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HPOAOTOT IZTOPIQN 

H. O. I 
nOATMNIA OTPANIA KAAAIOHH 



MACMILLA.N AND CO., LiHirxD 

LONDON • BOMBAY • CALCrTTA 
MSLBOnBIII 

THE MACMILLAK COMPANY 

N>W TOBK ■ BOSTOK ■ CHICAOO 
ATLANTA ■ SAN FKANCI8C0 

THE MACMILLAN CO. OF CANADA, Ltd. 

TOBORTO 



HERODOTUS 

THE SEVENTH, EIGHTH, & NINTH BOOKS 

WITH 

INTRODUCTION, TEXT, APPARATUS, COMMENTARY, 
APPENDICES, INDICES, MAPS 



BY 



REGINALD WALTER MACAN, D.Litt. 

nSIVBRalTT RBAinR IN AKCIKXT HI8T0BT 

UASTKR (80MBTIMB FSIXOV AND TUTOR, VORMEBLT SCHOLAR) OF 

DNrVERSITT COLLRQK, OXFORD 



VOL. II 
APPENDICES, INDICES, MAPS 



MACMILLAN AND CO., LIMITED 

ST. MARTIN'S STREET, LONDON 

1908 



<^u^ y- ^L , Ou V- 5^' ? 



: l!l!V ^^ l^'-'O 1 



JU!^ 



Xi.. I •; 






vl ea^^-^JOx/vvAAZi^^^ ■^' 



.» 






^ <^ 



TRIBVS VIRIS ILLtrSTSTBUS 

.lOHANNI PENTLAND MAHAFFY 

SAMUELI HENBICO BUTCHER 

JOHANNI BAGNELL BUBY 

HOC VOLUMEN 

D.D.D. 

IBRNENSIBUS lERNBNSIS 



CONTENTS 



APPENDIX I 

AUTHORrriBS AND iCVIDENUES, OTUKR THAN UKRODOTUS, FOR 
THE HISTORY OF THK PERSIAN WAR 

SBCTIOa VkiiK 

1 

4 
8 
17 
21 
25 
29 
34 
41 
46 



Aristophanes 



1. The lost Persian archives and records 

2. The lost Greek witnesses .... 

3. The Poets : Aischylos, Pindar, Simonides, Timokreou, 

4. Tbucydides and the Periklean critique . 

5. Xenophou and Ktesias .... 

6. Theopompos and Ephoros. The Persai of Timotheos 

7. Isokrates ...... 

8. Demosthenes and Aischines : Lykurgos . 

9. Other Orators and Orations : Hypereides 

10. The Philosophers : Plato, Aristotle. The 'KOnniar ToXtrc<a 

11. Transition to the Roman period : The Parian Chroniele, Polybios, Cicero 55 

12. Literature under the Caesars : revival of historical interests . 61 

13. Universalists : Diodoros, Trogus ..... 66 

14. Biographers : Nepos, Plutarch. The Moralia . .82 

15. Topographers : Strabo, Pausanias . .93 

16. Rhetors : Dio Chrysostora, Ariateides . .101 

17. Ludan ......... 108 

18. Miscellanea : Arrian, Appian, Polyainos, Aelian, Athenaios 110 

19. Christian and Byzantine writers ...... 115 

20. Conclnnon ........ 119 



APPENDIX U 

THE PERSIAN PREPARATIONS 

1. Threefold subject of the first part of the Seventh Book (cc. 1-130) . 121 

2. Causality of the war (cc. 1-19) : (a) real causes ; (b) problem of delay ; 

(e) inconsequent, fictitious, and historical elements in the story . 122 

vii 



VIU 



HERODOTUS 



SBCnOM PAOE 

3. The King's route, and the advance from Susa to Therme (seven stages) 126 

4. Engiueeriugfeatsandanny-service (Roads, Bridges, Canal, Conunissariat) 140 
/ 6. The Uvie en matte (Analysis, Navy, Army, Sources) 150 

6. Objective and plan of the invasion ..... 183 



APPENDIX III 



THE PBEPARATIONS OF THB GREEKS 



1. Character of the transitional passage (7. 128-187) 

2. The Greek preparations (7. 188-178) 

3. Condition and policy of Greek states, 490-481 B.C. : Sparta 

4. Athens during the decade after Marathon 
6. The Pan-Hellenic union against the Mede 

6. The conduct of Argos, Erete, Sicily, Korkyra 

7. The case of Delphi 

8. Forces of the Confederacy, and prospects of success 



188 
192 
194 
199 
217 
224 
229 
237 



APPENDIX IV 



GENERAL STRATEGIC ASPECTS OF THE WAR: THESSALY 



1. Material conditions of the strategic problem from the Greek point of 



Chronological and geographical defects of the record 

Four possible lines of defence : the Isthmos 

The line of Plataia and Salamis . 

The line of Artemision and Thermopylai 

The Thessalian question . 

Seasons for the abandonment of Thessaly 

Subsequent conduct of the Thessalians . 

Strategic sequel of Salamis 



240 
241 
242 
248 
245 
247 
251 
254 
256 
257 



APPENDIX V 



ARTEIOSION-THERHOPYLAI 



1. Strategic aspects of the line Artemision-Thennopylai 

2. Character of the Herodotean tradition . 

3. Real causes of the failure at Thermopylai 

4. Diaries of the Persian fleet and army 

5. Reconstruction of the actual course of events 

6. Immediate results 



260 
261 
269 
272 
279 
286 



CX)NTENTS 



iz 



APPENDIX VI 



SALAHI8 



1. Strategic aspects of the battle of SaUmis 

2. Character of the records ..... 

3. The tactical problem (theories of Leake, Blakesley, Goodwin) 

4. Extent of the difference between Aisohylos and Herodotus 

5. Solution of the tactical problem (the six traditional items 

account) ...... 

6. Verification of the proposed solution 

7. Operations of the Persian army in connexion with Salamis 

8. Failure of the Oreeks to exploit their victory . 



in the 



287 
289 
297 
802 

304 
S16 
317 
324 



APPENDIX Vn 



FROM SALAMIS TO SESTOS 



1. Immediate strategic results of Salamis .... 

2. Traditional synchronism of the battles of Plataia and Mykale : 

significance ..... 

3. Operations of the Greek fleet after Salamis 

4. The disappearance of Themistokles 

5. Condition of the Greeks during the winter of 480-479 B.i 

6. Actual operations of the fleet in 479 B.c. 



its 



829 
381 
334 
336 



APPENDIX VIII 



PLATAIA 



1. General aspects of the campaign .... 

2. Character of the Herodotean narrative (Chronology, 

Figures, Motivation) ..... 

3. Sources of the Herodotean narrative 

4. Summary of the Herodotean narrative . 

5. Failure of the Herodotean narrative (twenty crueet) 
8. The two fundamental problems .... 

7. {^) The tactical positions occupied in succession by the Greek forces 

8. (B) The actual battle, and the Greek victory . 

9. The plan and its author .... 

10. Summary of the reconstructed narrative 

11. Chief points in the reconstruction 

12. Subsidiaty authorities (Diodoros, Plutarch) 



342 



Topography 




, 


345 


, 


358 


, 


364 




367 


, 


374 


ireek forces 


375 


, 


880 


, 


886 


, 


888 


. 


892 


, 


398 



HEBODOTUS 



APPENDIX IX 



THE CHBONOLOOT OF THS WAR 

tmonoM 

1. Three chronological problems presented by the subject . 

2. The period, or duration, of the war 
8. The epoch of the war, or its redaction to the Christian era 

4. DifiSoulty of determining the order of events within the period 
6. Chronological resources of Herodotus 

6. Synchronisms, consequences, and successions 

7. Cbief entee$ and shortoomings 

8. The supplementary authorities . 

9. The chronological perspectiTe reconstructed 
10. Kalendarial tables of the two years' war 



PAOB 

898 
899 
899 
401 
401 
404 
406 
408 
409 
411 



INDICES 



I. LscnoNDK 
II. Yekbobttk 

III. IToxnnrM . 

IV. Bxsuu 

V. Avcftosvu 



415 
418 
488 
445 
458 



MAPS 



1. Boute of Xerxes (with Mykale inset) 


. TofoM TUk 


2. Thessaly 


To face pag» 189 


8. Thermopylai .... 


261 


4. Salamis ..... 


287 


5. PlaUU 


348 


6. Central Greece .... 


412 



APPENDIX 1 

IfUfHORITIES, AND EVIDENCES, OTHER THAN HERODOTUS. 
FOR THE HISTORY OF THE PERSIAN WAR 



1. Tbe lost Persian archives and recoriis. § 2. Tbe lost Greek witnesses. § 3. Tlie 
Poets: Aischylos, Pindar, Simonides, Timokreun, Arbtopliaues. J 4. Tbucy- 
didea and the Pcriklcan critique. § 5. Xcnojilion and Ktesiaa. § 6. Theo- 
poiapos and Ephoroa. Tbo I'ersai of Tiinotheog. § 7. laokrates. g 8. Demo- 
atbenea and Aischincs : Lykurgm. g 9. Other Orators and Orations : 
Hrp«reidea. §10. Tlie Philosophers; Plato, Aristotle. The 'A0i;raW raXireio. 
f 11. Transition to the Roman period : The Parian Chronicle, Polybios, Cicero. 
$ 12. Literature under tbe Caesars: revival of historical interests. §13. Univer- 
■alisti: Diodoros, TroguH. §14. Biographers: Nepos, Plutarch. The Jforo/i'o. 
{ 15. Topographers: Strabo, Pausauios. § 16. Rhetors: Dio Chrysostom, 
Ariflteides. § 17. Lucian. § 18. Miscellanea : Arrian, Appian, Polyainos, 
Aeliaji, Athenaios. § 19. Christian and Byzantine vrriters. g 20. Conclusion. 



§ 1. The historian of the Persian war has to deplore bis misfortune 
in having no sources from which to draw, save on the Greek side. 
In some of the Greek sources, if not in all, Persian authorities, 
Persian records, may to some extent, and with more or less of refrac- 
tion, here and there shimmer through. Herodotus himself claims to 
reproduce Persian stories and slatemcnte.' Ktesias professed to have 
used the Royal Archives.- Greeks of Asia and Greeks of Europe 
during the fifth century, not a few, as exiles, subjects, soldiers, traders, 
uahasaadors, adventurers, and so forth, camo into contact with Medes, 
Persians, Egyptians,^ and other Orientals, and must often have 
pared notes with foreign friends or foes on the subject of the 
,t war. The Greek traditions themselves will have lieen in part 
ucta of a dialectic between the t*vo sides. Such a process may 
t in the denial, explicit or implicit, of a rival version ; but the 




» Cp. 1, 1-5, 85 J 3. 1, 87, 8» ; Intro- 
'i>)ctiofi, f 10. 

> ai ^iXtirai >t<p9tpat, Diodor. 2. 32. 
4> Cp. % 6 infra. Sir Willioni Jones 
■■it too (kr in regarding these parch- 
■■atA a* 'inventioDs' of the Koidian's 
*'to giv» aa air of authenticity to his 

TOU II 



imrh-rtineiit fables " ( Works, 1807, v. 
411) ; but it is not clear how far those 
inentioned by Diodoros recorded con- 
ti'injwrary events. 

' or whom Hdt. aaya 8. 2 ({ -^^ rwkt 
jral SXXot t^ ^tpaiiM vbtuita trieriarai 
Koi AiytHrruM. 



1 



HERODOTUS 



APP. 1 



negative involves the positive, and the would-be destroyer is not 
seldom the unwilling preserver of an alternative argument or story. 
Such transfigured conservation is, however, a poor substitute for the 
native original. Wo miss with regret the Persian accounts of persons 
and events, which fill the Greek trailitiona ; wo miss too, if less 
consciously, much douhtleas that has disappeared altogether in the 
one-sided record. Nor have we, in dealing with the last three Books 
of Herodotus, any esistern illustrations to compare with the motmmeiital 
and epigraphic material available for a commentary on the first three 
Books. There is no inscription to control the narrative of Book 7 as 
the Behistuii inscription controls the narrative of Hook 3. The Egyptian 
Logoi in the second Book are amenable line by line to monumental, 
epigraphic, papyrological ^ apj)e;il. The Oriental portions of the first 
Book can be compared wnth native evidences of one kind or another, 
even if Ljdian and Median witnesses arc hard to find. All that 
illuminates the earlier Books may be indirectly serviceable, as 
Prolegomena, to the subject proper of the last three Books, but the 
benefit is fragmentary and inferential. Nor is the lacuna filled by the 
later Persian literature. The Persian traditions of the middle age 
know nothing of the Greeks before the age of Alexander'' The wars 
of the fifth century are to these late authonties a blank. The early 
history of the Persian kings as told by the Persian poets and logo- 
graphers, still recoverable, diflers tolo cado from Medo-Persian history 
aa narrated by Herodotus and the Greek writers. As historj' tb 
appears almost worthless. There is no room for compromise between 
Persian and Greek authors in this matter j they are alternative. To 
prefer the Persian and to discard the Greek; to view the western dealings 
of Kyros, Kambyses, Dareios and Xerxes as figments of Greek imagina- 
tion, and the story of the Persian war as an occidental romance, was 
no very critical proceeding even for a critic in the eighteenth century.' 
The Greek traditions are contemporary with the persons and tho 
events described ; the whole subsequent history and development of 
Greece is a continuous verification of the main story told by Herodotus. 
A lack of interest, or a loss of evidence, or some other more positive 
motive operating on the late Persian authorities, led them t» ignore 



' Demotic jiajijTi ar8 (1 iiuderKtaud 
from Mr, F. LI. Griflith) likely to illus- 
tmte Bittuy items iu the Herodoteau 
account. 

" "' Notbing rernalDB of genuine Persian 
history before tho dynasty of Sa'sa'n 
except a few ruetiv tra<litioDs and fuMes, 
which furnished materials for the S/uih- 
ndmrh," Sir W. Jones, Works, iii. 108. 
This judgemeut nay be over-severe : Sir 
W. Jones recognizeg the identity of 
'Cynis' and 'Caikhosrau' (ii. p. lOfl) ; 
but the kind of defence of Persian 



traditions attcDipted by De Gobineau 
{Histoire da Peraa, 2 vv., Paris, 1S69) 
doe» not come to much, and even he 
admits tliat "avant I'avinement de Cyras, 
il vst impossible de soisir on moraent 
nettenieat deteniiin^ dans I'exiBtence 
des nations iraniunties," op. e. i. 338. 
Since that woa writteu fresh evidencet 
have transformed the account to be given 
of Kvroa liimsolf, 

' See the curious Diaicrtatum prefixed 
to Richanison's Dictionary of Fmian, 
jirabk und EnglUh (cd. 1829). 



AUTHORITIES OTHER THAN HERODOTUS 

the historic transactions of tbe fifth century B.O. Their treatment of 
Alexander and his exploits might have suggested the absolutely 
uncritical and unscrupidoiis character of their historiography.' Fortun- 
ately these diversions of a lexicographer misled no Hellenist, and might 
still be of use in helping to set the tna media of a reasoned criticism of 
Greek trariition somewhat towards the sceptical extreme, seeing what 
a margin of extravagance lies beyond. Even Grote was somewhat 
too easily satisfied in his retractation of the Horodotean story. The 
T«ry additions to our apparatus made since Grote's work was published, 
while confirming the subst^mce, confound the accidents of Persian and 
Graeco - Persian history, as told by Herodotus. The corpus of 
Acbaimenid inscriptions - has made such criticism us that contained in 
Richardson's Dissertation now for ever impossible, but unfortunately 
throws little or no direct light upon the relations of Greeks and 
Persians during tbe fifth century B.C. The PeraLan records, official 
and perhaps poetic, which existed at that period, would supply, if still 
open to our inspection, many contrasts, corrections, and supplements 
to Greek history. They are gone, and beyond recovery. We can 
but mark here and there, in the better Greek accounts, an oriental 
trait, an oriental touch, due perhaps to a native source. We may 
partially console ourselves ^vith the reflexion that, judging by Ktesias, 
who professed to draw upon the lioyai Archives, the Persian accounts 
of dealings with the Greeks were anything but adequate or accurate. 
Yet if Photios did Ktesias justice, it is not so certain that Ktesias did 
justice, from this point of view, to his official authorities. He wrote 
with a purpose, and a bad pui-posc : he selected and excerpted to suit 
hie purpose. We should like to be in a position to judge for ourselves 
bow far the Persian archives of the fifth century B.C. might be taken 
to confirm and to correct the work of Herodotus. Nothing can 
eonsole us for the lack of documents from the reign of Xerxes and his 
Buocessors worthy of a place beside the cylinder of Kyros, the tablet 
of Nabonidos, the inscriptions of the first Dareios. But method to 
•ome extent supplies the place of evidence. Reading between tbe 
Uoes of our Greek authors, we can see for ourselves that the Greek 
qoeation was not such an all-absorbing topic at Susa as was the Persian 
question at Athens, at Sparta, at Argos, at Thebes. Probably the 
Acbaimenid kings — like the Arsacidae and the Sassanidae — were more 
constantly occupied in securing or extending their frontiers to the 
north and to the east, and in maintaining their supremacy over the 



' Acrording to the Sluihruimtk of 
FirdiAi, Alexuuder was th« son of a 
imicluiisAii jirinceM and the Great 
King. an<l thns hrotlier to the 'Dara' 
vbom he overthrew, d'Herbelot, Bibl. 
tirirnt. (1697), p. 318. Richardson 
•tatc* the case somewhat dilTt-reiitly, 
but a|>{iafentlT apiiruves the Peniian 



iiccoiint. Acooniing to Turner Hacan, 
in hifl Preface to the first printed e4lition 
of the Shilh Kdmeh (4 vols., Calcutta, 
1829), ' Firdousce ' makeii Alexander 
a Cbristinn ! Was the mediaeval 
AlexandfT • epoi influenced by thia 
Oriental literature ? 

> Recorih of the Past, vol. ix. 65 ff. 



HERODOTL'S 



APP. I 



D 



Asiatic provinces and kitigdoms, tlian in dreams of indetitiite extension 
wrestwards.^ But if so, this result was in part a product of the wars 
with Greece, and of the distinct and rejieated fnihire of the Great King 
to effect a permanent lodgement in Europe. The diplomatic passages 
of the fourth century, and the Alexandrine history itself, are proofs 
positive of the importance of the antecedent relations between Persia 
and Hellas. Of those relations at the time there were doubtless 
sufficiently copious records on the Persian side, and now nothing can 
compensate us for the loss of them — least of all the Iwld achieve- 
ments of oriental fabulists and poets, at a later time, when Greece had 
long been eclipsed by Rome, when the creed of Zoroaster had waned 
before the Christian Church, or withered imder the MohamniedaTi 
conquest, and the representatives of the ancient worsliippers of Ahura- 
mazda sought and found in the fabulous glories of the piimitivo ages a 
consolation for their lost religion ami their changed estate.* 

From their records, on n'en saurait tirer autre cfufsr . . que le 
sentimeiU de certaims r^alit/s I'va-nmdes : * in other words, they destrve 
no weight, in comjviiison with Herodotu.s and the Greek writcre, as 
authoritie.? for historic events, nor, I would venture to add, do they 
deserve much weight, in comparison with the elder parts of the 
Avesin, to say nothing of the monuments, when the question is one 
of creed, cult, and other institutions of the Persian jirime. 

§ 2. The loss of Persian records is not the only disaster which the 
historian of the lifth century has to deplore : a whole literature of 
Greek authorities has likewise perished, or is but dimly reflected in 
the extant remains. That Herodotus himself was not the first Greek 
writer to deal, from one standpoint or another, with th« persons and 
events of the Persian war, his own work bears witness.* It is hardly 
likely that the last three Books have fidly incorporated, or exploited, 
all the available material antecedent to their composition. The lost 
ffwinissai of Phrynichos ** might present contrasts with the Herodotean 
atoiy as frappant as the contrast presented b}' Aischylos in the Persai. 
The epos of Cho irilo s^can no longer be reckoned among the sources o£ 



' "The ancient ammla of the I'ei-siana 
arc entirely eraiiloyeJ in poaimemoratinf,' 
their numerous wars wttli tlie Turanians 
beyond the Jiliuii," Riclinrdsou, op. c. 
p. xl. 

" Tlte mediaeval autliorities in Persia, 
starting practically with Firdusi (c. P40- 
1020 A.1I. ), rccoKiiizod four dynasties 
preceding the Mohammodan conquert 
(636 A. D.): I. Peiflluladinn, lasting 2441 
years; II. Kianiiin, frona Kikobad to 
Dani (or rather to Alexander), lasting 
782 years ; III. Ashkanian (d'Horbelot), 
or 'Confederacy of Kings' (T. Macan), 
lasting 200 years ; IV. Sajisanian, loHtiag 
601 years. These dates are perhajis 



»liproximatu. The latter i»art of the 
Hccand period and dytinaty obviously 
correapoudg to the AcLaiuienid r^me, 
but tnough some of the itersons are 
parhai)9 recognizable, especially Kyros 
and Alexander, the facte are wUdly 
fabulous. It is not altogether amiss 
that I&fondyar-Mardouioa quite eclipsea 
Ardeshyr - T!»hnmn • Xerxes, but hi« 
'St'ven Labours' have no rc-lntion to 
historic possibilities, and B.s father of 
Uahman he is merged in Dareios I. 

' De Gobineau, li. 152. 

* For reff. cp. Introduction, | 10. 

" PluUroh. Themiit 5 ; Nauck, Tr. 
Or. Fr, p. 559. 



AUTHORITIES OTHER THAN HERODOTUS 



Herodotus ; ' but it might serve, if recoverable, as no bad commentary 
and contrast. Though the Memoirs of Dikatog are but an h^^jothesis,* 
the Jlypomnemnla ^ of Ion once existed, and would surely have furnished 
material, of one kind or another, to the full record of the Persian 
war. lieferenccs in the extant remains of the literature of the fifth 
century suggest that the complete works of authors still represented 
would have enriched our materials with multitudinous points, and still 
more, perhaps, the works of authors that are clean perished. Dionysios 
of Miletos is little more than a name, hut his works must have covered 
the ground of the last three Books of Herodotus, and possibly more.* 
The Tlipir iKd of Qharon of Lampsakos contained references to the 
expedition of Mardonios, and to the Hight of Themistokles, and plainly 
could not have been silent on the invasion of Xerxes."' The complete 
and authentic legacy of Hekataio s could add nothing to the mere story 
of the Persian war, and is probably more fully represented in the work 
of Herodotus than is that of any other author ; but a whole Hella- 
nikoa might supply a valuable supploraent.*' Others of the writers 
named, or referred to, by Dionysios of Halikarnassos could not but 
illustrate the same themeJ In all such cases either Herodotus him- 
self, or later extant authors, may preserve something of the lost 



r TjMt< 



' A§ bj Niebuhr. Lecturts on Anc. 
HUl i. 321. Choirilo!) of Sftmos was in 
Ute tr«iii of Lysaiider after the Pelo- 
jiooneiian war (I'lntarch, Lyn. 18 rijy 
a 'TOtip'wi' XotpfXoi' ftiy del wtpX avrhv 

TucTfl), and diod at the court of Archelaos 
(c Ol, 95 T) ; cp. Suidas mb n. The 
Lesioogiaplier raay liava confiiH«d the 
teoiiaa with another {Kiet of the same 
<e, bnt U iirobably right iu repre- 

^ting the jwet as indebted to the 

luitQiinii for his subject. Borglc, Or. 
Lit. iL 480, credits the connexion between 
Herodotiig, Panyitsis, and Choirilos, whose 
epok, if reoovt-rable, would thus take 
f«rly rank among the tesliuumia to the 
Uarx)dot««D Irogoi. I'he fragments may 
be found iu 0. Kinkel's Epicorum Or. 
Pnia. voL i. (Tcubncr) (but now cp. 
D. Mulder, " Clioirilos von Samoa, eiiie 
r*'- '• ' ' 'uelle Ilerodots" in Klio, vii. 
1 

, rridnction, 9 10. 

• Or li,iniiitde.i, c]). Atheu. 603 K. On 
loa'i relation to Kiraon, Plutarch, Kim. 
B, 16. The Chian poet was well known 
te Atheoa, cp. Ari«tX)ph. Peact, 835, 
wharc he died jiFobably a little before 
Ihi Pcsoe of Nikiaa, Ber^k, Or. Lit. iii. 

• Saidaa, Aion'-^ioT .MiXTJa-iof, laro- 



"KtKTif ktK. Dion y nog too has been con- 
founded with later namesakes, bnt the 
Htf)VtKi- or t4 /irrik Aaptior YltpaiKii were 
]>erhap8 genuine. MncUer, F.H.G. iv. 
b53, proposes to read ri iUtcpi Sapttov, 
uuneceaaarilf ; cp, F.U.O. ii. 5 ff., 
Schwartz nji. Pauly-Wissowa, v. j. 983, 
and especially C. ¥. Ijolunann (Bettrdge 
t. alt. Oach. il (1902) p. 338), who 
sneeests that the VUpcuti. dealt with the 
earlier histnry, and rd /trrd Aapelov with 
the early years of Xerxes ; cp. also 
Introduction, § 10, 

* For the Frags, cp. F.H.O. i. 32 ff., 
especially Fr. 4, 5. Siiidiu ascriboa to 
him UffxriKi, and 'EW-qnici, and the 
reference to the flight of ThcniiatoUes 
occurred apjarently in the Utter. 

• Op. Introduction, § 10. 

' iJc Thitcijd. 5 (ed. Hudson, ii. 224) 
dpX<i<o< i'^" off (ri'77po0e<i iroXXol Kal 
Karil jroXXoi'i t6tcvi i-y^yorro irph ToO 
XliXoTrowTfcnuKOV TroXifior. Among thum, 
besides Hekataion of Miletos and Charon 
of Lampsakos, lie names Eugeon of 
Samoa, Deiochos of Prokonnesus, Endemoe 
of Paros, Denioklea of Pygela. Aku»ilaa 
of Arg08, Klelesagonu of Chalkedon, 
adding as all but contemporariea of 
Thncydi<le8, Hellanikos of Lesboe, 
Damafltcs of Sigeion, Xenomedes of 
Chios. Xonthos the Lydian. (Hellanikoi 
is cited bv Plntarch, Mor. 869, a^^ainst 
Hdt) 



■^ 



inheritance ; and the lost writers subsequent to Herodotus will often, 
like those still extant, have owed much to the Halikarnasaian : hut 
t everything. They were no mere epitomators ; they pretended 
an independent authority. From the point of view of pure 
literature we may have saved the best, and forfeited but the second 
best ; but the better literature is not always the better history. 

In another department the ruin lias been even more complete. Of 
the mass of inscriptions, of the midtitudinous monuments of one kind 
and another, all over the Greek world, which once commeraorated the 
persons and events of the Peraiim war, what a mere remnant still 
survives ! True, Herodotus himself and the later authors, Pausaniaa 
the Periegete above all, may enable nn to compile a fairly full 
inventory of the major monuments once in existence ; but how poor 
a substitute this, for the potential wealth of archaeological and 
epigraphic evidences formerly in being ! ^ The excavations at Deles 



I 



I 



' Hdt. nmntioiiH some three dozeu 
objects, of one kind and auotiier, pos- 
sibly extant in his generation, and con- 
nected with tlie Persian war. For the 
/inventory see Introductio n. S 1 0,^ where 
/they are given among the actual or 
/ potential sourcoB o( hiii reconls. The 
I compilation or kd exhaustive lii^i of all 
' remains, nmnuiiit'iitu, work.s of art, olfer- 
inga, intjcriptionH, and so forth, con- 
nected with the Persian uur, liaa 
apiiarently not yet been attempted : the 
following may serve aa a stop-gap. 

(1) Actual spoih: a vast quantity 
must onco have been in existence. 
Pausan. 1. 27. 1 tueutiona the corselet 
of Masistios (cp. Hdt. 9. 22. 10) and the 
spurious dagger of Mardouioa (note I.e.). 
According to one story tho timbers of 
the Persian ships were used in the tou- 
atruction of the O'ieioii at Athens (cp. 
note to 9. 82). Our esplorer.'i have not 
yet discovered the spot on the Aitemisian 
strand, which preserve<l traces of the 
cremation of the corpses and wrecks, 
Plutarch, Them. 8. (2) Tniphies on 
ci'ery battle- field doubtless were erectcfi : 
that for Salamis in SakinLs, i'aus. 1. 3fJ. 
1 ; at Plataia the trophy was fifteen 
etades distant from the city, 9. 2. 6. 
According to Plutarch, ArCti. 20, the 
Lakedaimouians and Athenians liad 
erected trophies separately. (The trophy 
at Marathon was of white marble. Pans. 
1. 112. 4. This memorial, like all the 
other Marothonian monuments, except 
at Delphi, must have been erected after 
the war with Xerxes : trophy of Athene 
Pronoia at Deljjhi, Diodor. 11. 14. 4.) 
'"" Graves UTid tomht (the .Soros at Mara- 



thon, Puus. 1. 29. 4) : of Konnthians in | 
Saltmis, Plut. Mar. 870 ; of Lakcdai- 
monians, Atheuiang, Hellenes at Plataia, 
Faua. 9. 2. f> ; of Meg&rians at Mo};ara, 1. 
48. 2. Of individuals : Pnusanias and | 
Leonida.s(!] at Sparta, 3. 14. 1 ; Eary- 
blades, S. IB. (i ; of Adeimantos tho | 
Korinthiaii, Plut Mor. 870 ; a tomb, 
or kenota|ih, of Aristeides at Phaleron, 
Pint. ArUl. 27 J a tomb, or kenotnph, 
of Theniiatokles near Peiraiens, Plut. 
I'luvi. 32. Tliia momnnent was in form 
of an altar. (4) Allan : the most cele- 
brated thnt of ZeuK Kleutherioa at Plataia, 
Plut. Ari^. 20, Pans. 9. 2. 5 ; one of ' 
Helios Eleuthcriod at Troizen, Paus. 2. 
31. B ; and an altar of Peace (after Eury- 
moJon, or more probablv after 445 ' 
H.C,), Plut. Kim. 13 (cp. Hdt. 7. 178). 
[5] Templen : as of Artemis ProHeoa at 
Artemiaion, erected by the Athenians, 
Pint. Them. 8 ; of Athene Areia at 
Plataia. Plut. Arist. 20, Pans. 9. 4. 1 
(that this temple was erected "out of 
the simils of Blarathon " is due to the 
Athenian legend of that liattlo) ; of 
Artemis Ariatohule, in Melite, by 
'I'hcnitstokles, Plut. Thtm. 22 ; of 
Enkleia < Artemis of Good I!eport!> a 
pseudoMarathoniam, Paus. 1. 14. 4 ; 
of Nike, Pau-s. 1. 22. 4 — Pausanias does 
not definitely connett with the Persian 
wars, but cp. E. Gardner, Anc. Athens, pp. 
375 f. ; of Athene in Aigina (Collignon, 
Hiit. de Heulp. Or. i. 287), or rather, 
of Aphaia (cp. A. Furtwiingler, Aegiiia, 
das HeUiglHiii der Aphaia, 2 vv. 4to, 
Miinchen, 1906, or tnc same author's 
brochure Die Aegineteii, ibid.); aud the 
shrine of Maron and Alphcios at Sparta, 



§ 2 AUTHORITIES OTHER THAN HERODOTUS 7 

and Delphi, at Olympia and at Athens, do not leave much hope of 



pi 



1 »v. . 



Pkns. 8. 12. 9. (6) Building of leM 
ralijjioiis import, such as tlie Odeiun 
(but we aliove), the Eleatherios Stoa at 
Athena (E. Gardner, A. A. p. 387), the 
great Stoa at Sparta, Pans. 3. 11. 3. 
(Why should JL Haurottp, HfrodoU, etc. 
p. viiL, class that with 'apocryphal 
monnrocntfl ' f) The Athenian treasury 
at Delphi may really have been a dedica- 
tion from ^larathon, Pans.. 10. 11. 4. 
(Had the Athenians any separate dcxlica- 
tion in Delphi from the spoil of the 
Great Persian War ?) (7 ) Atialhemata : 
offerings of rarioaa kinds, the group 
of Oodn, Heroes and Miltiades at Delphi, 
Pans. 10. 10. 1, was no doubt connected 
with Marathon, as were some of the gilt 
•hielda on the temple at Delphi, 10. 
19. 4, but the dates of dedication are 
leetionable ; the pan-Hellenio offering 
'1 extant, in part (cp. notes to S. 82, 
9. 81), Paua. 10. 13. 5 ; an ox dedicated 
by the Ptataians, and another by the 
Karjstians, were to be seen at Delphi, 
PaiWj. 10. 16. 1, 16. 6 ; a private 
Athenian, one Kalliai, had dedicated a 
horse, 10. 18. 1. (That the bull on the 
Athenian Akrnpiolis, dedicated by the 
Areiopagofl, was connected with the 
Persian war E. Curtius conje<'tured, cp. 
Frazer, Paiaaii. ii. 296 : vf*M the bronze 
tripod supported by a (^roup of Persians 
in the Olyrapieiou, Pans. 1. 18. 8, un- 
connected therewith T) The bronze jialm- 
tree and rilt Athene, at Delphi, were 
dedicated oy Athens from the s[^oila of 
thi' Kitnonian victory at tlm Eurytnedon, 
Pius. 10. 15. 4. There wen; olfcrings in 
Korinth, as by Diodoros, and a cele- 
brated one from the Korinihian women. 
Pint. Jfar. 870. (8) Statuei may for 
oonrenience be classed separately. The 
principal were (a) of Gods : the colos.sal 
Zm» at Olympia, Paus. 5. 23. 1, 10. 14. 
; Apollo at Delphi, 10. 14. 3 ; Athene 
the Akrupolis, 1. 2i. 1 ; the Epidaurian 
polio at Delphi, 10. 15. 1 ; Artemis 
the Siiviour at Megani, 1. 40. 2 ; Zeus 
Kl«utherioa at Plataia, 9. 2. S ; Athene 
Arxia .It riataia (by Plieidias I), 9. 4. 1 ; 
and the Nemesis of Pheidias or Agors- 
krito* at Rhamn<li< (1. 33. 3, cp. Over- 
back. Sdiri/lq. 884 B. }. No doubt there 
Wore hoats of other votive statues (e.g. the 
Aiginetan pefliments ?). (b) Of Men : 
in Athens, of Miltiades, Themistokles, 
Pkoa. 1. IS. 3 ; of Xanthipiios, 1. 25. 1 ; 
•r Themistokles, Plot. Them. 22 : of 
K*llia», 'who concluded the Peace,' 1. 



8. 2, cp. Hdt. 7. 151 ; at Platoia, of 
Arimnestos (sic), who had commanded 
the Plataians at Plataia (' and provinnsly 
at Marathon ' !), 9. 4. 2, cp. Hdt. 0. 64, 
72 : at Delphi, of Skyllis (sic) and his 
daujjhter, 10. 19. 2, cp. Hdt. 8. 8 , at 
Troizeu, of the Athenian refuneea, women 
and children, 2. 31. 7, ci). Hdt 8. 41 ; 
at Sparta, of Pausanias the Regent (2), 
Paus. 3. 17. 7, etc. (9) Monuments 
might include the Stelai on the strand 
of Arteraision, Plut. TTiem. 22, and 
snpiilchrs! monuments such lut the 
Kenotaph of the Korinthians at the 
Isthmou, Pint. Mor, 870, the monument 
of Theniistokles iu the market-place of 
Magnesia, Plut. Them. 22, if, indeed, 
that was not the genuine tomb : here 
too might be found room for the Dama- 
rHeia, Diod. 11. 26. 3 (cp. B. Head, 
Uitt. Num. p. 161), indirectly com- 
memorative of the victory at Himera. 

(10) Fata : the celebrated and so-called 
Dareioa-VM* (Banmeister, Prnhnatler, 
I 408 ff., Tnfel vi.), though of an tin- 
asnal type, ia not quite unique, cp. 
op. eit., but serves, of course, to illus- 
trate a spirit, not to report a fact. 

(11) PaiTUingi, more directly illuatrativo 
of the war, onoe exi.«ited, the most cele- 
brated the Battle of Marathon iu the 
Poikile Stoa, Paus. 1. 15. 4 (cp. Ifdt. IV.- 
VI. ii. 227 ff. ) ; the figure of .Salamis at 
Olympia, Paus. 5. 11. 2; the pictures 
in the temple of Athene at Plataia, Plut. 
Arist. 20, and those in the Telestcrion 
of the Lykomidai iu Phlya, Plut. Them. 
1. (Whether tht'xe paintings were purely 
of mvthicat subjects is not clear ; they 
can Iianlly in any case have been as 
illustrative of the war as the great 
picture of Mandroklea in the Samian 
Heraion, Hdt. 4. 88.) (12) IiuicriplioTtt. 
— Most, if not all, of the material 
witnesses above illustratc<I will have 
borne inscriptions. The only extant in- 
scriptions are the Delrthian List (Hick^ 
19), the epitaph on tne Korinthiana in 
Salamis (Hicks* 18), the restored epitaph 
on the Megariana (Hicks' 17), the dedica- 
tion on the Athenian treasury at Delphi 
(Hicks* 13). AraouR notable inscriptions 
added by our literary authorities are to 
bo found the Olympian List, Pang. 6. 
23. 1 ; the inscription on the altar at 
Plataia, Plut. Arul. 19, Jfor. 872 ; and 
the six inscriptions bearing on the 
KnrinthiaTi question quoted by Plutarch, 
Mor. 870, 872. 



8 



HEEODOTUS 



APP. I 



any further great finds in this department : perb&ps Ionia may Btill 

have revelations in store ; otherwise, there seems more chance of 
unearthing evidences of the earlier stages of Hellenic history, than of 
discovering more of those fifth -century monuments, which were all 
along for the most part aboveboard, and thereby exposed to the 
destructive action of man and of nature. But here too we are not 
quite without consolation. 

In one sense, indeed, the grandest monument of the Persian war 
was, and is, Athens itself, risen and rebuilt from its ashes. Her 
citizens in the days of Periklee might well have anticipated the rootto: 
«t monummtmn quaeris, circumspice / The walls of Themistokles, though 
designed perhaps as much against the Spartan as against the Persian, 
embraced an enlarged circuit ; the rtstored fortifications of the 
Akropolis still attest, on the north side, the stress under which the 
builders worked at first, and on the south the wealth and leisure of a 
more peaceful day, in the finer and more deliberate work defrayed 
by Kimon out of the spoils of the EurjTnedon. The little temple of 
Athene Nike may perhaps betray, in its decoration, a more than 
Periklean solicitude for the reiived memories of the Medic wars. The 
whole surface of the Akropolis has revealed not merely the wealth 
and science and art of Athens, as head of League or Empire, but the 
character and extent of the culture destroyed by the Persian invasion. 
Olympia has now nothing, and Delphi comparatively little, to show, 
which can be directly connected with the Persian war; but all the 
buildings and monumental remains in Athens, dating from the fifth 
century, bear eloquent even if indirect witness to the great crisis of the 
Persian war, and the contrast between the city before and thereafter. 
The architectural and archaeological history of the town, its walls, ita 
fortifications, its temples, and so much of its art as remains to this 
day, divides itself ^vith ine\i table precision into the eras before and 
after the Persian war. The crisis found Athens (one might almost 
say) of tufa and left it on the way to become marble : found it archaic 
and left it immortal. 

§ 3. Sources from the Persian side failing, and much of the early 
evidence on the Greek side, particularly material evidence, being lost, 
we are thrown back upon the remains of the literature. The poeta 
claim the first word, and at their head Simonides and Aischylos, 
primary sources after their kind, and superior in time to the text of 
HerorlotuB itself. The historian may, indeed, as above shown,' lave 
derived materials for his story from their works. In such cases his 
testimony adds nothing to the strength of theii*s. To Pinda r, to 
TjTijiofclwm of Rhodes, Herodotus will have owed nothing directly 
m his history of the war, nor can we extract much matter of fact from 
them. The military or polittcjil point is here of less import than the 
spiritual complement. These writers, even the Boiotiao, reflect feelings 

' Introduction, § 10. 



5§2-3 



AUTHORITIES OTHER THAN HERODOTUS 



from a contemporary world ; they Bupply facta in the ethical and 
paychical order, valuable as affecting our judgement of tradition. 
Somewhat later fall the references in Aristophanes : the element of 
contrast, the conscious antithesis between Now and Then, the idealiza- 
tion of the days of yore, afftct his views of the Persian war. But, in 
common with the other poets above named, Aristophanes helps to 
preserve for us the note of reality, the immediate reference to life, the 
direct reflexion of feelings, still vividly occupied with the persons and 
events of the Persian war. 

But, though the poets are, us it happens, in their present form, 
rather aids to our imaginative appreciation than witnesses to the 
.%ctual incidents of the war, privilege has already been claimed in 
regard to AlscHYLOS, and in a minor degree Simonides. The I'ersai 
must be reckoned a serious and independent source for the storj' of 
the war, and in jMirticular for the action and manwuvres that culmin- 
ated at Salamis. Composed within an octavo of the events,^ by one 
who bad himself l>een witness and agent,'^ and presented foithwith 
to a public whicli hofl in pereon manned the fleet and stood shoulder 
to shoulder on the battle-field, the play, deficriUing or dramatizing 
these recent and vivid experiences, couid not with impunity defy the 
historic or critical Muse : certain bounds were set to poetic licence 
and to patriotic fancy, and the residuum of implicit or explicit fact is 
not inconsiderable. The scene is, indeed, laid at Susa ; thus the poet\ 
obtains a perejjeotive from space, wiiich he has sacrified in time, and 
observes the new realism without loss of classic dignity. The 
'IraiiuUit personae are all Persians, or foreigners,^ nor is any Greek so 
much as named in the course of the drama. Thus the piitriot avoida 
invidious comparisons, and secures a fair hearing for the piece. The 
jiece is no party jyamphlet Themistokles is not celebrated at the 

cpense of Arist«ides, nor is Aristeidea exalted above Themistokles. 

le Athenian is not serving a local patriotism : ' the sons of the 

lellcnes'* are all, with him, good men and true, and no scorn, no 

il, distils from his pen. Nor are the PerKian.s mere objects of 

amity, or marks for triumphant revenge. The Chorus of Susan 
Elders is aa sage as any Greek Chorus need be : the Protagonist's 
^pails'' are not meant to be ludicrous, unless we are to laugh at the 
jhokleian Philoktetes. The tlierapeutic power of Pity and of Fear 
acts through the religious lesson involved in the Persian's pride and 

Li/i, § 4, from the Medicean Ms. ; Cji. 
Wecklcins ed. 1891, ]>. 3. 

' Chorus of Elders, Atossa, Messenger, 
Sbade of Dareios, XoTxea, 

• 1. 402. 

° 809-1076. The Peraai wm certainly 
not the 'vatiric' drama in the totralngj-: 
I'hiucuH, rersai, Glaiikoit, Prowetheiu ; 
cp. Hijpotheau, 



' It w»« acted for the first time itrl 

Mirufof, 01. 78. 4, 473-2 ii.c. ; cp. 

Iton, F'nii i!.» 39. Prnhably it is 

hjrioa' oldejit extant drama, tiot- 

ithstandiog Ariatoph. Froffa 102(i f. 

• ytMinxtOf a atrrtiv ^cri icaX /UTacrxtir 

r,i« If itafiaOivi m^XV^ o'*^' '''V <ii<^^u 

Ivrryttpy, T7t re tv ^a.Xafib'i eav/uixlat 

ry rewrdry ruy aitX^r 'Afitirl^ 

««2 r^f /r IlXaroiari rtfonaxiai. Tlic 



10 



HERODOTUS 



APP. I 



discomfiture, as exhibited in the drama. It was a great though not 
unprecedented ' effort for a Greek dramatist to spiritualize the world 
of the present under the heroic conditions demanded by the tragic 
stage. It was a poetic triumph to succeed in that iittempt, without 
dropping the mask, and allo\ring the features of the politician and 
tho [xirtisan to show. Any patent disregard of notorious facta would 
have made the result ridiculous in the eyes of Athens and of HcUaa ; 
and thus, with due regard to the poetic and dramatic hypothesis of 
the work, the Persai of Atschylos must be accounted an authentic 
source of real knowledge. But its object was not history, nor was it 
written 'in order that the deeds wrought by Grreeks and B;irl}arian6, 
and the war waged between them, might be had in everlasting 
remembrance' It is not a history, nor even an historical poem, but 
a drama, a morality, with historical and still living characters on 
tho stage. It has neither the merits nor the defects of an historical 
essay in contemporary politics ; it supplies rather a standard than 
constituent materials to the historical reconstruction. What every 
Greek, or Athenian, knew, or might have known, if recited at all, 
must needs have verisimilitude ; what hardly any Greek could check, 
was open to the poet's free will. We may be sure that the size and 
numbers of the invading host were not understated - ; but we need 
not suppose that the names of the Persian captains or grandees' were 
drawn from official records. We may be sure that tlie major events 
of the campaign are placed in their true 3e<pience, irrespective of the 
order in which they are mentioned in the poem. We may be sure 
that tho description of the battle of Salarais is consistent with Attic 
topography, and probably consistent with itself, and with the real 
course of the action ; here, if anrwhere, should Aischylos and 



wapairfroi.fivOn.L, il/id. The I'/ioiniMHl 
woa ]>rodaccd with Tlietuistokles as 
Chorals in 476 v.v. ; cp. Plutarch, 
Them. 6, und Clinton, FiuslC, ad ann. 
(There had \ieeu the still earlier ease, 
Hdt. 6. 21.) 

* The number of Greek shijw in f^vfn 
as 300, tliat of the Persiiiu on 1000, or 
08 1-207, 11. 339 ff. ; cp. Hdt. 7. 8!'. 

' There are three liati of oaptiiitis, or 

frandees, in the Persai: (A) in the 
'arotios, coatAining seventeen names ; 
(U) in the Mcsaenjicr's speech (302-330), 
containin;;; iiiueteeii names; (C) in the 
ir«/imo»(S07-end), containing twenty -six 
uanies. Of the namea six may l>e re- 
garded ft-H common to A and B, throe to 
ABC, two to AB, two to L5C. Tho 
total number of distinct names is tliQS 
forty-nine. Tho names stand in no re- 
lation to tlio Hcrodotean list of ipxoin-(s. 



or Mjrriarchs, thirty in number. This 
discord is not due to the fact that the 
ipxoi^es are officers of the LanU-.^rmy, 
wliile the Penai ia concerned with the 
Fleet and .Salainia, for it is obvious that 
Chonis, Messenger, and King have in 
mind myrianlis and chiliarchs, as well 
as captains of ships and ailniirals : one 
indeed of thu lo«t loaders was myriaTch 

I of 30, 000 cavalry (314f.)! Therearenot 
more than six names camnion to tliese 
listi and the lists in TTiU. (' Api6iiapioi, 
'Apadnrit, 'Apra^pirrii, 2»<r<lfU'T;i, 2iV»- 
vtatf, tepfySdnjt ; but yiap36vioi and 
Ma(ri<mj{ may be added), and a few of 
the names in Aischylos appear elsewhere 
in Hdt. (e.g. ' KpTt)i^fni%, 'Ultyn^irrfs, 
♦opooMXOT, not to say M^/i^it and 
•^ififuz). Hdt. does not furnish a list 
of the naval captains ; but we can hardly 
flatter ourselves that we possess in the 
Aiachyloan lists any trustworthy material 
wherewith to cover that omission. 



S3 



AUTHORITIES OTHER THAN HERODOTUS 



It' 



Herodotua be at variance, it is not the poet miist give way.^ Wc can 
eamly allow room for exaggeration or borrowing in the record of the 
retreat of Xerxes,- where the actual facts were already remote from 
observation, and the dramatic hypothesis made it ditficult for the poet 
otherwise to utilize, or point, the moral of later disasters. The miai' 
en s*ine set the poet free to represent transactions in Susa according 
to his pleasure, or the dramatic necessities ; * we shall not mistrust the 
account of Salamis because the poet tiikes liberties with the liealifn of 
the Persian court,* nor discoimt the reference to Plataia liecause it is 
put into the mouth of the Ghost of Dareios.' 

PlND.Ui was strictly contempo raryjgith the Persian wars, and his 
works are eminently representative of the genius and <?tho8 of his 
age and nation. If the contribution they afford to our knowledge 
of the war, its circumstance and heroes, is slender and disapjjointing, 
this defect may be due less to the fact that the poet was a Boiotian, 
and 80 committed on the wrong side, than to the lo.ss of the greater 
portion of his poetic achievement. Had wo in possession all the 
seventeen books, or volumes, into which antiquity distrilrated his 
remains,** we might find a larger part of Pindar's work to illustrate 
our subject. The Epinikia, by which he is now in the main represented, 
celebrated victories of peace, eminently characteristic no doubt of 
Hellenic civilization, but having as little tu do directly with Salamis 
and Plataia as the jUaying-fields of England with Trafalgar or Waterloo. 
Yet in one or two cases even the Epinikia throw a reflected light upon 
the subject of the war. Just as the seventh Pythian ode illuminates 
dl6 position of the Alkmaionidat in Athens about the date of the 
battle of Marathon," so the last Isthmian, especially in its opening, 
reflects the state of Thebes and the natural dej)re8sion of ' the Thebaii 
eagle,' not long after the battle of PJataia.^ It was in an Epinikion 
that Pindar volunteered to sing the praises of the Athenians for 
Salamis, or of the Spartans for Plataia,** as in another he refers in no 
obscure terms to the Aigiuetan Arukia at Salamis.'" Somewhere 
Pindar had celebrated the crossing of the Hellespont by the Persians, tv 



' Cp. Appendix VI. § 4. 
» IL 482-514. 

* e.g. the unmedijite return of Xerxes 
to Siua. 

* Tli* situation, for exaraj)!*-, in tlio 
KrintiiK* i.4 jiuroly theatrical, and not 
ii: ■ ': :>f.o!iMl, but imjKissible. 

•:.!0. 
. /'.Z'.'jr. i.* 367, and the iir<» 
(Cimat eti. miii. (1806), p. c tT.). 

T Cp. fMt. ir.-yi. ii. 170. 

■ 7) ; the precise dates of the 
>, : self, and of the paiikratiast 

»irku[ic« iiiorein reporttHi, are in some 
Arabt, bat it is agreed that the poem 
•«■ oompoMd witMn a year or two of 
the battle of Plataia ; cp. especially J. B. 



Bury, lah. Mra (1892) p. 134, note; 
also Idh. 3. 34, and Bury, Clas». Rev. 
1905, p. 10. 

» l^vth. 1. 75 ff. i.piotuu I ir4/> itiP 
'Za\a^uyot ' k8i\yaliit* X^f^" I )^<rl>i>'- '' 
^wdpTf S' ipiuf vp6 Ktffaipiliyo^ /«lX<»'i I 
Taieri MrJJfioj xdfiov iyxvMTOiM «t\. A 
reference to Hinicra follows iniineilmtoly. 
(The Ode in in honour of Hiinm, 'of 
Aitna.' and also refera to lii« victory 
over the Etriwans and Carthanlnlaim 
oirCiiniae, 474 b.i'. 1 

'" Isih. 6 (4). 49 IT. KoJ »0» i» 'A/xi 
yLnprvpitatu Kty x4Xif Atat^oi dfiOijOiifa 
fai'roti I ff woXii^ipv JUaXo^li Ai4f 
6n^p>i>, I iyapldi*un> iylpCif x*^^t^*'^' 
p'jy(f<. 



IS 



HERODOTUS 



perhaps not merely in a passing allusion to the war.^ Can he have 
written an Enkomion for Alexander of Makedon,- nnd have made no 
reference to that prince's real or supposed services to Hellas in the 
war with the Barbarian ? Was it not that poem, above all, which 
moved ' the great Ematlnan conqueror * to spare the poet's house, 
when all the rest of Thebes was razed to the ground ? * Was not 
the Aiginetan Frosodion eh 'Acfiaiuv* written for the dedication of the 
temple, built probably out of the spoils of the war,' and would it not 
I have been rich in allusions to the heroism of the Aiginetan sailors and 
IhoplitosJ Fragments survive of the Dillvjramh, in which Pindar 
Iglorified the victories of tlie Athenians from Artemision to Eion : ^ who 
can say how much of the same kind has been lost ? Even in view of 
the references, just given, it is haKl to believe that Pindar's sympathies 
were with the dominant paily in his native state ; if ever any poet had 
a proper vocation to sing the praises of liberty and the higher life, 
the very essentials of Hellenic culture, was it not Pindar 1 ^ Was he, 
indeed, so little employed therein, as the meagre evidence just surveyed 
would seem to suggest ? 

Far other was the fortune of SlMONIDES of Keos,^ whose name is 
more intimately associated with the victories of the Hellenes over 
'the Barbarian' than that of any other poet. Unfortunately, the 
works of this master of sepulchral elegy and votive epigram have 
come down to tis but as second or third-hand citations in other writers, 
and in many cases the authenticity of the citation is doul)tfuI, or 
indefoiisible," Tliere was, perhaps, no battle of the wars from 
Marathon to the Eiirymedon, or even to the Peace, which was not 
commemorated in elci^ics that might pass as worthy of Simonides ; 
while on countless offerinj^s in all the great centres of Hellas his style 
was recognizable, and surely enhanced the value of the gift. Simonides 
wrote a lyric poem on Artemision, and from the same poem, or a 
cognate one, Diodoros quotes a eulogy on the heroes of Thermopylai.'" 
And he wrote elegies on the battles of Salamis and Plataia.^' The 
inscriptions on the Stdai at Thermopylai were from his pen,^* as were 



' Fr. 189 TOJtHaful (rdv Stlnaro Her> 
Toann) rol likv inrip Tivnoc'EWat w6pov 
ipir. The inotre is the same as in the 
Parodos of the Persai : whether Pindftr 
copied Aiachyloa (Bergk), or Aiachyloa 
copied Pindar (Chriat), vi doubtlul. 

' Bergk, Christ, Fr. 120 f. (<5\^iu«- 

'KtuirTo), 

* Arrian, Aiiab. 1, 9 10. 

* Fr. 89, cp. Pnus-in. 2. 30. 3 (and 
Hdt. 3. h^ as amended by Kiirz). 

' Cp, note 1 p. 6 fupra, 

* Fr. 76-78. Plutarch quotes 77 no less 
than four timos : Tfieni. 8, Mor. 350, 
552, 867. 8^1 vaiStt ' \9rii>alu¥ fjSdXooTo 



^atrvAji I KpTiwiS' fXtvffplat (nc. Arte- 
mision). 

' Cp. even in Ifth. 8, 15 iari 8' irrl 
pparj-oit (rini y' fXtvBeplif. «at ri. 

» Bergk, P.L.O. HI* 382-535. 

* Cp. A. Haurette, de VautheniiciU 
da Epiyrawiiics de. Sivuniide, Paris, 1896, 

'0 Bergk t.c Diodor. 11. 11. 6 (eight 
or nine lines). 

" Bergk iii. 423-126, Fr. 83-86. 

" Bergk, Fr. 91-94. Tlu-re were five 
iuscribi'ii SUiai accordiug to >Strabo 425, 
who quotes one in addition to the thr«« 
preserved by Hdt 7. 228. Cp. Rergk, 
Fr. 99, 100. 



the elegies on the tombs at Plataiu,' and the tombs in Salamis bore 
epitaphs of his miiking.' The lines which guarantee the presence of 
the Megarians at Artemision, Salamis, Pliitaia, and M}'kale, are still — 
by an uniijuo chance — extant on marble, though not on the original 
slab ; ' and the ascription of the epigram in whole or in part to 
Simonides has some authority. Simonides compoaefl the dedication 
on the Altar of Zeus at Plauua,* ami that which once adorned the 
golden tripod at Delphi, and which has survived in spite of the Spartan 
erasure.* He hati celebrated alao the victory of Hiinera in the west;* 
but he can hardly have lived to witness the last victory of Kimon 
in Kypros ;' yet oven if for the quatrain on the Attic arrows dedicated 
to Athene" we have only the authority of the Antholofji/, shall we 
greatly err in accepting the Simoiiidean authorship I And albeit 
Timokreon of Rhodes survived the Keian ]>oet, none but Simonides 
will have written and bequeathed to the Rhodian the jocosely crushing 
epitaph,* the gravest libel in which is only too fully justified by what 
remains of the Khodian's own words. 

The maledictions of TiMOKR KON ^^ are, nevertheless, among the 
moat precious fragments of the early fifth-century literature which 
good fortune has alloweil to reach us, for the simple reiisoii that 
they demonstrate how soon, to wit immediately after the crowning 
victory, the spirits of envy, malice, evil-speaking, lying, and slander 
were let loose, and at once set to work to destroy the great reputations 
which had l)een made in the war. Timokreon is, in short, one of our 
chief benefjictors, not of gowl will, but of the reverse. The glimpse 
of his malignity sets ua thinking what a world of such stuff must 
once, and that ejirly, have existed ; we wonder now the less if 
Herodotus, with all the good will he possessed, has taken up something 
of that kind into his composition, upon the principle that what is 
being said, or has been said, should be repealed, however malignant 
and improbable it may be." The notion that the traces of malignity 
in the Ilerodotean history of the war all date from a comparatively 
late stage in the evolution of tradition is curiously naive in itself, and 
is refuted by the evidence of Timokreon, Within ten years of the 
battles of Salamis, of Plataia, and Mykale, the three Greek leaders 



' Pansfcii. ». 2. 5, Bergk, Fr. 101- 
103. 

* At for the KoriiithiaDs, eridtnce 
which Dio Chrys. and Platarcli justly 
quote o^inst the Hcandal in Hdt 8. 
S>t, cji. Hergk, Fr. 96, 97. 

» Bergk, Fr. 107. Hicks* 17, who re- 
cognize* the first couplet u f^nuine 
Bimonides, It neithi-r PaiiR&niM nor 
Platareh moDtioii or quote this opigram, 
the reaaoQ may be that it was illegible, 
until 'reatorea* by HoUadios, "prowibly 
u Ute a« the fonrth century a.i>." 



* PluUroh, Ariateid. 19. Mor. 873 ; 
c'|i. Bergk, Fr. 140. 

» Thuc. 1. 132. 2 ; op. Bergk 138. 
" Bergk 141. especially v. \: Aa^- 
pirov xp^'ov, rdt 2rx<irat 5c«rd rar. 
' Berfc'k II 2. 
' Bergk 143. 

• Bergk 1C9 iroWd it^yi„v koX rciKKa. 
iriCiiv Kal ToKKii nix tlvuir | irHpt^ovs 
««i/«M "VinoKpiuv 'PAJioj, 

"• Bergk, /".Z-.O. iii.* .138-541. 
» 7. 152 tyii W i4>rl\u Uytir rd 
Xtydftrva kt\. 



14 



HERODOTUS 



APP. I 



/ 



and commandere whose names were most intimately associated with 
those victories were fallen and discredited ' : the ungratefiJ process of 
discounting their services and blackening their names had been 
inaugurated even before their fall. But the critiwil perusal of the 
Herodotean record tends to prove that the spirit of mutual suspicion, 
detraction, and Jeiilousy had not been quite completely laid to rest, 
even during the perioii of successful co-operation and comi»arative 
harmony between states, parties, and persons.- The mysteriously 
omitted chapter on the Arisieia of Plataia ^ might have shown an out- 
break of jealousy on the ftelci of victory before the dead were buried, 
or the spoils divided. The generous pan-Hellenism breathed in the 
' Fersai of Aischylos attests the magnanimity of the poet, and perhaps 
a moment of more cordial approximation between Spjirta and Athens,'' 
but neither covers all elements in the living tradition and discussion 
of the day, nor even fvilly photographs the mind, or double-mi ndedness, 
of Hellas in the recent struggles and very hour of victory. The 
remains of Timokreon may at least serve to show how the thing 
_8truck an interested and cynical contemporary.^ 

With Aristoi'H.\nks we pass from the writers whom Herodotus 
may have used to the writers who used or may have used Herodotus, 
and Aristophanes may be set here with the good poets i-ather than 
with Thucydides his contemporarj', because he too was a poet, because 
genius counts in this case rather than chronology, and ethos entitles 



^ Themifitokles, Pkosanias, Leoty- 
chidos. 

' Gf. the strife over the question of 
Hegtntonia (Hdt. 8. 3) ; the 'neutrality' 
of Argos (7. I48-]5]) ; tho barely com- 
posed qu&rrel between Aigiua Hnd Atbeua 
(7. 14.5) ; the uaiicriit quarrel between 
Athens ftnil Korintli, whiuh doubtless 
dates from the iiaival law of Tliemiiitokles ; 
the ambiguity in the uttituda of Delphi ; 
the Mediaiu of most of the Amphiktyonic 
nations ; to say uotliiii<; of exiles, rivals, 
cross purposM aiid divided interestii ou 
the ktnff's side ; and we have enough to 
convince ua that the roots of ranch of 
the maliynilas in the traditions of the 
Persian war go right back to the very 
generation of the war itaelf. 

' Cp. PluUrch, Arist. 20 ; Hdt. 9. 
71. 

* Themistokloshod just been saoriliced 
to the reseatment of Sparta a year before ; 
for tho date of his ostrakisra cp. liusolt 
tll. i. 112. Among itn causes should not 
be overlooked the growing aversion of 
Theuiistoklea to tho policy of Kimoii, 
the eudlcas war with Persia, and the 
fettering friendship with Sparta. Tbemi- 
gtoklea had thwarted Sparta already 



again nnd again, notably in regard to 
the refortilication of Athens, and the 
manipulatioa of the Amphiktyonic 
League. S]uirta'g hostility to him dates 
long before his residence in Argos. 

' The rpcovered poems of liAKt'HYLiSES 
might have been uxjiected to yield some 
material for tho history of the Persian 
war, but it is not so. The prime editor 
has well aaid : "The poems connected 
with Athena (x., xviL, xviii., xix.) would 
appear, iu the case of the last three at 
least, to have been written subaeijtu'iit 
to the Persian ware ; for, though there 
is no direct allusion to these or any 
otlier political events, the tone in which 
Athens is addressed seems to imply that 
she has already attained that eminent 
position which was due to tlie battle of 
salamis and the formation of the con- 
fedsraoy of Dclos. " — F. G. Kenvon, The 
Paeins of Bacdiylidt^, 1SD7, \^ "ix. The 
distinct reference in the {toems of 
TuEOONiB to the delivorance of Megara 
in the Persian war (1. 77.5), like the 
address to Simonidea (1, 1349), onlv 
show that the work is composite and 
parts of it falsely aiicrihed to tho elder 
Megarian poet. 




AUTHORITIES OTHER THAN HERODOTUS 



Aristophanes with all his vagaries to be associated with Pindar, 
Aischylos, Simonides. On the subject of the Persinn wars Aristophanes 
ia, indeed, archaic, as compared with Thucydides, and even in 
comparison with old Aischylos himself. His ideal of Atheus lies 
before the time not merely of Perikles Viut even of Kimon. He does 
not harp much on the Persian wars ; but if he must refer to them, 
the first rather than the second war takes his fancy, and the 
Maraihanotnachai are his heroes, the nautical mob his laughing-stock.^ 
True, as eomjmied with the Deraagognea of hia own day, a 
Tbemistokles is of glorious and immortal memory ; ' but there is ordy 
one express reference to the battle of Salamis, in the extant plays, 
and that is broad farce.^ True, a late and perhaps dialcctically 
laughable passage celebrates, with comic fervour, the defence of 
Artemision and Therraopylai ■• j but the most remarkable passage on 
the Persian wars at large,'' though it gains its chief point from the 
X«rxeian occupation of Athena, reported almost in the words of 
Herodotus,* yet plainly refers the Greek success to the l>attlc of 
Marathon/ and makes no clear reference to the actual engagements 
of the second war : though the subsequent Athenian acquisitions in 
Asia are implied in the context.^ The Imttles of Plataia and Mykale 
are never cited by Aristophanes, and the one reference to Aristeides,* 
in which he is classed with Miltiades, may be chiefly due to his 
prominence at Marathon.'" If Aristophanes refers to the Persai of 
Aischjrloa ^* it is merely as a date in that jwet's literary biography. 
The names of Leonidas '- and Artemisia '^ might have been current in 
Athens in any case, but may with Aristophanes be of the nature of 
literary allusions, like some others," due to the recent circulation of 
the work of Herodotus. Aristophanes, in fact, lives in a world where, 
for the most part, the name of the Mede is no longer 'a terror to 
hoar,' ^ and the breeches, or bags, of the Mede are merely a jest to 



/ > C(«. 11(0. IV.-FI. u. lS2(r. (Appen- 
U" X. g 10). 

' Th«mUtot(le8 u fire times named in 

the JCnifffUt {42* ikC.) to the diaparage- 

nt ot Kleon (11. 84, 81i!, 813, 818, 

). It lookn as if Kleon had been 

vocatiiit; an alliance witli Argos, and 

Soting iTie authority of Tbemistokles 
errfor. 

• KnighU "85 »r Jra *oS(fou ^aXaituii, Ira. 
tkif fpip^ H)' ^c SaXa/iivi. Marathon 
luia Men mentioned, in much grander 
tomta, juat four linea earlier. 

• LyiU. (411 B.C.) 1247-1265. 
» W<uip»(\'n B.r.) 107R-1100. 

• ^l<' ^\9' A fidpfiapm, [ t(J) icarr^ 
Aravoj' riii> t6Xii' irai rvproXwn : 

Hilt. 8. 50. inri) Si ruif rofevudTuv 
iitir rbr oiparir : cp. Hdt. 7. Tit. 




^ U. 1081-5, without actually naming 
the spot. 

* 1. 1098 TotyapoOr iroXX&t iriXtit 
TA'^Sur i\6i'rtt kt\, 

• KniyliU 1825. 

'• Cp. PhiUrch, Arist. 6. 

" Frogs (iQ5 HM.) 1026. 

'= Ly: 1254. '• Lt/s. 675. 

'* Bird>t (414 B.i.',) 278 tha T<i? inv 
arafir^Xov M^Sot w» fMxTaro ; The reftr- 
enoe in ff'ntps 12, M^36« rit . . riir- 
Totcrijt Omot, is obiioure ; if M^of means 
'fejirfii]' then it is purely jocular, ns 
who should say, 'a fearsome barbarous 
sleep invaded me!'; but is not the 
atreaa on the antecedent word (dvKrrpa' 
TfiVoTo), the closing words being rather 
iropd rpoaioKiaf t 
"> Hdt. 6. 112. 



16 



HERODOTUS 



A pp. I 



heholders.^ Persia is now chiefly notorious for its luxuries : life in 
Ekbutana is 'iiU jam' ;- Athenian embassius go to and from Suaa, and 
suck thereout no small advantage ; ^ Psemlartabas, the King's Eye, 
is a farcical figure in the Athenian Assembly,* and the charge of 
' Medisni ' is an anachronism.'' In all this Aristophanes adds nothing 
to our actual knowledge of the war ; but just on one point he makes 
a valuable addition to Herodotus, in suggesting that there had been 
a financial le\'y on the citizens during the war, akin to, but not 
identical with, the later income-tax." In fact, Aristophanes is of 
value as marking a sttige, perhaps also a decline, in the spirit of 
tradition, but he supplies little of material contents to the subject in 
band. He is no tiatterer of the maritime mob, no admirer of its 
victories. He is a lover of the soil, not of the sea. He could never 
have advocated the war of revenge, the fpiplous to Kypros, or the march 
to Susa. Though no friend to Porikies, on two points be is almost a 
Periklean : ho would drop anti-Medism, and he could hardly praise 
Sparti^. But in his heart of hearts Aristophanes was a 'little Attiker,' 
and would cheerfnll}' have seen combined the domestic policy of a 
Kimon with the pacific phase of the Periklean foreign policy. The 
exact place of the ' Empire ' in the programme of ilristophanes is not, 
indeed, well defined ; he might perhaps have been willing to adopt 
in a sense of his own the motto : I'cmpire, c'est la pais.. Butj like a 
true lover of culture, his preference was inevitably for the antique. 
The vulgarity of the new men is what maiidy strikes himJ It is a 
common fault io take jVi'istophanes too seriously as a politician, or 
even us a moralist ; he is above all a poet and a wit, with a vivid eye 
for the situation of the hour. There is not much in alt that to lead 
him into the details of the Persian war ; with Marathon to glorify, 
he could wellntgh ignore Sidamis, the triumph of the naval and 
knavish mob, and turn his back on Platfiia, tuu chief glory of Sparta. 
To the great Persian war, then, he is, though for diflerent reasons, 
but one degree loss indifferent than the Periklean Thucydides himself. 
What is true of Aristophanes may be allowctl to hold good of the 
authors of the Old Comedy in general. In vain we ransack their 
remains for events, or names, or sjxjts of local colour, wherewith to 
enrich the story of the campaigns of Xerxes and Mardonios, If 
preserved in fuller degree the Comedians would chietl.v avail to 
i-epresent, directly and indirectly, the milieu through which those 
memories and records wore regarded, by the bulk of the upj>er classes 
in Athens, during the Periklean and sub-Periklcan age. But these 
poets were not themselves true Periklcans. For the better expression 



* Wasps 1087 tXra S' flir4/*<(7^a Owfi- 
tofTft (it Toit dv\iKovt. 

* Knufhtu :0S9 iv 'ExpardfOit StKdaeit, 
Xelxw iirlirooTa. 

' Achurn. (42.=; B.c.)a5ff. 

* Achftm. 91 ir. 



» KniglOa 478, Petux (4ai B.C.) 108, 
TUmtoph, (411 B.C. !) 337, 366. 

" Lystr. 6M tA* Ipatof rip \(y6iitror 
' Knighum, etc. 




H3-4 



AUTHOIIITIES OTHER THAN HERODOTUS 



of the Periklean attitude, in its maturity, tovrards the most glorious 
chapter in the history of Athens, we must turn to the gi-cat master, 
whose immortal work — perhaps an all too successful vindication of 
Perikles and his polity — has dominatcstl men's conceptions of the 
hifltory of the fifth centurj' ever since. 

§ 4. Thucydidks, the most austere of Attic historians, has one 
strong feeling in common with Aristophanes, the lightest of Attic 
poets, a hearty conttfmpt for the popular leaders who succeeded 
Perikles : but here their agreement ends. With the poet dislike 
extends to the policy of the Demagogues, with the historian it is 
mainly concentrated on their persons. Moreover Thucydides, in 
contrast with Aristophanes, has a thorough atlmiratioii for Perikles, 
for the Periklean policy and tlie Periklean rt-gime, and undertakes 
to prove that the war between Sparta and Athens, the history of 
which he proposed to ^vrite, was of all wars the grandest, the most 
ine\'itable, and the most interesting.' A war it undoubtedly was, 
for which the main responsil^ility rested on Perikles. The gay 
comedian, who disliked the war, expressed his views of that rcsponsi- 1 
bility, after his own fashion, in the famous parody on the Proejn of 
Herodotus - : the grave historian, who canonised Perikles, reviewed 
the whole past history of Greece, the Persian war included, in a false 
perspective.* Perikles had never been closely identified with the 
Medic war in any of its phases.'' He had made his political d^but 
in opposition to the man whose twofold idea in foreign policy was 
war <> outrana with the Persian empire and peace at all costs with 
Sparta, as the necessary complement thereto.'' Perikles was early 
identified with the invasion of the sphere of Spartan in^uence, with 
the approximation to Argos, with the abandonment of the endless 
feud against Persia, in short, so to speak, with the three principal 
clauses in the testament of Themistokles to his not too grateful 






' I. 1. 1 ftfyov T» . . iral (IftoXiryitfraTOV 
rv* xpirtCftinftUvuni. C]). 1. 21. 2. Its 
meritabie character is proved by the 
afialTxia of its oanaes aud antccedeiita. 
Tlte Penlau war not comparable to it, 
J. 23. 1. 

- Ariatoph. Aehara. 524 ff. 

• Thu-', 1. 2-19. ThucyJidea con- 
n MitiOB and Ajjaiiiemnon good 

UeDes, but he baa a very iiuiilei|iiute 
mneeption of the iiower and civilizatiua 
of tha Aig&ian in &linoau and Mykciiaiau 
tiaw*, to nay nothing of uiore ret'eut 
Amy* of liTal lea^oa, of colonLrationa, 
tyi«nt«, -"I — '•■•rth. 

* I ri .►6«' ^j/r|lina^ia, ruuorded 
by Pltii Y. 17, aa a very early 
item iu Ui« reiiklcHD record. It oelonga 
to t)ie first ot*^ of hi« iiolitical career, 
after tlw battle of tlio Luryinedoii, but 

VOL. II 



before the actual breach with Sparta. 
It onumea the time to be come for 
treating the Fenian question as settled. 
It was not a succe.ss. 'The gi'eat ex- 
ptftlition to E/qrpf (Time. 1. 110. 4) c*n 
hardly have bcon audertaken in oppoai- 
tioii to Periklfts, but he himself remained 
at lionie. He may Luvc couinmnded 
a s<|nadroii operstin;; at some time ia 
Aaiatit: waterti (Plut. Kim. l.'i, cp. Duucker 
viii. 247), but uotliin); came of it, and 
ha waa still a merely secondary figure in 
politicK. 

' BeMides those two ideas Kiinon must 
have hod two others: the firm main- 
tenance of the Maritime Syiumachy, 
and the preservation of tlie irirpun 
voXirrla at home. The proieoutioQ of 
Kimon by Perikles may be dated 46S B.C., 
'\9. w. 27. 1 ; cp. Buaolt ui. i. 245. 

C 



18 



HERODOTUS 



country. The new policy carried a new estimate of the relative 
values of Mediam and anti-Medism, Lakonisni and unti-Lakonisni, aa 
means to the glorification of Athens. The now calculus of values 
reacted upon men's estimate of Greek history and Greek relations 
with Persia. For Thucydides the distinction hetween Hellenism and 
B&rbarism is merely one of degree.' There is no 'eternal ' or essential 
■onflict between East and West, The most profound antithiysis in 
history is to be aecn in the typical struggle between Athena and 
Sparta — the Athena of Perikles, progressive, critical, adventurous, 
cultured, and the ignorant, stay-at-home, churlish, unchangeable 
Sparta.'^ Thuc}'dide8 holds no brief for democracy : he judges 
monarchy, whether of fact or of form, not unkindly. He writes as 
though a Peisistratid restoration might have been no groat ofl'cnce ' : 
was not the Perikiean regime itself of that natiu'c?* Viewed from 
this standpoint the chief intereat of the Persian war was that it had 
necessitated and justified the Athenian Empire, for which Perikles was 
prepared to find a fresh rau^on d'etre \vithout wasting men and treasure 
in endless warfare with the Me<le.'' With such a shift in the centre 
of gravity it is no wonder if the work of Thucydides ofTers at first 
sight 80 immense a contrast to the work of Herodotus, and that, 
perhaps, in the very effort to displace it. Yet in spite, or in 
consequence, of that eftbrt Thucydides makes, in at least two 
particulars, a more valuable contribution to the right estimate of 
the Persian wars tlian any other extant writer between Herodotus 
and Plutarch. In the fii*at place, Thucy«lides duly appraises the 
relative significance of the first and of the second war, and docs 
justice to the part played by the fleet in the liberation of Hellas." 
In the second place, Thucydides corrects the malignant legend about 
Themistokles, and writes the first of that long series of HeHnngen, 
which the malice of contemporaries has continued to require of 



' The distinction between 'Hellene' 
and 'Karb&iian ' ig post-Homeric, 1. 3. 3; 
ep. CO. 6, B, especially the conclusion : 
iroXXii i' Av Kal fiXXa rit i-roHtlffie rb 

papiKif SiaiTa'^Fvov. Thucydiiles himself 
had Thrakian blood in his veins. 

* Cp. especially the two celebrated 
contrasts between Athens and Sparta in 
the Kon'ntliian speech (i. 63-71) and the 
FniHTal Oration (2. 35-46). 

' «. 54-59. 

* irrb roO irpilrrov a.v5pi% Apx^ 2. 65. 9. 
The whole chapter contains tlie apo- 
theosis of the [wlicy and adnnnistration 
of Perikles, and was nlainly written in 
whole, or part, after tne fall of Athens, 
and Bubsequently to the commendation 
of the moderate democracv in 8. 97. 2 — 



I assume tho authi-nHcity of the eighth 
Book — which is not, if rightly regarded, 
inconsistent therewith. 

' rbf 'M^ior ixOp6» fxo>>TH t^ 'ipxV 
iKr/ifftwro (Herniokrates) 6. 17. 7 : iiKalut 
rdr M. KaraK/'iTai'Tfi ipxcfitr 5. 89. 1 
(an arffunipnt tliey waive, i.'p. 6. 83. 2) : 
6.r$' Cm (the ' Medisni ' of the lonians) 
ftfioi Tt icTef &fia ipxafity 6ti rt rrX. 
(Euphcnios) 6. 82. 4, 83. 1 ; Perikles 
iiiits it frankly on the basis of solf- 
mtercst. 2. 63. 2 : cp. 3 . 76. 3 (a Perikiean 
ambassador I). 

' Salaniis on the nhote is the battlo 
of the war on which Thucydides dwells 
with least reluoUnce, 1. 18. 2, 1. 73. 4, 
esjHjrially 1. 92. 3, and generally the 
enipbosis laid on the uaral service, e.g. 
1. 73. 5. 



^ generations/ me first ot tnese services 
supplies a protest against the Atheni:m exaggerations in the fifth 
century B.c, but serves to condemn in anticipation the stili wilder 
excesses of the Mai-athouian k'gend in after days.- In the second case 
it was not merely current Attic tradition, nor merely allied scandal, 
we may well believe, which Thucydides applied himself to correct: 
the work of Hero<lotus, his great exemplar and opposite, had subsumed 
too much of that tradition and that scandal, and challenged correction: 
it waa here, if anywhere, that the Periklean writer wiib bound to 
intervene, with something like a new redaction, and a final judgement. 
Nor is it merely in these two particulars that the work of Thucydides 
makes a valuable contribution to the materials for the history of the 
Persian war. The facts and the causalities of the war, Jis well as ita 
sequelae, are familiar to Thucydides, and utilised by liira for his own 
purposes ; and it is not merely to the work of Herodotus thai he owes 
his knowledge of the facts," much less his rationale of the history. 



dir 

m 



> 1. 14. 3, 93. 7, 74. 2, 137. 3. 

• Co. Hdt. ly.-Vr. ApiK-ndix .X. 

' Taat Thucydides was aoquainted 
with the work of Hdt. is a moral 
Mrtainty, attested, apart from geucral 
probability, by four kinils of evidence, 
(i.) The fact that Thucydides gooa out of 
hia way to carry on the record of Greek 
hiatory, just from the (lolnt where Hdt. 
drops it. On« might almoat as well 
Mvne that Xenophon wrote ITellenics 
bEl I, 2 in i^iioranee of Thuc. 8 as 
that Thuc. wrote the history of the 
it\^wii x^P^ (1- ^7. 2) without reference 
to the work of Hdt. (ii.) The many 
pHoagw in which Thuc. conrcta aud 
aappknwnts Hdt., of which four ex- 
amples must here suffice : (a) 1. 126 
(Kylonisn i.yo\), cp. Hdt 5. 71 -, (6) 
fl. 54-69 ( Peisistratidai), cp. Hdt 5. 
&5-4&; (c) 4. 4 (origin of Zaiikle-Messene), 
op. Hdt. 7. 164 ; Id) 1. 20 (lliTariT^i 
'Unt.'^), ep. Hdt. 9. 53. (iii.) The refer- 
«*0M maale by Thuc. to his predecessors 
(L 81, 07>, ininlyin;; a com])let<! acquaiiit- 
ABOO with all exihting literatnro. (iv.) 
The conictons and ohWous contrast 
betwoen the work of Thucydides and 
that of Hdt., and I would venture to 
add th* obvious debt of Thuc. to Hdt, 
dirvct and indirect. 

The brief sniamaries of the war as a 
lole. 1. 23. 1 (the four liattles), 1. IS. 
2 (the whole war), conform to Hilt., 
aad so nencrally ; e.g. 1. 73. S (retreat 
of XerxM, ry irVovi roft rrparov). In 
a Certain nuuilter of c<ues Thuc. supplc- 
mtuU Hdt. (1) 1. 89. 3 (description of 
M left by the barbarians). 



There are not less than six references 
to the evacuation of Athen.i aud Attica 
by the Athenians, proving the impression 
made on tradition by that flitting (1. 18. 
2. Thuc. himself; 73. 4, 74. 2, Ath. 
orator at Sjiarta, who adds that the 
Athenians themselves destroyed their 
own property; 1. 144. 4, PerifclM; 6. 82. 
4, liuphonios. In 2. 16. 1 Thuc. for bis 
own purposes makes more of the removal 
of the country-folk into the city in 
431 ii.c. f). (2) The story ofthodeatmc- 
tion of I'lataia is rich in allusions and 
adds to Hdt., e.g. the 'dynasty' which 
ruled Tiiebea in 480 B.C. (8. 62. 3), the 
<rTorial of Paosanias, which guaranteed 
inviolability to Plataia (3. 68. 1), and 
so forth ; cp. Thuc 2. 71, 3. 62-68. (8) 
The Athenian sie^e of Scstos, in company 
with allies loniun and Helleapontine 
(1. 89. 2), (4) Spartan opposition to 
the rofortification of Athens in the 
winter 479-8 B.C. (1. 90 f.). (5) The 
whole presentation of Thcmistokles and 
his policy, including the letter, 1. 137. 
(6) The account of Pausanias, including 
his inscription on the tripod. (7) The 
shipa atSalamia, 1. 14. 3. The rationale 
of the Greek victory, as presented by 
Thuc, ia naturally different from that 
in Hdt. The following ]iassages are 
specialty .<4igtiifieant: (1)6. 83. 5 (HermO- 
kratcs); (2) 1. «&. 5 ( Korinthian) ; (3) 
1. 144. 4 (Perikles: yytiiij) re vXion 1) 
Ti'XB «ol Ti\>i]; jifi{e¥i f) tvydL/ut) ; (4)1, 

73. 4 (Athenian vievr of the importance 
of Salamis to the Peloponnese) ; (5) 1. 

74. 2 (Athenian view of Pelo[>onne8iaii 
policy). Thuc. in what he laya of 



80 



HERODOTUS 



APP. I 



AmoJig his inexhaustible merits is to be accountod the fact that Thucy- 

(lides furnishes a valuable commentary and appendix to the stories of 

Herodotus ; and the commentary is no whit the less valuable if it 

betray upon closer examination some subtle inconsistencies. Thucy- 

dides depreciates the importance of all Greek history and experience 

down to the arcbonship of Pythodoroa ; yet he must needs wnte the 

last chapter of the Persian war. Thucydides condemns the methods 

and style of his predecessore ; yet he feels compelled at every tnrn to 

emulate the historian of the Persian war. His attempt to depress 

the work of Herodotus is neither good art nor good nature, nor has 

' it ever for long been successful ; but the spirit which dictated it is 

intelligible as the product of a time when the intervention of Persia 

had been welcomed again and again in Hellenic aBTairs, when Athens, 

that had so lightly risen from the Persian conflagration, was locked in 

a death-struggle with her quondam yokfrfellow in Greece, to be saved 

in the end from totjil destniction only by the mutual jealousies of her 

Greek enemies. Undoubtedly the work of Thucydides represents far 

better than the work of Herodotus the atmosphere and interests of 

the latter half of the fifth centuj-y B.C., a period when the Greek 

states were chiefly concerned in their own development each at the 

other's expense, and the record of the common efTort, for the repulse 

of the foreign and common foe, must have seemed tike a faint echo 

from an archaic world. But the point of view natural to a Greek, 

and even to an Athenian, during the last quarter of the fifth century, 

I was not destined to be normal or abiding. Two tendencies co-openited 

to break it down, the exhaustion of the city-state, which was accom- 

, plished in the first half of the fourth century, and the expansion of 

/ Hellas, under Makedonian auspices, which quickly ensued. The 

Thucydidean standpoint itself became an anachronism, and statesmen 

like Epameinondas or Demosthenes, who looked for the enemy still 

within, or only just beyond, the border, play the part, however 

inevitably or heroically, of mere Intranaigeants or Reactionaries. 

With the revival of the pan-Hellenic ideal, best attested in the pages 

of IsokratoB, with the renewed cry for the conquest of Asia, the literary 

and traditional interest in the Persian wars of yore, never indeed quite 

defunct, likewise revived and rose. The fulgiuons work of Thucydides 

may ever be regarded as the last word of a period, which closed in 

doom and disaster over the State that had justly been described by 

Herodotus as the Saviour and by Thucydides as the School of Hellas. 

The bare fact that Athens never again could achieve elTectivc sovranty 

or purpose in war and politics led her citizens to cherish all the more 

fondly the memor}' of her former titles to fame — an occupiition for 

which the more zest and opportunity were fouml, as the Thucydidean 



I 
I 

1 

I 
I 

I 

I 



I 



TheniiBtokles scuniH rather to endorse 
the Kertklc*n formuU. {Nw\4: dimUtis, 
a remarkable article in the Times, August 



31, 1905, apjiIiiM the observRtion of 
HurmokmteH to the case of Russi&'g war 
with Japan.) 



AUTHORITIES OTHER THAN HERODOTUS 



formula, with a diiTorence, worked itself into practice, and the sovran city 
of Themistokles and Perikles blossomed, or sank, into a cosmopolitan 
university of sophists and rhetoricians. It is now all that process, in 
its manifestations and effects on the tradition of the Persian war, that 
has to be traced down the literature of the fourth and ensuing centuries. 
^ 5. Xknophon meets us on the threshokl of the fourth century, 
and hia works reflect more completely than those of any other writer 
events of the first half of that century, and contemporary chariges in 
politics and 6tho8 throughout the Greek world. Xenophon witnessed 
the rise of Sparta to an imperial position, and recorded the overthrow 
of her marine power by the Persian fleet under an Athenian admiral,' 
and the ruin of her land power - by that state whoso Medism had well- 
nigh cost Greece its liberties in 479 B.C. Xenophon lived through 
a time when the policy recommended of old to Mardonioa by the 
Theljans was applied successfully to the Greek states by Persian 
emissaries': a time when Persian intervention in Hellenic affairs was 
a familiar idea, and pan-Hellenic peace came down as an act of grace 
from ' the King.' * WTiat could the name of Salamis signify in the 
ears of a generation of Athenians that owed the rebuilding of the 
Long Walls and the refortification of the Peiraieus to Persian gold 
and Phoenician workmen 1 ' What reproach could attach to Medism 
at a time when Greek embassies competed for audience at Siisa,"' and 
the Thebans could claim precedence on the score of their loyalty 
to the King at the time of the great invasion ^ ? During the fourth 
eentur}' the history of the wars of liberation was almost a dead letter 
in the city-states of the penin.sula, .so far as practical politics were 
concerned ; and the historian of its earlier half has little occasion to 
aasiune, or to excite, the intereat of bis readers ifi the subject." And 
yet Xenophon himself hat! taken part in that premier J imlia.4s, which, 
albeit only a domestic matter from the Porsi.an point of view, had 
opened the eyes of all intclligpnt Greeks to the vulnerability of the 
Persian power ; and the hazardous yet brilliantly executed retreat of 
the Ten Thousand had been cheered at a critiail moment by the trophies 



» At Knidos, 394 b-c, Heil. 4. 3. 10-1'^. 
' At Leuktrn, 371 B.O., Hell. 6. 4. 

i-n. 

• Timokmt«s the Rhodiu, RtU. 8. !>. 
,{8»5i».o.). Cp. Hiit.9. 2. 
1^ ffsU. 5. 1. 30. PvMM or AnUllddas, 

LC. Op. «. 5. 1. 
I B.C., ffeU. 4. 8. 7-12. 

7. 1. 83 ff. (367 B.C.). But 
fhc charge or Mediani was used to ruin 
lanwniu, H<ll. 5. 2. 35. 
' 7. 1. 34 rix' y^fi ^^'u" «»' 't"' ijAvk 

nXnrotati (note iibvoi). 

* After Ijouktra tber« wu tn ap- 
proximation between Athens and Sparta ; 




apjieal was made to the meDioriea of the 
Persimi war : Ufll. 6. 5. 34 inratuiurif- 
fftovTii fxiv u; riv pipfjupoii Kom^ iwt- 
liaxfcoJiTo Kr\. Cp. 43 rl iroTt viXiv 
(\8oi TO 'EWiSi Kitiurot vr6 fiap^pup, 
rlfff if /idWov irurreivcurt ^ XantBai- 
Mwioit : Wvat i' tiv itSWor raparrirat 
ffiior Totrroir iroti)ff(M<rSe, u>* yt nal vi 
Tax^irrei in 6cp/ioiri''.\aiT iwarrct clXovro 
ixaxhiuvoi AToOart'iv ftaXKoy i) fCirm 
iTfia<t>4pfaBai rbr ^apfiapw t§ 'EXXdAi ; 
from the wpcech of Kleitelea the 
Korinthian at Alliens in 369 O-C. (note 
dvovrtt). 'I'lio talk about this time of 
'betithiii«' Thebes, nell. 6. 3. 20, 6. 
5. 36 (cp. Hdt. 7. 132), is a reiuiuiscenco 
of the Persian war. 



ss 



HERODOTUS 



APP. t 



of Marathon,* and the memory of Salamia and of Plataia.- Xenopbon's 
ideal hero seemed for a while not unlikely to realize that Asiatic 
empire which Aristagoraa of Miletos was reported to liave offered to 
KJeomenea of Sparta a century before.^ For Xenopbon's public Jason 
of Pherai dramatically points the moral of these experiences in the 
maxim that it was rasirr lo conquer the Pfrsitin empire than {t<> uni(<!) the 
Greek states.* Yet Xenophon, the writer, does not pursue that theme 
nor advocate that cause. The failure of Agesilaos may have convinced 
him that no Greek would succeed where his hero, through no fault of 
his own, had failed. The monarchical idea hovers before the mind of 
Xenophon,'' but he is still too much a RejHiblican, and a Greek, to 
anticipate the rise and expansion of the ^lakedonian power. His 
attitude towards Thebes is bjised not on its former crimes against 
Hellas, but on its present hostility to Sparta. Thus preoccupied by 
contemporary history and politics, Xenophon adds very little directly 
to our knowledge of the Persian war. So fai- a« the memories and old 
associations of that period could act upon contemporary Greece, he 
probal)ly indicates with sufficient truth the place they held in the 
public mind. Indirect!}' his works may be of some further service to 
the student of Herodotus." On two particulars — the institutions of 
the Spartan state," and the ethnography, geography, and government 
of the Asianic provinces" — Xeno]>hon must be reckoned a good 
authority, and they are both important elements in a right under- 
standing and critique of the Herodotean Loo'u. In both cases alike 
the presumption ia that, apart from obvious changes, what holds good 
for the time of Xenophon holds good for the time of Herodotus. 



» Anab. 3. 2. 11 IK This pasaage is 
MpecUlly important 08 giving tho carli*<st 
evidenco for the kiiduoI sac-rilice to tlie 
Agrotera of 500 kids as a composition 
for tlie vove made before Mar&thon. 
(Bnt ia§ 12 genuine t) 

'76. 13 iirttTo 8rt Sip(^ trrtpor 
6.ytipa% Ti)r araplfffLTiTOV arpariiLr ^\8t» 
i'wl TT)i' 'EXXdSo, Hal rlrrt i¥lKur oJ 
iltiirepoi Wfyiyonoi roin roiriiii' Trpoyifovs 
Kal itari v^* koX kotA WXottov. None 
of the biittle« ia actually localized by 
name. Strictly speaking tbeso refer- 
ences, if correctly reported, would date 
from the close of the fiith century B.C. 
(Oct, 23, 401 ; cp. II. G. Dakyna, Hlca. 
qfX. i. 151). 

* IltU. 4. 2. 3 diM TLfiHtv Kol (rfcjc 
iXwliur irKTrtptiTo icrX. of Agesiilaos, 
when rci^llMl from Asia in 394 b.c, Cf. 
Hdt. 5. 49 Ttaptxor Si t% 'Airiijt Tiaris 
ifX*"' tiwrriut (an auachronism for 
498 B.C,). 

* Hell. 6. 1. 12 i¥ iyii inr-tiKi>oi> inxii- 
aaadat tri ({'KarepyaaTirrepoy rj-fOvfLat tJyat 
1) TTif 'EXXiia. 



' Id the K6pov vaiitla, the 'AyyjalXiiot, 
the 'l^pwv. 

* Xenophon makes only two distinct 
additions to our knowledge: (1) the 
position enjoyed by Oemaratos and bis 
posterity in Asia, avrl r^i trt t^i 'EXXdfla 
(TvarftaTtla^ Ucli. 8. 1. 6, to wit, the 
government of Touthraoia, Halisama, 
Pergamou ; (2) the {lalace bnilt by 
Xerxes at Kelainai, Anab. 1. 2. 9 ifrauBa 
A^fiiift, Bre iis t^ 'iCXXdSot ifrrqBtlt rj 
nAxv a,wfxu>pei, X^yfrai oUoSoiiijacu raOrd 
re rd /SairJXeia nal ttjv KrXcupur diC/MiiroXif. 
The doubt implied in Xiyerai might 
cover the whole statement, or merely 
one or more of its elements (datv, 
jierson, circumstanL-es, nniount of build- 
ing). Tho fttdteinent, IleU. 4. 2. 8. that 
Agesilnosi returned from Asia rrir avr^r 
oSiv, Ijtnrtp jiaxriKti)^ dre iwl Tr)* 'KXXdJa 
irrpiTtutr is interesting, but adds 
nothing to our knowledge of the route. 

'Not merely in tho Aaketainovlu^ 
iroXiTcIa but in the 'EWrtruti passim, 

' Principally in the Atuibasis and 
Hellenita. 



AUTHORITIES OTHER THAN HERODOTUS 

Xenophon is a partisan of Sparta's; but his partisanship, while it 
leads him to be unjust to Thebes and its two great men, does not 
extend to the misrepresentation of Spartan institutions — of which he 
has a fuller knowledge than any which Herodotus could pretend to — 
nor does it even betray him into an oblivion of Spart^i's crimes.^ The 
movements of Xenophon in Asia are much clearer and better 
ascertained than the probl<'malic journeys of Herodotus on that 
continent ; and the conditions of the Persian pro\'inces as described 
for the times of Tissaphornea and I'harnabazos, of Tithraustes and 
Ariaios, are applicable, without much revision, to the days of 
^Vrtaphenies and Artabazos. Other indirect gain may accrue from the 
joxlaposition of the two authors.- Of direct reference to Ilerodolus 
little or nothing is to be found in Xenophon ;^ yet, wore it not hard to 
believe that ' the Attic bee,' who recoiled from the crabbed obscurity of 
Thucydides upon the simpler exponents of old Ionic prose, owed 
□othini;; to the greatest exemplar of the narrative style, pure and 
simple 1 Were it rash to surmise that Xenophon's belief in the 
Divine nemesis, the God in History, claims kinship with the piety of 
Herodotus, its most obvious literary precedent V Or could Xenophon, 
in tine, lie acquainted with the works of Ktesias, and know Tiothing of 
the work of Herodotus 1 

Kttcsias of Kniilos is named and cited by his contemporary 
Xenophon in such a way as to imply that he had written at least some 
account of his experiences in the East before the Athenian exile 
composed his own Anabasis.^ Other evidences confirm and amplify 



' e.g. the ao(|Ditta1 of Spborlrias, 
iltlL 5. 4. 24 (xai iro,\Xw» tioifv aCnj 
Si) djuii^ara tK XaKtialfioyi ij Sliai 
fjn&i^at). Cp. 6. 4. 1. 

• «.g. (1) the explanation of the 
ktniegic i]n{iortjiu)c«! uf Kitliairon (IldL 
i. 4. 36 ti ^i} Til vpoKaraX^^MTo rir 

iltfitlStar) and the iles<Ti|)tiou of the 
I^MM• ('^' £$ 14-18) oti hearing ou the 
campaigii of 479 b.c. ; (2) utterances and 
Uliutr^tioDs ou the qiieation of iiytnoola 
(a.^. IlelL 3. 4. '/7, reasons for the 
unification of oommand by land and sea; 
7. 1. 1 IT., the diHousnion in 369 B.C. at 
Atheiu, OD thv division of command 
between Athens iind Sparta, etc.). 

• Btil. 6. "J. 34 fLT) fi4fiif'ta8iu tV Siicriv 
nasd not he a reininlBcence of Hdt 8. 
IM The itnaTtvtl9irai in fML 6. 3. '20, 
0. &. S5 iniv Ih.< quit« iudo|>ondcnt of 
Ildl. 7. 132.' The reply of the Dolphit 
Kod, JlelL 6. 4. 30 6ti aCrn^ nt\i/ia-tt, is 
not verbally identii^al with the response 
Sa Hdt. 8, 86. The iraplBfiijT'" irrpaTii 
in Anai. 3. 2. 13 might recall Hdt 9. 
79. The ramels brought by Agesilaoa 



into Greece {Hell. 3. 4. 24) hare nothing 
to say to the camels of Xerxea. I do 
not pretend to have sorted the vocabulary 
of Xenophou, but a good many worcu 
are common to it and the Herodotean. 

* Cp. JIi'll. 6. 4. 1 ToXXd fiiv aCy 4* nr 
Ixoi Koi dXXa \iytiy xal 'EWifviKi xai fiap- 
fiapixd, u>i 0eol oilrr tw* aa tftoirrunr oOrt 
Tutr Avlicta TMoiorwy 6.iu\oCffi xrX. : 6. 
4. 23 xai 6 Siin H, m loust, roXXdaiif 
Xa'p" '"'^ l^* MiKpo^t >4*>iXoi'i woiutr, 
Toirs Si fuyiXovi fuiipoii: 7. 5. 13 wtpit- 
ylypavTO yip, uf loiKtr, iiri tou dtiov 
fUxpt i^ov flKTi iiiSoTo auTot^. The8« ara 
thoroughly Herntloteau Hentiments. 

» Annb. 1. 9.. 26 tl'. otv Toi>To«f ii C» 
(nc. 6 Kiipof] Ka.6op^ fiaaiXia xal tA d/i0' 
tudyov (TTi^t • KoX (i>9in o6k ^ivi(rx*TO, 
dXX' tlvtifv, rt* &i/ipa ipu, ttro ir' aiVif 
<cal Toifi Kar^ t6 trrfpyor xal TtTfuioKti 
Sia Tov Siipaxoi, (ijt ^ipri Knfjriaf i larpbt 
Kal liirBat ai'rrbt t6 rpuifui ^rici. . . driooi 
liiir riDir aiKfA ^ai\iaikTi6»Tj<TKa» Kri/irtar 
\iyti- rap' iictivii) yip ^y ktX. <at the 
battle of Kunaxa 401 U.C. ; Plutarch, 
Artax. 8, alone preserves for us the 
uame). 



24 



HERODOTUS 



APP. I 



this indication.^ The Asklepiad- of Knidos was undoubtedly 
jittached for years to the Persian court, and availed himself of his 
position to compose a work, or more than one work, on Oriental 
history, geography, and cognate matters.^ Ktesias appears in writing 
to have made express reference to the work of Herodotus hy name.* 
The Knidian author thus cornea into court as the first professed witness 
to the existence and popularity of the Halikarnassian's work. 
Altljough his witness does not reach us quite in proper form, yet it is 
of sufficient bulk and authenticity (as in the previous case of Simonides) 
to he here placed and considered in its chronological position. Our 
actual knowledge of the works of the physician of Knidos is confined 
to the late and scanty Epitome in the BibliotkecH of Photios, and to 
such fragments or specimens as have been disinterred from the works 
of Diodoros, Nikolas, Strabo, Plutarch, Athenaios and others, his 
successors. The whole truth about Ktesias we shall never know. 
What degree of animus excited him against Hcrodotns, and what its 
motive, who can say! Did the ambition of the Knidian to castigate 
the Halikaniassian proceed from the spirit of local rii'alry, or from 
the love of truth for truth's sake 1 That Ktesias enjoyed unique 
opportunities for ascertaining the official Persian new of the wars with 
the Greeks is indubitable:'' whether he made the best usts of his 
opportunities is another question. Doubtless he will have caught 
Herodotus tripping here and there amid the relics of the prao-Persian 
empires ; though even in this region we might elect, in not a few 
cases, to err with HerodotJis : for, though Ktesia-s might give us a 
native version, Herodotus might be no further from the truth. For 
what concerned events of his oivn age, whore there could, indeed, be 
no clash with Herodotus, Ktesias must, of course, count as a primarj' 
authority. On the geography and institutions of the Persian empire 
the complet« Ktesias would, no doubt, be a very vahiable supplement 
to Herodotus and the existing sources ; but as concerns Persian 



' Diodar. 2. 32. 4 Krrialat S^ o KfiSiot 
TM fiiti xp^*'0<i irTTJ/^c Kard riir Kvpov 
iTT/joTefo* M 'A/n-of^pfjif rAf iieXipiv, 
ye»6fici>ot ti alxM^^f'Tot, xal 8i4 ttjk 
loLTpiKTir iiriarrini]!' ivaKrjipOtit inri reu 
^atriX^on, tirTaKalSfxa Irq &infK(ae rt/iw- 
fuvot uw' auTov kt\. Cfi. 14. 46. fl, which 
shows that Ktesias csrried his Pereisu 
history down t^ the year 898 B.C. Cp. 
Strabo 656 ; Plutarch, Arttu. 1, 6, 13 ; 
Siiidas tub lu ; Photioa, BibliotA. 72 (eil. 
Bi^kkcr, 1824, p. 3&). 

^ G&len, p. 731 ; Kiilm. ji. 662, e(L 
Basil (l^aethr, p. 362). 

' Besides the Perxica, Photitv*, "3, (fires 
an epitome of a work on Indin (^Indica). 
Other works are quoted by ancient 
authoritie-s, y'n. a, PtriplQiu of Asia, a 



work On the tribvia of Asia., and treatises 
on Mountabw and on Rivers; cp. Ktesias, 
cd. Baelir, 18'^4, §§ 1, 6, ed. Gt)more, 
1 888, ]>n. 3 f. Baehr would add a work 
on meiiiciup, on the strength of the 
citation in Galen. 

* Photius, E}nt. 1 o-x'JA" i" iraffiv 
d»TtireI/«i'o 'Hpoihrri^ le-ropC/v, dXX4 koI 
'ptiitrrriv auriv iroKaXiw i» iroKKott, koI 

* Diml. I.e. ofroi oB» ^ffa> {k tuv 

fiaa'i\iKui' ti^Btpur . , avrrafifimn riiv 
laroplav tU TotW "EVXTjraj i^crtyKtlr. 
Photios I.e. ifnjcl ii airrhr rwf rXci&fwf 
d iirropti aiVirnji' yivd/itvov f) rap' aiTuv 
JIfp<rui»i, tvda tA hpa* fil) drtx'^P^^t '"'''" 
riKooi' Kararrimi, oCtu rifr irroplav 
cvyypd'f'at. 



AUTHORITIES OTHER THAN HERODOTUS 

history from Kyros to Xerxes,^ to have exchanged Herotlotus for 
Ktesiaa would have been a Diomedean bargain. Particularly in 
what concerns the great invasion of Greece (481-478 B.C.), to judge 
hy what remains of him,* Ktesias may, perhaps, furnish a name, a 
fact or two, in supplement, but can hardly over have been right against 
Herodotus on the main theme.^ On two points at least lie must be 
adjudged egregiously in the wrong. Ktesias has placed the battle of 
Plataia before the battle of Saiarais, an absolutely fatuous Hysteron 
ProUrcm : * Ktesias has recorded a successful assault, by the Persians, 
on Delphi, and the sack of the temple — a fable, disproved by the 
material evidences, and far less tolerable, as it stand.=!, than the equally 
fabulous alternative in Herodotus.'' If in all that Ktesias had 
Persian documents and evidence before him, then so much the worse 
for such evidence. Clearly now the chief value of Ktesias is the 
indirect evidence he affonls of the importance attached to the work of 
Herodotus, even early in the fourth century, and also, perhaps, of the 
revival of an interest in the memories of the Persian war, consequent 
on the growing conviction that the empire of Asia was within the 
reach of a united Greece. 

§ 6. With Ktesias and Xenophon there passed away the last of the 
historians who couid have claimed anything like primitive authority 
in relation to the stories of the Persian war. Xenophon, better em- 
ployed in recounting the experiences and events of his own life-time, 
bad no special reason for an excursus into the field preoccupied by 
Herodotus ; while Ktesias, tempted by his access to special sources, 
invaded that area only to jeopardize the character of a primary 
Authority, which he rightly possessed for his own period. To these 
great writers, who still in a sense retain the qualities of the authors 
of the fifth century, historians of a new type succeeded : men whose 



' Tbia {leriotl wu comnritied in Book^ 
7-13. Cx>. Fragg. w3. Mueller (Didot, 
pp. 6»-67) ; Gilmorc, pp. I20-15B. 

» Prnita j§ 19 27 corre.iiwnda to HJt. 
Bit*. 7-8. 

• (a) Hia figures are modfrat«, e»peci- 
•lljr OD the Greek liiie (cp. Appenuices 
II., III., et4*.), but ereii here h« ap- 
parently thoui^ht that the only defenders 
It Thermopyfai were the 300 Spartan.<i, 
■nd he Kive* Pausantas at Plataia 
only the forcM which ho abould hnvc 

fireti to Leonidaa at Thermopylni. 
itO.OOO ia given as the number of tb'- 
army of Mnnionioa. (b) Many names 
h« has in common with Hdt. In addi- 
tion, K^liaJni and Timaphcniea of 
Tn«hi«, He((i«]i of Ephesoa, Matakas 
Um «i»iiiicb, loiik like real persons, (c) 
KtadM adds two items to the accotint 
of SalAniiR, which look sound, (I) the 



Herakleion as marking the spot where 
Xerxes was construoling the mole, (2) 
the Krctan archeni ohtainod l>y the 
Athenianii. [Was Ari.iteides aent to 
conduct them? Cp. Hdt. 8. 79.) 

' I>is]iroved by AiHchyi. Pera. 805 ff., 
by Hdt., and by Ktesias himself, who 
siipplieA no adequate finale to the 
invasion. 

* Hilt. 8. 35-39. According to Ktcsioa, 
Mardoiiios, after the battle of Plataia, 
at which he hnd been woiindod, wa.s 
dcsmtchi'd by .Keries to sack the oraclo 
at Delphi, and ther« mat hiit end in a 
haiUtuMii. I'he king'n purpose was, 
however, subsequently carricu out by 
Matakas in a fretm ex{>edition despatchea 
from Aniu. It looks as thon^h in the 
Koyiil Records the iicrount of the in- 
vasion of Greece rnded with some such 
fable. 



26 



HERODOTUS 



APP. I 



works depended for their existence on the works of their literary 
predecessors, and very sliglitly, if at all, upon a still living tradition. 
The age was becoming a learned age. Learned men hegin to write, 
after a fashion, in a purely historical interest, and from historic;d 
sources. History, as distinguished from mere logography on the one 
hand, and from personal or contemporary experience on the other, is 
born. Under tlm cireiimsUtnces there were, perhaps, but two main 
courses open to such writers : thoy might epitomize, or they might 
reprotluce, with improvements dictated by the canons of the new 
generation, the works of their predecessors. In reganl to the story 
of the Persian war, the one alternative was adopted by Theopompos, 
the other was marked by the achievement of Ephoros. Unfortunately, 
our knowledge in the cases of the-so two great historical writers of the 
fourth century is even more completely dependent upon critical infoi- 
enoe and reconstiiiction, combined with the literary history in later 
authorities, than in the case of Kt«?sias, for no professed epitome of the ■ 
work of either historian has come down to us. With TuEOPOMPOS,' ■ 
indeed, we are the less concerned for the present, owing to the nature 
of his principal works,'- albeit his suliject will have brought him again 
and again into contact with the acts, the scenes, and some of the 
personages of Herodoteaii story. His appreciation of Hero<lotus as a 
writer may not have been high, but he at least paid him the compli- 
ment of beginning his own historiography by making an epitome of ■ 
the Herodotean work.-"' Judging by the qualities generally ascribed ■ 
to the Pkiiippika- of Theopompos, we might be tempted to regret that, 
in relation to the Persian wars, the Chian had not exchanged tasks 
with Ephoros of Kyme, and thus perhaps enriched the subject with a 
more critical deposit.* The weight and measure of Ephoros have 
nowadays, in the process of sifting our all too scanty materials, been 
pretty well ascertained.'' Ephoros was neither soldier, statesman, nor ■ 



' Not boru before 380 B.C., survived 
Alexander, and waa with Ptolemy in 
Eg3rpt near the end of the century ; cp. 
A. Schaefer, AbrUz cUr QuelleitkufuU i.^ 
58 f. 

' For the Fra^^ents bm Miiller, 
F.H.O. i. 278-333 (upwards of 300). 
His bistorii-al worka comprUed 'EXXi^vicd 
in twelve Books, carrying on Greek 
history from the end of the wiirk of 
Thucvdides to the battle of Kiiidos 
(Diodor. 13. 42. 5), *i\nnrik<i in fitiy- 
«ight Books, i.e. llakedonian Imtory 
(with digreaaions) from the ac^ceasion of 
Philip, or from the foundation of I'hilipiii 
onwards (Diodor. 16. 3. 8). For the 
parpoflea of this liistory Tlieo{iom[K)s 
wasa strictlyrnntctnporauootia Btithority. 

■' Suidiui »ub II. (ypa^ti/ iiriTotii)V Tijjy 
'Hpoidrov icropiu>» i» ptpXtott fi'. This 



is, however, the only authority, exctpt 
the four or five late citations, F.E.G. 
i. 278. Miillcr, however, accepts the 
Epitome an a genuine work ; cp. op. e. 
p. liviii. I have shown alwve that such 
a work would not have been rw a 
Th-eopcnnpi afiate et ingtnio aliena (Voss). 

* The historical cliaracter of Theo- 
pompos (ivitpar4<rraTas rim-ur tQv 
Iffoicpdroi'i ^laPufTuv) stands high with 
Dionys. HsI. Ep. ael Pomp. c. 6 (Usener, 
]). S3, Roberts 120 ff.). Polybios had 
found fault with him, 8. II f. He was 
censorious, cp. Plutarch, Lii«. 30, and 
anti-Atheuian, Atbeaaios 254 B, but a 
lover of tnilh, ib. 8fi A. Cp. further 
lip, A. Schaefer, op, c, and especially 
F. Blaas, Atl. BercdsauikeU ii. (1892) 
414 ff. 

» MiiUor, F.H.i^. i. Ivii. ff. 234-277 ; 



AUTHORITIES OTHER THAN HERODOTUS 

even traveller ; he was an historian by profession. He wrote, or 
rather he rewrote, history to please aii educated public, and his work 
exhibited the results of the application to tradition, whether oral or 
written, of the sophistry and stylism of Isokrates his master.* That 
his work had merits seems proved not merely by its immediate 
popularity but by its long-lived authority. Those merits can be to 
some extent discerned in the fragments disinterred from his successors,- 
in the works of his imitators,^ in the utterances of his admirers and 
critics.* The Hislorm of Ephoros covered a large space, and a long 
time, after a new fashion.'' His work was the first of its kind.*' It 
digasted a vast amount of previous literature, general and special in 
character;' it presented a homogeneous result, a continuous record, 
with some pretensions to historical science, and no slight expenditure 
of literary art. But the art was rhetorical, the science was sophistic, 
and neither the sophistry nor the rhetoric was the best of its kind. 
Politics, at least for a time, may profit by such devices ; natural 
science has a permanent court of appeal, wherein to purge itself from 
mere fancy and fallacy ; but history is neither practical, like politics, 
nor verifiable, like science ; and once evidence has been swept away 
and afterthought installed in the place of autopsy, the case is deeply 
prejudiced, and often but blank ignorance or alternative possibilities 
result from the belated critical inquiry. Ephoros probably did as 
much as any one man ever did to corrupt history in the name of 



Schaefer, op. c % 28, pp. 48 ff. ; Bluss, 
op. c. ii. ill (T. ; Busolt, Or. O. i." (1893) 
155 ff., Li." (1895) 622 tf. ; Wschsinuth, 
Einlnlung (\%95), pp. 498 11. 

* DioUor. 4. 1. ^ 'Zipopot fiJkv >dp i 
Kupaiot, 'laoKpdToit idr naBitrnt kt\. 
U« WTOt« the hi«tory of Greeks from the 
ratnm of tho FleniKleiiiai to the siege 
of P«rinth<>» (341 B.f. ) iu twenty -nine 
Books ; each Uuok hii<l uii iutrodttctiou, 
laA WW complete in itself; cp. DioU. 
£.1.4 rur f\p pi^Kan inimi* Tt-roLijKt 
TtfUxf i'aTiL-f4¥0t rdi rpdim : 16. 76. 
( fitfi^vt yiypa^ r/Mdxovra, xpoolfuov 
ifAfrji wpodflt. His SOD Domnphilos 
wldc'l the thirtieth Book, euibraciug 
tha historv of the Sai-red War ; cp. 
Diodor. 16. 14. 3,F.H.O. i. 274. Non- 
Heilenic Dcliona came in for notice 
fmni their r«latioD8 with the Greek*. 
Tb« Bubjert matter of the several Books 
baa been to some pxtent established, 
Imt not completely throughout. As he 
n).,,...,t..< 1 1.* period from the rotum of 
tt i'is to tlie patttjafte of the 

h' 'Y Alex«ndur in 334 D.t:. as 

jf««(i>, lie may hare intended to 
_ his hi«tor>- down to this date, or 
fioaibl; to the appointment of Alex- 




ander as Generalissimo for the Persian 
war. 

* F.H.O. i. 284 a gives 167 frag- 
menUi from the Uinturies ; of these Noe. 
2, 3, 18, 29, 47, 63, 54, 64, 67, 70, 
107, 117, show Ephoros to advantage. 

' Kunecialljr Diodoros and Trogns 
Ponipeins. 

'' i'olybias was one of his cbief 
admirers ; cp. 12. 28. 10 6 yi.p 'G^opof 
■wap BXrjr r^f irpaypartiar fiavinicKO^ &¥ 
Kol (card T-j)f ^p^au' tcai Kari, rbr X'^P'^f^ 
kolI card r^r irlfoiar Tuiy XriftfiiTuti, 
S(ir6ra.Tl>t im¥ iy rail irapiKfidafji col 
rati d^' airrov yrufuiXirfiai.t icrX. In 
12. 2S PolybjcjH defends liini from the 
criticism of Timaioii ; but he also (iomm 
an nnfaroiirablc judgement on his ao- 
ooanta of lAnd.biittle«, 12. 25 g rum /lin 
Kard ffdXaTTB* fpyuy iiri woainr i'rdKniw 
irx^K^piu /joi Sonet Tiif Si irord yfjr 
iyuifiMi* Arfipof dvai rrXius. Strabo 
niaki's muL-h of him ; cp. 422 (Eph. Fr. 
70) and passim. 

' Cp. note 1 mpra. 

* Polyb. 5. 33. 2 'E^pov, rd»> rpCrrw koI 
fiifoy firifit^\TffUyor ri Ka8o\ov ypdiptiy. 

' Wiclisniiith, I.e., to whom 1 am 
much indebted iu what follows. 



S8 



HERODOTUS 



APPJ 



history. He was superior to a merely chronological ordering of 
e\'eDts, but he was incapable of grasping the deeper causes of historical 
phenomena. He formulated a difference between myth and truth, 
but he did not scruple to adorn his narrative with fictitious incidents 
and speeches. He found a large portion of his field preoccupied by 
greater men than himself ; he borrowed their work freely and made 
it his own by omissions, combinations, additions, and various stylistic 
devices. Some of his maxims were good,' but his methods were not. 
equal to his maxims. The methods of Ephoros, and the material 
brought together by Ephoros, dominated thenceforward, for the 
period covered by hts labours, the history of Greece aa reproduced in 
the later writers open still to our inspection. The account given by 
Ephoros of the great Persian war was apparently little more than the 
Herodotean story (perhaps from the Epihiim of Theopompos), rendered 
explicit, coherent, rational, and complete, by infi'.rence, by combina- 
tions, by afterthought, by sheer invention, by all the resources of the 
Isokratean school, perhaps fiirther enlarged or limited by the idio- 
syncrasy which Ephoros himself brought to his task." But the ' little 
more ' was here, too, ' worlds away.' As a result the Ephorean version 
of the stoiy, in whole or piirt, constituted almost an alternative to the 
Herodotean. Yet two considerations will always operate to obtain for 
the alternative a hearing : first, the [xissibility that Ephoros had 
recourse to other sources, no longer open to us ; ^ and secondly, the 
certainty that in reconstructing the tradition of the Persian wars, 
iurcoi-ding to his lights, he was only doing in the fourth century before 
Christ what w© ourselves are doing, according to ours, in the twentieth 
century after Christ. But, as the Ephorejin version is known to us 
chiefly from its reproduction by the writers of the Roman period, 
we may conveniently postpone the further consideration of ita 
elements, and give precedence here to the extant writers of the 
fourth century, whose works in some cases exhibit, so to speak, the 
moulds to which the Ephorean version owed its form, and in others 
may be found to suggest that the Ephorean version was hardly 
published before it established its authority,* an authority destiued to 
be of secular duration.-' Those w^riters naturally fall into two groups, 
the Orators and the Phil08ophei-«, for Poets, with one notable exception, 



' e.g. Fr. 2, 8 (the latter=Polyb. 
12. 27. 7 tl SivaTin ijF oiVoi^i (sc. reruni 
Bcriptores) ira/xiKac raai toii Tpdy/iaai, 
rairrTjr St] ii^^ipta/ itoKii ruf ifj.'KeipiCtv. 

^ Sigui orpartia&nttliip, Attici>tiii, anti- 
Lakouiam are pot down hy 'WacliRniiith 
less to Eplioroa iiim.wjf " tlinn to his 
souroca ; but he recugnizua a 'local 
[MtriotLtm ' in the [irominence given to 
AiolianH and Kyirie. 

' The only artiinl sources recognized 
by Bnwlt li.' eCl are Aischyloc (the 



Psrsai) and Ktesias. 'Wlir not, for 
examjile, Siniouides too ? Where did 
Diodoros get !iia quota tiou 11. 11. 6 ? 

* Aristotle, in the Politicji, and the 
author of the 'Afhtvaiur iroXirelo, SMm 
to Imvc used EphoroB ; see § 10 below. 

' Plutarch, on hia own account, iiuotea 
Eplioras freely, and siitiricnlly notices 
(ifor. f>14) that to have read "two or 
thnKi Bonks" of his was all the eicnse 
Bomc borw had for their gamdity. 



are absent, or aileut, in this Choir. The exception is practically but of 
recent creation. A poom, alas ! not quite complete, on The Persians, 
the work of Timotheos of Miletos, has arisen, like so much of the lost 
literature of antiquity, from a grave in Egypt.' The poem was 
largely concerned with a description of the battle of Salamis,* but 
unfortunately the description is ideal, typical,^ obscure,^ iinhistorical,'^ 
axiding nothing to our knowledge of the battle, however much it may 
enrich our concept of Greek letters, however well it may inaugurate 
the spirit of the age. The exact occasion of the poem remains un- 
certain. The glorification of Salamia can hardly be conceived except 
as a compliment to Athens, and the appeal to the memory of the great 
deliverance seems to herald the cry for the invasion of Asia by an 
onited Greece, which was the idea! jrolicy of pan-Hellenism in the 
fourth century B.c. If in a poem on Siilamis the poet says a good 
word for Sparta too, that is in keeping with his purpose, of holding 
up as an example to the present the great deeds in the war of 
liberation. The contrast might suggest that the way of salvation for 
the Greek states, amid their mutual destruction, lay in a common 
undertaking directed agjiinat the Barbarian.* 

§ 7. Among the Orators Isokratk.s fairly claims the first place, 
not mainly on chronological grounds,' nor even as the founder of a 
school, and as master of Ephoros, but because he advocated that pan- 
Hellenic policy which could not but revive, in its own interest, the 
Uaditions of the Persian war, and because his extant remains are 
especially rich in references to those traditions. Tiiere are three clear 
notes in the i>an-Hellunic chord as struck by Isokrates : three leading 
ideas merge in one policy, (a) He everywhere aasumes and proclaims 
the absolute dualism of Europe and Asia," the inveterate hostility of 



' For the previously kuown Fraj;iueDta 
of Timotlieoa cp. licrgk, J'.L.O. iii.* 
SI9-S26, iooluding three from the llJpa-ai. 
For the retovered portion, the «lition 
\tj U. von Wilamowilz ■ Moilcndorff, 

* Thr uarne Salaniis does tint actually 
occnr, but the rererenccs to tbe orossing 
of ihn Helleepont justify the ideutjfica- 
tioD. 

• yieJU die beatimmie Seeachlatht wird 
fnchiUUH, notuUm die lyjritehe, vou 

|ir.-M. op. e. 5S. 

• Keiii ThemiMloiles, lain Arisleidet, 
utitr Salamit itceh Pin/ttaleia j/tnannt, 
thtrhaupt kein Eigennaine, ib. 61, 

* The de»cription takes no Account 
>if the differrvnces in Bhim, in tactics, 
mravnxi cti-., Wtwecn the iKwt's own 
liBS and l)io day of Salanns, ib. 69. 
|fl«>arTowB make their arqiearuDCC : Hdt. 
neonls their um by ihv rGrsians a^'siust 
Um Akropolis, bnt not by the Grc«ks 

' at th« king'c fleet, 8. b'l. 



" Then.' ure Bomo eU'irients in tlio poem 
not obviously va keeping with such a 
purpoie,and von Wilamowitz-Mollendorff 
suggeata that Timotheos first i>rodiice<l 
it at a pan-Ionic fathering at Mykalc, 
c. 398-9ti B.C., with a distinctly ]H>Iitital 
pur{>ose, in favour of .Siuirta und her 
oligarchir riartisans in Miiotos and Ionia. 
He candidly admits tiie Q<ldity of a 
poem conceived iu Auch a tone, making 
the victory of Salaniis ita theme (m id 
■icahrlich triLvim, das-i das Dokumenl 
diearr Stimmunij van dem Siege katuUU, 
an den AUun dfii loniern und den Pelo- 
jwnnesiem die Frcihcit erkSmp/t liatU, 
op. c 64) ; but he does not explain it 

' Hi« life extended from 436 to 838 
"'", !<ii[ "for ns be lives and thinks 
and feel« alunost exclusively in the jwn 
3S0-38 II.C.," R. C. Jebb, AUic Oralon, 
ii. 2. 

" The antitliesia between Euroi* and 
Asia is a constant formula, cp. 4. 90, 
10. 51, 12. 47, etc. Cp. Hdt. 1. 4. 



30 



HERODOTUS 



AS9.~ 



Hellene and Barbarian,* the meaaurelesa inferiority of Persia to Greece.^ 
(i) He constantly preaches union to the Greek states, with a view to 
carrying war into Asia,^ enriching themselves at the expense of the 
Barbarian,^ puttitip; an end to the power of Persia.'' (r.) He indicates 
Athens as the natural and proper leader in such an undertaking, as 
the state with the strongest eliiini to the Hegemony/' but failing 
Athens, he appeals to SjMirta;^ failing the republics, he will go to king 
or to tyrant" with the same demand, to head the holy war of revenge 
and advantage.*^ With this programme t-o push, Isokrates naturally 
makes mention of the former wars of glorious memoiy. But these 
references leave a good dejtl to be desired in the historical interest. 
They are generally in vague terms and anything but precise.'*' Though 
Iaokrat«8 advocates action against Asia, his victorious {irecedenta are 
found in Europe. Marathon," Artemision,^^ Thermopylai,'^ Salamis,'* 



' Helleii"*3 mil Barbariana are <f>{vii 
re>\ifuoi, 12. ItiS ; c]i. 4. 158 ifiwni 
woXt/UKuJt wp6t auTotit fx^f'*"- 5. 42 rlf 
■yap i.v iirepftoXii y^fOiTO r^t txQfxxt t^i 
irpAt 'S.ipi-yi* Toit 'EXXiTtri yfyo/Ur^ ; re- 
calls Hdt. 7. n. 

^ Greuka are to Barbariana aa meu to 
aniniala, 19. 23. Evagoras worked a 
miniolo in tliat ix pappdpwv (U» 'EWijrat 
irotri<rer, 6. 66. Barbariaas should be 
mere Helots and Pcrioikoi fur Uelloncs, 
4. 131. Cp. Ep. 3. r>. 

' 5. 9 tit riir ' Kaiar rbr Tb\(fior 
iiatrfKtlv : cp. Epp. 3. 2, 9. 11. 

• 4. 133 T^v 'Aalan KapwoCff$M. ib. 
135 Komy T^j» 'Aaiav vopOtiy. 5. 130 
Toit Si fiapfiapovf aipt\i<r$ai tt)* {'rdp- 
Xovaav eiSai/ioylaii, 5. 132 aiaxp^" 
repiopar rrjK 'Airiap ifttaror vpiTTOvaar 
TTJf Ei'/Kiinyj. 

• 5. 120 /udXiirro fUv . . B\r)r r))i« 
fiaffiXtloif dvcXriv, e^ Si nil, X'^P"'" Sri 
irXri(mfi» iipoplaaafiai nal iioKa^tv, uii 
"Kiyayrai rtvei, diri KiXiiciai ticxjn 2rfvunri)t 
(i.e. tbe iwrtioa occujiieil by Greek 
colonies). 

• Athens is the dirrp r^i 'EXXaSot, 15. 
299, 16. 27. Siiarta deserved well of 
Greece in the Porsisn war, but her 
deserts were not to be compared to tliosc 
of Ather»», 4. 73 ; cp. If 62, 189. 
While Athena had the Hi'gemouy the 
Persian's army was not allowed to cross 
tbe Halys, nor his ships to come west 
of Phaselis, 7. 80, 12. 59 ; cp. 5. 69, 
8. 30. 

' Or. 6. 

• Cp. Wie Philippoa {Or. 5), tXic A rchi- 
damos (Or. 6). JA.son of Pherai had 
promised, 5. 119 ; Diunysioa, 'the tyrant,' 
was willing, 6. 8'J. 



• 5. I'i."" vwip (Jir naKuii ivAOoiuv 
i.lii-i>eaOiu, 4. 133 i^v dStdt roWi. 

'" Besides parsing references there are 
two great piussages deiiling at length 
with tlu! Peiniau war: 4. {Pancgjfr.)^ft- 
99 ; 12. {Pnnnth.) 49-52 <92, 187). 

" Cp. mv Hdl. JK-ri. ii. 193 ff. 
(Aj.p. X. S 21). 

" 4. 90 oi S' iitUrtpm, rariptt ir' 
' KpTcfilciOv, i^^iKmrra TpiiiptLi xXripuiaarrt 
rpAt drav t6 Tuir xoXf/iiwi" caiTiicii*' 
ol S' Tjfi/Tfpoi Tdi niv TpiirXoi'j iflKTiacwiM 
fweiSi) B' ijnoiicaf rfii irapoSov to(i iroXe- 
fjUoKt KpaTovfTas, oixiSt KaTawXt^arrn 
kt\. TUe disap])earance of all other 
ships, and the rMuction of the Athenian 
veHsela to sixty, are not Herodotean. 

'" 4. 90 AaKfSatpumm liiv tis Otpfio-rvXat 
irpit tA refjc, x'WoM aiTiii' ^TiX^forrtt, 
Kal Tu>i' avnixdx(^P 6\lyoi't rapaXa^iiirrft, 
lis ii> roll artroU KuXi'COfrit ai>roi>i Ttpat- 
ripu irpO€\Stii' . . ol fiiv SittpOdprfca.* nal 
Toit i)/i<xa.» viKuvTtt TOit (Tutfiafftir dreiTOi', 
ov yap iii roirri yt Oi/xit eiirtir, lir vm)- 
Bijaaf ouSeit yip oi'tiOk tftiyciy iiiloratr, 

5, 14S Kai yi^p (ntlfur /laXXof iyarTen 
t}}v ^rra* riji/ ir B(pnoirO\ait fj rdi dXXai 
vixat. Cp. 6. 93 {not named), 100 
(1000 Lukedaimonians against 700,000 
l)arbarians ; their end bfyond all praise). 
12. 187 {irepl Tjjt avrnpcpat Tfjt 'ZrapTtd- 
Toii IP QepiioxvXaK yenofiirTit — a disaster 
niore glorious than a victory over other 
Hellenes). Isokrates lends no support 
to the theory of a 'dcvotio' ; also, he 
gives no details (except numbers). "" 

" Salnniis is only once named, 6. 14T 
The battle is relerred to. 12. 49, 50," 
very rlearlv, and taken for granted ia 

6. 93-96. 



§7 



AUTHORITIES OTHER THAN HERODOTUS 



31 



Plataia,' are the battles he cites ; Mykale, and the subsequent \'ictorie8 
on Asiatic soil, or in Asiatic waters, he ignores. Though he refers in 
exaggerated yet vague terms to the Peace, elsewhere known as the 
Peace of Kallias,' he never mentions Kimon by name ; tlie history of 
the war ends for him practically with the work of Herodotus. The 
Oi-ator's knowletlge is probably in part derived from the work of 
Herodotus,' but he is not confined or tied down thereto. He employed 
other sources, however, to very little puriK)8e, for he adds very little 
to our knowledge. His terminology is interesting, as compared, for 
example, with that of Thucydides : the war with him is always the 
Persian war,* the Medes retire into the background.'' He confirms, if 
borrowing direct or indirect is confirmation, many material items in 
the Herodotean recoi'd : the Hellespontine bridg'.-," the Athos canal,^ 
the Isthmian wall,** the chief events. His estimate of numbers is 
probably based on Herodotus ;" but wliole episodes are missing, and 
there is a plentiful lack of details. '° The alteration of emphasis, the 
new stress laid on certain points, are especially significant. The 
evacuation of city and hind by the Athenians — an event which 



'12. 9*2 « ToJrw wtpl IlXoTaiVai 
Iwfoiar, drorot &r tfr/r, ei ravr ri'/n)Kwt 
(»c. rtpl rijz uifiiiTijTtn «oi x^'^^'^T''" 
rqf Aoxfjoi/iovluv) igtlvur ni) firriadtlnv 
Wf if rg X^f^ rrparoirttevoanti'Oi iu0' 
Tj^awr nii rir IWur ffVfiftAxuy <cai rapa- 
ra^dfurot rdtt ro\etti<ut arai Orcdfurot rvi; 
9<WT TOij ir' iKtlpwr tipvfjJvoii ov fUtfOV 
IjXn^tponra.iui' (sic) rii» 'EXXticuf toiVj lud' 
iutuH' irrat aWd xoi roi>t ivayKaoBtvrat 
1f*r4f0ai Iter' iKtluuv, cai rauT ixpii^a.tijtv 
W3sa.TaUa.i Xa/Soi'Tft iibrovi Boturwi' iriv- 
syimfurrii «tV There is a reference in 
the Platniknt (U) 67-8 (where Plataiii is 
trekted ma-inl? as ui Athenian victory], 
bnt none in the Arehidamot. 

* 4. 118. 7. 80, 12. 59, Phuelia and 
tha Halya as the western termini of the 
Idng's arms. 

* Cp. 4. 94, Xerxes hopes to capture 
Paloponneae by help of Athenian uavy ; 
t. 52, 91. K 42, Atheniaus oa the 
cavioor* of HeDas, eto. 

* « l\epait6t Ti\tixoi, 6. 42, 8. 88, 12. 
«». 14. 67, 16. 233. ow.i rpit S/pfj?!-, 
14. 71. 1«1 : cp. 4. 71, 6. 42. 4. 68 
tn^ur^'rraTm iUr oi'f rir woXiiiur 6 
Utpvtxit ytyom (O Thucydidee !). ri 
lUfgiU, 7. 76, 8. 37, 90. 

* The conquest of the Medcs by Kyroa 
aad the Persians ia mentioned 9, 37. 
This faut Iitokmte* might liave bad of 
Bdt., bat the prvcisinu of laiigua^ ia 
perfaapa dne to writers like Xonophou 
and Kteaiaa, and to the constnnt prnrtice 
of diplosucj, ' Mcdisni ' is mentioned 



as a CApital oHence, 4. 157 ; even now- 
adays a curse is pronounced on any 
citizen who proposes a mission to the 
'Persians.' (Anstophanes and Thucy- 
dides are less nice in the use of the 
terms.) 

• 4. 89 rir ftip 'E\Xij<nro»Toi' {"evfat. 

^ 4. 89 rbn S' 'A6u iiopi(at (an ex- 
aggeration for tV 8' 'Ar7T)»). 

» 4. 93. 

' On the Greek side he diminishes 
Hdt.'s figures: the Athenians sent only 
sixty ships to Artemision, the Spartans 
only ten to SslnuiiH (12. 49), but there 
the Athenians outnumbered all the other 
Greek contingents put together. The 
1000 Lakedaimonians for Thermopylai 
are already in Hdt. implieitc, ep. note 
7. 202. On the Persian side the figurea 
arc more obviously Herodotean ; 4. 117 
gives the fleet as 1200, 12. 49 gives it 
as 1300, botli tignres obviously related 
to Hdt. (and Ai&chylos). The live 
milHous in 12. 49 i-ome from Hdt. 7. 
186. The figure 700,000 (6. 100, 12. 49) 
for the fiix^foi- (Hdt.'s w«rd) may have 
been gut by dropping the words cat 
<«orA» in Hdt. 7. 60, 184. 

"> Tlie attack oa Delphi, the Uttle 
of Mykale, the siege of Sestos nowhere 
occur, and no battle is described in any 
detail. Names are rare. Eurybisdea i» 
mentioned (to his discredit) 12. 49, bnt 
not Leouidos, Pausanias, Lcotychidas, 
much less Alexander, Mardanioa, etc 



32 



HERODOTUS 



APT. 



Thucydidea trcatod so cavalierly, and Hero<lotu8 v/as content to record 
in simple terms— comes up for ample rhetorical emblmKonment. ' The 
Aristeia are claimed for Athens from first to last, by a fiction at 
Salamis, an absurdity at Plataia.* Theniistokles is the hero of 
the war : in this respect the L'ethinff hy Thucydides, the diminished 
horror of Medism, and the re-adjwstment of the perspective, duo to 
mere lapse of time, have brought justice to the memorj' of the 
'Liberator of Hellas.' >^ There, are, perhaps, but three concrete items 
which Isokrates supplies to the actual story of the war, and those, 
moreover, not above suspicion or dispute: (1) the curse on Medizers;' 
(2) the indefensibility of Athens in 480 B.C. j** (3) the vow of the 
lonians not to rebuild the holy places destroyed by the Bnr1}arian, as 
an eternal witness against his impiety.*' The first point hardly touches 
the history of the war itself, though it attests the impression left on 
the minds of the Athenians, especially perhaps by the connexion 
between Medism and a tyrannic restoration. The third point is of 
dubious authenticity, and in its Isokratean form tends by anticipation 
to discredit the similar vow when recorded of the Hellenes J Tlie 
second ]>oint could hardly have been anything more with Isokratca 
than with ourselves, namely, a legitimate and correct inference from 
tlie history of Athens previous to the war, and during the war itself. 
In all this, then, there is practically nothing new or valuable, for the 
historian of the war, to be got from the pages of Isokrates. Hia 
value »nd interest for us lie elsewhere. Isokrates displays the 
patriotic revival of interest in the Persian wars during the first half 
of the fourth century, ere yet the rise of Makedon had taken all heart 
out of the cry for a war by Athens and Sparta against the Asiatic 
barbarianB." Isokrates attests the patriotic revolt against the shameful 



' intifi tijt Tdv iWuv (\evd€plat, 5. 

1<7 ; 6. «, 83 ; 8. 43 i 12. BO ; ]6. 233. 

» i.n, 7. 75, 8. 76, 12. 189 e» <? 

Sffirfytcar AaKtScunovioiv iv dTcurt roti 
xu>jt>vmt if 'Ktlvoi TuiD dXXctir. 

• 15. 307 Tit i' ^y (liT iKiiPor (so. 
Miltiades) toui 'EXXi/fat iXevOtpibaat «tai 
Toitt irpoydfoi/t irl ■rifi' Tfyt)to*liw koI tijv 

t)iv ipvauf Thy ToO littpaiiiit KaTt6uiy xal 
t4 Tttxot aKivTuy AaKfiaiixoyl^y rg wAXtt 
irtpt^aXuty ; 12. fil 8. tAc ofu)\oyovfi4yii)t 
Uratrw alTiOP ctfai S^ofra xai toS riiy 
iravfiaxl-ay ytyiaOai Kara rp&iroy xai rCiv 
iWiM ivdrruy rCiy iy iKtirtf rip Xfi^'"t> 
Ka,TopduOepTu)y, 16. 233 6. ijycfiLU' iy 
T<f noX^fU)! tQ Jlc/xrcKi^ yty6fifyos. In 4. 
164 hia rocejition by the Pei-sians is re- 
foiTwl to, without rcijrobntion. Aristoidua 
is only oni:« iianicil, 8. 76, and then in 
A breath with Thuiiiistokles and Miltiades 
as far butter mou th&u the latur Uem- 
agoguoa. 



* i. I'll iv Si Tail <ri)X\i7o«i fri Kal 
vOy dpdr irotoOrrat, rpiv dXXo n XPV- 
fiaTl{ny, et rii irmripvKficrcu nipaait twv 
ToXiruw. 

' 12. 60 lA Si Trariptt ijiMy &v6/rraT0L 
yfytytifUyoi xal TTjf rSXty (WrXotxArti 
Sta. t6 ftii Tcrcix^^"^ *•"■' infufoy ri* 
Xp6yoy icr\. 

» 4. 166 f. tI i' oU ix^fiiy oArofl ^irrJ 
Tiir Top' iifuy, ol Kal ri, rC/y Stum lot) 
Kai Toin ytut <Tv\ai> iv Tip -wpoTipif roKifu^i 
Kal «.'ara«rdifi» ^t6X^ii)0'cu' ; Sii Kal toiis 
'lurvas Aiioy ^iratyfly, Sn tuiv inirpric9i»Twv 
itpuy itntpiaayr' tt Ttyti Kiyijfftiaf ^ rd\iy 
fh Tapxaia KaToaTT/aai ^v\ii8tttr, ovK 
iropouyTtt rbdtv ixia Ktv&atMTUi , 6.W' Iy' 
irrifirrfiia. toTj iviytyyoftivois f T^j twf 
fiappipmy aacpdai. Was tlnn it«ni first 
produced by one of tlii' Ionian writtTS » 

' C]). p. -10, and i>. 100 note 2 in/ra. 

" Inokratos hiul u-een antioipated in 
hiu Pro]Kiganda by Gorgiks ; cp. Fr. 1 
Orat. AU. (BaiUrSauppo) ii. 129 i « 
'OXviatiKbt Xiryoi inrip rou futylcTou ah-tfi 




I of Autalkidas, and against the position assigned to the Gieat King 
in purely Hellenic afl'airs.' Isokrates implies a new public, sick of the 
miserable memories of the Peloponriesian war, and ripe for a return lo 
the happier momenus of llerodotean story. Isokrates prepiires the 
retractation of that story by bis own disciples, whether in an historical 
or a political interest. But from his own point of view the appeal 
of Isokrat«s was not destined to be a success. It suffered from an 
inherent defect : it was superseded by an external accident. The 
pan-Hellenism of Isokrates lacked a pnictical finish, a jjolitical goal. 
The war to which ho evoked the Uellenes was to be a war of revenge, 
of 8(>oliation, but without further ami higher aims.'^ It could not be 
otherwise, for his cnisade was preached to the city-rcpubHca of Greece 
in the first instance, and nothing but a monarchy coidd replace the 
Persian throne, or govern the Persian empire." 

Isokrates overlooked the difference between a defensive war and a 
war which should carry the Greeks into Asia : victory in the one case 
was possible to a republic or a league of republics, success in the 
other only possible to the military genius of a single leader. Isokrates 
could at most have looked forward to a fresh Peace with Persia upon 
the old terms, real or supposed. The inner purpose of the summons 
of Isokrates w;»s, to do him justice, not war with the king, but peace 
among the Greeks. The war with Persia was to be again, as it had 
been of old, a means to a pan- Hellenic union, which could have been 
oolr, as of old, evanescent. Even so mtich was not realised. The 
ideal of Isokrates failed, as all idefds fail which aim at revivals, 
restorations, of the past : history will not repeat itself. He omitted 
to reckon with the luiforesecn, that is, the accidental, which was also 
the obvious. The peace of Greece resulted from the Makedoriian 
conquest, which indeed merely suppressed or siuotherod rivalry and 
bloodshed between cities and between factions, and not from pan- 
Hellenic movements or ideals. But Greece, reduced to the i>eace of 
impotence, set \Likedon free to realize, and more than rcdize, the 
ambitions of Isokrates ; and the process of events proved, not for the 
first nor for the last time, that the world-history pro^ndes a better 
•olulion of the world problem than is dreamt of in the philosophy of 
politieal doctriniiirea. 



(Oofviac) /toXit€i''<»i7- <rraai<i(m><Tap -jfi/j 
rl/r E.VXil^ hpuir inofolat ivftfiovXat 
ovroif iyirrro rpiwur t'lrl toui ^apfidftott 

mil r4f d\XijXui> iriXtit, aWk T»|r 

BtrtdwmktU L^ {Uii7) &SC <Jatr« the 
HMBch OL »7, 882 i).c. (OncVcu and 
K»il had pluied it iu tlie lifth century. ) 
' laokntM docsi not name AnLilkiao)!, 
tut he rmjueDtly rtlvn to the Pe&ce ul 
387 I1.C. M. 3 Jisf.Tacc, A. 115 ir„ 175 ff. : 
i'i. IW TOta('Trii> fWOi^ayTO rijv e/pijnj*, 

VOL. H 



JJt ouStlt 4* (rtSe^etcv oOt' alax^<^ rdrrort 
yrvofUvrir kt\. When it servea hiii turn 
h<' is less opi)robriou% 8. Iti, 68. 

- C|i. notes 3, 4, t), p. 30 sufrta. 

' I.tokratcs knew that: the Grcvka wer« 
intolerant of monarchy: 5. 107 ot'jc 
(iBi9tfivov% VKondvtm tAi novt^pxla.t : lio 
kuewthedangcrs that attended nionarcby 
iu Greece, ib. 108. But he overlooked, 
apparently, tbo connexion between 
riionnrcby anil big warfare, and that 
with Ja.sou of Pherai, the Dionjsioi, 
Pliiliji under his eye«. 



34 



HERODOTUS 



APF. I 



§ 8. If Isokrates focusses tho pan-Hellenic ideal, which served, for 
half a century, aa a protest against the domestic and internecine 
warfare of the Greek city-states, Demosthenes, of the renmining 
orators, best serves to document the more practical question, which 
was coming to a head of flame about the middle of the fourth century.' 
Demosthenes was no disciple of Isitkratea-; in almost every respect 
the younger jwlitician contrasts with the elder doctrinaire. Tnie, 
Demosthenes too would fain have seen Athens at the head of a united 
Hellas, but with a view not to an offensive war against Persia, but to 
a defensive war against Makedon. The objective of Demosthenes was 
nesir, was practical, and was brought to the test. His policy failed, 
not from any proper inconsistency, but because the penetration of 
Hellas by Makedon in the fourth century was an intinitely more 
feasible movement than the invasion of Hellas by the Persians had 
been at any time. Makedon was at hand ; the Makedonian soldierv 
was armed and trained in the best traditions of Greece itself, raised 
to a higher jwwer. Makedonian policy had tiie simplicity and self- 
consistency which only a monarchical state can achieve ; and the 
Makedonian monarchy represented still tho feudal kingdom of the 
heroic age, reinforced by tho statecraft of six centiu-ies. It was 
hardly oven an accident that Greece in its decadence was confronted 
in succession by two Makedonian leaders of extraordinary ability. 
Athenian orators might declaim against Pliih'p and Alexander as 
" Barbarians " ; tho Dorians of the Katkodos had been mde warriors, 
led by utdettered chieftains, but the court of Pella had long enjoyed 
relations with the centres of Hellenic culture, and been the resort of 
Hellenic poets and professors : it was not so much a civilization as 
merely the form of govornment which now distinguished Makedonian 
and Hellene. On the other side the city-states were hastening to 
decay. The mutr il rivalries, which Isokrates wished in vain to 
dissolve in a comuiun hostility to Asiji, had exhausted the miniature 
republics of Greece. Athens nover recovered from the Peloponnesian 
war. Sparta collapsed at Leuktra.^ The might of Thebes was buried 
in the grave of Epameinondas.* Money had a new, or at least a 
manifold multiplied, power in politics ; statesmen were venal, as at 
liome during the century preceding the fall of the Republic' Moral 



* The Athpnian occopation of Tlier- 
mopjrlai took place in 352 n.e. The (irst 
I'hiiippie w»s delivered in 351 b.c. Tlie 
battle of Chaironeia was fought 338 b.c. 

- Cp. Plntanh, Mor. 844, Life of Detn. 
5, Tho majority, xvith more probability, 
ref;arded Isaioa an liis master. 

' fda.v -yip wXTjTrijK oi>x inHivtyittv ■^ 
irAXif j(tX.. Aristot. rol. 2. 9. 16= 1270 a. 

9a^f Ti;*' iirafuy two OijjSalwr o Aoip^t, 
Dcttttuies, S 14. Tho metaphor is uti- 



furtnuately almost an oratorical rotudiod- 
plnc« ; cp. [Lyi.] 2. GO, Lykurg, 50, 

° Philippiui omnia costella expiignari 
poKse dicebat in quae niodo R9ellu» 
onu.<<tiift aiiro poKst't asceniiere, Cicero 
ad Att. 1. 16. 12: qi. Piutarcli, itor. 
178. The fute of Fliilokratcs is a 
conBpicuoija illustratinii ; the nuitusl 
rcoriiui nations of Ai!«;]ijnea aBd Deino- 
Bthenca ehovr what could be bolievcxl ; 
the niLssiona of Timokratcs, and others', 
what was expected. The adventure of 



AUTHORITIES OTHER THAN HERODOTUS 

enthasiasm had declined upon social and domestic topics : the contrasts 
of wealth and poverty, the cult of the individual, the rights of women 
and of slaves.* The gowl man was no longer a good citizen. Public 
burdens were evaded ; military service was left to professionals and 
adventurers ; the mob was demoralized by freedom and flattery. Yet 
Athens was not wholly without a prophet In the welter of corrup- 
tion Demosthenes stands up, a far grander and more truly tragic hero 
th&n Cicero amid the ruins of the Koman Republic. Demosthenea 
recalled the frivolous freemen of his day to the virtues of their 
fathers. He praised famous men of old in the vain hope of reinvigor- 
ating their degenerate offspring. He stood not for one order in the 
state against the state, but for Athens in Hellas, and for Hellas against 
Mkkedon. His foe, if not a barbarian, was at least a foreigner. His 
watchword was not Conquest and Empire, but Defence and Liberty. 
On his work and his wisdom the biographer has one verdict to pass, 
the historian another : let philosophy harmonize them, if it can. His 
policy was a failure, yet his every utterance was a success. He roused 
Athens, at last, to a great effort ; he reformed her finances, ho restored 
her army, he reconciled her with ITiebes, he set the allied forces in 
the field, he barred for one glorious moment at Chaironeia the advance 
of the Makedonian. The moral force and constancy of Demosthenes 
make his failure splendid, But his end was less glorious : happier his 
memory had he fallen, where he fought, in the ranks at Chaironeia. 
He clung to the forfeit cause of so-called Freedom with a desperate 
consistency, in which too probably the personal factor counted over 
much. He would have welcomed the triumph of the utter 
barbarian over the Makedonian, if so be Athens might stilt pretend to 
a liberty which she had long ceased to deserve. He had little sense 
^■^ the generosity of the victor, or sympathy for the champion of 
^^hirope, or foresight of the mission of Makedon, or insight into 
' the signs of the times. As Cicero Caesar, so I>emo8thene8 survived 
Alexander, only to exult, like Cicero, in the extinction of a too 
generous opposite, and to fall a victim to his own consistent hatreds, 
and the not unnatiual resentment of Alexander's heirs,- 

It is hardly, then, from Demosthenes that we could expect much 
direct light upon the antiquated war with Persia. He has no pre- 
judice against the Persian as such. His first public speech is a veiled 
protest against the chimerical idea of undertaking a war against the 
I'ersian king' For him the barbarian foe of Hellas and Athens resides 

* He hAd, of eonrse, « rnoment of late 
triilin|ih in liin recall (like AnNtriilcs 
befi>re him ; ep. tf>. 26. 6) from Aiginii, 
ipiickly turuea to woe by the failure of 
the Laniian ranipaign (like Cicero'a lo, 
Trivrnphf. {Phil. 14), by the failure of 
the eam)>aigii round Mutiua). 

* ripl au/ifiopiur. Or. 14, delivered in 
354 B.C. on the report of a projected 



Harpaloa haa left a smndga even on the 
fair nani« of Demosthrnea. For Rome 
cp. Salloat, fuq. 8, IS, 15. 20, 29, 31, 
M, 3«. 80, «t«." 

* AriatAphanca and the New Comedy, 
th« inMriect Sokratie», Plato and Arix- 
t&O* ail attest, in their several wayii, 
tha deeline of |)olitical interests, of 
" I life, of citizenship. 



36 



HERODOTUS 



in Pella. He hoped to see Greece quit of the Makedonian by means 
of the Persian. He is practically prepared to riiedize, up to a certain 
point : he will receive and use Persian gold, not to stir up strife among 
the Greek states, but to unite them against Makedon.* He thinks 
Konon's rebuilding of the walls, by means of Persian gold and 
Phoenician labour, more creditable than their original erection by 
Theniistokles ! * He could have little hopes of Sparta, the old yoke- 
fellow of Athens in the Persian war.^ He had no prejudice against 
the Thebans, who would defy Philip and Alexander, even though 
they had 'betrayed' Hellaa to Persia in the days of yore.'' 
Demosthenes had no special interest in the old wars with Persia, 
except as furnishing examples to be employe*! against Makedon, or 
the Makedonian partisans in Athens.* For the mere story 
Demosthenes appears to inherit a Periklean indiflcrenco, a Thucjdidean 
disdain." Nowhere does he acknowledge or betray any debt to 
Herodotus. There is but one item which looks like an Herodotean 
reminiscence, the embassy of Alextmder to Athens, and that is 
inaccurately remembered.^ His nominal blunders, fis Kimon for 
Miltiades,* Perdikkas for Alexander,^ do not inspire us with con- 
fidenee to accept from him Kj^rsilos in place of Lykidas a-s the name 
of the Athenian traitor in 470.^" Demosthenes is more instructive 
on the memorials of the war,*^ which belong in a sense to the history 
of the I'ctiiekontaeleris, and on the events of that history itself.'- than on 



invasion of Greece by Artazersea Ochos. 
The orttor nses tlie opportunity, how- 
ever, to exhort AthciiR to put her bouse 
in oriitr. 

' Aisohines 3. 23S, Dcinarchos 1. 10, 
18, Diodor. 17. 4. 8 irgXXd -ykp x/'^/xaTd 
^au> aurbv el\ii<p4yai irapi Ile/xrur tva 
To\trci>i7rai xarii MaKtSiyiiiy kt\. 

» Or. 20. 71 ff. (o. Upt. 354 B.C.); cp. 
Xen. ITetL 4. S. 12. 

* Plutarch, Kivyjn \6 ndf. 

* 14. 33 f. tl roirvK t« ofrriu Gij/Salaus 
tfftffffat tur' itdivou (so. toi" fiap^ifiov) 
kt\. iyui rol»w oTftai roffouTow aWx*'* 
Bri^lotn Tou ficr' iKclvov tot' If i\6tTy 4irl 
ToiH 'EXX»;xai, SxTTf roWuv Hv xpTi/iiriav, 
el tx'^c ioiyax, irplaaBai ytfiaSai rtfd 
auToit Kcupiv Si' oil rdf wporipat dcaXi/- 
aorrai irp6t roOt BWrjvac a/uipTiai, 

'14. 30 lire nir roiit iTi6rrat iKtlvu» 
d^Jnn^ol'P^B<l^ ol MapaButvi icai ^a\ap2¥i 
rui¥ vpoy6rtMjir ai^roG /xdXuTT &r tiSeuir, 
But this is in 354 n.o., Iwfore the Mako- 
donian qnevtion has become acute ; c}). 
p. 34 note 1 mtpra. 

* Op. Or. 6. 11, his perfunctory apology 
for the omission of a recital of the dor- 
ring deeds & Td»Ttt del •yX(x<"''''Oi X^c*, 
dffut S' outfit e('T«iK SfiCirriTaL, Sibrtp 
Ki^w TdpaXtl^u SiKolw! with the wordj 



of Perikles ap. Thuc. 2, 36. 4 ri ^ 
Kard, iroKifiovt fffO; oJi tKaara. iirrffiji, {) 
tl aiVroi fj d Taripes t)imjjv pdp^apov fi 
"EXXtjuo ToX^/xiov iTidma irpodv/uji •ijfivi'i- 
ptOa, fiaxpytyopelr i» clSbair oii pov\6fxmot 
iiau. This Periklean reserve was, jMjr- 
baps, necessitated hy the pconouiy of 
the Thucydidean work, the ^k/SoXjj (1. 
98-117) supplyiuj? the omission ; but 
for the real uttitude of Thucydidos cp. 
§ 4 ifttpra. 

'' ibid. Toyr ftky i/tteripovt ■rpoy6rovf 
i(ir aiiToU rwr XoitiIik i-px"-* 'EXXiycuv 
Cyrr' aiVout irra,Koi>tt» ^ai\u, oi pLifov 
ouK dvarxoftirovs tA» XA70i' Touror, iiviK' 
fl\8tv 'AX^iavSpot 6 toiVw* rpSyofof irtpJ 
roi/Tuii' «r^pi'{, dXXA «ai rijv X'^P"" ^"^'-Tur 
Tpa<\oiJvoirt rrX. The Orator evidently 
dates the mission before Salamis. 

' Or. 23. 205. 

" 23. 200. The same mistake occurs 
in fOr. 13. 24. 

'» 18. 204 : q.. Hdt. 9. 5 and note 
<ul I.e. 

" The sword of Mardonios 24. 129 
fcp. note to Hdt 9. 22), the walla of 
Tlieniwtokles 20. 71, the j(reat Atheua 
19. 272 (the Poikik Stoa and the 
Delphian tripod are in tfi9. 91-96). 

" Tlie mission of Artlimios of Zolcia 



the Persian war proper. The building of the walla and the origin of 
the Athenian alHanoe and empire he may have taken from Thucydidea ; 
but the record of the missioTi of Arthmios and his attjunder, the 
account of the Peace of Kallias, are tnio oratorical deposit ; and the 
notices of the swonl of Mardonios, of the great Athena, are his own. 
Even the heroes of the war are ofteneet mentioned for sendees or 
characteristics subsequent to the war. Ariateides is the model of a good 
statesman ; but it is his assessment of the tributes and the modesty of 
his mansion alone which are specified to his credit.' Themistokles is 
'* the most illustrious man of hiis time " ^ — the Thucydidetin Rtttung has 
had its effect — and he is described as the author of the evacuation of 
the city,' and as "the victor of Sjtl.arais,"* only to be robbed of this title a 
moment later.'* His building of the walls, and his subsequent pride and 
ite punishment, had sharper lessons for Demosthenes." In the extant 
and authentic orations none other of the heroes of the war with Xerxes 
is mentioned, no, nor even tlmt monarch himself." The events, or 
battles, of the war with -\sia fare no better. The great battles are 
enumerated in the celebrated atljuration which was provoked by 
Aischines, and was intended to crush him;'* but Salamis alone comes 
in for any detailed notice," and the notices add nothing to our know- 
ledge of the event, thougli the tribute to Themiatoklea, and tha 
emphasis laid upon the evacuation of land and city, have, as already 



». 41-46, 1». 271-72. The Peace of 
Kallias 19. 273, which here apj>«ar9 iu 
a more extea<iiri) form than id I»okrateB. 
The fall of Pausaniaa (b ru* Acunjat- 
IMOmlur paffiKevt) and tlio reiiiarknble 
jmcaediDgi of the DaUiana af^inst the 
Lak«daimoniai» before the Amphiktyonic 
eoQrt occur in t59. 97, 98. 

' In 3. 21 he is coupled with Nikias, 
Perikle^ and the Demostheaca of Thnoy- 
didean story, as a samule of the good 
oU times ; in 3. 26 witb Miltiules, for 
the simplicity of his private cHtab- 
lisbment. (So too Themistokles and 
Miltiades, 23. 207.) In 23. 209 he 
appear* aa the assessor of the tributes. 
Tlie only passage which mi^ht bear 
directly on Hdt. is in tOr. 26. t (Aigina 
as his residence in exile, cp. Hdt. 8. 79). 

* 20. 71 i Tur icad' iavr^ AvAirruf 

* 18. 20-1. By a charactcristio in- 
aiwarmcy Doniosthenva flscri>>c8 his 
elactioD aa .Stratcgos to liis carrying thi.s 
aaaaaie. In 6. 10 thf> evacuntinn of 
Athani is m«ntione<l without reference 
to Themiatokleii. 

* 23. 196 Tov Hjr (v ZaXa/iin rai'/iax'u' 

* 23. 198 oi'i' tariv oi/it\t Sarit Af ttwot 



dXX' 'ASffraluir, There was some reMQD 
for the difference between the foorth 
and lifth century foivhion in Buch matters: 
ID the flfth eenluiy the AtbGiiians 
fought their own battles, in the fourth 
they hired others to tight for them. Cp. 
also +13. 21, 22. 

• 23. 205 ^Ktifoi QtiuaroicXia \afiiwrit 
fuTfov a\rrC)» i^iovrra ^po»fu> /{^Xaaar 
ix TTJt viXeui Kot fxifiia itif KiniyyiiMiat. 
For the walls 20. 71 fT. 

'' Xer.tes, Leouidiui, Pausaniaii are 
named in what would be the moat re- 
markable passage in Demosthenoii on the 
Persiiin wars, if only it were authetitie: 
+f<9. (c. iVe<u;r.) 94-98. It contains the 
astounding blunder that half the 
Plataian^ died with Lconidas at Thermo- 
pylfti ; it describes Piusanias as 'kiug' 
of the Lakednimonians (cp. Hdt. 9. 76, 
note) ; it makes the I'latnianR prosecute 
the Lakodaimonisna before the Amphi- 
ktyonic ooiirt for the elegy oo the 
Delphian tripod. For the notices of 
Alexander see p. 38 note 1 below. 

* 1ft. 208 iiA. Toi>» MopaOu»« rpoKir- 
SvftOaaPTat rCir ■itpoy6rii3r ical roiit 4* 
nXaroxait raparofa^covi nai roiH tr 
SaXn/uVi ra i//iax^<raJ'TaT Kal Toin tw' 
'Aprtiii(rt<i>, 

^ Cp. notes 4, 5, 8 above, and 6 p. 36. 



ry 



38 



HERODOTUS 



APP. I 



seen, a value of their own. Perhaps the only precise item which 
Demosthenes contributes to the history of the war is the destruction, 
real or supposed, of the fugitives from Plataia, by the Makedonian 
king, Alexander, for which the orator hardly thanks him.' Yet the 
variants and the blunders of Demosthenes are evidential, not merely 
of his own indifTerence to the subject, but also of the existence of 
sources and tra<Jitions, probably Athenian, in the fourth century, other 
than the Herodotean work. 

AiscHlNKS might, from his opposition and hostility to Demo- 
sthenes, be expected to furnish a contrast too in his utterances on the 
Persian question, but the contrast is not a very strong one. Possibly, 
if more remained of the literary and oratorical efforts of Aischines, 
references to the Persian wars of old might be more copious ; but the 
three extant orations* add nothing to the traditional deposit, so far 
as the story in Herodotus goes. Aischines as a Makedonian partisan 
is, indeed, personally above the slightest suspicion of an intrigue with 
the Persian ; * he can, with a good conscience, use the case of Arthmios 
of Zeleia as a, precedent against Demosthenes,^ and invoke the 
memories of the Persian war to discredit Demosthenes and his 
compact with the Barbarian.'' But, for the most part, Aischines uses 
the names and events of the Persian war in a conventional manner;* 
and his best contribution to the actual evidences falls into the history 
of the Pen-feliVniaHfris,'' to wliich also belongs, strictly speaking, his most 
elaborate historical reference, a borrowed piitch, riddled with errors.* 
But the conventional use of the heroic names and events of the Persian 
war is itself not without significance for the state of the traditions in 
the fourth century. Themistoktes is before all the hero of the war, 
and no touch or hint of prejudice occurs to mar his fame.' Aristeides 

• 3. 258 (wlierc the phrue i^tx^pv^ar 
. . ii iirdaijs ^i 'KBrjimiai ApxouiTir sliovta 
that the iucidont e4iuiiot belong to the 
Herodotean jteriod of the Persian ww). 

'8 i!59 B(fu<XTOii\ia 8i koI to6s tV 
Maf>atfwvi reXewT-iJcoi'Tot Kal roi^t ir IIXo- 
Tatait KoJ aiTOut toiVi ritpoui roiH rur 
trfioyirur ovK &v oUaGe <rrt*6i(U, tl 6 ftrra 
rdr jiaipfii.(Kii» btio\oyCiy toT» 'EXXiyi/i 
d»riirpdrTfii' irr«()<unj>6^atTtu ; For Ma/xi- 
ft^i'i we might have eip(.<cted SaXa/Mvi. 
B^'EXX-qcri tuust be meant M>kcdotiiaDs. 

• 2. 76, 172; 3. 1S2, 181. 
^ 3. 183-185, a jwssage which supplies 

the epigi-ams on the Hermfti erecti-d 
after the Strymonian campaign. (Th« 
Picture uf Marathon is mtintioned % 186.) 

• 2. 172 (T. This passage is ap|tarently 
based on Aiidokides ; c^i. Andokides 3. 6. 
Also Aisch. 1. 12fi. 

■ I. 25, coupled with PeriVles and 
Ari.steid&i : 2. 9, with AlkiWiades ol 
xXtlff'To*' Tuji' 'EXXi^i-ur Sbirj 8iiirryKai< : 
3. 181 with Miltiades and Aristeidet 



■ Demosthenes auhatituten, indeed, the 
name of Perdikkaa (Thucydideau pre- 
occnpatinn !) aa the Makedonian king 
who ovorwhelitu'd the rnmnaut of the 
Persians from Pktain : 23. 200 WtpMnKq. 
T((F kotA rV Tovfiapfidpov wot' iirirrpaTtlav 
^oaiKeitovri ^AaKfiofia^ tout 6.v(LxuipouvTa.i 
4k n\ara«an> rui' ^ap^pur Sta<f>0flparTi 
(toi riXeiov TOTi/jfiM* iroc)^<ra»'Ti T<^ ^airiKti. 
The same mistake oMurs in +1.1. 24. 
The correct name is given in Philip's 
Letter +12. 20 f., n« also the scene of the 
butchery ' Ainphinolis,' and the golden 
Alexander at Delphi, from the spoil ; 
cp. p. 37 note 7 supra. 

' (1) c. Timarch. (2) De /aim Icgnt. 
(3)c CUsiph. The ^jiVVcj! are generally 
recarled as spurioos. 

* Cp. iEp. 11. 3. The idea of his 

foing to th.> Persian king is abanrd, 
ut the further stab'ment is true in 
character: Kalroi ri lltpauir pt Kal Mi^joir 
ovSelt l<tn} Tori ippovtin kbI r6jfTU» fj«t«-ra 



AUTHORITIES OTHER THAN HERODOTUS 



30 






di 



IB a name to conjure with ; but he is remembered for his asaess- 
raent of the tribute,' for his justice, or righteousness,'' not for any 
special service in the Persian war. The battle of Artemision is once 
ed,* Plataia twice,^ Salamis some three or four times ^ : this 
on the names of Themistokles and Salamis represents the 
>miDon sense of Athenian historians ; the gradual appropriation of 
lalaia by Athenian glory-seekers is almost more significaut. No 
Sp&rtan, no Persian, is named bj' Aischines, but in one remarkable 
ge, the orator, pointing the contrast between the position of the 
ersian king in the past and in the present, to the greater glory 
of Makcdon, uses phraseology which might go back, directly or in- 
directly, to the pages of Herodotus." We are but imperfectly informed 
un the state of Athens during Alexander's campaigns in Asia, but 
apparently the destruction of Thebes had made so deep an impression 
upon her nearer neighltour that any active co-operation with the 
ersian was left to the remoter and less assailable Sparta.' The time 
in Athens was largely occujiied by the long-drawn straggle between 
Aischines and Demosthenes, a purely personal issue, wliich ended in 
the vindication of Demosthenes and the voluntary withdrawal of his 
bitter foe it»to exile. From his retreat in Asia, Aischines will have had 
news of the Uarpalian aifair, and have witnessed the fall of his hated 
rival. Ab ho apparently survived the death of Alexander, he will have 
digested, with what grace he could, the triumphant recall of Demo- 
sthenes, and have received, without regret, the subsequent news of his 
iserable end. It was hardly with reflexions upon the Persian wars 
if old that .^\jschines consoled his expatriation ; and the rate at which 
Alexander had made histoiy during his adventurous reign of three 
lustres may well have cost those old memories for a while into the shade. 
Lykueoos, of one party and |)olicy with Demosthenes, per- 
formed prodigies in the reorganization of the finances of Athens, 
making thereby possible the desperate attempt to realize the foreign 
policy of his friend But as an orator Lykurgos offers a greater 
contrast to Demosthenes than Aischines, and betrays some of the 
literary merits, or defects, of the Lsokratcan school. His sole surviv- 
ing oration, a forensic speech for the prosecution of one Leokrates. 
on the charge of having abandoned, or betrayed, his country, after 
Chaironeia, smells of the lamp, and contains incidentally more ancient 
history than the whole extant corpus of Aischines. There are, in 



•jnin, And u Strategos at Salaiuu. 
(TIm BpiMU* imiUte, cp. 3. 2 : 7. 'i, 3 ; 
II. 7. The phnwe in 3. 2 4 Ti)r "EWdaa 
i\tvttiM«at u remiirkable.) 

' 2. '23 r«i">t ^poit Ti(at Toti'EKXriat : 
c|x 3. 258. 

* \. 2C' i tUoiat irucaXeOfitrot : cp, 3. 
23. 8. 181. 

' 2. 75. * 2. 76 ; 8. 269. 

» 2. 76(A«1: 2. 172; 3. ISl. 



"3.132 oi'-x 6 nir T^f UepffOr pturiKt(t, 
i rAr 'A$u Siopiiat, o Tin> 'KW^Torroy 
tVLt(at, i y^ Kal iSup roirt'KWrjyaf airuf, 
6 ToKfijip t» rail (Ti^roXaii ypi^ttw Sri 
2einr4nji trrli' ii-wArriM irffpunriim i^' 
i/Xlov ifibirrot t^^XP^ ivofUrov, rir ov rtpl 
Tou Ki''piot elpoj iiayuflttrni, dXX* ifiri 



cp. Arriao, 



(ol TTJi Tou aiifiaros aiitrriplai ; 

^ It did not come to much; c 



Anab. 2. 13. 4-6. 



40 



HERODOTUS 



APP. I 



fact, in relation to the Persian war three elaborate passages, each of 
which places important episodes of the war iti a novel light, making 
very distinct addenda to the tradition, or to the interpretation of the 
facte. There are also, as it happens, three minor or passing references, 
likewise of interest in connexion with the war. These six items invite 
careful examination. 

(1) Anticipating that the defence would seek a justification of 
quitting the city and land at the hour of peril in the historic precedent 
supplied by the war with Xerxes, Lykurgos cornea to discuss, or at 
least to appraise, that incident' The orator's reply is hardly in itself 
adequate," but incidentally he contributes two or three gems to the 
setting of Salamis. Etconikos (sic) the Lakedairaoiiitm, Adeimantos 
the Korinthian, and the Aiginetan contingent were abuut to fly under 
cover of night, but our ancestors compelled them to remain in Salamis 
and fight, and so won a double victory, over their allies as well as 
over the enemy.'* Here perhaps the most important note is the em- 
phasis laid on the victory of the Athenians over the Peloponnesians, 
though its point is blunted by a rhetorical turn, which leaves it 
rloubtful whether the Peloponnesians acquiesced in tfie ruse which 
defeated them, The aggressive war on Asia, the double victory at 
the Eurymedon, are treated as the natural sequel to Salamis, and the 
celebrated Treaty of Peace, imposing limits on the movements of the 
king's fleet, and securing autonomy for the Greeks in Asia, is regarded 
as the complement to "the Trophy of Salamis."' (2) Lykurgos is the 
first of our authorities to record an Oath as taken by the Greeks 
before Plataia, including the vow to betithe all the cities which had 
joined the Barbarian, and to leave the temples burnt or destroyed by 
the Barbarian in ruins as an everlasting memorial of his impiety.^ 
The historic charact€r of this oath is very small. It is admittedly 
moulded on an Athenian precedent. It conflicts vrith the Herotlotean 
account. It comprises two items which, even if both subjects of vow 
or agreement, may have belonged to difl"erent occasions. It is else- 
where repeated in variant forms.'' But whatever its historical value. 



> IS 68-74. 

" The obviouH reply wonld be that the 
Athenianj) quitted Athena and Attica 
for Salamia lu the Persinn war uudpr an 
order of gtat« : Lcolcrateii had run fivv&y 
to Rbod(^9 artor Chaironoia on hn own 
authority. The cases are so disparmto 
that the introduction of S,ilaniia look.s 
like a bit of learniii;; de^tigiied to gratify 
the orator's taste nnd to stimulate the 
patriotism of the jury. 

' S 70 ifKaToKtiTifuroi Si oi trp&yoi'Oi 
irr6 viyruv Tur 'EXXTJfur (H(f Kai. roin 
dXXoirt -liXfvB/piiiaar, iyayKdaayrtt iv 



y6va<ri, xai Tuir TroXf/jUuy xal tQv avmiAxiiiy. 
liitfKaHpur Trpoa^KifToit fiiv fvepytrovirrtj, 
Toit Si Max^M**"** UKuyTft. 

* § 73 ri Kc^Xatoy riji plKifs, oi! rd itr 
ZaXo/uu'i Tpdnuof dyar-^aarTtt Imiirar 
dXX' . . avyffijKat i-ravifaarro /iaxfufi fti» 
•wXotv fii) irXeo" ivrht Ki'oWwp khI "froiri- 
Xi2oi, Toi!r; S' 'VWifvat ainovbiioi'^ tloax, 
M-h fiifoy Toi''» r))» EvfniitTir oXXA xal roii 
TTiy 'Affiar KaTOiKoCvTai. 

• § 80 Tai'TTf* wlcTiv (Soaav avroti i» 
\\\a.Taiah rirTti oJ "EXXtji-iti ort l/u\X.oy 
irapaTo^imvoi /iiiixeff^^at Trp6t riiir Sip^ov 
Si>yap.iy kt\. 

° Cp. p. 32 notes 6, 7 luyra. 



§$8-9 



AUTHORITIES OTHER THAN HERODOTUS 



41 



in ite first instance, it is undoubtedly illustrative of the trend of Attic 
tradition, or rather, perhaps, afterthought, in the fourth century. (3) 
This characteristic is even more fully documented in the third case, 
which ilhistratea in the clearest way that comparison and antitheaia 
hclween the battles of Themiopj'lai and Marathon which in the 
dialectic of tradition may so powerfully have affected the legend of 
each.* Thus, in relation to the three great battles of the great Persian 
war, Lykurgos makes distinct addition to our materials, not indeed 
for discovering the facts, but at least for appreciating the growth of 
the story. The absence of proper names, or the error, prepares ua to 
find his contributed details of minor worth. Thus (4) with him too 
Pansanias, the betrayer of Hellas to Persia, is 'kiog.'^ (5) Without 
naming Themistokles ho notes it as an illustrious service to furnish 
the fatherland with a circuit of walls.^ (6) The last item to be 
mentioned, for sheer confusion and inaccuracy, deserves the prize. 
Lykurgos has apparently confounded the story of the lapidation of 
Lykidiis with the story of the mission of Alexander to Athen."!, the 
one originally recorded by Herodotus just after the other. Lykurgos 
relates the execution by the Council, with its own hands, of the 
.inonymous traitor in Salamis ; and in proof of their love of the 
fatherland adduces the fact that the Athenians nearly stoned to death 
Alexander, though previously a friend of theirs, because he came 
from Xerxes (sic) to demand earth and water.^ If this last record be 
.trgued to possess independent existence, yet the aiicnce of Herodotus, 
the improlmbility of the outrage in itself to the person of the friendly 
king- ambassador, .and the subsequent relations of Alexander and the 
.\thenians, proclaim its falsity. In fine, Lykurgoa makes a valuable 
contribution to the legend of the Persian wars, without much enrich- 
ing the history. He was evidently a student of past instances and 
illustrations ; if he accomplishes so much for our purpose in the course 
of one forensic speech, what may we not liave lost by the disap|)earance 
of the fifteen speeches, or more, accredited to him in antiquity, some 
of them on public occasions, which might have justified an extensive 
OM of his methods of appeal to antiquity 1 

§ 9. The other orators, aa well later as earlier, make for the moot 



' 01O8f. tA gdWiara Tdf t(rjii>» i/ufHt- 
'tpatt fir KarttfTfariifra. Onr ancMtora 
efi^sted (lie barbarung, who first invaded 
rAnira, proring therebj tbat couraee is 
niperior to wealth, and valour to numbers. 
AnJuSoA/t^iiiM i' ir Bt^^urriiXait rapa- 
Toit fiif rirxatt o^x il*ot<iit 
rairro, rg 6' drtptlf r6\v virruit 
^ I k^t^ t oy. Twya/wCo iiri Toft iiploit 
frnfT^fna tcrvr ISur icrX. He quotes 
IIm apiUphs, for Thennopyliii and for 
Manthon. 

* f 128 navaarloM ykp riv paaiKia kt\. 
Ukt a good Athenian h« mentions hia 



betrayal of Greece, but not hia victory 
at Platain. Cp. p. 37 note 7 supra. 

* § 139. This may hare been meant 
as a compliment to Dcmosthenea. 

■• Cp. § 71 oDtu yoDr i^\evi> T-fjr TarpiSa 
vi.rrtt, Sxrrt rdr -rapi, Sif^ov -rptaptirniv 
'Wd^arlpor, ^^o' trra at/roTt Tpirrtpw, 
Stl ■y^K <rol rju»p jfrijcre, fiiKpoi 8«ri> «raW- 
\tvaa.v. § 122 i^LO* rolriv iKoOaai tial 
rod rtpi ToO iv SaXa/iiri Te\ti'H)aa.rrm 
yfronifov ^^riiptcrfiaTtn, if ii (ioiA-^, 6ti 
XAyCff n6rtji iprxfipt* rpoSii&rai riji' w6\ir, 
Ttptt\o)ihri Toi>f «rTt^¥OV% aiTPXt'pi 
aviicTH*tv. 



42 



HERODOTUS 



APP. 1 



part little or no further contribution to the subject. Antiphon, indeed,, 
lies outside the period and the present interest, nor is there any refer- 
ence in his extant works or fragments to the Persian vran.^ Isaios, 
notwithstanding the purely private or forensic nature of his speeches, has 
an occasional reference to the public events and personages of his own 
time,^ but never a word on Themistokles, Aristeides, Manithon or 
Salamis. AniX)KIDKS is more fertile ground, but grows only weeds.^ 
He suppUes Aiscliines, as above shown,* with a very marvellous 
muddle on the history of the PeniekoiUagiens ; in another wild passage 
he mixes up the memories of the first and the second Persian wars, 
naming Marathon, in his pure Atticism, where ho should have named 
Salamis and Plataia.* Those vagaries do not dispose ua favourably J 
towards his assertion that the Athenians stole the ashes of Theraistokleal 
from Magnesia, and dissipated thera.'^ It reduces the tomb in Attica 
and the tomb in Asia alike to kenotaphs. Plutarch naturally demurs. 
We should hardly be content to rationalize on the supjwMition that 
the Athenians did indeed repossess themselves of the mortal remains 
of the " Liberator of Hellas," and interred them at Muntchia ! There 
is nothing further in Andokides to detain the student of the Persian 
wars.' At the other end of the oratorical periml Demades* and 
Dkinarchos" add at must a touch or two, showing that the Persian 
tfuestion, with the memories of its former interest for Athens, is yet 
alive, The Makeilonians, Demados argues, in the acme of their 
strength, were ready to grasp at the sceptre and treasuries of Persia, 
if only Demosthenes had let them alone."* Deinarchos, like Demosthenejj, 



* Condemned to death 411 B.C. for his 
mrt in the overthrow of the Democracy , 
Thiic. 8. 68. 1-a ; Plntarcli, Mor. 882 f. 

* Of the «xtADt speechoa apparently 
the eldest may he dated e. S89 B.O., the 
youngest e. 353 R.c. Blass, AtlUehe 
Bereds. ii.* 488. References occur to 
thti hattlea in Eleusis, Spartolon, Knidos, 
.'>. 42 ; to the Korinthian, Thesaalian, 
Tholian wars, 9. 1-1, etc., hut merely as 
iiicideutal to the livea of his clienta. 
Timotheos is mentioned 6. 27. 

' Andokidi-a was uotorionaty involved 
in the prucoedingB agaioat tlui Hermu- 
kopij* (415 luc), but his earlioat extatit 
siwBi'h, No. '2 {On hii Jtrttirn), \a dated 
c. 407 B,c., the sjieffh On the Myiteries 
(No. 1) 399 B.C!., and that On, the Peace 
(No. 3) 392-1 H.C. Cp. 111.1S3, AU. B. L» 
298. 

* Cp. p. 33 supra. ; Andok. 3. .'> (cspoci- 
ally ajrrl ii Ttav rpf^fxar at rttre iifuv fjaaf 
ri^jued Kal ArXoi alt ^amX^a teal fiap- 
jidpoui KaTayavpiax^cayfif ri\(v9ipJifati€i> 
ToOi 'EWtfKaJ, dfri toi'tiiIk rc3» K^v iKaT&y 

' 1. 107 CcTepor Si TjrlKa PaciKeif 



(Tt(tTpiTtiiattr irl Hfr "BWiia (the 
AtheniaDR decided) roiis re ijieiyormt 
«caTa4^Jao-S<u Koi to6t ijtiioirt iiriTifiOvi 
roi^ai (ctX. ijjioi/r f^At airoif rpcrri- 
{(UTtt irpb Tiir 'EWriouiy drdcT-wv liirai'- 
T^oi {aic) Toit fiapjiipoit MapaduvdSt 
«tX. rfif irAXiK iydaraTov wapoXajSirTci 
Upi Tt KaTaKfKHuitiya rtlxt ft koX oUiat 
KaTavtirTUKvlaf kt\, 

* Fr. 3, Plutarch, Them. 32. 

" TliB llf^iror^ ogriy-^ made for Alki- 
biadea at Olympia liy the Ephesiana is 
a Huggestivc sjmt of colour, 4. 30. 

' After Cliaironeia ouu of the leaders 
of the Mukeilotjian party ; nuthor of the 
d<-ath - sentence aguiust DenioiitbeDes, 
Plutarch, Demoslh. 28 ; met his own 
death in Makedonia 319 B.C. The 
{lortiou of the speech vrtp t^s SioStca- 
<Wai extant is generally condemned &i 
spurious ; Baiter aail Saupiie, ii. 312 ff. 

■ Last, uot least, of the 'Ten' Orators; 
horn c. 360 B.C. and flourished under 
Demetrios Phaloreus. The three extant 
orations are M concerned with the eauM 
tiUbre of Harpalos. B. and S. i. 483 ff. 

'" § 13 iJKfiaj^oti Si Toit (Tu/uuriK ol 



AUTHORITIES OTHER THAN HERODOTUS 



Aischines, and others, tiikes up his parable on Arblimios, son of 
Pjthonax of Zeleia,^ and has a good deal to say against Cemosthenes 
in reference to Alexander's money embezzled by Harpatos, and 
received by Demosthenes, as well as the earlier money from the great 
king ^ ; but his only direct reference to the Persian question in its 
fifth -century stage just serves again to prove that Atbens, in the 
fourth century, thought of Ariateides only as the assessor of her 
tributes, and of Theraistokles preferably as the rebiiilder of her walls.* 

This review of the oratorical deposit upon the traditions of the 
Persian war may fitly conclude by an appreciation of two extant 
examples of that s{>ecific type of rhetorical exercise, the Fiuieral Oration, 
from which might naturally be expectetl the richest and most direct 
contribution to the subject here under consideration. Perikles in the 

io prineeps of this genre had apologized, in a way, for omitting the 

t«d reference to Marathon and Salamis,* The pseudo-Demo- 

enes, in the onition which ought to represent the speech of 

ostbenes over the heroes of Chaironeia, formulates or adopu the 
oft-repeated contrast between the Athenians in the Persian war and 
the Greeks at large in the Trojan war, much to the advantage of the 
former ; and does not hesitate to ascribe the double repulse of the 
Persian wholly and solely to Athens, thus spreadiug the halo of 
Marathon boldly over Salamis, Plataia, and the rest.* But none the 
less is the reference somewhat perfunctory, and all details taken for 
granted. The EpiUiphios found among the works of Lyaias, in any 
case probably an earlier example of the kind, treats the subject more 
generously. A long passage recites the glories of Marathon," and a 
■till longer passage envelops and conveys a surprising number 
of Herodotean details in a rhetorical flood of atticizing commentary.' 
Xerxes is there,* and the date is there,' the number of his shipa '" and 
the innumerable company of his host," his pride and his impiety,'* his 




Xonj^m, o(lt ffiif ratt iXriaa Hri ri 
fir^Trpa tal Toin Utpaun 9'^a\'poit i] 
Tim «i'^y3«fer. 
' 2. 24, 25. 

* 1. 10. 18. 20, 70. 

If <i^ X^fv 'KpiCTfiiif* xal 6f/xurro«tX^a, 
▼•♦t ifiOiiaarrat t4 rtixi] rfjt iriXeuj nol 
T«*l i>ipovt tit iKp6ira\ir iftoeyxii'Tat 
rap' fr6rTu>r nai flcu\o(i^¥ur Tiif 'RXX^fun. 
Ti. noo of the tribute in the 

A> \olvea an anai'lironigm. 

* I imr. i. 38. 4, without projudit'o to 
tb« purely ThuirydideHn authi)rshi|) of 
tbs sjwcch. BUm, AU. B. i.« 436, re;;ar<is 
OorgiM as the real literary foundor of 
tli« trpx ; cp. Ba.it«r .lud Sauppc ii. 129. 

■ Mm. t60. 10 Ao'vAi rh* ii, ilirdai7t 
T^l 'AtloM eriXor i\0itrra fiSrot t\t 
^ptfwarrs soi card 7^ cai xard ddXarraf, 



ami Slit Tuir ISlur Kti'dt/fur KMf^f awrifplM 
vaai roit 'EXXtjitu" aXnoi iraWcmprai' . . 
roaoirif yi.p ifuLfovt Tuif firl Tpolav 
CTpaT€vaa.fiiviiUi iratii^oirr' hv tUbrun, iao» 
ol fUr it awdirnt rijt 'KXXdJoT flKTri ipiffTils 
Six try) r^j 'A<rlai tr x'^P^""' iroXtop»oi5»''f» 
/H^Xif <r\o*, oBtoi ii tAk »x xa<n;f T^ 
■ffxtlpov ot6\ov i\9bi>Ta. ^ii-cx, tIXXo ■ri.ma 
Kartrrpa/ifiJi'oy , oi it.6vo» ^/uiroKro, dXXd 
Kal Tifuaplar i/rip Sn> Toirt dXXout tiSIkovi> 
irtSrfKap, 

* I.VMM -hJ. 20-26. Cp. BM, IK-FI, 
ii. 195 (Appendix X. § 22). 

' 12. 27-47. 

' S^pfi^T A r^t 'A<rlat /?a<«Xe)''f . . 

* StKirifi trti. 

'* x'^'o'T f*^' '<>' tMKOflatt mvalr . . 
" iIwTe iroJ rd ISnj t4 >i<t' auToS dxaXov- 
tftja-avra woXi> I* IfTfOii e(ri Kara\di<u. 
'* inrtpiSu}* nal rd ^uati rc^tncira Kal 



44 



HEKODOTDS 



A pp. I 



bridge on the Hellesjwnt and his trench through Athos/ and the 
multitude of traitors that flocked to his standard, from fear or avarice.- 
The synchronous struggle at Artcmision and Thermopylai ^ and the 
diverse fortunes of Athetvians and Lakedaimoniaas are duly rehearsed, 
not without a passinj^ acknowledgement to the courage of the latter.* 
The patriotic heroism of the Athenians in evacuating the city '' gives 
place to a record of the battle of Salatnis, in which the concrete details 
of the fight are lost in a sensational description of the feelings of the 
warriors and spectators.^ The Arideia, however, are boldly accorded 
to the Athenians in virtue of their three-fold claim : the number of 
ihoir ships, the skill of their men, the strntegij of their general 
Themistokles." The treachery of the Peloponnesians behind the 
Isthmian wall is terminated by an Athenian taunt, accompanied by a 
hint of possible modism, far more delicately veiled than in Herodotus : 
the orator in this respect is more tender of the fame of Athens.^ The 
final battle of Plataia follows, on essentially Herodoteau lines ; the 
bulk of the allies nin away under cover of night; the Lakedaimonians 
and Tegeaus defeat the barbarians ; the Athenians and Plataians 
account for all the Greeks on the kin<;'8 side." That day is final and 
secures the liberties of Europe, and the hegemony of Athens, ^*^ This 
whole passage is rhetoriciKed history in exceUis?^ Elsewhere the 
genuine Lysias pays interest to the name of Themistokles,^- and pre- 
serves a fact or two in the inner history of Athens not without a 
bearing on the war, or on the policy of Themiatokloa, though the 
bearing is not specificd.^^ 

The one genuine Epitaphim Logos which has come down to us falls 
chronologically into the close of the period : it is the panegyric pro- 



tA 6t7a rpir^naja. koI rat iteSptmriyat 
8taj>oia.t. 

' ffi/foi /lin rip 'EWTJff'TorToi', Jiopt'^ai 
Si rdr'Affu. 

' iltiplirepa i' lif avroit t4 wttOonTO., 
KtpSm Kal 2/ot. 

' yevofUvov Si toO KiySlJi'ov xarik Tit> 
airrbv XP^*"**- 

* 'A^rarot nkv ivUuir rf rai/MOx'?) 
,\.&Ktiaifil>»ioi if, oi; rail ^u^aii i»8efif 
ytrdiurot . . oi/x rfm^BirTei Tuiv ivajfTiini/ 
. . rur fii¥ ivoTiixifffivTuv, tuiv Si kt\. 

' i^iXiwor inrip rift EXXd Sot rrjj' 
r6\w . > 

• ToJa* Si yviifiijr tlxov f) ol 9tui/itP0t 
, . fj ol itAWorrtt favnax'fl<rt<i' kt\. 

' tXjutto Si Kal KaWirra ^KUftu inrip 
TTJt Tuy ' EW^rdii/ i\fv8eplai ai'yejidXorTO, 
rrpaTtjySy fiiy Offu<rroK\ia, luayunaTov 
flvftr Kal yvuiyax Kai Tpd{a(, vain Si 
rKiclotn r^r A\\u>y ardyroiy ffv/ifii.xt'ii', 
iySpat Si itiirfipoTi.Tovi . . fiffre Sixalon 
fiiy iiyapufna^iirrfTa raptartia ryt yavfia- 
Xtm fKa^oy rapi Trjt 'EXXdJoi kt\. 



* rtpi Airafray rijy Tlt\ar6ypTi<roy Tnj(o» 
reptjia'Kf'iv ■ el yi.p aural vwi rHiv 'EXXi^ruF 
irpoSiSbp.tym ixera Tu>y j3ap/3dpu>v laorrai 
(ctX. 

i46. 

" pifiaior fiiw r^v iXrvBtfiar rg EvpiirT) 
tcartipydrayro . . irwi riyruy ■riiitl>OTivay 
. . riyep.6yti yfy^aBai rT^t'EWdSot. 

" Tlio remini/iopiicos of Hdt. in tJn- 
posiui^e nreijuite ha co)ia)ilcnoiia as thoKf 
of Thiic Tlie rhrforiciil trojies, somi' 
of wliicli recur tti Isokrates, have been 
largely omitted. 

" 12. 6U, tliebuiiains by Theinistokle* 
contnuted with t!io destruction under 
Theraracnes. 30. 28, Thenristokles ia 
coupled with Sulon and reriklvs *m a 
goo«l Irgiaktor. (t2, 42, he ia named aa 
at iJsInmis, itee above] 

" 14. 39, tho ostrakisms of Alkibiade^ 
and Megaklos (before the invasion of 
Xerxes) ; cp. Appendix III. § 4 iv/rn. 




noanced by Etpereides on Leosthenes and the Athenians who fell in 
the war at Lamia in 323 RC.^ Hypercides no doubt shared the views of 
his quondam friend Demosthenes upon the relative danger to Crreece 
and u{K)n the intrinsic harlmrit}' of Persians and Makedonians 
aeverally. In more than one respect this genuine and actually 
livereJ oration coritriistB with the rhetorical conventions of the time 
occasion. In the first place, the speech is in the main an en- 

ium on Leosthenes, the strategos. Hypereides apologizes, indeed, 
for spending so much on the leader, and saying so little of the men- 
At-arms, explaining that praise of the general includes praise of the 
citizen-soldiers, so far as there were any, who followed him.- In fact, 
this defjjirture from rule and precedent may perhaps he taken as a 
recognition of the difference which had come over military service 
&Dd esprit in the age of mercenary soldiers and professionalized 
leading. In the second place, it wa« hardly possihle for Hypereides 
to speak of a battle at Lamia against the Makedoniana without any 
reference to the earlier fighting in the same region against the 
Persians, and the reference is forthcoming.^ But with a tnily refresh- 
ing novelty Hypereides does not hesitate to describe the exploits of 
Leosthenes as the most glorious ever perlormed in that neighbour- 
hood,* he does not hesitate to prefer the virtues and achievement of 
Leosthenes to the deeds of Miltiades, Theraistoklea, and the other 
liberators of Hollas.'' The first [loint might puss with an audience 
which at all times esteemed Marathon and Salamis above Thermopylai ; 
the second might almost have seemed a rhetorical lifie-nutjcsU. Had 
we the lost PlataiJcos of Hypereides, should we too adjudge it a greater 
honour to his country than the victory of Aristeides ? * 

§ 10. To pass from the rhetors to the philosophers, from Isokratos 
«nd Lykurgos back to Plato and un to Aristotle, is to come into 
« cooler temperature, a clearer tight, and, in n sense, into a more 
historical atmosphere. The philosophers, moreover, make their own 
proper contribution, not so much to the traditions themselves, though 
that is not wholly wanting, as to the framing of the traditions of the 



' Or. 0, ©d.* Blast, Myperidia Orulionrs 
*tE, 1894. Tenbner. 
» S 1.'.. 

* § 12 IKOiiv tit Tl6\(tt ural xaroXa^ur 
T^ rapiJoit 4(' iif Kal itpiiTtpor ixi r<M^ 
'KXXirrat oi ^ipfiapoi iKoptv6-t]aa», 

* $ 18. The remark that the animil 
uaemtiliM of the Hvllenes At Tbermo- 
uyUi will rfdounil to tbe credit of the 
mpartf^ 111 nie» might woll be Iraasfcrrod 
to thr larliiT Btory : i^nmot'Htvoi yiip oi 
*KXX)p><t AwojiTtf Hi ToS /viavr^S th riji' 

HvXaioi', Otaipoi ytri^ortat rcl-v lp^un> rwf 
vtwfaffiirur airroif lifia yip ei's rov r6irut> 
ififnivfi^OfTcu Kal TTJi Toiriav dptj^t 



" § 38 X^w 5ri Toin repl MiXridSiyy Kol 
(ie/u<rToi:\ia xal tqvi iXXov^ oi rijti'KWiia 
i\(vt)tpiiaa>rTtt (uTifwy fui> rriv traTplia 
KaTidTTiaa.i' ifSoior 51 roy ain-Qiv fiior 
iwolfiaai', u)» oiVoj rtxroCTOf iirtp^irxto 
irSpei^ Kal it>poyi\aei Haav ol liiv iireKdoxiaav 
T-^K Til» fiapjiipwy SOratur ■fifiCfaDTO, i ii 
/iriS' iirt\Sf'ui iroitiaei', KaKciroi fiir iy 
rp oinelf roi>i ixSpc^'t iwtiSor dyuvi{'opi- 
KOii, ourot Si if TJi Tu»f tx^pu" rtpttyirtTo 
Twif di>Tiwd\uv. The orator'g 1oj:ic ia a 
liitlo thin. 

• C\>. PliiUr. li, Mor. 350 ip' oB» IftoK 
■lepoKpifat Tin 'TrrtpelSoi- IlXarauAv rift 
'.ipioTeJSoi/ arpanryiat xal rUifi ; 



46 



)DOTUS 



APP. 



war. Plato and Aristotle exhibit in this as in other departments 
minor differencea, but three broader notes are common to the twain. 
First, while they share, inUee<I, with Tsokrates and the rest tbe^H 
antithesis between Europe and Asia,' the patriotic prejudice, or^| 
preference, for the Hellene above the barbarian,- they have little or 
no interest in the Persian question, in the conquest of the barbarian, 
whether in Asia or in Europe, and the record of the former wars are 
as ancient history to thera, in the actual details of which they show 
very little concern. Secondly, the philosophers have but one opinion 
in the moral they draw from the war for political philosophy and the 
theory of the State : both interpret the course of the war in a sense 
unfavourable to ilemocracy, both win from the war a verdict favourable 
to aristocracy and the government of the few. This verrlict is not 
altogether satisfactory, or conformable to the facts of the case, and in- 
volves Aristotle at least in somethin<j very like a self-contradiction ; but, 
thirdly, it is quite consistent therewith that both philosophers adduce 
the statesmen of that period, and of the fifth century generally, to wit, 
in Athens, as typical specimens of great and good man in more or less 
favourable contrast to their successors. Beyond these three points^| 
the general agreement hardly extends, and each philosopher must be^H 
estimated separately. The MenfX^nos, ascribed to Plato, and not un- 
worthy of him, contains, in its model Funeral Oration, a subtle satire ^^ 
on Lysias or Isokratca, as if to show how much better, if such thingtt^H 
must be, an Asfyasiu or a Sokrates could ac'hievo them for love,'* than 
the paid rhetors achieved them for money. There is, in truth, a 
comparative sobriety in the tone of the mock-oration, which makes it j 
difficult to dismiss the historical exaggerations, suppressions, or ac-j 
commodations as introduced with a specifically satiric intent. Nor i»j 
the history altogether so bad as to constitute a rediictio ad abmrduml 
of Attic tradition: it ia no worse than appears in the Aristotelian] 
AGrjvaliov TToAiTeia, and passed muster everywhere in Athens during 
the fourth century. The ostensible speech follows the noi-mal lines of 
the EpUaphioi Logoi^ but contains a specially l<"ngthy passiige on the 
Persian wars,' for the introduction of which, perhaps, some external 
reason in the circutMstances of the time, or in the sources from which 
the author was drawing, might host account. The passage falls into 
three sections — on the Marathonian campaign, on the Xerxeian invasion, 
and on the sequel, whenas the Athenians carried the war into Asia 
and Egypt, and compelled the king in his ]>lan8 to substitute Ins own 
preservation for the conquest of Greece. The relative sjKice allotted 
Uj these three stages in the story may, perhaps, be taken to indicate 



> Plato, Menex. 239 ; Aristot. /'o/. 
1285 a, 1.327 b. 

' Plato, A>;i. 470 'EXXi(Kat nh Apa 

fiaxof^vovs re tp^^opuv kqI iroXe/iioL't 0u<F«t 



(Zvai : Aristot. Pol. 1252 b rair^ i^m. 

' 23tS K dXXd ithrroi aai yt Sti xnpiitf^iu- 
ktX. 

♦ '239 c-241 B. 



AUTHORITIES OTHER THAN HERODOTUS 

their relative importance in the eyes of the Athenian public of the 
day, being as 3 : 2 : I.^ Marathon was all along for all Athenians 
the prime victory : won on their own soil, unaided, eclipsing not 
merely Salamis, but still more Thermopylai and Plataia. But within 
the limits of the second war itself the MeiitTtnos cleverly ranks 
" Salamis and Artemision " — for nought is heard of Therniopylai — 
next to Marathon, as having afforded by sea the same prerogative 
instance of victory as Marathon by land.* The third place, and only 
the third place, belongs to Plataia, " the common achievement of Lake- 
daimonians and Athenians," ^ the presence of allies having been ignored 
at Salamis and Artemision equally as at Marathon. This hierarchy 
of the battles, which correspoiida to the temporal order, and also to 
the relative part played by Athens in each case respectively, is 
si^iificant of the state of the traditions, at least in Athens. By a 
miracle of Attic chivalry, indeed, the Lakedaimonians arc allowed pre- 
cedence at Plataia, but it is a bare precedence and nothing more : the 
confederate victory is but an application of the lesson of Marathon. 
It is perhaps a negative sign of grace that Mykale is passed over in 
iQence ; but Mykale seems to have dropped out of fourth -century 
aoiu'ces, until Ephoros revived, and rationalized, the story from 
Herodotos ; and in any case, as a naval imdertakinp, it belonged to an 
aspect of the question which Plato, or a Platorii-it, would not be 
anxious further to aggrandize. 

Such J8, indeed, a fair inference from the second element above 
noted in the jjhilosophic stratum, wliich for Plato is most fully 
exhibited in The Laws. Two great passages in this work enforce the 
political and moral lessons of the Persian war in a sense advcrae to 
the claims of the ' naval mob ' and its achievements, favourable to 
the merits of the moderate democracy, the quasi-aristocracy, its polity, 
ita education, its ethos, its victories. How can a political consiihttian he 
a good one — asks the anonymous Athenian — which is based on the tea- 
fiik t Whereto Kleinias : iVhy, ut Kreians opine thai Ute battle of Salamis 
VMS the $almtion of Hellas. A common opinion nil the tvorld over, replies 
the Athenian, but not miw or that of Megillos here (the Spartan) : oti the 
eaniranj, ice asseii iJuit the battle of Marathon be/fan and the battle of Plataia 
ttmpleled the. salvalum of the Hellenes, and, moreover, that the land-battles 
wade the Hellenes better men, and the sea-battles the reverse.^ The same 
moral is urged from the positive side in an eiirlier and longer passage 
on the same theme.'' The seaet of the .sueress of AthfTis in the Persian 
wars teas to be found in the old order, the moderate eoiistitution, the people 



* After k proem of twenty-two liiii's, 
Urn firat talces thirty-four liiiex, th<.< 
•Hond about twenty-two linea, the third 
abtnt tweUe (Zurich <m1. 1830). 

* rA fUr air iptirreuL nf Xiryif ^trelvoii 
d»a4«W«r, r^ ii itvriptta rort irtpl 



Koi riir^affi. (With this juxtaposition 
op. Zaift* 4. 707.) 

' Tplrov a \i-fu t6 if nXoT-aiart 
tpyov xal ipi$n^ xal iprrji ytpia^iu rr)t 
'E\\i;»ir^r aumjpias, coiriK i^At; nOr(r 
AaxtSainovtiiiy re Kal 'A^ko/iiW. 

* 4. 707. " 8. «98 f., cp. 6M f. 



48 



HERODOTUS 



APF. t 



nurtured in the fear of tlie Laws, a united people, whose only refuge < 
trust, at the oncoming of the innuiMrabk hod of harlxtrtaiis, uhis in tkem- 
aelirs and in llieir deities, while on the other side the failure of Persia 
was due in p<irt to its despotic form of government, and the total lack 
of liberty among its people. Success and failure in war depend on 
many factoi-s, and there are wars and wars; but it would be a. curiously 
perverse political philosophy which saw no connexion between the 
inner constitution and t'thos of a state and its success or f'aihire in 
warfare, defensive and offensive, by land and by sea. The suggestive 
remarks, of Plato upon the subject reappear in Aristotle later with a 
ditt'ercnce, and pass on to Polybioa in a theorem, which leads him, in 
its application to llomun history, not so much to a false estimate of 
the causes of Rome's success in war, as to a false analysis of the nature 
and working of the Roman constitution.^ Even in the hands of 
Plato tbia dogma proves a treacherous weapon, and yields him not 
merely a somewhat idealized perspective of the jmst but a somewhat 
enfeebled perception of the present : or was the democracy of Athens 
even more law-ridden and law-abiding than in the fourth centuiy 1 
His admiration for the psist, however, does not lend Plato to extol 
everything in the conduct of Helbis during the crisis of the Persian 
wars. All may have been well with Athens, and there may not be 
any express fault to find with Sparta, but there was much in the 
action of the Greek states at the time open to censure ; in fact, the 
Persian invasion was an unnecessary and avoidable experience : a 
united Athens had repulsed the invader, a united Hellas would have 
niiule invasion from the very first impossible." 

Thirdly, as of the institutions, so too Plato judges of the men of ' 
the past; the practical statesmen of the fifth century had left no 
successors : this fact is at once their glory and their shame, They 
were gooti men, and able ; but they could not make others able and 
good — though Themistokles taught his son, Kleophautos, to ride.''' 
Tlio Sokratea of the Gitrifias, indeed, which is the classical depository 
of this argument, comes to the conclusion that all Athenian statesmen 
.<itand alike condemned, as not having made the ]jeople whom they led, 
or governed, any better ; * but, aliowing for the irony of the argument, 
Phito here, as elsewhere, hears witness to the position and reputation 
of the historic names, It is, therefore, the more interesting to observe 
that, while Aristeides is but twice adduced as an instance of the good 
man,'"' Tberaistc:)k3es figures in that capacity, or at least as a man of 



• Polyb. 8. S tf, 

^ Laws 3. 692 f. tl S' i)V rti TrpoopOv 
rtnt ravra , . oiJk i» -rart 6 lUpaiKht i-wl 
Ti)y 'KWASa o6d' iXXot odSeU irr6\ot ftc 
apliifat (ctX. aUrxftii>i 7Ci'»' -fiiwoarTo avroit 
ktX. ToWi. Si hlyaii' if rtt t4 t6t< yaiS- 
fum vepi fKrivor t6v v6\choi' ttj^ 'EWdcSos 
ovdafiws evtrx'^f^ova dv KaTTfyopoi . . cl ^^ 



KoiPtj Siar6ri/ia iffLimt rijv iTioOffOr SovXtiar 
kt\. 

' Mm. 93 1» (repeated in the spuriou 
tie virl. 377 li). 

