allowable Greek, I doubt if that use of it
is applicable here. Surely to address to must be rendered by irpos TO
afperepov rjdos, and not by the dative. The other two translations are
mere evasions of the difficulty, giving the sense, but not explaining the
construction. The only other possible sense of the dative which suggests
itself to me, is the instrumental "by ; but by the aid of their character
is I think not a probable, though a possible, mode of expressing the
conformity which is here required. The meaning is plain ; speeches
which express, or are in conformity with, the characters and manners of
certain classes, whom we may have to address. As a last resource I
venture to propose 6p.o\oyov^ivovs as a substitute for Af yo/ieVous ; there is
no variation of MSS ; but it certainly seems possible that the three first
letters in the long word in question may have been accidentally de
capitated in the course of transcription, and then the remainder Aoyou-
fieVovr would naturally have been converted into Xeyo//e j>ouy.
CHAP. XIV.
i. The character of men in the prime of life will plainly lie
between the other two, by subtraction of the excess of each, (so that)
they are neither excessively confident for that kind of disposition is
rashness nor overmuch given to fear, but in a right state of mind as to
both, neither implicitly trusting nor altogether distrusting everyone in
discriminately, but rather with a due distinction according to the real
facts of the case .
affraipflv, properly opposed to irpotrTidevai, as in a numerical calcula
tion to add and subtract. Hence withdraw, remove, et sim. For ex
ample, Plat. Cratyl. 431 C, Trpoo-riQiis rj d<j)aipav ypa/^iara. Ib. 432 A.
Phaedo 95 E, bis, et alibi. Xen. de Rep. Ath. ill 8 and 9, Kara piKpov n
irpoffQevra r/ d(pe\6vra, by slight and gradual addition or subtraction
(said of the changes of political constitutions).
PHTOPIKH2 B 14 2, 3. 159
res Tt]v vTrepfioXr iv, Kai OUTC cr(po^pa Oappovvres (Qpa-
2 crvTtis jap TO TOLOVTOV) ovre Xi.av <po/3ov/mevoi, /caAws
e TTjOos a/uL<pct) e^o^re?, OUT Trdcri TTitrreiWres oirre
Trdcriv aTricTTOvvTes, d\Xa KUTO. TO dXrjdes Kpivoi/T6s
jj.a\\ov, Kai OVT Trpos TO KaXov ^wj^re? (JLOVOV otrre P. 139 <*
Trpos TO aruju.<pepov aAAa Trpos dfj.<j)(*), Kai oi/Ve Trpos
(j)lO(ji) OVT TTpOS d(Tlx)TLaV d\\a TTpOS TO dpjULOTTOV
3 djuioitos $6 Kai TTjOO? 6vfj.ov KCU TTpos e7ri6u[j.iav. Kai
crctxppoves fj.T dvSpias Kai dvdpeiot fierce (rw(ppocrvv)is.
ev yap TO?? veois Kai TO?? yepovcri SwprjTai TavTO."
t(ri yap ol fj.ev veoi dvSpeloi Kai dKO\a(TTOi, ol oe
ws 3e Kct66\ou
ocra p.ev iriprjTai 1 veoTt]s Kai TO yripas TCOV
, TavTa a/uL(pia ey^ovcriv, ocra S V
and Gpacrvrr^s here preserve their proper distinction, 6dp<ros,
true courage, dpaaos, reckless audacity or impudence, though these senses
are often interchanged. The verb dapa-elv or dappdv, as Plato, Aristotle,
and the later Greeks write it, has never the unfavourable sense.
2. And the conduct of their life will be directed neither to honour
alone, nor to self-interest, but to both . Compare 12.12; 13.9. And
neither to parsimony nor to profligate extravagance, but to what is fit
and proper , i.e. the mean, (XfvdepioTTjs , Eth. N. II 7, 1107 b 10, IV i,
1 1 20 a i, seq.
3. And similarly in respect of passion and appetite. And they
will be temperate (sober-minded, under self-control) with courage, and
courageous with self-control : for in the young and old these two are
separated (or distinguished), the young being brave and licentious (devoid
of self-control), and the elders sober and temperate but cowardly . Self-
control is the form in which the virtue appears especially in Plato s
Gorgias and Republic, where it is described as a regulating principle
which guides the whole man, ordering and harmonising his entire moral
constitution.
And, speaking in general terms, all the advantages (good qualities,
elements of good character) that youth and old age have divided between
them ( = exi dirjprjueva), both of these the others enjoy; and whereinsoever
(the two first) are excessive or defective, in these (they observe, subaudi
ol uKua^ovrfs exovcriv) a due moderation (or mean) and a fitness or pro
priety of conduct .
oo-a SiyprjTai 77 veorrjs KOI TO yfjpas] I think Siaipt iadai must be here
middle, said of those who divide amongst themselves, have shares in any
joint work or possession. Thuc. VII 19, fiteXo//fi/ot TO epyov. An objec
tion might be taken to this, that Str/ pr/rot is singular and not plural, and
160 PHTOPIKHS B 14 4.
\owiv n eXXeiTTOVcri) TOVTWV TO /uLeTpiov KCCI TO ap-
4 IULOTTOV. cxKjma^ei $e TO fjiev (rco/ma drro TWV
e.Tu>v fJ-^XP L T U >V TrevTeKaiTpictKOVTcty tj $
TO. eVos Sew 7revTi]KOVTa,
that no one can share a thing with himself. But although the verb is
singular in form, being connected grammatically with vforrjs alone, which
stands next to it, yet it is evident that yfjpas is meant to be included in
the distribution as well as the other. It is accordingly equivalent to 8iy-
prjp.fva frowns. I think it cannot be passive ; the analogy of mo-rev fa-Oat,
TI to be trusted with something , fmTfTpdfpdai TI, and the like, cannot be
applied to this case.
TO fjLerpiov] is Plato s snmmum bonum, the highest in the scale of
goods, in the Philebus; also the Horatian aitrea mcdiocritas: it may also
stand for the Aristotelian pea-ov, which at all events is the sense in which
it is employed here.
TO apjjLOTTov] that which fits, the fitting ; derived by metaphor from
the carpenter s, joiner s and builder s trades ; is nearly equivalent to TO
Tvptirnv, and like it refers us to the._fitness of things, as a standard of good,
to a harmonious organisation or order of the universe, a system physical
or moral which has all its parts dove-tailed, as it were, together, arranged
in due order and subordination, carefully and exactly fitted together;
Cicero s apta compositio (inembrorum, of the human figure [de officiis
128.98]).
4. The body is in its prime from 30 to 35 (years of age), the soul
(i. e. the intellectual and moral faculties) about nine and forty (50 minus
one : Selv is Seov, wanting so much).
Two of the numbers here mentioned are multiples of seven. The
stages of life are determined by a septenary theory, the earliest record
of which is an elegiac fragment of doubtful genuineness (Person), at
tributed to Solon (ap. Clemen. Alexandr. Strom., Bergk, Lyr. Gr. p. 332
[346, ed. 2], Sol. Fragm. 25), in which the seventy years allotted to human
life, and its successive stages of growth, development and decay, are divided
into ten periods of seven years each. The dates here given by Aristotle
for the prime of body and mind, agree tolerably well with the verses of
the fragment, rfj 8e rtraprrj rras TIS fv (jB8ofia8i p,iy apicrros Icr^vv rjv T*
(ivftpfs crrujLaT e\ov<r dpfrfjs. The fifth septenary is the marriageable age.
In the seventh the intellect and powers of speech have reached their
prime. eTrra 8e (49) vovv KOL yXuxraav ev J3dop.d(riv pty Spurrog K.r.A.
The same theory, whether derived from Solon or not, which seems to
have been generally current, reappears in Polit. IV (vn) 16, 1335 b 32, Kara
rrjv rfjs Biavoias O.K/J.IJV avrrj 8 ecrrif ev rois likflcrrois ffVTTfp T<OV Trot^rcoi/ rives
dprJKacriv ol iitTpovvTts rais fpftopacn rrji> rjXiKiav, irep\ TOV xpavov TOV TUV
TTfvrijKovTa eraiv (i.e. 7 xy = 49): and again Polit. ib. c. 17, 1336 b 37, 8vo
o flcrlv r)\iKiai Trpov as avayKalov 8irjprjcr6aL TTJV TraiSet ai/, /jLfra rf)i> OTTO Tt5f
ol yap rals iffiofuuriv ftiaipovvrts -ras ^ XiK/as eoj- eVi TO TTO\V \(yov<riv nv
PHTOPIKH2 B 15 r. 161
Trep fjiev ovv veoTr]TO<s KOI <yt]p(i)<z KCII aK/uj/s, TTOIWV
i]6u)V eKacrrov e crr/y, elptjcrOa) ToaravTa*^ Trept $e TWV CHAP. xv.
, \ / / /j ~ * , / > ~ \ \ P- 8 3-
cnro Tv%t]s yLyvofj.evdov ayauwv, ci ocra avrutv Kat TO.
KaAcoy (leg. KaKins, Spengel), Set Se rfi Siaipecrfi rijs fpvcrfcos e
Nevertheless the theory is departed from in assigning the proper age of
marriage in the two sexes ; ib. c. 16, 1335 a 28, the woman is to marry at
18, the man at 37 or thereabouts ; neither of them divisible by seven; iv
Toffouro) yap aK/iabucrt re rots crw/zafrt crv(vis carat K.r.X. And in line 35
the term of human life is again fixed at 70 years. So the Psalmist [xc. 10],
" The days of our years are threescore years and ten."
And to the same theory (the number seven, marking a crisis, or stage
of growth, in the life of an animal,) reference is frequently made, in the
Hist. Anim., as VII 1.2, 16, 18, c. 12. 2, and elsewhere: from all which it
may be concluded that Aristotle was a believer in it. Plato, Rep. v 460 E,
fixes the prime of life in a woman at the age of 20, in a man at 30: in
Legg. IV 721 A, and in three other places, the age of marriage is fixed
from 30 to 35, though in one of them (vi 772 E) 25 is also named.
Compare on this subject Hes. Opp. et D. 695 seq. Xenoph. de Rep.
Lac. I 6, (Stallbaum s note on Plato 1. c.).
But the theory of the virtues of the number seven was carried to a far
greater extent, as may be seen in T-6 of Macrobius Commentary on
Cicero s Somnium Scipionis, of which the sum is given in a quotation
from the Somnium Scipionis: Cicero de septenario dicit, Qui numerus
rerum omnium fere nodus est. Everything in nature is determined by
the number seven. Near the end of the chapter, we are told, in con
formity with Aristotle s statement, Notandum vero quod, cum numerus
se multiplicat (at the age of 49, 7 x 7), facit aetatem quae proprie perfect a
et habetur et dicitur: adeo ut illiiis aetatis homo, utpote qi{i perfect ionem
et attigerit tarn, et necdum praeterierit, et consilio apt us sit, nee ab exer-
citio virium alienus habcatur. This is the prime of mind and body
together. Quinta (hebdomas) omne virium (strength and powers of body
alone), quanta esse nnicuique, possunt, complct aiigme)itu)n. All this
came no doubt originally from the Pythagoreans ; as may be inferred
from Arist. Met. N 6, 1093 a 13, where this number seven, is said to be
assigned by them as the cause of everything that happened to have this
number of members ; seven vowels, seven chords or harmonies, seven
Pleiads ; animals shed their teeth in seven years yes, says Ar., some do,
but some don t and seven champions against Thebes. And from this
and similar considerations they inferred some mysterious virtue in the
number; and identified it with voi/s and Kaipos. (Ritter and Preller,
Hist. Phil. c. 2, Pythag. 102, note a.)
So for youth and age and prime of life, the kind of characters, that
is to say, that belong to each, let thus much suffice (to have been said).
CHAP. XV.
A yvufjir) of Phocylides may serve as a motto of this chapter. al
roSf $coKvXt Sea) rt rrXeoi/ yeVos (vyeves dvai ols ovr V pidois fTrerai %apis y
AR. II. I I
1 62 PHTOPIKH2 B 15 2.
i]vn TTOL aTTa arvfj.fia.ivei TCHS dvOpcoiroK, \e
6<pet]s. evyeveia^s JJLZV ovv i]6os ecm TO (pi\OTiju.6-
Tepov eivai TOV Ke/CT^yUeVoy CCVTIIV aVai/res yap, OTCIV
vTrapxy TI, 7rpo<s TOVTO (rwpeveiv eltaBacrtv, r] evye-
veia evTi/uLOTtj S TI<$ Trpoyovwv i&TLV. KUL Kara(ppo-
vr]TiKov KO.L TCOV o/uLoitov earrl TCUS Trpoyovois To1<s
aura)!/, ^LOTL Troppw TavTa fjiaXXov rj e
OVT fv\ j$ov\fi; Brunck, Poet. Gnom. p. 91. Bergk, Poet. Lyr. Gr.
P- 339 [P- 358, ed. 2].
I. Of the goods arising from fortune, as many of them, that is, as
have an influence upon men s characters, let us proceed to speak next in
order .
2. One characteristic of noble birth is that the ambition of the
possessor of it is thereby increased. For everyone that has anything to
start with, or to build upon , (as a nucleus, focus, or centre of attraction :
vnapxfiv, to underlie, to be there already, prop, as a basis or foundation
for a superstructure,) is accustomed to make this the nucleus of his
acquisitions or accumulations, and high or noble birth implies or denotes
ancestral distinction . crcopeu eii> irpos T, ///. to bring to this, in order to
heap round it, any subsequent accumulations. The meaning is, that any
new acquisitions of honour or property that a man makes, will generally
take the form of an addition to some stock which he already has, when
ever he has one ready for the purpose, orav \mapxf]-
This condition of life is inclined to look down upon even those who
resemble, are on a level with, (in condition, wealth, rank, distinction, and
so forth,) their own ancestors, because their distinctions, in proportion to
the degree of their remoteness, are more distinguished (than those of con
temporaries) and are easier to brag of (more readily admit of boastful
exaggeration). Distance lends enchantment to the view. Honours and
distinctions shine with a brighter lustre in the remote ages of antiquity,
and confer more dignity upon those who by right of inheritance can claim
a share in them, than those of the same kind, and equal in all other
respects, when acquired by contemporaries familiarity breeds in some
degree contempt for them just as apxaioTrXovrelv is a higher claim to
consideration than veoTrXovre lv, II 9. 9, q. v. Antiquity of possession
carries with it a prescriptive right.
KaTa<f)povT)Tin6i>] agrees with ro tvycves, the abstract for the concrete,
und. from the preceding evyeWia. An abstract term is often particular
ised, or expressed by the component members in detail, as in construction
of antecedent and relative, such as Polit. I 2, 1252 13, Koii>u>via...ovs
Xapai/Say KaXfl... This construction is an instance of that wide-spread
and multiform grammatical figure , the crx^a irpos TO a-tjfj.aiv6fj.fvov,
which, in a great variety of different ways, departs from the usual con
struction of words and adapts it to the thing signified ; as, in the case
above given, the abstract virtually includes all the component members
of the society who are expressed in the plural relative.
PHTOPIKHS B 15 3. 163
3 evTi/norepa KUI evaXa^ovevra. ecm Se evyeves /ULEV
TI]V TOV <yevous dpeTTjv, ryevvcuov e Kara TO /ut.t}
<pv(T6(t)<s o Trep cJs ewi TO TTO\U
fva\u<jvevTa] On a\aoveia and d\aa>v, see note on I 2.7. Of the
two significations of the word, that of bragging is here uppermost.
3. The term tvytves (well-born, come of a good stock, of noble
race, or descenf) is applied to mark distinction (excellence) of race ;
yfwdios (of noble character] to the maintenance of the normal type of
character (keeping up to, not degenerating from, the true family
standard). The difference between evyevrfs and yevvmos lies in this ;
that in the former the race or descent, ytvos, is- directly expressed as the
prominent and leading idea ; it indicates that the evyevijs comes of a
good breed, but says nothing of the individual character : in the latter
it is the character, conformable to the excellence of the breed or race,
that is put prominently forward. The account here given of evyeVeta
is illustrated by the definition of it in I 5. 5 ; it denotes in fact the ex
cellences and distinctions of one s ancestors, as distinguished from one s
own. See the passages there collected. In Hist. Anim. I i, 488 b 18,
these two words are defined and distinguished almost in the same terms ;
fvyfvts pev yap eVrt TO e dyadov yevovs, yevvaiov 8e TO IJLTJ ei<TTa/j.evov
(K TTJS avTov (pvcrfus. Ar. is here characterising the dispositions of
animals. Some are fktvdepia ical dvdpda KOI tvyevr) oiov \ttav, ra 8e yevvaia
KQI aypia /cat f m /3ouXa, otov \VKOS from which it appears that yfvvaiorrjs
is strictly and properly only the maintenance of a certain type of cha
racter, which need not necessarily be a good one : though in ordinary
usage it is invariably applied to denote good qualities. On evyevfia,
see Herm. Pol. Ant. 57.
e /o-Ta<r$ai] to quit a previous state ; of a change in general, especially
a change for the worse, degeneration. Plat. Rep. II 480 A, TTJS tavrov
ifttas fKfiaivfiv. ..ftnep TI f^ioTairo TTJS OVTOV Idtas of God, changing his
own proper form, and descending to a lower. Eth. Nic. VII 7, 1150/7 I,
d\\ ^CTTT]Kf TTJS <$)V<Ta>S, (aCTTTfp OL fJLaiVOfJLfVOl TU>V dvdptOTTM. Pol. VIII (V)
6, sub fin., ai S^oKpaTi ai KOI oXiyapxlai i^itrravrcu eviort OVK ds TO.S fvavTias
irdXiTflas K.T.X. Ib. C. 9, 1309 b 32, o\tyap^iav KOI 8^p.oKpaTiav...(^(crTi]-
Kvias Trjs (3(\Ti(TTr]s Ta^fcoy.
On (f)va-is as the Te Xor, the true nature, the normal or perfect state
of anything, see Pol. I 2, 1252 b 32, ij 8t (pvais T(\OS e o-TiV oiov yap ficao-Tois
(cm TTJS yei>((T(a)S TeXftr^eto ^y, TavTrjv (pcifj.tv TTJV (pvcriv eivat enaaTov, <a(rirep
dvdpanrov, ITTTTOV, oiKias. Grant, on Eth. Nic. II i. 3, distinguishes five
different senses of <io-t? in Aristotle, of which this is the last.
Which (the maintenance of the ancestral character) for the most part is
not the lot of the well-born, but most of them (the members or descendants
of an illustrious family) are good-for-nothing 1 (evYeXTjs vilis, cheap. Fortes
non semper creanturfortibus] ; for there is a kind of crop in the families
of men (ojopa here implies an alternation of <opa and d<popi a, of good
and bad crops) just as there is in the produce of the soil (///. the things
1 iravpoi yap TOL iraiSes 6/j.oioi trarpl TT&OVTCLI ol TrX^ovej /ca/aovs, iravpot 5^ re
jrarpoj dpeiovs. Horn. Od. |3 276.
I I 2
1 64 PHTOPIKH2 B 15 3.
ov (rv/uLfialvei. TO?? ev^eveariv, d\\ ettnV ol TTO\\OI
(popa yap T/S e crr^ eV rots <yevecriv dv^pu,v
eV TO?? /caret rck ^w joot? ryiyvo/ULevois, Kai eviore
av fi d<ya6ov TO ^et/o?, eyyivovTai cUa TIVOS %povov
that grow in the country places) ; for a certain time (8td with gen., along
the course or channel of, during,) remarkable men (distinguished above
their fellows, standing out from among them, Trepi,) grow up in them, and
then (after an interval of unproductiveness) they begin again to produce
them . There are two ways of understanding dvaftidaxriv ; either it is
active, to send up, produce , as the earth yields her fruits, and this is
the natural interpretation, and supported by the use of the word in
other writers: or, as Rost and Palm in their Lex., zuriickgehen, to go
back , relapse into a state of barrenness, on the analogy of dvax^pdv
et sim. [ deficit*. Index Aristotelicus\. In this case 8i86i>ai is neut. (by
the suppression of the reflexive pronoun) as indeed both itself and its
compounds frequently are and may be either f to give (itself) back, to
give way , or perhaps rather, like dvievai, dvieadai, to relax or slacken in
production (dvfj, Soph. Phil. 764). Victorius gives both renderings ; I have
adopted his second version ["posteaque rursus, intervallo aliquo temporis
edit ac gignit industries item atque insignes viros"], which seems to me
the more natural interpretation of di/aS/Scao-tv.
<opa] provcntiis, the produce which the earth bears, (pepet, is either
a crop simply, or a good crop , opposed to dfpopia fertility, abundance,
to barrenness, either absolute or comparative. Plat. Rep. VI II 546 A,
ou \iovov (pvrols tyyeiois, dXXa ACCU ev CTTiyfioiS C? olf <popa <a\ d(f>opia. ^/vx js
re KOI <ra>/zdra>i/ ylyvovrai. Ar. Hist. Anim. V 21. I, e Xatwi <popa, a crop
of olives . Ib. 22.3, eXateSi/ <., de Gen. Anim. ill I. 15, TG>V SeVSpwi/ ra
7roXXo...e|avaiVfrat /if rot TTJV (fropdv (after the crop). And metaphorically
in Dem. de Cor. 61, (popav TrpoSorwi/ *cai SoopoSoKav. Aesch. c. Ctes.
234, </>. prjTopmv TrovTjfjutv afjia KOL ToXfjirjpaJif. Dissen ad loc. Dem. cit. Plut.
Platon. Quaest. I I, 999 E, <p. a-o(pia-T(ai>. Diodor. XVI. 54, (p. TrpoSorcui .
"Sic Latine novorum proventiun scelerum dixit Lucan. Phars. II 61, et
similiter messem usurpat Plaut. Trinum. I i. 1 1." Dissen, 1. c.
With the whole passage compare Pind. Nem. XI 48, ap^mat 8 aperal
r dXXao-o-o/jci ai yfVfals dvftpav crdsvos. ev <r^;/pa> $ OUT <av /Mf Xatrat
(8o)Kav apovpai 8VSped T O\IT eWXet Tvacrais tTftov irfp 68ols \_al.
avdos evcoSey (pfpeiv, TrXoura) "icrov, dXX tv dfj.fiftovTi. KOL dvaruv
OVTU> vdfvos ay ft Molpa. Ib. VI 14 (Gaisford).
When clever families degenerate, their characters acquire a tendency
to madness, as for instance the descendants of Alcibiades and Dionysius
the elder (tyrant of Syracuse), whereas those of a steady (staid, stable)
character degenerate into sluggishness or dutness (of which the stubborn
ass is the type; cos 8 or owy-.-e/StTjo-aro TralSa? vmdi^s, w Si) TroXXa TTfpl
poTraX dfji(pls edyrj [II. XI 559]), as in the case of those of Conon and Pericles
and Socrates . We learn from Plato, Men. 93 694 E, that the son of
Themistocles, Cleophantus ; of Aristides, Lysimachus ; the sons of Pericles,
Paralus and Xanthippus : of Thucydides (the statesman and general, the
opponent of Pericles and his policy), Melesias and Stephanus; all de-
PHTOPIKH2 B 15 3; i6i. 165
aVfyes TrepLTTOi, KciTreiTct 7raA.fi/ dva^L^iacnv. e/CTTa-
TCCI oe TO. fjiev v(pud <yevr] ek fJLaviKcarepa fj6rj, oiov
ol aV AXKtfiidfiov Kal ol aVo A.LOI/VCTLOU TOU Trpo-
Tepov, TO. Be (TTa.(TL{jia el? d(3e\Tepiav KUI va)6poTt]Ta,
OLOV OL CCTTO KtjUWI/OS KCtl YIeplK\6OVS Kttl ^LcoKpCtTOl S.
1 TO) Be TrXouTto a eweTai i\6r]j e TrtTroAf/s CCTTIV fBet
ctTracTLV v(3pi(TTai yap KCII V7rep}](pavoi, Tracr^oi Tes TL
VTTO Tt]s KTfj(T6Cws TCI/ TrAoiATOtr (JocTTrep <ydp e^oj/Tes
TayaOd OVTW ^>ia.K.eiVTai 6 yap TT\OVTOS O LOV p. 1391.
generated from their fathers ; and in spite of the advantages of their edu
cation turned out nevertheless either quite ordinary men, or altogether bad.
The alliance of quickness of wit or cleverness and madness is marked
again in Poet. XVII 4, 1455 a 32, tvcfrvovs rj TTO^TIK^ ta-riv ij P.CLVIKOV (the
poet s fine frenzy ). Probl. xxx i. 18, ocrois fifv Ti-oXXi) KOI ^vxpa ew-
trap^d (fj Kpadts TTJS ftf\CUVT)S X^V y ) J w^pot *cal fltupoi, o&ois 8f \iav TroXXrj
KOL 6fpfj,r) naviKol Kal tv<f>vtls K.T.\. Great wits are sure to madness near
allied, and thin partitions do their bounds divide, Dryden [Absalom and
Achitophcl, I 163].
aracrifj.a] settled, steady characters, is illustrated by Time. II 36, eV rrj
Ko&trrfKvtf yjXtKiq ( mature and vigorous age ), Soph. Aj. 306, e/x<^)pcoi/
/ioXty TTCO? vi> XP V( ? Ka6l<TTarai ( settles down again into his senses ).
Aesch. Pers. 300, Ae oj/ Karao-ras ( first compose thyself, and then speak ).
Blomfield, Gloss, ad loc., refers to Ar. Ran. 1044, weii^a Kadearrjws, and
Eurip. Orest. 1310, ndXiv narda-Tyd j)o-v ^w p.ev o/^/icm. Theophr. ap. Pint.
Synip. I 5> P- 623 B, p.d\iaTa 8e 6 fi dovcnaa/^os e^tcrr^crt Kal iraparptTTfi TO
re crco/^ta not, rfjv <})a>vr)v row Kadfcrrr] KOTOS. Victorias points out a similar
opposition of the two characters here contrasted, in Probl. Ill (16. i).
What is here called d/3fArepi a and vadporys is there designated by reru-
0o>/ie j>ovr, a term of similar import. Sia rl o olvos /cat rerv^co/ieVouy Troiet
Kal fiavKovs; evavria yap ) diddfcris. (reri;^)c5o-^at is explained by Harpo-
cration and Suidas of one who has lost his wits in the shock of a violent
storm ; whether by the storm itself which has confounded him, or by the
accompanying thunderbolt : Hesych. s. v. ^le/^i/eVai ; and rtrv ^corai, dn-o-
Aa>Aei>. e /xTreVp^arat. e/i/Sf^Spoi/r^rat. fTrt ipdrj. Hence, of one stnp ficd,
os, Trapan-Xi/l, out of his wits ; or of fatuity, dulness in general).
CHAP. XVI.
i. The characters that accompany wealth (the characteristics of
wealth) lie on the surface within the view of all (///. for all to see ; fTrnro\rjs
aircHTiv coo-r au rous I8("iv aura 1 comp. I 15.22, and note there); for they
are insolent, inclined to violence and outrage, and arrogant (in their con
duct and bearing 1 ), being affected in some degree (their nature altered, the
alteration for the worse regarded as a kind of suffering or affection) by
the acquisition of wealth. These dispositions originate in the supposi
tion that (in having wealth) they have every kind of good, all goods in
1 66 PHTOPIKH2 B 16 2.
/ >- jy./ <~ ,f x ,. IN \ , / ,/
Tf/x^ T*s Tf/s ams TWJ^ a\\wv, cio (paLverai wvia.
2 ctTravTa eivai avTOv. Kal Tpv(pepoi Kal
Tpv<ppoi fjiev Sia TY\V Tpv(j)t}v Kal Tr}v ev$i
l (TO\OIKOI <$ia TO
one ; for wealth is as it were a sort of standard of the value of everything
else, and consequently it seems as if everything else were purchasable
by it .
2. They are also voluptuous (dainty and effeminate, molles et
delicati, Victorius), and prone to vulgar ostentation, the former by reason
of their self-indulgence (the luxury in which they live) and the (constant)
display of their wealth and prosperity (euScu /icoi/, as well as oA/3ioy, = 7rXou-
trtos) ; ostentatious and ill-bred, because they (like others) are all accus
tomed to spend their time and thoughts upon what they themselves love
and admire (and therefore, as they think about nothing but their wealth,
so they are never weary of vaunting and displaying, which makes them
rude and ostentatious), and also because they suppose that everybody
else admires and emulates what they do themselves . Foolishly sup
posing that every one else feels the same interest in the display of wealth
that they do themselves, they flaunt in their neighbours eyes till they
excite repugnance and contempt instead of admiration.
Tpv<f>fpoi] denotes luxury rpvcp??, and its effects, luxurious, effeminate,
voluptuous habits: Eth. N. VII 8, 1150 b I, o 8 eAXeiVoof TT/JOS a ot TroXXot
/Cut avriTfivovcri KOL Svisavrai, OVTOS /jLoXaKuS /cat rpv<j)a>i> nal yap TJ rpvtpfj
//aXaxi a TI S eartf. Eth. Eudem. II 3- 8, o (j.tv /Lu^dcfuw vTTOfievwv Xvinpr,
/n^S et /SeXnoi/, Tpwfiepos.
o-aXaKwi/ej] denotes vulgar ostentation, and is very near akin to, if
not absolutely identical with, fiavavcria and dneipoKohla ; the former is the
excess of /teyaXon-peVeta, proper magnificence in expenditure : the pdvav-
o-os goes beyond this, spending extravagantly where it is not required:
Eth. Nic. IV 6, 1123 a 21, seq., eV yap rot? piKpols rQ>v dcnravrjudTaiv TroXXa
ai/aXt oTcet KOI \ap.npvi>fTai Trapa /ie Xos of which some instances are given
- KOI TraVra TOT Toiavra Trot^cret ov TOV KO\OV evena, dXXa TOV TT\OVTOV
(TTi8e IKV vp,f vos, Kal 8ia ravra olo^fvos 6avp.d^(a6ai. Ib. C. 4? 1 122 a 31,
T) 8 inrepftokr) (f\ev6fpioTr)Tos} flavavcria Kal aTretpo/caXt a (bad taste) KQI ocrai
ToiavTai,...fv ois ov 8(t Kal a>s &v del Xc/iTrpwo/ievat. Comp. Eth. Eudem.
II 3.9, (itrajroff (spendthrift) peit 6 irpos airatrav dairdvrjv inrpftdXXa>v, dve\ev-
depos S c5 Trpos cnracrav e\\fi7ru>v. opoios 8e Kal 6 niKpoTTpfTrfjS Kal o craXa-
KOV 6 p.fi> yap VTrepfldXXfi TO irpftcov (o (raXaK(k>v), 6 8 eXXetVct TOV TrpeTrov-
TOS, Hesych. s. v. tra^cucavia r) lv irtviq d\a[ovfia. (ra\aKa>vicrat (after a
different and wrong explanation, he adds) o fie 0f 6<ppao-ros o-aXaKwd (prja-iv
elvai, TOV SanavaivTa orrov ^ tt; which agrees with Aristotle. Suidas, s.v.
(raXa/co)!/ Trpoo-noiovp.fvos TrXov&ios ui>ai,7revr)s wi/ (as Hesych.), Kal traXaKow a
aXa^oveta vnep TO Seoy, Kal craX/ccofiVat d\aovevecr6ai. Ib. SiacraXaKam crat,
ftia6pv\l/-ao-0ai. " etra irXovo-iais wSi Trpofias Tpvffrepov TI StacraXaKcovtcroj/"
( swagger , Arist. Vesp. 1169).
o-oXotKoi] rude, ill-mannered, ill-bred ; liable to make mistakes, or com
mit solecisms ; first, in language croXviKlfciv, rfj X/ei pappapi&iv, Top. I (dc
PHTOP1KHS B i62. 167
eicoBevai SiaTpifieiv Trepi TO eputfJievov Kai 6av/ma^o-
VTT avTuiv, KCCI rw o lecr6ai ]\ovv TOVS a\\ovs
a Ka avTo. ajULct e Kai eiKOTws TOVTO
TTO\\OI yap ei<riv oi ^eo/^ei/oi TWV i^ovTcov. oQev
TO Zfyuwj/i^of eipriTai Trepi TWV o~o<pa)v Kai irXovtr uov
Soph. El.) 3, ult. [p. 165 b 21] and secondly, transferred thence to man
ners, conduct, breeding. Victorius cites, Xen. Cyr. vill 3. 21, Aa ifpdpvrjs 6V
TIS r\v (ToXoiK jTepos avOpmnos T<3 rpono), os- o>ero fl JUT) ra^it inraKovoi e\(vdepv-
repos av <paii>ecr6ai. Plut. Pol. Praec. p. 817 A, ov^ axrnep fvioi ra>v dnfipo-
KaXatv Kai (ToXoi/cw. Ib. Vit. Dion. p. 965 A, ouSf ev rfj Stairy <ro\oiKov
firibtiKvvpfvos, The word is derived from SoXoi, a town of Cilicia (there
was another place of the same name in Cyprus), TroXis dgioXoyos (Strabo).
Qui cum barbare loquerentur, inde vocabulum hoc ad omnes vitioso
sermone utentes, et tandem ad illos quoque qui in actionibus suis in-
eptiunt, est translatum (Schrader). Strabo xiv c. 5, Cilicia. Diog. Laert.j
Solon I 5!) eKeWev re djraXXaytls (6 Kpotcroj) tytvero tv KtXtKi a, KOL TTO\IV
<Tw<pKi<Tfv r)v CITT avrov (Solon) SoXou? fKaXfcrev (others represent Soli as
founded by the Argives and Lindians from Rhodes. Smith s Diet. Geogr.
Vol. Ill IOI2<); oAryovs re rivas rd)i> A.dr)vai<8V (yKarcaKio-ev, ot rw xp v( p T *l v
(poivrjv dTToeva>6fVTfS eKf^Orjauv. Kai flcriv oi fj.ev evdtv SoXeij, ot S dno
KuVpou SoAiot. Schrader therefore is incorrect in saying, Solis oppidum
cuius incolae Soloed ; O-O\OIKOS is derived from 26\ot, but is not the
name of one of its inhabitants.
And at the same time, these affections are natural to them, for many
are they who require (the aid, the services) of the wealthy . They have
an excuse for being thus affected by their wealth ; the numerous claimants
upon their bounty elate them with a sense of superiority, and at the same
time by their servility give them frequent opportunities of exercising at
their expense their ostentation and ill manners. On ot e^ovrfs, the
possessors of property, suv.xprnj.ara, see Monk on Eur. Ale. 57. Whence
also this also gave occasion to the saying of Simonides about the
philosophers and men of wealth to Hiero s wife, when she asked him
whether it was better to get rich or wise (to acquire riches or wisdom) :
Rich, he replied : for, said he, I see the philosophers waiting (passing
their time) at the doors of the rich . This same story is alluded to by
Plato, Rep. vi 489 C, without naming the author of the saying, who in
dignantly denies its truth. The Scholiast, in supplying the omission,
combines the two different versions of Aristotle and Diog. Laert., and
describes it as a dialogue between Socrates and Eubulus. Diog. Laert.
(ll 8. 4, Aristip. 69) tells the story thus : epaiT^dfls (Aristippus) vno
Atoi/vo-t ou 8ia TI oi p.(v (pi\oo-o(f)oi eVt ras TU>V TrXovcrlwv dupas ep^oirai, oi Be
TrAovcrtot eVi ray rail/ (iAoo-oca)i/ ovKfTi, f cprj, on oi fj.fv {o-acriv u>v dctWat, ot
8 OVK uratrtv 1 ,
1 The merit of another mot attributed to Aristippus, as it is also connected
with our present subject, may excuse its insertion here. Aiovvviov TTOT
(T&V ApiffTnrirov) eirl ri T]KQI, ^<prj...oirore /i.tv cro<f>ias 48f6/J. r)i>, JJKOV Tr
vvv 5e X/"?, U *T- WJ; Seo/y-eJ os Trapa cr rJKO}. Diog. Laert. u. s. 78.
1 68 PHTOPIKHS B 16 2 4.
TTjOos Tr\v yvvaiK.a TIJV lepcovos 6pOfj.evr]V irorepov <yc-
vecrdai KpeiTTOv TrXovcriov r\ (ro(f)ov TrXovcriov eiTrelv
TOI)S (7od)oi)s yap e(f>r] opdv ETTL TCUS TOJV irXovor nav p- 84.
3 Ovpais SiaTpifiovTas. Kal TO o lecrOai allows eivai
cipxeiv X eiv 7^1 oiovrat cov eveitev ap%6iv d^iov.
Kal w? eV K6(j)a\aiu) , dvo^TOv evfiai/uovos i)6ov<$ 6
4 7T\OVTOS i(TTLV. Sia<p6pl $6 TCH9 VetiXTTl K6KTt1[JieVOlS
Kal TO?S TraXai Ta i]6t] TO) airavTa fj.aXXov Kai (bau-
Xorepa TO. KaKa "% e iv TOL/S veoTrXovTOvs wcnrep yop
On eVt rats TUT/ TrAovo-i oof dvpats, see Ast ad PI. Phaedr. 245 A, p. 376.
Add to the examples there given, Plat. Symp. 183 A, 203 D, de amantibus.
6vpav\flv, Ruhnken ad Tim. p. 144, Stallbaum ad Symp. 203 D, Arist.
Eccl. 963.
3- KCU -TO o ifadai (f Keren, rw TrXouro)). Cum KOI ol olofievoi pergere
oporteret, TO oifcrffat posuit. Vater. Wealth too is accompanied (in the
minds of its possessors) by the opinion of a just claim to power (office,
authority); and this is due to the supposition that they have what makes
power worth having (a^iov}. This I think is the only way of translating the
text, with agiov : and so the Veins Translatio; habere enim putant quorum
gratia principari digniim. The version of Victorius is quod tenere
se putant ea, quae qui possident regno digni stint. But this seems to
require agtoi, though the sense and connexion are certainly better; aioi
had suggested itself to me as a probable emendation. Bekker and
Spengel retain atoi>. And in sum, the character that belongs to wealth
is that of a thriving blockhead (a prosperous fool, good luck without
sense). Victorius very properly observes that ev8aip.ovia is not to be
understood in its strict ethical sense of real happiness, which must
exclude folly, but it is used here loosely as a synonym of fvrvxta. He
also quotes a parallel phrase in Cic. de Amic. (5-4), nihil insipicnte fortu-
nato intolerabilius fieri potest.
4. However there is a difference in the characters of the recent
and the hereditary possessors of wealth, in that the newly-enriched have
all the bad qualities of their condition (TO) in a higher degree and worse
(than the others) ; for recently acquired wealth is a sort of want of
training in wealth (in the conduct, the use and enjoyment of it) . On
the habit of the parvenu, Victorius quotes Pint. Symp. vn, p. 708 C, ical
TTfpi oivutv 8ia(popas Kal fjLvpa>i> epatrav Kal 8unrvv6dv(cr6ai. (pnpriKov Ko^i8jj Kal
vfon\ovrov ; and Gaisford, Aesch. Agam. 1009, et S oZv avdyKr) rJ/crS
firipptiroi Tvxfjs, ap^atoTrXourwv StcrTTOTKiv TroXXi) \dpis ol 8 OVTTOT eXrrl-
cravres rjp.r]crav KaXeus aJjaoi re SouXois Tfavra Kal Trapa crTadp.iji . Blomfield s
Glossary. Donaldson s New Crat. 323. Supra II 9. 9.
And the crimes that the wealthy commit are not of a mean character
petty offences of fraud and mischief but are either crimes of insolence
and violence or of licentiousness, such as assault (outrage on the person)
in the one case, and adultery in the other .
XVII.
PHTOPIKH2 B :64; 17 i -3.
TrXovTOV eorTi TO veoTrXovTOv eivai.
dSiKOv&iv ov KaKOvpyiKa, a /\/\a Ta
d Ta $6 aKpaTeuTiKaj oiov els aiKiav
/moi^e iav.
1 o/ULoicos %e Kai Trepi $v vafj.eu>s cr^e^oi/ Ta 7r\i(TTa CHAP.
(pavepa ecrTiv t]6tr Ta fjiev yap Ta avTa e%ei tj Suva-
2 /uis TU> TrXouTw Ta $e j3e\Tia) (piXoTi/uoTepoi
Kai dvSpaiSea-Tepoi elcri Ta i]6tj ol ^vvdfjievoi
7r\ov<TL(av Sid TO ecfiiecrdai epywv ocra e^
3 TrpaTTeiv Sid TV\V %iuva}juv. Kai CTTTOV
Sia TO ev 67TlfJL\ela eivai, dvayKa^ofJievoL (TKOTreiv Ta
4 Trepi Tfiv ^vvafjiiv. Kai (refJ-VOTepoi rj fiapvrcpoi Troiei
els aiKiav K.T.X.] signifies the direction or tendency, or the issue or
result, of the particular dSiKij/ua. This distinction of crimes has already
occurred twice in the delineation of the characters of Youth and Age,
II 12. 15 (see note), and 13. 14. atuct a, the legal crime of assault and
battery, is here adduced as an illustration of vftpis, though under the
Attic law it is expressly distinguished from it ; vfipi-s denoting a higher
class of crimes, subject to a ypa^ or public prosecution, alida only to
a 8iKT), private suit or action. [Isocr. Or. 20 2, 5 ; Dem. Or. 54 (Conon)
.T, 17. Comp. J ebb s Attic Orators II 215 6.]
CHAP. XVII.
i. And in like manner also of power, most of the characters are
pretty clear, the characteristics of power being in some points (or par
ticulars) the same as those of wealth .
2. In others better (but still of the same kind ]; for the powerful
are more ambitious and more manly (or masculine) in their characters
than the wealthy, wHich is due to their aspiring to such deeds (achieve
ments) as their power gives them the liberty of effecting . eVrtj/ 5 ore
TOV 0tXort/ioj/ tVati/ov/icv coy dv8pa>8r) (shewing how nearly the two charac
ters coincide), Eth. Nic. IV 10, 1125 b 11, di>8p<ad(is cos dvvafjLfvovs np^ftf,
Ib. c. 1 1, 1 126 b 2. The power supplies the occasion of doing great deeds,
and the habit of doing them forms the ambitious and masculine character:
wealth does not confer such opportunities.
3. And more active and energetic, by reason of the constant atten
tion they are obliged to pay in looking to the means of maintaining their
power ; which without such close attention might probably slip from
their hands.
4. And they are rather proud and dignified than offensive, because
their distinguished rank (or position) by making them more conspicuous
(than all the rest) obliges them to moderation (in their demeanour). This
pride and dignity is a softened (subdued) and graceful arrogance (or as
sumption) .
170 PHTOPIKHS B 17 4 6.
<ydp jji<f)ave(TTepovs TO d^i
e(TTL $6 f[ (T}JiVOTt]S fJLCtXai
KO.V ddiKwcriv. ov uiKpadiKriTai eicriv dXXa
i i
5 r\ c) VTV%a KOLTO. T6
TO. i)6r] ek yap TavTa avvTeivovariv at
eivai evTViai. KUL ETI ei<$ evTeKv iav KCII TO,
Kara TO (rw/ma dyaBa TrapacrKevd^ei t] evTV%ia irXeov-
6 eKTeiv. vireprifyavcoTepoi fj.ev ovv /cat dXoyicrTOTepoi p. i 39 i
Sid Tt]v evTV^Lav eicriVj tv () aKoXovQet (SeXTia TOv
1 leg. rd [margin of Mr Cope s copy of Bekker s Oxford ed. 1837].
ftapvs, heavy, burdensome, and hence offensive, the German lastig.
Papvrrjs, offensiveness in general; Dem., de Cor. 35, speaks of the
di>a\yr]aia and (3apvrr]s of the Thebans, where it evidently means im-
portunitas. Similarly in Isocr. Panath. 31, it belongs to the character of
the TTfTratSev/ifVoi, to assume themselves a becoming and fair behaviour to
their associates, KGU ray p.fi> TO>V a\\a>v dr]8l.as KOI (BapvrrjTas fVKo\<as Kai
paSt wj (pepovras; where it seems to denote offensiveness in the form of ill
manners. Here it is applied to a particular kind of offensiveness or bad
manners, which shews itself in that excess or exaggeration of <re\ivl-rris or
pride called arrogance and assumption. Whenever they do commit a
crime, the criminality shews itself, not in a trifling and mean offence, but
on a grand scale, in high crimes and misdemeanours .
5. Now the characters of good fortune are indeed found (or ex
hibited, principally) in the parts (the three divisions) of those already
mentioned-^/<?r all those which are considered the most important kinds of
good fortune do in fact converge to these -but also besides these, good
fortune (prosperity) provides an advantage (over a man s neighbours) in
respect of happiness of family, and all personal gifts and accomplish
ments .
K\tove.K.ri(.v\ must here, I think, be used, not in its ordinary and
popular acquired signification, of seeking an undue share, covetousness,
greed, rapacity, but in the simple and literal meaning, which it sometimes
bears, of having an advantage (of any kind) over others. The ordinary
sense though Victorius appears to understand it so seems to me quite
inappropriate to the passage. These other kinds of good fortune are
supplied in the list given I 5.4, where (vTenvla and ra Kara TO aw/xa a-ya&i,
are both introduced, and the particulars of the latter enumerated.
6. Now though good fortune makes men more arrogant, over
weening and inconsiderate, thoughtless, yet good fortune is attended by
one excellent characteristic, viz. that (the fortunate) are pious or lovers of
the gods (Godfearing, we say), and have a certain religious character,
their trust in them being due to the good things they have derived from
fortune ; they are in reality due to fortune, but arc ascribed by them to the
PHTOPIKHS B 17 6; 18 r. 171
i]6o^ rrj evrvx ia, on (j)i\66eoi eicri KUI e^ovcri Trpos
TO 6eiov 7Tft)5, TTicrTevovTes Sid TO. yLyvofJieva dyadd
O.TTO Ttjs Tv^ris.
Trepi fjiev ovv TWV Kad ti\iKiav Kai ru^rjv r]6cov
eipriTai TO. <ydp ivavTia TWV eiprifjievcov IK TWV evav-
TLCOV (pavepa. ea-riv, oiov TreVr/Tos Kai drv^ovs ?]6o<5
\ 5^. t > \ <5.j ~ /)**% -> CHAP.
i aovvaTOV. ejrei o rj TCOV TTLVCIVCOV \o f yiai> xpt](ri<s xvm.
divine grace and favour. Lactantius, Div. Inst. II 1.8 (quoted by Gaisford),
gives a truer account of this matter: Turn (in prosperis rebus) maxima
Deus e.v menwria hominum elabitur, cum beneficiis eius fruent:s lionorem
dare divinae indulgentiae debcrent. At vero si qua necessitas gravis
presserit, tune Deuin recordantur. And Lucret. ill 53, multoqm in
rebus acerbis acrius advertunt animos ad religionein.
So of the characters which follow the various ages and conditions
of life enough has been said ; for the opposites of those that have been
described, as the character of the poor man, the unsuccessful (un
fortunate), and the powerless, may be easily ascertained from their
opposites , i. e. by substituting the opposites of their opposites, the
characteristics, viz. of poverty, misfortune, povverlessness, for those of
wealth, prosperity, and power.
CHAP. XVIII.
The following chapter marks a division of the general subject of the
work, and a stage or landing-place, from which we look back to what
has been already done, and forwards to what still remains to do. The
evident intention of the writer is to give a summary statement of the
entire plan, and the main division of his system of Rhetoric, contained
in the first two books, which comprise all the intellectual part, TO. Trepi
TTjv duivoiav, II 26.5, all that depends on argument; as opposed to the
non-essential and ornamental part, style, action, and arrangement, treated
in Bk. in. And it may fairly be supposed that it was also his intention
to arrange these divisions in the same order as that which he proposed
to follow in the actual treatment of the subject.
But in the text, at any rate of the first half of the chapter, to iroirjTfov,
this order is not observed ; and there is altogether so much irregularity
and confusion in the structure of the sentences, and such a mixture o^
heterogeneous subjects, that it seems tolerably certain that we have not
this portion of the chapter in the form in which Aristotle wrote it. First,
the long parenthesis about the applicability of the terms Kpio-is or decision,
and KpiTT]s, jiidge or critic, to all the three branches of Rhetoric, has no
natural connexion with the context though at the same time it is quite
true that the use of the parenthesis, a note inserted in the text, is a marked
feature of Aristotle s ordinary style : still this would be an exaggeration, or
abuse of the peculiarity. Spengel has pointed out (Trans. Bav. Acad. 1851,
p. 35), that the whole of this parenthesis, eVrt 8e ftovhfvovrai [p. 175, line 2,
to p. 176, last line], is nothing but an expansion of a preceding passage,
172 PHTOPIKHS B i8 i.
I 1.2, the same notion being here carried out into detail. But although
it is so much out of place that it is hardly conceivable that even Aristotle
(whose style is not remarkable for its close connexion is in fact often
rather rambling and incoherent) should have introduced it here, as
part of an enormous protasis of which the apodosis or conclusion
relates to something entirely different ; yet as it bears all the character
istic marks of the author s style, including the irregularity and the
heaping of parenthesis upon parenthesis, though it was most probably
not written for this place, there is no reason to doubt that it proceeds
from the pen of Aristotle.
The parenthesis ends at f3ov\vovrai, and we ought now to resume
the interrupted Trporacns. This appears, according to the ordinary punc
tuation, (with the full stop at Trportpov,) to be carried on as far as irp6rfpov y
the conclusion or apodosis being introduced by wore, as usual. The
grammar eVf i... wore is no objection to this, since we have already seen
(note on II 9. 11) that Aristotle is often guilty of this, and even greater
grammatical irregularities. But the sense shews that the passage when
thus read cannot be sound. There is no real conclusion ; for it by no
means follows that, because the employment of all persuasive speeches
is directed to a decision of some kind , and because (second member of
protasis) the political characters have been described (in I 8), therefore
it has been determined how and by what means or materials speeches
may be invested with an ethical character . In fact it is a complete
non-sequitur.
Bekker [ed. 3] and Spengel, in order to establish a connexion between
protasis and apodosis, put a comma at Trporepov ; suppose that the
preceding sentence from the beginning of the chapter is left incomplete,
without apodosis, at (BovXtvovrcu ; and that wo-re marks the conclusion
only from the clause immediately preceding ; the meaning then being*
that the description of the political characters in I 8 is a sufficient
determination of the modes of imparting an ethical character to the
speech. But this cannot be right: for not only is the fact alleged quite
insufficient in itself to support the conclusion supposed to be deduced
from it, but also the two kinds of characters designated are in fact
different ; and it could not be argued from the mere description of the
characters of I 8, that the ydos tv rw Xyot/rt had been sufficiently dis
cussed and determined ; which is in fact done so far as it is done
at all in n i, and not in I 8.
Other proposed alterations and suggested difficulties in the rest of
the chapter may be left for discussion to their place in the Commentary :
the meaning and connexion of this part are in general perfectly intel
ligible, though omission, interpolation, and obscurity or error are alleged
against this and that phrase ; and the order of the actual contents of
the work coincides essentially and in the main with that which is here
followed.
I have now to state the views of two recent critics and commentators
upon the whole passage, in its connexion with the order of the several
divisions of the entire work.
Spengel s views upon this subject are to be found in his tract iiber
die Rhetorik dcs Arist., in \\~\z.Transactions of the Bav. Acad. 1851,
PHTOPIKHS B i8 r. 173
pp. 32 37 ; a work which I have already had frequent occasion to refer
to. He had previously spoken of the order contemplated and adopted
by Aristotle, in the arrangement of the three main divisions of his
subject ; the analysis of the direct proofs, Tricrrfis, by logical argument,
and the two modes of indirect confirmation of the others, the ydr), and
the irddr]. The passages which he himself quotes in illustration of the
first order in which Aristotle proposes to take them, pp. 25 27, shew
that the order is Trurrftj, ijdrj, nddrj : nevertheless Spengel inverts the
two last, p. 30 et seq., omitting the actual treatment of the tjOos, as a
subsidiary argument or mode of persuasion in n i, the true r\6os *v r<5
\(yoi>Ti ; and, as it seems to me, confounding that with a totally dif
ferent set of characters, which are delineated as an appendix to the
nddrj, and consequently after them in II 12 17. This I have already
pointed out, and explained the real application of the six charac
ters of II 12 17 to the purposes of Rhetoric, in the Introduction
p. 110, foil, and at the commencement of c. 12 in the Commentary.
Spengel notices the inconclusive wore in the apodosis, c. 18. i (p. 34),
apparently assuming that the passage is corrupt, but throws no further
light upon the interpretation or means of correcting the section. Next
we have, p. 36 foil., an attempt to prove that TO XOITTO, in 5, is to be
understood of the treatment of the -ndGos and ijtfo? contained severally
in c. 2 ii and 12 17 of Bk. II, and that consequently from the words
OTTCOS TO. XoiTra TrpocrdfVTfs dno8u>fifv TTJV ft; dpx^s Trpodfcriv we are to con
clude that the order of treatment of the contents of the first two books
was as follows ; the ( {8rj, or nto-rds eg avrov TOV \6yov (as if the r/flos and
Trddos were not equally conveyed by the speech itself}, occupying the first
book ; next, the four KOWOI TOTTOI, and the second part of the logical
Tria-Tfts, II 18 26; and thirdly, the irddos and tfflos in the first seventeen
chapters of Bk. II, which originally formed the conclusion of that book,
though now the order of the two parts is inverted.
Vahlen, in a paper in the Transactions of the Vienna Acad. of
Sciences, Oct. 1861, pp. 59 148, has gone at some length into the ques
tions that arise out of this eighteenth chapter, where it is compared with
other passages in which Aristotle has indicated the order in which he
meant to treat the several divisions of his subject. Op. cit. 121 132.
His principal object in writing, he says, p. 122, is to defend against
Brandis criticisms Spengel s view that the original arrangement of
Aristotle in treating the subjects of the second book has been subse
quently inverted in the order in which they now stand ; Aristotle having
intended to complete the survey of the logical department of Rhetoric
before he entered upon the r\6i] and Trddrj. He is of opinion (p. 126) that
the analysis of the KOIVOI TOTTOI came next (in accordance with the original
plan) to the e {Sr) of the first book ; and consequently that there is a gap
at the opening of the second between the conclusion of the e?S?j and the
commencement of the tfdr) and iraQy ; and that as a further consequence,
the words in 2, en 8 e coV r : 6iKovs Sttopto-rat, are an interpolation of
some editor of Aristotle s work, who introduced them, after the Koivol
TOTrot had been transferred to their present place, as a necessary recognition
of what had actually been done. His principal object is in fact to
establish what he conceives to be the true order of the several parts of
174 PHTOPIKH2 B 18 i.
the work; and in doing so he deals, as it seems to me, in the most
arbitrary manner with Aristotle s text. He assumes a Redactor, or
Editor, who has taken various liberties with the text of his author, and
has interpolated various passages, chiefly relating to the ijdr), to supply
what he conceived to be deficient after the order had been changed.
How or why the order was changed, neither he nor Spengel gives us any
indication ; and the supposition of these repeated interpolations has little
or no foundation except his own hypothesis of the inseparable connexion
of the ei 8/7 and KOII/OI TOTTOI : for my own part I cannot find in the passages
which he quotes in support of this opinion, or elsewhere in Aristotle s
Rhetoric, any statement of a necessary connexion between the two, such
as to make it imperative that the KOIVO\ TOTTOI should be treated im
mediately after the e ldr). The order of treatment which we find in the
received text appears to be sufficiently natural and regular to defend it
in default of the strongest evidence to the contrary against the suspicion
of dislocation and interpolation, though no doubt the order suggested by
Vahlen may be, considered in itself, more strictly logical and consecutive.
On the connexion of the clauses of the passage now under consideration
(c. 1 8 i), and how and why the long inappropriate parenthesis was
introduced here which are, after all, the things that most require ex
planation he leaves us as much in the dark as his predecessor Spengel.
His interpretation of TO. Xo(?ra (which Spengel seems to have misunder
stood), and anything else that requires notice, may be left for the notes on
the passages to which they belong.
I have suggested in the Introduction, p. 250, the possibility of the
accidental omission of some words or sentences between elpyrai -rvportpov
and wore Siupio-pevov, in order to supply some connexion between protasis
and apodosis, and give some significance to the conclusion ; but without
any great confidence in the success of the attempt to solve the difficulty :
to which I am bound to add that it leaves unexplained the introduction
of the parenthesis, eari 8e /3oiAeiWrai, which, however and whencesoever
it may have been introduced, is here most certainly out of place. And
I will now proceed to give a summary of the contents of the chapter, as
I understand them.
All speeches which have persuasion for their object are addressed to,
or look to, a decision of some kind. In the two more important branches
of Rhetoric, the deliberative and forensic, ev rots TroXiriKois aySxriv, the
decision and the judge may be understood literally : in the third or
epideictic branch, the audience is in some sense also a judge, in his
capacity of critic, being called upon to decide or pass sentence on the
merits of the composition. Still it is only in the first two that the term
judge can be applied to the hearer in its absolute, or strict and proper
sense (an\a>s Kpirrjs). Then, as a second member of the protasis, comes
a clause which has the appearance of being a continuation or supplement
of something which has been lost a reference, namely, to the treatment of
the TjQos in n i, which might justify the conclusion that follows, that it
has now been determined in what way and by what means speeches may
be made to assume an ethical character . Still the sentence and its
statements remain incomplete: for if, as it appears, Aristotle s intention
was to give an enumeration in detail of the main divisions of his Rhetoric
PHTOPIKHS B i8 i. 175
ea~Ti (wepl lav yap larfJLev xal KKpiKa/uiv,
en Set Aoyoi ), ecrTi e, av T6 Trpos eva TIS TU> p. 8-
in the order in which he had placed them, the omission of the important
department of the Trddrj would be quite unaccountable, unless indeed
which I am myself inclined to believe he meant to include the rrddr)
under the general head of rjdiitol \6yoi ; which, as the treatment of the
Trddij belongs to Ethics, and the effects of the use of them by the speaker
are purely ethical, he was fairly entitled to do. At the same time, if this
be admitted, the first part of the protasis with the parenthesis appended
has no sufficient connexion with the conclusive (Sarre : nor is it clear why
the political characters , which do not come under the rjdos proper,
should be especially singled out as one at least of its representatives :
though, if I am right in supposing something to be lost which stood
before this clause, it might very likely have contained something which
led to the mention of these characters, as one of the varieties of Tjdos
which impart an ethical colour to the speech.
However, let us suppose at least, as we fairly may, that Aristotle s
intention, however frustrated by corruption of his manuscript, was to tell
us what he had already done from the commencement of the second
book, and what he next proposed to do in the remainder of it. He has
hitherto been employed (in this book) upon the Ethical branches of the
art, by which the character of the speaker himself may be displayed in
a favourable light, and the emotions of the audience directed into a
channel favourable to the designs of the orator, i.
We now take a fresh start, and from a new protasis, which states that
the f *Lrj, from which the statesman and public speaker, the pleader, and
the declaimer, may derive their premisses and proofs, have been analysed
under these three branches of Rhetoric, and also the materials, which may
serve for imparting an ethical colour (in two senses, as before) to the
speech, have been already despatched and determined, we arrive at the
conclusion that it is now time to enter upon the subject of the KOIVOI or
universal topics three in number as they are here classified, the possible
and impossible, the past and the future, and amplification or exaggeration
and depreciation which comes next in order ; and is accordingly treated
in the following chapter. When this has been settled, we must en
deavour to find something to say about enthymemes in general, arguments
which may be applied to all the branches of Rhetoric alike, and examples,
the two great departments of rhetorical reasoning or proof, that by the
addition of what still remained to be done (that is, by the completion of
the logical division of the subject, by the discussion of enthymemes and
examples, c. 20, the enthymeme including the yvap-rj, c. 21, the varieties
of enthymeme, demonstrative and refutative, c. 22, and specimens of
these, c. 23, fallacious enthymemes, c. 24, and the solution of them, c. 25,
with an appendix, c. 26), we may fulfil the engagement, the task, which
we proposed to ourselves at the outset of this work .
I. earl 8e, av re jrpos fva K.r.A.] Comp. I 3. 2. 3, of which most of the
statements of this parenthesis are a repetition, though in other words.
This may help to account for the introduction of it here, where the
i;6 PHTOPIKH2 B 18 i.
owjuei>os 7TjOOTj067r>7 77 ccTTOTpeTrri, olov ol vov6e-
7TOLOVCTLV t] TTe lQoVTes (OV^>V yap i]TTOV KplTtJS
6 ei? oV yap <$el Trelcrai, OUTOS .<TTLV ws a?r/\ws enreiv
KpiTtj i), edv re TT^O? diuL<picrfiriTOuvTa e aV re TT^O?
VTToBeariv Xeyn Tfs, d^co/ws* TW T^jO Xoyu> aVay/o;
KUL dvaipeiv TavavTLa, irpos a cocnrfp djm(pi(r-
^ ^ - < ^.^ \ >
TOV \o<yov TroieLTcti. wcravTws oe Kat ev
67ri$eiKTiKo is uxnrep yap wpos Kpirriv TOV Geiapov
f ^ / / /^ ^.\/ 5>
O AO^O? a"VVCTT1]KeV . O\0)<S 06 IULOVOS tCTTLV aTT
TO?5 TTOXfTtKO?? d WO lV 6 Ta
Ta Tf. <ydp dfjL^icr/SrjTOviuLeva tyrelTai TTW? e^ei, KUL
Trept lav (3ov\evovrai. Trepi $e TWV Kara ra?
author is reviewing the progress of his work; the same train of reasoning
recurs to his mind, and he starts again with the same topic.
Kpirrjs 6 els] Comp. Ill 12. 5.
edv re Trpos d/i(/H<r/3?7roCj/ra K.r.X.] Whether you are arguing against a
real antagonist (in a court of law, or the public assembly), or merely
against some thesis or theory (where there is no antagonist of flesh
and blood to oppose you) ; for the speech must be used as an instru
ment, and the opposite (theory or arguments) refuted, against which
as though it were an imaginary antagonist you are directing your
words . In either case, if you want to persuade or convince any one, as
an antagonist real or imaginary, you are looking for a decision or judg
ment in some sense or other : in the case of the defence of the thesis,
the opposing argument or theory, which has to be overcome, seems to
stand in the place of the antagonist in a contest of real life, who must be
convinced if you are to succeed. When you want to convince anyone,
you make him your judge.
wcrTrep yap npos Kpirr^v K.r.X.] the composition of the speech is
directed (submitted) to the spectator (for his judgment or decision) as
though he were a judge . The spectator, the person who comes to listen
to a declamation, like a spectator at a show, for amusement or criticism,
stands to the panegyric, or declamatory show-speech, as a critic, in the
same position as the judge to the parties whose case he has to decide.
I 3-2, dvayKij TOV aKpoaTTjv rj deatpov flvai f) KpiTtjv...6 8f nepl rfjs S
1 But as a general rule it is only the person who decides the points in
question in political (public, including judicial) contests that is abso
lutely (strictly and properly) to be called a judge ; for the inquiry is
directed in the one to the points in dispute (between the two parties in
the case) to see how the truth really stands, in the other to the subject of
deliberation .
PHTOPIKHS B i82 4. 177
eV TO?S (TV/LJi/3oi/\eVTlKOl<5 e lptJTai TTpOTCpOvJ
<t ^ * >i ~ \ <?> \ / \
<a<TT6 CLMpia-fjievov av eit] TTWS re KCLI cia TLVWV TOWS
_ \ 5/1 \ / 5 \ <N * \ t/
2 Aoyovs tjuiKovs TTon/reoi/. 67re* oe Trepi eKacrrov
yevos TWV Aoywi/ erepov i\v TO Te Ao?, Tre^
cT avTwv el\rifj.fjie.vai So^ai KOI TrpoTacreis ei<riv e cov
7riorT6i<s (pepoucri KCU wfjifiovXevovTes KO.I
Kcti djuLcpLcrfitiTOvvTes, eri S e^
-\ / ^ - x \
roi/s A.o<yovs eroe^errtf Troieiv, KCU Trepi TOUTWV
3 pi(TTai, \OLTTOV riiMV <$i\6eiv rrept TU>V KOIVWV 7ra<ri
dvcfyKctlov TO. 7Tpt TOV SWCITOU KCII a^vvaTOV
ev TOIS \oy0K, KO.L TOI; {Jiev ws ecrrai
4 TOfs e aj<s <yeyove TreipdaOai ceucvvvai. TL $6 Trept
/ULeyedovs KOIVOV aTravTiav C<TTI TCOV Xoywv xpoovrai
yap Traj/res rw fJieLOvv KO.I av^eiv Kal CTV]J.j3ov\6vov-
1 irpbrepov. dare Bckker (ed. 1831-).
eV rot? a-vp.^ov\evTLKo"is] The division of the work, from I 4. 7 to I 8
inclusive, in which is contained the analysis of the various etS^, or spe
cial topics, which belong to the deliberative branch of Rhetoric. The
punctuation jrpurepov, wore, in Bekker s [later] editions and in Spengel s,
making wore noirjTfov the apodosis to the preceding clause only, has
been already mentioned in the introductory note to this chapter [p, 172,
middle], and the arguments against it stated.
flprj-rai -rrporepov] I c. 8, see especially 7 : the notes on 6, and Introd.
p. 182, and p. no.
2. erepov r^v TO re Aoy] tft>, is as was said , sc. I 3. i, scq.
dogm KOI Trporacreti?] 86gai are the popular prevailing opinions which
form the only materials of Rhetoric, Trporaa-eis the premisses of his enthy-
memes, which the professor of the art constructs out of them. Vahlen,
Trans. Vienna Acad. u. s., p. 128, remarks that this combination of 8o|a
and irpoTacris occurs nowhere else except here and in n i. i, and is an
additional mark of the connexion between that passage and tkis chapter.
(TV[i.[Boij\fvovT{ j] in I 4. 7, to I 8 ; cVifietKi r ^ez ot in I 93 an d dfj.(pL(rftri-
TOVVTfS, I IO 15.
Irt 8e Sico pio-rai] Vahlen (u. s., p. 126), in conformity with his
somewhat arbitrary hypothesis, has, as already mentioned, condemned
this clause as an interpolation, partly on account of the absence of the
n-adrj where they required special mention. I have already observed
that in default of any other evidence of the spuriousness of the passage
we may very well suppose that Ar. intended to include them in the i]6i-
KO\ \uyoi [see p. 175 /;///.].
3, 4. The four KOIVOI TOTTOI, common to all three branches of Rhe
toric. These are illustrated in c. 19.
irpoa-xprfadai] to employ them in addition to the f lftrj.
AR. II. 12
i;8 PHTOPIKH2 B 18 5.
res Kct eTTcttvouvTes ^/eyovTes Ka KaTtyyopovvTes j
5 a.7ro\o<yoviJievoi. TOVTWV c)e SiopiorOevTiav Trepi re evQv- r. 1392.
KOivtj TTipa6u>fJiev eiTrelv, e l TL e^o/zey, Kal
i TrapaSeiry/uaTiav, OTTWS TO. \onrd Trpo<r6evTes arro-
TY\V e dp^iis TrpoQea-iv ecrri $e TWV KOIVWV TO
/mev aveiv oiKeioTctTOV rots eTTideiKTiKo is, worTrep e ipiiTcu,
TO $e -76701/0? Tols SiKavLKols (Trepi TOVTIOV <yap r\ Kpi-
(n^, TO $e ^VVCITOV Kctt EvofJievov rots
juev ovv Trepi ^VVUTOV Kal O^VVCITOV Xeyto- CHAP,
(ed..i8$i) A c . Kal irpOTptirovres Kal dwoTp^TrovTes Q, Y b , Z b .
^ aTroTpsVoi/res is rejected by Bekker and Spengel [ed. 1867], and is cer
tainly suspicious. The latter had already remarked, Trans. Bav. Acad.
