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Book ".._  .„ 


HISTORICAL  SKETCH 

of  (efy 

LOGIC, 

FROM  THE  EARLIEST  TIMES  TO  THE  PRESENT  DAY. 


BY 

ROBERT  ^LAKEY, 

PROFESSOR  OF  LOGIC  AND  METAPHYSICS^  QUEEN'S  COLLEGE,  BELFAST. 

AUTHOR  OF 

UTHE  HISTORY  OF  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  MIND," 


LONDON:    H.    BAILLIERE. 

EDINBURGH:  JAMES  NICHOL.     GLASGOAV:  GRIFFIN  &  CO. 
BELFAST :  W.  M'COMBE. 


y>*$» 


PREFACE. 


The  following  historical  sketch  of  logical  science 
has  been  written  under  a  conviction,  that  some 
such  work  was  needed,  both  by  the  general 
philosophical  reader  and  the  student  of  logic. 
The  theories  of  reasoning  are  so  numerous,  and 
so  diversified  in  their  principles  and  practical 
aim,  that  some  general  outline  of  their  external 
history  seems,  from  the  antiquity,  and  acknow- 
ledged importance  of  logical  speculations,  both 
called  for,  and  desirable  in  itself.  There  is  not, 
so  far  as  I  know,  any  work  of  this  kind  in  the 
English  language;  and  the  two  or  three  trea- 
tises I  have  met  with  of  a  foreign  origin,  pos- 
sessing a  historical  character,  have  been  so  brief 
and  limited  in  their  range,  that  I  have  not  been 
able  to  derive  much  assistance  or  benefit  from 
them. 


Vlll  PREFACE. 

It  has  been  my  constant  aim  to  keep  the  ge- 
neral principles  of  the  different  logical  systems 
I  have  noticed  distinctly  before  the  reader's  at- 
tention, and  to  make  the  historical  outline  as 
fruitful  as  possible  of  solid  and  useful  informa- 
tion ;  valuable  especially  to  those  who  may  be 
undergoing  a  course  of  logical  tuition.  How  far 
I  have  succeeded  in  effecting  this  object,  it  does 
not  rest  with  me  to  determine. 

It  has  often,  in  the  preparation  of  this  work, 
been  a  source  of  regret,  that  the  limited  space 
I  have  had  allotted  to  me,  prevented  me  from 
giving  such  an  extended  notice  of  particular 
and  interesting  logical  questions  as  I  thought 
desirable;  but  brevity  was  unavoidable  where 
the  number  of  systems  and  authors  so  far  out- 
stripped the  time  and  means  at  my  disposal. 
Indeed,  five  or  six  such  volumes  as  the  present 
would  have  been  scarcely  adequate  to  do  any 
thing  like  ample  justice  to  a  subject  of  such  great 
magnitude  and  diversity  of  materials.  My  short- 
comings, both  in  this  and  in  other  respects,  I 
am  conscious,  are  numerous  and  weighty;  but 
if  I  have,  in  the  humblest  degree,  succeeded  in 


PKEFACE.  IX 


barely  planting,  here  and  there,  a  few  useful 
finger-posts  to  such  logical  historians  as  may 
afterwards  follow  the  same  route,  I  shall  feel 
proud  of  the  achievement,  and  fully  satisfied 
with  the  reward  it  will  carry  with  it. 

It  was  my  original  intention  to  enter  more 
fully  than  I  have  done  into  the  history  of  what 
is  called  formal  logic  ;  but  I  soon  found  that  this 
would  extend  the  work  much  beyond  what  was 
convenient ;  and  not  only  so,  but  that  I  would 
infallibly  be  led  into  a  complete  labyrinth  of 
matters  of  detail,  which  are  comparatively  very 
uninteresting  in  themselves,  whilst  the  funda- 
mental questions  relative  to  the  nature  and 
offices  of  logic  itself  are  as  yet  undetermined, 
and  held  in  abeyance.  It  is,  therefore,  chiefly 
to  the  philosophical  aspect  of  the  science  that 
the  contents  of  this  volume  refer.  I  hope,  how- 
ever, to  be  able,  in  a  short  time,  to  give  some 
account  of  this  technical  and  formal  division  of 
logic,  so  far  as  it  is  connected  with  the  general 
science  of  reasoning  itself. 

Belfast,  January  1,  1851. 


CONTENTS. 


Page 

INTRODUCTION, xv 


CHAPTER  I. 

THE  PYTHAGOREANS,  ZENO,  ETC.,  500-400  B.  C,  .  .  .  .  1 

CHAPTER  II. 

PLATO— ARISTOTLE,  380  B.  C,  .  .  .  .  .28 


CHAPTER  III. 

PROGRESS  OF  LOGICAL  SCIENCE  FROM  THE  DAYS  OF  ARISTOTLE  TO  THE 

CHRISTIAN  ERA,  .......         51 


CHAPTER  IV. 

GENERAL  REMARKS   ON  THE  INFLUENCE  OF  CHRISTIANITY  ON   LOGICAL 

SCIENCE,  ........        66 


CHAPTER  V. 

LOGICAL  WRITERS  FROM  THE  CHRISTIAN  ERA  TILL  THE  TIME  OF  CHARLE- 
MAGNE, .  '  .  .  .  .  94 


XI 1  CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

Page 
QN  THE  ARABIAN  AND  JEWISH  WRITERS  ON  LOGIC,  FROM  THE  NINTH  TO 

THE  THIRTEENTH  CENTURY,     .  .  .  .  .  .112 


CHAPTER  VII. 

ON  THE  SCHOLASTIC  LOGICIANS  FROM  THE  COMMENCEMENT  OF  THE  NINTH, 
TILL  THE  REVIVAL  OF  LETTERS  LN  ITALY  IN  THE  MIDDLE  OF  THE 
FOURTEENTH,  CENTURY,  .  .  .  .  .  .121 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

LOGICAL  PHILOSOPHY  FROM  THE  MIDDLE  OF  THE  FOURTEENTH  CENTURY 
TILL  THE  PUBLICATION  OF  LORD  BACON'S  NOVUM  ORGANUM,  IN 
1620.  ........     160 


CHAPTER  IX. 

ON  THE  NOVUM  OR GANUM,  OR  BACONIAN  LOGIC,     '  .  .  .200 

CHAPTER  X. 

LOGICAL  SPECULATIONS  OF-HOBBES,  GASSENDI,  AND  DESCARTES,  .      220 

CHAPTER  XI. 

LOGICAL  SCIENCE  FROM  DESCARTES  TILL  THE  PUBLICATION  OF  LOCKE'S 

ESSAY  IN  1690,  .  .  .  .  .  .  .244 

CHAPTER  XII. 

THE  LOGICAL  PRINCIPLES  OF  LOCKE,  .  .  -  .271 


CONTENTS.  Xlll 


CHAPTER  XIII. 

Page 
THE  PROGRESS  OF  LOGICAL  SCIENCE  IN  GERMANY,  FROM  THE  PUBLICATION 

OF  LOCKE'S  ESSAY  TILL  THE  END  OF  THE  EIGHTEENTH  CENTURY,        .      283 


CHAPTER  XIV. 

PROGRESS  OF  LOGICAL  SCIENCE   IN  FRANCE,  FROM  THE  PUBLICATION  OF 

LOCKE'S  ESSAY  TILL  THE  END  OF  THE  EIGHTEENTH  CENTURY,  .      308 


CHAPTER  XV. 

LOGICAL  SCIENCE  IN  HOLLAND  AND  BELGIUM,  FROM  THE  PUBLICATION  OF 

LOCKE'S  ESSAY  TILL  THE  END  OF  THE  EIGHTEENTH  CENTURY,  .      324 


CHAPTER  XVI. 

PROGRESS  OF  LOGICAL  PHILOSOPHY  IN  ITALY  AND  SPAIN,  FROM  THE 
TIME  OF  LOCKE'S  ESSAY  TILL  THE  END  OF  THE  EIGHTEENTH  CEN- 
TURY, ........      328 


CHAPTER  XVII. 

PROGRESS  OF  LOGICAL  SCIENCE  IN  GREAT  BRITAIN  AND  IRELAND,  FROM 
THE  TIME  OF  LOCKE'S  ESSAY  TILL  THE  END  OF  THE  EIGHTEENTH 
CENTURY,         .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .342 


CHAPTER  XVIII. 

OF  LOGICAL  SCIENCE  IN  SWEDEN,  NORWAY,  DENMARK,  POLAND,  RUSSIA, 
&C,  &C,  FROM  THE  PUBLICATION  OF  LOCKE'S  ESSAY  TILL  THE  END 
OF  THE  EIGHTEENTH  CENTURY,  .  ,  .  .  .37; 


CHAPTER  XIX. 

A  FEW  BRIEF  REMARKS  ON  THE  EASTERN  AND  INDIAN  LOGIC,         .  .      380 


XIV  CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  XX. 

Page 
ON   THE    NATURE    AND   CHARACTER    OF    LOGICAL    LITERATURE   IN   THE 


SEVERAL  NATIONS   OF  THE  CONTINENT  OF  EUROPE,  FROM  THE  YEAR 


387 


CHAPTER  XXI. 

A  BRIEF  ACCOUNT  OF  THE  DIFFERENT  SYSTEMS  OF  LOGIC  TAUGHT  IN  THE 
UNIVERSITIES  OF  GREAT  BRITAIN  AND  IRELAND  DURING  THE  LAST 
HUNDRED  YEARS,  .......      419 


CHAPTER  XXII. 

THE  LOGICAL  LITERATURE  OF  GREAT  BRITAIN  AND  THE  UNITED  STATES 
OF  AMERICA,  OF  A  PHILOSOPHIC  AND  SYSTEMATIC  CAST,  FROM  THE 
YEAR  1800  TILL  THE  PRESENT  DAY,    .  .  .  .  .448 


INTRODUCTION. 


It  may  confidently  be  asserted,  that  there  is  no  de- 
partment of  human  speculation  and  inquiry  in  which 
so  many  contradictory  opinions  are  entertained  as  in 
the  science  or  art  of  logic.  For  the  last  five-and- 
twenty  centuries,  system  has  followed  system  in  rapid 
succession  ;  and  one  generation  of  logicians  after 
another  have  been  chiefly  occupied  in  refuting  or  mo- 
difying the  principles,  and  correcting  the  mistatements 
of  their  predecessors.  No  sooner  has  a  particular 
logical  system  obtained  a  footing  in  some  locality  in 
the  republic  of  letters,  and  become  incorporated  with 
the  general  routine  of  philosophical  education,  than 
some  aspiring  and  ambitious  speculator  has  called  in 
question  its  fundamental  principles,  or  subjected  its 
practical  rules  to  supervision  and  amendment.  From 
Zeno  to  modern  times,  every  theoretical  logician  has 
flattered  himself  in  his  day  that  he  had  placed  logic  on 
a  firm  basis — not  to  be  disturbed  as  long  as  the  world 
lasted.  He  has  flattered  himself  with  the  idea,  that  it 
was  his  fortunate  lot  to  chase  from  the  science  every 
vestige  of  doubt,  to  reconcile  every  real  and  apparent 
contradiction,  and  to  make,  to  all  future  generations, 


XY1  INTRODUCTION. 


the  path  of  knowledge  and  science  indisputably  plain, 
and  of  ready  and  agreeable  access. 

And  the  same  spirit  animates  the  philosophical 
logician  of  the  present  hour  in  every  direction  where 
his  science  is  known  and  cultivated.  Every  speculator 
has  a  system  of  his  own  with  which  strangers  do  not 
intermeddle.  He  is  the  sole  champion  of  his  own 
theory,  and  the  herald  of  his  own  fame.  He,  too, 
labours  under  the  cheering  anticipation  that  he  is  put- 
ting the  finishing  stroke  to  the  science,  and  silencing 
for  ever,  throughout  the  philosophic  world,  the  voice 
of  doubt  and  contention.  Though  he  may  have  all  the 
learning  of  the  East,  and  all  the  talent  of  Christendom 
centred  in  his  own  person,  yet  he  knows  full  well  that, 
apart  from  his  own  professorial  chair  or  private  study, 
he  will  not  find  a  single  cultivator  of  the  same  science 
entirely  agreeing  with  him,  either  on  the  fundamental 
principles  of  logical  philosophy,  or  on  the  best  modes 
of  applying  them.  But  this  does  not  discourage  him, 
nor  ruffle  the  equable  current  of  his  self-complacency. 
He  has  the  advantage  over  those  who  have  gone  before 
him,  hoping  unto  death  the  same  thing  as  himself;  in- 
asmuch as  he  reasons  that,  if  there  ever  is  to  be  a  time 
when  the  principles  of  his  science  are  to  be  known  and 
unalterably  fixed,  he  may  be  the  fortunate  instrument 
in  this  grand  and  noble  achievement.  While  there  is 
life  there  is  hope ;  and  this  consideration  is  sufficient 
to  sustain  him  in  his  labours,  amidst  the  mass  of  disap- 
pointment that  lies  behind  him. 

The  speculative  aspects  under  which  logic  has  ap- 
peared in  different  ages  and  countries,  have  not  been 
more  checkered  and  varied  than  its  external  fortunes. 


INTRODUCTION.  XV11 

It  has  at  one  time  revelled  in  unbounded  authority  and 
power,  and  yet  at  another  been  doomed  to  the  bitter 
humiliation  of  abject  servitude  and  dependence.  It 
has  been  the  petted  child  of  courts  and  monarchs,  and 
yet  been  reviled  by  the  beggar  in  the  street.  It  was 
once  the  art  of  arts,  the  science  of  sciences,  and  the 
proudest  emblem  in  the  escutcheon  of  the  philosopher. 
The  warrior  ventured  not  to  battle  without  it,  nor 
could  the  lawyer  on  the  bench,  or  the  theologian  in 
the  pulpit,  acquit  himself  with  grace  unless  versed  in 
its  canons  and  rules.  Notwithstanding,  however,  all 
this  power  and  grandeur,  we  have  witnessed  the  science 
scouted  from  many  influential  universities ;  and,  where 
admitted,  it  was  only  on  the  condition  of  becoming  a 
humble  menial  and  a  willing  slave. 

In  spite,  however,  of  all  such  reverses,  fluctuations, 
and  uncertainties,  logic  has  within  it  a  vigorous  prin- 
ciple of  vitality.  Like  the  phoenix,  it  is  continually 
rising  from  its  own  ashes.  It  never  allows  mankind  to 
wander  far  nor  long,  without  pressing  its  claims  and 
obtruding  its  counsels  and  admonitions  upon  them.  It 
must,  therefore,  have  a  permanent  hold  of  our  sym- 
pathies, some  fixed  root  in  our  nature,  or  it  would  have 
been  obliterated  long  ago  from  the  book  of  knowledge. 
Astrology  and  Alchymy  never  tantalized  human  reason 
so  severely.  For  what  can  present  a  greater  anomaly 
to  the  understanding,  than  that  logic-^calling  itself  a 
science ;  having  chairs  in  universities  set  apart  for  its 
especial  cultivation ;  witnessing  its  professors  taking 
the  first  rank  among  the  acute  and  profound  of  our 
race  ;  and  pointing,  with  exulting  pride,  to  more  than 
a  thousand  distinct  treatises  on  the  subject  which  have 

b 


XV111  INTRODUCTION. 

emanated  from  tlieir  pens  within  the  last  three  hundred 
years ;  that  logic,  we  say,  should,  under  these  circum- 
stances, not  be  able  to  furnish  two  logicians  of  any 
country,  who  can  agree  in  any  one  common  principle 
of  this  science,  nor  be  able  to  state  to  what  particular 
or  general  uses  it  can  be  applied;  must  present  to  the 
candid  mind  one  of  the  most  striking  phenomena  in 
the  entire  range  of  human  thought.  Can  any  subject, 
in  the  whole  circle  of  the  sciences,  present  such  a  lack 
of  unanimity,  or  a  more  cheerless  and  desponding  as- 
pect ?  The  use  of  the  word  logic  is  almost  the  only 
thing  which  disputants  have  in  common  :  if  we  venture 
a  step  beyond  this,  and  ask  for  a  definition  of  what  is 
implied  in  it,  we  are  instantly  stunned  with  a  thousand 
discordant  voices  from  all  parts  of  the  world. 

Reverting  again  to  the  acknowledged  vitality  of  logi- 
cal speculations,  there  must  be  some  adequate  and 
powerful  cause  for  it  in  the  nature  and  constitution  of 
things.  There  must  be  something  to  which  such 
speculations  invariably  point,  not  always  possessed,  but 
which  has  something  obvious  about  it,  though  difficult 
to  lay  hold  of  and  secure.  The  opposing  or  antagonis- 
tic forces  which  obstruct  our  readily  seizing  the  leading 
truths  of  logical  science,  and  making  them  obvious  to 
the  understanding  of  others,  must  be  the  result  of  some 
settled  law  of  nature,  or  some  extensive  range  of  human 
feelings  and  sympathies,  which  the  principles  and  forms 
of  civil  society  foster  and  sustain.  Let  us  then  examine, 
in  a  sober  and  serious  frame  of  mind,  into  the  number 
and  nature  of  these  opposing  forces,  with  a  view  of 
throwing,  if  we  can,  some  little  light  on  the  great 
question.  Why  is  it  that  logic  presents  such  an  assem- 


INTRODUCTION.  XIX 

blage    of  discordant  and    contradictory  opinions    and 
principles  ? 

In  the  first  place,  then,  logic,  whether  of  a  philo- 
sophical or  formal  caste,  is  involved  in  the  common  diffi- 
culties of  all  questions  connected  with,  or  springing  out 
of,  mental  philosophy.  Logic,  or  the  science  or  art  of 
reasoning,  is  expressive  of,  and  embodies,  a  purely  in- 
tellectual act.  This  is  one  of  the  sources  of  the  hazi- 
ness which  encircles  its  operations  and  causes.  Every 
logician  must  be,  to  some  extent,  a  metaphysician  also ; 
he  deals  with  mental  causes  and  effects.  He  must 
learn  the  difficult  art  of  looking  into  his  own  mind,  and 
scanning,  with  more  or  less  comprehension  and  preci- 
sion, its  varied  powers  and  faculties.  This  is  a  matter 
of  paramount  perplexity  to  many  men ;  and  to  men, 
too,  of  even  average  learning  and  ability.  Here  is  an 
obstacle  at  the  first  step.  The  truth  soon  flashes  across 
the  mind  of  every  inquirer,  that  the  noblest  part  of  his 
being — his  intellectual  frame — must  ever  remain  par- 
tially and  imperfectly  known.  This  conviction  shakes 
the  confidence  of  his  own  judgment,  and  imparts  a 
doubting  spirit  to  every  thing  connected  with  the  reflec- 
tion on  his  own  mind.  His  examinations  and  inquiries 
are  personal,  and  cannot  be  visibly  portrayed  or  commu- 
nicated to  others.  The  mode  of  investigating  the  world 
within,  is  not  the  same  as  that  which  we  use  for  investi- 
gating the  world  without ;  and,  if  we  attempt  to  employ 
the  one  mode  instead  of  the  other,  we  shall  miserably  fail 
in  our  object.  The  tablet  of  the  mind  is  not  like  a  chess- 
board, where  the  unfinished  game  may  be  taken  up  at 
the  point  where  the  last  player  left  it ;  for  the  move- 
ments of  thought  are  complicated  and  subtile,  and  our 


XX  INTRODUCTION. 

trains  of  ideas  seldom  remain  fixed  or  visible  to  con- 
sciousness for  any  length  of  time.  The  lamp  of  our 
internal  knowledge  is  for  ever  passing  onwards,  and  we 
can  only  now  and  then  arrest  its  course,  and  benefit  a 
little  from  its  light.  Every  man  has  to  commence  a 
new  plan  of  instruction  for  himself,  and  is  compelled  to 
leave  it  in  turn,  as  a  broken  thread,  to  whoever  comes 
after  him. 

Logic  being,  then,  expressive  of  an  intellectual  act 
or  operation,  it  is  involved  in  all  that  doubt  and  mis- 
conception which  appertain  to  descriptions  of  mental 
phenomena  generally ;  but  the  science  of  reasoning, 
viewed  in  another  light,  and  in  connexion  with  mind, 
naturally  gives  rise  to  the  chief  portion  of  that  differ- 
ence of  opinion  and  judgment  so  visibly  impressed  on 
its  past  history  and  present  condition.  Logic  is  a 
science  or  art  hewn  or  cut  out  of  the  mind ;  out,  as  it 
were,  of  its  very  centre,  or  out  of  the  vital  part  of  its 
organization.  This  is  a  prolific  source  of  disputes,  and 
of  divers  opposite  systems.  The  question  is,  how  much 
mentality  shall  we  portion  out  to  the  reason,  or  how 
little?  Some  thinkers  consider  reason,  or  reasoning, 
as  the  entire  mental  individual  —  an  embodiment  of 
the  whole  intellectual  apparatus  ;  others,  again,  limit  it 
to  a  small  fraction  of  the  mind.  The  question  becomes 
an  open  and  undecided  one.  The  logician  and  meta- 
physician are  brought  into  collision.  They  differ  about 
the  boundaries  of  their  respective  sciences.  The  one  lays 
claim  to  the  whole  of  the  domain;  while  the  other  is  in- 
capable of  fixing  on  the  precise  portion  of  it  which  he 
wants  for  his  own  special  purposes.  The  formal  logi- 
cians, for  example,  say,  We  only  want  three  items ;  a 


INTRODUCTION.  XXI 

subject,  a  copula,  and  a  predicate,  and  with  these  we  can 
frame  a  proposition,  and  present  it  under  various  points 
of  view;  with  these,  in  fact,  we  can  display  an  act  of 
reasoning  in  all  its  logical  purity  and  comprehension. 
This  is  the  only  solid  and  philosophical  foundation  of 
logical  science.  Their  opponents,  however,  remind 
them  that  there  are  more  mental  phenomena  involved 
in  the  subject,  the  copula,  and  the  predicate,  and  in 
their  formal  arrangement  into  distinct  propositions, 
than  what  are  commonly  thought  of.  If,  say  the  oppo- 
nents of  the  strictly  formal  school,  you  profess  to  give 
an  accurate  analysis  of  an  act  of  reasoning,  it  should  be 
a  full  and  complete  analysis ;  and  if  this  be  given,  the 
result  will  be,  that  the  regular  syllogism  will  be  shewn 
to  embody  the  distinct  co-operation  and  exercise  of 
a  much  greater  number  of  mental  powers  than  the  for- 
mal theory  embraces.  In  the  development  of  every 
syllogistic  process,  we  recognise  the  operation  of  the 
powers  of  perception,  memory,  attention,  abstraction, 
comparison,  judgment,  and  even  others  ;  and  in  every 
analysis  of  such  a  process  of  reasoning,  it  is  incumbent 
we  should  not  only  take  into  consideration  all  these 
separate  and  independent  faculties,  but  also  portion  out 
to  each  its  individual  share  in  the  general  result.  Until 
this  is  done,  there  is  no  full  or  true  analysis  of  the  rea- 
soning faculty.  A  partial  or  one-sided  analysis  is  of  no 
use.  If  logic  be  solely  confined  to  the  development  of 
the  laws  of  thought,  considered  as  thought,  it  is  indis- 
pensably requisite  that  all  those  laws  should  be  brought 
out  to  open  day,  and  admitted  as  necessary  and  recog- 
nised phenomena  in  the  syllogistic  process.  Besides, 
say  the  anti-formalists,  we  would  like  to  see  a  logician's 


XX11  INTRODUCTION. 

warrant  for  confining  the  province  of  logic  within  the 
strict  boundary  of  merely  considering  the  laws  of 
thought  as  thought?  Where  is  his  authority  for  so 
doing  ?  Can  he  back  it  by  historical  evidence,  ancient 
and  modern  ?  Nay,  we  go  beyond  even  this  in  our 
demands ;  we  require,  in  conjunction  with  the  autho- 
rity of  historical  logic,  the  philosophical  reasons — the 
regular  and  formal  canons  of  science — why  such  and 
such  a  thing  should  be  considered  as  logic  rather  than 
any  thing  else.  Let  these  reasonable  conditions  be 
complied  with,  and  then  the  great  question  at  issue 
will  be  in  a  fair  way  for  a  satisfactory  solution.  For 
any  logician  to  say  that  this,  and  nothing  else  but  this, 
is  pure  logic,  amounts  to  nothing.  We  must  have  the 
scientific  proofs  for  the  validity  of  the  statement,  or  it 
must  be  comparatively  valueless. 

On  the  other  hand,  again,  it  is  argued,  that  there 
must  be  a  line  drawn  between  logic  and  metaphysics, 
to  preserve  the  independence  of  each.  When  we  once 
admit  the  consideration  of  psychological  phenomena, 
and  the  laws  and  mutual  dependence  of  the  separate 
powers  of  the  mind,  to  constitute  a  determined  portion 
of  logic,  we,  in  fact,  at  once  open  the  door  to  a  vast  mass 
of  knowledge,  which  can  be  of  no  use  whatever  as  an 
element  in  logical  tuition ;  but,  on  the  contrary,  must 
tend  to  obstruct  every  rational  and  salutary  application 
of  its  rules  to  the  understandings  of  men.  We  are  not 
to  consider  here  what  is  theoretically  sound,  but  what  is 
practically  possible.  Besides,  by  limiting  the  definition 
and  offices  of  logical  science  to  the  perception  of  truth, 
arising  from  the  consideration  of  the  laws  of  thought, 
as  thought,  we  really  and  virtually  do  all  that  is  pos- 


INTRODUCTION.  XX111 

sible,  from  the  necessities  of  the  case.  To  go  beyond 
this,  we  must  either  take  all  objects  of  human  inquiry, 
and  decide  on  their  truth  or  falsehood,  or  only  some  of 
them.  To  adopt  the  first  plan  is  obviously  impossible, 
and  to  adopt  the  latter  is  to  make  a  selection  upon  no 
settled  or  rational  principle.  The  only  alternative  which 
is  left  is,  to  confine  logic  strictly  to  thought,  as  an  act 
of  thinking,  and  to  pass  by  the  particular  objects  about 
which  the  mind  thinks. 

This  is  substantially  the  true  position  in  which  the 
question  as  to  the  real  objects  of  logic  has  been  left  by 
the  two  great  rival  parties  who  have  taken  a  distin- 
guished interest  in  logical  discussions  from  the  earliest 
times  to  the  present  hour.  The  question  always  arises, 
How  much  of  the  mind  shall  be  appropriated  to  logic  ? 
The  entire  history  of  the  science  of  reasoning,  when 
viewed  from  a  purely  intellectual  position,  is  nothing 
but  a  practical  and  running  commentary  on  this  ques- 
tion. This  has  been  made  the  chief  point  of  dispute 
among  all  the  leading  philosophical  logicians  of  every 
age  and  country;  and  the  numerous  and  diversified 
solutions  given  of  it  are  conspicuously  portrayed  in  the 
historical  annals  of  the  science. 

This,  then,  is  one  of  the  great  obstacles  in  the  way 
of  mankind  arriving  at  any  thing  like  a  general  conclu- 
sion as  to  the  limits  of  logical  science.  There  seems  to 
be  no  avoiding  the  difficulty,  unless  by  making  the 
matter  in  dispute  an  object  of  compromise  and  arrange- 
ment. There  has  been  hitherto,  and  there  must  always 
be,  mutual  concessions  among  all  logicians,  from  the 
sheer  necessities  of  their  position  relative  to  the  subject- 
matter  with  which  they  have  to  deal. 


XXIV  INTRODUCTION. 

There  are,  however,  other  impediments  in  the  way  of 
unanimity  as  to  the  principles  and  modes  of  teaching 
logic,  arising  from  causes  of  a  different  and  more  exter- 
nal character  than  those  to  which  we  have  just  briefly 
alluded.  These  obstructions  have  their  principal  seat  in 
the  influence,  direct  and  indirect,  which  other  depart- 
ments of  human  knowledge  exercise  over  logical  specu- 
lations and  systems.  Logic  has  never  been  studied  and 
taught  as  an  independent  science.  It  has  no  absolute 
domain  of  its  own  over  which  to  range.  In  all  ages  it  has 
professed  to  deal  with  truth,  whether  properly  or  not  we 
need  not  stop  at  the  present  moment  to  inquire.  Suffice 
it  to  say  for  our  present  purpose,  that  its  abstract  as 
well  as  practical  aim  has  been  to  deal  with,  touch 
upon,  regulate,  and  establish  the  canons  of  truth 
in  some  general  or  modified  shape  or  fashion.  Now, 
what  is  truth?  A  word  confessedly  of  vast  import, 
— embracing,  in  fact,  all  that  is  intellectual,  and  all 
that  is  materially  interesting  to  man — all  that  is  ab- 
stract, and  all  that  is  practical.  It  has  the  heart  as 
well  as  the  head  for  its  basis  or  foundation.  It  em- 
bodies, in  reality,  the  entire  mass  of  human  knowledge, 
human  happiness,  and  human  prospects. 

Truth,  then,  though  it  has  to  do  with  every  thing, 
has  not  to  do  with  every  thing  in  the  same  mode  and 
fashion.  Truth  implies  existence,  but  to  mankind  it 
implies  much  more.  It  is  true  that  there  are  trees 
and  houses  around  me  where  I  now  write ;  but  this 
truth  has  no  hold  of  my  personality — it  is  a  matter  of 
no  concern  to  me — it  conveys  neither  anxiety,  pain, 
nor  pleasure.  The  truths,  for  example,  of  astronomy 
are  highly  sublime  and  interesting,  because  they  can 


INTRODUCTION.  XXV 

be  applied  to  practical  purposes  in  guiding  the  mari- 
ner's frail  bark  in  the  trackless  ocean,  and  as  being  in 
themselves  powerful  incentives  for  elevating  the  mind 
to  Him  by  whom  the  entire  universe  is  maintained ; 
but  take  away  these  immediate  and  personal  effects 
from  astronomical  truths,  and  the  whole  science  would, 
in  fact,  be  no  science  at  all.  And  the  same  thing  may 
be  affirmed  of  every  other  branch  of  knowledge.  Science 
of  every  kind  has  our  internal  nature  for  its  basis. 
Even  the  abstract  truths  of  mathematics  can  only  be 
viewed  as  things  having  a  bare  intellectual  existence, 
and  can  be  designated  and  considered  as  truths  only 
by  virtue  of  the  reflex  influence  of  other  principles  of  a 
mental  and  spiritual  cast.  There  is  absolutely  neither 
wisdom  nor  folly  where  the  voice  of  humanity  is  not 
heard. 

Such,  then,  being  the  nature  of  truth,  with  the  mys- 
teries of  an  eternity  in  the  background,  we  have  to 
inquire  how  logic,  which  pretends  to  have  something 
to  do  with  it,  comes  to  be  invested  with  a  peculiar  in- 
terest, and  to  be  moulded  in  its  character  and  applica- 
tion by  the  prevailing  influence  of  other  branches  of 
knowledge  ?  Here  a  vast  field  of  inquiry  presents  itself, 
which  it  is  impossible  for  us  at  present  to  travel  over ; 
but  we  shall  glance  at  two  or  three  of  the  most  promi- 
nent objects  in  the  mental  landscape,  which  may  pos- 
sibly throw  some  light  on  the  question  we  have  ventured 
to  discuss. 

We  have  a  very  striking  illustration  in  the  writings 
of  the  scholastic  logicians,  and,  indeed,  from  almost 
every  class  of  writers  on  mental  subjects  up  to  a  very 
recent  period  of  history,  of  this  peculiar  mode  of  appre- 


XXVI  INTRODUCTION. 


hending  the  nature  and  offices  of  all  philosophic  truth. 
This  is  exemplified  in  the  discussions  on  the  nature  of 
being.  Every  one  who  has  looked  into  the  books  of 
logic  and  metaphysics  of  the  middle  ages,  must  have  re- 
cognised the  importance  attached  to  this  abstract  notion 
of  existence.  The  grand  end,  however,  which  it  is  made 
to  serve  as  a  philosophical  instrument  of  reasoning,  is 
to  impart  to  the  mind  a  right  conception  of  the  design 
of  all  human  knowledge.  This  being  is  made  to  con- 
sist of  two  elements ;  namely,  goodness  and  truth.  These 
are  its  inherent  attributes,  and  they  are  made  the 
medium  of  connecting  all  human  investigations  with 
the  vital  interests  of  mankind, — that  which  is  good, 
and  that  which  is  true.  The  entire  scope  of  the  dis- 
cussions springing  out  of  the  consideration  of  this  gene- 
ral idea  of  being,  and  which  have  a  direct  bearing  on  all 
science  whatever,  is,  to  enforce  the  conviction  on  the 
mind,  that  all  true  knowledge  must  have  for  its  ulti- 
mate object  the  permanent  happiness  and  improvement 
of  mankind;  but  that  these  cannot  be  attained  by 
limiting  our  views  to  merely  temporal  or  material  ex- 
pedients. 

In  the  first  place,  logical  systems  have  uniformly 
been  discussed  through  the  medium  of  metaphysical 
theories.  Whatever  opinions  a  logician  might  have  on 
the  abstract  nature  of  mind,  or  on  the  number  and 
specific  character  of  its  separate  powers  or  faculties, 
these  opinions  were  sure  to  influence  him  in  his  investi- 
gations into  the  reasoning  process.  There  must  be  a 
harmony  maintained  in  his  general  creed  at  any  price. 
This  is  strikingly  exemplified  in  the  entire  history  of 
logical  philosophy,  from  its  first  dawn  in  Greece  to  the 


INTRODUCTION.  XXY11 

present  hour.  In  every  age,  the  mental  theories  being 
given,  we  can  determine  with  scrupulous  precision  the 
general  phases  of  logical  speculations.  And  so  point- 
edly is  this  the  case,  that  all  the  general  terms  of  classi- 
fication commonly  used  to  designate  theories  of  the 
mind,  may  be  applied  with  the  same  force  and  exact- 
ness to  systems  of  logic.  We  have  the  material,  the 
rationalistic,  the  eclectic,  the  transcendental,  the  theo- 
logical, the  mystical,  the  sensational,  and  the  common 
sense  theories  of  logical  truth  or  science,  in  the  same 
way  as  we  have  corresponding  theories  of  mental  philo- 
sophy and  speculation  comprehended  under  these  seve- 
ral terms. 

And  not  only  is  this  the  case,  that  logic  is  greatly 
and  directly  influenced  by  the  current  doctrines  of 
mental  science,  but  it  is  also  greatly  modified  and 
checkered,  in  its  outward  arrangements  and  rules,  by 
the  prevailing  sentiments  and  opinions  of  philosophers 
on  particular  questions  of  metaphysical  knowledge. 
Witness,  for  example,  the  unsatisfactory  state  in  which 
theories  of  mathematical  evidence,  of  induction,  of 
^Nominalism  and  Realism,  are  at  the  present  moment 
placed.  Nothing  can  be  more  opposite  and  conflicting 
than  the  judgments  of  the  philosophers  of  Europe,  at 
the  present  moment,  on  these  perplexing,  though  highly 
interesting  points.  Yet  all  these  distinct  questions  are 
so  closely  blended  with  systems  of  logic — theoretical, 
practical,  and  formal — that  no  ground  can  be  occupied 
by  any  speculator  promulgating  doctrines  on  the  nature 
of  general  reasoning,  free  from  their  actual  intrusion  and 
influence.  These  questions  lie  at  the  very  threshold  of 
logical  investigations,  and  must  be  disposed  of  in  some 


XXVI 11  INTRODUCTION. 

fashion  or  other  before  the  logician  is  allowed  to  take 
a  single  step  in  his  inquiries. 

Independently  of  this  obstacle  from  mental  philo- 
sophy itself,  we  have  still  other  more  direct  and  power- 
ful influences  to  contend  against,  in  reference  to  the 
unity  of  logical  doctrines  and  tuition.  Antagonistic 
forces  of  an  external  character  meet  us  at  every  turn. 
Logic  having,  or  professing  to  have,  to  do  with  truth, 
the  watchfulness  and  jealousy  of  men  are  called  into  a 
state  of  activity,  whenever  the  truth  of  particular  de- 
partments of  knowledge  is  conceived  to  be  in  jeo- 
pardy, or  likely  to  be  affected  in  any  way  or  degree. 
All  the  interesting  and  moving  questions  which  en- 
gross the  feelings  and  sympathies  of  the  mass  of  man- 
kind in  every  country,  and  which  are  connected  with, 
or  grow  out  of,  the  sciences  of  theology,  morals,  and 
politics,  have  a  direct  reflex  effect  upon  both  the  theory 
and  practical  application  of  logical  science.  It  forms 
an  item  of  secular  interest  and  calculation  to  the  tem- 
poral powers  of  the  world,  which  is  never  lost  sight  of. 
The  theologian,  the  moralist,  and  the  legislator,  keep 
a  watchful  eye  over  the  use  of  an  instrument  which 
professes  to  deal  with  every  department  of  scientific 
evidence  or  proof,  with  every  speculative  form  of 
thought,  and  with  the  application  of  knowledge  to  the 
everyday  interests  and  necessities  of  human  life. 

True,  the  influence  of  logical  systems  is  not  viewed 
with  the  same  degree  of  suspicion  in  all  departments 
of  human  inquiry.  The  mathematical  and  physical 
sciences,  for  example,  seem  removed  from  any  direct 
logical  control.  The  ingenuity  of  man  may  exercise 
itself  here  in  comparative  independence  and  liberty ; 


INTRODUCTION.  XXIX 


and,  with  some  trifling  qualifications,  he  may  adopt 
any  theory  he  pleases.  With  purely  objective  know- 
ledge, logic  does  not  come  in  hostile  contact.  It  is 
only  in  the  mental  and  spiritual  element  that  its  con- 
flict lies.  The  moment  we  pass  the  boundaries  which 
separate  the  outer  world  of  matter  from  the  inner  world 
of  thought,  we  tread  upon  debatable  ground,  and  ex- 
cite the  feelings  of  human  nature  in  such  a  way  and 
degree,  as  they  are  never  seen  to  be  excited  in  the 
ordinary  philosophical  investigations  carried  on  in  the 
pure  and  physical  sciences. 

The  weighty  influence  which  is  thus  brought  to  bear 
on  logical  studies,  by  particular  branches  of  knowledge, 
arises  from  the  intimate  union  subsisting  between 
them  and  the  faculty  of  reasoning  generally.  Theo- 
logy, for  example,  has,  in  many  epochs  of  her  history, 
imparted  the  highest  degree  of  interest  to  logical  doc- 
trines, and  inspired  a  reverence  and  enthusiasm  for 
their  cultivation  among  great  masses  of  people.  On 
the  other  hand,  again,  theology  often  stands  in  awe  of 
logic,  and  views  all  its  modes  of  tuition  with  jealousy 
and  apprehension.  The  reason  for  these  opposite  states 
of  feeling  in  religious  communities  is,  that  the  logical 
or  reasoning  powers  have  a  peculiar  and  powerful  in- 
fluence over  the  theological  element,  and  may  be  made 
to  agitate  vital  and  momentous  questions  to  a  serious 
extent.  It  is  the  established  policy  of  Christian  nations 
to  prevent  such  occurrences.  The  action  and  reac- 
tion of  theology  and  logic  is  strikingly  observable  in 
every  period  of  history ;  and  the  mutual  sympathy  be- 
tween them,  even  at  this  hour,  is  as  active  and  influen- 
tial as  ever. 


XXX  INTRODUCTION. 

If  mankind  could  be  brought  to  think  unanimously 
on  all  the  fundamental  principles  of  theology,  morals, 
and  politics,  there  would  be  then  some  chance  likewise 
for  logical  unanimity  ;  but  as  this  is  not  likely  to  hap- 
pen, there  must  always  be  great  differences  of  opinion 
on  the  principles  which  should  constitute  a  science 
of  argumentation.  Long-established  institutions  and 
modes  of  thinking  are  always  chary  of  speculative  inno- 
vations ;  for,  unless  some  palpable  and  immediate  ad- 
vantage presents  itself  as  an  infallible  result  of  change, 
the  public  mind  keeps  in  the  old  channels  of  inquiry 
and  knowledge  in  which  it  has  been  so  long  accustomed 
to  move,  regardless  of  the  bold  pretensions  of  startling 
novelties. 

Logic  must,  then,  I  conceive,  be  doomed  to  present 
for  ever  a  variable  aspect — to  be  a  system  not  united 
or  bound  together  by  a  series  of  scientific  axioms,  sus- 
ceptible of  independent  and  demonstrative  proof,  and 
backed  by  a  rigid  and  unvarying  consequentially ;  but 
rather  as  constituting  a  code  of  rules  and  judgments, 
gathered  from  individual  observation  in  every  walk  of 
science,  and  from  every  position  in  which  the  human 
mind  is  placed— partaking,  moreover,  largely  of  a  pru- 
dential and  precautionary  character.  And  this  has 
been,  in  fact,  the  true  form  logic  has  been  compelled 
to  assume,  particularly  within  the  last  three  centuries, 
purely  from  the  necessity  of  accommodating  itself  to 
the  progressive  and  extended  range  of  philosophic 
thought,  and  to  the  constant  desire  manifested,  that 
all  knowledge  should  be  tested  by  its  susceptibility  of 
promoting  the  moral,  religious,  and  intellectual  im- 
provement of  individuals  and  societies.     No  scientific 


INTRODUCTION.  XXXI 

truth  becomes  important  unless  it  be  productive  of 
practical  and  "beneficial  results.  The  necessities  of 
human  existence  require  this  rule  to  be  rigidly  en- 
forced at  all  times,  and  under  all  circumstances,  Men 
are  led,  by  a  profound  and  instinctive  feeling,  to  sepa- 
rate the  valuable  from  the  unimportant.  Between 
what  is  abstractly  true  and  conceivable,  and  what  is 
possible  and  useful,  there  is  often  a  wide  and  impass- 
able chasm,  which  no  mere  subtilty  of  mind  can  either 
bridge  over  or  fill  up. 

And  when  we  come  to  look  at  logical  treatises,  even 
of  the  most  formal  and  technical  character  and  preten- 
sions, we  recognise  in  reality  the  presence  of  the  same 
class  of  rules,  of  a  provisional  and  precautionary  form, 
which  constitute  the  staple  articles  of  other  logical 
works  of  a  looser  and  more  unscientific  texture.  The 
difference  between  formal  and  philosophical  or  popular 
logic  is  not  so  great  as  at  first  sight  appears.  There 
is  little  or  no  difference  in  principle  ;  and  the  difference 
in  matters  of  arrangement  and  detail  resolves  itself 
simply  into  a  question,  how  far  some  logicians  will  go 
in  a  given  direction,  or  at  what  point  they  are  deter- 
mined to  stop  ?  Both  parties  are  proceeding  on  the 
same  track;  but  the  one  is  bent  on  taking  a  more 
lengthened  journey  than  the  other.  And  this  will 
appear  obvious  if  we  look  at  the  position  of  both  classes 
of  reasoners.  The  general  doctrines  which  form  a  part 
of  every  formal  system  of  logic — such  as  definition,  ana- 
lysis, method,  and  the  like — are  all  grounded  on  mere 
rules  of  expediency ;  and  are,  in  short,  plastic  and 
flexible  adaptations  of  the  judgment  to  some  leading, 
though  ill-defined,  conception  of  the  mind  or  under- 


XXX11  INTRODUCTION. 

standing.  They  have,  in  fact,  no  scientific  basis  what- 
ever. Xo  writer  on  logic,  from  the  earliest  times  to 
the  present  day,  has  ever  succeeded  in  framing  a  rule 
on  the  definition  of  things  and  terms,  through  which, 
to  use  a  common  phrase,  one  might  not  drive  a  coach 
and  six.  And  what  logician  has  ever  given  a  rule 
to  limit  the  analytical  process,  to  teach  us  when  to 
separate  or  divide  no  further?  Every  writer  on  the 
subject  makes  analysis  consist  of  a  greater  or  less 
number  of  general  rules,  dependent  for  their  validity 
on  the  kind  or  order  of  things  analysed;  the  pur- 
poses for  which  such  an  analysis  is  required ;  and, 
at  the  same  time,  enforcing  precautionary  maxims  for 
its  right  and  successful  application.  And  these  re- 
marks are  substantially  applicable  to  logical  methods, 
and  to  all  that  has  ever,  up  to  this  moment,  been  writ- 
ten about  them.  Where  shall  we  look  for  a  single  rule 
or  maxim  on  method,  which  is  not  purely  a  conven- 
tional and  shifting  thing,  applicable  in  one  case,  and  of 
no  use  in  another  ?  So  that,  viewing  the  differences 
between  the  logical  formalists,  and  the  philosophical 
and  common  sense  school  of  logicians,  it  is  obvious  that 
both  parties  are  doing  the  same  thing,  varied  only  by 
the  different  terms,  and  the  technical  phraseology  em- 
ployed to  express  each  other's  designs  and  purposes. 


HISTORICAL  SKETCH  OF  LOGIC. 


CHAPTER  I 


THE  PYTHAGOREANS,  ZEtfO,  Etc.,  500-400  b.c. 

The  science  of  reasoning,  considered  under  two  distinct 
aspects — namely,  as  a  science,  and  as  an  art — must  have 
been  coeval  with  the  first  ages  of  literature  in  every 
country.  The  social  position  and  wants  of  men — the 
regular  development  of  the  laws  of  thought — and  the 
various  ideas  and  principles  on  which  the  moral  judg- 
ments and  opinions  of  mankind  rest,  must  have  exer- 
cised a  direct  and  powerful  influence  over  all  those 
mental  operations  which  form  the  constituent  ele- 
ments of  ratiocination.  There  never  was,  nor  ever 
could  be,  a  time  in  the  history  of  any  people,  in  which 
reasoning,  as  a  distinct  mental  section  of  education  and 
philosophical  instruction,  was  not,  in  some  degree  or 
measure,  known  and  cultivated.  The  only  difference 
which  we  can  trace  between  a  learned  and  polite,  and 

A 


Z  GENERAL  REMARKS. 

an  ignorant  and  unpolished,  people  is,  a  difference  of 
degree  only ;  a  more  refined  and  extended  range  of  the 
mind  is  manifested  in  the  former  case  than  in  that  of 
the  latter.  Both  carry  on,  by  certain  given  rules,  pro- 
cesses of  argumentation,  partly  from  the  natural  spon- 
taneity or  fecundity  of  the  mind  itself,  and  partly  for 
the  more  effective  discharge  of  the  duties  and  purposes 
of  human  existence. 

It  is,  however,  both  interesting  and  important  to 
trace,  along  the  course  of  ages,  what  were  the  peculiar 
stages  of  advancement  and  perfection  which  mark  the  > 
movements  of  thought  in  the  ratiocinative  intercourse^ 
of  men ;  and  how  far,  and  in  what  manner,  the  general 
stock  of  knowledge  which  any  nation  at  a  particular 
epoch  possessed,  tended,  directly  or  indirectly,  to  the 
cultivation  and  dissemination  of  truth.  We  clearly  per- 
ceive, that  at  certain  periods  of  history,  and  of  periods 
too  of  long  duration,  the  reasoning  powers  of  men 
— taking  these  powers  in  their  most  comprehensive 
development  —  were  more  prominently  and  directly 
cultivated,  and  brought  to  a  higher  pitch  of  per- 
fection, than  at  others.  When  there  happened  to  be 
any  thing  in  the  social,  political,  or  intellectual  his- 
tory of  a  people,  which  chilled  for  a  time  their  mental 
ardour,  contracted  their  sphere  of  knowledge  generally, 
or  led  them  to  give  an  undue  preference  to  some  of 
the  other  departments  of  human  learning  or  specula- 
tion, then  the  reasoning  powers  seem  to  have  fallen 
into  a  state  of  comparative  inaction  or  collapse.  On 
the  other  hand,  we  can  distinctly  perceive,  that  when 
the  mind  of  a  nation  was  energetically  excited,  and 
subjects    of   intense    interest    engrossed    their    atten- 


GENERAL  REMARKS.  -i 

tion,  then  a  new  and  vigorous  impulse  was  given  to 
argumentative  talent,  and  the  reasoning  man  appears 
in  all  his  native  vigour  and  power.  To  trace  out  these 
intellectual  movements,  then,  and  to  mark  the  leading 
incidents  and  circumstances  with  which  they  were  occa- 
sionally or  commonly  associated,  is,  I  conceive,  a  legi- 
timate topic  of  discussion  to  the  mental  philosopher 
and  logician. 

We  shall  commence,  then,  with  a  few  remarks  on 
the  science  of  reasoning,  or  the  art  of  logic,  as  it  was 
developed  and  cultivated  in  Greece,  where  philosophy 
was  known,  in  all  its  various  aspects,  at  a  compara- 
tively early  date. 

It  may  here  be  premised,  that  one  of  the  chief  causes 
which  gave  birth  to  and  cherished  the  dialectic  or  logi- 
cal science  in  Greece,  was  the  peculiar  condition  inse- 
parable from  its  laws  and  institutions.  These  gene- 
rated argumentative  talents,  both  in  writing  and  in 
speaking.  As  the  democratic  element  appeared  in 
vigorous  action  in  the  fifth  century  B.C.,  there  was  a 
direct  incentive  manifested  to  the  cultivation  of  those 
mental  powers  more  immediately  and  directly  con- 
nected with  the  reasoning  faculties  of  man.  To  culti- 
vate the  power  of  persuasion — to  defend  the  interests 
of  the  commonwealth,  or  the  opinions  of  a  party,  or 
the  reputation  or  life  of  an  individual — was  an  interest- 
ing and  important  duty,  which  no  true  citizen  could 
altogether  neglect.  Patriotism  glowed  in  the  breast  of 
every  active  member  of  the  community.  The  whole 
intellectual  energies  of  man  were  directed  into  civil 
and  political  channels.  To  protect  the  state,  a  friend, 
or  himself,  was  a  duty  which  every  person  who  aimed 


4  GRECIAN  DIALECTICS THE  PYTHAGOREANS. 

at  any  thing  like  an  intelligent  position  in  society, 
might  in  a  moment  be  called  upon  to  discharge.  To 
be  prepared  for  this  became  therefore  a  necessary 
accomplishment,  and  often  an  indispensable  piece  of 
precautionary  policy,  in  all  those  who  felt  an  interest, 
and  took  any  part  in,  the  civil  and  political  movements 
of  the  day.  Facility  in  speech,  argumentative  dex- 
terity, correct  and  prompt  classifications,  and  a  readi- 
ness in  marshalling  all  the  intellectual  powers  and 
appliances  to  a  given  point,  became  objects  of  emula- 
tion and  ambitious  rivalship.  Success  here  led  the 
way  to  influence  and  renown  ;  though  not  unfrequent- 
ly,  from  the  fierceness  of  party  strife,  consequences  the 
most  disastrous  ensued,  both  to  the  state  and  to  some 
of  its  most  distinguished  citizens. 

The  philosophic  spirit  was  also  a  conspicuous  ele- 
ment in  Grecian  dialectics.  It  was  both  a  cause  and 
an  effect ;  sometimes  stimulating  to  prominent  logical 
manifestations,  and  at  other  times  repressing  and  hold- 
ing them  in  check.  We  see  this  strikingly  exemplified 
in  the  history  of  various  philosophic  sects  in  Greece. 
The  first  decided  and  marked  speculative  impulse 
which  the  science  of  argumentation  received  in  this 
country,  was  from  the  Pythagoreans.  They  came 
forward  as  cosmogonists.  They  embraced  the  totality 
of  all  things,  physical  and  spiritual.  The  philosophic 
problems  they  sought  to  solve  were  of  the  most  pro- 
found and  gigantic  character.  What  is  the  animat- 
ing and  creative  principle  of  every  thing  we  see? 
What  are  the  ultimate  atoms  of  all  things  which  are 
made  ?  Why  is  change  effected,  and  what  is  it  in 
itself?     What  is  composition  and  decomposition,  and 


GRECIAN  DIALECTICS ZEXO.  5 

to  what  do  they  ultimately  lead?  These,  and  many 
similar  questions,  were  the  constant  burden  of  their 
logical  disquisitions  and  dialectic  warfare.  They 
sought,  through  these  abstruse  questions,  to  classify 
and  arrange  the  entire  objects  of  knowledge  and  of  the 
mind's  perception,  and  to  develop  the  forms  and  rules 
which  the  logic  of  uninstructed  nature  imparts  to 
them.  They  called  into  their  aid  other  ideal  appli- 
ances, such  as  numbers,  mathematical  ideas,  and  musi- 
cal harmonies.  It  was  maintained,  that  all  mental 
operations,  and  matters  constituting  what  was  termed 
truth,  were  grounded  on  certain  relations  or  combina- 
tions of  numbers  and  harmony.  The  entire  reasoning 
powers  of  man  constitute,  in  fact,  a  harmonica}  deve- 
lopment.* 

Zeno  of  Elea  (460-440  b.c.)  is  commonly  con- 
sidered as  the  first  philosopher  who  really  gave  birth 
to  the  regular  dialectic  science.  He  had  studied  phi- 
losophy under  Parmenides  of  Elea,  a  sage  of  great 
renown  in  his  day.  This  Parmenides  published  a  work 
"  On  Nature,"  several  fragments  of  which  have  come 
down  to  us,  wherein  he  lays  down  certain  abstract 
principles  relative  to  all  philosophic  truth,  and  the 
rules  and  forms  of  communicating  it.  These  are 
treated  of  under  the  heads  of  opinion  and  certainty. 
Zeno  shewed  himself  a  great  logician.  All  his  rea- 
sonings proceeded  from  certain  general  principles ; 
and  Aristotle  considers  him  as  the  inventor  of  the  art 
of  dialectics.  He  carried  the  form  of  the  dialogue  to  a 
great  extent ;  so  much  so,  indeed,  as   to   lay  himself 

*  Stab.  Eccles.  1,     Diog.  Laert.,  1.  8. 


6  LOGICAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  METHODS — ZENO. 

under  the  imputation  of  employing  his  reasonings  in 
this  form,  more  for  the  purpose  of  sophistication  and 
bewilderment,  than  for  the  discovery  and  promulgation 
of  truth  itself.  The  peculiar  nature  of  the  abstract 
principles  which  lay  at  the  root  of  his  logical  system, 
was  calculated  to  foster  this  idea.  These  rested  on 
his  hypothesis  of  multiplicity,  wherein  each  individual 
was,  first,  both  similar  and  dissimilar  to  itself;  secondly, 
both  one  and  many ;  and  thirdly,  as  at  rest,  and  yet  in 
motion.  These  opinions  he  endeavoured  to  illustrate 
and  develop  by  certain  perplexed  and  attenuated 
reasonings  on  space  and  quantity.* 

Zeno  published  a  treatise  to  illustrate  all  these 
recondite  points  of  his  theory,  and  even  held  public 
discussions  on  them  before  large  assemblies  of  people, 
among  whom  were  some  of  the  most  celebrated 
thinkers  of  the  day.  That  he  produced  a  powerful 
impression  on  the  philosophic  mind  by  his  energetic 
and  indomitable  spirit  of  controversy,  is  affirmed  both 
by  Plato  and  Aristotle.  It  is  said  that  he  visited 
Athens,  and  gave  logical  instructions,  for  considerable 
sums  of  money,  to  some  eminent  Athenian  citizens. 
It  is  also  maintained,  that  he  conversed  with  both 
Pericles  and  Socrates ;  the  latter  of  whom  being,  at 
that  time,  just  bursting  into  manhood. 

On  Zeno's  merits,  as  an  expounder  of  logical  prin- 
ciples and  methods,  Mr  Grote,  in  his  "  History  of 
Greece,"  makes  the  following  judicious  and  pertinent 
remarks  : — "  His  appearance  constitutes  a  remarkable 
era  in  Grecian  philosophy,  because  lie  first  brought  out 
the  extraordinary  aggressive  or  negative  force  of  the 

*  Diog.  Laert.,  1  8.     Lect.  Emp.;  8-7.     Arist.  Top.  1.  8. 


POSITIVE  AND  NEGATIVE  SPECULATION — ZENO.  7 

dialectic  method.  In  this  discussion  respecting  the 
one  and  the  many,  positive  grounds  on  either  side 
were  alike  scanty ;  each  party  had  to  set  forth  the  con- 
tradictions deducible  from  the  opposite  hypothesis,  and 
Zeno  professed  to  shew,  that  those  of  his  opponents 
were  the  more  flagrant.  We  thus  see,  that  along  with 
the  methodized  question  and  answer,  or  dialectic 
method,  employed  from  henceforward  more  and  more 
in  philosophical  inquiries,  comes  out  at  the  same  time 
the  negative  tendency — the  probing,  testing,  and  scru- 
tinizing force  of  Grecian  speculation.  The  negative 
side  of  Grecian  speculation  stands  quite  as  prominently 
marked,  and  occupies  as  large  a  measure  of  the  intel- 
lectual force  of  their  philosophers  as  the  positive  side. 
It  is  not  simply  to  arrive  at  a  conclusion,  sustained  by 
a  certain  measure  of  plausible  premises,  and  then  to 
proclaim  it  as  an  authoritative  dogma,  silencing  or  dis- 
paraging all  objectors,  that  Grecian  speculation  aspires. 
To  unmask  not  only  positive  falsehood,  but  even  affir- 
mation without  evidence,  exaggerated  confidence  in 
what  was  only  doubtful,  and  the  show  of  knowledge 
without  the  reality — to  look  at  a  problem  on  all  sides, 
and  set  forth  all  the  difficulties  attending  its  solution — 
to  take  account  of  deductions  from  the  affirmative 
evidence,  even  in  the  case  of  conclusions  accepted  as 
true  upon  the  balance — all  this  will  be  found  pervading 
the  march  of  their  greatest  thinkers.  As  a  condition 
of  all  progressive  philosophy,  it  is  not  less  essential 
that  the  grounds  of  negation  should  be  freely  exposed, 
than  the  grounds  of  affirmation.  We  shall  find  the 
two  going  hand  in  hand,  and  the  negative  indeed  the 
more  impressive  and  characteristic  of  the   two,  from 


8    POSITIVE  AND  NEGATIVE  SPECULATION THE  SOPHISTS. 

Zeno  down  war  ds,  to  our  history.  In  one  of  the  earliest 
memoranda  illustrative  of  Grecian  dialectics,  the  sen- 
tences in  which  Plato  represents  Parmenides  and  Zeno 
as  bequeathing  their  mantle  to  the  youthful  Socrates, 
and  giving  him  precepts  for  successfully  prosecuting 
those  researches  which  his  marked  inquisitive  impulses 
premised,  this  large  and  comprehensive  point  of  view 
is  emphatically  inculcated.  He  is  admonished  to  set 
before  him  both  sides  of  every  hypothesis,  and  to  fol- 
low out  both  the  negative  and  the  affirmative  chains  of 
argument  with  equal  perseverance  and  equal  freedom 
of  scrutiny;  neither  daunted  by  the  adverse  opinions 
around  him,  nor  deterred  by  sneers  against  wasting 
time  in  fruitless  talk ;  since  the  multitude  are  igno- 
rant, that  without  thus  travelling  round  all  the  sides  of 
a  question,  no  assured  comprehension  of  the  truth  is 
attainable."* 


THE  SOPHISTS. 

There  were  a  number  of  philosophical  logicians  in 
Greece,  in  the  early  ages  of  her  mental  speculations, 
designated  by  the  name  of  Sophists.  The  class  of 
persons  who  went  by  this  title  occupy  a  conspicuous 
place  in  the  history  of  logical  science.  (Their  name 
stands  for  a  particular  species  or  kind  of  reasoning ;  or 
perhaps,  to  speak  more  correctly,  for  a  particular  or 
special  application  of  the  powers  of  ratiocination  gene- 
rally^   Many  have  been  the  discussions  among  philo- 

*  Hist,  of  Greece,  vol.  viii.  p.  471.  See  also  Bayle's  Diet.,  article  "  Zeno." 
Brandis,  Gesch.  cler  Griecli.  Rom.  Pliilos.  i.  p.  409.  Shnplicius,  in  his  Commen- 
tary on  Aristotle's  Physics,  p.  255,  says  that  Zeno  was  the  first  who  composed 
written  dialogues. 


THE  SOPHISTS — THEIR  VOCATION.  \) 

sophers,  both  ancient  and  modern,  respecting  their 
motives  and  character  as  a  sect  or  party.  By  the 
great  majority  of  critics  and  historians,  they  have  been 
denounced  as  the  corrupters  of  the  minds  of  youth ; 
the  subverters  of  their  country's  glory  and  indepen- 
dence ;  the  overweening  pretenders  to  science  and 
wisdom ;  the  wholesale  dealers  in  logical  quibbles,  con- 
ceits, and  conundrums ;  and  the  unscrupulous  revilers 
and  scorners  of  the  truth  in  every  department  of 
human  knowledge. 

These  opinions  on  the  Sophists  have,  on  the  other 
hand,  been  in  a  great  measure  dissented  from  by  some 
writers  of  judgment  and  reputation ;  in  particular,  by  Mr 
Grote,  in  the  eighth  volume  of  his  "  History  of  Greece." 
He  says — "  The  paid  teachers,  under  the  name  of  the 
Sophists,  were  Protagoras  of  Abclera,  G-orgias  of 
Leontini,  Polus  of  Agrigentum,  Hippias  of  Elis,  Pro- 
dicus  of  Keos,  Thrasymachus  of  Chalceclon,  Euthy- 
demus  and  Dionysodorus  of  Chios — to  whom  Xenophon 
adds,  Antiphon  of  Athens.  These  men — whom  modern 
writers  set  down  as  the  Sophists,  and  denounce  as  the 
moral  pestilence  of  the  age — were  not  distinguished  in 
any  marked  or  generic  way  from  their  predecessors. 
Their  vocation  was  to  train  up  youth  for  the  duties, 
the  pursuits,  and  the  successes  of  active  life,  both 
private  and  public.  Others  had  done  this  before ;  but 
these  teachers  brought  to  the  task  a  larger  range  of 
knowledge,  with  a  greater  multiplicity  of  scientific  and 
other  topics — not  only  more  impressive  powers  of  com- 
position and  speech,  serving  as  a  personal  example  to 
the  pupil ;  but  also  as  a  comprehension  of  the  elements 
of  good  speaking,  so  as  to  be  able  to  give  him  precepts 


1  0  THE  SOPHISTS THEIR  VOCATION. 

conducive  to  that  accomplishment  —  a  considerable 
treasure  of  accumulated  thought  on  moral  and  political 
subjects,  calculated  to  make  their  conversation  very 
instructive,  and  discourse  ready  prepared,  on  general 
heads  or  common-places,  for  their  pupils  to  learn  by 
heart.  But  this,  though  a  very  important  extension, 
was  nothing  more  than  an  extension,  differing  merely 
in  degree  of  that  which  Damon  and  others  had  done 
before  them.  It  arose  from  the  increased  demand, 
which  had  grown  up  among  the  Athenian  youth,  for  a 
larger  measure  of  education  and  other  accomplishments 
— from  an  elevation  in  the  standard  of  what  was 
required  from  every  man  who  aspired  to  occupy  a  place 
in  the  eyes  of  his  fellow- citizens.  Protagoras,  Gorgias, 
and  the  rest,  supplied  this  demand  with  an  ability  and 
success  unknown  before  their  time ;  hence  they  gained 
a  distinction  such  as  none  of  their  predecessors  had 
attained,  were  prized  all  over  Greece,  travelled  from 
city  to  city  with  general  admiration,  and  obtained  con- 
siderable pay.  While  such  success,  among  men  per- 
sonally strangers  to  them,  attests  unequivocally  their 
talent  and  personal  dignity,  of  course  it  also  laid  them 
open  to  increased  jealousy,  as  well  from  inferior 
teachers  as  from  the  lovers  of  ignorance  generally — 
such  jealousy  manifesting  itself  by  a  greater  readiness 
to  stamp  them  with  the  obnoxious  title  of  Sophists."* 
In  order  to  form  something  like  a  correct  notion  on 
a  subject  of  this  kind,  where  such  opposite  opinions 
and  sentiments  have  been  expressed,  one  must  look  at 
it  from  different  angular  positions,  and  give  a  due 
share  of  weight  to  those  extraneous  influences,  which, 

*  Hist.  Greece,  vol.  viii.  p.  48G. 


POLITICAL  AND  SOCIAL  STATE  OF  GREECE.  11 

though  not  necessarily  connected  with  the  history  of 
Grecian  logic  as  a  science  or  art,  were  nevertheless  so 
intimately  associated  with  it,  from  incidental  circum- 
stances, as  to  modify  its  exercise,  to  a  considerable 
extent,  in  the  great  field  of  human  thought  and  action. 
These  influences  chiefly  lay  in  the  political  and  social 
state  of  the  country.  It  was  divided  into  a  number  of 
petty  states  or  republics,  in  which  an  oligarchical  and 
democratic  influence  were  each  perpetually  struggling 
for  the  ascendency.  Ehetorical  and  argumentative 
appeals  to  the  passions  and  opinions  of  the  people, 
were  the  stock  and  trade,  as  it  were,  of  all  who  aspired 
to  power  and  distinction  in  legislative  affairs.  The 
entire  current  of  domestic  and  public  education  was 
therefore  directed  into  this  channel.  A  talent  for  dis- 
putation, for  a  power  of  minute  analysis,  or  even  for 
the  handling  of  theoretical  and  abstract  principles  of 
speculation,  was  considered  a  favourable  omen  of  a 
man's  rising  genius  and  future  celebrity.  In  this  per- 
petual agitation  and  contention,  where  mind  was  the 
grand  and  moving  power,  it  may  readily  be  imagined 
that  many  abuses  and  misapplications  of  its  faculties 
and  energies  would  arise.  They  would  be  irregularly 
developed,  and  subjected  to  a  one-sided  cultivation  and 
exercise.  The  prizes  of  power  and  distinction  lay  too 
openly  and  too  invitingly  before  the  eyes  of  the  citi- 
zens ;  and  in  that  eagerness  to  seize  hold  of  and  retain 
them,  what  was  really  true,  and  really  stamped  with 
sound  wisdom,  became  in  a  great  measure  secondary 
questions  in  the  eyes  of  the  struggling  competitors. 
To  gain  a  victory  by  disputatious  acclamation,  or  to 
create  doubts,  or  puzzle  and  bewilder  the  understand- 


12        CORRUPT  AGENTS  AND  INFLUENCES. 

ing,  where  a  victory  of  this  kind  was  to  be  achieved, 
was  the  great  object  of  men's  ambitious  strife  and 
rivalry. 

This  state  of  affairs  was  sure  to  gather  corrupt  agents 
and  influences  around  it  from  all  quarters  :  and  accord- 
ingly we  find,  that  one  of  the  most  powerful  stimulants 
to  this  undue  cultivation  and  exercise  of  the  logical 
energies  of  society,  was  the  practice,  which  universally 
prevailed  among  the  Sophists,  of  demanding  and 
receiving  large  sums  of  money  for  their  professional 
services.  This  led  to  great  abuses,  and  was  one  of  the 
chief  sources  of  that  derision  which  has  been  so  un- 
sparingly and  indiscriminately  heaped  upon  them  as  a 
philosophical  sect  or  party.  They  travelled  from  state 
to  state,  and  from  city  to  city,  disposing  of  their  know- 
ledge and  talents  to  the  highest  bidder  —  taking- 
especial  care,  however,  to  impart  to  their  professional 
services,  a  marketable  value  at  all  times,  whether  they 
squared  in  or  not  with  the  dictates  and  interests  of 
truth.  Among  a  people  naturally  prone  to  mental 
speculations,  and  possessing  no  very  high  tone  of  moral 
feeling,  and  nearly  destitute  withal  of  every  thing  like 
religious  principle  or  restraint,  it  is  quite  natural  to 
suppose  that  a  class  of  persons,  set  apart  for  such  ser- 
vices in  the  logical  art,  and  stimulated  by  such  public 
and  private  advantages  as  they  enjoyed,  should  over- 
shoot the  limits  of  truth  and  dignity,  and  often  degene- 
rate into  the  political  demagogue  and  the  speculative 
quibbler. 

^Lnother  agent  which  conferred  tremendous  power 
on  the  dialectics  of  the  Sophists,  was  the  proneness  of 
the  Athenian  race  to  purely  speculative  topics.     They 


DIALECTIVE  SYSTEM  OF  THE  SOPHISTS.  13 

delighted  in  playing  one  antagonistic  principle  of 
human  reason  against  another.  It  was  not  so  much 
the  aid  or  purpose  of  reasoning,  as  the  mere  form  or 
exercise  of  it,  which  excited  their  attention,  and  received 
their  acclamations.  To  be  a  reasoner  or  logician  was 
one  thing,  and  to  be  a  lover  and  promulgator  of  truth 
was  another ;  and  this  distinction  became  a  settled  and 
active  principle  in  the  public  mind — leading,  in  fact,  to 
an  unnatural  separation  of  two  things  which  should 
always  be  in  unity,  and  thereby  operating  injuriously 
to  the  cause  of  general  truth,  knowledge,  civilisation, 
and  human  happinessy 

When  we  thus  take  into  consideration  the  three 
elements  which  entered  so  largely  into  the  dialective 
system  of  the  Sophists — namely,  the  political  and  social 
condition  of  the  Athenian  commonwealth,  the  merce- 
nary nature  of  the  logical  profession,  and  the  tendency 
of  the  people  to  foster  abstract  questions  of  speculation 
— we  cannot  fail  to  see  that  a  widely-spread  and  firmly 
concatenated  plan  of  instruction,  founded  on  and 
strengthened  by  such  agencies,  must  have  often  oper- 
ated injuriously  on  the  cause  of  truth  and  justice.  A 
body  of  public  teachers  spread  over  the  whole  country, 
acted  upon  by  such  gross  and  material  influences,  must 
have  often  left  behind  them  any  thing  but  a  favourable 
impression  of  their  nature  and  value.  When  the  intel- 
lectual balance  becomes  unequally  poised,  the  cause  of 
truth  must  suffer. 

Now  it  may  safely  and  consistently  be  admitted,  that 
there  might  be  many  distinguished  and  able  men 
among  the  Sophists,  who  really  and  disinterestedly 
laboured  for  the  solid  and  useful  instruction  of  man- 


14  TEACHING  OF  THE  SOPHISTS. 

kind ;  and  yet  there  might  be,  in  the  great  body  who 
followed  this  itinerating  logical  profession,  much  that 
was  highly  censurable,  and  positively  corrupt  and  de- 
basing. Taking  all  the  circumstances  into  considera- 
tion, there  was  much  that  was  calculated  to  make  this 
a  very  colourable  presumption.  The  outward  forms 
of  declamation  and  dispute  were  the  chief  things  which 
engrossed  the  attention  of  both  speakers  and  hearers. 
The  great  thing  was  to  produce  effect.  This  led  public 
declaimers  to  cultivate  pertness,  self-sufficiency,  and  a 
shallow  and  off-hand  treatment  of  a  subject ;  and,  where 
this  could  not  be  successfully  followed,  they  took  shelter 
among  the  fastnesses  of  abstruse  and  mystical  questions, 
susceptible  of  a  double  meaning  and  interpretation,  or 
were  otherwise  of  such  a  character  as  not  to  be  solved 
by  any  powers  of  the  human  faculties.  Then,  again, 
came  the  great  temptations,  from  the  love  of  power  and 
party  influence,  to  bias  the  judgment,  and  to  mislead 
both  instructors  and  people  ;  and  this,  too,  on  questions 
of  great  moment,  but  which  intrinsically  demanded  the 
highest  degree  of  dispassionate  calmness  and  consider- 
ation to  bring  to  a  satisfactory  and  truthful  conclusion. 
The  representations  which  the  ancients  have  given 
of  the  Sophists  may  be  safely  taken  as  generally  correct. 
These  painted  the  tendency  of  their  public  and  private 
teachings  of  the  art  of  reasoning  or  argumentation,  as 
calculated  to  retard  the  progress  of  real  truth  and 
sound  wisdom.  Men  by  this  mode  of  tuition  acquired 
a  decided  taste  for  fine  and  flashy  ornaments,  which 
retarded  their  advancement  in  more  solid  and  valuable 
attainments.  Besides  all  that  was  positively  corrupt 
and  base,  there  sprung  out  of  the  system  of  the  Sophists 


LOGICAL  AND  RHETORICAL  DISPLAYS.  15 

an  arrogant  and  superficial  pretension  to  knowledge, 
which  overshadowed  and  overbore  truth  itself  in  all  its 
native  grandeur  and  simplicity.  This  evil  is  copiously 
and  feelingly  dwelt  upon  by  many  of  the  most  distin- 
guished philosophers  of  Greece. 

And  the  same  thing  which  happened  in  Greece  re- 
lative to  logical  and  rhetorical  displays,  would,  under 
the  same  circumstances,  happen  to  any  enlightened 
country  of  Europe  in  the  present  day.  If  Great  Bri- 
tain, for  example,  were  parcelled  out  into  so  many 
distinct  and  federal  republics  or  states,  each  struggling 
for  superiority  and  influence,  and  if  this  internal  strife 
were  to  be  carried  on  through  the  means  of  paid  and 
pampered  logicians  and  rhetoricians,  we  should  have  a 
race  of  Sophists  the  exact  counterpart  of  those  who 
figured  in  Greece  more  than  two  thousand  years  ago. 
A  sense  of  justice  would  cease  to  have  that  degree  of 
influence  necessary  to  control  party  views  and  party 
interests.  Men  would  meet  each  other,  not  for  the 
laudable  and  useful  purpose  of  hearing  great  truths  ex- 
pounded, but  to  be  amused,  or  to  award  a  prize  to  the 
cleverest  speaker  or  the  most  dexterous  declaimer. 
The  disputatious  spirit  would  necessarily  acquire  such 
strength  and  predominancy,  as  to  be  the  all  in  all  with 
every  class  of  the  people.  To  dispute  equally  well  on 
both  sides  of  a  question,  would  be  the  great  object  of 
ambition  among  all  ranks  of  society.  True  it  is,  that 
we  have  now,  in  the  present  state  of  learning  and 
knowledge,  sufficiently  powerful  guards  or  checks 
against  a  state  of  things  like  this ;  but  this  circumstance 
does  not  weaken  the  original  argument,  but  decidedly 
confirms  and  strengthens  it.     There  is  no  form  or  de- 


16     LOGICAL  SYSTEM  OF  THE  SOPHISTS — ANTISTHENES. 

gree  of  influence  which  moral  and  religious  principle  can 
assume,  which  cannot  be  seriously  weakened  by  a  sys- 
tem of  public  and  private  instruction  which  trifles  with 
truth,  or  weakens  the  innate  power  it  should  exercise 
over  the  human  heart  and  affections. 

What,  then,  was  the  logical  system  of  the  Sophists  ? 
It  was,  in  few  words,  a  system  based  on  sordid  and 
grovelling  motives  and  contrivances.  It  was  a  narrow 
and  contracted  theory  of  the  abstract  nature  and  value 
of  truth.  Its  aim  was  to  show  that  "  the  worse  was  the 
better  reason."  It  was  declamation  without  knowledge 
— subtilty  without  comprehension — paradoxical  with- 
out ingenuity  —  a  display  of  the  forms  without  the 
essence  of  reasoning — a  fruitless  and  barren  exercise  of 
the  noblest  powers  of  the  intellect — undertaken,  not 
for  the  high  and  noble  purpose  of  extending,  but  of 
checking  the  progress  of  sound  knowledge  and  truth 
among  mankind. 

Antisthenes. — This  philosopher  entertained  certain 
opinions  on  that  branch  of  logic  which  embraces  the 
nature  and  use  of  definitions.  He  held  that  a 
definition  could  not  express  the  essence  of  a  thing ; 
for  of  all  things  we  can  only  say,  that,  as  a  whole, 
they  are  what  they  are.  A  definition  can  only  deter- 
mine or  fix  the  nature  of  one  quality  or  attribute  of  a 
thing. 

THE  MAGARIAN,  ELIAN,  AND  EEETRIAN  SCHOOLS  OF  LOGIC. 

Euclid. — The  logic  of  this  distinguished  philosopher 
is  of  a  negative  character.     He  tells  us  that  the  most 


EARLY  HISTOEY  OF  LOGICAL  SCIENCE — SOCRATES.      17 

successful  mode  of  refuting  any  train  of  argument,  is 
not  to  attack  the  premises,  but  the  conclusion.91'  He, 
and  his  immediate  disciples  and  followers,  pushed  this 
doctrine  to  a  great  length. 

Socrates. — The  name  of  Socrates  is  intimately 
associated  with  the  early  history  of  logical  science.  (He 
was  not  only  a  great  and  profound  reasoner  himself, 
but  he  spent  a  long  life  in  publicly  teaching,  "  without 
money  and  without  price,"  what  were  the  best  rules 
and  principles  for  guiding  the  judgment  in  the  acquisi- 
tion and  promulgation  of  truth  generally^)  His  name 
is  one  of  these  conspicuous  landmarks  in  ratiocinative 
science,  which  strikes  the  eye  of  every  inquirer  into  its 
external  history  and  development.  The  Socratic  form 
of  argumentation,  though  pretty  well  known  to  most 
general  readers  and  students,  requires  to  be  illustrated 
in  some  of  its  leading  points.  This  we  shall  attempt 
to  /lo  in  as  brief  terms  as  possible. 

(Jit  would  appear  that  Socrates  obtained  his  elemen- 
tary knowledge  of  logic  from  the  schools  of  Permenides 
and  Zeno.  (It  was  in  this  course  of  elementary  instruc- 
tion that  he  imbibed  the  notion,  which  he  so  firmly 
and  unflinchingly  maintained  in  all  his  subsequent 
teachings,  that  we  should  look  at  every  question  in  a 
double  light — both  negatively  and  positively — in  order 
to^arrive  at  just  and  satisfactory  conclusions  respecting 
it.  j  His  doctrine,  in  this  point  of  view,  was  an  illustra- 
tion of  the  common  maxim,  of  hearing  both  sides  of  an 
argument.      This    is    one  among  the    many   of  those 

*  Diog.  Laert.,  ii.  107. 
B 


18  LOGICAL  SYSTEM  OF  SOCRATES. 

general  principles    on  which  the   entire  fabric  of  his 
peculiar  mode  of  reasoning  rested. 

( The  logical  system  of  Socrates,  in  its  practical  cha- 
racter and  results,  was  analytical  and  synthetical,  alter- 
nating as  the  occasion  suited ;  but  generally  displaying 
the  former  attribute  rather  than  the  lattery  Xenophon, 
in  his  Memorabilia,  tells  us  that  "  Socrates  was  con- 
stantly engaged  in  discussions  on  subjects  immediately 
connected  with  human  nature,  investigating — "  What 
is  piety  ?  What  is  impiety  ?  What  is  the  honourable 
and  the  base?  What  is  the  just  and  the  unjust? 
What  is  temperate  or  unsound  mind?  What  is  a 
city  ?  What  is  the  character  fit  for  a  citizen  ?  What 
is  authority  over  men  ?  WTiat  is  the  character  befitting 
the  exercise  of  such  authority  ? — and  other  questions 
of  a  similar  import.  Men  who  knew  these  matters,  he 
accounted  good  and  honourable ;  men  who  were  igno- 
rant of  them,  he  assimilated  to  slaves." 

(^Again,"  says  Xenophon,  "  Socrates  considered  that 
the  logical  or  dialectic  process  consisted  in  coming  to- 
gether and  taking  common  counsel,  in  distinguishing  and 
distributing  things  into  genera  or  families,  so  as  to  learn 
what  each  separate  thing  really  was.)  To  go  through 
this  process  carefully  was  indispensable,  as  the  only  way 
of  enabling  a  man  to  regulate  his  own  conduct,  aiming  at 
good  objects  and  avoiding  bad.  To  be  so  practised  as  to 
be  able  to  do  it  readily,  was  essential  to  make  a  man  a 
good  leader  or  adviser  of  others.  Every  man  who  had 
gone  through  the  process,  and  come  to  know  what  each 
thing  was,  could  also  of  course  define  it,  and  explain  it 
to  others ;  but  if  he  did  not  know,  it  was  no  wonder 


ANALYTICAL  PROCESS  OF  SOCRATES.  19 

that  he  went  wrong  himself,   and  put   others  wrong 
besides."* 

(Aristotle  also  informs  us,  "that  there  are  two  things 
which  must  in  justice  be  awarded  to  Socrates — the 
inductive  method  of  proof,  and  the  general  definition 
of  ideas — both  of  which  belong  to  the  first  principles  of 
philosophy."')-') 

The  analytical  process,  which  formed  such  a  conspicu- 
ous ingredient  in  the  Socratic  logic,  was  nothing  more  or 
less  than  an  exhibition  of  that  inward  movement  which 
every  man  of  sane  mind,  no  matter  what  portion  of 
acquired  knowledge  he  may  possess,  carries  on  almost 
every  moment  of  his  life.  Our  minds  are  perpetually 
dividing  the  aggregate  representations  of  things  pre- 
sented to  its  contemplation,  whether  of  a  physical  or 
mental  stamp,  and  resolving  them  as  it  were  into  their 
original  or  primary  elements ;  and  after  this  is  effected, 
we  sum  them  all  up  again,  contemplate  the  representa- 
tions as  entire  and  perfect  wholes,  or  compound  con- 
ceptions, and  fix  them  as  such  in  the  mind.  This 
mental  process  is  so  subtile  and  rapid,  that  we  seldom 
can  arrest  the  trains  of  thought  which  constitute  it,  a 
sufficient  length  of  time  to  bring  the  faculty  of  atten- 
tion to  bear  upon  and  observe  them.  But  a  person 
who  has  acquired  some  command  over  his  mind,  and 
can  readily  fall  back  on  his  own  consciousness,  is  never 
at  a  loss  to  comprehend  the  whole  phenomena  of 
analysis  and  synthesis,  and  to  recognise  any  chain  of 
reasoning  founded  upon  them. 

The  analytic  and  synthetic  process  of  thought,  which 
Socrates  brought  out  so  prominently  before  his  coun- 

*  Xenophon  Mem.,  iv.  11-12.  +  Met.,  xiii.  4. 


20   ANALYTICAL  AND  SYNTHETICAL  PROCESS  OF  SOCRATES 

trymen,  enter  into  every  train  of  argumentation,  how- 
ever limited  or  unimportant.  Hence  the  interest  which 
his  discourses  excited.  We  are  almost  entirely  en- 
grossed with  them.  But  general  readers,  and  youthful 
students  in  particular,  are  apt  to  fall  into  an  error  re- 
specting them,  chiefly  by  the  language  which  logicians 
and  metaphysicians  employ  in  giving  an  account  of 
their  nature  and  operation.  We  are  apt  to  imagine 
that  the  analytic  and  synthetic  methods  of  reasoning 
are  purely  matters  of  art,  and  were  brought  to  light  by 
the  inventive  powers  of  some  philosopher  or  another. 
It  is  no  uncommon  thing  to  meet  with  statements  in 
philosophical  treatises,  in  which  it  is  affirmed  that 
Socrates  invented  this  analytic  method.  But  this  is  a  great 
mistake.  The  power  of  dividing  our  general  concep- 
tions or  ideas  into  their  component  parts,  and  the 
faculty  of  uniting  them  again  into  their  former  or  ori- 
ginal state  of  aggregation,  are  mental  manifestations 
intimately  blended  with  the  very  earliest  movements  of 
the  mind  of  man,  however  rude  or  unenlightened  it 
may  be.  We  recognise  the  use  of  these  intellectual 
instruments  in  the  savage  as  well  as  in  the  philosopher, 
as  far  as  their  respective  degrees  of  knowledge  and  the 
duties  of  life  require  their  application. 

(Guarding  the  reader,  therefore,  from  supposing  that 
Socrates  invented  or  discovered  this  mode  of  analytical  and 
synthetical  reasoning,  we  must  yet  award  him  great 
honour  for  having  so  fully  and  clearly  developed  it ; 
not,  however,  in  its  abstract  or  philosophical  character, 
but  in  its  practical  details  and  consequences)  And 
unquestionably  his  dialectical  plan  of  argumentation 
must  have  produced  a  great   effect  on   the  thinking 


DIALECTICAL  ANALYSIS  OF  SOCRATES.  21 

portion  of  the  citizens  of  Athens,  when  we  take  into 
consideration  what  was  the  all-prevailing  mode  of 
philosophical  discussion  in  his  own  day  on  every  branch 
of  human  speculation  and  inquiry.  The  origin  of 
things — their  abstract  attributes  or  qualities,  and  the 
whole  phenomena  of  both  the  physical  and  material 
universe — were  thrown  into  a  promiscuous  jumble,  and 
dignified  with  the  name  of  philosophy.  This  huge 
mass  of  speculation  presented  nothing  tangible  or  prac- 
tical to  the  understanding :  it  had  neither  beginning, 
middle,  nor  end.  Now  Socrates,  by  a  steady  and  con- 
centrated examination  of  his  own  mind,  perceived  the 
radical  error  of  these  philosophizers.  He  perceived 
that,  by  barely  looking  at  these  phenomena  in  their 
state  of  aggregation,  no  correct  information  could  pos- 
sibly be  derived.  The  complex  whole  must  be  broken 
up,  and  resolved  into  its  component  parts.  Every  thing 
around  him  presented  a  wild  chaotic  mass  till  this  was 
accomplished.  He  put,  therefore,  his  powers  of  analy- 
sing, or  his  powers  of  observation,  into  full  play,  and 
tenaciously  grappled  with  principles  and  doctrines  in 
their  totality.  He  placed,  as  it  were,  his  dialectic  wedges 
into  them,  and  split  and  divided  them  into  such  man- 
ageable and  intelligible  portions  as  the  ordinary  mind 
could  retain  and  profit  by.  The  way  and  manner  in 
which  this  was  done  was  his  own.  His  individual  cha- 
racter displays  itself  here  very  strikingly.  (He  endea- 
voured to  carry  his  analysis  as  far  as  he  well  could, 
without  running  into  frivolous  minuteness ;  and  then 
he  either  performed  the  synthetic  process  himself,  or 
left  his  hearers  to  make  it  in  the  way  and  fashion  that 
best  suited  them.     Every  thing  was  to  be  done,  how- 


22  DIALECTICAL  ANALYSIS  OF  SOCKATES. 

ever,  according  to  a  given  plan  or  method ;  and  this 
plan  or  method  was  to  be  in  perfect  agreement  or 
harmony  with  the  object  which  the  mind  had  in  view, 
by  the  adoption  of  any  particular  line  of  reasoning  or 
argumentation.) 

On  this  point,  I  cannot  refrain  from  inserting  a  few 
lines  from  a  recent  and  able  writer  already  quoted : — 

"  In  our  present  state  of  knowledge,  some  mental 
effort  is  required  to  see  any  thing  important  in  the 
words  of  Xenophon ;  so  familiar  has  every  student  been 
rendered  with  the  ordinary  terms  and  gradations  of 
logic  and  classification — such  as  genus,  definition,  indi- 
vidual things  as  comprehended  in  a  genus,  what  each 
thing  is,  and  to  what  genus  it  belongs,  &c.  But  fami- 
liar as  these  words  have  now  become,  they  denote  a 
mental  process,  of  which,  in  400-430  B.C.,  few  men 
besides  Socrates  had  any  conscious  perception.  Of 
course  men  conceived  and  prescribed  things  in  classes, 
as  is  employed  in  the  very  form  of  language,  and  in  the 
habitual  junction  of  predicates  with  subjects  in  common 
speech.  They  explained  their  meaning  clearly  and 
forcibly  in  particular  cases :  they  laid  down  maxims, 
argued  questions,  stated  premises,  and  drew  conclusions, 
on  trials  in  the  Dicastery,  or  debates  in  the  Assembly : 
they  had  an  abundant  poetical  literature,  which  appealed 
to  every  variety  of  emotion  :  they  were  beginning  to 
compile  historical  narrative,  intermixed  with  reflection 
and  criticism.  But  though  all  this  was  done,  and  often 
admirably  well  done,  it  was  wanting  in  that  analytical 
consciousness  which  would  have  enabled  any  one  to  de- 
scribe, explain,  or  vindicate  what  he  was  doing.  The 
ideas  of  men  speakers  as  well  as  hearers — the  produc- 


DIALECTICAL  ANALYSIS  OF  SOCRATES.  23 

tive  minds  as  well  as  the  recipient  multitude — were 
associated  together  in  groups  favourable  rather  to  emo- 
tional results,  or  to  poetical  rhetorical  narrative,  and 
descriptive  effects,  than  to  methodical  generalization,  to 
scientific  conception,  or  to  proof  either  inductive  or  de- 
ductive. (That  reflex  act  of  attention  which  enables 
men  to  understand,  compare,  and  rectify  their  own 
mental  process,  was  only  just  beginning.)  It  was  a 
recent  novelty  on  the  part  of  the  rhetorical  teachers  to 
analyse  the  component  parts  of  a  public  harangue,  and 
to  propound  some  precepts  for  making  men  tolerable 
speakers.  Protagoras  was  just  setting  forth  various 
grammatical  distinctions,  while  Prodicus  discriminated 
the  signification  of  words  nearly  equivalent,  and  liable 
to  be  confounded.  All  these  proceedings  appeared 
then  so  new  as  to  incur  the  ridicule  even  of  Plato  ;  yet 
they  were  branches  of  that  same  analytical  tendency 
which  Socrates  now  carried  into  scientific  inquiry.  It 
may  be  doubted  whether  any  one  before  him  ever  used 
the  words  genus  and  species  (originally  meaning  family 
and  form)  in  the  philosophical  sense  now  exclusively 
appropriated  to  them.  Not  one  of  those  many  names 
(called  by  logicians  names  of  the  second  intention)  which 
imply  distinct  attention  to  various  parts  of  the  logical 
process,  and  enable  us  to  consider  and  criticise  it  in 
detail,  then  existed.  All  of  them  grew  out  of  the 
schools  of  Plato,  Aristotle,  and  the  subsequent  philoso- 
phers, so  that  we  can  thus  trace  them  in  their  begin- 
ning to  the  common  root  and  father,  Socrates."* 

There  are  several  general  considerations  arising  out 
of  the  historical  notice  of  the  logic  of  Socrates  which 

*  Grote's  "  History  of  Greece,"  vol.  riii.  578. 


24  LOGICAL  PROCESSES  OF  SOCRATES. 

are  worthy  of  being  placed  on  record,  inasmuch  as  they 
display  the  sound  and  comprehensive  view  he  took  of 
reasoning  as  a  science  or  art. 

(One  of  the  leading  principles  he  steadily  kept  before 
his  numerous  auditories,  was  the  lofty  and  dignified 
character  of  reasoning  in  itself.  It  was  the  chief  orna- 
ment of  our  race,  and  the  keystone  to  all  our  other 
intellectual  endowments  and  graces.  It  represented 
the  entire  man,  and  was  in  fact  the  embodiment  of  all 
that  could  with  propriety  be  termed  rational  belonging 
to  him.  It  was  not  a  thing  to  trifle  or  play  with,  but 
a  serious  occupation,  always  implying  an  imperative 
duty. 

Socrates  was  guided  in  his  logical  processes  by  that 
which  has  latterly  assumed  the  name  of  common  sense. 
He  was  certainly  the  first  logician  who  really  considered 
it  as  an  indispensable  element  in  the  art  of  ordinary 
ratiocination^  This  is  implied  in  Cicero's  declaration, 
that  Soprates  brought  philosophy  down  from  heaven  to 
earth.  IXenophon  likewise  tells  us,  that  when  he  wished 
to  form  a  decision  on  any  subject,  his  reasonings  always 
proceeded  from  propositions  generally  assented  to  or 
understood.*  He  always  took  his  stand  on  first  prin- 
ciples, and  felt  dissatisfied  with  the  mere  logical  forms 
of  dialectics. ) 

In  all  the  argumentive  displays  of  Socrates,  we  re- 
cognise the  high  principle  of  moral  responsibility  which 
he  invariably  imparted  to  them.  Truth  was  a  thing 
which  involved  the  highest  interests  to  mankind  ;  and 
under  this  grave  and  solemn  light  he  discussed  every 
question  which  came  before  him. 

*  Mem.,  4,  6. 


ESTIMATE  OF  SOCRATES    CHARACTER.  25 

There  are  certain  circumstances  which  have  always 
entered  into  the  estimate  of  Socrates'  character  as  a 
logician,  which  are  altogether  unconnected  with  the 
abstract  merits  of  that  particular  system  of  dialectics 
which  he  cultivated  and  brought  into  general  use. 
These  circumstances  have  their  influence  even  at  the 
present  hour,  and  indeed  always  must  have  with  all 
future  generations.  His  death  was  tragical  in  the  ex- 
treme. He  was  an  acknowledged  wise  and  good  man. 
He  laboured  earnestly  and  disinterestedly  to  inspire  his 
countrymen  with  lofty  and  pure  conceptions  of  virtue, 
intelligence,  and  rectitude  of  principle.  Yet  he  was 
doomed  to  feel  the  weight  of  the  most  flagrant  and 
unprincipled  cruelty.  Though  far  advanced  in  life 
(being  at  his  death  in  his  seventieth  year),  he  met  his 
fate  with  that  heroic  and  calm  fortitude  which  has  ex- 
cited the  admiration  and  sympathy  of  all  writers  and 
historians  since  his  dav. 


26  GRECIAN  LOGIC — PLATO. 


CHAPTER  II. 


PLATO— ARISTOTLE,  380  B.C. 


Grecian  logic,  considered  as  a  science,  received  a 
powerful  stimulus  from  the  lofty  and  splendid  genius 
of  Plato.  Having  a  mind  of  the  highest  order,  with  a 
strong  natural  predilection  to  extreme  generalization 
and  theoretical  disquisitions,  he  felt  dissatisfied  with 
the  mere  power  of  analysis  displayed  by  his  master 
Socrates,  and  the  shallow  and  mechanical  formalism  ot 
the  Sophists.  He  sought  for  some  solid  foundation  on 
which  our  reasonings  and  constant  aspirations  after 
truth  might  be  placed.  He  attempted,  therefore,  to 
penetrate  into  the  hidden  constitution  of  the  mind 
itself;  to  bring  to  light  its  remote  and  general  prin- 
ciples ;  and  to  direct  the  inward  power  of  conscious- 
ness to  those  deeper  things  which  lie  beyond  the  mere 
framework  of  logical  or  dialectic  science.  This  he 
considered  as  the  only  chance  that  mankind  had  of 
placing  truth  upon  a  firm  and  abiding  structure. 

To  a  mind  like  Plato's,  all  preceding  displays  of  logi- 
cal science,  taking  them  in  their  general  aspects,  and 
in  conjunction  with  the  discussions  on  their  leading 
principles,   must   have  appeared,   in  a  great  measure, 


SCIENCE  OF  TKUTH — PLATO.  27 

puerile  and  unsatisfactory.  His  innate  love  of  truth 
was  vehement  and  sincere  ;  and  he  could  not  view  with 
complacency  those  whose  chief  occupation  in  the  sphere 
of  public  and  private  tuition  was  to  trifle  with  the  judg- 
ments of  mankind,  and  to  throw  the  human  under- 
standing into  a  state  of  irremediable  doubt  and  uncer- 
tainty on  every  topic  interesting  for  man  to  know. 
The  sophistical  wrangling  and  declamatory  rhetoric  of 
the  day,  was  a  thing  too  flimsy  and  common-place  for 
a  mind  of  his  order  and  pretensions.  Though  he  had 
witnessed  the  effects  of  the  public  teachings  of  Socrates 
to  counteract  this  injurious  system  by  the  analytical 
displays  of  his  searching  mind ;  yet  Plato  must  have 
perceived  what,  to  his  eye,  would  appear  a  radical  de- 
fect in  the  Socratic  method,  calculated  to  limit  his 
admiration  of  its  scientific  value  and  efficiency  in  the 
important  work  of  laying  a  secure  foundation  of  ratio- 
cinative  science.  Analysis,  however  minutely  and 
accurately  exercised,  can  of  itself  lead  to  nothing. 
By  dividing  things  into  a  multitude  of  particulars,  and 
thereby  placing  the  mind  face  to  face  with  them,  is 
only  one  of  the  functions  of  the  reasoning  process,  and 
by  no  means  the  entire  or  final  consummation  of  it. 
The  synthetic  mode  was  more  to  Plato's  liking;  but 
it  was  a  mode  seldom  used  by  his  distinguished  master, 
Socrates.  All  the  various  processes  of  argumentation, 
and  the  diversified  rules  which  guided  the  different 
schools  of  dialectic  art,  assumed  a  detached  and  iso- 
lated appearance  previous  to  Plato's  day.  He  it  was 
who,  in  treating  of  the  science  of  truth  in  general,  first 
clearly  saw  the  importance  of  a  thorough  knowledge  of 
the  entire  faculties  and  powers  of  the  human  intellect ; 


J28_  SCIENCE  OF  TRUTH PLATO. 

and,  above  all,  of  entertaining  those  lofty  and  sublime 
conceptions  of  its  origin  and  destiny,  which  can  alone 
confer  a  lasting  interest  on  the  duties  and  teachings  of 
the  logician. 

The  first  step  which  Plato  took  in  his  dialectic  specu- 
lations, was  to  clear  up  the  question  as  to  the  origin  of 
our  knowledge.  This  he  conceived  was  of  the  first 
importance.  Some  philosophers  who  had  preceded 
him,  founded  all  truth  on  sensation  ;  while  others  again 
as  stoutly  denied  the  validity  of  our  sensuous  impres- 
sions. He  examined  the  arguments  on  both  sides; 
and  after  many  discussions  came  to  the  conclusion, 
that  sensation  cannot  of  itself  be  the  foundation  of 
truth,  but  only  one  of  its  instruments  or  accessories. 
A  theory  of  evidence  which  rests  merely  upon  the 
impressions  which  external  objects  make  on  our  various 
senses,  did  in  his  opinion  involve  so  many  formidable 
difficulties,  and  even  gross  absurdities,  that  no  rational 
philosopher  could  maintain  it  upon  any  plausible 
grounds  whatever. 

('On  the  nature  of  propositions,  Plato  enters  likewise 
into  various  discussions,  chiefly  with  a  view  of  obtaining 
some  clear  conception  of  what  is  necessarily  involved  in 
every  formal  mode  in  which  scientific  or  abstract  truth 
can  be  presented  to  the  intellect.  A  universal  propo- 
sition is  constituted  of  materials  which  possess  a  per- 
manent and  eternal  existence — are  true  of  all  times 
and  in  all  places ;  and  therefore  are  distinctly  removed 
beyond  the  sphere  of  that  change  which  marks  the 
results  of  all  mere  sensational  knowledge.  The  truth 
which  attends  the  impressions  of  the  senses  is  transi- 
tory and  variable;  but  the  truth  on  which  science  is 


NATURE  AND  CHARACTER  OF  TRUTH — PLATO.  29 

founded,  and  which  can  be  transmitted  from  age  to 
age,  resides  in  the  soul  itself,  and  possesses  a  real 
existence  from  all  subjective  influences  whatever.  If 
this  were  not  the  case,  there  could  be  no  such  thing  as 
knowledge  or  reasoning;  nor  could  the  generation  of 
men  of  to-day  benefit  in  any  degree  from  the  expe- 
rience and  knowledge  of  those  who  had  gone  before 
them.  There  would  be  nothing  among  men  save  the 
fleeting  and  momentary  sensations  of  sensual  feeling.\ 

This  notion  of  Plato's  on  the  nature  and  character 
of  all  truth,  and  of  the  mode  of  acquiring  and  promul- 
gating it,  rests  entirely  upon  his  leading  opinions  as  to 
the  essence  of  our  ideas  generally.  These  opinions 
have  been  a  topic  of  controversy  in  all  ages.  But  into 
these  disputes  we  cannot  enter.  Suffice  it  to  say,  that 
for  the  ordinary  purposes  we  have  now  in  view,  we 
shall  endeavour  to  give  what  we  consider  was  the  lead- 
ing notion  which  Plato  entertained  as  to  the  character 
of  ideas,  when  considered  in  conjunction  with  the 
dialectic  or  reasoning  science  or  art. 

Now  let  us  suppose,  for  example,  a  person  taken  to 
an  eminence,  and  a  beautiful  and  sublime  landscape 
suddenly  bursts  upon  his  sight.  Here  is  a  general 
idea  which  at  once  engrosses  his  mind.  He  dwells 
upon  it,  is  enchanted  with  it ;  and,  as  an  entire  unity 
or  whole,  it  is  for  ever  present  to  his  mind.  Should 
he,  however,  begin  to  analyse  this  aggregate  concep- 
tion into  its  elemental  parts,  still  the  unity  of  the 
whole  is  preserved,  however  varied  the  individual  sen- 
sations or  perceptions  may  be  of  which  it  is  composed. 
He  pronounces  the  landscape  to  be  grand  and  magni- 
ficent; and  these   attributes  are  conceived  to  be  in- 


30       REALITY  AND  IMMUTABILITY  OF  TRUTH — PLATO. 

vested  with  permanent  or  eternal  truth,  inasmuch  as 
the  same  idea  would  enter  the  minds  of  others  at  all 
times,  if  placed  in  the  same  circumstances.  It  is  quite 
possible  that  the  individual  perceptions  or  sensations 
of  men  might  vary  considerably  in  the  viewing  of  this 
landscape ;  but  one  sentiment,  one  opinion,  one  judg- 
ment, one  idea,  would  be  entertained  by  all — namely, 
the  idea  of  grandeur,  beauty,  and  sublimity.  This 
would  be  general  and  permanent — would  have  the 
attribute  of  truth  impressed  upon  it — would  be  a  thing 
to  talk,  to  think,  to  dispute  about,  altogether  apart 
from  the  individual  elements  of  sensation  which  enter 
into  its  composition  or  nature. 

Now  it  is  precisely  the  same  with  every  other  class 
of  our  general  conceptions  which  forms  the  elements  of 
our  reasonings.  The  ideas  which,  we  have  of  what  is 
good,  what  is  just,  what  is  right,  what  is  intellectual, 
are  obtained  in  the  same  manner,  and  clothed  with  the 
same  attributes  of  permanency  and  stability,  as  those 
we  have  just  enumerated  as  constituting  the  beautiful 
and  sublime.  And  if  ideas  did  not  partake  of  this 
solid  and  stable  character,  there  could  be  no  such  thing 
as  reasoning  or  logical  truth  among  mankind.  The 
reality  and  immutability  of  truth,  of  which  we  are 
always  speaking,  and  to  which  we  are  constantly  mak- 
ing appeals,  must,  if  Plato's  notions  are  incorrect,  be  a 
mere  delusion.  He  demonstrates  this  in  numerous 
parts  of  his  writings. 