* 517 oi'Siva Tt^U tatitv ifSpa AyaOlir 
yt-yofin-a to. xoXiriid if T^St rg riiXei. 

" Men. 94, Gunf. 526 b (U 5i »al 
iravv 4\\6yL/xos y^yove ital eij Toi)f AXXoi'S 
"EAX>}i>aj, 'ApufTtlSTft 6 Xvaipiixov [d-e virt. 



AUTHORITIES OTHEU THAN HERODOTUS 

note, some five or six times.^ On the other hand, Xerxes is named 
curiously often, and serves as a stock example of the results of 
tyranny, wickedness, and a ba<l odncation,* just ns the Persian consti- 
tution has been censured as despotic, and Persian culture as luxurious 
and intemi)erate.* In all thi-s, while there is much charucteristic of the 
media through which the tnulition of the Pcrsiati wars was transmitted, 
there is little, if anything, of definite historical moment added to the 
corpus of tradition itself. All the more strikinj^ are two concrete 
statements of quite fresh import, to be found in the Platonic writings. 
The authentic Laches advances as admittedly true a statement 
calculated to ilhiminate, if not to revolutionize, the conception of the 
last day's fighting at Platiiia, according to Herodotus.^ Unfortunately 
the passage reads like a distorted reminiscence of the description in 
Herodotus of the Spartan fighting at Thermopylai ; '' and though tlie 
one day ended with defeat and the other in victory for the Spartan 
arms, the absolute independence of the Platonic record, as genuine 
tradition, is far from incontrovertible. The rlonbtful or spurious 
Axiochos, winch at any rate may count jis an early and possibly fourth- 
century witness, fathers a strange tale on one Gobryas, a Magiaii, who 
reported that his grandfather and namesake bad been sent to Delos, 
at the time of the expedition of Xerxes, to keep guard over the 
island birth-place of the two ilivinities.*' The story, if tnie, might 
have a useful bearing on the question, how far religion and religious 
motives operated in the invasion of Greece. But the story looks only 
too much like an invention, devised in the interests of the Platonic 
doctrine of the immortality of the soul, the Persian or M^ian belief 
thereof being ingeniously traced to the discovery at Delos, on that 
occasion, of certain bronze tablets, which had been brought by Opis and 



Ffct 



879 o]. There is no special connexion 
witb the Persian war. 

> Men. 93 I), 99 B, Oorg. 503 c (with 
Kimon. MilliiKk-s Periktea), 515 u, 5t6i> 
(ostrakisni, anil liaiibhniciit), 519 A ; Rrp. 
1. S30 (hill witty ru)>ty to the Seriphian, 
ep. H(it. 8. Vib). In thesimriuiis Thtaget 
126 \ Themiitoklcs, Terikles, Kimou are 
cited a» r4 ToXiTcrA Stivi^. Hi* death 
xn exile i» poiiitetlly referred to, Ajiochoa 

Id D. AaiithipiMM is twice named iu 

labtful dialoftues, but mei-ely as thu 
fathrr of Perikles. Alk. i. 104 B, Mi-nrj; 
2$5 K. Pausanias ' the Lakcdainionian ' 
19 oieDtioued aa a gntut man nidy iu 
.^.2. 311 A. 

* Oorg. 488 D o6tm rh SUaior W«p«rcu, 
rir Kftlrro) roO ffrroiioi ipX'i" Kcd v\4or 

irl rifr "EXXdJa iarpdrtwrtr fj d wariip 
0tr«v «4ri ZtiiSai; C|i. Hep. 1. 33« A, 
Latet 3. 695 D ^kt^l H ^R/irioc « rj ^aat- 

VOL. n 



\iK^ Kol rpvipuxTji irdXiv TraiStvBclt waideif 
A^piifl. 'Q Aaptli, eirrely i(rri SiKiuiTaTor 
tcuti, 8i tA Kvpou Kanbv oik (fuiOff, iOpi^a 
Si 'Zlpi.ito r'c Tori aiTots fjOtai* in Aa-wtp 

iratJciujK -ffvL)u»ot iKyofot, vaparXi/aia 
drtr/Xcff'c rotj Kafi^ivov iraB^ttaffL. C|). 
A/L I. 105c (123.', Axioch, 371 A, 
' without pi-ejudioe *). 

^ L<iws 1. 037 11 (wliere Peniiang are 
class«d with Skyths, Thnikiana, Kelts, 
Ibtiriaus, Carthaginianx), 3. 698. 

' Lticha 191c AaKtSaiiiovioi,-i yip <paan> 
ir IIXarata?(, iirtiSij irpii Toti yt ppoiftipoa 
iyivorto, oiiK i6{\ti» fiiitoiiTixt wpis aOroitt 
HiXf<rS<u, dXXd ^i*7«u', ivuSfi S' iXM-qcaf 
ai Tii^ett tui» Wtpaiir, dfttarpufxifUiioin 
uxrwep irriat nix'"^"^ ^o' OiTU M/r^ai 
rJ|» ^Kti ^ixt"' ■^-■^. i^V^V X^Treil. 

» 7. 211. 

" Arioch. 371 A lipr) kbtA Ttji' Zip^cv 
iii^aaiv htX, 



i 



60 



HERODOTUS 



APP. I 



Hekaerge from the Hyperboreians,' and the occasion itself being 
purhapa hut. a vague reminiscence, or an exchange of circumstances 
between the first and the second wars. 

Plato, then, adds little if anything to the genuine traditions of 
the war, but he fiu-nislies more than one interesting and sigriificant 
commentary on the facts. His judgement on the war is that of an 
Athenian, and an Athenian of the old school. Plato judges tho 
Persian war to have been an unnecessary war, but not u trifling 
or an insignificant war. Athens of all Gn-ek states comes best out 
of the story, and the Athens of Marathon better than the Athens of 
Satamis. The conduct of Sparta was not quite beyond reproach, 
and the rest of the Greek states disgractd themselves. Of all the 
heroes of the war Themistokles stands highest, his name occurs 
most frequently. Of the battles Salamis is named some five tiuies,^ 
Plataia four times," Artemision tvrice,^ and Thermopjiai not at 
all. Plato sanctions 'the canal through Alhos,' and 'the bndge 
over Hellcapont,' but never commite himself to details in regard to 
figures, and ]>resents the facts for the most part in a sulilimated 
residuum. His references to tho war and to Pei"sian history 
generally seem traceable, notwithstanding some discrepancies, to the 
Herodotean story, reinforced by other ami independent sources. It 
remains only to add that the Platonic writings, in contrast with those 
of Thucydides and of Aristotle, know the war only aa the ' Persian ' 
war, in this respect agreeing with tho terminology of I.wkiates.' 

With Aristotle the war is habitually denominated the ' Median "^ 
war," but this reversion to tbo older terminology does not mark any 
essential reaction, in relation to this particular subject, against the 
Platonic atatidpoint, Aristotle in fact, as already indicated above, 
exhibits a suhstantiid agreement with Plato on three broad aspects of 
the question, save only that this agreement is qualified in two or three 
ways. With Aristotle the war is, if anything, more remote, and bis 
standpoint in view thereof is less distinctly Attic, or Attieized, while 
events aTid personages have dropped more than a jwg or two into the 
limbo of historic instances and logical illustrations. This mortal result 
is part of that general giowth of scholasticism, which infects the 
passage from Plato to Aristotle. Yet this degeneracy is not equally 
apparent in all the .rVristotelian writings, but varies to some extent with 
the subject and intereat of the particular treatise. It may, therefore, 



» Cp. Hdt. 4. 35. 

* Z^ws 8. 698 c (a mere date), 4, 707 
(not altnf^ether a benefit) ; JJentx. 241 
(W»), 245 a (the trophy). 

* Lttthci 191 c (a posaible novelty) ; 
Lau:K 3. 707c (final); JUenor. 241 c 
(inrerior to Maratlion, and to Snlatintt), 
246 A (tho Athenians iti the fourth 



century woiUil not shame the trophy by 
assisting the king). 

« Lan-s 4. 707, i/nirx. 241. 

" A lIcjxriKAc oToXo* Laws 1, 842 K, 3, 
692 p, 6[»8c ; 6 II. irtiKtfiot Mentx, 242 B. 

* 6 MnSiK^s r^Xc^or PosL An. 94 a, 
Pol. 1307 a. Td hiriSiKi. Metaph. 4. 
1018 b, P<a. 1308 a, 1303 b, 1304 a,. 
1341 a. 



^ 



}» convenient to distinguish the distinctly political works from those 
of logical or similar purport, and to allow here to the latter the pre- 
cedence which chronologiwilly belongs to thera. 

Thus, in the Metaphi/sicx the Median war serves as a sample of 
Ancient History, though not quite bo ancient as the Trojan: ' in the 
Posterior Amilylirs it occurs as an instance in which efficient causality 
am be shown as a middle term predicable of major and of minor.^ In 
the Sophi»tk Elejichs Themistokles does duty as the mere symbol of a 
man, where any other proper name would have served the turn as 
welL' In the Rhetoric, however, he appeare in historic circumstance, 
though still merely to point a distinction between the witness to a 
past event and the witness to a future event, in one boat, forsooth, with 
the oracle-mongora.* Aristeides is here in better case, being twice 
cited aa the just and \nrtuous man, but his virtue has nothing directly 
to say to the Median war.'' More in point is the notice of Salamis 
"•nd Marathon aa proper subjects for panegyric in Athens, though the 
purpose ill view would warn us, were it more fully exemplified, not to 
expect pure history.' Finally, the invasion of Xerxes sinks to a 
parudeiym,' and Xerxes himself swells to a pdorty or monster,* mere 
figures, that is, of rhetoric, mere details of literary criticism. After 
this descent it is refreshing to unearth, from the purely literary 
criticism of the Poetics, such an historical gem as the real, or supposed. 



' /.It wpirrpa yip r& Tpui'xi ru» Miy- 
SatHf, Sn TtppuiT(po» arfx" ''''>" "i"- 

* Lr, t6 ii iiii rl i Mri8iK6i wiXi/iot 
iyfvrTt 'Affii»al<ut; rii ahia toC roMntt- 
tioi 'A^vaioi't ; 6ti fit ^ptut fier' 
'BftrpUuir ^/fJo.\o» • TOVTO fip (Klnf(Tf 
TfiuiTor. wiXtfioi i<t>' oS A, -rparipov^ 
fir^oXfip B, 'Atfip>atai rh V. \nrd.pxti iii 
t4 B Ttf r, tA -wpbTtpor in^aXt'ir roif 
'A^ifroiott, ri j^ A ry B- voKtuaivi >i/> 
rntt wpin-tpor ilin~i\aa.iTtii. vytipx*^ ^P^ 
Ty iii9 B T.^ r tolt 'AOifalotf xpirtpoy 
•/ifi f^piar. fiiaop ipa xal iyraOea r6 
tJrum ri -rpurror Kirifaaw. This ileli^lit- 
fal psauLge, wlticli redupos rd MfiSixi to 
• lofpcal Kgure on the blackboard, refers 
plimmrily lo the Marathoniaii campjii^n, 
«Bd might have found a place in Ifdl. 

ty.-yr. Apj«niiix .\. §23. 

' 175 b r( yip ii.a.<fi4pti tpurqcat fl 

KAXXiaf Koi QfpXffTOK\if% ftOVClKpl flfflf 

Or i* there a latvtit rt-fercuce to the 
•acodote which was recorded by Ion, 
■ad rMppears ap. Plutarch. A'l'rn. 9, 
TXtmiat. i, and even in Ari9tn]>h. IVaapt, 
959, 989 ci9aplfetK yap ouk iiriaraiia.!. : 
cp. PlDtarcb, Tliein. «I. Bauer. 

* 1376 a wtpl Si napT6pbti> kt\. wtpl 
•/* ofo Tuir ytro/iifup ol rmoOroi ndprvptt, 
wtpl H rUf itroiUfwii cat oJ x/^fM^^^O'i 



olor Of^KTroxX^t, Sri ravitajpiTloo, t6 

" 1398 a yiKaiof tr 4'artlii, ti rpit 
' Apt<rTtliTfi> Kornptopovrra rovri th ttwtity 
(sc. av fiiy Ay 'A^otcISt)! o6k Ar irpololiis 
iyui a kt\.). 1414 b oIoK Sti Sti Toi)t 
Aya0oii% TifiSji, Sii xal airrit 'AptaTtliiif 
fwairtl 1490a (/'r. 83, Plutarch, Arixteid, 
27] merely points an hereditary quality 
of iptrf). 

* 1306 a tl nil fx"*/"' '^'' ^^ — aXof***! 
ravfiaxia' f) rtjn ^y MapaOCwt f^XV "'X. 
(how could xvL< praise the Athenians f). 
1411 a l> niontiuiui Salamis, iti citing 
a metApIiar from the Epiiaphios of 
Iiiokrates : 4fio» t/w iirl t<J! ritpip Tif tup 
iy 1.a\aiJ.lyi Tt\turria6.yTuy ntipaaOat rii* 
'EXXdSa Cn airfKaTaffavrofUyiji rp i-ptrg 
atrruv t^ {Xttidtplat. 

'' 1 ■'592 a b Ian ii r& flip wapaSeiy)ia 
TOi&ySe Ti, SiCTttp tt tij \tyoi Sri Sit 
wpbi ^ciXia TrapaaKfvitt(r6ai Kai n^ iar 
Atyinrroy x"p"«""'^<'i • nal yip Sapttat 
oi wpdripop itijiii rpiy Alyvrroy \apilp, 
Xa/Siiiy ti SU^i), naX irdXiK Z^^f oi' wplt- 
TipoP iirtxtip^at, wpir fXa^tr, Xo^uv ti 
iiijiil ■ Cxm Koi oCtoj, liii Xi/Sg, Siaftii- 
atrai- diA oi'n imptinioy. 

" Ilia quotation, 140(Sa ofef \vK6^pmp 
S4p^p triXupoP SpSpa. 



$ 10 



AUTHORITIES OTHER THAN HERODOTUS 



&3 



cinJly in Asia, to subjection ; but he never hints, or seems to 
gpect, that the one constitution through which Helleniam was to 
'exercise that sovranty of natural right was the Makedoniaii monarchy 
under his very eyes.* Aristotle is still immersed in the ])rejudice8 of 
the city-state ; but, less aristocratic, decidedly toss philo-Lakonian in 
his sympathies than Plato, ho reverts, even more distinctly than 
his mooter, to old Athens for his political ideal. From thi.s point 
of view the Persian war marks an era of decline in the state of 
Athens ; and Aristotle dials less with the antecedents and events 
of the war than with its sequelae. In tracing them he involves 
himself in a serious inconsequence, which is surely duo to an 
historical misconception. Tht"; inconsequence lies in ascribing to 
the war double and contrary otFects upon the constitution of Athens, 
an ag'.Tandizement of the democracy, an aggrandizement of the 
.aristocracy.* The misconception arises out of a false inference from 
the attack by Ephialtes on the Areiopagos in 462 B.v.,^ coupled with 
the distorted history of that institution current in the fourth century 
at Athens. The Atthidographs of that period antedated the demo- 
cratic institutions of the state, and exaggerated the demotic ethos of 
pro-Persian Athens. Some reformers also desired to restore the 
^ .)« to the ]X)Rition which it had fx hiq^tlkf-si enjoyed before 

. nay, before Solon. To both aides alike an attack upon the 
Areiopagos and its powers, seventeen years after the battle of Salamis, 
\«-aa only intelligible on the suppcsition that the Senate had recovered 
powers and authority, of which it had been shorn by the fathers of 
the Democracy, Solon and Kleisthenes. In truth the previous loss of 
jMwer had not been so great as was supposed, and the supposed 
recovery of powers was an illusion. Perhaps the first great blow to 
the Areiopagos, apart from the competition of the Solonian and 
Kleisthenic Boului, was conci-alod in the introduction of the Lot for the 
Archontate, shortly after the battle of Marathon ; but that reform 
vrould scarcely have had time to make itself fully felt by the date of 
the invasion of Xerxes. The Areiopagos may well have shown itself 
operative, efficient, patriotic, during the crisis of the war. But the 



' 1S95» 8c& yap tA SovXtKilrrrpoi ttrai 

•I H wtpl rJ)!- 'A(rlai> rCiv TtfA rV 
WtfAt i)», OrrofUroiin riji' 3«nroTi«cJ)i> 
i(^X^ oi/3^r iiiaxtfnlform. Cp. 1327 b 
(tA T(i» 'EW^i'tiii' 7^i'oi) i\fu6(p6r rt 
3<«rcX<t iiai pfXTiara. iro\tTtvi^nH> ital 
ttfAturo' ipXtw rdfTur, /udf T\rfgi:in» 
(On the ' Physics and Politics' 
thi* paasage c[>. notes to Hdt. 9. 

• 1274 It Tijt Kafopx'"* y^fi O" '"<'" 
M'tfiuoa 6 iTifiot ofriot ■ytp6pupm 4if>pairri- 
tiarifflhf, <ai iritiayuyain fXa/ie ipauXoif 
imMtDstrtvoiUrwr rCn ittuiKuw, 1804 ■ 



i) c¥ 'Kptlif '*iyii> ^ovhi] tifSaitiif/iiraira, ir 
ToU M))J«iroIf fSo^e avvTontiripai) Tot^tti 
rV ■woKmlar, xai rdXtv 6 i»oi>thi6i flx^<" 
ytrbfuoo^ aCriof T^t irepi Xa\aiura r(«tiji 
xal SiA raiTiit rijt Jiytftorlat itd t^jk ««t4 
9d\arTtLr dCryafUV rifv iijuoKparlar lirxvpo- 
rtpay iroLifatit. 1341 a (rjcoXajTiKun-tpot 
yh-p ytyydtufoi Sii. r&t iviropiat nol firyaXo- 
\f/vx6Tepoi irpitt apcH)*, fri Tt wpbrepor 
nol tucri tA Mi^JtuA ^poiriiiM,TiC$iirrt% 4k 
Tu)v tpyuf, trdints IJTTomo Ma#i^e<in, oCStf 
SiaKpiyovTtt iW in^Tovirrii ktX. 

' 1274 > TTjK fiir iv 'Apflip rdyip pov\iir 
'E<pii\Ttit 4K6\oii<rt, rd H iixairHipia 
fuaOo^pa KoriaTTtat Ilf^/cX^ (eiueudeJ). 



54 



HERODOTUS 



AFP. I 



<lirect and nett result of the war was assuredly the increaae of the 

tlemocratic power and ethos in the state, until thej found vent in 
the legislation of Ephiakes and of P<?rikU'8. It is no solution of the 
Axisbotelian antinomy to say that the Athenian state as a whole was 
enlarged and strengthened by the efforts and the rewards of the great 
struggle, each element, aristocratic, democratic, profiting in the 
common movement : the argument deals with the relative iiggrandize- 
ment of internal factors. A state cannot liccome both more aristocratic 
and more democratic at the same time. Our conclusion may well be 
that the Areiopagos had retained more powers down to the Persian 
war than Aristotle and the fourth century generally conceived, and 
that the great legislation of Ephialtes, which followed not long after 
the crowning victory of the Eurymedon, was not a democratic 
restoration but a democratic advance, bringing the institutions of 
Athens into harmony with the heightened consciousness of individual 
worth and common achicveraent, on land and sea, which was the 
natural product of some twenty, or even thirty yeai-s of warfare, 
sacrifice, and victory. However that may be, behind the Aristotelian 
antinomy or paradox there rises the historic witnc^is to the service of 
the citizens at Salamis, otherwise imleed still l>et.ter known, and the 
service of the Senate in the hour of need, which is a Jail vmiveau, 
acceptable and eminently characteristic of such a corponition, as the 
Areio]>ago8 still was at the date of the invasion. Apart from this 
most interesting theorem the Politirs offer scarce any contribution 
directly to the subject of the Persian war. No battle but Salamis is 
mentioned ^ : none of the heroes are named save Pausanias, for his 
subsequent coup d'/tat,- and Xerxes, merely in the hour of his death.* 
For the rest, the Metlian war is merely a date, an epoch ; though this 
fact is itself significant.* 

Whether the 'Adijvalotv Trokirela is very Aristotle, or, as seems 
infinitely more probable, only very Aristotelian,* it has in four 



' 13(M K ; cp. mipra. 

^ 1307 H idv rij lUyat § iral Swdnit»oi 
In ful^uK tbiai, Xva tiooapxv, Ccartp iv 
AaxcSaf^ovi SoKii Wavtravlas 6 arparTi- 
TtJitoi xarA rbtr "SlifiiKir ■r6\tfioi'. From 
hiiji Aristotle, of coursf, diutinguishcs 
Uawarlai 6 jSairiXtCt (1301 b. 1333 b), 
• distinction oWiternted in the /ndtx 
ArisloU.Hcta (Boiiitz) ; cp. Hdt. 9. 7ti. 
A third I'ausanias, the assassin of Pliili{ik 
oocors 1^11 b. 

* 131 1 b. The sonrce might well be 
Kteiiiaa. 

* 1303 a iv tipovn rp-niOiirnar kbX 
a,iro\on(»ui> roWuf yniiiplfujy iJTi tup 
'larirfuy tiiKpAn OffTepon nir >li;3iKurv 
IhjUoicpaTla ifivrro ix woXireJat (cj). H<)t. 
1. 170). 1303 b oToi' iv *E<ma(^ avvi^i) 
furik rd Mi)^urtl. Aristotle, liko Tbucy- 



dides, eviilently makes ri. TiiiSiiti end 
with Herodotus. 

' (I) The treatise can be dated be- 
twecii 329 B.C. (c. r>4) and 32& B.C. (c. 
46), or certainly beToi-e the legislation 
of Deijietrios. It is later than the 
Politics. Aristotle died in 322 B,c. 
(2) It was one of 168 similar trcalisps, all 
alike ascribed in antiquity to Arintotle : 
did he writ« them all with his own 
hand, and after tliis one ! (3) Tbe snp- 
]N)siiion tliHt tho truati^es were written 
on Aristotelian liDoa and under Aristo- 
telian auspices fully nieoCii the case, and 
has many analo<^e9 in its favour. (4) 
The atylistii: arttumeut is iiieonclusive ; 
also (5) tbe material argtiraeut that the 
history in the treatise ia bad, especially 
the early hiatory. 



10-11 AT 



PIES OTHER THAN HERODOTUS 



55 



respects enriched our materials for the hifitory of Athens in the 
[period of the Persian wars, without adding any item to the actual 
kistory of the warfare itself. (1) The inner history of Athens between 
the dates of Marathon and Sulaniis bis been illuminated by the 
l^account of the Reform of the Archontate, and the operation of 
strakism, throughout tlie decade.* (2) The naval law of Tliemihtokles 
lias l)een more clearly diited, defined, and presented than heretofore.^ 
(3) The exact nature of the service of the Arciopa.ihte Senate in the 
supreme crisis of Athens, which was taken for granted in the Politics, 
is here described.^ (4) The legend of Themistokles, and indeed the 
Fgend of Aristeides, are developed before our eyes, in a way calculated 
to arouse a deep distrust of the authorities upon which this portion of 
the tract was based. This last item hardly belong.s to our present 
labject, but falls to the historian of the PaiiekonUuleriA * ; the first three 
ems can be more fully and more conveniently discussed in another 
connexion.'^ It only, therefore, remains here to notice that, as in the 
Politics so in the Polity nf Alh&a, the ' Median ' war has become a 
date, a convenient era, by which to fix events t^itally unconnected 
with the war itself : * the aupriL'me significance of the battle of Salamis 
for Athens receives the like homage, by the chronological purjjose it 
srves.^ No other battle of the war is named, and, as in the Politics, 
ao other personages excepting Pausanias, and he, not for his victory 
ftt Pliitaia, but for his outrageous conduct thereafter.'' 

§ 11. During the period which may here be called the Greco- 
Makedonian, or Hellenistic period,* historicjil Hterat\xre miflTers an 



' c 22. « i6. § 7. 

» c. 23. 

* It mny, howerer, be worth while 
to note that the '\0, iroX. acceutuates 
lie Aristoteli&n antiuomy, above anft- 
rzed, ill two (larticulars : (a) by making 
lie eevcnth Coustiturion ' tliat wliioh 
tceeeded the Median wars, niider the 
'laprein&cy of the Areiojiagos,' and the 
eighth <.'onstitution ' tiiat nketchcd 
by Ariiteidea and nocomnli.sliad by 
KphialtM,' c. 41. (6) By making 
Tnemiatokles jolut-aathor of the over- 
throw of the Areiopagog, c, 25. The 
tr*«tisc adds two further absurdities of 
Liu own. (c) Id c. 28 Theuustokleis and 
kriateidea arc o|iringed to otie another 
the re9|iective loaders of the Demos 
loTerument) and yrJipinoi (opjMisition), 
ad in c 24 AristHdes is re|irpscnted 
tlui aathor of extreme doiuocnitic 
•Telo|iin«nta. {d) lu c. 41 E|>hiaIteH 
'eoroplotia the democmtic constitution ; 
in cc 2S, 27, after hiii death, IVrikles 
attil farther devc]oi>!i R.nd agpiraiidizt-a 
the democracy. If Theiniiitokleg took 
jtjw.place of Ariatcidea in c. 24, if 



Themiatoklea and Perikles took the 
filacea of Ariat^ideg and Egdiialtea in 
c. 41, the historical sketch of tlie 
FdUekontaeUru given by the trat-t would 
preaent a leas improbable and a more 
oonaiatent result 

• Apjiendix HI. § 4 infra. 

" fieri, rd M»Ju-d 23. 1, 26. 1, 41. 2. 

' c. 23. 4 Irtt rplrifi fitri, rifp ir 
Xa\afuin rnvftaxiaii (formation of the 
Athenian syinniachy) ; 27. 2 /juri Si 
rti» iv XaXa^Ufi ¥a.i'n<ixla¥ i»6t Sri mrti- 
KO<m} (t€i (outbreak of Pelopounesian 
war). 

<■ 23. 4 iwl ii rV iritrraeir r^ 
tUv 'Iwfitf*' iwb TTJs riiv Xandainoriur 
(fvfiiiaxiai 'Api(rT«(Jij' ?» o T/)OTp^\(ot, 
rrifi^at roivt Adirupai iiajit^Xijuirovs SiA 
IIai<<rai'la>'. This |)as8agt' hna another 
value too, in its bearing n|>ou Hdt. 9. 
92. 106. 

• On the terms cp. Holm, HiM, of 
Greece, E.T. iv. 5 ff. , where the i>olemio 
n^ainat Droysen's tcrni' appcani to me 
c.xa^erated ; but the substantive UelUn- 
isni certainly cannot bo restricted to the 
culture of this period. 



56 



HERODOTUS 



APP. I 



extraordinary and prolonged eclipse. No works have come down to 
us belonging to the generations hctwefin Philip II. and Perseus. The 
historic literature produced during the interval, whether it dealt with 
contemporary or with past events, has all alike perished, or lives only 
in ao far Jis .sutjsumod into the works of writers of the Greco-Komaii or 
Roman perio<J. To be strictly acciimte, we have no extant historic 
literature between Xenophon and Polybios.' Even for oui' knowledge 
of Alexander's achievement's anil adventures we are dependent upon 
such later writei-s as Diodoros, Arrian, Plutarch. The-^e writers had, 
indeed, primary soiircea on which to draw of quite exceptional merit^, 
and the results for the life of Alexander leave comjiarativuly little to 
be desired. For the succeeding section, until the history of Greece and 
of the Med-iterranean world becomes, in the jmgos of Polybios, merged 
in the triumpharit record of Rome, we have to be content with mere 
fragments and scraps, and those not contemporary with the events. 
How fareil the traditions of the Persian wars throughout that period 
it is hard to saj". Were they overwhelraod in the rapid changes of 
power and fortune among the Duidochoi, and forgotten during the 
refornjation of the Greek world into the new system of relatively large 
political units and unions t Were they conned and recommitted to new 
forms by the scholars of an ago, when science and letters were becom- 
ing more and more of a profession 1 Were they ever appealed to, in 
a practical sense, by orators of Greek states, still struggling for a shadow 
of freedom "i There were not wanting events, which might have 
challenged such analogies. Exactly two centuries after the invasion of 
Xerxes, and but forty-four yofirs after the death of Alexander, the 
Greeks at Thermopylai successfully withstood the assault of swarms of 
Gallic barbarians led by Brennus, and Delphi again witnessed a great 
deliverance, far more formidable in realitj'' to the temple and its 
treasures than ibe visitation of the Persians ; but for our knowledge of 
these events we are dependent on three late authorities, the earliest of 
which merel_y refers en ^ws.^ant to the destruction of the Gauls at Delphi, 
while the second and third depict the occurrences in terms more and 
more highly charged with colours from the Herodotcan palette.^ One 
remarkable <locument emerges from the literary darkness of this transi- 
tion to illustratu the survival, in learned corners, of the bare facts of the 
old story, and something more. The PARIAN Chronicle* })re8ents, or 
rather presented, a somewhat arbitrary sketch of Hellenic history from 

' Op. A. Schaefer, Abrix: der Qiullrn- 
kuncU i." §§ 23-54. 

^ (1) Polyb. 1. 6. 5, P)-rrlius entered 
Italy TV wfibTtpm Irei r^t rCiv raXaTwy 
i<p6iov, Tuv rt rfpl .AcX^otVi <f>8ap4vTtii>', 
Kai TVF irtpaiuiQivTuv fii -r^v 'Aaiar : cp. 
2. 20. 6, 2. 35. 7, 2. 46. 1. PolybioN 
does not mention the battle at Thermo- 
pylai, which apiHiars, with oilier details, 
in (2) Diodoros, Pragg. 22, 9 (cd. Tcwbncr 



iv, 306 ff.). Finally, tbo whole story is 
found, M'itb fuller UeroJottian motift, in 
(3) PaiisaniM 1. 4. 1-5, 10. 19-23. Were 
the Parian Chronicle complete, perhap-s 
this event would be foand recorded in 
it. The date of llio Keltic invtution is 
280 B,c, 

* Cp. F. .lacoby, Das Marmor Parivm, 
Berlin, \WA. 



AUTHORITIES OTHER THAN HERODOTUS 

the oceessiou of Kekrops to the Archontate of Diognetoe, 264-3 B.C. 
The lines which record the Persian war are fortunately preserver! and 
decipherable, and not devoid of a special intprest.' The space devoted 
to the subject is relatively large. The record is enhanced by the 
comparative rarity of sucli notices on the stone : thus, previ<jns to the 
battle of Marathon, the only wars specified are the Arjfive-Theban war,- 
the Trojan war,' the Sacred war,* and the war of Kyros against 
Kroisos ■' ; while the first battle mentioned after Plataia is Leuktra": 
thus the Persian wars are set in high relief. The events of the two 
campaigns selected for mention are also noticeable : the bridging of the 
Hellespont, the canal of Atho.s the 'battle' in Thermopylai, the naval 
'victory ' for the (Jreeks at .Sidamis, mark the campaign of Xerxes, and 
the archontate of Kalliades.^ For the next yejir the battle of Plataia ia 
recorded as a purely Athenian victory over Manlonios, the general of 
Xerxes, and his death in the battle is specified.* The ijcrversc Atticism 
of this passage, in which more credit is given lo the Athenians for 
Plataia than for Salamis, goes beyond anything in evidence from earlier 
sources, yet it but marks the climax of a process of appropriation, which 
the fourth-century orators had in their time promoted. The items of 
general history in this Cfironicle have been, with high probability, 
referred to Epboroa (ko far as his work extended)*; but Ephoros 
certainly did not justify this wholesale plagiarism of Sparta's victory. 
Some fifty years '" after the era of the Parian Ohrofiidf, Lykiskos, an 
Akamanian orator, pleading at Spartii the cause of Makcdon and 
Achaia against Komc and Aitolia, appeals to the memory of the 
Persian wars, in three defLuite particulars," to prove that the men of 



* Epr. «8. 61, B3, n. 62, 63, 6&-68. 
» Ep. ja, 1. 37. 

• Kp. 33. I. 38. 

* Ky. 37, 1. 62. 
» Ef>. 48. 1. 67. 

* Ei>. 73, IL 83 f. (The AnaJbasit of 
Kyros is given Aju. 64, I. 78.) 

tir *EXXi;irirAKTuH hai rin 'AHiii Siiipi'^e, ical 
it Ir 6<p(iofir(l(07)\ai« ^t^X^ i'jtreTO, tal 
nvnaxln rotf 'KXXijcri Vfpl ^Xa^i'ra roin 
Wipcax, fpt irlKiiir ti "^XXijifft, trt] 
liHAPII, i.fix"*''^'^ 'K/Hpir)ai KaXXidJot', 

• 93. i-<t>' <^ ri if (68) nXaToiait ftdxri 
tyivtro ' Mrtvaiott wfiit Mapiivior rif 
^piov VT(MTyjy6>i, fle inlKUif 'Adi/vaiw, 
tal MapHrtof trtXcvntatv iv rp iiixt^' 
lat t6 wvfi tpirt) ([y] (tiO) SiKcXIai -mpl t^v 
htmir. In) UHAri, S.pxorrot ' X6-fynfai 

• imrohy, op, <•• xiv. 

•• 210 B-c, ; op. Freeman, Hint, of 
Fmitrat Oov." \\ 451. 

^^ (I) The outm^in on tho envoy of 
XerxM {tie), (2) tlic heroisni of Leoniilas 



and hi» men, (3) the vow to ' b«titho ' 
the Theban* (sic) ; cp. Polyb. 9. 38. 2 ff. 
rffot x^P^' vtroXau^ivcTt toi^j vfifTifiOit 
irpoyityot'Tt d^dptt AafCfSat^u^t^iOc, xad' o^c 
itaipoi>t Zifii'>l% dir/iTTetXe wpie^vntf 
Trpit v/iai, 6dup Kal yrjr alToiitffot, drill- 
<rairra% it rd ^p^ap rbr wapayryorliTa, 
Kol Trftoircwt^iWoirrat t^t y^f, Kt\tvtiy 
Qiro"y7frXai rijJ ^ip^ji, Siirri irapd AaKeiai- 
fiorlwv Ix't til Kari. rifii irayytXitt.i', Otup 
Kal y^r ; rinot -riXi* idtXor-niv xal wpo- 
6i)\un i^opiMif aroBaroviUrovt toC'S r<pl 
AetafiSitr ; ip' oix ^>^ iiiuci ^li) nbrov 
TTJt airiiir, i\\& col rf/t tuik dYXiiw 
'EXXi^u*- iXtvdtplat rpCKiySvytCttr ; 9. 
39. 4 f. «raXdi» 7*. raiTiii rijt wntxaxtat 
fifTatrx'ii' Kard wpoatptijiv, dXXait yt xai 
A^aKtSaitiorloit inrdpxorrai, ol 71 ftrifiaiovt, 
rods Jcar' ariyxTir Jiavxia" iytir (iouXtv- 
aafUnvs /tiyovt tQ* 'EXXi^vuv xard r^c 
Tuv HfpaCif t^xttov, iifrntplaarro itKurtu- 
atut TtHt Otaiit, Kpar^airrtt Tif rroKifUfi 
Twy fiapfiipur. These Btatemcnts difler 
in xevenil obvioiia details from the stories 
in Hdt. 



66 



HERODOTUS 



APP. I 



Lakedaimun ought now to join or head the cause of Hellenic liberties 
agiiinst the barbarians of the west, as erst ag.iinst the barbarians of 
the easL.^ But we must take the report of this oration on trust 
from POLYBIOS, whose birth probably fell some years later than 
the date of the confort-nce at which this appeal was addressed to 
the SjKirtans. Polybios hinaaelf must have been acquainted with 
the history of the Persian ivara in the work of Ephoros^ but he 
makes little use thereof.'^ The chief war with Persia for hiiu, indeed, 
is the conquest of Asia by Alexander,^ but he has no occasion to 
celebrate it. For Polybioa the greatest of all wars, expressly greater 
than either PelojKi'niiesian or Persian, was the first Punic war, 
especially for its continuous length, and the magnitude of the ships 
and navies employed.* The old Persian jrower, in its I'igid confine- 
ment to Asia, supplies him with one of several contrasts to the 
greatne.ss of the lionian,-^ and the passage of Xerxes into Europe 
serves him as an epoch-making event:" but such invasions of 
barbarian hordes Polj'bios accounts more alarming than really 
dangerous, and easily to be averted by inferior numbers of valiant 
men fighting for fatherland and freedom."^ The dama'.;e infliL-ted upon 
the Athenians, though it involved the evacuation of their land, and 
the destruction of their city, was tran.sitory, and converted to their 
ultimat-e aggrandizement.* Naturally Polybios censures the conduct 



' Ct>. e. 49. 3 ft, where Polybios 
himsclr iioiiita out tliat the Spartans 
afterw&riia, for the sake of tlieir own 
aupremocy in Greece, oOr toltniaav itaxb- 
)ixyoi, raiJroiT aS^i; vrituivat woiiiit rb 
Trf>o<rTaTT6fiefoi'. iwnropiiiotiivoii fiir yip 
ToM ll^piTaT (vIkwv, 6iayij)Vii6tifiiM wifii 
Tifs Tuir 'EXXtJcui- iXfv$cpiaf {rapt\$ouat 
Si Kal ifn/yo'iirii' rpcPSuiKav inSliToi't rit 
'FiWriKiSat iTilXfU Kara tt)¥ it' ' XinaXxloau 
ytvofUrriv flpi)yrir, X^P"" '"''' xpij^tiTwv 
eiiwoprjaai vpds tt}* xari ruv 'EXXi]<'(tfi' 
SvpoeTtla*. 

" Cp. S 9 tupra. 

' Cp. 3. 6, 4-H, wliere lie di-icussca 
the true aWai row irpUt rodt lUpcat 
iro\(tu>ii. The uw of the term 6 Hepffixbt 
wiXf/Mn for war with P«rse«e of Makedoo 
(27. 13. 8) is Tfmarkable. 

* 1. 63. 4-8 iriXe^oj Cjy ^W't Ifffuv, 
dicoQ liaBboTtt, ToXuxpoKiiiiraTOf Kal irvy- 
ex^rraTot Kal lUyirroi . . el S4 nt 
povkriOdTi vvWoylaaffffai ttjc Sta^^opAv 
Twy vevTiipiKuiy rXoiuiy TrpAt rit Tpi-/ipti%, 
att o{ T( n^/Krai wp6t Toin 'EXXTjKai, xai 
raXi» '\8f)yiuai icai AaKcJaiftAviM wpdi 
dXXiiXoi/t /rai'^dxoi'V' ci'i' Sjt Ka9!i\oii 
Svpt}0«Iti TTf\ticatrTas Suydfifii cirpfiv iv 
8a,\i.rTT) ii-qyiayuffUvai. This pifKajt^ 
reifls, both ia f'trni Aud subiitiiuue, like 
a remiuiscence of Hdt. aud Thuc. 



'I. 2. 2 Uipvtu Kord ricat icw/wt't 
H.c-fi,\T\r dpxV KOLTtfTi}aavTO Kai Svra- 
(rrtlay • dXX' oo'dftir iTliKfUfaay Cirtpfi'^rai 
Toi/i TTJt 'Aalat Spovt, oi/ fiiyor vwip rijt 
ipXV^ dXXd KO-l Tepl (Ttpum iKiyiOyevaan. 

* 3. 22. 2. The first treaty Ix-tween 
Rome aud Carthngc is diit"-d twenty-eifrht 
years bofore the invaaton of Greece by 
Xerten (r^t 'S.ip^ou Siafiiatut tk rJj* 
'EXXdSa). 

' 2. 3.*). 7 f. Kal yiip ToOt Hjr flrpffir 
ttjtoSor irl r^y 'EXXdSa Kal TaXarur irl 
A<X0oi>t tit iurfiii.i]v (cal Tapiioaiy ritwr 
6iyayl>yTti, oi luKpk fieyiXa i' olo/iai 
ffi'/i^liX^fiat xp6t TOiH vrip rrft KOirtjt 
TWM 'EXXi^fur 4\tv8eplat iyCiyat- ofrt 
yip xo/'TV"^''' aCd' SirXuv, oCt' iySpuy 
rr\fi8oi iraTorXoTrit if Tit oiroffTaiij t-^ 
TfXtirraiat ^rlBot, Tofl BtayuiylftaOai irept 
TTit (Tperipat X*^!^^ "^ trarpiSot, Kal 
^unj/iovd'biv 6<rat p^vpidSai xai rlvat r^XMor 
Kol vr}\iKat rapaiTKCvat i) ruiy <riy y<f Kal 
ftfri. \oyurfiov KiySirytvimtinr alptait cat 
i/iyaiut KaStiXfy. 

' 38. l^ fUyuTTor 17 rOxv ioKel ^>6^w 
i-ruTTTfaai roii "EXXija-i (tori t^k "Zipiov 
iii^aco) tit r7)» E«/p<iT»)*' rtrrt yip 
iKiySi'vtvffay nhi Ti.yrit, (rraiaar ii 
TfX^fajT 6\tynTT0if /idXurra ii roi^rwr 
'.K^Tiyaiof trpotiSJtityoi yi.p i fi.ipp6vii>t rA 
ItiXKoy, iifXiWoy rtjr warplSa luri. Tito-ur 



AUTHORITIES OTUER THAN HERODOTUS 



of the ThebatiB at the time, which be aacnbes simply to their fears, 
and a love of peace at any price, and in this cortdemnatioii Pindar is 
expresdly involved by name.' Thus in general terms Polybios reflect* 
upon the perraanent lessons of the Persian war, but contribute* 
nothing to tlie details, except a transpurent mistake or two.^ He 
never names a single battle of the war, and the two great Athenians 
whom he does happen to mention by name are cited, not for their 
services during the war, but for tlieir roputiition as statesmen." 
Polybios never names Herodotus, but hn inherited from Ephoros the 
idea of a universal history and appiietl it to the absorption of the 
Mediterranean world by Rome* He himself behehl and recorded the 
int of the black cloud from the west,* which shrouded Hetlas in 
misery, passing, in his opinion, that of tottil annihilation itself.' 
Polybios made his own peace and found his welfare with th«j barbarian 
conquerors. But the first Greek historian of Rome was still too 
deeply immersed in the categories of the City-state, inherited from 
Plato and Arihtotle, even to reap the full political moral of hia tiwn 
age, much less to foresee the fate of the Iloman constitution, wliich be 
admired as one in kind with the Spartiin in it.s prime: he failed to 
prognose the consequences for the state and the individual, involved 
in the gr»?at process of which he was the historian. Small blame to 
him therefor : the Roman Republic, the cotisLitution of which, 
however superior to Sparla and to Athens, was stitl a mere city-state, 
died hard : a century later than Polybios, Cicero still di<l not quite 
despair of it, though monarchy had been atlvancing in one form or 
another all the time, and philosophers of the Garden and of the Porch 




a^oit ^r-ijpeyicf Kf>pt« yip ytyriOivra oi 
fidpfiapM, ntptlrt iit<t>6(ipar riif ' \6i}va.^- 
ov ftijr drcidof oi*i' alffy/tmjv^ rh A' ivoLyrlov 

iuyi9nfi> (iin^rYiray, Stj Tdyra ii> iXiaitoyi 
Hfttr^i, r^f ainip riixv tXXofTO K(nrii)i>€ii> 
TMt d^Xoit 'EWi^ri, Totyapoi/r ira\^ 

It}>rar i«cTTjiTorTO tt)k irciTplia urttl rifr 
iwriir j^Jipai', dX\d «al irepl t/)i r^y 
4XXtf>' 'hI\Xi^wi> tiytfioyUit lif' iKlyoi' 
%it^trfi^«vp wpit AaKticuiioriont. 

* 4. 31. 5 Qi'Si yip Bi/^afat/r itrawovfui' 
c«tA t4 Mifjixd, iiiri Tiir Irrip ttji 
*JCkW3of iwoariyrts xtpSi'vuti; ri IIcpiruK 
Sti ri» ^fiay oiSi lUriapoy 
vo^ri.)uvo¥ niVoit Ayur rfji' ijavxtv 
T^rit rur irotTfudTwr rrV Op. § 3 



m 



• Cp. p. 57 note 11 supra. 

' Ariateitle* is twice mcntinned : 0. 
23. 4 (with I'eriklea) as a sound «t»t«a- 
D. ill contrast to liitor doroaeogues ; 
i. 4 f. (witb Epamc-iuoudas) as an 



)ione8t man, iu nionpy mutters (but not 
<>i]iial to L. AemiliUN Paului). 

TheTiiistoklea in mentioneil onc«, and 
posailily the ppocli nf tlie Persian war is 
in vitiw ; 6. 44. 2. Athens was unstahle 
compared with Rome, but had her )iioaX 
men and iker great inonients : icai yip 

rg Qtiu<rroK\ioit iprr^ (riwa»tfiJffo<ra. 

* 2. 37. 4 w Twdt irpd^ut, naOirtp ol 
Tpi riiiu)v, alof rdf 'IiX\T)i'ixdt <) lltpaitdt, 
ofioO a rdi iv roU yytapifoft/fitoit /Upt^i 
T^i olKO\iiUin\% ayaypi<ptir itriKfX'^R'^^M"- 

' 9. 37. 10 TjjXixoCTOf yi<pas iwi rijt 
iaripat, i itoTd ixi» ri rap6y ttut xpiimut 
iriaKorfiafi Ma«8(H»i, »tar4 Si rb avytxit 
traaur IcTou roTt "EXXifcrt pxyiXtjy KaKMi 
alTlB¥, 

" 38. 1* KaOi^o* ToO» firrat ^tri 
rtfujplat iXftivoripovt vofiitoiity rur iv 
Toi» ifuKM iKKtmltmiiy riu> filor, Kari 
Too-ofn-o Kol rdi rjre irepiirtrtlal Tiir 
'EWi^vbM' (Xftwari p9.i yomffrioy rC/y vvfi- 
fiirrair Kapx^io'io'f "'X. The whole 
passa^ has served as model for DioJoros 
32. 26. 



60 



HERODOTUS 



APr. T 



had come from Hellas to Rome carrying the anodyne for subjection, the 
indifference or the superiority of the imlivitlnal to all his suiTOiindings, 
with them. Cicero, whose mind ching to the political ideal of the 
City-stJitc ' while a wliolo world was waiting for reorganization, sought 
light or alleviation in his hour of need from the precedents afforded 
by Greek history. Hia own exile was consoled, if we may believe 
Dio Cassius, by the precedents of Themi8Ujkles and Aristeidcs.* Ho 
judges Pomi>ey'9 strategy, in quitting llomc and Italy, in the light of 
the evacuation of Atticsi by Themistokles and the Athenians.' In 
his eyes Caesar is a now Peisistratos,* and his assassins are ' tyranni- 
cides,' liberators, like Harraodios and Aristogeiton.'* The immense 
erudition of Cicero is familiar with Herodotus, whose nsine here first 
meets us in the Latin tongue, and Tnlly cites freely the leading names in 
historiography from Herodotus to Epiinros, from Ephoros to Polybios.* 
Cicero is deeply versed in the Themistoklean legend, and Themistokles 
fills a larger space in his \mtings than in taken by any other Greek 
atatesman.^ Aristeides too is there, of course, a* the rigbt<eou a,^| 

41 



^ Cicero aeenn never to have grasped 
the fundnnieiitHl not-d of his ago, which 
was the reorgatii/tatioo of tbo Mediter- 
ranean world, only to be elTevted andor 
a cvutnilizod utid niotinrcliic govornttn-iit. 
Hut hta ideal of a nioderaior lUi publicae 
was n conces-iion in advance to the 
Angiistan re^mu and the I'rincipate, 
even though the aim and objpct of the 
prini'e, in Gicero's plan, waa to Im the 
happiiiesa and welfare of tlio eitizf.iis, 
not of the Hiibjoots, of the Romans 
rather than of the Romnn worlil ; cp. 
adAtt. S. U. 

' Cp. tlie conversation of PhULskos 
with Cicero rBj)ortcd by Dio Caaa. 38. 
28, iaclofling the mnxim so atterly 
sabvenive of the ohi order : airrbt 
txiurrm aCrrif Kal irarplSa Kal ti'im/ioptay 
ael Kal roi^oxou irwei (jj 2). 

' ad All. 7. 11. 3 Urbem tu reliuquas? 
ergo idem, si GalH vt-nircnt. ' Noii est ' 
inquit 'in parietibai res jnubltca." At 
Id aris et focis. ' Fecit Themistoclea ; 
flucttim cuiiti totius Iwrlmriao fcrrc urbii 
ana non poterat' At idem Pcridea non 
fecit, etc Cp. also ad Fam. 2. 12. U (a 
pasasge misnnderstowi by Orelli, aiui 
others, to refer to the exile and restora- 
tion of an individual). 

* ad AU. 8. 16. 2. 

* Tymnnootoni, ad Ait. H. 15. 2, 
16. 15. 3; Harniodius mid Aristogiton 
aa patriots, Tux. IHnp. 1. 49. 116; nostri 
Uberatorca, ad AU. 14. 12. 2. 

' Cp. especially de oral. '1. §S 51-58. 
Polybioa ia mentioned not there, but 



elsewhere (e.g. dc re pub. I § 34, 2 
g 27, 4 § 3>. Herodotus is named at:d 
tiled by Cicero more than a dozen limes : 
for reff. cp. Orelli's OtunmastUon, and 
Freund's Cieero Hintorieits. In the 
ceiobrateJ lottei' to Luucoius, Cicero seems 
to regard Hdt. lu a panegyrist of Tbemi- 
stocles {ad Fam. 5. 12. 7). Cicero is 
our authnrity for calling Hdt. 'the 
futlmr of History' [de Itgg. 1 § 5 et 
apud llerodotum, {latreni historiaa, et 
apnd Thvo[ioniintm sunt inuumerabiles 
fuhnlai'). Cicero's notes on Hdt. are 
largely concertied tvith the question of 
style : the material citations arc mainly 
from Bk. 1. 

' There are upwards of three dozen 
])a8sage8in uhiodi Theniiatoklesisname^l: 
among the point.* eliicidntcd arc the 
following: (1) ld.'» date, eouteniporary 
with Coriolanus, Brut. §§ 28, 41 ; cp. 
Lael. § 42. (2) Uis evacuation of the 
city, ad AU. 7. 11. 3, ad Fain. 5. 12. 5; 
cp. dr. off'. 3 § 48 (stoninK of Cyrsilus). 
<3) Hi<i un{>opularity and exile, ad Aft. 
10. 8. 7, de liep. 1 § 5. (4) His volun- 
tary death, ad Alt. 9. 10. 3, pro Scavro 
§ .'}, Lnel. § 42, BnU. 42. (.1) His 
proposal to burn the Lace<iaeinonian 
fleet, dc of. 3% 49. (6) His early ambi- 
tions (the trophioii of Miltiades), Tiuc. 4 
§ 44. (7) His patriotism, pro i'f.i/. 8 141. 
(8) His wisdom and eloquence. Brut. 5 
28. de Or. 3 § 59. (9) His craftiness, de 
off. 1 § 108 (equal to Jason of Pht-rae). 
(10) His good memory, Cal. § 21, Aead. 
2 § 2. (11} Hia retorts and hotti mots. 




^$11-12 AUTHORITIES OTHER THAN HERODOTUS 



The heroism of Leonidas, the treason of Pausanias, are not 
forgotten.* The chief battles of the war are all at least mentioned.' 
He emphasizes the religious aspect of the war.* But Cicero's main 
service to the matter in hand is to sliow that, before tlie fall of the 
Republic, learned Komo was familiar with the stor3' of the Persian 
war, and in possession of a whole torpua of writers who could he 
cited as authorities.^ 

§ 12. The Makedoniaii conquest had signalized the collapse of the 
Greek city-state system in the eastern Mediterranean, and had made 
Jlonart'hy the chief order of the day over tliat region. The Roman 
Empire was the legitimate outcome of the failure by the city-state in 
the west to organize the world which it had conqueretl, or inherited. 
Julius Caesar was the inevitable and conscious successor of Alexander, 
and his union with Cleopatra, the queen of the last surviving of the 
kingdoms carved out of the heritage of Alexander, is the most 
profoundly symbolic wedding in history.*' The interval between 
Alexander and Caesar, rather more than two centuries, may seem a 
long one : time was needed to settle the question of supremacy in the 
west before the warring league.s and kingdoms of the east could be 
absorbed into the Roman system. Meanwhile, with the possible 
exception of Rhodes, no city in the east could pretend to revive the 
autonDinous glories of the Greek ptlis, no combination of states could 
impose a universal peace even upon the eastern Mediterranean. Greek 
history during the interval between Alexander and Caesar is, even in 
the eyes of its best friends, deficient in political interest and im- 
portance : it is, in its l>est asjtects, the history of a culture, not of a 
state, or even a complex of states." The political centre of gravity 



iX< arat. 2 §§ 299, Sfil. tU Jin. 2 § 104 
(the art of oblivion) ; C'al. § 8 (his re])ly 
to the SeripLisD) ; <lf. off. 2 § "1 (on 
the Diarriaite of liis •laughter). 

' pro Srit. S 141 (iiiius omnium iustis- 
tiuixxt), Titae. 5 § 104 (iioiinc ob cam 
cauMni expuUiiB est patria, quod praetiT 
moduiu iuxttiH ni8i<t f), de uff. S ^ 16. 
His oppositinn tn Theniistocles, ife off. 
i i 49. His gO'xl (ixaraple, df Jiu. 5 

63 (qois Aristidcm iiutt mortuum 
11). 

' Leonida*, ./«■ Jin. 2 § 97 ; Tux. 1 
I 101 (<-p. lldt. 7. 228) ; PausaniM, 
r.w. S 75. 

' TlipmiopyUe, Tvx. 1 $ 101 ; Salamis, 
Tvc 1 f 110 (ante enini Salamina 
i|a«m NeptunuB obroct, qnani Salaiuiuii 
trufiaei meruoriani). Cp. de off. i i 61 
Hinv rlietunim caiiiims de Msratlion«, 
Salamitie. PUtaciH, Tbermupyliii, ulc 

* tU Ugy. 2 f 26 ; cp. note to Hdt S. 
109. 15. 

* BmL § 42 (Attico toq.) Ut eniiii tu 




nunc de Corioluiio, sic Clitarcliua, iiic 
Stratocles de Tliemiatock" fiuxit (viz. llio 
dcnth by bull's blood). Ou Klcitarchos 
<;p. Schaefer, Abrva % 37, Snuemihl, tir. 
Lit. in Aiexandrinrrz. i. 637 ff. Cicero 
did not think well of him, and represeuta 
Atticiu as sayiug of SiiteDiiB, de legg. 1 
g 7, in historia puerile quiiidam oon- 
sfctalur, ut uniun Clitarchunt, neque 
praetuvea ijui>ni(|iiarii do Graecis legisav 
videatur. StratoklcH niif^ht l>e the 
Stoic ? cp, Siisemibl, op. e. ii. 239. 

• To identify Ponipcy with Alexauder 
as tbe Romans did was to ^.vidge by 
externals and arcidents (Plutarcti, rvmp, 
2), Fur nuire siKuilicaiit is the anecdote 
orOesar, PluLirch, Cnea. 11. Plutarch 
himself riglitly included the Lints of 
Alexander and Caewr in one Book ; op. 
-4/m, 1. 

' A. Holm's HiM. of Oruee, vol. iv. 
(E.T. 1898), says all that can be said 
for thu Orreks of the transition, and 
their elforts to recover or achieve political 



62 



HERODOTUS 



APP t 



had shifted, na Polybios saw, to the west But Hellenism effected 
conquests such as Hellas could hanlly have conceived, and the greatest 
of them was the conquest of Kome.' l)y the time of Augustus, history 
had refuted the doctrine of Aristotle thiit man was of necessity a 
'political animal,' that the City-statfl was the necessary condition of 
human wellare : the empire and the peace legitimated the cosmopolitan 
and the individtwliatie idesis, which had long been shaping theni- 
selvea amoTig the conquered peoples of the cist, and now hecanie 
necewities to the conqueror himself. Literature, the faithful mirror 
of the times, developed on the historical side two rival yet com- 
plementary forms of expression ; the Universal History and the 
Biography came equally into vogue. Diodoros and Trogus exemplify 
the one tendency, Nopos and Plutarch the other, From such writers 
direct contributions to the matter in hand are, of course, to be 
obtained. A hardly less direct tribute is made by writers on topo- 
graphy and antiquities, fur whom Strabo and Faus^inias, though by 
no means contemporaries, may stiind as leading reprosentativis. 
Writings of this class are also significaTit of dwindling interest iu 
politico, of an ago of peace and relative prosperity, wherein mind and 
body were free to rove and to research. Nor is it merely from writers 
dealing professedly with history, biography, geography and monuments 
of the past that the student of Henitlotus and of the Persian war may 
enrich his matcritds. The Mcrraiia of Plutarch, even from this point 
of view, are second in value only to the Lives, and light may fall, if 
not upon the actual events, then at least upon the growth of tradition, 
the accretion of legend, from unexpected sources. Poets, historians, 
philosophers, rhetors, may illustrate a point in passing, or sometimes 
on purpose, and at greater length, Juvenal denounces Sostralos : but 
his arrows reach Herodotus, who supplied the facta, ^ Josephus is not 



freedoDi and importaDi'e ; bat lie hardly 
suoomcIb ill proving that the C'ity-8tate 
wu more thaa a aurrival, a sliadow gf 
iti former self. His achiiirablo apprrcia- 
lion of the New Comoily (pp. 150 IT.), 
his clear recogtiition of the signilicancv 
of Stnicisni and Epicurettniam, the philo- 
sophies i>t' the cosRiopolis, or th« 
individual (pp. 142 if.), hiii sketch of 
tha di6|>)aeeuieiit of Iho old religions 1>y 
the oult and a}>othootiis of kings and 
living men, are not uouaistcnt with the 
theory of real vitality in the city-state. 
The aubstitution of mercenary and pro- 
fessioual soldiery for the ciiizen-anuy, 
and even the foundation of couiitlfM 
cities by the kings, are symplonia with 
the same moral : a city, even a stste- 
oity, is not a city-state. The jironiiiience 
of the Leagues and their uonstitution 
virtually points to the same conulasion. 



The e8taMish(u«nt of the (yrattnis in 
Sgmrta, only to be srippresseit by Bonian 
aid, is not a. witnes.s to jnhtical frtcdom. 
The Athens nliirh added Antigonis and 
Deuietriaa to the Klelstheiman tiibes is 
not the Athens of Themistokles and 
Porikles, nor yet of Kallistrntm nuil 
Demosthcaes, even if it coulil play off 
Kgy])t against Makedon or, somewhat 
lat^r, Poutus a^iiiisl Rotae. BiU the 
Jatttr end of Athens was by no means 
despicable ; it gave to mankind what had 
been too long absorbed in tlie town 
Council: from a city-state it was trans- 
formed into the premier University of 
the world. 

1 Horace, £pp. 2. I. 156. 

- Juvenal 50. 173-186— 

crcditnr olim 
vclificatnji Athos, et quidi^uid Graecia 

raendax 




AUTHORITIES OTHER THAN HERODOTUS 

concerned with the Persian war, but h& can use, or abuse, Herodotus 
upon occasion.^ Seneca takes bis knowledge of Aristeides from 
elsewhere,- but Xerxes is a familiar instance with him ^ ; he adds a later 
touch to the legend of Thermopylai,* and a whole paragraph to the 
DemaratOB-fable.^ The rhetors, of whom Dio Chrysostom and Aelius 
Aristeides are the eminent survivors, found so much to say on our 
subject proper, that they must stand in a class and possess a paragra])h 
to themselves. And various as the value of these different writers 
and kinds of writers may be, they have one advantage or disjidi-antage 
in common. To all alike, whether Greek or Roman, the history of 
Greece before Alexander, yea before Augustus, was as ancient almost 
it is to us. Tliey viewed it dispas.sionately as a subject for amuse- 
ant or for moralization.'' The study of its records had for them the 



•udet u liutoria ; ooiutntuin clauibus 

isdvni 
Fnppositumque rotia solidum mare ; 

crt-diniua ultos 
litfeciise amuet epot«(^ue flumina Medo 
prandcnte, et madidis cantat quae 

Sostrntus ulu. 
lili tamfn qaalis rediit Siilainine reliota, 
in Cunim atque Eanim aolitus (Mevire 

fla^llis 
barbarui, Acolio nunquam hoc in carccrc 

pMKW, 

i|i5am onmpvdibus qui viaxerat Eiiiiosi' 

Ka«niii ! 
mitiua id lane quod non et atigniate 

di(n>uin 
cr»<lidit. hinc qui^uam vellet sernrtf 

deonim I 
i«d quali;! rediit t oempe una nave, 

crurbtia 
flttctiliiis, ac tarda yet dens* cadavcra 

prorm. 
On. LncretitiB, 3. 1029 If.— 
ille qaoque !{»>(:, viam qai quondatn per 

mare magnuin 
•travit it«rquu dedit legionibas ire per 

altnm 
ac petlibus salaai doouit *u{M.>rare lacuiiaa 
et rnntenuit equia insultana murinura 

poiiti, 
luraiiie ailempto auimam moribundo 

«or|>orv fiiilit. 

* JceephuH is iiutitrallv concerned with 
Uia S<«oDd Book of Hut. ; cp. AiU. 8. 
«. 2 : S. 10. 2. 3 ; 10. 2. 4; t. Ap. 2. 13. 
TIH- -I- ■ ■- ■ .1 -'tieraUy, ib. I. 3, cspeci- 
■: ih. 1. 14. Hdt. doea 

»!_. '■,<*. 1. 12, but he diM-» 

TirtnailT nienlion the Jvwa, ib. 1, 22. 
iBcidftntally Roman hititorianii may illiu. 
tTBt« tb« rentiaii war, as when Livy 
ilaaoribea Tempe (44. 6), or Appian 
lliertDOpylai, .Vi/r. 18 (with a distinct 



reference to Xerxes, Leouidas, and tha 
jMith). 

• See the curioiu aneudote of the 
righteous man's meekness, Dial, 12. 
I'i. 7 ducebatur Athcnis ad aupplieium 
Ariiitides, etc. (for the occasion cp, 
Plutarch, Ariit. 26). 

=> Dial. 10. 17. 2 (the despot's tears; 
op. Pliny, Epp. 3. 7. 18) ; Dial. 5. 16. 
4 (the sou of rythio«). 

'' £]h 82. 20, the bon mot of Leonidoa 
(Sic, inqiiit, commilitones, prandete 
tanqiiam apiid inferos coenaturi). 

• cU bentf. 6. 31 cum bellum Graeciae 
indiceret Xerxes, etc. After a free para- 
phraae of Hdt. 7. 101 If., with reniini- 
scenres of ce. 47 ff. (Art/ibaiios) and of 
c 203 (LeonidiLS, nihil tarn magnum est 
quod i>erire non jwwit), Seni;ca adds : 
itaque Xurxea pudore quaui dutuno 
miserior Demaruto grntiaii e^it, quod 
solua aibi rcnini dixisset, et I'prnii.iit 
petere quod vellet. Petiit ille ut .Sardis. 
maximam Asiae civitateni, currn vectua 
intraret rectam cjipite tiaraui gv-rens. 
Id solis datum rc|,;ibiis. DiKnus fuerat 
praensio, nntequnm peteret : wd (junm 
miscrahilis kcuh in (|na nemo fuit, qui 
vemin diccret rogi, nisi qui non diccbat 
8ibi ! Tills story reapprars in Plutarch, 
TTuinitt. 29. The passage in .Seneca haa 
been missed by Bauer, Plutarcha Thcmi' 
stokles, 1884. 

• Cp. nionys. Hal. 11. 1. 21D7 rolt 
Tt yiifi roWoct oi'K AirapKeT tovto iib*ar 

wi\tftor ■ (Ik' tiri Toinof nofficuuOLi to* 
Xbyov) irlttitcar 'Afftifoiol t« nal Aaxf- 
Sain&noi Stial vai'^x'"" ""■^ ^'fof'^'-X^ 
idq. Karayuviadtuvin tAt pipftapor r/xa- 
noeiat Ayoyra tLi'piidaf aiiToi triV toTt 
iri7>;ulX(x> 0*/ rXtlovt Srrtt tritxa fti'piiiduv ■ 
dXXd xat Tot'i r^oii, di> oft al rpdittf 



64 



HERODOTUS 



APP. 



charm of a revival, Its material and ])olitical conditions were so* 
entirely remote from tbeir own that even under a Benailive and jealous 
Caesftrism no suspicion of Ihe vuijesli' attached to tlie study of Hellenic 
antiquities. Satirists or critics might make capital out of the real or 
8upfH>sed mendacity of the Greeks : emperors doligbted tu honour 
their vencralile and harmless traditions.* In an age where individuals 
hail ceased to make history, at least as history was then understood, 
there was evidently a large pubHc interested in the great men and the 
great events nf other days. A large amount of history was rewritten 
in the spirit of the times ; study of the older authorities was revived 
or augmenbeiL I 

This literary ?,aal and revival of historical interests under the 
Caesars worked for the benefit of the sulijett here in view in two 
distinct ways. In the first place there appeara to have been a groat 
and growing interest in the work of Herodotus. Among Greek 
writers none could appeal more successfully to the mind of the age 
than the historian of the Persian war, and that to a great extent 
because he was so much more than the mere aniiali.st of a single war. 
Herodotus, with his wide range in time and space, his interest in 
"barbarians" of all sorts, his passion vi:>endae antiqailalis — for viewing 
the monuments of ancient history — hit the fancy of the Augustan and 
still more of the Antonine age, as perhaps nont; other of the ancient 
prose Wrights. The finrde-sUde Romans felt the full charm of his] 



fyiyoTTO, po6\oirra.i rapa rift Icroplat 
fiaBur, Kol rdf alrlat iKoScai, Si' At r& 
demtuurri. kcU rapiHoia Ipya freTiXtcrar, 
Kol rifft fyriw ol TWK orparoiriSuy ■ijyendi'tt 
Tiii" Tt jiapfiapiKuiD Kal Tuy 'E\X7jk«u)» 
laropiiffai, xal nyjStvii uit ttireiy dfi^KOM 
yevia'dai tu>v mvTtXurdimiiy -rfpl rout 
iyQyat. Dimiyatos 9, 1. 1789 cites the 
invaiion of Xnrxes as a roenioralilEi event 
for tlie (iSlh 01yiu|>iftd, and tlie Arclioii- 
tate of Kaltiadra, but he hox himself 
aomethinj^ else to dn than to rctieat the 
work of his great townainnn. Once, 5. 
17. i {SSH), he name.s Artemi^ion, Sjilainis, 
Pl&taia and ManitluMi in a breuth, to 
claim priority for the fuucral urntiuii 
iirouounoed on Brutus the Regifup;. 
His critical works, in which a largo 
amount of space ii devoted to Her»<iottiB, 
are concerned cut with the matter but 
with tliB style of that author. 

' Cji. the anecdote of Gaiiii. Dio Oass. 
r>9. 17 (\.l). 39): «i4 Si t^i floX<io-<ri)f 
rpawoy ti»A Sitiml/aai iffffifitict, ycipvpw- 
<jot tA neraiu ru>v Tt lIouT^AXuf »ai rCiy 
Bai'Xwv . . \t^uy Stl xai i noaciSuiw 
aCrrSr i^o^ifit), irtl ft yt Thy Saptloy ical 
rby A^piriy ouSiy 4t( ovk i.it4aKUTrr(v, 
Cn Kai troXXairXcierii^v trtpcijy ^jJrpoy ttjs 
6a\d<ra-7ii j^ti'^at. If Hadrian (as is somu- 



tinies asserted, cp. Bury, f!l udtni's Jloman 
Empirt, p. 608) had trauslcrrod the oele- 
bmtion of the Elctitheria from Plataia 
to Athens, he would have seemed to 
endorse the most extravagant claims 
made on behalf of the Athenians in re- 
gard to tbat buttle (en. ji. .07 supra) ; but 
Angnst KIoTiiintien, ffsU der Stadl Athtti 
(1898), p. 16S, argues that Neubauer's 
iisantuptiou is uiittumhle, t.'.I.A. iii. n. 
127 proving that the 'VXeuSipio. at 
Platam survivtMi ilio institution of the 
IlarfXXi^ta at Atheus. Mominsen, how. 
pver, enilorses Neubuner's bujjf^stion that 
Hadrian, iu irtsti tilting the ['anhtthnitt, 
Imd the Eleuthen'a iu view : cj). Dio Casa. 
(ii>. 16 ; riuUrch, Aruit. 21. Caracallus, 
who fancied hiiiiielf a second Alexander 
(' AlexaudniTu Maffuuni eiusipiu gesta in 
ore aemj)i'r )iabuit,' Aclius S|«irt.), on his 
way to the East [& '2H a.i>.) raisr'd a 
bodyguard of young SpurUus and called 
it his Pttanate cohort (Hcrodian, 4. 8. 3 
diri T( ^Trdprrjt HfTixitfu^inifyot yfaylai 
AaKuvixiiv Kai {\iTa»6.TTjv Xit'^ov ^xdXei) ; 
this must have lieen a reininisuence of 
Hdt. 9. 53. The emperor ,luli«u refers 
to Hdt. as Qoiipim \oyairoil>t. .389 B, 
Ft. ^, but plaeea him in a goodly com- 
l»any, 423. 



AUTHORITIES OTHER THAN HERODOTUS 



vivacity, his luiiveU^ his simplicity, his good nature. The evidence of 
contact with his work is constant from Dionysios to Plutarch, from 
Arrian to Lucian.' The estimate of his value may not he quite 
uniform, may not increase in any definite ratio, but the evidence of 
the popularity of his work is conclusive. If from one point of view 
this fact is characteristic of the times, from another point of \new it is 
a guarantee of the authentic and genuine nature of the text, as far as 
it goeSi. Lucian and Pausanias, Plutarch and Arrian, Dionysios and 
Cicero seem to have used a text, which is substantially identical with 
our own. Whatever dialectal heresies and errors ignorance or taste 
may have induced upon the original, the mere historian has the con- 
sensual testimony of the writers of the Roman period to the substance 
of our primary source for the history of the Persian war. 

Secondly, the writers of the Roman period, who dealt with a 
history which was ancient in their time almost as fully as in our own, 
have a great value for us, as embodying a large supplement of tradi- 
tions, eWdences, materials, in addition to the primary authorities open 
to our direct inspection. This value cannot easil}' bo over-estimated, 
although it varies from author to author, from case to case, sinking 
with the facile methods and afterthought of Diodoros, rising in the 
learned and variegated pages of the industrious Plutarch. Perhaps 
Diodoros may have read more authorities than recent criticism is dis- 
poeed to allow, and may have contributed more to the structure and 
treatment of his subject than the Graeco-Koman, or Jlakcdoniim 
chronology, its most patetit and sometimes ill-applied ground-plan ; 
bat doubtless for the brief period here under consideration he gives 
us less indeed than was in Ephoros, but little or nothing which was 
not in Ephoros." With Plutarch the case is different. Though we 
are dealing at j)resont with the history of but two or three yaii's, that 
were to Plutarch of no very special importance, his contribution to 
our materials is the most varied and most valuable, coming from any 
single extant source, outside the work of Herodotus. Plutarch may 
not have read all the authors whom he cites by name, much less 



' To the UMimonia might bu «<lded 
that of the elder PHcy, who iu the 
Hi*t<iria Xnt. v.\U'f< IMt. by nnme at 
lesat ten times : halT of these references 
•M to the SL*cnDd Book, Rnd the others 
to the Third and Fourth Boolu. None 
refer to the Persian war, or the hitor 
oka, bnt the antiquity of Hdt. is 
phMi««d in placed ($. 4. 1 ; 12. 41. 1 
"Ikbulottn btmivit antiquita$, )^iriDC«p8ve 
Hvodotus; 36. 17, 2, where Hdt. heads 
• loDiK lJ»t of writers mi the pyramids). 

* TOodoros deucribe^ the work of Hdt. 
at the close of hia own aoooqnt of the 
, II. 37. 6 'Upiiaitot ip^i-iievot ir^ 
T^iiidF j^p^rwr ytypaifn Kmydt irxtS!)* 
tit TJjt oiKoviUr-T/t wpd^tit ir pip\Mt fnia, 

VOL. U 



KaTmrrpiijui ii Ti\v Biyra^w «it r^r rtpl 
MuKd\<f¥ nixv '■<>«' 'EXXjffft wpAt roil 
Il^^xrai Kol -T^tfToP roXiopKlar. He also 
ventured to criticize it : 10. 24. 1 koI 
Tairra vapt^i^iitiei' ovx oPrurt 'llfioiirou 
«raTi}7op^<rtti ftovXtiOirrti wi vwoiti(ai Sri 
tCj» \irfu>¥ ol OavtiAoiiH. rotVt 6.\i\(liU xar- 
trX''*!*' fiiiSaeiy. But the only direct 
references t« the text of Hdt. are to 
passaged in the first three Books, and 
even these may not Ije at tli-bt hand, 
Diodoros also refers freely to lliucydidca, 
Ktesias, Xenophon, iu a way which 
might seem to imply tome aoquniutance 
with their works, as well as to Ephoros 
and Theonouipos, whom he is holi«v«d 
to have followed in the main. 



66 



HERODOTUS 



AFP. I 



verified all his citations pen in hand ; but no author, not Photios 
himself, not the earlier or the later lexicographers, does so much to 
reprodnce for us the lost literature, and therewith the lost history of 
older Hellaa.' And what is tnie of Diodoros and Plutarch, in their 
several ways, holds good for the writers generally of the Roman 
period, whether primarily writere of universal histories, or of biography, 
or of any kind of literature, which brings them in contact with our 
subject. 

§13. Diodoros presents ua once more with an express and con- 
nected story of the war as a whole, the like of which has not been seen 
since we took to the secondary sources. This distinctive quality give» 
the account in Diodoros a special and all but unique interest." The 
peraonal equation counts hero, however, for very little : Diodoros 
is in this case, at least so far as the Persian war is concerned, almost 
purely Ephoros, probably on a somewhat reduced scale.* The con- 
tinuous text does not equal one-fifth of the text contained in the last 
three Books of Herodotus. With the exception of the Sicilian episode, 
or just the story of the battle of Himera, which bulks largely in the 
Sicilian's work, Diodoros is, perhaps, but the e])itome of an epitome.* 
The narrative breaks up into four, or with the section just named 
into five distinct portions.* I. The preparations on both sides for 
war (cc. 1-4, corresponding to Hdt. 7. 1-207). This section 
represents not merely a reduction, but also a rearrangement, and a 
partial rationalization, of the corresponding aection of Herodotus. It 
makes also two notable additions to the Herodotean story, to be 
specified below, in their proper contexts. This section further divide* 
into four sub-sections, the account of the war-preparation.s alternating 
from side to side, more rapidly than with Herodotus, apparently in 
the interest of an improved chronology, minuter sub-division emphasiz- 
ing supposed synchronisms. Thus, after the literar)' proem to the 
Book," and the usual chronological indication,^ (i.) the reason of the 
undertaking is given, the king's preparations are described, including 
the building of fleets, the lev^e «i masse, the Bridge and the Canal ; 



' In tho Li/e of Aristcides Pliitarclt 
cites by imrae six atithors, including 
Hdt., for the ppiiod ul" the Pci-stan war 
(and iiino for the stibsciniiiiit ['priod, 
includiiiR Tliucyiiidc*). In the Life of 
ITumiMohles he cites by tiftriie twelve 
authors, in aililitioii to Hdt,, for the 
earlier {teriod. ami in addition fifteen 
othcn, includinj; Thiicydidps, for the 
later period. A lar^e iiiimliir of these 
citations appear to be at Hriit hand. 

* On Oiatlorofl cjj. A. Schaefer, Abrits 
der QueUmlninde ii. (1881) § 37 ; 
Wachsmuth, Xmleilunff (18&5), 81-103 ; 
Buaolt ii.» (1895) 622 ff. : iir. i. (1897) 
pp. 16 Jf.; E. Schwartz ap. Pauly- 



Wissow* V. i. (1903) 663-704. My 
citations are from the Teubner editions 
of L. Diiidorf (1807), F. Vogel (1890). 

' Die QcifJiieJUe der Penerk&mpfe, der 
Penitkowtaelie %md da peioponneaisehen 
Krit-get bietet fcui nur einen Avtiug 
aiu detn grosatn JVerk dti Ej>horo$, 
Wacbsmuth, cp. c, 101. The fast nw 
suggeata a qualiScation ; see further 
below. 

* Tho Sicilian history in Bks. 11-14 
Waehsmuth l.t. derives so gut wie 
avsddifss/ifJi out of Tim&ios ; see bclow^ 

» Bk. 11. cc. 1-37. 

• c. 1. 1. 
' §2. 



§§ lS-13 AUTHORITIES OTHER THAN HERODOTUS 

but to these details Diodoros luakes a fresh and suggestive addition. 
Xerxes sends an embassy to Carthage to arrange for a concomitant 
invasion of Sicily ; the synchronism between the war in Sicily and the 
war in Greece is here, for the first time, ascribed to intention and 
design on man's pirt, Diodnros also brings the king and the land- 
forces to Sardes, and the fleet to Kyme and Phokuia, in this section.^ 
There follows at onco^ (ii.) an account of the Hellenic expedition to 
Thessalvi and its return ; a list of the medizing Greekf^, in somewhat 
rationalized form, and an account of a meeting of the Helletn'c St/nedriun 
at the Islbroos, whereat the celebrated vow against the Medizers is 
made, and embassies are despatched to neutrals to engage them for 
the cause of ' the common Freedom.' A rhetoricizcd account of the 
pourparlers with Argos follows. The previous Book had contained 
an account of a prior meeting at the Isthmos, and the despatch of 
an embassy to Sicily, Diodoros in this respect too presenting a revision 
of the Herodotean perspective, (iii.) The third sub-section ' reverts to 
the Persian side and carries Xerxes from Sardes to Doriskos, which is 
expressly marked as the first rendezvous for army and Heet. Figures 
on a reduced, that is, rationalized basis are given for the forces there 
assembled and reviewed, (iv.) On the national side the Synedroi decide 
on the occupation of Artemision and Theimopylai ; the arrangements 
for the command and the numbers of the forces are set out on the 
Herodotean lines, but Diodoros makes a major and a minor addition 
to the record. The Lokrians, who had submitted to the Persian king 
and promised to secure the Pass in his interest, revert to their natural 
loyalty and join the Greeks — that is the minor point. The other is 
more significant. The theory of the death of Leonidas as an act of 
devotion, already given by Herodotus, is here presenU-d in a developed 
and elaborate form, and Leonidas leaves Sparta resolved to die 'for 
the common Freedom,' in obedience to the oracle, and with the full 
knowledge and consent of the Spartan Epiiors. This vwtij stands side 
by aide, in Diodoros as in Herodotus, with the evidences which jirove 
that the defence of Thermopj'lai was seriously meant and really 
attempted.^ There follows in Diodoros — H. — a passage, or rather two 
passages, separately recounting the fighting at Therraopylai (cc. 5-11, 
eorreaponding with Hdt. 7. 208-239) and the fighting at Artemision 
(cc 12, 13, corresponding with Hdt. 8. 1-20). In the preliminaries 
the njirrative closely follow.s the Herodotean theme with characteristic 
TariatioMs : thus there is a fresh estimate of the king's army * ; scouts 
or messengers are sent to Thermopylai ; a rhetorical reply is received 
irom the Greeks ; there ensues a conversation between Xerxes and 
Demaratos. But in the account of the actual fighting at Thermopylai, 
Diodoroa (i.e. Ephoros) undertook to develop and improve the 



e. 1. 8-«. 2. 4. 
* c. 4. 1-7. 



» & 2. 5-c. S. 6. » c 8. »-9. 

• Cp. p. 76 note 3 »7j/r<i. 



68 



HERODOTUS 



APP. I 



Herodotoan record. On the first day selected natioiiB iji succession 
are sent agaiiist the Greeks, only to be in succession repulsed. On 
tlie second day picked men from all the nations are massed for the 
attack, with no l.ietter result. Then a certain anonymous Trachinian ^ 
comes to the king with the plan for circumventing the Greeks, and 
20,000 men are despatched for tbo purpose.'- The plan is reported 
to Leonidas by a deserter from the king's side, one Tyrastiarlas of 
Kyme^ : a syitedriou is held, Leonidas dismisses all the Greelis but the 
Lakedaimonians ajid Thespians — he has only 500 men in all — and 
then heads a night assault upon the Pereian camp, which very nearly 
proves successful ; but at daybreak the Barlwrians, on discovering 
the paucity of their opponents, surround and shoot them down. This 
novel episode had evidently been disputed, for Diodoros pauses in his 
piinegyric on the heroes of Thermopylai to defend the story * : his 
eulogy then runs on to a veritable Epilaphios logo^, and preserves an 
otherwise lost fragment of Simonides.'' Thus, even more completely 
than Herodotus, Ephoros- Dioiloros isolates the action at Artcmision 
from the action at Theixoopylai, and freely re-aiTuagos the actual 
story. Only after winning ' the Kadmeian victory ' at Thermopylai ^ 
does the king resolve to make trial of a naval battle. The admiral, 
' Megabatcs,' and the fleet are summoned from Pydna : three hundred 
longships are lost in the storm oft" .Magnesia; three hundred more are 
despatched to circumna%'igate Euboia, the remainder (i.e. 600) are 
attacked, off Aphetai, by tiie Greek fleet (less than half in numbiM-'), 
and the ambiguous engagement, in two stages, lasts until nightfall.* 
A (second) storm follows, as in Herodotus, intended to equalize 
matters,* and the Greek fleet receives a reinforcement of fifty 
Athenian vessels '" : a second naval engagement apparently repejits the 
experience of the former one, but the Arisleiti ior both bjittles are 
duly awarded to the Athenians on the Greek side, to the Sidonians 
on the Persian." The news from Thermopylai causes the Greeks to 



' This Rtionyraity is jtrolwbly a result 
of tho attempt to harmouize the varia- 
tions in Hdt. 7. 213 f. coupled with iLo 
desire to epitomize. 

' As against the 10,000 Immortals in 
Hdt. 7. 315. Rphonm liaa used them 
up iu the first Jay's fighting. 

' A notable variation, by the Kyineau 
historian, ou the Hurodotean account 
7. 219. From the desorijition of this 
patriot, c. 8. 5 Tb y(yoi Sif Kviiotot, <^\6- 
Ka\os Si Ka.1 ri* TftdTon <S» iyaOlit, he 
might be a double, or forbear, of Ephoros 
liimtieir. 

* c. 11. 2 xal riir rCiv Xlepauiv Si 
xoTdirXijJif oiJk ^i" tii dirtirnjcrat ytviaBai 
ktX. 

* Cp. § 8 siijsrra. 

* a 12. 1 Kara, ttj* rapot/da.i' t^v 



KaSficiat rU^i/ yii/ucrjKwi : cp. Hdt. I. 
166. The phra-se is misapplied to 
Tliemiopylfti, which mi^ht, however, 
have been tialloJ a Pyrrluc victorj* ; cj). 
the kind's own reiiiBi-k after his victory 
at Asinihim (Apulia), Plutarch, Pyrrh. 
'2^ S.r In Ulan liixv Pu^alout pik^swiup, 
i.va\ot't)it8ti iraiTe\wt. 

• 280 iu all, of which exactly the half 
avi) Athenian. 

" The Greeks attack and scatter the 
Persian ships, but afterwards the king's 
fleet draws together and a vat>/taxia 
lirxspi enaues. 

* 0. 13. 1 ; cp. p. 76 note 6 infra. 
"> As against 63 in Hdt. 8. 14. 

'' c. 13. 2 dptoTfCirtu Si f» Afi^oriptut 
rail pavtiaxl<M ^acl trapA nit rait "EX- 
\jl<fty ' AO^PCitovt, rapii Si tois Pa/ipipoit 






retire; the Atb^stnanD effect the migration to Saiamis, and the 
Persian imvarch occupies and plunders Euboia. Thus in this whole 
passage the Herodotean account of Tliormopylai is enlarged, rational- 
ized, and rhetoricizod, the Herodotean account of Arteraision is reduceil, 
and the connexion between the two actions, or aeries, hopelessly 
broken.' There follows — III. — the Persian advance through central 
Greece, and the battle of Salainis (cc. 14-- 19, corresponding to Hdt, 8. 
21-120). Here Diodoros adds to a reduced account of the Persian 
assault on Delphi the valuable notice of the monument erected and 
inscribed to record it.- Here too occurs a report on the Korkyraians 
transferred from the Seventh Book of Herodotus, again presumably in 
the chronological interest.^ The battle of Salamis foJlows and is de- 
scribed on a relatively large scile.* A naval battle is assume<l to be 
inevitable, but the Synedrion meets to decide on its locality. The 
Peloponnesians advocate the waters at the Isthmos ; Themtstokles 
demonstrates the advantage of the Straits : a decision follows to fight 
at Salamis. But the 'masses' and the ' mob' dissent from the decision 
of the ^^ifjifdroi and all is disobedience and confusion in the island, 
while at the Isthmos ' the wall from Lechaion to Kenchreai ' is already 
a fiiit accompli. Whereupon Themistokles scTids the message to Xerxes, 
which puts the Persian fleet in motion, and brings about a battle in 
the Straits. Diodoros here supplies the indispensable manceu\Te by 
which the retreat of the Greek fleet was cut ofT; he also adds, or at 
least greatly develops, the patriotic action of the loiitans on the king's 
tide, until it becomes one of the chief factora in the Greek victory, 
In the tactics of Salamis the account throws some light, but not a 
rfectly white Mi^hu The Greek fleet fills 'the passage between 
Salamis and the Herakleion,' the Athenians and Lakedaimonians (sie) 
on the left wing, the Aiginetans and Megnrians on the right, opposed 
respectively to the Phoenicians and medized Greeks. The Persian 
fleet is clearly massed outside the Straits, enters the Straits to do battle. 
and is then thrown into some confusion by the necessary alteration of 
its array, and by the loss of the admiral and the admiral's ship, which 
was leading the van. The Barbarians iiack water and then retreat 
into the open sea. The fate of their right wing is first decided and 
described. The Athenians perform prodigies of valour and of skill ; 
the Phoenician and Kjrprian vessels are routed, the Kilikian, Pam- 
phylian, Lykian, on the same wing, abandon the fray ; the victorious 



StdwvlovT. Hdt. has very little to say 
of the second d«y'8 lighting at Thcrmo- 
pyUi, bnt clearly articulates the three 
Mttloa off ArtfttnUion : Ephoros chnrac- 
teruticklly inverts the Herodotean 
einphasia. 

' Tht atnteric connexion is not re- 
Htor«d by the rhetorical analogy r, 13. 2, 
ohvioiialy copied from Hdt. 8. 15. 

J c. 14. 4— 



twana T a\eSi»Spov iroX^^ou Kcd fidprvpti 
vlxat 
AiX^ol fu rraaiut, Zarl xap<i'V"'ot 
aim 'PoiPn), rroMwopSof iwuxrif^iroi trrix^ 

Kal xaXKOOT^^rov ^I'O'd/m'ot rifuroi. 
Cp. $ 'i not*, atipra. This oleg)' was not 
n8cribe<i to Sinionidca. 

» c. 15. 1 ; cp. Hdt. 7. 168. 

* oc. 15. i-l9. 6, some five pp. 



70 



HERODOTUS 



AFP. I 



Athenians decide the fate of the Barbarians' left likewise, and a general 
rout ensues. The king, who is viewing the battle from ' over against 
Salamis,' visits the Phoenicians with condign punishment, insomuch 
that the remnant of their fleet sails under cover of night for Asia. 
Themrstokles crowns his victory with a second stratagem. A message 
to Xerxes announcing the projected destruction of ' the bridge ' pro- 
cures the instant retreat uf the king, with a largo {wrtion of the forces, 
though ' forty ' myriads of the beet, both horse and foot, are left behind 
with Mardonios in Greece. Tho inevitable moral is drawn that the 
two ' stratagems ' of Themistokles were the sah-ation of Hellas.^ 

IV. At this point, or pjiuse, Diodoros inserts his account of the 
Carthaginian invasion of Sicily, culminating in the battle of Himera 
(cc. 20-27, corresponding to Hdt. 7. 165-167), with the difference 
that liere, for once, the narrative of I Hoiloios completely eclipses that 
of our primary authority botli in Jnilk and in detail. The story here 
is not drawn from Herodotus and amplified, but derived from an 
independent and local source.^ There is, however, an obvious parallel 
indicated between Gelon and Themistokles, and indeed an express 
comparison between the battle of Himera on the one hand and the 
battles of Salamia and Plataia on the other, the moral of which is 
drawn in favour of the Sikeliotes, the more plausibly inasmuch as 
Diodoros makes the victory of Gelon over Amilkar synchronize exactly, 
not with the victory at Salamis, but with tlie defeat of Thermopj'lai,* 
the eastern Greeks thus profiting by the ewimple and results of the 
great success of theii* brethren in the west.* According to tho 
Sikeliote story the victory at Himera was duo to a brilliant stratagem 
on the part of Gelon. Advancing to the relief of the city, which was 
blockaded by Amilkar from two camps, one for the ships and naval 
force, the other for the land-army, he intercepted despatches from the 
Carthaginian summoning tho men of Selinfts to a great siicrifico on a 
certain day in hono\ir of Poaeidoa On that day Gelon, who had 
likewise formed camp outside Himera, sent roimd his cavalry by a 
detour from the west to appear at the gates of the Punic naval camp, 
personating the Selinuntines ; once admitted, they were to fall upon 
the stratfgos, to fire the ships, and generally to slay and destroy. 
Their admission to the camp was to be the sign to Gelon for a separate 
attack on the Punic land-force in its camp. The whole plan succeeded 
to perfection. By Gelon'a orders no quarter was given ' ; vast 
numbers were slain ; the remainder, which had occupied a hill without 
water, surrendered. Hosts of prisoners wore made, and employed 



* Ou this account see further, Ay- 
jiendix VI. § 6 tii/ni. 

* The source ia plainly Sikeliote, and 
bbilo-SyracuasD, as agaiuat Akragati, and 
highly favourable to Gelon'a ttietuory : 
the author may very well have Uiea 



Timsios, op. Pr. 87=Polvb. 12. 26, b 
{F.H.G. i. 213). On tiits story cp. 
Freeman, Uui. of SicUy, ii. 166 fll 

' c. 24. 1. 

« 0. 2.3, 

» c. 22, 4. 



§ 13 



AUTHORITIES OTHEIt THAN HERODOTUS 



71 



afterwards on the great works of Syracuse and Akragas.' Twenty 
ships, which had been left ia the water, rescued a few of the survivors, 
but encountered a storm and were lost on the home voyage ; only a 
few men, in a small boat, reached Carthage and reported the disaster.' 
The Carthaginians expected invasion in turn, and sent an embassy to 
Gelon to avert it. He granted them terras, the moderation of which 
was dictated partly by his own character, partly by his desire to go to 
the help of tlie Greeks against Xerxes.* As ho was preparing to start, 
newB came from Korinth of the victory at Salamis .and of the retreat of 
Xerxes, and Gelon abandoned his intention.* The narrative pointa the 
parallel between Gelon and Themistokles by the contrast in their ends. 
Themistokles and Pausanias, the Greek leatlers in the oast, wore, the 
one done to death by his fellow-citizens, the other driven out to find 
a refuge with his enemy Xerxes ; but Gelon lived long in honour as 
king of Syracuse and bequeathed his power to his kinsmen. 

This story is not free from the rhetoric, the rationalism, and the 
improbabilities which belong to the context in Diodoros ; it can neither 
be accepted as a simple substitute for the story in Herodotus, nor quite 
completely reconciled therewith. The traitor in Sicily disappears ; 
the direction of the attack on Htmera is not intelligible ; the part 
played by Theron and the Akragaiitines is obscure.^ But upon the 
main issue, the great stratagem of Gelon, by which the Carthaginian 
forces were annihilated at Himera, the local Sikeliote story looks 
acceptable, even if its acceptance might seem to destroy the Herodotean 
hint, that is, the Carthaginian theory, of the death of Amilkar, as 



• c 25. 2. The prisoners were clLstri- 
bat«d K&rii rix ipifft'^ tuu" vvfrrpaTrv- 
e4*Tvi», »» arierwnrds tlio spoil at 
rUtAUL, c S3. 1. The explanation, 
which follows, of the problem, how then 
the Akra^utities, who hiui done little 
nr nothinK in the b&ttle, according to 
tho story in Diodoros, yet came by »o 
rnnny prisonen, is transpareutly *prag- 
niktic. 

• Freeman ii. 200 remarks: "That 
bMt U clwrly the fellow of that other 

in which .Xerxes crossed the 
leapont." For "that other boat" 

^ p. 80 note 1 infra. The Carthaein- 

{ana in the boat collide with tlie ]>reviou8 
itatement c. 23. 2 fiijS^ dyyeXw tU riir 
Kafxt^^^ Juvw^^foi (a \<oot echo of 
the atronger phrase, Hdt. 8. 6 iitiSi 
rvp^par . . iK^nryiirra. rtfnytylaOai). 

» C, 2«. *. 

• c. 26. 5. As Freeman remarks (ii, 
203 not*"), " surely the horseiiien of 
^racaae might have been useful at 
flAtMa." The further riH;ord of Gelon 's 
a y pfoyiii pro vita $ua, and the coustitu> 



bMt 



tional titles and honours heaped upon 
hini, hardly concern the historian of the 
Persian war, thongh they tlirow an 
interesting side-light upon tho history 
of t}ie Qroulc tifrannia. 

* c. 23. 3. ''In one way Himera waa 
more than Salamis ; no Plataia waa 
needed to finish the work," Freeman, 
iL 200. But Clio work in Sicily had to 
bo done again and again ; iu Uellaa 
it was done oiioe for all. 

Te rill OS hod been driven out of 
Himera by Theron, and called in the 
Carthaginians, Hdt. 1. 165. Freeman 
well remarks that iu Diodoros ' ' there 
seems a certain disposition to pat the 
energy of Gelou in contrast wuh the 
faint-nearteducas of Ther6n " (ii. 191), 
and that "ThcrOn and his people have 
clearly received less than their due share 
of houonr " (p. 203). He has not 
observed that the elimination of Tcrilloe 
and Tberon is, if not essential, at least 
ex|)edieut for the hypothesis that the 
invasion of Sicily by the Carthoginiana 
was in response to the iei|Ue8t, or 
dictate, of the great king. 



78 



HERODOTUS 



APP. r 



an act of devotion, after its kind, as pious and as patriotic as the 
death of Leotiidas itself.^ 

V. Finally, Diodoros, returning to tbe story of the Persian war, 
relates the doiible campaign of 479 B.C.- by land and by sea, culminat- 
ing at Plataia and Mykale, in two successive passages (cc. 27-33, cc. 
34-37), corresponding exactly to the Ninth Book of Herodotus, with 
its two parts (cc. 1-89, cc, 90-121), to which also the end of Bk. 8 
(cc. 121-144) must be added to complete the correspondence. Here 
again we have a narrative reduced, rationalized, and rhctoricized in 
places from the ampler, less coherent, hut far weightier traditions in 
Herodotus. The assignment of the Aristcia for Salaniia to the 
Aiginetans is explained as due to Sjiartaii policy, which tries to 
compensate at least Themistokles by doing him honour. The Spartan 
honours to Themistokles alienate Athenian sym{>athies, and lead to 
his removal from the Strafegio. The alienation of Athens and the 
fall of Themistokles are followed by overtures from Mardonios, and 
an embassj"^ from Sparta ; the Athenian replies are simply the 
Hcrodotean report in little. The story of the Plataian campaign 
follows the lines of Herodotus till the climax is reached, and rewritten 
freely in the interests of the national honour. Mardonios reinvades 
Attica and retires to Thebes. The Greeks advance to Plataia, after 
registering a solemn vow to fight to a finish for the common cause, 
and if victorious to found a festival in honour of Freedom, and to 
celebrate it for ever at Plataia.' Tbey are led by Pausanias and 
Aristeidea, and their first position is at Erythrai. Mardonios has a 
camp on the Aaopos fortified, like all camps in Diodoros, * witli a 
deep ditch and a palisade.'^ The 100,000 Greeks are opposed by 
500,000 barbarians. A set battle takes place in this position, corres- 
ponding to the Ifippomachia in Herodotus, but begun by the Barbarians 
at night, and apparently from the first a genenil engagement : victory 
is secured by the Athenian support to the hard-pressed Megariana.^ 
This success encourages the Greeks to advance to a second position, 
' better fitted for a complete victory,' between a lofty hili to the 
right and the ri\er Asopos on the left.*^ Here in this narrow room 



> Cp. Hdt. 7. 167. If t!ie Syraciwan 
horsemen cut him down, he did not 
perish by leaping into the fire. 

' 0. 27. 1 gives the chronological 
indeK. The passage is a good ezunple 
of Diodoros' method. Tne Archontic 
year of Xanthipfins, or Xanthinpidea, 
would b«giii at niiilsunimer, the consular 
year (two it«niB in Roman history are 
incorrectly given afterwards c. 37. 7, 
the Volscian war and tlie execution of 
8p. CassiiiR) would, in tlioao days, hare 
begun with March, while the eventa 
narrated iu cr. 27, 28. 1, '2 obviously 
occurred in the winter or early spring 



preceding. This overlap is not, how- 
ever, as bad as occurs later on in the 
work, when the chronology ia com- 
plicated by data taken from records 
based on the Makcdoniau calendar, in 
which the yi?ar l^egan, like the S{nrtaii, 
at the autumn equinox. 

'■> c. 29, 1 ff. The exact words of tlie 
TOW are given, cp. notes to 7. 132. 

* c. 30. 1 rd0^ fiadilf Kal re/x" ivXlKf. 
Cp. c. 20. 3, 21. 2, 34. 3. See too p. 75 
note 14 in/ra. » c. 30. 2-4. 

' fttri Si raiha iK rfp i-wvptlat furt- 
aTparo-riicv(Ta.r eh trtpov rbnov tiiBeru.- 
Ttpap Tpbt T^v oKocxtpv i'Ik7)i>. 6 fi* yip 



SII 

' m 
le 

a{ 



• great battle ensues, the Greeks apparently assuming the offensive, 
though the actual assault is delivered by the Barbarians.' A triple 
break-up on the Persian side leads to a similar division on the Greek 
side.- The Lakedaimonians, after slaying Mardonios and routing the 
ersians, pursue them to the fortified camp. The medized Greeks have 
made for Thebes, and are followed thither by the Athenians : there 
under the walls takes place a great battle, in which the Athenians, at 
length victorious, drive the Thebans into the city, and return to 
support the Lakedaimonians in the attack upon the fortified camp ; 
aft«r a desperate struggle the attack, in which Lakedaimonians and 
Athenians compete, is crowned with success.^ No quarter is given, 
d upwards of ten myriads of barbarians are put to the sword.* 
eanwhile Artabazos, with more than 40,000 men, lias made good 
his escape to Phokis, and ultimatel)- i>a8ses through Makedonia into 
Asia.' The historian goes on to record the burial of the Greek dead 
— upwards of 10,000 in number — the division of the spoil, the 
adjudication of the Arhtria to 8parta and to Pausantas.'* Nor is the 
dedication of the tithe to Delphi in the form of a golden tripod with 
an inscription thereon forgotten ' ; two epigrams from Therraopytai 
are added by a curious alterthought.* Most significant of all, the 
honours at Athens to the heroes of the Persian war, including the 
institution of the Funeral Oration and the 'law' governing its 
delivery, are here inserted*: the narrative then reverts, after the 
manner of Herodotus, to the visitation of Thebes, brieHy and easily 
disposed of,'"^ and concludes with the story of the campaign of Mykale, 
told on an unexpectedly large scale.'' Tlie narrative follows the 



- 



rur ti^ii'i'lUM' ■A<ranrAi wcraiidf t6ii i' 
drA fUaov rirroii i-ruxf V irrpaToveSela, 

rw» ri/wuv mroxitiplii. 

* c. 32. 1 toOtop ii TAf Tpbirov i» tj 
^vyS rue ^a^/Sd/Miw cxKrffivTuiy, output 
ral t4 tu)» 'EWiJi'uh' wXijBot S»ntplv9ri 
rr\. The triiiartite break-up bas been 
recor<le<i in tb« prvvioiu chapter, though 
't is nooounted for only by tmt miiocmbiuI 

i>t»nce of the Lakedaimonians, who 
nt th« Barbarians to 'flight' (in three 
Tpcticns) after the fall of Mardonios. 
' c. 32. 4 tifuWuPTo yip rpit dXAiJXon 
ol riji EXXdiot ifyoi'turoi AaKiSai/iirtoi 
fAl 'A^raiM, ntfUTtupia ixtvoi fUv rait 
•poyr^tPifi^rait rlxeut, wiiroiOlntt Si rati 
trnvrCfr AprraU. That has the true 
laokimtean ring I 

* j 6 fiTlUra {u-fptlr : cp. C 22. 4. 

* c 31. 3, 83. 1. Doea the omission 
of Theasaly and Thrace point to com- 
preation, oweleamesa, on the part of 



Ephoros, or to tlio extent of Maltedonian 
inlhicnce in his day t 

« 0. 33. 1. 

' § 2 'EXXddot tC'pvx^pov (mrnjpti t6»S' 
ayiSfiKO-it I SovKcxrvrrji im-ytpat jii'adfiTi'Oi 
T&Xiar. Not attributable to Stinonidea ; 
cp. Ilauvette, de raitlhmticiti, etc. p. 131. 
He places the inacriptiun ou the marble 
base, under the coiumu, whiiih supported 
the triiKwl. 

» Tlie first two in Hdt 7. 228. Cp. 
§ 3 avpra. 

• c. 33. 3 ofLolun Si «al o Tiii' 'KBiiratur 
Srjiiot inbdiniat Toi>t rd^ow rwr ir riJJ 
lltpaiKif iroX^/i<#> TeXei/rrfffdi'Tui', xal ri* 
ayuira rbr ^-wiriifHov rlrrt irpurron i'weliiire, 
KoX obnoy tByfKe Mytiv ^Kii/uor ran 
Sitf-ocif BawTOfUron toi>i Tpoaipt6i»T<u rii* 
InfT&puy. rcrhajn the ultiniato authority 
for this assertion is only Thuc. 2. 35. 1. 

"> c. 33. 4. The guilty Tliebuns at 
once surrender, and ara all nut to death. 
Their names are suppri'ssou. Cj). Hdt. 
9. 86-88. 

" oc. 34-37, upwards of four pages. 



HERODOTUS 



&PP. I 



HeroJotean lines with almost serrilo fidelity.^ The Greek fleet 
under Leotychidas and Xanthippos advances from Aigiua to Delos 
spoHtaiiooualy, from Delos to Samoa by invitation. The Persian 
navarcha retire before it to Mykale, draw up their ships, surround 
them with 'a wooden wall and a deep ditch,' summon reinforce- 
ments. The scene of the battle i.'J rightly located on the land, but in 
three or four particulars the version in Diodoros takes liberties with 
the Horodotean original. Thus the Herald's staff becomes a live 
Herald, with a loud and definite appeal to the lonians on the Persian 
side." The divine Pkeme, or Rumour of victory, is degraded to a 
deliberate fiction, devised by Leotychidas to encourage hia men.* 
The services of the lonians in the Persian ranks to the national cause 
are set forth in no ambiguou-s terms, and virtually secure victory for 
the Greeks.'* The actual delivery of the attack is assigned to the 
Persians, though they h:ive allowed the Greeks to land unhindered. 
The diverse fortune of the Athenians and Lakodaimonians, and the 
Aristeia of the foiTOer, are passed over in silence.'' The battle is 
recognized as a great one, and its effects are far-reaching." The 
proposed transfer of the lonians to European Hellas is at first accepted, 
and is then annulled on the interpellation of the Athenians;'' the 
confederat-e fleet parts at Samoa, Leotychidas and the Lakedaimonians 
going straight home, Xanthippos with the Athenians, reinforced by 
the lonians, to Sestos. That city is forthwith attacked and easily 
taken : a garrison is left in occupation, the allies are dismissed, the 
Athenians under Xanthippos return home.* ' Such was the end of 
the Medic war, which jjisted hut two yejirs,' and was narrated in the 
work of Herodotus, the contents of which are briefly described,^ as if 
to reveal or confess the principal, if not the sole, source from which 
the eventual narrative has been borrowed. 

Whether Diodoros, throughout the whole passage just analyzed, 
gives us much more than what he found in Ephoros is a moot point. 
The annalistic chronological data are his own, no doubt, but the adjust- 
ments and synchronisms, as well as the temporal dislocations of the 



' The syTichroiiisiii wiili the lust battle 
st Plataift i« accejiteii, o. 34. 1. 

' c. 34. 4 irl\pvKa. r6r fie7a\o^ti)i'&raTar 
Tir {» r<^ OTpaTowiitf. However, the 
herald is iit Hdt 9. 93 as well u the 
herald's wand in 9. IDO, so perhaps the 
wand hag aimjily bton dro|i|>(?d. 

' c. 35. 1-3. The pas-sage ia not quite 
solf-coDsiiiteDt : the rumour of victory 
ia duly reported and then Imir-heartedly 
explained as a device of the commanders 
to encourage their men. Had the ruae 
of AgesilooB before the battle of Koroneia 
in a94B.c. (cp. Xeuoph. Hell. 4. 3. 13) 
anything to say tti this case to the 
rationalism of Eplioros ! 



' c. 36, 2. Leotychidas raistakea them 
at first for reinforcements from Sardes 
(§ 3): this ia hardly consiRteiit with 
the iramediate sequel, in which their 
ap[>earaiDce ia the mark for the flight of 
the Barbarians. 

► Thougli given by Hdt. 9. 102, 106. 

" c. 34. 1 H€y6.\ri ftix^. For the 
results cp. c. 3n. 5-7. Tliere is great 
slaughter, a general movement to revolt 
from Peraia, tlie retreat of Xerxes to 
Ekbatana, etc. 

' c 37. 1-3. 

' §§ 4, 5. The Herodotean narrative 
is here 'telescoped' for the sake of 
brevity. » § 6. 



§13 



AUTHORITIES OTHER THAN HERODOTUS 



70 



Herodotean narrative, may b« due to Ephoros. The great passage 
on Sicilian affairs, a real though not quite aatisfactory addition to our 
reaoorces, ' Diodoroa of Sicily ' will have taken not from Ephoros, but 
from the work of a compatriot. The textual citations from Simonides 
may perhaps come from the fourth-century writer ; but the literary 
description of the work of Herodotus, as ' in nine Books,' cannot do 
80 ; and the reference to Pindar,' from the context in which it occurs, 
may be accounted to Diodoros himself for bibliographical righteousness. 
For the rest, in further characterizing this important contribution to 
our resources, our appraisement parses through Diodoros back to 
Ephoros, and the historiography of the fourth century, of which he 
is the type. The omissions in the story, as retold from Herodotus, it 
is hardly necessary to enumerate ; they are patent and wholesale.^ The 
rearrangements and readjustments are more subtle, and are not a mere 
matter of literary presentation. They are sometimes dictated by 
a chronological motive ;" they are sometimes designed to make good a 
previous omission : * they sometimes amount to novelties, intended to 
improve the Herodotean position, and must be reckoned with as such. 
But to a great extent they arc flowers of the rhetoric and fruits of 
the philosophy, or rationahsm, in which the whole fabric htui been 
steeped or stamped. The rhetoric attains distinct body in such 
passages as the diplomatic retort to the Argivcs,'' the secret conversa- 
tioo between Leonidas and the Ephors," the Greek reply to the 
overtures of Xerxes at Thermopylai," the epigrammatic parainesis of 
Leonidas,^ the elaborate panegyric on the heroes of Thermopylai,* the 
of vengeance and loyalty taken by the (ireeks,'" the valiant rivalry 
Athenians and Spartans,'' as well as in the general description of 
the fighting,'- in the deliberate cultivation of dramatic effects,'* and 
even in the recurrence of typical phrases.'* The rationalism, though 
not always equally crude or ungainly, appears in propter form to 



overt 
I L eon: 

■■l Ai 



* At the end of tlio Sikeliolo storv, c. 
84. 8, • very tiatnrnl connexion in winch 
tn mention Pindar'!) acme ; cp. Waikias 
Llovd, aiitory of Sicily (1872); E. 
Boshmer, Pindan Sicilixhe Oden (1891). 

*«•(!• W <le«criptiou of the army of 
XorxMh (2) action of Thessaly, (:"!) of 
llakedon, (4) reduction of the oiigage- 
manta olT Artemition, (6) omission of 
tba defence of tlie Athenian Akronolia, 
and (C>) of the Psytt&leia episode at 
Salamia, (7) reduction of the operations 
at Plalaia, (8) omiHsiou of the services 
of Tberou in the Sikeliote story, besides 
ntuoben of leMcr details, names, etc. 



* Cp, p. «6 rupra, 

• Tiie : 



: anonymoas Samian, who swims 
to Salamis with iiiroi-niation from the 
loiiians to Eiiryliiu>li.'4, c. 17. 3. looks 
like the double of Skyilias, Hdt 8. 8. 



» c. 3. 6. • c. 4. 2-4. 

' c, 6. 6. 

' c. 9. 4 roi5T«r mfi^^eiXt raxdut 
iptimrroir7a0au wt tw fSou Sfiwyriaottivout. 
» C. 11. 

>° cc. 3. 3, 29. 3, especially the latter. 

" c. 32. 4. 

>' Therniopylui ia the wont ease, bnt 
all the battles are rhetoricixed : Freemiin, 
however, ii. 198 note, praises the 
'rigorous picture' in Diixl. II. 22. 
It is apparentlr intended for a speaking, 
or rather a shouting likeness of the 
preliininariea of a battle. 

" The partiality for night- effects is 
obvious ; cp. co. ft, 10, 30. 2. 

" e.g. r^f Koif^ i\€vSfptat, CC. 8. 1, 

3. 6; 4. 4; (5. 6; 6. 2; 7. 1; 11. 1): 
n. 5 ; (2«. 1 ; 86. 5). Cp. ]>. 72 note 

4, p. 73 note 4 supra. 



HERODOTUS 



APP. r 



motivate the expedition,^ to explain the victories,- to reduce the 
monstrous estimates and figures/ to aceoiuit for the disjippearance of 
Themistoklcs,* to elimiaate the supernatural.'' Yet this rationalism 
is not quite successful or even self-consistent ; it leaves the super- 
natural a sort of aupernumerary rfile in the action," and it fails to ' 
eliminate the inconsistencies present in the Herodotcan tradition, li 
particular, the inconsistency still survives, and in an aggravated fonn,| 
between the ilemtio of the Spartans at Thermopylai and the evidently 
serious intention of defending the pass. The parallel inconsistencj 
for Salamis remains, between the resolution of the Greeks to fight at 
Salamis and their desperate efforts to escape. It is characteristic 
the superficiah'ty of the Epliorean criticism that the natural apo 
created by the duplication of the storms," of the messages of Themi-j 
stokles,* of the Greek vowa,^ and by some minor episodes and items 
intrinsic improbability, are not even detected, much less resolved." 
Yet amid all this provoking sliow of second-rate art and paeudo-scienc 
there emerge certain items, with which the modern reconstruction 



' 0. 1. 2 Sii TaCrriP riiv ahlav, viz, 
the ambition of Manlonioa. c. 2. 2 iid 
re rijr toO rarpAt ivifioX^ xai T-Jjf toO 
Mapioflcv tri'^/^ovWof. The gre.it works 
were utiilertok«iti partly to fiicilitato the 
pAsaage of the forces, ]iaitly to terrorize 
the Greeks, ibiil. § 4. 

' The suporiority of Greek weaponR 
U much insisted on in the story of 
Theniio[(yl(ii, c. 7. 2 toIi iprrait ical rip 
/ityiOti tQv iinrlSur. § 3 daTria-i yip 
xal WXraii fuKfiaU ol ^dppapoi xf"^/'-"''"- 
crX. /uyiXaii iirTlai aK(vatofj.fvovt 5Xoc 
tA irCina, avrol Si Sii, rdt <coii^T»rraj tCii' 
iTKcramjplwir 5ir\uif f\aTTo6fievoi kt\. 
The advanta^^e of tlie Greeks at Arte- 
mifiion is explained jiartly by the 
acftttered bases from which the Per.sian 
fleet has to act, c. 12. 6 ^k toXXwk 
\i,u^iin' dj'ayofiJyiin'. The victory of 
Salamia is duo to the 'strategy' uf 
Themistoklea (o. 19. 5), that of Hiiiieni 
to the same merit in Gelon (cc. 21. 3, 
'22. 5). The victory of Plat^ia is due 
to the wiRdam of the Greeks in clioosiog 
tlieir ground : o. 30. 6 toii /jLif otV 
"EXXijffw ift^ftbrun ^ov\tv(ranivoif toX\4 
iri/re/3dXcTo lepin rijv vUr/v ij tui» r&iTDy 
rrfnox'^P^H'- The tihysical facts are hero 
altered to suit tiie theory proper to 
Thermopylai or Salaniis. The victory 
at Mykale ix largely traced to the action 
of the lonians. 

» The king's fleet is left at the 
Herodotean figurca, e. 3. 7-9 (more than 
120O longships, 850 transports, 3000 
trlakonters : the items, however, do 



not quite aquare with the totals). Thi 
army is greatly reduced : starting witl 
Ufivfards of 800,000, it is nu«id 
1,000,000 by the £ui'0]j«un uoatingen 
c. 5. 2. Tht? force that goes round at 
Tliermopylai ia donblei!, e. 8. 5. The 
amiy of MardoDios starts at 400,000, 
0. 19. 6, Biid 18 raised to 600,000 on 
the field of buttle, o. 35. 1, where the 
Hellenic force falls to 1 00,000. Rhetoric 
hero gaina on rationaltsra and has a 
kindly word to say for the figures c. 

5. 3. 

* c. 27. 9, owing to the estrangement 
between Sparta and Athens and the 
honours paid him thero. 

^ c. 3.'), the rationalistic explanation 
of the 4>7J/«i;. 

* The oracle, on which Leonidas 
relied, ia omitted ; but tlie deliverance 
of Dsljihi was iraipoWfwt and jiroved rrjr 
Tcii* Seuiv ivepytlan (o. 14. 3), the storm 
sliowed rb Qtiov ijfTi\aix^irta6a.i. tCiv 
'EXKitvuv (c. 13. 1); otherwise the super- 
natural mnchinery Iiah disappeared. 

T ec. 12. 3, 13. 1. 

* cc. 17. 1. 19. 5. The abstirdity of 
making the same man act as messenger 
on both occasions ia, however, studioiuly 
avoided. 

» cc. 3. 3, 29. 2-3. 

'° The most interesting is the foi 
century anachronism put into the mouth 
of Demaratos in addressing Xerxes, c 

6. 2 rout yiip iipiorafUrovt tUv fiapfiifMf 
'EX\ri»tKatt Swd/itai KaTaKo\ttuii. 



iomly 



I IS 



AUTHORITIES OTHER THAN HERODOTUS 



of the story is bownd to deal more seriously : nine such may be 
enumerated, and treasured for that purpose. (1) The theory that the 
invasions of Sicily and of Hellas was a concerted movement, nnt a 
fortuitous synchronism.' (2) The elevation of Doriskos into the first 
rendezvous for Fleet and Amiy on the Persian si<lo.^ (3) The clear 
and definite statement of the circumnavigation of Salarais and the 
closing of the western outlet of the straits by a squiulron of the king's 
fleet ; ' and in general the effort to clear the tactics of this battle. 
(4) The services of tlie lonians at Salamis, and especially at Mykale, 
in securing victory for the national cause.* (5) The original docu- 
ments quoted in the text, which have an ob^nous and independent 
value;* with thera may be a.ssooiatcd the notices of the Delphic 
tripod, the Delphian trophy, the Geloiitan offerings. (6) Though the 
particular numbers for amiies and fleets have no intrinsic value, their 
substitution for the HeroJotean figures attests a legitimate incredulity. 
(7) A similar remark applies to readjustments of the Herodotean 
chronology or sequences : Ephoros exercised a liberty in this matter, 
•wliich we may claim, and use perhaps to better purpose. (8) The story 
of the war in Sicily, though hardly an integral portion of ' the Median 
war,' yet deserves enumeration, as it is distinctly though briefly 
anticipated in Herodotus, and supplies an imporUint complement, or 
correction, and a valuable supplement to the Herodotean record. 
(9) The bibliographical notice of the work of Herodotus*^ has a value 
not merely for the tfsdmonui — whether it go back to Ephoros or only 
to Diodoros — but also as bearing upon the problem of the proper end 
and completion of the Herodotean work, and so inferentially upon the 
problem of the composition of that work. Diodoros and Ephoros to 
boot — as we may feel with certainty — regarded the work of Herodotus 
AB complete, and the siege of Sestos as a natural and fitting end to 
the story of the Medic war. But after all the greatest lieuefit derivable 
from the Library of Diodoros in this connexion is the proof of the 
jirocesses to which the tradition of the Persian wars was subject in 
the foiu'th centiuy, and the popularity accorded to the result in much 
later times. 

TKOGirs PoMl'EIUS ^ by general consent stands a class or two higher 
than Diodoros as historian, or at least as artist.^ Even in the care- 
loBB Epitome of Justin and in the Prologues, described by Niebuhr as 
'indescribably barbarous,' which still exhibit the main linos of his 



« ». 1. 4. » i;. 3. 7. 

» c. 17. 2. 

• «!. 17. 8; 86.2. 4, 

» (1) c. U. 6 (Simoiiiiles) ; (2) c. H. 
i, 'elegy' on the Delphic trophy; (3) 
e. 33- 2, tli« thcee epigram* ; (4) c 29. 
3, thu vow before I'luUM ; (6) the notice 
of the ^atxapirum vbiusfux (c. 26. 3) b 
important, but probuMy iuiu-cnrate ; cp. 
Fnaman, Sicily, ii. 190. 



• 0, 37. 6, Ab Ephoros himiielf was 
the first historian to write ' Books ' it 
is not likely that h<! 9]>ecilied that the 
work of H<lt. was 'in nine Books.' 

' Cp. Toubner edition by F. Ruchl 
(1880), which oontaius the Prologi from 
Guttichmid'ii KCfniion. 

' Cp. Niebuhr, LecCuru on Ane. BiU. 
i.U8&2) pp.7 If. : Wachsmath, Hinltitung 
(1895), pp. 108 ff. 



78 



HERODOTUS 



APP. I 



work, the greatness of his plan and the sltill with which bis episodes 
were handled shine through.^ The section on the Persian war, as 
epitomized, extends barely to six pages," but the lines upon which the 
story ia constructed are so, strongly marked that we must suppose the 
Epitome a faithful miniature of the original. The war ia here presented 
in nine successive episodes, or tableaux, which dispose themselves 
obviously into three groups, distinguishable in subject, scene, and 
aoquenco. The omissions of traditional items in Justin are frappant,^ 
but the unity of the argument is so intimate as to suggest that Trogus 
himself, not his epitomator, is responsible therefor. In the first three 
episodes the action may l>e regarded as taking place on the Persian 
side. (1) TIte accession of Xerxes* virtually opens the story, as with 
Herodotus. ' Dareus ' dies in the midst of preparing for the 
re-inviision of Greece. ' Ariamenes," the deceased king's eldest son, 
claims to succeed : Xerxes urges two pleas in his own favour, his 
birth ' in the purple,' ^ and his mother's right. *^ The dispute is 
referred to Artaphernes as arbiter : he decides in favour of Xerxes. 
' In those days brothers divided kingdoms more amicabl}' than small 
fortunes nowadays' — a moral not unworthy of Tacitus.' (2) The 
tahtft of Deiiuiratus^ is next introduced. The exile has not figured, as 
with Herodotus, in the first episotle, but the second is all to bis credit. 
The anecdote, which appears at the end of our Seventh Book of 
Herodotus, here occurs, with the trifling variation, due to a lapse 
of memory, or perhaps an error of & translator, that the lady, who 
discovers the rua! inwardness of the apparently blank missive, is 
described, not as the wife but as the sister of King Leonidas. (3) The 
niiiijnilwle of the Feidan forces^ is next presented in terms that might 
have been borrowed from Diodoroa or from the Attic Orators : the 
magnitude of the forces, the powers at the king's disposal, are used to 
accentuate the incompetence of their leader, and the disgrace of their 
fate.^" But at this point the seene shifts instantaneously to central 



* C\>. Justiu's I'ratfatio. Tlie work 
wu in forty-four Books: omnium tiu- 
eulorum, regain, natii?num popttJontmque 
r« ge$ltu cantintntur. It was the first 
nniveni&I liistorv in the Latin tongue. 
TroBU* belonged to the generation after 
Diodoros, and was acquainted with 
Livy'a work, Jtiatin 38. 3. 11. 

=" Justin *i. 10-14, 

' Among the most notable are (1) the 
king's morfh, (2) tho storin, (3) the 
fighting at Artemision, (4) the Greek 
preparations, (5) Artabazos and hia 
aohievemencs, (6) the siege ofSestos. 

* c. 10. 1-11. Cp. Hdt. 7. 1-4. 

° §§ 3, 4 de nosceudi felicitate . . se 
regi primuiu natnm. 

* § 8 matemo . . se iure et avito 
vinoere. 



' § 11 t^uto moderatius tunc fratrea 
inter so maxima i-egna divitlebant, qiiam 
nunc exig\ia ]mtrinionia jmrtinntur. 

» c. 10. 12-17. 

• c. 10. 18-24. The utimbei's are aejjtin- 
genta viitia de rt'jito nnd trccerUa miiia 
de avxiliis. For Diod. cp. p. 76 note 
3 supra. The ligure for the ships is in- 
credible and corrupt : natrs qtioque dccies 
eentim milium Huviero habuisse dicUur. 
But cp. Dio<lor. 11. 5. 2. With § 19 
cp. Diwlor. 11. 6. 8. 

"> §§ 21 ir. ipse autetn primus in fuga, 
poaticmus in praelio . . in pericitlia 
tiniidiis, sicubi mutiis abesaet, inflatua 
. . veluti naturae ip.><ius dominus et 
montca in planum deduoebat ct convex* 
vallium aeqnabat et qiiaodant mnria 
pontibufi strrnebat . . turpi^ ac foedua 
discesaua fuit 



a! 
bi 
in 
oi 



AUTHORITIES OTHER THAN HERODOTUS 

Greece, no time or space being wasted on the advance of the forces, 
And a second group of three episodes carries the narrative onwards to 
jt8 climax. (4) Tlie slori/ of Thei-mtq'ylai ^ reproduces the most signifi- 

nt features of the story in Diodoros with a difference or two, not to 
the credit of Trogus. The reference to Marathon is there,-' and above 
all the grand finale of the night-uttack on the Persian camp is there ; 
but the figiu-es for the forces are varied, in a somewhat rhetorical 
interest," and the fighting is vaguely extended, beyond the tridnvm, 
on to a fourth day/ As with Diodoros the struggle at Thermopylai 

quite dissociated from any operations at sea ; moreover, Artemision 

altogether omitted, doubtless in the interest of the sequel, and the 
[second epiaode in this group is confined to (5) tke apjtetd of Thtmi- 
ttokles to the laniam,^ which is paraphrased in a thorouyhly Isokratean 
fashion.^ But though Artemision has been omitted, (6) the assault 
on Delphi^' and the supernatural discomfiture of the Persians are 
briefly recorded, and the successful destruction of Thesjiiai, Plataia, 
and Athens serve as a brief appendix, or transition,** to sustain the 
interest, which might otherwise have culmfnated with the attack on 
the gods." (7) J/w btUlle of Salaniis^^ follows, and is thus made to 
appear as the first sea-battle, and the chief interest of the story. The 
episode is treated as self-contained, its antecedents going back to 
Marathon and the post-Manithonian policy of Themistokles. The 
story, told on strictly Herodotean Lnes, comprises the Delphian 
Response and its interpretation, the evacuation of the city, the union 
of the fleet at Salamis, the difl"erences of opinion, the ruse of Themi- 
stokles, the valour of Artemisia the Halikarnassian queen. But in one 
respect this accoiuit further develops the motif which Diodoros, i.e. 
Ephoros, had already evolved from Herodotus : the victory is expressly 
ascribed to the withdrawal of the lonians in obedience to the injunc- 
tions of Thfmistokles.'^ (8) The flifihi of Xitntes,^" with its cognate 
^nsodes, is also repeated on Herotlotean lines. Mardonios proposes 

e return of the king, and remains himself with a select force behind. 
A 6econ<l message from Themistokles, by the hands of the same slave, 
converts the king's retreat into a flight. Xerxes finds the bridge over 
the Hellespont Tjroken down, as in Herodotus ; but a new rhetorical 
point is gained by reducing the ship, in which Herodotus allowed the 

» c. 12. 1-7. 

* e.g. § 4 an idvu mociiia veiitTit con- 
didiraus, iit essenc nui nostra delurent ? 

' c. 12. 8-10. 

* sn. 

* S d prorsns qTmai non cum Gnccii 
tantum, Kd et cimi diis inimortalibiu 
bcllutn goreret . . ut intellngcret, qutm 
iiuUae efewut hominum adveraua deo* 
vir<?». 

'» c. 12. 12-27. 
» g§ 25. 26. 
»* c. 13. 1-12. 



' c. 11. 2-19. 

* $ 2 COS piiKiiam caiiesjiicr« iubet, 

JlQonim cognati Murathoiiia pugna inter- 
teti faemiit. Cp. Diodor. 11. 6. 4. 
' The total forces with Leonidts are 
ivdnoMl to 4000, cp. Kdt. 7. 228 ; the 
mnaining wiih iiini at the end 
-Vtunbers 600 n^ainat 600, Dindoroa 11. 
S. a. The nnmber of the I'cnsian force 
•ent round is put (with Diodoros 11, 8. 
8) at 20,000. 

* jl 4, 5 tridiio ibi . . dimicatiini 
quarta die, etc. 



80 



HERODOTUS 



APP. I 



king to cross the channel, to a fisherman's boat ' ; and, as if to 
betray the fictitious character of this climax, an elaborate moral is 
drawn from the situation." The sufi'erings of the army could not 
exceed the earliest records in Aischylos and Herodotus ; Init the birds 
and beasts, which consume the corpses, have perhaps migrated from 
another context in lIero<Jotus.^ After Salamis and the king's flight, 
(9) the dmiblr-ridori/ of I'talaia-Myhnk* is brieflj' dismissed, in two 
short fmrallels, both of them saturated with Atticism. At Plataia 
little more than the bare fact of a battle is recorded, Mardonios is left 
alive and allowed to escape, perhaps by a careless identification with 
Artabiizos,'' and the plunder of his camp is made responsible for the 
beginnings of luxury in Greece.'' The ojicrations of the fleet are 
treated no less cavalierly. Mykale is apparently converted into a 
strictly naval engagement,^ but though the synchronism with Plataia 
and the fama are duly recorded, the services of the lonians ai"e 
omitted, perhaps because this motif has already been employed in the 
account of Salamis. The record concludes with the award of the 
Aristeia by universal consent to Athens among the states, and to 
Themistokles among the leaders, his fame still further augmenting the 
glory of Athens.* 

The conciseness and rapidit}' of this narrative, the graphic individu- 
ality of the episodes selected for treatment, the calculated omission 
of items likely to duplicate and so to weaken certain effects, the co- 
herence and balauce of the whole, show a high degree of literary art. 
Expressly rhetorical passages are not bad rhetoric, presenting, as they 
<lo, points with the epigrammatic terseness proper to the Latin tongue. 
Bat if it be a.skod whether Trogiis has fished up any forgotten pearls 
of genuine tradition, or adds anything of real history to our materials, 
the answer must be in the negative. There is very little in Trogus 
which is not in Herodotus or in Diodoros, and that little is jirobably 
or certainly wrong. Arianienes, not Artobazanes, may have been the 
name of the eldest son of Dareios, but the supposed arbitration of 
Artaphernes looks like exaggeration, or misunderstanding, in the 
interest of the moral. The description of the unnamed Gorge as 
'sister' of Leonidas is simply an error. The reduction of tjie 

inter se auro Persico divitianun luxoria 
cepit. 

§§ 7, 8 navali proelio in Ari* sub 
munte Mycak adveraus Pctsas dimicatutn 
est. ibi ante eongresi-ionem, cuoi cUnea 
ex advei'so stnrent, etc. 

* §§ 10, 11 confecto bello, cum de 
i>ra*«aiiis ciritatium agoretur, omnium 
mdicio Athenieoiiiuiu virtus ceteris 
praelata. inter ducus (juotjue Tbemi- 
sturlos princL'ps civitatuiu testimoDio 
indicaiiia glonain psitriae suae auxit. 
Leonidaa and Tlieiiiistokles are the only 
Greeks mtntioncd by name. 



' § 9 ulii cum solutum ijont^nj 
hibarnis tooipestatibua olfeijiiUset, pi.'ica- 
toria sqaplia trepidua traiccit. 

^ § 10 orat rss spDctaculo digna ct ad 
acatimationem sortig humuiiae, utc. 

' § 12. Cp. Ildt 7. 10 ad f. 

* c. 14. 1-6, 7-9. In § 1 Mardonius 
(sk) captures Olyntliiia; cp. HdL 8. 
127. Thi* might be defended by 
rcgai'dinK Artabazos ua Iu» lieutenant. 

^ Ktesias might be res{H»isible ; cp. 
§ S !nt])m. 

• 5 6 castra refcrta re<;ali oputeiitia 
capta unde prinium Graecos diviso 



}13 



AUTHORITIES OTHER THAN HERODOTUS 



81 



number of men under Leonidas at Thermopylai is a carelesgness 
traceable to the uncritical use of the epigram in Herodotus. The 
variant version in the appeal of Themistoklea to the loiiiana is trans- 
parent rhetoric : the extension of the fighting to four days is, perhaps, 
a displaced reminiscence of an Herodotean item. The important role 
feasaigned to the lonians at Salamis is the most plausible addition or 
fdevelopment in this authority, but it can hardly be ascribed to a 
[genuine tradition : it is more like a rationalistic suggestion to 
ccoiuit for the victory, rendered the more artistic by the suppression 
^of all notice of the Ionian services at Mykale, The fiahcrman's boat 
in which Xerxes crosses the Helles]K>nt is an eflective novelty, for 
which we have long been waiting. It is the last logiail effort of the 
ssitiric nemesis, which could no further go ; for, to have made the king 
Bwim across the channel would liave set him up again among the 
Plieroes. The escape of Mardonios from Platjiia may be due to mere 
confusion, or may have been taken from Ktesias; but anyway has the 
effect of reducing the fame of that Spartan victory. The apparent con- 
version of Mykale into a strictly naval })attle is, perhaps, but the 
unintentional result of compression and omission ; but the assignment 
of the Aristeia to Athens and the Athenian general, for which of course 
Trogua had authority, gives the lie to the best sources. There is, in 
ehort, nothing to be gained for the history of the Persian war from 
the work of Trogus in Epitome. The indications it affords of a partial 
emancipation from Diodoros, and a partial return to Herodotus, and 
other independent sources, liave a decided value and interest for the 
history of the traditions themselves. It may be due to the good name 
of Trogus to add that the Persian war was not, and could not well be, 
the portion of his work wherein he showed to the greatest advantage.' 



' The fragment of the mysterions 

|AitiSTODEJii>!j may be c«nvenieutly 

ISoticed heru, as it niaintains the cbar- 

[■eter of » general liistury, though its 

I data may Se considerably lat«r than 

[Trogai, or even Jiutin. For the text 

'•« MtteUer, Fragg. Hist. (}r. v. (1873) 

pp. 1-S. Schwartz np. Pauly-WiMovra 

iL 928 may be right in saying that the 

only novelty in Aristmlomos conceminp 

the Persian war ia the notice of the 

I>isk, with the li^t of states in les^ie 

Li^iiut the ileJe ; ep. ArLstud. c. ix. 

\ M. e. p. 1 2 ^TT-iio-euT a oPaift rapi, roir 

[*EXAijai rLraf itl Trpcypa^riiiai aiWuv rCt* 

^wviiiufuixv^^'^'' i" 'Tip yiT)5iKifi voXifiVi 

f4it^p«p oi AaKfi{un6rii>i Till/ HiTKoy, d<fi' ou 

li«Xor<pu>t /w^patjrav rdf rfywvtaii.iva\ 

I viX^ii, tin M^« rpiirrom nrij yrypi^a.t 

k ^i4^ u<rripoin. Until liiis round-robin 

I tnni* up, we may safely regard the story 

'm an mvention. But to a student of 

'the vToliition of the liistory, or legend, 

TOL. U 



of the war the Diiik is not the only item 
of intfit'st ill the context. AristtMlemoN 
evidently Lfave a. brief, but complete, 
survey of the war. The fragment o])cns 
iu the und^t of the story of Salamis ; 
accounts of Plataia and Mykale follow. 
Some half-dozen (wiutis at leoat are of 
interest Iu the dnry of Salamin. (1) 
Tliemi.st»iklea pleads — evidently with the 
other admirals — for a delay of 'one day 
more,' and utilizes the interval todespatcn 
Sikinnos with a message to XerxeSi 
Siktmiti« re[x:irts the intended flight of 
the Greeks : the king afisumcs, or infers, 
the medism of Thcmistoklcs. (2) The 
jiroject of crossing to Salamis by a bridge 
((■tOq/fia) is distinctly placed before the 
battle. (3) The king's throne is located 
on ' Pomes,' near to the Horakleion. 
(I) The sITair of Pirttaieia is given a 
Hpecial turn, {a) The occupation is 
dixtiuctly dated after the commenoe- 
ment of tlie battle, (fr) ' Myriads ' of 

G 



»2 



HERODOTUS 



APP. I 



§ 14. The Bioijraphers. — C0RNKLIU8 NepOS, a Transpadane,^ the 
friend of Catulkis,* of Varro,' of Atticus/ and of Cicero,'' exhibited in his 
writings both the universaliat and the hiographica! tendencies of his 
age. Only a portion of his biographical works has como down to us, 
and that in a questionable and imperfect form.** The Life of Miltiades 
happens, in the absence of other authorities, to have acquired a 
factitious value, for it preserves the Ephorean account of the battle of 
Marathon, after a fashion.^ The brief biographies of Themistokles, 
Aristeides, and Pausanias add little of substance and less of value to 
the materials for the history of the Persian war. The Grecisms in 
the vocabulary of Ne[H>s point to his employing native sources.* Not 



Persians are landed, (c) Their slaughter 
is Ht;;[ialtzed as the s;reatest schievemcnt 
of AriateiJes tn the cause of Hellas 
(eclipsing his comniaiid at PUtain). (t>) 
The ArisUia are aaaigned to Athens, 
Aigina ia placed second. (6) The pro- 
JMted more to the Hellespont is ascribed 
to ' the Hrjllcniw,' i» opposed by Themi- 
stokloa, and by linii betrayed to XentoB, 
who thereupon takes to tiight. (7) As 
evidence for tlie interposition of the 
Rods is cited the vision of ' the son 
of Theokydos' (whose proper n.ime is 
textiiallj corrirpt), i.e. aitjuirently the 
vision is datetl to tlio day of battle. 
There is an equal tmmbeT of signidcant 
items ill the slorij 0/ Fialaia. (1) 
Alexander is commissiouGd to negotiate 
for the neiUmlily of Athens, and is 
dismisiied with contumely. ('i) The 
actual fighting is cut down apparently 
to one euja;agenu'ut, tlie victory i:i which 
is secured by the advent of the Athtniana 
to the support of the LakedaiinoninDs. 
(3) The story of the e.Kcliau^ie of jioaitionB 
it confaaed, curtaiW, and brought into 
inunedute connexion with the batrle- 
pieoe. (4) Mardonios, 'bare-heiided,' is 
stain by Aeimnestoa, a 'Lakedaimonian.' 
(5) The Persians fly tt> Thebes (not to « 
fortified camp). (0) There is a curious 
precision in lignroji. Plataia is SO atadea 
from Thebes. There are 40,000 Boiotiaus 
with Mjirdoniofi. The .slain amount 
lo l^iO.OOO. A monj^rcl item occurs in 
the 60,000 annihiUted by Alexander of 
Makedon on their homeward way. (7) 
The trophies, the betithing of Thebes, 
according to oath, and the foundation 
of the f'ltviheria are noticed. The stvni 
of Mtjkalt is more cnrtly related. (1) 
The Oreeks pursue the Persian fleet to 
Mykalv, (2) a mountain in Milestn, 
4'iOO stndes distant from Salamis. (3) 
The battle takes place on land, (4) 
aynchronoualy with Plataia, and (5) 



40,000 barbarians are slain. The record 
<if the Persian war thus jireservBd shows 
very clearly (1) the return to Herodotus, 
coupled with (2} acceMory sources, of 
the ratioualinng and rhetorical schools, 
especially favourable to Athena. Later 
on, e.j;. in the story of PauaaniAS, 
Ari.9t(xiemos betrays the same sources 
as Nepos. Waclmninth, regarding the 
fragmoTit a.i a forgery, takes no account 
of it in his EinUiluitg. The noniiual 
author cannot lie identified with any 
known writer; but the fragment itselfi 
notwithstanding its literary liiatory, has 
a plausible air, and presumably goes 
back to the Roman jieriod. 

' Pliny. Nat. SUt. i. 22. 2 Ncpos . . 
Padi atcola. Cp. PUny, E]ip. 4. 28. 1. 

' Catullus, Carmen 1 ad Comelinm 
Nepotem. 

"The imagines were probably the 
pattern for his ViUit (Wnchsmuth, op. e. 
p. 210), and Varro perhaps named one 
of his works after Nepos (Wiaaowa in 
RmIEm. iv. 1410). 

•• Tlio Life of Allicus {rxv.) it th« 
ehef (I'lienvre of Nepos. 

» Aulas Gellius, 15. 28 ; Snetonins, 
Jnlhii 56. Nojws wrote a life of Cicero 
(GpIHus, I.e.). The second Book of 
Letters from Cicero to Nepos i.s cited by 
Maorobius, Sat. 2. 1. 14, and a letter of 
Nepos to Cicero by Lactantius, InMU. 8. 
15. 1 0. Two rather nmbiguoos references 
occur in Cicero'.') letters to Attious after 
Caesar's deatli : 16. ^. 5 ; 14. 4. 

" As copied (and edited with a dedica- 
tion) for Theodoaius II. {408-4.10 a. d.) 
by ono Aemilius Probns. (not witliout 
asisistance). 

' Cp. Hilt, IV.ri. ii. 206 (Appendix 
X. § 26). 

'eg. Aatu = Athenao Theni. 4, ob- 
sonium 16. 10. Some Greek words are 
introduced timplieiter (AiTO/tarla, ir/wxr- 
Kviftif). A good many are transUter- 



AUTHORITIES OTHER THAN HERODOTUS 



that the Lives are baaed on Herodotean authority : Nepos betrays little, 
il any, sign of the return to Herodotus, which was barely beginning 
in his day. The Greek authority whom CornoHus is most apt to cite 
by name ia Thucydides ; ' but there is nothing of the better spirit or 
practice of Thucydides in his methods. He drew mainly from the 
rhetorical historians ; hut even the worst of them are not to lie 
mode responsible for the blunders of Nepos, some of which would 
have been impossible for any Greek writer. Thus he substitutes the 
' Corcyraeaiis,' and a war with them, for the Aiginetaus, as the first 
occasion of public service by Theraistokles : - he avoided the bhmder 
of representing Pausanias as 'king' of Sparta, only to fall a victim 
to the ' kingship ' of Eurybiades, an even less excusable en-or.^ He 
was something of a chronological authority, yet his chronology is 
frequently deplorable.^ He had written a work on geography, yet 
he makes an egregious confusion between the battles of Mykale and 
the Eurymedon.* His superficial and borrowed rationalism may 
especially be seen in his account of the defence of Thermopylai and 
Artemision : 'many of the cities were displeased with the policy of 
a naval battle,' hence the occupation of Thermojpylai ! *' And the 
abandonment of Artemision is ascribed, not to the fall of Thermopylai, 
but to the apprehension that the Greek ships might be circumvented 
and taken in the rear by the king's Heet.' We hear the reverberation 
of the fourth-century rhetoric in the statements that, at Salamis, 'one 
n saved Greece' and 'Asia succuralied to Einope.'* We sadly 
the comic Nemesis — Nepos is no great humorist " — when 
ilemnly assured that * Xerxes greatly distinguished himself by invad- 
Greece with the largest army and the largest fleet on record.' '*• 
There is hardly a single item to be found in Cornelius which can be 
treated as authoritative. His estimate of the forces of Xerxes is, of 
course, a bit of rationalism, and it is ruined by the absurd figure for 
the cavalry," The army of Mardonios, selected virilim, is at least 




atcd (acnwma, onogaostea, f^naeconitis, 
■ejrtalo, *trttteeera&, tena.siniis, etc. etc.). 
Othen are obviously paraphrased, or 
tmiaUt«d. 

' a^ Tktm, 9, Pausan. 2. 

* Thtm. 4. Th« Pausanias was in- 
dnded among the Lives of tha^o who 
ilMl not been kiiigM. Lieet enim lf(jitnu 
torum e-uivOi tphoro hoc fticere r»ji (c. 8) 
atiat, tlierefore, not be preeaed. It is 
trmnalated from Thuc. 1. 131. 2. 

* Cktnllus I.e. refers to the Chronica. 
The title is supplied by Auaonius, Em. 
16. Ktpoa restores Arintrides in the 
'•ixth' year of bis exile, though he 
allows him to be present (iu a private 
capacity) at Salamis. 

* Ctmm 2. The elder Pliny seems 



to quote a geographical work freely ; cp. 
Pauly-Wisaowa, iv. 1411. 

• Them. 3. 
"> ihid. 

' ThfTTu 5 sic nniua viri pnidcntia 
GraocialiborataesUEuroiMcquesuutiubuit 
Asia. 

* ibid, aeque a Theniistoclc non 
anperatiim sett conservatnm iudicavit. 
Probably from the Greek source as much 
as the anecdote of Aristeidea, Aritt. 1. 

" lie Rtgibui 1 Xerxi niaximc est 
illustre, quod maiciniis poHl hominum 
memoriam exercitibus terra niarique 
bellum intulit Gnieciae. 

•> Tlutn. 2. 1200 longships, 2000 
transjiorta, 700,000 infuiitry, 400,000 
cavalry. 



64 



HERODOTUS 



APP." 



more miinageable.' The description of 'Mardonius' as a 'royal 
satrap' is spoilt by making him 'a native of Media.'* Cornelius 
perhaps follows the better tradition in marking the auj^'mentation of 
the Attic fleet distinctly by instalment* ; ^ and though his reiwrt of 
the king's return to Asia from Athens in ' less than thirty days,' 
whereas ' more than six months ' had been spent on the outward 
journey, transgresses the Herodoteaii account at both emls, the doubled 
estimate for the invading march ia not unreasonable.* The neatest, 
or at least the most living touch in these presents, is the notice of the 
sepulchre and statues of Themistokles ' still extant ' at Magnesia ; ^ 
and the incidental remark that Themistokles returned from ' Persia ' 
to ' Asia ' unconsciously but delightfully betrays the Roman point of 
view.* In short, Cornelius is for our purposes here devoid of value, 
except as a witness to the cuntinuity and character of the literary 
tradition of the Persian war, and withal a poor witness even to that.' 

To pass from the extant Nepos on to the extant Plutarch is 
to exchiuige brass for gold, to leave the cave for the open air. The 
contribution made by the prince of biographers to our subject is large 
even to embjirrassment at this stage in the proceedings. The two 
Lives, Themistokles and Aristeides, furnish togetliei- an almost complete 
account of the war, or at least of the principal battles, Artemision, 
Salamis, Plataia. If Plutarch wrote a Life of Leonidns no doubt ample 
ji^tice was done to Thermopylai.* Nor is Plutarch merely a biographer. 
The Momlia are rich in references to the incidents and ;igents of the 
Persian war; one treatise in particular supplies a running commentary 
upon the work of Herodotus, including of course the last three Books." 
In dealing with the Ptutarchian materials it will be legitimate and 
convenient to follow the accepted classification of the works, and also 
to lay an emphasis upon the novel, or at least the characteristic, 
additions made, that is preserved, to the story of the Persian war, by 
the latest member of the Boiotian triumvirate in letters.'" 

The variety and number of Plutarch's sources are in strongly 
marked contrast to the labour-saving methods of most of his pre- 
decessors. He is no one-souixed author, In this respect ho recalls 
the wealth and the generosity of Herodotus himself, with a difference. 
Plutarch's sources are all literary : a li^nng tradition, a voice still 
audible and dating from the Persian wars, hardly existed in his time ; 



^ Pausan. 1. 200,000 infantry. 20,000 
cavalry. 

* ibui. aatrapes regius, natione Medas. 

* T)um. 2. One huudrod trireniea 
are built for the ' Corcyraeati ' war ; 
another liimdred after the Dolphic 
Response about womlen vvalli) ! 

* Them. 6; cp. Hdt. 8. 51, 115. 
» Them. 10. 

* ibid. The Latin writer is thinking 
of the Roman 'province.' 



' On Comelins Ncpos cp. Wachsmiith, 
EinJeiluTt'j 142 (F., aiO ff. Wissowa iu 
Pauly-Wisaowa, iv, 1408 ff. 

" Ho promised to do so, Mar. 866 (rf< 
malig. Udti 32). 

" rif^l r5« "QfKtSbTou KaKoijBtlat, 
e8|)ecially cc. 28-43. 

'" Heaiod and Pindar are constantly 
on Plutarch's page. 




AUTHORITIES OTHER THAN HERODOTUS 

or, if it existed, makea no sound in his pages. Yet we profit much, 
not merely of Plutarch's mind and character, but of his circumstances 
fuid time. He is no partisan, except of virtue. He has the merits 
almost without the defects of his Hellenic culture. Oddly enough, if 
be was ever the sophist, it was in his critique of Herodotus. The 
language, the landscape, the spirit of Greece, were his own. Though 
his knowledge of the past is derived from literature, it is informed, 
vivified, by touches concrete and subtle, which belong to his own present. 
Ajicient monuments in countless numbers he has seen, and perhaps 
copied.^ Plutarch of Chaironeia knows that it is a day and a half's 
journey from Thermopylai to Thebes,- and reckons Plataia five 
hundred stades distant from Delphi.' He has in person attended 
the Plataian Eieutheria^* just as he has witnessed Spartan boys 
whipped at the altar of Artemis Orthosia.* True, the one ceremony 
like the other was a revival, and something of an anachronism.'' 
But the possibility of such revivals is itself significant of time, 
place, and spirit. Plutarch was infitutely closer to the whole life of 
ancient Greece — ancient even to him — than most of his contempo- 
raries, or than any of his auccessora, in literature, not excepting 
P&OBanias. The genius loci was with him, too, and what may, perhaps, 
be called the genius of polytheism, at its best, its humanest, so 
necessary to a true appreciation of ancient life. The subjects of his 
biographical essays are in fact his heroes, and he writes the ParnUd 
Lii-fs with a practical object, an ethical interest, to help himself and 
others to be better men.^ This purpose may detract more or less from 
their historical value, though it has helped to make them, at gr&it 
epochs of humane awakening — the Renascence, the Revolution — doubly 
popular.* But the industry, the erudition, the wealth of detail, 
tleposited in the form of biographical hero-worship, matures to the 
benefit of critical history. 

The two Lives here chiefly in evidence present a considerable 
contrast in many particulars. Tliemistokles came into court with an 
almost hopelessly damaged reputation. Aristeidos had been all along 
the Hellenic ideid of the righteous man. Plutarch had no difficulty 
in Kustaining the reputation of Aristeides, even if, on one or two 
occasions, his saint seems to sail rather near the wind.'' Themistokles 
appears almost past Plutarch's arts of rehabilitation. Yet 
Aristeides is after all the moaner man. The immense greatness of 



' Cp. itot« I p. 6 supra. 

• Jior. 88* jr. * AritMd. 20. 

• lA. 21. • Lyhtrg. 18. 

• But cp. R. C. Bowinquet, Timet, 
7lh Aufpist 1907, p. 10. 

' Op. Fort-word to Timokon (vulgo 
AeraiL 1). 

Cp. Korth'a translation, Slmkeii- 
e's Plularch, and the uomeadature 
French Bavolntiou. 



• The anecdote told of Aristeides iu 
c. 4 would be discrtxiiitiible to him, w«re 
it true. The siuspicion that, if not re- 
stored, hu would mudizo (c. 8) is not 
complimentary. The adtuiiisioii made 
in c. '25 that hia Dolicy was often 
conformabla to 'the nypothesia of his 
coutitrjr' shows him a 'good citizen' 
ratLur tliaa u 'good man.' 



86 



HERODOTUS 



APR I 



ThemistokJes is attested, not merely by the patriotic services recorded 
of bim, but by the place he is indirectly shown to have filled in 
literature. The two Lives are j>recisely the same m length ; but 
whereas in the Arisleides Plutarch cites by name only some fourteen 
authors besides Herodotus, in the Themistoldes he cites seven-and- 
twenty ; and of these authors cited five in the former case ' fall to the 
chapters on the Persian war as against twelve in the latter." The 
same moral may belong to another observation ; the number of 
novelties, or quasi-novel ties, is largpr in the Themisloklrs, but the items 
are in themselves trifling. In the ArisUides there are at least two or 
three statements, or stories, which, if true, are of cardinal importance. 
One class of trivial novelties is common to both Lives. The hero in 
each case alike is nominally associated with actions, which have been 
recorded from of old — generally by Herodotus — but anonymously. 
Thus the resignation of the Hegemony,^ the procuring of portents,* 
the recall of the exiles,' are expressly put down to the personal agency 
of Themistokles. Similarly the replies of the Athenians to the 
Spartans and to Mardonioa,'^ the speech against the Tegeans,^ the 
intervention of the Athenians in the cavalry -skirmish,* the interview 
with Alexander," the e.\change of positions with the Spartans,'" the 
final engagement with the Thebuns on the right,'' are all, with 
Plutarch, expressly acts of Ariateides. Such precision might well be 
due simply to constructive inference. Certain fresh anecdotes and 
items, additions or modifications of Herodotean story, are crvmnion to 
the two Lives, notjibly the record of a human sacrifice, extorted by the 
diviner Euphrantides at the hands of Themistokles from the captives 
sent by Aristeides from Psyttjileia ; '- also, the transfer to Salamis 
and to Aristeides of the conversation which is recorded by Herodotus 
of Eurybiades and Themistokles at Andros.'^ Plutarch also con- 
sistently substitutes for Sikinnos, Arnakes, an eunuch and prisoner, 
as employed by Themistokles in the second mission to Xerxes." For 
the rest, the real contribution made to the events in the Persian war, 
with which the name of Themistokles was specially associated, is 
exiguous. A few proper names are added : Epikydes, the would-be 
Athenian Strategos, who at all hazards had to be kept out of office '^ ; 
Pelagon, the Euboian, who brought the money of his countrymen 
to Themistokles at Arteraision '" ; Architelos, the tricrarch of the 
sacred ship, who was artfully punished and rewarded to do his 
general's bidding''; Nikagoras the Troizenian, who passed a decree for 



' Aiscliylos, Ariaton, Dfaaetrios 
rhalereua, IdoracDeus, FuDoitios. 

' Aischylos, Akestodoros, Aristoo, 
Aristotle, KleidfHios, Nesnthes, Phsnia^ 
Phanodcinoe, Pindar, Plato, Simonides, 
Stesimbrotoa. 

» Themisl. 7. * ib. 10. 

' i6. 11. * AriBUitL 10. 



' ib. 12. ■ ib. 14. 

» ib. 15. » *. 16. 

" ib. 18. 

" AriM. 9, Them. 18. 

'• Arisi. 9, Tfumt. 16. 

" ib. ih. 

» Thtm. 6. 

'• ib. 7. " ibid. 






the benefit of the Atheuiiin boy& in exile j' Ariaramenes, the Persian 
udmiral, who boarded an Athenian ship and was knocked off into the 
-fiuch names are hardly mere inventions. As much, jierhaps, can 
ly be said for the heroic hound that swam the Straits,' or the 
portentous owl that perched upon the shrouds.^ But Theniistokles may 
have had a liand in bringing ways and means to light fur the Hitting to 
SiUumis.'* The ascription to him of a psephism by which the interpreter, 
"who acted for the Persian ambassadors in demanding earth and water, 
as put to death, looks less probable and rather aiiachronisiic." The 
story of Arlhmios of Zeleia involves an almost demonstrable ana- 
chronism : ^ not so the apparent transfer of the visitation of the 
islands to a date later than that given by Herodotus.*' Hut the 
description of Themistokles as a youth at the time of the battle of 
Marathon is hardly consistent with Plutiirch'a own statement of bis 
service in the battle,' much less with his age at his death '" — to say 
nothing of his probable Archontate iu 493 B.c.^^ In chronological 
matters Plutarch is not over-careful. The day on which a victory was 
celebrated seems to liave stood to him as the day upon which the 
battle had been fought ; ^* and he, or some one before him, transferred 
the Elousinian vision to the actual day of the battle of Salamis, 
{>erhap8 as a more effective synchronism.''' Apart from topographical 
items — the description of Artemision,'^ the position of Xer.ves at the 
Itattle of Salamis ^* — there are, perhaps, only two statements concerning 
the Persian war of much value, and also new, in the Life <>j Themistvkle^, 
and one of these is a ' natural ' observation. The morning wind 
favoured the Greeks at Salamis, and that calculation bad entered into 
the plans of Themistokles.'" The Athenian vessels mounted eighteen 
EpibaUti, of whom fourteen were archers, and four were hoplites.'" 

With the Life of Aristeides the case stands differently. Before the 
battle of Plataia there is nothing further that calls for remark, except 
the statement that Themistokles procured the ostrakism of Aristeides 
by accusing him rtgni affectaruli, of aiming at a tyranny, a statement 
which will hardly stand against the Aristotelian Poliiy}^ To the story 
of Plataia, however, Plutarch contributes three or four additions of 
great intrinsic interest, with some further points, and an appendix, of 
considerable value. These additions are not, indeed, incontrovertible 
matters of fact ; but, even if merely developments of the legend, they 
pouess significance. 



» Thetlt. 10. ■ ih. 14. 

» ib. 10. * »ft. 12. 

• ibid. • Th«m. 6. 

' HHd. Cp. |>. 86 note 12 mpra. 

• Them. 21. 

• t*. 8; cp. AriMt. 5. 
*• ThemutokleH wm nixty-five years of 

at bia de«tb according to PlutarrL, 
81, proUably kbout 468 A.c. Cp. 



Busolt, lit. i. 138, who regi.rda thst aa 
an nndcr-estimate. 

" Cp. Busolt 1 1, » 642. 

'J AriM. 19 ; cjx p. 89 below. 

" Tluia. 15. 

'♦ 1*. 8. 

'» i6, 13. 

'• ih. 14. " »Wi 

'* Aria. 7 -, Cp. g 10 iUpra. 



88 



HERODOTUS 



(1) TJu story of a misswn despatched by Arisleides to Delphi^ ap 
parently from the battle-Bold of Plataia, is far too good to be true.* 
Tbe circumstances are against it, and the silence of Herodotus in itself 
almost fatal. Yet Plutarch, if ever any one, should be an authority 
on the Delphic archives. - la it rash to see in this response a genuine 
utterance of the Pythia (even though recorded in prose) dating from 
the time of the original alliance of Athens with Plat^iia, and referring 
to those engagements with the Boiotians, in which the Athenians had 
already done and suflored much for their allies on Kithairon •'' T (2) 
The. repoiied ronspiraoj to overthrow the Alh^enian democranj.* Soma veri- 
similitude is lent to this atory by the introduction of the chief offenders 
by their official names.* Against that might be set the assembling * in 
a house at Plataia,' at a time when Plataia was in ruins. Wonderful 
to relate, Thcmistokles is not brought into this plot. Is there rea.son 
to suspect that the Athenians were disunited, and threatened with 
traitors from ivithin, after the victory of Salamis 1 Is not this atory 
a transfer from the memories of Marathon, or, it may be, some much 
later occasion 1 In the next two cases Plutarch makes palpable hits. 
(3) He must bo more or less right in the record of the Arista — that 
frappant omis.sion from the pages of Herodotus.* Arisiaa must have 
been awarded for Plataia, as for every other battle in the war. The 
Athenians had not obtained them for Salami.i, and tho Spartans did 
not obtain them for Plataia. They went to the Plataians in the one 
case, as they had gone to the Aiginetans in the other. Plutarch's 
story can hardly be true in detail. That the Athenians claimed the 
Arisleia at Plataia is hardly credible : that they opposed the grant to 
Sparta, though hardly at sword's point, is probable enough. Possibly 
the mediation of the Korinthian, KJeokritos, is historical. The 
Athenians would have backed him. Incidentally Plutarch supplies 
the names of two of the Athenian Strategoi besides Aristeides." 
Theogeiton the Megarian also is a witness to character. The passage 
reads on the whole like good history ; Plutarch, alas ! does not name 
his source. (4) A smaller but grateful item is the nnwber of Greeks 
aetvaUy slain in the baftle, 1360, among them fifty-two Athenians, aU 
of the Aiantis.* But members of tho other tribes too will have fallen. 
The total in any case only repre.'ients hoplites and full citizens. 
Plutarch's appeid here to the monuments is marie elsewhere in sharper 
form.** Other details in the story of Plataia arc less acceptable. (r>) 
Th^' oi/iwOTi'* and tJte iears^^ of Fausanias may safely be forgotten and 
dried. (6) The story of the Ijjdians,^" who got in and upset the Spartan 



» AriA. 11. 

* He was Priest in Delpti, and Boiotian 
Hieromnemon \ cp. Wachsmutli, Ein- 
kitung p. 214. 

' Hdt. 6. 108. * ArLH. 13. 

' AiHchinea of Lamptni, Agesias of 
Achamu. 



• Aritt 20. 

"^ r^okratea, MjTOnides. 
» Arixt. 19 ;-cp. Mor. 628. 

* dt Maliij. jmssiin. 
"> Arist. 17. 

" <h. 18. 
» Arid. 17. 



leader's sacrifice, is a transparent cult-fiction, as the context suggests. 
I ( 7) The Appendix ' hartlly affects the actual story of the battle, but 
links the present — Plutarch's present — with the past in a pious and 
immortal memory. Tlu death of tht runner, Eurhidas,'' may be an in- 
ference from his epitaph : the psephism of Arisleides,'^ founding the 
' festival of the Eleulhma, ami a national levy withal for the war with 
the Barbarian, cannot be authentic. But the festival itself, in its 
^^original as in its revived form, is a precious adiiition to Hellenic 
^^^Beortology, and as concrete and authentic in its kind as the shrine of 
^^^dlhrru, erected by the Plataiana from their share of the spoil, and still 
I^Wisible, in Plutarch's day, adorned with paintings, which, if he is to be 
trusted as a critic, had never undergone restoration.* Such is the high 
value and interest of the AnflfiJi-.i, especially in what concerns the 
great battle in Boiotia ; such too the relative obscurity and short- 
coming of the real work of Aristeides in general tradition. For the 
historian of the Persian war the loss of this biography would have 
left far more to be desired than if the life of the greater man Themi- 
j shklti had dropped right out of Plutarch's legacy. 

The Maralia contain many references to the agents and events of 
the Persian war, but (excejit for one treatise) add little of bulk or 
novelty to the genend tradition, or to the deposit in the Lives. They 
how, however, even more clearly, if possible, the trivial gossipy 
bftracter of much that Plutarch thought authoritative, and the 
scrupulous fashion in which the tradition of the Persian war had 
been developed, or rather encrusted with anecdote, before his time. To 
precise dates for Plataia and for Salamis the (k glmia Atheniensium 
ids the statement that Salamis was fought at full-moon.^ This state- 
t, if correct, might have some importance for the argument 
touching the movements of the Persian ships on the night before the 
ttle. But the month given by Plutarch is Mnunychion, and he has 
probably inferred the day of Imttle from the day of Thanksgiving, 
which may well have been about the next full-moon. The Moralia 
are full of anecdotes of Themistokles, many of them to be found in 
the Life^; this repertoire obtjiins the most astounding addition, on 

Ilhe authority of Agatharchidea of Samos. Themistokles, it appears, 
bad a brother named Agesilaos. Their father Neokles in a dream 
beheld Agesilaos with his two hands cut oft When Xerxes invaded 
Dreece with five million men, ami anchored off Artemision, Age-silaos 
ms sent, disguised as a Persian, to spy out the camp. He mistook 
Mardonios for Xerxes, and slew him. Arrested and brought before 
the king, who was just engaging in a sacrifice, Agesilaos thrust bis 

' oe. 21, 21. • Viust nnml)er» of those wc ai)o- 

' c SO. phthegms, b<m» moU, etc., e.g. sevenb^en 

' a 21. ' c. 20. %n given ilor. 184-5 ; cp. 1, 92, bZA, 

* Bo(<dramion 3 for PlaUia, Many- 541, 602, 800, 807, 809, etc. Tlie Lift 

•\atm 16 for SalamU ; cp. \\ 87 supra. pMsim, and eapecuilly c, 18, 



90 



HERODOTUS 



APP, I 



right hand into the fire upon the altar, to show what manner of men 
the Athenians were, and ottered to forfeit the left hand likewise if 
the king was unconvinced. After this example of his prowess in 
history, the loss of Agatharchides of Samos becomes bearable. 
Plutarch himself jwinta the parallel with the story of Mucius 
Scaevola.* Themistoklea acquires, presumably in his own right, a 
fresh epithet, ' the slayer of Persians,' ^ and his mentor Mnesiphilos 
appears, in the company of the Seven Sages, as a man of the Solonian 
School "' — a chaniiing anachronism which rules him out of the Ijattle 
of Salamis, more than a century later. Aristeides, as a subject of 
anecdote, is nowhere in comparison with Themistokles. 

The Lakonic Apophthegms* preserve sundry sayings attributed to 
Deraaratos,* Leotychidaa,* Leonidas,^ Pausanias,^ Gorgo"; even 
' Buris and Spertis ' {sic) are not forgotten.'*" Again the anecdote- 
monger is in evidence, but nothing useful is added to tradition. 
Elsewhere, on the authority of Aristeides of Miletos, in his Fersika, 
the legend of Thermopylai receives a doubly grotesque accretion.^' 
The Milesian evidently accepted the Ephorean story of the Spartan 
invasion of the Persian camp by night, and added that Leonidas, 
transfixed with spears, rushed at Xerxes and snatched the crown from 
his head. After such a derring deed, no wonder the heart of Leonidas 
was found, his body having been opened, to be covered with hair ! 
There are items direct to the address of Xerxes. His wrath was 
exhibited not merely in flogging and branding the sea, but in a letter, 
which he addressed to Mount Atlios, the very words of which are pre- 
aerved, including the threat that, if the mountain was troublesome, the 
king would topple it into the sea.^' Two other anecdotes of Xerxes 
are more respectable. The first offers an interesting variant on the 
lleiodoteari account of the king and the corn-Bhips. Xerxes refused 
to eat Attic figs, till he should cat them an Ort urtd Stellr, in Attica 
itself! " The second stipplies a still more plausible variant upon the 
Herodotean story of the accession of Xerxes. Plutarch has here 
preserved, as an illustration of fraternal affection, a variant so respectr 
able, and further, so well supported, that it deserves to be reckoned 
with seriously.'* It would be pleasant to believe a good report of 

' Mnr. 305 {ParalUh). 
' ne^ojrrivot, Mor. 34D. 
» Mor. 3 54. 

* Mor. 208 ff. 
» Eight. 

• Three. 
' Fii'tveu. all but one referring to 

Tliemiofiylai. One of the apoplithefrms 
is transfeiriHl to L«onicl&9 from Dienekes, 
Hdt. 7. 226. 

* Six, the only two rererririj? to the 
Persian war >)eing taken frnin Hiit. 

• Foar, none referring to the IVrHlttn 
war ; Mor. 240. 



"J i\f<rr. 236 (Ap. ioc. Ix.). In Mor. 
8'JO they reappear na Bulis and Sparchis ; 
cp. Hdt. 7. 134-137. 

" Mor. 306. 

'- ih. 455. 

" ib. 178. This variant explains the 
ciinous paastage in Eusehioi, Sync. 470. 
7 KlfiMv 4tr' Eipv/iJBotrTi ll/paai ckUo 
vau/uax'f Kal irtf^/u.ax'?. ""^^ ^ MrjSiKln 

IVpacut Kol 'ABtifcUoii kcU TaurtK '£\X);o'ii' 
Air' airroO. 

•* Mvr. 488. Cp. note* to Hdt. 7. 2, 
and App. II. § 2, p. 123 note 3 in/ra. 



AUTHORITIES OTHER TEIAN HERODOTUS 



r 



e.v 

a 

li 

at 

ai 

le 
A 



Gelon's dealing with the Carthaginians, twice recorded ' ; but it reads 
like ati Hellenic suggestion of what should have been, or a Isxie 
plagiarism of a Roman precedent, and not a genuine fuct in Syracusan 
history. 

The Moralia, in fact, contribute practically nothing from the 
objective order of events to the history of the Persian war, but they 
indicate two literary fact«, one of evil and one of good omen : the first, 
a deplorable degeneracy in the tradition, or literary treatment of the 
old story ; the second, what has been called above ' the retiu-n to 
Herodotus.' This return is shown not merely in the biographical 
notes — his 'exile' or migration, his friendsiiip with Sophokles- — or in 
the express citation of his work, Book by Eook,^ but still more in the 
silent use of the work, for historical or quasi-historiciil purpose,* in the 
express citation of Hero<lotean jihrases,^ in the appeal to Herodotus as 

,n authority." This familiar and fiiendly use of the work possim in the 

'arcUuiy as in the Liixs, makes it somewhat more difficult to treat the 
I>e malignitaie, which systematically criticizes Herodotus in a far different 
spirit, as bona fide or genuine Plutarch. Perhaps it was a relatively 

venile work; perhaps Plutarch ha,s been to 'the schools of the Sophists ' 
not long before penning it ; perhaps he was more or less ' defending 
a thesis,' playing ' the Devil's advocate ' ; perhaps lie is not the real 
author. Anyway the work attests as none other the [>osition which 
Herodotus has recovered and enjoys in, or rather before., the Antonine 

ge. That position it was app&rently the object of this tract to 
destroy, and that object was, at least in part, effected. The authority, 
and even the chiiracter, of the great historian of the Persian war were 
levelled down to the demands of a Ktesias, an Aristophanes, an 
Aj^tharchides, and it was left to the modem worhl gradually to re- 

iscover the supreme value of the Hero<ioteuti Historifs. 

Considerably more than half the tract here in view is directly 
concerned with the examination of the last three Books of Herodotus, 
that is, the history of the Persian war.^ Our present concern is not 



» Jf<rr. 175, 652. Cp. Freeman, Sicily 
iL 208, who iliscussea the }ioint nl length, 
*nd thinks there must have been some 
tralh in it. The same story was tnld, 
FrvenuMi t»y\ of 'Darius' — hnt ho gives 
no authority therefor. 

' The mixration from Halikamaasos 
lo Thurioi, Mur. 005, a mach kindlier 
t«f«reiice than lu 868 {(U uuilig. 35). 
The EpiKTsm of Sophokles, Mot. 785 
(bnaatifullr oomtileted hv Gomperz in 
Mdangft Henri tVeil, 1898). 

'In the dt malig. piusim ; op. also 
Mor. 826. 

• Jfor. 470, «01, 828, etc. 
» itirr. 414, 417, 607. 436. 

* Mor. 403. 479, etc. 



^ The first two Books are dealt with 
in CO. 11-20 (thouj^'h he has littlu to My 
against Buok 2) : the Third oocupies oc. 
21, 22. The Fourth is passed over. The 
Fifth Book is dealt wjth in cc. 23, 24. 
the Sixth in ce. 26-27. The Seventh 
Book 18 not expressly cit«d, but ita 
contents are criticized in cc. 28-1(3. 
The Eighth Book tills co. 34-40, 'the 
Ninth and last' cc. 41, 42. A goneral 
summary concludes (c. 43), correspond* 
ing to the funeral Intr«>duction (cc. 
1-10). Obviously the Themistoklean 
portion of Hdt's narrative bulks most 
largely in the critic's work, and the last 
three Books are more fully reviewed 
than the first six. 



HERODOTUS 



APP. I 



30 much with the critique as such, as with the contribution indirectly 
made, over and above, to the materials for a history of the Persian 
war, or, it may be, merely to the history of that history. 

The aupplcmeritary Sources are not badly represented in the latter 
portion of the tract; and, if Plutarch had been more concerned to 
make good the omissions for which ho censures Herodotus, the result 
might have been more instructive, even if less entertaining. Aristo- 
phanes of Boiotia, Nikandros of Kolophon, Hellanikos, Kphoros, are 
all cited by name, as well aa Pindar and Simonides. We owe to this 
tract our knoAvledge of upwards of thirty lines of epigram, epitaph, 
elegy. The references to monuments erected to commemorate the 
war are valuable. But when we come to add together the actual 
contribution to the story of the war, the debt is not large, nor all 
jierhaps botu) womi'iif. (1) The feuds between Thessaly and Makedonia, 
Korintfa and Megara, Chalkis and Eretria, with which the Herodotean 
record of the reconciliation of Athens an*! Aigina is capped,' look a 
little inferential. (2) The recent dominion of the Thessalians over 
Phokis and a part of Boiotia, their defeat by the Thelians, and the 
death of their lejider Lattamyas, may be a legitimate extension of the 
story in Heroilotus of the Thessalo-Phokian feud, and was doubtless 
to be found in Aristophanes.- (3) The statements that the Thebans 
sent 500 men under Mnamias to Tempe,' and that (4) the commander 
of the 400 Thebans at Thermopylai was Anaxandros (not Leontiades),* 
presumably came from the .«ame authority, and look plausible ; less 
so the other additions to the legend of Thermopylai- — or is it Thebes? 
— (5) that Demaratos, as kosjKS of Attaginos, intervened to save the 
Theban captives,* (6) that Lconidas foresaw in a dream the future rise, 
and fall, of Thebes.** The censure on Herodotus for omitting the 
night-attiick on the Persians before Thermopylai is merely the 
expression of the writer's preference for an Ephorean fiction." The 
fine anecdote of the refixsal of the Spartan warrior, who haughtily 
declined to save his life by acting as dcsjiatch-bearer, has occurred 
alroatly elsewhere," and is in any case probably only ben irovafo. 
Other concrete facts there are none. But the arguments, by which 
it is proved, that the Thebans were well received by the Persians,* 
that the Greeks did not ' run away ' from Artemision,^" nor the 
Korinthians from Salamis," nor the centre at Plataia,*" are valid, and 
the conclusions acceptable : equally so the suggestion that Herodotus 
has done less than justice to Themistokles.'* And, perhaps, we must 
allow that in twitting Herodotus with the prominence accorded to 
^Vrtemisia in the councils and campaign of Xerxes,'^ this sophistic 



33. 



ibid, 
ibid. 



' c. 36. 
» c 31, 
■ ibid. 

"I o. 32. 

• ibid. Cp. Afor. 225. 

» CO. 31, 33. " c 34. 



II e. 39. 

" c 42. 

" cc 37, 38, n-h«re the writer mddi 
that 'Otv<rffti)i iru¥oitd<r0Ti Si6. Ti)r ^p6r>)- 
aiv. Also c. 40. 

" ibid. 



»-15 AUTHORITIES OTHER THAN HERODOTUS 



k 



^TJter has touched a human weakness ; though oddly enough Plutarch 
himself elsewhere ascribes to Artemisia a service to Xerxes, for which 
Herodotus is not bis liuthority.' Of the critique as a whole suffice 
it to say that, while certain details in the Herodotean story are 
ehrewdly censured, the whole method of the critic is vitiated by the 
failure to distinguish between Herodotus and his Sources, and by a 
confusion between the intention and the results of his historiograjihy. 
None can fail to recognize the dominance of the Attic and phil-Attio 
tradition in Herodotus, a dominance duo, in part no doubt, to the 
simplicity and good faith of the man. A critical historian Herodotus 
was not ; yet his work would not have been better, but far worse, 
less a treasury and a mirror of history than it is, could he have 
anticipated, and adopted, the critical or the constructive jirinciples of 
his censors. This canon applies not merely to Ktesias, Plutarch, and 
all that class, but to Thucydides, whose own great work was intendcfl 
to be the last word on Herodotus. But the truer verdict on Hei-odotas 
must ever be an appreciation, and that Plutarch exhibits by his own 
practice rather than by his critique.^ 

§ 15. Topographers. — Strabo and Pausanias, though divided in date, 
and to some extent in subject and method, may be conveniently here 
classed together for our purjxiso, both alike dealing rather with the 
Jimlien than with mere tradition as such. To both history is but 
incidental, in the one case to geography, in the other to antiquities, 
And antiquities in strict topographical setting. As geographer Strabo 
makes, indeed, some contribution to our subject, though hardly as 
much as might have been expected. Stralx) is addicted to Homer : 
the Homeric landscape, or at least the Homeric choriography of Greece, 
is predominant with him. His descriptions of Thermopylai and the 
neighbourhood,* of Salamis and the Attic coast,* of Plataia and the 
Parasopia,^ are of value, but he attaches very little of the story of the 
Persian war to these locitlitios, and that little is manifestly not 
derived directly from Herodotus. The heroes of the Persian war 
are scarcely named by him. Themistokles is roontiotied, but not in 
connexion with the war.'' The names of Xerxes ' and Mardonios ' 
are associatetl with traditions of the war ; Leonidas is barely lauded ''; 
the traitor Ephialtes is not forgotten "^ ; and a martyr to barbarian 



' Them, 14. 

' Some few trifles will have escaped 

the above tiftitig of tlie Momlia, e.g. 

the misfliun to consult the oraclvs of 

Amiihiaraoe etc. is rcTerred to Mor. 411 
r(^ dtfect. Or. S), and the story goee that 
) tb««Uve — uLydiiMi— sent on this niiasion 
'had tdreAin which foivahowed thederrat 
I aad death of MardoDJos, w)io was kilk-d 
\hf a atone. Again, ibid., an oraolo nt 
, Irtpra foretold the Greek victory, one 

Ecuekntea being the prophet. 



» C. 428. 

* 393. 
■ 409. 

* 587 ; cp. 636 ; passages which show 
that Strabo followed those who dated 
Themistoklea' recoptioT) in Asia to the 
reign of Xerxes. 

"> 10, 131, 394, 395, 443. 
» 412, 

* 10, 429, 467. 

'" 10, 19 (a bogle). 



94 



HERODOTUS 



APP. r 



ignorance, Salganeus by name, unknown to Herodotua, makes his 
appearance, together with a Persian admiral Mt'gabates^; but Paitsania-s, 
Ariateides, Artemisia, and the rest aie all forgotten. The battles of 
the war, so far as noticed, are dismissed in brief generalities. 
Artomision ia not even mentioned, but the storm may bo recognized 
in the rlietorical statement that * Hellas was full of wrecks at the 
time of the Xerxean expedition,' and is afterwards referred to not with- 
out a touch of scorn in the description of Magnesia.* The anecdote 
of 'Salganeus,' or the man of Salganeus, is, indeed, a remarkable 
addition to the log of the Persian fleet, if only it could be accepted as 
anything more than a historicized fable to illustrate a topicid illusion.* 
Nothing is added to the story of Thermopylai except the rhetorical 
inference that ' the Persians despised Leonidas and his men for their 
hair-dressing till they met them in battle ' ^ ; but the notice of the 
monuments and inscription in loco has a real value.'' The topographical 
notes on Salamis are naturally welcome,^ the battle is dismissed 
summarily,^ and the dispute between the Athenians and Aiginetans, 
though not expressly mentioned by Herodotus, does not go beyond 
the common tradition.* Two items, however, in this context have 
some importance, one for tho theory of the battle, and both as 
illustrating the relation of Strabo to Herodotua. (1) The king's 
attempt to huilrl a mole across the ferry to Salamis is recorded, and 
recorded to have been arrested by tho battle.^ If that was the case, 
thu building of tho mole preceded the battle. (2) Strabo mentions as 
a tradition that the Persian wreckage was cast ashore at Kolias, and 
he quotes as an Apolliiie oracle the line which Herodotus ascribes to 
Lysimachos.'*^ In neither of tliese cases is Strabo drawing directly on 



■ See below. 

' 10 irXi)/>>i5 Tf rauayluy ij 'EWit 
vrrjpif Kara rijr ^ip^ou CTpartiav. 443 
ri nivToi 2ipr«at aKTr\ xai TtrpaytfiSr)TaL 
/itrit Taiha xal i^inrijnu Siik rbr irravOa 
dtpufmiiAii ToO lltpaiKoO <rr&\ov xtX. 

" 10, 403. The leooud passage gives 
the atorj. Salganeus wm employed to 
(^fuide the Persian ahips through the 
Earipos. On Approaching' the atraits 
the aJmira], Megabatcs, tlioilght the 
f^aide was ninnitig the fleet ashore, and 
slew him. The mistake was discovered, 
an<l tho Peraiitns buried Salganeus in a 
ToagniliVL'nt tonib. This was the oriuin 
of the Boiotian city of Sali;aneiis. The 
trae eponymous hero of Sal>;aneua will 
aurely be much older than the I'eniiaii 
war. The Dlmtkon was "S-aXyivioj, 
Stcph. Byz. rub v., who adds, however, 
SoX^oplnjt and S^aXiraMi^i 'Aa-AWuK. 
Poanibly * a Boiotian of Salganeus ' may 
liave acted the jxart and met the fate 
rocorded in this storj* ; if so, it is 



Strabo'a one contribution to the history 
of tho war. 

* 467 Toi!% Tcpl Aewvfjav irrtnfoiUvouu 
St' i^-^taar tit rijr fii.xn", naraiftponiSiirai 
Wyoi'irti' vr6 rur lUpvuiP, iy Si rj /i.ixV 
ffavfiaaBijrat. This will be the com- 
mentary of Ephoros, or his like, on 
Hdt. 7. 208. 

» 429 ; cp. 8 2 supra. 

• 393. 

^ 394 iviipayiis Si ij rr/aot inr^p(t . . 
(rai 3iA rd xepi r^v vijirov toi'TT)*' Kara- 

iroi iptyfiv (It Ti)n oUdav. 

' 376 at}-ni 3' icrly 17 xal SaXarroKpar^- 
irairi vore xal irepl irfXiFrctuiv d;i^<r^)fn)- 
ffoffa rp6i 'A^ri^aiovt i* rf rtfi laXajuVa 
vavfuxxlif Korii ri Ilf/wucd. Op. Udt. 
8. 122. 

' Sd.*) 6 tls ^Xa/uya -wopBttM Scof 
SiardSiot, Av SiaxoOf iirtiparo A^p^iftt 
(tpOii Si f) ravfiaxiix ytvofi^inj kcU <pvyif 
Tuiv Vlfpaiir. 

'<■ 398; cp. Hdt. 8. 96. So, mora 



Herodotus.' For Plataia as for Thermopylai the topographical notes 
are valuable, and the notice of the tombs, of the temple of Zeus 
Eleutherios, and of the actual celebration of the festival, anticipates, ao 
to 8poak> our debt to F'lutarch * ; hut the battle itself is dismissed 
with the facile remark that ' Mardonios and his thirty mjiiada were 
simply wipetl out at Plataia by the Hellenic forces.'* Mykale ia 
frequently mentioned as a grand landmark,* but is described without 
a word about tlie battle that capped Plataia. Sestos and the 
Ueplastadion are duly surveyed at some length,'' the bridge of Xerxes 
being just mentioned there," aa the canal at Akanthos, though without 
any express citation of Herodotus ; but there is no record of the siege, 
the story of which bulks large in Herodotus. In short, Strabo was 
not much interested in the Persian war, and his notices of it were not 
derived directly from Herodotus. 

Nevertheless Strabo was much occupied with the work of Herodotus, 
and his own work bears constant mtness to his acquaintance there- 
with. But it was not the last three Books, probably, with which 
Strabo was best pleased ; nor was it the story told by Herodotus, 
which Strabo was ever prepared to endorse.' Strabo had a poor 
opinion of Herodotus as historian. He recognizes indeed, to a certain 
extent, hia charm, or at least his readableness,^ but he classes Herodotus 
as an historical authority with Hellanikos, Ktesias, Eudoxos, and 
other gay deceivers " ; he prefers Hesiod and Homer as truthful story- 
tellers'"; he agrees with Theopompos — he might have said Thucydides 
— that Herodotus was a myth-monger.*' Still, Strabo upon bis own 
proper ground pays Herodotus the compliments of use antl approval. 
For physical geography, topography, even for local customs or rurioio^ 
Stmbo cites Herodotus by name aa an authority,'- and perhaps uses 



nnukabl; *till, Strabo tnin»runus a 
Pi«iUn bon mot into a Delphic resiwnse : 
cp, my note to Hdt. 4. H4. 2. 

> Str*bo, 635, <]uot(;-< Kalliathenes 
u his authority for the alory of the 
fining of I'hrvnirhos, cp. IMt. 6. 21 ; 
Strabo. f>31, stat«s that on the Araxes 
Kallutbenea foUo-rv:! Hermlotiis. Suidas 
dtea the second book of the Ile/xricd s.v. 
XapSafdraXor. The ideutiticstiou of 
tha ntpciti. witli the Alexander-history 
Hpuroly conjeotnml. 

■Stnibo 404, 408-412. He menliona 
taUr alia the injury done to Boiotia 
tw tha Persian war (402), and notices, 
■taancteriatically, that the name Plataiai 

liar in Homer. 
12 irravOa Map3iivi<»> xai rhs Tpid- 

lAVpiiSat Uffiaur al ruv 'EXX^t'oii' 

ct>. e«|iecially (i3(t. 
124. and eapccially S01. 
l,/r.6<J. 



' 33], fr. 35, where the doubta of 
DemetrioB of Skepsis are recorded. 

» 318 ToXXA 5' 'UpiSorii t« koJ 4XXot 
0Xi<a/]onrif, Citnrtp ni\ot 1^ ^I'SfjiAr ff 
l^vafii T( T<f \6yti> riir Ttpariiiu xpoa- 
ipiporTit (the examples rjuoted are from 
Book 2). 

» 48, 503. 550. 

>• 508. 

" 43. Aa an actual instance he gives 
'the myth of Arion,' 618. Cp. Hdt 1. 
24. In 61, 62 ho censnrcs the Hyper- 
borean arjfUDjent, cp. Hdt. 4. 32 ff. 

" e.(?. 58 (the alluviation of the 
Echinadeij, Hdt. 2. 10) ; 544 (Halya- 
mouth) ; 626 (Hcrmos-niouth) ; fi.53, 027 
(Lydian customs); 823 (Effvptian) ; 98, 
100 (circumnavifjation of Libya by order 
of DareioB («<•)) ; 151 (ArRanthonioa) ; 
301, 305 (expedition of Dareios into 
Skythia) ; 448 (tlie Sagene in Erelria) ; 
478 (temple in Memphis) ; 673 (Tennilai 
in Lykia). 




96 



HERODOTUS 



him also Mnthout citation. To the last volume of Herodotus there 
are, in Strabo's work, at least four express references, and oddly 
enough lUl to the Seventh Book. Hei-odotua on the Thrakian 
Chersonese,^ on the origin of the I'amphylians,^ on the foundation of 
Hyria,* and on the topography of Trachis,* is apparently good enough 
for StralH) to borrow of. Certain Herodotean phrases and turns, in 
relation to matters geographical, are specially happy in Strabo's 
opinion. One such he quotes expressly not less than four times ^ ; 
another he transfers sUently*"; others he notes, apparently with 
approval.'' Thus Strabo,a contemporary of Dionysios of Halikarnassos,'' 
as of tho emperor Tiberius," bears, after his kind, witness direct and 
indirect, l)oth to the revival of Herodotean studies, and also to the 
extent to which the Herodotean tradition of the Persian war had 
been superseded by writers of the rhetorical and rationalistic school. 

Pausanias the feriegek, whose life and composition fail into the 
second and thii-d <|uarters of the secojid century of our era,^" may be 
taken to exhibit the high-water mark of the Antonine reaction, 
or development, in Herodotus' favour. Of all his coiitemjxiraries 
Pausanias ia the most conscious and loyal follower of Herodotus, for 
Arrian, much a.s he is indebted to Herodotus, is primarily a pupil of 
Xenophon's ; and Lucian'a satire and parody recall in more genial 
aspect the scorn of Strabo and the indignation of Plutarch. The 
Lydran " antiquary is one in mind and to a great extent in method 
with the 'father of history,' so far as the con.scious reproduction of 
antique e.vamples can ever be really homogeneous with them. 
Pausanias emulates his great exemplar's piety and philosophy, repro- 
duces his formulas and parrots his phrases. The style alone would 
prove the man a plagiary.'- His real use of the work of Herodotus is 



> 331. /r. 52; cp. Hdt. 7. 58. 

« 668 ; cp. Hdt 7. 81. 

» 282 ; cp. HUt. 7. 170. 

* 428 ; ep. H.lt 7. 199, 200. 

■ iStpov rou iroTa^oC 30, 36, 536, 691 ; 
cp. Hdt. 2. 5. 

' T/>6<rx7Ma riii 'EXXdSet 440 (Kalydon 
and Plearon) ; cp. Hdt. 5. 28 r^j 'luvfi)? 
wpi(rxVfM (Miletos). 

' ifrlit' A\voi 534. 

' 666 ; cp. 465, 478. 

» 228; cp. 291, 305, 618. 

" 6. 21. 15 he gives 01. 226-127 A.D. 
u ^0' ijiMv. He rervrH to Trajan (4. 35. 
3, 6. 13. 6), Httdriau {passim), and the 
two Antonines (8. 43). Tlio ware with 
the Gemiana and Sannatiitna there 
mentioned began in 166 a.d., and wtre 
not really terminated by the ' triumph ' 
of 176 A.D. ; but this may well be the 
latent rofereni'c in Patuunias. Tl>e iirat 
Book on Elis he was writing in 174 a.d. 



Cp. 5. 1. 2 (Fnwer, iii. 465). He wrote 
the '.\TWf before, and the 'Ax<ult after, 
160 A.D. ; cp. 7. 20. 6 with Frazcr's 
note (iv. 149). The invasion of the 
Kostoboks (10. 34. 5 xar' ini) is dated 
by Frazer (v. 439 f.) between 166-180 
A.D. Cp. Frazer, Introduction, I. xv. ff. 

" If a Lydiau he was : 5. 13. 7 hardly 
proves it. Hut cp. Frazer, l. x\x. 

" e.g. 1. 14. 3, 1. 26. 4, 1. 38, 7, 
1. 39. 3, 2. 17. 4, 3. 11. 1, 3. 25. 5, etc. 
etc Cp. Frazer, ItUrodtietion, i. \xxx. 
Ixxiii. The style of Pausanias u not, 
of coarse, Herodotean ; but if he got hia 
vinegar from Hegesias, he drew his drops 
of lioney from Hdt. Curiously enougn, 
for the iiistuliility of humsu happiness 
Pau&aniiu cites tbe authority not of Hdt., 
but of a greater than Hdt., viz. Homer ; 
cp. 8. 24, 13. The reference to 'the 
Age of Kroisos ' in the immediate context 
aug^csts, however, the latent association 
of ideas. 



AUTHORITIES OTHER THAN HERODOTUS 

proved not merely by direct citation — Herodotus is cited by name 
not less than fifteen times in the course of the Periegesis ^ — but still 
more by the silent use of the master's work everywhere as authori- 
tative. A score of such cases is easy to glean from the history of the 
Persian war alone.^ Not that Fausauiaa repeats Herodotean stories. 
On the contrary, Pausanias studiously avoids mere reproduction of 
stories told by j Herodotus, and makes a canon of this avoidance.* 
Thus he takes for granted everywhere the story of the Persian war as 
told by Herodotus, and in all the major episodes he plainly follows 
Herodotus, and not Ephoros, or his like.^ But though he avoids 
mere repetition, be supplements and amplifies the Horodotcan tradition, 
he comments on HerodoLean themes, and he reports or reconstructs 
later episodes, under Herodotean influences, in a way almost to 
persuade us, if that were possible, that history repeated itself. All 
this he does mainly in reporting tradition, though he is not primarily 
historian or logographcr. Pausanias is primarily archaeologist and 
topographer. Under these hesida, too, his work forms a valuable 
commentary upon the work of Herodotus, especially as concerning the 
Persian war. His topographical descriptions of places and positions 
amplify and confirm the Herodotean descriptions of the JMttle-fiolds,* 
His archaeological inventories of buildings, tombs, monuments, and so 
forth, connected with the war, have an independent vahio of their own, 
which haa been already indicated under another liesiding.^ We are 
here concerned to exhibit merely the contribution which Pausjiiiias 
makes to the actual traditions of the war. These novelties will not 
all have been committed to writing before Pausanias ; several woidd 
appear to have been gathered. by the periegete in the presence of material 
monuments or objects with which the story or tradition was associ- 



' (Hdt. 1) 2. 16. 1. 3. 25. 7, 3. 2. 3 i 
{HdU i) 1. 43. 1, i. 36. 12. 1. 33. 5 ; 
(Hdt. 6) I. 5. 1, 2. 30. 4 ; (H.lt. 6) 2. 20. 
10; (Hdt. 7) 5. 2(J. 4, 10. 20. 2 ; (Hdt. 
8) 10. 82. 8, 9 -, 10. 33. 8, 10. 33. 9, 
10. 33. 12. Four Booka of Pa,u8&nia« 
(4. 7, 8, 9) have uo uiUtion or Hdt. by 
bune. 

• ll) 2. 3, 8 = Hdt. 7. 62. (2) 3. 9. 
7 = Hdt. 7. 21, 22, etc. (3) 6. 6. 4 = 
Hdt. 7. 125. (4) 7. 10. 2 = Hdt. 7. 6, 
180, ete. (5) 1. 19. 6== Hdt 7. 189. 
(«) 8. 12. 9 = Hdt 7. 227. (7) 9. 1. 
3=Hdt.8. 1. (8) 2. 29. 6 Hdt. -8. 46? 
(9) 10. 8. 7 = Hdt. 8. 39. (10) 3. 11. 3 
(ArterolM*). (11) 3. 16. 6 (Eurybiadtvs). 
<12) 1. 1. 6 = Hdt. 8. 96. (13) 9. 23. 
< = Hdt. 8. 133 f. (14) 10. 2. l = Hdt. 
9. 17. (15) 8. «. l = Hdt. 9. 28. (16) 
<J. 14. 8 = HdL 9. 33 ff. (17) 9. 4. 3= 
Hdt. 9. 49. (18) 3. 4. 9 = Hdt. 9. 76. 
(19) 1. 27. l^Hdt. 9. 63. (20) 7. 10. 
2 = Hdt. ». 89, etc. etc 

VOU U 



' 2. 30. 4 taura fi'riVro* 'tipoSirav 
KaO' iKHUTo* aiTuc iir' anpi^if oS n<n 
•fpi<ptu> Kard yvuitnir l/v rrX. Cp. 1. 6. 1. 

* 1. 18. 2 (capture of the Akropolis), 
1. 27. 2 (jmrtcnt of the olive-shoot), 
are probably from Hdt., though tlio first 
poBsage uontaiiig a touch of rhetoric, and 
tho second an inaccuracy {aii6'^tifp6p). 
8. 52. 2 f. gives a remarkable aunimary, 
or outline, of the Persian war, but cot!* 
beyond Hdt. Ephorns i§ (rightly, I be- 
lieve) not even niontioned by Dr. Frazor 
among ' Historians used by Pausanias,' 
Inircduetion., IxxiiLf. 

' Therniopylai did not atricUy come 
within the PmegttJiia, and ia onlj in- 
cidoutally illustroted ; cp. 7. 15. 3, 10. 
22. 8. But the description of Salamis, 
1. 35. 1, 2 ; 36. I, and more espociaUy of 
I'lataia, 9. 2-4, are valQable. (For 
Marathon ep. //<//. IV.-VI. ii. 226 ff.) 

' Cp. § 2 fupra. 

H 



98 



HERODOTUS 



AP?. I 



ated, and orally handeil down. However that may be, we at least 
owe them to Pausaiiias, in whose work they make their first appearance 
as literary deposit. 

There are sotne fifteen such items. (1) Pausanias solves the 
problem left open by Herodotus as to the visitation of the Athenians 
for their ill-treatment of the Persian heralds in 431 B.C. — Miltiades 
had been the author of the crime, and his fate was the divine con- 
sequence. Pausaniaa has here surpassed Herodotus in his own 
properest vein.^ (2) The statement t])at the Hellenion at Sparta was 
iised for the deliberations of the national representatives in the 
Persian \var may have been gathered by Pausanias in Sparta, but can 
hardly be allowed to supplant the stJitements of Herodotus, which 
make the Isthmos the scene of meeting. Either further delibei-ations 
took place in Sparta, of which Herodotus knows nothing ; or 
Pausanias, that is, S[)artan tradition, associated the confederate 
meetings in the Persian war with a building, which may have been 
u.'?ed by the Spartan Si/mmarktf on other occasions.* (3) The 
Olympian list of the Hellenic confederacy us given by Pausanias is 
undoubtedly an important, and presumably an authentic document. 
But this list of states agrees neither mth the list on the serpent- 
column at Delphi nor with the Ilerodotean army-ltst for Plataia ; and 
both tho Delphian and Olympian lists include island-states, which 
surely were not represented on that occasion. Obviously, even if the 
monuments were defrayed from the Plataian spoil, the lists went 
beyond the Plataian battle-roli. The Olympian list, as given by 
Pausanias, only differs from the indubital>ly authentic Delphian list by 
the omission of four names. As the exact date and circumstances 
under which the Eleian list was compiled are not recorded, there 
seems insufiBcient reason for doubting its accuracy ; but neither the 
Olympic nor the Delphian list can discredit the army-list in 
Herodotus.^ (4) Pausanias tells a curious story of ' Skyllis ' of 
Skiono and his daughter Hydna, which he presumably picked up at 
Delphi in presence of their statues. They were reported to have 
dived, during the storm which befell the ships of Xerxes off Pelion, 
and to have loosened the Persian anchors, and so contributed to the 
wreckage. This report does not exactly contradict the record of 
'Skyllias' in Herodotus, but might rather be accounted one of the 
fictions about the diver which Herodotus knew, hut would not repeat, 
even on Delphic authority.* (5) Far more valuable is the mention in 
Pausanias of a Trachinian route 'throiigh the Ainianes,' even though 
he incontinently identifies it with the path — Anopaia — by which 
Leonidas and his men were circumvented. This route should be alter- 
native not merely to Thermopylai, and to Anopaia, but even to the route 



» 3. 12. 7; ep. Hdt 7. 133. 

" 3. 12. 6 ; ep. Appendix III. § 5 



» 5. 23. 1, 2. Cp. Dr. Fraier's admir- 
ablo note to 10. 13. 9, v. 299 tf. 
* 10. 19. 1, 2; cp. HdU 8. 8. 



§ 15 



AUTHORITIES OTHER THAN HERODOTUS 



into Doria by the Aaopos gorge, and may really have been used by a 
Persian division.' (6) Tradition long expected the conversion of 
Thermopylai from a failure into a success, from a defeat into a victory. 
This conversion Pausaniiw expressly records tis accomplished in Spartan 
tradition, and he gives us a clue to the making, or to the transfiguring 
agency, in his notice of the annual celebnition of the event at the tomb 
of Leouidas in Sparta. In his own notices of the Persian war he vii-tu- 
ally adopts the Spartan point of view on this subject./' (7) That the 
Boiotian town of Haliartos was loyal during the Persian war to the 
national side, and was destroyed in consequence by Xerxes, if true, 
marks a startling omission in the pages of Herodotus. The site of 
Haliartos would make its isolated heroism more inexplicable than the 
loyalties of Thespiai and Plataia. Did the legend of the heroism of 
Haliartos only date from the days when the Romans, after razing the 
city for its adhesion to Perseus, banded over the Haliartian land to 
Athens t' (8) The story of Salamis is enriched with the apparition of 
the serpent-hero, Kychreus, perhaps from one of those 'songs of S;ilamis' 
which Pausanias elsewhere notices, and peradventure heard.* (9) The 
trophy set up by Themistokles is alrea<ly an old friend, though not 
obwrved by Herodotus. Perhaps Pausanias may actually have seen 
it^ (10) The legend of Themistokles obtains a startling addition by 
the story of the refusal of the Delphian Apollo to accept an offering 
at his hands. This story cute, as some may have seen, both ways. 
Themistokles had asked leave of the god to make him a present from 
the spoils of Salamis. Had the god been so consulted in other cases, 
would he have accepted any gift from the spoils of the Mode ? As a 
matter of fact there was no Athenian offering in commemoration of 



' 10. 22. 8 i^ inrip Tpa^'vos might be 
the routs throagh the Asoims gorge. 
^ 6 A rqt AUidim/p must be sought 
further to the west ; en. uotea to 7. 216. 
Putaaniaa expressly identifies it with 
the route follotred by Hydamcs and tlio 
Siedes, i.e. the ' Anopsia ' of Ildt. As 
he nowhere nscs the Herodoteaa term, 
be msjr possibly in this cose he intending 
to correct the Ma!<Ur. Cp. 3. 4. 8. 

* 1. 13. 5 AaKfSainofloit M Trph fiir 
tr \titTpoit eiiiy iytyStti rraiir/ia, CiCTt 
o6ii avrtx'^po*"' iyv'l vu KiKparrjcOai 
TtfV' AfwrlSf Iti' yip viiriiivrt ovk l^aar 
r»it hroni*9vt i\ rtXiar t^apKiaat ^dopdr 
rtjr N^uv kt\. 3. 14. 1 tou Orirpov 
tl Aramnpii llauaemioKi roO IlXaraio^rtf 
irfi/fOfUrou twr/^ii iari, rh Si IrfpOf 
AmriSw ■ Kal X^oit card f rot Itatrroy 
tr' ai!frott X^Toviri ical rtMa^ir iywra, tv 
y vXift XwaprmTiirv dX^^ yt oit larm 
*^i^tf9ai. Cp. 3. 4. 7. 8; 8. 52. 2 
AsMrMai i 'Arafai'tplSov xal &ttwrroK\ijt 
i ytviiXdovt Awiiaarro Ik rfft 'EXXdioi 



Zip^ifr, i> fiir rail i>ai>^;(^it ifitpoT^pait 
Atuc/ias bi dYuiri rifi i* B<^/xori/Xair. 

» 9. 32. 6; up. Strabo, 411. The 
stratugic imjiortanco of Hnlisrtos must 
be obvious to every trareJler in Buiotis. 
The city coTcmanded the col, or passsce, 
between tlie iiUin of Thebes knd tno 
bnain of the Kopnta lake. 

« 1. 3fi. 1. Op. 8. 10. 9 iScrai Si 
iiri 'Adijvalur lin 9fol aipiaiv iv Ma/iaC'wrt 
iral ir XaXa/jMi tou Ipyov fitTd<rxouif, 

» 1. 36. 1. KUewhere, 8. SO. 3, 
PftUBauias records that the spoctators 
stood lip tn receive Themistokles at the 
Olympian Festival (01. 76?). Bo it 
remarked hcru that I'autmnias does not 
lovo Aristeid&s. He associates his name 
with the Plataian victory, but adds that 
he forfeited his populiirity by taxing the 
Islands (8. 62. 2) ; and he mriitions the 
destruution of 400 Perainns on Psyttaleia 
(1. 36. 2) without nanaing the hero of 
that exploit. 



100 



HERODOTUS 



Salamis at Delphi, for fairly obvious reasons. Pausaniaa has not, how- 
ever, observed that the argument, or explanation, he records does not 
harmonize with the request addressed by the Delphian god to Aiginsi, 
according to Herodotus.^ (11) Pausaniaa will have seen the doorless 
and roofless Heraion on the road to Phaleron, said to have been left 
in that condition as a monument of the devastation wrought by 
MardonioB in Attica — in any aiee a local legend.- (12) Far more 
important and like a genuine tradition, of local provenience, is the 
story of the destruction of a portion of Mardouios' forces in the 
Megarid. This episode, if accepted, would bo of real assistance in 
explaining the movements of Mardonios for the evacuation of Attica.* 
(13) Pausaniaa gives, what Herotlotus could not have given, 'the 
seventy-fifth Olympiad ' as th« date of the battle of Platfiia ; but he 
does not give the year in theqiiadrennium precisely.* (14) He makes 
'Arimnestoa' (si/) general of the Plataians 'in the Imttle agiuust 
Mardonios,' as previously at Marathon.^ (15) Finally, he records 
the destruction of a remnant of the forces of Mardonios in the 
grove of Demeter Kabiria — perhaps an alternative, but not a direct 
contradiction, of the pious observation in Herodotus on the 
immunity of the precinct of Demeter Eleusinia from the pollution 
of blood.*" 

The items thus enumerated are not all of equal value, or of similar 
import. In a class by themselves stand tlie Olympian list, and the 
notice of the alternative route in Trachis. The defeat of the Persians 
in the Megarid is more plausible than the destruction of the remnant 
after Plataia, and this, again, more pleasing than the ruin of Haliartos. 
Mere wonders, like Skyllis the Diver's feats, or Kychreus the Hero's 
apparition, are easily disposed of : they belong to the regular repertoire 
of Greek story-tellers. More interesting as reflexions of delmte and 
afterthought are the Delphian rejection of the victor of Salanus, and 
the Spartan conversion of Thenuopylai from a fiasco into a success. 
The judgement exercised in finding a scapegoat for Athenian crime 
might be credited to Pausaniaa' own exercises in the Herodotean 
theodicy. He is on safer ground when he envisages trophy, or 
Heraion, or Hellenion, without, however, adding so much to our re- 
construction of events, or to the actual story of the Persian war. 

Finally, in another class of passages, Pausanias goes rather further 
beyond Herodotus, while still attesting his own Herodotean interest, 
and illustrating the sur^nval of Herodotean authority. (I) The 



' 10. 14. 6, 6 ; cp. HJt. 8. 122. 

« 1. 1. 6. Elsevrhere (10. 35. 2) he 
recorfiB the vow cf the Greeks (uiiknown 
to Hdt.) not to rebuild the tetuples 
destroyed by tho Petsiiiiis. Cp. pp. 32, 
40, (70) aiipra. 

' 1. 40. 2. 3. The gtory Wft8, perhaps, 
told in connexion with the statue of 
Art«mi8 Sot«ira. Tho benighted and 



[jaiiic - stricken Persians, Jest in the 
mountains ou the way from Megtra to 
Thebi's, and iiily discharRtng their arrows 
against tha jifroaning rocks, are a spectacle 
worthy the pen of Herodotns. Pausanias 
rises to tlie occasion. Cu. Hdt. 9. 14. 

« 6. 3. 4. 

» 9. 4. 2. 

' 9. 25. 9 ; op. Hdt. 9. 65. 