[1851], p. 33, note 2, that Ar. never uses a-v^^ovXtveiv for TrporpeVeii , as he
has done in this case if the text be genuine. Therefore, either uv^ovKevovrf s
must be changed into irpoTpeirovrfs (printed by an oversight aTrorpeVoires-)
or better, 77 an-orpeVoi/res erased : the course which he has adopted in his
recent edition. Of course Arist. employs av^ovKf-veiv as a general term
including both persuasion and dissuasion ; as in II 22. 5 and 8 (referred
to by Spengel).
5. Next to the KOIVOI TOTTOI will follow the illustration of the Koivol
Tria-Tfis, c. 20. i, the universal instruments of all persuasion, Example
(c. 20), Enthymeme (and its varieties) cc. 21 24, with an appendix on
Refutation, c. 25 (and a shorter one of a miscellaneous character, c. 26).
ra XotTra] interpreted by Spengel, u. s., of the fjfy and Trddrj, which he
supposes to have been treated last in this book ; and by Vahlen (rightly,
as I think) of the logical part of the treatise, the enthymemes and exam
ples, which still remain (after the analysis of the KOIVOI TOTTOI) to be
handled, u. s., p. 129). Brandis, ap. Schneidewin s Philologits IV i, p. 7,
note 7, unnecessarily limits ra XOITTO to the contents of cc. 23 26.
Schrader, " doctrinam de elocutione et dispositione hoc verbo innuit,
quam tertio libro tradit." Vahlen, u. s., pp. 128 and 132, contemptuously
rejects this interpretation.
diro8(ofj,v TTJV irp66fcnv\ On aTroSiSovai, see note on 11.7- Here, to
fulfil a purpose or intention, ///. to render it back, or pay it as a due,
to the original undertaking.
OKTTrep eipTjrai] I 9. 40. Comp. Rhet. ad Alex. 6 (7). 2. TO 8e
yeyovbs rols 8iK.aviK.ols, I 9-4 I 3- 4 a.nd 8. TO fie $vvaTbi>...To1s
crv/n/3o vXt vriKols, I 3- 2 > and 8.
TO yeyovbs ...... TTfpl TOVTWI ] Fact , as an abstract conception, and
therefore neut. sing., is represented in its particulars or details the par
ticular, individual, instances, from which the notion is generalised in
the plural TOVTGOV.
CHAP. XIX.
In the following chapter the KOII/O! TOTTOI are treated under the three
heads, (i) of the possible and impossible, (2) fact, past and future, and (3)
PHTOPIKH2 B 19 i, 2. 179
av $rj Touvavriov rj ^vvaTov t] eivai tj yeviaQai,
^ > /^,/c. >\T ^ / T > *,
TO evavTLOv coj^eiev av eivai cvvcnov, OLOV ei bu-
VO.TOV avQpwTrov vyiacrOfivai, Kai vocrfjcrai t] yap avrt]
<$vva{jiLST(av evavriwv, tj evavTia. Kai el TO OJULOLOV
amplification and depreciation ; for the topic of degree, of greater and less,
or the comparative estimate of goods, which might be distinguished from
the third, seems here, and c. 18. 3, 4, to be included in it. In the latter
of the two passages, this third rorros is called simply irtpl peytflovs, and
here the two parts are included under the one phrase ntpl fj.tyd\cav Kai
fjiiKpwv, which is equivalent to aCtiv KOI finovv, and denotes one general
topic. I wish so far to correct what I have said in the Introd. p. 129^
They may also be divided into four, or six heads.
Of the importance of the first in deliberative oratory Cicero says, de
Orat. it 82.336, Sed quid fieri possit aut non possit quidque etiam sit
necesse aut non sit, in utraque re maxime quaerendum. Inciditur enim
omnis iam deliberatio, si intelligitur non posse fieri aut si necessitas
afferturj et qui id docuit non videntibus aliis, is plurimum vidit,
Quintilian has some observations on the possible, and necessary, as
partcs suadendi, Inst. Or. in 8. 22 26.
On 8vvafj.it, Swarov and the opposite, and their various senses, there is
a chapter in Metaph. A 12.
I. The possibility of anything, in respect of being or coming to be,
implies the possibility of the contrary : as, for example, if it be possible
for a man to be cured, it is possible for him also to fall ill : for there is
the same power, faculty, potentiality, i.e. possibility of affecting a subject,
in the two contraries, in so far as they are contrary one to another .
r/ fvavrid] i.e. solely in respect of their being contraries, and excluding
all other considerations. As in the instance given, a man is equally
liable to be affected by health and sickness in so far as they are con
traries, without regard to any properties or qualities in himself, which
may render him more or less liable to one or the other. This is
Schrader s explanation.
TavavTia] contraries is one of the four varieties of avTiK.fiiifva, op-
posites . These are (i) avrityaa-is, contradiction (or contradictories), Kard-
(frao-is and dnof^aa-is, affirmation and negation, affirmative and negative,
to be and not to be, yes and no. (2) TO. tvavrla, contraries which are
defined as the extreme opposites under the same genus good and bad,
black and white, long and short, quick and slow, &c. which cannot
reside in the same subject together. (3) Relative opposites, TO. Trpos TI, as
double and half, master and servant, father and son, &c. And (4)
opposites of state and privation, e|i? and oWp^o-ir, the possession of
something and the privation, absence, want, of it ; as sight and blindness.
(This last term, however, privation, is properly applied only to cases in
which the opposite, possession or state, is natural to the possessor; in
which consequently that which wants it, is deprived defrauded, as it
were of something to which it has a natural claim: blindness can only
be called a arfprjvis when the individual affected by it belongs to a class
12 2
i8o PHTOPIKHS B 19 2.
of animals which have the faculty of vision : Tt>$Aoi> \eyofj.ev ov TO w fx"
Ij-^rtv, dXXo ro fj.Tj e^ov ore ire(f>vKv f\fiv. Categ. c. 10, 12^26 seq.) On
opposites , see Categ. cc. 10, 1 1. Top. B 2, 109 b 17 23. Ib. c. 8, 1 1 3
15 seq. Ib. E 6. Metapli. A 10, 1018 a 20 seq. (where two more kinds
are added, unnecessarily, see Bonitz ad loc.) and I 4, 1055 a 38, where
the usual four are alone mentioned. Cicero, Topic. XI 47 49, enumerates
and illustrates the same four. Of evavria he says, Haec, quae ex eodein
genere contraria snnt appcllantur adversa. Contrarium with him is
Aristotle s dvriKeifj.(vov, the genus, or general notion of opposite.
The argument from contraries, as employed here, is this : the possi
bility of anything being or becoming the one, implies that of being or
becoming the other ; only not both at once : a virtuous man may always
become (has the capacity, fiu i/a/xty, of becoming) vicious, and the converse ;
but evtpyda, when the one state is actually present, and realised in the
subject, it excludes the other. This reciprocal possibility in contraries
arises from the fact that the two contraries belong to the same genus or
class. Black and white both fall under the genus colour, of which they
are the extremes ; they pass from one into the other by insensible grada
tions of infinite variety, from which we may infer that any surface that
admits of colour at all, will admit either of them indifferently apart, but
not together ; two different colours cannot be shewn on the same surface
and at the same time.
2. Again, likeness or resemblance, TO O/JLOIOV, between two things
suggests or implies a common possibility; if one thing can be done, the
probability is that anything else like it can be done equally.
This is a variety of the argument from analogy. We have a tendency,
which appears to be natural and instinctive, to infer from any manifest or
apparent resemblance between two objects, that is, from certain properties
or attributes which they are seen or known to possess in common, the
common possession of other properties and attributes, which are not
otherwise known to belong to them, whereby we are induced to refer
them to the same class. So here, the likeness of two things in certain
respects, is thought to imply something different, which is also common
to both ; a common capacity or possibility. The argument being here
applied solely to the use of Rhetoric, the things in question are rather
actions and their consequences than facts and objects: if it has been
found possible to effect something, to gain some political advantage for
instance, in several previous cases, we argue that in the similar, parallel
case which is under consideration, the like possibility may be expected.
This however, though the popular view of the argument from analogy,
and the ordinary mode of applying it, is not, strictly speaking, the right
application of the term. Analogy, TO avakoyov, is arithmetical or geo
metrical proportion, and represents a similarity, not between objects
themselves, but between the relations of them. See Sir W. Hamilton,
Lect. on Logic,\ T o\. II. p. 165 174, Lect. xxxn, and on this point, p. 170.
Whately (Rhet. p. 74, c. i), "Analogy, being a resemblance of ratios, that
should strictly be called an argument from analogy, in which the two
cases (viz. the one from which, and the one to which we argue) are not
themselves alike, but stand in a similar relation to something else; or, in
other words, that the common genus that they both fall under, consists
PHTOPIKHS B 19 3 5. iSi
3 (WaroV, Kai TO OUOLOV. Kal el TO ^a\7TWTpoi/
4 ^viaTOVj Kai TO paov. Kal el TO (TTTOV^CUOV Kal Ka\ov
5 TTtoTepov yap Ka\i]v oiKiav t] oiKiav eivai. Kai ou
in a relation." This he illustrates by two examples of analogical reason
ing. One of them is, the inferences that may be drawn as to mental
qualities and the changes they .undergo, from similar changes (i.e. rela
tions) in the physical constitution though of course there can be no
direct resemblance between them. Hamilton s illustration of analogy
proper is derived directly from a numerical proportion : that of analogy
in its popular usage is, "This disease corresponds in many symptoms
with those we have observed in typhus fevers ; it will therefore correspond
in all, that is, it is a typhus fever, p. 171.
Butler s Analogy of Natural and Revealed Religion to the constitution
and course of Nature may be regarded as an analogy of relations between
them and God the author of both, in the proper sense of the word, though
in his Introduction he twice appears to identify analogy with mere like
ness or similarity.
Lastly, the logical description of Analogy is to be found in Thomson s
Laws of Thought, 121, Syllogism of Analogy , p. 250, seq. The author s
definition is, p. 252, "the same attributes may be assigned to distinct but
similar things, provided they can be shewn to. accompany the points ot
resemblance in the things, and not the points of difference. Or when
the resemblance is undoubted, and does not depend on one or two
external features ), "when one thing resembles another in known par
ticulars, it will resemble it also in the unknown."
On the different kinds of o/uoior^s and opoia, consult Metaph. A n,
1018 a 15, with Bonitz note, and Ib. i 3, 1054 b 3, seq., also Top. A 17, on
its use as a dialectical topic.
~3. Thirdly, if the harder of two things (as any undertaking, effort,
enterprise, such as the carrying out of any political measure) is possible,
then also the easier . This is by the rule, omne mains continct in se
minus; or the argumentum a fortiori.
4. And (again a fortiori) the possibility of making or doing any
thing well, necessarily carries with it the possibility of the making or
doing of it in general (o\a>s, the general or abstract conception of making
or doing ; in any way, well or ill) : for to be a.good house is a harder thing
than to be a mere house , of any kind. The same may be said of -a. fine
picture, statue, literary composition, or any work of art ; anything in
short in which apery, merit, or excellence, TO (nrovdalov, can be shewn.
paov yap OTIOVV -jroirjcrai rj KaXcas Troirj(rat, Top. Z I, 139 < 8 (cited by
Schrader). Compare with this Metaph. A 12, 1019 a 23 "[onTtrTe various
acceptations of Suraroi/), en. ?/ TOV *caXcos TOVT eiriTeXflv (8i!j>a/iir) fj Kara
TTpoatpffftv eVi ore yap rovy p.6vov av Tropfv6evras r/ tlnovras, /x?) KaXccs 17 /xr)
a5s TTpofiXovro, ou (pa/jLfv 8vva(r6ai \tynv rj fBa8i(iv; which may possibly
have suggested the introduction of the topic here.
5. The possibility of the beginning of anything implies also that
of the end: for nothing impossible comes into being or begins to do so,
i82 PHTOPIKH2 B 19 5, 6.
*>\<S /] > * \ ><M *
t] ap%rj cvvaTai yevecruai, KUL TO reAos* ovctv yap
yiyveraL oi/c) ap%6Tai yiyvecrOai TiLv dftuvctTiOV, olov
TO <TVjJi{j.eTpov Tt\v SiajueTpov elvai OUT av ap^aiTO
yiyveo Bai OVTC r yi r yv6Tai. K.O.L ov TO TeAos, KCII 1}
6 dpxn ^>waTn airavTa yap e
as for example the commensurability of the diameter (with the side of the
square) never either begins to, nor actually does, come into being. To
begin implies to end, says Tennyson, Two Voices [line 339]. In interpret
ing a rhetorical topic which is to guide men s practice, it is plain that we
must keep clear of metaphysics. The beginning and end here have
nothing to do with the finite and infinite. Nor is it meant that things
that can be begun necessarily admit of being finished : the Tower of
Babel, as well as other recorded instances of opera interntpta, shew that
this is not true. And though it may be true of the design or intention,
of any attempt, that it always looks forward to an end, immediate or
remote, still to the public speaker it is facility and expediency, rather
than the mere possibility, of the measure he is recommending, that is
likely to be of service in carrying his point. All that is really meant is,
that if you want to know whether the end of any course of action, plan,
scheme, or indeed of anything is possible, you must look to the begin-
ing : beginning implies end : if it can be begun, it can also be brought to
an end : nothing that is known to be impossible, like squaring the circle,
can ever have a beginning, or be brought into being. Schrader exem
plifies it by, Mithridates coepit vinci, ergo et debellari poterit. Proverbs
and passages on the importance of apxn are cited in the note on I 7. 11.
The incommensurability of the diameter with the side of the square,
or, which is the same thing, the impossibility of squaring the circle, is
Aristotle s stock illustration of the impossible : see examples in Bonitz ad
Metaph. A 2, 983 a 16. Euclid, Bk. x. Probl. ult. Trendelenburg, on
tie Anima ill 6. I, p. 500, explains this : the diameter of a square is repre
sented by the root of 2, which is irrational, and therefore incommensu
rable with the side. He also observes that Aristotle cannot refer to the
squaring of the circle; a question which Was still in doubt in the time of
Archimedes could not be assumed by Aristotle as an example of impos
sibility. The illustration, which passed into a proverb, CK Sta^eVpou avTi-
Kfla-dai, is confined to the side and diameter of the parallelogram. See
also Waitz on Anal. Pr. 41 a 26.
And when the end is possible, so also is the beginning, because
everything takes its origin, is generated, from a beginning . The end
implies the beginning : everything that comes into being or is produced
everything therefore with which the orator has to deal in his sphere of
practical life has a beginning. Since the beginning is implied in the
end, it is clear that if the end be attainable or possible, so likewise must
the beginning be.
6. And if it is possible for the latter, the posterior, the subsequent,
of two things, either in substance and essence, or generation, to be brought
into being, then also the prior, the antecedent ; for instance, if a man
PHTOPIKHS B 19 6. 183
el TO va"repov Trj ovcria i] Ttj ryevecrei ^VVUTOV <ye-
i, KO.L TO irpoTepov, oiov el avfipa <yevea-6ai $u-
can be generated, then a child ; for that (the child) is prior in generation
(every man must have been first a boy ; this is ev yevto-ti, in the order
of growth, in the succession of the natural series of generation or
propagation) : and if a child, then a man ; because this (the child, eKeivrj
being made to agree with dp^r; instead of Truly,) is a beginning or origin .
This latter example is by the rule that every end necessarily implies
a beginning ; a child stands in the relation to mature man of beginning
to end: and therefore every grown man must have passed through the
period of childhood ; which is also reducible to the other rule, that the
possibility of subsequent implies that of antecedent, of which the pre
ceding example is an illustration.
TO vorepov, TO Trporepov] The two principal passages on the various
senses in which irportpov and vcntpov, before and after, earlier and
later, antecedent and subsequent, prior and posterior, can be applied,
are Categ. c. 12, in which five varieties are distinguished, and Met. A 11,
in which there are four. On the former passage Waitz says in his Comm.
p. 316, " non premendam esse divisionem quam nostro loco tradidit :
apparet enim non id agi in his ut ipsa reruin natura exploretur et per-
vestigetur, sed ut quae usus ferat sermonis quotidiani distinguantur
alterum ab altero et explicentur.
In the Metaphysics, the divisions are four. In the first, prior and
posterior refer us to a series and an order, established either by nature
or by the human will, under which the rrj ytveo-ei of the Rhetoric will
naturally fall. Of this there are five varieties, (i) Kara TOTTOV, local (comp.
Phys. IV u, 219 a 14, seq.) ; (2) Kara XP OV V > chronological, the order of
time (Phys. IV 14, 223 a 4, seq.) ; (3) Kara Kivrjcnv ; (4) KOTO 8vvafj.iv, capacity
or power; capacity a natural order, power either of nature or human
choice ; (5) Kara rati/.
In the second the order of knowledge is referred to : only in two dif
ferent applications the meaning of the two terms is inverted : in the order
of growth the particular is prior to the universal, sense and observation
to generalisation or induction : in the order of dignity, the universal is
prior to the particular, as the whole to the individual parts. The one is
irporepov rrpos ?//*ay, the Other, Trporepov oTrAwf.
The third, Trporepa Xe yerat ra rav irporep&v Trddrj, the priority of the at
tributes of the prior (in some series), as straightness is prior to smooth
ness, because the line is prior to the plane or surface the notion is
that the plane \& generated from, and so, in growth and origin, posterior to
the line ; and therefore the attribute of the latter is prior to that of the
former is not, as Bonitz remarks, coordinate with the three others,
"pendet enim a reliquis, quae suapte natura sunt priora, tamquam
accidens a subiecto suo qui inhaeret."
The fourth, the otWa of the Rhetoric, priority and posteriority in
essence or substance, ra Kara (frvaiv Kal ova-lav ; priority in this sense
belongs to things ocra eVSt^erat fivai, avev aXXwi/ : that is, things which are
independent of others, whereas the others (the posterior) are dependent
on them : the latter imply the former, the former do not necessarily imply
the latter. Such is the relation of one and two ; two always imply one,
1 84 PHTOPIKHS B 19 7, 8.
vaTOV, Kai Trou&a (Trporepov yap 6K6ivo r yiyv6Tai), KUI
7 el Trainee, Kai av^pa (dpx*l 7 a p Keivr]}, Kai u>v eptas i]
7ri6ufJLia (bv(rei earriv ouoeis yap TCOV a&vvdTwv epa
8 OV& eTTlBujJ-ei ft)S 67Tt TO TToAu. KGU (*)V eTTLCTTrj/ULai CLCTL
one docs not necessarily imply two. Similarly the first category, ova-la
substance, is prior to all the others, which express only properties and
attributes of the first. This priority is ova-la, which is evidently inserted
merely because it was suggested by the opposite -yeWcris, and being utterly-
useless in Rhetoric, from which all nice distinctions and subtleties of all
kinds are alien, is accordingly passed over in the illustration. This divi
sion of ova-ia also includes priority of dvvap,is and eWpyeio, where again
the order of growth and of dignity inverts the relation of the two : dvvafjus,
the capacity, being of course prior in growth or time, the eWpyeia, actns,
the realization, or active and perfect condition, being superior in the
order of dignity and importance, or in conception, Aoyco.
Another division is that of ova-la substance, Xoyco conception, and
xpvva- Metaph. 6 8, 1049 b 11, seq.
See further on this subject, Bonitz ad Met. An, Comm. p. 249 252 ;
Waitz ad Organ, p. 14 a 26 (Categ. c. 12). Trendelenburg, Categorienlehre
p. 38, seq., 72, seq.
7. And things (in general) are possible which are the objects of
love or desire these -nadrj, being instinctive and natural, show that the
objects of them are attainable, because "nature does nothing in vain",
a constantly recurring principle in our author : ovQiv yap, as </>a/zeV,
^arrjv $ (fivais Trotei, Pol. I 2, 1253 a 9, ft ovv T) (f>v<ns nydev p^Tf areAey.
Trotet /J.IJTC (j.a.TT)i>, Ib. c. 8, 1256 b 20, ct passim ; if the desires could not
be satisfied, nature would not have implanted them in us for no one
either loves or desires anything impossible for the most part : the
qualification coy enl TO iro\v, is added to allow for the exceptional cases
of insane or infatuated passion as that of Pasiphae (referred to by
Victorius) or of Pygmalion ; or a child s desire to have a star to play
with.
8. And all sciences and arts imply the possibility of the existence
or generation of their objects . The sciences, as natural history, moral
and political philosophy, chemistry, geology, &c., have facts or phe
nomena, actually existing, which are to be observed and generalized,
for their objects ; the practical arts produce, or bring into being, their
objects, as painting, sculpture, and the fine arts in general, also the
useful and mechanical arts. This I think is the distinction here intended.
Moral and political philosophy come under the head of sciences which
have facts, moral and social, for the objects of their study ; though they
belong to the practical department of knowledge, and have action for
their end and object. emo-Typr) and its object TO (TTKTTTJTCV, are relative
terms, the one necessarily implying the other, Categ. c. 10, u b 27, Kai ij
fTTia-Ttjfirj de rco eVicrr^ra) coy ra Trpo? TI dvriKfiTai ; and often elsewhere.
This may help to establish the necessary connexion which is assumed
between knowledge, science, art, and their objects. But I do not suppose
that Ar. here means to assert the existence of a natural law which con
nects them ; but only that, as a matter of fact, men never do choose as an
PHTOPIKHS B 19 9, 10. 185
Kai re^vat, vvarov TO.VTO. Kai evai Ka
9 Kai bcrwv t] dp%r] Trjs ye^e crew? eV TOUTOIS ecrTiv a
rj/xels aVay/cacrai/^ei/ av r] 7rei(rai/uLev Tavra 3
IO ti)V Kpe lTTOUS // KVplOl t] (pl\0l. KUl CuV TO.
a, Kai. TO o\ov, Kai u>v TO o\ov eWaroV, Kai TO.
cos 7Ti TO TToXv" el yap Trpoa-^ia-fJia KUI Ke<pa\ls
J^LTWV ^vvaTai yevecrOaij Kai
object of study in science, or try their hand at producing by art, anything
which they know in the one case to have no real existence, and in the
other to be incapable of being produced.
9. And again, anything (that we wish to do, or to effect, in the
ordinary course of life, as in our business or profession) of which the
origin of generation lies in things which we would (if we wished it,
opt. with av,} influence or control either by force or persuasion (meaning
by eV TOVTOLS men in particular, as appears from what follows; but not
excluding things, as circumstances, conditions and such like, the command
of which might enable us to effect our purpose) ; such are (persons whom
we can influence or control) those whose superiors we are in strength
and power, or those who are under our authority, or our friends . The
two first classes illustrate the avayna^fiv the force of superior strength, and
of authority natural (as that of a parent or master) or legal (the authority
of the magistrate) ; the third, friends, who are amenable to persuasion,
exemplify the TTfideiv.
10. If the parts are possible, so also is the whole: and if the
whole of anything, so are the parts, as a general rule : for if slit in front,
toe-piece, and upper-leather, are capable of being made, then also shoes
can be made; and if shoes, then front-slit, toe-piece, and upper-leather .
A whole implies its parts, and the parts a whole. Whole and part
are relative terms : neither of them can stand alone, nor has any
meaning except in reference to its correlative : hence of course the
possibility of the one necessarily implies the possibility of the other.
o\ov Xe yertu ov nrjBtv arrfcm fJLfpos ( u>v Xeyfrat o\ov (pvcrei, Metaph.
A 26, 1023 b 26. Ib. c. 2, 1013 b 2.2, the whole is said to be TO ri fy elvai,
the Xoyo? or formal cause of a thing, that which makes the combination
of parts what it was to be, viz. a whole, and therefore of course in
separable from it.
The qualification, o5v eVi TO irokv, of the universal possibility of the
divisibility of a whole into its parts, seems to be introduced to meet the
objection which might arise from the existence or conception of dSim pera,
such as a geometrical point, or an atom, or the human soul, or Par-
menides one , ovXot>, p.owoyfi>es,-..fi> vvf%es [Ritter and Preller, Hist.
Phil. 145].
Of the parts of a shoe here mentioned we have absolutely no infor
mation either in ancient or modern authorities. The explanation of the
word Trpoo-xtcr/xa, given by Photius, who refers to Aristophanes for an ex
ample of it, fl8os v-rroSijuaTos ; and by Hesychius, the same words with the
186 PHTOPIKHS B 19 11,12.
< yevecr6ai ) Kai el VTroS/iiuLaTa, Kai Trpoor^KTfJLa Kai Ke-
11 <pa\is Kai ^iTtav. Kai el TO 761/05 b\ov TWV ^VVUTWV r. 1392
yevecrQai, Kai TO e/^o?, Kai el TO eiSos, Kai TO yevos,
oiov el TrXolov yevecrdai. ^VVCITOV, Kai Tpitjpr), KCII el
12 Tpirjpt], Kai 7r\o!ov. Kai el 6aTepov Ttav Trpos a\\*]\a
addition of taxicrfievov en TOV e/jLTrpovdfv, and Pollux will not apply here
at all events, nor to Ar. Probl. xxx 8, inroS^pa en Trpoo-^ V/naroy, where
it is plainly, as here, a part of the shoe, and not the whole though it
is probable enough that Aristophanes in the passage referred to by Pho-
tius may have meant it by vno&rj paras d8os : and K(<pa\ls and ^ircof are
passed over in total silence : they appear in none of the dictionaries of
antiquity that I am acquainted with, nor are the ordinary Lexicons more
instructive. We are left therefore to conjecture as to the precise meaning
of them, but I think the consideration of the words themselves will help
us at least to understand what they represent.
Trpoo-^ttr/ia is a slit in front of the shoe, with which Aristotle s use
of the word in the Problem above quoted exactly agrees. This I think
is fully confirmed by a drawing of a vTroSi/^a in Becker s Charicles, p.
448 (Transl. ed. 2), which is a facsimile of a modern half-boot laced up
in front. The Trp6o-x lcr l JLa is the slit down the front, which when the shoe
is worn has to be laced up. This seems pretty certain ; but of Kf<pa\is
I can only conjecture from the name, that it is a head-piece, or cap,
covering the toes, and distinguishing this kind of shoe from those in
which the toes were left uncovered, which seems to have been the usual
fashion, ^mov guided by a very common use of the word, which
extends it from a covering of the body to any covering whatsoever (in
Rost and Palm s Lexicon, s. v. No. 2, Vol. II. p. 2466) I have supposed
to mean the upper leather, the object of which, just like that of the
tunic or coat, is to protect or cover the upper part of the foot, and
keep out the cold. Stephens Lexicon referring to this passage translates
K((j)a\is tegnmentnm capitis ! Xen. Cyrop. VIII 2. 5, (where vxifav and
XiTa>vas are used in connexion with shoes,) and Schneider s note, throw
no additional light upon the exact meaning of these three words.
ii. The possibility of a genus or class implies that of any sub
ordinate species, and conversely ; if a vessel can be built, then triremes ;
and if triremes, then a vessel .
12. And if the one of two things that stand in a natural relation to
one another (i.e. two relative terms ; see above, 8 and 10) be possible,
then also the other ; as double implies the possibility of half, and half of
double . Categ. c. 10, u b 26, fiiTrAao-ioi/ KCU rjp.icrv is one of the stock
examples of one kind of ra irpos n, the category of relation. Of these
relative opposites Cicero says, Top. XI 49, nam alia qnoque sunt contrari-
orum genera, velut ea quae cum aliquo conferuntur: ut duphim, simplum;
multa,paucaj longum, brevij mains, minus. In de Invent. I 30.47, the
argument from these opposites is thus illustrated ; In iis rebus quae sub
eandem rationem cadunt hoc modo probabile consideratur : Nam si
Rhodiis turpe non est portorium locarc, ne Hermacrconli quidcm tnrpe
PHTOP1KH2 B 19 13, 14. 187
7re(pvKOTiav, KUL OctTepov, oiov el SiTrXdcriov, Kal \]fjucrv,
13 Kal el i]/uu<TU, Kal $i7T\a(Tiov. Kal el avev Te^i^s Kal
^VVCITOV yevecrdai, /u.a\\ov $ia re^i^s Kat
cWaroV oQev Kal Ayadcavi eiptjTai
Kal jULtjv TO, fjiev ye %pi] Teyvn Trpdcroretv, TO. $e p. 87.
dvayKt\ Kal
14 Ka e TO? xeipcxri Ka tjTToari Ka
est conditccre. To which Ouintilian (referring to this place of Cicero, and
quoting the example) adds de suo apparently, for it is not in the original
Quod discere honestum, etdocere [comp. Cicero, Orator, 145]. Victorius.
Ar. Rhet. II 23- 3> n" tf I/ 3.nd ird(r%tiv TI K(\evcrai and 7r(7roii]Kivai. d yap
IJLT]& vfj.1v alcrxpov TO 7ro>Aeu , ov5 ?V I/ r " (ovf Krflai.
13. And if a thing can be done without art or preparation (or
perhaps rather, apparatus) it is a fortiori possible to do by aid of art (8id
with gen. through a channel , medium, and hence, by means of ), and
pains (study, attention) . This is not the exact converse of the topic of 3,
which implied the possibility of a thing being done at all from that of its
being well done ; here the use of art, study and attention, and any other
artificial means by which we assist nature, is alleged as facilitating the
construction of anything, or of carrying out any purpose or design that
we may have in view: the possibility of doing anything without art
implies a fortiori the possibility of doing it with additional help and
contrivance.
In the two verses of Agathon (from an uncertain play) w : hich follow,
the old reading was Kal ^v ra fiev ye TTJ Ti>xn Trpaa-afiv, TO. 8f 7 ?/^ " dvayKrj
(cat Te%VT] TrpocryiyvfTai, but Person s transposition ofrv^j and rexyg (ad
Med. 1090), which is undoubtedly right, has been adopted by Bekker,
ed. 3, and Spengel, as it was by Elmsley, ad Med. 1062. This altera
tion brings them into the required correspondence with Aristotle s text.
"If", says Aristotle, "anything can be effected without art", which is
interpreted as it were by Agathon s "accident, and necessity or over
powering force". But rfj r/x"?7 may be very well retained; and the
translation will be : "And moreover it falls to our lot to do (effect) some
things by art, others by force and mere accident", irpoo-yiyvfadat occurs
three times in this sense, efficior, accido, in Sophocles, Oed. Col. 1200,
Electr. 761, Trach. 1163 (Ellendt s lex.).
14. And anything that is possible for inferiors in capacity (and
personal qualities in general), and power or position, and intelligence, is
a fortiori possible to the opposites (those who are superior) in all these .
Schrader quotes in illustration : Ergo haec (ferre laborem, contemnere
vulnus,) veteranus miles facers poterit, doctus vir sapiensque non poterit?
ille vero meliits ac non paullo quidem (Cic. Tusc. 1 1 17). Galgacus, ap.
Tacit. Agric. 31, Brigantes femina duce exurere coloniam, expugnare
castra, ac nisi felicitas in socordiam vertisset, e.vuere iugum potuere : nos
integri et indomiti primo statim congressu non ostcndcmus qnos sibi
Caledonia viros seposuerit?
188 PHTOPIKH2 B 19 14 16.
V, Kctt rots evavTLOis (jiuXXov , a}(T7rep Kal Icro-
e(prj Seivov eivai el 6 /mev Evduvos efj.a.6ev, t/ros
^ * \ <N / , \ ^\ , <N / ^~-v
15 ce /U.T] cuv)icr6Tat evpeiv. Trept ce acvvaTOV ot\\ov OTL
K TWV evavTiwv TO?? eipti/JLevois vTrap^ei.
1 6 el c)e yeyovev // /uLr] yejovev, e /c TcovSe crKeirreov.
1 As indeed Isocrates said, that it was monstrous to suppose that what
an Euthynus could learn he himself should be unable to discover . Of
Euthynus Buhle says, "de Euth. nihil constat, praeterquam quod ex
hoc loco colligi potest, fuisse eum stupidi et sterilis ingenii hominem."
After all it is only Isocrates estimate of him that we have to judge by :
in comparison with himself most of Isocrates contemporaries were to him
contemptible. The name of Euthynus does not occur in Isocrates extant
orations. A doubtful speech, -rrpbs Evdvvow (Ready wit), is printed with
his works. This Euthynous was dv\jsibs NIKI OV, 9. Of course he cannot
be the person here meant. Euthynus, a wrestler, is mentioned by De
mosthenes, c. Mid. 71, who might possibly be the man for whom Isocrates
expressed his contempt.
[The latter part of the speech npbs Evdvvow, Isocr. Or. 21, has not
been preserved, and Aristotle may possibly be here referring to something
in the part that is now missing. Perhaps the only difficulty about this sup
position is the loose sense in which icroKparris $77 must then be interpreted,
as the speech in question (whether written, as I believe, by Isocrates, or
not) was not delivered by him. In another speech, Isocr. rrpbs KaXXi /za-
X v ) O r - l8 15, we have the words : 6avpda> 8 et atrbv fj.ei> IKO.VOV yvuvai
VOfuffl, oTi...c p.e 8" OVK av o ifrm TOUT e^fvpflv, eurep ffBovKofir^v \l/tv8r) \eyav,
07-4 K.T.A., and Aristotle may, after all, be quoting niemoritcr, as is his
wont, from the latter passage ; in this case we should have to suppose
that TLvdwos is a slip of memory for KaXXi/Lia^oy. See Blass, die Attische
Beredsamkeit, II 203; and comp. J ebb s Attic Orators, 1 1 259. S.]
15. On the impossible, it is plain that the orator may be supplied
with topics from the opposites of those which have been already men
tioned (on the possible) .
vndpx.fi] are already there , ready at hand, for use; as a stock, on
which he may draw for his materials.
1 6. The second of the KOIVO\ TOTTOI is the topic of fact, whether such
and such a thing has been done or not : this is most useful in the forensic
branch", in courts of law. It is the orao-t? aro^ao-rucr;, status coniccturalis
the first of the legal issues, and the first question that arises in a case.
To this is appended, 23 25, fact future ; or rather, future probability,
whether so and so is likely to happen or not. This of course belongs
almost to the deliberative orator, who has to advise upon a future course
of policy. The following topics suggest arguments to prove the probability
of some act having been committed which the pleader wishes to establish
against his antagonist.
First of all we may infer that if anything that is naturally less likely
to have occurred has happened (been done), then (a fortiori] anything (of
the same kind) that is more usual may probably have happened also .
PHTOPIKHS B 19 1719. 189
/uev yap, ei TO TJTTOV <yiyvecr6ai 7re(pvKos
17 yeyoi/ei/ ? yeyovos av e lrj Kai TO jULa\\ov. Kai el TO
vGTepov elwOos yiyvecrQai yeyovev, Kai TO TrpoTepov
yeyovev, olov el eTriXeXtjarTai, Kat e/made TTOTC TOVTO.
1 8 Kat el e^svvaTO Kat e/3ov\TO, TreTrpa^ev TTOLVT^ yap,
OTCIV Swa/uevoi (3ou\t]6uxrt, TrpaTTOv&iv ej
19 ovSev. eTt el e(3ov\eTo Kai [jLrjSev TCL.V
The probability the degree of which is estimated by the frequency of
recurrence, being in the latter case greater. Introd. p. 160.
17. And if (in a relation of prior and posterior, antecedent and
consequent) the usual consequent (of the antecedent) has happened, then
(we may argue that) the antecedent also has happened ; as, for instance,
the having forgotten something implies a previous learning, some time or
other, of the same . Learning is the necessary antecedent of forgetting ;
without the first the second is impossible. As this is a necessary con
nexion, the argument from it is a rfK^piov, a certain indication : it is not
however convertible, as a necessary sequence ; for it does not follow that,
because a man can t forget without having first learnt, he also can t learn
without afterwards forgetting: the converse is only probable, not neces
sary.
1 8. When power is combined with the will to do a thing, we may
argue that the thing has been done : this is human nature : every one,
having the power to do what he wishes, does it ; because there is no im
pediment, nothing to hinder him from the gratification of his desire.
Polit. VIII (v) IO, 1312 b 3, a 8e POV\OVT(II 8vvap.evoi TrparroDcri TrdvTfs.
19. Further, it maybe argued that an act has been done, if the
supposed perpetrator had the wish or desire to do it, and no external
circumstances stood in his way; or if he had the power of doing it (some
injury to another), and at the same time was angry; or if he had at the
same time a desire and the power of satisfying it , (the desire here is
especially lust, and the act done, adultery); for men for the most part are
wont to gratify their impulses when they have the power of doing so ; the
bad from want of self-control, and the good because their desires are
good or well-directed (because they desire what is good, and nothing
else).
fpovXfTo, eTTfdvfjifi] " Voluit praevia deliberatione, concupi-vit ex
affectu." Schrader. If Schrader meant by voluit that povXya-is is will
ing and not wishing, and that it implies deliberation and purpose, as he
certainly seems to say, this is a mistake. I will endeavour to determine
the proper signification of J3ov\r]<nv and its distinction from firtdvpia.
First, however, it must be admitted that neither of the two terms, ftov-
Xeo-0ui and e-mdvp-flv, is confined exclusively to its own proper and pri
mary sense : these like other terms of psychology are used with a lati
tude and indefiniteness which belong to a very early stage of inquiry
into the constitution of our inner man. For instance, emdvpia, which
properly denotes the three bodily appetites, is often extended to the
190 PHTOPIKHS B 19 19, 20.
KO.I el 6<Waro Kai tapyi^eTO, Kai el e^vvaTO Kai
6vfJ.l w? yap eTri TO TTO\V, d>v opeyoi/Tcti, av Svvcav-
Tai, Kai 7TGLOv(TiVy ol fjiev <pav\oi Si ctKpacriav, ol
20 eTTieLKels OTI TWV eTriciKwv eTriBv/uLovcni . Kai el
whole class of desires, mental as well as bodily ; and thus becomes iden
tified or confounded with /SouXr/o-t?.
From a comparison of three passages of our author in which we
find notices of pov\r]<ns, we draw the inference that it means wish
and not will. Will implies purpose; and we are distinctly told in
Eth. Nic. in 4, mi b 20 seq. that f$ov\r](ris is distinguished from
Trpoaipfo-is, deliberate moral purpose, by the absence of this. Further
the exercise of irpoaipeo-is is confined to things which are in our
power to do or avoid; the wish sometimes is directed to what is
impossible or unattainable, to immortality for instance or happiness.
It is also directed to the end, whereas 7rpoatpf<ris looks rather to the means
of attaining the end. re Aor e crri T>V irpaKTutv o fit avro Pov\6[if6a, Eth.
Nic. I i, 1094 a 19. Further it is always directed to what is good, real or
supposed, Rhet. I 10. 8. Psychologically considered, it belongs to the
family of the opegfis, the instinctive impulses which prompt to action,
acting unconsciously and without deliberation. These are three, de
Anima II. 3, 414 b 2, opt^is ptv yap firidvfiia (appetite) KOI 6vp.6s (passion,
especially anger), Kai /3ovX^o-ts (wish, the mental desire of good). (jSovX^o-tr,
Rhet. u. s., is distinguished from eViflv/u a, by this intellectual character
of discrimination between good and bad ; cVidu/ua being a mere animal ap
petite, aXoyo? opetr). Comp. de Anima I. 5,41 1 #28, en 8e TO eiridvp.e iv Kai
ftovXea-Bai K.a\ oXcoy at ope etr, where the two are again distinguished. And
in Rhet. u. s. the three opegfis are divided into XoytoriKif and aXoyot, the
former character belonging to /SouX^o-ts, the latter (irrational) to Bvpos
and e-mSvp-la. firidvuia therefore is bodily appetite, and eVe0u/iet here, as
a cause of crime, though not excluding hunger and thirst, refers more
particularly to lust. In the second case, f7ridvp.ov<rtv rav eVtfiKwi , de
sire is extended to intellectual impulses, which can distinguish good
from bad; and is thus confounded with povXrjtris, which denotes wishing,
but not willing. It is to be observed that the discrimination which is
exercised by fBovXyo-is in the choice of good, is purely impulsive or
instinctive, otherwise it would not be one of the opegfis: it employs no
calculation or deliberation like the Trpoaipea-is preparatory to decision,
and does not always stimulate to action ; as when it is directed to im
possibilities.
ft tSvvaro Kai wpyi ero] Because anger, as long as it lasts, is always
accompanied by the desire of vengeance, which, if a man have the power,
he will be sure to wreak on the object of his anger, II 2. 2. After each of
these three clauses supply TTfirpaxfv, from 1 8, as the apodosis.
2O. Kai ft f/ieXXe yiyvecrdai, /cat 7roteti>] What seems to be meant is
this; anything which was on the point of being done, we may assume to
have actually happened ; or whatever a man was on the point of doing,
that he actually did. Expressed at full length this would run, Kai ti TI
yiyvrdai, (tyevtro) Kai (ft TIS e^fXXf) iroiflv, iiroirjtrfv, or
PHTOPIKH2 B 19 21. 191
Troieiv CIKOS <yap TOV p.e\\ovTa KCII
21 TTOificrai. Kal el ryeyovev bcra 7re<pvKeL irpo eiceivov tj
eveKa eKeivoVj olov el ^crrpa^e, Kal efipovTiicrev, Kal
el eTTCipacre, Kal eirpa^ev. Kal el ocra vcrrepov Tre-
f yi f yve<r6ai i] ov eveKa yiyveTai <ye<yovev, Kal TO
(again from 18). In any other Greek author one would hardly perhaps
venture upon thus supplying an ellipse ; but I see no other way of ex
tracting at once sense and Greek from the text. There appears to be no
variation in the MSS. Bekker, ed. 3, and Spengel, read Kal el f/zsXXf
[yiyveo-dai, /cat] TTOK IV. In 19, the latter also puts e/3ot5Xero KOI, and (after
fKcaXvfv) KOI ft Bvvaruv (so A c for edvvaro), in brackets, as interpolations.
The last three words are also omitted by MS Z b . It seems to me that,
in the two latter cases at least, the text is perfectly intelligible and
defensible. The only reason alleged for omitting the five words in
brackets in 19 is that, if we retain them, ei ej3ofcXero...eica>Xi;ej>is a mere
repetition of the preceding d ediivaro Kal tftovXeTo. That this is not the
case, Victorius has pointed out in his explanation. The former of the
two topics, 1 8, combines power and wish: both together are certain to
produce the act. The latter statement is different ; the wish alone is
sufficient to produce the act provided there are no external impedi
ments in the way: in that case the mere wish, the internal impulse, is
not sufficient.
For it is natural or likely this is all we want for our argument
that one who is waiting to do something, or on the point of doing it,
would also actually carry out his intention, and do it : the probability
is that it has been done .
21. In this connexion of antecedent and consequent, if it is usual,
but not necessary, it is a sign, o-^/xeloj/, and uncertain ; when necessary,
it is a TfKurjpiov. Anal. Pr. II 27, sub init. 0-rjfj.f iov (here including both
kinds) 8e fiovXerai (would be, if it could : aspires to be) flvai Trporaa-is
drroSfiKTiKri dvayKaia. rj ev8oos ov yap OVTOS eanv T) ov yevofjifvov TrpoTtpov,
rj vffTfpov yeyovf TO Trpayp.a, TOVTO (rrjudov (cm TOV yeyovevai f) fivai.
And again, if what had been previously (incpvKfi, had always been ,
the regular accompaniment) the natural antecedent of so and so, (of the
assumed event, or imputed act,) or means to a certain end, has happened,
(then the ordinary consequent has happened, or the end aimed at been
attained) ; for instance, we infer from the occurrence of thunder that
there has been lightning ; and from the attempt, the execution of a
crime . By eVm pao-f, says Victorius, is meant principally, not exclusively
stuprmn, seduction , the attempt on a woman s chastity : on this use
of the verb irtipav see Ruhnken ad Tim. s. v. p. 210. Timaeus explains
it, ireipafiv 8ta Xoycov TrmSa fj yvvalta. Plat. Phaedr. 227 C, Arist. Plut.
150, and Lat. tentare.
And (the converse) if what had been the ordinary natural conse
quent of something else, or the end of certain means (the aim and
object of certain actions) has happened, then we infer that the ante-
192 PHTOPIKHS B 19 2123.
KUI TO TovTOV ev6Kct yeyovev, oiov el efipov-
Kai rlcTTpa^ev, Kai el eTrpa^e, Kai eTreipacrev.
6 TOVTltiV CtTraVTCdV TO. fJLV 6^ OtVofy/C^? TO, W5
> \ \ ^. \ ,r >r \^\--\ /
22 eTTi TO TTO\V ovTcos e-OVTa. Trepi 06 Tov /uLr] i ye f yovvat
(pavepov OTI ex. TCOV evavTiaiv rols eiptumevois.
23 Kat Trepi TOV ecro/uevov eK Ttov avTcov $fj\ov TO P. 1393.
cedent in the one case has occurred, the means to the end in the
other have been employed, as we infer lightning from thunder, and the
attempt from the execution of an act or crime. And of all these cases,
in some the connexion is of necessity, in the rest only for the most part .
The natural antecedent and consequent, as the uniform order of nature,
is the necessary connexion : of the uncertain issues of human agency, TO.
rnj.1v, actions which depend upon ourselves and our own will, nothing
more than probability can be predicated : d-ya-rrr^Tov ovv Trepi TOIOVTCOV Kai
e< TOIOVTOIV \eyovras 7raxv\a>s Kai TVTTOI raXrjdfs fv8fiKWO dcu ) Kai Ttepl TK>V
cos eVt TO TroAv /cat fK TOIOVTCOV Xeyovras roiavra KOI av/J.7repaive<rdai : the
conclusions of moral and social sciences can but amount to probability
(Eth. Nic. I i, 1094 b 19, et passim}. Consequently, the connexion of
motives and actions, and of actions with one another, follows only a
general rule, and this rule can never be applied with absolute certainty.
22. Materials for arguments on the topic of not happening , the
disproof of a statement of fact, may plainly be derived from the opposites
of the preceding, which shew how it may be established. The verb is
omitted: supply, as in 15, vnapxei. This omission of the verb probably
accounts for the omission of on in MSS Q, Y b , Z b .
23. Arguments for the establishment of the probability of future
events and consequences clearly maybe derived from the same source:
for where the power and the wish to do anything are united, the thing
will be done ; as likewise when desire, anger, and calculation, are
accompanied by the power of gratifying the two first, and carrying out the
third. Spengel has again, without manuscript authority, bracketed *cat Xo-
yto-/icp as an interpolation ; doubtless because it is not mentioned in 18, 19,
of which this is a summary. The objection has been already anticipated
and answered by Victorius. Calculation or reasoning is implied, he
thinks, in the desires of good men, which are always directed to what
is good. I cannot think however that this is what Ar. means here by
\oyia-fios. And if we insist upon the strict interpretation of eTnOv^ova-iv,
as excluding any operation of the intellect, still it is hard to deny the
author the opportunity of supplying in 23 what he has omitted to
notice in 19. The statement is perfectly true: calculation plus the
power of carrying it out will produce future consequences : neither
does it contradict anything that has been said before, but merely
supplements it. After all even Aristotle is a man, and liable to human
infirmities ; and certainly his ordinary style of writing is not of that
character which would lead us to expect rigorous exactness : on the
contrary it is hasty and careless in a degree far beyond the measure of
ordinary writing. Upon the whole, I see no reason whatsoever for
PHTOPIKI1S B 19 2325. 193
Te yap ev SvvdjULei Kai /3ou\t]<rei ov eo~Tai, Kai TCI ev
7Ti6vfJLia Kai opyfj Kai \oyicr JULW /meTa %>vvafJLew<s bvTa.
^\ " \ > t ~ * >\ -v -\
cia TavTa Kai ei ev op/my TOO Troieiv rj /uLe\\^(rei t
ecTTocr cas yap eirl TO TTO\V yiyverai fj.a\\ov Ta /xeA,-
24\ovTa r* TO. /mrj p.e\\ovTa. Kai ei Trpoyeyovev bcra
TrpoTepov 7re(j)vKei yiyvea-Qai, olov el a-uvvefyel, ti/cos
25 vtrai. Kai el TO eveKa TOVTOU yeyovev, Kai TOUTO \\ 88.
yevea-Qai olov el 6efJL6\ios, Kai oiKia.
excluding *cai Xoyt<r/iw from the text : the MSS warrant it, and Bekker
retains it.
fita raiTa K.r.X.] The meaning of this obscure sentence seems to be
this: It follows from what has just been stated, 8ia ravra the statement,
that is, that the co-existence of impulse (desire and passion) with power,
is a sure source or spring of action that the intention which these
impulses suggest, whether it be immediately, in the very impulse (or,
starting-point, first start) to action, or (future) when a man is anxiously
waiting for his opportunity (ei> /ieAXTyo-ei), is most likely to be carried out ;
and then an additional reason is assigned for the probability of the
future event when it is on the point of taking place, either immediately,
or not long hence, that things that are impending (acts or events) are
for the most part much more likely to happen than those that are not
impending. With ev opufj comp. Soph. Phil. 566, ovrat Kaff op^v 8pa>criv.
I subjoin Victorius explanation. "Vi etiam horum locorum, si operam
dabat ut gereret, ac iam iamque earn rem aggrcdiebatur (hoc enim
valere hie arbitror lv 6pp.fi), aut denique si post facere aliquando statuerat
(quod signincari arbitror hoc verbo /zeXX^o-ei) dici potest id futurum :
duos autem, si ita legatur, manifesto locos complectitur : quorum prior
rei tentandae peragendaeque propinquior erat : alter tantum facere in
animo habebat."
24. And if the things that had previously been in the habit of
preceding, in a natural order of succession, have already happened, (then
we may expect the usual consequent) ; if the clouds gather, we may
expect rain .
a-wvffpe if, transitive, Arist. Av. 1502. Here impersonal, according
to the analogy of verbs which express states of weather or atmospheric
phenomena, vet, vi(pft, e /Spwr^tre, rjaTpa-^-ev, supra 21, ea-eicre, Thuc. V. 52.
The impersonal use of these verbs is explained by the original ex
pression, and subsequent omission of a subject, o Geo s or Zevs (the God
of the sky). In their ignorance of the natural causes of these and similar
phenomena, they attributed them to divine interposition [Shilleto on
Thuc. I 51. 2, luyfo-xorafe],
25. And if anything which would serve as means to a particular
end (act or event) has happened, then we may infer that the end or
object which these imply is likely to be brought about ; as a foundation
implies a future house .
AR. II. 13
194 PHTOPIKHS B 19 26, 27.
26 Trepi c)e /meyeOovs Kai /miKpoTtiTOs TWV
i juetbi/os T6 Kctl iXaTTOvos Kai oAws
K TCOV TrpoeiprijULevcov ^JULIV ecrri (pavepov
Tai yap ev Tots (rvfJLfiovXevTiKols Trepi re
dyaOcov Kai Trtpi TOV [J.ei(^ovo<s ctTrAws Kai e\a.TTOVOS.
WOTT eTrei Ka6 Ka(TTOv TUIV Xoycov TO trpOKeifJievov
TfA.O5 dyaBov ecrTiv, oiov TO (rv{j.(pepov Kai TO Ka\ov
Kai TO SiKaiov, (pavepov OTI $i eiceivwv XriTTTeov rets
27 avfyla eis TraGLV. TO c)e trapa TO.VTO. TL
26. The last of the three KOLVOI TOTTOI is that of amplification and
depreciation, of exalting and magnifying or disparaging and vilifying any
thing, according as we desire to set it in a favourable or unfavourable
light. Its usual name is aveii> Kai ^eioDv, II 18. 4 ; 26. i ; in 19. 3. Comp.
Introd. p. 276, on n 26, and the note. Though this is a K.OIVOS TOTTOS, and
therefore can be used in the three branches of Rhetoric, it is most
especially applicable to the eViSet/crtKoj/ yevos, and finds there its most
natural and appropriate sphere ; I 9. 40.
The subject of (rre/n) the arguments or inferences that may be drawn
as to the value of things, absolute or comparative ; of greatness and
littleness of things in themselves, or relatively to one another; or in
general of things great and small ; is clear from what has been already
said . They have been treated of under the head of the deliberative
branch of Rhetoric, in I 6, on things good in themselves, and I 7, on the
degrees, or comparative value of them.
an-Xcos] simpliciter (Victorius), seems to be more applicable to fj.eye6oy
than to the relative fielfrv and e\ar-rov. As it is applied here to the latter,
it must mean that the degree, or relative value, is the only thing which is
taken into the account of them in that chapter.
And therefore, since in each of the three kinds of speeches (l 3. 5)
the end or object proposed is some form of good, that is to say, either the
expedient, or the fair and right, or the just, it is plain that these must be
the channels by which they are all (all three kinds of speakers) supplied
with the materials of their amplifications .
olov\ that is to say , nempe, scilicet, not for instance ; defining or
explaining, not exemplifying ; occurs perpetually in Aristotle s writings.
Waitz has some examples on Categ. c. 4, i b 18; comp. note on 4 b 23;
and Bonitz on Metaph. A 4, 985 b 6. [For some instances, see infra, note
on in i. 4.]
27. But to carry our inquiries beyond this into the subject of
magnitude and excess or superiority absolutely and in themselves is mere
idle talk (trifling with words) : for for use, or practical purposes (the
needs or business of life), particular things are far more important (au
thoritative, carry greater weight with them, are more convincing) than
universals . What is said here of particulars being more useful than
universals for practice, or for the practitioner in any art, and therefore
PHTOPIKHS B 19 27; 20 r. 195
aVAo)? Kai V7repo^(t]<5 KevoXoyelv icrriv KV~
piwTepa yap ecrTi Trpos TYIV -^peiav TCOV Kci66\ov ra
Kad eKa(TTa TUIV Trpay/maTtai/.
i fj.ev ovv ^vvctTOv Kai dSvvaTOV, Kai Trorepov
ou yeyovev Kai eVrcu rj OVK ecrrat, ert e
Trept fj.eye6ovs Kai /miKpoTt]TOs TWJ/ Trpa^fJidTcov ei-
/) - - \<>\ \ /~ -~ /
pticruw TauTa \OITTOV oe Trepi TWV KOIVCOV 7no"TeaH f CHAP. xx.
ciTracriv eiTrelv, ejrei Trep eiprjTai Trepi TU>V L^LCOV. elcri ",
for the rhetorician, is illustrated by Metaph. A i, 981 a 12, irpos /j.ev ovv TO
irpdrrfiv ipireipia Tf^vys ov8ev 5o/cet bia(f>(peiv, aXXa Kai fjia\\ov fVtruy^a-
vovras opco/xej/ TOVS f/J.ireipovs TO>V avtv Trjs f/jLTTfipias \6yov ex ovr<av - a iriov
8 OTI tj fj.fv ffJtireipia TO>V KaB 1 fKavTov eVrt yvwcris, rf 8e Tf^vr] TU>V naBokov, at
8e 7rpaei? Kai at yeveafis Tratrat Trepi TO Ka.ff tKacrTov flcrii* ov yap avdpatTTov
vyidd 6 laTpev(ov...a\\a KaXXiav rj 2a)(cpar^i/. In Rhet. I 2. II, where at
first sight this might seem to be contradicted, the author is speaking of
Rhetoric as an art, which deals with universals, if it be a true art and not
a mere empirical practice: here as a practice, and as employed by a
practitioner.
Kfi>o\oyflv] is found in the same sense applied to the mere variety or
idle talk, without meaning, of the Platonic ideas, in Metaph. A 9, 991 b 20,
and the repetition of the same passage, M 5, 1079 b 26.
CHAP. XX.
Having now finished the treatment of the special modes of rhetorical
proof, the e i8rj, ydos, irddoi and Koti/oi TOTTOI, we have next to speak of the
universal.
Hitherto the objects of our investigation and analysis have been of
a special character, included under particular sciences, chiefly moral and
political, and also, under the three branches of Rhetoric, the topics severally
appropriate to each : the %6os and nddos, the secondary arguments, by
which a favourable impression of the speaker s character is conveyed to
the audience, and they themselves brought into the state of feeling which
his purpose requires, are likewise confined to Rhetoric : as are also the
Koivol TOTTOI common to all the three branches, though even these are not
equally applicable to all, and may therefore in a sense be included under
the term i8z (so Schrader). We now proceed to what remains to be
done before we bring the logical and intellectual division of Rhetoric to
its conclusion to give an account of the two universal methods common
to all reasoning of every kind, compared with which all the rest may be
called 1 Sta, viz. deduction, demonstration, syllogism, and induction ; or,
as they appear in Rhetoric, in the imperfect forms of enthymeme (in
ference) and example ; which are in fact the only two methods by which
we can arrive at truth and knowledge. 6Yi & ov povov ol 8ta\fKTiKo\ KU\
aTToSeiKTiKol o"vXXoyto-/*ol 810. T<av Trpoeiprjuevcav yivovTai o-^Tj/iarwi (the figures
of syllogism), aXXa KO\ -01 prjTOpiKoi, Kai OTrXtoy r/TKrovv Tn orts Kai Kab*
132
196 PHTOPIKH2 B 20 13.
al ttoival 7ri(TTeis Svo TW yevei, TrapdSeiyfJia Kai
r\ yap yvtofj-ri }jLepo<s e
2 TrpwTOv fj.ev ovv Trepl 7rapa$eiyiu.aTOs
yap eTraywyrj TO TrapdSeiy/ma, r\ 3 67raya)yt] d
Tiav <> e lSt] duo eV /mev yap ecrrt
eifios TO Xeyeiv 7rpa.yfji.aTa Trpoyeyev^-
jueva, ev e TO avrov Troieiv. TOVTOV 5 ev p.ev Trapa-
3 (3o\rj tV e \6yot, oiov ol AicrooTreioi KaiAifivKOi. ecrri
OTTOiavovv pedoSov, vvv uv f lrj Xexrvop. ajravra yap m(TTevofj.ev TJ $ia cru\-
\oyia-pLov t) e | eVaywy^?. Aristotle supposed that inductive reasoning
could be reduced to a syllogistic form [Grote s Aristotle I 268]. Anal.
Pr. II 23, 68 b Q- etVfp fj.avddvoiJ.fv rj fTrayaiyij T) aTroSet^ei. Anal. Post. I
1 8, 8 1 a 40. This explanation will reconcile the apparent contradiction
of including the Koivol TOTTOI under 1 Sta ; it is only as contrasted with the
still more universal induction and demonstration that they can be so called.
These common (universal) modes of persuasion, or rhetorical proof,
&re generically two (two in kind as we say ; two species in one genus],
example and enthymeme; for yi/wp? is a part of enthymeme . This last
remark is meant to correct the ordinary treatment of the yv^^ as a
distinct species of argument, apart from the enthymeme, of which in
reality it is a mere variety. This is actually done in the Rhet. ad Al.
c. 7 (8). 2 and c. 11 (12). The yva>^ and its logical character are de
scribed in the next chapter, 2.
2. First of all then let us speak of example; for example is like
induction, and induction is a beginning or origin . 8r,\ov 17 on. ijftlv TO.
Trpwra firayayyr) yvu>pifiv avaynalov Kai. yap o lcrdi^cris ovrco TO KadoXov fp.iroif i.
Anal. Post. II 19, 100 b 3, and the whole chapter. Induction is a be
ginning, because from and by it, originally from objects of sense, we
collect all our primary (n-pcora) and universal first principles, the highest
apxai, from which all our syllogisms must ultimately be deduced. It
seems that this is assigned as a reason for beginning with Trapd8eiyna,
which is a variety of induction, rather than with ev&vfitffOi, the rhetorical
offshoot of dTro^fi^is, demonstration or deduction. On Trapddeiyfj,a, or
example in general, see Introd. p. 105, seq.
Of examples there are two kinds : one of them is to relate past facts,
the other to invent them for oneself. Of the latter again, one kind is
comparison or illustration ; the other Xoyot, fables, like Aesop s and the
Libyan ; (and the fables of Phaedrus, La Fontaine, and Gay). The illus
tration, those of Aesop and the Libyan , is confined to only one of the
two kinds of Xoyoi, fables proper, in which animals, plants, or even
inanimate objects are endowed with speech and reason: the other in
cludes fictions, tales, stories : analogous cases, fictitious, and made for
the occasion, or more usually derived from the writings of poets, espe
cially epic and tragic, philosophers, historians, or any authors of credit.
See further on these terms and divisions, Introd. pp. 254 6, and the
PHTOPIKH2 B 20 3, 4. 197
e TO }J.6V Trpay/uLaTa \ejeiv TOiovde TI, wcnrep e t TI<S Ae-
yoi OTL $e? Trpos (3ct(Ti\ea 7rapaa Keva(^ea 6ai KCII /urj eav
AiyvTTTOV xeipMcracrOai Kat yap Aapelos ov TrporepoVP. 13933.
ciefiri TrpivAiyuTTTOi/ e\a (3 ev, \aficov Se Siefirj, /ecu 7rd\iv
^ep^rjs ov Trporepov eVe^e/jO^cre Trpiv eAa/3ei/, Aa/3wy
e $if/3r] iacrTe Kal OVTOS eav \aj3ri, $ia/3)i(reTai $10
4ovK eTriTpeTrreov 7rapa0o\t] Se ra ^,(*)KpaTiKcty oiov
references there given: and on Xoyoi, fables , p. 255, note. On the
Fable, see some excellent remarks in M uller, H. G. L. c. XI 14, 15 ; and
G. C. Lewis, in Phil. Mus. I 280, "On the fables of Babrius." He begins
with this definition : "A fable may be defined to be an analogical
narrative, intended to convey some moral lesson, in which irrational
animals or objects are introduced as speaking."
3- tori 8e TO [fv Trpayfj.ara \fyfiv] For TrapaSety/xa of the older
editions, I accept with Bekker, ed. 3, Spengel s alteration Trpdyfiara \eyeiv.
It is suggested by MS A Trapa8fiyfj.ara \tyeiv, and supported by 8, ra 8ia
TK>V jrpay/j.ciTa)v ; see in Trans. Bav. Acad. Munich 1851, p. 49.
The historical example (ro \eyeiv Trpay/iara Trpoyeyei/^/xei/a) is of this
kind: as if, for instance (a deliberative speaker) were to say, We must arm
against the King (the Great King, the King of Persia, as usual without
the article), and not allow him to subdue Egypt: for in fact Darius did
not cross (the Aegean to attack us) until he had secured (got possession
of) Egypt, but as soon as he had done that, he did cross ; and Xerxes
again did not make his attempt upon us until he had seized it, but crossed
as soon as he was master of it : and therefore (the inference from the two
examples or historical parallels) this King also is likely to cross if he is
allowed to seize it, so that we must not permit it . The case here given
in illustration is probably an imaginary one, ei ns Ae yot; and this seems
to be Victorius s opinion. But it is barely possible that the recovery of
Egypt by Ochus, 6 /urropo/iacr&ic Apraep|qc (Diod.), about 350 B.C.,
Clint. Fast. Hell. 1 1, p. 316 and note w, may have attracted the attention of
the Athenian assembly, and this argument have been used by one of the
speakers on the question. Max Schmidt, in his tract On the date of the
Rhetoric, makes use of this passage as helping to fix it, pp. 19 21.
Artaxerxes expedition to Egypt was undertaken in 351 B.C., and continued
through the next year. Both the rival sovereigns, Nectanebus, the reign
ing king, and Artaxerxes, sent ambassadors to the Greek states for aid,
and the subject excited general interest at Athens, as well as in the rest
of Greece. It was at this time that Aristotle, who was then employed on
his Rhetoric, introduced this illustration, which was suggested by what
was actually going on at the time.
4. TTapaftoXij \sjuxtaposition, setting one thing by the side of another
for the purpose of comparison and illustration ; taking analogous or
parallel cases ; it is the argument from analogy, av TIS dvvrjrai opoiov opqv,
7. A good instance of Trapa/SoX?? in this sense occurs, Pol. II 5, 126464,
where Plato is said to derive a 7rapa/3oXr/ , or analogy, K TWJ> drjptw
198 PHTOPIKH2 B 20 4.
e l TIS Xeyoi on ov del KXrjpwrous ap%eiv ofjioiov yapp. 89.
uxnrep av e l TIS TOUS a$A.f/ras K\*ipoirj /mr] o l av duvcov-
d f y(0vifa<r6ai d\\ o l av Xa^wcriVj rj TCOV 7r\co-
ov TLva del KvjSepvav KXripwcreiev, ws deov TOV
(i.e. dogs), to prove that the pursuits and occupations of men and women
should be the same, i
Of TrapafioKrj 1 the Socratic practice or method is an example ; as for
instance if one were to say, that the magistrates ought not to be chosen by
lot : for this is analogous to the case of choosing for the athletes (who were
to enter the lists) not those who are fitted for the combat, but those upon
whom the lot falls ; or to choosing the steersman out of a crew of sailors
on the principle that it was the man who won the toss, and not the man
of knowledge and skill (the man who knows his business), that ought to
be chosen .
This very same analogy is ascribed to Socrates by the accuser
at his trial, as one of those which he was in the habit of using,
Xen. Memor. I 2. g. And the same mode of inference, from the analogy
of the mechanical and other arts, was transmitted by Socrates to Plato,
and through him to his pupil Aristotle, in whose writings it constantly
appears in illustration of many of his moral and social and political
theories. It is to this practice of Socrates that Critias refers, when he
and Charicles, during the tyranny of the Thirty, summoned him before
them, and forbade him to continue his dialectical practice and inter
course with the young Athenians. Socrates inquires what sort of ques
tions he is ordered to abstain from. Ib. I 2. 37, 6 de Kpirius, aXXa ruvSe
TOL are drrexeaOai, e(pr], der/crei, &&gt; 2<w/cparf j, TOIV cruvTeaiv Kal T<av TfKTovcov KOI
T>V XO\K(COV Kal yap OI/JLOL avrovs r]8rj KaTaT(Tpi(p6ai 8ia6pvX\ovfjiei>ovs VTTO
troO. Similarly Callicles, Plat. Gorg. 491 A, vrj TOVS Qeovs, are^vcoy ye del
(TKvreas re KOI Kvacpeas Kal payeipovs \eya>v Kal larpovs ovSev Travel, K.T.X.
Alcibiades, Sympos. 221 E, ovovs yap Kav6r)\iovs \eyei Kal ^a\Keas TWOS
1 IIa/>a/3oA?7 is thus described by Eustath. ad II. A p. 176 (ap. Gaisford, \eyeraiSe
7ro/)o/3oXr? Sto rt rots \tyo/J.ei>ois 7ra/>a/3dXX, rovrean ffvyKpivet Kal TrapariOrjcri, irpay-
fj.d TL yvupi/jLOv eiudbs del yiveadai- birep 6<pei\et Tratrus yvupifiuiTepov dvai TOV 5i o
Tra.pd\-f)irTOLi. KO.KLO. y&p Trapa.f3d\rjs rb ayvucrTOV Kal dffuvi)Ofs...di6Ti ovSf SiSaffKoXiKt)
q roiaijTTi effrl Tra/ja/SoXij. On the definition, and various definitions of the parable,
see Trench on the Parables, Ch. I Introd. The author in defining parable, and dis
tinguishing it from fable, seems to confine himself too exclusively to the New Testa
ment parables, when he says that the latter is constructed to set forth a truth
spiritual and heavenly," whereas the fable "never lifts itself above the earth"; it
"inculcates maxims of prudential morality, industry, caution, foresight," all its
morality being of a worldly character, p. i. And again, p. 9, "the parable differs
from the fable, moving as it does in a spiritual world, and never transgressing the
actual order of things natural." Aristotle, to whom Dr Trench does not refer, dis
tinguishes parable in general from fable by this ; that the former depicts human
relations (in which the N. T. parable coincides with it) ; it invents analogous cases>
which are not historical, but always such as might be so ; always probable, and
corresponding with what actually occurs in real life. The fable is pure fiction, and
its essential characteristic is, that it invests beasts, birds, plants, and even things in
animate with the attributes of humanity.
PHTOPIKH2 B20 5 . 199
5 \axdrra AAa rf T oi/ eTTLCTTa^evov. Aoyos 3e, olo?