This  notion  of  ideas  must  also  be  viewed  in  connexion 
with  Plato's  theological  system.  He  may  be  said  to 
have  been  the  first  man  who  ever  gave  to  logical  studies 
a  religious  bias.     His  ideal  theory,  which  represents 


THEOLOGICAL  SYSTEM  OP  PLATO.  31 

the  true  and  the  real  in  science,  has  a  firm  and  per- 
manent foundation,  inasmuch  as  he  places  it  upon  a 
supreme  idea,  which  comprises  all  the  subordinate 
ones,  and  imparts  to  all  the  details  and  minor  divisions 
of  truth,  the  unity  and  beauty  which  we  all  feel  when 
they  are  presented  to  the  understanding.  E"ow  this 
supreme  idea  represents  the  principle  of  all  things — in 
fact,  the  idea  of  Glod,  the  source  of  all  wisdom  and 
truth.  The  Deity  is  therefore  made  the  measure  or 
standard  of  all  that  we  call  knowledge.  It  is  here  that 
all  truth  rests,  as  upon  a  grand  and  common  centre. 
This  centre  is  the  beginning,  middle,  and  end  of  all 
things.* 

This  idea  of  Deity  comprehends  within  it  every 
other  idea,  and  is  that  unity  which  comprises  or  em- 
bodies the  true  essence  of  all  things.-)"  This  is  the 
reason  why  sound  philosophy,  in  all  ages,  has  con- 
nected that  delightful  sensation  which  we  experience 
in  viewing  or  contemplating  what  is  good,  just,  hu- 
mane, right,  beautiful,  orderly,  and  harmonious,  with 
the  Sovereign  Power  which  makes  and  governs  every 
thing.  It  is  by  this  means  that  men  are  insensibly  led 
to  the  notion  of  Supreme  Power,  to  believe  in  its  exist- 
ence, and  to  recognise  its  influence  over  the  destinies 
of  humanity.  Truth  can  have  no  value,  no  influence, 
no  charm,  unless  viewed  in  relation  to  this  great  theo- 
logical principle.  God  is,  therefore,  the  true  and  only 
source  of  all  that  is  beautiful  and  good,  and  the  true 
aim  and  pattern,  by  striving  after  which  man  may  par- 
ticipate in  all  that  is  innately  grand,  ennobling,  beauti- 
ful, and  rational.j 

*  De  Leg.,  iv.  p.  715.  f  Tim.,  p.  29.  t  Phsedr.,  p.  246. 


32  THEOLOGICAL  SYSTEM  OF  PLATO. 

These  theological  ideas  possess  great  interest  when 
viewed  in  conjunction  with  the  dialectic  system  of 
Plato.  That  beauty  or  harmony  which  all  truth  pos- 
sesses— not  the  mere  beauty  or  harmony  which  body, 
or  art,  or  any  particular  science  has — but  that  beauty  or 
harmony  of  the  highest  order,  is  the  real  and  substan- 
tial emanation  of  the  Divine  nature,  which  is  the 
essence  of  all  beauty  and  harmony  itself.  Plato  tells 
us,  that  precisely  in  the  same  manner  as  the  material 
sun  is  not  only  the  source  of  sight,  and  the  real  cause 
that  objects  are  seen,  but  that  they  grow  and  are  pro- 
duced; so  the  Supreme  Good  is  of  such  power  and 
innate  beauty,  that  it  is  not  merely  the  source  of  all 
scientific  knowledge  to  the  soul,  but  is  also  the  source 
of  all  being  and  reality  to  whatever  appertains  to 
human  wisdom.  And  as  the  sun  is  not  itself  sight,  nor 
the  object  of  sight,  but  presides  over  both ;  so  the 
Supreme  Good  is  not  science,  or  the  essence  of  truth, 
but  superior  and  distinct  from  both.  They  are  of  a 
goodly  nature,  but  not  the  Supreme  Good  itself.* 

/According  to  the  Platonic  notion  of  reasoning,  mind 
or  spirit  is  the  grand  moving  principle.  It  is  impos- 
sible to  maintain  the  progressive  and  permanent  nature 
of  knowledge  or  science,  unless  on  the  assumption  of 
this  truth.;  And  one  of  the  chief  attributes  of  this 
mind  or  spirit,  is  that  innate  fecundity  or  spontaneity 
which  is  indispensable  to  its  existence,  and  which  dis- 
tinguishes it  from  all  material  properties  and  essences. 
The  mind  is  self-moving,  and  therefore  different  from 
the  body.f 

What  Plato  advances  on   the    nature  of  language, 

*  De  Rep.,  iv.  p.  506.  f  De  Le?.,  x  p.  895. 


NATURE  OF  LANGUAGE PLATO.  _33 

and  on  that  division  of  dialectics  which  embraces  the 
nature  of  distinct  propositions,  does  not  differ  very 
materially  from  many  opinions  of  the  present  day  on 
the  same  topics.  He  maintains  that  the  employment 
of  words  in  sentences  or  propositions  is  not  arbitrary, 
but  follows  certain  rules  and  principles.  In  every  sen- 
tence or  proposition  there  must  be  a  noun  and  a  verb, 
otherwise  the  mind  is  unable  to  grasp  or  lay  hold  of  it. 
Being  or  existence  is  involved  in  every  verb,  and  in 
every  phase  or  form  of  it ;  and  action  and  passion  are 
consequently  imparted  to  every  object  of  which  any 
thing  can  be  affirmed  or  expressed.  The  verb  is  the 
living  and  animating  principle  of  all  things,  and  like 
the  eye  to  the  body,  without  which  every  thing  is  in- 
volved in  impenetrable  darkness.  (This  being  or  exist- 
ence, as  well  as  its  opposite,  non-being  or  non-exist- 
ence, cannot  be  denned ;  only  the  being  is  represented 
by  an  effulgent  light  which  encircles  it;  whereas  the 
non-being  is  the  pure  negative,  or  the  want  of  this 
irradiating  influence.) 

In  every  form  of  words,  therefore,  which  can  be  sub- 
mitted to  the  reason  or  understanding,  there  is,  in 
order  that  it  may  be  cognisant  of  them,  an  under-cur- 
rent of  thought ;  and  this  thought  is  the  subject  of 
conviction  or  rejection  in  every  formal  proposition 
which  the  intellect  can  possibly  frame,  or  which  can 
be  brought  to  bear  on  the  minds  of  others.  Words 
are,  in  fact,  the  simple  instruments  of  the  thinking 
principle,  and  in  no  case  act  as  the  substitute  of  that 
principle. 

We  have  now  touched  on  the  leading  and  charac- 
teristic points  of  the  logical  system  of  Plato ;  and  we 

c 


34  LOGICAL  WORKS  OF  ARISTOTLE. 

shall  leave  the  subject  for  the  present  without  any 
general  comments.  His  views  will,  in  many  subse- 
quent parts  of  our  historical  sketch,  come  under  our 
notice  ;  and  it  would  only  be  leading  us  into  useless 
repetitions  to  enlarge  on  the  matter  at  the  present 
moment. 

ARISTOTLE. 

We  come  now  to  one  of  the  most  prominent  land- 
marks of  logical  science  and  art — to  Aristotle — one  of 
the  most  surprising  men  in  point  of  talent,  reputation, 
and  influence,  whom  the  world  has  ever  seen.  The 
longest  life  of  man  would  be  inadequate  to  give  a 
naked  abstract  of  all  that  has  been  said  and  written  on 
his  logical  works  alone ;  and  as  to  the  direct  and  indi- 
rect influence  which  these  works  have  exercised  over 
the  minds  of  men  for  more  than  two  thousand  years, 
who  can  form  an  estimate  of  its  intensity  and  range  ? 

In  bringing  the  logical  works  of  Aristotle  before  the 
reader's  attention,  we  shall  strictly  confine  ourselves,  in 
the  present  instance,  to  a  plain  statement  of  their  aim 
and  character,-  leaving  all  general  comments  on  their 
merits  to  subsequent  sections  of  this  treatise.  This 
arrangement  will  prevent,  as  in  the  case  of  Plato, 
needless  repetitions  and  observation ;  besides  its  being 
more  in  accordance  with  the  nature  and  offices  of  a 
mere  historical  sketch  of  this  department  of  human 
knowledge.  These  two  Grecian  philosophers  have 
been  dialectic  rivals  from  their  very  first  appearance 
on  the  stage  of  life  ;  and  even  at  this  hour  they  may 
be  said  to  divide  substantiallv  between  them  the  suf- 


Aristotle's  book  of  the  categories.  35 

frages  of  all  logical  thinkers  in  every  section  of  the 
globe.  Their  respective  systems  are,  therefore,  neces- 
sarily brought  before  us  in  various  periods  of  history, 
either  in  greater  or  less  proportions,  and  are  thus  made 
topics  of  criticism  and  remark  in  every  direction,  and 
on  every  occasion. 

The  works  of  Aristotle  of  a  logical  character  are  the 
following,  namely  : — 1st,  The  Book  of  the  Categories  ; 
2nd,  One  of  Interpretation  ;  3d,  First  Analytics ;  4:th, 
Last  Analytics ;  5th,  Topics;  and  6th,  Of  Sophisms. 
We  are  told  by  Diogenes  Laertius,  that  many  other 
works  of  Aristotle's  on  the  same  subject  are  lost.  It 
has  been  a  common  practice  to  publish  the  whole  of 
these  several  treatises  under  the  name  of  "  Aristotle's 
Organon,"  or  his  "Logic." 

/The  Book  of  the  Categories  is  preceded  by  some 
general  and  explanatory  remarks,  to  which  the  school- 
men gave  the  name  of  ante-prcedicamenta.  Words  are 
divided  into  three  kinds  ;  those  whose  meaning  is  fixed 
and  determined,  those  that  are  equivocal,  and  those 
that  are  denominative^  What  we  say  about  any  thing, 
is  either  simple,  as  man,  horse  ;  or  of  a  compound  cha- 
racter, as  a  man  fights,  the  horse  runs.  On  predication, 
Aristotle  says,  There  is  a  distinction  between  a  subject 
of  which  any  thing  can  be  affirmed  or  denied,  and  a 
subject  of  inhesion.  A  thing  is  said  to  be  inherent  in 
a  subject,  which,  although  not  part  of  the  subject,  can- 
not be  conceived  without  it ;  as  figure  in  the  thing 
figured.  Of  all  things,  some  may  be  predicated  of  a 
subject  which  are  not  in  any  subject ;  as  man  may  be 
predicated  of  Charles  or  John,  but  is  not  in  any  sub- 
ject.    Some  again  are  in  a  subject,  but  can  be  predi- 


36       BOOK  OF  THE  CATEGORIES — QUANTITY. 

cated  of  no  subject ;  as,  for  example,  my  knowledge  of 
language  is  in,  or  belonging  to  me,  as  its  subject,  but 
it  can  be  predicated  of  no  subject,  because  it  is  an  in- 
dividual or  personal  thing.  Again,  there  are  some 
things  which  are  both  in  a  subject  and  can  be  predi- 
cated of  it ;  as,  for  instance,  science,  which  belongs  to 
the  mind  as  its  subject,  and  may  be  predicated  of  geo- 
metry. Lastly,  there  are  things  which  can  neither  be 
in  any  subject,  nor  be  predicated  of  any  subject.  All 
individual  substances  are  of  this  class.  They  cannot  be 
predicated,  because  they  are  individuals;  and  cannot 
be  in  a  subject,  because  they  are  substances. 

The  Categories,  according  to  Aristotle,  comprehend 
all  of  which  we  can  have  the  least  knowledge.}  They  are 
ten  in  number ;  namely,  Quantity.  Quality,  Relation, 
Action,  Passion,  the  Where,  the  When,  Position  in  Space, 
Possession,  and  Substance.) 

Quantity. — Quantity  is  divided  into  discrete  and  con- 
tinued. Discrete  is  that  whose  parts  can  really  be  sepa- 
rated. These  are  again  divided  into  successive  and 
permanent.  Successive  quantity  is  that  which  comes 
by  succession,  as  time  and  motion.  The  parts  of  these 
cannot  be  divided  as  those  of  number,  but  run  onwards 
in  a  continued  series.  Permanent  quantity  is  that 
which  remains  always  the  same,  as  space ;  which  never 
changes  as  time  and  motion  do,  but  has  always  a  last- 
ing and  permanent  existence.  Its  category  is  long, 
broad,  and  deep.  And  here  we  may  observe,  that 
quantity,  when  considered  barely  extended,  without 
breadth  or  depth,  is  called  a  line;  when  it  has  both 
length  and  breadth,  a  surface;  and  when  it  has  length, 
breadth,  and  depth,  it  is  denominated  a  solid. 


BOOK  OF  THE  CATEGORIES — QUALITY,  RELATION.      37 

Quality. — This  is  divided  into  four  kinds.  First, 
Habits;  which  are  such  endowments  as  are  either 
created,  or  very  materially  strengthened,  by  repeated 
acts  of  the  mind.  When  a  man  is  virtuous,  we  say  he 
possesses  the  habit  of  virtue.  In  a  similar  qualified 
sense  we  apply  the  word  habit  to  wisdom,  temperance, 
learning,  &c.  Those  endowments  which  are  acquired 
by  different  acts  of  the  mind,  are  also  considered  as 
qualities ;  but  they  are  usually  called  habits,  Secondly, 
Natural  powers  ;  which  relate  more  particularly  to  our 
bodies,  such  as  the  power  of  walking,  riding,  &c. 
These  powers  are  possessed  more  or  less  by  all  man- 
kind, and  can  be  exercised  as  occasion  requires. 
Thirdly,  Sensible  qualities ;  which  are  those  we  acquire 
by  our  senses  from  the  operation  of  external  objects, 
such  as  colours,  tastes,  smells,  sounds,  &c.  Fourthly, 
Figure  and  Form  are  also  ranked  under  this  category ; 
all  external  objects  must  be  possessed  of  these. 

Relation. — This  indicates  the  relative  connexion 
between  a  multitude  of  things  which  are  of  a  heteroge- 
neous and  discordant  nature,  as  one  thing  like  another; 
one  thing  unlike  another ;  one  thing  near  another ;  one 
thing  far  from  another ;  one  thing  before,  after,  along 
with  another ;  one  thing  great,  equal,  less  than  another ; 
one  thing  the  cause  of  another ;  one  thing  the  effect  of 
another ;  one  person  a  master,  a  landlord,  a  tenant,  a 
servant,  a  child,  a  parent,  a  subject,  a  wife,  a  slave,  a 
client,  &c,  of  another.  Many  of  the  relations  of  which 
these  words  are  descriptive,  are  from  their  very  nature 
very  complicated,  and  give  rise  to  numerous  logical 
distinctions,  which  are  not  here,  however,  of  any  vital 
importance  to  enlarge  upon. 


88    BOOK  OF  THE  CATEGORIES — ACTION,  SUBSTANCE,  ETC. 

Action, — Action  is  either  internal  or  external.  In- 
ternal action  is  when  I  think  of  a  particular  thing  con- 
fined within  myself,  and  which  effects  nothing  without 
me.  External  action  regards  something  without;  as 
when  I  cut  a  piece  of  wood,  or  hew  a  stone. 

Passion. — After  action,  passion  naturally  follows  ;  it 
is  always  expressed  by  a  verb. 

The  Where. — This  answers  to  the  question,  Where 
was  such  a  thing  done  ?  If  one  asks  where  such  a 
battle  was  fought,  I  tell  him  it  was  in  such  a  country, 
and  near  such  a  city. 

The  When. — This  category  gives  answers  to  ques- 
tions relative  to  time.  As,  How  long  is  it  since  he  died  ? 
One  hundred  years  ago. 

Position  in  Space. — This  relates  to  standing,  sitting, 
before,  behind,  right,  left,  &c. 

Possession. — This  category  involves  the  whole  rights 
of  property. 

Substance. — This  is  divided  into  two  kinds,  spiritual 
and  temporal.  Spiritual  is  again  divided  into  living 
creatures,  as  man,  beasts,  birds;  and  temporal  into 
inanimate  things,  as  metals,  minerals,  earth,  air,  stone, 
&c.  Both  orders  may  again  be  subdivided  into  an 
almost  endless  number  of  classes  and  divisions. 

Aristotle  explains,  in  several  chapters,  what  the 
schoolmen  called  post-prcedicamenta  ;  that  is,  an  expla- 
nation of  the  four  kinds  of  terms  expressive  of  opposi- 
tion— namely,  relative,  privative,  of  contrariety,  and  of 
contradiction. 

\The  treatise  termed  Interpretation  relates  to  language. 
What  is  a  noun  ?  What  is  a  verb  ?  What  affirmation  ? 
What  negation  ?    What  speech  ?     Words  are  the  signs 


ARISTOTLE INTERPRETATION,  ANALYTICS,  TOPICS.      39 

of  mental  things,  and  writing  is  the  sign  of  words. 
Both  the  signs  of  ideas  and  the  signs  of  words  are  vari- 
able among  mankind,  but  the  operations  and  powers 
of  the  mind  itself  remain  the  samey 

On  the  First  and  Last  Analytics,  and  the  book  of  Topics, 
we  shall  give  some  short  account,  sufficient,  it  is  hoped, 
to  make  the  leading  principles  of  the  Aristotelian  logic 
intelligible  to  ordinary  readers.  To  give  any  thing  like 
a  complete  analysis  of  the  entire  system,  would  be  alto- 
gether out  of  place  in  a  work  of  this  kind.  We  are 
compelled  here  to  be  brief;  and  this  must  be  our 
apology  for  the  omission  of  many  things  which  some 
logicians  may  be  inclined  to  think  ought  to  have  been 
treated  of,  and  fully  expounded. 

(Although  last  in  order  as  being  treated  of  in  the 
Topics,  we  shall  notice  the  predicables.  These,  accord- 
ing to  Aristotle,  are  four,  namely,  genus,  differentia,  pro- 
prium,  and  accidens  ;  that  is,  every  question  must  either 
be,  first,  about  the  genus  of  a  subject ;  or,  secondly, 
about  its  specific  difference;  or,  thirdly,  about  something 
proper  to  it ;  or,  fourth  and  lastly,  about  something  acci- 
dental. The  doctrine  of  the  predicables  makes  an 
essential  part  of  the  Aristotelian  logic ;  and  the  reasons 
which  its  author  adduces  for  them  are  substantially 
the  following : — 

"Whatever  is  attributed  to  a  subject,  it  must  either 
be  that  the  subject  can  be  reciprocally  attributed  to  it, 
or  that  it  cannot.  If  the  subject  and  attribute  can  be 
reciprocated,  the  attribute  either  declares  what  the  sub- 
ject is,  and  then  it  is  a  definition,  or  it  does  not  declare 
what  the  subject  is,  and  then  it  is  a  property.  If  the 
attribute  cannot  be  reciprocated,  it  must  be  something 


40  NATURE  OF  THE  SYLLOGISM — ARISTOTLE. 

contained  in  the  definition,  or  not.  If  it  be  contained 
in  the  definition  of  the  subject,  it  must  be  the  genus  of 
the  subject,  or  the  specific  difference ;  for  the  definition 
consists  of  these  two.  If  it  be  not  contained  in  the 
definition  of  the  subject,  it  must  be  an  accident." 

The  two  treatises  called  "  Analytics,'"  develop  the 
doctrines  and  principles  of  the  syllogism.  These  are 
stated  at  full  length,  and  in  every  possible  form  and 
combination.  Though  the  Categories,  the  Predicables, 
and  some  say  the  Interpretation,  are  not  claimed  by 
him  as  his  own,  he  does  nevertheless  lay  claim  to  the 
syllogistic  system  as  his  own  invention  and  develop- 
ment. The  "First  Analytics"  contain  forty-six  chap- 
ters, which  embrace  the  four  leading  topics ;  first,  the 
conversion  of  propositions ;  secondly,  the  structure  of 
syllogisms  in  all  the  different  figures  and  modes ;  thirdly, 
the  invention  of  the  middle  term ;  and,  fourthly,  the  re- 
solution of  syllogisms.  The  "Last  Analytics"  treat 
chiefly  of  the  matter  of  syllogisms ;  and  this  may  be 
either  true  or  false,  probable  or  improbable. 

Of  the  nature  of  the  syllogism  generally,  we  shall  simply 
state  that  it  is  an  argument  or  form  of  reasoning  con- 
sisting of  three  .propositions,  the  last  of  which  is  deno- 
minated the  conclusion,  and  is  inferred  from  the  two 
preceding  parts,  which  are  termed  the  premises.  The 
conclusion  has  two  terms,  the  subject  and  the  predi- 
cate ;  its  predicate  is  called  the  major  term,  and  its 
subject  the  minor  term.  In  order  to  draw  a  conclu- 
sion, each  of  its  terms  is,  in  the  premises,  compared 
with  another  term,  called  the  middle  term.  By  this 
means  one  of  the  premises  will  have  for  its  two  terms 
the  major  term  and  the  middle  term  ;  and  this  premiss 


NATURE  OF  THE  SYLLOGISM ARISTOTLE.  41 

is  called  the  major  premiss,  or  the  major  proposition  of 
the  syllogism.  The  other  premiss  has  for  its  two  terms 
the  minor  term  and  the  middle  term,  and  is  called  the 
minor  proposition.  Thus  the  syllogism  consists  of  three 
propositions,  distinguished  by  the  names  of  the  major, 
the  minor,  and  the  conclusion;  and  although  each  of 
these  has  two  terms,  a  subject  and  a  predicate,  yet  there 
are  only  three  different  terms  in  all.  The  major  term 
is  always  the  predicate  of  the  conclusion,  and  is  also 
either  the  subject  or  predicate  of  the  minor  proposi- 
tion. The  minor  term  is  invariably  the  subject  of  the 
conclusion,  and  is  also  either  the  subject  or  predicate 
of  the  minor  proposition.  The  middle  term  never 
enters  into  or  forms  a  part  of  the  conclusion,  but  stands 
in  both  'premises  either  in  the  position  of  subject  or 
predicate/) 

Syllogisms  are  said  to  be  in  various  figures,  accord- 
ing to  the  various  positions  of  the  middle  term.  All 
the  possible  positions  of  the  middle  term,  are  in  Aris- 
totle's system  only  three.*  Eirst,  The  middle  term 
may  be  the  subject  of  the  major  proposition,  and  the 
predicate  of  the  minor,  and  this  constitutes  the  syllo- 
gisms in  the  first  figure.  Secondly,  The  middle  term 
may  be  the  predicate  of  both  premises,  and  then  the 
syllogism  is  of  the  second  figure.  Lastly,  The  middle 
term  may  be  the  subject  of  both,  which  arrangement 
makes  the  syllogism  of  the  third  figure. 

All  syllogisms,  according  to  the  nature  of  the  subject 
to  be  proved  by  them,  are  divided  into  universal  affir- 
mative, universal  negative,  particular  affirmative,  and 
particular  negative. 

*  The  fourth  figure  was  afterwards  added  by  Gralen. 


42 


NATURE  OF  THE  SYLLOGISM — ARISTOTLE. 


The  following  is  an  illustration  of  all  the  three 
figures.  We  must  observe  that  A  is  the  minor  term, 
C  the  major,  and  B  the  middle  term : — 

FIRST  FIGUEE. 


Universal  Affirmative. 

Universal  Negative. 

Particular  Affirmative. 

Particular  Negative. 

All  B  is  C, 

All  A  is  B  ; 

Therefore 

All  A  is  C. 

No  B  is  0, 

All  A  is  B  ; 

Therefore 

No  A  is  C. 

Some  B  is  C, 
Some  A  is  B  ; 

Therefore 
Some  A  is  C, 

No  B  is  C, 
Some  A  is  B  ; 

Therefore 
Some  A  is  not  C. 

SECOND  FIGURE. 
This  figure  expresses  nothing  but  negatives,  general  and  particular. 


No  C  is  B, 

All  A  is  B  ; 

Therefore 

No  A  is  C. 


All  C  is  B, 
No  A  is  B  ; 

Therefore 
No  A  is  C. 


No  C  is  B, 

Some  A  is  B  ; 

Therefore 

Some  A  is  not  B. 


All'C  is  B, 
Some  A  is  not  B; 

Therefore 
Some  A  is  not  C. 


THIRD  FIGURE. 


All  B  is  C, 

No  B  is  C, 

Some  B  is  C, 

Some  B  is  not  C, 

No  B  is  C, 

All  Bis  A; 

AH  B  is  A ; 

All  Bis  A; 

All  B  is  A ; 

Some  B  is  A ; 

Therefore 

Therefore 

Therefore 

Therefore 

Therefore 

Some  A  is  C. 

Some  A  is  not  C. 

Some  A  is  C. 

Some  A  is  not  C. 

Some  A  is  not  C. 

The  theoretical  principle  on  which  Aristotle  demon- 
strates the  four  modes  of  the  first  figure,  is  denomi- 
nated the  Dictum  de  omni  et  nullo,  and  its  nature  is 
this :  That  what  is  affirmed  of  a  whole  genus,  may  be 
affirmed  of  all  the  species  and  individuals  belonging  to 
that  genus ;  and  what  is  denied  of  the  whole  genus, 
may  be  denied  of  its  species  and  individuals. 
(Although  these  various  syllogistic  figures  have  rules 


Aristotle's  book  of  sophisms.  43 

peculiar  to  each,  there  are  nevertheless  some  which  are 
common  to  all  syllogisms.  Aristotle  enumerates  the 
following :  1st.  Every  syllogism  must  have  only  three 
terms  or  propositions.  2nd.  The  middle  term  must  be 
taken  universally  in  one  of  the  premises.  3d.  If  one  of 
the  extremes  be  particular  in  one  of  the  premises,  it 
must  be  particular  in  the  conclusion.  4dh.  The  conclu- 
sion must  be  particular,  if  either  of  the  premises  be 
particular ;  and  negative,  if  either  of  the  premises  be 
negative.  5th.  ~No  term  can  be  taken  universally  in  the 
conclusion,  if  it  be  not  taken  universally  in  the  premises.  , 

The  Book  of  Sophisms. — As  the  sources  and  forms 
of  error  are  almost  infinite,  so  are  likewise  the  rules 
which  may  be  framed  for  their  detection  and  classifica- 
tion. Aristotle  attempts  to  bring  all  the  fallacies  that 
can  enter  into  the  syllogistic  form  under  thirteen  heads 
— six  of  which  refer  to  diction  and  language,  and  seven 
that  are  not  in  the  diction. 

The  fallacies  in  diction  are, — 1st.  When  a  word  is 
taken  at  one  time  in  one  sense,  and  at  another  in  a 
different  sense.  2nd.  When  an  ambiguous  phrase  is 
taken  in  the  same  way.  3d  and  ith.  Eelate  to  ambigui- 
ties in  syntax.  5th.  Embraces  ambiguities  in  prosody, 
accent,  or  pronunciation.  6th.  Ambiguities  from  figures 
of  speech. 

The  seven  fallacies  which  lie  not  in  language,  but  in 
things,  are, — 1st.  Taking  an  accidental  conjunction  of 
things  for  a  natural  or  necessary  connexion.  2nd. 
Taking  that  absolutely  which  ought  to  be  taken  com- 
paratively, or  with  certain  limitations  or  qualifications . 
3d.  Taking  that  for  a  cause  which  is  only  an  occasion 
or    concomitant,      ith.    Begging    the    question.      5th. 


44  LOGICAL  SYSTEM  OF  ARISTOTLE. 

Mistaking  the  question.  6th.  When  that  which  is  not 
a  consequence  is  taken  for  a  consequence.  7th.  Falla- 
cies which  lie  in  complex  propositions.*/ 

We  have  now  submitted  to  the  reader's  notice  the 
leading  framework  of  the  logical  system  of  Aristotle ; 
but  it  must  also  be  observed  that,  independent  of  its 
technical  and  collossal  form,  we  find  it  supported  and 
defended  by  a  large  mass  of  purely  speculative  thought. 
It  is  not  as  a  mere  system  of  dialectic  formalism  we 
must  contemplate  and  value  his  labours  as  a  logician, 
but  as  a  profound  metaphysician  and  philosophical 
thinker;  and  one  who  clearly  perceived  that  every 
scheme  for  recognising  and  promulgating  of  truth, 
must  ultimately  rest  upon  the  validity  of  certain  ab- 
stract principles  of  mental  philosophy.  These  prin- 
ciples must  be  examined  and  discussed ;  they  must  be 
brought  out  to  open  day,  and  stripped  of  those  doubts 
and  ambiguities  which  hang  about  them,  from  the  very 
constitution  of  things,  and  the  peculiar  structure  of  the 
human  intellect  itself. 

To  these  purely  philosophical  elements  of  his  logical 
system,  we  have  not  space  sufficient  to  do  any  thing 
like  adequate  justice.  A  few  general  remarks  are  all 
that  we  can  devote  to  them;  and  must,  therefore, 
leave  the  reader  to  fill  up  the  hiatus  by  a  perusal  of 
the  author's  metaphysical  works  themselves,  or  such 
portions  of  them  as  have  a  direct  bearing  on  his  logical 
speculations. 

It  may  be  remarked  in  the  first  place,  that  Aristotle 
connects  his  logical  system  with  a  self-created  and 
self-sustaining  power  in  the  universe.     There  must  be 

*  See  Dr  Reid's  "  Analysis  of  Aristotle's  Logic." 


VIEWS  OF  THE  SYSTEMS  OF  PLATO  AND  ARISTOTLE.      45 

an  ultimate  basis  on  which  every  species  and  degree  of 
truth  must  rest ;  for  there  could  be  no  such  thing  as 
science  from  causes  which  run  into  an  infinite  series.* 
There  must,  therefore,  be  a  First  and  Efficient  cause,  f 
If  we  cannot  assume  an  eternal  and  permanent  essence, 
independent  of  all  physical  or  sensible  properties,  how 
could  order  exist  in  the  world,  or  how  could  there  be 
any  thing  like  reason  at  all,  seeing  that  the  nature  and 
purposes  of  reason  are,  in  all  cases  where  it  is  exer- 
cised, to  perform  nothing  without  an  end  or  aim  ?  The 
mind  of  man  cannot  be  for  ever  tossed  about  in  the 
region  of  infinity ;  all  the  leading  divisions  or  prin- 
ciples of  its  structure  point  to  something  which  is 
neither  moved,  nor  can  be  moved  by  ought  else  than 
the  inherent  power  of  its  own  character  or  being. 

Although  many  able  critics  on  Aristotle  consider 
that  his  leading  views  of  the  mind,  and  of  the  abstract 
nature  of  the  reasoning  faculties  in  particular,  were  of 
a  more  material  complexion  than  those  of  Plato's;  yet 
there  is,  I  conceive,  sufficient  grounds  for  maintaining 
that  his  notions  of  the  understanding,  or  the  higher 
faculties  of  the  intellect,  were  decidedly  of  an  elevated 
and  spiritual  cast.  His  opinions  on  the  nature  of  ideas, 
it  is  true,  were  not  so  sublime  as  those  of  Plato's ;  but 
the  difference  was  not  so  palpable  and  wide  as  to 
justify  us  in  classifying  the  Stagy  rite  with  materialists 
of  any  grade  whatever.  We  see  clearly  from  his  writ- 
ings, that  as  a  general  principle  he  affirms,  that  from 
pure  matter,  and  its  laws  and  properties  strictly  con- 
sidered, nothing  can  be  rationally  deduced,  calculated 
to   satisfy  the  innate  craving  of  an   inquiring  spirit. 

*  Met.,  ii.  2.  f  Phys.,  v.  1. 


46     VIEWS  OF  THE  SYSTEMS  OF  PLATO  AND  ARISTOTLE. 

Many  of  the  faculties  of  the  mind  he  also  views  as 
merely  instruments  in  the  hands  of  the  understanding, 
which  is  altogether  of  a  superior  nature,  is  entirely 
distinct  from  it,  and  out  of  which  true  science  can 
alone  be  deduced.  Memory  is  likewise  considered  as 
a  mere  motion  of  the  soul,  and  does  not  partake  of  the 
nature  of  science.  And  even  men  of  the  most  extended 
experience  are  looked  upon  as  mere  inanimate  or  life- 
less instruments,  when  they  are  not  inspired  with  the 
higher  reason  which  is  concerned  in  the  investigations 
of  the  causes  of  those  facts  which  come  before  them.* 

In  Aristotle's  opinion  it  was  of  the  greatest  moment 
to  all  science  that  we  entertain  proper  ideas  of  the 
relation  in  which  the  mind  of  man  stands  to  the  Divine 
or  First  Cause.  Our  notions  of  the  nature  and  im- 
portance of  all  truth  are  directly  and  vitally  effected 
by  this  relation.  The  exact  position  in  which  the 
human  intellect  stands  in  reference  to  the  supreme  and 
governing  mind  of  the  universe,  appeared  to  him  as 
involving,  among  other  things,  two  very  essential  prin- 
ciples— namely,  a  constant  desire  to  approach  nearer 
and  nearer  to  that  grand  source  of  all  true  wisdom  and 
science ;  and  yet,  secondly,  a  deep-rooted  conviction 
or  consciousness  that  the  contemplative  reason  could 
never  arrive  at  that  loftier  and  higher  rule  of  evidence 
and  truth  from  which  its  existence  took  its  origin. 
These  considerations  naturally  lead  him  into  many 
perplexing  and  unfathomable  questions;  but  he  seems 
nevertheless,  amid  all  his  cogitations  on  the  subject,  to 
have  maintained  with  remarkable  tenacity  and  firm- 
ness, and  even,  betimes,  at  the  expense  of  his  logical 

*  Met.,  i.  1. 


HISTORICAL  SKETCH  OF  ARISTOTLE'S  SYSTEM,  47 

consistency,  the  complete  integrity  of  that  principle  of 
connexion  between  the  Divine  and  human  minds, 
which  he  looked  upon  as  the  sheet-anchor  of  all  sound 
philosophy  and  ratiocination.  And  hence  many  of  his 
most  remarkable  and  pointed  expressions  on  the  sub- 
ject— such  as  his  famous  declarations,  "  That  the 
thought  of  God  is  the  thought  of  thoughts;"  and 
"  That  the  reason  in  man  is  exactly  the  same  in  its 
nature  and  offices  as  the  reason  in  God." 

(The  grand  object,  therefore,  of  all  scientific  truth,  is 
to  investigate  the  grounds  on  which  the  phenomena 
around  us  present  themselves  to  our  notice.  The  prin- 
ciples or  rules  of  investigation  are  held  together  by, 
and  rest  upon,  a  supreme  first  cause,  God,  in  whom 
alone  every  thing  can  be  fully  known  and  compre- 
hended. We  can,  however,  by  the  faculties  we  possess, 
attain  to  such  conceptions  as  fully  correspond  to  the 
objects  and  things  we  recognise :  and  to  feel  assured 
that  these  conceptions  adequately  express,  to  philoso- 
phical minds,  the  truth  of  things,  such  as  science^  and 
the  reasoning  powers  of  man  reveal  them  to  us.  }  As 
Plato  maintains  that  the  Deity  is  the  principle  of 
unity  of  science  and  substance,  so  likewise  Aristotle 
declares  that  God  is  both  intelligence  and  the  intelli- 
gible. (Jhe  principles  and  essence  of  all  things,  so  far 
as  their  actuality  is  concerned,  must  be  in  perfect  uni- 
son with  the  rational  spirit  of  man ;  for  this  is  a  neces- 
sary and  indispensable  condition  of  their  being  appre- 
hended and  rendered  intelligible  by  the  reason  or 
understanding. )  This  is  the  source  of  that  refined  and 
delightful  feeling  which  the  soul  experiences  in  the 
pursuit  of  science  and  truth. 


48  HISTOKICAL  SKETCH  OF  ARISTOTLE'S  SYSTEM. 

We  ought  not  to  omit,  in  this  historical  sketch  of 
the  famous  logical  system  of  the  Stagyrite,  a  few 
remarks  which  he  has  left  us  himself  on  its  compara- 
tive merits  in  his  own  eyes.  These  are  important  and 
interesting  declarations,  when  viewed  in  conjunction 
with  the  subsequent  history  of  his  power  and  influence 
over  the  art  of  reasoning  among  mankind — 

u  Of  those  who  may  be  termed  inventors,  some  have 
made  important  additions  to  things  long  before  begun, 
and  carried  on  through  a  course  of  ages ;  others  again 
have  given  a  small  beginning  to  things,  which,  in  suc- 
ceeding times,  will  be  brought  to  greater  perfection. 
The  beginning  of  a  thing,  though  small,  is  the  chief 
part  of  it,  and  requires  the  greatest  degree  of  invention ; 
for  it  is  easy  to  make  additions  to  inventions  once 
begun.  Now,  with  regard  to  the  dialectical  art,  there 
was  not  something  done,  and  something  remaining  to 
be  done.  There  was  absolutely  nothing  done ;  for 
those  who  professed  the  art  of  disputation  had  only  a 
set  of  orations  composed,  and  of  arguments,  and  of 
captious  questions,  which  might  suit  many  occasions. 
These  their  scholars  soon  learned,  and  fitted  to  the 
occasion.  This  .was  not  to  teach  you  the  art,  but  to 
furnish  you  with  the  materials  produced  by  the  art ;  as 
if  a  man  professing  to  teach  you  the  art  of  making 
shoes,  should  bring  you  a  parcel  of  shoes  of  various  sizes 
and  shapes,  from  which  you  may  provide  those  you 
want.  This  may  have  its  use,  but  it  is  not  to  teach  the 
art  of  making  shoes.  And,  indeed,  with  regard  to  rhe- 
torical declamation,  there  are  many  precepts  handed 
down  from  ancient  times ;  but,  with  regard  to  the  con- 
struction of  syllogisms,  not  one. 


ADVENTURES  OF  HIS  PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS.  49 

"  We  have  therefore  employed  much  time  and  labour 
upon  this  subject ;  and  if  our  system  appear  to  you  not 
to  be  in  the  number  of  those  things  which,  being  before 
carried  a  certain  length,  were  left  to  be  perfected,  we 
hope  for  your  favourable  acceptance  of  what  is  done, 
and  your  indulgence  in  what  is  left  imperfect." 

The  philosophical  works  of  Aristotle,  including  of 
course  his  logical  ones,  had  some  singular  adventures. 
Historians  tell  us  that  they  remained  in  a  great  mea- 
sure unknown  after  his  death.  Theophrastus,  who  suc- 
ceeded him  in  the  Peripatetic  school,  became  possessed 
of  them.  This  philosopher  transmitted  them  to  JSTeleus, 
his  heir,  who  afterwards  sold  them  to  Ptolemy  Phila- 
delphus,  king  of  Egypt,  who  conveyed  them  to  Scepsis, 
a  city  of  Troas,  where  they  were  deposited  in  a  vault, 
lest  they  should  fall  into  the  hands  of  the  king  of  Per- 
gamus,  wdio,  it  is  alleged,  wished  to  appropriate  them 
to  himself  for  some  trifling  amount  of  money. 

In  this  place  of  concealment  they  remained  for  the 
space  of  one  hundred  and  thirty  years,  until  the  damp 
and  vermin  had  rendered  them  nearly  illegible.  They 
were,  however,  by  some  means  not  accurately  known, 
preserved  from  destruction,  and  were  afterwards  sold  to 
Apelicon,  a  philosopher  of  the  Peripatetic  school,  who 
caused  them  to  be  transcribed,  and  to  be  placed  in  his 
library.  There  they  remained  till  Sylla,  a  general  of 
the  Roman  army,  conquered  Athens,  when  he  came 
possessed  of  the  entire  library  of  Apelicon,  and  trans- 
mitted them  to  Rome.  It  was  here  that  one  Tyrannion, 
a  Greek  grammarian,  and  an  intimate  acquaintance 
of  Cicero  and  Atticus,  obtained  a  copy  of  Aristotle's 
writings,  through  the  instrumentality  of  the  librarian 


50  ADVENTURES  OF  HIS  PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS. 

of  Sylla ;  and  Tyrannion,  being  an  able  critic,  got  them 
transcribed  and  corrected  with  great  precision;  and 
from  this  copy  the  Eomans  seemed  to  have  received 
the  chief  portion  of  their  knowledge  of  the  Peripatetic 
philosophy. 

It  is  supposed  that  the  Arabian  philosophers  derived 
their  first  acquaintance  of  the  logical  works  of  Aris- 
totle, from  copies  of  his  writings  which  the  king  of 
Egypt  purchased.  The  knowledge,  however,  of  his 
works  in  Italy,  appears  to  have  been  nearly  extin- 
guished by  the  inundations  of  German  barbarians, 
who  overthrew  the  Roman  dynasty  in  the  fifth  cen- 
tury. It  is  confidently  affirmed  that  there  were  no 
part  of  his  works  much  read  or  admired  in  Europe  till 
about  the  eleventh  century;  and  that  the  knowledge 
of  them  then  acquired,  was  chiefly  obtained  through 
the  instrumentality  of  the  Arabian  writers. 


PROGRESS  OF  LOGICAL  SCIENCE — ARISTOTLE.  51 


CHAPTER  III. 

PROGRESS  OP  LOGICAL  SCIENCE  FROM  THE  DAYS  OF 
ARISTOTLE  TO  THE  CHRISTIAN  ERA. 

V^hat  was  the  degree  of  influence  which  the  logic  of 
Aristotle  exercised  immediately  after  his  death,  on  the 
minds  of  the  Athenians,  we  have  but  very  scanty  means 
of  knowing.  The  history  of  some  succeeding  centuries 
presents  his  dialectics  only  now  and  then  to  public 
notice;  and,  most  commonly,  in  conjunction  with  other 
branches  of  his  philosophy.  From  a  story  which  has 
been  often  told,  it  would  appear  that  he  was  somewhat 
anxious  that  a  system  which  had  cost  him  so  much 
labour,  and  on  which  he  seems  to  have  anticipated 
that  his  fame  in  after  times  would  ultimately  rest, 
might  receive  the  fostering  care  of  the  most  influential 
and  talented  of  his  friends.  The  story  runs  thus:  — 
That  a  little  before  his  death,  and  when  very  infirm,  he 
was  requested  by  some  of  his  disciples  to  name  a  suc- 
cessor worthy  of  teaching  his  philosophy  and  logic. 
Two  of  his  scholars  appeared  to  him  eminently  fitted 
to  discharge  this  duty — Theophrastus  of  Eresos,  in 
Lesbos,  and  Eudemus  of  Rhodes.  After  some  little 
delay,  Aristotle  asked  for  some  Lesbian  and  Rhodian 


52    PROGRESS  OF  LOGICAL  SCIENCE — THEOPHRASTUS,  ETC. 

wines,  and  after  tasting  of  each,  he  pronounced  them 
both  good,  but  that  he  had  a  decided  relish  for  the 
Lesbian.  His  disciples  interpreted  this  decision  as 
intimating  that  Theophrastus  should  be  the  successor 
to  his  school. 

Theophrastus  became,  therefore,  the  head  of  the 
Peripatetic  school,  and  he  is  stated  to  have  filled  the 
situation  forty-five  years — to  have  lived  to  the  great 
age  of  ninety-nine — and  to  have  had  under  his  tuition 
as  many  as  two  thousand  students  at  one  time.  Both 
he  and  Eudemus  maintained  their  master's  logical 
system  nearly  entire  as  they  found  it,  with  the  excep- 
tion of  some  trifling  matters  of  detail.  It  is,  however, 
affirmed  by  some  writers,  that  their  united  teachings 
imparted,  on  the  whole,  a  more  material  and  mechani- 
cal spirit  to  the  general  system  of  reasoning  which  the 
Stagyrite  had  left  behind  him. 

Whether  this  be  the  case  or  not,  certain  it  is,  that 
the  latter  Peripatetic  philosophers  gradually  lowered 
the  standard  of  truth,  and  of  those  faculties  of  the 
mind  more  immediately  subservient  to  its  discovery 
and  promulgation.  Aristoxenus  instituted  the  analogy 
between  the  soul  and  the  principle  on  which  the  har- 
mony of  musical  sounds  is  founded.  As  this  is  the 
result  of  certain  fixed  and  unalterable  relations  which 
subsist  between  the  various  tones ;  so  the  soul,  in  like 
manner,  is  the  result  of  certain  relative  arrangements 
of  the  different  parts  or  functions  of  the  body — the 
intellectual  principle  being  only  a  given  tension  of  the 
physical  frame.  Dicsearchus  follows  in  nearly  the 
same  strain.  He  distinctly  declares,  that  the  soul  and 
reason  are  not  entities,  but  merely  a  certain  state  of 


PROGRESS  OF  LOGICAL  SCIENCE — STRATO,  ETC.    53 

body ;  a  species  of  lively  animation,  which  results  from 
the  peculiar  configuration  of  the  various  parts  of  our 
bodily  structure. 

The  logical  speculations  of  Strato,  of  Lampsacus, 
and  of  Lycon,  Ariston,  of  Ceos,  Critolaus,  his  imme- 
diate followers  and  disciples  in  the  Peripatetic  school, 
seem  to  have  been  nearly  of  the  same  stamp  with  those 
we  have  just  alluded  to.  All  these  philosophers  appear 
to  have  paid  but  a  very  slight  and  superficial  attention 
to  those  comprehensive  mental  principles  connected 
with  the  evidence  we  have  of  scientific  truth  and  gene- 
ral propositions.  The  material,  the  technical,  and  the 
sensible,  characterised  their  ordinary  philosophical 
teaching. 

Following  the  Peripatetics,  another  class  of  logicians 
made  their  appearance,  denominated  Sceptics.  The 
prominent  feature  of  their  reasonings  was  a  spirit  of 
doubt ;  and  hence  the  name  has  descended  to  our  own 
times,  as  descriptive  of  a  captious  rejection  of  ordinary 
truth  or  evidence  on  subjects  usually  submitted  to  the 
understanding.  The  Sceptics,  in  fact,  constituted  only 
a  species  of  that  logical  genus  called  Sophists,  of  whom 
we  have  already  spoken. 

The  sceptical  logicians,  who  gained  some  degree  of 
renown  about  this  period  of  history,  owe  their  origin, 
partly  to  the  peculiar  political  circumstances  in  which 
their  country  was  then  placed,  and  partly  to  the  old 
leaven  of  sophistical  wrangling  and  rhetorical  decla- 
mation, which  so  prominently  marked  the  days  of 
Socrates,  and  those  philosophers  who  immediately  pre- 
ceded him.  There  was  here  a  union  of  the  Cynical 
and  Magarian  notions  of  the  nature  of  truth ;  while  a 


54        PROGRESS  OF  LOGICAL  SCIENCE — PYRRHO,  ETC. 

party  sprung  up  called  the  Dialectici,  whose  profession 
was  to  challenge  disputations  on  the  most  subtile  ques- 
tions and  interminable  disputes.  This  mass  of  floating 
doubt  and  captiousness  became  moulded  into  some- 
thing like  a  formal  system,  for  the  development  and 
promulgation  of  which  Pyrrho  of  Elis  laboured  with 
great  zeal,  and  some  ability. 

This  philosophical  logician  is  described  by  historians 
as  having  been  of  low  parentage,  and  by  profession  a 
painter.  He  likewise  served  with  the  army  of  Alexan- 
der the  Great  in  India.  On  his  return  to  Greece  he 
devoted  himself  to  the  study  of  philosophy,  and  parti- 
cularly to  the  system  of  the  Dialecticians,  and  the 
speculations  of  Democritus,  the  latter  of  whose  writ- 
ings, it  is  said,  first  inspired  him  with  a  love  of  study 
and  intellectual  improvement.  He  also  cultivated  an 
acquaintance  with  the  speculative  notions  of  the  Gym- 
nosophists  of  India,  whose  ascetism  he  admired,  and 
whose  mystical  doctrines  constituted  a  formidable 
jungle,  through  which  his  subtilty  and  dialectic  skill 
sought  in  vain  to  penetrate. 

Pyrrho  left  behind  him  no  written  records  of  his 
philosophy  and  logic.  His  successor  was  Timon  of 
Phlius,  originally  a  choric  dancer,  and  who  studied 
logic  under  Stilpo  of  Magara  and  Pyrrho  of  Elis. 
After  having  acquired  an  ample  fortune  by  his  itiner- 
ating disputations,  he  retired  to  Athens,  where 
he  spent  the  remainder  of  his  life,  which  was  very 
long,  in  comfortable  ease  and  independence.  He  is 
highly  spoken  of  for  the  purity  and  simplicity  of  his 
manners. 

The   Grecian  scepticism,   or  Pyrrhonism,  was  em- 


PROGKESS  OF  LOGICAL  SCIENCE — THE  SCEPTICS.         55 

bodied  in  what  were  termed  the  Ten  Tropes,  which 
are  often  alluded  to  in  the  writings  of  the  philosophers 
of  this  and  the  succeeding  ages.  Thus  tropes  may  be 
considered  as  a  species  of  logical  rules  for  the  govern- 
ment of  the  mind,  in  the  pursuit  and  acquisition  of 
truth.  They  are  more  of  a  negative  than  positive 
character.  The  principles  of  doubt  involved  in  them 
go  simply  to  recommend  a  suspension  of  assent,  rather 
than  a  positive  denial  of  matters  submitted  to  the  un- 
derstanding.* 

The  stronghold  of  the  Sceptics  was  the  variable  na- 
ture of  our  ideas  of  pure  sensation.  These  always 
afforded  them  weapons  against  the  attacks  of  their 
adversaries.  The  Sceptics  carried  their  analogical  rea- 
sonings from  this  source  into  every  department  of 
human  knowledge,  but  particularly  into  our  notions  of 
what  constituted  good  and  evil.  Here,  too,  they 
received  fresh  succour,  from  the  apparently  discordant 
opinions  and  judgments  of  mankind  upon  the  rules 
and  obligations  of  morality.  People  in  different  coun- 
tries have  different  notions  of  what  is  proper  and 
beneficial ;  and  this  diversity  is  strictly  analogous  to 
the  variable  sensations  of  external  things,  produced  by 
the  operation  of  the  senses.     It  would  be  idle  to  deny, 

"  Que  Pyrrbon  ait  ete  aniene,  par  son  doute  universel,  a  ne  pouvoir  agir,  a  ne 
croire  a  rien  dans  la  pratique,  a  ne  pas  se  detourner  pour  eviter  un  precipice,  comme 
le  raconte  Diogene  Laerce,  ces  assertions  sont  sans  fondement  et  tout-a-fait  invrai- 
semblables.  Ce  pbilosopbe  reconnaissait,  au  contraire,  l'autorite  du  bon  sens,  des 
lois,  des  usages;  il  admettait  des  regies  de  morale,  et  pretendait  que  ces  regies 
araient  leur  fondement  dans  le  cceur.  II  voulait  qu'on  suivit  les  apparences,  sans 
se  mettre  en  peine  de  la  realite ;  qu'on  agit  comme  le  commun  des  bommes,  qu'on 
evitat  soigneusement  les  discussions  epineuses  qui  ne  pouvaient  enfanter  que  le 
doute,  et  qu'on  demeurat  dans  ce  repos  d'esprit  qui  seul  peut  faire  le  bonbeur  de 
1' homme."— Bouvier,  Hist.  Abregee  de  la  Philosophic,  vol.  i,  p.  184.  Paris, 
1844. 


56        PKOGRESS  OF  LOGICAL  SCIENCE — THE  SCEPTICS. 

that  such  analogical  reasonings  would  have  a  powerful 
effect  upon  popular  opinion ;  but  still  the  nature  of  all 
similar  logical  declamations  exercises  a  pernicious  in- 
fluence over  the  progress  of  sound  and  rational  know- 
ledge. 

The  more  abstract  scepticism  among  the  Greek  and 
Roman  philosophy  has  a  great  uniformity  of  character, 
because  it  was  grounded  upon  views  and  arguments 
which  lay  very  open  to  common  remark  and  observa- 
tion. The  following  may  be  stated  as  the  principal 
springs  out  of  which  the  various  currents  of  sceptical 
opinions  flowed,  in  almost  every  period  of  the  ancient 
philosophy : — 

1st,  The  great  diversity  in  animal  nature  as  to  its 
origin,  organization,  &c.,  the  differences  in  which  exter- 
nal objects  are  viewed  by  the  inferior  creation ;  all  of 
which  go  to  show  what  a  vast  variation  there  must 
necessarily  be  in  the  conceptions  formed  of  the  qualities 
and  properties  of  external  bodies,  through  organs  of 
sense  so  much  varied.  The  question  then  is,  as  animals 
are  deprived  of  reason,  what  grounds  have  we  to  prefer 
our  perceptions  to  theirs,  when  we  are  in  the  search  of 
truth  ? 

2nd,  The  diversity  of  character  is  very  great  in  human 
nature,  and  the  differences  among  men,  both  in  mental 
and  bodily  qualifications,  are  varied  beyond  all  concep- 
tion. This  contrariety,  joined  to  the  interminable  dis- 
putes among  philosophers  themselves,  and  the  differ- 
ences in  tastes  and  affections,  particularly  noticed  by 
physicians,  render  all  attempts  to  arrive  at  the  truth  of 
things  hopeless. 

3d,    There  is  a   great   difference   in   the   organs   of 


PROGRESS  OF  LOGICAL  SCIENCE — THE  SCEPTICS.         57 

sense,  and  every  organ  has  its  appropriate  objects.  Do 
the  qualities  of  these  objects  belong  to  the  particular 
confirmation  of  our  senses,  or  only  to  the  objects  them- 
selves ?  Have  they  only  as  many  and  such  qualities 
and  properties  as  we  perceive,  and  have  they  none 
which  we  do  not  perceive  ?  What  are  the  constituent 
elements  of  objects — have  they  just  such  and  such  qua- 
lities, and  no  other  ? 

4:th,  The  various  ways  in  which  our  physical  organs 
are  affected,  by  disease,  sleep,  old  age,  sadness,  fear, 
cold,  heat,  and  a  thousand  other  circumstances,  must 
necessarily  create  a  great  diversity  of  judgment  relative 
to  things  around  us. 

5th,  The  differences  from  variation  in  the  quantities 
of  things,  produce  often  opposite  judgments  and  con- 
clusions. A  little  more  heat,  a  more  rapid  motion,  or 
a  little  more  wine  or  spirit,  creates  divers  changes  in 
our  opinions.  The  general  aggregation  or  division  of 
homogeneous  bodies  greatly  modifies  sensation. 

6th,  The  various  kinds  of  education  among  men,  and 
the  different  laws  and  conventional  rules  of  society, 
beget  opposite  opinions  and  conclusions  on  the  most 
important  subjects. 

7th,  From  the  interminable  mixtures  and  combina- 
tions of  things,  it  is  next  to  impossible  to  form  a  correct 
opinion  of  the  mass  of  objects  around  us.  Colours, 
density,  and  forms,  are  for  ever  changing,  and  the  eye 
can  only  judge  of  that  which  is  at  the  moment  an  object 
of  vision. 

8th,  The  relations  of  things  one  with  another  are 
continually  changing.  We  seldom  see  an  object  pre- 
cisely in  the  same  point  of  view  twice  in  succession. 


58     PROGRESS  OF  LOGICAL  SCIENCE — THE  EPICUREANS. 

9th,  All  relations  and  objects,  opinions,  notions,  and 
principles,  are  connected  together,  and  have  mutual 
dependencies  one  upon  another ;  so  that  the  mind  of 
man  can  never  be  certain  that  the  conclusions  it  forms 
are  the  really  true  ones.  All  things  are  not  perceived ; 
therefore  our  judgments  are  one-sided. 

Of  the  logical  views  of  the  Epicureans,  with  Epicurus 
himself  at  their  head,  little  can  be  said  possessing  any- 
great  novelty  or  interest.  Epicurus  and  his  disciples 
considered  all  truth  and  evidence  through  the  medium 
of  the  senses  and  bodily  appetites ;  and  formal  rules 
relative  to  definitions,  axioms,  and  propositions,  were 
considered  by  them  of  little  or  no  utility.  Whatever 
was  useful,  pleasant,  and  delightful,  was  true;  and 
these  were  the  chief,  if  not  the  sole  attributes  which 
constituted  the  evidence  of  real  science.  The  absolute 
criterion  of  truth  rests  therefore  upon  the  senses. 
These  are  the  only  tests  we  have,  and  they  never 
deceive  us.  Whenever  there  is  any  discrepancies  from 
this  source,  the  real  cause  of  them  arises  from  hasty  or 
premature  judgments  on  objects  presented  to  the  ex- 
ternal organs. 

The  reason  or  principle  of  intelligence  is  not  alto- 
gether a  dependent  or  slavish  instrument.  The  Epi- 
cureans invest  it  with  supreme  power  and  authority 
over  the  whole  of  the  senses.  Its  office  is  therefore 
to  mould  the  sensuous  impressions  into  what  we  call 
thinking,  conceiving,  reasoning,  and  deliberating.  The 
mode  in  which  this  transmutation  is  effected,  appears  a 
little  singular  and  whimsical.  There  are  certain  airy 
and  spiritual  essences  generated,  which  present  them- 
selves to  the  reason.     These  essences  are  disengaged 


PKOGRESS  OF  LOGICAL  SCIENCE THE  STOICS.  59 

from  external  bodies,  or  are  formed  in  the  air,  and  seize 
hold  of  the  mind,  and  fix  themselves  in  it.  These 
essences  have  also  a  sort  of  voluntary  power,  making 
choice  of  those  intelligences  whose  attention  is  excited, 
and  such  as  direct  themselves  to  particular  forms  of 
thought ;  to  others  they  remain  perfect  strangers. 
Attention  is,  then,  reason's  chief  instrument ;  by  it  logi- 
cal judgments  and  conclusions  are  formed. 
Cjjie  logical  system  of  the  early  Stoics  is  worthy  of 
consideration  on  two  or  three  points. 

The  Stoics  do  not  appear  to  have  entered  very 
deeply  into  the  logic  of  either  Plato  or  Aristotle.  The 
elaborate  system  of  the  latter  was  in  a  great  measure 
overlooked  by  them.  They  chiefly  occupied  themselves 
with  speculations  on  the  foundation  of  truth  or  science, 
and  laboured  hard  to  reconcile  those  conflicting  views 
which  arose  out  of  the  connexion  subsisting  between 
external  objects  and  the  sentient  or  thinking  principle 
which  perceives  them.  They  set  but  a  light  value  on 
the  opinions  and  labours  of  their  predecessors,  and 
were  extremely  anxious  to  appear  to  the  world  in  the 
character  of  original  thinkers  and  expounders  of  the 
laws  of  human  thought. 

All  general  truths  or  maxims  employed  in  formal 
propositions,  or  in  trains  of  reasoning,  were  considered 
by  the  Stoics  as  proceeding  from  a  certain  refined  pro- 
cess of  sensation.  Such  truths  as  did  not  appear  to 
follow  immediately  from  the  impressions  of  outward 
things,  were  formed  in  the  mind  by  a  species  of  ana- 
logy or  transposition.  There  were  certain  scientific 
or  logical  rules  under  which  our  thoughts  invariably 
arranged  themselves;  and  these  rules  were  the  great 


60  PROGRESS  OF  LOGICAL  SCIENCE — THE  STOICS. 

guides  of  the  uninstructed  and  unlettered  part  of  man- 
kind, in  all  those  matters  necessary  for  their  existence 
and  wellbeing. 

These  universal  or  general  ideas  seem  to  have 
puzzled  the  Stoics  not  a  little.  Their  notions  of  trans- 
formation from,  sensible  perceptions  were  always  falling 
short  of  that  measure  of  conviction  which  could  satisfy 
a  rational  mind.  Their  discussions  on  this  point  were 
far  from  being  consistent,  or  even  intelligible.  They 
laid  down  certain  principles,  but  expressed  themselves 
violently  hostile  to  the  inferences  fairly  deducible  from 
them.  At  one  time  general  ideas  were  identical  with 
the  mentally  conceivable;  and  at  another  they  were 
merely  a  peculiar  form  of  language.  It  was  in  this 
manner  that  they  bandied  the  subject  from  one  hypo- 
thesis to  another,  without  coming  to  any  fixed  or 
settled  opinion  on  the  matter. 

These  speculations  on  general  and  particular  ideas, 
naturally  led  them  to  the  consideration  of  the  cate- 
gories, especially  those  of  Aristotle.  They  did  not  adopt 
them,  but  sought  to  frame  categories  of  their  own,  of  a 
more  accurate  and  comprehensive  character.  These 
they  reduced  to  four ;  namely,  the  substrate,  or  that 
which  forms  the  groundwork  of  things ;  secondly,  that 
which  has  qualities  or  attributes;  thirdly,  that  which 
has  a  general  relation;  and  fourthly,  that  which  has 
a  particular  relation  to  some  other  thing.  These  cate- 
gories the  Stoics  considered  an  improvement  upon  those 
of  Aristotle,  inasmuch  as  they  were  both  more  compre- 
hensive as  well  as  accurate.  They  conceived  that  no 
mere  investigations  into  the  forms  of  logical  science 
could  prove  of  an  utility,  without  they  were  based  upon 


PROGRESS  OF  LOGICAL  SCIENCE — THE  STOICS.  61 

some  generally  correct  notions  as  to  the  fundamental 
principles  of  all  scientific  truth. 

The  substrate  embraces  the  imperishable  elements  of 
things ;  quality  is  that  which  resides  in,  or  constitutes 
a  thing  to  be  what  it  is.  This  second  category  is  neces- 
sarily subordinate  to  the  first,  but  stands  nevertheless 
next  in  degree  of  importance  to  it.  The  third  category 
indicates  a  changeable  or  perishable  property  or  rela- 
tion, and  not  that  which  possesses  a  positive  fixity  of 
existence.  The  fourth  category  is  the  lowest  class  of 
our  thoughts,  merely  designating  these  particular 
objects  which  have  a  circumscribed,  a  transitory,  or 
local  existence.  With  the  Stoics  the  essence  and  the 
subject  were  the  highest  objects  of  intellectual  percep- 
tion, and  to  which  every  thing  must  be  referred ;  be- 
cause here  rested  that  absolute  entity  which  embraces 
all  forms  of  existence  or  being,? 

There  was  a  great  deal  of  the  sensible  and  material 
in  the  logical  philosophy  of  the  Stoics.  They  viewed 
mankind  in  their  practical  and  everyday  movements 
of  life.  They  took  men  as  they  found  them.  And 
hence  it  is  that  theories  of  every  kind  hung  loosely  about 
them.  What  floated  on  the  general  surface  of  society 
constituted  the  staple  of  their  public  teaching.  Theories 
they  had  undoubtedly,  and  an  abundance  of  profound 
speculation ;  but  there  was  a  wider  chasm  between 
their  speculative  and  practical  systems,  than  between 
any  other  class  of  ancient  philosophers.  And  the 
natural  consequence  of  this  is,  that  we  find  greater  in- 
consistencies and  discrepancies  in  their  system,  when 
viewed  as  a  whole,  and  in  reference  to  logical  science, 
than  in  any  other  which  antiquity  presents  to  us. 


62   PROGRESS  OF  LOGICAL  SCIENCE — THE  LATTER  STOICS. 

The  logical  views  of  the  Latter  Stoics,  or  New  Aca- 
demy, do  not  very  materially  differ  in  theory  from  those 
of  the  old,  but  they  diverge  from  them  in  practice  to  a 
considerable  extent.  Arcesilaus,  one  of  the  principal 
conductors  of  this  school  of  philosophy,  revived  the 
Socratic  mode  of  argument,  and  endeavoured  to  take 
great  pains  to  inculcate  in  the  minds  of  his  students 
the  propriety  of  entering  fully  into  the  merits  of  every 
question,  and  also  of  allowing  an  opponent,  in  every 
argument,  to  state  his  case  with  all  reasonable  degree 
of  amplitude.  Arcesilaus  gave  a  decided  preference  to 
the  logical  principles  of  Plato  over  those  of  Aristotle. 

GCarneades  followed)  in  the  Latter  Academy,  and 
greatly  distinguished  himself  as  an  expounder  of  logic. 
His  dialectics  are  eulogized  as  being  at  once  precise  and 
comprehensive.  He  was  a  man  of  splendid  oratorial 
powers,  so  much  so  indeed,  that  his  appointment  as 
one  of  the  ambassadors  of  Athens  to  Rome,  was  the 
result  of  this  reputation.  It  was  in  Rome  where  he 
delivered  a  series  of  famous  lectures  on  the  nature  of 
justice  ;  entering  fully  into  all  the  complicated  views  of 
the  question,  and  balancing  his  philosophical  arguments 
so  nicely,  that-  his  able  and  enthusiastic  pupil,  Clito- 
machus,  declared,  that  he  never  could  detect  what  his 
master's  own  opinion  on  the  subject  really  was. 

This  mode  of  argumentation  naturally  led  him  into 
what  were  considered  sceptical  habits.  He  called  in 
question  the  criterion  of  truth.  He  thought  philoso- 
phers up  to  his  day  had  failed  in  establishing  any  thing 
of  the  kind.  This  criterion  must  be  sought  for  either 
in  our  sensuous  impressions,  or  in  the  reason  itself. 
But  he  maintained,  that  whatever  is  a  judgment  of  the 


PROGRESS  OF  LOGICAL  SCIENCE — CLITOMACHUS,  ETC.     63 

understanding  cannot  be  such  solely  from  its  own 
nature,  but  must  have  some  relation  to  sensation  or 
conception  ;  and,  on  the  other  hand,  sensation  itself  is 
not  a  chain  of  argumentation,  from  which  a  judgment 
proceeds,  but  solely  a  fleeting,  uncertain,  and  transitory 
thing.  Therefore,  on  whatever  side  the  logician  looks, 
as  to  the  absolute  standard  by  which  all  evidence  should 
be  tested,  he  meets  with  insuperable  barriers  in  the  way 
of  a  rational  solution  of  the  difficulty. 

^Notwithstanding,  however,  his  arguments  against  a 
standard  of  truth,  we  find  him  insisting  strenuously  for 
man's  power  to  seize  hold  of  the  truth  of  things  by  a 
system  of  probability.  Though  nothing  was  absolutely, 
yet  many  things  were  probably  true  ;  a  very  paradoxi- 
cal proposition.  His  theory  of  probable  evidence  rested 
on  the  distinction  he  made  between  the  elements  of 
thought,  which  related  to  the  object,  and  the  element 
considered  in  relation  to  the  thinking  principle  itself, 
in  its  general  character.  Every  idea  has  two  relations, 
one  to  the  object  presented  to  the  senses,  and  one  the 
presenting  subject.  The  first  is  stamped  with  truth 
when  it  agrees  with  the  object,  and  is  false  when  it  does 
not  agree  with  it ;  in  the  second  relation  it  is  either 
true  or  false : — if  the  former  it  is  called  probable  ;  if  the 
latter,  improbable^ 

We  know  little  of  the  logical  system  of  Clitomachus, 
a  disciple  of  Carneades,  with  the  exception  that  he  is 
said  to  have  written  four  books  on  the  general  reasons 
which  ought  to  induce  us  to  suspend  our  assent  to  the 
truth  of  things. 

\Philo  wrote  largely  on  the  nature  of  truth  and  the 
rules  of  evidence.      He   distinguishes  three   kinds  of 


64        PROGRESS  OF  LOGICAL  SCIENCE — POTAMON,  ETC. 

truth ;  first,  That  which  is  deduced  from  a  self-evident 
proposition ;  secondly,  That  which  is  deduced  from  a 
false  proposition,  though  conditionally  true  ;  and  thirdly, 
From  a  proposition  from  which  the  conclusion  presents 
not  only  a  hypothetical  but  a  real  truth,  in  spite  of  any 
absurdity  contained  in  the  truth  itsejjp 

The  Alexandrian  school  of  logic  exercised  indirectly 
no  small  degree  of  influence  on  the  science  of  argumen- 
tation. Diogenes  Laertius  tells  us,  that  the  philosopher 
Potamon  was  its  founder.  He  goes  on  to  observe  : — 
"  But  a  short  time  since  a  new  sect  called  Eclectic 
had  been  introduced  by  Potamon  of  Alexandria,  who 
selected  from  each  school  of  philosophy  that  which  he 
considered  the  most  worthy  and  important.  He  thought 
there  were  two  criteria  of  truth.  One  resided  in  the 
same  faculty  which  judges ;  that  is,  reason,  which  pre- 
sides over  the  whole  system  of  intellectual  laws  or 
movements.  The  second  consisted  in  those  perceptions 
which  serve  as  the  measure  or  instruments  by  which 
knowledge  is  communicated ;  or,  in  other  words,  in  the 
certainty  and  evidence  of  the  received  impressions  from 
external  objects." 

On  the  Roman  school  of  logic  we  have  not  much  to 
say.  Sylla  brought  to  Rome  the  works  of  Aristotle, 
which  became  generally  accessible  through  the  means 
of  a  translation  effected  by  Tyrannion  and  Andronicus 
of  Rhodes. 

On  the  difficulties  connected  with  the  investigation 
of  truth  in  general  cases,  Cicero  makes  the  following 
remarks  : — "  All  knowledge  is  encircled  with  difficulties. 
Such  is  the  natural  obscurity  of  things,  and  the  con- 
stitutional weakness   of  the  principle   of  intelligence, 


PROGRESS  OF  LOGICAL  SCIENCE— CICERO,  ETC.         65 

that  the  most  sagacious  minds  of  antiquity  have  doubted 
whether  we  ever  can  arrive  at  truth  at  all.  The  most 
part  of  mankind  embrace  opinions  without  having  the 
power  of  choosing  them :  they  judge  of  what  they  do 
not  know,  and  attach  themselves  to  some  favourite  sys- 
tem, as  mariners  do  to  a  rock  in  a  tempestuous  sea; 
but  a  philosopher  will  only  give  his  assent  after  he  has 
patiently  heard  both  sides,  and  after  a  careful  review 
of  all  the  opinions  which  have  previously  been  advanced 
on  the  subject."* 

After  Cicero  we  have  Alcinous,  Maximus  of  Tyre, 
Alexander  of  Aphrodisias,  and  Galen ;  the  latter  of 
whom  paid  great  attention  to  logical  science,  and  was 
the  author  of  the  fourth  form  of  the  syllogism,  which  is 
commonly  given  in  our  school-books  of  logic. 

*  De  Finibus,  ii.  12. 


66  INFLUENCE  OF  CHRISTIANITY 


CHAPTER  IV. 


GENERAL  REMARKS  ON  THE  INFLUENCE  OF  CHRISTIANITY 
ON  LOGICAL  SCIENCE. 


We  come  now  to  an  important  epoch  in  the  history  of 
the  science  of  reasoning — to  the  establishment  of  a 
system  of  theology,  which  has  influenced  the  logical 
powers  of  men  to  an  astonishing  degree,  from  the 
period  of  its  introduction  to  the  present  hour.  Though 
laying  down  no  formal  rules,  no  classification  of  propo- 
sitions, no  technical  framework,  by  which  men  might 
be  guided  to  reason  soundly  and  safely  on  all  topics 
cognisant  to  the  understanding ;  yet  in  place  of  these, 
there  are  embodied  in  the  Christian  code  certain  com- 
prehensive principles  and  axioms,  of  immense  value 
and  power  to  the  rational  faculties  of  man. 

The  observations  we  are  now  about  to  make  in  this 
chapter,  are  altogether  of  a  general  character ;  yet  we 
hope  they  will  not  prove  the  less  useful  to  the  ordinary 
reader,  or  be  considered  less  appropriate  in  the  esti- 
mation of  the  scientific,  to  the  design  and  scope  of  this 
work.  Although  at  first  sight  it  may  appear  to  many 
that  theology  is  placed  at  a  great  distance  from  the 
science  of  ratiocination,  yet  we  trust  to  show  that  there 


ON  LOGICAL  SCIENCE.  67 

always  has  been,  and  ever  must  be,  a  vital  and  living 
sympathy  between  them — a  sympathy,  in  fact,  of  such 
a  character,  as  to  constitute  the  permanent  distinction 
between  man  and  the  animal  creation — between  what 
is  rational  and  wise,  and  what  irrational  and  brutish. 

These  introductory  remarks  will  be  arranged  under 
two  leading  divisions ;  those  of  a  theoretical,  and  those 
of  a  practical  nature. 

It  will  not,  I  conceive,  be  doubted  by  any  person 
competent  to  give  an  opinion  on  the  subject,  that  every 
logical  system,  whether  of  a  purely  formal  or  of  a  scien- 
tific cast,  owes  all  the  interest  it  can  possibly  excite  in 
the  estimation  of  men  to  certain  principles,  which  lie 
as  it  were  in  the  background  from  it,  and  which  are 
seldom  or  ever  formally  presented  to  the  understanding 
in  the  ordinary  course  of  tuition.  To  suppose  for  a 
moment  that  any  logical  scheme — a  thing  professedly 
teaching  you  how  you  are  to  detect  truth  from  error — 
could  have  any  possible  hold  of  men's  esteem — could 
be  an  object  of  any  conceivable  value,  apart  from  these 
rudimental  notions  or  conceptions  inseparable  from  the 
nature  of  truth  itself,  and  inseparable  from  the  mental 
nature  of  that  being  to  whom  that  truth  is  of  unspeak- 
able importance ;  is  a  proposition  so  ridiculously  absurd, 
that  I  shall  not  assume  that  any  man,  how  desperately 
soever  he  may  be  wedded  to  any  particular  system,  will 
in  his  cool  moments  give  his  assent  to  it.  To  suppose 
any  such  thing,  would  be  to  suppose  that  all  the  lessons 
of  history  had  been  thrown  away  upon  him,  and  that 
he  had  set  at  defiance  all  the  dictates  of  common 
sense. 

That  the  rejection  of  this  supposition  is  not  a  merely 


68  INFLUENCE  OF  CHRISTIANITY 

gratuitous  or  unwarrantable  assumption,  will,  I  trust, 
appear  from  the  following  considerations. 

The  science  or  art  of  Logic  differs  from  every  other 
department  of  human  knowledge  in  one  important 
particular.  It  is  conversant  about  truth,  which  is  the 
only  thing,  quality,  or  attribute,  which  renders  any 
science  interesting  to  man.  Logic  has,  therefore,  to  do 
with  all  subjects  of  inquiry.  It  does  not  stand  apart 
from  all,  but  it  exercises  a  supervisional  power  or 
authority  over  all.  Other  sciences  are  mere  instru- 
ments in  its  hands ;  and  it  forms  the  medium  of  com- 
munication between  them,  and  the  soul  or  intellect  of 
man.  It  must  examine  into,  arrange  and  classify, 
weigh  and  balance,  direct  and  guide,  and  pronounce 
an  opinion  and  judgment  upon  those  particular  ele- 
ments which  constitute  knowledge,  and  which  make  it 
that  really  important  and  interesting  thing  which  man- 
kind feel  it  to  be.  For  it  must  be  borne  in  mind,  that 
whatever  may  be  the  qualities  or  properties  which  we 
may  conceive  inherent  in  truth,  one  thing  it  must  pos- 
sess, that  of  taking  a  firm  hold  of  the  inward  nature  of 
man — of  his  mind  and  affections — or  it  cannot  be  said 
to  be  truth  at"  all.  But  on  this  latter  point  we  shall 
speak  more  at  large  afterwards. 

'Now,  all  the  ancient  logicians  of  whom  we  have 
already  spoken,  saw  clearly  that  the  purely  formal  part 
of  logic,  or  indeed  any  scientific  view  of  it  whatever, 
could  only  derive  its  validity  and  importance  from  a 
consideration  of  the  truth  and  full  comprehension  of 
certain  other  principles  on  which  it  naturally  rested, 
and  which  really  conferred  upon  it  every  property 
which  could  render  it  either  acceptable  or  beneficial  to 


ON  LOGICAL  SCIENCE.  69 

the  human  race.  This  they  clearly  perceived.  And, 
as  a  confirmation  of  this  fact,  we  can  appeal  to  all  their 
writings  and  speculations  on  the  nature  and  importance 
of  scientific  disquisitions,  considered  in  relation  to  their 
nature  or  character. 

To  enter  fully  into  all  these  discussions,  or  to  travel 
over  the  entire  field  of  ancient  investigation  on  this 
matter,  would  far  exceed  the  limits  of  the  present  work. 
But  we  shall  just  dot  down  a  few  of  the  leading  topics, 
which  seem  to  have  exercised  a  great  influence  over 
the  minds  of  the  ancient  philosophers  who  especially 
treated  of  logical  systems  and  theories,  partly  because 
these  topics  enveloped  their  minds  in  doubt  and  uncer- 
tainty, and  partly  because  they  were  the  offspring  of  a 
deep-rooted  conviction,  that  it  was  absolutely  requisite 
that  some  fundamental  truths  relative  to  the  under- 
standing should  be  fully  considered  and  agreed  upon, 
before  any  mere  framework  of  logical  rules  could  be 
erected  for  the  use  of  their  scholars  or  students. 

Some  of  the  principles  or  matters  which  the  ancients 
considered  as  lying  at  the  root  of  all  logical  systems, 
were  the  following  : — 1st,  Whether  there  was  a  creative 
power  in  the  universe  ?  2nd,  Whether  this  power  was 
invested  with  the  attributes  of  goodness,  wisdom,  and 
truth  ?  3d,  Whether  the  mind  of  man  formed  a  part 
of,  or  was  made  analogous  to,  this  Divine  mind  or  prin- 
ciple ?  \th,  Whether  this  intellectual  part  of  man  was 
of  an  absolutely  spiritual  nature,  and  was  endowed  with 
immortality  ?  5th,  Whether  there  is  any  thing  abso- 
lutely true  or  absolutely  good  in  the  nature  of  things  ? 
6th,  Whether  the  true  and  the  good  relatively  to  man, 
be  the   same   in  essence  as  the  true  and  good  rela- 


70  INFLUENCE  OF  CHEISTIAN1TY 

tive  to  the  Divine  nature?  *Jth,  Whether  man  can 
form  any  adequate  or  correct  conceptions  of  matters 
beyond  the  pale  of  the  material  universe  ?  8th,  Whe- 
ther man  was  an  object  of  any  particular  care  or  inte- 
rest in  the  Divine  economy  of  the  world,  and  had  any 
means  of  ascertaining  this  fact  ?  And,  9th,  Whether 
we  have  any  general  and  definite  ideas  in  the  mind, 
when  we  make  use  of  such  words  as  truth,  justice, 
power,  existence,  creation,  intelligence,  benevolence, 
virtue,  vice,  &c.  &c.  ? 

We  have  only  to  cast  a  cursory  glance  over  the 
writings  of  the  ancients,  to  see  how  large  a  share  of 
attention  was  paid  to  these,  among  other  topics  of 
a  speculative  character.  These  subjects,  it  must  be 
remembered,  were  not  investigated  as  subjects  belong- 
ing exclusively  to  the  science  of  mind ;  but  were  con- 
sidered and  classified  in  their  systems  as  logical 
elements,  and  brought  prominently  forward,  as  occa- 
sions required,  to  fortify  and  recommend  particular 
schemes  of  ratiocinative  art  and  dialectical  argumenta- 
tion. The  Pythagoreans,  the  Sophists,  the  Socratists, 
Plato,  Aristotle,  the  Sceptics,  the  Academics,  and  in 
fact  every  section  of  Grecian  thinkers,  took  a  more 
or  less  distinguished  part  in  discussions  of  this  kind, 
making  them  the  foundation,  or  starting-point,  of  their 
respective  theories  of  general  reasoning.  Whether  this 
mode  of  philosophising  was  a  legitimate  or  sound  one, 
we  need  not  at  this  moment  stop  to  determine.  In 
the  present  stage  of  the  argument  it  is  with  the  fact 
alone  we  have  to  deal,  and  this  is  indisputable.  It  is 
one  of  those  things  which  cannot  be  gainsaid,  in  as 
much  as  it  is  supported  by  the  entire  train  of  specula- 


ON  LOGICAL  SCIENCE.  71 

tive  thought  for  centuries,  and  confirmed  by  opposite 
and  rival  schools  of  profound  learning  and  logical  skill. 
Such,  then,  being  the  state  of  things  when  Chris- 
tianity made  its  appearance  (always  meaning  by  this, 
the  Old  and  J^ew  Testament  conjointly),  it  cannot  be 
a  matter  of  surprise  that  it  should  powerfully  influence 
the  general  current  of  logical  thought  among  those  who 
adopted  it.  And  it  just  did  so  happen,  that  ancient 
learning  and  speculative  curiosity  were  at  a  very  low 
ebb,  both  at  the  commencement  and  for  some  time 
after  the  introduction  of  the  Christian  system;  and 
it  consequently  became  almost  the  only  source  from 
which  any  positive  knowledge  and  learning  could  be 
derived.  A  union  was  now  formed  between  the  reli- 
gious and  literary 'elements,  which  has  subsisted  ever 
since.  Christianity  was  placed  as  a  beacon  on  a  hill, 
to  be  a  light  and  a  guide  to  all  succeeding  generations 
of  thinkers.  It  threw  a  new  element  into  the  rational 
powers  of  man — it  made  his  logical  path  shorter  and 
smoother.  There  was  a  glare  of  sunshine  thrown  upon 
all  those  speculative  dogmas  which  had  previously  en- 
grossed the  attention,  and  bewildered  the  ingenuity  of 
the  most  refined  and  intellectually  gifted  of  the  sons  of 
men.  This  great  and  renovating  change  was  effected, 
not  by  the  introduction  of  philosophical  dissertations 
on  each  or  any  of  these  dogmas ;  but  there  was  simply, 
though  under  external  circumstances  the  most  sublime 
and  impressive,  a  declaration  from  heaven  made,  respect- 
ing, among  other  things,  many  of  those  matters  which 
had  previously  been  stumbling-blocks  to  all  the  ancient 
sages  of  the  world.  This  declaration  influenced  the 
reasonings  and  judgments  of  man  in  divers  modes  and 


72  INFLUENCE  OF  CHRISTIANITY 

degrees ;  some  implicitly  believing  in,  and  adopting  it 
as  a  rule  of  thinking  and  acting,  while  others  again  felt 
nothing  but  doubt  and  hesitation.  Still,  within  the 
sphere  where  it  was  proclaimed,  there  became  insepar- 
ably amalgamated  with  the  elements  of  human  thought, 
certain  principles  of  knowledge  and  criterions  of  truth, 
which  were  henceforward  to  effect  great  and  permanent 
changes  in  all  the  grades  of  society,  on  their  future 
intellectual  pursuits  and  speculations. 

ISTow,  let  us  just  cast  a  retrospective  glance  at  the 
present  state  of  the  question,  up  to  this  stage  of  our 
progress.  Here  we  have  presented  to  us  an  accurate 
and  lengthened  historical  chart  of  logical  speculation 
for  several  centuries,  among  a  highly  civilized  people, 
who  were  utter  strangers  to  all  and  sundry  of  the  pecu- 
liar doctrines  of  the  Christian  system;  but  who  had 
made,  nevertheless,  great  advances  in  demonstrating 
the  importance  and  necessity  of  some  principles  which 
the  human  understanding  required,  in  order  to  impart 
confidence  to  its  decisions,  and  to  point  out  that  path 
it  might  beneficially  and  profitably  take  in  all  its  move- 
ments and  aspirations.  The  philosophers  among  this 
people  were  possessed  of  intellectual  endowments  of  the 
highest  order — endowments  which  have  never  been 
surpassed  by  any  subsequent  class  of  human  beings, 
and  which  are  even  at  the  present  moment  objects  of 
deep-felt  wonder  and  admiration.  They  are  one  and 
all  engaged  in  schemes  for  the  improvement  of  the 
mind,  and,  above  all,  in  giving  a  right  direction,  and 
imparting  a  strength  to  the  reasoning  faculty,  which 
they  considered  as  the  sole  instrument  for  the  discovery 
and  promulgation  of  truth,  which  they  affirmed  was  the 


OK  LOGICAL  SCIENCE.  73 

only  object  interesting  to  man  as  a  citizen  of  the  uni- 
verse. For  this  purpose  they  examined  the  structure 
of  then:  own  minds  with  the  utmost  assiduity  and  care. 
They  recognised  certain  elementary  principles  shadowed 
forth  with  more  or  less  distinctness,  on  which  their 
respective  ratiocinative  systems  vitally  depended.  These 
principles  were  grappled  with,  discussed,  analysed, 
viewed  in  every  possible  aspect,  and  assayed  to  be  de- 
veloped with  marvellous  acuteness  and  philosophical 
skill.  Yet  no  firm  decision  could  be  come  to  on  any 
of  them.  Universal  doubt  enveloped  the  understand- 
ings of  the  sages.  They  placed  doubt  against  doubt, 
and  hope  against  hope.  For  want  of  the  requisite  ele- 
mentary knowledge  of  which  they  were  in  search, 
partisans  ridiculed  the  systems  of  each  other  with  keen 
and  unsparing  bitterness.  And  after  ages  of  philo- 
sophical strife,  without  a  parallel  in  the  history  of 
mankind,  they  all  virtually,  on  quitting  the  stage  of 
life,  announced  their  deep  and  solemn  conviction,  that 
until  these  questions  were  placed  upon  a  firmer  basis, 
the  human  understanding  was  doomed  to  perpetual 
doubt,  and  that  human  life  in  all  its  aspects,  and  with 
all  its  boasted  knowledge  and  science,  was  nothing 
better  than  an  illusion  and  a  dream. 

Such  precisely  was  the  state  of  the  philosophic  mind 
of  the  world  at  the  Christian  era.  It  was  in  the  most 
disconsolate  and  forlorn  condition.  Every  thing  around 
it  looked  dark,  impenetrable,  and  cheerless.  There 
seemed  an  impassable  gulf  between  its  capabilities 
and  its  wants.  Well ;  there  suddenly  appeared  a  theo- 
logical system,  which  excited  a  surprising  influence 
over  the  minds  of  those  who  espoused  it.     Though  its 


74  INFLUENCE  OP  CHRISTIANITY 

professed  object  was  not  to  teach  logical  philosophy, 
yet  it  spoke  of  certain  things,  laid  down  certain 
principles,  gave  authoritative  judgments  on  particular 
questions,  and  treated  of  the  general  mass  of  human 
knowledge  and  scientific  evidence  in  a  tone  and  manner 
altogether  new  to  mankind.  This  religious  creed  was 
embraced  by  vast  bodies  of  people,  among  whom  the 
learned  and  the  philosophic  formed  no  inconsiderable 
portion.  It  extended  from  province  to  province,  and 
from  kingdom  to  kingdom.  It  changed  the  entire  face 
of  human  society.  It  entered  into  an  alliance  with  true 
knowledge  and  science  of  all  kinds,  which  revolving 
ages  have  not  only  not  weakened,  but  have  rendered 
more  indissoluble  and  lasting.  It  has  in  fact  influenced, 
more  or  less,  all  the  reasonings,  the  discussions,  the 
argumentations,  and  controversies  of  mankind,  from  the 
first  hour  of  its  introduction  to  the  present  moment. 

!STow,  why,  and  in  what  manner,  has  this  been  done  ? 
These  are  important  questions  to  be  answered.  Let  us 
just  refer  back  to  some  of  those  primary  doctrines  which 
the  Grecian  sages  considered  as  necessarily  and  essen- 
tially connected  with  every  regular  and  formal  system 
of  ratiocinative  philosophy.  Among  the  number  of 
these  we  recognise  the  important  and  interesting  prin- 
ciple of  a  Divine  Creator  of  the  universe.  This,  Chris- 
tianity affirmed  in  the  most  pointed  and  emphatic 
manner,  was  a  true  principle.  Even  the  wisest  and 
most  profound  of  the  ancients  saw  this  grand  truth, 
but  "  darkly,  as  through  a  glass."  Then,  again,  we 
have  the  declaration,  that  this  external  universe,  with 
all  its  manifold  beauties  and  wonders,  was  actually 
made,  such  as  we  find  it,  by  this  supreme  and  intelli- 


ON  LOGICAL  SCIENCE.  75 

gent  Being ;  that  this  Being  was  really  the  centre  of 
all  wisdom,  goodness,  and  truth ;  that  He  made  man  a 
living  and  spiritual  soul ;  that  good  and  evil  were  posi- 
tive and  absolute  things  or  existences ;  that  what  was 
good  and  true,  vicious  and  false,  relative  to  man,  were 
likewise  good  and  true,  vicious  and  false,  relative  to 
his  Maker ;  that  man  was  the  object  of  God's  benevo- 
lence and  providential  care ;  that  the  soul  of  man  was 
immortal;  and  that  it  was  possible  for  the  human 
creature  to  form  to  himself  certain  mental  conceptions 
of  the  things  appertaining  to  spiritual  life,  and  to  an- 
other state  of  existence. 

These  were  a  few  only  of  the  elementary  and  gene- 
ral truths  which  revelation  made  known  to  the  world 
after  its  own  mode  and  fashion.  And  it  is  quite  plain 
to  demonstration,  that  these  truths  must  have  altered 
the  entire  framework  of  reasoning  on  every  thing  con- 
nected— no  matter  how  remotely — with  human  nature, 
from  the  period  they  were  received  as  canons  of  scien- 
tific thought  among  the  civilized  nations  of  the  earth, 
till  the  present  day.  There  can  be  no  dispute  on  this 
point,  I  conceive,  if  we  consider  for  a  moment  the  inti- 
mate connexion  which,  from  the  nature  of  things,  sub- 
sists between  these  primary  truths  and  the  science  or 
art  of  argumentation,  as  this  is  developed  in  all  the 
varied  departments  of  human  science  and  speculation. 

The  logical  conclusions  which  the  ancient  philoso- 
phers arrived  at  relative  to  this  entire  question,  strik- 
ingly shew  us  the  general  bearings  and  correctness  of 
these  remarks.  They  all  saw,  for  example,  that  the 
doctrine  of  a  Deity  was  of  essential  importance,  even 
in  reference  to  the  mere  dialectical  forms  of  thought, 


76  LOGICAL  CONCLUSIONS  OF 

when  these  forms  were  tested  by,  and  made  to  bear 
upon,  the  fundamental  question  of  truth  itself;  for 
why  should  there  be  any  thing  lofty  or  engaging  about 
truth — why  an  object  of  incessant  inquiry  and  eager 
pursuit — or  why  should  it  be  even  truth  at  all — if 
there  were  no  living  and  intelligent  principle  whatever 
in  the  universe — nothing  save  a  mere  series  of  mate- 
rial events  fleeting  before  the  outward  senses  of  man  ? 
This  was  the  question  which  all  the  ancient  thinkers 
put  to  themselves ;  and  it  was  just  a  question  of  that 
description  on  which,  to  men  in  their  precise  position, 
there  would  be  divers  and  discordant  opinions  and 
judgments.  But  still  the  question  never  lost  any  of 
its  inherent  interest,  notwithstanding  the  different 
solutions  given  to  it.  Every  philosopher  of  any  mark 
in  the  heathen  world,  saw  clearly  that  he  could  make 
no  progress  whatever  in  any  kind  of  rational  know- 
ledge— could  move  in  no  possible  direction — could 
carry  no  argumentative  train  of  thought,  relative  to 
human  nature,  to  any  thing  like  a  satisfactory  conclu- 
sion— unless  this  problem  were  solved  in  some  fashion 
or  other.  A  principle  of  intelligent  vitality  must  be 
established  at -any  cost,  whatever  might  be  the  num- 
ber and  varied  hues  of  these  material  or  fantastical 
adjuncts  with  which  the  subtil ty  or  the  whims  of  man 
might  clog  or  encumber  it. 

And  the  same  observations  apply  to  the  great  pro- 
blems in  morals.  Why  was  a  thing  good  or  evil  ?  or 
why,  if  these  terms  were  merely  expressive  of  the 
naked  differences  of  things,  or  carried  no  ultimate  re- 
sults with  them  beyond  the  transitory  feelings  or  per- 
ceptions of  the  present  moment,  did  mankind  attach 


THE  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHERS.  77 

to  them  any  importance  at  all?  Why  talked  about, 
discussed,  analysed,  and  moulded  into  the  forms  of  a 
logical  system  ?  The  answer  is,  that  the  ideal  of  the 
good  stood  upon  precisely  the  same  basis,  in  the  eyes 
of  the  philosophers  of  Greece,  as  did  the  ideal  of  the 
true  ; — both  must  have  a  direct  reference  to  some  vital 
and  intelligent  principle  ;  otherwise,  to  talk  of  this  or 
that  action  being  good  or  bad,  moral  or  immoral, 
praiseworthy  or  blamable,  was  at  bottom  sheer  folly 
and  delusion.  They  viewed  the  mind  of  man  in  all  its 
totality,  and  more  especially  directed  their  attention  to 
that  attribute  of  its  nature  which  was  immediately  en- 
gaged in  the  pursuit  and  communication  of  truth  ;  and, 
scanning  this  attribute  from  every  angular  position 
in  which  it  could  present  itself  to  the  understandings 
of  men,  they  saw  that  it  revolved,  as  on  a  fixed  centre, 
upon  the  great  and  interesting  truth,  that  there  was  in 
some  unknown  sphere  of  creation  some  living  and 
active  power,  which  inspired  men  with  ideas  on  these 
topics,  and  forced  upon  them  that  indissoluble  con- 
nexion which  subsisted  between  what  was  true,  and 
good,  and  beautiful,  and  the  preservation  of  their  own 
existence  and  happiness  as  human  creatures.  Nine- 
tenths  of  all  ancient  speculation  are  constituted  of 
little  else,  save  the  constant  efforts  to  penetrate  into 
the  secret  connexion  between  what  is  called  the  science 
or  knowledge  of  human  nature,  and  the  existence,  at- 
tributes, and  modes  of  government,  of  Him  who  was 
considered  as  the  great  author  and  sustainer  of  it. 

Now,  I  am  free  to  admit  that  there  have  been  phi- 
losophers of  great  powers  and  reputation  who  have 
maintained,  that  this  attempt  of  the  ancient  sages  to 


78  LOGICAL  CONCLUSIONS  OF 

grasp  and  seize  hold  of  the  ultimate  principles  of  all 
knowledge,  was  an  unauthorized  mode  of  proceeding, 
and  was  not  sanctioned  by  any  sound  or  rational  view 
of  the  legitimate  purposes  or  ends  of  all  philosophical 
inquiries.  This  mode  of  argumentative  interpretation, 
it  has  been  affirmed,  was  their  great  besetting  sin — the 
"  slough  of  despond  "  into  which  they  plunged  them- 
selves and  their  followers,  and  out  of  which  they  never 
could  be  extricated.  Plato,  Aristotle,  and  others,  took 
too  high  an  aim  in  their  logical  philosophy,  and  conse- 
quently fell  short  of  their  object.  Had  they  confined 
themselves  to  the  strict  or  naked  forms  of  reasoning, 
they  would  have  done  good  service ;  but,  seeking  to 
go  beyond  them,  and  to  drag  into  open  day  certain 
mental  conceptions  but  faintly  shadowed  forth  in  the 
intellect,  they  were  continually  kicking  against  the 
pricks,  and  enveloping  the  plain  rules  of  practical  rea- 
son in  doubt  and  obscurity.  Their  views  were  un- 
questionably noble  and  imposing,  but  they  were  im- 
practicable and  visionary.  Had  they  known,  it  is 
said,  the  modern  rules  and  principles  of  philosophizing, 
they  would  not  have  fallen  into  this  great  error.  They 
would  have  seen  the  folly  and  inutility  of  all  such 
questions  as  they  raised  respecting  a  First  Cause,  the 
nature  of  the  thinking  principle,  good  and  evil,  and 
the  like,  and  would  have  contented  themselves  with  a 
simple  collection  of  facts,  and  of  pointing  out  the  best 
modes  of  classifying  and  arranging  them  for  general 
use  and  comprehension. 

I  beg  to  observe,  that  whether  the  philosophical  method 
of  the  ancients  was  right  or  wrong,  does  not  immediately 
concern  the  chief  argument  now  under  consideration. 


THE  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHERS.  79 

Investigations  into  the  legitimacy  of  this  method  will 
occasionally  present  themselves  in  subsequent  parts  of 
this  volume  ;  but,  in  the  mean  time,  I  assume  that  this 
method  which  I  have  already  mentioned,  was  followed — 
that  it  exercised  a  great  influence  on  the  Greek  logi- 
cians who  developed  it — and  that  it  was  considered  by 
them  as  being  vitally  connected  with  every  mere  formal 
system  of  dialectical  and  ratiocinative  knowledge.  It 
is  therefore  not  necessary,  for  the  establishment  of  the 
points  I  have  in  view,  to  prove  the  logical  philosophy 
of  the  Greeks  to  be  the  very  best  that  could  be  adopted. 
All  I  require  is  the  fact,  that  they  did  pursue  a  certain 
line  of  argument  and  discussion  on  the  abstract  nature 
and  influence  of  those  principles  on  which  they  con- 
ceived their  respective  systems  of  logic  rested.  This  is 
all  that  my  position  needs  at  the  present  moment. 

By  way  of  vindicating,  however,  the  Grecian  thinkers 
for  the  mode  they  adopted  in  throwing  so  many  ab- 
stract questions  into  their  logical  theories  and  specula- 
tions, we  may  be  allowed  to  make,  in  passing,  a  single 
remark  on  the  subject.  What  they  did  was  quite 
natural.  Human  nature,  constituted  as  it  is,  could 
have  suggested  no  other  course.  It  was  not  a  matter 
of  choice  with  them,  nor  has  it  ever  been  a  matter  of 
choice  with  philosophers  of  any  subsequent  age,  whether 
they  had  the  power  to  check  all  inquiries  into  the  first 
principles  of  knowledge.  We  must  bear  in  mind,  par- 
ticularly on  this  occasion,  that  the  science  of  logic  is 
not  a  thing  which  possesses  an  independent  existence, 
but  is  merely  the  exponent  of  all  other  subjects  or  de- 
partments of  human  inquiry  which  force  themselves  on 
the  attention  of  mankind.     This  science  takes  especial 


80  INFLUENCE  OF  CHRISTIANITY 

notice  only  of  that  which  is  true  of  every  other  science ; 
and  it  has  not  a  body  of  truth  of  its  own  apart  from 
other  subjects  over  which  it  exercises  an  authoritative 
control.  Consequently,  it  necessarily  becomes  a  ques- 
tion of  eager  solution,  how  shall  we  discuss  this  or  that 
kind  of  truth  which  presents  itself  to  the  understand- 
ing ?  How  shall  we  test  it,  deal  with  it,  communicate 
it,  defend  it,  refute  it,  admit  it,  or  make  it  an  object  of 
belief  or  principle  of  action  ?  We  can  only  do  this  by 
tracing  it  back  in  all  cases  to  the  sources  from  whence 
it  springs.  The  mere  forms  of  argumentation  will 
teach  us  nothing;  they  will  not  suffice  to  bring  the 
whole  truth  before  the  mind,  as  it  were,  face  to  face. 
We  are  compelled,  therefore,  to  fall  back  upon  those 
fundamental  principles  or  conceptions  of  the  intellect 
from  which  such  and  such  truths  are  supposed  to  be 
derived,  or  of  whose  existence  and  influence  they  are 
at  once  an  explanatory  and  illustrative  proof.  Were 
the  light  of  revelation  again  entirely  withdrawn  from 
mankind,  and  no  remembrance  of  what  it  taught  on 
particular  philosophical  points  left  among  our  race,  the 
speculative  part  of  man  would  have  to  travel  precisely 
the  same  route  as  the  heathen  sages  of  old  did.  They 
would  strive,  but  strive  in  vain,  to  obtain  some  rational 
and  consistent  theory  on  which  to  arrange  such  logical 
systems  as  necessity  required,  or  curiosity  prompted. 

Reverting  now  to  our  original  proposition,  namely, 
the  influence  which  the  Christian  system  has  exercised 
over  the  logical  understanding  of  the  world  since  its 
introduction,  we  shall  briefly  state  that  this  influence 
has  been  both  powerful  and  salutary.  The  modes  in 
which  it  has   manifested   itself  have   been    numerous. 


ON  LOGICAL  SCIENCE.  81 

and  of  a  varied  character,  not  susceptible  indeed  of 
very  nicely  defined  limits,  but  sufficiently  mapped  out 
in  their  ordinary  operation,  as  to  enable  us  to  classify 
them,  in  some  measure,  under  general  heads.  A  few 
of  these  we  shall  briefly  advert  to. 

In  the  first  place,  the  Christian  dispensation  deeply 
impressed  the  minds  of  men  with  the  value  and  im- 
portance of  truth.  The  sacred  writings  depict  it  in  the 
most  lovely  and  glowing  colours,  and  represent  it  as 
one  of  the  most  conspicuous  attributes  of  Deity  itself. 
It  is  compared  to  the  light,  to  the  eye,  to  the  soul  of 
the  world.  It  is  affirmed  to  be  intimately,  nay  neces- 
sarily, connected  with  happiness  here,  and  immortality 
hereafter.  Its  pursuit  is  commanded  to  be  the  ever 
active  impulse,  and  its  acquisition  the  crowning  glory 
of  life.  Both  the  precept  and  the  spirit  of  the  gospel 
tell  us,  that  the  love  of  truth  is  a  powerful  stimulus  to 
all  grand  and  noble  enterprises.  It  is  the  genuine 
impulse  to  all  impartial  inquiry — of  all  effective  com- 
munications from  one  mind  to  another — to  all  the 
charities,  duties,  and  improvements  of  life.  It  com- 
ports more  with  a  passionate  thirst  after  real  and  use- 
ful knowledge,  than  with  a  petty  and  shallow  curiosity. 
The  glorious  powers  of  speech  are  but  tinkling  cymbals 
without  it,  and  the  most  gorgeous  rhetoric  a  noisy  and 
profitless  waste  of  words.  Wherever  the  love  of  truth 
reigns  in  the  breast,  it  fires  the  whole  man,  and  lightens 
up  his  mind  for  grand  and  useful  deeds.  It  is  the 
basis  of  the  patriot's  heroism  and  the  martyr's  renown. 
Without  it  the  power  of  argument,  the  pungency  of 
wit,  the  bitter  severity  of  sarcasm,  the  exercise  of  dia- 
lectic skill,  the  pompous  display  of  declamation,  are  but 


82  MORAL  OBLIGATION  OF  PURSUING  TRUTH. 

the  fleeting  and  evanescent  shadows  of  unsubstantial 
realities. 

Such  are  the  sentiments  on  truth  which  revelation 
has  inculcated  into  the  minds  of  all  its  followers,  since 
it  was  known  to  the  world ;  and  it  is  no  unwarrantable 
assumption  to  affirm,  that  their  power  over  the  ordi- 
nary, as  well  as  the  philosophic  mind  of  Christian 
societies,  must  have  been  great  beyond  all  calculation 
in  every  age  of  the  Church. 