§§16-16 AUTHORITIES OTHER THAN HERODOTUS 



mysterious prophet Bakis, who flit« across the pages of Herodotus, 
materializes for Pausanias into a Boiotian, with something at least of 
a human personality.* (2) The unwritten chapters in the history of 
the Thessalo-Phokian feud are supplied by Pausanias with malarial 
which commands respect, whatever the channels by which it has 
filtered through to this lato authority.- (3) Herodotus had given the 
bare pedigrees of the Spartan lioyal Houses ; Pausanias repeats them, 
not without a trifling v:iriant or two, but with a wealth of historical 
or biographical doUiil which makes the more genealogies good reading.^ 
(•t) Furthest from Herodotus in one sense, yet nearest in another, is 
the astounding story of the invasion of Greece by the Gauls under 
Brennus, the circumvention of Thermopylai and its defenders, the 
iniractilous preservation of Delphi : a story, or series of episodes, 
narrated, with the most transparent plagiarisms, as exact parallels to 
the episodes of the Persian war, as narrated by Herodotus. Possibly 
the Gauls really did use the route ' through the Ainianes,' in their 
attack on Thermopylai ; and Pausanias, in his determined parallelism, 
hiis been le<i to identify it with the path ' betrayed by Ephialtes of 
Trachis to the Medes.' * 

§ 16. The Hhetarf. — There will be no great injustice done to either 
if Dio, the exponent of 'the simplo life,' and Aristeides, a devotee of 
' faith-healing,' arc here classed together as representatives of rhetorical 
literature, albeit they belonged to dirt'ereiit generations, and were in 
other respects contrasted characters. Both, indeed, wura Asianic 
Greeks ; both represented a strong atticizing tendency in literature ; 
both were exponents of a revived national feeling among Hellenes ; 
both made use of the traditions of the Persian war, in the literary, 
rbetoric.ll and national interests ; and both attest the popularity of 
Herodotus, or at least the 8te.idy recourse to his work, in the first 
and second centuries of our era. Dio Chrysostom,-' indeed, true 
to his Attic preference, places Tbucydides and Theopompos above 



■ 10. 12. 11 iK Bwb^ra; Bixir . . 
(ard^-XfTO* SfJ^a ix vu^^uir. Cp. 4. 27. 
4, ». 17. b, 10. 14. 6, 10. 32. 8 (B«kis 
uid HdL reconciled). 

■ 10. 1. 3-11 ; op. notm to Hdt. 8. 27. 

* The Agids, 3. 2-fl ; cp. Hdt. 7. 204. 
The Earypontids, 3. 7-10. 5 ; cp. Hdt. 
8. 131. (or the ditferuuces see notes to 

;/.e. 

* 1. 4. 1-4, 3. 10. 9, 10. 19. 6-10. 28. 
Qf, p. 98 rupra, 

* Cocc«Uiiua Dion was alire, and in 
PniM ad Olympiim, his native place, 
daring Pliny's Leratiou in Qithynin, 
111 A.D., op. Pliiiy 8 LtUeri, 10. 81, 82. 
Hia binfa, nowerer, may fall u early as 
40 A.D. ( W. Schmid, ap. Pauly-Wissowa, 
T. 849). His life divides itself into 



three distinct stages— (i.) c 40-82 A.D., 
during which he became mora or less the 
typi.al rhetor; (ii. ) S2-97 A.D., the 
|)eriod of bis exile or retirement, travels 
and hardahi[>8, during whicli he more 
and more put on the philosophic mind ; 
(iii.) c. B7 A.n. to the end, the jwriod of 
his restoration and f^rcator influence, 
though his good intentions and activity 
were not a little th\TArted hj local 
jealousy and Klci}iaiddterH. Philo- 
stratos, de vil. S'ophui/. 1. 7, gives a short 
account of hiru, but the main jioints in 
his biography are to bo recovered from 
the 80 extant Orations : the results 
admirably put together by Schmid, I.e. 
Cp. also L. DindorCs edition, Tenbner, 
1857. The title xj'"^^<'^°Mor was not 
borne by Dio during his life-time. 



102 



HERODOTUS 



API'. I 



Herodotus, as historians ^ ; but his highest praise is reserved for 
Xenophon.^ He does not cite Herodotus as authority for the Persian 
war, though the Herodotoan tradition reappears strongly throughout 
his own references to the course of events^ : the work of Herodotus is 
to Dio a form of literature rather than of history.* Dio himself, a 
philosopher in his way, sits rather loosely to historical t'acts,^ and uses 
the story of the Persian wars of old mainly with an ethical reference, 
which is at times Herodotean." He adds nothing concrete to our 
knowledge of the actual traditions of the war, but his occasional com- 
ments are not without intrinsic value, and a refracted interest^ His 
defence of the lie in history, as illustrated by the Persian accounts of 
the war, is distinctly suggestive.^ His preference of Aristeidea to 
Themistokles is not surprising," but he has a good word to say for 
Themistoklcs too as against the Athenians.^'' It is the moral of the 
war, which Dio delights to draw ; and the moral sometimes leads to 
a slight transfiguration of the story.^^ The mishandling of nature as 



' Or. 18, i 282 5. The reE are to 
Dindorf, ed. eit. 
^ibid. 

* The Coriathiae/i, Or. 37, is replete 
with Hdt., Iiut it in not gpnuioe ; the 
references in the f^nuine OraiioTui are, 
liowever, strongly Herodotean. But 
Dio is not coDcemed to dcfi'ud Hdt. 
even igainst Ktesias, op. Or. 11 (i. t\Q), 
01 itiv tjuuriv HiTTepov yaiitrSai r%v irtpl 
yia\afu»a vav/iaxlar Tip i» IlXaratait 
HiXtt, oi 8^ TiiK IpyiM TtXturaXm elya.i tA 
in IIXaTouat;, Cp. § 5 above. 

* Or. 18 I.e. 'UpoibTif fiiv o5r, el vart 
tiippocvnit ffm itt, jj,er^ ToXAiJi iiavxlas 
itrrfi^n. tA ^Ap dvti/juivov Kai ri y\vKi 
Tfjt dravyrXiai i-irilFoiaf irap/f«i ni>Bii>6et 
^dXXof fl laTafuKlitf tA evyyf>aii)ia iWai. 

* He makoi) curious slips, e.f;. the 
eonfuaioii of the SKipfnji Vixoi with the 
lUrayArt)^ (i. 210) ; the inclusion of 
Tbrake and Makedonia in tho domiuiona 
of the Great King (Or. 3, i. 46) : as 
Sokrates is one of tlie interlocutors, this 
involves an auachroiiism. 

* e.g. Or. 17 {i. 276) o to/pi* Zip^-nt, 
4 T-^j Mpat 1)irtipov xvptot, i-rtlit] khI ri}t 
'BXXdJoi itttSvurjet KoX roaoOror (rTi\o¥ 
Kal Toaa&rat fiupiiSai aimafayui* HvfyKt*, 
iraaar niv o/o'xpwi iiwlpoXt t^v Svya/up, 
n6\it Si tA auifta tirx^of 5(a<rw<rai ipeiywir 
airr6t. 

' e.g. his observitiou that a mnb is 
not an army : oiSi yi.p tA roir sl^piou 
arpir^vfia XafiT/Ay ^r, r\i)y tl uti n 
SiopirrrfiP f) iicurKdrrdv J) toioOtop trtpor 
tp-foy npirrtiv, Or. 32 (i. 430). 

* Or. 11 (L 211) fyw •yoi;* i.yip6t linowa 
Mii^oii XtyavTm in oC'Siy o/LoXoyoutny ol 



Xlfpaai TUP rap6, roa 'EVXjjin*' dWi 
Mpetop lUy kt\. After a few lines which 
reduce the battle of Marathon to tho 
merest fipax^ wplxTKpowrita. (cj). Hdt. 
IV.-VI. ii. 222) the passage oontinues : 
/irrA W toCto E/p£ij» iirl ripi ''E\Kd8a 
arpaTt(-aa»ra KaKiiaxfioylovt /liy fiK^iu 
wtpl Qtpfunrv\at Kal TdK /SaffcX^a aiTdw 
iroicrtlyai AtiiiplSav, ttjj- Si tCip 'A^ijvafbir 
w6kip i\6yTa Karaffxd^ffai, nai 6<roi ni) 
iU<pvyoy dySparoSlcaaSai. raOra 8i 
voi-Z/iTayTa. teal ^4/>oi^f itiBivra To«t 
'EXXT;jri» eij rjjr 'Aeiay dwtKBtly. The 
ooninient whioh follows might bo added 
to the previous note : 4ti iUp otV yf/€}j6ij 
ro-vrd irriy ouk dS^Xiw, irt Si tUbt V '^b'' 
^aaiXia KcXfOtrai orpaTivaiu roTt d»u 
(SpfGiP o6k cSvyaTou, tya /ti) ffopvPuxrw. 

' Themistokles was a ' rl>etoric Dema- 
gogue, ' Ariateidtfl a 'genuine Philo- 
sopher.' Or. 22 (i. 303), cp. Or. 49 (ii. 
148). 

" Or. 73 (ii. 262) ef^<rTo«X^a Si U- 
rtatiii (all rpoSiSbvra, 8t rapa\a/3d»r airoit 
ov Svpafiiyovt ToC8o(>ot rijt TarpiSot olxe'ir, 
dWi wapaxi^povyrav tois iro\fftioit aiVoS 
ToD iffTtut Kal TuiP UpCip, oil pi6yor raiTa 
wdrra dxiSuiKty, i\X' fri koI tUp 'EXXi^ur 
■ijytii.6yas iTolifaty, d^fXAMn'ot AaxtSai- 
noviovt ii ipxv^ txoPTa^ T^\r Tini)y raOrrir. 
Cp. comparison of Themistokles and 
Periklem Or. 2."* (i. 312). 

" (I) On TUerinopylai (Sjiartan love of 
Honour, Fame, Liberty), Or. 31 (i. 349), 
Or. 78 (ii. 283). (2) Athenian viotorie* 
and Education, Or. 13 (i. 247 f.). (3) 
The pride and ])uni8hment of Xerxes, 
Or. 17 (i. 276) iiuoud not* 6 alwvo ; Or. 
14 (i. 254) oi'iA af' "Zip^tiy ArijWira dra- 



AUTHORITIES OTHER THAN HERODOTUS 

an exhibition of power by the Persian despots seems to excite his 
disapprobation ^ ; and once at least, in his comparison of the tyrant 
with the cook, he might seem to formulate the comic Nemesis.* But 
Die's interests, to do him justice, were not so much in the past as in 
the present, with his own contemporaries. He was, in his better 
moments and actions, more than a mere rhetor, or philosopher. He 
had immediate and practical ends in view. He was a municipal re- 
former and benefactor, a counsellor of princes, a man of wide travel 
and experience, and truly an ornament and an honour to his age,' 
Hia best historical work was connected with contemporary history * ; 
and his practical and ethical discourses are chiefly to be admired as a 
mine of information in regard to his own time and circumstances, and 
a mirror of the social and ethical conditions and tendencies in the 
>man world from Vespasian to Hadrian.* Aklius Aristkidks ' is a 
imposing and a less attractive figure than Dio, little more than a 
nMre rhetor in letters and hypochondriac in life ; but he brings a 
larger contribution to the matter hero in hand. The Orations of 
Aristeides are long-winded and elaborate, and probably intended for 
readers rather than for listeners.'' They are full of pauses and 
digressions, and are constructed with a painfully self-conscious art. 



Tj in)l rdjnnd iitddrro t^5 KV^tpirijr-g nal 
TiXfA, Ti}y iKflfOV yyutiitr ovk Mrf^txer 
airri^ oi-ii rtvaat ovSi ^fTafir/vau. This 
too might be added to the preriuiis note 
ai an * improvement' iu traditiou. 

' '>r. 3 <L 44) 1^ yt fi>f<m xai t4 iSivara 
ioKoOyra TOtrfvcu Sward, tl ftoiiXoiTO 
Ttifi'faBai nir ttjii $a.\txrra», TX^io'^at it 
rk 6ptf, Toin ii irora^ou; inXtlirfiy irwh 
irtptttriar riroiitwovt. 1) oix 6jtt\Koa^ bri 
Zifttt* <> ''■'^ ttepaiir (iatri\ei>t 7-J)i« fiiv yijy 
fTaiyjft 0a\arTtw, SkXuv t6 lUyiaroy tuih 
ip^f Kal JiaiTTi^at iwi riji T/wtlpov r^y 
'ABu, Sii. i^ Tri% SaXimit tAk ref^ 
tTfaritP Ayui' ^Xaurev iit> ipn^roi ; 

* Or. 4 (i. 72) irt yoCv Zipi'^ »ol 
Aopctot dvwffrr in ISoiVuv IjXavroir To\i>i> 
^xXo" Htpcuir re xal Mij^uv xal Soxivv 
a«i ' KpiftiM «col \ly\.'TTiii)¥ irvpo tit rijr 
'BXXdfa droXol'^Ml'or, rortpcr /^(uriXiKiv fj 
iiayitptK^ txpa-rrw lpiyo» Xc(ai> /Xai/vorrci 
ia.raxaT^aiUr<\v ; 

• PiiUoatr&toa (fe vUa ApolUmii Tya- 
nniMT 5. 27 ff. («d. Okarius, 1709, ppu 

ff.) reprrseDts Dio as in attendance 
Vespasian in Egypt, and reports a 
,t«, in vrhich Euphrates, l^io and 
ApoUonios with the Emperor diMiusa the 
■itaatton. Dio is rtpreseuted as approv- 
ing DemocrBcy in abilraeto, and advigiii^ 
Tecpasimn to give the Romans their choice 
between that and monarchy (c 34). 



nrntt 
BSbal 



* He wrote, apparently, a work in eight 
Books ou thv achievameiits of Alexander 
(Suidos), po&aibly for Trajan's benefit. 
Of more im{iortBDce were hia rtrurd, 
probality an ideali^rtic study of *the 
noble savage,' after the manner of 
Tacitus' Germania, bat based upon bis 
own experience ; op. W. Schmid, op. 
Panly-Wisaovrn, v. 878. 

' Dio appears among the witnesses to 
the moQiiincmtB and trophioa of the 
Penslaa war : ' the sword of Mardonioa ' 
at Atlions outJfhinea Propylaia and 
Olytnpieion in Or. 2 (i. 27) ; the Pernk* 
Slioa at Lnkc<iaitnon figures in Or. 47 
(ii. 1 34), cp. § 2 supra. 

* 129-189 A.U., bom in Mysia, studied 
in PergHmon und Athens, paid a long 
visit to Egypt, was in Rome in 156 a.d.. 
returned to .Stiiyriia, Was a chronic 
invalid and devotoo of Asklepios, and 
apparently gained relief. Six of his fifty- 
one extant Omtions are occiijiied with 
this topic (Nns. 23 - 28). jJb found 
favour with the EmiJerons M- Aureliu* 
and CommoduB. 

' I have used the somewhat antiquated 
edition of Canter, 1604, a caprice that 
may be condoned if I add that my copy 
lias btilongiHl, in sucL'ession, inter alim, 
to Thonia.H Cfaisfaitl and Walt«r Pater. 
But DiDdorPs numbers are added. 



104 



HERODOTUS 



APP. r 



They make a free use of history, and historical subjects, and, besides 
more casual references, in at least two extensive ptvssages Aristeides 
comes to speak at length on the traditions of the Persian war : once 
in ' the Defence of Themistoklea,' ^ again in the Pamithenaica,^ an 
epitome of Greek history, to the glory of Athens. Though Aristeides 
rarely, if ever, cites or names Herodotus ; though ' the taw of all 
great expeditions,' which he applies to the Persian invasion, be 
probably borrowed from Thucydides ^ ; and though he cites Aiachines, 
the Sokratic, as ex]]re8s authority for a pjirt at lejist of his defence of 
Themistokles,* that, and his whole tre;\tment of the story of the 
Persian war, bear witness to a first-hand and first-rate acquaintance 
with the work of Herodotus, such <is mediate sources could never 
supply.^ To the vogue and authority of the work of Herodotus 
Aristeides is, indee<l, a more copious and consistent witness than was 
Dio ; there is very little in all his elaborate diatribes on history, where 
they cover the Herodotean area, which conflicts with Herodotus, and 
still less which, ao far as it conflicts with Herodotus, might not be 
ascribed to mere inference, invention, or carelessness. 

The ' defence of Themistokles ' is undertaken in the second Platonic 
Oraiiiiu, which is directed against the strictures containetl in the Gttrffian 
on the four grejit Athenians, MiUiades, Themistokles, Perikles and 
Kimon.** There are three periods in uhich tlie tp-eu[ne-<is of Themistokles 
maij be tested : (i.) liefore the earning of the ' Barbarian' ; (ii.) during the war; 
(iii.) after the tear, when he prevented the destrudiutt, of the medizing States, 
vpwards of thirty in number, by tlie Lakedaimmt-ianaJ The orator's apology 
for Themistokles observes these periods, and consists, for the first 
two, in little more than a rapid but withal rhetorical review of the 
Herodotean traditions in Books 7, 8, 9, save that to Themistokles is 
ascribed more expressly than in Herodotus the authorship of the 
various proposals and acta which conduced to the defence and salvation 
of Helhis. So (1) the decision to join the national cause, (2) the reply 
to the Persian heralds, (3) the composition of feuds, (4) the restora- 
tion of exiles, are all recorded expressly as Dogmata of Themistokles.* 
To these are added (fl) the waiver of the Hegemony," (G) the psepbism 



* Or. 48 {Oritio Platonica wiMuidB, 
pro Quatuomria). 

» Or. 13. 

" Or. 80 (Sicuk post.), ii. r.3, S/io i' 
otucu rbv i>6iioy itaorrai tCiv vrepopiur Kal 
fifyiXoif arpaxtiCif • ifi vtpiiirfat ixir o 
\l(p<rC»i fiaatXti'i 6 SeOfM orpaTtiraat, 

SiKcMoj' fivpidai, iroWaU xal ircj'^i xa2 
fairriKTii Siviiifus. Cp. Thuc. 6. 33. 5 
6\iyoi yip St) <rri\iu /j.ryi\oi, i) ' EXXjJraii' 
1) ^ap^ipuy, raXi> airb r^r iavri^v irdp- 
ofTft Ka.TihpdiiKra¥. 

* iii. 36.1. 

* There is, however, a good deil in 



Aristeides which recalls Plutarch, or 
Plutarcli'a Sources, to mind. 

■ CjK note 1 xupra. iii. 293 iqq. 

' ib. 360 1). Perhaps all resumed in 
the previous phrase, 294 c iu^ifKSt Sia 
rwr TpiKVfuuiv vlkuv, 

* ib. SOS Kt^tov &ituirTOK\4ovt Sirfftara. 
Themistokles is made reajmnsible for the 
answer to the Henilds and the death of 
the interpreter, a retlnciiient probably 
due to the diiilectic- of tradition. Aris- 
teides a[ipareiitly means the Heralds of 
Xer.xes. 

• ib. 310 c. 



AUTHORITIES OTHER THAN HERODOTUS 



105 



for the evacuation of the city,^ (7) the decision in favour of a naval 
battle, and the choice of the scene of battle, as previously (8) the 
creation of the Athenmn navy."-' Further services of Tbemistokk's arc 
specified, such as (9) his interpretation of the oracles, (10) his appeal to 
the lonians, (1 1) his management of Eurybiades, (12) hia management 
of Xerxes, (13) hLs management of the Greeks. All the virtues and 
gfjicea arc heaped upon the head of Tbemistokles.' He is expressly 
exalted above Miltiadea and Kimon * ; his maritime policy ia justified 
as salutary and necessary for Athens ^ ; to it are traced all subsequent 
successes ; and it is acquitted of the charge of demoralizing the 
Athenians.^ The two most damaging charges against Themistokles, 
his corruptibility or avarice, and his treachery or Mrdism, are virtually 
ignored. They disappear under the floo<i of his personal merita and 
achievements : they seem absurd as qualities of ' the good genius of 
Hellas,' ' of the man who ' with the Gods and with Athens,' wrought 
salvation for Greece ^ ; through whose lips some God spake,^ and to 
whose voice the Athenians clung, as to 'an holy anchor,'^" With 
really consummate art Aristeidea points out, as the end and climax 
of the argument,'' that Themistokles had never aimed at ' the tyranny,' 
but was the author and establishcr of Liberty ; he, who rebuilt the 
city on a grander scale, had first taught the Athenians, in the words 
of Alkaios, that not stones, i\m wood, fwr- walls a city make ; whtrf. brave- 
mm and free arr found, there shall be no iaek of cities.^ And not Themi- 
stokles alone, but all the operations of the war are in this passage : 
Tempe and Thermopylai, Artemision and Salamis, Plataia and 
Mykale ; and all exploited in the interests of Athens. Thermopylai 
was a defeat, Salamis a victory '^ ; Artemision was the comer-stone of 
liberty,'* and at Mykale the Athenians were atlraitted victors. •* Even 
Plataia is converted to the glorification of Athens, for none vied at 
Plalaia icUh the Athenians — except th* Lakedmrnonians^^ — who, as Plato 



' UL 316 a. 

> ib. 30)1 r., S42. Some added that 
Themiitokles determint^ not merely the 
««:«ne but the very hour of Ijattle : rni- 
(rd/unot Hif rav/utxini' KariAvTor ToD 
mnOiJiaroi. 

' He is expreasly accreditwl with 
anSpla, au^fxxrCvi), tixaioaiyri, avvtan, 
AfirirtjT, vpabrrjf, KopTfpla, ruap^oarta, 
/u7aXo^u;(la, aiid other good quulitied. 

• iii. 2J>4. cp. 260. 

• ih. 838. 337. • 3«B, 

' ib. 289 A «aWffTTj Toil "EXXifffH" it/r' 
<i7«9«v ToO ial/uvn. The ' tertiwy pre- 
Aitxte ' here iteeiTui odd : query, tou ? 

• ih. 806 a 

' iA. 31 7 A Stuir rif 8id r^i Bf^uoroKX/oi/t 
7Xwm}i i^iy^aro. 

" ib. 319 a wt irp4t UpS,t iyKipat r^ 
iitlrou <piii»fp ixi/'^i'oi. 



" ib. 329 6 aroXo^ur ri^ Xfriw- 
" ib. 338, 339 uivot Si imh ioxe't wdrrwv 
Ai>Bpi!rrrii)» , 1j KOfuiij y( iv iXiyw itX^ax 
Oe^OTaxX^i 6.\riei) rA* Xi^OF Srro, if 
irdXai nh 'AXitaiot i toi^t>)» flirtr, Oartpoir 
St ol iroXXoi iropaXa^6i^i!f exp^"'"'"'' '*'• 
ifia ov XWoi, oM fiJXo, oi'-Si Hx'V Tetriituf 
al «-6X(it fhif • dXX' 8iroii tot' 4» iffu' 
AfSptt aOroit a\i)^iui tlS&ret, irrauBa, KoX 
rttxt «ol TrSXtit, 

" ib. 358. 

■* ib. 309 D, with the stock quotation 
from Pindar ; op. §§ 3, H tttpra. 

'» ib. 354 B. 

" ibid, if T) itin/ovt SaKtStuiiorlovt tt^- 
a^XXoM tvxo*. The viotory is cited 
to proTc tliat the Athenians were none 
the worse men for the naval policy. 



106 



HERODOTUS 



APP. I 



himself admilted, retreated in. the battle.^ Tlie Gods foagkt fcv Hellas in 
the Persian war, and ratified the plans of Themistokles ^ ; his coiikmjxrraries, 
the Spartans, crotmed him for his merits " .■ what vmUd Plato have done in 
his place f* Or how, as Aristeides asks elsewhere, can you expect even a 
Themistokles to do what the Gods themselves cannot du, make men mrtwous ? * 
Even in that passage the defence of Themistokles merges into a 
panegyric of Athens. Much more in the Panatheaaim. " is the state 
glorified and the statesmnn or general ignored, bo that in the long 
passage on the wars of Athens/ and in the portion thereof that deals 
specifically with the Persian wars,* as in the Persai of Aischylos, 
though ' liarharian ' kings be named, no Greek or Athenian appears 
nomiiuiliin, or in propria peisojia. Here too the story of the war with 
Xerxes follows very closely the Herodotean lines. Allowing for the 
rhetorical setting, there is very little to be found here but a trans- 
figured, and at times a caricatured Herodotus. Xerxes laid himself out 
to surpass his sire, and to punish the Greeks by one effort.'^ His imane 
ambiti'jn aimed even at tlie ' Klenichies ' on tlu: Atlantic ! '° The sea parted,"^^ 
aiul rivers failed at his coming}'^ Alhos remains as a monument of his 
handiwork^^ He did not ^number,' he ^measured' his army^*: he moved 
the whole world against Hellas}^ But it teas not Athens he captured, he 
captured llw mere wraith or smnblance of a ciiy.^^ He mt enthroned io view 
the battle, then quickly changed his tune, recanted, and fled, btf the way 6y 
which he had coma, hit in far other guise, his one object to reach the raft in 
safety." 

Athens was indeed the salvaiion of Greece,^* and vmiM again, as at 
Marathon^ unaided have saved Greece, but that for very modesty and sluxme 
she summoned the rest of Hellas to tier aid.^' The removal of the city was 
more wonderful than the Barbarian's bridging ike sea, or piercing the 



' ilL 344 f. , a refereooe to the Laehts ; 
cp. § 10 supra. 

* ib. 350 c. 
» t*. 860. 

* tJ. 334. 

» Or. 45 (Platonic* pr.), iiL 141 D. 

* Or. 13. Cant«r i. 160-344. 
' ibid. 199 c, ei sqq. 

■ litW. 207 !> tt sqq. 207 D to 220 A. 
comjirisua the M&rathonian caingiatgn ; 
tlien follows ati elaborate treatnieut of 
Xerxes knd bk invaaion (220-281) ; but 
tb« passage on the war only closes with 
tha acceptance by the kin^ of the cele- 
brstfld terms of Peuec (2fl7). 

■ ih. 220 n dTwfo iiirXovv Ayuftj^erai. 
" ib. 2!il D ^Ti Si 'ArXorTtKoP wtXiyon 

" ib. 223 B Kai 0d.\aTTa iirrx'iifxi. koI 
«-<i\ii> vvyijti r<f! /SafftXei. H« a<lds the 
enij^atic platitude : cai riv (an r^t 
rial SaXdTTTji 5<roj Tijf iKtirov Siapiireut 
Xpifot, 



«» ib. 222 D. 

'" iV*. 223 B KoI 6 'ABus irrl itHiXtii rf 
IfTfif \i\tnrTai.. 

'* ib. 223 n 0(Xo»(xi}<Tar J^ fiaOtiv 6 rirra 
iroros peuriXtit A»4<roi/t iye {ixRV t^P 
KoX Toln-o iKtlvif yfrisOax ivvarbr) if»ay- 
KixrBy) fierpTJaai rpd-ror 4i) Tira /laWw fl 
ipi6tiij(rai r^r trrpaTiiv. Cjp. Hdt. 7. CO. 

" ib. 224 A irivTa mrCiv ijei, ctV 

"' ib. 226 B C Cxrvtp ti3v irinrrrCiif ipaat 
TLUft, Tby 'A\i(af Span t^i 'EWM171 t4 
tt5u)\oy \apta', aMir Si oi Swir^^w- 
oCtu Kai S^pf>?f kt\. 

" ib. 246-7 Zipiv' bi ncafl^o ^r rrX. 
Tra.XinifiSliU' pje, KiU fuTOffTpitf/at jfn tJjo 
airr-^v, oi fi^rii roO oiVoO ox'/lftaTot, tr 
■libr\ TOUT iyiiirifffUL TOiOVfurot, r>)K CX'fi'^ 
KaraXafitir. 

'* ib. o&riii Sib. irdrrbiv ij r&KiS wif Icttct 
rb 'EXXijru-A*. 

" 16. 225 C a{<rx'''">f^'^ /*<" boK^lr ^ifij 
^mfr/rai Tip ^appiptp Kaffiwtp vpirtpor if 
MapaBuiyi, 



§ 16 



AUTHORITIES OTHER THAN HERODOTUS 



107 



> 



mountain.^ Evm/thing depended on the shipsJ* The OretJcs had more 
confidence in the Athenians than in themselvee.' Those who /ought at 
Thtrmopylni tried to emulate the victors of Marathon, InU ihey tried in vain.* 
At Artemisitm and at Salamis Atheni defeated at oiue holh liarharian and 
HelUne, and saved the Greeks in spite of Ihenisdve.i.^ The vidory of 
Salamis ido* almost as much ilteir own as that of Maratlion futd been.' 
The Athenians deserved tite jrrize twice over, for tliemselves and for their 
General,' a man worth all the rest, wlw divined, Hire one inspired, tfte time, 
and place, and plans of the Barbarians, and foresaw the event.^ A gallant 
ttppendir to the vidory ueas the achievement of (inother Athenian ivlunte^^ 
who, with the old mgn left in Salamis, landed on t/ia island opposite, and 
ptti Ike Persians in occupation to the sword.^ It was the Athenians wfio, 
after rtjecting fresh offers from the King and Mardonios, iy the hands of 
Alexander of Makedon, assembled the Greeks at Plataia}^ The battle of 
PlataiK is converted into a purely Athenian victory, but naturally, in this 
interest, (ietaila are confused and omitted." The exchange of positions 
13 emphasized, and references occur to the Athenian »ervtce8 against 
the cavalry, and in the assault on the fortified camp ; but the campaign 
Jb cut down to the dimensions of a single battle, and the result of that 
iMittle is to impress the Barliarians for ever with a memory of Athens.*^ 
It is the Athenians, again, who, after the thanksgivings for the victory, 
and the division of the spoils, carry the war into the enemy's country. 
Mykale is their victor}', and is treated, in logical rather than in 
chronological relation, as the first of a series of victories, for the clear- 
ance of Thrace and the invasion of Asia.^^ 

In some of the other Oralionx, the chief moments or common- 
places reapj)ear, the bridging of Hellespont,'* the piercing of Athos,''^ 
the evacuation of the city by the Athenians/" their superhuman 
heroism,^^ and so forth. Kimon's after victories are set above 
Artcmision and Thermopylai,'* but nothing diminishes the fame of 
^farathon and Salamis, and no statesman or general eclipses the merits 



> iiL 226 B. 

* ib. 228 n ih rif raCt ^rt rire toU 
'SXXifm ri Trpdyfiara. 

* ii. 230 A ouKOu* 6fu>\orytiT' 'A&ijiraioit 
y^ tapptlw uwip auTuir /laXXor f) l/fiiv 
tt^Mf rrX. 

« ib. 228 0. 

* H>. 2.12 n Toi>! liiv -yiip ix^poifl TOiX 
4vXw( TJ) Si iwutKtl^ Toit <fti\out fyUyi<r<u. 

* H>. 244 c. 

'a. 294 jcol avrt^-q t% iriX» iix^" 
Ti wpUTtla. ir€\4<r0iu, rit nir yiip T6X»r 
vrtptixo* 'Mrifaioi, TO<y( Si ifSpat ifijp 

■ ilrid. tit i»Tl ir(t»Tut» f/v, 8t liivot xal 
rirrovt, mil Koipoit, nai rd rur ftap^dpiiir 
iTippirra., KcU rd lUWorra &<nrip fidyra 

* U>. 246. 



'• ib. 218 B icol rd ni» ai-rou ^lunX/iJt 
o&rfcw «Tx< ■ Mopiii'ioj Si kt\. 253 C 
trvrayayi»'Tft Si tow "EXXijfat Hiij fiiWmi 
oiVroit ixoXovStiy SvvafUyovt, tr IlXaraiatf 
7(7>'<M'Tai. 

» i6. 2S3, 254. 

'^ iitul. lun Tiin> fiap^ipup ol fUr ktX. 
Tuv ' Affjifdluy fUfunffUyot. 

" ib. 262. 

'« Or. 29(Siculapr.), u. 18. 

'• iWa., Or. 48, iL 373. 

'^ ibid. I. pr. e, tl ft^ raOra wdiTa xal 
Toit 64)$a\iiott Kal rj ynif-j) yfuralun «a2 
wtpuTipbt T^j ijidpurtla.\, tl Mr Tt eiwtiv, 
ipiiTtiin Si^iriyKtf, rou fiir &>> Tpbrtua 
raravra; wou Si ifytfiovla'EWiiriiiv ; «tX. 

'• Or. 46, iii. 260. 



108 



HERODOTUS 



APP. 1 



of Themistokles. To him Aristeidea seems to ascribe even tha 
attainder on Artbmios of Zeleia by a more uncommon anaclironism, 
well calculated to dissipate the evil odour of Medism, which could not 
but cling round the memory of the great Athenian in his Asianic 
exile.' 

As poetry is a criticism of life, so rhetoric may sometimes bring 
into prominence the essential oloraents or features of tradition, in the 
very effort to improve the occasion. Aristeides says that the defenders 
of Thermopylai souglit to emulate the victors of Marathon ; that thfl 
battle of Salamis was almost as much an Athenian victory as the 
battle of Marathon had been ; that at Pktaia tbti Lakodaimoiiians, oi 
the admission of their best frien(J, retreated, while the Athenians 
proved themselves the right men in the right place. Had he said 
tt&t the stories of Thermopylai and of Marathon had been devised 
and developed as counterparts and makeweights ; that the tradition of 
the wars had fallen too much into the hands of Athens and her 
partisans, but that wherever \'ictory had been organized there had 
;issuredly been an organizing will, a superior intelligence at work — 
"•ould much fault have been found with such conclnsions t Almost so 
far what may be called the inner dialectic of a litei^ary and rhetorical 
tradition has carried Aristeides. His results remiiin empirical and 
stiperficial. Without a serious re-examination of the Soiu-cos, and the 
determination of their intrinsic values, coupled with a constant 
reference to the physical conditions of the action and its story, no 
materia! advance was to bo made by history. But, within the limits 
of mere argument, Aristeides sjiys all but the last word logically 
possible in antiquity upon the story of the Persian war. One 
element he lacked, a sense of humoiu- ; and he never thought of the 
rfdwtio ad absurdu.m, to which his own rhetoric was at times perilously 
near bringing the whole story. That consummation was to come 
about, yet less by an express attack upon the specific traditions of 
rhe Persian war than by a general deadening of serious interests, a 
j,Towing aversion toward old-world ideas, and the decline of literature 
upon jxarody and pedantry. 

§ 17. In the meantime, Lucian, of iSamosata,- if any one, might 
have realised these possibilities. The very incarnation of Belles Leitres, 
pure and simple, he employed satire and persiflage with a security of 
touch worthy vi Aristophanes, making merry of all the pomp.s and 
vanities of life, pitting common-sense against every extravagance, and 
dissolving all pretensions in mordant ridicule. A greater contrast to 
Aristeides, his contemporary, could scarce be imagined. But Lucian 



» iil 367, CD. Or. 18, i. 832. 

' The Article in SuidAs is pUinly pre- 
judiced : the date (^^ove W irl toO 
Kalirapot Tpai'avot/ icai hr^Keioa) is per- 
imps too earlv ; cp. Clinton, Fa/<(.i Rom. 
ml ann. 165, 166, 182 A.D., and iL 288 ; 



also 'Bipont' edition of fForks (1789), 
I, \v. (where on internal grounds Im 
date is fixed e. 120-200 A.D.). His 
birthplace is guaranteed, inUr aJia, by 
himself, Hisloria <pu}im>do, 24 (ii. 14, 
JbiKiljitz). 



^ 16-17 AUTHORITIES OTHER THAN HERODOTUS 



is not much concerned with politics and history. The follies of poets 
and of philosophers are mainly bis mark : the absiUTlities of the old 
mythology and of the new enthusiasm alike fall under his censure. 
To the matter here in hand ho makes less of a contribution than mipht 
have been expected ; and a jxirt of the contribution which he mukes 
shows him to little advantage perhaps as an historic.il authority, or 
critic. He has, indeed, composed an admirable Bccipe for the MTiting 
of history,' but he has not illustrated his own canons by bis own 
example. He condemns the vices of the rhetoricians, and he ndicules 
their extravagance with a delicate irony immediately applicable to 
Aristeides and Iiis like * ; but he hfis himself- — Syrian that he is — no 
national or historical interest in the Hellenic wars of yore. Lueian 
appUes a sound and a well -reasoned standard to historians, and 
plainly for him Thucydides represents the high -water mark of 
historical composition ^ ; he has Herodotus, too, at his fingers' ends, 
and reckons him among 'the best.'* But, again, it is more for stylo 
than for subject matter that he values Herodotus * : the stories he 
uses are not chiefly taken from the ]ast three Books, nor concerned 
with military events": he places Herodotus in one category with 
Ktesiaa and other lost souls ^ : he regjird.s him as too ' poetic ' a writer 
to be resXly a good historian.* Yet Lueian none the less attests more 
explicitly than any of his contemporaries the popularity of the 
Herodotean 'Muses'"; and Lueian, oddly enough, contributes some 
striking novelties to the biography of the historian, to wit, a patro- 
nymic,'° the anecdote of the Olympian Recitation,'' and a hint of the 



' The Histwia ^uniuMio coruicrileiula, 
oocAsioned by variotu absard or in- 
comiietent hUtoriea of the Psrtbian war, 
l«2-l«6 A.M. The Fera Hisloria (two 
Books) has of coarse uothing to do with 
biitorjr. 

* His ccnsiiro on the confuiiioD of 
History with Encomium, Hiit. quoniodo, 
7. C\>. lOiilor. yrtueept. 18 iwi iravi 6i 
o Ma/>a9b>r xai b Tcivfalytipot, uiv ovk ir 
n t»fv yfpoiTo. xal ill o A^ut wXtlaSu 

tai rd 'O0f>\'i5ovfpdn4iaTa iyayifwa KiaOu, 
coi 17 £dXa^t xai rd ' \pTttiiaioir ical ol 
IlXarotsi TeXXA ravra xal rcxyd, Kai drl 
■wiat tA 6\iya iftlra irb/iaTa ^TiiraXa^frw 
(oJ tvaridru, nrX. 

» Hid. gaomodo, 2. 16, 26, 38, 42, 47, 
U. M. 

* ibUi. 2. 18, 64. 

' Hrrodoluis. Aititm (ii. 391-4). 

' There is hardly a prociae reference to 
any paaaaK* in Bks. 7, 8, 9, unless the 
•torv of Doreaa and Orcitliuia he »uch 
<Philop*.Z,dtSall.4(i). There in a large 



numlier of references to Bk. 1 (Stories 
of Kroisos, Arion, Arganthonios), and 
also to Bks. 3 (Polykrateit, Maiandrios, 
with a variant, etc.), 4, and 6 (e.g. Pan's 
ArisUia at Marathon, Ikor. Dial. 22. 
3, I'hitops. 3, Jiis aecua. 9). 

' Vera Hiit. 2. 31 (ii. 65) xal /Myl<nat 
iwaauir ri/iuptat i/ti fitfov d \fifvadiUfoi 
Ti rapi Tic /Jfoj" /coi ol MJ; rdXij^^ ffiTr-ye- 
■y/3a0ir« iv ols Kal KrTfalat o Koldtot Ijr 
Koi 'iipiSoTot Kai AXX« roXXo^ 

" Hdt. and Ktesiaa are classed with 
Homer and the jioetB as iyypiipif n} 
\f/tv<rfuiri KfxpifiiUvovt, Philoja. 2 (iii. 88). 
Cp. Htrodotut (i. 302) ovrot iKti»o\ 
'^Ipbiartn imif a rdt fi^X"-^ '''^^ lle/xrucit 
'loori <rvyy^pa(f>wt, 6 rdi rUas Tifiwr 
iifirritrat. 

" ibid. ayuritrTT]i> waptixtf iairrii' 
'OXii/ixfiiii' ^iuv T&1 Irroplat nai KifXiii" 
roi)t wap6rTat. ixfi' tov xai Moi/trof hXi)- 
Bljirai. Til pipXoi'i aiToC ivoJa xai oirrdu 
oiVat. Cp. J/iit. quotnodo, 42. 

"> de dmno 20 itoi fiot gif 4^ inip^i 
irpo(TKd\fi ai'Tdo 'Hp6ioTO¥ Ai(ou 'AXf 
Kapvaca66tr. 

" In the Herodot\ta. Cp. note 9 above. 



no 



HERODOTUS 



APP.l 



rivalry of Thucydides.* Of additionti or contributions to the materiala 
for the story of the Persiani war from other sources, there is little 
nothing to be ascribed to Lucian.- He may refer in passing to events,^ 
or persons,* or objects ^ associated with the war, upon their merits ] 
but his own interests lie elsewhere, and, to do hira justice, he is more 
occupied with the present than with the past. Thus the direct 
polemic, or satire, of Lucian falls wide of our mark : a fact perhaps ii 
its own way significant of the fate impending over the traditions 
the Persian wars of oM, in an ago when military historians were 
finding matter worthy of their attention in contemporary events/ 

§ 18. Enough hiis, perhaps, been hero set down already to jiistifji 
the conclusion, that little or nothing further of real import is to 
won for the history of the Persian war from later writers under t 
Roman Hlmpire. A few accretions or developments in the legends, 
especially that concerning Themistoklea, may still be obtainable ; but 
the story of the war itaelf dwindles, and is dissipated into a spray of 
anecdotes or ruriosa. The Koman writers who are attracted by the 
work of Herodotus praise or imitiite his stylo rather than reproduce 
his matter, or, if they quarry in his work, make more use of the 
earlier than of the later Books. Caesarians were, perhaps, rather 
repelled than attracted by the record of the victories of Republican 
Hellas over imperial Asia ; and at a time when Orontes was flowing 
into Tiber, when the apotheosis of the earthly Leviathan was every- 
where spreading, when the imago and superscription of the Persian 
aun-gotl were moving victoriously from the Euphrates to the Danube, 
and from the Danube to the Tyne, the western world more and more 
lost touch with the memories of Marathon and of Salami.'*. The 
empire of Alexander, and the Roman empire itself, seemed better 
themes foe literary emblazonment ; or literature, sated with heroits,, 
declined on mere anecdotage and pedantry. A group, or series,! 
of vsTiters may here be somewhat arbitrarily brought under one 
category to illustrate these ikspects of the story of the old Persian 
wars. Arrian, the disciple of Epictetus, the Legate of Hadrian/ 



' HiaC. qiLomodo, 4'J. This vuriif is 
found miicli Diore fully clevcloiitd iu tht! 
Life of ThueyiiUle3, by Marcetliiins, 54. 

' Lucian, however, jioiiits out («/«/). 
Trag. 20) the nmbiguity of the cele- 
brated line w Bfii) Xaka/ilt kt\, xal 
II/p<rai yip, olfiai, xal 'EWijvct riicva 
yvvdiKiiy ficar. 

' Eiimm. Lteiuoslh. 36 (Marathon and 
Salamis). 

♦ ibid, 32 o&Si KaKloir iyu S^pfov toO 
BoCXtv iral IvipX"' '''"^ AaKfiaiti-oylovf 
fiavfi.i<Tai>TO% xai, KTiirai irapiy, d^vroj. 
The ojifHjgition of Aristeidt's to Thttiii- 
stoklea, Caliim. 27, is not spi-cislly 
Herodotean, or referred to the Persian 
question. 



' The great works of Xerxes, A>r» 2. 
Cp. D. Mart. 20. 2 tXra at, Ji Kieapfia, 
i} 'EXXdi ItppiTTt ftirynVra fUv rhir 
'EXXi^irorroc, Std 8^ r<ii» dpwp rXtur 

* The de S;/ria dea (iii. 341-63) is 
WTitten in Ionic, &nd iniitat«« Herodntas 
throughout ; but ita authuntidty ia hardly 
adroi.tsible, and it coiitning no material 
for thu present argunu'nt, except in so 
far as it ilhtatrates ihe popnlarity of the 
' prince of loidnn lii.storians.' 

'' Cp. H. F. Pelhani, 'Arrian as 
Legate of Cappadocia ' in £71^. Hitl. 
Rev., Oct 18J>6. Arrian beiaime Legate 
in 131 A.D. and was atiJl living in 
171 A.O. 



^ 17-lR AUTHORITIES OTHER THAN HERODOTUS 

took Alexander of Makedon aa hia hero, and Xenophon as his literary 
model. But still the AnafHisLs Akxandri is full of stylistic plagiarisms 
from Herodotus,' and everywhere betrays a first-hand acquaintance 
with ' the Father of History.' * All the more remarkable is the slight- 
ness of the material debt from the historian of Alexander to the 
historian of the Persian war, and extremely exiguous is the addition 
made by Arrian'a work to the actual history of the fifth century b,c. 
The Annlhisis of Arrian even more than the Jnalaisia of Xenophon 
is, indeed, valuable to the modern student of the work of Herodotus, 
from the light shed by it upon the geogiaphy of Asia, and the 
organization of the Persian empire in the fourth century. Alexander's 
^-ictoriouB career in Asia makes the defence of Hellaa, a century and 
a half earlier, all the more easily intoiligible. But, of direct reference, 
illustration, or supplement in the work of Arrian to the work of 
Herotlotus, there is, perhaps, less than might have been expected : 
the direct references hardly concern the story of the Persian war,* 
the additions fall beyond the express Herodotean limit,* and now and 
again an opportunity for comment or reference seems thrown away, 
an Herodotean opening, so to speak, ignored*'' — all suggesting a 
diminisliing interest in the person and work of the Halikarnassian. 
The same conclusion is more inconteatably demonstrable from the 



' Cp. H. R, Gnindmann, QiM in 
tioeutiont Arriani Uercxloto debttUur 
(Berlin, 1884). Ariiao's itylo is a 
hash of Herodotean, Thacydidean knd 
XenophontcAO phraseology, in which 
HeitxioteMiiaiua pre^Kioderate ; but as 
the eoMmble is Attic, it still uiak^s 
{pa£» OruDdmann) the ancieut verdict, 
tliat the ' Attic b«e ' va.% Arrian 'b chief 
nuuter, defensiblo. 

* Herodotus is cited by namu six times 
in the Anahasit, 2. 16. 3 (H<;nikle8 in 
ElUpt) ; 3. 80. 8 ('H. 6 Xo7oiroiiii, the 
Tanaia) ; S. 6. & (E^pt iwpof tou 
rora^isv) ; 5. 7. 2 (H. h 'AXucapvatraciyt, 
the bridgin>; of Hellespont) ; 7. 13. 1 
(Niaaisu plain) ; 7. 13. 6 (the Anuuonea). 
The noraiiial references by no means 
exhauat the actual use ; cp. further notes 
below. 

* The Second and Fourtli BVii. of 
Hdt, acooant for four of the six direct 
nfarenoas. Sea above. References to 
naata of the Persian wnr aro not 
■MMMTQy refcreucea to the work of Hdt., 
«.g. 8. n. <J ("If you may eny that the 
battle of Gaugamela took place at 
Arbela, then you may lav that the 
battle of Salamia took place at the 
Istbrnoa, or the battle of Arteraision at 
k\fpn% or Sudion ') ; 1. 9. 7 (the destnic- 
tion of Thebes by Alexander a /i^<> ^■'^ 



rou 0eio>} ... if r^i rt ir rf Mi;3u«ji 
TToWftV rpoSovlai rdD ' EX X TJi-w* K t\ . Also 
for their cruelty to Plotaia, xat tou 
Xwpiou Tijt ipTjiiuafut ir 6rif ol 'GXXijrfT 
fapaTaiifuvoi MijAoiT dwivtrcuTO riTf 
'EWdiSoi tAx Kirdvror) ; 7. 14. 6 (ttOmo of 
Alexander's doings were worthy rg 

dttai) Kai Tars riiait it XfyoutrLy tit t6v 
'EXXr^inroiTor naOt'tvai SMp^v, Ti/xotpoi!'- 
furw ifjBtv Tin 'EXXiJirroi'Ttti'). Cp. also 
3. 18. 12. 

* (1) The works of art carried off by 
Xerxes and rost'>red by Alexander, 3. 16. 
7 ; 7. 19. 2. (2) The passages on Kyroa 
the Great, viz. 3. 18. 10 <his treasury at 
Paaargadai) ; 6. 29. 4-U (his tomb); 
£. 4. (condition of Persians in his 
time); 6. 24. 3, cp. 4. 11. 9 (his disasters), 
are all of apeomi interest. (8) The 
destruction of the Babylonian temple* 
by Xerxes, after his return from Greece, 
7. 17. 2, cp. 3. 16. 4. 

' 4. 11. 9 (sytecch of Kallistbeni'S ou 
the rpoffKunTictt), though very Herodotean 
iu substance, contain* no reference to 
Hdt. 7. 135f. ; 5. 5. 2, Mykale is de- 
scribed, without reference to the battle 
iu 479 B.C. ; 1. 20-28, tlie siege of 
Halikamasaos contains no reference to 
Hdt., and so forth. 



IIS 



UERODOTUS 



APP. I 



writings of Appian.^ APPIAN too is an imperialist : the history of the 
making of the l^man Erapiie ia his subject. His Protrm sets forth ite 
chiims. Compared with the Empire of Rome other empires have been 
feeble and shortlived. In duration as in extent it surpasses all its 
predecessors. The 'empires' of Athena and of Sparta, brief and 
insignificant though they were, entitle those states to a passing notice, 
which ' the wars of Liberation ' would not have secured them. The 
greatest empire before the Roman was the Makedonian, but it passed 
like a flash of lightning.- Appian could not indeed describe Thermo- 
pylai, as the scene of the first great encounter between the Romans 
and Antioehos, without a refei-ence to the defence of the Pass by 
Leonidas ; but the Romans are his heroes, and the Hellenistic king is 
circumvented by them exactly as the Spartan king had been circum- 
vented of old by the Persians.' There is no reference in the extant 
work of Appian to Herodotus ; and the one notice of Themistoklcs 
goea back to Thucydides, niediat«ly or directly, and ia not concerne<J 
with the Persian war.* The case is widely different indeed with 
Appiau's contemporary, the Makedonian POLYAINOS.* He uses 
Herodotus freely as an authority, though only, be it observed, as one 
among many. The difference, such as it is, in favour of Herodotus 
may be duo |mrtly to the author's subject, and partly to his origin." 
Among his own sources Polyainos can hardly be said to show any 
preference for Herodotus, even as concerns the ' stratagems ' employed 
in the Persiiui war.' And the references to the Persian war are 
neither the most important nor the most numerous points at which 
Polyainos traverses the work of Herodotus, whether in a favoiu^ble 
or a dissentient mood.® On the whole, Polyainos by himself scarcely 



' Appian, of Alexandria, was an oUl 
mu uniW Antonioiia Piua. His work 
waa compoaed before ItiS A.t>., for he 
gives the Euphrates as the Roman 
n-ontier. He became a Proeuralor 
Aufftuli. Cp. Schwartz, ap. Panly- 
WissowB, 11, i. 210 ff. 

' Proivi 10, 3ii T^» fipaxvTTiTa tov 
Xpi'ou wpoaioiKiv drrpairg \a^irpj. 

' See XvpuLKii 17. In 18 there is a 
reference to -^ \ryofUi'r) i.Tpax6t, J Si) Kai 
AaitfStunovloit rois i/jL^l Atuyliav S^p£t;t 

* 'Etuj>v\. f 48. Rebilus, e.^caping oii 
a ship to Sicily in 43 B.C., otiw n Koi 
0(/uaT0K\^ tjjti'-fur iirolTjaev, threatened 
the captain with a counter-delation, if 
hetr^ed. 

° The eight Books of the ZTparyfyiKi. 
have each one a separate dedicntioii to 
the icpbrraToi ^aaiXeii, M. Antoninus and 
L. Verus, i.e. the work must liiive been 
corapascd between 161 and lti9 a.d, 

• Polyainos 1 ad inU. ifCi Si MaictSwc 



ir^p, ■wi.Tpuat fxoii' t6 Kpareir UipeChi xrX. 
addressing the two Bmperors, after 
the victory 'over the Persians and 
Partliian*. ' 

' 1. 27 (Gelon) and 28 (Theron) cou- 
cvrning tho battle of Himera are not 
Hcrodotenn. 32 (Leoniiias) and 33 
(Lootychidca) are from later sonrceR 
(E[ibnros«). But]. 30 (Theiuistoklea) 
is aliiiuHt [iLire Herodotus, no far as the 
Persian war is coucerned, except for the 
substitution of ' Arsakes ' for Sikinnos, 
in the second message. (The name 
' Arsakes ' ia suspicious in a Boinaa 
^vriter of tho Antoiiine age.) 7. 15 
(Xerxes) is four- fifths pure Herodotus, 
33 (Artabazos) is two-thirds Herodotus, 
45 {Persians at Myksle) is Herodotus. 
On the other hand 1. 31 (the enj^gement 
of AriatciJes and Themistokles) is not 
Herodotean. 

* Bk. 7 deals with 'Stratagems* of 
' Barbarians.' Some of these (e.g. Deiokes, 
Hari>agos, Oibares, Zopyros) are Hero- 



I 18 



ADTUORITIES OTHER THAN HERODOTUS 



113 



reflects the popularity of the Herodoteaii work in his time, and some- 
what heavily discounts uny vivid interest in the battles of the Persian 
war. Had he been more of iv strategist and tactician in reality, had 
he conceived of the art of war less aa a bundle of conjurer's tricks, 
and more as a matter of far-sighted plans and large dis}>ositions, he 
might have been attracted to the consideration of the tactics at Salamis 
and Plataia, which betrayed the mind and hand of a real master of 
the art of war. Polyainos is in sooth but a sort of militaiy anecdote- 
monger. Aklian, the only genuine lioman of ihom all,' though he 
displays his erudition by writing hia Miscellanies in Greek, has no such 
]>reference for military matters. The Poikile Eistaria is a treasury of 
good stories, a largo number of which concern persons and events 
familiar to the student of Herodotus.'- But, though he names 
Thucydides, Theopompos, Epitimedes, Dinon, Pausanias, and jrosaibly 
other authors, Aelian never mentions Herodotus by name iis his 
authority for any anecdote, and even where an ariealote agrees with 
or reproduces an Herodotean incident, Aelian seems to hjive found it 
in some other source.' More frequently the items in Aelian show 
little or no sign of Herodotean colouring, and are plaiidy drawn from 
indepondent sources.'' Sometimes Aelian might seem deliberately to 
invert an Herodotean situation, or from sheer carelessness to put the 
cart before the horse.'' To the history of the Persian war Aelian 



doteau ; otbere (e.^. Alyattes, Psam- 
metichoa, Amuis, ilidas, KroisoH, 
KAmbyses] are quite dliren>i)t from Udt. 
Others again («.g. Kyros, Dareius) slxiw 
« 'contamination' of Hilt, atid utiier 
aonrees (not necewarily made l>r Poly- 
ainos himself). A similar verdict fits 
Bk. 8 (StratagecDs by women). Even 8. 
M (Arteniiiia) is not pnre Hdt. The 
balk of caaea in Polyainos come into no 
cOBpariaon with Udt, at all. 

» Cu. For. ffist. 2. 38, 12. 25, 14. 46. 
Tiro Lives exist, one by Flavius Philo- 
atratua {Fit Soph, 2. 31) and one in 
Snida^ Aelian, of Praenesle, belong to 
the first quarter of the third century of 
our era, cp. note ad Le., I'biloBtratus, 
ad. Oetenachldger, 1709. 

' e.fi. Anacharaiii, Solon, P«isistrato«, 
i'ytliaffiiraii, Polykratcs, Kleomenes, 
LfKinidaM, Oclon, Skythes, Aristeides, 
Th<nii«t'ikl(iB, Kyros, Dareios, Xerxes, 
«tc. etc. 

• Cp. ^offiti i. i\ ; t6 i' ipofia. \tyirij 
fXXof [>, 11, of items to be fuund in 
lierodotas. -2. 14, 9. 39, Aelian cluir- 
acterixM the conduct of Xerxca in 
«or«kitii|>iug thi; pill ue- tree a» abnurd 
(Cf. Hdt, 7. 31}. A«lian 5. 11 goea 
Uck Ut Hdt. 8. 11(1. Tbv atory of 

VOL. n 



Xerxes and the water of the Choosjicti 
(12. -10) is not in Hdt., but might Lave 
iU root in Hdt 1. 188. The numbers 
of Xerxes' army are given aa 700,000, 
Aelian 13. 3. 

■• 8, 25 (Leonidaa) shows no sign of 
Hdt. 6. 10 recording the numbers of 
the Athenian fleet isays nothing of tlie 
Persian war. 6. 1 (the treatment of 
Chalkifl by Athena) ia hardly a mere 
misreading of Hdt. The stories of 
Celun, the notices of Pemian custonu, 
and other points, show (tost-HerodoteaD 
sources. 

•'• Aelian 2. 16, <. 17 tells of Pythagoras 
the story which Hdt. 4, 15 tells of 
Aristcaa. Aelian 3. 8 says that the 
Athenians made the poet Phryuiuhos a 
general to reward him for the martial 
music of one of his tragedies, but cp. 13. 
17 and Hdt. 6. 21. Aclian's notice of 
the var between Syluiris and Eroton, 
3. 48, differs widely from that of 
Hdt. 5. 44. His remark, 4. 22, tliat 
the Athenians ' notwithstanding their 
luxury' won the battle of Marathon ia 
very uti- Herodotean. His aex-ount of 
the origin of the Persian war, 12. 53, aa 
due to a rjuarrcl between Maiandrios the 
Saminn and tlii> Athenians would he im- 
]>ossible toastudeutof Hdt. 's work. 5.19, 

I 



114 



HERODOTUS 



APT. I 



makes no direct or real contribution, unless exact dates for some 
engagements are to be reckoned to bis credit ; ' but many references 
to tbe war occur in his p;*ges.- The legend of Themistokles he 
enriches with some piquant incidents and some by no means unworthy 
ajHtphthegins.* Aelian makes two or three valuable, though un- 
intended, contributions to a commentary on Herodotus, in preserving 
the moral myth of Stlenos,* in his borrowed description of Tempe and 
the via sacra thence to Delphi/ in his reconl of the end of Xerxes,^ 
and further, in a number of parLictdars concerning Persian kings and 
cuatoms,' and so forth. But, though it is hardly fair to dismiss his 
work as a miscellany of edifying stories, and though he vnia certainly 
no philosopher, it is safe to say that a genuine historical interest is no- 
where apfwrent in his History. He writes for a pviblic of innocent 
triflers who have grown weary of large views, and are quite content 
with novelettes, His work might stand for the careless herald of 
that aversion from serious political and military history which buitt 
itself an immortal tomb in the DeipnoAophwts of the Alexandrian 
polymath not so long after.* Athknaios may here be taken as 
exhibiting the rediictio ad ahsurd-um of the tradition of the Persian 
wars. The Greek of Egypt is, indeed, well acquainted with Hero- 
dotus," and quotes him expressly Book by Book, like Plutarch in the 



Atnyniiis (uii;) the brother of AiachyloH 
lost hia hand at th« battle of Salamis ! 

' 2. 25, the Persians defeated (at 
Marathon ? at Artemkion \ Aelian aeemx 
to oonfu.se the two) on ThariieJion 6, and 
at Plataia arrd Mykale on Thargelion 8. 
The dates aru quite inadniisaible (except, 
p«rhapfi, for Artemiaion). The relerenoo 
to Al«xander may acconut for the error. 

» 2. 25 (dates just given) ; 2. 28 (cock- 
fighting introduced at Athens in con- 
nexion with the war) ; 3. 25 (Leonidas 
»nd the 300) ; 3. 47 (SalamLs, Plataia) ; 
4. 22 (Marathon): 5. 19 (Salamis 1) ; 12. 10 
(valour of thu Aiginetaiis) ; 12. 43 (6c/u- 
<»TO(c\% 5^ 6 Toi>i ^ap^ipovs Kararav- 
)tax^<''cn ical fL^vor cii'irlt rdt tUp SfCir 
in Toir xPV^f^°'f ^wils) ; 12. 53 (origin 
of the war. .Sec above). 

• 2. 12 (bon mot on Envy) ; 2. 28 (his 
remark on fighting cocks); 3. 21 (bis pride 
as a boy, in the days of Peisistratoti t) ; 
8, 47 (his public services brought him no 
benefit, but cp. 10. 17) ; 9. 6 (hia pro- 
test at Olympia against Hicron) ; 9. 18 
(his compiirisou with an oak-tree) r ifrW. 
(the two paths, to Hades and to tbo 
Bema) ; 12. 43 (bis mother's name, 
Abrotonos ; and the general description 
quoted aboTe) ; 13. 40 (the Persian neck- 
let, cp. Phitarch. 7Vw. 18); iltul. (a bon 
mot; Imtcp. Hdt. 2. 172); ibid. (Themi- 
fitokles and Burybiades, op. Plutarch, 



TTuvj. 1 1) ; 13. H (Aristeides and Themi- 
stokles had the same tutor). Attention 
mijjht here be directed to a development, 
or a symbol of the Icgiuiti of TlicmistokJca, 
preserved by Puilostkatus Imoifintt 
2. 31. Teubner, 1893. pp. 123 ff. (a 
picture representing Themistokles at 
Babylon in the ]>re8enpe of Xerxes). 

* 3. 18, cy. Hdt. 8. 138. 

» 3. 1, cp. Hdt. 8. 31, 35. 

* 13. 3 iBpohat yip i^iofiiiitorra fLvpi- 
dSas iwl Tovt'EWrfiiat kokuj dir^Wafw 
eJro ^■irav(\&wr atcrxi<rro irffpwria* iiri- 
Sartv, airoiTipayels yvKTUp i» 7-g tinr^ inrd 
ToO vloC. 

' 1. 22, 31-34; 2. 17 ; 3. 39; 5. 1 ; 
12. 48 (Indians and Persians had transla- 
tions of Homer) ; 12. 62; 14. 12. 

' The date of Atheuaios, of Naukratis, 
is diitcTn)inc-d by the fact that the Ulpiau 
of the Dialogue iii a shadow of tbe great 
Jurisconsult, who died in 228 a.d. The 
composition therefore falla at earliest 
into the second quarter of the third 
century of our era. 

* Athen. 14. 620 a cites Jason for the 
interesting fact that Hegeaiaa the comic 
actor had presented the works of Hdt. in 
the Grand Theatre at Alexandria {ir ru 
lityd\<f> Stirpifi iiTOKplraaOai 'Hyiiciar t6k 
icvifui)Sii> tA. HpoSAroi'). But that would 
not hold gnod for the time of Atheuaios 
hi ni.se If. On Jason op. Suseoiihl, Otich. 



d4 MalignUaJe ; ' but the only passages in the story of the Persian 
wars which have a vital interest for the sophistic Banqueters are 
the pawagea to do with eating and drinking, and other luxuries : * 
the chief addition which Athenaioa makes to the ever-growing legend 
of Themistoklcs is of sorry and demi-mondaine insignificance,^ while 
the great and religious oaths by the herobs of the Pci'siaii wars, which 
still reverberate on tlie lips of Demosthenes with thrilling effect, 
become a jest and a derision by profane and frivolous abuse in the 
pages of this learned and representative savant of the post-Hellenistic 
decadence.* 

§ 19. We are arrived in this review within measurable distance 
of the point from which wc set out. The reference, in the pages of 
Polyainos,* to a \*ictory over the 'Persians' and Parthians, won by 
Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus, is othnologically inaccurate, and 
may be ascribed to the Makedonian's pride or prejudice ; but Persia 
reappeared on the stage of the world's history before the epoch 
reached in the previous paragraph, and for upwards of four hundred 
years maintained an equal struggle with Rome and with Constantinople, 
until not Greek Emperors but Mohammedan Caliphs made an end of 
the Fire-worshippers." Doubtless the Persian Kenascenee, under the 
SaManian dynasty, handed on to the times of the Arabian conquerors 
those romantic traditions of old Persia, which arc embalmed for ever 
in JTu? Book of tlie Kin^s. The worthlessness of those traditions for 
our purpose has already been made manifest: they convoy no genuine 
reminiscence of the wars of the Achaimenids with Hellas in the fifth 
century B.oJ Nor did the Oriental wars, in which the later Roman 



li. Or. Lit. in Alexandr. Zeit, U. 246 
(1892). 

I Only two of the 15 Bks. of the 
Dnptumphittf contain no reference to 
HdU, riz. Bks. 5 and 7. Of the nine 
Rka. of Hdt. all are cited, Rka. 5, 8, 9 
Once each, bka. 3 and 4 twice each, Bks. 
( and 7 thrice. Bk. 2 rIz times at least, 
Bk. 1 eleren or twelve times. These 
ttatiiitjrg are based on Sohweighaenser. 

» A then. 4.138 = Hdt. 9. 82 ( PausanioB" 
object lemon); 146 a = Hdt 7.118 (Xeriea' 
eoramiauriat, veHtalim) ; 146D=Hdt. 9. 
110 (til* tTi«TO, verbatim); 148 P= Hdt. 
9. 19 (Banquet of Attaginos— ridiculed) ; 
U. M3 A (the Thessalians from love of 
luznrjr invited the Persians into Greece). 
Add «. 267 E= Hdt 8. 105 (story of 
I'kaionioe): 0. 401 d:^ Hdt 7. 163 
(Syagroa); 11. 486E = Hdt 7. 76 (irpo- 
04Xevt 969 AvKotpyiat, op. App. Crit. 
•'te.), 

* 12. 588 D, 18. 576 c, a shocking 
■Mwial, rendered precise by Idomeneus, 
who«Ten knew the names of the HfUiirai 
jvkad to tlie l^ailriga. Athenaios adds 



some better items to the record of Tiiemi- 
stokles : .^33, how, as Magistrate, in 
Magnesia he celebrated the Panathcuaia 
and the Choes (auctorc I'oosi) ; how ho 
built a banqueting- hnll and said he 
Mould lie content could he but fill it 
with friends. 

* 9. 380 itA. Toin tv "UlapaOCitu Kirivvti- 
(Toyrat xai rpoairt toi'i i» SoXn/im navna- 
Xi^ffavToi kt\. Ulpian caps it with /id 
TO)>f iv 'Aprtfuaiifi Kifivrtvaarrai. The 
problem is concerned with cooking a pig 
and capping a quotation. Cp. f § p. 87 
n. 8 tKjrra. 

rlmty rrX. StnUcijiai 1, Pro^tn, The 
oiKcial title of the war was btllum, 
Arvuniacum ft Parthieum. The triumph 
of the Emperors took place in 166 A.D. 
Cp. H. Schuler, 0«»th. a. r6m. Kaineneit, 
L«S8-«i2. 

• The overthrow of Parthia by 
Ardeachr, the aon of Sasaan, is dated 
226 A.I)., that of Fenia by the Arab* 
652 A. D. 

' See g 1 aboveu 



116 



HERODOTUS 



Empire was involved, do ao much to recall the glories of Athens and 
of Sparta in the Persian wars of yore as might have been expected. 
Caracallus, when he went eastward to the Parthian frontier, from 
which he was never to return alive, sent to Sparta for a bodyguard, 
which he wijs pleased to call " the corps of Pitane " ' — taking sides 
thereby with Herodotus against Thucydidos in an old controversy ; 
but his inevitable exemplar was not Leonidas or Themistokles, but 
Alexander of Makedon.- It devolved on the feeble Syrian, Alexianos 
or Alexander, misnamed Severua, to inaugurjite hostilities with 
Ardeschr, the founder of the new trans-Euphiatean monarchy. There- 
after the Persian power in the East grew greater constiintly at the ex- 
pense of the Roman. The Aujpisian History notices the varj-ing fortunes 
of the quarrel, without a reference to Hellenic precedent ; oven the 
career of Zenobia, Regent of Palmyra, whether a£ champion of Rome 
or as re!)el, is narrated without allusion to her prototypes, Artemisia 
and Ada. The Empire of Diocletian broke for ever with Republicjin 
ideals, whether in Hellenic or in Italian dress ; and the establishment 
of Christianity, as the state religion, by Constantino did little or 
nothing to resuscitate traditions of a liberty tainted with paganism. 
The romantic but reactionary Julian, who encountered his death in 
the Persian war, found little inspiration in the work uf Herodotus ; " 
and his restoration of Paganism was a religious and not a republican 
madness. The division of the Empire could only have the effect of 
still further dissociating western literature from the ancient history 
and liberal precedents of Republican Hellas ; while the first Christian 
emperors of Byzatitiou were for the most part too busy suppressing 
paganism, or pursuing heresy, to encourage a study of the ancient 
history of their Hellenic subjects.* Christianity, indeed, whether in 
the Efist or in the West, could at first have but little time or concern 
for the wars of old, or the works in which they were narrated. Its 
attention was directed against the gods and the philosophers, but 
could afford to leave the histoiians for the most part severely alone.'' 



• Herodian 4. 8. 3. Cp. p. 64 note 1 
supra. " ibid. 1, 2, 6, 9; 9, 3, 4. 

' For the imperial nutlior's reflf. to 
Hdt. cp. !>. 64 uote 1 imprn. 

' Justinian is reported to have sup- 
pressed the Schools at Atheni) in 629 a.d. ; 
cp. Gibbon, c xL Agathios relates « 
'curious story' of the flight of Siuipliciiia, 
the philosopher, with six companiona 
to tho I'ersmu court, and their rc'tiira. 
Choaroea subsequently secured them ex- 
emption ' froDi the iienal laws which 
Justinian enacted against his Fugan 
subjects." But the evidence for the 
original edict, closing the Schools, has 
been somewhat blown upon ; cji. Kmtn- 
baclier, Byzant. LiifnUuryctch.'' (1897) 
p. 6. 



• 'Tbo Father of History ' is occasion- 
ally cited by the AntcNlcene Fathers, 
bat seldom in connexion with the Porsiaii 
war. Tatian cites Herodotus as an 
authority on Homer, possibly a reference 
to the psendepigraphic Life, or else to 
Bk. 2, Atuenagobab uses the second 
Book as evidence for the religion of 
EK>'pt Th EOt'Ji ilus, of Antioch, quotes 
Hdt., indeed, but tiirows scorn ou ihe 
history of the Greeks and Persians. 
Ci.EMKsr of Alexandria cites the inter- 
view ofSoloDatid Kroiaos, and mentions 
the Delphic Response to the Athenians 
(sic: Hdt. 7. 178) to pray to the winds. 
Ho makes also a curious contribution to 
the legends of tho war in the statement 
that tho sacrifices of Epinienides of Krete 



f 1» 



AUTHORITIES OTHER THAX HERODOTUS 



117 



, fal. 



Moreover, it waa itself more and more inTolved in a struggle for 

exiatence with new hordes of barbarians, destined sooner or later to 

conquer the classic and Christian worlds in West and East alike. The 

fall of the Western Empire overwhelmed the elements of Hellenic and 

ellenistic culture in an oblivion of centuries, which left our moclern 

tiations in the making strangers to the language, literature, and art of 

Greece, except in so far as materials and ideas may have filtered through 

into the Latin or (.rorraan worlds from the transformed but still living 

workshops and libraries of the Byzantine empire. For, in the Eastern 

Mediterranean, neither Church nor State could ever quite discredit 

or diaown their Hellenic ongins and elements. The Greek language 

remained a living and official medium : a knowledge of old Greek 

literature never faded out of Constantinople, till the Turkish conquest 

drove learning once again westw.'ird, to help in the making of our own 

Renascence. For a thou.'iand years the Byzantine historians imitated 

I the old models, Herodotus perhaps ns much as any ; ■ and Byzantine 

™tg''*™niarians and scholiasts and lexicograpiiers wrote articles on the 

^Hltinguage, literature, and institutions of old Hellas, and com]>ilod 

^Bbiographies of the old authors, surety not from their own inner con- 

^Vaciousness alone.' But the actual story of the Pereian war engage*! 

[ their attention very seldom ; and I suppose they make little or no 

^K addition to our resources in this respect, save in so far as they have 

^^Kescued from oblivion here and there an otherwise lost author of the 

^^ earlier centuries? Actual acquaintance with Herodotus is continuous; 

hut it is his style and language that are mainly in evidence. The name 

of Themistokles persistently crops up in unexpected places ; * but a 






postponed thr war for ten years. Bat 
na has no interest in the war as such. 
Ooa department of ancient history the 
Fathers cultivate with lost, to wit, 
Chronology, in the interest of the Old 
"""eatament record». The Byzantine 

hranographefH are ba,sed on their 
Chriatlan predecessors, notably Juliu» 
Africantu and Euaehioa ; see infra. 

' Prokopios, the hiaturian of Jns- 
tinian. citee Herodotus by name (e.|a;. 
dt Ml. Qolh. p. 578 d), and copies hu 
style, and that of Thacydiiies (op. dt 
b/llo Perrico, ad init). Ho com|Mire!i 
the bridging of the San^rioR dv Justinian 
with the bridging of the Hellespont by 
Xerxes : d« ncdi/. .'). 3. See further, 
infra. AcATHIAS, who continued the 
work of Prolcopios, so to speak, citee 

erodotus. Photio» (c. 850 a.d.) had 
the 'Nine Muses' of Hdt, and 

_ .rdad the work as the 'Canon of the 
Ionian dialect' {Bibliolhtea 60). And, 
to omit othi^rs intervening, Laomkos 
CHALKOKoyoTLAS, the oidy Athenian 
known to Byzantine hiatoriography, in 



TSTitinff bis history of the Tnrks (12B8- 
1-163) deliberately took Herodotus and 
Thncydides as hia models, like I'rokopios 
nine c«nturjea before. 

' Even in later Epitorm the work of 
Stephanos is a monument of topogra- 
phical and literary lore, going back to the 
sixth century. Tzetzes in tha twelfth 
century had read Hdt. Gbroorio.x 
Pardob, of Korinth, qaotcs Hdt. 'at 
first hand.' The Lanka Segueriana 
include a LexUcon to Hdt. (cp. Stein, ed. 
mai. ii. 441 ff.). Above all Suidas (about 
a century after Photios) contributes his 
biographiral articles 'HpAJorot, IXari'oau, 
etc. Kruinbacher holds that one of the 
chief Sonrccs of Suidas was a lost work, 
of an encyclopaedic kind, by Constautine 
Por|ihyTogenitua. 

' As Photios, for example, the Pertica 
of Ktesias. 

* e.g. AHMIAXUS MABCELLIiriTB (4th 
cent.) has the anecdote of Themistokles 
and the Persian collar of gold, 30. 8. 8. 
Also 8 notice of his connexion with 



118 



HERODOTUS 



APP. I 



new or finer ajiprecifttiori of him is hardly to be looked for. The 
Achaimenid kings are remembered, even in out-of-the-way quarters ; ' 
their connexion with the Old Testament history secured them attention 
from monks and theologians ; but too much had happened since the 
days of Salamia and Plataia to make those names any longer •wonderful 
in the eyes of historians and pulilicists. The conquest of Asia by 
Alexander was iu itself enough to eclipse the previous defence of 
Europe by Athens ; and literature in Constantinople was largely Uiken 
up with the interests of the court and empire from day to day.* 
Yet it may be that a closer study of By7Antine literature from first 
to last would reveal a larger interest in the real elements enshrined 
in the Greek traditions of 'the wars of Liberation,' and even some- 
thing more of a direct contribution to the story, than hiis here been 
claimed for it.^ At present both time and space fail for a proper 
exposition of this long hist portion of our subject; I drop unwillingly 
t!ie thread which has guided us in this undertaking, not without a 
half-breathed vow to resume it elsewhere, and to complete, under 
the shadow of Saint Sophia's, the whole history of the History of 
the Persian war, begun, so to speak, at the kenoUiph of Herodotus. 
Of a truth, ever since the revival of learning in the West, preoccupation 
with the better and more brilliant literature of Old Hellas has, perhaps, 
all too much diverted attention from the later stages of that essenti- 
ally continuous and distinct consciousness and activity, which made 



Lampaakos, 22. S. 4. (Ammianua cttea 
Hdt by Dime, 22. 16. 28 (tho Pyramiiis) ; 
mentions the navieatioa of Athos Bod 
the DiibTch over Helleapoat, 22. 8. 2, 4 ; 
ead givM a loose acoonnt of the Persian 
war, 23. 6. 8.) Prokopioa compares 
Justinian ami ThemiiitoIueB as makers 
of cities, much to the disadvantage of 
the Atheoian : He atdif. 1, 1. The 
Chrwiioyn, Patehaie (7th cent.} specifies 
the flight of ThetuLitokltf!) to Persia, 
and his ileath, by drinking tiuU'a bLooJ. 
(Al80 the oatraklEtn of Ariateidea and 
t\\ii fiimai of Herodotus.) The Cknmo- 
(tiujj/iia of George Syncollna {9th cent.) 
uuntaina at least two striking eontribu- 
tions to an Herodotcau commentary. (1) 
p. 248 "H^ioTOt IcTopiK^i frifi-^Sti nap^ 
T^r 'ASrivalidi' ^ovXijt i-roMtxyroif^ oi^rott 
rii pLp\otfr. (2) Kifiuix i-rl Ki'pu/jJiom 

Kdl Jti)8ixdt ir&Stiios (waiHraTO, Sid 
^i^iXeit (irxa^at triHrrit Wpcais Hal 
'ABi]ralovf leal Toffw "EXXTjin* dx' airov. 
(Cp. page 90 note 13 mpra.) Tlie re- 
markable account of the origin of the 
Persian war has been supposed to rest 
on a variant of Hdt. 7. 147 — a doubtful 
hypotbesia (p. 246 c gives a noticeable 



account of the battle of Marathon). The 
chronological statements ore taken fnjm 
EuHebios, or perhaps from Scxtus Julius 
African us. 

' Notably by the chronographers, in- 
cluding Malai.as, with whom (ed. 
lionn, p. 167} Hdt. ia 6 ltrroptoypi<f>iK. 

- 'Si moniimeatuin quacris,' inspice 
CoNSTANTisi Poiti'iiYKOijENiTi rf« eoere- 
mi/niis aiilat Bi/tantinae, 

' Ch.ilkokondylas d* rebus Tureiei» 
p. 2 » shows how much the wars of 
Alexander ocIi]>sed the Persian invasion 
of Europe. P. 81 does more justice to 
the great invasion : tffre 87) koI Zipiv 
rdy Aaptiou, ^acriX^a lU^uri', irX4^ ifw6aa 
i-yi/ievos Kal ft TTif U.i'puinji' jta/jdi -rapii 
Ppaxti fwiid awo$afovfi(yot. il fit) MapSinot 
vvoarit Ifpuvey aiVij) riv SXtBpo" iraPtSrrai 
[i'rarioi'Ti ',] is ^oOim. This view of the 
operations of Mardonios, as designed to 
cover the king's retreat, ia put into 
the month of Paiazetc-s, and must be 
accredited not to the Ottoman king but 
to the Christian author. P. 78 ascribes 
to Paiazetes the idea that Alexander's 
invasion of Asia was a retuni for t^ it 
rein 'EWrfvat Sipitia i'\i<r(Ui. 



I 



I 



-§§ 19-20 AUTHORITIES OTHER THAN HERODOTUS 119 

of Homer and Eustathios, of Herodotus and Chalkokondylas, but 
separate links in an unbroken chain of letters. 

§ 20. In conclusion, then, the chief observations to be gathered 
from this review of the Sources, external to Herodotus, for the histoiy 
of the Persian Invasion of Greece in 480 B.C., may l>e briefly formuLatecl. 
There are, perhaps, six results especially prominent. (1) Herodotus 
is neither the only nor the earliest primary authority for the history 
of the war : the poets, his predecessors, must l)e allowed to l>ear wit- 
ness. (2) There existed a strong ivnd rival trudition, or body of 
tradition, which attained to defitiito consistency in the fourth century 
B.C., mainly under the shaping hand of Ephoros. Even if largely a 
rationalization of the Herodotean traditions, this vereion of the story 
should not be dismissed as worthless. (3) A host of minor traditions, 
local variants, anecdotes, infereiKcs, conjectures, sports, fancies, in- 
ventions, have come down to us in the later Sources. Such materials 
.are not merely contributions to the psychology of tradition, they are 
occasionally of material value for the local colour they convey, the 
criticism they presuppose, the custom or the creed which they preserve 
from oblivion. (4) Nevertheless, from contact with all three rival 
elements of evidential value, such as they are, Herodotus emerges as, 
upon the whole, the most considerable anil indeed the supreme witness 
to the course, character, and circumstances of the war, (5) But, it is 
hardly from him, or his narrative, much less from the silence of 
Aischylos, that the greatness of Themistoklea in the traditions of the 
war can have been derived. Yet that impression is inevitably there. 
Among the chief actors in the great drama of the national deliverance, 
no other personality compares with that of the Athenian Stmiegos, or 
General, for the impression made upon the Hellenic consciousness. 
The constant and instinctive hom^^ge paid to the son of Neokles and 
Abrotonoa by a tradition not free from malignity is apparent from 
first to last Themistokles was inferentially a really gi-Ciit man, a 
veritable genius ; and ho is the only man of supreme ability revealed 
in the story of the war. But his greatness was neither apjireciated 
nor understood at the time, nor fully explained at any time in the 
extant Sources. They leave it, on the whole, as a problem for our 
solution. (6) This failure, or shortcoming, in the traditions of the 
war is not more obvious than the complete, or almost complete, failure 
to present an adequate or intelligible account of the actual operations 
of the war, in their strategic and Uictieal aspects, — These critical 
observations leave a critical task to bo accomplished, to which modem 
critics have already addressed themselves. Criticism, Jis now under- 
stood, is not merely negative, or destructive ; nor is it content merely 
to analyse tradition into its elements, and to determine the pro- 
venience of those elements severally. The rts gesta is the antecedent 
of tradition ; the dramatis persona is essential to the fable. Historical 
criticism aims at recovering the facts of the case, and the characters of 



120 



HERODOTUS 



APP. I 



the principal agents. The process whereby these results are to be 
attained is undoubtedly ratioTialistic. Tradition is to be tested by its 
inner character and consistency, and by its relation to the pernaanent 
and verifiable conditions of the story, conditions, that is, of time, of 
place, of physical and of psychical congruity. If a tradition is exiguous, 
incoherent, isolated^ no positive results may be attainable. Even in 
the presence of tolerably copious and continuous literary sources many 
events will be obscure, many actions doubtful, many characters 
ambiguous. But the cardinal points, the principal aspects of the 
world, or of the age of the world under observation, are ascertainable 
by the methods above indiaited. The Peraian war of 480 and 479 B.C. 
is not in one and the same Cfttegory with the Trojfin war, with the return 
of the Herakleids, or even with the expeditions of Kyros against the 
Masaagetai, of Dareios against the Skyths. It is a well-attested 
series of historical events, of undoubtedly ecumenical import. To the 
elucidation of its problems, the reconstruction of its objective story, 
the appreciation of its leading poraonalities, in the light of the 
Herodotean and all other genuine traditions, tested and reinforced by 
alt the critical methofls at our disposal, the remainder of this volume 
is dedicate. Many laboiu-ers have already worked with good result 
in this vineyard ; but there still seems room for one and another more 
or ever the vintage be fully gathered and gleaned. 




I 



Threefold rabjret of the Erst part of the Seventh Rook {cc, 1-130). § 2. Causality 
of the war (cc. 1-19): (a) Real cauMta. (A) Problem of delay, (c) Incon- 
sequent, Gutitious, aud Listoricnl elements in tho 6tory. § 3. The king's route, 
and the advance from Suaa to Therme (seven atagea). § 4. Engineering feat« 
■nd amiy-Bervice (Roads, Bridges, Canal, Coramis-sariat). § 6. The kv^ en 
mame (Analysis, Navy, Army, Sources), § 6. Objective aud plan of the 
invasion. 



§ 1. The first portion of the Seventh Book (cc. 1-137) contains, in 
Herodotean form, an account of the preparations n park ffrsnrum for 
the reinvasion of Greece, as undertaken and conducted by the king, 
from the disaster at Marathon down to the arrival of Xerxes with his 
forces at Therme, or in Pieria (c. 131), within sight of Olympos, and 
on the very frontier of HelLis. Elsewhere Herodotus supplements 
to some extent the narrative, the descriptions, in this passage by 
additional matter ; ' the passage itself, too, shows signs of ha\'ing 
received additions and insertions in places at the author's own hand.- 
In any case, the section in question is of somewhat composite 
Btmcture,^ and must have been derived from various sources.* Yet 
it presents upon the whole a sustained and continuous argument, 
treating coherently three main topics, closely related to each other : — 
I. The causality of the war, or the reasons for the expedition of 
Xerxes, for the reinvasion of European Hellas. II. The actual 



' e.g. (1) Message to Sparta from Dom- 
siatos in Susa, 7. 239, if authentic ; (2) 
Reception of the Greek spies in Sardea, 
7. 146 ; (3) Revenge of Beniiotimos, 8. 
1<MJ ; (4) Army left in Ionia under 
Tigranea, 9. 96 ; (5) Persian courier ser- 
rir«, 8. 98; (6) Xerxes in ElaiAs, 9. 
118; (7) Xerxes in Thrace, 8. 115-16; 
(8> Total numbere of the king's forces 
u Therme, 7. 1S4-7. 

' e.g. (1) fiarta, if not the whole, of 
the anny and nary lints, cc. 61-99 ; 



(2) items, if not more, in the Thrakian 
seation, such as ethnography, c 111 ; 
geograuhy, c. 113; the kmg'i road, c. 
il5 ; the Lion-area, c, 1'26 ; (8) the visit 
to Thessaly, cc. 128-80 ; (4) u>t <toi rp6- 
T(/>6v fiM itSii\iirrai, c. 108 ; cp. further 
Ckimmentary ad U. and Introduction, 
§ 0, and Appendix III, § 1 infra, 

' Cp. Introdtictiou, § 3. 

* Cp. Introduction, % 10, and p. 181 
infra. 



122 



HERODOTUS 



APP. II 



preparations made for the expedition, including the building of 
bridges, the cutting of a omai, tlie erection and storing of magazines 
or depots, and the grand mobilization of the forces by latid and sea. 
III. The king's march from Susa, and the whole advance of the 
Persian forces through Asia and Europe, down to the point where 
the first active resiatiince on the part of the Greekii was to be 
encountered, or at le<ist expected, on the frontier of ThessaJy. These 
three great topics are treated with equal and complete assurance by 
Herodotus, but his methods are not equally sound, nor bis results 
equally convincing, in regard to all three. We are, however, through- 
out tu the presence of historical facts and of actual processes, nor is 
it difficult anywhere to discriminate between the more and the less 
probable elements in the record, and to attaiii, ou many important 
points, a relative certainty, to restore at least the probable skeleton 
of the actual course of events. 

§ 2. I. r/w Cuumliltf of the JFar (cc. 1-19). — (a) Tiie real aiuses of the 
Persian war are not far to seek. Leaving out of account the eternal 
but somewhat threadbare opposition between East and West,^ and 
making little of the natural expansion of an imperial and conquering 
state, until some definite or natural limit is reached,^ we c-an yet see 
enough in the immediate antecedents and circumstances of the Persian 
empire at the given date to render an invasion of European Greece 
the chief order of the day. (i.) The secular and sulistantial unity of 
the two sides of the Aignian made an effort to unite them under one 
government inevitable to any state of imperial capacity, on either side. 
Moreover, the reaction of the free Republics of European Hellas upon 
the Greeks in Asia, subjects of the Persian king, could not but be a 
constant source of danger and disturbance to the Persian power, and 
called for active intervention on its part. ISparta, if the story be true, 
had already warned Kyros off the Asiatic Greeks,' and Athens had 
certainly supported them in their recent revolt against the king * ; the 
pornianeut and undisturbed possossion of the Asiatic side demanded 
a predominance u]>on the European main, (ii.) Nor should it l^e 
forgotten in this connexion thiit Persia was a]re<«ly something of a 
European power, and even, after a fashion, the paramount European 
power. Thrace and Makedou acknowledged the Persian suzerainty ; 
lliasoB and other islands, reckoned to Europe, had been already 
incsorporated in the empire. The navy-list of Xerxes is proof of the 
range and extent Ut which Persia might be alrea«.Iy considered an 
Hellenic or phil-Hcllenic monarchy. The Persian frontier already 
technically marched with Thessaly. Xerxes at Themie was still 



' Not without some justiScation in 

Hdt. Cp. 7. 11 Tp6K(tTai iyuif, Ii»o j> 
T(W< -wivTa vir6 "EXXrjff* fj ixeira wiyra 
I'iri n/p<r^irt yfvTp'ai- tA yip fUuov ovSif 
rijt txBfiip itrl (Xerxes loq. ). 

^ 7. 8 r6/ioi> rkvSt . . oviai^i. KU ippttil- 



aatur : ittid, yrir ri)t' Wtpalia 6.ToSi(oitep 
Tip Alii aldipi 6fioufMoii<nu>. 

3 Cp. Hdt. 1. 152. The message 
' Hau<l8 otf' is nowhere again adduced 
iLS a casui belli. 

* il it 2.dpSii ia^oXii 7. 1. 



§§1-2 



THE PERSIAN PREPARATIONS 



123 



within the confines of his own dependencies ; the true invasion begins 
not at the blellespont, but at Tempe, nay, ultimately at Theriuopylai. 
It is a long way indeed from Susa to Sparta,' but no very far cry 
from Poteidaia to Athens I (iii.) Again, more precisely, the previous 
expedition determined the sequel, and the check at Marathon could 
not be allowed to jkiss unrevenged. Not merely pride but policy 
might seem to dictate an effort to punish or to reduce the con- 
tumacious Athenians. Marathon unavenged must have reacted 
unfavourably upon the western provinces of the Peraian empire, 
MAkedoo, Ionia, £gy]it ; who could tell how soon the Athenians 
might be encouraged, by impunity, to a repeated aggression 1 (iv.) 
The accession of a new king wsis but a reason the more for a warlike 
undertaking. The grandson of Kyros could ill aftbnl to altandon the 
tradition of conquest without an effort^ ; the time had not yet come 
when a Persian king could subside into the cares of domestic 
Administration or become the mere puppet of palace intrigue. Was it 
not the great blood-letting on this very expedition which made the tamer 
Persian record of the next century and a half possible? (v.) More- 
over, the rather to encoxirag© the new king to this undertaking, in the 
direction undoubtedly of least resistance, there were not wanting 
positiva invitations and encouragements, by the mouths and in the 
persons of Greek refugees, or ambassadors, from Thessaly, from 
Athens, from Sparta, from Argos, promising a divided and weakened 
resistance, and even a partial welcome ; pledges, at least, of a dutiful 
subjection for the future. (vi.) Doubtless there were operating, 
besides, motives of personal ambition, hopes of spoil, captives, and 
fortune, not to forget the charm of adventure, which must ever make 
war attractive. Mardonios, as tlie leader of a war-party in the king's 
Council, is a sufficiently plausible figure. Whether there were any 
higher views of commercial policy and pacific settlement is a problem 
of more doubtful issue. Enough that, tested by the given antecedents 
And conditions, the invasion of Greece by Xerxes was a foregone 
conclusion. What rather called for explanation was the delay of a 
decade in the reinvasion of Hellas, after the miscaiTiage at Marathon, 
(ft) The sense that here, in the delay, was a problem calling for 
solution is exhibited in the very opening of the Seventh Book, which 
represents Dareios as doubly resolved lor the reinvasion of Athens 
upon a scale irresistible. A space of three years is indeed filled by 
vaster preparations, till in the fourth year the revolt of Egypt occurs 
still further to retard the king's vengeance on Athens, alWit making 
no change in his resolve ; only death supervenes to discharge Dareios 
of all further earthly underUikings. A disputed succession,^ and the 



i Cn. 6. fio. 

» Cp. 7. 8, 11. 

* On the r]a«etioo of t1i« nuccesiiion 
cp. Boto to 7. 2 and add : Trogus (Jusitiu 



2. 10) and riuUu-cli, Afor. 488, tell a. 
Mtory in ttulxiUiitiul HLtievmont with one 
another, siiij widely diirrring IVoin Hdt 
Oil four poiiiUi tliey agree to diller from 



124 



HERODOTUS 



APP. II 



prime urgency of the Egyptian revolt, nmy still further have postponed 
the re-opening of the Helk-ntc question ; hut from the first Xerxes is 
represented as resolved to assume this legacy fi'om his father ; and 
here the Herodoteau story sets in with an initial inconsequence, and 
follows that up with a series of apocryphal marvels, which almost 
obliterate the simple rationale of the whole proceedings. 

(c) The inconsequence lies in the re-opening of the previous 
ijuestion after the king has taken his resolution to carry out his 
father's project for the conquest of Greece. The resolution of Xerxes 
is fully formed, in the first instance, before the re-settlemcnt of Egypt ; 
and that successful achievement of his policy and arms would plainly 
form no ground for the abandonment of the other project, though the 
interval of time, secured between the king's first resolve for an 
Hellenic war, and his forma! deliberiitions in Council, may eiise the 
dramatic sequence. The inconsequence, however, is not exhausted 
above ; it extends to the reproduction, at the second stage, of argu- 
ments pro and contra, which must have been, or at least ought to have 
been, heard and considered or ever the king resolved upon the war 
at all. But human action is often far from consequent, and the 
problem remains whether the inconsequence here detected belongs to 
the king or to the historian, and is a defect in the character of Xerxes 
or in the composition of Herodotus. The highly artificial structure 
of the story, presently to be indicated throughout the context, might 
tempt us to suppose that only a genuine reminiscence, or tradition, of 
a change of purpose on the king's part could account for so ob^nous 
an inconsequence in the narrative, if, indeed, we had found Hcroilotus 
elsewhere and throughout careful to avoid such incoherence. But 
Herodotus is nothing if not inconsequent ; and his inconsequence 
appears often traceable to mere variations in source, and the juxta- 
position of alternative stories. In the present case the main thread 
of the story may have passed originally from the decision of the king 
to invade Hellas (cc. 5-6) through the recovery of Egypt {c. 7) direct 



Hdt. : — I. The question of the guccession 
arises only on tho death of Darcios. 
2, It is decided jiKlicially, «d<1 amicably, 
by su arbiter, 3. The name of tho elder 
brother of Xerxes is ArianiL'ncs. 4. Tho 
name of DemaratoB and the gujipoHrd 
.S;>artan precedont are oinittol. They 
differ from ea<:h other in three parti- 
culars: — 1. Troj^iis makes the iu<i(U; Arta- 
phemea, Plutart-h tlie 5i/taonjf Artabanoa. 
i. With Trogiis the brothers have re- 
course to a doiiusHcum iudkent ; with 
Plutarch the ' Persians ' appoint the 
dikast • Xerxes at first objects, and would 
prefer (like a true tyrant t^J irXij^fi tti- 
roiOtit) a popular court. 3. In Trogiis 
AtosHa does not act directly ; in Plutarch 
she is one of the dramatia peraonae. All 



threo aououDts agree that (1) there was 
a dispute over the sut'ceasson, (2) decided 
without violence or bloodshed, (3) chiefly 
by two arguments; (a) the iu* malernum. 
{b) the ]iogt-r«gnal binb of Xerxes. Hdt. 
has prrhaits couCiised the questions of 
appointing a vicegerent in the king's 
absence with the que-ttiun of succession 
to the throne, atiii antedated the effec- 
tive decision iu the case of Xerxes. He 
n)ij;ht do so the more easily, ns the qnes- 
tioii must have been oft«n discussed, and 
tho absence of a bloody succession may 
have soggestcd tho inference that the 
question had been etfectively settled 
before the deatli of Dai-cios. ' Perhaps 
also there is some justification for the 
rOle assigned to Demaratos. 



THE PERSIAN PREPARATIONS 



n 



to the preparations for the great invasion {cc. 19 ff.); and the brilliant 
Bcenes intervening, which are laid in the king's Council-chamber and 
in the king's Bed-chamber (cc. 8-1 &), may hiive been derived from a 
difiFerent quarter, or he largely a free product of the historian's own 
fancy, added or inserted, jierhaps not in the very first draft of the 
original work. 

Nowhere, indeed, does Herodotus appear to deal more freely with 
his materials or to procure a more artificial result than in this account 
of the king's deliberations upon the invi»siori of Greece (cc. 8-19). 
The scene is laid at Susa, about the year 483, and shifts from the 
Council-chamber to the Bed-chamber, and back again. The Greek 
exiles and their suite have disappejired ; the mitg en seine is purely 
Persian; the dramatis j)erso7ute are the king, with his good genius and 
his evil genius, Artabanos, Mardonios, while in the background moves 
in and out a silent chorus of privy councillors. The drama comprises 
a diary of events for three days and throe nights ; and the king's 
decision alternates between War, Peace and War. Speeches are 
delivered, for which Herodotus could hardly have authentic record ; 
a supernatural apparition, a vision capiible of rhetoric, plays its r6le as 
one of the dramatis perswMc, in accordance with Homeric analogy ^ 
and the tradition of the Attic stage.^ Thrice the Council meets by 
day, thrice the vision appears by night, and throughout, of course, the 
transactions are recoixied and conducted in the best Ionic Greek. The 
-whole passage is obviously dranuitic, poetic, fictitious. How should 
Herodotus thus have known the secrets of the king's couch, and of 
the king's heart 1 Or how report in extcnso the speeches in council or 
in chamber 1 Who can treat seriously the supernatural machinery, 
or fail to discount the too obviously ethical contntsts between the wise 
and the foolish councillor^ The intensely Greek moral put into the 
mouth of Artabanos must bo ascribed not to the spre^id of Hellenic 
influence at the Persian court, but to the dramatic devices of the 
writer. Perhaps nothing is more fatal to the historical claims of this 
r|aange than the detection of the literary origins and antecedents of 
the speeches.^ 

Not but what oven this passage may have had some historical 
mntecedents, some partial justification, in actual transactions at the 
ersian court. Hermlotus is not so poor an artist as to reject the 
vantage to be derived from reproducing realities, so far as attainable. 
He deals with real persons, with actual relations, with genuine 
influences and motives. \Miere exactly authentic tradition ends 
and inference begins is as hard to determine as whore inference 



' Th« TUtioDS of Agamemnon, Riad. 

* e.g. wraith of Dsreioe in the Persai, 

* M. Hauvette, //ifrorfote (1894), rocog- 
■iaes three rery clear aouvenin d'Esehyle 

I the speech of Xerxes, and Adniits that 
' tlia speechM of Mardonios and of Arta- 



banos are largely Greek, or Hcrodoteaa, iti 
Hf ntinient ami Mot, HiRtorical authority 
cannot Im vindicated for tlie gpeeoheti 
by thoir quality of voriKimilitude, wbiuli 
uiorely allows that HerodotuK was • good 
artist. Cp. Introduction, § 11. 



126 



HERODOTUS 



APP. It 



makes way for fancy and free creation. There is enough in the age 
of ArtabanoB, his relation to the king, and the trust committed to his 
charge, to account for the r6lc assigned to him in this dramatic frag- 
ment, even if he had not really opposed the Thrakian expedition of 
Dareios, nor actually dissuaded Xerxea from iwlveiituring in Greece. 
The pwt actually and undoubtedly played Viy Mardonios in Greece in 
479, as previously in 4 9 '2, and the fate which ovoitook him at Plataia, 
are quite sufficient to account for his being made into the evil genius 
of Xerxea in legend, as he was undoubtedly the evil genius of Greece 
in fact, whether there was or was not a peiice-party and a war-party 
at Susa in 483. It is almost absurd to cite such touches as the 
reference to the Magi,* or even the mention of ' Persian authora,' ^ for 
proofs of an historical contants to the story, as though such veri- 
similitudes were beyond the resources of 'the prince of Ionian 
historians ' ! Upon the whole we may conclude that this passage has 
little or no geruiine history in it, where it differs or goes beyond the 
previous and probably independent passage, in which Mardonios 
appears, side by side with the Greek exiles, as advocating a war 
policy. That policy was probably never in doubt ; it wjis prescribed 
and ineviUible all alorig> though the exact moment for the inception 
of the undertaking, the magnitude of the forces, the route, the plan 
of campaign, were doubtless matters of deliberation. Herodotus has 
treiited his topic with undue freedom, and this passage is one of those 
which most tend to discredit his character as an historiiin, not because 
ho is here sinning against light, but simply because be is doing his 
best according to his lights. This conclusion is doubtless an un- 
fortunate one, from some points of view, %vith which to start ; at the 
same time we may remember that Herodotus might easily know more 
of Greek, or semi-Greelt, than of purely Persian situations and pro- 
ceedings, and that the subsequent coui-se of his narrative brings him 
more and more within the re^^on of the knowable and the known. 
In discussing this passage M-e have faced all but the worst th;it can 
bo said against Herodotus' history of the Persian war ; it is a romance, 
a chapter from an historical novel, wliere he is dealing with Persian 
affairs from Persian sources. Yet it quickly improves in passing 
within the range of native Greek sources, and there is already a 
strongly marked difference uixjn the present topic between the longer 
passage, from which Greek agents and Greek sources are excluded, 
and the shorter passage, in which Demaratos and the Aleuads, 
Onomakritos and the Peiaistratidai, have played their parts. The 
dilTerence is all to the advantage of the latter.^ 

§ 3. III. The King's Rmte. — At the other end of the scale, for 
exactitude, verisimilitude, and historical value, are to be set the 
passages, which, taken together, give an account of the king's march 
from Susa to Therme, or rather of the king's route, from station to 



«2-3 



THE PERSIAN PREPARATIONS 



127 



station, so far as given, or im(>lied, between those trrmim. The 
anatomy of the rout« must indeed be distinguished from the story, or 
stories, of the march, even as the determination to invade Greece ha« 
been distinguishetl from its romantic and imaginary setting. The 
roate-map is involved in the iMirralive of the march, and that narrative 
itself ia not a bare itinerary, but is embroidered with anecdotes, and 
enriched with incideutJs, of varying probability and significance, some 
of these passages, indeed, presenting data of importance for the light 
they throw upon questions of the organization, numbers, and character 
of the forces, and even upon general questions of policy and strategy. 
Detached from these more problematic dements the skeleton route 
emerges as one of the most certain residfcs of Herodote-an criticism, 
and carries with it, into certainty or high probability, many incidental 
items and consequences in the narrative. Here, too, the itinerary of 
the route grows in clearness and completeness as it approaches its 
terminus, and moves on to and over Greek soil. Between 8usa and 
Sardea the route itself, like the march, is obscure and problematical ; 
from Sardes to Therme it ia as sure and simple as the subsequent 
stages from Therme to Athens, at leixst in regard to the main questions. 
No doubt this result lies in the nature of the case, the march of Xerxes 
baving followed, from 8ardes to Athens, linos well within the ken of 
Greek travellers, and even perhaps known nsualiy to Herodotus 
himself, at least from leading point to j>oint. Some topographical 
error occurs even in this relatively well-known region of Thrace, or 
Chalkidike * ; but what is more surprising than the exceptional error 
is the general fulness and completeness of the topography. This result 
must surely be ascribed not so much to the records of the march of 
Xerxes, as to the permanent knowledge of thia highway poeaessed in 
Athens, in Ionia, and in Hellas at large, and already enshrined in more 
than one prose authority." But, whatever the sources of his knowledge, 
sll credit belongs to Herodotus for his relatively full map of the 
Tluakio-Hellespontine regions, and, in diminishing quantity, for the 
general skeleton of the route of Xerxea from firat to last. The march 
of Xerxes from Sardes to Athens is at least bjs clearly ascertained in 
the pages of Herodotus as the march of Hannibal from Saguntum to 
Traaimene in the pages of Polybios and Livy : had Hannibal happened 
to start from Carthage, we might perhaps have fomid his route from 
CStfthsge to Gades and from Gades to Saguntum as dim and vague as 
the stages of Xerxes' route between Susa and Kritalla, between 
Kritalls and Sardes. Viewed in its whole extent between the points 
indicated, the march comprises seven stages geographically, of which 
three belong to Asia and three to Europe, while one may be assigned 
to the crossing. They run: — (i.) From Susa to Kritalla; (ii.) From 
Kritalla to Sardes ; (iii.) From Sardes to Abydos ; (iv.) From Abydos 



' Cp. CommenUry, 7. 22. 8, etc. 
* Notably Hekataios. C|>. Commentary, paiaim, and Introduction, § 10. 



128 



HERODOTUS 



App. ri 



to Sestos ; (v.) From Sestos to Doriskos ; (vi.) From DoriBkos to 

Akatithos ; (vii.) From Akanthoa to Therme. It will be convenient to 
pursue the description of this route atul tbe narrative of the march in 
detail, and to segregate the elements of anecdote, of incident, and of 
romance — for romance still recurs — from the strict way-bill or inventory 
of the road, and from the materials that find their proper uses under 
the heads of the Naval and Militarj' organization of the expedition. 
The process will furnish at once an analysis of the text of Herodotus 
bejiring upon these subjects, and a preliminary critique of the relative 
values of the various elements. 

(i.) Frutii Susu to KriiaUa in Kappadolda (c. 26). Tbe king himself, 
with suite and escort, must have moved (summer of 481 Rc.) from 
Susa, or one of his capitals, perhaps down the higher stages of the 
' Royal Road,' somo fifty days' march at least, if the itinerary, or 
rather the s!adwsi>u>s, of the Fifth Book is to be trusted,' to Kritalla, 
the first rendezvous for the forces. This journey of the king's is, 
indeed, an absolute blank in the pages of Herodotus, who might bo 
taken to regard Kritalla as the true terminus a ipw for the whole march. 
There was assembled, not indeed the total land-forces (6 ire^s ajras, 
e. 26), as Herotlotus may seem to say in the first instance, but all or 
BO much of the infantry, and no doubt all or so much of the cavalry, 
as formed the column or cmjis d'ariiu'e that marched with the king 
in person — that is, as the sequel will show, about one-third of the 
total land-forces. At Kritalla, perhaps, the king awarded to one or 
other of the leaders of the Eastern contingents — Tersians, Medes, 
Baktrians, EJamites, dwellers in Mesopotamiii, and so forth — rewards 
or decorations according to the numbers and appearance of their 
musters ; and doubtless a review, perhaps more than one, took place 
at Kritalla, which must have been an open plain or champaign. 
Unfortunately the topographical identification of KritaUa still baffles 
our chonographers of Minor Asia, and the exact scene of the first 
mustering of the forces is still left vaguely ' in Kappadokia,' where 
Herodotus places it r Kappadokia itself being a somewhat elastic or 
elusive term njion the Herodotean map, east of Phrygia, and west of 
(Armenia and) KUikia. With Herodotus the Halys is the frontier 
between Phrygia and Kappadokia ; but, then, the Halys iUelf is con- 
ceived as crossing Asia Jilinor south and north, and almost bisecting it 
from sea to sea.- The subsequent narrative which carries the king 
across the Halys might seem to imply that Kritalla is to be sought 
north of the upper course of the Halys, and a further natural 
inference would be that the army advanced from I^italla, and from 
the Halys by the * Royal Road.'^ But the clearer sequel shows that 
Xerxes approached Sardes from the south-east, and 'the plain of 



' Cp. 5. .12 f. and Appendi-x XIII., 
'On tliR Royal Roa"],' in ray llerodUva 

/r.-r/. (i89fi). •■' 1. 72. 



' This iufereni'« is, indeed, actually 
made by W. 11. Rauisaiy, Hist. OeogrtytSy 
of Asia Minor (IS&O), p. 41. 



THE PERSIAN PREPARATIONS 

Tyana ' has with some probability been identified a3 the site of 
Kritalla.^ Tyana lies far to the south of Mount Argaios and the 
river Halya : to gain Tyana Xerxes would ha%'e had to turn Bouth, 
leaving tiie Royal Koad on the north, unless, indeed, he reached the 
plain of Tyaua from the south through the Kilikian Gates. In any 
ewe the examination of the next and somewhat clearer stage will 
make it probable that Xerxes himself followed another than the Royal 
Road in his march from Kritalla to Sardes, if not from Siisa to Kritalla. 
(ii.) From Kritalla la Sardes (cc. 26-32).— If the 'Royal Road' had 
Iwen followed, the route would here have corresponded to the forty 
days' journey from Sanies given in reverse order by the st^uismos of 
the Fifth Book. The crossing of the Ualys favours the adoption of that 
route, but the crossing of the Halys might be an ine\'itablo inference, 
arising from the historian's enoneous conception of the upper course 
of that stream. The crossing of the Jlaiandroa before Sardes is reached, 
«ad the occurrence of Kelainai and Kolossai upon the line of march — 
places which certainly did not lie on the Royal Road — prove that 
Sardes was not appraiehed by the Royal Road. To harmonize these 
indications in a sense favourable to Herodotus it is necessary to sup- 
^^ pose, with Sir W. M. liamsay, that Xerxes crossed the Halys by the 
^H Royal lioad, and at a later stage, for some unexplained r(.%-ison, tnade 
^H a wide divergence to the south, and struck on Kelainai, the point 
^H from which onwards his route to Sardea is perfectly clear. It is much 
^H eimpier to suppose, especially after placing Kritalla at or near Tyana, 
^H that the king's route through Asia Minor, from Kritalla to Sardes, lay 
^H 'wholly to the south of the Halye, and of the great central deserts and 
^V lakes, along a line roughly corresponding to the route of the Kyreian 
I expedition in 401, or to the great trade-route, known later as the ' High- 
I way ' {koivi) o&3s). The stations Kelainai and Kolossai are identiail with 
^ stages on the amibusis of Kyros, and the route of Kyros from Sardes 
to the Maiandros ford, and again from the Maiandios to Kolossai, was 
no doubt the same as the way pursued by Xerxes in reverse order. 
KyroB emerged ultimately after crossing ' Lykaoiua ' and part of 
Kappadokia at ' Dana ' (Tyana), but it would be rash to assume that 
bis route between Kelainai and T^^ana coincided throughout with that 

bof Xerxes l>etween the same points.^ From Tyana to Ikonion, through 
'Kappadokia' and 'Lykaonia,' was (on Xcnophon's showing) some 
55 ' parasaugs,' some nine to ten days' march, and here the route 
of KyroB may have coincided with that of Xerxos. Xenophon, 
indeed, names no towns upon the way between Ikonion (Konia) and 
Dana, or Tyana {Kkli-nis^ir, near the modern Bm) : the route may 
hav« lain from Tyana along the line of the later Roman road, Tyana, 
Kjbistra, Kastabala, Barata Iconium, which appears to correspond to 

• Ramsay, op. c 
* fUnuay obMrv«a that Kyron w«;Dt soatL of the lat«r main route ; op. e. 

VOL. II K 



130 



HERODOTUS 



APP. n 



one of the modern routes/ though not the most direct, or shortest.' 
The modern route is reckoned at some fifty-three hours' going, say 
seven days' journey at the least for an ordinary traveller, a reckoning 
•which may correspond aufficiently to the inciications of the Anabasis, 
where an army is in question. The great king will have moved even 
more slowly. Between Ikonion and Kelainai, apparently a fortnight's 
march or more (92 parasangs), the Annbasis places in urder, going east' 
wiud, Peltai, Kcramon Agora, Kaystrupedion, Thymbrion, Tyriaion; 
but Kyroa here goes out of the direct way northwards, and at Kcramon 
Agora touches even the Koyal Roatl. Xerxes may have taken a more 
direct route. His lino may have more nearly coincided with one of 
the modern routes between Koniir (Ikonion) and IHneir (Kelainai), say 
Konia — Yalovach (Antioch) — Diiieir,^ a journey of forty-eight hours, 
or some six to eight days ; or, if we may mark the possible course by 
antique names, irrespective of a strict chronology, the king's route 
from Ikonion to Kelainai may have jxassed by Tyriaion and Thymbrion 
to Kaystrupeilioti, or Ii)eos : in this stretch of 40 piirasiings, perhaps 
a seven or eight days' march, coinciding with the route of Kyros, of 
course in the reverse direction. From Kaystrupedion the king 
(having turned the Sultan Dagh) moves south-west by Metropolis to 
Kelainai : a distance of some sixty Roman miles or so, probably 
another week's work for the king's army. This route is easier but 
longer than the modern one above given.^ 

Before Kelainai the Idng's route is dim and conjectural ; the oidy 
place named, Kritalla, cannot be certainly identified ; we cannot surely 
decide whether the king reached Kappadokia through the Kilikian 
Gates, or by the Koyal Road ; in either case, it is just possible to 
maintain that he traversed Phrygia by the Pioyat Road, and only struck 
down to Kelainai after crossing the Halys, albeit the alternative 
suggestion, that he advanced from Kritalla by a southern route, does 
far leas violence to the natural probabilities. At Kelainai the king's 
route emerges into relative certaint}% not merely because Herodotus 
supplies fuller data, but also because the march of Xerxes between 
Kelainai and Sardes exactly corresponds with that of Kyros, for 
which we have the complete stadiasmos of Xenophon. From Sardes 
to Kelainai is apimrently a seven days' march for Kyros and his men 
(50 parasangs), though at that rate the pace is rapid ; the king will 
probably have rcquiretl at least ten days to accomplish this section of 
his journey. In other respects there is no reason to differentiate the 



' Wilson, Asia Minor (Murray 1896), 
Route 52. 

' Cp. Ramsay, o}/. c p. .15", and 
Wilson, Handbook of Asia J/jn/»r( Murray, 
1895), Routes 52, 53. 

* WilsoTi, Route 47. 

■• Ramsay, Asia Minor, p. 49, notices 



na error in the Peutinger map regarding 
the section between IpHua (Julin) and 
MctrojKilis, the mai> tircscntiug ulterna- 
tive locvps, via Syniiadii anii Eupliorbium 
res[)ectiTely, as « single route. If, how- 
ever, Enphorbioni was where Kieiiert'.s 
last map jilact-a it, it cannot have been 
on any road fioni Metropolis to Julia. 



THE PERSIAN PREPARATIONS 



r 



N 



march of Xerxes from the well-ascertained route of later times, and 
the bare data of Herodotus may ha supplcraoiited by names which, 
though representing later foundations, doubtless mark an ancient 
route, and even ancient settlements. From Kelainai to Kolossai 
(' 3 stathraoi, 20 pai-asangs,' Xenophon) the route would have followed 
approximately the existing line of railway from Dineir (Apameia- 
Kelainai) to Gonjeli (Ijaodiceti ad L3'cum), past the salt lake Aji-tuz 
Geul (Anaua), through the ' colelirated ' Piiss of Chardak, and flown the 
valley of the Lykos.* From Kolossai to the Maiandros-croesing (' 1 
stathmos, 8 parasangs,' Xen., a very long day's journey, probably a 
two days' march) the road apparently went down the left bank of the 
Lykos, past the site of the later Laodicea, alrea<]y doubtless marked 
by a settlement, and crossing to the right bank of the river went on 
by Kydrara (Hierapolis),-' which with Herodotus is the Knotmjtunkt, 
junction or fork, for tivo roads, the one leading down the Maiandros 
valley ' to Karia-wards ' — subseiiuently tlie first stage on the great 
road from Epheaos to Apameia, now marked by the railway line — the 
other to Sardes and the Miiiandros-crossing, that then taken by the 
king. From Kydrara to the Maiandros-crossing woidd seem to be 
some four hours' march.^ From the Maiandros-crossing to Sardps 
Xenophon reckons 3 stathraoi. or 22 parasangs. It is apjiarently 
Bome sixty miles' distance, and presumably not less than four days' 
march. In later days the rojid passed by Tripolis, Apollonis Hieron 
and Philadelphia, down the valley of the Kogamos.* Herodotus names 
one city en, route, Kallatebos, iiassed by Xerxes apparently the day 
before he entered Sardes, an indication which would scarcely 
accord with even the site of Philadel]»hia (Alashehr) ; but the import- 
ance of the site may justify the identification,'" despite the chronological 
ob^er dictum of Herodotus, 

Thus the stage of Xerxes' march from Kritalla to Sardes, or rather 
the latter stages of it, from Kelainai to Sardes, are comparatively clear 
and full, and the actual route at least in this latter section ascertainable 
with substantial accuracy. The use of this route by Xerxes is 
incidentally confirmed by Xenophon," and Herodotu-s has had fairly 
trustworthy sources for the march, once it is within the horizon of the 
Ionian trailers from Ephcsos, Miletos, and the islands. The topo- 
graphical indications given by Herodotus on this route are not, 
however, sufficient to assure us that he had himself traversed it. 



' tVtween Dinoir and Api>a the line 
of rail liea rather to tb« oortli nf tlie old 
line of road ; cp. Wilson, op. c. p. lOfi. 

* Kydram, attitude 1250 ft. Wilson, 
«>p, *. p. 105. 

* Ramuy'H maji (o>). c p. 10*) etrone- 
oculjr ideutifie!! Hiera[iolis with Kallnte- 
boa; ep. WUaon, op. e, p. 107. 

* Cp. Bamiay, op. c. p. 49. 



' Rawlinson, note ad I, 

« Anab. 1. 2. 9 ifTav^a S4p^i &Tf ix 
riit 'EXXdiot ^mjSclj rp liixo iir<X'»>/«« 
X/7rro< oUoioiiiicai ravri re ri paaCKcia 
teal T^¥ KtXaivwc iKpinroXiv. That there 
were buildiDgs of Xerxes in Kelainai is 
likely enough ; that they were ereotod 
oil liis return to Asia ' after his defeat ' 
(at SalaniLK] is leu convincing. 



132 



HERODOTUS 



APP. U 



The oecurreiice of the names, Kelainai, Anaua, Kolossai, Kydrara, 
Kallateboa j the mention of the rivers, Maiandros, Katarraktes, Lykoa, 
and of the salt lake Anaua ; even the more graphic description of the 
boundary -stone at Kydrara, the fork of the roads to Sardes and 
' Karia,' and the bon-bon manufactory at Kallatebos, do not transcend 
the possibiiity of second-hand information ; and we may be almost 
8iire that if Herodotus himself bad ever been in Kelainai he would not 
have omitted to mention the palace built there by Xerxes. The anec- 
dote of Pythios, hia interview with Xerxes at Kelainai, and the incident 
of the plane-tree at Kallatebos, belong to the humours of the voyage, 
which must be tested on their own merits, and are sufficiently 
discussed in the commentary ; here they may be cited as illustration 
of the growing wealth of Herodotus, his sources for this portion of 
the way, and an indirect testimony to the route actually followed by 
the king. 

It may be added, however, that although clearly the king himself 
approached Sardes by the route Kelainai — Kolossai — Hierapolia — 
Philadelphia, and probably reached Kelainai from Tyaiia by a route 
passing south of the great central desert, or salt^district of Asia Minor, 
it is by no means necessary to bring all the forces, which reached 
Sardes in the autumn of 481 B.C'. or the winter following, by one 
and the same route thither. The larger we suppose the muster at 
Kritalla, the greater the probability that the host advanced westward 
by more than one route : one moiety perhaps by the great northern, 
or Royal Road, while the other made good its advance by the great 
southern route, which was destined more and more to supersede the 
other and perhaps older line, as the head centres of power and 
commerce shifted westwards.' If levies from Asia Minor itself con- 
centrated at Sardes they too would have come, to a great extent, by 
the Royal Road, as the army-list itself would seem to imply ; possibly, 
however, these levies, at least in part, wore appointed to meet the 
king at Abydos in the following spring, and made their way thither 
on diverse roads, according to their places of origin. Of which more 
anon. 

The winter of 481-80 B.c. plainly was passed by Xerxes at Sardes, 
doubtless to a great extent in matming the plan of invasion, pushing 
on the necessary works and prepiirations, and sounding the Greeks as 
to the probable reception to be expected by the Persians. To this 
point is expressly referred by Herodotus the mission of hemlds into 
Hellas (7, 32), who only meet the king again at Therme (7. 131) ; and 
to this point we must refer the somewhat problematic story of the 
treatment of the Greek spies at Sardes (7. HG), which in Herotlotus 
figures mainly as an illustration of the great king's whimsical 
magnanimity. On Greek tradition this residence of the king, still 

' The roail-making for the king's mtircl) newl not be rigidly uvuQuedE to Euro{ie ; 
cp. p. 140 b«low. 



THE PERSIAN PREPARATIONS 



133 



undefeated, and busy with organizing the great invasion, made 
apparently less imprcaaion than the residence at Sardcs a year later, 
jiftcr Xerx&s had Hed discomfited from Salamis, and when his military 
and material repulse already repeated itself for Greek observers in his 
moral corruption and collapse. 

From Sardea onwards, when the march is resumed in iho following 
spring, we are conscious of fuller sources, stronger tradition, and a 
growing suggestion of personal acquaintjince, more or leas intimate, 
with the region traversed. There arc other proofs of a first-hand 
acqimintJtnce, on the part of Herodotus, with the Hellespont; and 
his meticulous choriography in Thrace and Makedon attests the 
high state of practical information about these regions, long known to 
Greek writers and travellers, thick sown with Greek settlements, and 
at the very time, when Herodotus was writing his history, incorporated 
in the alliance of Athens. To this stage still belong such romantic 
stories as the sequel to the Pythios' anecdote, and the dramatic 
conversation between Xerxes and Artabanoa at Abydos on the 
Hellespont, beside the more plausible incidents of the visit to Troy, 
the sacrifice at Nine Ways, the e.xcursion to Tompe. This wliole 
passage also affords numerous hints, and larger sections, which supply 
the chief materials for estimating the numbors and organization of 
fleet and of army, the order of march, and the strategic ideas governing 
the whole movement. Ignoring for the present the anecdotal and 
romantic incident.s, and postponing the employment of the last grouj) 
of indications, until we come to discuss the strictly military aspects of 
the story, we may proceed to reconstruct the king's route to Therme, 
with all but complete fulness and accuracy, and a consequent brevity 
and freedom from debate. 

(iii.) Siirdes to Abydos (7. 40-44). Here first occurs in the text of 
Herodotus a description of the actuid column upon the march (cc. 40- 
41), as well as something approaching to an exact way-bill, though 
without precise indications of time or distance (cc. 42, 43). The 
route passes out of Lydia into Mysia by crossing the rivor Kalkoa, 
but the exact route from Sardes to the Kaikos is not clearly indicated. 
On the assumption tliat the whole army moved upon one road — 
which is plainly the assumption of Herodotus^ — that road was 
presumably the easiest one, down the valley and over the col to 
Smyrna — the line of the moflern railway makes a detour round 
Sipylos — and then northwards by the coast-road past Kyme and 
Myrina. Possibly a second column moved by a more direct line 
inland, from Sardea to the Kaikos ; before the army reaches Abydos 
there is to be found an unconscious hint of some such arrangement. 
The march from Saifles to the Kaikos-crosaing would not have 
occupied the king less, presumably, than six days. No incident is 



134 



HERODOTUS 



recorded for this section, except the scene on loaying Sardea ; nor is 
any place en route expressly named ; Smyrna,' or, if the king kept to 
the Hermos valley with Mount Sipylos on his left. Magnesia, if not 
both, must have been touched ; and holween Magnesia, or Smynia, 
and Kyme the Hemioa mast have been crossed before the Kaikos 
was reached, though Herodotus does not specif}' this crossing. 

Once across tlie Kaikos and in Mysia, the topographical indica- 
tions determining the rout« multiply. From the Kaikos the king 
moves by Atarncus to Karene, passing a mountain, of Kane, on the 
left hand, i.e. plainly going inland from the coast, between Karene 
and Adramytteion. If Karene is correctly placed on Kiepert's map," 
it would lie about two marches soiith of Adramytteion ; Antandros, 
also named, lies one djiy'a march beyond. That from Antandros 
Xerxes passed Mount Ida upon the left, so reaching the river 
Skamandros and Troy, is a questionable assertion. The easier route 
must have followed the coast, round the promontory of Lecton past 
Gargara, Assoe, Larissa, Sigeion ; from Antandros to Sigeion, or to 
the Skamandros-crossing between Sigeion and Ilion, could hardly 
have been less than a week's march. The statement regarding Ida, 
however, might be an unconscious indication that a part of the ai-my 
moverl direct from Antandros to Abydos, by a second and inland line. 
From the skamandros Xerxes visits old Troy, an incident which 
implies th.'it he and the men with him crossed that river on its lower 
course. From Ilion to Abydos the king's route passes Rhoiteion, 
Ophryneion, and Dardanos ; three days, or four at most, would have 
sufficed to take the king by easy stages from Troy to Abydos. 
Upon the whole the king will have taken from three to four weeks 
to carry the land-forces from Sai*dea to the Hellespont, even if his 
following be reduced to a single corps d'arim'e. ProV>ably Abydos was 
the rendezvous for a considerable number of the forces, and the Iwo 
days occupied in crossing might be explained as an unconscious 
homage to the composition of the forces at this point, where they may 
have comprised not merely the levies brought by Xerxes from 
Kritalla to Sardes, but levies from Asia Minor itself, which met 
the king at the Hellespont. 

Abydos is certainly in the pages of Herodotus the first point 
where the fleet and the array come into direct touch, and Xerxes has 
view of the water-way covered with vessels, as well as of the plain 
of Abydos and the neighbouring heights and headlands occupied by 
masses of men. The ports and harbours of Asia Minor had been 
filled, the winter long, with ships and their manning ; a portion of 
the fleet had perhaps supported the engineering works on the 
Hellespont and at Athos ; a portion of the fleet may even have 
moved in the spring, from Miletoa and Ephesos and Smyrna and other 



' Or its rains, cp. Stmbo 646. 



' Formae Orbit AiUipii (1894), iz. E. (L 



THE PERSIAN PREPARATIONS 



points along the coasts to the Hellespont parallel with the king's 
movement from Sardes. The Hellespontine contingent at least may 
have put in at Abydos. The mustering and early movement of the 
fleet have left no impress upon the traditions in Herodotus, and the 
fleet makes its first apj>earance in his pages at Abydos, apparently 
in full force, and of a sudden. But that the whole ns^vy mustered 
at Abydos is fairly incredible, Rojison will presently appear for 
thinking that the full forces of the king first came together at 
Doriskos, and were there organized. But in the pages of Herodotus, 
the account of the advance of the Persians is complicated, from 
Abydos onwartis, by the double series of movements, on sea and 
on land, of fleet and of army, both of which are duly indicated in 
the text of Heroilotus. 

(iv.) Ahydos to Sedos (») fiid^aons rov 'EAAiytrroiToi', cc. 54-56). — 
The actual crossing concerns, indeed, only the land-forces, as the fleet 
was not directly engaged, except perhaps in guarding the passage. 
The minute topography of the bridges is elsewhere discussed.* 
The distance is given as seven stades of water-way, to which must 
be added the distance covered on land either side the straits from 
bivouac to bivouac for every several contingent- The time occupied 
is variously stated by Herodotus at two days, at seven days and 
seven nights, ami at a whole month.* These items, of course, proceed 
from various sources, and belong to independent accounts, not 
rationalized by Herodotus into a consistent whole. The last and 
largest estimate is probably not much in e-vcess of the whole period 
occupied in and about the Hellespont, from the king's arrival at 
Abydos to his departure from Sostos. The jiassage of the Hellespont 
is marked by solemn religious formalities, where the facts must be 
carefully distinguished from the motives conjectured by Herodotus.* 
A new disjxjsition of the force* t;vkes place at Abydos, according to 
Herodotus, the baggagot-train and camp-followers all crossing by the 
one bridge (on the Aigaian side), and the fighting men, in a new 
order, by the other bridge (on the side of the Pontos). The order 
of march for the fighting men is in itself more probable than the 
order given for the departure from Sardes : the scpai'ate apportion- 
ment of army and baggago-train to the bridges is probable enough, 
and perha|)8 baaed upon Hellespontine memories; while the assignment 
of the bridge on the side of the Pontos to the fighting men places 
them at the head of the column on the European side : a more 
proper position than their order in the procession out of Sardes. 

(v.) Sestoi lo Doriskos (cc. 57-60.) — The fleet, or so much of it as 



' See not«« 7. 33-36. 

* The HtjiUiMadivn may be an nnder- 
MtimaU) ; rp, notes to 7. 34. 

* Two diij-s, 7. 54, .IS ; seven days 
and teren nights, 7. 56 ; a whole moDth, 
9. 61. 



* With the cercinooy aud otferings of 
Xerxes at the Helluspoiit may be com- 
jMred the jwrrorrnauceii nr Alexander at 
tlie same place ; cp, Arrion, Anab, I, 
12. 6. 



136 



HERODOTUS 



App. n 



had entered the Hellcsirant for the review at Abydos, must hnve made 
its way out again (SW.), rounded the promontory of Elaifia, and then 
struck almost due north, across the mouth of the bay of Melas, for 
the promontory of Sarpedon {-nfyrySovtif aKpi), Hdt.), and so, still making 
northwards, for the movjth of the Hebroa, and the plain of Doriakos, 
where it may have awaited the armj'. The distance from the opening 
of the Hellespont to ' the beach hard by Doriskos ' {tw alyiakhv rhv 
wpoa-fx^a iio/JUTKif)) cannot be much above 50-60 E. miles, or 400-500 
stadia, i.e. an easy day's voyage on Herodotus' own showing (4. 86). 
The site is further marked for Herodotus by the Hamothrakian colonies, 
or forts, Sale antl Zone, and defined as extending (westwards) as far 
as the promontory Serreion. The locality is absolutely identified as 
the plain immediately west of the river Hebros (T'ui./ff), the plain of 
Iioviigik. Doriskos itself was a Persian fortress dating (according to 
Hdt.) from the Persian annexation of Thrace in 512 B.C. As it is 
not likely that the whole Persian fleet had entered the Hellespont, we 
may supftose that Doriskos was the rendezvous to which the greater 
j)ortion of the fleet in the first instatice resorted, perhaps two of the 
tliree squadrons of which, as will hereinafter appear, the naval arm 
^v!^a comjHised.* 

The land-forces had in point of distance at least twice as far to 
cover between Sestos and Doriskos as the fleet, and would, of course, 
also move very much more slowly : the march can hardly have been 
accomplished in less than five or six days. The geographical indica- 
tions given by Herodotus are precise, and an appreciation of the 
geographical facts is shown in the record that the fleet was bidden 
await the army at the Sarpedonian promontory, and that the army at 
starting moved in a direction opposite to that taken by the fleet. 
From Sestos the land-route lies up the Chersonese, passing the tomb 
of Helle on the right, lea\'ing the city of Kardia on the left, but going 
straight through Agora (later Lysimacheia). This stretch might 
represent a two days' marcL From Agora the army rounds the hea<l 
of the gulf of Melas, crosses the river, and then, moving westwards, 
passes Ainos and Lake Stentoris, crosses the Hebros — a detail omitted 
liy Herodotus — and so reaches the plain of Doriskos, to find the fleet, 
and any forces the fleet may have conveyed thither, already there. 

The plain of Doriskos is, with Herodotus, the scene of the number- 
ing and organization of the host, and the organisation of the host i$ 
the occasion for a detailed description, all which will l>e considered 
more conveniently in another connexion.- The length of the pause at 
Doriskos is unfortunately not specified, but it cannot have been 
insignificant. Doriskos is in the narrative of Herodotus the most 
important station, from the military point of view, upon the king's 
march between Sardes and Themie. If we could implicitly accept the 



' Cp. Diodoros n. 3. '. 



■■" § 5 w»/ra. 



THE PERSIAN PREPARATIONS 

Heroilotean record, Xerxes reached DoriRkos at the head of a vast 
mob, and left it at the head of an organized army. It will be shown 
hereafter tliat such a record involves palpable misconceptions ; but 
the misconceptions are based probably upon genuine tradition, 
♦•specially vivid and accessible for the portion of the king's march, 
which led him through the Thnikian district of Athenian influence 
and subsequent empire. 

(vi.) Doriskos to AknntJws (cc. 108-121). — The geographical indica- 
tions for this portion of the march are especially thick ; cities, tribes, 
rivers, lakes, mount^iins, miners and bridges are all named in succession, 
and a special deed of horror is associated with the Persian crossing of 
the Strymon at I^iine Ways. Two points of especial significance are 
recorded of the king's march : the army and the fleet are in touch 
throughout the advance from I>orisko8 to Akanthos, and the army 
moves, according to Herodotus, through this section of the way — and 
apparently through this section only — in three separate columns, and 
on three more or less parallel roads. Both points require, however, 
important modification and readjustment, if they are to fit the real 
conditions. The tripartition of the land-forces, even if originating at 
Doriskoe, is certainly not to bo confined to this one short section of 
the march ; and not more than one of the three cohimns can be 
supposed to have accomjianied the fleet as far as Akanthos : the two 
inner columns will certainly have moved straight on from Ennea 
Hodoi and the Strymon to Therrae. It may also be doubted whether 
the fleet and the nearest shore column moved from point to point 
with an absolute synchronism, as the fleet would easily make each 
point at least twice as rapidly as the army.' 

This section of the mhance falls naturally into two sulniivisions : 
(i) from the Hebros and Doriskos to Alxlera and the Nestos ; (iL) 
from Abdera and the Nestos to Akanthos, or rather perhaps to 
Akanthos for the fleet, and to Ennea Hodoi and the Strymon for the 
army. These subdivisions are to some extent reflected in the narrative 
of Herodotus, in which Abdera figures as of some especial importance. 
(L) One column may have moved along the coast by the cities named, 
the Samothrakian forts (Sale, Zone, previously named), and the most 
westerly and important Mesambria (perhaps a halting-place), and so 
on across the Lissos, by Stryme (a Thasian settlement), Maroneia and 
Dikaia to Abdera, that side the Nestos : the fleet might in one day 
have accomplished this distance, which tlie army can scarcely have 
traversed in less than four days ; but Abdera and the mouth of the 
Nestos may well have been a common station for the fleet and the 
shore column. The other two columns, into which Herodotus divides 
the king's army on the march through Thrace, must have moved by 
routes further inland : the remarkable enumeration of Thrakian tribes 



' It ia jnat conceivable that there 
were oaljr two marching colurani, tho 



third coiuniD being conrcjed on (hip- 
board. 



138 



HERODOTUS 



APP. II 



between the Hebros and the Strymon may be a homage to that fact ; 
the mere choriogiaphy of the coast miyht have been obtained from 
the naval amirces, btit hardly the ethiiograijhy of the interior. Not 
but what both alike might have lieeii derived from the general 
geographical sources open to Herodotus, to say nothing of his own 
travels, albeit he is in error in placing Abdera upon the Nestos.^ The 
tradition of the king's march is, however, guaranteed for Abdera, as 
for Doriskos on the one aide and for Ennea Hodoi upon the other, by 
the definite anecdotal reminiscencea and incidents asaociated with each 
of these places respectively. 

(ii.) From Abdera and the Nestos mouth the fleet no doubt passed 
on between the island of Thasos and the projecting headland, on 
which Pistyros is placed by Kiepert, and so round to Eion, if it did 
not make straight for Akanthos and the canal. The army, or rather 
one of its three columns, passes Pistyros, leaves Mount Pangaion 
on the right, and passing Phagres and Porgamo.s, forts of the 
' Pierians,' reaches Eion and the Strymon. As Herodotus here omits 
to name places such as Oisyme and Galepsos, Thasian colonies known 
to Tliucydides, upon the coast-line between the Nestos and the 
Strymon, he is, perhaps, giving the route of the middle column alone, 
the left column making its way along the coast by a more difficult 
route, while the right marched furthest inland, beyond Pangaion, upon 
the line Krenides (PhiJippi) and Myrkinos, and rejoined the centre at 
Ennea Hodoi. The mention of tribes to the north of Mount Pangaion 
may bo taken to confirm this conjecture. The march from the Nestos 
to the Strymon could not have occupied less than three days. 

Herodotus tak«s Xerxes in person to Akanthos. It is likely that 
the king visited the canal through which the Heet was to pass, so as 
to avoid the dangers of Mount Athos; but it is, humanly speaking, 
certain that at least one column of the array will have marched to 
Therme by a route far to the north, across the narrowest part of the 
Chatkidic peninsula — a line of march of which Herodotus takes no 
account. The towns named by Herodotus between the Strymon and 
the canal may each mark a day's march upon the route of the main 
column, Argilos, Stageiros, Akanthos. From Eion to Akanthos and the 
mouth of the canal the course of the fleet would have been due south, 
and the voyage easily accomplished in a single day : at Akanthos the 
fleet and the army-column take leave of each other to meet again at 
Therme. 

(vii.) Ak-antkM lo TJi^rme (cc. 122-131). — The fleet is represented as 
passing through the canal and sweeping round the head of the gulf 
and down the east side of 'Sithonia' — the middle of the thi-eo 
Chalkidic promontories — rounding Cape Ampelos, and completing the 
whole circuit of the giUf of Torone from east to west, rounding Cape 
Kanastraion, passing up the west coast of Pallene and Kroasaia, visit- 



PREPARATIONS 



W 







ing every city on the way, commandeering additional contingents till, in 
the bay of Tberrae, it comes to rest on the shore between Therme and 
the mouth of the river Axios, in Mygdonia, a land-district already 
reckoned to the realm of xMakcdon. The narrative of this cruise from 
Akanthos tf) Therrae contains an all but complete catalogue of the 
cities in Chalkidike, such indeed as Athenian tribute-lists might have 
furnished, or Ionian geographers, before or after this expedition, might 
have compiled. That the lists are derived from express traditions or 
records of the Xerxeian ex])edition seems the least probable hypothesis. 
It may also be doubted whetiier the whole Persian fleet performed 
tliis elaborate periplus, instead of cutting across from Cape Ampelos 
to the point of Pallene, the rather because, having this time in any 
caae considerably the longer route, the fleet nevertheless arrives first 
at Therme, and there awaits the advent of the king and the land-forces. 
From Akanthos one column may have passed across the heads of 
the Singitic and Toronean gulfs, by Assa (Assera) and Olynthos, and 
so to Therme, though upon this route the land ai-my would still have 
L-id touch with the fleet, at least from jwint to point, as at Olynthos. 
The king himself may have pjirtially retraced his steps, and rejoined 
the centre column, so as to cut across the njidland by the shortest 

lUtc, across the neck of the Chalkidic ijortinsuia, to Therme.^ This 
bourse is described by Herodotu* as leading through Paionia and 
Kreatonia, a description which suggests a route lying still further 
north, and may perhaps point in a dim fashion to the route followed 
by the right, or inmost column, from the Strymon to the Axios, up 
the Strymon plain for some way, and across Mount Dysoros, and so 
down the valley of the Echeidoros. The whole movement from 
Ennea Hodoi to Thermo can scarcely have demanded less than nine or 
ten days. 

At Therme there is « hyjwthrsi a considerable pause, during which 

e Persian ' heralds ' return from southern Hellas, further preiKira- 
ions are undertaken for easing the advance of the army into Thessaly, 
while Xerxes, according to flerodotus, makes an excursion by sea to 
the mouth of the Peneios and the vale of Tempe. Such an excursion 
would have been an absurdity, if Xerxes hiraaelf were about to enter 
Thetisjily through the pass between Olympos and Osaa. The record 
ro»y be used as an argument to show that the king crossed into 
^essaly by one of the other passes, or may be discarded as an 

erodotean inconsequence of the ordinary type, on the supposition 
that the king reached Tempe at a later stage in due course by land. 
This premature visit to Tempe certainly implies a considerable reliance 
o the loyalty of the Thessalians, a complete satisfaction with the 
nces, brought back by the king's heralds, or proffered by the 
Aleuadai in his train. The road-making over the Makedonian 
mountains in front, which detains Xerxes a while at Therme, may fill 



HO 



HERODOTUS 



App. n 



a paiise correctly, but must not be allowed to rule out similar under- 
takings for earlier stages of the march. But this problem, though 
not a large one, may be more conveniently discussed in the next 
ensuing section, than as a mere appanage to the record of the king's 
march. 

§ 4. II. or far less certain and ascertainable quality than tho 
route of tho Persian forces from Sardes (or Kritalla) to Therme, are 
the Herodotean accounts of the actiuil j)reparation3 for the campaign, 
including those measures which wore necessary to make the march 
itself possible, such as the cutting and levelling of roads, the building 
of bridges, the digging of canals, the erection and storing of d^pdts 
and magazines, all culminating in tho actual mobilization of the forces 
by sea and land, wnth the lists of the army and navy so mobilized. 
On the last topic, indeed, Herodotus gives elaborate and more or less 
systematic information, which demands the closest and most minute 
scrutiny. On the prior group of topics Herodotus gives but incidental 
information, expanding here and there into a more elaborate passage, 
US that concerning the Ilellespontine bridges, or the Athos canal. 
It will be convenient to en^nsage separately here the engineering and 
commissariat arrangements in the first place, and to deal at greater 
length with the account of the Ime mi innnsf. 

(a) Engineering tporh : (i.) lioad-maJcing. — Tradition had preserved 
for Herodotus only the most notable instances, or reminiscences, as of 
the bridges and the canal ; the remainder is taken for granted, or but 
incidentally mentioned ; yet enough remains to suggest that much has 
been omitted or forgotten. Only for the district between Makedon 
and Thessaly does Herodotus happen to specify expressly any road- 
making ; ' but it is not unreasonable to suppose, especially in view of 
tho briilgos and canal, that the road question was not neglected, either 
through Thrace or Asia Minor ; that improvements were undertaken, 
and even new roads, or sections laid or cleared, along the main hne 
of advance, though this less sensational work has left little impression 
upon the Greek tradition. Only in Thrace is a hint preserved of 
local admiration for the European extension of the Royal Route :- we 
may, however, susjiect that in Asia Minor the great southern route, 
from Tyana to Apameia, was to some extent improved for the king's 
use upon this occasion. The Strymon was not the only river bridged, 
perhaps, nor is Herodotvis' list of the fortified d^pfita and magazines 
complete. The prominence given to the two chief works of the Persian 
engineers has probably obscured a great deal of useful but less 
astonishing work all along the route. The rapidity with which the 
Persian advance seems to have been effected implies no less.^ 



* 7. 131 rd yhp Sit *P*f ''* MoKeSovcKiv 
fxtipe rrit ot/mtj^j riurriiioplt, Xra rairrji 
8ir{i]) dirajTa i) (rrpaTii) it XlfpfKuPovt. 

' 7. 115 ■Hfy a oSiir Tai)Ti)i» rg j9a(riX(i>t 



Op^xei oSt' iirurwflpovai aifiorral re fuyd- 
\uf rb fUxjH- i/uu. Cp. XenophoD, Hell. 
4. 2. 8. 

' Alexander in 334 8.0. moTed from 
Pella (?) to Sestos in 20 days ; but his 



THE PERSIAN PREPARATIONS 



I acl 




In regard to the two chief works, the Hellespontine bridges and 
the AthoB canal, the simple matter of fact has to be distinguished — 
as so often with Herodotus — from the rationiile or motivation assigned 
by Greek tradition, popular or literary. If the fact be granted, 
the further question arises, how far a true description has been 
preserved, or ia recoverable, of the particular works in question. Of 
the existence of the bridges and the caiial Merodotua, as the repre- 
sentative of Greek tradition, has indeed not the shadow of a doubt; 
but the fantastic element in the motives, to which he ascribes these 
great works, and the inadequacy of his descriptions of them, from a 
practical or scientific point of view, have tended to aggravate the 
incredulity with which the traditions concerning them have been 
received.' Curiousl}' enough, the bridges over the Hellespont have 
never excited so much scepticism as the actual digging and use of the 
canal, though the former wei'c eje hifpothfjii quickly destroyed, and from 
the nature of the case have left not a wrack behind, while the latter 
invited, and still invites, the test of local verification. Of the two 
achievements the bridges were certairdy the greater triumph of 

gineering skill : the incredulity with which the story of the Athos 
'tenal has been received arose partly from a misconception of the 
exact line of the work, and jmrtly perhaps from the apparent 
inadequacy of motive for the work, and the disproportion between the 
efforts put forth and the permanent gain. In both respects it is 
possible on reflexion to abate the prejudice ; and criticism, while show- 
ing that the Herodotean descriptions leave much to be desired, and 
that the Herodotean rationale is fantastic and inconsequent, may end 
by adhering, as firmly as Herodotus himself, to the main facts, that 
the bridges were built and that the canal was digged. 

(ii.) Tlu hridcfirui of the Ilelktjwtii : {a) The fad. — It might be 
argued that the bridging of the llellcspont, a vast undertaking, was 

perfluous, with the fleet there ready to convey men and horses 
88 ; that the story of the bridges is no more than a legend 

nerated of a inotajvhor. The fleet itself is the bridge of boats u|>on 

hich the army crossed, the yoke of cords and timber which the 
g laid upon the neck of the sea.' For such criticism tti excelsU 
there are precedents in recent research, and there may be instances 
to which it is applicable ; but in the present case it was a maiufest 
.bsurdity. Even th« most ]>oetic description of the bridge is perfectly 
tetinite as to the nature of the object ; and the prose tradition leaves 



imtxtij only nuniliurfil some JO, 000 nicn, 
iii'l firot/iilily a portion of it wa.s ^elll 
in advance ; c{>. Arriau, Amih. 1. 12. 
5. 

* Am hj Demetrioa of .Skepais and 
Inveiul in ancinut tim<M, \>y Stciu, 
reoklein and otbcri) iu modern ; cp. 
'lUnvetU, HirodoU (1894), p]i. 290 If. 



- Cp. omclft quoted by HJt. 8. 77. 
AischyL fenai 69 tf. AivoitafUfi ■rx'S'9 

ToKiiyon^r SSiff/ui {iTY^r aii^^a\ini ai- 
Xi>i rhvTou. Cp. furlber 11. 112, 130, 
7-21-3, 731-6. 744-60. The oracio ( Bakia) 
in Hilt. i. 21 niigfat be i>srlier than the 
Aisohylean references ; cp. notes ad I. 



142 



HERODOTUS 



APP. rr 



no room for doubt, in a case where neither natural nor mechanical 
impossibilities are in question. The record of the loss and destruction 
of the first pair of bridge?, the account of the rebuilding, the description 
of the actual passage, the subsequent destruction of the bridges before 
the advent of the Greeks, ami the part played by the Bridge-motive, 
80 to speak, throughout the history of the naval operations, fomi in 
themselves a sufficient body of testimony. To these points may 
now l)e added the recently recovered name of the architect^ The 
Hellespontinc tradition in regard to the bridges must have been 
vivid and notorious. The ropes at Athens wore eloquent, if not 
absolutely conclusive, witnesses." Not less convincing to us maybe 
the consideration that the passage of the Hellespont by the bridges 
is almost essential to the rapid advance of the Persian host, othenvise 
inexplicable. Moreover there was good precedent for tliis bridge- 
building in the bridges over the Bosporos and over the Danube, 
unless we are prepared to dismiss those substantial erections into the 
limbo of iictions, to which, indeed, they lead, in the pages of 
Herodotus.' Unleaa there were something in the actual description 
of the bridges to condemn them as imi>ossiblo figments; we have no 
reason to doubt their historical reality ; yea, even in that case, while 
the actual form and structure of the bridges might be irrecoverable, 
the fact of their brief existence would remain. The description, 
however, though leaving much to desire, may be taken nevertheless 
to confirm the bare fact in question. 

{b) The de^aipHon of the. bridges. — Herodotus has complicated his 
description of the bridges by adopting a quasi-Homeric method of 
narrating tlie actual process of construction, and so attempting to 
rebuild the bridges before his re<Mler's eyes. The result is disastrous ; 
no bridge could ever have come into being by the process, or series 
of successive acts, enumerated by Herodotus. There are plainly in 
Herodotus two bridges, and the building of each of these bridges 
proceeds in four great acts, of which the last comprises some four or 
five subordinate and successive actions. (1) Tlie 'synthesis' of boats, 
pentekonters 'and triremes ' {360 and 314 respectively for each bridge), 
of course with their stems upstream. How this synthesis was 
accomplished Herodotus does not specify, nor what the relative 
positions of the triremes and the pentekonters. (2) Tlie anchoring of 
the bridges. Each bridge must have been separately anchored, and 
two sets of anchors must have been applied to each bridge, though 
Herodotus does not say ao, and his reason for the anchoring, not the 
current but solely the winds, is obvn'ously inadequate. Herodotus 

' Harpalos, possibly identical 'w-ith the and fame of the Samian were preserved 
Greek astronomer of the name ; cp. Diels, by the picture iu the Heraion. 

The oraUsion of the name by Hdt. is "'^'- ^- '-'^• 

pazzling, especially in view of hunnmiDB- * Hdt. 4. 83, 8S, 87. 88-39, 07, 98, 

tionofMandrokles, 4. 67. But the name 118, 136-U2. 



THE PERSIAN PREPARATIONS 






pf 



adds here a notice of the gap between the triremes and the pent«konters 
left for the purpose of allowing ships to pass up and down the 
Hellesf>ont. Aa a permanent arrangement this gap is an impossibility. 
I have conjectured that the pcntvkontcrs in each hridge were bound 
together, and formed a detachable portion or raft, which conid be 

ipped from itJj place, and drawn back again into position.* 
(3) The laying and tighteinn-g of ilie rahlet:. To each bridge are assigned 
six cables, two of flax, or hemp, and four of papyros, and these are 
now, according to Herodotus, drawn taut by capstans, or windlasses, 
on shore, verily a marvellous performance, if we are to conceive each 
of these ropes as upwards of a mile long. (4) The roadway. The 
passage is now bridged, but the roadway across the bridge, in each 
case, has yet to be laid : this is apjiarcntly accomplished by a succession 
of five distinct processes. First, wooden planks, which have been, 
of course, pre^^ousIy prepared, are laid across the six cables, apparently 
conceived as lying upon the triremes and pentekonters. Secondly, 
the planks, or logs, so placetl, are bound together, apparently by a 
fresh set of cables, not further described. Thirdly, upon the flooring 
BO created brushwood, in faggots perhaps, is laid, and, fourthly, upon 
this floor earth is deposited, and stamped or pounded into a compact 
iSarface. Finally, the roadway of the bridge, in each case, is completed 
by side walls, or parapets, drawn along each side, its full length, of 
a material and structure not further specified. 

This report, as it stands, is inadequate and unintelligible j it is 
neither a coherent account of the process of bridge-building, nor is it 
a visual description of the bridge, or bridges, as completed ; but it 
obviously contains a large amount of usable material for the ideal 
reconstruction of the bridges, and it is not in all respects equally 
unsatisfactory. The fourth, or last stage, suggests a concrete image. 
We see the roadway of this bridge, or that, guarded on either side 
by a close palisade, or barrier, as high as a man, and pi"eaenting a 
smooth surface of earth, which must have been <]uick]y converted 
ijito clouds of dust, unless kept constantly watered, an easy task 
under the circumstances. The basis of tins roadway may have liecn 
[fonnod of carefully selected faggots, of one kind or another, laid upon 
flooring of logs, firmly bound together. No bolts, nails, rivets, 
pins, or any such devices are mentioned in connexion with 
structure.^ The attachment of these logs to the underlying 

ibles is problematic ; were they bound thereon, or were they in any 
Idirect connexion whatever with the enables? Herotlotus' conception 
of the relation of the cables ami their purpose, throughout, seems 




' The t«xt it in doubt ; cp. 7. 36. 12. 
Thcrt •re. it may l>e remarked hero, six 
or «igfat textual problems in the chapter, 
for which »ee App. Crit. Tin- critical 
Bot« ou 7. 36. 10 is, (jerhaps, uot quite 



clear ; it would better run : t^i H iriptft : 
Trjt a Mptfl T^ z : rii H wpbi iaviprit 
re y«u H. : Midciu mihi oocnrreraat. 
* But op. Aiichylos, I.e. supra, roM- 



144 



HERODOTUS 



App. n 



somewhat obscure. This obscurity dominates the three previous 
stages in the bridge -building, as formuluted above. In the third 
stage the six cables in each bridge are stretched taut by the wind- 
lasses or capstans. Whether these six cables run across the whole 
length of the bridge, whether the cables of each sort are used con- 
tinuously throughout the whole length, whether the cables are 
attached to the vessels or lie upon them independently, ure all unsolved 
problems. The anchorage of the bridges as described by Herodotus 
is unintelligible. He assigns one set of anchors on the right hand 
to the one bridge, and another set of anchors on the left hand to the 
other bridge : this anuugement is absurd, unless the two bridges 
were so bound together as to make virtually one structure. He 
gives as reason for the anchorage not the current but the winds. 
Here, as in the remarks on the .^yjuiy/io*, on the SLtnTkooi, and on 
the orientation of the triremes and pentokonters in the first instance, 
he passes from description to theory, and becomes thereby doubly 
questionable. As to the anchorage, further, it is not clear whether 
each vessel is anchored, or whether the whole structure is anchored 
by a smaller number of huge anchors. How any interval can lie 
left in the bridge, 'between the pentekonters and triremes,' for 
other vessels to pass through is not explained. The first stage of 
all is equally obscure. Is the ' synthesis' of triremes and pentekonters 
independent of the cables ? Are the vessels in position across the 
waterway before the cables are brought into work 3 Are the bridges 
constructed across the waterway, or is the bridge first of all con- 
structed, and then swung into position 1 From which side of the 
straits is the work begim, or is it conducted equally from both sides T 
All these, and other questions, remain obscure in the narrative of 
Herodotus. 

To reconstruct the bridges conjecturally, without mechanical 
experience or knowledge, one might suggest that the ' synthesis ' of 
triremes and pentekonters, or perhaps the ' syntheseis,' took place along- 
shore, the pontoons so formed being floated, or towed out into the 
straits, and secui'ely anchored. The alternative is to picture each 
vessel as separately anchored, an arrangement presenting almost 
insuperable djfhculties from the strength of the current, and the depth 
of the waterway. Whether either bridge in its whole length was 
completely constructed and floated out, or whether the bridges were 
made in sections, and the sections joined, may be an open question : 
the latter alternative looks the moie probable to an unprofessional 
eye. The distance or interval betwt-en each vessel forming the bridge 
is not stated : was there any, or were not the vessels touching, broad- 
side to broadside ? Three hundred and sixty triremes, so arranged, 
might easily fill a space of 2600 yards,' so that, even with some fifty- 

' At 20 Ceet for tLti oubtide width, not an over-estimate ; cp. Torr, Ancient Skip* 
(1894), p. 22. 



1 



oared galleys introduced, we may conceive the space from shore to 
shore as completely filled in with a tine of ships lying side by side. 
The use of the pentekonters is not explained by Herodotus. It may 
be that the pentekonters, lashed together, formed a small section of 
either bridge, which could be slipped from its place and floated down- 
stream, in order to admit the passage of merchant and other craft up 
and down, the section being drawn back into its place by cables, when 
the bridge was to be used. This arrangement would, however, make 
it difficult, if not impossible, to supijose that the main cables were 
stretched from shore to shore, or extended along the whole length of 
the bridge. An alternative presents itself in the supposition that the 
majority of the vessels composing the bridges were pentekonters, and 
that triremes were introduced only where it was necessary to provide 
lor a gap, or passage, in the bridge, the cables and roadway being 
then carried over the larger and higher vessel, and a gap being left 
not between the triremes and the pentekonters but between one 
trireme and another ; the roadway extending above like a veritable 
bridge, and vessels and boats passing underneath, of course with masts 

CAod sails lowered. A third, but less prol>able, alternative presents 
■itself, viz. that one bridge was composed wholly of pentekonters and 
the other wholly of triremes. This is not the conception of Herodotus, 
or he would have put it moi-e cleaiiy ; nor is it easy to suggest a reason 
for auch a difference in the structure of the two bridges. Herodotus 
appears to conceive the cables as laid, and held taut, from the one 
shore to the other shore ; but this arrangement appears both 
superfluous and mechanically questionable ; and there is, perhaps, in 
lis mind a confusion between two kinds of bridges, a suspension-bridge 
of a type not uncommon in the East, but inapplicable to a passage of 
the dimensions of the Hellespont, and a pontoou-bridge, the only kind 
of bridge suitable to the conditions. The immense cables, which 
undoubtedly existed at Athens in his time, and the capstans or 
irindlasses, remains of which may have been visible still at Abydos and 
at Sestos, had perhaps been usetl for towing the pontoons into position, 
or for mooring them from the shores ; but to pull a great cable taut 
■from shore to shore across a mile of sea would have been a mechanical 
achievement transcending even the forces at the disposal of the great 
king. 

The variety of possibilities and alternatives thus presented in regard 
to the actual structure and character of the bridges, the real existence 
of which at the time and place certified is not in dispute, shows in 
itself how much the Heiodotean tlescription of the bridges, as 
mechanical works of engineering skill, leaves to be desired. Nor does 
Herodotus enable us to decide with complete aseurance the exact spots 
on either coast where the ends of the bridgea were attached to the 
,^^sbores, nor does ho specify whether the roadways were parallel to 
ch other, or at an angle. The orientation of the vessels stem and 

VOL,U L 



146 



HERODOTUS 



APP. It 



stern, tou /ui' ndiTow tTriKo/wtn? ToP Se EXAjpoTTOiTov xoTa pdov, 
BUggeata indeed that llorodotua conceived tho HelIes[)ont as foiining 
an angle with the Euxine, which is correct enough, but does not enable 
us to locate the bridges by reference to the course of the current. 
Prima facie the words imply ihat the vessels individually were parallel 
to the current, and to the sliores also ; and there is no hint in Herodotus 
that the current in the Hellespont crn-ssea from shore to shore, The 
abutment of the bridges on to a promontory upon the European side is, 
however, an ahsurdit}' gratuitously foisted on HerwloLus ' ; the bridges 
must have abutted upon a plain or valley, and it is possible that they 
were not parallel, but crossed the straits at an angle of which the apex 
was Abydos, abutting on the European shore on either side of a 
lieadland.-' 

((') MotiviitioTi. — Herodotus treats the bridges over the Hellespont, 
and presently the Athos canal, as evidences and exhibitions of the 
pride and folly of the Persian despot, still further displayed in hia 
wanton insults to the elements. The bridges had an adequate 
strategic justification ; by no other means could so large a force have 
advanced so rapidly, and the possibility of such undertakings bad already 
been demonstrated by Dareios in his European campaign. The 
bridging of the Hellespont was the natural sequel to the bridging of 
the Bosporos, Whether Xerxes hoperl to maintain the ])ridgcs 
Ijcrmancntly as a strategic and commercial highway is more doubtful, 
and far from the thought of Herodotus, though not in itself an idea 
to be dismissed as absurd. 

(iii.) Tke Atfws Canal. — (a) Th'i fad has lieen challenged again and 
again both in ancient and modern times, even by those who have 
credited the far more ambitious and difficult feat of bridging the 
Hellespont. This scepticism may in part have proceeded from a mis- 
conception of the exact line of the canal, and an erroneous assumption 
that the canal pierced Mount Athos itself. For such an error there 
is no excuse in the text of Herodotus, and the literary tradition, 
which includes not merely the description of the work by Herodotus 
and the record of the actual passing of the fleet thrnugh the canal,'' 
but also a guarantee by Thucydides,^ himself undoubtedly familiar 
with the region, is sufficiently borne out b}' the actual topography o£ 



1 Cp. my uote to 7. 33. 4. 

' Cp. Hauvette, pp. 294 ff. Tho un- 
equal length of the bridges woiilil not 
in itself prove that they were not 
jmrollel ("Or Stein retuarque avcc raison 
(!) que, les denx tignea tie bateaux qui 
fonn&ient le double pont (fi<) ('tant (ic 
longueur ini%ale, lenr direction ne 
do7ait ]iaa 6tre parallele." Hauvette, I.e. 
Uolesa the two coasts are to bo 8Ui)po.scil 
exactly parallel, why should they not 



have hflun connected by unequal parallel 
lines y 

' Deiiietrios of Skepsis, Straho 331, 
Jnvenal 10. 174, Stein, note to Hdt. 7. 
'ii, Weuklein, Tradition d. PenerkrUge 
p. 20, aiiggest that the canal was not 
actually used. 

* Th. 4. 109 l<rTi 9i {i, 'Axrii) irh roii 

Alyxloy -riXayot. 



THE PERSIAN PREPARATIONS 



k 



the isthmus, which still shows signs of the reality of the work.* Not 
to come to modern examples to prove the possibility of such work, 
Xerxes had tlie precedent of the canal of Necho and Dareios, a 
far more difficult and extensive undertaking,'^ and in relation to this 
fact the apologist has an easy triumph over the sceptic. 

(b) Destription. — That triumph is not gained, however, owing to 
the merits of Herodotus' account of the work, which again takes 
rather the form of a narrative of the process of construction than a 
description of the result \vhen efl'ecte<.l ; a method which suggests 
that Herodotus follows secondhand sources for the story, and was not 
personally acquainted with the remains of the canal in his own time, 
trhicb must still have been considerable. The praise accorded to the 
Phoenician engineers for following a method of construction, which, 
in spite of the historian's express assertion to the contrary, all the 
engineers, if any others were employed, must equally have followed, 
is proof afresh that Herodotu.s, in these matters, is completely at the 
mercy of the most popular and even trivial authorities ; while his feeble 
and confused description of the works, which were probably intended 
to prevent the silting up of the entrance to the canal, but discharge 
no definite function in his pages, exemplifies once more the conclusion 
that he himself was not abreast of the mechanical art a'ny more than 
of the natund science of his day.' 

(c) The rulmudc or motivation of this work is also at fault in the 
pages of Herodotus. The ostensilile reason, which he records, to save 
the fleet from the dangerous passage round Mount Athos, a passage 
which had cost Mardonios dear in 492 B.C., gives way, in his account, 
to another motive, the despot's pride. But for this pride, which 
plumed itself on accomplishing the impossible, removing mountains, 
taming seas, absorbing rivers, setting all natural and divine limits at 
defiance, Xerxes would, Herodotus opines, have contented himself 
with rolling his ships across the isthmus — as though such a por- 
formance could have been easily and quickly accomplished ! The 

rgument again recoils on its author, and damages his credit. ^Miether 
Xerxes had not an ulterior object, and hoped to keep open the canal 
as a commercial route, may fairly be asked, but can hardly l>e answerefl 
positively. Tlie failure of the whole expedition involved the ruin of 
the canal, and even Athens, with all her later interests in Thrace, 
teems never to have aspired to reopen this cutting. Commercially it 
irould probably have been a bad speculation. To this extent there is 
a sense in the Pride-motive advanced by Herotlotus : the canal was 
An unproductive and useless expenditure of labour and capital, except 
in its piu-ely strategic purpose: the failure of the military end in 
view discredited the mi^ans to that end, and the canal remained ' an 



• Cp. Leike, Northern Ortecf, iii. 24, 
125 ; CotuAairj, Voyage m SfiuAioiiu;, ii. 
158 ; HauMtte, op. ci<. 291. 



'' Hdt. 2. 158, 4. 39. 
' Cp, notes to 7. 23, 87. 



14H 



HERODOTUS 



APP. n 



example of a despot's folly, which is but the converse of a despot's 
pride. 

But from the Persian point of view, in the year 481 B.C., granted 
the design of reinvading Greece, with joint forces by sea and land, 
such works as the bridges and the canal were legitimate and even 
necessary contrivances, if Greece was to be invaded from Asia, on the 
scale projected, within the limits of a single campaigning seiison. The 
groat engineering works are not more bravado, but well calculated 
means to the given en<L It is with something of a .superstitious 
feeling that Greek tradition converts them into exhibitions of insensate 
human pride and folly, dictated by a mortal who mistook himself, or 
might have been mistaken by others, for an earthly C!od ! ^ 

(iv.) T}ic Commissariat. — The deliberate and practical spirit in 
which the great expedition was undertaken is in nothing more 
evidently displayed than in the provisions made for the support of 
the troops and animals. The commissariat is not the department of 
ancient warfare which ever engages the attention of the ancient 
historians to the degree which its interest and importance might seem 
to deserve. Greek warfare was on a small scale, and to a great extent 
self-supporting; and at all times the more showy side of warfare, the 
battles and sieges, the actual engagements, and adventures by soa and 
land, better lend themselves to rhetoric or story-tolling than the more 
humble yet not less essential work of piovisioning the forces, on the 
march or in the field. Herodotus is hardly the roan to prove an 
exception to the ruling neglect with which this aspect of ancient war- 
fare has been generally treated ; yet here, as often, incidental hints 
and touches are not wanting, which imply a larger background and 
perspective, and justify some constructive inferences ujion our part. 
The preparations which e.xtended over four years plainly include the 
accumulation and deposit of huge stores of provision (tu Trp6o-4>opa Ty 
ffrfiaTiy 7. 20), and magazines were formed in Europe, upon the route 
already selected, to which su[)plies were consigned from Asia, as well 
doubtless as accumulated from the surrounding country. Leuke Akte, 
Tyrodiza, Poriskos, Eion are all specified as such d6p6ts in Thrace, 
and Makcdon is also expressly included in the programme, Therme 
no doubt being the chief diJpfit in that quarter (7. 25). These great 
stores accumulated ujion the rout« may have been independent, to 
some extent, of the actual supplies commandeorod by the Persians on 
arrival, from place to place, as well as of supplies conveyed by the 
various columns on the march,- and probably served the Persians in 
good stead upon the return march, when food would doubtless 



* Cp. the anecdote 7. 56. 

* 7. 83 ifiTa Si ffipt (roTi niparfat) X'^P'f 
irroiiyia ^ov, 7. 00 toito fiiy yip aCrol 



rpXXV (pop^^v iptp6iJ.fvoi roptvltiiiOa, tovto 
S^ Tuiv ir (roil fwi^iwiu* yrir nal lOros, 
TOVTuy rbv ffiTOF i^otur- iw' ipor^pat ii 
xal 01' POfidSat trTparfvituBa. drtpas (XerxS* 
to Arlabaiios at Abyiioa). 



M 



TUE PERSIAN PREPAKATIONS 



149 



have been more difBcult to procure from the tribes or cities through 
which the retreat la^'.^ The Persians may have counted to some 
fxtent upon living at the expense of the enemy; but in such a coiintry 
as Greece, for such a host as the king's, that prospect would rightly 
have seemed a very luicertain one, to say nothing of tho possibility that 
the Greeks themselves would destroy the crops and means of sub- 

[.flistence for man and beast, rather than allow them to fall into the 
enemy's hand. Probably the king's fleet was very largely devoted 
to the convoy serA-ice of the commissariat : of the huge flotilla of 
3000 sail (nominal), which accompanied the fleet proper, the greater 
part was probably for the service of the army. The resolute refusal, 
or inability, of the king to use the fleet upon independent service 
points to some such drag upon its free movement : the shipe of war 
were needed for the protection of the Commissariat transports. 
Herodotus leaves no doubt as to the nature of the direct levies or 
requisitions made upon the Greek cities fringing the king's route. "^ 
The case of Thasos is oidy the most conspicuous of it« class, and the 
entertainment provided by the Thasians is by no means confined to 
the king and his immediate suite ; though doubtless the king's table 
was most sumptuously served : the provision, however, extends at 

I least to the whole column, which marched with the king, and similar 
provision was doubtless made for the other columns. Nor was the 
arrangement an impromptu extemporization : full notice had been 
given a long time in advance.^ Herodotus abates his wonder at the 
reported failure of the rivers to support the demands made by the 
innumerable host of Xerxes, only to enlarge it, in view of the supply 
of meal for all those myri.ids.'* The exaggeration of the numbers 
creates a part of his difficulty ; but the passage which preserves his 
wonderful calculation is, in any case, a just homage to the admirable 
provision made for the commissariat. The movement of the army 
from Therme to Athens also implies in itself an adequate organization ; 
nor do the arrangements fail Xerxes on his retreat, nor Mardonios 
during his subsequent operations,^ even though the king's fleet has 
been dissipated, and all supplies must have been found in loco or 
drawn from Thessaly, Makedon, anrl Thrace overland. But the 
Commissariat too must have its comic and humorous side for the 

'Greek witlings. It was no joke to have to entertain the great king, 



* ib. <tJ init. ¥ixn-lfaont¥ dr/ifb) o&tt 
X<>iy irrvx^tt otia/Mi oOrt dVXo d>;a^ 
oiSi» -raSbPTtt (Hdt.'s irony). 

* 7. 116 cue of Akanlhos, 7. 110 of 
TtiMM, 7. 120 of Abdera, 7. 121 the 

reitiM gDDenllj. The exact sum ex- 
bonded by the Thuuns u given as 
JOO t«lent« ; see further, notw ad ll.e. 
The story of Pythioa, 7. 27. suKests 
4 similar arrmngement for the king's 



preriona advance to Sardes ; cp. notes 
adl. 

' 7. llfi ^<r iroXXoC XP^">" rpoeipiiiUi'oii. 

* 7. 1S7 oCSir lUH OCijM. TaplrraTai 
wfioiovvai ri. jMtOpa twp roratiwr fcTi¥ 
£)r, dXXd ftaWoi' 5kui rh atrta irri-xjnjat 
@un6. iiM nvpiiai Toaavrgvi. On the 
riven that failuil cp. note to 7. 31 ; ib. 

> Cp. the anecdote 9. 82. 



160 



HERODOTUS 



APP. ri 



but it was made the occasion of many an indifferent jest ; ^ and no 
anecdote better illustrates the whimsical magnanimity of the oriental 
despot than the assiiredly distorted reminiscence of hia dealings with 
the Hellespontine corn-traders. - 

§ 5. Tlie Let:h en Manse: Nitmbers, Composition and Leading of Ok 
King's Forces. — The subject is launched by Herodotus in an unusually 
rhetorical passage, not free from some rather crude exaggerations, 
yet bearing witness to the strength of the traditions, which repre- 
sented the forces, whose preparation, organization, and mobiliKation 
hfid occupied upwards of four years, according to report, as the 
greatest ever set in motion, within Greek memory or knowledge, by 
one man.' Herodotus follows Up the passage cited by detailed army 
and navy lists, containing statements respecting the numbers, com- 
position or description, antl leading of the king's forces by land and 
sea. The following analysts gives the specific references under the 
several heads: — InfarUnj : numbers, cc. 60, 184-186; composition, cc. 
61-80; command, cc. 81-83, Cavalry: numbers and composition, cc. 
84-86 ; command, cc. 87, 88. Navy : numbers (i.) of ships, cc. 89, 97 ; 
{ii.) of men, cc. 184-186 ; composition, cc. 89-95 ; command, cc. 
96-99. Incidentally the equipment and armature of the forces are 
also described, in graphic terms. The soiurces from which Herodotus 
derived this mass of material are not easily detenninahle : let it suffice 
here bo say that there is good reason to ti-ace various elements to 
various sources, and that upon the whole his descriptions and calcula- 
tions of the king's sea-power are more acceptable and reasonable than 
hia account of the land-forces. It will therefore be convenient to 
review the passages on the navy in the first place. 

The Perdaa Navj/'Ust, as first given (c. 89), comprises twelve 
contingents ranging from 300 ships to 17, and enumerated in 
geographical order from Phoenicia to the Hellespont. The particulaj' 
number of ships in each ethnical contingent is exactly specified : the 
figures, with one exception, are all round numbers ; the items and the 
sum total agree.* Aischylos appears to confirm, if he is not the 
authonty for, the Herodotean total. ^ It would be carrying scepticism 



• 7. 120. 
» 7. 147. 

' 7. 20, 21. 

* (1) Phoenitians 300, (2) Aegyptians 
200, (3) Kyprians 150, (4) Kilikiaiis 100, 
(:'.) Pamphylians 30, (6) Lykirins SO. (7) 
Dorians 30, (8) Kariana 70, (9) lonians 
100, (10) Nesiotes 17, (11) Aioliana (JO, 
(12) Hellospcmtinns 100 : total 1207 
('fixiin Asia,' c 1S4). The Thrakian 
refficm stipplies 120 in addition, 7. 185, 
raiaioff the total to 1327. 

' Awchyl. Periu 341 (T. SipiT) S4, Kal 
yip olici, X'X'it fUy ^y \ iiy JJTfe rXf/9oi, 
o! J' inripnarm rix" I inB-'riiy Jit ^ar 



irrd B'- <13' tx^i \lrfOt. Herodotui haa 
rightly luiderstood Aischylos to put 
the sum total at 1207, the 207 vessela of 
extra speed not l>eing included in the 
Chiliad ; cp. the preceding linea on the 
number of the Greek fleet, where the 
Ihead in plainly in addition to th« 300. 
Aischylos gives the figures for Salainis, 
Herodotus the Persian ligiire forDoriskos; 
but the discrepancy is unimportant, for 
Herodotua rates loanea and additions 
between Doriskos and Salnmis as practi- 
cally equal ; cp. 8. 66. This eatiraate 
is, however, quite abanrcJ in view of the 
actual losses recorded in the course of the 



THE PERSIAN PREPARATIONS 



151 



N 



undulj far to regard this list as a purely ideal list : the narrative 
inddentally confirms the composition of the fleet in sundry particulars, 
And the sum total, even when raised to 1327 by the addition of 120 
vessels from the European Greeks, is not absolutely incredible. Six 
liundred triremes had sailed to Ionia, according to Herodotus, in 490 
B.C. (6. 95) ; six hundred triremes had served in the fleet of Dareios in 
512 B.C., a fleet mainly raised from Asia Minor (4. 87); six hundred 
vessels was the nominal total of the lleet opposed to the lonians at 
Lade (6. 9).' Twice that total does not appear an impossible figui-e 
for a fleet recruited from Egypt, Phoenicia, Kypros, and the whole of 
Aaia Minor. But the fact that Herodotus in the course of his 
subsequent narrative accounts for the destruction of more than half 
the Persian fleet before it reaches Phaleron, may seem to throw some 
doubt upon the original total, the losses are so abnormal. Herodotus 
is in two minds as to the amount of these losses and their cfTect upon 
the total of the Persian fleet, hut they were probably exaggerated in 
tradition. From 1000 to 1200 may not be an incredible figure for 
the nominal strength of the Persian fleet at Doriskos ; but perhaps 
little more than half that number finally reached Phaleron. The 
figure 3000 for the transport and commissariat looks incredibly large, 
jind as presented by Herodotus the figure is unacceptable. But if wo 
Euppose a pait of the forces to have been conveyed to Doriskos by 
«ea, a proportion of 2 or 3 to 1 between the transports and the 
b.ittle-shipe may not seem so gross an absurdity ; though the total 
may be one small reason the more for suspecting exaggeration all 
along the line. 

The estimate wluch Herodotus gives for the manning of the fleet 
follows from his figures for the ships. Granted a fleet of 1207 
triremes, granted 200 men as the crew of a trireme, there results as 



Uftnutire, which amouBt to 6i7 +x + y: 

400 ut least in the stomi, 7. 190, 286; 

«4id 15 captured by the Grveks o(t 

ArtamisioD, 7. 194 ; 200 wrecked in 

' circnronaviKating Euboia, 8. 7. 13 ; 30 

[captursd by the Ore«ks in the first 

Kngsgeuieut off Artemision, 8. 11 ; a 

Lemnian vessel deserted, 8. 11 ; a Kood 

number, not Hperided {=z), of Kilikian 

jkTMsela deatroyed in the second engnge- 

Inent off Artemi«>on,8. 14 ; a large nttmbcr, 

|lk>tap«cified ( = i/), lost in the third en- 

Inigeiuent off Artemiirion, 8. 16. Hdt. 

l3oM not specify the number of xhips 

I deetroyed or cuptun^d at Salamia, bat ■ 

eertaiu d timber, probably the greater 

part of the fleet, escaped, 8. 108, ISO; 

ui tlie following ye«r the fleet only 

•Mionntti to 300, the lonians tDcluded, 

It. 130 ; and this remnant, it may be 

[added, was all deotroyed by lire after 



Mykale, 9. 106. If we allow 53 for x 
and y above, the total losses actually 
accounted for in the pages of Herodotus, 
exclusivoorthe battle of Salamis, amount 
to 700 vessels : adding the 300 recorded 
at Mykale a Chiluid is ncMTOunted for ; 
by a process of exhaustion 207, or in- 
cluding the 120 ships frnni Thrace 327, 
woald be the figure for the loss at 
Salaniis. As a 'regulative idea' this 
figure is not devoid of pUosibility ; but 
no great authority can be claimed for 
the above calculations on which it is 
based. 

* The figure of the fleet of Mardonioa 
in 492 B.(.'. is not given, but it was a 
large fleet (x/^M^ roXXi>' vtwr), and the 
number wrecked on Athos was put at 
300, wliich would imjily a total of at 
least 600, Hdt. 6. 43-45. 



15S 



HERODOTUS 



APP. 



total of the crews, 241,400 men. Thirty Epibatai for each trireme- 
a high but not incredible allowance — gives a total of 36,210 fighting 
men, and a gross total for the fighting fleet of 277,G10 men. This 
sum is no doubt conjectural, and must suffer rebate from the probable 
exaggeration of the numbers of the Heet, as well as discount for 
failures and losses on the way, to say nothing of squadrons 
covering the lines of communication. The figure in any case 
represents an estimate for Doriskos, not a record for Salamis. 
Herodotus adds 130 ships as raised from Europe, and estimates their 
crews at 24,000 men, inconsequently making no allowance for Epbatai 
upon this contingent : analugy demands an addition of 3600 on 
that score ; but the whole item is open to grave suspicion. Herodotus 
adds 240,000 men as manning for the 3000 pentekonters, and other 
light boats, at 80 men per boat ; and counts all these to the ' fighting 
men,' getting a total for the fleet alone of 517,010 — the European 
contingent (24,000 + 3600) not included. But, if the fleet of 3000 
vessels represent anything, it probably re]>resents commissariat and 
transport, not fighting mat oriiil ; an<l if a quarter of a million be taken 
as roughly the sum total of the naval forces at Doriskos, irrespective of 
transport, wo have still a host of astonishing and unexampled magnitude. 
His own figure Herodotus doubles by the simple expedient of allowing 
an attendant for every man whom he reckons to the fighting force, a 
device which at one stroke of the pen raises the personnel of the navy 
to upwards of a million souls, always exclusive of the Euroi>ean 
additions. Put in this way the device appears monstrous, and the 
result incredible : the humble oarsman at lea.st had no valet ! But if 
we may suppose the sense underlying it to be that, whatever the 
numbers in the fighting fleet, all told, whether oarsmen, sailors, 
oflicers or marines, as many more must be allowed for the transports, 
naval commissariat and service generally, the statement is admissible, 
and the result, which would raise the personnel mobilized in connexion 
with the fleet to upwards of half a million men, remains sufiiciently 
astonishing. Herodotus, indeed, will have slightly more than doubled 
that figure ; but this exaggeration appears comparatively venial, after 
his estimates for the land-forces have been considered.' 

TJk Vrnnmand lunl Orffiniizalkm of the FUet is a further problem 
which arises naturally from the indications in Herodotus. Clearly 
there were four admirals of the fleet, but whether the fleet was 



» NA\Tr. 

1207 slifpsit 200 men , 
SO Epihiit&i jier aliip 



8000 Pent«koDtera at 80 



211,100 
36,210 



277,810 
240,000 

617,610 



Attendants . 

Raised in Europe, 120 Bhii« 
AttendontB 

Totnl given by Hdt 
Epibotait 



. 517,610 

1, 03.1,220 

24,000 

. 24,000 

. 1,088,220 

3,600 

1,086.820 






THE PERSIAN PREPARATIONS 

divided into three or into four distinct squatJrons, and whether there 
was any supreme admiral except Xerxes himself, are points open to 
discussion. Ariabignes commands ' the Ionian and Karian ships,' 
Achaimenes 'the Egyptian,' Prexaspes and Megabazos 'the rest'; 
hether as one or as two divisions is not 8t<ited. This express 
rganization made by Herodotus breaks down complete!}', if strictly 
applied to his own navj'-list. The ' Egyptian ' contingent numbers 
200; the 'Ionian and Karian' numbers 170, or including the 
' Dorians,' who might be reckoned to the Karian, 200 ; but this 
would leave upwards of 800 vessels under the command of Prexaspes 
and Megabazos — a very improbable arrangement, all the more so 
as Achaimenes, the king's own brother, evidently in the traditions 
occupies a foremost position as admiral. The supposition, which 
might present itself, that the total fighting fleet numbered — as 
usual — 600 vessels, divided into three squadrons of 200 eiich, takes 
too little account of the strength and precision of Herodotus' navy- 
list, and of the scale which must be conceded to the forces of Xerxes, 
if the general tradition in regard to the war is to be explained. 
Assuming that the fleet was organized in four divisions, under the 
I four commanders named, and that the total figure is correctly stated 
as 1200 (1207), we obtain 300 ships as the figure for each division, 
^H« likely enough hy]X)thesis. The exact composition of these divisions 
^His again speculative. The Phoenician, ."^OO strong, perhaps under 
^Bfeapreme command of Prexaspes, son of Aspathines, may well have 
^Bconstituted a unit in itself. The Egyptian contingent, 200 strong, 
^Htinder Achaimenes, may have been raised to the required strength for 
^H a squadron by the addition of the Kilikian 100. The 'Ionian and 
1 Karian ' squadron, under Ariabignes — a fixed point of light in the 
tradition — may have included also the Dorian (30), Aiolian (60), 
Pamphylian (30), and Nesiote (17) contingent*, giving a strength 
for the squadron of 307. There remains, as a fourth squadron, 
the somewhat anomalous union of Kvprians (150), Lykians (50), 
and Hellespontines (100) under the potential command of Megabazos. 
Fleets of 300 vessels, or of multiples of 300, are more or less normal 
in Persian history of the period, and the fourfold command suits 
this alternative. On the other hand, a tripartition of the fleet would 
be in accordance with analogj*, and with some of the indications for 
the Ijattle of Salamis ; and a tripartition of the fleet into s(|uadrons, 
of appro.ximately 400 vessels, is also suggested by the actual grouping 
of the commanders by Herodotus. A natural division of the fleet 
into three squadrons may be thus effected : the Egyptian (200), 
Kyprian (150), Lykian (50), or ' Egyptian ' squadron under 
Achaimenes ; the ' lonio - Karian ' under Ariabignes, comprising 
lonians (100), Karians (70), Dorians (30), Pamphylians (30), Aiolians 
(60), Hellespontines (100), Nesiotes (17), and amounting to 407 
Teasels, all told; and 'the rest,' that is, the Phoenicians (300) and 



164 



HERODOTUS 



AFP. n 



the Kilikians (100) under Prexaspes and Megabazos, a general 
arrangement which left the native princes in command each of the 
contingent from his own city. Unfortunately the indications in the 
narrative, although they allow us to catch a glimpse here and there 
of the fortunes of particular contingents, are far from enahling us 
to decide with absohite confidence upon the comprjsition and numlicr 
of the several squadrons, or divisions, of the Beet. Upon the whole 
tripartition seems the more probable alternative to my mind, and I 
should not hesitate to carry one, if not two, of the squadrons direct 
to Doriskos, as convoy for the transports, and leave one, rather than 
two, for the j>rotection of the bridges and the naval review at Abydos.' 
Herodotus describes the equipment or armature of the marines, or 
fighting men serving on the fleet, but it is a short sinnmary compared 
with the elaborate catalogue and description of the land-forces, and 
may better be considered later, in connexion therewith. It may, 
however, be said here that Herodotus involves himself in something 
of an inconsequence by describing the various ethnic equipments of 
the Epiltatai on the fleet — it is to Epibiilai alone that the descriptions 
couJd apply — and also apparently representing the Epiba(<ii on the 
fleet as drawn from the Persians, Medes, and Sakai, wliose armature 
ia described in the course of the army-roll. The explanation of this 
apparent contradiction may be that while the various contingents 
earned a normal number of native Epibatai, a complement of Archers 
was added to e^ach contingent, or vessel, drawn from the chief nations 
that used the bow, either in addition to the thirty Epihaim, specified 
by Herodotus for each vessel, or more probably as included in this 



' Eiihoroa (Diodoros 1 1, 3. 7) evidently 
tliouglit that tha fleet first came into 
touch with the army at Doriskos. The 
'HellL>8j)oiiliiio' ships would naturally 
rcndezvuusi in the Helle.spoat. On the 
other hand Xeriea enters a Sidonian 
ship at Abjrdoa, and Phoenicians bad 
been employed on one of the bridges. 
At DoriBKOig a naval review i« held, as 
\voIl as a review of the land-forces. The 
I'c.'sl or final organization of the fleet, as 
of the army, ia effected at Doriskos, and 
it ia little short of absnrd to suppose 
that the whole Beet of 1000, or QpwnnLs 
of 1000 vejisels, was previouHly reviewed 
at Abydos, in a more or le-ts cluiotie 
condition withal. It is to be noticed 
that beaido the four Persian admtntls 
the various contingents mnkin^ up the 
ftuct were nuder their loca.1 coiiininndenn; 
wc have the following ideutiHcations in 
Herodotns : — The Sidonian, TfTj>ii;u>j)crTOj 
'AfiVof, the Tyrian Morrfjv Sipui^oi'i the 
Aradiun >Wp^aXoi 'Ay/JdXoi', the Kilikian 
"^uiryfta 'UpofiiSovTot. Each of these 
commanders may represent 100 shipe. 



The Lykiati Kv^tpulffKot SUa preaomably 
coniinnuded fifty vo:iMl8. The names of 
four Kyprian coromaiidera have come 
■lown : Vipyot o X^/xt(oi, Ti^udwoJ 6 Ti/io- 
-fiptw, these two apiyarently in the chief 
jilace ; the Paphtao admiral IlevfluXoi 
6 Siffumiov had started with twelve ships 
from Paphos (7. 105), ^iKduv. brother of 
Gorgoa (iupra) of S.ilamis, was perhaps 
in command (S. 11): but the exact 
distribution of the 150 Kvprian shipe 
among the native commanders remains 
obscure. Of the Karians (70 ships) 
three commandera are named, 'Icmatoi i 
'V^'^U'iu, niyprft o 'taatXSupoi; ^auaal- 
St'fjLot 6 KafSai'Xetii, to whom may be 
added, though in a humbler position, 
'ApTt/u<rlti f) Ai'ySd.fuot, who led five (of 
the thirty Dorian) shiipi. The governor, 
or tyrant, of Aiolitin Kynie is also 
named as in command of fifteen ahi{)<, 
SafSuiHTjt 6 Qatioaiou (7. 194). On the 
ll;;ht shed by the narrative of the naval 
operations uixm the composition of the 
various squadrons see riirtner in/ra. 



THE PERSIAN PREPARATIONS 



1S5 



number. In any case the largo niunber of Epihatai^ and the nature 
af their equipment, would show that the tactics of a naval battle 
were intended to follow, as nearly as ])083ible, the tactics of land- 
forces. 

Upon the whole, Herodotus' account of the naval forces of the 
king is characterised by relative sobriety and verisimilitiule, in spite 
of the uncertainty, inconsequence, and exaggeration touching the 
numbers of ships and of men, and the inadequacy and shortcoming 
of his description of the command and organization of the fleet in 
its various divisions. These comparative merits are only to be 
«xpecte<l in an account of that part of the forces, a moiety of which 
was drawn from Greek cities, and almost all from regions with which 
the Greeks were familiar ; the ca.se is not the same with the army-list. 
I The Army or Land-Fi/rces. — Herodotus does not start with a 
■complete estimate of the numbers produced by the Itde en masse. 
Not until ho has brought the anny (and fleet) to Doriskos, in his 
account of the advance or march of the king towards the frontiers of 
Hellas, does he attempt a numerical estimate. His excuse for this 
procedure is that not till Doriskos was reachetl did Xerxes himself 
and bis Persian officers know the numbers of the forces. As thus 
asserted, this view seems improlmble, not to say absurd. According 
to Herodotus himself there had been a great muster at Kritalla, and 
prizes given to the best equipped contingents: this record implies 
numbering. The king and bis forces had spent a whole winter at 
Sardes : had there been no numbering and organization of the forces 
there ? At Abydos a review of army and of fleet had been held : was 
no use made of the occasion for the purpose of estimating, or verifying, 
previous estimates of the numbers i With the numbering at Doriskos 
went, if we may believe Herodotus, the organization of the forces ; 
till they reached Doriskos the forces of Xerxes were ex hifpotfifxi an 
unorganized unnumbered mob. But how could a march, of hundreds 
of miles, have lieeti arranged on such hajipy -go-lucky principles ! The 
narrative of Herodotus itself suggests something better than such mere 
chaos : there is at least an organized core to the army which leaves 
Sardes ; there is an organization for the passage of the Hellcspjut by 
jthe two bridges, and the fighting raon and army service are clearly 
listinguiahed ; nay, the order of march is changed en rmUe, which 
iplies a considerable degree of organization. The precise items for 
lio fleet imply the levy of definite numerical contingents from the 
cities and nations composing it ; the same method will have held good 
for the land-forces. From every point of view it seems impossible to 
admit that the great army came together, a casual and uncalcuiated 
multitude, and that, until the i)um)>ering was accomplished at Doriskos, 
Xerxes and his officers were completely in the dark respectins^ the 
numbers of the fighting men on land. Moreover, at Doriskos, 
method is recorded for the numbering of the cavalry, while the 



166 



HERODOTUS 



APP. II 



numbers of the infantry are ascertained by an absurd method, im- 
possible under the circumstances ; and the anecdote tends to discredit 
not merely the sum total given, but the whole scene laid at Doriakos.^ 
Yet several considerations point to the admission that Doriskos was 
an important station on the Persian a«ivancc, and that some definite 
stage in the mobilization of the Persian forces was there accomplished. 
Doriskos was the last rendozvo\i8 po8sil>le for the forces by sea and by 
land before the passage of Atbos ; it was the first station in Europe 
where a complete muster would have been possible. It was itself on 
a large well-watered plain beyond striking distance from Greece, a 
point in its favour against the plain round Therme. From Doriskos 
onwards the narrative itself exhibits the Persian land-forces as a well- 
organized array advancing in three distinct columns, by three separate 
roada. The whole tradition of the scene at Doriskos, however 
questionable in details, may be held to imply a consciousness, a 
reminiscence, of some great ami memorable transaction. The least we 
can see in the muster at Doriskos is the occasion for giving final and 
definite constitution and organization to the land-forces. It is jit:)Ssible 
that the forces reached Doriskos as ethnic units, tho number of men 
ill each, of course, already known and recorded, at leitst by the native 
leaders and their Persian superior officers. If so, the ethnic units were 
then organized and thrown together into squadrons and divisions, of 
approximately equal numbers, and finally massed into three great 
columns or rorpx d'arm&. It may even be suggested that a great 
portion of the land-forces, including a large part of the cavalry, 
reached Doriskos not by the Hellespont, and overland, but by sea, 
in transport vessels, from Asia and the Levant. There might then be 
three great points on the march at which musters, and the gradual 
organization of the land army, were held and accomplished : Kritalla 
in Kappadokia, the rendcKvous for the land-forces of middle Asia, which 
marched ^vith the king to Sardes ; Sardes, or perhaps Abydos, the 
rendezvous in the spring for the lnv^e drawn from Anatolia ; and 
Dorisk'w, tt) which the transports might convey direct a large part of 
the land-forces, not merely from the south of Asia, Minor, but from 
further east, Parthians and Baktrians, enshipped in the ports of Syria, 
men and horses, and carried with comparative ease and expedition to 
Thrace, there probably to await tho atri\al of the king, his guards, and 
Anatolian levies. A portion of the fighting fleet would presumably 
have been employed to convoy the transports to Doriskos ; and though 
Xerxes had hold a review of ships at Abydos — the first available point 
for the puqiose, and the earliest common rendezvous for army and navy 
— it is not likely that the whole vast fleet of upwards of 1000 vessels 
was taken into the narrow channel of tho Hellespont, simply to be 
seen and taken out again. - 

Numbers. — As to the actual numbers for the Persian forces, even at 



' Soc notes to 7. S9, 60. 



* Cp. note 1 p. l.')4 iupra. 



Doriakos, Herodotus has no items to give, but contents himself ^^nth 
simple totjils, which are stiil in themselves surprisingly large, 
1,700,000 for the foot, 80,000 cavalry. These figures are else- 
where (cc. 184 ff.) actually doubled, as in the case of the navy, by 
the simple expedient of allowing one servant or attendant for each 
fighting man. The expedient npi)ear8 to be an assumption transferred 
from the practice of the heavily-armed fJreek citizen infantry, and is 
plainly inapplicable to the Asiatic forces of Xerxes. A mass of 
Attendants, of both sexes, upon the Persian officers and leaders, and 
other privileged persons, an immense suite and retinue for the king 
himself, may be lulmitted to swell the marching column, and to 
encumber the camps and laagers ; but the simple duplication of the 
forces, by the allowance of an attendant to every fighting man, may 
safely be cancelled, and the original figures discussed upon their own 
merits. At the same time the ultimate totals, results of Hcroilotus' 
own speculation, impossible and absurd as they are, do not tend to 
enhance his authority in the earlier and lower estimates, for they show 
•with how little critical faculty or concrete imagination he handles the 
problems of time and space, of movement and rest, of supply and 
accommodation involved.* 

Before discussing the incredible figures in Herodotus it may be well 
to notice the reduced estimates offered by the ancient authorities 
subsequent to Herodotus. The variant* here come into account. 
Rtesioa and Ephoros give 800,000 as the regulative number.- This 
figure might have resulte<l from the figiire in Herodotus for the 
t-avalry. Trogus and Nepos have an estimate at once lower and 
higher: 700,000 is indicated as the number of the infantry, raised 
to a million, or more, by the addition of au.xiliaries, or cavalry ; 
the form of this variant in Trogus is evidently preferable, but the 
figures are all alike unconvincing.* The later estimates improve on 
Ilerodotus by lowering the totals, but might be merely rough 
rationalizations of his figures, have no appearance of being based upon 
inde{»emlent tradition or evidence, and carry no authority, except as 
condemnatory of the Herodoteiin exaggerations. The oldest estimiUe 
is a poet's, and fixes the number at three millions (Simonides ap. 
Hdt 7. 228). 



• AtlVY. 

liifwitry .... 1,700,000 

Ctvulry .... 80.000 
Chiiriota«n and Camel- 

<lrive« .... 20,000 

Tl.r»kian»<eto.) . 300,000 



2,100,000 
Attendknta. . 2,100,000 



TotJvI of Land-forcea 
ToUl of Sea-forcea 



^, -JOG. 000 
1,083,220 



Total given by Hdt. 
Ouiittod by UdL 



fi,2.S3,2:iO 
3,«00 

6.2S«.820 



» Cp. Ai»i«ndi)i I. §1 5, 0, 13. 

» C[). ApptiidiJC 1. §§ 13, 14. The toul 
in Ne|KM and Trogiis can hardly have 
been obtained by oinittiug xal ^Karif 
in Hdt. 7. 60, for the authenticity of 
these words is guaranteed by the elaborate 
calculationa in cc. 184 £ 



158 



HERODOTUS 



App. ir 



So far as Herodotus is concenied, tlie problem of number centres 
upon the figure of 1,700,000 given for the infantry. The figure iu 
itself is a difficulty ; it is a vnsi army, and considerations of time, 
of space, for its march and raovementa, especially over the bad roads 
and rugged highlands of Thrace and Makedon, reflexions upon the 
commissariat, the extravagance of such a host in view of the end to 
be accoinjjlished, and tho patent impossibility of conducting such a 
multitude under the given circumstances, all militate against the 
credibility of the total. Yet the figure could be more satisfactorily 
explained away, if its origin had been traced. It has been supposed 
that there were actually 170 Wyriarclis, captains of ten thousand, 
at Doriskos, arul on the supposition that every Myriarch had really 
10,000 men under his command, the sum total would work out to 
1,700,000 men. But if these great regiments were only of nominal 
strength, and your Myriarch commanded rarely a 10,000 men, and 
often but a half, or a quarter such, though we get a kind of origin 
for the given total, we have no conclusion at alt as to the actual 
strength of the infantry ; and we are left hovering over any figure 
between a million and a miHion and a half, still far too high an 
estimate for concrete possibilities or, we may add, for the subsequent^ 
indications of the narrative. Yet the method in this computation 
is not wholly amiss ; and as doulitless the king and his liigh officers 
will have obtained frL>m their subordinates evidences and return* 
to satisfy them how far the results of the levy realized their 
expectations, and what the attnal number of men under arms was ; 
and seeing that the decimal system plainly nndorh'es the organization 
and leading of the Pirsian army as a fighting force, it is assuredly 
the arrangement of the command which, if anything, will furnish a 
clue to the actUiU numbers involved.^ 



' There are thrao methods by which 
attempts have boeu made to reduce aud 
rationalize tho tiguiies in Hdt. — (a) Simple 
rational i.tm, bs by Rawiinson (vol. iv. 
pp. Ifilf. ), who Mtimatea the Asiatic 
infantry at about 1,000,000, iind allows 
the 80,000 cavalry to pass. This niethoil 
is arbitrary, and Diiconvincing, having 
nothing but vague possibilities to guide 
it. (6) Sa-ch-Krilik; based upon more pre- 
ciae material indications. Thus Duncker 
(vii. 20B-7) got aliout 800,000 as the 
total for the lajid-foreo from the 'Bcven 
days and seven nights' occupied Uy the 
host in cros-iiiig the Eelh'sgiont. But 
the seven diys and suveu nights are (1) 
obvious folk-lore, (2) only one of three 
estimates for the passage, and (3) apart 
from other consiaerations no aden\iate 
basis for an inferenee. Welzhoftr 
(Fleckeisen's Jahrb. 1S92, pj'. 145 IT.) 



on the same tack, choosing the 'two 
days ' to steer by, reduces the lightiiiK 
men to 80,000, and the forces all told 
to 150,000. Ddbnick (Fcr,-trkrUge 
140 if.) substitntes apace for time as 
tlie calculas, disproves Hdt.'s figures 
by arguing that the Persian force* in 
Prussian marching order would have 
reached ' from Damascus to Berlin,' aud, 
arguing from the sire of Mardonioji' 
oanip and the rtcordcd moveoiputs of 
his force, to a total (for liini) of about 
60,000 fighting men. This Sack-Krilik 
leads to negative reaulta of value, bnt 
atfords little or no ground for positive 
estimates. More hojjfful is \c) tho 
method of inferring the numbers of the 
forces from iho data for their orgauim- 
tion and leading, llanvette (oj>. cil. 
U10> has unfortunately reversed this 
muthol, arguing that there wore ITO- 



THE PERSIAN PREPARATIONS 

The artangmients for Hw Uading, or eommand, of the forces in tlie 
field are, relatively speaking, rather fully described, (a) Each ethnic 
contingent is under native commanders (eirt^tuptot r^ytfiovtfi) in the 
first instance. ' In each nation there were as many leaders as there 
were cities.' This provision is not as clear as might be wished. 
Not every nation {iSvos) could show cities (foAius), indeed the 
terms are frequently used in Herodotus as alternatives. Perhaps the 
Phoenician case may be taken as illustrating what is in Herodotus' 
mind, though the Phoenicians belong to the navy, not to the 
infantry. There the several city- contingents are under the city 
kings, though all subordinate to the Persian admirals. Probably 
Herodotus intends to say that each ethnic unit was under a native 
commander, or leader, with other native officers suSiorcIinate to 
him. The exact relation of these ethnic officei's to the ne.Yt series 
of officers specified is not ipso fnclu clejir. {f>) Herodotus describea 
a numerical organization, on the decimal system, as impo-sed upon 
the ethnic organization, apparently without wholly superseding it: 
companies of ten, one hundred, one thousand, and ten thousand men 
tinder Dekarchs, Hokatontarchs, Chiliarchs, Myriarchs. If there were 
still, u Herodotus affirms, native commanders {iOi-im' a-i^fiavropa), 
what was their relation to the hierarchy of officers on the decimal 
system 1 Were they not identical, or to a great extent identical, 
persons t Could the Dekarcb, a mere sergeant, or corjioral, be any- 
thing but a native ) Could the Hekatontarch, or Centurion, nay, the 
Chiliarch, be officers, who spoke a language foreign to the men under 
their command 1 Herodotus might seem, indeed, to have conceived 
the whole hierarchy, from the Dokarch to the Myriarch, && composed 
of native officers, all)eit superimposed upon a previous system of 
commands, also native, without superseding it. This conception 
Kerns improbiible. If a strictly numerical system {Kara rcAm) was 
superimposed upon the ethnic contingents, led and comnmnded by 
their own officers, we must gupjinso that the existing officers were 
utilized as far as pos.<=iible for the new organization, if it was new. 
Only it may be questioned whether native officers wore entrusted 
with such high posts as command of ten thousands : were the 
Mjrriarchs then really native, or were they Persian, or quasi-Persian 
officers} (r) Throughout the whole infantry ran a system of Persian 
^eommandB, and Herodotus actually gives the names of these high 
Scora {apxpiTfi), twenty-nine in number, a most remarkable and 
lentic-looking list. He represents the twenty-nine as superior 
[to all the officers in the class just described, and bailed on the decimal 
jiystem: were the twenty-nine, then, not related to the decimal 
'scheme of organization 1 They should be so related certainly, yet 



. a* thrrc are said to have lieeii tlie twenty-niuu ipxorrn werv reatly 
Is (of infantry), Du Goliineau myriarchs, but hv n>i»seil tlie thirtieth. 
iier J'ers-:s i!. 191) saw that 



160 



HERODOTUS 



App. n 



the figure stands in no clear relation to the sum total of men, or of 
myriads (VV*)- Tl'is figure 29 is a greiit stumbling-block; it is 
extraordinary how easily the commentators and liistoriana have 
glided over it ! (d) Above the twenty -nine Persian commanders 
{apXQV7€i) come six generals, or field-marshals, named in three jiairs, 
as commanding the three colunms into which the army was divided, 
ex htfpoUu'si, at Doriskos, for the march to Akanthos : Mardonios and 
Masistes commanding the column which marched along shore, in 
touch with the fleet ; Smerdoraencs and Megabazos commanding the 
centre column, with which the king himself moved ; Tritantaichmes 
and Gergis couimiiruliog the right column, which moved parallel to 
the others, hut furthest inland, (e) Last of all is mentioned Hydarnes, 
commander of the ten thousand Immortals, a mere Myriarch he, 
albeit a Persian of the Persians. Now the first two classes, or series, 
of commauders look, as above shown, like the same men under 
different aspects, or titles, at least up to a certain point ; but should 
the Myriarchs have been included among the native officers of each 
nation ? Few of the nations enumerated will have furnished a full 
myriiid of men. IJydarnes indeed is a iMyriarch, and Hydarnes is an 
ethnic commander, a Persian commanding Persians ; but what could the 
coQunander of ' the Immortals ' have been else ? On the other hand, as 
a Persian he is also co-ordinate, not with the six Straiegoi but with the 
twenty-nine Arciumlts, and he raises the figure to thirty. How, then, 
if the thirty great Persian commanders, who are plainly next in sub- 
ordination to the six Stnitfijoi, are the Myriaichs projier, and what if 
Herodotus has wrongly included the Myriarchs in his list of the 
native officers T There is a passing inconsequence in his account of 
the apjiointment of these various officers : the twenty-nine ArchoiUt.* 
appoint the Chiliarchs and the Myriarchs ; the Myriarchs appoint the 
Hekatontarchs and the Dekarchs : ought he not to have said, the 
Myrtaruhs, or Persiiui Archontes, apjiointcd the Chiliarchs, and the 
Chiliarchs appointed the HekatoivLarchs and Dekarchs ? According 
to lloroJotus it was the twenty-nine Persian Archonks who ejected 
the organization of the chaotic ethnic host into myriads, by the 
extraordinary and absurd contrivance above demoUshed ; but this 
statement disguises a real fact : Hydarnes and the 10,000 or myriad 
Immortals are there from the first, a standing corps ; the remaining 
twenty-nine Persian Archontes, assuming them to be Myriarchs, real 
or nominal, naturally constitute or represent a host of twenty-nino 
myriads, or, with the Immortals, an infantry of 300,000, in the first 
instance exclusive of cavalry. These figures stand in an obvious 
relation to the six Straiegoi and the three corps d'arw^e ; they give 
100,000 men (infantry) to each corps (Tarm/e, still nominally exclusive 
of the cjivalry. The figure 300,000 reappears for the force left with 
Mardonios for the second camjaign ; either that figure is a gross 
exaggeration for the army of Mardonios, or tslse Mardonios retained 



THE PERSIAN PREPARATIONS 



i 



the bulk of the knd-forces with him, after the retretit of Xerxes. 
Xerxes reaches the Hellespont with a mere remnant of the masses 
rejected by Mjirdoiiios in Thessaly, a patent, fiction ; for the return 
or flight of Xerxes is largely a legend, fiill of improbabilities, alter- 
natives and self-contradictions; not least among them this, that 
Artabazos, after accompanying the king to the Hellespont, returns 
to besiege Poteidaia with 60,000 men. It may be that as Mai-donios 
■tops into the king's place as commander-in-chief, so does Artabazos 
take the place of Mardonios as Straleijos, general at the head of a 
corps d'arm^e or a moiety, a division of a corps <ramu!r, of 50,000 
infantry and 10,00U horse nominal strength; or it may be that 
Mardonios retained at most a moiety of the army of Xerxes. In 
either case, the figure 300,000 is primarily valid for the king's forces 
in 480 B.C. In this review the vast ethnic procession which parades 
through the jxages of Herodotus disappears, and makes way for a 
relatively manageable and compact force, fairly well organized and 
officered. There is the king, as commander-in-chief. Under the 
commander-in-chief are six Stralegoi, each commanding 50,000 infantry 
and a certain number of cavalry ; and these six great divisions are 
combined into three columns, or armies. In each army there are ten 
Persian Myriarch.s, ejvch commanding 10,000 men, five such corps, 
with their commanders under each of the six Slrategoi. 