6 Xrta-i Trepl QaXaptios K^ AiVwVoi; iVe^o TO
<rTpa-
avroKpdropa TUV Ifiepaiui, QaXapiv Kal
Xorrtav ^vXaKrjv hSdvcu TOV o^arcs, -ra\Xa
\ex6ek eLTrcv aim> Xoyov cos iWos /care^
c \a 0oi; /ca^ hafeeiporros rr]v vo-
TOV eXaov jrira TOV
, e ia T w arw ravra 0atVera t
Xcyecv. And Hipp.as sneer, Xen. Mem. IV 4, 5 and 6, (Socrates had
just compared ^ ^ the teaching of justice to that of various t ra ds)
^dTo^ t par ? M " flwi Xf yeis > a ^ * aw ^ ^
and Socrates rejoinder repeated in Gorg. 490 E , 491 B. Compare Xei
Mem. m ,. 2 and 4, in 7. 6. Plat. Rep. i 332 c 333 c n 370 D ,7?c
37
does H < o
Rogues. His favourite trades for the purposes of this kind of illus-
tratu.nseemto have been that of the physician and cobbler (d L^CS
o-7rfp av et w ] See note ad i i. 5, Vol. r, p. 9.
^ , 5; Th f faWe may be exem Plificd by that of Stesichorus about
Phalans, and that of Aesop, in his defence of the demagog^
For when the Himereans had elected Phalans general with absolute
hS fin hT.H^ 0111 t0 , giVG him a b d ^ Uard Stesichorus af
having finished the rest of his argument (or discussion), told them a
ame 1 L * ^ "*? ** ^ P SSeSS r f a meado - -hen as" I
came and desiring to take vengeance upon the stag for spoilt his i
ture he asked the man (or a man , MS A, Spengel) if he could help
him to chastise the stag: the other assented, on L condit on of S
accepting a bit and allowing himself to mount him with his javSin , .
slaves. The same fable is briefly told by Horace, Ep. i. zo 34
equum p ug na melior communibus herbis pdlebat &c
This fable of Stesichorus, which Aristotle here assigns to the
age and case of Phalaris, is by Conon a writer in Julius Caesar s
marble tha Stesichorus hved Ol. LXXIII 3, (this is highly impro
bable; lt places Stesichorus ^^ a fuU century too low, & in th y ear
B-C. 486; which should indeed be 485, the year in which Gelon be
came master of Syracuse, Clinton, Fasti Hclllnici, sub anno, } 4t eTactly
200 PHTOPIKHS B 20 5, 6.
av6pa)7TOV el SuvaiT av fier CIVTOV KO\acrai TOV e
(f>ov, o S e(pticrev, edv Xdfiy -^aXtvov KCII avTO<s dvafiri
67T avTOV e%a)v aKOVTia crfi/o/^oAo yj/ o ai TOs e Kai dva-
fidvTOS, dvTL TOV Tiju.copna ao Bai O.VTOS edovXevcrev ijSri
TM dvdpOJTTW. (( OVTW $ KCtl V/Uiels " effrr] " 6paT6 jULt]
/3ovXofj.evoL TOI)S TroXe/ULtovs TijJiwpncracrQai TCLVTO ird-
6r]T6 TW iTTTTO) TOV JULEV ^dp ^aXlVCV C^eT tj^tj)
e\6/mevoi (TTpaTnyov avTOKpccTOpa edv ^e (pv\ctKtjV
KCLI dvafinvat e acr^re, SovXeiKrrjTe
e ev
agrees with the age of Gelon, and Conon s account of the story may
seem more credible than Aristotle s. And then all the argument that
would settle Phalaris age from the time of Stesichorus, will vanish
into nothing (which is probably Bentley s principal reason for main
taining the paradox). Mure, Miiller and Clinton, F. H., sub anno 632,
place the date of Stesichorus birth in B. c. 645, 643 or 632, and 632,
severally ; so that, says Miiller, H. G. Z. ch. xiv 4, (as he lived over 80)
he might be a contemporary of the Agrigentine tyrant Phalaris,
against whose ambitious projects he is said by Aristotle to have warned
his fellow-citizens (he was a native of Himera) in an ingenious fable.
Mure likewise, Vol. ill. p. 226, follows Aristotle. Clinton, F. H., places
Phalaris accession to the throne of Agrigentum in B.C. 570. On Pha
laris, see Mr Bunbury s article in Smith s Biographical Dictionary. Mr B.
says, it would appear from Aristotle, Rhet. II 20, if there be no mistake
in the story there told, that he was at one time master of Himera as
well as Agrigentum.
On fl Sufair av, see Appendix at the end of this book, On av with the
optative after certain particles.
6. AUTCOTTOS] On Aesop, see Miiller, Hist. Gr. Lit. c. xi 16.
And Aesop in Samos as advocate for a demagogue on his trial for a
capital offence, said that a fox in crossing a river was driven into a cleft
or chasm (in the bank) ; being unable to get out, she suffered for a long
time, and many dog-ticks fastened upon her. And a hedgehog, in his
wanderings, when he saw her, took compassion upon her, and asked her,
if he should (was to, optative) remove the dog-ticks from her. But she would
not allow it. And upon his asking her why, she replied, because these
are already satiated with me and suck (draw) little blood ; but if you
remove these, others will come, hungry, and drain me of all the blood
that is left. But you too, men of Samos, he continued, this one will do
you no more harm, for he has got rich ; but if you put him to death,
others will come who are poor, and they will waste all your public pro
perty by their thefts.
This fable is referred to also by Plutarch, An seni gerenda respublica
p. 790 C, f\ uev yap AiVwTmos aXajVyl TOV t\ivov OVK (?a rovg K
PHTOPIKH2 B 20 6, 7. 201
Trepi BavctTOV e(pri dXcoTreKa $ia/3aivov(ra.v
a.7ru>(r6rivai ets <papa<y<ya, ov Svva/mevtiv S
lK/3fji>ai TroXvv xpovov Ka.KOTraOeli j KCII Kwopaicrrds
7roAAoi)s e^eaOai avT^ e^Ivov e TrXavtofuievov, cos
eifiev avTt iv, KaTOiKTeipavTa epcoTav el d<pe\ot auTrj<s
TOI)S Kvvopdi<TTd<s Tt]v c)e OUK edv epofjievov e Sid T/,
OTI OVTOI jutv (pavai 778?; JULOV 7r\^pei^ elarl KCCI oXiyov
e\KOV(nv ai/ma edv $e TOVTOVS d<pe\iis, eTepoi e\66v-
Tes TreivtovTes eKTriovvTai JULOV TO \OLTTOV alpa. f( di-dp
\ -~ 5? > j , , f I T? 7 > ^ x
Kai v/u.as e<p*l, w avopes 2^a[jiLOL, OVTOS fjitv ovcev
TL /3\a\j/6i
oe TOVTOV
eTepot ]ovcri Tre^res, oi u/ij/ a- P. 1394.
7 AftKroyov ra /coti/a /cAeTrroi/re?." etcr/ S O
avrrjs a^eXelv (3ov\6ft.{vov, av yap TOVTOVS, e<f>^, pecrrovs diraXXa^ys erepoi
TTpoa-iaa-i vreii/coi/rfr. Victorias.
ets <apcryya] (frapayt- has two senses, a cliff , as Alcm. Fragm. 44
(Bergk), euSovo-ii opecov Kopv<pai re KCZI 0fipayyey ; and a chasm or cleft ,
which it bears here. A fox in attempting to cross a rapid river has been
carried down by the torrent, and lodged in a rent or chasm of the
precipitous bank, and is there caught as it were in a trap, prevented
from getting out by the rapidity of the stream in front. This sense of
(pdpayg is illustrated by Thuc. II 76, bis, where it is used of the pits or
clefts in the rocks into which the Athenians threw the bodies of the
Spartan ambassadors who had been betrayed into their hands and then
murdered, the Lacedaemonians having previously treated Athenian pri
soners in the same manner, dneKTeivav navras Kal e? (frapayyas evfftdXov.
Eur. Troad. 448, (pdpayyes v8ari. xfip.dppa> peovaai, whether they are narrow
clefts or ravines traversed by winter torrents. Arist. Equit. 248, of
Cleon, cpdpayya (met. vorago, a chasm or abyss, which swallows up all
the income of the state) Kal ^apu/SSti/ dpTrayfjs. Xen. de Ven. v 16, Hares
when pursued sometimes cross rivers, KOI Karadvovrai els (pdpayyas "are
swallowed up in their chasms or abysses."
Another of these political fables , of Antisthenes (Socraticus), is
referred to by Ar., Pol. ill 13, 1284 a 15. Speaking of the folly of
attempting to control by legislation the born rulers, who, one or more,
excel all the rest of the citizens together in virtue, and are like Gods
amongst men, he adds, "they would very likely reply if the attempt
were made, a-rrtp Airio-tfe i/r/s f cprj rovs \eovras 8rjp.r)yopovvTtoV TWV da(rvn6<i)v
(hares) Kal TO icrov dtoiWa>j/ Trdvras fX. eaf
KwopaivTai, dog-ticks . These canine-tormentors are as old as
Homer. Argus, Ulysses dog, in his old age was covered with them :
tv6a KVU>V Keir *Apyoy cYiVXfio; KWOpaiOTfOiV- Od. p (XVIl) 300.
7. Fables are adapted to public speaking, and the virtue they
202 PHTOPIKH2 B 20 7.
i, K.O.I e^ovcnv d<ya6oi> TOVTO, OTL
evpe iv ofj.oia y 6 7 ei/ ^/ ue I/a %aA.e7roV,
paov Troirjcrai yap del cocnrep Kai 7rapa/3o\as, av Tts p- 9-
TO ojuoiov opav, o Trep pa^iov e<TTiv ex. (j)t\o-
have lies in this, that whereas (^tv) similar facts that have really happened
are hard to find, fables are easier (to invent evpelv being unconsciously
used in two different senses) ; for they must be invented, like the parallel,
analogous, cases ; (which, as we have seen, are invented for the occasion,
but must be conformable to the circumstances of real life,) that is to
say, if one has the faculty of seeing the analogy, which may be facilitated
by the study of philosophy . Philosophy is used here in a vague and
popular sense, for intellectual study, and mental exercise in general.
So research and philosophising are identified, Pol. V (vm) n, sub fin.
1331 a 16, frTtlv Kai (piXo(ro<eii . Comp. Ill II.5> " KOI ev <f)i\oao(f>iq TO
ofjioiov Kai fv TroXu difx ovcrtv 6topei evorro^ou, and the note there. The
tracing of resemblances in nature is the foundation of analogous reasoning,
and consequently of the inductive method, frrtlv 8e Set eVi/SXeVoi ra eVi
ra o/ioia Kai aSta<popa, TrpuTov TL arravTa ravrov f^ovcnv, K.T.\. Anal. Post.
II 13, 96 b 7. In Top. A, 13, 105 a 25, 77 rou ojnoiou aKf^is is said to be
one of four opyava fit coi> evnopijcro^ifi ra>v truXXoytcr/icoi . Comp. c. 17,
108^ 7, seq. on analogies. See Trendelenburg, El. Log. Ar. 59, p. 137.
On the various senses of (iXoo-o</a and Trpay/nare/a (which are often
identified) see Waitz, ad Org. 96 b 15, II. p. 415.
On Isocrates comprehensive use of this word see note in Camb.
Journal of Cl. and Sacred Phil. Vol. II, No. 5, p. 150, and especially the
passage of irepl aVriSoo-ews 180 192, where he includes in it all
branches of mental education, in which Rhetoric of course occupies the
foremost place. Other references are there given 1 . [Comp. Isocr.
Paneg. 10 TT/V Trepl TOVS Xoyovs $tXocro0/ai/ (with note) and especially
] ebb s Attic Orators, 1 1, p. 37.]
Xoyoi dr][j.r)yopiKoi] 8rjp.rjyopLKov yevos, or 8r]fiT]yopia, is one of the
alternative names of the first branch of Rhetoric, the o-v/*/3ouXevTiK6i/.
I I. IO, Trept Ta S^/i^yoptKa /cat SiKaviKa, rfjs drj^yopiKris Trpay/xarftaf, ev rols
Srjp.r;yoptKOts, rj Srjprjyopia. Ill 12. 5, 77 S^jjyoptKi} Xe lu. Historical examples
(as indeed we are told in the next section) of similar cases that have
already occurred, must of course be more useful to one who is addressing
a public assembly on matters of state policy, than to the pleader in a
court of justice, or a declaimer in an epideictic speech. But these, says
our text, are not always easy to be found ; either there are none at all,
or they are rare ; or at all events easily forgotten : whereas fables, and
other analogous cases, which may be invented for the occasion, may
be easily supplied if the faculty of tracing resemblances already exists ;
if not, it may be cultivated by exercise in philosophical study.
dya^oi ] some virtue, something good (about them), comp. I 2. 10,
(pavcpov OTI Kai e/carepoj e ^et ayaGbv TO etoy
t a is inadequately rendered literature in Introd. p. 256.
PHTOPIKHS B 20 8, 9. 203
8 cro(pia<$ pata fj.ev ovv Tropia acrBai TO. $ia TWV Xoytov,
a $6 Trpos TO fiovXevcracrOai TO. Sta TCOV
o/uoia yap ok eVf TO TTO\V TO. fj.e\\ovTa
(fj yap TT/CTTfS $ld TOV-
TCOV), e-fcOVTa e ok [JLapTVpioLS, eTriXoyca
To1<s evdufJu iiJLaa iv TrpOTiBe/ueva JULEV yap eoiKev e
ywyrj, TO?S ^e priTOpiKols OVK o lKeiov eTrayiayt] TrXqv eV
8. Now the arguments or inferences by way of fables (ra Sid,
with genitive, which are conveyed through the channel of, are conveyed
by ,) are easier to supply (provide) oneself with, but those by way of
facts (historical parallels) are more serviceable for deliberation ; because
the future for the most part resembles the past . We can therefore
argue with probability from the results of circumstances past, to the
results of similar circumstances, which are now under deliberation, in
the future. Men are much the same in all ages ; human nature is
tolerably constant in its operations and effects ; the same motives prevail,
and lead to similar actions ; what has been in the past, will be in the
future.
9. Examples must be used, in the absence of enthymemes, as
direct logical proofs for this is the road to persuasion (or conviction)
if we have them, as (confirmatory) evidence, and they are to be employed
as a supplement to our enthymemes : for when put first they resemble
an induction (the several examples are the particulars, or facts, from
which the general rule is collected^, but induction is not appropriate to
Rhetoric, except in rare cases ; but when they are appended to the others
they are like evidence, and evidence is always acceptable (the witness
always carries weight, is always listened to ; people are inclined to believe
him) .
The enthymeme is the o-co/za rr?y Tmrreoor, I I. 3, a7roSfiu p^roptK?)
fv6v^r]^a...KvpiK>Tarov ra>v Tricrrecov, Ib. II. On the application of the
term aTroSei^ts to rhetorical proof, see note on I i. 1 1.
eVi Xoyos is here simply equivalent to ro firt\ey6pevov } something
added, appended, as a supplement, and not to be understood as the
technical eiriXoyos, the concluding member of the speech, the peroration.
eVtXdyw ^pw/zf vov rols evdvp-rmacriv] This cannot mean using the
enthymemes as a supplement , which is directly contrary to what the
author intends to say. The construction is, -^pat^vov (avrois as) eVtAoyw
rols evdvpTJ/Jiaaiv, that is as Xoyw eV! TOLS ev6vfj.ijp.ainv as a Xdyos- argu
ment or sentence after, following, supplementary to, the enthymemes.
And this is confirmed by eTj-iXeyd/ieva juaprvpi oi? in the next clause. This
construction, the substantive taking the case of its verb, is fully justified
by the examples given in the note on n 4. 31, supra p. 56, note i.
204 PHTOPIKHS B 20 9 ; 21 i, 2.
e /mpTVs irav~
Kal 7rpOTi6evTi fj.ev dvayK.fl 7ro\\d
v / > -v > <$\ \ t \ t / / \
Aeyeiv, eTTiAeyovTi oe K.O.L ev LK.O.VOV jmapTvs yap
THCTTOS Kal ets
Trccra /u.ev ovv eri TrapaeiryjULaTcav, Ka TTWS av-
Kal 7TOT6 ^jO^o TeW, elprjTai Trepi c>e t yvu>imo\o yias ) CHAP. xxi.
vTOs TL e<TTi <yva)imti, /aa\i<TT av yevoiTO (pavepov
Trepi Troiwv T6 Kai Trore Kal TIGIV dpiuLOTTet xprj(r6ai
2 TO) yvu>}Jio\O yel.v eV rots Aoyof?. e<TTL Se yvw/mri aVo-
And therefore also, if you put your examples first you must neces
sarily employ a considerable number ; if you introduce them afterwards
even one is enough; for even a single witness that can be relied on is of
service . This is a second objection to putting the examples first. If you
do so, they will resemble an induction: but an induction derived from
only one or two particulars is of little or no force. Therefore the parti
cular cases must be numerous ; and so, not only the induction itself is
inappropriate in Rhetoric, but you will also be obliged to make it long.
So the subject of the number of kinds of examples, and hosv and
when they are to be employed, has been dispatched (disposed of) .
CHAP. XXI.
Of yi.wfj.ai maxims , general sentiments of a moral character,
which serve as enthymemes, and are therefore included here as intro
ductory to the treatment of them, an account has been given, with
reference to other writers on the same subject, in Introd. p. 257 seq., to
which the reader is referred. Compare on this subject Harris, Philolog.
Ing. Vol. IV. p. 182 seq. The author mainly follows Aristotle.
For examples of yvta^ai. see Brunck s Poetae Gnomici, passim : and
Bergk, Poet. Lyr. Cr., Theognis, Phocylides, Solon, &c.
i. yvwuoXoyia, the subject, or art of maxim-making , occurs
again, PI. Phaedr. 267 C, as part of the contents of Polus rhetorical
repertory 1 . As to (the art of) maxim-making, we shall best arrive at a
clear understanding of the objects, times, and persons, to which and at
which the employment of it is most appropriate in our speeches, when
it has been first stated what a maxim is.
2. A maxim is a declaration not however of particulars or indi
viduals, as, for instance, what sort of a person Iphicrates is, but univer
sally (a general statement, an universal moral rule or principle) . aVo-
1 This may help to throw light on the disputed explanation of this word in the
passage of Plato, see Dr Thompson s note ad loc. It is there translated " the style
sententious." yvuno\oyla is here, at any rate, the science or study, the theory
(\6yos), and (in Rhetoric) the use or practical application, of yvGifjMi, maxims or
general moral sentiments; after the analogy of darpoXoyia, /uerewpoXo-yt a, StKo\oyla
(Rhet. I 1. 10), (j)v<Tio\oyia, (Flut.) and a great number of modern sciences ; the use
of the maxim predominates in the application of yvuno\oye iv throughout the
chapter.
PHTOPIKH2 B 2i2. 205
ov /mevTOi Trepl TWV KaO GKacrTOv, olov 7ro?os
TI<S I<piKpa.Tris, d\\a naBoXov K.a.1 ov Trepl TrdvTiav
Ka6o\ov, oiov OTL TO GvOu TO) KGtuTTfAw evavTLOv* d\\a
I I I
Trepl o(ra)v al Trpd^eis eicri, Kal alperd t] (pevKTa e
Trpos TO TrpaTTeiv. UKTT iirel TCI ev6v{JU]fJia.Ta 6
TOVTOJV (ri/AA.O yfcr/xos e<TTt <r^eoVj TO. T6
juara TWV evdujmn/mctTwi/ Kal al dp^ai d<patpe6evTOS TOV
oiov
ov TToO y os TI<S dpTi(ppwv 7re<pvK dvi ip,
cro(povs.
(drroffxiiveiv) a declaration or utterance . Here again we
have in two MSS the varia lectio dno^aais. See on this, note on I 8. 2.
Coinp. 9) aypoiKot fj.a\Krra yvoofioTinroi fieri KOI pafticos aTrofpaivovrai,
and 1 6, 8iu TO airofyaivecrdut. TOV TT/V yi>(ap.rjv Xeyoi/ra...
a7ro(paive(T&ai seems to have some special connexion with yvw^rj in its
ordinary signification as well as this technical application. See Heindorf
on Gorg. 48, p. 466 c. In several passages which he quotes the same
verb is used for declaring a yv^^, in the sense of opinion. [" So Protag.
3360, TTJV favrov yv<ap.r)v dTro<paivf(r6ai ; ib. 34 B." Dr Thompson on
Gorg. 1. c.]
And not of all universals, as, for example, that straight is opposed to
crooked, but only of those which are concerned with (human) actions, and
are to be chosen or avoided in respect of action. This concern with human
action rrpa^is can only be predicated of human beings gives the yvapr) its
moral character. See, for instance, the beginning of the second chapter
of Eth. Nic. II. Of actions it is said, 1104 a 31, mirai. yap el<ri Kvptai
KOI TOV TToias ytveadai TUS eeis ; they determine the moral character.
And so frequently elsewhere. This moral character of the yvd>p.r\ how
ever, though il undoubtedly predominates in the description and illus
tration of it through the remainder of the chapter, is not absolutely
exclusive: the yvw^r) may be applied likewise to all practical business of
life, and all objects of human interest, as health in 5 ; and Trpci.s must
be supposed virtually to include these. With this definition that of
Auct. ad Keren. IV 17. 24 deserves to be compared: it is not so complete
as Aristotle s, but may be regarded as supplementary to it: Sententia
(i. e. yvmpr], which is also the term by which Ouintilian expresses k, Inst.
Orat. vni 5) est oratio sumpta de vita, quae ant quid sit aut quid esse
oporteat in vita breviter ostendit, hoc pacto; it is there illustrated to the
end of the chapter. One useful precept for the guidance of the rheto
rician in the employment of the yva>^ may be quoted here, especially as
Aristotle has omitted it. Sententias interponi raro convenit, ut rci
actores, non vivendi praeceptores videamur esse. yvapat often take the
form of precepts . Harris, u. s , p. 182.
And therefore since rhetorical enthymemes are as one may say
2o6 PHTOP1KH2 B 21 2.
TOVTO /UL6V ovv <yvu>fjit] TrpocrTeecrris e Tts arias
TOU Sia TI, ev6v/mri/ud ECTTI TO array, oiov
yap
(pBovov Trap dcrTwv dXtydvowi
TO
OVK e&Tiv os TLS 7TO.VT dvr]p
Kai TO p - I 3
OVK <E(TTIV dv &pWV OS TtS ECTT 6\6v6epOS P- 9 r
Trio s
rj xpti/maTcov yp oi/os ecTTtv r\
pretty nearly , that is, not absolutely, but generally, rnaking
allowance for some which are not concerned with the practical business
of life so Victorius) the logical mode of reasoning or inference on these
subjects (the business of life and human actions), when this syllogistic
process is withdrawn (and the major premiss or conclusion is left alone),
the conclusions and major premisses of enthymemes are yvw/mi . These
premisses and conclusions taken by themselves are mere enunciations of
some general principle : they do not become enthymemes, i. e. infer
ences or processes of reasoning, till the reason is added sententia cum
ratione, Quint, and Auct. ad Keren., Introd. p. 257 which is stated in the
next sentence. Hanc quidem partem enthymematis quidam initium aut
clausulam epichirematis esse dixerunt: et est aliquando, non tamen semper,
Ouint. vill 5.4 (de Sententiis, vni 5. I 8, q. v.).
For instance, " No man that is of sound mind ought ever to have
his children over-educated to excess in learning," (Eur. Med. 294). Now
this is a maxim (moral precept, the conclusion of the enthymeme) : but
the addition of the reason, and the why (the alrla or cause) makes the
whole an enthymeme, for example, " for besides the idle habits which
they thereby contract to boot" (into the bargain the comparative aXXor,
other, in this common, but illogical use of the word, brings two hetero
geneous things into illicit comparison : see [p. 46 supra and note on ill i. 9])
" they reap (gain as their reward) hostile jealousy from the citizens." The
apyia here is the literary indolence, or inactivity, the withdrawal from
active life and the consequent neglect of their duties as citizens, into
which they are led by their studious habits. This is what provokes the
jealousy and hostility of the citizens. Plato s unpopularity at Athens was
due to the same cause. Plato justifies himself against these charges of
his enemies in four well-known passages, in the Republic [vi 484 497],
Theaetetus [1720] and Gorgias [527]; and in the seventh Epistle, if that
be his [see Introd. to Dr Thompson s ed. of the Gorgias, pp. xii xiv].
These lines are put into the enthymematic form, as an argument, in
7. It is a specimen of a practical syllogism, or enthymeme, logic
applied to action or conduct. As a syllogism it would run thus : All
PHTOPIKHS B 21 3 5. 207
3 el Sti icrTL <yvwfjiri TO eipri/ULevov, dvdyKri TeTTapa e l^rj
eivcti yvitifJLris r\ yap JULGT 7n\oyov ecrTai r] dvev
4 eTTiXoyov. aTroSei^ecos /ULEV ovv ^eo/mevai elarw ocrai
"$ y- -\ x ^ /o 5- v
7rapaoof-ov TI \e < yovo LV tj afjifpifrp^TOvfJievov ocrai oe
5 fj-ri^ev TrapdSo^ov, dvev eTriXoyov. TOVTCOV S amy/a;
rets /mew Sid TO TrpoeyvtocrOai /uuicev SelcrBai eiriXoyov,
olov
dvfipt S vyiaiveiv apurTOV e&Tiv, as y ^JJLLV So/cet
ought to avoid, or no man should be rendered liable to, idle habits and
the hatred of his fellow-citizens : children who are over-educated do
become idle and unpopular; therefore children ought not to be over-
educated.
And again, "There is no man who is altogether happy" Eur.
Fragm. Sthenel. I (Dind., Wagn.). The reason, which converts it into an
enthymeme, is supplied by Aristoph. Ran. 1217, ^ ^yap Tre^uKcoy eV0Aor
ova e^ft fiiov, fj 8vcryevf]s u>v, (he is here interrupted by Aeschylus who
finishes the verse for him with Xqwdiov aVcoAeo-ei/ : but the Schol. supplies
the conclusion,) TrXovaiav apot TrXa/ca.
And another, "there is none of mankind that is free " is a yvunirf,
but with the addition of the next verse (r< e^ofttveo ret) it becomes an
enthymeme, "for he is the slave either of money or fortune." From Eur.
Hec. 864. Our texts have 6vr]T<av for dvSpaJv : doubtless it is one of Ar. s
ordinary slips of memory in quotation, and a very unimportant one.
But I think as a general rule, it is quite unsafe to rely upon our author s
quotations in correction of any reading in more ancient writers.
3. If then a yv<ap.r] is what has been described, there must neces
sarily be four kinds of yi>cop.r) : either with, or without, an appendage or
supplement (containing the reason) . It is first put forward independ
ently as a yvatfjLT], and then, if it is not generally acceptable, and a reason
is required, this is added, and it becomes an enthymeme.
4. Those that require proof (airoSeil-is demonstration , as before,
used loosely for proof of any kind) are all such as state anything para
doxical (contrary to received opinion ; or surprising, unexpected, con
trary to expectation, and to anything that you ever heard before) or any
thing which is questioned (or open to question) : those that have nothing
unexpected about them (may be stated, Xeyoj/rat) without a supplement .
These together make up the four kinds.
5. The first two kinds are those which require no supplement.
Of these, some must require no supplement owing to their being
already well known, as, " best of all is wealth for a man, at least in my
opinion;" because most people think so .
The line here quoted is of uncertain origin. There was a famous
vKoKiov, drinking-song or catch, usually attributed to Simonides, which
Athen., XV 694 E, has preserved amongst several that he there quotes ;
and it is also to be found in Bergk s Collection, Fragm. Lyr. Gr. Scolia,
208 PHTOPIKHS B 21 5, 6.
(<paivTai <ydp TO?? TroA/XoIs oirrw), TO.S & a /ma Aeyo-
evai e7ri\sao iv t oov
s epaa"rr]s os TIS OVK del
~ ^ \ J5^/ A \ > /}
6 TWJ/ oe /xer 67rt/\oyoy at fj.tv evvVfJuifjLaros /mepo
ov Trod os T/S dpTi<pp(av,
13. It runs thus : vyiaivtiv jitv apicrrov dv8pl 6varw, ftfiirepov 8e
(pvai> yeveo-dai., TO rpirov Se TrXoureii/ dSoXco?, /cal TO reraprov ijfiqv
TU,V (pi\uv. This is repeated by Anaxandrides in some iambics of his
Thesaurus, Fragm. I (Meineke, Fr. Comm. Gr. ill 169), and quoted
by Athen. immediately after the o-noXiav as a parallel or illustration.
Anaxandrides does not know the author ; o TO <TKO\IOV evpuv (Kf ivos,
oaTLs rjv. Plato has likewise quoted it in Gorg. 451 E, and elsewhere (see
Stallbaum s note). The Scholiast on this passage says, TO <TK.O\IOV TOVTO
ol p.fi> 2ifjLa>vl8ov (paa-iv, ol 8e Em^apfjiov. On which Meineke, u. s., note,
says Nonne igitur pro ij/zli/ legendum t^lv, et ipse ille versus, dvftpl 8
vyiaiveiv K.T.X., Epicharmo tribuendus? The trochaic metre is doubtless
in favour of this supposition, but that shews on the other hand that it
could not have formed part of the scolion above quoted, which is in
quite a different measure : and also, supposing it to be taken from that,
it would be a most improbable and unmeaning repetition of the first
line. If therefore Meineke is right in attributing it to Epicharmus, it
must have belonged to another and independent scolion. Another
scholium in Cramer, Anecd. Paris, on Ar. Rhet. has TO " dvftpl S vyiaiveiv
apiarov" Si/iam Sov eVrij/ OTTO TCOJ> o-KoAio5v auroi) (TTCOV. ol 8 E7rt^ap/xov.
Meineke, u. s. Simonides at all events has something like it, ov8e KaXas
o-c0t a? x^P ls > " M Tts *X. fl <refj.vav vyifiav. This places health at the
head of the list of goods : another distich, quoted in Ar. Eth. Nic. I 9,
Eth. Eudem. init, as the Delian inscription eVi TO n-poTrvXcuoi/ TOU
ATJTWOV (Eth. Eud.), Theogn. 255, and (in iambics) Soph. Fragm. Creus.
(Stob. cm 15, Dind. Fr. 326), places health second in the order, or rather,
perhaps, leaves the question open. Ariphron of Sicyon (Athen. XV 702
A) wrote a hymn to Health, beginning vyleia Trpeo-^io-Ta paKapuv ; he
also regards it as the greatest of all blessings, a-edev 8e xps ovns
(t8aip.a>v f<pv, line 8. See in Bergk, Fr. Lyr. Gr. p. 841 [p. 984, ed. 2].
Comp. Philem. Fr. Inc. 62, atrw 8 vyieiav Trpmrov, eiT* evrrpa^iav K.T.X.
Whereas others (the second kind, of division i) (though previously
unknown) are clear the very moment they are uttered, provided you
pay attention to them, (or perhaps, the moment you cast your eye
upon them) . Comp. Top. r 6, 120 a 32, 34 ; l> 15 and 30, E 4, 132 a 27.
eVi /SXe^is Anal. Pr. I 29, 45 a 26, eVt/SXe^ewv Ib. V 17, 7rpoererri/3Xmj>
Ib. v 21 (from Waitz). Upon the whole I think the comparison of these
passages is in favour of the former of the two interpretations : and so
Victorius.
olov K.T.X.] as "no lover is inconstant in his affection. " Eur. Troad.
1051, quoted again, Eth. Eud. VII 2, 1235 21.
6. Of those which have the supplement (these are the two kinds
PHTOPIKH2 B 2i 6. 209
dl ev6u/uui/maTiKai ^ueV, owe evBvfJLtjfJLaTO^ Be /mepos at
TTCp Kai jJ.d\L(TT evfioKl/mOVCTlV. L(Tl UVTCll V OCTOftS
ejm(f)aivTai TOV Xeyo/mevov TO aiTiov, olov iv Tto
TO jiev <a <avai j.t ev e
of the second division), some are part of an enthymeme, as "no man of
sound mind ought," (the commencement of the verses of Euripides in
2), and the rest have an enthymematic character, but are not part of
an enthymeme : which (the latter) are in fact the most popular , at
fifv fv6vfj.ijiJ.aTos fMfpos may be thought to be a careless expression,
contradictory to the description of enthymeme in I 2. 13 : since it is
characteristic of the enthymeme that it omits at least one of the premisses
(see on the enthymeme Introd. p. 104), and therefore a yvu>^ with the
reason appended represents a conclusion with one premiss, which is an
enthymeme. The explanation seems to be that an enthymeme is an
assumed syllogism : the inference which it draws rests upon the possibility
of constructing a syllogism out of it : if that cannot be done, the inference
is not valid. So that in one sense the enthymeme is a true and complete
syllogism, in another, in so far as it expresses only one premiss, it may
be called a part of it, and incomplete. And this serves to explain the
statement of I 2. 13, TO 8 ivQv^^a avX Xoyia-p.ov (i. e. a mode of syllogistic
reasoning), KCU e oKlyatv re K<U no\\a.Kis tXaTTovav fj e can 6 Trpcoros
And all those have this (latter) character in which the reason of the
(general) statement is made to appear, as in this, "mortal as thou art,
guard, keep (cherish), not immortal anger ;" for, to say "that a man
ought not to keep his anger for ever" is a yvat^rf ; but the addition, "as
a mortal" (because he is a mortal), states the (reason) why. And like
it again is this, "Mortal thoughts" (or a mortal spirit that is, one which
confines its aims and aspirations within the limits of its mortal con
dition), "not immortal, become a mortal man."
The first of these two quotations is used by Bentley in his Dissertation
on Phalaris, p. 247 [p. 229 ed. Wagner], and foil. He does not attempt to
fix the authorship of it, but contents himself with saying "this, though the
author of it be not named, was probably. . .borrowed from the stage," p. 247,
but afterwards, p. 249 [231], "and even that one (the verse in question) is
very likely to be taken from the same place" (viz. Euripides). Subse
quently, p. 262 [243], he speaks of it as from "a poet cited by Aristotle," and
"Aristotle s poet." He quotes from Euripides Philoctetes, Fragm. IX
(Dind.), XII (Wagner), a parallel passage as having been borrowed by the
author of Phalaris, (Sanep 8e dvrjrov /coi TO oto/J. rmmv f<pv, OVTO> npoa-tJKfi
/irjSe rr)v opyrjv ^fiv adavarov, ocrns traxf>povfa> eVurrarm. The same verse,
with txdpav for opyr/v, occurs also in Menander, IVco/iai /iowo-Ti^ot, line 4,
ap. Meineke Fragm. Comm. Gr. 340. Wagner, Incert. Trag. Fragm. p. 185,
"Auctor versus, quisquisfuit, imitatus est Eurip. Fragm. 790 (sc. Philoct.);"
and to this also he ascribes the yva^irj attributed to Menander,
being "sive calami errore, sive imitatione."
AR. II. 14
210 PHTOPIKH2 B 21 6, 7.
yvw/mrjy TO $e Trpo&Kei/uLevov ft QVYITOV ovra TO Sia TL
Ae ya. ofj.oiov Se Kal TO
OvrjTa 1 xpn TOV BvrjTov 1 ) OVK dQdvaTa TOV OVYITOV*
(ppovelv.
<f)avepov ovv K TCOV .ipr)p.ev(av Trocra re el^tj yvco-
fJLtis, Kal Trepl Trolov e/cacrroi/ dp/noTTet Trepl p.ev <yap
TOJV d/u<pi(r0rjTOV/uiei>cov fj Trapa^o^wv /mr] dvev ITTI-
j a A/V t] TrpoOevTa TOV e7ri\o i yov
1 6va.Ta....6va.T6v. Si Epichar mi est versus, male vulgares formas Bvrfrb. atque
6vr)Tov exhibet k.,.doricamformam ceteri omnes praeferunt? Spengel.
The second verse, Qvara xpj K.T.A., is ascribed by Bentley to Epi-
charmus ; a supposition with which the dialect and metre agree. Mtillach,
Fragvi.Philos. Gr. p. 144, Fr. Epicharm. line 260. This maxim is alluded
to, but condemned, in the exulting description of perfect happiness,
Eth. Nic. X 7> *I77 b 3 2 > ^ XP*I $* Kara TOVS TrapawovvTas avSp^iva.
(fipovflv avdpa>7roi> ovra ovde 6vrjTa TOV GVTJTOV, dXX ffi ocrov eVSf ^erat ddava-
Tt(iv K.r.X. Buhle quotes Horace, Od. il n. n, quid aeternis minoretn
const His animum fatigas ?
For the use of the article in TOV dv^rov, indicating a member of a
certain class, see notes on I 7. 13, 1 1 4.31.
7. It is plain then from what has been said, how many kinds of
yvcapr) there are, and on what sort of subject (or occasion) each of them
.is appropriate ; for (when it pronounces) on things questionable or para
doxical (or unexpected, surprising, as before) the supplement must not
be omitted (snbaudi app.oTTti Xe-yetv) ; but either the supplement should
come first, and then the conclusion (of the inference) be used as a
yv(o/j.r) as, for instance, if it were to be said (returning to the first
example, 2), " now for my own part, since we are bound neither to incur
jealousy nor to be idle, I deny that they (children) ought to be educated";
or else, say this first, and then add the supplement (the reason) .
TU>V afji(pKT^r)Tovfjifv<i>v f) 7rapa8o<oj/ K.r.X.] " Ni enim ratio addatur,
fidem non inveniet huiusmodi sententia. Melius esse iniuriam accipcre
quam inferre (this is the apparent paradox maintained by Socrates in
Plato s Gorgias and Republic) : suppliciun misereri non oportere, et his
similia qui audit reicit ; at si rationes annectantur, haud dubie assen-
tietur; nempe qui facit iniuriam semper improbus est, at qui patitur
probus esse potest. Et misericordia intempestiva iustitiae solet esse
adversa." Schrader.
(When they are) about things, not unexpected, but obscure (not
immediately intelligible. Understand Set, appoTTft, \eyeiv array), you
must add the (reason) why, as tersely as possible . A popular audience is
always impatient of long explanations, and long trains of reasoning ; or
enthymemes, II 22. 3 ; comp. I 2. 12, ill 17.6. In assigning therefore the
reason for the ambiguous or seemingly paradoxical yva>fj.rj, we must express
ourselves in the fewest possible words, as briefly and compactly as possible.
PHTOP1KHS B 21 7, 8. 211
crQai TW cru/uLTrcpda lULaTi, oiov ci TJS C LTTOL "eyw fj.ev
ovv, eTreL^rj ovre fy6ovi(r6a.i e? OVT dpyov eivoiLy ov (pri/uLL
TraL&evecrSai" % TOVTO Trpoenrovra iTrenreiv TO.
8 TTpocmBevTa TO SIOTI orTpo<y r yu\a)TaTa.
(T eV ro?s TOIOVTOIS Kai TO. A.aK(t)vtKa
i TO. aiviyfjtaTtoStj, oiov ei TI<S Aeyet o Trep
(rrp6yyv\os, rounded , compact (as a ball), is properly applied to
the periodic style the period, TTfpi -oSor, is in fact a kind of circle, "a
sentence returning into itself," Miiller, Hist. Gr. Lit. [ll 155]. Comp.
Dionysius, de Lysia Jud. c. 6. ij a-vvrptyovva (condenses, packs close) ra
i/ojf/iara KOI crrpoyyi;X<By fK<j)(povcra Xe ^ir, " expresses them in a rounded,
compact, terse form." Arist. ^Krjvas KaTa\ap.[3avovo-ai, Fragm. IV (Meineke,
Fr. Comm. Gr. II 1 142), of Euripides neat, terse, well-rounded style, xP^^ ai
yap avrov TOV arofiaTos TW crrpoyyvXa). So rotunde j Cic. de Fin. IV 3- 7>
Ista ipsa, quae tu breviter, a te quidem apte et roiunde : quippe habes
enim a rhetoribus. Brut. LXVlll 272, rotunda constructio verborum. Orat.
Xlil 40, Thucydides praefractior nee satis, ut ita dicam, rotundus. Nizo-
lius ad verbum, continue, explicate, orpoyyvAeor. Ernesti, Clavis Cic. s. v.
8. In such cases (or on such subjects) Laconic utterances and
enigmatical sayings are appropriate, as when one employs what Stesi-
chorus said at Locri, that they had better not be so presumptuous, lest
their cicales should be brought to chirp on the ground. AaKwviKa airnfyQe-
yfjiara ; pithy, sententious, utterances, which have become proverbial in
our word laconic . Plutarch has made a collection of Laconic Apo
phthegms , from which it appears that they are usually of a character rather
wise than witty though there are also some extremely smart repartees in
answer to impertinent questions or observations pithy, pungent, preg
nant, expressed with pointed brevity, which indeed is characteristic of
them, and is also the soul of wit .
I will quote only one (a short one) as a specimen. Antalcidas :
8e TOV dfj.adf is KoXovvTa roiis AciKtSai/jioviovs Adrji/atov, p.6voi yovv,
ijfj.( Is ov8fv fj.(nadi]KaiJ.(v Trap V/JLUIV KUKOV. Quite true (says Ant.) ; we are
deplorably ignorant "At any rate we are the only people that have
learnt no mischief from you. " The word is applied to two sayings of
Theramenes, before his death, Xen. Hellen. n 3 ult. For a description
of these A.aKQ>viKa diro(p6eyp.aTa as pointed and pithy as the pjj/xara de
scribed, see PL Protag. 342 E [eWjSaXe p^/xa aiov \6yov flpaxv /cal trvvf-
crrpanfjifvov oicnrep Beivos aKovTia-Trjs].
alviynaT<a8r/~] hard, obscure, ambiguous sayings, which like riddles
require solution before they can be understood; like that pronounced by
Stesichorus to check the presumptuous insolence of the Locrians : the
solution of which is, that cicalas always sit in trees when they chirp. So
that, 01) ytvovTai rtmyet onov (JLTJ dtvftpa (crriv, Arist. Hist. An. V 30, 556 a
21 (the entire chapter is on rimyes). When the trees are gone, when
they have been felled and the land ravaged, then it is that the cicalas will
14 2
212 PHTOPIKH2 B 21 9.
(Tixopos eV AoKjOoIs eiTrev, OTL ou del vfipt.crTas eivai,
9 OTTWS fJLri ol TeTTfyes yauLodev a$u)(riv.\ dp/ULOTTCi $e P 1395-
, * ,, / I /, / i ^ / P- 9 2 -
<yv (a fj.0 \oyeiv tj\iKia JULEV TrpecrpuTepois, Trepi oe TOVTMV
have to sing their song on the ground. This is what the insolence of the
Locrians will bring them to. See Mure, Hist. Gr. Lit. (Stesichorus), in
248. He says, note 2, " Similar is our own popular proverb of making
the squirrels walk , denoting a great fall of wood." This is repeated nearly
verbatim, III 1 1. 6. Demetrius, Trcpl ep^veias (ire pi o-wdtaems ovop.a.To>v] 99
(Vol. ill. p. 284, Spengel, Rhet. Gr.}, attributes the saying to Dionysius,
without telling us to whom it was said : and calls it an aXA^yopi a. And
again, 243, nepl ^eivorrjTos (ill p. 315), OVTO> KOI TO xapoBev ol Terriyes
Vfiiv qcrovTui Sfivorepov aXX^yopiKtos prjdev, rj f iirep aaXcu-? eppyOrj, ra 8tv8pa
vnuv fKnoirijo-fTai. The felling of the trees, especially the fruit trees,
always accompanied the ravaging of a country in a hostile incursion.
Hence Sei>8poro/ieu/ Thuc. I 108, of Megara, comp. II 75. i, iv 79. 2. Dem.
de Cor. 90 (in a Byzantian decree), KOI rav xcopav Saiovros /cut 8fv8poK.o-
TTf ovros- [Dem. Or. 53 (Nicostr.) 15, $vrfVTripia...KaT(K\acrfv, OVTO> 8fiva>s
wy ovS av ol TroXe /ztot Stadflev].
9. The use of maxims, or sententious language, is appropriate in
respect of age (time of life) to elders, and as to subjects, should be
directed to those in which the speaker has experience ; since for one who
is not so far advanced in life to employ maxims is as unbecoming as
story-telling (i. e. fables, legends, mythical stories), whilst to talk about
things that one knows nothing of is a mark of folly and ignorance (or
want of cultivation) . On p.vdo\oy(1v Victorius says, " Fabellarum sane audi-
tione delectantur pueri ; non tamen ipsis fabulas fingere aut narrare con-
gruit." And this, because young people have as yet had little or no expe
rience of life, and if they pronounce maxims and precepts at all, must do
it of things of which they are ignorant : and this shews folly, as well as
ignorance. So Quintilian, who supplies the reason for this precept : VIII
5. 8, ne passim (sententiae) et a quocunque dicantur. Magis enim decent eos
in quibus est auctoritas, Jit ret pondus etiam persona conjirmet. Qnis
enim ferat puerum aut adolescentulum aut etiam ignobilem, si iudicat
in dicendo et quodammodo praecipiat? " It has been said too they come
most naturally from aged persons, because age may be supposed to have
taught them experience. It must however be an experience suitable to
their characters : an old general should not talk upon law, nor an old
lawyer on war." Harris, Philol. Inq. Works IV 186. The Justice in the
Seven Ages {As you like it [ll 6. 156]), who is advanced in years, is full
of wise sauis and modern instances. A sufficient indication (of the truth of
what has just been said, viz. that it is only the simpleton, or the ignorant
and uneducated, that pronounces maxims upon subjects of which he knows
nothing), is the fact that rustics (clowns, boors) are especially given to
maxim-coining, and ever ready to shew them off (exhibit them) . This
propensity to sententiousness, and the affectation of superior wisdom
which it implies, characteristic of the rustic , has not escaped the obser
vation of Shakespeare: whose numerous clowns are all (I believe)
addicted to this practice. Dogberry in Much ado about nothing see in
PHTOPIKHS B 21 9, 10. 213
6t> V e/ULTTClpOS TtS 6(TTfV, W TO JU6V p.t} rt]\lKOVTOV OVTCL
<yv(jt)/uio\O y iv aTrpeTres co&Trep Kai TO fJiv6o\oyeiv, Trepi
3 wv aTreipos, tj\i6iov Kai aTrai^evrov. (rrifj-elov B
IKO.VOV ol yap d<ypoiKOi jJid\i<rTa yvcofj.oTviroi elai
\ *./ > i / /I x ^ > \ /I -v
10 Kca paoicos aTrofyaLvovToti. KavoXov be p.r] OVTOS KavoXov
juidXca-Ta dp/moTTei ev cr^erAfacrjUw Kai
particular, Act in Sc. 5 the fool in Lear I 4 Touchstone in As you
like //, in 3 and Costard in Love s labour s lost, throughout; are all
cases in point.
dypoiKoy, country-bred, rustic, boor, clown, implying awkwardness
and the absence of all cultivation and refinement of language, manner,
mind, is opposed to dorelor which represents the opposite, city life,
and city breeding, the city being the seat of refinement, cultivation
personal and intellectual, civilisation and fashion ; as rusticus to rtrbanus,
and Country with its associations, to Town and its belongings, in our
dramatists and light literature of the two last centuries, the echo of
which has not quite died away.
10. Generalising, where there is no generality (stating a pro
position or maxim universally which is only partially true), is most
appropriate in complaint and exaggeration, and in these either at the
commencement (of either of the two processes), or after the case has
been made out (proved, aTroSeucj upai here again in a vague and general
sense) .
(rxeT\iaa-fjtos, " coiiqnestio, h. e. ea pars orationis qua conquerimur et
commoti sumus ex iniuria vel adversa fortuna . Ernesti, Lex. Technologiae
Graecae, s. v. Conquestio est oratio auditoruin misericordiam captans, Cic.
Inv. I 55. io6,who gives a long account of it divided into 1 6 topics. This was
the subject of Thrasymachus treatise, the eXeot (iniserationes Cic. [Brutus
82]), referred to by Arist., Rhet. ill i. 7 ; the contents are satirically
described by Plat., Phaedr. 267 C. It was "a treatise, accompanied with
examples, on the best modes of exciting compassion" (Thompson ad loc.).
What follows, dpyio-ai re av K.r.A. describes the art of Sfivwo-is, which no
doubt accompanied the o-^6TXiao-/xos in Thrasymachus work. On Thrasy
machus eXeotsee Catnb.Journ. of Cl. and Sacred Phil. Vol. Ill 274, No. 9.
o-^erXtao-/ioy therefore is the act of complaining, or the art of exciting the
compassion of the audience for the supposed sufferings of the speaker
himself or his client by age, penury, distress, or wrong or injury from
others : and its appropriate place is the eVi Xoyoy, the peroration of the
speech. See Rhet. in 19.3.
deivaMTis is a second variety of the same KOIVOS TOTTOS, viz. avrj<ris
and fjifiaxris, to which both of these are subordinate. There is in fact
a natural connexion between the two : pity for the person wronged is
usually accompanied by indignation against the wrong-doer. This is
indignatio, of which Cicero treats de Inv. I 53. 10054. 105. Indig natioest
oratio per quant conficitur ut in aliquem hominem magnum odium aut in
reni gravis offensio concitetur. The art of exciting indignation or odium
214 PHTOPIKH2 B 21 ir.
ii Ka ev Torots p-fcoiJLCvov rj
$e e? Kai rat s Te6pv\rnu.evai<s Kai KOLvals <yi/w /xcs, eav
wcri xprtcrtjuioi &a yap TO eivai KOivaL, W9
against any person or thing, by exaggeration or intensification ; vivid
description heightening the enormity or atrocity of that against which
you wish to rouse the indignation of the audience. "SeiVwo-t? invidiae
atque odii exaggeratio," Ernesti, Lex. Techn. Gr. s. v. Quint. VI 2. 24,
Haec est ilia quae dfivcaa-ts vocattir, rebus indignis asperis invidiosis
addens vim oratio; qua virtute praeter alios plurimum Demosthenes
valuit. Ib. VIII 3. 88, Selvaxris in exaggeranda indignitate. IX 2. 104,
intendere crimen, quod est SetVwo-ts. Comp. Rhet. in 19. 3, on the
eTri Xoyoy.
Macrobius Saturn. IV 6 (ap. Ernesti u. s.), Oportet enim, ut oratio
pathetica ant ad indignationem aut ad misericordiam dirigatur, quae a
Graecis O!KTOS Kai SeiVaxrts appellatur : korum alterum accusatori neces-
sarium est, alterum reo ; et necesse est initium abruptum habcat, quoniam
satis indignanti lenitcr indpere non convenit.
The illicit generalisation above mentioned is one of the arts em
ployed to heighten the two iradrj which are most serviceable to the
orator, eXfor and opyij or vt/jLtcris by (r^erXiacr/ios and ftfivaxris. The first
is well illustrated by Victorius from Catullus, Epith. Pel. et Thet. 143,
the deserted Ariadne exclaims, lam iam nulla viro iuranti femina
crcdat, Nnlla viri speret sermones esse Jideles &c. (similarly Ovid, Fasti
in 475, Nunc quoque nulla viro clamabo l femina credat" 1 } and Eur.
Hoc. 254) a^apKirov vp.<ai> crrrep^i ocrot 8rjfj.r)yopovs ^XoiJTe Ti/ias. This is
a generalisation from the single case of Ulysses. Add Cymbeline, Act II
5. I ; Posthumus. Is there no way men to be, but women must be half-
workers ? We are bastards all &c. and (already quoted in Introd.) Virg.
Aen. IV 569, varium et mutabile semper femina; and Hamlet, Act I Sc. 2,
[146], Frailty, thy name is woman. So ovSeV yeirovias xaAeTT&rrepoi/ 15.
1 1. Maxims which are in everyone s mouth (notorious), and univer
sally known, should be also employed if they are serviceable (when they
are to the point): for the fact that they are universal (universally known
and employed) being equivalent to an universal acknowledgment (of their
truth), they are generally supposed to be right (true and sound) .
Tf6pv\r]pevai.s KOI Koivals yva>[j.ais} Such are the sayings of the seven sages,
and of the old gnomic poets in general, Theognis, Hesiod, Phocylides and
the rest, which everybody remembers and repeats. dpvXflv is to repeat
again and again, as v/j-velv, decantare. Zonaras, awex^s \fyeiv. Suidas and
Photius, XaXeTi , KVKQV. (Hesych. $pvXXei, rapaa-crfi, o^Xtt. $pvXXoi, tyi6v-
pi<rp.oi, o/ziX/ai.) Arist. Eq. 348, TTJV VVKTO. 0pv\>i> KOL XaXcov eV rat? oSotr, of
the sausage-monger, who after having made, as he thinks, a good speech,
walks about the streets all night repeating it over and over again, and
chattering. Eurip. El. 909, KOI ^v fit opSpuv y OVTTOT f(\ip.Travoi> dpvXovv ,
a y flrrelv rjdf^ov. "She had long practised and considered her speech
in the early dawn of the mornings." Paley. For Tfdpv\rjiJ.ei>ais cf. also ill
7.9 ; 14.4, notorious . Plat. Phaedo 65 B, 76 D. Tro\vdpv\r)Tov, Ib. 100 B,
Rep. vill 566 B. Isocr. Panath. 237, nepl uvriftovfeis 55, (Xoyovs) TOVS
PHTOPIKHS B 21 ii. 215
aTravrtav, opBws X eiV SOKOVCTLV, olov TrapctKa-
\OVVTI 67ri TO Kiv^vveveiv p.rj Bva afj.evou s
<s api(TTO<s d/mvvecrBat irepi
KCtl eTTl TO tJTTOVS OVTO.S
67Ti TO dvaipeiv TWV e^Bpcov TO. TCKva KCCI
i Trap vp.lv 8iarfdpv\r]p.tvovs. Ast, Lex. Plat, decantare. May not
(so it is sometimes written) be an onomatopoeia from the sound
of the harp, like $perrai/eXo, Arist. Plut. 290 ; the notion of constant
repetition, recurrences being derived from harping perpetually on the
same string, chorda qui semper oberrat eadcm? [Horace, A. P. 356].
irapaKa\oi>vTi\ lit. to a man exhorting ; when Ar. wrote this dative he
was most likely thinking of fav cotri ^pr/o-i/^ot, rather than of anything else ;
though it is extremely uncertain. As for instance in an exhortation to
make the adventure run the risk of battle without previous sacrifice .
Sva-afjifvovs] Schrader interprets litare, said of a sacrifice which pro
pitiates the deity to whom it is offered. He may possibly mean that it is
the use of the middle voice that gives it this sense for themselves, for
their own benefit .
els olavos K.-.X.] Horn. II. xn 243 (Hector to Polydamas, who has
threatened him with an evil omen), olavos in the yvut^rj has reference
to the preceding dvaaftevovs. Talk not to me of your omens (from
sacrifice) says the officer, cheering on his men, who are disheartened by
the absence of favourable omens ; " One omen is best of all, to rally
for our country s defence." Pope, "And asks no omen but his country s
cause." Lord Derby, " The best of omens is our country s cause." Applied
by Cioero to his own public conduct and intentions, Ep. ad Attic. II 3. 3,
ult. Schrader quotes Cic. Cato Maior, 3. 4, Q. Fabius Maximus, augur
cum esset, dicere ausus est optimis auspiciis ea geri quae pro reipublicae
salute gererentur : quae contra rempublicam fierent contra auspicia fieri.
And again an exhortation to run the risk (subaudi TiapanaXovvTi eVi
TO Kiv8vvfi>iv l ) with inferior forces ; gwbs Ewa Xior, II. xvm 309. This
again is from a speech of Hector, expressing his readiness to encounter
Achilles. Oil ynv eytoye 0euo/xai...dXXa /iaX" avrrjv orT^aofiai, TJ Kf (pfprjcri
fj.eya KpciTos, r) Kf (pfpoifirfv, t-vvos EvvdXios, nai re KTaveovra jcareKra. This
passed into a proverb for the equal chances of battle . Archilochus,
(Bergk, Fr, Lyr. Gr. No. 56, p. 479 [p. 550, ed. 2]), erijTvp-ov yap vi>os av-
6p<aTTois "Aprjs. Aesch. S. c. T. 409, epyov 8 fv Kvfiois "Apijs Kpive t. Liv.
XXVIII 19, In pugna et in acie, nbi Mars communis et victum saepe
erigeret et affligeret victorem. Ib. v 12, XXI i (quoted by Trollope on the
verse of Homer).
And an exhortation (und. as before) to destroy enemies children
1 Gaisford, echoing F. A. Wolf, says of this, "Recte statuit W. haec non sana
esse. Mihi videtur verbum aliquod excidisse." In a writer like Aristotle there is
notlrng at all extraordinary in such an ellipse as I have supposed : in any other it
might no doubt lead one to suspect an omission.
216 PHTOP1KHS B 21 12, 13.
OL&lKOVVTCt
vriinos os TrctTepa /cre/ms TralSa
12 ert tVLai TU>V Trapoifjuwv KO.I ^vw^al 6t(riv, oiov Trapoi-
i Simla " ATTIKOS TrdpotKos." del fie ras
Kcti Trapd Ta ^e&^jjioa-ievfjieva (Aeyw c)e
oiov TO yvcodi (TavTov Kal TO jmri^ev ayai/), OTO.V t] TO
(j)aivecr6at /ae\\tj (3e\Tioi>, r] Tr
> ^ \ r\ \ / ? ,/ ,
ecrTi oe TraurjTiKr] fj.ev 9 oiov ei TIS o
even when innocent, " Childish is he, who first slays the father and then
leaves the children behind." This is a verse of Stasinus s Kun-pia, one
of the Cyclic poems. It is ascribed to him by Clemens Alex. Strom, vi
p. 747. Diintzer, Fragm. Epic. Cr. p. 16. See note on I 15. 14.
12. Some proverbs also are yj/to/xat; for example, "an Attic neigh
bour" is a proverb (and also may be used as a yvcopij} . VTJTTIOS os K.T.\.
is quoted as a proverb in I 15. 14; here it is a yvoc^rj. It may be added
to the list of Trench s immoral proverbs , On Proverbs, p. 82 seq.
On th e Trapoifiia, its definition and character, see Erasmus, Adag.
Introd. : and Trench, "on the lessons in Proverbs."
What sort of neighbour an Attic neighbour was, may be best gathered
from the description of the Athenian character drawn by the Corinthians,
and contrasted with that of their Lacedaemonian rivals, in their speech
at the Congress at Sparta. Thuc. I 70. The restless, excitable, intri
guing spirit, the love of novelty and foreign adventure, the sanguine
temper, quick wit, and daring audacity, therein described, must neces
sarily have made them the most troublesome and dangerous of neigh
bours ; ever ready to interfere in their neighbours affairs, and form
schemes of aggrandisement at their neighbours expense. Another pro
verb of the same kind is mentioned by Schrader as having been applied
to the Franks, Francum amicum habeas, vicinum non habeas: it is
found in Eginherd s Life of Charlemagne. Gibbon also refers to it, with
out naming his authority. In the loth century at Constantinople, "a
proverb, that the Franks were good friends and bad neighbours, was in
every one s mouth." Decline and Fall, ch. XLIX. Vol. IV. p. 509 (Murray,
1846).
13. Maxims may also be cited in opposition to, or in contradic
tion of, those that have become public property by these I mean such
as know thyself, avoid excess (the maxims or adages of Solon and
Chilon) whenever one s character is likely to be put in a more favour
able light (thereby), or the yvm^rf has been pronounced in an excited
state of feeling (by the opponent who is to be answered) ; of this
pathetic yv(afj.rj an instance is, if for example a man in a fit of passion
were to say that it is false that a man is bound to know himself, " this
gentleman at any rate, if he knew himself, would never have claimed to
be elected general."
Aristotle has said that there are two classes of cases in which a
PHTOPIKHS B 21 13, 14. 217
f > . <
w oet ivui&K.eiv O.VTOV
yovv e eyyvwo Kev eavrov, OVK av TTOTG
t]^iw(rei> t \TO (He t]6os (3e\Tiov, OTL ov e?, wcnrep
(pi\eTv aj<s fJLL(T}](rovra<s d\\d /uLa\\oi> /uLHrelv cos
14 trot/ras. del c)e r^ Ae ^et -n/V Trpoaipecrii/ crvv$ri\ovv t
generally accepted or universal maxim such as Solon s yva>6i a-fav-
rov may be contradicted with effect. One of those is, when the yvu,^
itself, including the contradiction of it as appears from the example
is uttered in a state of excited feeling, real or assumed, such as indigna
tion. The example of this is a man in a Jit of passion, opyi^o/jLevos,
loudly asserting that Solon s universally accepted maxim, or the precept
conveyed by it, is untrue, or at any rate liable to exception ; for if so
and so (some imaginary person) had had a true knowledge of himself
(and his own incapacity) he never would have aspired to be a general:
but he has clone so, and succeeded in the attempt : and this success
shews the falsity of the rule, as a prudential maxim, at any rate in this
case ; and also being undeserved provokes the indignation of the speaker.
And it is to be observed that this success without merit is necessary to
inspire the feeling, the existence of which is distinctly stated. The case
is that of Cleon, Thuc. iv 27 seq. Victorius however understands it in
a different sense. According to- him the case is that of an Iphicrates,
who raised himself from a low condition to the height of power and dis
tinction ; Rhet. I 7-3 2 > Irfiuipcrnjs avrov eveK<op.iafa Xeycoi/ e cov vnrjp^f raCra ;
I 9. 31, e| oltov els ofu, (TO TOU l</)tfcparouy) ; if Iphicrates had known himself,
i. e. remembered his origin, he never could have entered upon such a
career. But it seems to me that this is not a proper interpretation of
self-knowledge , and that the maxim could not be applied in this sense:
the mere recollection of his former low estate surely is not entitled to
the name of knowledge of self. Iphicrates, instead of disobeying the
precept, conformed to it in the strictest sense ; he did know himself so
well, he was so fully aware of his capacity for fulfilling the duties of the
office, that he did not hesitate to apply for and exercise the command of
an army. Victorius words are; " Tra6r]TiKa>s dicet, qui ira percitus ita
loquetur" (but what is the occasion of the anger, when it is thus inter
preted? The mere contradiction of an universal maxim does not give
rise to a fit of passion), "falsum est omnino, quod aiunt, debere homines
seipsos nosse : hie enim profecto si se ipsum cognosset nunquam praetor
ducere exercitum voluisset." It may perhaps be meant that the speaker
assumes indignation in order to give force to his contradiction: or really
gets into a passion at the thought of the folly of mankind for believing it.
Our character is bettered, men s opinion of our character is im
proved, by saying for instance (snbaudi olov ei TIS Xe yot, ant tale aliquid}
that we ought not, as is said, to love as with the prospect of our love
being turned into hatred, but rather the reverse, to hate as if that was
likely to become love . This is Bias precept or suggestion, vnod^KT}, see
note on II 13.4.
14. The language (statement, expression) should be accompanied
218 PHTOPIKH2 B 21 14, IS-
> r\ > / X >/ x f *? 9\ tf >
et oe fJLt], Tt]v aiTLav Tri\vyeiv, oiov n OVTWS eiTro
OTI " e? e <pi\elv ov% tacnrep (pacriv, d\\ ok del
(piXi jo-ovrct e7Tifiov\ov jap Gd-repov" n code " OVK
dpea-Kei $e fJ-OL TO Xeyofj-evov del <ydp TOV 7 d\t]6ivov
(f>i\ov a}<s (pi\r](rovra del (piXeli/." Kal " ovfie TO p- 93-
/Jitney ayav %e1 yap ToJs ye xaKovs ayav jLUcretV."
15 eleven cT ek TOI>S Xoyovs (3ot]6eiav jueyaXriv /miav P. 1395^
a TY\V (popriKOTrjra TUIV aKpoarwv %aipov(n
by the manifestation of the deliberate moral purpose (by which the
moral character of every thought and action is estimated), or if not, the
reason (at any rate) should be added ; as thus " a man s love should be,
not as people say, but as though it were to be lasting (as deep and fer
vent and assured, as though it were to endure for ever) ; for the other
(the reverse) has the character of treachery (belongs to, is characteristic
of, a designing, plotting, treacherous man ; implying deceit together
with evil designs of future mischief)." This is the construction that may
be put upon it : it also admits of a more favourable interpretation : see
the note on II 13. 4, already referred to. Or thus, "but the statement,
the maxim, does not satisfy me : for the true, sincere, genuine friend
should love as if his love were to last for ever." And again, neither does
the (maxim) "nothing to excess (satisfy me); for the wicked surely
should be hated to excess."
15. These yva>p.ai are of the greatest service (help) to our speeches
one of which (the other follows in the next section) is due to, arises
out of, the want of cultivation and intelligence in the audience ; for they
are delighted if ever any one chance to light upon, and express in
general terms, any opinion that they hold themselves, but partially .
(fropTiKoTTjs, as far as Classical Greek is concerned, appears to be a
a/ra Xeyapevov: it is found also in Eustathius (Steph. Thes. sub v.). $op-
TLKOS, from (f)6pros a burden or load, burden-like, burden-ish, and hence
met. burdensome, oppressive, annoying : especially applied to vulgarity,
in person, manners, or intellect. The last of these senses, intellectual
vulgarity, the want of cultivation and refinement, and especially of phi
losophical cultivation a coarse and vulgar habit of mind, which looks
merely at the surface of things, with little or no faculty of observation or
power of distinction, and contents itself with a mere vulgar knowledge
shared with the mass of mankind is, if not peculiar to Aristotle, at any
rate much more commonly found in his writings than in others. In
this sense the (fropriKos does not differ much from the diraiSevTos, and is
opposed to the ^aptei r, which, in Aristotle, often expresses the highest
degree of grace and refinement, arising from the study of philosophy.
It is in this signification that the word is used here, meaning a svant of
intelligence and of philosophical or (generally) intellectual training,
which disqualifies men for making distinctions and estimating the
value of an argument; consequently they measure the validity of a
PHTOPIKH2 B 2i 15- 219
yap idv TI<S Ka6o\ou Xeycov eTTLTv^ri TWV ^o^wv as
KCCTOC ]u.epos e^ovfTiv. o
code, ajaa e K.al TTWS e? airras 6tipevetv. r\ jjiev yap
yvu>fj.t]j cocnrep e lprjTai, d7r6(pav(ri<s Ka6o\ov etrriv,
Xaipov(ri $e Ka66\ov Xeyo/mevov o Kara fJLepos Trpo-
V7roXaiJifidvovT<s Tvy^avovcTLV oiov ei TI<S yeiTOcri
Tv%oi Kexprj/mevos r} TCKVOLS (pavXois, ciTroSe^aiT av
TOV e nrovTO s oTi ovSev yeiTOvias %a\e7ra)Tpov f} on
ov^iev ri\i6iOTepov TKVO7roiias. wcrre
reason not by its logical force or cogency, but by its coincidence with
their own previously conceived opinions ; which they love to hear exag
gerated by the orator, who humours them by these illicit generalisations.
The Scholiast explains it aypomlav. Victorius has, I think, entirely mis
taken the meaning of the word. The (^opriKorqs here ascribed to vulgar
audiences is much the same as the [jLo^ipia rcav a/cpoaro>i>, in 1.5, the
vices or defects, which oblige the orator to have recourse to raXXa ea>
TOV drroSft^ai in order to convince them, because they are unable to
appreciate logic alone. Comp. I 2. 13, on this subject, o yap *ptrj}s
inroKfirai elvai O.TT\OVS. See also on III I. 5.
My meaning will be explained, and at the same time also how they
(the yvwfiai) are to be caught (hunted, pursued, like game, Anal. Pr. I 30,
46 a u, 6rjp(iifiv a p^dr), by what follows (8e) . The yvu>p.r], as has been
stated ( 2), is an utterance or declaration expressed universally; and an
audience is always delighted with the expression, as of an universal
truth, of any opinion which they previously, but partially, entertain : for
example, if a man chanced to have bad neighbours or children, he would
be glad to hear (approve) any one who said " nothing is more troublesome
(harder to bear) than neighbourhood" (abstract for concrete, ye iToves
neighbours), or "nothing is more foolish than the procreation of
children." Possibly also, though this is doubtful, a man with a frail
wife might like to hear Hamlet exclaim "Frailty, thy name is woman."
ye irof /ay] Plat. Legg. VI 1 1 843 C, xaXcTrrjv K.IU <r<p68pa TriKpav yeiroviav aVfp-
ya^ovrai. yeirovnv, apudeundem. For ^aXeTrwrf pov yfirovias, COmp.Thuc.