Christian  doctrine  has  not  only  invariably  represented 
truth,  and  an  earnest  and  sincere  pursuit  of  it,  as  ob- 
jects possessing  of  themselves  great  innate  beauty  and 
interest,  but  it  has  hedged  them  around  with  a  moral 
sacredness  of  inestimable  value.  We  are  not  allowed 
to  trifle  with  truth  on  any  serious  or  important  sub- 
ject ;  nor  do  the  principles  of  Christian  ethics  permit 
our  playing  the  sophist,  or  of  following  any  line  of 
argumentation  which  has  no  other  object  in  view  than 
to  produce  a  quibbling  and  captious  spirit,  or  to  foster 
feelings  of  indifference  as  to  the  value  and  extension  of 
truth  generally.  All  careless,  apathetic,  and  latitudi- 
narian  opinions  and  practices  on  this  point,  are  consi- 
dered reprehensible,  and  are  in  direct  hostility  to  the 
letter  and  spirit  of  the  Christian  scheme.  What  is 
foolish,  as  well  as  false,  is  prohibited  and  censured. 

And  of  so  much  importance  has  the  moral  obligation 
of  pursuing  truth  appeared  to  some  modern  writers, 
that  the  position  has  been  formally  laid  down  in  philo- 
sophical treatises,  and  illustrated  at  great  length,  that 
man  is  responsible  to  his  Maker  for  his  belief  as  well  as 
for  his  outward  conduct.  It  is  as  criminal  to  think 
erroneously  as  to  act  improperly.     Indeed  it  is  one  of 


THE  DOCTEINE  OF  AUTHOEITY.  83 

the  plain  and  explicit  declarations  of  the  Scriptures, 
that  man  is  responsible  for  his  creed — responsible  for 
his  conduct  in  the  pursuit  of  truth — responsible  for  his 
manner  of  promulgating  that  truth — and  responsible, 
too,  for  the  way  and  degree  in  which  he  allows  that 
truth  to  influence  his  passions,  feelings,  thoughts, 
emotions,  and  judgments.  And  this  varied  responsibi- 
lity is  based  upon  the  reason,  that  these  Scriptures 
treat  of  things  of  unutterable  magnitude  and  incon- 
ceivable importance  to  every  human  being.  Examina- 
tion, inquiry,  a  desire  for  information  or  knowledge, 
are  demanded  of  every  one ;  not  a  mere  passing  glance 
at,  or  superficial  dipping  into  evidence  and  proof,  but 
that  full,  active,  unbiased,  and  candid  train  of  investi- 
gation, which  distinguishes  the  unfettered  and  unpre- 
judiced mind.  This  alone  can  discharge  the  full  weight 
of  obligation  to  seek  and  to  know  that  which  is  true. 
The  very  nature  of  revelation  presupposes  this  obliga- 
tion, and  is  inconceivable  without  it. 

We  come  now  to  glance  directly,  though  briefly,  at 
the  great  principle  of  authority  itself,  which  has  exer- 
cised, since  the  introduction  of  the  Christian  code,  such 
a  vast  influence  on  our  modes  and  maxims  of  reasoning, 
both  scientific  and  formal,  and  with  which  principle  the 
preceding  remarks  have  an  obvious  connexion.  The 
doctrine  of  authority  was  not  unknown  to  the  ancient 
philosophers,  but  with  them  it  had  no  firm  basis  on 
which  to  rest.  To  give  credence  to  the  statements  and 
declarations  of  others,  and  to  constitute  this  depen- 
dence on  their  veracity  and  judgment,  an  active  prin- 
ciple in  the  government  of  our  own  understandings 
and  conduct  is  an  original  or  primary  law  of  human 


84  LIBERTY  OF  THOUGHT  AND  ARGUMENT. 

nature,  the  end  or  purpose  of  which  must  be  obvious 
to  the  most  ordinary  capacity.  Without  it,  there  never 
could  have  been  any  decided  progress  in  knowledge 
whatever,  beyond  the  mere  progress  of  the  individual 
himself.  The  information  of  one  age  could  never  have 
been  transmitted  to  another.  But  this  original  power 
of  the  mind  is  susceptible  of  important  and  beneficial 
directions,  and  can  be  strengthened,  weakened,  regu- 
lated, expanded,  and  moulded  to  a  prodigious  extent, 
by  other  and  extraneous  influences.  And  this  is  the 
reason  why  it  plays  such  an  important  part  in  the  his- 
tory of  the  logical  and  philosophical  understandings  of 
mankind. 

Every  Christian  community  places  itself  in  a  logical 
position,  and  takes  its  stand  upon  certain  abstract  and 
philosophical  principles  and  truths ;  and  it  decidedly 
and  unhesitatingly  takes  the  initiative  in  all  questions 
which  come  before  it  for  rational  discussion  and  adju- 
dication. The  liberty  of  thought  and  argument  which 
it  proclaims  and  allows,  is  not  of  an  absolute,  but  con- 
ditional character.  It  does  not  empower  its  members 
to  speak,  to  discuss,  to  argue,  and  reason  as  they 
please :  this  has"  never  been  allowed  since  Christian 
societies  were  instituted ;  nor  does  it  seem  a  likely 
occurrence,  that  such  a  measure  of  liberty  of  discussion 
will  ever  be  meted  out  in  any  country  where  the  Bible 
is  upheld  and  revered.  The  fact  is,  that  intellectual 
liberty  is  apt  to  run  into  "  licentiousness,"  as  well  as 
social  and  civil  liberty  ;  and  hence  the  necessity  of 
some  stringent  checks  upon  the  movements  of  the  for- 
mer as  well  as  on  the  latter.  To  exercise  the  reasoning 
faculties  in  any  way,  or  on  any  subject  we  think  fit,  is 


THE  PRINCIPLE  OF  ECCLESIASTICAL  AUTHORITY.        85 

a  liberty  which  we  can  only  enjoy  under  special  and 
conventional  sanctions.  More  than  this  no  country 
can  possibly  allow;  and  it  may  well  be  questioned 
whether  a  right  to  absolute  and  indiscriminate  discus- 
sion can  be  exercised  in  any  state  of  human  society, 
however  rude  or  barbarous. 

The  question  of  ecclesiastical  authority,  viewed  in 
relation  to  logical  philosophy,  opens  out  a  wide  range 
of  topics  for  our  special  contemplation.  This  authority 
may  be  considered  under  two  aspects — internal  and 
external.  The  internal  influence  manifests  itself  much 
in  the  same  way  as  we  have  just  noticed,  in  its  indirect 
control  of  the  judgment,  and  in  the  modifications  of 
our  sentiments,  opinions,  and  decisions  on  matters  of 
moment  and  interest.  We  are  swayed  in  this  manner 
in  every  direction,  and  to  a  great  extent.  And  the 
more  numerous  the  religious  sects  of  any  country  are, 
the  more  is  this  internal  or  secret  power  over  the  logical 
forms  and  conclusions  of  the  understanding  brought 
into  operation.  The  various  shades  of  opinion  on  fun- 
damental doctrines  of  faith  and  practice,  the  different 
systems  of  church  government,  and  the  diversities  of 
rituals  and  observances,  naturally  give  rise  to  nice  dis- 
criminations of  the  judgment,  and  introduce  into  social 
and  religious  communities  an  entire  code  of  logical  and 
argumentative  canons,  with  a  view  of  smoothing  down 
the  angular  prominences  of  sectarian  bitterness  and 
strife,  and  of  giving  a  free  currency  to  the  courtesies 
and  amenities  of  human  life. 

The  external  manifestations  of  the  principle  of 
ecclesiastical  authority  are  of  a  more  bold  and  decided 
character  than  the  internal,  and  may  be  viewed  in  a 


86  FORCE  OF  PUBLIC  OPINION. 

twofold  light ; — as  expressions  of  public  opinion,  and 
as  rules  or  principles  of  legal  and  judicial  prohibition. 

The  force  and  influence  of  public  sentiment  or  opinion 
have  been  powerfully  augmented  since  the  Christian 
era.  They  have  also  been  more  concentrated  and  uni- 
form in  their  operation,  in  proportion  as  compulsory 
prohibitions  have  become  less  numerous  and  severe. 
The  very  liberty  of  thought  which  has  been  allowed  to 
the  philosophic  mind  of  society  at  large,  has  added 
both  to  its  power  and  to  the  refinement  and  spirituality 
of  public  censure  and  reproof.  The  authority  of  public 
opinion  has  become  a  natural  element  of  the  social  in- 
tellect,— pervading  all  its  minutest  movements  and 
inclinations,  and  guiding  and  moulding  its  logical 
conclusions  in  conformity  to  certain  pre-established 
doctrines  and  principles.  This  species  of  authority  is 
sufficiently  yielding  and  plastic  as  to  allow  great  lati- 
tude of  thought  and  discussion ;  but  there  are  limits  to 
this  indulgence,  though  not  susceptible  of  practical 
definition,  beyond  which  it  is  not  permitted  that  any 
member  of  society  should  pass. 

All  the  great  and  interesting  branches  of  science  and 
inquiry,  and  mare  especially  those  in  which  logical 
forms  and  rules  are  most  indispensable,  are  conducted 
in  every  Christian  state  under  the  absolute  control  and 
supervision  of  this  public  opinion  and  authority.  The 
sciences  of  politics,  morals,  mental  philosophy,  and 
theology,  taken  in  their  widest  acceptation,  where  logi- 
cal principles  and  forms  constitute  such  essential  ele- 
ments in  their  development  and  elucidation,  afford 
striking  illustrations  of  the  extreme  and  sensitive  vigi- 
lance which  is   exerted  by  the   community  over  the 


FOKCE  OF  PUBLIC  OPINION.  87 

modes  of  investigation  pursued  by  the  cultivators  of 
these  several  branches  of  inquiry;  and  how  intensely 
anxious  the  public  mind  becomes,  that  there  should  be 
found  no  conclusions  of  the  philosophic  judgment,  save 
those  which  are  in  strict  and  lofty  harmony  with  the 
leading  principles,  doctrines,  and  usages  of  theological 
truth. 

In  questions  relative  to  political  science,  for  example, 
it  not  unfrequently  happens,  that  some  particular  prin- 
ciple of  that  science  is  prominently  brought  before  the 
public  eye,  and  gives  rise  to  long  and  animated  discus- 
sions. If  the  principle  in  question  should  be  carried  to 
its  full  or  ultra-logical  consequences — and  if  these  con- 
sequences appear  to  militate  in  any  degree  against  some 
other  general  principle  or  canon  of  theological  or  phi- 
losophic truth,  which  the  community  at  large  have 
previously  incorporated  with  their  established  creed — 
public  opinion  then  makes  her  voice  heard ;  calls  back 
with  potent  authority  the  disputers  to  first  principles ; 
puts  an  end,  perchance,  to  the  discussion ;  and  pro- 
nounces either  for  a  total  rejection  of  the  obnoxious 
principle  in  question,  or  such  a  modification  of  it  as 
shall  comport  with  certain  other  elementary  and  vital 
truths  which  constitute  the  established  faith  of  the 
country. 

Thousands  of  instances  illustrative  of  such  proceed- 
ings might  be  gathered  from  the  legislative  assemblies 
of  every  country  in  Europe.  Indeed,  it  seldom  happens 
that  a  single  session  of  the  British  Parliament  passes 
over,  which  does  not  offer  some  pointed  confirmation  of 
this  mode  of  dealing  with  public  questions.  And  the 
same   thing  may  be   affirmed   relative   to   philosophic 


88  PHILOSOPHY  OF  SCRIPTURE. 

books  and  treatises  on  all  the  sciences  we  have  just 
enumerated.  Public  opinion  displays  here,  too,  its 
power  in  the  most  effective  and  absolute  manner. 
Every  work  of  this  kind,  as  soon  as  it  makes  its  appear- 
ance, is  immediately  tested  by  certain  abstract  principles 
of  philosophy  and  theology ;  and  if  found  to  run  counter 
to  any  of  these,  in  an  essential  degree,  it  is  forthwith 
censured,  and  ultimately  repudiated  by  the  entire  com- 
munity. In  fact,  the  logical  understanding,  in  every 
movement  and  manifestation  it  assumes,  is  laid  under 
a  solemn  and  imperative  interdict ;  and  it  is  only  by  a 
tacit  acquiescence  in  the  truth  of  certain  elementary 
principles  of  human  knowledge  that  its  exercise  is 
tolerated,  and  the  result  of  its  labours  become  in  some 
measure  appreciated,  and  introduced  to  public  favour. 
Even  physical  science  itself,  apparently  so  far  removed 
from  some  of  those  principles  of  abstract  thought  which 
mingle  themselves  with  the  sciences  of  human  nature,  is 
not  altogether  removed  from  the  influence  of  the  philo- 
sophy of  Scripture.  The  logical  arrangements  and  sys- 
tems of  material  inquiry  have  invariably  been  scrupulously 
watched,  lest  any  thing  might  creep  into  them  inimical 
to  one  or  more  of  those  fundamental  maxims  on  which 
the  Divine  record  rests.  That  Christian  communities 
have  been,  and  are  even  at  this  moment,  jealous  to  a 
high  degree  on  this  point,  is  a  truth  which  cannot  be 
disputed.  The  logical  arrangement  of  facts,  the  classi- 
fication of  principles,  the  construction  of  theories,  and 
indeed  the  whole  framework  of  what  is  termed  the 
philosophy  of  induction,  bear  evident  marks  in  their 
history  of  the  influence  of  ecclesiastical  authority.  And 
it  is  little  better  than  a  naked  truism  to  declare,  that, 


LICENTIOUS  AND  INJURIOUS  DISCUSSIONS.  89 

however  splendid  a  philosopher's  reputation  and  fame, 
and  unbounded  his  knowledge,  he  has  it  not  in  his 
power  to  rear  any  regularly  concatenated  system  of 
material  philosophy — to  give  his  opinions  any  logical 
weight  in  the  world  of  letters — totally  irrespective  of 
those  general  mental  principles  on  which  the  Scriptures 
are  grounded.  He  cannot  take  a  first  step  in  any 
direction  towards  such  an  object  without  their  aid, 
countenance,  and  support. 

When,  however,  public  opinion  becomes  outraged, 
and  is  no  longer  able  to  check  what  the  community 
consider  as  licentious  and  injurious  discussions  and 
reasonings,  either  of  a  verbal  or  written  character,  we 
immediately  see  the  manifestation  of  penal  authority. 
This  species  of  coercion  has  existed  in  every  country 
since  Christianity  was  incorporated  with  state  affairs. 
Though  this  power  of  bodily  punishment  has  been 
gradually  diminishing  in  most  nations  for  a  long  time 
past,  yet  none  have  entirely  renounced  it.  We  seldom 
now  take  away  liberty  or  life  for  opinion's  sake ;  but 
there  is  still  a  measure  of  punishment  meted  out  to 
every  obstinate  and  perverse  reviler  of  the  established 
creed  of  a  whole  people.  And  it  seems  to  me  a  diffi- 
cult thing  to  conceive,  how  penal  exercises  of  authority 
could  be  entirely  dispensed  with,  as  long  as  Christianity 
forms  "a  part  and  parcel"  of  the  law  of  every  civilized 
country. 

Now,  viewing  the  principle  of  authority  in  all  its 
phases,  we  cannot  fail  to  recognise  its  prodigious  in- 
fluence over  the  logical  and  philosophical  mind  of  man- 
kind. It  compels  them  to  pay  a  respect  and  deference 
to  certain  primary  and  vital  principles  of  human  specu- 


90        MENTAL  MOVEMENTS  OF  MANKIND. 

lation.  It  places  a  complete  barrier  on  absolute  liberty 
of  thought  and  argumentation;  and  by  reason  of  its 
connexion,  directly  and  indirectly,  with  all  the  civil, 
political,  and  social  institutions  of  a  country,  it  exer- 
cises in  the  outset  of  life  that  portion  of  influence  over 
every  rising  generation,  which  is  generally  effective  in 
checking  any  violent  infringement  of  its  rules  and  com- 
mands. All  the  avenues  of  instruction  and  education 
in  every  state,  are  placed  under  the  absolute  control  of 
this  Christian  authority.  Universities,  colleges,  public 
and  private  schools,  and  seminaries,  are  all  regulated 
by  its  injunctions ;  and  the  entire  mass  of  human  know- 
ledge, both  practical  and  speculative,  is  pervaded  in 
even  the  most  minute  sections  of  it,  and  to  its  very 
heart's  core,  with  that  restraining  and  directing  power 
which  the  declarations  of  the  Christian  code  possess. 

The  sacred  writings  have  also  exercised  a  powerful 
influence  over  the  logical  and  philosophical  mind  of 
Christendom,  by  the  inimitable  conciseness  and  the 
simplicity  of  their  statements.  Being  far  removed 
from  every  form  of  dialectical  abstruseness  and  mysti- 
cal subtilty,  and  presenting  principles  and  maxims  of 
such  a  logical  cast  as  to  meet  the  wants  and  satisfy  the 
curiosity  of  every  state  or  grade  of  intellectual  advance- 
ment, a  steadiness  is  imparted  to  the  mental  move- 
ments of  mankind  which  nothing  but  these  writings 
could  supply.  It  is  chiefly  from  this  cause,  that  when 
we  cast  a  cursory  glance  over  the  controversies  and 
argumentative  conflicts  in  which  men  have  been  en- 
gaged for  centuries,  we  so  readily  recognise  that  prin- 
ciple of  order  and  uniformity  which  every  way  pervades 
them.      Whenever    controversial    intemperances    and 


AUTHOEITY  AND  INFLUENCE  OF  SCRirTUKE.  91 

excesses  have  broken  out,  they  have  immediately  been 
corrected  by  an  appeal  to  the  letter  and  spirit  of  the 
Christian  canons  of  argumentation.  The  wars  of  the 
mind,  like  the  wars  of  the  body,  have  been  stripped  of 
their  most  revolting  features,  by  the  conciliatory  and 
candid  spirit  conspicuously  displayed  in  the  Christian 
profession. 

The  inspired  volume  is  the  great  book  of  human 
nature,  where  all  its  intellectual  principles,  and  moral 
springs  of  action,  are  displayed  with  surprising  accu- 
racy and  distinctness.  The  entire  man — body  and 
spirit — is  here  portrayed  in  every  conceivable  position, 
and  under  the  influence  of  every  conceivable  motive. 
As  the  science  or  art  of  logic  has  the  great  field  of  the 
inward  man  for  its  exclusive  display,  and  as  its  maxims 
and  rules  call  into  requisition  nearly  the  whole  train  of 
intellectual  faculties,  and  exercises  moreover  a  reflex 
effect  upon  his  moral  affections  and  sensibilities — we 
can  perceive  at  once,  that  such  an  inspired  record,  from 
its  very  fulness,  completeness,  and  universality,  must 
be  an  important  instrument  for  guiding  the  reason  of 
mankind,  and  pointing  out  those  paths  they  ought  to 
take,  amid  the  perplexing  labyrinths  that  surround 
them. 

It  may  be  alleged  that  this  authority  and  influence 
of  the  Scriptures  over  logical  science,  are  altogether 
indefensible ;  that  they  tend  to  circumscribe  and  fetter 
the  human  mind;  and  that  they  proceed  upon  an 
erroneous  principle,  relative  to  the  nature  and  purposes 
of  human  knowledge.  To  these  statements  I  need 
offer  no  direct  arguments  at  the  present  moment.  It 
is  only  with  the  facts  of  the  case  I  have  here  to  do 


92        CONNEXION  BETWEEN  THE  THEORY 

— to  attend  to  these  in  a  historical  sketch  is  all  that  is 
incumbent  upon  me.  Whatever  opinions  some  philo- 
sophers may  entertain  as  to  the  authenticity  or  value 
of  the  Bible,  the  facts  of  its  influence  over  the  reason- 
ing faculties  of  mankind  cannot  be  doubted.  They 
stand  out  in  prominent  relief  in  every  page  of  history 
since  the  Christian  era.  To  those  who  question  the 
legitimacy  of  theological  influence  over  the  logical 
understanding,  we  must  refer  them  to  subsequent  por- 
tions of  this  treatise,  which  will  develop  reasons  and 
statements  bearing  directly  on  the  abstract  merits  of 
the  entire  question. 

In  bringing  those  general  observations  to  a  close,  we 
beg  to  remind  the  reader,  that  the  chief  source  of  all 
this  direct  and  indirect  theological  influence  over 
logical  systems,  both  theoretical  and  practical,  arises 
from  the  fact,  that  the  Bible  pronounces  authori- 
tatively and  uncompromisingly  on  the  truth  and  rea- 
sonableness of  certain  mental  principles — which  prin- 
ciples lie  at  the  root  of  every  system  of  rational  logic 
or  argumentation.  The  intimate  and  necessary  con- 
nexion subsisting  between  the  theoretical  and  prac- 
tical part  of  logical  science,  was  clearly  seen  by  the 
heathen  world;  but  its  philosophers  and  logicians 
had  no  means  or  power  to  develop  that  connexion 
in  such  a  way — to  encircle  it  with  such  safeguards,  and 
to  enforce  it  with  such  penalties — as  to  constitute  it  an 
active  and  ever-living  element  in  the  understandings  of 
mankind.  These  logical  philosophers  were  powerless 
for  such  a  task,  although  they  clearly  saw  that  it  was  re- 
quisite to  be  undertaken  and  executed  before  the  great 
object  they  aimed  at  could  possibly  be  attained.     This 


AND  PRACTICE  OF  LOGICAL  SCIENCE.  93 

important  truth  is  confirmed  by  arguments,  both  ab- 
stract and  historical,  the  most  convincing  that  can  be 
presented  to  the  mind  of  man.  Christianity  came  to 
the  rescue,  and  has  placed  upon  record  certain  facts 
and  opinions  relative  to  the  nature,  operations,  and 
purposes  of  human  reason,  which  are  found,  by  large 
classes  of  the  most  intelligent  and  refined  of  our  race, 
to  remove  much  of  that  haziness  and  obscurity  which 
bedimmed  the  intellectual  vision  of  the  sages  of  anti- 
quity. And  the  more  fully  these  facts  and  opinions 
are  understood,  and  the  more  universally  they  are 
applied  to  the  scientific  elucidation  of  every  species  of 
knowledge,  in  the  same  proportion  are  the  boundaries 
of  that  knowledge  extended,  and  the  greater  and  more 
widely  disseminated  are  those  advantages,  to  all  classes 
of  societv,  which  it  is  calculated  to  confer. 


94  THE  FATHERS  OF  THE  CHURCH. 


CHAPTEE  V. 

LOGICAL  WRITERS  FROM  THE  CHRISTIAN  ERA  TILL  THE 
TIME  OF  CHARLEMAGNE. 

The  logical  writers  of  this  period  of  history  may  be 
classed  under  three  divisions — The  Fathers  of  the 
Church  ;  The  Alexandrian  School,  or  Latter  Platonists  ; 
and,  Miscellaneous  Authors. 

THE  FATHERS  OF  THE  CHURCH. 

The  logical  speculations  of  the  Christian  Fathers, 
furnish  innumerable  illustrations  of  those  principles  of 
mental  philosophy  which  abound  in  the  Scriptures,  and 
which  we  have  in"  the  previous  chapter  endeavoured  to 
point  out.  These  writers  took  the  volume  of  inspira- 
tion in  their  hand,  and  discussed  all  subjects  of  human 
inquiry  through  its  medium  and  spirit.  They  were 
the  first  who  openly  declared  for  the  moral  obligation 
of  pursuing  truth,  and  for  bringing  it  before  the  minds 
of  all  men,  irrespective  of  their  fortune  or  condition. 
The  science  of  reasoning  in  their  minds  involved  a 
serious  and  imperative  duty ;  and  the  interests  of  the 
human  race,  both  here  and  hereafter,  was  necessarily, 


THE  FATHEKS  OF  THE  CHURCH.  95 

in  their  opinion,  connected  with  the  way  and  manner 
in  which  that  duty  was  discharged.  As  they  were 
expounders  of  a  new  system  of  theology,  which  had  to 
contend  with  numerous  and  formidable  difficulties,  they 
had  to  deal  directly  with  the  understandings  of  men ; 
and,  consequently,  all  legitimate  and  effective  logical 
appliances  were  indispensable  instruments  to  their 
calling.  They  may  be  considered  as  the  greatest  of  all 
logical  reformers  and  theorists — inasmuch  as  they 
zealously  and  successfully  laid  the  foundation  of  all 
those  broad  principles  of  thought,  connected  with  the 
nature,  offices,  and  ends  of  truth,  without  a  knowledge 
of  which  the  civilisation  and  improvement  of  mankind 
could  neither  have  been  exemplified  nor  secured. 

It  may  be  stated  as  a  fact,  which  the  general  testi- 
mony of  ecclesiastical  history  sufficiently  attests,  that 
the  logical  principles  of  Plato  were,  up  to  the  fifth  or 
sixth  centuries,  decidedly  preferred  by  the  fathers  of 
the  Church  to  the  writings  of  Aristotleo  The  reason 
for  this  preference  was,  that  Plato's  philosophy,  as  con- 
nected with  the  abstract  nature  of  truth,  and  the  rules 
of  evidence,  was  more  in  accordance  with  that  which 
the  Scriptures  developed.  The  Platonic  theory  em- 
braced more  elevated  views  of  moral  truth,  of  a  Divine 
government,  and  of  a  spiritual  principle  in  man,  than 
were  displayed  in  the  writings  of  any  other  of  the  hea- 
then sages ;  and  these  doctrines  the  Fathers  considered 
as  eminently  corroborative  of  the  importance  which 
revelation  attached  to  truth  generally,  and  to  those 
means  in  particular  by  which  it  could  be  attained. 
"  I  find,"  says  Justin  Martyr  (99  a.  d.),  "  powerful 
and  inexpressible   charms  in  the  spiritual  notions  of 


96       WRITINGS  OF  JUSTIN  MARTYR  AND  TERTULLIAN. 

Plato ;  and  the  contemplation  of  his  system  of  ideas 
carries  my  mind  toward  grand  and  lofty  topics."  St 
Athenagoras  says  (172  a.  r>.),  "  Plato  contemplated, 
with  a  lofty  stretch  of  thought,  that  eternal  intelli- 
gence and  divinity  which  reason  alone  can  combine." — 
"  The  idea  is  the  first  erection  of  the  celestial  Euler ;  it 
is  the  type  of  all  creation." 

And  it  may  be  incidentally  remarked,  that,  in  view- 
ing the  Grecian  logical  systems  as  a  whole,  the  Fathers 
of  the  Church  were  deeply  impressed  with  the  idea, 
that  these  systems  were  evidently  designed  to  prove 
confirmatory  of  the  abstract  truths  of  the  Scriptures ; 
inasmuch  as  these  Grecian  speculations  shewed  how 
far,  and  in  what  manner,  the  unassisted  mind  of  man 
could  advance  in  the  path  of  scientific  truth.  We  see, 
said  the  Fathers,  the  great  speculative  difficulties  which 
lay  at  the  root  of  all  their  logical  principles  and  forms 
of  evidence,  and  how  totally  unable  the  heathen  sages 
were,  notwithstanding  their  splendid  powers  and  con- 
summate refinement,  to  grapple  with  any  one  of  them, 
so  as  to  disentangle  themselves  from  the  jungle  of  per- 
plexities in  which  they  were  doomed  to  spend  their 
entire  existence."  Had  we  not  had  this  notable  ex- 
ample of  man's  innate  speculative  impotence  so  point- 
edly brought  before  us,  one  of  the  most  powerful  proofs 
of  the  truth  and  lofty  origin  of  our  creed  would  have 
been  wanting.* 

In  the  apologetieal  writings  of  Justin  Martyr,  Tertul- 
lian,  and  others,  as  well  as  in  those  treatises  compiled 
for  the  purpose  of  demonstrating  the  general  credibi- 
lity of  the  gospel  history,  we  have  the  first-fruits  of 

*  See  the  Histories  of  Du  Pin,  Lardner,  Mosheim,  and  Cave. 


WRITINGS  OF  JUSTIN  MARTYR.  97 

the  application  of  the  logical  philosophy  of  the  Bible 
to  the  everyday  purposes  and  reasonings  of  human 
life.  We  see  the  art  of  argumentation  displayed  in  a 
manner  not  to  be  witnessed  in  any  previous  ages  of 
mankind.  We  see  here  continual  and  stirring  appeals 
to  the  innate  feelings  of  men — to  then'  general  notions 
or  conceptions  of  right,  justice,  virtue,  vice,  &c. — to 
those  principles  of  common  sense  diffused  among  all 
ranks  of  men — and  to  all  those  constitutional  and 
necessary  checks  and  safeguards  which  keep  contro- 
versies and  discussions  within  certain  prescribed  and 
commendable  limits.  The  logical  displays  which  the 
purely  theological  writings  of  the  Fathers  exhibit,  or 
those  beneficial  effects  which  indirectly  flowed  from 
them  to  human  inquiry  generally,  we  make  no  mention 
of  here,  because  these  writings  stand  upon  different 
grounds.  But  to  those  which  are  specially  directed  to 
the  world  at  large,  and  treat  of  matters  and  things 
on  which  men  of  all  ranks  and  stations  can  form  an 
opinion,  we  owe  very  great  obligation.  They  were  the 
pioneers  or  forerunners  of  that  enlightened  system  of 
philosophical  and  candid  discussion  and  inquiry,  which, 
both  in  its  spirit  and  letter,  has  descended  down  to  us 
unimpaired  to  the  present  hour. 

Justin  Martyr  (a.  d.  90),  one  of  the  first  of  the 
Fathers  we  shall  notice,  is  a  striking  example  of  the 
logical  influence  of  the  sacred  writings.  One  of  his 
first  efforts,  after  he  became  acquainted  with  the  Chris- 
tian system,  was  to  obtain  clear  and  concise  notions  of 
the  elements  of  human  reason.  He  saw  the  necessity 
of  searching  examinations  and  inquiries,  and  he  steadily 


98  JUSTIN  MARTYR — TATIEN. 

directed  his  attention  to  those  rudimental  conceptions 
which  lie  at  the  root  of  all  rational  argumentation.  He 
was  well  acquainted  with  the  philosophical  thought  of 
Greece,  and  he  was  not  slow  to  recognise  what  were 
the  chief  stumbling-blocks  which  lay  in  the  way  of  the 
most  eminent  philosophers  of  that  country,  in  forming 
just  opinions  on  the  nature  of  truth  generally,  and  of 
those  particular  laws  of  the  human  mind  by  which  it 
can  be  obtained  and  conveyed  to  the  minds  of  others. 
This  led  him  to  grapple  with  the  philosophy  of  logic — 
with  those  primordial  principles — imbedded  as  it  were 
in  the  intellect  of  mankind.  He  scanned  the  various 
logical  systems  of  the  Pythagoreans,  the  Sophists,  the 
Peripatetics,  and  Stoics,  and  found  them  all  more  or 
less  imperfect  in  the  correct  conception  of  the  true,  as 
well  as  in  that  of  the  purposes  or  ends  of  all  rational 
investigation.  St  Justin  was  deeply  impressed  with 
the  solemn  duty  of  examining  into  all  truth;  and  he 
was  equally  impressed  with  the  conviction,  that  without 
men  set  out,  in  their  inquiries  after  it,  from  sound  and 
rational  starting-points,  they  could  never  hope  to 
obtain  it.  These  starting-points  are  developed  in  the 
Scriptures,  and  are  to  be  found  nowhere  else.* 

Tatien  (a.  d.  170),  who  was  a  disciple  of  Justin's, 
followed  in  the  footsteps  of  the  master  relative  to  his 
opinions  on  the  nature  of  truth,  and  of  the  powers  of 
the  understanding  in  pursuing  it.  Tatien  held  that 
the  reason  of  man  was  the  supreme  and  loftiest  faculty 
of  the  soul ;  that  it  was  Divine  in  its  origin  and  charac- 
ter, and  could  be  considered  as  a  logical  instrument  in 

*  Apologia,  §§  5,  15.     Dialog,  cum  Triph.,  §§  218,  219. 


ALEXANDRIAN  SCHOOL ST  ATHENAGORAS.     99 

no  other  light,  except  in  subjection  to,  and  in  harmony 
with  the  creative  power  of  the  universe.* 


LOGICIANS  OF  THE  ALEXANDRIAN  SCHOOL. 

The  students  and  philosophers  of  this  famous  semi- 
nary of  learning,  were  of  all  nations  and  professional 
pursuits  of  life.  And  hence  it  is  that  we  are  obliged 
to  treat  of  both  lay  and  clerical  writers  under  one  and 
the  same  division. 

The  general  doctrines,  it  may  be  remarked,  which 
were  here  taught,  were  of  all  imaginable  complexions. 
We  have  the  mysticism  of  the  East,  the  Grecian  specu- 
lations, and  the  Christian  system,  blended  into  one 
mass ;  and  the  consequence  is,  that  we  find  the  logical 
systems  emanating  out  of  this  Eastern  sect  of  specula- 
tion of  every  description,  both  as  to  abstract  principles 
and  formal  classification.  We  shall  notice  these  writers 
or  teachers  of  logic  whom  we  know  received  their 
academical  instruction  here,  totally  irrespective  of  their 
professional  character  or  mode  of  life. 

St  Athenagoras  (a.  d.  170)  was  one  of  the  Christian 
Fathers  who  received  his  education  at  Alexandria.  He 
maintained,  that  though  the  faculty  of  reasoning  is 
essentially  the  same  in  all  mankind,  yet  it  is  indis- 
pensable that  it  should  be  under  the  guidance  of  some 
superior  influence  to  reap  the  happiest  results  from  its 
exercise.  Unless  it  be  based  on  theological  principles, 
it  must  fall  a  prey  to  the  most  wild  conceits  and  irra- 
tional crudities.")" 

*  Contra  Grsecos,  §§  12,  26,  31,  32. 

f  Legatio  pro  Christianis.,  §§  5,  6,  8,  15,  19. 


100    ALEXANDRIAN  SCHOOL — PLOTINUS,  ST  CLEMENT. 

Plotinus  (a.  d.  206)  was  an  able  and  scientific  logi- 
cian, but  enveloped  his  principles  and  rules  of  reason- 
ing in  abstruse  and  mystical  speculations.  "  The 
human  mind/'  says  he,  "  has  two  modes  of  acting  and 
knowing — the  one  by  a  participation  in  the  principle 
of  intelligence,  and  the  other  by  dialectic  or  logical 
forms.  It  enjoys  the  former  when  filled  and  illumi- 
nated with  this  high  and  refined  intelligent  influence ; 
and  the  second  is  enjoyed  through  the  means  of  certain 
outward  characters  or  signs,  and  laws  of  the  mind  im- 
parted to  our  natures.  All  the  rational  forms  of  things 
are  imprinted  on  the  mind  by  our  Creator." 

St  Clement  (a.  d.  218)  was  another  distinguished 
Father  of  the  Alexandrian  school,  and  one  who  entered 
profoundly  into  all  the  philosophical  questions  of  the 
day.  He  defended  the  rational  use  of  dialectic  or 
logical  forms,  on  the  general  ground  that  they  served 
as  species  of  bulwarks  against  the  attacks  of  sophistry 
and  unbelief.  "  The  cause  of  all  error,"  says  he,  "  and 
false  judgment  is,  that  we  cannot  detect  the  reasons  on 
which  the  accordance  or  differences  of  things  amongst 
themselves  are  founded;  and  we  thus  erroneously 
classify  matters  together  which  ought  to  be  separated. 
It  becomes  necessary,  then,  to  apply  the  art  of  dialec- 
tics as  a  useful  instrument  to  conduct  us  to  truth,  to 
enable  us  to  demonstrate  it  to  others,  and  to  protect 
and  defend  it  from  captious  argumentations.  But  we 
must  guard  against  the  abuse  of  this  dialectic  art." 

The  necessity  for  this  precaution  is  forcibly  pointed 
out  in  that  portion  of  the  writings  of  St  Clement,  in 
which  he  treats  of  the  logical  connexion  subsisting  be- 
tween faith  and  science,  and  in  all  those  rules  which 


ALEXANDRIAN  SCHOOL PORPHYRY,  LACTANT1US,  ETC.   101 

guide  the  understanding  in  every  rational  investigation 
or  inquiry.* 

Porphyry  (a.  d.  22-3)  was  one  of  the  most  subtile 
logicians  of  his  age.  He  was  the  author  of  a  work  on 
the  Predicables  of  Aristotle.  His  chief  aim  is  to  give 
an  analysis  of  the  notions  we  attach  to  particular 
generic  terms  of  reasoning ;  such  as  genus,  species,  ac- 
cidents, contrariety,  identity,  and  the  like.  "  Genus/' 
says  he,  (i  is  the  principle  which  contains  the  species 
and  individuals  placed  under  it,  and  involves  the  idea 
of  multitude  or  number.  If  genus  and  species  possessed 
each  a  separate  and  independent  existence,  or  were  two 
distinct  and  separate  notions  of  the  intellect,  then  on 
the  first  supposition  they  would  have  a  corporeal 
existence  ;  and  on  the  second,  they  would  be  of  an 
incorporeal  nature,  for  they  would  be  separated  from 
sensible  or  external  things." 

There  were  several  Fathers  of  the  Church,  as  Her- 
nias, Tertullian,  Arnobius,  Irenaeus,  and  Lactantius, 
who  entertained  opinions  that  logical  pursuits,  especially 
when  viewed  through  a  scientific  medium,  were  gene- 
rally inimical  to  the  interests  of  revealed  religion. 
Hernias  wrote  against  the  Pagan  systems  of  philosophy ; 
and  Irenaeus  against  the  Gnostic  speculations.  Tertul- 
lian disliked  the  system  of  Plato,  and  considered  the 
Academic  mode  of  reasoning  as  destructive  of  all  true 
science  and  wisdom.  Logic,  in  even  its  most  simple 
or  formal  shape,  fell  under  the  displeasure  of  Arnobius, 
who  maintained,  that  with  all  its  display  of  methodical 
arrangement  and  demonstrative  conclusions,  it  was  a 
very  imperfect    instrument  for    guiding  us    to   truth. 

*  Stroinat.,  lib.  i.     Ed.  Paris,  1641. 


102    ALEXANDRIAN  SCHOOL ST  AUGUSTINE,  PROCLUS. 

Lactantius  followed  in  the  same  strain.  a  That  por- 
tion/' says  he,  "  of  philosophy  which  we  call  logic,  is 
that  which  contains  dialectics  and  the  rules  of  reasoning. 
The  Divine  reason  has  no  need  of  any  such  assistance  : 
it  resides  not  in  the  form  of  words,  but  in  the  heart, 
and  it  is  of  little  moment  what  language  we  employ ; 
for  it  is  things  we  seek,  and  not  words." 

St  Augustine  (a.  d.  354)  entered  into  many  specu- 
lations on  the  nature  of  truth,  and  the  laws  of  the  mind 
employed  in  its  acquirement  and  promulgation;  but 
his  views  are  so  much  blended  with  other  topics  relat- 
ing to  mental  and  theological  philosophy,  that  we  can- 
not readily  separate  the  purely  logical  from  the  general 
mass  of  his  writings.  In  his  work,  "  Against  the  Acade- 
micians" he  descants  on  the  value  of  logical  philosophy, 
and  on  the  importance  of  cultivating  a  love  of  truth ; 
and  examines  at  considerable  length,  and  with  much 
care,  all  those  general  principles  of  the  mind  on  which 
scientific  evidence  appeared  to  him  to  rest.  In  his 
opinion,  every  form  of  scepticism  is  self- destructive ; 
for  the  bare  suggestion  of  a  doubt  is  a  proof  that  there 
is  such  a  thing  as  truth  in  existence. 
0  Proclus  (a.  d.  409)  endeavoured  to  change  the  entire 
framework  of  human  reason  ;  but  his  logical  views  are 
so  intimately  blended  with  his  theology,  that  we  can 
scarcely  separate  them  for  especial  notice.  He  culti- 
vated the  Greek  logic,  but  founded  upon  it  the  East- 
ern ideas  of  illumination  or  intuition ;  and  this  led  to 
almost  impenetrable  darkness  and  mysticism.  The 
human  mind,  according  to  Proclus,  may  be  viewed 
under  two  great  categories — identity  and  diversity. 
These  purely  primordial  forms  give  rise  to  three  other 


MISCELLANEOUS .ENESIDEMUS,  AGRIPPA.  103 

principles — harmony,  unity,  and  similitude.  These 
three  produce  by  their  individual,  as  well  as  con- 
centrated influence,  all  the  forms  and  entities  which 
are  displayed  in  the  dialectic  or  logical  processes  of  the 
human  understanding. 

The  Platonic  logic  was  the  great  idol  of  Proclus. 
With  him  reasoning  was  the  loftiest  and  noblest  faculty 
of  the  mind.  In  his  Elements  of  Theology,  the  reader 
will  see  in  what  manner  he  has  attempted  to  develop 
the  entire  system  of  Platonic  speculation. 

Synesius  (a.  d.  410)  and  Claudianus  Mamertus  (a.  d. 
450)  were  both  able  expounders  of  the  logical  system 
of  Aristotle.  Ammonius,  the  son  of  Hermeas  (a.  d. 
470),  was  the  author  of  a  book  on  the  Categories,*  in 
which  many  observations  will  be  found  connected  with 
the  nature  of  classification  and  definition  generally. 


MISCELLANEOUS  writers  ox  logic. 

The  logical  scepticism  of  Pyrrho  was  again  revived 
by  ^Enesidemus  and  his  followers.  In  the  second 
chapter  of  his  work  on  the  doctrines  of  the  Academi- 
cians, he  treats  of  truth  in  general,  and  of  those  ques- 
tions necessarily  connected  with  its  investigation ;  such 
as  causation,  action,  chance,  motion,  production,  de- 
struction, and  the  like.  All  his  observations  and 
reasonings  on  these  points  tend  towards  impressing  the 
mind  with  a  feeling  of  doubt  and  mistrust,  even  as  to 
matters  the  most  familiar  and  certain. 

Agrippa  was  the  successor  of  -ZEnesidemus,  and  laid 
down  five  maxims  relative  to  truth,  which  he  considered 

*  Edit.  Venice,  1506. 


104     MISCELLANEOUS — FAVORIN,  SEXTUS  EMPIEICUS. 

were  in  some  respects  original.  The  first  maxims  ap- 
pertains to  those  differences  which  are  to  be  found  in 
all  the  schools  of  philosophy  on  fundamental  proposi- 
tions ;  the  second  embraces  the  notion  of  infinity  in- 
volved in  every  chain  of  argumentation;  the  third 
relates  to  the  uncertainty  we  experience  relative  to  the 
nature  of  all  external  objects ;  the  fourth  maxim  points 
out  the  errors  arising  from  our  hasty  or  purely  gratui- 
tous mode  of  reasoning ;  and  the  fifth  maxim  indicates 
the  common  method  of  arguing  in  a  circle. 

Favorin  was  a  native  of  Aries,  and  considered  one  of 
the  most  profound  as  well  as  popular  logicians  of  his 
age.  He  was  enthusiastically  attached  to  the  entire 
doctrines  of  Pyrrho.  Galen  was  his  antagonist,  who 
remarks,  "that  some  recent  writers,  and  among  the 
number  is  Favorin,  carry  their  doubts  to  such  a  pitch 
as  to  call  in  question  the  existence  of  the  sun." 

Sextus  Empiricus  is,  however,  the  most  able  and 
voluminous  writer  belonging  to  this  sceptical  school  of 
logic.  This  author  remarks,  that  nearly  all  the  philo- 
sophers who  had  preceded  him  had  laid  down  three 
principles  or  standards  of  truth,  or  rather  three  instru- 
ments for  the  discovery  of  truth  and  falsehood.  The 
first  is  the  natural  judgment  of  man ;  the  second  the 
means  he  takes  of  exercising  that  judgment  through 
his  senses  and  understanding;  and  the  third  is  that 
action  or  power  by  which  he  applies  these  objects  or 
instruments.  The  first  standard  he  discards  on  account 
of  the  compound  nature  of  man,  possessing  a  body  and 
a  soul,  which  organization  must  needs  give  rise  to  many 
inward  operations  of  thought  and  action  which  can 
never  be  accurately  known.     The  second  criterion  is 


MISCELLANEOUS SEXTUS  EMPIBICUS.  105 

refused  because  the  impressions  on  our  outward  senses 
are  variable  and  conflicting.  The  third  principle  is  in 
like  manner  rejected,  on  account  of  doubts  springing 
out  of  our  organs  of  vision. 

The  impossibility  of  man  recognising  truth  under 
any  circumstances,  results,  according  to  Sextus,  from 
three  leading  considerations, — 1st,  The  mind  itself; 
2nd,  The  objects  with  which  the  mind  is  occupied; 
and,  3d,  The  relations  which  subsist  between  the  mind 
and  these  objects,  or  between  the  subject  and  the  ob- 
ject. The  author's  arguments  may  be  arranged  under 
three  heads  or  divisions. 

1st,  Eelative  to  the  mind,  the  subject  of  knowledge, 
we  have  sensations  and  conceptions.  This  division  of 
our  mental  nature  embraces  fundamental  principles  of 
doubt ;  for  sensations  and  conceptions  are  logically 
antagonistic  to  each  other.  The  treatment  of  the  mind 
under  this  point  of  view,  has  given  rise  to  the  respective 
theories  of  the  ideal  and  the  sensual.  Again,  if  we 
ever  take  sensations  and  conceptions  separately,  the 
result  ends  in  doubt.  Sensations  are  opposed  to  each 
other,  and  likewise  conceptions ;  so  that  we  are  hem- 
med in  on  every  side,  and  cannot  know  what  to  believe 
or  not  to  believe. 

2nd,  With  respect  to  all  external  objects  it  is  impos- 
sible to  understand  their  nature,  fully  and  adequately, 
unless  we  can  comprehend,  and  take  within  the  mind's 
grasp,  the  entire  mass  of  relations  subsisting  among 
them,  and  all  their  individual  properties  of  every  kind. 
In  the  world  around  us,  we  have  to  grope  our  way 
among  its  phenomena  by  the  help  of  signs,  and  we  are, 
in  numberless  cases,  not  able  to  distinguish  even  one 


106  MISCELLANEOUS — SEXTUS  EMPIRICUS. 

sign  from  another.  The  simplicity  and  the  diversified 
character  of  objects,  give  rise  to  constant  doubt  and 
misgivings. 

3d,  "When  the  objective  and  subjective  relations  of 
things  are  duly  considered,  another  wide  field  is  opened 
for  sceptical  conclusions.  Sometimes  the  mind  acts  by 
intuition,  and  totally  irrespective  of  formal  or  artificial 
combinations  of  ideas ;  and  at  other  times  again  it  is 
discursive,  and  conspicuously  unfolds  those  laws  of 
mind  which  logicians  more  particularly  attend  to. 

When  human  knowledge  is  considered  logically,  as 
combining  certain  perceptions  and  conceptions  accord- 
ing to  artistic  rules,  man  proceeds  to  treat  of  certain 
things  called  definitions,  categories,  and  arguments. 
These  create  confusion  in  minds.  Definitions  of  all 
kinds  are  entirely  useless.  He  who  makes  a  definition 
must  be  in  a  position  to  know  every  thing  that  can  be 
known  of  the  thing  defined.  If  definition  is  to  be 
applied  to  one  thing,  it  must  be  necessary  in  all ;  and 
thus  the  mind  is  perpetually  whisked  round  in  a  com- 
plete circle,  without  coming  to  any  fixed  point.  If,  on 
the  other  hand,  we  can  dispense  with  definitions  in 
any  one  case,  why  not  be  able  to  dispense  with  them 
in  all? 

All  categories,  such  as  genus  and  species,  are  useless, 
one-sided,  imperfect,  and  often  completely  false.  If 
we  consider  them  as  purely  mental  conceptions  or  con- 
troversies of  the  mind,  how  can  we  determine  their 
relation  to  external  things  ?  For  any  thing  we  know 
to  the  contrary,  the  mental  instrument  may  have  no 
real  or  true  relation  whatever  to  the  thing  on  which  it 
operates. 


MISCELLANEOUS — CAPELLA,  BOETHIUS,  ETC.         107 

Argumentation,  Sextus  states  in  substance,  combines 
general  propositions  with  particular  ones ;  but,  on  the 
one  hand,  it  is  requisite  to  set  out  from  individual 
objects  in  order  to  arrive  at  an  universal  truth;  and, 
on  the  other  hand,  we  must  rest  on  universal  proposi- 
tions when  we  are  desirous  of  proving  the  reality  of 
individual  objects.  All  reasoning  and  logical  trains  of 
thought,  rest  upon  a  basis  of  particular  things  admitted 
to  be  false — to  run  in  a  vitious  circle  ;  and  the  mind 
cannot  arrive  at  truth,  because  it  requires  an  examina- 
tion of  the  individual  objects,  without  any  limitation  or 
exception,  included  in  the  universal  proposition  ;  and, 
consequently,  a  process  of  sound  and  infallible  reason- 
ing, on  any  thing  whatever,  is  manifestly  impossible 
for  man  to  accomplish. 

These  are  the  leading  points  in  the  logical  scepticism 
of  Sextus.  It  need  scarcely  be  remarked  that  univer- 
sal scepticism  is  a  thing  inconceivable.  It  also  mili- 
tates against  every  feeling  and  principle  of  our  nature. 
The  mind  revolts  from  it  as  it  does  from  the  notion 
of  annihilation  itself. 

In  the  sixth,  seventh,  and  eighth  centuries,  there 
were  several  writers  and  expounders  of  logical  science 
of  note  and  reputation.  Martin  Capella  wrote  on 
dialectics.  The  celebrated  and  unfortunate  Boethius 
translated  the  Categories  of  Aristotle  into  Latin.* 
Cassiodorus  wrote  several  dissertations  on  the  logical 
system  of  the  Stagyrite,  which  were  used  as  text-books 
in  some  of  the  schools  in  the  East  for  a  considerable 
time  after  the  death  of  the  commentator.     His  views 

"  Explicatio  qiiorundam  Vocabulorum  ad  Cognitiorum  Dialectica  conducen- 
tionem,  et  Introductionem  ad  Logicam  Aristotelis."— Toliti.  4,  161(3. 


108    MISCELLANEOUS- 

are  contained  in  the  treatise  "Mhetorica  Compendium" 
wherein  he  lays  down  the  leading  principles  of  logic, 
and  also  combines  them  with  matters  strictly  apper- 
taining to  rhetorical  subjects.  Later  down  the  stream 
of  time,  we  have  John  the  Grammarian  discussing  logical 
systems,  as  well  as  St  John  Damascenus,  who  makes 
the  following  remarks  on  method  : — "  There  are  four 
dialectic  or  logical  methods.  The  first  is  the  division 
which  separates  genus  and  species ;  the  second  is  that 
which  defines  the  subject  by  the  genus;  the  third  is 
analysis,  which  decomposes  every  part ;  and  the  fourth 
is  demonstration,  which  establishes  the  truth  by  means 
of  the  last  term."  This  author  also  distinguishes  ana- 
lysis by  three  different  characters  or  signs — natural, 
logical,  and  mathematical.  The  first  resolves  compound 
ideas  into  their  simple  elements ;  the  second  resolves 
the  syllogism  into  its  component  parts ;  and  the  third 
consists  in  the  admitting  the  correctness  of  a  given 
principle,  in  order  to  arrive  at  a  knowledge  of  an  im- 
portant and  unknown  truth. 

Isidorus  of  Seville,  in  his  " De  Arte  Mhetorica"  enters 
at  some  length  into  logical  disquisitions.  The  abstract 
nature  of  propositions  in  general,  and  the  doctrine  of 
the  syllogism,  are  both  dwelt  upon.  He  divides  his 
subject  into  two  leading  portions  ;  that  which  is  strictly 
rhetorical,  appertaining  to  the  use  and  choice  of  words  ; 
and  that  which  is  dialectical  or  logical,  and  relates  to 
ideas  and  their  formal  combination.* 

Following  this  writer,  we  have  some  logicians  of  dis- 
tinction in  the  latter  period  of  the  Byzantine  empire. 
George   Pachymera  wrote    a    Compendium   of  Logic ; 

*  Paris  Edit.  1549.,  pp.  67,  332,  341. 


MISCELLANEOUS PACHYMEEA,  PELAGIUS.  109 

Theodoras  Metacliita  stood  as  the  head  of  a  school  for 
logic  and  eloquence  at  Constantinople ;  and  Magen- 
tinus,  George  Cyprius,  and  Michael  Psellus,  are  com- 
monly known  as  assiduous  cultivators  of  logical  studies. 
David,  the  disciple  of  Leon  the  philosopher,  wrote  on 
the  Categories  and  Predicables  of  Aristotle,  and  Blemade 
composed  his  Epitomes  of  Logical  and  Physical 
Science. 

Pelagius,  a  Syrian  by  birth,  but  connected  with 
Spanish  affairs,  wrote  on  general  logic  and  the  art  of 
reasoning.  He  flourished  in  the  eighth  century  ;  and 
in  the  after  period  of  his  life  lived  as  a  solitary  hermit 
in  one  of  the  wildest  and  unfrequented  parts  of  the 
kingdom  of  Spain.  He  appears  to  have  been  well 
acquainted  with  the  works  of  Aristotle. 

Logic,  he  maintains,  is  conversant  about  three 
things ;  the  nature  of  the  human  understanding,  the 
nature  of  truth,  and  the  method  of  investigating  and 
communicating  that  truth  to  others. 

There  are  three  acts  of  the  mind  more  immediately 
involved  in  every  logical  operation — perception,  judg- 
ment, and  reasoning.  There  are  also  three  other 
faculties  necessary  to  argumentation  ;  namely,  compar- 
ing, naming,  and  ranging  our  ideas. 

There  are  two  sources  of  error  which  vitiate  our 
logical  conclusions  on  many  subjects  of  interest  and 
importance — authority  and  precipitancy.  The  first 
induces  us  to  reject  an  opinion  without  thoroughly 
examining  it ;  and  precipitancy  induces  us  to  follow  a 
like  course,  by  making  us  content  with  a  very  super- 
ficial examination  of  the  evidences  on  which  certain 
opinions  rest.     Added  to   these  two,  there  is  also   a 


110  MISCELLANEOUS — ALCUINUS. 

spirit  of  contradiction  which  is  inimical  to  our  progress 
in  sound  and  rational  knowledge. * 

Alcuinus  (Albinus  Flaccus)  was  an  English  prelate, 
who  was  the  principal  agent  in  the  establishment  of 
the  public  schools  founded  by  Charlemagne  towards 
the  termination  of  the  eighth  century.  We  have 
Alcuinus'  system  of  logic,  which  he  divides  into  two 
parts — dialectics  and  rhetoric.  His  mode  of  arranging 
the  materials  of  dialectics,  is  precisely  the  same  as  most 
of  the  treatises  we  have  on  this  subject  at  this  period 
of  history.')- 

The  eight  centuries  we  have  just  past  over,  present 
on  the  whole  but  a  dark  and  checkered  aspect  when 
viewed  in  connexion  with  the  progress  of  rational 
knowledge  and  science.  The  good  work  of  improve- 
ment, however,  was  here  commenced.  This  was  the 
epoch  of  the  regular  consolidation  of  European  society. 
The  seeds  were  sown  which  in  after  times  were  to 
yield  a  fruitful  harvest.  The  true  foundations  and 
limits  of  human  inquiry  were  distinctly,  though  some- 
what roughly,  sketched  out.  A  mortal  struggle  be- 
tween heathen  speculation  and  revealed  truth  had 
been  brought  to  a  successful  termination ;  and  the 
human  mind,  for  the  first  time  in  its  history,  had  for 
its  guidance  a  solid,  though  still  limited  code  of  logical 
canons  for  all  matters  of  deep  and  general  interest. 
Speculations  on  the  nature  of  truth  became  more 
rational  and  concentrated.  Christian  institutions  were 
now  being  consolidated,  and  beginning  to  impart  a 
steadiness  to  men's  minds  of  incalculable  importance 

*  See  Los  Padres  del  Disierto.     Madrid,  1564.     Vol.  ii.  Art.  St  Pelagius. 
t  See  Dialectica  et  Grammatica.     Folio,  p.  487. 


MISCELLANEOUS CON  CLUSION.  Ill 

to  the  future  intellectual  movements  of  mankind.  The 
philosophy  of  Scripture  made  itself  heard  in  every 
corner  of  Christendom,  and  was  day  after  day  chasing 
away  the  clouds  of  mystic  fanaticism  and  ignorance. 
Theological  doctrines  were  silently  yet  steadily  forming 
the  basis  of  public  opinion ;  and  their  intimate  rela- 
tions with  numerous  philosophical  questions,  which 
they  touched  at  all  points,  were  constantly  becoming 
more  clearly  ascertained  and  defined.  The  remarkable 
harmony  which  the  Christian  scheme  exhibited  between 
the  world  within  and  the  world  without — the  subjec- 
tive and  objective  existences  of  logicians — was  of  such  a 
character  as  to  satisfy,  in  a  great  measure,  the  minds 
of  speculative  men,  and  to  induce  them  to  make  the 
leading  principles  of  that  system  their  common  text- 
book in  the  investigation  and  promulgation  of  truth. 


112  ARABIAN  AND  JEWISH  WRITERS  ON  LOGIC. 


CHAPTEE  VI. 

ON  THE  ARABIAN  AND  JEWISH  WRITERS  ON  LOGIC,  FROM 
THE  NINTH  TO  THE  THIRTEENTH  CENTURY. 

We  cannot,  in  a  historical  sketch  of  logic,  omit  a  short 
notice  of  the  Arabian  and  Jewish  writers  on  the 
science.  The  former,  in  particular,  paid  great  atten- 
tion to  it,  and  have  left  indelible  proofs  of  their  inge- 
nuity and  fervour  of  zeal  in  this  direction,  even  to  the 
present  hour.  . 

The  Arabian  logical  philosophy,  taken  as  a  whole, 
is  a  compound  of  three  leading  ingredients — the  Scrip- 
ture doctrine  as  to  the  nature  of  truth,  the  Grecian 
dialectics,  and  the  theories  of  the  New  Platonists.  A 
knowledge  of  the  general  philosophy  attributed  to  the 
Arabians,  is  said  to  have  been  chiefly  derived  from  the 
teachings  of  some  distinguished  Christian  thinkers, 
such  as  John  Philoponus,  Mesne  of  Damascus,  Hor- 
nian,  and  others.  It  was  through  this  channel  that 
the  writings  of  Aristotle  and  the  commentaries  of  the 
~New  Platonists  were  conveyed  to  them  about  the  com- 
mencement of  the  ninth  century,  and  which  imparted 
such  a  powerful  stimulant  to  their  speculative  subtilty 
and  dialectic  skill. 


ALKENDI,  ALFARABI.  113 

Alkendi,  a  native  of  Bassora,  a  city  on  the  Persian 
Gulf,  flourished  as  a  philosopher  at  the  commencement 
of  the  ninth  century.  He  wrote  various  treatises  on 
the  Categories,  the  Predicables,  the  Sophisms,  and  other 
divisions  of  logical  science.  He  likewise  paid  great 
attention  to  the  nature  of  mathematical  evidence,  and 
regarded  it  as  a  very  necessary  preliminary  study  to 
philosophy  in  general. 

Alfarabi  was  a  logician  of  unrivalled  skill  and  talent. 
He  studied  at  the  city  of  Bagdad,  under  John  Mesne  ; 
and  the  character  he  bore  from  one  of  his  contempo- 
raries, testifies  "  that  he  penetrated  the  very  depths  of 
logic,  revealed  its  secrets,  and  facilitated  the  under- 
standing of  it.  The  writings  which  he  composed  are 
filled  with  clear  observations  and  acute  conceptions." 

Alfarabi  aimed  at  great  achievements.  He  was  am- 
bitious of  entering  into  the  very  arcana  of  nature,  and 
extorting  from  her  all  her  most  hidden  secrets.  With 
the  assistance  of  the  formal  dialectics  of  the  Greeks,  he 
essayed  to  develop  the  entire  system  of  Oriental  intui- 
tion, and  to  resolve  all  the  problems  connected  with 
the  moral  and  physical  world.  His  tract  Upon  the 
Sciences  forms  a  sort  of  dictionary,  or  methodical 
classification  of  various  branches  of  human  knowledge, 
embracing  the  leading  principles  of  these  several  sub- 
jects of  inquiry,  and  pointing  out  their  logical  con- 
nexion one  with  another.  He  places  Divine  wisdom 
at  the  head  of  all.  "  This  science,"  says  he,  "  demon- 
strates, that  the  objects  embodied  in  this  heavenly 
branch  of  knowledge  raise  the  mind  of  man  to  the 
height  of  perfection.  The  ascending  scale  of  his  intel- 
ligence terminates  at  the  first  principle  anterior  to  all 

H 


114  ARABIAN  AND  JEWISH  WRITERS  ON  LOGIC. 

things ;  this  is  the  primordial  unity,  which  confers 
existence  and  design  upon  every  thing  we  see.  Truth 
flows  from  it  as  its  only  and  proper  source,* 

The  author's  work  Upon  the  Understanding  relates 
more  particularly  to  the  connexion  subsisting  between 
logical  forms  and  the  ideas  they  represent,  or  to  those 
processes  of  the  intellect  which  are  requisite  for  the 
full  development  of  universal  truths  and  propositions. 
These  are  not  the  results  of  any  mechanical  or  elabo- 
rated process  of  the  understanding,  but  arise  out  of  it 
by  virtue  of  its  own  innate  vigour  and  spontaneity. 
Men  can  scarcely  be  said  to  be  really  cognisant  of  their 
existence,  seeing  that  they  display  themselves  so 
promptly  and  rapidly  in  every  exercise  of  their  rational 
powers.f 

Avicenna  was  another  distinguished  Arabian  logi- 
cian. In  his  Treatise  on  Logic  we  find  that  he  adopts 
the  principles  of  Aristotle,  but  does  not  follow  him 
slavishly,  According  to  Avicenna's  notions,  "  all 
knowledge  consists  in  two  things — representation  and 
conviction.  We  may  represent  things  to  ourselves  in 
various  fashions,  without,  however,  persuading  our- 
selves of  their  truth.  Representation  is  acquired  by  de- 
finition, or  some  such  similar  contrivance  of  the  mind ; 
but  conviction  is  derived  from  reasoning  alone."  The 
author  also  conceived  that  there  were  certain  general 
and  distinct  conceptions  of  the  mind  which  lay  at  the 
root  of  all  argumentation  ;  and  he  cites  the  notion  or 
idea  of  being  as  one  of  these.  This  conception  of  his 
own  existence,  and  the  existence  of  things  around  him, 

*  Alfarabi,  De  Scientiis.     Paris,  1638,  pp.  35,  36. 
f  Opera.     Paris,  p.  43. 


AVICENXA,  ALGAZELI.  115 

is  ever  present  to  the  mind  of  man.  He  cannot,  for 
even  a  moment,  divest  himself  of  it.* 

Algazeli  flourished  as  a  logician  in  the  eleventh 
century,  both  at  Bagdad  and  Alexandria.  In  some 
essential  points  he  differed  from  Avicenna,  particularly 
as  to  the  mind's  power  to  frame  universal  conceptions. 
All  men  have  not  the  like  power  of  recognising  and 
using  these  universal  ideas — inasmuch  as  Algazeli  con- 
ceives that  high  notions  of  moral  worth  and  intellectual 
refinement  are  indispensable  to  the  attainment  of  a 
large  measure  of  truth.  The  soul  of  man  is  as  a 
mirror :  it  reflects  the  truth ;  but,  in  order  to  do  this 
fully  and  faithfully,  it  is  requisite  that  it  should  be 
pure  and  unsullied  by  vice  and  error.  "  The  logical 
understanding,"  says  he,  "can  perceive  itself;  it  can 
perceive  its  own  perception ;  it  can  perceive  what  it 
produces ;  it  can  pass  from  the  strong  to  the  weak, 
from  the  obscure  to  the  luminous,  without  any  essential 
change  of  its  nature;  it  is  strengthened  instead  of 
weakened  by  years.  The  derangement  of  the.  organs 
of  sensation  may  act  upon  the  reasoning  faculty  in  two 
ways — by  causing  a  distraction  of  the  mind,  and  by 
depriving  it  of  that  assistance  required  for  judging  of 
external  bodies.  But  still  our  intellectual  power  can, 
by  virtue  of  its  own  innate  energy,  emancipate  itself 
from  this  double  dependence."  f 

The  logical  method  of  Algazeli  has  been  charged 
with  embodying  a  species  of  scientific  scepticism  ini- 
mical to  all  sound  reason.  His  enthusiastic  admiration 
of  the  Koran  induced  him  to  maintain  that  all  truth 

*  See  Logique  d'Avicene,  by  Vattier.     Paris, 
t  Logica  et  Philos.     Cologne,  1506. 


116  ARABIAN  AND  JEWISH  WRITERS  ON  LOGIC. 

should  be  viewed  through  its  pages,  and  be  submitted 
to  its  authority.  And,  in  order  to  establish  this  dog- 
matic position,  he  argued  for  the  uncertainty  and  doubt 
which  naturally  hang  around  our  powers  of  mental 
perception.  The  only  true  antidote  against  absolute 
scepticism  was,  in  his  judgment,  to  take  shelter  in  the 
Koran, 

In  the  middle  of  the  twelfth  century  we  have  the 
doctrine  of  absolute  logical  intuition  brought  forward 
by  Avenpace.  He  was  a  profound  but  mystical  genius. 
He  entertained  a  thorough  contempt  for  dialectics  of 
every  form,  which  he  considered  a  barren  and  stupify- 
ing  branch  of  public  education.  Tophail,  who  flourished 
about  the  same  time  at  Cordova  in  Spain,  followed  in 
the  same  mystical  path.  His  work,  The  Man  of  Na- 
ture, is  a  description  of  a  man  who  in  infancy  had  been 
left  in  a  desert,  and  nursed  by  a  she-wrolf ;  having  no 
intercourse  with  mankind,  but  cultivating  an  acquaint- 
ance with  nature  by  means  of  his  unaided  physical 
and  mental  powers.  He  is  represented,  as  he  increases 
in  age,  as  going  forward  from  one  stage  of  mental  con- 
templation to  another,  until  he  arrives  at  the  perfectly 
intuitive,  which  rests  upon  Deity  itself. 

These  fanatic  opinions  created  a  reaction  ;  and  many 
of  the  Arabian  philosophers  of  lesser  note  and  influence 
fell  into  a  species  of  logical  materialism,  and  considered 
all  truth  to  be  represented  by,  or  embodied  in  mere 
formal  technicalities  and  rules.  The  absolute  scepti- 
cism to  which  these  opinions  naturally  led,  gave  rise 
to  a  number  of  persons,  professing  the  religious  doc- 
trines of  the  Koran,  called  Talkers,  who  devoted  them- 
selves, like  the   Greek   Sophists,   to    mere   dialectical 


THE  TALKERS,  AVERROES.  117 

exhibitions.  The  entire  secret  of  their  exploits  in  this 
way,  was  by  throwing  all  questions  into  obscurity,  and 
by  dwelling  on  both  sides  of  an  argument  with  equal 
earnestness  and  zeal.  Truth  with  them  was  a  name 
only,  and  nothing  more. 

This  was  the  precise  state  of  things  when  Averroes 
made  his  appearance.  He  was  a  native  of  Cordova  in 
Spain,  and  flourished  in  the  twelfth  century.  His 
grand  aim  was  to  give  a  right  and  powerful  logical 
direction  to  the  science  of  his  age.  He  attempted  to 
establish  a  species  of  eclecticism  relative  to  the  entire 
science  of  reasoning.  Dialectical  principles  and  systems 
were  all  at  variance,  and  he  strived  to  reconcile  and 
harmonize  them  with  each  other.  Being  intimately 
conversant  with  the  writings  of  Plato  and  Aristotle, 
and  also  with  the  dialectics  of  the  Alexandrian  school, 
he  conceived  there  was  a  possibility  of  rearing  a  natural 
and  consistent  theory  of  truth  out  of  the  several  dis- 
cordant materials  before  him.  With  this  view,  Averroes 
maintained  it  was  requisite  to  examine  the  primary 
foundation  of  all  evidence.  It  was  clear  to  him  that 
nature  herself  distinctly  pointed  to  two  kinds  of  evi- 
dence or  truth  ;  to  that  which  was  within  the  man, 
and  that  which  lay  without  him.  There  was  an  intellect, 
and  there  was  a  soul.  The  former  takes  cognisance  of 
all  truth  as  it  is  exhibited  in  universal  or  particular 
propositions ;  while  the  office  of  the  latter  is  to  recog- 
nise those  relations  which  subsist  among  the  several 
phenomena  of  the  material  world.  The  intellect  is 
active,  the  soul  passive.  The  former  belongs  to  all 
men,  although  possessing  the  attribute  of  distinct 
individuality,  and  the  latter  constitutes  that  which  is 


118  ARABIAN  AND  JEWISH  WRITERS  ON  LOGIC. 

individual  in  each  man.  The  intellect  is  eternal  and 
incorruptible,  the  soul  corruptible  and  mortal.  The 
union  of  the  two  principles  is  necessary  to  produce 
thought,  as  it  is  developed  in  man.  What  the  univer- 
sal intelligence  is,  the  result  of  this  combination,  has 
been  the  subject  of  much  controversy  among  the  critics 
on  Averroes'  speculations.  Some  view  it  as  a  decided 
pantheistical  principle,  while  others  considered  it  as  a 
species  of  logical  dualism.  The  latter  opinion  is  the 
more  common  of  the  two ;  and  is  supported  by  testi- 
mony from  several  works  of  the  author,  wherein  he  had 
to  defend  his  philosophy  against  certain  objections 
which  the  Mohammedan  doctors  brought  against  it. 
He  seems  to  have  been  driven  into  a  corner ;  and,  to 
extricate  himself,  he  maintained  there  were  two  kinds 
of  truth — theological  and  philosophical.  Theology  is 
simply  the  expression  of  popular  belief,  and  is  only 
relatively  true  ;  it  indicates  only  the  outside  of  things. 
Philosophy  possesses  truth  in  itself;  its  principles  and 
conclusions  partake  of  the  absolute.* 

Mr  Hallam  observes,  that  the  general  doctrine  held 
by  Averroes  was,  "  that  there  is  one  common  intelli- 
gence,— active,  "immortal,  indivisible, — unconnected 
with  matter,  the  soul  of  the  human  kind ;  which  is  not 
in  any  one  man,  because  it  has  no  material  form,  but 
which  yet  assists  in  the  rational  operations  of  each  man's 
personal  soul,  and  from  those  operations,  which  are 
all  conversant  with  particulars,  derives  its  own  know- 
ledge of  universals.  Thus,  if  I  understand  what  is 
meant,  which  is  rather  subtile,  it  might  be  said,  that  as 
in   the   common    theory  particular    sensations  furnish 

*  AverroeSj  Opera.     Venice,  1660. 


AYERKOES.  11.9 

means  to  the  soul  of  forming  general  ideas ;  so  in  that 
of  Averroes  the  ideas  and  judgments  of  separate  human 
souls  furnish  collectively  the  means  of  that  knowledge 
of  universals  which  the  one  great  soul  of  mankind  alone 
can  embrace.  This  was  a  theory  built,  as  some  have 
said,  on  the  bad  Arabic  version  of  Aristotle  which 
Averroes  used.  But  whatever  might  have  first  sug- 
gested it  to  the  philosopher  of  Cordova,  it  seems  little 
else  than  an  expansion  of  the  Eealist  hypothesis,  urged 
to  a  degree  of  apparent  paradox.  For  if  the  human 
soul,  as  an  universal,  possesses  an  objective  reality,  it 
must  surely  be  intelligent ;  and,  being  such,  it  may 
seem  no  extravagant  hypothesis  :  though  incapable  of 
that  demonstration,  we  now  require  in  philosophy  to 
suppose  that  it  acts  upon  the  subordinate  intelligences 
of  the  same  species,  and  receives  impressions  from  them. 
By  this  also  they  would  reconcile  the  knowledge  we 
were  supposed  to  possess  of  the  reality  of  universals, 
with  the  acknowledged  impossibility,  at  least  in  many 
cases,  of  representing  them  to  the  mind."* 

The  Jewish  writers  on  logical  science,  particularly 
for  the  first  ten  or  twelve  centuries  of  the  Christian 
era,  exercised  no  small  influence  on  the  current  of 
philosophic  thought  in  the  East,  and  in  the  southern 
parts  of  the  European  continent.  It  would  appear 
from  the  edict  of  Augustus,  in  the  year  15  b.  c,  to  all 
the  governors  of  the  Soman  provinces,  that,  though 
we  have  no  account  of  the  Jewish  philosophers  indi- 
vidually, they  must  have  been  held  in  no  small  note, 
both  in  Spain  and  the  south  of  France.  They  occu- 
pied chairs  of  philosophy  and  logic  in  all  the  principal 

*  Lit.  Middle  Ages,  vol.  i.  p.  198. 


120  ARABIAN  AND  JEWISH  WRITERS  ON  LOGIC. 

schools  of  learning  in  several  of  these  provinces,  and 
particularly  in  the  cities  of  Cordova  and  Toledo.* 

Abraham  Ben  Isaac  was  a  logician  of  Toledo,  of 
great  renown.  He  was  born  in  1119,  and,  on  account 
of  his  wisdom  and  profundity,  was  called  the  Sage. 
He  wrote  a  work  on  logic,  in  which  he  adopts  the 
leading  principles  and  forms  of  Aristotle. 

Jehudah  Ben  Thibon  Marimon  was  born  in  1134, 
and  distinguished  for  his  logical  attainments.  He 
translated  into  Arabic,  and  wrote  commentaries  upon, 
the  entire  works  of  Aristotle.  E.  Joseph  Aquichi, 
born  in  1190,  followed  Thibon  Marimon,  and  adopted 
the  same  opinions  as  to  the  nature  and  offices  of  logic 
as  those  contained  in  the  commentaries  alluded  to. 

Among  all  the  Jewish  writers  on  logic,  Moses  Mai- 
monides  is  the  most  distinguished.  He  was  a  native 
of  Cordova.  He  is  the  author  of  a  work  on  logic 
called  Miloth  Higayon.  This  treatise  was  originally 
written  in  the  Arabic  language ;  but,  after  the  death  of 
the  author,  it  wras  translated  into  Hebrew  by  Moses 
Eben  Tibon.  Maimonicles  follows  Aristotle's  method, 
though  he  endeavours  to  make  it  applicable  to  his  own 
peculiar  theological  views. 

*  Semaeli  David. 


LOGICAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE  MIDDLE  AGES.         121 


CHAPTEE  VII. 

ON  THE  SCHOLASTIC  LOGICIAN'S  FROM  THE  COMMENCEMENT 
OF  THE  NINTH,  TILL  THE  EEVIVAL  OF  LETTEES  IN  ITALY 
IN  THE  MIDDLE  OF  THE  FOURTEENTH,  CENTURY. 

The  logical  philosophy  of  the  scholastic  ages  is  closely 
identified  with  mental  science  itself;  so  much  so,  in- 
deed, that  it  becomes  a  difficult  task  to  keep  always  in 
view  the  radical  distinction  between  that  science,  and 
the  purely  dialectic  forms  or  systems  which  are  ever 
obtruded  on  our  notice  in  the  abstract  speculations  of 
the  middle  ages.  This  difficulty  must  be  our  apology 
for  such  passages,  in  this  chapter,  as  may  appear  to 
confound  or  blend  together  the  two  branches  of  know- 
ledge. 

The  writings  of  the  schoolmen  present,  at  first  sight, 
a  huge  and  disorderly  mass  of  thought.  Extending  as 
they  do  over  nearly  six  centuries,  we  are  only  able  to 
catch  here  and  there  the  more  bold  and  rugged  parts 
of  it.  But  by  dint  of  keeping  the  mental  eye  fixed  for 
a  period  on  the  vast  materials  around  us,  we  gradually 
begin  to  see  light  gleaming  through  the  rents  and 
chinks  of  the  apparently  solid  and  impenetrable  struc- 
ture, and  to  recognise  many  of  the  primary  and  indivi- 


122        LOGICAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE  MIDDLE  AGES. 

dual  elements  which  compose  it.  Though  treating  of 
all  things  and  subjects  which  can  come  under  the  ob- 
servation of  thinking  creatures,  yet  there  is  one  conspi- 
cuous feature  in  the  scholastic  literature, — namely,  its 
logical  or  dialectic  character.  Viewed  as  a  whole,  it 
was  essentially  one  grand  and  magnificent  organon  for 
the  discovery  and  dissemination  of  truth.  This  was  its 
prominent  and  ostensible  object  in  all  its  phases  and 
vicissitudes.  It  aimed  to  give  a  reason  for  every  thing ; 
from  Deity  itself  to  the  most  insignificant  material 
object.  It  was  constantly  in  search  of  some  splendid 
and  infallible  logical  method,  which  should  conduct  the 
understandings  of  men  to  a  full  and  perfect  knowledge 
of  all  truth. 

We  are  very  apt  to  imagine  that  the  logical  philoso- 
phy of  the  middle  ages  was  altogether  of  a  purely 
formal  character,  and  solely  confined  to  sheer  techni- 
calities and  syllogistic  rules.  But  this  was  not  the 
case.  The  grand  source  of  all  the  controversies  and 
disputations  of  which  we  read,  was  not  the  logical  vali- 
dity of  the  formal,  but  the  logical  validity  and  value  of 
the  mental  principles  of  reasoning  ;  which  principles, 
as  the  philosophers  of  these  times  conceived,  lay  at  the 
root  of  all  formal  rules  of  argument,  and  were,  in  fact, 
the  only  things  which  imparted  life  and  interest  to 
them.  Hence  it  is  that  we  find  every  scholastic  logician 
of  any  mark  had  some  definite  system  of  mental  prin- 
ciples and  maxims  to  guide  him  in  all  his  philosophical 
inquiries  ;  and  though  he  might  use  the  mere  formal 
portions  of  logical  instruction  as  a  help  to  his  labours, 
or  as  an  instrument  to  express  his  meaning,  yet  he 
never    rested   the    importance   of  his   cause,   nor    the 


LOGICAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE  MIDDLE  AGES.         123 

strength  of  his  conclusions,  upon  such  a  narrpw  and 
insecure  basis.  It  was  always  to  the  great  and  general 
principles  of  reasoning  to  which  he  looked  forward  for 
the  overthrow  of  a  rival,  or  the  establishment  of  his 
own  fame  as  a  solid  and  original  thinker.  ~No  scho- 
lastic logician  was  ever  great,  even  in  his  own  day,  or 
in  his  own  university  chair,  from  his  mere  skilful  and 
adroit  management  of  the  armoury  of  formal  logic.  It 
was  as  necessary  to  the  attainment  of  reputation  then 
as  it  is  now,  that  a  reasoner  should  rise  above  the  low 
jugglery  of  logical  dilemmas  and  syllogistic  conundrums. 
All  the  really  great  men  of  the  middle  ages  had  to  lay 
these  aside,  and  take  their  stand  upon  those  compre- 
hensive principles  of  mind  which  are  called  into  requi- 
sition in  all  argumentative  trains  of  thought,  employed 
in  the  development  or  illustration  of  fundamental  and 
vital  truths. 

To  the  student  and  ordinary  reader,  there  are  certain 
characteristics  which  belong  to  the  scholastic  logic, 
viewed  as  an  entire  system,  which  it  is  requisite  to 
know,  in  order  to  fully  comprehend  its  bearings  and 
import.  On  some  of  these  we  shall  make  a  few  brief 
observations. 

One  of  the  prominent  features  of  the  scholastic 
philosophy  is,  that  its  cultivators  sought  for  their  re- 
spective logical  methods  among  the  principles  of  human 
nature,  or  within  those  sciences  which  more  immediately 
spring  out  of,  or  are  based  upon,  man's  mental  and 
moral  constitution.  They  looked  at  him  in  a  social, 
political,  moral,  thinking,  and  religious  aspect.  It  was 
in  these  provinces  of  the  inward  man  that  they  carried 
on  their  logical  warfare.    The  abstract  evidence  derived 


124        LOGICAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE  MIDDLE  AGES. 

from  a  purely  deductive  science,  like  that  of  mathema- 
tics, was  seldom  or  ever  noticed ;  and  as  to  any  peculiar 
philosophical  interest  being  involved  in  mere  physical 
phenomena,  this  never  once  entered  into  their  minds. 
The  outward  world  had  but  few  logical  charms  for 
them.  It  was  to  humanity  alone,  in  its  strictest  signi- 
fication and  form,  that  they  paid  attention.  The  reason 
of  this  is  apparent ;  it  lies  on  the  very  surface  of  things. 
Opinions  on  the  sciences  of  human  nature  were  more 
important,  and  also  more  discordant  in  their  elements ; 
and  here  we  recognise  at  once,  both  cause  and  effect 
for  all  that  argumentative  turmoil,  and  subtile  disputa- 
tion, so  conspicuously  portrayed  in  the  middle  ages. 
These  disputes  touched  the  sympathetic  cords  of  huma- 
nity in  all  directions.  Every  logical  method  for  the 
discovery  or  promulgation  of  truth  was  considered  as 
having  a  direct  reference  to  some  vital,  social,  political, 
or  religious  principle,  intimately  involved  in  the  very 
constitution  of  society  itself;  and  therefore  the  discus- 
sion of  every  such  logical  method  was  to  be  carefully 
watched,  and  kept  within  proper  and  orthodox  limits. 
Though  morals,  politics,  social  and  mental  philoso- 
phy, were  severally  embraced  in  the  scholastic  disputa- 
tions, yet  the  theological  element  greatly  predominated 
over  all  these  topics.  The  logic  of  the  schools  had  a 
strong  and  direct  religious  bearing  or  purpose.  It  was 
illustrated  and  enforced  by  constant  appeals  to  theolo- 
gical doctrines.  It  was  an  instrument  to  strengthen 
the  powerful  hand  of  the  Papacy,  which  was  every  way 
present ;  working  with  incredible  industry,  by  its  mis- 
sionaries, its  rules,  its  decrees,  and  its  institutions,  to 
gain  the  ascendency  over  the  heathen  element  around 


LOGICAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE  MIDDLE  AGES.         125 

it,  and  to  place  its  authority  upon  a  solid  basis.  The 
grand  idea  of  the  schoolmen  was,  in  one  word,  to  rear 
an  entire  and  perfect  temple  of  human  knowledge,  and 
to  make  the  logic  of  theology  its  basis. 

The  idea  on  which  the  logic  of  the  schoolmen  rested, 
was  unquestionably  an  idea  of  theological  unity.  To 
them  the  entire  world  of  thought  seemed  to  rest  upon 
it.  The  grand  object  of  the  Bible  was  to  teach  truth. 
Without  it  the  declarations  it  contained  were  worthless, 
and  man  the  most  forlorn  and  desolate  of  creatures. 
St  Thomas  Aquinas  is  decisive  on  this  point ;  and  he 
speaks  the  sentiments  of  all  his  order  who  either  pre- 
ceded or  followed  him.  "Those  arts,"  says  he,  " which 
govern  other  arts,  are  called  architectonic  or  ruling 
arts  ;  and  those  who  exercise  them  are  called  architects, 
and  claim  the  name  of  wise.  These  artificers,  however, 
as  aiming  only  at  particular  ends,  reach  not  the  uni- 
versal end  of  all  things.  They  are,  therefore,  only 
called  wise  on  this  or  that  particular  subject.  In  this 
sense  it  is  said,  i  As  a  wise  master-builder,  I  have  laid 
the  foundation.'*  But  the  name  of  absolutely  wise  is 
reserved  for  him  alone  whose  speculations  turn  on  the 
end  of  the  universe,  which  is  also  the  principle  of  all 
things.  Wherefore,  as  the  philosopher  says,")-  the  wise 
man  must  consider  the  highest  causes.  But  the  ulti- 
mate end  of  every  thing  is  that  which  is  intended  by 
its  first  author  and  mover.  But  the  first  author  and 
mover  of  the  universe  is  Intellect.  Therefore  the 
ultimate  end  of  the  universe  must  be  the  good  of  In- 
tellect, which  is  Truth.  Truth  must  then  be  the  ulti- 
mate end  of  the  universe ;   and  with  the  consideration 

*  1  Cor.  iii.  10.  +  Arist.  Metaph.,  1,  2. 


126         LOGICAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE  MIDDLE  AGES. 

of  this  end  must  wisdom  be  principally  occupied. 
Therefore  the  Divine  Wisdom  clad  in  flesh  declares, 
that  He  came  into  the  world  to  manifest  the  truth, 
saying,  '  To  this  end  was  I  born,  and  for  this  cause 
came  I  into  the  world,  that  I  should  bear  witness  unto 
the  truth.'"* 

It  is  from  its  theological  bearings  that  the  unity  of 
the  scholastic  logic  is  chiefly  derived.  This  unity  of 
spirit  and  design  is  striking  and  complete  when  viewed 
from  a  certain  point ;  but  on  looking  a  little  deeper 
into  the  subject,  and  contemplating  it  apart  from  its 
mere  external  manifestations,  we  see  from  time  to  time 
considerable  variety  in  the  general  principles  it  pro- 
pounded and  discussed.  We  find  among  the  schoolmen 
abstract  speculations  of  every  shade  and  conceivable 
cast.  We  have  materialism  and  spiritualism,  empiri- 
cism and  intuition,  pantheism  and  orthodoxy,  with  all 
the  varied  hues  of  opinion  to  which  the  mingling  of 
these  leading  notions  with  each  other  may  be  subser- 
vient, pressed  upon  our  attention  in  every  age  of  scho- 
lastic learning.  And  it  would  be  difficult  to  point  out 
a  single  speculative  theory  of  the  present  day,  on  the 
nature  and  origin  of  human  knowledge,  which  will  not 
find  its  counterpart  in  the  middle  ages.  But  there  was 
this  great  difference  between  these  times  and  our  own, 
that  then  books  were  scarce,  and  the  means  of  mental 
communication  between  man  and  man,  and  kingdom 
and  kingdom,  few  and  tardy ;  and  also,  that  whenever 
an  opinion  or  speculative  theory  reared  its  head,  which 
had  the  most  distant  chance  of  militating  against  spiri- 
tual orthodoxy,  it  was  immediately  struck  down  by  the 

*  John  xviii.  37. — See  Chretien  on  Logical  Method,  p.  41. 


LOGICAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE  MIDDLE  AGES.         127 

hand  of  clerical  authority,  and  forthwith  consigned  to 
oblivion.  The  union  of  the  scholastic  system  is  there- 
fore  only  a  comparative  unity ;  for  there  were  in  the 
shape  of  abstract  principles  of  thought  every  variety 
and  license  in  its  speculative  inquiries.  Outwardly, 
that  system  presented  an  unity  of  purpose  which  no- 
thing seemed  capable  of  disturbing ;  but  inwardly  there 
was  a  great  diversity  of  philosophical  sentiment  and 
unstable  speculation. 

These  remarks  apply  substantially  to  the  logical  unity 
of  the  scholastic  system.  Though  there  were  here 
likewise  all  kinds  of  logical  methods  suggested  and  de- 
veloped, yet  there  was  still  a  certain  unity  of  purpose 
relative  to  the  chief  ends  of  all  argumentative  processes 
of  thought.  Logic  in  the  eyes  of  all  the  schoolmen, 
no  matter  how  opposite  their  abstract  principles  might 
be,  was  a  grand  and  noble  thing.  It  was  to  embrace 
the  entire  universe  of  truth.  It  contained  within  itself 
all  the  instruments  for  the  purpose.  When  the  scho- 
lastic logician  sallied  out  to  battle,  he  went  armed  with 
the  ten  Categories,  with  a  certain  stock  of  universal 
ideas  or  conceptions,  to  which  were  added  the  Predi- 
cables ;  and  the  whole  embracing,  as  he  conceived,  the 
various  divisions  of  all  existing  things,  both  physical 
and  mental,  he  was  thus  enabled  to  handle  all  kinds  of 
propositions,  and  to  mould  them,  by  the  use  of  lan- 
guage, into  all  sorts  of  nominal  shapes  and  forms.  His 
machinery  was  so  perfect,  that  nothing  was  too  com- 
prehensive or  too  minute  for  its  grasp.  It  constituted 
his  skill  to  bend  and  humour  these  mechanical  appli- 
ances to  all  circumstances  and  contingencies.  And  he 
no  more  doubted  of  their  potency  than  he  doubted  of 


128        LOGICAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE  MIDDLE  AGES. 

his  own  existence.  Hence  logic  was  to  him  the 
"  science  of  sciences/'  "  the  rational  science/'  the  "  art 
of  arts."  All  investigations  were  to  take  their  depar- 
ture from  logic,  because  it  was  the  only  mode  of  teach- 
ing how  we  should  proceed  in  other  sciences.  This 
was  the  current  or  everyday  belief  of  all  the  scholastic 
thinkers  in  every  age  of  their  disputations ;  and  this 
belief  forms  that  logical  unity  which  is  imprinted  on 
the  mind  of  every  one  conversant  with  their  specula- 
tions. 

Another  striking  feature  of  the  schoolmen  is,  their 
incessant  and  pertinacious  disputes  on  the  nature 
of  particular  and  universal  ideas.  This  is  one  of  the 
most  conspicuous  incidents  in  their  history,  and  has 
served  alike  to  hand  down  their  fame  to  posterity,  and 
to  make  them,  in  the  eyes  of  many,  objects  of  com- 
miseration and  contempt.  For  the  sake  of  those  who 
may  not  know  the  general  merits  of  the  question,  we 
shall  make  a  few  explanatory  observations  upon  it. 

The  point  of  dispute  is  simply  this  : — The  Nomi- 
nalists affirm  that  there  are  two  classes  of  truth ;  one 
class  relating  to  individual  or  single  objects,  and  their 
particular  qualities  or  properties  ;  the  other  class  to 
general  collections  or  assortments  of  things,  which  we 
designate  by  a  general  term  or  terms.  A  man  is  a  par- 
ticular idea ;  a  multitude  of  men,  a  general  idea.  The 
Nominalists  affirm  that  the  difference  between  those 
two  kinds  of  ideas  is  only  a  verbal  one ;  that  is,  that 
when  men  talk  or  reason  about  these  general  ideas  or 
attributes  of  things,  the  general  term  is  the  only  thing 
with  which  the  mind  is  conversant. 

Now,  the  Eealists  denied  this  doctrine  in  toto.    Thev 


LOGICAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE  MIDDLE  AGES.         129 

maintained,  that  though  these  general  terms  are  used 
in  our  descriptions  of  the  similar  properties  or  qualities 
of  things,  yet  there  is  a  general  idea  always  present  in 
the  mind  when  it  thus  characterises  the  common  attri- 
butes which  belong  to  a  particular  genus  or  class.  This 
general  term  is  not  a  mere  verbal  instrument  or  sym- 
bol, but  stands  for  a  real  permanent  intellectual  con- 
ception, which  is  always  present  to  the  mind,  and  to 
which  the  name  of  general  idea  is  uniformly  given. 

Some  reasoners  attempted  to  steer  a  middle  course 
— they  were  called  Conceptualists.  They  agreed  with 
the  Nominalists  in  denouncing  general  ideas  or  concep- 
tions, such  as  the  Realists  considered  them  to  be ;  but 
they  still  thought  the  mind  had  the  power  of  creating 
those  general  ideas,  which  they  preferred  to  call  concep- 
tions. They  said  there  were  no  essences  or  universal 
ideas  to  agree  with  general  terms,  and  that  the  mind 
could  reason  about  classes  of  individuals  without  the 
mediation  of  language. 

It  may  be  observed  in  passing,  that  the  schoolmen 
must  not  be  considered  as  the  originators  of  this  con- 
troversy  about  particular  and  universal  ideas.  We  can 
trace  it  in  the  oldest  records  we  have  of  logical  philo- 
sophy. Plato,  Aristotle,  the  Stoics,  and  many  other 
philosophers  and  sects,  entered  deeply  into  the  entire 
question.  They  were  all,  however,  unable  to  solve  it, 
and  it  descended  down  to  the  schoolmen  of  the  middle 
ages,  with  all  its  puzzling  freshness  and  inherent 
mystery. 

The  progress  of  scholasticism  was  characterised  by 
extraordinary  public  excitement  wherever  it  was  studied. 
Emperors  and  kings,  as  well  as  the  clergy  and  the  laity, 

1 


130        LOGICAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE  MIDDLE  AGES. 

partook  of  the  reigning  enthusiasm.  The  universities 
of  France,  Germany,  and  England,  became  one  grand 
arena  for  the  discussion  of  the  abstract  doctrines  of  the 
overheated  parties ;  and  sovereigns,  led  doubtless  by 
some  political  reasons  of  the  day,  took  part  in  the  con- 
tests, and  even  scrupled  not  on  some  occasions  to  em- 
ploy the  civil  power  to  gain  a  victory  or  punish  an 
enemy.  The  accounts  which  creditable  historians  and 
eyewitnesses  have  given  of  these  contests,  exceed  all 
ordinary  belief.  We  are  told  by  one  author,  that  at  the 
public  discussions  of  the  scholastic  ages  it  was  no  uncom- 
mon thing  to  see  disputants  shout  till  they  were  quite 
hoarse,  use  the  most  gross  and  insulting  language, 
make  grimaces  at  each  other,  threaten  personal  chas- 
tisement, and  struggle  with  and  endeavour  to  prostrate 
each  other  to  the  ground.  When  words  and  threats 
failed,  recourse  was  had  to  the  fists.  As  in  the  wrest- 
ling schools,  they  buff,  and  spit,  and  kick,  and  bite ; 
and  even  go  beyond  this,  and  use  clubs  and  other  dan- 
gerous weapons,  so  that  many  got  wounded,  and  not  a 
few  killed  outright.* 

We  shall  not  extend  these  general  observations  to  a 
greater  length,  but  shall  now  give  a  brief  account  of  the 
individual  logical  opinions  and  writings  of  some  of  the 
most  distinguished  of  the  scholastic  philosophers. 

John  Scotus  Erigena,  a.  d.  900. — Mere  formal  logic 
had  but  a  feeble  hold  on  the  mind  of  this  famous  scholastic 
writer.  In  every  case  he  made  it  subservient  to  men- 
tal science.  His  grand  design  was  to  construct  a  system 
of  human  knowledge  by  an  a  priori  process.  The  primi- 
tive unity  was  the  result  of  his  logical  synthesis.     The 

*  See  Ludovicns  Vives. 


■  JOHN  SCOTUS  ERIGENA.  131 

entire  material  universe,  and  the  whole  range  of  human 
thought,  were  the  logical  domains  for  the  employment 
of  analysis  ;  and  when  this  analysis  was  fully  made,  and 
carried  to  its  ultimate  limits,  the  results  were  again 
absorbed  into  the  union  of  synthesis — -just  as  all  creat- 
ed things  must  return  to  the  divine  unity  from  which 
they  sprung. 

The  chief  work  of  Scotus  is  his  "  De  Divisione 
Naturce."  The  dialectics  incorporated  in  it  are  deeply 
tinged  with  Platonic  and  Oriental  notions,  This  has 
led  to  the  general  charge  against  Scotus,  that  his  views 
were  pantheistical.  The  "Division  of  Nature"  was  in 
subsequent  ages  condemned ;  and  Pope  Honorius  III. 
issued  a  bull,  in  which  it  was  declared  that  it  "  abound- 
ed with  worms  of  heretical  depravity."  All  persons 
were  threatened  with  excommunication  who  should 
retain  a  copy  of  the  work  in  their  possession.  The 
treatise  is  divided  into  five  books;  and  the  author 
endeavours  to  work  out  his  logical  problem  by  means 
of  four  instruments — division,  definition,  demonstration, 
and  analysis. 

The  human  understanding,  according  to  Erigena, 
has  two  powers,  reason  and  sense.  By  the  latter  he 
does  not  mean  external,  but  internal  sense.  The  ex- 
ternal organs  of  sensation  only  connect  the  understand- 
ing with  the  body.  Eelatively  to  their  principle  of 
action,  they  are  but  one.  These  senses  are  like  a 
porter  or  messenger ;  they  introduce  external  represen- 
tations to  the  internal  senses,  which  preside  over  the 
operations  of  the  mind  in  its  pursuit  after  truth.  The 
grand  object  of  the  reasoning  faculty  in  man,  is  to 
direct  us  to  a  Deity  as  an  universal  cause.     All  human 


132        LOGICAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE  MIDDLE  AGES. 

knowledge  or  investigation  may  be  resolved  into  four 
categories  ;  namely,  "  that  which  creates,  and  is  not 
created ;  that  which  is  created,  and  creates ;  that  which 
is  created,  and  doth  not  create ;  and  that  which 
neither  creates,  nor  is  created." 

The  logical  method  of  Erigena  sets  out,  like  those 
of  the  philosophers  of  old,  with  the  primitive  unity  of 
all  knowledge ;  and  this  unity,  in  his  mind,  was  every 
thing  which  is  comprehended  by  the  word  nature. 
2sTow,  what  would  a  logician  do,  aiming  at  the  solution 
of  all  truth,  under  such  circumstances?  The  answer 
is,  he  must  endeavour  to  shew  how  variety  has  been 
produced  from  this  radical  unity.  But,  according  to 
Scotus,  every  thing  rests  on  Deity ;  all  phenomena, 
diversities,  and  states  of  being.  The  intelligence  of 
the  Deity  embraces  all  other  intelligences.  All  exist- 
ent cognitions  are  simply  an  expression  of  the  universal 
unit.  Every  thought  and  feeling  is  but  the  represen- 
tation of  that  which  does  not  appear ;  the  comprehen- 
sion of  that  which  is  incomprehensible ;  the  form  and 
body  of  that  which  possesses  neither  form  nor  body. 
As  human  intelligence  is  enshrouded  from  the  outward 
eye,  and  only  makes  itself  known  through  the  means 
of  sounds  and  letters ;  so,  in  like  manner,  does  the  in- 
effable Divine  goodness  descend  from  the  heights  of 
creation,  and  expand  itself  to  the  utmost  limits  of  ex- 
istence ;  doing  all  things,  subsisting  in  all  things,  with- 
out the  slightest  alteration  or  absorption  of  its  nature 
or  essence.  As  every  thing  springs  out  of  this  unity, 
so  must  every  thing  one  day  return  to  it.  This  is  the 
spiritual  progress  of  things,  the  ultimate  destination  of 
all  science.     In  this  return  to  the  bosom  of  unity,  "  the 


LANFRANC.  133 

body  will  be  resolved  into  vital  motion,  vital  motion 
into  sentiment,  sentiment  into  reason,  reason  into  tlie 
soul,  the  soul  into  the  science  of  all  things  which  are 
below  God ;  science  into  wisdom,  which  is  the  ultimate 
and  immediate  contemplation  of  truth,  so  far  as  it  can 
be  attained  by  the  creature.  At  this  point  of  return- 
ing progress,  every  spirit  becomes  an  intellectual  star, 
and  thus  is  accomplished  the  final  consummation ;  the 
evening  of  creation,  the  lying  down  to  rest  of  all  intel- 
ligences in  the  luminous  shadows  where  lie  enshrouded 
the  causes  of  all  things,  and  thus  day  and  night  will  be 
one  and  the  same." 

Lanfranc,  a.  d.  1036. — Lanfranc  was  by  far  the  most 
able  and  distinguished  dialectician  of  his  age.  He  was 
born  at  Pavia,  but  he  settled  at  Avranches  in  Normandy, 
where  he  established  a  seminary  for  the  teaching  of  logic, 
among  other  things.  This  establishment  gained  great 
popularity  and  fame.  Being  deeply  versed  in  all  meta- 
physical lore,  he  cultivated  a  spirit  of  subtile  disputation, 
and  was  in  this  line  one  of  the  master  spirits  of  his  age. 
We  are  informed  that  his  pupils  were  "  clerks,  the  sons 
of  gentlemen,  masters  of  transcendant  renown,  power- 
ful chiefs,  and  individuals  of  high  nobility."* 

Historians  relate  a  circumstance  relative  to  Lanfranc, 
which  shews  that  the  "  ruling  passion  "  for  discussion 
and  disputation  was  strong  even  in  death.  His  dis- 
ciples were  weeping  around  him,  and  offering  up  their 
fervent  prayers  in  his  behalf — the  last  rites  of  the 
Church  had  been  administered — he  was  upon  the  very 
confines  of  the  unseen  world — when  he  opened  his  eyes> 
and  in  a  feeble  but  distinct  voice  said,  "  I  should  have 

*  Tiraboschi,  Brucker,  Fleury. 


134        LOGICAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE  MIDDLE  AGES. 

been  glad  before  my  death  to  have  committed  to  writ- 
ing my  ideas  upon  the  origin  of  evil,  for  I  had  got 
some  explanations  which  will  now  be  lost."  So  say- 
ing, he  gave  a  wave  with  his  hand,  and  immediately 
expired. 

Koscellinus,  a.  d,  1089. — This  scholastic  was  canon 
of  Compeigne.  He  is  commonly  considered  as  the  first 
writer  who  distinctly  broached  the  Nominalist  theory. 
He  maintained  that  all  general  terms  or  names  used  in 
formal  propositions,  are  but  simple  mental  abstractions, 
which  the  mind  forms  by  comparing  a  certain  number 
of  individuals  with  each  other.  In  fact,  he  went  the 
full  length  of  maintaining  that  universals  were  nothing 
but  names.  This  position  appeared  novel  and  startling 
to  his  age ;  and  hence  it  was  that  he  drew  upon  him- 
self ecclesiastical  censure  and  rebuke.  Eoscellinus  was 
obliged  to  retract  his  opinions  at  the  Council  of  Sois- 
sons,  held  in  the  year  1092.  He  was  afterwards 
banished  both  from  England  and  France.  The  theo- 
logical bearings  of  the  logical  question  were  the  real 
cause  of  his  defeat  and  punishment.  He  taught  "tres 
personas  esse  tres  realitates  different es  " — a  proposition, 
says  his  antagonist  St  Anselm,  that  ought  to  warn 
every  one  how  cautiously  they  should  handle  questions 
of  holy  writ.  Those  dialecticians  of  our  day,  who  are 
heretics  even  in  logic,  consider  universals  to  be  nothing 
but  mere  speech.  Such  reasoners  should  be  altogether 
excluded  from  discussing  spiritual  doctrines.* 

Aventinus,  a  writer  of  the  sixteenth  century,  makes 
the  following  observations  on  the  system  of  this  scho- 
lastic : — " Eoscellinus,"  says  he,  "the  founder  of  the 

*  St  Anselm,  Be  Incaniatione  Verhi,  ch.  2. 