Ttie Cavalry. — To each iorps d'armSf a cavalry division is attached, 
the exact number of which is doubtful. Herodotus gives the total 
of the cavalry as 80,000, but the oidy items be supplies are — 
{1} 1000 select Persian cavalry, heading the column on the march 
from Sardes, no doubt under a Cliiliarch ; (2) a second chiliad of 
chosen horse, that followed the royal bodyguard on the same 
occasion ; (3) ten thousand Persian horse, no doubt led by a Myriarch, 
that followed the ten thousjind Persian infantry (or Immortals) on 
the same occasion. Taken strictly, these three items would give a 
total of 12,000 for the Persian cavalry. (4) In the army-list the 
Kagartians are said to have furnished 8000 horse, being the only 
nation of those supplying cavalry not previously named and described, 
as furnishing infantry, in the anny-list. The JSagartians and Persians 
between them thus furnish 20,000 of the total cavalry. No items 
are given for the remaining six nations named as fm'nishing con- 
tingents, but on the supposition that each of the six nations furnishes 
a nominal ten thousand (under a Persian Myriarch) the 60,000 
required would be forthcoming. The allocation of the 80,000, and 
the eight Myriarchs implied among the three columns, or coiys 
tFarm^e, is not however so easy. Had the total of the cavalry been 
given as 60,000 the case M-ould have presented a simpler solution : 
six myriads, under six Myriarchs, would have allowed two mjTiads 
and two Myriarchs to each corjis d'armft-, or one myriad, under its 
Myriarch, to each of the six divisions under the six Siralc;joi.. This 

VOL. 11 



lea 



HERODOTUS 



APP. II 



suggestion is bonie out, as above shown, by the figure assigned to 
the division under Artabazos : it ia 60,000 strong, that is, 50,000 
infantry and 10,000 cavalry, and likewise by the same figure for the 
corps itarmie safeguarding Ionia in 479 B.C. (9. 96). The total 
given for the cavalry may bo too large by two myriads, and perhaps 
should have been fixed at a nominal 60,000. The Persians, Medes, 
ELiflsians, 6<iktrinns might have supplied each a myriad ; but the 
Sagartians are only credited with 8000, and the three lemaining 
nations named seem less important, Kaspians, Paktyans, Parikanians. 
The Persian and Siigartian contingents amount together to two 
myriads, the total proper, on the above theory, for one of the 
columns, or corps d^arm^e. It may be that these 20,000 have been 
erroneously added to the 60,000 wliich already included them, the 
error being due to Herodotus himself, or perhaps his source. The 
Persian and Sagartian myriads, or chiliads of horse, may have 
accompanied Xerxes to Sardes, and have formed the cavalry con- 
tingent for that central column, or corjis d'arm^e, ^vith which the 
king himself marched. The suggestion that the cavalry comprised 
5ix myriads, two myri.ids being attached to each army-corps, ia 
further liome out by the arrangements for the cavidry command 
(c. 88). The whole civalry is under three Hipparclia, Harmamithres 
and Tithatos, the two sons of Datis the Mede, and Pharnflches, 
who fell from his horse as the column quitted Saixies, and had to be 
left behind. Herodotus does not name his successor, but we may 
venture to find him in Maaistios, who was ' Mipparch ' at Plataia, 
and fell there gallantly leading the cavalry under bis command. 
The * Hipparchs ' are the highest cavalry officers, doubtless with 
Myriarchs below them : upon the present hypothesis each Ilipparch 
commanded two myriads, and was attached to one of the three corj'i 
d'arvu^^^ perhaps co-ordinate with the two Strategoi commanding it. 
It ia plain that Pharnftches, and Masistios after him, was attached 
to the middle column, or army-corp."? with which the king marched, 
and which was probably made up of the Persian and JSagartiun 
cavalry. The two sons of Datis would have been attached, each with 
his two mj-riad horse, to the right and the left columns respectively. 
It may be that Persia proper actually furnished the largest contingent 
to the cavalry, four chilia<is in excess of the Sagartians for example, 
and still more in excess of the remaining six nations, none of whom 
need have furnished more than from six to seven chiliads, in order 
to bring the total up to 60,000; it may be, however, that the two 
chiliads of chosen Pei-sian horse should be included in the Persian 
myriad, for the purposes of the present argument, and that the figure 
8000 for the Sagartian contingent was an inference in the first 
instance from the known figure of the force at Sardes in the winter 
of 481-480, viz. 20,000, on the supposition that the Persians 
furniahed 12,000, that is, two chiliads of chosen horsemen, in 



§5 



THE PERSIAN PREPARATIONS 



163 



I 



addition to the normal myriad — from which as a matter of fact 
the two chiliadB had been selected. It is hardly worth while to 
attempt to estimate precisely the number of chiliads furnished by 
«ach of the six remaining nations : the Modus and Kissians might 
have furnished ten chiliads each, like the Persians ; the remaining 
four nations, each five chiliads ; and the allocation of the four myriads 
thus raised, two to each of the remaining a/rps cCarm^, may have 
followed the ethnical disposition just indicated ; or the Modes, with 
two of the further nations, may have furnished the cavalry to one 
column, and the Kisaians, with the remaining two nations, the 
cavalry to the other column. Carried further than this, speculation 
might prove idle. It remains to add, under the head of number 
and organization, that the chiliads and myriads must of course have 
b«en nominal, and the number of myriads is no guarantee for an 
exactly corresponding total of efficient horsemen at Doriskos, much 
less at Plataia (where, however, the Persians had their Thessalian 
and Boiotian allies to supplement their own deficiencies). The 
argument regarding the cavalry suggests that the figures for the 
Persian forces were the result of the addition of a given number of 
chiliads and myriads, and not the result of any process of mechanical 
numeration, such as is described by Herodotus for the numbering of 
the infantry. The number of chiliads and myriads to be raised by 
the levSe m masse was presumably fixed beforehand, and a proper 
number commandeered from each nation, province, or satrapy : 
successive reviews, at Kritalla, Abydos, Doriskos, would serve to verify 
the extent to which the /erVe had been successful, and the requisite 
numbers of myriads and chiliads raised, even though the myriads 
and chiliads were to some extent nominal ; a myriad being still 
called a myriad even after a chiliad or two had been withdrawn, 
or lost, or never mustered ; and a chiliad being still called a chiliad 
even if the number of men fell to three figures. In regard to the 
cavalry, however, it is to be observed that the figures, the number of 
myriads given as the total, require but little qualification, com- 
paratively speaking ; and whereas it is necessary to reduce the myriads 
of infantry from 1 70 to 30, it seems necessary to reduce the myriads 
of cavalry only from 8 to 6 ; or otherwise put, whereas the figure 
for the infantry has been more than quintupled, the figure for the 
cavalr}' has been augmented merely by the fractional addition of a 
third. This relative modyaty in regard to the figure for the cavalry 
bay be due in part to the fact that in any case the cavalry was far 
kss numerous to start with than the infantry, and the larger initial 
figure invited, so to speak, the grosser exivggeration. It may be due 
also to the obvious absurdity of bringing hundreds of thousands of 
horses to Greece, where there was no scope for cavalry operations 
on such a colossal scale. It is at least in part due, however, to the 
better sources, as in the case of the fleet, which have controlled the 



164 



HERODOTUS 



APP. n 



figure. Two-thirds of the cavalry was probably transported to Doriskos 
by sea, and the maritime Greeks had perhaps especial means of 
checking the estimates of the land-forces at least under this head. 

The horsenifn, it is to lie observed, in the army of Xerxes are all 
from upper or further Asia ; Anatolia supplies not a single mounted 
man. To the cavalry Herodotus seems to attach Indians and Libyans, 
who drive chariots, and Arabians, who form a corps of camelry. But 
these chariots and these camels barely appear in the narrative of the 
ciirapaign, and may be dismissed as belonging, not to the true tradi- 
tion of these events, l>ut to the abstract scheme of the lev^e en nmxse 
for the Persian Empire. The cavalry proper are credited with the 
same arms and equipment aa the corresponding nations in the infanti-y, 
except that some of the Persian cavalry are endued with metal heail- 
pieces, and that the Sagartians, ' drest in a style betwixt the Persian 
and the Paktyan,' have no other weapon hut the lasso and the dagger, 
the former of which they are described as wielding with deadly effect 
It is a ground for some suspicion that even at Platjiia the Greek story 
of the war takes no account of the use of these lassoes. 

Jierisfd Numbers. — The numbers thus arrived at for the land-forces of 
the Persian army l^ave the figures still enormously large in comparison 
with any scale for military operations with which the Greeks were so 
far acquainted. The infantry are estimated at 300,000 — no doubt a 
regulative or ideal number, yet still potentially involved in the thirty 
Myriarchs who led the forces under the six ISlntlt'jm. The cavalry 
may be added, amountiiig to 60,000, represented probably by six 
Myriarchs, two under each of the three Hipparchs. These 360,000 
are all fighting men. It may be doubted whether an ancient army 
moved with the same amount of iiiqmlimenia and as large a service- 
train as are attached to an army nowadays ; but the description of 
Herodotus is perfectly explicit on this head in rcgaixl to the Persian 
forces, and the express assertions of Herodotus are borne out to a 
great extent by the narrative. It is, howei'er, an excessive estimaU^', 
to allow an equal number of non-combatants as servants, attendants, 
and so forth — to say nothing of ciUup-foUowers, male and female, 
merchants, peddlers and others, who may have attached themselves to 
the aiTny for their own private objects and of their own accord. 
AVithout them the fighting forces on land, accomiJaniod by their own 
baggage-train and servants, might have amounted to nearly three- 
quarters of a million men : a truly immense multitude in Greek eyes.' 
It remains to add the na\'y and the naval transport and commissjiriat 
service, as above estimated, the fighting portion of the fleet alone 
carrying a q\iarter of a million men, to which may bo added as many 
more for the transports. Altogether upon this showing the army 



' Dareioa took across the Bosporus, 
according to H<lt., 700,000 men, not 
coontiiig the navy, but inclndiiig the 



cavalry ; this was the total niuist«r for 
the emjiire, l/yt Se wdrra rCm i5/>X*i ■*• 
87. 



* 



and navy of Xerxes employed and set in motion upwards of a million 
eouis, to aay nothing of European cozitingents and additions, certainly 
some not inconsiderahle number, and of the hosts of camp followers, 
and the hosts of labourers employed on the great local works, or upon 
works executed eii route. 

Ethnically viewed, as the navy is drawn from twelve difterent 
nations, or qu?isi-nations, and as the cavalry is supplied by eight 
difTerent nations, so Herodotus specities forty-six dilferertt peoples as 
furnishing his 170, or, aa we say, 30 myriatls of infantry. In the 
navy-list precise figures are given for each of the twelve contingents 
of longships, and in the cavalry it is |K>ssible to frame estimates, as 
above, for the several items, some of which are even specified ; but in 
the case of the infantry the forty-six nations stand in no obvious 
relation, either to the 170 m^Tiads of Horodotus, or to the 30 myriads 
to which they have been reduced in the foregoing discussion ; and except 
for the Persians Herodotus furnishes no figtu-es for the items or particular 
contingents. A myriad per nation might not in itself have seemed at 
first sight an utterly incredible figure, and would find some slight 
support, or verification, in the representation of the 30 myriads in the 
army of Mardonios as a selection, involving the rejection of a certain 
number of myriads, were it only sixteen ; but there is no hint or 
suggestion in Herodotus of forty-six myriads, one from each nation 
specified, rather it is implied that the ethnic contingents stood in no 
relation to the numerical organization of the army aa constituted at 
Doriskos in 170 myriads, but were simply maaaed as they came in 
batches of ten thousand. On the Herodotean hypothesis of a total 
amounting to 1,700,000, many of the forty-six nations must obviojisly 
have furnished several myriads each to the infantry, but the attempt to 
conjecture particular items for a total itself disproved and incredible 
ii a labour like that of ' milking the he-goat into a sieve.' On the 
more acceptable hypothesis that the total of the infantry may be set 
at 300,000, and the total of the cavalry at GO.OOO, the 30 Persian 
commanders (fi/>;(oiT€«), representing 30 Myriarchs, each commanding 
a (nominal) myriad, it is possible, with the guidance of Herodotus' 
.■^rmy-list, to assign to each Myiiarch the nations supplying levies to 
his command, and to determine which of the ethnical units amounted 
to a nominal myriad, and supplied a distinct regiment, under a Persian 
Myriarch, and which nations appear to have supplied a part of ten 
thousand, generally a moiety, and to have been combined with a 
second contingent so as to form a full (nominal) myriad. In nearly 
half the ca.ses (14) one ethnic unit is under a Myriarch, and therefore 
presumably supplies a nominal myriad. The case of the Persians is 
unique, as they furnish the 10,000 Immortals, under Hydarnes, as well 
as a nominal myriad, tmdcr Otanes (the father of Amestris, wife of 
Xerxes). Besides the Persians, Media, Kissia, Hyrkania, Assyria, 
Aria, Sogdia, the Kaspian region, Sarangia, Paktya, Parikania, in the 



166 



HERODOTUS 



\rf. 11 



eastern moiety of the empire, are each credited with a myriad ; of the 
myriads from the eastern proinnces only five appear as dra^vn from 
more than one ethnic or territorial unit : ftiktrians and Sakai (Scyths) 
serve under one command ; the eaatern Aithiopians are associated 
with the Indians ; Parthiana and Chonismians go together, as do the 
Ganiiarians and Dadikes ; the Utians and Mykians combine to 
furnish one myriad : in no case arc more than two ethnic names com- 
bieied into one unit. These seventeen myriads represent the contribution 
of the eastern portion of the empire to the infantry of Xerxes.^ 
Thirteen units of command, thirteen myriads, remain to be supplied 
by the western and outlying portions of the empire, and among them 
Asia Minor is most largely represented. The Arabians and Aithiopians 
(Nubians) furnish one myriad, the Libj'ans a second, the Neaiotes of 
the Islands in the ' Ked ' Sea a third. The remaining ten myriads are 
supplied by twenty-one nations of Asia Minor, in such ^riae that in 
one instance, and in one only, the Thrakians (i.e. Bithynians) supply a 
myriad, under a Persian Myriarch ; in two cases three nations combine 
to furnish a contingent ; in the remaining seven cases the myriad is 
raised from two nations, presumably in a nominal 5000 (five chiliads) 
from each. This analysis of the bare essentials in the army-list 
seems to confirm the theory above formulated in regard to the total 
figures, as well us in regai-d to the composition and organization of the 
forces, and conKnns the view that the king's army wits raised by 
the commandeering of definite numbers of men, or of chiliads, fiom 
each prcvince, satrapy, and nation ; though the actual numlwrs of 
men put intfl the field, or, so to speak, joining the standards, may 
have fallen far short of the ideal delectus. 

It ta perhaps worth while to attempt a further advance in the 
direction of a reconstruction. Ten myriads (100,000 men) appear, 
upon this scheme, as the levy for Asia Minor, and, as already pointed 
out, a natural place for the rendezvous or mustering of this rorys 
(Tarm/e would have been Abydos. Two corps (Tarmde remain to be 
levied from the remainder and larger portion of the empire, and 
chiefly from the further east and Iran. One of these corps, perhaps 
composed of the first ten myn'ads (from twelve nations), had Kritalla 
for its rendezvous, and marched with Xerxes, or jierhaps by more 
than one road, to Sjirdes, where it wintered. These two great 
divisions of the army, in themselve* two armies, may have crossed 
the Hellespont in the spring of 480 B.c. and made their way to 
Doriskos. The third army-corps, or the greater portion of it, together 
with the cavalry, except the Persian and Sagartian levies attached to 
the king's own column, may have been conveyed to Doriskos by sea, 
from the ports of Egypt, Phoenicia, and Kilikia, or perhaps even in 



' These 17 myriads of the E^t might 
be accountable Tor th« 170 myriads of the 
whole wrcny ; but th« figar« 17 recurs io 



Another connexion (see p. 175 )>elow), 
and these coincidences are uioet prob- 
ably fortuitooB. 



THE PERSIAN PREPARATIONS 



I 



part through the Bosporos and Hellespont This third column, like 
the cavalry, is thus ex Uypoihrii the levy drawn from the outlying 
and more remote parts and portions of the Persian empire, and is 
represented in the army-list of Herodotus by the nine Myriarchs, and 
myriads succeeding the first ton, together with the last item of all, 
the islanders from the Er)*thraian sea. The displacement of this item 
IS an anomaly not «isy to explain, but that it is a displacement seems 
all but incontrovertiLile. Two solid blocks, or series, of commands 
occur in the list as given by Herodotus. The first seventeen (or 
sixteen) names, divisions, or tr, liypoifitM myriads, represent the Ai-yan 
and Semitic portion of the empire. Geographically the last item of 
all, the islands of the Erythraian sea, might he counted with these, or 
with the next two items, the AralxHEthiopian diviaion aad the 
Libyan ; how it comes to be appended to the solid phalanx of ten 
commanders, ten myriads, from the twenty or one-aiid-twenty nations 
of Asia Minor, is one of the mysteries of the composition of Herodotus' 
work in this portion. For the purpose of reconstructing the corps 
d'armie of Xerxes, as finally organized or constituted on the plain of 
Doriskos, I do not hesitate to replace the.se Nesiote foot-men in their 
natural order and connexion as the XVIU. regiment, or myriad, 
forming a portion of the second army-corps. The first army-corps 
{I.-X.) is the column with which Xerxes himself marched. It was the 
central column in the march from Doriskos, and it bore the brunt of 
the fighting at Thermopylai. Which of the other two cmys d'armie 
formed the sea-side or left marching column, and which the right, is a 
matter of mere speculation : it can hardly be regarded as quite certain 
that all three columns advanced south of Othrys ; immense numbers 
of men will surely have been left in Makedon and Thrake, and along 
the whole line of communication. 

Armature. — The army-list of Xerxes, even on its primary or 
military side, is much more than a mere catalogue of the nations 
cupplying levies, with a computation of their numbers, total and 
partial, and an accoiuit of the organization and leading; it gives 
descriptions of the equipments and accoutrements, the weapons and 
defensive armour, worn and used by the forces, on land and sea. 
Beside, and in contrast with, the Hellenic armature, which held good 
for a considerable portion of the foice-s, twelve distinct types of armature 
for the army may be distinguished in the Herodotejiii descriptions, 
albeit Herodotus does not actually supjily distinctive or individual 
titles for the whole number. Of the twelve, eix belong to the further 
Asiatic and largely Iraniau portion of the empire, viz, the Medo- 
Persian, Paktyan, Baktrian, Skythian, Indian, and Sagartian (i.-vi.) ; 
three types belong to Mesopotamia and the adjacent nations, viz. the 
Assyrian, the Aithiopian, and the Libyan (vii.-ix.) ; the remaining three 
types are taken from Asia Minor (x.-xii.) viz. the Paphlagonian, 
Thrako-Bithynian, and Moschio-Kolchian. Each type incites further 



168 



HERODOTUS 



ATP. n 



specification, and the navtU contingents add some further typos of 
their own. 

(i.) Tltf Persian, (he Median, or Medo-Persian (i) lltpa-iKi] a-KtnJ, rj 
ilijSiKi]). — Herodotus speaks ot the t3rpe as Persian, or as Median, 
indifferently, though he asserts that originally and properly the 
dress and armature were Median. The type is worn liy the Medes 
and Persians, the Hj-rkanians have apparently exactly the same, the 
Kissians nearly the same, except for their headgear, while the 
Baktrians, who present a distinct type, have nevertheless something 
very like the Median head-dress. The islanders from the Erythraian 
sea have dress anti arms closely resembling the Median, the Arians 
and Sarangians have the Medic Irow, and the Sarangians the Medic 
spear in addition. The items of the dress and equipment work out 
as follows. Though some of the cavalry liave metal headpieces, the 
prevailing headgear is the stitl" felt cap, or fez (ir/Ao* aTrdy/]<;, nnpa), 
with the point or apex bent and hanging down, varied in the case of 
ihe Kissians by the Babylonian turban.' The body-garment was a 
sleeved tunic, of gay colour, girt with a zone round the waist. The 
legs were encased in the most unhellenic of garments, the trews, or 
trousers (dva^vplHf^), a terror to behold.- The shoe, boot, or foot- 
covering is omitted by Herodotus. For further defence the Mede, or 
Persian, Avore a breastplate composed of fine metal scales. This 
breastplate was worn apparently under the tunic* How efficient a 
protection it might prove upon occasion is exhibited in the storj' of 
Masistios ; but it may be doubted whether the common soldier was 
proAided with this costly protection. The most prominent defence 
was the light thoiigh large wicker-work shield (yippov), terminating 
in a point, which might bo fixed in the ground, so as to form a frail 
shield wall or rampart.* The offensive weapons were three in number. 
Large bows and arrows, the latter carried in a quiver ; spears, short in 
compiirison with the Hellenic, but still used, not for hurling, but for 
hand-to-hand fighting; a dagger, hanging in the belt, or girdle, on 
the right side, and of course usable only in the last resort Had 
Herodotus been describing the appearance of the soldiers on the frieze 
of the Apadana of Xerxes in ^Snsa, he could scarcely have made a 
more accurate report, except for the omission of the foot-covering.*^ 
But Herodotus would not need to go to Susa in order to describe, 
with tolerable accuracy, the Medo-Persian equipment ; it was seen of 
many in Asia Minor and in Egypt ; hosts of Greeks in Greece proper 
were no doubt perfectly familiar with it, and could pourtray it to its 
minutest particulars (not omitting the boots) ; and it may even 



' Cp. 1. 196. ' 6.. 112. 

* Oi>. 9. 22. 

* C|). 9. 61 f. ippiiavrei . . t4 yfppa 
ol II^pcRi iirt€ira.r tCip ToitvudTdir iroXXi 
dtptiSiots — iylrrro ii Tpurov wfpl t4 yippa 



° This fricip. or a portion of it, now con- 
stitutes one of the glories of the Loavre 
mvisenm. For representations nee Perrot 
and Cliipiez, Art of Persia, The monn- 
nieiits »{i|iaieDtly omit the gcrrhon ; cp. 
note to 7. 60 (i. 83). 



surprise us to find Herodotus describing it here so fiilly, especially as 
he has apparently taken it for granted previously — unless, indeed, this 
apparent inconsequence conceals, as often in such cases, one of the 
secrets of the Herodotean composition.^ 

(ii.) The Paktyan (»} llaKTviKi], sc. o-Ktw}, c. 85). — The title is 
explicitly given by Herodotii-s I.e. and contrasted with 'the Persian.' 
The Piiktycs are paraded in c. 67, and their equipment holds good for 
three other of the Iraru'an nations, or tribes, the Utians, Mykians, 
and Parikanians (Oirtot, Mi'icoi, JlapiKavioi). It is all the more dis- 
appointing to find the items of the inventory few and slight. Neither 
headgear nor footgear nor body raiment is described or mentioned ; 
nor is any defensive armoiu- supplied, unless the cloak be so accounted. 
Three items only are specified, the said cloak, of hide or leather, the 
native bow, and the dagger. There is nothing peculiar apparently in 
the dagger; the native bow may be of specific form and confined to 
the foiu- nations named, or it may be contrasted simply with the 
Median bow, and in that case not very different from the Riktrian 
bow. In short, the really distinguishing mark of this type was the 
leathern cloak or capote {tria-vpva). The Kaspians have already been 
endued with such cloaks (c. 67); and in so far the Paktyan type is 
ainular to the Kaspian, but the Kaspian soldier is better anned — he 
has a sword (a»ca'a(c»j<f). Anyway, the leathern capote becomes an im- 
portant mark, the differentia of the type. Perhaps this skin-mantle 
had a hood, which served as a headpiece. 

(iiL) The Bnkhian. — The exact title (»} BaicT/Bi»cj)) is not actually 
given by Herodotus, but five other nations — Parthians, Choraamians, 
Sogdians, Gandarians, Dadikai — are dcscnbed .is all having the same 
equipment {<TKt\n)) as the Baktrians (c. 6G), and the Arians also are 
in all but one particular equipfjcd like the Baktrians ; it may be 
therefore inferred that the Baktrian equipment furnishes a distinct 
type, worn by no less than seven nations of the Iranian highlanti. and 
constituting the most typically Iranian, if not Aryan, equipment of all. 
Yet the Baktrians have headgear very like the Median (c. C-4), and 
have also 'short spears' {al\iixi<i (Spaxiai), which are presumably like 
the Median ; their difl^erentia lies, so far as specified, only in the 
fashion of the bow (ro^a KaAa/um-a e7rix<>V"») : » dJfTerentia emphasized 
by the particular exception made in regard to the Arians, who have 
been armed with ' the Median bow.' Dress, defensive armour, and 
the other items are not specified. The Baktrian probably wore the 



• It w, boworer, more briefly described, 
ttil'0U)<}i the lipi of AriKtagoras the 
Milesian, 5. 49 fj ri ndxv oi^'^u'*' ^<rrl roi?)j(, 
r6fa 1(0.1 aixM-^ ppaxio^' ivaivplSat fi 
fxorrn (pxor-riu it rdf fuixoi xoi Kvpfia- 
fist 4wl rffi K(4>a\ifft. This poasage, 
though preceding in the finished text 
the fuller deauriiition in Bk. 7, is, of 



conrse, in accordance with the theorj' of 
compoaition here advocated (cp. Intro- 
duction, §§ 7-0), of later genesis in the 
work of Herodotus, nuiess, indeed, the 
descriptions in Bk. 7 belong to tha 
Btratam of com position added, or iniicrtcd, 
in Bks. 7, S, 9 for the especial benefit 
of "Weatem readers or licarers. 



170 



HERODOTUS 



APP. II 



'trews,' and prosumably had some kind of shield, as well as dagger; 
but the effect of the description in Herodotus, which ignores all that, 
ia to set the Baklrian bow in high relief, as the weapon par ejxellence 
of Iran. 

(iv.) The Slytkuin. — In the army of Xerxes the Skythiana, or 
Sakai, are represented by the 'Amyrgii' (c. G4), probably nomad 
tribes from the steppes, not necessarily of Aryan or Indo-European 
stock.^ Their equipment ia distinctive, though not fully described. 
For headgear they wear a cap which Herodotus elsewhere describes as 
the Persian or Mediitn fez (5. 49 Kiy)/3acr«i5), but with a difTerence, 
that the Skyths wear the (x^int or apex upright (e? d^v d-n-qyfiivai, 
6p$!ii weTrrjyviai). On their tegs they too have the trews of Iran — if 
the trewH be Iranian. No defensive arm is .specified in their equip- 
ment, but they were probably not shieldless. For offence they have 
three weapons, the bow, of local form, the axe, and the dagger (to^o 
cff-i\«ip(a, o-ayapn, (y)(ei/)tSia). There is little to distinguish this type 
except the cap with the upright apex, and perhaps some variation in 
the make of the bow. 

(v.) The Indian (i; 'IvSikij, cp. c. 65). — Neither headgear nor foot- 
gear is described, but the Indian type is cognizable by the cotton 
garraonts worn on the body, and the bow (and arrows) of bamboo, 
jointed of course, the arrows being further differentiated by having 
points of iron, as compared with the bronze, flint, or bone heads with 
which doubtless the v;tst mass of arrows undescribed were pointed. 
With the Indians Herodotus classes the ' Aithiopiaiis of Asia ' as in 
most respects simihuly armed, though differing in respect of their head- 
gear and shields. Ho has not described any shields or headpiece as 
proper to the Indians ! The eastern Aithiopians wear horsehead- 
skin, with ears and mane upon the head, and for shields use crane- 
bauka. The differences are so striking that it is strange to find the 
x\ithiopians of the East thus treated as an appendage of India — 
unless wo suppose that in this case they represent the dark tribes 
fmm beyond the Indus. 

(vi.) The SiKjnriian (»; Saya/jrucjJ, c. 85). — A distinctive type ia 
supplied from the cavalry by the Sagartians, whose distinguishing 
weapon is the lasso. In other respects their equij>ment is described 
as something between the Persian and the Paktyan. Did they wear 
tho leather cape, which is the ' note ' of the Paktyan type, and the 
Median * trews ' 1 They lla^•e daggers, but no other weapon of metal. 
The lasso of thongs, leather or skin, envelops their enemy, and drags 
him down J the dagger probably does the rest. The Sagartian lasso, 
(ieraanding the steppes or plains of Asia for its use, plays no part in 
tho actual narrative of Herodotus : not so much as an anecdote 
testifies to its real presence in the Greek theatre of war ; none the less 

' On the Imbitat of the ^nJSat or Xd/coi, "between the Kaspt&n und Buktria," 
o|>. my Herodotus IV.-Vl. (189£r), H. U. 



PREPARATIONS 



■ 



does Herodotus not merely describe the weapon, but the method of 
using it. The Sagartian weapon forms the one fresh type suggested 
for the cavalry ; the other seven nations furnishing horsemen are 
wjiiippetl on horseback as on foot. 

The Iranian levies of the king rely principally for their weapons 
of offence upon the bow : they are archers, To^drm, whether on foot or 
mounted ; the short spear is also in evidence, especially among the 
Persians, Medes, and perhaps the Kissiana. In the last resort they 
have daggers to use hand-to-hand. The only efficient weapons of 
defence specified are the scale-breastplates, or cuirasses, and the wicker 
shields assigned to the Persians, and the strange headpieces and 
shields ascribed to the eastern Aithiopians. A few of the Persian 
cavalry have metal headpieces. The leathern ca^HJtes of the Paktyans 
might be some protection ; but the Iranians, with their eastern and 
northern neighbours, are doubtless poorly equipped for close encounter 
with men clad in metal armour, and using long spears and long sword*. 
As against one another the Persian, or rather the Median, equipment 
«eems the most effective alike for offensive and for defensive purposes. 
Compared with the remainder of the army the Iranian levies 
present a distinct type in common. The next common group contains 
the four types supplied by Assyria, Eg^-pt, Aithiopia, Libya. 

(vii.) The Assyrian (i) 'Aa-a-vpli], cp. c. 63). — By 'Assyrians' 
Herodotus here, as in most cases, understands the Babylonians and 
dwellers in Mesopotamia generally. Of mere dress, tunics or what 
not^ Herodotus mentions nothing in this connexion, nor of their foot- 
gear.^ Their armour is, indeed, such as to bide any garments worn 
merely for cleanliness or comfort. On their beads they have helmets 
of bronze {^'^Xxtn. Kpdvia) or headpieces of plaited or twisted work 
not easily described (TrtTrkeyfiiva rpoirov rivh. (idplSapov ovk evan~)']yr]TOv)l 
in either case effective headpieces. On their bodies they have breast- 
plates, or cuirasses, of linen, no doubt quilted, or thickened, so as to 
) offer some defence to arrow and blade ; they have besides shields 
I ^(icnrt&is), ' like the Eg}^>tian.' For ofTeiice they have the spear, the 
wooden club studded with iron nails or knobs, and the dagger. The 
|«lab may seem a Httle out of date ; but for the rest, the Assyrians arc 
armed with the weapons of civilization, and must certainly he reckoned 
to the heavy infantry. Except Greeks they are apparently the only 
heavy infantry in the land-forces of the king. 

(viii.) Tfie Aithvojnan (Aldum-iKti, cp. c. 69). — With the Aithiupian 
the army-list passes out of the civilized area again, though heavier 
weajMns are not wholly discarded. The wild-beast skins, of pard 
and lion, which they carried were probably, at least in part, head- 
gear — like the horse-heads worn by the Asiatic Aithiopians (c. 70). 



' The Babylonian dress described in 
Bk. 1 c 195 is DO doubt a purely {uicitic 
Attire ; but the description belong 



probably to a different period, and 
'provenience,' from that of the army- 
list of Xerxes. 



172 



HERODOTUS 



APP. n 



The body was pjiinted or smeared white and red, with chalk aiid 
vermilion. Of shields or further weapons of defence thcro is no 
mention, but their offensive arms are relatively fonnidable : long 
tows, full six feet, made of the paim-leaf stem, with which were used 
arrows of reed tipped with flint ; speara, with points of horn ; knotted 
clubs, only less massive than the Assyrian mace with its iron knobs. 
Of sword, of knife, there is no mention, but the Aithiopian gear ia 
one of the most cl&vrly marked types. 

(ix.) The Libyan (Ai/3wjJ, cp. c. 71). — The note of the Libyan 
dress is that it is of akin, hide (o-Kcvij (TK\m\n\), which may extend 
to head and foot coiijecturally, am] itidudo a shield, though of these 
details there is no account in Herodotus. The weapon of offence 
is the javelin, with point hardened in the fire, a peculiarity which 
approximates the Libyan type to the typo of the ne.xt gioup. 
That so little is made here of the Libyan type is the more remarkable 
in view of the space devoted to Libyan ethnography elsewhere — a 
contrast which, as in other similar cases, raises, and may help to 
solve, the problems of the composition of Herodotus' work.' 

(x.) 37te Papklagonian {I'j Ha<{>X.ayortKij a-Ktin'), c. 73). — The 
Paphlagonian equipment presents an absolutely distinct type, 
particularly as compared with the Iranian, and the AssjTio-Egyptian 
types. This equipment, although named after one of the Asianic 
nations, the very name of which had something of ultrabarbariam 
in it to nellciiic ears,* is worn by no less than seven of the 
nations of Anatolia (Paphlagonians, Ligyans, Matieni, Mariandyni, 
Kappadokiaiis, and virtually by Phrygians and Armenians) ; it is, 
in short, the distinctively Anatolian equipment, and may originally 
have been rather of Kappudokian (or even ' Uittite ') origin, than 
proper to the Paphlagonians. It ia marked in dress {headgear and 
boots) and in weapons, especially by the substitution of the javelin, 
or throwing-spoar for the bow and arrow. The items are given with 
relative fulness. For the head the plaited holm (xpiiyta veTrXryiiiva), 
for the feet a boot, with toe upturned to the middle slun ; for defence 
a small shield ; for offence, beside the hurling-spear (aKoiTiov) of 
which perhaps more than one was carried by each man, small spears 
and daggers. Wherein the Phrygio-Armenian variety differed from 
the normal type ia not precisely specified — perhaps merely in the 
matter of boots. The combination of the smalf spear with the 
javelin is noticeable, but it is the latter weapon that especially marks 
the Anatolian type, and reappears in the armature of Mysians, 
Bithynians, Pisidians {as jt^o^oA?)), Marians, Kilikians, and evea 
Phoenicians, who presumably had borrowed, not originated it. 

(xi.) Tlie Thrakio-BUhynian (0pi;iKv), rdv Qpi)tKii>v riov iv tq 'Atriy, sc. 



' The passage in Bk. 7 apjieaTS to bo 
written without reference to Bk. 4, an 
obserration easily explicable if Bk. 7 



were the earlior composed ; cp. Intro- 
duction, § 8. 

« Cp. note 7. 72. 1 (i. 95). 



§5 



THE PERSIAN PREPARATIONS 



173 



Bidwwf, c. 75). — The Bithyniana wore fox-fells on their heiids, on 
their feet and legs boots of fawn or doe-skin, while their bodies were 
covered with an upper and an under garment, bright coloured or 
embroidered capes {(upd'i) over tunics (of linen, or wool]). Their 
weapons are javelins and small daggers, but the itrm which gives 
moflt distinction to the type is the Thrakian shield, or }>-Ua (7r«ATt;), 
which may have been carried from Europe into Bithynia. It makes 
its first appeamnce in Greek literature on this ocntsion, and there 
is nothing to suggest hero the great future which was before it in 
Greek history and warfare. 

(xii.) Th« Moscho-Kolehian (c. 78). — As three other peoples 
(the Tibarenoi, Makrones, and Mossynoikoi) are described as equij)ped 
in like fashion to the Moschi, the Moschian may be reckoned a 
distinct type of armature. Again, as the Alarodii and the Saspeiros 
*re equipped h'ke the Kolchians, the Kolchian type may also be 
regarded as distinct. Yet the Moschian and Kolchian are not very 
different, and may perhaps be classed together. Both have a 
distinctive helmet, or lieadpiece, of wood (xptlvfa ^lAira) ; both 
have shields, described in the case of the Kolchians as small and of 
undressed ox-hide — a tfescription which may also probably apply 
to the Moschian ; both have short spears (m'xfias- fipaxiat, a-fiiKpd<i), 
but the Moschian is further distinguished by the relatively lai-ge 
size of the spear-head : to neither is assigned the specifically 
Anatolian weapon, the javelin, but the Kolchians at least liave swords 

(/taxaipas:).^ 

Herodotus draws no hard and fast line between the types of 
armature in the army and on the fleets but chisses them together ; 
rightly enough, seeing that the Epibalai on the fleet, whose armature 
^H alone could be in question, were simply infantry soldiers, whether 
^^native in each contingent or supplied by the Persians and Mcdes. 
Thus, as it happens, the description of the fleet adds only five types 
to the military ethnography of Hero«lotu8. Speaking generally, the 
marines incline to the heavy infantry type, and are better armed 
and protected than the Iranian or the Anatolian levies, even apart from 
the predominance of the Hellenic type in the fleet. The naval 
contingents from Asia Minor naturally present the national weapon, 
the javelin, but generally reinforced with weightier weajwns of 

■ offence. In four aises the description of the several e(juipmcnt8 
may perhaps be held to constitute a distinctive type, Phoenician, 
Egyptian, Kilikian, and Lykian ; in the remaining three cases, 
Kyprian, Paniphylian, Karian, the equipment is \nrtually Hellenic, 



* Two nnlious have not heea accounted 
for in thix «urvay of annn, tlie Marea 
*tiri the Milywi. The Mares are 
altacheU to the Kolchoi in 7. 79, and to 
the Moiuiynoikoi in 3. 94. They have 
• peculiar helmet, and liaro no swords ; 



but they lianlly oonntitnte a diirtinct 
tyjie. The Milyans, c. 77, would atill leai 
deserve ipjuratc cl&Mification ; their dia- 
tiiK'tivc mark is the fibula, a uiatter of 
dress rath«r thuu armature. 



174 



HERODOTUS 



APP. H 



with exception of a variation in Kyprian headgear, and an addition in 
the case of the Karians of booked or curved knives, and of daggers. 

(xiij.) The Phoenician (c. 89). — The Phoenician type in armour, 
as in other things, seems to result from a certain eclecticism, or 
'contamination' of other types, and hardly to possess originality. 
The helmet is described ' as very like the Hellenic ' ; a linen breiistplate 
is woni, 218 by Egyptian or Assyrian ; the shield has no nm, so 
resembling the pelta. The only offensive weapon assigned to the 
Phoenician is the (Anatolian) javelin, or throwing-spear. It seems 
hardly likely that the Phoenician marine was so ill-equipped for 
fighting at close quarters. If the Herodotean typology were in this 
case really complete, an inference to Phoenician sea-tactics would be 
legitimate, if not inevitable, and the inference would he that the 
Phoenician galleys were not meant to fight at close quarters, but 
must have relied on speed, manoeuvres, and ramming to effect their 
purposes. Yet who will believe that the Phoenician marine was left 
without sword, dagger, spear, or club, in case his own vessel was 
boarded, or to enable him to board the enemy on occasion? The 
obvious inference is that the Herodotean description in this case, as 
in too many other cases, is incomplete and misleading. 

(xiv.) The Egi/piian Iffpe is a perfectly distinctive one, and like 
most of the marine types, as well sis the Assyrian, which is reckoned 
of course to the land-forces exclusively, may be described as belonging 
to the heavy infantry. Head, breast or body, and whole person are 
well protected liy 'plaited' helmet (/cpui-os xv^"^''""^)i l^irge convex 
shields with metal rims, and breastplates or cuirasses (perhaps of 
linen) ; while for offence the Egyptians are armed with ' naval ' spears 
and large clubs. They have, moreover, what comparatively few 
of the king's men have, claymores {jxa)(aipa^ juydka^). 

(xv.) 7'hf Kiii/cprn. — That the Kilikians present a distinctii^e type 
of armature is to be inferred not merely from the description in detail, 
but also from the fact that the description of the arms of the ' Lasonians,' 
among the land infantry (c. 77), is postp<.>ned as identical with that of 
the Kilikian marines, to be subsequently described. The Kilikian 
wears on his head 'a native helmet' {Kpavo<; hrixtoptov) and. on his 
body a woollen tunic (Kidwv dpivtos) ; while he protects his persoa 
with the light targetuf undressed ox-hide (Aawn/toj' mjj.ofioiii<i Trarotrnuvov), 
dating at le.'iSt from Homeric times. His offensive weapons consist 
of two javelins, reinforced by a sword (^u/'o^), like an Egyptian 
cl.aymore. Altogether, tlie Lasonians on land and the Kilikians on sea, 
while retaining the Anatolian javelin, present the formidable appearance 
of light well-protected swordsmen. 

{xvi.) The Lyk'mn. — If one man bore and wore all that is set down 
under the head of Lykian equipment, the Lykians must have been 
among the best-dressed, and most fully armed, of the non-Hellenic 
marines. Upon his head the Lykian set a felt cap, or fez (ttcAos), 



J 



with a ring of (upright) feathers round it (irrspourt irtptecrTtt^Ko/xti-o?). 
His breast was protected with a cuirass (Oioprrj^), and, above the 
cuinuss, upon his shoulders he wore the goat-skin, or aigis (aiyo? 
Mpfta). The absence of a shield gives occasion for wonder. As 
weapons he carried bows and arrows of distinctive character, the bow 
of Uie cornel-tree (x/xiicta), a ' tough and springy wood,' beside the 
inevitable Anatolian javelin ; while, if matters came to close quarters, 
be bad the hooked aword (?>pfi^avov) and dagger to rely on, 

(jtvii.) Ihllenif. — A very large part of the fleet, and some portion 
even of tlie land-forces, were equipped in Greek fashion, of which 
Herodotus, forgetful in this case of the niutahility of human afiiiirs, 
and of the future fortune of his own work, has given no description. 
Yet even without such description the Hellenic type can bo restored 
from the incidents of the narrative, nnd from other sources. The 
Greek infanterist is a heavy-arme«i soldier, clad in mai!, with leather 
or metal holmet, cuirass and leggings, and large well-rimmed shield. 
His weapons of offence are spear and sword. The type of the 
Greek hoplite varied but little from state to state, nor much from 
age to age ; yet there were floubticss variations not merely in the 
appearance, but in the weight, size, and excellence of the weapons, 
which must have told considerably on the results of particular en- 
counters. A Greek panoply was an expensive affair, and it may 
fairly be doubtcf! whether all the solders in the army and navy of 
Xerxes, described by Herodotus as equipped in Hellenic fashion, were 

k equally well armed one witli another, or as a rule as well-armed as 
the men they were moving to attack. 
The foregoing anahsis results in the recognition of some seven- 
teen distinctive types of accoutrement and weapons to be distributed 
Among the forty -six nations supporting the army, and the twelve 
nations supplying the fleet of Xerxes. This result no doubt is some- 
what more systematic than the Herodotean methods were capable 
I of attaining consciously ; yet our artificiid analysis may be carried 
^^•ven somevrhat further without detriment. The forces of Xerxes more 
^Vl>roadIy viewed present six main types of armature, and these six 
types correspond approximately to the ethnical and geographical 
arrangements: — (i.) The Iranian, which relies chiefly on the bow for 
distant work, and on the knife or dagger for hand to hand, while the 
fighting man has little more than his dress, and his agility, to give him 
protection, (ii.) The Medo-Pfrsian : the spoar is added to the bow 
and dagger, the footman has a long light shield (the gerrlum), and in 
the case of the picked and superior soldiers, cuirasses and even metal 
headpieces are not unknown ; but the foz and the trews are protections 
nst the weather rather than the foe. (iii.) The Anatolion groups 
id levies have in the throwing-spear, or javelin, their most distinctive 
iireapon of offence, though some add the bow, others the spear, and 
ime the sword. Their heads and bodies ai-e, as a rule, hotter 



176 



HERODOTUS 



APF. n 



protected than the levies of the further east, skins, leather, wood, 
and metal being more freely employed both for headpieces and for 
shields, though the shields are mostly small, (iv.) Assifrio-Egyptian: 
a fourth type is supplied by the elder civilizations, Assjrria, Egypt, 
perhaps Phoenit^'ia ; the type of weapon, both offensive and defensive, 
is heavier, and better provision made for fighting at close quarters : 
metal hi*lmets and well-made headpieces ; cuirasses, even if only of 
(jiiilted linen, but sometimes strengthened by rings or scales; shields, 
large and strong to resist not merely arrow-flight but spear-thrust, 
consort naturally with the more formidable arms of offence, the sj^ear, 
the club or mace, and the claymore, (v.) The Utllenk equipment, how- 
ever, especially in its defensive aspects, leaves even the Assyrio-Egyptian 
type far behind, in a militai-y point of view. Stout helm, metal cuirass 
and leggings, hirge shield also of mutal, become by their weight, when 
rightly used, part of the offensive value of the heavy infantry armed with 
great spear and good sword, at least where the battle is hand to hand, 
on ship-board or on gi'ound. {vl ) MisceUaiUioris : an outlying group, 
logically perhaps the first rather than the last in this series, may be taken 
to comprise the odds and ends of the army-list, not covered by any of 
the previously enumerated types. Under this head might fall Indians, 
Arabians, Aithiopians, Libyans, and any other 'utter' barbarians, 
some approximating to one type, others to another : so the Arab iann 
and Aithiopians are archers, the Libyans akontisUii. ^H 

Again, looking at the w^hole matter from a fresh standpoints^ 
the army-list may be sifted so as to show a classification of the 
weapons and armature on simply morphological principles. Here the 
bow demands first attentiflu from the immense number of tribes and 
peoples armed with one kind or another of bow.^ As many aa nine 
different species of lx)w might seem to bo distinguishable in the 
Herodotean list — Median, Baktrian, Paktyan, Kaspian, Skythian, Indian, 
Arabian, Ethiopian, Lykian ; but the first five named may, perhaps, 
admit of some reduction. Differences might comprise materials, size, 
shape ; but no material is specified for the further ^Vsiatic bows except 
calatnus, that is, reed, or cane of one sort or another, though, as calamus 
is not specified in every case, at least one other mat>erial, say wood, 
might seem to be implicitly granted. Moreover, calamus itself might 
cover very different sulistancea : thus the Indian calamus is of course 
the bamboo (cp. 3. 98), but the Baktrian and Kaspian native bows, 
though made of calamus, can hardly have been made of bamboo, any 



' Modes, Persians, Hyrkanians, Kis-siatis, 
AriuDS, Sarangians (all have the 'MedUu' 
bow) ; Baktriaua, Parthians, Choras- 
laian.s, SogdioDB, Gandarians, Dadikai 
(all have the 'Baktrian' bow appar- 
untly) ; Paktyans, Utians. Mykians, 
Pai-ikaiiiaij!j (all have apfai-enlly tlie 
' Paktyau ' bow) ; Iho Kospiaus, the 



Indians, the Skyths, the Arabians, tba 
Aithiopiiuia, the Lykians ate all bow- 
luou, with more or leas Jiatitictive tyi)es. 
The Indian bow is more fully descriWl 
by Arrian, Indka c. 16. (Cp. Sir Ralph 
?8yn<f-(jallwey, Bt., Turkish and other 
circvlar Boica, Lougmaus, 1907.) 



OI 11 

j Med 

^Tbut 
A' 
o\ 
ai 

in 



more than tbe Median arrows. The bows will also have varied in 
size; the Median is described as a 'long-bow.' There is no suggestion 
of varieties of shape until the AxaV^ian bow is reached ; as that is a 
long-bow and recurved, it cjinnot have been made of any mlnmm, but 
mast have been of wood. The Aithiopiaii bow, also a long-bow, Ls 
neither of cane nor sapling, but made of a palm-leaf stem. The 
Lykiaii material is clearly specified, cornel -wood, but on further 
niceties of construction no light is shed. We may safely posit three 
main types of bow from upper Asia; the Median, a long-bow of wood, 
perhaps of various woods ; the Baktrian, or Skythic bow, not perhaps 
ementially different from the Paktyan, Kaspian, and Skythtan, a short- 
bow, made sometimes of cane or reed, sometimes perhaps of wood ; 
and the Indian bow, a long-bow (like tbe Median) but made of kiraboo. 
The throe non-Asiatic or non-Iranian bows are clearly distinguishable 
in the Herodotean list: Arabian, Aithiopic, Lykian. The reduction 
of the types of up]>er Asia leaves six main types of bow standing: 
Median, Baktrian, Indian, Arabian, Aithiopian, Lykian. 

The arrows present similar problems. Where the material is 
ified it is always calamus (Median, Indian, Aithiopian, Lykian), 

lUt the calamus cannot in every case be the same (e.g. Indian and 
Aithiopian), and other shafts than calamus were probably used by 
other archers. The size of the arrows also varied : the Aithiopian 
are actually describetl as small, or short arrows ; but all the othei-s 

fo not to be supposed of one size. Probably the long-bow had 
long arrows, and the short-bow corresjX)ndingly short shafts. The 
two ends of the arrow admit of different treatment : no doubt 
all arrows were notched anfl pointed, but while the vast majority 
will have had feathered butts (cp. 8. 128), the Lykian arrows 
are described as unfeatherod. The point also admits of various 
handling. The Indian arrows have iron ti]is ; the Aithiopian a sharp 
-■tone : what of the rest ? Many must have been armed with heads 
of flint, bone, or other similar material ; many no doubt had bronze 
points ; some heads may have l>een simply of hardened wood, though 
Herodotus does not specify this variation. Next in importjince, as 
in type, to the bow and arrow would be reckoned the javelin, or 
ihrowing-spear, a missile like the arrow, but necessarily used at a 
lorter distance. Few if any of the Anatolian nations or peoples are 
without this weapon ; thirteen are expressly named as using it,^ l)eside 
the Phoenicians, the Libyans, and even the Samothrakians, incidentally 
in the narrative.* The javelin itself is not described, but [tassing 
hints imply that all javelins were not quite alike : for example, the 
Piflidian irp6(3oX(K XrKtoc^»/s will have differed considerably from the 



' PanliU^nians, Matienoi, Litres, 

MarianuynoL, Syrians (i.e. Kappido- 

(kians), Amieniaii.s Phrygians, Myaians, 

Bithjmians, risi<lUu»(Tpo/3&\ot't), Marea, 

VOL. II 



Kitikians, Lykiana, Libyana, Phoeni- 
ciana. 

" Cp. 8. 90 fire St 4brTn dicavrurrai oi 
£a^Q9pi)iicf; ktV, and tliey ' loiiiaua' ! 

N 



178 



HERODOTUS 



App, a 



Libyan aKOKrtov hriKaiTov. Probably the majority of the akoiitia had 
metal heada or points, and a shaft of wood or cane. Some forms of 
javelin may have had thongs attached to the shaft to facilitate or 
improve the throwing act. Javelins probably varied considerably in 
size and weight, though Herodotus uses the diminutive term txKavriov 
throughout. The missile spear ia not a weapon to be despised, and 
was especially serviceable, perhaps, in naval engagements, such as 
those off Arteniision and Salamis; although it hardly figures so largely 
in the actual narrative of the ciimpaign as its prominence in the 
army-list might lead na to expect. The akmtistai, however, of the 
Anatoh'an levies probably liad very little of the fighting to do. 

The number of spears, of spearmen, in the king's forces is immense, 
but few of them, if any, beside CJreeks, or those peoples armed in 
Greek fashion, are possessed of the long spear, or heavy spear, which 
is related mainlj' to the phalanx, or close formation in battle. \Vhere 
the javelin type ends and the spear type begins it might not be veiy 
easy to say exactly. The small or short spear might be freely used 
as a missile, but such spears as those which the Immort^ds wielded, 
could not have been meant to be throwii &vra.y. Large numbers of 
the archer nation.'s, Modes, Persians, Hyrkaniana, Kissians, Saningians, 
are provided ^vith short spears (aix^fia^ fipa^ia^, M»;(?i*;a«), in a<ldition 
to the bow. As the Baktrians have such spears, probably the six 
other nations armed in like fashion are similarly provided with the 
short spear in addition to the short-bow. The seven nations with 
' Paphlagonian ' or Anatolian equipment^ that is the hurling-spear or 
javelin, arc armed also with 'small spears' (aix/i"« ox' fuydka^); if this 
weapon is not a mere duplicate of the Javelin, the spejirs must have 
been meant for close quarters. The Kolchiau variety (three nations) 
includes the short spear. The Moschian type is in so far distinct 
that the spear is the only offensive weapon expressly assigned to tho 
four nations comprised in the Moschian group, and this spear is itself 
of special form, small-ahafterl but large-pointed. Assyrians and 
Egyptians have spears of much the same type, and that, in the case of 
the Egyptian at least, a weapon suitable to naval battle — perhaps 
a spear of portentous length. The nations using Hellenic weapons 
would all have spears intrr alia, like the Greek hoplites themselves. 
Several nations, however, have only one weapon, and that not a spear^ 
as the Indians, Arabs, Aithiopians among the archers, and the Libyans, 
Mysians, Pisidians, Marians, and Phoenicians atnoiig the ' akontists," 
at least according to the account in Herodotus. Other nations again, 
which forgo spears, have some other weapon for close quarters to take 
its place — axe, or sickle, or dagger, or sword. 

The paucity of swordsmen in the king's forces, other than the 
Greek contingents, is one of their most conspicuous defects. The 
Kaapians have, beside their cane bows, good swords (dKivanai), but are 
apparently the only men of the further east thus well proWded. The. 



55 



THE PERSIAN PREPARATIONS 



179 



N 



Kolchian group have swords of a sort, perhaps, but short-bladed 
(fiaxaipai, c. 79) ; the Eg)i>tian8 are creJited with claymores, or 
cutlasses (jutxaipai fuyaka^, c. 89) ; the Kilikians (and so the Meionians) 
have swords, comparable to the Egyptian, and, better still, named like 
the Greek (^«'<^»/) ; that the Greek and Hellenizing contingents are 
swordsmen all apparently needs no stating. Though swords thus 
appear conspicuous in the Persian hosts only by their rarity, nearly 
every one has a dagger, save and except the scanty swordsmen them- 
selves. Medes and Persians have a dagger hanging from the belt 
or girdle on the right side, .md so likewise presumably all those 
with Median equipment. Daggers are expressly specified for Sakai, 
Paktyans, Assyrians, all the minor Asiatics, who follow the ' Piiphla- 
gonian ' style, as well as Sagartioi, Lykioi, Karians, Thrakiitns. Ordy 
to the following no dagger is expressly given : the Riktrians (and their 
group), Indians, Sarangians, Arabians, Aithiopians, Mysians, Pisidians, 
Milyans, the Moschian groufi, the Marians. Failing the sword, the 
Sakai wield an axe, the Lykians the sickle, the Assyrians their clubs, 
studded with iron knobs, while the Egyptians have clubs in addition 
to the sword, and the Karians ' sickles ' as well as swords. 

Defensive armour is not less various in type and efficiency 
throughout the army than the weapons of offence just described ; 
nor is the line between armour and mere dress clearly drawn. 
Throughout the whole of the eastern armj', from Media, Persia, Iran, 
and the further portion of the empire, helmets are apijareutly 
unknown -, the prevalent type of hejid-dress is the fez, or felt cap, 
with the point or apex hanging down, or in the case of the Amyrgian 
Sakai allowed to stand upright ; the Elamites have borrowed the 
soft turban from Babj'lon ; in Kypros kings and commons wear 
soft headpieces of different form : even the Lykians have adopted 
the fez, and don it decorated with feathers more for show than for 
defence in battle. The western nations as a mie wear helmets of 
metal, wood, or leather. Helmets of bronze are expressly assigned 
to Assyrians, (Egyptians ?), Phoenicians, Pisidiaus, and of course the 
Greek contingents ; helmets of wood to the seven nations making 
up the Moschian and Kolchian gioup ; helmets made by twisting, 
or plaiting (it might be Icfithcr, or lathes, or even metal hands), are 
worn by the seven Anatolian peoples, by the Marians, and perhaps 
by some Assyrians and Egyptians ; while the Milyan headpiece 
and, perhaps, the Libyan are of hide, or leather. The strangest 
•ppetimnce is presented by the caatem Aithiopians, their heads 
furmounted by horse-heads and manea, or by the Bithynians with 
their fox-fell caps ; and the pard and lion-skins on the Aithiopians 
of Nubia may have covered the head. The peoples wearing the 
risuma could probably draw it over the bead as a hood, and the list 
contjiins but three or four names, to which no definite beading is 
attached : Indians, Sarangians, Arabians, and perhaps Libyans, 



180 



HERODOTUS 



Apr. n 



For BhieldB tho Median equipment has the yippov, above described, 
which may be assigned to all nations of this type, but no shields 
ai'e reported for the rest of the nations of upper Asia, except that 
the Indians have crane-backs for shields: it is hardly conceivable 
that the Baktriaii armour did not include at least a light shield, or 
target. A small shield is expressly predicated of at least seventeen of 
the minor Asiatic peoples in the infantr)-, the Kiiikians have their 
<ix-hide targets, and tlie 'Thrakiuna' their peltai ; in fact, the small 
shield is almost as distinctive a ' note ' as the javelin for the Anatolian 
and Asianic levies. The civilized peoples, of course, have shields ; 
tiie Phoenicians rimless (probably small) shields ; the Assyrians and 
Egyptians shields with rims ; tho Hellenic Jwplon goes undescribed. 
As far as express description j:oes a large part of the army of Xerxus 
might have been unshielded. 

The rest of the equipment, for body, legs ami feet, is even less 
expressly and systematically described, nor is it easy here to 
distinguish clearly between the objects proper to armoury and 
wardi-obc respectively. Corslets or cuirasses are worn by Mcdes 
and Persians, some of them at least strengthened by fish-scale metal 
plates, and even the bare linen corslets of Assyrians, Phoenicians, 
Egyptians, Lykians, were probably stiffened by met*d rings, scales, 
oi' fittings. For Uggings, the Medes, Persians, Hyrkanians, Skythians, 
uttd perhaps must of the further Asiatics, wure the unlovely 'trews' 
{•li^a^vpiSa) ; the Pisidians bad bright red ' puttees ' on their legs ; 
the Lykians alonu of nonllullenie peoples are endued with proper 
greaves. For clcanlines-s, comfort, and beauty rather than pmtoction, 
the Indians have their cotton shirts (ef/iara) or t\iiiics, and tunics 
of one substance and kind or another are worn by the MedoPersians 
(sleeved), Sarangians (cohiured), Bithynians, Milyans (with fibuUw), 
Kiiikians (of wool) ; and the list is no doubt imperfect. The 
Kaspian cloak, or capote, defends the wearers (of some (ive nations) 
primarily from the cold; of similar use was the Arabian mantle, and 
tho Bitliynian, though of gayer appearance. How much the Libyan 
leather covers, the historian here does not clearly attest. The 
Aithiopians would have found their red and white paint a poor 
protection from the rigours of a Thrakian, or even a Thesaalian 
winter. 

Like too many armies the army of Xeixes seems very ill-provi<led 
with shoe leather, or the historian at least has not condescended 
to attest its footing. Not less than five of the Anatolian nations wear 
boots with point-i turned up halfway the shin,^ and the Sarangian 
boot reaches even the knee ; but for the rest, except for the Bithynians 
in their fawn skin foot-gear,* the whole army might have marched 



' 7. 72, ir/S<Xa worn by Pa]iIiIagouiaiis. 
itc. {it fUvTjv K'^nrii' ipaTtlrorTa). 

•' 7. 7b zriiiXa rtPftOm (srf/il Join iriial 



Te Kol tAj Ktr/iiiat), porhajis not v«iy 
ililTvreut from llie foregoing. 



THE PERSIAN PREPARATIONS 



181 



bare of fcx)t as of hand, for aught the Herodotean CatAlogue 
intains.^ Were shoes, or eandals, as much a luxury as gloves T 
Surely not ! On the floor of the palaistra the athlete was safer if 
he went barefoot ; but for the march from ICritalla to Therme 
some protection for the sole of the foot was surely desirable. The 
Immortals on the Susan frieze are all well-shod. The Greek soldier 
of the fifth century went to work with sandal or boot on his foot." 
It is, in fact, not conceivable that the army of Xerxes and of Mardonios 
moved, or fought, barefooted ; though the same canon might not 
apply to the EpibaUii of the fleet ; and the mere manning of the 
navy, put by Herodotus at 241,400 bodies, had, perhaps, hardly a 
»ir of sandals among them. To go barefoot was the mark of a 
'ilave, and to put the shoes from off the feet a mark of homage to 
the king, or the god ; but the omission on Herodotus' part to shoe 
-the king's forces may safely be ascribed less to any over-subtle 
penaie, even with a moral attacho<l, than to sheer oversight, 
the nature of his knowledge and its sources. 

Sources. — In fact the Herodotean Catalogue is not a systematic 
[•report or investigation into the composition and equipment of the king'.'* 
brmy, nor can it be biised upon authentic and official lists, documents, 
reports : it is a tmir <U force n\K>\\ tho part of Herodotus himself, 
constructed upon the precedent of the Homeric Catalogue, just as the 
account of the (ansii hdU, or of the motivation of the war, is plainly 
constnicted after the original in the IHad. The artificial character of 
the Herodotean Catalogue is shown, almost to demonstration, by tho 
mythical, historicjil, and geographical notes with which it is thickly 
sown ; matter which could never have been contained in the official 
^'Per«ian documents drawn up by the Persian secretaries at Doriskos. 
It is shown by the accounts and description of the Medes and Persians, 
which would no more have been included by a Persian scribe in his 
report to the king than is a description of the Greek soldier and his 
equipment included by Herodotus in his Catalogue designed for a 
tireek public. But this great Catalogue, though in the main the work 
of Herodotus himself, was of coiu-se not a pure invention, or creation 



' Elaewhrre Hdt. occuion&llr ail- 

rertuea ancient foot-wear. Peraeua had 

, » tarSiXiOf 2, 91 (rather a wonianUb 

tide of attire ?), and a wliolo city was 

' [led to the wife uf the satrap of 

^pt to provide her with viroH\)una. 2. 

Tho viti)iii)tA .Htitehcd by Histiaioa 

wurii by Aristagoras, 6. 1, is a 

pbor. Babylonian uxoHifuLra. re- 

je Boiotian ijx^iit^, 1. \^?\. But 

(Ljdian) xiOoproi are unwnrlike, 1. ir>r<. 

* Cp. Thticyd. 8. 22. 2. The Make- 

L doDiaa military boot was the Kprfrii ; cp. 

iTheokritos 15. 6. The old notion that 

Homeric warriors went bare-foot into 



battle ia not tenable; cp. Buchhoir, 
Bealitn ii. 278. 'lipiKpaTlSet doubtless 
c«me in duriuf; the fourth century, cp. 
L. * 8. tub roc. Pollux, 7. 80-94, haM 
a disquiMtion on shoes and shoemakem, 
which implies a widespread habit of 
protecting the foot, but the practice was 
not so unirersal as with inodern Europe ; 
cp. Diet, Aniiqq. sub vv. Caktut, etc. 
A huge haul of old boots has recently 
been ninde in Dumbartonshire ; cp. 
Maodonald and Park, TKe Soman Fort* 
on the Bar Hill (Glasgow, 19M), pp. 
101 ff. 



182 



HERODOTUS 



APP. II 



tjt nihilo : its author had authoritiea and sources of knowledge, and 
there is no reason to doubt hia good faith ia the matter. Believing, 
as he did, that Xerxes brought all the furccs of the Empire to bear 
on Greece,' and having certain data of a more or less authentic 
character to go upou, it was easy for him to posit an enumeration 
and to give a description of the forces from various means at his 
dtspoBal. HekatJiios, and other geographers, genealogists, an<l logo- 
graphers, might have furnished a good deal beside the mythical and 
genealogical notes inserted passim in the bare description of the army : - 
Herodotus had seen the picture dedicated by Mandrokles in the 
Heraion of Samos; * and the representation of the hosts of Dareioa 
which crossed the Bosporoa would hold good for the hosts of Xerxes 
which crossed the Hellespont. Inscriptions and inventories, such as 
l)ureio« erected on the Bosporos, may have been erected by Xerxes, 
on the Hellespont or elsewhere, albeit Herodotus does not say so ; in 
any case the contents of the Dareian stelai would be valid for the 
musters of Xerxes.* Hearsay, tradition in the Ionian and Dorian 
cities of Asia Minor, might account for a good deal of the miscellaneous 
information put together by Herodotus in the Catalogue. It is 
tempting to surmise that some documents fell into the hands of the 
<i reeks after Piatsiiai, and might have furnished some of the mo.st 
indisputably authentic elements, such as the list of the Persian 
Myriarchs {a.p\Dtrrt>;) and the details of the command. It is generall}' 
admitted that Herodotus was not the first prose author who had 
treated even the episodes of this war : how else account for the clear 
reference to Greek writers who were in error in regard to tlie correct 
fiirm of the name Maaistios J ' The hypuihesis that Greek memoir-writers 
were busy on the Persian side is, indeed, not verifiable, but it is not 
absurd." To suppose that Herodotus had but one source, mediate 
and ultimate, aiid that an official Peraian document, were truly simple. 
He himself could not have used such a document ; and the Catalogue 
titntains muny items that such a document would not have contained. 
The composite character of the Catalogue in itself imjjlies a variety 
of sources ; but imperfect and erroneous as many of the items may be, 
artificial as the whole may be, and gross as the exaggeration in regard 
to the total figures assuredly is, there is no resisting the indications 
which point to authentic and even official sources for the ultimate 
anatomy, so to speak, and essentials of the Catalogue. If the argu- 
ment* and aspects urged in the preceding pages be valid, it appears 
that in this case — as in some other ciises — we understand Herodotus' 
data better than he himself understood them ; in particular, the figures, 
the arrangements of command, the lejiding, the order of march : even 



» 7. 21. 

^ Cp. 6. 36, a passage which suggests 
a large debit to Uekataios ; Inlroduction, 
§10. 



" 4. 88. 

« Cp. i. 87. 

^ 9. 20. 

* Cp. Introduction, g 10. 



THE PERSIAN PREPARATIONS 



I 



tta we may understand better the strategic and tactical aspecta of tbe 
c.tmpaign. These claims maj' look a trifle arrogant, but be it recognized 
that only through Herodotus do we undertake to explain Herodotus; 
hj supplies all the data for the readjustment and correction of his 
own main theses. Moreover, his Catalogue possesses a high value as 
presenting, in the most graphic and lively colours, an inventory of 
the weapons taken by the king's host into action, and thus rendering 
more intelligible the inferior and motley character of the forces 
opposed to the well-armed Greek hoplitea. The variety of nations 
and languages mustered for the review })etrays, probably not quite 
wthout the historian's own cognizance, a desperate source of weak- 
ness on the Persian side : the army and navy lists are the best 
introduction to a rationale of the Greek victory. Apart from these 
immediate bearings of the lista upon the subject proper, Herotlotus 
lias, in this passage, as in the Ski/t/iiim and the Libyan Luijui, na in the 
second and third Books, as in many shorter passages of his histories, 
put in evidence materials of interest and value for the ethnologist, 
•nthropologist, geographer. How far such an object may have been 
within his conscious purpose matters nothing now to the value of the 
result. And if the inventory of the king's ft>rce8 were even more of 
an ideal scheme than it has here been assumed to be, and was mainly 
constructed on a priori principles, to exhibit a graphic picture of the 
Persian empire, as conceived by the writer, yet these secondary 
interests must permanently belong to it, and must ever secure for it 
the attention of the anthropologist or ethnographer, to whom mere 
military or political events are unimporUint, and merely chronological 
Jifferetices are negligible quantities, whereas the study of human 
arts, arms, culture and institutions is the main purpose in his view. 

§ 6. The objective of the Persian undertaking, and the general 
]»lan of campaign, are implicitly given again and again in the course 
of the Herodotean narrative, and are aJso more explicitly suited on 
several special occasions. The points are obviosis, and need not be 
elaborated. Superficial inconsistencies in the formulas for the military 
objective are easily harmonized. The plan of campaign rio doubt 
underwent some modification under stress of eventii ; the exact plans 
of Xerxes and Mardonios in the second year are obscure and open to 
discussion ; but hero, in the first instance, we are only concerned with 
the original project. The most considerable jiroblem, in this 
connexion, is to ascertain, if possible, how far the synchronous 
invasion of Sicily by the Carthaginians was a measure designed and 
concerted by the great king and his advisers, for the utter confusion 
of the Greeks and the easier conquest of the separate parts of Hellas, 
in detail. The several aspects of the fundamental question, thus 
fi^)rmulated, may here be discussed in brief. 

(a) Three distinct place-names occur as defining tht dbjrctiee of the 
expedition, to wit, Athens, IloUas, Europe. The relative frequency of 



184 



HERODOTUS 



AFP. If 



the several fommlas is not without interest. Europe is thrice given 
as the proper l>ournft of the iiinlertakitig, which ainiB at nothing lesa 
than the conquest of the whole mainland.^ The narrowest fonnuhi 
occurs twice as often, and niisea the resnlts of at least the first 
ciimpaign to the rank of successes from the Persian point of view.- 
But the most frequent is also the most obviously reasonable formula ^ : 
ct-rtainly the reduction of the Peloponnesos, as well jis Central Greece, 
was the goal of the Persian invasion; though whether that reduction 
could be effected on the fiehls and in the waters of Central Greece 
was a point to be referred to the actual strategy of the campaign. 
The variation in the formida for the objective is purely superficial, 
and the harmony is effected by Herodotus himself, or by his tiramath 
personaf* The exclusiv«>ly Athenian formula is due, in this connexion, 
less to the prejudice of the Attic Sources than to the actuid course of 
events, which brought the Persian once and again into actual possession 
of Athens.^ The reduction of Hellas was fully understood as the 
inevitable and intended goal of the expedition, predetermined by the 
geographical conditions, the historic antecedents, the ethnical and 
military solidarity of the Peloponnesos and Central Greece.'* 
Herodotus certainly lends no colour to the notion that at any point or 
stage in the campaign the Persian contemjilated drawing his frontier so 
as to exclucie the Peloponncse and even Attica." The largest formula, 
which includes all Europe in the scope of the undertaking, is open to 
grave suspicion, as a possible device intended to involve the Pereian 
in all the grejiter failure and disgrace by an exaggeration of his aims 
and ambitions. The most plausible gi-ound for ascribing such an 
intention of universal conquest to Xerxes is lost to Herodotus, by his 
omission to co-ordinate the invasion of Sicily, or Western Hellas, with 
the invasion of the Motherland. Yet even this formula is not quite 
senseless. The Persians had explored the Western waters twenty 
yeara before.'* Their Asianic subjects had long-standing relations 
with their kinsmen in Italy and Sicily.* Greeks from the West wero 



' 7. 50 Kanurrpf^dMcvoi irocrav Wjr 
VHfnimiv i'o<n-/i<rofi.tt' irlaiii (X. IfK).) ; cji. 
c, 54 (the king's piaytT at the Hflles- 
]iODt) ; c. 101 (oi Xoiroi ol irpi» iairi/nft 
oMomt irdpuiiroi). 

* 7. 2, 8 {bin) ivl rit 'Atftjeof: 8. 68 
oiV 'x"* m'' ■'^' 'Atf^a» tC)P irep (trtxa. 
apu^iBTjt crr/XLTeikiTSai : cp. cc. 102, 106. 

' 7. 1 rrparcCifffSai irl r^r 'EWdJa 
(fiix), cc. 7, 12, 17, 2.1, 38 (Pytli. loq.), 
39 (X. loq.), 46, 47. 67, 82, 101, 160, 
[239]; 8. 100, 115, 116. 

* 7. 8 el TouTom re gal Toit roi'Totei. 
1r^»^ff«OJClipol'T Ka.TaffTpnf/6tit9ti, ct ITAoiroi 
ToO ^piryij rip-wrai X'^PV' tV' '"^•' 
UtpvlSa i-roifiofier rifi ^t6i aiSipt i/iov- 
ptouvar itrX. (rip4at iriffat ^7u) ^Mtt iiM-'f 



Et''/xinjt. 7. 138 ^ W TrpaniKaalii i) 
;}a4rc\/9i ofpofUL fiiv fJx' '^^ ^''^' 'AB/jvaT 
iXaurei, Karlero Si it Tratrar -rifv 'KWdSa, 
Cp. 7. 157 ; 8. 142 wtpl -nit iturripijt 
ipxV^" i.yi)v tyirrro, vim Si iptpu icai 
it ira<rai' ryjv 'EXXdJo. 
» Cp. 9. 1, 3. 

• Cp. 9. 101 n^ wtpl MapJoW(j» wraiiry 
i] "EXXdi. 

' As suggosted by G. B. Orundr, 
Ot. Persian IFar, p. 449. Tlie projecte<l 
political frontier is one thing, the 
immediate military base auotlier. 

' Cp. the mission of DeniokeJpR, about 
511 B.C. {ffdt. W.-VL Appendix 111. 
§ 6), to iiay nothin;; of Sataspes, 4. 43. 

• (5. 21, etc. 



THE PERSIAN PREPARATIONS 



185 



not unkiioTrn or unwelcome \nsitant8 at the Persian court.' Gelon of 

Syracuse may be summoned as an ex|jert witness to the dangers nf a 
direct Persian aggression upon the Western Greeks.'- Had tlie 
Hellenic j^eniusula passed, like Makedon and Thrake, under the 
Persian yoke, a further attempt at expansion westwards was nothing 
but a question of time. Only a niilitwi y defeat somewhere in Europe 
could staj' the natural advance of the Persian power, in accordance 
with the law of a merely military Empire.^ Thus, apart from any 
conscious or fully projected plan of campiiign in 480 Kv., there was a 
real sense in which ' Europe ' was the ultimate objective of the Pei-sian 
advance, and the iiattlos of Salamis and Plataia secured, in a sense, 
the liberties not merely of Hollas, and of Athens, but of the whole 
Western world, from the Oriental invader. 

{b) The plan of campairjn is, perhaps, nowhere clearly or fidly 
stated, from the Persian point of view, but may be gathered from the 
actual course of events as naiTated, and from the critique on its short- 
comings and failures placed in the mouth of this or that actor in the 
drama, or even conveyed by the historian in proper person. The 
kn'f en nMs-<ie, the army and navy lists, the organization of the 
command, the route followed, and the actual conduct of operations all 
imply certain conceptions on the Persian side in regard to the strategic 
aspects of the invasion. There is a deliberate revival of the methods 
of Mardonios in 492 B.C., and a design to make bis conquests, or re- 
conquests, the basis of further aggression. Two ideas appear pre- 
dominant : first, a reliance on mere numbers for military superiority ; 
secondly, a determination to keep army and fleet together, and to 
operate conjointly upon both elements. A partial and inadequate 
condemnation of the first of these ideas is put into the mouth of 
Artabanos at Abydos.* A more adequate exposure of the defect in 
the second is entrusted to Demaratos, who demonstrates, moreover, 
that the pedantic adherence to the second principle frustrates the 
merits of the first.'' The two arms may really have been more closely 
tie<l up together on the Persian side by considerations of supply, 
or even by political motives — each moiety perhaps to some extent 
guaranteeing the loyalty of the other — than is fully brought out in 
the records. But, as a matter of fact, the scheme broke down in 
operation. The Greek fleet was allowed to win a purely naval victory 
Salaniis : the Greek army completed the work of liberation, a year 
ter, on the Asopos. It would her*- be premature to ent^r more fully 
into the complicated relations of the several engagements during the 
wjir to each other : their strategic, as well as their purely tactical, 
anpects will be more conveniently discussed in a later context. 

' 6. 24. formuUtes the principle of the Persisn 

' 7. 168. atrat«gy in c. 236 rai 6 vaiTt/cAt rip rt^i^ 

' 7. 8 oC'Safii kw ifTpefU<reLfLiv /rrX. Ofrfjitt «ii i nfdi Tifi fat/rncip Ofiov ropet>6- 

* 7. 49. firrot ' «i ii itarritrnr, olhe iri l(rtai 

, * 7. 23^, Achaimenea the Adminl ixtlvrnff^ xfi^'fo^ ^^< ^Kitun vol. 



It 



HERODOTUS 



AFP. U 



(c) Finally, the question recurs, related yet distinct, whether the 
synchronous invasions of Sicily iind Ureece were concerted, aa a single 
and uniteil effort of the ' Barbarians ' to conquer all the free Greeks 
eiist and west at once, or ivhether the synchronism was merely 
accidental, and the two events two several results of independent series 
of historical antecedents. To Herodotus the synchronism is an 
accident, though doubtless a providential accident.' To Diodoros, 
that is to Ephoros in the fourth century, the two invasions were alike 
organized and ordered from Susa..^ This idea of a concerted attack 
upon the Hellenes, e^ist and west, at one moment, is not in itself 
praposterous or ahsurd. Persia had long had relations with the 
Punic power, and perhaps even claimed suzerainty over the 
colonies of Tyre in the West." Persia had likewise knowledge of the 
condition of Italy and Sicily, and doubtless cherished some vague 
ambitions of aggressions there.* The appro-xiraate, not to say the actual 
synchronism of the two invasions is indubitable.'' Yet, for all that, 
this attractive hypothesis must be dismissed, not merely as unproven, 
but iis improbable. The silence of Herodotus, his failure, the failure 
of his informants to draw the obvious inference, count for something. 
The inference is iu perfect keeping with the whole method of the 
Ephorean historiography ; it is a logical effort of 'rationalism,' it is an 
effective stroke of 'rhetoric' Set in the objective order of events, it 
goes far beyond the resources of Persian diplomacy, or of Persian war- 
leading. It IB not in the same class with the incompetent strateg}' of 
the cam])aigning in Hellas. What Hanniljal witli Piiilip and Antiochos, 
what Sertorius with Mithradates failed to realize in the simple case of 
Rome, that Xer.ves will not have anticipated in the more atomic or 
chaotic world of the fifth century B.C. Moreover, the assault on 
Greece, the assault on Sicily, has each its own clearly traced chain of 
antecedents. The invasion of Sicily by the Carthaginians in 480 B.C. 
would have taken place just as surely had Xerxes never crossed the 
Hellespont, had he been detained in Upper Asia by intrigues in his 
palace, or revolts in his provinces. Certaiidy, Xcr.ves did not wait on 
the co-operation of the C'arthaginians to determine the moment of his 
inviision of Hellas. And probably the Cartiiaginians determined the 
moment of their appearance in Sicily by the purely local circumstances 
in the West. But the synchronism, though undesigned, was not, we 
may still believe, without results upon the actual conduct of operations. 
There is, indeed, little ground for supposing that any Greeks from the 
Motherland would have gone forth to do battle for their sons in 
Sicilj', even had the Persian not stood just then at the gates of 



' 7. 106. 

* Cp, ApMnJix I. § 13 luprn. 

' Op. Hdt. 3. 17. Do the Cfirtln- 
giDi»ii8, aad their native neighbours, 
app«ar among the subjects of Dureiois < 



Cp. Records of the. Peat, ix. 7B, where the 
' Maxyana ' ami ' Karka ' figure among 
the tributarios of the king. 

* Cp. itotes 3. 9, supra. 

' Cp. Apiiendii IX. § 6 in/m. 



4 6 THE PEKSIAN PREPABATIONS 187 

Hellas.^ Bat there is some ground for believing that Gelon of 
Syracuse might have come to the aid of the Greeks at Salamis, had 
he not been preoccupied and embarrassed at home by the Carthaginian 
question.^ The event proved that his aid was not necessary for the 
salvation of Hellas, but leaves us speculating, perhaps somewhat idly, 
what the position of Gelon in the Greek world might have been, could 
he have added the Aristaa of Salamis to the honours of Himera ; and 
whether that world could have accommodated at once the Lord 
of Syracuse and the Generals of Athens, if Hellas had owed, or had 
seemed to owe, her whole preservation to a Sicilian tyrant. 

' Cp. the mysterions tannt of Geloa, 7. 158. 
« 7. 165. 



'ENDIX III 



THE PREPARATION'S OF THE GREEKS 



§ 1. Clinracter of tlic transition*! passage (7. 128-137). § 2. The Greek proiinratioii* 
(7. 138-178). § S. Condition and iiolicy of Urcek sUtes, 4fiO~lSl B.C. ; SpmrtiL. 
§ 4. Atbons diiriitg the decade tftcr MarathoD. §5. The r»n- Hellenic union 
ai;ain9t the ITeda. § 6. The condiict of Argos, Krete, Sicily, Korkyra. { 7. 
The case of Delphi. § 8. Forces of the Coafwleracy, and prospects ofsncoaas. 



^ 1. Herodotus has postponed his account of the preparations of 
the Greeks, such as it is, to his review of the king's preparations a»-'' 
his record of tlie Persian advance as far as the frontier of Hellas. Tbo 
instorian might have had a logical, a chronological, an artistic reason 
for thia course. The great king was the aggressor ; the move remaine<l 
with him after Marathon, after Paros ; he still was acting on the 
offensive. Also, as it appears, the Greeks were tardy in realizing the 
necessity for union and co-operation in view of the impending danger, 
and it was not until the eve of the re-invasion that effective steps 
were taken to meet the invader. From the purely literary point of 
view, also, Herodotus has indubitably followed the proper order of 
presentation in giving precedence to the Persian movements. In all 
three aspects the structure of the Seventh Book fully justifies itself. 
Yet there remains somewhat of a mj'stery about its composition, anfl 
the transition from the first and greater section, dealing with th; 
Persian preparations for the conquest of Greece, to the second and 
lesser section, which deals with the preparations made by the Greeks 
to defend their liberties, is not effected without hitch or friction. 
The fault does not lie in the abruptness of the scene-shifting : the 
more sudden and complete the transition in such a case the better. 
Obscurity arises rather from the complex yet inconsequent manner in 
which the section plainly dealing with the Persian prepiirations is 
jointed, or dovetailed, into the section no less plainly dealing with 
the Greek preparations. AVere the passage (cc. 128-137), by which 
the transition from the Persian side to the Greek side is mediated, 
wholly wanting, the loss would indeed be considerable from more than 
one point of view, for the passage in question is rich in lights and 

188 



Virum. 



raxileJ 



r? 







THE PREPARATIONS OF THE GREEKS 



18U 



colours and more solid mattors ; but from the point of view of lucid 
arrangement and logical structure the passage would never have been 
mined. It comprises three disparate sub-sections, all or any one of 
which, however vahuible or interesting in itself, might be removed 
without obvious loss or detriment to the historical argument and 
sequence of the storj as a whole : to wit, (a) Tlie risU of Xenrs to 
Tempc, with the geography of Thessaly thrown in (cc. 128-130 = 56 
lines); (/3) u short but composite passage (cc. 131, 132=14 lines) 
recording various disparate items, to be more precisely specified below j 
{y) a longer passage (cc. 1 33-1 37 = 73 lines) giving the story of thr urath 
iif Tallhyhios (/it/n? 'iaXQvfiiox^ from its reputed cause, in the year 491 
B.C., to its final issue in the year 430 B.C. This last and largest item 
yields obviously a late reference, perhaps the latest in this part of the 
work of Herodotus, to contcmixii-ary events ; the passage is confessedly 
Ji digression, and presumably an insertion in the pre-existing draft, or 
text of the story {ritv vpnTtpov Aoyoi', c. 137 ad fin.). This previous 
story is wholly excluded from cc. 133-137; it is the story of the 
expedition of Xerxes (») (npan^Xaa-iij tf /iacrikioi, c. 138). The passage 
Ciinnot well have been written, or inserted in the pre-existing text, 
l^fore 428 B.C., and its composition might date a little later. ^Vhy 
the story should have been inserted in this place rather than at a more 
appropriate point, in chronological sequence, it is hard to say, unless 
we suppose that Herodotus hatl passed that point, in the course of 
his final revision, before the year 430 B.C"., or before ho became 
;icquainted with the fate of Nikolas and Aneristos and theii' 
companions, or acquired the truly aetiological legend which had 
grown or sprung up in Lukedaimon {a>s Xcyoiwi AaKtSat/idi-toe, c. 137) 
j to explain that catastrophe. If Herodotus wrote his history from 
j first to last as we have it, this story would serve to date the last part 
I of the composition as later than 430 B.C. If he rewrote ov revised 
his work, or this portion of his work, more than once, this passage ia 
plainly one of the last insertions, and no part of the original draft or 
i «veD of the former revision.' 

The first item in the list (a supra) has also the air of being an 

I Addition to the original text, of course from the author's hand. TIu 

rixit of Xerx4's to Tempt is an inconsequence in the general story of 

the war, and jars on its own imme<iiHte context here. Having 

jtMicbed Therroe (c. 127), or Pieria (c. 131), Xerxes is supposed, i>our 

\pcumr U temps, to have visited the outlet of the Peneios, the vale 

of Tempe, on a voyage of inspection (as was his way, om-js ti 

*8iXoi Toioi'To JTotJ/o-at) : his only chance, indeed, of seeing the fatuous 

I pmaa, as he was intending to enter Thessaly itself by another and 

' tuoro difficult route further inland. Surely Xerxes did not etit«r 

Thessaly from Makedonia twice, once by sea and once by land ? If 

I the king reached Tflmpo by sea he remained (we may snppoRp) in 

' Cp. Introducliou, § 8. 



190 



HERODOTUS 



APp. nt 



Thessaly, at Larissa, till joined by the bulk of his amy, and did not 
return to Tberme or to the nearer Picria. If the kiiig entered 
Thessaly by land, and by any pass other than the vale of Tempe 
itself, he may have visited Tempe still, but, if so, he reached the pass 
by land and not by sea. Is it out of reason to suppose that the 
Herodotean Xerxea is taken from TLcrnie to Tempe by sea, tiecause 
Herwlotua himaeif approached this famous locality by that route ? Is 
not Xerxes taken to Tempe in order to give Herodotus an opportunity 
of describing the place, and the plain of Thessaly, and of introducing a 
local criticism upon the medism oi' the Thessjdians, dramatically placed 
for the occasion in the lips of Xerxes himself 1 The description of 
Thessaly has the note of autopsy about it, and upon the strength 
of this passage we are justified in taking Herodotus himself to 
Thessaly. The visit of Herodotus to Tlieasaly would, however, have 
preceded his migration to Tburioi, still more his return to Athena, 
shortly before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war.' It would no 
leas naturally have succeeded his first migration from Halikarn;isso8 to 
Samos, and from Samos to Athens. If Herodotus brought to Athens 
(as we have supposed) the first draft of his history of the Persian war, 
this passage upon Thessaly was not contained in it. It is an addition 
intwle after the fii-st composition, but before the final revision of the 
work ; it belongs to what may be called the second draft, the middle 
period, or stage, of his composition and of the genesis of his work. 
This conclusion may be acceptable even to those who are unwilling to 
cancel altogether the historical reality of the king's visit to Tempt--, 
exactly aa narrated by Herodotus. The story of the king's visit to 
Tempe may have come to the ears of Herodotu.s first in connexion 
with his own visit to the same region : that observation, however, 
still leaves to the passage in question all the character of a digression, 
an addition to the original draft of the work. Those, however, who 
appreciate the material inconsequence of tiie kiny's excursion from 
Therme to Tempe by sea, and the double inconsequence of his return 
from Tempe to Therme by sea, can feel little difficulty in the hypo- 
theaia hero advanced in reg.ird to the compasition, and original 
provenience, of this portion of the text, 

The case is by no means bo clear in rogai-d to the remaining 
section, the short passage (/J .mpiu) intervening between the digression 
upon Thessaly and the appendix upon the wrath of Talthybios (cc. 131, 
132). This brief passage contains nothing which is not strictly 
cognate to the principal arf,nunent and narrative ; yet, on the other 
hand, the items are not happily placed, and whether open to criticism 
or not, upon their own merits, heighten the confusion of the transit 
from the larger section of the Seventh Book, which deals clearly with 
the Persian preparations, to the lesser section of the Book, which deals 
no less clearly with the Greek. Four such items may be distinguished 



? 1 



THE PREPAEATIONS OF THE GREEKS 



191 



I moiil 



in the passage : — (i.) The notice of thf pivtse m Pieria, while one of the 
three corjis d'arnUe (t?)? o-rpaTuj? TpiTiifiopti) is tlwiring a way for the 
passage of the 'whole' force into Perrhailiia: a notice which simply 
repeats, with some slight amplification, a remark already made in the 
preceding section (c. 128), and is, to that extent, a 'dittograph' — 
wliether earlier or later in original com])osition. (ii.) The record of the 
return of (Jm Hrralds sent from 8»irde8 (c. 32 sujira) into Hellas, to 
demand earth and water, some empty-handed, and some with the 
required symbols of submission. These two items may be classed 
strictly with the contents of the whole preceding section upon 
the prepiiratious of the Persians for the invasion of Hellas and 
the king's advance to the border ; and yet they involve, or at 
least naturally introduce, not merely the two following items in 
the passage itself, but also the manifest digression and addition Hi>on 
Ote wrath of I'ullhybios, which succeeds. For there follows first (iii.) 
a list of the nwlv^ng sUUfs and peoples, which gave earth and water 
to the king's messengers, a list involving some prol>lems here better 
to be postponed, and further {iv.) a record of (he sidniin v<nu of vengmncf 
taken h'f Ute cmffderat^; (rrt^h, whose association for the defence of 
their common cause has still to be reported — though that is the least 
of the problems raised by this remarkable record. Of the four items, 
thus ilisintegrated, the last three are closely cnntiected, not merely 
with each other, but with (y) the great story of the uralk of Tallhtfhws 
(cc. 13.3-137) which immediately succeeds. The question at once 
presents itself : to which stage in the composition of the work does 
this minor section (cc. 131, 132) belong t What is it^ stratigraphical 
secret] As belonging, or cognate to the main argument, it might he 
thought as old as anything in this portion of the text, l)Ut that the 
repetition of the note upon the upper pass fia Perrhaibia into Thessaly 
is clumsy and enigmatical. As connected with the story of the strath 
of Tnltht/hios the soctioiv might seem to belong to the thirrl, or final, 
revision of the work. Or is it necessary to refer the whole section, 
brief as it is, to the same stratura of deposit t The tirst two items 
(c. 131) adhere naturaily to the narrative in c. 127, when the excursus 
on Tliessaly (cc. 128-130) is eliminated, that is, referred to the second 
or middle period of composition : Xerxes is at Thei-rae, and in the 
Pierian circle, while his army is making a road into Perrhaibia, and 
t*) him there return the heralds despatched into Greece from Sardes 
months before. The pjissjige so far leads on naturally, and even 
mentatively, to the next main section, upon (hf i'Sreek jnejiarntions, 
and that without in any waj* anticipating or discounting it. In 
other words, the narrative and argument originally might have passed 
from c. 127 to c. 131, and from c. 131 to c. 138. while cc. 128-130 
represent an addition and insertion in the second draft, still consonant 
with the main argument, and avoiding trcspuss upon the subject of 
the Greek preparations, the antecedents of the war from the Greek 




1!>2 



HERODOTUS 



API*, m 



side, but certainly discounting the record in c. 131 by the fuller 
notice of the upper or second pass iat-w Theswily via Perrhailjia. To 
the same stratum, the second draft, maj' be referred the two subse- 
quent items, which do more inartistieally break the clear presentiition 
of the historian's argument, by introducing mattere of fact out of 
their natural order : matters, indeed, which Herodotus may very 
well have Ifcirn^d for the first time in European Hellas, and more 
particularly in Athens. The problematical ehai-acter of the alleged 
fact in itself but enhances this probability. Once the ehaiin of 
continuity or of logical presentation had thus been broken, it was 
easy to aggravate the inconsefjuence by the further and subsequent 
insertion, as late as 429 B.C., of (y) the story of the wralk of Talllnjbios 
(cc. 133-1 37), It thus appears that the stratification of this transition*! 
.section is very complex : originally we may suppose the narrative 
paased from c. 127 to c. 131, and from c. 131 to c. 138. The first 
revision of the work added cc. 128-130, and c. 132. Finally, cc. 133- 
137 took their place in the third or final draft, a place naturally 
suggested by the mention of the return of the heralds, a fact recorded 
in the oldest draft of the Book, and suggested by the list of niedizing 
states, and the fate vowwl, but never executed, upon their devoted 
lieads, which may itself have been placed in that connexion ali'eady 
in the second state of the text^ 

§ 2, The additions thus made by the .author, at second or thin! 
hand, are chiefly interesting as contributions to the history of the 
attitude and condition of the states in Ureece previous to the invasion, 
and in view of it — a subject originally introduced in more set and 
formal fashion in c. 138. This passage (cc. 138-178), dealing with 
fhe jirepanifinri:! of the (jreeL^, on^e reached, is in many ways a great 
contrast to the previous section (cc. 1-127 and 131) dealing with the 
king's movements. (1) It ia much shorter, smaller in bulk (22 pp. 
against 52 pp.), though it covers, in a way, a larger subject, seeing 
that on the Greek side the action of man}* independent states and 
centres of policy is involved. (2) It is, in consequence, more com- 
plicated in regard to its argument, au<l pre-suniably more diverse in 
respect of it.s origin, or sources. (3) It has thus a less obvious unity 
and coherence than the eailier and larger portion of the Book, dealing 
with the Persian advance, and might seem, at first sight, more illusory, 
loss authoritative. Such a judgement upon it would be superficial. 
The greater coherence and consistency of the passage dojxSing with the 
PersiaTi history is not a guarantee of greater fidelity or truth, nor is 
the comparative incoherence, confusion, and inadequacy of the shorter 
section, dealing with the affairs of the Greek .states, a reason for 
regarding it as fictitious. On the contrary, clearness and coherence 
may be dearly purchased by a paucity of witnesses, or of authorities, 
.ind by a corresponditjg liberty of prophesying, or historicizirig, un- 
checked by evidence ; while a conflict of numerous and authentic 



f§l-2 



THE PREPARATIONS OF THE GREEKS 



193 



■witnesses, from a variety of partial sources, may result in a leas 
oonsisteiU but a truer history. It is, indeetl, obvious that Herodotus 
has allowed himself to take great liberties with the story of the 
Persian preparations, especially that part of it for which he may surely 
be said to have had the least authentic testimony, the scenes laid in 
Susa, and the private conferences of the king vrith his chief advisers, 
Artabanos, Demaratos, and so forth. But, in dealing with the policy 
and acts of the free Kepublica of Greece, and with scenes laid in 
relatively familiar groiuid, it wjis inevitable that he should, from the 
very nature of the case, and of the evidi^tices, rely more implicitly 
upon his sources, his authorities, and should &\\o\v less freedom to 
his own fancies or inferential reconstructions. This portion of the 
uarrative of Herodotus may, therefore, be taken to reflect more truly 
than the preceding portion an authentic tradition, or mass of traditions, 
and to exhibit less of the free creative action of the historian's 
own mind, and less of a debt to previous writMs, unconcerned with 
^^- his subject proper. The residta, upon the whole, must be more 
^■satisfactory to a modem and critical rt-ader, and the historical contents 
^^must seem, on the whole, more considerable, and pregnant with 
I greater possibilities of ascertainable truth. Not, indee<l, that an 
I authentic tradition, or a mass* of authentic traditions, is necessarily true 
to the actual facts of the past ; but rather that authentic tradition 
is a kind of evidence prior both in time and in importance to the 
imaginative re-creations, or the inferential constructions, of the literary 
artist. But tradition itself is not quite artless ; nor is authenticity a 

(term convertible with truth. Tradition may be not merely inadequate, 
us a record of the actual facts, but may misrepresent the facts, under 
the inflluenco of national and local prejudices and interests, or even 
Wmply for the greater glory of God, or the greater delight of man. 
The mass of independent traditions presented in this section of 
Herodotus' work, while but imperfectly supplpng a connected and 
consistent account of the independent or common action of the Greek 
^^ states, during the interval between Mnrathon and Thermopylai, 
^^reflects the humours, the prejudices, the af tor-thoughts, not so much 
' of the period preceding the war, as of the period succeeding, during 
which Greece was accumulating a stock of memories alxjut the Great 
War and its antecedents. Yet here we are dealing all along with 
real persons, with actual situations ; the very incoherence of the 
narrative, as a whole, is one of the best guarantees of the authenticity 

ko( the traditions in detail. The gamut of truth, however, ranges 
over a wide interval in these stories, from the patent fictions, in 
regard to the action of Delphi, or the speeches of Gelon, through the 
^doubtful and obscure problems in Spartan policy, to the cleai'er acts 
of Athens and her statesmen — however deeply even these may still 
be involved in a prejudiced medium, or disorganized by the imperfec- 
tion of the record. Viewing the passage broadly, and calling in, 




194 



HERODOTUS 



APP. in 



to supplement its imperfect record, the passage previously analyzed 
(cc. 128-137), and also incidental ami sporadic passages or notes 
introduced elsewhere,^ it may be said to contain, or adumbrate, two 
main topics, or groups of topics, which are rightly distinguishable 
from the very nature of the case itself : first, the condition, policy, 
and fortunes of the leading states of Greece, during the years between 
Marathon and the Persian invanion, especially in view of this danger ; 
and secondly, the furmation nnd action of the patriotic defence league, 
or Confederation, from its inception dorni to the occupation, by 
the national forces, of the line of defence based upon positions at 
Artemision and Therniopylai. In other words, the main passage here 
in view, supplemented by other jiassages to be found in Herodotus, 
though not by him systematized for the purpose, contains an account, 
or series of accounts, more or less adequiite, of the preparations made 
by the Greeks to resist the King's invasion, and in connexion therewith 
some records of the contemporary or immediately anterior condition 
of the leading Greek states, in their domestic fortunes, and in their 
mutual relations. It will be convenient to deal sepanitely with 
these two main departments of the subject, and in so doing to supple- 
ment, from all available sources, tlie fragmentary data supplied by 
Herodotus. 

§ 3. To judge by the evidence, now available, it was only in the 
course of the summer or aututnn of 481 B.C., about the time of the 
King's arrival in Saixles, and not very much before the appearance of 
the King's emissaries in Greece to demand 'earth and water,' that 
any steps were actually taken to bring about a union of Hellenic 
states to resist the impending invasion. Yet at any time during the 
previous eight years the Greeks might have been expecting a renewal 
of the Persian attack : not a few will have perceived that Marathon 
could not be the end of the long-prejjared and inevitable struggle. 
But circumstances and eveTits combined to postpone the reinvasion of 
Hellas, and postponement lulled the Greeks into a false security. 
Slarathon gave jmuse, though not a final pan.st, to the Persian plan of 
conquest ; prepiirations were indeed on foot for the reinvasion of 
Greece, upon a larger scale, but such prepaiations demanded time. 
The revolt in Egypt, the death of Dareios, the disputed succession, 
the preoccupation of the new king with the domestic situation, the 
need to operate first against Egypt, all combined to reassure the 
majority, ever satisfied with short views : only one or two of the most 
far-sighted st-itesmen in the fJreek cities anticipated the inevitable 
development of the story. Thus, for the greater part of the decade 
which intervened between Marathon and Salamis, the Greek states 
relapsed into their normal conditions of local rivalry and domestic 
party-struggle. Yet indirectly out of such conditions was boni the 
policy and >vrought the weapon destined to shatter the Persian invader 



2-3 



THE PREPARATIONS OF THE GREEKS 



195 



^ 



r 



at Salamis and at Plataia. Two states with their several allies had 
already been nominally in league to resist the Barbarian, Athens and 
Sparta ; and there could never have been, during the fifth century, 
any other nucleus for a pan-Hellenic combination against Persia than 
the intimate union of these two states. It is well to trace in detail, 
ao far as the evidences permit, the fortimes and policy of these two 
states in the decade preceding Salamis, as preliminary to the birth of 
the pan-Hellenic Union of 481 BX'. 

The Ctiiulilion, AUituih, and Volu-y of Sparta from 490 B.C. to 481 B.C. — 
There are but very scanty materials in Herodotus to illustrate the 
subject, nor do other authorities supply his deficiencies. The last 
three Books make no consecutive attempt to sketch the progress of 
events in Sparta from the date of Marathon down to the eve of the 
greater struggle : a couple of isolated anecdotes represent the Spartan 
record of the period, liecourso mnst he had to the previous volume of 
the work, especially to the Sixth Book, which partially supplies the 
omission, albeit the materials there introduced leave much to desire 
both for quantity and for quality. In particular, the chronological 
perspective is blurred and problematic, nor is any attempt made — 
such was hardly in Herodotus' way — to rationalize the policy and 
action of Sparta, even so far as recorded. This last is the easiest 
omission for us to supjilvi seeing that the policy of Sparta at any 
given crisis is sure to have been determined by more or less ascer- 
tained and constant factors. The lass of acts and events in Spartan 
history of the decade is more deplorable, and mere conjecture on such 
points were worse than useless. 

Sparta started the decade in alliance with Athens against the Mede. 
The alleged treatment of the Persian heralds in 491 B.C., narrated out 
of season in 7. 133, is evidence on the point. The story, even if devoid 
of truth in regard to the professed argument, implies a situation, and 
would hardly have been told at any time except upon the l^asis of some 
such understanding. Sparta and Athens were acting together, in a 
common policy of resistance i oufranct to the king's demands. The 
aame moral is involve<l in the better attested and more acceptable story 
of the Spartan intervention, in 401, or in 490 B.C., against the mediz- 
ing Aigina, and the deposit of Aiginetan hostages in Athens by the 
Spartan kings Klcomcncs and I.eotychidas — an act which cannot 
hare anticipated by much the actual appearance of Datis, Artapbrenes, 
and Hippias in Attic waters (6. 49 tf.). Still more conclusive evidence 
is involved in the despatch of the two thousand Spartan warriors, 
under anonymous leading, to the support of the Athenians at Marathon 
(6. lOii, 120), a belated fulfilment of their treaty -engagements, 
which assuredly brought no credit to SjMirtan policy or leading at the 
time. Of the nature of those engagements there should never have 
been any doubt. Sparta and Athens had ])laiidy bound themselves 
mutually to a defensive alliance, and a defensive alliance only ; but 



196 



HERODOTUS 



ATP. HI 



even that limited obligation Sparta, for one reason or another, failed 
in the hour of need to fulfil. That these treaty -obligations were 
euhsequently and formally revoked there is nothing in the traditions 
to suggest ; but it is none the less evident that after the Athenian 
Buccess at Marathon, and after the Afcheuian aggression on Paros, the 
attitude and policy of Sj*arta were somewhat modified for a time. 
Aigina was taken back into favour ; the Aiginetan oligarchy was 
perhaps encouraged in its anti-Attic policy ; an attempt was made to 
liberate the Aiginetan hostages in Athens by diplomatic means; and 
although Sparta did not take an overtly hostile part against Athens 
in the Aiginetan war (487-481 B.C.), she probably viewed it with a 
neutrality mainly benevolent to the oligarchy of the Dorian island. 
No doubt Sparta at this time observed the developing ambition, power, 
and democratic institutions of Athens with ever-incre^ising mistrust ; 
and the alienation from Athens, which ensues on ' the death of 
Kleomenes' about 487 B.C., coincides not merely with the outbreak of 
the Aiginetan war, but with great changes in the domestic institutions of 
Athens. Of still greater significance than her action, or inaction, in 
Hellas is the mission despatched by Sparta to the Persian court shortly 
afterwards, when Xerxes was already established upon the throne (7. 
134, 135). Tiie record is now, indeed, embedded in a story the main 
purport and moral of which must be completely discredited : the 
mission of the Talthybiads, Sperthias and Boulis, in 485 B.c. or there- 
about*, was rot for the purpose of expiating an offence, which had never 
been committed, nor was it merely for the purpose of reporting ujx)n 
the state of things in Siisa and in the Persian empire generally ; there 
was presumably some more deiinite political purpose in \-iew, concerned 
ivith the i>ositioD of Demaratos in Asia, or of Sparta in Clreece, though 
the Spartans themselves were not the men to plead guilty to any such 
charge. Even admitting the historical possibility of the stury as told 
by Herodotus, the mission of Sperthias and Boidis can haidly have 
failed to open the eyes of the Spartans to the realities of the danger 
menacing Hellas ; and if the further anecdote, of the letter of 
Demaratos, with which the Seventh Book now concludes (c. 239), may 
be treated as e\'idenc6, the Spartans were the first of all European 
Greeks to get wind of the coming atorm, and that before the congress 
of 481 B.C. Anyway, in 481 B.C. Sparta reverted to the policy of the 
dead Kleomenes, to her alliance with Athens against the Mede, and 
something more : nor is this reversion and this development in the 
policy of Sparta difficult to explain, in the light of her domestic 
situation, of her position in Peloponnese and in Hollas, and of her 
traditional attitude towards the Persian. 

(i.) The domestic situation in Sparta during the earlier years of 
this decade was plainly distraught. The expulsion, restoration, and 
end of Kleomenes fall into the first hiatrum, and the story, as told by 
Herudotus, conceals one knows not how serious a danger to Spartan 



§3 



THE PREPARATIONS OF THE GREEKS 



197 



institutions, nor how ghastly an intrigue against the dangerous king. 
There was something of a tragedy in the elder royal line at this crisis. 
Moreover, the deposed and fugitive king, Demaratos, was at the 
Persian court, with other Greek exiles and renegades, or perhaps was 
Already established in the Troad as a Persian vassal, scheming against 
his compatriots. Leonidas the Agid and Leotycliidas the Eurj'pontid 
king in Sparta were both deeply concerned in keeping him at bay. 
Leonidfis, half-brother, son-in-law, and successor to Kleomenes, inherited, 
we may be sure, his great predecessor's feud. Leotychidaa was the 
personal enemy of Demaratos, had dethroned him, and succeeded in 
his room. The Spartans at large did not desire a Kestoration, perhaps 
a T)Tanny, under Persian auspices. 

(ii.) There was further trouble and ground for apprehension in 
Sparta during this period beside the intrigues for and against 
ELleomenes, Demaratos, Leotychidas, Leonidas. The story of the 
'devotion' of Sperthias and Boulis implies, and indeed expres-ses, as 
much, whatever the causes or antecedents of the trouble may have 
been. Apart from the perpetual dread of a Helot rebellion, disturb- 
ance in the domestic affairs of S])artJi was apt to react unfavourably 
upon her position in the Peloponnesus and in Greece generally. She 
had allies to humour or to coerce, she hod the constant rivalry and 
ambitiou of Aigoa to guard against. Kleomenes had scotched, not 
killed, the Argive snake about the time that Miletos last surrendered to 
the Persian (494 B.C.).' The relations of Sparta to Argos in the ten 
years or so subsequent to the Kleomenean war are obscure. The 
approximation between Sparta and Athens cannot have been followed 
with favour in Argos, and may already have suggested to Argos, 
even before the battle of Marathon, a philo-Persian policy, or a miso- 
Hellenic neutrality. The Argives did not officially assist Aigina in 

bthe war with Athens (487-481 B.C.}, perhaps the renewed friction 
between Athens and Sparta contributed to stay the oflScial hand ; yet 
Argos went further than Sparta in the matter, if a thousand Argives 
' volunteered ' under Kurybates and crossed to Aigina, albeit with 
small advantage, it would appear, to Aigina or to themselves (6. 92). 
The disaster in Aigina was a reason the more for the attitude of Argos 
on the Persian question. Granted that Argos was medi^ing all along, 
or likely to medizo (lldt. 7. 148-ir)'2), then Spjirta was all the more 
bound to 'hellenize'; and if Argos, indeeil, was dreaming a recovery 
of the Ilegemonia under Persian auspices, S]>arta had no alternative 
but to choose the better jwrt. Her position in the Peloponnesos, no 
less than her domestic peace and prosperity, became identified with the 
national cause, with the Athenian alliance, and with resistance to the 
Mede, if ever the Mede should again invade the Greeks of Europe. 



' Mt. J. Wella'snaperon "Some point* Imvm me nncoiiviQtxd that tho defeat 
t to th« C'hroDoloj{y of the Eoijm of of Argos took pUce "earlj* in the reigu 
CnaomenMl.,' V./r.5.xxr. (1905), 193 tf., of Cleomeneg " (o^. c. p. 196). 



198 



HERODOTUS 



APP. Ill 



(iii.) Still larger aspects of the (jueBtion must have supervened. 
Sparta will soon have discovered that she bad made a great mistake 
in allowing Athens to win the battle of M;ira.ihon without aid from 
Pdoponnfse, or Lakedaimon : a greater ami loss excusable misUikOj 
even, than when aid was refused to the Asianic Greeks in 498 B.C. 
Sparta's honour and prestige had sufl'ered eclipse : Athens had 
flouted her in Aigiua, anil was bidding fair to rival her in Hellas. 
The Ionian revolt, the abortive expedition ol Mardonios, the victory 
at Marathon, even the raid of Miltiados on the Kykladeis, had shown 
that Persia was not irresistible, and might be defied with impunity, if 
not with success. Spart-a's jwsition as political head of Greece, 
recognized at least for upwards of iialf a century, was at stake, once 
the Persian reinvasion became a monil certainty. The possible success, 
or the more probable failure of Athens, if left to her own unaided 
resources, must have been viewed with almost equal apprehension in 
Sparta. If Athens again scored a triumph, even such a negative 
triumph as the victory at Marathon, Sparta, was deposed, and Athens 
became by sea and land the protjigouist of Hellas. The failure of 
Athens was destined to be no less disastrous. Sparta couid not view 
with equanimity the incorporation of Athens and of central Hellas in 
the Persian empire. The liberties of the PelojHjnnesos, the very 
existence of Sparta itself, with its institutions, were not worth, in that 
case, a year's purchase. These obvious considerations demonstrate 
the absurdity of the view that Sparta was dragged, or oijolef], by 
Athens into the war with Xerxes, and had no interests of her own at 
stake. The phy.'^ical and the historical conditions of the conflict with 
Persia, upon European soil, ordained for Sparta a patriotic policy, as 
the very condition of her own independent e.\i-stence. 

There was that also in the Spartan tl/io.% and in the previous 
relations of Sparta to Persia, to prohibit medism, or even neutrality, 
upon this occasion in S{iarta. A genuine dislike of the Asiatic, of the 
Jlede, his political and social institutions, his very dress and appear- 
ance, perhaps even his religion, may have had something to do with 
Sparta's policy. There was also the tradition of the anti-Medic 
alliance with Lydia in 550 B.C., and of the famous message to Kyros 
on behalf of the Ionian Greeks. If Sparta had done the great king 
less material damage than had Athens, yet her hands were really no 
cleaner than those of Athens. Of course, if the story of the treat- 
ment of the Persian heralds at Sparta in 491 B.C. were true (7. 
1 33) Sparta had indeed deserved the king's vengwmce ; but the king 
declined to wreak it, nor does the supposed Spartan outrage on the 
law and comity of nations ever figure as a ground of Persian hostility, 
or of the actual disaster and losses that overtook the state in the 
Persian war. If a Spartan embassy to the Persian court during the 
period under view be admitted, the true purport of that embassy 
must be sought outside the traditional or Herodotean motivation. It 



THE PREPARATIONS OF THE GREEKS 



id!i 



» 

k 



may have beeu purely exploratory, or it may have carried o, protest 
against the reception accorded to Demaratos. The least likely 
suggestion would be that Sparta was making, at this time, any direct 
bid for Persian support. 

In estinmiing the force of the motives and considerations just set 
forth upon the policy and action of Sparta it must, of course, be 
remembered that these forces acted concomitantly and ^vith cumulative 
efifect. The result of such an estimate is to render the conduct of 
Sparta in tbe second Persian war not merely intetligihle but inevitable. 
Sparta was in no true sense the tool of Athens in the war ; yet, on 
the other hand, the war was not of Sparta's seeking, the war was not 
to Sparta's advantage. Compared with Athena Lakedaimoii hod but 
a secondary interest and stake in the war, and that not merely because 
Athens had given the greater jirovocation, had earned the express 
vengeance, lay more directly exposed -, but also arid rather because the 
character and genius of Athenian institutions, and the recent develop- 
ments of Athenian policy, mjtde tbe coming struggle big with a mighty 
hope and a glorious ambition for the city of the Virgin goddess. 

§ 4. Condition, I'olicy, and Attihule of Athtiis, 490-481 B.C.— The 
decade succeeding Marathon was a ]>eriod of struggle, reform, develop- 
ment, for Athens. The state which fought at Marathon was one thing, 
the state which fights at Salamis is another thing: a city of the soil is 
become a city of the sea. The great change tiius signified was the 
syrnptom and coctlicient of much else; a further stage in constitutional 
history is to be recorded, a new foreign policy to be illustrated. The 
Athens of Kleisthenes gives way to the Athens of Themistokles. 

On this immense revolution, or evolution, Herodotus throws but 
little light, has apparently little knowledge or perception of it. 
Plutjirch, and others, are more helpful : the 'A^i^i'aiioi' iroA.tTetti is our 
chief boon. Since its publication in 1S91 the history of this decade, 
as of other decides of Athenian history, especially in what concerns 
the inner or domestic policy and condition of affairs, has been trans- 
formed. Not that the data of the Aristotelian writer can lie accepted 
as absolute, or beyond criticism — far from it — ^but that the materials 
and traditions at the disposal of the Attic writers of the fourth century 
for the reconstruction of the iimer and constitutional history of Athens 
were more copious and in some ways more authoritative than the 
incidental and ex parte stories, or mere obiter dkia, which Herodotus, 
who was not primarily concerned with the subject, has preserved for 
our investigation. The ^vritcr of the Athenuin Polikia was acquainted 
with the work of Herodotus ; ditference, therefore, or conflict between 
the authorities must bo regarded as deliberate and critical ; though 
it does not follow that the fourth-contury authority is always right 
aa against the writer of the fifth century, or even right where, for 
one reason or other, no eonfliet arises between them. Recent in- 
vestigation has, however, done little, comparatively speaking, for the 



200 



HERODOTUS 



APP. ni 



AthenLiii history of the decade here in view ; the argument and 
results which follow here, however simple and obvious, cannot 
altogether escape the prejudice of novelty. 

The constitution of Athens underwent a considerable reform or 
development early in the period. The l)attle of Marathon had been 
won hy ;i Democracy, but it was a 'moderate' middle-class Democracy, 
of heavy -armt'd infantry, providing their own arms, organized in their 
ten phylu regiments, probably each about a thousand strong, com- 
manded hy the ten Strakgoi, each elected by and from the j)hyle which 
he led, the whole militia being under the supreme command of the 
Polemarchos^ or war-lord, elected by the whole body which ho thus 
commanded, and taking counsel with the phytic Strfite/joi in the hour 
of need. But, witiiin the decade following Marathon, two great 
changes were made in the military institutions of the State, the one 
affecting the nature of the commando, or leading, the other affecting 
the nature of the service and power of the State. These changes, the 
one a reform, the other a development, were not unconnected with 
each other, and involved further changes, conser[uential or concomitant, 
both in policj- and institutions, which all tended to enlarge the contrast 
between the Athens of Marathon and the Athena of Salamis. The 
reform consisted in the abolition of the Polemarchia, as the war-lord's 
office had been named, and the new organization of the Strate^, 
together with the creation of certain political and military institutions, 
the significance of which even the Aihftmn PoHf-ria leaves in some 
obscurity. The development consisted in the substitution of seii-power 
for latid-power as the basis of the policy, position, wealth, welfare, 
even the very existence of the Atlienian State. The former change 
was more obviously and immediately connected with the internal 
condition and domestic policy of Athens, the latter with the external 
relations; but the two changes stood in organic relation to one another. 
The need for special commanders of a new type had already been felt 
in connexion with maritime undertakings, as was proved in 498 B.C. by 
the mission of Melanthios to the support of the lonians, and again in 
489 B.C. bj^ the mission of Miltiades to Paros. The struggle with 
Aigina, which became inevitable after the escape, or exchange, of the 
-AJginetan hostages,* found the Athenian Strategia already reformed, but 
the Athenian navj- still inadequate to the immediate task before it, and 
compelled the Athenians to become a maritime people and a sea-power. 
The policy, thus realized, had its beginnings in the previous decade, 
if at least we should bo right in associating the beginnings of the 
Peiraieus with the Archontate of Themistokles in 403 B.C. — a doubtful 
point, to which a preferable alternative will he suggested below.* 
Meanwhile it is well to envisage separately and fiUly the e\'idences 
and arguments concerned with the reform of the commando and the 

» Cp. my Hdt. ir.-VL (1895), iL 116. 
9 Cp. III. (6) ivfra, p. 215. 



M 



THE PREPARATIONS OF THE CREEKS 



20] 



development of the navy .- the one, primarily a constitutional item, 
and only secondarily of political import; the other, primarily a matter 
of policy, and only in the secoml intention reacting upon the constitu- 
tion and fithos of the State. 

I. The lifjurm of the Mililary Command, — The Polily has given 
documentary authority for the view, suggested long before the dis- 
covery in 1891 of the Aristotelian tractate, that the Poltnuircfi was 
technically siill commander-in-chief in the year 490 B.C., and therefore 
certainly an elected, not a ballot-box officer, the ten Slra/fgoi lieing merely 
colonels, or chief captains, of the ten phylic regiments.^ On the other 
hand it was clear that in the great Persian war (480-479 B.C.) the 
Strategia occupied ]»ractic.til]y very much the same position as in the 
days of Perikies, and in particular that Themistokles in 480 B.i*. at 
least was as much commander-in-chief of the State forces as ever Perikies, 
or Nikia«, or Alkibiiules afterwards. It was thus plain (at leasit to 
some scholars), even before the recovery of the Poiihj of Alheiis, that 
a reform in the command, or leading, of the Athenian furces had taken 
place between the battle of Marathon and the battle of Salamis ; 
Kallimachos was phunly the last Polenuirch who actually commanded 
the Athenian militia in the field. These conclusions were verified 
and more than borne out by the newly discovered text of the 
Athenian Polihj. But the new authority presents the reform from 
a partial anri even a prejudiced standpoint. The Athenian Polity 
all along lays too little stress on warfare, and the polemical institution ; 
thus the second part of the tract, though containing valuable informa- 
tion on the Ephebi4i, the Strategia and similar offices, the conditions of 
military service, and the care of the ships, may be searched in vain 
for a systematic accoimt of the military and naval organization. In 
the present instance the organization of the Struiegia is concealed 
under the account of a reform of the method of appointing the Nint? 
Archons, the I'olemarch of course included, by the substitution of 
Sortition for Election. Thus the long-debated question respecting the 
date and significance of the intnxluction of the Lot for the appoint- 
ment of the Archons is reaohed in a manner and by an authority 
which there is no critical ground for dip]»uting or disallowing in thiB 
uutance, so far as essentials are concerned. In regard, indeed, to the 
date of the change, the Polity might seem to fix it to the Archontate 
of Telesinns, that is, 01. 73. 2 = 487-486 B.r, ; but for reasons, which 
will follow below, we shall interpret this datum to mean that 
Telesinos was himself the first Archon appointed by lot, an inter- 
pretation which throws the legislative act back at least into the 
preceding Archontate (Anchises, 01. 73. 1 = 488-487 B.C.). In any 
caae, if Telesinos and his colleagues formed the first college of Archons 
appointed by lot, Anchises and his colleagues were the last elected 
under the system of the Kleisthenean constitution. If, however, the 




202 



HERODOTUS 



APP. in 



introduction of the lot might be ascribed to ^Vristeides, we can 
hardly refuse to carry back the legislative enactment to the previous 
year (01. 72. 4 = 489-488 B.C.), th.-it is, the Archontate of Ariateidea 
himself, during which he mny have laid such a proposal before Council 
(/3oi/Aj}) and Assembly ((VkAi/o-iu) in his official capacity.^ That a ye»X 
elapsed before the first appointment under t!ie new system creates no 
dvffiyalty. Either a year of grace wjus deliberateJy allowed to the old 
system, or, more probably, the measure of Aristeides was carried too 
late in his year of office to be brought immediately into operation, nay, 
the Archons for the ensuing year may already have been elected. 
The significance of the reform can oidy be fully appreciated in view 
of the consequential or concomitjint chjinges involved, and of the 
subsequent development of Athenian policy and public action. 
Imprimis, the sortition of the Archons, even though the candidates 
wore still restricted to the first class {Tt)tr;/xa, t«'\os) of citizens, implies 
a reduction in the functions and importance of the offices, not 
specified by the Athenian Politi/. The six Thesmothdai, indeed, 
had never been more than civil or judicial functionaries, and the 
powers of the kinjj {Mwjikii'i) had long been restricted to religious, 
judicial, and ceremonial spheres ; but tlie Polciiiareh and (as I 
should suggest) the Arehon atill wielded considerable powers, and 
enjoyed important prerogatives, the one as supreme War-Lord, the 
other probably, not merely as a jinlicial but as an iulministrative 
and cvecutive official, concerned with all the public interest* of the 
State, and sitting and acting with the Council of the Five Hundred, 
and possibly, for some purposes, with the Areiopagos. He may 
even have had the presidency of the Council of Five Hundred, and 
would in any case be influential in moulding its probouieumata and 
in executing its decrees. One concomitant of the new law intro- 
ducing sortition for the oflScfS of Arrhm., BasUeus, Poktnarckos, and 
ThesJiuithittit must have been some greiit invasion and limitation of the 
administrative spheres and executive importance of the firat three 
magistrates : the Fdemarchiii in particular was deprived of all militarj' 
function and importance, and became a mere civil or judicial magis- 
tnicy, comparable to the ofhce of Praetor peregrimts at Kome, but still 
invested with certjiin religious duties and dignities. Another necessary 
consequence, or concomitant, of the reform was tlie provision for the 
better discharge, by some other officers, of the functions which had 
been withdrawn from Arelii>n and from Polomarch. This pro\a8ion 
appears to have been made not by the institution of any new office, 



' The authorship of the Lot is auony- 
luous. Plutarch, Arutt. 22, asi.-ribea to 
AriBtcides a reform of the Archnutate 
after Plataia, by which all citizt'iiii lieuaine 
elij<ihle {yfti^i \(Hi<fM.ana. Kourk* <'>"" H)f 
iroXtTtiaw irai roiJt dpx"'^'" ^f 'KOrfvalui' 
■n-iiiTuii aiptiaOai). ThiA cannot Stand 



against tbw Potity. Plutarch, ArM. 1, 
showa that Dcmrtrios of Phaleron made 
the douhk mistake of thinking th*t 
Aristeides had obtained the Aroliontate 
(1) by Ut, (2) aft«!r Platai*. But was 
not Aristeides, ]>et'haps, concerned in 
the reform of the otBce after Marathon I 



p 



§ 4 THE PREPARATIONS OF THE GREEKS 203 

bat by tlie development of the Stratef/ia, and the transfer to the 
Straiegoi of the principal functions hitherto invested in the Arduni and 
the PoUmarch. The Slraii-.tjai now ceased to be merely the colonels of 
the pliylic regiments, and became a supreme military college, an Etat- 
vbtj^rr, without the exact limits of their initiative or corajjetence being 
rigidly defined upon the civil side. The colh'gc had constant access to 
the Council of the Five Hundred, frinn which the Archon, Polemarch, 
and Biisilaufi; (with perhaps the Thesraothetai to boot) disappi^ared ; 
and a great deal of business, hitherto initiated or carried out by the 
' Archoiis,' was now handled by the Slmlc/oi. In the normal course 
of business the Prytanein, or presidency in the College of Ten, circulated 
daily through the members, and the Prylanis, or Hegeinon for the day, 
was for the time being supreme War- Lord : an arrangement of 
doubtful expediency from a military point of view, and perhaps 
responsible for disaster once and again. But it is obvious that the 
Ekklesin, perhajjs on the requisition of the Council, itself thereto moved 
by the StnUetjoi, might appoint one SlrdUgos as permanent Prylanis, or 
JleyenioTi, and invest him with 'autocracy' (uvTOKparia) against itself, 
the Council, or his Colleagues, any or all of these. On special service, 
or for independent commands, one or more members of the College 
could be and were employed synchronously. Obviously this 
development in the powers of the Strateijni involved the transfer of 
their appointment, by election, from the Pht/lai severally, to the 
collective Ekklesia : the !<tral<goi were now officials of the w!)ole PeopU-, 
elected by the whole l\'oplo, though the phylif limitation still obtained, 
BO far as to secure the representation annually of all ten Phylai in the 
strategic college. As the Slrairijoi thus ce;ised to be merely phytic 
officers, provision must at the same time have been made for the 
command of the phytic regiments, and tlie institution of the latiarclis 
must be referred to this same date and scheme of reform, officers 
commanding the ten regiments of infantry, previously led each by its 
own SJraU'jos. As little or nothing is beard of Athenian cavalry in 
the second Persian invasion, and as cavalry was never a 'popular' 
service in the ancient state, it may well bo doubted whether the 
lieform-programmc of Aristeidos, in 489-488 RO., included any 
development of the Hippeis ; nor was the infantry itself affected, 
except in the matter of leading. The mass of citizens (which took to 
itself the chief credit for the victory at Marathon) was left untouched 
in itfl military privilege and service, until the development of the 
navy gave the lower order of citizens an enhanced importance as men 
of war, and in turn necessitated further developments in the popular 
direction. The pressing question after Marathon, and all the more, 
)>erhaps, after the expedition to Pares, was the question of leading, 
whether military or political ; and the immediate scheme of reform, 
which concerned simply the organization of the lead, or command, 
and of the highest official positions, was completed by the new 



204 



HERODOTUS 



Arp. m 



institution of the OstraJmpSioria, which supplied a safety-valve for 
the over-violont pressure which might be generated under the new 
conditions of the strategic Archairesiai. The Athenian Polity, to 
which much of our J>est information about the Oslrdcojihoria is trace- 
able, iiscribcs the institution to Kleisthenes, but it dates the first 
actual employment of the institution to the year 488-487 B.C., that 
is, more precisely, to the spring of the year 487 B.C. I have else- 
where ^ shown the inconsenuence and absurdity of the hiahis thus 
posited between the original institution and the first employment, 
or, as one may say, the first five successive employments of the 
new device ; and the relation observable in all the known cases of 
Ostrakism between the Osirakophorm and the Stmityia, or rather the 
Strategir Demagogw, confirms the suggestions there (as here again) 
made aa to the synchronism of the original institutions. If any one, 
however, atili prefers to adhere to the Kleisthenean authorship of the 
OsfrahtphoTM; he should in tdl fairness by analogy suppose that the 
institution was designed in relation to the election of the Archon — 
an office, from its original creation down to the date of its supersession 
by the Stnitegiu, the great bone of contention, and prize for ambitious 
politicians, at Athens.'- He must also admit, however, that the 
Odrakophor'ui was never invoked, or actually put into effective opera- 
tion, until the office of Strategos was made to supersede the offices of 
Archon and Polemarch. Ostrakism was a device for getting rid of a 
dangerous politician, or leader, without recourse to assassination, 
and without abuse of the forms of Justice by a political verdict from 
a law-court. The scandal aroused in Athena by the condemnation of 
Miltiades, after his failure in Paros, and by his miserable dcjith in prison, 
to whom the State notoriously owed, more than to any other individual, 
the glorious and immortal memory of Marathon, may have suggested 
to Aristeides and Xanthippos, now high in popular favour, this more 
excellent way of dealing with their leading opponents, by anticipating 
the {yoKLfiaa-Lu, SO to speak, of the potential Strnl^gos, so aa to prevent 
his election, rather than by aggravating, or abusing, the tvOwat, so as 
to get rid of him, after the mischief Was done. The engineers of this 
ingenious device were, indeed, very short.ly 'hoist with their own 
petar,' but this result was due to a new situation, and a new man, 
capable of reviving the ideas of Miltiades under circumstaneca which 
insured a triumph for the policy, Ixjth external and domestic, which 
Xanthippos and Aristeides had set themselves to thwart and to resist. 
The use to which Ostrakism came to be applied, was not e.vactly in 
the intention of its first authors ; but the further consideration of its 
use and significance, in the period before us, will beat be taken in 
corine.\ion with the history of the struggle, which converted Uie 
hoplite democracy of ICleisthenes or of Aristeides, the victors at 



' Cp. Hdt.iy.-ri. {1885), Appendix IX. § 14. 
' '\e. r. 13. 2. 



» 



4 4 THE PREPARATIONS OF THE GREEKS 205 

Alaruthon, into the ' nautiutl mob ' of Themistokles, triumphant at 
Salamis. 

II. The Political Struggle in Athens, 490-481 B.C. (Phaiiiippoa to 
Hypsichides). — After the return from Marathon Miltiades was appar- 
ently the most popular and powerful man in Athena. Whatever the 
credit due to the memory of the polemarch Kallimachos, the Siralegos 
of the Oiiieis was regarded, and righlly regarded, aa the intellectual 
author of tiie battle and the deliverance. The personal or party 
enemies, who hail brought him to trial, about a year before, on the 
charge of ' tyranny,' in Chersonesos, were for the moment still further 
discredited, and eclipsed. The extraordinary commission to Faros, in 
490-489 B.C., furnishes the measure of the confidence enjoyed by 
Miltiades for the moment. The domestic and foreign policy of 
Miltiades may be regarded as fairly intelligible. Miltiades had ro- 
tiu"ned to Athens to oppose a Peisistratid restoration, and a Persian 
annexation -, he was the leading and most competent representative of 
Attic liberties for the time being ; the accusation of ' tyranny ' levelled 
against him in 491 had broken down, and he bad been elected by his 
own phi/lriai their Slrnterius in 490 B.C., and as such had, more than any 
other man, determined the victorious action of the State. The 
Peisistratid rump in Athens must have been thoroughly discredited 
for the moment ; and even the Alkmaionid faction, which had no doubt 
for some twenty years posed as the champions of Athenian liberty, 
but had alread}', perhaps, compromised its reputation by intrigue 
%rith the Athenian exiles, was for the moment reduced to impotence. 
The expetlition to Paros, for which we may fairly hold Miltiades 
responsible, is a distinctly new departure, or it may be a recurrence 
to ideas of expansion in tlie Aigaian, natural enough to the returned 
'tyrant of the Chersonese,' but unacceptable to statesmen of the school 
of KJeisthenes, who did not want ' lonism ' in Attica, who preferred 
an Attica which did not include I..emnos aud the Chersonese, or even 
the Kyklades, who had lookt-d to I'elphi for support and not to Delos, 
much less to Branchidai ; the very men who had recalled the Athenian 
fleet from Ionia in 498 B.c. and had prosecuted Phrynichos in 493 B.C. 
successfully for his thamatic criticism of their betrayal of Miletos. 
The expedition to Paros in 489 ac. is the first forward step on the part 
of the Athenians in the direction of making up for their abandonment 
of the lonians to Persia ten years before. It was hardly as Polemarch 
that Miltiades acted : Strakgai had already commanded on such service, 
and it may fairly be doubted whether the Polemarch was ever called 
upon to lead the forces of the State beyond the frontier, or at least to 
conduct a maritime expedition. But the multiplication of such 
occasions was all the more bound to increase the powers of the Strategoi, 
and to necessitiitc a reform in the position and functions of the office. 
The failure of Miltiades at Paros ia the occasion and excuse, in the 
£r8t instance, for the condemnation of the forward policy, and its 



20Q 



HERODOTUS 



API', m 



author, or reviver. Xanthippoe, the bridegroura of the Alkmaionid 
Agariste, was his principal accuser, supported perhaps by Aristeides, 
another statesman of the samo school. Pn>}>ably the medizing or 
Peisistratid reniiiant united with Xanthippos and Aristeides against 
the Philaid. Perhaps Sjwrta wjia not over well pleased with the 
projects of Miltiades, and took a hand against him. The too cordial 
reception of Ina elder son, Metiochos, ;it the Persian court looked 
suipicious, and doubtless vras cited against him. The combination, 
which had condemned Phrynichos in 493 B.C. to a fine of a thousand 
Jraclnnai for a poetical licence, now procured the condemnation of 
Miltiades to a fine, three hundred times as large, for a military yw*50, 
into which the court was jMjrsuatled to read a political treachery or a 
personal ambition. The cry of ' tyraiuiy,' of an unconstitutional usurpa- 
tion of power by the extraordinary SlnUegos, was perhaps raised once 
more on this occasion, and with some eflfect ; if the institution of 
Ostrakism had been already in existence, the Athenians might have 
taken that less ingrat* method of getting rid of a dangerous or un- 
jxjpular leader. The fall of Miltiades only just preceded the important 
constitutional reforms which have been already outlined above, and we 
are more than justified in connecting those reforms with the situation 
immediately antecedent, that is, with the battle of Marathon, the 
death of the Polemarch on the fields the expedition to Paros, under 
Miltiades as Sfnilegos^, and the abuse of the law-courts, by which his 
condemn:ition was procured. 

The end of Miltiades did not, however, bring with it any finality to 
the two great questions in Athenian politics at the hour — the question 
of a tjTannic restoration, whether in the person of Miltiades, or of 
some other more nearly connected with the Peisistratid house ; and the 
question of the future development of Athens, and Athenian power, 
to a position of superiority at leiist over against Aigina, her nearest 
foo. The reforms of Aristeides, that is, aa already shown above, the 
reduction of the Archontat* and of the Polemarchia, the development 
of the Strategia, and the in.stitution of the annual OstridvjJiorui, must 
have been in some way connected at least with the domestic histoiy 
and policy of the State. The connexion is not far to seek. Aristeides 
and Xanthippos, the statesmen of the Kieisthenean school, must be 
credited with a genuine deternnnation not merely to resist the ex- 
pansion of Athens over sea, and the Ioniz«'ition of the Stale, but to 
maintain the existing democracy of Kleisthenes, or to develop it upon 
strictly Kieisthenean lines. Hostility to the ' lonism ' of Peisistratos 
and his successors was a tradition of this school, and was bound np 
with hostility to the tyrannic house itself. But these statesmen wore 
not impenitently conservative, nor incapable of learning a lesson even 
from an enemy — as they proved very clearly in the second Persian 
wjir and its sequel. The Marathonian campaign itself must have 
convinced Aristeides that the Polemarchia was out-of-date ; and the 



THE PREPAJIATIONS OF THE GREEKS 






* 



Archontate had lent itself, under the Peisistratid regime, to the 
purposes of the tyrauny.^ Tbo dcvelopiuent of the StraUgiu, the 
supersession of the offices of Archon and of Polemarch, each with well- 
deKned and independent functions, by a board of ten officials, who 
took over, in a collegiate capacity, the functions of the two offices 
which most wisily lent themselves to one-man power, was a reform 
eminently congrnoHswith the Kleistheneaii democracy. The arrange- 
ment for the circulation, in normal conditions, of the prytany or 
hegemtmy of the College daily among the members might seem a 
safeguard against any abuse of the new office, such as the case of 
Miltiades had just rendered visible, or the older prece<lent of 
Peisistnjtos miglit have recalled. To make assurance doubly sure, the 
scheme included the institution of the antmal Oshakophi>rui, by which 
any man marked out as likely to abuse the strategic office into an 
organ of tyranny, or monarchic power, could be surely got rid of 
in advance. Perhaps there was even a more distinctly personal 
reference in the institution of Ostrakism. The first man against whom 
the institution was effectively used was Hipparchos, and that in the 
spring of the year 487 B.C. The PolUij declares that Ostrakism was 
instituted by Kleisthenes, and that for the express pur|)08e of Iwinish- 
ing this very man Hipparchos. Tiie two statements are mutually 
exclusive : if Ostrakism was instituted to get rid of Hipparchos, it was 
not instituted by the act of Kleisthenes. But neither if it was first 
used in the year 487 is.r. can it have been of Kieisthenean institution. 
Aristeides, indeed, may well have been its real author ; its institution 
may well date, with the other reforms, to his Archontate (489-488 
B.G), and in this case Aristeides, whatever his own immediate in- 
tention, can hardly have overlooked the possible application of the 
new institution to the Peisistratid rump, in the first instance. \^'hat- 
ever the ultimate design of the institution, its immediate application 
was for this very purpose of eliminating the friends of the tyrants : 
for three years in succession the leading friend of the tyranny in 
Athens was tmnished by this semi-judicial process, }et without 
prejudice, first Hipparchos, then Megakles, then Alkiliiades : * the 
Peisistratid, the Alkmaionid, the Eupatrid, each, as we know or may 
suppose, regarded as hostile to the existing constitution and to the 
democracy, which had received its baptism of tire at Marathon. 

Nothing is commoner, in the history of institutions, than to find 
an institution made and devised to serve one purpose, lending itself 
sooner or later to a different ami even a contrary use ; nothing is 
rarer than for an institution to maintain itself constant to its original 



' Tbno, 0. 64. (J. (The Jfhrwui need 
not be restricted to the Aronontate, but 
must include it) 

* I place here the n»trakisin of Alki- 
biadea the Elder. Lysios 14. 39, pe.- 



Auilokidea 4. 34. Hiit aupixised second 
(or rather first) ostrakism may point to 
his having shared tho exile of Kleisthenes 
the Alkinaionid, and would help to 
explain his renanciatiou of tbo Spartan 
Promnia, 



208 



HERODOTUS 



APP. in 



founder's design. Ostrakism, so Aristotle and the Aristotelians affirm, 
was designed to prevent 'tyranny,' or 'one-man poiver,' and was thrice 
in succession employed for this, its original purpose; but its conversion 
to an exactly opposite use, as a means of throwing jx)wer unopposed 
into the hands of a popular favourite, or of eliminating opposition to 
a popular policy, has long been well understood, and is attested later 
in the ciises of Themistoklos, of Kiraon, of Thukydiiles. It is more 
startling to find this applicatinn, abuse it cannot be called, of the 
institution as early as the fourth and fifth years of its institution, or 
employment, yet such is the inevitable conclusion from the historic 
facts, unless we are prepared to count Xaiithip{>0B and Aristeides 
iiimself, and that in flat contradiction to the 'A^j^kh'iui' jroAiTtio, among 
the 'friends of the tyrants.' There is an irony in the fate of these 
exiles which should have appealed to the moral philosophy of Hero- 
dotus, but for the miserably imiicrfect and biassed traditions, which 
were all he had to rely on apparently for this decade of Athenian 
history. Ostrakism had been invented to make the revival of & 
Peisistratos, or of a Miltiades, as Archon, or as Stralfgosy impossible; 
but it was used now, once and again, to get rid of the obstruction, 
ofli'ered by its authors, to the policy and demands of a man who was 
prepared to revive, in great part, the policy of Peisistratos so far as 
the jMisition of Athens in the Aigaian was concerned, and who was 
being ' kept awake o' nights by the laurels of Miltiades.' 

III. Tlic Ai(finetan War, and the liisc of Th-eniUlokles (487-481 B.C.). 
— Herodotus gives but little information upon the subject; what in- 
formation he gives about the war ia in part displaced, and out of 
relation to Themistoklos, and the r6le of Themistokles, both as states- 
man and as Stmierfos, presinnably, during the war ; and the develop- 
ment of Athens into a gieat power on the sea is dislocated and 
diminished in his pages, as doubtless pre^nously in his sources. 
At the time, and in the places, where Herodotus collected his 
materials, and wrote down his history, whether in the first or in 
the second draft, the name of Themistokles was become a byword, and 
the memory of his policy and pubUc services neglected, obscured, and 
even defamed. The victor of Salamis, the rebuiklcr of Athens, the 
founder of the Peiraieus, the author of the more fertile and successful 
ideas in the policy of Perikles, had been sacrificed to the implacable 
resentment of Sparta — not unjustly from the Spartan point of view — 
and the no less implacable jealousy of his oivn rivals in Athens, who 
had borrowed one-half of his programme and used it to defeat the 
other half. His flight to Asifi, and acceptance of a handsome billet 
from the king, conduct on first sight at irreconcilable variance with 
his earlier antl more obviously [mtriotic action, might have disconcerted 
his best friends at Athens. To Themistokles himself (as we may 
understand) there was nothing inconsistent with loyalty to Athens 
in a diplomatic medism, at a time when he at least had come to 



THE PREPARATIONS OF THE GREEKS 

perceive, whnt all Athens recognized ten years lat«r, that the real 
enemy M'as — Lakedaimon. His 'medism/ indeed, was a matter also 
of mere self-preservation, and was never carried to the point of injury, 
or damage, to a single Athenian interest, and his voluntary death 
attested the fidelity of his feeling towards a country which bad 
greatly wronged htm. But his enemies were not silenced, nor converted 
by his exile, attainder, ami voluntary death. The earlier stages of his 
story were related, or ignored, under the prejudice aroused by its 
later developmenta. The memory of the man, who had outwitted 
Sparta, Houted Korinth, ostrakized Xanthippos and Aristeides, and 
allowed no scruple to interfere with the aggrandizement of his 
country, and therein found his own no small advatitage, was damned 
from a dozen different quarters. We are not concerned to deny the 
personal ambition of Thomistoklea, or even to cancel wholly the trail 
of corruption attached to his name. How many Greeks in prominent 
positions were innocent of ambition, the politician's vice, or of avarice, 
' the vice of the wise ' 1 Yot it is fair to Themistokles to remember 
that his personal ambitions were always coincident with the real 
interests of Athens, and that no charge of corruption, or malversation, 
was ever judicially brought home to him. Many of the anecdotes 
upon the latter subject are trans|>ar6Qt absurdities. Against all that 
must be set his splendid nerve, his dauntless spirit, his unrivalled 
sagacity and foresight, his noble elo^[uence, his strategic ability, his 
diplomatic address, his admirable self-control. To do Herodotus justice, 
he supplies part of the facts in support of this apologj', side by side 
with scandal, tittle-tattle, and 3elf-contra<lictions all to the same address. 
The calmer and more reasoned judgement of Thucydides prevails in the 
court of appeal. Aristophanes is kinder to Themistokles than might 
have been expected. The Orators, the Aristotelian Politij, Plutarch, 
and the later authorities, supply, to some extent, though not free from 
the influences that are apparent in the Herodotean tradition, materials 
for a better and truer estimate of Themistokles and his policy. 
The man cannot be wholly divorced from the politician: the virtues of 
the good citizen, of the wise statesman, of the hrilliant general, must 
be held to redeem a character in the day of judgement. It ia far 
easier to understand and account fur the denigration of the i>ei-son 
of Themistokles in the records, than to hold at once that his nature 
was so ignoble and mean, his actions so high and unappealable, 
aa they would have us believe. 

On five or six distinct points, aa far as the period here immediately 
under review is concerned, some degree of certitude seems attain- 
able. (1) Themistokles was mainly and immediately instrumental in 
the immense developments of Athens as a sea-power, which constitutes 
the chief conti-ast between the [»vrt played by Athens in 490 B.C. at 
Marathon, and the part played by Athens in 480 RC. at Salamis. 
On this point practically all authorities are agreed. (2) The im- 

VOL. n 1' 



210 



HERODOTUS 



App. m 



mediate motive, or excuse, for this action wiis supplied by the war 
between Athena and Aigina, which broke out afresh after the fiasco 
at Paros, and the relejtse of the Aiginetan hostages from Athens 
(Hdt. 7. 144, Thuc. 1. 14). The answer of the Athenians to the 
application of Lootychidas was {I suggest) dictated by Thomistoldes : 
Aristeides, at that time, wonld probably have adopted a more concilia- 
lory attitude. Proliably Themistokles was engaged as Sirateffos in the 
war with Aigina, and perhaps such success as attended the Athenian 
arms in the stniggle was due to his leading. That success, however, 
was far from decisive, and Themistoklcs, as a politician, before BtmU 
and EkkUsia, at last carried his point for the enormous augmentation 
of the fleet. Thucydides, however, gives us expressly to understand 
that in the mind of Tbemistokles the Aiginetan war was but the 
ostensible pretext, the coming invasion of Attica by the king was 
the real ground. It is characteristic of the bias in Herodotus' sources 
that the maritime development of Athens is represented as the natural 
effect of the Aiginetan war, without direct reference to the action or 
policy of Themistokles. Why Themistokles ehoidd have suppressed 
his thought in the matter, and based the naval augmentation solely 
on the Aiginetan war, is incomprehensiblo, if the augmentation was 
only proposed, and carried out, or begim, in the year of the psephisra, 
variously reported by Herodotus (7. 144) and by the 'A^rjwiW 
TToA-LTtia (22. 7), Is it not probable that the proposal was made in 
the first instance soon after the outbreak of hostilities in 487 B.C., 
even if the final sUige in the arrangements was only reached in 483- 
482 B.C. ? (3) In any case one principal source, by means of which 
the expenses of the naval augmentation bil! were to be defrayed, was 
the public revenue arising from the silver mines at Laureion and 
Maroneia. This proposal involved a patriotic sacrifice upon the part 
of the poorer citizens, which it must have cost them an effort to make. 
In nothing docs Themistokles aj>pcar more the stjitesman and less 
the mere demagogue than in this demand upon the citizens at large, 
to sacrifice the immediate piTifit of the moment to larger and remoter 
ends. (4) The policy of Themistokles mot with obstinate resistance and 
obstruction ; Aristeidea in particular, and perhaps likewise also Xanth- 
ippos previously, had to be removed by osti-akism before the bill became 
law.' The dates of these two ostrakisms are, perhaps, to be regarded 
as problematical. The Athenian Polity somewhat obscurely chrono- 
logizes both, and has been interpreted to mean that the ostrakism of 
Xanthippos occurred in the year 485-484 B.v,., that is, in the spring of 
the year 484 B.C., the year immediately after the third ostrakism, 
or ostrakism of Alkibiades; while the ostrakism of Aristeides is 



' I have alre&dy clsen)iei-e suggested 
th»t XanthipiioB uiny more i«irticiilurly 
have opposed thu ThotnisLokle&ii j)olicy 
of a restoration, or institution, of the 



Ijyttuliii, while Atist«ide8 may raore 
imrticularly hava thwarted the naval 
bill. op. ifdt. IV.'VI. ii. 145. 



^ 



THE PREPARATIONS OF THE GREEKS 

apparently dated two clear years afterwards, in the Arcbontate of 
Nikomedes, 483-482 B-C, the same date as that given for the final 
passage of the psephism of Themistokles. The Ostrnkophoria woidd, 
of course, have taken place in the spring of 482 B.C., and the passage 
of the psephism would then have to be placed between the spring of 
482 RC. and the midsummer new-year. The chronological indication, 
however, in regard to the ostrakism of Aristeides is not so precise us 
that in regard to the ostrakism of Xanthippos : Eusebios distinctly 
phices the banishment of Aristeides in the previous year, 484-483 B.C., 
under the Archon Leostratos, that is, in the spring of 483 B.C., and 
this date accords better with the natural probabilities of the case.' The 
Aiginetan war had broken out afresh under Tolcsinos (487-486), per- 
haps in the spring of the year 486 BX'. Themistokles may have made 
his proposal any time between that and the ostrakism of Xanthippos 
in the spring of 484 B.c. The resistance of Aristeides was overcome, 
or removed by his banishment, in the spring of 483 B.C. (Leostratos), 
and immediately afterwards Themistokles was elected, or re-elected, 
one of the Slrategoi for the year 483-482 B.C. (Nikomede.?), during 
which his proposal vn\s carried, none too long before the news from 
Asia left no doubt of the objective to which the movements of 
the Persians were directed. Little more than two years was to 
elapse before the fleet, as constituted by Themistokles, should be 
called upon to hoist sail and ply oar for the waters off the north 
of Euboia. 

Une can well imagine how easy it was for the opponents of 
Themistokles to represent his policy of appropriating the Laureion 
surplus for naval purposes as 'unpopular.' Eut for him the money 
was to have been distributed viriiim to the poorer citizens, with every 
prospect of an annual re[>etition of the dole. It was Aristeides, 
apparently, who was the chief, or the hist, exponent of tliis argutnenlvm 
ad crumeruim. The 'Ad-rji-auuv TroAiTtto has thrown a new and not 
altogether convincing light upon the policy and practices of Aristeides, 
representing him as a sort of state-socialist, mainly concerned in 
providing ' free food ' (r^oc^v)) for the People.* This representation 
refers to a date subsequent to the Persian war, and is open to damaging 
criticism. The r6le and policy of Perikles, but very inadequately 
presented in the 'AOijvaitDv TroKtrua, is here transferred to his less 
eminent predecessor, and the passage teems with anachronisms as 
applied to Aristeides. But there may have been some such justifica- 
tion for the portrait of Aristeides in the character of People's Friend 
and purveyor of good things, as above indicated. He had opposed 
the confiscation of the Laureion surplus ; he had advocated the annvial 
distribution of the money to the poorer citizens. In opposing the 
means for the realization of the Themistoklenn policy, he had opposed 

' Cp. Clinton, iWi Htit. ii. 80, ml ann. 
3 'A0. r. 24. 



212 



HERODOTUS 



AFP. m 



the end and object of that poliL-j, to wit, the conversion of Athens 

into a sea- power. Possibly news from Asia and the Hellespont, 
Makedon and Thnike, niay have contributed to reinforce the argu- 
ments of Thomistoklos, before the actual great augmentation of the 
Fleet took place. A good manj' Athenians, beside ThemiBtokles, 
will have been con\Tncedf under the Archon Nikomedea and his 
successor, that the ships of Themistokles would be employed 
against a mightier power than Aigina, aud that to be employed 
with any prospect of success they would needs be commanded by 
their creator. 

(5) The Athenian Polity gives in more precise form than previously 
known the exact contents of the naval psephiam of Themistokles, as 
well as an exact date therefor.' The year of Nikomedes may very 
well be the true date for the passtigc of the bill, but the proposal 
will have been mooted in the first instance at least two or three years 
earlier. To the mind of Themistokles the return of the Persians 
was only a question of time ; he was convinced that the question at 
issue was one to be decided by sea-power, and was detemiined that 
the sea-power needed should belong to Athens. The recrudescence 
of the Aiginetan war may have supplied him with an occasion to 
urge the development of the fleet ; but by the year of Nikomedes, one 
might suppose, he was no longer alone in antici])ating the reinvasioa 
of Greece by the Barbarian. In the following year, at least, the 
danger must have been fairly evident to many in Greece, now that 
the King's pi-eparations at Athos, on the Hellespont, and in Asia were 
being reported. By the midsummer New Year of 481 B.C. the 
programme involved in the psephism of the previous year may have 
been reiilizod ; but the realization of that programme, as defined in the 
psephism, still leaves a lacuna to be tilled, between the fleet as 
brought up to the proposed strength, and the fleet as presented in 
the actual navy-lists of the war a year, or two, later. The psephism 
of Themistokles had provided for an addition of one hundred triremes 
to the existing navy of Athens, and no more. The existing fleet 
numbered apparently all told seventy vessels, and had perhaps been 
maintained at this figure for some fifteen years previouslv. This 
figure was itself an advance upon the normal fleet contemplated under 
the Kleisthenean constitution, which at most numbered fifty.- The 
psephism of Themistokles when carried out would give Athens a fleet of 
170 ships; or, as twenty of these had been borrowed hulls, and might 



' "AS. «-. 22, 7. 

' As the Kleisthenean TrMtju may 
be taken (voce 'Aff. ir. 21. 5) to corre- 
spond to the Solon inn Xankmrifi, one 
might be tempted to cotijCKiture that the 
Athenian Heet ha<l been reduced by 
Kleiwtht'ije!) to 30 ships of war. Tho 
20 Korinthian hnlls (Hdt. 6. 88) would 



huve raised the total to SO ip^in, which 
vu probably the Soloniaii figure (48 
from the Nankmries, together with the 
PsraloB and the Sakiiiinia ' Cp. also 
Iliad 2. 556). Rut 70 ships apjiarently 
were forthcoininj! for the Parian exiiedi- 
tion (Hdt. 6. 132) and the Aiginetan 
war (6. 89). 



THE PREPARATIONS OF THE GREEKS 

be regarded aa an extraordinary squadron, a nomial fleet of 1 60. In 
the war, however, the total number of Athenian vessels appears as not 
loss than 200 (the figure ascribed in the Herodotean text, probably 
corrupt in this particular, to the naval programme of Tliemistokles). 
It is possible that an addition of vessels from thirty to fifty was made 
to the fleet in the yc-ir 481-480 at". (Hypsichides), and that the total 
numl>er is correctly given by Herodotus as 200. It is also possible, 
though less probable, that a second hundred vessels were built and 
equipped, in the said year, in consequence of a re-enactment of tlie 
psephism of Thcmistokles. The method ordained in the psephism 
makes this latter suggestion highly problematical. Are the terms 
of the psephism, and the exact nature and extent of the service 
performed by this century of citizens, fully or correctly reported in the 
PMtijI The terms of the psephism as there given {and rej^roduced 
more or less accurately in the later authorities) suggest a carious 
anticipation of the chief litargtj of later times, the tritfarehia, but the 
process ascribed to Themistokles is entirely different from the pro- 
cedure afterwards in force. According to the terms of the supposed 
psephism a hundred talents were distributed to one hundred wealthy 
citizens on condition of performing to the satisfaction of the Suite 
a service not specified. The hundred took each man his talent, and 
builded, or procured the building, each man of a trireme, to the 
satisfaction of all concerned. Therewith his service might seem to 
have ended, the State presumably taking over the said trireme and 
doing all the rest. This procedure is exactly the reverse of the 
extraordinary Liturgy, known as the trierarchy, under which the 
State supplied to the trierarch the vessel, and more or less of ita 
equipment, while the trierarch, for his year of service, maintained the 
ship in seaworthy trim, a service likelj' to co.st him at the lowest 
estimite the best part of a talent, although the wages of the crew were 
paid by the State. The air of mystery imparted to the proposal in 
the psephism of Themistokles is perplexing. Themistokles demands 
a carte blaiuJu, or a vote of confidence and a free hand, at least to the 
ext«nt of being allowed to force a loan of a talent each upon one 
hundred of the richest citizens, with a penalty or sanction attached that 
if the citizen, thus made a debtor to the treasury, failed to satisfy (the 
People t) by the use to which he put his talent, ho should be called 
upon to repay the loan (with interest 1). The humlred citizens, 
selected in a further manner, not specified, perhaps by Themistokles 
himself, perhaps, on the analogy of the later trierarchy, by their 
phyletai, ten from each fifii/lt:, gallantly and amiably meet the demand 
made upon them, and presumably after consultation with Themistokles 
one and all set to work building triremes. One talent would just 
about, defray the expense of building and equipping a trireme. It 
would be satisfactory to have some inform<itiou as to the maintenance 
of the triroraes, so provided, during the next year or two, and the 



214 



HERODOTUS 



API*, in 



arrangements made for their maintenance and their command during 
the actual campaign of 480 B.c, From Herodotus it only appears 
that Themistokles persuaded the Athenians to huiid ships from 
the 8urf)lu3 ariaing from the mines, insteail of distributing it among 
themselves ten drachmai to each man. He ex]iressly specified the 
purpose in view, and exproaaly alleged the Aiginetan war as the 
excuse. The Athenians were thus fully apprised of the design, and 
fully aware of the purpose to which the money was to be applied. 
The only mystery, or reserve, on the part of Themistoltiea was that 
he said nothing, at least in the first instance, about the probability of 
the ships being used not against the Aiginetans, but against the Persians, 
as he himself foresaw and intended, The FoUh/ gives the amount 
of the surplus as a hundred talents, which provide a h\indred ships, 
all apparently within one year. Herodotus does not specify the total 
amount of the surplus, but he mentions that it would have given the 
citizens of Athens ten drachmai apiece. If the surplus for one year 
amounted to ahundred talents, and allowed a distribution of ten drachm:d 
to each citizen, the number of eitijiena must have amounted to 60,000. 
Just half that number, viz. 30,000, is the Herodotean estimate, and 
this estimate supplies fifty talents as the annual surplus of the revenue 
to be distributed. Thus the comparison of our authorities suggests 
the conclusion that the shipbuilding was spread over two years, that 
fifty ships were built in each year, and that the hundred ships and 
the hundred talents in the I'ohftj represent the total expenditure, and 
the total result attained.^ The hundred trierarchs taken from the 
Pentabiskmu'dimnoi probably were made responsible for the maintenance 
of these ships, and commanded them in the actual war. The total 
number of two hundred ships may have been reached by additional 
building on the part of the .Stiito, or it may be by voluntary and 
extraordinary efforts on the part of individual citizens, such as 
Kleinias, son of Alkibiades — who, however, would hardly have escaped 
being included in the first roll-call of the hundred richest. In fine, 
disguised under the confused and inadequate terms of the supposed 
psephism of Themistokles, which cannot be taken to reproduce the 
actual terms of his proposal, or to describe fully and acciu-ately the 
procedure for raising and maintaining the fieet that fought at Salamis, 
there lurks the evidence that Theinistokles, and no other, was the in- 
ventor of the Trierarchv, though not perhaps in the form most familiar 
to U8 from tho later authorities. 

(6) It only remains to indicate the position, political and official, 
occupied by Thomistokles in Athens for the period hero under review. 
Themistokica had been elccteil Archon two years before Phainippos, 
and was therefore a prominent citizen, a rising statesman, even before 



' If the slup-bnilding may be sprtaJ 
over three ye&rs, tho total of 200 may 
have been attained by three annual 



increments of 50 rensels, added to tho 
existing fleet ; cp. chronological table 
below. 



the return of Miltiade* to Athens in 491. Themiatoklea had assuredly 
fought in his place at Marathon, if not as Slrakgos, at least as Hoplite. 
Themistokles had probably estimated the victory of Marathon at a 
much lower figure than the bulk of his countrymen, and was not 
deceived by the delay in the return of the Medo. Themistokles 
had probably approved the undertaking of Miltiades against the 
Kyklades, and the failure of Miltiades at Paros probably cost 
Themistokles quite as many sleepless nights as the trophy of Miltiades 
at Marathon. Themistokles was already opposed to the Kleistbonean 
statesmen, who had hounded Miltiades to his doom, and Themit-tukles 
perhaps even extended a helping hand to the son of Miltiades after 
that ill-starrod general's death. Themistokles doubtlessapproved the 
reform of the Cotistitution in 488 B.C., even if proposed by his rivals, 
seeing better than they saw the uses to which the new institutions 
might be put. The answer to Sparta's intervention on behalf of 
Aigina may have been dictated by Themistokles : the first outbreak 
of war ■with Aigina was probably welcomed by him, as a desirable 
propaedeutic for the greater struggle which he foresaw more clearly 
than any one else. Elarly in the course of the struggle with Aigina 
he must have proposed, or demanded, the increase of the navy, and 
bis proposal must have been rejected and thwarted by Xanthippos 
and Aristeides, the most influential demagogues of the time. It would 
have been like Themistokles to see the use to which the Odrakophoria, 
designed and hitherto used by the loading demagogues as a means of 
eliminating the Peisistratid rump, might be turned, so as to serve not 
as a conservative but as a progressive device, eliminating not the 
enemies of the existing regime, but the opponents of further progress 
or reform. The ostnikism of Xanthippos and of Aristeides, in 
succession, left Themistokles virtually ' tyrant ' of Athens, that is, the 
man who for the time being absolutely dominated the policy of the 
State, and probably occupied the highest official position. For the 
two years following the Archotitate of Nikomedes, and the ostrakism 
of Aristeides, or rather for three, Themistoklos was virtually Prime 
Minister of Athens, the leading, the only demagogue. We cannot 
doubt that during these years he wjis continuously Slrattffos, elected 
annually by the Ekklesia, ami enjoying the undivided confidence of 
the citizens. If hitherto the Prytany, or Hegemony, in the strategic 
college had circulated daily among the ten Sirategoi, express enactment 
must have now been made, on the suggestion or with the sanction of 
Themistokles, for a better arrangement in view of the coming inva-sion ; 
and the novelty, the scale, the scene and duration of the impending 
war, in the preparation as in the conduct of which Themistokles was 
the soul, or at least the best brain, of the nation, made his Ilfijemomi 
the first order of the day. To tin's period I should assign likewise 
the project for the fortification of the Pciraieus, the postponement of 
which ia hardly intelligible, if it had been inaugurated ten years 



216 



HERODOTUS 



APP. in 



before, when Themiatoklea was Archon.' Themistokles is introduced 
by Herodotus as an interpreter of oracles, and it is credible that 
he made an effort to win Delphi for the national cause ; but Themisto- 
kles belonged to the line of Athenian statesmen who were not 
acceptable persons at Delphi. The invitations to the national con- 
gress at the Isthmos were no doubt issued by Sparta, or at least 
not without Sparta ; but it ia not fanciful to see both in tlie meeting 
itself, in its acts, and in the subsequent plans and operations of the 
Confederates, the hand and brain of Themiatoklea at work, even where 
his name is not expressly mentioned in the somewhat jealously-minded 
sources. With the sununons of the Isthmian Congress the poh'cy of 
Themistokles and of Athens merges in the general story of the actions 
of the Confederacy ; before broaching that subject, it will be well to 
summarise, in tabular form, the results of this section of our inquiry. 



ou 


B.C. 


ARCHOXS. 


KVBNT8. 


72.3 


490-489 


Pliainippoa 


Battle of ilarathon. 
Parian Expedition. 


72.4 


489-488 


Aristeidcs 


Condemnation of Miltiades. 
Constitutional Reforms iit Athciia : 

(i. ) Reduction o! the powers of the 

Arvbons. 
(ii.) Development of the StraUgia. 
(iiL) Ostrnkism instituted. 


73.1 


488-487 


Anchisea 


Change of Spartun policy ; a])pliofttion of 
Leotyehidas ut Atheus rejected. 

Seizure of tlie Tlteoriii by the Aiginet&ns 
(exchange of priHuiicra). 

First Ostrafcisro (Hippsrchos). 

First Sortition of the Archons. 

First Elei;tion of the Stratagoi by tlie 
Ekklttia. 


73.2 


487-18ti 


Tclesiiios 


The coup d'tUit of NikodromoH in Aigina, 

and its failure. 
Second Ostrakuni (Megakles). 


73.3 


480-48S 


Unknown 


The war between Atlions and Aigina. 
Third Ostrakism (AlkibiadeB). 


78. 4 


485-484 


Fliilokratcs 


War with Aigina continued ; jiolicy of 

Tbetiiistukles (uavnl augmentation). 
Fourth Oatrakism (Xanthippos). 


74.1 


484-183 


Lcoatratos 


War with Aigina continued ^ strnggla for 

naval au;;mentation oontiaaed. 
Fifth Ostrakism (Aristeide-s). 



' Thncydidea occaaionally nae* the 
terms ifomy, ipx""' of the Strategos. 
He appears also to avoid constitutional 
technicalities. The curious phrase in 



1. 93. 3 may, perhaps, be interpreted to 
refer to the strategic Hegemonia of 

Themistokles. 



THE PREPARATIONS OF THE GREEKS 



OL. 


B.C. ARCHOXS. [ EVKNT8. 


74.2 

74.8 
74.4 

• 


483-482 

482-481 
481-180 


Nikomedes 

Untitcwn 
Hypsichidu 


Thewistokles 'prime-minister'; psephiun 
of Tliemiiitolcleii L'arriod ; institution 
of the TrUrarckia ; 50 ships built 
anil a^saigned. Kortiticatioa of the 
Peini«ii8 begun ? 

Snpremacy of Themistokles ; 50 ships 
bciilt aud aiisijjned. 

Supremacy of Thomistoklea ; <S0 ships 

built and aasigned 1 7> 
Congress of Greek states at the lathmoa. 
Recall of Atheiii&u exiles. 
Be-eloctiun of Themistokles as Strategos 

Hegemoii ; election of Aristrides 

among kia colleague!. 



» 



§ 5. In the course of the fourth year of the seventy-fourth 
Olympiad (481-480 B.C.), if not before, Siiarta and Athens must have 
become convinced that a fresh iiiviision of Holliis bad been ordered 
by the new king, and that the coming celebration of the national 
festival would jjcrhaps be prevented or intcirupted by the advent of 
the ' barbarians.' News of the pre[)arations in Asia and in Europe, 
begun about the time of the Olympiad of 484 B.C., had by this time 
reached Helias. The canal, the bridges, the magazines and dt^pots, 
the requisitions from Greek stateii subject to the kin^, the orders 
for the ktiAs en viasst, must surely have been reported in Athens, in 
Sparta, in Delphi, wherever Greeks were gathered together, and in 
course of a twelvemonth no further doubt as to the reality and 
magnitude of the impending peril could subsist. The objective of 
such preparations and movements w.os hardly open to question, when 
viewed in relation to the general policy and the recent liistory of the 
«mpire.^ Herodotus expressly aUites that the Greeks had timely 
varning, and he enforces the sUitement incidentally by a couple of 
anecdotes which bear the same moral. The Argivcs, according to 
their own admission, had foreknowledge of the coming storm (7. 
148). Explicit and early information reached Sparta from Demaratos, 
and the Spartans must also have had their suspicions confirmed by 
the reports brought home by Sperthias and Boulia. Athens, with 
Themistokles at its head, was assuredly not behind Sparta either in 
knowledge of Asiatic affairs, or in plans to meet the impending attack. 
Neither Sparta nor Athens contemplated any other possibility than 
resistance. Each had adequate and compelling motives for offering 
a determined opposition to any further attempts upon their liberties. 
Severally and in combination they wore assuredly resolved upon that 

' Cp. Appendix II. 0. 



S18 



HERODOTUS 



APR in 



H 



course. There was probably subsisting, since 491 b.c albeit in a state 
of 'suspended animation,' the defensive alliance between Sparta and 
Athens against the Mede, which bound the two states to mutual aid 
in case of an invasion from Asia, white leaving them free in their other 
relations with each other, and with all other Greek states, whenever 
the Persian question was in abeyance, Sparta had responded to her 
engagement in 490 b.c., but too lato to be of use. It is not quite 
clear whether Sparta should have sent a confederate force upon that 
occasion : in any case the lead would doubtless have remained, by a 
well-known custom, in the hands of Athens, as the state whose 
territory was actually the scene of operations. But the larger scale 
of the invasion of 480 B.C. called for a correispondingly greater effort 
upon the part of Sparta and of Athens, if resistance was to be crowned 
with success. The existing Delphic Amj)hiktyony might have seemed 
to offer at least the nucleus for such a large co-operative move- 
ment in the common defence. The pan-Ionic League, which had 
maintained for upwards of five years an obstinate resistance to the 
Persian, even on Asiatic soil, had been apparently a development, or 
an extension, of the religious communion, the representatives of which 
had met from time immouior ial at the shrino of Triopian Apollon ; 
but there were many gooil and sufficient reasons why that precedent 
was not now transferred to Hellas. The Delphian League was a 
league not of city-states, hut of nations, or tribes, no longer repre- 
aenting the chief centres of political power. Its local connexion with 
central Grepce, and with Thes-mly, placed the natural foci of resistance 
too far frnra Sparta and from Athens. Its existing representative 
machinery was not devised for direct political or military purposes, 
and was too cumbrous to be easily adapted thereto. Last, and not 
least, the loyalty of some of the memWs, notably the Thesaalians, 
perhaps even that of the very custodians of Delphi itself, was not by 
any m«"an8 above suspicion. There seems to have been never an 
idea of invoking the Amphiktyonic Council, or the members of the 
Amphiktj'onic League, as such, to undertake the conduct of the 
national defence, at any stage in the story. The actually subsisting 
engagement between Sparta and Athens would have helped to pre- 
clude such an empT-iso, Nor could the existing Peloponnesian Con- 
federacy, or, to speak more correctly, the Lakochdmonian Symraaehy, 
supply an exclusive basis for the new leagiie. That was a permanent 
league of states associated with Sparta for all external pur])oses, and 
recognizing permanently the Hefftmony, or l<?ad, of Sparta. Athena 
stood outside it, in a looser and more nearly equal relation to Sparta, 
and could not be expected to enter it voluntarily upon the usual 
terms. Sparta herself did not aim at including exo-Peloponnesian 
states in the alliance, and might view with especial misgiving the 
entrance of a power which would give a prodominantly maritime 
character to the association. Ncfr was Athens the only state in 



§6 



THE PREPARATIONS OF THE GREEKS 



S19 



question ; it was contemplated, in view of the immense danger fore- 
shadowed by the king's preparations, to form a now and unprecedented 
alliance, embracing as many Greek states as possible, from all quarters, 
in one great union against the Mede. The Congress was, in fact, 
summoned by invitation, for the express purpose of creating a new 

thing : tt kius tv rt yiyono rh EAA.tji'ixSi' koi d or^Ki-^aiTts riavrh 
TpyjarTOitv irarres (7. 145): ii pan-Hollenic unity, and a complete co- 
operation among all members »i the race. 

It has been suggested that the initiative in organizing the pan- 
Hellenic SjTnmachy, or Confederacy, in 481 B.C. was taken by the 
Athenians, and Busolt quotes Herodotus 7. 139 to prove as much.' 
If this interpretation of the passage were binding, there would be a 
contradiction, or at least an inconsequence, between 7. 136 and 7. 
239, where Spjirta appears as obtaining the first knowledge of the 
king's intentions and communicating it to the rest, Such an 
inconsequence, arising from alternative sources, or moods, M'ould be 
nothing to surprise a student of Herodotus ; but in the present case 
the earlier passage cited does not of necessity cover the initiation of 
the Symmachy, or the holding of the Congress, nor does the second 
passage, even if authentic, or credible, expressly refer to that. An 
Athenian initiative does not conflict with a Spai-tan executive. In 
respect to the Congress, Sparta may have issued the invitations after 
conference with Athens, and perhaps at the suggestion of Athens. 
The place of meeting is neither at Sparta nor at Athens, but half-way 
between, in the temple of Poseidon, on the Isthmos. There is no 
extant list of the states to which invitations were sent, nor of the 
states which accepted invitations and sent representatives {^popovXoi) 
to the Isthmos ; nor do we know whether any state, wliich was 
actually represented at the Isthmos, declined to subscribe the 
Synviachia, though some of the original subscribers undoubtedly 
' medized ' in the sequel. The probable list of states invited to the 
Isthmos, or, at least, finally subscribing the treaty, may be reconstructed 
by certain means, within certain limits. All stjites must be excluded 
which were actually subject to the Persians already, such as the 
Greek settlements in Libya, in Asia, and not a few in Europe. To 
Kyrene, to the lonians, to the colonies in Makedonia, in Tlirake, and 
the adjacent islands, no invitations were issued. Again, states which 
joined, or were invited to join, the Symmachy at a later stage, had 
presumably been unrepresented at the original Congress. Argos, the 
Greek cities in Krete, Korkyra, Italiotes and Sikeliotes received no 
invitation, and sent no representatives to the Isthmos in 481 B.(J. 
States, the names of which are written in any of the Greek army- and 
navy-lists by Herodotus, or on the Serpent-pillar, or in the Olympic 
roll, may be safely included in the original Confederacy, so far as not 
known to have joined at a later stage. Sparta and her allies con- 



S80 



HERODOTUS 



App. m 



trolled probably the great majority of the votes ; as well the inland 
Arkadiaiis, Tegea, Mantineia, and the Eleians, as the naval allies, 
Korinth, Megani, Aigina. Athena wiis, of course, represented, presum- 
ably by Thcmtatokles, but had perhaps no second vote on which she 
could count except that of Plalaia, even if the Eulxtian towns were 
represented. Thebes was there, and probably other members of the 
Boiotian League. The further powers of central Greece were perhaps 
represented, Phokiaria, Lokriatis, Dorians. If any of the states of 
Thessaly sent repreaentativee, they might, perhaps, on the whole 
tend to support Athens. Some of the western states, Leukas, 
Anaktorion, Anibrakia, may have been represented, but would be 
likely to take their cue from Korinth, and so reinforce the Pelopon- 
nesian interest, only threatened by the possible secession of Aigina 
and Megara. 

(1) The first act of the Congress, thus brought together, must 
have been the creation, under all due religious formalities, of the 
Confederation, S<jnomosia, or Symmachy, to resist the Persian. 
Technically the Symmachy was, no doubt, an Epimtvhi/, or Defensive 
Alliance, probably unlimited in time, but clearly defiried in function. 
On the drafting of the general terms of the treaty must have followed 
a mighty and mutual swearing in of members, in the Peace and 
Alliance (oTroi-Sat rt koI fTvfXfia\ia) subscribed by the Proboulm. (2) 
Closely connected, indeed, with the Alliance was the establishment 
of Peace among Hellenes by the termination of feuds and wars 
{i)^6p^v KaraXXayy'i), the greatest of which was the cjuarrel between 
Athens and Aigina. (3) At an early stage of the Congress may also 
be placed the Vow of Vengeance (rb opKiov), if it has any historical 
justification at all, to confiscate and consecrate any Greek city, or 
nation, which should voluntarily surrender to the Persian. Perhaps 
at the time of the session of the Congress, Delphi had not yet com- 
mitted itself to the policy of Non-resistance. The vow was, according 
to its reported terms, a bid for the favour of Delphi, and the terms, 
if authentic, imply that Delphi is presumed to be on the national 
side. The oath would have been, in any case, a solemn farce, if 
registered at a time when nine at least of the twelve Amphiktyonic 
names had already 'niedized,' compulsion or no compulsion. The 
oath is, however, carefully guarded and qualified ; it bears merely 
on Greeks ; it would not apply to the Greeks of Asia, or even of 
Thrake and Makedon, who were plainly acting under compulsion, nor 
to any other Greeks, even of those represented at the Congress, who 
should hereafter submit to a force inajeure. On the whole the oath 
was rather of the nature of a bruium fiilmen, a reassurance and en- 
couragement to those combining to take it, rather than a very 
alarming threat to those who had submitted, or who should submit, 
to the king.^ (4) F«u-ther, if we may reconstruct the Agenda-pai>er, 



THE PREPARATIONS OF THE GREEKS 

or rather the Minutes of the Congress, from Herodotus, we muat 
conchide that a good number of itiiporUint proposals wore debated 
and decided before the meeting adjourned. Thus, spies were sent to 
AaxA, to report upon the king'3 preparations and progress (cc. 146, 
1 47). From the subsequent story it appears that these spies were 
well received at Sardes, and put in a position to give a full report to 
the Proboiil'n, or to tho Stratcgoi, of the Confederacy. (5) Emba-ssies 
were also appointed to visit the principal Greek states unrepresented 
at the Congress, namely, Argos, Syracuse (taking Korkyra on the 
way), and Krete. The reports of these embassies must have been 
made subsenuently, so far as the items in the stories are historical, 
to an adjournetl meeting of the ProboiUm, in the following spring, or 
it may be direct to Sparta. In no case, be it here observed in passing, 
was tie attempt to enlist these outlying members of the Greek race 
successful, and no attempt was made at all to rouse Kyrenc to strike 
a blow for Hellas, even by invading Egypt on the one h.and, or by 
co-operating against Carthage on the other. It is, further, evident 
that (6) the question of tho leading, or Heijcnionia, wjis raised, dis- 
cussed, and settled in favour of Sparta at this Congress. The question 
of leading in a confederate war was not a simple one, and a large 
number of possibilities might have been presented to a Greek congress 
for dealing with tho subject.' On this occasion the definite alternatives 
actually debated were, whether Sparta should be sole and supreme leader 
by land and by sea, or whether the supremo command iit sea should Iw 
invested in Athena, which was to supply the overwhelming majority 
of the fleet, Sparta retairting the le^ul on laud. The matter was 
decided wholly in favour of Sparta, no doubt by the votes mainly of 
the Peloponnesian allies, the Athenians, led in the matter doubtless 
by Themistokles, yielding the point not ungraciously.- It wjis not 
the only time upon which Athens, under Themistokles, sacrificed a 
point of amour jyrc>]>re or of liberty, in the interests of unity. From 
u purely strategic point of view tho decision to maintain one and 
the same power in command over army and fleet was sound and 
fully ju8tifi.able ; but probably political nither than military considera- 
tions determined the decision of the Congress, and the actual history 
of the campaigns leaves it doubtful whether Sparta ever interpreted 
the unity of her hegemony in tho strictest and most efficient sense, or 
overcame the natural dualism of command by land and sea.* (7) The 
question of the actual conting<>nts to be furnished by the several allies 
was presumably raised and settled at some stage of the proceedings ; 
perhaps the original act of alliance embodied an obligation binding 
upon all the subscribers to come to each other's support in full force to 



■ Cp. Xenopbon. JMf. i. 2. 10, and 
the utcmativeii proposed in .369 b.c. 
between S)iui'tA and Athuiia {Hell. 7. 
1. 2-14), xni\ in 302 li.r. 1)etwecn tho 



SpartHUs Mid their alliM {Hell. 7. 6. 8). 

•J Cp. Hdt. 8. 3. 

'' Cp. case of AgeHilam iii 3!)4 B.C., 
.Ken. UrII. 3. 4. 27. 



£22 



HERODOTUS 



APP. ni 



the best of their ability by sea and by land : a provision which would 
mean in the Peloponnesos, and probably elsewhere, that two-thirds 
of the available fighting men should be employed on foreign service 
by land ; in regard to the Heet, however, apparently every available 
ship was employed, at least by Athens, and probably by ail the naval 
allies. (8) Finally, the question of the plan of campaign for the 
defence of Greece must have been raised, more or less discussed, and 
provisionally resolved, in this Congress. There is nothing anomalous 
in the introduction of this item into the acts of the Probouloi. No 
hard-and-fast line divided the military and the political function in 
a Greek state, and probably many, if not all, the representatives 
actually assembled at the Isthmos in 481 B.C. commanded the con- 
tingents of their respective states in 480 B.C. Two previous acts of 
the Congress involve the question of the strategic plan of defence ; 
the enrolment of centiul Greece in the Confederacy gives every state 
enrolled a direct interest in di-awing the line of defence so as to cover 
itself ; the decision, or necessary assumption, that the war was to be 
conducted by sea and by land was bound to g<^ivern the actual plan of 
operations. The leading on both elements had, indeed, been voted 
to Spjirta ; but it does not follow that Sjiarta was left to determine, 
by her own unaided intelligence, the precise plan of actual opemtions. 
The lines of defence were debated and selected by a confederate organ; 
the need of co-ordination for sea and laud operations makes it im- 
possible to believe that the commanders on sea and on land deter- 
mined their several lines of action independently. A higher potency 
is required to draw the fundamental and original plan ; that organ 
is supplied bj' the Con^'ress of representatives from ail the states 
actually concerned. The meeting in the autumn of 481 RC. will 
not have broken up without having arrived at a general under- 
standing upon this alt-important point. The king's intention could 
not be in doubt ; the bridges, the canal, let alone rumour and 
authentic information, made the Thrako-Makedonian route a foregone 
conclusion ; the extension of the national coafederacy to Boiotia, 
central Greece, Euboia, and eventually to Thessalj-, dictated a more 
or less self-evident line, or succession of lines, for the Greeks, acting 
on the defensive. Bat the obscurity which rests upon the relations 
of the Confederates to Tbessaly infects the question of the actual 
plan of defence. If the commons of Thessaly, or the bulk of the 
Thessalian towns, are to be included among the signatories to the 
pan-Hellenic treaty of 181 B.C., whether as original members or as 
admitted before the close of the Congress, in either case the inclusion 
of the Thessalians in the National Union involved a plan of campaign 
which should draw the first line of defence mucli further north than 
would have been required in the interests of the Peloponnese, or of 
Attica, or even of Boiotia and central Greece, The Profjouloi, accord- 
ing to Herodotus (7. 1 72, 1 73), admitted the Thcasalians to the Alliance, 



THE PREPARATIONS OF THE GREEKS 



223 



oc 



§5 

and decided to occupy the Paas of Tempe, a plan subsequently carried 
out ill the following spring. The rest of that adventure belongs to 
the story of the acttial opei'ations and strategic conduct of the war. 
The Congress of FroUnU<d, however, will hardly have contented itself 
with the determination to guard Thessaiy, and wholly omitted to 
discuss further alternatives in the event of the break-down, from any 
causes, of this first plan of campaign. Yet HerotJotua appears to 
date the resolution to occupy Artemision and Thermopylai very 
distinctly to the spring of the year 480 B.(;., months after the 
dispersion of the Congress of 481 B.C., though he lays the scene of 
the new resolution at the Isthmos, where the Congress had previously 
met. The record is, indeed, here, as elsewhere, lamentably imperfect 
and inexact, and considerable room is left for conjecture — a necessary 
evil under the circumstances — as to the actual procedure and course 
of action among the Confederates. Was there more than one meeting 
of the Prohouloi at the Isthmos T It has been held that the Congress 
(o o-i'AAoyos T^v irpofiovkiiiv) on breaking up in 481 B.C. after its first 
session never mot again, the executive passing at once to Sparta, her 
government and her commanders, advised by the meetings of confeder- 
ate generals and admirals respectively (wvi^piix rwc (rrparT^ymv)} But 
there are several objections to be made to this view. 

(i.) A meeting of the Frobouloi would have been naturally called 
to receive the reports of the embassies despatched in the autumn of 
481 B.C. to Argos, Krete, Korkyra, and Sicily. Eveo if the embassy 
to Argos, or that to Krete, mi;.'ht possibly have reported before the 
break-up of the first session, the report from the envoys to Sicily 
could hardly have been expected before the following spring. The 
spies sent into Asia would also have to bring back a report to the Con- 
gress, (ii.) Herodotus expressly represents ' the Hellenes ' as holding a 
meeting in the spring of 480 B.C. at the Isthmos ; and it is natural 
to »ee in this meeting a second session of the Congress of Prol)ouioi. 
True, the only decision he reports of this rapcting is the resolution to 
occupy Artemision and Thermopylai, now that Thessaiy has been 

ibandoned ; but this resolution comes just as well from the I'robouloi 
the resolution previously and expressly reported of them, to occupy 

^nd defend the Pass of Tempe ; both alike are strategic resolutions 
determined largely by political considerations, (iii.) Moreover, it is 
possible to enlarge the acts of the second, or spring-meeting, of the 
Congress, not only by the presentation of reports from the envoys 
and the spies, already referre<l to, but also by the transfer to this 
meeting of one or two items aliove assigned to the first meeting in 
the previous autumn. The Vow of Vengeance should, perhaja, be 
dated to this meeting, and with all the more point in \iew of the 
' medism ' now forced upon the Thessalians by the abandonment of 
Tempe. (iv.) A spring -meeting of the Probouloi was presumably 



i9« 



HERODOTUS 



APP. Ill 



held in order to report tke progress of preparations in the various 
cities which had already joined the Confederacy ; to admit fresh 
members, if fresh members wore forthcoming ; to concert fresh 
measures, in view of any fresh circumstances ; and to give the final 
comjnission to the several commanders. The actual resolution to 
defend Thermopylai and Artemision may only have been determined 
at this meeting, though it may have been considered, with other 
alternatives, in the previous autumn. Upon the whole, then, it 
appears reasonable to maintain that the Congress adjourned in the 
autumn of 481 B.C. to meet again in the spring of 480 B.C., and 
actually did then meet again, received reports from the cities com- 
prising the alliance, from the spies despatched to Asia, from the 
eml)a88ie8 returned from Sicily, Krete, and Argos, and, above all, from 
the commanders already returned from Thessaiy ; recorded a vow of 
vengeance upon traitors to the national cause, a usefuJ hint to Argos 
at least ; and concerted a final plan for the defence of Helios, in view 
of the abandonment of Thessaly. It would only bo on the break-up 
of the Congress after this second session that the executive conduct 
of affairs, now a purely militiiry and naval question, or set of questions, 
passed to Sparta, her king, and her navarch. This hj'pothesis 
appears to furnish the more probable perspective of the action of 
Greek states, and to accord better with the indications in the narrative 
of Herodotus, than the supposition that Sparta had taken over the 
whole conduct of aflairs in the autumn of 481 B.C. 

§ 6. The abandonment of Thessaly involved a change, or rather 
a development, in the plan of campaign ; not so the refusal of all 
co-operation from Krete, Korkyra, and Sicily, or even from Argos. 
But these refusals must have been evil tidings for the trobouloi. 
Herodotus goes out of his way to apologize for Argos, perhaps under 
the gkmour of a later situation ; but neither his apology in itself, nor 
the story by which it ia supptirted, is coherent or satisfactory. The 
Delphic oracle alleged by the Argives sis part of the excuse for their 
neutrality or abstention was perhaps given on some other occasiont 
and transferred by the Argives to this context;^ but, if rightly dated, 
it serves rather to condemn Delphi than to justify Argos. The war 
with Kleoraenes, in which the Argives had lost '6000' hoplites, had 
occurred, not recently, but some half generation before, and many 
of the ' boys ' were now come to man's estate ; quite recently, how- 
ever, the Argives, fighting against Athens, had lost in Aigina nigh a 
thousand men, of whom nothing is said in this connexion.- The 
jealousy of Spartan leading and the dread of Spartan power are no 
doubt permanent factors in the policy of Argos, and were dominant 
factors at this moment, all the more as Sparta found hei-self in 
temporary union with Athens ; but the story of the pourparlm 
between Argos and Sparta over the question of the Hegemony is not 



Hdt. 9. 13. 



^ Hdt. 6. 92. 



THE PREPARATIONS OF THE GREEKS 




consistent with the facts that Argos was addressiog not a Spartan, 
but a pan-Hellenic envoy, and that the Congress had already decided 
the question of Hegemony. By joining iho pan-Hellenic Union, Argos 
would have obtained not merely a thirty years' truce with Sparta, but 
a complete composition of the secular foud {i^Opaq KaruAAay/)) such as 
had been just arranged between Aigina and Athens ; but Argos would 
have obtained security at the price of recognizing Spartan Hegemony, 
and this price Argos was not prepared to pay. The Argives preferred 
to remain outside the National Union, and to wait upon events, 
trusting doubtless to profit by the defeat which the king was expected 
to inflict upon Sparta, und to recover, even at the expense of a 

lognition of I'ersian supremacy, the coveted lead in the Peloponncsos. 

"Whether the meciism of Argos went further than this constructive 

n is doubtful ; the patriotic vow of vengeance, mainly devised 

'or the benefit of the Argives, was not enforced against them, and it 

easy enoi^b to undersUnd the common report that the Argives 
were in correspondence with Xerxes, and had even invoked the king 
to the invasion of Hellas, as a commentary upon their neutrality of 
the normal type common among Greek political philosophers ! Yet 
the refusal of Argos to co-operate with the National League was a 
serious blow to the piitriotic policy, and even affected stmtegic plana 
and operations, hol[iing, among other things, to explain the culpable 

I reluctance of the Sjmrtans to leatl the Peloponnesian forces beyond 
the Istbmos. 
The less malignant recusancy of the Kretans came also, in course 
of time, to be excused by the dictates of the Delphian oracle, but in 
itself, i)erhap8, hardly evokes surprise. Krete lay to an extraordinary 
degree, considering its early importance in the records of Aigaian 
civilization, outside the main cnnenta of Greek politics and of Greek 
history in the fifth century. This isolation, so significant of the great 

(break between the history of the Mykonaian world and the history of 
fthe Hellenic world, fortifies a sitspicion that non-Hellenic elements 
iwcrc still potent in Krete even in the days of Themistokles and 
Perikles. Kretan hoplites are unknown on Hellenic battle-fields, and 
the days were long fled of Kretan thalattocracy. From Krete at 
lieat might have come some light-armed auxiliaries, to reinforce the 
Hellenic army in a somewhat defective department of its armature. 
Herodotus knows nothing of any such service ; but, if Kteaias is to 
be trusted, Kretan archers were present at Salamis in the Athenian 
fleet.' The answer of Sicily, or of the Sikeliotee, to the national 
appeal calls for more extended discussion. Here, as elsewhere, the 
hnre facts, which may bo regarded as historically proven, must be 
distinguished from the motives and the circumstances, the speeches, 
and the setting generally, in which they are framed, or rather trans- 
figured. It is quite certain that no Syracusan or Sikeliote forces 

I'enioa, 26. 



S86 



HERODOTUS 



APP. Ill 



came to the assistance of the Greeks in the war with Xerxes : is it 
equally certain that Gelon, the lord of Syracuse, had been formally 
incited, by an embassy from the Congress at the lathmos, to send a 
contingent to the supix>rt of the motherland, perhaps actually to join 
the National League against the Persian ? So fantastic, so transparently 
fictitious are the circumstances, and especially the speeches, reported 
of this embassy, that one might be tempted to dismiss the whole story 
of such an application tu Gelon, were it not for the many particular 
incidents, apart from the story itself, which tend to confirm the 
historical character of the bare fact, such as the attack on the Greeks 
of the west whether concerted between Xerxes and Carthage, and 
designed to prevent a co-operation between western and eastern Greece, 
or not ; the existence of a fully adequate and historical explanation, 
side by side with the fantastic and artificial story, accounting for the 
admitted absence of all help from Sicily ; one might perhaps add, the 
mission of Kadmos to Delphi, on Gelon 's behalf, sliowing at least an 
organic connexion between Syracuse and the progress of events in the 
east, which would make it extraordinary if the Greeks at the IsthmM 
had made no application to the Greeks in the west for assistance in 
the supreme hour of need. Similar expectjitioiis were entertained 
long afterwards in Peloponnesos under circumstances which appealed 
far less directly to Sikeliote interests ; and though the application by 
the Peloponnesians to Syracuse for help against Athens in 431 B.C. 
met practically with little or no immediate response, the policy in- 
volved suggests an inference to the earlier and more urgent case, 
half a century before. The immense power of Syracuse under Gelon, 
far transcending that of any other single Greek state, makes it 
probable that the Pro^uuiloi. at the Isthmos cannot have omitted to 
apply to Syracuse, when they were applying to Korkyra, to Krete, 
and to other out-lying members of the Hellenic name. The fact that 
one ship from Mtujna Grtti'tiii did actually tiike part in the battle of 
Salamis confirms the traditional fact of the despatch of the embassy 
from the C!ongre5s at the Isthmoa to the Greeks of Italy and Sicily : 
we must suppose that the ambassadors Wsited Kroton and probably 
other cities of the west as well as Syracuse. The help sent by 
Italiotes was miserably small ; the Sikeliotes sent no help at all ; 
but Herodotus incontinently furnishes full and sufficient excuse 
for the absence of the Greeks of Sicily from the army- and navy-lists 
of eastern Hellas. 

The story of the reception of the embassy b,v Gelon is sharply 
contrasted with the story told by the dwellers in Sicil}-, and cjin 
hardly be from a Sikeliote source, much less from a comedy of 
Epicharraos * ; but it is sufficiently unhistorical to have had such an 
origin. The story is fictitious, I>ecauHe the Spartan and the Athenian 
envoys cannot have addressed the tyrant of Syracuse and the lord of 



THE PREPARATIONS OF THE GREEKS 



Sicily in such terms as are here put into their mouths. The story 
is fabulous, because it has a moral, a ' tendency,' to exhibit the hybris 
of the tyrant, and the glorious independence of the free Republics of 
Greece. The best vwt put into Gelon's mouth is a plagiarism from 
Periklea, and a clumsy plagiarism to boot,' The alternative story, 
definitely given on local Sikeliote authority, explains by a ma causa 
the absence of the Sikeliotes fiom S;ilami8 ; they were fully occupied 
at home with the great synchronous invasion of Sicil}' by the Cartha- 
ginians. That waa a fact which Syracuse could not forget, though 
there is no consciousness of it in the Herodotean story of the embassy. 
This story, though it reads to us like a satire on republiavn diplomacy 
and republican pretensions, was intended to exhibit the outrageous 
character of the tyrant. The total omission of all reference to Korinth, 
in the report of an embassy to the greatest of Korinthian colonies, 
may be due, not to the Syracusan, but to the Athenian provenience 
of the fiction. The mere story of the embassy is probably a part of 
the original draft of the Seventh Book, and as old as any part of the 
connected narrative ; but it has received later additions, as the author 
became acquainted with additional facts, or fictions. The story of 
the rise of the house of Gelon is one such a<.ldition, the plagiarism 
from Perikles another ; the appendix containing the story of the 
Carthaginian invasion is plainly derived from local Sikelioto sources. 
In the impending or synchronous invasion of Sicily by the Cartha- 
ginians a real and insvjperaWe obstacle existed to Gelon's giving any 
direct supjwrt to the defence of eastern Hellas ; it does not, however, 
follow that there is no truth in the reportetl qiuirrcl over the Hegemoniit, 
however wild and improbable the exact terms of the speeches put 
into the mouths of Syagros the Spartan, the anonymous Athenian, 
and Gelon himself. It has been suggested that Geloti deliberately 
put the ambassadors off by making outrageous demands ; but, granted 
his position at the time, and the military and naval forces at his 
disposal, there was nothing very outrageous in his demand for an 
equal share in the Hegemony, or even for the whole. The conscious- 
ness betrayed by the story, in however apocryphal a form, that, had 
Gelon come to the assistance of Greece, with his fall forces, the 
question of the command must have been raised, is undoubtedly tnie 
to the conditions of the case, and in all probability the point was 
raised at the inter\new between the ambassadors from the Isthmos 
and the tyrant of Syracuse. But Gelon will hardly have confessed 
that, in view of bis relations with Carthage, and the impending 
invasion, of which he had already in all probability intelligence, he 
dared not denude Syracuse and Sicily of ships and men. Gelon 
did not coimt assuredly upon the Greeks winning a decisive victory 
over Xerxes, least of all without his support ; but neither did he 
regard their pro-spects as ho])ele88. Aa a matter of fact, the Greeks 



S28 



HERODOTUS 



APP. Ill 



of the mother-couutry achieved & more complete success against the 
king than Gelon himself could boast to have achieved over tlie 
Carthaginian. Gelon looking ahead may have contemplated the 
poaaibility of a union with the eastern Greeks, after and in case he 
should have annihilated the Carthaginian power in Sicily. His 
interests lay on the side of an Hellenic victory in the east, as in the 
west ; he had nothing to gain by the success of the Persians, though 
he prepared for that eventuality also. The somewhat obscure refer- 
ence put into his mouth to a previous invitation of his own to the 
eastern Greeks, to Korinth presumably, or to Sparta, through Korinth, 
that they should assist him against Carthage, and secure 'the open 
door' in Sicily, has an unmistakably historical ring in it.^ Such an 
application attests Gelon'a appreciation of the solidarity of eastern Hellaa 
and Sicily, One tradition affirms that he still intended, after his inter- 
view with the envoys, to join the Hellenes of tl;e old country against 
the king-; hut Salamie had rendered his assistance less desirable, and 
the surrender of the Hegemony by Sparta less probable than ever. The 
tradition prol>ably affirms a merely logical possibility. The envoys 
returned from the west to report to the spring meeting of the Probouloi, 
not that any assistance was to be expected from Sicily, nor even that 
the Greeks of the west were procluiled from sending help by the 
anticipjited invasion of Sicily, but that the tj'rant of Syracuse had 
complained of having been left to fight his own battles previously 
alone, and had offered assistance on impossible terms. On this report 
tradition improved, as attested by the Heroilotcan fable. The 
ambassadors from the west had, however, at least one promise of 
assistance to announce, and to that extent were more fortunate than 
their colleagues, who ha«l been despatched to Argos or to Kroto. 
The Korinthian colony of Korkyra had pledged itself to send assist- 
ance to the national cause, and in due time a fleet of sixty sail was 
despatched ; but, unlike the humbler contingents from Ambrakia, 
Anaktorion, and Leukas, the Korkyreati ships never arrived, and the 
name of Korkyra was not to be inscribed in any list of the confederate 
Hellenes. As things turned out, the Greeks fared well enough 
without the Korkyrean squadron ; the islanders thcm-selves were the 
chief losers by the absence of their own vessels in the day of 
victory. Yet this story too, as told by Herodotus, is open to grave 
suspicion. The historian goes even furtlier than his wotit in reporting, 
orationf recta, the very words which the Korkyreans would have 
addressed to Xerxes, had he proved, as they expected, completely 
victorious, and so justified their malingering. The story betrays a 
strong animus against Korkyra, and may date from a time when the 
trouble between Korinth and Korkyra, which was one of the immediate 
antecedents of the Peloponiiesian war, was actually brewing. But 

» Hdt. 7. 168. 
» Hdt. 7. 165. Cp. Freeman, Sicily, ii. 205. 



fe 



THE PREPARATIONS OF THE GREEKS 

Herodotus pays the Korkyreans too high a compliment when he 
expressed a belief that Xerxes would have shown special favour to 
the Korkyreans for their neutrality. Had the Persian heralds not 
ravched Korkyra, and demanded there the symbols of surrender t 
Would the king have set so much store upon a mere neutrality, the 
ambiguous character of which could hai-dly have been disguised t 
The Korkyreans were awkwardly placed, half-way between Hellas 
and Italy. Their interests were really as much threatened by the 
Carthaginian invasion of Sicily as by the Persian invasion of Hellas. 
Vet their conduct undoubtedly wiia selfish, disloyal, unpatriotic ; they 
profited by the victories of the (ireeUs in the east and in the west, 
without contributing one iota to the cost of either. Little wonder 
if Korkyra enjoyed a unique unpopularity, while she exploited from 
one generation to another a position which gave her a share in all 
the profits of the national struggle, without any sacrifice, save that 
of honour, on her own part. 

§ 7. 77w! Ciise of Delphi. — The problematic promise of Korkyra, 
the inevitable refusal of Synicu^e, the punctilious neutrality of Argos, 
the haughty negative from Krete, the doubtful adhesion of Thessaly, 
may one and all have provetl in the long-run less distressing and 
disastrous to the national counsels than despondency and discourage- 
ments from tlie shrine of Delphi. The invasion of Xerxes was 
the true, or at least the supreme, ordeal of the chief pan-Hellenic 
organ of divine revelation, prophecy, and counsel, and Delphi un- 
doubtedly was found wanting in the day of judgement. Whether 
the Pythia actually ' medizod ' is not clear ; that the oracle, and 
its conductors, failed to seize the opportunity and rise to the 
height of the occasion is only too evident ; nay, worse, counsels 
of despair and cowardice were heiird from the Pythian shrine. The 
attitude of Delphi may not liave been quite uniform towards 
all applicants for advice, or throughout the whole crisis, but the 
occasion was not one for ambiguity or faint-heartedness ; it demanded 
faith which could remove moutitains, and the faithlessness of Delphi 
was in itself portentous. The time was not yet come when the acts 
or utterances of Delphi were a negligible quantity. Delphi had 
even recovered, to a great extent, from the damage to its credit 
involved in the fall of Kroisos, a good half-century before, as indeed 
it was destined t») recover, though less completely, from its fatal error 
in the Persian war. Delphi had been, and still was, a great force in 
Hellenic history, and U{)on the whole a force making for righteousness. 
Even within the [Mist half-century Delphi ha«i set up and put down 
kings, had founilod states, had dictated or sanctioned laws and con- 
stitutions, ha<l promoted peace, had justified war, between state and 
state. Delphi was the most universally recognized centre of the 
national religion, and the Pythian festival the high- water mark of 
Hellenic art and culture. The most austere and intimate morality 



230 



HERODOTUS 



App. ra 



marked the private counsels of the Pythian Sibyl. Delphi was the 
chief focus and capital of a great league, with a definite organization 
and indefinite authority, chiefly, no doubt, in rnatbers of intertribal 
or interpolitical faith and morals. Had Delphi embraced, heart and 
80ul, the national cause, and ranged itself uncompromisingly upon the 
side of those who had chosen the better part (ol to ci/jmu'w <})poviovTt^), 
Delphi itself might have suflfered, iis Abai, as Athens auflered, at 
the hands of the Persians, Imt how much more resolut-e and perhaps 
successful had been the national resistance, how much more quickly 
achieved the national success, how much more glorious and far-reaching 
the fame and the future of Delphi itself ! B'ifty years were scarce 
elapsed since the accidental destruction of the old temple by fire. 
The piety and patriotism of the Greek world, and not of the Greek 
world alone, tad rebuilt the temple on a grander scale ; an Athenian 
house hatl put to shame the previous history of all building-contracts 
by its liberality, well-calculated and not ill-repaid. Thrice happy 
Delphi, had the Alkmaionid erection perished in Uames kindled by 
the Persian, and had all the treasures of the past been carried to Susa, 
or melted into a common and amorphous mass by the god of Fire ! The 
Pythian tompie must have arisen from its ashes, to be the wonder of 
the world, and even the latest posterity could scarce have doubted 
the divine legation of an oracle that had provoked destruction at the 
hands of the Barbarian. Alas, it was not to be ! The direct relations 
of the Persian to Delphi are indeed obscure ; but jilain and incontro- 
vertible is the fact that Deljihi jiassed unscathed, unsacked, uninjured 
through the storm that swept Athens away, and respected the oracular 
shrine of Abai in Boiotia as little as that of Branchidai in Ionia, 
if Delphi itself did not actively medize, yet nine out of the twelve 
members of the Amphiktyonic League gave earth and water to the 
great king, This fact in itself is enough to explain the immunity of 
Delphi in the Persian war. An examination, in detail, of the e\ndences 
as to the position and policy of the Pythian power in the crisis of 
the national fortunes may result in a verdict of 'not proven,' but 
cannot entitle the too sagacious oracle to an acquitted on the charge 
of raedism. 