Ill 113, edeicrav p,>) oi A-dyvaioi e^ovres ai)-n)i> ^aXeTrwrepot crfpia-nrdpoiKOi a>cn.
With the yvco /LiT; comp. Demosth. -rrpos KaXXt/cXea [Or. 55], init. OVK yv ap , w
aVSpey A.drjvaloi, / ^aX67rcorepoi ov8(i> Jj yeirovos jrovrjpov KCU nXeovfurov rv^flv
(Victorius), evidently referring to this proverb, [cf. Hesiod, Op. et D. 345,
7rfjp.a KO.K.OS yfLTCDv}.
a-Toxa^fa-dai /c.r.X.] And therefore (the speaker) must guess what their
previous (already formed) opinions are and what sort of things they are
about (Jiow they think about what), and then express this opinion in a general
proposition on these matters . Schrader quotes Cic. de Orat. II 44. 186,
(M. Antonius) sicut medico. . .sic cum aggrcdior ancipitem cansam et gravem,
ad animos iudicum pertractandos omni mente in ea cogitatione curaque
versor, ut odorer quam sagacissime possim quid sentiant quid existiment
quid exspcctent quidvelint, quo deduci oratione facillime posse videantur.
220 PHTOPIKH2 B 21 16; 22 i.
TTWS Tvy^vovcn Troa
1 6 eW ouTca Trepi TOVTWV KaQoXov Xeyeiv. Tavrnv re Sf)
e-^ei fjiiav xpfjariv TO yvwfjioXo yeiv, KO.I eTepav KpeiTTco
i]6iKOvs yap Troiel -roiJs Xoyovs. t]6os S e^ovcnv ol
Xoyoi ev ocrcus $>ri\n 1} Trpoaipecris. al $e -yyto/xcu
Trdcrai TOVTO TTOioucri $id TO d7ro<paive(r6ai TOV TY\V
fyvtajULfiV Xeyovra KaQoXov Trepi TUIV TrpoaipeTcov, UXTT
av ^p^crTal WGTLV al ryvajfjiai, Kai %pria TOt]6ri (j)atvecrBai
TTOIOVCTL TOV XvyOVTO..
Trept fj.ev ovv yvwfJ.ris, KCCI TL ecni KCCI irocra ei^n
KO.I 7rws xpii&Teov avTrj KO.I TLVCL uxpeXeiav
t) TOcravTct Trepi 3 evOvfJUfi/naTcov KaQoXov CHAP.XXH.
TTUIS iro1a] Two interrogatives withcxut copnla : common in Greek but
in verse rather than prose as Soph. Phil. 1090, TOV TTOTC Tfv^o/j.ai...7ro6fv
fXnio os.
1 6. This then is one use (or usefulness, advantage) of the employ
ment of yvcofjLai, there is also another, and a better ; that is, that it gives
an ethical character to our speeches. All speeches have this moral cha
racter in which the moral purpose is manifested . Comp. in 17.9. The
rjdos referred to in ill 16. 9 is of a different kind, it is dramatic cha
racter, the third of the three distinguished in Introcl. p. 112.
All -yi/co/xai have this effect, because any one who uses ayi-co/*?; makes
a declaration in general terms about the objects of moral purpose (or
preference), and therefore if the yi/dj/iat themselves are good (have a good
moral tendency) they give to the speaker also the appearance of good
character . On aTrofpaiveadai, see above on 11 21.2.
So, for the treatment of yv<ap.r], its nature, number of kinds, mode of
employment, and advantages, let so much suffice .
CHAP. XXIT.
On the treatment of enthymemes in general. A summary of the
contents of this chapter is given in the Introduction, p. 260 seq., and the
enthymeme in its logical aspect described in the same, p. 101 8. The
principal part of it is occupied with the selection of topics of enf
memes, preparatory to, and exemplified by, c. 23, the roVot ra>v tvffvfir]-
/iarcoi/. [On the enthymeme, see Grate s Aristotle I 291 3.]
On the selection of topics, comp. Top. A 14. "Derivatum est hoc caput
ex fVTropia 7rpoTa.o-(t>v, ratioiie conqnirendi medios tcnninos" the middle
term which connects the two extremes and so gives rise to the conclu
sion, is therefore the thing to be looked for in constructing a syllogism
"quae docetur, Anal. Pr. I 27 32: ut seq. cap. (23) e libris Topicorum,
c. 24 et 25 ex Elenchis Soph, est traductum." Schrader. Of course the
mode of treatment is adapted to the purposes of Rhetoric. I will repeat
PHTOP1KH2 B 22 i 3. 221
TLva TpoTrov Sel tyiTeiv, Kai //era TauTO.
TOVS TOTTOfs* a AAo yap e/So? eicaTepov TOVTCOV ecmv.
2 OTI juev ovi^ TO ev6vfirifj.a (ruXXoyKr/mos rts e<TTiv 9 eipn-
Tai Trporepov, KCCI TTWS (rvXXoyia-^.6^, Kal ri <$ta<pep6L
^> -v " ^ /I ^ ~
3 TWI/ cia\KTtK(jt)V OVT <yap TTOppwuev OVT6 Trav-ra cei
here, that the enthymeme differs from the strict dialectical syllogism
only mform. The materials of the two are the same, probable matter,
and of unlimited extent: the dialectician may dispute, and the rheto
rician draw his inferences, about anything wliatsoever. The difference
between the two is simply this, that the dialectician rigorously maintains
the form of the syllogism, with its three propositions, major and minor
premiss and conclusion : the rhetorician never expresses all three if he
did, his enthymeme would become a regular syllogism though his argu
ment or inference derives all the validity of its reasoning from the syllo
gism, of which it is a kind. [See esp. note on p. 103 of Introd.]
i. Let us now speak of enthymemes in general, that is, of the
mode of looking for them, and next their (principal) TOTTOI (general heads
of enthymemes, arguments or inferences ; a classification of cases to
which orators may refer for appropriate arguments in any particular
case which they have to argue: in c. 23); for each of these is (of) a
different kind . On which Schrader, "ratio seligendi enthymemata differt
a locis ipsis. Quomodo aliud est argenti fodina, aliud argentum investi-
gandi et explorandi modus."
2. Now that the enthymeme is a kind of syllogism has been
already stated (i 2. 8, and 13), and also how (in what respects) it is a
syllogism, and wherein it differs from those of dialectics (i 2. 11) ; for
these are two of the differences we must neither go very far back,
nor introduce all the steps (of the regular syllogism), in drawing our
inferences ; the one is obscure by reason of its length, the other is mere
chattering (idle talk, or vain repetition, leading to nothing, ill 3. 3),
because it states what everybody sees already (what is already evident) .
ovre yap Troppmdfv K.r.A.] This is a manifest reference to I 2.13,
where both of these two things which the rhetorician has to avoid are
expressly mentioned.
First, he must not deduce his inference, the conclusion which he
wishes to establish, by a long train of connected syllogisms from a
remote distance, crvXXoyi^eadai Kai trvvayeiv *K crv\\{\oyicriJ.fi a)i> Trporepov...
dvdyKr) fj,rj aval. fvenaKoXovdrjTov 8ia TO prJKos, 6 yap KpiTijs inroKfirai eivai
aTrXoOy. Comp. I 2. 12, ecrri TO f pyov avrfjs (rrjs pr]TopiK.f)s)...ei> rols TOIOVTOIS
aKpoarais ol ov dvvavrai Sta TroAAcoz/ (rvvopav ov8e Aoyi ecr#a<, noppuidfi .
(Comp. Topic. A n, 105 a 8, where this is extended to dialectical argu
mentation. A similar precept is given in ill 17.6. froppadev of far
fetched metaphors, ill 2. 12. Comp. ill 3.4.) This will only puzzle his
simple audience, whose powers of perception and memory will be alike
unable to keep pace with him. The reasoning of the rhetorician must be
as clear and as brief as possible.
Secondly, he must draw his conclusion without expressing all that
222 PHTOPIKHS B 22 3.
\afjifidvovTas (rvvdyeiv TO juev yap aerates Sia TO
jjLtiKOs, TO Se. d^oXecr^ia Sia TO (pavepa Xeyeiv. TOVTO
yap aiTiov Kat TOV TriOavcaTepovs eivat TOI)S ctTrai&ev-
TOI/S TOJI/ TreTTaiSeviuLevwv ev ro?s cr^A-Cus, uxrTrep (f>aa~ii/
belongs to the regular syllogism ; this is also for the sake of brevity ; the
formal syllogism is unsuitable to the orator who has a great deal to say,
and is hastening to his conclusion, fearing to weary his audience, because
it expresses a great deal that is self-evident, and may well be left for
the hearers themselves to supply. Besides this, the enthymeme which
he employs obliges him to omit either one of the two premisses or the
conclusion ; which of them it is to be, depends upon the degree in
which the reasoning will be intelligible without it : anything that is
absolutely <$>avep6v should (in reasoning) be omitted to save time. These
are the two points in which the use of the enthymeme differs from that
of the dialectical syllogism.
With respect to the first, the dialectician, whose object is merely to
gain the victory in the dispute, and who has an antagonist more or less a
match for him, can take his own time, and need not accommodate his
reasoning to the intelligence of his opponent : to the rhetorician, the time
allowed is generally limited, he has usually an uneducated and perhaps
unintelligent audience to address, which he must keep in good humour,
and therefore neither puzzle nor weary. The second point conveys the
essential difference between the enthymeme and dialectical syllogism,
that in the former ou iravra del XapfBdvovras a-vvayeiv. Trdvra may also
include, what Schrader adds, "multas propositiones probabiles, com
munes, intempestivas," which " plane omitti debere praecipit."
On aSoXetrxt a, see note on in 3.3. Eth. N. in 13, mStf i. Comp.
de Soph. El. c. 3, 165 15.
TOVTO yap] yap here can hardly bear its usual signification, that of
a reason assigned : the fact that the uneducated are more convincing
to a mob than your philosopher is not the reason of the preceding
statement, but rather the reverse ; the previous statement explains
(supplies the reason or explanation of) the fact. It must therefore be a
case of that use of yap which Schleiermacher in his translation of Plato
represents by ndmlich, videlicet j a use of the word which frequently
occurs in the Platonic dialogues. And so I have translated it : though
it is to be observed that if ndmlich always represents the Greek yap
(in these special cases), the English namely will not always represent
the German ndmlich. [Comp. note I on p. 134, and Shilleto on Thuc.
I. 25. 4.]
This, namely, is also the reason why the ignorant (or illiterate)
have a greater power of persuading when they are addressing a mob
than the highly educated or cultivated (in dialectics and philosophy),
as the poets say that the uncultivated are the more accomplished
speakers in a crowd .
01 TToirjTal] is generalised from one, viz. Euripides, who alone is
referred to. The plural sometimes expresses the single individual
plus those like him. So we speak of our Newtons and our Bacons ,
PHTOPIKH2 B 22 3. 223
OL TrouiTcti rofs ctTrctiSevTOvs Trap o^Xt
as if there were several of them, poets, Homers and Virgils ; or
else conveys contempt, don t talk to me of your Hegels and Schel-
lings (from some one who was no admirer of German philosophy) and
so on. Soph. Phil. 1306, \lffvSoKjjpvKas, of Ulysses alone (Schneidewin).
Sim. Plat. Rep. ill 387 C, KMKVTOVS re KOL 2rtryay. Aesch. Agam. 1414,
XpvcTTjiScoi/ /LKtXfy/za ra>j/ VTT iXt w. (Longin. Trepi v^ovs 23, f^fi\6
re Kal SapTrq Soi ey, Eur. Rhes. 866, OVK oi8a TOVS crovy ovs Aeyety
Hor. Ep. II 2. 117, Catonibus atque Cethegis, Lucan, Phars. I 313,
nomina vana, Catoncs, quoted in Blomfield s Gloss, ad loc.) Arist.
Ran. 1041, HaTpoK\a>v T(i>Kpa>v QvnoXtovrtov (characters of Aeschylus).
See Valckn. ad Theocr. Adon. line 141, sub fin. AevKaXuoi/as.
The verses here referred to, not directly quoted, are from Eur.
Hippol. 9^9? ot yap fv aroffoois (paOXoi, Trap o^Xco ^ovcriKwrepoi \eyeiv. The
same verses are referred to by Plutarch, de Educ. Lib. c. 9, p. 6 B.
povaiKos, has here an unusual sense, which seems to be borrowed
from the notion of cultivation, literary and intellectual, which the term
expresses: hence skilled in , highly trained or cultivated in the
practice of & particular art. So Rost and Palm Lex. wohlunterrichtet, ge-
schickt. "Accomplished in" seems to unite the two meanings ; general
cultivation, with special skill in the particular art. Ast s Lex. Plat., on
/uov<rio>y : "Et in universum decenter. Plat. Rep. Ill 403 A, epa>y iretyvKe
. ../novo-iKwy f pav, Legg. VII 8l6 C."
For the one (the TreTraiSeupeVoi) talk about generals and universals,
the others about (// /. from , the materials from which the speech is
derived) what they really know, and things that are near to us (near,
that is, to our observation, things sensible ; and to our interests, those
which nearly concern us) . The KOIVO. Kal Kado\ov are the general or
abstract, and universal notions, with which alone the philosopher and
man of science care to deal. These are of course remote from popular
knowledge and interests. The artist also is conversant with generals
and not with particulars or individuals : the rules of art are all general
rules. Experience or empiricism deals with the particular : rj fiev
ffjiTreipia TWV K.a.6 eKacrrov e ort yvSxris, ij 8e Te^vrj ra>v /ca$oXov. Metaph.
A i, 981 a 15. Rhet. I 2.11, II 19. 27. But although these abstract
universal truths and rules are in themselves better known, Ka0 ai5ra,
an-Xeuy, rfj (puo-ei yi Oipifj.coTfpa, that is, convey a higher and more compre
hensive kind of knowledge, yet to us, r/tuv, irpos was, things of sense
and the concrete, the visible and palpable, are nearer or closer (eyyvy),
clearer and more interesting, and in this sense, better known ; the
knowledge of these comes to us first, as the simpler Trporepof, appeals to
our senses, and is consequently more in accordance with our lower
nature 1 . The distinction of absolute or objective, and relative or sub
jective, knowledge is very familiar to Aristotle. See Phys. Auscult. at the
1 cherts is used in more than one sense : thus it may be applied to the normal or
abstract notion of nature, its true and highest form, perfect nature ; or an imperfect
nature, as it shews itself in us and our imperfect faculties and condition.
224 PHTOPIKHS B 22 3.
\eyeiv ot {JLZV yap TO. KOLVO. Kai KaBoXov Xeyovcnv,
ol S e wv icraa i, Kai TO. eyyvs. wcr-r OVK e^ dirav-
TCOV TWV SoKOVVTWV d\\ 6K TWV WplOTfJieVCOV AeKT6OV, p. 94.
T >\ ~ / ,\ A , $./ t P. 1396.
OLOV i} TOis Kpivovcriv i] ows aTTOoe^ovraL. KCCI TOVTO
beginning [p. 184 a l6], irf<$>VKe 8e fK. TUIV yi/(opifJ.o>Tpa>v T;/LUZ/ 77 oSo? Kai
aafpfo-Tepaiv eVl ra (rafpfarepa Trj (pvcrei Kai yytopi/ncorepa ov yap ravra rjp.1v
re yvmptfj.a Kai drr\m$. Metaph. Z 4, 1029 b I, seq. Bonitz ad loc. Waitz
ad Organ. 71 a i, n 299, 71 ^24, p. 307. Trendelenburg ad de Anima
p. 337 seq., Elein. Log. Ar. 19, p. 82.
We therefore must not derive our arguments or inferences from all
possible opinions (" ex omnibus quae probantur, et vera esse videntur."
Victorius) ; but select them out of those which are defined or determined
or settled for us (marked off, and separated from the rest, as especially
suitable to our purpose) (in some way or other) as, for instance, either
by the judges (i. e. their known opinions : this in a law case) or those
whose authority they accept .
That is, there are many truths, such as scientific generalities, which
may indeed be included amongst opinions (because they are believed as
well as known} but yet are alien to the purposes of Rhetoric, and also
many opinions, properly so called, which are unfit for its use, OVK e
wv erv^tv, I 2.ii; and besides this, "every fool has some opinions",
i 2. 1 1 ; we must therefore make a selection if we wish to persuade
we had been already told that though the sphere of Rhetoric, like
that of Dialectics, is theoretically unlimited, I 2. i, yet that in practice
it is usually confined to the business of life and human action, and there
fore that its materials are in fact drawn from Politics, including Ethics,
from political and social philosophy, ib. 7.
Here however there is a still further restriction we must select out
of the vast range of probable opinions those which happen to suit our
immediate purpose : for instance, if we are arguing a case in a law-court
we must draw our inferences from such opinions as they (the judges)
themselves are known to hold, or at any rate such as those whom they
regard as authorities are known to approve. Kpiveiv and Kpirrjf, as we
have seen, II i. 2; 18. i, may be extended to the decision of audiences in
all three branches of Rhetoric, the assembly, the judges, and the Gearal or
dfupoi of an epideixis, and Victorius takes this view. As however Kpivovviv
is qualified by olov, which shews that there are other analogous cases, the
two audiences of indirect Kpivovrts may perhaps be left to be understood.
rcav SOKOVVTOIV] probable opinions , comp. II 1.6; 25.2, and <atVeri
in I 2. 11, and in the succeeding clause.
oca! TOVTO 8e] And this too should be clear the speaker should be
quite certain that it does so appear to that this is really the opinion
of all or most (of any audience) . If de be retained (so Bekker), compare
note on I 6. 22. MS A 8rj. Quaere 8el ? Victorius seems to understand
it so, as he uses the word debet ; perhaps supposing that the notion of
ought is carried on from the preceding AeKreoj/ : and this is confirmed
by the following a-vvdyfiv.
PHTOPIKH2 B 22 3, 4. 225
5 , on OVTM (f)aii/6Tai, SijXov elvat / irdcTLV rj TO?? P.
7r\ei(TTOis. Kai /mrj fjiovov (rvvdyeiv IK TOOV dvayKCticov,
d\\a Kai e/c nav ws eVt TO TTO\V.
4 TrpuJTOv (J.ZV ovv $ei \afielv on Trepi ov Set \eyeiv
i cru\\oyi^a-6ai eire iroXinKta cru\\oyio~inu) eld
And his inferences should be drawn not only from necessary propo
sitions, but also from those that are only true for the most part , proba
bilities. The TfKfjLijpiov, the certain sign, the necessary concomitant, is
the only necessary argument admitted in Rhetoric : its ordinary mate
rials are d<ora and o-^/xela, things by their very name and nature only
probable. On these materials of Rhetoric, see Introd. p. 160 seq. One
might suppose from the phraseology adopted here, p.rj p.6vov ft rS>v dvaynaiav,
d\\a Kai e /c TUV coy eVi TO ird\v, that the necessary propositions and con
clusions were the rule and the probable the exception; instead of the
reverse. The true statement is found in I 2. 14. Comp. Anal. Pr. I 27,
43 b 3236.
4. So first of all it must be understood that anything we have to
speak or reason about (on a-v\\oyieo-()ai et sim. for reasoning in general,
see note on I i. n), whether it be on a political subject or any other
whatever, it is necessary to (have in our possession) be acquainted with
everything that belongs to this also (Kai besides the <n)XXoy(o>ids itself,
or the particular point which the argument has in view), either all or
some (according to circumstances) ; for if you have nothing (no informa
tion, no facts) in your possession (as material) you will have nothing to
draw your inferences from . The same thing is stated, and nearly in the
same words, Anal. Pr. I 30, 46 a 3, 77 /*eV ovv oSos Kara navrav 77 av ri) KOI
TTfpi (pi\o(ro(f)iav Kai Trepi re^vrjv orroiavovv KOI fj.ddrj^.a (all learning and all
philosophy and science begin with observation,} 8d yap ra vitdpxovra
Kai ols VTrdpxfi irtpl fKarepov ddpe iv, Kai TOVTOIV cos jrXftOTMV tviropflv. And
again, a 22, &&gt;orf av Xrjfpdfj TO. inrdpxovra TTfpl fHacrrov, ^p-trepov rjftr) ras
aTro8fiei.s eroiuws iptfraviCflV. d yap /j.r]8fv Kara rr/v laropiav TrapaKrjCpdfiTj
Tcav d\T)du>s vjrapxovraiv rolt Trpdyfiacriv^ e^opfv Trfpl anavTos, ov p,f.v ecrnv
air68fiis, ravTTjv fvpflv Kai dnofttiKvvvai, ov 8e [if) Ttt(pvKfv tiTroSet^t?, TOVTO
noiflv (pavepov. The vTrap^oi/ru here spoken of are all that properly
belong to a thing, all its properties, qualities, attributes, all its antece
dents and consequences these are especially important in human
actions, the rhetorician s subject everything closely connected with it,
whether similar or different, as opposites, relative terms and so on : in
short, if you have to speak or reason upon any subject, if you wish to
succeed, you must first know all about it. This is illustrated at length
from the three branches of Rhetoric in the next five sections.
\a$siv I take to be here Xaftj> rw v$ or 777 StaiWa, to seize or grasp
with the mind, apprehend, conceive.
TroXiTiKcp] Politics, including Ethics, being almost exclusively the
source from which rhetorical enthymemes are to be drawn, though
theoretically the field of rhetorical practice is boundless : see note on p. 224.
Otherwise, TroXtrtKor (rv\\oyio-(j.6s may mean a rhetorical syllogism or
AR. II. 15
226 PHTOPIKHS B 22 4 6.
OTroiipovv, dvcvyKcuov Kai rd TOVTM e^eiv
i] Trdvra n evict- jULtfiev yap e-^wv e ovdevos av e
5 (rvvdyeiv. Xeyw S olov TTWS av duvai/meOa (TV/ULfiov-
Xeveiv AOrjvaiois el TroXe/uL^Teov r] fjit] TroXe/mriTeov, {Jin
e^oj/res T/S r\ Swapis avTaJv, Trorepov vavTiKtj 77 Tre-
(^/CT) rj djULCfxa, Kai avrrj Trocrrj, Kai Trpocro^oi rive s tj
(j)i\oi Kai e%6poij eTi $e Tivas TroXejULovs TreTToAcjtZff-
6 Kacri Kai TTW?, Kai Ta\\a ra TOiavTa t] eTraivelv, el
fjiri e^oi/uLev Tr]v ev ^aXa/uuvi vavjuta^iav jj Tt}v ev
enthymeme : political that is on political subjects , to which Rhetoric
is almost exclusively confined, is so far convertible with rhetorical .
This seems to be Victorius view; on n 22. 10.
5. As an instance of what I mean how could we possibly advise
the Athenians (the o-v/ijSotAevrtKoi ytVor) whether they should make war
or not, unless we know what is the nature of their power (or forces),
whether it is a naval or military force, or both, and its amount or mag
nitude, and what their revenues are, and their friends or enemies, and
besides all this what wars they have waged, and with what success (or
possibly, what are their modes of warfare) and everything else of the
same sort . Compare with this I 4. 7, to the end, on political topics.
6. Or deliver a panegyric (the firtSfiKriicov ytvos) if we had not the
sea-fight at Salamis, and the battle at Marathon, or all that was done on
behalf of the Heraclidae, or anything else of the like sort. For all (pane
gyrists) derive their encomiums from the fair deeds, renown, distinctions
(of their hero), real or supposed .
These are the stock subjects of the Athenian declaimers : ov xa\crrov
Adrjvaiovs ev A.6r]paiotg ivaivtiv, I 9. 30, ill 14. n. Plato s Menexenus
has all these topics, the Heraclidae, 239 B; Marathon, c. 10; Salamis,
c. n. Isocrates, Panegyricus, 5460; 64, 65 ; Marathon and Salamis,
85 seq. Comp. Philipp. 147. de Pace 37. Panath. 194, Eurystheus
and the Heraclidae; 195, Marathon. He can t even keep it out of the
TTtpi dvri8o(Ta>s (though that speech is of a purely personal nature) ;
where it appears again, 306. Lysias, tVira^toy, n 16, 2026,
27 43. And the same three topics recur in the same order, only more
briefly treated, in the eVtra^to? attributed to Demosthenes, 8 seq.
Pseudo-Dem, n-fpi avvrdgfus 22. Aesch. c. Ctesiph. 259. Demosth.
c. Aristocr. 198. These topics are not introduced in the Speech for
the Crown.
The tragic poets wrote dramas upon the same stories of unfailing
interest, as Aeschylus Persae, and Euripides Heraclidae ; and Aris
tophanes refers derisively to this habit of self-glorification, Acharn.
696 7, Vesp. 711, Equit. 781 785, and 1334. The Mapa0a>i/o/zaxat, the
warriors of Marathon, Ach. 181, Nub. 986, is not applied altogether in
jest.
[eV Mapa$c3z/t is an instance of departure from the stereotyped ad-
PHTOPIKH2 B 226S.
MctpaBaJvi /ULa^rjif t] TO. inrcp HpaK\et()uJv
t] a\\O TL TlOV TOLOVTUIV 6/C yap TWV VTTap-^OVTMV t]
7 ^OKOvvTttiv vTrap-^eiv KaXwv eiraivovcTL TraVres. o/zo/ws
e Kal -^seyovcTLV e /c TUJI> evavTitav, OTKOTTOVVT^ TL
VTTap^CL TOLOVTOV CCUTols t) $OKl VTTap^eil/, OLOV OTL
TOI) EAAf/i/as KaTefiovXcjoaavTO, Kal TOI)S 7rpo<s TOV
(Sapfiapov (TVjui/ULaxecraiuLevovs Kal dpKTTevoravTas iqv
$pa7ro$i(ravTO h.lyLvr]Ta^ Kal rioTi^amra?, Kal o(ra
a\\a TOiavra, Kat e l TL a\\o TOLOVTOV dfidpTrjfJict
VTrap-^eL avTols. a)s 8 ai/Vws Kal ol KaTivyopovvTes
Kal ol aTToXoyovjULevoL e /c TWV vTrap-^ovTiav (TKOTTOV-
8 JULCVOL KaTriyopovvL Kal a.7ro\oyovvTai. ovfiev 2>e $ia-
verbial form Mopn^cow, without the preposition. See Cobet, Variae Lcc-
tiones, p. 201, and Dr Thompson s ed. of the Gorgias, p. 152.]
7. And in like manner also topics of censure are derived from
the opposites of these, by considering what of the like (i. e. TO evavrlov,
the opposite) nature actually belongs, or seems to belong, to them (the
objects of the censure; things as well as men: see note in Cainbr.
Journal of Cl. and Sacred Phil., Vol. n., No. 5, p. 158), as for instance,
that they (the Athenians) reduced the Greeks to servitude and made
slaves of the Aeginetans and Potidaeans, men that had shared in the
fight and distinguished themselves against the barbarian (in the Persian
invasion), and everything else of the like kind ; and any other similar
offence that can be alleged against (///. belongs to) them . On the treatment
of the Aeginetans, see Thuc. II 27 ; and of the Potidaeans, Ib. c. 70.
Against the charges brought against the Athenians of abusing their
maritime supremacy, and oppressing their subject states, and other
iniquities, Isocrates, Paneg. 100 scq., defends them as well as he
can : /zera Se Tavra Tjdr) rives rj/xcoi KdTTjyopovcriv, cas eVeiSi) Ttjv np^v
rijs 6aXa.TTTjs 7ropeXa/3o^ej/ TroAAcSi/ KCIKU>V a irioi rots "EXX^(rt KaTtcrTTjfjLev,
Kai TOV Tf M^At coi di>8paTToKriJLov KCU TOV Siu&rauM Z\f6pov ei> TOVTOIS Tols
Aoyot? i?^Ti Trpotptpovaiv K. r. A.
And in like manner also, plaintiff and defendant (in a court of
justice) derive their (arguments in) accusation and defence from the
circumstances of the case, which they have to consider (take into
account) , ra inrdpxovTa are here the acts and facts alleged, the characters
of the two parties, and such like.
Schmidt, On the date of Aristottis Rhet? p. 17, remarks on the three
last sections, that the examples therein given would have been used by
none but a resident at Athens, and go far to shew that the Rhetoric was
written in that city.
8. But in doing this (in acquiring the requisite information on
the facts of the case, and the character and history of the person) it
IS2
228 PHTOPIKH2 B 22 8io.
(pepet Trepi ABtivaicov tj AaKe^ai/uLOvicov rj dvQptaTrov */
Beov TavTO TOVTO Spdv Kai <ydp (ruiu(3ov\evovTa TCO
e? Kal eTraivovvTct Kai -^eyovTct Kai
Kai dTroXo yovfJLevov VTrep avTOu TO,
i] ^OKOVVTO. V7rdp%ew XriTrreov, iv e /c TOVTWV Xeyto/mev
67raivovvT6<s t} -^seyovTes ei TL KaXov i] aia"%pov vTrdp-
%ei 9 KaTnyopovvTes S t] aTroXoyovfJievoL ei TL ^LKUIOV
rj a^LKOV, (TVfjLfiovXevovTes 5 ei TL crvfj.(pepov i] ,8\a-
9 fiepov. 6/uioia)^ Se TOVTOIS Kai Trepi irpayfjiaTOS OTOV-
ovv, olov Trepi SiKaicxrvvtis, el dyadov tj /mt} dyaBov, eV p- 95-
10 rtoi/ VTrapxovTWV TY] ^iKaiofrvvn Kai TW dyadip. OJOTT
makes no difference whether our subject be Athenians or Lacedae
monians, man or god; for whether we advise Achilles (for any indi
vidual), or praise or censure, or accuse or defend him, we must alike
make ourselves acquainted with all that belongs, or is thought to belong
to him, in order that from this we may have to state whatever belongs
to him and to his interests, whether fair or foul (noble or base, right or
wrong), in praise and censure; just or unjust, in accusation and defence ;
and in advising (advice or counsel includes dirorpeireiv as well as irpo-
TpfTTdv) expedient or injurious .
9. And in like manner any subject whatsoever is to be dealt
with ; as for example, the question of justice, whether it be good or
bad, (must be discussed from topics) derived from the belongings of
justice and good . Victorius reminds us of Thrasymachus thesis in the
first book of Plato s Republic and he might have added that of Callicles
in the Gorgias that injustice is in reality, and by nature, superior to
justice, which is the good of others, but injurious to the just man himself.
10. And therefore since everyone manifestly demonstrates (i.e.
argues, infers) in this way (i. e. from and by the knowledge of everything
that belongs to his subject) whether his reasoning takes the exact or
rigorous form of the syllogism (as in scientific demonstration, and
probably also in dialectical argument), or employs the laxer mode (of
the rhetorical enthymeme) (yap in the parenthesis that follows, assigns
the reason for the selection , the Trept (KCIOTOV fx fiv f&ikryp-fva ; and
as it comes before that for which it assigns the reason, must be translated
since ) since they don t take (their propositions, premisses, materials)
from everything^ (OVK e airavTw TO>V tfonovvratv K.T.\. supra 3 see note
ad loc. OVK wi> ervxev, I 2.n : although it is true that Rhetoric admits
of this, it may argue anything), but from what belongs to each particular
subject (that comes under their notice), and by means of the speech
(at any rate, to say nothing about the demonstrative and dialectical
syllogisms) it is plainly impossible to prove anything otherwise 1 : it
1 This I take to be the meaning of 5ia TOV \6yov. The other interpretation,
it is plain by reason , or reason shews that , is supported by Muretus and Vater.
PHTOPIKH2 B 22 10. 229
j Kai TraVres OVTW (paivovTcti a.7ro%eiKvvvTe$, idv
TE dKpi(3e(TTepov edv re /uLaXaKWTepov (
is clearly necessary, as in the Topics (or Dialectics, in general), first to
have ready on each particular subject a selection already prepared of the
probabilities and of those circumstances of the case which are most suit
able, appropriate (opportune, timely, seasonable, germane to the matter in
hand); (these are to be kept in stock, and ready prepared for use on occasion:
from which are distinguished TO. e vnoyviov) , and also about circum
stances (evidence, or what not) that arise on the sudden, to pursue
your inquiries in the same way (make yourself acquainted with them
as far as possible in such an emergency) ; turning your attention not to
things indefinite (such as universals, intellectual and moral) but to
what actually belongs to the subject of your speech, and including
(drawing a line round, enclosing with a line) as many, and as close
(nearly connected) to the subject, as possible: for the more of these
circumstances there are in your possession, so much the easier is it
to prove your point ; and the closer the connexion, so much the more
appropriate are they, and less general .
Of the selection of Trporao-etj for syllogisms, Anal. Pr. I 27, 43 b 6,
it is said, Staiptreoj/ 8e /cat TCOJ/ iiropevcav (antecedents, consequents, and
concomitants) oo-a re Iv rw T L eWt, KOI 6Va cos tSta (propria : properties
which, though not of the essence of the subject, are yet inseparably
attached to it, and peculiar to, characteristic of it), at oo-a coy crti/i|3/3>7/cora
Karqyopelrat, /cat TOVTOW irola doacrrtKcos /cat Trota (car dXijdeiav oVco p,ev
yap av 7f\fi6va>v TOIOVTOIV fVTropfj TIS &O.TTOV eVret!<rai cru/iTrepacr/iart, ocrcp
8 av a\rjd(crTfp(i)v paXXov a;roSei |et. Mutatis mutandis, and omitting the
Trota /car dXijdfiav the truths of science , this agrees with what we find in
the Rhetoric.
a/cpt/Se orepoi ] the more exact mode of reasoning by formal syllogism,
demonstrative or dialectical : the latter probably included, because, as
far as the form is concerned, the dialectical syllogism follows precisely
the same rules as the other, and the construction of the two is identical.
paXaKVTfpov] softer, more yielding, less stiff and rigid and unbending, is
naturally transferred to a more relaxed or less rigorous mode of rea
soning, in force and substance, i.e. to the rhetorical enthymeme. Though
the word is very often used metaphorically, I can find no other instance of
this particular application of the metaphor. [For the metaphor, compare
Metaph. E I, 1025 b I3> dwodeuatwiMru fj avayKaiortpov TI /iaXa/ccorepoi , ib. K 7
1064 a 6, dfiKvvvai ra XOITTO /iaAaKcorfpoi/ TJ aKpififorfpov, de generatione et
corruptione, B 6, 333 ^ 2 5> *^ ei * v *1 opla-acrdat fj vTrodeo dai fj d.iroSf i^ai, fj
Victorius renders it, " as by general use, so also, it a etiani ratione quadani con*
firmatur" meaning by ratio the process of reasoning. As to the first, it seems to
me that Std TOV \6yov would be a very affected and unnatural way of expressing
either by reason , or by reasoning : it would rather be T< \6y y if that were the
meaning. Also did with the genit, which denotes the channel, medium, course,
or means, of anything, is much more appropriately joined with dfiKvvvai, with
which my version connects it, than with 5rj\oi>, which, to say the least, would be
very unusual Greek.
230 PHTOPIKHS B 22 10, 1 1.
(ou yap e diravrtav \ct}jifiavovG iv d\\* e /c TO,V Trepi r. 1396^.
eK.aa TOV vTrap-^ovTuiv] , Kai Sid TOV \6yov SijXov OTL
O&VVO.TOV a\\tt)<s ^eiKvvvai, (pavepov OTL
cu(nrep ev TO?S TOTn/ccus, Trpwrov Trept eK.
e^eiXeryfJiiva Trepi TUIV eV^e^o/^eywy KCCI TUIV
1 1 TaVwi/, Trepi Se TU>V e^ vTroyviov ytyvdfJLeviav
TOV avTOV TpOTTOV, dTro0\eTrovTa jar] eis dopUTTCt d\\
17 paXaKcos, rj a/iooy ye Trcof, ib. N 3> I (XJO (5 8, juq Xt ai/ 7} fj,a\aKos (6 Xoyoy),
de Caelo, A 6, 313 b 4, fixrras \vei /^aAnKco?. Index Aristoteliciis (Bonitz).]
wo-Trep eV TOIS roTrtKoTs] Brandis, in the tract so often referred to [Philol.
IV i] p. 1 8, notices on this "that it marks the connexion between Rhetoric
and the Topics, i. e. dialectics", being a reference to n 23. It seems not
to refer to any particular passage of the Topics, but merely to state in
general terms that the mode of treating the Topics is the same in Rhe
toric as in the Topics , i. e. the entire work, or the practice of dialectics
in general. Similarly Schmidt, in the tract On the date of the Rhet
p. 2, "verisimile est etiam in tribus aliis locis (videlicet, II 22. 10, II 23.9,
II 26. 4)eum non suos de arte topica libros (we need not go so far as this)
sed hanc artem ipsam intellexisse." Is it possible that this may be one of
the, I might almost say, ordinary lapses of the Aristotelian memory in
quotation, and that he has referred to the Topics instead of the Prior
Analytics? In the latter, I 30, quoted above on 4, there is a passage
which contains a statement very closely resembling what has been said
here about the selection of topics, 46 a 10, OTTWJ /nr) j3XcirfMf> els airavra
TO \eyop.fva...d\\ (Is eXarrw KOI tapUTfttva, naff tKCUTTOV 8e fK\tytiv ra>v
OITCOV, olov Trepi ayadov fj iirumjfujg. Whether this be so or not, the pas
sage at all events deserves to be compared with this section of the
Rhetoric. Top. A 14 is upon the selection of TTporaaeis, chiefly in the
shape of 8oai for dialectical purposes ; but cannot, I think, be directly
referred to here.
fei\fy[j.eva, eK.\oyrjs, 12.] "The collection of premisses, whether
scientific theses, or dialectical organa, or rhetorical specific data, is ex
pressed by the word (K\eyeLv or fK\ap&dveiv," Poste, Poster. Anal. p.
121, note i, comp. p. 25, and note i. The terms occur constantly in the
Anal. Prior. [Comp. supra I 2, 1358 a 23, fteXnov ovv f<\eyea-6ai ras irpo-
Tao-ets.] The use of them is not confined to Aristotle, and seems to be
technical. Rhet. ad Alex. c. 10 (11), 2, fKXrjnreov.
(TrtKaipoTciTuv] So Top. F 6, 109 a 36, p,aXiora erriKaipoi Ka\ KOIVOI Tav
TOTTCOV. Ib. H 4 init.
1 1. (g viroyviov] See note on I i. 7, p, 1 1. The phrase is applied here
to circumstances that arise out of the occasion, which you must seize on as
well as you can ; extemporaneous, sudden, unpremeditated, and there
fore unprepared ; temporary accidents of the subject in hand, quae
repente evcniunt (Victorius). These we must collect as well as -use can, on
the spur of the moment ; but the same rules are to be observed as in
the other cases. Poste, u. s., p. 24, singular circumstances."
PHTOPIKH2 B 22 n, 12. 231
k TO. vrrdp-^ovTa Trepi u>v 6 Ao /o?, KCII TrepiypcKpov-
OTL TrXelcTTa K.al eyyi/rara TOV TrpayiuLaTOS ocrw
yap av TrXeico e^rjTat TU>V VTrap-fcovTcw, TOCTOVTCO
paov ^eiKvvvai, ocrw eyyvTepov, TOCTOVTW oiKeiOTepa
12 Kal I]TTOV KOLvd. Xeyco e Koiva jULev TO eTraivelv TOV
A^iXXea OTL ai/dpwTros Kal OTL TWV Ji/ULiBecov Kal OTL
67Ti TO \Xiov eo TpaTevo aTO TavTa yap Kal aXXois
TroXXols, OKTT oi/ei/ /maXXov 6 TOLOVTOS
a?] irfptypd(p(iv and irfpiypcxprj are usually applied to the
outline of a drawing, so TTfpiyeypcxpdv rdyadov of a rough sketch or out
line of good (opposed to dvaypd\l/ai, to fill up, ///. draw over, this outline)
Eth. N. I 7, init. and irfpiypafyrj Ib. 1098 a 23 : but this is not applicable
here. Praefinientem seponentemqtie says Victorius. The meaning required
seems to be that of enclosing , for the purpose of keeping things sepa
rate from others, so that you may be able to lay your hand upon them
at once when you want them, and not have to sort them at the time : for
this purpose you draw a line of demarcation round them, which keeps
them from getting mixed up with other things that resemble them, or at
all events that you don t want just then. [Metaph. K 7, 1064 a 2, e^atm?
yap TovTO>i> TTfpiypa\lrap.evr] n yevos avrfj Trepi TOVTO Trpay/zareutrat.]
TJTTOV Koivd] less general , and therefore more special, idia. KOIVU is
illustrated in the next section ; from which it appears that it means here
the wider and higher generalisations which are attributes of very large
classes, and have therefore nothing special, distinctive, and characteristic,
about them. Neither of them is used in a technical sense, as genus and
species. iSia are peculiarities and peculiarities of individuals.
In contrast with what is here said of the selection of rhetorical topics
compare Anal. Pr. I 27, 43 b i seq., on the selection of topics for demon
strative syllogisms : in these the major premisses and conclusions must
be universal and necessary, and the rules laid down are in conformity
with that. Near the end of the chapter, Xqirreov 8e K.T.\. 43 b 32, seq. a
supplementary note is added, on probable (ra <os eVi TO iroXii) questions
and their syllogisms, referring to dialectical and rhetorical proofs.
12. By "common" or "general" I mean, saying (for instance) in
praise of Achilles, that he is a man, or one of the demigods, or that he
joined the expedition against Troy ; for these things belong (these dis
tinctions are shared by, are common) to many others besides, so that one
who does this (such an one) praises Achilles no more than Diomede.
By " special" or " peculiar", what belongs (properly as a separable accident,
but not technical here) to no one else but Achilles, as for instance to
have slain the famous (TOV) Hector, the best and bravest of the Trojans,
and the renowned Cycnus, who, being invulnerable, prevented the landing
of the whole (Greek) army ; and that he was the youngest of those that
made the expedition, and joined it without taking the oath (unsworn,
i. e. voluntarily, whereas the rest were compelled to serve by their engage
ment to Tyndareus), and anything else of the same kind .
232 PHTOPIKH2 B 22 12, 13.
A^iAXea eTraivei i] Aio/a^nv i$ict $e a fJLrjSevi a
(rviu{3e/3riKev i] TW A^f/VAeT, oiov TO diroKTelvai TOV
EKTOpa TOV apt-OTTOV TWV TjOfcW KCLl TOV KvKVOV, OS
eK(jo\v(rev aTravTCis ctTTofiaiveiv aTjOw-ros wv, /ecu OTL
vecoTaTOs KCCI OVK eVojO/cos ft> i/ e crT|OaTei <rey, tcai ocra
a\\a TOiavTa
els fJ.ev ovv TJOOTTOS TTJS eK\oyris /ecu TrpwTOs DITTOS
6 TOTTi/co s, TO. Be crTOi^ela Ttav ivdvjjLYifjiaTijov Xeyco/uiev.
Be Xeyta KO.L TOTTOV evdv/m^/uLaTO<s TO CLVTO.
eiTrco/uLev Trepl iav dvcfyKcuov eiTrelv
KVKVOV] Cycnus does not appear in Homer. The earliest mention
of him seems to be that of Pindar, Ol. II 82 (146), who uses him for the
same purpose as Aristotle, viz. for the glorification of Achilles. (Ar. s
notice may possibly be a reminiscence of Pindar.) AxtXXea...o$ "E/crop"
cr(aAe, Tpway a^n^ov dorpa/S/; Kiova, ~K.vK.vov re 6a.va.TO) iropev, Aovs re TratS
Aldioira (Memnon.) The story of Achilles encounter with Cycnus at
the landing of the troops, the long conflict with his invulnerable antago
nist, and how Achilles finally destroyed him, are all related at length
by Ovid, Met. Xii 64 145. He was the son of Neptune, Ovid u. s. 72,
proles Neptuniaj is again classed with Hector, line 75 ; and in lines 135
144 is described as finally crushed and strangled with the thong or fasten
ing of his own helmet.
arpwror] not unwounded, but invulnerable (invulnerable by ordinary
weapons ; not absolutely, since he was killed). Find. Nem. x 1 1, drpwrw
Kpaftia, Isthm. Ill 30 arpcoroi TraTSey Qtatv. Plat. Symp. 219 E.
OVK evopKos] The oath sworn by Helen s suitors to her father Tynda-
reus at Sparta, that they would defend him whom she chose for her
husband against any aggression. This was Menelaus. Victorius quotes,
Pausan. Lac. c. 24> "O/x^pos S eypa^e pev TTJS Troii/cretoy dp^op-fvos <as
? \api6fji(vos rots Arpeco? Tratcrt, KOI OVK fvf\6^itvos TOLS SpKois rms
, TrapayevoiTo els Tpoiav. The passage referred to seems to be
II. A 158. Ulysses says the same of his son Neoptolemus, Soph. Phil.
72, (TV nev TTfVXet/Kaj OUT ei-op/coy ovdevi K.r.X.: and Philoctetes of himself,
Ib. 1026. The story of the oath is told in Eurip. Iph. Aul. 49 65 ;
and frequently alluded to elsewhere in the Tragic writers. Comp. Soph.
Aj. IHI, Teucer of Ajax, ev yap TI rijs o-rjs ovK eVrparevo-aTO, ...... dXX
oirf^ opKtov olaiv rjv eVaj/noro?.
13. One method of the selection then, and the first (most im
portant), is this, namely the topical (dialectical, following the dialectical
method, that by topics} ; and now let us pass on to the elements of enthy-
memes ; by elements and topics of enthymemes I mean the same thing .
This is repeated, c. 26. I. On <rroixfiov= TOTTOS, and why so called, see
Introd. pp. 127, 128. Add to the examples there given, Rhet. ad Alex. 36
(37)- 9 oroixf io. Koiva Kara navruv, which seems to mean
PHTOPIKHS B 22 1416. 233
14 t(TTi jap TWV ev6vjULr]jULdT(ji)v e l^tj SJo* TO. fjiev yap Sei-
KTlKa eCTTlV OTL ECTTLV Y\ OVK eCTTLV, TO. 5 eX^KTlKCX., KUl
$ia(pepi wcnrep iv TO?? SiaXeKTiKol s eAey^os Kai a~v\-
J 5 Aoytoyxo s. ecm Se TO fj.lv SeiKTLKOv evBv/uLrj/uLa TO e
oVoAo yoi yUeVwi/ arvvd f yeiv 9 TO e eXeyKTiKov TO TO. dvo-
16 /moXoyou/aeva arvvd<yeiv. o-^e^ov fjiev ovv rifMV Trepi
But (before we proceed to do so) let us first state the necessary
preliminaries .
14. Of enthymemes namely there are two kinds : for some un
dertake to shew that something is, or is not, so and so direct proof;
the establishment of a proposition, affirmative or negative others are
refutative ; and these differ just like refutation and syllogism in dia
lectics . On this and the next section see Introd. pp. 262, 3, and the notes.
15. The demonstrative enthymeme (which proves directly) is,
to draw an inference (to gather, colligerej corresponding to the con
clusion, o-u/iTr/pacr/ia, of the regular syllogism) from universally admitted
premisses (those general probabilities which everyone is ready to
admit) ; the refutative is to draw inferences or conclusions not agreeing
(with the opinions or inferences of the adversary) . The eXe-y^o? is
avTi<fra<Tfu>s (ruXXoy(o-/Ltof, the negative of, or conclusion contradictory to,
the conclusion of the opponent : refutation always assumes an opponent,
real or imaginary, whose arguments, or opinions, or theories are to be
refuted by proving the negative.
This interpretation is in conformity with the received signification
of dvofjLo\oyovnfvos disagreeing with, contradictory . This negative sense
is rare : Plat. Gorg. 495 A, Ar. Anal. Pr. I 34, 48 a 21 [TOVTO 8e aj/o^oXo-you-
ptvov TO IS rrpoeipr]fjLtvois], Rhet. II 23. 23, fit s, are the only instances cited ;
comp. Buttm. Auctar. ad Heind. Gorg. 108, p. 490. So Victorius, "quae
adversentur iis quae ab adversario ostensa prius et conclusa fuerint;"
and Augustinus Niphus (quoted by Schrader) "quod ex datis concessisve
adversario repugnantia atque improbabilia colligit. Repugnantia autem
et improbabilia dico quae sunt contra adversariorum opinionem."
1 6. Now of the general heads or classes of the specific topics
that are useful or necessary we may be said to be pretty nearly in
possession; for the premisses on each particular subject have been
selected, so that the special topics from which enthymemes on the
subjects of good or bad, fair or foul (right or wrong), just or unjust,
must be derived (these are the f idrj, analysed under the heads of the
three branches of Rhetoric in the first book, from c. 4. 7, to 14), and in
like manner the topics of the characters, and feelings, and states of
mind, have been previously taken and are before us (vTrdpxowiv are
ready for us, for our use).
The construction of the preceding clause wore ol TOTTOI I under
stand to be this, though Vahlen [Transactions of the Vienna Acad.
of Sciences, Oct. 1861, p. 131] declares coo-re and TOTTCOV to be indefensible.
TOTTG>I> is attracted, as usual, to the construction of the relative, for
ot TOTTOI ( uv Set (frfpeiv ra fvOvn^ara : and o TOTTOI is repeated at the
234 PHTOPIKH2 B 22 16.
eKacrrtav TWV eiSwv TOJV xpnarifjiwv Kal dva<yKaitt)v
end of the clause unnecessarily perhaps, but not ungrammatically
in the second part of it introduced by /cat. As to the coo-re, readers of
Aristotle must have remarked that his ware s are not always to be very
strictly interpreted ; sometimes they almost lose the force of a logical
consequence, and indicate little more than a sequence. I presume that
Vahlen s meaning (which is not explained) is, that wo-re K.T.\. is a
mere repetition, and no consequence at all. But the two things spoken
of are not precisely identical, and there is a certain connexion of cause
and effect between them : it is first said in general terms that the
premisses upon each subject of Rhetoric have been already selected :
and from this it may in a sense be said to follow that we are supplied
in detail, with topics for our enthymemes, with ei S?; or special topics
under the three branches of Rhetoric, and also for the Tjdrj, nddr) and
eeis in Bk. II.
Vahlen, u. s. pp. 130, I, for the reasons before mentioned (some account
of his views on this subject has been given in the introductory obser
vations on c. 1 8), condemns the whole of section 16, as the interpolation
of an editor, who has inserted (we are not told "why) a sentence without
motive, and disturbing the connexion, in which of course, following
the altered arrangement (which is assumed) he has placed the ijdrj and
Trddr) immediately after the eldrj (as they now stand).
Besides this he objects to iradrj^aTcav and eeo>i/, with which we have
next to deal. irddrjua in this sense for nddos, is certainly very rare,
perhaps unique. But, per contra, there are at least four passages where
irddr)ij.a is found in other senses, to express which irddos is always
elsewhere employed. Metaph. A 2, 982 b 16, r$>v rfjs o-eAi^r Tra^/iarcoy,
and c. 4, 985 b 12, r5>v iradTjpdraiv (rfjs vTroKfipfvrjs ouo-i aj) : Anal. Post.
I 10, 76 b 13, rc5i> naff cura 7ra6^dru>v, and Anal. Pr. II 27, 70 b 9
ocra (pvo-iitd eVri TTaQ^ara : which certainly seem to be sufficient to
justify 7rn$J7pmoi/ here 1 .
1 [Bonitz (Aristotelische Studun V 50, and Index Aristotelicus) holds that in
Aristotle there is no clear distinction of meaning between irddr)/j.a and Trades, "sed
eadem fere vi et sensus varietate utrumque nomen, saepius alterum, alterum rarius
usurpari." In the Aristotelian writings, Trdd-q/j.0. is never found in the sing, except in
the spurious Physiognomonica 806 a 2 ; the gen. pi. TraOrj^druv occurs 38 times, iraOuv
only 8. (Note Eth. Eudem. B, 2, 1220^ 6, Xe/cre oj drj Kara ri -Hjj ^vxijs trol
drra rjOrj. eVrcu 5 Kara re ras SiW/teis rwj/ ira9 / r]|idTWV, Ka0 ay <vs TradrjriKol
Myovrai, Kal Kara rcis e<s, KaO dj TT/JOS rd irdOi] ravra \tyovrai ry vd.yx.fiv
TTUS rj aTraOeiS elvai. [itra. ravra rj Siaipeais ei> ro?s dwij\\ayfj.^voLS (?) Ti2v
ira6T](Ji.a,Tv Kal r&v Swapeuv Kal ruv ^euv. X^a> 5^ irdOi] fj.fi> rd roiavra,
6v/j.ov 06/3oi> aldu f-iriOvfj.lav.) Bernays, while admitting that the words are often
used loosely, draws the following distinction : TTO ^OS ist der Znstand eines -rrdffxuv
und bezeichnet den nnenvartet ausbrechenden und voriibergehendenden Affect ; vddrj^.a
dagegcn ist der Ziistand eines vaffyriKos und bezeichnet den Affect also inhiirirend
der afficirten Person und als jederzeit zum Ausbruche reif. Kilrzer gesagt, irdOos
ist der Affect rind Trd0rifj.a ist die Affection (Aristoteles liber Wirkung der Tragodie,
Abhhandl. der hist. phil. Gesellschaft in Breslau, I. pp. 149, 194 6). The
distinction is insisted on in a treatise by II. Baumgart, Pathos und Pathcina
itn Arislotelischcn Sprachgcbraiich, Konigsberg, 1873, pp. 58.]
PHTOPIKH2 B 22 1 6, 17. 235
ot ToVor e^etXej/uLei/at <ydp al Trporda-eis
e/cotcrroV eicriv, <TT e wy Be? (pepeiv TO. eV- P- 96.
TOTTWV Trepi dyaOov i] KUKOV, r] KU\OV r)
alar^pov t) SiKaiov i] ddiKOV, Kcti Trepi TCOV i]6(Jov Kai
7ra6^fjLa.T(av KCCI e^ecov t0<ravTtas etXrffJLfJLevot r\^iv VTrdp-
17 %ovcri TrpoTepov ol TOTTOI. tTi c> aXXov TpOTrov Ka6-?. 1397-
As to eewi>, this, through a deviation from the author s usual phrase
ology, who generally confines himself to r^Qr] and irddr), appears again
in this connexion, II 12 init., ra 6 rfdij TTO LOI rives Kara ra iraQr) KOI ras
efis K.T.X. The author there himself tells us his meaning, interpreting
Zgfis by dptras KCU Ka<ias; and I can see no reason for condemning the
word, as Vahlen does, except the very insufficient one, that it is un
usual 1 . The egeis in this sense, do actually enter into, and in fact
constitute the 77^0?, and I do not see why they should not be specially
mentioned, if Aristotle chose to depart from his ordinary practice, and
do so.
So far then we have been occupied with the e {r), special subjects
derived from special sciences, and specially employed each in one of
the three departments of Rhetoric this is generally, not absolutely true ;
for though the three ends of Rhetoric, the good or useful, the just, and
the noble or right, are more appropriate and more serviceable, each
in one of the three branches, yet any of them can be, and sometimes
is, introduced in them all and we must now turn to the topics, the
families, classes, of arguments into which enthymemes in general may
be made to fall. This is for convenience of practice, that we may
know where to look for them when we want them, and apply that
which happens to be appropriate to the particular case. This clas
sification is made in the 23rd chapter, which therefore is the rhetorical
representative of the far more extensive and minute classification of
dialectical topics, and is the object also of Cicero s Topica. And as
the treatise on fallacies, the book Trepi cro(/uoTiKc3i/ eXey^atv, is appended
to the books of the Topics, so we have a similar chapter on rhetorical
fallacies (c. 24) added to the analysis of the genuine arguments.
I will here remark (against Vahlen) that the word Ka66\ov 17, which
contrasts these universal TOTTOI with the special topics that have pre
ceded, renders the actual mention of them in the foregoing section
almost, if not quite, necessary.
17. Let us now proceed further in another way to take (or find)
1 I have noticed in many recent German commentators on Aristotle, Brandis
being an honourable exception, a disposition to pin down their author to a fixed
and particular mode of expression in certain cases from which he is never to be
allowed to deviate. Aristotle is the very last writer to whom any such rule should
be applied. He is always hasty, often careless ; and, as we have seen in so many
instances in this work, is very apt to use words in senses either vague and indeter
minate, or (properly) inapplicable, or unusual ; and his style is loose and careless to
a fault, both in construction and expression. He is a writer who more than all
others requires a most liberal allowance for irregularities.
236 PHTOPIKHS B 22i;;23i.
6\ou Trepi otTravTiav \d/3(i)/uLev, KCII \eyco fj.ev Trapa-
TOVS eXeyKTiKOvs KCII TOVS aTToSeiKTiKovs
TOI)S TWV (f)aivop.evwv evdu/uriiuLd Ttov, OVK OVTWV 3e
TU>V 3e TOVTWV, Trepi TWV Xvcrecov Kat eVfrraVewj/
TroOev $e? Trpos ra evdvfj.rijJLara (frepeiv.
yf ^>T\ f ^* ^ ** y
CCTTi iS JieV T07TOS TWI/ CClKTlKtOV EK
universal topics about every thing (taken promiscuously, that is, from
any of the f idrj, and applied indifferently to any of the three branches of
Rhetoric), and add a supplementary note upon the refutative and demon
strative (subaudi TOTTOVS eVtfv/iT^aTwi/) topics of enthymemes (the contents
of c. 23), and those of apparent (shams, impostors, not genuine), not real,
enthymemes ; not real, because this is likewise the case with syllogisms
(of which enthymemes though mutilated are a copy, and therefore share
with the others the fallacious kind) .
The literal translation of OVK oi>ra>v fie fV^u^/iarcoj/, eirci Trep ov8e truXXo-
yiaiJitov is, "enthymemes not real, because there are also unreal (not-real
syllogisms"; ov Se, neither, being broken up into two parts, of which the
fie contrasts a-vXXoyicr^uiv with fvdv/j.r)p.dT<ov, and the ov negatives the
genuineness (und. from the preceding) of the syllogism, not the syllogism
itself.
Trapao-^ati/o/xez/ot] is a very oddly chosen word to express the treat
ment of chapters 23 and 24, which are just as much connected with the
subject of the work, and treated with as much care and detail, as the rest.
It means according to Victorius (and Rost and Palm s Lex.} adscribere,
adnotare, applied to something of subordinate interest and importance, or
not immediately and closely connected with the subject in hand, as a
note on the margin of a manuscript; noting beside the main subject, a
supplementary note. This is certainly the meaning of it in Top. A 14,
105 b 16, where it is applied to the noting down of the opinions of indi
vidual philosophers, beside , as supplementary to, those which are gene
rally accepted : and also, as Victorius thinks, of Trapaa-rj^a in de Soph.
El. 2O, 177 b 6 this is not quite so certain: [ei> rot? yfypa^evois irapacrr]^a
Troiovvrai (signa ponunt ad vocabula distinguenda), Index Aristotelicns~\.
Alexander Aphrodisiensis in his commentary on the former passage adds
TTapaypafaiv, apparently as a synonym, or interpretation of the other.
And after this has been made clear, let us pass on to the determina
tion of solutions and objections, whence they must be brought, from
what sources derived, for the refutation of enthymemes . Of \v<ns and
its two modes, eXey^oj and eVorao-iy, the contents of c. 25, see Introd.
268 seq.
CHAP. XXIII.
In an excellent Review of the study of ancient Rhetoric [by Spengel],
read at the celebration of the eighty-third anniversary of the foundation
PHTOPIKHS B 23 i. 237
of the Munich Academy of Sciences, 1842, a clear account is given of
the relation of these TOTTOI fvOvfirmdrav that follow to the ("i8rj of the first
book, of which I will give a translation with very slight alterations.
To the first of these he gives the name of formal , to the second of
material proofs. " Formal proofs, such as they appear in Dialectics
and Rhetoric, are of an universal nature, and therefore applicable alike to
all branches of science ; they form the collective Topics, which Aristotle
has elaborated for Dialectics with wonderful completeness in the most
comprehensive of all the works of his Organon ; whilst in Rhetoric, not
without reference to the other, he has selected and put forward only what
is most essential. Material proofs are with him such as are derived
from the principles of the special sciences, the knowledge of which the
orator must bring with him, ready for any occasion on which it may be
properly applied. Aristotle is by no means of opinion that a mere
superficial description, without thorough knowledge of the object to be
described, and alien to the true spirit of it, can be called rhetorical
with propriety ; on the contrary, the orator must be thoroughly imbued
with the knowledge of his subject, whatever department of knowledge it
may happen to belong to, and from this special science bring with him
his concrete proofs, for the purpose of convincing. Accordingly, for
forensic pleading the accurate study of law is indispensable, for the deli
berative speaking or counselling that of Politics, the science of govern
ment, and similarly for each kind the special knowledge which belongs
to it. But this special knowledge cannot be obtained from Rhetoric
itself, otherwise it would carry in itself all knowledge, which is not the
case : the office of Rhetoric is, to work up the proofs which the special
science offers, to combine them with the formal , and so to bring the
subject within the reach of universal comprehension."
On the contents of this chapter, and its connexion with the Topics,
Brandis, ap. Schneidewin s Philologus [iv i.] p. 18, has the following
remarks. " Wenow turn (c. 23) to the universal points of view (topics)
most worthy of attention for the formation or refutation of enthymemes,
which are briefly discussed. Before passing to this, Aristotle has already
pointed out the connexion which exists between this division of the
Rhetoric and the Topics (c. 22 10). It is perfectly conceivable however
that here also (as before, referring to Rhet. I 7,) what in the Topics has
met with a detailed discussion in regard of the various modes of applying
them, is here only briefly referred to, and with an exclusive view to the
application to be made of them in speaking." He then illustrates this at
some length from the two works ; but it will be more convenient to leave
these details till we come to them in the course of the notes on the
topics themselves. [On the Topics, see in general Crete s Aristotle, ch. IX.]
Cicero, Topica, first gives a summary classification of the various
forms of these arguments under their most general heads, in 11. These
are, coniugata, ex genere, ex forma, ex similitudine, ex differentia, ex con-
trario, ex adiunctis, ex antecedentibus, ex consequentibus, ex repugnantibus,
ex caussis, ex cffectis, ex comparatione tnaionnn ant parium aut mino-
;-;, (the last, comp. maiorum et minorum, are the topics of Rhet. I 7,)
which are afterwards described in greater detail and illustrated, cc. ix
38, XVlll 71, Haec ego argumenta, quae transferri in multas causas
238 PHTOPIKHS B 23 i.
r ^ ~ \ ^ ~ ? I \ i t
TLd)V cei yap arKOTreiv et TW zvavrita TO evavriov
possunt, locos communes nominamus, de Inv. II 15. 48. Quintilian
treats them, Inst. Orat. v 10, 20 94, and sums them up thus, 94; Ergo
ut breviter contraham summam, ducuntur argumenta a personis, causis,
locis, tempore (cuiits tres paries diximus^ praecedens, coniunctum, in-
sequens), facultatibus (quibus instrumentum subiecimus}, modo (id est ut
quidque sit factum\ finitione, genere, specie, differentibus, propriis, remo-
tione, divisione, initio, increments, summa, similibus, dissimilibus, pug-
nantibus, consequentibus, efficientibus, effectis, eventis, iugatis, compara-
tione, quae in plures didncitur species. lugata are Cicero s coniugata,
Aristotle s o-uVrot^a and o/ioicu Trrdxreis.
These arguments can all(f) be turned both ways, and applied to
prove either the affirmative Sei-iKa, KaracrKevao-rtKa, constructive, con
firmatory ; or the negative, eXey/criKa, (23. 30) ; di/ao-KC va^eiv, avaipiiv ;
destructive of the proposition maintained by the theorist (in philosophy),
the opponent (in dialectics). Rhetoric -rdvavrLa cri>AAoyi erai [i I. 12].
Of the first, e TO>V fvavrlav, this is expressly stated.
I. One class of demonstrative (or affirmative) enthymemes is
derived from opposites: we have to consider, namely, whether the oppo
site (to the one) belongs to (i. e. can be said, or predicated of) the oppo
site (to the other). Two pairs of opposites are supposed, as in the
example, temperance and licentiousness, good, i.e. profitable, and inju
rious : the question is whether the two opposed terms or things stand in
the same relation to one another, i. e. that one can be predicated of the
other, as the two first, to which they are opposed : if they can, the ori
ginal proposition may be maintained, or inferred by the enthymeme ; if
not, it can be confuted or destroyed. The inference in either case is
drawn oc TUV evavricov, from the correctness or incorrectness, the truth or
falsehood, of the assertion of compatibility or coexistence in the oppo
sites, or that one can be predicated of the other. Thus in the example,
if the opposites to the original proposition temperance is profitable
stand in the same relation to one another as the two members of the
first, so that the one can be truly predicated of the other if the oppo
site, injurious, is truly predicable of licentiousness then, so far, we infer
the truth of the first : if not, the proposition may be confuted. The
inference, like all other rhetorical inferences, is probable, not necessary :
it can always be contradicted.
Aristotle, as we have already seen (note on c. 19. i), distinguishes
four kinds of diTiKfineva, or opposites ; contradictory, contrary (extremes
under the same genus, as here aaxppocrvvrj and aKoAao-i a are the two ex
tremes, virtue and vice, under the genus rjOos, moral character), relative,
and ety and oWp^o-jj, state and privation. In the Topics all the four
kinds in their relation to this form of argument are successively handled;
in the Rhetoric, the treatment is confined to the single kind of contraries,
as the most useful and plausible, and the rest passed over. See Brandis,
u. s., p. 1 8. The passage in the Topics corresponding to this is B 8 ?
seq. [Grote sAr. i, chap. ixpp. 422, 3]; but compare also B 2, 109^ 17; on
the import and limitations of tvavriov Ib. c. 7 ; r 6, init. on the great ad
vantages and wide extent of these two first topics, viz. this, and the next,
PHTOPIKH2 B 23 i. 239
avaipovvTct fjiev ei fju] V7rap%ei, KaTa(n<eva-
oe ei VTrap^eiy oiov OTL TO (riafppovelv dya66v
TO yap a.KO\a(TTaLveiv /SXafiepov. i] o)s eV Tta Mecr-
(TtiviaKit) el yap 6 7roAe//o? a lrios TUV TrapovTtav Ka-
Kuiv, fjL6Ta Tt]s eipqvtj? del 67ravopdcocra(r6ai.
el Trep yap ovSe ro?s /ca/cws
dKOV<ri(as SiKaiov ets 6pyt}v
oi/ S dv ctvayKacrOeis TIS ev Spdcrrj Tivd,
7TpO(TtJKOV e<TTl TO)3
d\\ el Trep ecmv ev
TTiBavd, vOfutJEOf xpt] ere Kai TOvvavTiOv,
d\t]6tj ?ro/\/\a (rv/ufiaiveiv
TO>V crvcrroi^aiv Kai TU>V Trrcacrfuv. 6jj,oici>s yap evSo^ov TO autocrat, et Tracra 7)801/7}
dyadov, KO\ Xinryv iracrav elvai KOKOV K.r.X. followed by a series of illus
trations : also B 9, 114 b 6. The treatment of opposites in the Topics and
Rhetoric corresponds in this, that in both works it has reference solely
to the art of reasoning, to the inferences affirmative or negative that may
be drawn by constructive, or refutative, syllogisms and enthymemes.
Cicero (who borrows a good deal from Aristotle), Topic. 4 XI. 47,
Deinceps locus esf, gut a contrario dicitur. Contrariorum autem genera
sunt plura : nnum corum quae in eodem genere plurimum differunt
(Arist.), lit sapientia et stultitia....Haec quae ex eodem genere contraria
sunt appellantur advcrsa. His instance is, si stultitiam fugimus,
sapientiam sequamur (this in the Aristotelian form would be, If folly
is to be shunned, wisdom is to be sought or pursued). He then goes
through the three remaining kinds of contraria^ following Aristotle.