ROSCELLINUS,  ST  ANSELM.    "  135 

~New  Lyceum,  first  cultivated  the  science  of  words  and 
phrases,  and  discovered  a  new  mode  of  cultivating 
philosophy.  To  him  we  owe  a  particular  illustration 
of  that  system  of  philosophical  inquiry  which  the  Peri- 
patetics, or  followers  of  Aristotle,  divided  into  two 
classes ;  the  one,  older,  abounding  in  invention,  and 
claiming  for  itself  the  science  of  things,  and  therefore 
called  the  real  school ;  the  other,  later,  embracing  the 
disturbers  of  this  science,  men  calling  themselves 
Nominalists,  because,  being  niggardly  of  things,  and 
prodigal  of  names  and  notions,  they  appear  to  be  the 
partisans  of  words."  * 

St  Anselm,  a.  d.  1109. — St  Anselm  was  one  of  the 
first-rate  logical  thinkers  of  his  time.  His  opinions  may 
be  gathered  from  his  Dissertation  on  Truth,  written  in 
the  form  of  dialogue,  and  to  be  found  at  the  com- 
mencement of  the  third  book  of  his  "  Monologium" 
In  this  essay  we  find  him  endeavouring  to  establish  the 
three  following  propositions  : — 1st,  That  all  intimations 
from  our  external  senses  or  organs  are  founded  in  truth. 
Whenever  there  is  any  error  in  this  quarter,  it  arises 
from  the  internal  sense  of  perception.  2nd,  There  is  a 
truth  in  the  essence  of  things ;  and  this  truth  depends 
upon  the  supreme  truth,  which  is  God  himself.  3d, 
That  truth  has  neither  beginning  nor  end. 

St  Anselm  was  a  bold  speculator.  He  conceived 
he  had  found  a  logical  mode  of  silencing  all  future 
cavillers  and  disputants.  The  following  is  a  general 
summary  of  his  views  : — 

While  he  admitted  the  certainty  of  knowledge  de- 
rived from  faith,  he  maintained,  at  the  same  time,  that 

*  Annals.     Basil,  1580. 


136        LOGICAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE  MIDDLE  AGES. 

it  was  incumbent  on  all  men  to  cultivate  the  reasoning 
power,  and  to  unfold  the  truth  in  the  shape  of  science. 
The  Scriptures  are  the  true  foundation  of  all  mental 
knowledge,  just  as  the  phenomena  of  nature,  revealed 
to  the  external  senses,  form  the  basis  or  ground- 
work of  all  physical  inquiry.  Now,,  the  revealed  and 
the  scientific  sources  of  truth  may  be  brought  into  com- 
plete harmony. 

The  sphere  of  science  must  be  considered  as  an 
unity,  and  within  this  unity  we  shall  find  a  general 
principle  for  the  elucidation  of  all  things.  This  prin- 
ciple has  two  inherent  attributes ;  its  logical  universa- 
lity,— that  is,  its  susceptibility  to  comprehend  all  other 
ideas ;  and,  secondly,  its  character  of  real  or  objective 
universality, — that  is,  its  harmony  with  a  reality  con- 
ceived as  the  source  of  all  other  realities.  Unless  we 
have  this  second  attribute,  we  must  be  doomed  to  run 
round  a  series  of  logical  speculations,  which,  though 
they  may  assume  a  certain  dialectical  form  or  cohesion, 
would  have  no  necessary  connexion  with  the  reality  of 
things.  What  is  required  therefore  is,  to  establish  a 
foundation  or  firm  basis  for  the  logical  order  and  the 
real  order  of  things  ;  and  the  only  way  of  doing  this  is, 
to  find  out  some  universal  idea  which  could  not  subsist 
as  a  perception  of  the  mind,  without  at  the  same  time 
involving  the  absolute  reality  of  its  object.  Now,  ac- 
cording to  St  Anselm,  there  is  one,  and  only  one,  idea 
in  the  human  understanding  adequate  for  this  purpose 
— the  idea  of  infinite  perfection,  or  the  supreme  good ; 
in  fact,  of  Deity  itself.  The  logician  maintains,  that  if 
the  idea  had  not  a  corresponding  reality,  it  could  not 
be  the  idea  of  absolute  and  supreme  perfection.     But 


ST  ANSELM.  137 

this  idea,  the  more  it  is  examined,  will  be  found  to 
unite  into  one  both  the  logical  and  the  real  universality ; 
logical  universality,  since  all  other  ideas,  implying  more 
or  less  of  being  or  perfection,  are  contained  within  it ; 
and  objective  or  real  universality,  since  the  infinite 
reality  is  the  generating  principle  of  all  other  realities 
or  states  of  being.  It  is  manifest  that  no  other  idea  of 
which  the  human  mind  is  cognisant  possesses  these  two 
characteristics ;  therefore  the  idea  of  G-od  is  the  general 
principle  of  science.  The  Deity  appears  under  two 
aspects ;  in  the  logical  sphere,  as  the  head  or  source  of 
all  ideas  ;  in  the  objective  sphere  of  reality,  as  the  head 
or  source  of  all  existences.* 

It  is  almost  needless  to  say,  that  though  the  views 
of  St  Anselm  are  lofty  and  noble,  he  has  not  succeeded 
in  placing  them  beyond  the  reach  of  doubt  and  cavil. 
This  will  appear  more  fully  afterwards. 

The  authors  of  the  Literary  History  of  France  speak 
highly  of  the  logical  talents  and  learning  of  St  Anselm. 
Logic,  say  they,  agreeably  to  its  general  and  primary 
meaning,  was  the  art  of  reasoning  soundly  and  justly, 
and  by  which  truth  might  be  discovered.  But  to  exer- 
cise this  art  to  advantage,  certain  general  ideas,  arising 
from  the  knowledge  of  things,  were  indispensable ;  and 
the  logicians  of  this  age  seemed  to  have  little  relish  for 
such  necessary  information.  Their  dialectics  consisted 
chiefly  of  words,  and  dry  and  barren  rules,  the  proper 
and  judicious  application  of  which  was  by  no  means 
commonly  understood.  To  remedy  this  evil,  St  Anselm 
wrote  his  work,  the  Grammarian,  which  is,  in  fact,  a 

*  The  edition  of  St  Aiiselm's  works  here  referred  to,  is  that  of  Cologne,  1612, 
folio. 


138        LOGICAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE  MIDDLE  AGES. 

treatise  on  the  art  of  reasoning.  In  this  work  he 
undertakes  to  define  the  two  general  attributes  of  all 
our  ideas,  substance  and  quality.  This  definition  aided 
greatly  in  simplifying  the  researches  and  teachings  of 
future  logicians.  From  him  the  inquirers  after  truth 
learned  to  elevate  their  minds  above  the  barbarous 
sophisms  of  the  schools ;  to  make  use  of  that  natural 
reason  that  was  within  them ;  and  to  contemplate  the 
eternal  essence  in  all  its  magnificent  effulgence.* 

Gtuinalon,  a.  b.  1119. — This  was  a  monk  who  wrote 
a  treatise  under  the  title  of  "  Liber  pro  insipiente  adver- 
sus  Anselmi  in  Prosologio  Ratiocinationem"  in  order  to 
refute  the  leading  opinions  of  St  Ansehxu  Guinalon 
endeavours  to  prove  that  his  antagonist  has  not  made 
out  a  good  case ;  that  his  theory  of  human  knowledge 
is  gratuitous ;  and  that,  in  matters  of  detail,  it  is  full 
of  logical  imperfections  and  fallacies. 

William  of  Ciiampeaux,  a.  d.  1120. — This  may  be 
styled  the  Augustan  age  of  scholastic  logic.  Our 
modern  notions  of  the  value  of  dialectics,  come  far 
short  of  realizing  the  interest  and  mental  activity  which 
were  called  into  requisition  under  the  championship  of 
William  of  Champeaux,  He  opened,  in  1109,  his 
school  of  logic  in  the  University  of  Paris,  which  had 
been  founded  about  a  century  before.  His  fame 
speedily  spread  to  the  remotest  corners  of  Europe. 
Wherever  he  came  immense  numbers  of  students 
flocked  around  him,  to  hear  him  expound  his  logical 
system.  The  Benedictines  of  St  Maur  represent  Paris, 
in  their  glowing  language,  to  be  a  Modern  Athens ; 
and  they  affirm  that  the  number  of  logical  and  philo- 

*  Hist.  Lit.  dc  la  France,  torn.  xiv. 


WILLIAM  OF  CHAMPEAUX.  139 

sophical  students  was  so  great,  that  they  actually  out- 
numbered the  ordinary  citizens  themselves.  The  in- 
flux of  scholars  was  so  prodigious,  that  Philip  Augustus 
had  to  enlarge  the  boundaries  of  the  city  for  their 
accommodation.  Paris  was  called  the  city  of  the 
world.* 

It  is  recorded,  that  there  were  certain  days  of  the 
week  which  were  more  than  usually  thronged  with 
students ;  and  these  were  set  apart  by  William  for  the 
exclusive  discussion  of  universals.     And  the  eagerness 

o 

to  obtain  an  entrance  to  the  lecture-hall  was  so  great 
on  these  occasions,  that  students  often  took  their  places 
the  day  before,  and  that  more  than  once  death  was 
produced  from  the  extreme  pressure  of  the  crowd. 
These  lectures  were  the  engrossing  topic  of  general 
discussion ;  and  epitomes  or  abstracts  of  them  were 
every  day  handed  about,  both  among  the  nobles  at 
court,  as  well  as  the  merchants  and  traders  of  the 
city.f 

That  the  eloquence  and  method  of  instruction  of 
this  celebrated  scholastic  teacher  were  unrivalled,  is  an 
opinion  in  which  all  historians  seem  to  agree.  We 
have  the  testimony  of  Abelard  on  this  point,  who 
says  : — u  I  preferred  the  armour  of  dialectic  warfare  to 
all  other  modes  of  philosophy;  for  it  I  quitted  the 
military  life,  choosing  rather  the  conflicts  of  disputa- 
tion than  the  trophies  of  real  battles.  With  this  view, 
emulating  the  Peripatetic  fame,  and  disputing  as  I 
went,  I  passed  through  various  provinces,  wherever  I 
understood  that  the  study  was  zealously  pursued.  At 
length   I  reached  Paris,    which  was    then    the    great 

*  Hist.  Lit.  de  la  France,  torn  ix.  73.  f  Chron.  de  Paris,  folio,  1596. 


140        LOGICAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE  MIDDLE  AGES. 

theatre    of  the    art,    where    William    of    Champeaux 
taught,  whom  I  chose  for  my  preceptor."* 

William  of  Champeaux  had  been  a  pupil  of  Kos- 
cellin's,  but  differed  entirely  from  his  master  on  the 
nature  of  universals.  These  he  considered  as  ideas 
which  had  a  positive  and  independent  existence,  apart 
from  all  forms  or  combinations  of  words.  There  was 
something  permanent  and  real  in  such  terms  as  good- 
ness, justice,  creation,  intelligence,  mind,  and  the  like. 
His  entire  Eealistic  theory  is  based  upon  the  assump- 
tion, that  universals  are  individualized  in  particular 
objects  or  beings,  in  such  a  manner  that  these  par- 
ticular objects  or  beings,  though  strictly  identical  in 
their  respective  essences,  differ  only  in  the  variety  of 
their  accidents  or  transient  forms. 

It  is  said  that  William  renounced  this  logical  creed 
in  a  later  period  of  his  life.  Abelard  says : — "  Again 
I  attended  his  school  to  hear  his  lectures  on  the  art  of 
rhetoric ;  but  where,  in  our  several  contests,  I  so  pressed 
him  on  his  favourite  doctrine  of  universals,  that  he 
gave  up  the  point,  renounced  his  former  opinion,  and 
hence  lost  all  the  fame  which  he  had  acquired." 

Abelard,  a.  d.  1142. — The  name  of  Abelard  is  inti- 
mately connected  with  the  early  history  of  scholastic 
logic.  He  was  a  zealous  JSTominalist,  and  zealously  con- 
tended for  the  validity  of  his  theory  through  every 
phase  of  his  eventful  life.  John  of  Salisbury  says : — 
"  That  Abelard  and  his  disciples  looked  upon  the  pro- 
position, that  we  can  affirm  one  thing  from  another 
thing,  as  a  great  absurdity,  though  this  absurdity  was 
backed  by  the  authority  of  Aristotle." 

':  A.belard's  Epist.,  1. 


ABELARD.  141 

It  is  a  difficult  matter,  even  at  the  present  hour,  to 
ascertain  correctly  how  far  Abelard  is  really  compro- 
mised in  the  Nominalist  theory.  He  certainly  denounces 
the  Realists  in  no  measured  terms ;  but  his  own  pre- 
cise opinions  on  the  chief  point  of  dispute  are  by  no 
means  accurately  known.  De  G-erando  conceives  that 
Abelard  considered  universals  to  have  no  strict  or 
proper  independence  or  objective  reality,  but  to  be 
simply  conceptions,  formed  and  retained  in  the  mind 
solely  by  virtue  of  the  signs  of  language.  Again,  John 
of  Salisbury  says : — "  The  one  (meaning  Roscellin) 
takes  his  stand  on  words;  the  other  (Abelard)  on 
propositions.'"  These  statements  would  go  to  prove, 
that  Abelard  looked  upon  these  conceptions  as  deriving 
their  validity  and  authority,  not  simply  from  the  power 
of  words,  but  from  their  logical  position  in  every  formal 
proposition  submitted  to  the  understanding.  If  this 
opinion  be  correct,  Abelard  must  not  then  be  classed 
with  the  supporters  of  absolute  Nominalism,  but  must 
occupy  a  kind  of  middle  station  between  the  Nominalist 
theorists,  and  those  who  go  under  the  denomination  of 
Conceptualists. 

Up  to  the  time  of  Abelard,  logic  had  been  most 
assiduously  cultivated  in  many  countries  in  Europe. 
Schools  and  academies  for  its  cultivation  were  esta- 
blished at  Padua,  Modena,  Naples,  Capua,  Toulouse, 
Salamanca,  Lyons,  and  Cologne.  The  Platonic  dialec- 
tics were  preferred  in  some  localities,  while  Aristotle 
was  all  dominant  in  others.  In  the  West,  looical 
philosophy  found  munificent  patrons  in  the  Emperor 
Frederick  IL,  and  Alphonso  X.,  king  of  Leon  ;  the 
former  of  whom  caused  the  logical  works  of  Aristotle 


142        LOGICAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE  MIDDLE  AGES. 

to  be  translated  into  Latin,  with  the  laudable  view  of 
giving  them  a  more  extended  circulation,  and  making 
them  more  general  topics  of  commentary  and  public 
discussion. 

The  mere  dialectical  character  of  logical  studies 
began  at  this  time,  however,  to  wear  itself  out  for  a 
season.  Men  became  tired  with  the  everlasting  play 
upon  the  pure  syllogistic  forms,  and  longed  for  some 
variety,  and  a  wider  range  for  their  powers  and  facul- 
ties. The  human  mind  became  arid  and  mechanical, 
there  being  nothing  to  touch  or  fire  the  inward  soul, 
nor  satisfy  its  natural  cravings  for  interesting  novelties 
or  lofty  speculations.  The  reasoning  power  itself 
assumed  a  disproportionate  activity  and  strength,  and 
was  out  of  keeping  with  the  other  parts  of  the  mental 
structure.  A  reaction,  therefore,  against  the  entire 
dialectic  system  was  the  natural  consequence.  The 
heart  and  the  head  must  be  brought  into  a  closer  con- 
tact and  sympathy.  Science  and  knowledge  were  to 
be  known  and  cultivated  through  the  medium  of  con- 
templative and  elevated  feelings,  and  not  by  boisterous 
and  logical  chicanery.  A  new  path  to  wisdom  must 
be  discovered,  and  the  old  one  of  pure  abstractions 
abandoned.  We  must  look  to  the  moral  and  theologi- 
cal principles  of  our  being  for  this  new  direction, 
where  we  shall  find  that  contemplative  intuition  which 
can  alone  give  confidence  to  our  footsteps,  and  conso- 
lation to  the  spirit.  We  must  impart  comprehension 
and  spirituality  to  our  reasonings,  and  no  longer 
mould  them  in  those  inanimate  and  shrivelled  forms  in 
which  the  dialecticians  present  them  to  us.  The  new 
school  said,  in  fact,  "  What  have  we  to  do  with  the 


HUGO  ST  VICTOR,  RICHARD  ST  VICTOR.  143 

disputes  about  genera  or  species,  or  particulars  or 
universals  ?  He  for  whom  the  eternal  Word  is  enough, 
is  freed  from  an  infinite  perplexity  of  doubts  and 
opinions." 

Hugo  St  Victor,  a.  d.  1140;  and  Eichard  St 
Victor,  a.  d.  1173. — These  two  scholastics  were  of 
the  contemplative  school  of  logic.  Hugo  belonged  to 
Belgium,  and  Eichard  to  Scotland,  and  both  were 
monks  of  the  Abbey  of  St  Victor,  at  Paris. 

Hugo's  logical  method  may  be  summed  up  in  the 
following  words : — "  Our  organs  of  sensation  apprise 
us  of  the  nature  of  external  objects,  and  the  imagina- 
tion refers  to  things  beyond  the  confines  of  matter. 
The  latter  power  expands  itself  every  where,  and  moves, 
and  acts,  and  creates,  and  wills,  just  as  it  pleases.  It 
ranges  over  boundless  space,  and  embraces  all  the 
works  of  the  Almighty,  meditates  and  contemplates 
upon  them,  and  all  heavenly  phenomena.  Eeason 
perceives  the  substances,  forms,  differences,  proper- 
ties, and  qualities  of  objects.  It  detaches  the  qualities 
from  the  object,  not  however  in  reality,  but  by  the 
power  of  abstraction,  and  places  them  before  the  eye 
of  the  mind.  The  understanding  is  the  faculty  which 
perceives  invisible  and  spiritual  substances  or  things. 
Intelligence  is  that  which  immediately  recognises  the 
existence  and  attributes  of  the  Deity,  and  which 
ascends  to  the  source  of  all  things,  and  to  all  that  is 
immutably  true. .  This  intelligence  is  exclusively  di- 
rected to  the  abstract  principles  of  things ;  that  is  to 
say,  those  relating  to  the  Deity,  to  substance,  and 
ideas  generally.  Genius  seeks  after  that  which  is  un- 
known, and  reason  judges  of  these  discoveries  of  genius. 


144         LOGICAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE  MIDDLE  AGES. 

Memory  gathers  and  preserves  these  judgments,  and 
collects  other  fresh  materials  from  new  decisions.  There 
is  thus  established  a  progressive  system  of  ascension 
from  things  inferior  to  things  superior ;  the  one  de- 
pending upon  the  other.  The  understanding  is  a  kind 
of  image  of  intelligence,  reason  a  sort  of  image  of  the 
understanding ;  and  so  on  throughout  the  whole  extent 
of  mental  operations.  The  senses  form  the  imagina- 
tion, and  this  again  gives  birth  to  reason  and  sagacity. 
The  Divine  presence  enlightens  reason,  and  thus  pro- 
duces intelligence ;  and  this  again  gives  rise  to  that 
which  we  term  wisdom.  There  are  two  distinct  move- 
ments, or  it  may  be  said,  there  are  two  distinct  sexes, 
in  the  human  spirit.  One  movement  bears  reason  to 
heavenly  things — this  is  true  wisdom ;  the  other  move- 
ment draws  it  downwards  to  earthly  objects — and  this 
constitutes  worldly  prudence  and  judgment.* 

Richard's  logical  views  may  be  stated  as  follows  : — 
"  There  are  three  parts  to  instruction — experience, 
rational  deductions,  and  faith.  The  first  conducts  to 
profane  and  worldly  knowledge  ;  the  other  two  to  ever- 
lasting knowledge.  Wisdom  conducts  to  virtue,  and 
virtue  to  wisdom :  nevertheless,  men  are  generally  car- 
ried with  more  ardour  towards  wisdom  than  towards 
virtue.  The  latter  requires  sacrifices — a  triumph  over 
our  passions,  which  cannot,  in  ordinary  cases,  be  ob- 
tained without  a  considerable  effort. 

"  Philosophy  is  the  living  thought,  the  identical 
reason,  the  primitive  intelligence  of  all  things. 

"  The  exercise  of  the  bodily  senses  precedes  the 
senses  of  the  heart  in  a  knowledge  of  things ;  for  if  the 

*  Eruditio  Didascalia,  hook  ii.  c.  6. 


JOHN  OF  SALISBURY,  ETC.  145 

mind  were  not  made  previously  acquainted  with  them 
through  the  influence  of  the  organs  of  sensation,  there 
could  be  no  opportunity  for  it  to  exercise  thought  upon 
these  objects.  What  are  visible  things,  if  they  are  not 
a  kind  of  picture  of  invisible  objects  ?  But  intelligence 
is  the  power  by  the  aid  of  which  we  can  perceive  in- 
visible objects." 

Gilbert  de  la  Poree,  a.  d.  1150. — Gilbert  was  a 
determined  Eealist.  He  published  a  work  entitled 
The  Six  Principles,  which  some  have  considered  as  an 
attempt  to  condense  the  Categories  of  Aristotle  into 
that  number ;  while  other  critics  again  affirm,  that  The 
Six  Principles  were  only  a  species  of  expansion  of  the 
six  latter  Predicaments,  which  the  Greek  philosopher 
had  passed  too  cursorily  over.  Gilbert  gives  us  a  logi- 
cal definition  of  form.  "  Form,"  says  he,  "  is  contin- 
gent on  matter,  consisting  of  simple  and  invariable 
essence." 

Peter  Lombard,  a.  d.  1170. — Peter  Lombard,  far 
from  indulging  in  any  contemplative  mysticism  about 
the  nature  of  scientific  truth,  was  nevertheless  deeply 
impressed  with  the  conviction,  that  the  general  dialec- 
tics of  the  day  were  by  no  means  serviceable  to  the 
progress  of  sound  knowledge  and  religious  truth.  It 
was  in  order  to  give  a  check  to  the  current  of  logical 
disputation,  that  he  composed  his  Book  of  Sentences, 
which  was  an  attempt  to  harmonize  general  philosophy 
with  religion.     He  was  a  decided  Eealist. 

John  of  Salisbury,  a.  d.  1180. — This  distinguished 
scholastic  was  a  native  of  England.  He  directed  his 
critical  powers  with  great  vigour  against  the  prevalent 
abuse  of  the  formal  logic  so  commonly  taught  in  his 

K 


146        LOGICAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE  MIDDLE  AGES. 

clay.  He  tells  us  that  all  his  companions  in  France 
were  so  entangled  in  sophistic  pursuits,  that  they  had 
not  for  many  years  made  a  single  step  in  the  path  of 
useful  knowledge,  nor  did  he  think  it  probable  they 
ever  would.  He  says,  "  The  benefits  of  the  art,  as  it 
perfected  other  mental  acquisitions,  I  am  ready  to  ad- 
mit ;  but  by  itself  it  is  sterile  and  void  of  life." 

This  author  tells  us  that  there  were  six  distinct  sects 
of  Realists  in  his  own  time.  These  some  modern  critics 
have,  however,  reduced  to  four ;  namely,  1st,  Those 
who  adopted  the  doctrines  of  Plato  on  ideas,  and  main- 
tained that  the  names  of  genera  and  species  belonged, 
strictly  speaking,  only  to  those  objectively  existing 
universals.  2nd,  Those  who  thought  that  the  indivi- 
dual contained  within  itself  the  entire  essence  of  the 
class,  and  consequently,  when  such  particular  was 
viewed  in  a  certain  light,  it  was  itself  an  universal. 
3d,  Those  who  declared  that  the  entire  aggregate  of 
individuals  was  identical  with  the  universal.  And 
4th,  Those  who  looked  upon  the  universal  as  a  sub- 
stance in  some  mode  or  other  existing  in  the  singular 
being  or  object. 

The  following  is  his  exposition  of  the  Conception- 
alists — a  class  of  logicians  whose  notions  are  but  very 
vaguely  understood  even  at  the  present  hour : — "  The 
senses,"  says  he,  "judge  of  material  things;  but  intel- 
ligence is  requisite  to  perceive  spiritual  or  incorporeal 
things,  and  reason  to  form  a  judgment  of  them.  The 
understanding  considers  real  objects  under  various 
points  of  view ;  sometimes  in  an  absolute  manner, 
sometimes  as  a  whole  ;  sometimes  as  connected  with 
other  things  with  which  they  are  not  necessarily  con- 


AMAURY  DE  CHARTRES,  DAVID  DE  DINANT.  147 

nected ;  and  sometimes  separated  from  that  with  which 
they  may  be  combined.  Though  by  analysis  the  ap- 
pearance of  things  may  be  otherwise  than  their  real 
qualities,  this  operation  is  not  nevertheless  a  vain  con- 
ception of  the  mind  ;  for  it  opens  the  way  to  the  most 
sagacious  and  useful  investigations.  Analysis  is  an 
instrument  of  philosophy ;  it  sharpens  reason,  and  dis- 
tinguishes objects  according  to  their  true  nature.  If 
we  separate  the  understanding  from  the  faculty  of  ab- 
straction, we  shall  remove  from  the  arts  the  arsenal 
which  contains  their  instruments.  What  the  senses 
perceive — that  is,  subject  to  forms — is  primary  and  sin- 
gular substance.  We  give  the  name  of  secondary  substance 
to  that  which  is  necessary  to  the  existence  of  objects, 
and  to  their  susceptibility  of  being  known  to  us.  That 
which  is  one  is  always  one.  A  universal  is  that  which 
is  common  to  many  by  reason  of  the  constitution  of 
their  nature.  The  notion  of  a  universal  is  produced 
in  the  understanding  when  it  conceives  the  conformity 
which  nature  has  established  amongst  divers  objects,  as 
their  forms,  qualities,  &c.  Though  qualities  and  relations 
cannot  exist  separately  in  the  order  of  realities,  they 
can  be  separately  laid  hold  of  by  the  mind,  and  this  is 
the  essential  end  or  purpose  of  all  true  philosophy." 

A  short  time  after  John  of  Salisbury,  we  have  a 
pantheistical  reaction  against  the  logical  methods  of 
both  the  Nominalists  and  Eealists.  This  reaction 
manifested  itself  in  the  writings  of  Amaury  de  Char- 
tres,  a,  d.  1195,  and  David  de  Dinant,  a.  d.  1220. 

Garson  gives  us  the  ideas  of  Amaury  de  Chartres 
in  the  following  words : — "  Every  thing  is  God,  and 
God  is  every  thing.     The  Creator  and  the  creature  are 


148        LOGICAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE  MIDDLE  AGES. 

one  and  the  same  being.  Ideas  are  at  once  creative  and 
created,  God  is  the  end  of  all  things,  in  the  same 
sense  that  all  things  must  return  to  him,  in  order  to 
constitute  with  him  an  immutable  individuality.  Just 
as  Abraham  and  Isaac  are  nothing  but  individualiza- 
tions of  human  nature ;  so  all  beings  are  only  indi- 
vidual forms  of  one  sole  essence."  This  is  the  ideal 
pantheism  he  taught.  Our  ideas  are  the  only  things 
in  which  there  is  any  reality ;  every  thing  besides  these 
is  only  a  manifestation. 

David  de  Dinant  broached  a  pantheism  of  a  material 
cast.  Deity  is  the  universal  matter  of  existence ;  and 
all  forms — that  is,  every  thing  not  material — are  but 
imaginary  accidents  or  qualities. 

Vincent  de  Beauvais,  a.  d.  1260. — Vincent  studied 
logic  with  great  zeal.  He  supports  the  Realist  theory 
with  great  ardour.  The  three  great  problems  pro- 
posed by  Porphyry,  in  his  introduction  to  the  Cate- 
gories of  Aristotle,  relative  to  the  certainty  of  general 
ideas,  engrossed  the  whole  of  Vincent's  attention. 
Before  attempting  to  resolve  them,  he  ascribes  three 
different  meanings  to  the  word  being — the  one  meta- 
physical, the  second  mathematical,  and  the  third  phy- 
sical. On  the  first  problem,  after  comparing  the  opin- 
ions of  Plato  and  Aristotle  on  the  point,  he  comes  to 
the  conclusion,  that  universals  exist  not  only  in  the 
intellect,  but  in  nature.  The  second  problem  he  solves 
in  accordance  with  universals  relative  to  spiritual  mat- 
ters. The  third  and  last  problem  he  resolves  in  the 
following  fashion  : — "  There  are  two  causes  which  bring 
the  universal  within  the  sphere  of  being ;  the  one 
material,  which  resides  in   the  individual ;   the  other 


ST  THOMAS  AQUINAS,  ETC.  149 

efficient,  which  resides  in  the  understanding.  Under 
the  first  relation  the  universal  is  one  in  many ;  in  the 
second  it  is  one  simply  in  unity.  Thus  we  are  able  to 
reconcile  the  conflicting  opinions  of  Plato  and  Aris- 
totle."* 

William  of  Paris,  a.  d.  1270. — William  was  well 
skilled  in  all  the  logical  systems  and  speculations  of 
the  Arabians.  He  points  out  six  meanings  to  the  word 
truth  : — 1st,  The  fidelity  of  the  sign  should  express  the 
thing  signified ;  2nd,  Eeality  opposed  to  apparent  de- 
ception ;  3d,  The  purity  of  a  substance,  as  when  we 
call  good  silver  that  which  is  exempt  from  all  adultera- 
tion ;  4th,  The  essence  of  things,  such  as  is  expressed 
by  the  definition ;  oth,  The  existence  of  a  Creator ; 
6th,  Simple  logical  truth,  which  relates  to  the  harmony 
between  the  terms  and  the  proposition. 

St  Thomas  Aquinas,  a.  d.  1274. — Thomas  Aquinas 
is  the  greatest  name  in  the  annnals  of  scholastic  logic 
and  speculation.  He  was  styled  in  his  day  the  Ange- 
lic Doctor.  He  was  born  in  the  kingdom  of  ^Naples ; 
and  after  publicly  teaching,  with  great  eclat,  at  Bo- 
logna and  Paris,  he  died  in  1274,  in  an  Italian  monas- 
tery, at  the  early  age  of  forty-seven. 

The  logical  method  of  Aquinas,  and  his  speculations 
on  the  nature  of  truth  and  evidence  generally,  are  de- 
veloped chiefly  in  his  Summa  Theologica,  and  in  his 
Commentaries  on  some  parts  of  the  philosophy  of  Aris- 
totle. The  former  work  has  retained  a  high  character 
among  theologians  and  philosophers  ever  since  its  ap- 
pearance ;  and,  in  fact,  it  is  almost  the  only  treatise 

*  Speculum  Doctrinale,  lib.  iii.  chap.  7. 


150        LOGICAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE  MIDDLE  AGES. 

out  of  the  numerous  folios  which  the  scholastic  ages 
produced,  which  we  meet  now  in  ordinary  libraries,  or 
which  is  referred  to  as  an  authority  by  modern  writers. 

Aquinas  maintained  that  the  end  or  object  of  all 
human  science  is  the  perfection  of  man.  As  there  are 
several  paths  to  science,  there  must  needs  be  some  guid- 
ing and  regulating  principle  to  collate  and  apply  the 
evidence  from  each  to  this  grand  and  common  result. 
The  different  sciences  are  like  individual  and  indepen- 
dent states,  but  governed  and  directed  by  a  federal  head. 
This  federal  authority  or  head,  is  mind.  This  mind  or 
intellect  is  to  be  considered  under  three  phases : — 1st, 
as  being  conversant  about  the  causes  of  things.  2ndly, 
as  being  entirely  distinct  from  the  external  senses,  be- 
cause these  relate  to  particular  things  or  objects,  where- 
as the  mind  is  conversant  about  universals.  And 
3dly,  the  mind  is  the  only  real  standard  of  the  in- 
telligibility of  things ;  for,  in  proportion  as  it  is  freed 
from  material  influences,  its  sphere  is  enlarged,  its  de- 
cisions are  more  momentous  and  important,  and  the 
happiness  of  man  is  more  directly  and  extensively  pro- 
moted. All  rational  intelligence,  therefore,  depends 
upon  and  springs  out  of  the  following  categories, — 
Being,  Possibility,  Existence,  Cause  and  Effect,  Action, 
and  Passion.  Mind  embraces  the  whole  of  these ;  all 
other  parts  or  divisions  of  human  knowledge  have 
only  a  partial  and  subordinate  reference  to  them. 

From  such  a  huge  mass  of  abtruse  speculation  as 
the  works  of  Aquinas  present,  it  is  entirely  beyond 
the  reach  of  a  work  of  this  limited  character  to  offer 
even  a  naked  summary  or  outline  of  his  arguments. 


ST  THOMAS  AQUINAS.  151 

The  reader  must  therefore  be  content  with  our  touch- 
ing upon  a  salient  point  here  and  there  in  his  logical 
philosophy. 

Considering  the  unity  of  science  in  a  logical  point  of 
view,  Aquinas  asks  the  question,  Do  scientific  prin- 
ciples result  from  a  pre-existing  empirical  knowledge  ? 
In  grappling  with  this  question,  he  maintains  that  there 
are  two  elements  in  the  principles  of  science  ;  the  terms, 
which  he  calls  the  matter  of  these  principles,  and  the 
relations  of  these  terms.  To  illustrate  this,  let  us  take 
the  principle  or  proposition,  the  whole  is  greater  than  a 
part.  The  ideas,  whole  and  -part,  are  the  terms  or  mat- 
ter of  the  principle  ;  the  idea  of  greater  extension  is 
the  relation  of  the  terms.  Again,  in  the  principle  or 
proposition,  the  affirmative  and  the  negative  cannot  be 
both  true  of  the  same  thing;  the  ideas  of  affirmation  and 
negation  are  the  terms  by  means  of  which  the  mind 
recognises  the  relation.  Keeping  in  view  this  distinc- 
tion, we  immediately  see  a  knowledge  of  the  terms  of 
any  principle  whatever  depends  upon  our  idea  derived 
from  experience  ;  but  the  knowledge  of  the  relation  of 
these  terms  is  not  derived  from  experience,  but  is  a  part 
of  the  mind  itself.  To  illustrate  this  more  fully,  let  us 
take  an  example  from  the  science  of  morals.  The  habit 
of  virtue  rests  upon  the  innate  notion  or  conception  of 
what  virtue  is,  or  what  it  implies.  Before  the  habit  is 
formed,  virtue  lies  in  an  incipient  state ;  when  it  is  exer- 
cised, it  enters  into  the  experimental  state,  and  then 
arrives  at  its  consummation.  But  the  disposition  and 
power  to  act  virtuously,  is  an  altogether  different  ele- 
ment or  thing  from  the  empirical  habit  of  it.  Now,  it 
is  precisely  the  same  with  science.     The  germs  of  all 


152         LOGICAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE  MIDDLE  AGES. 

sciences  lie  in  the  rational  conceptions  of  the  mind. 
From  this  doctrine,  Aquinas  laid  it  down  as  a  logical 
truth  beyond  all  doubt,  that  every  demonstration  of  a 
formal  proposition  is  the  result  of  the  union  of  these 
two  elements ;  the  experimental  and  the  rational.  The 
one  is  the  matter  of  the  demonstration,  and  the  other 
its  productive  form.  In  this  sense  logic  has  a  necessary 
relation  to  ontology. 

In  the  great  controversy  on  universals,  Aquinas 
adopted  the  doctrine  of  the  Realists,  at  least  of  that 
division  of  the  sect  or  party  who  maintained  that  the 
one  universal  existed  in  the  many  individuals.  This 
notion  followed  from  his  exposition  concerning  form 
and  matter.  Universals  may  be  considered  relative 
either  to  their  matter  or  their  form.  The  matter  of  the 
universal  of  tree,  for  example,  is  the  union  of  all  the 
attributes  or  qualities  which  belong  to  trees.  In  this 
sense  universals  are  a  parte  rei ;  their  matter  exists 
solely  in  each  individual  thing  or  object.  The  form  of 
universals  is  the  character  or  attribute  of  universality 
applied  to  this  matter;  this  character  or  attribute  is 
derived  solely  by  abstracting  what  is  peculiar  to  each 
individual  thing  or  object,  in  order  to  fix  the  attention 
on  what  is  common  to  many  of  them.  Universals  are, 
consequently,  a  parte  intellectus. 

St  Bonaventure,  a.  d.  1277. — This  author  was  call- 
ed the  Seraphic  Doctor,  and  his  views  of  the  nature  of 
scientific  truth  and  logical  evidence  were  of  a  spiritual, 
or  rather  mystical  character.  The  rational  faculty  of 
man  is  illuminated  in  four  different  modes.  The  first 
is  external,  and  refers  to  the  mechanical  arts  of  life  ;  the 
second  internal,  shewing  the  natural  forms   and  sen- 


DUNS  SCOTUS,  RAYMOND  LULLY.  153 

sible  truths  of  things ;  the  third  is  also  internal,  mani- 
festing intellectual  and  philosophical  truths ;  and  the 
fourth  teaches  divine  things.  There  is  a  truth  in  lan- 
guage, a  truth  in  things,  and  a  truth  in  manners. 

Duns  Scotus,  a.  d.  1308. — It  has  been  a  matter  of 
doubt  whether  this  scholastic  was  a  native  of  England, 
Scotland,  or  Ireland — each  country  has  contended  for 
the  honour  of  his  birth.  He  studied  at  Paris,  under 
St  Bonaventure  and  Aquinas.  He  founded  a  logical 
school,  in  opposition  to  his  last-named  master.  He 
differed  with  St  Thomas  relative  to  the  Eealist  question. 
Aquinas  maintained  that  universals  existed  really  in 
the  individuals,  whereas  Duns  Scotus  affirmed  that  they 
existed  only  formally  in  individual  things  or  objects. 
His  broad  doctrine  was,  that  intelligence,  as  a  principle, 
had  nothing  to  do  with  the  formation  of  general  terms  ; 
these  were  indeterminate  entities  really  subsisting  out 
of  the  mind.  He  considered  universal  ideas  to  be  the 
production  of  another  entity.  This  opinion  was  really 
not  his  own,  but  had  been  broached  by  some  specula- 
tors before  his  time ;  but  he  developed  it  more  fully, 
and  with  great  subtilty  and  acuteness. 

Duns  Scotus  died  suddenly  at  Cologne,  when  he  had 
only  reached  his  thirty- fourth  year.  His  reputation 
for  logical  ability  was  unbounded ;  and  historians  have 
left  it  upon  record,  that  thirty  thousand  students  press- 
ed forward  to  attend  his  lectures. 

Raymond  Lully,  a.  d.  1309. — This  was  a  zealous, 
but  eccentric  logician.  His  life,  in  connexion  with 
logical  and  philosophical  studies,  is  full  of  romantic 
interest.  His  Ars  Magna  is  the  exposition  of  a  plan 
to  enable  the  mind  to  work  out  all  kinds  of  propositions 


154         LOGICAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE  MIDDLE  AGES. 

through  the  means  of  a  mechanical  table  of  ideas,  dis- 
posed in  such  a  manner  that  their  different  correlations 
would  furnish  satisfactory  answers  to  every  imaginable 
sort  of  questions.  A  great  deal  of  ingenuity  is  display- 
ed in  this  logical  scheme  ;  and  some  degree  of  interest 
was  at  first  excited  in  different  schools  of  learning  as  to 
its  practical  and  successful  application.  But  its  barren- 
ness and  formality  soon  became  apparent ;  and  many 
of  the  scholastic  doctors  pronounced  it  as  useless,  and 
as  little  better  than  a  severe  satire  upon  the  entire 
system  of  dialectic  mechanism. 

During  the  life  of  Lully,  and  for  nearly  two  centuries 
after  his  death,  his  opinions  on  logical  science  were 
pretty  generally  adopted  in  seminaries  of  learning,  both 
in  Majorca  and  in  a  part  of  Spain.  Even  in  the  col- 
leges of  Parma,  Montpelier,  Paris,  and  Borne,  he  was 
cordially  esteemed  as  a  logician  whose  general  views  were 
both  enlightened  and  highly  favourable  to  sound  religion 
and  morality.  His  theory  of  reasoning  was  nearly  in  all 
cases,  however,  adopted  with  some  reservations;  and 
he  was  admired  more  for  his  ingenuity  than  for  sound- 
ness and  comprehensiveness  of  judgment.  The  doctors 
of  the  Sorbonne  protested  against  the  system  of  Lully, 
although  it  was  taught  with  great  eclat  at  Toulouse  by 
Raymond  de  Seboncle.  Politian  praises  his  method ; 
and  Leibnitz  himself  thought  his  logical  works  a  monu- 
ment of  genius  and  industry.  He  has  been  alike  the 
object  of  ardent  admiration  and  severe  censure.  Whilst 
it  has  been  declared  that  the  simple  touch  of  his  hand- 
kerchief frequently  cured  hundreds  of  the  sick,  yet  the 
Church  at  one  time  pronounced  himself  and  all  his 
disciples  as  heretics,  and  Gregory  IX.  placed  his  writ- 


WILLIAM  OCCAM.  155 

ings,  by  a  formal  bull,  in  the  Index  Expurgatorkis. 
There  seems  to  have  been  as  much  vitality  in  his  sys- 
tem, as  to  maintain  its  remembrance  for  a  considerable 
time  after  the  death  of  its  founder. 

The  chief  object  of  Lully  was  to  reconcile  the  philo- 
sophy of  reason  with  revelation.  This  was  the  prime 
notion  at  the  bottom  of  his  formal  system.  But  the 
leading  conception  is  so  attenuated  and  expanded  by 
numerous  divisions,  that  it  becomes  almost  impossible 
to  keep  his  original  drift  in  view  in  prosecuting  any 
connected  commentary  on  his  speculations  and  forms. 

His  writings  are  voluminous  to  a  surprising  extent. 
It  has  been  stated  that  he  wrote  more  than  seven  hun- 
dred distinct  treatises  on  philosophy  and  logic.  The 
most  complete  edition  of  his  works  is  that  published  by 
Bucholius,  at  Mayence,  in  ten  volumes  folio,  1721. 

The  following  are  among  the  best  Spanish  commen- 
tators on  the  logic  of  Raymond  Lully.  Alphonsus 
de  Cepeda,  Arboe  de  la  Ciencia  de  Raimundo  Lullo  ; 
Petrus  Cirnelo,  De  Arte  Raimundi ;  Jaimus  Januarius, 
Ars  Artium  Raimundi ;  and  J.  A.  de  Herrera,  Apologia 
pro  Raimundo. 

William  Occam,  a.  d.  1320. — Occam  was  a  native 
of  the  county  of  Kent,  studied  at  Merton  College, 
Oxford,  under  the  celebrated  Duns  Scotus,  and  was 
called  the  Invincible  Doctor.  The  Realistic  doctrines 
met  with  a  bold  and  formidable  opponent  in  Occam. 
He  adopted  a  certain  form  of  the  Nominalists'  theory. 
He  maintained  that  general  ideas  could  not  have  an 
existence  independent  of  external  things,  and  of  the 
Deity.  In  external  things  there  can  be  no  general  or 
universal  ideas ;  for  in  this  case  they  would  either  be 


156         LOGICAL  PHILOSOrHY  OF  THE  MIDDLE  AGES. 

the  whole,  or  only  a  part  of  these  things.  In  reference 
to  the  Deity,  these  things  do  not  constitute  the  inde- 
pendent essence  of  the  Divinity,  but  are  simply  objects 
of  knowledge.  In  the  mind  of  man  there  is  nothing 
more  than  this.  "Every  substance,"  says  he,  "is 
numerically  one  and  singular;  it  is  itself,  and  no  other. 
It  is  not  the  same  with  a  universal.  If  the  universal 
were  a  thing  existing  in  a  number  of  individual  or  par- 
ticular things,  it  would  then  possess  a  distinct  and  in- 
dependent existence  ;  for  every  thing  which  is  superior 
to  another  thing,  must,  according  to  the  established 
laws  of  Grod,  be  independent  of  that  thing — a  conse- 
quence which  leads  to  a  gross  absurdity  in  reference  to 
universal  notions."  * 

Again,  "  Every  universal  is  really  in  itself  a  singular, 
and  is  therefore  solely  a  universal  in  consequence  of  its 
signification,  which  is  a  sign  or  symbol  of  several  things. 
This  doctrine  was  maintained  by  Avicenna,  who  de- 
clares that  a  single  form  in  the  understanding  is  related 
to  a  multitude  of  things,  and  is  therefore  a  universal, 
inasmuch  as  it  is  an  intention  in  the  mind,  whose  oper- 
ation is  invariable  to  whatsoever  you  apply  it.  In 
consequence,  this"  form,  though  in  relation  to  the  indi- 
viduals it  is  a  universal,  yet  in  relation  to  the  intellect 
on  which  it  is  impressed  is  itself  only  an  individual, 
for  it  is  one  of  the  forms  which  are  in  the  understand- 
ing."   "No  universal  is  any  thing  external  to 

the  mind." "No  universal  is  a  singular  sub- 
stance ;  for,  should  this  be  maintained,  it  would  follow 
that  Socrates  is  a  universal ;  for  there  is  no  more  reason 
why  one  singular  substance  should  be  a  general  idea 

*  Logica  Oceami,  chap.  xiv. 


JOHN  CHARLIER  DE  GERSON.  157 

more  than  another." "  If  any  substance  be 

more  things  than  one,  it  must  be  either  several  singu- 
lars or  several  universals.  If  the  former,  it  follows  that 
a  certain  substance  will  be, — e.  g.y  several  men ;  and 
then,  although  the  universal  will  be  distinct  from  any 
one  particular  man,  it  will  necessarily  be,  however,  the 
same  with  all  the  particulars  together.  But,  looking  at 
the  other  side  of  the  question,  that  one  substance  is 
really  several  universals,  we  must  then  ask  ourselves, 
Is  this  universal  a  plurality  of  things,  or  only  one  ?  If 
we  answer  it  is  only  one,  it  follows  that  it  is  only  a 
singular  ;  if  we  say  it  is  several  things,  I  again  demand 
whether  it  is  several  universals  or  several  singulars,  and 
so  on,  ad  infinitum"* 

The  commentators  and  critics  of  Occam  have  been 
by  no  means  agreed  as  to  the  precise  nature  of  his  own 
opinions.  He  is  charged  with  arguing  in  the  most 
decided  manner  against  the  Eealists — stating  the  case 
of  the  Nominalists,  and  then  leaving  the  question  with- 
out offering  his  own  opinions  upon  it.  What  these 
really  were  seems  to  be,  that  he  could  not  go  the  whole 
length  with  the  Nominalists'  theory,  and  that  he  was 
substantially  what  is  denominated  a  Conceptualist. 

Occam's  logical  doctrines  were  prohibited  in  the 
university  of  Paris  by  Pope  John  XXII.  All  persons 
claiming  the  degree  of  Master  of  Arts  were  bound  by 
oath  not  to  teach  his  system. 

John  Charlier  de  Gterson,  a.  d.  1363. — This  able 
man  filled  for  some  years  the  important  office  of  Chan- 
cellor of  the  University  of  Paris.  He  seems  to  have 
entertained  a  very  low  estimate  of  the  scholastic  logic ; 

*  Logics  chap.  xiv. 


158         LOGICAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE  MIDDLE  AGES. 

and,  to  escape  from  its  chilling  effect,  he  took  shelter 
in  the  intuitive  or  mystical  philosophy.  He  maintained 
that  "logic  was  not  of  itself  a  science,  but  only  the 
path  which  conducted  to  science."  He  conceived  that 
the  pivot  on  which  the  whole  contention  of  the  schools 
moved,  arose  from  the  notion  which  was  invariably 
attached  to  the  general  term  being  as  the  point  of  con- 
tact between  the  thinking  principle  and  an  external 
universe — a  notion  which  had  been  buried  under  a  load 
of  obscurity  by  imaginary  abstractions  and  refined 
verbal  distinctions.  He  defines  two  distinct  modes  of 
being : — "  The  one  is  absolute  being  or  existence,  arising 
from  the  nature  of  the  thing  itself;  the  other  consists 
in  its  representative  character  as  an  object  of  the  un- 
derstanding. Being,  under  the  latter  point  of  view,  is 
quite  a  different  thing  from  what  it  is  under  the  former. 
This  distinction  will  be  found  to  be  the  key  for  the 
pacification  of  the  Realists  and  Nominalists,  if  it  can 
be  clearly  and  steadily  seized  and  kept  in  view  by  the 
mind.  Real  being  or  existence  cannot  constitute  a 
science,  when  considered  in  its  objective  character,  in 
relation  to  positive  or  absolute  reality ;  it  does  not 
change  its  real  existence  to  agree  with  modifications 
arising  out  of  this  objective  character.  Such  is  the 
error  of  the  Realists,  who  wish  to  establish  metaphysics 
upon  realities,  without  taking  into  account  the  opera- 
tions of  the  understanding.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
Nominalists  envelope  themselves  too  frequently  with 
numerous  verbal  distinctions,  which  have  little  or  no 
meaning."* 

The  scholastic  system  which  we  have  attempted  to 

*  De  Concordia  Metaph.  et  Logic,  20. 


LOGICAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE  MIDDLE  AGES.         159 

sketch,  taken  in  its  widest  logical  sense  and  applica- 
tion, failed  in  the  grand  object  as  a  scientific  organon, 
chiefly  from  aiming  at  ideal  perfection.  Its  deductive 
apparatus  wanted  coherence  in  its  first  premises.  Error 
once  admitted  was  irreparable ;  and  nothing  could 
check  its  downward  movement.  Its  first  principles  fell 
short  of  necessary  truths,  and  its  facts  were  by  no 
means  infallibly  tested.  The  chain  of  perfect  demon- 
stration became  thus  broken ;  and  no  fresh  materials 
could  repair  the  breach.  The  scholastic  system  dealt 
with  all  subjects,  but  it  dealt  with  them  in  so  reflective 
and  formal  a  fashion,  that  it  deadened  the  perceptions 
of  truth,  and  paralysed  the  active  powers  of  mind. 
Every  thing  fell  into  a  mechanical  routine,  and  a 
drowsy  apathy  stole  over  the  intellect,  and  deprived  it 
of  all  vigorous  and  healthy  impulses  and  movements. 
A  change  was  imperatively  called  for;  and  when  it 
came,  though  it  was  slow,  it  was  sure.  Another  order 
of  things  was  fast  ripening  to  maturity,  which  gradually 
widened  the  basis  of  human  knowledge  and  freedom  of 
thought ;  and,  though  old  logical  difficulties  still  re- 
mained, they  were  rendered  less  disheartening  by  a 
vast  accession  of  new  and  interesting  truths.  The 
schoolmen  served  their  day  and  generation ;  and  were 
soon  to  be  supplanted  by  men  of  more  enterprising 
genius,  and  more  varied  tastes  and  acquirements. 


160        FROM  THE  FOURTEENTH  CENTURY 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

LOGICAL  PHILOSOPHY  FROM  THE  MIDDLE  OF  THE  FOUR- 
TEENTH CENTURY  TILL  THE  PUBLICATION  OF  LORD  BACON'S 
NOVUM  ORGAN UM,  IN  1620. 

Logical  science  was  now  on  the  eve  of  undergoing  a 
great  change,  both  in  its  scientific  and  formal  character. 
New  and  powerful  influences  were  about  to  display 
themselves  in  rousing  the  activity  of  the  European 
mind,  and  in  directing  it  into  those  paths  of  investiga- 
tion which  would  extend  the  boundaries  of  knowledge 
far  beyond  their  present  limits.  In  reference  to  Logic, 
men  were  in  a  sort  of  transition  state ;  held,  on  the 
one  hand,  by  the  power  of  custom  and  authority  to 
exercise  their  reasoning  powers  in  a  certain  formal  and 
prescribed  manner ;  and,  on  the  other,  strongly  urged, 
from  the  circumstances  of  the  times,  to  give  unbounded 
freedom  to  their  faculties,  and  to  set  out  afresh  on  new 
discoveries  in  search  of  more  comprehensive  and  satis- 
factory methods  and  systems  of  eliciting  and  promul- 
gating all  truth,  both  secular  and  theological. 

There  were  several  causes  external  to  the  study  of 
logic  itself,  which  had  a  considerable  share  in  the  pro- 
ducing of  this  state  of  things.     The  dismemberment  of 


TILL  THE  NOVUM  ORGANUM  m   1620.  161 

the  Eastern  empire  induced  a  number  of  learned  men 
to  take  refuge  in  Italy,  who  were  of  contemplative  and 
speculative  habits,  and  deeply  imbued  with  philosophic 
lore.  They  were  received  with  enthusiasm  in  the 
country  of  their  adoption.  They  imparted  a  fresh 
ardour  to  abstract  studies,  and  particularly  to  logic  and 
mental  philosophy,  and  other  kindred  subjects  of  in- 
quiry. The  entire  system  of  Greek  speculation  was 
overhauled,  and  submitted  to  a  critical  and  most 
searching  examination ;  and,  as  might  be  naturally 
expected,  men  divided  themselves  into  sects  and 
parties,  in  accordance  with  their  general  leaning  to- 
wards particular  systems,  connected  with  the  great 
and  venerated  names  of  antiquity.  Plato  and  Aristotle 
were  the  two  grand  centres  of  attraction  and  rivalship, 
and  divided  between  them,  in  certain  variable  propor- 
tions, the  general  suffrages  of  the  new  school  of  philo- 
sophical inquirers. 

There  was  another  event  at  this  time  highly  influen- 
tial in  extending  the  boundaries  of  science  generally, 
and  logic  in  particular ;  namely,  the  discovery  of  the 
art  of  printing.  From  the  rise  to  the  fall  maturity  of 
scholastic  philosophy,  discussions  on  logical  methods 
had  been  chiefly,  and  indeed  necessarily,  confined  to 
oral  lectures ;  but  after  printing  became  somewhat 
general,  these  discussions  were  embodied  into  formal 
treatises,  disseminated  in  every  direction,  and  were 
also  submitted  to  a  more  critical  ordeal  than  they  ever 
could  have  been  subjected  to  within  the  walls  of  a 
university  or  college.  Hence  logical  inquirers  became 
better  known,  as  well  as  more  widely  circulated ;  and 
they  travelled  with  more  rapidity  and  accuracy  from 


162  PHILOSOPHICAL  LOGICIANS. 

one  country  to  another,  than  they  had  formerly  done 
from  one  professional  chair  to  another. 

It  may  be  remarked  here,  that  the  general  mass  of 
logical  discussion  which  distinguishes  this  period  of 
history  we  have  now  entered  upon,  was  marked  by  its 
decided  leaning  towards  viewing  all  reasoning  methods 
for  the  discovery  and  promulgation  of  truth,  through 
the  medium  of  certain  metaphysical  principles  and 
faculties.  The  passionate  admiration  for  Plato  and 
Aristotle  encouraged  this  mode  of  thinking.  The 
Italian  philosophers  entered  fully  into  all  those  ab- 
stract notions  which  lie  at  the  root  of  the  dialectic 
systems  of  both  Plato  and  the  Stagyrite ;  and  they 
laboured  hard  to  shew  that  these  notions  were  in  per- 
fect good  keeping  with  the  purely  formal  systems  of 
reasoning  adopted  by  both  these  distinguished  men. 
This  is  one  of  the  leading  features  of  the  logical  philo- 
sophy of  this  period. 

The  logical  writings  of  this  section  of  history  may  be 
classified,  for  all  essential  purposes  of  utility,  under 
three  heads ;  those  of  the  philosophical,  the  theologi- 
cal, and  the  mystical  logicians. 

PHILOSOPHICAL  LOGICIANS. 

The  logical  writers  under  this  head  were  chiefly 
those  who  viewed  the  art  or  science  of  reasoning 
through  the  medium  of  the  Grecian  philosophy.  As 
it  was  pregnant  with  antagonistic  principles,  there  was 
consequently  a  corresponding  difference  of  opinion 
among  its  expounders  and  commentators ;  and  on 
some  occasions  we  witness  an  almost  complete  depar- 


PLETHO.  1 63 

ture  from  the  logical  canons  of  Plato,  Aristotle,  and 
other  Greek  speculators.  Indeed  we  see  here  very 
distinctly,  for  the  first  time  during  many  centuries, 
that  men  were  bent  on  testing  all  logical  methods  and 
systems  by  their  own  private  judgment,  and  to  be  no 
longer  led  by  the  sheer  power  of  authority  for  ancient 
and  venerated  names.  This  independent  spirit,  it  is 
true,  was  shared  by  a  few  only  of  the  more  bold  and 
courageous  among  the  crowd  of  logicians  of  the  times ; 
but  still  the  speculative  principles  of  these  despisers  of 
intellectual  authority,  have  exercised  a  powerful  influ- 
ence on  the  general  current  of  logical  studies,  from 
their  own  day  to  the  present  hour. 

George  Gemistus  Pletho  (a.  d.  1391)  entered 
warmly  into  the  dialectic  system  of  Plato.  In  his 
work,  On  the  Difference  between  the  Platonic  and 
Aristotelian  Philosophy,  he  endeavours  to  shew,  that 
Plato's  views  of  the  great  principles  which  lay  at 
the  foundation  of  the  ratiocinative  art,  were  the  only 
sound  and  elevating  ones  with  which  the  human 
mind  could  be  satisfied  in  its  pursuit  after  truth.  In 
every  respect  they  were  much  superior  to  those  em- 
bodied in  the  Aristotelian  system,  which  are  manifestly 
tinged  to  a  great  extent  with  empirical  and  material 
elements.  It  must  be  acknowledged,  however,  that 
Pletho  carries  his  admiration  of  the  Platonic  system  to 
an  extravagant  and  unwarrantable  length,  incorporating 
in  his  disquisitions  many  of  the  attenuated  and  mys- 
tical notions  common  to  Eastern  speculation,  and  to 
the  theories  promulgated  by  the  Alexandrian  school.* 
This  was  the  reason  why  his  work  was,  after  his  death, 

*  De  Differentia,  &c,  pp.  44,  60.     Frankfort  Edition,  1584. 


164  ,  PHILOSOPHICAL  LOGICIANS. 

committed  publicly  to  the  flames.  Bessarion,  Bishop 
of  Mce  (a.  d.  1400),  wrote  also  in  favour  of  the  Pla- 
tonic dialectics,  but  in  a  more  rational  and  subdued 
tone  than  Pletho.  The  bishop  conceived  that  there 
were  in  reality  but  few  points  of  difference  between 
Plato  and  Aristotle  on  the  main  principles  of  their  re- 
spective logical  systems.  What  difference  there  was, 
was  more  apparent  than  real ;  arising  not  from  the 
purely  abstract  nature  of  the  two  systems,  but  from 
the  transcendental  interpretation  which  was  commonly 
given  to  that  which  Plato  espoused.  His  theory  of 
truth  rested  on  the  eternal  character  of  his  ideas,  and 
on  his  considering  the  law  of  thought  and  the  rule  of 
it  to  be  alike  involved  in,  and  necessary  to  all  logical 
processes  whatever.  Aristotle,  as  Bessarion  points  out, 
viewed  reasoning  in  the  same  light ;  only  the  Stagyrite 
did  not  adopt  to  its  fullest  extent  Plato's  system  of  ideas, 
having  their  archetypes  in  the  Divine  mind.  It  was 
chiefly  from  these  considerations,  that  the  bishop  was 
anxious  to  reconcile  all  those  differences  of  opinion 
which  arose  in  his  own  day,  relative  to  the  respective 
natures  and  importance  of  the  Platonic  and  Aristotelian 
dialectical  philosophy. 

Cosmo  de  Medici,  being  an  enthusiastic  admirer  of 
the  dialectic  theory  of  Plato,  as  well  as  of  his  other 
speculations,  patronised  Marsilius  Facinus  (a.  d.  1430), 
and  induced  him  to  undertake  a  translation  of  all  the 
Platonic  treatises,  as  well  as  to  act  upon  the  defensive 
against  the  assailants  of  the  great  doctrines  they  con- 
tained. Mr  Eoscoe  makes  the  following  just  observa- 
tions on  Facinus,  in  reference  to  the  influence  of  his 
labours  on  that  spirit  of  free  inquiry  which  a  short  time 


FACINUS,  GE0EGE  OF  TEEBIZOTO,  ETC.  165 

after  his  clay  formed  so  conspicuous  a  feature  in  the 
scientific  mind,  both  of  Italy  and  of  other  countries  in 
Europe.  "The  education  of  Facinus,"  says  he,  "was, 
as  he  himself  informs  us,  entirely  directed  to  the  new 
philosophy.  The  doctrines  and  precepts  of  the  Grecian 
sage  were  assiduously  instilled  into  his  infant  mind; 
and,  as  he  increased  in  years,  he  applied  himself  to  the 
study,  not  of  the  works  of  Plato  only,  but  also  those  of 
Plotinus — a  distinguished  promoter  of  the  doctrines  of 
that  philosopher  in  the  third  century.  Nor  were  the 
expectations  which  Cosmo  had  formed  of  Facinus  dis- 
appointed. The  Florentine  Academy  was  some  years 
afterwards  established  with  great  credit,  and  was  the 
first  institution  of  Europe  for  the  pursuit  of  science, 
detached  from  the  scholastic  method  then  universally 
adopted.  It  is  true  the  sublime  and  fanciful  doctrines 
of  Plato  were  almost  as  remote  from  the  purposes  of 
common  life  and  general  utility  as  the  dogmatic  opinions 
of  Aristotle  ;  but  the  introduction  of  the  former  was 
nevertheless  of  essential  service  to  the  cause  of  free 
inquiry  and  substantial  knowledge.  By  dividing  the 
attention  of  the  learned,  they  deprived  the  doctrines  of 
Aristotle  of  that  servile  respect  and  veneration  which 
had  so  long  been  paid  to  them ;  and,  by  introducing  the 
discussion  of  new  subjects,  they  prepared  the  way  for 
the  pursuit  of  truths  more  properly  within  the  sphere 
of  the  human  intellect."* 

The  admirers  of  the  Aristotelian  logic  were  far  from 
viewing  this  homage  paid  to  Plato  with  complacency, 
Theodore  Gaza  (a.  d.  1440),  Georgius  Scholarius  (a.  d. 
1464),  and  George  of  Trebizond  (a.  d.   1484),  were 

*  Life  of  Lorenzo  de  Medici,  p.  15. 


166  PHILOSOPHICAL  LOGICIANS. 

three  Greek  philosophers  who  came  into  Italy  under 
the  patronage  of  the  Medici  family,  and  who  were  en- 
thusiastic admirers  of  the  logical  philosophy  of  the 
Stagyrite.  They  unitedly  maintained  the  superiority 
of  his  system  above  every  other. 

Manettus  (a.  d.  1435),  a  Florentine  by  birth,  trans- 
lated Aristotle's  Categories,  with  Porphyry's  Introduc- 
tion, and  wrote  treatises  on  Wisdom,  Truth,  Possibility, 
&c.  His  notion  of  the  nature  of  all  truth  was,  that  it 
was  an  absolute  principle  of  unity,  and  that  it  was 
essentially  in  essence  the  same  in  the  Divine  nature  as 
in  man.*  Larentius  Yalla  (a.  d.  1445),  a  native  of 
Rome,  warmly  combated  the  Aristotelian  logic,  and 
maintained  that  the  study  of  it  could  in  nowise  advance 
the  cause  of  useful  knowledge.  Erasmus  praises  Valla 
for  his  literary  industry,  learning,  and  eloquence.  ]Sfor 
ought  we  to  omit  mentioning  the  name  of  Erasmus 
himself  (a.  d.  1464)  as  an  enemy  to  the  logic  of  the 
schools,  who  in  his  treatise,  The  Praise  of  Folly,  makes 
use  of  the  most  severe  and  biting  sarcasms  against  the 
logical  excesses  and  frivolities  of  the  middle  ages. 
"  They  are  making  preparations  (he  writes)  for  a  war 
against  the  Turks.  With  what  view  soever  this  be 
undertaken,  we  ought  to  pray  God  that  it  may  be 
profitable  not  to  a  few,  but  to  all  of  us  in  common. 
Should  we  conquer  them,  it  is  to  be  supposed  (for  we 
shall  hardly  put  them  all  to  the  sword)  that  attempts 
will  be  made  to  bring  them  over  to  Christianity.  Shall 
we  then  put  into  their  hands  an  Occam,  a  Durandus,  a 
Scotus,  a  Gabriel,  or  an  Alvarus?  What  will  they 
think  of  us  (for  after  all  they  are  rational  creatures), 

*  Opera,  folio,  p.  64.     Frankf.,  1564. 


LUDOVICUS  VIVES.  167 

when  they  hear  of  our  intricate  and  perplexed  subtilties 
concerning  instants,  formalities,  quantities,  and  rela- 
tions ?  What,  when  they  observe  our  quibbling  pro- 
fessors so  little  of  a  mind,  that  they  dispute  together 
till  they  turn  pale  with  fury,  call  names,  spit  in  one 
another's  faces,  and  even  come  to  blows  ?  What,  when 
they  behold  the  Jacobins  fighting  for  their  Thomas,  the 
Minorites  for  their  most  refined  and  seraphic  doctors, 
and  the  Nominalists  and  Realists  each  defending  their 
own  jargon,  and  attacking  that  of  their  adversaries  ?" 

The  names  of  these  three  men  are  honourably  known 
in  connexion  with  the  improved  translations  of  Aris- 
totle's works.  Gaza  was,  however,  so  ill  rewarded  for 
his  labour,  that  he  fell  into  a  state  of  hopeless  despon- 
dency, and  destroyed  himself.  Trebizond  wrote  A 
Comparison  of  Aristotle  and  Plato>  full  of  party  rancour 
and  bitterness.  Scholarius  was  the  author  of  an  Intro- 
duction to  Porphyry  on  TJniversals,  and  a  Commentary 
on  the  Categories  of  Aristotle. 

Ludovicus  Vives  (a.  d.  1440),  a  man  of  great  talent 
and  penetration  of  judgment,  raised  up  his  voice  against 
the  general  system  of  scholastic  logic.  He  says : — 
"  Some  persons  maintain,  that  studies  of  this  descrip- 
tion are  useful  to  prepare  the  way  for  other  kinds  of 
learning,  by  sharpening  and  invigorating  the  faculties 
of  the  student;  and  that  those  who  understand  such 
subtile  questions  will  the  more  readily  acquire  know- 
ledge of  a  less  difficult  nature.  Neither  of  these 
assertions  is  true.  One  of  the  chief  reasons  why  ques- 
tions of  this  kind  are  thought  profound  and  ingenious 
is,  that  they  are  not  fully  comprehended;  for  it  is  no 
uncommon  thing  for  men  to  applaud  what  they  do  not 


168  PHILOSOPHICAL  LOGICIANS. 

understand.  In  the  opinion  of  many,  however,  these 
enigmatical  subtilties  are  only  to  be  ranked  as  childish 
amusements ;  being  in  truth,  not  the  produce  of  vigo- 
rous understandings  exercised  by  sound  erudition,  but 
springing  up  in  an  unoccupied  mind,  from  a  sheer 
ignorance  of  better  things,  like  noxious  weeds  in  un- 
cultivated grounds."* 

James  Faber  or  Le  Fevre  (a.  d.  1483)  was  another 
mortal  enemy  to  the  logical  philosophy  of  the  school- 
men. He  conceived  that  all  logical  studies  ought  to 
proceed  from  a  broad  and  enlightened  system  of  men- 
tal philosophy ;  and  that  the  mere  technicalities  of  the 
schools  tended  to  cramp  and  impair  the  human  under- 
standing. He  wished  to  restore  Aristotle's  logic  to  its 
original  purity ;  and  his  Commentaries  on  the  Dialectics 
of  the  Stagy  rite,  have  this  for  their  chief  object.  One 
of  his  contemporaries  states,  that  "  Faber  has  rendered 
the  Peripatetic  doctrine  so  obvious  and  intelligible,  that 
we  have  no  longer  any  occasion  for  Ammonius,  Sim- 
plicius,  or  Philoponus."  These  logical  innovations,  how- 
ever, brought  upon  the  head  of  the  author  the  perse- 
cutions of  the  Sorbonne ;  but  he  was  protected  by 
Margaret,  Queen  of  Navarre,  at  whose  court  he  re- 
mained for  the  remainder  of  his  life,  which  terminated 
at  the  advanced  age  of  one  hundred  years.  Nearly 
contemporary  with  Faber,  was  Koclolphus  Agricola 
(a.  d.  1484),  who  sought  to  effect  a  reformation  of 
logic  He  is  praised  by  Leibnitz ;  and  Peter  Ramus 
affirms,  that  Agricola  awakened  a  lively  feeling  in  Ger- 
many towards  the  correction  of  the  abuses  which  had 
for   centuries    disfigured   the    logical    tuition    of   that 

*  Lib.  iii.,  p.  120. 


PETER  RAMUS.  169 

country ;  and  that  he  taught  the  youth  of  his  day,  not 
only  how  to  express  themselves  with  correctness  and 
readiness  in  debate,  but  also  to  think  and  reason  with 
power  and  justness. 

Peter  Eamus  (a.  d.  1515)  stands  conspicuously  in 
the  history  of  logic  at  this  period.  He  was  a  very 
popular  lecturer  of  the  science  at  the  college  of  Na- 
varre ;  and,  in  order  to  obtain  the  degree  of  Master  of 
Arts,  he  published  a  thesis,  in  which  he  was  bold 
enough  to  controvert  some  of  the  chief  tenets  of  the 
philosophy  of  Aristotle,  and  also  to  speak  in  dis- 
paraging terms  of  the  logical  system  of  the  Stagyrite. 
This  act  produced  an  immense  ferment  throughout  the 
whole  of  France.  Alarm  was  pictured  in  every  counte- 
nance, and  the  university  of  Paris  took  the  affair 
immediately  under  their  cognisance.  The  members 
of  this  institution  censured  the  conduct  of  Eamus 
severely;  they  considered  him  a  rash  and  headstrong 
person,  and  charged  him  with  bringing  ridicule  and 
dishonour  on  their  entire  body.  Nor  did  then  censure 
spend  itself  in  mere  words.  They  prosecuted  Eamus 
before  the  parliament  of  Paris,  and  petitioned  that 
some  marked  and  adequate  punishment  should  be 
inflicted  upon  him  for  the  heinous  offence  of  which  he 
had  been  guilty;  an  offence,  they  affirmed,  which  di- 
rectly aimed  at  the  entire  subversion  of  all  sound 
morality  and  religion.  The  members  of  the  university 
being,  however,  somewhat  suspicious  that  the  parlia- 
ment might  not  enter  so  warmly  into  their  views  as 
they  desired,  got  the  indictment  against  Eamus  removed 
to  the  king  and  council,  where  it  was  confidently  an- 
ticipated a  suitable  verdict  would  be  obtained. 


170  PHILOSOPHICAL  LOGICIANS. 

Francis  the  First  was  not  slow  to  respond  to  the  call 
which  the  university  made  upon  him.  He  entered 
warmly  into  all  their  grievances  and  prejudices.  Judges 
were  appointed  to  investigate  the  matter.  They  heard 
evidence,  and  gave  judgment  in  favour  of  the  university. 
The  king  heartily  approved  of  the  decision,  and  pub- 
lished it  as  a  royal  mandate,  with  his  own  observations 
upon  it.  The  sentence  was,  that  Ramus  had  been 
guilty  of  rashness,  impudence,  arrogance,  and  igno- 
rance ;  that  his  thesis  was  an  unfounded  and  malicious 
attack  on  the  Aristotelian  logic,  which  all  the  world 
admired,  and  which  he  did  not  himself  comprehend ; 
that  the  publication  of  this  thesis  should  be  entirely 
suppressed  for  the  peace  of  society,  and  the  interest  of 
truth ;  and  that  no  person  whatsoever  should  transcribe, 
print,  disperse,  or  read  it,  under  pain  of  the  most  severe 
punishment. 

Teissier  mentions,  in  his  Eloge  des  Hommes  Savans, 
that  the  books  of  Ramus  (his  Institutionem  Dialectics, 
and  Animadversiones  Aristotelicce)  were  prohibited  by 
the  Court,  and  publicly  denounced  before  the  Eoyal 
College.  Eamus  was  condemned  to  "  abstain  from 
pursuing  his  logical  instructions."  His  sentence  was 
published  in  Latin  and  French,  and  placarded  through- 
out all  the  streets  of  Paris.  He  was  even  publicly 
ridiculed  on  the  stage,  amidst  the  uproarious  plaudits 
of  thousands  of  the  disciples  of  Aristotle.  He  recovered, 
however,  from  these  multiplied  and  unmerited  insults. 
The  plague  raged  in  Paris,  and  cut  off  several  of 
its  most  influential  and  popular  of  the  professors  of 
the  university ;  and  this  event  seems  to  have  again 
opened  the  way  to  his  logic  chair.     In  1527,  the  sen- 


PETER  RAMUS.  1 71 

tence  of  Trancis  was  reversed  by  Henry  II.,  and 
Eamus  was  appointed  Eegius  Professor  of  Eloquence 
and  Philosophy.  But  this  was  only  a  deceptive  glimpse 
of  hope  in  his  fortunes.  Worse  things  soon  awaited 
him.  The  cry  was  raised  against  him  of  secretly  enter- 
taining and  propagating  Protestant  opinions ;  and,  in 
consequence  of  this  imputation,  he  was  assassinated  at 
the  great  massacre  of  St  Bartholomew,  and,  shocking 
to  relate,  his  mutilated  body  was  thrown  out  of  the 
windows  of  the  college,  and  his  infuriated  students 
actually  tore  out  his  very  intestines,  and  dragged  them 
about  the  street !  * 

Eamus  gives  us  his  reasons  for  making  this  attack 
on  the  logic  of  Aristotle.  He  says,  that  after  he  had 
spent  three  years  in  the  study  of  this  system  of  dialec- 
tics, he  put  some  questions  to  himself,  "  What  use  has 
it  been  to  me?  Has  it  rendered  me  more  fluent  in 
speech — given  me  a  finer  and  quicker  perception  of 
poetic  beauties — made  me  better  acquainted  with  all 
those  really  important  subjects  which,  when  a  man 
thoroughly  understands,  he  is  said  to  be  a  wise  man  ?  " 
The  answer,  he  tells  us,  to  these  questions,  was  not  by 
any  means  satisfactory.  Wherein,  then,  lay  the  imper- 
fection ?  Did  it  rest  with  him,  or  with  the  system  of 
logic  which  he  studied  ?  He  pondered  over  these  mat- 
ters for  some  time  :  at  length  the  dialogues  of  Plato 
fell  into  his  hands,  and  he  thought  he  discovered  a 
more  plain  and  effective  instrument  for  general  reason- 
ing than  that  he  had  been  using  from  Aristotle.  Full 
of  this  idea,  he  concocted  that  system  of  logic  which 
now  bears  his  name ;  and  it  was  with  this  instrument 

*  Varillas,  Hist,  de  Charles  IX. 


1  72  PHILOSOPHICAL  LOGICIANS. 

that  he  produced  such  a  terrific  effect  amongst  the 
learned  doctors  of  the  university  of  Paris. 

The  leading  notion  which  seemed  to  have  occupied 
the  mind  of  Ramus  relative  to  logic  was,  that  all  its 
formal  rules  should  be  pure  transcripts  of  the  laws  of 
thought,  as  these  are  displayed  in  the  act  of  reasoning. 
ISTothing  should  be  admitted  into  any  system  that  will 
not  bear  this  test.  He  defines  logic  to  be  the  art  of 
discoursing  correctly  or  justly ;  and  the  examples  which 
he  gives  are  chiefly  taken  from  the  ancient  orators  and 
poets.  Though  professing  to  introduce  new  matter 
into  the  science  of  reasoning,  yet  all  his  innovations 
are  merely  of  a  nominal  character ;  for  the  essentials 
of  his  work  are  altogether  of  an  Aristotelian  cast. 
Ramus  seems  to  have  had  a  very  incorrect  and  incom- 
plete idea  of  definition.  He  places  it  in  the  first  rank 
in  all  logical  operations.  And  there  can  be  no  doubt 
but  this  led  him  to  pay  more  attention  to  verbal  than 
mental  definitions. 

It  is  difficult  to  determine  of  what  the  great  logical 
improvements  of  Ramus  consists.  His  system,  viewed 
as  a  whole,  seems  as  complicated  and  as  formal  as  any 
work  of  the  kind,  even  in  the  most  rampant  days  of 
the  schoolmen.  It  has  been  surmised,  and  I  think 
truly,  that  Ramus  owes  more  of  his  popularity  to  his 
disclaimer  of  Aristotle's  authority,  than  to  any  thing 
he  himself  suggested  or  did  in  reference  to  logical 
science.  In  this  he  kept  no  bounds.  He  vilified  the 
private  character  of  Aristotle,  and  attempted  also  to 
shew,  that  the  logical  works  attributed  to  him  were 
really  not  written  by  him,  but  were  the  result  of  studies 
long   prior   to   his    day — to    Prometheus    among   the 


PETER  RAMUS.  173 

Greeks,  and  to  Noah  among  the  Israelites.  Mr  Hallam 
observes,  that  "  as  the  logic  of  Eamus  appears  to  be  of 
no  more  direct  utility  than  that  of  Aristotle  in  assisting 
us  to  determine  the  absolute  truth  of  propositions,  and 
consequently  could  not  satisfy  Lord  Bacon,  so  perhaps 
it  does  not  interfere  with  the  proper  use  of  syllogisms, 
which  indeed,  on  a  less  extended  scale  than  in  Aristotle, 
form  part  of  the  Eamean  dialectics.  Like  all  those 
who  assailed  the  authority  of  Aristotle,  he  kept  no 
bounds  in  depreciating  his  works, — aware,  no  doubt, 
that  the  public,  and  especially  younger  students,  will 
pass  more  readily  from  admiration  to  contempt,  than  to 
a  qualified  estimation  of  any  famous  man."* 

After  his  death,  the  logic  of  Eamus  became  very 
popular  in  many  of  the  European  seats  of  learning. 
Melancthon  introduced  it  into  Germany ;  in  some  parts 
of  Italy  it  was  received  with  favour ;  and  even  in 
France  itself,  in  many  districts  at  least,  it  contested 
the  honour  with  the  Stagyrite  himself.  Andrew  Mel- 
ville introduced  the  logical  doctrines  of  Eamus  at 
Glasgow  university;  and  they  were  prelected  on  at 
Cambridge  in  1590.  His  work  passed  through  various 
editions  in  England  before  the  year  1600.  His  views 
were  also  well  known  at  this  time  in  Switzerland,  Den- 
mark, and  Holland. 

An  able  and  popular  historian  and  biographer  of  the 
Eeformation,  has  expressed  himself  deeply  impressed 
with  the  great  advantages  which  resulted,  to  Scotland 
in  particular,  from  the  cultivation  of  the  logical  system 
of  Eamus.     It  is  on  this  account  that  I  venture  to  lay 

*  Lit.  Middle  Ages,  vol.  i.  p.  390. 


174  PHILOSOPHICAL  LOGICIANS. 

the  following  quotations  before  the  reader,  containing, 
as  they  do,  many  observations  worthy  of  notice  : — 

"  In  investigating  the  progress  which  science  made 
in  Scotland  during  this  period,  the  first  thing  which 
strikes  us  is  the  introduction  of  the  Eamean  philoso- 
phy, and  its  general  substitution  in  the  room  of  the 
Aristotelian.  The  influence  which  Eamus  had  in  the 
advancement  of  philosophy,  has  not,  in  my  opinion,  had 
that  importance  attached  to  it  by  modern  writers  which 
it  deserves.  In  forming  an  estimate  of  the  degree  in 
which  any  individual  has  contributed  to  the  illumination 
of  the  age  in  which  he  lived,  it  is  necessary  to  take  into 
account  something  more  than  the  character  of  his  opin- 
ions viewed  in  themselves  :  we  must  show  that  they 
were  brought  fairly  and  fully  into  contact  with  public 
opinion,  and  attend  to  the  circumstances  which  com- 
bined to  aid  or  to  neutralize  their  effect.  By  a  close 
examination  of  the  writings  of  such  men  as  Bruno  and 
Cardan,  we  may  discover  here  and  there  a  sentiment 
akin  to  a  truer  philosophy ;  but  then  these  sentiments 
appear  to  have  struck  their  minds  during  certain  lucid 
intervals,  and  are  buried  in  a  farrago  of  fantastic,  extra- 
vagant, and  unintelligible  notions,  which  must  have 
discredited  them  with  every  sober  thinker.  They  are  to 
be  viewed  rather  as  curious  phenomena  in  the  history  of 
individuals,  than  as  indications  of  the  progress  made  by 
the  human  mind.  There  are  three  grand  events  in 
the  modern  history  of  philosophy.  The  first  is  the 
revival  of  literature,  which,  by  promoting  the  study  of 
the  original  writings  of  the  ancients,  rescued  the  Aris- 
totelian philosophy  from  the  barbarism  and  corruption 


PETER  RAMUS.  1  75 

which  it  had  contracted  during  the  middle  ages.  The 
second  is  the  emancipation  of  the  human  mind  from 
that  slavish  subjection  to  authority  under  which  it  had 
been  long  held  by  a  superstitious  veneration  for  the 
name  of  Aristotle.  The  third  is  the  introduction  of 
what  is  commonly  called  the  inductive  philosophy.  In 
the  progress  of  the  human  mind  it  behoved  the  two 
former  to  precede  the  latter.  In  bringing  about  the 
first,  a  multitude  of  persons  in  all  parts  of  Europe  had 
co-operated  with  nearly  equal  zeal.  The  merit  of 
effecting  the  second  is  in  a  great  measure  due  to  one 
individual.  The  Platonic  school,  which  was  founded  in 
the  fifteenth  century,  did  not  produce  any  extensive  or 
permanent  effects  on  the  mode  of  study  and  philoso- 
phizing. It  originated  in  literary  enthusiasm ;  its  dis- 
ciples were  chiefly  confined  to  Italy;  and  they  con- 
tented themselves  with  pronouncing  extravagant  and 
rapturous  panegyrics  on  the  divine  Plato.  Valla, 
Agricola,  Yives,  and  Nizolius,  had  pointed  out  various 
defects  in  the  reigning  philosophy,  and  recommended 
a  mode  of  investigating  truth  more  rational  than  that 
which  was  pursued  in  the  schools.  But  they  had  not 
succeeded  even  in  fixing  the  attention  of  the  public  on 
the  subject.  The  attack  which  Eamus  made  on  the 
Peripatetic  philosophy  was  direct,  avowed,  powerful, 
persevering,  and  irresistible.  He  possessed  an  acute 
mind,  acquaintance  with  ancient  learning,  an  ardent 
love  of  truth,  and  invincible  courage  in  maintaining  it. 
He  had  applied  with  avidity  to  the  study  of  the  logic 
of  Aristotle ;  and  the  result  was  a  conviction,  that  it 
was  an  instrument  utterly  unfit  for  discovering  truth  in 


1  76  PHILOSOPHICAL  LOGICIANS. 

any  of  the  sciences,  and  answering  no  other  purpose 
than  that  of  scholastic  wrangling  and  di-gladiation.  His 
conviction  he  communicated  to  the  public ;  and,  in 
spite  of  all  the  resistance  made  by  ignorance  and  pre- 
judice, he  succeeded  in  bringing  over  a  great  part  of 
the  learned  world  to  his  views.  What  Luther  was  in 
the  church,  Ramus  was  in  the  schools.  He  overthrew 
the  infallibility  of  the  Stagyrite,  and  proclaimed  the 
right  of  mankind  to  think  for  themselves  in  matters  of 
philosophy — a  right  which  he  maintained  with  the  most 
undaunted  fortitude,  and  which  he  sealed  with  his 
blood.  If  Ramus  had  not  shaken  the  authority  of  the 
long  venerated  Org  anon  of  Aristotle,  the  world  might 
not  have  seen  the  Novum  Organum  of  Bacon.  The 
faults  of  the  Ramean  system  of  dialectics  have  long 
been  acknowledged.  It  proceeded  upon  the  radical 
principles  of  the  logic  of  Aristotle ;  its  distinctions  often 
turned  more  upon  words  than  things  ;  and  the  artificial 
method  and  uniform  partitions  which  it  prescribed  in 
treating  every  subject  were  unnatural,  and  calculated 
to  fetter,  instead  of  forwarding,  the  mind  in  the  dis- 
covery of  truth.  But  it  discarded  many  of  the  useless 
speculations,  and  much  of  the  unmeaning  jargon  re- 
specting predicables,  predicaments,  and  topics,  which 
made  so  great  a  figure  in  the  ancient  logic.  "  It  in- 
culcated upon  its  disciples  the  necessity  of  accuracy 
and  order  in  arranging  their  own  ideas,  and  in  analys- 
ing those  of  others.  And  as  it  advanced  no  claim  to 
infallibility,  submitted  all  its  rules  to  the  test  of  practi- 
cal usefulness,  and  set  the  only  legitimate  end  of  the 
whole  logical  apparatus  constantly  before  the  eye  of  the 


PETER  RAMUS.  177 

student,  its  faults  were  soon  discovered,  and  yielded 
readily  to  a  more  improved  method  of  reasoning  and 
investigation."  * 

"  The  bold  and  persevering  spirit/'  says  Dugald 
Stewart,  "with  which  Eamus  disputed,  in  the  univer- 
sity of  Paris,  the  authority  of  Aristotle,  and  the  perse- 
cution he  incurred  by  this  philosophical  heresy,  entitle 
him  to  an  honourable  distinction  from  the  rest  of  his 
brethren.  He  was  certainly  a  man  of  uncommon  acute- 
ness,  as  well  as  eloquence,  and  placed  in  a  very  strong 
light  some  of  the  most  vulnerable  parts  of  the  Aristo- 
telian logic ;  without,  however,  exhibiting  any  marks  of 
that  deep  sagacity  which  afterwards  enabled  Bacon, 
Descartes,  and  Locke,  to  strike  at  the  very  roots  of 
the  system.  His  copious  and  not  inelegant  style  as  a 
writer,  recommended  his  innovations  to  those  who 
were  disgusted  with  the  barbarism  of  the  schools ; 
while  his  avowed  partiality  for  the  reformed  faith  (to 
which  he  fell  a  martyr  in  the  massacre  of  Paris),  pro- 
cured many  proselytes  to  his  opinions  in  all  the  Pro- 
testant countries  of  Europe.  In  England  his  logic  had 
the  honour,  in  an  age  of  comparative  light  and  refine- 
ment, to  find  an  expounder  and  methodizer  in  the 
author  of  Paradise  Lost ;  and  in  some  of  our  northern 
universities,  where  it  was  very  early  introduced,  it 
maintained  its  ground  till  it  was  supplanted  by  the 
logic  of  Locke."  It  has  been  said  of  Eamus,  that 
"  although  he  had  genius  sufficient  to  shake  the  Aris- 
totelian fabric,  he  was  unable  to  substitute  any  thing 
more  solid  in  its  place;"  but  it  ought  not  to  be  for- 
gotten, that   even  this  praise,  scanty  as  it  may   now 

*  M 'die's  Life  of  Melville,  vol.  ii.  p.  302. 
M 


178  PHILOSOPHICAL  LOGICIANS. 

appear,  involves  a  large  tribute  to  his  merits  as  a  phi- 
losophical reformer.  Before  human  reason  could  ad- 
vance, it  was  necessary  that  it  should  first  be  released 
from  its  fetters.* 

James  Concio  (a.  d.  1530)  was  a  native  of  Trent, 
and  is  the  author  of  a  little  work,  De  Methodo,  of  con- 
siderable merit.  He  sets  out  with  some  observations 
showing  the  necessity  of  a  given  or  prescribed  method, 
when  pursuing  our  philosophical  inquiries  into  any  sub- 
ject whatever.  This  method  is  the  primordial  idea  on 
which  the  mind  rests ;  and  to  bring  out  all  our  con- 
clusions in  strict  logical  harmony  with  it,  is,  or  ought 
to  be,  the  grand  object  of  all  reasoners.  A  method  is 
a  classified  arrangement,  a  general  term,  a  starting- 
point,  a  conception,  a  comprehensive  idea,  a  purpose 
or  end,  a  theory  or  a  hypothesis.  It  is  like  the 
central  point  of  a  circle  to  which  all  the  radii  converge. 
Hence  no  formal  system  of  logic  can  be  intelligible, 
unless  there  be  a  method  lying  underneath  it  which 
aims  at  accomplishing  some  definite  thing,  or  effecting 
some  definite  conclusion  of  the  understanding.  A 
method  is  the  living  principle  of  all  formal  reasoning ; 
without  it  the  mere  technicalities  of  an  argumentative 
process  are  devoid  of  all  significancy  or  value. 

All  terms,  such  as  general  idea,  principle,  concep- 
tion, genus,  species,  analysis,  synthesis,  &c,  have  then- 
foundation  in  the  notions  of  method  which  the  human 
mind,  from  its  first  rudimental  movements,  is  led  to 
entertain.  These  terms,  or  their  equivalents,  enter 
into  every  thing  susceptible  of  arrangement  and  classi- 
fication.    Children  display  this  power  of  methodizing 

*  Dissert.,  p.  30. 


JAMES  CONCIO.  179 

very  early  in  life;  and  among  all  characters  of  men 
we  find  it  in  active  operation,  and  as  constituting  one 
of  the  chief  features  in  their  intellectual  physiognomy. 
But  there  is,  so  to  speak,  a  method  even  in  the  em- 
ployment of  method.  We  find  abuses  from  the  use 
of  it,  just  as  we  find  abuses  from  the  employments 
of  many  of  our  powers  and  faculties.  Absurd  sys- 
tems and  theories  arise  out  of  the  use  of  method,  as 
well  as  rational  and  sound  ones.  To  determine  its  fit 
and  beneficial  application,  there  would  seem  to  be 
a  set  of  faculties  which  sit  in  judgment,  as  it  were, 
upon  it,  determining  the  legitimacy  of  its  use  here, 
and  denouncing  its  misapplication  there.  All  kinds  of 
scientific  excellencies  and  defects  take  then  rise  from 
this  common  source ;  from  the  huge  collector  of  scat- 
tered and  undigested  facts,  to  the  concise  and  methodi- 
cal systematizer  of  them  for  popular  use  and  instruction. 
Method  is  the  first  step  in  the  rational  movements  of 
men ;  the  significant  symbol  of  growing  intelligence 
and  usefulness.  It  operates  as  a  finger-post  to  point 
out  the  road  to  some  hitherto  unknown  or  undiscovered 
region.  There  is  in  the  mind  of  every  philosophical 
inquirer  an  undefined  notion  of  the  direction  he  should 
take,  the  general  appearance  he  should  give  to  his 
materials,  and  the  end  or  purpose  they  should  serve; 
still,  as  this  is  but  vaguely  set  before  the  intellect  by 
the  notion  of  method  adopted  from  the  commencement 
of  his  labours,  the  intrinsic  value  and  importance  of 
the  guide  can  only  be  estimated  when  the  journey  is 
finished,  and  the  labours  summed  up. 

Method,  he  tells  us  again,  is  the  proper  manner  of 
proceeding,    whether    in    the    examination    of   known 


180  PHILOSOPHICAL  LOGICIANS. 

truths,  the  obtaining  of  those  which  are  not  known,  or 
in  transmitting  knowledge  to  others.  But  a  philoso- 
phical method  requires  preliminary  arrangements.  It 
is  requisite  we  should  determine  beforehand  in  what 
the  knowledge  of  things  consists,  how  we  obtain  that 
knowledge,  what  matters  it  embraces,  and  what  por- 
tion of  these  we  are  able  to  trace  to  their  proper  causes. 
These  are  considerations  of  great  moment.  We  may 
be  said  to  have  a  perfect  knowledge  of  a  thing  if  we 
know  what  it  is ;  comprehend  it,  not  only  as  a  whole, 
but  in  all  its  most  minute  parts  and  dependencies. 
We  should  know  the  genus  as  well  as  the  species ;  not 
only  immediate  or  proximate  causes  and  effects,  but 
those  that  are  more  remote  and  hidden. 

All  knowledge  deduced  from  a  process  of  reasoning 
presupposes  some  primitive  truths,  immediate,  founded 
on  nature,  and  independent  of  the  reasoning  process. 
The  office  of  method  is  to  bring  these  primitive  truths 
to  light.* 

Logic  may  be  summed  up  as  the  "  right  method  of 
thinking  and  teaching:"  recta  contemplandi  docendique 
ratio.  This  "right  method"  demands  great  attention 
and  labour ;  so  much  so,  indeed,  that  Concio  affirms, 
that  if  a  subject  required  thirty  years'  study  or  applica- 
tion, he  would  not  think  it  disproportioned  to  allot 
two-thirds  of  that  period  to  the  acquiring  a  dexte- 
rous use  of  the  methodical  arrangements  requisite  for 
the  execution  of  the  work.  He  lays  great  stress  upon 
the  rules  which  he  gives  for  constructing  definitions,  by 
paying  strict  attention  to  the  genus  and  differentia. 
The  soundness  of  many  of  these  rules  may,  however, 

*  De  Metlmdo,  §§  1,  3,  13,  20,  61.     Antwerp,  1602. 


ZABARELLA,  NIZOLINI,  CAMPENELLA.  181 

be  fairly  called  in  question.  In  the  distributing  of  a 
subject  the  analytic  method  is  the  best,  both  for  the 
investigation  and  communicating  of  truth. 

James  Zabarella  (a.  d.  1532)  was  a  logician  of  some 
note,  and  published  Commentaries  on  Aristotle.  Marius 
^izolini  (a.  d.  1553),  wrote  a  work  On  the  Proper 
Principles  and  Mode  of  Reasoning,  in  which  he  dis- 
cusses some  of  the  leading  points  of  the  Aristotelian 
logic,  and  likewise  enters  into  an  inquiry  relative  to 
the  nature  and  offices  of  general  terms.  He  was  a 
decided  [Nominalist,  and  conceived  that  the  Eealistic 
theory  had  not  a  single  argument  of  any  weight  on 
which  it  could  rest.  Leibnitz,  who  published  an  edi- 
tion of  his  work  with  an  able  preface,  censures  Nizo- 
lini  for  his  unmeasured  condemnation  of  the  Eealists. 
In  Italy  his  work  met  with  little  countenance  or  sup- 
port— chiefly  from  his  violent  censures  on  the  logic  of 
Aristotle;  and  in  more  modern  times  it  has  been 
variously  estimated  by  Bruker,  Buhle,  Dugald  Stewart, 
and  others.  "  Nizolini  argues,"  says  Mr  Hallam, 
"  against  all  dialectics,  and  therefore  differs  from  Eamus 
— concluding  with  two  propositions  as  the  result  of  his 
whole  book  : — That  as  many  logicians  and  metaphysi- 
cians as  are  any  way  found,  so  many  capital  enemies 
of  truth  will  then  and  there  exist ;  and  that,  so  long  as 
Aristotle  shall  be  supreme  in  the  logic  and  metaphysics 
of  the  schools,  so  long  will  error  and  barbarism  reign 
over  the  mind.  There  is  nothing  very  deep  or  pointed 
in  this  summary  of  his  reasoning."  * 

Thomas  Campanella  (a.  d.  1568)  was  one  of  the 
most  active  spirits  of  his  age.     He  seems  to  have  early 

*  Lit.  Middle  Ages,  vol.  ii.  p.  18. 


182  PHILOSOPHICAL  LOGICIANS. 

in  life  imbibed  a  strong  feeling  against  the  logical 
system  of  the  schools.  He  enters  into  the  question 
as  to  its  value  in  his  work,  Philosophia  Mealis.  He 
here  states  fully  the  arguments  for  and  against  it ;  and 
comes  to  the  conclusion,  that  the  interests  of  truth  and 
the  salvation  of  men  require  that  a  final  and  complete 
renunciation  should  be  made  of  the  Aristotelian  logic. 
He  maintains  that  all  truth  centres  in  a  Deity ;  and 
there  are  only  two  great  sources  from  which  it  can  be 
obtained, — first,  by  examining  nature  carefully  by  way 
of  induction,  and  then  directing  the  attention  to  what 
intuition  teaches,  and  to  what  the  prophets  reveal  to 
us.  These  he  considers  as  the  chief  heads  under  which 
all  human  knowledge  should  be  classified. 

The  innovations  which  Campanella  introduced  into 
dialectics,  could  scarcely  be  said  to  be  any  decided  im- 
provement on  the  system  of  the  schools.  He  seems  to 
have  laboured  under  the  notion,  that  whatever  he  could 
advance  contrary  to  the  formal  system  of  the  Stagyrite, 
must  necessarily  prove  a  valuable  addition  to  logical 
science. 

He  expresses  himself  with  great  contempt  for  the 
logical  squabbles'  so  frequent  and  inveterate  in  the  ages 
which  had  preceded  him.  In  his  work,  De  Investiga- 
tions, he  says  that  he  ventures  upon  pointing  out  to 
young  men  a  better  and  readier  mode  of  obtaining 
knowledge  than  either  Plato  or  Aristotle  ever  taught. 
He  would  teach  them  to  reason,  not  like  Raymond 
Lully,  through  the  instrumentality  of  mere  words,  but 
from  the  sensible  objects  and  operations  of  nature 
around  them. 

Sanchez  (a.  d.  1576),  a  Portuguese  physician,  was  a 


SANCHEZ.  183 

theoretical  logician  of  a  decidedly  sceptical  cast.  His 
arguments,  if  such  they  may  be  called,  are  chiefly  those 
which  the  ancient  Pvrrhonians  used,  arising  from  the 
differences  of  opinion  and  sentiment  among  mankind 
on  most  subjects  of  acknowledged  importance.  There 
is  nothing  new  or  striking  in  Sanchez's  scepticism.  He 
maintains  there  are  two  modes  of  arriving  at  truth,  but 
neither  of  them  give  us  positive  information  of  the 
real  nature  of  things.  These  modes  are  experiment 
and  reason.  Neither  of  these  alone  can  communicate 
absolute  scientific  truth.  Mr  Hallam  observes,  that 
"  this  treatise  of  Sanchez's  bears  witness  to  a  deep 
sense  of  the  imperfections  of  the  received  systems  in 
science  and  reasoning,  and  to  a  restless  longing  for 
truth,  which  strikes  us  in  other  writers  of  this  latter 
period  of  the  sixteenth  century.  Lord  Bacon,  I  believe, 
has  never  alluded  to  Sanchez,  and  such  paradoxical 
scepticism  was  likely  to  disgust  his  strong  mind ;  yet  we 
may  sometimes  discern  signs  of  a  Baconian  spirit  in 
the  attacks  of  our  Spanish  philosopher  on  the  syllogis- 
tic logic,  as  being  built  on  abstract  and  not  significant 
terms,  and  in  his  clear  perception  of  the  difference  be- 
tween a  knowledge  of  words  and  one  of  things."* 

Logical  pursuits  had  been  cultivated  the  latter  part 
of  the  fifteenth,  and  the  whole  of  the  sixteenth  century, 
with  great  ardour  and  industry.  Independent  of  those 
names  we  have  singled  out  in  the  sections  of  this  chap- 
ter, there  were  many  other  logicians  of  no  small  repu- 
tation, both  as  teachers  and  writers.  There  seemed  to 
be  a  restless  desire  for  indefinite  logical  innovations, 
both  as  to  fundamental  principles  and  formal  systems. 

*  Lit.  Middle  Ages,  vol.  ii.  p.  16. 


184  PHILOSOPHICAL  LOGICIANS. 

New  methods  of  investigation,  and  new  classifications 
and  arrangements  of  rules,  were  seen  springing  up  in 
every  direction.  Many  were  eagerly  engaged  in  pulling 
down  old  systems,  while  others  were  tenaciously  de- 
fending them.  Every  where  men's  minds  appeared  in 
search  of  new  truths,  and  more  practical  and  popular 
modes  of  disseminating  them  when  found.  Kecker- 
man,  who  published  his  Prcecognitio  in  1606,  tells  us 
that  there  were  upwards  of  sixty  distinguished  logical 
writers  in  his  day. 

In  Spain  and  Italy  there  were  many  logical  authors 
of  note  in  the  sixteenth  century.  We  can  do  nothing 
more  than  merely  mention  a  few  of  them.  All  the 
logicians  of  the  former  country  took  their  leading  prin- 
ciples from  the  system  of  speculation  developed  by 
Thomas  Aquinas.  In  Italy  there  was  not  the  same 
uniformity  among  its  theoretical  writers  on  the  art  of 
reasoning.  Francis  Toledo  (a.  d.  1550)  wrote  Institu- 
tiones  ad  Logicam ;  Father  Zunica  (a.  d.  1560)  was  a 
popular  teacher  of  dialectics;  Antonius  Eubeo  (a. d. 
1582)  was  the  author  of  Commentaria  in  Universam 
Aristotelis  Logicam;  Franciscus  Murcia  de  la  Liana 
(a.  d.  1584),  Selecta  circa  Universam  Aristotelis  Dialec- 
ticam ;  Francis  Gonzalez  (a.  d.  1600),  Logica  Tri- 
partita ;  to  whom  may  be  added  the  names  of  Francis- 
cus de  Bivar,  Antonio  Coronelli,  Antonius  Johannes 
Andreas ;  Gregorius  Valentinus  Arcisius ;  Barth.  J. 
Paschius,  Dominic  Soto,  Joh.  Bapt.  Monlorius,  John 
Clementis,  and  Petrus  H.  de  Mendoza. 

In  Belgium  and  Holland  we  have  many  distin- 
guished names  connected  with  logic  in  the  sixteenth 
century.     Among  the  number  we  may  mention  Petrus 


THEOLOGICAL  LOGICIANS,  185 

de  Bruxella,  Petrus  Bertius,  Joh.  Murmellius,  J. 
Polyander,  Th.  Eebus,  P.  Grallardius,  Justus  Yelsius, 
J.  Sturmius,  P.  Carpenterius,  John  Bononia,  J.  Csesa- 
rius,  Th.  Buridanus,  Father  Dionysius,  Franciscus 
Byrs^eus,  F.  Titelmannus,  Bodolphus  Snellius,  Augus- 
tus Huens,  Bar.  Latonius,  Martinus  Dorpius,  Gerd, 
Listrius,  and  Joh.  Aldeburgus. 