And first, (i.) acts and utterances are on record against Delphi 
calculated to discourage the Greeks in their resistance to the Persian 
king, to divide them, and to justify neutrality, indifference, and 
medism. The Argives defended their unpatriotic abstention by 
appealing to a Delphic utterance, which expressly forbade them to 
take sides with the Hellenes. The oracle in question is, indeed, not 
al)ove suspicion. If it was given to Argos 'shortly after' the loss 
of the 6000 in the war with Kleomenes, its proper date might rather 
be 491 than 481 B.C., a date that would suit well enough with the 
general circumstances of the time. There is nothing in the resjjonse 
itself to determine a date, or even to suggest a reference to the 



^^ 



THE PREPARATIONS OF THE GREEKS 



231 



* 



Persian wair ; Art;os may have kept a genuine Delphic response on 
hand to be produced at any time in justiBeation of a discreet 
neutrality. But the fact remains that the Argivcs could with com- 
plete verisimilitude allege an express consultation of the oracle in 
481 B.a, in \Titnt;s8 whereof they produced a response giving their 
actual conduct a Delphian sanction ; and the possibility remains that 
their story was in suljstance true. The terms of the oracle are in 
themselves truly oracular, that is, the response luis all the notes of 
authenticity. That Argos should consult Delphi, if there were any 
doubt as to the better course to bo pursued, or even if there were a 
desire to obtain a response justifying a foregone policy of abstention, 
accorded with precedents and probability. In fine, the response to 
Argoe, if correctly dated, and rightly associated with the Persian 
crisis, is clear proof of the complicity of Delphi ; and even if wrongly 
dated, or misiipplied, ia cleitr proof tliat the attitude of Delphi diu^ng 
the said crisis made such a story as the Argive acceptable in the 
next generation. The moral of the Kretan story is similar, if it be 
a Kretan story, and not a postscript picked up by Herodotus in the 
west Anyway the Kretans were said to Live obtained a response 
from Delphi more than justifying their absence in the day of battle. 
Whether the actively ' niedizing' attites, Thossalians, Boiotians, and the 
other members of the Amphiktyunic league, to the number of nine, 
had express advice or sanction from Delphi for their unpatriotic policy 
does not appear ; but neither is there on record one single word of 
reproof, of cxhortJilion, addressed to them from Delphi. Nor is the 
story of the mission of Kadmos, son of Skythes and trusty servant 
of Gelon, with a huge treasure, to Delphi, there to await the result 
of the war, and to act accordingly, favourable to the reputation of 
Delphi ; for Gelon must presumably have had reason to believe that 
Delphi was a safe treasui-y in either event, and safety in such a case 
was dishonour. Victory for Xerxes must have spelt ruin to Delphi, 
if Delphi hiul bwen ;in active centre of the national defence. 

Not but what there are also in evidence (ii.) acts and utterances 
from Delphi calculated to stimulate and to oncoui-ago the patriotic 
Groehs, and to increase the chances of the patriotic movement. Such 
is the oracle reportetl to have been given to the Spartans well before 
the war, and jiromising the deliverance of Sparta and Peloponnesos in 
return for the 'devotion' of a Spartan king (7. 220). But this oracle 
is almost certainly a valid n turn post erattum, a justification, not a pre- 
diction, of the death of Leonidas, and is pirt of the general but self- 
contradictory apology for the fiasco at Theimopylai put into circulation 
after the event. Hai-dly more historical can be the oracle, reported 
to have come to the Lakedaimonians from Delphi, after the death of 
Leonidas, and indeed after the victory at Salamis, directing them to 
demand satisfaction from the King for the death of their king (8. 1 1 4). 
These items served inter alia to put Delphi right, so to speak, with 



232 



HERODOTUS 



APP. Itl 



Sparta, at a time when it w:is in Spart&'s interest (as may appear 
anon) to condone the attitude of Delphi in tho Pci-sian war. Another 
link in the process of rehabilitation is supplied by the oracle ' Pray to 
tho Winds ' (dvi/iJouTi <TL'x<ff"^ut). a response to the good Delpbians 
themselves, when they consulted the god, 'on behalf of themselves 
and of Hellas ' (iVJp etuimuv kuI tjJs 'EAAd5o5), promptly reported by 
them to ' the Hellenes,' a patriotic act, whereby they won undying 
gratitude (7. 178). If only it were not too likely that the oracle 
succeeded tho atorra, not the storm the oracle ! Perhajw tho oracle 
which 'came to the Athenians,' bidding them invoke their son-in-law, 
that is Boreas, tho North Winil, was a Delphic onicle (7. 189): if 
80, it might either be a douWet of the preceding one, which came to 
* the Hellenes,' or a fresh item in tho apology of Delphi, to the address 
of Athens. The most signiticant, the most problematical instance 
remains to bo considered in the oracie, or oracles, extorted from 
Delphi by the Atheniftn Uumvi, ostensibly before the war (7. 140, 
141), admittedly before the decisive issue had been reached. These 
oracles have, if not in themselves, yot in their setting and circum- 
stances, the appearance of full authenticity. The two versified 
responses are, indeed, stjirtliiig in their photographic realism of the 
situation in Attica upon the very eve of the luittle of Salamis, and 
startling in the ruthless logic with which tho two altwrnatives, then 
before tho Athenians, and before Greece, are presented : to wit, a 
groat naval battle, which should risk everything on one last throw ; 
or else flight, flight in the ships across the main, to find a new home 
in the west — in tho west it could only bo. This circumstantiality in 
the oracles almost compels us to date them to tho point just indicated : 
the precise reference to Salamis is moat easy of admission after the 
abandonment of Artemision ; the 4le8cription of the state of Attica is 
hardly conceivable before the loss of Tliermopylai, perhaps before the 
advance of the Persians across Kithiiiron. The precision in the 
names of tho Pythia, of Timon tho Athenian pvjreuos, the part played 
by Theraiatokles in the interpretation of the response favourable to 
his own policy, all comltino to heighten the authenticity of the story 
in its essentials, of which the ostensible date, well Iwfore the struggle 
actually began, is nut one. After the failure at Thermopylai, and 
the still greater failure of the Peloponnesiaiis to keep tryst in Boiotia, 
a struggle had presumably broken out in Athens itself between 
Theraiatokles and his opponents — some of the returned exiles among 
them — as to the best course to be pursued under the circumstances. 
While Themistokles was determined to do battle by Salamis, less 
confident and less provident leaders were already advocating the 
alternative policy, the 5<iT<pos ffA.o?«, evacuation of Salamis itself, and 
migration en massf to a new home, in Italy, or elsewhere. That both 
parties consulted the oracle, antl that each received a response favour- 
ing its own wishes, is as significant of the ambiguous faint-beartedness 



§7 



THE PREPARATIONS OF THE GREEKS 



23» 



of Delphi ill thjit disastrous day as though the double alternative had 
been included in one single response ; but the policy of Themistokles 
had at least the advantage of 'the last word.' The fact that after 
the fall of Thermopylai the Athenians aunt a theoria to Delphi would 
bo the clearest and strongest proof forthcoming that even at the 
eleventh hour Delphi was not yet fully committed to the Mede, nor 
had quite forfeited the confitlence and hopes of the national forces. 

Uence we can the better undorstanrl (iii.) the acts of the patriotic 
Greeks, which seem to recognize the patriotism of Delphi, or at least 
to acquit the oracle of the charge of mediam before or during 
the struggle. The vow of vengeance, to confiscate the medizing 
states, and to consecrate a tithe of the spoils to 'the god in 
Delphi' (7. 132), is the most frappant evidence, and probably in time 
auterior to the Athenian thtoria just discussed. This vow is to be 
dated at latest to the spring of the year 480 B.C., probably after the 
abandonment of Thessaly, and certainly after the announcement of 
the neutrality of Argos and the reception of discouraging reports from 
other quarters. When that vow was registered it may have been 
known that the Thcssalians must ' medize,' but it was not expected 
that the Persian forces would ever penetrate Thermopylai, or pass the 
Euripos, or come within striking distance of Delphi. At a time when 
nine out of the twelve Amphiktyonic nations were vassals of the king, 
such a vow would have been an absurdity.^ 

The greater part of the evidence in favour of Delphi comes mani- 
festly and r.'' hifpotheH after the event of the war, consisting in the 
tithes and offerings presented to Apollo from the spoils of the Greek 
victories, and the monuments erected by the Amphiktyonic Council in 
honour of the great and gallant Dead. In view of the present argu- 
ment, these monuments form the best commentary upon those offerings. 
Of the medism of the vast majority of the tribes represented in the 
Amphiktyonic Council there can be no manner of doubt : voluntiirily, 
or yielding to furcf. majeurr, nine of the twelve nations were confessed 
traitors. But the act of the Pylngm'ai was in the nature of an amnesty, 
a self-rehabilitation, a re-iulmission to the larger Hellenic communion. 
It was also very plainly dictated by Sparta, or agreeable to the policy 
of Sptirta, at a moment when she was looking to a revival of the 
Delphic Amphiktyony to furnish a coimterweight to the alarming 
revival of the pan-Ionian confederacy of Delos, under Athenian 
auspices. The subserviency of the Amphiktyony to Spartan wishes at 
this time is evidenced by the dogma of the Council, which set a price 
upon the head of the reputed traitor Epialtes, the Malian.- The 
restoration of the Amphiktyonj' was a part of the rehabilitation of 
Delphi, but neither effort was a complete success. Themistokles 
defeated the policy of Hparta at Thei-mopylai,' and the religious 



> Cp. |>|k 220, 2-23 $upra. * Cp. Udt. 7. 2U. 

• Ci>.,PliiUroh, Themia. 20. 



234 



HERODOTUS 



APKni 



splendours of the Athenian Akropolis and of Eleusis more and more 
tended to throw Delphi into the shade. Greece had owed Delphi too 
little in the hour of supreme danger ; and though it waa to the general 
interests to restore confidence in the chief organ of supernatural 
guidance and authority open to all comers, many tendencies of the age 
combined to make a complete restoration im[>oasible. Delphi had 
recovered from the shock of the fall of Kroisos, and its triumphant 
apology for that miscarriage may l»e read, in various forms, alike in the 
verse of Bakchylides and in the prose of Herodotus. Its misgivings, 
its suspicious and too fortunate escape in the Persian war, irretrievably 
damaged its credit as an organ of political wisdom. Herodotus, 
indeed, accepts the apolo<;y of Delphi on both occasions at its own 
valuation, but Herodotus in this, as in other cases, cannot be taken as 
exemplifying the best or most enlightened thought of his owii age. 
The grand yik^ j usiu-aiive presented on Delphi's behalf is the story of 
the miraculous deliverance from the Persian attack (8. 35-39), which, 
if it had only been generally believed, would have set Delphi on a 
higher pinnacle than ever, and made it, more than ever, the omphalos 
of the Greek world. But the subsequent fortunes of Delphi prove 
that the story W!is not generally believed even at the time, and to-day 
it is, of course, doubly incradible, The Herodotean version is open to 
a host of fat;il objections, and its genesis is easily explained. The 
miraculous element, the aacred arms found of their own accord outside 
the temple, the thunderbolts from heaven, the twin peaks rent from 
Parnassoa and rolling down upon the Barbarians, the war-cry from 
out the shrine of Athene, the a|)paritions of the departed heroes, 
Phylakos and Autonoos, in front of their sanctuaries, of gigantic 
stature, clatl in [yanopUes, pursuing and slaying the panic-stricken 
Persians, are all to little purpose! The moral is obvious: Delphi too 
was assjiuited, but preserved : Dtonim iniurias IHs curtur ! Some have 
been tempted to rationalize the story, missing thereby, as generally in 
such cases, the main points in the crejition and in the critique of the 
legend. There was no assault upon Delphi by the Persians for the 
very good reason that by this time, if not the Delphians themselves, 
yet nine of the Amphiktyonic nations had already made terms with 
Xerxes. But the god — as it turned out — never did Delphi a worsfl 
sei\nce than when he saved his treasures from the Persian spoiler, and 
his temple from the Persian flames. Not to have foreseen and fore- 
told the victorious issue of the war, and thereby contributed to hasten 
and to secure it, was a great shock to those disposed to trust in the 
inspiration of the Pythia : the immunity of Delphi was a still greater 
trial to their faith. The legend of the miraculous preservation of 
Delphi is the god-foi"8akon effort of the Delphians, to rescue the credit 
of the shrine, in view of incontestable facts. It was not, the pious 
fraud seldom is, altogether a failure. The story imposed upon the 
easy credulity of Herodotus, and it may have imposed, in course of 



§7 



THE PRErARATIONS OF THE GREEKS 



236 



» 



* 



time, upon the Delphiatm themselves. But apart from the in- 
credibilities involved, and the obvious apologetic intention apparent 
in the story, it stands comlemned as inconsistent %vith another and 
prima fade more historical anecdote in Herodotus' own pages (9. 42). 
Mardonios, upon the eve of btttle, observing some dejection among 
his otticers, sought to reassure thotn Ijy aTinouncing to them an oracle, 
which foretold ruin to the Persians should they plunder the temple 
of Delphi. Verily a weird consolation if the Persians, a few months 
before, had done their best to plunder the temple, and been discom- 
fitetl, whether by natural or by supernatural means ! Mai'donios, 
when he ap|)eal8 to such an oracle, knows nothing of any attempt on 
the part of the Persians to possess themselves of the treasures of 
iJelphi. In v.ijn Herodotus attempts to put himself right by restoring 
the oracle in question from the Persians to the lllyrians : if Mardonios 
used the onicle as applying to the Persians, the ti-ausfcr had already 
been made in that direction, and may oven have ho!{>ed to preserve 
Delphi intact, and to encourage the Persians elsewhere ; for the uraclo 
might be taken to promise success to the Persian if he respected the 
property of Delphi, and so Mardonios interprets it. Nor does it 
matter to the present argument, even if the anecdote of Mardonios be 
itself unhistorical. Its invention must then be ascribed to some 
retailer of good things, who was as ignorant, as his own Mardonit «, of 
any attempt of the Persifins up<}n the treasures of Delphi. But 
Mardonios is a conaultcr of the Greek oracles, although Delphi is con- 
spjcuoas by its absence from the list of shrines visited by his envoy ; 
and if either the anecdote of Mardonios or the story of the attempted 
sack of Delphi is to be received as true, it surely cannot be the 
transparently lictitious story. Its credibility is not enhanceil, albeit 
its genesis may be rendered more easily intelligible, by the occuiTence 
«f varying duplicates, two of which arc supplied by Ktesias. In the 
first Xerxes sends Mardonios himself to sack ' the shrine of ApoUon,' 
Mardonios is overwhelmed by a siorni, and perishes. This episode 
occtirs after the battle of Plataia, and before the battle of Salamis, 
according to the inverted perspective of Ktesias. In the second 
instance Xerxes was for sending Megabyzos to sack ' the temple in 
Delphi ' ; Megabyzos begged off, and Xerxes sends the eunuch 
Matakas, who accomplishes his task successfully, and returns to 
Xerxes ; this achievement is placed after the return of Xerxes to Asia. 
The first of these stories is evidently a wildly distorted version of the 
miracidous preservation of Delphi as told also by Hcrodotua, thotigh 
the name of Delphi is not actually used by Ktesiaa in this instance. 
The second story, in which Delphi is expressly named, has neverthe- 
less a curiously historical suggestion about it, and may possibly deserve 
to be referred to an episode connected with the temple of Apwllon at 
Bninchidai, and might be converted into genuine history by exchanging 
the terms ' temple of Apollon ' in the first instance for ' temple 



236 



HERODOTUS 



APT. m 



in Delphi ' of the second. But whether Ktesias supplies two stories 
in point, as in bis unaracnJed form, or only one story in point, as 
in the proposed emendation hy exchange, in either case the duplica- 
tion of tlie story in Herodotus of the assault on Delphi and its 
miraculous preservation only serves still further to discredit that 
incredible legend. 

Not that every circumstance in the story is alike unaccepuible. 
The panic of the Persians is a fiction, but the panic of the Delphians 
themselves may bo an authentic fact. Even down to the loss of 
Thcrmopylai, although there is little or nothing to suggest that 
Delphi was putting itself forward at the head of the national defence 
movement, encouraging the faithful, reproving the faint-hearted, 
seeking to extend the area of the patriotic Alliance, and so forth, yet 
there is almost etjually little of avithentic evidence to suggest that 
Delphi had given earth and water to the king, or irrevocably com- 
promised itself with the heads of the National League. When in the 
midsummer of 482 B.C. the 27th Pythiad was being celebrated, the 
preparations of the great king must have l)een known to the hosts of 
pilgrims and th-eoroi flocking to Delphi for the occasion, and doubtless 
were warmly debated by festive guests, and by the inner ring of 
Delphian authorities. But Delphi was not .selected as the meeting- 
place of the national Congress in the following year: had the 
Amphiktyons, or even the Delphian."*, cJaimed such honour, could it 
have been denied 1 Yet Thessaly, and all the Amphiktyonic nations, 
were at first inchidod in the national movement, and it is not conceiv- 
able that the Del])hian8 were already medizing. After the refusal of 
Argos to join the national symniachy against the Persian, and the 
abandonment of Thessaly, the sympathies of Delphi may have begun 
to faint, and the apprehen-sions of Delphi to grow ; but Thermo- 
pylai was to be defendefl, with every prospect of success, and the 
vow of vengeance against the voluntary raodizors is evidence that 
the patriolic Alliance had not despaired either of victorj' or of the 
loyalty and the safety of Delphi. When Thcrmopylai had been forced, 
and Artemision, of necessity, abandoned, the question became acute 
for Athenians, whether to stand at Salamis, or to take up their bag 
and baggage and make away to the west. Delphi ^^iis still approached 
for counsel and revelation upon this cnicial question. Never were 
poeta of Delphi more fervently excited, never prophetess more hope- 
lessly distraught: contmdictory uttorance.s, supporting rival plans 
of action diametrically opposed to each other, proceeded out of the 
same inspired mouth, and were carried to Athens to make confusion 
twice confounded, until the wit of Themistokles came to the in- 
terpretation of the last word, which he (or his wealth) had procured, 
and 'divine Salamis' carried the day. Meanwhile, at Delphi, the 
more simple or more timorous hail acted on the advice which had 
been formulated for the Athenians, and evacuated city and ahriue for 



THE PREPARATIONS OF THE GREEKS 



^ 
* 



fear of the Persians, not yet realizing that Theesaly, that Thebes, 
that the mass of medizing Greeks, by this time on the Persian side, 
were an adef)uate security for the king's clemency. A few of the 
wiser heads, the inmost ring of the Delphian autlioritiea, may have 
been from the first, or have very soon !>ecome, apprised that there 
■was nothing to fear. Delphi liad said or done little to earn the king's 
displeasure ; and Xerxes was not a mere bandit, or raider, but a 
statesman in search of fresh provinces, and more or lesa contented 
subjects. The medizing Greeks were, from tlie first, in a position 
to reassure the Delphians. Prol)ably enough, a Persian contingent 
passed Delphi on the way to tlie south-c^ut. NotwithstAnding tho 
criticism of Herodotus, it is not improbable that the Persians, or 
Mardonios in particular, received such an onick' as was afterwards 
reported to that council of war before Plataiu. Why should Delphi, 
that had shown such favour to the Mermnad kings, and enjoyed such 
bounties at the bauds of Amasis, despair of the piety and liberality of 
the Achaimenids ? The Delphic god throughout was in utrumque 
paraius, but this ambiguous attitmle waa too clever liy half. A genuine 
prophet might have forecast the Greek victory, an heroic diviner 
would have gladly shared the Greek disaster. Delphi never recovered 
from the double discredit of it« collapse in the Persian war ; the effort 
for its rehabilitation was but a pftrtial success ; no great political 
achievement, no national crisis, ever again owed a decisive sanction 
or decision to the Pythia. Delphi remained a safe depository for 
trc<ifiuri>, a store of votive monuments, and still a source of guidance 
and consolation in private affairs; but its desperate condition is attested 
by its anti-Periklean jiartisanship in 431 B.C., and still more by it« 
Philippism^ or impotence, in the fourth century. We, who have known 
mightier organs of a fuller inspiration side again and again with the 
cause of darkness against light, of slavery against freedom, of wrong 
a^nst right, can the more easily condone, as all the Greek world itaelf 
conspired to do, the shortcoming of Delphi in the Persian war : the 
rather, ' iiarbarians ' as we are, seeing that its failure was partly due 
to the defects of its virtues. Delphi had lotig given up to mankind 
what was meant for Greece, and, albeit not actually cursed with the 
bias of anti-patriotism — the besetting sin of other times and cither 
churches— ooidd not regain an exclusive Hellenism even in that hour 
of potential martyrdom, when to have lost this world had l>een for 
Delphi, as for every human institution or child of man in like c&sa, 
to have gained a crown of immortalit}'. 

§ 8. The material forces at the disposal of the National Alliance 
in 4S0 B.C. are documented for us in the Greek army- and navy-lists. 
The detailed consideration of these list£ is bettor to be undertaken in 
connexion with the review of the actual operations of the war ; here 
it will be enough to consider the highest totals. There is in respect 
of these li8t«, used for this purpose, an observation to be made 



8S8 



HERODOTUS 



ATP. Ill 



similar to the observation already made for the Persian lists: the navy- 
lists have a greater prima facie autlieriticity, or at least vei'isimilitude, 
than the army-lists. The specific items tor the various conlingenta 
of the fleets, given in ships, are more plansiblo than the specific items 
for the various contingents of the !aiid-foi'c«'s, given in men : the 
fonner are seldom merely round mind)er8, the l.itt*'r are never any- 
thing else. Still, in regard to the army on the Greek side, as on 
the Persian, individual contingents were organized in tens, and 
multiples of ten, and the Greek units were probably more nearly full 
units than the Persian, if for no other reason because they were 
smaller, and did not aim at such immense totals. In the case of both 
fleet and army on the Greek side an ndditioti might have to be made 
to the actual lists given by Herodotus, in order to cover ships and 
men detjiched, or left Vjehiml, for garrison-duty, or home and coast 
defence, and perhaps even on the lines of communication. Probably, 
from the nature of the case, the fullest navy -list represents more 
nearly the sum total of ships, and therefore of men, available for 
service at the front, than the fullest array-list. Taking here the lists 
for Salamis and for PJataia respectively, we get a total of 380 triremes, 
and a few (6) pentekonters in the fleet. Allowing 200 men to each 
trireme for crew, a total manning of 76,000 is required for the long- 
Bhips ; and supposing the E}n}xttui were in the .larae proportion as on 
the Persian ships — a very doubtful supposition — 11,400 armed men 
•would have to be adtled, making a total of <^7,400, or, with the crews 
and marines of the pentekonters, nearly 88,000 men. All things 
considered, it does not seem rash to compute the txjtnl manning of the 
Greek fleet, from first to last, losses at Artemision and so forth 
considered, as not falling far short of 1 00,000 men — a total doubtless 
much below, not merely tho reputed, but the actual strength of the 
king's navy, yet still a force by no means despicable, and when fighting 
under favaunilile conditions likely to give a good account of itself. 
In the following year a good many of the men who had fought at 
Salamis probably did duty at Plataia, Avhereas the fleet had been ait 
down to 110 vessels; wo are therefore not justified in simply adding 
the totals of men for Kalamis and Plataia together, as gi^'ing a grand 
total for the whole forces of the Greeks : the army-list must l>o 
treated as a separate computation, and valid for the second campaign 
Only. The computation for PlaL-iia gives, however, a minimum 
of 38,700 hoplites, or heavy infantry, and 69,500 light -armed 
Boldiera, or, julding the 1800 Thespians who had lost their armour, 
71,300, making a total of 110,000 men, the largest Greek force on 
record, as assembled on one field, and far larger than the army with 
which Alexander set out to over-nui the Persian empire. Adding a 
computation of 22,000 for crews and 3 SOU hoplites serving on tiie 
fleet at the same time, we obtain a grand total of 135,300 men in 
motion, at one and the same time, upon the (ireek side in the second 



THE PREPARATIONS OF THE GREEKS 



I 



year of the war : a conajderable, but by no means incredible figure, 
albeit at a time when nearly the whole of the centre and north of 
Greece was in the hands of Mardonios, and suppljinp contingents to 
his forcfs. Had the unitj' of Grcoco, or even of the free members of 
the Greek name, been effected by the Congress of 481 B.f., or even 
had the degree of unity temponirily effected been permanently main- 
tained, the Persian inviision need not have caused so vast a scare ! 
Xerxes could Iiope to reduce Greece only by the aid of Greeks. Even 
with the degree of unity attained and maint<uned, the cause of Greece 
was anything but desperate in the spring, or in the summer, of 480 
B.C., and it is obvious that one man at least, Thcmistokles, never 
despaired of it. He rightly estimated the enormous advantages upon 
the side of Hellas, in spite of the numerical superiority of the foe, 
and the absence, treachery, hostility, of some who should have been 
members of the patriotic Alliance. Provided the sound portions of 
Hellas remained sound and true to each other, Themistoklcs had 
forecast a glorious issue to the struggle, that should eclipse ti>e trophy 
of Marathon itself. For this end he restored unity to Athens by the 
recall of the exiles. For this end he maintained unity in the Con- 
federacy by the sacrifice of the Athenian claim to the Hegemony. At 
later stages in the course of the actual o[wrationa he again and again 
secured the material and moral unity of the national forces, at critical 
moments, by the timely concession, by the double-edged stratagem, 
it may be even by the judicious bribe, or the desperate threat. But 
'Themistokles was no martyr of a hope forlorn : the real condition.s, 
strategic and tactical, the actual course of the naval and military 
operations in the war, fidly justified his unerring forecast, if only unity 
among the mere remnant of the Greeks could be preserved. 



APPENDIX IV 



GENERAL STRATEGIC ASPECTS OF THE WAR: THE.SSALY 

§ 1. Material conditions of the strategic i>ri>lileni from the Greek point of view. 
8 2. Clirouological aud geograiihical defects of the record. § 3. Four poaaihle 1 
lines of defence : this Istlimos. g 4. Thn line of Pktaia ftud S&laiiiis. § 5. 
The lino of Artcmisioti and Thermmiyliii, g 0. The TliL-ssalian cjuestiou. § 7. 
Kcasons for the abandonuunt of Thessaly. § S. SubseqneDt couduct of tbc 
Thessaliaus. § 9. Strategic iiequel of Salainis. S 10. The Persian strategy, 
and its inherent weakness. 



§ 1. About tho middle of the year 481 B.c. Greeks on the Eurof)eaa 
eide became convinced that the re-invasion of Hellas, upon an immense 
scale, was impending. Measures were accordingly taken, unexampled 
hitliei'to in tho history of Greece, to unite, in one common league and 
plan of defence, all the states whoso liberties were threatened. The 
objective of the Persian expedition could not be Athens alone, nor 
could its purpose be simply to avenge iijion Athena the too auccessfol 
resistance of nine or ten years back. The jirojected and now clearly 
ascertauied route of the expedition, its double character, portending 
oi^erations on land and on seit, the scale upon which it wiis organized, 
and other self-evident observations, all enforced the conclusion that, 
from Olympos to Tainaron, no Greek sbite could count its existence 
sure, except by submission and the surrender of earth and water 
to the king's emissaries, or its independence safe, except by an 
armed and adetjuate resistance. Yet from Tainaron to Olympos was 
a far cry, and a complete solidariU of interests was still to seek 
throughout tlie peninsula. Much was to happen before Peloponnesian 
states could needs fool themselves immediat-oiy involvetl in the military 
crisis : Argos was throughout to maintain its habitfuil dissidence. 
Athens might believe itself the priraaiy goal of the king's anibitioa j 
and displeasure; the remaining states of central Greece cannot bave^ 
been ardent advocates of the national cause. Fortunately for Hellaa 
the honour of Sparta was as deeply implicated as tho liberty of Athens 
in a reaistance d ontranct : the question remained, on what line such 
resistance should be offered. That question involved more than 

340 



GENERAL STRATEGIC ASPECTS OF THE WAR 



^^ merely military or strategic issues. The plan of military defence 

^fteuuld ]ie separated neither from the policy of the leaders tier from 

^™ the actual extent and composition of the league. An attempt to do 

r so was indeed made, when the Athenians were invited to abandon 

^H Salamis for Peloponnese ; but the proposal proved even in a strategic 

^^P«spect disastrous, and had to be withdrawn almost as sootk as hazarded- 

' The war was to bo conducted by sea and by land : a war, in which 

the direct co-operation of fleet and army upon the king's part was 

expected. Even failitig direct co-operation, still indirectly the 

possession of supreme power at sea was bound to exercise a decisive 

influence upon the campaign and its issues. The theatre of the war 

was to be. in the first instance, the Hellenic peiiinsTila itself, with its 

coasts and the islands immediately adjacent, albeit hostilities might 

be carried into the enemy's countr)', and were carried thither before 

long, by a brilliant development of offensive -defensive strategy. 

For such a development, however, a decisive victory, and for choice 

a naval victory, by the Greek forces was an almost indispensable 

condition. The lack of complete solidarity on the Greek side, the 

division of interest between the chief land-power and the chief sea- 

I power, to say nothing of subordinate rivalries, led inevitably to a 

^Kxlesire on the one hand that the Heet should boar the brunt uf the 

^Vattack, and to a corresponding desire on the other hand that the army 

[ should take its fair share, perhaps even something more than its fair 

^H^share, of the fighting. In short, Sparta's main object will have been 

^Bito obtain a victory at sea, and that as near home as possible ; the 

^^ main object of Athens presimiably was to obtain a ■victory by land, 

and that somewhere well in front of Attica : the further north the 

better. These, and other cognate considerations, explain a great deal 

that is obscure in the Greek traditions of the war. Herodotus, 

indeed, is far from conceiving, clearly or consciously, the strategic 

^H kspects, or problems, presented by his own narrative ; but incidentally 

^Hftnd imperfectly he records acts and indicates discussions which help 

^Hns to restate problems and to rcconstnict solutions, factual or ideal, 

^Vas they presented, or may have ])resented, themselves to the intelligent 

and leading minds of the time, and as they worked themselves out 

ill the real coui-se of events with a logic as unerring as a superhuman 

pro^'idence itself might have dictated. 

§ 2. The chief obstacle to a generally convincing reconstruction of 
I the war-story and the war-theory lies, no doubt, in the absence of an 
^■^ accurate and fairly complete chronology even of events actually on 
^Vrecoril. I! the precise dates of oracl&s, and oracular directions, 
detailed by Herodotus, of political and even of military movements, 
of treaties and of battles, of banquets and of dialogues, are in doubt, 
the very first requisite for an authoritative reconstruction of theory 
fend of history is wanting. The story becomes to some extent a 
function of the theory ; events themselves wait upon the supposed 

VOL. n R 



242 



HERODOTUS 



APP. IV 



logic of events. Dealing with evidence so imperfect in amount, and 
80 elastic in character, historians can hardly bo expected to arrive at 
& complute agreement in regard to all points of debate, or even in 
regard to the true course of the main story. Yet the effort to recover 
the perfect story from the imperfect traditions will not and cannot 
be abandoned, bo long as the history and literature of ancient Hellas 
retain their pristine and inalienable charm for humanity. An im- 
mense advance has been made, within living memory, in the treatment 
of the subject, partly owing to an improvement in historical metho<l8 
and criticism, jiartly to the vivifying and concrete inHiience of topo- 
graphical study pursued fin Ort und SUUe. The history of ancient 
warfare is nowadays informed by a geographical science, to which 
the 6mi>irical observations, much more the hearsay reports, of ancient 
historians must conform, or else be discarded. The correction of 
their chronology must remain to some extent a speculation : the 
correction of their topography ia a verifiable act. If, by some chiince 
little short of miracle, all the generally admitted facts recorded by 
Herodotus could be precisely dated to the days, or even months, of 
the Attic calendar for the years of Hypsichides, Kalliades, and 
Xanthippides, the policy and strategy of the Greek states would 
stand in a comparatively full daylight. 

§ 3. Viewed generally, and from the standpoint of Sparta, the 
hegemonic state in the Persian war, there were four lines of defence 
open to the Crreeks in 480 B.C., and by them discussed and considered. 
Each lino had special advantages and disadvantages, political and 
military, of its own. A review of these strategic alternatives will 
induce a fuller and more concrete appreciation of scarce-reported 
controversies, and will develop the latent record of actual events in 
the war-campaigns into positive, even if problematicwil, results. The 
inmost or last possible line of defence was drawn across the Isthmos ; 
several arguments were urgeable in favour of this line. At the 
Isthmos the <ireek land- and sea- forces could co-operate directly, a 
condition which could hardly be realized anywhere in central trreece, 
south of Euboia. Again, the Isthmo-s-line delayt-d the acttul en- 
counter with the Persian arms, and removed it further from the 
Persian base : the later in the season, the further in Europe the Idng 
advanced, tlie worse in some ways at least for his chances of victory, 
the greater his disaster in case of defeat. Finally, the Isthmos-line 
was in a high degree defensible, especially upon the land side, where 
it was capable of artificial strengthening ; there too the leaders could 
count upon the courage of desperation in the Peloponnesiun force.", 
when fighting at their own gates pro riris tt fods. But the objections 
to acquiescing from the first in a defence based on tbe Isthmos and 
confined to Peloponnesos must have been so obvious and overwhelming 
that the Isthmos-line can liardly have been discussed openly before 
the disaster at Thermopylai, though the Peloponneaians and their leader 



I 



» 



$$ 2-4 GENERAL STRATEGIC ASPECTS OF THE WAR 243 

ftll tUong held this alternative in pdio, aa the one most agreeable to 
purely Peloponnesian interests, if pure Peloponnesian interests ever 
became predominant. For the lethmoa-line marked the abandonment 
of all central Greece to the Mede, and involved not merely the loss 
of Boiotia, Phokis with Delphi, and the other distiicta and tiibes of 
that region, but the positive accession of local resources and recruits 
to the king. In particular the Isthmos-line meant the extermination of 
Athens : but would the Athenians suffer that no effort should be ma<le, 
no blow struck, for liberty north of the Isthmos ? The Athenian" 
fleet was from the first all-essential tu the interests of the Peloponnese 
itself ; the Athenians had, if necessary, an irresistible argument at 
their disposal, to compel Sparta and the Peloponnesians to give Kaltlc 
beyond the Isthmos. To do .S[jarta justice, there can hardly, in the 
first instance, have been any serious question of aUindoning all central 
Hellas to the Persian. Separate though the cause of the Peloponnesos 
might appear in Hellenic politics, the dullest- wittod Spartan will have 
understood that the Persian empire might be stayed at Olympos, but 
could nevtr be baired by the Korinthian gulf. So long, therefore, 
as political considfrations were combined with the piu-oly strategic 
problem, the Pelojmnnesians tliemselvea must have recognized the 
necesftity of seeking a defensive position beyond the Isthmos-line. 
Probably Herodotus is not mistaken in representing the question of 
the Isthmos-line as having taken practical shape only after the fiasco 
at Therniopylai, and in connexion with the alternative of Salamis, aa 
a station for the fleet. f2ven at that stage the opposition of Athens 
to the abandonment of Salamis was sufficient to compel the Pelopon- 
nesians to remain in the straita, although the Greek army was not 
there to co-operate a victory, or to cover a defeat. But for a while 
the defence of the Akropolis by the Athenians to some extent made 
good the absence of the Greek land-forces. As au isolated naval 
engagement the battle of Salamis was a departure from the pre- 
ordained plan of campaign, something of an extemporized achievement. 
But it was perhaps only after the fall of the Akropolis that there waa 
ever any serious thought of al«indoning Salamis. In the end the line 
of the Isthmos remained an ideal ; the actual fighting was all done 
beyond it ; the Greeks were ne%'6r driven liack upon their last possible 
alternative. At what exact point the Isthmos-lino became a practical 
issue, or even whether the resolution waa ever seriously taken to fall back 
upon it, with the fleet as well as the army, remains an open question. 
§ 4. North of the Isthmos, and still south of Tbessaly, there were 
more lines of defence than one possible. The nearer or lower alterna- 
tive was, however, the less clearly definable, in view of the conditional 
co-operation of fleet and army. No great or decisive land-battle has 
ever taken place in Attica ; Boiotia witnessed most of the decisive 
ea in Greek history. But those battles were all purely land-battles, 
tween powers whose fleets were non-existent, or not engaged. In 




244 



HERODOTUS 



APP. IV 



the Persian war the Greeks well understood that a land-battle by 
itself could not deliver them ; nor did the Peloponneaians desire to 
fight a pitched battle by land at all, if such could t>e avoided. Upon 
this point there may have been eonie confusion, some obscurity, which 
led in the sequel to the isolated and therefore indecisive victory of 
Salamis. In Boiotia there was no possibility of securing the cover, or 
the immediate co-operation of the fleet. If the Greek Heet was to 
!« sUitioned in the Eurtpos, the Persian fleet might be expected to 
round Euboia, and attack the Greeks in front and in rear simultane- 
ously. If the Greek fleet was to be stationed at Salamis, where was 
the urmy to take up its position ! 

The logic of events decided this question in favour of an ideal line, 
which connects the army in Boiotia with the fleet in strictlj' Attic 
waters^ and passes through the kindred points of PJataia and Salamis. 
But upon this lino the co-operation of army and of fleet is topographicAlly 
imperfect or disjointed, and this imperfection repeats itself in the 
mutual anachronism of the Greek victories at Salamis and Plataia. 
Yet, strategically viewed, the battles of Salumis and Plataia stand in 
the most intimate relation to each other, the one being the natural 
complement of the other, neither being comptote in it«elf. Had 
these twin actions Uiken place on the sjime day, or even in the same 
month, their intimata and organic connexion would have l)een self- 
evident ; the interval of eleveii months dividing them cannot wholly 
obliterate it. In the victory at Salamis the land-forces of the Greelra 
took little or no part. If Pausanias could defeat Mardonios before 
Plataia in August 479, might not Klcombrotos have defeated Xerxes 
at Plataia, or it may be at Orchomenos, in August 480 B.C. f The 
pezomachia, if sepirate in time from the ruiutnaehia, should rathex- 
have preceded than have succeeded it ; a defeat of Xerxes by land 
might have made a sea-fight unnecessary, or have left the Greek 
fleet but the task of pursuing a fugitive though still unbroken navy. 
In that very order Ktcsias, to hi.s own discredit and the confusion of 
our not uncritical Blakesle}', actually placed the two actions ! ' The 
Greeks no doubt intended that, if Therraopylai came to l>e evacuated, 
the transit of the Persian forces through Boiotia should be resolutely 
disputed, and the pjisaes of Kithairon occupied. Such a promise had 
neen received, or extorted, by the Athenians from the Confederates or 
ever the fleet moved to Artemision, Did any one in (Jreece expect 
that the Persian, who had been defeated at Marathon, would ever 
force his way by land through Therraopylai i But the possibility of 
a defeat at sea had to be contemplated and provided for. Such a 
disaster would involve the evacuation of Therraopylai, and leave not 
merely Theboa but Attica at the mercy of the invader, unless the 
Peloponnosian forces appeared in time north of Kithairon. The 
Peloponnesians were under oxprcss en^gement to be there.- 



' Cl". p. 26 ^iipiii. 



" H«it. ». -10. 



N 



$§ 4-6 GENERAL STRATEGIC ASPECTS OF THE WAR 24ri 

The occupation of Salainis by the Greek navy, after the abandon- 
ment of Artemision, is often regarded, in deference to the supposed 
indications of Herodotus, as an unforeseen and undesigned development, 
due to the special instance of Themiatokles, and a fortuitous character 
thus attaches to the whole aeries of actions which culminate in the 
great victory. But this opinion is a superficial thesis, derived from 
an imperfect reading of the Herodotean story. On the abandonment 
of Artemision by the Greek admirals Salamis became the next station, 
no doubt foreseen and prearranged, for the Greek naval forces, always 
upon the assumption that the land-forces had occupied Boiotia. In 
this position at least Attica was covered adequately both by land and 
by sea. A Greek army on Kithairon and a Greek navy at Salamis 
were not in hopeless isolation, the one from the other, much as the 
situation might leave to be desired from this or that point of view, 
liad the Peloponnesians been faithful to their pledges, Xerxes need 
never have set foot in Attica, and the battle of Salamis itself might 
never have been lost and won. The evacuation of Attica, the 
destruction of Athens, were sacrifices not so much to the essential 
military conditions of the case, as to the timidity or the faithlessness 
of the Peloponnesos. Those fears and failings were, indeed, natural 
enough after the unforeseen and unexpected fiasco at Thermopylai ; 
but they involved a complete departure from the prearranged plan of 
action, whicli had included the possibility, and the pledge, of a battle 
in Boiotia, in defence of the ]ms8ea over Kithairon, an engagement 
which had probably less terrors for the Greeks, who had not beeu 
allowed to forget the morj.! of Marathon, than the less tried, the 
never experienced venture of so great a naval encounter. The Greek 
victory on Kithairon was postponed a twelvemonth by the half- 
heartedness of the Peloponnesians. The temper of the Poloponnese 
is explained, if not justified, by the Persian victory at Thermopylai, 
antl the non-arrival of the Greek force expected in Boiotia made the 
occupation of Salamis an open question for the admirals, and raised 
the Isthmos station into a practical alternative. But the historic fact 
remains that upon the strategic line of Salamis-Plataia the double 
victory of the Greeks was actually achieved. The chronological 
discrepancy between the actions cannot deprive that line of its 
enential military significance ; and the actual traditions preserve some 
hints that the line in qtiestion was one deliberately chosen after 
discussion, and not merely the result of a chapter of accidents.' 

§ 5. One supreme disadvantage, however, this first exo-Pelopon- 
nesian line of defence lay under : it covered Attica, indeed, but it 
abandoned all the rest of central Greece to the enemy. The argu- 
ments which could draw the Peloponnesian forces north of Kithairon 
at all, were enough to carry their army to Thermopylai and their ships 
to Artemision, the twin points on a line which undoubtedly oflTered, 



246 



HERODOTUS 



APP. rv 



from the political and strategic points of view, the niaiiinum of 
advantage and the minimum of risk to the defence. Politically this 
line covered not merely Attica, but Boiotia, Phokis, Lokris to boot ; 
and this political advance carried here a materia! and a moral 
advantage : the League enlarged the area of recruiting for its forces, 
and met the invader on the threshold, or nearly on the threshold, of 
continuous Hellas. Strategically the line had two great merits : the 
army and the fleet were in immediate or close juxtaposition ; and, 
owing to the native character of the two stations, while each pass, or 
strait, viewed severally, was easily defensible even against vastly superior 
numl>ers, viewed together as a unity, the double passage was the verit- 
able key to centnil Greece, But this line, which proved in the sequel the 
scene of first contact with the enemy, was not wholly admirable from 
the strategic point of view, nor wholly free, perhaps, from a certain 
weakness, as well military as political. Without a great and decisive 
victory by land, or by sea, or both, the Greeks could not hope, on this 
or any line of defence, to avert once for all the peril which threatened 
them. The line of defence actually chosen as the first line ofl'ered 
little or no scope for a decisive issue on land, in favour of the Greeks. 
The mere defence of Thermopyhii could not bring about a positive 
decision ; the annihilation of the Persian army in front of Thennopylai 
was not to be thought of. The occupation of the line Thermopylai- 
Artemision must be taken to mean that, for an actual decision in their 
favour, the Greeks were looking, in the first instance at least, to the 
fleet. This plan was a thoroughly sound one, as the sequel proved ; 
and the victory afterwards achieved at Salamis might have been 
anticipated at Artemiaion, if only Therraopylai could have beea 
miccessfully defended to the end. The twin stations stood and fell 
together. The very strength of the Hue Thermopylai-Artemision was, 
in the event, its weakness. Land and sea were too completely inter- 
dependent. A defeat of the Greeks upon either element made their 
jxtsition upon the other untenable, Were the Greek fleet driven from 
Artemision, the army at Thermopylai could at once l>e taken in the 
rear from the sea side. Were the Pa.s8 of Thermopylai forced, the 
position of the fleet at Artemision became useless, however successfully 
held. A complete defeat of the fleet at Artemision was, however, in 
the highest degjee improbable : forced to retreat, or driven back into 
the straits, it might, perhaps, have been ; annihilation was not to be 
anticipated. What must have been hoped for, and expected, was 
\'ictorj', a victory by sea, which might render the retreat of the 
Persian army imperative, by threatening its line of communication 
and its base, and by calling into active hostility all the latent dis- 
aff"ection in its rear. The circumvention of Thermopylai upon the 
land aide was the chief danger to be reckoned with, and its possibility 
the chief flaw in the chosen line of defence. Such an eventuality the 
Greeks must have contemplated from the first. They knew theii' own 



^ S-6 



THESSALY 



247 



country well enough to snrmiao that there was never a pass in the 
land but could be turned by a second way round or through the 
mountuina within a measimibte distance ; even if there had been no 
Phokians, or others, well acquainted with the landscape of Trachinia 
and Doris, to instruct them. But the land-force was expected to hold 
t!iB laud-passes at least long enough to allow the fleet time to prove 
its prowess oti' Artemision, and the expectation was not in itself un- 
reasonable. The fleet, a few wueks later victorious at Salamis, might 
surely have reportetl a more decisive issue off Artemision, during the 
three days of grace gained by the valiant defence of ThermopylaL 
But a kind of fatality seems to have afiectcd the Greeks all along, 
until their plight became desperate : the naval states still !i«>king to 
the land-forces to spare them the need of sacrifice, and the Pelopon- 
nesians still hoping that a naval victory would make a pitched battle 
by land superfluous ! 

§ 6. At what exact point the decision to occupy the line Arte- 
mision-Thermopyiai, na the first line of defence, was actually taken 
by the Greeks is a problem which cannot be decided irrespectively 
of the date of Thossaly's admission to the confederate Alliance. 
Herodotus appears to date the Thessalian application for admission 
immediately before the despatch of the Greek forces under Evainetos 
to Tempe, and to make the whole episode synchronize with the 
presence of the king at Abydos, or on the Hellespont, a situation 
which, according to one traditiou, endui'ed a month.' To judge by 
these indications, the whole affair occupies a few weeks in the spring 
of the year 480 B.C., and the abandonment of Terape leaves the Greeks 
without any definite plan of campaign, until a fresh meeting at the 
Istbmos discusses and decides for a stand upon the line of Artemision 
and Thermopylai. But the story of the Thessalian alliance and ex- 
pedition, as told by Heroflotus, is incoherent, and his chronology here 
is by no means canonical. That the actual expedition to Tempe took 
place in the spring of 180 ac. is, indeed, a matter of course ; but are 
the antecedents of the expedition correctly narratetl or chronologized 
by Herodotus 1 The question of the attitude and policy of Thessaly 
and the Thessaliatis must, in any case, have been presented to the 
Congress of 481 B.a Either the Thessalians were represented among 
the Probcridoi upon that occasion, and subscribed the sworn Alliance 
at one and the same time with Peloponnesians, Athenians, and the 
rest J or else the actual Confederates arranged for an embassy to 
Thessaly at the same time as they arranged for missions to other im- 
portant members of the Greek name, imreprcsented at the meeting. 
If the Thessalians were absent from the Congress in 481 B.C., the 
Greek states, which despatched from the Istbmos embassies to Argos, 
to Krete, to Sicily, cannot have left Thessaly severely alone. No 
embsMy to Thessaly is recorded ; but neither is there any express 



248 



HERODOTUS 



APF. rv 



record of the admission of the Thessiilians to the AJliance, a condition 
surely antecedent to the despatch of the confederate forces to Tenipe. 
If the ThesiMilians were original members of the League, if their 
admission is to bo dated to the first meeting of the Frolxniloi in the 
autumn of 481 b.(;., then a Bitimtion was ipso facto created which 
involved the defence of Thessaly by the confederate forces, in the 
event of the Persian advance upon the sTnely prefigured route. In 
that case, before the Congress adjourned in 481 Bj;. a more or less 
explicit engagement had been formulated that, upon the advance of 
the Persian in the ensuing spring, the confederate forces should occupy 
the Thessalian frontier. Some such hypothesis is not difhcult to 
reconcile with the subsequent narrative and course of events. The 
despatch of a force of 10,000 men to Tempo in the spring of 480 B.C. 
is not such a trifle aa to have been lightly extemporized by Sparta, or 
by the supposed S^nedruni of Sfniteijoi,^ upon the spur of the moment, 
in response to a spontaneous and apparently unexpected application 
from Thessaly, which reaches the meeting at the Isthmos only when 
Xerxes i.s just about to set foot in Europe. Still less can this 
Herodotean synchronism pass muster, if the whole strategic and 
political bearings of the expedition to Thessaly, hereinafter presently 
to be furtlier considered, are taken into account Again, if, as 
Herodotus appears to suggest, the resolution, to make Arteiuision and 
Thermopylai the most advanced line of defence, was first actually 
formulated and adopted in the spring of 480 B.C., after, some appreci- 
able time after, the abandonment of Thessaly, and the return of the 
forces ' to the Isthmos,' the abandonment of Thessaly must have 
created a new and all but unforeseen situation, involving fresh military 
and political contingencies. The conclusion presents itself that the 
Thessaiians had been re]iresented at the Isthmos, in the original Con- 
gress of 481 B.C., and that the defence of the Thes«ilian frontier, in 
the foreseen event of a Persian advance by the gi-eat northern route, 
was a consequential resolution, which hardly admitted of discussion. 
The subse(]uent abandonment of Thessaly, and the compulsory medism 
of the Thessaiians, obliterated tlic original relation of Thessaly to the 
Congress, and explains the dissippearance of the Thessalian name from 
the list of those Hellenes who had chosen the better part and were 
confederate against the Persian. If this hypothesis be deemed some- 
what too reconstructive, there remains the other and, in that case, 
inevitable alternative: the Congress of 481 B.C. must have sent to 
Thessaly amljassadors, charged with the mission of winning the 
Thessaiians to the cause of Hollas. The mission was apjiarently 
successful ; at the adjourned meeting in the following spring the 
Thessaiians were formally admitted into the Alliance, and the inevit- 
able plan of campaign was forthwith adopted : a confederate force was 
mobilized and directed to the Thessnlimi frontier (7. 172 f.). 



n 
» 



The composition, tlie leading, and even the transjwrt or route of 
the said force, raise some difficult questions. In the event the whole 
ftffkir proved a fiiisco. The failure of the ex{>editiori, and of the policy 
jind plan implied in the expedition, may have lejicted unfavourably 
upon the record. At the time, however, the despatch of the ten 
thouKind to Tempe must have appeared, what indeed it undoubtedly 
was, an act of definite and far-reaching import. In the narrative of 
Herodotus the force comprises Peloponnesians and Athenians, perhaps 
in equal numbers ; but there i& no explicit evidence to exclude other 
hypotheses. Elsewhere there is evidence of the presence of a sub- 
stantial Thebjvn contingent/ and the silence of Herodotus is not in 
itself sufficient to discredit that evidence. The number of Sfmrtan 
citizens in the force may not have been large ; the numbers of men 
from central Greece nuiy have been more considenible than the 
isolated reference to a Theban contingent approves. The substitution 
of a private fcsimrtan for the king as commander-in-chief, is not 
suggestive of a strong ypurtan leading or following for the Thesealian 
plan ; the presence of Themistokles as the Athenian leader, and the 
fact that the forces were carried by sea (so runs the story), 
suggest that the plan and policy of the whole movement emanated 
from Athens rather than from Sparta. The Greek ships are, indeed, 
upon this occasion, used simply as transports, according to the story ; 
but this implication agrees badly with the known conditions of the 
campaign, and the subsequent course of event*. From first to last 
the war was tound to be a war on both elements conjointly, and the 
defence had frcmi the first to meet the attack by sea as well as by 
land. The expedition to Thessaly is treated by Herodotus as a purely 
land expedition, though the force is conveyed to its destination by 
sea ; but the Greeks cannot have expected, in the spring of the year 
of invasion, to withstand and to repel the Persian attJick, without 
putting their war-galleys to the front. Of all men Themistokles was 
least likely to harbour any such illusion, If the forces which wont 
by sea to Ualos in Thessaly, and then marched to and fro Tempe, re- 
presented either element exclusively, they were the naval levies. But 
another possibility presents itself. The confused and incomplete 
tradition may have omitted ' the Prince of Denmark ' from the caat 
of Ilantlet : was it ever intended that the Greek army should 
operate in Thessaly and that the Greek fleet should remain inactive 
at Pogon, or at Salamis ? The occupation of Tempe by the con- 
federate army could only have been a serious move if the confederate 
fleet was to occupy some lino or station which should cover Tempe 
as efliciently from the advance of the Persian iloet as Artomision 
covered Thormopylai, or as Salamis covered Kitli:iiron, and, if ne«l 
should be, the Isthmos. But where was such a station to be found ? 
Certainly not in immediate juxtaposition to the harbourlesa Peneios 

' C|», p. 92 nipra. 



250 



HERODOTUS 



output, nor anywhere upon the inhospitable Magneaian coast, but onlj 
in the Gnlf of Pagasai, or still better off the north coast of Euboia. 
Artemision was a station to threaten the Persian fleet, and to cover 
the Hellenic army in Thessaly, as effectively, or almost as effectively, 
as it covered the Greeks at Thermopylai thereafter. Off the Arte- 
mision, or aomewhero in the channel north of Euboia, lies the naval 
key to Temiie, no less than to Thermopylai. The plan to defend the 
Thessaliaii froiitiei* by land must have included a plan to defend the 
Thessalian adit from the sea. Nothing could have been better from 
the Greek, from the Athenian, point of view than to have barred the 
Persian fleet out of the Gulf of Yolo, and left it to encounter the 
risks of wind and waves on the high sea in front of Pelion. We 
may fairly doubt whether Theraistokles and the Athenians went as 
far as Tompe upon tliis occasion. If the 10,000 hoplites under 
Evainetos were advanced levies from Poloponnesc and central Greece, 
the war-ships, which perhaps convej'od them as far as Halos, were 
but the van of the confederate fieet, in which the Athenian contingent 
under Thetnistokles was doubtless the most conspicuous. But, if the 
policy of the Thessalian wimpjiign was to be a success, the chief fight- 
ing was bound to be by land. Peloponnesians and Thessaliana were 
to win a ManiLhonian %nctory under Ossa and Olympos, which should 
render the further advance of the king's fleet inadvisable. No Persian 
need ever have set foot in hostile guise south of Othrya. "WTiat a 
triumph for the future cause of Athens to have preserved her two 
hundred vessels intact, under the shelter of the Euboian an<l Thessalian 
shores ! 

Herodotus, very much at the mercy of his local, varying, and 
partial sources, treats the expedition to Thessaly as an almost negli- 
gible by-product of the Greek plan of campaign. He seems less 
surprised, so to speak, that the Greeks should have abandoned 
Thessaly, than that they should ever have thought of attempting to 
defend it. But, in reality, an effort to defend Thessaly, to keep 
Thessaly for the national cause, was dictated by the whole circum- 
stc'inces of the case, unless Thessaly had declared for the king from 
the outset. The position of Thessaly was no doubt an exposed one. 
Makedon was definitely a vassal state in the Persian empire, paying 
tribute and of course liable to service : the first bnuit of the invasion 
would fall iipon Thessaly in case of re-«istance ; from the divided and 
competing interests in central and southern Hellas absolute security 
for loyal support and co-operation was not forthcoming. Had 
Thessaliana medized as one man from the first, there would have 
been no groat cause of wonder, But in the eyes of southern Hellas 
and of the Confederates at the Isthmos, the inclusion of Thessaly in 
the National League might mean the indefinite postponement of the 
invasion, the repulse of the invader upon the very threshold of 
Greece, and much more. An effort to secure Thessaly, the pledge 



§§6-7 



THESSALTf 



261 



* 



to defend Thessaly with the full forces of the confederacy, waa there- 
fore from the first demanded by patriotism and interest alike. The 
plan, indeed, aa likely to involve a greater risk by land, called 
for a special etfort from the land levies of the Greek statea ; but 
that prospect did not deter the Congress at the Isthmos from 
inviting or admitting the Thessalians into alliance. What calls for 
explanation is not the project for the defence of Thessaly against the 
Persian, nor the despatch of a considerable force for that purpose, but 
the hasty retreat of the expedition and the aban<lonmont of the plan, 
without a blow struck upon this fourth and furthest line of defence. 

§ 7. Several good reasons are reported in the actual tradition, 
or suggest themselves in the circumstances and antecedents of the 
case, to explain an action which involved the bIoo<llesg surrender to 
the king of the wealthiest of the tireek provinces. (1) Herodotus 
appears to imply that, only when the Greeks reached Thessaly were 
they informed of the immense scale on which the king's forces were 
organized, an«l thai the evacuation of Thessaly vvaa the direct result 
of the terror so inspired. The message of Alexander of Makedon 
delivered at this crisis might even seem the first information received 
by the Greeks that a Persian fleet was in being. But these implica- 
tions are neither probable in themselves, nor consistent with other 
elements in the Herodotean story, which imply that the Greeks were 
early and well infornipd of the character and extent of the Persian 
mobilizatiort The role assigned to the phii-Hellenic Makedonian 
upon this occasion is only too well in keeping with other passages 
in the legend of Alexander's services to the national cause, and 
deserves little credence. It was not the discoverj' of the size 
and number of the Persian host, much less the consideration that 
fighting was to be done by sea as well as by land, which drove 
the Greeks to evacuate Tempe : the ratUmaU of their action must 
be further fetched. (2) A second and explicit suggestion in the 
Herodotean record demands more attention : the Greeks discover, 
on their arrival at Tempo, that the position is not impregnable, but 
admits of being circumvented by a second pass or path. A topo- 
graphical and strategic observation of this order commands respect. 
Unfortunately at this point Horodotufi betrays a grievous shortcoming 
in his knowledge of Thes-^aJian topography, and in his appreciation 
of the real strategic problem in the situation ostensibly described. 
The Gonnos path, whereby the position at Tempe might he turned, 
waa a difficult route over the shoulder of Olympos, by which probably 
not a single Persian subsequently entered Thessaly. Had this 
mountain-path been the only alternative to the Tempc-valloy route, 
arrangements might easily have been made to defend it : had that 
been all, the Greeks would not so lightly have abandoned the defence 
of Thessaly. But the entrances to Thessaly from Makedon are not 
limited to the valley -route m Tempe and the mountain-path via 



252 



HERODOTUS 



App. rv 



Gonnos, by which the vale might be avoided. From Makodon ^aa 
nearly alt the recent discussions of this subject have clearly recognizetl) 
two other j«v88es pierce the Olympio- Kambunian range ; these 
jiltenmtives of course made Tenipe intlefensiblt;, unless Petra and 
Volustana were each likewise to be defended by a myriad men. Can 
the Greeks have been so innocent as to suppose Tempe the only 
entrance to Thessaly from the north? Or, if Peloponnesians and 
Bonthem Greeks may indeed have been in such darkness, can the 
Thessaliana themselves have been so ignorant 1 The men of Larissa 
and of Trikka, if not the men of Pharsalos and of Pherai, roust have 
known well enough that the northern ranges could be traversed at 
more than one or two jKiints. Nor can we suppose that the problem 
was left in darkness before the despatch of the expedition under 
Evainetos and Themistokles. Doubtless the Theasalians on their 
matriculation in the national Symmachy had been examined as to 
the defences of their country, and what they themselves were prepared 
to undertake on its behalf. Presumably they were pledged, if the 
Greeks would occupy Tempe with an army, and defend the Pagasaian 
gulf with a fleet, to be themselves responsible for the defence of the 
other passes. 

(3) Xerxes, as Herodotus avers, miscalculated the amount of support 
on which he could reckon in Thessaly, thinking that the Aleuads 
addressed him in ' the name of the whole nation.' The I'robanloi at 
the latbmos in 481 B.C. (or 480) may have been guilty of a corre- 
sponding miscalculation, and believe<l that an absolutely united Thessaly 
was prepared to espouse the pan-Hellenic cause. The ensuing winter 
must have been a season of rare intrigue in Thessaly, and not in 
Thessaly alone. Xerxes was at Sardes, and had with him the 
Peisistratidai and others, including no doubt emissaries, perhaps 
hostages, from 'the sons of Alenas.' The prospects of Thessaly, if it 
was to become the scene of the mighty struggle between Persian and 
Greek, must have been eagerly and ceaselessly canvassed in the Thes- 
salian cities for weeks and months before the arrival of Evainetos and 
Themistokies with forces, prei^ared to fulfil their {)art of the bargain. 
The confederate captains found Thessaly divided against itself, and 
their own partisans no longer able, nor even, perhaps, willing, to fulfil 
the whole of their pledges. Under such circumstances it could not 
take them many days to convince themselves — Themistokles before 
all — that the loss of Thessaly was a foregone conclusion. To defend 
Tempe, to fight a successful action on the skirts of Olympos, was 
hopeless, or idle, bo long as the passes of Potra and Volustana were 
open to the Persians. Political division and rivalries in Thessaly 
made the situation still more desperate : to learn so much the Greeks 
may have had to visit Thessaly. The chief cause of the change of 
plan, involved in the evacuation of Tempe, is to be sought and found 
in the actual politics of Thessaly at the time ; the fact of potential 



* 



and actual stasis is certain, however doubtful may l>e its exact extent 
or character. Probably there were hostilities between city and city, 
and divisions cleaving each city itself in twain. The Aleuads plainly 
aspired to uniting the whole country under their own sway. There 
was to be a large tyranny, or at least a monarchy, which could have 
but two pillars, the revolting Pentsiai and the Persian suzerainty, 
one or both. The foreign lonl might make his count with democracy 
or with tyranny, as the Persians and other politicians discovered ; nor 
was the Greek tyrant himself at daggers drawn with democracy. The 
double intrigue repeated itself thereafter at very Spiirtii in the career 
of Pausanias ; Kleomenes, perhaps Demaratos, and assuredly the exiled 
Peisistratids, already afforde«l jjrecedents. Who knows on which side 
the Penestai were ready to declare themselves ? The Thessalians who 
joined the Greeks at Tempe were mounted men, aristocrats. The 
previous relations of Thessaly to Sparta, and to Athens, was no very 
favourable omen, for the present crisis. 

(4) Some would see in the attitude of the Boiotians and other 
states of central Greece a further reason for the abandonment of the 
Theswlian campaign in the spring of 480 B.c. Misgi^nng and un- 
certainty there may have been, but this argument appears to antedate 
the medism of the middle states. The subsequent occupation of 
Thermopylai and Artemision, as a serious lino of defence, rules out 
the suspicion for the most (Kirt. In central Greece as in Attica, and 
even in Peleponnesos itself, the e\'acuation of Thessaly must have 
increased apprehension, and have shaken loyalty to the national cause. 
Maliciously superficial is the judgement of Heroilotus that, ha^i Thessaly 
indeed remained in the Greek Alliance, the Phokians would have 
abandoned it for the standard of Xer.xes ; though the dictum may be 
valuable as a witness to the intensity of such local and ethnic rivalries, 
and as suggesting some consolatory reflexions, with which even the 
hellenizing Thessalians may have beheld the backs of the hoplites of 
Evainetos. 

(5) Still less can the expedition to Thessaly l>e explained away as 
a feint, a make-believe, which was never intended to be a success. 
The possible argument for such an explanation lies merely, or mainly, 
in the ca.sual and almost parergic character of the story ; but the story 
is plainly, like so much else in the traditions of the Persian war, 
MTitten under the influence of the historic sequel. In such cases you 
will sometimes have an episode mnj^nified and transiigurcd into heroic 
proportions, as in the case of Marathon ; sometimes the fact will have 
been distorted, diminished, discarded, as apparently in this very case 
under discussion. The true proportions and perspective of the expedi- 
tion to Thessaly, and even its details, have been disturbed and lost, 
because the undertaking had so slight an eil'ect upon the subsequent 
issue, was so totallj' ecli|wed by the heroic failure at Thermopylai and 
the heroic succesaes at Salamis and at Plataia. Plainly the less said 



S64 



HERODOTUS 



APP. IV 



about the Thessalian affair the better, from the point of view of later 
Greece. It was creditable neither to the diplomacy nor to the military 
leading of the day ; but the Spartiina at leaat felt, in the hour of 
subsequent triumph, that they had an account to settle mth the 
Thessaliana, who had espoused the cause of a monarchic democracy 
under Median auspices. Their attempt to balance that account proved 
again a Imd investment, the full aud true Btory of which was never 
told. Likely enough too many of the Peloponnesians had been luke- 
warm in the original undertaking, and Sparta herself sent her king to 
Thessaly four years too late. But the loss of Thessaly to Hellas in 
480 B.C. ciin hardly to any appreciable extent be a reproach to the 
ProbiMloi at the Isthmos, or to the Sirate<f(n at the front. Xerxes had 
already too many friends in the land ; the Thessalians themselves were 
not of one mind ; the strategic problem would not have been insoluble 
upon thi) Thcssalian frontier had the political situation been tolerable. 
The proximity of Makedon, and the infection of its example, may also 
have told in the same direction. 

§ K. The subsequent action of the Thessaliane on the king's side 
during the campaign proves that the Confederates had completely 
miscalculated the political position in Thessaly, or that it rapidly 
deteriorated, l>oth before and after the despatch of the confederate 
forces to Tempe in the spring of the year. Abandoned by the 
southern confederacy the Thessalians threw in their lot with the king 
unreservedly, and did him ' yeoman service ' throughout the subsequent 
operations. Xerxes — the anecdote is credible in its moral, if not in it« 
details — visited Temfie unopposed, -with no more escort than a modern, 
or an antique, tourist might require (what a lost opportunity for 
kidnapping a king !). The Thessalians set all the Amphiktyonic 
nations the example of ' unconditional surrender,' and enjoyed the 
especial favour and regard of the Persian. Men of Thessaly, so the 
Phokians averred, had guided the king through central Greece, and 
even directed the course and limits of his 'strategic devastations,' with 
a strict eye to their own |>artialities. Even after the defeat at Salamis 
Xerxes is iia safe in Thessaly as in his own capital, and the Persian 
army occupies winter-quarters in that impregnable and wealthy region. 
No record of tributes or of unrequited exactions has been preserved ; 
the Thessalians had apparently little or nothing to regret, from a 
material starulpoint, in the Persian occupation. Thessalian cavaby 
fought in the ranks of the Persian before Plataia ; the unmolested 
retreat of Artabazoa through the land was ill explained afterwards by 
a too transparent fiction. The failure of the Spartans to avenge the 
modism of Thessaly, aud the subsequent alienation of Sparta and 
Athens, left Thessaly for the most part in an independent but isolated 
position. The land and people paid in some kind the penalty of modism, 
and remained outside the main currents of national history, never 
achieving a satisfactory union at home, never piu^uing a strong policy 



§§7-9 



STRATEGIC SEQUEL 



S56 



abroad, never deserving to compete with the southem city-Btate» for 
the Hegemony of Hellas.' 

§ 9. The evacuation of the first possible line of defence on the 
Thessalian frontier brought the Greeks of necessity back to the line 
marked by Thermopylai and Artemision, the advantages and dis- 
advantages of which have been st;ited above. The occupation or 
non-occupation of this Hoe, once Thessaly had to be abandoned, was 
hardly such an open question as the records in Herodotus may 
(■eem to suggest. The Greeks could not surrender Attica find central 
^Greece without striking a blow, and the second line of defence 
iwas indicated more clearly than any other by natural features. But 
the abandonment of Thessaly and the occupation of Thennopylai- 
Artemision at once threw the main burden and bniiit of the defence 
upon the naval arm. This military observation has been obscured 
under the isolated precedence accorded by Herodotus to the story 
of Thermopyhi, in all its heroic details. The fact remains incon- 
trovertible that it was the land defence which failed in the first two 
instances, by default in Thessaly, by defeat in Malis ; but, in so 
tfar as a decisive victory for the fleet off Artemision might have 
stayed or turned the king's advance, the navid arm shares the 
responsibility for the Persian conquest of central Greece, including 
Attica itself. Still, at Thermopylai, and even after Thermopylai, 
the Greeks, or some good part of them, were looking for a victory by 
land to end the campaign, And verily, the event proved that without 
such a victory there was nu full delivoranco fmssible. Yet who can 
wonder if, after the fiasco at Thermopylai, the Fclojionncsian forces 
failed to appear in Boiotia, and left the fleet to effect at Salamis what 
' liad been missed at Artemision ? Ttie victory in Attic waters was a 
disjointed victory, lacking its essential complement by land, until 
Puisanias at Plataia nearly a twelvemonth later crowned the work of 
Themistokles at Salamis. Meanwhile the naval ^nctory enabled the 
Greek fleet to develop a most remarkable plan, at once political and 
strategic. The victorious fleet assumed the offensive, and carried the 
war over sea into the enemy's country, first in the expedition to 
Andros, which fell, however, far short of the design and ambition of 
Themistokles, and then, as the year came roiuid, in the Reries of 
movements which culminated under the twin peaks of Mykale, and 
upon the strand of Sestos. The political intrigues of the lonians in 
the winter of 480 B.C. are the complement and set-off to the political 
intrigues of the Thessalians in the preceding wnter : the ex[}edition 
under Leotychidas and Xanthippos to Ionia in 479 B,C. is a telling 
contrast to the expedition under Evainetos and Themistokles to 
Thessaly in 480 D.C, Thessaly had been lost and Ionia had been 
gained for the national cau^e in the interval of twelve or fifteen 

' The case of Jason (,Xeno}ihon, HelL Bk. 6, oo. 1, 4} hai-dly vupplies aa 
«xoeptioa. 




266 



HERODOTUS 



App. rv 



months, by tlio Spiirtaii failure on land and the Athenian success on 
the water. The aggressive movement of the Greek fleet across the 
Aigainn made it more than ever incumbent upon Mardonios and the 
king's forces in Greece to win a decisive victory on European soil, and 
no doubt contributed to determine the tactical offensive at Plataia, 
which proved disfiatrous to the Persians. In this way the campaign 
of Mykale stands intimiitcly related to the camjiaign in Boiotia. 
Moreover, the Greek Heet must have waited on the movements of the 
land-forces, and cannot have loft the home-waters uutd Mardouios had 
retired, and was known to have retired, into Boiotia. But, in the first 
instance, the battle in Boiotia, though belated, is the natural com- 
plement to the battle ofi' Salamis, while the battle of Mykale is a work 
of supererogation, rendered possible, indeed, by the previous victory 
of the fleet in the home-waters, and redounding to the salvation and 
subsequent welfare of Hellas. Back on to their last possible line of 
defence the Greeks were never actually driven. It was a line which 
covered Peloponnesos, and barely that, and moreover was likely to 
leave all real fighting to the fleet. The Athenians had power to 
dictate and to force the decision in this case. No doubt they decided 
wisely, from tiie purely strategic and tactical points of view, to say 
nothing of policy, even after they despaired of direct co-operation by 
the Peloponnosiaii army in Attica. But still, for a while after the 
evacuation of Attica, the Athenians must have believed themselves 
strong enough not merely to dictate the exact locality for the inevitable 
naval battle, but also to compel the Peloponnesians to advance and 
do battle with the Persian by land. The sequel proved that the 
Athenians had not over-estimated their strength, even in their 
extremity ; albeit they had all but to play their last trump-card in 
oixler to force the Peloponnesians to the ' sticking-point,' and witnessed 
Attica twice occupied by the Barbarian before the grand army of the 
Peloponnesians would pass the Isfchmos. 

Looking back over the two cjimpaigns in the light of their 
victorious issues, more than one Greek, especially among the Athenians, 
may have felt that, however satisfactory the results attained, they 
might have been achieved both earlier and more cheaply. To think 
that within eighteen months of the crossing of the Hellespont the 
Heet had attacked the Asiatic dominions of the king, and not a free 
Persian remained alive south of Othrys ! Not the plan of campaign 
hiid been at fault, but its execution : success had been marred and 
made needlessly expensive to life and property, public and private, 
as well by military as by i>olitical blunders. Political reasons had, 
indeed, rendered the abandonment of Thessaly a mea.sure more than 
excusable from every point of view ; but the failure at Thermopylai 
was directly traceable to military misleading and shortcomings, nor 
hfwi the t)eet achieved all that might have been expected off Artemision. 
The evasion by the Peloponnesians for months of their treaty-obliga- 



§§9-10 



STRATEGIC SEQUEL 



257 



tiona was attributable in part to the shock of their first defeat, 
and it completely upset thu original plan of defence, by leaving the 
tieet to operate in isolation at Salamis ; but the success of the lieet no 
dotibt helped to breathe fresh courage into the land-forces and captains, 
and to revive their emulation. The broken plan was resumed and 
made good on the field of Platiiia in 479 B-c with a rider and 
development, contemplated indeed long before by the most far-sighted 
and courageous mind upon the Greek side, but only now rendered 
possible by the antecedent victory at iSalamis. Thus Plataia syn- 
chronized not with its true and ap{>ointe{l complement, but with a 
consequence and product of that victory. Yet, though the decisive 
Wctory on Greek soil wjis thus belate<l, the early assumption of the 
offensive at sea was fraught with ulterior consequences, which more 
than made goo<l to Athens all the losses and sufferings for which, 
as she might be pardoned saying, she ha<l the PelofKvnnesiaiis to 
thank as well as the Persians. In the long ran, indeed, the Greek 
states, or at least the leaders, profited by their victories in proportion 
to their sjicrifices for the national cause: Athens, whose destiny made 
the Persian war no doubt primarily an Athenian war, was repaid all 
her losses a thousandfold in power, wealth, achievement, beauty. 
Plataia was a Spartan victory, but from this point of iiiew the losses 
of Sparta at Thei'niopylai weze M'orth almost more than a victory. 
The story of Therrnopyl.ii became the consecrated legend of Spartan 
heroism, and gave Sparta a fresh lease of her life-principle, honour. 
But, at the time and in itself, the defence of Thermopylai was a 
failure, and left the mainland above the Isthmos for a while com- 
pletely at the mercy of the Persian. The intellectual anil moral 
force, which insisteti upon the stand of the fleet at Salamis after the 
collapse of the army in central Greece, is perhaps the most admirable 
revelation in the wliole story of the war. 

§ 10. Ujjon the Persian side all went well enough, in a strategic 
sense, till the fatal hour of Satamie. The losses by the storm off 
Magnesia, no doubt considerable, were grossly exaggerated in the 
Greek traditions, which hasten to correct the exaggeration, almost as 
soon as utt«red, by a fresh extravagance.' And, however gi-eat the 
Persian losses before Salamis, the coiu-sc of events so far pointed to 
an ultimate and complete success for the Persian arms. From the 
inception of the undertaking right down to the capture of Athens 
the facts all bespeak a wcll-considored scheme and a competent war- 
olhce upon the Persian side. The elaborate preparations for the 
commissariat and the movement of the forces, the brid go-building, 
road -making, magazines, and !>o forth ; the organized and large 
mobilization; the carefully -considered and well -worked -out route ; 
the advance of the land-forces in three divisions on parallel roads ; 
the uses made of the fears or loyalty of the Greeks within the empire. 



> Cp. 8. 06. 



VOL. U 



258 



HERODOTUS 



APP. nr 



and of the divisions and rivalries of the Greeks without ; last, not 
least, the measure of actual military success achieved on the king's 
part before the autumn of 480, all denote a not incompetent handling 
of the strategic and political problems of the case from the Persian 
point of view. Too much stress is, perhaps, laid on the king's error 
in mobilizing such enormous masses of men, a {Kiiiit very clearly made 
against him in the dialectic of the Greek tradition itself. The numbers 
are, to begin with, enormously exagj^erated ; but in any case the 
criticism can scarcely l>o pressed very far, unless the critic is prej)ared 
to maintain that, with half or a quarter of his actual forces, the king 
would have achieved a final and complete success, or at least have 
done much better than he did in fact. With such forces, bo 
equipped, as the king had to dispose of, numbers were the one remedy 
for all disadvantages on his own side, and advantages upon the side 
of the Greek. The numbers, moreover, were not without their 
effect both upon the minds and upon the actions, and inactions, of 
the Greeks ; nor did the actual numbers of the king's forces on 
land involve him in any disaster, or disadvantage, during the march 
to Athens. The steady advance, and the absence of any sign of 
starvation or shortcoming of supplies, speiik well for the Persian 
organizjition and leading so far. At Sidamis, iiideeil, the Persian fleet 
was impeded by its own numbers, and at Plataia, perhaps, the masses 
of Asiatic infantry may have stood in each other's way ; but these 
facts, if facts they be, point to tactiad blnmJers in the leading and 
command, and leave the question open whether with better handling 
of the same forces a different result might not have been attained. 
The Persian side was bound to make use of its vast superiority in 
numbers and resources as the best chance of success, but it failed to 
make the best use of that advantage. The crucial defect in the 
Persian plan of campaign was patent to the Greeks themselves, 
possibly at the time, certainly afterwards and upon reflexion. The 
Persians failed to employ to the greatest advantage their vast 
superiority in numbers, especially at sea ; they adhered, too long and 
too rigidly, to the idea that fleet and army must remain in touch 
and co-operate directly ; they failed to seize the opjjortunity alTorded 
by the non-appearance of the Greek army in Boiotia, and the con- 
sequent break-down of the Greek plan of defence. The Persians 
possessed a suflBciont superiority of forces to have kept the Greek 
fleet cooped up in Salnmis, and at the same time to have harried and 
raided the Peloponneso in a way tit to drive the Greeks to desperation. 
The attack upon the Greek floet in Salamis was no doul»t both a 
strategic and a tactical error. It was an error, superinduced on the 
over-confidence of the victorious Persians by an express ruse and 
stratagem from the Greek side ; but the main blunder of the Persians 
lay in their failure to detach a sufficient squadron for operations 
against the Peloponnesos. One ctTcct of such an operation must have 



§ 10 



PERSIAN STRATEGY 



S69 



L 



been to force the Peloponnesian contingouts at Salamis to uiiike their 
way homewards, iti which case they must have fallen an easy prey 
to the king's fleet off' the island. Tlie miaadventure which had 
attended the despatch of the squadron round Euboi;i nmy have helped 
to discourage the Persians from attempting a movement directtid against 
the Polopoiiriesos afterwanls ; politicjil considerations may also have 
opei-ated, and more powerfully, to tame the Pei-sian initiative and 
leading ; and the Persian fleet, made up of heterogeneous, of rival, 
and even of disloyal elements, could no longer be trusted out of sight 
of the land-forces, nor its several contingents be allowed to act in- 
dependently of each other. The engagements off" the Artemision, and 
to some eartent the inscriptions of Themistokles at Histiaia, may have 
contributed to augment the tlistrust of the maritime allies, or rather 
Bubjects, of the king, nanitally entertained in any case by leaders 
who were themselves primarily landsmen and cavaliers. All things 
considered, there is no doubt substantial truth in the candid verdict 
put by Thucydides into the mouth of his anonymous Korinthian, that 
the failure of the liirbarian was due to hia own blunders ; but the 
blunders were mainly strategic and tactical, and they were, to a great 
extent, made inevitable, not ai> much by the exaggerated size or scale 
of the forces, as by their political and ethical defects. In a military 
sense the idtimate Greek \nctory was due in the first place rather to 
tactical than to strategic advantiages upon the Greek aide, and in the 
second place to various antecedent conditions, including superiority in 
weapons, discipline, spirit, cause, which gave the advantage in Lactica 
to the Greek side both by sea and by land. Viewed from the purely 
strategic standpoint the historic censure remains true that the 
leaders of Greece allowed the Barbarian to make his way from the 
uttermost parts of the etirth to the very gates of the Poloponneaos 
without attempting any aderpiate means of staying his victorious 
advance.^ 




APPENDIX V 



ARTEMISION-THERMOPYLAI 



% 1. Strategic aspects of tbo line Arteumion-Tlieriiiopylui. § 2. Cli«ractor of the 
Ilurodote&n troditiou. § 3. Kcal CAUwsa of the failure at Therinopf lai. § 4. 
Diaries of tlie Persian fleet and nrmy. § 6. Reoonstruction of the itctaal course 
of ev«nt». § 6. Immediate results. 



§ 1. The operations for the defence of Greece, in the year 480 
B.C., upon the line of Artemision and Thcrmopylai, obviously formed 
one organic scheme, to which the services of fleet and of &rmy were 
alikt! subordinate. Faihire of either arm was to a surety fraught with 
nun for the whole plan of defence upon the given line. If the Greek 
fleet had been driven from its position, or circumvented, or captured, 
or in any way put out of being, the position of Leonidus and the land- 
forees at Thermopylai became ipso facto untenable, the Persians having' 
it in thtnr power, as commanding the sea, to diaembark any number 
of soldiers in the rear of the Greeks at Thermopylai. Their fleet 
itself might be directed against the Greek position, ao as to aid from 
the water, at least by showers of arrows, if not by an actual landing, 
the frontal and rear attacks upon the Spartan king. A serious defeat 
of the Greek navy must have spelled retreat or ruin for the Greek 
army. The correlative proposition does not, perhaps, extend so far. 
The annihilation of the defouders of Thennnpylai did not immediately 
threaten the Greek fleet with ass.iult a tfiffti, except indeed that such 
a disaster might provoke medism in mid-Hollas; but, alike politically 
and strategically, the naval position at Artemision became useless and 
practically untenable, once the Avays into central Greece were open 
to the Persian army. The capture of the land-passage was naturally, 
if not necessarily, a signal for the retirement of the Greek fleet from 
the first efTective line of defence. These aspects of the campaign are 
now generally recognized by all students of the case. What has not 
been so fully or generally iccognized is the theorem that the first 
line of defence, baaed upon the positions of Artemision and Thermopylai, 
devolved upon the naval side the chief share of the lighting, if the 

2«0 



ARTEMISION-THERMOPYLAI 



261 



f^ "^'^ 



■k Fit V. 
... i 



N 



§^ 1-3 ARTEMISION-THERMOPYLAI 261 

defence was to be a complete success. A merely negative result was 
all that was necessary, or even possible, for the army of Leonidaa, its 
position, its numbers, and the nature of the case considered — if a 
successful defence of the land-passage may be called a negative result 
For a positive victory, upon the given line, which should compel the 
invader to fall back, the Greeks must have looked to the naval arm. 
A victory off the Artemt-^ion, such as the Greek Heot afterwai-ds 
achieved at Salamis, seconded, of course, by a successful defence of 
Thermopylai, must have changed the wliole situation, and brought 
about the king's retreat. A naval victory in Euboian waters would 
have threatened the whole line of Persian communications, and would, 
of course, have been immediately followeil by revolts and emancijiatory 
niovementa either side the Aignian. On the further a.spects of ' the 
might have been ' it were idle to speculate. In the long nui, things 
could hardly have turned out better for Greece at large, or for Athens 
in particular, than things vn the actual sotiuel proved ; nevertheless, 
no sane man courts adversity, no wise state disaster, for all the sweet- 
ness and the use of such experiences. The nett result of the actual 
fighting upon the line of Artemision and Thenmopylai was disaster to 
Greece and victory to the king ; and this resxilt was due not to the 
destruction of the Greek navy off the Artemision, but to the failure 
of the Greek army under Leonidaa to hold Thermopylai. 

§ 2. (a) The cjiuwdity just formulated is buried, in the traditional 
stories of the defence, under a muss of paradox, incoherenciea, and 
apology. The apologetic tendency, or prti^rmatism, of the record is so 
complex and extensive that it will bo more fully discussed below : the 
psiradox may be more briefly dismissed. The Cireek army is por- 
trByed as a band of heroes, led by a hero and fighting like heroes ; 
yet it is the army that fails, and tots the Barbarians into Hellas ! 
The Greek fleet is « mob of poltroons, that upon the aiivance of the 
enemy beats a hasty retreat, and, having been brought back to its 
proper station, twice again contemplates flight ; yet the Greek fleet 
holds its own victoriously, or not unsuccessfully, upon the water, luitil 
retreat for it becomes inevitable, by reason of the loss of Thermopylai I 
For such a paradox there is no excuse, unless the Greek fleet be made 
answerable for the whole failure, in that it had not eff'ected a victor}' 
at sea, which should have put the Persian vessels completely out of 
action. To such a censure the reply might have been made that, had 
the land-force but held Thermopylai a little longer, the required victory 
at sea would have been forthcoming. 

(i) If a paradoxi«il and apologetic tradition is also incoherent, what 
else could be expected 1 The tradition was not concerned with the 
simple strategic or tactical aapectfi of the actions so much as with their 
political and monil issues. In the pages of Herodotus the operations 
on land and the operations at sea are presented as two independent 
series of events, the presentments agreeing neither in themselves nor 



262 



HERODOTUS 



APP. V 



with each other. Thus, the historian completely finishes off the story 
of Thermopylai, and even buries the deiul and builds hira their monu- 
ments, before developing the story of ArLemision. Again, he represents 
the Greek navy as making, and as contemplating, movements which 
are inadmissible if army and fleet were co-operating and in conjunction. 
This apparent dualism in the action is artificiaUy heightened for 
modern readers by the existing division between the Seventh and the 
Eighth Books, which tends further to isolate the two series of actions, 
those on land narrated in the Seventh Book, and those on sea narrated 
in the Eighth. Moreover, the Eighth Book makes a sort of fresh start, 
with a navy-list, and a recorrl of the discussion, closed months earlier 
than the jK)int here attained in the narrative, concerning the naval 
command, or Hegemonia ; and this fresh start stiil further exaggerates 
the divorce between the stories, and consequently between the actions, 
of Thermopylai and of Artemision. Thus apology begets panulox, 
and panidox augments incohcreney. 

{<•) Here, however, as elsewhere, the Herodotean record carries its 
own corrective. Imperfect as is the author's grasp of military problems, 
there is enough in his narrative to confirm, nay, to suggest, the view 
above formulated in regard to the present subject. Strategic and 
tactical observations, or hints, isolatetl indeed, and preserved in a 
medium to which they are foreign ; an unusually full topography, 
explicit and implicit in the story ; chronological data, which, when 
carefully synthesized, give a veritable diary of the actions for a whole 
week and more : all these are there. l'arado.\ical, incoherent, prag- 
matic, the stories of Thermopylai and of Artemision may, in their 
moat obvious aspects, appear ; yet, when the detected apology is duly 
discounted, the paradox reduced, the incoheroncies harmonized, there 
remains a substantial balance to the credit of the truth. It is here 
worth while to verify this critique of the traditions, out of which alone 
can be rebuilt any concrete conception of the actual course of 
events. 

To tiike, in the first place, those hints attd indications throughout 
which postulate a complete interdependence of the engagements by 
sea and by land, off Artemision and at Thermopylai : the following 
items will fall under this head. (1) Tlie account of the original 
decision of the Greeks to occupy Thermopylai - Artemision, the 
description of the localities, their relation to each other, albeit little 
or no stress is laid upon the naval side, or on the indispensitble covei^ 
ing of the army by the fleet (7. 175-177). (2) The way in which 
the movements of the Persian fleet and of the Persian army are 
interlarded, or intercalated, one with the other, especially in the 
Seventh Book. Herodotus, indeed, throughout appears more conscious 
of the interconnexion between fleet and army upon the Persian than 
upon the Greek aide ; not fully realizing that the one involves the 
other, and that, if the Persian advanced y«/i pa^u on both elements, 



{8 



ARTEMISION-THERMOPYLAI 



2G3 



» 



the Greeks were bound to acLipt their defence to Uiis diul attack. 
Thus the record starts, so to speak, with the log of the fleet (c. 1 79), 
which is brought from Therme to Aphetai (cc, 179-196), encountering 
sundry adventures en mynge, before the king's march from Therme, or 
at leait from Pieria (c. 131), is resumed, and conducted through 
Thesaaly and Achaia into M&lis, and so to Tnichis and the very gates 
of Greece (cc. 196-201). (3) The arrangements for communication 
between the Greek army nt Thermopylai and the Greek fleet at 
Arlemision (8. 21) imply the ffict, which is fiu-ther confirmed by (4) 
the synchronism of the throe engagements at sea with the three days* 
fighting oil lanti (8. 15), albeit this synchronism appears to be regarded 
by the historian as purely fortuitous. (5) Finally, the instant retreat 
of the fleet, so soon as ever news of the disaster at Thermopylai 
reached it (8. 21), enforces the same conclusion, though Herodotus 
believes that the admirals hiid determined to retreat inespective of 
the fortunes of the Spairtan king at Thermopylai. Al\ such hints are 
in themselves only the more valuable in this connexion for having an 
air of being mere chiter dicta ; they are, in truth, points where the logic 
of facts breaks through the deposit of fortuitous, or fanciful, or even 
fraudulent tradition ; and the logic of facts in this particular case 
signifies the deliberately planned leading and action of the Greek 
forces. 

{d) The geographical defect in Herodotus in regard to Thermopylai 
and Artemiaion is rektively small, and easily corrigible, though not 
therefore devoid of significance, in its l>euring upon the character and 
qualities of the narrative. Criticism is here upon ascertainable 
ground, and can pronounce a confident verdict. The landscape of 
Thermopylai has altered considerably since the days of Herodotus, or 
of Leonidas ; but physiography can restore the antique conditions to 
a degree practically verifying and completely according with the 
Herodotean requirements, in all essentials. Where political geography, 
or choriograpliy, comes in, there is naturally some room for discussion ; 
but in the present case no essential point in the reconstruction of the 
true story appears to depend upon the exact location of Anthela, of 
AlpenoB, of Trachis, or of Antikyra ; though, as a matter of fact, the 
exact location of alt these spots has been accomplished with all but 
certainty. Other and smaller discoveries in topography will be even 
more important for the story : the exact sites of the altar of Herakles, 
of the Phokian wall, of the temple of Demeter, of the sanctuary of 
Amphiktyon, of the Amphiktyonic Seats, of the Lion of Leonidas, of 
the other monuments. But the general topographical problem at 
Thermopylai lies within clearly defined and verifiable limits, and upon 
all essential points the data in Herodotus are fully acceptable. The 
chief wonder, indeed, lies in the accuracy of his topographical indica- 
tions, forasmuch as his one ciirdinal blunder proves that he can 
hardly have visited the place before writing his account of it. No 



204 



HERODOTUS 



AFr. V 



one, least of all a Greek traveller, accustomed to orient his position in 
the ojien, had he stood at Thermopjiai, and looked across the bay to 
the long line of Othrjs, coxdd ever describe the mountain behind him 
as lying to the west of the pass, and the sea in front of him as lying 
to the east. Herodotus commits this error, and makes the road, by 
implication, nirt north and south. But, except in this one respect, the 
description of Thcrmopyini could hardly be better, even had Herodotus 
himself traversed every inch of the ground. There is no other bit of 
topography in the whole work of Herodotus — not the battle-field of 
Plataia itself — more satisfactory to the travelling scholar of to-day. 
The same euloginm cannot be pronounced ujion the cnrter and more 
vague description fif Artemision, and of the position of the fleet. The 
precise determination of the site of tho temple of Artemis would not 
in this case add much to our resources for deciding the tactical or 
strategic problem. Students have long been agreed that the n&me 
must be applied to a consirlerable stretch of shore on the NW. coast 
of Euboia, in order to harmotdze the scene with the story of the 
fighting. In any case the description of the scene of the naval 
engagements was a more difficult task to accomplish, whether at first 
or at second hand. His personal experience may rather have hindered 
than have helped Herodotus in one respect, He failed to realize the 
full si^'nificance of the proximity of fleet and army at Artemision 
and at Thorraopylai. If he visited thn ]iarts in question on a voyage, 
his shortcoming is the more intelligible. The station of the fleet, 
placed as near Thormopylai as is compatible with the actual operations 
described, cannot have been loss than forty Roman miles distant from 
the camp on land. Fleet and army were far from being fully in 
sight or in touch of each other. This removal is, indeed, unconsciously 
reflected, and exaggerated, in the dualism between the stories of the 
two series of operations ; but the suspicion that Herodotus himself 
had not considered the traditional stories of the battles on the spot 
is confirmed by the observation that there is no attempt, or even hint, 
at an estimate of the acttial di.stance between the two positions.^ 

(f) The remarkable accuracy and fulness of the Herodotean topo- 
graphy of Thermopylai, and, to a less degree, of Artemision also, second- 
hand though it all probably was, helps to explain, by proving the 
excellence of his sources in thi.s section, a still more remarkable feature, 
the relatively full and acceptable chronology. Topography was, of 
course, a matter open to inspection and verification by all comers, in 
Heroflotus' day, as in our own ; for the chronological data Herodotus 
was of necessity dependent upon tradition, as we are in turn dependent 
on his report of tradition. The chronology, as above remarked, 
presents us at this crisis with a veritable journal ; the week, the ten 
days, preceding the death of Leonidas, are almost as exactly and fully 
reported as the week, or ten days, preceding the death of Alexander 



' On 



the topogra(>hical details cp. the Coniinentary art II. jmimm. 



§« 



ARTEM ISION-THEKMOPYLAI 



265 



the Great.* The diary of Thermopylai and the diary of Artemision 
are preserved but incidentally ; the remarkable synchronisms between 
them are treated as accidents ; but incident or accident is additional 
guarantee of their respective authenticity. A perfect harmony, a 
completely satisfactory and convincing chronology of each event and 
action, is not, indeed, attainable ; some readjustments in the apparent 
scheme are necessary in order to rationalize the story. Even the 
chronology of Herodotus at this crisis is somewhat incoherent. The 
multiplicity of sources for the various stories and items which 
make up the complex narrative, and the absence on the historian's 
part of a clear perception of the relation between the operations by 
sea and the operation.'* on land, go far to explain the admitted in- 
coherence, and to justify the attempted rationalization, of the 
traditional story. There are, indeed, some apparently precise data in 
the narrative which conflict with each other; there arc data which 
almost require that their exact point of occurrence should be revised 
in the interests of the strategic and tactical theory of the actions. 
Such a procedure would l>e inadmi-ss-ible in relation to a historian who 
had a definite and systematic method of chronologizing his narrative ; 
no such bar exists to our rationalization of the looser texture of the 
Herodotean narrative. Moreover, the existence of the former class of 
discrepancies is justification of the method applied to the latter class of 
chronological cruces. Thus there is an apjKvrent discrepancy in reganl 
to the exact date of the arrival of the king before Thermopylai 
between two passages in the text.- This discrepancy may be overcome 
by a ])lausible interpretation ; but the two data plainly belong to quite 
different cycles, or sources, of tradition, and are not in any conscious 
way harmonized by Herodotus himself. A variety of soiu-ce and an 
unrationalized chronology are {as will be argued below) responsible 
for doubling the storm which played havoc with the Persian fleet ; 
hut on such a point unanimous agreement will hardly be obtaineil. 
Upon the exact dates of events, such as the appearance of Skylltas in 
the Greek camp, the retreat of the Greeks to Cbalkis and their return 
to their proper station, the wreck of the Persian fleet upon the 
Hollows of Euhoia, and so forth, the theory of the action would of 
course depend, if the given chronology were complete and coherent : 
in all such cases historicjd criticism will venture to readjust chronology 
in the interests of a rejil perspective. Such a procedure is not quite 
satisfactory ; but in the absence of a full chronology it is inevitable, 
unless we arc to de8i>air of evoking coherent history from a discrepant 
medley of anecdotes and episodes. Certain land-marks, or rather 
time and tide marks, are to be accepted as regulative : the exact 
synchronism of the actual engagements at Thermopylai and at 
Artemision by land and soa is the basis of all. From this point, 




266 



HERODOTUS 



APP. V 



and from this poiiit of view, the diary of Thermopylai and Artemision 
must be reconstructed ; the critical historian will work backward from 
Thennopylai to Therme, and not in the other, albeit the Herodotean 
direction. In the result our reconstruction of the chronology may 
be a little too com[iact. A margin of error, or of variation, is to be 
admitted for the movements chronologized, whether by sea or on land, 
as well as for the synchronisms established between the two series; 
but the margin of error cannot be large or very alarming, and practical 
convenience is consulted in drawing up the chronological schedule 
with the utmost precision permitted by the records, fairly examined. 
The result may be a rej^ulative hypothesis which falls short of absolute 
authority, but iiKiispulably brings order into what were otherwise 
a chaos, both chronological and causal The wonder is that the 
Herodotean narrative, in view of its general characteristics, yields so 
much excuse and material for so bold a reconstruction. The attempt 
here to be made goes far beyond what is generally possible for the 
earlier portions of his narrative. It is no mere question of the year, 
Or of the season of the year, or even of the calendar mouth, or 
approximate month, for the operations dated : on that larger chrono- 
logy there is little doubt or obscurity. The question is to determine, 
within a jteriod of three weeks, in the first instance, the daily move- 
moiite of fleets and armies, the orders and conferences of generals and 
leaders. That the text of Herodotus contains a host of items to 
encourage and compel such an attempt speaks volumes for the 
comparative sanity and weukli of tlie traditions garnered by him for 
our belated consideration. Little more seems wanting, upon the 
chronological side, to raise this portion of the work of Herodotus from 
more logography into history of all but the highest order. Were 
there still extant in the time of our author any documents or 
miiterials, open to his inspection, which could have enabled him to 
correct the discrepancies, or to supply the deficiencies, which are so 
easily detected in his narrative, just because it goes so curiously far in 
the direction of chronological completeness 1 

(/) Not, indeed, the weakness of its chronology, still less the 
defect in its topography, constitutes the chief offence, from a strictly 
historical point of view, in the Herodotean story; the main source of 
error, of confusion, and of shortcoming lies rather in the rhetoric 
and sophistry, whether for the good or evil cause, which the record 
in almost every part betrays. Panegyric and malice, scandal and 
apologetics, have usurped too large a place in the traditions preserved 
by HtTodotus ; where rhetoric and politics come in at the door science 
and history fly out at the window. The degree in which these 
characteristics of the narrative redound to the discredit of the writer 
himself is open to discussion. If the crude assaults of Plutarch on 
' the midignity of Herodotus ' are manifestly excessive and uncritical,^ 



I« 



ARTEMISION-THERMOPYLAI 



207 



> 



yet to acquit our author wholly of partiality and prejudice is not easy, 
to applaud his excessive and uncritical naivete is imjwssible. Wholly 
uncritical Herodotus mrely, if ever, is ; but in the majority of caaes 
his good faith is pruserved at the expense of bis critical acumen, by 
carrying back the worst quiilities in the narrative from the naiTator 
to his primary authorities. After all, Herodotus was in a difficult 
position. Was there anywhere procurable a true unbiassed account of 
any single episode in the war J His narrative betrays both general and 
particular interests and prejudices, (a) There is a universal or general 
* pragmatism ' to be detected in the traditions. I^rbarians blaspheme<l 
Greeks, and Greeks Barbarians, but the worst stories told of each other 
by Greek and Karbariiin were haiflly so bad as what Greek would tell 
of Greek, the patriot of the meilizer, the Athenian of the Sjwrtan, or 
Korinthian, or Theban, and the others of the Athenian, the partisiin 
of his rival and opponent, and the mere scandal-monger and tale-bearer 
of all alike. Panegyric too played its corresponding part : self-assertion 
and self-glorification were the natural complement of jealousy and 
hatred. The materials at tlie disposfd of Herodotus were deeply 
infected with political and moral vices. The marvel is that out of 
«ucb materials there nevertheless results a fairly intelligible record of 
events. For this boon we are ind<"bted to the Herodotean method, 
at once neither so artless nor so unscientific after all as it seems at 
first sight. To report in readable form the traditions of the Persian 
wars, as they were living on the lips of men, a generation or at most 
two generations after the event, rather than to synthesize the chaos of 
individual stories into a single self-consistent unity, was the task which 
Herodotus more or less consciously set himself, with this result (araon^ 
others) for us, that we are in a position to reiison with the cloud of 
witnesses, to go behind the personality of our treasurer, and to audit 
bis accounts for ourselves. We can hardly expect to see the materials 
for a judgement augmented or enriched ; but to the more and more 
intelligent appreciation of the traditional deposit there is apparently 
no prescribed limit. 

(/8) Criticism may further mark one broad contrast between the 
story of Thermopylai and the story of Artemision, the existence of 
which is incontestable, whatever its explanation may be. The story 
of Artemision is upon the whole not creditable to the Greek fleet 
ftnd the Greek commanders ; and although prizes of valour are 
awarded to the Athenians, neither they nor Themistokles, their 
general, come ptirticiilarly well out of the record. This depreciatory 
tendency in the stories is all the more significant since the hard fact 
cannot wholly be denied or done away with, that the fleet only 
retreated finally when ita position became useless and untenable owing 
to the failure of the land-forces to hold Thermopylai. This qiuility 
in the story of Artemision can hardly arise from the materials having 
been drawn from unmaritime, or auti-naval states in Hellas, or from 



268 



HERODOTUS 



APP. V 



traditions among the Greek states at the time engaged upon the 
Persian side : on the conti-arj-, a dominantly Attic provenience has 
l)een detected in this part. Possibly naval operations and naval 
battles are in their very nature more difficult to comprehend at the 
time, ami to preserve or restore afterwards, than land-actions. More- 
over, the Athenians, and the Athenian aonroes, with which Herodotus 
was primarily acijuainted, were not greatly concerned to justify the 
memory of Themistokles. Yet still, the failure of tradition to appreciate 
the stand made by the fleet at Artemision remains a curious puzzle. 
In part, the glorious and immortal memory of Sidamis maj' have 
obliterated the merits of Astemision. In part, the apologies for 
Thcrmopylai involved an injustice to the Hect at Artemision. In [wrt, 
the spletulid failure will always command the sympathy of human 
souls before the miserly success of him who fights and nuis away. 
In part, the success of the fleet off Artemision was after all perhaps 
but moderate, and mainly of a negative character. An adequate 
victory at Artemision might have saved Thermopylai, and all the rest. 
Tradition takes its own method of enforcing that moral. Whatever 
the reason, the result is patent in the prestige and preference accortled 
to the failure at Thermopylai over the stand at Artemision. 

(y) The story of Thermopylai, as given by Honxlotus, is highly 
composite, and by no means drawn from one simple source ; it is, no 
doubt in consequence, incoherent, not merely in regard to the story of 
Artemision, but in itself, and this incoherency goes so far &s to preserve 
three explanations, or 'apologies' for the disaster, which are more 
or less inconsistent, or alternative to one another, and any one of 
which might in itself serve, aa certainly the must incredilile of the 
three might serve (but for the existence of the two others), as an 
adequate excuse or explanation of what was undeniably a military and 
political fiasco, (i.) Thus one story, or rather one set of stories, 
explains the failure by the ignorance of tho defenders, and the treachery 
of those who should have been their friends : a lame excuse, for the 
ignorance VtHS inexcusable, if indeed true, and the treachery was an 
obvions and foregone conclusion, (ii.) A second and somewhat better 
argument was found in the alleged cowardice and desertion of the 
greater jvart of the forces under Leonidas ; but this excuse, which, if 
a true one, would of course explain everything, is traversed not merely 
by the recorded and admitted courage of the Allies, throughout the 
fir.st two days' fighting, but by the variant tradition which asserts that 
Leonidas himself sent the allied contingents away, (iii.) This variant 
relates itself to the third apology, at once the most adequate and the 
most easily refutable: the fiasco at Thermopylai was a deliberate act 
of patriotic courage and religious devotion on the jwirt of Leonidas 
and his companions to secure a dirine and supernatural intervention 
on behalf of their country. In itself such an act wore perfectly credible, 
and of good precedent] nor is the explanation of the sacrifice of 



ARTEMISION-THERMOPYLAI 



■ 



Leotiidas at Thermopylai,^ as an act of such devotion, wholly inadmis- 
sible, at least in a secondary sense. The death of Loonidas was, 
indeed, a challenge not merely to the Persians, but to the Greeks, to 
the Spartans, to exact justice {<p6vov Sikus) from the Barbarian.' But, 
Hi a primary explanation for the facts, this account is open to one 
fatal objection : it implies that the defence of Thermopylai was never 
intended to be a succt^ss. That implication is wholly inadmissible. 
The defence of Thermopylai was intended to be serious and thorough, 
as is proved by the follonnng observations. (1) The Greeks had most 
carefully considered the plan of defence and deliberately chosen the 
line of Artemision-Thennojiylai as the best (c. 175). (2) The inter- 
dependence of fleet and army — -obliterated by Herodotus — proves 
that the land-forces were to hold Thermopylai as long as the fleet 
held the Euboian channel. (3) The political advantages involved ia 
this line of defence, which covers all central Greece, approve it. (4) 
The Greek array-list shows it (c. 202). The Greeks, even as reported 
by Herodotus, put a considerable force at Thermopylai, and Herodotus 
understates the actual forcea posted there, (b) The proclamation of 
Leonidas, recorded by Herodotus, proves it ; that is, one tradition in 
Herodotus disproves another (c. 203). (G) The manifest surprise at 
the failiu-e of the enterprise proves it (7. 206) ; that is, again, one 
story in Herodotus is confuted by another. (7) And so the alternative 
stories to account for the failure prove it, for tliey imply that, but 
for ignorance and treachery in the one case, or but for cowardice and 
desertion in the other, there might have been a very diSerent story 
to tell. (8) Last, and not least, the visible growth of the legend, 
especially in passing from Herodotus to Diodoros, that is perhaps only 
to Ephoros, proves it a fiction, due to afterthought, but a highly pleas- 
ing fiction withal." It pleased more than the Simi tans, for it cancelled, 
if once thoroughly established, the jxiinful alternatives, or at least the 
second alteinative above indicated. But, like many afterthoughts, it 
proved too much on the one side, it proved too little on the other : if 
it accounted for the death of Leonidas and his Spartiiitai, it failed to 
account for other facts, which any attempt at a reconstruction of the 
real story cannot ignore : the equal devotion and fate oF the Thespians, 
the detention and escajw of the Thehans. 

§ 3. The real causes of the failure at Thermopylai, involving the 
retreat from Artemision as well, are not after all very far to seek ; 
they are inherent in the strategic situation, taken together with the 
indisputable facts preserved by tradition. Of the main responsibility 
the Greek navy must be acquitted: it was not the fault of Themistokles 
and his colleagues, including his official superior, Eurybiades the 
Spartan, that Thermopylai was lost, and Leonidas sacrificed. The 
fleet at least held its own. No doubt a decisive victory at sea might 

' Cp. 8. 111. 
' Cp. Ap[>end>x I. § 13, p. 67 sujira. 





270 



HERODOTUS 



A.PP. V 



have relieved, or removed, the pressure on land ; but on each element 
a separate, albeit cognate success was to be achieved, and the success 
on each element had to be separately accomplished. Possibly enough 
the Peloponnosian allies were hoping that the fleet, that is, mainly, the 
Athenians, would repeat on the water the success of ten years before 
on land. Leotiidas w&s sent perhaps only to hold Therraopylai, wliile 
the fleet should achieve a decisive issue. If so, there was a funda- 
mental flaw in the Gi-eek couiiseU, which helps to explain the actual 
result. That result, however, in itself is immediately traceable to two 
closely related matters of fact. In the first place, the position at 
Thermopylai was liable to be turned, unless sutticient forces were sent 
to cover every adit through the narrow waist of the Greek peninsula, 
between the Malian and Korinthian gulfs. In the second place, 
sufficient forces were sent to hold only the main passage, that by 
Thermopylai and Hyampolis, while tho second main route, the road 
between Trachis and Kytinion {and so forward to Ainphissa and to 
Delphi), was left apparently out of account. This route, indeed, plays 
no part in the story of the attack atid defence in the pages of Herodotus, 
and is ignored and treated as non-existent." Most of the modem and 
even recent discussions of the case follow suit in this matter, and 
discuss the problem of the defence of Thermopylai, either tacitly or 
explicitly, as though the road by the seji-coast had been the only route, 
which a Persian force could have taken into the Kephisos valley.* But 
Herodotus himself in this as in so many cases supplies the missing 
evidence unconsciously and in another connexion, seeing that he actually 
records the passage of the Persian forces from Trachinia into Doris, 
and that withal as though the whole army had marched by this route, 
and left the coast-road through Thermopylai, and the pass by Hyam- 
polis, altogether on one side (8. 28). Whatever the state and condition 
of the great north route from Delphi ria Amphissa and Kytinion to 
Trachis and Thessaly at the time of the Persian invasion, it was 
evidently a strategic factor, which the Greek plan of defence ought to 
have taken into account, and perhaps did take into account, although 
all memory thereof seems to have disappeared from the Ilerodotean 
version. Herodotus, in fact, presents the strategic elements in the 
defence of Thermopylai .almost as imperfectly aa the strategic elements 
in the defence of Tempe.^ The fleet is, indeed, stationed at Artemision, 
in communication with the army at Thennopylai, but the full signifi- 
cance of this combination is far from being realized or represented in 
the Herodotean story. And just as the abandonment of Thessaly is 
made, by Herodotus, to hinge ui>on the possibility of Tempe being 
turned by the Gonnos path over Olympos, without a hint, in the 



' Cp. CommentAry, e»p. to 7. 216, 
itnd Appendix I. § 15, p. 98 supra. 

^ Exodption nm.st now be made Tor 
G. B. Urundy's Great Pcnsian War 



(1901), and the subsequent dlscnssions 
aroused by it. 

' Cp. Appendix IV. § 7, pp. 251 f. 
supra. 



§3 



AIITEMISION-THERMOPYLAI 



■271 



immediate context, of the existence of those major passes hj which the 
Persians undoubtedly entered Thessaly : so the faihire at Thermopylai 
is all explained, in the Herodoteun story, by the Anopsia path, without 
reference to the real pass by which a large portion of the Persian 
forces actually entered Phokis, and completely turned the position 
at Thermopylai. To put the [xjitit shortly : Herodotus takes some 
cognizance of the tactical aspects and problems of the case, but ignores 
or betrays little appreciation of its larger strategic aspects. In fact 
Thermopylai is not, and never was, a position so strong and easily 
defensible as it appears to have been accounted. The defence can be 
turned not merely by sea, on the north, but by land, on the south ; 
and again, not merely by the path Anopaia, over Kallidromos, but by 
the passes between Iv/dlidronios and Oita, from Malis into Doris. It 
is (at least in my judgement) highly improbable that the Greek con- 
federates were so ignorant of the land-routes in Greece, between 
Delphi, for example, and Thessaly, as nut to be well aware of the 
possibility of a Persian column penetrating by the Trachini.'in route 
into Phokis and the upper Kophisos valley. They might possibly have 
been ignorant of the mountain-path. Anopsia, albeit that supposition, 
or, if you will, that tradition, is not easily to be accepted. Kallidromos 
is by no means an imi>assablo barrier : paths and routes over such a 
hog's back are matters of course, even to the mere tourist ; there were 
plenty of men in the confederate ninks well acqu.ainted with the 
locality. For tho solo defencn of Thermopylai the forces under tho 
immediate command of Leonidas were probably sufficient : the sequel 
proves as much. Provision was also made for guarding the mountain- 
track by which Thermopylai could be least circuitously turned. This 
provision was inadequate, albeit there is no knowing what a thousand 
resolute men might not have effected in such a situation, had the situa- 
tion been so simple as the Herodotean story assumes. But to cover 
not merely Thenmopylai-Anopaia, but also the pass from Malis into 
Doris, to say nothing of the route ' through the Ainiancs,' the forces 
under the disposal of Leonidas were not sufficient. The question 
arises whether nothing was done, and that on either side. Did the 
Greeks leave this large door open, by which a Persian column might 
have penetrate<l into Phokis, into Boiotia, and as far as Delphi itself, 
while Leonidas continued to hold Thermopylai, and to keep the 
Persians in front of him at play 1 Or did the Persians, with none to 
bar the main rojul west of Kallidromos, make no use of that open door, 
or use it first, after they had forced Thermopylai, and even (so 
Herodotus might seem to imply) then at last exclusively, and in 
preference to the route along the coast f The story of Thermopylai, 
as told by Herodotus, is wholly concerned with the actions of Leonidas 
and the men immediately under his command : in that story, so 
preoccupied, the full strategic problem, inevitably raised by the 
consideration of the mere geographical data, is ignored. We are not 



272 



HERODOTUS 



APP, ▼ 



bound by the Herodotean convention, but rather are bound iit least to 
state the problem in its entirety. Its solution, of course, is another 
matter. For a solution nothing short of definite tradition can be 
satisfactory, and a definite tradition is not forthcoming. But there 
are not wholly wanting hints in the Heroilotean stories, which point 
beyond the Herotioteiin conception. If the forces under Leonidas 
were enough to hold Thermopylai, why were they proclaimed as 
merely the advanced guard, or van, of the confederate army ? What 
was the main body to do when it arrived ? If there was unea-siness 
and discontent in the contingent under Leonidas, were not these feelings 
connected with the unguanled condition of the Tnichinian pass i Vt'tis 
that pass wholly and from first to last unguarded ? Were none of the 
local tribes, already or still, pledged to its defence 1 If some of the 
forces under Leonidas were deteiched and sent away, was it homcwai'da 
they were sent, in the first instance, and not perhaps round, or across, 
the hills, to Doris, and the opening of the Trachinian pass? Was 
there no fighting on that route, because none has been recorded by 
Herodotus ? He drew his knowledge of the defence of Themiopylai 
mainly from Spartan sources : they were more concerned ^^•^th the 
apotheosis of the three hundred than with the strategic lesson of the 
campaign. The jmsition of Thermopylai was turned ; it might have 
been rendered untenable by passing a Persian column over the western 
pass : the mere silence of Herodotus does not prove that no such 
operation was conducted, nor, in the absence of explicit tradition, can 
it now be categoricttliy asserted. But the hypothesis agrees not merely 
with the general conditions of the case, but with some positive hints, 
some otherwise anomalous items, in the story, and at least deserves 
recognition among the rival explanations of the result, 

§ 4. The problem of what actually took place at Artemision and 
Thermopylai may now be approached with better hope of finding a 
relatively convincing solution, undisturbed by reference to the remoter 
and unrecorded corollaries of the whole transaction. The initial 
requisite here is to establish the exact tci-ms of the synchroaism 
between the operations of the fleets and the actions of the land-forces, 
from the point of departure in Therme down to tiie Persian occu{)ation 
of Thermopylai and Ailemision. A sort of journal of events is 
pi'escnted by Herodotus in the natural order, and with Therme as the 
starting-point. But the synchronism on this method is imperfectly 
determined, for two reasons : first, t!ie exact period of deiay on the 
part of the Persian fleet behind the army at Therme is ambiguously 
stated ; secondly, the exact point of rejuncture between army and 
fleet is open to dispute : at neitlier end, in fact, does a certain result 
emerge on this method. In short, the true -synchronisms cannot be 
determined by comparing the independent diaries of the fleet and of 
the army ; the given synchronisms must be taken as the point of 
departure for reconstructing the diaries throughout. On this scheme 




we shall proceed from the better to the less ascertained, and from the 
later to the earlier stages. Let the fixed point of departure be the 
recorded fact that there were three days' fighting by land, and three 
days' fighting at sea, the (ruiuum of each being one and i«lentical. From 
this point it is easy to reconstruct the diaries of Ht-et iind army, at 
least back to the day upon which the Persian fleet finally left Therme. 
Thus, the three days' fighting for the fleet are preceded by three days 
of storm, and the storm bursts upon the night immediately succeeding 
the passage of the Persian fleet from Therme to the Magnesian coast. 
In short, the log of the fleet alone comprises but a week of seven liays 
inclusive, from the departure out of the Makedonian port to the third 
and final engagement off Aphetai, and may be represented in ibc 
following table : — 

Loo OF TEE FUCET 

First day : Leaves Therme and reaches Magnesia. 

Second day ; Stonn. 

ThirtJ day : Slorin. 

Fourth flay ; Storm. 

Fifth day : Movea to Aphetai : first engagement. 

Sixth day : S«conJ engagemeat- 

Seventh day : Third and last engagement. 

The certain synchronism between the fighting by land and bj' sea 
is the point of dejmrture for the reconstruction of the diary of the 
army : that is, the Hfth, sixth, and seventh days in the log of the fleet 
are identical with the last three days, the days of fighting, on land. 
But the first day of fighting by land is preceded by four days of 
recorded inaction, or pause. It follows that the second, third, and 
fourth of these days of inaction, or pause, in the diary of the army, 
correspond exactly with the three days of storm at sea, which figure 
as the sccoml, third, and fonrth days in the log of the fleet. While 
Boreas, or Hellespontias, was raging on the sea, and reducing the 
king's fleet to a negligible quantity, the king was at rest, with his 
army, in front of Thermopylai. There remains the first day, upon 
M'hich the fleet made from Therme to the Magnesian shore. During 
this day the king was already resting in front of Thermopylai. This 
rest appears essential in the plan of campaign to give time for the 
advent of the fleet ; but whether it is to be construed as a complete 
inactivity appears more doubtful. The natural presumption is that 
on this day, whereon the fleet left Therme, the king arrived at Trachis, 
aad in front of Thermopylai. Like enough some part of his forces, 
perhaps a column, was there before him. Uis intention, presumably. 
was that the assault upon the Greek positions by land and sea should 
take place upon the following day. The storm arose and spoilt, or 
postponed, fur three days the execution of this pl&u. Nothing 

VOL. II T 



2~i 



HERODOTUS 



Al'P. V 



expi)ses more completely the true character of the Herodotean sources, 
and the Herodotean method, than the total absence of any reference 
in this narrative to the obvious connexion between the three days' 
storm and the apparent waste of time by tije Persian army before 
Thermopylai — unless, indeed, it bo the trivial and absurd motives 
ascribed to the Persian king for bis inactivity. This inaction, how- 
ever, extends back one day earlier — if inaction it was, and not a day 
upon which the king himself takes up his position in the Persian 
camp. How many days had elapsed since the king's departure from 
Therme, or Pieria, is not quite clear ; but the jjoint is comparatively 
trifling. For an appreciation of the strategic and tactical problems 
connected with the defence of Artemision and Thermopylai it is 
sufficient to have established : (i.) the exact synchronism of the three 
days of fighting ; (ii.) the exact synchronism of the three days of 
storm at sea, with three of the four days' |iause on land ; (iii.) the 
exact synchronism of the first of those days of inaction on land, or 
more proltably the day of tiie king's own arrival in front of Thermo- 
pylai, with the day of the departure of the tieet from Therme and its 
arrival at Magnesia. Thus the synchronous and interrelated action 
of the Persian arm_v and fleet for the seven days immediatfly pre- 
ceding the final catastrophe of the Greeks, on their first line of defence, 
is fully and ck-arly established. The shorter diary of the fleet from 
Therme to Thermopylai is indeed complete ; the longer diary of the 
land-forces is almost a blank, and the exact interval between their 
defxirture from Therme and their arrival at Trachis open to dispute. 
Two chronological data are supplied incidentally, but neither is quite 
free from ambiguity, (a) Xerxes is reported to have arrived in Malis 
" on the third day " (rptTatos), apparently before the arrival of the 
Persian fleet at Aphetai (7. 196); but on the above reading of the 
other evidences, tho day of the arrival of the fleet at Aphetai is 
the fifth day of the king's jiresence in Malis. The term TptTaiof, 
however, admits of another explanation more in harmony with tho 
diary of the fleet. The day in question is not the third day bf/t/rc 
but the third day after the date of some other event. Unfortunately 
that event., not being expressed, must be conjectured. Tlie most 
obvious material considerations suggest that the ifrmmw.s a quo, or 
starting-point, is the visit of Xerxes to Halos in Achaia, or bis 
' passage through Tbessaly and Achaia' mentioned in the inime<iiate 
context : that is, Xerxes reached Malia the day but one after he bid 
reached Halos in Achaia. If this suggestion be accepted, nine clear 
days are accounted for in the diary of the king's movement*, viz. the 
three days of fighting at Thermopylai, three preceding days of inaction 
on land (and storm at sea), and the three days again preceding, on 
the last of which Xerxes reaches Malis, on the middle one of which 
Xerxes was apparently at Halos, and on the firet of which the king 
entered Achaia from "Theasaly," or rather perhaps from Pelasgiotis. 



f* 



ARTEMISION-THERMOPYLAl 



275 



How many days had previously elapsed since the king, and at least 
the column with which he moved, had begun the march, is not quite 
clear. The answer turns upon the interpretation to be given to (i) the 
" eleven " days' start allowed by the fleet to the army in the advance 
from Thenne (c. 183). Taking the eleven days as reckoned exclusively, 
and the day on which the fleet left Therme as the twelfth day in 
the Ephernerides of the army, and also ais coincident with the day of 
the king's entrance into Mails, nine days will have elapsed since the 
first movement of the army into Thessaly over the northern passes, 
and the arrival of Xerxes in Achaia will be dated to the tenth. The 
harmonized diaries of the army and navy may consequently be 
exhibited as in the following table : — 

Persian Diaky, from Therme to Thermopylai 

First day : Xerxes and the ariiiy column slarl. 

Second-Ninth days : Xerxe« and the arm}' in Thessaly. 

Tenth day : (1) Xerxes enters Achaia 

Eleventh day : (S) Xerxes at Haloa 

Twelfth day : (3) Xerxes enters Malia 

Thirteenth dny ; 

Foorteenth day : 

Fifteenth day : 

Sixteenth day : Fint land eiigageuient. 



Seventeenth day : Second land engage- 
ment. 

Eighteenth day : Third laud engage- 
ment 



First day : Fleet leaves Therme. 

Second day : Storm. 

Third day : Storm. 

Fourth day : Storm. 

Fifth day : Fleet reaches Aphetai : 
First naval engugeinent. 

Sixth day: Second naval engage- 
ment. 

Seventh day : Third naval engage- 
ment. 



Nineteenth day : 
Twentieth day : 
Twenty-firat day : 



Eighth day : King's fleet occupies 

Histiaia. 
Ninth day : Visit of the Marines to 

Thermopylai. 
Tenth day : Visit of the Marines to 

Theimopylai, 



In relation to this harmonized journal of the army and fleet 
several points are almost self-evident ; the diaries are produced from 
the Persian and not from tiie Hellenic side ; the journal of the Persian 
fleet is presunmbly the more authentic, exact, and primary: an 
observation quite in accord with the most probable proveiiience of 
the historian's sources in this matter. Possibly the naval journal is 
unduly compressed. Purely material considerations might suggest 
that the movements of the fleet would have so been timed that the 
3hips of wiu' should reach Aphetai, or the Pagasaian gulf, while the 
king was at Halos in Aciiaia ; yet the diary shows that the fleet only 




276 



HERODOTUS 



APP. V 



leaves Thertne oa the very day whereon Xerxes reaches Trachis. In 
view, however, of the formal precision and agreement between the 
tu'o diaries, all the more authoritative becaaae obviously undesi^'ned 
by the historian, we are not at liberty to depart in this case from the 
strict evidence supplied by Hero<Iotas. The above table might at 
least be accepted &s supplying the best regulative scheme for the data 
in Herodotus, as well on the material as on the formal side. 

The parallel journals, however, as so far reconstructed, leave out 
of account certain events and movements, especially at sea, the proper 
appreciation of which must be of the utmost importance for the 
reconstruction of the actual story of the operations. These items are 
imperfectly, or even erroneously, chronologized by Herodotus, at least 
if an intelligible account is to be given of the operations as a whole. 
Such problematical points concern chiefly the three following episodes : 
(i.) The retreat of the Greek fleet from Artemision to Chalkia (7. 183), 
and its return {7. 192). (ii.) The despatch of the squadrou of 200 
vessels round Euboia to take the Greek navy in the rear (8. 7). 
With each of these major episodes a minor episode is connected, viz. 
{i.b} the first encounter at sen between the ton advanced Persian 
vessels and the three Hellenic (7. 179-182), and (ii.i) the advent and 
report of Skyllias, the Diver, in the Hellenic naval camp (8. 8). 
There is also (iii.) an episode, viz. the capture of the fifteen ships 
forming the rear-guard of the king's Heet on its way to Aphetai (7. 
1114-195), which stands curiously irrelated to the material sequel. 
Upon the determination of the chronological position, and causal 
relations, of these episodes must largely depend our conception of the 
actual course of events, especially at sea, upon the occasion. 

(i.) TVje retreat of the Greek fieet from Artemision to ChuUdi is directly 
connected by Herodotus with (i.J) the advance of the ten ships, which 
form a flying and exploring squadron, and their success against the 
three Hellenic vessels which were on the !o<ik-out off Skiathos. 
News of the disaster to their three vessels is conveyed to the Greek 
Ueet at Ai'temision by fire-signals, and the Greek fleet, in terror, 
removes from Artemi.sion to Chalkis. This teiTor is simply caused, 
to all appearance, by the failure of their three vessels to make way 
in the open against the ten ' barlmriau ' ships. The whole Greek 
Heet apparently retreats before the flying scjuadron of ten vessels ! 
The exact day upon which this retreat was effected is not precisely 
indicated, but might apparently have been some days before the king's 
fleet finally advanced from Therme to the Magticsian coast ; for the 
ten ships, after losing three of their number on the Ant-rock Ijetween 
Skiathos and the mainland, return to Therme, and report their adven- 
ture to the Persian admirals. Nor was that all : the " barbiirians " 
had time to despatch the same, or some other, squadron back to the 
Ant- rock, for the purpose of erecting a guide-pillar of white marble 
on the treacherous reef as a warning to the fleet; all which must 



§4 



ARTEMISION-THERMOPYLAI 



277 



have taken time, and falls apparently into the ten days immediately 
after the king's movement into Thesaaly. The Persians were not 
yet in possession of the pass of Tempe, or of Thessaly itself, or the 
Athenians, who beached their ship "at the outlet of the Peneioa," 
could hardly have made their way by land through Thessaly to 
Athena. That these fugitives betook themselves '* to Athens " and 
not to Chalkis, much less Artemision or Thermopylai, is not the least 
curious item in the story. The date of their arrival at home, the 
time spent on the way, are points not specified. The story, as it 
stands, is not credible, nor even plausible. The Greek fleet cannot 
have retired to Chalkis, or even contemplated such a retreat, so long 
as the Greek army was occupjnng Thermopylai. Least of all can the 
Greek admirals have retired simply on learning — by bale-fires — that 
two or three of their vessels had been overcome by the advancing 
Persian fleet, or its vanguard. The reality, though not perhaps the 
precise date, of the episode of the three ships can hardly be doubted ; 
but the Greek fleet never retired " to Chalkis " in consequence. If 
the Greek fleet terajwrarily evacuated its station at Artemision, there 
was some other and sufficient reason therefor. The station is re- 
occupied apparently on the second day of the storm (7. 192) in 
consequence of the reports brought (to Chalkis!) by their scouts of 
the storm, and the havoc it was working on the king's fleet (cc. 183, 
192). Why the Greek fleet should now have been in such a hurry 
to ro-occupy a relatively exposed position, before the storm had spent 
its fnry, is not obvious ; but that the movement to and fro Artemision, 
if such a movement took place, should be connected with the storm, 
and not with the mere fortunes of the three ships on the outlook, is 
a more than jjlausible hypothesis. That the Greek fleet put right 
back to Chalkis is patent exaggeration : the guard of the Eurii)06 
did not require the whole force, nor could Thermopylai be left exposed 
on the sea side. The Greek fleet may have moved down the channel 
of Oreos to gain shelter from the storm ; but, if so, this movement 
will only have taken place on the 13th day of the diary, above given, 
and many days after the misadventure of the three look-out ships — 
unless, indeed, this adventure itself is to be brought down and dated 
to the 12th, the day on which the Persian fleet left Therme and 
reached the Magnesian shore. In this case, indeed, the coherence of 
the argument is assured. On the 12th, early in the morning, the 
Persian fleet leaves Therme : ten of the swiftest and leading vessels 
encounter, ofT Skiathos, towards evening, the three Hellenic vessels 
on the look-out, and ultimately make prize of them, only the crew of 
the Athenian ship eff'ecting their escape (ultimately, by who knows 
what roundalxmt route) to Athens. News of the advance of the 
whole Persian fleet is telegraphed to the Greek fleet at Artemision. 
That same night bursts the storm, which is to rage for three days, 
upon the Persian fleet erposed to its full fiiry in the open. The 



278 



HERODOTUS 



APP. V 



Greek fleet shifts its niooringa, or its strand, further down the channel, 
perhaps round the cape Lithada into the channel of AUilanti, to be 
out of the fury of the Helleapontias — that wind would blow full up 
the channel of Oieos. 'When the storai abated, and hardly before, the 
Greek fleet made its way back to its proper station : that is to say, 
probably on. the morning of the 1 6th day. 

(ii.) The despatch of the 200 .f}iips, to sail rmind Euboia and seize 
the EuripoB, or even attack the Greek vessels in the rear, is apparently 
dated by Herodotus exactly to the 1 6th, the day on which the Persian 
fleet reaches Aphetai. On the same day (ii.J) SkylUas arrives in the 
Greek njival camp and informs the Greek admirals of the shipwreck 
of the Pei-sian fleet, and of the despatch of the squadron of 200 vessels 
round Euboia, The twu points are not, indeed, harmonious. Such a 
ship-wrecking as Her«j4lotu3 has described ofi" the Magnesian coast, 
would hardly have left the Persians disposed to detach a squadron of 
200 sail to go round Euboia. Moreover, a part of the news ascribed 
to Skyllias was utterly stsile. The Greek admirals already er hjjMjthesi 
know all about the storm from their own scouts (to say nothing of 
beacon-fires from Skiathos). Here again a fresh arrangement, another 
perspective for the daUi in Herodotus, is inevitable. The advent of 
Skyllias is, perhaps, post-dated ; he reached the Greek fleet not on the 
16th hut on the 13th, bringing news, indeed, of the 8hii>wrecking on 
that first day of the storm, and also of the movement of a squadron of 
200 ships round Euboia. This stuudron too is destined to be wrecked, 
" off the Hollows of Euboia," and a second storm is raised to wreck it. 
But, if the squadron was despatched on the 12th, the storm, which 
destroyed it, is the same storm as fell upon the Persian fleet off the 
Magnesian sliore, and the odd reduplication of the storm is simply 
accounted for l>y the variety and incoherence of Herodotus' sources. 
Or, even if the advent of Skyllias to the Greek admirals is correctly 
dated fco the 16th, yet he may well have brought the first news of the 
despatch of the squadron round Euboia. Though its fate was still 
problematic, the Greeks must have reckoned on the possibility of it« 
destruction in the storm, which had raged for three days. On the 
ITth the Greeks at Artemision are reinforced by the squadron of 
fifty-three Attic ships, in which we may well see the rearguard of the 
Greek fleet detached and sent Ixack to form or to reinforce the guard 
of the Euripos against the squadron circumnavigating Euboia. This 
Athenian contingent brings news of the total destruction of the Persian 
squadron, a fact which had set them free to rejoin the main fleet for 
the defence of the channel of Oreos. Thus, in all these respects, 
compression appears to be necessary in order to obtain from the 
Horodotean story — itself but a string of incoherent episodes — the true 
sequence and connexion of events. Nor is the process here quit© 
completed yet. Besides the advent of Skylliiw on the IGth to the 
Greek camp, two other events are dated to that day, for both of which 



§§ 4-6 



ARTEMISION-THERMOPYLAI 



279 



room can hardly be found in the already well-stocked journal : namely, 
(iii.) thr aiplure of the- fijken Persian vessels, forming the rearguard 
of the fleet (7. 194), and (iii.6) the first engagement at sea ofT Aphetai 
(8. 9-11). The two episodes are manifestly to be placed upon the 
same day (the 16th), yet they are narrated at a considerable interval 
by Herodotus, and put into no sort of connexion with each other. In 
the one case fifteen ships fall, by an error, into the hands of the Greeks 
off Artemision ; in the other case thirty ships arc captured a& the 
result of an engagement ; but, oddly enough, the two sets of captured 
ships belong to the same division of the king's fleet The one story 
is obviously from an Asianic source ; the other story, no less obviously, 
from an Athenian. Allowing for the ditference of the sources, it 
would not be ditliciilt to Iinrmoniso the two versions, and to see in 
them various accounts of one and the same exploit. The explanation 
of these two stories as an unconscious doublet, the reduction of the 
two exploits to a single one, and one on the lesser scale, has the further 
advantage of bringing the achievements of the Greek fleet off Arte- 
mision more into accordance with the spirit of the tradition, which 
certainly rather depreciates the naval results. 

§ 5. The foregoing observations and argimienta involve a re- 
construction of the whole story in journalistic form for some three 
weeks to the following effect 

Fir.^l (lay, Xerxes and the army start to cross the passes into 
Thessaly, leaving the fleet still at rest in the bay of Therme. For 
eleven days, including the first, the fleet remains in the same position, 
giving the army-columns time to make their way into Thessaly and 
out of it again on the other side, before the fleet moves from Therme. 
During this pause the Persian fleet need not have been wholly inactive. 
The mission of the ten advanced cruisers, their encounter with the 
three Hellenic 8hi]>s, their subsequent misadventure off" the Murmer, 
the steps taken to buoy, or rather to land-mark, that channel, might 
be dated during the first week ; but a more compressed jwrspective is 
here adopted in preference, and room found for all the action of the 
Persian fleet within the later and clearly marked week. For nine 
days the journal of the army is also a blank, while the army is un- 
doubtedly upon the march through Thessaly. At least two, and 
prol)ably all three, Persian columns, or distinct jiortions of all three 
columns, entered Thessaly, and no doubt by three distinct passes. 
Xerxes himself may have crossed the mountains by the Petra 
pass, seeing that he had been moving previously with the centre 
column ; though it is surprising to find the king avoiding the easier 
coast-road. Two other columns, perhaps, entered Thessaly by the 
passes of Tempe and of Volustana respectively. Now, if not before, 
the king may have visited the Pencios gorge, and made the ingenuous 
remarks reported b}' Herodotus at an earlier point : now, in any case, 
the race-meeting must have been held, in which the Persian horaea 



280 



HERODOTUS 



APF. V 



and horsemen proved their vast superiority over the Thessaliaii cavairv. 
On the tenth day Xerxes marches out of Thesaaly (Pelasgiotis 1) into 
Achaia, and on the eleventh may have passed by Halos. Here at any 
rate Xerxes is moving by the coast-route ; but there can be little 
doubt that another column crossed from Thessaly and Achaia into 
Malis and Trachinia, by the regular and main pass of Thaumakoi, over 
the Otkrys range, One Persian column, perhaps the left or coast 
column, possibly remained bohind in Thess;dy, to secure the Persian 
lines of communication, and the fidelity of the tribes in the king's 
rear. On the tivdfth day the king, moving by the coast route, enters 
Malis, and proliably finds the right column already encamped upon 
the banks of the Spcrcheios. Xerxes had moved at no insignifi- 
cant pace if he rejiches Trachis " upon the third day " after quitting 
" Thessaly," or even after passing Halos. On this same day, at early 
dawn, the fleet had started from Therrae, and by evening found itself 
off the "Ovens" of Magnesia. The flying squadron had headed the 
main body, encountered and captured the Aiginetin, Troizenian, and 
Athenian cmisei-s, and perhaps advance*! as fur south as the Ant-rock, 
in the channel between Cape Sepias and the island of Skiathos, to 
prepare the passage for the main fleet. Ere nightfall the squtidron of 
two hundred sail had been detached to circumnavigate Eul)oia, and to 
secure the Euripos. That night the storm burst upon the Persian 
fleet off Magnesia, and upon the squadron that was making its way 
round Euboia. For three full days (13th, 14th, 15th) the storm 
raged, reducing the king to inactivity on land, and working destruc- 
tion, doubtless exaggerated by rejrort but still in reality con.siderable, 
upon the Persian fleet. In pjuticular, the squadron off Euboia was 
virtually annihilated. The (Jreek fleet had retired before the storm 
into the more sheltered channel of AialanSi. Upon the abatement of 
the storm, i.e. on tfte sixteenth, the Greek fleet returned, as it was 
bound to return, to its former position, or at least to some position in 
the channel of Oreos, based upon, Euboia. The tactical aim of the 
Greek fleet in this place appears perfectly simple and obvious. It« 
primary purpose is to prevent the passage of the king's ships through 
the channel. For that purpose the Greek fleet is not drawn up acrosa 
the channel, a position wherein it« left wing would have rested on the 
Achaian coast, already fully in the enemy's possession, wherein, too, 
the advance of the Persian fleet would have to be met front to front. 
The actual position of the Greek fleet was tactically far superior. 
The Greek lines e.xtended along the Euboian strand, and enabled the 
defenders to attack the king's ships in flank, shoidd the Persian 
admirals attempt to force a way down the channel. Early that same 
afternoon (16th) the Persian fleet was seen rounding Sepias, and 
making into the giilf of Pagasai for Aphetai. This movement waa 
carried out without interference from the Greeks, who might, perhaps, 
have attempted to take the Persian fleet at a disadvantage during this 



ARTEMISION-THERMOPYLAI 



281 



I 



$5 

manccuvre. It is to be observed that the Greek admirals allow the 
ptissage of the Persian fleet, ex hypotfiesi aadly damaged by the three 
days' storm, to AphetAi >nthout challenge or attack. The waterway 
was large ; the Persian main fleet had not suffered so very grievously 
from the storm ; the Phoeniciun, if not the Ionian, marine was still 
accounted superior to Athenian or Peloponnesian ; a Lakonian was in 
command ; the Greek admirals had not yet risen to a full sense of 
what was required of them ; even Themistokles was, perhaps, still 
anxious to spare the resources of Athens. One limited success good- 
fortune brought the Greeks : a squadron of fifteen vessels fell into 
their hands. Among the commanders on board were Sandokes, a 
Persian, the governor of Aiolian Kyme, a man with a remarkable 
piist ; Aridolis, tyrant of Alabanda in Karia ; the Paphian Penthylos ; 
and we may probably venture to add the Salaminiau Philaon. To 
these dimensions may be reducible the "mighty sea-fight," too fully 
described in the Eighth Book, Now, on this evening, perhaps for 
the first time, the Greek admirals, lie it from Skyllids or from 
Antidoros of Lemnos, the sole "deserter" (!) from the king's side, or 
from their captives on the fifteen ships, learned the despatch of the 
squadron of two hundred sail round Euboia : in the narrative the 
point of time at which the Greeks heard of the despatch of the 
squadron may have been confounded ^vith the point of time at which 
the squadron wa.s desjiatched. A good jmrt of that squadron had 
already gone down to the bottom, or on to the rocks of Euboia, as the 
Greek acimirals knew at bitest next day ; but they now detached, or 
thought of detaching, a portion of their own fleet to reinforce the 
rearguard, which had doubtless been left to hold the Euripos. Mean- 
while, upon this same day, the first assault had been made upon 
Thermopylai, and had been successfully resisted. This event too 
was kuown doubtless ere morning to the leaders on the Greek fleet. 
The Medes, the Elamites, and the Persian " Immortals " were all 
engaged by the book at Thermopylai upon this day ; but the fighting 
at Thermopylai is done too much per schema, or schedule, and little 
confidence can be placed in the details. Apparently on this, the 
•ixteentb day of the whole journal, which is the fifth day of the Log 
of the Persian Fleet, and the first day of actual battle at Artemision 
and Thermopylai, the fighting on land was more serious and on a 
larger scale than the fighting at sea. A determined effort was made, 
by a frontal attack, to force the pass at Thermopylai. The exact 
acone of the fighting is in doubt, but probably should be limited to 
the space between the wall and the western gate of the pass, which 
Loonidas can hardly have attempted seriously to maintain.^ The 
Persian fleet evidently made no effort to force the channel on this 
day, nor is it credible that the Greeks, after allowing the Persians to 

' The King's men ooiilU eaxily hmve ■wtrmed orer the compsnitivoly easy col. or 
■pur, whioh forms 'the Western Gate.' 



282 



HERODOTUS 



App. r 



come to anchor, or to shore, at Aphetai, advanced, late in the after- 
noon, to draw the Barbarians out to battle, and to sample the sort of 
fighting to be expected from that quarter. The Greeks were content 
\rith their lucky capture of fifteen ships or so, and witli the oppor- 
tunity of magnifying this stroke of luck into a great victory. 

Un the mvenifenth day { = the sixth, the second) some 6ghting 
apparently took place both by sea and land. The Pei-sian fleet, indeed, 
remained inactive at Aphetai ; but the Hellenes, reinforced by the 
arrival of fifty-three Attic ships, which apparently brought news of 
the fate of the Persian squadron off Euboia, are credited with an 
attack on the Kilikian ships, their destruction, and a victorious return 
to " Artemision." The account of this naval success is of a somewhat 
perfunctory order. No explanation is given of the means by which, 
while the king's fleet is doing nothing at Aphetai, the Greeks manage 
to become engaged with a considerable but aiJiMiretitly isolated con- 
tingent. The fate of the Kiliktan squadron is also suspicious ; it is 
all destroyed, no prizes taken, no fibres given. Are these Kilikian 
ships haply the remnant of the two hundred ships that had been 
despatched round Euboia? Are they too cut off, aa they are making 
their way back to the main fleet 1 Is this exploit another of the kind 
reported (in Bk. 7) for the previous day, and niagtu'fied again into a 
grand achievement 1 Possibly the achievement this time was not an 
Athenian one, or we might have had richer details. Anyvfay, neither 
the lost squadron, nor these unnumbered Kilikian ships, perhaps a 
section of it, ever rejoined the king's fleet ; and we have no record of 
these adventures from the Asianic side. The account of the night 
and day at sea, even for the scenes laid at Aphetai, is obviously 
traceable to European sources. 

Perfunctory as is the account of this day's doings in the fleet, the 
account of the fighting on land is even more so. Details are lost in a 
mere vague generalization. Fighting there may have been: the result 
will have disappointed the king. But this day was nevertheless for 
ever memorable :ls the day upon which the decision was taken, or 
acted on, to abandon the mere frontal attack upon Therm opylai, and 
to attempt a circumvention, by sending round a body of men, inland, 
to attack the Greeks from the rear. " About the time of the lighting 
of the lamps " Hydarnes set out from the Persian camp, at the head 
of the choicest troops in thti Persian army, the myriad of " Immortals." 
Guided by a local man, thoy ascend the gorge of the Asopos, follow a 
track behind the cliffs of Kidlidromos overlooking the hot springs, and 
descend, pfist the modern village of Fhakospilia, by a good path, upon 
the rear of the " middle gate " of Thermopylai, and the Greeks posted 
there. The march was a night's stiff work. The path was no secret, 
and the possibility of some such attempt on the part of the Persians 
had been fully taken into account by the defenders. A thousand 
Pbokians at least wore posted near the top of the pass to bar the way. 



so 



ARTEMISION-THERMOPYLAI 



283 



Even if outnumbered, ten to one, who can say what a thousand resolute 
and well-armed men might not have effected, aa far as this particular 
path was concerned t So far as the Herodotean story goes, there was 
some cowardice, or incompetence, on the part of the Phokians, who 
retired up to higher ground, perhaps expecting to be attacked, yet 
remaineil inactive, when the enemy gave them the go-by. The whole 
situation may not be fully represented in the Herodotean story : the 
ten thousand, who came round by the path Anopaia, may not have 
been all the men who had climbed the Asopos gorg« ; the head of a 
Persian column may already have pushed its way into Doris. In any 
case, the position of Leonidas at Thermopylai had l^een tunied, and 
the fate of the defenders scaled. 

Not until about mid-day — if we may trust the Herodotean horologe 
— was any movement discernible in the king's fleet. For two days 
the Persian vessels had remained at Aphetai, refitting, or what not, 
after their rough experiences. On the water the Greeks had so far 
taken the offensive ; but the actual fighting has been reduced above 
to very mcKlest proportions as compared with the ostentatious reports 
preserved by Herodotus. On the first day some fifteen ships, or so, 
had been cleverly isolated and cut oil' from the rear of the Persian 
fleet ; on the second day the remnant of the wrecked and scattered 
squadron, previously detached to circumnavigate Euboia, had fallen 
into the hands of the Greeks. Now, upon the third day, the Persian 
fleet at last assumes definitely the offensive, and advances to attack 
the Greek. This point, a very significant one, appears clear in a 
narrative encumbered with the usual generalities. The Persian 
admirals no doubt had their orders. The definite assault was made 
on the Greek positions by sea and by land at the same time, or on 
the same day. Had not the Persian naval plan miscsirried, a squadron 
woidd have been attempting, at this sjime time, to force the passage 
of the Euripos, or might already have achieved that action. The 
third day's engagement at sea is not claimed as a Greek victory : the 
Greek ships barely hold their own. The Egyptians are most highly 
distinguished on the king's side, and make prize of five Greek ships, 
crews and all. The Athenians among the defenders, and among the 
Athenians Klcinias son of Alkibiade-s, this day deserve the prize of 
valour — more by their sufferings appjirently than by the damage they 
inflict, for half the Athenian ships are disabled or temporarily put out 
of action. Perhaps neither side was left in a position to renew the 
conflict on the morrow ; but, meanwhile, the issue for the nonce had 
Ben decided on land. 
The accounts of the third and last day's fighting on land seem 
Superior to those for the preceding days ; though it would indeed 1)6 
strange if they left nothing to desire, or satisfied a moderately search- 
ing criticism. Leonidas had long known what to expect. As soon 
as the Greeks had reached Thermopylai, they had been 



284 



HERODOTUS 



AFP. V 



itiformeil, by men of Trachis, of the existence of tlie pathway over 
Kallidromou (7. 176), and the Pbokians had undertaken to defend it 
(7. 217). Leonidas must have foreseen that, sooner or later, the 
Persians would make an attempt to circumvent his post by this route, 
even if they did not turn the whole position by a longer circuit over 
the Trachinian pass into Doris. Now, upon this fatal day, the 
eighteenth since the Persians had quitted Therrae, the seventh since 
Xerxes had arrived in Malis, the third since his fleet had reached 
Aphetai, a most determined assault was to be made on the Greek 
defence, as by sea, so by land, and the Spartan king was early apprise<I 
thereof. ^Vhatever the indications read by the gallant diviner, 
Megistias, from the sacrificial entrails, the start of Hydarnes for the 
mountain was duly reported, under cover of night, by Greek deserters 
from the Persian camp. At daybreak their rojvort was fully confirmed 
by scouts, hurrying on short cuts down the mountain-side to announce 
the near advent of the Persian force. In regard to the ensiling action 
of the Greeks there can be in the main little doubt. The forces at 
Thermopylai divided : tlie larger part retired, and made good its 
retreat, no doubt along the main coast-road, and over the pass of 
Hyampolis, into Boiotia, and so to the Isthmos ; the smaller part 
remained, and met a gallant death, fighting to the last moment and 
the last man. Whatever the motive and design of this action, its 
immediate and even its remoter results are plain enough. The 
immediate eflect obviously was to secure the retreat and escape of a 
large number of fighting men, who, had they remained, might indeed 
have raised the price of the Persian victory, but must themselves have 
shared the fate of Leonidas, or increased the number of prisoners, who 
surrendered to the victors. So obvious a result can scarcely have lain 
outside the design of the responsible commander, and those immediately 
about him. The heroes of Thermopylai went to their fate well 
assured that they were purchasing by their deaths the escape of their 
comrades. To this extent it is no exaggeration to say that, in the 
final scene, Leonidas and his men were fighting, of set purpose, a rear- 
guard action, with the definite intention of covering the retreat of the 
main hodj ; in this intention the action was, not merely justifiable, 
but completely successful. The retention of the The.spian8 and of the 
Thebans is also more intelligible from this point of view ; the Boiotian 
contingent remained, perhaps well to the rear of Leonidas and his 
Lakedaimonians, and acted as further cover to the armj' in retreat. 
But whether the fate of the rearguard was already known to be 
desperate, when this resolution was adopted, is not quite so clear and 
certain. If, indeed, the main body evacuated Thermopylai only upfjn 
the morning of this day, and in consequence of the news that the 
position had been turned by the Persians on the path Anopaia, then 
Leonidas at least and the chief officers, as well those who departed as 
those who remained with him, must well have known that the case of 



the rearguard was hopeless. Such is the conclusion forced upon us 
by the Uerodoteon time-table. On such a point, however, Herodotus 
is not quite convincing: the immediate context is riddled with in- 
consisteucies of one kind and another. The resolution to evacuate 
Thermopylai may have been taken somewhat earlier, in conse<iuence 
either of the previous fighting, or of the command of the whole 
position enjoyed by the Persian, in virtue of his possession of the road 
from Trachis over into Doris. The main Ijody of the Greek forces 
may have had a somewhat longer sUirt of the Persians than appears 
in the narrative of Herodotus : the Persian night-march by Anopaia 
may have threatened not the whole Greek force Imt only the rearg\uird, 
which had remained at its post. In either cjise a tactical problem 
most have presented itself to Leonidas and his staff: whether to offer 
front to the Persians descending from the mountain on tlieir rear, or 
to adv.ince and do battle with the Persian main force on their front. 
The exact course of the last action, and the precise details in regard 
to place, time, and circumstance, are open to dispute ; but on the 
whole the probable course of affairs may be established. Apimrently 
the Greeks, on tins occasion, advanced further west to meet the Persian 
fi'ontal attack than in the previous engagements, and may even 
perhaps have pushed out beyond the western gate.' If so, this advance 
was not the desperate attack of doomed men, anxious to shorten their 
inevitable fate, but rather a necessai-y part of the plan for gaining 
time for the retreat of the main forces undistiubed. But a point was 
reached when, from their losses and exiiaustion, and by reason of the 
approach of the ten thousand on their rear, a concentration was 
naturally called for. The fighting had, indeed, been close and 
desperate : Leonidas was already slain, and among the many Persians 
who had fallen were two of the king's own brothers. The men of 
the rearguard were selling, and were still resolvetl to sell, their lives 
dearly. The position of their hisl rally and final annihilation is 
precisely and credibly marked in the narnitivo, no doubt iu view of 
the monuments aftenvards erected and therein described. The hillock 
on which the Lion of Leonidas was couched, in honour of the men who 
had fallen there in dutiful obedience to the laws of Lakedaimon, is 
doubtleaa one of the tliree large mounds immediately within the eastern 
gate of the pass, to the left of the road as you go towards Lamia. 

The fact that the last stand of Leonidas and his men was a well- 
calculated stratagem with a definite tactiod and ultimately strategic 
aim, in no way detracts from its heroic quality. The dead Spartiatai 
at Thermopylai are among the true Immortals : the story of their 
parsing is an everlasting possession for humanity. But the heroes of 
that day can hardly themsolves have realised in their mortal agony 
the remoter results of their example, or the fame and profit that 
should accrue, before all others, to Sparta from the devotion of her 



286 



HERODOTUS 



App. y 



sons. So it must have been in this, as in a score, an hundred, other 
similar cases. " Theirs not to reason why ! " To the soldier, selectad 
for that forlorn hope, or volunteering, it was enough to follow th© 
call of duty, of honour, of loyalty — and to leave the issues on the 
knees of the gods. The leaders may have had a larger or more 
conscious outlook ; but, of course, wherever the most gallant dee^ 
had to be done, the place of Leonidas and his bodyguard was there. 
Who woidd have stayed in Therniopylai had the Spartan king and 
his guards >vithdrawn 1 Policy, duty, devotion, honour, all pointed 
one way — not because under no circumstances was a Spartan permitted 
ever to give way before an enemy's force, but because, on this occasion, 
the smaller number had to be risked, or even annihilated, in order to 
save the rest ; and because, had the leiwJer retreated, taking with him 
his own men, a general stampede had ensued, and all alike would then, 
have shared one and the same inglorious doom. 

§ 6. The defeat at Thermopylai vf&a destined to work out to mors 
credit than a victory ; yet none the less was it at the time a defeat 
for the Greeks, and a decisive military success for the king. Apart 
from the actual losses of the Uroeks in the pass, the victory on land 
rendered the further efforts or resistance of the Heet in Euboian waters 
useless and impossible, Phokis and IJoiotia were now completely at 
the king's mercy : Attica itself was doomed, unless the Peloponnesiau 
forces had taken up a position to the north of Kithairon. The news 
from Thermopylai was hartlly calculated to encourage so bold a line of 
conduct. Tht' Greek flcft itself had been somewhat roughly handled 
in the final engagement off Euboia, and the loss of Thermopylai, and 
presently the discovery that there were no Peloponnesiau troops north 
of the Isthmos, for the moment completely disconcerted its plans, and 
threw the scheme of defence out of gear. Now, if not before, Delphi 
abandoned all hope of the national «uise, and uttered only counsels 
of de-spair. The Jmmetiiate results of Thermopylai were, indeed, dis- 
turbing and apparently disastrous to the Greek cause. Li process; 
of time, when the memories of Salamis ami of Plataia, and a long 
catalogue of successes won from the Persian within the traditional 
frontiera of the Empire itself, grew up to console and to rehabilitate, 
the Greeks at the expense of the Barbarians, the stories of the first 
misadventures, of the early Persian successes, were retold in the liglit 
of later events ; the potty engagements off Artemisiou were magni- 
fied into brilliant Greek victories : the incontrovertible failure at 
Thermopylai was explained away on various hyputheses, possessed of 
one common virtue, that they contradict each other. But, beneath 
the glamour of these contradictory apologies emerges the plain historio 
admission that upon their first well-chosen line of defence the Greeks 
had encountered disaster, and had beaten a retreat. Was that retreat 
to turn to flight, to surrender 1 Or was victory still retrievable in. 
the national cause, upon a lower or inner line of defence t 



Hn^au^ MnBti RffMtc tnDtju. 



BAY 








SALAMIS 



9 !• 8tnt«gtc asp«ctB of the battle of Saiamis. § 2. Character of the records. $ 3. 
The tactical problem (theories of Leake, Blakealcy, Goodwio). ^ 4. Kxt«nt of 
the ditfereuee betweieu Aischyloa aud Hvrodotux. § 5. Solution of tin- tuctical 
(irobleni (the six traditional items in the acvrxiDt). § 0. Vcrilicatiun of the 
propoaed aolution, § 7. Operations of the Persian army in vounexion with 
Salamia. § 8. Failure of the Greeks to exploit their victory. 



§ 1. On the larger aspecU, strategic and military, of the battle of 
Salamig there is hardly much room for serious difference of judgement. 
The whole series of operations, in which the Salaminian victory formed 
a cardinal cri-sis, involved strategic and tactical combinations by sea 
and land. Historical parallels and analogies are seldom, if ever, exact ; 
but it may perhaps be aiid, by way of suggestive illustration, that the 
invasion of Greece by Xerxes combined against Hellas, and especially 
against Athens, the war methods {oSol 7roA</«ji') which, in the later 
struggle of Rome against Carthage, were divided between the first 
and the second Punic wars : albeit Duilius or Claudius was no more 
a Themistokles than Xei-xes or Mardonios was a Hannibal ! But, in 
such cases, the correlation of fleets and armies, on the one side and on 
the other, is rarely so complete and intimate as may have been 
intended. Something occurs on sea, or on land, if not on the one side, 
upon the other, to throw all that complicated machinery out of gear; 
exact co-operation gives way to isolated or alternate adventures, which 
may in the long run, but only at a greater expenditure of time and 
material, bring about decisive results. Such at least was the course 
of working among the secondary causes which determine<l the issue of 
the Persian war. In its fundamental aspects the war is a struggle on 
both elements, and, so long as the Persian maintains the offensive, u()0n 
both elements equally. This its fundamental aspect is fully presented 
in the operations upon the first line of contact. But the collapse of 
the Greek defence at Thermopylai and Artemision is followed by a 
strategic uncertainty and incoherence, which to some extent alters, or 
partially obscures, the real connexion of events. Salamia is, at least 
prima facie, a purely naval operation ; and, although a great victory for 

287 



ass 



HERODOTUS 



APP. VI 



the Greek fleet, it remains in itself indecisive of a war which is a 
question of armies as well as of fleets. The complement of Salamis 
may, inJeod, bo found in the victory of Plataia, ten months later, 
which delivers ancient Hellas for ever from the danger of an oriental 
master. Upon the whole these two victories took place within pre- 
destined and appropriate scenes, linked together by an inner and 
essential relation. Plataia and Salamis %newed continuously represent 
the line upon which, jia a matter of historical fact, the double victory of 
Greece, by land and sea, was accomplished. No better arena for the 
chances of the Greek fleet could have been selected than the straits of 
Sal.imis ; and the northern slopes of Kithairon ofTered a most favour- 
able station for the Greek army, if anything in the nature of a pitched 
battle was to decide the campaign. Yet it might Be«ra as though 
Mardonios was allowed to select his own field in the one case, while in 
tLe other the Greeks Lad been first led by accident, and then compelled 
by a somewhat sinister cunning, to risk an engagement in the water* 
of Salamis. Hints and reminiscences in the traditions of the war, 
the natural relations of places and circumstances, the actual course 
of events, suggest a less accidental and more deliberately chosen 
connexion between antecedents and consequents. In all probability 
Salamis as a naval station for the Greek fleet not merely came to 
stand in a somewhat ideal relation to the position subsequently 
occupied by the Greek army upon Kithairon, but also had some real 
and definite relations to posts actually held by the Greeks on land at 
tbe time. Three such positions require consideration, namely, Salamis, 
the Akropolis, the Isthmos. 

The island of Sahimis itself undoubtedly was not merely a harbour 
and basis for the Greek navy, but an enclosure and portion of Greek 
soil, which would have been obstinately defended to the last, even had 
the Greek navy suflTered annihilation in the Straita. The Peiraieua 
was not yet built or fortified, or it would probably have been garrisoned 
and held by the Athenians, as no doubt Mcgara was actually held by 
its own citizens.' Athens itself was not at this time in a state to stand 
siege ; but the mysterious story of the defence of the Athenian 
Akropolis has been held, by more than one critic, to conceal, or half- 
reveal, a serious military intention, the failure of which considerably 
disturbed the CJreek commanders at Salamis.'-^ The actual distance 
which separated the Greek navy at Salamis from the Greek army 
behind the wall across the lethmos, was hardly so great as the interval 
which had parted the Greek navy off Artemision and the Greek forces 
lielniid the wall at Tbermopylai. When the actual day of battle 
dawned, the Greeks at Salamis, or at least their leaders, perfectly 
understood that the operations at sea were as essentially protective of 
the Isthmo.s and the Peloponne.'o itself, as though the scene of combat 



had becti luid in die bay of Kenchreai. Thus, brokeu for the moment 
though the Greek plan of defence may have been by the collapse at 
Thermopylai, and the non-appearance of the Peloponnesian arms in 
Boiotia, it is not necessary to regard the occupation of Salamis by the 
(Treek tloet as fortuitous or lying outside the general plan of campaign. 
Un the contrary, Salamis may be regarded as the pre-ordained station 
for the Greek fleet, if compelled to abandon Artemision : albeit the 
question of quitting Salamis, or remaining, appears to have been raised, 
perhaps more than once, in the sequel, as the result of other and not 
fully foresei-n developments. 

Thus, when the fleet put in at the Athenian harbour and discovered 
that Attica was to bfl exposed to the full fury of the Persian invasion, 
an urgent question presented itself as to what course the Athenians 
were to adopt. The question was not simply a strategic one : political, 
moral, nay, religious issues were involved. Many good citizens believed 
that Athene was able and willing to save the city, or at least thti 
citjwiol : the resolution to hold the Akropolis against the barbarian had 
in its favour the prospect of an advance by the Peloponnesian forces 
and the relief of the besieged. Now, if not before, recourse was had 
to Delphi for illumination ; now, at this crisis, Delphic responses were 
reported, which, in truly oracular fashion, alTorded equally divine 
encouragement to all three ])088ible alternatives : wholesjde flight, the 
defence of the Akropolis, the naval engagement in Salamiiiian waters.* 
The alternatives were not, indeed, necessarily or mutually exclusive, 
nor was any one of them inconsistent with the plans of Themistokles. 
All three were contemplated, and tried, in the sequel, albeit utter flight 
was u$ed but as an argument, and that itself not quite the dnnier 
ressori of the Athenian statesman, to compel the Peloponnesiaiis to 
fulfil their engagements to Athens.- The fall of the Akropolis, indeed, 
reopened the question, which had firet been raised by the unprotected 
state of Attica as a whole ; for the Persian capture of the Akropolis 
put the actual advance of the Peloponnesian boplites into Attica out 
of the reckoning. Only then, perhaps, did Themistokles demonstrate 
the strategic bearing of the naval {M)sition at Salamis upon the military 
defence of the Isthmos, and reinforce his demonstration by the throat 
of an Athenian secession, even if he did not force the hands of the 
Peloponnesian admirals by a ruse, which involved victory or annihila- 
tion for the Greek naval forces. 

§ 2. Sucli are the broader strategic aspects of the real situation 
at Salamis, at least considered from the Greek side. They were 
hardly to be expected in the poetic brief of Aischylos ; they are but 
obliquely presented in the Herodotean stories, or even in the more 
highly rationalized versions of his successors. But there are not 
wanting, in the traditions all through, materials for some such bold 



' Cp. 7. 140 with Commentary ad I. 
" Cp. 8. 62 and 9. 11. 9. 



VOL. n 



290 



HERODOTUS 



API 



reconstruction; while the whole mass of positive evidence, fai: 
sifted and interpreted, gives a pretty full and intelligible accoun 
the actual dispositions, tactics, and achievements which seci. 
maritime predominance and deliverance for the Greeks. The ator 
Herodotus is, indeed, here, as elsewhere, made up of a host of traditi 
anecdotes, records, items, traceable to various sources, drawn f 
both sides, infected witli local and personal (irejudices and inten- 

full of inconsistencies, improbabilities, fictions. The result, even w 

rationalized, can hardly be other than highly problematical. Here, as 
elsewhere, we desiderate a precise chronology, or horuriuro, which 
might decide so many doubtful points of motive and of action ; nor 
can we even here regard the topography as quite clear and complete, 
although in this case the substantial landscape has not altered appreciably 
since the battle-day itself. More distracting even than chronological 
obscurities or topographical cruces are the irrationalities of motive, 
action, and event, freely predicated of Ixith sides and of all concerned. 
A part, at least, of the historian's sins of omission can be made good 
from other sources, each of which, however, in its turn lies under some 
suspicion of one kind or another. To Aischylos belongs indisputable 
priority in this case ; and, making all allowauce for poetic treatment, 
and dramatic situation, Aischylos must remain the regidative witness 
in regard to the actual battle, of which he, and he alone, writes aa a con- 
temporary and eye-witness for eye-witnesses and contemporaries. In 
case of contradiction between Aischylos and Herodotus, in regard to 
matter of fact, and failing a haimony or expbinulion, the historian must 
succumb to the poet. The more reasoned unity of Diodoros, i.e. of 
Ephoros, is not to be rejected as a mere rationalism of Herodotus' in- 
consiatenciea ; it may contain elements from sul)sidiary sources, and 
authors of the fourth century stood much nearer to the primary sources 
than those of any later age. Plutarch, and some other similar writers, 
are mainly valuable, of com'se, just in so far jis they preserve scraps 
of tradition other than the materials supplied by Aischylos and 
Herodotus. To decide whether an item of apparent tradition, so far 
guaranteed, is much more than a very early inference, or act of re- 
flexion, may not always be easy ; but the point at which this rubicon 
is passed, and inferences, combinations, reflexions, hypotheses, have 
infected mere memory and pure tradition, lies already l>efore the 
Herodotean composition, or oven the j^Uschylean creation. Amid such 
a wealth of variants, possibilities, and rival stories, broken by pauses 
and silences jis perplexing as the sharpest discords of tradition, a 
.synthesis win hardly be obtained which will subsume all alternatives, 
or convince oven all equally well-informed critics. Yet the argument 
of late has advanced quite steadily towards a more and more satisfactory 
conclusion. The latest theory of the battle of Salamis is not tiie 
virgin essay of an isolated genius, solely in contact with the traditional 
evidences, or the verifiable conditions ; it is the product of a dialectical 



process of reconstructive criticism, which has with gro\ring clearness 
sifted fiction and fact, and related traditional fact to verifiable 
conditions, marking precisely more and more the scale of probabilities. 
The last word in such a critique may never be spoken ; but what here 
follows may at least deserve a place of its own in the durable 
argument. 

Chronologictil. — The year, and even the month, and part of the 
month, for the dating of the battle of Salamis, are not liable to much 
difference of opinion. The battle was certainly fought on some day 
in the last deca<1e of Boedromion, that ia to say, September of the 
Attic year of Kalliades, 01. 75. 1 = 480-479 b.c. It is possible to go 
somewhat further, and to propound a particular day ; such a specifica- 
tion might be acceptable as a regidative idea, even if the evidence be 
not quite convincing, nor the argument quite conclusive.' But, even 
if such precision were admitted in regard to the precise day of the 
battle, the journalistic data do not give us quit« so long, nor so clear 
and coherent a perspective in regard to Salamis as has been obtained 
for Artemision-Thermopylai. The events of the day of battle are, 
indeed, clearly marked by Herodotus and by the other authorities ; 
the immediate antecedents of the battle can be re-traced less clearly 
through the preceding night and day. Back from that point the 
intervals to be allowed for the previous action are less and less clear : 
to co-ordinate, or synchronize, the movements of the king's fleet and 
army, or either series with the movements and action of the Greek 
fleet, is not easy. Sevem! indications, indeed, occur in the Herodotean 
text, of a diarial character ; but precise seqtiences, definite intervals, 
strict co-ordination, are wanting. How long was the Greek fleet at 
Salamis before the Persian army made its appearance in Attica, 
and invested the Akropolis 1 How much time is to be allowed for 
the siege of the Akropolis 1 What interval separate<l the arrival of 
the Persian king in Athens and the arrival of his fleet at Phaleron 1 
How many days, or hours, elapsed between the arrival of the king's 
fleet at Phaleron and the actual day of, or day before, the battle t 
Exactly how long did the king's fleet consume in the voyage from 
Artemision to Phaleron ? On the Persian side some precise statements 
are forthcoming upon these points ; especially in regard to the navy 
there is some show still of a diary, such as has already been recon- 
Btnicted for Artemision. Thus six days apjMrenlly elapse between 
the return of the Persian murines from Thermopylai to Histiaia and 
the arrival of the Persian fleet at Phaleron. It is not, indeed, quite 
clear whether tlie days specified are all reckoned inclusively or ex- 
clusively ; but having regard to the actual events, and the magnitude 
of the movements in question, the days may reasonably be reckoned 
exclusively. According to this hypothesis, upon the 27th day of the 
journal, already projected for the synchronous movfmentj? of the 



292 



HERODOTUS 



A.pr 



Persian forces from TLcrmc,' the king's fieet reached Phaieron, by 
means an extravagant estimate in either direction. The army n 
have moved upon the iJlst or 22nd through Thermopylai, or 
movement of the Persian forces through Doris, Phokia, and Boic 
may really have begun a day or two sooner. Five or six da 
indeed, seem none too much to allow for the advance of 
king from Thermopylai to Athens. The arrival of the fleet 
Phaieron was presumably timed to agree with the arrival of the 
army in Attica ; but in this case, as in the previous case, the Persian 
army is given a long start of the Heet, not merely because the fleet 
moves much more rapidly than the army, but also in order to 
enable the army to arrive and establish itself in the next position 
before the fleet advanced to its co-ordinate station. In ancient 
warfare, possession of a land-basis was doubly necessary for naval 
operations in presence of the enemy ; in the present case the 
Persian fleet only left Histiaia, or at least Chalkis, when assured that 
there would be no more fighting north of Kithairon, or even, perhaps, 
outside the Isthmos. If the session of the King's Council (in itaelf 
largely fictitious), or the resolve to give battle to the Greeks, is to be 
dated to the same day as the arrival of the Persian fleet at Phaieron, 
both might be placed the day but one before the battle, which is alio 
the day of the capture of tho Akropolis. The day after the capture 
of the Akropolis, that is the day before the naval battle, is somewhat 
fully reported. This was apparently tho day on which the Greek 
exiles held a sacrifice on the Akropolis ; somewhat later Dikaios and 
Demaratos may conceivably have hatl their vision on the Thriasian 
plain. The king's army was on the move towards the Isthmoa — or 
at least towards Eleusis and Megara : the king's fleet was moving 
up from Phaieron to Salamis. A message, moreover, waa received 
from Salamis at Persian headquarters, which apparently led to a 
further movement or development of the Persian fleet, occupying a 
great part of the night. Movements and events upon the Hellenic 
side have hitherto been left chronologically vague ; but at this point 
it is possible to co-ordinate within limits the action on both sides. 
On the day before the battle the Greeks had already fully determined 
to fight, and on this day, while still the coast was clear, sent to Aigina 
to invoke the Aiakidai. During the night of that day Aristeides 
apparently reported a fuller development of the Persian position, and 
the report was confirme<] ere morning by the Tenian vessel, which 
deserted the Persian for the national side. On the previous day the 
Greeks were, of course, fully aware of the captm-e of the Akropolis, 
and of the arrival of the Pei-sian fleet at Phaieron ; and the two 
events, especially the former, may have reopened the question of 
remaining to do battle at Salamis, or retiring to the Isthmos ; but, 
if so, the decision was certainly again in favour of remaining. 



SALAMIS 



00 

m 



Perliaps only upon the previous day b&d Xerxes made his appearance 
in Attica ; only then at least bad the investment of tlie Akro(>olia 
begun. The precise marches of the king previously must be purely 
'eonjectural ; but, in view of the diary of the fleet, and the approxi- 
mate co-ordination of the movements on sea and land, the foUowing 
table may be provisionally acceptable : — 

Twenty-second day : Xerxea at Ab&i. 
Twenty-third day : Xerxes at Eoroneia. 
Twenty-fourth day : Xerxes at Thebes. 
Twenty-fifth day : Xerxea at Tanagra : Fleet leaves Histiaia. 
Twenty-sixth day : Xerxes at Athens : Fleet under way. 
Twenty-seventh day : Fall of the Akropolis : Aixival of the Fleet. 
Twenty-eighth day : Day before the Battle (Boedrora. 20). 
Twenty-ninth day : The Battle of Salomis, 

The Greek fleet had certainly evacuated its position off Euboiit on 
the night of the 18th day in the reconstructed Diary, and had probably 
made all haste round Sounion. It will have arrived at Saiamis on 
the 20th, or at latest on the 2l8t, five or six days before the appearance 
of Xerxes in Attica. There is time for the measures, both political 
and material, to be taken for the evacuation of Attica, but not too 
much time, if Delphi has to be consulted, as no doubt Sparta, and if 
proposals have to bo passed by the Athenian Council and tlkklesia 
before the material evacuation can take place. Perhaps the move- 
ments of the king's land and naval forces are unduly hurried and 
compressed in the above scheme : it may be taken as defining the 
le&st period that can reasonably be extracted from the records, con- 
rmably to material conditions, for the series of movements in question. 
JBome nicer points, touching day and night, or the precise chronometry, 
mwat be reserved, until the quality of the records have been further 
considered. 

Topographical. — The scene of the battle of Salamis is almost as 
well known, in its main outlines and landscape, as any such scene can 
be. From Cape Kolias to Eleusia the Attic coast is to-day substan- 
tially what it was on the day of battle in 480 6.C. Phaleron, 
Mounichia, Peiraieus, Aigaleos, all the places named by Herodotus, 
are easily identified. The island of Salamis it«elf, the island of 
Psyttaleia, are still much what they were 2500 years ago. Only 
in two or three particulars is there anything problematic in the pure 
topography, as presented by our authorities for the battle, (i.) The 
exact identification of Keos and Kynosoura has been much debated, 
but may now be regarded as definitely settled in favour of the long 
projecting spit forming the south wall of the Bay of Salamia' But 
this identification nither relieves the Herodotean text of a difficulty, 
than determines oiu* theory of the tactics of the Persians on the 




294 



HERODOTUS 



i.PP. TI 



occasion. Tlie tongue of land in question must have been an im- 
portant factor in the battle, whether it can clearly bo identified nominatim 
ifi Herodotus or not. (ii.) Again, the exact site of the temple of 
Athene Skiras has been much discussed. If the site were certainly 
identifiable (by epigrapbic or similar evidence), we might have to 
discard, or to rewrite, the anecdote of the Korinthians in which the 
site figures. If the temple be placed on the coast of Salarais anywhere 
overlooking the bay of Eknisis, or the straits towards Megara — the 
further west the better — the anecdote may be well accommodated in 
a rational reconstruction of the movements during the battle, (iii.) 
Even leas turns upon the identification of the Herakleion (not 
mentioned by Herodotus) in connexion with the site of the throne 
of Xerxes, overlooking the battle-piece. That throne, placed anywhere 
on the slopes of Mount Aigaleos, looking south, will fit well enough 
into every proposed theory of the piece, (iv.) Psyttaleia is the only 
one of the smaller islands, between Salamis and the mainland, which 
actually figures by name in the records. Its prominence may fairly 
be taken to signify that it was the only one which seriously entered 
into the actual tactics of the Kittle, (v.) The head of the mole, pro- 
jected and begun by Xerxes from the mainland to the island of 
Salamis, may have been directed, in the first instance, on to the islet 
of St. George, unless, indeed, it followed still more nearly the line of 
the modern Ferry (SH of the islet). In any case no question, in 
regard to the naval battle, turns on this point ; though this location 
of the mole may be taken to confirm, or to square best with, the situa- 
tion of the Greek ileot in the bay of Salamis. 

Some quasi-topographical difficulties do arise in connexion with 
the e.xact orientation of the battle-lines, and the exact movements of 
the fleet*. These diffieultios, so far as soluble, are to be solved by 
reference to the actual topographical f.-icts, open to verification. If 
not thua soluble, they may be charged as errors upon our authoritie.?, 
but need not be made the ground of belief in any substantive change 
of the landscape, or in any irrational and absurd conduct on the part 
of either combatant. The sequel of this argument may succeed in 
reconciling these apparent difficulties with each other, and with the 
actual scene, without recourse to either of the hj^pothetical devices 
just indicated, and equally without any change or violence done to 
the received text. The exact jmsition of particular vessels at special 
moments in the battle caimot, of course, be very precisely determined ; 
but there is no insuperabJe difficulty in the way of reconciling the 
Herodotean and other traditions with the actual scene to-day ; and 
this landscape, or seascape, is itself one of the chief factors by which 
to determine the significance and intequetation of statements, the 
real meaning of which may not have been always fully present to the 
minds of our first rejwrters. 

Imprrfeciion of the Record. — Far more serious difficulties are raised 



SALAHIS 



P 



r 



by the incompleteness and incoherence, by the partiality and animus, 
displayed in the actual narrative, or series of anecdotes, into which 
the report made by Herodotus breaks up. Here are stories which 
betray such obvious prejudice as to bo ipso facto inadmissible, at least 
in their primary form : sucli as the story of the conduct of the 
Korinthians, expressly discredited by Herodotus himself.^ Yet a 
certain sense, a reasonable deposit of acceptable matter, may be 
extracted even from this story. A good part of the anecdotes of 
Themistokles, here as elsewhere, are open to grave suspicion upon 
similar groiuid : such as the inspiration by Mnesiphilos,^ or the second 
mission of Sikinnos.^ Other matters are simply improbable, or in- 
credible, as they stand : such as the report of the conncil of war 
held by Xerxea,* and the adWce given by Artemisia thereat.'^ For the 
most part, however, the stories are rather incoherent, inconsequent, 
or inadequate than obviously malevolent, or partial, or wilfiUly 
misleading. This incoherency has been already exemplified by 
reference to the asymptotic chronology ; it may be further illustrated 
by the problematical meetings and decisions of the Greek councils of 
war. How many such councils are conceived by Herodotus as held 
in succession 1 A council is apparently sitting at Salamis in c 49, 
before the arrival of the king, or the siege of the Akroixjlis. This 
council is debating the question whether to make a stand at Salamis 
against the king's fleet, or to retire on the Isthmos : the majority of 
tbose present favour the latter course, This council is apparently 
still sitting, still discussing, a day or two later, when news of the fall 
of the Akropolis reaches Snlamis. The king's fleet has not yet, at least 
in the pages of Herodotus, appeared at Phaleron. The council now 
decides to abandon Salamis for the Isthmos {c. 56). Themistokles 
returns in dejection to his ship, but is nerved and inspired by his 
mentor Mnosiphilos with a new (1) set of arguments, in favour of 
doing battle at Salamis. Themistokles appeals to Eurybiades ; a 
fresh Synedrim is held : Themistokles makes use of the arguments of 
Mnesiphilos, and Eurybiades at least is convinced, and determines to 
remain. The inconsotiuence is here frappant. The ativocates for 
remaining at Salamis must have used in the previous meeting just 
the arguments (by no means obscure or far-fetched) put into the 
mouth of Themistokles upvon this second, or third, occasion. The 
idecision now taken is in so far final that a Th/;ma is despatched to 
Aigina for the purpose of invoking the Aiakidai. And yet ne.xt day, 
upon the movement of the king's army and fleet, discontent breaks 
out afresh in the Greek laager at Salamis, and somehow an ap^mrently 
popular and informal meeting (o-ikXayoi) grows, or dissolves, into a 
Hnal meeting of the Strategoi, at which the old question is being 
debated afresh, while Themistokles steals out, under cover of night, 
from the council-room, and despatches the trusty Sikinnos to betray 



iM 



HERODOTUS 



APP. VI 



the intention of the Greeks to Xerxes, in hopes that the king will 
forthwith, by taking the appropriate manteuvres, force the Greeks to 
an engagement there and then. Everything turns out &a designed by 
Themistokles. While the council is still sitting, Aristeides arrives 
to report that retreat is now impossible — a report confirmed ere 
morning by the autoinolous Tentans. There is here pkinly not time 
for the actions reported ; or the council keeps sitting a most uncon- 
scionable time, and that too in the absence of the chief advocate of 
the unpopular action, to which ex hypothesi the majority of the council 
of war is opposed. Other and external evidences and probabilities 
further discredit the Herodotean story. Thus the message, sent 
according to Herodotus on the lips of Sikinnos under cover of night, 
is sent in Aischylos apparently by day, and sent not for the purpose 
of outwitting and forcing the hands of the Greek commanders, but 
apparently -with their full knowledge and approbatiotL* Again, accord- 
ing to Herodotus, Aristeides apparently makes his first appearance, 
since his ostralciam, in the Athenian forces on this very night before 
the battle, and one of the interviews de rhgle between him and 
Themistokles takes place, with a more than usuiilly excellent moral. 
Some evidence and much probability support the view that Aristeides 
was at this very moment one of the Athenian Slrategoi, and had 
I'eturned to Athens from exile, weeks or even months earlier. Small 
wonder, after these antecedent incoherences and improbabilities, if 
the Herodotean account of tlie battle itself, as a tactical achievement, 
should be unsatisfactory and obscure ! But it by no means follows 
from the above observations that there was no justification in the 
actual course of events for the repeated councils, for the reported 
variation or reversal of plan, for the rflles ascribed to Themistokles, 
to Eiirybiades, to Aristeides, perhaps even to Adeimantos. The arrival 
of the Greek fleet at Salamis, to find Attica unprotected by the 
Peloponnesian forces, created an unforeseen and unintended situation, 
in which the question of remaining at Salamis may well have been re- 
considered. The fall of the Akropolts, a few days later, created a fresh 
situation, even a[»art from the appearance, perhaps on the same day, 
of the Persian fleet round Sounion, in which the question of remaining 
at Salamis might very well have been again reopened. The aggressive 
movement of the king's fleet, and still more of the king's army, early 
on the day which proved to be the day before the battle, can hardly, 
indeed, have led to any serious debate on the previous question, 
alreMdy decided, perhaps twice, as above recorded ; but it may have 
led to the despatch of a nje»«ige from Themistokles, with or without 
the sanction of his colleagues, across the straits to the Persian king, 
who in consequence ordered a fresh movement, or development, in 
the disposition of his fleet, the true and full significance of which 
cannot be discovered in the pages of Herodotus. It is, in short. 



* 



necessary, in reconstructing the tactic&l history of the battle of 
Salumis, to manipulate the narrative of Herodotus mther freely, in the 
light of tlie other authorities, especially liia predecefiaor Aischylos, and 
in the light of the veritiable topography of the scene : the marvel 
finally emerging, that much which in the pages of Herodotus, taken 
by themselves, is incoherent and unintelligible, or oven absurd, is 
•een to have a real relation to the probable course of actual events, 
and to admit of a satisfactory interpretation. 

§ 3. The Taciiail J'roblent of the Battle of Salamis. — Recent debate 
upon this subject hiis moved thruugh three main positions, according 
as stress has been laid upon the testimony of Herodotus, upon tho 
testimony of Aischylos, or upon the topographical argument. In all 
cases, of course, reference has been made to the whole range of 
testimony and evidence, literary or material ; but considerable difi'er- 
ence has nevertheless resulted from the relative attention given to each 
witness respectively. The attempt to reconstruct the Wttle-piecc mainly 
from Herodotus, of coiu^e in relation to the actual to{X)graphy, but 
in complete predominance over Aischylos and the later testimonies, 
resulted in a certain conception of the action, which for long held the 
field as the orthodox or at least established theory of the battle. 
Saeh was the conception of Leake, Qrote, and others. There is still 
something to be said for it, at least from one point of view, as a scheme 
or theory of the ideal tactics, or of a part of the ideal tactics, pursued 
in the battle. The theory, however, was shattered by the growing 
Appreciation of the superior authority of Aischylos, and of his report of 
certain tactical features in the engagement — an appreciation largely 
due in the first instance to the arguments of Blakesley. Blakesley 
first pointed out that the conception of the actual engagement based 
by Leake upon Herodotus — of course not without regard to the actual 
topography — was nevertheless irreconcilable wnth any theory of the 
battle that should do justice to the testimony of Aischylos. Of the 
alternatives thua presented neither was manifestly adequate, neither 
was preferable on its own merits. The discussion reached a further 
stage iu Professor Groodwin's Linds, when tlie military or naval 
topography was put in the first place, as that tribunal to which all 
theories alike must bow, and all the authoiitics submit themselves, 
carrying, as it does, certain elementary necessities and conditions in 
respect to the tactical ordering of the battle. Thus, for exam])le, the 
whole situation prescribes the conclusion that the Persian admirals 
must have designed or projected a movement to cut off the retreat of 
the Greek fleet, through the bay of Eleusis and the Straits by Bou- 
doron, us they had previously attempted to do in the case of Artemision, 
although no such design or movement is clearly ascribed to them, or 
recorded for Salamis, either in Herodotus or in Aischylos. But, 
further. Professor Goodwin claims to have reconciled the chief 
contradiction between Herodotus and Aischylos, by a remarkable 



208 



HERODOTUS 



APP. TI 



interpretation of the former, and so, indeed, to confirm the theory 
which he has himself propounded. It will be convenient to state and 
discuss the three main theses of the authorities just named, with a 
view to determining how far they contribute to a final sohition of the 
problem. 

I. Leiike's theory} derived from Herodotus (especially cc. 76, 85), 
represents the battle lines, in the actual engagement, as based 
respectively the Persian upon the coast of Attica, within the Straits, 
the Greek upon the opposite shore, or bay, of Salamis. This theory 
involves the assumption that the Persian fleet had entered the Straits 
during the night preceding the battle, and occupied a position, in a 
long line or lines, backed by the Attic shore. The ensuing battle 
takes place mainly itv the waters between Salamis and Aigaleos, the 
lines being oriented as lying due cast and west. Subsequently the 
Peraian tleet, while escaping from the narrow waters out into the open 
bay, ia compelled to do some fighting at the entrance to the Straits, 
and about the island of Psyttaleia, by a sort of development of its 
first intention and position, in short, onl)' when it has actually taken 
to flight. This theory, however, though endorsed by Grote, Rawlinson, 
and others, is quite inadmissible for the following reasons, (i.) It 
conflicts with the indications of Aischj'Jos, who plates the main battle 
at the entrance of the Straits, and as the Persian fleet is attempting to 
enter, not within the Straits, or in the bay of Salamis, or as the fleet 
is attempting to escape, (ii.) The theory is inconsistent with some 
points in Herodotus' owni account, and ignores others. Thus it leaves 
the occupation of Psyttaleia b}' the Persians unaccounted for, and it 
ignores the report of Aristeides. The occupation of Psyttaleia, and 
the movement of Persian ships on the outside of the island of Salamis, 
stand in no clear relation to a battle fought out in the bay of Salamis. 
(iii.) Last and not least, the theory is in itself, and in relation to the 
narratives, tactically absurd. (1) If the lines of battle had been really 
oriented as on this supposition, the Persian fleet, when defeated, would 
have been driven back on the shore of Atlica, under Mount Aigaleos, 
and not out through the Straits into the open sea. (2) Again, the 
theory assumes that the Persian admirals, drawn up in battle-array 
under Mount Aigaleos, allowed the Greek oarsmen and marines to 
embark in full ^icw, undisturbed, and to advance to the attack, with- 
out attempting to anticipate or to disturb them. This assumption 
involves the Persians in a tactical error almost inconceivable. (3) 
Moreover, upon this theory, the F*ersians have fatigued themselves, by 
entering under cover of night the Straits, and taking up a position 
deliberately in confined waters, face to face with the Greek position, 
under circumstances which would give a great advantage to the 
Greeks, who have tlieir night's rest undisturbed, and are to fieht in 



^ Leake, Athma and the Dem i, iL Appendix. 
(1872), p. 223. 



Cji. ttlso the map in Grotc, vol. ir. 



SALAMIS 



299 



narrow waters. The Persian admirals had made no such error off 
Eiiboia : are they to be saddled therewith at Salamis, in view of the 
weakness and conflict of the evidence, and of other possibilities of 
explaining the case 1 

IL Blaktsle^s theory,^ derived from Aischyloa, represents the battle 
lines as extending not parallel but at right angles to the shore of 
Attica, and conceives the conflict as taking place not in the bay of 
Salamis, but just inside the narrow entrance of the Straits. That 
Blakesley was right in his negation of Leake's theory, the previous 
argument has just shown ; that hia main contention in regard to the 
point of contact is right, the testimony of Aiscbylos certiiinly demon- 
strates. Nevertheless his conception of the battle-array and tactical 
procedure is open to at least two decisive objections. In the first 
place, Blakesley's account of the Persian movements, antecedent to 
contact with the Greek fioet, is dobilitatetl by his identification of 
Keos and KjTiosoura with the island and the Marathonian promontory, 
and further, by an indistinct apprehension of the necessity the Persian 
fleet would he under of psissing from line to column formation in 
entering the Straits. The second objection to Blakesley's theory 
concerns the supposed position of the Greek line. Blakosley conceives 
the Hellenic fleet as drawn up in line across from Sjilamis to the Attic 
shore, so that its left wing rested upon the Attic shore. On that 
supposition the result of cont^vct is doubly perplexing : for a column 
of ships under such circumstances would probably succeed in cutting 
through a line, and throw it into some confusion, and at least the 
first success would have rested with the Persians. Moreover, the Attic 
shore was in possession of the Peraian forces : Xerxes was sitting 
somewhere on Mount Aigaleos to see the sport. The extreme left of 
the Greek line would thus have been exposed to great embarrassment, 
and probably have been thrown into confusion by Persian missiles 
directed from the land side. Blakesley's theory is quite unacceptable 
in these particulars : his merit is to have been the first to emphasize 
the importance of Aischyloe as a witness, and to have shown grave 
cause to doubt the theory of Leake, based on Herodotus. 

IIL Professor Goodwin's theory- is both an advance upon the preceding 
positions, and also to some extent a harmony, or resumption, of what 
is sound in them. It is based upon a more full and critical considera- 
tion of the topographical conditions than even Leake, prince of 
topographers though he was, had in this case achieved : it is based 
upon a fuller consideration of the literary traditions, not merely in 
the primary but also in the secondary sources, than had been accorded 
by the preceding theorists. On these lines Professor Goodwin's con- 
tribution to the argument is twofold. (1) In the first place, he has 



' Blakesley, Ilerodotut : Excursus on 
viii. 7«, vol. ii. (1S64), 400 IT., a con- 
tribution curiooaly overlooked creti iii 



r«'C«<nt divquisitioim uii the sumo theme. 
■■' See Paprra <if li»t ^ mericnn School at 
Athem, i. (1885). pp. 239 ff. 



300 



HERODOTUS 



ATP. VI 



enlarged and elucidated the topographical and tactical objections to 
Leake's theory, and in particular, emphasized the objection to nssumiiig 
that the Persian fleet was drawn up, in a line, or lines, under Mount 
Aigateos, parallel to the Attic shore, in full view of Salamis, and yet 
allowed the Greeks to embark undisturbed, to form in battle-array, 
a mile off, and then to assume the offensive, at their own will. (2) 
In the second place. Professor Goodwin has obviated a part of the 
apparent contradiction between Aischylos and Herodotus in regard 
to the tactical position of the Persian fleet by a suggestion which 
naturally occurred to one whose eyes were thoroughly familiar with 
the actual scene. The suggestion affects the interpretation of the 
phrases used by Herodotus to describe the orientation of the Persi 
lines. In the Heix>dutean account of the battle, and of the manceuvn 
preceding the battle, the expression " west wing " (rb vpbi fanifnis 
Ktpas) is twice used (in c. 76, and in c. 85) of a twrtion of the Persian 
fleet. Leake and others naturally assumed that in these two plactis 
the same expression referred to one and the same wing, or end, of 
the Persian lines, that is, to the same lot, or division of ships. The 
chief merit of Professor GJoodwin's critique is, to have shown that this 
interpretation is not inevitable, or even acceptable. The words may 
bo referred in the first place to the one wing of the Persian fleet, and 
in the second place to the other — manaMivres having taken place in 
the meantime, which completely altered the disposition of the Persian 
vessels. To assume that Hero<iotua himself bad clearly realized the 
position, or correctly conceived the manct!U\Tes, which he reports, is 
not necessary to this interpretation. Had he done so, the obscurity 
atid dispute would hardly have arisen over the question. Herodotus 
himself has not a clear conception of the tactics in the case, but 
CJoodwin's interpretation makes it possible to reconcile Herodotui 
in this instance, with himself, with Aischylos, and with the tof 
graphical conditions. This interpretation is therefore to be regarded 
as a permanent and luciferous contribution to the main argument. 
Nevertheless the whole theory of the battle as expounded by Prof 
Goodwin is not equally acceptable. 

There are, in particidar, five points wherein Professor Goodwin*! 
conception of the battle may seem to require correction, or amendment ;' 
and these corrections must lead on, if accepted, to a revised conception 
of the whole proceedings antecedent to the actual engagement. (1) 
To take the smallest point first : Professor Goodwin, rightly enough, 
makes the Persian fleet, upon the morning of the battle, enter the 
Straits in column ; but whether the column is a single file, or more, 
is a question not raised by him. The presumption seems to be that, 
in his conception, the column is a single file of ships. It will be shoMoi 
hereafter that the column Avas in all probability formed of threes. 
(2) A more serious point arises in regard to the tactical disposition of 
the Greek fleet, which Gkiodwin (like Blakesley) apparently conceives 



he . 

iao^H 



§3 



SALAillS 



301 



a.s extending acrosa the Straits, bo as to bar the progreaa of the 
Persian column, and as resting its left upon the Attic shoro.^ This 
conception is of^en to the objections alreadj urged : it exposes the 
Greek line to Imb cut in two by the advancing Persian column ; it 
exposes the left of the Greek line to the darts and arrows of the 
Persian force on land. Moreover, the exponents of this theory have 
not clearly stated, how and when the Greek vessels took up that 
position, face to face with the advancing Persian column. (3) Further, 
the theory supposes that the Persians weje expecting to find the Greek 
fleet still in iho bay of Salamis, and weio intending themselves to 
form in line along the Attic coast, and then to deliver the attack: 
in other words, the battle was ultimately expected to adopt the lines 
upon which Leake conceived it actually to have taken place. Bub 
t his assumed project is open to several specific objections. It leaves 
the occupation of Psyttaleia quite out of account, yet that occupation 
(Professor Goodwin suitposos) is part of the developed plan of Xerxes. 
Psyttaleia coidd play no tactical r6lQ in an engagement within the 
Straits and the bay of Salamis itself, Moreover, this project ascribes 
to the Persians the assumption that they would be allowed to enter 
the Straits in column, and to refoiin in Une, before the eyet of the 
Greek fleet in the bay of Salamis. But this assumptton is no better 
than the assumption, which Professor Goodwin has censiu-ed in his 
predecessors, that the Persian fleet would have allowed the Greeks to 
embark, and to form at sea, while it was in » position to attack and 
prevent them. The Persians could not enter the Straits in column, 
believing the Greeks to be still in the bay of Salamis, and hoping to 
reform in line to attack them, or to resist an attack : such a move- 
ment and project would have been to court disaster with open eyes. 
The fact that the Persians entered the Straits is proof that they 
cannot have expected to find the (ircek navy any longer in the bay 
of Salamis, unli^ss, indeed, they were in possession of some knowledge, 
or assurance, that the CJrcek fleet was practically innocuous — a surmise 
which forms no part of Professor Goodwin's theory. (4) Professor 
C^oodwin's theory hardly makes enough of the squadron detached to 
circumnavigHte the island of Salamis, and block up the exit to the 
west : albeit his critique has associated this movement with the 
alteration, or development, in the tactics of the Persian fleet, brought 
about by the message from Themistokles to Xerxes. The circum- 
navigation of Salamis is plainly an essential part of the Persian plan : 
the occupation of Psyttaleia is also, perhap«, a significant act ; but the 
relation of these two acta to each other, and to the manoeuvre of the 
main Persian fleet, in entering the Straits, is not so plain. Nor is the 
exact relation between the movements of the Persian fleet and the 
message of Themistokles quite clearly estti)>lisbed upon the theory 

' Dr. O. B. Grundy tthiutt, Goodwiu'a of the GncV. Ae«t ; km> his (htat I'trtutn 
(ud Blakealey's) view of the orientation War (1901), ]\ 384, niitp and plans. 




302 



HERODOTUS 



ATP. ■ 



now considered. (5) Finally, Profeaaor Goodwin has undertaken 
harmonize the record of Herodotus with that of Aischylos, but the 
discrepancy and conflict between the two authorities extends further 
than his theory appears to recognize. The ingenious suggestion in 
regard to the intorpreUition of the phrase "western wing," in the iwd 
passages of Herodotus in which it occurs, may fairly be taken 
reconcile the stiitcmenta of Herodotus with the sictual topography, 
and so with himself : but can any ingenuity completely reconcile 
Herodotus with Aischylos, or Aischylos with Herodotus 1 The 
differences between them extend to the time, the purport, and 
effects of the message of Themisiokles, and the two authorities prese 
two completely different conceptions of the transactions of the day" 
and night before the battle. In regai-d to the mere battle-piece itself, 
their accounts may be tapible of harmony ; in regard to the events 
leading up to the battle, they cannot be harmonized in all particulars : 
one or other must be preferred as more probable in certain respects. 

§ 4. iJifffrence bdweeii Aischijhs tttid Heroilotiis. — With Aischylos 
the date of tbe message, the purport and contents of the message, 
and the effects of the message, differ very considerably from the 
date, purport, ami result of the message as reported by Herodotus. 
With Aischylos the message is the beginning and source of the 
whole mischief. It is sent off from the Greek camp and reaches 
tlie Persian king upon the day before the battle. Its piu-port is that 
the Greek fleet is about to make away, under cover of night, and 
scatter hither and thither, by various routes, and so avoid battle, 
or capture in Salamis. Its result is that the king issues orders to 
his navarchs, that when night arrives the bulk of the fleet, which is 
clearly not yet set in motion at all, is to move up and draw across the 
outlets and passages, by which the Greeks might attempt to escape, 
while other ships are to be posted round the island of Aias. These 
orders are carried out, after the fleet has taken its evening meal, 
and occupy the whole night. The Greek fleet, meanwhile, makes no 
attempt to escape. But on the next morning the Greek fleet advances 
to the attack, coming apparently out — of the bay, or of the Straits — 
to do battle. There are two slight hints in the Aischylean account to 
suggest that the Persians had entered, or were entering, the Straits, 
The word pfv/ia suggests a column -formation, which would be in- 
explicable except upon the supposition that the Persians were comiiii 
in, and the words ly (tt€v<i>, in the immediate context, confirm the 
supposition. The notice of the exploit of Aristcides (of course not 
named) upon ' the little island-liaunt of Pan ' (Psyttaleia) forms a, 
climax of the narrative somewhat isolated ; nor is the seat of Xerxe 
though mentioned, so clearly located as to throw much light upon the^ 
Aischylean conception of the Iwittle. Simple and compact as the narra- 
tive of Aischylos is, taken in itself, there are two or three points where it 
is obscure, or suggestive of further question : (a) in regard to the ships 



$§3-4 



SALAMIS 



SOS 



posted round the isle of Aias, (h) in regard to the exact scene of the 
battle, (c) in regard to the silent process by which three (rroixoi become 
one pfviia, and (rf) in regard to the relation of the landing on Psyttaleia 
to the rest of the Persian plan. W^ith Herodotus, on the other hiind, 
the message of Themist<:tkle8 is apparently sent off from the Greek 
CAmp after the order to do battle had been issued by Xerxes, and after 
certain man03uvres had been already begun by the Persian ileet : in 
fact, night has apparently already fallen, when Sikiniios is despatched. 
The purport of the message again is substantially different to the 
report given by Aischyloe : Sikinnos announces to Xerxes that not 
only flight but tr&ichery is brewing in the Greek camp, and that if 
the Greeks are attacked, some of the forces will declare for the king, 
and turn upon their allies. The two elements in the message are 
indeed hardly consistent : flight provokes pursuit, treachery invites 
attack. The results are also different, in conformity with the differ- 
ence previously observed. With Aischylos the night movement is 
the first movement, and the only movement, of the Persian Heet ; it6 
object is to prevent the Greeks escaping. The difference between the 
expectation of the Persians and the actual event is that, when the 
Greek fleet advances in the morning, it moves not in disorder, like a 
fugitive force, but in battle-array. With Herodotus the effect of the 
message received at night is to cause a further movement and develop- 
ment of tlie Persian forces and position as established the day before : 
this developmont in Herodotus comprises ( 1 ) the debarciition of a force 
on to Psytt^deia, (2) the movement of the western wing round Salamis, 
(3) the movement of the vessels off Keos and Kynosoura in a direction 
not clearly indicated, but in such a mode apparently as to block more 
effectually the water-way. When the accomplishment of these move- 
ments is reported by Aristeides to Themistokles, the latter is repre- 
sented as saying that they were bis doing, and designed to compel the 
Greeks, against their will, to do battle. On the morrow, however, the 
Greeks go into action in the prose of Herodotus as cheerfully as in the 
verses of Aischylos himself. Undeniably there is a substantial difl'er- 
ence between the two reports : a complete harmony is far to seek. The 
greater discrepancy concerns not so much, or at least not so clearly, 
the actual battle, as the events and actions of the previous night and 
day. If the representation given by Aischylos of the date, purport, 
and effects of tlie message received by Xerxes from the Greek camp 
be correct, then not merely must the council and interviews diu-ing 
the night, as described by Herodotus, in any case suspicious enough, 
be purely fictitious, but the account of the movements of the Persian 
fleet on the previous day must be erroneous. Those movements 
display a determination to do battle, aa previously recorded, in the 
Herodotoan story, which was itself only brought about, according to 
Aischylos, by the message in question. But, su-spicioui as many of 
the details in the Herodotcan story may be — notably the whole account 



304 



HERODOTUS 



of the council at night, and the interview Wtween Tbecoistokles and 
Aristeides — we cannot aimpiy cancel the first movements of the Persian 
lleet, recorded by Herodotnfi, or resolve them into a duplication, or 
anticipation of the movement later and more elaborately described, in 
favour of the Aischylean relation, for the reason already indicated 
that the story in Aischylos, simple and compact as it is, contains hints 
or suggestions that go far beyond its express tenor, and imply that a 
good deal has l>een tunitted in the diamatic recital. For the supple- 
ment we must look in the main to Herodotus, and we may hope to 
reconcile, so far as a reconciliation is possible, our two main authorities, 
only by a more circuitous method, and by a somewhat elat>orate 
critique. Herodotus must, indeed, be reconciled with himself, before 
he can be reconciled with Aischylos. 

§ 5. The tariical prnhkma, underlying the story of Salamis, do not 
appear in themselves obscure, or difficult to appreciate, in view of the 
topographical and material dat;i. Both sides were willing, and even 
anxious, to do battle, &ich, of course, upon its own terms. The object 
of the Persiikns must have been to get the (Ireek fleet out into the 
open waters, and there to engage it. The object of the Greeks, 
dcmonatraterl by express tradition and actual results, was to get the 
Persian fleet into the Straits, and there to attack it. Any and every 
theory of tho steps, by which the actual engagement was brought 
about and the victory achieved, mnst accept and intei-pret the main 
elements, or factors, in tho traditional deposit, at le;ist as stated in 
their essential terras. Si.^ such factors may be at once disengaged, 
as follows: — (1) The decision of the king to do battle at sea. (2) 
The despatch of a squadron with orders to circumnavigate Salamis. 
(3) The occupation of Psyttaleia by the Persians. (4) The movements 
of tho main portion of the Persian fleet. (5) The message 
Themistokles. (6) The Greek tactics, and the actual engagemi 
Under these six hoad«, which are each and all essential factors in the 
Ureek traditions and in tho military situation and result, the whole 
problem of the battle may be resumed — the action of the land-forces 
being treated as supplementary to the naval engagement, and pre- 
liminary to the retirement of Xerxes. The precise chronological 
sequence of the six items enumerated is in part open to discussion. 
Some liberty may be allowed in respect to tho minor chronologj', and 
even the cau.sality, of a .story, not completely nor coherently given 
in any ono single authority. It is ob\nously more probable that exact 
movements of tho Persian fleet are corr<*ctly recorded thiin that they 
are quite conectly timed, or quite correctly accounted for, in any of 
the authorities.^ With this liberty granted, we may hope to resolve 
the sixfold problem. 



enu 

enlH 
the^^ 



' Dr. G. B. Gruudy in Tht Grmt 
Ptrsian iVar (1901), pp. 373 ff., con- 
tributes some tmportaut observations 



under this head. I (»niiot think, how- 
ever, that Hdt. agrees willi Aischylo* 
in timing the message of ThemiatoKlM 



(1) Thr- derision of Xerj-4S io do battle with the Greeis at sea. — (a) 
This decision is represented by Herodotus as anterior to and inde- 
pendent of the message received from Themistokles, and as taken by 
Xerxea in a council of war held at Phaleron, after the arriva] of hia 
Heet. Aischylos cannot Ije said to contniftiet Herodotus upon this 
|X)int, but he certainly ignores it. The point is, however, of importance 
in regard to the reconstntction of the antecedents of the battle, in- 
cluding the movements of the Persian Heet, and other acts. If th« 
king had decided to attack the Greeks in Salamis, a part at least of 
the movements during the day and night preceding; the battle may 
be ascribed to this decision, and not to any resolution taken in con- 
sequence of the messagu from Themistokles, whatever the precise 
[wint of time at which that message was received in the Persian 
camp. The fact of such a decision is independent of the highly 
i|uestionablo details and circumstances with which Herodotus has 
invested the story of the king's council. The recorded decision is 
infinitely more probable ihan the reported circumstances and details, 
and would of course have been known to Greeks serving on the King's 
side. Wa.s not some such decision, indeed, inevitable? The Persians 
were the inviiders and the attacking party : their army had been com- 
pletely successful so far : the destruction of the Greek fleet was a 
matter of the highest importance. That Heet was known to be cooped 
up in the narrow watei^, or on the strand, of the bay of Salamis : a 
resolution to gut at it by one means or other appears most natural. 
The record is incidentally confirmed by some secondary items, such 
as the movement of the Persian land-forces towards the Peloponnesos, 
the erection of a tlirone for Xerxes somewhere on the slopes of Mount 
AigaleoB, the accordance between a decision to do battle and some of 
the further movement? presently reporte<l. The decision to do battle 
is, therefore, to be accepted as historical, independently of any motive 
supplied by the message received from Themistoklei;. 