Ex contrariis, Frugalitas bonum, luxuria enim malum (enthym.).
Si malorum causa bellum est, erit emendatio pax : si veniam meretur
qui imprudens nocuit, non meretur practnittin qui imprudens profuit.
Quint, v 10. 73. In the last example, the opposites are, excuse, in
dulgence (for a fault), and reward (for a service), injury and benefit :
the merit or desert is common to both : only in the one case it takes
the form of demerit, which deserves punishment : as is also the absence
of purpose, of good or ill intention.
di/aipeiv, to take up , passes on to the sense of removing, taking
away ; thence to taking off, destroying ; and so finally, when it comes
to logic, is applied to the argument which upsets, subverts, destroys,
or refutes the adversary s argument or position.
Or (a second example) as it is in the Messeniac speech (of Alci-
damas, on which see note on I 13. 2), "for if it is the war which is the
cause of the present evils, it is by the peace (which I now propose) that
they must be rectified." o-v/i/3otAevet o A\Ki8a/na? rots AaKeScu/zoi/i oj?
HTJ KaraSovXwtrat roiir eV MfCTOT^VJ/, fTrixfipav tK TOV evavriov. El yctp 6
2 4 o PHTOPIKH2 B 23 2.
2 aAAos EK TWV ofJLOttav TTTtaarewv o juo/ws jap
f, <})T)<ri, Trpovg(VT](Te rd8f TO. KaKa, eipyvr) TraXii/ raCra
(Scholiast). Verba ipsa Alcidamantis scholiastes videtur conservasse."
Sauppe ad Alcid. Fragm. Messen. 2. Oratores Attici, ill 154. Ouintilian
has borrowed this, see above [middle of p. 239].
"The four lines which follow as a third example are of uncertain
authorship : Gaisford attributes them either to Agathon or Theodectes :
the enthymeme ex contrario that it contains would suit either of them,
since they both cultivated Rhetoric as well as the dramatic art (Wagner
Trag. Gr. Fragm. ill 185). To avoid the conjunction of ei and ov, Elmsley,
ad Med. 87, proposes eVci. Reisig, Coniect. I p. 113 (ap. Pflugk), justly
replies that eiTrep is equivalent to eVei, and therefore admits the same
construction. On ei with av and the optative, see Appendix (on II 20 5)
at the end of this book ; and on ei followed by ov, see Appendix C,
Vol. I p. 301. For ovS" av, Wagner proposes either r\v or av.
Cicero, de Inv. I xxx 46, has adopted this : In contrariis hoc modo;
itain si Us qui imprudcntes laeserunt ignosci convenit, Us qui necessario
profuerunt haberi gratiam 11011 oportet, and Quintilian, V 10. 73,
(above).
The second quotation (example 4), is from Euripides Thyestes,
Fragm. vn (Wagner). This we learn from the Scholiast, quoted in
Wagner s note. Matthiae refers to the similar paradox in Agathon s
couplet, Rhet. n 24. 10.
2. Top. II. (K TOW ofioiav, TTTwo-fcoi ] On TTTKicrfLS and avcrrotxa, see
note on I 7. 27. TTTOXTIS " grammatische ffibiegung" Brandis \Philol.
IV i]. Another (inference may be drawn) from similar inflexions ; for the
inflected words (or, the inflexions of the word) must be capable of similar
predication, (for instance from St /cj; by inflexion, or variation of termina
tion, are formed the Trrwo-etr, dixaiot, fit/caiW as well as the grammatical
cases, inflexion and declension, and if Siicaiov can be predicated of any
thing, then ducaicos must be predicable of the same). We may therefore
argue, says the example, that justice is not all good , taking the negative
side, pfi vTrdpxfiv, good is not universally predicable of justice ; otherwise
good would be predicable of the TTTWCTIS, Si/ca/coj, which is not true in
all cases; for all good is alperov, an object of choice ; but a just punish
ment, or to be justly punished, everybody would allow not to be de
sirable . This is an application of the topic to its negative, destructive,
or refutative use : the inference is that the rule laid down is not true.
Compare with this example, I 9. 15, where the same distinction is made:
although ra SiVata and 8iKaiu>s epya are similarly predicable, yet this is
not the case with the irddtj : eV ^6vrj yap (this is therefore an excep
tional case to which the ordinary rule of o/ioiat n-rcocreir does not apply)
ravry T<0>v aptrcav OVK. dl TO StKcu coy KO\OV, dXX Vt TOV frp.iovo dai aicr^poz/
TO SIKGU COS /iaXXov T) TO ii8iKa>s.
Brandis u. s. notes on this topic another difference which shews itself
between the Topics and the Rhetoric, that whereas in the former the
o-vcrroixa are usually (not always) added to the 7rra>o-fis in the treatment
of it, they are here omitted, and the grammatical form of co-ordinates
alone taken into account.
PHTOPIKHS B 23 2, 3. 241
n W virapxetVf oiov OTL TO SiKaiov ov irav dya-
6ov Kal yap av TO StKaiws, vvv & ov% aipeTOV TO
3 (Waiws diroftaveiv. aAAos e/c Ttav Trpos a\\t]\a el
yap OaTepit) V7rdp%ei TO Ka\(Jo<s t} SiKaiws Troifjcrai,
BaTepw TO TTCTrovdevai, Kal el K\ev(rai, Kal TO Tre-
The use of the topic as a dialectical argument is abundantly illus
trated in the Topics, in very many places, as may be seen by consulting
Waitz s Index ad Organon, s. v. The principal passage on the subject is
Top. B 9, where the.Trrcocras, the grammatical co-ordinates, are properly
subordinated to the more extensive trva-roixa, things which are logically
co-ordinate^i 14 b 34. The latter are exemplified by BiKaiocrvvrj, diKaios,
diKaiov, SiKaias. Compare A 15, 106 b 29, on the application of them to
ambiguous terms, -riKtovayas Xeyo/iez/a, also F 3, 118 a 34, A 3, 124 a 10,
and the rest, which indicate their various applications 1 .
Cicero, Top. IV 12, comp. ix 38, illustrates coniugaia, which is his
name for Ar. s Trrwo-a?, by sapiens, sapienter, sapientiaj and the argu
ment from it by, Si compascuus ager est, ius est compasccre. Haec ver-
borum coniugatio, he says, crv&yia dicitur: on which Spengel (Specint.
Comm. in Ar. Lib. II 23, Heidelb. 1844) remarks, "Non Aristotelem qui
semper a-va-roi^iav dicit, sed posteriores, in primis Stoicos, intelligit." In
de Or. II 40. 167, they are called conivncta.
Quintilian, who treats the topic with some contempt as hardly de
serving of notice, has, Inst. Orat. v 10. 85, His illud adiicere ridiculum
putarem, nisi eo Cicero uteretur, quod coniugatum vacant : ut, Eos, qui
rem iustam faciant iuste facers, quod certe non eget probatione; Quod
compascuum est compascere licere (from Cicero).
3. Top. ill. fK Tuv irpos aXXijXa] The argument, from mutual
relation of terms or notions. This is treated. Top. B 8, 1 14 a 1 3, under
the head of oppositions or opposites, avriQia-eis, or avTiKfi^va, of which it
is one of the four varieties. For example, inferences may be drawn
from double to half, and vice versa; from triple to multiple and the con
verse ; from knowing or knowledge emo-Tij/zT/, to the thing known TO eVi-
OTIJTOK; from sight as a sensation, to the thing seen as an object of sense.
The logical objections, fva-rda-ets, that may be brought against it are
also given [Crete s Atis.tot.le I. pp. 423, 424].
" Latina schola vocat relata. Talia sunt ista : facere pati ; emere ven-
dere ; dare accipere; locare conducere : et nomina ista; pater filius ;
dominus servus ; discipulus magister." Schrader. He also cites as an
example, Cic. Orat. XLI 142, Sin ea non modo eos ornat penes quos est,
sed etiam universam renipublicain, citr aut discere turpe quod scire
1 If I am not mistaken Sfioiai Trrwcretj is a misnomer. If Trrwo-eis are the various
inflexions declensions in an extended sense of a root- word, the term must be
confined to the changes of the terminations: in these appears, not similarity, but
difference: the similarity lies, not in the terminations, but in the idea or root com
mon to all the varieties : similar therefore, though it may very well be predicated
of the <rvffToixa, is not properly applied to vruatis.
AR. II. 16
242 PHTOPIKH2 B 23 3.
oiov cos TeXwvns io/ULttav trepi TWV
T\a>v " el yap ju^S v/uuv a.la"%pov TO Trw/XtiV, oi/S
tj/uuv TO tavelcrOat." Kal el TU> TreTrovQoTi TO KorAws n
vTrdpxei, Kal TW TroitjcravTi) Kal el TU> TTOI-
Kal TW 7T7rov6oTi. ecTTL 5 ev TOVTW Trapa-p-91-
\oyicracr6ar el yap &K/WS eiraBev TI, (HtKaicas Trerrov-
6ev, a AA icrcos ov% IITTO crov. $10 e? cr/coTreu/ Xtapis
el a^ios d TraBcov wadeiv Kal 6 7ron;cras Troiijcrai, eiTa P. 1397^
honestum cst, nut quod nosse prilcJierrimnm est id non gloriosum docere :
a good illustration of the argument from relatives.
This topic has occurred before, II 19. 12, as one of the topics of the
possible : where the parallel passages of Cic. Topic, xi 49, ana de Inv.
I 30. 47, will be found in the note. On the same, Quintilian, Inst. Or.
v 10. 78, Ilia quoque quae ex rebus mutuam confirmationem praestan-
tibus dnciintur (q:iae proprii generis videri quidam -volunt, et vacant (K
TU>V irpos a\\T]\a, Cicero ex rebus sub eandem rationem venientibus)y"0r-
titer consequcntibus iunxcrim (I should be bold to add to consequents) :
si portoriitm Rhodiis locare honestum est et Hermocreonti conducerey ct
quod discere honestum, et docere (from de Inventione, u. s.). The argu
ment is, If it may be said of one (of the two terms of the relation) that
he has done rightly or justly, then the same terms may be applied to
what the other has suffered (iroitlv and Trao-^eii , agent and patient, are
relative opposites 1 ); and similarly (cfXevi/ is relative to irtiBevQai) com
mand implies obedience, and the converse (this may be inferred as the
ordinary, probable, not a necessary consequence): as Diomedon the tax-
collector argued about the taxes (i. e. the farming of them) " If it is no
disgrace to you to sell, neither is it to us to buy."
niov cos] This pleonasm occurs again in 6, olov coy l^iKpdrtjs.
Of Diomedon, nothing is known but what we learn from the passage.
And if the terms fairly or justly can be applied to the sufferer, then
also to the doer (or perpetrator) of the act ; and conversely, if to the
doer then also to the sufferer . If there be any difference between this
and the preceding, yap dartpai neTrovdevat, it is that the first is the
general expression of the relation between agent and patient, the second
is a particular exemplification of it, in the justification of what would
otherwise be a crime.
But this admits of a fallacy : for though it may be true (in general,
or in itself) that deserved suffering involves the justice of the punish-
1 The relation of Troieiv and iracrxfiv, agent and patient, action and passion, is
well illustrated in the argument between Polus and Socrates, Plat. Gorg. c. 32,
476 B, seq. It is there shewn by analogy the usual Socratic and Platonic
method that the relation between the two prevails throughout its various applica
tions, and therefore that crime and punishment follow the same law, and that justice
or desert in the punishment* of the criminal or patient implies the like justice in the
infliction of it by the agent, and vice versa.
PHTOPIKHS B 23 3. 243
oTTOTCpws dp/moTTet" ei iore yap SicKpwvel TO
TOIOVTOV Kai OV$V Kto\U6l, WCTTTep CV TW A.\KfJ.ai(t)Vl
crr]v ou n<s e<TTvyei fipo
rcov ;
ment, yet perhaps (it does not always follow that) you should be the
agent of it, that the punishment should be inflicted by you (any parti
cular individual) . This fallacy is actually illustrated from Thcodcctcs
Orestes, infra c. 24 3. The argument is used by Orestes in his trial for
the murder of his mother Clytemnestra. In the trial scene of the Eume-
nides this point is taken into consideration, and the act of Orestes justi
fied by Apollo and Athena on the general ground of the superiority of
male to female ; the father, the author of his existence, has a higher
claim upon the son s affection and duty than the mother, and Orestes
was right in avenging his father s death even upon her. Aesch. Eumen.
625 seq., 657 seq., 73840. Comp. Eur. Orest. 528, where Tyndareus,
Clytemnestra s father, says, Qvyar^p 8 rp.^ davoixr eirpa^tv evStKa aXX
ovxi Trpos roCS IKOS rjv avrr)v Bavdv : and Orestes, ib. 546, defends him
self on the same grounds as in Aeschylus, eyw 8 dvocrios et/u p/repa
KTavtav, ocrios 8e y erepov oPO/ta, rifiapcov irarpL 55 2 > Trarrjp fJLtv tffniTtwrev
p.f K.T.\. $62, fTrl 8 edvcra fujTtpa, avcxria [lev 8pwv aXXa TifUOp&V irarpi.
Electr. 1244, (quoted by Victorius on (pr)<r\ 8 mroitpti ofw^f icroiwiv,) the
Dioscuri to Orestes, Siaata fiev wv ^S e^fi av 8 ov^ 8 pas. The case
of Orestes and Clytemnestra became one of the stock examples in the
rhetorical books. Auct. ad Keren. I 10. 17, I 15.25, 16. 26. Cic. de Inv.
I 13. 1 8, 22. 31. Quint. Jnst. Or. in 11. 4, and n seq., VII 4. 8.
And therefore a separate investigation is required, not only whether
the sufferer deserved to suffer, but also whether the doer had a right to
do it (as, to inflict the punishment), and then make the appropriate use of
either: because sometimes there is a difference in cases of this kind (i.e.
both kinds of right are not always found together: the punishment may
be just, but you may not be the proper person to inflict it), and there
is nothing to prevent (the case being) as it is put in Theodectes Alc-
maeon (where this division , 8iaXa/3oi/7-a, is actually made): "And did
no mortal abhor thy mother?" This is a question put to Alcmaeon, pro
bably by Alphesiboea (Victorius), whose reply includes the words actu
ally quoted, aXXa 8taXa/3oi/Ta xp*l aKOTTflv, with, of course, a good deal
more about the murder which is omitted. To which (Alcmaeon) says
in reply "nay but we must first distinguish, and then consider the case."
(The division or distinction here spoken of is well illustrated by the
parallel passage, the case of Orestes, II 24. 3.) And when Alphesiboea
asks "How?", he replies, "To her they adjudged death, (i.e. decided
that she was justly slain,) but (decided also) that / should not have been
the murderer." From this reply it may be gathered that the judges in
Theodoctes play had made the requisite distinction: the death of Eri-
phyle they agreed was deserved, but it was not for her son to inflict the
penalty. "Alcmaeon Eriphylerr matrem suam intcrfecerat, quod haec
Amphiarai mariti salutem prodiderat" (Alcmacon s act, like that of
1 6 2
244 PHTOPIKH2 B 23 3.
d\\a
e TJJS AX^)eo"f/3oms TTWS, viroXafiuiv (prjcri
Tr\v fJiev davelv eKpivav, e/me c)e JULT} KTaveiv.
Kal oiov t] Trepi A^/iOcrfleVoi s 2>LKri Kai TWV
TCOV Ni/cai/OjOa* eVe* yap &/ccuws CKpWrjcrav a
Orestes, was justified by the implied murder of his father the treachery
which caused his death). "Alphesiboea fuit Alcmaeonis uxor." Schrader.
This fragment is quoted by Wagner, Theodect. Fragm. Alcm. I, but with
out a word of commentary, III 118.
On Theodectes of Phaselis, the rhetorician and dramatic poet, the
friend of Aristotle, who frequently refers to his compositions in both kinds,
and on the rhetorical character of his writings, which is well illustrated
here and in II 24. 3, see M tiller, Hist. Gr. Lit. ch. xxvi 7, who refers
to these passages. Also, Camb. Journ. of Cl. and Sacred Phil. No. IX
Vol. in p. 260 seq. 1 To the passages there quoted on this author, add
Theopomp. Hist. Phil. Lib. I, Fr. 26, ap. Fragm. Hist. Gr. (Didot) p.
282 ; and a ref. to his Philoctetes, Eth. Nic. vn 8, 1150 b g.
Two other examples follow, but, as Spengel (Tract on the Rhct.
in Trans. Bav. Acad., Munich 1851, p. 46) justly says, they have no
connexion with the preceding example from Theodectes, and the division
which it exemplifies, but are illustrations of the general topic. Retaining
the text (with Bekker) as it. stands, we must accordingly understand
the words eort 6 lv rovYa> /JLTJ KTavflv as parenthetical, and suppose
that the author, after the insertion of this as a note, proceeds with his
exemplification of the general topic. Spengel, u. s., p. 47, suggests that
they may have been a later addition by the author himself, a note
written on the margin, which has got out of its place. My supposition,
of a note, not written on the margin, but embodied in the text as a
parenthesis which is quite in Ar. s manner will answer the purpose
equally well, and save the text in addition.
And, another example, the trial of Demosthenes and those who
slew Nicanor ; for as they were adjudged to have siain him justly (the
act), it was held that his death (the passion or suffering) was just .
This is cited by Dion. Halicarn., Ep. I ad Amm. c. 12, as a proof that
Aristotle was acquainted with and quoted the speeches of Demosthenes,
referring it to the case (against Aeschines) for the Crown. In doing so
he omits nepi Of course v TTPI Arj/jioa-devovs S/KJ? cannot have this mean
ing : and it is .most probable that it is not the Orator that is here
referred to, but Thucydides general, or some other person of the name.
1 The unwarrantable identification, there supposed, p. 261, of the Theodectea
with the PrjTopiKTj- wpbs A.\^avbpov, has been sufficiently corrected in Introd. to
Rhet. pp. 55 67, on the Theodectea ; where more information will be found about
the author and his works.
PIITOPIKHS B 23 3. 245
a.7ro6ave1v. KCtt Trepi TOV Q/i@tj<nv aVo-
) 7T6pt OV 6K\l/(T Kplvai 61 SlKCtlOS i]V a7To6a-
veiv, ws OUK a^LKOV ov TO aVo/CTetVcu TOV SiKaitos aVo-
Neither is anything known of Nicanor and his murderers. On the use
of Demosthenes name in the Rhetoric, see Introd. p. 46, note 2.
And again, the case of him that died at Thebes ; concerning whom
he (the spokesman of the defendants) bade them (the judges) decide
whether he (the murdered man) deserved death, since there was no
injustice in putting to death one that deserved it . " In hanc quoque
historiam nunquam incidi." Victorius. Buhle rightly refers it to the case
of Euphron, introduced as an episode, and described at length by
Xenophon, Hellen. VII 3. There had been one of the usual quarrels
between the aristocratical (ol /SeXnorot) and the popular party at Sicyon,
of which Euphron took advantage, with the design of making himself
master of the city. But knowing that as long as the Thebans occupied
the acropolis he had no chance- of success, he collected a large sum of
money and went to Thebes with the intention of bribing the Thebans
to assist him. Some Sicyonian exiles learning this, followed him to
Thebes and murdered him in the acropolis. Here the murderers were
brought to trial before the magistrates and council, who were already
there assembled. The accusation of the magistrates, and the speech
for the defence, are both recorded. All the accused with one exception
asserted their innocence : one alone admitted the fact, and in justifica
tion of it pleaded for himself and the rest the guilt of the man that had
been slain, just as Aristotle here describes it. Oi u.ev ovv 6ij/3atot ravra
anovcravres eyvatcrav Strata TOV EiKppoi/a Trenovdfvai. But the Sicyonians
(ol TToXIrai), interpreting the word good in the sense of good to them
(roiis evepyeTas eavTu>v\ said he was a good man, and buried him in
the market-place, and adore him as the (second) founder of their city
(a>s apxyytTrjv}, like Brasidas at Amphipolis (Thuc. V. n).
The whole of this section, with the exception of the last example, KOI
Trepi TOV Qr)ftrj(Tiv cmoQavovTos, is quoted by Dionysius 1. c. in support of his
view that Demosthenes speeches had been delivered before the composi
tion of the Rhetoric, and were accessible to its author. The difference be
tween the text which he seems to have used and that now received is very
great, and apparently unaccountable. Besides minor discrepancies, the
entire quotation from Theodectes, evioTe yap xravelv is omitted ; and
the clauses preceding and following stand thus, eo-ri 8e TOVTO irapaXoyi-
aatrdcu.. ov yap el SIKOU O)? etraQev ai/, nal 8iKaia>y VTTO TOVTOV irtTVOvdfV, a>s o
(povov ata Troiijcras Trar^p, et vno TOV viov TOII eavTov TTJV V1 davaTca aTrayerat,
8d o-KOTTflv X^P ^ ...... OTTOTepcas av dpnoTTTj. (More -yap SicKpcovei TO TOIOVTQV.
wcTTrep eV TW AX*/taum TOV Oeo8enTov, Kat olov ff Trepi Arj/zocr^eVovs Sinr] Ac.r.X.
All the alterations seem to be for the worse, and in one of them, enadev ai>
for enadev rt, the grammatical blunder betrays corruption. The additional
example of the father and son introduced by Dionysius is, as Spengel
observes, not here in point. The very example for the sake of which
the extract was made is mutilated, and the explanation, end yap
dnodavdv, omitted : from which Spengel very justly argues that it could
246 PHTOP1KH2 B 23 4.
otAXos e /c TOJ} /ULO.\\OV Kcti I]TTOV, oiov " el
ol 6eoi TrdvTct icrao i, cr^o\r] <y e L avQpwjroi"
not have been in the MS that he used : if he had read it there, he could
not have so absurdly misapplied the example to the case for the Crown.
Spengel has reviewed the two passages in connexion in the tract above
cited, pp. 44 47. Our text, which is, when properly explained, perfectly
consistent and intelligible, is retained by Bekker and seems to require
no alteration : at all events none of Dionysius variations could be
advantageously introduced.
4. Top. iv. The argument from greater to less from that which
is more to be expected to that which is less (Brandis) and the converse ;
Top. B 10, 1 14 b 37 seq. To which is subjoined, 5, \ir\T* /xaXXov
TJTTOV, where two things are compared which are equally likely or
probable, and accordingly the one may be inferred from the other : of
this there are three cases, K roC 6fj.o[u>s virap-^eiv rj 8o<elv imapxeiv rpt^wr.
Top. Ib. 115 a 15. Of the first there are four varieties : according as (i)
the more or less is predicated of the same object if pleasure is good,
then the greater the pleasure the greater the good ; and if wrong-doing is
bad, the greater the wrong the worse ; the fact is to be ascertained by
induction or (2) when one of two things is predicated (in the way of
comparison), if that of which it is more likely to be predicated is without
it (any property or quality), the same may be inferred of the le ss likely ;
or conversely, if the less likely has it, a fortiori the more likely : or (3)
(the reverse of the preceding) when two things are predicated of one, if
the more likely is not there, we may infer that the less likely will not, or
if the less likely be found there, that the more likely will also: (4) when
two things are predicated of two others, if that which is more likely is
wanting to the one, the less likely will surely be wanting to the other;
or, conversely, if that which is less likely to be present to the one is
there, the other will be sure to have that which is more likely [Crete s
Ar. I. p. 425]. These nice distinctions, though appropriate to Dialectics,
are unnecessary in Rhetoric, and are therefore here omitted; but the
examples will suggest the proper use of the topic. The inference in all
these cases is plain and will be acknowledged by the audience, and that
is all that is required.
The inference from greater to less, or from more to less likely or pro
bable, is commonly called the argumentum a fortiori; the rule omne mains
continet in se minus may also be referred to the same principle, though
the two are not absolutely coextensive.
Cic. Topic, ill 1 1, Alia (ducuntur argumenta) ex comparatione maiorum
ant parium aut minorum. This is well exemplified in iv 23. xvili 68,
Reliquus est comparatio>iis locus cuius...nunc explicanda tractatio est.
Comparantur igitur ea quae aut maiora aut minora aut paria dicuntiir:
in quibus spectantur haec, numerus, species, vis, quaedam etiam ad res
aliquas affictio. These four modes of application are clearly explained
and illustrated in the following sections, 69 71.
De Oral. II 40. 172, Maiora autcm ct minora et paria comparabimus
sic : t .v ma lore; si bona existimatio divitiis praestat et pecnnia tanto
opci c cxpctitur, quanta gloria magis est expetenda : ex minore ; Hie
PHTOPIKIIS B 23 4, 5. 247
TOVTO yap etTTiv, el ta jULa\\ov av V7rap%oi /uuj VTrap-
OTI ou& to r jTTOV. TO & OTI TOvs 7r\r](riov
os *y e KGt * TO? TTanrepct, eV TOV, el TO J]TTOV
i, K.O.I TO fJiaXXov V7rdp%ei, Kad* OTTOTepov av
5 fieri fie i^ai, eid OTI vTrdp^ei e ld OTI ov. ert el
pamae consuetudinis causa huius mortem fert tarn familiariter ; Quid si
ipse amasset? quid hie mihi faciet patri? (Terent. Andr. I i. 83): ex
pari sic; est eiusdem et eripere et contra rempublicam largiri pecunias.
De Inv. I 28.41, II 17. 55, de Orat. Part, n 7, ult. Quint, v 10. 86 93,
Apposita vel comparativa dicuntur quae maiora ex minoribus, minora
ex maioribus, paria ex paribus probant. These are applied, subdivided,
and illustrated through the remaining sections.
Another from the more or less, as for instance, "if not even the gods
are omniscient, surely men can hardly be supposed to be so :" for that is
as much as to say, if that to which something is more likely to belong
wants it, plainly that which is less likely must want it too. Again (the
argument) that a man who was capable of striking his father would also
strike his neighbours, follows (is derived from) the (general rule or prin
ciple), that the less involves or implies the (possible existence, or capa
city, 8vvafj.is, of the) greater; in whichever way we are required to argue
(the inference is required to be drawn), whether the affirmative or the
negative . This last example, as an exemplification of the inference from
less to greater, has been looked upon as an error, and various corrections
have been proposed, as by Vater, and Spengel in Sperim. Comm. ad Ar.
Rhet. II c. 23, p. 12, 1844. The latter has subsequently altered his opi
nion, and in 1851 (Trans, of Bav. Acad. p. 58) he admits that the expla
nation suggested by Victorius, and adopted by Muretus, Majoragius, and
others, is sufficient to support the text ; which, as usual, is retained by
Bekker. No doubt, according to the ordinary interpretation of /naXXoj/
and TITTOV in one of these comparisons, where the greater and less are
referred to the magnitude and importance of the crime, the argument is
TOV fia\\ov, ex maiore ad minus: the man who would strike his father
(the greater) would a fortiori strike an ordinary acquaintance. But Ar.
has here departed from this usual application of the topic, and makes
the comparison in respect of the frequency of the crime : as it is less
usual to strike one s father than one s neighbour, a man that could be
guilty of the former, is much more likely to commit the latter and lesser
offence: and the inference is from the less to the greater in this sense.
"Aristoteles, cum boni viri officium sit nemini vim afferre, cumque
iniuria ab omni abesse debeat, si tamen ibi manet ubi minus esse debe-
bat, illic etiam existet ubi frequentius esse consuevit : et haec causa est
cur ft TO TJTTOV vTrdp^fi appellant, a minore<y\Q earn significari voluerit."
Victorius.
On the double reading of MS A, see Spengel, Trans, of Bav. Acad.
1851 p. 57 [and to the same effect in Spengel s ed., 1867 ; "in A post
dftj Sdt-ai haec scntentia alia ratione verbis rvirrei oTi...8f2 Selui cxpli-
catur...duplicem sententiae formam iuxta positam melius perspiciemus :
248 PHTOPIKH2 B 23 5.
eprjrai
Kai cros fjiev OLKTpos TTotiSas aVoXecrofs
Oivevs 5 ap ov%i K\eivov aVoAeVas yovov ;
i oriy el fj.r]$e Qricreus rtSiKtj&eVj ovd A\eav$pos,
i el p.ri& ol Tvvoapifiat, ovft AXe^avSpos, Kai el
\ S.J < \ > f f \ >
TO OTt TOVS TT\T]O~IOV TVTTTl OS yf KO.I TOV TTdTepd
TVTTTfl fK TOV KCITO. TO TjTTOV
KOI
av
paXKov vuapxfi. Kad onoTfpov
TVTTTfl OTl (I TO TjTTOV
TOVS yap naTfpas
TjTTOV TVTTTOVCTIV T/ TOVS TT\r](rloV. ff
8f) OVTCOS r) fl (a fj.a\\o > vTrap^fi, ^17
Virap^fl, Tj <B fjTTOV ft VTrap^fl OJTOTf-
pov Set Seiai
eW ori inrap\f(, fW OTI ou."]
On these Aristotelian SiTToypcxpiai, see Torstrik, Praef. ad de Anima,
p. xxi, seq.
5. The second branch of these inferences from comparison, is that
of parallel cases. This is the argument from analogy, the foundation of
induction, the observation of resemblances in things diverse, leading to
the establishment of a general rule: the Socratic and Platonic Method:
comp. c. 20.4, note. Ex part, Cic. de Inv. I 30. 47, ut locus in mari sine
portu navibus esse non potest tutus, sic animus sine fide stabilis amicis
non potest esse. On the argument from analogy in general, see note on
c. 19. 2.
Again if the comparison is not of greater and less, (but of things
equal or parallel) : whence the saying, " Thy father too is to be pitied
for the loss of his children. And is not Oeneus then, for the loss of his
illustrious offspring?" apa marks the inference. "Par infortunium
parem misericordiam meretur." Schrader. The verses are supposed (by
Victorius, Welcker, Trag. Gr. p. 1012, and Wagner, Fr. Trag. Gr. ill 185)
to be taken from Antiphon s Meleager, which is quoted again 20, and
at II 2. 19. (Antiphon, a Tragic Poet contemporary with the Elder Dio-
nysius, Rhet. II 6. 19, Clinton F. H. Vol. II. Praef. xxxm, flourished at
the end of the fifth cent. B. C. Compare note on II 2. 19.)
The first of the two verses if the story is that of Meleager refers
to the death of the two sons of Thestius, Toxcus and Plexippus, by the
hand of their nephew Meleager : Oeneus was the father of Meleager,
whom he too had now lost. The words are those of some one who is
consoling Althea, Oeneus wife, and perhaps belong (says Victorius) to
Oeneus himself. The meaning then would be, (Oeneus to his wife,) You
speak of the losses of your father whose sons are slain are not mine
as great as his, in the loss of my famous son Meleager ? and do we
not therefore equally deserve pity? The story is told in Diod. Sic. IV 34
(Schrader), and Ov. Met. vill. See 86, 87, Anfelix Oeneus nato victore
fruetur, Thestius orbus erit ? melius lugebitis ambo.
The conduct of Alexander or Paris in the abduction of Helen is next
justified by the parallel case of Theseus, who did the same ; Isocr.
PHTOPIKHS B 23 5, 6. 249
TlaTpOK\ov EKTwp, Kai A^fAAe a AXeai>opos. Kai
el jLO/S ol a\\oi Te^lrai (pav\oi, ovo ol <pi\ooro(poi.
Kai el JULYS ol (TTparrj^oi <pav\oi OTL T^TT^VTUL TTO\-
t j^.f / \ f tr ^ -^
Aoas, ovo OL a-o<pi(TTai. KUL OTL " ei cei TOV I
T//S vfJXTepas Sof|S eVtyueAeur&a, Kai v/uas
6 EAAj/ywy." aAAos e /c TOV TOV %povov (TKOTrelv, olov
Helen. 18 20; and every one and more especially an Athenian
audience must allow that he was a good man and could do no wrong
(OVK iJSucjjo-ei/) ; and of the Tyndaridae, Castor and Pollux, who carried
off the two daughters of Leucippus, Phoebe and Eleaera (or Hilaira,
Propert. I 2. 15), Ov. Fast, v 699, Theocr. Id. xxn 137, and these
were demigods; and if Hector is not blamed for the death of Patroclus,
neither should Paris be censured for that of Achilles. This is from
some fyKcontov or an-oAoyi a A\fdv8pov, of an unknown rhetorician,
similar to Isocrates Helen. It is referred to again, 8, and 24 7, 9.
And if no other artists (professors of any art or science) are mean
or contemptible, neither are philosophers : and if generals are not to
be held cheap because they are often defeated, neither are the sophists
(when their sophistical dialectics are at fault) . From some speech in
defence of philosophy, and of the Sophists.
The following is an argument, urged by an Athenian orator upon the
general assembly, from the analogy of the relation of a private citizen
to the state of which he is a member, to that of the same state as an
individual member of the great community of the entire Greek race
to the whole of which it is a part : if it be the duty of an individual
Athenian to pay attention to, to study, the glory of his own country,
then it is the duty of you, the collective Athenians whose representatives
I am now addressing, to study in like manner the glory of the entire
Greek community. Or it might be used by the epiddctic orator in a
Panegyric (iravr]yvpi<6s \6yos, delivered in a Travjyvpis), pleading, like
Isocrates, for the united action of the Greeks against the Barbarian.
6. Top. v. The consideration of time. This kind of argument,
thougli important in Rhetoric, is inappropriate in Dialectics, and therefore
receives only a passing notice in the Topics, B 4, ill b 24, ert eVi TOV
xpovov tnifiXfTTfiv, i TTOV Sto^wfet, where the word eVi/SXeVeiz shews
that it is a mere passing glance, a cursory observation, that it requires :
and in Cicero s Topics it is altogether omitted [Grote s Ar. I p. 418].
The application of it in Top. B il, 115 b 11, referred to by Brandis, is
different, and indeed unsuited to rhetorical purposes.
On this topic of time, and its importance in Rhetoric, Quintilian, Inst.
Orat. V 10.42 seq., after a preliminary division of time into (i) general
(now, formerly, hereafter,) and (2) special or particular time, proceeds, Quo-
; uin utrorumque ratio et in consiliis (genus deliberativum) quidem, et in
illo demonstrative! (rw eViSet/crtKw ytvti) genere versatur; sed in iudiciis
freqiientissima est. Nam et iuris quaestiones facit, et qualitatem dis-
tinguit, et ad coniecturam plurimnm confert (contributes very greatly
to the establishment of the fact the status coniccturalis or issue of fact
250 PHTOPIKHS B 23 6.
tvs IfyiKpdrns eV Ty TT^OS ApfJiotiioy, OTL " el Trpivp. 98.
7roif](rai TI^LOVV T^S eiKOitos TV^eiv eav Trouycrw, ectare
av 7roiri(ravTi S ap ou So/Vere; /^} Toivvv fieAAoi/res
and especially to the refutation of the assertion of an alleged fact : this
is illustrated by the cases following) ; ut quum interim probationes
inexpugnabiles afferat, quales sunt, si dicatur (ut supra posui) signator,
qui ante diem tabiilarum decessit : aut commisisse aliquid, vel quum
infans esset, vel qtium omnino natus noti essct. Further, 45 48,
arguments may be readily drawn ex Us quae ante rent facta sunt, aut
ex coniunctis rei, aut insequentibus, or from time past, present (inslans),
and future : and these three are then illustrated. Inferences may be
drawn from what is past or present, to the future, from cause to effect ;
and conversely from present to past, from effect to cause. It seems
that the two principal modes of applying the topic of time to Rhetoric
are (i) that described by Ouintilian, in establishing, or, more frequently,
refuting the assertion of a fact, which is the chief use that is made of
it in the forensic branch this is again referred to, II 24. n, on which
see Introd. p. 274 the consideration of probabilities of time in matters
of fact : and (2) the /tmpd?, the right time, the appropriate occasion,
which may be employed by the deliberative orator or politician in
estimating the expediency, immediate or prospective, of an act or course
of policy ; and by the panegyrist to enhance the value and importance
of any action of his hero, or of anything else which nay be the object
of his encomium. On this use of naipos comp. I 7.32, I 9.38, and the
notes. For illustrations, see Top. r 2, 117 a 26 b 2.
Another from the consideration of time, as Iphicrates said in the
case (subaudi duo?) against Harmodius, "Had I before the deed was done
laid claim to the statue, provided I did it, you would have granted it me :
will you then (the inference) refuse to grant it me now that I have done
it ? Do not, then, first make the promise in anticipation, and then,
when you have received the benefit, defraud me of it. " The case, or
speech, as it is here called against Harmodius , is also known by the
name of 17 rrepl rfjs eiKuvos : this was the statue which was granted
him in commemoration of the famous defeat of the Lacedaemonian
p.6pa in B. C. 392. Aesch. c. Ctesiph. 243, Ask the judges why they
made the presents, and set up the statues, to Chrbrias, Iphicrates,
and Timotheus. The answer is, I0i/cparet on p.6pav AaKf8aip.ovio>v aW-
KTUvev. [Dem. Lept. 482 84, Tt^wi/rey Trore ifpiicpaTTjv ov [lovov avrov frifJH]-
. 86, ovSe yap vp.1v app.aTTfi 8oKflv Trapa p,tv TO.S evepyecrias otlraj
s ex eu/ ware p-f/ povov avroiis roiis evepyfras np.av, dXXa *ai TOVS
eK(iv(t>i> (pi\ovs, eTTfibav Se ^poi/os 8ie\6r] jBpa^vs, /ecu Sara avrois 8f8u><arf
TUI/T dfpaipflvOai]. The speech here referred to was attributed by some
as Pseudo-Plutarch vit. Lys. uvveypa-^re 8e Ao-yov KCU ic/x/cparet rov
p.ev Trpos A.pp,68iov to Lysias 1 , which is denied by Dionysius, de Lysia
1 See or! this and two other speeches of Iphicrates attributed to Lysias, Sauppe,
nd Fragm. Lys. xviu and LXV. Oratorcs Attici in 178 and 190; [also Blass,
die Altischc Beredsamkeit) p. 335].
PHTOPIKHS B 23 6, 7. 251
TO Qtifiaiovs ^tieivai <&i\i7nrov ets TI}V
OTI (t el Trplv fior]6t](rai ek QcoKels tjPiov, VTrecr%ovTO
O.V CLTOTTOV OlIV 1 CLOTL TTpOeLTO KCtl 67riO TeV(T6 fJLY\
7 <$L)]<TOVGriv" aXXos e /c TCOV eiprijmevtov KaB avrovv Trpos
lud. c. 12, on two grounds, first the inferiority of the style, which was
unworthy of Lysias ; and secondly, because Lysias died seven years
before the deed for which the statue was granted. Aristotle plainly
ascribes it to Iphicrates himself. The speech n-epl rijs eiKwos, is quoted
again, 8. See also Clinton Fasti Hellcnici II 113, sub anno 371. It
was not till after Iphicrates had resigned his military command, and
retired into private life, drroSovs TO. <rrparevpara l8iu>Trjs yiverai, that he
claimed his statue, p-era A.\Ki<rdevT)i> ap^ovra, i. e. in the archonship of
Pharsiclides, B. C. 371. The grant was opposed by Harmodius, a political
antagonist.
And again to induce the Thebans to allow Philip to pass through
their territories into Attica, it is argued that, "had he made the claim (or
preferred the request) before he helped them against the Phocians
(when they wanted his aid), they would have promised to do so ; and
therefore it would be monstrous for them now to refuse it, because he
threw away his chance (then} ; behaved liberally or with reckless gene
rosity (so Viet.) on that occasion, and neglected to avail himself of his
opportunity, (see the lexicons, s. v. irpoiea-dai) and trusted to their honour
and good faith . The former event occurred in B. c. 346, when Philip
allied himself with the Thebans and overran Phocis, and so put an
end to the Phocian war. An embassy was sent to the Thebans after
the capture of Elataea B.C. 339, to request that Philip s troops might
be allowed to march through their territory to attack Attica ; but
was met by a counter- embassy from Athens, proposed and accompanied
by Demosthenes, who prevailed upon the Thebans to refuse the request,
and conclude an alliance with Athens. Kara Avtrtpa^t Sf/i/ apxovra, Dionys.
Ep. I ad Amm. c. u. On this embassy and the proposals there made,
see Demosthenes himself, de Cor. 311, 313, from which it would seem
that the words here quoted are not Philip s, but an argument used by
his ambassadors. Comp. also 146, oi/r els rrjv ATTIK^V e\6e1v dwaros...
p.riT Qrjpaicw &U(VTO>V : and Aesch. C. CtCS. 151, nal ypd-^dv e (pij ^ (pio-p-a
(o AT]fj.oa6fVT)s*)...-rrefj.Treiv vfj.as Trpeafifis aiTijcrovras &r)ftaiovs ftiodov errl 3?i-
\imrov, (referred to by Spengel, Specim. Coinin. ad Ar. Rhet. Heidelb.
1844, p. 15). In the following year, 338 B. C. eVi apxovros XotpwySov, was
fought the battle of Chaeronea. M. Schmidt (On the date of the Rhet.
Halle, 1837, p. 16) uses this passage in fixing the date of Ar. s work.
[See Introd. p. 38.]
Dionys., ad Amm. c. n, cites the whole of this topic. The only
important variations are two manifest blunders ; the omission of els be
fore "JwKetr, and dUa-rrfvcrev pi) 8<aaovcrii> for eirioTfV(re piy $ir}<Tova iv.
7. Top. VI. This topic, "the retort which turns the point of what
has been said against ourselves upon him who said it," viz. the adverse
252 PHTOPIKHS B 23 7.
TOV enrovTa $ia<pepei $ 6 TJOOTTO?, olov ev TIO
party in the law-court or assembly, belongs, as Brandis also remarks,
u. s., p. 19, exclusively to Rhetoric. "Cum argumentum ducitur ex iis
quae ex moribus vitaque ipsorum dicta sunt, admodumque ipsis con-
gruunt, adversus ilium ipsum qui dixit : eminet autem, inquit, hie inter
alios, ac vim maximam semper habere existimatus est." Victorius. That
Kara in the definition means against and not of (in respect of) appears
from the example. Iphicrates asks Aristophon, who had accused him
of taking bribes to betray the fleet, "Would you have done it yourself?
No ; I am not Iike_y0#. Well then, as you admit that /##, Aristophon,
are incapable of it, must not I, Iphicrates, (your superior in virtue and
everything else,) be still more incapable of it?" As Ar. adds, the
argument is worth nothing unless the person who uses it is conscious
of his own moral superiority, and knows that the audience whom he
addresses shares his conviction : employed against an Aristides the
Just , it would be simply ridiculous.
8ia<pfp(i 8e 6 Tpo-rros K T.X.] This is interpreted by Spengel, Specim.
Comm. u. s.,p. 16 [and ed. 1867], "Mores sunt qui in hac re in discrimen
vocantur; mores enim et vita eminet et litigantes discernit." I doubt if
rpoTrof, standing thus alone, can mean mores : nor, I think, is the mention
of character and manners appropriate in this place : further on it would
be suitable. Gaisford s explanation and connexion seem to be upon the
whole most satisfactory. "Verba olov ev T&&gt; Tet5/cpo> (iiretev puto esse 8ta
neo-ov. His certe seclusis belle procedunt omnia. Sententiae nexus
hie est ; Excellit autem hie modus (vel locus reading TOTTOJ), Sed ad
fidem accusatori detrahendam." And in that case, Quintilian s words,
V 12. 19, Aristoteles quidem potentissimum put at ex eo qui dicit, si sit
vir optimus c., may be a translation of Siatpepfi 6 Tponos. fttcxfrfptiv, if
thus understood, denotes pre-eminence, distinction above others .
olov ev TW TtvKpcp] This is no doubt Sophocles tragedy of that name :
of which four fragments (and one doubtful one) still survive. See Wagner,
Fragm. Tr. Gr. I 388, 9. " Quum Ar. ubi poetarum nomina omisit tan-
tummodo clarissimos quosque respexerit, facile inducimur ut eum So-
phoclis Teucrurn dixisse credamus." And Spengel, Spec. Comm. u. s., p. 16
[and ed.] " Sophoclis puto ; si alius esset, nomen addidisset." The same
play is- quoted again, ill 15.9, whence it appears that Ulysses was one
of the characters. In an altercation with Teucer, the latter must be
supposed to have used a similar argument, or retort, founded upon his
own acknowledged superiority in moral character 1 . See Wagner 1. c.
1 Ulysses may be supposed to have accused Teucer of the murder of his brother
comp. Aj. 1012 seq. and 1021, where such a suspicion is hinted at : \iyou, Ulysses,
are shocked at such a crime, do you suppose that /, Teucer, could have been guilty
of it ? The same argument was employed by Euripides in his Telephus. Fragm.
xu, Dindorf, ap. Arist. Acharn. 554. Wagner, II p. 364. Fr. Tel. 24. TO.VT old on
a? eopare (ita Meineke), TOV ol Ttj\e<t>ov OVK ol6fj.tff6a ; comp. Valck. Diatr. ad Fr.
Eurip. p. 211, " Telephi verba cum Ulysse loquentis." Ulysses had been making
some charge against Telephus, who makes this reply: You would have done so
and so: am /not as likely, or still more so, to have clone the same? Plut. airotyd.
Alex. II, p. 180 B, Aapdov oi5oi>ros avrif /jLvpia raXavra KM. rrjv A.aiav
PHTOPIKHS B 23 7. 253
a) exptjtrctTO I (p IK partis Trpos ApicrTcxpcovra, ewpo-
jueyos el TrpoSoiti av Tas vavs ITTI xprmaariv ou (pet
er KOVTOS Se "eira" tiirev <f crv /ueV a>Y ApicrTCxpwv OVK
av
who gives a long account of the subject of the play, and compares it
with Pacuvius play of the same name, supposed to be borrowed from
Sophocles.
Aristophon was already celebrated as an orator in 403 B.C. (Clinton,
P. H., sub anno.} His fame may be inferred from the frequent and respect
ful mention of him by Demosthenes especially (see for instance, de Cor.
219, de Fals. Leg. 339), Aeschines and Dinarchus. See Baiter et
Sauppe, Orat. Att., Ind. Nom. s. v., p. 21, Vol. in. He was an Azenian,
Afyvievs, and thereby distinguished from his namesake of Collytus, de
Cor. 93. The speech to which Iphicrates here replies was delivered in
"the prosecution of Iphicrates by him and Chares for his failure in the
last campaign of the Social war, Diod. XVI 15. 21," (Clint. F. H. sub anno,)
in the year 355 B.C., at an already advanced age. See also Sauppe,
Fragm. Lys. 65, Or. Att. in 190: and note on Rhet. in 10. 6. He died
before 330, the date of the de Corona, Dem. de Cor. 162. On the
speech inrep ifpiKparovs TrpoSocn ar aTroAoyi a, attributed to Lysias (rejected by
Dionysius, de Lys. lud. c. 12, comp. note on 6 supra; on that against
Harmodius), from which Iphicrates saying against Harmodius is sup
posed to have been extracted, see Sauppe, Fragm. Lys. LXV, (Orat. Att.
in 190): and comp. ibid. p. 191, Aristid. Or. 49, who quotes the same
words somewhat differently, and, like Aristotle, attributes them directly
to Iphicrates, and not to Lysias. [A. Schaefer, Dem. und seine Zeit,
I I5S-]
Ouintilian, v 12. 10. borrows this example, referring it however to a
different class of arguments, probationes quas TradrjTiKds vacant ductas
ex affectibus, (he means the ydos,) 9. After quoting the nobilis
Scauri defensio^ (on which see Introd. p. 151, note i,) he adds, cui
simile quiddam fecisse Iphicrates dicitur, gut cum Aristophontem, quo
accusante similis criminis reus erat, interrogasset, an is accepta pecunia
rempublicam proditttrus esset f isque id negassetj Quod igittir, inquit, tu
nonfecisses, ego fed f Comp. Spalding s note ad lociim.
i Trpo8otr] av] e t = irorepov ; see Appendix, On av -with the optative
after certain particles [printed at the end of the notes to Book ll].
del 8" inrapxew /c.r.X.] But (the person who employs the argument)
must have this advantage on his side, that the other (the opponent)
would be thought more likely to have done the wrong: otherwise, it
would seem absurd, for a man to apply this to an Aristides (the model of
justice and integrity) when he brings a charge; (not so), but only for the
discrediting (throwing a doubt upon, making the audience distrust, the
credibility) of the accuser: (if aXXa be connected with what immediately
precedes, to complete the sense, something must be supplied, such as ov%
poj O.VTOV tirlff-qs, Kal Hap/j,evtwvos elvbyTOS, Z\a8ov dv et
aju, vfj Ala, flirev, el napfj-evluv T///.IJJ .
254 PHTOPIKHS B 23 7.
iuia\\ov av ^OKOVVTO. d^LKt](rai eKeivov el c)e
\olov av (fiaveiri, el Trpos ApicrTeifin
TOVTO Tfs eiTreiev, d\\d Trpos airuTTiav TOV
pov oA.o)s yap (3ov\erai 6 KaTrj^oowv fie\TL(av elvai
TOV evovTOS TOVT ovv teXeeiv del. Ka6o\ov
OVTW, dXXa xpr/crre oj/ 1 ), and this, because as a general rule the accuser
pretends to be {would be if he could) a better man than the defendant :
tin s (assumption) then always requires confutation . Should not dei be Set? 2
fiovXfTai] f}ov\eo-6ai like edeXeiv frequently implies a tendency, design,
intention, or aspiration, real or imaginary the latter in things inani
mate wants to be, would be, would like to be, if it could ; and hence
here it denotes the assumption or pretension of superior goodness, he
would be better . Zell, ad Eth. Nic. in i. 15 (in 2, 1110^ 30, Bk.),
Stallbaum ad Phaed. 74 D. Ast ad Phaedr. 230 D, p. 250. Thompson
ad eundem locum. Viger, pp. 263, 264, n. 77.
Eth. N. Ill 2, IIIO$3> T0 & dttovtriov /SouXerat \eyfcr0ai OVK ft TIS
K.r.X. won t be called , don t choose to be called , as if it had the choice.
Hist. Anim. I 16. n [495 a 32], 8e\ei yap elvai 8tp.tpj]s (wants to be, would
be if it could ; of a general tendency, intention or plan, not completely
carried out) o TrXtv^mv ev airao-L rols e^outriv avrov dXXa K.T.X. [the
Index Aristotelicus does not quote this passage, either under 6t\tiv or
under 8ip.(prjs, though it is given under TrXev^av]. Ib. VII 3. 4 [583 b 26],
at Kaddpa-fis l3ov\oi>Tai...ov p.rji> (^aKpiftovcri ye K.r.X. (the same); de Part.
Anim. IV IO, 29, 6e\ei, Ib. Ill 7. 2, o eyKf(paXos /3ouXerai 8ifj.fpr)s emu. de
Gen. An. n 4, 9, 10 (bis eodem sensii). Ib. v 7. 17, [787^19], ra 8
ocrra ^rjTel TTJV TOV vevpov (pvcriv is used in the same sense. This I
believe to be a a-rrat; Xfyoptvov, [no instance is given in the Index
Aristotelicus. s. v. f^reo-, where even the passage just quoted is not
cited]), de part. An. IV 2. 10, ^ovXtrai, is designed to be ; so Eth. N.
V 7? H3 2 a 2I> o SjKncrrj}? ftovXerm eiVai oloi SiKaiov f^,\^v^ov, animated
justice, the embodiment of abstract justice this is what he is intended
to be, though he often falls short of it. Ib. c. 8, 1133 b 14, /3<wXertu
fieveiv paXXov. de Anima A 3, 407 a 4, /3ot Xertu, Plato means or intends.
Topic. Z 5, 142 b 27, TO 8e yevos fiovXfTai TO T I eVn crrjfjiniveiv. Ib. C. 13,
151 a 17. Pol. II 6, 1265 b 27, ?; o-vvTagis 0X77 /3. eiwu (TroXtTf ia) is de
signed, or intended, to be . Ib. 1266 a 7, tyKXtveiv /3. irpbs TTJV oXcynpxiav.
Ib. I 5, 1254 b 27, c. 6, 1255 b 3, c. 12, 1259 b 6, et saepe alibi. [" Saepe
per /3ouXerai elvai significatur quo quid per naturam suam tendit, sive id
assequitur quo tendit, sive non plene et perfecte assequitur." Index
Aristotelicus, where more than forty references are given.]
So Latin vellej Cic. Orat. XXXIII 117, qucm volumus csse cloqiicntem.
Hor. A. P. 89, versibus exponi tragicis res comica non inilt.
Ka86\ov 8 aroTTos eVriv K.r.X.] Und. o rpo7ros(or o TOKOS) from above : not
1 This is the usual way of connecting the parts of the sentence ; but I think
Gaisford s explanation, quoted above, is certainly to be preferred.
2 ["In cod. abest Kal post Tei /c/ay (p. 252), ego addidi; post tpavei-rj extat fl,
ego Kal scripsi : deinde TOVTO TIS, ego TOVT OVTIS; extreme autem loco del, Muretus
aliique Set." Ussing, in Oftisciila Philologica ad Madvigiirm, 1876, p. i.]
PHTOPIKHS B 23 7, 8. 255
OTO7TOS <TTW 9 OTUV Tf
77 Trouicrciev dv, rj TrpOTpeTrn Troielv a auros /mi]
Troiei /ULt]^e TTOit icreLev av. aAAos e 6pi(TfJiOV, olov
,r ^ < ^ ^ > \ -v > > v /3 v ^ /J ~
on TO caifjioviov ovcev ecrriv a\\ t] (/eos *; feoi/
as Victorius, who supposes it to mean an absurd man. c And in general the
use of it is absurd whenever a man censures (taxes) others for something
which he does himself, or would do (if he had the opportunity), or ex
horts them to do what he does not do now himself, and never would do
(under any circumstances) . The first of these two cases is that of Satan
rebuking sin ; the second that of one who preaches what he does not
practise.
8. Top. VII. Definition. The definition of terms is the basis of
v all sound argument, and the ambiguity of terms one of the most abun
dant sources of fallacy and misunderstanding. A clear definition is
therefore necessary for intelligible reasoning. To establish definitions,
and so come to a clear understanding of the thing in controversy, was,
as Aristotle tells us, the end and object of the Socratic method. The
use of the definition in dialectics is treated in the Topics, A 15, 107. a 36
-^ 5 [Crete s Ar. I p. 404], B 2, 109 13 seq. and 30 seq. Cic. Topic. V
26 vii 32. De Inv. II 17. 5356. Orat. Part, xn 41. De Orat. n 39.
164. Quint. V 10. 36, and 54 seq.
Theyfrj/ example of the argument from definition, is the inference
drawn by Socrates at his trial from the definition of ro dai/ioptop, Plat.
Apol. Socr. c. 15. Meletus accuses him of teaching his young associates
not to believe in the gods recognized by the state, and introducing other
new divinities, crepa taupowa Kaii>d, in their place. Socrates argues that
upon Meletus own admission he believes in 8a.ifj.6via divine things (27 c) ;
but divine things or works imply a workman ; and therefore a belief in
Sfu/xowa necessarily implies a belief in the authors of those works, viz.
8aifj,ovfs. But 8aiiJ.ovfs are universally held to be either 6eoi or 6tu>v
Treaties (27 D), and therefore in either case a belief in 8aifj.6via still implies
a belief in the gods. The conclusion is roO avrov flvai daipovia Kal
Qfla TJyflcrdai. (E).
In Xenophon s apology this argument is entirely omitted ; and So
crates is represented as interpreting the naiva doifuma (which he is
accused of introducing) of TO datfiovtov, the divine sign which checked
him when he was about to do wrong ; and this is referred to the class of
divine communications oracles, omens, divination and so forth.
As to the status of the da-lpoves opinions varied: but the usual conception
of them was, as appears in Hesiod, Op. et D. 121, and many passages of
Plato, Timaeus, Laws (VIII 848 D, 6ea>v re KOI ru>v firofumv deals baipovrnv),
IV 713 B, OVK avdpcarrovs dXXa ytvovs daortpov re Kal afj,(ivovos, Sai /nofar,
and elsewhere, that they were an order of beings, like angels, interme
diate between men and gods, and having the office of tutelary deities or
guardian angels to the human race. So Hesiod. u. s., Theogn. 1348 (of
Ganymede), Plat. Phaedo 108 B, 107 D, 113 D. Aristotle seems to imply
the same distinction when he says, de Div. per Somn. I 2, init., that
dreams are not 6t ire^itra, because they are natural, Sai^ona petroi rj yap
256 PHTOPIKH2 B 23 8.
epyov KCCLTOI os TIS o teTai 6eov epyov eivai, TOV-
TOV dvd<yKr] oieardai Kal Oeovs eivai. Kal ws I(pi-
OTL fyevvaioTciTOs 6 (3e\Ti(TTO<s Kai yap
iw Kal ApiVToyeLTOvi ovfiev TrpoTepov vTrtjp^e
yevvcuov Trpiv yevvalov TL Trpa^ai. Kal OTL orvyye-
vecTTepos ouros* f{ TO. yovv ep*ya (Tvyyeveo Tepa eVrt
TO. ejULa rots Ap/uLO^iou Kal ApicrToyeiTOvos i] ret era.
Kal aJs eV TW A/\e^aV^j06J, OTL TrdvTes dv o/ULoXoyrjcreiav
TOVS /uLt] KOCT/ULLOVS ov% c^os (Tw/maTO s d^aTTav djroXav-
(j)va-Ls Saipovia, cJXX ou dfia. This argument of Socrates is repeated, in
1 8. 2, more at length, and with some difference of detail.
The second example is taken from Iphicrates speech upon the
prosecution of Harmodius. the 1/07 npbs Ap/ioSioi/, supra 6, "cum Har-
modius generis obscuritatem obiiceret, definitione generosi et propinqui
fastum adversarii repressit et decus suum defendit." Schrader. Har
modius had evidently been boasting of his descent from the famous
Harmodius, and contrasting his own noble birth with the low origin of
Iphicrates. The latter replies, by defining true nobility to be merit,
and not mere family distinction (comp. II 15, and the motto of Trinity
College, virtus vera nobilitas [luv. vill. 20 nobilitas sola est atque
unica virtus]); for Harmodius (himself) and Aristogeiton had no
nobility anterior to their noble deed\ Next as to the relationship
which Harmodius claimed : he himself is in reality more nearly related
to Harmodius than his own descendant : true kinsmanship is shewn in
similarity of actions : at all events my deeds are more nearly akin to
those of Harmodius and Aristogeiton than thine . This is still more
pointedly expressed in Plutarch s version, ATro^^ey/^ara fia<ri\eu>v Kal orpa-
rrjywv Iphicr. f , p. 187 B. npos 8e Ap/xofiiov, TOV TOV TraXaiov Ap/j.o8iov dnoyovov,
(Is 8va-ytv(iav avrw \OltoopOV fWVOV e<j)r) TO fieit epibv OTT C /JLOV ytvas ap^erat,
ro 5e (TOV tv aol naverai. This seems to be taken, with alterations, from
a speech of Lysias, ap. Stob. flor. 86. 15, quoted by Sauppe, Fragm.
Lys. xvm. Or. Att. ill 180. Another form of Iphicrates saying, briefer
still, is found in Pseudo-Plut. mept evyfvftas c. 21 (ap. Sauppe u. s.),
l<piKpaTT)s ovfi$ioij.fi os fls Svayeveiav tya> ap<, eiTre, TOV ytvovs.
The third is taken from the Alexander of some unknown apologist,
quoted before, 5, and 12 ; and c. 24. 7 and 9. On this Schrader;
" sententia illius videtur haec esse : Paridem intemperantem habendum
non esse, una quippe Helena contentum. Argumentum e definitione
temperantis (temperantiae) petitum." Similarly Victorius, "/xi) Koa-fjuos est
qui una contentus non est...sed quot videt formosas mulieres tot amat.
Cum sola Helena ipse contentus vixerit, non debet intemperans vocari."
cvos therefore is one only , and dyairav to be satisfied with . dnoXava-is,
of sensual enjoyment, Eth. N. I 3, sub init., o diroXavoriKos /Si oy, the life
of a Sardanapalus. Ib. Ill 13, 1118 a 30, aTroXauorfi, ij yU erai travel bC
d(prjs KOI tv (TIT IOIS Kal fv TTOTO IS Kal rols d(ppo8ia iois \fyoptvois. VII 6,
1148 a 5, Tas uco/iartKar diro\av(Tfis.
PHTOPIKH2 B 22 8, 9. 257
<riv. Kat ot b ^.a)KpaTris OUK e(j)rj fiaSifaiv ws A^e-
Xaov vfipiv yap e(pti eivai TO jur) vva(r6ai d/uLvi/acrdai
o^OLtvs ev TraQovra wcnrep KO.I KctKws. TraVres yap
OVTOI 6pi<rafJLevoi Kai XafiovTes TO Ti e crTf, (ruXXoyi-
9 tyvrai Trept tl)v Xeyovviv. ctAAos e /c TOV
The fourth is, the reason that Socrates gave for refusing to go to pay a
visit to Archelaus ; that it would be ignominious to him, to receive favours
from a man, and then not to have the power of requiting the benefits
(good treatment) in the same way as one would injuries (ill treatment).
This was a new definition, or an extension of the ordinary one, of vfipis,
which is "wanton outrage," supra n 2. 5, an act of aggression, vfipis
usually implies hostility on the part of him who inflicts it; in this case
the offer of a supposed benefit is construed as inflicting the ignominy.
The abstract vppis, for the concrete vftpia-riKov, occurs often elsewhere,
as in Soph. Oed. Col. 883, dp ovx vfipts raS ; KP. vftpis d\X avenrea,
Arist. Ran. 21, eir ovx vftpts ravr eon ; Lysistr. 658, Nub. 1299. Simi
larly Ter. Andr. I 5. 2, quid est si hoc non contumelia est ? (Reisig ad loc.
Soph.) And in other words ; 3> pla-os (i. e. ^.ICTTJTOV hated objecf] fls
"EXXr/i/aj, Eur. I ph. T. 512 ; J //tcros, Med. 1323, and Soph. Philoct. 991.
aXyo? for d\yfiv6i>, Aesch. Pr. Vinct. 261. Eur. Ion, 528 ye Xwy foryfXoioi ,
and Dem. dc F. L. 82, eon 8e ravra ye Xcor, paXXov 8" qvatcrxyvTia. duvrj.
Arist. Acharn. 125, ravra 8fJT OVK ay^oi"/.
The contempt of Archelaus implied in this refusal is noticed by
Diog. Laert., Vit. Socr. II 5. 25, vTrfpe(j)p6vr]a- oe Kal Apx f ^ou TO v Mae-
8ocos.../nr;re Trap CLVTOVS airf\6u>v , and see Schneider s note on Xenophon,
Apol. Socr. 17, on Socrates ordinary conduct in respect of the ac
ceptance of fees and gratuities and favours in general. On Archelaus
and his usurpation of the throne of Macedonia, and his tyranny and
crimes, see Plato Gorg. c. xxvi p. 470 c 471 c.
For all these first define the term (they are about to use), and then,
having found its true essence and nature, they proceed to draw their
inference (conclude) from it on the point that they are arguing. The
opoj or opto-p.6?, definition , is itself defined at length, Metaph. A 12,
1037 b 25, seq. : and more briefly Top. A 8, 103 b 15, 101 b 39, Z 6,
143 b 20. The definition of a thing is its Xoyor, ro ri yv tlvai tnjfiaivmv,
that which expresses the formal cause of a thing ; the what it was to
be; the essence of it, or that which makes it what it is. Only f t&rj or
species can, strictly speaking, be defined : the definition of the e iftos
gives the ytvos, the essentials, together with the Sia0opa, or specific
difference : and these two constitute the definition ; which is here
accordingly said to express TO rt eW/, the, what the thing really is .
On the definition see Waitz, Organ. II p. 398, and Trend. El. Log. Ar.
54, et seq. This topic of definition afterwards became the araais
opt*?;, nomen or finitio; one of the legal issues , on which see Intro
duction, Appendix E to Ek in pp. 397 400.
9. Top. vin. < TOV TToo-axas] Between the topics of definition
and division ( 10) is introduced this topic of ambiguous terms, or words
AR. II. I
258 PHTOPIKHS B 23 10.
10 oiov ev roZs TOTTIKOIS Trept TOV opOws. aA/Vos e/c fticti-
pecrews, oiov el TraVres Tpiwv eveicev d$iKOV(riv i]
*" : yap eveKa ^ Tovfie tj TovSe KOI did /mev TO. $vo p. 99-
that are susceptible of many and various senses, such as good (Top. A 15,
106 a 4 [Crete s Ar. I p. 402]) ; which must be carefully examined to see
whether or no they are all of them applicable to the argument. It is treated
at great length in Top. A 15, and again B 3 ; and is inserted here (be
tween definition and division; Decause it is equally applicable to both
(Brandis). The exhaustive treatment bestowed upon it in the Topics
supersedes the necessity of dwelling on it here ; and we are accordingly
referred to that treatise for illustration of it. Brandis, u.s., p. 19, objects
to Trept TOV opdas, "that there is nothing in the Topics which throws
any light upon the enigmatical op6>s ;" and proposes irepl TOV ei 6p6o>s
upon the right use of the terms , i. e. whether it can be applied properly
in any one of its various senses or not. But surely the reading of the
text may be interpreted as it stands in precisely the same meaning :
oiov fV TOTTlKois (Xe XeKTCtt, Ol" 8l<apl(TTai) TTfpl TOV Op0O>S (xpfjo-dai dVTo), aS
in the Topics (we have treated) of the right use of the terms . Muretus
has omitted the words in his transl. as a gloss : and Victorius, followed
by Schrader and Buhle, understands it as a reference, not directly to the
Topics, but to the dialectical art , as elsewhere, II 22. 10, for instance
see Schrader s note on n 25. 3. "Disciplina Topica intelligenda est."
Buhle. It seems to me to be a direct and explicit reference to the
passages of the Topics above mentioned, in which the right way of
dealing with these ambiguous terms is described.
10. Top. IX. < 8iaipf(rea>s] the topic of division. This is the
division of a genus into its e idij or species ; as appears from the example,
the three motives to crime, from which the inference is drawn. Finitioni
subiecta maxime videntur genus, species, differens, proprium. Ex his
omnibus argumenta ducuntur. Quint, v 10. 55. Top. B 2, 109 b 13 29.
T 6, 120 a 34 [Crete s Ar. I p. 435]. On Siaipea-is Tn demonstration, use
and abuse, see Anal. Pr. I 31. Trendel. El. Log. Ar. 58, p. 134 seq. Cic.
Topic. V 28, XXII 83, de Orat. II 39. 165, Sin pars (rei quaeritur) partitione,
hoc modo : aut senatui parendum de salute rei publicae fuit aut altud con-
silium instituendum aut sua sponte faciendum ; aliud consilium, superbum;
suum, adrogans ; uiendum igitur fuit consilio scnatus. Quint. V 10.
63, 65 seq. Ad probandum valet, et ad refcllendiim, 65. Periculosum ;
requires caution in the use, 67. The example, which illustrates the
topic by the three motives to crime or wrong-doing, pleasure, profit,
and honour, is taken from Isocrates di/Ti Socris, 217 220, as Spengel
points out, Trans. Bav. Acad. 1851, p. 20, note. All the three are suc
cessively applied to test the accusation (of corrupting youth) that his
enemies have brought against him, and all of them are found to be
unsuitable to explain the alleged fact. He therefore concludes by the
method of exhaustion, that having no conceivable motives, he is not
guilty. It must however be observed that Ar. s Sta 8e TO TP ITOV ovS
avroi (pacriv, is not supported by anything in Isocrates text. The causes
and motives of actions have been already divided in I 10, with a very
PHTOPIKH2 B 23 ii. 259
ii a&vvarov, $ta $e TO TpiTOv ov& auTOi (j)a(rtv. aAAo?
oiov e/c Trjs TIeTrapriBias, OTI irepl TCOV
different result. The same terms are there employed, S(eXo>/xe0a 6,
and SiatpeVeis I !
For an example of this topic, see II 23. 22 in the note.