Olaus  Mcolai  Nericius  introduced  the  logical  doc- 
trines of  Peter  Bamus  into  Sweden  in  1570.  He 
illustrated  them  with  great  eloquence,  and  was  one  of 
the  most  popular  lecturers  on  logic  in  the  north  of 
Europe.  John  Skytte  was  at  the  same  time  the  zeal- 
ous organ  of  the  Aristotelian  system.  Bishop  Gothus 
published  his  Comments  in  1578,  on  the  general  scope 
of  Eamus's  innovations  in  logic ;  and  a  short  time  after 
this,  J.  Rudbeckius  gave  to  the  world  his  System  of 
Logic,  in  which  were  incorporated  many  important 
metaphysical  speculations. 

THEOLOGICAL  LOGICIANS. 

The  great  movement  of  the  Eeformation  effected 
logical  science  considerably — not  only  in  its  formal,  but 
in  its  scientific  character.  All  the  great  reformers, 
though  differing  on  matters  of  detail  as  to  logical 
instruction,  maintained  that  the  Scriptures,  as  a  whole, 
had  their  own  philosophical  method  relative  to  the 
manner  in  which  truth  should  be  investigated  and  dis- 
seminated among  mankind.  They  dealt  with  the 
science  of  man  in  all  his  relations  as  a  political,  social, 
moral,  and  religious  being.  On  all  the  branches  of 
knowledge   springing  out   of  these  several   relations. 


186  THEOLOGICAL  LOGICIANS. 

they  spoke  with  authority  and  without  compromise. 
There  was  no  appeal  from  their  decisions.  What  was 
not  taught  in  the  Bible  concerning  human  nature,  was 
neither  true  nor  fit  to  be  taught.  This  was  the  first 
time  in  the  history  of  mankind  that  Eevelation  had 
been  fairly  and  directly  placed,  face  to  face,  with  the 
natural  understanding  of  man.  Whatever  conflicts 
had  taken  place  between  the  philosophy  of  pure  reason 
and  theological  truth,  had  only  assumed  the  character 
of  occasional  skirmishes  ;  but  now  the  great  battle  was 
to  be  fought,  which  should  once  and  for  ever  deter- 
mine where  sovereign  authority  should  permanently 
reside. 

It  was  impossible  that  such  ardent  minds  as  those  of 
the  Reformers,  could  view  with  complacency  any  mere 
dry  and  formal  study,  which  seemed  to  cramp  the 
energies  of  the  mind,  and  which  dealt,  or  professed  to 
deal,  with  the  great  principles  of  human  reasoning. 
And  this  impossibility  will  appear  still  greater  when 
we  reflect  that  a  system  of  this  kind  was  one  of  the 
chief  instruments  which  sustained  the  power  and  influ- 
ence of  their  enemies.  Accordingly  we  find,  that  the 
scholastic  logic  was  one  of  the  first  things  to  which 
Luther  and  his  reforming  associates  directed  their 
attention.  It  presented  a  stupendous  stumbling-block 
at  the  threshold  of  their  theological  movements.  To 
remove  it  altogether  seemed  beyond  their  strength; 
and  to  modify  it  appeared  a  work  of  no  ordinary  diffi- 
culty. But  something  was  to  be  done.  It  must  be 
grappled  with  in  some  shape,  or  Protestant  doctrines 
and  teachings  would  be  of  no  avail.  Luther,  being  the 
most  ardent  and  impetuous  of  all  the  Reformers,  and 


LUTHER.  187 

the  least  able  to  brook  authority  of  any  kind,  was  very 
much  inclined  to  strangle  the  "  logical  monster  "  forth- 
with,  as  the  only  means  of  making  his  future  footsteps 
smooth  and  secure.  Of  course  he  keeps  no  terms  with 
the  schoolmen.  He  decidedly  declares,  that  it  would 
be  impossible  to  establish  any  beneficial  mode  of  public 
tuition  in  theology,  if  students  were  to  be  clogged  with 
the  scholastic  dialectics.  He  spoke  from  experience, 
having  filled  an  Aristotelian  chair  of  philosophy  him- 
self. The  Bible  was  every  thing  to  him.  He  even 
goes  so  far  as  to  paraphrase  its  grand  and  leading  doc- 
trines with  the  chief  divisions  of  the  philosophy  of  the 
schools  in  a  somewhat  whimsical  manner.  He  says, 
"  In  divine  things,  the  Father  is  the  Grammar ;  for 
he  imparts  words,  and  is  the  source  whence  flow  good, 
pure,  and  harmonious  sayings.  The  Son  is  Logic,  and 
suggests  arrangement,  order,  and  sequence  of  ideas.  The 
Holy  Ghost  is  Rhetoric,  states,  presses  home,  enlarges, 
and  gives  life  and  strength,  so  as  to  impress  and  hold  the 
hearers'  hearts.  The  schoolmen  have  neglected  these 
important  signs  for  silly  trifles."  "  The  decalogue  is 
the  doctrine  of  doctrines ;  the  creed  the  history  of  his- 
tories;  the  Lord's  prayer  the  prayer  of  prayers ;  the 
sacraments  the  ceremonies  of  ceremonies."  Again  he 
says,  "  What  doth  it  contribute  towards  the  knowledge 
of  things,  to  be  perpetually  trifling  and  cavilling,  in 
language  conceived  and  prescribed  by  Aristotle,  con- 
cerning matter,  form,  motion,  and  time?"  "I  am 
persuaded  that  neither  Thomas,  nor  all  the  Thomists 
together,  ever  understood  a  single  chapter  of  Aristotle." 

"The  schoolmen!    let  them  go  to  ."     "The 

pagan  Aristotle  was  held  in  such  honour,  that  whoever 


188  THEOLOGICAL  LOGICIANS. 

had  disputed  his  authority  would  have  been  condemned 
at  Cologne  as  a  rank  heretic ;  but  that  he  was  so  little 
understood,  that  a  monk,  preaching  on  the  passion, 
favoured  his  hearers  with  a  two  hours'  discussion  of  the 
question,  whether  quality  were  really  distinct  from  sub- 
stance— stating  as  an  instance,  "  I  could  pass  my  head 
through  that  hole,  but  not  the  size  of  my  head." 

The  cumbersome  forms  and  quaint  language  of  the 
dialectic  system  annoyed  Luther  not  a  little.  He  says, 
"  The  most  celebrated  and  best  school  is  at  Paris,  in 
France.  It  has  twenty  thousand  students  and  upwards. 
The  theologians  there  have  the  pleasantest  spot  in  the 
whole  city,  being  a  street  to  themselves,  with  gates  at 
each  end :  it  is  called  the  Sorbonne — a  name  derived,  I 
fancy,  from  the  fruit  of  the  service-tree  (sorbus),  which 
grows  by  the  Dead  Sea,  and  which,  beautiful  without, 
are  only  ashes  within.  Even  so  the  university  of  Paris 
shows  a  goodly  multitude,  but  is  the  mother  of  many 
errors.  In  disputing,  they  bawl  like  drunken  peasants 
in  Latin  and  French,  so  that  the  auditors  are  obliged 
to  stamp  with  their  feet  to  silence  them.  Before  one 
can  take  one's  degree  as  doctor  of  theology,  one  is 
obliged  to  have  been  a  student  of  their  sophistical  and 
futile  logic  for  ten  years.  The  respondent  must  sit  a 
whole  day,  and  dispute  with  every  comer,  from  six  in 
the  morning  to  six  in  the  evening."  "  If  I  were  to 
write  a  treatise  on  logic,  I  would  reject  every  foreign 
word,  as  proposition  syllogismus,  enthemena,  exemplum, 
&c,  and  give  them  German  synonyms."  "  Aristotle, 
Porphyry,  the  theologians  of  the  sentences — these  are 
the  unprofitable  study  of  this  age.  I  desire  nothing 
more  ardently  than  to  lay  open  before  all  eyes  this  false 


LUTHER.  189 

system,  which  has  tricked  the  church  by  covering  itself 
with  a  Greek  mask,  and  to  expose  its  worthlessness 
before  the  world."  "  If  the  syllogistic  method  were 
applicable  to  divine  things,  the  doctrine  of  the  Holy 
Trinity  would  be  '  known/  and  not  '  believed.'  ' 
"Aristotle  is  to  theology  as  darkness  to  light." 

Luther  had  studied  logic  under  Justus  Jodocus 
of  Eisenach,  or,  as  he  is  commonly  called,  Dr  Eisenach, 
a  monk,  and  the  author  of  two  works,  Summa  Totius 
Logicce,  1501,  and  Epitome  seu  JBreviarium  Dialectics. 
Luther  seems  to  have  entertained  a  great  affection  for 
his  master ;  but  the  latter  felt  deeply  concerned  at  the 
former's  reproachful  and  unqualified  denunciations  of 
the  scholastic  system — a  system  which  appeared,  in  the 
doctor's  eyes,  as  the  sum  and  substance  of  all  real 
knowledge  and  learning.  And  it  is  affirmed,  that  so 
much  did  he  take  the  matter  to  heart,  that  his  death 
was  hastened,  if  not  actually  produced,  by  the  opinions 
and  sentiments  of  the  great  reformer  on  this  subject. 

In  Luther's  letters  we  find  these  differences  between 
his  logical  tutor  and  himself  often  alluded  to.  In  an 
epistle,  addressed  to  Spalatin,  there  is  a  remarkable 
passage  containing  his  opinion  of  the  school  logic  in 
reference  to  theology ;  and  so  important  are  his  state- 
ments, that  although  the  passage  is  long,  I  cannot 
refrain  from  quoting  it,  because  it  embodies  in  fact, 
and  in  very  clear  terms,  some  of  the  leading  philoso- 
phical difficulties  which  lie  in  the  way  between  this 
logical  system  and  revealed  truth. 

"  You  ask,"  says  Luther,  "  how  far  I  think  dialectic 
is  useful  to  theology ;  verily  I  do  not  see  how  it  can  be 
other  than  poison  to  a  true  divine.     Grant  that  it  may 


190  THEOLOGICAL  LOGICIANS. 

be  useful  as  a  sport  or  exercise  for  youthful  minds,  still 
in  sacred  letters,  where  simple  faith  and  divine  illumi- 
nation are  to  be  awaited,  the  whole  matter  of  the  syllo- 
gism is  to  be  left  below,  even  as  Abraham,  when  about 
to  sacrifice,  left  the  youth  with  the  asses.  And  this, 
John  Eeuchlin,  in  the  second  book  of  his  Cabbala, 
sufficiently  confirms.  For  if  any  dialectic  be  necessary, 
that  given  by  nature  is  enough,  by  which  a  man  is  led 
to  compare  one  belief  with  another,  and  so  to  arrive  at 
the  truth.  I  have  not  unfrequently  engaged  in  discus- 
sions with  my  friends  as  to  the  profit  to  be  gained  from 
this  so  sedulous  study  of  philosophy  and  dialectic ;  and 
truly  with  one  consent  we  have  marvelled  at,  yea  be- 
wailed over,  the  calamity  of  minds  finding  in  these 
studies  no  help,  but  rather  a  whole  flood  of  hinderance. 
"  Finally,  I  have  written  to  Dr  Isenach,  the  prince 
of  dialecticians  (as  it  seems)  in  this  age,  insisting  most 
strongly  on  the  same  thing,  which  indeed  cannot  be 
denied ;  to  wit,  that  dialectic  cannot  help  theology,  but 
rather  hinders  it,  because  the  same  grammatical  terms 
are  used  in  a  widely  different  sense  in  theology  and  in 
logic.  How,  therefore,  I  say,  can  dialectic  be  of  any 
use,  when,  after  "I  enter  on  theology,  the  same  term 
which  in  logic  signified  such  a  thing,  I  am  compelled 
to  reject,  and  to  receive  in  another  sense  ?  And,  that  I 
may  not  multiply  words,  take  for  example  the  follow- 
ing : — Body,  in  the  tree  of  Porphyry,  signifies  a  thing 
made  up  of  matter  and  form;  but  such  body  cannot 
belong  to  man,  seeing  that  in  the  Scriptures  our  body 
signifies  matter  only,  not  also  form;  as  where  it  is  said, 
'  Fear  not  them  which  kill  the  body,  but  are  not  able 
to  kill  the  soul.'     Farther,  I  instance  the  absurd  state- 


MELANCTHON.  191 

merit,  that  an  angel  is  neither  rational  nor  irrational ; 
as  also,  that  it  is  of  no  use  to  the  Scriptures  for  a  man  to 
be  called  sensitive,  rational,  corporeal,  animated;  and 
briefly,  the  whole  of  that  arrangement  of  the  tree  of 
Porphyry,  I  have  said,  and  still  say,  is  more  trivial 
than  an  old  woman's  fancy  or  a  sick  man's  dream,  and 
justly,  therefore,  is  it  called  Porphyrean  (that  is, 
bloody),  from  the  Christian  souls,  to  wit,  which  it  has 
slain. 

"  The  good  man  took  it  much  to  heart,  and  affirmed 
that  my  sophisms  could  not  be  credited  even  by  my- 
self. But  these  worthies  are  the  bondmen  of  Aristotle 
and  Porphyry,  and  consider  not  what  is  said,  but 
simply  who  says  it.  Hence  it  comes  that  they  are  not 
able  to  understand  a  single  chapter  of  Scripture,  much 
less  to  render  it."* 

Melancthon's  antipathy  to  the  scholastic  logic  was 
not  so  bitter  as  that  of  Luther's ;  but  he  by  no  means 
entertained  a  very  high  opinion  of  its  merits.  Speak- 
ing in  general  terms  he  says,  "  It  was,  however,  the 
prevalent  opinion,  that  logical  philosophy  was  to  be 
pursued  merely  in  subservience  to  theological  disputa- 
tion, and  to  furnish  weapons  for  controversy.  [Nothing 
but  abstruse  and  subtle  questions  were  proposed,  which 
generated  a  war  of  words.  It  was  characteristic  of  the 
scholastic  philosophy  to  display  all  possible  ingenuity 
in  reasoning  about  nothing,  or  nothing  better  than  the 
merest  trifles.  Dialectics  were  employed  not  to  assist 
the  understanding  in  the  search  for  truth,  which  is  their 

*  Luther's  Briefe,  Ed.  De  Wette,  vol.  i.  See  also  Baynes,  "  On  the  New 
Analytic  of  Logical  Forms,"  Appendix,  pp.  108-113,  from  which  this  extract  is 
taken. 


192  THEOLOGICAL  LOGICIANS. 

only  legitimate  application,  but  to  perplex  what  was 
plain,  to  distinguish  what  did  not  differ,  and  to  entangle 
the  mind  in  a  labyrinth  of  inexplicable  absurdities. 
The  topics  of  discussion  were  intention  and  remission, 
proportion  and  degree,  infinity,  formality,  quiddity, 
individuality,  and  others  equally  intelligible  and  edify- 
ing !  Aristotle  was  considered  as  having  reached  the 
utmost  limit  of  human  knowledge — a  convenient  opin- 
ion, it  must  be  admitted,  for  those  who  were  desirous 
of  being  spared  the  trouble  of  thinking  or  examining 
for  themselves ;  and  so  preposterous  was  their  attach- 
ment to  this  heathen  oracle,  that  they  blasphemed  the 
great  Teacher  of  the  world  by  publicly  reading  to  the 
people  in  sacred  assemblies  the  Ethics  of  Aristotle,  in- 
stead of  the  Gospel  of  Christ  I"  * 

Melancthon's  opinions  underwent,  however,  a  change 
as  to  the  Peripatetic  system.  He  conceived  that  it 
was  not,  in  its  general  tenor,  so  inimical  to  the  Chris- 
tian faith  as  Luther  conceived.  Melancthon  says,  "  I 
will  add  something  concerning  philosophy,  and  the 
reasons  for  believing  that  of  Aristotle  to  be  the  most 
useful  for  the  church.  It  is  agreed,  I  think,  by  all, 
that  logic  is  of  prime  importance,  because  it  teaches 
method  and  order ;  it  defines  fitly,  divides  justly,  con- 
nects aptly,  judges  and  separates  monstrous  associa- 
tions. Those  who  are  ignorant  of  this  art,  tear  and 
mangle  the  subjects  of  discourse  as  puppies  do  rags.  I 
admire  the  simile  of  Plato,  who  highly  extols  it  as  re- 
sembling the  fire  which  Prometheus  brought  from 
heaven,  to  kindle  a  light  in  the  minds  of  men  by  which 
they  might  be  able  to  form  correct  ideas.    But  he  does 

*  Melanc.  Apol  ,  p.  62. 


MELANCTHON,  ETC.  193 

not  furnish  us  with  the  precepts  of  the  art,  so  that  we 
cannot  dispense  with  the  logic  of  Aristotle.  That  of 
the  Stoics  is  not  extant ;  and,  instead  of  being  a  simple 
method  of  reasoning  fit  for  the  explanation  of  profound 
subjects,  it  appears  to  have  been  a  complete  labyrinth 
of  intricacies,  and,  in  fact,  a  mere  corruption  of  the 
art."* 

The  two  chief  ends  which  Melancthon  proposed  to 
himself  in  compiling  his  two  treatises  on  logic,  was  to 
shorten  the  student's  passage  to  a  knowledge  of  the 
science,  and  to  guide  and  direct  him  through  the  chan- 
nel of  religious  sentiment  and  doctrine.  His  contem- 
poraries give  him  credit  for  the  accomplishment  of  both 
these  purposes.  And  what  was  Melancthon's  object  in 
this  respect,  was  alike  the  object  which  all  the  most 
active  continental  reformers  had  in  view.  They  wished 
to  avail  themselves  of  whatever  was  rational  and  sound 
in  the  old  logic ;  but  at  the  same  time  cultivating  an 
acquaintance  with  it  through  the  medium  of  more 
comprehensive  and  liberal  principles  of  philosophical 
inquiry  than  those  adopted  by  the  generality  of  the 
schoolmen. 

The  professors  of  logic  in  most  of  the  Protestant 
colleges  and  universities,  adopted  the  dialectic  views  of 
Melancthon.  The  most  eminent  among  these  were 
Simon  Simonius,  Philip  Scherbius,  Ernest  Sonner, 
Michel  Picart,  Christ.  Scheible,  Cornelius  Martini, 
Daniel  Stahl,  James  Schegk,  Conrad  Hornejus,  Christ. 
Dreyer,  Hermann  Conring,  and  Melchior  Ziedler. 

The  Eeformation  effected  in  our  own  country  a  great 
change  in  logical  pursuits  and  studies.     In  England, 

*  Orat.  de  Aristotle. 


194  THEOLOGICAL  LOGICIANS. 

though  the  syllogistic  method  was  still  preserved,  yet 
there  crept  into  all  the  seminaries  of  learning  grave 
doubts  as  to  its  value  and  importance  as  a  general 
branch  of  academical  education.  These  doubts  in  the 
course  of  time  gradually  weaned  the  minds  of  the 
learned  from  logical  studies  of  any  kind ;  and,  speaking 
with  considerable  latitude  of  meaning,  this  has  been 
the  prevailing  state  of  feeling,  in  this  part  of  the  island, 
from  the  first  dawn  of  Protestant  opinions  till  the  pre- 
sent hour. 

In  the  report  of  the  visitation  of  Oxford,  ordered  by 
Henry  VIII.  in  1535,  we  find  the  scholastic  system  of 
logic  treated  with  great  contempt.  The  king  himself 
had  indeed  been  at  one  time  a  zealous  admirer  of 
Thomas  Aquinas ;  but,  after  his  rupture  with  the  Eoman 
see,  the  schoolmen  had  but  few  merits  in  his  estimation. 

In  Scotland  the  case  was  somewhat  different.  Here 
the  clergy  took  up  the  scholastic  logic  with  great  zeal 
and  earnestness,  and  considered  its  general  bearings  on 
theological  doctrines  nearly  in  the  same  light  as  their 
Protestant  brethren  on  the  continent.  Andrew  Mel- 
ville, as  we  have  already  seen,  introduced  the  logic  of 
Eamus  into  the  university  of  Glasgow  in  the  latter  part 
of  the  sixteenth  century.  James  Melville,  his  brother, 
was  appointed  professor  of  logic  when  Andrew  left  for 
St  Andrews.  John  Eutherford  was  one  of  the  distin- 
guished logicians  in  Scotland  at  this  period.  He  was 
a  native  of  Jedburgh,  in  Eoxburghshire,  but  had  been 
educated  in  France.  He  became  principal  of  St  Sal- 
vator's  college  at  St  Andrews,  His  work  on  the  Art  of 
Reasoning*  is  considered  as  one  which  decidedly  marks 

*  Comment,  de  Arte  Disserendi.     Edin.  1577. 


JOHN  RUTHERFORD.  195 

the  progress  of  sound  knowledge  in  his  own  country. 
It  is  founded  on  the  system  of  Aristotle,  but  differed  in 
some  essential  particulars.  "  Treading  in  the  steps  of 
his  master  De  Grouchi,  Rutherford  rejected  the  errors 
into  which  the  ancient  commentators  upon  Aristotle 
had  fallen,  and  discarded  many  of  the  frivolous  ques- 
tions which  the  modern  dialecticians  do  so  much  de- 
light in  discussing."  * 

The  university  of  St  Andrews  is  the  earliest,  and  for 
a  long  period  was  the  most  distinguished,  academical 
institution  in  Scotland.  Its  foundation  dates  from 
1411,  and  its  educational  functions  were  classified  under 
the  title  of  a  general  study.  Prior  to  this  period  there 
was  no  university  in  Scotland ;  and  those  who  were 
destined  to  follow  the  learned  professions,  had  to  seek 
their  education  in  foreign  countries.  The  university 
was  modelled  from  those  of  Paris  and  Bologna.  Soon 
after  its  foundation,  logic  was  regularly  taught  by  lec- 
tures ;  and  all  graduates  had  to  send  in  a  petition 
stating  their  knowledge  of  the  text  of  Aristotle.  The 
regent  assembled  his  class  three  hours  every  day, — 
reading  and  explaining  the  books  of  the  Stagy  rite, 
which  the  students  were  bound  to  bring  with  them. 
The  first  course  began  with  dialectics  or  logic ;  and 
then  followed  ethics,  physics,  metaphysics,  and  ma- 
thematics. To  exercise  the  students  in  the  art  of 
argumentation,  there  were  regular  days  appointed  for 
public  disputations.*)-    In  the  early  part  of  the  sixteenth 

*  M'Crie's  Life  of  Melville. 

+  "  We  hard  the  Oration  pro  rege  Deitaro.  Than  he  gaiff  ws  a  compend  of  his 
awin  of  Philosopi  and  the  partes  yr  of.  We  enterit  in  the  Organ  of  Arist.  y*  year, 
and  leirnit  to  the  Demonstrations.  The  secund  yeir  of  my  course  we  had  the  Demon- 
strations, the  Topiks,  and  the  Sophist  captiones." — James  Melville's  Diary,  p.  22. 


196  THEOLOGICAL  LOGICIANS. 

century  logical  studies  underwent  a  change.  There 
was  a  dissatisfaction  manifested  at  the  unprofitableness 
of  the  Aristotelian  system  generally ;  and  it  was  en- 
acted that  "  the  most  profitable  and  needful  parts  only 
of  the  logic  of  the  Stagyrite  should  be  insisted  on ;  and 
that  there  should  be  likewise  lectures  on  the  Platonic 
philosophy,  in  order  to  counterbalance  in  some  measure 
the  formal  and  deadening  effect  of  Peripateticism. 
This  alteration  was  hailed  by  the  liberal  part  of  the 
university  with  great  pleasure.  Melville  is  generally 
considered  as  having  been  the  chief  instrument  in 
effecting  this  reformation.* 

It  would  appear,  however,  that  this  modification  of 
the  scholastic  logic  was  not  well  received  by  many  of 
the  more  bigoted  portions  of  the  university;  and 
Melville  came  in  for  his  full  share  of  the  obloquy  thrown 
on  the  innovators.")-  "  Disregarding  the  ignorant  cla- 
mour and  interested  alarm  which  had  been  excited,  he 
persisted  in  the  course  which  he  had  taken ;  and,  when 
the  subject  was  introduced  in  the  public  meetings  of 
the  university,  at  vacations  and  promotions,  he  refuted 
the  arguments  of  his  opponents  with  such  readiness, 
force  of  reasoning,  and  overpowering  eloquence,  as  re- 
duced them  to  silence.  Before  he  had  been  two  years 
at  St  Andrews,  a  favourable  change  was  visible  on  the 
university.  Many  of  those  who  were  most  strongly 
prejudiced  against  the  new  learning,  as  they  called  it, 
were  induced  to  apply  to  the  acquisition  of  languages  ; 
instead  of  boasting  perpetually  of  the  authority  of  Aris- 


*  Melville's  Diary,  pp.  58,  64. 

f  "Their  breadwinner,  their  honor,  their  estimation,  all  was  guan,  giff  Aristotle 
should  be  so  owirharled  in  the  hairing  of  their  shollars." — James  Melville's  Diary, 


MYSTICAL  LOGICIANS.  197 

totle,  and  quoting  him  ignorantly  at  second-hand,  they 
perused  his  writings  in  the  original,  studied  the  arts  for 
purposes  of  real  utility,  and  not  for  show  and  verbal 
contention ;  and,  becoming  real  philosophers  and  theo- 
logians, acknowledged  that  they  had  undergone  "  a 
wonderful  transportation  out  of  darkness  into  light."  * 

MYSTICAL  LOGICIANS. 

The  mystical  logicians  of  this  period  of  history 
scarcely  differ  from  those  of  their  sect  in  former  times, 
save,  perhaps,  by  their  somewhat  greater  extravagance 
and  love  of  paradox.  It  must  always,  however,  be 
taken  into  consideration,  that  there  are  every  degree 
of  mysticism,  from  the  overheated  zeal  for  grand  and 
noble  principles,  to  absolute  folly  and  conceit.  Where 
the  mystical  spirit  begins,  and  the  rational  terminates, 
is  often  a  very  nice  and  difficult  question  to  solve. 
Mysticism  is  unquestionably  a  phase  of  the  intuitive, 
but  a  phase  embodying  more  or  less  of  a  lofty  reli- 
gious feeling. 

Nicolas  de  Cusa  (a.  d.  1401)  was  born  at  Treves, 
and  was  a  philosophical  logician  of  some  note  in  his 
day.  He  maintained  that  the  reasoning  faculty  of 
man  only  develops  itself  through  the  instrumentality 
of  ideas  of  number;  which  ideas  are  its  constituent 
elements.  Human  nature,  considered  in  all  its  fulness, 
is  simply  that  which  belongs  to  man  as  man ;  and 
every  movement  of  this  nature,  in  its  argumentative 
phases,  is  solely  for  the  attainment  of  God  in  man.f 

*  M'Crie's  Life  of  Andrew  Melville,  vol.  i.  p.  259. 
t  Opera,  Paris,  1514. 


198  MYSTICAL  LOGICIANS. 

Paracelsus  (a.  d.  1493)  denied  there  was  any  active 
or  spontaneous  power  in  the  reason ;  it  was  entirely 
passive.  All  science  lies,  as  it  were,  in  the  depths  of 
the  human  intellect,  in  the  same  manner  as  we  con- 
ceive it  lies  in  the  mind  of  the  Deity.  No  formal 
reasonings  can  develop  it ;  but  man  must  retire  into 
himself,  and  then  he  will  recognise  the  truth  by  a 
species  of  divine  illumination,  to  obtain  which  prayer 
is  the  means,  and  purity  of  heart  an  indispensable 
condition. 

Yan  Helmont  (a.  d.  1577)  adopts  nearly  the  same 
theory  as  that  of  Paracelsus  as  to  the  nature  of  evi- 
dence. The  former  enters,  however,  more  fully  than 
the  latter  into  the  nature  of  logical  science,  and  mi- 
nutely examines  its  methods,  in  order  to  shew  their 
complete  insufficiency  for  leading  us  to  the  fountain  of 
truth.  He  maintains  that  the  several  relations  which 
subsist  between  the  terms  of  a  syllogism,  exist  in  our 
minds  prior  to  the  conclusion  we  draw  from  them ; 
and  therefore  all  syllogistic  modes  of  argumentation 
are  nothing  more  than  a  bare  repetition  of  anterior 
notions,  the  only  uses  of  which  are  that  of  facilitating 
an  exposition  of  the  ideas  of  a  speaker,  and  of  aiding 
the  recollection  of  them  on  the  part  of  the  hearer. 
All  science  has  an  independent  existence  apart  from 
demonstration ;  and  the  only  way  of  realizing  its  con- 
clusions and  principles  is  by  intuition.  Sound  reason- 
ing or  knowledge  depends  upon  the  entire  annihilation 
of  every  intellectual  operation. 

Jacob  Bohme  (a.  r>.  1578)  maintained,  that  it  was 
impossible  for  any  man  to  arrive  at  truth  by  any  other 
means  than  by  a  direct  illumination  from  heaven.     At 


JACOB  BOHME,  ETC.  199 

the  same  period  with  Bohme,  Fred.  Aug.  Frankonius 
flourished  in  Sweden  as  a  mystical  logician.  He 
taught  that  every  ordinary  truth  was  a  direct  scintilla- 
tion from  the  Divine  mind,  and  that  in  the  acquire- 
ment of  science  men  were  entirely  the  instruments  in 
the  hands  of  Providence,  who  meted  out  such  portions 
of  general  intelligence  as  suited  the  ends  and  purposes 
of  the  times.  George  Stjernhjelm,  a  few  years  after, 
followed  in  his  wake  with  nearly  the  same  class  of 
dogmas.  John  Buraens  also,  a  Swedish  writer,  illus- 
trated the  nature  of  scientific  truth  through  the 
medium  of  the  doctrines  of  Zoroaster. 


200  ON  THE  NOVUM  ORGAN  CM, 


CHAPTEE  IX. 

ON  THE  NOVUM  ORGANUM,  OR  BACONIAN  LOGIC. 

One  of  the  great  landmarks  of  logic,  considered  in  its 
philosophical  bearings,  is  the  Novum  Organum  of  Lord 
Bacon.  It  gave  a  new  and  powerful  impetus  to  logi- 
cal investigations.  We  have  seen,  in  several  of  the 
preceding  chapters,  how  theories  of  reasoning  fluc- 
tuated from  Plato  to  Aristotle,  and  from  Aristotle  to 
Plato;  but  it  was  reserved  for  his  lordship  to  with- 
draw the  scientific  world  from  these  distinguished 
names,  and  fix  its  attention  almost  exclusively  on  him- 
self, and  that  mode  of  investigation  and  inquiry  which 
he  has  so  carefully  pointed  out,  in  the  celebrated  work 
now  before  us. 

It  would  be  altogether  unnecessary,  in  a  treatise  of 
this  nature,  to  do  any  thing  more  than  give  a  very 
concise  outline  of  the  nature  and  scope  of  the  Novum 
Organum  for  general  purposes.  The  Baconian  method, 
or  logic,  as  his  lordship's  work  is  often  called,  has 
been  a  standard  topic  of  discussion  for  more  than  two 
centuries  in  every  country  in  Europe,  and  has  elicited 
various,  and  somewhat  conflicting,  opinions  on  its  real 


OR  BACONIAN  LOGIC.  201 

nature  and  importance.  Indeed,  these  are  by  no  means 
agreed  on  at  the  present  hour.  But  to  state  the  dis- 
cussion fully,  and  give  all  the  arguments  for  and 
against,  would  require  many  volumes ;  consequently 
the  reader  must,  on  the  present  occasion,  content  him- 
self with  our  brief  notice,  however  limited  or  imperfect 
it  may  appear.  Should  he  require  mure  lengthened 
statements,  there  are  plenty  to  be  had  in  all  languages, 
and  at  a  very  trifling  cost  of  either  money  ur  trouble. 

The  great  object  of  the  Novum  Organum  is  pointed 
out  by  his  lordship  in  the  following  words: — "  But 
whence,"  says  he,  "  can  arise  such  vagueness  and 
sterility  in  all  the  physical  systems  which  have  hitherto 
existed  in  the  world?  It;  is  not  certainly  from  any 
thing  in  nature  itself ;  for  the  steadiness  and  regularity 
of  the  laws  by  which  it  is  governed,  clearly  mark 
them  out  as  objects  of  certain  and  precise  knowledge. 
Neither  can  it  arise  from  any  want  of  ability  in  those 
who  have  pursued  such  inquiries,  many  uf  whom  have 
been  men  of  the  highest  talents  and  genius  of  the  ages 
in  which  they  lived;  and  it  can  therefore  arise  from 
nothing  else  but  the  perverseness  and  insufficiency  of 
the  methods  that  have  been  pursued.  Men  have  sought 
to  make  a  world  from  their  own  conceptions,  and  to 
draw  from  their  own  minds  all  the  materials  which 
they  employed ;  but  if,  instead  of  doing  this,  they  had 
consulted  experience  and  observation,  they  would  have 
had  facts  and  not  opinions  to  reason  about,  and  might 
have  ultimately  arrived  at  the  knowledge  of  the  laws 
which  govern  the  material  world. 

"  As  things  are  at  present  conducted,"  he  adds,  "a 


202  ON  THE  NOVUM  ORGANUM, 

sudden  transition  is  made  from  sensible  objects  and 
particular  facts  to  general  propositions,  which  are 
accounted  principles,  and  round  which,  as  round  so 
many  fixed  poles,  disputation  and  argument  continually 
revolve.  From  the  propositions  thus  hastily  assumed, 
all  things  are  derived  by  a  process  compendious  and 
precipitate — ill  suited  to  discovery,  but  wonderfully 
accommodated  to  debate.  The  way  that  promises 
success  is  the  reverse  of  this.  It  requires  we  should 
generalize  slowly,  going  from  particular  things  to  those 
that  are  but  one  step  more  general;  from  these  to 
others  of  greater  extent;  and  so  on  to  such  as  are 
universal.  By  such  means  we  may  hope  to  arrive  at 
principles,  not  vague  and  obscure,  but  luminous  and 
well  defined,  such  as  nature  herself  will  not  refuse  to 
acknowledge." 

The  Novum  Organum  consists  of  two  leading  parts. 
The  first  is  that  which  the  author  thought  was  fitted 
to  prepare  the  mind  for  the  full  development  of  the 
inductive  process.  The  first  aphorism  of  the  first  book 
embraces,  in  fact,  his  whole  theory  of  reasoning — 
"  Man,  the  servant  and  interpreter  of  nature,  does  and 
understands  only  so  far  as  he  may  have  observed  by  sense, 
or  mentally,  of  the  order  of  nature — beyond  this  he  neither 
knows  nor  can  know." 

The  divers  modes  in  which  men  are  led  from  the 
true  method  of  interpreting  nature,  Bacon  classifies 
under  the  head  of  idols.  In  the  thirty-ninth  aphorism 
of  the  first  book,  he  states  that  "  There  are  four  kinds 
of  idols  (or  false  images)  which  beset  the  mind  of 
man.     To  these,  for  instruction,  we  have  given  names, 


OR  BACONIAN  LOGIC.  203 

calling  the  first  kind  Idols  of  the  Tribe;  the  second, 
Idols  of  the  Cave ;  the  third,  Idols  of  the  Forum ;  the 
fourth,  Idols  of  the  Theatre. 

"  The  excitation  of  notions  and  axioms  by  true  in- 
duction, is  certainly  the  fit  remedy  for  discharge  and 
removal  of  idols  ;  and  yet  an  indication  of  the  idols  is 
of  much  profit,  for  the  doctrine  concerning  idols  has  a 
like  regard  to  the  interpretation  of  nature,  as  the  doc- 
trine concerning  sophistical  confutations  has  to  the 
common  logic. 

"  Idols  of  the  Tribe  are  planted  in  the  human  nature 
itself,  and  in  the  very  tribe  or  nation  of  mankind. 
For  it  is  untruly  asserted,  that  human  sense  is  the 
measure  of  things — nay,  contrariwise,  all  the  percep- 
tions, whether  of  sense  or  mind,  are  from  analogy  of 
man,  not  from  analogy  of  the  universe ;  and  the  human 
intellect  is  like  an  uneven  mirror  to  the  rays  of  things, 
which  mingles  its  own  nature  with  the  nature  of  things, 
and  distorts  and  corrupts  it. 

"  Idols  of  the  Cave  are  idols  of  the  individual  man. 
For  every  one,  besides  aberrations  of  the  human 
nature  in  kind,  has  a  den  also,  or  certain  individual 
cave,  which  breaks  or  vitiates  the  light  of  nature — 
either  through  the  peculiar  and  individual  nature  of 
any  one — or  through  his  education  and  converse  with 
others — or  through  his  reading  of  books,  and  authorities 
of  those  he  studies  and  admires — or  through  differences 
of  impressions,  as  they  happen  in  a  mind  pre-occupied 
and  pre-disposed,  or  in  one  equal  and  sedate — and  the 
like.  So  that  plainly  the  human  spirit  (as  it  is  disposed 
in  several  men)  is  an  inconstant  thing,  and  every  way 
disordered,  and,  as  it  were,  casual.     Hence  Heraclitus 


204  ON  THE  NOVUM  OROANUM, 

has  it  well,  that  men  seek  for  knowledge  in  their  own 
little  worlds,  and  not  in  the  great  and  common  world. 

"  There  are  idols,  too,  as  if  by  agreement  and  mutual 
confederacy  of  the  human  kind — which,  on  account  of 
the  commerce  and  consort  of  men,  we  call  Idols  of  the 
market-place  or  Forum.  For  mankind  associate  by 
discourse ;  but  words  are  imposed  from  the  apprehen- 
sion of  the  vulgar.  Accordingly,  the  evil  and  foolish 
imposition  of  words  besets  the  intellect  in  strange  ways. 
Neither  do  the  definitions  or  explications,  by  which 
learned  men  have  been  used  to  fortify  and  clear  them- 
selves in  some,  at  all  retrieve  the  matter.  But  words 
plainly  put  a  force  upon  the  intellect,  and  trouble  all 
things,  and  draw  men  away  to  idle  and  numberless 
controversies  and  fictions. 

"  There  are  idols,  lastly,  which  have  immigrated  into 
the  minds  of  men  from  the  sundry  dogmas  of  philoso- 
phy, and  even  from  perverted  laws  of  demonstrations — 
and  these  we  call  Idols  of  the  Theatre;  because,  as 
many  philosophies  as  have  been  received  or  invented, 
we  count  so  many  fables  produced  and  acted,  which 
have  furnished  fictitious  and  scenic  worlds.  Neither 
do  we  talk  only  of  the  present,  or  even  ancient  philoso- 
phies and  sects,  since  many  other  such  fables  may  be 
framed  and  compacted;  for  of  errors  wholly  different 
the  causes  are  yet  nearly  common.  Nor,  again,  do  we 
understand  this  only  of  universal  or  entire  philosophies, 
but  of  the  many  principles  also,  and  axioms  of  science 
which  have  grown  to  strength  from  tradition,  and 
trust,  and  negligence.  But  of  these  several  sorts  of 
idols,  we  are  to  speak  more  at  large,  and  separately,  for 
caution  of  the  human  intellect." 


OR  BACONIAN  LOGIC.  205 

Such  is  the  description  which  Bacon  gives  of  his 
Idols.  His  further  illustration  of  them  occupies  nearly 
the  entire  portion  of  the  first  book  of  the  Novum  Or- 
ganum.  The  second  part  is  devoted  to  a  more  extended 
development  of  his  method  of  studying  nature.  Here 
his  matter  becomes  more  philosophical,  if  we  may  so 
term  it,  although  more  abstruse.  His  designations 
may  be  divided  into  three  portions, — 1st,  The  discovery 
of  forms ;  2nd,  Tables  to  illustrate  this  discovery ;  and, 
3d,  The  doctrine  of  instances. 

What  Bacon  meant  by  forms  is  extremely  difficult  to 
say.  He  gives  us  the  following,  among  several  defini- 
tions of  the  word  : — "  When  we  speak  of  forms,  we 
understand  nothing  more  than  those  laws  and  modes 
of  action  which  regulate  and  constitute  any  simple 
nature — such  as  heat,  light,  weight,  in  all  kinds  of 
matter  susceptible  of  them ;  so  that  the  form  of  heat, 
or  the  form  of  light,  and  the  law  of  heat,  and  the  law 
of  light,  are  the  same  thing,  nor  do  we  ever  lose  sight 
of  praticce  and  things  as  they  are."  * 

The  tables  which  he  gives  as  illustrative  of  the  in- 
ductive method  of  reasoning,  are  taken  from  his  Sylva 
Sylvarum,  or,  A  Natural  History  in  Ten  Centuries. 
Many  of  the  materials  in  this  section  of  his  work  will 
not  bear  the  examination  of  modern  science.  And  the 
same  thing  may  be  stated  in  reference  to  his  doctrine  of 
instances,  or  facts  illustrative  of  the  discovery  of  forms. 

*  This  word  form  has  cut  a  great  figure  in  all  logical  systems,  from  Plato  down- 
wards.   Butler  makes  Hudibras  say,  that  he 

"  profess'd 

He  had  first  matter  seen  undrest, 
And  found  it  naked  and  alone, 
Before  one  rag  of  form  was  on." 


206  ON  THE  NOVUM  ORGANUM, 

We  must  here,  however,  refer  the  reader  to  the  Novum 
Organum  itself  as  a  justification  of  these  observations. 

The  Baconian  logic  proceeds  upon  the  assumption 
of  there  being  certain  laws  of  nature,  and  that  they  are 
uniform  and  stable  in  their  operation.  The  great  mat- 
ter, then,  in  all  physical  inquiries  in  particular  is,  to 
bring  the  numerous  facts  which  constitute  them  under 
general  heads  or  principles ;  and  not  to  pronounce  any 
thing  as  being  either  a  cause  or  effect  of  another  thing — 
or,  in  other  words,  as  being  a  law  of  nature — until  re- 
peated observations  satisfactorily  establish  the  fact 
beyond  all  cavil  or  dispute.  His  lordship's  system  may 
be  viewed  as  a  piece  of  general  advice,  admonishing 
philosophers  to  come  to  no  hasty  conclusions,  but  to 
leave  their  minds  open  to  the  freest  current  of  observa- 
tion and  experiment.  Nature  must  be  tested  and  in- 
terrogated; and  we  must  be  ever  on  the  watch  to 
record  accurately  and  faithfully  the  result.  We  must 
neither  generalize  too  soon  nor  too  late.  Every  thing 
must  be  well  and  properly  timed,  and  then  our  physical 
researches  will  proceed  upon  a  satisfactory  and  enlight- 
ened basis.  This  is  the  only  legitimate  way  in  which 
true  science  can  extend  her  dominion. 

His  logic  is,  then,  solely  of  a  cautionary  and  admo- 
nitory character.  It  promulgates  no  new  principle, 
because  mankind  have  uniformly  acted  upon  his  sug- 
gestions from  the  earliest  times;  but  they  have  not 
always  viewed  them  in  all  their  comprehensive  fulness 
and  import.  They  have  been  rash  and  froward  when 
they  should  have  been  calm  and  circumspect,  and  been 
fond  of  theorizing  when  they  should  have  been  simply 
observing  and  recording  facts  and  circumstances.    They 


OR  BACONIAN  LOGIC.  207 

have  too  often  hastened  to  be  wise,  and,  like  commer- 
cial aspirants  who  hasten  to  be  rich,  have  often  found 
a  snare  in  their  path.  Accurate  observation  and  cau- 
tious generalization  are  the  two  graces  which  preside 
at  his  logic  ;  and,  except  they  act  in  harmony  with  each 
other,  little  good,  in  the  way  of  promoting  sound 
knowledge,  can  be  effected.  All  theories  should  hang 
lightly  and  loosely  about  the  true  philosopher.  He 
must  ever  be  as  ready  to  entertain  a  doubt  as  to  search 
for  and  state  a  fact.  To  him  systems  must  be  mere 
terms  of  classification;  and,  when  he  sees  need,  he 
must  make  a  cheerful  surrender  of  every  theoretical 
notion,  no  matter  how  long  and  warmly  cherished,  and 
consider  himself  again  simply  as  a  recorder  of  observa- 
tions and  facts. 

Men  in  all  ages  and  degrees  of  civilisation  have  sys- 
tematized or  theorized,  and  must  ever  do  so,  whatever 
may  be  the  number  and  accuracy  of  the  facts  with 
which  they  have  to  deal ;  and  Lord  Bacon  would  un- 
doubtedly have  conferred  upon  them  a  most  invaluable 
mental  instrument,  had  he  been  able  to  lay  down  any 
general  and  uniform  principle  to  show  when  men  were 
fully  justified  in  framing  a  theory,  or  adopting  a  gene- 
ral system  of  scientific  classification  of  the  raw  materials 
of  their  knowledge.  This  would  indeed  have  been  an 
instrument  or  organon  of  immense  value.  But  the 
Baconian  logic  does  nothing  of  this  kind.  ]STotwith- 
standing  the  great  extension  of  physical  science  since 
Bacon's  time,  we  are  apparently  no  nearer  obtaining 
any  such  instrument  than  were  those  interrogators  of 
nature  who  preceded  him.  Beyond  a  general  and 
loud  proclamation  of  caution  and  circumspection  in  the 


208  ON  THE  NOVUM  OROANUM, 

construction  and  promulgation  of  general  truths  of 
science,  his  lordship's  system  does  nothing.  But  still 
the  admonitions  he  gives  are  admirable  as  far  as  they  go; 
and  he  deserves  well  of  mankind  for  bringing  them  be- 
fore their  attention  in  the  way  and  manner  he  has  done. 
The  Novum  Organum  is  founded  on  a  grand  idea — 
on  the  absolute  unity  of  all  knowledge.  This  was  by  no 
means  new ;  but  the  method  Bacon  took  to  realize  this 
unity,  differed  from  that  which  the  scholastics  adopted. 
His  mode  of  proceeding  was  the  very  opposite  of  theirs. 
He  built  his  unity  on  plurality — they  took  the  unity 
and  descended  to  particulars.  He  took  his  stand  on  a 
broad  pyramidal  basis  of  facts  and  observations,  till  he 
came  to  the  highest  point  of  knowledge,  which  is 
theology.  He  did  not  commence  with  this  vital  and 
sublime  science,  like  many  of  his  predecessors,  but 
ended  with  it.  "  It  is  the  duty,"  says  he,  "  and  virtue 
of  all  knowledge,  to  abridge  the  infinity  of  individual 
experience  as  much  as  the  conception  of  truth  will 
permit,  and  to  remedy  the  complaint  of  vita  hrevis,  ars 
long  a — which  is  performed  by  uniting  the  notions  and 
conceptions  of  sciences — for  knowledges  are  as  pyra- 
mids, whereof  history  is  the  basis.  So,  of  natural  philo- 
sophy, the  basis  is  natural  history,  the  stage  next  is 
physic,  the  stage  next  the  vertical  point  is  raetaphysic. 
As  for  the  vertical  point,  opus  quod  operatur  JDeus  a 
principio  usque  ad  finem,  we  know  not  whether  man's 
agency  can  attain  unto  it.  But  these  three  be  the 
true  stages  of  knowledge,  and  are  to  them  that  are 
depraved  no  better  than  the  giants'  hills, 

'  Ter  sunt  conati  imponere  Pelio  Ossam 
Scilicet,  atqne  Ossne  fronclosum  involvere  Olympum.' 


OR  BACONIAN  LOGIC.  209 

But  to  those  which  refer  all  things  to  the  glory  of  Grod, 
they  are  as  the  three  acclamations,  'Sancte,  Sancte, 
Sancte ; '  holy  in  the  description  or  dilatation  of  His 
works,  holy  in  the  connexion  or  concatenation  of  them, 
and  holy  in  the  union  of  them  in  a  perpetual  and  uni- 
form law." 

Again  he  says,  "  Horns  are  attributed  by  the 
ancients  to  Pan,  or  the  universe,  broad  at  the  base,  but 
tapering  to  a  point ;  for  the  whole  nature  of  things  is 
pointed  like  a  pyramid.  The  individuals  over  which 
the  base  of  nature  extends  are  infinite;  these  are 
collected  into  species,  themselves  also  numerous ;  the 
species  again  rise  into  genera;  and  these  too  again 
contract  into  classes  still  more  general,  till  all  nature 
at  last  seems  to  unite  in  one — which  is  indicated  by  the 
pyramidal  figure  of  the  horns  of  Pan  ;  and  no  wonder 
that  his  horns  strike  the  very  heavens.  For  the  lofty 
things  of  nature,  or  universal  forms,  in  some  sense  touch 
divinity;  and  therefore  that  famous  chain  of  Homer 
(the  chain,  that  is,  of  natural  causes)  was  said  to  be 
fixed  to  the  foot  of  Jupiter's  throne.  And  no  one  (as 
may  be  seen)  has  treated  of  metaphysic  and  the  eter- 
nal and  immutable  truths  of  nature,  withdrawing 
his  mind  for  a  time  from  the  flux  of  things,  without  at 
the  same  time  touching  on  natural  theology — so  ready 
and  natural  is  the  passage  from  the  vertex  of  the  pyra- 
mid to  things  divine."  * 

This  figure  of  the  pyramid  looks  tolerable  upon 
paper,  but  will  not  bear  a  minute  examination.  Men 
are  so  constituted  that  they  cannot  lay  a  broad  founda- 
tion of  inductive  science  before  they  arrive  at  any  theo- 

*  De  Augin.,  lib.  ii. 
O 


210  ON  THE  NOVUM  ORGANUM, 

logical  opinions.  The  very  contrary  is  the  course  of 
nature.  Theological,  moral,  and  mental  principles  are 
among  the  very  first  productions  or  objects  of  human 
thought,  and  the  topics  of  impassioned  interest.  This 
is  not  a  matter  of  choice,  but  necessity.  A  man  is  not 
left  at  complete  liberty  to  adopt  any  method  of  acquir- 
ing knowledge  he  may  think  proper ;  the  constitution 
of  things  does  this,  in  a  great  measure,  for  him.  2tfo 
individual  ever  did  rear  such  a  pyramid  of  knowledge 
as  Bacon  here  delineates,  nor  will  any  man  ever  do  so 
till  the  end  of  time.  The  phenomena  of  human  nature 
must,  in  a  great  degree,  be  the  first  objects  of  atten- 
tion and  generalization;  the  universal  conceptions  of 
being  and  creation  must  occupy  the  reflective  under- 
standing ;  and  the  rules  of  duty  and  obligation  form 
the  current  interchange  of  thought  between  man  and 
man,  in  even  the  most  rude  and  primitive  state  of 
existence.  The  scholastics,  whose  logical  philosophy 
the  Novum  Organum  intended  to  supersede,  had  a 
better  claim  to  consider  their  deductive  principles  as 
the  primary  staples  of  all  science  and  truth,  and  the 
first  to  be  developed  and  treated  of,  than  Bacon's  judi- 
cious interpretation  of  nature  could  lay  claim  to.  The 
scholastic  theory  had  the  ordinary  course  of  nature, 
and  the  historical  records  of  our  race,  to  support  it ;  the 
Novum  Organum,  in  its  extreme  principles,  is  a  pure 
fiction  of  the  imagination.  This  is  the  view  which  has 
been  taken  of  it  by  many  distinguished  philosophers 
on  the  continent,  and  by  some  even  in  England.  The 
idea  of  working  upward,  from  a  complete  and  accurate 
interpretation  of  nature  to  a  knowledge  of  nature's 
God,  may  seem  a  feasible  and  unexceptionable  maxim 


OR  BACONIAN  LOGIC.  211 

in  common  conversation  or  discourse ;  but  when  viewed 
as  the  keystone  to  a  logical  and  philosophical  system, 
it  cannot  fail  to  prove  both  unsatisfactory  and  mis- 
chievous. 

Perhaps  the  true  and  sole  conception  which  Bacon 
had  of  his  own  logical  system  was,  that  it  should  oper- 
ate as  a  check  upon  those  extreme  views  which  philo- 
sophers had  entertained  relative  to  human  reason. 
They  vastly  overrated  its  powers  and  capabilities  in 
working  out  the  unity  of  science.  Under  this  impres- 
sion he  wished  to  call  men  back  again  to  the  study  of 
the  material  universe,  as  a  suitable  counterpoise  to  this 
one-sided  estimation  of  the  value  of  logical  methods. 
Philosophical  logicians  were  too  apt  to  be  carried  away 
by  an  extreme  love  of  system ;  hence  he  says,  that  the 
mind  "needs  not  the  addition  of  wings,  but  rather  a 
burden  as  of  lead,  to  bar  all  leaping  and  flying."  The 
inductive  science  was  the  true  remedy  for  all  logical 
vices  springing  out  of  this  cause.  "  As  vulgar  logic," 
says  he,  "  which  governs  its  subjects  by  syllogism,  per- 
tains to  all  sciences,  and  not  to  physical  science  onlv, 
so  likewise  our  logic,  which  proceeds  by  induction, 
embraces  all." 

Lord  Bacon's  view  of  the  syllogistic  theory  was  not 
favourable  to  it.  He  says,  (i  The  logic  which  is  in  use 
avails  rather  for  establishing  and  fastening  errors  (which 
are  founded  in  vulgar  notions),  than  for  inquisition  of 

truth ;  so  it  is  hurtful  more  than  profitable." 

"  Syllogism  is  not  applied  to  the  entrances  and  rudi- 
ments of  the  sciences ;  and  to  mediate  axioms  is  applied 
in  vain,  since  it  is  by  many  degrees  unequal  to  the 
subtilty  of  nature.     Accordingly  it  binds  assent,  not 


212  ON  THE  NOVUM  ORGAN UM, 

things." "  Syllogism  consists  of  propositions, 

propositions  of  words,  words  are  the  symbols  of  notions. 
Therefore  if  notions  themselves  (which  are  the  ground 
of  the  matter)  be  confused,  and  hastily  taken  up  from 
things,  there  is  no  solidity  in  what  is  built  upon  them. 
The  only  hope,  then,  is  in  a  true  induction."  * 

These  opinions  had  a  powerful,  though  not  an  im- 
mediate effect,  upon  the  reputation  and  mode  of  teach- 
ing of  the  syllogistic  logic.  The  great  effect,  however, 
of  Lord  Bacon's  writings  on  this  branch  of  learning, 
arose  more  from  negative  or  indirect  causes,  than  from 
his  own  openly  declared  sentiments  on  the  nature  and 
offices  of  the  syllogism  itself.  He  directed  men's  minds 
into  other  channels  of  philosophic  inquiry ;  and  this 
had  the  natural  tendency  to  humble  the  lofty  preten- 
sions, and  to  call  in  question  the  general  principles,  of 
the  old  school  of  disputation.  The  influence  of  the 
Novum  Organum  in  universities,  was  long  in  being 
sensibly  felt  on  the  prescribed  modes  of  logical  tuition. 
This  is  not  to  be  wondered  at.f  Innovations  are  here 
invariably  tardy.  Adam  Smith  truly  observes — "  The 
improvements  which  have  been  made  in  several  branches 
of  philosophy  have  not,  the  greater  part  of  them,  been 
made  in  universities,  though  some  no  doubt  have.  The 
greater  part  of  universities  have  not  been  very  forward 

*  Novum  Org.,  Aph.  12,  13,  14. 

t  "  Considering  the  nature  of  the  reformation  brought  abo\it  by  Bacon,  and  view- 
ing it,  as  it  ought  to  be  viewed,  in  the  light  of  a  simple  return  to  the  principles  of 
unsophisticated  reason,  it  was  not  to  be  expected  that  any  material  addition  to  the 
rules  of  investigation,  considered  as  an  art,  could  be  made  either  by  his  immediate 
successors,  or  by  more  modern  philosophers.  The  Novum  Organum  professed  to 
accomplish  little  more  than  to  induce  men  to  reason  on  philosophical  subjects,  as 
they  are  accustomed  to  reason  in  the  ordinary  affairs  of  life ;  to  rescue  them,  in 
short,  from  the  dominion  of  art,  and  restore  them  to  the  clear  light  and  unfettered 
liberty  of  nature." — Jardiv's  Outlines  of  Phil os.  Education,  p.  152. 


OR  BACONIAN  LOGIC.  213 

to  adopt  those  improvements  after  they  were  made  ; 
and  several  of  these  learned  societies  have  chosen,  for 
a  long  period,  to  be  the  sanctuaries  in  which  exploded 
systems  and  obsolete  prejudices  found  shelter  and  pro- 
tection after  they  had  been  hunted  out  of  every  corner 
of  the  world.  In  general,  the  richest  and  best  endowed 
societies  have  been  the  slowest  in  adopting  those  im- 
provements, and  the  most  adverse  to  admit  any  con- 
siderable change  in  the  established  forms  of  education. 
Those  improvements  were  more  easily  introduced  into 
some  of  the  poorer  universities,  in  which  the  teachers, 
depending  upon  their  reputation  for  the  greatest  part 
of  their  subsistence,  were  obliged  to  pay  attention  to 
the  current  opinions  of  the  world."  * 

The  different  views  which  have  been  taken  of  the 
nature  and  value  of  the  Baconian  method  of  induction 
have  been  various,  though  on  the  whole  flattering.  The 
late  Professor  Napier,  in  a  paper  read  to  the  Eoyal 
Society  of  Edinburgh,  and  inserted  in  its  published 
Transactions,  has  given  a  very  graphic  and  full  account 
of  the  influence  which  the  Novum  Organum  exercised 
over  the  minds  of  the  learned  in  every  country  in 
Europe  soon  after  its  publication.  This  influence  seems 
to  have  been  great  beyond  ordinary  conception.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  work  has  fallen  considerably  in  philoso- 
phical admiration,  from  modern  critiques  on  its  merits 
which  have  of  recent  years  appeared  both  in  England 
and  on  the  continent.  To  enable  the  reader  to  form 
an  opinion  on  the  subject,  we  shall  furnish  him  with  a 
quotation  or  two  from  popular  writers  of  acknow- 
ledged talents  and  reputation. 

";;"  Wealth  of  Nations,  vol.  ii.  p.  258. 


214  ON  THE  NO  VUM  OR(JANUM, 

"  The  great  glory  of  literature/'  says  Hume,  "  in  this 
island,  during  the  reign  of  James,  was  Lord  Bacon.  If 
we  consider  the  variety  of  talents  displayed  by  this 
man — as  a  public  speaker,  a  man  of  business,  a  wit,  a 
courtier,  a  companion,  an  author,  a  philosopher — he  is 
justly  entitled  to  great  admiration.  If  we  consider  him 
merely  as  an  author  and  a  philosopher,  the  light  in 
which  we  view  him  at  present,  though  very  estimable, 
he  was  yet  inferior  to  his  contemporary  Galileo — per- 
haps even  to  Kepler.  Bacon  pointed  out,  at  a  distance, 
the  road  to  philosophy  ;  Galileo  both  pointed  it  out  to 
others,  and  made  himself  considerable  advances  in  it. 
The  Englishman  was  ignorant  of  geometry ;  the  Floren- 
tine revived  that  science,  excelled  in  it,  and  was  the  first 
who  applied  it,  together  with  experiment,  to  natural 
philosophy.  The  former  rejected,  with  the  most  posi- 
tive disdain,  the  system  of  Copernicus ;  the  latter  forti- 
fied it  with  new  proofs,  derived  both  from  reason  and 
the  senses.  Bacon's  style  is  stiff  and  rigid;  his  wit, 
though  often  brilliant,  is  also  often  unnatural  and  far- 
fetched. Galileo  is  a  lively  and  agreeable,  though 
somewhat  a  prolix  writer." 

"  Though  it  cannot  be  denied,"  says  Professor  Play- 
fair  in  answer  to  this,  "  that  there  is  considerable  truth 
in  these  remarks,  yet  it  seems  to  me  that  the  compari- 
son is  not  made  with  the  justness  and  discrimination 
which  might  have  been  expected  from  Hume,  who 
appears  studiously  to  have  contrasted  what  is  most 
excellent  in  Galileo  with  what  is  most  defective  in 
Bacon.  It  is  true  that  Galileo  showed  the  way  in  the 
application  of  mathematics  and  geometry  to  physical 
investigation,   and   that   the   immediate   utility  of  his 


Oil  BACONIAN  LOGIC.  215 

performance  was  greater  than  that  of  Bacon,  as  it  im- 
pressed more  movement  on  the  age  in  which  he  lived, 
example  being  always  so  much  more  powerful  than 
precept.  Bacon,  indeed,  wrote  for  an  age  more  en- 
lightened than  his  own,  and  it  was  long  before  the  full 
merit  of  his  work  was  understood.  But  though  Galileo 
was  a  geometer,  and  Bacon  unacquainted  with  the 
mathematics — though  Galileo  added  new  proofs  to  the 
system  of  the  earth's  motion  which  Bacon  rejected 
altogether — yet  it  is  certain,  I  think,  that  the  former 
has  more  followers  as  equals  in  the  world  of  science 
than  the  latter,  and  that  his  excellence,  though  so  high, 
is  less  unrivalled.  The  range  which  Bacon's  specula- 
tions embraced  was  altogether  immense.  He  cast  a 
penetrating  eye  on  the  whole  of  science,  from  its  feeblest 
and  most  infantine  state  to  that  strength  and  perfection 
from  which  it  was  then  so  remote,  and  which  it  is  per- 
haps destined  to  approach  continually,  but  never  to 
attain.  More  substitutes  might  be  found  for  Galileo 
than  for  Bacon.  More  than  one  could  be  mentioned, 
who,  in  the  place  of  the  former,  would  probably  have 
done  what  he  did ;  but  the  history  of  human  knowledge 
points  out  nobody  of  whom  it  can  be  said  that,  placed 
in  the  situation  of  Bacon,  he  would  have  done  what 
Bacon  did :  no  man  whose  prophetic  genius  would  have 
enabled  him  to  delineate  a  system  of  science  which  had 
not  yet  begun  to  exist — who  could  have  derived  the 
knowledge  of  what  ought  to  be  from  what  was  not — and 
who  could  have  become  so  rich  in  wisdom,  though  he 
received  from  his  predecessors  no  inheritance  but  their 
errors.  I  am  inclined  therefore  to  agree  with  D'Alem- 
bert,  that  when  one  considers  the  sound  and  enlarged 


216  ON  THE  NOVUM  ORGAN UM, 

views  of  this  great  man,  the  multitude  of  objects  to 
which  his  mind  was  turned,  and  the  boldness  of  his 
style,  which  unites  the  most  sublime  images  with  the 
most  rigorous  precision,  one  is  disposed  to  regard  him 
as  the  greatest,  the  most  universal,  and  the  most  elo- 
quent of  philosophers." 

"  The  vulgar  notion,"  says  Mr  Macaulay,  "  about 
Bacon,  we  take  to  be  this,  that  he  invented  a  new 
method  of  arriving  at  truth,  which  method  is  called 
Induction ;  and  that  he  detected  some  fallacy  in  the 
syllogistic  reasoning  which  had  been  in  vogue  before 
his  time.  This  notion  is  about  as  well  founded  as  that 
of  the  people  who,  in  the  middle  ages,  imagined  that 
Virgil  was  a  great  conjurer.  Many,  who  are  far  too 
well  informed  to  talk  such  extravagant  nonsense,  enter- 
tain, we  think,  incorrect  notions  as  to  what  Bacon 
really  effected  in  this  matter. 

"  The  inductive  method  has  been  practised  ever 
since  the  beginning  of  the  world  by  every  human 
being.  It  is  constantly  practised  by  the  most  ignorant 
clown,  by  the  most  thoughtless  schoolboy,  by  the  very 
child  at  the  breast.  That  method  leads  the  clown  to 
the  conclusion,  that  if  he  sows  barley  he  shall  not  reap 
wheat.  By  that  method  the  schoolboy  learns  that  a 
cloudy  day  is  the  best  for  catching  trout.  The  very 
infant,  we  imagine,  is  led  by  induction  to  effect  milk 
from  his  mother  or  nurse,  and  none  from  his  father. 

"  Not  only  is  it  not  true  that  Bacon  invented  the 
inductive  method,  but  it  is  not  true  that  he  was  the 
first  who  correctly  analysed  that  method  and  explained 
its  uses.  Aristotle  had  long  before  pointed  out  the 
absurdity  of  supposing  that  syllogistic  reasoning  could 


OK  BACONIAN  LOGIC.  217 

ever  conduct  men  to  the  discovery  of  any  new  prin- 
ciple ;  had  shown  that  such  discoveries  must  be  made 
by  induction,  and  by  induction  alone ;  and  had  given 
the  history  of  the  inductive  process,  concisely  indeed, 
but  with  great  perspicuity  and  precision."  * 

"  The  Baconian  logic/'  says  Mr  Hallam,  "  deduces 
universal  principles  from  select  observation ;  that  is, 
from  particular,  and,  in  some  cases  of  experiment,  from 
singular  instances,  It  may  easily  appear  to  one  con- 
versant with  the  syllogistic  method  less  legitimate  than 
the  old  induction,  which  proceeded  by  an  exhaustive 
enumeration  of  particulars,  and  at  most  warranting  but 
a  probable  conclusion.  The  answer  to  this  objection 
can  only  be  found  in  the  acknowledged  uniformity  of 
the  laws  of  nature ;  so  that  whatever  has  once  occurred 
will,  under  absolutely  similar  circumstances,  always  occur 
again.  This  may  be  called  the  suppressed  premise  of 
every  Baconian  enthymem,  every  inference  from  ob- 
servation of  phenomena  which  extend  beyond  the 
particular  case.  When  it  is  once  ascertained  that 
water  is  composed  of  one  proportion  of  oxygen  to  one 
of  hydrogen,  we  never  doubt  but  that  such  are  its  in- 
variable constituents.  We  may  repeat  the  experiment 
to  secure  ourselves  against  the  risk  of  error  in  the 
operation,  or  of  some  unperceivecl  condition  that  may 
have  effected  the  result ;  but  when  a  sufficient  number 
of  trials  has  secured  us  against  this,  an  invariable  law 
of  nature  is  inferred  from  the  particular  instance : 
nobody  conceives  that  one  pint  of  pure  water  can  be  of 
a  different  composition  from  another.  All  men,  even 
the  most  rude,  reason  upon  this  primary  maxim ;  but 

*  Essays,  vol.  ii.  p.  406. 


218  ON  THE  NOVUM  ORGANUM, 

they  reason  inconclusively,  from  misapprehending  the 
true  relations  of  cause  and  effect  in  the  phenomena  to 
which  they  direct  their  attention.  It  is  by  the  sagacity 
and  ingenuity  with  which  Bacon  has  excluded  the 
various  sources  of  error,  and  disengaged  the  true  cause, 
that  his  method  is  distinguished  from  that  which  the 
vulgar  practise."  * 

The  following  remarks  from  Stewart's  Life  of  JReid 
present  as  correct  and  candid  a  view  of  the  Baconian 
method  as  any  to  be  found  elsewhere : — f  The  influ- 
ence of  Bacon's  genius  on  the  subsequent  progress  of 
physical  discovery,  has  been  seldom  duly  appreciated — 
by  some  writers  almost  overlooked,  and  by  others  con- 
sidered as  the  sole  cause  of  the  reformation  in  science 
which  has  since  taken  place.  Of  these  two  extremes 
the  latter  certainly  is  the  least  wide  of  the  truth ;  for 
in  the  whole  history  of  letters  no  other  individual  can 
be  mentioned  whose  exertions  have  had  so  indisputable 
an  effect  in  forwarding  the  intellectual  progress  of  man- 
kind. On  the  other  hand  it  must  be  acknowledged, 
that  before  the  era  when  Bacon  appeared,  various 
philosophers  in  different  parts  of  Europe  had  struck 
into  the  right  path;  and  it  may  perhaps  be  doubted 
whether  any  one  important  rule,  with  respect  to  the 
true  method  of  investigation,  be  contained  in  his 
works,  of  which  no  hint  can  be  traced  in  those  of  his 
predecessors.  His  great  merit  lay  in  concentrating 
their  feeble  and  scattered  lights — fixing  the  attention 
of  philosophers  on  the  distinguishing  characteristics  of 
true  and  of  false  science  by  a  felicity  of  illustration 
peculiar    to    himself,    seconded    by    the    command    of 

*  Lit.  Middle  Ages,  vol.  ii.  p.  420. 


Oil  BACONIAN  LOGIC.  219 

powers  of  a  bold  and  figurative  eloquence.  The  method 
of  investigation  which  he  recommended  had  been  pre- 
viously followed  in  every  instance  in  which  any  solid 
discovery  had  been  made  with  respect  to  the  laws  of 
nature ;  but  it  had  been  followed  accidentally  and 
without  any  regular  preconcerted  design ;  and  it  was 
reserved  for  him  to  reduce  to  rule  and  method  what 
others  had  effected,  either  fortuitously  or  from  some 
momentary  glimpse  of  the  truth.  These  remarks  are 
not  intended  to  detract  from  the  just  glory  of  Bacon ; 
for  they  apply  to  all  those,  without  exception,  who 
have  systematized  the  principles  of  any  of  the  arts. 
Indeed  they  apply  less  forcibly  to  him  than  to  any 
other  philosopher  whose  studies  have  been  directed  to 
objects  analogous  to  his — inasmuch  as  we  know  of  no 
art  of  which  the  rules  have  been  reduced  successfully 
into  a  didactic  form,  when  the  art  itself  was  as  much  in 
infancy  as  experimental  philosophy  was  when  Bacon 
wrote."  * 

*  Sect.  2. 


: 

MBfi. 


220  LOGICAL  SPECULATIONS  OF  HOBBES, 


CHAPTEE   X. 

LOGICAL  SPECULATION'S  OF  HOBBES,  GASSENDL  AND 
DESCAETES. 

We  have  witnessed,  in  the  two  previous  centuries,  the 
extraordinary  activity  of  the  logical  understanding, 
and  how  generally  and  earnestly  men  were  engaged  in 
examining  into  the  established  modes  of  discovering 
and  promulgating  truth,  on  all  subjects  cognisant  to 
the  human  mind.  The  influential  and  important  prin- 
ciples which  lay  in  the  background  to  this  logical 
movement,  were  chiefly  those  which  related  to  the 
inward  nature  of  man — to  man  as  a  social,  political, 
moral,  and  theological  being.  On  matters  of  philoso- 
phical inquiry,  arising  out  of  these  divisions  of  his  con- 
stitution, there  were  silently,  though  steadily,  prepa- 
ring important  and  sweeping  theories  and  speculations, 
which  were  at  no  distant  period  to  ripen  into  practical 
systems,  calculated  to  exercise  no  small  influence  on 
his  condition  and  prospects.  These  general  views  of 
human  nature  could  not  be  fully  developed  nor  worked 
out  by  a  dry  and  formal  system  of  logical  rules.  All 
such  barren  collections  of  technicalities  were  repudiated 
by  the  ardent  and  comprehensive  minds  of  the  age, 


GASSENDI,  AND  DESCARTES.  221 

who  were  bent  on  renouncing  all  kinds  of  authority, 
and  of  hewing  out  to  themselves  new  paths  to  know- 
ledge and  science.  Great  differences  of  opinion  on  the 
leading  principles  of  political  science,  on  the  foundation 
of  moral  sentiments,  on  the  doctrines  of  theology,  and 
on  the  rudimental  nature  of  mind  itself,  obliged  philo- 
sophers to  refuse  at  once  an  acquiescence  in  any  uni- 
form logical  system  which  immediately  had  to  deal 
with  their  respective  theories.  It  therefore  behoved 
every  new  system  to  have  a  new  logical  instrument  of 
its  own — otherwise  its  propounder  could  never  hope 
either  to  gain  proselytes  or  fame. 

The  philosophic  mind,  being  now  in  a  high  state  of 
excitement,  called  in  question  the  truth  of  every 
branch  of  knowledge,  and  nothing  could  satisfy  it  short 
of  commencing  afresh  at  the  very  elements  of  things, 
and  of  re-constructing  the  entire  edifice  of  human 
thought  and  speculation.  It  was  from  this  cause  that 
we  now  distinctly  recognise  a  mingling  of  all  the  chief 
ingredients  of  mental  investigation  with  logical  prin- 
ciples and  rules,  and  perceive  treatises  on  the  art  of 
reasoning  issuing  from  the  press — more  or  less  imbued 
with  distinct  portions  of  political,  moral,  intellectual, 
and  religious  philosophy.  The  proportions  of  all,  or 
any  one  of  these,  which  might  be  amalgamated  with 
logical  maxims  and  forms,  depended  entirely  on  the 
views  the  writer  entertained,  and  the  ultimate  object 
he  wished  to  accomplish.  If  a  man  had  a  political 
theory  to  establish,  he  sought  out  a  logic  to  correspond 
with  it ;  and  if  a  theological  system  was  to  be  consoli- 
dated, a  logical  scheme  must  likewise  be  had  to  agree 
and  harmonize  with  its  general  nature  and  character. 


222  LOGICAL  SPECULATIONS  OF  HOBBES, 

And  the  same  thing  may  be  remarked  of  every  other 
science  or  department  of  human  inquiry.  All  direct  or 
formal  allegiance  to  any  particular  logical  system  was 
thrown  off;  and  every  speculative  mind  felt  itself  fully 
at  liberty  to  mould  its  logical  tools  to  the  nature  of  its 
special  habits  or  undertakings. 

We  date,  therefore,  from  this  period  the  general 
embodiment  of  considerable  portions  of  mental  philoso- 
phy with  strictly  logical  forms  and  maxims — a  practice 
which  has  been,  in  latter  times,  so  commonly  followed 
in  every  country  in  Europe.  The  intimate  relationship 
subsisting  between  the  mind  itself,  and  its  laws  and 
formal  manifestations,  as  displayed  in  the  reasoning 
process,  has  undoubtedly  been  one  of  the  leading 
incentives  to  this  mode  of  treating  logical  science.  But 
still  there  were  other  causes  which  had  a  share  in  this 
effect ;  and  these  are  fairly  traceable  to  that  indiscri- 
minate license  in  which  all  speculators  thought  they 
had  an  undoubted  right  to  indulge, — to  mould  their 
instrument  of  ratiocination  in  any  way  and  manner 
best  suited  to  the  attainment  of  the  grand  object  they 
had  in  view. 

The  philosophers  whom  we  have  now  before  us  in 
the  seventeenth  century,  were  in  many  essential  points 
possessed  of  more  intellectual  vigour,  and  a  stronger 
stamina  of  enthusiasm,  than  the  current  mass  of  logical 
writers  who  had  for  two  or  three  centuries  preceded 
them.  The  men  of  this  day  had  not,  perhaps,  more 
learning,  but  they  had  certainly  more  talent  than  their 
predecessors.  The  former  were  not  made-up  philoso- 
phers, but  full  of  original  energy,  ambitious  projects, 
and  theoretical  skill.     Thev  would  not  allow  anv  mere 


GASSENDI,  AND  DESCARTES.  223 

prescriptive  authority  on  formal  matters  to  stand  in  the 
way  of  their  inquiries,  nor  sacrifice  their  cherished 
systems  to  any  mere  punctilious  attentions  to  what 
might  be  considered  logical  etiquette  or  formalism. 
Their  great  object  was  to  press  forward,  to  open  up 
new  and  hitherto  unknown  routes  to  knowledge  and 
science,  and  to  inscribe  their  names  on  the  highest 
pinnacles  of  philosophic  fame  and  distinction.  Many 
of  them  had  bidden  farewell  to  all  that  lay  behind 
them,  in  the  shape  of  speculative  knowledge  and  learn- 
ing ;  fully  determined  to  labour  henceforward  on  their 
own  individual  account,  and  for  their  own  individual 
honour  and  aggrandizement.  What  others  had  said 
or  done  before,  was  nothing  to  them.  The  unfettered 
exercise  of  their  faculties  imparted  additional  vigour  to 
their  movements ;  and,  breathing  the  air  of  perfect 
freedom,  and  conscious  of  their  own  strength,  they 
were  neither  overawed  by  the  responsibilities  of  innova- 
tion, nor  the  number  or  magnitude  of  their  toils. 

The  names  we  have  placed  at  the  head  of  this  chap- 
ter are  well  known  throughout  the  speculative  world. 
They  undoubtedly  figure  more  in  the  character  of 
philosophers  than  as  mere  logicians ;  but  it  would  be 
difficult  to  name  other  three  men,  living  contemporane- 
ously with  each  other,  whose  opinions  and  writings 
have  exercised  a  greater  indirect  effect  upon  the  science 
of  reasoning  in  modern  times.  They  were  decidedly 
three  of  the  most  active  and  logical  understandings  of 
their  age.  We  shall  take  especial  care,  however,  to 
shape  our  remarks  on  their  several  systems,  so  as  to 
keep  as  closely  within  the  boundaries  of  purely  logical 
science  as  we  possibly  can.    Their  general  philosophical 


224  LOGICAL  SPECULATIONS  OF  HOBBES, 

principles  do  not  fall  within  our  present  historical 
range. 

Thomas  Hobbes,  b.  1588,  n.  1679. — Hobbes  was  one 
of  the  most  able  men  of  his  time,  and  occupies  an  im- 
portant station  in  the  history  of  speculative  knowledge 
in  the  seventeenth  century. 

Hobbes'  system  of  philosophy  was  evidently  of  a 
material  cast ;  and,  on  this  account,  he  was  too  clear- 
headed to  admit  into  his  logic  any  principle  or  formal 
arrangement  which  might  seem  to  be  at  variance  with 
his  leading  views  on  human  nature.  All  thought,  he 
says,  is  engendered  by  sensation.  Reasoning,  in  every 
form  it  assumes,  is  resolvable  to  seeking  either  the 
whole  by  the  addition  of  all  its  parts,  or  a  part  by  the 
subtraction  or  withdrawal  of  the  rest.  All  deductive 
and  inductive  reasonings  are  simply  forms  of  equation — 
or,  in  other  words,  all  thoughts  are  expressible  in  ma- 
thematical formulas ;  and  every  thing  which  cannot  be 
put  into  such  formulas  can  have  no  reality,  at  least  in 
reference  to  our  understandings. 

All  words,  according  to  Hobbes,  employed  in  pro- 
cesses of  reasoning — expressing,  or  attempting  to  ex- 
press, the  incorporeal  or  spiritual,  the  infinite,  &c. — 
have  no  meaning  whatever,  because  they  have  no 
representative  sensations  in  the  mind.  All  such  terms 
ought  therefore  to  be  banished  from  systems  of  logical 
philosophy  and  instruction. 

The  Computatio  sive  Logica,  which  contains  the  au- 
thor's views  on  the  art  of  reasoning,  is  part  of  his  great 
work,  Elementa  Philosophic.  He  thought  favourably  of 
the  syllogistic  theory,  both  as  an  instrument  for  demon- 
stration  and  useful   instruction.       His   notion   of  the 


GASSENDI,  AND  DESCARTES.  225 

abstract   nature  of  the   syllogism  is    in   some   points 
original. 

ft  The  thoughts/'  says  Hobbes,  "  in  the  mind  answer- 
ing to  a  direct  syllogism,  proceed  in  this  manner, — 
first,  There  is  conceived  a  phantasm  of  the  thing  named, 
with  that  accident  or  quality  thereof  for  which  it  is  in 
the  minor  proposition  called  by  that  name  which  is  the 
subject ;  next,  The  mind  has  a  phantasm  of  the  same 
thing,  with  that  accident  or  quality  for  which  it  hath 
the  name,  that  in  the  same  proposition  is  the  predicate  ; 
thirdly,  The  thought  returns  of  the  same  thing  as 
having  that  accident  in  it  for  which  it  is  called  by  the 
name,  that  is  the  predicate  of  the  major  proposition ; 
and,  lastly,  Remembering  that  all  these  are  the  accidents 
of  one  and  the  same  thing,  it  concludes  that  these  three 
names  are  also  names  of  one  and  the  same  thing ;  that 
is  to  say,  the  conclusion  is  true.  For  example,  when 
this  syllogism  is  made,  Man  is  a  living  creature — a 
living  creature  is  a  body — man  is  a  body — the  mind  con- 
ceives first  an  image  of  a  man  speaking  or  discoursing, 
and  remembers  that  that  which  so  appears  is  called 
man  ;  then  it  has  the  image  of  the  same  man  moving, 
and  remembers  that  that  which  appears  so  is  called 
living  creature;  thirdly,  it  conceives  an  image  of  the 
same  man  as  filling  some  place  or  space,  and  remem- 
bers that  what  appears  so  is  called  body ;  and,  lastly, 
when  it  remembers  that  that  thing  which  was  extend- 
ed, and  moved,  and  spake,  was  one  and  the  same  thing, 
it  concludes  that  the  three  names  of  the  thing,  man, 
living  creature,  and  body,  are  names  of  the  same  thing, 
and  that  therefore  man  is  a  living  creature  is  a  true 
proposition.     From  whence  it  is  manifest,  that  living 


226  LOGICAL  SPECULATIONS  OF  HOBBES, 

creatures  that  have  not  the  use  of  speech,  have  no  con- 
ception or  thought  in  the  mind  answering  to  a  syllogism 
made  of  universal  propositions ;  seeing  it  is  necessary 
to  think  not  only  of  the  thing,  but  also  by  turns  to 
remember  the  divers  names,  which  for  divers  consider- 
ations thereof  are  applied  to  the  same."* 

Hobbes  was  a  rigid  nominalist  in  logic,  and  conceived 
that  words,  and  words  only,  were  the  things  with  which 
the  mind  is  conversant  in  a  reasoning  process.  At  least 
this  is  the  conclusion  to  which  we  are  led  from  many 
passages  in  his  writings  connected  with  the  acquisition 
of  knowledge.  We  shall,  however,  cite  a  few  passages 
from  his  Leviathan,  relative  to  the  nature  and  offices  of 
words  as  used  in  general  reasoning : — "  One  universal 
name  is  imposed  on  many  things  for  their  similitude  in 
some  quality  or  other  accidents ;  and  whereas  a  proper 
name  bringeth  to  mind  one  thing  only,  universals  re- 
call any  one  of  these  many."  "The  universality  of 
one  name  to  many  things,  hath  been  the  cause  that 
men  think  the  things  are  themselves  universal,  and  so 
seriously  contend,  that  besides  Peter  and  John,  and  all 
the  rest  of  the  men  that  are,  have  been,  or  shall  be  in 
the  world,  there  is  yet  something  else  that  we  call  man, 
namely,  man  in  general,  deceiving  themselves  by  taking 
the  universal  or  general  appellation  for  the  thing  it 
signineth."f  "  Logic  is,"  he  says,  "  the  art  of  compu- 
tation." "Logicians  add  together  two  names  to  make 
an  affirmation,  and  two  affirmations  to  make  a  syllo- 
gism, and  many  syllogisms  to  make  a  demonstration ; 
and  from  the  sum  or  conclusion  of  a  syllogism  they 
subtract  one  proposition  to  find  another."!      "  Reason 

*  Coin  put.,  p.  50.  i  Leviathan,  c.  4.  J  Ibid.,  c.  5. 


GASSENDI,  AND  DESCARTES.  227 

is  nothing  but  reckoning  (that  is,  adding  and  subtract- 
ing) of  the  consequences  of  general  names  agreed  upon, 
for  the  marking  and  signifying  of  our  thoughts." 

In  the  author's  Logica  we  find  the  same  doctrine 
maintained.  "An  universal/'  says  he,  "  is  not  a  name 
of  many  taken  collectively,  but  of  each  thing  taken 
separately.  Man  is  not  the  name  of  the  human  family 
in  general,  but  of  each  single  member  of  it — as  Peter, 
John,  and  the  rest,  separately.  Therefore  this  univer- 
sal name  is  not  the  name  of  any  thing  existing  in  na- 
ture, nor  of  any  idea  or  phantasm  formed  in  the  mind, 
but  remains  so  by  some  word  or  name.  It  thus  hap- 
pens that  when  an  animal,  or  a  stone,  or  a  ghost,  or 
any  thing  else,  is  called  universal,  we  are  not  to  under- 
stand by  this  term,  that  any  man,  or  stone,  or  any 
thing  else,  was,  or  is,  or  can  be,  an  universal ;  but  only 
that  these  terms,  animal,  stone,  and  the  like,  are  uni- 
versal names, — that  is,  names  common  to  many  things ; 
and  the  ideas  or  conceptions  corresponding  to  them  in 
the  intellect,  are  the  images  or  phantasms  of  single 
animals  or  other  things.  And  consequently  we  do  not 
need,  in  order  to  comprehend  what  is  meant  by  an 
universal,  any  other  faculty  than  that  of  imagination, 
by  which  we  remember  that  such  words  have  excited 
the  ideas  in  our  minds,  sometimes  of  one  particular 
thing,  sometimes  of  another."*  "  If  speech  be  peculiar 
to  man,  as  for  ought  I  know  it  is,  then  is  understanding 
peculiar  to  him  also  ;  understanding  being  nothing  else 
but  conception  caused  by  speech."  "  True  and  false 
are  attributes  of  speech,  not  of  things ;  where  speech 
is  not,  there  is  neither  truth  nor  falsehood,  though  there 

*  Cap.  ii.  §  9. 


228 

may  be  error.  Hence  as  truth  consists  in  the  right 
ordering  of  names  in  our  affirmations,  a  man  that  seeks 
precise  truth  hath  need  to  remember  what  every  word 
he  uses  stands  for,  and  place  it  accordingly."* 

On  the  nature  and  offices  of  definition  in  processes 
of  reasoning,  he  makes  the  following  observations  : — 
"  Every  man  who  aspires  to  true  knowledge  should 
examine  the  definitions  of  former  authors,  and  either 
correct  them  or  make  them  anew.  For  the  errors  of 
definitions  multiply  themselves  according  as  the  reckon- 
ing proceeds,  and  leads  men  into  absurdities,  which  at 
last  they  see,  but  cannot  avoid,  without  reckoning  anew 
from  the  beginning,  in  which  lies  the  foundation  of  their 

errors In  the  right  definition  of  names  lies  the 

first  use  of  speech,  which  is  the  acquisition  of  science. 
And  in  wrong  or  no  definitions  lies  the  first  abuse, 
from  which  proceed  all  false  and  senseless  tenets,  which 
make  these  men  that  take  their  instruction  from  the 
authority  of  books,  and  not  from  their  own  medita- 
tions, to  be  as  much  below  the  condition  of  ignorant 
men,  as  men  endued  with  true  science  are  above  it. 
For  between  true  science  and  erroneous  doctrine,  igno- 
rance is  the  middle.  Words  are  wise  men's  counters ; 
they  do  but  reckon  by  them ;  but  they  are  the  money 
of  fools."  f 

On  the  nature  of  human  knowledge  generally, 
Hobbes  remarks,  "  There  are  two  kinds  of  knowledge ; 
the  one,  sense  or  knowledge,  original,  and  remembrance 
of  the  same ;  the  other,  science,  or  knowledge  of  the 
truth  of  propositions,  derived  from  the  understanding. 
Both  are  but  experience,  one  of  things  without,  the 

*  Leviathan.  f  Ibid. 


GASSENDI,  AND  DESCARTES.  229 

other  from  the  proper  use  of  words  in  language ;  and 
experience  being  but  remembrance,  all  knowledge  is 
remembrance.  Knowledge  implies  two  things,  truth 
and  evidence ;  the  latter  is  the  concomitance  of  a 
man's  conception,  with  the  words  that  signify  such 
conception  in  the  act  of  ratiocination."  "  Evidence  is 
to  truth  as  the  sap  to  the  tree,  which,  so  far  it  creepeth 
along  with  the  body  and  branches,  keepeth  them  alive ; 
when  it  forsaketh  them  they  die ;  for  this,  evidence, 
which  is  meaning  with  words,  is  the  life  of  truth." 
"  Science  is  evidence  of  truth,  from  some  beginning  or 
principle  of  sense.  The  first  principle  of  knowledge  is, 
that  we  have  such  and  such  conceptions ;  the  second, 
that  we  have  thus  and  thus  named  the  things  whereof 
they  are  conceptions ;  the  third  is,  that  we  have  joined 
these  names  in  such  a  manner  as  to  make  true  propo- 
sitions ;  the  fourth  and  last  is,  that  we  have  joined 
these  propositions  in  such  a  manner  as  they  could  be 
concluding,  and  the  truth  of  the  conclusion  said  to  be 
known."* 

Hobbes  defines  method  to  be  "  the  knowledge  we 
acquire  by  true  ratiocination  of  appearances,  or  ap- 
parent effects,  from  the  knowledge  we  have  of  some 
possible  production  or  generation  of  the  same ;  and  of 
such  production,  as  has  been  or  may  be,  from  the 
knowledge  we  have  of  the  effects.  Method  is,  there- 
fore, the  shortest  way  of  finding  out  effects  by  their 
known  causes,  or  of  causes  by  their  known  effects."  f 

Gassendi,  b.  1592,  d.  1655. — The  most  important 
event  in  the  life  of  Glassendi  was  the  publication  of  his 
Exercitationes  Paradoxic^,  published  in   1624.      This 

*  Hum.  Nat.,  c.  6.  +  Coinput.,  p.  66. 


230  LOGICAL  SPECULATIONS  OF  HOBBES, 

was  a  bold  and  fierce  attack  upon  the  logical  system  of 
Aristotle.  Though  the  work  raised  up  many  enemies 
against  him,  yet  it  extended  his  fame,  and  obtained 
him  Church  preferment.  The  censures  in  the  treatise 
were,  however,  so  severe  and  general,  that  Gassendi 
found  it  expedient  to  qualify  his  opinions  on  the  sub- 
ject of  logic,  and  to  allow  the  scholastic  system  some 
portion  of  honour  and  merit. 

These  modified  logical  opinions,  cherished  in  after 
life,  are  to  be  found  in  G-assendi's  Syntagma  Philo- 
sophicum.  The  work  is  divided  into  three  parts,  logic, 
physics,  and  ethics.  In  the  first  two  books  on  the 
logic,  we  have  a  history  of  the  science  from  Zeno  to 
Descartes,  and  on  the  criterion  of  truth. 

In  this  historical  sketch  we  have  an  account  of  the 
logic  of  Zeno,  of  Elea ;  Euclid,  of  Megara ;  of  Plato,  of 
Aristotle,  of  Epicurus,  of  Eaymond  Lully,  of  Ramus,  of 
Bacon,  and  of  Descartes.  These  several  dissertations 
amount  collectively  to  thirty-six  pages  folio. 

The  author's  Institutiones  Logicce  are  divided  into  four 
parts, — 1st,  The  conception  or  idea  of  things  ;  2nd,. 
Propositions ;  3d,  .The  Syllogism ;  and  4th,  Method.  * 

We  must  seek  for  Gassendi's  logical  opinions  in  his 
system  of  mental  philosophy.  He  may  be  said  to  have 
followed  a  sort  of  middle  path  between  Hobbes  and 
Descartes.  Gassendi  conceived  that  sensation  was  the 
source  of  all  human  knowledge;  and  hence  his  often 
repetition  of  the  ancient  maxim,  "  that  there  was 
nothing  in  the  mind  which  had  not  been  previously  in 
the  senses."  But  the  position  was  qualified  in  this 
manner,     Sensation  furnishes  us  with  the  perception  of 

*  Opera  Omnia,  vol.  i.     Lugd.  1658. 


GASSENDI,  AXD  DESCAETES.  231 

facts,  but  the  mind  makes  a  comparison  of  facts ;  and 
from  this  mental  act  or  movement  there  spring  up 
particular  notions,  and  general  ideas  and  principles.* 

Gassendi's  writings  were  more  influential  on  logical 
science,  from  the  spirit  of  discussion  which  they  awak- 
ened in  Europe  than  from  any  positive  innovations  he 
made  in  the  mode  of  teaching  science  itself.  His 
speculations  became  known  in  every  seat  of  learning; 
his  great  and  acknowledged  erudition,  his  love  of  truth, 
his  intellectual  courage,  and  the  opposition  he  encoun- 
tered, were  favourable  to  the  extension  of  his  opinions ; 
and  his  indefatigable  industry  enabled  him  to  turn 
these  varied  advantages  to  the  most  profitable  use. 

Descartes,  b.  1596,  d.  1650. — This  distinguished 
man  was  a  native  of  Haigh,  in  Touraine,  and  received 
his  education  at  the  Jesuits'  College  of  Fleche.  Here 
he  studied  philosophy;  but  soon  joined  the  French 
army  in  Holland.  His  innate  love  of  study  was,  how- 
ever, too  powerful  for  the  pleasures  and  perils  of  the 
camp,  and  he  retired,  while  quite  a  young  man,  into 
private  life,  there  to  devote  himself  henceforward  to  the 
more  congenial  and  noble  occupations  and  pursuits  of 
the  philosopher. 

Descartes  is  to  be  considered  both  in  the  light  of  a 
theoretical  and  practical  logician.  In  the  former  capa- 
city he  lays  down  the  principles  on  which  all  evidence 
and  science  rest ;  and  in  the  latter  he  treats  of  those 
common,  but  important  rules,  which  guide  the  reason- 
ing faculty  to  great  and  interesting  results,  and  pre- 
serve it  from  pursuing  erroneous  and  futile  methods  of 
investigation. 

*  Logic,  p.  93. 


232  LOGICAL  SPECULATIONS  OF  HOBBES, 

From  the  incessant  and  discordant  disputes  on  the 
nature  of  truth,  and  the  fundamental  axioms  of  science, 
which  had  preceded  Descartes  in  the  schools  of  logic 
and  philosophy,  he  was  led  to  entertain  desponding 
thoughts  relative  to  the  standard  of  scientific  truth 
generally,  and  to  meditate  on  the  apparent  impos- 
sibility of  the  human  understanding  ever  being  able  to 
extricate  itself  from  the  jungle  of  difficulties  into  which 
the  ingenuity  of  men,  from  age  to  age,  had  led  it. 
Thinking  long  and  earnestly  on  this  topic,  he  was  in- 
duced to  conceive  that  there  must  certainly  be  some 
method  or  other  which,  if  pursued,  would  enable  candid 
and  inquiring  minds  to  throw  off  this  incubus  of  doubt ; 
and,  following  up  the  first  suggestion,  he  thought  he 
saw  in  the  distance,  like  a  nebulous  cloud  in  the  horizon, 
a  certain  principle  which  pointed  him  to  something 
like  certitude  and  truth.  Setting  aside  all  the  stand- 
ards of  evidence  of  which  he  had  ever  heard  or  read, 
he  began  the  inquiry  himself,  and  in  himself;  and  this 
inquiry  led  him  to  repose  an  unconditional  and  absolute 
confidence  in  the  principle  of  his  own  internal  conscious- 
ness, Cogito,  ergo  .sum,  was  his  first  and  solid  stepping- 
stone  to  rational  conviction.  What  he  himself  felt 
must  be  true,  if  there  be  any  thing  true  in  nature  what- 
ever. This  appeared  to  be  a  maxim  of  immense  value 
to  the  prosecution  of  scientific  certainty,  and  he  hoped 
to  be  able  to  shew,  by  a  full  and  comprehensive  devel- 
opment of  it,  that  the  reasoning  faculty  of  manjiad 
something  satisfactory  and  solid  to  rest  upon.  "  What- 
ever doubts,"  says  he,  "  I  may  have,  I  cannot  doubt 
of  my  own  existence." 

Having  made  this  maxim  of  consciousness  a  starting- 


233 

point,  he  proceeded  to  demonstrate  certain  other  im- 
portant truths,  some  of  which,  however,  lie  within  the 
provinces  of  philosophy  and  theology  rather  than  logic. 
Among  the  most  vital  of  these  was  the  existence  of  a 
Deity,  which  Descartes  considered  was  vitally  con- 
nected with  the  logical  elements  of  all  truth  and 
science.  The  problem  he  attempted  to  solve  assumed 
this  form.  To  find  an  idea  which  could  not  subsist  as 
an  intellectual  conception,  without  its  object  itself 
having  also  a  positive  existence — an  idea  which  should 
be  invested  with  subjective  possibility,  as  far  as  it  had 
objective  reality.  He  makes  the  idea  of  a  supremely 
perfect  Being  as  the  principle  which  connects  or  binds 
the  ideal  with  the  real.  This  idea  of  supreme  perfec- 
tion implies  or  involves  existence,  inasmuch  as  existence 
is  itself  a  decided  perfection.  "  If  we  ask,"  says  he, 
"  not  in  respect  of  a  body,  but  in  respect  to  any  thing, 
whatever  that  thing  may  be,  which  has  within  itself  all 
the  perfections  which  can  be  embodied  within  it, 
whether  existence  is  to  be  reckoned  among  them,  we 
may  at  first  perhaps  be  in  some  doubt  about  it,  be- 
cause our  mind,  which  is  finite,  not  being  in  the  habit 
of  considering  them  separately,  may  not  perceive  at  the 
first  glance  how  necessarily  they  are  joined  together. 
But  if  we  examine  with  care  whether  existence  belongs 
to  a  Being  supremely  powerful,  and  what  sort  of  exist- 
ence that  really  is,  we  shall  find  ourselves  in  a  position, 
first,  to  affirm,  that  at  the  least  possible  existence  agrees 
with  Him,  as  well  as  with  all  other  things  of  which  we 
have  of  ourselves  any  clear  idea,  even  those  which  are 
composed  of  fictions  of  our  own  understanding;  and, 
secondly,  because  we  cannot  think  that  His  existence  is 


234  LOGICAL  SPECULATIONS  OF  HOBBES, 

possible,  without  knowing  at  the  same  time  that  He 
can  exist  by  His  own  innate  power  or  force ; — hence 
we  conclude  that  He  really  exists,  and  that  He  has 
been  from  all  eternity.  It  is  very  evident  from  the 
light  of  nature,  that  that  which  exists  by  virtue  of  its 
own  force  or  power,  exists  always ;  and  thus  we  come 
to  know  that  necessary  existence  is  contained  in  the 
idea  of  a  supremely  powerful  Being,  not  by  a  fiction  of 
the  understanding,  but  because  it  belongs  to  the  true 
and  immutable  nature  of  such  a  Being  to  exist;  and 
we  readily  know  that  it  is  impossible  for  this  supremely 
powerful  Being  not  to  have  in  himself  all  other  perfec- 
tions that  are  contained  in  the  idea  of  God,  in  such 
order  and  character,  that  by  their  own  proper  nature, 
and  without  any  fiction  of  the  understanding,  they  are 
always  joined  together  and  exist  in  the  Divine  essence. 
Just,  in  like  manner,  as  I  affirm  my  own  existence, 
because  the  idea  of  it  is  contained  in  the  notion  or  con- 
ception of  thinking ;  so,  likewise,  I  affirm  the  existence 
of  the  supremely  perfect  Being,  because  the  idea  of  ex- 
istence is  contained  in  the  very  idea  of  such  a  Being. 
The  existence  of  ,an  external  reality  rests,  therefore, 
upon  the  same  logical  basis  as  the  internal  reality." 

The  logical  rules  deducible  from  Descartes'  method, 
may  be  stated  under  the  four  following  heads, — 1st, 
Nothing  is  to  be  admitted  as  true  or  certain  but  what 
is  clearly  and  obviously  so — that  is,  there  is  to  be 
nothing  more  admitted  in  the  conclusion  than  what 
presents  itself  distinctly  to  the  understanding;  2nd, 
Every  question  should  be  analysed  into  as  many  sepa- 
rate parts  as  possible,  in  order  that  every  part  may  be 
easily  recognised  and  conceived,  and  its  relation  to  the 


GASSENDI,  AND  DESCARTES.  235 

whole  more  readily  ascertained ;  3d,  Every  examina- 
tion should  be  conducted  with  order,  commencing  with 
objects  the  most  simple  and  easiest  known,  and  ascend- 
ing step  by  step  to  truths  of  a  more  complex  and 
difficult  character.  4th,  We  must  calculate  with  great 
care  and  circumspection,  that  nothing  is  omitted  in  the 
consideration  of  the  question  before  us. 

And  here  it  may  be  remarked,  that  the  chief  incen- 
tive to  Descartes'  inquiry  as  to  the  foundation  of  logical 
philosophy,  proceeded  from  a  theological  source.  We 
have  here  before  us  another  striking  illustration  of  the 
all-powerful  influence  of  revelation  on  logical  studies 
and  inquiries,  which  we  have  already  noticed  at  some 
length  in  the  fourth  chapter.  The  train  of  thought 
which  led  Descartes  to  institute  investigations  into  the 
nature  of  truth,  was  precisely  the  same  as  that  which 
displayed  itself  in  the  mind  of  Plato,  Aristotle,  and 
others — only  qualified  and  rendered  more  precise  and 
definite  in  its  aim  by  the  knowledge  which  the  French 
philosopher  had  of  the  sacred  canons.  It  appeared 
obvious  to  the  ancients,  that  the  doctrines  of  an  intelli- 
gent First  Cause,  and  the  immortality  of  the  soul,  had  a 
direct  and  necessary  bearing  upon  all  abstract  maxims 
or  principles  of  reasoning ;  and  the  same  thing,  in  the 
case  before  us,  occurs  to  Descartes.  He  seems  to  have 
said  to  himself — of  what  importance  are  any  discussions 
about  truth,  if  there  be  no  intelligent  Being  in  the 
universe  ?  If,  moreover,  men  die  like  the  grass  or  the 
beasts  of  the  field,  of  what  consequence  to  him  whether 
a  thing  be  what  you  term  true  or  false  ?  What  can 
moral  truth,  or  political  truth,  or  judicial  truth,  or  any 
other  kind  of  truth,  be  to  a  being  that  is  born  but  to 


236  LOGICAL  SPECULATIONS  OF  HOBBES, 

die,  and  for  ever  perish  ?  It  is  only  a  contradiction  in 
terms  to  talk  of  truth,  while  it  is  denied  in  the  same 
breath  that  there  is  any  intelligent  principle  in  nature. 
Truth  and  intelligence  are  but  two  words  for  the  same 
idea.  And  how  did  that  idea  ever  enter  into  the  mind 
of  man  ?  From  whence  did  it  proceed  ?  Why  should 
truth  be  the  eager  object  of  all  our  inquiries  and  pur- 
suits, if  there  be  no  great  intelligent  cause  in  nature 
on  which  it  can  rest  ?  Why  connect  truth  with  man  ? 
Why  not  talk  of  animal  truth,  of  vegetable  truth,  of 
fossil  truth,  or  of  granite  truth,  if  man  has  neither  an 
intelligent  Creator  nor  a  spirit  within  him  ? 

Such,  I  have  no  doubt,  constituted  the  substance  of 
the  inquiries  which  Descartes  often  put  to  himself,  in 
meditating  on  his  philosophical  and  logical  method. 
We  have  the  strongest  proof  that  such  trains  of  thought 
really  did  pass  through  his  mind,  not  only  from  the 
general  scope  of  his  writings,  but  from  the  language 
used  in  one  of  his  meditations.  He  says,  "  I  have 
always  conceived  that  the  two  grand  questions — the 
existence  of  God,  and  the  immortality  of  the  soul,  were 
the  chief  of  those  which  ought  to  be  demonstrated 
rather  by  philosophy  than  by  theology.  For  although 
it  is  sufficient  for  us,  who  are  of  the  faithful,  to  believe 
in  God,  and  that  the  soul  does  not  perish  with  the 
body,  it  certainly  does  not  appear  to  be  possible  to  per- 
suade the  infidels  to  any  religion,  nor  hardly  to  any 
moral  virtue,  unless  we  first  prove  to  them  these  two 
doctrines  by  natural  reason." 