(A) If the King decided to give battle by sea, he nuist have resolved 
on attacking the Greek Heet, by one means or another : he could not 
be expecting that the Greeks of their own accord should come out 
of their sheltered station, and attack in the open a force in numbers, if 
not in actual equipment and material, vastly superior to their own. 
The problem from the Persian point of view must have been to drive, 
or to draw, the (ireek fleet into the more open waters, either east or 
west of the actual harbour then occupied by them. To use the land- 
forces in support of the naval arm would have l)een in accordance 
with the conduct of the campaign, as laid down and hitherto pursued 
upon the Persian aide. In the given sitimtion the Persian plan must 
have aimed at getting the Greek navy out of the Straits in the one 
direction or in the other ; or else, at advancing upon it, simidtaneously, 



to "the late afternoon" {op. e. p. 377). 
Hilt 8. 70 shows that the nteessge wm 
VOL. II 



deapatched after night&ll, aoeording to 
the historian's conception. 

X 




906 



HERODOTUS 



APP. VI 



from both sides, and so completely hemming it in. To effect either 
such purpose the first condition obviously was to detach a considerable 
squadron, and send it round in order to approach the Greek position 
from the side of Megara and Eleusis. The bay of Salamis might 
have been entered with less danger from the west, or north-west end 
of the Straits, than from the east, or south-east. There was a prospect 
of driving the Greek Heet out to sea from the north-west to the east ; 
but in any case there would obviously be a risk in assaulting the 
Greek position from one side alone, as the attack must in that case 
expose itself for a time to an assault enflanr. The problem of forcing 
a battle, under the circumstances, was obviously no easy one to solve. 
(2) The despatch of ships to circumiMvigtite Salamis. — This movement 
is obviously one of the highest iin[iortaiicc for the tactics of the com- 
ing battle, yet it is not clearly recorded by any writer before Ephoros 
{apud Diodortun).' Its identification with the stationing of vessels 'aJl 
round the island of Aias,' as reported by the Persian messenger in 
Aischyloe, is to be rejectud for two reasons. In the first place, the 
language of Aiachylos describes a perfectly comprehensible manoeuvre 
of an entirely different character, and wdth an obviously different 
tactical purpose. In the second place, the report made by Axisteides 
to Themistoklos {upud Herodotuni) may be understood to refer to this 
mauoeuvre, nither than to the circumnavigation. Herodotus has been 
taken to report the circumnavigation of Salamis in another passage, 
describing tlie movement of the 'west' wing of the Persian fleet, though 
obscurely, after nightfall, as one of the results of the message of 
Themistokles. The movement to the west round Salamis, into the 
Megarian or Eleusinian channel, may have been undertaken, or 
developed, after nightfall, and even after the reception of the message 
of Themistokles in the Persian camp ; but it can hardly have been a 
direct or special result of that message. The despatch of a squadron 
to close, or to pierce, the Eleusinian channel must have been part of 
the original Persian plan of attack on the Greeks at Salamis. It was 
an obvious device, previously employed on a larger scale, oft" Euboia : 
to have omitted it would have been to have left open a retreat for the 
Greek Heet westwards — an incredible omission under the circumstances. 
The ultimate purpose of the movement may have been to co-operate in 
drawing, or driving, the Greek Heet out of the bay of Salamis. The 
Egyptian squadron may have moved westwai-d.* after nightfall, in the 
hope of escaping detection by the Greek.s ; lint the westward move- 



' Op. Appendix I. S 13 mpra. I can- 
not share the view that Aisohylos Pers. 
368 (dWat Si «ct/v\y rrjaov Alarrot wipii) 
dearly reTers to the eircuninavigiitioii of 
the island : the verb is rd{(u. In order 
that ships should be posted, or stationed, 
round the inland, ships would have to 
row round into position, dropping de- 



tachments as thoy went ; but this 
mameuvre is very ditferent from a ir«pi- 
tXoui. If a verb (ir^/i^ai) is to b« nnder- 
.stood out of rdfoi, the penplua can 
hardly be said to be clearfj iadioated. 
That tiio periplus in Ephoros ia simply 
an inference, or derolopmoot, from this 
line in Aischylos, were a disputable thesis. 



SALAMIS 



ment of a portion of the Heel for the purjraso of circumnavigating the 
island is an integral clement in any plan conceivable for att^icking the 
Greek fleet in the waters between the island of Salamis and the main- 
land. The hoiir at which this movement was developed may have led 
Herodotus, or hiB aoiirces, to regard it as a result of the message of 
Tfaemistokles. 

(3) The oceupaHim of PiyttcUeia by Ou Persian may for siiuiJar 
reasons be regarded as misconceived, if not misdated, in the pages of 
Herodotus. As the Persian fleet entered the Straits next morning 
evidently in the expectation that any fighting, which might have to 
be done}, would Udce place far west of Psyttaleia, the occupation of 
Psytlaleia stands in no apparent relation Uy the finsU advance of the 
Persian fleet. The occupation of Psyttaleia relates itself naturally to 
operations, the scene of which was to be laid immediately outsiJe the 
Straits of Salamis, and to the cast, it can be harmonized with the 
despatch of a squadron to circumnavigate Salamis, and nnth the move- 
ment of the miiin fleet up to the very mouth, or inlet into the bay of 
Salamis, but not so easily, if at all, with operations which were to take 
place within, or beyond the Stniits, or bay of Salamis. Thus the 
occupation of Psyttaleia, even if correctly chronologized by Herodotus, 
a moment later than the reception of the message from Thumistoklos 
in the Persian camp, is not, on that account, to be reckoned among 
the results of that message. It beIoi»g8 rather to the original Persian 
plan of operations, which was alt(?red or modified ex hyjwlhesi in con- 
sequence of the reception of that message. 

The owupatton of Psyttaleia appears in Aisebylos late and in- 
cidentally, and without any clear organic relation to the Persian 
movements, which are by him referred only to the message of 
Thcmislokles : an omission ejisy to explain, if the occupation belonged 
to a previous plan of operations, developed and superseded after the 
reception of the message, the point at which Aischylos takes up the 
story. But the record in Aischylos suggests another possibility. 
Aischylos merely records, as an appendix to the actuid battle, the 
exploit of Aristeides on Psyttaleia ; in Herodotus too that exploit 
appears as an afterthought. Was the occupation of Psyttaleia an 
originid part of the Persian plans ? Was the island only occupied in 
the coui-se of the battle, in order to afford protection to Persian sliips 
and men, as they backed out of the Straits, or struggled for life in 
the sea ] Herodotus may have antedated the occupation of the island, 
and so brought it into artiRcial connexion with the original plan. 

( t) Afovenientt of the main portion of Uu Persian fleet. — (a) If the 
occupation of Psyttaleia was part of the first Persian plan, that move- 
ment of the Persian fleet, after nightfall, l)y which the water-passages, 
either side Psyttaleia, were blocked with Persian vessels, could hardly 
be ascribed wholly to the second plan. This movement appears to 
relate itself to the occupation of Psyttaleia, and both together might 




308 



HERODOTUS 



AVT.' 



have hod no further purpose than to prevent the escape of the Greeks 
from Salamis into the open waters towards Aigina. The movement in 
itself, though an advance, is not necessarily an offensive movement, nor 
does it bring the Persian fleet within striking distance of the Greek. 
Had the Persians been t^xpecting the Greeks to escape, or to attack 
them, this movement might have been made, with a view to bar the 
exits, and to secure some co-openitioji between the land-force, which 
had disembarked on Psyttaleiii, and the naval line. But the move- 
ment of the ships up to this point does not in itself involve any further 
movement, much less actual entry into the Straits : it is quite con- 
sistent with a struggle, the scene of which was to be laid outeide. 
This forward movement, still outside the Straits, supersedes and 
develops, according to Herodotus, movements of the fleet, which had 
occupied the whole, or the greater jjarl of the preceding day. What 
could the objects of such movements have been 1 Did the Persians 
really expect, merely by cruising about in the open, to lure or to 
attract the Greeks out of the tiarruw wiiters into the bay I Or could 
the previous movements have been anything more than the necessary 
preliminaiies, on the part of a huge Heet, for atlvancing to the outlet 
of the Saltiminian Straits, and there, under cover of night, closing the 
exits, and preparing to withstand the onset of the Greek tioet, should 
it be drawn, or should it bo driven, to essay a sortie oti the ensuing 
day J But if the Persian fleet was already on the move, before the 
reception of the message of Themistoklea, the Idng must ali-eady ha¥e 
bad a plan of attack. 

(6) The forwai-d movement of the Persian fleet into the Straits of 
Salamis upon the tuorning of the battle is a further advance, implies 
an active oflensive, and develops the attack. But it is, under the 
circumstances, so obvious and folos-sal a blunder as to call for aome 
adequate explanation. Its inevitable result was to expose the Persiui 
fleet, necessarily advancing now in column, to a flank attack from the 
Greek line, which ea.sily cut off the hea<l of the advancing columji, 
and threw the remainder, outside the Straits, and imperfectly informed 
of what was taking place wthin, into desperate confusion. The 
advance of the Persian column into the StraiLs can hardly Ihs explained, 
except on one or other of two suppositions. Either the admirals were 
satisfied that the Greeks had evacuated the bay of Salamis and were 
in full retreat, past Eleusia and the narrow Megarian channel (where 
the Egyptian squadron wa.s coming to meet them) — in which case the 
movement of the Persian column wa.s primarily a pursuit of the flying 
foe — or else the Persian admirals had reason to believe that the Greek 
fleet, though still at Salamis, was in no humour or condition to advance 
to the attack, as advance it actually did. The latter hypothesis is 
apparently favoured by Aischylos, who records the astonishment of 
the Persians on finding themselves attacked. But the bay and shore 
of flftlftmiw was full in view of the opposite coast With the whc 



Attic shore in posseasion of the Persians, surely they must have been 
aware that the Greek fleet was still in the bay of Salamis, and cannot 
have supposed themselves ad\anciDg simply to pursue a flying foe. 
An cxpL'UDition remains, therefore, to be discovered for the apparently 
infatuated venture of the Pcrsiau fleet, in exposing itself to a flank 
attack in the narrow waters between Salamis and the mainland, when 
the alternative api)arently was to sustain the onset of the (4reek vessels 
in conditions much more favounible to itself. The explanation can 
only be supplied by the message of Thcmistokles. 

{5) Tht meisar/e of Thfinisloklfs is the most highly problematic of 
all the antecedents of the Itattle, both in its circumstances, its import 
or contents, and its exact effect upon the action of the Persians. The 
conflict of evidence and of conception, between Aischylos and Herodotus, 
here involves contradictory or alternative accotmts of the immediate 
antecedents and rationale of the battle. According to Aischylos a 
message is seut from the Greek camp to the Persian, during the day- 
time, to report the projected escape of the (Jreek fleet from Salamis. 
The measures and movements of the Persians art all occasioned by 
this message, but are not inauguratod, or begun, until nightfall. There 
is no hint that this message was a trick played ofl" upon the Greeks by 
one of their tmnilDor; it is a ruse practised on the Persians alone. 
The deceplion lies in leading the Persians to expect that the Greeks 
wore about to Uike to flight ; whereas the Greeks, in reality, were 
thirsting for the fray : and, to the astonishment of the Persians, 
advance in the morning's light, obviously fully prepared to do Ijattle. 
This account of the Diess.-ige and its effect* is not merely contradicted 
by Herodotus, but is in itself unsatisfactory, and leaves various items, 
even in the context, or in the admitted facts, inexplicable. It does 
not explain the actual movement of the Persians into the Straits in 
the morning-- a movement which is incidentally indicated or admitted 
in the context ; it does not account for the occupation of Psyttnleia ; 
it leaves the despatch of the squadron round Salamis altogether un- 
noticed. The whole story in Aischylos appears, at least in the light 
of other traditions, as over-favourable to the Greeks, especially in 
regard to the antecedents of the battle ; and also fails adequately to 
account for the fatal movement of the Persians into the narrow waters : 
for why, so far as Aischylos goes, did not the Persians await the 
expected flight of the Greek ships from Salamis, or at least take care 
to verify the fact, that it had already taken place during the night t 

The facts as presented in Herodotus are widely different. Xerxes 
has resolved on battle, and issued orders in accordance with that resolu- 
tion. Movements have already been in progi-ess to that end, the day 
through, albeit the ex|)octation or design of the Persian operations 
is not revettle<l. Then, during the ensuing night, the message of 
Themistokles rciiches the Pereian camp, and leads to fresh movements, 
cvilminating in a decisive action. The contents and effect of this 



310 



HERODOTUS 



APT. n 



message, as reported by Herodotus, are far from satisfactory, or 
convincing, and, indeed, ill accord with the facta as presented by him 
hitherto. The message of Themistokles, reported by Hei-odotus, 
exhibits two hardly consistent purts. On the one hand, the intention 
of the Greeks, to abscond from Sfilamis and avoid battle, is reported ; 
on the other hand, Themistokles promises that, if the Greeks are 
attacked, the Athenians will turn against their allies and make common 
cause with the king. This pledge is to be found in the message only 
as reported by Horodotu.s : it constitutes a most startling addition to 
the contents us rejwrted by Aischylos, and indeed by all the other 
authorities. The two elements of the me8a;igo do not seem to invite 
quite the same kind of actiun on the king's part. The projected escape 
of the Greeks from Salamis would suggest the blocking of the channels 
at both ends of the Straits, between the island and the mainLind. The 
promised mcdism of the Athenians would be an inducement to attack 
the Greek Heet aldose quarters, iuid even to venture upon a somewhat 
risky movement in so doing, as was indeed shown in the sequel. But 
what could have been the object or de.sign of the movements of the 
Persian fleet, during the previous day, unle-ss they aimed at intercepting 
the escajre of the Greek fleet, of cooping it up in ftdamis, with a view 
to its ultimate capture, or surrender, with or without an actual battle! 
In another irajwrtant respect the ruse of Themistokles differs in 
the reports of Aischylos on the one hand, and of Herodotus and his 
followers on the other. With Aischylos the ruse is practised solely 
upon the Persians, and apparently with the full consent, or approval, 
of all concerned on the Greek side. With Herodotus, .ind others, 
the ruse is practised upon the Greeks by Themistokles with a view 
to forcing their hand, and compelling them to remain and fight 
against their will. This representation does not very well accord 
with the readiness ami courage of the f^reek mariners, on the follow- 
ing morning, to embark and to advance against the Persian ships ; 
but, if conscience makes cowards, manifest danger may make heroei 
of nnpromi.sing material. Once the (ireok position at Salamis wu 
surrounded, or both e.vits from the Straits, ejist and west, effectively 
blocked, the Greeks were bound either to surrender, or to attempt 
to fight their way out to the open sea, and so make good their escape 
— a hoj^eless undertaking by the Megarian channel if blocked, as it 
might easily have been, even by a small squadron, unless indeed the 
Greeks had already secured command of it; and an almost eqmUly 
forloni hope, in face of the vastly superior numbers of the Persian 
fleet, through the channels either side Psyttaleia. If the l^ersians 
have already detenained upon action, and been in motion half a day, 
or more, with a \new t-o action, what !>ction w.'is in viexv, unless this 
verj' one of barring the exits, imd so compelling the Greeks to 
surrender, or to fight '? What Tieed for a mes.sage to Xerxes, that 
the Greeks were contemplating flight, at a time when the Persians 



have already been manoeuM-iag to prevent such Hight 1 How cuuld 
such it belated message have been a ruse practised upon the Greeks, 
to compel them to remain and fight, when the king's fleet had been 
alreatiy manoeuvring, and was all on the water, under orders to carry 
out that very same design ? But the promise of Athenian co-operation 
gi\'os a very different complexion to the message. Such a promise 
might induce the Persians prematurely to enter the Straits, counting 
upon the co-operation of the Athenian navy in the action that might 
then ensue. Otherwise, the olivious >visdom of the Persians was to 
block the Greeks up in Salamis, and to await their inevitable attempt 
to break out. As a matter of fact, the battle opened in the Straits. 
The point of contact was determined by the entrance of the Persian 
fleet in the morning. That movement ftpi)ears to have been brought 
about by the message of Themistokles. An Jissnrance that the Greeks 
were going to run away under cover of night, or even that the Greek 
fleet had actually under cover of night moved out of the bay of 
Salamis into that of Elousis, and so through the Straits of Megara 
(ex hypothesi blockaded by the Egjrptian 8(juadron), could hardly in 
itself have been sufficient to induce the Persian fleet to enter the 
Straits i>f Salamis. From the Attic shore, from Mount Aigaleos, in the 
early morning, could it not be seen whether the Greek ships were 
still in the bay of Salamis, afloat or sishore, or whether they had rowed 
off, during the night, in the direction of Eleusis and Megaiu ? Can 
the Persians have entered the Straits at daybre^ik, believing that the 
Greek fleet had already abandoned Salamis, and that they were simply 
pursuing a fugitive foe ? Or would the Persian cohimn have been 
sent foj-wanl, to expose itself to an attack in flank, unless the Persian 
admirals, or the king himself, had been convinced that they could 
count upon a diversion, a division, in the Greek navy itself in thoir 
favour, aasivances of which had been conveyed to them, according to 
Herodotus, in the message received during the preceding night from 
Themistokles T 

A complete harmony between Aischylos and Herodotus carmot be 
effected, but the harshness of the antithesis between them, in regard 
to the message of Themistokles, might be mitigated by the rather 
desperate supposition that there were, in fact, more messages than 
one passing between the Greek and the Pemian headquarters. A 
message may have reached the king, on the day before the battle (as 
recoi"de<l by Aischylos), to the effect thiit the Greeks were intending 
to retreat, under cover of night, to the Isthmos. That some such 
suspicion, or con\iction, was in any case implanted in his mind, the 
subsequent operations of the Persian fleet prove ; for they are directed 
so as to prevent any such movement on the part of the (Jrceks. But 
that conviction by no means involved a direct attack upon the Greek 
fleet in the bay of Salamis ; it was enough for the king to keep the 
paaaagea and channel blocked (perhaps by relays of squadrons), and 



31S 



HERODOTUS 



APP. VI 



to await the inevitable attempt of the (rreeks to break ont The 
further resolve, to enter the Straits in the morning, marks a develop- 
ment of the former plan, and presupposes some special occasion. Such 
occasion may be found in the reception, during the night, of an 
assurance that, if the Greeks wore attacked, the best part of them 
would turn their arms against their allies, and declare for the king. 
There is here, at least in conjunction with other considerations, sudi 
as the impatience of the victor, the difficulty of keeping the ships in 
large numbers continuously at sea, and so forth, an adequate explana- 
tion of what must otherwise appear the unbounded folly of the 
Persians in ordering an advance into the Straits. Their cause of 
wonder then was, not that the Greeks advancefl in battle - array, 
instead of attempting to fly, but that both wings of the Greek Heet 
advanced with equal ardour and loyalty, and that the promised 
defection remained a promise, which had lured them into a tactical 
disaster. 

Is it worth while to effect this partial harmony between Uorodottu 
and Aischylos, at the expense of duplicating the messages of Thcmi- 
stokles, before the battle of Salamis, and in view of the diifereooet 
remaining still unadjusted between them 1 Herodotus will still requir« 
of us itot merely the determination of Xerxes to do battle, but the 
actual inanceuvres recorded of the Persian fleet on the day before the 
actual fight We should also be involved in the paradoxical con- 
clusion that, of the two message."*, one was sent without and the other 
with the consent of the Greek commanders, the one being the news 
of their projected flight, which produced the movements to prevent 
their escape ; the other being the promise of Athenian medism, which 
encouraged the Persians to assume the offensive, and actually to enter 
the Straitfiw Why not be content to suppose that there was but one 
message, the one sent by night, which deceived the Persians to their 
fatal error? The suspicion that the Greeks might bolt from Salamis, 
the mancBU\Tes intended to prevent that flight, and to compel them 
to do battle, on terms favourable to the Persian, do not appc:ir far- 
fetched, or beyond the compass of Persian strategy : there is the 
express testimony of Herodotus in their favour, and they reproduce, 
on a somewhat diminished sctile, the operations off Euboia. The 
narrative of Aischylos, on the other hand, though that of an eye- 
witness, is not u military or even an historical report : the action has 
been dramatized, that is, reduced to its barest terms, for recital on 
the stage. No clear hint of any change or development in the Persian 
attack is given ; the most important feature in the whole action, the 
advance of the Persian fleet into the Straits, is not described, but 
merely implied. The priority of Aischylos here counts for little 
against his poetical and patriotic bias ; and the obscuration of the 
actual services of Themistokles in the Athenian poet's report may 
not have been accidental 



Herodotus, on the other hand, cannot bo fully follovred in hia 
reprosontation of the message of Themistoklos as a ruse played off 
upon the Greeks, to com|)el thoni to stand and fight. The circum- 
navigation of Salamis, the blocking of the channels, might have that 
ofl'ect ; but these measurea belong to the first plan of the Persians, 
and were independent of the niesstige of Thcniistokles. The message 
of Themistokles induces the Persians to assume the offensive with 
fatal effect to themselves, just because the Greeks were prepared and 
resolved to do battle, and even to advance to the attack, before the 
Persian fleet had time to form out of column into line. The notion 
that Themistokles tricked the Greeks into fighting, when they would 
fain have fled, seems to belong to the lej;endary oitier of ideas, which 
delighted to represent Themistokles as the incarnation of duplicity, 
treachery, and unacrupulousnoss. In Diodoros (Ephoros) a distinction 
is suggested between the general mass of Greeks on the fleet and the 
commandera : a similar distinction is suggested, in a confused way, 
by Herodotus when the vague (T>'A.Xoyo« crysUvllizea into the foiiual 
irvyfSpwy, during the session of which the message is sent. The 
Admirals may well have known more than the Maruies. Yet we may 
fairly hesitate, with llerodottis, to believe that Themistokles in this 
matter took any one into his confidence. His message was intended 
t4> induce the Persians to enter the Straits next morning, and it turned 
out successfully ; but if it consisted in, or contained, a promise that in 
the event of a Pereian attack the Athenians would desert the Greek 
side and declare for the king, the matter was almost too risky for any 
disclosures. Could such a message have been deliated at the cotincil, 
or confided even to the Navarch, without exciting a suspicion that 
the Athenians were, indeed, meditating surrender I Themistokles 
may have kept his own counsel ; but this discretion falls far short of 
a trick played on the (< reeks, nor was it devised in order to force 
them to battle, but in order to induce the Persians to assume the 
oiTensive. Possibly the Greeks had actually resolved to attempt to 
break out through the Persian block.odc, and on seeing the Persians 
enter the Straits next morning, felt that the gods bad delivered the 
enemy into their hands. The message of Themistokles was a purely 
military stratagem, even if he alone in the Greek camp at that time 
possessed tlie secret 

(6) Thf Gretk taciicf. — An interesting feature in the battle of 
Salamis appears to be that both combatants were acting, at the 
moment of contact, on the offensive. The explanation of this fact is 
not far to seek. The Persians were entering the Straits in column- 
formation, induced to this movement, involving a change of plan, by 
the message of Themistokles, when the Greeks advanced in line, out 
of the bay of Salamis, and foil upon the side of the advancing column. 
The mancctivrc, by which the Persian Heet had been formed, or 
partially formed, into column, is also easily recoverable. On the 



HERODOTUS 



ATT. Tl 



previous day, in execution of the original pkn, the Peraian fleet had 
been drawn up in three lines, extending from the neighbourhood of 
the Peiraious across the open sea towards Salamis. It was there in a 
position to receive the Greeks, should they attempt to break awny 
into the open sea southwards ; and even the forward movement, 
closing the water-ways beiweon Salamis, Psyttaleia, and the mainland, 
together with tho occupiilion of Psyttiiloiii, may have belonged, like 
the despatch of the Egyptian fi(|uadron round the island, or the order 
for that movement, to the original plan of operations. The new 
development, vnider which the Straits were entered the next morning, 
must, indeed, have been contemplated from tho first; for, had the 
Greek navy actually evacuated the bay of Salamis, and made past 
Eleusis, in the hope of escaping by the western channel, the main body 
of the Persian Hcet would no doubi have cnterwl the Straits, for the 
purpose of pursuit, in the very order actually observed on entering for 
the purpoHe of doing battle. The manreuvre by which the movement 
w;i8 to be carried out is self-evident. Tho right or eastern (NR) wing, 
towards tho Peiraieus, or the Attic shore, wheeled to tho right and 
entered the Straits between Psyttaleia and the mainland, as beaul of 
the column, the three lines of Persian ahipa, as they had l>een the day 
before, and all night long, becoming threes tiles. They had penetrated 
some distance into the Straits before realizing that the Greek fleet, far 
from being divided in counsels or loyalty, was advancing, an unbroken 
line, out of the bay of Salami.s, with tho apparent intention of att 
ing them. How long the Persian loaders may have cherished the 
of a split among tho Greek contingents, and a defection or <lecIanition 
for tho king, there is no knowing : long enough, at any rate, to 
enhance the diaippointment and confusion caused by their error. m 
The ruse of Themistokles was crowned with complete success. Hff' ■ 
had contrived that the engagement should Uikc place in the Straits, 
the narrow waters, favourable to the Greeks. But not merely that, 
The tJicticaJ position wits all to the advantage of the Greeks: they 
hail but to atlvance and fall upon the side of the triple column to 
throw it, inevitably, into confusion. These were the same tactics 
which they luul hoped to employ off Euboia, at la-ist if the Persians 
attempted to force their way down the channel of Oreos ; these were 
the tactics which the Athenians had used with success at Marathon ; 
these tactics, equally ap[>licable to a sea-fight, secured an equal success 
on the present occji.'^ion. The Greek right nnturally reached the 
enemy first, and first became engaged ; tho head of tho Persian column 
must have been cut off; the Athenians seem to have accounted for it 
Tho Persians baft been taken by surprise : the vessels, perhaps coat»in- 
ing the chief admii-al, wore still outside the Straits, pressing forward 
in ignorance of the situation within. The attempt of those within to 
back out must have thrown the whole column into confusion. After 
a while Greek vessels began to emerge from the Straits into the open 



water, and fell upon the disorganized Persian ileot. llie conflict 
resolves itself more and more into a teries of individual engagements, 
in which the " Ixirbarians," disorganized and distraught by the complete 
failura of their plans and dispositions, are put more antl more at a 
disadvantage. The celebrated exploit of Aristeides marks the sequel 
rather than the climax of the Greek victory : the Persian fleet is in 
retreat to Phaleron, or further. Meanwhile, nothing has been heard 
of the squadron that should have rounded Salamis : the Korinthians, 
and perhaps some other of the Greek contingents, might have been 
able to account for it The movement of the Korinthians, which 
Athenian malignity afterwards represented as an ignominious retreat, 
may be explained as a tactical disposition to meet the onset of the 
Egyptian 8quadix)n, of whose movements the Greeks at Saiamis cannot 
have remained ignorant. Whether the Korinthians encoimtered 
at the southern entrance to the bay of Eleusis, where perhaps is 
to be placed the temple of Athene Skiras,' the full onset of the 
Egyptian vessels may well bo doubted : .such an encounter could 
hardly have failed to leave a deeper impression upon the traditions 
of the fight. 

§ 6. (a) The theory thus formulated, in regard to the main tactical 
aspects of the battle, and of the mannjuvres on the preceding day, 
appears to embrace and account for the six elomenta i^t tradition as 
above enumerated. There is no pretence that the main authorities 
themselves have any conscious grip on the problem, as a whole. 
Aischylos, the earliest, says nothing of the squadron sent to circum- 
navigate Saiamis, to take the Greeks in flank, or rear, or to bar their 
retreat. Herodotus says something which may be interpreted as 
referring to that squadron and its movement, but need not necessarily 
be so interpreted. In any case this squadron, its movement, and 
operation, though an essential element in the larger tactics of the case, 
was not visil>le within the landscape of the battle-field. Other move- 
ments of the Persians, the occupation of Psyttuleia, the message of 
Themistokles and its effects, the actual point of first contact, the 
general character and result of the liattlo, seem all preserved in the 
proposed reconstruction. 

(b) Some further incidental matters may also be included. Thus, 
for example, the theory is justified of the fact that both fleets were 
moving forward when actual contact took place, to wit, the Persians 
in column towaitls the opening of the bay of Eleusis, the Greeks in 
line towards the shore of Attica. Even so small a [mint as the 
appearance of the Phoenicians, before the throne of Xerxes, harmonizes 
well with the above theory, for in it the Athenians are in a position 
to cut off and drive back the Phoenicians on to the Attic shore below 
Mount Aigaleos, and hard by the Herakleion. A place is also easily 
provided for the achievement of Aristeides. The Aristeia of the 



316 



HERODOTUS 



APF, TI 



Aiginetans, or even the excuse for it, remainB more problematic, except 
that the Greek right wing was the first engaged, and that the 
Aiginetans were posted on the right. Possibly the Aiginetan squadron, 
which distinguished itself in cutting off* retreating Persian vessels, 
arrived from Aigina during the action, and took the Persians in the 
rear. The retreat of the bulk of the Pei-sian fleet to Phaleron is, of 
course, explic;iblc on this theory, as upon the theories of Blakesley and 
of Goodwin. In short, only the omissions, or the transparent in 
coherencies of the tnwlitional stories, or perhaps the minor chronology, 
refuse to accommcKJate themselves to the reconstruction and solutioni 
of the tactical problem here- suggested. 

(c) The foregoing reconstruction happily combines from til 
princi|»il antecedent theories, which it is intended to supersedeifl 
elements, in which they appear severally to have done justice to 
various factors in the traditions. Thus Leake's conception of the 
Ix)8ition and orientation of the Hellenic forces at the opening of tht 
battle remains uncontroverLcd, though his conception of the position 
and orientation of the Porsian Hoet is completely cancelled. Again, 
the suggestion of Blakesley that the Persian fleet was only just enter- 
ing the Straits in the morning, imd entering in column, is followed, 
developed, and defined ; bnt the conception of the position of the Greek 
fleet, held by Blakosley and Goodwin, is here almndoued. Goodwin's 
appreciation of the importance of the movement of a squadron 
detached to circumnavigate t^alamis, is here fully endorsed, and indeed 
magnifietl ; but this mo\ enient, together with the occupation of 
Psyttaleia by the Persians, is refeired to the Krat plan of Xerxes, and 
the movement of the Persian fleet recorded by Herodotus in c, 76, 
even if identical with the <ie8[>atch of the squadron round Sal&mis, is 
wholly divorced from the moiiSiige of Theraistokles. A change, or 
development, in the Peraiun plan of action is here also accepted ; but 
that change cjinnot have consisted nioroly in the despatch of the 
circumnavigating squadron, a movement which muat;have belonged to 
any Persian plan of attack. The grcjit change consisted in the advance 
of the Persians into the Straits, which was due to a belief, established 
by the measjige of Themist^>kles, that if the Greeks were actually 
attacked, the Athenians would desert their confederates for the king. 
This view is indeed contrary to the represent^ition of Aischylos, who 
neither recognize.-* \n>r suggests any change or development in the 
Persian plan and tictica ; 1mt on this head the testimony of Herodotus 
is preferred, because, without some such theory, the variojis elements 
in the tnwlitions, including some preserved by Aischylos himself, 
cannot be synthesized. The omission in Aischylos can be accounted 
for by the dramatic situatiotj, the necessity for compression in the 
narrative, and quasi-patriotic motives. Details in Aischylos are them- 
selves hardly explicable without the supposition of some such duvelop- 
ment. The conception of a change in the Persian plan is fulljr 



endorsed by Goodwin, but with him includes : («) the detachment of 
the west wing of the Persian Heet to circumnavigHte kSalamis ; (b) the 
movement of the main body of the Persian fleet forward so as to stop up 
the passages between Psyttnlciu and Sakmis on the one hand, Psyttalciit 
and Attictt on the other. But, on that supposition, what cotild the 
original plun and movement of the Persijin ttect have been intended 
to accomplish ? The movement of a squadron round the island of 
Siilamis, the stopping of the uutlots, the oocuixttioH of I'svttaleia, all 
belong (it is here contended) to the original Persian plan, which aimed 
at takinj; the Greek fleet l>etweeji two firi'5, and driving them out of 
the bay of Salamis, eastwards, or for the most p;irt ejistwanls on to 
the main fleet, or westwards on to the Egyptian squadron. The 
change, the new development, comes in with the <letermination of the 
Persians to enter the Straits in the monting, midei- a belief that the 
Greek fleet can sjifely be attacked even in the hay of >«alunii8. 
AJschyloB, who recognizes but one plan, and one continuous set of 
movements, jiscribes the whole to the message, (lates that message to 
the day time, though he dates the Persinii movements whcilfy to the 
ensuing night, and hmits the message to reporting a projected Hight. 
The change of pbui, the date of the mossagf at night, its Themistokle.m 
authorship, are to be found in HcnKlotiis; but the change of plan 
consists (if the theory here advanced bo correct) simply in the move- 
ment by which the Persians enter the .Stniits in the moniing to attack 
the (rrecks, instead of waiting for the Greeks to be pushctl, or driven 
out upon them. 

§ 7. 77i/ Opeiutions of the Army. — There are tour points, and only 
four, after the capture of Athcn.*, at which the Persian land-forces are 
in evidence in connexion with the l>Httle of Salamis : (i.) the occupa- 
tion of Psyttaleia ; (ii.) the move towards the Pelo(>oimeso8 ; (iii.) the 
building of a mole from the mainland to Siilamis ; (iv.) the evacuation 
of Attica, or the (tight of the king. The first and second of thcue 
items have alrt-jwly Ix-en notici-d in thoir connc.vion with the naval 
movements, and call for less discussion iiidcpcmlently ; the third is 
highly problematic, and requires some examination ; the fourth is at 
once the most eUborate and the most easy to dispose of. 

(i.) The occupation of PsyttuUia by a force of Persian infantr\° is (;ia 
almve remarked) apparently rcktive to u plan of o|K!ration according 
to which the scene of combat would have lain nuti^idr the ivctiuil 
Straits, or just at the SE. entrance ; and although the plan of opera- 
tions was subooqucntly changed, or developed, by the entrance of the 
Persians into the narrows, yet, owing to the discomfiture and retreat 
of the king's ships, Psyttaleia became no doubt an importjint nucleus 
in the actual struggle. The exploit of Aristoides in clearing tlie island 
of the Persians can hardly have been undertaken until compamtivci^' 
late in the day, when the tide of battle had already ebb^ beyond 
the Straits : the {)oaition in which the episode is placed in the 



318 



HERODOTUS 



luuratives both of UerodotUK and of Aischylos might suggest, or coufirm. 
this suspicion. The actual numbers of mea engaged ai-e unfortunately 
not specified, but the numerous Athenian hoplitea, shipped over, had 
been probably dra^vn up on Kynosouiu, in the first instance, to resist 
llie landing of the Persians from Psyttaleia, which woidd presumably 
have taken place had the fortunes of the naval engagement gone 
differently. In PsyttJileia the Persians arc more than half-way acron 
to the larger island of Salarais : the employment of these troops, 
actual and prospective, confirms the view that, when the occupation 
of Psyttaleiii was oitlered, the Persians exjwcted to find the Greeks in 
Sakmis, and hoped to drive the (ircek vessels eastwards out of the 
Straits. But, at whatever point of time, and with whatevt-r purpose 
imdortaken, the occupation of Psyttaleia proved a disjistrous move on 
the part of the Persians, comparalile to the occupation of Spbakteria 
in 425 au. by the Spartans, though more excusable. 

(IL) The inoirinaU of the Persian urrny, or of some considerable 
portion of it, totmnh (he l'ehponneM>s, is dateti somewhat precisely by 
Herodotus to the night before the battle, the night, that is, of the 
day upon which, according to him, the movements of the Persian fleet 
began, for the jjurpose of biinging about an engagement at sea.^ That 
the objective of the movement on land was the Peloponncsos is 
probably more than the historian, or his sources, could know for, 
certain : a movemetit westwards of Eleuais was observed, or knov 
to have biken place, and was interpreted, by the Greeks, ae direct 
against the wall across the Isthmoe and its defenders. Had Persia 
forces ever actually reached that point, the fact would certainly have 
been duly emphasized in C4reek tradition ; on the present occasion the 
Persians do not seem even to have attacked, or to have reached 
Megiira, though the occupation of that town, and of its port, Nisaia, 
wouhl surely have been a strategic undertaking of considerable 
impnrtiince for the development of the campaign. Megara, however^ 
may have been well fortified, and no easy nut to crack." The actu 
movement of the Persian forces in that direction need not have 
a mere feint, to alarm tlie occupants of Salamis, least of all if it wmII 
conducted under cover of night ; it rather relates itself to the despatch 
of the Egyptian contingent to circumna^'igate Salamis, or to blockade 
the western outlet of the Straits towards Megara, a detachment on 
land being directed to support and co-operate with that naval squadromj 
There may, however, be some exaggeration in the Herodotean account 
of the movement upon land, apart from the supposed objective. The 
Persians were in possession of Eleusia and the Thriasian plain ; one 
detachment at least will have come through tiio pass of Diyoskephal 
though Xerxes himself may have reached Athens from Oropos 
Dokelcia. Herodotus seems to conceive the Persian army as 
moving from Athens, but the supposed movement in this case ma] 



SALAMIS 



represent little more than the presence, at Eleusifi as well as at 
Athens, of a Persian corps. 

(iii.) The bnUdinif of tht moU. — There is a strong tradition, found 
not merely in Herodotus, but in Rtesias, and then in Sti-abo, Plutarch, 
and other tertiary authorities, to the effect that Xerxes had a plan, 
which was partially carried out, for throwing a bridge, or building 
a mole, across from the mainland to Salamis, and so attacking the 
Greeks in the island witli his land-forces. Such an exploit offered 
comparatively little difficixlty from the purely mechanical point of 
view ; but the work could hardly have been carried out without 
interruption from the Greeks, especiiiliy when the tele du pout began 
to approach the shore of the island. The project, and the actual 
inception of the work, appear to be historical, and as facts must have 
a considerable bearing upon the plans of Xerxes and the tactical dis- 
positions round Salamis. Here, as in all! cases, much turns upon the 
questions of exact time, place, circumstance, and motive ; and on all 
these points the authorities differ, nor can any one witness be un- 
reservedly accepted as final upon them all. Herodotus (followed 
by Plutarch) put* the bridge episode aft«r the buttle : Ktesias clearly 
places it befoie the battle. The position of iho epi.sode in the 
tactics of the whole piece will obviously vary sis the one or the otlier 
of these dates is preferred. Herodotus is the earlier and in general 
far the better authority — does not Ktesia.% for e-vample, date the battle 
of Salamis after the battle of Plataia, followijig the geographical 
order f — but, the account of the project in Herodotus losiving so much 
to be desirerl, and the account in Ktesias having in one or two other 
points an ad\'anUige, Ktesias might here be preferred in his ordering 
of events, save for more general strategic or tactical reasons. Xerxes 
would scarcely have set to work tfj build a causeway, or bridge, across 
to Salamis, at a time when his Heet was intact, prepared to do battle, 
and expecting a victory. Its erection would have been inconsistent 
at least with the first plati of operations by the Persians against 
Salamis, as above elucidated. Much less will the building have been 
begun before the arrival of the fleet at Phaleron. It remains to 
accept the date given by Herodotus and Plutarch, which places the 
inception of the buUding after the battle. If, however, Herodotus 
is to be understood to mean that tbo building was begim on the very 
day of the battle, a correction is called for. This fresh project can 
hardly under the circumstances have been undertaken before the 
following day, even if the battle itself did not last until sundown, 
as Aischylos asserts. The project, whatever its motive, seems to 
imply the failure of the fleet, and presents an alternative to the 
manoeuvres by the fleet, the circumnavigation and the assault — at 
least, if the object really was to transport the army across to Salamis, 
and not merely to gain a point d'apptti from which tu harass the 
Greek mariners. 



3S0 



HKRODOTUS 



APP. TT 



The exact site for the projected crossing is in no way indicat«d or 
suggested by Herodotus. Ktesin*, and the authors who follow him, 
mark precisely the spot from which the building started, and this 
precision is u jioint in their favour. The bridge, or causeway, was 
to start from the Heraldeion, a little to the east of Cape Amphiale, 
just where the channel was narrowest, only some four stades actxMs — 
on the Hue, in fact, of the ferry. In the first instance the mole waa, 
perhapt^, intended to rest on the island of St. George, which might 
iict na a bulwark or pier for the structure ; and might serve as a 
fresh basis, whence to advance against Salamis. The \ictors in laager 
at Salauiis were to ho threatened from the north side now, as they 
might, jwrhaps, have been threatened from the south, by the soldiers 
on Psyttaleia, had the fortunes of the day at sea gone otherwise for 
Greeks and Persians. 

The atitual form and stnicture of the edifice are not clearly 
it]dicate<l in the authoritie.s, an omission for which good excuse may 
be allowed in a ca.se where the structure in question had never been 
completed, biul perhaps hardly been begun, and at all events had long 
disappeared. If, however, the work was to be composed of ships, if 
in tact it was to be a bridge, or raft, such as had been thrown over 
tlie Hellespont, though here on a smaller scale, how were ships to be 
brought into the Straits for any such purpose, in the face of th« 
victorious Greeks, who, a fe\v hour.s before, bad driven the Persiaa 
navy back in eniifusion to Phaleroti 1 Herodotus, however, himself 
place.H the Iniilding of a mole (;^(i/iu) before the constniction (or 
constriction I) of the nift (ir;^cAi>;), while Kteaias and bis followers, 
including i'lutarch, have nothing to say of a raft, and simply specify a 
mole. The construction of a pontoon of bouts, inside the Straits, is 
almost an absurdity under the circumstances, and the construction of 
Bueb a raft outside the Straits, in the hopes of Hoating it in (section 
wiseY) to its place between the Herakleion and Salamis, hardly I 
absurd. Perhaps the raft, or [wntoon, in Herodotus, is a speculati 
hypothesis on the idtimate form of the projected structure, had it e 
been completed : probably the structure, so far as accomplished, sinipl 
presented the appearance of a jetty, or dam, was in fact a mole, 
carried out a certain way into the waters of the Straits. The proji-ct 
was a failure, at least the actual structure was never completed, or 
employed for its ostensible purpose ; the question, therefore, arises as 
to the cause of that failure, the reasons which led to the abandonment 
of the work. This argument is somewhat further complicated by the 
motivation of the king's action in Herodotus : the failure or succi 
of the work, as a device of war, being obviously relative to the obj 
with which it was undertaken. 

In regard to the motivation of the work, as in regard to its precise 
date, the authorities are divided, Herodotus treating the undertaking 
as a mere stratagem, or ruse, intended to cover the king's ref 



on- 

I 




already determined : while Plutarch and the KteBias-group all treat 
the mole-building as a serious measure, begun at any rate with a view 
to an attack tu be made by the Persian land-forces upon the Greeks in 
Salamis. The Morodotean theory has been adopted recently by 
BuBolt,' and others, upon the ground that command of the sea was 
necessary for the building of such a structure (especially if it was to 
include a bridge of Iwats), and that after the CJroek victory at sea, the 
Persians could not seriously have expected, or designed, to complete 
•uch a structure. But could they, then, have exj>ected to beguile the 
Greeks with such an abortive stratagem 7 Unless the mole was capable 
of being put to serious uses, or completed so far as to convince the 
Greeks that it [wrtendml n retil danger, it was likely to be a more 
laut;hing-stock to both sides alike. Plutarch, who dates the building, 
with Herodotus, after the battle, treats it as the outcome of a serious 
plan and intention of attack. 8ucb an idea docs not appear either 
psychologically or strategically improbable at the moment. The full 
extent of the victory at sea was not immeiliately realized in the (rrcek 
camp, and the Persians had still probably numerical superiority in 
ships to the t»reeks. In any case the structure of a mole, or dam, 
across to Salami.s might not seem at first an impossible undertaking to 
the power that had bridged Hellespont and canalized Akte. The 
undertaking was, indeed, a1>undoned, and this failure calls for explana- 
tion , but the explanation is not far to seek. An actual mole all 
across the channel may hare soon revealed itself as beyond the 
mechanical resources of the Persian engineers ; the king's ardour may 
have cooled, and less adventurous counsels prevailed ; last, and not 
least, a good tradition associates the retreat of Xerxes, which of course 
involved the abandonment of the mole-building, wintb a second message 
from Themistokles, which threatened the employment by the Greeks 
of their superiority at sea on a much larger scale than that involved 
in any operations in the straits of Salamis. The retreat of Xerxes, 
thus induced, fully accounts for the abandonment of the undertaking, 
(iv.) HttrMt of tfte Persian army: Jlight of t/te kini}. — The evacua- 
tion of Attica by the Persians, after the battle of Salamis, may be 
easily accounted for, on strategic and politictil grounds, without 
ascribing it to panic, or to loss of nerve. The array was still un- 
defeated, but the supromac}' and the advantage of the Persians at seti 
were gone. The fleet wn.s bound to retire. Beside the losses, material 
and moral, incurred at Salamis, the service of the whole summer 
through had doubtless told heavily both upon ships and crews. The 
retirement of the navy involved, of course, the withdrawal of 
transports and grain-ships, so far as these had accompanied the advance. 
Under these circumstances, and at this stage in the campikign, it was 
natiu^l to witbdiaw the land-forces also, even apart from political 
considerations, upon their baMs and magazines in lliessaly and 



Biuolt. Or. OeteA. ii." (1895), p. 708. 



VOL, 11 



3SS 



HERODOTUS 



AVP. Vl 



Makedonia. There is no liint, nor any need to suppose, thai th« 
retreat was dictated by fear of an advance of the Peloponnesian forces 
from the Isthmoa. The Pei-sian army remained in Attica, after the 
defeat at sea, and su contained the Greeks at Salamis, long enough to 
secure the undistui'bed retreat of the Persian vessels ; but the strategic 
pause was not converted into a permanent occupation. Even on 
purely strategic grounds better winter- quarters were to be found in 
Boiotia or Thessaly. 

The political results to be anticipated from the naval victory of 
the Greeks at Salamis must have constituted a further reason for the 
retirement of the armj', us well as of the navy, from Attica, and of 
the return of Xerxes himself to Asia and to Sardes. The remnant 
of the iioet was needed on the Aaianic coast, and the Persian army 
might be called upon to secure the adhesion of Boiotia and Thessaly. 
The loyally of the Ionian and other Greek subjects of the king 
was all along suspect : the victory of Salamis must have excited 
apprehensions of a fresh revolt in Ionia, which wore in fact to be 
verified immediately. Probably the cities and tribes of Thrake and 
Miikedoii, which had once already used the opportunity of an Ionian 
revolt to throw off their allegiance to Persia, were thought quite 
capable of using a fresh occasion to renew the attempt. The 
subsequent operations of Artabazos against Poteidaia attest the reality 
of the risk. The continued loyalty of Thobos, of Thessaly and Makedon, 
throughout the coming winter, suggests that more was expected of 
Mardonios and his army than had been achieved by the combined 
forces under the leading of bis master. 

Whether the king from the iii-st intended to withdraw from the 
actual command of the army in Greece is a question ; but there were 
good reasons, there was precedent, for such a withdmwal. Kyi"o« had 
retired to upper Asia, after the capture of Sai-dos in 547 B.a, leaving 
the conquest of Ionia to be effected by deputy. Darcios, after his 
expedition across the Danube in 512 B.*'., ha^I handed over the further 
conduct of operations in Europe to his lieutenants, and had awaited 
the success of their efforts in the comparative ease of the palace at 
Sardes. The Persian king could not afford to be the organizer of 
disaster ; it was still just possible to represent the capture of Athens 
as the crowning achievement of a successful campaign.^ Genuine 
solicitude for the safety of the king's person and the supremacy of 
the Achaimenid house, and therewith of the Persian state and hegemony, 
may have co-operated with private ambitions to make the Persian 
marshals and council desirous to remove Xerxes from the front : the 
actual conduct of the war was not likely to suffer by his removal 
The Persian land-forces were still undefeated, nay, hitherto victorious. 
Marathon had been avenged. The Peloponnesiiins had scattered 
from Thermopylai to rally Isehind the Isthmos-wall, without daring to 



cross the path of the Persian again. lieljiitg on the loyalty of Boiotia 
And central Greece, Mardonios, the commander of the forces, perhaps the 
satrap of the new province, took up winter-quarters, amid the compara- 
tive comforts of Thessaly, and employed his lei>;ure in making pioiu 
overtures to various centres of the natioii;d religion, and tempting offers 
to the distracted Athenians, the trani^fer of whose fleet might still 
secure him an easy conquest of Peloiwnnesos. 

The record of the movementa of the Persian ai-my is connected, 
but not identical, with the story of ilu fiighl of thi: king. Few 
episodes in the war have been more fully exploited by the Greek 
legend-mongers than the retirement of Xerxes after the battle of 
Salamis. Circumstances and motives have alike been made the sport 
of the fantastic and moralizing tendencies of victorious fabulists. 
Herodotus is neither the first Tjor the worst offender in this matter. 
Aischylos before him had already given the popular voice literary rank 
on the subject : writers of the Roman period were still improving the 
occasion with more prosaic moralities. The bare facts of the case no 
doubt involved a dramatic contrast. At Salamis the conquest had 
been stayed ; the Persians had achieved their last success at the 
expense of Hellenic arms ; the king himself disappeared from the 
scone ; the sef|uel crowned Salamis with Plataia, and carried the war 
into the enemy's country. All this great peripeteiu dated from the 
victory in the Straits, and the king's own exit was the symbol thereof. 
The symbol was duly exaggerated into a parable, and the parable 
presents the spectacle of a craven and ignominioiis flight, invested with 
every circumstance of disaster and humiliation. Only in the light of 
further and complete success can the immediate sequel of Salamis have 
been so grossly transfigured and caricatured by Greek tradition. The 
story contra«licts itself, is at variance with the given situation, and is 
refuted by the record of the subsoqnent operations of the Peraians on 
Greek soil. Herodotus himself, here as elsewhere, supplies the 
materials for his own correction. The i>ause in Attica, after the eea- 
figbt, the building of the mole, the commission given to Artemisia, the 
easy and orderly retirement through central Greece, the reception of 
the Spartan herald, the commission to Mardonios issued in Athens and 
confirmed in Thessaly, the service of Artabazos, who escorts the king 
from Thessaly to the Hellespont with sixty thousan<l men, and returns 
to besiege Poteidaia — these are all items inconsistent with the repre- 
sentation of the king's return as a panic-stricken and disastrous flight. 
The existence, side by side, of two obviously exaggerated, contradictory, 
and absurd stories of the adventured in 'Thrake further discredits the 
general tradition. The comic a-escendo, which obtains in the account* 
of the king's passage of the Hellespont, bctitiys the spirit governing 
the whole. Aischylos allows Xerxes to recross by the bridge. 
Herodotus, perhaps correctly, takes him and his men across in the 
ships, which have duly reached the Dardanelles. Ephoros confines 



3S4 



HERODOTUS 



App. n 



the king in crossing to an open boat. The forty-five days' journey 
from Athens to Sestos may be a fossilized fact of genuine tradition ; 
less acceptable are the strata of honors and farce in which it is 
embedded. But all the fable is not inexplicable. Apart from the 
desire for |>oetic justice on the woulJ-be conqueror, the lord of 
barbarous Asia — already fully developed in the pages of Aischylos — 
two suggestions go far to accouiit for the Herodotean version. In the 
first place, Herodotus has to get rid of the colossal exaggeration in 
the numbers of the host of Xerxes. He accomplishes this duty by 
lejiving thirty myrijwla of men with Mardonios, and destroying the 
remainder -majority in Thrake. In the second place, much of the 
hardships, sidlerings, losses, and horrors of the march through Thnike 
may have been borrowed from the retiun of the remnant of the 
Persian forces from Plataia, some twelve months later, and transferred 
by anticipation to the com[»inion9 of Xerxes. There might thus be 
some literal tmth in the incidents, though directed to the wrong 
address. The admission, however, that Artabazos after Plataia led his 
40,000 successfully home through Thrake, and crossed into Asia vk 
the Bosporos, somewhat discounts the value of this apology. 

One further point. In the Persai of Aischylos, with daring but 
dramatic propriety, the Hight of Xerxes carries him incontinently 
home to iSusa. Herodotus, doubtless in this particular more accurate, 
allows the king to winter at Sartles, but obtain.s a touch of tragic 
kaiha/rsis in the truly tenible story of the Despot's Amours, in which 
Xerxes disapi>ears from the scene in a foul frenzy of lust and bloodshed. 

§ 8. The Greeks apparently did not at once realize the extent of 
their victory ; they were looking for a fresh attack on the following 
day. Even when apprised of the departure of the Persian fleet, the 
victors of Salamis were pinned for a while to their stations, by the 
enemy's continued occupation of Atticji. A gi-and opportunity was 
there lost. Greater energy and courage at this crisis might hare 
made a second campaign in Greece unnecessary, and have save*! Attica 
from a second occupation. It was no glory to the Greeks that the 
king and his land-forces were allowed to retire unmolested at their 
own discretion. A >'igorous initiative at the Isthmoa might have 
utilized the moral effects of Salamis for the immediate discomfiture of 
the Persian army in Attica. A demand to that effect was probably 
addrftsed t.o the Spartans, though not recorded. A timely eclipee of 
the sun furnished the pious excuse for the inaction of the Pelo- 
ponnesians. The inactivity of the Greek army at the Isthmos, when 
apprised of the victory at Salamis, confesses the formidable character 
of the Persian host, and attests the respect still entertained for the 
victors of Tbermopylai by the compatriots of Leonidas. Had the 
Sjjartans that day been minded to demand of Xerxes in person 
vengeance for the slaughter of their king, they now had their 
opportunity. There was no pretending that the Peloponne«ian army 



SALAMIS 



had followed the retreating Pei-sians ; but the anecdote of the Spartan 
mission to Xerxes in Thessalj' served its turn. It belongs in part to 
the rehabilitation of Delphi, Delphi here again already acting on the 
national side : it serves to obliterate a lost opporturtity, with a touch 
of Sophoklean irony, which aiiticipjites the holocaust of Plataia. 

The Greek fleet, as already shown, cannot have quilted tSalamis, 
least of all the Athenian contingent, so long as the Persian army 
remainetl in Attica. But the victory opened up the po.ssihility of an 
ultimate move against the Persian line of coramiuiications, of an 
attempt to break, at the Hellespont, the most fragile link in the chain 
between Salamis and Susa. A possibility so ob\ious must have been 
taken into account on the Persian .side, once the extent of the naval 
disaster at Salamis became apparent. For that reason, presumablj', 
the remnant of the I'ersian fleet made for the Hellespont and Aiolis, 
perhaps direct from Salamis. Had the Persian been blind to that 
obvious possibility, his eyes were opened, and his movement* perhaps 
accelerated, by fresh information, which reached him from the Greek 
camp. Of the authenticity of this mes.sage there need be no insuper- 
able doubt ; Theniistokles himself is our apparent authority for it ; * 
but neither the Herodotean nor the Plutarchian version of the circum- 
stances is quite acceptable. The message umnot have been conveyed 
by the same hand as had carried the pi-evioua message ; it wll have 
been sent not from Andros, but, as indeed Thucydidea avers, from 
Salamis : Tbemistokles tto doubt was the author of the message, and 
he need not have kept it dark either to Aristeidcs or Eurybiades. 
The object of the message may have been to liberate Attica from the 
presence of the Persian army, by accelerating the inevitable retreat of 
the king. Probably Themistokles did not employ this ruse, until 
convinced that no active service was to be exfwcted of the Pelo- 
ponnesian army. But, if the message was calculated to hasten the 
king's retreat, it was calcidatcd also to liberate the Greek navy to 
quit Attic waters, and to carrj' out the very project which Themi- 
stokles is supiwsetl to have pledged himself to the king to prevent. 
The course contemplated by Theinistokle-s apparently included the 
pursuit of the Persian fleet, the completion of the naval Wctory, the 
destruction of the bridges over the HellesiHjrit, Such a course waa 
too adventurous far the Spartati Navarch, and little in accordance 
with ordinary Spartiiii conduct of Wt^ory- But was it, indeed, ever 
seriously contemplated by Themistokles himself ? Action cannot 
have been intended until the Persian army had evacuated Attica ; the 
season was advanced ; there w;is work for the fleet nearer home ; the 
message served its turn, if it had contributed to clear Athens of the 
presence of the enemy. 



' ap. Thucyd. 1. 137. 7 ypi^t rift iic 



«tX., with W. H. Forbes' note ad I. 
{Thwtifdidts, Bk. I. Oxford, 1895). 



APPENDIX VII 



FROM SALAMLS TO SESTOS 



1. Immediate strategic results of Salamia. § 2. Truditionsl syucbronism of the 
battles of PUtuia and Mykale : it« nigiiiticaiiicc. § 3. Operations of the Greek 
fleet after Snlaniifi. § 4. The digap|)oarance of Themistokles. § 5. CnnditioD 
of the Oreoka during the winter of 480-479 n.r. S "• Actual operations of the 
fleet in 479 B.C. 



§ 1. The victory of Salamis loft the work of dcliveranoe but half- 
aocomplisbed. llie Porsian fleet, had been put out of action, or at 
least reduccfl tn act purely on the defensive. No further attack was 
to be apprehended from the sea. But the victorious Persian army 
w;is atill in possession of Attica, of centnd Crreece, and of Thessaly : 
the Persian dominion still extended continuously from the Hellespont 
to the Isthmos ovei--!and, though Persian sea-power w;is for the time 
broken. Even the half-detiveraace elTected at Salamis did not at 
once reveal itself in its true proportions, if we may trust the tradition 
that the flreeks fully expectcil the renewal of the combat on tlie 
following day, the disiippearatice of the king's fleet from Phaleron 
coming upon them as a surprise,' lliat disappearance by no meant 
loft the Greek fleet free to act at once on the oflensive, or to pursue 
the fugitive foe. So long as the Persian arm}' remained in Attica 
the Greek fleet must have been required to cover Salamis, even 
though the Persian ships were no longer in evidence. The retreat 
of the king's land-forces will, however, have opened the eyes of the 
Greeks at once to the full extent of their victory, none the less if 
that retreat had been accelerated by a communication from Themi 
stokles, conveying a threat of aggressive tiction by the victoriout 
Greek against the Hellespont, or the Peraian lines of communication.- 
The Peloponnesos was now safe from attack : tSalamis had completely 
covered the Isthmos, and the whole coast and lands to the southwards. 
Tlie strategy of Themistokles bad more than justified itself from the 
Spartan point of view. The tactical blunder of the Persian ia 
entering the Straits bad but crowned bis strategic blunder in rejecting 



I 8. 108. 



» 8. 110. 



32S 



the plan for a direct descent upon the Peloponnesian coasts. * The 
Pelojjonnese vr&s now virtually imprognable, provided always the 
loyalty of the Athenians stood tirm, and the Athenian fleet in no 
case should jjass over to the enemy's side. 

With Athena and Attica, however, things stood very differently. 
The bare victory of Salamis left the ({uesLion for the Athenians almost 
in statu, quo, as in fact the second occupation of Athens ten months later 
proved. Salamis was decisive for the Peloponnesians, indecisive for 
the Athenians. The interests, and even the very existence, of Athens 
still )i3 before demanded a forwanl and aggressive plan of action on 
the part of the Co Ji federates. Attica could be saved only by a 
decisive victory on land, which should annihiliite the Persian army at 
l&iat as effectually as the PerHi;i.n iicet bml been armibilnted at Salamis. 
The advantage of Salamis was that it ren<lered an aggressive action on 
the part of the Gn^ek fleet possible, and possible even us un alternative 
to the campaign by land. Had the evacuation of Salamis been carried 
out even as a sequel to the evacuation of Attica ; had the Athenian 
citizen body retired, on the invitation of the Peloponnosiana, behind 
the Isthmos, the further and aggressive action of the fleet against the 
Persian lines of coninninication, against the Hellespont, agiiinst the 
Persian dominion in Ionia, in Asia itself, might have rendered a pitched 
battle on European soil for ever unnecessary. The separate interest 
of Sparta demanded, after the victory of Salamis far more than before 
that victory, the removal of the Athenians with bag and baggage into 
the Peloponnesos, and the employment of the Greek fleet in active and 
aggressive movementis. The ol>8tinat<3 refusal of the Athenians in the 
second iusUince to abandon Salamis served a dovtbtc purpose and result : 
it hampered the movements of the fleet, which had to be retained in 
the home waters, to cover Salamis, not from the Persian navy, but 
from the Persian army ; and it involved the advance of the PeIn]>on- 
nesian army beyond the Isthmos, and an engagement, on offensive- 
defensive lines, if a solution was to be found for the complicated 
problem, consjstetitly with the preser^'ntion of Athenian liberties. 

Thus, from a strategic point of view, the victory of Salamis, though 
a maritime victory, and a victory complete in its own kind, by no 
means dissolved the solidarity of terraneous and maritime operations 
on the Greek side. While the relation between the opcnitions by land 
and by sea upon the Persian side was shattered by the battle of 
Salamis, the correlation of land and sea operations upon the Greek 
side was maintained, and the movements of fleet and army were 
still interdependent. But this interdependence was rather now a 
voluntary than a necessary plan of operations, and was deliberately 
enforced by the policy and the passion of Athens. What ap^iears to 
have been the Peloponnesian plan of campaign for the ensuing 
season might have been successful after Salamis. Had the 



3S8 



HERODOTUS 



APP. 



Athenians retired to the Peloponnesos, the Greek land-forces might 
have laughixl Mardonios to scorn from behind the Isthmian wall, 
while the fleet, maintained at its full figure, might have undertaken 
euch o}}erations as must have recalled the Pereiang to Thrake, and 
ultimately to Asia. To pursue the possible results of the alternative 
plan any further were useless. The Athenians insisted upon main- 
taining their position in Salamis, and enforced a land-campaign beyoi 
the Isthmos ; albeit, to carry their point, they had to threaten 
transference of their fleet to the king's side, and had also to take 
their full share of the actiml fighting on land. Kesults quickly justi- 
fied the Athenian policy from a strategic point of view j but nothing 
finally overcame the inherent duality of interests between Athens 
the Peloponnesos, or ever welded the two powers into a real politic 
union. Tlie victory of Plataia, though perhaps unduly retarcled, 
brought a decisive issue far more quickly, and upon a grander scaI^ 
than could well have been attained by any other process 
though mainly a Spartan victory, it redounded far more to 
advantage of Athena than to the advantage of Sparta. The victory 
in, and over, Boiotia left Athens the dominant land-power in central 
Greece, and liberated Athens for aggressive maritime movement«L 
which hafl far reaching results, strategic and political, just in con 
quenco of the complete deliverance of Athena on the land side, 
the destruction of the Persian forces, and of the medizing party, in 
central Greece, The battle of Plataia was not less essential to 
naval supremacy, and ultimately to the naval empire of Athens, il 
the victories at Mykalo and on tbc Hellespont. Thus, althougS 
the actual operations of the Greek fieet in 479 B.C. might seem 
to a superficial view an independent series, and the sole prelude lo 
the subsequent foundation of the Athenian hegemony at sea, their 
correlation with the contemporary campaign on land must be restored, 
Bo to speak, at both ends, if the full significance of the concurrent 
campaigns is to be appreciated. On the one hand, the aggressive 
action of the fleet, the campaign in Ionia uud on the Hellespont, is 
inconceivable and cannot have been undertaken, until Attica was 
evacuated by the Persians for the second time ; the advance of 
the Peloponnesians beyond the Isthmoe was an essential condition 
for the advance of the Greek fleet to Deloa, and ultimately to Ionia. 
Again, and on the other hand, the destruction of the Persian forces on 
one day in Boiotia and in Ionia set the Greeks, and especially the 
maritime powers among them, free to carry the war, for revenge, 
profit, or any larger ambition, into the enemy's country. It was not 
an accident that Pausanias, the victor of Plataia, was the first commissary 
of such an undertaking by the confederate Greeks ; and his victory 
had previously made possible that independent tuition of the Atheniaos 
on the Hellespont, which no doubt secured to them the reversion ^ 
the separate naval hegemony. 



FROM SALAMIS TO SESTOS 






§ 2. A perception of these organic relations between the actions 
of the confederate Greeks by sea and by land may be indirectly 
attested by the asserted synchronism between the battles of PlatAia 
and of Mykale, the latter of which, though not strictly a naval bjittle, 
was still rendered possible only hy the uncontested superiority of the 
Greeks at sea. But, if the exact synchronism wna indeed a matter 
of historical anti attested fact, its assertion by tnulition is to be 
iiscribed to the fact itself, and not to a jwrception of its strategic 
significance. The synchronism ia not in itseJf impossible, or even very 
unlikely ; there is lime enough and to spare, between the evacuation 
of Attica by Mardonios and the finale at Plataia, to carry the fleet 
from Sidaniis to Delos, from Delos to Mykale, and an undesigned 
coincidence in time between the two battles is not ipfo facto incredible. 
The chief reason for doubting it is the report of the Plataian victory, 
which spread among the ranks of the Greeks at Mykale on the same 
afternoon. If authentic, the report imiilies that time harl elapsed 
Ijetween the two events ; if unauthentic, or a strategic device to 
encourage the men, the false report might itself be accountable for 
the recorded synchronism. So nuu'h at least may Vie taken as granted, 
that the victory at Mykale did not precede in time the victory at 
Plataia, though, had it done so, the stnitegic relations of the two 
actions would have been in no lespect impaired. Plataia renders 
Mykale, not Mykale Plataia, fruitful ; nay, Mykale is not even con- 
ceivable without the antecedent movements which brought Greeks 
and Persians face to face in Boiotia. But of these correlations little 
or no consciousness is betrayetl by Herodotus, who seems to treat the 
vementa of the Greek fleet in the spring and summer of 479 B.c. 
an wholly independent series, determined by conditions of its own, 
d culminating, by a curious accident, in a startling synchronism, 
significant for him of a divine interposition, and for us at least of a 
causal correlation. 

S 3. If the movements of the Greek fleet in 479 b.c. Ik; thua 
correctly correlated with the situation upon land, the representation 
of aiiiiirB immediately after the victory of Salamis given by Herodotus 
cannot be accepted as it stands. The visitation of Andros, the division 
and dedication of sjjoils, the awai-d of prizes, as described by Herodotus, 
are all under some suspicion, (n) The Greek fleet cannot have 
advanced to Andros until the Persian arm)' had evacuated Attica. 
The advance to Andros cannot have Iwen in pursuit of the Persian 
fleet, which had some diiys' start of the Persian army in the work of 
evacuation. The Persian fleet must have made good its retreat un- 
molested and unpursued : the advance of the Greeks to Andros is a 
substantive attempt to reap the iirstrfruitfi of the Salaminian victory 
by detaching the Kyklades from the Persian cause. The operation is 
manifestly a confederate undertaking, but its political and military 
significance is completely obscured and distorted in Herodotus hy the 



330 



HERODOTUS 



APP. va 



* malignity ' of his sources, and their manifest perversion of the £acu 
to the discredit of Themistokles. The stories of the council of war 
held at Andros, of the interview between Themistokles and Eurybiadea, 
of the advice of Tbomistoklus to the Atheniana, and of his second 
message to Xerxes, have ul ready been discounted and corrected, 
far as correction may be possil)le. Placed in their present contel 
they involve manifest al)8urditic8, and contlict with other and, in son 
ways, more probable traditions. The record of the corruption 
Themistokles is discredited partly by the involved assumption that 
Themistokles has a free hand to direct the action of the confederate 
fleet, and parti}' by the tendency, which it shares with other and 
similar stories, aireWy discredited, to damnify the memory of Themi- 
stokles. The astounding fact remains that Aiidros defied successfully 
the efforts of the confederate Heet ; a fact which confirms the suspicion 
thiit the full signifiwuice of the victory uf Salamis was not immediately 
apparent. Even maritime states might still be feeling that the war 
in Greece wiis far from lieing decided by a single naval engagement 

Unacceptable as the story of the debate at Androa is, the qaeBtaon 
maj' have arisen among the Strategoi before Andros, whether thej 
should go further and seek out the remains of the Persian fleet on 
the Asianic side or on the Hellespont, and endeavour to cut ofl' the 
retreat of the king by land, and the over-sea communications of 
army with A«ift. Possibly Themistokles at this crisis advocated 
ofHjration if undertaken by the confederate Heot, and opposed, 
sejMiratist action on the part of the Athenians alone. Tradit 
obstinately emphasizes the connexion of this idea >vith the name 
Themistokles, and three or four times expressly ascribes to him the 
design of carrying the fleet to the llcUeaiiont ^ — a design only finally 
achieved after his temporary disappearance from the rOle of protagonist 
So here, at Amiros, Themistokles pacifies the Atheniana by the pledge 
that in the spring he will lead them to the Hellespont and Ionia- 
But the fictions in the story of Andros may well cover the whole 
debate. The conduct of Themistokles towards the Athenians is 
involved with the reported mission of Sikinnos and the motives 
assigned for it, which are completely to be discredited. Moreover, 
was any Athenian at this crisis prepjired to go so far from home, 
instciwl of returning home to restore things in Salamis and in Attica ? 
Or, who were the Athenians who at this point presumed to dictate 
to Themistokles the plan of action ! The discussion, if not the 
blockade of Andros iteelf, at this point is probably a pure anachronism. 
The Greeks, months later, considered Samos 'as far off as the Pillars 
of Herakles ' : were the Athenians included, who now are anxious to 



' (i.) Cp. Plutarch, riu-mitt. 7 us 
vpoaiar&Tu Tijt 'KWiSot iirafrSii> Tifi 
fiap^pi^ KSTck diXarrai'. (ii. ) iiml. 16 
yvtiitiV' (xoifiTO Xi'HV rd i^fvffia rah 
Foi^ii' {'iriirXfi/iraKTfi ett 'KW'^irovroi' 



"Srus" tif/Ti "riiv 'Kalan (» tj 8J 

Xi^ufit*" (cp. Hdt. 8. lOSV (iii.) 

8. 110 (iiiMsage to Xerxes), (iv.) Thnc 
1. 137. 1 (letter to ArtAxeries). 



FROM SALAMIS TO SESTOS 



sail to Hellespont ? Without prejudice to the falsity of that anecdote, 
the inconsequence, or at least the contrast it involves with this, attests 
at once the fictile character of Herodotus' sources, and his own lack 
of self-ciiticism in reporting such inconsistencies. 

(6) How unconcerned Herodotus is about ihe 'mint and anise' 
of chronology is further illustrated, in the immediate context, by his 
record of the division of the spoil, and the offerings to the gods in 
honour of the victory at Salamis. If the trophied triremes were set 
up at Soimion, at Salamis itself, at the Istbmos, before the confederate 
fleet broke up for the >vinter, yet the tithes cannot have been sent 
to Delphi while Mardonios was still in Greece, nor can the works of 
art described have been made and dedicated, or the Aiginctan offering 
set up ' in the corner near the Krator of Kroisos,' until months, perhap* 
years, after. Herodotus betrays no sense of lime or perspective in 
this passage, wherein wo may fairly be allowed to see an evidence 
of the process of rehabilitation rendered necessary, or expedient^ for 
the Delphic oracle by the ambiguity of its utterances, and the too 
fortunate escape of its treasures, during the Persian occupation. 

{c) The award to the Aiginetans of the prize for the battle of 
Salamis remains one of the unexplained jwnidoxes of the M'ar. The 
Aiisteia may have been not in accordance with deserts : certainly, if 
sufferings were to be considered as well as services, no maritime state 
could justly compete with Athens. But the award suggests a further 
incompleteness in the records of the actual fight. The invocation of 
the Aiakids, even their actual presence in the ilay of battle, will 
hardly have entitled their island to the prize for valour on that day ; 
but the notice of tlie Aiginetan service, in cutting off the retreating 
Persians in the Straits, may cover a much more valiant and signal 
achievement than appears in the bald and phil-Athenian stories of the 
fray. The Aiginetan ships, wanting in the navy-list, may have been 
foremost in the fight, whether at one or other end of the Straits. 
The Athenians themselves can hardly bo said to have directly con- 
tested the justice of this award, except by re-telling the story of Salamis 
all to their own advantage 

§ 4. A much greater paradox remains to be disctused in the 
triumph of Themistoklej^ and his instant disappearance. A fact 
apparently implied in Herodotus is expressly recorded elsewhere, 
that Thcmistokles was deposed from the StraUffia in Athens, that is, 
W!ia not re-elected Slmlegos in and for the coming year (179-478 B.C.). 
The two most prominent members of the strategic college in thc 
second campaign are Aristeides and Xanthippos, the quondam rivals 
and opponentfi of Thcmistokles, the one supreme in the army, the 
other in command of the Attic fleet. Thcmistokles is unnamed and 
unnoticed. Herodotus and the ancient authorities explain this paradox 
after their own manner. Themistokles had rendered himself unpopular 
rith the Athenians by accepting the honours lavished on him at 



332 



HERODOTUS 



APP. VII 



Sparta : his corruption also ha<l leaked out, aud he had given himself 
insufferable aire as the saviour of the State. In short, a jealousy, not 
wholly unileserved, much less unnatural, hu«l broken out against him 
and contributed to his dowrifitll : the good quah'ties of his opponents 
were notorious. 

Modern scholars, justly ill -content with such purely personal 
aud hardly rational motives, have had little difficulty in discovering 
for the disappwirance of Thcmistokles more significant and plausible 
reasons in the political and strategic situation of the moment. The 
policy and plans of Themistokles had indeed been finally successful 
in the first camjjaign, but at what an enormous cost to Athens ! 
Without a decisive battle by land the safety of Athens could not be 
secured. The fall of Themistokles and the election of his rivals, 
accomplished at Athens only after artlent debate and a violent party 
struggle, signified a protest and n demand — a protest against the idea 
that the war was to be conducted pitrely at sea ; a demand addressed 
to the Peloimnnesians, and to Sparta, that the ensuing campaign 
should be energetically conducted on land, so as to cover Attica from 
a fresh invasion, and to push matters to a decisive and victorious issue 
against the Persian army. The heroes of Mai-athon had less respect 
for ' the Medic dress and the men clothed therewithal ' than had the 
survivors of Thermopylai. 

Before accepting in their entirety either the ancient or the modem 
solutions of the paradox, there is still room to iisk whether the 
apparent facts are so incontrovertible as has been assumed. Is it 
absolutely certain that Themistokles was completely shelved for the 
ensuing year, and shelved as the result of a party vote and a struggle 
between two alternative policies 1 Themistokles is not expressly 
named among the Slrategoi of the year 479-478 ; his two former 
opponents, Aiisteides and Xanthippos, are the most prominent 
members of the college for that year. But the list of StraU^ is 
very incomplete ; and even if Themistokles was displaced from the 
leading position, he may have remained nevertheless a member of 
the board. The assumption that Themistokles opposed the policy 
which demanded that the Pelopoiincsiaus should advance in force 
to the protection of Athens, and should even, if possible, engage the 
Persian land-forces north of Kithairon, is anything but inevitable. 
Themistokles was identified with the attempt to meet the Persian 
invasion in Thessaly, an attempt which, sis alxjve shown, involved 
presumably the greater exertions, and possibly a pitched battle, on 
land. The defence of Thermopylai was, of course, a i«rt of his 
strategy, and Themistokles had never intended that the Persians 
should set foot in Attica. His resolute refusal to evacuate Salamis, 
or to remove the Athenians en masse behind the Isthmos, involves 
the defence of Attica, by land as well as by sea, or its recovery. 
The words put into his mouth by Hero<Iotus after Salamis, and 



§4 



PROM 8ALAMIS TO SESTOS 



S3S 



addressed tr, hypothesi to the Athenians, though of very doubtful 
historical authority, are interesting in this connexion as implying 
that Atticji was not to be again occupied or ravaged by a Persian 
host: an implication which would piuctically commit Themiatokles 
to the subsefjuent ]>olicy, which is supjiosed to be the special preserve 
of his opponents. An<i further : that policy being the sound and 
right policy for Athens to pursue under the circumstances, did 
Themistokles, of all pereons, fail to understand the situation, or 
believe that Mardonios and the Persian forces couhi be kept out of 
Attica, unless the Peloponiiesian forces advanced beyund the Isthraost 
More likely no one else in Athens so clearly understood the strategic 
and military necessities of the case as Themistokles. How, then, 
account for his disappesiranco 1 Possibly he was regarded in Athens, 
and regarded himself, iis no longer the man t)e.<jt fitted, or most likely, 
to persuade Sparta and the Peloi>oniiesittiis to fulfil their pledges and 
to do the Tieedfui. After all he hati faileil, in the previous year, to 
get Kleombrotos and the Peloponnesians to advance even into Attica. 
The honours with which ho had been received and despatched by 
Sparta may have made it less easy for him, in his own eyes as well 
as in the eyes of his fellow-citizens, to bring the full pressure to bear 
upon the Spartans that might bo required for the coming campaign. 
The magnanimity of Themistokles did not date from his deathbed. 
The patriotism and self-denials of Athens in this very war were his 
inspirations. The feud with Aigina had been composed, the claim 
to the naval hegemony had been waived, by Tliemistokles in the 
common interests. Who but Themistokles had recalled the Athenian 
exiles, Aristeides and Xanthippos among them ? CJenerous rivalry 
between the two great leaders, as to which of them should most 
benefit his country, had already begun : what but the pragmatic and 
malignant motivation of the Oreek gossip-mongers of the day entitles 
us to suppose that peraonal feud and rivalry had already broken out 
afresh 1 Within a year Aristeides and Themistokles are found again 
co-operating in a most deliaite and subtle intrigue against the manifest 
and declared interests of Sparta for the fortification of Athens. On 
that occasion Themistokles is apparently taking the intellectual lead. 
The event falls well within the official year of Aristeides and 
Xanthippos ; i.s it so certain that Themistokles too is not one of the 
Strakgoi of the year? If Themistokles was a private person during 
the year 479-478 B.C. until appointed ambassador to Sparta, was ho 
present in the ranks at Plataial He may equally well have been 
present there in a strategic capacity, albeit Aristeides was undoubtedly 
the commander-in-chief. A few months later again and Aristeides, 
as Strategos at Byzantion, is promoting the ideas of Thenii.<)tokles by 
securing the naval hegemony of Hcltas for Athens. The politicians 
of ancient Athens were not preclud«ftl l>y the dearly-purchased party 
system of modem states from tulvocating the particular measure 



334 



HERODOTUS 



APP. 



which at ihe moment might be manifestly to the interest of the 
dty; and we cannot be too careful to avoid corrupting our vision 
of the inner history of the ancient state by misleading analogies from 
modem politics. In fine, the supposed disappearance of Tiiemistokles 
from office in 479 B.C., and his conversion into a 'Leader of the 
Opposition,' may be an exaggeration and an illusion, due primarily, 
no doubt, to the >'icioiis Londition of our sources of knowledge. 
Leading straif<jos, or commander-in-chief, he ceilainly was not ; and 
that fact is no doubt fiignificant in view of hia position during the 
previous year ; but that he completely dropped out of the Stfoif^^i 
is more than we are justified in ast-umin^, until a complete list of tbl9^ 
Stratefjoi for the year can be produced without him. Still less are we 
justified in assuming that he was opposed to the policy of Athens, 
iis shown in the campaign of 479 n.u, or at variance with the men 
whose names are especially associated with its execution : the im- 
mediate sequel shows the very reverse of such a division. It is more 
reasonable to conclude that the Athenian policy of 479 was tlie 
policy still of Theraistokles, even if the hands chiefly charged with 
its execution were those of Aristcides and Xanthi]>pos. 

§ 5. There is utifortunately little or no direct evidence of 
satisfactory kind in regard to the minds and actions of the Greek stat 
and statesmen during the winter immediately succeeding the victor 
of Salamis. This chapter of history is, therefore, largely conjectural 
— an infortince, or series of inferences, from the given situation, and 
from the later and ascertained course of e\ent8. The winter must 
have passed amid an ever-growing appreciation of the results of the 
great victory just won, and a growing confidence in regard to the 
campaign still impending. The islands, with the possible exception 
AndroB, within the Delian circuit, had been won for the national cans 
or at least detached from the Persian. The king's residence in Sarde 
and the measures taken to safeguard loida and the Hellespont, wert^ 
doubtless known in Sparta and in Athens. That nothing was to be 
expected from the north but a fresh invasion must also have been well 
understood : the news of the successful resistance of Poteidaia to 
the Persian blockade wa.s assuredly reported in Korinth and Athens. 
There were no signs of a reinvasion of Greece by sea ; the king's fleet 
had been partly disbanded, an<l the remainder restricted to guarding 
the Hellespont and Ionia. But^ as the war was plainly not over, the 
question must constantly have presented itself to the Greek leaders, 
how the further defence was to be conducted. The defeat of the 
Persians at Salamis had opened up the jwseibility of carrying the war 
into the enemy's coasts or country ; but it would be rash to ascribe to 
Sparta any such definite purpose or project ; and although the Greek 
fleet is early on the move, in the ensuing spring, its movement is in 
the first instance purely defensive in character. Before the fleet 
mustered the Peluponnesians were again definitely pledged to advanM 



FROM SALAMIS TO SESTOS 



beyond the lathmos, and to cover Attica from a second invasion. 
The position thus implied must be the position subsequently taken on 
the northern slopes of Kithsiii'on. The Greeks never dreamt of 
;idvanciiig against Mardonios into Thcssaly ; it is more sui-prising that 
no hint occurs of any projected re-occupation of Thermopylai. The 
medism of Thebes and of central Greece, and perhaps the presence 
of Persian or Makedoniftn ganisons in the principal cities, may help 
to account for an oniission which the recent associations of the spot 
would in themselves have failed to justify: otherwise, against the 
forces of Mardonios, especially if the Hellenic fleet bad again occupied 
a corresponding position, Thermopylai might surely have been success- 
fully defended, and the death of Leonidas have been avenged on the 
very spot whore he had fallen. But the fulfilment of their pledges 
by Sparta and the Peloimnriesiana was postponed, until the postpone- 
ment involved thorn in a flagrant breach of faith, and afflicted Attica 
with a second Persian occupation. A second time the Athenians 
crossed en masse to Salamis, but only to Salamis, which remained an 
outpost, challenging relief by a Peloponnesian advance, and almost 
forcing a battle in defence, or rescue, of the Attic soil. 

The extreme reluctance of the Peloponne.si;uis to advance or risk 
a battle is indisputable, and, from the purely Peloponnesian view, 
not hard to un<icrstand. What is not so easy to understand is the 
Lakontc assumption that the Athenians would suffer again the spoil- 
ing of thoir goods, and all the loss and misery of a second migration, 
without seeking to come to terms with the Persian, or caiTjing out 
their threat of the previous year. The story of the embasBies to 
Athens, from Mardonios and from the Spartans, during the winter, 
though it supplies a solution of the problem all too glorious to bo 
strictly historical, points to real possibilities, and risks, of Athenian 
secession, then and later, which Sparta boldly discounte<l. Spartji may 
have believed that Athens was too deeply compromised with tite king to 
hope for genuine favour or mercy, what«ver promises were held out : 
too passionately attached to the Attic land to make good the threat 
of a permanent and distant migration. Sparta may have been waiting 
on events in Ionia and in the north, not without hopes that Mardonios 
would be recalled, and that a third campaign might ha indefinitely 
postponed. Can it be said that such hopes were entirely exaggerated t 
If the story of Mykale be not a colossal fable, would the occupation 
of Greece have been long maintained, or the invasion soon repeate<l, 
after that victory t Doubtless other considerations may be cited in 
extenuation of Peloponnesian policy. The attitude of Argos was all 
along a great drag upon the free action of Sparta. The disaster at 
Thermopylai had not yet been transfigured into an heroic and jiolitic 
sacrifice. Perhaps Sparta and the Peloponnesians viewed with no 
great regret the losses and sufTerings of Athens ; albeit, if so, their 
Sehadenfreude was a gross miscalculation, as the event proved. Nay, 



SS6 



HEKODOTUS 



APP. 



might men not have foreseen that the repeated invasion of Attic 
couM ili> nothing to tliminiah the importance of the Athenian navy, 
but rather ntigbt tend — as no doubt it availed in the sequel — to throw 
the Athenians more and more upon the sea as the sole safe basi^ for 
their power 1 

Whatever nuiy have been the calculations, or nuBcalculations, of 
Sparta at ttiis crisis, the fact may be reganicd as certain that only 
the final and fatiil threat of motiism, wrung by Peloponnesian perfidy 
from the deeply humiliated Athenians, at last put an end to Spartan 
shutUing, and drew the Pelo[)onnesian forces out from behind the wall 
across the Isthmos. Is not that threat in the manner of Themistoklest 
Was it not one of the grounds of the later charge against him V Even 
now the Peloponnesians allow Mardonios to retire into fioiotia, and 
to choose his own laager and battlefield : a permission which must be 
interpreted as an error in the Greek strategj'. For, if Mardonios was 
anxious to get into the more favourable plain of the Asopoa, and 
80 much nearer to hia main base in Thebes, and his single line of 
commuiiicjition with Thessaly, it was obviously the interest of the 
Greek commanders to entangle and engage him in Attica, whes^H 
the strategic advantage was with them. ^| 

§ 6. (a) The iissuraptioii is safe, although neither Herodotus nor 
any other of the ancient authorities expressly supports it, that until 
Mardonios and the Persians were ascertained to be clear of Attica, the 
Greek Hcet cannot have left the home waters. The second retirement 
of the Athenians to Salamis is almost as inconceivable without the 
support and cover of the Heet as the first, even though Mardonios had 
no Asiatic ships at hia disposal. With the Greek fleet at Delos, or 
even at Aigina, the Athenians in Salamis would have been exposed to 
assault from the Persians and medi^ed Greeks in occupation of Atticti^^ 
and some means would easily have been found for crossing the Straittl^l 
Whether a second Hellenic, or at least Athenian, fleet was at the tim^^ 
in commission ; or whethei" the Greek, or at least the Athenian, 
squadron moved back from Delos, for the protection of Salamis ; or 
whether the whole Greek fleet was originally at Salamis, not at Aigina, 
in the spring of 479 B.C. — by one moans or another Salamis must 
have l>een covered. In the absence of express testimony, and in view 
of the log of the fleet as given by Herodotus, perhaps the first of the 
alternatives above stated may be accepted as most probable ; for the 
numbers of the fleet under Leotychidas and Xanthippos fail to accoiuit 
for the Attic ships, and others, which must have been harboured some- 
where. We might even be tempted to place this forgotten fleet undf r 
the command of the forgotten admiral, Themistckles. But, whatever 



' The idea of iiicdism was duoply 
associatotl with tho name of Tbemi- 
Btokles toDg boforc his final condemnn- 
tion, by ttts iiiessageu from Salamis 
(op. Appemlix VI. § S, p. 309 supra), 



by his chaiupionshiii of the me 

States in the Delphian Amphiktjo 
(Plutarch, Them. 20). and j)erhap« 
the threat referred to in the 
(Hdt. 9. 11). 



the dispoaitions made for the aafe-gtiarding of the Athenians in 
Salaniis, the tiect mider Leotychidas and Xanthippos cannot have 
advanced to Samos and the Asiariic main so long as the Persians were 
still in large numbers in Attica, and while an attack upon the 
Isthmos, if not ii[]oii Halamis, was a daily posBibility. The retirement 
of Mardotiios not merely drew the Peloponnesians into Boiotia, hut set 
the Greek navy free to cross to Ionia. 

The naval results of Salamis were, indeed, immense. Ten years 
were to elapse before a Persian Heet ventured to face an Hellenic 
fleet at sea, only to be defeated again : six and eighty years had passed 
away before a Persian Meet again appeared within sight of Athens.' 
The marine initiative and aggressive in the Aigaian had been trans- 
ferred at one stroke to the European Greeks ; hut it coidd not be put 
into opemtion so long ns Attica remained in the hands of the Persian 
forces. The evacuation of Attica by Maixionios thus set the Greek 
fleet free at last to utilize the advantage won at Salamis, and to strike 
a blow on the Asianic side for the deliverance of Europe. The hazard 
and daring of this adventure need not be exaggerated : there were 
numerous precedents and examples, from the days of Kyros onward, 
to encourage such an undertaking, iuid the positive risk to be en- 
coimtered upon this occasion was not great. The Greeks had the 
most pressing invitations and assiUTinces from the two great islands off 
the Ionian coast, and in the first instance at any rate the projuuted 
intervention may have been limited to the island of Samos.- Doubtless 
the forward movement of the Heet was fully approved by the Spartan 
government, and thu application of the lonians wiis sure of a favour- 
able hearing and sii{>part in Athens, or among the Athenians at 
Salamis. The further move from .Samos to Mykalc, and the actual 
resolution to attack the Persians upon the mainland, is more surprising; 
but the whole story from (irst to Uist i.s related by our authorities in a 
way to excite some suspicions, and it is possible that fuller and more 
accurate records would throw a sonjewluat different light ii[)on the 
operations of the tleot. The engagement at Mykalc was not, perhaps, 
in itself an affair comparable to the defeat of Mardonios, fis a militarj' 
operation ; but it was a brilliant strategic move, it led to further 
developraetits imp<3rtant both in a political and in a military sense, 
and its story was told in a way to console the Athenians for theii' 
shortcomings in Boiotia ! 

(b) Neither the exact number nor the composition of the fleet is 
ascertainable. Herodotus gives the total as 110, but without specify- 
ing any itenu, or naming the separate con tributaries. Those omissions 
are the more striking, in view of the character of his navy-lists for 
Artemision and Salamis. The navy was, however, certainly composed 
of Peloponnesian contingent-^ and of an Athenian squadron. In 
oidentally wo learn, from the account of the battle of Mvkale, that 



' Xeaophon, He/f. i. S. 9 If 

vou n 



» Hdt, X. Vi'i, 9. 90. 



»S8 



HERODOTUS 



.\pp. vn 



beside LakedairaoiiiaiiK there were present coritingente from Koriuch, 
Sikyon, and Troizen. A fleet of 110 ships would have mustered 
some 22,000 men at most among the crows, while 3300 hoplites 
might be added as a liberal estimate for the Ejnbatai That such a 
force could have accomiitished the feat ascribed to the Greeks at 
Mykalc, against the vastly superior [lumUers of the Persian fleet, 
supported by a considerable army to boot, is hardly credible. Possibly 
the figures for the Greek side are under-estimated, the ligures for the 
Persian side exaggerated, and the part played by the loniaus, jxnd 
Greeks nominally on the Pei-siau side, quite inadequately rendered. 
Diodoros gives the number of the Greek fleet at Delos as 250.^ The 
figures in Herodotus are for Aigina, some weeks or months earlier. 
Between the muster at Aigina in the spring, and the start from Deloe 
to Samos, after midsummer, the numbers of the Greek fleet may b*VB 
been doubled, or more than doubled. If there were five or ox 
thousand hoplites at Mykale the exploit becomes more intelligible, 
but even so, the active co-operation of the lonians, the division and 
mutual mistrust of the Persian loaders, the memory of the defeat *t 
Salamis, and a terror, or panic, inspired by the daring aggresaive of 
the Greeks, are all required in order to make the achievement at 
Mykale intelligible. 

(c) The actual story <is told by Herodotus is curiously precise ; 
exact ; but precision and exactitude are not always the marks of.j 
true history. Tliere are several grounds in the present case 
suspicion. The description of the actual fjattle is a reproduction, 
mutatis mvtandis, of the battle-piece at Platjiia. At Mj'kale, indeed, 
the Greeks are the atUicking, at Plataia the defending, side ; but in 
other respects, apart from chronological or topographical coincidences, 
there is a too curious resemblance between the parallel stories. The 
right and left wings of the Greek army have again somewhat similar 
difliculties : the Lakedaimonians are advajicing over higher and broken 
groutul, the .Xtlnniiana l>oIow in the plain. Again there is the Persian 
rampart-wall of shields, and the flight to the fortified camp, when the 
shield-wall is broken through. Again the fortitieil camp is the scene 
of an obstinate struggle, and the contest is finished on the arrival of 
the rebirded Greek >ving. The literary parallel is, perhaps, sufficiently 
close to justify the suspicion that the account of the battle of Mykale 
has been moulded to some extent on the traditions of Plataia, with 
due allowance for the undisputed Atht-nian AriMeiii on Ionian 
Other items in the story are not ]es.s suspicious for one reason 
another. The actual result can hardly be explained, without assign 
to the action of the Junians far more importance than is assigned to 
it in the accounts, presumably from Attic sources, given by Herodotus 
The exact synchronism and the double presence of Demetor may 
pass as facts, without justifjnng Herodotus' moral ; but the 'rumour' 



FROM SALAMIS TO SESTOS 



(0T/^i/) and the 'Herald's staff' (KyfpvK-i^iov) : what is to be made of 
them t Are we to rationalize them away, as Ephoros plainly did 1 < 
Or to regard them as importe<] afterthoughts into the story ? Such 
a product the synchronism must have been, whether true or false. 
We can hardly credit the other items as they stand ; and such in- 
credulity tends to disquaiif}" the whole narrative. 

(d) The scene next laid at iSamos has too often been allowed to 
pass unchallenged as good history. After their astounding victory 
on the mainland the ' Hellenes ' return to Samos, and hold a delibera- 
tion, in which the Peloponnesians propose to evacuate Ionia, and 
transfer the lonians Ixidily to Europe, finding room for them by the 
expulsion of the mcdizing Greeks : this project is, however, vetoed by 
the Athenians, with the result that the Samians, Chians, Lesbians and 
other islanders present are admitted to the Hellenic alliance, under 
all solemn formalities. This whole episode, as related by Herodotus, 
is improbiible in itself and hardly consistent with other indications in 
the context. Thus the Samians have already been solemnly admittefl 
to the Greclc alliance by Lcotychidas at Delos : and again, the 
Hellenes have fought at Mykale with the full consciousness that the 
islands (Samos, etc., included) 'and the Hellespont' were the prizes 
of victory. Again, such a matter could never have been settled by 
the Pcloponncsian and Attic officers serxnng on the fleet, without 
reference to the home governments. Authority to admit lonians, 
Nosiotes, Hellespontines into the alliance Leotyehidas and Xaiithippos 
might have had, but liardly authority to transfer the lonians to 
Europe, and the modizing Greeks to Asia. Moreover, neither of 
tbeee operations was a very simple one, or to be accomplished without 
opposition ; and what meanwhile was to become of the Hellespontines, 
juid other Greeks, under Persian rule 1 The question thus debated 
by the commanders of the fleet at Samos, after the first A'ictory on 
Asianic soil, would have been better debated before advancing to 
Mykale at all, nay, before admitting the Samians to the alliance : not 
at Samoa, or at Dclos, but rather in Sparta, and in Athens. In short, 
if any such suggestion was ever seriously made, or discussed, it 
belongs to the antecedents of the naval movement across the Aigaian, 
and was discussed, between Athens and Sparta, before the opening of 
the campaign of 479, and is misdated and misplaced by Herodotus. 

(e) The adjournment to the Hellespont cannot have been in doubt, 
nor is it reported to have been in doubt, after Mykale. It was one 
thing to sail to the Hellespont after Salamis in order to cut off the 
retreat of Xerxes .uid his still uncompromised army, and a very 
different thing to sail thither a year later after the victory in Ionia, 
in order to cut off the retreat of the remnant of the broken host of 
.Mardonios. Assuredly before they headed for the Hellespont, if not 

foro they made for Mykale, the Greek admirals knew of the groat 
ctory in Boiotia. iiut, if the Hellespont was a part of the prize at 



340 



HERODOTUS 



Mykale, the Hellenic fleet did not sail from Samos to Ab^-dos simply 
to break down the bridges. Their very destination seems to imply 
that the Hellespontine towns were already to some extent in revolt, 
or prepared to revolt from the Persian. The mere destruction of the 
bridges would, perhaps, have been rather a b<ir to a fresh invasion 
than a serioua impediment to the escape of the Persian remnant still 
in Europe ; and iis a matter of fact Artabazos crossed fiom Byzantion 
without difficulty. But the Peloponneaians were not prepared to 
remain into the winter on naval service, and thus it came about that 
from the siege of Sestos, if not from the council at Siimos, dated th*t 
separate action and protectorate of the Athenians, which quickly 
became the reason for their maritime hegemony. There were of 
course old relations between Athens and the Chersonese, which help 
to expbiin the action of the Athenians upon this occasion ; but from 
the political point of view Leotychidas and the Peloponnesian captains 
gravely compromised Spartan interests by their acquiescence in the 
action of XanthtppoH and his colleagues. Spartans were not fond of 
sieges, and iSestos was strongly fortified and held. More was expected 
of Atheniiins. When the siege proved obstinate and the Athenian 
privates wearieti of it, the SlraUgoi did not venture to raise it without 
orders from home : was there not in Athens an acute and severe critic 
of their action ! 

(J) The complete unity, between persons and parties, if we can 
rightly speak of parties at Athens, whs indeed being attested, while 
XanthippoB lay befoie Sestos, in the conduct of Athetiian policy 
towards Sparta. The victory of Plataia had seciu-ed the joyful return 
of the Athenians in Salamis to their homes and city ; and no time 
was lost, nor labour spared, to make good the effects of the two 
Persian occupiition.s. Neither Spartj4 nor Athens felt as yet convinced 
that no freah Persian invasion was possible, or to be feared ; but the 
two governments had very different plans for meeting the prospective 
danger. SparUi atii! clung to the idea that the Peloponnesos should 
be regarded a.s the one akropolis of Helljis, and that the Athenians 
might contemplate \nth equanimity a third, presumably a fourth 
evjvcuation of their land, and the fresh and repeated occupation of their 
city by the Persian, when he came again and again. The naiveW of 
this proposal ia (juite South-African ! If the atoiy had stood in 
Herodotus, and not in Thucydides, one might have been tempted to 
doubt its historical accuracy, or to regard it as a pragmatic persiflage 
upon Spartan pretensions from an Athenian source. The Atheniaiu 
naturally wtirc resolved never to repeat, if they could help it, the 
experiences of the past two years. Athens had been unable to stand 
a siege in the Persian invasion : the land defence, for which Sparta 
was responsible north of Attica, had twice broken down, with dis- 
astrous results to the Athenians, who were now resolved to put their 
city in a condition to stand » siege, as Poteidaia had just triumphantly 



§ 6 FROM SALAMIS TO SESTOS 341 

done. But Spartan representations coiild not be met with a direct 
negative, nor could the Athenians hope to convince the Spartans by 
debate. The wisest among them distrusted Sparta, and perceived 
that the walls, raised against the Persian, were likely to be used 
against the Lakedaimonian. Themistokles and Aristeides were at one 
in this matter, and the righteous man lent himself fully to the nise, 
by which the worldly wiseman outwitted the Spartans, and earned 
their fatal enmity. It is almost ludicrous, in view of this episode, to 
suppose that a twelvemonth earlier, or indeed less, Themistokles had 
been removed from the Straiegia as likely to be too subsenaent to the 
special interests of Sparta. 

When Xanthippos returned to Athens, bringing with him the 
cables of the Hellespontine bridges, he found the walls of the city 
already raised high enough to defy Persian, or Greek ; and ere ever 
another twelvemonth came round Aristeides had exploited the pride 
and mimic tyranny of the victor of Plataia to effect the transfer of the 
naval hegemony of the Greeks from Sparta to Athens. Thus was the 
unity of Athens purchased by the division of Hellas, and political 
wisdom, in the persons of Aristeides and Themistokles, there too 
was justified of her children. 



APPENDIX Vm 



PLATAIA 

$ 1. General asiiccts of tli« u&nifiaigu. § 2. Charaoter of the Herodotcan aarntiTe 
(Chronology, Tojiograjihy, figures, Klotivatiou). §3. Sources of the Herodotean 
narrative. § 1. Stmmmry nf tlie Hurodotcan narrativL-. § 5. Failure of the 
Uvrodotoun uarratire (twi'Dty cmcfi). § 6. The two rundamental problems. 
I 7. (A) The tactical ]K>aitioii» occupied in auccessioii by tlif Greek forcM. J 8. 
(B) The actual battle, and tlii! (ireek victory. § 9. The iibin oiid its anthor. 
8 10. Summary of the recoiistructetl narrative. § 11. Chief points in the recon- 
atniction. § I'J. Subsidiary authoritivs (Diodoroa, Plutarch). 

S 1 . The general aspects of the campaign of Phitaia huve been alrearly 
in great p<irt anticijiated.^ Of its .supreme military and {kjlitical 
significance there can be as littlo doubt as of its actual occurrence, 
approximate date, imd scene. The significance of the victory is, how- 
ever, much more manifest than the exact conditions and circumstances 
under which it was achieved. Plataia was truly a decisive battle, 
putting an end once for id! to the Persian scheme for the conquest of 
European Hellas. Neither was the victory dejirly purchased, nor 
apparently very difBcult of achievement, when it came. The problem 
rather is, to determine why the day of judgement was so long post- 
poned. The victory gained over Mardoiiios in 479 might, to all 
appearances, have been gainetl over Xerxes in the same place a year 
before.'- Attica m^ed never have been occupied, much less twice 
occupied and twice devastated, by the Persian host. The battle of 
Halamis might have been anticipated, and rendered unnecessary, by a 
victory over the Persians on the Asopos. The feebleness and in- 
conseqtience of the Greek, that is, of the Spartan leading after the 
disaster at Therraopylai, boar the best witness to the extent of that 
disaster. It cost the Athenians for the time being their land and 
city ; but it cost the Spartans in the long rTiii their hegemon3'. With 
out speculating in detail on the results for Sparta and the rest of 



' Cp. Appendix VII. §§ 1, 2. 

* Kteaiasi, Pers. 56 ; Hlakesley I/em- 



dotuK (18&4). ii. 495 IT. 
8. 40 ttipra. 



Cp. note* to 



.■^42 





'? 



■s 



xV 



T 

n. 



Greece, had the Wctory of Plataia been anticipated by a twelvemonth, 
broadly speaking, at least, the position of Spiirta would have been 
8uch as she never attained in actual histor}'. /Vfter Thermopylai, 
indeed, such an achievement was too much to expect. The Greek 
plan of defence practically broke down, only to be painfull)' restored, 
piece by piece, and not according to the uriginul intention. Salaniis 
remained an isolated and incomplete achievement The question of 
the subjugation of Greece was still an open one at the beginning of 
the ensuing campaign. 

The victory of Salamis, however, though indecisive for Athens and 
cenind Greece, had virtually secured the Poloponncee from attack, 
provided Athens remained loyal to her allies. The Persian fleet had 
practically disappeared, or was reduced to a ' negligible quantity,' so 
far as aggressive measures were concerned. From behind their 
fortifications on the Isthmos the Peloponnesians could defy the army 
of ManJonios for an indefinite time. With Athens the case stood 
otherwise. Athens was still fully open to attack, invasion, and re- 
occupation from the land side, so long as a Persian force remained in 
being south of Thermopylai ; nothing but a pitched l>attle by land and a 
decisive victory over Murdonios and his Greek allies could permanently 
secure the safety and liberty of the Athenians. Even a naval expedition 
to the Hellespont, or to Asia, could at most, in the first instance, only 
provoke the Persians in Greece to a more vigorous aggressive. The 
iiest way for Mardonios to provide against any attempt on the jiart of 
the Greeks to operate over sea against his ultimate base, or against his 
communications, was obviously to keep them fully occupied at home. 
Nevertheless, an inequality of interest and a difference of opinion was 
naturally developed between the Athenians and the Spartans in relation 
to the eiLsuing campaign. The Athenians were urgent that the 
Peloponnosian army should cross Kithairon, or, failing that, should 
move into Attica, and there do battle with the Persians.' The 
Peloi»onnesians were reluctant to come forward. The attitude of the 
two leading states towards the question of naval operations is not 
quite so clear. We are scarcely justified in crediting Sparta with an 
original and positive plan to bring about the evacuation of Greece b}' 
iun attack on the Persians in Asia, by fomenting revolt in Ionia, bj- 
threatening the islands and the Hellespont Still less are wo entitled 
to represent the Athenians as opposed to any such plan. But two 
conclusjions may \te deol;ire<l inevitable. First, some strategic connexion 
existed between the operations on land, culminating at Plataia, and the 
operations over sea, which culminated at Mykale. Secondly, the Greek 
fleet could hardly have assumed the otTensive, or abandoned the homo 
waters, until Mardonios had evacuated Attica the second time.^ If 



' Cp. 8. 144, 9. 7. 

' The Gro«lc flaet will hove waited on 
the operkdoiik uf M«rdoniM rather 



than M«rrloniu« on thaie of the Onrck 
fl«<it {pot* Delbriii-lc, I'mrrkritge, 102;. 
Ci>. p. 329 tiupm. 



344 



HERODOTUS 



APP, VIIJ 



tbe Athenians coMid have been brought to consent to abandon Attica 
and Salamis compleluly, and to retire into the Peloponnesoa, behind 
the Isthmian wall, the fleet night, indeed, have miderUiken a forward 
and offensive movement on a large scnie. The resolute refusal of tbe 
Athenians in the [jrevious year to iwloj>t that course was not likely to 
be reveraeil after Salamis. Nevertheless the ]>atent division of intere*! 
between Athens and the Peloponnesos was eo vfide that apparently the 
positive threat of medlsm on the jiart of Athens wjis required to force 
the hand of Sparta, and compel the Peloponnosians to crose the 
Isthmos.' This episode was indeed a humiliating one for all partiea 
concerned, and goes far beyond the worst throat extorted from 
Themistokles before the battle of Salamis. Yet of its substantial 
accuracy there can hardly be any doubt : what other motive could the 
Athenians liave brought to bear uj>on the Spartans to compel them to 
adopt a forward movement T The battle of Plataia was fought to save 
Athens from a permanent occupation by the Barbarian. But there 
WHS a seconrl motive operating more directly on Sparta. The active 
medism of Thebes and of Thessaly, the fear, perhaps, of an Argive 
revival under Persian auspices, the alienation of Delphi, must have 
helped to reconcile Sparta to the military nece88itie.s imposed upon her 
by the obstinate reFusal of the Athenians to cvaciiati' Salamis, and tb« 
final threjit of the Athenians to join the Persian, unless the Pelopon- 
nesians aime to their rescue. All the 9f»me it is remarkable that, after 
the evacuation nf Attica by the Persians, Pausjiniaa should have taken 
his army into Boiotia. This move wiia more than Kleombrotos bad 
faced in the previous autumn, aTid might seem to be going beyond the 
bare necessities of the case. But the defence of central Greece had 
lain in the original plan of campaign ; the Spfutans bad been pledged 
to appear north of Kithairon from the first. Moreover, the frontier of 
Attica had apjjfirently been moved so as to include the northern slope 
of Kithairon. Appaj-ently Pausanias had not advance*! beyond tlie 
technical boimdary of Attica, until he crossed the Asopos in pursuit of 
the Persians, who had taken refuge in their fortified CAmp.- Once the 
Greek and the Persian forces stood face to face upon the banks of the 
Asopos a battle became inevitable, and the questions arising in the 
given situation are mainly tactical. The reluctance on both aides to 
come to & decisive issue is remarkable. Perhaps either side, or both 
sides, waited to some extent upon the development of events elsewhere. 
Yet MikrdonioB can hardly have expected any great disaster to the 
flreek fleets and the Greeks can hardly have expected that the 
immediate action of Mardonios would depend on the success or bulure 
of their naval enterprise across the sea. The tactical problem at 
Plataia in fact, once given, demanded a purely local solution. Nor is 
the solution obscure. Each side desired to fight a defensive action : 
or perhaps, putting the case more accurately, the Greeks were 



' St. n. 



■J Ci>. 5. n, C. 108, and 'Plwt&rch, A riatetd. 11. 



^ 1-2 



PLATAIA 



346 



determined not to ventui-e across the Aeopos, on to ground where their 
phalanx might easily be circumvented, or taken in flunk, by the 
Persian cavalry ; while Mardonios, naturally desiring before all things 
to draw them down from the high and rough ground on to the plain, 
postponed as long as posaibte an attack in force upon the Greeks in 
a position which gave them cover from his cavalry. In the end, by 
accident or by design, the battle was joined rather on the Greek than 
on the Persian terms, and with a result^ of the most favoui'able 
character at the moment, of the most far-reaching influence in the 
sequel, for the |)atriotic Kepnblics of Hellas. 

S 2. But, while the broader strategic and even politic aspects of 
the battle of PlaUiia are thus fairly obvious, to appreciate in detail 
the movements and actions of leaders and forces concerned is a task 
beset with difficulties, owing to incompleteness and errors in tha 
record. Alike the antecedents and the actual course of the battle 
itself are largely matters of conjecture, that is, of almost hopeless 
disputAtion. We may exercise a critical faculty, or arouse a learned 
leisure, upon the problems piesentcd by the subject ; hut we can 
hardly hope to attain any solution which will be of universal obliga- 
tion, The evidence is too scant in amount^ too poor in quality. 
Whether we attempt to determine details of time, place, causality, 
motivation, or aim merely at describing the bare action or event, 
we are baffled by failures, obscurities, self-contrarlictions, absurdities 
in the recoixl. The discovery of the historic event more and mom 
resolves itself into a literary evaluation of the o\idence8 : what should 
have been but a means to the historian's end .asserts itself as the end 
in itself. Not but what the dialectical process of criticism, now for 
long applied to the matter in hand, has made some progress in 
elucidating probabilities, and especially in placing the cardinal or 
pivotal points of the argument in an ever-growing light. But the more 
articulate statement of the problems, or even the plausibility of this 
or that solution here and there, is far from gi^^ng us a concrete story, 
or a complete leeonstruction. No pjkrticular theory can harmonize 
all the evidences, for the evidences ai-e in part self-contradictory and 
absurd ; nor is it to be expected that any particular theory of the 
event* wUl silence rival hypotheses where none can admit of actual 
verification. Enough if each contribute a solid point or two to the 
argiunent, and render the scholar's grasp upon his materials at once 
more firm and more elastic. 

This tentative conclusion is likely to be all the less convincing to 
novices in that there is no other battle de8cril>ed by Herodotus with 
so much fulness as the battle of Plataia. Thus chronologically, apart 
from the general 8e«|uenco and indications for the date, he furnishes 
apparently a diary of the oiierations, or of a part of them, which lends 
an air of verisimilitude to the events narrated. The to|x>graphy is 
indicated not merely by a number of incidental items more or less 



34ft 



HERODOTUS 



APP. vin 



capable of verification, but also by precise and express descriptions 
of a series of positions which, lying in a comparatively well-knoim 
Greek landscape, might justify hope of a materia! basis and certainty 
for the framework of tlip notion. The army-lists, given for both 
sides, comprise not merely ethnic titles, but precise figures for the 
various contingents, and that more especially on the Greek side. Of 
the motives and causes assigned for the principal! changes in position, 
some at least possess a distinctly military character, and few, if any. 
are so improlwible, or intrinsically irrational, as to demand sununar}' 
dismissal on the ground of physical or psychological impossibilitj. 
Finally, under whatever drawbacks and obscurities, certain tactical 
positions antl dispositions are indicatetl by Herodotus for the forera 
in action, which have been generally accepted in all reconstructions 
of the probable course of events. Yet, in spite of these merits in the 
Herodote;in narrative of Plataia, which doubtless give it a very high, 
perhaps the highest, place in any attempt at a classification of Hcrodotean 
stories, according to their intrinsic worth and historical value, the story 
of Plataia nevertheless break.s down again and again at each important 
crisis, and there remains at the end a great gulf l>etween the sum of 
acceptable items, or oven the general underlying scheme, to be found 
in Herodotus on the one side, and every modern attempt upon the 
other, to obtain an adequate and coherent view of all the circumstances. 
A closer spycification under each of the heads above indicated will 
justify this opinion in more detail. 

(.'hroiwhgi/. — The date of the battle of Plataia may be regarded 
as fixed, even by Horo<Jotus, at least within a range of about thirty 
days. This residt is, relatively speaking, satisfactor)', though it might 
easily have been more precise. It is determined by two or three 
elements in combination. («) The diary for the period during which 
the Greeks occupieil the (supposed) 'second pf;sition ' before Plataia, 
t«j the thirteenth day of which the actual battle is expressly dated by 
Herodotus.' (i) An ititerval preceding this period, snfficient for the 
action in ' the finst iKwition ' (or previous pfisition), and the antecedents 
back to the despatch of the Spivrtan forces from Lakodaimon, and the 
evaciuition of Atticii by Mardonios. The duration of this interval is 
not specified, but a Urminii.< a quo is incidentally supplied by the notice 
of the Hi/id-inthia, which arc presuniaiily over before the departure 
of the Spartans from home.* Still, some .slight variation in the 
estimate can hardly be avoided in relation to this interval, and an 
element of uncertainty at once arises.* (c) A more precise indication 
appears to be contained in the e.vpress lissertion that the invasion of 
Manlonios took place * ten months ' after the first occupation of Athens 



' 9. 33 (rj» ietrH/rji i)tUn) ; 3» [iiiUpai , , 
dKTii) ; 40 (Mfiat Si'o Ijiiipat) ; 41 ifSt- 
Kdrti); 44 (t^S); 47 (^)l 62 (rrjr TlfUpifw 
riany nvicrit) ; 56 (i^t). 



* For date of Hyakinthia op. not« to 
9. 7. 

* The eight days in c. 39 might oov«r 
the whole period so far in Boiotia. 



PLATAIA 



by Xerxes ; ' but, apart from other difficiilties of interpretation in this 
passage, the indication lacks precision in two directions. First, it is 
not clear whether the ten months are to be reckoned as nominal 
calendar months, or as fiUl periods of thirty days ; secondly, the exact 
duration of Mardonios' occupation of Athens remains in any case 
indefinite. As to the firet point, probably the months are token from 
the Attic calendar, and the actual interval between the two events 
was appreciably less than three hundred days. As to the second, 
the panse in Attica remains an elastic section, which may be pro- 
longed or reduced by the mo<lern investigator as theory seems to 
require ; but the chronological exactitude of the whole story is thereby 
invalidated. The precision of the data, as far as they are precise, 
is indeed in itself auspicious. Not merely does the exact synchronism 
asserted for the battles of Plataia and Mykale arouse suspicion,'^ but 
the recurrence of the conventional reckoning by decades of days, 
that is, by (ireck calendar weeks, suggests the artificiality of the 
temporal perspective.^ Yet, although confidence in the journal of 
Plataia is thus shaken, the limit of error in the calendarial date is 
comparatively small, and the Hero<lotean scheme may be allowed to 
pass, for regulative purposes, fis the best working hypothesis at our 
disposal.* Far more serious is any doubt as to the material sequence 
of events, and the validity of the oider, in which they arc presentetl. 
The character of Herodotus' sources, the idiosyncnisy of his methods, 
leave it too often an open question whether a particular stoiy, an 
individual episode, is presented in true sequence and temporal order. 
There are several points where such a doubt is legitimate in regard 
to the story of Plataia and its immediate antecedents. (1) The 
Athenian nff/oliatiwis with SpiirUi, and the action of the Spartans. 
Elements in the story for the year of Plataia (479 B.C.) might seem 
intrinsically to belong to the pro\nous year. An appeal of the 
Athenians for .ussistance, or rescue, in Attica must surely have been 
addressed to Sparta in the previous campaign, although Herodotua 
makes no mention thereof in its proper context. In the Ninth Book 
the appeal, dated to the spring of 47!), is rx h/pjihesi heard in 
Sparta before the completion of tlic Isthmian wall ; ' but the fortifica- 
tions at the Isthmos cannot have \teen still incomplete at that time. 
Herodotus, indeed, involves himself in a chronologiwd inconsequence 



' 9. 3 ; qi. BotM ad. I. '9. 90, 100. 

» 9. 8, 41, 88. Cp. BuMit, iL» (1896). 
72«a, 

* Biuolt ;. c. dates the Utile (i.e. the 
13th dajr) 'about the lic^nninf; of 
AaguBt': Dnncker 7ii.» (1882) 333 n. 
'towards the end of Sentenilwr." Plu- 
tAFch is jireciM but sclr-contradictory ; 
Aridevl. 19 gives Ro«dromion 4 ; CavnU. 
19, Mvr. 347, Boedr. 3. E. QreMwell, 
Or. Kal. HeU. i. (1862) 40«, decides for 



the latter, and ideiittfiea it with Sept. S, 
47» B.C. iioeckh ideutiiied Bo<jdr. 3 with 
S«pt. 26, bat himwir preferred Mctageit. 
2« =S«pt. 19. Afterwards he tnuisferred 
the date from the victory to its celebration 
{Monde. 67, rp. Duncker /. c). Busolt'a 
doto MKsiiin too fsrly for Hdt. 9. 3, bat 
thi< battle was prolmlily earlier than the 
anniYeraary of Snlsmis, or we thonld 
have had n story to cap 8. 66. 
» 9. 8. cp. 9. 10. 



»48 



HERODOTUS 



AFP. vm. 



here, aud supplies the means of his own refutation. The wall vt 
apparently complete before the eclipse of October 2, 480, yet it 
is unfinishetl at the time of the Ilyakinthia in 479 ! A second in- 
consequence lies in the exaggerated duration of the HyakinOiiii^ 
which .Spartw is jipjmrently celebrating on or before the arrival of 
the Athenian envoi's, and is still celebmting on the eve of their 
departure ten days later. The latter difficulty might easily be 
explained away as flue to a mere rhetorical trope ; the former is more 
obstinate, and both alilce go to show that the Herodotean sequence of 
events breaks down at this point, and consequently cannot be taken 
as the basis for the eaUKil connexion of actions and events. (2) A 
second instance lies in the story of Ihi lynch'mfi of Lylcidas,^ though 
its discovery is due to the conflict of external evidence with the 
Herodotean seqvience. There is, anyway, the inconsequence that at 
the moment when the Athenian envoys are threatening the Spartans 
with the racdism of Athens, the Athenians should be stoning one of 
their councillors, with his wife and family, for suggesting the 
jictualizatioii of the Athenian threat to Sparta. J The apologist may 
indeed be at no loss to explain away such an apparent anomaly : the 
one transaction takes place in Sparta, the other in iSalamis : the one 
is a threjit aildtessed in secret to the Spartan executive, the other 
a practical suggestion for the Athenian people, and so on. But what 
were the Spartans to make of the threat, assuming it failed of its 
immediate ofTect, when the news of the fate of Lykidas was forwarded 
to thenj 1 The approximately synchronous acts of the Athenian 
etivoy.s and of the Athenian Council remain a gross inconsetjuence ; 
uiifl the best way to save whate\er tmth there may be in the story 
of Lykidas is to redate it to some other point in history. Its present 
place in Herodotus must be taken to show that his chronological 
secjncnces are not always safe clues to the causal connexions of events, 
as a true chronology must ever be.* 

The two instjinces examined belong to the antecedents of the cam- 
paign, rather than to the actual openitions around Plataia. Other 
cases of chronological difficulty, that is, of more or less probable 
anachronism, arise in connexion with the actual story of the campaign. 
These instances am hardly be discussed here, in their chronological 
aspects, without anticipating other aspects of the operations in question 
to be hereafter developed. The time-condition is essential to the 
appreciation of strategic and tactical movements. Suffice it, then, to 
say here that rea-sons wilt subsequently appear for suspecting the 
precise date, or chronological point in the diary of Plataia, (3) of the 
dispute between the Athenians and Togeatai for precedence j (4) of 
the visit of Alexander of Makedon to the Athenian lines. Mom 



' 9. 4. 

- The fate of Lykidas is in keepinc 
with the peephisni ot Aristeidea reported 



liy PluUrch, AritUid. 10; but tJw 
l>9cpliism itself, if ftiithentic, were better 
dated earlier. 



PLATAIA 



serious than these comparatively trifling instances is (5) the doubt to 
be urged in regard to the duiation of the Greek occupation of the 
advanced position upon the Asopos, and (6) the omission of any 
indication for the time si>ent in the position pre\-ioiisly occnpie<l. 
These poi^sible errors and omissions affect deeply the conception to be 
formed of the V«ittle itself, the antecedent movements on the field of 
battle, and the actual plans and policy of the leaders. Some of the 
operations recorded by Herodotus, with araazinj; insvaciaua:, such as 
the double exchange of front in the Asopos-position, involve intn alia 
time-conditions, which arc sufficient in themselves to disprove the 
Herodotean report ; and it will appear, iu the sequel, that the whole 
tliary which Herodotus gives for the Greek occupation of the Asopos- 
position involves what may Fw iniliflTereritly regarded as a tactical 
imijossibility, or an anachi-oniana by transfer. In other words, 
Herodotus may allow, or indicate, sufficient time for the Boiotian 
campiiign as a whole ; but bo cannot be tnisted to have distribute*! 
the time at his disjiosal correctly, or always to have correctly marked 
the exact date, or sequence, <jf particular act« and events. 

Topo^aphy. — From the nature of the case we arc on safer ground 
when we pjiss from the chronology lo the geogniphy of Heroilotus. 
Topographical errors are less probable in themselves than chronological; 
and ancient geography and choriography admit of a kind and degree 
of verification unattaimible in relation to ancient chronology. The 
explicit, and still more the implicit, topography of the ancient historians 
is, as a mle, the most certain and reliable element in their works. 
The landscape of Greece is approximately the same to-day as it was 
two thousand years ago: mountains, rivers, plains, are not substantially 
altered, or the alterations can be detected and allowed for. The sites 
of cities and of edifices, sacred and profane, can lie identified with 
more or less assurance. The battle-field of PlaUiii, as described by 
Herodotus, is easily to be verified within certain limits, and the details 
of the possible and actiud scene of operations can be filled in with some 
confidence. The general faitures of the scene, moimtain and plain, 
hills and streams, are constantly indicated, and the catalogue is enriched 
by ft large number of definite names of objects in various kinds. Yet, 
notwithstanding these compjirative advantages, the topography of the 
battle-field, and its relation to the operations narrated, remain largely 
problematical. For this unsatisfactory result Herodotus is only in 
part accountable. Any one of his contemporaries, with the text of 
Herotlotus in hand, might perhaps have evolved a consistent and 
rational theory of the action, in conformity with the account of the 
historian : he would at least have come much nearer to such a restilt 
than auy modem can now hope to do. The ancient student might 
easily have identified cardinal features in the landscape and in the 
narrative, about the equivalence of which modems can scarcely come 
to any agreement. Certain fixed poiritn, lying outside the battle-field, 



360 



HERODOTUS 



APP. vin 



albeit related to it, are not in doubt, Plataia, Thebes, Tanagra, EUeosis ; 
but the exact sites of Skolos, of Erythrai, of Hyaiai, which, with 
Plataia itself, furnish the very framework of the bjittlc field, are more 
or less in dispute. The great natural features, mountain, plain, river, 
bills, are still substantially the same ; and the application of the 
greater natnes, Kithairon, Asopos, Oeroe, are not in doubt ; but the 
precise attachment of other titles, \'itiilly important in the narrative, 
Gargaphia, the Molocis, the Island, the Argiopiaii place, are involved 
in dispute and obscurity ; while the exact sites of the three buildings, the 
identification of which would go far to determine a true theory of the 
operations, the Heraion, the Demetrion, the Androkrateion, are uol 
ascertainable with complete assurance. Nor can Herodotus be ac- 
quitted of all blame in this connexion. Ho might fairly assume the 
position of buildings which were standing in his own day ; but it 
is no feather in his cap to have left the position of the Persian camp 
so much in doubt that some have placed it on the one, some oo the 
other bank of the Asojtos, while others again have combined the 
positions by placing the camj) iistride the river I Again, poeihlj 
Herodotus has confounded more than one building under one title; 
certainly he has failed tu warn his readera that there was more than 
one tenipli' of Demeter, within the area covered by the military 
operations before Plataia.^ We have also to suspect in Herodotus the 
mensuration of space as of tima His chronological decades reappear 
in his decimal system of mensuration, and the artificiality or conven- 
tionality of the method seoms to discredit the result for serious 
purposes. But by far the gravest flaw in the Herodotean topography 
is his failure to recognize the existence of more than one pass over 
Mount Kithairon vrithin range of the Greek and Persian strateg_v. 
No recent contribution to the argument more tends to the good than 
the clear recognition of the various possible routes over Kithairon 
behind Plataia ; conversely, no topographical defect in Herodotus' 
narrative better accounts for its incohcroncy, and the want of rational 
causality and motivation, than his neglect of this cardinal feature in 
the topography.- 



* There was a ' Demetrion ' Tor Plataia, 
for Hyaiai, for Erythrai, to say nothing; 
of similar sanctuaries at Skoloa and at 
Potuiai ; cp. notes to 9. &7. 8. 
/ ■■' The mouatain barrier of Pames- 
Kitliairon was travorsod or turned by 
six roiitea or passes. In onlor from E. 
to W. they run: 1. Dokoleia -Oropog ; 
II. Phyle- Skolos; III. Eleuais- Klou- 
therai - Erythrai - Thebes ; IV. Eleti- 
therai - Hysiai - Plataia ; V. Megara- 
Plataia ; VI. The Oero..- valley and 
Aigosthena. It is quite irassibfc that 
all of these six routes were used during 
the camjiaign of 479 B.C. Hdt. recog- 



niiea clearly I., cp. 9. 15 ; III., cp. 8. 19; 

luss clearl)' IV., cp. 9. 39. IL he uever 
indicates. V. may be behind the narra- 
tive in 9. SI, but Hdt. betrays no 
knowledge of it It ha3 been snggested 
that the Persian uavalry retumra from 
the Mcgariil (9. H) into Boiotia by VL: 
but that pas-s, like V., was hardly avail- 
able for cavalry (cp. Xonoph. Hfll. 5. 4. 
16 f.}, and it is much more likely that 
they returned by III., which, as far a* 
Dr)'08 Kcphalai, was identi(>al with IV. 
It has alao been eoggestrd (I)uiicker viL 
344} that Pausanias, in his final retreat, 
was intending to base hiiinelf on VI. 



Figures. — ^With tho question of the nwnbers available for the ^eiiei->il 
engagement we pass beyond verifiable facte into the region of 
testimony. Yet numerical statements have a real character. Figures, 
if ascertainable, are, indeed, facts to rank with conditions of time and 
space in military matters : all three are essentials to the SachKritiL 
The numerical data of Herodotus for the battle of Plataia are exact 
enough, but unfortunately in several respects erroneous. A gross 
exaggemtioti is manifest in his estimate of the slain ; ' and this 
estimate is based in part upon what may have been a great exaggera- 
tion in tho number of the combatants. The figure of thirty miliads 
(300,000) for the Persian forces, i.e. the Asiatic array,- comes over to 
Mardonios, or iBther to Herodotus, from the army-list of Xerxes ; 
but it makes no allowance for the wear and tear of the cam]3tiign, 
previous to the final battle, nor for the soldiere on garrison duty 
between Thebes and Makedonio, nor for the army-corps of Artalrazos, 
which formed at starting at least one-sixth of the whole force ; nor 
for the hypothesis that the army of Mardonios was but a selection 
from the forces of Xerxes. We have no real means of conlroUing the 
figures for the Persian forces at Plataia. If the acUial strength of 
Mardonios was even half his nominal strength, his forces were still 
immense, in view of the difficulties of supply for man arid beast 
Much is niiuie in tradition of the disproportion between the Greek 
and the Persian forces at Therraopylai ; bttle is made of any difference 
of numbers before Plataia. Mardonios shows some apprehension of 
the growing numbers on the Greek side : tho anecdotes of the depres- 
sion in the camp of Mardonios tend to diminish the supposed numerical 
advantage of the Persians. Tlie number of Greek allies on the Persian 
side is admittedly a pure conjecture of Herodotus' own. MakcdoniaoB 
must be inclu<ied in it ; but, even so, 50,000 is a too lil>eral estimate, 
aafely to be divided by not less than two ! Admitting that the forc« 
under Artabazos took absolutely no part in tho action, the number of 
men engaged on the Persian side would not bo over-estimated perhaps 
at 125,000.=' 

For the numbers tinder Pausaniae and Euryanax the historian 
had apparently more exact and more authentic evidence.^ But the 
army-liat is, on the face of it, more or less of an ideal. The ligures 
are all round numbers : the cadres would not in all cases be full : no 
allowanoe is made for losses during the campaign, which the additional 



TbU is improlMble, u the insition would 
have beeD ezpoted to the c*valry ; tlii: 
Greek position was probably based on 
IV. ond V. Duucker alio frii. 331) 
makes Mardonios retire into Uoiotia 
'orer Kithairoo,' i.e. by III. It is 
possible that II. was also era^iloyed on 
the retreat : but it a«ems uiilikoly that 
Mardonios attempted to circumvent the 



ijreeks by that (nus subsoqaently (Del- 
briick, ferurkruge, p, 117). See further 
notca to U. e. 

' 9. 70. 

- ». 32. 

* Le. one Persian army -corps, with 
<'avalry and Orcuk alliea. Cp. Appendix 
II. g 6, p. \6Q.tupra. 

* 9. 2!i. 29, 



352 



HERODOTUS 



APP. Tm 



details will hardly have made good. The precise pointy or moment, 
for which the figures are to be taken as valid is hardly indicated. 
One item especially challenges criticism. The enormous number of 
light iirmed men with the Spartan forces forms a blot on the whole 
story, for it generates a problem, which Herodotus himself was bound 
to formulate and -solve : why was no use made, or at le2ist no serm-* 
recorded, of this light infantry, the verj* kind of soldiery required 
under the circumstances 1 Instead of any such statement of the 
problem, Herodotus involves himself in a flagrant inconsequence by 
recording a request despatched by Pausanias (to Aristeides) during 
the last engagement for the loan of the Athenian Archers ! Modern 
historians, who treat the 40,000 Psihi on the Greek right wing as | 
serious and acceptable item, should reconstruct their theories of 
Ijattle 80 as to give due weight to the service of the light infantry! 
But Plataia Jia a victory won for Sparta by the Helots will not dos 
they would in that case have overthrown more than their Barbarian 
enemies. On the Greek side only the Hoplites and the few hundred 
Athenian Archers are to be counted among the combatants proper; 
of duly equipped and qualified light-armed troops the Greeks were as 
biire as of cavalrj-. Such troops, indeed, would have required not leM_ 
but more training than the Phalangites. The political conditions 
Greece, in the fifth century B.C., prevented the employment of aativ 
light-infantry, even if there had been, at that time in Greece, ao 
native commander capable of employing light-armed troops efficient 
in combination with heavy infantry.' The immense figure reporte 
for the Helots at Plataia must, however, have h-'vd some senae and 
justification. Such may, perhaps, be found by allowing one unamed 
attendant to each Spartan and Lakcdaimoin'an hoplite, and by 
relegating the remahiing thoiisfinds to the army sem'ce, or com- 
missariat trains. Apart from this serious error, and apart from a 
minor miscalculatiort iti detail, the estimate of the Greek forces is not 
unacceptable, in round numbers, and has generally been accepted u 
approximately correct and officialiy authentic' The remark that only 
a rough estimate of the Greeks on the Persian side could be made, as 
no oificial ooumeration of them had been attempted, though designed 
primarily in reference to the number given for the Barbarians — itsett^B 
a mere total — would be a trifle sophistical, if exactly the same stat4^| 
ment should have Ijeen made of the national forces. 

Gmtsality imd motimtion. — The permanent similarities of what may 
Ije called 'psychological verification ' render the motivation or rationale 
of events, as given by any historian, amenable within limits to 'real' 
criticism. In the record of the Plataian campaign Herodotus fre- 
quently adopts, or suggests, a motivation, or a rationale, for the 
bii^torica! process, both true to nature, and suitable in the particular 

' Waa Gelon the exceptiou ! Cp. 7- 158. 
•' Cp. notes ad U. c. 



«8 



PLATAIA 



353 



case ; yet, here as elsewhere, he prefers to emphasize the accidental, 
the separable, the trivial occasion, and to displace or ignore the 
essential and ultimutelj efficient antecedents of actions and erents. 
Here, as constantly in Herodotus, the recorded act must be distin 
goished from the motive assigned ; sometimes the historic fact may 
be recovered behind the factitious moral. On the whole, no story, or 
set of stories, in Herodotus lends itself to a mixlern rational critique 
more easily or more advantageously than the story of Plataia. 

TTu Supernatural, which in the last resort will, of course, accoimt 
for everything and anything, is never far distant in the Herodotean 
rationale of events ; yet it plays a relatively slight r6lo in his account 
of the Plataian campaign. The legend of Manithon is incomplete 
without its divine epiphanies and heroic resurrections. The island 
and straits of Salamis are suffused with the memory of miraculous 
manifestations. The heights of Mykale are haloed with ' the light 
that never was on sea or land ' — a testimony to the surprising 
character of that victory and the Attic provenience of its record. 
The immediate mark of the theocratic dispensation is limited, in the 
story of Piataia, to a few jejune and beggarly examples. The 
presentiments of disaster on the Persian side reveal the touch of fate, 
or of foreknowledge, yet hardly rise above the normal range of moral 
prejudice or afterthought.' The turn of battle coincides with the 
prayer of Pausanias to Hera.* No barbarian entered the precinct of 
Demeter.* That is all. The dinners in both armies play, indeed, 
a somewhat important r6lo in determining, or excusing, by their 
extispications, the tactical immobility of the armies, on the Persian 
side perhaps in a sense contrary to the wishes of the commander-in- 
chief.* But in all cases alike the apparent dictates of piety coincide 
with a definite political or strategic motive ; and the DifdxUeria on the 
battle-field of Plataia were probably as little the real determinants of 
miliUiry action, or inaction, as the Ilijakintiiw, had been of the previous 
politic quietism in Sparta, for which Herodotus himself suggests a leas 
ideal motive.'' The absence of authentic signs of exalted religious 
feeling in connexion with the Boiotian campaign, both in the actors 
and in the narrators, may be taken as signifying in part that this 
' fairest victory ' was no such great surprise to the victors ; in part 
that Athenian memories were not primarily interested in the victory. 
Plataia left the Greek imagination, and imaginative literature, com- 
paratively cold, because the military situation at Plataia was by no 
means unfavourable to the national forces, and because the victory 
was not one to which the Athenians primarily could lay chief claim. 
The Herodotean record may even do less than justice to tlie degree 
in which religious fervour was aroused, and to the extent to which 
the resources of the national religion were called into action before 



00. 16, 48. 



«. 88 f., «1. 



c. 62. 



0. 65. 



c. 8. 



VOL. II 




2 A 



S84 



HBEODOTUS 



APP. vin 



the battle of Plataia.' This comparative htish on the part of a writer 
BO prone in general to emphasisce the large, and even the trivial, 
aspects of the supernatural element in human history, argues ooo- 
sciouanesa of a strong case, in regard to the Platuian campaign, for a 
rationale of the action based on secondary causes. 

Personalitks. — Human will and pasbiun count for a good deal in 
politicjil and military matters ; but, though the personal factor appeals 
as none other to Herodotus, you will not easily discover how much, in 
the actions round Plataia, should really ]>e ascribed to the person- 
alities of the nominal agents, Mardoiiios, Arbibazos, Paiisaniu, 
Aristeides, Alexander, Timagenidas. The characters of the leading 
dramatis personam are not really drawn on clear or consistent hnes. 
Modern writers can alternately and plausibly represent Mardonios and 
Pausanias as men of great military capacity, playing the game of wai 
with consummate skill, and as vain incapables, blundering alike into 
victory and into defeat. Something is clearly to be allowed for the 
personalities on both sides, especially in the relations of Mardoniw 
and Artabazoa ; but Herodotus himself fails to a.ssign a clear value m 
the personal cowjfficients, and might seem to underestimate in this 
case the importance of factors, to which he is genei'ally prone to 
attach even undue importance. If the attitude and conduct of 
Artabazos be truly set forth in the pages of Herodotus, then Artab&ios 
alone might well bear the whole responsibility for the Persian defeat 
on the banks of Asopos. 8uch a moral is far from the intention of 
Herodotus. But, in this as in uther ciises, the facts themselves are 
not quite free from suspicion. As reported by Herodotus they point 
to rivalries and divisions on the Persian side, which would go far to 
account for the ultimate disaster. Herodotus himself, in reporting 
them, seems hardly to appreciate their full bearing in this connexion. 

Natural causatmi. — The comparative eclipse of the supernatural 
and the diminished stress laid by Herodotus on merely personal 
motives introduce, in the story of Plataia, a more than usual recog- 
nition of reasons in the nature of things for reported actions, and 
a comparatively iTitelligible rationale of actual results. In some 
instances Herodotus disiirms sus])icion, or at least bespeaks trust, bj t 
clearly indicated perception of the existence of a problem in regaixl tf> 
the causation of an event, be it the apparently heartless delay of the 
Spartans,* or the recorded trial of the Phokians.^ In the one CMt 
Herodotus' own suggestion is ob\'ious!y inadequate ; in the other, Ute 
whole anecdote has the air of a misconception concerning, it may be^ 
a iKsrfectly friendly proceeding. None the less acceptable is tha 
interjection of a critical formula in each case, as evidence thit 
Herodotus moves in a rational world, in which acts and events, to be 



' Op. PlnUrch, ArtMeid. 11. 

« 9. a. 

' 9. 17 r. With this idi'idcnt might 



lie compnreil the story of Kiueianos ajid 
his dealing witli tin; VitoUiani, Tacitus, 
JBist. 4. 46. 



credible, must be intelligible. Madness iuiil miracle iixe, of course, 
among the possible explanations of mortal conduct, but either only as 
an uUima ratio. The reasons given by Herodonis for the Greek, and 
specifically the iSpartan, victory at Plataia, are of the most matter-of- 
fact order, but none the less acceptable on that account: a vast 
superiority in weapons, in milit;iry and tactical skill, more than 
compensated (Herodotus himself clearly sees) for any real or supposed 
inferiority in mere numt>ers.' What he does not apparently see is 
that this clear and coo! rationale of the victory i-eacts very detri- 
mentally upon his report of some of the antecedents . such as the 
craven exchange of positions,' the distracting insubordination of 
Amompharotos,* and so forth. Greeks hful not to wait for the victory 
of Plataia to learn the superiority of their own equipment., discipline, 
tactics, to those of the Persian infantry : on the contrary, we may 
safely allow for that knowledj;e in our ow^l reconstruction of the story. 

The reasons which Herodotus gives for the actual manuiuvres on 
the field of Plataia, though nminly military and therefore rational 
reasons, are inadequate ; Imt their shortcoming will better appear in 
connexion with the critique and reconstruction of the atory. A safer 
inBtance of good causality is to be found in the reasons alleged for 
the evacuation of Attica by Mardonios.* Though here, too, the facts 
are probably not fully state<l, the form of argument could BCftrcely 
have been improved. Mardonios evacuate<.l Attica because it was not 
a country adapted to cavalry (and Ik>iotia was) ; because in case of 
disaster his retretit would have been ditlicult, and the passes easUy 
blocked ; because he had in Thebes an allied city and a good basis. 
Evidently his invasion of Attica is harder to explain, and here the 
old Herodotean rationale recurs in the personal caprice and vanity of 
Mardonios.'^' But the narrative also suggests the true reasons : the 
iiesire to force or to induce the Athenians to join him ; failing that, 
or in any case, the design to lure the Peloponncaian forces from behind 
their fortifications, dictated to Mardonios the reoccupation of Athens, 
and even the raid on Mogara. 

There are two or three facts which, if correctly reported by 
Herodotus, woidd lie important elements in elucidating the action 
and explaining the reaidt. Thus (1) tfm qiusiion of tupplicji, on the 
Persian side, is raised, arxl its solution might be of BOnte sigtiificance. 
But contradictory statements on the subject are put into the mouths 
of Alexander and Artabazos respectively." The contradiction is not 
resolved by the remark that Herodotus, in reporting inconsistent 
statements of third parties, is not committed to either ; for it behoves 
the milit«ry reporter to resolve the doubt he thus generates. Nor 
can tlie statements be reconciled by the observation that Alexander's 
assertion might refer to the Persian Laagtir, while the assertion made 



306 



HERODOTUS 



APP. Tin 



by Artabazos is expressly referred to Thebes ; for this difference, 
under the circumstances, is unimporUmt. Moreover, the condition of 
the Persian camp after its capture hj the Greeks is at variance witb 
that harmonistic evasion. On the whole the probability is that the 
question of supply was not urgent upon the Persian side. The state- 
ment put into the mouth of Alexander is, in short, a falsehood. Is 
it authentic ? Makedonian monarchs were not miracles of truthfulneea, 
as a rule ; but in this case the falsehood is more probably an e>idenoe 
of the carelessness of the historian than of the duplicity of the king 
for in the king's mouth the lie is a blunder : the failure of supplies 
would constitute a reason for hastening, not for postponing the attack. 

Again, there are (2) the hidicaiwm of ajyprfhenmn and distrust oh tlu 
Persian siiU-, which, if accepted, would have an important bearing on our 
estimate of the military situation. Alexander reports the fact ; and the 
advice of the Thebans, the opposition of Artabazos, point in the same 
direction. Two other anecdote-i set forth the same moral stiU more 
emphatically. (3) The story of llu: Bantptd of Attaginos^ implies an eariy 
and profound depression in the ranks of the Persians themselves, i 
conviction that their cause \vn& foredoomed to failure. This anecdote 
has an extraordinary degree of verisimiJitude given to it by the 
precision with which Herodotus cites his authority, and the upparentiy 
unexceptionable character of the witness ; and yet few critics will douht 
that the memory of Thersandcr was more or less affected by the 
actual course of subsequent events, while the reported convewation 
bears more than one internal mark of unautbenticity. (4) A second 
anecdote, llie Chresmology of Mardiiniox,- extends the pessimistic deprw- 
sion to the ranks of the Greek allies, and would be even more 
demonstrably incredible, as it stands, albeit the context incidentally 
confirms the good faith of Heroilotus, if there were any truth in tlM 
story of a Persian assault on Delphi in the previous year.'' Of couiw^ 
both stories, which account for the preservation of Delphi thronghoat 
the war, may be false ; if we iirc to choose between them, this anec- 
dote of Mardonios obviously has the greater verisimilitude. Even if 
Herodotus were right, and the oracle cited by Mai-donios was mifi- 
applied, that would not in any degree discredit the anecdote as it 
stands : who knows not a hundred niisa])plied preilictions ! On the 
whole, however confident Mardonios may have been, or thought it 
well to appear, his Greek allies may very well have had a considerable 
respect for the confederate army in front of them, and their apprehen- 
sions may well have been augmented, if they were aware of seriouii 
rivalries and dissensions among the Persian leaders, such as are 
implied in the difference reported as arising between Mardonios and 
Artabazos. 

(5) A third story enforces the same moral, and also conveys a 
censure on the policy of Mardonios. Thr reported critique of At 



» 0. 16. 



» c. 42. 



» 8. 36-39. 



I'iulaits ^ upon the proper plan of campaign to piu'sue agrees with the 
proposal ascribed to Artalmzos to avoid a pitched Iwittle, and to try 
the eQ'ect of bribory and corruption upon the leiiding men in the con- 
federate cities." Such a proposal implies a gi-eat respect for the 
military prowess of the confederate army, and heavily discounts any 
coiihdeirt exjMJctation of victory upon the Persian side. Yot this 
report too is not quite free from the suspicion of presenting rather a 
criticism after the event, than a policy explicitly advocated before- 
hjind. Whether as forethought or as aftertliought the wisdom of the 
Thebans should not bo allowed to pass too easily unchallenged. There 
is good gi'ouiid for tlouiit whether such h plan, if iwlopted, would have 
bad the desired result. The loyal co-operation of the Greek allies had 
been raised to a very considerable height before the passage of 
Kithairon. The supposed plan seems also to ignore the operations 
of the flf et, which wiis now acting on the offensive. Moreover, neither 
among the Athenians, nor yet among the Spartans, at this time was 
there any reaaornvble pro8|)ect of seducing the leading men : though 
possibly, had the plan been tried — the implication is that it was not 
tried •' — bribes might have been accepted, without making any 
difference to the conduct and policy of the recipients. Not merely is 
the story open to these general or intrinsic objections, it seems to 
contlict with the record in the context of the zeal of the Thebans in 
the actiuil initiation an<l conduct of the l^ersian assaults on the Greek 
position.^ The passjige is, indeed, unfavourable to the courage of the 
Thelwms, and exalts that of the Persian cavalry at their expense, and 
in 80 far lays itself ojien to suspicion in turn.'' Cavalry skiiTnishes 
are one thing, indeed, and a pitched battle, in which the infantry was 
to be involved, another ; while the Thebans furthered the one, they 
might well view with apprehension the proliable effects of the other. 
But, to recur here to the more general argument, the Theban interest 
was not likely to be most etfectually fuithered by a purely pacific 
solution. The policy of bribery and corruption could only be worth 
piuauing up to the [joint of creating some degree of trejichery, 
desertion, and confusion in the ranks of the Greek anny in the actual 
event of battle. No such suspicion was thrown upon the absentees, 
real or reported, in the sequel. Meantime, if the numbers of the 
loyal Greek forces were, indeed, making daily accretion," whether 
supplies in the Persian camp were failing, and depression in the 
Persian ranks or in the ranks of the Greek allies was spreading, or 
not, Mardonios had a reason the more for wishing to force a battle. 

In the cases bust cited statements of fact, which if ti-ue would have 
an important bearing on the rationale of actions and events, have to 
be heavily discounted, as open to doubt, or even as erroneously in- 



' 9. 2. 

» 9. 41. 

' Bat cp. Diodor. 11. 28. 3. 



* Hdt 9. 40. 

• On. c. «r. 
•0.88. 



358 



HERODOTUS 



APT. vm 



terpreted by the historian. There are other and happier cases in 
which the historian is irreproachable. 

No nitionftle of events is more effective than the simple namtiTe 
of their actual order, in which the subaequent can be clearly seen ipso 
fiu'to tia the result of the stntecedent. In a certain sense every true 
history, even if a mere chronicle, conveys this kind of rationale ; but 
great ia the art of juxtaposition, and HerodoUis has practised it tt 
times with signal success. For instance, the account of the cavalry 
operations against the Greeks in their ' first position ' is especially rich 
in this quality of reasonabk'ne.s.i, constituting verisimilitude.'^ There 
are eight or ten distinct iterais introduced merely with the temponl 
conjunction, yet forming in their coherent se»iijence a perfectly 
reasoned account of the whole action. Such, indeed, is ever the 
quality of the bent kind of narrative. Perhaps no disputations woold 
ever be necessary for an historian whose facts were all true, siifiicieiitlj 
numerous, and ptcsontcd in strict chronological sequence. 

§ 3. The consideration in some detail of the iSoM;-«ts, from which 
the Herodotean story of Plataia must have been derived, will further 
elucidate the value of the records. Herodotus was perhaps not the 
first author, not even the first prose-writer, who tried to present a 
connected story of the campaign, a coherent account of the battle; 
yet his ruirrative has, it must be admitted, very much the ring of th« 
vox fiva, and his debt in pun^Iy narrative passages to his literary 
predecessors is probably small. Wtilten xourr^x, of one kind or 
another, underlie his composition, but the passages most obviously 
based upon documents are not those constituting the real drama. 
The legends to which Tegeans and Athenians appeal in support of 
their opposite claims,^ had a long literary history, but hardly touch 
the subject proper of the campaign. The oracles of Bakis,'* of Musaios,* 
of Apollo himself,' doubtless reduced to writing, have hartlly any 
bearing on the military situation. Aischylos had referre<i to the 
battle of Plataia," but no dramatist had described it in such detail as 
Aischylos himself uses of the battle of Salamis. Elegies and epigrams 
were e.xtant, not a few, cekbrating the events of 479 B.i;. ; but, as 
Plutarch points out, Herodotus apjiears to ignore them.^ There are 
hints of a literature on the Persian war in the note on the name of 
Masistios,'^ and Athenian Skoliti have been suspected in the Aristeis 
of .Sopbanos, the Dckcleian hero ; ^ but these personalia hardly cooceni 
the main movement of events. Official documents, or memorials, 
might be suspected in the army-lists ; but Herodotus is too maoh 
artist to reproduce the mighty description ali-eady given of the 
Barbarian host. The Hat for Plataia is Hut the somewhat confused 



> 00. 20-28. » cc. 26, 27. 

* c. 48. 
■• iWrf. 

• ibid. But Hdt. knows nothing of 



the Delphic Ros(>onse reported bj Fln- 
taroh, Arixtrid. 11. « Ptrs. 805 IT. 

* Mvr. 872 f. » Hdt. ». 20. 

» Stein, (k/ 9. 74. 



selection of the previous year thrown into battle-array.' Behind 
these summaries looms the great compilation of Book VII. with ite 
sources ; but, as Herodotus asserts for the forces of Mardonios a total 
which represents the maximum admissible even for the hosts of 
Xerxes, the exaggeration and confusion were perhaps present in the 
literary record long before Herodotus took it in hand. For the Greek 
army-list - something like an official document may be conjectured as 
ultimate source, all the more in that Herodotus himself does not fully 
realize the significance of the document, nor perceive that the em- 
battled Greeks are enumerated in four main divisions, each forming a 
separate tactical unit. The list may be accepted as an authentic 
record, even though we cannot name the contemporary document 
upon which it wa.>! ultimately based, nor specify the exact medium to 
which Herodotus owed it. The list cannot have \>een compiled simply 
from the Delphijin tripod, with the addition of conjectural numbers 
from the historian's own hand ; ' for the Delphic and Plataian lists do 
not agree, an<l the military order and organization underlying the 
Herodotean list disappear in the monumental ; nor can there be 
reason for doubting that Herodotus had access to such materials before 
ever he set foot in Greece proper. 

InscriplioM no doubt Herodotus consulted upon occasion, and for 
the Plataian story such evidences hardly existed outside European 
Hellas. Herodotus doubtless saw at one time or another monuments 
and inscriptions in Athens, in Sparta, in Delphi,^ perhaps in Plataia 
itself,'^ bearing upon the events of 479 B.C., though the monuments 
themselves were probably less instructive or eloquent than the oral 
traditions and stories associated with them. Such evidences to some 
extent umierlie the anealotes, which form an appendix to the battle- 
piece itself : hut there is not much sign of their presence in the stones 
of the actual battle. 

The assumption generallj" made that Herodotus, before committing 
the campaign to writing. Lad visited the field of Plataia, and was well 
acquainted with the landscape and the local monuments, might long 
ago luive been challenged. No doubt in its present and final form 
the work of Herodotus has profite<l from tirst to last by such [leraonal 
experiences ; nevertheless the story of Plataia lacks conclusive 
evidences of a careful atUapsy, and contains indications ditRcult to 
reconcile with such an hypothesis. The failure to envisage clearly 
the various routes anil posses on to the Held, the apparent confusion 
between several distinct temples of Demeter, the exaggerated promin- 
ence assigned to Gai^phia, the obscurity and confusion in regard to 
the final position of the Greek forces, the error concerning the tomlw 



> Or is 8. 1 13 > ranenon of 9. 31, 32 7 
» 9. 2» »0. 

" Op. Beloch. SmMtonmf, pp. 8, 9. 
• 9. 81. 



* 9. 85. But he Aaof, not mention 
the PUui&n monttnwnt ; cp. Plutarch, 
An'jUeid. 20. 



aeo 



HERODOTUS 



APP. vtn 



of the slaiD, are among the more manifest obstacles to be overcome, 
before the author can be credited with having based bis narrative 
very largely upon his own observations. If Herodotus ever visited 
Plataia (as he certainly visited Thebes), the visit has not stamped 
itself so conspicuously upon this portion of his work as might bavfl 
been expected.^ 

But, whatever the element of autopsy in the narrative may be, the 
clear impress of the contemporary oral souru, or sources, cannot be 
gainsaid. For a knowledge of the Plataian campaign Uerodotai 
could hardly rely on his fellow-citizens, or other Asiatic Greeks * ; bat 
the story of the Persian disaster in Boiotia was doubtless told in lonit 
by medized exiles, or traitors, by Athenian, or philo-Athenian guests, 
and Herodotus may have heard it again and again. One such passible 
authority he ex]ire8aly indicates in the person of Thersander of 
Orchomenos,^ to whom far more may be due than has hitherto been 
recognize<i. There is no sufficient reason for postponing the acquaill^ 
ance between the Halikarniisaian and the Orohomenian to the date of 
Herodotus' visit to Thebes ; on the contrary, a medii;cd Boiotian was 
as likely to be met with abroad as at home. Thersander is certainly 
a man, or at least a moralist, after Herodotus' own heart ; had the 
younger man sat .is a pupil at the elder's feet in Halikamaaaoe, « 
elsewhere, and heard many a truth, embodied in a tale, from his lips I 
Nor were strictly Asianic sources wholly wanting. The mystery 
about the burial of Mardonios is surely not the only problem of the 
Boiotian campaign whicti Herodotus had discussed or heaid discussed 
with the men of that generation ; the presence of Paiuanias, of 
Themistokles, of other heroes of the Persian war, in Asianic parts, 
must have stimulated the interest in the traditions of the great 
expedition. Perhaps some slender ' Mysian,' Lydian, Karian, Egyptian 
sources flowed to swell the stream ; and long before Herodotus had 
visited Thebes, or even Athens, he was familiar with stories of the 
campaign in Boiotia. Beside such ' Persian ' authority as might 
ukimately be responsible for correct nomenclature, army-lists, and so 
forth, a more living Persian source has been suspected in the curiooB 
good-will with which the performances of Artabazos are followed.' 
ArtabazoB and his house were at home in the Ilellespontine satrapy, 
but the historian need not be brought into direct personal relations 
with the family in Haskyleion, much less in Babylon, in order to 
explain the phenomon<^ unless, per cotitra, every sign of 'malignity' 
in the Herodotean story is to be traced to similar personal antecedents. 
Nor need it be supposed that for all transactions on the Persian side 



' 9. 86 looks like aatopsy, bat cp. 
notes cui I. 

* 9. 8fi itDplies that an Epliesiau hod 
been proaent at the Itattlc ; cp. nates 
ad I. 



» 9. 16. 

* 9. 66, 89, ate. As the ntediana 
Greeks appkaded Artabuos, his recna 
might come in part from Boiotian or 
similar souroea. 



§3 



PLATAIA 



861 



Herodotus had recourse to Persian, or even to medizing sources : the 
action of Mardonios wan largely observable from the side of the 
Hellenic camp, and such observations and inferences have left their 
impress on the tratlitions. ' Probably not the patriotic but the 
medized Greek sources were most unfavourable to Mardonios and 
his tactics. His Theban and Thessalian friends will have been severer 
critics than Athenian or Spartan enemies. A sane and reasonable 
Mardonios is recognizable in the Greek traditions of the campaign. 
The infatuated and foredoomed commander may be a product of the 
minds which had medized and been disappointed. In short, though 
Herodotus was born a Persian subject and may have had friends and 
ac(|uatntances in Persian circles, there is very little, even in the scenes 
laid in the Persian aimp, which comes from a Persian, or even a 
' barbarian ' source. 

In all that concerns Alexander of Makedon, a philo-Makedonian 
Greek source or a phil-Hellenic Makedonian source may be 8U8p€Cte<I, 
and that of relatively recent provenience. The incoherence of the 
chief episode at Plataia in which Alexander figures - confirms the 
suspicion that it conceals an addition to the earlier strata of the 
story : the paltry rdle allotted to the Athenians prohibits its assign- 
ment to a purely Attic source. This instance sets us face to face with 
the problem of the native or European orufints of the story as a whole. 

The greater {mrt of the story of Plataia is undoubtedly tohi from 
native sources, which can bo more or less plauaibly localized, although 
not always securely characterized. The relation of Herodotus tt> such 
sources is a question inevitably mixed up with the problems of his 
European travels and tlie gradual genesis of his work. The element 
of ' autopsy ' in his account of Plataia has been somewhat diminished 
above ; and if the analysis of the story enables us to trace various 
sections ultimately to diiTerent 'peoples' or localities, the inference 
need not forthwith be drawn that Herodotus collected the local story 
himself at the local fountain-hciul, or even in all cases originally upon 
the European side. Every theory of the composition of the work of 
Herodotus recognizes that the latter Books in their present form are 
of late composition or retractation : the mere internal criticism of the 
result scarcely enables us to reduce the Herodotean story of Plataia 
to its original elements nr outlines. The story, as a whole, bears 
evidence of some ' contamination ' of various local traditions, effected 
on somewhat eclectic principles, and not always on the most obvious 
lines. Thus, though Platiiia was primarily a Spartan victory, and 
though Spartans figure largely in the narrative, there is very little in 
the story which can be a3crii>ed to a purely Sjiarlan source. Though 
there were at Delphi monuments of the war, a Delphian, or even a 
Phokian, tradiiion hanily shows its bead in this part of the history. 
On the Greek side the chief source for the Herodotean account of the 



Cp. note to I>. 16. 



■ 9. 44, 46. 



S6S 



HERODOTUS 



APP. Tin 



operations in Boiotia is, mediately or immediately, Athenian, or quan- 
Athenian, tradition. Not merely is there a great deal in the story 
which iR'tniys a distinct bias in favour of Athens, but the Attic pro- 
venience of the material bel})s to explain some remarkable omissions. 
Thus the only passes or routes recognized in the story are passes lead- 
ing into Attica. The all-important route, or routes, to Megara obtain 
no recognition. The disappearance of the Urcek centre in the final 
engagement shows that Herodotus draws his information with regard 
to the action of the Peloponnesiaiis neither from Pclojtonnesian nor 
even from local Plataian sources. The story of the movements in 
Attica,' and of the Athenian embassy in Sparta-; of the operations in 
the * first ' po-sitioii ■• ; of the Athene- Tegean dispute * ; of the exchange 
of positions between the Spartans and Athenians * ; of the retirement 
of the Greeks,** the engagement on the left,' the assault on the Persian 
camp,** the Aii^tein,^' one and all betray a strong 'Attic' interest. 
Still more remarkable is the detection of the Attic source for the story 
of AmompharetOH '" : such a story could never have been current in 
Spjirta. The insubordination of the ' Lochagos ' wouJtl have been 
severely censured ; a cardinal error in regard to the military instita- 
tions of S{»art-i would have been impossible. Such a story was 
perhaps wanted to cover a corresponding blunder in the Athenian 
retreat on the left wing: the 'psephos' of Amompharetoa was pick 
up in Athens ! 

Herodotus may have visited Plataia and surveyed thy battle-field: 
but if so, his account of the operations owes all too little to that 
opportunity. The scandal retailed against the Aiginetans may be due 
to u Plataian, if not to an Attic source " ; the curiosities of the battle- 
field might have been gleaned on the spot ; round the tomhe and 
memorials some stories may have gathered, which Herodotus has 
used. But a visit to Plataia conld hunlly have left him in ignorance 
of the award of the Aristeia : Plataians would have impre^ed upon 
him their rights and privileges, as guaranteed by Sparta and con- 
federate Greece. It might delight us to picture Herodotus present at 
the Eleutheria, and taking psirt in a discussion of the merits of 
Aristodemos, and the other Spartan worthies interred in Plataian soil; 
but, if the scene of that discussion is to be laid at Plataia, Herodotns 
himself can hanily have been present on the occasion, or he would not 
have failed to roconl the institution of the festival. If Horodotus 
ever traversed the field of Plataia he was not much concerned to revise 
hia materials in the light of Plataian memory or of local conaideralnons. 



' ec. 5-6. « oc. 6-11. 

cc. 46, 47. • CIS. 52-57. 

'• oc 58-67. 



' CO. 19-24. « ec. 26, 27. 

c. 67. ' e. 70. » CO. 7S-75, 

" cc 78-80. 85. 



§3 



PLATAIA 



99* 



SCHKDULR OF THE SOVSCES FOR BoOK 9. CC. 1-89. 


CO. 1-3 


Advance of MardonioH : re-occupation 
of Athens 


' Thersander ' -i- Attic 


4,5 


Mission of Mouiychidaa: fateofLykidas 


Attic 


6-11 


Athenian emltassy to Sparta: erodvs of 
the Spartan aniiy 


Attic 


12 


Hedism of tho Argives 


Spartan (?) 


13-15 


Retreat of Mardonios, and encampment 


Attic -^Theban 


16 


Banquet of Attaginos 


' Thersander ' 


17-18 


Trial of the Phokians 


' Thersander ' . 


19-24 


Greeks in the first position 


Attic 


25 


Move to second {Hwition 


Attic 


26-27 


Atheno-Tegean dispute 


Attic 


28 30 


The Greek army-list .... 


Documents (0 


31-32 


Persian battle-array .... 


Boiotian ( ' Thersander ') 


33-35 i 


Story of Teisamenos : a digression 


Delphi (!) 


37 


Story of Hogesistratos : a digression . 


(?) 


38-89 


Advice of Tiniagenidas 


' Thersander ' 


40 1 Sufferings of the Oreeku 


Boiotian i 


41, 42 1 


The Council of Mardonios . 


' Thersander ' 


43 1 Bakis, Masaios, onelef< 


Uterary, HDT. 


44, 45 


Alexander's Hellenism 


Makedonian(?), Delphi (?).. 


46, 47, 48 ! 


The exchange of [>ostM bctwe<>n 
Athenians and Spartans 


Attic 


4»-51 ' 
(cp. 40) 


The sufferings of the Greeks in the 
second {Mwition 


Attic 


52-«5 : 


Tlte third position .... 


Attic 


63-57 


Story of AmompharetoK 


Attic 


58 i 


Mardonios and the Alcuadai 


'Thersander' 


50-65 1 Tho battle 


Attic 


66 

1 


Retreat of Artabazos .... 


1 

'Thersander,' Daskylean(t) 



364 



HERODOTUS 



ScHUDULB ow THX S0UBCX8 roR BooK 9, flo. 1-89, eant. 1 


67 


EhigBgement between Athenun* and 

ThebADB 


Attic 1 


68 


rersian and Boiotian cayalry 


Attic ^^ 


69 


The efTorts of the Greek centre . 


^^M 


70 


Assault and captare of the oamp : 
nniubera of the glain 


^^M 


71, 72 


The Ariateia 


HDT. (a soppresaion) 


78-76 


Sophues the Dekeloian 


Attic 


76 


Faussnias and the £oau lady 


(Koanr) 


77 


Mantiiiejuu, Eleians, too late * . 


Attic (!) 


78-79, 80 


Scandal against Aigina 


Attic (cp. c. 86) 


81 


The Anathemata : divinon of the spoil 


I>elphi, etc. (T) 
oi \4yeTiu rpht tMa^iQm ! 


82 


Fersian pomp and Liokoiuc poverty 


HDT. 


88 


Carioeitiea of the battlefield 


HDT. (at PUtaia ») 


84 


Disappeannoe of the corpse of Mar- 
donios : a mystery 


HDT. 


86 


Tomha and memoriala 


UDT. (at Plataia f) 


8«-88 


Siqn uf Thebes : fate of Attaginoe and 
Tiiiiagenida* 


' Thereauder ' 


89 




Adaiiic (!) , 



§ 4. From his sources, whatever they were, Herodotua compiled an 
account of the knd campaign which, reduced to its bare elements, 
might read as follows: — 

Jn the spring Mardonios left Thtssdy, and marching, with Jiis forces, 
through central Greece, re-imwled and re-oceupied Athens, the Atheiuanx 
haring again taken refuge in Salamis, some ten mmdhs after the first 
occupation by Xerxes. The Persian made nverlwes to the Athenians, lohich 
came to nothing : the Athenians, by the threat of medism, prevailed on the 
Spartans to advance, with a very large army, to the Isthmos. On the 
advance of the Spartans Mardonios prepared to fall back on Boioiia, and 
took his whole force by way of Dekeleia and Tanagra to Skolos, after having 
ravaged all the couTiiry south of Kitliairon, indvding the Megarid. At or 
near Skolos he constructed a fortified stronghold, a mile square, but th« 



PLATA I A 






Laager for his immense army extended much further along tfie Asopos. 
There he awaited the advance of the Greeks, in a position carefully selected 
with a view to the evolutions of cavalry, and in proximUy to Thebes, hoping 
to bring matters to a pitched battle (9. 1-18). 

The Peloponnesians advanced to Eleusis, formed a juncture with the 
Athenians, crossed KUhairon to Erythrai, and look up a position on high 
ground above the plain. In this position they were attacked by the Persian 
cavalry, fntt gained a decided success, chiefly owing to the heroism of the 
Athenians, who slew and obtained possesion of the body of Meuiatios, the 
rommandcr of the cavaini, second only in position to Mardonios himself 
(ec. 19-24). 

Eikcowaged by this aueeess, and to obtain a better water-supply, and 
other eonvenienees, the Greeks decided to move down from Erythraian to 
Plalaian ground, and accordingly left Erythrai, passed by Hysiai on to a 
position, on some low hills, mar the fountain Gargaphia and the 
Androkrattion (c. 25). 

This position Ihey oceupieii for some twelvf days STtsuiTig, and in order 
of battle., which was here determined after a dispute betweeri the Tegeatai and 
the Athenians fm- the possession of the left wing. The Lakedaimonian 
army decided the <juestiott, after debate, by iudatnation, tn favour of Athens 
(ce. 26, 27). The order of battle, comprising two wings and a centre, was 
made up of rontingenis from twerUy4wo differeiU states, and comprised 
38,700 hoplUes, and 69,500 liglUaniied attendants, or 1 1 0,000 nu5» »n 
aUy including 1800 Thespians, who vjere unarmed.^ The Persian forces 
were drawn up in battle-array over against the Greek lines, to the number 
of some 350,000 fighting men, all told (ec. 31-33). The Asopos divided 
the armies, and neither side would advance across the river to deliver an 
attack, the saerifires on both sides alike being unfamuralile to offensive 
movements {ec. 33-37). 

This situation had been maintained already for eight days witfu/ut 
■nge or adventure, when, by the advice of Timagenidat, a Theban, the 
'Persian cavalry was sent to cut off a large convoy in the pass of Dryos- 
keplialai : this sfrvice vns surcessfully aca»mplished («. 38-39). 

The cavalry also harassed the Greek army considerably, but without 
bringing on a general engagement (e. 40). Mardonios became impattcni, 
and determined, in opposition to the advice of Ariabasos and of the Thelans, 
amd in spite of the depression visilde among his Greek allies, to attack the 
Greeks in their position {ec. 41-43). 

This determination was betrayed to the Athenians by Alexander of 
ttkedon (fc, 44, 45) and by Ihem communicated to Pausanias, who there- 
caused the Spartans and Athenians to exchange posiiions on the rigid 

left wtngs, and U^en a ^xond time restored //k original posts re- 
tpedively. The first of these movements was dictated by a desire to amid 
pitting the Spartans against the Persians.- the second, by the observation 



^^aki 
^MlSpon 



■ So oc. 28-80. But Hdt. hM omitted 
the 800 AtheoMo Archeni, and 6000 



Helotft ex hypoUteii iu attondanoe on tb« 
' LakedMinoDUuii ' ; cp. notes ad L e. 



866 



HERODOTUS 



A pp. 



that Mardonws had made a eorrespondmg change in the disposition of his 
own forces, which frustrated the Spartan's design. In. the end the stattu 
(|U0 ant« ioa$ rfstored on, both sides, Mardonios again following the Spariam 
kad (cc. 46, 4 7), and subsequently sending across a challenge to I'aMsamuu 
for a duel between e^ptal numbers of Persians and Spartans, to which no 
reply was vouchsafed (c. 48). 

If was now l)u twelfth day on which the armies liad faced each other m 
battle-array, witltoui coming to close quarters. Mardonios employed the day 
for a ren^oed and nuyre successful attack by the Persian cavalry upon the 
Greek position: the water-supply of the Greek forces teas destroyed, and 
their position rendered untenable. A council of war summoned by Pausaniat 
decided to retreat under cover of night to 'the Islaiul' in front of Plataia: 'the 
half were to be sent to open up tlu road for llie supply-train {ec. 49-51). 

Next morning Mardimios, having discovered that the Greeks had di*- 
appeared under cover of night, advariced in some haste and disorder aenu 
the river to pursue them. A great kittle, or rather two separate engage- 
ments, took pUuc between the wings of the two armies. Mardonios and the 
Persians overtook the Greek right wing on the Argiopion, the site of the 
Demetrion, hard by the river Moloeis. There an lA'slinale struggle took plau 
{both Die Persian horse and foot were engaged), in whidt. Mardonios was hm- 
st^ slain, and the Persians completely routed (cc. 58-65). Oh tfw left, and 
lower grounil, the Atlieniaris were engaged with tfie Persian right wing, eon- 
sisting of the medized Greeks, and routed it (c 67). fVhde the two Ortek 
wtn^s thus gained the vidorij, the majority of tlie arviy (ol Ttokkoi, c bi\ 
which luid retreated in Die night on Plaiaia, took little or no part in , 
fighting, one sedion, with the KorirUhians, having gone np the road 
the temple of Demeier,' the other section, including the Megarians 
PhUiasians, having ndvarued down on to the plain, where they were roughly 
handled and repulsed by the Tlieban cavalry (c. 69). 

The Persian right fied back to Thebes (c. 67). Artabazos led his 40,000 
off the field without striking a blow, or attempting to support the forioari 
movement of Mardonios. The Persian left {aiul the rest of the barbariemt) 
took refuge in the fortified camp, which toas promptly attacked by the 
Lakedaimonians and Tegeans, but successfully defended, until tlu AthrnioM 
came up and effected a breach, through which the Tegeans were the first to 
erUer. An immense slaughter of the barbarians ensued. Of the army of 
Mardonios, except fnr the 40,000 men under Artabazos, not 3000 remained 
alive (c. 70). 

This great victory was gained notuntiistanding ike complete lirtahdovm 
of the plan resolved upon bi/ the Greek couticil of war the day be/ore the 
battle. The break-down tva^ due to ttco chief causes : the misconduct of the 
Greek centre, which fl^d to Plataia instead of retiring to the island (c 52), 
and the misconduct of Amompliaretos, a Spartan officer, who refused tc 
retreat at all, and delayed the Spartans, until at last they abandoned km 
to his fate, whereupon he thought better of it, and rejoined the nuiin foreu 
on the Argiopion (cc. 53-57). 



§ b. Even as thus boiled down, or redilcod to its barest skeleton, 
this story is far from being coherent, or iiccoptable. The following 
hst comprises only the major and more obvioris defects, difficulties, or 
aporiai, visible in the Hero<lotean argument, some twenty in number. 

(1) Movemtnls of Mardonios in Attica. — Can Manlonios have taken 
his forces into and out of Attica by one pass only! Or will he have 
harked Itack, <is he vtoa leaving Atlicu by the Dckclcian road, in order 
to catch the Spartan advance-giuird west of Eleusis, and to ravage the 
Megarid t Probably Mardotiios took only a part of his forces into 
Attica. Even in that case two or three ]msses will have been used ; in 
particular, the cavalry, which overran the Megarid, will have made 
their way into Boiotia by the best and nearest route (Dryoskophalai), 
while Manionios made his own way to the Asopos by the roa<i from 
Dekeleia to Tanagra. The point is imporUirtt as showing the extent 
to which Herodotus may overlook the simplest strategic necessities. 

(2) The site of ilw Pnsian cnmp is not clearly indicated, a regrettable 
omission. On which bank of the Asopos did Herodotus conceive it as 
placed 1 The reference to Skoloa seems to leave it on the right ; the 
coarse of the narrative seems to imply a position upon the Ic^ft. The 
latter alternative is preferable also for strategic reasons ; but, whether 
the cjimp was astride the main road from Dryoskephalai to Thebes, 
or somewhat further to the east, is debatable. That road must liave 
been strongly held by Mardonios, and the bridge over the Asopos was 
doubtless in the Persian hands, and fortified. The Persian centre 
might, perhaps, be placed on this road, in the first instance ; in which 
CAse the main road will probably have run right through the Persian 
camp. Or the camp may be moved further east (to bring it more 
within range of Skoloa) ; in which case the camp, or the fortified 
portion, will have commanded the road in flank. But the Persian 
laager seems to have extended along the batik of the Asopos west of 
the main road, nnfl the reference to Skolos may be rather misleading. 
Was Mardonios himself on the extreme left of the position 'i His route 
from Attica, and his final encounter with the Spartans, favour that 
view. The cavalry, on the loss of Masistios, rode Ijack to Mardonios 
(c 23), but the exchange of positions (see below) pointA to other 
possibilities. The position of Artabazos on the field is obscure (see 
below). 

(3) The first jiotUion of thf. Greek army is not quite clearly fixed, stiU 
less the respective stations of the several contingents, or the length of 
time which olapee<l in this position. Were all the troops already in 
position when the Persian cavalry assaulted the Megarians? Poesibly 
the whole Greek army did not reach the position by the same route, 
or even on the same day. To def^oy a marching column of upwards 
of 100,000 men by one mountain-road would be a difficult and lengthy 
manceuvre. Possibly the whole army was never in this position at all, 
and aa soon as sufficient forces had made their way over Kithairon, by 



366 



HERODOTUS 



M"p. »m 



this and that pass, the Greek position must have been extended and 
may have been pushed forward, almost as a matter of course. But io 
any cise the mustering af the army in a 'first' position wotdd hare 
occupied more time than was rerjuired for the forward advance to a 
' second ' position. Moreover, such an advance presupposes a definite 
disposition of t\w forces on the march, and in the ' first ' position. 

(4) The story of llie Jighlimj in tJu Jirst position has been already 
noted for iU Athenian hitis. The heroism and services of the Athenians 
upon this occasion are plainly exaggerated. By a curious inconsequence 
no reference is made thereto in the subsequent speech in favour of 
the Athenian claim to the left wing. The Athenians are represented 
as volunteering to take the place of the Megarians, when the latter 
were haitl pre8se<i by the Persian cavalry, and the other contingent^ 
one and all hung back. In the first order of battle the Athenia 
were on the extreme loft (\vith the Plataians), and the Megari&ns we 
in the next post towards the right. Had not the Athenians and 
Megarians crossed Kithairon first of the Greek forces, and posted 
themselves at Erythtai, upon tht^ main road to Thebes, which nn 
exactly through the Megarian position 1 In any case the Athenians 
were probjibly the nearest and the proper force to support or to re^ 
place the Megarians. Pausanias is apparently already on the spot : 
if so, the whole ai-my would already have boon in position when 
first attack was delivered by the Persians — an improbability. 

(5) Thf adimur from the ' first ' to the ' second ' position, or, to" 
speak more carefully, from a position on the Hifporm to a position on 
the Asopos, is inadequately explained. Two resisons are given : (a) 
the position occupied was ill supplied with water ; the position to be 
occupied was in this respect a great improvement, (h) The success 
against the cavalry emboldened the Greeks to advance and occupr '» 
more convenient ' [wsition. These reasons may be not so much wrong 
in themsolves as inadequate, and out of tnio focus, The successful 
stand made against the cavalry and the desire to obtain a better water- 
supply may have been co-o{>erant motives ; but more explicit reason 
of a strategic and tactical nature arc demanded. The Greeks apparent 
desired to fight a Itattle. They could not expect that the Per 
forces, other than the cavalry, would cross the Asoixw to attack 
enemy posted upon broken heights, some two miles distant from the 
river. If the Greeks wished to offer battle they were bound to 
advance on to lower groun<l, and within reasonable distance of the 
Persian lines. An alternative view, that the Greeks were really worked 
out of the ' first ' position bj' the Persian cavalry into one still more 
disadvantageous and exposed, is unacceptable, as doing too much 
violence to the traditions. AVe may rather ask : did not the Greek; 
find the Persian cavalry less formidable, on a first acquaintance, than 
might have been anticipated f The advance to the Asopos-Gargaphia 
Androkrateion position ap|:ears to have been a voluntary adi 



§5 



PLATAIA 



se» 



undertaken with a view io bring on a general engagement. Whether 
made by rlay or by night is not specified. As it appears to have been 
unopposed, it may i>erhaps have been made under cover of darkness, 
or at earliest dawn. TJw. dispuit. beivxrn the Alheniuns and the Te<ifatai 
must be ruled out, at least at this crisis. Place^l here, it is — as before 
observed — an anachronism. Such a dispute is inconceivable in the 
presence of the enemy ; and is further inconsistent, as just observed, 
with the post and services of the Athenians in the ' first ' position (at 
Erythrai), which, indeed, in case of such a dispute, would have 
constituted the moet recent and vivid claim to honour, and yet are 
nut 80 much as mentioned in this connexion. Th« Greek order of 
battle, as of laager, must have been determined before the forces 
broke up from Eleusis to cross Kithairon. 

(6) Length of time spent in the advanced Asopos posilion. — Can we 
believe that for eight days the two armies faced each other in Imttle- 
array, without any active hostilities taking placet What was the 
Pt^rsian cavalry about all this time 7 Perhaps Herodotus intends bis 
readers to undet^itand that t'ur these eight days, and for the four days 
that follow, all the time the Persian cavalry was riding round the 
Greek position, or at least assaulting it, although it was only on the 
twelfth day that the Persians finally succeeded in rendering the 
position untenable. But such an assumption, or such a perfunctory 
notice, will not do in this position. Certainly, if the Greeks were 
really for twelve days on the Asopos, the Persian cjivalry will hava 
been opecating all the time ; but no less certainly, if the Persian 
cavalry was o])erating, the Greeks cannot have maintained such a 
position so long. The time has been unduly longthoneil, or events of 
this octave have been forgotten, or the manoeuvres have been unduly 
compressed or ' toloscoixil ' at the end. The long delay in this 
position is incredible. 

(7) TIk J'eraian ooupaiion of Dn/oskepkalai. — On the eighth day, 
or rather night, accoitling to Herodotus, the Persian cavalry rides up 
to Dryoskephalai, and cuts off a large convoy on its way to the 
Greek laager (c. 39). This affair appears, however, an isolated episode, 
although later on the cavalry is still keeping supplies from reaching 
the Greeks (c. 50). Herodotus does not understand apparently that, 
with the Greeks in their atlvunced position, the Persian cavalry rides 
up and down the road to Dryoskeplialai, and even perhaps all round 
the position, at pleasura The road from the Asopos bridge (not 
mentioned by Herodotus) to Oak Heads is clear of Greeks ; the Greek 
army is uu longer astride this road, no longer commands it. If, at a 
later stage, ooraroimications with the Peloponnesos are cut, the Persian 
cavalry must have not merely commanded the main rood, but at least 
threatened the descents from the other pass, or passes, aa woU 3 the 
obscurity here is specially duo to Herodotus 's failure to recognize the 
three passes and their relations. 



VOL n 



2 B 



370 



HERODOTUS 



App. Tm 



(8) The OnA lines of eommwdcalion. — Owing to his failure to 
specify the various passes over Kithairon Herodotus takes no clear 
account of operations, which may have had reference to the secondary 
passes. The memory of such movements may be dimly present in 
his mirrative, but, if so, they will rather tend to confusion, from not 
being definitely referred to their proper objectives and purposes. It 
thus remains an unresolved problem whether the operation referred 
to in c. 51 (u2/. is to be directed towards Dryoskephalai or towards 
the Plataia-Megara pass. 

(9) Absence of th« Persian cavalry. — These last two objections may 
be enlarged, or supplemented, by the observation that mere geiieralitiet 
in regard to the services of the Persian cavalry take the place of 
precise details at more than one point where such details are sorely 
needed, (a) The generalizations in cc. 40, 57 ill accord with the 
pause of eight days in c. 39, or with the supposed maintenance of the 
Greek advanced f>o»ition (on the Asopos). (1) The Persian cavalry it 
not really accounted for on the final day of battle ; it disappears from 
the scene, but its disappcirance is not explained. It cannot have 
been annihilated in the fight. 

(10) Action of Mardmiox.- -Heixxlotus involves Mardonios in an 
inexpliciible inconsequence. The Persian commander resolves (on the 
eleventh day) to cross the Asojws and do battle the next day : but, 
instead of carrying out his resolution, he marks time by an (incredible) 
manoeuvre and exchange of positions between bis wings ; though 
he has still time that same day, not merely to send a challenge to 
Pausanias, but at hist to render the advanced position of the GfMkt 
untenable, by cutting off their water-supply, and harassing than 
generally with his cavalry. 

(11) Excliange of positi<ms bettof^n the Athenians and Sparlatu." 
According to Herodotus a single exchange of positions is efib 
between the two wings of the Greek army, numbering re«pective 
11,500 hfiplites on the right, 8600 on the left, to say nothing of 
the boat* of light-armed men ! This exchange is easily and quickly 
effected in the presence of the enemy, the army being in an advanced 
and confined position, and in battle-array, upon the Asopos. How 
the centre of the Greek army (numbering 18,600 hoplites) comjiorte"! 
itself during these evolutions is not stated. On the failure of tlie 
manoeuvre to effect its supposed object it is repeated in the reverse 
direction, and the status <pio ante is restored. The story is incredible 
and absurd. Conditions of time, space, numbers, tactical Bituatioo, 
and motivation are all alike defied. The Spartans, with the halo of 
Thermopylai forming round their heads, are supposed to shrink in 
fear from facing the Persian infantrj', and to yield the post of honour 
to the Athenians, in full recognition of the heroics of Marathon 1 
Had the valiant and ambitious Tegeatai nothing to say to this arrange 
mentf Bid the obstinate and gallant Amompharetos acquieaoe 




without a protest in this surrender 7 What could ^VriBtodcmoB and 
the other bnives think of this exhibition of the white feather ? The 
atory is inconsistent as it stands, not merely with the real conditions 
and with Spartan honour, but with its own context Its philo-Athcnian 
provenience iind malice might surely have struck Herodotus himself. 
At the same time the record can hardly be a pure invention : some 
mantpuvro to excuse or justify this portentous growth of Athenian 
self-glorificHtion must be provided by any theory which undertakes 
to rationalize the story of Pliilrttii. Some evolution ujion the field of 
battle lent itself to this interpretation in Attic memories. The 
direction, in which a solution of the problem may be found, is fairly 
obvious. Doubtless the Greek army, in {Missing from one position, or 
formation, to another performed a manosuvre, or series of manceuvres, 
which Athenian vanity misrepresented a^ above. The exact nature 
and occasion of the manojuvre in question must here be reserved. 

(12) The Greek retreat. — The appearance of an argument, combined 
with a diminution of solid reiison, marks the apology ofl'ei-ed for the 
abandonment of the Asopos posiiion by the Greeks, in contrast to the 
lujcount of their original occupiition of it. The neetl of water is again 
emphasized ; but, as this extremity has ordy been created by the 
military advantages gained by the Persian, it looks like u half-hearted 
confession of a tactical defeat. The fact that other supplies were 
also wanting seems to admit that virtually the position had been 
rendered untenable by the operations of the Persian cavalry. That 
admission is doubtless the simple truth for once. Yet presently the 
refusal of Amompharetos to budge discredits the tactical and military 
reasons given, or admitted, and in themselves well adapted to account 
for the evacuation of the jMsition. Thus inconsequent does the 
method of Herodotus appear in these matters. The occurrence of 
military reasons for a military movement is not a thing to emphasize 
in view of an effective or humorous anecdote ! 

Further, be it noted that the /dan of retreat ascribed to the Greeks 
is incoherent and self -contradictory. They are compelled to evacuate 
their position ' on the Asopos ' : they determine to retire to ' the 
island ' : yet ' one half ' is to go up Kithairon, for the purpose of 
relieving a baggage-train, which is hemmed up in the mountain (by 
the Persian cavalry !) and unable to descend. ' One half ' of what f 
Of the whole army 1 Or of some portion of the army ? We are left 
in darkness. Apart from all topographical questions, these obscure 
and conflicting orders are sorely perplexing. Unless we may deal 
very freely with the situation thus presented, and with the terms in 
wliich it is presented, we shall hardly make sense of this item. 

(13) The retreat of tJte Greek ctrUre is also an ill-digested story. 
The centre holds out all day, but takes to its heels at night. It is 
ordered to retire, but its retirement is characterized as a flight. This 
flight, however, is arrested and terminated by a perfectly regular 



37S 



HERODOTUS 



bivouac. Subsequently this disorderly and routed force parte into 
two apparently compact divisions, and each attempts good and loyjil 
service. The manifest animus with which it* movements are described, 
discounts heaWly the discredit attached to it, and justifies an attempt 
to rationalize the story in relation to the actual result, that is, the 
Greek victory. 

(14) ^(ory of Anwmpharftos. — If the cowardly flight of the Greek 
centre is suspicious, the heroic insubordination of Amompharetos is 
no less out of place, inconsistent as it is with Spartan discipline, with 
ordinary Spartan tactics and warfare, and with the indications in the 
immediate context ; for, after all, Amompharetos finally does what 
he is determined not to do, he retreats in the presence of the foe. 
There are subordinate inconsequences in the story, which need not 
be unduly pressed, the rather as this problem, of all the extravagaaeet 
in the Herodotean battle-piece, admits of the simplest and most con- 
vincing solution. 

(15) Hie conduct asn'ibfui to the Athenians, who in the most fool- 
hardy fashion break their contract to retire, nnd remain in splendid 
isolation far on the left, lest the Spartans might have been playing a 
double game and bested them, is a crying absurdity. The beauty of 
it i.s thiit, the Athenians are quite rights in consequence, not indeed 
of the duplicity of Pausanias, but of the heroics of Amompbaretoa. 
In relation to both items Herodotus has abandoned, or perhaps never 
attempted, any intelligible conception of the tactical problem. No 
wonder, then, that ho has no very clear indication of the reaBOitt 
for which the Athenians, who should ex hfpothesi be retiring on the 
' island,' and apparently converging on one point with the Spartans, 
are marching away in the opposite direction, into the plain ! He has 
apparently not harmonized incoherent reports which have reAcbad 
him, but jncoherencies still admit of some sort of intelligible hannooy. 
Doubtless this story, too, covers some real mann-uvre, or episode, of 
the battle, of which it did not suit Atiienian tradition to give a very 
clear account. 

(16) A minor inconsequence is involved in the record of iI^e (Uaewit 
upon the Persian camp, where the Athenians effect the first breach, 
and the Tegeatai are the first Greeks to enter. Such a division of 
labour, or credit, Ls improbable. The men who breach a fortification 
are the first to enter through the breach ; and those who first enter 
have surely effected the breach. But this item is important not so 
much for the actual reconstniction of the true story of the battle, u 
in marking the quality of the historian's sources, and his own u» 
critical attitude in the presence of ex. parti traditions. 

(17) The comparative diisappearance of the Persian cavalry in the 
final stage of the conflict, or story, has been already noticed above . 
it remains to signalize the even more complete failure of tke Prrsum 
centre to put in an appearance at the supreme moment. The 



PLATAIA 



Atbeniaus are engaged on the Greek left with the right wing of the 
enemy, consisting of the medized Greeks ; the Spartans on tlie right 
are equally engaged with the ' Persians ' ; the Greek centre has Kr 
hypotlieii Hed beyond range of weapon, or assault : what becomes of the 
centre of the ' barbarians ' which had been so carefully di8pose<l over 
against the Greek centre, in battle-array, and comprised the Medea, 
Baktrians, Indians, and Sakaus t Did the Persian centre throw itself, 
together with the Persian left, upon the devoted Spartans? If so, 
the fact should have been specified by the historian, for other alter- 
natives are not excluded, as will appear anon. 

(18) Tlw position and roiuiud of Artabazos furnish not merely one 
criUy but a whole crop of thorny problems. The exact nature of his 
commission ; the exact composition of the force under his command ; 
his relation to Mardonios ; his actual post on the battle-field, or in the 
theatre of the campaign ; his apparent abandonment of Mardonios and 
the bulk of the army to its fate, \nthout striking a blow : one and all 
are perplexing, although not all iiif-rplicable. In a way the opposition 
and rividry between Mardonios and Artabazos is in itself one of the 
most vahi.'ible hints for the explanation of the Persian defeat ; but, if 
the conduct of Artabazos is at all correctly reported, he was a traitor 
to bis king and cause, and his reception at home is not easy to explain. 
In any case the story of his retreat, with 40,000 men (or more), 
through Phokis, Thessaly, Makedon iind Thrake, is full of absurdities. 
Considerable latitude is to be allowed in dealing with the Artabazos 
episodes. 

(19) The wndad of Alexander of Makedon might give rise to more 
than one reflexion upon the co-efiicienta of the Greek victory, if only 
the story, or its details, were acceptable. But the story is incon- 
sequential in several particulars, and its 'tendency' is all too obviously 
to justify the ways of Makedon to Helbis. Besides it« obvious moral 
the fable involves an absurdity, an inconse^pience, an improbability, 
and an omission. The nbsurdity lies in the Makedonian's warning 
the Athenians not to be surprised, when Mardonios attacks them on 
the morrow : a surprise under the circutnstances was surely out of the 
question. The inconsequence ensues when, notwithstanding the 
declared intention of Mardonios, no attack takes place. This objection 
may seem to have been anticipated in the story, for the possibility of 
a postponement is contemplated, but with the result of landing the 
iiaiTator in the improbable statement that the Persians were short of 
supplies. Finally, the interview l>etween Alexander and the anony- 
mous Athenian Strateijo'i is a very one-sidetl affair : no question, or 
reply, ia reported on their behalf. They would hardly have closed 
the interview without :in itppcal to Alexander to attest his phi! 
Hellenism on the morrow 1)y overt and decided actioit No nuob 
appeal, no such action is recorded : and the omission is further 
evidence of the purely apocryphal nature of the stor}'. Plataia is the 



374 



HERODOTUS 



APp. vra 



third occasion upon which Alexander figures as a well-wisher, or 
envoy, to the Greeks in the story of the war.' His special relations 
with the Athenians are confessed. That conimnniiations passed from 
him to them on the battlefield is not improbable. Whether their 
nature and occasion arc rightly recorded is another question. 

(20) Finally, Herodotus himself signifies an omission, which 
nevertheless remains a blot upon his recortl, and a slur upon hia 
authority. The story of the Aristcia for Plataia was unknown to him; 
something sealerl the lips of hia evangelists. As he reports the 
Aristtia for Arteniision, for Siilamis and for Mykale, the failure at 
Plataia is all the more extraordinary. Arisiriti must assuredly have 
been awarded ; and a knowledge of the award might have an important 
bearing upon our estimate of the action, and the chief heroes of the 
action. The omission in Herodotus is mado good elsewhere. PUtaia 
was indubitably a Sjiartan victory, though Herodotus' sources would 
not alkiw it. His incompetence in the presence of this aporia justifies 
a very free treatment of his testimony. 

^ 6. This round score of difficulties, or knots of difficulties, in the 
Herodotean narrative of the campaign of 479 B.C. in Boiotia might easily 
be increased ; but further instances would not afl'ect the reconstruction 
of the battle, and may hero pass gtib sttmtio. Nor are the twenty items 
in the foregoing list all of equal importance for the tactical or military 
prolilcms here to be stated and, if possildc, solved. Certain membets 
force themselves into prominence above the general level of tangled and 
incoherent logography, like tall trees outstanding in a juiiglo of brush- 
wood. Such are (1) the engagement with the cavalry in the 'first' 
position ; (2) the dispute between the Athenians and 'Tegeatai for the 
left wing in the battle-array ; (3) the reported exchange of positions 
between the Lakedaimonians and Attienians, in the position 'on the 
Asopos,' and, perhaps, (4) the communication fjom Alexander of 
Makcdon, which led to that exchange ; (5) the long immunity from 
attack enjoyo<l by the Greeks, and the ease with which their position 
was rendered untenable, when once Mardonioa took up the matter; 
(6) the strange and independent action of Artabiiios, and so forth. 
But to discuss these several items over again would be te«lioiis. 

At this stage of my argument the tactical and military questioiu 
present themselves in more generalized forms. The whole string of 
difficulties may be subsumed under two hea<ls, each group covering a 
fundamental problem. Firat {A), what positions were occupied, and 
for what periods respectively, by the Greek forces in Boiotia t \\Tiat 
events, manoen\Tes, or actions took place in those sevei'al positions, 
previous to the Htial engagement? Secondly {B), how did an army, 
which was apparently broken, woreted, and even in part fugitive, 
nevertheless extricate itself from its desperate position, and win a 
supreme victory I The first group of problems covers the action of 



§§6-- 



PLATAIA 



376 



Greeks and Persians in Boiotia down to the day of the final and 
decisive battle. The second group is concerned with the fortunes of 
that last eventful day, and with the manoeuvres of the preceding night. 
The two grotips viewed together obviously comprise the whole course 
of the campaign, so far as the scene was laid in Boiotia ; in other words, 
present the battle of Plataia with its immediate antecedents. Under 
these two heads, then, the argument, at once critical and constructive, 
may now be conducted to its natural conclusion. 

S 7. (A) Tlif jiositums occvjned mccesnrtly hij the Greek /(frees. — ^The 
uniform practice of mmieni writers on Greek history has been to 
restilve the actual movements of llie Greek forces at Plataia under 
throe heads or stages. Of these, the third has been described as the 
po.<!ition, or positions, actually occupied by the Greek forces on the 
day (the 13th) of the final struggle and victory on which the Greek 
army was apparently broken up into three, if not foui- sections, widely 
separated. The Lakedaimonians held the right or east wing on 
high ground : the Athenians were away on the left, down on the 
plain in front of Plataia ; the centre far to the rear, near the Heraion, 
to which it had incontinently retreated during the night, apparently 
divides and takes separate action — or rather, the one half advances 
to the support of the Atheniiins, with disastrous results to itself, while 
the other turned and marched up the road ' towards the Demetrion ' : 
with what purpose or with what result Herodotus omits to mention ! 

This (' third ') position, or series of positions, is conceived as de 
facto occupied by the Greeks quite contrary to the original intentions, 
plans, and orders of the commanders, in lieu of a position, marked by 
'the island,' to which the whole army, according to the plan of the 
Chiefs in Council assembled, was to fall buck. The ' island position ' 
can }m3 topographically identified with almost complete assurance, 
although rj- hypolhcsi never actually occupied. Its description, or at 
least riie intention of the commanders in regard to it, as reported by 
Herodotus, ir, however, slightly complicated by the pro^Tso that a 
part uf the forces, in falling back upon this position, was to be 
detached for special service up Kithairon. But any way, and in 
short, behind the t/n" facto ' third,' or supposed third, position rises 
an ideal fourth position, which should, so to speak, have taken its 
place, although neither Herodotus nor any of his commentators 
hitherto believes this ' fourth ' position to have been occupied by 
the Greeks at any stage in the course of their movements over the 
field. 

In front of the ' fourth ' and ' third ' positions rises a ' second ' 
position, very clearly markeil in the Herodotean narrative by the 
Asopos, Gargaphia, and the Androkrateion — a position ex htjpolfusi 
occupied by the Greek forces for twelve days. The identification of 
the locality is not gravely in doubt, but some of the modems credit 
the Greeks with a certain restlessness in this 'second' position, by 



376 



HERODOTUS 



-vpp. Tin 



which their lines are transposed fi-om side to Hide of the trough of 
Gargaphia. To this position, before the order of battle is settled, 
Herodotus transfers the punctilious dispute between Tegea and Atbent 
for precedence ; to this position, after order of battle has been 
definitely developed, he refers the incredible exchange of stations 
between the right wing and the left wing ; from this position, as his 
narrative admits, the Greeks were finally compelled by the Persian 
cavalry to beat a retreat. Kor eleven days the cavalry allows them 
to occupy this position unmolested ; then, in the course of one day, 
from the moment the assault on tlie water-supply begins, the position 
becomes untenable. I take issue again u|K)n this point. It is 
incredible that the Greeks were allowed for ten or eleven days to 
occupy this position unmolested ; it is therefore incredible that they 
continued to occupy it so long. The period which Horodotiis assigns 
to the occupation of this position (Androkrateion) must really belog 
to some otlier and presumably earlier stage in the operation 
Mardonios might leave the Greeks a day or two in possession of tfa^ 
Asopos-ndge and the water-supply behind it unmolested, in the hojte 
of their crossing the river to do him battle on ground of his own 
choosing; though, in iuiy case, lio might have used his cavalrj' to 
advantage on their rear in order to urge them across the stream ; 
the Persian, eager as he was to bring on an engagement, will nei 
have faced the Greek army, in position just beyond the Asopos, 
upwards of ten days without any hostile domonstration against it 
Probably the Greeks occupied this 'second' position barely twenty- 
four hours before they fell back to the hypothetical ' third ' positic ~ 
above described. The advance of the Greeks to the Asopoa-rid 
is a clear offer of battle to the Persian, if he is willing to crou 
river to attack them ; but it leaves their rear and their water-supply? 
as the experience of one day is more than enough to show, completely 
at the mercy of the Persian cavalry. If Mardonios will not cross the 
Asopos with his infantry to attack them, and they will not croM_ 
the Asopos to attiick him. there is no alternative left them but 
fall back upon a fresh or, it might be, a former ix>sition. 

According to the received theory, the Greeks had advanced to 
Androkrateion position from a ' first ' position, in which they 
successfully repulsed the attjicks of the Persian cavalry under MasistioB^ 
and immediately after that success. That ' first ' position must hai 
been at, or in front of, the debouchure of the main road, by whi(i 
they had come from Eleusis, where it left the mountain -pass of 
Dryoskephalai, proliably hard by the village of Erythrai. But the 
Greek forces must have como right out of the pass and mountain- 
road, not indeed before they were subject to assault from the Peraan 
cavalry, but before they could fall into line, or inlvance umuolested 
from the ' first ' position to the ' second,' or any other. Herodotus 
appears to take the Greek army direct and without pause, after tb 



repulse of the cavalry, from tho ' first ' position, at or near Erythrai, 
to the poflition marked by Gargaphia, the Androkrateion, and the 
Asopoa, generally called the ' second ' position. But he mentions 
HyaiaJ in passing as a station, or at least a landmark, upon their 
route.' Was it merely that? May not Hysiai mark a real 'position' 
in the Greek manceuvres, or at least such a development of the 'first' 
position as almost deserves to be separately envisaged and enumerated f 
Tlie Greek forces can have reached Erythrai only in marching column : 
did they put themselves in battle-array only whonas or whenafter 
they marched down to Gargaphia and the Androkrateion? At this 
point on the way, so to speak, from Erythrai to the Andiokrateion, 
Herodotus places the dispute between the Athenians and the Tegeatai 
for the occupation of the left wing : the matter is heard and decided 
by the whole Spartan army ! The Spartan army will have been in 
position somewhere. A marching column must have an order : and 
the order of tho marching column is siuely relative to the order in 
line of battle. As the various Greek contingents debouched from the 
pass of Dryoskephalai they must have t^ken up stations in a definite 
order. It is not quite clear whether tho Greeks ever occupied a 
position right tuiross the road from Dryoskephalai to Thebes, but 
they may have done so. In that case the right wing would be to 
the east of the road, close under ' the High Bastions,' and completely 
protected on the Hank from cavalry attack : but the centre and left 
would extend westwards beyond the road, and tho Athenians cannot 
have been in occupation of the left wing when they repulse<I the 
Persian horsemen. Three clearly distinct stages are marked in tlie 
narrative of Herodotus during the cavalry skirmish (tTrs-o/iuj^t'a), and 
before any question of precedence arises between Tegeatai and 
Athenians, (a) The Mcgarians are attacked by the Persian cavalry, 
and for some time sustain the assault unaided ; finally, they demand 
support, (b) The Athettians come to their assistance, and take their 
place, with better success ; although, before the fighting is done, 
(e) they had been further supported by the main body. Is there 
here anything more than a dim reminiscence of the arrival of succes- 
sive contingents of the Greek column at Erythrai, or at the north 
entrance of the chief pass across Kithairon, and of their struggle to 
emerge on to the IlyporMA In this undoubtedly 'first' position were 
the Greek forces ever definitely extended in line, or in battle-array 1 
The Atheno-Tegean rlisputo, which supervenes, implies tho contrary ; 
but we may safely continue to describe as 'the first position' of the 
Greek army the position in front of the main pass, marked by Erythrai, 
during their occupation of which some skirmishing with the cavalry 
took place, which was afterwards cUimed as a great victory for tho 
Athenians 

A deployment of the marching column in front of Erythrai, or 



378 



HERODOTUS 



APP. vm 



»Iong the Uyporra of Kithairon, to the Mrest, is next almost a military 
necessity ; and here I make bold to suggest that between the position 
marked by Erythrai on the Eleusis-Thebes road, and the positioD 
marked by the Androkratcion, Gargaphia and Asopos, the Greeks 
occupied an intermediate position, which may for the sake of con- 
venience be described as the Hysiatan position. Hysiai appears to 
have dominated the second pass, or road, from Plataia to Dryos 
kephalai, and so forth, even aa Erythrai commanded the road from 
Thebes to Dryoskophahii. This ' Hysiatan ' position would then lie, 
in truth, the 'aecontl' position of the Greek forces, and the position 
subsequently, on the Asopos-ridge, a thinl position. To go a st«p 
further : this second position may be recognized as substantially 
identical with the ideal or ' fourth ' position, marked by the AV.**, 
and possibly the Demetrion, to wit, the Plataian Demetrion. The 
position perhaps extended from the Demetrion westwards throagb 
the Nosos to the Heraion. In this ' second ' (or ' fourth ') po&ition 
the Greeks, for eight days or so, enjoyed comparative immunitj 
from the assaults of the Persian cavalry. From this position they 
descended, no doubt in Imttlc-array, to tiike up a more advaaoed 
station upon the Asopo», expecting perhaps that the Persians would 
assault them in front : to this position, or to one almost identical, 
they purposed to retreat, and, with exception of the Athenians, 
did retreat, when their advanced position upon the Asopos-ridge 
proved untenable. The comparatively lengthy tenure of this second 
position has been ' tcIe3cope<l ' in the traditions of the battle-field, 
owing partly perhaps to the absence of any stirring action meanwhile, 
parti}' to the transfer or loss of episodes, or of mere time, belonging 
to this position and stage in the operations, to the preceding, and still 
more to the siicceeding position. 