On the inference from disjunctive judgments , see Thomson, Laws
of Thought, 90, p. 1 60.
n. Top. x. eg eirayaiyfjs] The rudimentary kind of induction,
of which alone Rhetoric admits : two or three similar cases being ad
duced to prove a general rule, from which the inference is drawn as to
the present case. It is the argument from analogy, or cases in point.
This and the following, says Brandis, u. s., naturally find nothing cor
responding to them in the Topics. Cic. de Or. II 40. 168, ex similitu-
dine; si ferae partus suos diligunt, qua nos in liberos nostros indulgentia
esse debcmus? &c. Quint, v 10. 73, est argumentoriim locus ex siinilibusj
si continentia virtus, utique et abstinentia : Si fidem debet tutor, et pro
curator. Hoc est ex eo genere quod fTraycayijv Gracci vacant, Cicero induc-
tionem.
eVc rfjs Hfiraprjdias] SIKTJS ; COmp. 6, eV TJ; irpos Ap[i68iov. An extract
from the well-known Peparethian case , about the parentage of a child;
the speaker adduces two analogous cases, or cases in point, to prove the
rule which he wishes to establish, that it is the mother who is the best
judge of the parentage of the child. Gaisford quotes Homer, Od. A 215,
fJ-iJTijp fjiev T ffj.e (forjcri rov ep.fj.fvai, avrap tycoye OVK ot S ov yap TTCO TIS tov
yovov OVTOS dveyva : on which Kustathius ; doKfi fie icat rw AptcrroreAci ra
flprjp.eva op6a>s exeiv.
TlfTraprjdias 1 ] " Concionis (ut puto) sive alterius generis scriptionis
nomen est Peparethia," Victorius. But in that case it would be masc.
(with \6yos understood), not feminine : and the analogy of 6 is also in
favour of the ellipse of S/K/JS. Otherwise we might understand errayayfjs,
or yvvaiKOs.
The meaning is, Another topic of inference is induction ; as, for
instance, it may be inferred as a general rule from the Peparethian case,
that in the case of children (as to the true parentage of children) women
always distinguish the truth better (than the other sex) . And the same
rule has been applied, from a similar induction, in two other recorded
cases ; for, in the first, (on the one hand), at Athens, in a dispute in
which Mantias the orator was engaged with his son (about his legiti
macy), the mother declared the fact (of the birth, and so gained the
cause for her child) ; and in the second, at Thebes, in a dispute between
Ismenias and Stilbo (for the paternity of a child), Dodonis (the mother)
1 Peparethus, one of a small group of islands (Sciathus, Icus, Halonnesus,
Scyrus ; Strab. Thessal. IX 5) off the coast of Magnesia, irp^Keivrai ruv Mayi^row,
Strabo u. s. (vrjffos fj.la ruv KwrXdSwi , Steph. Byz. s.v., una ex Cycladibus, Buhle.
OVK a-n-oOfv Ei^3o/as, Suidas), N.E. of Euboea: famous for its wine, Soph. Phil. 548,
evporpvv HeirdprjOov, Aristoph. Thesmoph. Sec. Fr. i (ap. Athen. I 29, A [Aristopli.
fragm. 301. Dind. ed. 5]) Meineke, Fragm. Com. ii 1076. Comp. Herm. Fragm.
Phorm. 2 12 (ap. eund. n 410).
172
260 PHTOPIKHS B 23 n.
TeKVtav at yvvaiKes Travra-^ov $iopiov(Ti
TOVTO fjiev yap AB^vnori Mayr/a Tia pqTOpt ct)U^)r/8>?-P.
TOVVTL TTjOOS TOV VIOV tf fJLYlTY}f) d7Te(j)t]VeV, TOVTO $6
VOS d/UL(pia /3t]TOVVT(n)V
TOV vlov, KO.I <$ia TOVTO
OeTTa\io~KOV IfffULtivlov evSfUJ^Ov. /ecu TraXiv e /c TOV
vofjiov TOV QeofieKTOv, el rots /ca/cws e7n/zeA.770e?<n TCOV
made a declaration that it belonged to Ismenias ; and in consequence
Thettaliscus was always regarded as Ismenias son .
Mantias the orator , whose name does not appear in Smith s Biogr.
Diet., may be the same person who is mentioned as the father of Manti-
theus and Boeotus, of the deme of Thoricus, Dem. Boeot. de nom. 7,
10; comp. 30 (bis), 37. [ Mantias proposed that Plangon should declare
on oath before an arbitrator, whether Boeotus and Pamphilus were her
sons by Mantias or not. She had assured him privately that if the oath
in the affirmative were tendered to her, she would decline to take it... She,
however, unexpectedly swore that they were her sons by Mantias. Prom
Mr Paley s Introd. to Dem. Or. 39, Select Private Orations, I p. 131.
Comp. supplementary notes on pp. 134 and 182].
Ismenias, whose name likewise is wanting in Smith s Did., was in
all probability the one somewhat celebrated in Theban history, as leader,
with Autoclides, of the anti-Lacedaemonian party at Thebes, mentioned
by Xenophon, Hellen. v 2. 25 seq. He was accused by his opponent
Leontiades, tried, and put to death by a court appointed for the purpose
by the Lacedaemonians, who were then (383 B. C.) in occupation of the
Cadmeia, Xen. Ib. 35, 36, Grote, Hist. Gr. x pp. 80, 85, 86 [chap LXXVI].
His name is also associated by Mr Grote, H. G. x 380, 387, 391 [chap.
LXXIX], with that of Pelopidas, as one of the ambassadors to the court of
Artaxerxes at Susa in 367 B. C. ; and again, as taken prisoner with him by
Alexander of Pherae in the following year. The authority for these state
ments appears to be Plutarch, Artax. xxn for the first; and Id. Pelopid.
xxix sub fin. for the second: Xenophon does not mention him in this
connexion. At all events, it was not the same Ismenias, that was put to
death in 383, and accompanied Pelopidas, as ambassador and captive, in
367 and 366 l . Of Stilbon, and the other persons named, I can find no
further particulars.
And another instance from Theodectes "law" if to those who have
mismanaged other people s hoTSeS we don t entrust horses of our own, or
(our ships) to those who have upset the ships of others ; then, if the rule
hold universally, those who have ill guarded or maintained the safety
and well-being of others, are not to be employed in (entrusted with) the
preservation of our own . Sauppe, Fragm. Theod. No/zo? (Or. Att. in
1 The name Ismenias appears to have been traditional in Boeotia from the very
earliest times. Ifr/uijc/ijj 6 Boiwnos is mentioned in the biography of Homer
ascribed to Herodotus, 2, 3, as one of the original settlers of the new colony
of Cuma in Aeolia, and carrying with him Homer s mother Crithe is.
PHTOPIKHS B 23 ii. 261
d\\OTpiu>v nnrtav ov 7rapa$i$oa(ri TOVS otKe/oi/s, ovde
TO?S dvaTpe^lsavi rets d\\OTpias vavs OVKOVV el
d/iOiws e(j) diravTiaVy KO.I rots /ca/cws (>v\da(Ti TY\V
dXXorpiav ov ^pricrreov earriv ets Trjv owe iav (rcoTtj-
piav. Ko.1 ws A.\Ki$d/uLas, on Trai/res TOI)S cro<pov<s
TifJiwcriv YldpLOi <yovv Ap%iXo%ov Kai Trep fi\dcr<priiuLOV
OVTO. T6Ti/mr]Ka(ri, KOI XIcu O/mripov oi/ /c oWa
247), thinks with every appearance of probability that Theodectes
law " (declamationeni) ad rationes militum mercenariorum lege ab
Atheniensibus accurate ordinandas pertinuisse." Both the fragments
quoted by Aristotle, here, and again 17, agree perfectly with this view.
The extract here stigmatizes the folly shewn by the Athenians in entrust
ing their interests to mercenaries like Charidemus and his fellows who
have already shewn their incapacity and untrustworthiness whilst in the
employment of others foreign princes and states who have used their
services. The other extract, 17, is to shew that by their gross miscon
duct and the mischief they have already done, most of them with the
exception perhaps of men like Strabax and Charidemus have entirely
disqualified themselves for employment. From the example in Theo
dectes law , the general principle may be inferred, that it is forty to
entrust with the care of our own interests and the management of our
affairs such as have already shewn themselves incapable by previous
failures in like cases. The argument from the analogy of trades and
professions is quite in the manner of Socrates and Plato.
On Theodectes himself and his works, see note on II 23. 3, and the
references there.
A\KiSa/W] Of Alcidamas and his writings, see note on I 13.2, and
the reff. This fragment is referred by Sauppe, Fragm. Alcid. 5, to Al
cidamas Mova-elov, of which he says, on fragm. 6, that he supposes it
to have been : " promptuarium quoddam rhetoricum, quod declamationes
de variis rebus contineret" ^ Alkidamas . . .sein mannigfaltige rhetorische
Probestiicke ^^mfasscndes Buck povaeiov nannte" Vahlen, der Rhetor Alki-
damas, p. 495]. Alcidamas Mfo-u^viaKos \6yos is quoted, I 13. 2, and II 23. r.
Ilapioi yovv TI ir6\is] translated in Camb. Journ. of Cl. and Sacred
Phil. No. 9, Vol. ill. p. 267.
TOVS o-o^ou s] are here the great wits , men of genius; men distin
guished (not here specially as artists, but) for literature, learning, or
wisdom in general.
Of Archilochus, his life, character, and writings, a good account is to
be found in Mure, Hist. Gr, Lit. Vol. in. p. 138 seq. (Bk. in. ch. iii), in
which the j3\aa-(f)r)fj.[a noted by Alcidamas, as well as his great celebrity,
is abundantly illustrated. See also Miiller, Hist. Gr. Lit. c. XI 6 10,
and 14. Archilochum proprio rabies armavit iambo, Hor. A. P. 79 (with
Orelli s note). Parios iambos, Ib. Ep. I 19. 23 seq.
ou/c OVTO. noXirrjv] This, the vulgata lectio, is retained by Bekker, and
even (for once) by Spengel, though A c has n-oXmicoj/. In favour of this,
262 PHTOPIKHS B 23 11.
KUI MuTtXrjva ioi ^La7r(pa> Kcti Trep jvvaiKa oucrav, KCII
Aa/ce3cu/xcwoi X/Awj/cc TOJV yepovrtov eTroirja-av ij
(ptXoXojOL oWes, Kai IraXicorai Hvdayopav,
ovra e6a\jsav
the reading of the best MS, it may be urged, that TrdXiTrjv would represent
the Chians as disclaiming Homer as their fellow-citizen, quite contrary
to the pertinacity with which they ordinarily urged their claim to the
honour of his birthplace. This was carried so far, that Simonides in
one of his fragments, Eleg. Fragm. 85 line 2 (Bergk), says of a quotation
from Homer, XTos eenrtv dvqp. Comp. Thucyd. ill 104. On this Ionic
claim, see further in Mure, Hist. Gk. Lit. Vol. II p. 202. On the other
hand ov Tj-o\irr]v may mean as Miiller supposes, Hist. Gk. Lit. ch. v
i that they claimed, not Homer s birth, but merely his residence
among them. The other reading irokiriKov affords an equally good
sense ; that his Chian fellow-countrymen conferred honours upon Homer,
though not upon the ordinary ground of public services, or active
participation in the business of public life ; as the Athenians had
they so pleased might have dealt with Plato.
Kai irfp ywaiKa ovcrav] "Sappho so far surpassed all other women in
intellectual and literary distinction that her fellow-countrymen, the
Mytileneans, assigned to her the like honours with the men, whom
she equalled in renown ; admitted by her countrymen of every age to
be the only female entitled to rank on the same level with the more
illustrious poets of the male sex." Mure, H. G. L. Vol. in p. 273,
Sappho. He refers to this passage. Chiton, Mure, Ib. p. 392. Diog.
Laert., vit. Chil. 68, substitutes the ephory for the seat in the yepovo-t a
as the honour conferred on Chilon by the Lacedaemonians.
<iXoXoyoi] of a literary turn .
IraXuorcu] (SuceXtwrat) Greek settlers in Italy (and Sicily). Victorius
remarks that these are properly distinguished from iraXoi, the original
inhabitants, who would not have understood Pythagoras learning, or
institutions, or moral precepts.
Pythagoras, according to the received account, as reported by Diogenes
Laertius, vit. Pyth., was a native of Samos, to which after various travels
he was returning, when, finding it oppressed by the tyranny of Polycrates,
he started for Croton in Italy ; Kanel v6p.ovs dels TOIS iraXiwrcus eSogdo-dr)
(TVV TOLS fJ.adrjTCUS, Ol TTpOS TOVS TpldKOCriOVS OVTfS (fKOVOflOVV aplCTTd TO
TToXmKa, wore a-x*$ov apuTTOKparlav elvai rfjv TroXtret ai/, 3. In what
way the honour of his new fellow-citizens was expressed rather by re
spect and admiration, than by substantial rewards, may be gathered from
the famous OVTOS e(pa of his pupils, and from a notice in Diogenes,
14, OVTO> S edavfj-dcrdr] K.r.X.
Anaxagoras was a native of Clazomenae in Ionia, but, reXoy atro-
Xaprjcras els Aa/^^a^oi/ avrodi KaTtcrTpe^ffv. Diog. Laert., Anaxagoras, 14,
a custom held in his honour, Ib. TeKevrrja-avTa Si) avrov fQa-^rav evrifias
ol Aa^aKrjvol KCU eirfypa^aV Ei>$a8e, TrXetoroi dXrjdeirjs eV! repjw.
nvpaviov KOCT/UOV, Keirat A.vaayopas, 15.
PHTOPIKHS B 23 ii, 12. 263
TlfJLOJO tV 6TI KCtl V\JV. . . OTl K6t]VOLOL TOtS
vopois xpria-apevot euSai/uLovtjcrav KUI
TO?S AvKOvpyov, K.O.L Stj^CTiv a[j.a. ol TrpocrTaTai <pi-
i2\o<ro(f)oi ejevovro KCXI ev^aifjiovno ev r\ TTO\IS. aAAos
GK Kpiarew Trept rou avrov r) O/ULOLOU tj evavriov, fjid-
Kal A.drjva1oi] ita vulg. ct vet. transl. Lat. "on Afywuoi, A" apud
Viet, et Gaisf." Spengel. Accordingly Bekker, Ed. 3, Spengel and Vahlen
now read OTU A#. preceded by the mark of something omitted. And
in fact, as Spengel observes, what follows is not a proper continuation
of the preceding quotation from Alcidamas, but a new example of the
general topic of induction. The general rule which is derived from the
two following instances has fallen out, or something suggesting it, to
which on refers, has been omitted either by a copyist, or possibly in his
haste by the author himself. Aristotle is capable of this ; continuing
perhaps to quote from Alcidamas, he may have neglected to supply
the proper connexion. The general principle that is to be inferred
from the induction may be the Platonic paradox that the true statesmen
are philosophers : this appears from the three examples, that the
Athenians flourished and were happy under the laws of Solon, and
the Lacedaemonians under those of Lycurgus ; and at Thebes, the pros
perity (or flourishing condition) of the city was coeval with the accession
of its leaders to philosophy . I have rendered the last words thus to
express eyevovro. But the meaning of the whole is doubtless as Victorius
gives it, that the happiness of Thebes, that is, its virtue and glory, began
and ended with the philosophy of its leaders. This is inadequately
expressed by eyevovro, which only conveys the beginning of the co
incidence : and, if the explanation of the suppressed rule be right,
would have been better represented by Sfia ol (f)i\6(ro(f)oi Trpoorarai
eyevovro. The last word is a correction of Victorius from MS A c for the
vjilgata lectio eXe yoiro. (The leaders here referred to are Epaminondas
and Pelopidas.)
12. Top. XI. This is an inference e< npicreas, l from an authoritative
judgment or decision already pronounced upon the same question, or
one like it, or the opposite (opposites may always be inferred from
opposites) ; either universally and at all times (supply ovra> ittKpliuurtv}
or, in default of that, by the majority, or the wise either all or most
or good . This topic, like the last, is naturally wanting in the dialectical
Topics, to which it is inappropriate. Brandis, u. s.
Cicero, Top. XX 78, mixes up this topic with the authority of cha
racter, the tfdos ev raj Xeyoj/ri, which ought not to be confounded though
they have much in common ; the authority being derived from the same
source, intellectual and moral pre-eminence, but employed in different
ways. The former of the two is made supplementary to the other,
sed et oratores ct philosophos ct poet as ct historicos : ex quorum et dictis
ct scriptis saepe auctoritas pctitur ad facicndam fidcm. Quintilian omits
it in his enumeration, v 10.
264 PHTOPIKHS B 23 12.
Aicrra juef et TraVres KCLL dei, el 8e /u/, a AA cu 76
// o~o(pot rj TraWes r; oi 7rAe?a"TOt, /;
rj el avrol ol KpivovTes, r] ov<$
We have here, and in the following sentence, a classification of
authorities from whose foregone decisions we may draw an inference
as to the truth of a statement, or the rectitude of a principle, act, or
course of policy which we have to support ; or the reverse. Such are
the universal consent of mankind 1 , quod semper, quod ubique^ quod
ab omnibus: short of tnat, the judgment of the majority: or of the
wise , especially professional men, experts, pre-eminently skilled in
any art, science, practice, pursuit, or the majority of them : or, lastly,
the good, the right-minded, and therefore sound judging; whose minds
are unclouded by passion or partiality, unbiassed by prejudice, clear
to decide aright : men of <^povr}(ns who have acquired the habit of right
judgment in practical business and moral distinctions. The good, or
virtuous man, the (pp6vip.os or dyados, or the opdos \6yos, appears again
and again in Aristotle s Moral and Political writings as the true
standard of judgment. Comp. Rhet. I 6. 25, dyadov, o rcav (ppovinav TIS
r) TU>V dyadcav dvSpcov ) ywaucav TrpoeKpiixv, and see note and references there.
The wise, as authorities ; particularly judges and legislators, as well
as poets, philosophers, statesmen, prophets and seers, and the like ; are
one class of pdprvpes (as attesting the truth of a statement or principle)
of the are^i/ot iriareis, I 15. 13, seq. : where Homer, Periander, Solon,
Themistocles (as an interpreter of oracles), and Plato, are selected as
examples.
TI el avToi 01 Kpivovres] again KfKpiKaa-iv. Or again, (special classes of
authorities,) if the judges themselves, or those whose authority they
accept (have already pronounced upon the point) ; or those whose deci
sion we have no power of opposing, such as our lords and masters (any
one that has power, controul, over us, with whom it is folly to contend);
or those whose decision it is not right to oppose, as gods, father, pastors
and masters (whom we are bound m duty to obey).
An instance of this is what Autocles said in his speech on the pro
secution of Mixidemides (this is lit. as Aut. said, what he did say against
M. ) that (before < supply ftdi bi> tlvm aut tale aliquid, l it was monstrous
that, to think that ) the dread goddesses (the Eumenicles or Erinnyes)
should be satisfied to bring their case 2 before the Areopagus, and Mixi
demides not ! That is, that the authority of thecourthad been proved by the
submission of the Eumenides, Mixidemides was therefore bound to submit
in like manner : the jurisdiction and its claims had been already decided.
Of the circumstances of the case nothing further is known : but it seems
1 On the force of this argument from universal consent, see Cic. Tusc. Disp. I cc.
12, 13, 14, 15: especially 13, 30 (of the belief in God), and 15, 35, omnium con
sensus naturae vox est, seq. With which compare the maxim, Vox populi vox Dei.
2 oiKrjv dovvai is here, as in Thuc. I -28, Sfcas rj6e\ov Sod/at, to submit to trial or
adjudication : comp. Aesch. c. Ctes. 124, and theplirase SLKTIV dovvai /cat Xa/3V,
denoting a general legal settlement of differences. The usual meaning is to pay
the penalty or give satisfaction .
PHTOPIKHS B 23 12. 265
KpivovTe<$, o /mr oov T6 vavrov Kpveiv, oov
Kvpiois, t] ois /uirj KaXov TO, evai/Tia Kpiveiv, olov
t] TraTpi i] $L$aa Kd\ois i wcnrep TO el-s Mi^icr]-
eiTrev AvTOK\fjs, el TCHS /mev cre/ULvaT^ 6eais iKavws
ev Apeiw Trdyco Sovvai c tKtiv, Mi^i^ri/midy c ov.
ij wonrep Za7r<^>w, OTI TO aTrodvt iorKeiv KUKOV ol 6eoi
yap O UTO) K6KpiKa(riv djreOvricrKOV yap dv. in ws Api-
from the allusion here, that Mixid. had first refused to submit to the
Court of Areopagus the trial of some charge against him, on which he
was subsequently, and consequently, prosecuted in one of the ordinary
courts of Autoclcs.
The appearance of the a-ffj-val deal as prosecutors in the court of the
Areopagus is of course a reference to their prosecution of Orestes in
Aeschylus Eumenides. Of Mixidemides we know but the name. Au-
tocles was a much more important personage. He was an Athenian,
son of Strombichides, Xen. Hellen. VI 3. 2, one of the seven ambassadors
sent to the congress at Sparta in 371 B.C., in the spring before the battle
of Leuctra, Xen. 1. c., who reports his speech 7. Xenophon (u. s. 7)
calls him paXa eVto-rpe^^s ptJTap, a very careful orator (so Sturz, Lex.
Xen. and Lexx. but I think rather, dexterous , one who could readily turn
himself about to anything, versatile : and so apparently Suidas, who
renders it dy^tVovs). Autocles was again employed in 362 361 "in place
of Ergophilus (Rhet. II 3.13) to carry on war for Athens in the Helle
spont and Bosporus." (Grote.) Xenophon s Hellenics do not reach this
date. His operations against Cotys in the Chersonese, and subsequent
trial, are mentioned by Demosth. c. Aristocr. 104 and c. Polycl. 12,
and his name occurs, pro Phorm. 53 [A. Schaefer s Dem. u. s. Zeit
1 pp.64, 134 and ill 2. p. 158]. See Grote, H. G. x 223 [c. LXXVII], and
5 1 1 seq. [c. LXXX]. Another Autocles, d ToA/iim ov, is mentioned by Thuc.
IV 53, and again c. 119: and another by Lysias, irpos Si/xcovu 12: and a
fourth by Aeschines, de F. Leg. 155.
Or (another example) Sappho s saying, that death must be an evil:
for the gods have so decided ; else they would have died themselves :
using the gods as an authority for the truth of her dictum.
Or again, as Aristippus to Plato, when he pronounced upon some
point in as he, Aristippus, thought a somewhat too authoritative tone,
"Nay but," said he, "our friend" meaning Socrates "never used to
speak like that. "
Aristippus draws an inference from the authority of their common
master who never dictated, but left every question open to free discus
sion, always assuming his own ignorance, and desire to be instructed
rather than to instruct to the proper rule in conducting philosophical
discussion. On Aristippus see Crete s Plato, Vol. ill. p. 530, seq.
ch. xxxviil.
On this passage, see Grote, Plato, in 471, and note. In qualification
of what is there said of Plato s arrogance , so far as it can be gathered
266 PHTOPIKH2 B 23 12.
TTjOOj TlXaTiovo. eTTayyeXTiKUjTepov n ei- p-
utero (( d\\a /xi)i/ o y eraipos j)/>cwi/" ecpr]
fi ovOev TOIOVTOV" Xeywv TOV ^coKpaTtiv. KCLI
from our text, take Victorius commentary on cos w fro, with which I
entirely agree : "quae sequuntur verba modestiam Platonis defendunt, et
paene declarant sine causa Aristippum arrogantiae eum insumulasse :
addit enim o5y o>ero, ut opinio illius erat." I will not however deny that
Plato may even in conversation have been occasionally guilty of dogma
tizing : in his latest writings, such as the Timaeus and Laws, and to a
less degree in the Republic, such a tendency undoubtedly shews itself:
but by far the larger portion of his dialogues, which represent probably
nearly three-fourths of his entire life, are pervaded by a directly opposite
spirit, and are the very impersonation of intellectual freedom. Following
the method and practice of his master, he submits every question as it
arises to the freest dialectical discussion, so that it is often impossible to
decide which way (at the period of writing any particular dialogue) his
own opinion inclines; and always presents in the strongest light any
objections and difficulties in the thesis which he is maintaining. I think
at all events with Victorius that Aristotle at any rate lends no counte
nance here to Aristippus charge of dogmatic assumption. So far as his
outward bearing and demeanour were concerned, I can conceive that he
may have been haughty and reserved, possibly even morose : but a habit
of laying down the law , or of undue assumption and pretension in lec
turing and discussion which is what Aristippus appears here to attri
bute to him seems to me to be inconsistent with what we know from
his dialogues to have been the ordinary habit of his mind, at least until
he was already advanced in life 1 .
firayye\TiK<aTfpov] eVayye XXecrtfat is to announce , make public
profession of, as of an art, pursuit, business, practice. Xen. Memor.
I 2. 7, eV dperriv, of the Sophists, who. made a profession of teaching
virtue . So- Ilpcorayopov eVayyeXp.a, Rhet. II 24. II. This profession
may or may not carry with it the notion of pretension without perform
ance, imposture, sham, (paii/o/neV/; aofyla, show without substance : and it
is by the context and the other associations that the particular meaning
must be determined. Thus when Protagoras says of himself, TOVTO
(TTIV, a 2., TO eVdyyeX/ia o eVayye XXo/^ai, he certainly does not mean to
imply that he is an impostor : when Aristotle 1. c. applies the term to
him, this is by no means so certain; judging by his account of the
Sophists, de Soph. El. i, 165 a 19 seq. Instances of both usages may be
found in Ast, Lex. Plat. There can be no doubt that undue assumption
or pretension is meant to be conveyed by Aristippus in applying the
word to Plato s tone and manner.
And Agesipolis repeated the inquiry of the God at Delphi, which
he had previously made (of the God) at Olympia (Apollo at Delphi,
Zeus at Olympia), whether his opinion coincided with his father s;
1 I have expressed my opinion upon some points of Plato s character, in con
trast with that of Aristotle, in Introd. to transl. of Gorgias p. xxvii, and note ; to
which I venture here to refer.
PHTOPIKHS B 23 12. 267
(ri7ro\is ev AeA^oIs eTrripwra TOV 6eov, trpoTepov K6-
OXv/uLTriacrLVy el O.VTW TUVTO. Bo/cel a Trep Tto
ws aia"xpov ov TavavTia eLTrelv. Kal Trepi Trjs P. 1399.
ok IvoKpaTrys eypa^jsev OTL cnrov^aia, eiTrep
Qrj(revs eKpivev Kal Trepi AXe^dv^pov, ov al deal
TrpoeKpivav, Kal Trepi E Jayopoy, OTL crTTOfSatos, cocnrep
(prjoriv Kovwv yovv
assuming or inferring (CDS sc. from the obvious duty of respecting the
authority of a father) the disgracefulness of pronouncing the contrary .
For v. 1. Hy?;(ri7r7roy Victorius and Muretus had proposed to substitute
A-yr/o-tVoXu, from Xen. Hellen. IV 7. 2, which has been adopted in the
recent editions of Bekker and Spengel ; being also confirmed by a varia.
tion in the old Latin Transl., which has Hegesippus polis. See Spengel in
Trans. Bav. Acad. 1851, p. 53. Gaisford in Not. Var. and Victorius.
Xenophon in the passage cited tells the whole story. Agesipolis is the
first of the three kings of Sparta of that name, who came to the throne
in 394 B.C. (Clinton, F. H. n p. 205). His expedition into Argolis, to
which the consultation of the oracle was preparatory, was in 390 (Clinton,
F. H. sub anno]. This Agesipolis has been not unnaturally confounded
with his more distinguished fellow-citizen and contemporary Agesilaus,
to whom Plutarch, Reg. et Imper. Apophthegm., Agesilaus 7, p. 191 B,
erroneously ascribes this saying as an apophthegm (Gaisford). And simi
larly Diodorus, xiv 97, has substituted the latter name for the former in
his account of (apparently) the same event that Xenophon is relating in
the passage above cited. See Schneider s note ad locum.
And Isocrates argument about Helen, to shew that she was vir
tuous and respectable, (as she must have been) since (eiTrep, if as he
did} she was approved by Theseus (Theseus decided, or gave judgment
in her favour) . Aristotle s fKpwev expresses Jsocrates dyaTrrja-avras Kal
Bavpaa-avTas. See ante, I 6. 25. The passage of Isocrates referred to
occurs in his Helen 18 22. Compare especially 21, 22. He con
cludes thus, Trepi 8e TO>V OVTO> TraXaioiz/ TrpocnjKet rot? /car iKflvov rov xpovov
ev (ppovrja-aa-iv o^ovoovvras jj/xaj (paivtcrdai, to give way to their authority.
And the case of Alexander (Paris) whom the (three) goddesses (Juno,
Minerva, Venus) preferred (selected, decided, by preference ; Trpo, before
all others ; to adjudge the prize of beauty). This instance is given
before, with the preceding, in I 6. 25.
And as Isocrates says, to prove that (on) Evagoras was a man of
worth Conon, at all events after his misfortune, left all the rest and
came to Evagoras . Evagoras, the subject of Isocrates panegyric, Or.
IX, was king of Salamis in Cyprus. In the spring of 404 B.C., after the
defeat of Aegospotami (Svc-ri^o-as), he fled for refuge to Evagoras, Xen.
Hellen. n i. 29; the words Suo-rvx^o-as a>s Evayopav q\6e are a direct quo
tation from the Oration, 52. This incident of Conon s forced visit is
absurdly embellished, exaggerated, and distorted from its true significance
by the voluble panegyrist, 51 seq.
268 PHTOPIKHS B 23 13.
13 TOVS a\\ovs TrapaXiTTwi , cJs Evayopav r]\6ev.
CK TWV jULepaiv, wcnrep eV ro?s TOTTIKOLS, iroia. Kivr](ri<s
13. Top. xil. fKTuv fifpcov] the argument from the parts to the whole.
This topic, so briefly dispatched here, is much more clearly and fully set
forth in the Topics, B 4, in a 33 seq. [Grote s Ar. I p. 417], to which we
are referred ; the same example being given in both. The parts and whole,
are the species and genus. Anything of which the genus or whole can be
predicated must likewise fall under one of its species, because the species
taken together make up the genus ; if knowledge for instance be pre-
dicable of something, then some one of its parts or branches grammar,
music or some other species of knowledge must needs be predicable
of the same; otherwise it is no part of knowledge. And the same
applies to the declensions Trapcow/zwy Xe-yo/iei/a, the same root or notion
with altered terminations of the words representing the genus ; what
is true of eVior^/ij; &c. is equally true of en-to-r^cof, ypa^/zartKos 1 , /zoucn/cos.
If then all the parts of the genus are or can be known (this is assumed
in the text), we have to consider when any thesis is proposed, such as, the
soul is in motion (TTJV tyvxnv Kivelardai, meaning, that the soul is motion),
what the kinds of motion are, and whether the soul is capable of being
moved in any of them ; if not, we infer, from part to whole , that the
genus motion is not predicable of soul, or that the soul is devoid of motion.
Kivrjo-is is usually divided by Aristotle into four kinds, (i) <popa, motion
of translation, motion proper ; (2) aXXoiWiy, alteration ; (3) avgrjcris,. growth ;
and (4) $dio-is, decay. De Anima I 3, 406 a 12. Again Metaph. A 2, 1069
b 9, Kara TO TI TJ Kara TO TTOIOV r) TTOVOV rj jrov, where yevfcrts dnXfj KOI (pdopd
are added to the list, and distinguished from avfya-is and (pdiais, but
still included in four divisions ; yeveo-is Kai (pdopd, Kara roSe or ro ri ;
av^rjcns K.OL <f>0opd, KOTO. TO JTOCTOV ; aXXoicocris 1 , Kara ro Trddos, 01 TTOIOV ; and
(popd, Kara ronov, or nov. In Phys. VII 2 sub init. there are distinguished
(popd, TTOO-OV, TTOIOV. Categ. c. 14, 15 a 13, six, ytvecns, (pdopd, av^vis,
fj.fiaxrt.s, aXXoi axrtr, T) Kara TOTTOV /iera/SoXr}. Plato gives two, Parmen. 138
C, (i) motion proper or of translation and (2) change. To which, p. 162 E,
is added as a distinct kind the motion of revolution or rotation, (i) dXXot-
oiiadai) alteration, change of character, Kara ro Trddos, TO iroiov ; (2) /ieraj3atWti ,
change of place ; and (3) <rrp(eo-&H, revolution. And in Legg. x c. 6,
893 B seq., where the distinctions are derived from a prio reconsiderations,
ten is the total number, 894 C. (Comp. Bonitz ad loc. Metaph., Waitz
ad 1. Categ.) Cicero treats this topic of argument, under the general
head of dtjinitio, Top. v 26, seq., afterwards subdivided into partitio
and divisio; and under the latter speaks of the process of dividing the
genus into its species, which he calls formae; Formae sunt hae, in
quas genus sine ullius praetermissione dividitur : ut si quis ius in legem,
tnorem, aeqnitatem dividat, 31 : but does not go further into the
argument to be derived from it.
Quintilian, v 10. 55, seq., follows Cicero in placing genus and species
under the head finitio, 55, comp. 62 ; in distinguishing partitio
and divisio, as subordinate modes of finitio 63 ; and points out the
mode of drawing inferences, affirmative or negative, from the division
of the genus into its parts or species, as to whether anything proposed
PHTOPIKH2 B 23 13. 269
;/ -rv ;e yap tj fide. Trapa&eLyfJLa etc rov
TOI/S TOV 0eo3e/cTOir (( ets TTOLOV iepov t}aref3r]Kv ;
can or can not be included under it, 65. These are his examples.
Ut sit civis aut natus sit oportet, aut factus : utrumque tollendum est,
nee natus nee factus est. Ib. Hie servus quern tibi vindicas, aut
uerna tuus est, aut emptus, aut donatus, aut testamento relictus, aut ex
hoste captus, aut alienus : deinde remotis prioribus supererit alienus.
He adds, what Aristotle and Cicero have omitted ; periculosum, et cum
cura intuendiun genus ; quia si in proponendo unum quodlibet omi-
serimus, cum risu quoque tota res solvitur.
Example from Theodectes Socrates : " What temple has he pro
faned ? To which of the gods that the city believes in (recognises,
accepts) has he failed to pay the honour due ? " The phrase a<re/3eti> e Is
TO Ifpov TO fv AeXcpoiy occurs twice (as Victorius notes) in Aesch. c. Ctes.
106, 107. Theodectes " Socrates," which is (most probably) quoted
again without the author s name 18, was one of the numerous dn-oXoytai
SwKparouy of which those of Plato and Xenophon alone are still in
existence. We read also (Isocr. Busiris 4) of a paradoxical /car^yop/a
2<BKparot;? by Polycrates (one of the early Sophistical Rhetoricians, Spengel
Art. Script, pp. 75 7. Camb. Journ. of Cl. and Sacred Phil. No. IX
vol. ill 281 2), which was answered by an airo\oyia ScoKparovs from
Lysias, Speng. op. cit. p. 141. On this see Sauppe, Lys. Fragm. cxm
Or. Att. ill 204 : which is to be distinguished from another and earlier
one, also by Lysias, Sauppe, u. s. Fr. cxn p. 203. [Blass, Att. Bereds. I,
p. 342, n, pp. 337,416.]
Theodectes is here answering the charge of Meletus, ovs /xeV ?; TroXip
vo/*iet deovs ov voplfav, Xen. Mem. I i. i, Apol. Socr. n, Plat. Ap.
Socr. 26 B. To this Xenophon, like Theodectes, replies by a direct
contradiction, and affirmation of the contrary, Mem. I 1.2, 6va>v re yap
(pavepos TJV, K.r.X. comp. 2o; and sim. Apol. Socr. n seq. How the
charge is met by Plato in his Apology cc. xiv, xv, and dialectically
argued, has been already intimated, supra 8, see note, and comp.
in 1 8. 2. The difference of the mode of treatment severally adopted
by the two disciples in the defence of their master is remarkable. The
inference implied in Theod. s argument is this : You accuse Socrates
of impiety and disbelief in the gods. Has he ever profaned a temple ?
Has he neglected to worship them and do them honour, by sacrifice
and other outward observances? The indignant question, implying
that the speaker defies the other to contradict him and prove his charge,
assumes the negative. But such offences as these are the parts of
impiety which indicate disbelief in the gods the orator in his excitement
takes for granted that the enumeration is complete, that there is nothing
else which could prove disbelief in the gods and if he is not guilty of any
of them, neither can he be guilty of the impiety which includes these, and
these alone, as its parts ; the whole or genus is not predicable of him 1 .
1 This argument may possibly be suitable to a sophist and declaimer, but the use
of it in a court of justice would certainly be exposed to the danger against which
Quintilian warns those who employ the topic in general.
2/0 PHTOPIKHS B 23 14.
Tivas Oeuiv ou TeTifJitiKev wv jj TroAi? VOJJLL^OL ;"
14 aAAos, eTreiSfj eV* rwy TrAe/crra^ (rv/ufiaivei cocrO eVe-
o*0a/ Tt TO) ai/ro) d ya.Qov Kai KCIKOV, e /c TOI/ a /coAoiy-
BOUVTOS TrpOTpeTreiv rj ctTTOTpeTreiv KO.I KaTriyopeTv ij
Oai KCII eTraiveiv r\ ^Jseyeiv. oiov T
14, 15. Top. xin. Argumentum ex consequent ibusj *< TW
TIV\ dyadvv rj K.CIK&V, which Viet, found as a title to the topic in one of
his MSS. On eirecrdai and aKoXnvdelv, and their various senses, dialectical
and in the ordinary language, see note on I 6. 3 . The general meaning
of them seems to be concomitant ; that which constantly waits or
attends upon something, either as antecedent, simultaneous, or sub
sequent.
There are two topics of consequents, xni and xiv. The first is simple.
Most things have some good and some bad consequent" usually or
inseparably attached to them, as wisdom and the envy of fellow-citizens
are the ordinary results of education. In exhortation, defence, and
encomium (the three branches of Rhetoric) we urge the favourable
consequence the resulting wisdom in the case proposed if we have
to dissuade, to accuse, to censure, the unfavourable ; each as the occasion
may require. Th<T seconH^Js somewhat more complex. Here we have
two opposites (7rep\~$voiv KCU dvriKeiufvoiv) to deal with in the example
public speaking falls into the two alternatives of true and fair speaking,
and false and unfair. These are to be treated in the way before
mentioned , r<5 -xporepov etp^/ieVw rpoTro): that is, in exhorting or re
commending we take the favourable consequent, in dissuading the
unfavourable. But the difference between the two topics lies in this
(SicKpepei 8e) ; thaT~in the former the opposition (that must be the
opposition of the good and bad consequent, for there is no other) is
accidental that is, as appears in the example, there is no relation or
logical connexion between wisdom and envy ; they may be compared
in respect of their value and importance as motives to action, but are
not logical opposites but in the latter, the good and the bad conse
quences are two contraries (ropomr/a) love and hatred, divine and human.
In the example of the second topic, the dissuasive argument which
comes first assigns evil consequences {hatred} to both alternatives of
public speaking : that in recommendation, the contrary, love. The
" f < "7HSfif| 1 " >r " ac i ir> the general sense, as above explained, has
beenTalready applied in estimating the value of goodjs absolute, L-6^3_; ....
and in the comparison of good things, I 7.5. In Dialectics it does not
appear in this simple shape, tTTbugh tTTr-rirtually contained in the
application of it to the four modes of dvridfo-is or opposition, Top. B 8 :
and in the comparison of two good things, Top. r 2, 117 a 5 15.
Brandis u. s. \PhilologU3 IV i] observes of the two Rhetorical topics,
that they could not find an independent place and treatment in the
Topics.
Cicero speaks of the general topic of consequence diahcticorum pro-
prius ex conscqucntibus antecedentibus ct rcpugnantibus, omitting the
PHTOPIKH2 B 23 14. 271
crei TO (f)0ove?(r6ai aKoXovOet KO.K.OV, TO e <ro(f)ov eivai
dyaBov* ou TOLVUV el 7rai$eve(r6ai, (p6ovelcr6ai yap
ou eel $6? JJLG.V ovv 7rai$euecr6ai, orofpov yap eivai del.
6 TO7TOS Ol/TOS .(TTLV Y) KaXXlTTTTOU Te^Vt] TTjOOCT-
Xafioucra K.O.I TO ^VVCITOV Kai ra/\Aa, ok
simple form in which it appears in Rhetoric. His consequentia are
necessary concomitants, quae rem necessario conseqTiuntur. Top. XII 53.
The mode of handling it is illustrated, xin 53.
Quint, v 10.74, Ex consequentibus sive adiunctis; Si est bonnm ius-
titia, recte iudicandum : si mahim pcrfidia, non est fallcndum. Idem
retro. 75, sed haec consequentia dico, aKoXovdd ; est enim consequents
(in Cicero s sense) sapicntiae bonitas ; ilia sequentia, 7rapfir6fj.fva, quae
postea facta sunt aut futura. And two other examples of the applica
tion of the argument, 76, 77. Quintilian naturally, like Aristotle,
gives only the rhetorical, and omits the dialectical use of the topic.
Note by the way the redundant wore in a-vpftaivei ma-6" fTrecrdai. See
Monk on Eur. Hippol. 1323, Kinrpis yap tfdeX oSo-re yiyveadai raSr. And
add to the examples there given, Thuc. 1119, 8e7?$eWf? wore \!/rj<p., vm 45,
<S(TTe, Ib. 79; Soaj/ ware Stai ao/j.a^eii Ib. 86, emryyeXAojiO ol cocrre
Herod. I 74, III 14. Plat. Protag. 338 C, ddvvarov more, Phaed.
93 B, ea-riv wore, 103 E, (Stallbaum s note,) Phaedr. 269 D (Heindorf ad
loc. et ad Protag. 1. c.). Dem. de F. L. 124 (Shilleto s note). Aesch.
de F. L. p. 49, 158, eda-ere... wore. Arist. Polit. II 2, 1261 a 34, o-u/n-
/3cuWi wore iravras lipx fiv ( as here), Ib. VI (iv) 5, 1292 b 12, trv^iftr)K.(V
...wore. Ib. VIII (V) 9, 1309 b 32, earn* (BOT e%fiv. Find. Nem. V 64,
Soph. Oed. Col. 1350 (D), Si/caitoi/ a>orre...Eur. Iph. T. 1017 (D), TTWS ovv
ytvoiT 1 av wore... Ib. 1380.
The example of Top. is taken from the passage of Eur. Med. 294,
already employed in illustration of a yvafjTj, II 21. 2. Education of chil
dren has for its inseparable attendants wisdom or learning as a good,
and the envy of one s fellow-citizens as an evil : we may therefore take
our choice between them, and argue either for or against it, persuading
or dissuading. (Note a good instance of pev ovv, as a negative (usually)
corrective, nay rather ; this of course comes from the opponent who is
arguing on the other side, that education is advantageous. Also in
15-)
The illustration of this topic constitutes the entire art of Callippus
with the addition (no doubt) of the possible, (the KOIVOS TOTTOS of that
name,) and all the rest (of the Koivol ToVot, three in number), as has been
said , in c. 19, namely.
The two notices of Callippus and his art of Rhetoric in this passage
and 21, are all that is known to us of that rhetorician. He is not to be
confounded with the Callippus mentioned in I 12. 29. Spengel, Art.
Script. 148 9, contents himself with quoting the two passages of this
chapter on the subject. He was one of the early writers on the art of
Rhetoric ; and it is possible that a person of that name referred to by
272 PHTOPIKH2 B 23 15.
J/ \ "V *t \ *. ~ \ i f
aAApji^.oTav Trepi cvoiv KCII avTiKeifjievoiv
a.7roTpe7reiv e/7, KCII TW TrpoTepov eiptifJLevta Tpoirut
v xpfjcrdai. ($ia(pepei e, OTI e/ce? fj.ev TO.
avTiTiBerai, ivravQa e rdvavria. oiov
lepeia OVK eia TOV viov Srifj.rj yope iv eav imev yap, e(f>ii,
TO. SiKaia \e>yris, oi avQpwTroi <re fM(rti(rov(nv, eav $e
TO. aSiKa, oi 6eoi. del ju.ev ovv SrjfjLtiyopelv eav fj.ev
yap TO. SiKaia Xey^?, of 6eoi ere (piXriGOvcriv, eav Oe
TO. afiiKa, oi avdptoTroi. TOVTL S 6<TT* rai/ ro Tto \e-
<yofjLevu> TO eAos TrpiacrBai /ecu TOVS aAas* Kai r\ (3\ai-
Isocrates who was born in 436 B. C. as one of his first pupils,
dvTi86crfo)s 93, may have been this same Rhetorician Callippus.
15. Tiresias, ap. Phoen. 968,00-7-1? 8 efnrvpca xpJjrat re^vy fj.aTaios f/v
fj.fv f x^poi mffiyvas Tvxfli TriKpos Ka6f<rTT)x ois av olwvocrKOTrfj. Tfsfvftfj 8 vir
oi/crou Tolo-i xp&iuvois \ey(ov dStet Ta TU>V de>v } is compared by Victorias 1
with the example in the second topic.
This second topic of consequences differs from the preceding in these
particulars. In the first, which is simple, the consequences of the thing
"which is in question are twofold bad and good, and these are uncon
nected by any reciprocal relation between them. The second is more
complicated, and offers contrary alternatives, which are set in opposition
avTiTidfTai Tavavria, as Sixmo, and a8iKa \tyfiv in the example and then*
proceed as before, , r< Trporepov flpr]p.va TPOTTW ; that is, state the con
sequence of each, (favourable in exhortation or recommendation, unfa
vourable in dissuasion,) and bring the two into comparison in order to
strike the balance of advantage or disadvantage between them. In
public speaking, for instance, the alternatives are, true and fair, and
false and unfair, words and arguments : if your object is to dissuade
from it, you adduce the ill consequences of both, and contrast them, so
as to shew which is the greater.
But that is all one with the proverb, to buy the marsh with the salt :
i. e. to take the fat with the lean ; the bad with the good ; the unprofit
able and unwholesome marsh {palus inamabilis, Virg. G. iv 479, Aen.
VI 438) with the profitable salt which is inseparably connected with it.
An argument pro and con, but only of the first kind, Top. Xlll, by com
paring the good and the bad consequence, according as you are for or
against the purchase. An Italian proverb to the same effect is quoted
in Buhle s note, comprare il niel con le moschej and the opposite, the
good ivitliout the bad, appears in the Latin, sine sacris haereditas, Plaut.
Capt. iv 1.5 (Schrad.). [We may also contrast the proverb pr/de //e Xt,
HT)8f /j-eXifrcras : eVl r<5i> fj.f) ^ovXa^fvcav jradflv TI dyaQov fitra direvKTOV
(Diogenianus, cent, vi, 58). Cf. Sappho, fragm. 113.]
1 Gaisford, Not. far., cites this as from Victorius. It is not found in my copy,
Florence, 1548.
PHTOPIKH2 B 23 15. 273
TOVT eorriv, orav Svolv evavrioiv
dyaBov KUL KCT/COJ/ eV^rat, evavria eKarepa
There is an evident intention in the association of eXoy andXy: the
alliterative jingle, as in so many other proverbs (nadr/para [tadr/para, safe
bind safe find), sharpens the point, and helps its hold on the memory.
Some MSS have eXaiov for eXoy, which is expressed in the Vet. Tr.
Lat., olim (oleum) emi et sales, and by other interpreters; and also
adopted by Erasmus, Adag., oleum et salem oportet emere ; to be in
want of oil and salt, implying insanity, against which this mixture was
supposed to be a specific. Victorius, referring to the Schol. on Arist.
Nub. 1237) Xcrii/ Siacr/irj^fiy ovair av ovrocri, who notes TOVS Trapafppo-
vovvras aXcrt KOI eXa/w 8if^pe\ov, KOI eJcpfXot/iro, supposes that some
copyist having this in his mind altered eXoy into eXaiov. At all events
the proverb in this interpretation has no meaning or applicability here.
In the following paragraph (K<H 77 /3Xai crG>o-iy...arep.cvy) the meaning of
/3Xaio-<aorty, the application of the metaphor, and its connexion with what
follows, which appears to be intended as an exemplification or explanation
of the use of pXaia-axns, are, and are likely to remain, alike unintelligible.
The Commentators and Lexicographers are equally at fault ; Spengel in
his recent commentary passes the passage over in absolute silence :
Victorius, who reasonably supposes that /SXaiVoxm (metaphorically) repre
sents some figure of rhetorical argument, candidly admits that nothing
whatsoever is known of its meaning and use, and affords no help either in
the explanation of the metaphor, or its connexion with what seems to be
the interpretation of it. Buhle, and W. Dindorf, ap. Steph. Thes. s. v.
praevaricatio; Vet. Lat. Tr. claudicatio ; Riccoboni invcrsio. Vater dis
creetly says nothing ; and Schrader that which amounts to nothing.
After all these failures I cannot hope for any better success ; and I will
merely offer a few remarks upon the passage, with a view to assist others
as far as I can in their search for a solution.
|3Xcuo-oy and paiftos, valgus and varus, all of them express a deformity
or divergence from the right line, or standard shape, in the legs and feet.
The first (which is not always explained in the same way 1 ) seems to cor
respond to our bow-legged , that is having the leg and foot bent out
wards : for it was applied to the hind legs of frogs, /SXaicrorroST/s ^arpa^oy,
poet. ap. Suidam. And Etym. M. (conf. Poll. 2. 193,) interprets it, o rovs
TroSay y ra ea> Sieorpa/i/iej/o? (with his feet distorted so as to turn out
wards) KCU TW A (rroixfio) eoiKcas ; so that it seems that it may represent
the act of straddling. The adj. itself and some derivatives not unfre-
quently occur in Ar. s works on Nat. Hist ; likewise in Galen, once in
Xenophon, de re Eq. I 3, and, rarely in other authors ; but /3Xai <ro><riy
appears to be a anag Xeyopevov. paiftos is the opposite defect to this,
bandy-legged , where the legs turn inwards. And to these correspond
valgus and varus: the first, qui suras et crura habet cxtrorsum intortas,
of which Petronius says, crura in orbem pandit; and Martial, crura...
simulant quae cornua lunae. Huic contrarius est varus, qui introrsus
1 /SXcucror... bandy-legged, opposed to pcu/3os. paipos, crooked, bent, esf. ^/"bandy
legs. Liddell and Scott s Lex. sub vv.
AR. II. 1 8
274 PHTOPIKHS B 23 16.
i6aAAos, eTreiSrj ov TCLVTO, (pavepws CTraivovcri Kai d(j)a-
, d\\d (fiavepcos jmV TO. diKaia KUI TO. Ka\d
pedes et crura obtorta habet. " Vari dicuntur incurva crura habentes."
Festus (ap. Face.). Heindorf ad Hor. Sat. I. 3, 47. G. Dindorf (in Steph.
Thes.} explains it by praevaricatio, quoting Cic. Orat. Partit. XXXVI 126,
(praevaricator definitur) ex nomine ipso, quod signijicat eum qui in con-
trariis caussis quasi vare (Edd. varie) esse positus videatur^. If we
revert to the derivation, and apparently the original meaning, of the
word, following Cicero, and understand it as a deviation from the right
course or path, by a metaphor from bent or distorted legs, praevaricatio
might be taken as expressing by a similar metaphor the general meaning
of /SXaio-oHTis ; but in its ordinary acceptation of the betrayal of his
client by an advocate, and collusion with his opponent in which Buhlc
and the Translators must be supposed to understand it, since they offer
no other explanation it seems altogether inappropriate. So however
Rost and Palm, in their Lexicon.
The translation, as the passage stands, is and the /3AaiVa>o-t? is, or
consists in, this, when each (either) of two contraries is followed (accom
panied) by a good and an ill consequence, each contrary to each , (as in a
proposition of Euclid). This is a generalisation of the example in Top.
xiv : the two contraries are the fair and unfair speaking ; each of which
has its favourable and unfavourable consequence; truth, the love of God
and hatred of men ; falsehood, the love of men and hatred of God. But
how this is connected with /SXaio-coo-is I confess myself unable to discover.
The nearest approach I have been able to make to it which I only
mention to condemn is to understand /SXaiVcoo-ty of the straddling of the
legs, the A of the Etymol. M., which might possibly represent the divergence
of the two inferences pro and con deducible from the topic of conse
quences : but not only is this common to all rhetorical argumentation,
and certainly not characteristic of this particular topic, but it also loses
sight of the deviation from a true standard, which we have supposed this
metaphorical application of the term to imply.
1 6. Top. XV. This Topic is derived from the habit men have,
which may be assumed to be almost universal, of concealing their real
opinions and wishes in respect of things good and bad, which are always
directed to their own interests, under the outward show and profession
of noble and generous sentiments and of a high and pure morality.
Thus, to take two examples from de Soph. El. c. 12, they openly profess
that a noble death is preferable to a life of pleasure ; that poverty and
rectitude, is better than ill-got gains, than wealth accompanied with dis
grace : but secretly they think and wish the contrary. These contrary
views and inclinations can always be played off one against the other in
argument, and the opponent made to seem to be asserting a paradox :
you infer the one or the other as the occasion requires. This is in fact
the most effective (Kvpiararos) of all topics for bringing about this result.
The mode of dealing with the topic is thus described in de Soph. El. 1. c.
173 a 2, "If the thesis is in accordance with their real desires, the ~
1 Compare the whole passage 124 126, in illustration v>1 prcuvarlcatio.
PHTOPIKH2 B 23 1 6, 17. 275
vovcri juaAffrrcr, iS/ct e ret (TVfJLtyepOVTCt /uLa\\ov (3ov- p-
AOI/TGU, e /c TOI/TWI/ TreipdcrBai (rvvdyeiv QaTepov
yap TrapaSo^tav ot)ros d TOTTOS KupiajTaTOS
17 a AAos e /c TOI/ dvdXoyov Tavra (rvfj.fiaiveiv olov 6
respondent should be confronted with their public professions ; if it is in
accordance with them [the latter], he should be confronted with their real
desires. In either case he must fall into paradox, and contradict either their
publicly~expressed, or secret opinions." Poste, Transl. p. 43. This is for
dialectics : but it may be applied equally well to rhetorical practice, in
which there is nearly always a real or (as in the epideictic branch)
imaginary opponent. The author proceeds, Ib. 173 a 7, further to illus
trate this by the familiar opposition of (pvarts and vopos, nature and con
vention or custom, which is to be handled in the same way as the pre
ceding, and is TrXeurros TOTTOS TOV TO. Trapd$oa \eyeiv : referring to Callicles
well-known exposition of the true doctrine of justice conventional and
natural, in Plato s Gorgias, c. 38, foil.
This topic does not occur in Cicero s tract, which is confined to dia
lectics ; nor is it found amongst the rhetorical topics of Quintilian s tenth
chapter of Book V, which has supplied us with so many illustrations of
Aristotle.
Another; whereas in public and in secret men praise not the same
things, but openly most highly extol what is just and right, yet secretly
(privately, in their hearts,) prefer their own interest and advantage, from
these (i. e. from premisses derived from the one or the other of these two
modes of thought and expression, whichever it be that the opponent has
given utterance to,) we must endeavour to infer the other: for of all
paradoxical topics (topics that lead to paradox, which enable us to repre
sent the opponent as guilty of it,) this is the most effective (most power
ful, mightiest, most authoritative) . If the opponent has been indulging
in some high-flown moral commonplaces about virtue and honour, by an
appeal to the real but secret feelings of the audience on such matters, we
must shew that such sentiments are paradoxical, or contrary to common
opinion ; or conversely, if we have occasion to assume the high moral
tone, make our appeal to those opinions which they openly profess, and
shew that it is a paradox to assume with the opponent that men are
incapable of any other motives than such as are suggested by sordid
self-interest.
17. Top. xvi. Another (inference may be drawn) from the pro
portion of so and so (raura) . This is the argument from analogy in
its strict and proper sense, the analogy of relations . See Sir W.
Hamilton, quoted at II 19. 2, and on the argument from analogy in
general. The analogy or proportion here is the literal, numerical or
geometrical, proportion, 2 : 4 :: 8 : 16. "Analogy or proportion is the
similitude of ratios." Eucl. El. Bk. v def. 8.
This topic also does not appear in the dialectical treatise, where
it is inappropriate ; nor in Cicero and Quintilian, except so far as the
ordinary and popular analogy (see again the note above referred to)
IS 2
276 PHTOPIKH2 B 23 17.
I(j)LKp arris TOV vlov avTOv vewTepov bvTct Trjs
OTL jueyas r]V) XeiTOVpye iv dva i yK.a(ZpvTU>v ) e nrev OTL ei
TOVS fJLe<yd\ov<s TWV TraiScov av^pcts i/0fubvcrij TOWS
Ttav dv^ptov Traifias eivai -^sr](j)iovvTai. KCU p. 1399
eV TW vo/ua), OTL TroAiVas /mei; TroielcrOe TOWS
olov ^LTdjSaKct Kctt Xaiftrifjiov, $ia Ttjv
is recognised under the names of similitude (c) and similia (Q). Simili
tude is between two, proportion requires four terms. Eth. N. v 6,
1131 a 32, TI yap avakoyia icror^s eWl \oydav (equality or parity of ratios),
KOI fv Terapcriv e XaxtVroi?. And comp. the explanation of the propor
tional metaphor in Poet. XXI II, and the examples, 12, 13. Ac
cordingly of the two examples each has four terms, and the inference is
drawn from the similitude of the two ratios.
As Iphicrates, when they (the assembly, ifatpiovvrcu,) wanted to
force upon his son the discharge of one of the liturgies (pecuniary
contributions to the service of the state, ordinary and extraordinary,
of a very onerous character), because he was tall, though he was
younger than the age (required by law), said that if they suppose tall
boys to be men, they will have to vote short men to be boys : the
proportion being, Tall boys : men :: short men : boys. Two ratios of
equality. The argument is a reductio ad absurdum. The first ratio is
hypothetical. If tall boys are really to be regarded as men, then by the
same ratio, &c.
And Theodectes, in the "law" (which he proposes, in his decla
mation, for the reform of the mercenary service, see above n, note)
you make citizens of your mercenaries, such as Strabax and Chari-
demus, for their respectability and virtue, and won t you (by the same
proportion) make exiles of those who have been guilty of such desperate
(dvrjKto-Ta) atrocities?
Of these mercenaries who swarmed in Greece from the beginning
of the fourth century onwards, the causes of their growth, their character
and conduct, and the injury they brought upon Greece, see an account
in Grote, Hist. Gr. Vol. XI p. 392 seq. [chap. LXXXVII].
Charidemus, of Oreus in Euboea, in the middle of that century, was
perhaps the most celebrated of their leaders. He was a brave and suc
cessful soldier, but faithless, and profligate and reckless in personal
character. Theopomp. ap. Athen. X 436 B.C. Theopomp. Fr. 155, Fragm.
Hist. Gr., ed. C. and Th. Miiller, p. 384 b (Firmin Didot). 8ia T^V rifiKai/,
therefore, is not to be taken as an exact description of Charidemus
character, but is the assumption upon which the Athenians acted when
they conferred these rewards. His only real merit was the service he
had done them. He plays a leading part in Demosthenes speech, c.
Aristocratem ; who mentions several times, 23, 65, 89, the citizen
ship conferred on him by the Athenians in acknowledgment of his
services, as well as somewhat later a golden crown, 145,
TToXlT^f, (ITO. TTaXlV ^pVCTOlS (TTfCpUVOiy COS (VfpyfTrjS (TTfCpaVOITai,
PHTOPIKHS B 23 17, 1 8. 277
(pvyaSas S ov Trot^crere TOI)S eV TO?S JUL:-
18 cr6o(j)6pois dvriKea Ta 2>ia.7re7rpayiu.evovs 9 aAXos e /c
TO (rv/uLfialvov eav rj TCIVTOV, brl Kai e wy crvfjifi
TavTa oiov ^.vo(pavn<s eXeyev on 6[j.oi(*)s do~efiovcriv
ol yevea Qai (j)a(TKOVTes TOfs 6eovs TO?S a7ro6ave.1v A.e-
yovrriv d/uLCporeptos <yap o~v/uL(3aivei /ur] eivai TOI)S 0eoJs
7TOT6. /ecu 6 A.ws Se TO orvfj-fialvov e EKaTepov Xa/u.-
fidveiv ws Tai^TO del (( /xeA\T6 ^e Kpiveiv ov Trepi
presents, and the name of benefactor , 185, and 188. Besides the
Athenians, he was employed by Cotys and his son Cersobleptes, kings
of Thrace, and by M*mnon and Mentor in Asia. A complete account
of him and his doings is to be found in Weber s Proleg. ad Dem. c.
Aristocr. pp. LX LXXXIII.
Of the other mercenary leader, Strabax, all that we know is derived
from Dem. c. Lept. 84, that through the intervention or by the recom
mendation (810) of Iphicrates he received a certain honour from the
Athenians, to which Theodectes extract here adds that this was the
citizenship. We learn further from Harpocration and Suidas that Strabax
is an Svopa icvpiov. "Decommendatione Iphicratis, ornatus Strabax videri
potest Iphicratis in eodem bello (sc. Corinthiaco) adiutor fuisse." F. A.
Wolff, ad loc. Dem.
1 8. Top. xvn. Inference from results or consequents to ante
cedents, parity of the one implies parity or identity of the other 1 : if,
for instance, the admission of the birth of the gods equally with that
of their death, leads to the result of denying the eternity of their
existence in the former case there was a time when they were nof,
as in the other there is a time when they will not be then the two
assertions (the antecedents) may be regarded as equivalent, or the same
in their. effect, andy^r the purposes of the argument on 6^oia>s dvfftovo-iv,
because they both lead to the same result or consequent ; so that one
can be put for the other, whichever happens to suit your argument.
On Xenophanes, see note on I 15. 29, and the reff. On this passage^
Miillach, Fr. Phil. Gr., Xenoph. Fragm. Inc. 7, " Hoc dicto veteres
poetae perstringuntur, qui quum diis aeternitatem (potius immortalitateni)
tribuerent, eos tamen hominum instar ortos esse affirmabant eorumque
parentes et originem copiose enarrabant." And to nearly the same
effect, Karsten, Xenoph. Fr. Rell. xxxiv. p. 85. The saying against
the assertors of the birth of the gods is not found amongst the extant
fragments, but the arguments by which he refuted this opinion is given
by Aristotle (?) de Xenoph. Zen. et Gorg. init. p. 974. I, seq. and by
Simplicius, Comm. in Phys. f. 6 A, ap. Karsten p. 107, comp. p. 109.
For KOI fie, see note on I 6. 22.
And in fact, as a general rule, we may always assume (subaudibti, xpj,
1 "Von der gleiihheit der folgen anf -gleichheit des ikncn zufjp-unde liegenden
uhlussende." Brandis [Philologtis iv i.].
278 PHTOPIKHS B 23 18.
la-QKpaTOVs d\\a Trepi eTTiTnSev/uLaTOs, el %prj <pi\o-
(rocpelv." Kat OTL TO StSovai <yfjv KCII vfiiap $ov\eveiv
ICTTLV, Kai TO fj.6Te%6iv Tt]s KOivrjs eiptivrjs Troielv TO
out tale aliquid] the result of either of two things to be the same with
that of the other (eWe pov), (or with tKao-Tov, as A , adopted by Spengel,
the result of anything, i. e. any things, two or more, that we have to
argue about) as in the example, "what you are about to decide upon
is not Isocrates, but a study and practice, whether or not philosophy
deserves to be studied." Whether you decide upon Isocrates or his
pursuit and study, the inference or result is the same (TOVTOV), and can be
deduced equally from both. I have here adopted Spengel s emendation
of Isocrates for Socrates, "quam emendationem." as Spengel modestly
says, " Victorius si integram vidisset Antidosin nobis non reliquisset".
It is given in his Specim. Comm. in Ar. Rhet., Munich, 1839, p. 37.
A comparison of this passage with Isocr. Ttfpl dvn86a-fo)s, 173, ov yap
TTfpl ffjiov fi/XXere fj.6vov TT)V fyfjffrov dioio-fiv aXXa KOI irtp\ eVir^Sev/zaror, w
TroXXot TCOV vctoTtptov irpo(r^ov(Ti TOV vovv, certifies the emendation. Even
Bekker has accepted it. At the same time the vulgata lectio SwKparovr,
as Victorius interprets it, yields a very sufficient sense, thus more briefly
expressed by Schrader, " Socrate damnato simul damnabitur studium
sapientiae : Socrate servato servabuntur sapientiae studia;" Socrates and
his study or pursuit stand or fall together ; to condemn Socrates, is to
condemn philosophy : and might even be thought to be confirmed by
Kpivtiv, which more immediately suggests a judicial decision.
And that (the result, effect, consequence of) giving earth and water
is the same as, equivalent to, slavery . The demand of earth and water
by the Persian monarchs from a conquered prince or state, in token of
submission, and as a symbol of absolute dominion or complete pos
session of the soil therefore equivalent to slavery, 8ov\fvfiv is referred
to frequently by Herodotus, IV 126, Darius to Idanthyrsus, the Scythian
king, 8(0-ir6ry TW <T6> 8a>pa (fiepav yrjv- re KOI v8up. V 17, the Same to
Amyntas king of Macedonia, Ib. 18, the same to the Athenians, Ib. 73,
vn 131, 133, 138, 163. Plut. Themist. c. 6. Plin. N. H. XXII 4 (ap.
Bahr), Summum apud antiques signum victoriae erat herbam porrigere
victos, hoc est terra et altrice ipsa humo et humatione etiam cedere: quern
morem etiam mine durare apud Germanos scio. It appears from Du-
cange, Gloss, s. v. Investitura, that this custom was still continued in
the transmission of land during the middle ages (Bahr).
And participation in the general peace (would be equivalent to)
doing (Philip s) bidding . The Schol. on this passage writes thus : */-
XITTTTO? KariyvayKacre TOVS Adrjvaiovs 1v tlptfVtveunv p,fr avrov <3(nrep KOI
at aXXai ^wpat, d 8f An^iocr^eV^y dirnrtTrTuiv \eyei OTI TO pfTf^eiv rfjs Koivfjs
flprjvrfs [J.(Ta TOV 4>iXi7T7rov fjp-as, <os Kat TOVS \onrovs iravras, e crrt TO Trotetf o
Trpoo-Tarret o $i\nriros. Spengel was the first to point out (Specim.
Comm. u. s. p. 39) that the KOIVT/ flpijvr] here referred to is the same of
which mention occurs several times in a speech irepl TUV -irpos AXegupdpov
avvdr)Ku>i> attributed to Demosthenes, but more probably by Hyperides ;
seethe Greek argument, and Grote, H. Gr. [chap, xci] xn 21 and note
PHTOPIKHS B 23 18, 19. 279
TTpOCrTCtTTO/ULeVOV. \rj7TT6OV S OTTOTCpOV O.V rj XP*1~
19 cnfjLov. A,\os e /c TOV fJLrj ravro TOI/S avrovs del al-
pelcrBat va-repovTTTrpoTepov, d\\ dvaTraXw, olov ToSe
TO evdujULrj/uLa, (< el (pevyovres jjiev e/xoc^o/xe^a OTTOK
10, 11,17,19,30. The K.OIVT) dpr/iv), and the awdqiuu irpos AX. both de
note the convention at Corinth of the deputies of all the Greek states, with
the exception of the Lacedaemonians who refused to appear, in 336 B. C.,
"which recognised Hellas as a confederacy under the Macedonian
prince (Alexander, not Philip) as imperator, president, or executive head
and arm." Grote, u. s. p. 18. The speech TT. T. TT. AXe l. a-., according to
the same authority, p. 21, was delivered in 335. But neither Aristotle s
quotation, nor the Scholiast s comment, can refer to this speech, as
Spengel himself observes. If the Scholiast is right in describing the
opposition of Demosthenes as directed against Philip, it must be referred
to a different speech delivered by him against the former agreement of a
similar kind with Philip, after Chaeronea, which took place two years
earlier than that with Alexander, in 338. Grote, u. s., p. 17. Comp.