This  famous  logical  method  of  Descartes  took  its 
rise,  therefore,  from  a  purely  theological  source.  The 
connexion  between  the  elementary  principles  of  religion 


GASSENDI,  AND  DESCARTES.  237 

and  the  standard  of  truth,  had,  it  is  true,  been  often 
noticed  before,  and  had  indeed  constituted  the  theories 
of  many  logical  speculators  ;  but  he  saw  that  connexion 
in  a  new  light,  and  illustrated  its  character  and  influ- 
ence after  his  own  fashion. 

There  are  many  objections  made  to  the  chief  prin- 
ciple of  Descartes'  method,  by  different  philosophers  of 
note,  all  of  which  he  endeavoured  to  obviate  or  explain 
away.  In  his  posthumous  work,  On  the  Search  after 
Truth,  in  one  of  his  replies  to  the  objection,  that 
to  prove  one's  own  existence  by  the  act  of  think- 
ing, we  should  previously  know  what  existence  and 
thought  are,  we  find  one  of  the  most  acute  and  pro- 
found passages  on  the  nature  of  verbal  definition  gene- 
rally, to  be  found  in  any  writer.  The  aim  of  the  pas- 
sage is  to  shew  that  there  are  certain  elementary 
principles  of  thought  which  circumscribe  the  range  of 
definitions  of  all  kinds ;  and  without  these  elementary 
principles,  or  intuitive  ideas,  such  a  thing  as  reasoning 
would  be  impossible.  Descartes  gives  here  an  impor- 
tant lesson  on  the  general  use  of  definition — a  lesson 
which  ought  not  to  be  thrown  away  on  those  modern 
writers  on  logic,  who  seem  to  lay  such  stress  upon  what 
they  call  the  correct  defining  of  terms,  as  to  lead  their 
readers  to  imagine  that  the  whole  art  or  science  of 
reasoning  depended  upon  its  exercise. 

"  I  agree  with  you,"  says  Descartes,  "  that  it  is  ne- 
cessary to  know  what  doubt  is,  and  what  thought  is, 
before  we  can  be  fully  persuaded  of  this  reasoning.  I 
doubt,  therefore  I  am ;  or,  what  is  the  same,  I  think, 
therefore  I  am.      But  do   not  imagine  that  for  this 


238  LOGICAL  SPECULATIONS  OF  HOBBES, 

purpose  you  must  torture  your  mind  to  find  out  the 
next  genus,  or  the  essential  differences,  as  the  logicians 
talk,  and  so  compose  a  regular  definition.  Leave  this 
to  such  as  teach  or  dispute  in  the  schools.  But  who- 
ever will  examine  things  by  himself,  and  judge  of  them 
according  to  his  understanding,  cannot  be  so  senseless 
as  not  to  see  clearly,  when  he  pays  attention,  what 
doubting,  thinking,  being  are,  or  to  have  any  need  to 
learn  their  distinctions.  Besides,  there  are  things 
which  we  render  more  obscure  in  attempting  to  define 
them ;  because,  as  they  are  very  simple  and  very  clear, 
we  cannot  know  and  comprehend  them  better  than  by 
themselves.  And  it  should  be  reckoned  among  the 
chief  errors  that  can  be  committed  in  science,  for  men 
to  fancy  that  they  can  define  that  which  they  can  only 
conceive,  and  distinguish  what  is  clear  in  it  from  what 
is  obscure  ;  while  they  do  not  see  the  difference  between 
that  which  must  be  defined  before  it  is  understood,  and 
that  which  can  be  fully  known  by  itself.  Now,  among 
things  which  can  be  thus  clearly  known  by  themselves, 
we  must  put  doubting,  thinking,  being.  For  I  do  not 
believe  any  one  ever  existed  so  stupid  as  to  need  to 
know  what  being  is  before  he  could  affirm  that  he  is ; 
and  it  is  the  same  of  thought  and  doubt.  Nor  can  he 
learn  these  things  except  by  himself,  nor  be  convinced 
of  them  but  by  his  own  experience,  and  by  that  con- 
sciousness and  inward  witness  which  every  man  finds 
in  himself  when  he  examines  the  subject.  And  as  we 
should  define  whiteness  in  vain  to  a  man  who  can  see 
nothing,  while  one  who  can  open  his  eyes  and  see  a 
white   object    requires    no    more ;     so   to    know  what 


GASSENDI,  AND  DESCARTES.  239 

doubting  is,  and  what  thinking  is,  it  is  only  necessary 
to  doubt  and  to  think."* 

"  Nothing/'  says  Mr  Hallam,  whose  translation  is 
here  adopted,  "  could  more  tend  to  cut  short  the  ver- 
bal cavils  of  the  schoolmen,  than  this  limitation  of 
their  favourite  exercise,  definition.  It  is  due  there- 
fore to  Descartes,  so  often  accused  of  appropriating 
the  discoveries  of  others,  that  we  should  establish  his 
right  to  one  of  the  most  important  that  the  new  logic 
has  to  boast."  f 

Out  of  this  scientific  method  of  inquiry  sprung  the 
little  practical  treatise  of  Descartes  on  logic,  entitled, 
Rules  for  the  Direction  of  the  Understanding.  This 
abounds  with  many  general  and  valuable  remarks  on 
the  cultivation  of  the  reasoning  powers,  and  on  the 
best  modes  of  strengthening  them,  and  giving  them, 
particularly  in  early  life,  a  proper  direction.  He  here 
evinces  his  dislike  to  syllogistic  forms  of  argumenta- 
tion. "  Truth,"  says  he,  "  often  escapes  from  these 
fetters,  in  which  those  who  employ  them  remain  en- 
tangled. We  frequently  witness  this  in  the  case  of 
those  who  make  no  use  of  logical  forms  whatever,  ex- 
perience showing  that  the  most  subtle  of  sophisms 
delude  none  but  the  sophists  themselves;  never  those 
who  trust  to  the  power  of  natural  reason.  And  to 
convince  ourselves  how  little  this  syllogistic  art  serves 
towards  the  discovery  of  truth,  we  may  remark,  that 
the  logicians  can  form  no  syllogism  with  a  true  conclu- 
sion, unless  they  are  already  acquainted  with  the  truth 
that  the  syllogism  develops.  Hence  it  follows,  that  the 
vulgar  logic  is  entirely  useless  to  him  who  would  dis- 

*  Vol.  ii.,  p.  369.  f  Lit.  Mid.  Ages,  vol.  ii.,  p.  453. 


240  LOGICAL  SPECULATIONS  OF  HOBBES, 

cover  truth  for  himself,  though  it  may  assist  in  ex- 
plaining to  others  the  truth  he  already  knows,  and 
that  it  would  be  better  to  transfer  it  as  a  science  from 
philosophy  to  rhetoric."  * 

As  an  example  of  the  many  popular  observations 
contained  in  this  work,  we  shall  just  quote  one,  rela- 
tive to  the  mode  which  Descartes  himself  followed  in 
the  acquirement  of  knowledge — a  mode  not  unworthy 
of  the  attention  of  young  men  of  the  present  day. 
The  passage  is  quoted  by  Mr  Hallam  for  a  different 
purpose ;  but  its  intrinsic  excellence  will  support  a 
transference  of  it  to  these  pages.  "  I  confess,"  says 
Descartes,  "  that  I  was  born  with  such  a  temper,  that 
the  chief  pleasure  I  find  in  study  is  not  from  learning 
the  arguments  of  others,  but  by  inventing  my  own. 
This  disposition  alone  impelled  me  in  youth  to  the 
study  of  science ;  hence,  whenever  a  new  book  pro- 
mised by  its  title  some  new  discovery,  before  sitting 
down  to  read  it,  I  used  to  try  whether  my  own  natu- 
ral sagacity  could  lead  me  to  any  thing  of  the  kind, 
and  I  took  care  not  to  lose  this  innocent  pleasure  by 
too  hasty  a  perusal.  This  answered  so  often,  that  I  at 
length  perceived  that  I  arrived  at  truth,  not  as  other 
men  do,  after  blind  and  precarious  guesses,  by  good- 
luck  rather  than  skill ;  but  that  long  experience  had 
taught  me  certain  fixed  rules,  which  were  of  surprising 
utility,  and  of  which  I  afterwards  made  use  to  discover 
more  truths." 

It  must  be  acknowledged,  however,  that  there  are 
some  of  the  rules  in  this  work  very  loosely  stated,  and, 
if  carried  into  practice,  would  contract  human  know- 

*  Vol.  ii.,  p.  255. 


GASSENDI,  AND  DESCARTES.  241 

ledge  to  a  very  great  extent.  In  one  place,  Descartes 
counsels  us  never  to  trouble  ourselves  about  objects 
except  those  which  the  mind  appears  capable  of  ac- 
quiring on  unquestionable  and  irrefragable  proof.  As 
he  was  a  distinguished  mathematician,  and  considered 
arithmetic  and  geometry  as  affording  a  species  of  evi- 
dence the  most  conclusive,  he  uses  language  which  is 
apt  to  lead  the  reader  to  conclude,  that  every  other 
branch  of  knowledge  affords  a  species  of  evidence  less 
satisfactory  than  arithmetical  and  geometrical  rela- 
tions, and  consequently  less  to  be  relied  on.  He  says, 
"  From  this  we  may  conclude,  not  that  arithmetic  and 
geometry  are  the  only  sciences  which  we  must  learn, 
but  that  he  who  seeks  the  road  to  truth,  should  not 
concern  himself  with  any  matter  of  which  he  cannot 
have  as  certain  a  knowledge  as  of  arithmetical  and 
geometrical  demonstrations."  If  this  were  Descartes' 
real  opinion,  it  stands  directly  opposed  to  some  of  the 
leading  canons  of  his  own  philosophical  method.  In 
fact,  if  the  rule  were  taken  in  accordance  with  its  lite- 
ral meaning,  it  would  cut  off  nine-tenths  of  the  learn- 
ing and  knowledge  of  mankind. 

In  this  little  treatise  there  are  twenty-one  rules  for 
the  government  of  the  understanding ;  but  the  reader 
will  find  the  first  six  or  seven  the  most  valuable  and 
philosophical  in  their  aim. 

Before  closing  this  brief  notice  of  Descartes'  logic, 
I  cannot  refrain  from  inserting  a  few  lines  from  Mr 
Hallam,  who  seems  to  entertain  a  very  high  opinion  of 
its  general  merits.  He  says,  "  I  consider  The  Rules 
for  the  Direction  of  the  Understanding,  as  one  of  the 
best  works   on  logic  (in  the  enlarged   sense)  which  I 

Q 


242  LOGICAL  SPECULATIONS  OF  HOBBES, 

have  ever  read — more  practically  useful,  perhaps,  to 
young  students  than  the  Novum  Organum ;  and 
though,  as  I  have  said,  his  illustrations  are  chiefly  ma- 
thematical, most  of  his  rules  are  applicable  to  the  gen- 
eral discipline  of  the  reasoning  powers.  It  occupies 
little  more  than  one  hundred  pages ;  and  I  think  that 
I  am  doing  a  service  in  recommending  it.  Many  of 
the  rules  will,  of  course,  be  found  in  later  books ;  some 
possibly  in  earlier."* 

The  Cartesian  system  spread  widely  after  the  death 
of  its  founder.  All  the  churches  and  public  institu- 
tions of  learning  in  Holland,  were  filled  with  able  men 
devoted  to  its  leading  views  and  principles.  Mr  Hal- 
lam  observes,  that  "  The  old  scholastic  philosophy 
became  ridiculous :  its  distinctions,  its  maxims,  were 
laughed  at,  as  its  adherents  complain ;  and  probably  a 
more  fatal  blow  was  given  to  the  Aristotelian  system 
by  Descartes  than  even  by  Bacon.  The  Cartesian 
theories  were  obnoxious  to  the  rigid  class  of  theolo- 
gians ;  but  two  parties  of  considerable  importance  in 
Holland,  the  Arminians  and  the  Coccejans,  generally 
espoused  the  new  philosophy.  Many  speculations  in 
theology  were  immediately  connected  with  it,  and  it 
acted  on  the  free  and  scrutinizing  spirit  which  began 
to  sap  the  bulwarks  of  established  orthodoxy."  f 

Descartes  was  viewed,  however,  by  some  parties  as 
an  obnoxious  innovator.  The  University  of  Ley  den, 
in  1651,  condemned  his  doctrines,  on  the  ground  that 
they  sapped  the  foundation  of  Aristotle's  system ;  and, 
about  the  same  time,  the  University  of  Utrecht  made  a 
formal  declaration  of  the  same  import,  j 

*  Lit.  Middle  Ages,  vol.  ii.  p.  456.  f  Ibid.,  vol.  iii.  p.  316. 

X  Tessel.  Hist.  Phil.  Cartesian*,  p.  55. 


GASSENDI,  AND  DESCARTES.  243 

It  is  almost  impossible  to  estimate  the  amount  of 
influence,  direct  and  indirect,  which  the  logical  specu- 
lations of  Descartes  have  exercised  over  the  science  of 
method  and  reasoning  since  his  day.  Nearly  all  the 
modern  theories  of  truth  and  evidence  touch  upon  it  in 
some  direction  or  other.  Dugald  Stewart  conceives, 
that  the  true  philosophy  of  modern  times  may  be 
dated  from  the  Principia  of  Descartes  rather  than  the 
Novum  Organum  of  Bacon,  or  even  the  works  of 
Locke.  Victor  Cousin  maintains,  that  Descartes  esta- 
blished in  France  the  same  method  that  Bacon  did  in 
England ;  and  that  he  did  this  with  less  grandeur 
of  imagination,  but  with  more  exactness  and  precision. 
"  The  Cartesian  philosophy,"  says  Mr  Hallam,  "  in 
one  sense  carried  in  itself  the  seeds  of  its  own  decline : 
it  was  the  Scylla  of  many  dogs ;  it  taught  men  to 
think  for  themselves,  and  to  think  often  better  than 
Descartes  had  done.  A  new  eclectic  philosophy,  or 
rather  the  genuine  spirit  of  free  inquiry,  made  Carte- 
sianism  cease  as  a  sect,  though  it  left  much  that  had 
been  introduced  by  it.  We  owe  thanks  to  those  Car- 
tesians of  the  seventeenth  century  for  their  strenuous 
assertion  of  reason  against  prescriptive  authority ;  the 
latter  end  of  this  age  was  signalized  by  the  overthrow 
of  a  despotism  which  had  fought  every  inch  in  its  re- 
treat, and  it  was  manifestly  after  a  struggle  on  the 
continent  with  this  new  philosophy,  that  it  was  ulti- 
mately vanquished."  * 

*  Lit.  Middle  Ages,  vol.  iii.  p.  317. 


244  LOGICAL  SCIENCE  FROM  DESCARTES 


CHAPTEB  XL 

LOGICAL  SCIENCE  FROM  DESCARTES  TILL  THE  PUBLICATION 
OF  LOCKE'S  ESSAY  IN  1690. 

After  the  writings  of  Bacon,  Hobbes,  Gassendi,  and 
Descartes  became  known  throughout  the  continent  and 
England,  logical  systems  became  modified  and  varied 
in  a  surprising  manner.  This  change  is  less  observable 
in  the  universities  than  out  of  them ;  but  in  every 
direction  we  find  writers  intensely  occupied  in  the  cul- 
tivation of  the  principles  of  logical  philosophy,  and  in 
moulding  the  formal  and  educational  treatises  on  the 
subject  into  a  conformity  with  the  general  theories  of 
reasoning  adopted  by  different  authors.  A  love  of 
change  seemed  to  have  taken  possession  of  the  philo- 
sophic mind  of  Europe. 

The  predominating  phase  belonging  to  the  class  of 
writers  in  this  portion  of  history,  is  that  of  seeking  out 
new  logical  methods  of  inquiry,  which  would,  in  some 
degree  at  least,  supply  the  deficiency  which  arose  out 
of  the  mere  verbal  and  phenomenal  character  which 
logic  had  assumed  from  Bacon's  time.  Principles  of 
logical  philosophy  had  been  propounded,  which  directly 


TILL  THE  PUBLICATION  OF  LOCKE'S  ESSAY.  245 

closed  the  door  against  theology,  In  treating  of  man's 
moral  obligation,  in  conjunction  with  religious  senti- 
ment and  feeling,  there  was  needed  a  solid  and  subjec- 
tive element,  altogether  apart  from  mere  verbal  defini- 
tions and  external  experience,  in  order  to  render  it 
intelligible,  and  to  effect  the  hidden  though  powerful 
instincts  of  the  heart.  We  must  see,  in  fact,  the  con- 
nexion between  God  and  ourselves.  This  must  be 
brought  fairly  and  directly  before  us.  Looking  merely 
at  the  outward  forms  or  constitution  of  things,  was  not 
sufficient ;  the  everyday  actions  and  feelings  of  men 
were  always  demanding  some  comprehensive  and  gene- 
ral rules  of  a  subjective  character,  by  which  they  might 
be  measured,  guided,  and  estimated.  Logical  methods, 
therefore,  which  were  based  on  mere  verbal  arrange- 
ments and  psychological  phenomena,  gave  only  a  one- 
sided and  imperfect  view  of  man's  nature,  and  the  na- 
ture of  truth  generally.  It.  was  from  considerations  of 
this  kind,  that  many  of  the  most  influential  writers  we 
are  now  about  to  notice  handled  the  subject  of  scientific 
evidence,  and  attempted  to  lay  down  such  logical  rules 
as  would  embrace  the  abstract  principles  of  theology, 
as  well  as  those  phenomena  more  directly  connected 
with  external  nature. 

The  generality  of  these  logical  methods  we  are  now 
about  to  sketch,  had  therefore  a  threefold  object — to 
shew  the  connexion  of  thought  with  language ;  to  dwell 
upon  physical  and  mental  phenomena  as  they  are  de- 
veloped in  our  sensational  system;  and  to  unfold  and 
bring  to  open  day  the  fundamental  conceptions  of 
Divinity  as  they  lie  in  the  depths  of  the  human  heart. 
It  was  requisite  that  each  distinct  object  which  these 


246  LOGICAL  SCIENCE  FROM  DESCARTES 

logical  methods  embraced,  should  be  individually  dwelt 
upon,  and  its  offices  and  limitations  accurately  defined, 
so  that  the  entire  structure  of  scientific  truth  and 
knowledge  should  be  of  fair  and  goodly  proportions. 
Philosophical  inquiry  was  to  be  unfettered,  and  science 
embraced  in  all  its  fulness  and  comprehensiveness;  a 
unity  of  character  was  to  be  impressed  upon  it,  and 
that  unity  was  to  rest  on  the  theological  element  as  its 
basis.  The  grand  object  of  all  reasoning,  as  now 
taught,  was  to  elevate  man  in  the  scale  of  intellectual 
existence,  and  to  make  him  a  more  moral,  religious, 
and  happy  being  than  heretofore.  This  was  the  burden 
of  all  the  logical  treatises  and  speculations  given  to  the 
world  at  this  period,  which  enjoyed  any  thing  like  a 
general  or  European  reputation  or  popularity.  They 
aimed  at  the  improvement  of  the  entire  man  in  head 
and  in  heart. 

Indeed,  at  no  period  did  the  important  element  of 
theological  authority  and  sentiment  exercise  a  more 
marked  influence  over  logical  systems  than  at  the  pre- 
sent epoch.  Religious  principles  were  regularly  and 
systematically  incorporated  with  almost  every  dialectic 
method.  They  formed  an  essential  ingredient  in  the 
philosophic  mind.  They  dictated  the  modes  in  which 
truth  should  be  sought  after  and  promulgated.  Logic 
had  no  limits  save  the  entire  science  of  man  in  all  his 
relations  in  life.  On  the  evidence  belonging  to  the 
several  branches  of  knowledge,  springing  out  of  these 
relations,  logical  writers  spake  with  authority  and 
power.  There  was  no  hesitation  or  compromise ;  nor 
was  there  allowed  any  appeal  from  their  decisions.  The 
spirit  which  animated  them  sprung  from  the  ennobling 


TILL  THE  PUBLICATION  OF  LOCKE'S  ESSAY.  247 

doctrines  they  espoused  relative  to  the  reason  or  soul 
of  man.  They  felt  it  incumbent  to  raise  it  from  the 
mire.  It  had  often  been  made  an  ignoble  thing,  and 
perishable  withal ;  like  the  leaf  that  spangles  on  the 
tree,  now  full  of  beauty  and  verdure,  but  soon  doomed 
to  fade  and  drop  from  its  stem,  to  be  again  resolved 
into  its  original  elements.  A  logic  which  taught,  or 
attempted  to  teach,  a  more  elevating  doctrine,  was 
therefore  received  by  Christian  societies  with  ardour 
and  gratitude,  and  as  possessing  an  especial  and  intense 
interest  in  the  eyes  of  those  who  had  the  guidance  of 
general  education.  Man  was  no  longer  considered  as 
only  a  finer  specimen  of  the  animal,  but  had  within  an 
immaterial  and  immortal  principle,  which  the  coldness 
of  the  grave  could  not  destroy.  This  was  the  true 
secret  of  that  influence  which  many  of  the  works  we 
are  now  about  to  notice  exercised  over  the  logical  studies 
and  opinions  of  the  world. 

And  as  a  necessary  consequence,  in  some  measure, 
of  this  vigilant  search  after  subjective  logical  methods, 
and  the  desire  to  render  them  extensively  useful,  and 
to  bring  them  to  bear  on  all  departments  of  human 
knowledge,  was  a  practice  which  now  sprung  up,  of 
expounding  logical  principles  and  rules  through  the 
medium  of  some  particular  subject  or  science.  Some 
writers  took  mathematics,  some  law,  some  divinity,  and 
some  the  interpretation  of  Scripture  facts  and  doc- 
trines. 

Godfrey  William  Leibnitz. — Few  names  in  modern 
philosophy  have  been  more  influential  on  logical  science 
than  that  of  Leibnitz,  especially  in  Germany  and  the 
north  of  Europe.    His  speculations,  though  of  a  general 


248  LOGICAL  SCIENCE — LEIBNITZ. 

and  abstruse  character,  have  nevertheless  a  pointed 
reference  to  the  great  questions  connected  with  scien- 
tific truth  and  certainty.  His  logical  investigations  are, 
however,  so  much  mingled  with  mental  theories  and  dis- 
cussions, as  to  render  it  a  difficult  matter  to  separate 
the  former  from  the  general  mass  of  his  philosophy, 
and  present  them,  in  all  their  unalloyed  purity,  to 
the  attention  of  the  general  reader.  Wherever  we  cast 
the  eye  over  his  productions,  we  meet  with  the  hypo- 
thetical element  in  rich  and  varied  abundance. 

To  a  certain  extent  Leibnitz  was  an  expounder  of  the 
Cartesian  philosophy;  but  his  theory  of  the  universe 
leads  to  conclusions  very  different  from  the  theory  of 
Descartes.  The  monads,  or  ultimate  atoms  of  Leibnitz, 
play  an  important  part  in  his  cosmogony ;  and  all  his 
speculations  on  the  nature  of  scientific  truth,  have  a 
close  affinity  with  the  doctrines  involved  in  this  peculiar 
theory.  A  knowledge  of  it  is  certainly  desirable,  in 
order  to  see  the  nature  of  his  logical  views;  but  its 
development  requires  more  space  than  is  at  our  com- 
mand. We  must  therefore  attempt  to  make  his 
notions  on  the  nature  of  reasoning  somewhat  intelli- 
gible, without  going  over  the  entire  range  of  his  philo- 
sophy. 

According  to  Leibnitz,  all  rational  perceptions  are 
connected  together  by  a  law  which  is  superior  to  that 
of  memory.  This  law  rests,  however,  on  two  principles, 
and  these  form  the  basis  of  every  species  of  reasoning 
or  dialectic  argumentation.  The  one  principle  is  the 
sufficient  reason,  and  the  other  the  principle  of  contra- 
diction. 

By  the  principle  of  the  sufficient  reason,  we  consider 


LOGICAL  SCIENCE LEIBNITZ.  249 

that  no  fact  can  occur  without  reason  sufficient  for  its 
occurrence  in  a  particular  manner,  rather  than  other- 
wise. All  theories  or  arrangements  of  facts  rest  upon 
this  principle. 

The  principle  of  contradiction  enables  us  to  mark 
and  distinguish  what  is  false  or  untrue ;  because  what- 
ever implies  at  one  and  the  same  time  an  affirmation 
and  a  negation,  involves  a  contradiction — as  if,  for  ex- 
ample, we  were  to  affirm  that  the  same  thing  could  be 
and  not  be  at  the  same  moment.  This  principle  of 
contradiction  is  the  principle  of  identity,  and  the  basis 
on  which  all  necessary  truths  rest. 

The  principle  of  sufficient  reason  deals  with  facts, 
and  the  principle  of  contradiction  with  indemonstrable 
truths.  Apparently  these  two  principles  are  distinct 
when  considered  in  reference  to  two  different  species  of 
knowledge  ;  yet  the  one  is  derived  from  the  other.  The 
necessity  of  a  sufficient  reason  for  every  thing  which 
exists,  is  itself  a  necessary  or  fundamental  truth  in  all 
reasonings,  because  the  negative  of  it  cannot  be  con- 
ceived. Ultimately,  therefore,  the  principle  of  contra- 
diction is  the  sole  and  common  root  from  which  all 
scientific  truth  springs. 

These  principles,  developed  by  great  talent  and  ori- 
ginal genius,  extended  themselves  in  every  direction 
throughout  Germany  and  other  neighbouring  states, 
and  exercised  a  marked  influence  over  logical  studies 
and  systems  of  logic  very  soon  after  their  promulgation. 

In  respect  to  the  syllogistic  mode  of  reasoning, 
Leibnitz  expresses  himself  a  qualified  admirer  of  it.  In 
his  criticisms  on  the  observations  which  Locke  made 
upon  it,  he  maintains  that,  though  he  agreed  in  the 


250  LOGICAL  SCIENCE LORD  HERBERT. 

main  with  the  English  philosopher's  statements,  he  still 
thought  that  the  syllogism  ought  not  to  be  indiscrimi- 
nately condemned.  It  has  its  value  chiefly  as  an  in- 
strument of  classification,  and  for  the  prompt  and 
ready  disposal  of  knowledge  previously  obtained  or 
agreed  upon  by  disputants.  Even  if  it  be  admitted 
that  men  ignorant  of  artificial  logic,  reason  sometimes 
more  promptly  and  correctly  than  those  intimately 
skilled  in  it;  yet  this  does  not  prove  its  absolute  in- 
utility, any  more  than  because  we  occasionally  find  per- 
sons quick  and  correct  at  arithmetical  accounts,  who 
nevertheless  know  scarcely  any  thing  of  formal  figures, 
that  therefore  the  science  of  numbers  is  of  little  use. 
Syllogisms  have  undoubtedly  been  greatly  abused,  and 
too  often  made  the  instruments  of  ingenious  trifling  and 
sophistication ;  but  still  they  may  prove  advantageous 
in  quickening  the  faculties  of  the  mind,  and  imparting 
to  them  a  vigour  and  energy  which  they  would  not 
otherwise  possess. 

Lord  Herbert  of  Cherbury  was  a  speculative  logical 
writer  of  this  period  of  some  note  and  eccentricity. 
His  general  views-  were  decidedly  sceptical  as  to  the 
nature  and  extent  of  general  evidence ;  but  his  influ- 
ence on  the  current  of  philosophic  thought  has  hitherto 
been  but  slender  and  limited. 

His  lordship's  work,  De  Veritate  (1624),  is  an  at- 
tempt to  point  out  the  sure  means  of  discerning  and 
discovering  truth, — distinguishing,  however,  the  truth 
from  revelation,  from  probability,  from  possibility,  and 
from  falsehood.  General  or  absolute  truth  rests  upon 
seven  fundamental  axioms, — 1st,  Truth  exists ;  2nd,  It 
is  coeval  with  the  things  to  which  it  relates ;  3d,  Its 


LOGICAL  SCIENCE BLAISE  PASCAL.  251 

existence  is  every  where ;  4th,  It  is  self-evident ;  oth, 
There  are  as  many  different  truths  as  there  are  differ- 
ences among  things ;  6th,  We  recognise  these  differ- 
ences by  our  natural  faculties;  and,  7th,  There  is  a 
general  truth  attached  to  all  these  several  truths.  An 
analysis  of  these  axioms  gives  the  following  results : — 
All  truth  is  distinguished  into  the  truth  of  the  thing  or 
object, — the  truth  of  appearance,  the  truth  of  percep- 
tion, and  the  truth  of  the  understanding. 

The  powers  of  the  human  mind  being  limited,  we 
can  only  know  or  grasp  the  truth  of  things  in  a  corre- 
sponding degree.  There  must  be  a  given  or  determined 
relation  between  the  truth  of  things  as  they  are  in 
themselves  and  our  intellect ;  but  this  relation  is  not 
always  an  object  of  accurate  perception.  In  order  to 
seize  it  in  all  its  totality  or  unity  of  being,  it  requires 
we  should  know  all  the  properties  of  things,  which 
knowledge  is  denied  us.  A  conditional  or  limited  view 
of  this  relation  is  therefore  all  we  can  obtain ;  and  this 
depends  upon  three  principles, — 1st,  That  objects  be 
neither  immensely  large  or  minutely  small ;  2nd,  That 
every  object  should  have  its  principle  of  difference,  or 
its  individuality,  distinctly  marked  out  from  other 
things  with  which  it  may  be  connected ;  and,  3d,  That 
this  individualization  should  be  in  accordance  or  har- 
mony with  some  sense  or  perceptive  organ.  All  truth 
must  rest  upon  these  primary  conditions. 

All  the  faculties  of  the  human  soul,  so  far  as  the 
discovery  and  appreciation  of  truth  is  concerned,  are 
four — instinct,  internal  perception,  external  sensation, 
and  reason. 

Blaise    Pascal, — Pascal   is    not    a  regular   logical 


252  LOGICAL  SCIENCE — BLAISE  PASCAL. 

writer,  but  lie  lias  treated  of  some  of  the  principles  of 
reasoning  in  a  way  which,  has  excited  the  attention  of 
many  eminent  logicians  since  his  day.  He  says  but 
little,  but  that  little  is  of  weighty  import. 

He  had  meditated  long  and  deeply  on  the  nature  of 
truth  in  every  department  of  human  knowledge  and 
speculation,  and  had  fixed  in  his  own  mind  the  precise 
amount  of  evidence  which  each  science  yielded.  In 
point  of  logical  certainty,  he  gave  the  preference  to 
geometry,  because,  he  says,  geometers  are  the  only 
reasoners  who  always  keep  the  true  laws  of  demonstra- 
tion uniformly  before  them.  These,  according  to  his 
system  of  classification,  are  eight  in  number.  1st,  To 
define  nothing  which  cannot  be  expressed  in  clearer 
terms  than  those  in  which  it  is  already  expressed  ;  2nd, 
To  leave  no  obscure  or  equivocal  terms  undefined ; 
3d,  To  employ  in  the  definition  no  terms  not  already 
known ;  4th,  To  omit  nothing  in  the  principles  from 
which  we  argue,  unless  we  are  sure  it  is  granted ;  5th, 
To  lay  down  no  axiom  which  is  not  perfectly  self-evi- 
dent ;  6th,  To  demonstrate  nothing  which  is  as  clear 
already  as  it  can  be  made ;  7th,  To  prove  every  thing 
in  the  least  doubtful  by  means  of  self-evident  axioms, 
or  of  propositions  already  demonstrated  ;  8th,  To  sub- 
stitute mentally  the  definition  instead  of  the  thing 
defined. 

Pascal  affirms  that  the  first,  fourth,  and  sixth  rules 
are  not  absolutely  requisite  to  avoid  erroneous  conclu- 
sions, but  the  other  five  rules  are  indispensable.  He 
also  remarks,  that  although  they  may  be  found  in  our 
ordinary  books  of  logic,  yet  none  but  geometers  have 
recognised  their  importance,  or  been  guided  by  them. 


LOGICAL  SCIENCE — POET-ROYAL  LOGIC.  253 

All  other  rules  than  those  now  given  are  mischievous 
or  useless ;  they  embody,  he  maintains,  the  entire  art 
of  demonstration.* 

The  Port-Koyal  Logic. — The  work  which  goes 
under  this  name  forms  an  important  landmark  in  mo- 
dern logical  science.  It  was  the  production  of  several 
writers — Arnauld,  Nicole,  Sacy,  Lancelot,  and  others ; 
but  chiefly  the  two  first.  Indeed,  according  to  the 
manuscript  of  the  younger  Eacine,  they  were  the  sole 
writers  of  it ;  for  it  is  there  stated,  that  the  disserta- 
tions and  additions  are  by  Nicole ;  the  first  parts  are 
by  Arnauld  and  Mcole  together ;  and  the  fourth,  On 
Method,  by  Arnauld  alone.  The  first  edition  appeared 
in  1662,  under  the  following  title  : — La  Logique,  ou 
V  Art  de  Penser ;  contenant  outre  les  Megles  communes, 
plusieurs  Observations  nouvelles,  propres  a  former  le  juge- 
ment. 

It  is  stated  in  the  advertisement,  that  its  production 
arose  from  the  following  circumstance  : — In  the  course 
of  a  conversation,  it  was  mentioned  as  a  somewhat 
remarkable  thing,  that  a  person  had  made  himself  well 
acquainted  with  the  greater  part  of  logic  in  fifteen 
days.  This  led  one  of  the  company  to  remark  in  a 
sportive  mood,  that  if  Mr  So-and-so  would  take  the 
trouble,  he  would  engage  to  learn  him  all  that  was 
really  useful  in  logic  in  four  or  five  days.  From  this 
random  proposal  it  was  resolved  to  make  the  attempt. 
An  abstract  of  the  science  was  determined  upon,  which, 
it  was  thought,  would  not  occupy  more  than  one  day ; 
but,  instead  of  this  limited  time,  it  took  four  or  five 
days,  and  at  the  end  of  this  period  the  work  was  sub- 

*  ffiuvres.  i.  66. 


254  LOGICAL  SCIENCE — PORT-ROYAL  LOGIC. 

stantially  finished,  nearly  in  the  state  we  now  have  it. 
The  treatise  has  been  translated  into  nearly  every  lan- 
guage in  Europe.* 

The  following  is  the  definition  of  logic  given  by  the 
authors  of  the  Port-Royal : — "  Logic  is  the  art  of 
directing  reason  aright  in  obtaining  the  knowledge  of 
things,  for  the  instruction  both  of  ourselves  and  others. 
It  consists  of  the  reflections  which  have  been  made  on 
the  four  principal  operations  of  the  mind — conceiving, 
judging,  reasoning,  and  disposing" 

The  logic  of  the  Port-Royal  is  divided  into  four  parts. 
I.  Containing  reflections  on  Ideas,  or  on  the  first  opera- 
tion of  the  mind,  which  is  called  conceiving, — This  part 
embraces  the  nature  and  origin  of  our  ideas — their 
relation  to  their  objects — the  ten  categories  of  Aristotle 
— the  ideas  of  things  and  signs — ideas  relative  to  their 
simplicity  or  composition — of  ideas  relative  to  their 
generality,  particularity,  and  singularity — of  genus, 
species,  difference,  property,  and  accident — of  complex 
terms,  universal  and  particular — of  clear  and  distinct, 
of  obscure  and  confused  ideas — examples  of  these  from 
morals — of  the  causes  of  confusion  and  obscurity  of 
our  thoughts  and  discourses — of  the  nature  and  influ- 
ence of  definition,  and  of  the  ideas  which  the  mind 
adds  to  those  which  are  expressed  by  words  or  signs. 

Part  II.  Containing  the  reflections  which  men  have 
made  on  their  judgments. — This  section  of  the  work 
contains  the  nature  of  words  relative  to  propositions — 
of  the  verb — of  what  is  implied  by  a  proposition — of 
simple,  accidental,  and  compound  propositions — of  the 

*  There  are  three  English  translations  of  the  work  ;  one  in  1680,  another  in  1716, 
and  the  third  by  Mr  Baynes,  1850.     I  have  quoted  from  the  last. 


LOGICAL  SCIEXCE — PORT-KOYAL  LOGIC.  255 

falsity  incident  to  complex  propositions — of  affirmation 
and  negation,  subject  and  attribute,  relative  to  propo- 
sitions. 

Part  III.  Reasoning. — The  nature  of  reasoning — 
the  syllogism — rules  relative  to  its  figures  and  modes — 
of  sophistical  and  bad  reasoning  in  civil  life  and  in 
common  discourse. 

Part  IV.  Of  Method. — What  is  implied  in  this — 
two  kinds  of  it — method  of  composition — method  of 
geometers,  axioms,  demonstration — method  of  the 
sciences — what  can  be  known  by  faith,  human  and 
divine — rules  for  the  direction  of  reason — of  the  judg- 
ments we  should  form  relative  to  future  events. 

Arnauld's  system  of  reasoning  is  essentially  an  expo- 
sition of  Descartes'  doctrines  on  the  same  subject, 
though  there  was  a  difference  between  these  two  philo- 
sophers on  some  matters  of  minor  import.  The  word 
idea  is  used  in  the  Port-Eoyal  logic  in  its  widest  and 
most  common  acceptation ;  standing  for  notions,  per- 
ceptions, images,  volitions,  conceptions,  desires,  &c. 
This  is  an  important  point  to  be  kept  in  view,  in  judg- 
ing of  the  nature  and  merits  of  this  celebrated  and 
popular  treatise. 

The  great  end  of  all  logical  studies  is,  according  to 
Arnauld,  to  perfect  our  judgments  on  subjects  connect- 
ed with  human  nature — to  view  man  aright  in  his 
several  relations,  as  a  moral,  political,  and  religious 
being.  This  is  emphatically  dwelt  upon  in  the  follow- 
ing observations  : — "  The  main  object  of  our  attention 
should  be,  to  form  our  judgment,  and  render  it  as 
exact  as  possible  ;  and  to  this  end  the  greater  part  of 
our  studies  ought  to  tend.     We  employ  reason  as  an 


256  LOGICAL  SCIENCE — POET-ROYAL  LOGIC. 

instrument  for  acquiring  the  sciences ;  whereas,  on  the 
contrary,  we  ought  to  avail  ourselves  of  the  sciences  as 
an  instrument  for  perfecting  our  reason — -justness  of 
mind  being  infinitely  more  important  than  all  the 
speculative  knowledge  which  we  can  obtain  by  means 
of  sciences  the  most  solid  and  well  established.  This 
ought  to  lead  wise  men  to  engage  in  these  only  as  far 
as  they  may  contribute  to  that  end,  and  to  make  them 
the  exercise  only,  and  not  the  occupation  of  their  men- 
tal powers. 

"  If  we  have  not  this  end  in  view,  the  study  of  the 
speculative  sciences,  such  as  geometry,  astronomy,  and 
physics,  will  be  little  else  than  a  vain  amusement,  and 
scarcely  better  than  the  ignorance  of  these  things, 
which  has  at  least  this  advantage — that  it  is  less  labo- 
rious, and  affords  no  room  for  that  empty  vanity  which 
is  often  found  connected  with  these  barren  and  unpro- 
fitable knowledges.  These  sciences  not  only  have  nooks 
and  hidden  places  of  very  little  use ;  they  are  even 
totally  useless,  considered  in  themselves  and  for  them- 
selves alone.  Men  are  not  born  to  employ  their  time 
in  measuring  lines,  in  examining  the  relations  of  angles, 
and  considering  the  different  movements  of  matter — 
their  minds  are  too  great,  their  life  too  short,  their  time 
too  precious,  to  be  engrossed  with  such  petty  objects ; 
but  they  ought  to  be  just,  equitable,  prudent,  in  all 
their  converse,  in  all  their  actions,  and  in  all  the  busi- 
ness they  transact,  and  to  these  things  they  ought  spe- 
cially to  discipline  and  train  themselves.  This  care  and 
study  .are  so  very  necessary,  that  it  is  strange  that  this 
exactness  of  judgment  should  be  so  rare  a  quality."* 

*  Discourse  I. 


LOGICAL  SCIENCE POET-ROYAL  LOGIC.  257 

The  Port-Koyal  logic  was  one  of  the  boldest  attempts 
to  overthrow  the  Aristotelian  system  that  had  been 
made  up  to  the  time  of  its  publication ;  and  its  anti- 
pathy to  that  system  is  more  decided  and  general  than 
what  at  first  sight  appears  from  the  work  itself — inas- 
much as  the  syllogistic  rules  are  retained  and  given  at 
full  length,  But  this  is  evidently  done  under  the  im- 
pression that  it  would  not  have  been  prudent  to  carry 
opposition  to  a  greater  extent.  The  whole  of  the  chapters 
of  the  work,  from  the  third  in  part  third,  to  the  twelfth, 
are  considered  as  consisting  of  matters  of  no  practical 
utility.  These  contain  the  rules  for  the  various  modes 
and  figures  of  the  syllogism.  The  authors  say  in  refer- 
ence to  these — "  More  of  doubt  arose  in  relation  to 
certain  matters  difficult  enough  and  but  of  little  use — 
such  as  the  conversion  of  propositions  and  the  demon- 
stration of  the  rules  of  figure  ;  but  we  have  determined 
not  to  omit  them,  since  their  very  difficulty  is  not  alto- 
gether without  its  use." 

The  ten  categories  are  given  at  length  in  the  work ; 
but  the  authors  remark  that  "  these  are  the  ten  cate- 
gories of  Aristotle,  about  which  there  has  been  so  much 
mystery,  although  in  truth  they  are  in  themselves  of 
very  little  use ;  and  not  only  do  not  contribute  much 
to  form  the  judgment,  which  is  the  end  of  true  logic, 
but  often  are  very  injurious,  for  two  reasons, — First, 
we  regard  the  categories  as  something  founded  on 
reason  and  truth,  whereas  they  are  altogether  arbitrary, 
and  are  founded  only  in  the  imagination  of  a  man  who 
had  no  authority  to  prescribe  a  law  to  others ;  and  the 
second  reason  which  renders  the  study  of  the  cate- 
gories dangerous  is,  that  it  accustoms  men  to  satisfy 

R 


258  LOGICAL  SCIENCE — PORT-ROYAL  LOGIC. 

themselves  with  words,  and  to  imagine  that  they  know 
all  things,  when  they  know  only  arbitrary  names,  which 
form  in  the  mind  no  clear  and  distinct  idea  of  the 
things."* 

The  fourth  part,  on  method,  is  a  valuable  portion  of 
the  work.  Pascal's  rules  of  evidence  are  here  adopted, 
but  enlarged  and  illustrated  at  greater  length.  Method 
is  considered  one  of  the  most  useful  and  important 
portions  of  logical  science.  It  substantially  consists  of 
a  series  of  several  reasonings,  by  which  we  incontest- 
ably  prove  some  truth. 

"  The  Port-Eoyal  logic,"  says  Mr  Hallam,  "  though 
not  perhaps  very  much  read  in  England,  has  always  been 
reckoned  among  the  best  works  in  that  science,  and 
certainly  had  a  great  influence  in  rendering  it  more 
metaphysical,  more  ethical  (for  much  is  said  by  Arnauld 
on  the  moral  discipline  of  the  mind,  in  order  to  fit  it 
for  the  investigation  of  truth),  more  exempt  from 
technical  barbarisms,  and  trifling  definitions  and  divi- 
sions. It  became  more  and  more  acknowledged,  that 
the  rules  of  syllogism  go  a  very  little  way  in  rendering 
the  mind  able  to  follow  a  course  of  inquiry  without 
error,  much  less  in  assisting  it  to  discover  truth ;  and 
that  even  this  vaunted  prerogative  of  securing  us  from 
fallacy  is  nearly  ineffectual  in  exercise.  The  substitu- 
tion of  the  French  language  in  its  highest  polish,  for 
the  uncouth  Latinity  of  the  Aristotelian,  was  another 
advantage  of  which  the  Cartesian  school  legitimately 
availed  themselves."")' 

M.  Crousaz  observes  in  his  Logic,  that  the  Port-Eoyal 
logic  exercised  a  more  powerful  influence  in  reforming 

*  Tart  I.,  chap,  ill,  t  Lit.  Middle  Ages,  vol.  iii.  p.  322. 


LOGICAL  SCIENCE MALEBRANCHE.  259 

academical  instruction  throughout  the  whole  continent 
of  Europe,  than  the  writings  of  either  Bacon  or  Des- 
cartes. We  may  also  acid  the  testimony  of  Stewart, 
who  says,  " Ho  publication,  certainly,  prior  to  Locke's 
Essaij,  can  be  named,  containing  so  much  good  sense, 
and  so  little  nonsense  on  the  science  of  logic ;  and  very 
few  have  since  appeared  on  the  same  subject,  which 
can  be  justly  preferred  to  it  in  point  of  practical 
utility."* 

Father  Malebranche. — This  philosopher  based  his 
logical  evidence  upon  theology.  His  Recherche  de  la 
Verite  was  published  in  1674,  and  excited  considerable 
attention  among  the  scientific  men  of  Europe. 

The  grand  principle  of  his  system  is,  that  we  see  all 
things  in  Grod.  In  this  he  follows  the  example  of 
Descartes  and  many  others ;  only  he  works  out  the 
problem  in  a  very  original  and  talented  manner.  All 
scientific  truth  must  ultimately  rest  upon  an  infinitely 
true  and  perfect  being ;  no  other  foundation  is  con- 
ceivable. This  idea  of  the  Divine  nature  implies,  on 
the  one  hand,  the  existence  of  its  object ;  and,  on  the 
other,  all  the  individual  ideas,  which  can  never  be  any 
thing  else  save  particular  aspects  or  phases  of  the  One 
universal  idea  of  being.  "  The  union,"  says  he,  "  of 
the  soul  to  God,  is  the  sole  means  by  which  we  acquire 
a  knowledge  of  what  is  true.  This  union  has,  however, 
been  rendered  so  obscure  by  our  original  transgression, 
that  few  can  understand  what  is  implied  by  it — to 
those  who  are  blindly  led  by  the  dictates  of  sense  and 
passion,  it  appears  imaginary.  The  same  cause  has  so 
strengthened  and  fortified  the  connexion  between  the 

*  Dissert.,  p.  80. 


260  LOGICAL  SCIENCE MALEBKANCHE. 

soul  and  the  body,  that  we  consider  them  as  one  sub- 
stance, of  which  the  latter  portion  is  the  principal  part. 
It  is  from  this  reason  that  we  may  be  all  apprehensive 
that  we  do  not  clearly  distinguish  the  confused  sounds 
with  which  the  senses  fill  the  imagination,  from  that 
pure  voice  of  truth  which  speaks  to  the  soul.  The 
body  speaks  in  a  tone  louder  than  Grod  himself;  and 
our  pride  makes  us  presumptuous  enough  to  judge 
without  waiting  for  those  words  of  truth,  without 
which  we  cannot  really  judge  at  all." 

The  work  is  divided  into  six  books.  The  five  first 
are  devoted  to  pointing  out  the  errors  of  judgment 
arising  out  of  the  senses,  the  understanding,  the  imagi- 
nation, the  natural  inclinations  or  desires,  and  the  pas- 
sions. The  sixth  book  contains  the  logical  method  of 
avoiding  these. 

The  Aristotelian  logic,  though  rapidly  falling  in- 
to discredit  among  enlightened  laymen  in  almost 
every  country  in  Europe,  had  still  a  numerous  host  of 
firm  and  zealous  friends  in  most  of  the  universities, 
and  particularly  in  the  bosom  of  the  Catholic  Church 
generally ,  The  -theories  of  Descartes  and  Leibnitz, 
the  common-sense  views  of  Arnauld,  and  the  philo- 
sophy of  Bacon,  were  making  a  deep  impression  among 
thinking  men  in  every  direction ;  but  in  proportion  as 
this  innovating  spirit  gained  strength,  in  the  same 
ratio  did  alarm  spread  itself  among  the  advocates  of  the 
purely  syllogistic  theory.  The  Jesuits  were  conspicu- 
ously active  in  retaining  the  ancient  method  of  instruc- 
tion ;  and  the  Sorbonne  of  Paris,  in  1693,  raised  its 
voice  in  their  behalf,  by  ordering  Aristotle  to  be  main- 
tained in  all  his  integrity  and  power. 


LOGICAL  SCIENCE — DIGBY,  WHITE,  GLANVIL.        261 

These  conflicting  opinions  gave  rise  to  various  logi- 
cal speculations,  having  for  their  ostensible  object  a 
reformation  of  the  science  to  some  extent,  but  the  real 
aim  of  which  was  to  give  support  to  one  or  other  of 
the  leading  systems  which  divided  the  philosophical 
opinion  of  Europe.  The  religious  element  predomi- 
nated in  most  of  these  logical  publications,  though 
there  were  exceptions  of  a  sceptical  cast  to  the  gene- 
rality of  the  rule. 

Edward  Digby  wrote  his  De  Duplici  Methodo  libri 
duo,  unicam  P.  Rami  Methodum  Refutantes,  in  1589 ; 
a  work  of  considerable  merit.  The  main  object  of  it 
is,  to  point  out  the  advantages  of  method  in  the  expo- 
sition of  those  principles  and  rules  which  lead  the  mind 
to  sound  reasoning.  His  views  on  this  subject  are 
very  much  in  unison  with  those  developed  by  James 
Concio,  already  noticed.  Thomas  White,  a  Soman 
Catholic  clergyman,  argues  for  the  supremacy  of  the 
syllogistic  theory,  and  maintains  that  it  is  admirably 
calculated  to  promote  sound  knowledge.  His  observa- 
tions are  contained  in  a  work,  entitled,  An  Exclusion 
of  Sceptics  from  all  title  of  dispute  ;  being  an  Answer  to 
the  Vanity  of  Dogmatizing.  White  taught  publicly  at 
Lisbon,  Douay,  Rome,  and  Paris.  Joseph  Grlanvil,  the 
author  of  The  Vanity  of  Dogmatizing  (1661),  against 
which  White  directs  his  censures,  has  a  violent  attack 
upon  the  Aristotelian  logic,  which,  it  is  affirmed,  is 
nothing  but  a  play  upon  words.  "  It  tells  us  nothing," 
says  the  author,  "  but  what  a  child  may  understand." 
This  publication  was  afterwards  entitled  Sceptis  Scien- 
tifica ;  and  has  received  the  high  commendation  of 
Dugald  Stewart,  who  observes,  that  it  is  "  one  of  the 


262        LOGICAL  SCIENCE — SIK  KE.NELM  DIGBY,  ETC. 

most  acute  and  original  productions  of  which  English 
philosophy  had  then  to  boast."*  Glanvil  likewise  stig- 
matizes the  system  of  Aristotle  in  severe  terms,  in  his 
Plus  Ultra,  or  the  Progress  and  Advancement  of  Know- 
ledge since  Aristotle  (1668).  His  own  views  on  the 
nature  of  scientific  truth  may  be  gathered  from  the 
following  observations : — "  The  philosophy  that  must 
signify  either  for  light  or  use,  must  not  be  the  work  of 
the  mind  turned  in  upon  itself;  but  it  must  be  raised 
from  the  observations  and  applications  of  sense,  and  take 
its  account  from  things,  as  they  are  in  the  sensible 
world.  The  illustrious  Lord  Bacon  hath  noted  this  as 
the  chief  cause  of  the  unprofitableness  of  the  former 
methods  of  knowledge,  namely,  that  they  were  but  the 
exercises  of  the  mind,  making  conclusions,  and  spinning 
out  notions  from  its  own  native  store ;  from  which 
mode  of  proceeding  nothing  but  dispute  and  air  could 
be  expected."  f 

Sir  Kenelm  Digby,  grandson  of  Edward  Digby,  just 
noticed,  was  a  stout  defender  of  the  Aristotelian  logic. 
His  opinions  on  this  subject  will  be  found  in  his  Insti- 
tutiones  Peripateticce.  John  Morris,  in  his  Essay  to- 
wards the  Theory  of  the  Ideal  or  Intelligible  World, 
endeavoured  to  illustrate  the  logical  philosophy  of 
Plato,  relative  to  general  truths  and  essences.  In  this 
he  follows  the  footsteps  of  Malebranche.  Wallis's 
work,  Institutio  Logicce  ad  Communes  Usus  Accommo- 
data  (1687),  became  generally  well  known  among 
logicians  in  England.  And  Oldfield's  Essay  towards 
the  Improvement  of  Reason,  founded  upon  some  of  the 
logical   principles   of  the  Port-Royal,    obtained   some 

*  Dissert,,,  p.  217.  t  Plus  Ultra,  \\  52. 


LOGICAL  SCIENCE BUKGEKSDICIUS,  KEG1S.  263 

limited  notice  in  its  day.  About  this  time  appeared 
Aldrich's  Compendium  Artis  Logicce.  We  have  the 
Artis  Logicce  of  the  immortal  John  Milton,  who  de- 
fines logic  to  be  "  the  art  of  reasoning  well."  His 
work  is  divided  into  two  parts ;  the  one  relates  to  the 
nature  and  invention  of  different  kinds  of  arguments, 
and  the  other  to  the  disposing  of  them  in  formal  order. 
The  last  division  is  worked  out  in  conformity  to  the 
logical  views  of  Peter  Ramus.  Method,  Milton  says, 
is  of  vital  moment  in  logic. 

Fran.  Burgersdicius  was  a  distinguished  logician  at 
this  period,  and  published  his  Instit.  Logicce  ad  Aristo- 
telis  prcecepta  Concinatce  at  Cambridge  in  1647,  and  at 
Geneva  in  1651.  Smiglecius  likewise  obtained  no  in- 
considerable reputation  in  the  path  of  logical  literature.* 
Louis  de  la  Forge  examines  the  nature  of  truth  through 
a  Cartesian  medium  in  his  Traite  de  V Esprit  de  V Homme 
(1666).  Of  what  does  knowledge  or  truth  consist? 
He  answers  the  question  thus :  "  To  know  is  simply  to 
perceive  that  which  is  internally  represented  in  the 
mind."  Innate  ideas  are  of  three  classes — the  sub- 
stance which  thinks,  the  substance  which  is  extended, 
and  the  third  is  a  composition  of  both.  Pierre  Sylvain 
Regis  followed  nearly  in  the  footsteps  of  De  la  Forge. 
The  logic  of  Regis  will  be  found  in  his  Systeme  de  la 
Philosophic  (1690).  At  the  commencement  he  states, 
"All  I  have  said  being  due  to  M.  Descartes,  whose 
principles  and  method  I  have  followed  even  in  explana- 
tions that  are  different  from  my  own."  In  accordance 
with  his  master,  he  tells  us  that  all  knowledge  from 
reasoning  is  acquired  "by  a  simple  and  internal  in- 

*  "  La  Logique  de  Smiglecius  est  un  bel  ouvvage." — Rapin. 


264  LOGICAL  SCIENCE — HUET,  FOUCHEK. 

tuition,  which  precedes  all  acquired  knowledge,  and 
which  I  call  consciousness."  In  the  author's  logic,  he 
professes  to  be  guided  by  the  doctrines  of  the  Port- 
Royal,  although  he  does  not  give  any  account  of  the 
figures  and  modes  of  the  syllogism.*  Huet,  Bishop  of 
Avranches,  discusses  several  of  the  leading  principles  of 
logic  in  his  several  works,  Traite  Philosophique  sur  la 
Faiblesse  de  V Esprit  Humain,  Demonstratio  JEvangelica, 
Qucestiones  Alnetance,  and  the  Censura  Philosophice 
Cartesiance.  Huet's  notions  of  scientific  evidence  in- 
clined to  scepticism.  "  We  demand,"  says  he,  "  a 
criterium  of  truth — a  sign,  a  stamp  to  which  conviction 
shall  be  attached.  But  where  is  this  criterium  ?  It  is 
not  in  man,  and  nature  declares  she  knows  nothing  of 
it.  It  cannot  be  in  the  instruments  we  use,  for  our 
senses  and  imagination  deal  only  in  deceptive  impres- 
sions ;  and  the  understanding  and  reason  offer  no 
grounds  for  certainty,  since  they  are  both  a  hidden 
mystery  to  us.  Nor  need  we  look  for  it  in  the  active 
energy  of  the  mind  itself.  In  fine,  to  obtain  a  criterium 
of  truth,  we  must  previously  know  what  truth  is ;  whilst 
again,  to  know  truth,  we  should  still  require  a  criterium. 
Of  what  importance  is  a  rule,  if  it  be  not  a  right  one '? 
And  how  can  we  know  it  is  right  ?"f 

We  find  a  portion  of  the  same  scepticism  in  the 
Dissertation  sur  la  Recherche  de  la  Verite,  ou  sur  la 
Logiques  des  Academicians  of  the  Abbe  Foucher.  He 
also  maintains  the  doctrine  that  there  are  no  necessary 

*  "  Nous  ne  dirons  rien  des  figures  ni  des  syllogismes  en  general :  car  Men  que 
tout  cela  puisse  servir  de  quelque  chose  pour  la  speculation  de  la  logique,  il  n'est  au 
moins  d'aucun  usage  pour  la  practique,  laquelle  est  I'unique  but  que  nous  nous 
sommes  proposes  dans  co  traite." — P.  37. 

f  Traite,  ch.  8. 


LOGICAL  SCIENCE HIRNHAIM,  DERODON.  265 

truths  connected  with  the  sciences  of  physics  and  morals  ; 
they  are  only  to  be  found  in  mathematics,  and  in  the 
demonstrations  of  the  existence  of  a  Deity.  The  logi- 
cal opinions  of  P.  Marsenne  will  be  found  in  his  work, 
La  Verite  des  Sciences  contre  les  Sceptiques.  As  an 
antidote  in  some  measure  to  the  doubt  pervading  some 
of  these  speculations,  we  have  the  treatise  of  Jerome 
Hirnhaim  of  Prague,  entitled,  De  la  Certitude  des  Con- 
naissances  Humaines  (1671).  He  maintains  that  all 
the  reasonings  of  men  are  grounded  upon  a  few  ele- 
mentary principles  of  an  intuitive  character, — as  the 
belief  of  our  own  existence,  the  faith  in  the  testimony 
of  others,  and  the  firm  conviction  of  our  perceptions  of 
right  and  wrong."5" 

David  Derodon  was  a  logician  of  great  eminence  in 
his  day.  He  taught  logic  in  several  universities  in 
France,  but  ultimately  settled  at  Geneva,  where  he 
officiated  for  many  years  as  professor  of  philosophy. 
His  general  principles  of  logic  are  founded  on  Aris- 
totle's system,  which,  viewed  as  a  whole,  he  considers 
based  on  incontestable  evidence.  Being,  however,  of 
an  original  and  independent  mind,  Derodon  did  not 
take  the  commonly  received  doctrines  of  reasoning  mi- 
grant ed,  but  urged  many  special  grounds  of  dissent 
from  some  notions  prevalent  in  his  time.  The  most 
important  of  these  related  to  the  predicaments,  to  the 
definitions  of  universals,  to  the  nature  of  genus  and 
species,  and  to  the  discrepancies  of  opinion  on  some 
points  of  little  importance,  between  Aristotle  and  the 
logical  views  of  Plato,  Democritus,  and  Epicurus.")* 
About  the  same  time  Duhamel  flourished,  who  likewise 

*  De  la  Certitude,  chap.  vii.  +  Logiea,  Part.  i.  %  5. 


266  LOGICAL  SCIENCE DUHAMEL,  BAYLE. 

proved  himself  a  profound  logician,  and  who  was  ap- 
pointed secretary  to  the  French  Academy  at  its  estab- 
lishment. His  work,  Philosophia  Vetus  et  Nova  ad 
Usum  Scholce  Accommodata  (1684),  contains  many 
valuable  observations  on  the  art  of  reasoning.  He 
thinks  Bacon's  inductive  method  not  altogether  satis- 
factory, chiefly  on  the  ground  that  induction,  from  its 
very  nature,  must  prove  a  fallacious  guide  in  many 
instances  by  the  imperfect  manner  it  is  performed  by 
the  mass  of  mankind.  Duhamel  conceives  that  the 
best  logical  method,  both  for  the  discovery  and  pro- 
mulgation of  truth,  is  to  combine,  in  fair  proportions, 
theoretical  with  practical  knowledge.  They  ought 
always  to  go  hand  in  hand  in  the  study  of  nature. 
"Investigations  of  causes,"  says  he,  "is  confirmed  by 
experience ;  but  experiments  by  themselves  are  often 
only  blind  and  fortuitous  kinds  of  things,  unless  there 
be  some  light  thrown  on  their  causes." 

The  "  logic  "  of  Peter  Bayle  is  contained  in  the  fourth 
volume  of  his  collected  works,  and  is  given  in  Latin  and 
French.  He  defines  logic  to  be  "  the  art  of  forming 
those  instruments. which  guide  us  to  truth."  His  views 
on  logic  as  a  science  are  compounded  of  the  opinions  of 
Aristotle  and  Descartes.  He  ends  his  work  with  a 
short  chapter  on  method,  which  contains  some  sound 
remarks  on  giving  our  argumentative  labours  a  fixed 
and  determinate  direction.  His  constitutional  scepti- 
cism is  discernible,  however,  in  many  portions  of  the 
Logique  ;  and  in  his  other  treatises  we  see  evident  signs 
how  prone  his  mind  was  to  toy  with  subtle  and  extra- 
logical  questions.  A  striking  instance  we  have  of  this 
in    his   Dictionary,   under    the    article  "  Chrysippus." 


LOGICAL  SCIENCE BAYLE.  267 

"  What  is  it,  said  some  of  the  ancient  sophists,  which 
constitutes  what  we  call  little,  much,  long,  broad,  small, 
or  great  ?  Do  three  grains  of  corn  make  a  heap  ?  The 
answer  must  be — no.  Do  four  grains  make  a  heap  ? 
You  must  make  the  same  answer  as  before.  They  con- 
tinued their  interrogatories  from  one  grain  to  another 
without  end ;  and  if  you  should  happen  at  last  to  answer, 
'  Here  is  a  heap,'  they  pretend  your  answer  was  absurd, 
inasmuch  as  it  supposed  that  one  single  grain  makes 
the  difference  between  what  is  a  heap,  and  what  is  not. 
I  might  prove  by  the  same  method,  that  a  great 
drinker  is  never  drunk.  "Will  one  drop  of  wine  fuddle 
him  ?  ~No.  Two  drops,  then  ?  By  no  means  ;  neither 
three  nor  four.  I  might  thus  continue  my  interroga- 
tories from  one  drop  to  another ;  and  if,  at  the  end  of 
the  nine  hundred  and  ninety-ninth  drop,  you  answered, 
He  is  not  fuddled,  and  at  the  thousandth,  He  is,  I 
should  be  entitled  to  infer  that  one  single  drop  of 
wine  makes  the  difference  between  being  drunk  and 
being  sober— a  most  absurd  proposition.  If  the  inter- 
rogations went  on  from  bottle  to  bottle,  you  could 
easily  mark  the  difference  in  question.  But  he  who 
attacks  you  with  a  sorites,  is  at  liberty  to  choose  his 
own  weapons ;  and,  by  making  use  of  the  smallest  con- 
ceivable increments,  renders  it  impossible  for  you  to 
name  a  precise  point  which  fixes  a  sensible  limit  be- 
tween being  drunk  and  being  sober ;  between  what  is 
enough,  and  what  is  too  much.  A  man  of  the  world 
would  laugh  at  these  sophistical  quibbles,  and  would 
appeal  to  common  sense — to  that  degree  of  knowledge 
which,  in  common  life,  is  sufficient  to  enable  us  to 
establish   such   distinctions.      But    to   this    tribunal  a 


268  LOGICAL  SCIENCE — BOSSUET. 

professed  dialectician  was  not  permitted  to  resort ;  he 
was  obliged  to  answer  in  form  ;  and,  if  unable  to  find  a 
solution  according  to  the  rules  of  art,  his  defeat  was 
unavoidable.  Even  at  this  day,  an  Irish  tutor  who 
should  harass  a  professor  of  Salamanca  with  similar  sub- 
tilties,  and  should  receive  no  other  answer  except  this — 
Common  sense,  and  the  general  consent  of  mankind,  suffi- 
ciently shew  your  inferences  are  false — would  gain  the 
victory ;  his  antagonist  having  declined  to  defend  him- 
self with  those  logical  weapons  with  which  the  assault 
had  been  made." 

Bossuet's  logical  opinions  had  some  influence  in  his 
day,  chiefly  among  the  most  refined  and  philosophical 
of  the  French  clergy.  His  Logique  is  divided  into 
three  books,  in  accordance  with  the  three  powers  or 
faculties  of  the  understanding — conception,  judgment, 
and  reasoning.  There  are  general  precepts  given  at 
the  end  of  each  book  for  the  guidance  of  the  mind  in 
its  pursuit  of  knowledge.  The  work  was  composed  for 
the  Dauphin  of  France,  and  is  written  in  a  very  plain 
and  popular  style.  He  defines  truth  to  be  that  which 
exists,  and  falsehood  that  which  has  no  existence. 
Truth  being  eternal,  it  must  of  necessity  rest  upon 
Deity.  All  necessary  truths  and  principles  existed 
prior  to  the  human  understanding ;  and  consequently 
we  can  only  be  said  to  find  truths,  not  to  create  them. 
Huygens,  professor  of  logic  in  the  University  of 
Louvain,  and  the  celebrated  Fenelon,  entertained  nearly 
the  same  notions  of  the  philosophy  of  logic  as  Bossuet 
did.  Thev  both  argue  for  the  intuitive  nature  of  all  our 
primary  maxims  of  reasoning,  and  that  the  idea  we 
entertain  of  the  absolutely  true,  is  intimatelv  and  neces- 


LOGICAL  SCIENCE — FOKTEtfELLE,  MARIOTTE.         269 

sarily  connected  with  our  general  conceptions  of  a 
Divine  and  Intelligent  power.  Fontenelle's  view  of 
logical  truth  did  not  differ  widely  from  those  of  the 
three  last-named  authors.  In  his  Fragments  on  Human 
Reason,  the  Human  Mind,  and  Instinct,  he  lays  down 
the  proposition  generally,  that  any  cumbrous  dialec- 
tical framework  is  calculated  to  retard  rather  than  ad- 
vance our  knowledge  and  intellectual  improvement. 
His  opinion  is,  that  all  universal  propositions  and 
scientific  maxims  are  the  result  of  often  repeated  ex- 
periments or  observations.  Necessary  truths  he  terms 
natural  axioms.  These  natural  axioms  constitute  the 
basis  of  all  human  reasoning,  and  may  be  divided  into 
two  great  classes — those  which  are  derived  from  the 
external  world,  and  those  appertaining  to  our  internal 
nature.  What  Fontenelle  calls  the  laws  of  thought, 
seem  to  be  of  the  same  character  as  those  subsequently 
developed  by  the  common  sense  school  of  philosophy. 

The  Abbe  Mariotte's  work,  Essai  de  Logique,  Con- 
tenant  les  Principes  des  Sciences  (1678),  contains  ex- 
cellent illustrations  of  those  principles  on  which  the 
certainty  of  human  knowledge  is  based ;  and  the  same 
thing  may  be  said  of  several  other  French  works  on 
logic,  which  appeared  at,  or  a  little  before  this  time. 

The  logical  works  of  Italy  and  Spain  at  this  period 
are  not  of  a  character  to  require  any  special  enumera- 
tion. In  Spain  particularly,  every  thing  remained  just 
as  it  was  in  the  clays  of  Thomas  Aquinas.  IsTo  new  or 
foreign  element  had  been  introduced  into  the  formal 
treatises  appropriated  to  logical  education.  Kapin 
even  affirms,  that  the  logicians  of  this  country  had 
made,  for  the  last  two  centuries,  a  decidedly  retrograde 


270  LOGICAL  SCIENCE KEMPE,  ETC. 

movement,  instead  of  advancing,  by  the  practice  of 
introducing  into  logic  a  great  number  of  childish  and 
frivolous  questions  and  subtilties,  which  had  no  other 
effect  than  to  bewilder  the  intellect. 

In  the  north  of  Europe  logical  studies  were  prose- 
cuted with  ordinary  diligence,  There  were  several 
works  of  importance  published  in  Sweden  during  the 
seventeenth  century.  In  1623  we  have  Alexander 
Kempe  discussing  the  merits  of  Aristotle's  logic,  and, 
on  many  vital  points,  calling  its  validity  in  question. 
He  argues  that  the  syllogism  is  too  slender  a  basis  for 
rational  argumentation.  He  is  followed  by  Joh.  Ches- 
neiopherus  in  1629,  who,  in  his  Logica,  incorporated 
many  of  the  notions  of  Ramus.  P.  Aurivillius  defended 
the  logic  of  Aristotle,  and  stoutly  maintained  it  was  the 
only  safe  guide  to  the  understanding.  Enander,  in 
1640,  became  a  very  popular  lecturer  on  logic,  and 
partially  made  known  some  of  the  peculiar  views  of 
Bacon  and  Descartes  on  the  subject.  Students  from 
the  remotest  parts  of  the  kingdom  came  to  hear  him. 
His  rival  was  J.  Boethius,  a  professor  of  logic.  For- 
sius  and  George  .Olavi  were  dialecticians  of  a  mystical 
character.  The  logical  works  of  Laurens,  Javelin,  and 
Gezelius,  are  purely  treatises  of  a  formal  or  scholastic 
order. 

In  Holland  and  Belgium  we  have  the  following  au- 
thors,  among  many  others,  who  cultivated  logic  : — Joh. 
Schalerus,  P.  Nannius,  P.  Cornelius  Brederod,  Martinus 
Schookius,  M.  Paludanus,  Baldinus  Junius,  Gerardus 
de  Boot,  Guil.  Philippi,  Jacob  Speecq,  A.  Verhel, 
Anth.  Senguerdius,  A.  Deusinghins,  Gisb.  ab  Ysen- 
doorn,  and  Cornelius  ab  Hooghelandc. 


LOGICAL  PRINCIPLES  OF  LOCKE.  271 


CHAPTEE  XII. 

THE  LOGICAL  PRINCIPLES  OF  LOCKE. 

It  may  safely  be  affirmed,  that  Locke's  Essay  on  the 
Human  Understanding  (1690),  has  given  birth  to  a 
more  diversified  series  of  logical  systems  and  specula- 
tions, as  well  as  modes  of  tuition,  than  any  other  single 
work  since  the  days  of  Aristotle.  Though  not  profess- 
edly a  logical  treatise,  yet  it  contains  so  many  views 
and  facts  connected  with  the  reasoning  process,  and  has 
proved  so  suggestive  to  the  minds  of  men,  relative  to 
the  government  of  the  understanding,  that  novel  logical 
doctrines  and  systems  have  sprung  up  on  all  sides  of 
us,  from  the  publication  of  the  Essay  till  the  present 
day.  It  has  been  the  great  dialectical  innovator  for 
nearly  two  centuries — aiming  at  the  solution  of  all  pro- 
blems on  the  broad  principles  of  common  sense  and 
common  reason,  arising  out  of  the  varied  and  subtle 
movements  of  the  reasoning  faculty. 

Locke's  influence  over  the  logical  studies  of  modern 
times,  has  arisen  chiefly  from  two  sources — the  one 
metaphysical,  and  the  other  dialectical.  The  mental 
powers  are   so  minutely  analysed,  so   accurately  and 


272  LOGICAL  PRINCIPLES  OF  LOCKE.      . 

plainly  mapped  out,  that  the  entire  structure  of  the 
inward  man  is  laid  bare  to  every  inquirer ;  and  then 
again,  the  logical  apparatus  which  moved,  guided,  and 
directed  the  individual  parts  to  their  several  offices  and 
ends,  was  so  simple  and  effective,  and  so  much  in  unison 
with  the  everyday  current  of  thought,  that  men  have 
been  led  to  think  that  every  thing  necessary  to  be 
known  was  to  be  found  in  the  Essay,  and  nowhere  else. 
By  a  single  sentence  or  a  passing  remark,  he  some- 
times throws  a  flood  of  light  upon  some  logical  precept, 
and  shows  its  relation  to  the  entire  economy  of  the 
reasoning  faculty.  Then,  again,  he  deals  with  the 
science  or  art  of  argumentation  in  its  widest  significa- 
tion— pointing  out  the  most  striking  phenomena — 
harmonizing  scattered  and  disjointed  facts — and  guid- 
ing the  judgment  to  some  important  generalization  or 
abstract  truth. 

It  is  not  necessary  to  give  more  than  a  brief  outline 
of  so  well-known  a  book  as  the  Essay  on  the  Human 
Understanding.  And  this  outline  must  also  be  limited 
to  that  portion  of  the  Essay  which  directly  bears  upon 
logical  principles  and  rules.  With  the  philosophy  of 
the  treatise,  properly  so  called,  we  have  nothing  to  do, 
further  than  to  obtain  that  very  general  conception 
of  its  character  and  scope,  which  is  absolutely  neces- 
sary to  a  ready  comprehension  of  the  author's  logical 
theory. 

The  mental  philosophy  of  Locke  is  based  upon  two 
principles — the  origin  of  our  ideas,  and  the  principle  of 
human  knowledge, — that  is,  the  agreement  of  ideas  with 
objects- 
There  are  two  sources  of  the  origin  of  our  ideas — 


LOGICAL  PRINCIPLES  OF  LOCKE.  273 

sensation  and  reflection.  All  ideas  of  things  distinct 
from  the  thinking  subject  are  derived  from  sensation, 
or  the  effects  of  external  bodies  upon  our  several  senses 
of  seeing,  hearing,  tasting,  smelling,  and  touching. 

All  ideas  of  the  modes  of  being,  or  of  the  operations 
of  the  intellect — such  as  ideas  of  perception,  thought, 
doubt,  belief,  knowledge,  will,  reasoning,  intelligence,  and 
the  like — are  derived  from  the  power  of  reflection. 

The  principle  of  knowledge,  or  the  correspondence 
of  ideas  with  things,  embraces  that  portion  of  the  au- 
thor's speculations  which  have  a  direct  reference  to 
logical  systems. 

Locke  defines  knowledge  to  be  the  perception  of  the 
agreement  or  disagreement  of  our  ideas.  It  can  be 
viewed  in  three  different  aspects, — 1st,  In  reference  to 
its  objects  ;  2nd,  In  reference  to  its  nature ;  and,  3dly, 
In  reference  to  its  origin. 

Knowledge,  in  reference  to  its  objects,  is  of  four 
kinds, — 1st,  A  knowledge  of  identity  and  diversity ; 
2nd,  A  knowledge  of  relation  ;  3d,  A  knowledge  of  co- 
existence ;  and,  4th,  A  knowledge  of  real  existence. 

Knowledge,  in  reference  to  its  nature,  is  of  two  kinds 
— actual  and  habitual. 

Knowledge,  in  reference  to  its  origin,  is  of  three 
kinds — intuitive,  demonstrative,  and  sensitive. 

Locke  prescribes  the  limits  of  human  knowledge  in 
this  manner:  —  1st,  We  have  knowledge  no  further 
than  we  have  ideas ;  2nd,  We  have  knowledge  no  fur- 
ther than  we  have  perceptions  of  the  agreement  or 
disagreement  of  these  ideas ;  and,  3d,  That  this  per- 
ception is  either  by  intuition,  demonstration,  or  sen- 
sation. 


274  LOGICAL  PRINCIPLES  OF  LOCKE. 

Truth  is  defined  by  Locke  to  be  the  joining  or  sepa- 
rating of  signs,  according  as  the  things  signified  by 
these  signs  agree  or  disagree  among  themselves.  He 
again  divides  truth  into  two  kinds — moral  and  meta- 
physical. Moral  truth  consists  in  speaking  as  we  think, 
whether  the  thing  spoken  of  be  as  we  state  or  not. 
Metaphysical  truth  is,  when  thought  corresponds  with 
the  real  existence  of  things. 

A  proposition  is  defined  to  be  a  sentence  affirming 
the  agreement  or  disagreement  of  two  ideas — such  as, 
Plato  was  a  philosopher ;  white  is  not  black.  Every 
proposition  consists  of  three  members, — namely,  the 
subject,  the  predicate,  and  the  copula. 

Judgment  and  probability  are  two  important  instru- 
ments in  Locke's  logical  system.  Judgment  is  defined 
to  be  the  joining  or  separating  ideas,  as  they  are  pre- 
sumed, not  perceived,  to  agree  or  disagree.  Probability 
consists  in  the  appearance  of  agreement  or  disagree- 
ment of  ideas  through  the  means  of  other  intermediate 
ideas,  whose  connexion  is  not  invariable,  but  only  more 
or  less  frequent. 

Probable  evidence  forms  the  greatest  portion  of  all 
the  evidence  we  have  for  the  truth  of  any  thing.  It  is 
based  on  two  principles — experience  and  testimony. 

Experience  is  of  two  kinds — partial  and  general ; 
and  testimony  is  regulated  by  six  distinct  circumstances, 
namely, — 1st,  The  number  of  the  witnesses ;  2nd,  Their 
integrity ;  3d,  Their  skill  or  knowledge ;  4th,  Their 
intention  or  aim ;  5th,  The  consistency  of  their  rela- 
tion ;  and,  6th,  Contrary  testimony. 

Reason  is  treated  of  by  Locke  at  considerable  length. 
AH  reasoning  consists  of  four  parts  or  elements, — 1st, 


LOGICAL  PRINCIPLES  OP  LOCKE.  275 

The  finding  out  of  proofs  ;  2nd,  The  disposing  of  them 
in  proper  order ;  3d,  The  perceiving  of  their  mutual 
connexion ;  and,  4th,  The  making  a  right  use  of  them. 
It  is  in  this  division  of  his  work  that  he  treats  of  the 
syllogistic  logic.  Of  the  syllogism  generally,  he  says, 
"  It  serves  our  reason  but  in  one  only  of  the  foremen- 
tioned  parts  of  it ;  and  that  is,  to  show  the  connexion 
of  the  proofs  in  any  one  instance,  and  no  more :  but  in 
this  it  is  of  no  great  use,  since  the  mind  can  conceive 
such  connexion  where  it  really  is,  as  easily — nay,  per- 
haps better — without  it."  "  If  we  will  observe  the 
actings  of  our  own  minds,  we  shall  find  that  we  reason 
best  and  clearest  when  we  only  observe  the  connexion 
of  the  proof,  without  reducing  our  thoughts  to  any  rule 
of  syllogism."  .  .  .  .  "  All  who  have  so  far  considered 
syllogism  as  to  see  the  reason  why,  in  three  propositions 
laid  together  in  one  form,  the  conclusion  will  certainly 
be  right,  but  in  another  not  certainly  so,  I  grant  are 
certain  of  the  conclusion  they  draw  from  the  premises 
in  the  allowed  modes  and  figures.  But  they  who  have 
not  so  far  looked  into  these  forms,  are  not  sure  by 
virtue  of  syllogism  that  the  conclusion  certainly  follows 
from  the  premises — they  only  take  it  to  be  so  by  an 
implicit  faith  in  their  teachers,  and  a  confidence  in 
those  forms  of  argumentation ;  but  this  is  still  but  be- 
lieving, not  being  certain.  Now  if,  of  all  mankind, 
those  who  can  make  syllogisms  are  extremely  few  in 
comparison  of  those  who  cannot — and  if,  of  those  few 
who  have  been  taught  logic,  there  is  but  a  very  small 
number  who  do  any  more  than  believe  that  syllogisms 
in  the  allowed  modes  and  figures  do  conclude  right, 
without  knowing  certainly  that  they  do  so — if  syllogisms 


276  LOGICAL  PRINCIPLES  OF  LOCKE. 

must  be  taken  for  the  only  proper  instrument  of  reason 
and  means  of  knowledge — it  will  follow,  that  before 
Aristotle  there  was  not  one  man  that  did  or  could  know 
any  thing  by  reason ;  and  that,  since  the  invention  of 
syllogisms,  there  is  not  one  of  ten  thousand  that  did." 

"  God  has  not  been  so  sparing  to  men  to  make  them 
barely  two-legged  creatures,  and  left  it  to  Aristotle  to 
make  them  rational, — that  is,  those  few  of  them  that 
he  can  get  to  examine  the  grounds  of  syllogisms  as  to 
see,  that  in  about  threescore  ways  that  three  proposi- 
tions may  be  laid  together,  there  are  but  fourteen 
wherein  one  may  be  sure  that  the  conclusion  is  right. 
God  has  been  more  bountiful  to  mankind.  He  has 
given  them  a  mind  that  can  reason  without  being  in- 
structed in  methods  of  syllogism." 

"  Of  what  use,"  says  he  again,  "  then,  are  syllogisms  ? 
I  answer,  their  chief  and  main  use  is  in  the  schools, 
where  men  are  allowed  without  shame  to  deny  the 
agreement  of  ideas  that  do  manifestly  agree ;  or,  out  of 
the  schools,  to  those  who  from  thence  have  learned 
without  shame  to  deny  the  connexion  of  ideas,  which 
even  to  themselves  is  visible.  But  to  an  ingenuous 
searcher  after  truth,  who  has  no  other  aim  but  to  find 
it,  there  is  no  need  of  any  such  form  to  force  the  allow- 
ing of  the  inference ;  the  truth  and  reasonableness  of  it 
is  better  seen  in  ranging  of  the  ideas  in  a  simple  and 
plain  order.  And  hence  it  is  that  men  in  their  in- 
quiries after  truth  never  use  syllogisms  to  convince 
themselves."  "  Eules  of  syllogism  serve  not  to  furnish 
the  mind  with  those  intermediate  ideas  that  may  show 
the  connexion  of  remote  ones.  This  way  of  reasoning 
discovers  no  new  proofs,  but  is  the  art  of  marshalling 


LOGICAL  PRINCIPLES  OF  LOCKE.  277 

and  ranging  the  old  ones  we  have  already."  .  .  .  .  "A 
man  knows  first,  and  then  he  is  able  to  prove  syllogis- 
tically.  So  that  syllogism  comes  after  knowledge,  and 
then  a  man  has  little  or  no  need  of  it."  * 

Again  he  says,  "  Having  here  had  an  occasion  to  speak 
of  syllogism  in  general,  and  the  nse  of  it  in  reasoning 
and  the  improvement  of  our  knowledge,  it  is  fit,  before 
I  leave  this  subject,  to  take  notice  of  one  manifest  mis- 
take in  the  rules  of  syllogism, — namely,  that  no  syllo- 
gistical  reasoning  can  be  right  and  conclusive  but  what 
has  at  least  one  general  proposition  in  it.  As  if  we 
could  not  reason,  and  have  knowledge  about  particu- 
lars ;  whereas  in  truth,  the  matter  rightly  considered, 
the  immediate  object  of  all  our  reasoning  and  know- 
ledge is  nothing  but  particulars.  Every  man's  reason- 
ing and  knowledge  is  only  about  the  ideas  existing  in 
his  own  mind,  which  are  truly,  every  one  of  them, 
particular  existences ;  and  our  knowledge  and  reason 
about  other  things  is  only  as  they  correspond  with 
those  of  our  particular  ideas."  j- 

The  logical  theory  of  Locke  may,  I  conceive,  be 
substantially  and  fairly  illustrated  in  the  following  man- 
ner : — It  consists  of  three  divisions  or  members — ideas, 
faculties,  and  reason  or  intelligence.  He  considers 
ideas  as  the  raw  material  out  of  which  propositions  and 
arguments  of  every  kind  spring.  Hence  his  maxim, 
that  the  more  ideas  a  man  has,  the  more  soundly  and 
comprehensively  is  he  likely  to  reason.  He  considers 
them  as  the  foundation  of  all  logical  operations ;  and 
to  have  correct  conceptions  of  their  various  orders  and 

*  Essay,  ehqh-xvi.  0^.^,0^.17.      t  Book  IV.,  chap.  xvii. 


278  LOGICAL  PEINCIPLES  OF  LOCKE. 

chief  characteristics,  is  a  necessary  preliminary  to  every 
rational  movement  of  the  mind. 

The  author  having  fixed  the  science  of  reasoning  on 
ideas,  he  next  directs  attention  to  the  faculties  or 
powers  of  the  mind.  These  are  the  instruments  which 
operate  on  ideas.  These  powers  are  all,  individually 
and  collectively,  susceptible  of  improvement  from  exer- 
cise ;  therefore  a  knowledge  of  their  nature  and  offices 
in  the  mental  economy  is  of  essential  service  in  their 
use  and  application.  It  is  incumbent  to  examine  into, 
and  to  obtain  clear  conceptions  of  what  these  various 
original  powers  and  faculties  are,  which  are  thus  em- 
ployed about  ideas,  either  in  their  creation  through  the 
inward  power  of  reflection,  or  in  that  power  of  recalling 
them  before  the  mind's  eye,  and  regulating  their  move- 
ments in  the  process  of  mental  conviction.  These  are 
the  instruments  which  the  logician  must  wield  when- 
ever he  makes  a  display  of  his  art,  either  to  satisfy  his 
own  mind,  or  to  bring  the  force  of  truth  to  bear  on  the 
minds  of  others. 

]SText  comes  reason  or  intelligence,  whose  office  is 
to  direct  the  faculties  in  all  their  dealings  with  our 
ideas, — in  guiding,  directing,  and  moulding  them  to 
some  given  end  or  object,  which  is  invariably  a  general 
idea  or  conception,  and  which  lies  in  ihe  bosom  of  the 
intelligent  principle,  so  to  speak,  till  circumstances  de- 
velop or  quicken  it  into  life  and  activity.  The  reason, 
therefore,  exercises  an  efficient  and  superintending 
power  over  the  entire  mental  machinery.  It  is  not 
itself  a  mere  intellectual  faculty  or  process  :  it  is  more. 
It  embraces  the  whole  man.    It  enters  into  every  thing 


LOGICAL  PEINCIPLES  OF  LOCKE.         279 

in  the  shape  of  knowledge.  Whether  we  deal  with 
facts,  experiments,  or  observations,  we  never  get  beyond 
the  sphere  of  reason.  As  the  author  observes,  "  If 
general  knowledge  consists  in  a  perception  of  the 
agreement  or  disagreement  of  our  own  ideas,  and  the 
knowledge  of  the  existence  of  things  without  us  be  had 
only  by  our  senses,  what  room  is  there  for  the  exercise 
of  any  other  faculty  but  inward  sense  and  inward  per- 
ception ?  What  need  is  there  for  reason  ?  Yery  much, 
both  for  the  enlargement  of  our  knowledge  and  regu- 
lating our  assent ;  for  it  has  to  do  both  in  knowledge 
and  opinion,  and  is  necessary  and  assisting  to  all  our 
other  intellectual  faculties." 

We  can  see  from  the  general  scope  of  Locke's  Essay, 
that  he  aims  at  the  laying  down  certain  comprehensive 
rules  for  the  discovery  and  promulgation  of  truth.  He 
makes  the  distinct  portion  of  his  philosophy  subser- 
vient to  this  end.  He  looked  upon  his  own  system  in 
the  same  light  as  Bacon  did  his,  as  forming  an  entire 
and  consolidated  organon  for  the  successful  prosecution 
of  all  science  and  knowledge.  But  there  was  this  great 
difference  between  these  two  distinguished  logicians, — 
Locke  engrafted  his  logic  upon  certain  primary  prin- 
ciples of  mind,  very  dogmatically  and  pointedly  en- 
forced ;  whereas  Bacon  dealt  simply  with  the  sensible 
and  material  things  around  him,  and  only  ventured  to 
suggest  admonitory  cautions  and  maxims  as  to  their 
arrangement,  and  the  discovery  of  their  causes.  Locke's 
theory  of  human  knowledge  and  logical  truth,  was 
therefore  more  fraught  with  the  elements  of  dispute 
and  misapprehension  than  Bacon's ;  and  more  likely 
to  give  riser  when  reduced  to  any  practical  bearing,  to 


280  LOGICAL  PRINCIPLES  OF  LOCKE. 

more  diversified  opinions  as  to  its  intrinsic  nature  and 
merits.  And  this  is  just  what  we  find  has  been  the 
case.  The  logical  aim  of  Locke  has  been  more  severely 
and  minutely  criticized,  and  more  generally  misappre- 
hended and  misconstrued,  than  that  of  Bacon's.  The 
theory  of  scientific  evidence  maintained  by  the  latter, 
was  preserved  from  oscillating  beyond  a  given  point  by 
the  material  agencies  within  which  it  was  encircled ; 
but  the  system  of  Locke  opened  out  at  once  a  bound- 
less range  of  discussion  and  speculation,  calculated  to 
affect  questions  of  the  most  vital  character. 

A  very  cursory  glance  at  the  chief  parts  of  the  Essmj 
of  Locke,  will  teach  us  that  his  logical  method  is  pre- 
cisely the  same  as  the  inductive  method  which  Bacon 
applied  to  the  study  of  physical  science.  The  philo- 
sophy of  mind  is  a  science  of  facts  revealed  to  us  by 
consciousness.  This  is  Locke's  fundamental  position, 
and  the  basis  of  all  his  logical  illustrations.  His  mental 
power  of  reflection  is  the  instrument  which  corresponds 
to  the  artificial  instruments  and  reproductive  processes 
of  the  Baconian  hypothesis. 

We  cannot  close  these  remarks  on  Locke's  logical 
views  without  a  passing  word  on  his  little  tract,  On  the 
Conduct  of  the  Understanding.  This  has  occasionally 
been  incorporated  as  a  distinct  chapter  in  his  Esscaj, 
for  which  it  was  originally  intended  by  its  author.  It 
is  a  valuable  fragment.  Its  general  scope  is,  to  impress 
upon  the  youthful  mind  in  its  pursuit  of  knowledge 
the  moral  and  religious  obligation  attending  every  ex- 
ercise of  the  judgment  and  understanding;  and  that 
every  display  of  the  logical  art  should  be  guided  and 
influenced   by  a   conscientious   love    of   truth.      This 


LOGICAL  PRINCIPLES  OF  LOCKE.  281 

small  essay  of  seventy-five  octavo  pages  has  often 
been  employed  as  a  logical  text-book  in  some  of 
our  English  universities.  Indeed,  its  utility,  as  an 
instrument  of  early  •philosophical  education,  is  highly 
spoken  of  by  Mr  Hallam,  whose  learning,  judgment, 
and  candour,  give  at  all  times  great  weight  to  his 
opinions.  He  says,  "  Aristotle  himself,  and  the  whole 
of  his  dialectical  school,  had  pointed  out  many  of  the 
sophisms  against  which  we  should  guard  our  reasoning 
faculties ;  but  these  are  chiefly  such  as  others  attempt 
to  put  upon  us  in  dispute.  There  are  more  dangerous 
fallacies  by  which  we  cheat  ourselves — prejudice,  par- 
tiality, self-interest,  vanity,  inattention,  and  indifference 
to  truth.  Locke,  who  was  as  exempt  from  these  as 
almost  any  man  who  had  turned  his  mind  to  so  many 
subjects  where  their  influence  is  to  be  suspected,  has 
dwelt  on  the  moral  discipline  of  the  intellect  in  this 
treatise  better,  as  I  conceive,  than  any  of  his  predeces- 
sors." Again,  "I  cannot  think  any  parent  or  instruc- 
tor justified  in  neglecting  to  put  this  little  treatise  in 
the  hands  of  a  boy  about  the  time  when  the  reasoning 
faculties  become  developed.  It  will  give  him  a  sober 
and  serious,  not  flippant  or  self-conceited,  independency 
of  thinking  ;  and  while  it  teaches  how  to  distrust  our- 
selves, and  to  watch  those  prejudices  which  necessarily 
grow  up  from  one  cause  or  another,  will  inspire  a  rea- 
sonable confidence  in  what  he  has  well  considered,  by 
taking  off  a  little  of  that  deference  to  authority,  which 
is  the  more  to  be  regretted  in  its  excess,  that,  like  its 
cousin-german  party- spirit,  it  is  frequently  united  to 
loyalty  of  heart  and  the  generous  enthusiasm  of  youth."* 

*  Lit.  Middle  Ages,  vol.  iii.  p.  388 


282  LOGICAL  PRINCIPLES  OF  LOCKE. 

The  monuments  of  Locke's  influence  over  the  logical 
mind  of  Europe,  are  to  be  seen  in  every  direction.  He 
founded  a  school  of  his  own,  and  gathered  around  him 
a  body  of  ardent  and  intelligent  disciples,  in  whose 
labours  we  recognise  the  sagacity  and  truthfulness  of 
their  master.  His  method  and  his  principles  have 
taken  a  deep  root  in  the  minds  of  men ;  and  though 
these,  in  some  cases,  have  given  rise  to  speculations  at 
variance  with  the  general  spirit  of  his  logical  philo- 
sophy, yet,  on  the  whole,  his  labours  have  proved  highly 
serviceable  in  the  extension  of  rational  knowledge  and 
scientific  thought  among  the  masses  of  mankind. 


PROGRESS  OF  LOGICAL  SCIENCE  IN  GERMANY.        283 


CHAPTER  XIII. 

THE  PROGRESS  OF  LOGICAL  SCIENCE  IN  GERMANY,  FROM  THE 
PUBLICATION  OF  LOCKE'S  « ESSAY,"  TILL  THE  END  OF  THE 
EIGHTEENTH  CENTURY. 

The  writings  of  Bacon,  Descartes,  Leibnitz,  and  Locke, 
were  not  long  in  making  their  way  into  all  the  chief 
seminaries  of  learning  in  Europe.  Although  viewed  in 
various  lights  in  reference  to  logical  science,  yet  they 
unitedly  produced  a  great  effect  upon  the  established 
methods  of  developing  its  rules  and  principles  for  the 
purposes  of  general  instruction.  It  was  now  attempted 
to  place  logic,  both  in  its  scientific  and  formal  relations, 
upon  a  more  comprehensive  basis — to  give  it  a  popular 
and  useful  direction — and  to  supplant  that  lethargic 
system  of  the  schools  which  had  for  so  long  a  period 
retained  possession  of  the  public  mind  in  every  country 
of  Europe. 

In  no  part,  however,  of  the  continent  was  there  a 
greater  change  effected  by  the  writings  in  question 
than  in  Germany.  We  recognise  the  new  doctrines  of 
the  philosophy  of  reasoning  in  almost  every  logical 
work  of  the  eighteenth  century.     This  change  effected 


284        PROGRESS  OF  LOGICAL  SCIENCE  IN  GERMANY. 

the  scientific  more  than  the  formal  rules  of  logic.  The 
profound  thinkers  of  Germany  turned  their  attention 
to  the  abstract  principles  of  the  ratiocinative  art,  with 
a  view  of  discovering  some  short  and  certain  route  to 
•  all  knowledge,  which,  they  conceived,  must  certainly 
lie  embosomed  in  some  of  the  forms  and  principles  of 
the  intellect  itself.  With  this  design,  they  turned  all 
their  thoughts  inwardly,  scrutinized  every  movement  of 
mind  and  feeling,  and  sought  to  reduce  the  entire 
phenomena  of  existence  to  some  single  principle  or 
general  law.  And  so  intent  were  they  on  this  mode  of 
proceeding,  and  so  full  of  hope  that  their  fondest  wishes 
would  be  realized,  that  they  plunged  at  once  into  the 
most  unfathomable  speculations,  and  gave  eager  chase 
to  the  most  attenuated  and  nebulous  forms  of  thought, 
in  order  that  they  might  have  something  to  boast  of  in 
the  way  of  originality,  if  a  higher  object  could  not  be 
attained.  Hence  it  is  that  the  philosophical  logicians 
of  Germany  stand  so  conspicuously  apart  from,  and 
have  so  few  points  of  intellectual  contact  with,  their 
brethren  in  every  other  quarter  of  the  world.  The 
German  savans  .philosophise  to  themselves,  and  for 
themselves.  Their  logical  systems,  viewed  in  their 
scientific  relations,  stand  like  colossal  and  unshapely 
buildings  in  the  heart  of  a  desert  plain — monuments  of 
intellectual  labour,  but  totally  unsuggestive  of  a  single 
rational  motive  why  they  were  ever  conceived  or  con- 
structed. 

In  spite,  however,  of  their  general  arid  and  unsatis- 
factory character,  there  was  a  lofty  spiritual  aim  in  all 
the  logical  speculations  of  Germany.  They  had  no- 
thing in  them  directly  low  and  grovelling.     One  of  the 


DESCARTES  AND  LEIBNITZ.  285 

most  prominent  elements  in  this  spiritualism  was  the 
theological,  which  ofttimes,  it  must  be  allowed,  made 
its  appearance  under  very  questionable  aspects,  but  still 
a  distinct  and  individual  element  it  was  of  great  power 
and  efficiency.  The  religious  feelings  of  mankind  were 
clearly  and  forcibly  demonstrated  to  constitute  one  of 
the  main  pillars  of  truth  in  general ;  and  the  peculiar 
way  in  which  this  was  often  done,  threw  no  small  portion 
of  light  upon  the  fundamental  doctrines  of  theology, 
considered  as  an  embodiment  of  scientific  truth.  ]5Tot- 
withstanding,  therefore,  all  the  mystical  vagaries  of  the 
German  logicians — and  they  have  been  neither  few  in 
number,  nor  insignificant  in  influence — they  have  not 
treated  theology  with  an  open  and  disdainful  contempt. 
They  have  generally  acknowledged  her  authority  and 
influence  in  the  science  of  reasoning,  although  the 
manner  they  have  often  chosen  to  manifest  their  alle- 
giance was  calculated,  in  the  eyes  of  sober  thinkers,  to 
militate  against  both. 

The  logical  systems  of  Bacon  and  Locke  did  not  ex- 
ercise any  thing  like  the  same  degree  of  influence  over 
the  German  mind  as  those  of  Descartes  and  Leibnitz. 
The  latter,  in  particular,  reigned  for  a  long  period  with 
almost  undivided  sway  and  authority  in  the  province  of 
philosophical  logic. 

We  can  hold  out  but  slender  hopes  that  what  we 
shall  advance  on  the  logic  of  Germany,  will  in  any  de- 
gree prove  intelligible  to  the  general  reader.  To  gain 
an  insight  into  it,  some  knowledge  of  the  metaphysics 
of  the  country  is  indispensably  requisite  ;  but,  as  we 
cannot  enter  upon  so  vast  a  subject,  he  must  needs 
grope  his  way,  as  he  best  can,  through  what  we  have  to 


286        PROGRESS  OF  LOGICAL  SCIENCE  IN  GERMANY. 

state  on  the  matter.  If  he  can  make  himself  in  some 
measure  familiar  with  the  German  mode  of  prosecuting 
mental  science,  and  of  the  phraseology  currently  em- 
ployed, his  case  will  not  prove  quite  so  hopeless  and  for- 
lorn. But,  under  the  most  favourable  circumstances, 
it  will  be  prudent  to  keep  his  expectations  of  realizing 
any  great  stock  of  useful  knowledge  within  somewhat 
narrow  bounds. 

Following  Leibnitz,  we  have  Tschirnhausen  and 
Christian  Thomasius :  the  father  of  the  latter,  Jacob 
Thomasius,  author  of  Logica  (Leipsic,  1695),  had  been 
the  tutor  of  Leibnitz,  and  one  of  his  most  ardent  ad- 
mirers, Neither  Tschirnhausen  nor  Thomasius  entered, 
however,  very  fully  into  his  logical  philosophy,  although 
they  viewed  it  favourably,  and,  to  some  extent,  founded 
their  own  individual  views  upon  it.  In  his  Medicina 
Mentis  (1696),  Tschirnhausen  develops  some  prin- 
ciples of  logic  with  clearness  and  great  acuteness. 
Thomasius  thought  logic  and  history  the  two  eyes 
of  all  human  knowledge.  The  abstract  principle  on 
which  he  considered  all  reasoning  rested  was  this, — that 
sensation  furnished  the  rough  materials  of  knowledge ; 
but  the  reason,  a  faculty  of  a  complex  character,  elabo- 
rated out  of  them  all  those  fundamental  principles 
relative  to  human  nature  which  constitute  what  we 
term  the  science  of  man.  It  is  a  false  view  of  truth  to 
consider  it  as  a  thing  relative  to  the  intellect  alone  : 
it  is  the  product  of  the  sentiments  and  feelings  of  the 
soul,  as  well  as  of  the  mind,  strictly  so  called.  Hence 
all  truths  concerning  human  nature  are  under  the  di- 
rect influence  and  control  of  two  distinct  principles — 
intelligence  and  will.    The  entire  body  of  scientific  truth 


TSCHIRNHAUSEN,  THOMASIUS,  WOLFF.  287 

relative  to  man — as  a  social,  moral,  religious,  and  think- 
ing being — must  always  be  viewed  in  reference  to  these 
two  separate  sources  from  which  they  flow.  It  is  from 
not  keeping  this  distinction  before  them,  that  logicians 
in  all  ages  have,  in  the  opinion  of  Thomasius,  com- 
mitted such  egregious  blunders  in  the  construction  of 
their  systems. 

The  great  logical  instructor  of  Germany,  after  Leib- 
nitz, was  Wolff.  He  devoted  a  long  and  laborious 
life  to  illustrating  the  principles  of  the  author  of  the 
Pre-established  Harmony,  and  applying  them  to  the 
science  of  logic,  both  philosophical  and  formal.  Wolff 
stands,  even  in  Germany,  as  a  striking  monument  of 
indefatigable  application  and  methodical  skill.* 

The  Philosophia  Mationalis  sive  Logica  of  Wolff  has 
gone  through  many  editions,  and  been  moulded  into 
innumerable  digests  and  epitomes.  The  author  de- 
fines logic  to  be  that  science  which  directs  and  guides 
our  faculties  to  a  knowledge  of  truth.  He  divides  logic 
again  into  innate  and  acquired.  All  men  reason  with- 
out a  knowledge  of  any  formal  rules  ;  but  they  reason 
more  steadily  and  comprehensively  from  an  acquaint- 
ance with  logical  maxims  and  precepts. 