To the first ijuestion, then, above proposed, the answer here 
suggested is that the Greek forces occupied at least four positions in 
succession : I. A position at Erythrai, seized by them as they emerge 
from tlie pass, and possibly developed by the inevitable transition frum 
column to line formation. How long this position was occupied thera 
is nothing to show clearly; but if all the (rreek forces marched by 
the same route (i>y no means a probable hypothesis), it would take 
some time for an array of 100,000 men to deploy out of the pass. 
In Herodotus' narrative the cavalry action might all take place on a 
single afternoon ; but two or three days may really be covered hy 
the action of the story in this part. As long as any of the Greek 
forces remained actually on the road in front of the pass they would 
certainly be subject to the assaults and missiles of the PenUn 
cavalry ; and notwith.standing the claim advanced on behalf of the 
Athenians to a victory over the cavalry in this position, one reason 
for evacuating it may have been a desire to get on to ground leas 
ezpoeed to direct assault by the Persian moiuited men. TT. A 



position in front of Hysiai, along the high ground bolow Kithairon, 
and well above the trough of Gsrgapbia — a position in which their 
loft at least would be on or about the Nesos, if not still further 
west, while the wntro and right mtvy have extended over Kidge 2, 
as far as the motiern vilJago of Krii'lcvuH, ground that in ancient times 
may well have belonged to Hysiai. In thin position the Greeks would 
be in front of the second pas*, or loop-road from Plataia to Dryos- 
kephalai, and also and more completely cover the third pass, through 
which the difficult route to Peloponnesos went via Megara, and by 
which reinforcements were reaching them daily. To this position 
the long delay is to be referred : in this position a dispute may have 
arisen between the Athenians and Tegeatai on the point of honour, 
and no doubt the final order of advance was decided. This position 
the Greeks abandon in order to move down on to the Asopoe-ridge. 
The question arises, what induced them to aliandon this companitively 
strong and safe position for the exposed Asoposridge '( The answer 
is not far to seek. Broadly, after waiting ten days or so, there 
seemed no chance of a general Persian attack on this position, and 
the (rreeks were prepared and anxious to fight a defensive battle. 
On the Asoposridge they might fairly hope that the Persiiin infantry 
would cross the stream to attack them, oapecially if they knew, or 
suspected, the desires and necessities of Mardonios. They had ]>erhaps 
precise information and further inducement. To this point might be 
transferred the message of the Make<lonian, whatever it stands for — 
albeit Herodotus, who has carried the Greeks down to Gargaphia 
days before, inevitably associates the Alexander e]>isode with the 
Asopos position. Another inducement, too, the Greeks may have had 
to move. On the night of ' the 8th ' the Persian cavalry appeared in 
their rear, and had cut off thoii" supplies, at least by the more direct 
route. To this point finally might be referred the manoouvre which 
has been transfigured in the ])hil- Attic soiuxre into the exchange of 
positions between Spartans and Athenians. The new position to be 
occupied lay to the west and north of the position to be evacuated : 
the advance of the Greek forces *ti fcheltm may have given rise to 
observations which ignorance and partiality afterwards converted 
into the alwurd story preserved by Henxlotus. The reference of the 
story to manoeuvres in this position explains the corresponding 
movements recorded of the Persian forces, which would not have 
taken place merely in response to the Greek development from 
the position at Erythrai to the position at Hysiai. III. The position 
marked in Herodotus by the Anrlrokrateion with Gargaphia (near 
the Spartans) and the Asopos (near the Athenians) becomes by this 
hypothesis the third distinct position occupied by the Greek forces 
on the great field of Plataia, but their oceuimtion of this position 
is reduced in duration from riays to hours. The position was an 
exposed and an isolated one : no competent observer upon the Greek 



380 



HEROIX)TUS 



APP. vm 



side can have had any illusions on the subject. Even if the PeniAn 
cavalry bad not hustled the Greeks ofl* the main road oa to th« 
Jhjporta, and pressed them forward down the Hifjwrta on to the 
Asopos-bank, yet mounted men could obviously ride round and round 
the new position at pleasure. The success of the Greek advance to 
the new position depended upon its inducing the Persian infantry 
to deliver an attack. If that were assured, the position was not ill- 
chosen. The Persian cavalry could hardly charge up the hillsidec 
the Greeks on the top could present an unbroken front to every 
quarter : if once the Asiatic infantry came within spear's length, 
Thermopylai and Marathon had taught the Greeks their own im- 
measurable superiority. But in this advanced position, on the Asopos- 
ridge, the LJreeks were cut off from their base, bereft of supplies, 
and unable even to secure a permanent access to water. The position 
coulil nut possibly be maintained for long under such circumstaocei. 
If Mardonios still would not &tt;ick ihem, they must either cross the 
river or make goo<l their retreat. 

These considerations dispose of the long delays, the exchange of 
positions, and other fabulous or romantic items in the Herodotean 
account of events in this position. There is no need to devise 
modifications and raovementB of the troops, except to the rear, nor 
is there room for such manoeuvres on the groimd. The chivalroiu 
challenge of Mardonios is not quite incredible, but is perhaps say^ex- 
tiuous. The message of Alexander can be better used in the earlier 
situation. The 8up]»ased exchange of posts between the Spartans and 
Athenians has been alr&uly explained and utilized. But the Grreek 
council of war, the last, though surely not the only one, may well 
have met and deliberated on the alternatives open to the Greeks — 
advance across the Asopos to the atuick, a desperate venture with 
the Persian cavalry about, or retreat to ' the Island,' that is, to their 
previous (or 'second'^ position, or somewhere thereby. 'A council 
of war never fights' — uidess, indeed, the deliberations in this case 
resulted iu a plan which must be inferred, not from the ezproB 
report, but from the event and results. 

J^ 8. {B) At this point the argument piisses naturally to the second 
problem above fonnulated : viz. how did the Greek army, on the 
final day of battle, when apparently broken into at least three different 
units, in retreat, if not partially already in flight, nevertheless ndiy, 
hold its own, convert retreat into advance, and finally put the pursuing 
host in turn to flight, snatching victory out of the very 'jaws of 
death ' 1 Closely connected with this inquiry is the determination of 
the exact position, or positions, occupied by the Greek tactical unita, 
in the final engagement, and the manoeuvres by which they came W 
occupy those positions (regarded brotidly) after their evacuation of the 
Asopos- ridge : in other words, IV. what was the 'fourth' position 
occupied by the Greeks on the held of Plataia, in which they aotualljr 



^ 



gave Iwttle and won the victory ? It is but rarely, and undor the direct 
inspiration of a great captain's genius, that a broken and scattering 
army can recover moral, and convert defeat into victory.' Are we to 
credit Pausanias with the personality of Alexander, of Caesar, or even 
of Frederick the Great? Or are we to suapect the fideh'ty and 
coherence of the narrative, boldly challenge the character of the 
evidences, and reconstruct the probable course of events in the light 
of the result, controlled by our knowledge of the ground, and con- 
ditioned by psychological and miliUtry possibilities f The story, as it 
sUiuds, is too fragmentary, incoherent, and improbable to be accepted. 
There is no alternative I nit to abandon all ert'ort to make the Greek 
victory intelligible, or else to have recourse to Sdch-Krili/:., ' real ' con- 
siderations, a constructive criticism, or a critical reconstruction of the 
.story. But to operate without regard to traditio7i were idle. Every 
auch reconatmctive attempt will be rightly judged as more or less 
saccasflful in i)roportion as it, so to speak, absorbs a greater or smaller 
proportion of the traditional doposit. The present essay claims to 
advance the discussion by furnishing an intelligible theory of the 
battle conformable to the material conditions, while leaviuj; no con- 
dderable item in the traditional .story, or stories, uiumsimilatod, or 
unexplained. 

On the morning of the 1 3th the advanced position on the Asopos- 
ridge, occupied on the previous day by the Greeks, was seen to be 
empty. The national army had fallen back upon a new hne of 
defence. This line has now to be discovere«l, or reconstructed. The 
traditions may here be accepted as proving that the line actually 
occupied by the confederate forces on the morning of the 13 th was a 
long and a broken one. The Greek right was in one place : the Greek 
centre was in another place : the Greek left wjis in a third place, all 
three separated by intervals. The traditions imply that the actual 
positions occupied were in no single case the positions which the 
Greek divisions had Ijeen intended and commanded to occupy : some 
one, it seems to be admitted, had blundered. Nevertheless, |>erfect 
order appears to prevail. The three divisions are in communication 
with each other, if not in actual touch. What, then, was the exact 
emplacement of the battle-lines I How far did it really differ from 
the intention of the commanders? 

The several positions of the Greek divisions must obviously be 
considered serialm. (a) The precise jKJsition of the Spartans and 
Tegeatai on the right is unfortunately obscured by th(' ambiguities of 
the Herodotean nomenclature. Where was the Argiopion ? SVhich of 
all the streams coming down from Kithairon bare the name Moloeis T 
Which of the various Demctria on the battle-field was included at 
this point in the Spartan lines ? The Island has been given as the 
proper destination of the forces. The story is of Athenian provenience 

' /•«« the word* ofThemistoklc*. 8. 109. 



882 



HERODOTUS 



ATr.vvi 



The Island may have marked the position for Athenian purposes, bat 
the whole of the Greek forces assuredly were not to be cooped up 
in the laland. The Island la described as ten stades distant from 
Uargapbia. Pausanias is expressly recorded to have retired ten stadee 
and then halted. He did not reach the Island. But the presiimptioD 
is that he reached his appointed station. If the Moloeis be identi£ed 
with O. I or with A. 5, the Dometrion in this passage with the Plataian 
Demetrion, and the Argiopius locus with Ridge 2, we obtain a position 
for the Greek right which fully accords with the Island as the centre, 
or possibly the left, of the new (or fourth) Greek position. 

(/y) The position of the forces which had formed the Greek centre 
is more clearly defined in the narrative : they are now las^ered at the 
Heraion, in front of the city of Phitaia. This |x>sition, though liardlj 
' twenty stades ' flistant from Gargaphia, was perhaps more nearly 
that distance fiom the post previously occupied by them upon the 
Asopos ridge. Their halt and orderly occupation of the new ground, 
as well as their subsequent action and advance, entirely disprove the 
transparently malicious tradition which represents their retirement as 
a flight But, in the new position they appear to be upon the extreme 
loft of the Greek line, and so to be occupying a post held by the 
Athenians in the earlier formations. The Greek centre has in fact 
become the left wing, and a serious gap has arisen between the two 
wings, right and left. This gap might have been filled by the inter- 
position of the Athenians; and the question presents itself: whether 
tliis very raanieuvre was not intended all along and ordered, though 
delayed, and only very tardily and imperfectly carried out t Indica 
tions in two directions are not wanting to support this suggestion. 
(1) The Athenians are in direct tommunication with Pausaiuaa daring 
the night of the 12th ; they are urged and summoned by him, on the 
morning of the 13th, to close up ; finally, they actually take a pai-t, or 
claim to have taken a [>art, with the Tegeatai and Spartans in the 
assault on the fortified ciinip. This supposition also puts some sense 
into the curious claim of the Athenians to be specially qualified to face 
the Persian levies : standing in the centre they might have been 
opposed to the Modes, Baktrians, Indians, and Sakans. Moreover, if 
the Greeks, lis is probable, had reason to believe that their medixed 
countrymen on the Persian right would take very little part in the 
morrow's battle, there might have been a good reason the more for an 
exchange of posts between the left wing and the centre in the battle- 
array. Bub, if so, Athenian tradition ignored the assignment of the 
left wing (in the fourth position) to the Megaro-Peloponnesian con- 
tingents, and explained the ultimate junction of Athenians with the 
right wing by a clumsy fiction. (2) Conversely, the retirement of the 
Greek centre ujKin Plataia accords with the special service probably 
assigned to it, or rather to one of its two divisions, of convoying, or 
extricating, the baggage-train from its embarrassments in Kithairon — 



especially if the iMggikge-tTaiu w&a making its way over the mountain 
by the Megaro-Plataian patb. Tlie ' half tbaiged with this seirice in 
c. 51 was not half the whole forces, but only half the centre, i.e. one 
of its two subdivisions — a point jilainly not understood by Herodotus. 

(c) In short, the position and the conduct of the Athenians on the 
Qioriiing of the last battle in Boiuliu are most diflicult to define and 
to defend — and the Athenian.s have had the Killing of the story ! The 
traditions at this point have plainly some miacarriage, or failure, on 
the part of the Athenians to justify ; the apology takes the form of 
a charge of cowardly desertion against the centre, and of notorious 
duplicity against the Spartans on the right wing. But what has really 
happened ? The Greek centre has gone back to its appointed quarters 
at Plataia, and the right wing has fallen back in perfect order to its 
new position on the Island, or rather to the east of the Island, on to 
the Argiopion and the Plataian Dcmetnon ; the Athenians, who should 
have (illod in the gap by falling back on the Island, have failed to 
carry out their part of the pUin. Better excuses may perhaps be 
suggested for this failure than the Herodotean apology, which consists 
in abuse of the plaintiff's uttoniey ! In the first ])lace, the manteuvre 
wiis a more complicated one than a simple retirement. It would be 
necessary to allow the two great divisions of the centre to clear out to 
th6 south-west before the Athenians could move across their track to 
the south-cast. Again, from the Androkratcion to the Island was 
considerably further than the 'ten stades' to be traversed by the 
Spartans. Finally, the Athenians may have been expected to cover 
the movement of the centre, and a rearguard of Athenians that of 
the main bofly. performing a service corresponding to that performed 
on the right by Amompharetos. This rearguard m.ay have become 
too deeply engaged, and so arrested the Athenians' movement, or even 
compelled them to return on their steps do^^oihill. Thus continuity 
was never, perhaps, completely established in the new position between 
the wings and the centre, and it was possible for spectators, or even 
combatants, to regard the whole m&noeuvTe as a failure, and the Greek 
army, on the morning of battle, as a 'broken ' force. 

How then did a victory for the Greeks result t For one thing, 
the Greek army, though not all fully ensconced in the position intended, 
HTMs not in any part or sense a beaten army, as the sequel proved. 
On the west, where the situation was more serioiw, the quondam centre, 
or rather one of its two divisions, advanced gallantly down from 
Plataia to cover the Athenian left, and enabled Aristeides to extricate 
his men from a serious embarrassment. On the right, where the 
Spartans were drawn up in perfect order, awaiting the foe, the issue 
was never in aerioua doubt. The performances of the Persian cavalry 
on this part of the field can hardly be genuine : the Spartans could 
never have advanced to attack the Persian infantry if the Persian 
cavalry had been on their flaak. Some other distraction must be 



384 



HERODOTUS 



APT. vm 



provided for the mounted men that morning : they were away on the 
Dryoskephalai road, or engaged with the ' Korinthians and Phleijisians," 
while the Spartans were free to deal with the flower of the Persian 
infantry alone. Finally, no doubt the cavalry was recalled and em- 
ployed to screen the Persian retreat The course of this engagement 
is tolerably clear. It comprises foui- scenea 

(i. ) The Persians crossed the iV^opos, and advanced up the slopes of 
the Hypirrfa, then halted within bow-shot of the Spartans, fixed their 
wicker shields in the ground, and from behind their frail ramptirt 
discharged showers of arrows upon the Greek ranks. For a while the 
Spartans sat unmoved under their shields beneath these missiles, until 
their commander judge*! the moment opportune — a lidl in the bail of 
weapons or what not — and at a word tlie ranks arose and chai^ged, 
quickly coverins; the fifty yards between. Then was seen the majesty 
with which the Spartan hoplites fought, (ii.) The Persian gerrh* 
hartliy stayed the advance of these heavy warriors : a close hand-to- 
hand Imttle ensued, and doubtless, as at Thermopylai, they sworded 
the strangers in shoals. The Persians broke and fled down the hill, 
and along the little stream-valleys, to the Asopos. (iii.) Where the 
hills again rose, hard by the former station of the Spartans, above tb« 
trough of Gargaphia, a fresh stand, a rally, was attempted : there 
Mardonios fell, and ^vith him disappeared the last hope of a Persian 
success, (iv.) Large numbers of the fugitives took refuge in the camp, 
and here the Athenians ut last come into touch with the Greek right, 
and bear a hand in the butchery within. 

The ruiti of Persian hopes on the right, and the timely support of 
the Megaro-Phloiasian division, had securo<l for the Athenians an easier 
victory on the left. Even Boiotians hardly thought of pushing their 
advantage in that <|uarter when they knew the Peraian cause already 
lost And the Boiotians appnrently alone of mcdized Greeks had 
made any serious etfort, in this last battle on the king's behalf. The 
rest of the Greek allies, if they went into the battle at all, of a surety 
broke and fled, so soon as they were ware of the Persian disaster on 
their left. Doubtless the Athenians owed Alexander of Makedon a 
deep debt of gratitude for his action, or his inaction, on that daj.i 
The Athenians had the telling of the story, and they repaid the! 
Makedonian king after their kind. But the supreme cause of disaster] 
on the Persian side was surely the misconduct of Artabazos. Had 
Artabazos thrust his cvrps d'arvUe into the gap left in the centre of 
the Greek line by the Athenian miscarriage, what might he not ban 
effected t The treachery of Artabazos may explain why nothing is 
heard of the Persian centre during the actual fray. If he commanded 
the centre ho may have withdrawn it, or never allowed it to croei 
Asopos. Certaiidy he failed to support Mardonios at the critical 
moment, as he failed to avenge him. Upon Artabazos apparently 
devolved the chief command on the death of Mardonios. Artabaaoe 



»S-9 



PLATAIA 



contented himself with using the cavalry to cover the retreat of his 
men, who, if Herodotus is to be trusted in the matter, had not struck 
one single blow in the action. HorodotuB betrays no consciousness of 
r,ho iippiilling significance of tho criities imputed to Artabazos. What- 
ever the jealousies and divisions upon the side of the confederate 
Urneks, they sink into insignidc-iuce beside the rivalries, the cross 
purposes, the intrigues in the camp of the Persian. The serried ranks 
of the Barbarians on the left bank of Asopos concealed far deeper 
divisions and causes of defeat than the tripartite, or quadripartite, 
Ureok army. On the 6eM of Plataia the Greeks were as never again 
united, and animated by a lofty loyalty to the common cause. Plataia 
was in every way the grandest, fairest, moat decisive victory of Hellas. 
The jealousies and malignities which appear on the Greek side, in the 
Uerodotean story of the battle, are largely the product of afterthought 
and reflexion, and belong to a time when the spoils were divided, the 
prizes awarded, the meed of valour assigned. What remained was 
the struggle for fame with posterity. The story, drawn, as it happens, 
mainly from Athenian, or phil-Athenian sources at a later time, wlion 
local interests have ignored and obscured the real courses and con- 
nexions of events, not merely has failed to reproduce the unity of 
plan underlying the action, but ha^ grossly exaggerated a tactical 
miscarriage, on the morning of the battle. For that miscarriage the 
Athenians were primarily responsible. It made little or no difference 
in the event, but it mi^ht have completely mined the Greek cause. 
If the centre of the Greek army disappeared for a time, and the 
Athenians failed to replace it, the Persian centre never put in an 
appearance at all, Tlio superb steadiness of the Spartans, the gallant 
efforts of the quondam centre, one half of which advanced to cover 
the Spartans, while the other went down to extricate the Athenians 
from their predicament, and it may be a mighty effort by the Athenians 
themselves, more than made good the threatened disaster. Still, 
there had been a inaucaise ipuirl d'heure for which the Athenians were 
re3pon8ibl& It was not altogether a pleasant memory. When 
reflexion supervened on action, frank criticisms were no doubt forth- 
coming, mutual reproaches were soon heard, and a whole crop of 
recriminations, misunderstandings, and selt'-contradictory apologetics 
was the inevitable result. Under this flood of dialectic the simple 
narrative was lost, ami it may even be suspected that Greek traditions, 
and even Athenian legends, did not more but less than justice to the 
heroes of Plataia. A further advance in the hypothetical reconstruc- 
tion of the story may be admissible. 

§ 9. If the plans and actions of the Greeks were to be credited 
with the confusion and incoherence with which they are invested in 
the narrative of Herodotus, tlie victory would appear a stroke of luck, 
a gift of chance, or at best the result of errors and treachery on the 
Persian aide, added, perhaps, to the heroism of the Spartan spearmen. 

VOL. II 



W9 



HEKODOTUS 



AFF. vni 



But there are not wanting general consiilerationE to suggest a rationale 
of the victory more flatteiing to the victors, and many particular hints, 
or incongruities, in the narrative fortify those general conaiderationB. 
Strange paradox, that a broken and retreating army should rally and 
overwhelm its victorious pursuers ! The story attrilmtes a definite 
plan to the Greek retreat, though it assumes that plan to have been 
frustrated. The question arises whether the plan is fully revealed, or 
apprehended, in the traditions. The fact abides that the Greeks 
fought a winning game upon ground of their own choosing. Plainly 
the great ijueation throughout the operations in Boiotia was, which 
army should cross the Asopos, manifestly to its own disadvantage. 
In the end Mardonios, not Patisanias, accepted that disadvantage 
Presumably the Persian wjis outwitted and out-manceuvred. The 
Greeks were acting throughout on inner lines, and never really lost 
their concentration. The description of the final day's battle seems to 
imply that there was a huge gap in the centre of the Greek front ; but 
the enemy does not succeed in piercing this gap, or iti&erting himaelf 
between the Greek right and left. If any such gap really existed, wu 
it only for a time, and during a perio<l, when the Persian commander 
could not avail himself of the opportunity 1 Were not the tactics of 
Marathon reproduced on the field of Plataia ? Was an artificial und 
temporary weakness in the centre of the Gieek line, or the appearanct 
thereof, part of the inducement offered Mardonios to draw him, m 
fancied pursuit, across the fatal river T However that may be, the 
dominant conclusion of the preceding argument comes to this : the 
Greeks at Plataia fought out the decisive issue on their own side of 
the stream, on ground of their own choosing, on the most advantageous 
terrain in the whole possible area of conflict, and fought practically 
upon their own terms. At the psychological moment theii- passive re- 
sistance, their purely defensive attitude, is exchanged for the offensive, 
a forward charge which sweeps the lighter Persian infantry befo 
them down the hill and over the Asopos, in a confusion doubly 
founded by the meeting of fugitives and fresh men advancing to 
fray. The charge at Marathon is not more indubitable than the 
Spartan advance at Platsiia. The superior tactics on the Greek aide 
were furthered by other forces which the narrative of Herodotus 
explicitly recognizes — an immense superiority of weapons, once fighting 
came to close quarters, superior intelligence, superior disciplme, and 
(we may add) the better cause. The official superiority of numbers 
on the Persian side has already been heavily discounted ; and, even if 
still within limits allowed, numbers, under such conditions, are but 
sheep led to the slaughter. But the superiority in tactics, discipline, 
and arms upon the Greek side was undoubtedly seconded to an in- 
definite extent by desertion, treachery, misgiving, and other fatalities, 
active and ]>assive, on the Persian side, in themselves enough to 
account for the result. The victory of Plataui is not hard to under- 



FLATAIA 



stand : in reality it was all along a foregone coaclusion, if the Greeks 
could but engage the Persian infantry at close quarters, and they knew 
it ! Evidence of this knowledge may be found in the purely 
naturalistic tone of the traditions of Plataia. The battle of Marathon 
({uickly passed into a legend palpitating with divine and heroic 
incidents : Salamis and little Mykale had their apparitions, telepathies, 
theologies ; but on the field of Plataia Herodotus is hard put to it to 
provide an epiphany, a special providence, a supematuralism, a curiosity. 
Spartan victories were more merely mundane and prosaic than Athentuti ! 
The story of Plataia is moralized in a series of anecdotes which strike 
a purely human tiote.^ There is thus a good deid to be said for the 
view that the victory of the Greeks at Plataia was largely the result 
of intelligent strategy and tactics ; not merely the better cause and 
the better army, but also the better leading won the day. The 
question remains : to whom in particular the credit of this leading 
belongs t Prima fade Pausaiiias is the hero of the uimpaign. 
Pausani&s is commander-in-chief, to all appearances -.^ Fausatuas himself 
afterwards took credit for the victory : ^ Herodotus appears to allow 
his claim.* But Herodotus is uncritical ; and, as usual, there are 
indications in his narrative which contntvene its dominant or express 
verdict. The Spartans cancelled the liegont's assumptions, without, 
however, acknowledging the proper author of the victory.^ The 
supreme position of Pausiinia-s at Plataia is titular, hereditary, 
oiBcial : the intellectual guidance might have to be sought elsewhere. 
It was indeed wonderful, if the young and untried liegent, placed in 
command of the largest Greek army which ever operated on (ireek 
soil, proved himself a strategist and tsictician worthy of mention 
beside the best. Strange that the jealous traditions, which have 
furnished Themistokies with a mentor in Mnesiphilos at Salamis, and 
robbed Kallimachos to pay Miltiades at Marathon, make so little uf 
the Horaklcid captain, Euryanax, associated with Pausauias in the 
supreme comnvand. iSucb an arrangement was a not infrequent 
Spartan device for reinforcing or controlling the probable shortcomings 
of a youthful commander placed by conservative custom in a position 
which was likely to prove too much for him. Had we merely to 
choose between the probable merits of Pausanias and Euryanax, we 
might be sorely tempted to invest the elder Herakleid with the laurels 
of Plataia ; nor would the discreet and ungenerous silence of Sparta 
bo difficult to explain, even if th(< disiippearance of Euryanax from the 
scene were to suggest a domestic ti-agedy. But the transcendent 
abilities of Euryanax, the son of Dorieus, are after all an unknown 
quantity, even if his association in the supreme command is pro tanto 
in his favour. Athenians would perhaps have succeeded, if left to 



• Hdt 0. 78-82. 9 9. 10. 

» Thucyd. 1. 132. 2. 



aiur riip iituh tintr Hnvropiiit 6 KXfO/t- 
fipirov roll ' AmfartplSrv. 

' Thucyd. 1. 132. 3. 



S88 



HERODOTUS 



AJP. VIII 



themselves, in resolving the victory at Plataia into a soldiers' battle; 
or have called the supernatural into manifest operation ; or, perhaps, 
have allowed some credit to the collective counsels of the Greek oom 
manders. But a council of war at best endorses the plan which some 
captain of real ability submits to it. Wjis Aristeides, then, such a 
strategist, or so apt in the handling of large masses of men ? The 
Athenian had, indeed, the advantage of experience, eleven years before^ 
in the Marathonian campaign, and traditions of the Ionian revolt may 
have left their military lesson on Athenian minds ; but, if we look 
fairly round Hellas at this moment, we are almost bound to conclude 
tliat, of known men, there were only two qualified by ability, force, 
and character to devise and push through the great plan, strategic and 
tactical, which underlies the campaigns of 479 I5.c., and culminates on 
the field of Plataia. Those two men were Gelon and Themistoklee. 
The former is in the particidar case hors dt comUil ; while Tfacmistokles 
in the records is tmly conspicuous by his absence. Is it a very rasb 
hypothesis, that will see in Themistoklcs at least the intellectiml author 
of the plans, both naval and military, jmrsucd by the Greek forces in 
479 B.C. ? To some extent those plans may have been laid before the 
Spartans in the winter of 480-479, and Theinistokles may perhaps have 
assisted at their realizsitioa at Plataia in the ensuing summer. What 
other suggestion so well explains the high quality inherent in the 
strategy and tactics of the Greeks on that field 7 The Boiotian or 
Asianic sources available for Herodottis would not have known the 
authorship, or been concerned to recognize the quality of those plans : 
the native sources, whether Spartan or Athenian, would deliberately 
have ignored the claim of Themistokles. The recovered plan speaks 
for itself and for him : if there was any such masterly lead, who else 
was as well qualified as be to give it 7^ 

§ 10. To reaume the whole story in brief. The battle of Salamia 
had not completely decided the fate of fJroeco and its invaders. The 
Persians were still in possession of Thnikc, Makedon, Thessaly, and 
central Greece north of Kithairoti. It was thoroughly understood, at 
least in Athen.s, that a great elTort by land would be necessary to 
secure the complete victory of the patriotic cause. Even the 
Peloponnesiuns and Sparta could not acquiesce in the permanent 
medism of all continental Greece beyond the lathmos, for such a 
situation would be a permanent danger to their own independence. 
A definite plan of campaign wiis concerted, during the winter, for the 
defence and liberation of Greece. The fleet had already performed 
its part at Salamis ; there was nothing sen'ous to apprehend from over 
the sea. Even if at Sparta, or elsewliere, it was suggested that the 
mission of the fleet to Asia or the Hellespont might have the desired 
effect, the inconclusiveness of such a policy by itself cannot have been 

' The formula for tba tai^tios of Plataia (and Marathon) ia poteutially givan ia 
the words of Themiatocles 8. 100. 8. 



PLATAIA 



overlooked. The fleet might injure the Greek subjects of the Persian 
in Asia, hut could never penetrate sufliciently into the mainland to 
ensure a decisive result. In any case the clear determination of 
Athens in the matter put such a plan out of court. The fleet was 
reduced to dimensions sufficient for purely defensive purposes, and 
sufHcioiit, as it aftem'ards proved, to second the operations on land in 
Europe by a bold demonstration upon the Asiatic coasts ; more, or 
even so much, was hardly expected of it. 

The proper field of kittlb was deliberately forechosen by the 
Uruek commanders. The modism of Boiotia made the reoccupation 
of Thermopylai impossible, even if such a step could otherwise have 
commandecl approval. The northern slopes of Kithairon presented 
the fairest field from the Greek point of view. The Persian cavalry 
might there he .safely dolied ; and, if only a general engagement with 
the Barbarian foot-soldiers could bo brought on, the Greeks counted, 
beforehand on a victory. Attica ha«l bt;en invaded and devasUitcd 
once ; but there was no reason why the enemy should pass Kithairon 
a second tim& 

But, to secure such result£, ii was necessary that the Spartans 
and their Peloponnesian allies should cross the Isthmos in full force ; 
and such u movement Sjiarta never dared undertake unless seoure on 
three points of constant anxiety : the quiescence of her vast serf- 
population, the loyalty of her allies and the neutral cities, iuul, above 
all, the neutrality of her secular foe and rival Argoa. Mardonios bad 
not been idle during the winter. Not merely had bis emissaries 
securecl the fidelity of the Boiotian cities, and tempted the fears or 
the ambition of Athens, but had oven visited some of the Pelopon- 
nesian cities, and assured him of the ;ictive sympathies at legist of 
Argos. The Spartans devised employment for the Helots which 
relieved the state of the most intimate danger : the response to its 
levy on the Peloponnesian cities convinced it that no danger was to 
bo expected from the side of Arkadia, or Elis, or Achaia; but the 
attitude of Argos was to say the least ambiguous, and might excuse 
some delay in Siiarta's advance. Sparta must finally have had such 
assurances from Argos as satisfied her : thoy were due, perhaps, in 
part to the mediation of Athens, Tcgea, and other of the loyalist cities. 

The delay had cost Athens dearly, and was afterwards regarded 
there as a case of Spartan perfidy. Manlouioe, when repeated over- 
tures in Athens had proved unavailing, reinvaded Attica, and wreaked 
a final vengeance on the most obstinate foe of Persia. From Salamis 
the Athenians, behind the securer rampart of their ' wooden walls,' 
beheld their homes and temples a second time in flames. Was not the 
threat of 'medisra' — it Themistokles would bo capable of that — required 
lo put an end to Spartan hcsitiition t The report of the Peloponnesian 
advance into Megara convinced Mardonios that the Greek forces were 
likely to offer him Itattle ; and he retired with his light column and 



)TUS 



AFP. TW 



cavalry — all that had re-ftntered Attica for good strategic reasons 
into Boiotia to his Ljwe and muin forces. Thus it came about th;it 
the Greeks too crossed Kithairoii, weeks later than had been originally 
intended, and at a time when bolder leading from the Peloponnesoc 
might have scored an advantage south of Kithairon. But, if the great 
bulk of the Persian forces had not entered Attica at all, if Mardonioe' 
force in Attica consisted mainly of mounted men, Pausaniaa tod 
Euryanax may have been well enough advised. 

Once assured of the evacuation of Attica, of the formation of a 
base and fortified camp on the Asopos, the Greeks abandon their 
hesitation. The bulk of the Peloponnesian forces were joined by tie 
Athenians at Eleusis ; and the column advanced up the pass by 
Eleutherai to cross the mountain-range, a part of the forces making 
its way, perhaps, by more direct but difficiilt routes. The army, all 
told, will have numbered some thirty-five to fortj' thousand hoplitei, 
%vith an equal number of hypt\spists, attendants, and light-amied troopt. 
Not less than two days' march separated Eleusis from Erythrai. 

The head of the Greek column on emerging from the pass wm 
attacked and harassed by .swarms of Persian cavalry, which charged 
freely up the main road leading from Thebes to Dryoskephalai. By 
degrees, however, the Megarians, who must have headed the colunni. 
or occupied the sbition athwart the road, supported first by the 
Athenians, and subsequently by the rest of the force, made good their 
occupation of Erythrai, or the Erythraian po.sition. Whether the 
Greek army was ever formed definitely in order of battle in this 
position is doubtful ; but the place where actual contact with the 
enemy was first obtained, and at least a skirmish with the cavalry 
ensued, may conveniently, and in strict conformity with the Herodotean 
account, be designate*! as ' the first position.' The Athenians claimed, 
not wholly without justice, special credit for service in this position : 
probably their archers had most to say to the retirement of the 
Persian cavalry ; but the frontal attack on the head of a single Greek 
column cnidd hardly have been expected to lead to definite reettlu, 
ami was perhaps premature. 

A development of this position, or rather a distinct move to the 
west, appears to have been made as soon as possible. This movement 
brought the Greeks on to Hysiatan and Plataian territory, and in 
front of the roads from Plataia to Dryoskephalai and from Phitaia to 
Megara. Perhaps the whole ami}- first congregated iii this place, the 
column which hml come by Erythrai hero joining forces, which had 
arrived by the other passes. In this position, which must now be 
described as ' the second position,' the Greeks doubtless occupied a 
definite lino and order of battle. The Athenians and Plataians on 
the left were probably in Plataian territory, and may even have been 
posted about the Horaion. The ' Island ' may have been occupied by 
the centre, while the Lakedaimonians and Tegeatai on the right held 



the ridge or ridges of the Hyporea in front of the Plataia-Dryoskephalai 
pass, probably not far from the Flataian Deinetrion, and even jierhaps 
on tho Argiopioa, and beside the river Moloeis. The right wing of 
the Greeks would here be in front of Hysiai, or on Hysiatan territory. 
In this poiiition the forces remained for eight days or so, until a 
variety of circumstJinces urged them to advance down to a more 
exposed station. Their chief tactical purpose was to offer battle at 
closer quarters, and to induce Mardonioa to cross the Asopos \rith his 
infantry ; but tliey may also have had assurances of co-openition, or 
at leaat of a benevolent neutrality, from the mass of the medised 
Greeks ; they may have known something of the dissensions at 
Persian headquarters ; they may have been sufl'ering from the 
occupation of Dryoskephalai by the Persian cavalry ; they may even 
have hiul assurances that the Persians would cross the river to 
atuick them in the new position. They therefore resolved to 
advance. 

'The thinl position ' occupied by the Greek troops was about a 
mile and a quarter in front of the second, and must probably have 
been occupied under cover of night. It lay between the Asopos and 
the well-heads covered bj' the name Gargaphia, and is more precisely 
marked by the Audrokrateion, i.e. the church of St. John. Perhaps 
an outpost, or the extreme right, held the hill now occupied by the 
church of St. Demetrion, then the site of the Hysiatfin temple of 
Eleusinian Demeter. A better water-supply is not tho motive bv 
which to explain the advance of the Greeks to this position ; but a 
water-supply was no doubt es.sential. They looked to be attacked 
forthwith by tho Persians : that the Persian operations against them 
in this position werc^ still confined to cavaliy skirmishing wjis a dis- 
appointment, and involved a miscarriage of their plans. As the 
cavalry could completely ride round this position, the Greeks were 
not only cut ofT from the water, but from all supplies, save what 
they had brought with them, .\8 they were determined not to cross 
the Asopos — a proceeding which would have led to their complete 
discomfiture by the cavalry — no course was open but to retire, not 
perha^M without the hope that the Persian would at last follow them. 

This hope was realized. Perhaps the Greek commanders bad 
again at this point express assurances, upon which they relied. At 
any rate they determined to retire, under cover of night, to the 
position, Ilysiai-Island Plataia, in which they had previously offered 
Imttle. But a retirement in presence of the enemy is a more ticklish 
and complicated movement than an luivanco. Forces were detached 
to cover the retreat ; also apparently in the new order of battle the 
Athenians and tho centre were to change phices, so that the Athenians 
should come into direct touch with the Spartans, and be able to 
engage the Barbarian centre. Moreover, one of the two divisions of 
the Greek centre was to move further back up Kithairon, apparently 



S98 



HERODOTUS 



for the purpose of holding the Plataia-Dryoskephalai ptuss against » 
poasible attack of the Persian cavalry, or else to convoy the suppUea 
en rouU from Poloponnesos. But something went wrong with theae 
elaborate dispositions, and for that miscarriage the Athenians, if any, 
were to blame. The Spartans plainly carried out their instructions 
exactly ; tliey retired ten stiides, on to the Moloeis and the Argiopion, 
and were there rejoined by thoir rearguard, under Amompharetoc 
Meanwhile the centre likewise had cairied out its instructions : one 
of its two divisions was already posted, ere day broke, in front of the 
Heraion <at Plataia, white the other had moved right up the pass, to 
cover the rear of the whole position. Only the Athenians had failed 
to make good their retreat, and were down on the plain when they 
ought to have been up on the Island. In that position they were 
exposed to the attack of the Thebans, who perhaps again had been 
the first to ]>erceive the alteration in the Greek positions, and alooe 
of the medized allies had their heart in the work. Fortunately for 
the Athenians, the Makedonians, the Thcssalians, and others took httle 
or no hand in the fray ; fortunately, too, the <livi9ion of the Greek 
centre {kostod at the Heraion, observing the situation, advanced quickly 
to the support of the Athenians, diverted the brunt of the Boiotian 
attack on to themselves, and thus extricated Aristeides from a very 
awkward situation. Meanwhile the battle on the riglit had been 
won by the Spartans ; and the Persian host was already in rout, its 
centre having apparently marched off the field without striking a 
blow. 

§ 11. The chief points in which this representation of the battle 
differs from any hitherto propounded are the following : — 

(i.) The recognition of the four positions occupied in succeadon 
by the Greek army. ^^J 

(ii.) The identification of the second with the fourth of tJi(l^^| 
positions (eubstanti-illy). 

(iii.) The transfer of the delay of eight, or twelve days, from tb« 
third (AsojKJs) to the second (Nesos- Argiopion) position, together with 
the suggestion that the estinmte of days covors the whole period of 
the operations in Boiotia. 

(iv.) The observation that the Greeks at Erythrai were in column, 
and the suggestion that the fighting at that point was with the head 
of the column. 

(v.) The recognition that on the final day, the Spartans and thf 
two divisions of the Greek centre had carried out accurately and fully 
their parts in the general plan of operations. 

(vi.) The recognition that the Athenians alone (whose stories 
Herodotus has followed) failed to execute the orders and compact: 
a failure fortunately rendered practically innocuous by the victoiy 
on the right wing, the loyal support and services of the centre, the 
voluntary neutrality or inaction of the majority of the Greek allifcn 




4$ 11 Ifi 



PLATAIA 



393 



the Persian right, and the conduct and leading of Artabazos, the 
second in command on the Persian side. 

In this reconstruction the points of moat vital import:uice are — (1) 
the clear topogruphiciit gr:tsp upon the four successive Greek positions ; 
(2) the clear chronological grasp on the true distribution of the days 
to the occupation of the several positions, and particularly the reduc- 
tion in the time allotted to the occupation of the advanced Asopos 
position ; (3) the clear critical grasp u()on the animus and bias of the 
Athenian, or phil-Attic xuurcfs, and the reconstniction of the story iii 
view of that critique. Compared with these fundamentals, the exact 
parts played by Alexander, by Artabazos, by the Thcssalians, are of 
quite subordinate import ; nor docs the theory depend, in essentials, 
upon the exact nattire of the fighting in the first position, nor upon 
the alMoIute identity of the second and the fourth positions, much less 
upon the intellectual authorship of the Greek plan, or the precise 
merits of particular leaders or contingents. 

§ 12. Besides the work of Herodotus there are two aiid only two 
other considerable attempts at a nan^ative and description of the fightr 
ing at Plataia in 479 B.C., the earlier by Diodoros, the later by Plutarch. 
Both accounts are to a greater or less extent based upon Herodotus, 
that is, drawn from sources more or less indebted to Herodotus. 
Diodoros indeed here,' as elsewhere, gives very little bey otid a rationalized 
and rhetoricized version of the Herodot«an story, with much of its 
l>cst elements omitted : such a version as we have learnt to expect 
from his chief authority, Ephoros. Such a version is not devoid of 
value : it forms at least a cnticism of a kind upon the Herodotean 
account ; but in the al)seuce of any clear sign of recourse to in 
dependent sources, its value is almost confined to that, and its thin 
facility leaves its value even as criticism rather low. (a) The figures 
in Diodoros are exaggerate^.! and self-coTitrndictory : the original levy 
of Mardonios amounts to not less than 40(J,000 ; to these more than 
200,000 are added for the medizod Greeks : this whole force Mardonios 
takes with him into Attica ! yet the actual number finally engaged is 
500,000. The barbarians who fell he estimates at only 100,000 or 
more. The number of Greeks is given as 100,000. Of these above 
10,000 fell and were buried. This last item is at least a corrective 
of the egregious under-estimate in Hero<iotU8. (6) The topography 
and local colour in iJiodoros is poor. Mardonios might have passed 
the winter in Boiotia : the camp is noticed, but its location is not 
defined ; the various positions on the Hold of Wttlo are reduced to 
two, except indeed that the Athenians are finally advanced to the 
very walls of Thebes, where their success over the Tbebans is won * : 



- The idea that the Greeks poahed 
forwktd tbeir left wing with b view of 
croMiDg the A^opoe, lud atlai-king 
Thebes, appear* to me uutcnahle : the 



wiog or colnmn would have hetn taken 
snjlane, the Peraiftn CAvalry would have 
made game of it, aTnl Theliea, moreover, 
waa a fortified city (cp. Hdt. 9. 86-88) ; 
the authority of Epboroa will not aave it. 



3fl4 



HERODOTUS 



the victory of the Greeks is ascribed to the confined space (17 r^r 
TiiTTwi' a-Tfvo^topia), as though not the Asopoa but the vale of Tempf, 
or Thermopylai, were the scene of battle. (c) The chronologital 
indications are similarly' curtailed, except for the truly Ephorean 
touch that the first engzigcment was fought at night. There are 
no sigiiM of delay on either side. The advance of the Greeks to 
a second and final position and the ensuing battle takes place at 
once, after their first success, (d) Strategic and tactical problems 
and reasons, suggested by Herodotus, are ignored and disappear. 
The retirement of Mardonios from Attica is unexplained ; the Persian 
cavalry is never engaged after its first defeat ; the second battle, 
with the infantry, is commenced by the orderly advance of the 
whole CJreek lino, which is placed between a lofty hill on the right 
and the river Asopos on the left ; the Persians likewise advance, and 
in the ongjigement are defeated and broken into throe sections ; the 
majority take refuge in the fortified camp, the medized Greeks retire 
on Thebes, while the remainder, upwards of 40,000 men, are led off 
into Phokis by Artj\bazas. The first set is pursued by the Spartans ; 
the last by the ' Korinthiatis, Sikyonians, and Phloiasians,' while the 
Athenians come up with the medized Greeks at Thebes and win a 
great victory : after which they return to assist the Lakedaimonisnt 
at the camp ! This account is a miserable parody of the Herodotean 
reports, (e) Diodoros gives no hint of opposition or rivalry between 
Artabazoa and Mardonios, and never names Alexander at all. The 
former omis-sion may be a deliberate criticism of Herodotus ; the latter 
ma}' bo due to the Tnakcdonizing tendency of the fourth-century soorca, 
and not, like other omisaitms, to mere carelessness. (/) Addition* 
there are also to the Herodotean story, but they hardly cany con- 
viction with them. (1 ) The decision of the Greek Sijnfdroi, if victorioua, 
to found a festival in honour of Freedom is an impudent afterthought, 
though the express tlecision to go to Pktxiiii and there fight a battle 
is beii trovitto. (2) The oath of the Greeks asijembled at the Isthmo* 
is unauthentic, and {KjHthumous. (3) The 'No quarter' order issued 
by Fausanias La perhaps an inference from the absence of any mention 
of prisoners in the original record. (4) The assignation of the Ariitan 
to Hparta, as city, and to Pausanias, as man, marks a real lacuna in 
the Herodotean story, but confliots with a rival supplement in Plutatth. 
It is, however, entirely acceptable. In fine, there is extraordinarily 
little to be found in l)iodoro.s which we can prefer to Herodotus, or 
even accept as valid criticism of his narrative. The chief result of « 
comparison between the two is the zeal and interest with which the 
modern liiBtoriftM must return to the con-sideration of the Herodotean 
logography on its own merits. 

With Plutarch the case is rather different. Plutarch gives both > 
direct criticism of the work of Herodotus, and also a systematic 
account of the Boiotian campaign, which at least compares favoural 



§12 



PLATAIA 



3S)!> 



with Diodoros. The I)e maliffnitate, though a captious and essentially 
uncntical production, succeeds in spotting some real defects in 
Herodotus' story, iind also performs the Wetter service of putting in 
some fresh evidences in refutation of the false report.' The criticisras 
on the rflle assigned to Chileus in determining Spartan policy, on the 
absurdity of ascribing to the Spartans a reluctance to face the 
Persians, on the award of the victory to three cities to the exclusion 
of the others, and the appeal to the toralw, roemoriaU, epitaphfl and 
so forth, ai*e valid, as far as they go. But the complaint that Herodotus 
puts dowTi the Spartan victory merely to a sujMsriority in armature, 
and that his recognition of Persian courage is inconsistent with what 
he elsewhere reports of the Barbarians, is criticism in the worst style 
of the Antonine sophistrj'. A much more serious contribution is 
made to the subject, or to our materials, by the Life nf AristridfS, 
which contains a long and rea.soned account of the operations in 
which Aristeides took a leading pan.- Plutarch was himself at home 
in Boiotia, and had even attended the celebration of the Eltuthtria at 
Plataia : hi$ topography should l>e of the best. Plutarch, however, 
is not a military historian, but a biographer and a moralist. This 
character is not altogether a disadvantage. If it leads him to 
exaggerate the merits or doings of his heroes ''ind to tell the story for 
the greater glory of the gods and the (Treeks, yet it leaves him free 
to follow the older narrative of the campaign without attempting to 
rationalize tradition in a merely tactical interest. Above all, Plutarch 
is a really learned man, with a large command of tlie available ' sources,' 
and his inetho<i3 in relation to them resemble somewhat the methods 
of Herodotus, and compares favourably with the methods of Diodoros 
and his chief authority. Plutarch, within limitR, allows the sources 
to speak for themselves : we can at least still sec, or infer, to a great 
extent, their provenience, and allow therefor. The chief source here, 
mediate or immediate, is clearly Herodotus, even if he were not 
expressly cited ; but Plutarch shows that in his time there were other 
fountains of tradition, or quasi -tradition, available. He names 
Idomcnous ; he names KJeidemos ; he draws from other authors ; he 
has been to Delphi, and not in vain ; he makes use of monuments, 
inscriptions, cults, calendars, and what not. Nothing is more signifi- 
cant of the character of his materials than his three express citations 
of ' psephisms ' of Aristeides. unless it be the two great stories to the 
credit of Delphi, or the conspiracy in the Athenian camp itself to 
overthrow the democracy. All these are additions to the story in 
Herodotus. Evidently, also, the Herodotean story has been revised 
and rationalized, partly in a strategic and partly in a <lramatic interest. 
The forces hare their rendezvous, not at Kleusis, not at Erythnii. but 
at Plataia ; and no fighting is recorded until that position is abandoned. 
The 'second' position is marked by the Androkrateion and the 



00. 41 IT. 



' CO. 10-21. 



306 



HERODOTUS 



APT. Tin 



(Hysiatan) Demetrion, and is apparently occupied bofore the Sijfo- 
machia takes place. The long pause in bringing about the battle it 
preserved from Herodotus, and the Rnal resolution of the Greeks to 
retreat is rocorded, but very inadequately motivated. The account of 
the retreat goes even beyond the Herodot«an story in its uublusbiog 
' Atticism.' Not merely is the retreat of the centre converted more 
explicitly into a disorderly flight, but the Athenians are represented 
as going back, in good order, until their movement is arrested by a 
request from Pausanias. Apparently the Lake<iaimonianB are to 
blame, and their delay, coupled ^vitb thou- commander's forgetiulnen 
or absence of mind, all but involved the Greeks in a great disaster. 
The battle between the Spartans and the Persians is artictilately 
described on the Herodotean lines, but with some interesting additions. 
Meanwhile the Athenians are halting to await the arrival of the 
Spartans ! A fresh message from Pausanias causes them to stan 
to his support, but on the way they are attacked by the medizing 
Greeks. How at this point, consistently with the rest of his story, 
the Athenians come to be " upon the plain " Plutarch does not pause 
to consider. The rest of the day proceeds much upon the Heroflotean 
basis, with additions which reveal tertiary, or in one item even 
primary, sources : Plutarch, in view of the precise lists of the slain, 
refutes the statement of Herodotus that the Greek centre took no 
part in the fighting, without, however, describing the part to be 
assigned. Agiui], in the records of the great quaixel over the Ariiieia, 
and of the founciing of the EleulheriOf and the provisions for the 
maintenance of the Alliance, Plutarch add.s items of the highest 
importance to the Herodotean story, with which we could ill afford 
to dispense. 

On the dramatic and personal side the action of after-thought 
rather than of the better or even the supplementary source is even 
more apparent. Aristeides is throughout the hero of Plutarch't 
narrative. Aristeides goes in person to Sparta to urge despatch, 
though Plutarch can quote Aristeides himself against that story. 
Aristeides proposes and carries, at Athens and in the Allies, the 
psephisms of loyalty and liberty. Aristeides sends to Delphi, and 
secures Plataia to Athena for ever, Aristeides deals »vith consummate 
wisdom and tact with the traitors in the Athenian ranks. Aristeides 
determines the position to be occupied by the Greek army. Plutarch 
has not eliminated the strife between the Tegeatai and the Athenians 
for the left wing ; nor the interview of Alexander and the Athenian 
g<3neral6 ; nor the proposed exchange of positions between the Spartans 
and Athenians on the eve of battle ; but in each case he, or his pre- 
ferred authorities, have vastly improved the occasion by the argument 
put into the mouth of Aristeides ; and the eloquence of Aristeides it 
invoked once more in a patriotic appeal to the medizing Greeks, alas ! 
this time in vain. The ethical interest with Plutarch predominitas 



$ 18 PLATAIA 397 

over the historical ; but, owing to his other merits, this preoccupation 
does not prevent his preserving incidentally valuable or suggestive 
items of tradition: his record contrasts favourably with that of 
Diodoros, and even the Herodotean devotee need not disdain to draw 
a supplement from Plutarch or Plutarch's authorities. 

NoTB. — The thesis by Henry Burt Wright, Ph.D., entitled The Oampaign 
of Plataea, New Haven [U.S.A.], 1904, 8vo, pp. 148, might aeem to have 
left little for those who come after to say on the subject ; my own work 
was too far advanced to be much affected thereby, and I hail rather a 
co-operator than a creditor in the Yale Professor. Mr. H. Audrey has 
favoured me with some additional notes (1905) to his paper in the Annual 
(^ Br. Sch. at Athena, L (1896), which are welcome as emphasizing difficulties 
in the hypothesis that Thebes was the objective of the Greek forward 
movement (cp. p. 393 tupra). To Prof. Woodhouse's paper in J.H.S. xviii. 
(1898) pp. 33 ff. I may have owed a keener perception of the Attidzing 
tendency in Hdt's account of Plataia. That the victory was the result of 
deliberate strategy on the part of the Greeks was suggested in my Hdt. 
IV.-VI. (1896) ii. 24V, note. 



APPENDIX IX 



THE CHRONOLOGY OF THE WAR 

1 1, Three eUronologiwl problems preaeB ted by the subject. § 2. The period, <* 
(iuration, of the war. § 3. Trie epoch of the war, or its rednotion to the 
Chrkliau era. § 4. Difficulty or detenuiuini; the order of events witliu 
the period. $ 5. Chronological reoourceii of Herodotus. | 6. Synchroninu^ 
consequeDces, and aaccosaions. g 7. Chief crueea and shortcomings. § & Tht 
lapplementary authorities. § 8. The chronological perspeotire reoona tlilcte J. 
§ 10. Kalandarial tables of the two yeani' war. 



§ I. Thk chronology of the great Persian war has been to a gnat 
extent anticipated and involved itt thn Commentary on the text, u 
well as in the Introduction and Appendices, contained in these 
volumes.' Nevertheless a brief yet more explicit examination of the 
subject seems natural in view of its intrinsic imiwrtance, and the scale 
and method of this work. We arc not here concerned with the dat^ 
of events, which were ancient history to Herodotus himself: nor, 
again, with the chronology of the Pfntekoniaeieris, for the events of 
which Herodotus is a contemporary authority. The present task is 
limited to the chronology of the main story in the last three Books of 
Herodotus, that is, the invasion of Xerxes, and its repulse, from tho 
king's departure out of Susa, or of Siirdes, down to the capture of 
Sostos, and the return of the Athenian forces under Xantbippos homfr 
wanls — the hist event reeordcl in the continuous story. Thre« 
chronological problems, or groups of problems, present themselves for 
solution in regard to this story. 

I. The temporal length, duration, or period of the story from finfc 
to last is to bo ascertained. 

n. The epoch, or date of the story according to our era, that iB, 
its proper place in the series of years before the birth of Chnit 
(vnih. the equivalents according to the Olympian reckoning, and the 
Archontic anagraph), is to be determined. 

III. The chronological order of the events recorded, including the 



■ Cj>. Introductions 11 (iL) ; Appen- 
dices V. 8 4 ; VI. S 2, pp. 291 (T. ; VII. 



g§ 2, 3 ; Vlll. § 2, pp. 346 tL, % i (t\ 
p. 3(S9; Index IV., «it6i). 



3S8 



THE CHRONOLOGY OF THE WAR 



sucoe«fiioDs, intervals, and synchrotiisms hi rotated senes of itctions or 
cccurronccs within the whole area ur theatre of the narrative, is to be 
elucidated. 

These three problems, or groups of problems, are by no means 
cqiaally easy of soluiioii. The Krst and second may be quickly 
disposed of, and with complete assurance. The third involves a 
much more complicated and ohsoure investigation, and may end by 
leaving many chronological point* stiO undetcnnined. This investiga- 
tion will, therefore, lie conveniently [iost|Kjned to the ascertainment 
of the period, and the determination of the epoch, of the events as a 
wfaolo in question. 

§ 2. I. The duration, or period, of the war incontestably comprises 
some two years, reckoning the campaigning season to l)egin with the 
spring. Thus Xerxes leaves S;irdcs, after passing the winter there, 
and advances towards the Hellespont in the early springtime {d/xa rif 
iapi, 7. 37). The time occupied in crossing the Hellespont is variously 
computed,' but the narrative of the king's invasion of Europe and of 
Hellas proceeds in a continuous and consecutive fashion, and after 
passing Thermopylai about midsummer,* Xerxes reaches Athens " three 
months" after leaving the Heltespotit (8. 51). A winter follows upon 
the battle of Salamis, clearly marked both for the fleet (8, 1 30) and 
for the army (8. IS.'l). The ensuing spring (8. 130) opens the second 
year of the war. The ninth Book records the events of this second 
year in two parallel and synchronous columns, so to speak, one for 
the armies in Greece (cc. 1-88), the other for the naval forces on the 
Asianic side <cc, 90-107), culminating in the synchronism of the battles 
at Plataia Jitid Mykale, in the late summer, or early autumn. The 
chronicle is carried forward to the end of " the year," that is, to the 
dawn of another spring, by the story of the Athenian siege of Sestos 
(cc. 11 4- 121). This matter is so clearly presented by Herodotus that 
there never has been any doubt as to the actual duration of the war, 
however problematic the precise dates of the beginning and ending 
may be, to a month or a day, and however disputalile the inner 
sequences, intervals, and synchronisms of the events lying between 
those terms may appear. 

§ 3. II. The epoch of the war, that is, the reduction of these two 
years of campaigning to the notation of the Christian era, involves a 
recourse to external evidences, but otherwise ofTers hardly any difficulty, 
or ground of dispute. The establishe<l equivalences between the 
Olympiads and our reckoning of years CC. may of course be assumed, 
as likewise, in the main, the annual correspondences with the Attic 
list of Archons. The epoch of the Peloponiiesian war is a certainty, 
and the ascertainment of earlier dates in the fifth century B.C. proceeds 
upwards from Thucydides and his verifiable chronology through the 



400 



HERODOTUS 



APT. II 



Pentekontmttris to the Persian war, and so forth. It is, therefora, 
certain that the Persian war took place " about fifty years " before the 
Peloponneaian,' that is, about fifty years before the spring of the year 
of the Attic Archon Pythodoros, which was the year extending from 
midsummer 432 B.C. to midsummer 431 ac, and was practically identical 
with the first year of the 87tb Olympiad. Two clear indications in 
the text of Herodotus prove that the first year of the war covered an 
Olympian Festival (7. 206, 8. 26). This Olympiad could only be the 
74th, 75th, or 76thj allowing the greatest possible margin of variation, 
fiut the name of the Attic Arcbon for the year of Salamis, to wit, 
Kalliade^ is incidentally preserved by Herodotus (8. 51). Thia 
Archon's name is attested in a number of ancient authorities - ; and 
though all the notices do not admit of reduction to the same year, stiO 
upon the whole the weight of evicJence is in favour of the identification of 
hia yetir with Olympiad 7.'5. 1. Moreover, Olympiads 74. 1 and 76. I 
are already provided with Eponynis, Above all, the chronology of the 
PentekoniaJeteria, however disputable in points and places, practicaJly 
requires the identification of the two years comprised in the last 
three Books of Herodotus with the years 480-479, 479-478 Er. 
The antecedent chronology, notably of the Peisistratid regime, of the 
Lydian monarchy, and of the sixth century, back to Solon — full of 
problems and of disputable points though it be — nevertheless is to be 
reconstructed on the basis of the identity of 01. 75. 1 with the year 
of the invasion of Xerxes, and forms in a way a further verification of 
that identity. 

The fullest and most immediate verification of this epoch for the 
Persian war would be found in the dating of the eclipses recorded 
for the period : a method of verification which ia fully applicahio 
to the chronology of the Peloponnesian war as given by Thucydidee. 
Two eclipses of the sun are recorded by Herodotus in connexion 
with events of the war. The first occurred as Xerxes was leaving 
Sardes for the Hellespont {7. 'M), that is, ex hypothesi, in the sprinf of 
the year 480 B.c. The other is adduced as the cause for the retin- 
ment of Kleombrotos, the Spartan Kegerit, from the Isthmos, together 
with the army, which had been engaged in building the wall that w«« 
to keep the Persians out of the Peloponnesos (9. 10). This eclipw 
must., therefore, have taken place after the death of Leonidas, and 
before the death of the Regent Kleombrotos, and the succession of 
Pausanias to the Regency. Materially, or by the logic of events, the 
natural date for thv retirement of Kleombrotos from the Isthmos would 
coincide with, or immediately follow, tho retirement of Xerxes from 
Athens and Attica : that is, falls on a day shortly after the battle of 
Salamis. Two solar eclipses should therefore be forthcoming, one 
in the spring, the other in the autumn of 480 B.C. Unfortunately 



§§3-5 



THE CHRONOLOGY OF THE WAB 



401 



only one such eclipse is verifiable, and known. An eclipBe of the 
sun took place on October 2, 480 RC, which suits exactly the 
requirements of the eclipse of Kleombrotos.' But the only solar 
eclipse, visible at Sardes, iinywhore about the given date in spring 
was an anntiiar eclipse, which took place on February 16, 478 B.c- 
The astronomical verification of the Herodotean chronology" falls, 
therefore, short of a complete coincidence and iissm-»iiice. But can 
any competent critic, versed in the methods of Herodotean historio- 
graphy, hesitate to strike the balance here in favour of the reaL'ty of 
the eclipse of Kleombrotos ? The eclipee of Xerxes may easily pass 
into the same category as the other portents recorded to have marked 
the king's ill-omened departure from Sardes, or from Sestos, for the 
invasion of Hellas.* The invention, or the transfer, of this portent to 
the spring of the year 480 B.c. may have been facilitated by the actual 
occurrence of an eclipse, \iaible at Sardes, two years later, possibly just 
as Xerxes was leaving the old Lydian capital in order to return to 
Upper Asia. But the sheer invention of so appropriate a portent was 
hardly beyond the licence of Hellenic logography ; and, in any case, 
the October eclipse visible at the Isthinos, and fitting in admirably 
with the {jcrapective of Halamis and its sequel, remains an iirefnigable 
support to the proposed equation of the year of Salamis with 01. 
75. 1, or 480-479 B.C., and the legitimate conclusion of the whole 
argument in this section is, that we may endorse, with complete 
assurance, the proposed^ and generally accepted, dates, according to 
our era, for the 6iennium of the grcjit Persian war. 

§ 4. HI. When from these broad and general conclusions we 
advance to the attt<mpted solution of the man}' pro))lems connected 
with the ex:ict order of events recorded for the two years in question, 
wo may soon lose oiu* bearings amid manifold alternatives and con- 
flicting possibilities. The standard and resources of Herodotus were 
not adequate to an exact chronology of the operations and occurrences 
of the period. The supjjlementary authorities do very little to improve 
his results. It will be woll before attempting to reconstruct in outline, 
anrl to present in tabular form, a chronology for the two campaigns, 
that we should take stock of the chronological resources of Herodotus, 
and mark tlio chief rnirr^ which the errors and shortcomings of his 
chronological apparatus have left on our hands. We shall then, 
perhaps, be reasonably disposed to acquiesce in a chronological 
perspective which leaves not a little to Iw desired. The defect of 
the apparatus^, and the poverty of the devices to which the historian 
was driven to make good that defect, will be seen to leave the nicer 
determination of the time-values largely hypothetical. 

§ 6. A precise and correct chronomctry is the basis of accurate 
chronology ;, but the chronometry of Hero<lotus was not complete nor 



VOL. 



' Cp. not* to 9. 10. 13. ^ Cp. note to 7. S7. 7. 

» Cp. notes to 7. 57. 1, 7. 

n 2d 



408 



HEROIX)TUS 



Mrr.n 



exact. The divisions of night and day, of month and year, hued 
upon aatronomiciil conaidonitions are familiarly cmployod by him, but 
neither precision nor system is attained in the use of these natural 
divisions. The most element<iry distinction in time is, of course, 
supplied by the succession of light and darkness ' ; but Herodotus is 
content with somewhat vague indications for the subdivisions of day 
and of night: daybreak, dawn, sunrise, forenoon, mid -day, early 
afternoon, late afternoon, sunset, are rather obvious than exact 
indications ^ ; the ' full market time ' and ' the time of the lighting of 
the lamps ' are rather picturesque than precise ^ ; there is no attempt 
to utilize the dial or gnomon, or the twelve segments of the day 
which the Hellenes, as Herodotus elsewhere affirms, had borrowed 
of the Babylonians, in the records of military openitions.* Night, the 
kindly time of repose, reijuired, perhaps, less precise subdivision than 
the <i!iy, as a rule ; but in warfare vigilance was exercised, and wc 
find, though rarely, indications of moi-e precision for the nigbt-time 
than for the day in the narrative of Herodotus.* Such indication» 
suggest that the historian's methods hardly reproduce with fidelity 
the practice of the ago, which was less haphazard than might be 
inferred from the records. 

Multiples of days appear both short of the month, and in excess.* 
An ambiguity arises in some such cases from the doubt whether the 
figures are to be reckoned inclusively, or exclusively. The con- 
ventional Hellenic week may sometimes underlie a seemingly preoM 
indicalicjn," and in one cjiae, perhaps, the conventional Semitic week 
insiiniatcs itself.^ But the pitJciao and consecutive diaries for Artemision- 
Thermopylai, for Salamis, for Plataia, and for other episodes,* 
challenge serious attention as bases for a real reconstruction of the 
story. The ' forty-five ' days for the ' flight ' of Xerxes would look 



' Ct>. for ¥0^, 7. '217 {Tacay ttji' voKra) ; 

8. 12, 13, 66, 76 ; 8. 10, &1. 118. etc. ; 
for Wp<>> 7. 183 {wamf/upir), 219 ; 8. 14 : 

9. 11, etc. etc. 

' e.g. i}u)j SU<pawt 7. 217, 8. 8S, 9. 47 ; 
dixa. 6fi$fx^ 7. 188, Amo i^< 7. 219. A/ui 
rjidif OKiSyafiivn) 8. 23, i)Mov avartCXayTot 

7. 223, d^ta r<p ^Xty inivTi 8. 64 ; rpul 
In r^r y\tUpift 9. 101 ; Kari fiiaoy ijfijfnit 

8. 16, ft^xp^ liiaov ijfiiiptit Vi. : rcpl StlXriv 
irpulriy ■ytyondtnfy 8. 6, M^x/*' 5<'^'7t <5yH»jt 
7. 167, 6el\riy d^lrjv yiyotUyriv r^t Tifiiint^ 
{^i/XdfaKTfs) 8. 9, rtpi Sti\i)v 9. 101 ; 
wpi Sirroi ii\lov 7. 149. 

' it ayopfji Ml' ;«iXwTo irXi)Ocipiri> 7. 
223, -rtpi \&xyij>y aipdt 7. 216. 

* Cp. 2. 109 Tri\oy ni* flip koX yvuinova 
xai tA SifuittKa jt/fxa r^j riiulprti irapi. 
Ba/Si'Xuivfuy t)iaSoy ai'SWiftt. The nso 
of &pi) in 8. 1 4, 9. 6S is remarkkble. 



" tiMppinf 8. 12, 14, etc., wpiMv Tfi 
yiicT6t 9. 44, yiiKra fiicrqy 8. 9, pdam 
y^KTti 8. 76, itvripti <f>v\ajcti 9. 51 (tat 
aoteadl.). 3. 104, 4. 181 Uke HdtiD 
round the clock. 

» umfptUn 7. 64, 212; & 22. 2«: 9. U 
93; ifvrifiri { = v<rT(pali!) 7. 192; 8. M, 
55 ; 9. 33. 84 ; 6uo TnUpat 9. 41 ; r^&i 

8. 16, TiiUpox Tpfis 7. 191, 8. 66, ew. 
rpjTOioi 7. 196 ; Trrdprn 7. 192. HafffCt 
Vl^pat 7. 210; wffirni 7. 210 ; (If 8. 6«i; 
J'lTTa 7. 66 ; iicru 9. 36 ; S4Ka 9. 8, 40: 
fyStKa 7. 183, iyirKdrr, ». 41, 86; riM#T? 

9. 87 ; ^ HvTt kclI -rtaafpdxorra ^pfn 
•S. 115 ; 6\lyat vfiipat 8. 113 ; ^tUpfci d 
ToXXj(ri 9. 17. 

' Cp. 7. 183 ; 9. 8. 41. 8«, S7. 
' 7. 56. 

» Buthardly". 8-19: cp. IntTOductiea. 
§ 3, p. XV ; Appendix II. $ i 



THE CHRONOLOGY OF THE WAR 

more like a genuine fossil-fact, if it were not just exactly hiilf the 
period of his advance.' 

The ' month ' unfortunately is employed but mrely by Herodotus 
as a division of the year, or a unit of chronometry, and that without 
kalendarial title or specification. It remains doubtful whether his 
months are official loans from this or that stiite-record, or merely 
rough-and-ready modes of reckoning from point to iwint for periods 
of eight and twenty, or thirty days. Thus the Barbarians sjwnt 
' one month ' in the passage of the Hellespont, and in ' three months 
more ' appeai'cd in Attica.- The siege of Poteidaia by Artabazos lasted 
upwards of ' three months. ' ' The rewiptuie of Athens by Mardonios 
took place ' ten months after ' it« capture by Xerxes.^ Thesa estimates 
do not advance the precision of the chronology to any appreciable 
extent. Still less do the notices of the varjring ' seasons ' of the 
year enable us to date the events of the season precisely. Such 
notice.s arc valuable for the general outline and structure of the 
chronology of the war, but leave the events of each spring, summer, 
autumn, and winter, to be chronologized by simple sequence, or other 
considerations.'' 

Nor is the Herodotean 'year' itself quite free from ambiguity. 
For the actual story of the war, indeed, this ambiguity is almost 
a matter of indifference : the ' years ' may be taken as campaigning 
years, beginning with 'the spring,' and the spring may >je supposed 
to begin with the Attic month Elaphebolion." But in cases where 
Herodotus, in the course of his narrative, or in digressions, has 
occasion to exceed the limits of the campaigning truUria, or bi/tnniuin, 
the distinction between official yetirs and jK>int to point years, between 
full years and nominal years, complicate and obscure the chronology of 
events, while the absence of any method of fixing the particular ' year ' 
leaves us in doubt and difficulty. The ' thirty-six years ' of the reign 
of Dareios apparently carry back to the tleath of Kambyses, and aie 
taken ultimately from an official Persian source.^ The Herodotean 
chronology of the inter\'al between Mai-athon and the Great Invasion, 
probably based on Greek materials, leaves much to be desired, but 
fortunately can be controlled from other sources.** The Sikeliote 
chronology comes to very little with Herodotus, outside the history of 
the war itself.^ The items of ancient history casually prei>erve<l, or 
introduced, in the Army and Navy Lists, and elsewhere, lie quite 



8.1U 



• 8. 129. 



' 8. Bl, 116. 

' 9, 3 ifKifiriom (perhaps only nine 
iuonth.<<). 

' d^ ri|r (apt 7. 37. Hifitir rov trtot 
«lXXl<rnj» 7. 50, lapm it irtXin'^ayrot 
(rputot rrX.) 8. 130, t6 tap yuriimor 8. 
13'J ; Trji Siprtt fUcoy 6ipcn 8. 12 ; infvUlM 
iLDfu-nav 7. 148 ; ijnapiif t<m trvn woXrfUfii' 



8. 113, ipewirupor 9. 117; x*V<<p'<rM 
7. 87. x'^M'p'rM'Tot 8. 126, ix^'I^^P^t* 8. 
130. fxfi^pwrov ilnd., ^«<Maf« 8. 133. 

" C]>. itvTtpi^iTtiTo&Tuiil.SOi KapriiK 
daTtpifSffTf iifwr S, 142. 

' 7. i. 

" 7. 1, 20. Cp. Ajipendis III. 

• 7. 164, 166. 



404 



HERODOTUS 



AFF. a 



beyond the present argument ' ; l>ut the want of a recugnizable and 
ctirrent chronometry is deplorable in relation to the events of tiie 
I'enidumUietcris, wherein chronological precision would have heen 
authoritative on the part of Herodotus.- There is not one sin^ 
precise date given by HerfMlotus for the events of that period, unlev 
the more hearsay 'ton years' in the scandal against the Aiginetonstt 
to be accounted such.^ Nor can the author's references to his own 
present, or his own date, he precisely fixed within his generation.* 

§ 6. But to return to the war, which is here the immediate 
subject of investipation, The lihsence of precision in regard to month* 
and days notwithstiinding, there is a certain degree of chronological 
satisfaction rendered in the orderly narrative of events as serial, and 
the express or implied synchronisnis between different scries, or 
different incidents. A synchronism, at least when marked as such, 
implies a reckonuig and a time calculus ; and even the mere tem}XinJ 
sequence of events, when represented in a consequential narrative, 
enables us to realize the time-conditions just in proportion as it is lull 
and coherent upon the material and effective side. A great deal of th« 
chronology of Herwlotus in the last three Books, and there more ihim 
elsewhere, fnlhls these ie«s formal conditions in the mere structure and 
design of his narnitive. Synchronisms, of more than one order, an 
marked, or occur, again and again in the record ; while the story a» » 
whole, and the minor episodes which go to make it up, are genemlly 
presented iti the eventual order of Ruccession. Internal synchroaii>m^ 
supplied by Herotlotus arc of tlu-ee orders, corresponding roughly to 
a diminishing scale of probjibility. There are (i.) the brcwul general 
synchronisms of action upon the Persian side and upon the Gn-ek 
side, or, again, upon soa and upon land, or generally between independonl 
series of actions and events occupying considerable sections of time: 
and these larger synchronisms underlie the general structure of the 
narrative. So, for example, the whole account of the preparationfi on 
the Persian and Greek 8ide.s — in other words, the first and second 
parts of the seventh Book — [)re.sent two series of events, transacted in 
different theatres, but broadly of contemporaneous occiu-rence. A simibr 
synchronism obtains between the invasion of Hellas by Xerxes kA 
the invasion of Sicily by Amilkar ; or, again, between the campaigr 
of Plataia in the second year of the war and tht? operations of tbe 
rtoct in Ionia, though this synchronism can hardly be regarded as in 
any sense a mere coincidence. These larger and general synchronisnii, 
however, advance the argimient but a little way. More problemjlif 
and more profitable are (ii.) the synchronisms asserted or implied i<s 



' Apart from these a ooiiaiilorabte 
numlier of items are Himply iiiAxA vp6- 
Ttpor TouTiar, or aiiiiilarly ; i.p. 7. 108, 
150. Hi, 194; 8.27, 96; 9.37. 

- Cp. Introduotion, % 8. 

' 9. 85. 15. Cp. nott ad I. 



* *d» 7. 108. 123, 129, 170. 176.1;!' 
226 ; 8. 83, 73 ; fl(rl 7. 1 1 1. 200 ; H»wn% 
7. 106 ; Iti «nt « tM* 7. 107. 123, IM: 
9. 73 ; tri xal < t iJM^ar 8. 39 ; fri. id •> 
itU 8. 121 ; Kar' i^i 7. 170 : to *fv 
i/teHT. Ill, 115. 



THE CHRONOLOGY OF THE WAR 

mtnor passages, and periods, within the general action, such as (1) the 
movements of the Persian fleets and armies fi-om the Hellespont to 
Doriskos, from Doriskos to Akanthos, from Akanthoa to Therme ; (2) 
the engagements at Arteraision and at Thermopylai ; (3) the retreat 
of Xerxes and the block;ide of Aadros, etc., to say nothing of the 
numerous openitions on the various battle-fields, where the synchronous 
actions of the two sides are involved in the continuous narrative. 
Further, there are (iii.) particular and precise synchronisms at various 
points, which help to space the narrative, hut win seldom be treated 
fts indisputable, such as the date for the expedition to Tempo, ' whenas 
Xerxes was at Abydos ' (7. 172, 174), the Delphic utterance, 'what 
time the Persian was in Pieria' (7. 178), the occupation of Thermo- 
pylai while the king was in Thessaly (7. 208), the coincidence between 
the Olympian Festival and the defence of the pass (7. 206, 8. 26), an 
objective and not merely a relative indication. Most precise of all 
sxTii the synchronisms of Sidamis and Uimera (7. 166), of Mykale and 
Plataia (9. 90), ;ilV»eit neither can l>e regarded as indubitable, nor does 
either in itHolf supply an objective fixture to the chronology of the war. 

Among the most valuable aids to the determination of the tnie 
chronology are the records expressly designed, or incidental, of (iv.) the 
synchronism of military operations, or other events, with festivals and 
holy days, the places of which in the Greek kalcndars are ascertainable 
and so reducible to our notation, such as the Olympia just name<l, 
the Karneia (7. 206, 8. 73), the Eleusinia (8. 65), the Hyakinthia 
(9. 7, 11). Yet the citation, or the equivalence, between the holy 
day and the event is seldom so precise and definite as to serve an 
exact chronological purpose : the notices rank as general confirmatioDS 
of the season, and succession, of leportofl incident*, without enabling 
us to reduce the dates to months and days. It is far more certain 
that the invasion of Greece took place in the year 4i>(0 B.C. than 
that the defence of Thermopylai exactly synchronized with the 
Olympic Apon of that year : the l>attle of Saiamis iLssnredly took 
place in the year of Kalliades, and in the month Boedromion, but 
whether on the twentieth day of that mouth must renuiin an open 
question, even after the external authorities ancillary to Herodotus 
have been examined. As the visit of the Athenian envoys to Sparta, 
in the spring of 479 B.f., lasted apjjarently upwards of ten days, and 
the Hyakinthia to which it is dated was but a three days' festival, the 
synchronism is obviously oidy approximate. 

Divided but by a hair's breadth from such synchronisms on the one 
hand, and from the ordinary succession of acts and events, as presented 
in a coherent narrative, on the other, are some caaea of (v.) immediate 
combination where antecedent and consequent are expressly related 
as cause and effect, such as the evacuation of Artemision and the 
fortification of the Isthmos, consequential up<:in the fall of Thermopyhii 
(8. 21, 71); the capture of the Athenian Akropolis and the proj< 



4oe 



HERODOTUS 



App. a. 



flight of the Peloponnesians from Sftlivmis (8. 56) ; or the second 
retirement of the Athenians to Salamis as a result of the advance of 
Mardonios (9. 3). But for the most part the causal nexus of events 
is left to bo inferred from (vi.) the sequence, in which the events are 
mirrated, and the onler of narration, within the various sections or 
p.'iS8ages of the story, is assumed or intended to be chronological. 
Frequently the chronological order is incidentally confinned by 
geographical considerations, as in the record of the movements of 
fleets and armies ; but, except for the journals and the other express 
and incidental notes of time, already specified, exact periods or intervals 
are not ascertainable. To exhibit in detail the chronological quality 
of the narrative, as a record of serial action and event, would involvo 
re^vritiug tho whole 8torj% as has indeed been done times without 
number : let it here suffice to emphasize once more the merit of 
Herodotus as a mere story-teller, whereby the order, in which tie 
actions are made to succeed one another in time, carries with it s 
suggestion of their real connexion, dispensing with tedious fonnnlai 
and with reflective digressions. 

§ 7. But the narrated order of events, \inless based upon 
accurate and adequate materials, such as were far beyond the raogo 
of Herodotus even for the history of the Persian war, is bound to give 
way, more or less constantly, at the criticad moment ; hence the long 
list of chronological civ^-fs in the Hei-odotean Logoi of the war, wherein 
the real connexion of events is lai-gely a matter of argument, and the 
chronological! becomes a deduction from the causal sequence. Sncli 
cases aire the following : (1) the Delphic Responses to Athens Iwfore 
Salamis; (2) the Congress at the Isthmos ; (3) the vow to 'betithe' 
the 'Mcdi«ers'; (4) the application and admission of the Thessalians 
to the CoTifederacy ; (5) the attempted circumnavigation of Euboia by 
a Persian squadron, ami sundiy other preliminaries or details 
connected with the engagements ofi" Artemision ; (6) the fortification 
of the Isthmos.; (7) the mission of Sikinnos, tho movements of the 
Persian fleet before Stdamis, and other incidents of the engugement; 
(8) the building of the mole ; (9) tho blockade of Andros ; (10) tlw 
diary of Plataia, including important incidents, such as ' the dispute 
for precedence,' ' the message of Alexander,' ' the exchange of positions,' 
and so forth. These are but leading examples of questions tial 
perplex the student at every turn,' And the problem is not so tnuch 
to obtain sin objective date for the given event, as to detemine 
whether the event is placed in its proper order in tho historic seriei 
True, more than the mere chronological order is generally in question ; 
the event is suspect, not merely in its date, but in its cireiimstanoes, 
in itself. But its anachronistic appearance is often one of the chief 
reasons for condemning its historical character ; and the bttre fact may 



§§6-7 



THE CHRONOLOGV OF TEE WAR 



407 



often be preserved for history by redating its occurrence, Such re- 
cotirse to other methods for correcting the chronological defect, or error, 
can seldom, if over, wtrry the fidl assurance of an ample and authentic 
chronicle. Had it oceiirre<l to the Attic historians — Thucydides and 
Xenophon, for example — boklly to date contemporary events by the 
months und days of the Attic kulendar, we should now be in a vastly 
more favourable position for the reconstruction of the history of the 
Kfth and fourth centuries B.C. Such a demand, ii addressed to Herodotus, 
who W!ia neither Athenian, nor ccmtemporary with the main course of 
events recorded by him, would be a hypercritical censure. None the 
less we have to deplore the absence of any precise standard or method 
of chronologizing the story ; and we have to make the best of the 
express synchronism, of the mere succession, of the imdesigned 
coincidence, of the occasional and somewhat arbitrary journal, of the 
more explicit chronological note, here and there, not always free from 
a suspicion of artifice. Worse still, wc are at times driven to make 
tlie chronology a function of the causal connexion, real or 8ap[)osed, 
l>etween eventa. The freedom with which Herodotus in his narrative 
moves from side to side, equally at home, as he appears to be, in Susa 
and in Syracuse, on Attic or Asian ground, aggravates the chronological 
chaos. His alternating excursions with the fleets and armies, whether 
Persian or C4reek, complicjito the synchronistic problems. True, the 
whole matter moves within narrow limits. Given the two years 
for the two campaigns, we can hanlly ever be more than a few 
days, or a few weeks, out of the true reckoning for the sequences and 
the synchronisms of the events recorded. But in such aiscs, notably 
in military matters, a day or two, an hour or two, more or le&s, miiy 
throw the whole machine out of gear, and distort the whole perspective. 
The rationale of ovent.s depends upon their order, the credibility of 
movements upon their dunition. The precise synchronism of the 
battles of Himern and Sjdamis makes little or no difference to our 
appreciation of the events ; but a few days' interval between Plataia 
and Mykale would open the door wide to rational explanations of the 
conduct and speech of Leotychidaa, Again, looking beyond Herodotus, 
we shall not accept the hygtrrcn jiroterim by which Ktesias inverts 
the whole perspective of the war after Thermopylai ' ; bixt we may well 
feci some doubt whether Herodotus has correctly timed nil the 
antecedents of the victory of Sfilamis as against Aischylos. Apart 
from any conflict of authorities, the hick of an exact and consistent 
chronometry in the prime authority for the story of the war leaves us 
again and again the prey of conflicting hypotheses, precludes too often 
the ascertainment of the true relation between events, and even 
throws doubt upon the reality of this or that occurrence, or transaction, 
however minutely recordetl or described. 




408 



HERODOTUS 



APT.tr 



§ 8. There is, unfortunately, very little in the subsequent 
HUtboritios which goes beyond combinations and inferences deducible 
from the Hcrodotean record itself ; nor is there any additional pre- 
cision forthcoming until we reach Plutarch's Lives and Moralia. The 
gross hysteron protnon in Kteaias already noticed involves, of course, 
a chronological blunder of the first order. The Marmor Parium^ 
confirms the period and epoch, but works on too small a scale to 
chronologize detiiils. Diodoros,'- with his apparatus of Olympiadi, 
Archonsatui Oon-suU, has, in spite of his aberrations and carelessnesMt^ 
effected something for ancient chronology as a whole ; but, for the 
precise chronology of so short a periotl as the Medic war, his daU 
are almost negligible. He specifies, indeed, its biennial duration 
expressly, and he distributes the main events of the two years in the 
Herodotean order ; but, as the Consular year does not correspond to 
the Archontic, nor the Olympian to the Herodotean war-year, be is 
only saved from serious coufasion by the limits of the subject, and 
his obvious preference for the rhetorical presentation of history. 
Thus, his reduction of the engagements off Artemision to two days, 
his oblivion of the synchronism with the fighting at Thermopylai, 
his apparent date for the awards of the Sabiminian Aristeia and the 
emba-ssies at Athens to the year of * Xanthippos ' (479-478 B.C.), carry 
no weight His recognition of the synchronism of Mykale and Platai* 
is a homage to the Herodotean tradition, the more remarkable in 
view of the temptation which he, or his authority Ephoros, apparenilj 
felt to rationalize away the mysterious rumour of victory into an 
invention of the Commanders, a process surely more easily accom- 
plished by denying the synchronism ; his transfer of the synchronism 
with Himera from Salamis to Thermopylai is a transparent SicUianim, 
probably taken over from Timaioa and perhatm intended to justify the 
inference, expressly drawn, that the victory of Gelon was an encoorage^ 
ment to the national confederacy at home. There is, in fact, little to 
be gained for the critique of Herodotus, in regard to the reconstructicm 
of the precise chronology of the war, from the Library of the Sicilian. 
One datum in Diodoros is, however, of more apparent promise: 
jiccording to the terms of the vow, to which the foundation of the 
EleiUherui is traced, the Festival should mark the exact day of the 
battle of Plataia ; if that be so, a supplement from Plutarch clinches the 
point. Plutarch,^ indeed, preserves what at first sight appears predse 
information regarding the exact days to which the Iwttles of 8"UT"i» 
and Plataia may be dated ; but unfortunately he gives variant, though 
precise, dates for each event. Thus he dates the battle of Salamis 
in one place to the twentieth of Hoe«Jromioii, and in two other places 
to the sixteenth of Mounychion, a wholly unseasonable date. The 
former may be an infeience, and possibly a correct inference, from 

' Appendix I. $ 11, p. 67 tuprxi, =' Appendix I. $ 13, pp. 66 IT. mam. 

• Appendix I. S 14, pp. 87, 89. 



THE CHRONOLOGY OF THE WAR 

the story of the Eleusinian vision in Herodotus ' ; the othor is almost 
ceitainly an erroneous identification of the Commemoration-day with 
the anniversary of the actual battle. The variation in regard to the 
day of Plataia is puzzling from ita very insignifiauice, ranging only 
over twenty-four hours. If the statement quoted from Diodoros bo 
correct, ;uid Plutarch be right in dating the Eleuiher'w to the fourth 
of Boedromion, a definite point is gained for the reduction of the 
chronology to our notation. The alternative suggests itself of dating 
the battle to the third, and the Festival in \Xs honoiu- to the fourth. 
But a material objection arises from the fact that the defeat of the 
Persians was not the end of the carajjaign, nor were the Greeks quita 
at liberty to institute the Thanksgiving before the fall of Thebes, 
some twenty days later ; a formal objection arises from the analogy 
of other cases, where the Euchariitleria for victory are rarely, if ever, 
celebrated on the precise anniversary of the event. 

§ 9. The conclusion of the whole matter in not altogether flattering 
to the ambition of your student of antiquity. liolalively satis- 
factory as the chronology of the Persian war appears, it falls far 
short of modern standards, and methods nowadays practised as matters 
of coui-se. Theic is but tme event recorded in the liist three Book* 
of Herodotus which can be dated with absolute accuracy, to wit, the 
eclipse of the sun in the autumn of 480 B.C'. Kven the action of 
Kfeombrotos associated therewith may have followed after an 
interval of a day, or more, and cannot therefore be bo precisely 
chronologized. The Imttte of Salamis vrill have tjtkon place upon a day 
before that eclipse, and after the Ansion of Uemaratos, and Boedromion 
20 is an acceptable date, at least for regulative pui-poses, say, 
September 22 ; but absolute certainty has already given place to 
approximative conjecttuo. The precise interval lietween the battle of 
Salamis and the engagements at Artemision and Thermopylai is still 
more problematical : it can be inferred with ceruiinty neither from 
the diaries of the army and fleet for the interval, nor from the 
alleged synchronism between the defence of Thermopylai and the 
Olympian Festival For the operations of the Persian army and fleet 
during some three wcoks before the fall of Thermopylai, Herodotus 
furnishes an ostensible journal, possibly Ijfised upon Ionian log-books, 
and in any cjise acceptable as an artistic pcrBj)ective, <»rrying the 
movement back to Therme. Certainly the better part of three months 
(90 days) is thus accounted for. For the march through Thmke and 
Makedon precise indications arc wanting, but it must have been rapid, 
if three months covered the whole time from the start at Scstos down 
to the arrival of Xerxes in Athens, about the middle of the month 
Boedromion, and some days before the actual battle. A month is 



' It miut ba renambcKd tli*t the 
Attic 'd«y' bagaa (lOtt the Hebrew) 



with sunset, and tkereiu differed ta well 
from the Roman m from our own. 



410 



HERODOTUS 



App. a 



expressly assigned by Herodotus for the passage of the Hellespont ; 
and if three weeks are allowed for the march from Sartles to Abydcs, 
and twenty days for the pauses at Doriskos and in Pieria, there is no 
great iHfficulty in bringing back the start from Sardcs to the middle 
of the month Elaphebolion, the right time for such undertakings. 

' Ten months ' after its occupation by Xerxes Athens was reoccupied 
by Mardonios. The nsiml diffien!tie,s recur in dealing with this 
estimate. The ten months in any case cover the autumn, winter, 
spring, and part of the summor of the years 480-479 B.C. Xenes 
may have reached Sestos on his return journey about the middle, 
and Sardes before the en<l, of the month Maimakterion. The three 
months' siege of Poteidaia just occupies the winter ; the events in 
Greece recorded in the last part of the eighth Book fall into the 
winter and early spring.^ Mardonios must have reached Athens 
before the Attic new ye<ir, at latest in the month Skirophorion, the 
tenth month reckoning inclusively from the previous Boedromion , 
but the mention of the HtjaHnihut might point to the previous month, 
and, if insisted on, would press back the date of the King's entry by 
a nominal month. In any case, time can be found for the journals 
of Plataiii Ijefore the fourth of Boedromion, or even, divorcing \'ictory 
and celobnition, before a daj' towards the end of the previous month, 
Metageitnion. We may allow the synchronism with Mykale to pass, 
without undertaking to cast the log of the fleet dining the intervsl 
since its muster in the spring. The events of the autumn and early 
wiritei-, so far as recorded by Herodotus, fall into easy perspective: 
the aii'go of Sestos began apparently some time before the autumn, 
and no doubt before the end of the month Boedromion ; it may hara 
surjmssed in duration the siege of Poteidaia in the previous winter; 
and the exact date of the retiirrt home of the Athenian fleet remains 
one of the unresolved problems in chronology. Upon the lines of 
these considerations and rough estimates the following tables bare 
been coustructud, hypothetically, and merely for graphic purposes.* 



' By a ourions hifsteron proleron the 
gpriiig movements of the Greek fleet 
(8. 131 f.) arc preiHwited to the winter 
concerns of MardoDios (8. 133 ff.). 



' The equivalence between the Altic 
anil modern mouths is aMutned u 
merely approxiinate. 



§§9-10 



THE CHKONOLOGY OP THE WAR 



411 



§ 10. — First Ysar of thb War 



01.74.4 = 481-480 

I B.C. 

EUphebolion : 
March 

MounyeUon : 
April 



Thaigelion: May 

Skiropboiion : 
Jnne 

OL 76.1 =480-479 

B.C. 

Hekatombaion : 
Jnly 



MeUgeitnion : 
Aagnit 



Boedromion : 
September 

Pyanepckn: 
Octobn 

Uaimakterion : 
November 

PoeeiileoD : 
December 

Oamelion : 
January 

Anthexterion : 
February 



I 



Pkbsuns 
Xerxes leave^i Sardes, 7. 37 



pasMge of the Hellespont, 
7. 64 



mnater at Doriskos, 7. 69 
pauM at Therme, 7. 127 



reaches Thermopylai, 
7. 196, 198 



Xerxes in Athens, 8. 51 

b. of Salamis, 8. 65, 88 
Xerxes in Thessaly, 8. 114 



Xerxes reaches Sestos, 
8.117 

siege of Poteidaia, 
8. 126-129 



Oribkb 



expedition to Tempe, 
7. 178 



defeat at Thermopylai 



evacuation of ArtemLiion, 
8.21 



evacuation of Athene, 
8.40 

victory at Salamix 



expedition to Androii (!), 
8. Ill 

meeting at the Isthraos (!), 
8.123 

ThemLstokles iu Sparta, 
8. 124 

Alexander in Atheni), 
8.140 

[plan of campMgn ?] 



Arelum: Hjrpsichidei, - 

•A0. w. 22. 8 

Stralegoi: Themistokles, 

Hdt 7. 173 



Archon: Kalliades, Hdt 
8. 51 ; Mar. Par. 61 ; 

Diodoros 11. 1. 2 

SttaUgos: Themistokles, 

Hdt. i paisim 



[partial rebuilding of 
Athenn] 



41S 



HERODOTUS 



AFP. IX $ ll 



Sbcxind Year of thk War 



OL 76.1 =480-479 
B.C. -eotUiniu«d 


PUSIAMB 


Grkikb 




Elaphebolion : 
March 


Mardonioa in Themaly, 
8. 181, 183 ; 9. 1 


the fleet at Aigina, 8. 131 




Mooitycbion : 
April 


paaaes Tbermopylai 


the fleet at Ddoo, 8. 182 




Huugelion : May 


MardonioR in Thebes, 9. 2 


evacuation of Attica, 9. 8 




Skirophorion : 
Jnne 


Teoccnpies Athena, 9. 8 


[the fleet at Salamis] 




01.75.2 = 479-478 

B.C. 

HekatombMon : 
July 

Metageitnion : 
August 


retir«a into Boiotia, 9. 13 
battle of Platua, 9. 56 


the fleet at Samoe, 9. 96 
batUe of Mykale, 9. 100 


Arekon: Xasthi 

Mar. Par. 62 ; Dx 

11. 27. 1 ; XaBtlu] 

Plutarch, AriitB 

Strattgot: Amh 

Hdt. 9. 28, et 


Bocidromion : 
September 


retreat of Artabaios, 9. 89 


aege of Sestos, 9. 114 




Pyanepsion : 
October 


Artabaxoe in Tbessaly, 
9.89 


« 


PortifieatioDofA 
nine. 1. 90 


Maimakterion : 
November 


Artabazos in Makedon, 
9. 89 


,. 




Poseuleon : 
December 


Artobazos in Thraku, 9. 89 


,» 




Oaiiieliou : 
•lanunry 


passage of the Bosporoe, 
9. 89 


capture of Sestos, 9. 118 ■ 




Anthesterion : 
February 


(reaches Sardes) 


return of the fleet, 
9. 121 





cej^t: 




'Hmgiam'' \ 





INDICES 

I. LEGTIONUM 

II. VSBBOBUM 

III. NOMINUM 

IV. REBUM 

V. AUOTOBUM 



41S 



The references in Index I. are to Book, Chapter, and line. Id the 
other Indices the Roman figaies denote pagee of the Introduction. 
Arabic fignres, with an a or b added, denote the left and rij^t 
colnmns respectiTely of the Commentary in Vol. I. ; without any 
addition, the pages of Vol. II. [ ] denote tiiat the word does not 
occur in I. e. or in Herodotus. 



414 



INDEX I 
LECTIONUM 

(The referenom are merely to notM Id the Commentary.) 



1. 4 iwolee 

7 rtfi^f 

8 Kal rXota 

2. 5 Vofipitu SvyaTpit 
6. 9 iX\' tl 

8. 16 re 

29 dTixi^yot 
32 T<1 

10. 31 ruir ft^piwr roS 

60-65 1 S^ • • 'axit 
<Iitu 

11. 8 <Ka2> . . <ToDKi;pov> 

15. I coX^ovra 

4 icu^pdrtof 

16. 17 ^wrrd 
36 StSSmiTcu 

18. II fftwrpar(twdfi(i>e» 

21. 6 A/ia 

22. I ■muairriiiv 

8 vrd iyBpunran 
26. 7 triTov 
26. 6 dpa 
29. II iTtt€4tt 
31. 7 /«\c8m>4> d0ariiry 

d»Api 
36. 4 m-yia.t 

10 8o\tp^ 
36. 7 nii'Toi/ 

8 d>«cwx«% 

9 r^t Mprft . . 
9 it^ipov 

11 TfuripiiM 
20 ro9 r6iw 

39. I i/ttlptro 

5 aiSrg r$ yvraucl 

40. 3 aifi^uxTm . . Sia- 

K€Kplft(POl 



Book 7 

40. 10 M^ 
42. 5 '/LipaiiArrtuHt 
68. 14 Myunff 
61, 2 rtd/nt xaXro/u^vovt 
4 lacuna 

63. 8 ToOrur Si /lemjd 

XoX&ubt 

64. 3 dTx^roTtt 
4 oL :SK6$at 

76. I lacuna 

1 <i/u/So&'at 

2 Xvnoffry/af 

77. 4 (tiuLra htwtrop- 

WOTO 

81. 5 <oJ> 

86. 8 Kitrrun 

88. 3 ^1 . . rrpti- 

■rf<re 
90. 2 ^<rrdXaTo 

96. 2 Toirwi' 

97. 7 Tpl1)K6l>TepM 

r/xox'Xta 

98. 3 Ztpti/tov 

101. II /til i6rres ip$ium, 

14 xM'i'MM 

104. 5 TUYxdyw . . iK€l- 

fOVt 

109. 8 tclW 

13 Ularvpos 
111. 8, 9 oCroi . . roixtXci' 

TfpOf 

116. 8 Kol rwr . . olKtb¥- 

TIM 

119. 13 iiuatTiovci 

15 #<r« ktX. 

121. 6 lacuna 

122. 5 iwU/wot 

123. I S(0wriq 
129. 26 )peU»tT<u 

416 



136. 


4 U0t6fuyai 


187. 


1 1 Todi ix Tlpwdot 




18 /wTd Si—ir^p 


139. 


4 tAt 4wt6i>ra 




21 d^toprdvoi ri 




dXi;«^( 




23 iUpefd . . ^iryrf- 




parrtt 


140. 


5 <?« 




13 ptviiuroi 


141. 


3 KiXflVrfifov 




9 fUvoimr 


143. 


5 ^Arrwi 




14 e^Tew 


144. 


4 rwv dvd Aavprfov 




6 Sti/xoo-fat 




7 X^WK 




1 1 aSrcU re ktX, 


145. 


7 VXPW^'W 




17 oMo^r . . lUiw 


152. 


10 a-ovrdrafft 


163. 


15 Koi ToOro 


164. 


5 lacuna 


167. 


10 <74^> . . MO'dXwt 


168. 


18 'EUi^ywr 


162. 


6-II 'manifcstant 




scholium ' 


164. 


5 «»/>* 


166. 


S 'Arpuwot 


170. 


13 drrJ M «r»cu 




17 oCrw 


171. 


7 dxd 




9 ripMaBax ktK. 


172. 


I wt 8iiS€(ap 




2 iri oC (T^ ^Jfjofe 




ktX. 


173. 


II o( 




17 ffTntabmrrn rrX. 


176. 


9 /iirrat /oSva 



41C 






HERODOTUS 








181 


a 'A(rurMi;t 


194. 


14 <-rtpOtvwe<u 


228. 


4 


k-okA TfSf Tfia- 


186 


3 djcdrowt 


197. 


3 t4 wtpi. . . Ai6t 






Koarlau 


187 


6 dart . . [xaipi- 


206. 






8 S, teV crX. 




ffTorat] 


212. 


10 [eOpivKor] 


229. 


13 






8 eipUricu -ydtp rrX. 


216. 


I <oi> 




14 


ytt^O V All ttv J u 




13 lacana 


216. 


S X^hfti KxX. 


287. 


7 •»f tnyg 


191 


6 y&riai 


220. 


5 rV yixiiurp' r\ti- 




12 


W^ 


198 


2 UoatiSiufos . . 




OTOS €lfli 


288. 


19 


dcevmu 




ro^^orret 




23 luaiviav 


239. 




(the whole) 


194. 


4 rwv ktX. 


223. 


14 lacuna 




I 


r4 




12 4prfaaiii»w 


228. 


I lacana 
Book 8 




3 


«> 


1. 


I iBCUna 


69. 


6 irtutpln 


109. 


II 


dvcMrd^rcK 


•1. 


2 erpTTtu rrX. 




II TOptaKtiOffTO 




17 


dX\' 


5. 


II iXiryA'Tct 


78. 


II iKitSupUvurai 




18 


rOr /t^ . . m- 


6. 


9 0e(%Ecir0(u 




12 ToO xpirov 






/uXi^ffqroi 


8. 


II TOi5roui 


74. 


2 [8p6tu,vl 


111. 


10 


tfewr x/nytrrur 


10. 


1 ipumtt 


76. 


6 [r^f] Kw4<roi/po«' 






^mev «iS 


16. 


I Tt 


77. 


totam cap. 


113. 


II 


dXXirv 




9 xofr^own 




12 [is] 




14 


fr 


16. 


8 d^wcifdyMFW 


80. 


7 Cn . . TttOra 


116. 


3 


tAc «-4par [ttjs 


19. 


2 pappdpov 


81. 


2 <d(>eic«'Xwa'a< 






S(a/3d0-u»} 




20 (the whole) 


84. 


4 ITaXXi^vftH 




«5 


<rai ^ MoiceSaW; 


20. 


3 T/Mxreo-dfarro 


86. 


12 oi A* . . -rfpawrl 


116. 


4 


t4 Spot tV 'Podi>^ 


21. 


4 roXV'tc 


90. 


18 Td wiX^crai A^-yd- 


119. 


3 


dXX<«t 


2r.. 


4 KcU Oewttet 




Xeftw 


120. 


8 pmXKmr . . tirpi- 


27. 


15 ripat 




20 rpo<rtpi\tTo 






MOTM 


28. 


I iroX(o/>WoKrat 




20 Tt 


121. 


9 


#ffnjr«e . . i x^- 


31. 


6 1j Ttp Ijv kt\. 




20 <'I<iW«> 






fftOJ 


S5. 


5 Ato\tS4wy 


93. 


4 rX^M 


128. 


17 


cararX'q^ 


37. 


7 npovatift 




9 (!if Tpirtpov ttpiirtu 


130. 


14 


araOiie^ium 


40. 


I utarJoTcet 




10 j^a*" . . 4>aX4p4> 


131. 


8 


TSitipvibiairrvs 


43. 


5 nifSov KOI 


9t. 


II SpiiTiaai 




8 <ToO Sioi>> 


44. 


7 T^jy vtpaliiv 


96. 


7 ical Moixraii^ 




II 


hrri 


49. 


S e^ mmiOiiixn 




II A«Xi)Sef 


132. 


17 


KararXbHTot 


50. 


2 ^X)jXi)e€€ 




12 <t>p6^ovai 


133. 


2 


Ei>)j«»-A» 


63. 


2 ^fo3o5 


98. 


3 iyyap^iov 


135. 


I 


r6«e 


66. 


I W! 




13 To&ro . . dyyo/njior 




9 


lacuna 




3 aro6cva6iiei>oi 


99. 


4 ^u<r/j;in 


136. 


7 


'AXd/Sai-aa 


60. 


I [x^j] 




6 Karyipel^avTo 


137. 


9 liaav yiip . . xM- 




5 Karriyop^eii' 


100. 


I ytvoimov 






/uxai 




1 1 papirripas 




II Tout) 


138. 


5 


Tora/ubs . . ffwr^pt 




22 wept-ix^ixSc 


104. 


3 o! J^ nj;3a(r^es . . 


140. 


10 


irrlotr 




31 <(faTtk >'Aoi'> 




iyhero 


142. 


8 


apxtjOef 


66. 


28 /lerapffiuOiv 


105. 


6 iKTap.i>v iywiuw 




9 


dXXcM Tt toiJtbw 


67. 


9 /Sao'tXer'; 


108. 


1 1 ipyduTcuTO 






drdi^wr 


68. 


4 rixtii' 


109. 


8 [KeKirq/t^voi't] 
Book 9 








1. 


6 xoXeiroiJs 


16. 


8 KpovMiuvofy 


27. 


24 pMwo/jULxiifavrtt 




9 'oTCP'i 




10 TfraiUvof 


28. 


21 


HoXi^ei 


4. 


7 ioOini^ 


22. 


I Titfi' rap<6i^(i)i' 


32. 


4 


t'pvywi' re nt 


6. 


S rpoa<f>ipei. 




17 ^iriSfleirai' 






MMrujy 


«. 


II 9t( . . u){ 


23. 


8 dirooT^oJo-ej 




6 0? re . . niYtuuk 




13 fe/i-owt . . papfiipovi 


25. 


6 ToOra ^xofew 




II 


lis coi rplntpo* 


11. 


17 T(ii«-4 toOto iwolfov 


26. 


12 o.yop€ixiaiT6a.i 






StS^iKurtu 


14. 


2 Tp6Spopiov 


27. 


22 ^ori 


33. 


7 virow 









INDEX I 






41' 


34. 


2 alrtofihovt 


70. 


20 xaraXij/i^rcu 




93. 


23 ToAs wpo^i^at 


S5. 


2 vim-un 


71. 


7 is . . iri/tlriv 




94. 


16 8ta>iL iwoiet, to 




5 /mCtm . . ToXt^rcu 




10 6 ^wafmljfnit 




96. 


2 KdKanlaoio-i 




lO 'lv6(Ufi 




18 Twr . . MXV 






12 <iriip> 


87. 


24 ouyKtKvpriiUrw 




19 povMfUPOt 


Awo- 


97. 


2 ^wcmfiirp 


39. 


II oA ijxMiupoi . . 




Bartip 






7 waptaKtvdSaro . 




ifOpuTov 


78. 


14 reri/uw/n^eu 






rapto-KtvAfoirro 


41. 


8 wirra rif (rrpariit 


81. 


13 TdXarra 




98. 


17 uvrit . . 'SKKrffft 


45. 


19 ^{oi^np 


82. 


6 ica0iit 




100. 


7 trviiwivToitnit 


51. 


15 [•fhpi,,] 


88. 


3-84 




102. 


Stri 


53. 


12 raur' inuroiUrov 




4M 






15 oOtw 


54. 


6 Tttl 


86. 


3 ro^ ^yat 




104. 


8 Sii t<t>tpo» 


56. 


2 iraKpirofUrovi 


86. 


3 airur 




105. 


2 EdSolrov 


67. 


2 ye 


88. 


6 Sute4t<r0ai 




106. 


14 ifiroKcua 


64. 


S tQi> , . ibrrrt 


90. 


2 kcnna 




107. 


10 ^poo-tfeit 


65. 


9 Tit lp6v 


92. 


2 ot /l^K . . wou6- 


109. 


7rvii 


66. 


9 Kan/pTriiUput 




lurot 




110. 


7 <6> 


70. 


5 AaxtdaiftorUm 


98. 


3 Topa [<X< 


3ra>] 


111. 


25 KOi; 




II ^WOf 




woroftAi' 




116. 


23 i^KTUt 



VOL.11 



2k 



INDEX II 



VERBOEUM ET GRAECITATIS 



/ 



Afiarot 678 b 

i.ya$it6l7h 

AyaXfia 68Sh, 690 a 

Ayavdat 698 a, 760 b 

iyaup6rara 78 b 

dTTa/n^Mv 511 b 

dyyeXh,377b, 680 b, 616* 

d77«^o» 2 a, «b, 197 a, 
203b,208a,2248,22Sb, 
260 a. 262 b, 303 b. 441 a, 
664 a, 672 a, 684 a, 781 a 

iyieaeai. 468 b 

i.yta> 160 a, 206 a, 290 a, 
391 a, 606 b, 608 a, 626 a, 
603 a, 610 a, 661 a, 671b, 
790 a 

iytvOai 9 a, 818 b 

iyivitw 621 b 

iyKvpa. 62 a 

&yrtaiuxx6ini 698 a, 699 b 

iyopeOtw 643 a 

dyo/r^ 36 b, 329 a 

a^ptoj 375 b 

4yX"'''"» 764 a 

iyxUrrpo^ 23 a 

d7xo0 410b, 697 b, 795 b 

d-yiir 391b, 527 b, 685 a, 
644 b, 670 a, 724 a, 777 b 

iyuvlftm 644 b 

iyuviftaecu 374 a, 379 b 

dSaiy^Laif 456 b 

dSai^t 691 a 

Hd/Mt 190 a 

ASeia 684 a 

dSeCn 815 a 

dSi;>> 678 a 

iivfaah] 251 a 

dSvyariy rt 725 b 

iSvToy 188 a 

ie0\oy 802 b 

deffXoi 298 b 

ietpttf 172 b, 443 b, 505 b| | 
581b, 705 b, 723 a 



di^Xof 187 b 

iedvarot 107 b, 314 a, 539 a 

d0^^uaTot689a 

alyta\is 797 a 

al84t<r0iu 604 a 

altl 136 b, 627 a, 804 a, 

824 a 
a/0p{if 57 b, 278 a 
alfuurlif 83 a 
a<r^«y 130 b, 661b 
ofri; 536 b, 622 a 
aip^eu' 107 b, 260 a, 262 a, 

786 a, 804 a, 830 b 
alpifffOou. 661 a 
aXaiiun 686 a 
aUrxpiit 589 a 
aWeur 814 b 
aWij 175 a, 179 b, 618 b, 

685 a, 747 b, 748 a 
oXtio*, t6 160 b, 657 a, 

606 a, 788 a 
ofTtot 318 b 
alXpuiXarrot 756 a 
a^XMii210a 
al^ 625 b, 646 b 
alwpiear 514 b 
Axarot 274 b 
iMh<i6ai 350 a 

din^/NITOT 16 b 

dKtvdmjs 76 a, 547 a, 762 b, 

811a 
djtorTtonJi 498 b 
&Ko6tu> 376 a, 603 a, 755 b, 

761 a, 768 b, 772 a, 790 a, 

796 b, 810 b 
iKpr, 79 a, 153 b, 164 b, 

286 a, 624 a 
ixpiTot 561 a 
iKpo^oXl^ffdai 463 a 
iKpoOivia 548 a 
d«/XM>401a, 810 b 
dxpJToXtt 417 b 

418 



d<c^6a, 141a 

ixptrr^pum S21 b 

dim) 47 b, 480b, SOTb. 

827 a 
dXaXavAutt 412 a 
dX^ev 86 a 
dX/ccv 310 b 
dX^1^r(f 626» 
iXxvpor 149 a 
dX(w/n}602a 
dX)jfleii|848b, 777 b 
dXi,Ww»774b, 779 a 
dXq^687a 
dXi}t, 887 b. 808 b 
dX/q 176 a 
dXl<r<cer0a< 450 a, 521a, ! 

678 a ' 

dXx4 626a, 744 a 
dXXd 13 b, 865 a, 451 1, 

530 a, 588 a, 597 l>, 

693 b 
dXXoi 73 b, 150 a, 239 1. j 

279 a, 308b(M»), 442 b, 

539 a, 545 a, 547 a, 616 h, < 

741b, 762 a, 765 a 
dXX^p(ot470b . 

dXX'oiJ 602 a, 645 a, 688 » 
dXXut 399 a, 544 a, 546», 

552 a, 585 a, 630 a 
iiXfivpin 50 a 
dXo7^«i' 339 a, 644 a 
i.\aylii 311 a 
dXt 384 a 

dXorot 296 a, 784 b 
iXuKTitta 744 a 
dX^trov 149 a 
aXtariKtm 99 b 
ifujL (adv.) 877b, 438 1, 

605 a: (prep.) 387 b, 

442b; also 38a, 66b, , 

146 a, 278 a, 323 a, 6221, ' 

634 a, 688 b, 764 a 
ifux. /liv . . ifia M 538a, 



^^^^^^^^f^^F INDEX II 


I 

419 


672 b, SSSa, «0-Ja: Hfia 


dvdjTTopw 735 a 


628h, 58.';b,596b,ei6a, 


a/ 603* 


di>«Kw< 530 a 


622a. 625 0. 687 b. 694 a. 


'AiMioflt 647 b 


ii'tticwx*!'"'' 51 b, 128 b, 


720 a, 7a8 b. 744 b 


inaitrit 300 a 


239 ft. 613 b 


airUrai (-ri^) 364 ft 


ifiaprimw 60S a 


ifa\afifiiii>fir 213 ft, 340 b, 


AKuroCy 132 b 


kftaLprit 280 ft, MO b 


628 b, 638 b, 704 b, 


dvMrrdrai 751 a 


a4MVfov* 609 » 


708* 


ifoiet 440 a 


i/uiXi;T< 596 ft 


dMi\kn-M 438 b 


dt>o«\(n 730 a 


AM('^c<r 44& a.416 b, 484 b. 


ifoMx*'^'^ 6^ b 


ayinrtot 529 a, 759 a 


756 b 


ipofUrtiM 718 b 


dyratrovrrivrir 179 b 


^Mrlfw, rd 627 ft 


aimiu.tari)OKtiii 683 a 


dKTVx"" (-«<r*ai) 379 b, 


d^i^rtrof 789ft 


drd^iof 13 b 


681 b, 631 b, 715 b 


d^TXay'i? 535 b 


dvo^up^t 84 a, 89 ft 


ifTl 85 ft, 44 ft, 244 b, 


dMiXXa66b 


ifartTratUrot 447 b 


398 ft, ."iseft, 814 b 


dM«/9ii 223 b 


drarcTarvi^vai 607 a 


d^{a 660 ft, 694 b 


djurtXot 42 ft 


dfarXdffffdf 530 a 


ittriKaritaeai 679 b 


i/iTitfnt 557ft 


ifar^itw 376 b 


iimXaylii 482 a, 774 b, 


ifiOna ( cff^ou) 438 ft, 4 74 ft, 


drdnirrot 814ft 


775 b 


587 b, 803 b 


dl^^^rd^tr397ft, 728 b 


irrlioot 70 ft, 205 b, 285 ft, 


iij^A l»2b, 193 b. 308 b, 


irapplmut 7 1 n 


322 b, 546 b 


478 b. 667 b, 718 h. 740 a, 


dnl/Nriw 673 b, 816 ft 


i^lot, 729 a 


741 «, 820 b, 8251) 


dfapr/rffCai 12 a 


di>Tir6X<^i 462 a 


•M^/3a<rii| 486 a 


acapx'n 83.'i it 


drTiTd<7-<r»i» {-tfOai) 658 b, 


i.u4t<rfiarifir 753 b 


dvaffkoXoirJj'tu' 760 ft 


630 b 


«r 131b. 161ft, 226 a, 


iriararrot 1 04 b 


iMTlTtil>tlP 323 b 


240ft. 27Cb. 504 a, 517 a. 


dj^dffrao'ii 807 b 


AjrrtnddKU 447ft 


i 578 b. 682ft. 737 a. 747 b. 


iya^Taiipour 288 b, 361 b 


drrixa/iifrff^ai 145 ft 


1 819 ft: Av omitted. 725 a, 


dj-OffX""*' 686 b 


djrrtxpdy, 276 a 


' 773 b 


iva,Tfty(n> 96 a, 261 ft 


ajnpor 410 a. 786 b 


drd 372 a, 467 ft, 560 ft, 


iimriBdnat 247 a 


ajr6€u> 735 b 


762 ft. 773 b 


drariiiSj' 667 b 


druplri 538 a ' 


ira/taUuf 19 b. 307 a. 


irarpH-tir 460 b 


dfufT^^ 559 ft 


321 b, 742 ft 


iiKiTpixti* 443 ft 


(d{iotf<i7roi \xix note) 


<u>a^XX(ir 606 b 


dra^iwir 203 b. 399 ft, 


di<4^oxi>t 349 a 


dmi^(T<i329ft 410a, 412a, 457b 


d{i4»aro» 276 b 


ii««/tM»349b 


di>axwp/<i'' 5 b 


d{iM 687 ft. 743 b, 757 b, 


Ara^M386ft 


draxu/nff 385 a 


765 ft. 814 b 


imiytiv (firtfai) 128 b. 


dra^(/X(u' 81 b 


dird->(>»88b, 542 a, 714 b 


464 b, 478 a, 468 b (bit). 


dr3d»«« 250 a, 519 ft, 600 b. 


droY^f 83 b 


790 b, 793 b 


627 rt, 761b, 814 b 


dwayoptCtir 203 », 544 ft. 


iraytyi'iMrKtiir 8 b, 532 b 


iiripaya.eiii 236 b 


735 b 


ayayUfa^ 132 b, 246 b, 


dvdpifiT) 126 a 


axatlprii' 444 b, 447 ft, 


523 ft 


dj4ptdt247ft, 396 ft 


805» 


araYXftli) 120 b. 126 ft. 


drf«A<rrgf Illb. 176s 


dwa&^i 271 b 


183 b, 184 b, 324 a, 618 b, 


dret»2gb, 467 b 


drait 306 b 


623 a 


irtXiir 201 b 


diraXXari}309b, 414 b 


arayxaUin 581 ft, 690 b. 


dtxfiot 646 ft 


dirdXX&fti 614 b 


645b 


di'<i> 682 a 


droAXdirirnr 589 b, 706 b, 


drd7in|178b, 188 ft. 251 ft 


di'^X'U' (o-^cu) 166 ft, 166 ft. 


808 a 


iraypdipti* 492 b 


368 b, 392 b 


dra^(Xo7(if 44 a 


di'aiii<ifKHi' 452 b 


dv<^>6«608b 


drdnr&82ft 


iMaipatuif 315 a 


d»iiKti»26a, 360 b. 2^36 b 


droX/df 669 b 


arafcwTyOviu 447 a. 681 b 


<bn)v<rrwi39«b 


drtiXriHlpiot 536 a 


i»d^^404a, 409 a 


drifKotwrVf IT 27 • 


irnra 604 a 


dMii»<r0ai 710 b 


d^p 78 a, 115 b. 125 b, 


dre^iriurtfai 28 a 


dMu/i/«ir 66tfa(6a), 732* 


136 a, 181b, 192 U 275 ft. 


drtt/Hrrot 15 a 


i*aKalui> 383 a 


313 b. 444 ft, 462 ft, 521 a. 


i]rei/M», 720 b 


dra/ia\/<ii> 782 b 


.'.28 a, 540 a, 625 b, 694 a, 


dveXiif'ftir 306 b, 316 a, 


draxcitf^ai 396 b 


746 b. 817 a. 828 b 


518 b, 530 b 


dvax/Wyco^iu 714 ft 


iMifputrm 15 a, 68 b, 78 a, 


dW^«» 140,, 407 b, 789 b 


itritipiait 464 a 


177 a. 184 a, 248ft. 313 b, 


iTtcTpa/ifUvot 223 b 


dyftxpo/fiv 489 b 


398 ft. 413 ft. 437 b. 465 ft. 


dTt«rT(i 771 b 



^^^1 4X0 


HERODOTUS ^^^B 


^^^^ Ar^Xf" (-«'('<>') M5 a. &70 ft 


droirV«ir 791 b, 807 a 


555 b. 565 a. 631 a, 7ImH 


^^^r imiKiwTris 27 6 u 


iropar 410 b, 741b 


726 a, 763 a. 808 b ] 


^^^^ arUrai ( ii7M<) 153 b, 416 b. 


d»-op/ij43»b. 796 b 


4pX«''487B. 72Sa ^d 


^^^^H 434 u, 776 b 


iiropot 696 a 


dffijn^ 644 a, 601 a ^^H 


^^^^^^H ivUvai {-tifu) 148 b 


dr6pfn,Tos 688 a. 7B» b 


dirWctv 666 a ^^| 


^^^H irixpietrffat 439 k, 599 b, 


iropplirT(i» 503 » 


d(r<(6( 41 a ^H 


^^^H 607 b, 779 b. 8S4 b 


driMr<{ri>> 633 a 


Aaiitixti 522 b ^^H 


^^^^H drijir 624 757 a 


iro<rT€lxfty 714 b 


d<nraf^u' 304 b. 824 a ^H 


^^^^^H iTia-rirai 


dirixrr^i'a. 805 b. 806 a. 


d<rirlt <>6 a ^H 


^^^^H irirraa^ax 354 b. 7H2ii. 


830 b 


dtrr^t 217 K 245 b, 4M|^I 


^^^B 810 a 


dirwrTpo^^ 532a 


dim/ 217b. M3b, 4««. 1 


^^^^H irirrlii 


dwoffx'f"' (-nreo*) 8412 a, 


721a J 


^^^^H irtcTot ■ 


727 a 


i<rrvy(Lruv 829 b ^^H 


^^^H dirXerot 374 b. 513 b, 815 a 


iroriMfur 351b. 546 a, 


d(rxd\X<ir 3Vi4 b ^H 


^^^H ix6 89 b. 161 a, 170 1, 


818 b 


d7dp70b, S89a ^H 


^^^H 229 b, 233 b, 248 •,260 a. 


6.wo<palnij> 127 n 


drdirtfaXos &29a.;fi9kal^H 


^^^H 843 m 374 b, 378 a, 388 •. 


droxpcu- 302 b, 695 b, 


dre 277 a, 314 a, M^H 


^^^H 415 a. 436 a, 441 a. 442 b, 


761b. 789 » 


710 a, 763 a l^l 


^^^B 455 a, 496 a, 506 > (bis), 


irpmrS6inrT0t 306 b 


i,TUw 331 a ^H 


^^^^1 540 b, *iOS K 621 a. 730 b. 


«Tr«»' (-«iT«/<u) 439 a, 762 a 


dreXed; 762 a ^^| 


^^^H 735b.73(ib.77:{b.781a. 


ipa 20 a. 26 b, 26 b, 60 a. 


drviiij 340 \ ^H 


^^^^ 


169 0, 210a, 368 b. 444 b. 


dri/iaC* 340 a, 341 a ^H 


^■^ clt6, rd r.0(> a 


S05a. .'>15b,532a.534b. 


dr/>arte257a, 31«a ^H 


^^m a.w6, t6 604 a 


670 n, 673 b, 606 b, 607 a, 


drptr^it 768 b ^ 


^^H dro- (in Oonip.) 584 a, 


628 a, 664 b. 689 a, 693 b, 


irpifuK 711 a 


^M 657 b 


720 b, 725 b. 772 b. 782 a, 


dr/>r/.l^u> 10 b. 88 a. 7Mb 


^^H dirojSdtf^ni 795 b 


806a, 813a 


drpvroi 705 a 


^H dro^Joirni' 343 b, 363 a, 


ipa 64S b 


iruxiii' 816 b 


^H 4»:{a, fiOSa, 797 a 


ipatpijiUrot 786 a 


ai/X<feer9iu 674 a 


^H diro^\^ireij> 728 a 


dpdtfSm 606 b 


aiX.ii'ieab, 167 b 


^^1 diroYlrcfftfai 740 a 


d/j^ffKen-SlSb, 736 a 


aO;»>> 661 a 


^^1 irvypiipeir 127 b 


iprrfj 6 a. 350 b, 353 a, 


OUTfxdT-l'tXTOf 43 b 


^^^1 diro8(i/n'i}i'ai 149 a, 185 a, 


392 b, 689 b. 631b, 651 a. 


ainUa. 326 a, 287 a, 39Sa 


^H 409 a, 497 b, 738 K 762 b 


678 b, 679 a, 743 a, 746 b 


488 b, 605 a, 525 a, 607 K 


^H drMr£it517a 


ipe^un 129 b, 607 a, 674 b 


772 b, 784 a fair. *r' 


^H iroSiSiyat 217 b, 60:! b, 


ipiSv\ot 456 b, 456 b 


dpx<it 735 b, 805 a ; atr. 


^H 760 a, 827 a 


4p./J/«>» 107 b. 130 b. 308 a, 


;i«T4 raura 757 b, 787 a, 


^H droSmVeu' 534 a 


368 a 


790 a, 819 a) 


^H drotf^etv 443 b 


apurrtitiv 752 b, 765 a. 


aSrtt 449a, 538a. &»0«r 


^H awoO^v 531 a, b 


806 b 


alrrdSfv 803 b 


^H diro0/)uNrKC(f 209 b 


ipt<rr/^oy 873 b, 549 b, 650 a 


atrriOi 569 b 


^^M dTotftai/idfciv 455 a, 817 b 


apKteagai 668 a 


oi>to«(XtJ5 601 b 


^H diTMirat 98 a, 99a. Il9b 


dpxa 60b. 110a, 187b, 


ain-^AUiror 678 a 


^H diroira, rd 826 b 


272 b, 543 a 


aiT0iui\4«ur 486 a 


^^B dTo<x<'('a< 719 a 


Afi/uifiaia. 61 a, 108 a. 766 b 


a^A^oXot323a 


^^1 diroKaX/cir 630 a 


apti6ittv 813 b 


ovrAimTi 484 a, 4S5a 


^^H dwoKfiifutir 657 b 


apxi^(w 811b 


ainSt 12a, 16 b, 19a, SSU 


^H d«-gK\>)(((i- 699 a 


ippuSlT, 253 b, 409 a. 802a 


44a. ,18 b. 68 b. 71«, 


^^H iroKoi/iar 479 b 


dpTOJ' 12 a, 739 a 


120 a. 208 b, 324 b (Am). 


^^B- da-oXo^/Sdntv 510 a, 876 b, 


iprT(t<r9<u 12 b 


355 b, 361a, 367 b (Mfk 


^H 704 b, .S20 a 


dprtos 619 b, 694 b, 708 ■ 


375 b, 379 b, 398a. 40»b 


^H droXit 133 b, 449 a 


d/>T(Mc6«raf 766 b 


[bis), 438 a, 4Ua. 


^H droXXi^ai 818 a 


ipTot 576 a 


495ab. 611a. Tltb, 


^^H droXi^eir 446 b, 775 a 


ipi-eir 67 7 a 


730 b 


^^^1 irofiaimyovr 520 b 


dpxatoi' 688 b 


ai>ror 19 b, 85 b, 160 a. 


^^^1 ivofidxniOat 179 a 


dpxatof 224 a. 272 a, 693 a 


161b. 189 b,S.%b. 4341. 


^^^B dTovaoT^ctv 413 a 


dpxe»»(-«rl?a.)105tt, 219K 


447 a, 462 b, 617 a, 644 U 


^^^1 irirdpa 371 a 


228 b, 237 a. 343 a, 644 b, 


558 b, 696 a, CIO a. 716 > 


^^B drareipoj' 461 b, 567 b, 


672 b, 805 b, 829 b, 830 b 


821a 


^H 631 


dpxT>^» 773 b 


aOrut 385 a, 693 a 


^^M aroT4i».TtiP 698 b, 725 b 


ipXV^f 133 a, 387 a, 685 a 


aux^if 320 b 


^^B droT^nrffai 22 b 


ipxfy' 322 b, 349 a, 350 a. 


{d<paipfia0ai 188 h) 



^^^^^^^^^^ INDEX 11 ^^^ 421 ^^H 


^Mif<v(r«v 23«b, refib 


■yfivAMH 392 a 


278 b, 311 0.3230, 331b, ^^^| 


^K^7«t 281 b 


y»of 273 b, 293 b. 310 b. 


:i56o,416b.446b,4d0b, ^H 


^K^iUwt «78 », 724 B 


384 b, 432 a b. 607 b, 


628 b. 5 12 b. 601 b. 696 b, ^H 


' a<!>4S19m 


619 U 666 u. 667 a, 688 h, 


706 a. 725 b. 806 .i. 816 b. ^H 


d^&woi 281 b 


766 b, 786 a 


81-..; 3/ aS 258b; « __^^ 


iipvKTut 824 a 


><fpai 133 b. 212 b, 662 b, 


yt 446 b; 5^ Hu 176o, ^^^H 


dxa/Nt 71b, 111b, 183 a, 


644 a 


196 b. 410 a, 688 b (S' ^^^H 


282 «, 376 b. 689 » 


yipf^ 84 a. 727 b. 799 a, 


if 211 b, 281 a. 691b, ^^^B 


dxdfKTOi 218 A 


803 a 


693 b, 761 a) ~^H 


dx<'«r<'iu 79&a 


7f i>cu> 68 a 


SfStyfUfot 600 b ^^^^H 


AXPV"^ ^^ •, 817 b 


yi^fivpa 17 a, 81 Oil, 827 b 


3<aa7/uu 26 a ^^^^^1 




ytwwtlnrii 635 b 


i€iaytiiyoi 22 a, 632 o ^^^^| 


fidl>y,,> 716 h 


yv 388 a, 389 a, 823 b. 


5<66>iyiiMt 26 o ^^H 


^ytiv2-2St 


829 a 


d^6o^tl76b ^^^M 


fiAKXtw (-cKT^a.) 322 b, 


7Ty*«^» 441 b 


Sitif 239 a, 439 b, 486 ». ^^^M 


384 a, 463m, 628 a, COOb 


yi^ox/etf 281 b 


673 a, 720 a. 75:ia. 814 b ^^^H 


fidpfiapot 49 b, 87 a, 237 a. 


7i(7)"<r«'<« 13 «. 44 b. 136 a, 


iitaffM 58 a, 220 b, 361a, ^^^H 


287 b, 399 a. 416a, 486 b. 


163 a, 272 b. 296 a. 462 b, 


363 a, 386 b, 391 a, 416 b, ^^^H 


1 496 b, 6011.. 521b. 680 b, 


548 b, 672 U.'>7!>b. 679 b. 


446 0,486 a. 587 b, 604 a, ^^^H 


1 S87a,606a,t)9&a, 761a. 


728 a, 746 b. 748 b. 816 a 


669 b. 774^816 b. 818 a ^^H 


1 782 a, 804 a 


•fi(y)ru><tiitLi> 696 b, 667 b, 


^^^H 


^a^447b 


766 b 


^^^^^H 


fiiurarlftut 198 b 


yXlXtceat 687 b 


StLtuUfar 1. ^^^^^^1 


fiaffiXtitm 629 a 


7Xi'<^ii' 93 b 


ttlXv 365 a. 370 b, 801 o ^^^H 


/SacriXcit b, 224 b, 234 b, 


7Xi>^ri 555 b 


SnXiq 392 ^^^^1 


425 a, 643 b, 670 a, 676 a, 


yXuiaai) 571 b 


S€o>6s Sl« o, 822 ^^^H 


603 b, 668 a. 669*. 787 b. 


yrufui 73 b 


i€trir€pa 1 ^^^^^H 


756a, 816b 


7i'u>fi>; 323b, 392a, 416 a. 


^^^^H 


ptaftatat 682 b 


4S4b. 526 a. 699 0,600 a. 


^^^^^H 


Piv 758 b 


6211.. 682 a 


StKdfiftfoi .''.98 b ^^^^^^^H 


^Jot 133 b, 391a, 614 b. 


yrtaaifiax^fui' 1 6fi b, 397 a 


^^^^^H 


622 b 


yirit 283 ii 


£«cdT<7 395 b. 763 o ^^^H 


^lon) 68 b 


7OM0<ot 768 a 


t^KiffBai 258 b. 397 o. 640 o. ^^^H 


pXoffTirtiF 217 a 


yifot 306 b, 666 a 


6600,677 0,600 b, 605 a. ^^^H 


^XaiTT&s 443 a 


yirv 755 b 


736 a, 788 a, 818 a ^^H 


fioar 602 b, 661 a 


ypdiifiu 386 a 


ieXrlor 365 o ^^^^H 


^4 412 a, 613 b. 723 b 


7/»aAiiuaTirr.^» 127 b 


i^Xrm, T) 671 b ^H 


0oTiS/(U'251a.3O»a,4e8a, 


7/xl^if 3181.. 571b 


aZ/uiv 300 a ^^1 


726 a 


yuftfiftue 311 a 


j/cV? 794 b ^H 


fkaurrdpxv 617 a 


7ur4 125 b, 676 a. 601a, 


j.^ri'as 810 b ^^^H 


P6<tK*u> 785 b 


6300.731 b,7a6b,810U, 


ac{>i^ 360 ^^^^1 


^ovXciVir (-r#tfcuj 3S1 a. 


8180,814 


3(£(dri7i ^^^^^H 


444 b. 476 b, 614 a, 626a, 


7i»V'0t 94 B 


8((rr6rrrt 6 ^^^^^H 


63fik,«80«, 772b 


71^001' 396 b 


><i>rf/M 27 b, 42 b, 74 a, ^^^^M 


fioiXtvua 346 b 


TmWt 549 b 


I42«.20Ub,37;.'b,412a. ^^^H 


/3ovXrirr4f»o» 202 a 




660 b. 5»S Ik. 797 a ^^^H 


/JokXi) 699 b 


Satftirun 28 a, 6$ b. 490 a 


StuTtpa, rd 619 b H^^H 


pipXwoj 384 a 


iaifitiir 766 a 


S<\rTtpfia 661 a ^^H 


/»<.)M<^r>30a, 764 a 


9<lUviu 621 b 


in'Ttpcr, Ti 248 b, 249 b, ^M 




Hdtpi'iui 241 b 


286 a. 289 a. 599 a, 806 a ^H 


yaiUtur 817 b 


iaravt) 380 b 


fc^r^ 8 b, 441a, 442 b, ^^1 


yA4LOpoi 216 b 


a/ 441 a. 461b. 603 b. 516b. 


664 b, 768 b ^^^M 


7dA<of813b ; 684Kfi86a.693K814b: 


ati276b.3iga«966o.381a, ^^^H 


I Tdp 393 a. M5b, <Mb, 


(dtHiiloceii)190b; (with- 


672a,600b.6^'>b,tf9Sb, ^^^1 


722 b, 748 b 


unt iUp) 447 b, 674 a; 


721 b. 797 s. 800 a, 818 a ^H 


} •yAp4»797b 


{emphalio) 8 a, 19 b. 
803 b; {iit^^(ori)12t. 


»^«(»> 368 b. 366 b, 737 b. __^^ 


7* 20 a, 716 tt 


763 ^^^M 


YcXov 541 u 


181b, 220 a, 223 b. 278 b. 


SrjXitirSai 731 b ^^^^H 


>(XatbT 311 b, 390 a 


386 b. 642 b. 601 b.69&b. 


SriXoOr 663 b ^^^^H 


7Aw» 812 a. 767 a 


731 b, 742 b. 7711.; (re- 


Stlfuo(fry6f ^^^^^H 


7<y/<r0ai 670 a 


•umtitivc, with bubject) 


iflftm 191a, 21 8 0. 600 b, ^^^H 


7(*-^w^674a 1 aab; 40 a, 160 a. 214 b, 


760 a ^^^H 



^^H 4M 


HERODOTUS 


^^ 


^^^H did 108*, 4154 a, 498 1, 


MpXtvOax 800 a 


fyKd^tfMt 56 • ^^^^1 


^^^H 522 &, 570 a, 598 a 


aifordvat 512 a 


fyicaracw/iar S70m^^^^H 


^^^H aia^yfv45b,320b,436a. 


^ixtw 153 a, 701* 


^iraraXc^mr 448lf^^^^^| 


^^^m 450 b, 721 b, 780 a 


afr>7/ia« 131b, 191 1, 237 a, 


ifKtiirdai 220 a ^^^^| 


^^^H aul/aa(r(T436a 


674 a, 687 a 


iyttXPV^"^ 190 1> ^^H 


^^^^1 iiapii\\tii> 887 a, 532 n, 


Si-fiKopo% 76/ a 


^ycoroT 397 &. 815 b ^H 


^^^H 


iuarivai 507 a 


iyKpa-r^ 808 a ^H 


^^^^^^ SiaiaTiiir9ai 327 a 


iiKOioaiiinj 231 b 


^r)'/>/<u' .311 a ^H 


^^^^H SiuStiKriirai 249 b, 720 a 


SiKcuo^ 627 b, 641 it, 682 b 


^(i/Maior 84 b ^^M 


^^^^H itaSiKtaSai 584 b 


SiKooT^ptor 787 a 


iyXplMiTT^'' 795 b ^^^B 


^^^H auMiwt 267 b 


iiKiurr^ 288 b 


^Y<u772a ^^^^^1 


^^^H diaSM/myocv 447 a, 7-JOa, 


^a/iQL <81b, 514 a, 731b, 


M/n; 320 It, 680 a ^^^H 


^^^H 724 a 


823 b 


lttir0ai 386 b ^^^H 


^^^^1 SiiSoxot 


5.{ii 306 b, 585 b, 752 b 


i0i\oKaKittM 386 b. 7^I^H 


^^^^H itsip^Ni' (((7001) 70 b. 131a, 


a<oaot 301 a. 798 b 


^^\wn)t 321 b. 644 a ^Hj 


^^^H 


iiopCvatiP 674 a 


tOpot 12 b, 105 b, IS7b. 1 


^^^^^B Siatptgit 


aib< 481 b 


140a. 315 b, 469 a. SaSb. 


^^^^^M iiaifftaOeu (-ifffdai) Gi'.i a 


a<^< 536 b, 604 b, 600 a 


539 b, 639 a. 664 b, dOS b 


^^^^H aiaK<\<ixiv 485 a. 490 a, 


3i»-XrJ<rioi 576 a 


tl 76 b, 280 b, 369 a, 4.'Jf. », 


^^^H 601a 


iiuBitir 775 b, 803 a 


6'i6a,683b,712a,777l'. | 


^^^H aia«p(»i» 324 a, 381 a, 


at<i«t» 187 b, 413 b, 583 b, 


el »i ttJi 386 b; tt ,>i 


^^^H 405 a, 720 a 


723 a, 758 a (M 


26 b; ({e4(c)lSb,3«a. 1 


^^^H SuiKpoOt<r0<u 240 b 


SiCtpvi 147 a, 162 b 


with Infinitive SWk; 


^^^H aioX^ir 523 b, 689 b 


ao(i)i> 178 a 


with Suhjunctire 70 b. 


^^^^^H iiaXv)MlrtaOai SlSh 


aojc/fo- 22 a, 253 b, 274 b, 


451a 


^^^^^H iiafulx((fOai 738 b 


387 a, 416 a, 444 b, 452 b, 


fiShai (.xdfup) 762a: (Ov 


^^^H iia/itlpe<r»ai 6li t 


453 a (fru), 468 b, 467 a, 


719a 


^^^^^M iiaoaviiaxitw i62h 


518 a, 519 a, 522 b. 538 a, 


ttSM 94 b, G21 a. 539 b 


^^^^^B Siawitut 


556 b, 560 a, 567 b, 584 a. 


efceir 37« b ) ^^^^ 


^^^^^B SiaWjMiv 550 a 


607 a, 687 b. 643 b. 688 b. 


ftrcXor a ^^^^B 


^^^1 M^cMa 511 a, «89 h 


699 a. 716 a, 724 b. 734 b, 


(kii 94 ^^^H 


^^^^m iid virrur 4 1 2 a, 584 b 


753 a, 772 b. 774 a, 775 b, 


rrXwt 338 b. 3^0 b, 7<2i < 


^^^^^H Siairai7<raXci/cu> 48 a 


817 b, 819 b, 820 b 


effia 89 b 1 


^^^^H atar^/tmi' 


36jtT)iTii 273 tt 


eirtu 213 b, 387 h, 399 «, 


^^^^^H iuiTopS/uvtiP C99 a 


aA*iMo» 471a, 624 b, 786 a 


441b, 543 b, 604 a, 679*. 


^^^^^H jiavpifa'treu' 681 b 


MXot 58'.i a, 783 a 


817a 


^^^^^H SiaaKtiaryvvai 324 .i 


Soiih<r0ai 2 b 


drfca 308 a, 408 a, 416 b, 


^^^^^1 dtdoTaa-if 168 b 


mv 566 a 


781a, 771 b, 774 a 


^^^^^1 iiao-T-^fu 380 b 


St^oiry 178 a, 69.1 11 


eXriKty 783 a, 816 b 


^^^H ata<r(^ 299 b, 3 1 9 b 


as^Xh^ot 473 b, 599 b 


«>«>290b. 660 a 


^^^^B aUraiit 641 a 


aipu 113 b 


tlptirSai 168 b i 


^^^^H iiOLTdafftw 264 b, 406 b, 


aoi>Xa(ri>i>i7 756 a 


eV^xx 115 a 


^^^H 465 a, 638 a 


SovXavf 724 a 


tlpvrip 683 b 


^^^H aiarplfitw 151a, 436 a, 
^^^1 678 a 


SpaxfiTi .'i04 a 


eh 384 a 


SpTTiTMit 363 a, 381 a, 387 b, 


€lt593a 


^^^^H 3<a0^pf U' b 


476 b, 510a, 614 a 


th Tis 391 a 


^^^^H Suiipeelptif 397 a. 404 b, 


Ipifup 721 b 


itn 444 b, 600 b 


^^^H 


SpOf, i] 322 it 


Vit 33 b, 48 a, 93 b, 104 L. 


^^^^H 8ui<ku>(rK(iv li 


Siyaiut 13 b, 211b, 798 b. 


226 a, 241b, 278 a. 806 b. 


^^^^^B iiax^*"' a 


826 b 


319 0,331 a, 376 b, 384 b, 


^^^^^^1 510 a 


at'-j-aaOai d06 b, 688 b 


386 b, 457 b. 487 b. 4964, 


^^^^^H itSStitfor, t6 OiO H. 


SvtiaffT€Oei.v 697 a 


511 a, 514 a, 515 b, 524*, 


^^^^H Si8<j/if rar 81 8 a 


SvraTir 816 b 


648 b, 553 b, COO b. 774 K 


^^^H atS6>'iuS77a.817a; (aiinjv) 


dvatfTffiri 542 b 


736 a, 739 a, 747 b. 754 a, j 


^^^H 514a, 515a-, (au-at)721 b 


SivOa»aT4fia> 749 1> 


774 a, 786 b ^BJ 


^^^^H at/KirXoos 53 a, 371 a 


at'iTji 368 b 


eirdc 494 b, 78$ b ^H 


^^^^B aic/cirXoOi' l.V.Jb, 485b 




tKorripu 596 a ^^^^^t 


^^^H Siiiipxttreai 512 b, 624 b 


^Sf 449 a. 468 b, 617 a, 


{KaoTM a ^^^^^M 


^^^H S,t(thai 351 a, 3S9 b 


696 a, 682 8, 736 a 


iKcurrot 178 a ^^^^H 


^^^B a(^foaot345b 


Up 56 b 


iKaT(xTT6t 67 b ^^H 


^^^H 6ii7rei, 755 b 


ifypitptif 486 b 


iicfiiXKup 244 a ^H 


^^^^H Bi€pydie<r0ai a 


^(t/xu' 560 a 


«c/SoXi» 164 a, 269 •, «7«^H 



" INDEX II 


^^^^ 488 ^^ 


ix^pictHv 279 a 


tiarprtaH 442 h 


/((upJa.ftr 149 b, 438 a, 1 


4irii>-t(r$tn 6 a, 11a, S3S • 


tmrposet 161a. 194 a, 


611b 


txywrn 136 a 


259 a, 440 a. 494 a 


iiny**ve,u 8 a. 349 b, 737 a. 


hitin 4 b 


tiL^uTot 790 a 


828 b 


hivcit 615 b 


fr 47 a, 258 b <fte<fT.), 


iW^wra 169 a 


iK8upitvra> 472 a 


340 N 342 a, 407 b, 412 a. 


/(iXdffKdr^ai 189 b 


/(elvn 522 b 


446 0,465 a. 602 a, 616 b. 


iiurraftttar 290 a 


inlat 364 a 


604 b, a22a(fri«), 691b, 


/{oJor 329 b, 489 b, 606 b. 


iiiKd\ita$ai 483 b 


694b,739h, 741 h, 766 b 


642 a 


rf««ATTfi» 794 b 


^voMM^rot 93 b 


i{oxAX(iF269a 


1 /«XaMia<l»rtr 790 b 


/yarriot 731 a 


i^aw\litu> 128 b 


iKXdwftr Cu K, 107 b, 184 », 


^vairoiWiti'v^tfai 720 » 


ilopitaaBtu. 703 a 


' 3.'.J a, tJ31 b 


^rcuicu' 340 b 


iiofULMiaeiji 544 « 


iKtuwedftiv 682 a 


i*av\lit<re<u 617 b 


r^w 79 a. 170 a. 337 a, 422 a. 


i!itxo7X/((r<>ai 268 b, 502 b. 


tvSitif 622 a 


748 b. 818 a ■{ 


694 a 


fvAfUKt-crdai 584 b 


tiaOfif 367 a, 600 b 


«rrtFT«t» 246 1> 


ir8iK(c6ai 72 a, 482 a. 584 b 


Or, T6 311b, 350 a. 611b 


€irr\iipou¥ 493 b 


^iocao-rut 255 a 


ivayyiWuv {-taBtu) 2 a, 


/KwXiiffattw 766 b 


iftpyi, 391 a 


42 a. 170a, 206 a, 389 a, 


fmrwMa 762 a 


/v^X"" (-«r9ou) 166 b, 439b, 


398 a. 686 a 


/KfffiywOKU 47S b 


674 a 


/n«<^i» 28 b. 67 b. 696 b 


iirrdtirtii' 818 b 


A'Ai267b 


ixaitu 786 b 


ixTiHtAoir 787 a 


O'#ai>T0 56 b, 183 I, 323 b. 


4ir<u»itui 721 a 


rfcn;0\(rf(in 789 b 


821b 


Iwawafs 760 a 


iKip^ptip 147 a, 278 b. 374 b, 


/KflefTfi- 368 h, 763 ;• 


iwiMTTot 198 b 


435 a, 565a,60Ob, 749 a 


^ftfti/itoi (-or) 441 li 


froA^cf 603 a 


i(fX"/>^"»' 470 b 


<i'Ui\rr6t 6 » 


iwa.iiaa9a.i. 3S9 a 


(iCbM' (Ivou {t( elvcu) 133 b. 


/vtw 443 b 


4w 4Liut>6rTtpa. 185 a, 387 a 


229 a, 543 b. 604 a. 710 a 


/FKOoiVtfot 309 b 


4rariyti.¥ (-a6ai) 796 b 


/\a{>|392a, 442 a 


^»o(.dK 315 b, 6821. 


4waraTt\4tt» 879 a 


fKaihftip 382 a, 634 a, 822 a 


tnpxii 521 b 


/royi/vai 182 a 


i\ri$ipm 582 a 


^ycrrifeu. 597 1. 


^dtrrfir 521 a 


iXfvdtpoOr 219 b 


i»<rTpaToir<ifiitada.i 638 u 


4iraaK4tw 806 h 


tfX(i;tf^/HM472b 


^i^dM'xu' 386 a 


/raiz/n^cTK 221 b 


i^v»ipu<ra 689 b 


tnt^w 713 b 


iwavpitrKtfdai 268 a 


Au'MU' 78 a, 467 ■• 


irTtra/Urui 74 l>, 556 b 


6r(«U 796 a 


^Xnictr 237 b 


A7dX>r 491 b 


^rr(239a.762b 


AXilMirrtu. 47311 


fKT-o/iof 282 b 


/retard 748 b 


EXXdtlSOa, 219 a, 671b, 


^i^if 6H b, 430 b 


4irttrai 169 b 


688 b. 725 a, 827 b 


/(1 40 a, 640a 


4rnp4cea.t 712 a 


'KKKy,' 626 b 


/faryAAeo- 266 b 


4rcipvTar 611 b 


'K>Ar,yiKU, ri 590 b 


^{B7itfy»> 217 b 


#weip<iTi|(rtf 686 b 


fXot 160 a 


4iaiipti» 811 b 


iirrirr 807 a 


r\T((r9(u 360 a, 819 a 


^(a4p/<(vl35h.763a,773b. 


4we\auriu> 270 a 


i\-rlfiif 286 a, 871 b, 473 a, 


824 b 


<irefi/«u 329 b. 688 b 


508 a, 525 a. 815 b 


<fo.W«» 773 n 


4-w4Ttir 10 b 


iXrit 728 b 


^(at^ixrt 689 b 


i-,4f>xt<re<u 202 », 605 b, 


4ttfidK\,i» 494 b, 498 !> 


4ia\tl<f>ti» 326 a 


781b 


^/ui^X«7^o< <>38 a 


^ofiiTtir 287 b, 489 b 


4-wta4pnt99at 613 l> 


titittrtuf 810 a 


^(aviordvu 246 a, 666 a. 


rT((r9ai620a, 714 b 


^M'«^^<r(f 109 b 


808 b 


^f(rT«tft60a, 147 a, 149h 


f MTO^" 79 a ; rd tin. 643 b, 


/(a*>t>«i> 271 a 


^TrTT^fiM^ot 450 b 


714 b 


iia-raToy 789 b, 822 b 


4r4Tti<n 527 a 


t^n/tT/xiixu 404 a 


ifa-fnetiUaeai. 37S a 


4'wtufiiaiut¥ 816 a 


^vixXq^i 544 b 


4^fl»<u 472 b, 669 b 


/t^X'" 184 a. 329 a. 363 h. 


iiarlrpiifu 629 a, 614 a, 


<f<Xtt<r<»270b 


367 U 402 b, 407 b, 468 a. 


735 a 


ii(\avv(u> 109 a 


669 a, 696 b. 722 a, 784 a 


i)twiwT<ii> 4Mb 


if /roj.TJ.,1 367 b 


^r«i/)oXi>t 636 b, 789 a 


iiaroiiitplldn. 309 a 


i(tri<rTatf0at 314 b. 786 b 


{tI 260 b, 386 b, 439 b, 


//troXaici' »08 b 


i^tfTfaitaSai 767 a 


483 b. 61 8 a, .''•24 b, 604 a. 


inwoftwar 101 b 


^f/p>«i» 120 bj 183 b, 816 b 


620 a. 769 b, 777 b. 790 b. 


ifkrpHM 108 a 


tiipxtaeat 673 b 


796 b, 811 a: with Av- 



^^H 4S4 


HERODOTUS 


^^ 


^^^^1 cuMtire, -i43b, 277 s, 


(rurr^wM 34 a 


iefioKi) 250 b. 2S1 b, 36< a. 


^^^^1 457 b : with Dative 17 b, 


iririaati* 352 a 


321 b, 8J>fi b ] 


^^^H 73 b, 112 b, 200 b, 211 ii. 


iriTt\iii» (44 a), 418 a 


iaixt"' 576 b i 


^^^H 261 b, 277 a, 32» b, 333 b. 


i?iriTi>«f05 672b 


ia9ilt 147 b 


^^^^B 382 b, 397 b, flOfi b, 673 a, 


/rinja^wi 605 a 


frxov 679 a 


^^^H 767 a, 767 &, 775 a : with 


^iti^St^s 584 a 


tvoSm 261 a 


^^^^H Gonitiru 17 1>, 47 b, 66 b, 


iriHiKtiM 366 a 


i<rriTfa8<u 799 a 


^^^H 79 a, 70 K 96 b, 107 b. 


cViritf/ru 805 h. 826 )> 


/(nrirreu. 330 b, 443 h, 


^^^H 115 b, 206 a, 277 a, 2«7 a. 


iriTprrrim 721 b 


502 a 


^^^^B 421a,457h.52^Sa, 611a, 


trWporm 246 a, 608 b 


iaaaw 474 a, 830 b 


^^^B 424 b, 675 b, 768 u : Ad- 


driTvyxirtm 617 b, 519 a 


i<rr6XaT0 113 b 


^^^H varbial 503 b, 


i-witpaviri 552 b 


fcrr' d» 450 a, 586 b, 587 b. 


^^^^^H 670a: in Composition 


ifi^twitiv 761 a 


693 a 


^^^m 


€-rl<t>eoi>oi 183 b 


^(rrdvai 651 b 


^^^^m (>i/)<Uvrii' 743 a 


^(^otrdv 350 a 


firr(164a, 189 b 


^^^H ^t^XXeiF a 


€Triit>p<LttaS€u 355 b 


Irri 165 b ( = fif>rrt), 347 b. 


^^^^B iwi^Ttita 119 1>. 268 a, 


rt-ixc'/njerti 565 a 


441b. 689 b, 670 b, 763 k 


^^^H 272 a, 558 b, 790 » 


^rixpi'vo? 762 a 


f^ir oil' 276 a 


^^^^H irtfidnjt 487 a 


^xixuipcoi 88 b, 91 a, 120 b. 


ia<pipta> 681 b. 744 a 


^^^H /nfioar 634 b 


292 a. 301 b. 557.1. «22 a. 


f(rw;f5a, 460 a 


^^^H irtfUniffifw 377 a 


8261. 


(TfpoXr^wt 374 ■ 


^^^B tKiylttaOai 296 a, 771 h. 


^irtf.j^ftu'449a 


hxpaU^ 805 a 


^^^H 824 a 


AroAdffc* 797 b 


irtpoioOv SOS a 


^^^^^1 lriyaiiitaKto> 522 a 


i-rofoiiAiur 148 a 


*«p(n327a, 43«b, »llb 


^^^H twi^inv 23 a 


erorot^ 226 b 


irtielai, ol 240 a 


^^^H /frtraVov 453 b. 738 h 


iiropnar 788 a 


#rt :i65a, 368 b. 378 •, 


^^^^^^H IrucApaim a 


(WopfUtur 485 1» 


444 K 464 a. 494 a. 495a, 


^^^^^1 iTiKaTajialvdv 4 12 b, 688 a 


J^TOf 73 a, 150 b, 384 a, 


801a(<rcU it ^^^ai414b) 


^^^^^^B iirlKainm a 


463 a, 457 b, 487 b 


#T»f 5 a, 8 b, 29 1., 827 b 


^^^^H triKturBut {-ietr8<u) 488 b 


frorpCrtv 249 b 


fO^vXos 532 a 


^^^^^^ iTiKtproiUtiv 503 a 


/par 813 a, 814 a 


fitoKvUtw 335 b. 749 1> 


^^^^H ^rtWtr^tu 13 a, 49 a 


fpyA{etr0<u 689 b 


eittpyiry^ i9'2h, 573a 


^^^^H ^iKiSydvot 188 s 


;^«r9(u294a, 813 b 


«t}]|<>eia 26 a 


^^^H ^<icXtr<» 9 b, 303 a, 516 b. 


^ryo" 6 b, 34 a, 70 b. 185 s, 


dVpti'^ 685 a 


^^^H 


215a.386b. 486 b. 496a. 


f&folr, ^8'i a, 


^^^^^H i-wxKpa,T4nv 381 a 


497 b. 499 a, ,-.02 a, 51 8 a. 


«i5»0OT 371 b 


^^^^1 ^riXafipifcif 798 b 


622 b, 523 b, !;43 b, 581 h 


eiyrotJxot 276 b, 6IW b. SJH 


^^^^1 f iriXdMirrdv 377 a, 558 h 


647 a, 648 a, 678 a, 753 b, 


tirrtr^t 782 b 


^^^^^^1 ^iXcoivciK 


760 b, 790 b, 803 a 


f^r^uTot 239 a 


^^^B iTTiMytir {-tirSai) 19t^b, 


ipStw5S9A, 805 a 


€OpnpLa 216 b, 628 b 


^^^H 203 a, 307 a, 327 a. 349 b, 


ipfltrap 743 a 


tiipl(fKfif 271 b, 276a, 


^^^^M 366 a, 385 b, 435 a {in*). 


iperfiit 509 b 


315 b, 398 a, 437 b. 622a 


^^^V 


(ptifLat 719 a 


528b,643<i,651h,694fe> 


^^^^H ririX«(T<iv 79 h, 163.1 


ipilLoif 247 b, 248 h, 255 a 


807 a 


^^^^H H^iXaylfetrOai 264 8 


f/)«ojl09b, 794 b, 799 a 


tiMii^\itTot 78a 


^^^^1 irC\oiir0t b 


ipua 270 a 


r^(312a 


^^^^^1 fxlfuixot a 


ipptaixhtm 742 b 


(t^Ki, 22 a, 278 a, 366 a, 


^^^^H /iri;uA«r^ai 530 a 


f/KTiji' 306 b 


874 b, 674 a 


^^^^H iwitUtut^adai 241 li 


ipuKtin 697 b 


r0X«r<>(u 285 a. 453 b 


^^^^H tinn-liyim 418a 


^/it>Aui330a, 618 b, 793 a 


t^opot 603 b, 757 a 


^^^^^H iititunirliaKiaBai 460 a 


tpxt(r9iu [it \6yo\t) 680 a, 


tX*"" 13 b, 64 b, 166 a. 


^^^H ^rirX/of 12:)b, 49,n,i 


687 a 


193 a. 208 a, 229 U 242a 


^^^^1 ^<irX(OT322a 


/i 44 a, 261b, 364 b (a;»u</). 


312a, 326 l>, 340 a, 441 ». 


^^^^f iripp4tu> b 


367 h, 374 1), 882 b. 386 a, 


462 a, 4 94 ;i, 506 h. 634 a 


^^^^^ tiriv'tjii.ov 496 a 


396 b, 631b, 606 a (K«), 


683h.57lb.597a,610a 


^^^ ixKriTlfftreai 264 a, 698 b 


732 b, 760 b: /5«2«8a, 


621 1,, 626 «, 6.33 a, 64U 


^^^^^B trlariurOat 14 b, 250 b, 


789 a: it »-<iKnit392b: 


683^1, 705 b. 733 a, 736 U 


^^^B 312b,S14b,322b,331a, 


it trpCrrovt 1 92 b 


756 b, 759 a b, 760a 


^^^B 372 a. 889 b, 408 b, 496 b, i 


iaoKoitu) 607 a, 726 a 


790 a. 798 a, 813 b. 816U 


^^^H 497 a, 51 la, 565 a, 673 b. 


ia^imv 444 a, 488 a 


826 a: txti* i, 887 k. 


^^^B 711 a 


iapiXKtiP 291 a, 400 b, 


787 a: txM H ITOa 


^^^^ /ri«TAXnv 329 a, 356 a 


677 b 


210 a. 666 a: rx«>"F^ 



^^^^^^" INDEX 11 


^^^^ 486 ^H 


Ml]' 349b: fXiuriro»803k: 


i^fupoSpifut 612 a 


Uvcu 44 jb. 596 a, 669 a. ^^^M 


XA>er 762 b : vX/or 


linepot 794 b 


^^^M 


742 b: (rTov»ii» 203 »: 


^fLfpcvKlrrot 270 a, 284 ft, 


^^^^H 


^nItw 769 b: with Ad- 


823 a 


Ijktv (cffAu) 624 b ^^^^1 


verb 530 a, 681 a, 600 b, 


n)ilr\t0p<» 269 ft 


Wg T^xvc 716 b ^^^H 


()44b,a45b,647>,678«, 


%it<rii 302 b, 704 ft 


W((» ^^^H 


711a, 72n., 787ft: 


^K 385 ft, 581ft, 689 a 


<«t) 267 ft, 4 12 b, 779 ft ^^^H 


=.J«u 378 b, 319 b, 


liwtipot 302 a, 422 a, 439 b, 


leitirUt ^^^H 


SaOb, 451ft, 467b: 


624 ft, 700 b, 795 b 


94 ^^^H 


— Kfi*0ai 302ft: =ypui- 


4r0<u 718ft 


^^^H 


vat 345 b : = SivaaOai 


^<i 636 b 


Urrripii) 189 a ^^^^H 


2«4ft,280b,311b,364b, 




IWrti 756 a ^^^H 


356 b,4Wft, 493 b, 637 ft, 




UWcirtfoi 644 b ^^^^H 


567 b, 60«ft, 768 b: 


0i\airaa 76 b, 442 ft 


lUaKtaOat 266 b. 537 b ^M 


^X"' (strong) 213 ■, 


Siwrtip 147 ft, 769 b 


MflOOb ^^^M 


249 ft, 343 b, 388 V 498 b, 


0i'(M'472b. r>82B, 687 b 


Xiitp<n 64 ^^^H 


613 ft, 820 ft: (to have 


tf6f637ft, 743 b, 814 b 


ha 621b: r»« m4 389 8, ^^^B 


towife)86b, 93 b, 280 ft. 


0(UK 413 a, 800 ft 


689 b: locative 38 a, ^^M 


307 ft, 672 b, 817 b 


$4\ti» 18ft, 651 ft 


542 b. 649 b, 711b. 751a ^^^M 


txtaeai 7 ft, 137 b (geogr.). 


tfrcT/xirior 148 ft. 293 b, 


IrraTto^ 33 ft ^^^^1 


l79ft,389b,342A,361», 


295 b, 786 b, 789 ft b 


irrapx**^' 629 b, 741 ft ^^^H 


447 ft, 627 b, 571b (iv), 


6tiwpowM 186 b 


fTTOpXBf 111 ft ^^^^^1 


68«ft,618b, 661 b, 673 b, 


0«^ 766 ft. 826 b 


inr(Ur(/(0{ 615 a ^^^^H 


796 b, 803 a 


«f^Tflii>274b 


IrreiH 310 b. 577ft. 712ft. ^^^H 


txOot 398 b 


9(PmAi 261 ft 


724 a ^^^H 


tx^pn 387 ft 


efadiu 707 ft 


IwriSpotun 222 a ^^^H 




8tup4ar 391 b 


tn<H, T) 252 a. 291b, ^^H 




»i>«i7 767b, 770 a 


539 a. 629 K 03 1 ft. 664 ft, ^H 


iUx» 278 ft 


eil\vSpl<ii 212 b 


696 Is 716 b, 718 b, 725 a. ^H 


ifKpA9%h, 09b 


(«i}<rai>p<^ i04 a, 807 ft 


^H 


ffiryKt'yai 60 a, 144ft 


OTiTti'tiir fi75 b 


rrroc, 6 397 ft, 630 ft, 730 b ^^^H 


}tvyot 49ft 


ecLn, 767 a 


Irrotfi/Ki; I90b ^^^^H 


ftifuouD 757 b 


0eX(;>&f 50 ft ' 


I'Twirqt 60 a ^^^^H 


itituiiattu 59 ft 


B6pupot 443 b, 494 A, 602 a 


Irroro(4n|t 696 b ^^^^| 


fi>ri7<f»»242b 


tfpAror 315 a 


lpd45ea ^^^1 


/An 521 ft 


tfi/7«T-4^817» 


lpi» 770 b ^^^H 


il^384ft 


eoan 148 a, 238 b, 826 b 


ipif 175 b, 211 b, 268b, ^H 


iC>»vh41\i 


SviitiuM 76 b 


281 a, 292 b. 293 b, 404 a. ^H 




Bv^ 73 ft, 223 b, 403 a, 


407 ft, 411ft, 437 b. ^H 




660 a 


441 ft b, 443 ft, 606 ft, __^^M 


i 886 b, 604 ft, 644 ■. 688* : 


*i./ioPr 313 b 


^^^M 


(4. . <f325b) 


(7i^/)ii 438 ft 


ip6t7&5a. ^^^H 


vy*tf6iu. 304 b. 695 b 


eualr,2Hih, 592 ft 


!/w^d»Tirt 211b ^^^^H 


irytiiMtufip 126 b, 3fl0a 


#u*ot 7S8 b 


iVrtf^ 290 ft ^^^^1 


^tMorltj 111b, 203 b, 


«u/ia 411b, 570 ft. 571b, 


lao% ft ^^^^H 


223 b, 608 b, 828 b 


611 b, 734 ft 


iffTtb'ai 638 b ^^^^H 


rn<liun' 86 b, .ISO b, 390 ft, 


0uiti{itr 369 ft 


trrairBtti 638 a ^^^^H 


407.. 643 b, 758 ft 


euiiAciOf 354 b 


^^^H 


ti6i) 220 a, 258 b, 434 ft, 


ewfi*)tio^f»t 639 ft 


lrrl» 443 ft ^^^^H 


620 b, 622 b. 620 b, 729 b, 


o^ni2b 


l(rroplti 120 b ^^^^H 


808 ft 




iirxvpir, r6 596 b ^^^^H 


^ot 19 ft, 616 1, 517 ft, 




^^^H 


692 b 


^«X'if«"' 457 b 


i'tOr^ 686 a ^^^^H 


ituM 608 b 


loKXt* 4ri5 b 


^^^H 


ftniy 219 ft, 390 b, 486 ft. 


tSri 141 It 


^^^^^H 


758 b: .r. 636 a 


lito§M\tun» 13 a , 


^^^^^^1 


^Xt«/if 27 h 


(j>tfi- 29b. 245 b, 318ft, j 


tatapfLit 295 ft ^^^^H 


^o»887b, 786 ft 


520 b ' 


taBapix 270 a ^^^^H 


flfio^ 686ft 


Upi'tif 161b, 469 b. 718 a, 1 


Kotfi^ (ftnoni.) 766 b ^^^^H 


^nut 694 ft, 695 a 


794 ft 


Kot 48 a (r<mm.), 71 ft, 73 b ^^^H 


?M'>'788b 


ISpvfia 692 a 


(n>/), 138 ft, 179ft (tei), ^^^M 


■illUfit, 877 ft, 390 b 

! 


iSp^ 188 ft 


186 ft («fiam), 388 b, ^^^H 



^■^ 486 


HERODOTUS 


^W" 


^^^H 38»b,390ft.;i9Sii.430a, 


KaTaSoKito' 464 a, 716*, 


rarr/M(«€iv 613 b 


^^^B 468 b (KoiTcp), f.ir.b 


798 b 


(rarf^rdvoi 307 a, 400 ft 


^^^H (sdvers.), f>35a, S51 b, 


icaraJovXoCr S47a, 589 b 


»0T«(mji[^ra4 674 b, 742 b 


^^^H ft73b.6»Sa.B90K6OOh, 


xaraelitir 283 a 


ifaWx"' 277 a. 445 a. 4S0a. 


^^^H 693b,781a.738B, rOlm 


KaTafii'cir 383 a 


478 b, 541 a. 544 b. 635 b 


^^^H 772a, 777 I>: 


iiaTa$vfu<n 688 b 


ic<irrr*f(r9cu 168 b. 678 b, 


^^^H Kol &2Sa. t>42a, 6D1 b, 


Karatp/nv 604 a 


737 b 


^^^H 760b, 802b, 80ab: xal 


Karaiphir {-trSat) 71 », 


KiiTTiytpL(ji> 165 b. 202 a 


^^^m Hi 27Sa, 506 b, 584 a, 


486 b, S2« b 


KariryopidP 308 a, 447 • 


^^^H 601 b, 604 b, 611 «. 6»4 a. 


KaroKoiftaJ' 569 a, 7S0 b 


ran)K«p 133 s, 169 a, S82 K 


^^^1 737 b, 74»a, (775b), 


xaraicorrijciv 626 a 


416a, 516a ^g 


^^^H 777 b, 803 a : (a2 Stj icai 


caraiciirrtu' 780 a 


Koriifnit 384 b ^H 


^^^H 16 b, 565 », 568 l>, 821 b. 


KaTa<p«oi;^^fiv 268 a 


KOTttfirniUvat 786 b ^^ 


^^^^H 827 b ; irat yip Si) Kai 


KaraXcifipiveu' 14 b, 314 li, 


icaTV^ai 714 a, 749 a. 781 » 


^^^H 390 n : Kat n^ l:)2 a : 


340 a, 366 a, 385 a, 640 b, 


KaTtiriu {-hjiu) 629 b ^^ 


^^^H A>4>' *i>^ ca^'-M -I-IO >>. 


596 a. 695 h. 785 a. 807 a. 


Mtnifi) 702 a ^M 


^^^P 466 a 


825 b 


Kariirrdvat 521 a ^^| 


^^^^ ica<(U' 298 b 


xaraXaM^ctt 721 b 


KaTMKttU' 230 b ^H 


^^M Kdciov 361 a 


«ara\^7«i* la6l., 140 b, 


naTopivaeiy 144a ^^H 


^^H KOLKoXoylif 351 n 


157 b, 445 b, 522 a. 748 a 


Karbm. 3 b ^^1 


^H KOKiW 824 b 


caraXfta-ttr 246 a, 793 a 


Karirtpat 164 », 3824. 1 


^m KdKit 208 b, 271 b, M8 b 


xaTa\((i<ii' 601 a 


574 a, 732 b J 


^H xax^t 188 a, 240 b 


KaraXj'<u> (-«r0a() 610 n 


KOTurvoutr 22 a ^^| 


^M «ac<:>T»77a, 782 b, 814 b 


Koratuifrf^tu' 552 b 


Kdrw 251b. 321b, {-ri^l^M 


^H KaXiijiuvot 88 b, 91 a 


KaTtwduratir 54 b 


566 b ^H 


^H taMeir 522 a. 620 a. 629 h. 


jraranti'/w* 817 b 


Krwot 710 b. 78Sa ^H 


^H 710 a, 777 b 


nororr/or 47 b, 438 b 


««»4j 170 b. 365 a, 719 a ^ 


^^1 vaX\(e/>^r(i> (-c<rtfcu) 143 b, 


icaTaira.T4f<rOai 253 a 


Ktlpeif 454 b 


^B ]76it.tt27b. (i75b, 7!44b, 


Karinp HI b. 429 a. 512 b 


Kfiffffai (-^eir^cu) £68(b 


^H 


KttTairXiitrffoi' 656 ti 


KfXninr 792 b, 829 b ^B 


^^H (caXXurreiicir 651 b 


(arairpieir 54 b 


KfKtviina. 24 n ^H 


^H KiiX\i» 589 b, (748 b), 759 h 


KaTdrpoiiSOvai 506 b 


kAi;; 110 a, 505 b ^1 


^H KdfMTtn 780 a 


»BTa)r/>ot5€(rtfai 27 « 


cepa^rru' 1 60 a, 492 b. 50rl|^H 


^H <r(iMr)Xotl08u. nOb. 272 b. 


rardirrfH' 458 ii 


tlpm 490 b, 641 b, «&Oa^H 


^^H 


(caTap/iwaMp 265 a, 269 b, 


Kfpawit 4 12 a ^H 


^^H Kdfj,rTti¥ 153 1) 


308 b, 476 b, 606 a, 689 a 


KtpUXiM 604 a " 


^^H •rarvoJiiT); 576 b 


KaTaffKarrtiv 176 a, 217 b 


xnrO^Mir 190 a 


^^^ KapaSotUi* 228 b, 239 b, 


icaTaa-K-^TrrfiM 456 b 


«c0aXfi2O2a. 351 b. 546 «, 


^H 


(tardiTKOirBt 197 b, 384 b 


816 a jM 


^H ica/iT&t 542 a, 585 b 


Koroa-irdv 286 a 


Krxfntaitffot 188 b ^^B 


^H Kd^a 371b, 446 a, 534 a: 


*aT<i<rTaffit 584 a 


/rg a ^^^^^| 


^H r6 r. 25 b, 393 a 


(caraoT^i'ai 173 a, 183 a 


in)««rtf<u 324 b ^^^H 


^^H KafiTep6t 375 b 


KaTaaTopfmirrai 741 a 


ic^Sot a ^^^^H 


^m rard 201a, 221b, :!Ora, 


«roroo-T/H<0fir 137 a 


CTTTOt ^^^^H 


^^__ 373 b, 376 a, 398 b, 41 la. 


tcarafT poirvi'rai 441 », 755 a 


in7fNk 355 a ^^^^^| 


^^^B 493 b, 567 a, 576 b, 778a: 


Karaai^dfeui 555 a 


Kiipvyiia. 176 b, 417l^^^^| 


^^^^H with Aco. 51b, 76 b, 


<carao-X(ii> 81 b 


KJIpVKfjiitl 175 b ^^^^H 


^^^H 178 a, 182 a, 202 b: 


card rd^or 309 a 


«Tfpi(r4«oi' 799 a ^^^^ 


^^^H locative 214 a, 296 a: 


Kararelyeiy 400 a, 618 b 


icijpi'f 46 b, 170 b, 6124. 


^^^^H temporal 4 a, 1 80 a, 


iioTaTi9^»ai 265 b, 327 a. 


796a 


^^^H 244 a. 251b: diatribu- 


759 b 


n0i^p 84 a. 99 b, 184 b 


^^^H tivo 184 b, 539 b, 804 a: 


KO-raipoiTUw 160 » 


icu'/«F706n, 712 a 


^^^^^H with Genitive 8a: in 


Kara^povinp 371 b 


KXtot 327 a. 694 b, 759 b 


^^^B Comp. 22 a 


Karaxpa.* 95 a (-a^tfcu 827 a) 


KKtrrur (■eo'^cu) 70a 


^^^^^ Kar' dpx<is ^29 U 


KaTfiKi^ew 815 a 


KXijSufr 783 a. 802 a ^m 


^■^ KaraPalreiv 254 a, 460 b, 


KarciX^rtv 395 b. 661 a. 


KKrifxn 789 a ^H 


^H 521 b, 568 a, 629 a, 789 a 


744 a, 810 b 


Khd-iuii 55 a ^^^^1 


^H Kara^Wiar 480 b, 539 a, 


KaTftXlaaetr 101 a, 268 b 


xX/»eiv a ^^^B 


^M 760 


xarnpi^iy, 508 a 


jcXcirtdSrt 607 a ^^^^B 


^^1 KaTd/3cuni 329 a 


KarcXxMiv 128 a 


«»ar 356 a ^^B 


^^1 xarii7e(r9ai 362 b 


Karertlytir 554 a 


«o7XoT 113 b. 546 b ^H 


^^M Karayiftip 337 b 


KarrpT^t'eirtfai 10 b, 807 a 


a ^^^H 



^^^^^ INDEX II 4«7 ^^^ 


KOir&t 445 b, 592 &, 642 a, 


\tios 741 a 


M<iX«rTa33b. 344 a. 465 a, ^^^^| 


782 b 


Xtlwtw (neiu) 291 U 325 a, 


757 a : /t. M^ 386 b : rA ^H 


»4X»o» 146 b, 163 •, 297 •. 


408 b, 423 a, 627 b 


^72«a _^M 


785 & 


lurrit 524 a 


^i>ed»tti> 321 b. 609 b. ^H^^l 


Ko\bn>it 333 b, 714 b 


X^flTtn 747 a 


628 b, 818 a ^^^H 


ro/uJi^S83a. 626 b, 810 b 


Xivxit 730 b 


tuxrTtitc6iu 409 b, 665 b, ^^^^H 


KOfuiip' 3S9 b 


Xexrroii)t 686 a 


675 ^^^H 


«,i/f«»624h. 638 a, 750 b, 


X^wo 320 b 


IMTTinor b. 438 a ^^^^H 


821 b 


Xnixr^rrpot 665 b 


IJuxrTuci) 790 a ^^^^^H 


Kovioprii 455 a 


XiJvto- 320 a, 705 a 


li&mt 32.3 a. 337 a, 395 b ^^^^1 


1 Korittw 28;i b 


X<^i7 550a, 762 a. 807 a 


MO/iT-iipio.' 327 a, 442 Is 547 a ^^^H 


KOfinin 64 b 


\^T0¥ 294 a 


tiArrii 132 ^^^H 


nipvM/SOT 322 b 


XiJMa 126 a. 730 a 


Hlx<u^ 104 a. 333 b, 677 a ^^^H 


Kopv4^ 4014, 410 a, 414 a, 


X/9M386a, 467 b, 794 b 


titkX<upo^6pat 662 b ^^^^^H 


798 b 


Xtft^r 786 a 


liAxtcdoi a ^^^^H 


KovfUtip 650 a 


X<^i»i|670b 


Miix>7 371 a, 645 a, 691 h ^^^H 


ci<rMi>r 108 a, 448 b, 4«3s, 


X4M^780a 


<i<ixi>iot 274 b, 662 a ^^^^1 


684 b, 723 b, 733 b, 737 b. 


Xfrcot 112 b 


tUya. ^^^^1 


740 a 


\iwapdtu> 494 a, 689 a. 


ju^7a0ot b ^^^^H 


nW72«a 


816 b 


MPyaXo^/MO-i/ni 179 u ^^^^^H 


KDv22a. 818 a 


Xirrapii, 631 b. 743 n 


Ai«7<iXwt 620 a, 678 b ^^^H 


«/)(£»« 95 b, 103 b. 115 a 


\iwap6t 481 b 


litXtbiiirln 58 a ^^^^^| 


KparUw 623 a 


Xttro^vx^eu' 339 a 


t^iXtiw 457 b, 468 b ^H 


tpiTM 276h. 633 a 


X«7<ii663a, 682 a, 730 b 


A^XfM 187 a ^H 


«/nH 639 b. 696 b, 700 b 


\oyii:iae<u 43 a, 67 b, 264 a. 


AiA(46a 1 


Kfrt^<l>tyrnm 488 U. 618 b, 


308 a 


/uXtr6rtt (-((Tfa) 418 a J 


793 a 


X^ytftot 620 a, 7S2b 


|iA;Utf4Ma.67l4« ^^^H 


(t/>7^/>762a 


XA>io» 448 b. 452 a, 683 ». 


tutuTifUrm 338 ^^^^^^| 


Kptftui 650 b 


684 b 


futiyfiaOax 744 u ^^^^^^| 


KTrrlffi* 311 a 


\iyoi 117 b, 119a. 120 b, 


^r without 5/ 64 b, ^^^^H 


L m;»6i 276 b 


131b, 138 a, 149 a, 165 b, 


167 n: followed by it ^^^H 


rrl^u- 211 a 


182 a, 1S9a, 206 a, 210a, 


8a, 10b. 4«a, 137 h. ^^^H 


KTurris 794 b 


216 a, 222 b, 223 h. 224 a, 


178 V 183 a. 304 a, 313 b, ^^^H 


KUKXoiw 371 b, 379 a, 478 a 


228 a, 247 b, 279 a b, 


366 K 374 b, 384 b. 416 b, ^^^M 


(KVMHTUr^ 9. 100. 3) 


292 a, 2981., 3H b, 


438 a, 465 K 482 a. 488 a, ^H 


cvr^ 102 a 


317 a b, 322 b, 328 b, 


522 a, 570 b, 694 a. 601b. ^ 


1 np^alri 88 )i 


330 b, 338 b, 342 a. 348 a. 


604 s, 605 a, 684 a, 721 a. 


Kuphir 823 b 


354 a, 365 a, 399 a, 435 a, 


731 a, 742 b, 746 b : 


KvpoShr 444 a 


442 a, 446 a. 457 b. 463 a. 


followed by iJvtm 566 b. 


n!wr 276 b 


473 a, 618 b, 523 b, 534 a 


767 !► 


cw 136 h 


(6w), 599a, 607 a, 673 b, 


^rroi 494 a, 566 h. 5Mk, 


' Kiinr, 300 b 


710 a, 721a, 741b, 


767 b, 769 b 




769 a b, 762 b, 780 a b 


lUpm 542 a 


XayxdcctK 74 b 


Xiarif 302 b, 809 a, 382 a. 


lUatti ri/rwi 477 l> 


' Xa«rii(or 115 a 


617 a, 689 a, 656 b. 766 a. 


ftteauppiri 299 b ^^^ 


1 AattSaifuar 344* 


804 b 


/Mcr^am 140 b, 779 b ^^^^H 


Xd««OT 149 b 


XovTfidr 261 a 


Itiffo^ 393 a, (8. 27. 1); ^^^H 


' \ati^ti, 355*. 373 b, 


XoxT)^"» 708 b 


^M/p7;( 378 a, 387 b ^^^^1 


381 a. 607 b. 765 b. 765 a, 


\6xot 709 a 


liiffw, /(13 a, 220 b, 371 b ^^^H 


826 a 


Xvypit 673 b 


^■ror. T(5 21 a, 1 38 a, 162 b, ^^^^1 


Xa^ira^^^i) 612 b 


X<5..y 533 b, 547 l>, 810 a 


I66a,386lH472b,47.'!b, ^^^^1 


XtL/irpit 753 b 


Xi/«o<p7ifi 100 b 


a ^^^H 


X4/if ktOoi 818 h 


Xi^K0t786b, 788 a 


^■rotSllh ^^^^H 


Xar0<iy«» 474a, 486 b, 


Xv/ialfciv 396 b 


lurtL 186 a, 240 a. 612 a, ^^^H 


509 a, 511a. 622 b. 633 b 


XMnj210b 


737b:^Ta219a ^^^H 


1 XiitaSoL 191 b 


Xirrpit 830 b 


Utrapalftu' 363 b ^^^^H 


\dxent686a 


\ucffar 747 b 


Mrra/3iiX\c<)' 73 a, 231 a, ^^^^^1 


\talrtir 686 b 


Xi/xroi, 319 a 


244 b, 387 a, 527 b. 544 b, ^H 


\/^i>f 762 a 




602 a ^^ 


X^-yo" 326 a. 3:i6 n, 380 a, 


fta^6t 818 b 


/xrrajSovXri'fnv 145 a 1 


413ab, 452 a, 512 u. 


AulXa 21 a, 274 b, 679 ■ 


/wraiWrtK 206 a ^^^^J 


572 a, 580 b, 602 « 


fiaXtfAt 188 a 


>i/raXXw 142 b. 754 h ^^^H 



^^^B 4S8 


HERODOTUS 


^»^ 


^^^^^H /i/mravrjinu 701 b, 829 ft 


¥a\nrth 368 b 


467ft,612*,557b.587h, 


^^^^^m titraHtirew (-«r9ai) 129 a, 


vaintTtoy 374 b, 381 a 


741a, 779 b. 780 ft 


^^^H G83 )i, 


ravXpx'c"' 280 b 


oJo^Xoe 365 b 


^^^^1 Ittraii, r6 SOO a 


rau/iax^'U' 433 b, 444 b 


iiirn 622 ft 


^^^^H litripciot 


ravftaxi't 376 b 


ob446ft 


^^^^^^m lUTapaioOw 457 h 


cat'/iaxot 113 b 


Ma. 39 N 318 a, 352 a, 


^^^^^M fUTti^rtpot 36S n 


ot^fila 100 a 


686 ft 


^^^^^^1 tuTtm/K^pai 48)t • 


c^«iv 497 » 


iiiy/pbi 787 b 


^^^H fitTiimi (-ii;M>) 5S0 b. 62"^ A, 


ro/Wiji 126 a 


o;itM»246b, 661 b. 830b 


^^^H 


ffworSSSa, 495 ft, 713ft 


oUtrm^Q^ 363 ft. 42S^ 


^^^^^^B f*tTurTii»iu {-adai) 516 h, 


ptKpln SSIh, 637 a, 768 ft b 


45 la, 522 b, 530 a, 533 a. 


^^^H 


rituw {tadaX) 248 b, 523 ft. 


586 a, 593 b 


^^^^1 tuToptiiifiv ll 


604 11, 824 a 


o5n^oi 380 b 


^^^^B )itru>v^^ 128 t> 


i>(odXta»Tot 826 ft 


odniiua 590 • 


^^^H liixP^ 141 B, 146 b, Ijlb, 


triw 642 a 


otiaiVK 789 B 


^^^H 271ft, »Sla, 387 b, 


ye<ynrt 28 a. 613 a 


oJmirup 193 b, 211 ft, 212 b, 


^^^H 678 ft b, 079 ft 


rtoT^i 798 b, 806 u 


326 ft 


^^^H ^i) IHb, 20a, 129b, l»Oft, 


i.^^618b 


o5clfcii' 245 ft 


^^^H 203 ft (ler), 226 b (ou). 


rtucTl 192 b, 201 11 


oikIh 296 ft. 563 b, 601 b 


^^^H .t 1 8 b, 322 b, 397 », 445 a 


otuTtpw 584 b 


oinreio/i^eti' 467 b 


^^^B (ov), G09 b, 541 ft, 687 b, 


yeurrepot 385 a 


oIkqj 133 b, 288 b. 332 h, 


^^^H •t06a.«07u.689ft,7fi9b, 


vi\ntilv 278 A. 322 ft 


810 b 


^^^^m 774 a. 802 ft, 803 a, 808 a. 


>'^i410b 


o/k&i, r6 354 b. 371 b 


^^^^^1 liifiuLfLSn &\i a 


>'i;ir<i^r7;t 1 18 b, 427 ft. 


oiKO^opitir 586 ft 


^^^^B /^i?!'", r6 622 b, 760 b 


429 a, 809 b 


oI6r re rlKoi 520 b, 567 b 


^^^H fiyfiiieif 249 1 >, 2r>r> a, :iP9 ft. 


<'^ot699b, 700 b. 802 b 


otX'irOiu 336 ft 


^^^H lUDK 472b, &36b, 589 b, 


vorav 256 a, 370 ft, 436 a, 


otuvAt 783 a 


^^^B 7;iS ft, 77:i a, 308 b 


695 b, 739 b, 756 b 


<i<(AX«u> 489 b 


^^^H M v^or 429 H, 757 b 


W<ij695b, 732 a, 801a 


6<CB 200 ft, 660 a. SOS* 


^^^H Mi^ 4U6 a b, 801 ft 


n^cr^ 612 ft 


(««) 


^^^H p.i,rUi» 241 b, 339 b, 605 ft 


>'0^eiv239>, 361a, 387 ft 


drouM 618 b 


^^^^H M^"'! 175 u, 29611. ;i39b 


M>«if«.'18eb,205a.495b, 


6ii6<rot 402 b 


^^^^^^1 ^ti;vcwi5i)t 379 


718 a 


feof 148 ft, 434 ft, 516 a, 


^^^^^1 iiiiTpOKCiTup 572 b 


voiui&iuva., rd 813 b 


595 a 


^^^^H /ii;r/»&!roXiT 72 b. 400 a 


rbfunot 170ft 


SKUt 61ft. 130 b, 28$ t, 


^^^^^1 litiX'ni'aaeaL 293 ft, 355 A, 


riMot 10 a, 497 a, 523 a, 


314b,376b, 43»a,4Ma, 


^^^H 


682 b, 694 a, 816 b, 822 a 


736 b, 803 ft: 8 a (tan- 


^^^H ^rat94a 


fbot 381a, 493 a, 577 », 


Ijoral), 28 b (wilh 


^^^^^H fufUtaSai 668 a 


796 b, 817 b, 827 a 


fiiture), 826 ft (oompan- 


^^^^H fjuaeit 498 ft, 544 a, 675 b 


»o<ri€iv 542 b 


tivc-): with d« 494*. 


^^^^H fuadoBy 


vvt> 129 a, 517 a 


587 b. 610 a : with ^ 


^^^^^H fuTfni^pot 86 a 


Kio'ISSfib 


10 b. 373 b 


^^^^^^B ixurjinbav*!)* 621 b 


>»¥ &» 774 a 


S\^m 475 b 


^^^^^B M''^<''o^^''< b 


¥VKT6t 395 b 


6\lyourt, iir 680 a 


^^^^^H p.in)<TiKiXKinr 398 a 


Ki-i 374 a, 375 b 


6\lyo» 825 b 


^^^^^^1 fmrjoTii b 




6\icit 38 a, 282 a 


^^^H fi^T't a 




6\o^Tpoxof 439 b 


^^^^^^1 (loi {wr iudicf) 570 a 


JriKca 177 b, 620 s, 777 b 


6tuux)iin 682 ft 


^^^^H fioi/m. :388 a, 725 h, n 


Jeirifftr 177 b, 779 ii 


S^qpor 328 b, 5dl a 


^^^^H /t^^Di 293 a, 686 a 


i(Lfi^ 146 b 


i/uXifir 40 a 


^^^^^H ^oi/i>i>/>xoi 232 b 


U'iOM 350 b, 606 b, 710 a, 


fl/uXot723b, 738 b, 741b 


^^^^^H /uoi'v«^x^"' *^3 a 


767 ft 


ipUrfXuvoot 691 b 


^^^^^H 


^l<t><» 331 a, 383 b 


a^Mtt (adv.) 151 a 


^^^^H tLOvrovr 550 b, 726 b 


(i^vot 674 b 


Smocm 346 b, 397 ft, 760a, 


^^^^^^H Hvp^KTi 46 


frJXoi- 55 a, 467 b, 514 b, 


792 ft 


^^^^^^H nvpalm) 513 b 


794 b 


ofiolut no a, 399ft 


^^^^^H /iUOTUcil 




iftoKoyietv 775* 
oitoXoylT] 185 ft, 533 a 


^^^^^H 


a^646a 


biuxTirUio 160ft (cp. 1. 14») 


^^^^^^H i>aua/)x^<iv 225 a 


pSmrop/i) 545 a 


oftArrovJot 621 b 


^^^^H vaicLfixoi 128 b, 560 b 


oS6< 164 a, 165 ft, 227 a, 


ilivrpiirtiot 621 b 


^^^^^H raiirV^riK 


292 ft, 333 ft, 367 b, 399 a. 


bubrpmrot 692 b 



pvi 


INDEX II 


^^^^ 4St ^^^1 


oiuxftpopfeir 338 1), 361 a, 


om 457 b, 671 b 


ireuTOibf 6 a, 1 7 u, 76 b, ^^^^^| 


&96I) 


oHdt 23 a, 444 b 


782 a, 816 a ^^^H 


Sfiui 139 • 


oiri^r 384 a, 389 a 


Tarro^wi315a ^^^^^| 


6»fiilt^fii> 002 l> 


9M^ei7a0a 


rapi (w. Ace.) 67 h, 666 a, ^H 


iwtiSos 340 A 


«^M386a 


22 b, 228 b ^^^M 


fretpoc 25 b 


oiKup 622 a 


va^/Sa<i<<iK 61 a ^^^^^H 


d»oM^«» 687 l> 


oi; ^ip oiS4 604 a 


Ta/ia/SdXXciv (-fff0at) 19 a, ^^^^^H 


droMOtfrAi 81 », 123 b, 748 A 


oi (i^ 7ih 


^^^^1 


tfrn 53 l> 


olipofM 182 b, 1 92 b. 790 a 


rapifioXot b ^^^^^^ 


te/wv 698 !• 


oi'iplftur 158 a 


ff-apayy/XXeu. 464 a, 707 l> ^^^^^H 


«rit588b, 7»6a 


oSpof 190 a, 326 b 


wapaytrtadtu 332 b, 611a, ^^^^H 


»r<ir9( 259 a, 200 b, 317 a, 


oM-i] 42 b 


b ^^^H 


440 a, 826 a 


oOtii 801 b 


ra/nyop^ffftfai 7l3a ^^^^^H 


irUrw 367 b, fi&4 a, tA «»■. 


o&rot 524 «, 686b: = ««« 


rci/nyu/u'oi")' 382 b, 687 h ^^^^^H 


6'26b 


108 b, 637 b 


ira/xia^((rir0a< 228 b, 679 a ^^^^H 


AtXiVt,! 302 1., 507 b 


9lhw 150 a, 176 b, 246 b. 


ra/xiJiSifai 216 a, 389 a, ^^^^H 


SrXw 37 b, ,51b, 688 b, 


278 a, 312 a, 327 a, »43b. 


^^^^1 


707 a, 708 a, 827 b 


402 )>. 494 a, 498 a, 502 b, 


ra^^aXd<reriot 177 a ^^^^^| 


^oJatr^ 323 b, 621b 


611 l.,619.a, 076 b, 687 b, 


irapa^i^CT) 688 a ^^^^M 


ipav 312 a, 371a, S89b, 


610 a, 0.13 a, 689 b, 700 b. 


rapairicty 383 a, 829 b ^^^^H 


413 a, 621 b, 627 b, 667 a. 


762b, 753 b, 774 a (^ 


Tap<uw/Vrtf'0at b ^^^^^H 


i 66»a. 707 b. 710 a, 712 b, 


liSt], 818 a, 829 b, (9. 


wapaKf\fifir {•t(r9(u)S7S», ^^^^^H 


1 720s. 737 b 


109. 13) 


604 n, 803 u ^H 


t 6pOtt 683 a 


oihu 2i) 354 b, (602 a), 


rapaop/fftv 46.5 a, 795 b ^^^^^U 


ip«oOr ISl b (bis) 


633 K 698 0,726 b. 731 h, 


wapaKofifiiriiif 21 8 b, 2S8 1 1. ^^^^| 


6pep<n, i 278 a 


809 a, 814 a, 824 b 


240 a, 241 a. 695 a, 601 a ^^^H 


<fi«<;>f 801 a 


dtpeaXfuar 338 b 


irapaXlri ii ^^^^^H 


6p»op 172 a, 643 b, 810 u 


6i(>0a.\fi.it 544 a 


ripa\ot a ^^^^| 


dp^ (-cuF^ox) 4 b, 28 b, 


j0X«7<rcii'Ctv 392 b 


rapofuiJj'^KeoBai 120 b ^^^^^^M 


267 a, 277 a. 280 a, 312 a. 


iX^oi 715 b, 7221. 


raporo/i^rtv :i62(k ^^^^^H 


375 b, 407 a. 421 a, 528 a, 


ixot 561 b 


wapunlwTfiM ^^^^^H 


579 a, 582 a, 59S A, 723 a. 


Af (01 370 b 


TaparX^tn 379 a : -foft ^^^^H 


725 a, 726 a, 804 a, 820 a, 


0f II 198 b, 787 a, 


149a ^^^H 


825 b : opitaaOai it 48 a, 


6\f>amoik 766 b 


wapapTov 656 b ^^^^^^| 


266 b. 661 a 




rapapT4e<f8iu 192 a, 480 a. ^^^^H 


6(>nitif 2n iL, 820 a 




^^^H 


6/.M28a 


wayKpArtor 806 li 


awpotf'ircc'di'cti' 465 b ^^^^^| 


»ffatgai 506 l> 


rdvoi 438 b 


wvLparpiprin 16 a ^^^^^^| 


Sp/wf 278 b, 287 b 


rieijua 574 a 


iraparL>7xd''((V 348 a ^^^^^H 


Spot 63 a (w. Oen.), 170 a, 


rdSof 501a, 609 b, 616 a. 


rapa^ptin a ^^^^^t 


499 a, 543 b, 786 a 


532 a, 546 b. 789 a 


wapaxpaaOai 331 a, 383 b ^^^^M 


ipoa&yyijt 492 1i 


ru2o06rot 282 a 


riptlpof 200 a, 577 a, 789 .i ^^^^| 


1 opriiny 309 a 


waltuf 633 b 


■■ap«>a«354h,713b,727a, ^^^M 


6pn-i\ 456 b 


ral(ti¥ 610 a 


744 b, 747 b. 765 b, ^^^H 


1 <f/>ir/>ta 147 b 


nit 710 b, 7.19 a, 790 a 


767 a ^^^H 


(i/>i^(r»v 35 a, 389 a 


irdXat, ri 760 b 


raptreiiicfi 247 b ^H 


i5pxij*4» 194 b 


raXouir, ri 262 a 


rd^' 73 b, .359 b, 43;; a, __^^M 


8t 48a, 763a (relative): 


irdXatff;ia 66(i a 


472 b ^^^1 


321 b, 444 a (dnmonatra- 


nXdfiT, 382 b 


Tapc(ii¥ai ^^^^^M 


tiv«!): 747b( = «<rrH) 


rBX^if 384 b 


rape&r, t6 605 a ^^^^H 


fowl 411 a 


raXfrrovoT 93 a 


iraf>//>X'(rtf<>t 486 a b, 786 b ^^^^H 


itv) iifuit ISiuif 141 a 


■raXXojo) 108 a. 276 b, 765 a 


To^df 150b, 368h, 399a, ^^^H 


«rM>r(443a,«36a 


rdXXeirtfai 826 a 


b ^^^H 


foot 349 b, 361 a 


war, ri 398 a 


Ta.fnf)iopit<r8<u 23 a ^^^^^^| 


6<rr» 585 b. 769 b 


rarSijMi 309 a. 468 a, 674 a 


va^xur ^^^^^H 


6rav 384 a 


■wanTifupii' 27 1 a 


Tojpff'ny ^^^^^H 


9t« 606 a 


rarotWir 522 b, 814 b 


rdpmcM a ^^^^H 


»r< «i4 615u 


rarrrparii 303 a 


»dp«f 696 ^^^H 


o«{<c) 19 b, 67 b, 251a, 


■rirraSU b, Sa(rdV766b 


vat 824 b : r£t r<t 62f> b, ^^^^1 


687 b 


(WKa) 


656 1> ^^^H 


oiJtt^t 81b, 197 b, 720 b 


varrax&9a' 486 b 


vdox'"* a ^^^^H 


(pl.h o«8aHi7l6« 

1 


TarrcX/uf 441 a, 530 b 


raTitp386b ^H 



^^H 


HERODOTUS 


^■^ 


^^^^^H wArpii 755 1), 700 1> 


TtfUTiiitirrita 528 a, 680 a 


Tm^ftir 71 a, 127 b, SMb, 


^^^H warplf 444 b, a. 


re/it«ar^(7ai 534 a, 763 b 


275 a, 282 b, 476 b, 523b, 


^^^^^H rarpbOfv 


wtpiK\r]LtLi> 209 b 


584 a b. 601 b. «3«1». 


^^^^H rArput 700 


■■fpt«Tio4'<t 201 b 


710 b, 789 b, 817 a 


^^^^^H irai^u' Ibh (n. InlJti. ), 


■wfptKVK\ov» 482 a 


TM/«r0<u lb, 48b, 62 1, 


^^^H 


rcpiXaM^drciv 522 b 


78 a, 81b, 182 b, 206 a, 


^^^H riSi, 49 D. 520 b 


xtploim 329 a 


227 a, 267 b, 268 b, 322b, 


^^^H aV&Xoy 96 a, 100 a 


TE^OUCOt 301 b 


328 b. 363 b, 368a, 8711. 


^^^H na/w «77 b, 701 & 


■wtftiopay 602 a, 604 1j, 682 a 


376b,378a, S79b, 884*. 


^^^H rtih 79 a, 81b, 105 a, 


ic/KrertJf 384 a 


385a. 389 a. 417a, 445 b, 


^^^H 106 a, 152 b, 159 a, 396 h, 


■ntpt-rirrfui 111 b, 279 B, 


473 a, 604 a, 529 a. 570(1, 


^^^M fil7a 


505 1. 


604 b, 635 a, 667 b (Wij, 


^^^H wti8n» b 


TtpnrX^uf 349 a 


684 a, 685 a, 688 a b, 


^^^^H rtipauBai (w. Infill.) 610 a: 


TffiiwoUtut 268 b 


699a, 710b, 767b, 768b, 


^^^H ( w. Particip. ) 14 a, 1 84 b. 


wtpivwepx^fn' 310 a 


786b,809b, 811a, Siea, 


^^^^1 201 a, 251 a, 642 a, 667 V 


Tf/MtrraSii' 334 a 


817 b 


^^^M 711a 


■wrpcirrAXfiJ' 724 b 


roKitiaov, t6 710 a. 815 b 


^^^^B WXa-yos 49 a, 76 h, 168 a, 


reptaTf^voiv 169 a 


rolv 542 b ^M 


^^^H 258 a, 375 


wf p<ffr^<u 600 b 


roiifpLa 109 a ^H 


^^^^1 vcXdfciy 190 a 


vtpurrpijnpSuaBex 570 a 


TWJjr'of 415 b ^1 


^^^H 


T</)«<rxif«i' 703 b 


TouciXm 84 a, 99 1>, 141 b 1 


^^^H vArirlOOa 


rfptxupiflt 695 b 


Tou^l79a ^M 


^^^B wifirtip 241 b, 91 1 a, 649 a. 


■TfpiXf utiv 826 b 


TvXf^pXOf 252 a ^^| 


^^^B 778 h 


rrpiftXoCr 768 a 


roX^^OT 200 a, 826* ^H 


^^^H w4tn)t 437 


Uep<rct9i)f 326|a 


woXiT^t 350 a. 429 b ^H 


^^^H nitOot a 


xtpaurrl 402 b 


roXtrrrlri 668 a ^^| 


^^^H revfi) b 


T^/wj 297 a 


roXiopKirir 3»6 b, 435a^^ 


^^^^H xcrrdcaXov 666 a, 754 a 


ir^pos713b 


721a, 733 b, 824 a 1 


^^^^H TonfKbrrtfKn 227 b, 432 a, 


Tij^iJ 543 a 


TiKi 2 a, 12 b, 344 a ^J 


^^^H 433 a 


»i7(iiaii'fii' 613 b 


iroX<riK6i 131 a ^^M 


^^^^p rerotii/j/m 360 b (midilic) 


vUitii> nb b, 728 a, 731 a 


wo\\6» 375 b ^H 


^^^m ir/Tw«a 775 b 


ir(AM83b, neb 


roXX<^ 220a, 446 a. 783i, 1 


^^^H -irtp 375 b, 440 b, 701a, 


■Kirrta) 228 b, 335 b, 379 b. 


811a jJ 


^^^H 714a 


633 b, 727 b, 731b, 738 a. 


woXvfL-ffKdt 384 a ^H 


^^^^^1 Tfpolot 


744 a 


ro/xTi) (0€£i;) 505 b ^^M 


^^^^^H rfpyafioir 64 b 


irioTtifui 532 b 


rdfot 281 a, 331 1., 47J^" 


^^^H W/njK'tODb 


irt<rT<i521b, 810 a 


497 a. 620 a, 647 b, 705 a 


^^^H rtpi 186 b, 196 a, 250 b, 


wiarln 546 a, 587 a 


xop«i«o.2»0b,885b.43«a, 


^^^H 268 b, 366 a, 367 a, 


TrXnTirirrin 42 a, 46 a 


641 a 


^^^H 385 a b, 392 b, 396 a, 


t\Ui» 782 b 


wopB/i^tw 38 a 


^^^^B 444 b, 472 b, 473 b, 482 a, 


T>jep<ty 128 b, 299 a 


ropOiiii 502 a 


^^^H 527b. 534b. 603a: w. 


vXiKfip^bh, 109 b 


T6pot 258a, 87da. 634«,_ 


^^^^H Aceus. 270 a, 284 b, 


tUw (<^peadai) 397 b 


541b, 544 b, 553 b ^H 


^^^H 513 b: VI. Dat 513 b, 


irXcovofWio' 535 b 


wopffOytir 603 a ^^H 


^^^H 751b, 802 a: w. Genit. 


irXtoniKTfit 220 a 


wirTtfun 385 b ^H 


^^^^B 68 b, 78 b, 513 b: loca- 


rXfu^v 749 a 


irirvta 793 b ^H 


^^^^^H tiv« 525 a: temporal 


«-X^u»829b 


ircH^ 674 b ^H 


^^^H 319a 


rXffiat 132 b, 404 b, 405 b, 


x/)i?T»i'541a, 7«Ia ^H 


^^^H Wpt 883 a, 400 b. 689 b 


412 b, 681b, 634 b 


■wptafirvtw 3 b |^^| 


^^^^1 Trp>/3il\Xru> <-rirOai) 281 b, 


w\TiBiipii 329u 


irpTTMa 22 a. 169 b, 185^i1 


^^^H 282 b, 36Sb, 678 a 


Khiimivplt 557 a 


199a, 206a, 207 a, 368a, 


^^^^B %(piyi»e<7eat 558 a, 596 b 


T\^y 243 b, 410 a, 563 b, 


372a, 332 b, 384a, 416a, 


^^^^^H -wtpiypatpfiv S3 a 


656 a, 739 b 


422b, 443b, 480 b. 494 a. 


^^^^B irrpi(u'at289 a, 448 b, 508 a. 


ifXr)/)ijt 29 b 


618a,621b,526b,713N 


^^^m 


trXripovD 450 a 


739 a, 800 a 


^^^H vtfuhrta/ 204 b, 268 b, 


itXrfalov 639 b 


rpi}<iaiu> 79 a, 377 a, 384 tv 


^^^H 314 a, 381 a, 395 b 


X'Xi;<r(&X<^P<" 719 b 


813 b, 815 ab, 818a 


^^^^^H vtptlpxta9<u{-t\8ti») 11 1 1), 


a-Xd-tfoi 467 b 


tpnyHipioifi 36 b 


^^^B 334 a, 523 a 


tXoio* 384 b, 387 a, 780 a 


wfAi> 815 a: ^ptp 4 180 1^ 


^^^^B Tcpt/x"" (-ri7&at) 372 a, 


jrXoDrot 763 a, 786 a 


446 a, 613b(U«). 824 b 


^^H 486 b (M*), 716 a 


iroJfur 400 a 


»p64b, 169a,n6b.l82li, 


^^^H ir(jatirW«^^a(318a 


ToO^Eif 634 a 


185 a, 210 a, 220 a, 350 b 





INDEX II 


431 " 


l«»),iJ80b, 363 b, 391a. 


atlverbial 236 a, 438 a, 


■wupii 46 a 


410b,436«, 140 », 444a, 


(8. 29. 7) 


TupoOv 616 b 


478b,«82b, 673b, 700b, 


rpoaarffui 784 » 


■w\}pwoS4tir6aj. 486 b 


707 ». 749 b: iji Com- 


rpeaatp/tii/ 609 a 


ru/»^260b, 598 a 


position 40 b, 267 s, 


»/xw4»Tij5 224 a 


Tv^^j^366a 


1^85 a, 448 a, 483 b 


wpocdTrav 383 b 




Tpoiyeiy G6S a 


rpoff/^dWdc 501 a 


^W^tr 49 b, 446 b 


wpopalftirAtOt, 462* 


-rpmrS^terOai 494 b 


Ixirrtir 625 b 


■rpofWAttr 18S b 


wpoaipxrrffax 194 a 


;W0i)768a 


rpA^Ta> 3S2a, 786 a, 


wpoanraydv 383 b 


pitBpop 701 a 


787 a 


wpoafxt"' 797 a 


^M» 657 b 


rp^Xoi 100 b, 202 a 


rpctrrxiit 651 a, 802 b, 803 a 


ln<t6iuv» 18^ a 


wfi6pwX<» 2&0 a 


irpiodict 768 a 


;W«i» 185 b 


wfiotftcrtiip 6tf b 


vpocicirTtaiai 264 a 


jiiinja. 480 i> 


irpotti6nu 184 b, 276 a. 