XI 700. [A. Schaefer, Dem. u. s. Zeit, in 186 193.]
This passage has been already referred to in the Introduction, on the
question of the date of publication of the Rhetoric, p. 28 ; and again, 46
note 2, on the references to Demosthenes in the same work.
Of the two alternatives (the affirmative or negative side, whether the
result is or is not the same, either may be taken, whichever happens to
be serviceable . Or, as Victorius, of the two alternatives, which though
in themselves different, yet in the result are the same, we may always
take that which best suits our argument .
19. Top. xvni. Another (is derived from the natural habit or
tendency of mankind) that the same men don t always choose the same
things (Spengel omits TOVS avrovs with A c ; Bekker, as usual, retains it)
after as before (something intermediate, act, occurrence, period), but
conversely (i. e. do the second time what they have avoided the first, or
vice versa) ; of which the following enthymeme is an example .
fj quaere 17? which expresses as (in the way in which), much more
naturally than q. This seems to be the required sense : and so I think
Victorius understands it, " non eadem iidem homines diversis temporibus
sequuntur." The same meaning is very awkwardly expressed, if indeed
it is expressed, by rendering ff or . In that case vorepoi* and irportpov
must be at one time or another : Riccobon posterius vel prius after or
before : sooner or later . I will put the question, and leave it to the
judgment of others. Which is the more natural expression, the more
usual Greek, and more in accordance with the example ? The same
men don t always choose the same things after as before , i. e. the second
time, when they have to repeat some action or the like, as the first time,
when the circumstances are perhaps different : or, if ^ be or, men don t
always choose the same things after or before, sooner or later . Surely
the alternative is here out of place ; in this case it should be /rat, not r\.
tvQv^iia] Victorius interprets this "argumentum ex contrariis conclu-
sum:" on which see Introd. pp. 104, 5, Cic. Top. xui 55. This is the
28o PHTOPIKHS B 23 19.
Kare\6(t)iuL6v 9 KctreXdovres e (f>ev6/uLe6a OTTWS /mr] /ma-
" ore p.ev jap TO /xeVety dvTi TOU
sense in which it is found in the Rhet. ad Alex., Cicero and Quintilian,
and was in fact the common usage of it. But, as far as I can recollect, it
never occurs in this special sense, at all events, in Aristotle s Rhetoric ;
and is in fact one of the leading distinctions between it and the Rhet. ad
Alex. Neither was there any occasion to depart here from his ordinary
use of the term : for enthymemes, i. e. rhetorical inferences in general,
are exactly what he is employed in illustrating throughout this chapter.
The original sentence of Lysias begins with, fcivbv yap av ei?;, w
A.dr)vdioi, fl /c.T.A. For monstrous would it be, men of Athens, if
when we were in exile we fought for our return (to be restored to our)
home, and now that we have returned (been restored) we shall fly to
avoid fighting . We were eager to fight before (this was, as will appear
afterwards, with the Lacedaemonians who aided the Thirty), shall we
now after our restoration shrink from it? The example is an instance
of what men are in the habit of doing, viz. changing their minds without
reason : the argument, that it is unreasonable, and monstrous at all
events to do it now.
KaTf\6(1v, to return from exile, prop, down , Kara, viz. to the shore
or harbour, at which almost all returned exiles would naturally arrive ;
either from the interior of the country, dvaftaivetv aara^alvtiv ; or from
the open sea into port, dvayta-Qai contrasted with Karayeo-tfat, Trpoo-o-^f iv-
Aesch. Choeph. 3, and his own commentary, Arist. Ran. 1163 5.
This is followed by Aristotle s explanation, which is certainly more
obscure than what it professes to explain. That is to say (yep), at one
time (before) they preferred staying (where they were, maintaining
their ground ) at the price of fighting ; at another (after their restoration)
not fighting at the expense of not staying , i. e. the second time, they
preferred not staying, quitting the city, to avoid fighting. It is necessary
to interpret avrl in this way, not instead of if the reading be sound, to
bring the explanation into conformity with the example; and thus no
alteration is required.
The words quoted by Ar. are taken from a speech of Lysias, of which
Dionysius, de Lys. lud. c. 33, has preserved a long fragment ; printed
amongst Lysias speeches as Orat. 34. Baiter et Sauppe Or. Att. I 147.
[Blass, die AttischeBeredsamkeit\\>.A,\i and Jebb s Attic Orators I p. 211.]
Dion, gives an account of the occasion of it in the preceding chapter.
He doubts if it was ever actually delivered. The title of it is, irfp\ TOU ^
KaraXvcrai TTJV iror/Hor iroKirtiav Kdr)vr)cri , and its object was to prevent
the carrying into effect of a proposal of one Phormisius, one of the
restored exiles /xera TOU 8ijp.ov, this was after the expulsion of the
Thirty in 403 B. C., when the demus had been restored and recovered
its -authority, and the other party were now in exile to perrnit the
return of the present exiles, but to accompany this by a constitutional
change, which should exclude from political rights all but the possessors
of land ; a measure which would have disfranchised 5000 citizens. The
passage here quoted refers to a somewhat different subject. The Lace-
PHTOPIKHS B 23 19, 20. 281
ore e TO fj.t] fjia^earai vTt TOV fJLr\
20 aAAos TO ou eveK av elV/, el JJ.TI >yevoiTO, TOVTOV eVe/ca
claemonians, who were at hand with their troops, were trying to impose
the measure upon them by force, dictating, and ordering, neXtvovo-iv,
jrpoo-Ta.TTovo-iv, 6, and apparently preparing to interfere with arms.
Lysias is accordingly exhorting the Athenians to resist manfully, and
not to give way and quit the city again, after their restoration, for fear
of having to fight : and Aristotle and this is a most striking instance
of the difficulty that so frequently arises from Aristotle s haste and
carelessness in writing, and also of his constant liability to lapses of
memory quoting from memory, and quoting wrong, and neglecting
to mention the occasion of the speech and the name of the author,
which he had probably forgotten for the time, has both altered the
words and omitted precisely the two things deivbv av e*rj, which shows
what the inference is intended to be, and Aaice&ai/LKw oir which would
have enabled his readers to understand his meaning. The passage of
Lysias runs thus : deivbv yap av firj, <S Adrjvaloi, fl oTf fJLtv efpfvyopfv,
ffjM.xofj.f6a AoJCcftat/iOVUHC iva KaTf^.6a>fj.fv, KareXdovres 8f <p(v6fj.tda iva pfj
pax<an(0a. And it is now pretty clear what the intention of the writer
of the fragment was, namely to stimulate the Athenian assembly not to sub
mit to the dictation of the Lacedaemonians and to encounter them if it were
necessary in battle, by urging the inconsistency and absurdity of which
they would be guilty, if, whilst they were ready to fight before their
restoration to their city, now that they were in actual possession of it
they should quit it and return into exile, merely to avoid fighting.
20. Top. XIX. The wording of this is also very obscure from
the extreme brevity. The title of the topic in one of Victorius MSS
"""Is" IK. TOV irapa TOV (TKOITOV TOV Aa/3oi/roj, crvufiaivfiv, inference, from the
issue being contrary to the aim or intention of the receiver, i. e. a
mistake on the part of the receiver of a gift, who takes it as offered
with an intention different from the real motive. This however is only
a single instance of the application of the topic, and derived solely from
the illustration, olov fl 8oirj K.T.\. The true interpretation is, as Brandis
expresses it, u. s., p. 20, the general one, " An inference from the possible,
to the real, motive," as appears from the examples.
Two readings have to be considered : v. 1. followed and explained by
Victorius et prj yevoiTo, which Bekker (ed. 3) has retained ; and, Vater s
conjecture, fj yevoiTo, following the Schol., OVTIVGS evfKa tivai, TJTOI, 5to
8i8a>ni <TOI vofj.io-p.aTa (this again refers exclusively to the first example).
77 yevotTo, r/rot eSw/ca : which at all events seems to shew that he read f)
yevoiTo : this is also expressed in Muretus version, cuius rei causa ali-
quid est, aut fieri potest, and adopted by Spengel in his recent edition.
To this in what follows ei^at f) yeywrjo-dai properly corresponds. The
translation will then be, To say, that the possible reason for a fact (flvai)
or motive for an action (yiyveo-dai), (lit. that for which anything might
be, or be done), that is the (true) reason or motive of the fact or action ;
as in the case of one giving another something, in order to cause him
pain by afterwards taking it away (withdrawing it) . Here is an osten
sible motive a gift being usually intended to cause pleasure which
282 PHTOPIKH2 B 23 20.
(pdvai eivai. f} yeyevfja Oai, oiov el doit] av TIS TLVL \v
d<pe\6fJievos \VTrn(rri. oQev Kai TOVT eiprjrai,
7roAAo?s d ^ai/uLcov ov /car evvoiav (pepwv
fj.e<yd\a SiStocriv evTV%niu.aT , d\\ iva
ras arvjUL()opds \df3a)<Tiv e
conceals the real motive, which is to cause pain ; and this is the in
ference, you infer from the apparent fact or possible motive to the real
one ; the object of the topic being to assign a motive which suits your
argument. Such then is the general meaning of the topic : the ex
amples are all of the possible concealed motive or intention which
may be bad or good as your argument requires that being the form
in which it is more likely to be of use in Rhetoric, ov ei/e/c av ("irj fj
ytvoiro that for which so and so would, could, or might be, or be
done , (would be naturally or generally, might be possibly,) expresses
the conditionality or possibility of the fact, motive, or intention, a
meaning which is confirmed by eVSf xerat yap K.T.\., in the explanation
of the third example. (I call it the third, olov ei Soir) av Xvmjcrrj being
an illustration.)
On Victorius interpretation of /xi) yevoiro, cuius rei caussa aliquid
esse potest, quamvis factum non sit] Vater says, "sed hoc qtiamvis factunt
non sit, ad rem non satis facit, neque in exemplis quae sequuntur eo re-
spicitur an haec caussa vera sit necne :" but whether that be so or not,
I think that a still better reason may be given for rejecting it, that et
fj.r) ytvoiro cannot be rendered quamvis &c., which would require el Kai,
or Kai d (Kfl) p.fi yeVoiro. Victorius seems to mean, though the Greek
(even independently of el for quamvis) would hardly I think bear such an
interpretation, to assert that what may be the cause of a thing (i. e. an
act) really is so, although it has not been (or, were not) done at all ;
in other words, though it is not : and this, though I cannot think it the
right rendering, can scarcely be said to be altogether beside the point.
On el Holrj av, see Appendix on d dvvatr av, c.20.5, On av with Opta
tive after certain particles 1 [printed at the end of the notes to this Book],
In conformity with the explanation there given, 8019 av, the con
ditional, is joined with tl, just as the future might be, of which in fact
the conditional (as the tense is in French and Italian) is a mere mo
dification.
The first example, from an unknown Tragic poet (Wagner, Fragm.
Tragic, Gr. ill 186), warns us that Heaven bestows on many great suc
cesses or prosperity, which it offers not out of good will, with no kind or
benevolent intent, but that the disasters that they (afterwards) meet with
may be more marked and conspicuous a contrast of the apparent with
the real intention, from which an inference may be drawn and applied to
a parallel case. Victorius compares Caes. de B. G. I 14 (ad Helvet.
legatum) Consuesse deos immortales, quo gravius homines ex commu-
tatione rerum doleant, quos pro scelere eorum ulcisci velint, his secun-
diores interdum res et diuturniorem impunitatem concedere. [Cf. Gaud-
ian s tolluntur in altum, ut lapsu graviore ruant (in Rufinum I. 22, 23).]
PHTOPIKH2 B 23 20. 283
i TO EK TOV MeAea-ypoi/ TOV AvTKpaivTOs,
ov% tva KTavaxri 1 6iip , OTTO)? e jmdpTvpes p- 102.
dperrjs yevcovTat MeXedypw Trpos EAAa Sa.
KCtl TO K TOV AlCCVTOS TOV QeO06KTOV, OTl 6 AlO-
jULijftrjs 7rpoei\6TO OSvcrcrea ov TifJLtav, d\\ iva \\TTMV
n 6 a.KO\ov6cov ei/Be^erat yap TOVTOV eVe/ca 7roirja-ai.
1 ou% ili/a Kavuffi
And another from Antiphon s Meleager . Referred to above, II
2. 19, where some account is given of the author, and the story of his
play. The author of the Meleager is Antiphon the Tragic poet. See
also note on II 23. 5, where the lines quoted are probably from some play.
Wagner, Fr. Tr. Gr. Ill 113. Antiph. Fr. 3. Conf. Meineke, Fragm.
Com. Gr. I 315. He suggests Kavuxri. for Krai/coat (<aiveiv is found several
times in Soph., twice in Aesch., and once in Xen. Cyrop.) : Gaisford, Not.
Var. 327, with much less probability ov% as xravcoo-i 1 . (The intention is)
not to slay the beast, but that Meleager may have witnesses of his valour
in the eyes of all Greece . " Qui locus," says Meineke, 1. c., "ex prologo
fabulae petitus videtur. Fortissimi quique Graecorum heroes (ita fere
apud poetam fuisse videtur) convenerunt, non quo ipsi aprum Calydo-
nium interficiant, sed ut Meleagri virtutem Graecis testificentur."
A third from Theodectes Ajax (Aj. Frag, i, Wagner, u. s., p. 118);
cited again 24, and ill 15. 10, where the same passage of the play is
referred to. It is there employed in illustration of the interpretation of
a fact or a motive, favourable or unfavourable according to the require
ments of the argument ; exactly as in the topic now under consideration.
Ar. there explains in much plainer terms its use and application : KOIVOV de
TO> 8ia/3aXXoi T( Kal ra> aTroXvo/ieVw, eVftS)) TO avro eVSe^erat TrXeioi tov evwa.
Trpaxdfjvat, r<5 ptv StajSaXXoi/Ti KaKorjdicrreov eVi TO ^eipoi/ e /cXa/i/Sdj/oi/Ti (put
ting an unfavourable construction upon the act and its motive), TW 8e
aTToXvo/ieVw eVl TO $\nov (the reverse). The same explanation will
apply to both quotations alike. Theodectes play contained no doubt
a rhetorical contest which would be quite in his manner, like Ovid s
between Ajax and Ulysses for the arms of Achilles, in which the argu
ment from the construction of motives would be applied to the fact, by
the competitors, in the two opposite senses. Ulysses would refer to the
preference (TrpoetXeTo occurs in both the passages), shewing a sense
of his superior merit, implied by Diomede when he chose him out of all
the Greeks to be his companion in the hazardous exploring expedition to
Troy by night (Horn. II. K. 227 seq. Ovid. Met. XIII* 238 seq. Est
aliquid de tot Graiorum millibus unum A Diomede Icgi, line 241); Ajax
would retort that this was not the real motive of Diomede s choice, but it
was that the attendant might be inferior to himself (ll 23. 20) or (as it
is expressed in ill 15. 10,) because he alone was too mean to be his
rival , to compete with him in his achievements, and to share in the
renown to be thereby acquired.
Of fvdfxtrai, as illustrating Soly av, I have already spoken.
1 Bckkcr and Spengel both retain oJx iva /c
284 PHTOPIKH2 B 23 21.
21 a AAos KOII/OS Kai rots dfjL^to-^rjrovari Kai TO?S
\evovcri, (TKOTrelv TO. TrporpeTTOvra Kai aTroTpeTrovra,
Kai <av eveKa Kai TrpdrTOVcri Kai (fcvyova lV Tavra
yap icTTiv a iav /uev VTrdp^rj del TrpaTTeiv, eav e jut}
vTrap^rjy [jLrj TrpctTTeiv. oiov el ^vvaTOV Kai pa&iov Kai
u}(pe\i/ULOV n avTw rj <pi\oi<s, 77 /3\a0epov e^OpoIs Kai
rj eXoLTTtov Y\ ty/uia TOU TrpdyfJiaTOS. Kai P. 1400.
e /c TOVTCW Kai a.7roTpeirov<riv e/c TWV
21. Top. XX. Another, common to counsellors (in deliberative rhet.)
as well as the two parties in forensic pleadings . This seems to imply
that the preceding topic is confined to the forensic branch ; and to this,
of the three, it is no doubt, most applicable ; the suggestion and con
struction of motives and intentions being there most of all in request.
Still in an encounter of two opponents in the public assembly, as in that
of Dem. and Aesch., it is almost equally available ; and in the remaining
branch even more so, as a topic of panegyric or censure. The present
topic, like the five preceding, with the partial exception of Top. xv,
which appears also amongst the fallacies of the de Soph. El., is appli
cable to Rhetoric alone and does not appear in the dialectical treatise.
It embraces arguments, which may be used in the deliberative kind
in exhorting to some act or course of policy, or dissuading from it ; and
in judicial practice in the way of accusation or defence; in which we
have to inquire, first what are the motives and incentives to action, and
what things on the contrary deter men from acting. The things which,
if they be on our side or are favourable to us, lav virdpxj], supply motives
for action, are such as possibility, facility, advantage, either to self or
friends, (of accomplishing or effecting anything) ; or anything injurious
(hurtful, damaging: that is, the power of injuring) and (bringing loss
upon, on this form of adj. see note on I 4.9) involving loss to enemies,
or (if or when) the (legal) penalty (for doing something) is less than the
thing (that is, the thing done, the success of the deed and the profit of it ,
( fructus voluptasque quae inde percipitur : quod cupiebant quod seque-
bantur et optabant. Victorius). The construction of the last words, 77 e Xar-
TOW TI Crmia rov irpay^aros seems to be, if construction it can be called, that
rj tw a is continued as an apposition to the preceding nominatives ; the
penalty being less than the profit is another incentive to action. From
such cases as these, arguments of exhortation or encouragement are drawn,
dissuasive from their contraries (impossibility, difficulty, disadvantage,
injury, &c.). From these same are derived arguments for accusation
and defence : from dissuasives or deterrents, of defence ; from persua
sives, of accusation . That is to say, in defending a client from a charge
of wrong-doing, you collect all the difficulties, dangers, disadvantages
and so on, to which the accused would be exposed in doing what he is
charged with, and infer from them the improbability of his guilt : in
accusing, you urge all or any of the opposite incitements to commit a
crime, above enumerated. To these last, the inducements to the com-
PHTOPIKH2 B 23 21,22. 285
e/c e TCOV avrav TOVTCOV KCLL
KCLI dTToXoyouvrai e /c /uev Ttov a.7roTpe7rovT(av ct
yovvTai, e /c 3e TCOV TrpOTpeTrovTcov
6(TTL S 6 T07TOS Ol>TOS O\r] Te^Vt] Y\ T Ha/H(j)i\OV KO.I
22 r\ Ka\\L7T7rov. aAXos e /c TWV ^OKOVVTWV jj.ev yry-
mission of crime, maybe added the topic cut bono, Cassianum illud
[Cic. Phil. II 35]. Compare with this the passage upon the various
motives and inducements to crime and wrong-doing, in I 10. 5 seq., which
is there mixed up with a general classification of all sources and causes
of action.
And of this topic the entire "art" of Pamphilus and Callippus is
made up . Of Callippus it has been already stated, supra 14, that
nothing is known but these two notices of Aristotle. It is likely, as I
have there pointed out [pp. 271 2], that he was one of the earliest pupils
of Isocrates mentioned in his dcn Soo-ir, 93.
Pamphilus, the rhetorician, is mentioned by Cicero, de Orat. Ill
21. 82, together with Corax, in somewhat contemptuous terms, Pamphilum
nescio quern, and of his Rhetoric, it is said, (tantam rem) tamquam
pueriles delicias aliqiias depingere. It is plain therefore that Pamphilus,
like Callippus, belonged to the early school of Rhetoricians of the age
of Gorgias and the Sophists, and treated his art like them in a puerile
and unworthy manner. Another, and very brief notice of him occurs
in Quintilian, in 6. 34, a chapter on the status or oracrets ; he rejected
Jinitio, the optKiy a-rao-iy. Spalding in his note describes the contents of
Pamphilus art from the passage of the Rhet, and then discusses,
without coming to a conclusion, the question whether or no this Pam
philus can be identified with a painter of the same name, mentioned in
Quint. XII 10. 6, Pliny in several places, and Aristoph. Plut. 385, and
the Schol. Spalding has no doubt that Quint s Pamphilus, m 6. 34,
is the rhetorician. Spengel, Art. Script, p. 149, note 83, thinks that he
cannot be the same as Aristotle s, (erat itaque ille P. non ante Herma-
gorae tempora,) in consequence of his acquaintance with crracrfis, which
were of much later invention, and the name of them unknown even to
Ar. The same doubt occurred to myself: but I laid the evil spirit by the
consideration that though Aristotle was unacquainted with the technical
terms and classification of the a-raa-fis, he yet was familiar with the
thing, which he frequently refers to ; and the technical expression may
belong to Quintilian and not to Pamphilus. Nine times the name of
Pamphilus occurs in the Orators, (Sauppe, Ind. Nom. p. 109, ad Orat.
Att. vol. Ill,) but the rhetorician is not among them.
22. Top. xxi. The object of this topic is (says Brandis, u. s.,
p. 20) to weaken the force of arguments from probability. "In incredi-
bilibus provocatur ad effectum, qui si conspicuus sit, resisti non potest
quin, quod incredibile videbatur, iam probabile quoque esse fateamur."
Schrader.
1 Another (class of arguments) is derived from things which are
believed to come to pass (yiyvf<rdai, actually to take place or happen)
286 PHTOPIKH2 B 23 22.
vecrBai aTTicTTWV e, OTL OVK av e$oav t el JJLYI i]V i]
eyyvs r\v. KCU OTL /ULCC\\OV rj yap TO. bvra t] TO.
eiKOTa V7ro\a.fjifidvovo iv el ovv a7ri(TTOV KCII JJ.Y] eiKOS,
s av e lt] ov yap Sid <ye TO ei/cos Kal TTiQavov
OVTWS. oiov Av$pOK\f]s eXeyev 6 TIiTBevs K.O.TY}-
but (still) are beyond (ordinary) belief, (you argue, namely) that they
would not have been believed at all, had they not actually been or
nearly so : i.e. either been in existence, or come so near to it, made so
near an approach to it, as to enable us by a slight stretch of imagination
to realize it so as to be convinced of its existence. Any case of very
close analogy, for instance, to the thing in question might produce this
conviction, rj eyyvs is a saving clause ; fact or nearly so . Rhetorical
argument does not aim at absolute truth and certainty: it is content
with a near approach to it within the sphere of the probable, which is
enough for complete persuasion.
Nay even more , (we may further argue that these at first sight
incredible things are even more likely to be true than those that are at
first sight probable. Supply SOKOVVTO. cart for the constr. and (/naAXoi/)
a\r)6fj or QVTCL (crri ru>v tiKorav KOI mQavcav for the sense): because men
believe in (suppose, assume the existence of,) things either actual, real
or probable : if then it (the thing in question) be incredible and not
probable, it must be true ; because its probability and plausibility are
not the ground of our belief in it . The argument of the last clause is
an exemplification of Topic IX, 10, supra, see note there. It is an
inference eVc Siatpecreco?, from division ; a disjunctive judgment. All
belief is directed to the true or the probable : there is no other alternative.
All that is believed and this is believed must therefore be either true
or probable : this is not probable ; therefore it must be true. dKijdfs
more antiquae philosophiae identifies truth and being : dKydes here = o>.
In other words, the antecedent improbability of anything may furnish
a still stronger argument for its reality than its probability. Anything
absolutely incredible is denied at once, unless there be some unusually
strong evidence of its being a fact, however paradoxical. That the
belief of it is actually entertained is the strongest proof that it is a fact :
for since no one would have supposed it to be true without the strongest
evidence, the evidence of it, of whatever kind, must be unusually strong.
The instance given is an exemplification of the topic in its first and
simplest form.
As Androcles of Pitthus (or Pithus, whence o Hidevs; an Attic deme,
of the tribe Cecropis) replied in the charge he brought against the law,
to the clamour with which he was assailed by them (the assembly, before
which he was arraigning the existing state of the law) for saying " the
laws require a law to correct them and set them right" which they
thought highly improbable "why so do fish require salt (to keep them
from corruption), though it is neither probable nor plausible that bred
as they are in brine (the salt sea) they should require salt : and so does
PHTOPIKH2 B 23 22, 23. 287
yopwv TOU vo/uLOUj errei e6opv(3r](rav avTw enrovTi "e-
ol VO/ULOI vofjiov TOU SiopOcacrovTO s," (( Kai <yap ol
KaiTOi OUK CIKOS oi/ c)e TTiQavov ev a\fj.ri
SelcrOai aAo?, Kai ra (TT6/uL(pu\a eXaiov
KCIITOI aTTiCTTOv, e (av e\aiov yiveTai, Tavra
23 e\aiov." aAAos eAey/crtKOS, TO TO. d
, ei TI dvofJLO\oyovfj.evov e /c TTCLVTWV Kai
oil-cake (orejv^vXa, the cake or mass of olives remaining after the oil
has been pressed out) require oil (for the same reason), though it is
highly improbable that the very thing that produces oil should require
oil itself. Here we have an improbable statement which is shewn by
two close analogies to be after all very near (fyyvs) the truth.
Of Androcles, and the time and circumstances of his proposed altera
tion of the laws, nothing is known but what appears in our text. The
names of three Androcleses occur in the Orators, (Sauppe, Ind. Nom.
p. 13, Or. Att. Ill) of which the first, mentioned by Andocides irep\ fiva--
TTjpicav 27, may possibly be the speaker here referred to. The Androcles
of Thuc. vm 65, (comp. Grote, H. G. vin 43 [c. LXII], Plut. Alcib. c. 19,)
the accuser and opponent of Alcibiades, assassinated in 411 B. C. by the
agents of Pisander and the oligarchical party, is most likely identical with
Andocides; the time of the events referred to in both authors being
nearly the same. I think upon the whole that it is not improbable that
Thucydides, Andocides and Aristotle may mean the same person 1 .
o-re/i0vXa] Ar. Nub. 45, Equit. 806, was a common article of food in
Attica. It denoted not only the cake of pressed olives, but also of grapes
from which the juice had been squeezed. Phrynichus, s. v., has ol fj.ev
TroXXoi ra TWV fioTpvcov fK.7riecrp.aTa a^aduts ol o* ArriKot ore/i0uAa eAawi/.
Suidas, on the other hand, ro e<cSvfia rfjs o-ra(^v\fjs T) ra>v eXawf, ols dvrl
o\lra>v fxpcavro, and to the same effect, Hesychius. Also Galen, ap. Lobeck,
note. Lobeck settles the matter by quoting Geoponic. vi 12.435, SVai
XPV OTI o-Tfp(f)v\a ovx, <%s Tives vo^i^ovcn, T>V eXaicav HQVOV e crr! Trvpfjvfs,
aAXa Kai ra TCOV o-Ta<frv\a>v yiyapra. (nvpfjvfs must surely be a mistake ;
no amount of pressing could ever convert grape-stones or olive-kernels
into an ttyoi/, a dainty or relish, and moreover what is here said, that
the oil proceeds from the o-Tffj.(pv\a, shews that the cake is made of the
olives themselves, and not of the mere stones.) The word occurs fre
quently, as might be expected, in the fragments of the Comic writers :
see the Index to Meineke s Collection.
23. Top. xxn. Another, to be employed in refutation , (i.e. of
an adversary ; which, real or imaginary, is always implied in refutation.
The office of the tXeyKriKov (vOvprjiJia is ra dvop.o\oyovfji(va vvvayfiv, to
conclude contradictories , II 22.15, an d note: see also Introd. ad h. 1-
1 The writer of the Article Androcles, in Smith s Biogr. Diet., has no doubt
upon this point. He says on this passage, Ar. has preserved a sentence from one
of Androcles speeches, in which he itsed an incorrect figure!".
288 PHTOPIKH2 B 23 23, 24.
Kal Trpd^ewv Kal \6<ywv, X W P^ ^ v e7r
(3rjTOvvTOS, oiov (t Kal (priori p.ev (j)L\eT^ v/uLas, truvw-
O?S TpictKovra" X W P^ ^ 6>7r
eivai /me (f)i\6$iKOv, OUK e^ei
7r
TOV d/uL<pi(rfir]TovvTOs, (( Kal OVTOS jueV ov
TTWTTOT oi/^eV, 670) e /ecu TroAA.oi/s \e\v/mai
24 aAAos ro?s 7rpo$ia0j3\riiuLevois Kal dvBptaTTOts Kal p-
, tj $OKOV(ri, TO \e<yeiv TT\V airiav TOV TT-
p. 263 and note ) is to take into consideration (and argue from) all
contradictories, repugnances, disagreements (between your statements
or conduct, and the opponent s), whatever contradiction may be derived
from all times (conflicting dates], actions and words; separately (dis
tinctly ; there are three distinct modes of employing it) in the case of
the adverse party, as for instance, " and he says he loves you, and yet he
conspired with the Thirty": the thirty tyrants namely, after Aegospotami,
B.C. 404: this is from the deliberative branch: and separately in your
own case (as applied to your own conduct, irpa^eis), " and he says that I
am litigious, and yet he can t prove that I have ever brought a single
case into court :" and again, distinguished from the preceding, the appli
cation of it to oneself and the opponent (in the way of a contrast of two
opposite characters and modes of conduct), " and he has never lent any
one a single penny, whilst I have even ransomed (got you liberated,
Xe Xv/icu,) many of you (out of captivity). " This last example reminds us
of the contrast drawn by Demosthenes, de F. Leg. pp. 412, 13, seq., of his
own character and conduct as compared with that of the rest of the
ambassadors to Philip, Aeschines, Philocrates and Phrynon: in which
the ransom of captives plays an important part.
This is Cicero s locus ex repugnantibus, Top. Ill II, IV 21, where it
is illustrated by an example, which concludes, repugnat enim recte acci-
pere et invitum reddere. And further, XII 53 seq. Quintilian, v 10. 74,
Ex pugnantibus, Qui est sapiens stultus non est, Ib. 8. 5, ex repug-
nantibus.
24. Top. xxm. The title of this topic in scripto quodam libro
apud Victorium, is ajro TOV Xfyo/ie i^s r^v alrias Xuftr&u dta/SoX^ i/.
Another, for (the benefit of; the dative seems to follow X/yfti/ ;)
those that have been previously brought into suspicion or odium, (whe
ther by actual calumny) or suspected (thought to be, having the appear
ance of being, SoKoGcri, guilty of something wrong, for some other reason
so Vater, reading ?/ SOKOVO-I), both men and things, is to state the rea
son for the (otherwise) unaccountable circumstance : for there must be
some reason (& 5 is the atn a,) for this appearance (of guilt) . MS A c
has ^117 SoKoDo-i, which Victorius adopts and defends. All the recent edd.
have 17. Victorius understands by /*?) SoicoOo-t a qualification of TrpoSia-
to express the unexpected, apparently unreasonable, nature
PHTOPIKHS B 23 24. 289
pafio^ov tern yap TI Si o (paii/erai. oiov V7ro(3e-
p\flfjLW)S TIVOS TOV avTijs viov & TO
of the calumny or suspicion, which seems to be quite unsuitable to the
character and circumstances of the object of it: "quae tamen nullo modo
haerere ipsis videatur, quod alienae ab ea sint." This agrees extremely
well with the trapa8oov following, and this reading and explanation is
deserving at all events of consideration. It supposes only one case to
be contemplated, that of unjust suspicion and consequent calumny.
Vater on the contrary thinks that there are two cases intended, direct
calumny, and suspicion for any other reason; and that this requires \
SoKoOo-t. His transl. is, "Homines significantur, qui proptcr calumniam
vel alia de caussavideantur aliquo modo affecti esse." This is not very
clear ; but I suppose his meaning to be what I have said. In this case
we must understand dftiicija-ai, or something equivalent, after donovcrt.
Spengel, in his recent edition, says that Victorius reading and inter
pretation is refuted by the sense of the passage which I cannot agree
with and that 8ia^f^\!jcr6ai must be understood after fj SOKOIHTIV. But
what is the meaning of apparent calumny? and how is it distinguished
from the other?
There is another point which has hitherto escaped observation, viz.
the interpretation of /cat avQpanrois KOI irpay^acri. Victorius interprets it as
in apposition to TO!? SjajSe/SX^/ieVoir, qui valet ad purgandas aliquas et
personas et res, which at first sight seems the most natural and obvious
explanation, and I have adopted it in my translation. But then, what are
the things that can be calumniated or brought under suspicion? One
might suppose that it means human actions : but Victorius renders it
res; and in fact actions are necessarily included in rots 8iap(fi\r)p,(vots;
they are the things that are subject to misinterpretation ; and therefore
there is no ground for a distinction between men and their actions, so
far at least as they are subject to calumny. I will venture to suggest,
though not with complete confidence, that we might give the words a
different construction, and understand them thus, "for the benefit of
those who have been unjustly we must in this case read ^ Sonovviv,
unlikely to be guilty subjected to suspicion, by men (by human agency,
directly) or by circumstances" (indirectly; which would be equivalent to
Vater s second case). At all events it makes very good sense.
We now come to a still greater difficulty, the interpretation of JTTO-
J3fj3\r)p.fvrjs in the example. A" reads Sta/3f/3X?;/zeV^s TWOS 77730? TOV viov
when a certain woman had been brought into suspicion with respect to
(i. e. as to her conduct or dealings with) her son , which gives a very
sufficient sense, but is rejected by Victorius as well as Bekker and Spen
gel and modern editors in general.
Victorius rendering and no other Commentary that I have seen has
a word on the subject is as follows ; I must give it in his own words as
it will hardly bear translation. " Ceu cum mater quaedam filium subiis-
set, corporique ipsius corpus suum supposuisset, ut commode eum os-
culari posset, in eo habitu corporis spectata visa est stuprum cum ado-
lescente exercere." wro/Sf/SAij/^Vq? is translated literally.
AR. II. 19
290 PHTOPIKHS B 23 24, 25.
eSoKet (rvvelvai TW jneipaKiio, Ae^eVros e TOV alrlov
e\v6rj r] $iaj3o\f] Kai oiov ev TW AtavTi Tta
Qfivaro evs Xeyei Trpos TOV A lavTa, SLOTL
>\ ~ * ,r > *. > \ \ > ** r >f
25 wv TOV AiavTOS ov coKet. aAAos CITTO TOV aiTiov, av
T6 VTTap^rjy OTL CCTTf, KO.V fJ-Tf VTTap^tJy OTL OVK (TTtV
afjLa yap TO aiTiov Kai ov aiTiov, Kai avev aiTtov ovOev
I see no other meaning that can be attached to the words as the
text at present stands, but it must be observed that vTro^e^Xtj/zeV^s TOV
avTTJs vlov is very strange Greek for supposuisse filium corpori suo, and I
do not see how it can be justified. The accus. after virofiaXXfiv repre
sents not the thing under which you throw something, but the thing that
you throw under something else: and the passive vTro^e^Xjj/ie^s mean
ing throwing herself under , is possible perhaps, but by no means usual,
Greek. The ordinary construction of inrofia\\tiv with two objects,
appears in these examples. The object thrown is in the accus. ; the
object under which it is thrown is either in the dat. or has a prepos.
introduced before it. imofia\\tiv nXevpols irXtvpd, Eur. Or. 223, vrroft.
ufjL(f)l fiacTTov tTTToSov, Suppl. 1 1 60. Xen. Oecon. iS. 5? VTT. TO. arpLirra inro
rovs TToSas. Plut. Brut. 31, vir. TO IS Ztyeo-iv ras cr<f)ayas, and similarly in
the metaph. applications of it (from Rost and Palm s Lex.). On the genit.
virofi(jS\T]fj.VT]s see note on n 8. 10.
The general meaning of the whole is, that a mother had been seen in
this position which she had assumed for the purpose of embracing her
own son which was not known to the witness was accordingly sub
jected to the suspicion of illicit intercourse with him: and we are to sup
pose further, that her character hitherto had been unimpeachable : when
the true reason was explained or stated, the calumny was at once
quashed (dissolved or unloosed as a knot). On this sense of \veiv,
diaXvftv, &c. see note in Introd. on II 25, p. 267, note i.
A second example is taken from the argument between Ajax and
Ulysses in the contest for the arms of Achilles, in Theodectes tragedy
the Ajax , already referred to 20 supra: where Ulysses tells Ajax why
(the reason, which explains the paradox), though he is really braver than
Ajax, he is not thought to be so. What the reason was we are not told ;
nor does Ovid. Met. Xlll supply the deficiency.
On Siort and its three senses, see note on I i. n.
25. Top. xxiv. OTTO TOU alrlov] the inference from cause to
effect. If the cause be there (its effect which necessarily follows, must
be there too, and) the fact (alleged) is so: if absent, then (its effect is
absent too, and) it is not so: for cause and effect always go together,
and without a cause (i.e. its proper cause) nothing is . Brandis, u. s.,
p. 20, observes, that this like the preceding topics is confined to Rhe
toric. Cicero, Top. 58 67, treats of cause in general and its vari
eties : but has nothing exactly corresponding to this, though he speaks
of the great importance of the general topic to orators (65 7). Quin-
tilian, observing that the " argumentatio, qua colligi solent ex us qnae
faciunt ea quae efficiuntitr, ant contra, quod genus a causis vacant"
PHTOPIKHS B 23 25. 291
<TTIV. oiov Acto^d/uas crTroA.o yoi/fiej Os eAeye,
Opct(rv(3ov\ov on fjv OTJjAtTfjs
is nearly akin to that of antecedent and consequent, V 10. 80, exem
plifies it in the four following sections.
Leodamas, for instance, said in his defence, when charged by Thra-
sybulus with having had his name inscribed on the column (as a mark of
infamy) in the Acropolis, only he had struck (or cut) it out in the time of
the Thirty , replied that it was impossible; for the Thirty could have
trusted him more if the record of his hatred of the people had remained
engraved on the column . The fact is denied on the ground of the
absence of a sufficient cause: an example of the second case, the nega
tive application of the topic, av ^ virdpxfl.
On Leodamas, see on I 7. 13, and the reff. Sauppe, ad Orat. Fragm.
xvi, Or. Att. in 216, thinks it impossible that the two Leodamases
mentioned by Ar., here and I 7. 13, can be the same [ ;// Recht\ A.
Schaefer, Dem. u. s. Zeit. I p. 129 .]. He argues that the Leodamas
whose name was inscribed on the column as a traitor (in proditorum
indice inscr.^ according to Thrasybulus, before the domination of the
Thirty, that is, not later than 404 B. C. (he says 405), when he must have
been about thirty years old 1 , could not have been the Leodamas men
tioned by Demosth. c. Lept. 146, as one of the Syndics under the
Leptinean law, in 355 B.C., and consequently, that the latter, the famous
orator of Acharnae, must have been a different person, because he
would then have been nearly 90. Clinton, F. H. n in, sub anno
3/2 3, merely says, quoting Rhet. II 23. 25, " From this incident it
appears that Leodamas was already grown up and capable of the duties
of a citizen in B.C. 404, which shews him far advanced in years at the
time of the cause of Leptines, in B.C. 355." And this appears to me to
be a sufficient account of the matter. Thrasybulus accusation of Leo
damas is mentioned likewise by Lysias, c. Evandr. 13, et seq.
The circumstances referred to in this accusation and defence, and the
meaning and intention of the inscription which Leodamas is said to have
effaced, are not quite clear. The use of the OT^ XJ; or pillar here referred
to was twofold: the object of it in either case was the same, to perpetuate
the memory of some act or character to all future time. But the fact or
character commemorated might be either good or evil ; and in the former
case it was the name of a public benefactor, in the latter of some signal
malefactor or public enemy, that was inscribed. It is usual to apply the
latter explanation to the case here in question, which is probably what
is meant ; and then it seems the story must be this : At some uncertain
time previous to the expulsion of the thirty tyrants and their Lacedae
monian supporters by Thrasybulus and his friends, the recovery of the
city, and restoration of the demus in 403 B.C., the name of Leodamas
had been inscribed as a mark of infamy as a traitor to his country, as
Sauppe u. s. and Herm. Pol. Ant. 144. u interpret it according to
custom on a pillar erected in the Acropolis for that purpose. Now if it
was hatred to the demus that was engraved on it (e fpa/^o^s) as
1 Je n en vois pas la nccessite.
I 9 2
292 PHTOPJKHS B 23 25.
eV Ttf UKpOTToXei, d\\ KKO\^aL CTTl TWV T
OIIK. eWe\ ecr$at <pt] fiaXXov yap av TricrTeveiv avTu?
TpuzKomra eyyeypafifievris T//S e%6pas Trpos TOV
the sign and cause of his imputed infamy, it follows that it must have
been erected at some period when the popular party was in the ascend
ant ; Leodamas of coarse being a supporter of the oligarchs. When his
friends were in power and he had the opportunity, Thrasybulus charges
him. inter alia of course, with having struck or cut it out to efface the
record. He denies the possibility of their effect by arguing the absence
of all assignable cause, whkh could have produced it : for this permanent
record of his hostility to the people would have been an additional recom
mendation to the Thirty, who would have trusted him all the more for it.
Thrasybulus, says Victorius. was accusing Leodamas of being an enemy
and a traitor to his country ; and one of the arguments he brought for
ward was the existence of this inscription, the subsequent disappearance
of which he attempted to explain. He likewise cites in illustration of
the use of the topic Cic. pro Mil. 32, cum ostendere vellet insidiatorem
fuisse Ciodium. Quonam igititr pacto pro&ari potest insidias Jfifoni
fecisst Cfodium f satis est quidtm in ilia, tarn audari tarn nefaria belltta
do-:ere magnam ti caussam, magnam sptm in Milanis morte propositam.
magnas utilitates fuisse. And, as Cic. goes on to remark, this is Cctssia-
num illudj cut bonofiterit.
Of 0177X77 the pillar, and a~rrj\lTrjs, the person whose name is engravec
on it, in its unfavourable sense, where the inscription is a record of
infamy which may be compared with our use of the pillory, the custom
of p j sting the name of a defaulter at the Stock Exchange, or a candi
date who has disgraced himself in an examination ; the object in each
case being the same, exposure of the culprit, and a warning to others 1 :
the difference between the ancient and modern usages, that the latter are
temporary, the other permanent the following are examples : Andoc.
. 78, in a Tfrr/<fruTpa. : Lycurg. c. Leocr. 1 17, fotijcrcarrfs trn]\jji>.
Toir aXiTrjpiovs KCU ravs irpo&yras : Demosth. PhiL T 42.
where an historical example is given, and the whole process describee.
Isocr. rtpi TOV nyavs. 9. err^Xtr^y dvcr/pafpfiv.
Of the favourable sense, Victorius quotes an instance from Lys. c
AgoraL 5 72, rptMrypai^ttu tls TTJV <rn]\j]v as tvfpytras ovrat. Herm. Pol.
Ant. u s. See also Sandys note on Isocr. Pan eg. | 180.
eWo^rcul Ar. seems here to have arbitrarily departed from his or:
ginal constr. Having begun with rar^/op*;* and on jjv, he abruptly
changes to the infin. as if Xry and not KOTTjynpdv had preceded : so tha*
1 At Milan , savs Manzoni, Introd. to the Storia d;Ila coZonna in/arm, in 1830
the judges condemned to the most horrible tortures some persons who were accost
of having helped to spread the plague, and hi addition to other severe penaltie-
d&r&iron di piu, ckt in qutllo spazio ( where the house of one of the condemned he
stood) / innaJzjsse una colmna, la jual^ davexe chiamarsi in/arm, ccm un 1 istr.
ziow cht tramandiis^ ai posteri la notizia delC attentato d della ftna. E in c
IHU / inganna-ron-] : quel giudizio fu v
PHTOPIKH2 B 23 26, 27. 293
_ . rifjiov, a/XXos, el eVeJe ^ero (3e\Tiov oAAws // eVSe-
wv f) arvfi/3ov\Ut tj TrpaTTet t} TreTrpa^e <TKO-
fyavepov yap on, el fj.tj OUTWS 6%et, ou TreTrpa-^ev
yap eKcav ra <pav\a Kai yiyvwo Ktav Trpoaipelrat. P. 1400 b.
e TOUTO >^eCos* 7ro\\aKK yap va"repov
TTWS >}v Trpa^ai /3e/Vnoi>, Trporepov e
, orav TL Ivavriov
we must supply \tyav to explain the government of the infinitive. It
cannot be the optative.
26. Top. xxv. Another, to consider whether it ever was, or is "
still, possible to improve (do better, more advantageously, under more
avourable conditions,) in any other way (by following any other course,
>y any alteration of time, place, conditions, circumstances), any (bad)
idvice (which the counsellor is charged with having given, Viet), or any
thing which he is doing, or ever has done (anything wrong that he is
either meditating or has committed), (you infer) that, if this be not so (if
he has not taken advantage of these possible improvements, which
vvould have contributed to the success of his advice or design), he is not
, r uilty at all ; because (no one would ever neglect such opportunities if he
iad it in his power to avail himself of them) no one, intentionally and
vvith full knowledge, ever prefers the worse to the better. It seems
rom the omission of erv^SovXevei and irparrei, and the prominence given
o irtirpaxfv the past act in the explanation of the reason, that although
.his topic may be applied to deliberative orator}*, it is much more usual
ind useful in defending yourself or a client in a court of law. You say,
vly client cannot be guilty of the act with which you charge him, for he
:ould have done it much better, would be much more likely to have been
successful, in some other way ; at some other time, and place, or under
other circumstances : therefore, since he has not chosen to do the thing
sn the best way that he could, and at the same time had full knowledge
>f what ivas the best way of doing it, it is plain that he has not done it
ow under less favourable circumstances. This is excellently illustrated
v Victorius from another passage of Cic. pro Mil. xvi 41. In retorting
ipon Clodius the charge of lying in wait to assassinate, he first enume-
ates several favourable opportunities which Milo had previously neg-
octed to avail himself of, and asks whether it was likely that, having
tcted thus, he should now choose an occasion when time and circum-
tances were so much less favourable, to carry out such a design: Qutm
gitur cum omnium gratia, noluit (occidere), hunt voluit cum aliquorum
qverela? quern iure, quern loco, quern Umpore, quern impune nan est
lusus, hunc iniuria, iniquo loco, alieno tempers, peruulo capitis, no*
lubitavit occidere f
But there is a fallacy in this : for it often does not become clear till
fterwards (after the commission of the act) how the thing might have
>een better done, whereas before it was anything but clear .
27. Top. xxvi. Another, when anything is about to be done
II. *
294 PHTOPIKH2 B 23 27.
ajj.a (TKOTrev* oov
el 6vw(ri TY\ AevKoOea KUL Bptivwariv, f] JULII,
crvvefiovXevev, el juev 6eov VTroXapfidvovcri, fj.ri
opposed to what has been done already (by the same person), to look at
them together : i. e. to bring together things that had been hitherto
separate, and so to be able to compare them TrapaXX^Xa <f)avepa /zaX-
\ov infra 30 ; TrapaXX^Xa ra tvavria paXicrra (paivfo-dai, III 2. 9? 9- 8,
11.9, 17. 13, 7rapdXXr;Xa fj,aX\ov Tavavria yvu>pi^Tiu a process which clearly
brings out the contradiction. Brandis u. s. \Philologus IV i] p. 20 thus
expresses the argument of the topic, "to detect a contradiction in the
action in question." It seems in itself, and also from the example
selected, to be most appropriate in giving advice.
As Xenophanes, when the Eleates (his present fellow-citizens)
consulted him, asked his advice, whether they are to offer sacri
fices and dirges to Leucothca, or not ; advised them, if they supposed
her to be a goddess not to sing dirges (a funeral lament implying
death and mortality); if a mortal, not to offer sacrifices . Xenophanes
here, by bringing the two practices into immediate comparison if
the example is meant to represent literally the statement of the topic,
we must suppose that the Eleates had already done one of the two ;
deified her most likely ; and now wanted to know whether they should
do the other makes the contradiction between sacrificing to (which they
had done), and lamenting as dead (which they were about to do), the
same person.
Of Xenophanes of Colophon, but then living at Elea, or Velia,
where he founded the Eleatic school we have already had notice in
I 15.29, and II 23. 18.
ft Bvucri] fl being here equivalent to Trorfpoi/, admits equally with it
of construction with the deliberative conjunctive : compare the same
deliberative conjunctive in interrogation, as a modified doubtful future ;
rt iroiwufv; what are we to do? instead of the direct, what shall we
do? Matth. Gr. Gr. 526.
This passage is cited by Lobeck, Aglaophamns, Eleus. 21, Vol. I.
p. 167.
Plutarch refers more than once to this dictum of Xenophanes, but
supposes it to have been addressed to the Egyptians, about the worship
of Osiris, and the propriety of Bpfjvoi in his honour. De Superst. c. 13,
p. 171 E, Amator. c. 18, 763 D, de Is. et Osir. c. 70, 379 B. Wyttenbach ad
loc. de Superst. Athen. XV 697 A, quoting Aristotle, ev TJJ anoKoyla, tl
(j.fj KaTtyfva-TaL o \6yoi apud eundem.
Ino, daughter of Cadmus and Harmonia, and wife of Athamas, in a
fit of madness inspired by Hera, threw herself and her son Melicertes
two sons, Eur. Med. 1289; see the whole passage, 1279 1292 into the
sea. Both of them became sea deities : she under the name of Leuco-
thea, Melicertes of Palaemon. Virg. Georg. I 436 7. The stories of
Athamas and Ino are told under those two names in Smith s Diet.
Biogr. Cic. Tusc. Disp. I 12. 28. de Nat. D. in 15. 39 /// Graccia multos
PHTOPIKH2 B 23 28. 295
28 et (T avBpunrov, fj.r] dueiv. aAAos TO TTOS TO e /c
dfjLapTt]6evT(*)v KctTrjyopeij/ rj ctTroXoyeia Oai, oiov eV
ivou Mrifieia o l HG.V KaTt]yopov(Ti^ OTL TOI)
ov <j)atv(r6ai youv ai/ roi/V ^/mapre <ydp
Trepi TY\V djrocTToXriv T&5V Traiocov t} c>
KapKi
Jiabent ex liomiuibus deos Leucotheam quaefuit Ino, et eius Palaemonem
filium cuncta Graecia,
28. Top. xxvir. Another, from mistakes made; to be employed
in accusation or defence . The example is an illustration of both; the
accusers convert the mistake that Medea made in sending away her
children into a charge of having murdered them ; Medea retorts the
same argument from another mistake which she could have committed
had she done what they allege, of which however she is incapable.
Brandis, " in any mistake that has been made to find a ground of accu
sation or defence."
For instance, in Carcinus Medea, the one party (of the disputants in
the play) charge her with the death of her children at all events (say
they) they no where appear : because Medea made a mistake in (in
respect of) sending away her children (instead of merely sending them
away, they argued that she had made away with them, since they were
no where to be found) : her defence is, that it was not her children, but
Jason, that she would have killed (if she had killed any one); for she
would have made a mistake in failing to do this, if she had done the
other too : and of such a mistake she never could have been guilty.
" Quasi dicat, quomodo tarn stulta fuissem (how could I have made such a
mistake?) ut innocentes filios necassem; perfidum autem coniugem et
auctorem omnium meorum malorum relinquerem ?" Victorius.
Carcinus, a tragic poet contemporary with Aristophanes, and his
sons, Philocles, Xenotimus, and Xenocles, are often mentioned by Ari
stophanes, never without ridicule. See Vesp. 1501 12, Nub. 1261, Pac.
782, 864, and in Holden, Onom. Arist. Miiller, Hist. Gr. Lit. c. xxvi
2, passes him over with very slight notice, " known to us chiefly from
the jokes and mockeries of Aristophanes." Meineke, Hist. Crit. Com.
Gr. p. 505 seq., Fragm. Comic. Vol. I., has a long and learned discus
sion, principally with the object of distinguishing this Carcinus from
others of the same name. There was at all events one other tragic poet
of the name, whom Meineke supposes to have been the grandson of the
former, p. 506, being said by Suidas to be the son of Xenocles (or Theo-
dectes). This Carcinus flourished according to Suidas before the reign
of Philip of Macedon , in the first half of the 4th cent. B.C. Some frag
ments of his Achilles, Semele, and Tereus, are given by Wagner in his
collection, Fragm. Trag. Gr. ill 96, seq. with some others of uncertain
plays: but he has omitted all those that are mentioned by Aristotle, the
Medea here, the Oedipus in in 16. n, the Thyestes, Poet. 16. 2. In
Poet. 17.2, there is a reference to a character, Amphiaraus, in a play of
his not named, with which Ar. finds fault. Athen. I 22 A. See also
Clinton, F. H. II. Introd. xxin.
296 PHTOPIKH2 B 23 28, 29.
\oyeiTai OTI OUK av TOV<S Traloas d\\d TOV Idcrova av
ctTreKTeivev TOVTO yap i]/mapTev av jut] Troiricracra,
eiTrep Kai OaTepov cTrouicrev. ecrrt 6 TOTTO? OVTOS
TOV ev^v/Uf/juaros Kai TO e/^os oA?? 77 irpOTepov 0eo-
29 Sujpov Te-^vrj. aAAos diro TOV oVo/xaros, otoi/ ok d
(ra(p<jos ^ifttjpco Kai (popoucra
And this topic and the kind of enthymeme is the whole of the earlier
art of Theodorus . Comp. supra 14 of Callippus, and 21, of Callippus
and Pamphilus.
77 Trporepov 0. nj(vtf\ i. e. 77 irportpov oZcra, yfypafj-nevr}, TTfTroiTjfjifvr] : as ol
TrpaiTov, the earliest writers , ill 1.9. Theodorus work must have passed
through two editions, of which the second, from what is said here, seems
to have been larger and more complete. This one is the first or ear
lier edition ; the one before the second. If this contained nothing but
the illustration of the topic of mistakes , it must have been extremely
insufficient as an art of rhetoric . \Ve must ascribe either to his second
and enlarged Art or to speeches and rhetorical exercitations all that
Aristotle says of him, together with Tisias and Thrasymachus, de Soph.
El. c. 34, 183 b 32, as well as the Kama \eytiv, Rhet. Ill II. 6, and his
divisions of the speech, ill 13. 5; as also the notices of him in Plato s
Phaedrus, Quintilian, Cicero Brut. XII 48, &c., Dionysius, &c. (which
may be found in Camb. Journ. of CL and Sacred Phil. No. IX. Ill 284
foil. 1 ). Of Theodorus of Byzantium to be distinguished from another
Theodorus, a rhetorician of Gadara, Quint. II 15. 21 see further in
Speng. Art. Script, p. 98 seq. ; Westermann, Gesch. der Beredtsanikeit,
30. 16, p. 40, 68. 7, p. 140. Sauppe, Fragm. Or. Aft. vm, Or. Att. m
164, simply refers to Spengel s Artiuin Script ores, and to his own tract
in Zimmerm. diurn. lit. antiq. 1835, p. 406. [Blass, die Attische-Beredsam-
keit, I p. 253.]
29. Top. XXVIII. The argument, aVo roO oix t^aros, significant
names: "which draws an inference from the signification of a name."
Brandis. A dialectical topic akin to, but by no means identical with,
this, (the one is confined to surnames, the other extends to all words in
general,) occurs in Top. B 6, 112^32, to consider the derivation and
signification of names with a view to applying them as suits the imme
diate purpose: which coincides more nearly with Cicero s topic, quum
ex vi nominis argumentum elicitur, quam Graeci fTvpoXoyiav vocant
Top. vm. 35 seq., than with the rhetorical form of it as it appears here;
though both of the others may be regarded as including this special
rhetorical application. But in the rhetorical treatise, the de Inv. ll 9. 28,
we have the same use of names (i. e. surnames) suggested as by Ari-
1 In referring to this paper I take the opportunity of withdrawing all that I
have said in p. 286, ^ irpircpov QeoSupov Texyi), and the illustration from Carcinus.
It is sufficiently corrected in the note on this section.
PHTOPIKHS B 23 29, 297
stotle : Nam et de nomine nonnumquam aliquid siispicionis nascitur.,.
lit si dicamus idcirco aliquem Calduin vocari, quod temcrario et repentino
consilio sit.
Ouintilian, v 10. 30, 31, thinks that an argument can seldom be
drawn from a surname, except in the case of such significant names as
are assigned for a reason, as Sapiens (Cato and Laelius), Magnus
(Pompey), and Plenus(?} : or where the name is not significant, but sug
gests a crime as the name Cornelius, in the case of Lentulus, was sug
gestive of conspiracy (for a reason there given). The use of the name
recommended by Aristotle s topic (which he does not mention) is pro
nounced, in the case of Euripides who represents Eteocles as attacking
the name of his brother Polynices, TroXv velnos, ut argumentum morum
as insipid and tasteless, frigidum. It is however a frequent material
for jokes; especially in the hands of Cicero, who freely employs it, as in
the case of Verres . The passage of Euripides referred to, is Phoen.
636 7 ; Eteocles terminates the altercation with his brother with the two
lines, et$ K x&Spay dXydun 8 ovo/xa Ho\vvfiKrj Trarfjp e$ero trot 6fia irpo-
voia vftKf<av (ncovvnov. With this use of significant names all readers of
the Greek Tragic poets are familiar. It is not to be regarded in them as
a mere play on words, but they read in the significant name the cha
racter or destiny of its bearer : and thus employed they have a true
tragic interest. It is singular therefore that Elmsley. who had certainly
studied the Greek dramatists with care and attention, should, on
Bacch. 508, after citing a number of examples, end his note with this
almost incredible observation, " Haec non modo \jsvxpa sunt" (is the epi
thet borrowed from Quintilian?), verum etiam tragicos malos fuisse
grammaticos. Quid enim commune habent ATroAXcoi/ et dnoXXvvat
praeter soni similitudincm?" And this is all that is suggested by Ajax s
pathetic exclamation, at at ris av iror w f r K.r.A. Soph. Aj. 430, and the
rest! Elmsley has omitted Aesch. S. c. T. 658, eVwi v/xa) Se /capra IIoXu-
vfiKr) Xe yeB, from his list ; and Eur. Antiope, Fr. i (Dind., Wagner), and
Fragm. 2, Ibid. Agath. Fragm. Thyest. I ap. Wagn. Fr. Tr. Gr. in 74.
Add from other sources, Dante Div. Com. Piirg. xm. 109, Savia non
fui, awegna eke Sapia fossi chiamata. Shaksp. Rich. II., Act II. Sc. I 73,
Gaunt. O how tJiat name befits my composition / Old Gaunt indeed ;
and gaunt in being old, &c. The king asks, Can sick men play so nicely
with their names ? No, is the reply, misery makes sport to mock itself,
&c. : which is not a bad answer to Elmsley s objection. This tracing of
the character or destiny in the name is particularly common in the
Hebrew of the Old Test., as the well-known instance of Genesis xxvii.
36, Is not he rightly named Jacob? for he hath supplanted me these
two times. The practice, which seems to be a suggestion of nature
itself, is thus shewn to have prevailed in various times, nations and
languages.
The line of Soph, is from his Tyro, Fragm. i (Fr. Soph. 563), Dind.
Sidero, Tyronis noverca: Fragm. IX, Wagn. Fragm. Trag. Gr. II 413,
"Egregie Brunck. versum hue rettulit, quo haud dubie Sideronis y crude-
litas in Tyronem exagitatur." On the Tragedy and its contents, Wagner
u. s. p. 410. Victorius and Gaisford cite Eustath. ad II. A p. 158, et ad II. r
379 = 287. 35, (cat fl<r\v a\r]Quss <fr(p<avv[j.a ro triVrtfy ot Trap O/i^pa)...os l ...
298 PHTOPIKH2 B 23 29.
KOLL ok eV TO?? TWI/ 0ewy eirctivote elca6a(ri Xvyeiv, KCXI P- 10 4-
ok Koj/fc)j/ QparrvfiovXov 6pa<rufiov\ov 6Ka\ei, Kat
Qpaa-vfjia-^ov " del 6pacrvfj.a-^o^ e/," /cat
" ae* o"i) TTwAos ei," Kai &.pa.K.ovra TOV VO/ULO-
OTI OVK. dvQptaTTOV ol vofjioi d\\a
Kara rrjv Trapot/Kafojxe z/^i ScSfjpco dparrelav tKfivrjv yvvaiKa, (fropoifv TO oi<fiov
ow/ia. In the second passage the latter part of this is repeated.
KOI <? ev TOIS T<av 6eav eiraivois\ " Fortasse intelligit iis nominibus vocari
eos tune solitos quae vim et potestatem eorum declararent." Victorius.
It may perhaps refer to the significant names derived from their attri
butes or occupations, by which deities are designated, and which as
special distinctions would naturally occur in the hymns addressed to
them. These may sometimes be substituted for their proper names,
and may furnish arguments of praise.
The Conon and Thrasybulus here mentioned are doubtless, as may
be inferred from the absence of any special designation, the Conon, the
victor of Cnidus (394 B. c.), and the Thrasybulus, the expeller of the
Thirty and restorer of the demus in 403 : though there are several others
bearing both of these names in Sauppe s Ind. Norn, ad Or. Alt. in.
pp. 63, 4, 81, 2, Thrasybulus is named by Demosth., de Cor. 219, as
one of the most distinguished orators among his predecessors, together
with Callistratus, Aristophon, and Cephalus ; the two first of these we
have had mentioned in the Rhetoric. In de F. L. 320, he is called TOW
(the popular Thrasybulus, the people s friend, nal TOV OTTO &v\fjs
OV Si^oi/. Conon and he were contemporaries. Conon
died soon after 392 B.C., Clinton, F. H. sub anno 388. 3, Thrasybulus,
"perhaps in the beginning of B.C. 389." Ib. sub anno 390. His name,
according to Conon, fitly represented the rashness of his counsels and
character. Grote, H. G. IX 509 [chap. LXXV.], in describing the charac
ter of Thrasybulus, omits to notice this.
In like manner the name of Thrasymachus, the rhetorician, is signi
ficant of the hardihood and pugnacity which were combined in his cha
racter. The sketch given of him in the first book of Plato s Republic is
in exact correspondence with this. "Always true to your name," rash
and combative, said Herodicus to him, doubtless provoked by some
rudeness of the Sophist in the course of a dialectical disputation. There
were two Herodicuses, both physicians; see note on I 5.10. Doubtless
this again is the better known of the two, Herodicus of Selymbria in
Thrace; of whose medical practice Plato gives an account, Rep. in
406 A seq. In a similar dispute with Polus, another Sophist and Rhe
torician, (whose character, in perfect agreement with this, is likewise
sketched by Plato in his Gorgias, where he is said to be vtos KOL dgvs 1 ,)
Herodicus again reminds him of the significance of his name, " Colt by
1 IP- 463 E.] A very brief summary of the leading points of Folus character as
he appears in the Gorgias, is given amongst the dramatis personae of the Introd.
to transl. of Gorg. p. Ixxvii.
PHTOPIKHS B 23 29, 30. 299
Kcti ws r\ ^vnriSov E/ca/3>; ets
TOVVOJJL
Kal w
TIevBevs ecrofjLei/t]^ a-v[jL(f)opas eVw
30 evSoKt/uLei $e fj.a\\ov TWV iv6v{jit]fj.d Tcov TO,
TLKO. TUJV ctTToSeiKTiKcov $ia TO (TWCfyutyriv p.lv evav-
name and colt by nature 1 ." And lastly this inveterate punster applies
the same process to Dracon the legislator , declaring that his laws
Avere not those of a man, but of a dragon; so cruel were they . AH-
stotle, Pol. II 12 sub finem, says of Draco s laws, that they had nothing
peculiar, but 77 ^aXeTror^s, 6\a TO rrjs (jr)fiius peyedos. Nearly every offence
was made punishable with death. Hence Demades said of them that
they "were written not in ink, but in blood." Plut. Sol. 17. Tzetzes, Chil.
5, line 342 sqq. ap. Sauppe, Fragm. Demad. 17, Orat. Alt. in 316; Grote,
H. G. in 202 [chap, x.], whence our Draconian legislation.
The verse that follows is from Eur. s Troades 990, where Hecuba is
answering Helen, who had been arguing the invincible power of Love.
"All follies are to mortals Aphrodite" (are attributed by men to this
passion, take the form of Aphrodite in their fancy), and rightly does
the goddess name begin the word a^^oa-vvrj. A.(j)po8irr] and A(ppocrvi>r)
have the first half of the word in common.
Hfvdevs, K.T.X.] Pentheus that bearest the name of thy future for
tune . Comp. Bacch. 367 and 508, and Theocr. Id. XXVI. 26, e opeos
TTfvdr)ij.a. Kal ov Yievdrja <j)fpovcrai.
Probably from Chaeremon s Dionysus, quoted three times in Athe-
naeus (Elms, ad Eur. Bacch. 508), and also probably, like the Bacchae,
on the story of Pentheus. Chaeremon s fondness for flowers and
the vegetable creation in general, noticed by Athen. Xin. 608 D, ap
pears throughout the fragments preserved. See infra III 12. 2 where he
is spoken of as aKpi^t, (So-irtp Xoyoypa^oj, on which see note in Introd.
ad loc. p. 325.
On Chaeremon see Muller Hist. Gr. Lit. XXVI 6, and the Art. in
Smith s Diet. Biogr. s.v. He is a poet whose plays are more suited for
reading than acting, dvayvaxmKos, Rhet. ill u. s. He is quoted again by
Ar. Probl. ill 16. In Poet. I 12, his Centaur is spoken of as a p-inry
pa\^6)8m, on the import of which see the two writers above referred to ;
and in Poet. 24. 11, this blending of heterogeneous elements is again
alluded to. See also Meineke, Hist. Crit. Com. Gr. p. 517 seq. Chaere
mon is one of those who have been erroneously included amongst the
Comic poets. Wagner, Fr. Trag. Gr. Ill 127 147. Clint. F. H. Vol. II.
Introd. p. xxxii.
1 This most ingenious rendering was given by Dr Thompson, then Greek
Professor, in a lecture delivered Feb. 6, 1854. [Introd. to ed. of Gorg. p. v.]
300 PHTOPIKH2 B 23 30.
TLWV elvai 6V fJilKpW TO \ yK7lKOV 6l/^l//i?jUCf,
aAA>yAa Se (f)avepd eivai TO> aKpoaTr] p.d\\ov.
3e /ecu TWJ/ eXe^/cri/cw^ KGU rw// SeiKTiKcov (r
(jiwv OopvfielTai fj.d\i<TTa TO. roiaura ocra dp-^oj
Trpoopwori JULJ} TW e THTroAj/s e*Vaf (a/xa y"/ KC " avroi
e(f> avrols -%aipova-i TTjOoaicr^ai/o/xej/Of), Kcti oarwv TO-
CTOVTOV va Tepi^ovo iv w(r6 a/ma eiprjUJLevcov yvcopi^eiv.
30. The chapter concludes with two observations on enthymemes
in general. First, Enthymemes of refutation are more popular and
applauded than those of demonstration, because the former is a conclu
sion of opposites" 1 (S\Q def. of eXey^o?; see Introd. p. 262, note i) in a small
space (or narrow compass), and things are always made clearer to the
listener by being placed side by side (close together, so as to admit of
immediate comparison) . This is repeated in nearly the same words,
Hi 17- 13-
But of all syllogisms destructive or constructive, such are most
applauded as those of which the results are at once (at the very begin-
ing, of the argument) foreseen : not because they are superficial (eVt-
iro\rjs, I 15. 22, note ad loc., II 16 i) for they (the hearers are pleased
themselves also with themselves at the same time ) are pleased (not only
with the speaker and his enthymeme, but) with themselves also (a/m)
for their sagacity in anticipating the conclusion : (and therefore they
don t think it superficial) and those which they are only just so far
behind which they can so nearly keep pace with as to understand
them (step by step) as they are delivered .
a/*a flprjfifvcov] On this genitive, see note on n 8 11. [For the sense,
compare in 10. 4.]
CHAP. XXIV.