In  the  first  part  of  his  work  he  treats  of  the  leading- 
principles  of  logic — of  notions,  judgments,  and  reason- 
ing. In  the  second  part,  he  shews  the  method  of  dis- 
tinguishing the  true  from  the  false ;  how  to  discover 
truth ;  the  scheme  of  composing  or  arranging  our  ideas ; 
the  most  effective  plans   of  communicating  truth  to 

*  "  M.  Wolff  a  rainene  les  principes  et  les  regies  cle  la  logique  a  la  demonstration. 
Nous  n'avons  rien  de  plus  exact  sur  cette  science  que  la  grande  logique  latine  de  ce 
philosophe." — Encycl.  Fran^ais. 


288        PROGRESS  OF  LOGICAL  SCIENCE  IN  GERMANY. 

others ;  the  best  means  of  promoting  general  know- 
ledge ;  and,  lastly,  how  to  bring  the  entire  mass  of  our 
acquired  information  to  bear  upon  our  conduct  of  life. 

He  makes  constant  appeals  to  the  force  and  great 
value  of  geometrical  reasonings ;  and  he  conceived  it 
was  quite  possible  to  introduce  mathematical  forms  or 
symbols  into  argumentations  on  all  subjects  connected 
with  human  nature. 

In  his  logical  work,  Wolff  endeavours  to  combine 
and  classify  all  the  chief  elements  of  Leibnitz's  philo- 
sophy, so  far  as  they  could  be  brought  to  bear  on  logic 
as  a  distinct  and  separate  branch  of  study.  This  cir- 
cumstance has  naturally  circumscribed  his  reputation 
as  an  original  thinker  into  very  narrow  limits.  He 
makes  the  two  great  principles  of  the  Leibnitzian 
theory — the  sufficient  reason  and  the  principle  of  con- 
tradiction— play  an  important  part  in  his  logical  specu- 
lations. They  appeared  to  him  to  embrace  doctrines 
of  great  utility  in  the  art  of  general  reasoning. 

As  a  key  to  his  entire  views  of  logic,  we  may  refer  to 
his  two  leading  points,  empirical  reason  and  pure  reason. 
The  former  deals  with  the  elements  or  products  of  sen- 
sation, the  latter  with  necessary  truths. 

It  was  a  favourite  opinion  of  Wolff's,  that  all  our 
reasonings  could  be  greatly  facilitated  by  having  re- 
course to  a  uniform  system  of  signs.  He  conceived 
that  hieroglyphical  emblems  or  figures  might  be  so 
applied  as  to  represent  fully  and  forcibly  all  general 
notions  and  propositions. 

The  knowledge  of  Wolff's  logic  was  not  confined  to 
Germany  alone.  Deschamps  made  it  known  in  France  ; 
and  in  Sweden,  and  other  neighbouring  countries,  it 


WOLFF,  RUDIGER.  289 

was  expounded  by  able  writers  and  professors.  The 
Swedish  logicians,  Wallachius,  Brunnmark,  and  Kyrger, 
differed  with  Wolff  as  to  the  application  of  the  sufficient 
reason  to  logical  views,  although  they  bore  testimony  to 
the  general  soundness  and  importance  of  his  system, 
taken  as  a  whole.  There  were  also  some  ardent  ad- 
mirers of  the  logic  of  Wolff  in  the  Low  Countries,  in 
Poland,  and  in  Italy. 

The  admirers  and  opponents  of  Wolff  in  his  own 
country  were  numerous  and  respectable,  both  in  point 
of  talent  and  reputation.  The  logical  portion  of  his 
writings  was  variously  contemplated,  as  it  happened  to 
agree  with,  or  militate  against,  some  favourite  meta- 
physical or  theological  theory.  As  the  religious  and 
mental  philosophy  of  the  country  became  more  varied 
in  its  character  and  aim,  and  foreign  elements  of  specu- 
lation became  likewise  more  generally  known  and  cul- 
tivated, there  arose  a  greater  diversity  of  opinion  as  to 
all  logical  systems  and  modes  of  tuition  among  the 
active  and  leading  spirits  of  Germany.  We  find  every 
where  fragments  of  all  sorts  of  theories,  and  often  very 
capriciously  and  fantastically  tacked  together.  We 
find  some  favourite  theme  of  Locke  dovetailed  into 
another  of  Leibnitz,  and  an  aphorism  of  Bacon  paying 
homage  to  Descartes  or  Spinoza.  Still,  amid  all  this 
apparent  variety  and  contradiction,  logic  preserved  its 
German  physiognomy  and  unity.  It  retained  its 
transcendental  type,  and  the  grand  distinction  between 
empirical  and  pure  reason  was  steadily  kept  in  view. 

Andrew  Eudiger  was  the  contemporary  of  Wolff, 
and  opposed  to  many  of  his  logical  views.     In  his 


290        PROGRESS  OF  LOGICAL  SCIENCE  IN  GERMANY. 

Philosophia  Synthetica  (1707)  and  other  works,  he 
argues  strenuously  and  forcibly  for  the  great  impor- 
tance of  logical  science.  He  entertained  an  idea,  that 
the  chief  source  of  all  error  was  fairly  traceable  to  the 
imperfect  and  one-sided  treatises  on  the  subject  which 
commonly  fell  into  the  hands  of  young  students.  Being 
of  a  captious  and  fastidious  turn,  he  was  led  to  search 
for  imperfections  more  among  the  forms  than  the  prin- 
ciples of  dialectics ;  and  this  induced  him  to  make  so 
many  divisions  and  technical  alterations  in  his  logical 
works,  that  his  readers  were  more  perplexed  than  bene- 
fited by  his  labours.  Yet  his  views  were  generally 
sound,  and  of  a  decided  and  enlightened  eclectic  cha- 
racter. Against  the  application  of  mathematical  forms 
and  reasonings  to  other  branches  of  knowledge  he 
raised  his  voice,  and  boldly  maintained  that  such  a 
course,  if  carried  out  to  its  legitimate  results,  would 
prove  subversive  of  all  sound  and  useful  knowledge. 

The  learned  Budeus  was  hostile  to  the  leading 
speculations  interspersed  throughout  the  logic  of  Wolff, 
and  particularly  to  his  application  of  the  doctrines  of 
the  pre-established  harmony,  and  the  principle  of  con- 
tradiction. In  his  work,  JBedenken  ilber  die  Woljffianische 
Philosophic,  he  charges  Wolff  with  undermining  the 
orthodoxy  of  his  students,  by  the  introduction  into  his 
scheme  of  public  tuition  of  the  elements  of  heresy  and 
infidelity.  Syrbius  was  a  logician  of  independent  mind, 
and  seemed  always  under  the  active  influence  of  a  sin- 
cere love  of  truth,  although  he  was  a  little  wayward 
and  mystical.  He  thought  that  a  knowledge  of  the 
mental  faculties  was  indispensable  to  every  mode  of 
conducting  regular  and  systematic  logical  studies,  but 


CRUSIUS,  D  ARIES,  ETC.  291 

that  this  knowledge  should  be  as  free  from  theoretical 
bias  as  possible. 

Crusms  thought  the  principle  of  contradiction  not  of 
so  much  importance  in  philosophical  logic  as  Leibnitz 
and  his  followers  conceived  it  to  be.  He  confined  its 
application  solely  to  mathematics.  He  thought  there 
was  another  principle  of  much  more  utility  and  influ- 
ence in  all  our  reasonings  on  matters  connected  with 
our  internal  constitution. — namely,  the  impossibility  of 
conceiving  certain  things  otherwise  than  true.  There 
were  two  portions  of  this  principle — incompatibility  and 
inseparability ;  and  these  lay  at  the  basis  of  many  of 
our  most  important  conclusions  relative  to  moral  and 
metaphysical  truths.  Gottsched  was  an  admirer  of  the 
logical  principles  of  Locke,  who,  he  conceived,  had 
done  especial  service  to  the  general  cause  of  truth  and 
rational  knowledge.  He  departed,  nevertheless,  from 
some  of  the  leading  maxims  of  the  English  philosopher 
— particularly  by  giving  a  conspicuous  station  to  the 
principle  of  contradiction  and  sufficient  reason.  Accord- 
ing to  Gottsched,  reasoning,  in  all  its  higher  and  more 
lofty  manifestations,  is  a  complex  operation,  calling 
into  activity  nearly  every  power  or  faculty  of  the  intel- 
lect. Sensation,  perception,  attention,  and  abstraction, 
form  inseparable  ingredients  in  every  judgment  or 
conclusion  of  the  understanding. 

Daries,  professor  of  logic  at  Jena,  in  his  Via  ad 
Veritatem  (1740)  entered  profoundly  into  the  prin- 
ciples of  logical  philosophy.  His  lectures  created  a 
lively  interest  throughout  many  parts  of  Germany. 
He  was  an  admirer  of  Wolff  to  some  extent ;  and  for 
Descartes  and  Leibnitz  he  entertained  an  enthusiastic 


2.92        PROGRESS  OP  LOGICAL  SCIENCE  IN  GERMANY. 

veneration.  Locke  and  Bacon  were  likewise  familiar 
to  him.  In  his  logical  labours  he  paid  great  attention 
to  the  rules  of  definition.  He  remarks,  in  reference  to 
the  introduction  of  new  terms  into  speculative  subjects, 
that,  in  the  progress  of  language,  words  become  often 
less  expressive  and  significant,  and  seldom  convey  at 
once  a  clear  view  of  a  subject,  and  a  logically  connected 
abstract  of  it.  Hence  arise  so  often  an  apparent  ne- 
cessity for  creating  a  new  scientific  terminology.  But 
on  all  sciences  founded  on  human  nature,  this  expe- 
dient only  removes  the  immediate  and  more  pressing 
impediments,  without  solving  the  real  difficulty.  In- 
deed, novel  words  and  phrases  introduce  new  difficulties. 
Their  coinage  may  be  unlucky ;  their  acceptation  is 
always  tardy ;  their  powers  of  verbal  combination  are 
very  limited;  and  the  necessity  of  learning  a  new 
language,  in  order  to  understand  some  new  view  of 
an  old  science,  renders  to  most  persons  that  science 
unpalatable. 

Daries  likewise  treats  of  induction,  and  of  the  mode 
the  mind  follows  in  arriving  at  truths  from  this  source. 
He  discusses  the  nature  of  philosophical  theories,  and 
endeavours  to  account  for  them  in  this  manner : — In 
the  investigation  of  any  subject,  however  limited,  where 
a  train  of  reasoning  is  required,  the  mind  instinctively 
or  intuitively  forms  to  itself  some  theory  or  general 
conception  under  which  the  facts  or  things  under  con- 
sideration are  to  be  arranged ;  and  then,  in  the  second 
place,  it  does  not  rest  satisfied  with  this,  but  is  invariably 
inquisitive  relative  to  the  final  cause  of  every  event  or 
occurrence.  The  intellect  in  all  reasoning  is  thus  in- 
fluenced by  two  separate  powers,  which,  when  exten- 


SCHLETEWEIN,  RENSCH,  PLOUCQUET,  ETC.      293 

sively  cultivated  and  developed,  are  the  impelling 
motives  to  that  spirit  of  theorizing  so  visibly  imprinted 
on  the  mental  history  of  mankind,  and  which  is  the 
prolific  source  of  all  scientific  arrangement  and  inves- 
tigation. Man,  in  his  search  after  truth,  deals  there- 
fore at  the  outset  with  a  priori  principles  or  conceptions, 
and  reasons  downwards  to  particular  things.  Were 
this  not  the  case,  science,  properly  so  called,  would, 
according  to  Daries,  be  impossible. 

Schletewein  of  Jena,  and  Holhnann  of  Grottingen, 
both  attempted  to  popularize  the  study  of  logic,  by 
freeing  it  from  unnecessary  and  cumbrous  terms  and 
divisions.  Augustus  F.  Muller  made  the  science  a 
somewhat  material  and  formal  thing,  founding  it  upon 
pure  sensation,  or  the  products  of  the  senses.  The 
logic  of  Eeimarus,  published  at  Hamburg  and  Kiel  in 
1756,  became  very  popular  throughout  Germany.  It 
is  characterised  by  clearness  of  statement,  and  its 
moral  and  religious  tendency. 

Eeusch  was  a  logician  whose  views  were  chiefly  taken 
from  Leibnitz  and  Locke.  The  faculties  of  sensation 
and  reflection  of  the  latter,  were  mingled  with  the  prin- 
ciple of  contradiction  and  the  sufficient  reason  of  the 
former.  His  Sy sterna  Logicum  (1741),  obtained  con- 
siderable reputation  for  many  years  after  its  first 
publication.  Walch  resolves  all  logical  science  into 
experience.  Every  thing  must  result  from  observa- 
tion. No  truth  can  stand  apart  from  it.  Sensation 
and  sentiment  are  the  foundations  of  all  human  rea- 
sonings. 

Ploucquet,  in  his  Methodus  Calculandi  in  Logicis 
(1764),  and  other  works,  laboured  hard  to  introduce 


294        PROGRESS  OF  LOGICAL  SCIENCE  IN  GERMANY. 

new  elements  into  the  science  of  logic.  His  great  aim 
was  to  reduce  all  human  knowledge  to  one  or  two 
simple  principles  or  rules,  and  to  establish  upon  these 
a  logical  method  which  would,  mechanically  as  it  were, 
convey  knowledge  on  every  branch  of  science  with  in- 
fallible certainty  and  great  expedition.  Reasoning 
was  to  be  reduced  to  its  simple  elements,  and,  by  means 
of  algebraical  signs,  rendered  a  matter  of  pure  calcula- 
tion. Logic  was  only,  according  to  Ploucquet,  the  art 
of  deducing  by  an  immutable  rule  the  known  from  the 
unknown,  and  this  is  amply  sufficient  for  the  explana- 
tion of  every  department  of  human  inquiry.  He  re- 
duces all  judgments  on  facts  or  experience  to  identical 
propositions,  by  the  aid  of  the  principle  of  sufficient 
reason* 

John  Henry  Lambert  was  a  philosophical  logician  of 
distinguished  eminence.  He  was  a  native  of  Alsace, 
and  published  his  Novum  Organum  in  1763.  The 
logical  principles  he  advances  are  chiefly  taken  from 
Leibnitz,  Wolff,  Locke,  and  Bacon.  He  was  of  opinion 
that  mathematical  reasoning  was  susceptible  of  appli- 
cation to  every  subject  of  human  knowledge.  It  was 
this  notion  which  induced  him  to  lay  so  much  stress 
upon  verbal  and  technical  terms  and  classifications. 

In  several  of  the  logical  works  we  have  just  enume- 
rated, and  in  others  we  have  not  particularly  specified, 
there  is  an  element  of  speculation  which  is  entitled  to 
a  passing  notice.  Some  logicians  talk  of  reason,  and 
the  reasoning  faculty,  as  a  power  rather  than  an  intel- 
ligence ;  as  something  which  produces  an  effect  without 
having  any  appreciable  consciousness  of  its  doing  so. 

*  Method.,  S§  10.  18,  104. 


KANT.  295 

The  peculiar  nature  of  German  philosophy  leads  the 
minds  of  its  cultivators  to  this  mode  of  thinking  and 
writing.  The  constant  dwelling  on  the  subjective  ele- 
ment, and  considering  it  in  all  its  totality,  induce  the 
mind  to  impart  a  sort  of  materiality  to  it,  and  to 
assimilate  its  workings  to  those  of  objective  agencies 
or  powers.  But  truth  is,  in  all  its  phases,  necessarily 
allied  to  intelligence;  and  this  intelligence  is  itself 
under  the  influence  of  the  active  and  voluntary  powers 
of  the  individual.  Eeasoning  is  not,  therefore,  a  gene- 
ral and  blind  energy  or  impulse,  directed  to  a  particular 
end,  and  guided  by  nothing  higher  nor  extrinsic  to 
itself.  Under  no  conceivable  circumstances  can  we 
form  a  notion  of  truth  as  belonging  to  any  thing  or 
quality  whatever,  as  being  purely  the  result  of  any  such 
impersonal  and  fortuitous  energy  or  power. 

The  general  scope  of  the  logical  speculations  of 
which  we  have  attempted  to  give  a  mere  sketch,  gra- 
dually prepared  the  way  for  the  introduction  of  Kant's 
system — a  system  which  has  imparted  to  the  logical 
philosophy  of  Germany  a  peculiar  and  interesting 
character.  His  views  on  logic,  strictly  so  termed,  are, 
however,  so  intimately  connected  with  his  entire  theory 
of  metaphysical  science,  that  it  is  next  to  impossible  to 
discuss  his  hypothesis  of  reasoning  without  offering 
some  short  notice  of  his  speculations  on  mental  science. 

Kant  asked  himself  the  question,  Is  human  know- 
ledge composed  solely  of  elements  furnished  by  expe- 
rience? He  answered  this  in  the  negative.  He 
maintained  that  we  have  certain  notions  altogether 
independent  of  sensation,  and  which  are  the  product 
of  the  understanding  itself.     And,  in  the  first  place, 


296        PROGRESS  OF  LOGICAL  SCIENCE  IN  GERMANY. 

he  noticed  the  mathematical  sciences,  which  are  ground- 
ed on  notions  of  this  stamp.  He  maintained  that  the 
judgment  we  form,  that  the  radii  of  a  circle  are  all 
equal  to  one  another,  is  not  the  fruit  of  experience, 
but  is  something  permanent,  necessary,  and  universal ; 
whereas  experience  deals  with  nothing  but  particular 
facts.  There  are  therefore  cognitions  of  an  a  priori  cast, 
entirely  distinct  from  any  sensible  element.  Kant  ex- 
tended his  inquiries  into  our  other  notions  relative  to 
the  constitution  of  human  nature,  and  he  likewise  form- 
ed judgments  here  of  the  same  a  priori  character,  and 
subject  in  their  application  to  the  same  conditions  and 
limits  which  mark  all  truths  of  a  mathematical  kind. 

There  are  thus,  therefore,  two  sorts  of  judgments. 
In  the  one  the  attribute  or  predicate  is  contained  in 
the  subject,  as,  for  example,  an  infinitely  perfect  being  is 
good.  This  judgment  does  nothing,  however,  but  de- 
velop a  notion,  without  adding  to  it  any  other  notion, 
and  in  this  point  of  view  does  not  enlarge  the  circle  of 
our  knowledge.  Such  judgments  Kant  termed  ana- 
lytical judgments.  The  second  kind  of  judgments  are 
those  in  which  the  attribute  is  not  contained  in  the 
subject,  as,  every  phenomenon  has  a  principle  or  cause. 
This  principle  or  cause  is  not  contained  in  the  simple 
notion  of  phenomenon.  Judgments  of  description  in-, 
crease  our  knowledge,  inasmuch  as  they  consist  in  an 
affirmation  or  statement  of  something  not  comprised  in 
the  bare  conception  of  the  subject.  This  second  class 
of  judgments  Kant  terms  synthetic  ones. 

Having  now  obtained  two  species  of  judgments,  the 
analytical  and  synthetical,  it  became  necessary  to  shew 
how  they  mutually  co-operated  to  produce  that  which 


KANT.  297 

we  call  human  knowledge.  This  is  the  problem  he 
undertook,  in  his  metaphysical  system,  to  solve.  His 
speculations  to  this  end  are  divided  into  three  principal 
branches  ;  the  criticism  of  theoretical  reason  ;  the  criticism 
of  pure  reason  ;  and  the  criticism  of  another  mode  of  rea- 
son, whose  office  or  nature  is  to  establish  the  harmony  or 
alliance  of  the  theoretical  and  practical  reason. 

Leaving  the  reader,  now,  to  other  sources  of  infor- 
mation on  these  abstruse  points,  we  come  to  state  the 
categories  of  Kant,  which  form  the  groundwork  of  all 
his  logical  speculations.  These  he  reduces  to  four ; 
and  he  affirms  they  contain  all  the  several  judgments 
which  the  human  mind  can  form — 

First — Quantity,  \  \\ 

i-ii  <  Plurality, 

which  embraces,         j        .       J 

(  Universality, 

Second — Quality,         \     ea  1  7* 
i-ii  <  -Negation, 

which  embraces,         j     .  6. 

(^  Limitation. 

Third-KELATiON,  (  Substance  and  Accident, 

which  embraces,        1  Causality  and  Dependence. 
(  Action  and  Eeaction. 

Fourth-MoDALiTY,       (  Possibility  Impossibility. 

i-ii  <  Existence,  .Non-existence, 

which  embraces,         )  .    ' 

(  Necessity,  Contingency. 

These  categories  are  not  the  result  of  experience; 
they  are  solely  the  universal  and  necessary  laws  of  the 
understanding.  All  our  notions  fall  within  them,  and 
they  are  the  forms  of  the  intellect,  as  time  and  space 
are  the  forms  of  our  sensibility. 

The  particular  treatise  which  goes  under  the  deno- 


298        PROGRESS  OF  LOGICAL  SCIENCE  IN  GERMANY. 

mination  of  Logic,  was  a  posthumous  work  of  Kant's. 
It  is  necessary  we  should  see  what  notions  he  enter- 
tains of  the  nature  and  province  of  logic.  He  affirms 
that  we  can  neither  think,  nor  make  use  of  our  under- 
standings, otherwise  than  in  accordance  with  certain 
rules.  All  these  rules  are  either  necessary  or  contin- 
gent. The  former  embrace  those  without  which  no 
use  of  the  understanding  would  be  possible ;  the  latter, 
those  without  which  a  certain  determinate  use  of  it 
would  not  take  place.  When  we  reflect  inwardly,  we 
discover  those  rules  of  the  understanding  which  are 
absolutely  necessary  in  every  respect,  and  without 
regard  to  any  specific  objects  of  thinking,  because, 
without  them,  we  could  not  think  at  all.  Hence  we 
have  an  a  priori  knowledge  of  them ;  because  they  com- 
prise, without  any  reference  to  external  objects,  merely 
the  condition  of  the  use  of  the  understanding  generally, 
whether  relative  to  matters  of  pure  reason  or  of  expe- 
rience. Hence  it  is  that  all  necessary  and  universal 
rules  of  thinking  must  relate  to  the  form  of  the  mind, 
and  not  to  the  matter.  Logic  is,  therefore,  the  science 
of  the  necessary  -laws  of  the  understanding  and  of  the 
reason,  or  the  mere  form  of  thinking  generally.  Logic 
is  to  be  considered  as  the  foundation  of  all  other 
sciences,  but  it  is  not  an  organon  of  the  sciences.  An 
organon  presupposes  an  exact  knowledge  of  the  sciences 
— of  their  objects  and  their  sources.  The  mathema- 
tics, for  instance,  is  a  science  which  comprises  the  ground 
of  extending  our  knowledge  in  certain  other  directions, 
and  on  this  account  may  fitly  enough  be  termed  an 
organon.  But  logic  is  but  the  use  of  the  rules  of  the 
understanding,  and  cannot  go  into  the  sciences,  and 


KANT.  299 

anticipate  their  matter.  It  is  not  for  enlarging,  but 
solely  for  judging  and  regulating  our  knowledge.  It  is 
simply  a  canon  of  the  understanding  and  the  reason, 
and  must  not  borrow  principles,  either  from  science 
or  experience  ;  it  must  comprehend  nothing  save  its 
a  priori  laws,  which  necessarily  appertain  to  the  under- 
standing itself. 

Those  logicians,  therefore,  who  amalgamate  psycho- 
logical principles  with  logic,  act  erroneously.  This 
mode  of  inquiry  leads  but  to  a  knowledge  of  contin- 
gent laws ;  whereas  in  logic  the  inquiry  is  not  after 
contingent,  but  necessary  rules — how  we  think,  but  not 
how  we  are  to  think.  It  is  to  teach  us  the  right  use 
of  the  understanding,  as  the  use  is  in  perfect  agreement 
or  harmony  with  itself. 

Logic  is  a  demonstrative  science,  for  it  is  occupied 
with  the  empirical  use  of  the  understanding  and  of 
reason ;  and  about  the  universal  and  necessary  laws  of 
thought,  which  depend  upon  a  priori  principles,  and 
from  which  all  its  rules  can  be  derived,  and  proved  to 
be  those  to  which  all  cognitions  of  the  reason  must  be 
conformable. 

Universal  logic  is  to  be  distinguished  from  transcen- 
dental logic.  The  latter  represents  an  object  as  the 
naked  product  of  the  understanding  ;  whereas  universal 
logic  extends  to  all  objects  in  general. 

Logic  is  divided  by  Kant  into  the  analytic  and  the 
dialectic.  The  analytic  discovers  all  the  operations  of 
reason  which  we  perform  in  the  act  of  thinking  in  gene- 
ral. It  is  the  analysis  of  the  forms  of  the  understand- 
ing and  of  reason,  and  justly  styled  the  logic  of  truth. 
The  dialectic  is  the  logic  of  appearances,  and  arises 


300        PROGRESS  OF  LOGICAL  SCIENCE  IN  GERMANY. 

from  the  abuse  of  the  analytic,  and  was  the  foundation 
in  former  times  of  the  mere  art  of  formal  disputation. 
The  ordinary  division  of  logic  into  popular  and  scien- 
tific, Kant  considers  unjustifiable.  Natural  logic  is 
not  logic,  but  simply  an  anthropological  science,  which 
deals  with  the  natural  use  of  the  understanding,  and 
which  has  only  empirical  principles  to  rest  upon. 
Scientific  logic,  comprising  the  universal  rules  of 
thinking,  is  that  alone  which  deserves  the  name  of 
logic. 

The  division  of  logic  into  theoretical  and  practical  is 
likewise  wrong.  Universal  logic,  considered  as  a  canon 
of  the  understanding,  and  abstracted  from  all  objects, 
is  not  susceptible  of  any  practical  application.  The 
same  objections  lie  against  the  common  division  of 
pure,  and  applied  or  mixed  logic.  The  latter  is  not 
entitled  to  be  called  logic  at  all.  It  is  mere  psychology, 
whose  object  is  to  consider  how  our  thinking  is  usually 
carried  on,  not  how  it  must  go  on.  Neither,  according 
to  Kant,  can  the  division  of  logic  into  common  and 
speculative  be  sustained.  He  likewise  says  that 
common  sense  can  be  no  foundation  of  logical  science ; 
because  this  sense  is  the  faculty  of  knowing  the  rules  of 
thinking  in  the  concrete,  whereas  logic  must  be  a 
science  which  embraces  the  rules  of  thinking  in  the 
abstract. 

Kant  enters  upon  the  discussion  as  to  the  nature  of 
truth.  The  question,  What  is  truth  ?  relates,  he  says, 
to  two  distinct  things, — to  that  which  is  without  us, 
and  to  that  which  is  within  us  ;  or,  technically,  to  ob- 
jective and  subjective  materials.  With  respect  to  the 
first,  the   objective  materials,  they  can  furnish  us  with 


KANT.  301 

no  criterion  of  truth ;  but  the  subjective  materials  can 
furnish  such  a  criterion.  A  universal  criterion  of  truth 
from  objects  around  is  not  possible ;  because  it  would 
be  impossible  to  embrace  all  the  modes  in  which  objects 
differ  from  one  another,  even  if  we  could  know  all  the 
objects  themselves.  But  a  subjective  criterion  is  pos- 
sible, because  truth  from  this  source  consists  entirely 
in  the  agreement  of  the  act  of  thinking  with  itself.  The 
universal  criteria  of  formal  truth  are  consequently 
nothing  but  universal  logical  marks  of  the  agreement 
of  cognition  with  itself,  or  with  the  invariable  laws  of 
the  understanding  and  of  the  reason. 

All  formal  universal  criteria,  though  they  cannot 
constitute  objective  truth,  are  to  be  considered  as  its 
conditio  sine  qua  non. 

The  formal  criteria  of  logical  truth  are, — 1st,  The 
proposition  of  contradiction  ;  and,  2d,  That  of  sufficient 
reason.  The  first  determines  the  logical  possibility  of 
a  cognition,  and  the  latter  the  logical  reality. 

There  are  three  principles  connected  with  the  criteria 
of  formal  truth, — 1st,  The  principle  of  contradiction 
and  of  identity,  which  determines  for  problematical 
judgments  the  internal  possibility  of  a  cognition  ;  2nd, 
The  principle  of  sufficient  reason,  on  which  the  logical 
reality  of  an  act  of  thinking  depends,  as  forming  matter 
for  assertive  judgments  ;  and,  3d,  The  principle  of  the 
exclusive  third  Qprincipium  exclusi  medii  inter  dua  con- 
tradictor ici),  in  which  the  logical  necessity  of  a  cogni- 
tion is  founded. 

The  distinction  between  theoretical  and  practical 
cognition  or  thinking  is  this  : — Practical  cognitions  are, 
— -1st,  Imperatives,  and  opposed  to  theoretical  cogni- 


302        PROGRESS  OF  LOGICAL  SCIENCE  IN  GERMANY. 

tions ;  and,  2nd,  The  grounds  to  possible  imperatives ; 
and,  in  this  point  of  view,  opposed  to  all  speculative 
thinking.  Every  imperative  proposition  expresses  or 
implies  a  possible  freedom  of  action  by  which  a  certain 
end  is  to  be  realized.  Theoretical  cognitions  are  such 
as  express,  not  what  must  be,  or  ought  to  be,  but  what 
really  is ;  consequently  they  refer  not  to  acting,  but  to 
being  or  existence.  It  is  the  nature  of  the  practical, 
however,  to  absorb  all  the  theoretical ;  for  the  absolute 
value  of  all  thinking  is  to  be  estimated  from  its  prac- 
tical results.  And  it  must  be  borne  in  mind  here,  that 
the  practical  reason,  as  unfolded  in  Kant's  entire  system 
of  philosophy,  contains  four  doctrines  —  the  liberty 
of  the  will,  the  obligation  to  virtue,  our  existence  in 
a  future  state,  and  our  responsibility  to  a  supreme 
Creator  or  Governor  of  the  universe. 

These  general  principles,  and  others  of  a  like  philo- 
sophical character  —  respecting  the  nature  of  belief, 
probable  and  mathematic  evidence,  cause  and  effect, 
&c.  &c. — are  given  as  an  introduction  to  the  study  of 
logic  proper,  which  consists  of  two  parts.  The  first 
contains  the  General  Doctrine  of  Elements ;  and  the 
second,  the  General  Doctrine  of  Method. 

The  first  item  in  the  elements  of  logic  are  conceptions. 
All  cognitions  or  thoughts  are  either  intuitions  or  con- 
ceptions. An  intuition  is  a  single,  and  a  conception  a 
universal  representation.  The  cognition,  or  knowledge 
of  conceptions,  is  termed  thinking  or  cogitation. 

Matter  and  form  belong  to  every  conception.  The 
object  constitutes  the  matter  of  the  conception,  the 
universality  its  form. 

The  origin  of  all  logical  conceptions  may  be  traced 


KANT.  303 

to  three  sources, — 1st,  Comparison,  or  the  comparing 
of  representations  with  one  another  relative  to  the 
unity  of  consciousness ;  2nd,  Reflection,  or  reflecting 
how  the  several  representations  may  be  comprehended 
in  one  individual  act  of  the  consciousness ;  3d,  Ab- 
straction, or  the  separation  of  all  that  by  which  any 
given  number  of  representations  are  distinguished  from 
one  another. 

The  sphere  of  our  conceptions  is  in  a  direct  ratio 
with  the  number  of  things  which  come  under  our  con- 
sideration and  reflection. 

The  universal  rules  relative  to  the  subordination  of 
our  conceptions  are, — 1st,  Whatever  agrees  with,  or  is 
repugnant  to,  the  superior  conceptions,  likewise  agrees 
with,  or  is  repugnant  to,  all  the  inferior  ones  which  are 
contained  under  them  ;  and  2nd,  Conversely,  whatever 
agrees  with,  or  is  repugnant  to,  all  inferior  conceptions, 
likewise  agrees  with,  or  is  repugnant  to,  their  superior 
ones. 

A.  judgment,  according  to  Kant,  is  the  representation 
of  the  unity  of  the  consciousness  of  various  represen- 
tations, or  the  representation  of  their  relation,  provided 
they  make  up  a  conception.  Matter  and  form  belong 
to  every  judgment  as  its  constituent  elements.  Logic 
cannot  occupy  itself  with  the  matter,  but  only  with  the 
form  of  conceptions.  All  the  logical  forms  of  judg- 
ments are  comprehended  under  the  four  categories — 
Quantity,  Quality,  Relation,  and  Modality. 

The  syllogism  is  treated  of  in  the  third  section  of  the 
first  part ;  and  Kant's  discussion  of  the  subject  does 
not  differ  in  any  material  point  from  our  common 
treatises  on  syllogistic  rules.     Syllogising,  he  tells  us, 


304        PROGRESS  OF  LOGICAL  SCIENCE  IN  GERMANY. 

is  that  function  of  thinking  by  which  one  judgment  is 
derived  from  another. 

In  the  second  part  of  Kant's  logic,  which  treats  of 
Method,  he  observes  that  all  thinking  or  knowledge, 
considered  as  a  whole,  must  be  conformable  to  some 
general  rules.  These  rules  relate  either  to  manner, 
which  is  free,  or  to  method,  which  is  co-active. 

All  thinking,  in  its  scientific  relations,  must  be 
arranged  according  to  some  method.  All  science  re- 
quires a  systematical  cognition,  regulated  by  digested 
rules.  Logical  method  has  to  treat  of  the  form  of  a 
science,  or  of  the  way  of  proceeding,  in  order  to  connect 
the  varied  cognitions  of  any  particular  department  of 
knowledge.  All  methods  should  be  characterised  by 
distinctness,  profundity,  systematical  order,  and  com- 
prehensiveness. 

Method  is  divided  by  Kant  into  several  kinds,  as 
the  following — the  scientific  or  popular  method;  the 
systematical  or  fragmentary  method;  the  analytic  or 
synthetic  method ;  the  syllogistic  or  tabellary  method  ; 
the  acroamatic  or  erotematic  method ;  and  meditation, 
by  which  is  understood,  reflection  or  methodical 
thinking. 

The  general  doctrines  implied  and  set  forth,  both  in 
Kant's  philosophical  and  formal  logic,  may  be  summed 
up  as  follows. 

What  we  denominate  human  knowledge,  taken  in  its 
widest  extent,  is  composed  of  two  elements  ;  the  expe- 
rimental, or  a  posteriori  element,  and  the  pure  reason 
element,  or  that  derived  from  an  a  priori  source.  If  the 
intelligence  or  reason  did  not  apply  its  forms  to  the 
intuitions    furnished  from   sensation,    these    intuitions 


KANT.  305 

could  never  become  cognitions,  or  objects  of  thinking. 
They  would  be  lifeless  and  abortive.  On  the  other 
hand,  these  forms  of  the  understanding  would  be  with- 
out any  signiflcancy  were  they  to  stand  alone,  without 
the  intuitions  which  the  senses  furnish.  To  consti- 
tute real  knowledge,  there  must  be  here  an  action  and 
reaction  of  one  element  on  the  other. 

All  the  notions  of  the  pure  reason  are  destitute  of 
objective  reality,  and  this  arises  from  the  reason  not 
acting  upon  the  intuitions  of  sense,  but  only  on  the 
forms  of  the  judgments  which  the  intellect  produces. 

In  attributing  to  these  notions  of  the  pure  reason 
an  objective  reality,  we  act  erroneously,  because  we  are 
straining  to  comprehend  existences  which  are  beyond 
the  sphere  of  the  sensible  world.  The  limits  of  our 
knowledge  are  the  limits  of  our  experience. 

We  likewise  act  erroneously  when,  instead  of  em- 
ploying the  notions  furnished  by  the  pure  reason  in 
arranging  and  systematizing  our  judgments,  we  apply 
them  immediately  to  the  results  of  experience.  This 
mode  of  inquiry  gives  rise  to  the  antinomies,  which  are 
a  series  of  judgments  terminating  in  contradictory  or 
inconceivable  results.  These  antinomies  are  placed  as 
sentinels,  as  it  were,  to  apprise  the  philosophic  inquirer 
that  all  such  modes  of  proceeding  as  give  rise  to  them 
are  decidedlv  erroneous  and  vicious. 

What  we  term  the  laws  of  nature  are  nothing  but 
the  laws  of  our  own  intelligence.  We  impose  the  laws 
of  our  mind  upon  nature.  The  order  which  we  attri- 
bute to  the  operations  of  nature,  are  at  bottom  only  the 
order  of  our  intellectual  perceptions,  determined  by  the 
fundamental  forms  of  the  understanding. 

u 


306        PROGRESS  OF  LOGICAL  SCIENCE  IN  GERMANY. 

The  logical  principles  of  Kant,  which  more  immedi- 
ately sprang  out  of  his  Critic  of  Pure  Reason,  created 
a  lively  sensation,  not  only  throughout  the  author's 
own  country,  but,  to  some  extent,  in  other  European 
states.  It  roused  the  spirit  of  inquiry,  and  was  the 
prolific  parent  of  that  huge  mass  of  German  speculation, 
which  has  astonished  and  perplexed  the  philosophic 
minds  of  men  wherever  it  has  been  heard  of  and  studied. 

Reinhold,  in  his  Versuch  einer  Kritik  der  Logik, 
founded  logical  science  on  the  representative  faculty, 
which  is  a  modification  of  the  pure  reason  of  Kant. 
There  are  six  rules  in  reference  to  philosophical  logic 
which  it  is  of  great  importance  to  keep  in  view, — 1st, 
All  elementary  truths  should  be  immediately  perceived  ; 
2d,  Every  fundamental  truth  should  have  an  existence 
of  all  knowledge  from  experience  ;  3d,  This  funda- 
mental truth  should  be  simply  the  expression  of  a  fact ; 
4th,  It  ought  to  be  recognised  by  all  men;  5th,  It 
must  be  entirely  separated  from  sensation ;  and,  6th, 
It  ought,  however,  to  appertain,  in  a  certain  logical 
manner,  to  all  experience  and  to  all  our  thoughts. 

Abicht,  in  his  Verbesserte  Logik  oder  Wahrheits- 
Wissenschaft  (1795),  defines  logic  to  be  simply  the 
perception  of  truth.  Three  questions  are  embodied  in 
all  reasoning, — 1st,  What  is  the  surest  and  most  direct 
road  to  knowledge?  2nd,  What  is  the  criterion  of 
truth  ?  and,  3d,  What  is  the  best  mode  of  communicat- 
ing truth  and  science  to  others  ?  Salomon  Maimon 
attacked  the  categories  of  Kant  in  his  Die  Kategorien 
des  Aristoteles  (1794),  on  the  general  ground  that  no 
objective  reality  could  be  inferred  from  them.  Jacob 
Sigismond  Beck  published  his  Lehrbuch  der  Logik  in 


PLATTFEK,  ANCILLON,  ETC.  307 

1796,  which  contains  some  remarks  on  the  logical 
principles  involved  in  the  Pure  Reason  of  Kant. 

Plattner  was  a  distinguished  logician  who  followed 
in  the  wake  of  Kant.  He  took  an  enlightened  and 
comprehensive  view  of  logical  truth.  And  the  same 
remark  is  applicable,  to  a  certain  extent^-toL  the  logical 
speculations  of  Eberhard,  Tetens,  Schaumann,  and 
Maass. 

In  the  Transactions  of  the  Berlin  Academy,  estab- 
lished in  1700,  and  which  enjoyed  for  many  years  an 
European  reputation  in  matters  of  speculative  science, 
many  interesting  papers  on  logical  topics  will  be  found 
— chiefly  from  the  pens  of  Formey,  Begnelin,  Beausobre, 
Merian,  Maupertuis,  Boyer,  and  Ancillon. 


308         PROGRESS  OF  LOGICAL  SCIENCE  IN  FRANCE. 


CHAPTER  XIV. 

PROGRESS     OF     LOGICAL     SCIENCE    IN    FRANCE,    FROM    THE 
PUBLICATION  OF  LOCKE'S  "ESSAY"  TILL  THE  END  OF  THE 
.  EIGHTEENTH  CENTURY. 

The  historical  aspect  of  logic  in  France,  in  its  scientific 
relations,  from  the  time  of  Locke  till  the  termination 
of  the  last  century,  is  altogether  of  a  different  cast  from 
that  which  we  have  just  noticed  in  Germany.  The 
philosophic  mind  of  France  had  little  constitutional 
relish  for  abstruse  systems.  It  preferred  something 
palpable,  clear,  definite,  and  material.  Bacon,  Locke, 
and  Gassendi,  had  more  charms  for  the  French  logi- 
cians than  Descartes,  Leibnitz,  and  Kant.  Hence  it 
is  that,  speaking  generally,  the  current  of  logical  philo- 
sophy chiefly  ran,  during  the  period  of  which  we  are 
now  speaking,  in  the  channel  which  the  three  first- 
named  philosophers  opened  out  for  the  prosecution  and 
development  of  scientific  truth.  Here  and  there  we 
recognise  the  logical  influence  of  Descartes  and  Leib- 
nitz ;  but  it  has  only  been  within  the  last  half  century 
that  the  French  have  manifested  a  lively  interest  in 
these  two  distinguished  men. 

The   logical   works   of  the   French  writers,  in  this 


PROGEESS  OF  LOGICAL  SCIENCE  IN  FEANCE.  309 

century,  are  characterised  by  a  vehement  desire  for 
analysis  and  simplification.  They  labour  to  reduce  the 
entire  reasoning  powers  to  a  single  element,  and  to 
account  for  the  whole  mental  economy  by  the  operation 
of  an  individual  principle.  This  principle  was,  with 
them,  the  result  of  some  outward  influence  from  ex- 
ternal bodies  on  our  senses;  and  reasoning,  in  all  its 
forms  and  aspects,  was  but  the  necessary  or  mechanical 
product  of  this  sensational  power.  The  laws  of  nature 
were  invoked,  attention  was  riveted  upon  them,  and 
all  the  rational  operations  and  sentiments  of  the  inward 
man  deduced  from  them.  The  French  logicians  re- 
fused to  look  into  the  intellect  itself — to  recognise  any 
subjective  element  beyond  the  authority  of  sensation — 
or,  if  the  great  facts  of  mental  consciousness  were  occa- 
sionally noticed  or  appealed  to,  it  was  only  for  the 
purpose  of  being  indiscriminately  buried  in  the  mass  of 
external  perceptions  and  material  agencies.  This  mode 
of  analysing  logical  science  necessarily  led  to  a  one- 
sided view  of  man  and  of  human  knowledge  generally — 
increasing  the  objective  at  the  expense  of  the  subjective 
element,  and  thereby  destroying  the  proper  balance 
between  them.  The  majority  of  French  logicians  never 
saw  that  the  fundamental  principles  of  thought  were 
altogether  different  from  the  phenomena  which  seemed 
to  suggest  them.  They  looked  upon  them  as  pure 
abstractions — things  set  apart  merely  from  the  pheno- 
mena, but  in  no  sense  superior  to  them,  or  having  any 
higher  office  to  perform  in  the  logical  economy  of  the 
understanding. 

The  early  and  enthusiastic  reception  in  France  of  the 
logical  philosophy  of  Locke,  tended  greatly  to  produce 


310  PROGRESS  OF  LOGICAL  SCIENCE  IN  FRANCE. 

this  mode  of  treating  logic.  'Not  forming  a  fair  esti- 
mate of  the  general  scope  and  design  of  the  English 
philosopher's  system,  the  French  thinkers  unfortunately 
stumbled  on  what  was  purely  physical  and  mechanical 
in  his  plan,  and  obstinately  shut  their  eyes  against  the 
intellectual  and  spiritual  portion  of  his  admirable  trea- 
tise. They  aimed  at  reforming  and  improving  Locke, 
while  they  only  mutilated  and  disfigured  him.  Their 
constitutional  appetency  for  what  was  clear  and  pointed, 
naturally  induced  them  to  shrink  from  the  very  appear- 
ance of  every  thing  bordering  on  profound  reflection  or 
abstract  refinement ;  and  commentaries  and  abridge- 
ments of  Locke,  sound  and  clever  as  far  as  they  went, 
getting  once  hold  of  the  public  mind,  there  could  be 
no  effective  check  given  to  the  spread  of  misconception 
and  error.  Consequently,  we  meet  with  repetitions  of 
his  logical  notions  in  every  direction,  without  the 
slightest  reference  to  any  statements  or  explanations 
calculated  to  qualify  and  correct  their  import  and  ten- 
dency. 

There  was  a  bold  and  uncompromising  nominalism 
displayed  in  the  entire  logical  literature  of  France 
within  this  period.  Words,  and  words  alone,  were  the 
things  which  constituted  the  elements  of  argumen- 
tation. We  find  it  stated  again  and  again,  that  it  is 
the  sole  province  of  logic  to  regulate  language.  Think- 
ing is  only  known  to  us  through  the  medium  of  speech  ; 
and  consequently,  every  idea  in  a  proposition  must  have 
some  internal  or  external  sign  to  represent  it.  There 
is  a  necessary  relation  between  the  sign  and  the  thing 
signified.  The  professed  object  of  logic  being  to  make 
us  acquainted  with  what  is  going  on  in  our  minds,  it  is 


CROUSAZ.  311 

clear,  say  the  French  logicians,  that  any  change  made 
in  the  symbols  we  adopt  to  express  our  ideas,  must 
completely  alter  the  nature  of  any  propositions  we  lay 
before  the  understanding  of  others  for  their  compre- 
hension or  guidance.  Unless  the  different  parts  of 
speech  are  accurately  arranged  with  regard  to  each 
other,  no  sound  logical  conclusion  can  be  arrived 
at. 

This  verbal  hypothesis,  though  in  strict  keeping  with 
the  general  spirit  of  French  philosophy  in  the  eighteenth 
century,  threw  logical  speculations  comparatively  into 
the  background.  They  became  little  heeded  and  cul- 
tivated. Man  was  considered  only  as  a  being  possessed 
of  a  superior  instinctive  power,  not  differing  in  essence 
from  other  portions  of  the  animal  creation.  This  no- 
tion lay  at  the  root  of  a  great  proportion  of  the  logical 
systems  and  speculations  current  among  the  French 
literati.  Of  course,  this  mode  of  considering  logic 
naturally  led  to  narrow  and  degraded  views  of  human 
nature.  It  was  likewise  dogmatic  and  imperious  in  its 
tone  and  spirit.  Every  thing  which  savoured  of  spiritu- 
ality was  scouted  as  ridiculous  and  fanatical,  and  the 
result  of  an  imbecile  or  misguided  understanding. 

The  Logic  of  M.  Crousaz,  professor  of  philosophy  in 
the  university  of  Lausanne,  was  for  many  years  a  popular 
work  on  the  continent,  and  particularly  in  France.  It 
is  contained  in  three  thick  and  closely  printed  volumes. 
He  divides  logic  into  two  great  parts — natural  and 
artificial.  The  first  leads  him  to  treat  of  all  the  powers 
and  faculties  of  the  mind ;  and  the  latter  to  the  nature 
of  language,  the  syllogism,  &c.  The  treatise  closes 
with  a  dissertation  on  method,  which,  he  maintains,  to 


312  PROGRESS  OY  LOGICAL  SCIENCE  IN  FRANCE. 

be  useful  in  logical  matters,  must  always  be  full,  brief 
and  certain. 

The  logic  of  Crousaz  is  decidedly  founded  upon 
Locke's  views  of  the  nature  of  mind  generally,  and  the 
faculty  of  reasoning  in  particular.  Gibbon,  in  his 
published  correspondence,  bears  testimony  to  the  value 
of  Crousaz's  labours.  "The  logic  of  Crousaz,"  says 
he,  "  had  prepared  me  to  engage  with  his  master  Locke 
and  his  antagonist  Bayle, — of  whom  the  former  may 
be  used  as  a  bridle,  and  the  latter  applied  as  a  spur  to 
the  curiosity  of  a  young  philosopher."  "  But  what  I 
esteemed  most  of  all :  from  the  perusal  and  meditation 
of  De  Crousaz's  logic,  I  not  only  understood  the  prin- 
ciples of  that  science,  but  formed  my  mind  to  a  habit 
of  thinking  and  reasoning  I  had  no  idea  of." 

Dumarsais's  Logique  is  grounded  on  the  Port-Royal 
system.  It  attempts  to  shew  that  the  more  our  ideas 
are  multiplied,  and  the  more  correct  notions  we  have 
of  the  nature  and  operation  of  our  minds,  the  more 
likely  are  we  to  reason,  on  other  branches  of  knowledge, 
with  clearness  and  profundity.  The  author  conceives 
that  the  power  of  mental  abstraction  is  one  of  the  chief 
habits  which  logicians  should  strive  to  cultivate  to  its 
highest  state  of  perfection,  inasmuch  as  it  is  the  foun- 
dation of  all  those  conceptions  we  form  of  general  truths 
and  propositions.  Dumarsais  falls  in  with  the  common 
current  of  French  thought  in  reference  to  the  influence 
of  language  in  reasoning,  and  ascribes  to  the  proper 
adaptation  of  words,  both  in  speech  and  writing,  the 
most  important  logical  results.  He  adopts  the  maxim 
of  Leibnitz  on  this  point,  that  language  is  the  mirror  of 
the  understanding. 


313 

The  Abbe  Terrason,  in  his  work  La  Philosophie  de 
V Esprit,  maintains  that  logic  is  not  a  branch  of 
knowledge  from  which  philosophy  derives  its  essential 
rules  and  maxims  of  investigation ;  on  the  contrary,  it 
is  an  emanation  from  philosophy  itself,  which  sheds 
its  influence  and  power  over  the  understanding  gener- 
ally, thereby  guiding  the  judgment  to  a  full  compre- 
hension of  all  the  truths  of  science  and  art. 

Father  Buffier,  a  French  Jesuit,  is  the  author  of  a 
work  on  logic  which  has  obtained  considerable  cele- 
brity as  well  in  his  own  country  as  in  foreign  seats  of 
learning.  In  order,  however,  to  comprehend  accurately 
the  general  scope  of  this  work,  it  is  necessary  we  should 
peruse  some  of  his  philosophical  dissertations,  particu- 
larly those  under  the  heads  of  First  Truths  and  Meta- 
physics. His  Logic  is  substantially  a  formal  exposition 
of  the  principles  entertained  in  these  two  essays.  The 
end  or  object  of  logic  is,  the  author  says,  to  form  just 
conceptions,  and  to  reason  well.  For  these  ends,  there 
must  be  rules  for  the  government  of  the  mind.  Buffier 
here  follows  the  scholastic  plan,  by  determining  the 
rules  to  be  three — apprehension,  judgment,  and  reason- 
ing; and  though  he  admits  the  importance  of  other 
rules,  such  as  relate  to  comparison,  doubt,  method,  and 
the  like,  yet  he  resolves  all  these  into  the  three  primary 
ones  laid  down  at  the  commencement  of  his  work. 

The  Logic  is  divided  into  two  parts, — the  first  is  in 
the  form  of  letters,  and  the  second  under  the  arrange- 
ment of  distinct  articles,  to  the  number  of  twenty-six. 
The  syllogism  is  treated  of  in  the  first  division,  and  the 
nature  and  origin  of  our  ideas  in  the  second. 

Buffier  says  that  logic  is  nothing  but  a  mass  of  rules 


314  PROGRESS  OF  LOGICAL  SCIENCE  IN  FRANCE. 

for  the  ready  direction  of  the  mind  in  its  several  opera- 
tions. This  is  the  total  of  all  logical  discussion.  The 
end  of  logic  is,  whatever  the  intelligent  mind  purposes 
to  accomplish. 

Whether  logic  be  a  science  or  an  art,  Father  Buffier 
says,  depends  entirely  upon  the  meaning  attached  to 
the  two  words  science  and  art.  If  we  call  all  true 
knowledge  acquired  by  certain  modes  of  reflection,  or 
by  rules,  science,  then  logic  is  a  science.  Whether  logic 
be  an  art,  depends  solely  on  the  conceptions  men  have  of 
the  term,  as  relating  to  material  or  spiritual  matters. 

The  name  of  Father  Buffier  is  intimately  associated 
with  the  history  of  philosophical  logic  in  France  during 
this  century.  His  peculiar  views  on  the  subject  con- 
nect him  with  the  common-sense  school  of  logicians, 
which  will  be  more  particularly  dwelt  upon  in  a  sub- 
sequent part  of  this  volume.  Suffice  it  to  state,  in 
passing,  that  Buffier' s  work  On  First  Truths  aimed  at 
shewing,  that  not  only  the  ancient  but  even  modern 
philosophers,  have  involved  the  nature  and  offices  of  the 
reasoning  faculty  in  such  abstruseness  and  difficulty,  as 
to  demand  far  too  large  a  share  of  reflection  to  be  com- 
prehended by  men  of  ordinary  capacity  and  learning. 
To  simplify  the  matter,  he  endeavours  "  to  know  truths 
in  their  very  source — to  analyse  those  to  which  we 
must  ascend,  in  order  to  ascertain  whatever  is  necessary 
to  be  proved,  and  which  constitute  the  utmost  boundary 
of  human  inquiry— to  deduce  principles  capable  of  dis- 
pelling the  mist  of  vulgar  prejudice,  the  perplexity  of 
the  schools,  and  the  prepossessions  even  of  certain 
learned  and  modish  philosophers." 

In  order  to  accomplish  this  desirable  purpose,  it  was 


BUFFIEK.  315 

necessary  to  refer  to  the  primary  truths  of  common 
sense  in  all  our  logical  investigations,  of  which  the  fol- 
lowing is  the  author's  definition :  "  Common  sense  is 
that  quality  or  disposition  which  nature  has  placed  in 
all  men,  or  evidently  in  the  far  greater  number  of  them, 
in  order  to  enable  them  all,  when  they  have  arrived  at 
the  age  and  use  of  reason,  to  form  a  common  and  uni- 
form judgment  with  respect  to  objects  different  from 
the  internal  sentiment  of  their  own  perception,  and 
which  judgment  is  not  the  consequence  of  any  anterior 
principle."  Burner  says  again,  "  The  original  source 
and  first  principle  of  every  truth  which  we  are  capable 
of  comprehending,  is  the  interior  sense  we  each  of  us 
have  of  our  own  existence,  and  which  we  feel  within 
ourselves.  This  is,  I  say,  the  foundation  of  every  other 
truth,  and  the  basis  of  all  human  knowledge.  Nothing 
else  can  give  us  a  more  home  conviction,  that  the  object 
of  our  thought  is  as  truly  existent  as  our  thought  itself; 
for  the  object,  the  thought,  and  the  inward  sense  we 
have  of  them,  are  really  nothing  else  but  ourselves,  who 
think,  exist,  and  have  an  interior  sense  of  those  things." 
The  perceptions  of  common  sense  are  grounded  on 
the  following  principles  : — 

1.  There  are  other  beings  and  other  men  in  the 
world  besides  ourselves. 

2.  There  is  in  them  something  that  is  called  truth, 
wisdom,  prudence;  and  this  something  is  not  merely 
arbitrary. 

3.  There  is  something  in  ourselves  which  we  call  in- 
telligence or  mind,  and  something  which  is  not  that 
intelligence  or  mind,  and  which  is  named  body  ;  so  that 
each  possesses  properties  different  from  the  other. 


316  PROGRESS  OP  LOGICAL  SCIENCE  IN  FRANCE, 

4.  What  is  generally  said  and  thought  by  men,  in  all 
ages  and  countries  of  the  world,  is  true. 

5.  All  men  have  not  combined  to  deceive  me. 

6.  What  is  not  intelligence  or  mind  cannot  produce 
all  the  effects  of  intelligence  or  mind ;  neither  can  a 
fortuitous  jumble  of  particles  of  matter  form  a  work 
of  such  order,  and  such  regular  motion,  as  a  watch. 

Burlier  defines,  as  first  truths,  all  propositions  so  clear 
and  obvious  that  they  can  neither  be  proved  nor  refuted 
by  other  propositions. 

Father  B-egnault,  another  Jesuit,  followed  the  foot- 
steps of  Buffler,  in  an  attempt  to  trace  the  first  prin- 
ciples of  reasoning  to  their  proper  source.  Begnault's 
work,  La  Logique  en  forme  d'entretiens,  ou  V Art  de 
tr ouver  la  Verite"  (1742),  is  written  in  the  form  of 
dialogue  between  master  and  pupil,  and  thrown  into 
the  most  popular  form  for  easy  comprehension.  It 
enjoyed  considerable  reputation  in  France  generally; 
and,  among  the  order  of  ecclesiastics  to  whom  the  author 
belonged,  it  was  for  many  years  considered  a  valuable 
and  indispensable  manual  of  the  science. 

Diderot,  in  many  parts  of  his  philosophical  writings, 
reduces  reasoning  to  a  mere  species  of  sensation.  He 
says,  "  Every  idea  must  necessarily,  when  brought  to 
its  state  of  ultimate  decomposition,  resolve  itself  into  a 
sensible  representation  or  picture  ;  and  since  every  thing 
in  our  understanding  has  been  introduced  there  by  the 
channel  of  sensation,  whatever  proceeds  out  of  the 
understanding  is  either  chimerical,  or  must  be  able,  in 
returning  by  the  same  road,  to  re-attach  itself  to  its 
sensible  archetype.  Hence  an  important  rule  in  phi- 
losophy— that  every  expression  which  cannot  find  an 


DIDEROT,  D'ALEMBEItT.  317 

external  and  a  sensible  object  to  which  it  can  thus 
establish  its  affinity,  is  destitute  of  signification."  *  Hel- 
vetius  affirms,  likewise,  that  all  truths  may  be  reduced 
to  simple  facts,  or  identical  propositions ;  A  =  B.  The 
reasoning  process  is  nothing  more,  he  says,  than  the 
development  of  this  simple  law  of  our  intellectual  ex- 
istence.-)" 

In  D'Alembert's  Histoire  de  Philosophie  (1760),  the 
reader  will  find,  in  the  fifth  essay  of  the  fourth  volume, 
a  dissertation  on  logic.  It  is  brief,  only  extending  to 
eight  pages.  But,  small  as  it  is,  it  contains  many  re- 
marks of  great  value  and  profundity.  The  purport 
of  it  is,  that  geometry  is  the  only  department  of  human 
study  where  vigorous  demonstration  can  be  obtained ; 
that  all  attempts  to  introduce  mathematical  forms  of 
reasoning  into  subjects  of  human  nature  or  theology  are 
absurd;  and  that  a  rational  conjecture  is  a  legitimate 
and  useful  instrument  in  every  general  system  of  logic, 
although  it  is  too  commonly  passed  over  by  logicians 
as  a  matter  of  little  moment. 

The  logical  doctrines  of  the  Encyclopedic  (1745),  a 
work  which  exercised  a  powerful  and  striking  influence 
over  the  philosophical  opinions  of  Europe  for  many 
years,  are  contained  in  the  articles  "  Logique"  and 
"  Syllogism."  Logic  is  defined  to  be  the  art  of  think- 
ing justly,  and  of  exercising  our  mental  faculties  in  the 
best  manner  in  the  investigation  and  promulgation  of 
truth. 

In  the  article  "  Logique,"  the  question  is  raised, 
whether  formal  or  artificial  logic  is  in  any  degree 
useful  for  the  prosecution  and  attainment  of  general 

*  CEuvres,  torn.  vi.  f  (Euvres,  torn.  iii.  p.  218. 


318  PROGRESS  OF  LOGICAL  SCIENCE  IN  FRANCE. 

knowledge  and  science;  and  it  is  answered  in  the 
negative ;  and  the  reasons  given  for  this  opinion  are 
mostly  a  repetition  of  those  found  in  Locke's  Essay  on 
the  Human  Understanding. 

In  the  article  "  Syllogism"  it  is  affirmed,  that  the 
notion  that  the  syllogistic  theory  was,  in  a  great  degree, 
useful  to  the  cause  of  truth  or  real  science,  was  one  of 
the  great  heresies  of  the  scholastic  ages. 

The  logical  speculations  and  writings  of  Condillac 
made  a  deep  and  lasting  impression  on  the  scientific 
mind  of  France.  He  took  Locke's  Essay  for  his  guide. 
The  logical  portion  of  his  voluminous  works  are  con- 
tained under  the  general  head  of  Cours  dEtude. 
Here  we  have  the  development  of  his  logic  under  three 
different  aspects  —  the  Art  of  Reasoning,  the  Art  of 
Thinking,  and  Logic.  The  illustrations  of  the  Art  of 
Reasoning  are  mostly  taken  from  the  mathematics  and 
the  physical  sciences.  The  author  here  asserts  that 
there  are  three  grand  sources  of  evidence  on  which  all 
reasoning  is  based — the  evidence  of  fact,  the  evidence 
of  sentiment,  and  the  evidence  of  reason. 

In  the  Art  of  Thinking,  Condillac  gives  an  account 
of  the  origin  of  our  ideas  of  truth.  As  a  fundamental 
principle,  he  lays  it  down  that  sensations  constitute 
the  origin  of  all  our  knowledge.  He  likewise  treats  of 
the  use  of  signs,  of  analysis,  synthesis,  method,  &c,  on 
all  of  which  topics  there  is  much  useful  and  interesting 
information. 

In  Condillac's  Logic,  he  conceives  that  all  reasoning 
may  be  ultimately  resolved  into  the  same  form  and 
certainty  as  mathematical  evidence.  The  mode  of 
accomplishing  this,  would  be  to  effect  such  improve- 


CONDILLAC.  319 

ments  in  language  as  to  make  it  represent  certain 
fixed  and  determined  ideas.  In  this  portion  of  his 
speculations  he  endeavours  to  mould  the  logical  views 
of  Bacon,  Locke,  and  Descartes,  into  one  harmonious 
and  consistent  code  of  logic,  both  scientific  and  practi- 
cal. Still,  however,  the  entire  framework  of  reasoning 
is  never  raised  beyond  the  standard  of  sensational 
knowledge.  "  Judgment,"  says  he,  "  reflection,  the 
passions,  in  short,  all  the  faculties  of  the  soul,  are 
nothing  but  sensations  which  transform  themselves 
differently."  Again,  "  When  there  is  an  act  of  double 
attention,  comparison  is  the  result ;  to  attend  to  two 
ideas,  is  to  compare  them ;  the  operations  are  identi- 
cal. We  cannot,  however,  do  this,  without  recognising 
either  a  resemblance  or  difference  between  them ;  this 
recognition  is  to  judge.  The  operations  of  comparing 
and  judging  are  only  attention  ;  and  it  is  in  this  manner 
that  sensation  becomes  successively,  attention,  com- 
parison, and  judgment." 

On  the  character  of  the  Logique  of  Condillac,  the 
author  of  his  life  and  writings,  in  the  last  edition  of 
the  Encyclopcedia  Britannica,  gives  us  the  following 
opinion : — "  The  object  of  this  work  is  to  give  a  con- 
densed account  of  the  principles  of  analysis,  taken  in 
the  acceptation  already  mentioned.  This  process, 
he  observes,  is  taught  by  nature,  and  is  always  con- 
ducted with  accuracy  when  man  is  in  quest  of  the 
means  of  supplying  the  urgent  necessities  of  his  being. 
It  is  when  curiosity  forms  to  him  a  separate  order  of 
objects  for  his  gratification,  that  we  become  precipitate 
in  grasping  at  conclusions,  and  embracing  them  with 
readiness,    though  not   the  produce  of  that  rigorous 


320  PROGRESS  OF  LOGICAL  SCIENCE  IN  FRANCE. 

exactness  of  method  which  necessarily  imposes  on  his 
earlier  pursuits.  In  giving  an  account  of  the  origin  of 
ideas  and  the  mental  faculties,  he  exemplifies  his  views 
of  analysis,  and  at  the  same  time  prepares  the  way  for 
further  applications  of  the  mental  powers  of  his  pupils. 
He  adheres  to  his  doctrine  of  the  supreme  and  exclu- 
sive influence  of  language  in  conducting  all  intellectual 
pursuits.  Generalization  and  classification  are,  with 
him,  nothing  more  than  the  contrivance  of  generic 
terms.  The  art  of  reasoning  is  made  to  consist  in  the 
formation  of  an  appropriate  language  for  the  different 
sciences.  He  considers  the  justness  of  our  reasonings 
as  depending  on  the  degree  of  perfection  of  the  lan- 
guages which  we  possess.  The  superior  certainty  of 
mathematical  as  compared  with  other  knowledge,  is 
ascribed  by  him  to  the  superior  certainty  of  mathema- 
tical language.  Hence  his  favourite  illustrations  of  the 
progress  of  the  mind  are  taken  from  arithmetic  and 
algebra.  This  principle  is  certainly  carried  by  him  to 
great  excess  in  the  framing  of  his  general  positions; 
yet  we  find  him  on  other  occasions  recommending  to 
his  readers  to  cultivate  the  unbiassed  study  of  nature, 
and  to  choose  their  words  rather  from  the  correctness 
of  their  application  to  objects  as  they  have  fallen  under 
actual  observation,  than  from  having  their  meaning 
fixed  by  the  unsatisfactory  formality  of  verbal  defini- 
tions. He  lays  down  some  highly  useful  rules  for  the 
prosecution  of  knowledge.  His  errors  arise  chiefly 
from  a  strained  effort  to  give  to  his  subject  a  degree 
of  simplicity  not  adapted  to  its  nature.  Hence  some 
of  his  maxims  are  more  quaint  than  just ;  but  com- 
pared with  the  complicated  systems  of  logic  previously 


DESTUTT-TRACY.  321 

in  use,  that  of  our  author  formed  an  improvement  which 
merited  the  grateful  reception  that  was  given  to  it ;  and 
even  at  the  present  day.  if  we  pardon  the  paradoxical 
generalities  by  which  it  is  disfigured,  we  may  profitably 
trace,  in  company  with  the  author,  the  steps  by  which 
many  intellectual  attainments  are  made,  and  the  means 
by  which  the  process  admits  of  being  facilitated."* 

Destutt-Tracv,  in  the  third  volume  of  his  EUmens 
ct Ideologie,  treats  of  logic.  He  considers  it  under  two 
aspects — scientific  and  technical.  He  follows  the  lead- 
ing principles  of  Condillac  on  the  subject.  He  declares 
Locke's  Essay  to  be  the  best  logical  treatise  that  ever 
appeared. 

Destutt-Tracy  affirms  that  all  our  perceptions  and 
ideas  are  real  to  us,  and  must  be  the  sole  foundation  of 
all  our  reasonings.  The  larger  treatise  in  his  Logic  is 
divided  into  nine  chapters,  but  they  contain  no  account  of 
the  syllogism  whatever.  There  is  prefixed  to  the  end  of 
the  volume  another  small  work  taken  from  Hobbes,  for 
the  special  use  of  students,  entitled,  Principes  Logiques. 
In  this  the  author  alludes  to  the  syllogism,  and  observes 
that  it  is  not  expressive  of  the  entire  act  of  reasoning. 

The  theory  of  all  truth  and  reasoning  lies  in  a  small 
compass — in  the  sensibility  of  our  frame.  We  recog- 
nise four  modifications  of  this  sensibility:  —  1.  Those 
impressions  which  arise  from  the  present  action  of  ex- 
ternal objects  on  the  senses.  2.  Those  which  result 
from  past  action.  3.  Those  which  give  rise  to  relation, 
and  are  susceptible  of  comparison.  And  4.  Those 
impressions  which  arise  from  our  wants,  and  which 
compel  us  to  seek  a  gratification  of  them.   The  first  class 

*  Article  Condillac. 


322         PROGRESS  OF  LOGICAL  SCIENCE  IN  FRANCE. 

of  impressions  gives  rise  to  feeling  simply,  the  second  to 
memory,  the  third  to  judgment,  and  the  fourth  to  will. 
This  constitutes  the  entire  man. 

We  cannot  refrain  from  noticing  a  small  work  by 
an  unknown  author,  entitled,  Principes  de  la  Logique 
(1793),  which  displays  an  enlightened  spirit,  and  a 
correct  conception  of  logic,  both  as  a  science  and  an 
art.  It  is  divided  into  two  parts.  In  the  first  the 
author  observes,  that  little  or  no  advancement  can  be 
made  in  sound  knowledge,  unless  we  take  a  compre- 
hensive view  of  the  powers  of  the.  mind,  and  institute  a 
rigid  examination  into  the  origin  of  all  those  primary 
principles  of  thought  and  feeling  which  constitute  what 
we  term  humanity.  Mere  technical  arrangements  and 
forms  of  reasoning  will  of  themselves  prove  useless,  in 
the  way  of  giving  a  decided  progressive  character  to 
valuable  and  popular  truths  among  the  great  bulk  of 
mankind.  Truth,  even  in  matters  of  science,  is  a  thing 
to  be  felt  as  well  as  understood ;  and,  unless  we  con- 
duct our  logical  operations  on  the  broad  basis  of  human 
nature,  we  run  a  certain  risk  of  failing  in  realizing  any 
increase  of  knowledge  applicable  to  the  great  end  or 
purposes  of  human  life.  There  is  unquestionably  much 
in  this  study  of  scientific  logic  that  is  difficult  and 
perplexing ;  because  every  man  is  apt  to  look  at  the 
subject  from  his  own  nature.  Hence  arise  doubt,  par- 
tiality, one-sidedness,  and  misapprehension,  But  still, 
if  a  love  of  truth  animates  our  inquiries,  and  guides  us 
in  all  our  conclusions,  we  shall  soon  find  that  a  com- 
prehensive logic  is  one  of  the  most  direct  and  powerful 
instruments  in  elevating  and  improving  the  intellect 
of  a  nation. 


PROGRESS  OF  LOGICAL  SCIENCE  IN  FRANCE.  323 

In  the  second  part  of  the  author's  volume,  he  goes 
into  an  examination  of  the  nature  of  formal  propo- 
sitions, and  gives  a  short  account  of  the  rules  and 
attributes  of  the  syllogism.  These  he  conceives  are 
useful;  but  the  mind  should  look  beyond  them,  and 
only  recognise  their  validity  as  a  part,  and  not  the 
whole,  of  the  mental  economy  of  reasoning. 


324       LOGICAL  SCIENCE  IN  HOLLAND  AND  BELGIUM 


CHAPTEE  XV. 

LOGICAL  SCIENCE  IN  HOLLAND  AND  BELGIUM,  FROM  THE 
PUBLICATION  OF  LOCKE'S  "ESSAY"  TILL  THE  END  OF  THE 
EIGHTEENTH  CENTURY. 

In  Holland  and  Belgium,  logical  speculation  presents, 
during  this  period  of  history,  but  few  materials  for 
lengthened  comment.  Such  works  as  appeared  from 
time  to  time,  were  characterised  by  a  serious  and  con- 
templative air,  dwelling  on  the  moral  obligations  implied 
in  every  art  of  reasoning,  and  looking  on  logic  as  one 
of  the  chief  instruments  for  the  extension  of  general 
information  and  science.  These  views  were  supported 
and  strengthened  by  the  fervid  and  profound  religious 
feelings  which  generally  pervaded  the  entire  community 
of  these  countries. 

The  opinions  of  Descartes  and  Leibnitz  exercised,  for 
the  whole  of  the  eighteenth  century,  great  influence  in 
this  section  of  the  European  continent.  The  method 
of  the  former,  and  the  pre-established  harmony  and  the 
principle  of  contradiction  of  the  latter,  constituted  the 
basis  of  the  logical  philosophy  generally  cultivated. 
Bacon  and  Locke  were  well  known,  and  on  many 
points  highly  appreciated. 

The  logical  treatise    of  Gravesande  was,   for  many 


GRAVESANDE,  LE  CLERC,  HULSCHOFF.  325 

years  after  his  death,  a  general  favourite  in  several  of 
the  most  distinguished  seats  of  learning  on  the  con- 
tinent. He  classifies  our  complex  or  general  notions, 
shews  the  nature  and  use  of  propositions,  points  out  the 
principle  which  guides  the  intellect  in  judging  of  pro- 
bable and  necessary  truths,  and  singles  out  very  care- 
fully the  chief  sources  of  our  errors  in  reasoning ;  and 
lays  down  also  many  excellent  rules  for  fixing  the 
attention  of  students,  and  strengthening  their  memories 
and  understandings.  In  addition  to  all  these,  he  shews 
the  use  of  analysis  and  synthesis,  and  the  advantages 
to  be  derived  from  the  use  of  theories  in  many  depart- 
ments of  human  knowledge. 

o 

The  Logica,  sive  ars  Ratiocinandi  of  John  le  Clerc, 
forms  the  first  volume  of  his  Opera  Philosophica  (1722). 
He  was  a  native  of  Geneva,  but  settled  and  died  in 
Holland.  His  Logic  is  divided  into  four  parts :  on  Ideas, 
on  Judgments,  on  Method,  and  on  Argumentation.  It 
is  an  excellent  work  of  its  kind,  incorporating  much 
valuable  philosophical  thought  with  the  common  rules 
and  principles  of  logical  science. 

Allard  Hulschoff  was  a  native  of  Groningen,  and  born 
in  1734.  He  was  the  author  of  several  works  which 
discuss  the  leading  principles  of  philosophical  logic. 
He  dissented  particularly  from  the  doctrines  of  Leib- 
nitz and  Wolff;  and  maintained,  in  fact,  that  their 
several  views  led  to  scepticism  and  infidelity.  All  the 
principles  of  truth,  and  all  the  modes  of  investigating 
and  promulgating  it,  must  have  a  direct  reference  to  a 
Deity.  This  was  the  fundamental  maxim  which  Hul-  - 
schoff  took  as  his  starting-point.  Every  portion  of  the 
inward  man  has  an  especial  sympathy  with  a  spiritual 


326       LOGICAL  SCIENCE  IN  HOLLAND  AND  BELGIUM. 

being,  whose  existence  and  attributes  form  the  ground- 
work of  all  human  knowledge. 

Dion.  Van  de  Winpersse  published  his  Institutiones 
Logicce  at  Groningen  in  1767.  He  was  a  professor  at 
the  university  of  that  place,  and  afterwards  at  Ley  den. 
His  logical  work  had  long  a  considerable  reputation  in 
Holland,  and  formed  the  text-book  in  many  seats  of 
learning.  His  views  of  logic  as  a  science  are  of  an 
eclectic  character.  About  the  same  period  Elie  Luzac 
published  at  Groningen  his  Pecherches  sur  quelques 
Principes  des  Connaissances  Humaines.  He  upholds 
the  logical  opinions  of  Leibnitz  and  Wolff.  A  few  years 
later  Dan.  Wyttenbach  wrote  his  Prcecepta  Philosophice 
Logicce  (1781),  which,  though  of  a  scholastic,  is  of  a 
judicious  character.  He  maintained  for  many  years  an 
angry  controversy  with  Yan  Hemert  on  the  nature  of 
Kant's  Pure  Reason.  Wyttenbach  was  violently  op- 
posed to  Kant's  general  system  of  logical  truth,  and 
invariably  predicted  that  it  would,  before  many  years 
passed  over,  be  entirely  neglected  and  forgotten. 

Paul  Yan  Hemert  introduced  Kant's  philosophical 
logic  into  Holland.  His  views  of  truth  in  its  highest 
attributes  are  the  following: — All  science  is  distin- 
guished by  four  qualities — it  is  general,  special,  true, 
and  necessary.  Error  is  the  result  of  the  contracted 
nature  of  the  human  mind.  The  senses  by  themselves 
could  never  lead  to  truth.  Truth  lies  in  the  reason. 
The  nature  of  this  reason  Yan  Hemert  discusses  at 
great  length.  He  shows  the  objective  character  of  our 
sensational  system — what  constitutes  the  basis  of  syn- 
thetic unity,  the  origin  of  analytical  judgments,  the 
nature  and  offices  of  analogy,  of  union  and  diversity,  of 


KIKKER.  327 

matter  and  form,  of  idealism  and  realism,  so  far  as  they 
affect  our  judgments  and  modes  of  reasoning;  the 
limitations  of  human  knowledge,  and  its  division  into 
theoretical  and  practical.  These  topics  are  all  treated 
of  in  reference  to  the  great  question,  What  is  truth  ? 

Johann  Kinker,  who  was  born  near  Amsterdam  in 
1764,  took  a  lively  interest  in  the  dissemination  of 
Kant's  philosophy  in  Holland.  According  to  Kinker's 
notions,  the  mind,  in  its  acquisition  of  general  know- 
ledge, runs  the  following  course : — Objects  act  directly 
upon  it  through  the  external  senses.  We  then,  by  a 
determined  inward  act  or  process,  collect  a  certain 
number  of  these  perceptions  together,  and  this  collec- 
tion constitutes  a  conception.  The  mind,  in  like  man- 
ner, combines  a  certain  quantity  of  those  conceptions 
under  one  head;  and  by  this  means  reasoning  and 
argumentation  are  produced.  Propositions  of  every 
kind,  when  fully  analysed,  will  be  found  to  be  the 
result  of  this  simple  process. 

In  Belgium  the  principles  of  some  of  the  French 
logicians  gained  a  footing  in  the  latter  part  of  this  cen- 
tury. The  systems  of  Condillac  and  Destutt-Tracy 
were  known  and  admired  among  a  certain  class  of 
thinkers ;  but  in  the  colleges  and  seminaries  of  learn- 
ing, they  never,  so  far  as  I  know,  formed  a  part  of  the 
general  routine  of  logical  instruction.  The  clergy,  both 
in  Belgium  and  Holland,  kept  a  watchful  eye  over  these 
French  theories  ;  and,  though  unable  to  prevent  their 
introduction  altogether,  they  were  always  powerful 
enough  to  check  their  general  growth  and  cultivation. 


328         LOGICAL  PHILOSOPHY  IN  ITALY  AND  SPAIN. 


CHAPTEK  XVI. 

PROGRESS  OF  LOGICAL  PHILOSOPHY  IN  ITALY  AND  SPAIN, 
FROM  THE  TIME  OF  LOCKE'S  "ESSAY"  TILL  THE  END  OF 
THE  EIGHTEENTH  CENTURY. 

From  the  days  of  Bruno,  Cardan,  and  Campanella, 
logical  and  other  kindred  speculations  on  mind  had 
been  very  little  cultivated  in  Italy.  Philosophy  in 
general  had  been  unfruitful  for  nearly  an  entire  cen- 
tury. Bacon,  Locke,  and  Grassendl,  had  made  a  partial 
impression  on  the  reflective  mind  of  the  nation ;  but 
still  their  respective  modes  of  handling  logical  methods 
and  rules  had,  at  the  commencement  of  the  eighteenth 
century,  been  but'little  influential  on  the  philosophical 
literature  of  the  country.  The  spirit  of  enlightened 
innovation  was  heard  but  here  and  there  in  a  whisper ; 
a  general  apathy  and  indifference  predominated  in  all 
the  seminaries  of  learning  ;  and  the  deathlike  stillness 
which  every  where  prevailed,  formed  a  striking  and 
saddening  contrast  with  the  philosophical  vigour  and 
activity  of  the  Italian  mind  of  the  preceding  century. 

The  first  manifestations  of  what  we  may  justly  enough 
call  the  second  or  modern  revival  of  speculation  in  Italy, 
were  in  the  direction  of  logical  philosophy.     And  we 


LOGICAL  PHILOSOPHY  IN  ITALY  AND  SPAIN.         329 

here  witness,  what  is  visibly  imprinted  on  the  entire 
history  of  abstract  literature,  that  the  first  impulse 
experienced  in  the  several  epochs  of  intellectual  pro- 
gression has  invariably  assumed  a  dialectical  character. 
This  was  the  case  in  Greece.  Socrates,  Plato,  and 
Aristotle,  by  their  respective  logical  methods,  gave 
order  and  consistency  to  the  scattered  fragments  of 
human  knowledge,  and  thereby  imparted  to  them  a 
useful  and  practical  efficiency.  The  Christian  system 
conferred  new  logical  canons  on  the  nature,  importance, 
and  promulgation  of  truth.  In  the  various  philoso- 
phical epochs  of  mental  history,  from  the  first  intro- 
duction of  this  system  to  the  time  of  Charlemagne,  we 
find  the  logical  element  the  chief  innovator,  and  ruling 
and  claiming  precedence  over  every  other.  The  first 
intellectual  movement  at  the  commencement  of  the 
middle  ages,  by  the  Arabian  philosophers  and  the 
scholastic  divines,  is  indicated  by  an  inquiry  into  the 
nature  of  particular  and  universal  ideas,  and  the  offices 
they  respectively  hold  in  the  logical  economy  of  the 
mind.  And  every  phase  of  scholastic  learning,  mapped 
out  by  the  hand  of  the  mental  historian,  is  solely  cha- 
racterised by  the  novel  methods  of  philosophising,  and 
the  fresh  rules  of  logical  deduction,  then  brought  con- 
spicuously before  the  public  mind  for  general  discussion. 
And  when  this  lingering,  though  vehement  conten- 
tion, on  the  merits  and  abstract  nature  of  logical  forms 
and  principles,  had  exhausted  itself,  we  contemplate 
with  pleasure  the  first  dawn  of  intellectual  freedom  in 
Italy,  at  the  grand  revival  of  letters  and  literature  under 
the  fostering  care  and  munificence  of  the  Medici  family. 
But  here,  again,  philosophy  presents  the  same  aspect. 


330         LOGICAL  PHILOSOPHY  IN  ITALY  AND  SPAIN. 

It  was  in  reference  to  the  comparative  value  of  ancient 
logical  methods  and  systems,  that  the  energetic  and 
active  spirits  of  that  day  displayed  their  learning,  and 
taxed  their  ingenuity.  When  the  discussions  in  this 
direction  came  to  a  close,  we  are  introduced  to  the 
important  logical  epoch  of  Bacon,  whose  name  is  im~ 
perishably  imprinted  on  the  memorials  of  modern 
philosophy,  not  for  the  amount  of  what  he  himself 
knew,  but  on  account  of  his  pointing  out  the  path  or 
logical  method  for  the  guidance  and  direction  of  those 
who  might  come  after  him.  This  was  the  crowning 
glory  of  the  Lord  of  Verulam.  Then  after  him  we  have 
Hobbes,  Locke,  Descartes,  Leibnitz, — all  of  whom  have 
become  landmarks  in  the  history  of  modern  speculation, 
chiefly  from  the  development  of  their  respective  plans 
of  logical  method,  and  their  liberal  and  enlightened 
suggestions  as  to  the  most  sound  and  efficient  rules  for 
the  improvement  and  guidance  of  the  human  faculties, 
in  the  pursuit  of  general  truth  and  science. 

And  this  predominance  of  the  logical  element  in  the 
history  of  human  progress,  presents  nothing  but  what 
a  priori  reasonings  would  lead  us  to  expect.  Know- 
ledge of  all  kinds  is  a  personal  thing,  and  must  die 
with  the  possessor,  unless  means  be  taken  to  perpetuate 
it.  The  disproportion  between  those  who  have  a  large 
share  of  scientific  information,  and  those  who  are  com- 
paratively destitute  of  it,  and  to  whom  it  is  desirable  it 
should,  in  as  ample  a  measure  as  possible,  be  commu- 
nicated, is,  and  ever  must  be,  great  and  palpable.  The 
inquiry,  then,  which  every  reflective  mind  institutes 
within  itself  is,  How  shall  I  be  able  to  impart  the 
knowledge  I  have  to  others  ?     Which  is  the  shortest 


vico.  331 

and  most  effective  plan  of  instruction  ?  How  shall  I 
gain  possession  of  the  minds  of  others  at  the  least 
possible  cost  of  time  and  labour?  How  shall  I  most 
surely  secure  myself  and  others  from  erroneous  concep- 
tions of  what  I  do  wish  to  communicate  ?  How  shall 
I  clothe  or  present  truth  in  the  most  engaging  and 
fascinating  forms  ?  These,  and  a  thousand  questions 
of  a  like  nature,  pass  through  the  minds  of  all  who  are 
engaged  in  the  pursuit  and  dissemination  of  knowledge. 
And  the  great  object  with  every  philosophical  inquirer 
is,  and  ever  will  be,  to  lay  his  hands  on  such  intellec- 
tual instruments  as  are  best  fitted  to  accomplish  the 
urgent  business  he  has  in  hand,  of  communicating  what 
he  knows  to  the  minds  of  others.  It  is  this  necessity 
of  our  condition  which  sets  us  at  all  times  in  eager 
pursuit  for  logical  methods,  and  which  has,  through  the 
vicissitudes  of  ages,  sustained  that  lively  interest  which 
mankind  have  felt  in  every  scheme  or  plan  which  pro- 
mised aid  to  the  reasoning  powers  or  faculties  of  our 
nature.  The  moment  knowledge  is  obtained,  there  is 
a  strong  and  instinctive  desire  to  communicate  it ;  and 
we  set  to  the  task  of  finding  out  those  formal  and 
scientific  rules  of  thought  which  we  conceive  most 
likely  to  effect  our  purpose.  This  is  one  of  the  most 
conspicuous  attributes  of  our  mind,  when  viewed  in  its 
active  and  practical  manifestations. 

This  innate  desire  after  logical  methods  and  rules  is 
strikingly  illustrated  in  the  state  of  Italian  philosophy 
at  the  period  we  are  now  treating  of.  We  have  the 
illustrious  Vico  before  us,  with  his  Scienza  Nuova,  or 
New  Science.  He  felt  himself  dissatisfied  with  all  the 
logical  methods  that   had  gone   before   him,  and  was 


332         LOGICAL  PHILOSOPHY  IN  ITALY  AND  SPAIN. 

bent  upon  finding  out,  if  he  could,  a  more  comprehen- 
sive and  satisfactory  one.  It  was  to  be  a  regular 
organon,  to  account  for  all  knowledge,  and  to  lead  the 
mind,  by  short  and  unerring  steps,  to  the  real  source  of 
all  our  rational  conceptions  and  judgments.  Bacon, 
Locke,  and  Descartes,  had  only  given  a  one-sided  and 
partial  view  of  the  reasoning  powers  of  man,  and  of  the 
fundamental  principles  of  scientific  thought.  But  Vico 
was  prepared,  in  his  New  Science,  to  place  human 
knowledge  on  a  solid  basis.  He  did  not  invoke  a  pro- 
found metaphysic  to  effect  this  end.  He  wished  to 
direct  the  attention  of  philosophers  and  logicians  more 
to  the  outer  world  of  human  action  and  passion,  than 
to  refined  abstract  contemplation.  The  materials  for 
his  theory,  he  contended,  were  scattered  around  him  in 
rich  and  varied  profusion ;  and  it  only  required  the 
application  of  some  comprehensive  principle  to  combine 
and  arrange  them  into  a  consistent  and  harmonious 
unity. 

There  are,  according  to  Vico,  two  essential  matters 
connected  with  the  cultivation  of  all  knowledge  which 
it  is  requisite  we"  should  know, — namely,  the  end  or 
object  of  all  studies,  and  the  best  means  of  prosecuting 
them.  The  grand  object  of  all  knowledge  is,  to  refine 
and  exalt  human  nature,  and  to  bind  us  more  closely 
to  Deity.  There  are  three  elements  of  all  divine  and 
human  science  —  knowledge,  will,  and  power.  The 
whole  rests  on  intelligence ;  not  on  a  blind,  unaccount- 
able, or  irrational  power.  The  eye  of  this  intelligence 
is  reason ;  and  the  eternal  flambeau  of  reason  is  Deity. 
These  three  elements  furnish  us  with  conceptions  of 
our  own  personal  existence,  and  we  can  in  turn  explain 


vice  333 

them  again  by  the  power  of  thought.  The  first  prin- 
ciples of  all  wisdom  and  truth  rest  upon  God ;  denuded 
of  this  spiritual  and  immaterial  conception,  they  are 
unintelligible.* 

In  order  to  develop  the  principles  of  truth  and  cer- 
tainty, we  must  analyse  or  reduce  them  to  their  ori- 
ginal elements,  which  are, — 1st,  Human  manners  and 
customs,  and  social  and  civil  institutions ;  and,  2d, 
Language,  which  is  the  key  to  the  human  understanding. 
It  is  from  these  that  the  primary  principles  of  a  com- 
prehensive logic  can  be  revealed  to  our  minds.  Let 
us  look  into  man  as  he  is  portrayed  in  his  aggregate 
union  with  his  kindred,  and  we  shall  be  sure  to  find  all 
those  general  ideas  on  which  human  science  rests.f 

"  Logical  philosophy,"  says  Vico,  "  contemplates 
reason,  and  forms  the  science  of  truth.  Philology,  or 
language,  recognises  the  authority  of  human  judg- 
ments, and  this  creates  the  consciousness  of  conviction. 
Logicians  and  grammarians  deceive  themselves  if  they 
neglect  to  give  mutual  aid  to  each  other.  The  inten- 
tion of  our  being  is,  that  there  should  be  a  mutual 
reaction  between  them.  Human  judgment,  uncertain 
in  its  nature  and  conclusions,  obtains  by  their  union 
the  infallible  sanction  of  common  sense  in  matters  of 
urgency  and  utility.  This  common  sense,  the  guide  of 
the  argumentative  powers  of  men,  is  an  unreflecting 
judgment,  which  is  felt,  or  rather  formed,  by  a  com- 
munity, a  people,  a  nation,  and,  in  fact,  by  all  mankind. 
Uniform  ideas,  under  the  guidance  of  uniform  logical 
principles,  created  among  an  entire  people  who  have  no 

*  Del  Metodo,  t.  2.  +  Scienza  Nuova,  pp.  10,  15,  60. 


334         LOGICAL  PHILOSOPHY  IN  ITALY  AND  SPAIN. 

individual  knowledge  of  each  other,  must  be  stamped 
with  the  seal  of  truth."* 

The  foundation  of  all  logical  science,  when  brought 
to  the  test  of  practice,  is  to  be  found,  says  Yico,  in 
method.  It  must  embody  the  formal  processes  of 
thought,  as  well  as  universal  ideas  of  science  or  truth. 
In  order,  however,  to  enable  us  to  fix  on  true  scientific 
methods,  we  should  endeavour  to  form  right  conceptions 
of  the  end  or  purpose  which  every  chain  of  reasoning 
is  intended  to  accomplish.  A  desire  to  know  the  truth 
is  indispensable  to  finding  it.  We  should  bear  in  mind 
that  all  true  science  or  wisdom  perfects  the  understand- 
ing and  regulates  the  conduct.  The  most  momentous 
of  all  kinds  of  knowledge  is  that  which  relates  to  Deity ; 
and  the  rule  which  should  guide  our  faculties  in  the 
pursuit  of  truth  is,  that  we  select  only  those  things 
for  logical  inquiry  which  are  fitted  to  produce  the 
greatest  amount  of  good  to  mankind.")" 

G-enovesi  was  a  distinguished  logician,  and  introduced 
into  Italy  a  knowledge  of  the  writings  of  Locke  and 
Leibnitz,  and  likewise  the  logical  systems  of  Tschirn- 
hausen,  Christian"  Thomasius,  Wolff,  and  Rudiger.  His 
works  are,  Elemental  Artis  Logico-Criticce  (1767)?  and 
Delia  Logica  (1799). 

Genovesi's  logic  is  founded  on  a  psychological  view 
of  the  mind.  He  points  out  three  formidable  obstruc- 
tions to  sound  knowledge,  which  he  calls  maladies  of 
intellect,  with  the  object  of  pointing  out  the  means  by 
which  they  may  be  removed.  He  distinguishes  four 
kinds  or  sorts  of  ignorance — the  want  of  notions   or 

*  Del  Metodo,  t.  3.     Paris,  1844.  t  Ibid.,  t,  2. 


GENOVESI.  335 

ideas ;  a  want  of  the  power  of  conception ;  our  in- 
capacity of  recognising  the  relations  of  one  thing  to 
another ;  and  the  want  of  perceiving  the  relation  of 
ideas  to  a  common  end  or  object.  There  are  likewise 
four  species  of  erroneous  judgments :  in  our  primary 
conceptions  or  general  notions  ;  in  our  conclusions ;  in 
our  trains  of  reasoning  ;  and  in  our  method.  He 
attributes  errors  to  three  sources, — those  which  arise 
from  the  mind  itself;  those  which  relate  to  material 
substances ;  and  those  which  spring  from  the  influence 
of  external  agencies  generally. 

All  knowledge  is  referred  by  Genovesi  to  four  pri- 
mary principles — consciousness,  sensation,  testimony, 
and  reasoning.  Our  various  ideas  or  conceptions  may 
be  all  arranged,  for  logical  purposes,  under  four  heads, 
according  to  the  way  or  manner  in  which  we  consider 
them,  —  1st,  Whether  considered  relatively  to  their 
origin ;  2d,  Relatively  to  themselves ;  3d,  In  relation  to 
the  objects  they  represent ;  and,  4th,  According  to  the 
way  or  mode  in  which  they  may  be  represented  to  us. 

Under  the  first  point  of  view,  ideas  are  adventitious, 
fictitious,  and  natural.  Adventitious  ideas  are  those 
arising  from  sensation,  from  material  bodies,  their  diffe- 
rent qualities,  forms,  and  modes  of  action.  Fictitious 
ideas  are  formed  in  our  understandings  from  similitude, 
proportion,  association,  abstraction,  and  deduction. 
Natural  ideas,  which  some  call  innate,  constitute  the 
foundation  of  the  conceptions  we  have  of  our  own 
existence,  all  the  internal  phenomena  of  the  thinking 
principle,  and  the  notions  we  have  of  truth,  justice, 
right,  intelligence,  and  the  like. 

Ideas  under  the  second  general  aspect  are  intelligible 


336         LOGICAL  PHILOSOPHY  IN  ITALY  AND  SPAIN. 

or  sensible,  simple  or  compound.  Under  the  third 
aspect  they  are  positive  or  negative,  adequate  or  in- 
adequate, singular  or  universal,  absolute  or  relative, 
abstract  or  concrete,  real  or  chimerical.  Ideas  under 
the  last  aspect  are  either  clear  or  obscure,  distinct  or 
confused. 

Every  system  of  logic,  G-enovesi  conceives,  ought  to 
be  based  on  a  knowledge  of  the  power  or  faculties  of 
the  mind. 

The  nature  of  truth  and  its  criterium  are  discussed 
at  considerable  length.  There  are  four  kinds  of  it, — 
moral,  natural,  metaphysical,  and  logical.  His  general 
opinion  is,  that  every  department  of  human  knowledge 
has  a  peculiar  species  of  evidence  belonging  to  itself. 
There  is,  for  example,  the  criterium  of  reasoning  ap- 
plied to  all  the  abstract  sciences ;  physical  certainty  to 
all  matters  belonging  to  natural  history  and  philo- 
sophy ;  and  moral  evidence  to  whatever  relates  to 
human  nature. 

The  following  observations  are  from  the  pen  of  a 
modern  Italian  author  on  the  merits  of  Genovesi  as  a 
philosophical  logician  : — "  Few  can  lay  juster  claims  to 
the  title  of  a  reformer  of  Italian  philosophy  than 
Genovesi,  who  not  only  made  it  known  to,  but  re- 
spected by,  the  learned  of  other  countries.  He  knew 
how  to  enrich  it  with  sound  logical  strictures,  profound 
metaphysical  discussions,  and  correct  moral  reflections. 
However  numerous  and  distinguished  the  philosophers 
who  have  trodden  the  same  path  before  him,  or  who 
have  anxiously  endeavoured,  by  profound  meditations 
and  sound  maxims,  to  assist  the  mind  to  think  closely 
and  clearly  (and  Bacon,   Malebranche,  Locke,  Wolff, 


SCARELLA,  BALDINOTTI,  ETC.  337 

and  others,  have  almost  exhausted  every  thing  which 
could  be  said  upon  the  subject),  still  Genovesi  knew 
how  to  embellish  his  subject  with  original  speculations 
and  remarks,  and  to  furnish  his  readers  with  a  system 
of  logic,  not  only  full  and  complete  for  philosophical 
purposes,  but  highly  useful  to  private  individuals,  and 
for  the  purposes  of  civil  society."  * 

The  JElementa  Logicce  (1762)  of  J.  B.  Scarella  is  a 
work  of  merit,  considered  as  a  popular  manual  of  logic. 
It  is  founded  on  a  knowledge  of  the  mental  faculties, 
and  is  eclectic  in  its  character ;  the  author  having 
culled  out  whatever  he  thought  useful  from  the  writings 
of  Descartes,  Locke,  and  Leibnitz.  Scarella's  theo- 
retical view  of  logical  science  rested  upon  two  principles 
— that  the  senses  furnish  one  set  of  truths,  and  the 
mind,  from  its  own  internal  resources,  another.  J. 
Gualberto  de  Saria,  in  his  Rationalis  Philosophice  In- 
stitutiones,  illustrated  the  logical  principles  of  Genovesi 
with  great  eclat  at  Pisa,  and  other  cities  in  Italy,  His 
labours  are  chiefly  directed  to  the  laying  down  useful  and 
general  rules  for  the  government  of  the  understanding 
in  its  prosecution  of  science.  Claude  Fromond  wrote 
a  work  entitled  Delia  Logica  (1762),  in  which  he 
attempted,  and  with  considerable  success,  to  popularise 
logic,  by  stripping  it  of  many  of  those  formal  techni- 
calities and  minute  divisions  which  the  scholastic  times 
had  imposed  upon  it.  His  own  terminology  is  often, 
however,  more  troublesome  and  perplexing  than  the 
old  language  he  has  displaced. 

Baldinotti  was  a  philosophical  logician  of  distinction 
and  note.    In  his  De  Recta  Mentis  Institutione  (1787), 

*  D.  Jxien.  Andres.     Venice,  1800. 
Y 


338         LOGICAL  PHILOSOPHY  IN  ITALY  AND  SPAIN. 

he  lays  down  the  general  principles  of  a  comprehensive 
logical  system,  embracing  human  knowledge  in  its 
totality.  Though  every  system  of  this  kind  must  rest 
on  mental  philosophy,  yet  the  application  of  all  the 
general  rules  of  a  philosophical  logic  must  be  illustrated 
from  the  models  of  thought  and  wisdom  which  posterity 
has  left  us,  and  the  actual  discoveries  in  science  which 
history  records.  A  successful  prosecution  of  truth  lies 
more  in  the  mode  of  treating  it  than  is  commonly 
imagined.  Scientific  knowledge  must  be  prosecuted  in 
a  given  way  and  manner  :  we  must  bring  the  mind  to 
grasp  many  principles  and  objects  at  one  and  the  same 
time,  to  view  them  in  all  their  varied  relations  to  each 
other,  and  then  to  draw  the  lessons  they  are  fitted  to 
impart  with  logical  precision  and  fidelity.  A  philo- 
sophical spirit  is  a  spirit  which  regulates  itself  by  means 
of  a  method  or  a  congeries  of  methods — all  tending  to 
some  given  end  or  purpose,  and  at  the  same  time 
paying  a  most  rigid  adherence  to  unity  of  action  and 
result/' 

The  name  of  Facciolati  stands  high  in  the  logical 
literature  of  Italy.  His  logical  works  are  the  following 
— JRudimenta  Logica,  Institutiones  Scholce  Peripat., 
Acroases  Dialectics.  He  grounds  his  system  on  the 
views  of  Aristotle.  There  are  two  sources  of  certainty 
- — the  one  historical,  and  the  other  the  internal  or  living 
sense,  which  testifies  our  own  feelings  and  existence. 
The  rules  of  reasoning  are  developed  by  Facciolati  with 
much  care  and  minuteness ;  and  his  suggestions  for  the 
government  of  the  understanding  in  the  pursuit  of  truth, 
are  at  once  profound  and  practical.     Franc.  Soave,  in 

*  De  Recta  Meat.  Instit,,  p.  583. 


MAZAKELLI,  ETC.  339 

his  Institutiones  de  Logica,  illustrates  the  leading  prin- 
ciples of  Locke's  Essay,  which  he  considered  the  best 
work  that  had  then  appeared  on  the  logical  training  of 
the  mind.  Soave  pays  great  attention  to  the  bearings 
of  language  on  logical  operations;  but  he  denounces 
the  employment  of  mathematical  forms  of  reasoning  in 
moral  subjects,  as  destructive  of  all  sound  knowledge. 

Mazzarelli,  in  his  11  buon  uso  della  Logica  in  Materia 
di  Religione  (1787),  discusses  the  science  of  logic 
through  the  medium  of  theology.  Taking  the  Scrip- 
tures as  the  foundation  of  all  truth — the  standard  by 
which  its  character  and  value  are  to  be  estimated — he 
institutes  the  inquiry,  how  far  the  ordinary  notions  en- 
tertained of  logic  are  in  unison  with  the  declarations 
and  doctrines  contained  in  the  sacred  canons.  We 
cannot  reason  soundly  in  theology,  he  maintains,  unless 
we  take  into  account  the  special  nature  of  the  evidence 
which  the  science  of  religion  presents.  Its  fundamen- 
tal principles  being  both  of  an  abstract  and  declaratory 
nature,  they  demand  the  application  of  special  logical 
rules  to  demonstrate  every  proposition  connected  with 
them ;  which  rules  may,  or  may  not,  as  circumstances 
require,  be  requisite  in  other  branches  of  speculative 
inquiry.  The  author  illustrates  these  views  in  a  variety 
of  ways,  and  accompanies  his  illustrations  with  many 
profound  and  excellent  remarks  on  the  science  of 
general  reasoning. 

In  the  speculations  on  scientific  logic  advanced 
from  time  to  time  in  the  Transactions  of  the  Academy 
of  Turin,  the  reader  will  find  many  topics  handled 
with  acuteness  and  ability.  Saint-Eaphael,  Tiraboschi, 
Denina,  Lampredi,  and  M.  Falette-Barrol,  have  dis- 


340         LOGICAL  PHILOSOPHY  IN  ITALY  AND  SPAIN. 

cussed,  from  various  points  of  view,  the  primary  prin- 
ciples relative  to  the  abstract  nature  of  truth,  and  to 
the  operations  of  the  mental  faculties,  as  manifested  in 
the  process  of  general  reasoning,  and  the  development 
of  scientific  methods  of  investigation.  Many  of  the 
papers  inserted  in  the  Transactions,  from  the  pens 
of  these  authors,  evince  a  truly  philosophical  and  en- 
lightened spirit. 

Yincenzo  Micheli  discusses  the  logical  principles  of 
Leibnitz  and  Wolff  at  considerable  length.  He  enters 
with  great  fervour  into  the  questions  of  necessary  con- 
nexion, sufficient  reason,  and  the  principle  of  contradic- 
tion, with  a  view  to  shew  their  fundamental  bearing 
upon  all  the  deductions  of  the  understanding. 