)r/xxr<riiJ>)T572b 


Mx'n 56 b, 557 b 


439 a. 604 b, 724 a 


wpoanuDUir 178 b, 545 b 


^X^lBlh 


Tpoiocli, 6S« ll 


irpoffKiVijo-it 23 11 


^M«'678a 


r;>aMni(899a 


TpoefUtryrui 239 a 


^roXoo 87 b, 94 a 


rpitpo/ioi 616 b 


r/]ii<roaoi315a, 802 a 


^i}«(rft»4 20 a, 2y5b, 321 b. 


rpofSplii 752 a 


wpoaopiyrc^Oai 7 a 


756 a. 759 b, 782 b 


TfionSiyai 682 a 


TpoarJ)tirni> 813 a 


^i;540a, 730 a j 


T^orijop 693 h 


rpoffiroi^e<r9<u 674 b 




Tftoti-rai 602 a 


irpoffTToiftK "J-I.'>a 


oarlt ri5a 


wpotiwtiy 146 b, 149 a, 


wpoariaattr S05 b 


aM 768 a 


1^0 b,l{>8 a, 20411, 748 a 


rpAi TouTo 445* 


adrreif 86 b, 96 a 


TpMXai/ydJ' 686 b 


wfio<rn«iir<u 272 b. 067 b 


Mt/nJ 109 ti 


TpotfdytH' 807 a 


rpov^/wir (■fo'tfai) 660 a, 


niftedrtw 284 b, 317 a, 


Trptx^ataativ 730 b 


696 a, 746 b, 828 b 


a69a, 372b, 450b, 477a, 


T^faj's^r^vot 729 a 


xplxTxyiiio. 219 a, 774 a 


484 b, 534 a, 714 b 


vpof^anloTaaOai 446 a 


wpooxapitir 448 b 


tnifiii.t'Tijip lOi*! b 


vpot^SpT] 66 a 


ir/)Aru> 350 b, 686 b, 697 a, 


mj^ijco* 502 h, 723 a 


ir/xwffrdMi* 681 b 


777 b 


wydi- 392 b, 632 b 


rpoixt^* 599 a, 632 b, 


irpocu>4)t'Mui> 805 a 


viyii 360 b: .r.yp 473 a, 


647 b 


rporWfcirtfai 669 a 


479 b, 787 a 


wpoOviUtaSai. 672 a 


wpoTtp^ttr 716 a, 787 b 


aiHiptor 27 a, 678 b 


rpc6viiiri 358 a 


rportMi'cu (-«r0ai) 177 b. 


aiStip68fTot 673 b 


xpfAviun 20b a, Sfi6 b 


446a, 816a 


<rliifpot 87 b 


TpuSfiV 188 a 


wporpdrtif 782 b 


Ciifapwpitat 407 b 


rpot^at (-<iMi) 814 a 


ir/*A««Kr»f 787 b 


cl»i9«iu 199 a, 400 b, 


TrpolffirOeu 461 a 


Tpi4)a<rit 339 b 


613 b, 696 a 


rpclax'iy 534 a 


rpo^^ir 552 b, (600 a) 


airn 455 b, 456 a 


«^p(KoX/wl9(u 694 b 


irpoip^rnjt 410 b (W») 


«r<nro«4t 275 b 


Tp^Kart 4 55 a, 57 1 b 


irpo^iAdirircii' 799 a 


alT<n 36 a, 681 b 


rpoKar-nrSiu 409 b, 808 a 


vpox^civ 285 a 


attXn 397 a 


rporcureoi 4 4 3 b. 7 24 a, 802b 


wpOfwt, 489 b 


«rir/nj 2.'0 b 


TpixXitaii 754 a 


wpui 801 a 


ir»rvdf«r 83 b, 112 b, 113 b 


TpOKpirtir 644 a 


T^M366a, 558 b 


<r«i>i.)}128a, 743 b 


TpiKfKxraot 277 a 


w/>iffia 128 b 


eini<i/it 240 a 


T/x)X/7(v 574 a 


Tpwra 46 a : r^ p/r 64 b : 


eKLSyasecu 190 b, 387 b, 


vpo/aiBitcffai 813 a 


x^. Td 23 a, 621a, 


762 b 


T/>oro<i7 49r> a, 593 b 


769 a : r/M^oxri, 6' 


f«rp«») 505 a 


wpiinoot 573 a, 589 a 


342 a: ir/wrw 24 a, 


<r.X,^ 374 b 


r«>oo)>^760b 


277a, 497 b, 655b, 712b, 


irxAXo^ 794 b 


vpimtipa 694 a 


720a, 738a. 743 a, 773 b 


tfMa'816a • 


»p4t w. Aecu». 76 b, 197 a, 


rraJ<(y 802 a 


rnvpmf 268 b 


210a,214b. 218b, 341b, 


rrttf^ffeu* 604 Vi 


•rA<n414b 


422 b, [446 b], 448 a. 


vuxiftw 295 a 


<roi>l{f<ie<u 395 b 


790 b: w. Dative 177 a, 


iTL'Xtu 439 b, 440 a 


<ro0(<) 551 b 


215a. 413a, 448a, 790b: 


ri/v0dv(«0ai 331b, 413 a, 


eo^>6i 169 a, 632 a 


w. Oenit. 28 a, 63 a, 


71Ua, 815 b 


<nrd^ 93 b 


184 a, 207 b, 236 a, 886 b, 


wvfTfot 742 a 


inra»8lla 


448a, 490b, 739 b, 808a: 


iTffiiK 383 a 


frdfiot 389 a 



^^H 


HERODOTUS 


^^ 


^^^^H ^rapm^t 007 b, 6M it 


tvyicaTt(rfi^r9»k SS6 b 


ovycir^iiUeu' 62S b ^H 


^^^^^H aTcipfin a 


<rvyKtia9ai 705 b 


(Twctrirtn-mr 803 b ^^H 


^^^^1 fvei'ilhiv 417 I), 


fViK(rTrtil) 197 b 


fvpetrrdjxu 191 b, M^^| 


^^^^H ovo¥Sri329a: (nrvcAalTSb, 


cvYKvpftir 495 a, 502 a, 


396a ^H 


^^^H 


780 b 


irv«>e<rnfc^Mit 332 b, 48^^H 


^^^^^H a-r6pot 530 a 


vvyxitir\l9iL, 192 a, 613 b 


rtnnipti)^ 141 a ^B 


^^^^^H VTTOvi^ 203 a tnrovii 


gvyX""' ■107 *> 696 b 


<rip0vita 367 b, 796 a ^H 


^^^H 


avyx'-'P^'"' 225 a, 670 a 


iruri^at (-clm<) 191a ^^H 


^^^^H araOtUfa^iu. 673 b 


a-vMy 404 a 


irvri^pai (-/i7^) 816 b ^H 


^^^^^H miOnt(itaOai 659 b 


avXK^eiy 251b, 382 b, 


(Tivrao'ircui S3 a ^^B 


^^^^H araOtitn ISU a 


446 a, 646 a 


in/yo^at 645 a, 686 a ^H 


^^^H <rra<r.d^«K 484 •, 649 l> 


<ri;XXo7M 9 b, 17 b, 389 a, 


vvwolKijtta. 218 a ^H 


^^^^H <rr6.<rit *, 694 a 


473 b, 487 a 


aurriftreir 154 b 


^^^^^^H trrojrtbrnjs 564 t>, 697 * 


<rvXKvirittre<u 789 a 


9v»rapiaftu> 696 b, 7C3 » 


^^^^H <rreiy&% 400 a, 669 b 


(rvfi^iyitr 801 a (6m) 


(Tvmtf/fcu 50 b. 601^^ 


^^^^B (rrelxtc 611s, 726 » 


crvfi8dWttr {-<aS<u) 192a, 


703a. 710b '^H 


^^^^^1 trrimia 295 a 


IMa. 271b, 276b, 315b, 


<ri»rtoc<ir 630 a, 78S* ^H 


^^^H arif^tt^ 133 a, 824 b 


366 b, 898a. 447 b, 506a, 


tfM'u;t^t200b ^^H 


^^^^H ariptuir 787* 


6S2a. 727 a, 733 a. 736a 


Zi^pivytp-iit 187 b ^H 


^^^^H rHptcffai 586 * 


ffvtt^M 2;i6 b, 688 b, 690 b. 


tri^oTafftt 237 b ^^H 


^^^^1 or/^aroT 392 k 


699 a. 773 b. 800 b 


ffi/OT^poi 195 a, 47^^H 


^^^B irrt^Xij 45 a 


irvftfiovXtCfir 178 a, 345 b, 


586l>, 780o ^H 


^^^^^^B rr^foi h 


350 b 


ffViTT/HiTriVirC^at 328 a ^^| 


^^^H 


o-v^ovXii; 72 a 


vwrrpiipitt' 626 a ^H 


^^^^^^1 irTi7ci>> 49 b 


ffviifidx«^Sat 354 U 


VMrrpo^ 18 b ^^| 


^^^^H <rrlyfui. 9i2h 


a-VMIMxh 566 b 


irvxm 175 a, 439 b, MtHi 


^^^H <rr{{-n» 


a-v/i/iaxucAv, r6 809 b 


804 b ^H 


^^^^B <rrZ^t 7161), 74 4 a 


aUti^iaxot 218 b, 255 a, 


<r0a7t<if«,r0a< 727 a, 74»^H 


^^^H rrikoi 


308 b, 382 b, 389 a, 4638, 


ff^dXXnr 192 a ^H 


^^^^m arhiui 56 373 h 


497 a, 633 b, 686 a, 588 a, 


(T^dXiui 607 a ^^| 


^^^^^H ffrpardpx^t 426 a 


610 b. 663 b, 738b, 783b 


(T^cFSovi^t 232 a ^H 


^^^^^^B trrpa-nvfaSiu. 87 a, 420 a, 


fviifdayeut 412 h, 445 b, 


<r0(a. 664b(=dXX,iXeiO ' 


^^^H 462 f.04 805 a. 


400b,483b, 505a.694a, 


<r0iSa^ 624 a 


^^^H 823 b 


701a, 739 b, 796 a 


aipirnlf 93 b 


^^^^^^H CTpdrevfut. f>21 b 


(rv/iwlrTtix 206 a, 378 a, 


ffX<'i'>r 54 li 


^^^^H rrpa-ntyitw 106h, 107 a, 


566 b, 684 0, 713 a, 800b 


vX^itir (ta^BA) 45 b. SSMk 


^^^H 121b, 12-2b, 152b, UlSa, 


(bis) 


405 a, 700 b 


^^^H a 


ffviiwXiipouv 358 a 


tfyfeu- 406 a 


^^^^^H arpartr/lt 502 b 


cvfup^ptir 5a, 174 b, 493a, 


<ritfr4p 285 a b, 677 b ^H 


^^^^^H (rr/wnryd? 177 a, 3S9b, 


494 b. 496N 498a, 675 a 


^^1 


^^^H 368b, 378a, 433b, 476b, 


irvit^f^ 176 a, 188 b, 767 b 


■ 


^^^H 498a, 523b, 539a, 650a, 


<rvii.il>v\daattv 250 b 


rd 409 b ^M 


^^^H 555 b, 560 b. 687 s. b 


aif 332 b, 774 a: in 


(ra>&i)7a H 


^^^^H (rrpar^XoirCir 182 b, 581 b 


Coni|>08. 345 b 


r(ij(529a ^M 


^^^^B arpa.Tfti 170 b, 387 b, 456 b, 


awiLYyt\<» 340 a 


rdXarrov 765 b ^H^ 


^^^H a 


cvrirfuy 36 a, 219 b, 268 a 


TOMi7» 437 b ' 


^^^^H cTpanian^ 375 a, 380 a 


avfaUfeir 22 b 


Td/i»«» 172 a, 64Sb, 771b 


^^^^^^H VTparoweStvtii' (-eirtfat) 


rvyan4>6T€f>oi 69 n, 430 a 


rafiapxoi 125 b, 4<ll. 


^^^H 638 700 


(pl.) 


633 b, 708 a 


^^^^H rrparbweioi' 348 b, 372 a, 


miiraf 688 b 


rdfit 315 b, 498 a, «lb. 


^^^H 373b, 389a, 419a, 476a, 


ffvraroOHtiriirur 828 b 


659 a, 723 b, 749 a 


^^^B 490a, r>06b, 618b, 625a, 


irM'ax0«<r<>at 686 b 


rapivatiy 703 a ^^ 


^^^H 643a, 704a, 711 a. 712a. 


ffwHew 826 a 


rdjfxxot 826 a ^H 


^^^H 783 b, 759 a, 762 a, 805a 


o'i/r2iax«p'{'(»' 804 b 


ropff&t 674 a VH 


^^^B (rrpaTbt 127 b, 271 b, 779 b, 


cvriSptor 446 a, 474 a, 


rti<r<r«r 376 b, 379 a, a«8~ 


^^^H 815a 


483 b 


roCpOT 326 b 


^^^^^^P rrpeirrln 762 


irvptMpiu 721 a, 726 a 


raOra 536 b 


^^^^H rri>tTTO(t>&pot 540 a 


avptKtlTTtw 434 b, 550 b 


rai^ 142a, 164a, l«6l. 


^^^^^^B rrpiavirCran 286 a 


(nntiKvpfyjatadtu 241 b 


261a, 263 b, 31«a,3»fc, 


^^^^^^B auyytriiaKttr 830 b 


avvtriirfaeat. 803 b 


367b, 376a, 898a. 400a, 


^^^^H avyir/xi^v^at 191 a 


mvfiri-airiifitpoi, 803 b 


407 a, 608a. 582a. BSSK 


^^^^^m auyKaraipiar 670 a 


irupipx'i'Bai 821 b 


667b. 731 a, 791 a, SOOb 



^^ 


INDEX II 


4S3 ^^ 


Ti<t>pot -iSV », 396 b 


ri M^x/x 1*1 ^ 146 h: 


TvpoKK/f 74 a, 676 a, 676 a J 


rdxa 268 a, 674 ft 


collective 331a, 398 a 


Tip(w»m 2*27 a, 289 a. ^^AH 


ToxJimjf, T^K 69 a, 681b, 


(xa^). 681a {ifUrtpo,), 


686 b ^^^H 


682 a 


r>90 b CEX\.;»ir«r) 


^^^H 


rdxM 524 a. r>4la. 605 a 


r43c&47a 


tHi/ fifuit tSiity 29 b. 42 b, ^^^^H 


(adT.) 


Tolyop 541 a 


147 a. 215 b. 362a, 368b. ^^^H 


Tax>>Tv^M)i' 802 a 


roi6<ri< 135 a, 340 a. 606 b 


620 b. 662a, 673 b, 769 b ^^^H 


re 720 a. 736 a, 739 a, 


rotoi>70f 698 ii 


^^^^^^H 


744b, 702 a: without 
KcU 519 a: n xal 59 b. 


Toixot 674 a 
r^oi 51 b, 824 li 


^ta^nmaTsseb, 544 b ^H 


61 a, 469 l>, 517 a, 529 a, 


Toifijttr '139 a 


{rfuUpfir 220 a ^^^^^| 


814a 


rdfrv/ui 555 b 


vfUrtpor, a ^^^^^H 


T«ix<>/«>x(l 742 11 


T<ifw Stjb. 93 a. 102 a, 


iVd7<«i< 787 a. 789 a ^^^^^| 


Ttixoj B03a, 681 b, 714 a. 


729 a 


irr<up4(iy 76U b, 822 b ^^^H 


804 a, 826 a 


TofAnji 222 a, 632 b, 726 b 


i>ira^«-d{'((i' a ^^^^^| 


Tt\iei» 148 b 


ricTot 319 a 


b ^^^^H 


rcXri/Taiot 656 b 


TixriirSt 818 a 


Orapxoi 39 b, 48 a, 184 b. ^^^H 


Tt\tura.y 35 a. 157 b, 248 a. 


ToffoOrot 16 a, 16 b, 22 a, 


135 b ^^^H 


f)Hb 


26 a b, 206 a, 313 a, 


ilTtlCKOtUttl* ^^^^^H 


rA(K 1051). Ilia. 315a, 


382 b, 623 b. 553a, 5a»a, 


inrttrieiinki 363 a ^^^^H 


3»0b, 473 b, 604 b, 664 b, 


626 b, 736 b, 739 b 


{iwtKXi^pttir ^^^^^^1 


683 b, 723 a, 676 a (ft). 


roCro fUr (followed by 


I'Tffaip/ni' 12 b ^^^^H 


808 b: adrerb. 656 b. 


To5ro 8/) «b. 318 a. 


vrtUx^"' 566 a ^^^^^H 


606 a, 803 b 


496a, 618a, 569a, 603b, 


i>rtp 514 b, 578 b, 686 a, ^^^H 


T^^trv, 296 a. 413 b, 570 b, 


646a.797b, 798a, S16a: 


825 h : in Compoa. 26 b ^^^^1 


610 b 


vrithnut toOto 5^ 33 a. 


IrwtpappuSitir 468 b ~^^B 


T^nria, Ti 261 b 


257 b, 612a: roi>ra »i 


vrtpliiWtir {11100,) 226 U, ^^^M 


Hpat 78 a b, 396 b, 411 a. 


without toOto tUf 447 b 


239 b, 240 b, 349 b, 389 a, ^^^H 


! r.76 b. 826 a 


Tfidwtir (ctf^at) 60 a, 826 a, 


651a, 576 b, 581b, 746b ^^^H 


T^i»»)716b 


668 a, 722 b, 731b 


irwtp^X^ 537 a ^^^^H 


r^i-T341 b, 473 IX 


rpifuir 340 b 


iiTtfrltfuavt 60 a, 217 b ^^^^^H 


rn 22»b, 256 «. 269 a, 


rpixny 78 b, 217*, 666 », 


vTrtpiAi)iini\ 582 b ^^^^^B 


aVJOb, 335b, :H9b, 631a, 


673 b 


iiirtpoiiiiti.» 142 b ^^^^^^1 


730 b, 737 a, 738 b 


TfttixOi 82t»ft : ftM 314 a, 


irrcfyriOcaSai 28 b ^^^^^B 


rgSt 189 b, 406 b, SIO a. 


381 a, 395 b 


\rwtpit>ti>tu> 578 a, 589 b ^^H 


694 a 


Tpf/Soi 582 b 


inrtpipvip 543 b, 759 b ^^^^H 


np-inoi)™ 331 a 


TpaiKiarrtpw (■%) 885 a 


irri<rxcTO a ^^^^H 


rtdpo 83 b 


Tp,7,pnn^u* 268 a, 269 a 


^^(if n ^^^^H 


tI S^) 177 b 


Tpiiipaf>x<n 492 a, 496 b, 


iVi-i/Kai 699 b ^^^H 


Tti>p7j{i) 547 a 


504 a 


l/rlrxtaSai. '£u'i a ^^^| 


riff^rot {-taBat) 312 a, 


TfH^fnit 432 a 


I'rrurxWcir^ac 522 a ^^^^^^| 


5 13 b, 526 a, 688 a 


TfKii)^ 770 a 


t<ir6 with AccDH. 145a, ^^^^^H 


rifioK 561 a, 761 b 


Tplrovt 396 a, 486 b 


233a, 466b, 503a, 704 a, ^^^H 


n^i>133h, 149 b, 661a 


Tfilt 577 a 


719a, 726a, 787a, 792a: ^^^H 


T/Au«748a 


Tptraiof 291 a 


with Dative 128a, 185b, ^^^^H 


Tifiup/tir {-tffdai) 5 a, 11 a, 


Tf>Lrr)n6pi<0 669 a 


322 a, 440 a, 499a b: ^^^H 


690b, 601b. 760 b. 761b, 


rptrrinopii 170 a 


with Qenitivp 19 b, 77 b, ^H 


788 b 


rplxi^lia- 94 b 


134b, 179b, 188b. 216a, ^^ 


TifuifmiM 241 b 


r/>^of 348 a, 606 b 


263b. 240a, 342a, 368 a. 1 


munfA-n 466 b 


T/wxdf«u« 787 b 


876 b, 879 b. 387 b, 404 b. jj 


rifuapit a a, 248 a 


TfoxatiUft 187 a 


472 a, 483 b, 642 b, 656 a. ^^HH 


Wy«r9« 826 b 


r/iuiMa 350 a, 393 a, 485 a, 


678 b, 673 b, 689 b, 698 a, ^^^H 


Wt 19 b, 351a, 689 b 


780 h, 800 b 


699a, 7a2b, 732b, 738a. ^^^H 


Tit 198 b, 378 a, 406 a, 


TV>7^d»'«i' 133 a, 807 b, 


764b, 760a, 796a, 816b: ^H 


497 b. 521b, 546 b, 676 b. 


461 b, 577 u, 730b, 812h. 


adverb. 84 a: in Com- ^^^^^H 


726 b, 769 b, 786 h, 796 a. 


814 a 


^^^^H 


823b 


Turrd 816 « 


irwofipvx^ 170 a ^^^^H 


;^Tto<. 479 b, 520 b, 623 a 


ruXoui" 87 b 


•)iroa^K«r0a. 321 b, 612 b, ^H 


riTfldtrKtir 381 a 


Tv\ur(n 94 a 


^^^H 


ri 185 b. 190 b, 221 h, 


Tvti^oxottif 147 • 


iroA/fiOf 69 b ^^^^H 


270a, 271b. 354a, 378a, 


n'lTTrii' 633 li 


vroaoxi? ^^^^H 


388 a: ri dri 679 a: 


TvparKifir 822a 


itwtimtirvx ^h ^^^^H 


VOL. n 


^^^ 


^^H 



^^^B 4S4 HERODOTUS 




^^^^H 6TO0iiityi 4ib a 


^^of 65 a, 412 b, 739 b 


Xfiiiita. 279 a, 281b {U*\ 




^^^^^H irwoKpU'fiy {-faBat) lil 1 m, 


imfii 93 b 


379 b, 392 b, 396a, 408 K 




^^^H 


0o»»((ftfei>' 481 b 


676 a, 507 a, 600 b. 7«>. 




^^^^H uricpiffii 616(1 


^oiTov 36 b 


807 a, 827 b 




^^^^H i'«-oXa;i^di>«i* 244 a, U75li, 


flkmr^cu' 160 b 


3j/)ija/ioX4yw 192* 




^^^H 508 b, 7«8 h 


0orai 756 b 


Ximii^f ^83 b, 686 b 




^^^^B i/woktlrttf 444 «. 460 b, 


i^tittr 754 a 


XPtai^oa-OfT) 667 b 




^^^^1 fil»a 


0op^ii71b, 136 b, 150 a 


XPVaTTifM d^rtrOat 1 86 K 




^^^^1 InriKoiwoi 248 b, C57 a. 


4>opu(>t 467 b 


669 a 




^^^^H uTOM^rnv 129 b, 782 a, 


ippayfidt 54 b 


jOT<rn>p»o» 101a, 4171; 




^^^H 


^^xii-rtv ( nrtfat ) 230 a, 8 1 1 a 


540 a, 567 a, 570 a. 7321 




^^^^^^1 inrofufir^iuijr 249 a 


i,pAc(T€iy 191b, 487 b. 


XPV<r<-6% 535 a, 727 b 




^^^^^^ iHroro^eiv 776 a, 797 b 


727 li, 742a 


Xptx'm 13 a, 44 a, $$7 1, 




^^^^B i/wocT^mi 501b, 869 a, 


tppff^pVf 713 b 


581b. 605 b, 714a. 727h. 




^^^^H 


^^ 607 b 


750b,S08*,814a:z^ 




^^^^^1 irroarpiipfi* 616 b, 626 a 


if)poif4ra> 130 b, 308 b, 822 b, 


729a, 732b: x^^mt. « 




^^^^^^H inroTiOiriu (-nrtfat) 355 b, 


597 a, 622 a, 797 b 


779 a 




^^^H 797 a 


^iphmttia 711 b 


X/>tvdopoc 481 b 




^^^^H vTovpr^tiv 533 b, 5851 a, 


tppovTiifiv 400 b 


Xvrbt 66 b 




^^^H 


(ppovTlt 306 b 


Xuj<a 510 a 




^^^^^H vrbipavait a 


ippovp^uif 321 b 


Xw^<» 465 », 729 a, 75511, 




^^^^H i>Tov('{i) 798 a 


0piVy€(K 509 b 


818 a 




^^^H vTuph, 290 b, 629 a, 636 b ! 


0t^ 804 a 


Xuf>n 40O a, 460 b 




^^^^^H OoTcpot 757 


^uXurt} 309 a, 387 b, 686 b. 


Xvplow 301 b, 390 a 






687 a, 688 a, 702 b 


X-p/ilOSa, 379 b, 621 ». 






<f>i\iLKot 788 a 


664 a, 769 h 




^^^^B Naivety (-cffdat) 455 b, 790 h 


<p6\ai 687 a 


xw/wt301«, 717 a 




^^^^B ^yai 225 b, 454 a 


<pv\d<t<rtir 361 a, 371 a. 






^^^^H ^vrdrecr^oi 18 a, 24 a 


377 b, 676b, 769 b, 816b 


fd^/iot 467 b 
^A.o» 762 b 
^Xio^pot 540 a 
V(«i)a<u' 416 a, 728 b 
^i^o-nji 313 a 




^^^^^H ^fitiUKfittP 


ipvWit 389 a 




^^^H 0af)Oi814b 
^^^H ^dUr^ 56 b, 490 a 
^^^H ^r» 4 a, 280 a, 504 b, 

^^^^H ^Uraeoi 681 b 
^^^H ^p(82ea 
^^^^H iptpiyyvot 69 b 


^I'XXor 322 a, 578 a 
0to»413a 
^uvi» 94 b 




xai/)ci»682a, 808 a 
xaplfeirffai 760 b 


\)rn<^itaetu. 310 a 
f^*«>t550a, 713 b 
4>CK(n 656 a 
f i-XiS 546 a. 761 1» 
f uX/x^i 685 b 




^^^^1 f^/xiv {-rceai) 19a, 180b, 
^^^^1 814a,367b, 447a,451a, 


Xi^t 403 b, 725 b, 762 a, 

811b 




^^^^1 404b, 502a, 514 b, 519 h, 


Xci^drr'c 282 b, 538 a. 






^^^H 509a, 626b, 661 a, 678 b, 


567 a 


(Mc 579 b, 601 b 




^^^B 766 a, 803 b, 827 a: 0. 


Xfifudi'tu' 538 b, 545 b 


C>Situ> 237 b 




^^^B ^t 164 a, 585 a, 667 a, 


Xtifupitur 66 b, 538 a. 


(Wur/ifit 482 a, 641b, 739 b 




^^^B 798 b, 806a: 4>. M 


554 a, 558 a 


wfio/S^ot 116 a 




^^^H 676 


xciyii^ 376 a, 578 b 


iitiofHnrox 100 b. 109 b 




^^^^^B ^iytip 


Xtip 29 b, 219 b, 497 a, 


iir626b, 697 a, 744 b 




^^^H 04f»r 624 b, 799 a, 801 a 


582 b 


iipoTc 11a 




^^^H 0«(U«v 224 a, 226 a, 278 b, 


Xtiptitorit 84 a 


I&/77I 606 a 




^^^H 742 a 


XfipoOv 269 a 


Sipit 71b, 150a, 3741n 




^^^^H ^irifTbifior 824 a 


X'ii\fvr6t 113 a 


377 b, 383 a. 706 b 




^^^H ^^irtrlllb 


xVot 610 a 


<W2b, 250b. 850a.3<«lN 




^^^^B i-eowiiUL 463 b, 520 d 
^^^H tfj^xtsSlja; 552 b, 747 b 


XlXiot 61 a 


S88b, 397a,443b.4i»a 




XiXof 393 a 


516b, 610a. 802b. 81»»: 




^^^H ^aXn 762a 


XoXoOeeai. 399 a 


in S.» 605a, 634a. 




^^^H i»>Jtu> 1 8 b, 656 a, 829 b 


xVm 081 b 


Cxravrw 360 a, 386*. 




^^^^B ^JXioi 228 a, 509 a 


Xpo» 141b, 325 a, 571b 


758 b. 766 a: in riwur 




^^^^B ^\ot 689 a 


XpaaSai 176 a, 188 b, 237 a. 


542 a : in fKaa-ro, SSih: 




^^^^H ^XaDpoT248a 


265 a, 348 a, 384 a. 672 b, 


in Tixwrro 466 b: W. 




^^^^B ^XotAt542b 


788 h 


Particij). 821 b 




^^^^H ^in;p^fu> 132 b 


Xptiir 684 b 


& 149 a, 626 b, 669 b 




^^^H tpo^taOai 715b 


XP^i'f 74 a, 445 b, 666 b, 


uMnrtp 702 a 




^^^H ^/t«p6<186a 


816 b 


Hart 148 a (w. Indie.), 





lB6b ( = St*). 
27Cii, 281b, 282 b, 
378a,a86b, :i97b, 
M2 b, 508 b, 
S«6b, 584*,eilb, 
676 b, «83a, 69e&, 
742b, 7&0a, 752b, 
782 b 
uTatcourriiir 560 a 
uN^X/i) 185 \>, 221 b 



25&a, 
342 b, 
446*. 
&23S, 
673 b, 
726 a, 
755 b. 



k 



Abstract for Concrete 
566 b, 731b, 609 b 

AccuBativc 200 a, 227 s 
a50b,460a, 581 b, 740k, 
78«b: absolute 338 b, 
840a: adverbial 544 b: 
anomal. 186 b : cognat« 
18a, 528b, 611b, 788b: 
double 42 b, 133 b, 1781). 
223b, 249a, 526a, &2ab, 
805 a: with infmitive 
78 a: of rtfcreuuu 64b, 
lOlb, 143a, 397a, 633a, 
720a, 749a, 759b, 76Ub, 
829 b: of timn 71b, 
278 a, 329 a, 784 b 

Adjective, with ix'"' 
457 b : predicate 607 a : 
vi^rbal 239 a 

Ahcruativeg 16 h 

Aaacoluthoti a6 b, 1781), 
181b, IQSb, 219a, 264a, 
267 », 27 lb, 368b, 494 U 
571b, 602a, 721a, 759 b, 
768 b, 775 b, 7S3b 

Aorist Jb, 170 b, 172 a, 
173a, 197a, 246 b. 251b, 
262a, 284 b, 286a, 318 b, 
322b, 343b, 3.19^443 b, 
403 b, 494 h, 514 a, 533 b, 
S51l>, 653 b, 570a, 586 a, 
6111). 614 a, 62n>, 6308, 
604 b. 701b, 703 a, 706 a, 
711b, 714b. 743a, 769b. 
7S7a, 791 b: gnomic 
ISb: narrative 28 a: 
participle 20 a 

ApiHMJtioii 369 a, 458 a, 
497 a, 57.S a, 682 a 

Article yb, 12*. 18 b, 
12Si4, 142a. 116b, Uih, 
161b, 199b, 21 t>a. 2-22 b, 
223 b. 226 b. 228 Ik 257 K 
aUb.27Sb. 376a, 379a, 
380a. 381b. 384 b. 392a 
r6t«), 455b, 476b, 527 a, 
578a,780b. 756a. 811a, 
816 a : cl(-nioiii«trativo 
35 a, 50 M, 288 u, 326 b. 
491a. 496a, 519a, 756b: 



INDEX II 

neuter 131a: omitted 
376 a, 387 b, 406 b: 
|MMB(!sAive 339 a. 384 a, 
386 b : relative IS a, 
15 b, 21 b, 24 a, 25 b. 
28 b, 85 a, 44 b, 50 a, 
64a. 68a. 73b, 76a, 
98 b, 94 a, 155 a, 319 a. 
381b, 343a, 411a, 413b, 
434a,497a, 518a, 648b. 
688b, 741a, 760a, 761b, 
780 b 
Asyndtitou 352 a, 552 a, 
605b, 736a. 746b, 818b 
Attici.snis 7 b, 695 a 
Attraction 11a, 12 b, 73 b, 
126b, 197b, 472b, 518a 

Brachylogy 4 b, 16 a, 82 b, 
36 a, 4ra, 281a, 314 a, 
397b, 404 a, 596 a, S82a 

City (for land) 304 a, 623 b, 
624a, 632b, 638 u, 657b, 
733b, 776b, 786a, 789a 

ColluctivcK 726 b 

Comparati vo, noiutrnction 
386 h : double 289 a 

Conditiouak 12 b, 13 b, 
18 b. 69 a, 131b, 133 b, 
161a, 178a, 185a, 199a, 
207 b, 223 b, 226 a, 232 a, 
240a, 26Sa, 275b, 345b, 
350b, 352a, 360a. 385a, 
43&a,4l7b, 450l>, 503b, 
646b, 581a, 614b, 618b, 
648a, 68fta, 695b, 726a, 
760a, 779a, 798b, 808n, 
819 a: participle 1291), 
672 a 

CoBJunctivo (sub-) 774 a 

Comtruetio ad tmuwn 
11 a, 116 b, lS3b, 396b, 
434 b, 556 a 

Co-ori)iiiatioii 642 a, 691 li, 
724 a, 760 b 

Dative 182b, 381a, 449 a, 
48»b, 497 b, 517a, 681 b. 
582 b, 798 b: of aKvut 
816 a: double 318 a: 
ethical 160 a, 226 a, 
241 b, 289 a, 363 a, 886 b, 
461 b, 521 a, 732L, 778b, 
,S26b: iustnimeiit 136li: 
|)arlii:ip. 372 a, 377 a: 
reference 136 b : time 
772 a 

Dramatics 347 b 

Dual 168 a 



Ellips( 

7 J A ! 



426 

aiiipat: 595a, 613b, 739a, 

7/6 a, 769a 
E[iezege8i!i 23 b, 445 b 
Euphemisin lUh, 282 a, 

385 a, 580 a, 607 a, 682 a 

Kiiialh 10 h, 130 a, 240 a, 
.'J24b, 367a, 376b, 378 b, 
389b, 499a, 606a, 689b, 
701b. 803 a 
Freqaentativea 314 b 
Future 10 b, 70 a, 286 a, 
319 b, 360 a, 368 a, 457 b 

GeniUve 13 a, 68 a, 148 a, 

225 a, 278 h, 311a, 31 4 a, 
351a, 357 b, (411a), 
445b, 448a, 482b, 528a, 
766 a, 779 a, 780 b: 
absolute 132 a, 316 b, 
408 b, 463 b, 527 a, 582 b, 
627b, 635a, 676 b, 702a, 
703 a, 790 a : w. adverb 
494b: attributive 104 b: 
double 58 a, 74 a, 494 b: 
partitive 363 b : place 
434 a: price 194 b, 675 b: 
time 395 b 

Hapaxlegoniena — djai}- 
Iumjp 455 b, dMfifO'ii 
626 a, ii>b>piii 538 a, 
dir«iXi7ri)piot 536 a, ipl- 
5>rXos 456 h, dr^fiv 331 u, 
aiWoK(\iit 601 b, Mfiit 
4 b, (KTt/^Xuvir 789 b, 
/W«t 8 a, ^rUauTot 95 a, 
xar(ir(J'y(ir554tt, \vxvur 
d^( 319 u, rurt 3391), 
ipxij^iy 194 b, ripot 
596 b, {IltLpauOt) 491a, 
wo\v)iriKit 384 a, rvp- 
wo\4*a9ai 436 b, vlvot 
456 n, cwolicijfLa 218 a, 
irrofipvx^ 170 a, irro- 
i^{toi 69 b, (rri^uait 53 a 

Hendiadys 6 b, 604 a 

Idiomatic (Joiu|)arativt; 
289 a 

Im}K<ratives 69 b, 349 b, 
613a, 726b, 770a. 706b, 
818a, 82Ba 

Imfierfeota 62 a, 107 b, 
238 b, 310 a, 322 b (W*), 
325 a, 363 a, 371 b, 372a, 
397 a, 488a, 450a, 464 b. 
467 b. 516 b, 534 a, 660a. 
564 a, 566 b, 571 b, 569a, 
602 a, 614 1), 620b(M«), 
630a, 6S5a, 667 b, 672a, 



436 

ti92ii, 7O4a,705a, 706 a, 
721i«, 727 b, 733b, 7«9b, 
773 b, 784 b, 800«, 808b, 
8ir>a : descriptive 28 a 

ImiMirsoniil construction 
399», 523 b, ttH7R, 739 «, 
754 ■ 

IndiMtivefl 16 b, 310 b 

lufinitivM 206 a, 253 b, 
318 b, 336 b, 330 b, 356 a, 
386b, 519a, 52J8, 530a, 
532a, 618b, 7 r2a, 808b: 
coiuevutire 25a: epvxe- 
f^ctic 648 u, 555 a, 573 u, 
688 •: imperfect 461b, 
464 ft 

Irony 58 a, 71 b, 1S4 b, 
634 b 

Irregular constrnctioo 
795 ft 

IteratioD 4Sft,385b, 393 a, 
758 ft, 817 b 

Metaphors 217 a, 226 a, 
227a, 528b, 590a, 625b, 
666 a, 802 a 

Mid<ll<- 9 a, 37 b, 44 a, 
149 b, 242 a. 289 a, 
314 b, 345b, 389a, 435a, 
437b, 443b, 452b, 483b, 
606 b, 614 b, 793 b 

Moods, chmngn of 301 b 

Negfttiros 13 b, 32 b, 76 h, 
226 b, 365 a, 587 b : 
douhlc 5 b, 42 b, 74 b, 
444b, 445a, 456 a, STib, 
515b, 534a, 546b, 554 a, 
53gb, 604 a, 613 a, 626 a, 
691b, 696 b, 778 b: 
idiomatic 26 a 

Neuter, oolU'ctive 274 b, 
382 a : uonMtract, 18 a, 
68 ft, 60 ft, 176 a, 215 a, 
258 ft, 368 b : plural 
88 b, 307 b, 398ft, 445b, 
626 a 

Nominative (idiomatic) 
179b,193b, 219b, 223b, 
409 b, 464 a, 506 b, 783 a, 
Slab 

Oblique Oration 391 b, 
465b, 545b, 571a, 596a, 
712», 761a, 783 b, 800 a 

Optative 289 a, 310 b, 
367a, 439a, 542b, 555 b, 
634 ft, 702 a, 712 a, 740 a 

FaraUxis 22 a, 36 ft, 58 b, 
321b, 322b, 350a, 364 b, 



HERODOTUS 

384 b, 410b, 418«, 444 a, 
45Sa. 464b, 456 ft, 487 a, 
6n«, 671b. 622 », 886 b, 
692ft, 713a, 718b, 784 a, 
795 b, 799 a 

Participial con-itructions 
24 b, 75 b, 105 a, 127 a, 
1771.. 184 b, 201 ft, 207 b, 
251a, 307 b, 318 b, 327 b, 
372 ft, 377 a, 392 a b, 
437 b, 446b, 448b, 44ga, 
517a, 521a, 628a, 632a, 
535 b, 545 b, 547 a, 660 a, 
667 a, 577 a, 687 b, 613a, 
620b, 638a, 642 a, 667 a, 
691 b, 711a, 712a, 730b. 
742a, 771b, 803 1<, 810a, 
8r2b,S13a, 817 b, 818 a, 
825 b, 828 b. 830 b 

Partiuiplf, adiectival 

447b, 450b, 7421): \vith 
adjpctivv 522 b: ad- 
vpr»ativp 24 a ; condi- 
tional 12 b, 57 b. 129 b, 
203a, 518 b, 523b, 553a, 
672«, 760 a, 779a, 798b, 
808 a: imiH'rrcot Sri b, 
240ft,372a. 534 a, 633a: 
pnidioativc, itcc Predi- 
cation 

Passivo, for middle 18 a, 
68 b, 180 H, 464 a, 489 b, 
5118, 521a, 524 1., 711a 

Patronymic 1 », 136 b, 
275 a 

Perfect 175 b, 312 a, 360 b, 
439a, 483b, 686 a, 688b, 
695 a, 711 a, 724 a b, 
801a, S19a 

Porxonal construction 

726 b, 757 b 

Phrase refieated 767 a 

I'k-otiaani 15 b, 24 a, 366 b, 
379 b, 604 a, 668 a, 691b 

Pluperfect 66 b, 60 a, 66 a, 
86 b, 89 ft, 05 a, 101a, 
107 b, 128 a, 137 a, 148a, 
150a,170b, 210b, 218a, 
240a,246a, 250a,262a, 
284 a, 286 tt, 289a, 291ft, 
308 ft, 309 b, 315b, 324 a, 
326 a, 338 b, 341a, 352 b, 
364a, 374 b, 385a, 409a, 
4I2b, 435b, 450a, 460>, 
466b,4S3b, 498a, 504 a, 
508a, &19&, 528 a, 532 b, 
538b, 554 a, 556 b, 539 b, 
580a, 606a, 624 b, 633 ft. 
65eb,65gu, 664b, 679b, 
681b, 687 a, 704 b, 705a. 
739a, 795 a, 803b, 804 a, 
805 b, 814 a, 821 b, 824 b 



Plurftl 2 ft, 10 b. 15 a, %b 

(heterocltte), 53 b, (U>k. 
74 a <poutical), 81 1>, 
10r.ft(vBrb), 128 b, 149b, 
301 l>, 316 b, Uii 
(polit./), 493 b, 551 1. 
621 a, 641 l>, 679a, t>«7t. 
723 b, 749 a, 763 a, 765 i. 
769 b, 788*, 817 b 

Poetic words — iSati/iar 
455 b, OKpoOlpia 54Si, 
iriHrTfixftt' 714b, dr^ivr* 
705 ft, Salyi-tu 621 h, 
Ji(irayUt<rlftu26Sh,lfAit 
805 a. eu^piri) 366 1, 
BfxlxjKttr 269 b, irdyi^m 
780 a, iraTxiffiViv 817 \ 
(X^^ 126 a, Xir).pAi67'(K 
liifwltw 339 b, ot't'ifM 
767 b, rtinaivctt 613 U 
■rfK)aii»t>t\itir 805 •. 

/kdn-fU' 625 b, (<rTw» 
811 ft, (rrtlxtif) 61U 
4>o»oi 755 b, ](f(/talKtf 
545 b 

Pot'tical phraseology 689 • 

Predication 28 a. 218< 
485 a, 637 a, 563 b, 7g8b: 
adjectival 607^ 72Jk. 
811 b. 817 b : adrrrbial 
263 h, rj^ a, 801 a : 'i^ 
monstntti vr 283 b : u 
v«rted 822 b : UfXitrj 
3a: j«.rtifi-' ""1 
258 a, 282 i 
(6«), 4961., 
518 a, 81 1 h: mV 
sUntiral 20«a, 340b, 
313 b. 442 b 

Pregnant oonstmctiM 
448 a 

Pre^vunt 317 b (hiatorici, 
377 a, 379 b. 410 k 
(graphic). 555 • (hi^ 
tone), 610 b. 690 b, 
722 a, 823 b 

Pronouu, use of 350a 



Bolativa 13 a, ISO ft 
Reminiscences — Ais'-iij!'"' 

12 b, 14 a : Hum.r- 

43 a, 222 b 



Sehtmu Pmidariam 48k 

Singular, verb in asSft 
Style, defective 8 b. 10 1. 
15 b. 26 4, 99a. 114*. 
130 a, 137a, 145ft. iSSfc 
268b,294a, 307 ft, 7S2h 
751b, 796 b: iaeU|^ 



INDEX II 



437 



120a, 283 b, 313 b, 825 a, 
82da, 339a, 379 b, 384 b, 
387 a, 614 b, 621 a, 538 a, 
648 a, 556 b, 673 a, 706 b, 
713a, 714a, 718a, 813a, 
820 a, 830 b : rednn- 
dancy of 347 b, 863 a, 
441a, 486 a, 493 b, 729 a 



Subjunctive 76 b, 322 b, 
324 b, 436 a, 701b, 778 b, 
796 b 

Superlative 326 a 

Tautology 186 a, 304 a, 
450 b 



219 a : cp. Present, 
Future 
Tmeais 18 b, 28 b, 187 b, 
188 a, 217 a, 232a, 322a, 
827a,402b, 481b, 497 a, 
601b 



450 b 
Tenses, aor. with present Zeugma 416 b, 621 b, 797 a 



INDEX III 

NOMINUM 
A. PERSONAL AND PLACE-NAMES 



AjSa(396b, 404 a, 668 b 
'AfiSripa, rd 138 b, 161a 
'AfipmcSftrp 832 a 
'APpiiirtxot 385 a 
Apv8oi 47 a b, 48 a, 199 b, 

254 b, 820 b 
'AyaiUiarw 222 b 
Ay^aXot 124 a 
'Kyiioup 116 b 
'KySavpoi 440 a 
'Ayo/yfi 79 b 
'KStlixarrot 182 a, 364 a, 

604 b 
' XSpaixirruov 63 b 
'Aei/iiT;(rrot 732 b, 749 b 
'A^poTO! 675 b, 579 b 
'Afdi-ip 91 a 

'k9iiMi 79 1), 293 a, 295 b 
'ASyiyayifnp 781 h 
'Atft/i-dStjt 317 a 
'Aeijvat 11 a, 114 a, 269 b, 

365 a, 460 a, 618 b, 652a, 

580 b, 603 b, 612a, 623 b, 

822 a 
'ABvycdv 65 a, 411a, 442 a, 

505 a, 743 b 
"Afluj 34 a, 36 a, 152 b, 

153 a, 280 b 
AlaxiStu, o2 453 b 
Mat 648 b 
Alycuov, rb 63 a 
AlyiXfun 499 a b 
Alyi 155 b 

Ar^ifa 482 b, 564 a, 757 a 
Alybt rorafiol 826 b 
Aieiowtri 114 a 
Alveia 157 a 

A6')7(rr«i;/«>s 213 b, 232 a 
Atpot 79 b 
AhXtSits 407 b 



AioX{i262b 
AfoXot293a, 295 b 
Ataa 167 a 
AUrxpoMt 373 b 
'AxarBot 146 a, 161 a b 
'Axi^parM 410 b 
'AKpai0<i; 671 a 
'AUparSa, ri 289 a, 672 b 
'AVfar3/>OT 262 b, 256 a, 

672a, 679b, 687a, 688a, 

690 a 
'AXfvdJot 6 b 
'AXewj«170a, 719 b 
'AXiixfiuy 161 b 
'AXKa/iiyift 305 b 
"AXk^s 579 b 
'AXjC(/3((i$7t 380 a 
'AXos 291 b 

'AXvTifolieOh, 263 b, 338 b 
'A\Tnin6t 320 a 
'AAi/omji 409 a 
'AXus 40 a 
'AX<>fis335a 
'Afuwlrit 489 b 
'AuetKOKX^t 281 b 
'A^iTO-rpji 84 b, 814 a 
'A/i/Xroj 234 b 
•A/toM<!Nip«Tov 708 a, 718 b, 

747 a 
'A/ircXot 153 b, 154 b 
'Aft^rrris 252 b, 572 a, 

687 a 
'Afiivnjs 572 b, 679 b 
'A/Ji(pidpfiai 669 a 
'A/xiplKaia 403 a 
'A;u0iXoxot 116 a 
'Afutnaaa 402 a, 410 a 
'Ai-o^ai-a/rfajT? 221 a, 304 b, 

306 a, 466 b, 561 b 
' AyA^avSpoi 305 a 

488 



'ArailKtm 235 b, 34(t. 

661a 
'Aj'awi 44 a 
'Ard/>i/9oiXot 189 a 
'AvSpoadi/iar 492 a, 781b 
'Aj> Jpor/idnft 640 b 
'ArSpofUSii 205 a 
'Ar8p(»526a, 534 a 
'Ar^purrot 176 b 
'Ar0i(Xi; 260 b, 300 b 
'Afvup 234 b 
'Aviraui 320 a 
'Arro-yipijf 756 b 
'ArravSpot 64 a 
'ArrlSupot 374 a 
'An-wi/pij 297 b, 317* 
'AiTtixoi 665 a 
'Arrlirarpoi 148 b 
'Aw<roi 123 b 
'Afiot 158 a, 160 a 
'AiriStwit 166 b 
'AriXXwy 669 a, 570 b 
'AtoXXwWi; 784 b, 786 », 

789_a 
'Abates 680 a 
'A^iXoj 145 a 
'Apyi6wiot 717 a 
'A^osl97a, 575 a 
'A/njs 101 a 

'Apiaplyprit 1223, 497 » 
'Aplaftn 107 a 
'Apiapifivrii 501 b 
'AplSiaXts 289 a 
'ApibfMpSoi 91 a, 103 a 
' Apurray6prii 11 b, 781b 
'A/KOT^as 182 a 
'A/MffTeiaiji 483 a, 485 b, 

506 b, 655 h 
■Ap«(rT6ii;/iiot 306 a, 388* 
'Api<rr6Srifiot 563 b 



■■ 


" INDEX III 


439 ^^H 


^ApurroW«i7 1S6U 


'Axoi/iifr,, (7. 11. 9) 


A^Xot 566 a, 566 b, 7S1 a ^^^| 


Kptrrw, \29ik,inh, 354 b 


'Axi(xa» 430 b 


AitlUprrrM 129a, 311 b. ^^^H 


'Api<f>l>tjp Mi « 




343 b, 364 b, 454 b, 468 a ^^^M 


'KpitaSl,) 114 a, 302b(M«) 


BaYOiOt 105 a, 569 a 


Su/tnimp 190 b, 300 b, ^^^H 


' kpiMtdepifl lllu 


Bdi^t 102 a 


734 b, 794 a ^^^H 


■ApMaW«i|t335h 


B<iic>t 383 b, 482 a. 508 b, 


AiiiiiKpiToi b ^^^^1 


'ApMoif'^lt 624 B 


686 b 


Ai)MvaoT 1>89 b ^^^^1 


' kpaaiji trtfi 92 b 


B<iirr,>a 819a 


Ai;/i^<Xot :I28 b ^^^H 


' Kpaiiiiit 94 a 


HatfAVaTjt 564 b 


Aiaa/>iMir< 328 b ^^^^1 


'Afr^l^a^l« 90 b, 563 a, 


Baff<Td«i7i 100 a 


Siwixrit h ^^^^M 


680 IS 721 a, 786 b, 778 b 


Bdpiuon 678 b 


SMpait^ot 836 b ^^^^^^| 


'A^nt^oJ'M 15 b, 07 a, 91 a, 


B^aT669a 


A<(«ual38b ^^^^^H 


100 a, 108 a, 392 » 


B«raXW»i 145 b 


Alic«uo« a ^^^^^H 


'Afn-a/idjTji 89 b 


Bt<riir(»i) 182 a 


Ai^'Wot 141 b ^^^^^H 


'Apraioj 91 » 


B^f 136 a 


Aisriiro^di'irc 769 b ^^^^^| 


'AprdiTFji 332 a 


Boc^.)Ji 167 b 


i^iTaUn t> ^^^^H 


'AinMl)(mjt 47 b, 103 », 


BoMwii) 694 b, 604 h, 606 a. 


Aop^irvDt 38 b, 80 a, 184 b. ^^^H 


822 a, 826 b 


023 b, 628 a, 774 a 


161 b ^^^H 


'KpraOmi 814 a 


B«^i^280a,b 


XbptxraM ^^^^1 


'ApTaOrriTt 91 b. 669 b 


Bomoiti 169 b 


^liM 402 b ^^^H 


' Kprojiftptrrit 1 1 h, 09 a 


Bou^Sopi;? 572 b 


A/H/OT^T 400 a b, 421 b ^^^H 


' kpT^^pinrt 09 a 


BoOUTl76b 


A/tvAi irr^oXtU 677 a ^^^^| 


•A^X»^Tji 88«, 147tt, 669a 


BufdrT.p»779b 


Ai'paT 298 a ^^^^H 


'A/ntiiffiffJn 828 b 




Awahun) 787 b ^^^^1 


Aprtfut 268 b, 480 b 


YtUtrui' 703 b 


Awptci^ 221 a, 306 b, 609 b ^^^1 


*A^(/tur<i; 126 a, 461 b, 


raX<;V<i( 154 a 


Aoi/iit 309 a. 400 a ^^^H 


494 a 


rapya<t>lTi 630 (>, 696 b 


AuTM a ^^^^H 


'Aprtnla-toy 257 a b (W»), 


Fai'di-Tp 57Mi 


^^^^^M 


286a, 416a, 419b 


FA.) 211 a 


^^^^^1 


'Aprdtmit 769 * 


TAoi' 210 b, 213 a, 21»a, 


'B^pot 80 b ^^^H 


'ApT&xfiv* 98 1. 


221 b, 2'23 b («»), 226 b, 


'EXoxoCt 33 h. 823 a, 826 b ^^^H 


A^ivTwfi} 94 a, 97 a 


228 b, 232 a 


'EXdr«(a403h ^^^1 


Aprriiptot 91 a (6<#) 


Ttpatarbt 367 ■ 


EX^ri, 760 ^^H 


'A/ix^<^ 306 '' 


r//»yt» 107 a 


EXftxrli 466 a, 466 a, 490 b. ^^^1 


'A^teTpariJifi 781 !■ 


Yiyiuvm 157 a 


736 a ^H 


'Ap%lSifiUH 561 a 


rXaiwur 754 a 


'EUdt 424 a, 808 a, 827 h ^H 


'A/fM 471 a 


rWai 686 l> 


'EXXv 79 b ^H 


'AaraOimp 122 s 


l"o/i/>ii7i So, 6 b, 97 8, 


'EXXViTMo-M 47 a, 48 b, ^^^H 


■A^TTwiTUf 10 b, 828 h 


10«a 


61b, 79a, I82a. a27a, ^^^H 


A/rra 163 a 


V6ffot 164ab, 25Sb 


436 a. 524 a. 641 a, 802 b ^^^H 


'As^wiJiTt 2C8a 


Tipyot 124 b 


'EXAorlTT 388 u ^^^^1 


'Avurhiupm 741 a 


Topyu 355 b 


'BviTciH 167 a ^^^H 


'Atrwrit 299 b, 320 b 


ropili,^ 677 b 


'ErtdXrTt 316 h, 329 a, ^^^H 


'Aatnit 619 b. 628 h, 


riT«it)572b 


^^^H 


667 a U, 875 b, 678 a. 




'Ert6av^T 427 b ^^^^H 


697 b, 699a. 700a, 721b 


AalJaXot 242 l> 


'^ptxet(n 280 a. 425 b, ^^^H 


'Atop»«'i 63 a, 622 a 


AoMacrlOv^iot 125 a, 494 b 


^^^H 


'Artata 106 b 


i^^tcot 1 a, 2 b. 29 b. 92 b. 


■^pivtU 421 b ^^^H 


'Arpcifat 30 a 


94 a, 97 a, 98 b, 103 a. 


'EpM<i^r47Iu ^^^^^1 


'ArT07irot 620 H, 773 » 


106b(W«>,122ab, 134K 


E^^Xmoi 806 b ^^^H 


'Arruri) 4a4 ;i, 439 b, US «, 


174tt, 2"fiii, 810 b, ?17a 


'Hp^ifun 619 b, 523 a ^^^H 


583 a, 612 a, 762 b 


^Apinr^ 66 b 


-Bpir«>T67ea ^^^H 


'Arvt 41 b, 98 b 


Aapriot 813 b 


' Y^pal 61 9 b, 628 a, 632 b ^^^H 


AiTUiKM 772* 


Aaritllb, Ilia 


*Bp<<XM 403 a ^^^H 


Airhtfotn 4 1 3 h 


Adrof 754 a 


BiJalrcTOt 252 u ^^^^1 


'A^rrai287a,d66a,a68a. 


Aai'Xioi (-luv Ti\n) 407 li 


Zi-^lv 268 b. 365 a, S7« a ^^^H 


374 b 


\t\4>ol 141b, 173 b, 186 a, 


BtWifiof 784 h, 790 a ^^^^1 


•A^8»<». 761 b 


201b, 228a, 354 b, 407 a, 


BMotyot 806 b ^^^H 


'A0VT1T 156 h 


409a, 640a, 666a, 763b, 


EdxXria^i ^^^H 


"Axajfir 290 b, 291 h 


787 b 


B4^i>f 503 l> ^^^^1 


'Ax<u<1 409 b 


dH(X^ 616 b 


t/tfiHiox 662 li ^^^H 


'AxatpV^t9», 122 b, 347 b 


An(^»ot 784 b 


Upvirei 609 b. 7 10 b ^^^H 



^^H 440 HERODOTUS 


^H 


^^^^B ^pv^nit 753 b 


G^paopipot 620 b 


Kd^^ 167 a .^^^H 


^^^^1 Bupu/Stdjqt 420 n. 449 n, 


Gitnrna (8. 50. 7> 


KavaiffT/Mi/i} 154 {^^^^^| 


^^^H l< 


e«TiraX/ij 164 a, 1 66 a. 


Koi'SaOXijT 12Sa ^^^H 


^^^^^H EiipiiSri/io^ 3\li b 


168 u, 251b, 256b(bu), 


Kdjn)63a ^^^H 


^^^^^^ RvpvK\(iiiit 420 & 


290 b. 640 a. 567 a, 


KairiraSoW); 39 a ^^H 


^^^^^^^^^B W'punpaTiStit 305 a 


595 » b, 661 b 


Kap3cifi.i'\-i] 471 * ^^1 


^^^^^^^B Ei^pi'/iaxat ii 


Girit 283 b 


KapSlv 79 b, 821 b ^H 


^^^^^^^m Zi'pirr v\ot 


e%3a( 568 b, 620 b, 624 ab, 


Kapi^vi} G3 b ^H 


^ KOpvaO/yrit 906 11 


646* 


KdJnjJ'oi 252 » I 


^^^H E0^i/roi338a 


e^lPv 93 b 


Kiur#avaii7 271 a, 279 a J 


^^^^M Evpv<piir o63 a 


e^paip 232 a. 


KaafUinj 216 « ^^H 


^^^^H KirTvxiivt 749 b 


eifffft/t 751a 


RafToXii; 414 a ^H 


^^^^B S{>puwi) 13b, ISu, 


Opa<n>SiniK 719 b 


Ka<trTipfin 867 A ^^^ 


^^^H 161a, 200k, 250a. 43ela, 


epa<TVK\h)f 781 b 


K^irpof 190 a, 426 a, t4«4 | 


^^^H h 


e^niuT; 273 a. 274 a, 778 u, 


KfXatyai 40 a ^J 


^^^^B B0e<ro: 51 9 n, {i21 b 


779 a 


K(Ar478a ^H 


^^^^H KxtlSupot 169h 


Opi^ior reSlm, t6 005 a 


K^pxwf 320 b ^H 


^^^^H Bx«M<>( 6'1'i'i 


ei^i; 266 b 


Kci^XXt^Wtt 664 b ^H 


^^^^1 'F;:(/(rrpaTOi 306 a 


Oiipijf 595 a, 719* 


Kti(pfv% ti44 a ^H 
Ki(^6j 266 b, 402 b ^^ 
K(9ai/>bn' 190 b, 629 a |/'t4 1 


^^^H 'idyxXv 228 b, 229 b. 231 n 


'lafU&u 665 b 


638 b, «7« tt, 704 a b _J 


^^^H 675 » 


'Upuf 216 b 


K(Xi{116b ^M 


^^^H Z(ii 60 b, 292 b, 604 a. 


'Itpiiroiios 666 b 


K\tiim772B. ^M 


^^^H H28 


'Iijinryhj 244 a 


KX^ar3pos 212 b, 213 » ^ 


^^^^H a 


'ieaftlTpi)t 91b, r.69.i 


KX^avSpot 215 a 


^^^^H Zi^i'poflOTa 


'lXiO» 30 a 


KXcirijji 380 a 


^^^^^H ZuKTri^p 524 a 


•IXiaAf 281 a 


KXc6Satoi 306 a 


^^^^^^^^H 


'Im^Ptj 233 a 


KXe^M^poroi 466 b, MM * N 


^^^^^^H 


'Ivw293a 


769 b 


^^^H B^7»6a 


'Iirro(279a 


KXeo4i^i>i>t 306 b, 365 b 


^^^H HynvlXtwf 305 b, 501 n 


lirrafixof 8 a 


K6Jpoi794a ' 


^^^^H a7ii<r^TpaT0i 781 b 


■IrTOKpd7-iji213a(6w) 


KorXa, rd376« 


^^^^H ' H yjielfrparoi 672 b 


'IiriroicpaT(i»)t 561a 


KoXtxTual 44 b 


^^^^H 'ByriToplSi]t 7b6h 


'IirirA/iQ^oi 675 b 


KififiwTot 139 b 


^^^^H 'HY<ni668a 


'lirrdriKirt 207 a 


K<i/>t»»OT 776 b 


^^^^B 


'l(r0M^ 250 a, 254 a, 255 a, 


Kopi-SaWi, 317 b 


^^^^H Hfporot a 


467 b, 643 a, 671a, 764 b 


K/>ij<rTovu[^ 159 b 


^^^H Hihw 39 a, 136 a, 143 a, 


'Urtah) 388 b 


Kpijnflieb, 197 a, 248b 


^^^H 545* 


■lirrtaioi 17 a, 492 a 


Kpijrbnp 236 b, 2«1 b 


^^^■. HXit471a 


'la-Tiaiot 125 a 


Kplrtrrot 232 b ^h 


^^^B ' H wiScwii 291b 


'I<rTiaii.>T£j388B 


KpfraXXa 39 a ^H 


^^^K UpaxXHtt 261b, 286 b, 


"IffTpot 17 a 


Rpirit'/JotiXos 566 a ^^H 


^^^H 298 b, 306 a. 422 a 


'Iffx^rom 268 a 


KpocVoi 45 b, 409 a ^H 


^^^H HpaKXeiSai 540 b, 042 a, 


'IraXt*; 451 a 


Kpoaaairi 167 h ^^| 


^^^H a 


'I<^x\ot 822 b 


Kufitp^UrKOi 124 b ^M 


^^^H 'Hp6S<not 664 b 


■Ix»<u 169 b 


ZMpapniba. ^H 




'Iw 426 b 


SiV7i;pa, rd 346 a ^^^H 




'luwi^ 806 a, 807 b 


Ki^voill4u ^^^H 


^^^^1 Ha/uiirtoi 




Kil>.>; 288 a, 558 a ^^^H 


^^^H Bf/uffroKX/iTi 192 b, 252 b. 




Kvydaovpa 478 a ^^H 


^^^H 381b, 385b, 444a, 474a, 


Kiii/ios227b, 228 b 


KvpKot 807 a ^H 


^^^V 491b. 537b, 550b, 7g7a 


Eairoi 63 a 


KDpof 3 b, 10 b, 72b. hH 


^^^^^H OeoxiSiis 454 a 


KdXa;Mi790b, 791 a 


103 a, 828 b, 839 b ^M 


^^^^H ero^i^o-Tw^ 492h, 781 )< 


KoXXdnj/Soi 45 b 


Kvria-aupot 295 a ^^^^^| 


^^^^^1 BeiirofiTot b 


KaXXtciSijt 437 a 


KuXtdi 508 b ^^^H 


^^^^1 eepdfi^ui 155 b 


KaXXii7t 207 a 


Kiifilipfia 157 a ^^^^^| 


^^^H eipfiv ISla, 168a, 161b, 


KaXXM^n;t 748 b 


RbnraJt 570 b ^^^H 


^^^H 270 b (Ms) 


KdXxat 116 a 


^^^^H 


^^^^H (iepnoir6\at 256 a, 259 a, 


KaM^i^<r7;t 2 b 




^^^H 260b, 271a, 300a, 316» 


KaMJSi)<r)jf 72 b 


AaxeSol/UMf 325 b, 336 b, 


^^^^H &tptJuitar 647 h. 686 b 


Ka^<(ii241b, 243 b 


344 a, 432 b, 602 •,613 • 





INDEX 111 


441 ^^H 


1 M.K/utr7Mii 


Marri)* 124 a 


'Oepit 166 it ^^^M 


Jiifiirur 6:t2 » 


Mrrii^rot 91 b, 122 a 


OlPiirti-nSa ^^^H 


Arifirur 781 b 


Mf7o^(in7. 122 a 


Olifiai:m 92 b, 821 b ^^^H 


Ai/irur 759 k 


Mryd^v^ot 107 a 


Ot-n) 261 a ^^^H 


AaifXiOK 194 a 


Mryn&JffTi,! 134 b 


'0\xifiirli! 247 b ^^^^1 


A^oY/wt 754 a 


Mryaxp/w 160 b 


'0\vfiTi68upi» 632a ^^^^| 


Af^dS(uiS«8a 


M/7a^615b, 616 a 


'0\v^Lwot 166 a ^^^H 


Acrriy 820 s 


MrydaiSpot 97 a 


'0\vi>»os 164 b. 554 b ^^^H 


AcorriiSirt 308 a 


Me7i<rrJi;i323a, 327 b 


'O/AVpot 225 b ^^^^1 


ArwtJj dKTji 38 b 


MrXd^roiT 668 a 


^Oyi^nt ^^^H 


AtvTvx^Srft 660 b, 563 b, 


MrXd^ri'Vot 320 a 


'Oi'o/idK/Mrot 7 a ^^^^H 


781ft 


M/XoT 79 b, 298 b 


'Orixwi-M 166 1>. 291 b ^^H 


AtiTu^llhft 561 a 


McX£^oca279B 


'O^rfi 1 b ^^^^M 


A(u^i>i7rt SOS b 


Mtrdpxjt 660 b 


'OpitrSiiw 6 11 a ^^^H 


Aiuw 268 a 


M/vJir 166 a 


'Opai^MTTOf 335 a ^^^^H 


Aiur 306 a 


MccAcuT 241 a b, 248 a 


a ^^^H 


ArwviJirt 304 b, 308 b, 


MfpfiaXot 124 a 


'Ordr^f 61 a, 106 h ^^^M 


310 b, 327 b, 333 b,3&5b. 


M<ffa>ij231a 


'Urdn^t 84 ^^^H 


■166 b, 608 b, 731 b, 760 a 


Mi7af(>7 85 b 


'Oriarrit n ^^^^H 


Afurwplinit 337 b 


Jl JiKt'ptpra 154 a 


'O^pi'txiov 6'> b ^^^^^B 


Atira^ 167 a 


M>;Xli2n6b, 300 b 


^^^^^1 


Ai(T<K 138* 


Mi«Dt 577 b 


^^^^H 


Airfia/ut 126 a 


Ml«i;<>OT 246 a 


IlaYwral 386 b ^^^H 


AvSl,^ 161 b 


M(X7?roj 17 a, 794 m 


lldryoiov, ri 142 a. 146* ^^H 


Ai'Mt 98 b 


M/»ut 241 b, 242 a, 248 a 


llatoctt) a ^^^^1 


AfiriaqteOOa, 60n> 


Mryi<rt<ln\ot 444 a 


Iloiofcfrl) 159 b ^^^^| 


AvKo/i^ir^ 373 b 


MoXAfit 716 b 


naXXr^n) 166 b, 66) a ^^^M 


Ai>«ot 44 b 


Moitrtxtii 478 b 


lldfuirst 167 a ^^^H 


AixrucX^ 38& a 


MwpirxiSvi 598 b 


lliii/Mw 271 n ^^^H 


Ai/W/«>xot483a. 665 b 


MoKaaiot 7 it, 509a, 686 ii 


UanalTiot b ^^^^H 


Aiviarpa-nt 509 a 


MiryeoWr, l&7b, 161b 


^^^^H 




Muic<iX.r 105 a, 792 a. 796 b, 


llaixnr/rt 404 b, 407 li ^^^H 




810 b, 820 a 


Ua.rTi.py)t '2l'2h ^^^^H 


Ma7i»;i7ii, 258 a, 286 a 


Mup/ii7f 270 a 


IIai'rfri,<34Ia ^^H 


^^atar^pof 45 b 


MiH667tt 


ilapawoTaiuM 403 b, 404 b ^^^H 


MaKtomli, 39 tt, 261 b, 




IIdpM)'il03a ^^^H 


li53b, 643b, 564a, 576b, 

677 b, 779 u 
MaiCfJoWi 162 a 
Matiimat 629 b 
MocTiiptoi' 211 b 
MaX/ij 240 l> 


Uhl w&ut 155 b 
SitXtit 794 a 
N«kX^t 252 b 
N<<rT« 189 b 
N/ui'401n, 403 a 
XUayi/wt 562 a 
Ntir6X«wT 176 b 


Ilaprn<rit.i9bh,i0\<%[ln3), ^^^M 

napriraoit 661 a ^^^^H 
na<rucXhft 794 a ^^^H 
Ildraurof 213 b ^^^^| 
llaivarfiTt 362 a, 608 u, ^^^H 


Ma/ial9.^i> 648 a, 691 u 


612n, 631b. 688a, 690b, ^^^M 


Mapnttvtm 6 b. 106 a, 461 a, 
611a,M3b, 614a, 518 b. 


Hvn^iapot 181 b 


707 b, 710b, 716a, 723b, ^^H 
728 a. 740 A, 748 b, 776 a ^^^M 


638a. 541 a, 553 b, 673 a, 




lUitdtt 403 a ^^^H 


695a, 612a, 013 a, 022 b, 


Sdrfftirvof 564 a, 821 a. 


[ftpatfl^T 491a ^^^^| 


658 b, 663 b, 680 a. 682 a, 


827 u 


lltiaurrpaTliai 7 n, 439 a ^^^^| 


684 a, 688 b, 693 a, 727 a. 


SriifaytrpTii 811 a 


nAXairi9b ^^^M 


730 b, 731 a, 748 b, 760a, 


S//is^it6b, 15 0. y7b, 39 b. 


UeXorivriKot 302 b, 34 9 ih ^^^H 


S20a 


Unb, 128 a, 142 a, 152 b, 


435 «, 462 a, 46«a, 470b, ^M 


Mai,i6rrr,t 10S«, 569 a, 


159a, 101 b, 163 a, 179a, 


615a. 643 a, 698 b ^^H 


804 a 


197 a, 199 b, 208 a, 


nAo^l2a. 21b ^^^M 


Mapc^iilt 41 a 


276 a b, 296 a, 351a, 


no0i/Xof289b ^^^H 


M<i/)wr 335 a 


37Sa. 379u, 460b, 485b, 


lUpiyaitm 142a ^^^^H 


Uapiireta 138 Ij 


496a, I99a, 5I3b. 523b. 


\UpSiK<c^ 674 b, 576 b. ^^H 


MMi^mri 106 b, 810 b, 


637 b, 640a, 558 a, 581b, 


^^^M 


813 a 


593a, 739b, 760*, 766a, 


Ilc^fwt 804 b ^^^H 


Ma4r<<rriof 104 a, 629 b. 


792 b, HI 4 a 


UfpattSiit 326 a ^^^^H 


685 a 


SouOo, 426 b 


IHXior 1 66 a, 368 b, 374 b ^^H 


MoiTcelMqt 134 b, 1S5 a 




Uriniin 164 a, 166 b, 269 a ^^^M 


MaaaAyrit 96 b 


Odpitot 95 b 


IU7^tl25a ^^^M 



^H 442 


HERODOTUS 


^B 


^H iUtpit} 264 


Zlyyot 163 b 


T-fifnit 181 b 


^H IlUupot loaa 


£t9uWi) ir>4 b 


T^iptXXot 232 * Ii 


^H Il/fJoi 166 It. 


XiKariii 243 u 


Tiypa^-nt 85 h, 392 a, 793 a, 


^H Iti^n-vpoiHOtt 


ZUat 124 b 


804 11 


^H nXtirota (8. 50. 8) 


£ucX/ii 19711, 2l9a, 232a, 


Tl^aior 1 1 1 « 


^^^^ IlXaraioi 340 b, 623 b, 


243 a, 30«a 


ri0op4a (Tic) 401 > 


^^^H (!:J7 h, 638 a, ef>7 b, 670a, 


S/Kifco! 476 b, 533 a 


Ti^-yd^n* 1 '^4 b 


^^^H 67(!b, 6791), rSSb, 75r>a, 


2<Xi7k4i 41 a, 578 a 


ri^arSpot 7 1 1 » 


^^^V 


ZttLuwlSiit 337 b 


Ti^TYcWairt S76a, 773 a 


^^B IIXti(rra/)xo{ OOSli 


£(r2m 158 a 


ttfiiSiifiot 552 b 


^^1 UXfioTwpof 826 b 


Xlpiz 451 a 


IVAffirof 555 b. 5«« h 


^H rioXiiiaqt 708 II 


^/Ni 543 n 


TI/iuo 189 » 


^H lloXi>af 381 U 


£(/>o/i/r/nri 93 b, 104 a 


Tiftwrai 124 b 


^H noXirJAri^t 562 l> 


SipbtftM 124 a 


TcToitAt 762 » 


^^H lloXvSupoi cj05 a 


Ztrifunit 90 a 


Topuini 154 a 


^^H IIoXiiK/xrat 503 l> 


2.TdX»i^ 181 b 


TpaOiK 139 b 


^^H noXi/vrioit H4Sh 


^ndfta^apot 64 b 


TpeU K(0aXsi 677 • 
T/nrxvli? 399 a 


^H II6irro( r>) u, 1 19 a, 199 b 


Sic«iflot258a, 267 », 367 a 


^H UixTiiSiuv 286 xb, 442 a, 


Xmufv 156 a 


T/nrxfj 258 b, 259*, »8li, 


^H H 


SnoXoirAtii 793 b 


299 b, 302 a, 004 a. 381 N 


^^H {loattiumot 746 U 


i:«i.tfT,t 227 b 


TptTajmi(xM>7» 106 a 


^H llo<ridi)(o»> 14r*b 


SftuXXiTji 368 b 


TpiTitt 403 a 


^^H lloTei5af7) ir)6u 


£«<2Xot 617 b 


T/wifljr 417 a 


^H npirf<i<rTii( 122tt 


XiUpiit 103 u 


T/M0<iir«it 568 a 


^H HpiK'iXebrt 811 >i 


S^epao^i^t-irt 106 b 


Ti^^ijf 125» 


^H npiiftixx 267 u 


S^JXa 157* 


Turiapidiu 750 b 


^H Ili><aMa; 64 b 


SoiVtt 177 b, 207 b, 354 b, 


Tipo«ii-o 38 b 


^^M UpdKXrp :<6;i u 


513 a, 813 b 




^H Ilpirriu'tt 562 h 


2»dpTTj 4 b, 203 b. 344 a, 


'Tafireii; 414 a 
'rifiToSit 396 b, 403 h 


^H IIpwrea^XfttfT 822 l> 


540b,551b, 612a, 732 b, 


^H ni«^i7i 268 a, 7r>9u 
^H Ili'^t 181 b 


745 a, 752 a, 7.'i6a 
Zripeitii 176 b 


rUpmit 90 a, 314*. 51** 

(bit), 539 a, 545 a 
'TJdpnjt 107 a 
■T«<ip«;t 107 a. 177 a. l7Sb 
'TXXoi 306 a, 843 a 


^H Ilt^tot 4n>, 57 b 

^B iii;X(u aoi h 

^^B ni'Xot 239 II 


XrepxdOt 297 b, 837 a 
2;rd7</>oi 145 b 
XTifi'iiiXvpot 73'J u 


^^^^^ fliiyvy 419 l> 


-TpOTTtl ,"j64 b 

Xrpini, 137 b 


■Trfpirffijj 332 a 
'Tpli, 244 a 


^^^^ 'P^7ioi' 246 Ik b 

^H 'Poai^MSb 

^^1 'PMr<OK65b 


Xrpu^uir 37 b, .39 a, 143 1, 
144 a, 543 a, 545 a, 517 1> 
Xiaypot 210 b, 222 b 
Xvtuvectt 124 u 
Si-Xf I'S 145 b 
XvpriKovaat 217 a 


'Trial 619 b, 6S8 b 
'Tirrdnji 102 a 
TiJTdimjt la, 16b 
'Tardo-TTji 89 b 
'TfirASu^f 126 a 


^1 ^M/)i^XXos213ii 


Z^tSaXin 617 ii 




^H ZaXa/ulT 114 H 


2:w<r/^.r,i 486 b 


♦d7/"?«142» 


^^1 2rfiXa^: 190 b, 417 0, 


Su^di-Tr! 749 b 


•MX vo' 4«0 b, 501 W, 5<»», 


^K^ 419 b, 4.:>3 b (6^4), 443 a. 




504 a, 524 a, 5 25 a, 643 b 


^^^^ 467 b, 473a. 478 a, 492b, 




>I>ai'a74/>»(i 317 b 


^^^^B 497 b, 51 Oii,r>48ii. 649b, 


Toifapor 239 it 


•^parii-nn 104 a, 765 a 


^^^■^ 


TaXet')9ioi l"5ab 


♦o/H-aj-dOpiji 89 b 


^V £<iXu 81 u 


Ti^aypa 617 b, 671b 


4>o/wdr7t 90 b, &SS «, 


^H 2:<lMof 569 a, 505 a, 781a, 


Tcdirr.s 104 a, 755 b 


735 b, 776 b 


^H 700 b 


T(7^i> 246 h, 670 a 


^^pKOiJxfi 111 a 


^H Sora^iin): 288 \> 


Tcffpiinov 403 a 


*tti)\X(u 431 h 


^H S<iv>)ir.6a 


Tewrd/ifuM 665 a, SrtP b. 


♦tpfi-adnjT 91 b 


^H Sapaifc la, 197 a, 198 a, 


670 Ii 


*iXiirTo? 579 b 


^H 521b, 544 b, 812b 


TtXXf.,1 395 b 


♦iXiiTTot 794 a 


^H 2<i^^ 15U li 


T<*^irfa, Td 251 1) 


4iiXoici>ui)' 746 a 


^^H ZtpitvXi] 154 H 


TtrpifwiiCTOt 123 b 


*\fypT, 15«b 


^H ^ppeicp 81 a 


TMXtvXoj 305 b 


^oiyUrj 114 a 


^H Zirrmt 271 li, 279 a, 281 b 


TriXUtitiUh 


•I'ou'.f 260 b, 29db (W«>, 


^H Si)<rr&T 48 ii, 821 a. 


TqXot2n» 


300a 



^^^^^^^^^^^ INDEX III 


^BH 


^H^T(tY«vn| 333 4 


XaXxJT 280 b 


Xu* 785 b ^^^H 


^Kl|nina>aS6« 


Xapihfia (tie) 402 b 


^^^^H 


^npuytn^nh 


Xa^X(wf 662 a 


"Ini-rdXtia. 508 a ^^^^^| 


^p6njt> 920 b 


XeWu^i 159 b, 168 a 




•WXawi 418 b. 49-J« 


\ifxri% 124 b 


^^^^H 


4>i/\Mt 143 a 


Xc/M-Avijaot 47 u, 821 u 


'a</><y>) 701 b, 703 b ^^^H 


<l>iMi( 400 h 


XiXfot 60G h 


'OKvTot 364 a ^^^H 




XAur 846 a 


'Qp<KO% a ^^^H 


XaUtTTfni 158 a 


\6rp(K 261 b 


'nponiSup 121 a ^^^H 


^L B. COLLECTIVE 


^1 


«^U»ijpi>a. 547» 


Barrpicx 88 a, 110 a, 669 b 


Ep/Mopin 420 b, 421 b. ^^H 


'A^mrot 11a, 16 b, 47 b. 


Bii<r<rol 141b 


468 b, 653 b ^M 


72 b, 174 b, 184 a, 186 «, 


BiffdXrai 543 li 


Kvfiodts 363 u, 383 », 383 a ^^^1 


189«, 192 b, 193 1^ 224 A, 


BtoTOvtt 140 a 


^^^^H 


281 ». 367 b, 360 b, 363 b, 


Bmi.rrol 303 a, 406 b (^m), 


'ESon>ct 140 b, 754 a ^^^1 


372 a, 4 15^4 18 a, 422 m. 


412 b, 660b,73Sa, KOOa 


'HXetm 468 a, 758 b (M«) ^^^H 


428 a, 424 a, 442 «, 490 a, 


B(jTTiar<K 273 b, r.54 b 


'Hp<uX»4<u .^40b, 642a, ^^H 


504 a, 504 b, 507 b, 673 b, 


BptVyoi 273 l> 


b, 667 a ^^H 


5ft& a, 599 a, 613 b, 641b, 




^^^^H 


646 a. 655 b. 660 a. 688 a. 


roj'Sdpioi 90 b 


m<rm 137 b, 148* ^^H 


690 b, 694 a, 711 a, 714 b, 


FrXifiM 217 b 


QfirrUn 328 a, 328 b, 334 a , ^^^H 


722 b, 724 a, 726 a. 743 a. 


r/|i)7««€t 66 a 


3S9b, (47eb) ^^H 


749b,7fi0b.7r.lb.754 3, 




04<nrpurroi 430 b ^^^H 


77 la. 803 a, 803 li, 806 K 


AaW«ro4 90 b 


64<Kra\oi IG8a, ^^^H 


821a 


AtKtMtt 750 u, 752 a 


249a, 252a, 263a, 282b, ^^H 


Alyunjrm. 194 b, 358 b, 


A«\^ 265 a, 409 a, 413 h 


342b, 398a, 397a, 398b, ^M 


427 a, 490 a, 601b. 603 a, 


AtpaaiM 140 b 


899 a. 626b, 777 b, 778 a H 


666 a. 769 a, 791 a, 762 b, 


AiXin-ft 171a, 'i74u 


Bij^fu 172 a, 328 a (M. ^1 


772a 


Apf}(«r«421 h, 470 b 


333 b, 34 1 a, 569 b, 570a, ^M 


AtyOirrioi 113 a, 12211, 


jiwiM/«117a, 119 b, 400 «, 


599a, 618a, 621 a, 678a, ^^H 


379 b, 662 a 


427 b, 459 b, 470 b 


682 a, 738 a, 773 b ^^^B 


Kieiowtt 27 b, 93 a, 94 a, 




e^KCt 99 b, 141 a, 181 b. ^^^1 


662 a 


Rytirralo, 221 u 


273 a, 092 a, 780 a. 826 a ^^H 


A/aX^<t 822 a 


'Eyxe\ift 686 a 


^^^^^H 


AlTuXoi 470 b 


'E\i<ri.«<» 234 a 


'laM'3«665b ^^^1 


'Axdrdioi 148 a 


■EXXijw ,57 b, 136 a, 160 b, 


'r/3irp«i 233 a ^^^H 


'AKfiayarTiyoi 232 b, 244 a 


172a, 197 b, 200 b, 20U, 


'liiwyti 244 b ^^^H 


'AXapMioi lU4a 


220a, S!22b, 3361). 264a, 


IXXipioi 575 b, 6»r>ii ^^^M 


'AXevAidi 6 b 


265a,264a. 264 b, 273 a, 


'USoi 89 b, 95 a. 110 a. ^^^H 


'AiirpoKiHrai 426 b, 664 a 


279b, 284a, SOU, 341b, 


660 a ^^^H 


'AuOpytoL 89 a 


357a, neeb, 416a, 443a, 


'Turn 13a, 119b, 371b, ^^^1 


'Ati^rrioifrt 337 a 


46&b,470h, 487a, 489a, 


424 a, 471b, 498a, 501 a, ^^^1 


'Afaarripim 664 a 


490a, 493a, 497a, 603a, 


664 a, 643 a, 782a, 796 a, ^^H 


'ArSpt«t460a, 686 a 


609a, 612b, ei8s,&18b, 


806 a ^^H 


'Apd/J«M92b. 110 b 


624 b, 637a, 636a, 648a, 


^^^^H 


'Apyt-toi 200 b, 207 a, 208 a. 


561 a, 696 b, 604 a, 629 a, 


Ka^X/ct 101 a ^^^H 


208 b, 472a, 612 a, 640 a 


639 b. 631 a, 639 a, 661 a. 


Kaiiitloi 649 b ^^^^^| 


'A^M 85 b, 89 b 


669b,690b, 696 b, 697 a, 


KaXvySOi 494 h ^^^^H 


'Ap«(Urt24ab,468a.470a, 


698a, 710b, 720a, 73t)b, 


Ka/ULptyatoi 217 a ^^^^H 


646 h, 651 b 


744a, 748 b, 761a, 767a. 


KaTiraiiiMi 96 b ^^H 


ApfUrun 98 a 


774a, 796b, 797 b, 802a, 


Kapft 117b, 125 a, 986 b ^^^B 


'hfTTd'uK 86 a 


802 b, (820a), 826 a 


Ka/x'-oTMi 469 li, 539 b. ^^^^| 


' kaa{>pioi 87 a, 87 li 


'Ki'i^fM 171a, 274 a, 298 a 


^^H 


'Aa\inr^o^ 617 a 


'Eopioi 27;ia 


K<v>Xi;36>>iM 234 b, 2:i6b, ^^^M 


'ArpfiSai 30 a 


•Rwiiai'pioi 368 b, 420 b, 


» ^^^1 


'Ax«ol 171 h, 274 a, 293 b. 


468 h, 652 b 


Kd^nriot 91 a, 1 10 a (Mf) ^^^1 


432 a, 470 a, 643 a 


'Bprr/NVd 358 b. 438 b, 


KrK^oirtJai 424 a ^^^^H 


-A^0iM826a 


663 b 


KtpKvpoMi (7. I) ^^H 



444 



HERODOTUS 



K-^ci 359 a, 429 a 

Kii^M 84 b 

KUontSlb, 138 •, 140* 

K(\iK(t 115 Ik, £16 a 

KWim 86 u, 110», »i:}b 

KJ>\xM 103 l> 

Kopivt^tot 290 n, .')ri8&, 
120b, 463s, riUr»i, fiOea, 
e&lb, 740ii, 790a, 80S b, 
807 a 

Kfiavaol 'l'^4 a 

KpiTTft2i0b, 248 b 

K/wroviTrat 431 a, 432 a 

K6»vtoi '130 a 

Ktiroi'/xM 470 a 
KiHrpioillSb, 114 b, 124 b 
KOpftoi 234 u 
Ki^ 228 b, 229 b 

AoKtiatfiirKH 17i>a, 176 a, 
160a, 204 a, 218 b, 239a, 
Slla, 332b, 337a. 358 b, 
420b, 468a, £40b, 58$a, 
58ea,616lr. 626 b, 6491j. 
(650 a), 666 b, (>74 b, 
««7a,707b, 711 tt, 711b, 
"14b, 742»,74&a, 7461', 
770 a, 803 a 

AacrAvKH 101 a 

AtvKdiioi 426 b, 654 a 

Al^uct 95 a, 110 a, 238 a 

Alyw 96 a, 233 b 

A-/ifivioi 470 b 

AoKpol 171b, 303 a, 310 a, 
3:.9a, 402 a, 469 b 

AvSot 98 b, 99 a 

Al/ww 116 a, 116 b 

M(l7ri7Tn]7]b, 274 a 

MiyoL 28 b. 143 b, 288 a 

MaKfS6vet 97 a, 164 a, 
274a,r.55ft,r.78b, 6«lb 

M^Kpuvtf 102 b 

Mou-TiWd 757 b, 768 b (M») 

Mapet 103 b 

Ma/»ai>5c'fef !)6 b 

Mo(r<707t'T(u 27 b 

TAaTirifol 96a 

Meyapitt 217 b, 358 a, 
426 b, 680 .-1,655 a, 741a, 
771a 

^fcffdrim 244 b 

Me^a^rioi 671 a 

M^m. 85 b, 86 a, 110 a, 
119 1., 176 b, 313 b, 
1354 b], 364 b, 429 a, 
454 b, 476 a, 540 b, 668 b, 
025 a, 669 h, 691 a, 691b, 
767 b 

Urilortt 98 )>, 101 a 



M«|Wcil71h, 319 a, 422a, 

459 b 
HiiXioi430a, 432 b 
MtAT^criM 805 a 
MiX<>ai 101 b 
MoaoiroiKM 102 b 
Miirxoi 102 a 
MvKTTvat'oi 646 a, 653 a 
MvKoi 91 b, 92 a 
yivcol^Oa, 99a, 662 b 

ifiitoi 429 a 

'OidtMrrm 142 h 
■0{-6Xot 402 a 
'OXiirtfiot 554 b 
'Uroi)KTcm 303 a, 359 u 
'OprtftToi 472 a 
'OpxoM^'KX 651 b 
Utfriot 91b, 92a 

Uotom 142 b, 273 a, 662 a 

n(u6ir\cu 142 b 

llairm 140 a 

UiKTUtt 91b, [110 u] 

UaXitt 614 b 

lIdM*i;\oc 115 b 

UipDoi »0a 

lUptKilKKK 91 b, 92a, 110b 

lld^m 460a, 536 b 

llapupfijTai 471 b 

Ua.ipXay&i'tt 95 b 

ll(i(TurrpaTiicu 7 a, 439 il 

U(\a<ryol 424 a 

IlcXoirovi' Vo' 347 b, 416 a, 
468 b, 643 b, 808 b 

lUppai^oi 164 a, 171 b, 
25» b, 274 a 

lUpcrat9l), 19 a, 22 a. 61a, 
74 a, 74 b, 83 b, 89 a, 
109 a, 109 b, 119 b, 121b, 
135 b, 136 b, 331 3,331 b, 
440b,612b,513b,5lSb, 
516 a, 516 b, 517 ». 539 a 
(bis), 539 b, 546 a, 568 b, 
611 a, 622 b, 058 b, 682 b, 
6 85 a, 699 », 720 b, 721b, 
727 b, 729 a, 730 b, 738 b, 
741b, 746 a, 805 b, 806 », 
80S u, (828 b) 

TlipvttSai. 326 a 

[ni|«a<T<f«t] 620 a 

nUp€t 142 a, 273 b 

niur<iai]100a 

1 ItTorifTai 709 a 

llXarat/ri 358 a, 655 a, 
700,b, 706 a, 728 a 

llo\ix>'<T(u 243 b 

lloTtiSiuqTai 557 a, 651 b 

npaUrioi 243 b, 247 b 

■Piryifot 245 b 



Za><l/n-toi 109 a, 110 b 
£dKw88b,89a(6t«},Ilt 

660 a, 746 b 
liiMMH 229 K 783 b, 784 J 

797 b. 806 ■ 
Sairatoi 140 a 
Xapayyai 91 a 
Xap56noi 234 a 
^<nreiprt 104 a 
:UTpai 140 b 
2:<^I^(k 430 a 
£tSuv(m 120 a, 126 b 
SuiH^tot 368 b, 4201 

468b,6S2a. 803 b, 807* 
2(0r(M43Oa 
ZmtirrouH 655 b, 656 b 
Tjcieai 16 a, 27 b, 29 b, 

88 b, 89 a 
^ir,8<K 90 b 
^va/rri^ni 133 a, 223 h, 

324 b, 360 a, 540 b, 652 a, 

607 b, 667 b. 671b, 691b 
^Tu^» 358 b, 4a0a, 658 M 
Xvp^Kicioi 223 b. 224 b ^ 
XiipMSl b, 98 b (5»ii).^ 
2;i'/p<K 112 a 

Ta\0l'fi^6.tal 176 b J 

Ta/Ku-Ttroi 245 a 1 

TrTTTTo* 641 h. (656 »), 

659 a, 743 a, 771a 
TtppUMi 116 b 
Tfi'KpoiaOm, 06 b 
TVux 460 a, 4S6a _ 

tipapjipol 102 b fl 

T/njxiviiH 257 a, 321 a 
•VpoiiiiKun 358 b, 420 K 
468 b, 652 b, 803b,807j 
Tmiapliai. 750 b 

['TtTT/«] 100 a 
'Traxatol 115 b 
'T/wcdviw 86 b 

<l>tfiu^ai 171 b 
tXetdriot 468 b, 

741.1, 771a 
4>oir(Kft 35 b, 112 a, 1^ 

233a,490a,497b,51<d 

791b 

<S>p*>v(t 97 a, 98a, M2 a 
♦wW« 262 a, 308 a, 810 a, 

321 b, 393 a, (624 a), 

661 a, 778 a 

XaXfarot 88 a 

Xa\.ci5/ct 358 a, 428 b. 

654 a 
[XdXw/»«] lOOab 
X«p<ro»i7<rrTo« 826 a, 826 a 
XuK 522 a, 566 b 
X»pd4r>uo( 90 a 



INDEX IV 



RERUM 



For Proper Names compare Index III. 



Abydos 134 (Rendezvoos) 

Aohaiauii 171 b, 262 b, 290 b, 293 b, 

432 s, 469 a, 470 a, 591a, 643 a, 

661b 
Achaimenes (b. of Xerxes) 9 a, 341 b 
Additions (to history of P. war) 26, 28, 

32, 41, 44, 49, 60, 61, 64, 66, 69, 76, 

77, 81, 84, 86, 87, 89, 92, 94, 97 ff., 

110, 111, 117, 396 
Adramyttcion, its legend 68bf.«i 
Ablian 113 
Afterthought (Ixxviii), 673 a, 680 a, 

685 a, 588 a, 689 b, 751 b, 799 b, 822 b ; 

100, 253, 269, 353, 385, 396 
Agamemnon 223 a 
Aharamazda 60 b, 68 b, 77 a 
Aiolians 262 b, 293 a b, 822 a 

AlSCHINKR 38 

AiRCHYLoa 476 a, 600 a, 607 a, 642 a, 
544 b, 598 a, 744 b, 813 a; 9, 290, 
302 ff. 

Akropolis, the 434 a (defence of), 435 b, 
437 a b, 438 a ff., 466 a, 515 a, 690 a 
(Restoration), 614 a, 633 b ; 243, 288, 
289 

Alexander I. 373, 384 

Alexander the Great 572 b, 635 b, 661 b, 
699 b ; 3, 12, 35, 39, 43, 62, 56, 61, 
64 (note). 111, 116, 118, 264 

AlUlujah A12\) 

Alliances 686 a, 687 a, 783 b, 784 a, 
809 b ; 195, 218, 339. Cp. Leagues 

Altars 764 a ; 6 note 

Amazons 504 a 

Amompharetos, story of 362, 372, 383 

AmphiKtyonic League 170 b, 172 b, 
196 a, 300 b, 316 a b, 337 a b, 397 b, 
403 b (Phokian war), 404 b, 408 a, 
549 b; 218,230,233, 264 



Amphiktyony, Kalaurian 417 b, 428 a 

Animas 535 b, 678 b, 706 a, 761 a, 762 b ; 
296 

Anachronisms 21a, 21b, 187 a, 201a, 
:I48 b, 349 a, 362 b, 367 a, 391 b, 416 b, 
465 a, 477 a, 478 a, 512 a, 527 b, 634 b, 
542 a, 549 a b, 550 a, 663 a, 673 a, 686 a, 
686 a, 698 a, 603 b, 604 a, 607 b, 643 b, 
644 a, 673 a, 684 b, 761a; 43 note, 
76 note, 90, 244, 330. 348 

AnaihevuUa 247 a, 393 b, 404 a, 648 a, 
649 a b, 763 b; 7 note 

AKBOKinica 42 

Andro8l46a, 634 a ff. 

Anecdotes 199 b 

Animism 761 b 

Anopaia 319 a, 320 a, 329 a b 

Anthela 300 a 

Anthropology xciii, 94 b, 830 a 

Anthropomorphism 18 b 

Anti-patriotiBm 237 

Antiphon 42 

Aphaia 12 

Aphorisms 463 a 

ApoUonia 784 b 

Apologetics 490 b, 540 a, 688 b, 684 a, 
688 b, 712 a, 736 a, 76.'! b ; 224, 231, 
234, 261, 268, 383 

Apologue 634 b 

Apophthegms 220 a, 221 b, 834 b, S41 a, 
448 b, 661a. 662 a ; 90. Cp. Gnomes 

Afpian 112 

Arbitration 214 b 

Archers 632 a b, 656 b. . 726 b ; 26 
(KreUn), 87 (Athenian) 

Areiopagos 438 b, 599 b, 647 a ; 58 

Argires 612a, 612b ; 197, 224, 331 

Arguments 626 b, 631 a, 547 a ; 92 

ArisUia 373 b, 380 a, 381 a, 427 a, 603 a. 



445 



^^H HERODOTUS ^^H 


^^^H 649b, 745b, 746b, 765a ; 14, 44, 73, 


288 b, 351b, 404 b, 529 b. 594 a, 7601), , 


^^^H 74, 80, 88, 331, 362, 374 


818 b jhd 


^^^^B Aristeidea 48a a li, 486 a, r>06 b, 589 b, 


Battle-fields 596 a, 605 b ; 243 ^M 


^^^H 665 b, 687 b; 43, 48, 51, 59 note. 


BaHmeuUus 46 a, 281 a ^^ 


^^^H 60, 85 (PluUrch), 202 (Archon), 211 


Biography 62, 82 


^^^H (his policy), ,'.\1, 383, 396 


BoaU 384 b, 385 a, 387 a. 389 a, 50CK_J 


^^^^B AaiBTBiDKS. Aemcs 103 


780 a ^M 


^^^^H AttlsTODKMOs 81 note 


Body politic, the 187 a, 202 a, 2a0a ^M 


^^^^H AiusTOPHANEa 14, 23 b 


Boiotarclm 617 a (add Oxyrh\fndu^^ 


^^^^1 Abibtotle 50 


Papyri V. 1908, p. 171) 


^^^H Arkadiana 114 a. (Kypros), 302 b, 390 b. 


Boiotia 595 a (held by Makedonians), 


^^^m 469 a, 470 a, 652 a, 768 a 


596 a; 243 


^^^H Armature 167 flf. (17 ty|i«s) 


Boiotiau (Confederacy 405 b. CfL 


^^^^H Armour, ilnfflnsire 179 if. 


Leagues 


^^^H Array • li.iU, Greek 302 a, 468 a b. 


Bona Mott xxis, xxsix, Ixxr, Ixzvi, 


^^^K 650 a b ff. ; 238, 352 


Ixxx, IxxxT, xcii, 73 a, 160b, 210a, 


^^^H Persian 658 b «. , 663 « b, 1D5 IT. ; 351 


218 a, 227a, 334 b, 446 b, 453 a, t«S«, 


^^^^V Anniw 


4»6b 


^^^^B Arruws 


Bouk, the 601 a. Cp. Institutions 


^^^^1 ArUl)anD8 16 b 


Bows 176 


^^^H ArtabazoB 680 a, 683*, 735 b, 776 b: 


Branding 49 a b 


^^^B 


BrennuB 66 (nt Thermopylai) 


^^^^H ArtachaiOii, his funeral 147 a 


Bribery 597|b, 600 b, 775 a, 776 b, 802. ; 


^^^H Artemisia Ixxix, 125 b, 461 b, 494 a. 


357 


^^^^ 92 


Bridges 37 b, 40 a (Halys), 45 b 
(Maiandros), 47 a (Hellespont), 48 a ff.. 


^V Artemision 257 b, 258 b : 250 


^^^_ Arthmios, of Zela 597 b ; 37. 38, 43, 87, 


55 b (Roman), 76 b, 219 a, 384 », 


^^^B 108 


510 b (at Salamis), 526 a. 581 b, 58ti. 


^^^P 


702 a, 722 a, 738 b, 779 b, SlOa; 


^^f^ Assyria 87 .*» ; 171 


i4off., 840 ^^mm 


^H 'ABiiPiilu* voXiTtia 55, 199, 208, 210, 


Bull 326 b, 796 b (Irish) ^^^H 


^H 211, 


Burial ^^^H 


^^M ATHENAIOf, 114 


Byiauitino Literature 117 f. ^^^^H 


^^^^^_ Athena 698a (reocuupied)'; 8 (a moDU- 


Byzoution 779 b, 780 b ^^^^H 


^^^^^H munt), 20 (its declitie),30 f. (evacuation 


^^^^^H 


^^^H f>f}, 62 (a UttiveTBity), 199 (490- 


Cables 827 b ^^^H 


^^^^M 461 B.I'.). Cp. Empire, Institutionit, 


Caesar 61 ^M 


^^^B 


Caesariam 110 ^H 


^^^^ Athletics 392 a 


Camels 108a, Ilia, 160a, 278b, 76«a.^H 


^^M Atta^noB Ixxvii 


CamtM 618 b, 628 b, 733 b, 742 a, 794 b^| 


^^B Atthidographe 53 


367 ■ 


^H AtticiRm 261b, 372 a, 886 a, 39Sb, 


Cana) 35 b, !i6 b, 147 a, 152 b; 146 ^M 


^^__ 398 b, 534 b, 582 a, 583 a, 598 b, 680 b. 


Carthage 232 a, 234 b (oonatitutioid^H 


^^^^ 631b,655b. 691a, 692 b, 693 b, 695 V 


236 b; 186 ^H 


^^^B 709 b, 7 Ub, 71&b, 743 b, 746 a, 776 a; 


Causality of the war 122, 287, 34S. 354^H 


^^^" 43, 80, 101, 362 


(Causation 1 95 a, 263 b, 35& a, 387 a ^H 


^^M AuouKTAN History, the 116 


(Causes of victory xc See Victory ^| 
Cavaliers 307 b (at Sjiarte) ^ 


^^M Anthonticity, not truth 193 


^^M Authorities, other than Hdt., 


Cavalry 33 s, 60 a, 81b, 106 a, 10«a. 


^^H Api>endix I 


108 b, 222 a, 252 a, 291 b, 310 b. 313 U, 


^^M j4utvptia iH^. Cp. Sources. 


399b, 539a, 614 h, 6I5a, 624 b, 629 tl|^ 




630 a, 631 a, 632 b, U»4 a, €50 a, 658 IvV 


^H Babylon, Revolt of 812 b 


861 a, 66 1 b, 664 a, 672 a, 676 b, 696 a. ^ 


^^M Bakohyiidea 14 note 


fl99a, 702a, 712a, 715b, 718b. 724*. 1 


^H Bakis 383 b, 4B2 a, 508 b, 685 b ; 101 


725*, 731a, 739b; 161 ff., 203, 345,^ 


^H Banquets Ixxvii, 620 a b, 767 a, 777 b; 


368, 370, 377, 379 f., 333 JH 


^H 116, 149, 356 


Oaves 410a (Korykian), 440a(AglaariaB|^H 


^H Barathron, the 174 b, 181 b 


568 a (Troiihonian), 571a (l*to«in) ^H 
CLariotii 60 b, 61a, 95 a, 110 a, 187I^H 


^H Barbarians 108 a, 237 a, 2S7 b 


^H Barbarism 421 a, 521 b, 587 a, 635 b, 


272 b, 543 a, 551 b (in Sparta) ^H 


^m_ 695 a, 756 b, 761a; 1 8, 30, 46 


Chestnut 271 a ^H 


^^^^ fiarbaritiea48a,50a, 129 b, 144 b, 198 b, 


Choinlos, of Sanios Uxv, 246 a ; fi ^H 



INDEX IV 



44V 



Christian Ethics 170 b 

Christian Fathers 116 note 

Chronology Ixxiv (documents), xciii {ex- 
oellonoe), 2 b, S a (^rot), 8 b (invasion 
of Egypt), 29 b, 33 1>, 47 a (winter 
481-460 B.i:.), 47 b (winter 47S-478 
B.a), &6b (winter 481-180 B.O.), 57 a 
(eclipse), 171a (vow of vengeance), 
172a (id,). 17Gab (SparUn affairs), 
l77a(miMioD of S]tertliiiu and llouli^*), 
181a (exploit of Ancriiitaa), 180 a 
(Delphic Responiies to Athens), 180ah 
{id.}, 190b {id.), 193b (t<^.)i 194a 
(oaval refonn), 19$a (Congreiis), 201 b, 
302 a (oracle to Argot)), 20fi b (embwuy 
of Kalliaa), 218 b (emlAssy to Oelon), 
227 a (miaaion of Rndmos), 243 b (con- 
ventional), 245 l> (Tiirentino-Rbogian 
disa8t«r), 270b (Lug of fleet), 291 a 
(Xenceu in Th.-isaly), 309b (01. 7a), 
ai3a (diary). 325 a b (oracles), ii67 h 
(diary), 391 b (01. 75), 436 b (King* 
arrival in Athena), 437 a, 463 a, 455 b 
(diary of Salarois, q.v.), 466a, 60Da, 
MO a, Mill, 564 a, r>79br. (Makv- 
doniau), DSOb (winter, 480-479 n.c.)i 
&K b ('two Uarveati '), 592a (Delphic 
Agoii), ibid. (Olympian), 598 b (Mar- 
donioa in Athens'), 6iy2b{Hyakinlhia), 
609 a (eotipae), 618a (Mordonioa re- 
tiros), 627 a (Greek advance), 643 b 
(a century), 653 a (destruction of 
Mykuuai, Tiryns), 6««b (01.), 675 a 
(arrest of Hegesistratoa), 698 b (diary 
of Plataia, q.v.), 731a (sequence), 
740 b (incoherence), 757 a, 772 a, 784 a, 
790 a, 797 b, 801 a b (dat« of PUuia- 
Mykale), 807 a, 820 a, 824 b (18 Sept. 
479B.C.), 827bt, 828a (winUr 479- 
478 B.C. ); 65, 72 note, 74 (Diodoroa), 83 
(Nepos), 89 (PluUrch), 114 (Aelian), 
132 (winter 481-480 B.o.), 195, 232 
(oracleti to Athena), 236 (Pyth. 27), 
241 (dofoctivo), 247 (cxi>eaition to 
Tempe), 264, 272 ff. (diary of Thermo- 
pylai, q.v.), 290 ff. (Salamis), 331, 
346 0: (PlaUia), 369, 398 ff.. 406 
{Cruets). Cp. Appendix IX., Diary, 
etc 

CiciBO 35 (and Demoithencs), 59, 60 

Circumcision 102 b 

Citiien, the gowl 35, 85 note, 209 

Citizon-soldiem 45 

City for country {nomiiuUim) 623 h, 
624 a, 624 b, 628 b, 632 b, 636 a, 657 )i. 
670 a, 679 b, 733 b, 756 «, 771 b, 777 a, 
786 a 

City-aUU, the 404 b, 450 a, .'ifll a, 502 b, 
880 a; 34 (its decay), 53 (prejndirer 
oO. t,9, 61, 105 

^'ivilizatiou 12 b 

Cleopatra 61 



Golonixation 451 a b, 591 a, 661 b, S5t a, 
790 a, 809 a 

Command, organization uf 433 b. Cp. 
Organization 

Commerce 621 a (slaves). Cp. Trade 

Commissariat 098 b ; 148, 305 

Composition, problems of 17 b, 23 b, 
27 b, 28 b, 29 b, 46 b, 72 b. 80 b, 82 b, 
83 b, 87 a, 107 a, 1071., 116 b, 117 b, 
118a, V6\h, 134b, 136a, 135b, 137a, 
143 a. 144 b, 156 b, 161a, 182 b, 183 a. 
195 a, 200 b, 208 a, 214 », 228 », 247 b, 
266 b, 288 b, 300 b, 306 b, 317 a, 
346 a b, 361b. 362 a, 380 b, 409 a, 
410 a, 421a, 452 b, 466 b, 469 b, 471 a, 
472 a, 502 a, 507 a, 51 1 b, 514 a, 554 b, 
r>67a, 5.09a, 572a, 585a, 593a, 616b, 
t!:l2 b, 633 b, 647 b, 654 b, 665 b, 668 a, 
671 b, 694 a, 752 b, 761 a b, 763 a, 
768 b, 779 b, 782 b, 787 b, 790 a, 792 a, 
814 a; 77, 121, 125, 189, 361 

Confederacy (481 B.C.) 219 

Congress (Iithmiau) 186 a, 196 a, 265 a, 
264 b, 303 b, 303 b, 360 b, 419 b ; 219. 
247 

Con8istuD<:y (not the teat of truth) 192 

Constantinople, Herodotus in 117 

Corv^ 33 b 

Cosmopolitanism 62 

ConncU 9 b (Persian), 29 a, 172 b 
(Amphiktyonic, q.v.), 235a (Cartha- 
ginian), 25.5 b (of war), 323 a, 410 a 
(Delphic), 434 a (of war), 443 a, 446 8, 
461 a (King's), 580 b (Athenian), 637 b 
(of war), 680 a, 683 b, 69Sa, 710 a, 
772b ; 125 (Privy), 298 ff. (of war at 
•Salamis) 

C'ouva^234a 

Criticism 174ab (story of Heralds) 

Criticism, modern 119, 242, 267, 345 

Crncifixion 288 b. 827 a 

Cuirass 633 n, 753 a ; 160 

Cuirasaiers 539 a 

Chirioaities 768 a (at PlaUia) 

Daidalos 242 b 

Dareik -ly li 

Dareioa, HvBtaspis lb (wrath of). 5a 

(a,^), 85 b (an Arian), 174 a (vow) 
Daroi08-vase 22 b 
Date of composition (q.v.) 298 b 
Dates. Cp. Chronology 
Dedications 764 b. Cp. AnaiheiiuUu 

DKiyARCHOS 42 

Dclisn League 316 a. 549 b, 554 b, 
r>«)6a, 590b, 809a, 810 a; 233 

I)el{»hi Ixxxiv, 41 b (connexion with 
Lydia), 173 b, 183 a, 186 a, 201b, 
228 a, 249 a (influence on jiistorio- 
grapliy), 265 8, 279 b, 316 b, 325 b 
(Thormopyloi), 39Hb, 405 a, 407 a ff. 
(asiault on), 415 a, 438 a, 618 b, 529 a, 



^^^B 44B ^^^r HERODOTUS 1 


^^^H 540 a, 548 b, S(t7 b, &74 a, 590 b, 592 a. 


369 a, 480 b, 441b, 483 a, 490 1. 


^^^H 616 ft, 666 a, 6M a, 735 a, 7«S b, 787 b ; 


504 b, 507 a. 519 », 52S b, fiUb. 


^^^H 25, 56 (0»aU), 99 (Tliemistokles), 


588 a, 593 b, 616 b, 620*, 665*, 


^^^H 216 {id.), 218, 220, 224, 229 fT., 2S9 


709 b, 750 a, 769 •, 778 b. 786 1. 


^^^H Dkmadxs 


823 a; 190, 227 


^^^^^H Damaratog Ixxviii (as Sage), 4 a (Might 


Drafts— Uecond 48a, 7» b. 134 b, 148*, 


^^^H of), 8 b (omitted J, 129 a, 310 b, 311 b, 


168m 171 a. 172b, 183 b, 18«a 


^^^H 334 b, 343 b, 454 b, 595 1> (disappears), 


208 b, 210 b, 232 », 247 b, 264a, 


^^^H 620 a, 720 a ; 63 (aneuiiotes), 78, 92, 


282 b, 327 a, 327 b. 354 &, 396 &^ 


^^^H 196, 197 


401a, 408 b, 409 a, 417 b, 4SSv 


^^^H Demea 317 b, 417 a, 424 a, 489 b, 503 b, 


431 «, 472 b, 480 b, 487 a, 50«k, 


^^^H 562 b, 616 b, 617 a, 709 h, 750 a, 751a, 


550 a, 569 a, 626 b, 666*. 73Sv 


^^^H 


739 a, 748 b, 750 ». 7«4b, 767 1^ 


^^^^H Democracy 6 a, 25 a, 202 a (at Argoa), 


807 a ; 227, 361 


^^^H 215 b, 216 a. 218 a, 232 b, 406 a, 429 a. 


Third 137 a, 143 a, 144 b, 146 b. m.. 


^^^H 597 a, 687 b, 711 h, 758 a, 758 b, 824 b. 


183 a, 206 b. 247 b, 327 a, M3., 


^^^H 827 a, 880 b ; 46. 47, 54, 200, 253 


354 a, 423 b, 456 a, 480 b, 506 1^ 


^^^^H DKMoHTHKN'Ba 34 


750 tt, 762 b, 767 b ; 228 


^^^^B Demotiktm. tin- 600 d 


Drums xlvii (influence of), Ixxir, %t. 


^^^^H Dcaoent into Hell 568 a, 


74 a, 495 a, 513 a, 514 a 


^^^H Devolio 176 b. 237 b, 807 a, 824 a, 325 b, 


Dreams Ixxxvi, 22 b, 26 b, 27 b, 568 b 


^^^H 393 


Dryopianti 653 b 


^^^^H Dhama 189 b 


Dryopi* 421 b, 470 b 


^^^^H Dialectic of tradition 1. 108, 258, 385 


Duel 643 a, 754 a 


^^^H Diary of Artvmision, »67 b, 370 a b, 
^^^H 377 a, 377 b, 378 a, 387 b, 390 b, 415 b, 




Earth 12 a (Hat) 


^^^H 458ab: 272 If. 


Ecli [■««!! 57 b ; 400, 409. Cp. Ottnw 


^^^B Diary of Platttia 624 a, 637 b, 664 b, 


logy 


^^^H 676 b. 678 a, 678 b, 679 a. 679 b, 685 a, 


Kgnatian Way, thf 151b, 27S b. 6751, 


^^^H 686 b, 688 b, 692 a, 696 a, 699 n, 705 n, 


785 a 


^^^H 768 b, 77:5 b ; 346 If. 


Egypt 9 a (revolt) 


^^^H Diary of SalamiB 453 a, 4r>r. b, 457 «, 
^^^^H 458 b, 465 b, 474 a, 477 b, 479 b, 482 b, 


Egyptians 113 a, 662 a ; 174 


Eleiiiti.'^ 758 li 


^^^H 487 a, 508 a, 523 b, 524 b, 537 b ; 291 If. 


Elcusinian uiystvriBK 191* 


^^^B Diaiy of Tliermopylai 321b. 323 a b. 


BltnUheria,, tlie 64 note. 86, 89, 95, 3tt 


^^^H 324a, 329a, 3I3a, 313 b, 319a: 


408 


^^^H 264, 273 


Emblem 753 4 


^^^^H Dikaios Ixxr (Mmnoiri of), 128 a, 439 b. 


Emp«dokles333a 


^^^B 454 a 


£mi>ire, Atlii-nioii 589 li 
Make<loiiian 66, 58, 61 


^^^^H Dio Chktsobtom 101 


^^^H D[ODQKO<) 65, 66 If., 269, 290, 393, 408 


Persian 10 a, 12 a, 122 f. 


^^^^H (Chronology) 


Uonian 61, 112, 116 


^^^^H Dionysios of Milot08 Ixxv, 206 b ; 5 


Engineering 35 b, 37 a, 58 b 


^^^^B Divination 323 a, 327 b, 665 a, 672 b, 


Ensigns 496 a, 602 b 


^^^H 675 b, 784 b, 790 a 


Envy 652 b 


^^^H Dirineru 395 b ; 353 


ErBOuos 26, 66, 74 f., 154, 269 


^^^^1 Dodona 787 b 


BpibiiUii 1.12 b, 272 a, 375 a. 487 b. 616*. 


^^^B Dog, ttie 275 b ; 52 


558 b; 173 


^^^H Doriauii 170 b, 202 a, 211b, 214 b, 223 a, 


Epinuiehy 220 


^^^H 232 b, 240 b, 242 a, 243 b, 246 a, 248 b, 


Epinikia of Pindar 11 


^^^H 262 b, 382 a, 400 a, 420 b, 426 a, 428 a. 


EpUitphioi Loffoi 43. 44, 46, 88 


^^^H 432 b, 469 a, 470 b, 563 b, 583 b, 591 a, 


Epouyni 751 a, 762 a 


^^^H 642 a, 646 a, 733 a, 808 b 


Epo8, the xlvii (inflnenoe of), 190 b 


^^^^1 Doris 


Eroohtheion, the 442 a 


^^^^H Dori^kos SO a ; 136 


Bather, story of 812 b 


^^^^H DtiriMtn 472 a. Cp. HEItOlKITUfi 


Etnunans 234 a 


^^^^H Doublets 370 a 


Europe 6 a (its exoelleoce), 11a (extotV 
12 b, 526 b 


^^^^H Drafts Ixvii (of the work)— 


^^^H First 46 b, 137 a, 161 a, 183 b, 192 b, 


Exaggerations 183 a. 381s, 596 b, OKt, 


^^^H 201a, 206 b, 208 11, 232 a, 239 b, 


624 b, 626a, 648 b, 663 b, 7lls 7«k, 


^^^B 247 b, 256 a, 264 b, 297 a. 298 b. 


766 a, 766 a, 804 b, 811 a ; 324, S86 


^^^H 301b, 327 a, 346 b, 351a, 354 a, 


Excommunication 243 b ^^^^k 



™ ^^" INDEX IV 44* ^^ 


Fikctiont) 676 » 


(Oroatheion), 616 b (DekeleU), 617 b 


Fallacies 422 a, 426 », S37t> 


(Tanagra), ibid. (Skolos), 619 >i 


FAUlum6321>, 814 b 


(Erythrai, Hyaiai), ibid. (Asopos), 


Fmtir»l8 308 b (Kariioiaii), 309 h 


628 b (EiTthrai), 629 a (Kithairon), 
636b ("The High Bwttionfl"). 638b 
(Hysiai), 639 a (Plateiis), 639b(Gar- 


(Olympian). a91 b {id.), 469a, 512b, 


802 a b (HyiikJnthiwi) 


Fetters 49 a 


Mphia), 640 b (Andrnkratoioii), 647 b 
(Thermodou), 699 b (The laland). 


Foods 19« b, aea a b (ThoaBalo-Phokian), 


393 a (id.), 399 a, 540 b (blcxxl-). 825 b 


701 b (Oiiroo), 716 b (Moloeiit), 


(Th.-Ph.), 674 b (Togea-SparUn) ; 92, 


754 b (Daton), 785 a (Ionian Gulf), 


101 (Tb.IMi.) 


785 b (Chaonia), 786 a (lAkmon), ibid. 


FictioDH 244 b, 444 b, 663 b, 600 a. 676 a. 


(Orikon), 792 a (Mykalft), 793 b 


«91ii, 693 b-, 126, 193, 226 f., 254, 


(Giiuun), 79!^ b (Mykale), 820a 


a82 


(Li'ktou), 821 a (The Cher»ones«), 


Finance 16 


82:. A (,ul.), 826 b (AigogjioUnioi), 829 a 


Fket 194 b (Atbeniau). Cp. Navy 


(Porsis), 8:j0 j b (Physics and Politics) ; 


Flogging 34 a, 48 a (HcUetipunt), 330 b : 


263 (Thermuiiylai), 264 (Artooiisiou), 
290, 293 r. (Salaniis), 349 f. (PUtaia) 


65 


Flosd 168 a 


Girdle 547 b 


Forgeriea 7 b, 241 a 


Gloaaea 47 b, 58 b, 88 a, 88 b, 145 », 


Fractions 669 b, 763 b, 765 a 


140 a, 166 b, 181 a, 283 a, 286 b, 292 b, 


FTonLi»n< 12 b (Persian), 32 b (Hakii- 


400 a, 421a, 472 a, 492 b, 498 a, 499 b, 


doni»n), 40 a (Phrygian), 40 b 


511b, 512 b, 011b, 629 b, 632 b, 062 b, 


(Lydiau), 190 a (Attic), 254 a (preoent 


663 b. 670 a, 678 a. 680 b, 796 b, 828ab 


Grwk), 400 b (Phokian), 405 b 


Gnomes 15 a. 18 a, 24 b, 68 b, 69 b, 180 a, 


(Boiotian), 592 a (linguistic), 602 a 


183 b, 209 b, 220 a, 223 b, 251 a, 350 b, 


(Boiotian), 614 b (Penian), 617 b 


361 a, 391 <i. 392 a. 392 b, 409 b, 535 b. 


(Attic), 619 b (Theban). 627 b 


586 b 


iDiabateria], 689 a, 640 a, 734 a 


Gold 41 b, 42b, 130 b, 136 b, 281 b, 649a, 


(Theban); 122 (Penian), 248, 344 


630 a, 755 a, 762b, 702 b, 703 a, 704 a 


(Attic) 


Gounoii 164 b 


Foneral 147 b (Artiicluies) : 43, 73 


GorgiBM 32 note 


(Orations) 


Great Oreeca 432 a 




Greek name, tb« 591 h 


Garden* 577 a ff. 




Oargapbia 696 b 


Haliartos 9y 


OfttMSOOa 


HalikamasaoB 267 b 


Oaols. the 56, 101 


Harpilos (engineer) 142 a 


Gelon 222 a, 224 b, 227 b, 228 a b : 70 f. , 


Hetiemunia 203 b, 222 b, 223 b, 255 b. 


226 tr. 


264 b, 304 b, 350 b, 453 a, 491 a, 495 n, 


Gelon (of Theaaaly) 393 b 


flOSb. 645 b; 221, 342 


Oem-cuttinf; 93 b 


Helen 750 b 


Genealoay. See Pedigree 

Geography xcii (exoellenoc), 34 a 


Ilelias 14 b, 129 b. 197 b, 204 b, 219 », 


460 a, 591b, 690 b, S»7Bb, 688 b. 


(Athoe), 39 b (KriUlla), 40 b (Halys), 


808 b, 827 b 


79 a (error), 88 b, 104 b (Krythnian 
■ea), 143 a (errors), 161a (Thermo). 


Hellebore 297 b 


UelleniAm 89 a, 132 a, 173 a, 204 a, 294 a. 


154 a (Torone), 101a (the lion), 163 b 


311a, 348 a, 421a, 424 b, 432 a, 497*, 


(Thesaaly), 164 a (TheKmlian )>a.sHas), 


519 b, 521b, 551a, 690 bf, 592 b, 


168 a (flood), 243 a (naniBS of Sicily), 


045 b, 750 b, 761a; 18, 30, 5«, 101, 


244 a (lapygia). 250 b (Tbenaalian 


287 


puaet), 370 b (The Hollows), 400 a 
(Doris), 400 b ff. (Pbokis), 402 n 


Hellenistiv Literature 55 tT. 


Hellespont, paaaage of 135 


(LokriH), 407 a <D«1pbi). 426 b 


Helmet 179 


(Anibnikia), 427 >t (Ltukas), 430 b 


Helots 338 b, 389 b, 608 a, 660 b, 077 b, 


(Tliciiprotiti),477a(PsyUaleia), 47Bab 


728 a. 749 a, 768 a. 767 b 


(Koo»-Kyno8iira), 479 a (Muniohia), 
608 b (Koliai.), 524a (Zoat-r), 625 a 


Henotbuijim 74 b 


Herakleia 262a. 298 b, 400 b 


(Andnw), 64.1 a (Strymon), 643 b 


Herakleian Pillars 506 b 


(RhodoiH)), 665 b (OibrnlUr), 670 b 


Hvrakloids, the 400 a (Return of), 509 b. 


(Kopaic lake). 572 b (Alabanda), 675 b 


042 a, 645 b, 667 b 


(Lebaia), 578 b (Bcmiios), Oil a 


Herakleion600B(oppo«<itP SalBmia) 


VOL. II 


2 



^^H HERODOTUS ^^^^^^| 


^^^^B HeriJcles 422 a 


Hkuodotiia — ^^^^H 


^^^H Heralds 


Political aagacity xci, 134 a ^^M 


^^^^H HXRODOTUS— 


FoDularity 65, 91, 96, 101, 109. ll^H 
aecliniug 111 J^^| 


^^^^Kf Animug, q.v. 


^^H Artist 67 b, 131 a, 207 a, 347 b, 514 a, 


Prejudice 532 a, S61 a, 563 b, 75^H 


^^V^ 016 a; 188 


b ^H 


^H Atticism 361 a, 367 b, 673 b ; 03. 


Priority of Books 7, 8, 9, q.r. ^H 
PsycholoKy 496 b ^H 
Public, Im 469 a, 472 b. 487 a. 498 b, ' 


^H Cr. Hub r. 


^^M Bona Met Ixxxvii, 184 a, 415 a, 


^H eiSb; 267 


502 b, 616 b, 773 a, 792 b 


^H censured Si, 95 


RatioaalLsm Ix.vjtix, 212 a, 265 a, 280 b, 


^^M Completeness of hiii work xl IT. , 317 a, 


2»8.1i, 315 a, 318 a, 369 a 


^B 361b, 828a, 8:jlab; 31, 77 


Rtidactious of liia work Ixi ff., lxi» 


^^H Criticisni 515 a, 516 a, 557 b 


(Periklean), 242 a. Cp. Drafts 
Religious tone 529 b. Cp. Religiou^J 


^H D«feoU Ixzriitf., 21b, 183 a, 209 a. 


^H 327 a, 350 a 


Return to 81, 83, 91, 96 ^M 


^H didactic 14 a 


Rhetoric 32 b, 275 a ^H 


^H Doristn 117 h, 127 a, 130 b, 424 a 


Roiiiau interest in 64 ^^ 


^^1 EiJncatioD 623 b 


Romnnuing 126 J 


^H £inpirioi.>>iii Ixsxviii, 20r>a, 208 a, 210 a, 


Scune-shifting XXV, 1 19 a, 284 a, 28»^J| 


^H 221 a, 436 b, 683 b, 704 h ; 211, 267 


286 a, 443 a, 466 b, 473 a, 637^^H 


^H Brrora 45a, 70a, 103u, 164b, 234b, 


548 a, 558 a. 723 b; 188 ^M 


^H 238 b, 259 b, 276 a, 284 a, 290 b, 


Style 1, Ixxvj, 8b, 10a, 167 b, 175i. ' 


^M 302 a, 307 b, 616 a. 618 a, 660 b, 


175 b, 184 a. 422 b, 514 a. &SOa. , 


^H 770 b, 819 a; 264. Cp. Mistakes 


558 b, 573 a, 621 a, 667 a, 670flB 


^H Exaggeration. Cp. Nuiiibers 


703 b, 705 b, 713 b, 718 a, 732 a^H 


^H Ignoranoe, confessions of 493 b, 556 b, 


b ^M 


^H 567 b, 606 a, 626 a, 768 b 


Stylomotry I, 192 b ^H 
Sup«rficiality 561 a ^^^| 


^H Inimnsequenoe 7Sa, 119a, 249b. Cf. 


^^B 


Traveller Ixi, 40 b, 63 a, 64 b, 87».aa^H 


^^B Inconsistencies, q.v. 


in Argos 201 1) ^^^M 
Athena 772 a ^^^M 


^M Incredulity 368 b, 496 a, 54<ia 


^H Insouciance 568 b, 593 a, 640 b, 696 a. 


Babylon 87 a, 106 a, 5£8a^^^H 


^m 696 b, 711b, 798 a, 822 a; 349. 


Boiotia 620 b ^^^^^ 


^^H Cp. Euipiricisiu 


Byzantion 780 b 


^M Irony 16 b, 2n>, 133a, 186b, 218a, 


Delphi 285 a, 396 b, 408 b, 418 h, 


^m 268 a, 292 a, 382 b. 463 a, 496 a, 


550 a, 655 a, 686 a, 764 a - 


^g 498 a, 514 b, 518 b, 623 a. Cf. aub ▼. 


Dodona 787 b, 788 b | 


Jests 60 b 


Kgypt Ixiii ^H 
Olytupia 247 b, 055 a, 764 b ^H 


Life 109 


Literary quality 102 
Lo(rio 414 b, 721 a 
Malice 253 


Plataia 697 b, 701 a, 707 a, 717^H 


722 b, 768 a; 360 ^M 


Sicily 212 b, 244 a ^H 


Maxim 648 a 


Spai-ta 709 b ^H 


Merits Ixxxvii ff. 


Thebea&d9a ^H 


Military Hhortcomings 236 b, 256 a, 
367 a, 269 b, 323 b, 366 a. 367 a, i 


Thomiopylai 261 b, 264 a, 297 a! » 


299 b, 301 h, 320 a, 321 ». 


371 a, 436 a, 478 a, 486 a, 524 b, 1 


822 a, 329 b, 333 a, 337 a 


666 a, 673 b, «23 b, 641b, 737 a, 


Theasaly 7 a, 103 a, 166 b. 167 »-, 


742a, 797 a, 801 b ; 241, 261, 262, 


292 a, 294 b; 190 ^J 


270. 367, 370 


Unity of last tlirue Books, q.v. ^^M 


mistaken apologies for zoiv 


'VVouder, 212 a, 734 a ^H 


MisUkea 362 b, 376 a, 433 a, 663 b, 


Hero-worship 146 a, 175 b, 2.>.Sb, 26^^| 
266 b, 289 b, 335 a, 529 a, 548 b. 58^H 


608 a, 656 a, 697 b, 710 a, 7708 


Motivation, q.v. 


10 b, S22 b, 826 b ^^M 


Namesakes 564 b, 741 a , 


Hiniera, battle of 70 H°. ^H 


Opinions 253 b, 274 b, 318 a, 326 a, 


Horse, the 60a (Nesaian), 111 b (sacn^^ 


387 a, 452 b, 459 a, 483 b, 537 a, 


iicial), 1 43 b, 51 1 b, 543 a, 630 a, 637 a, 1 


557 b, 674 a. 687 a, 734 b, 746 b. 


730 b. 766 a J 


748 a, 80Oa 


Hous<>, the. 576 b ^^M 


Partiality 267 
Philosophy 160 h, 209 b 


HypEUKinsa 46 ^^H 


Hyroania 86 b ^^^^^^H 



^^^^ ^^^^ INDF.X IV ^^^^ 4ftl ^^ 


Iambics 306 b 


Iraios 42 


IberUiui 233 a b 


IsIandB 346 b (atrategic mm) 


Idols 453 b, 488 b 


IsoKEATEt 29 


hniDorUls 46a, 61a, 107b, 177b, 198b, 


lEtbnios-linc of defi-nce 310 a, 466 h ; 


314 a, 319 a, 332 b, 334 •, 616 b, 539 a. 


242, 256, 238 


(.40 a; 2S1, -JSa, 285 




Impiety 682 b, 7r>9i» 


Japanese victories 518 a 


Iiu{irobabilitie8 610 b, 777 &, 7S8* 


JaMU of Phemi 222 b ; 22, 266 noU 


Inaccuracies 603 b 


Jealousy, divine xc, 18 a, 67 a, 68 b, 


Incohereiwe 247. 261, 266, 268. 296, 372 


552 b, 747 b, 762 a 


Incomo-Ux in Persian war, 16 


Jeat 753 a 


InaouBcquencc lib, 155a, 162a, 165b, 


Jewan2b, 161b, 418a, 420a 


169 b, 170 a, 180 b, 183 a, 189 b, 196a, 


JoHF.PHrs 62 


203 b, 205 a, 259 a, 270 b, 294 a, 320 a, 


.loumiiL Cp. Diary 


363 b, 376 b, 421a, 441 b, 449 b, 459 a, 


JnUAS 64 note, 116 


473 a, 476 a, 626 b, 631 a, 633 a. 636 b 


Jurinprudence 774 a, 775 u 


(fru), 566 b. 593 a, 603 b, 649 s, 656 b, 


JlTVESAl. 62 


658 b, 679 b, 689 b, 743 a, 828 b; 63 




(Aristotio), 124, 189. 219, 331, 347. 


Kodmos, story of 228 a ff. 


348, 371 


Kelaiiiai 40 a; 131 


Inconiistenciea 370 a, 391 a, 407 b, 420 li, 


Kintou 17 (his jwliey) 


436 a, 438 a, 525 a, 538 b, 540 a, 546 a, 


Kiasia 86a 


647 b, 553 a, 563 a, 684 b, 600 b, 606 a. 


Klenichs 868 a, 374 a, 417 a, 428 b, 41K)&, 


615 b, 649 b, 960 a, 662 a, 670 a, 689 a. 


699 a, 654 a 


744 b, 760 a, 788 h, 793 a, 819 a: 76, 


Korkyra 228 


235, 251, 286, 323 


Kow-tow. the 178 b, 198 b 


ladivitiaaligm 62 


Kretans 225 


In.HcripUoDS 386 a. 502 a ; 7 note 


Krete 241 a, 242 a (its cities) 


iDKtitutions 577 a (|irimitive), 830a b 


Kritalla 128 


(relativity of) 


KTB8IAK 23, 286, 344. 319, 407 


Athenian 191 a b, 195 h, 203 a. 


KyrosSb, lOlb, 72 b, 828 bfl". 


426ab, 487 A. 487b, 680b, 599h, 




eS2a, 666 a, 687b, 824 b ; 200 If. 


I^ugms. Cp. Camp 


Delpliian 410 b 


Lakonism 18 


Peraian 9 b, 24 b, 29 a, 39 b, 74 a, 


I^mia 297 b 


288 b (Mi), 313 a, 492 b, 611b. 


Lasso, the 109 b 


516 h, 769 b, 812 a If. 


Law, International 179a, 683a, 601a: 


Spartan 131a, 176 b. 176 a b, 203 b, 


of Empire lOo, 28 a 


262 a, 307 a, 312 a, 314 b, 340 a, 


Leagues 617b (Boiotian). 621a, 775a. 


S44aff., 368 b, 360 a, 366 b, 562 a, 


Cp. Aniphiktyonio, Dclian, etc. 


603 b, 606 b, 608 a, 609 a, 609 b, 


Legends of — 


618 a, 670 a, 673 a, 707 b, 708 b, 


Alexander 251 


746 a b. 747 a. 748 a, 752a. 7.'i6a, 


Amiizoiis 647 b 


757 a. 758 a. 767 a, 770 ^ 776 a ; 22 


Dflphi 234 


Invasions 30 a, 97 b, 262 b (Molossian), 


HemkleidB 642 a 


26da (Boiotian) 


Kodros 794 a 


Invocation 453 b 


Marathon 331a, 428 a, 688 a, 681a, 


Ionia 72 b, 88 a, 229 b, 8071), 809 a; 


648 a, 659 a, 664 b, 691a, 712 b, 


266, 339 


726b, 729a, 746a; 19, 43, 47, 108, 


toni&ni! 67 a, 72 b, 73 b, 118 b. 120 a, 


353, 386, 387 


170 1., 205 a, 2171. (Challcjdir), 2.T2b, 


Xliiio-- 242 » 


•Aiy a, 234 b, 235 b. 244 h, 273 b, 283 b, 


Mylwlc .138, 353. 387 


371 b. 381'b. 386 b, 423 b, 425 b, 426a, 


Persian war 590 h ; 41, 43, 49, 66. 67, 


488a, 442b, 451a, 452a, 470a, 471 b, 


77. 79, 91, 96, 107 


491 b, 498 a, 616 a, 621 a, 564 a, 666 a, 


PLiUJa632b, 726 b, 727 a 


643 a, 664 a, 789 »s 781 », 785 a, 79fla, 


Salamis 353, 387 


787 a, 806a 


SiiarUn (twins) 563 b 
fh^brt (Srplcm c. ) 646 a 


Ioniian206 


Iron 677 a 


TbeiiiiBtoklv« Ixxiv, Izzxriti, 631 b. 


Irony 241b, 811b, 534 b, S41 a, 693 a, 


651 b, 684 a ; 60, 99. 114, 116, 330 


694 a {bU), 721 a, 721 b, 760 b, 839 b ; 


Thennopylai 257 », 307 a, 309 b, 811 a. 


109. Cji. HmioDOTva 


311 b(Mi 814 b, 326 b, 831 b, 681 b, 



^^^H 408 ^^^r HERODOTUS V^H 


^^^^1 691 t>, 694 u, 759 b ; 63, 68, 84, 90, 


310a, 390b, 400 h. 400 a, 4I5c^nH^ 


^^^^1 02,90,108,267,26811. 


636 b, 549 a, 660 b. 668 b. 676 a. 894^71 


^^^^H ThvseUB 6-16 h, 647 :i 


738 a, 773 a, 808 b; 339 




^^^^1 Xcrxe»-IIij;)it M7 l> 


Mtmoin 5. C}>. Dikaioa 




^^^^^1 Leg^iug8 


Mercenarieh 222 b, 236 a 




^^^^^^H Iicv^e eit maS3e 150 


Messenian wars 562 a 




^^^^H Light-armed trooii» 222 a, :i02l>, 650 b, 


MiKnitions 30 a b. 98 b, 678 a. 807 K 




^^^H 656 b, 696 a, U«8 b, 725 b, 731 U 


829 b 




^^^^H Ligiirinns 96 n, 233 b 


MilMiaiu806b 




^^^H Lion, thi^ 161 II, 326 b, 338 b (of 


Miltiades, eudorSOfif. , 




^^^^^H Ijt-ouiiiiuJ 


Mines 194a H| 


^^^^H Logic (of evont.s) 263 


Minoles Isxxvi, 570a, 672a ^H 


^^^^^H £o</->i, AsKyriaii xJii, SI7ii 


Mole, at SaUmii* 510« b ; 94. 319 ^H 


^^^^H Egyptinn Ixiv, 317 a, 587 b, 662a: 


Moriothcisni 76 a 




^^^^H note 


Month, the 801 a ; 403 




^^^^^H Libvan 95 it 


MonumentJi of the Persian war, liat «( 




^^^^^H Lvdian Ixtii, 409 u 


6, 7 note 




^^^^H SknhiHU Ixii, 17 l<, 780 l> 
^^^^H ' The Sequel ' 31 7 » 
^^^H Lok nans 171 h, 303 It 


Mosses 643 b 




Mother-right 126 a, 496 a, 591 h 




Motivation lis, lib. 24a. 3«b. SMh, 




^^^^H Lot (lit Atbcua) 201 


239 b, 243 b, 263 b, 308 a. K62 a, 371 4, 




^^^^^B 


406 b, 415 b, 473 a. 477 n, 514 1, 




^^^^^m Ltkouroon (of Athena) 89 


531 a, 538 a, 551 a, 638 a, 690 b, 69Sa 




^^^^m Lykourgos (of Sparta) 306 b, 328 b 
^^^^^B Lynch -law 600 b 


701b, 718b, 722a, 79-2a: 146, ve.m 




198, 274, 290, 346, 362 ^■■fl 




Mourning 635 b ^^^^H 


^^^^^B HaKozinos 38 h 


Mutability 648 a ^^^^B 


^^^^H MaKi, Magiana 28 l>, 144 a : 49 
^^^^^B Mttkedon ilxxxiv (policy), 162 u (mon- 


Mykale, battle of 792 a If. ; 47, 9C ^H 


Mykenaian tombs 646 b ^^^^H 


^^^^^1 arohy), 690 a : in the fourth century 


Mysteries, the 465 b, 467 b ^^^H 


^^^^B 61 


^^^^^H 


^^^H Maiignitalt, de 81 


NamnKakes(af Hdt}741a ^^^H 


^^^H Malignity 385 b, 398 b, 504 b, 506 a. 


Nature 25 a, 588 a ^^^H 


^^^H 519 b, S34a; 13, 14. 119, 266, 330, 


Navsrch 627 b. 560 b ^^^B 


^^^^H 


Navy-li»ts 121 b, 357 b. 419 b, 420ai^H 


^^^^1 MapB 161 a, 290 b 


459 a, 463 b, 598 b ; 150 fT. (Panigi^H 


^^^^H Marathon 423 a, 507 b. Cp. Legend 


212 (Athenian), 337 ^^^1 


^^^^^H Marathonomaehai 15 


Naxos 429 b ^H 


^^^^^H Mardoniograpli 598 a 


Negroes 93 a, 94 b ^^H 


^^^^^H Mardunios 5 b (evil genius), 6 a (ambi- 


Nemesis (^bvot rrX.) xcf., 29 a. 1I^^| 


^^^^^H tion), 106 a (command), 461a, 514 u. 


180a, 209a, 268 a, 282&, 289a, SO^^I 


^^^H 518 b, 538 a, 541s, 566 b, 5811), 


:326 s, 348 a b, 354 b, 620 b, SI^H 


^^^B 595 a It'., 612 a, 613 a, 629 a, 6^0 b, 


529 a, 567 b, 731b, 736 a, 82«b:*PV 


^^^H 672 a, 680 n, 682 a, 693 b, 719 a, 730 b, 


324 I 


^^^B 760a, 802a ; 235, 336. 354, 366,,<361, 


Nemesiii, the Comic 388 b, 300 a, 614 K ■ 


^^^H 370 


541a, 646 a, 767 a: 88. 103 'MM 


^^^^^H tlare claiisutn 566 a 


Nicknames 332 a ^^H 


^^^^^H Marvels. Cp. Miracles 


Nomenclature 428 b, 61 1 a, 605 a, TM^H 


^^^^H Matiene 96 a 


Numbers Ixxxi, 36 b, 82 a b, 1 10b, l^^l 


^^^^B Measurements 299 a, 700 a, 701 ii, 707 ii 


132 a, 234 a, 245 b, 271b, 276a.37^H 


^^^H Medea 454 li, 640 b, 659 b, 691 a, 757 b ; 


281 a b, 299 a, 303 a b, 3S6a. SS^H 


^^^H 31 


368 a, 388 b, 390 a, 412 b. 127«f^| 


^^^^^H " Median " war, the 51, 65 ; op. sr. 


433a, 469a, 487b, 616b, 517a, &38K ■ 


^^^^^1 xliv 


542 a, .'i53b, 595 a b, 607 b, VHk I 


^^^^B Medicine 268 b, 338 b, 542 b, hii b 


632a, 650ab, 666a ff., 660b, 66}», 1 


^^^^H Medicine-men 665 b, 674 a 


664 a, 681b. 682o. 6968, 72Sa.7»»>, I 


^^^^1 Medisiu 476 b, 479 b, 531 b, 536 b, 588 b, 


736 b, 744 b, 745 a, 771a, 7i2b.774^J 


^^^H 686 b, 697 a, 610 1>, 612 a, 620 b, 661 a, 


779 b, 703 a; 76, 78, 8^, 161^H 


^^^H 673 a, 690 b, 758 a, 774 b ; 16, 21, 32, 


166 ff.. 164 ff., 2.38, aSS. 324, 351 ^H 


^^^H 36, 105, 108, 198, 208 f.. 226, 229, 


^^H 


^^^^B 253, 254, 336, 344, 348 


Oak, men of 422 u ^H 


^^^H Medizers 1 70 b, 205 b, 209 b, 249 b. 298 a. 


Oak -leaves 822 a ^^^H 



Oath 172 a 

Objective, the Persian 9b; 183 (f., 217, 

240 
OlMcaritiea 329 b 
Oligarchy 236 • b 
Olympia 764 b 

Olympiadg. Cp. Cbronology 
Olympian list of Confederate* 98 
^ Omens «72 »., 781 b, 783 a b, 784 b, 794 a. 

Co. Portent* 
I Oinuisiong 7a. 11a, lib, 34a, 89 li, 
, 40 b, 46 b, 66 b, 121a, 125 b, 134 b, 

I 186 a, 143 a, 16B a, 168 a, 172 h, 174 a. 

I 174 b, 176 b, 178 li, 181 b, 205 b, 207*. 

^_^ 316 b, 233 a, 260 a, 264 a, 267 b, 297 b, 
^B 819 b, 334 a, SSOb, 395 a, 397 b, 40ri b, 
^V 408 a, 442(1, 444 a, 4S8a, 495 a, 626 a, 
' 683 a, 664 b, 666 a, 668 a, 746 b, 776 a, 
791 b, 799 a ; 99, 362, 374 
Onomakritoa 7 a (a forger) 
•Open door,' the 607 a 
Ophthalmia 338 b 

Oraclea Ixxiii, Ixxxvi, 101 », HI b, 293 1>. 
296 b, 326 a, 383 b, 404 a, 480a, 609 a, 
540a, 667 a fT., 683 b, 684 b, 685 a b, 
786 b, 788 a ; 231 flT., 236, 289. 356 
Organisation of Peroian Army 105 1), 
111 a (cavalry), 151 b, 170a b, 271b, 
399b, 686a, 683b, 723a, 793a, 159 if.: 
Navy 121 b tf., 288 a, 162 If. : of Greek 
army 660 a b, 708 b, 740 a, 741 a. Cp. 
Army. Navy 
Orientditims 6 b, 13 b, 19a, 27 a, 49 a b, 
76b, 179a, 288b, 498b, C80 h, 
693 b : 3 
Ostrakinns 44 notr, 87, 204, 207 f., 210 

FaiutingR 7 note 

Pauhellenimii 466 a, 467 b, 687 a, 604 a ; 
39, 33 

PanicH 65 1<, 310 a, 366 a, 375 b, 412 b, 
443 b, 606 a; 100 note, 236 

rankration, tbc 806 b 

Paradox 261 

Parian Curuniolb, tlie 66 

Parikanians 92 a 

Passes 166a (Theaaalion), 260b [id.), 
264 u [id.), 256b [id.). 2&8b(Traohi- 
nian), 297 b iP/iurka), 318 b (Trachi- 
oiau), 319 b, 321a (Aiuinninu), 319 b 
(Aaopoft), 396 b (ityampoliM), .199 b 
(TWihifl), 606 b (Attic), 616 n ()Vf.), 
ei7a, 639a(Kitbairon), 676a, 677 a b, 
708a (Hykale); 212 |Thes<wlian), 
271 f. (Cintral Greece) 

PaM-word 796 b 

Patronymic, iwc of Ix, 1 a ('<«), 'i a, 
4 a, 6 b, 47 b, 84 Is 86 b, Ola, 99 b, 
103a. 106a. 126a. 129a. 177 a, 181 b, 
189a, 234 b, 235 b. 247 b. 252 b (Aw), 
376 a, 296 li, 305 a, 311 b, 327 b, 332 a, 
334 b. 38S a b, 387 b, 388 a [bit), 364 a, 



392 li, 406 b, 400 a, 429 b, 466 b, 483 a. 
489 b, 601a, 507 a, .160 b. 564 a, 572 a, 
600 a. 620 a, 620 b, 624 a, 629 b, 632 b, 
655 1), 668 b, 680 a, 687 a, 732 a, 736 b, 
750 a b, 758 li, 773 a, 776 b, 781b, 
804 b 

Pai'sanias 96 

Pansanias, the King 601 n 

PanaaQias, 'the Itegeut' 60S a. 609 a; 
354, 387 : iui.%aUed ' King ' SOI a, 
608 b, 756 a; 41, 83 

Pedigree-s Ivii, 20 a b, 85 a, 91b, 126a, 
213 b, 293 a, 304 b, 306 a, 332 a, 436 b, 
540 b, 660 b, 574 b, 670 )•, 680 a, 691 a, 
642 a, 644 a, 668 a, 781a, 819 b 

Pelaagians 424 a 

Pelo{)oiuie«ian8 527 a 

P«lo|K>nttn«o<i 469a (ethnography), 616a 
(project of attAcking) 

PclU 100 a 

Poucstui 253 

PmtekoiUaMerU, Histoi^ of tbe 36, 38, 
42 : r«ferf>Dc«8 to xhi, li, Ixv. sovi, 
432 ub 

PorikleB 3S0a, 439b, 4e6a, 629b (first 
programme), 589 b, 690 a : conaured t 
209 b : Funeral Oration 43 : his meta- 
phor 226a: his jiolicv Ixv, 16, 17, 
36, 208, 211, 237 : in tbo Pontoa Ixii 

Pcrmi of Aiachylos 10, 15 

PcTMai of Timotheoii 29 

Persia 21 (its weakness), 116 (revival), 
122(Phil-lienenio) 

Persian Galf, not recognized by Hdt. 
104 b 

Persian Records 1, 24, 25 note, 103 

" Pentian " war, the 60 

Porai* 43 b, 85 b 

Pessiiiiisni 68 a, 678 a b, 622 b 

Philistines 112 b 

Phoenicians 35 b, 114 a, 120 a, 139 a, 
213 b, 2a3». 498 a. 516 a, 566 a, 791b 

Phoki^inh 262 a ( Ile)<emony), 263 a, 
321 h, 398 b 

' PhyKJis and Pnlitit's ' 141 a, 829 b tX. 

Piety 769 a 

Pig. the 271 11 

PiUarii 666 b 

Pillar- worship. Cp. Religion 

PiNDAB 11, 69 (censured by Potybioe) 

Pitanate cohort 61 a ; 116 

Plan of campaign, Greek 253 b, 266 b, 
366a, 266a, 346b, 348b, 416b, 416a, 
417 a, 419 b, 422 b, 462 b, 468 b, 474 a, 
509 h, 527 b, 580 b, 581 a, 694 b, 698 b, 
628 a, 784 a b. 790 b, 796 b, 70«a ; 
222, 224, 24011'., 246, 260, 262, 255. 
256, 267. 260 r.. 269, 286, 289, 326, 
340, 343, 344. 388 

Plan of campaign, Persian. >See 
Stnit«gT 

PlaUia, Battle of— Drst ])Ositioa 629 a, 



464 



HERODOTUS 



630 b, 636 b, 637 b, 650 a, 602 b, 717 b, 
7I9a : Kocond [loaition 629a, 680b, 
637 u, 6391), 660 u, 657 u, 672 a, 692 b: 
tLird positiou 630 b, 707 b, 724 b, 
cp. 37r> tf. : relation to Salumis 244, 
288 

Plutaiuns 422 l< 

Pi.\TO 46, 49 (on PlatuiA) 

Plutarcu 6t,, S4, 290, 394, 408 (chrono- 
logy) 

Polcinarchy 252 a ; 200 (nt Athens) 

Policy of Argoi* 202 1., 2U7 I'. 303 « 
uf Athens 461 1>, 4r>2a : 340 
ofOelon 217 a, 213 a, 219 b 
of Hakedon 204 b, 258 a 
of Peisistretids 7 !> 
of Peloponaesians 227 u 
of Persia Ixxxiv, 8 li, 87 a 
of Sparta Ixxxiv, 18S», 262b, 3121), 

847 a, 347 b ; 19:.. 233. 33f., 339 
of ThMsaliana 222, 247 H'. 

POLTAINOB 112 
POLTSIOS 48, 58 

Polytheism 648 a; 86 

Puny express, the 512a 

Portonts l.\x.\vi, 57 b, 78 », 78 b, 411b, 
441 b, 443 a, 468 a, 490 a, 620 b, 673 1>. 
C]). Omens 

Pofltal seryice 441 a, 511 a 

Prtgmatism 229 a, 364 a, 379 b, 411b, 
415 s, 421 a, 437 b, 438 a, 468 a b, 
498 k, S70b, 624 a, 648 b, 776 a: 261, 
267, 340 

Prayer 280 b, 285 a, 728 b 

Predictions 7 b, 17 a, 20 a, 187 b, 683 b, 
782 a 

PrieHtbood 212 a 

Primitive Athens 423 b, 426 a, 426 a 

Priority of Books 7, 8, 9 : xlv, Ixi, 
Ixiv, lb, 21), 3b, 4a, 7a, 9a, 11a, 
11 b, 14 a, 15 b, 17 b, 29 a, 33 a b, 34 a, 
66 a, 67 a, 69 b, 73 a, 76 a, 83 a. 86 li, 
88 a, 89 b, 95 a, 08 b, 103 b, 107 a, 
109a, 112a, llSa, 118 b, 119b, I22a, 
137 b, 141a, 195a, 201 a b, 206 b, 
262 b, 297 a, 306 a, 306 b (W»), 337 1>, 
3688, 404 a, 409 a, 421 a, 427 b, 430 b, 
431a, 460 b, 467 u, 472 a, 4921). 602 a. 
61 1 b, 520 b, 522 a, 560 I), 572 1.. 574 o, 
588 a, 608 b, 609 b, 646 l>. 648 b, 652 b, 
662 a, 753 b, 779 b, 780 b, 792 a, 798 a, 
806 a b, 831 a b 

Prisoners 797 b (Athenian) 

PrivileBfes 752 a 

ProbpiM, the 223 (met more than 
once) 

Proclamations 74 a (Xerxes), 303 h 
(Leonidas) 

Prophecy 600 a, 518 a 

Proxenijt 589 a 

Fsephisms 417 a, 772 b (of Aristeidus), 
212tf. (ofThemfatokles) 



Psyttaleia 317 (occupation oO 
Puna 481 b, 523 a, 6S« a, 758 a 
Pylsgoroi 316 )• 
I^tho 409 u 

Bace, notes of 519 b 

Rationalism 415 a; 74 (in DiodoTML 
75 f., 83 (Nepofi) 

Referencea 117 b, 140 b, 167 b, ll»lb. 
228a, 321 b, 340 b, 359 a, 409 a, 421 a. 
460 II, 469 0, 472 b, 487 «, 491 b. 49S k, 
494 a, 496 b, 602 b, 50S h, 604 a, 607 •- 
613 1>, 615a, 616b, 522a, 633a, S47v 
553 I., 663 b, 663 b, 730 \>, 732a, 781 b, 
792 b, 793 a, 801 li, 827 a 

Regatta 66 b (at Abydos) 

Religion? b(Orphic), 57 b (Persian), 60b 
lid.l 66a (id.), 66a (Hellenio). 74b 
(Persian), 75 a, 88 b, 97 a (K»pi»- 
dokian), 14lb(a«xin), 144a(PeniaB>, 
172 a (oaths), 173 a (tithea), 17Sb 
(kowtow), 186 b (Dolphic), IMs 
(supplication), 190 a (intwuwMi— I, 
2121) (sex), 292 btr. (human oSr- 
ings), 295 a (purification), 38S b, 
418 a IT. (serpent - worship), 441 •> 
453 1), 509 b, 618a, 629 b (Petwu 
and Ok. £.), 648 a (Polytheiam and 
Chrisitianity), 566a (Persian), SM* 
(pillivr-wordhir)), 568 a b (lYophonitt), 
570 a (odtanU myth), 688 b (PrraiaBi 
and Uk. R.), 690 a, &92a (natiotui 
622b (Peraian), 672b, 682b. 766^ 
782 b. 822 b; 49, 363 

RominiM-onccH 12 b (Aischyloa), 4l4 
(Hom<-r). 187 b. 201 »( Pindar), M b 
(Homer), 277 ub (Homer) 

Rumission 581 n 

Rendozvoos 134, 156 

Retort 553 a 

Reviews 66a (Abydos), 81a (Dor 
460 b 

Revisions 554 b 

Rhetoric 76, 80, 83, 108 

Rhetors, the 101 

Righteousness 227 li ( Kudmos), 
229 b, 231 K 246 b (Mikythoa), 
(Aristoides) 

Rivers that failed, the 32 Is 64 K 79b, 
138 a, 291b, 29Sa 

Roads 300 a, 406 b, 407 b, 466 U 4<7 •> 
519a, 521b, 597b, 575|b. 619*^ 
636 a b, 738 b; 128, 130, 140, 270 £ 

Romance 678 b 

Rome 204 b, 283 b, 234 b. 830 b 

Roses 678 a b 

Route of Xerxes 62 a, 142 a, 146 b, 159H, 
200 », 253 b, 292 a, 296 a b. 399 •, 
403b. 405 ah, 413a, 436 b, 4Mt, 
624 a, 537 b, 554 a ; 126 (f. 

Routes 258b, 6na, 617 a, Sib a, 779*. 
779 b 



^ 456 ^^1 


RuMw 382 li, S90it, 3«3 b, 395 b, 475 k, 


5e6a, 57O11, 5r3a, (75b, S78b, ^^^| 


611 a, 681ft, 789 b, 799 h; 40. %S, 


611a, 620b, 625a, 6S6a, 661a, ^^^H 


289, 310, 314, 32(>, 341 


666 u, 655 b, 058 a, 668 b, 725 b, ^^^H 




726a, 729a, 735b, 741b, 749b, ^^^H 


Sneh-KrUU- 271b, 371 », 469 b, 478 o. 


762 b, 769a, 768 b, 773 b, 781 a, ^H 


, 6U b ; 158 not«, 246, 381 


803a, 804 b, 826a, 827a. 829a ; 1, ^H 


SMrifioe 237 b, 266 k, 267 b, 283 b, 


93. 181(1, 265, 290, SSSfT., 368 f., ^H 


292 1> if., 383 a, 418 a (bloodlMs), 


388 ^^^M 


507 a (haman), 627 b, 664 b, 727 a, 


Sources— Argive 204 a ^^^^H 


761 b, 82S b : 86 


Asianic 370 a, 379 b, 479 b, 491b. ^^^H 


Saka89a 


492 a, 494 a ; 279, 360 ^^^H 


Salamia. «lfocta of battle 612 b. 616 a, 


Attic 281 a, 364 b, 430 b, 504 b, 573 b, ^^^H 


672 a ; 244 (relation to Plataia). 288 ; 


583 a, 697 b, 606 a. 656 b, 678 b, ^^^H 


99 (Songs of) 


687a,694a, 696 b, 708 a (6i4). 710 b, ^H 


Samians SO.'*) a 


711a. 722 b. 724 a, 726 a, 741a, ^^^H 


Satrap 39 b, 177 a, 288 a, .'..'>»>, 683 b, 


772 a, 803 a, 822 b ; 268, 279, 302 ^^^M 


776 b, 778 a b. 779 b, 811 ab. 819 a, 


v<i(<<>r>«uLxviii, 40 b, 45b, 154a, 167b, ^^^H 


822 a ; 84 (MardoniiM) 


159 a, 163 b, 167 b, 168 b, 361b, ^^^H 


Satmi>y 1 a (Lyrlian), 48 a (Tlinke), 86 b 
(Babylon), 88 a (Baktria), 90a (Aria), 


286 a, 299 b, 301b. 321a, 333 b, ^^^H 


414 b, 431a, 511a, 556 a, 570 b, ^^^H 


90 b (Daakyleion), 91a (Zarangia), 


633 b, 637 a, 743 b, 764 b. 768 a, ^^^H 


92 b (Arabia), 103 ai (Moachian) 


771 b, 814 b ; 131 f., 133, 263, 264, ^^^H 


Scandal 489 b, 504 b, 537 a, 762 b, 768 b, 


^^^H 


772 a 


Delphian 265 a, 401a, 408 b, 41S*, ^^^H 


Soholostioisni 50 (Aristotlen) 


413 b, 666a, 732a ; 861 ^^^H 


S«a.i)ower 673 b, 607 b, 830 b ; 212, 241, 


Epi^mpbic 492 b ; 6 f., 359 ^^^H 


326, 336 


HaUkarnoaiian 811 b ^^^^H 


Skskua 63 


Literary Uxiii fT., 30a, 107 b, 118 b, ^^^^B 


Seraglio, the 519 b 


127 b, 161a, 167b, 306a, 307 a, ^^^H 


SerpeDt-|iillar, the 764 m. C|>. Religion 


235 a, 241a. 247 b, 248 a, 265 b, ^^^M 


Sex in Religion 141 h, 212 b, 568 a, 823 a 


279 b. 292 a b, 295 b, 317 b, 832 a, ^^^M 


auekbiao 


334 b. 336 a b. 337 b. 343 a, 430 b, ^^^H 


Shipi447bk(15a 


433 b, 454 a b, 495 a, 500 b, 508 b, ^^^H 


Shoe* 180 


509 b, 674 b, 629 b, 642 a b, 663 b, ^^^H 


Siege-oiierHtiona 742 1> 


750 b, 752 b, 765 b, 766 a. 794 b ; ^^^H 


Signalling 367 1>, 598 a, 728 a, 728 a, 
796 a 


^^^M 


Makcdonian 97 a ; 361 ^^^H 


Signii 188a, 418a, 549l>, 665a, 7S8a, 
/90 b, 799 a, 826 b 


Median 86 a ^^^H 


M«diMd299a. 3&lb ^^^H 


Sikvliotes 226 IT. 


Onl xUx, bcx, 306 a, 333 a, 279 », ^^^H 


SiUno«41a 


296 a, 326 a. 454 a, 504 b, 667 b, ^^^H 


SlMOMIDKii 337 b, 359 a, 429 a, 429 b ; 12 


623 b, 747 l>, 768 b. 769 b. 771b. ^^^H 


Sins 451 a 


360 ^^^H 


8,wmlK)k 33 b 


Persian Ixxv notis 1 (T., 360 ^^^^^| 


Siandor 19a 


Samian 492a ^^^H 


Snakcoult 346b, 418 ah. C|>. Religion 


Spartan 3 b, 180 a, 881 b, 770 b ; 373, ^^^M 


Sophistry 19 a 


^^m 


Sopboklea 623 a, 646 b ; 91 


Theaialian 168ab ^^^H 


SonrDaa IxviilT., 34 a. 41a, 47 b, 77 b, 


Weatanilxii.lxiiiDot«.lxix note. 233a ^^^^H 


81b, 82b, 86«, 87 a, 90a, 97 a, 


Sparta, population of 344 a If. ; Polioy. ^^^^H 


100a. 106b, 107b, Win, 114b, 


^^^H 


121 h, 127 b, 147 a, 166 a, 167 a, 


Spear, the 60 a ; 178 ^^^^H 


160 a, 166 b, 176 h, 177 a, 189 b, 


Speechea bcxvii, 67 a, 447 a, 448 b II., ^^^H 


»4a, 22r>a, 228 a, -JUbl, 237 a, 


462 a, 461b, 486 a, 487 b, 488 b, 616 a, ^^^H 


368 a, 274a, 284 b, 290a, 290b, 


516 b, 535 b, 528 a, 529 b, 534 b, 680 b, ^^^H 


891b, 300 b, 311 b. 323 a, 329 a. 


644 b, 646a, 648a. 649 a, 688 b, 684 a. ^^^H 


881b. 332 a, 332 b, 334 b, 886 a, 


688 a. 690 hff., 692 a. 695a. 778 a, ^^^H 


357 b, 362 b, 392 b, 418 a, 438 b, 


782 a, 782 b ; 125, 228 ^^^H 


429 a. 433 b, 438 b, 440 b, 468 a, 


SpiM, miuion of 198 a ^^^^M 


461b, 4S3a, 486 b, 490 a, 491a, 


Spoilii, note ^^^^^H 


493 a, 495 a, 612 a, 532 b, 645 a, 


SUiHs 484 a, 485 a, 684 b : 36S ^^^H 


547 a, 65Sa, 665 b. 557 a. 661 a, 


SUtues 549 a ; 7 note ^^^H 



466 



HERODOTUS 



8tigm» 342 b 

Stories 228b (KMlmM),246« (Mikytbos). 
S20b (Kerkopw), 520 b IT. (Hermo- 
timos), 674 a IT. (Makedonian mon- 
archy) 

.Storms 284 b, 290 a, 316 b, 360 b, 374 b, 
378 b, 377 b ; 2«6, 273, 276, 277. 278 

STRAIMt 03 

StraUgcuis 394 a, 681 a ; U2, 38fl 

.SIrategia, at Athens 200 ff. 

Strategy, Persian Ixxxiii, 366 b, 378 b, 
462 b, 466 a, M4 b, M6b, 638 a, 559 b, 
560 a, 573 b, 613 a b, 614 b, 615 b, 
628 a, 628 b, 629 a, 658 a, 672 a b, 
876 a, 680 a ff., 7fll b, 802 b; 100, 
185 ff., 256, 257. 262, 287, 305 ff. 

Succession, in Persia 2 b, 4 b, 123 : in 
.S|NU-ta 3 a, 4 b, 306 b f. 

Sun, the r>S7 h, 785 a b 

Supernatural, the Ixxxri f., 506 a, 688 a, 
799 a ; 353 

Susa 513 a {not a ' PeruiUi ' city) 

Sweetmeat!) 46 a 

Sword 37 (of Maidonios), 103, 178 f. 

Symbolism 577 a b 

Synchronisma 197 a, 220 b, 227 a, 2S2a, 
233a, 236a, 250a, 254 1>, 264a, 282b, 
305 b, 313 a, 325 a. 357 a, 371 a, 377 b, 
378 a b, 391 a b, 436 b, 466 b, 537 b, 
612 tt, 780 b, 799 b. 800 b. 801 b, 802 b, 
808 a; 53, 186, 245. 263, 265, 272, 
329, 347, 404 ff. 

Synedrion of Strategoi 265 b ; 248 

Syuoikiamus 751 a 

Syria 87 b 



Tablets 571b 

Taboo 293 b, 294 a, 569 b 

Tacitus, lost Books of xvi 

Tactics 372 b, 448 a, 464 b, 474 a, 478 al>, 
484 a, 488 b, 490 a b, 499 a, 501b, 
507b, 510a, 534a, 630a, 634a, 634 b, 
665 a, 672 a, 692 a ff., 699 a b, 702 a b, 
704 a b, 711a, 714a, /l.'iab. 722«, 
724 b, 727 ab, 728 b, 730 b, 749 a, 
799 a; 297 ff. (Sulioiiin), 30411°., 344 
(PlaUia), 374 ff., 531 

TagoM 596 u 

Talthybios, wrath of sxiii. Cp. Wrath 

Tanagro, battle of Ilii, Uv, 671 li 

Telegraphs 269 b, 284 b 

Tempo 163 b, 164 a U, 165 a, 167 b 

Teruples 411 a (Athoiw Pi-onaia), 437 b 
(on Akropolts), 441b, 505 a (Athene 
Skiras), 570 b, 571a tPtoan), 706 b 
(Heraiou), 717 ah (Dmuetcr), 728a 
(Heraion), 729 b (Demeter), 743 b 
(Athene Alea), 745 b (Athene, at 
PlaUia), 791a (Heraiou), 793 b 
(Denicter) ; 6 not« (various), 12 
(Apluiia), 100 (ruined) 



Teniane v, 486 a (at Salsmis) 
Teratology 411a. Cp. MlFBclm, Po 

SicHH 

Tbalattocnicy 536 b. Cp. Sea-power 

Thebanii 341 a (at Thermopylai) ; 92 (it 
Tempe), 249, 357 (at Plataia) 

Themi-itokles 192 b (d^bat), 252 b. 2S«li 
(in Theasaly), 363b, 381b, 385b, 
416a, 434 b, 438a, 444 a, 446a, 452a, 
474 a, 474 b, 484 b. 502 b, 509 b. 585 k, 
527 b, 528 b, 531 a. 532 b, 533 a, 583 b, 
535 b, .'iSeb, 537 a, 548 a, 549 a, 550 b, 
552 b, 559 b, 683 b, 585 a. 588 a, 589 k, 
670a (in Argos), 671a, 687b, 766b. 
824 b; 9, 14, 17, 82, 36, 37, 42, 44, 
48, 50, 52, 59 note, 60, 70, 72, 80, 
85 (Plutarch), 89, 104 tT., 112, 117, 
119, 208 ff. (character and inlioj), 
220, 221, 232, 233, 2;36, 239, 24«. 
259, 267, 269, 289, 309, 325, 
331 (disapp«atanee), 341, iSS. 
Lesend 

Theology 18 a, 28 a, 146 a, 17.3 1>, 18«~ 
190 a, 21 1 b, 223 a, 283 b, 286 b, ;<76 b, 
441b (Po.sei(1on), 442a, 453 b, 457l 
(Demolor), 529 a, 548 a, S88a, 599 b 
(Uomeric), 604 a, 822 a b, 756 ^J 
783 a, 800 a, 825 b 

TuKOPuttroH 26, 95 

Therme, pause at 139 

Thermopylai 259 b (describetl), 301 a >\ 
320 b, .S30a, 333 a; 56 (Gauls at), 
98 (routes), 112 (Antiochos at^ 215 
(strategic iiu«), 255 

Thersander of Orohomenos Ixxrii, ii6T| 
360 

Theseus 751 a 

Thespiai 475 b (its history) 

Thespians 328 b (at Thermopylai), 89t1 
334 a 

Thessalians 249 u, 262 b (uiiknowB to 
Homer), 342b (Hegemouy), S97a(«^l 
400 b, 418 b. Cp. Policy 

Throne 500 b (of Xerxes at Salami*) 

Thuoydidbs XV (t4 Mij«ur4), xvii 
('Books'), xl (incomplete), xliii {sym- 
metry), Ixxvi (not scientific), Im 
(spocches), 34 b (Athos). 162 a (Utk^ 
don), 180a (2. 67), 230 b (Zaskle), 
231 a (id.), 243a (n theorist). 424b 
(Pelasgiana). 464 b (TheokyJee), 53<i 
(Themistoklcs), 561b {id.), 576a, 
579a (Makedon), 592 b (HaUeniBU), 
640 b (at PlaUia 1), 707 i»b, 709 » 
(PiUnate Jjoehos), 733 a (third He*- 
scnian n-ar), 746 b, 751 » (Theseus), 
762 b (i&Tatiionii of Attica), 7Ma 
(Drabeskos), 771b, 820 b (siege of 
SestoH), 821a, 830 a (Physics ud 
Politics) ; 17 (a Perlkleaii), 19 (ao- 
quaintcd with Hdt.'s -work), M, Wi, 
lOS, 110, 259, 340. 407 



INDEX IV 



4B7 



TliariaD Redaction Ixiii. Cp, Secoad 

Draft 
Thurii 632 » 

TlMOKKBON 13 

Tithes 173 a, 396 a, 763 b, 7654 

Tombs 770a (at PlaUia) ; 6 note 

To|)ographen 93 

Torch-race 612 b 

Tra^le 64 b (timber), 160 b (honu), 109 b 

(rom), 218 a (sUiTes) 
Tradition 193 (not artlem) 
Trmsadies 282 a (doniestie) 
Traitors 316 a 

Travel Ixi (notes of). C|>. HutOiMTVS 
Treasuries 409 b 
Tnsatiet 643 b, 772 h 
Trierarchy 269a, 380b. 504a; 213 
Tri partition of Persian army 187. Cp. 

Organization 
Triremes 432 b 
Troous 77 ff. 
Trojan war 30 a, 241 a, 248 a, 262 b, 

647 b 
Tronaers 84 a, 147 a ; 180 
Truth, the 777 b; 193, 338 
Tyrannis, the 229 a. 2.'i2b, 492 a, 576 a, 

586 b, 781 a, 812a. 822a ; 253 



Uniformity of Nature 688 a 
Unity of Books 7, 8, 9, 

857 a b, 594 b, 595 a 
UnityorHellaR693a, 606 b 
Univeraaliam 62, 78inote, 82 



XV ff., la. 



VaM« 22 b, 279 b ; 7 note 

Valkyries 266 b, 280 a 

Fia BgwUia 575 b. See Bgnatian 

Way 
Viceroy, appointment of 2 b, 74 a 
Victory, Greek xc, 69 a, 314 a, 379 b, 

493 a, 689 a, 730 a b, 831a; 259, 

356. S8« 
Virtory, Persian 622 b, 831 a 
Virtue rewttrdcd C61'b. Cp. AritUia 
Voting, method of 550 b 
Vows, of Dareios 1 74 a: against Medizers 

\Ti%, 173b, 625b; 40, 191, 220. 

233, 236: before Phitaia 72, 408: 

against rebuilding temples 32, 40 



Walls 187 a (Athens), 191 b (Akroiiolis), 
192a (wooden), 216 b (Syraouse), 
262a, 319.1 (Phokisn), :j30a (id.), 
333b {id.), 437 b (Athens), 467 1> 
(lathmoif), 558 a (Potvidaia), i)03a 
(Isthmoa), 605 b. 608b, 614 a (Athena). 
615a (Mogara), 6l6a (v^.), ril9a 
(Persian camp), 681 b (Thebes), 743 a 
(wooden), 826 a (ChorMoncse) ; 21 
(Athenian rebuilt), 341, 347 (Isthmos) 

Wariue 14 b, 264 a, 349 b, 404 b, 587 a, 
695 b 

Warn 214 « (of Hippokratcn), 221 «. 
393 a fT. (The»tuiIo - Phokian), .{97 b 
(first Saorvd), 3P8 b (second Sacred). 
408 b (third Saored), 408 a, .'>e2a 
(llMaeniau), 673 a (Poloponnesian). 
579b (Messenian), 593 a b (Pelufion- 
netrian), 671 b (third Mosscnian), 7S3a; 
57 (eniiinerated on Alarmor Pariwn) 

Watches (Vigiliat) 31»«, 702b, 70.'ib 

Water-supply 696 b, 697 a 

West, thu 451 b, 452 a, 566 b 

Wind, theory of 25 a, 240 a. 265 a, 266 1 
(cult), '^78 a, 282b. 286a. 286tt 

Winds 645 a, 820 b 

Wine 156 a 

WitticianiH '225 b, 566 a. Op. Bitiu tnUt 

Women 601a, 6-SOa. 755 a If., 765 b, 
787 a, 810 b, 821a 

Wounded, tri-atment of 268 b 

Wrath 174 b (of Talthybios), 175 a, 
241b (of Minos), 296 n (of Zetta 
Laphystios), 352a (of Xerxes), 789a 
(of Evenioa) ; 191 (of Talthybios) 

Xknophom 21 

Xerxes Ixxix, Ixxxv, xci (character), 
3 b (tUte of birth). 20 a. 23 a. a6b, 
67b, 74ab, 163a (at Tcmpe), 179a, 
199 a, 264 b, 'J76 b, 291 b, 313 b, 379 a, 
408 b (At Delphi t), 441 a (at Athens), 
460 b, 464 a, 499 a b H. Ut .Sulamis), 
513 b, 514 b, 519 a, 529 a. 542 1>, 546 a, 
6-22 a (in tears). 695 a, 760 a, 766 a, 
780 a, 792 b, 812 aff., 822 h; 49, 51, 
68, 88. 90, 124, 237, 274, 322 f. 

Zeoobia 116 



INDEX V 



AUCTORUM 



AUil 578 b (on the ' Rosv-Gitnlen ') 

Adam, R. 481 It (ArtrmUion) 

Agar, T. L. 178* (Joii/r*) 

Arnold, T. 643 b (on Thniko), 708 b 

(Siwrtaii amiy) 
Audrey, H. 397 (PlaUiit] 

Ba«lir6a, 7b, 8s 

Butcr - Saiippo 32. 13 (Oorgios), 42 

(Dcmades, Dcinarclio.M) 
Bauer xlv (ou the order of Hdt.'s 

Logoi), \x : 51 (Plutarch's Thtmi- 

ttokUs), 5'i, C3 (omis,iioDN in his 

Plutarch's Tlttmintolltit) 
Bauineiitter 91) (Dareios vase), cp, 22 b ; 

7 (DsreioK vuso), 419 a (snake-cult) 
BehistuD Insorip. 13 a, 20 a, 75 b, 02 a, 

96 b, 109 b 
Boloeh 203 a ([io|>ulatioii of Argos), 

344 b (]K>ptilation of lakonia), 462 u 

(on Atlions in the West), 541 b 

(Agosilaos' maR'li by Xerxea' route) ; 

359 (aniiy-list) 
Berger 565 b (Pillars of Horaklos) 
Bergk 210 b, 216 b, 338 a, 421 b, 450 a, 

461a, 647 n (Theseis) ; 5 (Choiriks 

of .Samoa: Ion of Chias), 11, 12 

(Pindar), 12 (Sinionides), 13 (Timo- 

kn-on), 29 (Timotlioog) 
Bethe 569 b (Amphiaraos) 
Bevan 91 a (Zamugia), 92 b (Parikauioi) 
Binder, J. J, 194 u (on mines of 

Lauroion) 
Blakeaky xlv (on priority of Books 

7-9) ; Coiunicntary, ;mi»«i'w ; 299 (on 

SalamiB), 342 (date of Plataia) 
Blass, F. 26 (Theopoinpo8),27 (Ephoroe), 

33, 43 (Gor>pai«), 42 (Isaion, Audo- 

kides), 45 (Hyjiereidcs) 
Bliimner, H. 93 n (gem-cutting) 
Boeckh 173 a (.docarcivaO 
Boehmer, E. 76 (Pindar) 
Bonitz 54 (error ui his Aristot. Index) 



458 



Bownqnet, B. 194 a 

Bosanqnet, K. C'. 85 (Artemis) 

Brinkley 178 b (Kow-tow) 

Broendsted 654 b (XUt>Jet) _ 

BuohhoU 262 b (Thcsaaly in Homtr). 
283 b (Nereida), 181 (boots) 

Buokle 830 b (Physics and Politio) 

Bunbury 565 b (Pillars of Herakles) 

Bilrgel 316 b (Amphiktyonic League 
400 b (Aiiiphiktyony) 

Bnrsian 279a (the 'Ovens'), ilt. (Mtii 
boia), 291 b (Alos). 293 a, 297 b (Aut. 
kyra), 298 a (Ainianes). ih. (Dyr»s). 
298b (Oita), ti).(Melas).299b (Asopail 
ib. (Phoinix), 401 a (Tithorgi, 403. 
(Erochos), 403 a (Pedieis), 414 • 
(Autonoos), 617 b (Spbendale) 

Bury 7 b, U4 a, 254 a (Xena u 
Thessaly), 262 b, 291 a (Aeludtt), 
388 b (Bakis), 393 a (ThesMLty c 
Phokis : Phokjan supremacy), 403i 
(Amphissa), 432 a (Achai«OB)b 4S» 
(Aristeides a slraUrios at ^llm**) 

591 a (ou the naniej) Hollaa, HaUaaMl 

592 a (the P}-thian gam^a foonM 
by Kleisthenes : the Olyiiipian br 
Pheidun) ; U (on Piodar), 64 (Flataiia 
Ehvihrria) 

Bnsolt, G. Ixii (on the hutMT t( 
Thurioi), 107 a, 114 a, 207 a (I^o- 
iiloutoa), 309 b, 337 h (Am|ilii- 
ktyony), 346 b, 374 a (Leninos), 391b 
(Oli-mpiad), 398 b (sacred war). 4»b 
(Dorians), 451 b (Thnrioi), 153* 
(Atlieiu in the West), 675 a (aoeoMa 
of Perdikkas), 591 a (on th« 'Ottdc' 
name), 598 b (date of the wooad 
occn|iation of Athens), 602 b(HyakiD' 
thia), 609 a (rclipse of Oct. 2, 480), 
670 b (Tegean War), 671a (b. rf 
Diiaia), 671 b (on Text), 671 b (b. of 
Tanagra). 754 a b (b. of Datoa), 801 K 
(dates of Plataia and Mykale). 807 » 



INDEX V 



4S9 



(KaryatUn wurj ; 17 (<l»t« of Kinion's 
{vcMoeution), 27, 28 (Ei)horoH), 66 
(on Diodoros), 67 (Tni'miatokles 
ATxhm), 219 (Ath. itiitiutivo), 223 
(Synedriaii),321 (the Mole atSaUmis), 
347 (decades), 347 (date of Plataik) 
Bywivter 667 !• (x/njir^cxn^inj) 

(JuDter 103 (An«teid<D<) 

Ckrapunos 787 b (Dodona) 

CarUult 432 b (trirnnirx) 

Caton, R. 368 b (Aaklepios) 

Caner, P. 300 a h {Am|ihiktyonj), 816 b 
(Pylogoroi), 428 a (tit. Aeginut.) 

Christ 11, 12 (Pindar) 

Cicero 7a, 188 b, 223 b, 264 b, 336 b, 
377 a (snpplicatio), 529 b (Poniati 
religion), 678 a (myth of Silcnos), 
621 a, 783 b (omuns) 

Clinton 306 a, 344 a (Lakoniun cities), 
437 a (Kalliades.). 679 b {oti Makc- 
donian chronology), 806 b (Paukra- 
tion) ; 9 (the Periai), 10 {Phorni$sai), 
108(Lucian), 211 (Aristcidcs Ostrak.) 

Cobet, ApiNiratiis jnutim 

CoUignou 6 (Aiginetan tenipb') 

Cook, A. B. 133 li (unconfl«iou8 itfnition) 

C. I. A. 164a, 155b, 157a, 437 b (ro;iio<), 
632 b, 754 a, 780 b ; 553 (Bolbina) 

C. I. O. 471b (Paroreia), 710a, 7l9b, 
741b 

Cousinery 147 (canal of Xerxea} 

Curtiua, E. 300 a (Roads in Greece), 419 b 
(Pogon), 467 a (Skironis), 467 b (Isth- 
mian wall), 590 b (Unity of Hellas), 
671a (Dir«ia), 738 b (Stenykleroa) ; 7 
(mon. bull) 

Cnrtiuii, O. 425 a (Kranaos), 762 a 
(etym.) 

Cnrzon 829 a (Porsis) 

Dakyni, H. G. 22 (on Xcsoi)hon) 
Darmeatetar 29a (on Magi), 622 b 

(AvesU) 
De Gobinoau 2, 4 (early P. history), 

168 (army-list) 
Delbrtick, H. 168 (army-list), 343 

(Mardonioa), 351 (Phyle-SkoloM) 
D'Herbelot 3, 4 (Bihl. Orient,) 
Diilii 142 (LattrtuU AUaamdrmi) 
Dieulafoy 94 l< (Aithiopiuu) 
Dindorf, U 66 (Diodoros), 101, 102 

(Dio ChryHostom) 
Dionys. Halicar. 9)> (ou 1J<Ii.'h style) 
Ditt«nlH:rger 124 b, 207 a. 486 b (serpent 

colttian), 632 b, 652 b ("Troizen") 
Doerpfcld, W. 64 b (on Troy) 
I Dunckcr 49 a (floj^ng the sea), 66 b 

(start from Sardut). 66 a (P. religion), 

97 a ( Kap|iadokiau9), 124 b (Hiram), 

144 b (P. religion), 207 a (Peace of 



Kallias), 829 a (PewU) ; 17 (Pwikles), 
168 (army-list), 347 (date of Plataia) 

Ephenuris Archaiol. 646 b (Myken. 

tombs at Eleueis) 
ETans, A. J. 108 a (camel), 281b 

(Zankle), 347 h (Snakc-Ooddcss), 418b 

(snake -cult) 

farnell, L. R. 141b, 213 b (sex in 
religion), 190 b (Tp*T«>vf»t>f), 292 b 
(litunan sacrifice), 442 b (Athene- 
Poseidon), 604 a (Zeus Holleoios) 

Flaubert 237 b (human i>aoriticc) 

Forbes, W. H. 325 (Thucydi<le») 

Forbiger 31 b (on Lydians), 38 b (Helles- 
pont), 153 a (Assa), 245 a, 664 b (oiticti 
of Chios), 754 a (Drabeakos) 

Foucart 456 b (lakchoa) 

France, Anatole 320 1> {la devx frtrts 
Cercopen) 

Frazer, J. G. 292 b (sacritice), 403 » 
(Eroolios), 403 a (Amphikaia), 403 a 
(Charadra). 407 a (Delphi), 411 a 
(Delphi), 411b (Athene Pronoia), 
414 a (KasUlia), 419 b (Pogon), 438 b 
(Areiopagos), 550 b (temple of 
Poseidon), 671 a (tt-mplc of Ptoan 
Apollo), 690 a (Xoanon of Athene), 
736a (on tb« Anaktoron), 764 a 
(serpent - column), 764 b (Olymp.), 
786 B (tent of Xerxes), 770 a (graven 
of Plataia), 806 b (Hcrmolykos) ; 96, 
97, 98 (uu PaiuianiOH) 

Freeman, E. A. Isxv (ou the embassy to 
Gelon), 212 b, 213 a b, 214 a b, 216 a, 
216 a b, 217 a (on a metaphor), 217 b 
(site of EuImLs), 219 b (Gelon's con- 
stitutional position), 221 a, 231 b 
(Messana), 232 a (Theron), 232 b 
(Akragas), 233 a (Himera), 234 a 
(EliHykiaus), 236 a (wrongly ignored), 
238 b, 244 a, 246 a b(&likytlios), 247 a ; 
57 (Lykiskos), 60 (Cicero Historioas), 
70, 71, 77 (Diodoros); 91, 226. 228 
(Qelon) 

Furtwaengler 437 b (Erochtheion), 633 b 
(death of Maicistioj.) ; 6 (t. of Aphaia) 

Gardner, E. A. 437 b (Erechtheion), 439 b 
(Pro^jylaia), 440 b (Aglaureion), 479 a 
(Attic harbours), 614 a (Athens n 
walled town), 647 b (Amazon liattle), 
766 b (tent of Xerxes) ; 6 (t. of Nike) 
Qeltiier 41 b (age of Gyges), 126 a 
George, H. B. 67 b (Na[ioleon in Rnssia) 
Gilbert. O. 202a (Boule at Argo»), 437 !• 
{TOMtcu), 617 « (Boiotarcli). 756 a (Si-, 
const.), 709 a (Sp. army), 770 b {Ipirti^ 
Oilmore 26 (Ktesias) 
Giaeke 97 b (PhryK<>-Makedoniajui) 
Ooettling 677b ('Tlirei' Heads') 



HERODOTUS 



OomtMMi! 91 (epigntn of Sophokle*) 

Goodwin 181 h (Artemiidon), 4M b 
(theory of Salkinis), 334 • (iwdStaa) ; 
299 (on SaUniis) 

Omisberger (plaou-names) 139 a, 163 b, 
156 b, 421 b, 42« b 

Orenfoll, B. P. c {Papyri) 

Qrentwoll, E. 347 (date of PlaUia) 

Orifflth, F. LI. 38 a (Eg. ropea) ; '2 
(demotic jiapyri) 

Orot« 27 a (on effects of religious 
imagination), 47 b (cLirr^), 49 a b 
(defence of Ildt. ), 51 b (ou H. bridges), 
53 ah, 163a (error), 216a (an error of 
Ariatotlo'K), 307 a, 339 n, 4t!4 b (on 
SalantlN), 479 a (on Koos, Kyuosiira), 
600a (oD Lykidaa-Kyr.HiloB), 640 a 
(Gargaphia), 654 b (Olymp. liHt), 
693 b (Persian challenge), 746 a, 
778 a {.irUteitt of Plataia), 772 b 
(tretity of PUUia) ; 298 (.Salamis) 

GTuadnTanii 111 (Arrian) 

Gnuidy, G. B. 259 a (Aftopos-gorge), 
259 b (TherraopTlai), 260 a (Middle- 
Gate), 260 b (Alpenoi), 290 b (Thes- 
saly), 300 b (Anthela), 322a (0*k- 
leaveit),32Da(Anupaia),330a(Pbokian 
wall). 333 b (tbp Kolonos), 477 b 
(anachroniKni in Hdt.'s account of 
Halamis), 614 b (Kithairon-Parnoe as a 
Peraian frontier), 61 fi a (jwiascst between 
Attiua aud Bniotia), 619 b, 628 b (nitea 
of Erythrai and HyHiai), 639 a 
(Hyaiai), 636 b ( ' The High Bastions '), 
639a, .710b (Moloeis), 640a (Gar- 
gaphia), 640 b (Dciuctrion) ; 657 a, 
S58a, 697 b (Anopos). 700 a (the 
' Island ' ) ; 7 1 7 a b, 734 a ( Demetrion ) ; 
717 a (Argiopion) ; 184 (Kithairon- 
Pames frontier), 270 (Thermopylai), 
301, 304 (ou Salamis) 

GntHchmid, A. von Jtvi (diviaiou of 
Udt.'s work], 306a (credited with a 
(correction of Clinton'ft), 433 a (navy- 
list for Salaniis) 

Hagen, 0. E. ' Keilaehriflurkimden ' 20 b 
Hall, H. R. 116 b (head-dress), 117 a 

(Lykians), 653 a (Mykeoai) 

Hamilton 40 a (AsitiD topography), 46a 

Hativette 163 a (Hdt at Tejiipe) ; 

216 b, 337 b, 338 a, 429 b, 741b 

(Simonides) : 7 (the Spartan Stoa), 12 

(on Sinionides), 73 (Diotloros), 125 

{souvenirs d'EschyU), 141 (»c<'ptics), 

146 (bridgi's), 147 (canal), 158 (army- 

iiat) 

Head, B. 43a (on theDaric), 138ab, 146a, 

148 b, 1571), 231 a (Zankic-Messene), 

402 a (Amphitisa), 409 a (Delphi), 

417 b (TroiMn), 426 b (Ainbrakia), 

451b (Sins), 643 b (Mosses), 571a 



(Akniphia), 617 b (Tasogn), SaDk 

652 a ( ' Erchomenos ' : ' Sekroo '\ 

652 b ('Trozan'), 776 a (Bo>otia> 

826 a (Aigospotamoi), 78fi a (ApoUooii] 
Heiligenataedt {d^^ enunt. jKntU. aial 

10 b, 367 a 
Helbig 591 a (on the ' Greek ' name) 
Henderson, B. W. 37 a (Isthmian CantJl. 

235 a (Oonstitution of Cartilage) 
Hermann 189 a (sappljcaijon), 8W» 

(Olymp. victors) 
Horwerdeu, H. van, Apparatus poMHi 
liicks ('Manaal') 126 h, S88a, IUl 

430 a (t<1{i( 0.), 486 b (serpent colOBifi), 

654 », 655 a, 754 a, 758 b, 764 1 

(sorpeut c. ) ; 7 
HUl, G. B. (■ Sources') 136a. 1&3«. 

154a, 361 b, 460a, 671 1> (fria), 758^ 

780 b 
Hirechfeld 143 b (Phyllis), 153 b 

(Ampclos), 298 a (Ainianes), 6Mk 

(Aniythaunia) 
Hitzig- Bliininor 419b (Pogon). 671 1 

(text of Paussn. 'Ivdfiot) 
Hogarth, D. G. 40 a b (AslAii lop 

543 a (Siris), 544 a (Thrake) 
Holder, A. Apparatus paaaim 
Holm, A. 55 (on nelUnigmug), 61 

the Greeks of the decadence) 
Homolle, H. 411 a (Athene Pronaia) 
Hunt, W. 1. 717 a (Arg:iopion) 

InstTiptions, see Behiatun, C_/. 
C I. G., Gauer, Ditteaberg^r, 
Hieks, Hill, Jacoby, Jfarmor, Mic 
Jiiiuirda, Kolierts, Tiluli 

Jatxibitx 108 (Lucian) 

Jocohy, F. 794 a (Hann. Par.' 

(Martn. Par.) 
Jebb, .Sir R. C. 29 (Isokrates) 
Jont's, .Sir W, 1 (on the P« 

An-hivfs), 2 (early P. history) 

Kallenberg, Apparatus pastim 
Keane, A. H. 94 b, 95 a (Aithio 

2S8 a (Libyans), 233 b (Iberians} 
Kenyon, F. G. 14 (Bakchylidcs) 
Kiepert 44 b (Asian topography), IS 

(Phoenicia), 163a (heightofOlymf 

167 b (Thessaly), 233 b (lij " 

134 (Asia Minor) 
Kopecky 432 b (triremes) 
Kra7. 50 b (on bridges) 
Krotschmer 32 b, 97 b, 99 1 

Teukrians), 97 a (Kap]iiu]okianf), 

125b (Kandanles), 143 b (Paioniass). 

751a, 825b(-nt- -vd-) 
Kriiger 352b (unanthenticity of <■ 

239), 767 b (9. 83-4), 796 b (9. 98. 17- 

21) 
Krumbaeher 116 (Byxantine lit.) 



INDEX V 



461 



Krumbholz 102 a (Satnp omitted), 177 l> 
(MtFspy of Hfdsrne^)}, 563 1> (satraps 
of DoDkylcioii), 769 b (Maitlonios), 
777 « (Daskjlfion) 

Kuohnor 62S a (plural), 625 b (vat nt), 
035 s (Brachylngy), 708 b (dative) 

L«inl, A. G. 3A9 a (tlpifrcu), 656 b 
(Plataian army-list) 

Leakf, W. M. 37a(Xen[eii' caii«I), 119 a 
(Neaiotea), 124 b (Gor(;oR), 153 a b, 
154 ab, 155 b, 159 b, 161 b, 104 b, 
167 a, 286 b (Pagaaai), 321 a (' Trachi- 
nian ' iiiountains), 329 a (Anopaia), 
376 a (the Hollows), 403 a (Pedieis, 
Rrochos), 403 b (Elatoia, Hyaniiiolis, 
ParaiMtamioi), 404 a (Abai), 464 b 
(tacti(!8 at Salamis), 480 b (Arteiui- 
Hion), 482 a, 484 a, 486 a, 488 b, 499 b 
(theory of Salaniis) ; 505 b (the 
Skiradion), 508 b (Koiias), 665 a, 
578 b (aacont of Mt Bermius), 614 a 
(difficulty of destraction), 617 a 
(SphoDdaie), 617 b (Tanagra), 619 b 
(Erytlirai : Hysiai), 639 b (Gar- 
gaphia), 677 b (Dryos Kephalai), 700 a 
(thu ' Island ') ; 147 (canal). 298 
(theory of Saiauiis) 

Lehiiiaiin, C. K. 812 b (revolt of Babylon) ; 
5 (Dionysios of Milotos) 

Leaormant, F. 452 a (Siris) 

Lloyd, W. 76 (Pindar) 

Lolling 258 b (Artemiisian), 287 h 
(Aphetai), 291 b (Alos), 500 b (Tbrouo 
of Aorxes) 

Lupus 216 b, 217 a (Qclon's additions to 
Syracuse) 

Lyall, Sir A. 823a (Polytheism) 

Macan, T. S, 4 (Shah Nimeh) 

MacauUy 15 a, 61a, 70 b, 107 b, 141 b, 
618 a, 716 a. 798 b 

llacdonald, G. 543 b (coins of Mo8«vs), 
181 (ancient boots) 

Madvig 6 a, 386 b (&rre), 530 a (Ok. 
Syntax) 

MaliulTy, J. P. 653 a (on deatniotion of 
Mykenai) 

Maine, Sir H. S. 189 b (sitting dhaina) 

Man»o 308 b (Karneia) 

Marmiyr P<»rium 215 b, 338 a, 794 a, 
809 a 

Masperu 4 b, 88 b (on Pentian religion) 

MelUer, O. 234 a (f^rdiniana), 234 b 
(Mmo), 235 a (constitution of 
CBrUiage), 238 b (Semitic religion) 

Meyer, Ed. Iziii (Hdt.'s visit to Exypl), 
85 b (Ariau»), 97 s (Kapiwdcikians), 
114 a, 114 b (Kyproe), 223a (Aga- 
meaiDon), 234 a (Sardinia), 305 b (on 
Spartan traditiooa), 562 a (Ring 
PaoBauiaa' historical researches), 591 a 



(on the Greek name), 652 b (Hdt. 4. 

148), 653 h (destruction of Tiryns). 

812 b (revolt of Babylon), 831 I. 

(Pcrsis) 
Meiwer 604 a (dat« of Pindar s New. 5) 
Michel 486 b (serpent-column), 632 a 
Milchhoeffcr 317 b (Korydftlloa), 50a b 

(Anagyrous), 750 a (Dekeleia), 751 b 

(AphidnAi), 7ri2a (Titakos) 
MoniiuaCD, A. S91 li (Olympiad), 457 a 

(Kleusinia) ; 64 (Eluutfieria) 
Monro, D. B. 6 a, 11a, 50a {ipa), 166 a, 

225 b, 308 b, 309 a. 799 b 
Montesquieu 830 b (Physics and Politics) 
Morris-Jones 233 b (Iberians) 
Mlioke 147 b (hero-worsiilp) 
Mtilder, D. Izsv (on ChoiriloH of 

Samos) ; 5 
MuUcr, Fraff. H. O. ^ (Ktesiae), 26 

(Theojionijios), 26 (Ephoros), 81 

(AriHtu<lemo!t) 
Miilirr, F. Max 74 b (Ucuotheism) 
Miiller. K. 0. 203 b (Spartan Apella), 

307 a, 320 b (Story of the Kerkopes}, 

400 a (Pindos), 400 b (Doris), 433 u 

(navy-list at Salsmis), 455 a (on Hdt.j, 

472 a (Orni-ai), 502 b (Aiginetun 

admiral), 75wa (Lanipon) 
Miiller. W. Max 116 b (featl.cr huad- 

dreas) 
Munro, J. A. R. 481 b(Artemi8ioa) 

Newman, F. L. 235 a (uon»titution of 

Carthage) 
Niebuhr, B. 0. 5 (Choirilos of Samoe), 

77 (Trogufl) 
Nilsson, M. P. 418 b (Snake-Ood) 
NiMseu 233 b (Ligurians), 243 a (Sicuti), 

244Bb(Iftpygift) 
Noldeko9a(Bg. revolt) 

Oberhunimcr 138 a, 183 a, 293 a, 426 b 

(Amprakia) 
Oelenschlsger 103, 113 (Philostratoa) 
Orellt 60 {(/Hcnnattie&n) 
Overbeek 7 (SckTiftqutllm) 

Pap«-Benseler passim 
Paahloy 243 b (Etcokrctaus) 
Payue-Oallwey, Sir K. 176 (bows) 
Pelhani, H. F. 110 (Arrian) 
Perrot-Cliipiez 83 b (Pemian drens), 639 a 

(Persia) ; X, 168 (Apadana-fricxe) 
Peschel, O. 234 a (couvado) 
Petarseii 207 « (Kalliu<i). 380a (Kleiniax) 
Pomtovr. H, 410 b (Delphi) 

Radet 31b 99 a (on Lydiana), 41b 
(Gygos), 45 a (tapography), 63 b, 126 a 
(iiu matcrnum), 120 l> 

Runaay, Sir W. M. 40 a (Asian topogr.), 



46S 



HERODOTUS 



44 b, 4S4, 4«a {■wpinot); 12fi, 129 
(Au&n geogr.), ISO, 181 
BAwlinsott 3 b, 7 a, 829 a (Peraii), et 

Reclns 54:ifi (Seres), 829a(PersM) 
Records of the Past 20 a, 6£ a, 86 b, 89 a ; 

3, 186 (Ktrka) 
Reisko, Api>aratU8 ;Mun'wi 
Reiiuel 92a (Utii), 84b (Aitbiopians) 
RichardBon 2 (Pcrnian war li ligmeut), 

3,4 
Ridgaway, W. 432 a (Achaiana) 
Roberta, E. S., (ik. Jij/igr. 428 a, 433 a: 

26 ( Dionysias H. ) 

Rohdo 266 b (wind-cult), 888 b (Bakia), 

«40b(horo-cult) 
Rumpel {Leeikon Pindar.), 190 a b, 

412a, 755b 

Sebaefer, A. 287 a; 26 (Tbwpompos), 

27 (Ej.Iioros), 56 (Souroea), 61 
(Kleitarchos), 66 (Diodorm) 

Sohiller, H. 115 (Partbian war) 
Sabmid, W. 101 (Dio Chrysostom), 103 
Schmidt, J. H. H. 633 l> (ti'ttmi-, iroific) 
ScbradiT, O. 76 a (od aKinifiit) 
Schwartz, E. 66 (on Diodoros), 81 

(Aristudeiuost), 112 (Appiao) 
Schweigbacuser ;>aMtm, 115 (Athetmios) 
ShdA NdmtJi 100 h (Iosbo) ; 8 (Alex- 
ander), 115 (old P. tmditious) 
Sieglin, Sv. 47 a (on thu Hi'lloN])ont) 
Sittl, C. 17fla (Kow-tow), 756 a 

(supplication) 
Sitzlur, A]>i>aratua passim 
Stein, H., Apparatus and C^mmcotary 

p(uaim 
Stengel 266 b (wind-worship) 
Stracnan- Davidson, J. L. 234 b (Rome 

and (Jartbagc) 
Stuart Jones, H. 34 a (text of Tlmoy- 

dides], 279 h (cLe»t of Kypselos) 
Suidos xlix (on Hdt.), Ixix 
Stiaemihl 61 (KlBit&rclioti), 114 {Jaaou) 
Sykes 829 a (Persia) 

Telfy (Corp. lur. AU.), 191 b 
Thirlwall 27 a (inlUience of Magi) 
Thraeiiiitr (on Mysiaiis) 32 b, 68 a, 293 u 
Thucydidea xv (Median War), xli (rela- 
tion to Hdt.), cp. Index IV. 
" Tiints" 518 a (victory duR to virtues 

of Mikado) ; 20 (on Japan) 
Tiluli L\ici<u 117 a 
Toepffer 380a (Kleiniasj 
Toiiia«ohek88b(Baktria), 89a(Skyths), 

Mb (Arians), 143 a (Thrakians) 
Torr, C. 227 h (Ptintokonters), 496 b 
(Flagu): 144 (sbip's beam) 



Tour 151 b (Jews at SAlooiks), USK 
I59><, 160a, 163a, 164 a, 166«, 7»li 

(Samian Upraion) 
Tniutweiu, P. Ixxv (on the Dikaior- 

memoirs), 1 28 a, 454 a 
Trope*. <J. 231 b (ooina of Zankle) 
Tiimpel 266 b (wind-cult) 
Twain, Mark (Dr. Clemens) 512 a (Pea; 

EiproBs) 
Tyler, B. B. 234 a (convade) 

Ulrichs 401 a b (Tithora) 
Dnj^cr 391 b (Olympiad) 
Urlichs 41 b (on Atys), 42 a (Creuar*- «f 

KroisoH) 
Usener 26 (Diony«ios H. ) 

Veitcb 12 a 

Viacher 677 b (Dryoa Kephalai), 716 k 

(Moloeis) ^ 

Vogel, F. 66 (Diodoros) f 

Wacbamuth 440 b ( AgUnreion) ; 87, 21 

(Epboroa), 66 (on Diodoras), 77 

(IVogus), 82 (Ariatodemos). 83. •4 

(Nopoa), 88 (Plutarch) 
Washington, H. S. 706 b (site of tki 

Plalaian Heraion) 
Wecklein 666 b (PeoUthlon) ; I 

(Aischylos), 146 (Canal) 
Weir Sinvtb, Ionic 191b, 194 li, 304 k 

(LeoDiae^i), 559 l>, 561 a (Leatydtidn), 

665 b {\fiwi), 794 h (nouoa is -r^) 
Walls, J. Ixxv (Zopyroa-aourM) ; 

(chronology of Kleomeneia} 
Welzhofer 158 (anny-li.st) 
Wernicke 668 b (Aniytb«an) 
Wheeler, B. I. 490 b (critiqnr 

Goodwin'ii theory ofSalikmis) 
Wide, 8. 22:3a (cult of AguiMtnMOl 

602 b (Uyakinthia), 709 b (ArtansV 

747 a (Poseidon) 
Wiedemann 9 a (Eg. revolt) 
Wieland 150b(Abdem) 
Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, H. von xxxix 

(Hdt/s work unfinishol), 531 b 

(ThemiHtokles) ; 29 ( Ptrmi o( 

Timotheos) 
Wilkinson, G. 38k (Eg. ropes), ttb 

(itipi.), 93 b (gem cutting), 94 a (ehib^ 
Wilson, Sir C. 40 a, 44 b, 45 a, 63 a, 

289 b ; 180, 131 (Asian topognphyj 
Winckler 147 (hero-worship) 
Wissowa 84 (N«po«) 
Woodhooae, W. J. 640 b ( Androknt 

397 (Plataia) 
Wordsworth 164 a (Tempe) 
Wright, H. B. 761 b ; 397 (PlftUia) 



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