In the preceding chapter a selection has been given of the topics or
special classes of enthymemes which are most appropriate and service
able in the practice of Rhetoric : and these are ra ovra fvOvfjuJnara, c. 24.
ii, ult., sound, genuine, logical inferences. But besides these there are,
in Rhetoric as well as Dialectics, arguments apparent but not real, falla
cious, illogical, which are often employed to mislead and deceive. Now,
although we are to abstain from the use of these ourselves, ov yap 8f1 ra
t^auXa IT f 16 f iv, I i. 12, it is necessary for the rhetorician to be thoroughly
acquainted with them, in order to detect them in others and to refute
any unfair reasoning which may be employed against him, (ibidem) : and
so vindicate the superiority of truth and right to falsehood and wrong.
And accordingly we have in the following chapter a selection of the most
prominent rhetorical fallacies, and in c. 25 the solution of them ; cor
responding respectively to the two parts of the de Soph. El. (cc. i 15 ;
1 6, to the end), which in like manner is appended as a sequel to the
Topics in which is expounded and illustrated the genuine and artistic
method of the employment of the dialectical syllogism. On Fallacies in
PHTOPIKHS B 24 i. 301
general, see Crete s Plato, Euthydemus, Vol. I. c. xix [Crete s Aristotle
c.x.] and J. S. Mill, System of Logic, Vol. II. Bk. v. Whately, Logic, ch. v.
In the Topics, (de Soph. El.) c. 4, 165 b 23, fallacious arguments are
classified under two heads, irapa TTJV Xcii ? fallacies of language, verbal,
and e rijs Xeewy, non-Verbal, beyond the sphere of, not dependent upon
mere words; logical fallacies. "Alterumvitiumpositumest in pravaverbo-
rum interpretatione (wort-verdrehung), altcrum in falsa argumentation
(schhtss-fehler)." Waitz ad loc. 165 b 23. eco rfjs Xf|fo>y, die " welche in
den ansdruck ihren gnmd nicht haben. 1 1 Brandis, u. s. \PhilologU5) IV i]
p. 20. " Fallacies in the words, and fallacies in the matter," Whately, Logic,
ch. v. On Fallacies, i. Verbal fallacies are six in number: (i) o/itai v/iuz,
equivocal, ambiguous, terms, TO TrXeoyaxwy Xf-yo/iei/oi ; (2)an(l)ifio\ia,general
ambiguity in language, ambiguous expressions, "ambiguous propositions"
Poste ; (these two may be distinguished as here ; or, as in Poet, xxv
21, identified, under the one general term a /i$t/3oAi a, ambiguity in ex
pression : in the explanation of them, Top. u. s. 166 a 14 seq., we have
TI 6 Xo-yoj the proposition, or combination of words, 17 Tovvopa, the single
word, the o^mw^ov} ; (3) <rvvQris and (4) Staipeo-t?, explained and illustrated
Top. ibid. 1 66 a 22 38, illicit combination and separation of words;
(5) Trpoo-wSi a, accent, pronunciation which is of more use in criticising
written composition, especially poetry ; in Dialectics, where there is no
written text, avev ypa^s, it is of little or none. Ibid, b \ ; and (6th and
last),7rapa TO o-^/xa rijs Xefwy, in figura dictionis, Waitz, fallacies or am
biguities, arising from the confusion of (assuming the apparent for the
real,) different categories " categories, that is, in their grammatical
acceptation, as predicates, or a classification of the parts of speech ;
when, owing to similarity of (grammatical) form, a thing is referred
to the wrong category" (Waitz, note ad loc.). And as this difference of
categorical predication is expressed in the termination of words, it may
be otherwise represented as " a similarity (or identity) of termination,"
which leads to fallacy (Poste, Transl. of de Soph. El.). Thus the ter
mination -eiv (which marks the infinitive of a verb) in vyiaiveiv implies
some quality or disposition of a thing , (as we say, it is a neuter verb),
i. e. belongs to the category of TTOIOTTJS ex eiv m Tepveiv or oiKoSo/^eiv, it
implies action, iroielv ; i. e. it is an active verb ; belongs to the category
of iroiflv. Similarly from a masculine noun with a feminine termination,
or the reverse, and a neuter with either one or the other; Ibid, b 10 19.
"falsche grammatische form? Brandis, u. s. p. 22.
Of these, accent, division (probably including the opposite), and
d/i<pi/3oXt a, including 6fj.aivviJ.ia, are illustrated from the poets in Poet.
XXV 1 8 20. There is a fourth, 21, Kara TO e<9o? TT)S X f&&gt;r, which may
be brought under the more general topic of the dialectical treatise,
Trapa TO (rx^p-a TTJS X/ea>s.
Of these dialectical topics four are transferred to Rhetoric : o/uovufiuz,
including d^i<pt/3oXt a, 2 ; and a-vvdca-is and Siatpecri.?, together, as one
topic, 3. a-xrJiJ-n rfjs \ff-fcas, 2, stands for a fallacy of language quite
different to that which bears its name in the Topics. The difference is
explained in the note on 2.
Fallacies e|co Tfjs Xe fo>?, in the Topics are seven, (i) n-apa TO <rv/i-
pfftrjKos, from the confusion of subject and accident; (2) of absolute
302 PHTOPIKHS B 24 i, 2.
) ev$e%eTai TOV /mev eivai arv\\oyi(T{JiOV t TOV CHAP.
XXIV.
it] eivai jiiev (paivecrvai oe, dvayKt] Kai evuu/j.t]/ULa TO
eivai ev6u/uLt]/uLaj TO $e IJ.TI eivai <f)aivecrdai ^e, eirei-
TO ev6vfJLti/uLa (rv\\oyicriui6s TIS. TOTTOI 8 eicri
TWV (fiaivofjiiviav ev6v^{j.aTu>v eh /mev 6 Trapa Ttjv
(aTrXeos) and particular or qualified (Kara n, or TT^ 17 TTOU ^ Trofe >7 Tp<> rt)
statements ; (3) e\f-yx ov ayvoia, ignoratio elenchi, " an inadequate notion
of confutation," Poste, "inscitiae eorum quae ad redarguendum pertinent,"
Waitz ; (4) TO ev apxfi Xa/i/Saj/eii/, petitio principti, begging the question,
assuming the thing to be proved; (5) TO p) ainov <as ainov ridtvai, "in
ratione non recte reddita," Waitz, the assumption of not-cause for cause ;
(6) Trapa TO firoiJLfvov, the assumption that antecedent and consequent
are always and reciprocally convertible : that if B follows A, A must
follow B. (The order of these two last is inverted in the explanation ;
167 b I and 21.) (7) TO T<X Svo e pom^ara tv iroieiv, to put two (or more)
questions as one, when it escapes observation that the question is not
one but several, and one answer is returned, as though it were one . De
Soph. El. c. 5, 166 b 20 27, where there is a summary enumeration of
them; and to the end of the chapter, 168 a 16, where they are ex
plained at length and exemplified.
Of these (i) 6 (these two are the same only in name; see on 6) ;
( 2 ) 9> Io 5 (5) 8 ; and (6) 7, occur also in the Rhetoric, e /c o-^/xei ou, 5,
falls under the head of Ta eVc/ieva; de Soph. El. 167 b 8, v re TO IS prjro-
PIKOIS al Kara TO (rrj^flov dnoSei^tis (K rmv fTro[j.fvo)v tlcriv. The remaining
three (3) (4) (7), are found only in the dialectical treatise. Brandis, u. s.
p. 22, expresses his surprise at the omission of these three, and thinks
that it argues the later date of the de Soph. El.; though of the priority
of the Topics there can be no doubt. Vahlen, Trans. Acad. Vien. Oct.
1 86 1, p. 134, pronounces this to be very doubtful ; and proceeds to argue
in favour of the earlier date of composition for both treatises. Besides
these we have the purely rhetorical topic of Selvaa-is, aggravation, exag
geration, 4. The paradox or fallacy, dubs KOI TO Trapa TO ei*oV, or eaTai
TO p-i) eiKos tiKos, and also TO TOV ^TTCO \6yov Kpeirra) iroielv, both come
under the head of Trapa TO anXtas Kal p.rj aTrXwy, dXXa TI, No. (2), IO.
i. fnfl Se eV8e xTat] But seeing that besides the (real, genuine)
syllogism there may be another, which has only the semblance, not the
reality of it ; so in the case of the enthymeme, there must necessarily be
two corresponding kinds, one real and the other not real, but only appa
rent, since the enthymeme is a kind of syllogism , conf. I i.u. The
enthymeme is a syllogism incomplete in form. See Introd. p. 103, note i.
2. Topics of unreal enthymemes are, first, the fallacy that arises
from the language (Trapa rfjv Xeu>, as Victorius also notes, is not
against , but along of, Arnold s Thuc. I 141.9 ; like did, arising from ,
shewn in , as Trapa TTJV o/icovv/zi ai/, 2, Trapa TJJJ/ eXXfnfaj/, 3, 9) ; and of
this one part (sort or kind), as in dialectics, to omit or evade the syllo
gistic process (that is, to assume without proof) and then in the terms of
a syllogistic conclusion to state the result, " therefore it is not so and so
PHTOPIKHS B 24 2. 303
Kai TOUTOU eV fuiev /mepos, cc(nrep ev TOIS &- r. 1401.
TO p.r] <rv\\o r yicrdfjievov crv/unrepao iuLaTiKw^
TO TeXevTalov ciTre ii , OVK apa TO Kai TO, avdyKr] apa
TO Kai TOA Kai TO ro?s ev6ufJL^fiao i t TO <Tvve(TTpa[j.-
1 TO Kai TO, Kai Iv TOIS IvOvftiifMffi (Vahlen).
(the conclusion of an eXryx 05 or syllogism of refutation of an opponent s
thesis) or, therefore necessarily so and so follows" (conclusion of a
demonstrative, constructive, syllogism) ;- so in enthymemes (Rhetoric)
the enunciation of a concise, condensed, vi&h-rounded or turned,
periodic (crvvf(TTpap.^va><:, Plat. Protag. 34 2 E : on ij KaTfOTpap.p.(VT] \fis,
Introd. p. 308 seq. on ill 9. 3) and antithetical sentence passes for an
cnthymeme . The completeness in the structure of the period, which
" like a circle returns into itself", its carefully balanced members, and its
antithetical epigrammatic character, have the effect of an argument and
supply to the deluded listener the lacking proof. The force of the
antithesis and epigram in conversation and discussion is too well known
to need further illustration. I have followed Vahlen, who has discussed
this sentence at length in his paper, already referred to, zur kritik Arist.
Schrift. (Trans. Acad. Vien. Oct. 1861, pp. 136 8), in removing the full-
stop at TO era! TO and reading KOI tv for *ai TO: or perhaps the simple
omission of TO would be sufficient. He apologises for the anacoluthon,
and the repetition of evdvprj/jia at the end of the sentence, and proposes
two expedients for getting rid of them ; unnecessarily as it seems to me :
accepting the two alterations, as I have done, the sense is perfect, and
the expression of it quite in character with the author s hasty and care
less style. I pass over the attempted explanations of Vater and others.
Victorius has given the sense correctly, though his interpretation does not
adhere closely to his text. Bekker and Spengel leave the passage unaltered.
The words of de Soph. El. 15, 174 b 8 (comp. 18, 176 b 32), TO fid-
\iaTa cro(f)to~TiKov o-vK.o(f>aifTrip.a T<UI> (pcorcovruv, TO fjirj8fi> crvX\oyi(rap.fvovs fiij
fpwTtjp.a TToielv TO Tf\evTa1ov, AAa crvfJurfpavriKCis flne iv, as o-vXXfXoyto"/ie-
vovs, OVK apa TO *ai TO, present an unusually close correspondence in
word as well as sense with this parallel passage of the Rhetoric : few I
think will agree with Brandis in supposing the dialectical treatise to be
the later of the two compositions.
For such a style this condensed and antithetical, periodic, style,
the style of Demosthenes and Isocrates, is the proper seat of enthy-
meme . x^P a ^ e region or district, sedes, where enthymemes are to be
found ; their haunt or habitat : precisely like TOTTOJ, locus, on which see
Introd. pp. 124, 5, and the quotations from Cic. and Quint. So Victorius,
"sedes et tanquam regio enth." It cannot possibly be form , as Vahlen
renders it, (if I do not misunderstand him,) u. s., p. 137, die dem Enth.
eigenthiimliche Form.
With the statement compare ill 9. 8, of antithesis, r^Seia 8 la-riv y
roiavTr] Xfif)...Kal OTI eoiKf cruXXoyto-/iw o yap e\(y%os a-vvaycayrj TKIV O.VTL-
Ktip.tvu>v fcrriv. Ill iS. 4> TO fvdvp.rip.aTa OTI p.a\iarra (rv(rTpf<p(ii> 8(1.
1 A fallacy of this kind seems to arise from the fashion of (the style
304 PHTOPIKHS B 24 2.
Kat dvTiKeifJiV(a<s eiTreiv (paiverai
OiavTt] Ae^ts x^P a 6 crr ^ J/ iv6vp.rifJ.aTO^ t KO.L
TO TOLOUTOV eivcii wapd TO or^fjia Trjs Xe^ews. CCTTL
$6 ets TO Trj Xe^ei crv\\o t yicrTiKto<s Xeyeiv xf n 1 (TL f JiOV TO
TroAAwi/ Ke<pd\aia \e>yeiv, OTL rous
-rots eTepois eTi/uwpricre, TOI)S c)
crvvTeOtvTiav <$e (paiveTai Kai e /c TOVTCOV TL
>yi<yve(r6ai. ei/ ^6 TO Trapa TV\V 6 fjnavv p.iav , cos TO p- 10 5-
(bdvai orTTOVocuov eivai JULVV, dtp ou 7 ecrTiv
of) language used , (i. e. the periodical and antithetical construction of the
sentences). Such I think must be the interpretation of o^/wi rrjs Xt^fws,
though it differs z ;z /^/f from the signification of the phrase in Top. (de
Soph. El.) 4, 166 b 10, the 6th of the verbal fallacies (see above). Vahlen,
u. s., points out this difference, which is sufficiently obvious. Nevertheless
Victorius identifies them. Both of them may no doubt be referred to the
head of fallacies of language in its most general sense ; but the dialecti
cal topic is a mistake or misuse of the termination of single words, in
volving a confusion of categories ; the rhetorical is an abuse of language
in a totally different application.
For the purpose of conveying by the language the appearance of
syllogistic reasoning it is serviceable to recite (enumerate) the heads
(of the results) of many syllogisms (previous trains of reasoning) ; " some
he saved, and on the others he took vengeance, and the Greeks he set
at liberty" : (this is from Isocr. Evag. 65 9, as Spengel has pointed
out, Tract, on Rhel. in Trans. Bav. Acad. 1851, p. 22 note. Aristotle has
gathered into these three heads of the contents of Isocr. s five sections.
The person of whom this is said is of course Evagoras, the hero of the
declamation. The same speech has been already referred to, II 23. 12):
for each of these points was already proved from something else, but
when they are put together, it seems as if some additional (KOI) conclu
sion might be drawn from them .
Kf(f)d\ma] heads of arguments, in a summary or recapitulation. Plat.
Tim. 26 C. Dem. Olynth. r 23 and the foil., de Symmor. 11, K((f)d-
Xata 1% Svi-a/zewr, followed by the enumeration of them. De falsa leg.
315? eTTf\6flv eVi KfifiaXaitoV.
ev de TO Trapa rf/v o/ioivu/iiap] The second topic of verbal fallacies :
probably including the dialectical a/z(/u/3oAi a, ambiguous propositions ,
fallacies of language which are not confined to single terms. One (fal
lacious argument) arising from verbal ambiguity ; as to say that a mouse
is a thing of worth (a worthy and estimable creature)- -from it at least
the most valued (esteemed) of all religious rites is derived ; for the mys
teries are of all religious rites most esteemed . This is taken beyond all
doubt from Polycrates panegyrical declamation, the Encomium of
PHTOPIKH2 B 24 2. 305
Tart] 7rct(Tu>v T\6Ttr TCC yap p.va Trjpta Tracriav TIJULLO}-
Tarri reAer^/. t] el TIS KUVO. eyKw/uLid^wv TOV eV TW
ovpavw crvfjurapaXafjifldvei i] TOV flai/a, on TlivSapos
to fj.ctKap, bv Te /meyaXas Oeov Kvva
Ka\6OV(TLV O\V/UL7TIOI.
r] on TO /uifieva eivai Kvvct aTtjULOTOTOV fcrTiv, wcrre
mice , referred to in 6 : see the note there. The ambiguity from which
the fallacious inference is drawn is of course the assumed derivation
from p.vs instead of ^veiv. If mysteries are derived from mice, how great
must be the honour due to the little animal. See Whately, Logic, ch. v.
8, on ambiguous middle.
TfXfTT/] is a religious rite, and specially rites into which initiation
enters as a preparation mysteries ; sometimes initiation alone. Athen.
B. 12, p. 40 D, Te\eTas KaXovfjLfV ras ert (j.eiovs Kal yuera TIVOS fjLva-TiKrjs
TrapaSdo-ecoy copras. Suidas, S. V., Bvcria p-vo-njptw S^r 77 fifyiarrj Kal Tt/iicorepa.
Hesychius, reXerai eoprat, dvcriai, [jivcrTijpia. Photius, Ovaia /incrr?;pcoS?/s .
Lobeck, Aglaophamtts, Lib. II 8, Vol. I p. 304. Mystic rites, (Arist. Ran.
1032, Dem. c. Aristog. 11,) ascribed to Orpheus. Comp. Plat. Rep. n.
635 A, cos apa \vcrfis Kal Ka.6apfj.ol ddiKrujLaraiv dia dvcriaiv Kal 7rai8ias ijdo-
v>v elal p.ev en uxnv, elal de Kal TeAevr7<rcum>, as 8rj reXeraf KaXoucrti/, at
r<av e /cei KaKo>v aTroXvova-iv yuas fj.r/ Qixravras 8e 8fiva Trepipfvei. This is
said of the Orphic and Musaean rites and mysteries and initiation into
them, but will apply equally to the Eleusinian, and all others which had
the same object and character. Comp. Protag. 316 D [and Isocr. Paneg.
28].
Or if one in the encomium of a dog takes into the account the dog
in heaven (the dog-star} . KVUV, as the star Sirius, the herald of the dog-
days in summer, Horn. II. XXII 27 29, do-rep . ..ov re KVV QpiWos eVi-
iv Ka\eovo-iv. Dem. c. Lacrit. 13, Arist. Hist. An. Vlll 15.9, eVt
et alibi, as a mark of the season, like the Pleiads ; also VTTO *vva,
Kvva, TTfpl Kvva, Arist. Theophr. al. Cam s, canicula, Hor. Od. Ill
13.9; Ep. I 10. 16. Virg. Georg. I 218, Ovid, &c.
Or Pan, because Pindar called him "the mighty mother (Cybele) s
manifold dog" . Pindar, Parthenia, Fragm. 6. " Pan optime in illo car
mine audiebat, quo ante Magnae Matris, ubi eius statua, celebrabatur."
Bockh, ad Fragm. Find., Op. II. 594. By Cybele s dog Pindar meant
her faithful and constant attendant. This metaphor is converted by
some panegyrist of the animal into an argument in his favour, as if the
god Pan were really a distinguished member of that fraternity 1 .
f) on TO fj.rj8fva K.r.X.] The meaning of this is obscure. Victorius,
merely observing that this is another fallacious inference as to the value
of a dog, candidly admits that he cannot explain it. Schrader under-
1 Can the term dog be applied to Pan, in reference to his character of <n>inm
custos, (Virg. Georg. I 1 7, ) as a shepherd s dog ? I suppose not.
AR. II. 20
306 PHTOPIKH2 B 24 2.
TO KVVO. fl\OV OTl TlfJilOV. KCtl TO KOIVWVIKOV
TOV EpjULr}V eivai fJidXiCTTa TWV Qeiav fjiovos yap KU-
KOIVOS Epjujjs. KO.L TO TOV \6yov eivai cnrov-
/, OTL ol dyaOol dv &pes ov xpri/maTcov d\\d
stands it thus : " ne canem quidem in domo ali sordidum est. Ergo
canem esse honorifkum est." He goes on to say that the equivocation
lies in the double meaning of KVU>V, dag and Cynic 1 . " Cynici enim philo-
sophi Canes appellabantur, qui hac fallacia cognomen istud suum ornare
poterant." The argument is, To have no dog at all is the highest
disgrace (would this be accepted as probable?}; therefore to be a dog
(in another sense, a Cynic,) is plainly a mark of distinction.
And to say that Hermes is the most liberal (communicative of good
things to others (so Schrader); or sociable , communicative of himself,
superis deorum grains et imis,) of all the gods; for he alone goes by
the name of Common Hermes . The latter of the two interpretations
of KoivoviKov seems to be right, from the comparison of Polit. in 13,
1283 a 38, where justice is said to be a K.OIV&VIIO] dpfTij, y irdo-as avay-
KOIOV aKoXavOelv ras a\\as. Eine der biirgerlichen gesellschaft ive-
sentliche tugend, i. e. social, (Stahr). The fallacy lies in transferring the
special signification of KOIVOS in the proverb, and applying it in a general
sense to the character of the god.
KOIVOS Epfj-rjs] Hermes is the god of luck , to whom all ep/iata, wind
falls, lucky finds, pieces of good fortune, are due. When a man finds
anything, as a coin which has been dropt in the street, his companion
immediately puts in a claim to go halves , with the proverbial "Com
mon Hermes", i.e. luck is common, I am entitled to share with you.
Theophr. Char. XXX, KOI cvpio~Koii,tva>v xa\Ka>v lv raty 68ois vno TO>V oi
deivos (6 alo-xpoKtpo ris) aTratr/Jcrai TO /iiepoy, KOIVOV fivai (fijcras TOV
Hesychius, KOIVOS "Epfjifjs tVi T&V Koivy rt evpivKovTaiv. Plutarch, Phil, esse
cum princ. C. 2, aXX d/zovaia KOI amipoKaXia TOV Koiviv Ep/n^v e ^iTroXaioi/
Kal e^/xio-^oi yfvfadai (apud Erasm. Adag. Liberalitas, Communis Mercu-
rius , p. 1144, ed. 1599), the god of gain, profit, luck, has ceased to be
as of old common and liberal, and has taken to commerce and merce
nary habits. Lucian, Navig. 12 ; Adimantus had spoken of some golden
visions, to which Lycinus replies, OVKOVV TO Trpo^eiporarov roDro, KOIVOS
Ep^s, (fiaa-i, Ka\ es p.ea~ov KaTaTidfi (frfpcov TOV ivkovTnv (let me, as the pro
verb KOIVOS Epfj.jjs has it, share your wealth), agiov yap dn-oXaCo-ai TO /nepor
<pl\ovs ovTas. To be KOIVOS in this latter sense does not entitle a man or
god to the epithet KOIVWIKOS.
And, to prove that words (speech, rhetoric; this is probably taken
from an encomium on the art) are a most excellent, valuable thing ; for
the reason that the proper reward of good men is, not money, but Xoyor
(in the double sense of words , and consideration, estimation ; \6yov
Troiflo-6ai (x et ") TIVOS, fv ovdtvl Xoyw fivai, et similia passim); for Xoyou
1 On this name as applied to Antisthenes, compare the epigram in Diog. Laert.
VI I. 10, which interprets it thus, T&V [3ioi> ycrOa Ktuv, AvTlvBevfs, w5e
wore 8a,Kftv Kpadiijv p^fj.aati> ov aro/jLaffiv, and to Diogenes, VI 2. 60, 61.
PHTOPIKH2 B 24 2, 3. 307
\oyov eio"LV aioi TO yap \oyov a^tov ov% ccTrXcos
3 Xeyerai. X\os TO ^Lnpt^evov crvvTiQivTa. \eyeiv i]
TO (rvyKeijjievov SiaipovvTct ewel yap TavTov
.ivai OVK 6V TavTov TroAAa/as, oTTOTepov
pOV, TOUTO Set 7TO16LV. 6(TTl (He TOUTO }Lu6v$rj JU.OU \O-
709. olov TO el^evat OTL Tpttjptjs iv YIeipaiel iarriv
agtov is an ambiguous, equivocal expression (is used in more than one
sense).
3. a-vvdea-is and diaipecrts, wrong (fallacious) combination, com
position, and disjunction, separation, in reading or speaking , which are
here taken together as one form of fallacy, are two in de Soph. El. c. 4,
165 b 26, Ib. 166 a 22, and 33. The solution of them is given in c. 20,
where " Euthydemus argument" is also referred to, and thence no
doubt transferred hither.
Another is, to pronounce in combination what is (properly, or is
intended to be) separated, or the reverse, the combined as separate : for
since it seems to be the same either way (when combined or separated,
and it is in this appearance, and the advantage taken of it, that the fal
lacy lies), whichever of the two happens to be more serviceable, that
must be done . Set does not here imply a moral obligation ; it is not
intended to recommend the practice ; the only obligation is that which is
imposed by the art ; if you want to avail yourself of this unfair mode of
reasoning (which I don t say I approve, I am only stating what the art
requires), this is the way to proceed.
This is Euthydemus argument. For instance to know that a tri
reme is in the Piraeus, because he knows each (of two things which are
here omitted) . This example, which is unintelligible as it stands here,
has some further light (or obscurity) thrown on it by the form in which it
occurs in de Soph. El. c. 20, 177 b 12, KOI 6 Ev8v8^ov 8e \6yos, ap ot Sa? crv
vvv ovtras tv Ileipaiel rpi^peis tv 2i/ Xt a a>i> ; but in both much is left to be
supplied, the argument alluded to being supposed to be well known, and
in every one s recollection. Schrader thus fills up the argument : What
you know, you know in the Piraeus where the two disputants were
standing this is admitted : but you know also that there are triremes : this
also is conceded, because the respondent knows that the Athenians have
triremes somewhere; out at sea, or in Sicily, (referring to the expedition
of 415 B.C.): whence the conclusion, you know that there are triremes in
the Piraeus. The illicit combination (o-vvdfa-is} in this interpretation
though Schrader does not explain it further must lie in the conjunction
of the Piraeus with the knowledge of triremes, to which it does not belong
in the respondent s interpretation of the question : and e^aoroj/ will be
each of these two pieces of knowledge, the knowledge of what is known
in the Piraeus, and of the triremes . They are both known separately,
Euthydemus illicitly combines them.
This seems to be a reasonable explanation of the example so far as it
is given in the Rhetoric. But it seems quite certain that Aristotle is
2O 2
308 PHTOPIKHS B 24 3.
yap otSev. KCII TOV TO. crTOL^ela eTTicrrd-
on TO eVos ol^ev TO yap evros TO CLVTO ecrTiv.
eTret TO Sis TOVOVTOV yocrw^e?, /ar^e TO ev (pdvai
vyieivov elvai O.TOTTOV yap el TO. duo dyaOd ev
quoting identically the same argument in de Soph. El. The triremes and
the Piraeus appear in both, and both are styled EutfuSr^ov Xoyoj, the
well-known argument of Euthydemus. Schrader, though he refers to the
passage, takes no account of the words ev 2i/<eX/a &&gt;>, which it seems must
have formed part of it. Victorius has endeavoured to combine both in
his explanation of the fallacy I am not at all sure that I understand it :
I will therefore transcribe it in his own words -verbatim et litteratim.
"Tu scis te esse in Piraeo : quod concedebatur ipsi (the respondent), ac
verum erat. Scis triremes Atheniensium esse in Sicilia (miserant enim
eo classem ut earn insulam occuparent); id quoque non inficiabatur
qui interrogatus erat. Tu scis igitur (aiebat ille) in Piraeo triremes esse,
in Sicilia existens. Qua captione ipsum in Sicilia, scire triremes esse
in Piraeo cogebatur ; cum eo namque, scire in Piraeo, coniungebatur
triremes esse : a quo remotum primo pronunciatum fuerat : ab illo vero,
in Sicilia, cum quo copulatum editum primo fuerat, disiungebatur: atque
ita efficiebatur ipsum, in Sicilia cum esset, scire in Piraeo triremes
esse. Quod vero hie adiungit eKao-rov yap oldev : separatim scilicet utrun-
que nosse intelligit, se in portu Atheniensium tune esse: triremesque
item in Sicilia. E quorum conglutinatione fallax ratio conflata, quae
inde vocata est irapa. o-vvdeo-iv." By this must be meant, that the two
statements, existence or knowledge in the Piraeus, and knowledge of
triremes in Sicily, which ought to be kept separate, are combined in one
statement, and hence the fallacy : true separately, they are not true toge
ther. Whether this is a satisfactory version of Euthydemus fallacy I
fear I must leave it to others to decide. My principal difficulty is as to
the mode of transition from the Piraeus to Sicily in the two first propo
sitions, which as far as I can see is not satisfactorily accounted for.
What is there to connect the knowing that you are in the Piraeus , or
knowing in the Piraeus , with knowing or being in Sicily? And yet
there must be some connexion, apparent at least if not real, to make the
fallacy plausible. This is nevertheless Alexander s solution of it. Comm.
ad Top. 177 b 12, TOV Se \6yov Tjpcora o ~Evdv8r)fj.os ev Hetpaiel rvyxdvav, ore
at TO>V A.6rjvaiu>v rpnjpeis els 2i/ceXi ai> rjXdov. ecrri 8e rj TOV ao(f)ia-^.aTos dytoyr)
ToiavTT]. " apa ye (ru vvv fv Hfipaiel fi; vat. ap ot Say ev StKeAi a Tpiijptis
ovcras ; vai. apa oldas cru vvv ovaas ev Heipaifl Tpiypeis ev SiKeXm &v ;" Trapa
TT]v (ruv6nv TO o-oc/n oyia. However this may be, at any rate, if Plato s
dialogue is to be trusted, there is no kind of fallacy however silly, trans
parent, and contemptible, of which Euthydemus and his partner were
incapable ; and the weight of authority, notwithstanding the utter want
of sense, must decide us to accept this explanation.
Of Euthydemus, and his brother and fellow-sophist Dionysodorus,
contemporaries of Socrates, nearly all that we know is derived from
Plato s Euthydemus. They had studied and taught the art military,
PHTOPIKHS B 24 3. 309
OUTW nev ovv i\<yK.TiK6v, code $e SeiKTiKov
/> A t /\\ * f i <f^ 5. \ /
ou yap ecTTiv ev ayauov ouo KctKa. oAos oe o TOTTOS
7rapa\oyi(TTiKos. TraXiv TO YIo\VKpa.TOVs ets Qpacru-
0OV\OV, OTl TpLCLKOVTa TVpaVVOVS KaTe\V(TV (TVV-
and the forensic branch of Rhetoric, Euthyd. 273, C. D, before entering at
an advanced age upon their present profession, viz. that of epia-riKij, the
art of sophistical disputation, and of universal confutation, by which they
undertook to reduce any opponent whatsoever to silence. Many exam
ples of their mode of arguing are given in the Platonic dialogue, but
Aristotle s instance does not appear among them. See also Crete s
Plato, on Euthydemus, Vol. I., ch. xix. The fallacies are exemplified
from the dialogue, p. 545 seq. And on Euthydemus and his brother,
also Stallbaum s Disp. de Euth. Plat, prefixed to his edition of the dia
logues, p. 10 seq. (Ed. l).
An example of illicit combination is given in the nepl Ep wvcias, the
treatise on the proposition or elementary combination of words, c. n,
p. 2O b 35> a\\* ov%[, el crKVTfvs KCU ayados, Kal (TKVTfvs ayados. fl yap, on
(KOTfpov d\T)deS) flvai del Kal TO crvvd[i(p(o, TroXXa Kal aroTra ecrrat.
Another example is that one that knows the letters, knows the whole
verse; for the verse is the same thing (as the letters, or elements, of
which it is composed) . The reason given, TO ITTO? TO avro ea-nv, contains
the fallacy. It assumes that the things combined are the same as they
are separate ; which is not true.
And (thirdly) to argue, that since twice a certain amount- (of food
or a drug) is unwholesome, so must also the single portion be : for it
is absurd to suppose that if two things separately are good, they can when
combined unite into one bad . If the two parts together are unwholesome,
neither of them can be wholesome separately, because the combination
of two good things can never make one bad, This is a fallacious con
futation; of a physician, may be, who is recommending the use of a
. drug. You say that your drug is wholesome : now you only administer
a certain quantity. Suppose you were to double it, you would not say
that it was wholesome then : but if the two parts together are unwhole
some, how can either of them, the component elements being precisely
the same in each, be wholesome ? two wholesomes could never make an
unwholesome. Here the undue combination of the double with the
single part produces the fallacy (so Victorius).
Used thus, it serves for refutation, but in the following way for
proof (this is, by inverting the preceding): because one good thing cannot
be (made up of) two bad . If the whole is good, then the two parts,
which is not always true. But the entire topic is fallacious : in whichever
way it is applied (Victorius).
And again, what Polycrates said in his encomium of Thrasybulus,
that he put down thirty tyrants: for he puts them all together . This
again, which without further elucidation would not be altogether in
telligible, is explained by two notices in Quintilian, in 6. 26, VII 4. 44.
As an illustration of the argument from number, he gives this, An
Thrasybulo triginta pracmia debeantur, qui tot tyrannos sustulerit?
3 io PHTOPIKH2 B 24 3, 4.
Ti6t](ri yap. i] TO eV TW OpecrTri TW Geo^e/crou* eV
Siaipea-ews jap ecrTiv.
WlKCUOV 6CTTIV, t] TiS O.V KTlVf] TTOCTIV,
d7ro6vt](rKetv TavTriVj Kcti TW iraTpi ye Tiju.cope iv TOV
mov ovK.ovvK.al TauTa TreTrpaKTai crvvTeQevTa yap
/crws OVKETI SiKaiov. e lt] 5 av Kat Trapa TV\V e\\ei\jsiv
4 dffiaipe iTai. yap TO VTTO TWOS. aAAos Se TOTTOS TO et~
vtocrei KaTacTKevd^eiv tj dvacrKevd^eiv. TOUTO ecrTiv
OTav } fJit] Sei^as oTt eiroiria ev, av^tjcrr] TO Trpdy/ma
Whence it appears that Polycrates had argued that he deserved thirty
rewards for his services, one for each tyrant that he had expelled ; an
illicit combination. Spalding ad loc. ill. 6, "Hoc videtur postulasse
Polycrates, qui dixit :" quoting this passage. On Polycrates see 6, infra.
Or that in Theodectes Orestes, for it is a fallacy of division : "It
is just for her that slays her husband" to die, and for the son to avenge
his father: and accordingly this is what has actually 1 been done: (but
this is a fallacy) for it may be that when the two are combined, (the
sum-total) is no longer just . Orestes, being the son of her that had
slain her husband, was no longer the right person to take vengeance
on his murderer. On the use of OVKCTI, the opposite of ijdrj, not now
as before, in former cases , see note on I 1.7, 77877, OUTTW, ouWrt.
On Theodectes of Phaselis, see note on II 23. 3, and the reff. Also com
pare the topic of that section with this example from his Orestes, which
in all probability is there also referred to. This passage of Aristotle is
cited by Wagner, Fragm. Trag. Graec. in 122, without comment, as the
sole remaining specimen of Theodectes Orestes.
This may also be explained as the fallacy of omission ; for the (person)
by whom (the deed was done) is withdrawn . Had it been stated by
whom the vengeance was inflicted, the injustice of it would have been
apparent. It is stated generally, the particular circumstances which
falsify the statement in this case being omitted. Trapa TTJV e\\(i\jsiv is
explained in 9, rr)v e XXej^ti/ TOV Trort KOI TTQ)?, the omission of time and
circumstances, which falls under the more general head of TO aVAws
KOI pr) aTrXco?, 10, an unqualified, instead of qualified statement. It
occurs also in 7.
4. Another topic (of fallacious reasoning) is exaggeration, 8ti-
vuxris especially the excitement of indignation contrasted with eXeos, II
21. 10, in 19. 3 in construction or destruction (of a thesis or argument).
Haec est ilia quae Belvaxris vocatur : rebus indignis asperis, invidiosis,
addens vim oratio. Quint. VI 2. 24. Ernesti, Lex. Technologiae Graecae,
s. v. di>aoK{vd{iv and KaTacrKevd^fiv, are technical terms distinguishing the
1 A c and three other MSS have QVKOVV /ecu raOra ai irlirpa.K.Ta.1. Spengel,
ed. 1867, rightly puts the first in brackets and retains the second, which I have
followed in the translation.
PHTOPIKHS B 24 4) 5. 311
Troie? yap (paivecrBat r] cos ov TTCTroitiKev, orav 6 TY\V
aiTLav &x wv a v&i V * iTGiroitiKCV, OTO.V 6 KaTrj-
yopwv opyi&iTai. OVKOVV ecrrlv evdu/uri/ma 7rapa\o- p- 106.
yl^ETai yap 6 aKpoartp OTI ewoiri&ev rj OVK eiroirjo ev,
5 ov de^etyjueVoy. aAAos TO e /c cni/meiou dcrv\\6 yi<TTOv
yap Kat TOUTO. olov t rts \eyoi "rat s TroXecrt. (TVfj.-
(f)epou(riv ol epwvres* 6 yap Ap/mo^iov Kal ApHrro-
tvvo kinds of syllogisms and enthymemes, the destructive or refutative
f\fyKTiKoi, and the constructive or demonstrative SeiKTiKot, aTrofeiKTtKot: as
Karaa-Kfvd^fiv is to establish something which you undertake to prove, and
leads to a positive conclusion, so dvavK.evaeiv or dvaipflv (a term of the
same import) is to break down or destroy, upset, subvert, an adversary s
thesis or conclusion, by refuting it, and so leads to a negative conclusion.
KaraaKevaa-riKa of enthymeme, II 26. 3.
This means to amplify, heighten, intensify, exaggerate (a species
of the general topic av^av KOI pftovv, amplification and depreciation, the
fourth of the KOIVOI TOTTOI. Introd. p. 129, comp. II 26. i), the fact or act
alleged (usually a crime), without any proof of its having been com
mitted : for it makes it appear, either that it has not been done (read ov
for ovre, with Bekker and Spengel), when the party accused (or inculpated)
employs it ; or that the accused is guilty when the accuser grows angry
(works himself into a fit of virtuous indignation) . This might seem
to confine the topic to accusation and defence in the forensic branch,
and no doubt it is in this that it is most useful and most usual ; and
also this is its most appropriate sphere as a fallacious argument: still
as a species of one of the K.OIVO\ TOITOI it must needs be applicable to the
other two branches, and in fact in all invectives, and in epideictic
oratory, it is essential. Its appropriate place in the speech is the e n-i-
Aoyos or peroration, in 19. r, 3.
Accordingly it is no (true) enthymeme, for the listener falsely con
cludes (assumes) the guilt or innocence (alleged) though neither of them
has been proved . This is of course a purely rhetorical topic.
5. Another fallacy is derived from the use of the sign : for
this also leads to no real conclusion (proves, demonstrates, nothing) 1 .
On the sign and its logical character and value, see Introd. pp. 161 j f
and the paraphrases of Rhet. I 2. 15 18, Ibid. pp. 163 5.
In the Topics, fallacies from the sign are noticed as the form which
fallacies of consequence assume in Rhetoric, ep re TOIS prfTopinois al KOTO.
TO crr)fjLt1ov a.Trofiets < rS>v eiroittvv>v eicriV. De Soph. El. C. 5) I&7 & &
As for instance if one were to say, "Lovers are of service to states;
for it was the love of Harmodius and Aristogeiton that put down (put
an end to) the tyranny of Hipparchus ". This is a mere apparent sign
or possible indication of a connexion between love and the putting down
of tyranny : there is no necessary consequence ; it is not a TeKfirtptov,
a conclusive sign, or indication : no general rule of connexion can be
established between them, from which we might infer without fallacy
312 PHTOPIKHS B 24 5, 6.
ye iTOvo s epws KctTeXvcre TOV Tvpavvov tf
rj ei TL<S \e<yoi OTL K\e7TTr]<s Atoi/f cr
yap dcrv\\6<yL(T TOV yap KUI TOVTO ov yap
Trovnpos /cAe?rT^9, Gt AA. 6 K\67TTiis Tras
6 aAAos $ta TO crUyU/Se/S^Kos, oiov o \eyei Ho\vKpd-
that the one would always, or for the most part, follow the other. Herein
lies the difference between the dialectical consequence and the rhetorical
sign. The converse of this from the governor s point of view is
argued by Pausanias in Plato s Symp. 182 c. Ov yap, CHJU.CU,
rols a.pxov<TL..-<pi\ias ta^vpas *ai KOIVWLCIS (fyyivfcrdai) o 8fj /iaXicrra
TO. T aXXa TrcifTa not 6 epcor efOfOtflv. f pyw 8e TOVTO f/j.adov KOI ol (v6d8e
Tvpavvoi 6 yap ApiaToytlTOVOg f pws Kai Ap/xoSt ou (pi\ia /3e/3cuos yevo^ifvrj
Ka.T(\vo-fi> avTMv Tr]v dpxn v - Victorius.
Or again, if one were to say, (it is a sign) that Dionysius (Dionysius,
like Socrates and Coriscus, usually, in Aristotle, here represents any
body, men in general) is a thief, because he is a bad man : for this again
is incapable of demonstration ; because every bad man is not a thief,
though every thief is a bad man . The consequence is not convertible.
O Se Trapa TO eTTOfifvov e Xey^oy Sia TO o"eo~$tH avricrTpffpeiv TTJV d<o\ov-
Grjoriv, (the fallacy in this topic arises from the assumed convertibility of
the consequence), de Soph. El. 5, 167 b i. In the uncertain sign, antecedent
and consequent are never reciprocally convertible, the converse does not
follow reciprocally, and therefore the sign is always liable to be fallacious.
On the different kinds of consequences, see Anal. Pr. I c. 27, 43 b 6, seq.
6. Another, the fallacy of accident . This is not the same fallacy
as that which has the same name in the Topics, the first of the fallacies
ew TTJS Xff fa>y, de Soph. El. c. 5, 166 b 28 ; "Fallacies of accident are
those that arise from the assumption that the same things are predicable
alike of the thing itself (TO n-pay^a, i.e. the logical subject, TO vnoKdpevov).
For whereas the same subject has many accidents, it is by no means
necessary that all that is predicable of the former should also be
predicable of the latter." White is an accident, or predicable, of the
subject, man : it is by no means true that all that can be predicated of
man can also be predicated of white. The confusion of these, the sub
stitution of one for the other, gives rise to the fallacy. The example
is the following: A Sophist argues that because Socrates is not Coriscus,
and Coriscus is a man, Socrates is not a man. Man is the subject, and
Socrates and Coriscus are both predicates, attributes, or accidents of
man. And if we substitute name for man in the proposition Coriscus
is a man , the argument vanishes. But both the examples here are in
stances of accident for cause, and not for subject, which is no doubt a
more suitable application of it for rhetorical purposes.
The first example is taken from Polycrates encomium on mice, quoted
above without the name, 2. One of his topics in praise of them was
"the aid they lent by gnawing through the bow-strings." Something
similar to this is narrated by Herodotus, II 141 (Schrader), but the
circumstances do not quite tally. Sennacherib king of the Arabians and
PHTOPIKH2 B 246. 313
ts TOIS fj.vs, OTI
vevpds. t] e l rts (pattj TO CTTI ^eijrvov K\n6nvai
TCLTOV $ia <yap TO /ULr] K
Assyria invaded Egypt with a great host, when Sethos the priest was
king. The god appeared to him in a dream with promises of succour
against the invaders. " A flood of field-mice poured over the enemy by
night, which devoured their quivers and bows, and besides, the handles
of their shields, so that on the following day, flying without arms,
many of them fell," c. At all events, wherever the incident was taken
from, Polycrates meant to praise the mice for some service they had
rendered by gnawing the bow-strings : now this service was a mere
accident : their intention was, not to do service, but only to satisfy their
appetite (Victorius). Polycrates fallacy therefore consists in assigning as
a vera causa what was only accidental. I do not see how this can be
construed as a confusion of subject and accident. And so Victorius in his
explanation ; "quia quod casu evenit tamquam propter se fuisset sumitur V
Of the declamations of Polycrates, who has been already twice men
tioned or referred to, the most celebrated were the diro\oyia Eovcripiftos, a
paradoxical defence of Busiris a mythical king of Egypt, proverbial for
inhumanity, illaudatus Busiris, Virg. Georg. in 4; and an equally para
doxical KaTrjyopia. SoHcpdrous, Isocr. Busir. 4 (this speech is addressed to
Polycrates). He was also famous for his declamations paradoxical again
on mean and contemptible subjects, as mice, pots (xyrpas), counters,
(Menander ap. Spengel, Artiuin Scriptores, p. 75,) which he employed his
art in investing with credit and dignity. The paradoxical, irapddot-ov, is
one of the four kinds of eyKcafiia, Menander Trepi eVtSeiKriKcSi> II i. He may
possibly have been the author of the similar declamations on salt and
humble bees 2 , referred to, without the author s name, by Plat. Symp.
177 B, Isocr. Helen. 12, Menand. ncpl fTnStiKTiKccv (Rhet. Gr. ill 332. 26,
ed. Spengel). Similar paradoxical declamations of Alcidamas, TO TOV
Qavdrov eyndj^iov, rj TO Trjs H(vias, fj TOV Ilpcorecos TOV KVVOS. Menand. Trepi
(7Ti8et.KTi.Kaiv II i (Rhet. Gr. ill p. 346). Quint. Ill 7. 28, sotnni et mortis
scriptae laudes, et quorundam a medicis ciborum. It might have been
supposed that these ingenious exercises were intended for burlesques,
were it not that Aristotle by quoting arguments from them shews that
they had a serious purpose. Further on Polycrates, see Spengel, Artium
Scriptores,^. 75, 6 ; Westermann, Geschichte der Gr. u. R. Beredtsamkeit,
50, 22 ; Cambr. Journ. o/Cl. and Sacred Phil. No. IX, Vol. ill. p. 28 1 seq.
1 This seems to be the true interpretation ; Aristotle has here left it open by
not defining the topic. But if this absence of defin, be understood as a tacit
reference to the de Soph. EL, and we desire to bring the examples here into con
formity with the explanation of the topic there, we may understand rb irpay^a in
that passage, not as the logical subject, but as thing in general, and say that the
fallacy of the examples in the Rhetoric lies in the substitution of a mere accident
for the thing in question, i.e. the real thing, the reality ; as in that of the mice, the
accidental service, for the real appetite: and in Achilles case, the accidental neglect
to invite, for the real disrespect that it implied.
2 [Comp. Lucian s /tunas iyK&[j,iov. Blass, however, explains 8onp6\ioi, as Art
Trinkgejasse (see Bekkcr s A neat., s. v. and comp. xi Tpas, supra)}.
3 i4 PHTOPIKH2 B 24 6, 7.
o o
TOVTO 6777 TOV {J.r\ K\tl6fjl>0ll. aAAos TO
TO CTTomevov, oiov iv TM AXe^ctvSpw, STL /ue-ya-
Comp. Ib. No. v, Vol, II. p. 158, note. Sauppe, Fragm. Orat.Gr., Polycrates,
Or. Att. ill 220. [Also Blass, </zV Attische Beredsamkeil, II pp. 341, 342.]
Or if one were to say that an invitation to dinner is the highest
possible honour ; because it was the want of an invitation which excited
Achilles wrath against the Achaeans at Tenedos : his anger was really
excited by the disrespect, the non- invitation (the form or mode of its
manifestation) was a mere accident of it , cirt TOV on the occasion, in
the case of. This is a fallacious inference (drawn either by Arist. himself,
or, more likely, by some declaimer) from an incident in a play of Sopho
cles, the subject of which was this (Wagner, Fr. Trag. Gr., Soph., A^auS^
SvXXoyor, Vol. II. p. 230, from Welcker): The Greeks on their way to
Troy had put in at the island of Tenedos to hold a council as to the best
way of attacking the city. Achilles would not attend at the meeting,
having taken offence at the neglect, and presumed slight or contempt, of
Agamemnon in not inviting him, either not at all, or after the rest, to an
entertainment. There are two extant titles of plays by Sophocles, the
Axaiwv av\\oyos, and A^atcor (rvvbenrvov , or crvvbenrvoi, Plutarch, de discr.
adul. et amici, 74 A, Vol. I. p. 280, ed. Wytt. coy o irapa So^oAcXe? TOV
A^iXXea vapofcvv&V OSuo treu? ov (prja-iv c,pyir&ai 8ia TO ^elirvov K.T.A.,
citing three verses from the play (Ulysses had been sent with Ajax and
Phoenix to Achilles to make up the quarrel). Comp. Athen. I. p. 17 D,
2o$. e i> A-xataiv o-ui/SeiVvw, where four lines are quoted; and vin 365 B,
TO 2o<p. 8papa...eTriypd(f)fiv a^iovcri Svvftenrvov. Cic. ad Quint. Fr. II 16,
SwSfiirvovs So$. Dindorf, Fragm Soph.(Pozt. Sc.) p. 35, following Toup,
Brunck, and Bockh, supposes these two titles to belong to the same play,
a satyric drama(Dind.). Wagner after Welcker (Trag: Graec. pp. 112 and
233) shews that they were distinct, the A^attov o-vXXoyor founded on the
story above mentioned, the other Axuc3i> o-vvdfiirvov, or simply <rvi>8( mvov
or <Tvv8fi7rvoi, derived from the Odyssey, and descriptive of the riot and
revelry of the suitors in Penelope s house. See Wagner, Fr. Trag. Gr. t
Soph., Vol. II. pp. 230 and 380. The case of two distinct dramas is, I think,
made out.
7. Another from consequence , i.e. from the unduly assumed
reciprocal convertibility of antecedent and consequent : just as in the
sign (q. v.), between which and this there is no real difference. As we
saw in 5, in the de Soph. El. the sign is spoken of as the rhetorical
variety of the general topic of consequence: and they ought not to be
divided here.
As in the Alexander , i.e. Paris; a declamation of some unknown
author, already referred to, c. 23 5, 8, 12; (it is argued) that he is
high-minded, because he scorned the society of many (quaere ra>v iro\-
\a>v of the vulgar ) and dwelt alone in Ida : (the inference being that)
because such is the disposition of the high-minded, therefore he might
be supposed to be high-minded. This is a fallacy, or logical flaw, as
Schrader puts it, " quia universalem affirmantem convertit simpliciter, et
PHTOPIKHS B 24 7. 315
iStov yap Tr\v TTO\\U)V ofJiiXiav iv Ttj
Ka6 avTOV OTL yap ol /uLeya\6\j^v^oL
TOLOVTOL, Kal OI)TOS /ULeya\o\lsv%os $6eiev av. Kal
7Tl Ka\\a)7TlO TriS Kal VVKTCOp 7T\avaTai 3 /HOLLOS TOl-
OVTOL yap. O/ULOLOV $6 Kal CTL ev TO?S lepols ol TTTCD^OI
Kal adovcTL Kal 6p%ovvTai, Kal OTL ro?s (fivydcriv e-
OLKelv OTTOV av 6e\w(TLV OTL yap TO??
vTrdp^eL TavTa, Kal ots TavTa
av evSaijj.ove iv. Siacpepei Se TW TTWS* ^o Kal
quia in secunda figura concludit affirmative." Or rather, as this is an
illicit consequence, because here antecedent and consequent are not
reciprocally convertible : it does not follow, even supposing that all high-
minded men dwell apart from others, that all lonely-dwellers are high-
minded men : and to say that so and so, anybody whatsoever, is high-
minded for that reason and that alone, is as much as to say that the rule
is universal.
And again (to argue) that so and so is a dandy and roams at night,
and therefore a rake, because such are the habits of rakes . This, as
before, is to say that because (supposing it to be so) all adulterers are
smartly dressed and walk at night, therefore all smart dressers and
night-walkers are adulterers. This appears also as an example of the
sign, the rhetorical form of the topic TO firopfvov, de Soph. El. c. 5, 167 b g,
/3ouXojuei/ot -yap &eicu on pot^ox, TO iirofttvov cXaj3ov, on KaXAwTTicrr^s rj OTL
vvKTcap opaTai ir\avu>jj,evos, [See infra III 15- 5-1
KaXA.6>7ri<m;s] Plato Sympos. 174 A. Socrates (going out to dinner)
ravra Brj eKaXXa)7Ttcra^7;i/, Iva KaXos Trapa KaXov t a>.
And another (argument), similar to these (for exalting the condition
of poverty and exile), is that beggars sing and dance in the temples,
and that exiles are allowed to live where they please : because, these
things (enjoyments) being the ordinary accidents or concomitants of
apparent happiness, those who have them may also be supposed to be
happy . Here again there is an illicit conversion of antecedent and
consequent : if singing and dancing, or living where one pleased, were
coextensive with happiness, the inference would be true and the two
convertible. As it is, it does not follow that, because these are indi
cations of happiness, or often accompany (follow) it, all men that sing
and dance, or can live where they please, are necessarily happy. This
is taken from one of those paradoxical encomiums of poverty and exile
to which I socrates refers, Helen. 8, ^8rj ri>eV...ToAp3<ri ypafaiv, o>?
fcrnv 6 TU>V mwxfWVTOW Kal (frfvyovraiv /3/os ^Xcororfpos TJ TUIV aXXeov av-
0pd>ira>v ; such as Alcidamas irevias eyKconiov cited above from Menander
on 6. [For an aTroXoym lievias see Arist. Plutus, 467 597, in the course
of which a distinction is drawn between irtvla and jrro^eMi, 552 4.]
8ia<pfpfi 8e TW Trwf 8 16 Ac.r.X.] But there is a difference in their manner
of doing these ; and therefore this topic falls under the head of omission,
3i6 PHTOPIKH2 B 24 8.
etS T^]V 6\\6l\jslV efJ-TTLTTTei. d\\OS TTCtpd TO dvCLLTlOV
o5s aiTiov, oiov TO> a/ma $ /mera TOVTO yeyovevai TO
yap IULETU TOVTO ok Sia TOVTO Xajjifidvovcri, Kai fj.d-
\KTTO. ol eV TOUS TroAiTe/ats, oiov ws 6 A^/xac^s Tt]v
as well as (vat) that of TO erropfvov . Beggars and exiles do what appear
to be the same things as the wealthy and prosperous, they dance and
sing in the temples and sacred precincts, and change their place of
residence at their pleasure : but there is a difference in the mode and
motive of doing these things, which is omitted ; and the omission when
supplied explains the fallacy. The beggars dance and sing in the
temples to amuse the visitors and obtain an alms ; the wealthy and pros
perous out of wantonness or exultation; to shew that they have the
liberty of doing what is forbidden to humbler people (so Victorius, and
Schrader who borrows his note : these may however be mere signs of
happiness in the evdalnoves). And again, the exiles are obliged to live
abroad, and would gladly be at home again ; the wealthy and prosperous
travel for change of scene, to satisfy their curiosity, or (like Herodotus
and Plato) their desire of knowledge. The eXXei-^is is here of TO irws,
as in 3, ult. of VTTO TiVor, and in 9, of TTOTC and Trwy, which in each case
may be applied to explain the fallacy.
8. This section, aAAos Trapa TO avairiov crwe^rj 6 TroXejuor, is quoted
by Dionys. Ep. ad Amm. c. 12 with no other variation from our text than
the omission of oiov before cos.
The fallacy here illustrated is the familiar post hoc ergo proptcr hoc;
the assumption of a mere chronological sequence as a true cause : to
mistake a mere accidental connexion of the order of time, for one of
cause and effect. It is the rhetorical application, and only one variety,
of the wider and more general topic of the dialectical treatise (de Soph.
El. c. 5, 167 b 21) no n-causa pro causa, in dialectical argumentation.
Another from the substitution of what is no cause for (the true)
cause ; for instance (this substitution takes place) by reason of the
occurrence of something contemporaneously or subsequently (to that
which is presumed to account for it) : for it is assumed that what merely
follows (in time) is the effect of a cause, and especially by politicians ;
as Demades, for instance, pronounced Demosthenes policy to be the
cause of all their calamities ; because it was after it that the war (with
Philip, and the defeat of Chaeronea) occurred . Victorius refers to a
similar charge of Aeschines, c. Ctes. 134, K O \ -ravff r^lv vvpftift^tv
e OTOV &r)/j.o(rdvr)s jrpbs TTJV Tvokireiav 7rpo<Tf\rj\v6tv, compare 136, army
and navy and cities, ap8rjv flalv dvrjpTracrfjLfvai e /c rfjs TOVTOV naiXiTfias.
Dinarch. c. Dem. 12, 13.
This is the only place in which the name of Demosthenes appears
in Aristotle s Rhetoric. See on this subject Introd. pp. 45,6, and note 2.
In II 23. 1 8, a few words of his are quoted, but without the author s
name. The Demosthenes mentioned in ill 4. 3 is probably not the
great Orator.
On Demades and his remains, see Sauppe, Fragm. Orat. LIT, Demades,
Or. Alt. in 312 seq.
PHTOPIKHS B 24 9. 317
Arip.ocr6evovs 7ro\iTiav TTCX.VTMV TWV KCIKWV airiav
9 [A6T Kivriv jap arvveftn 6 TrdXefjLos. a\\os-3tapa Tt}v
6\\ei\jslV TOV 7TOT6 KCti 7TW?, OLOV OTL ^i/Ca/WS AA.e-
avSpos e/\or/3e TI]V EXcvrjv atpecris jap avrrj e&66ri
Trapa TOV Trarpos. ov jap del i croK, d\\a TO TrpcS-
TOV Kat jap 6 7raTr]p /me^pt TOVTOV Kvpios. r] e l TIS p. 1402.
(pairj TO TVTTTCIV TOVS e\ev6epovs vfipiv etvai ov jap
9. Another from the omission of when and how ; a particular
case, like those of 3, and 7, of the following topic Trapa TO aVXcos *ai
pi} an\<as ; a dicto seciindum quid ad dictum simpliciterj the omission of
particulars in the way of exceptions to a general statement, as time,
place, manner, circumstances. For example, that Paris had a right
to take Helen ; for the choice was given her by her father (Tyndareus,
the choice viz. of one of the suitors, whichever she preferred) . Eur.
Iph. Aul. 66, eVel & firi<TTa>6r)(rav, ev 8e TTCOJ yepcav V7rij\0ev avrovs Tvv-
Sapecos TTvKvfj (frpevi, St Scotr fXfcrdai Qvyarpi nvrjcmjpcov fva (Victorius). The
whole story of Helen s choice , and the sequel, is told by Agamemnon,
Iph. Aul. 49 seq., in his speech at the opening of the play, which serves
for the prologue.
But this is a fallacy ; for (the choice was granted) not it may be
supposed (i o-ws) for ever, but only for the first time : for in fact the
father s authority only extends so far . Helen, acting upon her father s
permission, chose Menelaus ; y 8 eiXe$ CDS ye /iT/Vor o>$eAei> Xa/3eli>
MfveXaov, Iph. A. 70 ; and here, at this first choice, her father s authority
and her own right to choose ended. The fallacy therefore consists in
the omission of the particular time, TOV TTO TC ; she generalized the
time of choice from the particular time to all time ; and therefore Paris
was not justified in taking her.
Or again, if one were to say, that to strike a free man is an act of
vftpis (wanton outrage, liable to a ypa^rj, a public prosecution) : for it
is not so in every case (TraKrcof = aTrXcSr), but only (/cara n) when the
striker is the aggressor . This of course makes all the difference in
the nature and legal construction of the offence. If the blow is returned,
it may be regarded as an act of self-defence ; the insulting wantonness,
the injury to the sufferer s honour and personal self-respect, is shewn
in the wanton aggression, av TIS TVTTTT] TWO. (prja-iv (6 i/o/ior), apx<av x fl P<*> v
d8iK(ov, cor, 6i ye jp.vvaTO, OVK dSiKet. Demosth. C. Aristocr. 50.
apxeiv xfipnv adiKuv is to strike the first blow, to give the offence.
The phrase assumes various forms. Rhet. ad. Alex. 36 (37) 39, a-we-
Koijsds fiov TOV vlov ; eycoye ddiiccov ^etpcoi* apxovTa. Isocr. Kara Ao^i rou I,
fTvjTTe pe A.OXITTJS apx^v x fl P<* >v d.diK<av. Xen. Cyrop. I 5- *3> Antiph.
rtrpaXoyta T. Or. 4, /3 I, and 6, apar TTJS TrXrjyfjs. ^etpcoi/ is sometimes
omitted, Bos, Ellips. p. 301, (527, ed. Schafer) ; sometimes ai /ca>i>, Plat.
Legg. IX. 8690, ap^. ^etpcov irpoTfpov. Herodotus has inrdpx (lv d-SiKcav epycoi/,
I 5 ; and various similar phrases, IV i. vil 8. 2, and 9 a, IX 78 ; also
d8iKir)s et sim. ill 130, &c. vn-ap^eti alone, Plat. Gorg. 456 E,
318 PHTOPIKH2 B 24 10.
10 TravTWS, er AA orav apxy X^P^^ dSiKtov. ert wcnrep p. 107.
ev Tols epL&TiKols Trapd TO aTT/Vws /ecu JJLTI aVAws,
d\\a T I, yiyveTai fya.LVOiJ.evos (rv\\o i yi<rfj.os, oiov ev
dfjLvvo^evovs p.rj vTrdpxovTas. Stallbaum et Ast, ad Legg. 1. c. Also a
alone ; Arist. Hist. Anim. IX. 12. 3, KCU TOV aerov, tav apt-rjTai, d
VIKOXTIV (ol KVKVOl).
10. ev rols fpioTiKois]. See note on I n. 15, where the meaning of
this as a technical term is illustrated from the de Soph. El. ra eptortxa
here designates a book or treatise ; the fallacious, sophistical reasoning
exposed in the ninth book of the Topics ; just as ra SiaAe/crtKa stands for
the dialectical treatise, including (as below), or not including, the ap
pendage on Fallacies. The subject of the de Soph. El. is described as
TTfpl TCOV aya>vi(TTi<<ii>v KOI tpurriKuv, 165 b IO. fpicrriKi] there, C. 2, is first
distinguished from the three other kinds of discussion , SiSao-KaAiK?}
(science), 8iaXe*crt/c^ , and Trftpao-riK?/, a branch of the latter; and the epi-
a-TLKoi are denned, o: CK ru>v (fraivoufvav eVSo^coi ^D) OVT&V 8e irvXXoytoTUCol
T) (f)aiv6^fvoi crv\\oyi(TTiKoi, which would include the crocpio-TiKoi. Else
where the two are distinguished ; both are ot ndvra>s VLK.O.V (victory at any
price) TrpoaipoviJ.fVoi, 17 1 b 24; but 01 rfjs VIKTJS avrrjs x^-P lv TOIOVTOI epi-
CTTIKOL <a\ <pL\fpi,8es SoKovcriv flvai, ol Se 86r]s X<*P LV T *l s e s XP T JI Jiarta l J -^ v
o-0010-rtKoi : the one dispute out of mere pugnacity and contentious habit,
the others add to this a desire of gaining a reputation which may be
turned to profitable account.
Further, as in the eristic branch of dialectics, from the substitution
of something as universally or absolutely for that which is so not univer
sally, but only partially, or in particular cases, an apparent (fallacious)
syllogism (i. e. enthymeme, see on I I. n) is elicited. As in dialectics for
instance, the argument "that the non-existent is (has existence), because
non-being is non-being" . (Is, eari, has two different senses, absolute and
relative, or absolute and particular : the Sophist, in the second case,
intends it to be understood in its most general signification aTrXcoy, of
actual existence: it is in fact a mere copula connecting the one p.rj ov
with the other, and merely states the identity of those two expressions,
which is no doubt a very partial statement indeed : it is true, but
nothing to the purpose of the argument. Comp. de Soph. El. c. 25,
1 80 a 33, 4.) Or again that the unknown is an object of knowledge,
because the unknown may be known that it is unknown . (Here of
course the particular that is left out of the account is the Sri ayvuxrrov ;
whereby the absolute or universal, the unknown is knowable , is sub
stituted for the partial or particular statement, that what is knowable
is only that it cannot be known.) So also in Rhetoric a seeming in
ference may be drawn from the absolute to merely partial probability ,
This topic is illustrated in Plat. Euthyd. 293 c seq. See Grote s Plato,
I 546, 7, and 549 ; [also Grote s Aristotle I 182, note].
The construction of this last sentence which had been obscured by
wrong punctuation in Bekker s 4to and first Svo ed., has in the second
been made intelligible and consecutive by removing the full stops at /ii}
ov and ort ayi/cooroi/, and changing all the colons into commas. The
PHTOPIKHS B 24 10. 319
/UL6V TO<S iaeKTlKos OTl (TTl TO fAt] OV OV, cTTl
TO jmt] bv JUT] bv, Kai OTL eirKTTriTOv TO cvyvwcrTOV,
yap ifri<rTt]TOV TO ayvuxTTOV OTL ayvuxTTOV, OVTCO
ei> TO?? prjTOpiKoI s ICTTI <f)aii>oiuiei/ov evOvfJLtjfJLa Trapd
TO /uLt] aVAws et/cos a AAa TI eiKOs. ecrTi 8e TOUTO ov
Ka66\oVj wcrTrep Kai A.<yd6wv Xeyei
TCL-% av TLS eiKO S avTO TOUT elvai \eyoi
fipoTolcri TToAAa Tvy%aveiv OVK eiKOTa.
yiryveTai >ydp TO Trapa TO etKOS, wVre et/cos Kai TO
Trapd TO ei/co?. el $e TOVTO, ecrTai TO /JL>I etKos et/cds.
correlative of coo-TTfp tv rols IpurriKois is of course ovra> KO.\ ev rots pr)Topmols .
and in the intervening sentence olov ev piv TO!? SujXeKrucoIr, the psv has
also reference to an intended 8e, to be inserted when Rhetoric comes
to be contrasted with Dialectics, which however is never expressed and
the fjitv left pendens.
The topic is first defined in general terms, as it appears in the dia
lectical treatise, and illustrated by two examples of its dialectical use:
and then exhibited in its special application to Rhetoric, the paralogism
of absolute and particular probability. The first, as in the dialectical
examples, is confounded with, or substituted for, the second.
This (particular probability, TI tlnos,) is not universally (true or
applicable), as indeed Agathon says : Perchance just this may be called
likely, that many unlikely things befall mortals , Agathon, Fragm. Inc. 5.
Wagner, Fragm. Trag. Cr. ill 78. Of Agathon, see Muller, Hist. Gr.
Lit. ch. xxvi. 3. Camb. Jonrn. ofCL and Sacred Phil. No. IX, Vol. in.
p. 257. Spengel, Artium Scriptores, p. 91, merely quotes four fragments
from Aristotle. The extant fragments are collected by Wagner, u. s., on
p. 73 seq. His style is criticized in Aristoph. Thesm. 55 seq. and imitated
or caricatured 101 seq. A specimen of his Rhetoric is given by Plato,
Symp. 194 E seq.
This probable improbable is illustrated in Poet. XVIII 17, 18, from
tragedy, by the cunning man cheated, and by the defeat of the brave. o-rt
fie TOVTO fiKos, wcrTTtp A.ydda>v Xryrt (l<us yap yivecrdai rroXXa Kai Trapa TO
riKos. Comp. xxv 29. On this fallacy the solution in Rhet. ad Alex.
36 (37) 29, is based. Dion. Ep. I ad Amm. c. 8, TO KaKovpyoTaTov ru>v
fTriXfipr][j.dTa>v...oTi KOI TO JJ.T) fl<os yLvtTdl TTOTC eiKoy.
For what is contrary to the probable does come to pass, and there
fore what is contrary to probability is also probable (KOI, besides what is
directly probable). And if so, the improbable will be probable. Yes,
but not absolutely (the answer) ; but as indeed in the case of Dialectics
(in the dialectical form of the fallacy), it is the omission of the circum
stances (KOTO Tt, in what respect,) and relation and mode that causes the
cheat, so here also (in Rhetoric) (the fallacy arises) from the probability
assumed not being absolute probability (or probability in general) but
320 PH 