The  logical  philosophy  of  Italy,  during  the  period 
now  under  review,  presents,  on  the  whole,  an  intelligent 
and  improving  aspect.  Questions  were  examined 
under  the  influence  of  a  sincere  love  of  truth,  and  an 
ardent  desire  to  bring  logical  studies  to  bear  upon  the 
ordinary  pursuit  of  knowledge,  in  such  a  manner  as  to 
facilitate  its  acquisition  and  dissemination.  This  was 
the  general  character  of  the  published  or  regular 
treatises  on  logic ;  but  with  respect  to  the  teaching  of 
the  science  in  the  old-established  universities  and  col- 
leges in  the  several  states  in  the  kingdom,  there  was 
little  or  no  change  visible  during  the  eighteenth  cen- 
tury. Almost  all  the  ordinary  epitomes  or  abstracts  of 
the  science,  more  directly  used  for  educational  purposes, 
were  entirely  confined  to  the  illustration  of  the  old 
scholastic  doctrines, — no  new  element  of  modern  philo- 
sophy being  admitted  into  the  formal  and  technical 
arrangements  of  the  subject.     The  logical  instruction 


VERNE  Y.  341 

directed  and  imparted  by  collegiate  institutions,  em- 
braced therefore  a  very  limited  range,  compared  with 
that  which  was  afforded  by  the  philosophical  treatises 
of  the  most  able  of  the  Italian  logicians.* 

The  logical  writings  of  Spain  during  the  eighteenth 
century  are  but  few  in  number,  and  of  little  intrinsic 
merit.  We  have  the  Logic  of  Louis- Antoine  Verney 
(1750),  which  contains  some  enlightened  philosophical 
views  of  the  science.  The  author  lays  great  stress  upon 
method.  He  arranges  all  human  knowledge  under 
three  categories,  —  substances,  modes,  and  relations. 
Universal  notions  are  necessary  to  every  act  of  reason- 
ing ;  and  the  mind  forms  them  by  contemplating  those 
qualities  which  objects  have  in  common,  and  abstract- 
ing that  in  which  they  differ.  Language  enables  us  to 
record  these  general  conceptions  ;  but,  though  an 
indispensable  instrument  in  all  dialectic  exercises,  it  is 
nevertheless  one  which  gives  rise  to  a  vast  number  of 
errors.  Our  judgments  are  of  three  kinds, — nominal, 
real,  and  ideal.  Verney  considers  this  a  most  impor- 
tant division,  and  thinks  logicians  have  committed 
serious  blunders  by  not  keeping  it  in  view.  Besides 
errors  from  this  source,  there  are  others  to  which  the 
understanding  is  liable  from  the  delusions  of  the  senses, 
the  power  of  imagination,  and  the  abuse  of  the  theo- 
retical spirit.  Truth  is  the  result  of  an  act  of  compa- 
rison between  the  subject  and  the  attribute. 

*  I  regret  I  have  not  been  able  to  meet  with  the  Milan  edition  of  Galileo's  works, 
which  contains  his  views  of  logical  science. 


342  LOGICAL  SCIENCE  IN  GREAT  BRITAIN. 


CHAPTER  XVII. 

PROGRESS  OF  LOGICAL  SCIENCE  IN  GREAT  BRITAIN  AND  IRE- 
LAND, FROM  THE  TIME  OF  LOCKE'S  "ESSAY"  TILL  THE  END 
OF  THE  EIGHTEENTH  CENTURY. 

The  history  of  the  science  of  logic  in  Great  Britain, 
during  this  period,  is  marked  by  some  features  of  in- 
terest and  importance.  One  of  the  principal  of  these 
is,  the  almost  utter  discredit  into  which  the  syllogistic 
or  school  logic  fell  in  general  estimation.  It  was  almost 
unanimously  scouted  and  condemned,  by  writers  of 
every  grade  and  system,  as  a  useless  and  sophistical 
instrument ;  and  even  where  it  was  still  retained  in 
treatises  on  logic,  it  was  viewed  more  in  the  light  of  an 
antiquarian  relic  "than  as  a  thing  possessing  any  intrinsic 
value  in  any  plan  of  general  education. 

It  is  necessary  to  premise  here,  that  this  chapter  will 
be  devoted  almost  exclusively  to  works  not  immediately 
connected  with  university  or  academical  systems  of 
tuition,  but  solely  such  as  treat  of  logic  as  a  part  or 
division  of  mental  philosophy.  I  shall  give  an  ac- 
count, in  a  subsequent  chapter,  of  the  systems  of  logical 
instruction  which  have,  for  a  certain  number  of  years, 
been  followed  in  most  of  the  universities  and  colleges 
of  our  own  country. 


TYRWITT,  LEE.  343 

Firsts  then,  I  shall  notice  a  small  and  very  scarce 
volume,  though,  a  little  out  of  chronological  order,  writ- 
ten  by  one  Thomas  Tyrwitt,  hearing  the  date  of  16-52, 
entitled,  Solid  Reasons  for  Philosophizing.  It  appears 
to  have  been  printed  and  published  at  Winchester.  It 
is  entirely  directed  against  the  logical  doctrines  con- 
tained in  the  Novum  Organum  of  Bacon.  Tyrwitt 
maintains  that  the  svstem  of  reasoning  laid  down  in 
that  celebrated  treatise,  cannot  lead  the  mind  to  right 
conclusions  as  to  the  moral  and  religious  nature  of  man; 
matters  which  are,  he  says,  of  the  deepest  importance 
both  to  individuals  and  society.  He  observes,  that 
"  the  mode  or  fashion  of  going  from  fact  to  fact,  and 
testing  and  cross- questioning  nature  in  every  possible 
form,  cannot  satisfy  the  wants  of  the  mind;  for  the 
power  of  creation,  and  the  arrangement  of  materials, 
are  the  things  which,  in  seeking  after  knowledge,  we 
are  constantly  in  search  after."  In  another  place,  he 
prophesies  that  his  lordship's  view  of  science  "  will 
only  tend  to  be  a  will-o'-the-wisp  to  mankind."* 

The  publication  of  Mr  Locke's  Essay  excited  great 
attention  throughout  England;  and  many  were  the 
pens  directed  against  particular  portions  of  his  treatise. 
Among  his  opponents,  Dr  Lee  holds  a  distinguished 
place,  chiefly  from  directing  his  remarks,  embodied  in 
his  Anti- Scepticism  (1702),  to  those  parts  of  Mr  Locke's 
work  which  have  a  logical  bearing  and  import.  Lee's 
observations  on  the  nature  of  propositions  in  general, 
are  in  many  instances  both  ingenious  and  sound ;  and 
there  will  be  found,  in  this  part  of  his  work,  many  prin- 
ciples faintly  shadowed  forth,  relative  to   the   nature 

*  Pp.  132,.  1S4. 


344  LOGICAL  SCIENCE  IN  GREAT  BRITAIN. 

and  province  of  reasoning  generally,  which  subsequent 
English  writers  have  more  fully  developed,  and  made 
the  groundwork  of  their  logical  theories. 

On  the  abstract  nature  of  truth,  and  of  the  mind's 
manner  of  perceiving  and  estimating  it,  we  have  a  great 
deal  of  valuable  information  and  acute  reasoning,  in 
Morris's  Theory  of  the  Ideal  or  Intelligible  World  (VJOY). 
There  is  much  of  the  same  kind  of  speculation  relative 
to  the  logical  foundation  of  truth,  and  to  those  faculties 
of  the  mind  more  immediately  connected  with  the  rea- 
soning process,  as  that  which  characterises  the  writings 
of  Malebranche,  and  others  of  the  same  school.  The 
first  volume  of  Morris  is  the  most  interesting. 

Dr  Watts'  Logic  (1*728)  was  the  first  popular  fruit, 
in  England,  of  the  speculations  of  Locke,  on  the  mental 
powers  and  faculties,  as  connected  with  reasoning,  and 
the  advancement  of  knowledge  generally.  The  work 
has  been  a  great  public  favourite  for  more  than  a  cen- 
tury and  a  quarter ;  and  such  is  its  happy  adaptation 
of  logical  materials,  that  it  promises  fair  to  maintain  its 
position,  in  spite  of  changes  of  opinion  and  systems,  for 
many  years  to  come. 

The  author  says,  that  "  logic  is  the  art  of  using  reason 
well  in  our  inquiries  after  truth,  and  the  communica- 
tion of  it  to  others."  Again,  he  says,  "  The  design  of 
logic  is,  to  teach  us  the  right  use  of  our  reason,  or 
intellectual  powers,  and  the  improvement  of  them  in 
ourselves  and  others." 

He  divides  his  Logic  into  four  parts,  according  to  the 
old  scholastic  fashion,  but  with  a  very  extended  mean- 
ing and  application ;  namely,  perception  (used  as  syno- 
nymous with  conception  or  apprehension),  judgment, 
reasoning,  and  disposition. 


WATTS.  345 

The  first  part  is  appropriated  to  long  discussions  on 
the  general  nature  of  our  ideas — the  objects  of  our 
conceptions ;  the  general  divisions  or  kinds  of  them ;  the 
words  or  signs  by  which  these  ideas  or  conceptions  are 
expressed ;  and  general  and  special  rules  and  directions 
how  to  mould  and  direct  these  mental  materials  to  a 
given  end  or  purpose.  The  second  part  relates  to 
judgments  and  propositions.  The  author  enters  into 
an  examination  of  the  nature  and  offices  of  these ;  the 
various  sorts  of  them ;  what  general  directions  should 
be  observed,  in  order  that  we  may  judge  soundly ;  and 
what  special  rules  should  likewise  be  attended  to,  in  order 
to  arrive  at  right  conclusions  on  particular  subjects  and 
questions.  Reasoning,  properly  so  called,  is  treated  of 
in  the  third  part.  This  embraces  the  nature  of  syllo- 
gistic forms ;  the  doctrine  on  which  they  are  founded ; 
the  nature  of  erroneous  judgments,  and  how  they  may 
be  avoided ;  and  general  rules  for  the  guidance  of  our 
reasoning  powers  on  all  subjects  to  which  they  may  be 
directed.  The  fourth  and  last  part  relates  to  disposi- 
tion or  method.  This  must  be  fully  considered,  along 
with  all  the  general  and  special  rules  which  come  under 
it,  in  applying  it  to  human  knowledge  in  all  its  bear- 
ings and  ramifications. 

Watts'  Improvement  of  the  Mind  is  a  supplement  to 
his  Logic.  It  embodies  a  vast  amount  of  just  and  use- 
ful observations  on  the  government  of  the  mind,  and  in 
connexion  with  education  generally.  Dr  Johnson,  in 
his  Life  of  Watts,  observes  that  "  few  books  have  been 
perused  by  me  with  greater  pleasure  than  his  Improve- 
ment of  the  Mind,  of  which  the  radical  principles  may 
indeed  be  found  in  Locke's  Conduct  of  the  Understand- 


346  LOGICAL  SCIENCE  IN  GREAT  BRITAIN. 

ing  ;  but  they  are  so  expanded  and  ramified  by  Watts, 
as  to  confer  on  him  the  merit  of  a  work  in  the  highest 
degree  useful  and  pleasing.  Whoever  has  the  care  of 
instructing  others,  may  be  charged  with  deficiency  in 
his  duty  if  this  book  is  not  recommended." 

Dr  Duncan's  Logic  (1760)  is  a  work  of  precisely 
the  same  cast  and  character  as  that  of  Dr  Watts. 
Duncan  was  professor  of  moral  philosophy  at  Aberdeen, 
and  this  gave  his  volume  no  small  degree  of  influence, 
not  only  in  his  own  country,  but  even  in  England.  It 
is  plainly  and  simply  written,  and  has  proved  a  really 
useful  and  instructive  volume.  It  has,  like  Watts' 
work,  gone  through  many  editions ;  but  it  has  not  by 
any  means  been  so  popular,  in  the  southern  part  of  the 
island,  as  the  Logic  of  the  English  divine. 

Dr  Duncan's  volume  proceeds  on  the  same  logical 
hypothesis  as  Locke  assumed  in  his  Essay.  The  un- 
derstanding is  represented  as  advancing  from  one  step 
of  knowledge  to  another,  and  exerting  various  distinct 
acts,  according  to  the  degrees  of  progress  it  makes. 
To  watch  and  record  these  steps  is  the  chief  office  of 
the  logician.  The  principal  divisions  into  which  logic, 
as  a  science,  is  mapped  out,  are  used  to  explain  the  pro- 
cedure of  the  mind  in  its  different  stages  of  improve- 
ment. The  rules  and  observations  requisite  for  this 
purpose  must  be  drawn  from  a  knowledge,  more  or 
less  extensive,  of  the  mind  itself,  viewed  chiefly  in  a 
psychological  aspect ;  and  therefore  some  account  of  its 
various  powers  and  faculties  becomes  necessary,  agree- 
ably to  this  theory,  in  order  to  give  clearness  and  force 
to  the  illustrations  of  logical  or  scientific  rules  and 
methods. 


duncan.  347 

The  doctor  has  followed  the  same  scholastic  division 
of  logic  as  Watts  has  done.  There  are  four  books. 
The  first  treats  of  simple  apprehension  —  a  subject 
which  embraces  a  copious  account  of  the  origin  of  our 
ideas,  the  various  kinds  or  sorts  of  them,  the  manner 
in  which  knowledge  is  derived  from  them, — together 
with  some  observations  on  the  rise,  progress,  and  nature 
of  language  in  general,  and  its  specific  application  to 
logical  subjects  in  particular.  The  second  book  is  de- 
voted to  the  consideration  of  our  judgments  or  intui- 
tions. Here  the  doctrine  of  propositions  is  developed, 
and  their  division  into  self-evident  and  demonstrable 
made  apparent.  The  third  book  brings  us  to  the 
syllogism,  which  is  illustrated  in  the  ordinary  way 
of  most  school  treatises  on  the  subject.  The  fourth 
book  ends  with  method.  This  the  doctor  thinks  impor- 
tant. It  can  only  be  made  use  of  with  advantage,  he 
remarks,  when  our  mental  faculties  have  been  exer- 
cised, and  some  decided  progress  in  general  knowledge 
made.  He  observes,  that  "when  a  man,  accustomed 
to  much  thinking,  comes,  after  any  considerable  interval 
of  time,  to  take  a  survey  of  his  intellectual  acquisitions, 
he  seldom  finds  reason  to  be  satisfied  with  that  order 
and  disposition  according  to  which  they  made  their 
entrance  into  his  understanding.  They  are  there  dis- 
persed and  scattered  without  subordination,  or  any  just 
and  regular  coherence  ;  insomuch  that  the  subserviency 
of  one  truth  to  the  discovery  of  another  does  not  so 
readily  appear  to  the  mind.  Hence  he  is  convinced  of 
the  necessity  of  distributing  them  into  various  classes, 
and  combining  into  one  uniform  system  whatever  re- 
lates to  one  and  the  same  subject.     !N~ow,  this  is  the 


348  LOGICAL  SCIENCE  IN  GREAT  BRITAIN. 

true  and  proper  business  of  method, — to  ascertain  the 
various  divisions  of  human  knowledge,  and  so  to  adjust 
and  connect  the  parts  in  every  branch,  that  they  may 
seem  to  grow  one  out  of  another,  and  form  a  regular 
body  of  science,  rising  from  first  principles,  and  pro- 
ceeding by  an  orderly  concatenation  of  truths." 

The  two  treatises  of  Watts  and  Duncan  tended 
greatly  to  obliterate  from  the  public  mind  of  this 
country,  every  vestige  of  esteem  and  reverence  for  the 
scholastic  logic.  But,  besides  these,  there  were  other 
writers  whose  speculations,  partly  metaphysical  and 
partly  logical,  tended  still  more  to  increase  the  disre- 
gard of  the  principles  and  forms  of  the  Aristotelian 
system.  These  antagonists  of  formal  logic  were  most 
energetic  and  zealous  in  the  northern  portions  of  the 
island.  Among  their  number,  'Dr  Campbell  stands 
conspicuous.  His  Philosophy  of  Rhetoric  (1762)  is  a 
work  which,  during  the  latter  part  of  the  last  century, 
exercised  a  marked  influence,  indeed,  over  the  general 
current  of  logical  thought  in  Great  Britain.  And  his 
treatise  is  not  destitute  of  influence  even  at  the  present 
day.  He  appears  to  have  entertained  very  decided 
opinions  on  the  nature  of  the  syllogistic  theory  of 
reasoning.  He  says,  "  The  method  of  proving  by 
syllogism  appears,  even  on  a  superficial  review,  both 
unnatural  and  prolix.  The  rules  laid  down  for  distin- 
guishing the  conclusive  from  the  inconclusive  forms  of 
argument,  the  true  syllogism  from  the  various  kinds  of 
sophisms,  are  at  once  cumbersome  to  the  memory,  and 
unnecessary  in  practice.  No  person,  one  may  venture 
to  pronounce,  will  ever  be  made  a  reasoner  who  stands 
in   need  of  them.     In  a  word,   the  whole  bears  the 


CAMPBELL.  349 

manifest  indications  of  an  artificial  and  ostentatious 
parade  of  learning,  calculated  for  giving  the  appearance 
of  great  profundity  to  what  in  fact  is  very  shallow. 
Such,  I  acknowledge,  have  been,  for  a  long  time,  my 
sentiments  on  the  subject.  On  a  near  inspection,  I 
cannot  say  I  have  found  reason  to  alter  them,  though 
I  think  I  have  seen  a  little  further  into  the  nature  of 
this  disputative  science,  and  consequently  into  the 
grounds  of  its  futility." 

Dr  Campbell  says  again,  in  reference  to  the  general 
character  of  the  scholastic  logic,  "  that  the  disputation 
of  the  schools  became  to  be  so  much  a  mechanical  ex- 
ercise, that  if  once  a  man  had  learned  his  logic,  and 
had  thereby  come  to  understand  the  use  of  his  weapons, 
and  had  gotten  the  knack  of  wielding  them,  he  was 
qualified,  without  any  other  kind  of  knowledge,  to  de- 
fend any  position  whatsoever,  how  contradictory  soever 
to  common  sense,  and  to  the  clearest  discoveries  of 
reason  and  experience." 

After  making  some  observations  on  the  abstract 
nature  of  the  svllooism,  which  he  thinks  is  resolvable 
into  a  mere  identical  proposition,  the  doctor  sums  up 
the  whole  discussion  with  these  words  : — "  What  shall 
we  denominate  the  artificial  system  or  organ  of  truth, 
as  it  has  been  called,  of  which  we  have  been  treating  ? 
Shall  we  style  it  the  art  of  reasoning  ?  So  honourable 
an  appellation  it  by  no  means  merits,  since,  as  hath 
been  shewn,  it  is  ill  adapted  to  scientific  matters. 
Shall  we  then  pronounce  it  the  science  of  logomachy, 
or,  in  plain  English,  the  art  of  fighting  with  words,  and 
about  words?  And  in  this  wordy  warfare  shall  we 
say  that  the  rules  of  syllogising  are  the  tactics  ?     This 


350  LOGICAL  SCIENCE  IN  GEEAT  BRITAIN. 

would  certainly  hit  the  matter  more  nearly ;  but  I 
know  not  how  it  happens,  that  to  call  any  thing  logo- 
machy or  altercation  would  be  considered  as  giving  bad 
names ;  and  when  a  good  use  may  be  made  of  an  in- 
vention, it  seems  unreasonable  to  fix  an  odious  name 
upon  it  which  ought  only  to  discriminate  the  abuse.  I 
shall  therefore  only  title  it  the  scholastic  art  of  dispu- 
tation.    It  is  the  schoolmen's  science  of  defence."* 

Lord  Karnes  was  another  Scottish  writer  who  spoke 
lightly  of  the  school  logic.  In  his  Sketches  of  the  His- 
tor y  of  Man  (1770),  he  says:  "The  slow  progress  of 
useful  knowledge  during  the  many  ages  in  which  the 
syllogistic  art  was  most  highly  cultivated  as  the  only 
guide  to  science,  and  its  quick  progress  since  that  art 
was  disused,  suggest  a  presumption  against  it;  and 
this  presumption  is  strengthened  by  the  puerility  of  the 
examples  which  have  always  been  brought  to  illustrate 
its  rules."  "  The  ancients  seem  to  have  had  too  high 
notions,  both  of  the  force  of  the  reasoning  power  in 
man,  and  of  the  art  of  syllogism  as  its  guide.  Mere 
reasoning  can  carry  us  but  a  very  little  way  in  most 
subjects.  By  observation  and  experiments  properly 
conducted,  the  stock  of  human  knowledge  may  be  en- 
larged without  end ;  but  the  power  of  reasoning  alone, 
applied  with  vigour  through  a  .long  life,  would  only 
carry  us  round  like  a  horse  in  -  a  mill,  who  labours 
hard,  but  makes  no  progress.'-'  "  When  the  power  of 
reasoning  is  so  feeble  by  nature,  especially  in  subjects 
to  which  this  syllogistic  theory  can  be  applied,  it  would 
be  unreasonable  to  expect  great  effects  from  it.  And 
hence  we  see  the  reason  why  the  examples  brought  to 

*  Vol.  i.  p.  182. 


LORD  KAMES,  BEATT1E.  351 

illustrate  it  by  the  most  ingenious  logicians  have  rather 
tended  to  bring  it  into  contempt."  "  Although  the 
art  of  categorical  syllogism  is  better  fitted  for  scholastic 
litigation  than  for  real  improvement  in  knowledge,  it  is 
a  venerable  piece  of  antiquity,  and  a  great  effort  of 
human  genius.  We  admire  the  pyramids  of  Egypt, 
and  the  wall  of  China,  although  useless  burdens  on  the 
earth.  We  can  hear  the  most  minute  description  of 
them,  and  travel  hundreds  of  leagues  to  see  them.  If 
any  person  should  with  sacrilegious  hands  destroy  or 
deface  them,  his  memory  would  be  had  in  abhorrence. 
The  predicaments  and  predicables,  the  rules  of  syllogism, 
and  the  topics,  have  a  like  title  to  our  veneration  as 
antiquities.  They  are  uncommon  efforts,  not  of  human 
power,  but  of  human  genius ;  and  they  make  a  remark- 
able period  in  the  progress  of  human  reason." 

Speaking  of  reasoning  in  general,  his  lordship  says, 
that  "  all  real  knowledge  of  mankind  may  be  divided 
into  two  parts, — the  first  consisting  of  self-evident  pro- 
positions ;  the  second,  of  those  which  are  deduced  by 
just  reasoning  from  self-evident  propositions.  The 
line  which  divides  these  two  parts  ought  to  be  marked 
as  distinctly  as  possible,  and  the  principles  that  are 
self-evident  reduced,  as  far  as  can  be  done,  to  general 
axioms."* 

Lord  Karnes'  Introduction  to  the  Art  of  Thinking 
contains  little  or  nothing  of  a  logical  character. 

Dr  Beattie's  Essay  on  Truth  (1770)  had  a  great 
effect  in  strengthening  the  antipathy  against  the  scho- 
lastic logic  throughout  Great  Britain.  The  work  was 
exceedingly  popular.     On  the  general  influence  and 

*  Sketches,  vol.  iii. 


352  LOGICAL  SCIENCE  IN  GREAT  BRITAIN. 

tenor  of  this  species  of  logic  on  the  character  and 
minds  of  those  who  cultivate  it,  he  observes  : — "  The 
apparent  tendency  of  the  school  logic  is,  to  render  men 
disputatious  and  sceptical,  adepts  in  the  knowledge  of 
words,  but  inattentive  to  fact  and  experience,  It  makes 
them  fonder  of  speaking  than  thinking,  and  therefore 
strangers  to  themselves, — solicitous  chiefly  about  rules, 
names,  and  distinctions,  and  therefore  leaves  them 
neither  leisure  nor  inclination  for  the  study  of  life  and 
manners.  In  a  word,  it  makes  them  more  ambitious 
to  distinguish  themselves  as  partisans  of  a  dogmatist, 
than  as  inquirers  after  truth.  It  is  easy  to  see  how  far 
a  man  of  this  temper  is  qualified  to  make  discoveries  in 
knowledge.  To  such  a  man,  indeed,  the  name  of  truth 
is  only  a  pretence ;  he  neither  is,  nor  can  be,  much 
interested  in  the  solidity  or  importance  of  his  tenets  : 
it  is  enough  if  he  can  render  them  plausible — nay,  it  is 
enough  if  he  can  silence  his  adversary  by  any  means. 
The  captious  turn  of  an  habitual  wrangler  deadens  the 
understanding,  sours  the  temper,  and  hardens  the 
heart ;  by  rendering  the  mind  suspicious  and  attentive 
to  trifles,  it  weakens  the  sagacity  of  instinct,  and  ex- 
tinguishes the  fire  of  imagination :  it  transforms  con- 
versation into  a  state  of  warfare,  and  restrains  the  lively 
sallies  of  fancy,  so  effectual  in  promoting  good- humour 
and  good-will,  which,  though  often  erroneous,  are  a 
thousand  times  more  valuable  than  the  dull  correctness 
of  a  mode-and-ngure  disciplinarian."* 

Lord  Monboddo,  in  his  Ancient  Metaphysics  (1779), 
is  an  enthusiastic  admirer  of  the  Aristotelian  logic.  He 
argues  that  Mr  Locke  and  all  his  followers  have  com- 

*  Essay  on  Truth,  p.  389. 


LORD  MONBODDO.  353 

pletely  mistaken  the  theory  of  general  reasoning,  which 
has  no  other  foundation  than  the  syllogism. 

Before  Aristotle's  time,  Lord  Monboddo  says,  "  Many 
philosophers  no  doubt  reasoned  very  well,  and  made 
great  discoveries,  but  they  reasoned  as  the  women  and 
children  spake ;  for  though  women  and  children,  who 
have  been  well  educated,  may  speak  very  well,  they  do 
it  by  mere  habit,  without  being  able  to  give  any  account 
how  they  do  it :  the  reason  of  which  is,  that  they  can- 
not analyse  language  into  its  elements."  "  The  philo- 
sophers before  Aristotle  could  reason  very  well ;  but  as 
they  could  not  analyse  reason,  so  they  could  not  give 
any  rational  account  why  one  argument  was  conclusive, 
and  another  inconclusive." 

Lord  Monboddo  keeps  no  terms  with  the  common 
sense  school  of  logic.  He  observes  :  "  Common  sense, 
they  will  say,  is  sufficient  to  let  us  know  what  certainty 
and  conviction  are,  and  when  we  ought  to  be  convinced, 
and  when  not.  But  I  will  tell  them,  that  not  only 
common  sense  is  not  sufficient  for  this  purpose,  but  even 
the  most  uncommon  sense  and  the  greatest  natural 
genius  ;  and,  in  order  to  know  what  truth  and  science 
are,  they  must  either  have  invented  themselves  a  great 
system  of  science,  such  as  Aristotle  has  delivered  in  his 
books  of  analytics,  or  they  must  have  learned  it  from 
others." 

Lord  Monboddo  defines  logical  truth  to  be  "  the 
perceiving  by  the  act  of  the  mind,  comparing  together 
its  own  ideas  or  perceptions ;  and  it  is  distinguished 
from  what  is  called  metaphysical  or  transcendental  truth, 
which  belongs  only  to  single  ideas." 

z 


354  LOGICAL  SCIENCE  IK  GEE  AT  BRITAIN. 

All  demonstrative  reasoning  presupposes,  according 
to  his  lordship,  not  only  the  existence  of  general  ideas, 
but  that  there  is  a  principle  of  subordination  running 
through  one  to  another;  that  is,  one  general  idea  or 
conception  is  more  comprehensive  than  another,  and 
the  less  general  is  contained  in,  and  makes  a  part 
of,  the  more  general  one.  It  is  this  constitution  of 
things  which  makes  the  syllogism,  and  imparts  to  it 
its  demonstrative  character. 

Lord  Monboddo's  notion  of  the  nature  of  truth  is, 
that  it  ultimately  rests  on  a  theological  basis.  There 
are  numerous  passages  of  his  work  illustrative  of  this 
idea.  Without  religious  principle,  logical  science  is 
unintelligible.  He  says  :  "  From  what  I  have  said  of 
the  subordination  of  ideas,  we  may  observe  the  progress 
of  things  upwards,  and  the  wonderful  tendency  of  all 
things  in  nature  towards  one  principle  of  union.  This 
is  to  be  found  in  all  the  several  classes  of  beings,  which 
still  rise  one  above  another  till  they  end  in  that  one 
category  to  which  they  belong.  And  here  the  analysis 
of  logic  ends  ;  but  where  logic  ends  theology  begins, 
and  shews  that  all  the  ten  categories  terminate  in  one 
principle,  and  have  one  common  origin,  the  Intellect 
Divine,  the  source  of  every  thing  existing,  or  that  can 
exist  in  the  universe,  where  all  things  exist  in  the  most 
perfect  unity ;  for  there  is  not  first  or  last  there,  nor 
the  succession  of  ideas  as  in  our  minds,  but  all  things 
are  present  at  once,  and  the  past,  the  present,  and  the 
future,  what  is  precedent  and  what  is  consequent,  are 
seen  in  one  view.  In  this  manner,  not  only  logic,  but 
every  other  science,  ends  in  theology,  the  summit  of  all 
philosophy,  and  which   to  know  is  the  perfection  of 


HUME.  355 

human  nature."*  Again  he  says  :  "  Truth  and  science 
are  to  be  deduced  from  a  much  higher  source  than  the 
human  mind,  even  from  Grod  himself."  "  Here  we 
may  see  with  what  propriety  God  is  called  in  Scripture 
the  God  of  Truth  ;  for  in  him  are  all  ideas  or  species 
of  things,  with  all  their  connexions,  dependencies,  and 
relations  one  to  another." 

We  must  call  a  moment's  attention  to  the  writings 
of  David  Hume,  who  deeply  interested  himself  in  the 
fundamental  principles  of  reasoning.  All  human  know- 
ledge, he  affirms,  may  be  embraced  in  two  categories — 
impressions  and  ideas.  Impressions  comprehend  the 
entire  mass  of  our  sensational  knowledge ;  and  ideas 
stand  for  all  those  thoughts  which  relate  to  the  higher 
functions  of  the  mind — as  remembering,  imagining, 
reasoning,  &c.  His  notions,  however,  on  the  relation 
of  all  sciences  whatever  to  the  science  of  human  nature, 
are  so  interesting,  and  have  been,  in  fact,  so  suggestive 
to  other  writers  on  the  principles  of  logical  science, 
that  we  must  allow  this  able  and  subtle  writer  to  state 
his  own  case  in  his  own  words  : — 

"It  is  evident,"  says  he,  "that  all  the  sciences  have 
a  relation,  greater  or  less,  to  human  nature  ;  and  that, 
however  wide  any  of  them  may  seem  to  run  from  it, 
they  still  return  back  by  one  passage  or  another.  Even 
mathematics,  natural  philosophy,  and  natural  religion, 
are  in  some  measure  dependent  on  the  science  of  man, 
since  they  lie  under  the  cognisance  of  men,  and  are 
judged  of  by  their  powers  and  faculties. *.  If  therefore 
the  sciences  of  mathematics,  natural  philosophy,  and 
natural  religion,  have  such  a  dependence  on  the  know- 

*  Ancient  Met.,  vol.  i.  p.  484^ 


356  LOGICAL  SCIENCE  IN  GREAT  BRITAIN. 

ledge  of  man,  what  may  be  expected  in  the  other 
sciences,  whose  connexion  with  human  nature  is  more 
close  and  intimate  ?  The  sole  end  of  logic  is,  to  ex- 
plain the  principles  and  operations  of  our  reasoning 
faculty,  and  the  nature  of  our  ideas ;  morals  and  criti- 
cism regard  our  tastes  and  sentiments ;  and  politics 
consider  men  as  united  in  society,  and  dependent  on 
each  other. . ;  .Here,  then,  is  the  only  expedient  from 
which  we  can  hope  for  success  in  our  philosophical 
researches,  to  leave  the  tedious  lingering  method  which 
we  have  hitherto  followed,  and,  instead  of  taking  now 
and  then  a  castle  or  village  on  the  frontier,  to  march 
up  directly  to  the  capital  or  centre  of  these  sciences — 
to  human  nature  itself,  which,  being  once  masters  of,  we 
may  every  where  else  hope  for  an  easy  victory.  From 
this  station  we  may  extend  our  conquests  over  all  those 
sciences  which  more  intimately  concern  human  life,  and 
may  afterwards  proceed  at  leisure  to  discover  more 
fully  those  which  are  the  objects  of  pure  curiosity. 
There  is  no  question  of  importance  whose  decision  is 
not  comprised  in  the  science  of  man,  and  there  is  none 
which  can  be  decided  with  any  certainty  before  we 
become  acquainted  with  that  science.  In  pretending, 
therefore,  to  explain  the  principles  of  human  nature,  we 
in  effect  propose  a  complete  system  of  the  sciences, 
built  on  a  foundation  almost  entirely  new,  and  the  only 
one  upon  which  they  can  stand  with  any  security." 

We  come  now  to  notice  an  entire  class  of  writers 
whose  united  speculations  have  given  birth  to  several 
new  views  of  logical  truth,  and  of  the  utility  of  logical 
systems  generally.  This  class  is  denominated  the 
common  sense  school  of  philosophers.     Its  doctrines  are 


COMMON  SENSE  SCHOOL  OF  PHILOSOPHERS.  357 

known  wherever  science  is  cultivated.  Though  not 
strictly  expounders  of  regular  and  formal  treatises  of 
logic,  yet  they  discussed  the  leading  principles  of  the 
science,  and  came  to  entertain  certain  opinions  regard- 
ing it  considerably  at  variance  with  pre-existing  theories 
and  maxims.  The  principal  writers  who  constituted 
this  school,  and  to  whose  labours  we  shall  now  briefly 
direct  attention,  are  Doctors  Reid,  Beattie,  and  Oswald, 
and  the  late  Professor  Dugald  Stewart.  In  shaping 
our  present  course,  we  shall  avoid  all  theological  and 
purely  metaphysical  discussion,  and  confine  our  remarks 
as  closely  as  possible  to  the  bearing  which  these  specu- 
lations have  on  the  broad  and  scientific  principles  of 
logic,  and  on  the  nature  of  those  mental  powers  con- 
sidered more  immediately  called  into  requisition  in 
every  act  of  reasoning  and  argumentation. 

For  the  sake  of  those  whose  knowledge  of  mental 
philosophy  may  be  but  scanty,  we  beg  to  premise  that 
there  have  been  various  and  somewhat  conflicting  defi- 
nitions of  common  sense  current  among  modern  philo- 
sophers and  logicians ;  but  the  general  meaning  of  the 
term,  as  we  shall  here  use  it,  is  mainly  the  same  as  that 
given  of  this  sense  by  Father  Buffier,  to  whom  it  origi- 
nally belongs,  and  which  has  been  inserted  in  a  previous 
chapter  of  this  volume.  We  shall,  however,  give  this 
definition  again : — "  Common  se?ise  is  that  quality  or 
disposition  which  nature  has  placed  in  all  men,  or  evi- 
dently in  the  far  greater  number  of  them,  in  order  to 
enable  them  all,  when  they  have  arrived  at  the  age  and 
use  of  reason,  to  form  a  common  and  uniform  judgment 
with  respect  to  objects  different  from  the  internal  sen- 
timent of  their  own  perception,  and  which  judgment  is 


358  LOGICAL  SCIENCE  IN  GREAT  BRITAIN. 

not  the  consequence  of  any  anterior  principle."  The 
reader  will  readily  perceive  that  this  common  sense  is 
not  like  those  senses  of  seeing,  hearing,  tasting,  and 
the  like,  which  recognise  the  existence  and  qualities  of 
external  bodies  by  a  species  of  intuitive  discernment ; 
but  it  is  simply  that  quality  or  attribute  of  mind  which 
men,  by  virtue  of  circumstances  and  age,  become  expe- 
rimentally possessed  of,  and  by  which  they  are  enabled 
to  form  a  common  and  uniform  judgment  on  divers 
classes  of  objects  or  things  which  come  before  them. 
This  explanation  will  be  found  to  coincide  substantially 
with  those  definitions  given  of  this  common  sense  by 
nearly  all  writers  who  have  discussed  the  subject. 

The  logical  doctrines  which  sprang  out  of,  or  received 
great  support  from,  this  common  sense  school  of  philo- 
sophy, may  be  stated  under  the  following  general 
heads : — 

1st,  The  doctrine  which  this  school  maintained  re- 
lative to  the  reasoning  powers  was,  that  there  was  a 
natural  logic,  which  was  quite  sufficient  of  itself  to 
guide  men  in  their  ordinary  intercourse  of  life,  and  to 
enable  them  to  sit  in  judgment  on  all  the  most  impor- 
tant truths  and  questions  more  immediately  connected 
with  their  own  inward  nature — their  mental,  moral, 
and  religious  feelings.  No  formal  or  artificial  systems 
or  rules  are  here  required.  The  uniformity  which 
human  life  has  presented  in  all  times,  and  that  com- 
plete certainty  with  which  we  expect  certain  conse- 
quences from  certain  causes,  are  irrefragable  proofs  of 
the  existence  of  this  natural  logical  talent.  The  great 
mass  of  human  knowledge  relative  to  man — as  a  think- 
ing, moral,  social,  and  religious  being — is  purely  derived 


COMMON  SENSE  SCHOOL  OF  PHILOSOPHERS.  359 

from  consciousness,  and  common  sense  or  experience; 
and  the  principles  which  embody  the  entire  science  of 
man,  are  the  exponents  of  the  common  sense  feelings 
and  common  sense  ideas  of  the  generality  of  men. 
These  principles  can  neither  be  detected  by  any  formal 
logical  rules,  nor  their  truth  tested  by  them  in  any  way 
whatever.  They  rest  on  a  foundation  altogether  their 
own,  and  refuse  to  be  brought  under  the  technical 
forms  and  discipline  of  the  mere  school  logician.  "  All 
reasoning,"  says  Dr  Beattie,  "  terminates  in  first  prin- 
ciples ;  all  evidence  is  ultimately  intuitive ;  common 
sense  is  the  standard  of  truth  to  man."  Again  he 
says,  "  There  are  few  faculties,  either  of  our  mind  or 
body,  more  improvable  by  culture  than  that  of  reason- 
ing ;  whereas  common  sense,  like  other  instincts,  arrives 
at  maturity  with  almost  no  care  of  ours.  To  teach  the 
art  of  reasoning,  or  rather  of  wrangling,  is  easy  ;  but  it  is 
impossible  to  teach  common  sense  to  one  who  wants  it."* 
Common  sense,  it  is  substantially  affirmed  by  the 
same  school,  exercises  a  larger  share  of  direct  authority 
over  the  formation  and  consolidation  of  some  sciences, 
than  many  philosophers  imagine.  Some  fixed  idea  is 
laid  hold  of  by  the  mind  in  ordinary  cases,  which  lies, 
as  it  were,  on  the  surface  of  things ;  and  it  serves  as  a 
kind  of  methodical  nucleus,  around  which  are  arranged 
a  multitude  of  individual  things  susceptible  of  scientific 
classification,  and  which  collectively  constitute  a  body 
of  truth,  having  to  the  individual  all  the  attributes  of 
a  regular  science.  Many  men  are  to  be  found  who 
have  a  very  considerable  portion  of  information  on 
many  branches    of  knowledge,   who  have    derived   it 

*  Essay  on  Truth,  p.  41. 


360  LOGICAL  SCIENCE  IN  GREAT  BRITAIN. 

entirely  from  a  shrewd  and  painstaking  method  which 
they  have  accustomed  themselves  to  follow  in  every 
step  of  their  search  after  science.  Such  persons  often 
become  quite  bewildered  when  you  attempt  to  shew 
them  the  logical  beauty  and  cogency  of  pursuing  their 
inquiries  in  accordance  with  some  comprehensive  and 
logical  system  of  investigation.  They  cannot  seize  hold 
of  the  mere  formal  thread  of  thought ;  and,  therefore, 
work  out  the  problem  in  their  own  way  and  fashion. 
The  common  sense  views  they  adopt  are  grounded 
upon  conceptions  not  very  accurately  defined,  nor  sus- 
ceptible of  intelligible  development  to  others ;  but  to 
themselves  they  serve  the  purpose  of  giving  a  full 
and  faithful  interpretation  of  the  things  of  which  they 
are  in  search.  All  such  scientific  conceptions  are 
involved  in  a  cloud  of  mystery  whenever  we  attempt  to 
penetrate  their  abstract  nature,  to  inquire  into  the 
manner  they  are  formed,  or  the  bond  or  link  which 
connects  them  with  the  general  faculties  of  the  mind ; 
but  of  their  real  individual  existence  there  can  be  no 
possible  doubt  whatever.  Numerous  illustrations,  con- 
firmatory of  these  statements,  might  be  derived  from 
the  history  of  every  department  of  human  know- 
ledge. 

Even  in  those  cases  where  writers  of  this  school  did 
not  feel  themselves  fully  justified  in  going  the  extent 
of  maintaining,  that  natural  logic,  such  as  they  con- 
ceived it  to  be,  was  of  itself  sufficient  for  the  purposes 
of  ordinary  education  ;  yet  it  has  been  invariably  con- 
tended, that  formal  logic  was  of  little  or  no  use  without 
the  aid  of  the  natural.  Buffier,  who  was  no  enemy  to 
the  old  or  technical  dialectics,  affirms  his  conviction, 


COMMON  SENSE  SCHOOL  OF  PHILOSOPHERS.  361 

that  no  logical  system  can  be  efficient  unless  both  the 
common  sense  and  formal  systems  be  united.  He  says, 
"  The  perception,  in  fact,  of  first  or  common  sense 
truths  is,  as  it  were,  the  key  to  all  the  sciences ;  the 
source  or  cause  of  every  just  decision ;  the  surest  guide 
to  the  most  accurate  knowledge;  the  very  soul  and 
essence,  in  some  sort,  of  all  truth  in  general,  which 
logic  attains  only  in  part,  though  it  has  the  honour  to 
be  styled  the  organ  of  truth — but  it  is  no  more  than 
the  organ  of  truth  consequentially.  And  this  supposes 
principles  already  known;  so  that,  as  experience  demon- 
strates, a  man  may  be  an  excellent  logician,  and  yet 
fall  into  considerable  errors  from  an  imperfect  know- 
ledge of  the  first  truths ;  whilst  those  which  are  to  be 
drawn  from  the  inmost  recesses  and  most  immediate 
operations  of  the  human  mind,  belong  to  that  more 
extensive  science  which  forms  the  subject  of  this  treatise. 
If  it  shall  be  considered  by  some  truly  metaphysical, 
they  will  not  perhaps  be  mistaken ;  but,  whatever  it  may 
be,  it  must  so  closely  accompany,  precede,  or  follow  logic, 
that  they  mutually  lend  a  necessary  support  to  each 
other.  Logic,  therefore,  remains  in  some  measure  incom- 
plete until  it  be  joined  to  this,  which  likewise,  in  various 
places,  supposes  the  former;  but  those  two  articles 
being  united,  furnish  any  thing  that  relates  to  the 
science  of  the  human  understanding,  and  teach  us  to 
form  thence  the  true  art  of  thinking  justly,  and  with 
precision — the  object  most  deserving  the  attention  of 
man — the  most  solid  fruit  of  science."* 

It  is  almost  unnecessary  to  remark,  that  this  opinion 
of  Buffi er's  has  been  entertained,  with  some  modifica- 

*  Premieres  Verites,  p.  2. 


362  LOGICAL  SCIENCE  IN  GREAT  BRITAIN. 

tions,  by  a  majority  of  the  most  acute  logicians  of  every 
country  in  Europe. 

2d,  The  common  sense  school  maintained,  that 
reason  was  not  a  single  faculty  or  power,  but  a  complex 
operation,  involving  the  exercise  of  nearly  the  entire 
intellectual  apparatus.  It  required  a  due  balance  to  be 
sustained  of  all  the  separate  powers  of  which  it  was 
composed.  If  there  were  any  irregularity  in  the  con- 
stitution of  the  inward  man — any  power  more  vigorous 
than  another,  and  out  of  keeping  with  it — there  was  a 
corresponding  derangement  in  the  reasoning  capabili- 
ties of  the  individual,  and  his  chances  of  being  a  sound 
and  comprehensive  reasoner  proportionally  diminished. 
The  question  was  reduced  to  one  of  actual  experience. 
This  opinion  was  a  favourite  one  with  the  late  Dugald 
Stewart ;  and  every  reader  of  his  admirable  works  will 
readily  bring  to  mind  some  of  those  fine  discriminations 
of  individual  character,  which  throw  such  an  agreeable 
charm  over  many  of  his  abstruse  speculations  on  the 
powers  of  reasoning  generally.  Indeed,  this  doctrine 
of  the  compound  character  of  the  argumentative  or 
logical  talent,  forms  at  bottom  the  only  substantial 
grounds  for  the  majority  of  these  rules  for  what  is  called 
the  government  of  the  understanding — a  phrase  scattered 
up  and  down  in  almost  every  logical  treatise  published 
within  the  two  last  centuries.  For  example,  memory, 
which  instantaneously  follows  sensation,  and  serves  as 
a  kind  of  repository  or  storehouse  for  all  the  materials 
of  our  experience  and  observation,  is  a  faculty  as  neces- 
sary, even  for  the  simplest  form  of  logical  argument,  as 
the  act  of  comparison  itself,  from  which  an  inference  is 
said  by  logicians  directly  to  proceed.     And  the  same 


COMMON  SENSE  SCHOOL  OF  PHILOSOPHERS.  363 

thing  may  be  remarked  relative  to  the  share  which 
other  intellectual  powers  have  in  the  general  result 
of  all  reasoning  whatever.  Even  in  mathematical 
science  itself,  no  progress  can  be  made  in  it  without  the 
active  assistance  and  co-operation  of  the  power  of 
memory  with  other  faculties  of  the  intellect. 

3d,  It  is  a  part  of  the  logical  creed  of  the  common 
sense  metaphysicians,  that  the  various  departments  of 
human  knowledge  have  particular  kinds  of  evidence  or 
certainty  belonging  to  each  ;  and,  therefore,  it  is  espe- 
cially requisite  that  the  logical  principles  appertaining 
to  every  individual  science  should  be  carefully  noted, 
and  considered  in  all  reasonings  and  conclusions 
regarding  it.  Physical  science  rests  on  one  kind  of 
evidence,  mathematical  science  on  another,  moral  evi- 
dence on  a  third,  and  so  on.  There  must  be  no  con- 
founding of  the  one  with  the  other.  It  would  be  pre- 
posterous, say  the  writers  of  this  school,  to  attempt  to 
solve  a  moral,  political,  or  religious  question  by  the 
forms  and  rules  of  mathematical  reasoning.  This  species 
of  reasoning  rests  entirely  on  intuitive  conceptions,  and 
consists  of  an  uninterrupted  series  of  axioms.  It  is 
solely  conversant  about  number  and  extension.  On  the 
other  hand,  moral  evidence  is  made  up  of  many  detached 
or  isolated  ingredients.  When  we  reason  about  virtue 
and  vice,  pain  and  pleasure,  right  and  duty,  there  is  no 
standard  by  which  to  estimate  their  different  agree- 
ments in  numbers  and  figures.  In  moral  evidence  we 
have  degrees ;  in  demonstrative  we  have  none.  It  is 
therefore  of  essential  importance  that  logical  systems 
should  treat  of  these  distinctions  in  the  several  sciences, 
in  order  that  rules  may  be  laid  down  for  the  govern- 


364  LOGICAL  SCIENCE  IN  GREAT  BEITAIN. 

merit  and  instruction  of  the  understanding  in  the  pro- 
gress of  general  knowledge. 

kth,  The  common  sense  logicians  had  a  great  aver- 
sion to  formal  systems  of  logic.  All  such  systems,  say 
they,  have  their  hold  on  the  minds  of  men  chiefly  from 
their  shutting  out  from  attention  these  general  ideas 
which  form  the  staple,  as  it  were,  of  thought  and  intel- 
ligence, and  are  almost  ever  present  to  the  intellect 
when  in  a  state  of  activity.  Human  thought  is  so  in- 
timately blended  with  questions  of  good,  right,  truth, 
justice,  advantage,  enjoyment,  and  questions  connected 
with  practical  life  and  consequences,  that  when  any 
mere  collection  of  formal  rules  are  presented  to  the 
mind's  attention,  and  repeated  over  and  over,  the 
interest  flags,  and  they  become  positively  nauseous  and 
unpleasant. 

We  cannot  handle  any  thing  in  the  shape  of  know- 
ledge, without  having  present  in  the  intellect,  in  a  state 
more  or  less  vivid  and  distinct,  certain  general  ideas, 
such  as  existence,  causation,  power,  efficiency,  agency, 
&c.  These  are  perpetually  obtruding  their  presence 
upon  us,  and  imperatively  demanding  a  share  of  our 
immediate  attention. 

The  disadvantages  arising  from  an  artificial  and 
purely  formal  system  of  logic  being  estimated  at  more 
than  it  is  really  worth,  are  graphically  pointed  out  by 
Dugald  Stewart  in  the  following  passages : — 

"  For  my  own  part,  so  little  value  does  my  individual 
experience  lead  me  to  place  on  argumentative  address, 
when  compared  with  some  other  endowments  subser- 
vient to  our  intellectual  improvement,  that  I  have  long 
been  accustomed  to  consider  that  promptness  of  reply 


COMMON  SENSE  SCHOOL  OF  PHILOSOPHERS.  365 

and  dogmatism  of  decision,  which  mark  the  eager  and 
practised  disputant,  as  almost  infallible  symptoms  of  a 
limited  capacity — a  capacity  deficient  in  what  Locke 
has  called  large,  sound,  roundabout  sense.  In  all  the 
higher  endowments  of  the  understanding,  this  intellec- 
tual quality,  to  which  nature,  as  well  as  education, 
must  contribute,  may  be  justly  regarded  as  an  essential 
ingredient."  "  If  these  observations  hold  with  respect 
to  the  art  of  reasoning  or  argumentation,  as  it  is  culti- 
vated by  men  undisciplined  in  the  contentions  of  the 
schools,  they  will  be  found  to  apply  with  infinitely 
greater  force  to  those  disputants  who,  in  the  present 
advanced  state  of  human  knowledge,  have  been  at 
pains  to  fortify  themselves,  by  a  course  of  persevering 
study,  with  the  arms  of  the  Aristotelian  Logic.  Persons 
of  the  former  description  often  reason  conscientiously 
with  warmth  from  false  premises,  which  they  are  led 
by  passion,  or  by  want  of  information,  to  mistake  for 
truth.  Those  of  the  latter  description  proceed  syste- 
matically on  the  radical  error  of  conceiving  the  reason- 
ing process  to  be  the  most  powerful  instrument  by 
which  truth  is  to  be  attained,  combined  with  the  secon- 
dary error  of  supposing  that  the  power  of  reasoning 
may  be  strengthened  and  improved  by  the  syllogistic 
art."* 

5th,  The  Scotch  philosophers  insisted  upon  the  intro- 
duction of  nearly  all  questions  relating  to  mind  into 
systems  of  a  logical  character.  They  were  not,  how- 
ever, the  originators  of  this  mode  of  procedure — they 
only  carried  out  the  opinions  and  plans  of  their  pre- 
decessors to  a  greater  extent:     Disliking  the  formal 

*  Phil,  of  Mind,  p.  432. 


366  LOGICAL  SCIENCE  IN  GEE  AT  BRITAIN. 

logic,  the  common  sense  school  more  earnestly  insisted 
on  the  utility,  and  even  necessity,  of  extending  our 
examinations  into  the  most  abstruse  and  profound 
questions  of  intellectual  philosophy,  and  of  laying  bare 
the  entire  framework  of  the  mind  itself.  Hence  logi- 
cians were  called  upon,  before  entering  on  the  formal 
rules  of  their  science,  to  give  some  account  of  the 
faculties  of  the  mind,  cause  and  effect,  the  belief  in 
testimony,  the  nature  of  experimental  and  intuitive 
judgments,  and  the  like.  It  was  impossible,  these 
writers  maintained,  that  a  person  could  make  any 
advances  in  logic  unless  he  were  conversant  with  all 
the  leading  questions  relative  to  the  science  of  mind. 

6th,  The  common  sense  philosophers  imparted  a 
nominalism  to  the  logical  speculations  of  their  times. 
Though  Drs  Eeid  and  Beattie  entertained  some  opinions 
on  the  nature  of  universals,  which  might  bring  them 
within  that  class  of  logicians  called  Conceptualists,  yet 
they  were  by  no  means  very  decided  on  this  point. 
Their  general  leaning  was  evidently  towards  the 
nominal  theory.  Stewart  was  uncompromisingly  at- 
tached to  this'  theory  likewise ;  but  it  is  curious  to 
witness,  that  he  was  only  bold  on  the  subject  when  an 
enemy  was  in  the  field :  for  when  musing  in  security, 
and  in  a  joyous  and  contemplative  mood,  he  often 
expresses  himself  somewhat  puzzled  by  the  theory  of 
language,  which  he  generally  and  strenuously  main- 
tained. It  may  be  remarked  that  the  most  ultra  view 
of  universals  agrees  better  with  the  leading  principles 
of  the  common  sense  theory  of  logic  than  with  any 
modifications  of  the  nominal  hypothesis. 

7M,  The  formation  of  what  they  termed  a  philoso- 


COMMON  SENSE  SCHOOL  OF  PHILOSOPHERS.  367 

phical  logic  was  a  favourite  theme  with  the  most  influ- 
ential of  the  common  sense  school.  Wishing  to  make 
logic  a  great  and  universal  instrument,  both  for  the 
discovery  and  promulgation  of  truth,  they  conceived  it 
could  only  be  made  effective  for  this  end  by  being 
placed  on  a  much  more  extended  and  solid  basis  than 
it  had  hitherto  been.  Among  the  things  desiderated 
for  this  purpose,  was  a  thorough  knowledge  of  the 
philosophy  of  mind ;  because  without  this  no  just  opi- 
nion could  be  formed  of  the  classifications  and  objects  of 
human  knowledge,  nor  of  the  rules  for  the  investigation 
and  communication  of  truth. 

The  anticipated  advantages  to  be  derived  from  such 
a  philosophical  logic,  are  enumerated  by  Dugald  Stewart 
to  be  the  following  : — 1st,  Such  "  an  instrument  would 
be  of  the  highest  importance  in  all  the  sciences  to  ex- 
hibit a  precise  and  steady  idea  of  the  objects  which 
they  present  to  our  inquiry.  What  was  the  principal 
circumstance  which  contributed  to  mislead  the  ancients 
in  their  physical  researches  ?  AYas  it  not  their  confused 
and  wavering  notions  about  the  particular  class  of  truths 

which  it  was  their  business  to  investigate?" "If 

we  examine,  in  like  manner,  the  present  state  of  morals, 
of  jurisprudence,  of  politics,  and  of  philosophical  criticism, 
I  believe  we  should  find  that  the  principal  circum- 
stance which  retards  their  progress  is  the  vague  and 
indistinct  idea  which  those  who  apply  to  the  study  of 
them  have  formed  to  themselves  of  the  objects  of  their 

researches." "A  philosophical   logic  would 

assist  us  in  our  particular  scientific  investigations, — 1st, 
By  keeping  steadily  in  our  view  the  attainable  objects 
of  human  curiosity;   so,  2d,  By  exhibiting  to  us  the 


368  LOGICAL  SCIENCE  IN  GREAT  BRITAIN. 

relation  in  which  they  all  stand  to  each  other ;  and, 
3d,  The  relation  which  they  all  bear  to  what  ought  to 
be  their  common  aim,  the  advancement  of  human 
happiness ;  4th,  It  would  have  a  tendency  to  confine 
industry  and  genius  to  inquiries  which  are  of  real 
practical  utility ;  and  would,  5th,  Communicate  a  dig- 
nity to  the  most  subordinate  pursuits  which  are  in  any 
respect  subservient  to  so  important  a  purpose."  .... 
"  From  such  a  system  of  logic,  too,  important  assistance 
might  be  expected  for  reforming  the  established  plan  of 
public  and  private  education  ?  It  is  melancholy  to  reflect 
on  the  manner  in  which  this  is  carried  on  in  most, 
perhaps  I  might  say  in  all,  the  countries  of  Europe ; 
and  that,  in  an  age  of  comparative  light  and  liberality, 
the  intellectual  and  moral  characters  of  youth  should 
continue  to  be  formed  on  a  plan  devised  by  men  who 
were  not  only  strangers  to  the  business  of  the  world, 
but  who  felt  themselves  interested  in  opposing  the 
progress  of  useful  knowledge." 

2d,  "Another  very  important  branch  of  a  rational 
system  of  logic  ought  to  be,  to  lay  down  the  rules  of 
investigation  which  it  is  proper  to  follow  in  the  different 
sciences.  In  all  these  the  faculties  of  the  understand- 
ing are  the  instruments  with  which  we  operate;  and, 
without  a  previous  knowledge  of  their  nature,  it  is 
impossible  to  employ  them  to  the  best  advantage.  In 
every  exercise  of  our  reasoning  and  of  our  inventive 
powers,  there  are  general  laws  which  regulate  the 
progress  of  the  mind ;  and,  when  once  these  laws  are 
ascertained,  they  enable  us  to  speculate  and  to  invent 
for  the  future  with  more  system,  and  with  a  greater 
certainty  of  success." "  The  method  of  com- 


COMMON  SENSE  SCHOOL  OF  PHILOSOPHERS.  369 

municating  to  others  the  principles  of  the  different 
sciences,  has  been  as  much  neglected  by  the  writers  on 
logic  as  the  rules  of  investigation  and  discovery ;  and 
yet  there  is  certainly  no  undertaking  whatever  in 
which  their  assistance  is  more  indispensably  requisite."* 

8th,  All  reasonings  and  judgments,  according  to  the 
common  sense  of  philosophy,  must  relate  to  two  orders 
or  classes  of  truths, — contingent  and  necessary. 

Reasonings  involving  contingent  judgments  have  the 
following  common  sense  principles  as  their  basis : — 

1st,  Every  thing  which  is  attested  to  me  by  the 
power  of  consciousness  and  the  internal  sense  must 
really  exist. 

2d,  The  thoughts  of  which  I  am  conscious  are 
thoughts  of  a  being  whom  I  call  i",  or  myself. 

3d,  The  things  which  memory  distinctly  recalls  to 
me  really  happened. 

ith,  I  am  certain  of  my  own  personal  identity  from 
the  remotest  period  to  which  my  memory  can  carry 
me. 

5th,  Objects  which  I  perceive  by  the  aid  of  my  senses 
really  exist,  and  are  as  I  perceive  them  to  be. 

6th,  I  exert  some  degree  of  power  upon  my  actions 
and  determinations. 

7th,  The  natural  faculties  by  which  I  distinguish 
truth  from  error  are  not  delusive. 

8th,  My  fellow-men  are  living  and  intelligent  crea- 
tures like  myself. 

9th,  Certain  expressions  of  countenance,  certain 
sounds  of  the  voice,  and  certain  gestures,  indicate  cer- 
tain thoughts  and  certain  dispositions  of  mind. 

*  Phil,  of  Mind,  vol.  i.  p.  31. 
2  A 


370  LOGICAL  SCIENCE  IN  GREAT  BRITAIN. 

10th,  We  have  naturally  some  regard  for  the  testi- 
mony of  men  in  matters  of  fact,  and  even  for  human 
authority  in  matters  of  opinion. 

11th,  Many  events  which  depend  upon  the  free-will 
of  our  fellow-men,  may  nevertheless  be  foreseen  with 
more  or  less  probability. 

12th,  In  the  order  of  nature,  that  which  is  to  take 
place  will  probably  resemble  that  which  has  taken  place 
in  similar  circumstances. 

The  necessary  truths  of  common  sense  are  of  a 
grammatical,  logical,  mathematical,  esthetical,  moral, 
and  metaphysical  character. 

The  logical  philosophy  of  the  common  sense  philo- 
sophers contains  little  or  nothing  which  can  be  called 
original.  It  is  a  compound  of  the  doctrines  of  Bacon, 
Hobbes,  Descartes,  Locke,  and  Leibnitz,  and  was  the 
natural  result  of  the  state  of  mental  science  for  nearly 
a  couple  of  centuries  before.  It  is  firmly  and  consis- 
tently put  together,  and  made  to  bear  on  important 
and  interesting  questions  connected  with  the  science  of 
human  nature.  It  has  had,  and  always  will  have,  great 
influence  on  logical  principles  and  studies ;  chiefly  for 
this  reason,  that  it  is  based  on  the  most  complete 
observation  of  our  internal  feelings  and  constitution. 
Every  thing  arising  out  of  the  operations  of  the  intel- 
lect is  brought  out  to  open  day,  and  contrasted  with 
the  rules  of  philosophic  investigation,  and  the  promul- 
gation of  scientific  truth,  in  every  department  of  human 
knowledge.* 

The  common  sense  school  of  logic  entertained  lofty 

*  See  the  several  philosophical  works  of  Reid,  Campbell,  Beattie,  Oswald,  and 
Dueald  Stewart. 


COMMON  -SENSE  SCHOOL  OF  PHILOSOPHERS.  371 

and  refined  views  of  human  nature  and  human  science. 
It  displayed,  in  all  its  phases,  a  healthy  and  invigo- 
rating tone.  It  viewed  truth,  and  the  means  and  appli- 
ances to  obtain  and  disseminate  it,  through  the  medium 
of  all  that  was  sacred  and  elevating.  Setting  out  with 
the  open  and  direct  intention  of  attacking  infidelity 
and  scepticism  in  their  strongholds,  it  threw  a  whole- 
some moral  responsibility  about  logical  science,  which 
removed  it  far  from  every  thing  sophistical,  formal,  and 
trifling.  It  can  bear  a  favourable  contrast  with  the 
logical  philosophy  of  France  at  the  same  period,  where 
human  reason  was  tested  in  a  very  ignoble  and  scurvy 
manner.  The  labours  of  the  common  sense  philo- 
sophers were  likewise  opportune  as  well  as  wise.  They 
tended  to  counteract,  in  no  small  degree,  the  silly  and 
trashy  logical  literature  so  prevalent  among  our  Gallic 
neighbours  during  the  eighteenth  century,  and  pre- 
vented the  philosophic  mind  of  Europe  generally  from 
running  headlong  into  the  same  course  of  folly  and 
flippancy. 

This  philosophic  school  of  logicians  aimed  likewise 
at  being  extensively  useful.  They  wished  to  arm 
human  reason  at  all  points,  with  a  view  that  it  might 
be  benefited  as  extensively  as  possible  from  scientific 
truth  of  all  kinds.  Their  logic  was  a  logic  for  the 
millions.  The  name  they  bore  indicated  the  number 
of  their  students,  and  the  universal  character  of  their 
instructions.  It  was  not  one  portion  of  the  intellectual 
frame  they  studied  to  strengthen  at  the  expense  of 
another;  but  they  directed  their  attention  to  that 
mental  cultivation  which  preserves  the  vigour  and 
symmetry  of  the  entire  inward  character,  and  imparts 


372  LOGICAL  SCIENCE  IN  GREAT  BRITAIN. 

to  it  real  beautv  and  usefulness.  This  school  conceived 
there  was  an  analogy  between  the  body  and  the  mind ; 
the  expertness  and  flexibility  of  the  fingers  might  be 
purchased  at  the  expense  of  the  strength  of  the  limbs, 
or  the  general  health.  So  likewise  with  the  intellect.  A 
quickness  and  cleverness  in  small  matters  might  be 
obtained  at  the  expense  of  solid  and  enduring  qualities. 
To  make  the  mental  soil  really  generally  productive,  it 
must  be  deeply  trenched,  and  not  merely  scratched  on 
the  surface.  Truth  is  a  thing  of  paramount  interest  to 
every  human  being  of  whatever  station  and  condition ; 
and  the  great  question  is,  How  shall  we  bring  it  home 
to  every  man's  mind  in  all  its  comprehensiveness  and 
variety  ?  The  most  solid  means  of  doing  this  are  obvi- 
ously the  best.  If,  say  Dr  Eeid  and  his  followers,  we 
make  a  young  man  acquainted  with  the  different  kinds 
of  evidence,  the  best  means  of  applying  them,  and  store 
his  mind  with  sound  and  general  rules  of  investigation 
and  reasoning  on  all  important  subjects,  he  will  be 
better  fitted  for  the  miscellaneous  duties  of  life,  than  if 
merely  skilfully  versed  in  dialectical  forms  and  subtil- 
ties.  This  was  the  practical  view  the  common  sense 
school  took  of  the  nature  and  offices  of  logic. 


LOGICAL  SCIENCE  IX  THE  NORTHERN  NATIONS.       373 


CHAPTER  XVIII. 

OF  LOGICAL  SCIENCE  IN  SWEDEN,  NORWAY,  DENMARK, 
POLAND,  RUSSIA,  &c,  &c,  FROM  THE  PUBLICATION  OF 
LOCKE'S  "ESSAY"  TILL  THE  END  OF  THE  EIGHTEENTH 
CENTURY. 

The  northern  nations  of  Europe  became  pretty  early 
acquainted  with  the  speculations  of  Bacon,  Descartes, 
Locke,  and  other  writers  on  the  principles  of  logic. 
But  the  progress  of  innovation  and  change  was  here 
comparatively  slow,  and  a  longer  time  elapsed  ere  the 
philosophic  mind  in  these  regions  was  roused  to  that 
pitch  which  gives  birth  to  new  systems,  or  to  great 
modifications  of  old  ones. 

In  Sweden,  Andrew  Eydelius  entered  warmly,  in 
the  latter  part  of  the  seventeenth  century,  into  the 
philosophical  opinions  of  Descartes.  We  have  his 
Compendium  Logices,  which  is  a  scholastic  work  both 
in  matter  and  arrangement.  His  opinions  on  the 
general  principles  of  logical  science  are  to  be  found  in 
his  other  publications  devoted  to  mental  philosophy. 
M.  GL  Block  was  also  a  Cartesian,  and  maintained  that 
the  philosophical  method  of  Descartes  was  the  only 
foundation  on  which  science  could  be  prosecuted  with 


374       LOGICAL  SCIENCE  IN  THE  NORTHERN  NATIONS. 

success.  His  works  bear  the  date  1708.  Joh.  Bilberg, 
in  his  Dissertations  on  the  method  of  Descartes,  mani- 
fests his  admiration  of  it,  but  takes  the  liberty  of  differ- 
ing from  his  master  upon  some  points  of  his  system. 
Bilberg  affirms,  that  Descartes'  philosophy  of  reasoning, 
taken  as  a  whole,  gives  an  undue  preponderance  to  the 
subjective  over  the  objective  element.  From  Descartes' 
notion,  that  assurance  is  not  the  same  as  the  standard 
or  criterium  of  truth,  he  likewise  dissents ;  because  he 
maintains  that  assurance  must  be  prior  to  the  reasons 
on  which  we  rest  certainty,  and  is  the  only  safe  and 
conceivable  guide  to  solid  conviction.* 

Wolff's  logic  was  a  great  favourite  in  Sweden  for  the 
greater  part  of  the  eighteenth  century.  Many  Swedish 
logicians,  however,  abridged  and  epitomized  his  system, 
so  as  to  render  it  less  perplexing  and  cumbrous  for 
young  students.  There  is  a  number  of  these  abridge- 
ments to  be  found,  in  almost  every  direction,  in  the 
northern  portions  of  the  Continent, 

The  logic  of  Wallarius  (1706)  was  popular,  though 
of  a  scholastic  type.  About  the  middle  of  this  century, 
Lallenstedt  and  J.  Plenning  entered  profoundly  into 
the  principles  of  philosophical  logic,  and  discussed 
various  portions  of  the  systems  of  Descartes,  Leibnitz, 
and  Wolff.  The  nature  of  method,  considered  accord- 
ing to  the  Cartesian  hypothesis,  as  an  instrument  for 
a  scientific  end  or  purpose ;  the  identification  of  sub- 
stance and  power — an  important  ingredient  in  the 
Leibnitzian  philosophy;  and  the  formal  definitions  of 
Wolff — constituted  the  leading  topics  of  logical  discus- 
sion in  the  works  of  these  authors.     Nearly  about  the 

BleditationSj  p.  256. 


STKOKVICH,  KOLMARK,  CHRISTIERNIX.  375 

same  time,  P.  Holstrom,  A.  Wahlstroin,  S.  Sinus,  Elis. 
HyphofF,  A.  J.  Molander,  B.  Westtersten,  C.  Mester- 
ton,  0.  Ronigk,  H.  Moller,  and  A.  Axelson,  severally, 
in  their  respective  philosophical  publications,  treated  of 
the  leading  principles  of  logical  science,  chiefly  through 
the  medium  of  the  theories  of  Descartes  and  Leibnitz. 

The  logical  speculations  of  Locke  were  well  known 
in  Sweden  in  the  middle  of  this  century,  and  highly 
prized  by  some  philosophers  of  note.  Among  the 
number  was  M.  Yan  Strokvich,  who  published  an 
epitome  of  the  Englishman's  work,  with  notes  and 
illustrations.  The  Swedish  author's  treatise,  Logica, 
eller  Stutkonsten,  &c.  (1721),  gave  rise  to  a  contro- 
versy on  some  of  the  leading  logical  tenets  of  Locke's 
book,  which,  for  a  time,  was  carried  on  with  great  zeal 
and  some  bitterness  among  the  logicians  of  Stockholm. 
But  the  fullest  and  most  complete  account  of  Locke 
On  the  Conduct  of  the  Understanding,  is  from  the  pen 
of  G.  P.  Leopold,  whose  work  was  published  at  the 
close  of  the  last  century,  and  became  exceedingly 
popular  among  general  readers  of  logical  treatises. 

P.  Kolmark  made  an  amalgamation  of  the  respective 
theories  of  Locke  and  Wolff,  in  reference  to  logical 
science.  His  work  was  favourably  received,  and  in 
some  colleges  made  a  text-book. 

The  intelligence  of  the  publication  of  Kant's  logical 
views  was  transmitted  to  Sweden  at  an  early  period, 
and  created  a  lively  interest  among  the  logicians  of 
that  country.  P.  E.  Christiernin  attempted  to  unite 
the  Critique  of  Pure  Reason  with  some  of  the  leading 
tenets  of  Locke.  His  work  was  published  at  Upsal 
in    1794,   and    considered  a   valuable  treatise   on  the 


376       LOGICAL  SCIENCE  IN  THE  NORTHERN  NATIONS. 

abstract  principles  of  logic.  Bjurbaeck  and  J.  Gottmark 
were  also  distinguished  writers  on  the  same  subject. 
Magnus  Blix,  Dan.  Boethius,  and  C.  A.  Ehrensvand, 
discussed  logic  in  conjunction  with  mental  philosophy, 
and  their  several  works  were  highly  esteemed  by  the 
learned  of  their  own  country,  but  beyond  which  they 
were  little  known. 

As  far  as  I  have  been  able  to  penetrate  into  the 
subject,  it  appears  that  the  general  mode  of  teaching 
logical  science  in  the  universities  of  Sweden,  during 
this  period  of  history,  was  a  combination  of  the  leading 
principles  of  mental  philosophy  with  the  ordinary  forms 
of  the  syllogistic  logic.  This  mode  of  introducing 
topics  of  intellectual  speculation,  with  a  view  of  illus- 
trating the  nature  of  reasoning  in  general,  became 
prevalent  in  the  early  portion  of  last  century;  but 
towards  its  close  there  was  little  or  no  notice  taken  of 
the  logical  peculiarities  and  bearings  of  the  Kantian 
system  in  any  of  the  ordinary  seminaries  of  education 
in  this  country.  The  common  summaries  and  text- 
books on  logic,  which  have  fallen  in  my  way,  present 
here,  as  in  most  other  places,  a  great  degree  of  simi- 
larity both  as  to  matter  and  formal  arrangement. 

Denmark  and  Norway  have  paid  considerable  atten- 
tion to  logical  studies  in  their  several  academical  insti- 
tutions. The  systems  usually  adopted  here  during  the 
last  century,  bore  a  great  resemblance  to  those  taught 
in  the  Swedish  universities  during  the  same  period  of 
time.  About  the  middle  of  the  last  century  logic 
began  to  be  discussed  in  Denmark  and  Norway,  in  con- 
junction with  a  portion  of  mental  philosophy — such, 
for  example,  as  the  nature  of  our  simple  and  compound 


ROTHE  TYGE,  NIELS  TRESCHOW,  ETC.  377 

ideas,  the  laws  of  memory,  the  power  of  abstraction, 
and  the  like.  Then  followed  the  nature  or  kinds  of 
propositions,  the  forms  of  the  syllogism,  and  a  few 
closing  observations  on  method.  This  was  the  uniform 
routine  of  logical  instruction,  in  these  two  countries, 
during  the  period  of  history  of  which  we  are  now 
treating. 

Apart,  however,  from  mere  academical  tuition,  there 
were  several  philosophers  in  these  countries  who  took 
a  more  comprehensive  view  of  the  reasoning  powers  of 
man,  and  who  have  recorded  their  several  opinions  in 
respectable  philosophical  treatises.  Eothe  Tyge  dis- 
cussed logic  through  the  medium  of  theology.  He 
embraced  the  opinions  of  Malebranche,  and  defended 
them  with  great  zeal  and  ability.  Christian  Bartholin 
followed  in  his  footsteps,  but  gave  a  more  popular  turn 
to  his  discussions  and  investigations.  Chr.  Horneman 
was  a  distinguished  professor  in  the  University  of 
Copenhagen,  and  illustrated  the  logical  system  of 
scientific  truth  common  to  the  views  of  Kant  and 
Locke  combined.  Niels  Treschow  is  one  of  the  ablest 
Danish  logicians  of  this  period.  He  entered  very  fully 
into  the  systems  of  Locke  and  Hume,  and  into  the 
logical  foundations  of  what  is  meant  by  existence, 
eternity,  space,  time,  intelligence,  and  the  like.  On 
the  logic  of  Bacon,  and  the  categories  of  the  principal 
German  writers,  he  displays  great  skill  and  erudition. 

The  logical  systems  commonly  taught  in  the  colleges 
and  universities  scattered  over  Hungary,  Bohemia, 
Moravia,  and  Galacia,  were,  as  far  as  I  have  been  able 
to    collect    any  positive   information    on    the    subject, 


378       LOGICAL  SCIENCE  IN  THE  NORTHERN  NATIONS. 

chiefly  compounded  of  the  old  scholastic  views.  Towards 
the  latter  end  of  the  last  century,  there  were  here  and 
there  new  doctrines  from  the  German  school  intro- 
duced into  logical  discussions ;  but  these  were  not  suf- 
ficient to  force  any  change  in  the  established  mode  of 
treating  the  art  of  reasoning  in  these  several  coun- 
tries. 

Logical  studies  formed  a  general  and  necessary 
portion  of  academical  education  in  Poland  during  the 
last  century.  They  were  founded  on  the  Aristotelian 
theory ;  but,  towards  the  latter  part  of  the  century, 
there  were  several  novel  ingredients  incorporated 
with  them,  chiefly  from  the  domain  of  German  philo- 
sophy. 

Logic  was  introduced  into  the  Russian  empire  in 
the  middle  of  the  sixteenth  century,  and  was  cultivated 
in  the  purely  Aristotelian  fashion  till  the  commence- 
ment of  the  last  century.  A  change  then  took  place, 
chiefly  through  the  instrumentality  of  JSTikodim  Sellj,  a 
Russian  monk,  who  had  entered  very  profoundly,  not 
only  into  the  scholastic  logic,  but  into  all  those 
abstract  questions  which  many  of  the  middle  age  logi- 
cians coupled  with  it.  In  1756,  Nikolaj  Popofskj 
gave  public  lectures  on  logic  at  the  University  of 
Moscow,  which  he  popularized  to  a  great  extent — 
giving  at  full  length  many  of  the  most  valuable  por- 
tions of  Locke  on  the  government  of  the  mind.  After 
the  death  of  this  professor,  Michael  Katschenofskj  suc- 
ceeded him,  and  imparted  additional  life  to  logical 
studies  at  the  same  university.  He  was  intimately 
acquainted  with  the  speculations  of  Descartes,  Leibnitz. 


PODSCHIWALOFF.  379 

Malebranche,  Locke,  and  Wolff.  A  still  wider  logical 
range  of  inquiry  was  instituted  by  Wassilj  Sergeje- 
witch  PodschiwalofF,  who  became  professor  of  logic 
and  polite  literature.  In  addition  to  the  German  and 
English  systems  of  logical  speculation,  he  introduced 
some  of  the  doctrines  of  the  French  school. 


380  REMARKS  ON  EASTERN  AND  INDIAN  LOGIC. 


CHAPTER   XIX. 

A  FEW  BRIEF  REMARKS  ON  THE  EASTERN  AND  INDIAN  LOGIC. 

I  confess  it  is  chiefly  from  a  compliance  with  recent 
custom,  that  I  here  offer  these  few  remarks  on  the 
systems  of  logic  known  in  the  Eastern  nations  and  in 
India.  I  have  no  doubt  whatever  of  the  existence  of 
such  logical  forms  as  have  of  late  years  been  brought 
prominently  forward  among  European  literati;  but  I 
have  a  great  doubt  of  such  logical  views  becoming  of 
any  value  whatever  in  the  cause  of  general  knowledge 
or  science,  or  of  ever  having  any  fair  claim  to  be  ad- 
mitted as  an  integral  part  of  the  Catholic  philosophy 
of  mankind.  It  is  absurd  to  conceive  that  a  logic  can 
be  of  any  value  from  a  people  who  have  not  a  single 
sound  philosophical  principle,  nor  any  intellectual 
power  whatever  to  work  out  a  problem  connected  with 
human  nature,  in  a  manner  that  is  at  all  rational  or 
intelligent.  Reasoning,  at  least  in  the  higher  forms  of 
it  among  such  semi-barbarous  nations,  must  be  at  its 
lowest  ebb ;  nor  does  there  seem  to  be  any  intellectual 
stamina,  in  such  races  of  men,  to  impart  to  it  more 
vigour  and  rationality. 

Gotama  is  considered  the  founder  of  the  logic  of 


EEMARKS  ON  EASTERN  AND  INDIAN  LOGIC.  381 

India.  In  his  system  there  are  six  "Predicaments" 
or  "  Objects  of  Proof/' — namely,  Substance,  Quality, 
Action,  Community,  Particularity,  and  Kelation.  To 
this  some  of  the  Indian  sages  add  another, — Privation, 
or  Negation. 

The  intellect  is  the  substratum  of  eight  different 
qualities, — namely,  Number,  Quantity,  Individuality, 
Conjunction,  Disjunction,  Priority,  Subsequence,  and 
Faculty. 

Many  of  these  categories  relate,  however,  more  to 
systems  of  cosmogony  than  to  logic  proper.  It  is  re- 
quisite, therefore,  in  order  to  give  any  thing  like  an 
adequate  conception  of  this  science  as  interpreted  in 
India,  that  we  should  enter  a  little  more  fully  into 
particulars. 

In  the  discovery  and  promulgation  of  truth,  on 
whatever  subject,  there  must  be  a  method ;  and  this 
method  embraces  the  enunciation  or  pro-position,  which 
is  the  name  of  any  object,  or  a  proper  name ;  then 
follows  the  definition,  which  fixes  or  determines  the 
qualities  or  attributes  of  the  subject ;  and  then,  lastly, 
there  comes  the  investigation,  whose  office  it  is  to  dis- 
cuss the  nature  and  application  of  this  definition. 

Connected  with  this  logical  method,  Gotama  enume- 
rates sixteen  dialectical  categories: — 1.  Proof;  2.  The 
object  or  matter  of  proof;  3.  Doubt;  4.  Motive;  5. 
Example ;  6.  The  truth  demonstrated  ;  7.  The  regular 
argument ;  8.  Eeduction  to  the  absurd ;  9.  Acquisition 
of  certainty;  10.  Debates  ;  11.  Conference  or  interlo- 
cution; 12.  Controversy  ;  13.  Fallacious  assertion;  14. 
Fraud  and  unfair  controversy  ;  15.  Futile  reply  ;  and, 
16.  Defect  in  judgment. 


382  REMARKS  ON  EASTERN  AND  INDIAN  LOGIC 

The  sixteen  categories  have,  however,  been  compress- 
ed, by  some  commentators,  into  three  general  catego- 
ries,— namely,  1st,  That  which  treats  of  proof;  2d, 
Whatever  relates  to  the  object  of  proofs ;  and  the  3d 
Refers  to  what  is  termed  the  organization  of  proofs. 

First  Category — Principle  of  Proof.  —  The  entire 
principles  which  constitute  proof  may  be  divided  into 
four  kinds,- — 1st,  Perception.  2d,  Induction,  which  is 
of  three  sorts  :  consequent  when  it  ascends  from  effect 
to  cause ;  antecedent  when  it  descends  from  cause  to 
effect ;  and  analogous  when  based  on  resemblances  or 
affinities.  3d,  Comparison.  And,  4th,  Affirmation, 
which  embraces  revelation  and  tradition. 

Second  Category — Objects  of  Proof — The  objects  of 
proof  are, — 1st,  The  soul,  which  is  the  seat  of  eternal 
knowledge  or  intelligence.  2d,  The  human  body,  the 
seat  of  this  soul,  considered  both  in  its  active  and  pas- 
sive state  ;  under  the  first  relation  it  is  the  fountain  or 
source  of  exertion ;  under  the  second  it  is  the  seat  of 
enjoyment.  3d,  The  organs  of  sensation  :  these  re- 
late to  the  various  material  elements, — as  earth,  water, 
light,  air,  and  the  ethereal  element  which  produces 
hearing.  4th,  The  objects  of  the  senses  constitute  an 
important  medium  of  proof:  these  are  derived  from  the 
above  enumerated  primary  elements. 

The  other  objects  of  proof  are, — the  intelligence. 
which  embraces  notions  and  recollections ;  the  manas, 
considered  as  the  instrument  of  intelligence  ;  activity  or 
determination,  from  which  vice  and  virtue  proceed ; 
transmigration,  or  the  future  condition  of  the  soul ; 
retribution,  punishment ;  and  lastly,  salvation  or  deliver- 
ance. 


REMABKS  ON  EASTERN  AND  INDIAN  LOGIC.  383 

Third  Category —  The  Organization  of  Proofs. — This 
general  class  of  proofs  is  divided  into  three  heads :  the 
first  embraces  legitimate  and  conclusive  proofs;  the 
second  relates  to  the  discussion  which  brings  proofs 
into  play ;  and  the  third  refers  to  false  proofs  or  so- 
phisms. 

Legitimate  or  conclusive  proofs  are  those  in  which 
doubt  is  expressed  by  the  position  of  the  question  ;  the 
motive  or  reason ;  then  the  example,  which  is  a  point 
upon  which,  in  every  controversy,  the  parties  are  fully 
agreed. 

Demonstrative  truth  is  that  which  is  recognised 
either  universally  or  individually ;  either  hypothetically 
or  by  concession.  The  regular  and  complete  argument 
is  the  syllogism,  which  is  composed  of  five  members, — 
the  proposition,  the  reason,  the  example,  the  applica- 
tion, and  the  conclusion. 

This  is  the  form  of  the  Hindu  svllogism  : — 

1 .  The  mountain  is  burning ; 

2.  For  it  smokes. 

3.  That  which  smokes  burns,  as  the  kitchen-fire. 

4.  Accordingly  the  mountain  smokes  ; 

5.  Therefore  it  burns. 

We  have  also,  in  connexion  with  the  organization  of 
proofs,  the  JEteductio  ad  Absurdum,  which  consists  in 
deducing  from  (false)  premises  conclusions  manifestly 
inadmissible,  which  compels  the  mind  to  renounce  the 
premises.  Then,  again,  we  have  the  acquisition  of 
certainty,  which  is  the  result  of  proof.  Debate  is  that 
which  consists  of  two  persons  with  contrary  principles, 
each  endeavouring  to  subvert  his  antagonist's  position. 


384  REMARKS  ON  EASTERN  AND  INDIAN  LOGIC. 

Interlocution  is  a  conference  between  two  persons,  in 
order  to  arrive  at  truth.  Disputation  is  defined  to  be 
that  state  when  one  of  the  controversialists  seeks  to 
overthrow  the  opinion  of  his  adversary  without  intend- 
ing to  put  forward  his  own  individual  opinion  or  system. 
False  proofs  or  sophisms  are  fallacious  assertions,  having 
the  semblance  of  reason  without  the  reality. 

Thus  we  see  that  the  categories  of  G-otama  are  in 
part  a  classification  of  the  chief  objects  of  philosophical 
investigation,  and  the  other  part  a  development  of  the 
scientific  methods  and  processes  of  investigation  itself. 
Both  comprehend  the  subjective  and  objective  elements 
of  human  knowledge, 

In  comparing  the  European  syllogism  with  the 
Hindu  logic,  it  has  been  observed,  that  the  three  last 
propositions  correspond  exactly  to  our  syllogism,  with 
this  single  difference — that  the  first,  or  major  term,  con- 
tains invariably  an  example.  Under  this  designation  the 
logicians  of  India  comprehend  either  a  sensible  object 
or  some  particular  point  admitted,  or  supposed  to  be 
admitted,  by  those  to  whom  the  argument  is  submitted, 
and  which  in  this  relation  becomes  a  positive  fact.  By 
means  of  the  example,  as  an  integrant  part  of  the 
syllogism,  and  inherent  in  the  major  premiss,  the 
general  proposition  is  not  presented,  except  as  realized 
in  a  positive  fact,  and  thus  abstraction  assumes  a  body 
and  form. 

When  the  five  members  of  the  Hindu  syllogism  is 
considered,  we  shall  readily  perceive  that  it  is  in  reality 
formed  of  two  syllogisms,  constructed  in  an  inverse 
order.     Setting  out  from  the  third,  which  is  the  major 


REMARKS  ON  EASTERN  AND  INDIAN  LOGIC.  385 

proposition,  and  which  is  placed  in  the  centre,  we  find 
successfully  the  minor  and  the  conclusion,  whether  we 
go  backward  to  the  two  anterior,  or  forward  to  the  two 
posterior  propositions.  This  construction  of  the  syllo- 
gism, it  is  contended,  is  in  strict  harmony  with  the 
constitution  of  the  human  mind,  which  alternately 
proceeds  by  analysis  and  synthesis.  The  first  syllogism, 
which  commences  with  particular  propositions  in  order 
to  arrive  at  a  general  truth,  corresponds  to  the  analy- 
tical process  of  reasoning;  while  the  second,  which 
begins  with  the  general  in  order  to  arrive  at  the  parti- 
cular propositions,  furnishes  an  example  of  the  synthetic 
process.  However  ingenious  this  may  appear,  still,  it 
is  argued,  the  Indian  syllogism  is  vastly  more  cum- 
bersome and  unwieldy  than  the  European,  and  less 
susceptible  of  ready  and  expert  application. 

The  followers  of  Jina,  an  ancient  and  celebrated  sect 
in  India,  hold  that  there  are  five  great  principles  or 
causes  which  unite  in  the  production  of  all  events. 
These  are, — Time,  Nature,  Fate,  or  JSTecessity,  Works, 
or  the  principle  of  Retributive  Justice,  and  Mental 
Effort,  or  Perseverance. 

The  same  sect  hold  likewise  that  there  are  six  cate- 
gories,— namely,  Motion,  Rest,  Vacuum,  Time,  Life, 
and  Matter. 

The  intellectual  or  inward  soul  of  man  is,  according 
to  the  doctrine  of  the  Persians,  composed  of  five  sepa- 
rate parts,  each  having  peculiar  offices  or  duties  to 
perform.     These  are, — 

1.  The  Feroher,  or  principle  of  sensation. 

2.  The  Boe,  or  principle  of  intelligence. 

2  B 


38 G  REMARKS  ON  EASTERN  AND  INDIAN  LOGIC. 

3.  The  JRouan,  or  the  principle  of  practical  judgment. 

4.  The  Akho,  or  principle  of  conscience. 

5.  The  Jan,  or  principle  of  animal  life.* 

*  For  further  information  on  the  subject  of  this  chapter,  I  beg  to  refer  to  The 
Transactions  of  the  Royal  Asiatic  Society,  vol.  i. ;  The  Asiatic  Researches  of  Cal- 
cutta, vol.  ix. ;  to  Mr  Fraser's  account  of  Persia  in  the  Edinburgh  Cabinet  Library  ; 
and  to  the  History  of  Philosophy  adopted  by  the  university  of  France. 


NATURE  AND  CHARACTER  OF  LOGICAL  LITERATURE.     387 


CHAPTER  XX. 

ON  THE  NATURE  AND  CHARACTER  OF  LOGICAL  LITERATURE 
IN  THE  SEVERAL  NATIONS  OF  THE  CONTINENT  OF  EUROPE, 
FROM  THE  YEAR  1800  TILL  THE  PRESENT  DAY. 

Within  the  last  fifty  years,  and  particularly  within  the 
latter  part  of  this  period,  the  study  of  logic  has  been 
greatly  on  the  increase,  both  in  collegiate  institutions, 
as  well  as  among  the  philosophic  portion  of  the  reading 
community.  Able  works  on  the  science  have  made 
their  appearance  in  every  country ;  and  very  opposite 
and  conflicting  discussions,  as  to  both  its  abstract  and 
practical  utility,  have  marked  the  character  of  the 
generality  of  these  productions. 

The  distance  over  which  we  have  to  travel,  and  the 
scanty  portion  of  space  left  us,  must  be  our  apology  for 
tripping  somewhat  hastily  over  the  ground  in  this 
chapter.  As  there  must  be  limits  to  all  things  in  this 
world,  so  must  there  likewise  be  limits  to  a  historical 
sketch  of  logic.  As  a  general  principle,  it  is  desirable 
both  to  know  and  to  communicate  all  things ;  though, 
when  this  principle  comes  to  be  applied,  it  is  often 
found  to  be  neither  very  edifying  nor  practicable. 

Commencing  with  Germany,  it  may  be  observed  that 


388    NATURE  AND  CHARACTER  OF  LOGICAL  LITERATURE 

Kant's  theory  was  the  great  starting-point,  either  in 
the  way  of  supporting,  modifying,  or  opposing,  to  most 
of  the  logical  treatises  of  the  country  during  this  pre- 
sent half  century.  This  theory  obtained  such  a  firm 
hold  of  the  philosophic  mind  of  the  nation  during  the 
first  twenty  years  of  its  history,  that  the  philosophers 
and  logicians  of  Germany  seemed  spellbound,  and 
unable  to  set  a  single  foot  beyond  the  prescribed  circle 
of  the  Critique  of  Pure  Reason.  The  entire  mass  of 
logical  speculation  of  modern  times,  rests  upon  an  in- 
genious system  of  ringing  the  changes  on  the  leading 
ideas  or  principles  involved  in  Kant's  views,  and  those 
of  his  immediate  followers  and  critics. 

Fred.  Bouterweck  viewed  the  principles  of  logical 
science  through  a  spiritual  medium.  Self  or  conscious- 
ness is  the  basis  of  reasoning  in  all  its  forms  and  aspects. 
In  the  apodictic  logic,  reason  examines  and  interrogates 
itself.  Every  train  of  reasoning,  of  whatever  length  it 
may  be,  is  of  a  purely  subjective  character.  The  reason 
is  a  living,  active,  and  creative  principle. 

Krug  taught  logic  at  Wittenberg,  Frankfort,  Konigs- 
berg,  and  Leipsic,  and  published  his  work  on  the  science 
in  1806.  In  his  exposition  of  the  nature  of  truth,  he 
maintains  that  every  proposition  rests  upon  intuitive 
certainty.  Human  nature  and  the  understanding  are 
our  boundaries  ;  consequently  we  can  only  seek  for 
proof  within  this  prescribed  range.  The  principle  of 
absolute  reality  is  the  principium  essendi,  and  the  ideal 
principle  is  the  principium  cognoscendi:  the  first  pos- 
sesses the  attribute  of  perfect  unity,  and  the  second  is 
either  material  or  formal.  Mathematical  evidence, 
Krug  conceives,  has  a  decided  superiority  in  point  of 


IX  THE  SEVERAL  NATIONS  OF  THE  CONTINENT.       389 

certitude  to  the  evidence  from  human  nature.  The 
latter  never  rises  above  the  degree  of  probability. 

J.  F.  Fries  was  an  influential  and  able  writer  on 
logic.  Being  dissatisfied  with  Kant's  system,  ho  pub- 
lished A  New  Critique  of  Pure  Reason.  His  theory  of 
the  logical  elements  is  based  on  intuitional  knowledge, 
faith  in  testimony,  and  the  notions  of  a  Deity.  "  Sea- 
son is  the  law  of  truth,  and  embraces  an  immediate 
knowledge,  purged  of  all  alloy  of  doubt  and  error.  It 
reposes  on  the  inward  convictions  of  the  existence  of  a 
Deity ;  the  supreme  good ;  the  elements  of  all  beauty, 
virtue,  truth,  right,  and  justice."  Fred.  Yon  Calker 
supported  Kant's  leading  views  in  his  logical  philosophy. 
Truth  consists  in  the  harmony  of  a  knowledge  of  the 
objective  with  a  notion  of  the  subjective ;  and  science 
is  the  agreement  of  consciousness  with  perception  and 
intuition — an  agreement  involved  in  our  belief  of  reality. 
Science  requires  proofs ;  and  those  are  derived  from 
demonstration  and  deduction,  acquired  through  the 
means  of  pure  and  empirical  intuition.  Bardili  founded 
his  logic  on  purely  ontological  principles.  Being  is  the 
basis  of  all  human  knowledge  and  reasoning.  The 
Deity  is  the  first  principle  of  all  reality,  of  all  thought, 
of  all  truth,  science,  and  being. 

Fichte  viewed  all  logical  results  through  the  medium 
of  a  lofty  transcendentalism.  His  several  treatises 
contain  many  profound  and  singular  doctrines  relative 
to  truth  and  the  general  operations  of  reasoning ;  but 
they  are  treated  of  in  such  a  manner  as  to  bring  them 
more  within  the  province  of  mental  philosophy  than 
logic 

Schelling,  in  his  system  of  philosophy,  did  not  treat 


390    NATURE  AND  CHARACTER  OF  LOGICAL  LITERATURE 

of  logic  in  a  regular  and  formal  manner,  but  merely 
touched  upon  the  principles  of  scientific  certainty  in 
some  particular  directions.  His  categories  of  all  human 
knowledge  will  afford  a  glimpse  of  his  leading  views  on 
logical  arrangement  and  evidence. 

1.  The  Absolute,  the   whole    in    its   primary  form 
(God),  manifests  himself  in, 

2.  Nature  (the  Absolute,  according  to  its  secondary 
forms). 

It  then  produces  itself  in  two  relative  orders,  viz. — 

The  Real.  The  Ideal. 


Under  the  following  powers  :- 
Weight— Matter. 
Light — Movement. 
Organization — Life. 


Truth — Science. 
Goodness — Eeligion. 
Beauty — Art. 


Above,  as  reflected  forms  of  the  universe,  place 
themselves, — 

Man,  the  Microcosm.  The  State. 

The  System  of  the  World  (the  External  Universe), 
— History. 

Klein  follows  Schelling  in  his  logical  views.  He 
maintains  that  all  formal  developments  of  logical  rules 
are  merely  general  expressions  of  metaphysical  prin- 
ciples. Logic  he  divides  into  two  parts;  the  analytical 
and  dialectical.  All  the  higher  manifestations  of  the 
reasoning  faculty  rest  upon  intuitive  principles.     Un- 


Ifl  THE  SEVERAL  NATIONS  OF  THE  CONTINENT.       391 

less  these  be  granted,  such  a  science  as  logic  is  impos- 
sible. F.  Ant.  Nuesslein  founded  all  sound  and  practical 
logical  tuition  on  psychology.  According  to  his  idea,  no 
logical  hypothesis  is  intelligible  unless  it  rests  on  a 
notion  of  Deity.  Wagner,  in  his  Logik,  views  the 
science  of  reasoning  in  a  different  light  from  any  of  his 
contemporaries.  His  aim  is  to  give  a  purely  mathema- 
tical form  to  all  logical  rules,  much  after  the  same 
fashion  as  Lully  and  Bruno.  Baader  and  Henry 
Steffens  are  both  somewhat  mystical  in  their  notions 
as  to  the  nature  and  application  of  philosophical  logic. 
Hegel,  in  his  Wissenschaft  der  Logik  (1816),  denies 
that  logic  is  merely  expressive  of  the  forms  of  thought : 
it  constitutes  its  very  essence  and  reality.  Logic  dis- 
plays three  different  states  or  conditions.  We  simply 
consider,  and  look  at  a  thing.  We  then  separate  that 
thing  from  others,  for  nothing  can  exist  in  absolute 
unity;  it  must  have  two  aspects,  or  a  positive  and  a 
negative  side ;  and  then  out  of  these  arises  a  certain 
relation,  which  alone  constitutes  truth,  reality,  being,  the 
absolute.  There  is  thought  in  its  immediate  existence  : 
thought  is  communicated,  and  thought  is  forming  a  full 
and  complete  conception  of  its  ownself.  The  formal 
arrangement  of  Hegel's  Logic  runs  thus  : — 

1.    Thought  in  its  immediate  Existence  or  Being. 

Quality  :  comprehends  Being  (Seyn),  Existence  (Da- 
seyn),  Independent  Existence  (Fiir-sichseyn). 

Quantity  :  Pure  Quantity  (Reine  Quantitat),  Divisible 
Quantity  (Quantum),  and  Degree  (Gracl.) 

Measure  (Maas)  :  The  union  of  Quality  and  Quantity. 


392    NATURE  AND  CHARACTER  OF  LOGICAL  LITERATURE 

2.    Thought  or  Mind  as  communicated.. 
Ground    of    Existence:    Pure   Notions   of  Essence, 

Essential  Existence  (Existenz),  Thing  (Ding). 
Phenomenon  :  Phenomenal  World  (Welt  der  Erschein- 
ung),  Matter  and  Form  (Inhalt  und  Form),  Rela- 
tion (Yerhaltniss). 
Reality  :  embracing  the  union  of  the  ground  of  Existence 
and  Phenomenon. — Relation  of  Substance,  Relation 
of  Cause  and  Effect,  Action  and  Reaction. 

3.  Thought  on  Mind  as  forming  a  Conception  of  Itself  . 

Subjective  Notion  :  Notion  as  such  (Begriff  als  salches), 
Judgment  (Urtheil),  Inference  (Schluss). 

Objects  :  Mechanical  Powers  (Mechanismus),  Chemi- 
cal Powers  (Chemismus),  Design  (Teleologie). 

Idea  :  Life  (Leben),  Intelligence  (Erkennen),  Absolute 
(Absolute). 

John  Fred.  Herbert  was  an  able  logician,  and  ex- 
pounded the  principles  of  the  science  through  the  views 
of  his  mental  philosophy,  which  was,  on  the  whole,  of 
an  enlightened  and  eclectic  character.  Eskharshausen 
maintained  that  there  were  seven  categories  of  the  un- 
derstanding and  judgment ;  namely, — 1st,  That  which 
recognises  external  objects ;  2d,  That  which  enables  us 
to  pay  attention  to  them ;  3d,  That  which  reflects  upon ' 
them  ;  ^th,  That  which  confers  variety  and  multiplicity 
to  our  perceptions  ;  5th,  That  which  passes  a  judgment 
on  any  thing ;  6th,  That  which  discovers  the  relations 
among  divers  things ;  and,  7th,  That  which  unites  into 
one  general  conception  the  truth  of  many  individual 
things.     Krausc,  in  his  Logik,  makes  all  logical  and 


IN  THE  SEVERAL  NATIONS  OF  THE  CONTINENT.       393 

scientific  truth  rest  on  two  ground  pillars — Organized 
Knowledge,  embracing  Unity,  Infinity,  Absolute ;  and 
Super-Essential  Knowledge,  wliicli  includes — 1st,  Sen- 
sible Knowledge — External,  Internal ;  2d,  Intellectual 
Knowledge — Conception  (the  common  and  abstract), 
Super-Sensible  (the  universal  and  necessary). 

H.  C.  W.  Sigwart  defines  logic,  in  his  work  on  the 
science,  to  be  that  which  unfolds  the  laws  of  thought. 
Scientifically  considered,  his  work  embraces  the  entire 
theory  of  human  knowledge,  and  has  the  whole  frame- 
work of  the  mind  for  its  basis.  Practical  logic,  he  says, 
is  that  which  influences  our  thoughts,  so  as  to  enable  us 
to  form  mental  prepositions  and  conclusions.  Rixner 
considers  logic  as  a  universal  science  under  the  relation 
of  quantity ;  and  views  it  under  two  aspects — as  true 
science  and  apparent  science.  J.  Hermann  Fichte  founds 
all  human  knowledge  on  four  phases  of  consciousness. 
The  third  phase  gives  rise  to  abstract  ideas  or  concep- 
tions, out  of  which  logic  takes  its  rise,  embracing  con- 
ception, judgment,  reasoning,  inference,  &c. 

Such  is  the  general  outline  of  the  logical  philosophy 
of  Germany.  It  is  a  compound  of  many  things  ;  and 
yet  there  is  a  unity  of  character  about  it,  sufficient  to 
sustain  its  nationality  and  distinctness  from  the  dialec- 
tical speculations  and  systems  of  every  other  people. 
There  is  this  peculiarity,  among  many  more,  about  the 
logical  as  well  as  the  mental  speculations  of  the  country, 
that  they  will  not  bear  transplanting  to  any  other 
region.  As  a  totality,  or  whole,  they  are  suited  to 
Germany,  and  Germany  is  suited  to  them.  And  even 
if  any  one  of  the  leading  principles  of  their  logical 
theories  were  detached  from  the  aggregate  mass,  and 


394    NATURE  AND  CHARACTER  OF  LOGICAL  LITERATURE 

engrafted  on  a  French,  or  English,  or  Italian  stock,  it 
would  impart  such  a  grotesque  quaintness  to  the  whole, 
that  it  would  mar  and  neutralize  all  scientific  and 
popular  plans  of  instruction.  All  attempts  to  mix  and 
blend  German  logic  with  any  other,  have  hitherto,  in 
every  country,  proved  utter  failures. 

With  perfect  unity,  there  is  likewise  great  variety  in 
the  logical  systems  of  this  country.  The  chief  reason 
of  this  is,  that  the  professors  of  logic,  as  well  as  pro- 
fessors of  every  other  branch  of  study,  are  allowed  the 
most  perfect  liberty  to  treat  their  respective  subjects 
according  to  their  own  personal  views  and  opinions, 
and  altogether  apart  from  the  prevalent  political  and 
ecclesiastical  sentiments  of  the  day.  Another  important 
circumstance  increases  this  variety  of  logical  systems ; 
namely,  the  wide  field  which  a  logic  chair  offers  to  a 
mind  ambitious  of  fame  and  distinction.  The  great 
mental  activity  which  prevails  in  all  the  German  uni- 
versities, arises  from  the  national  mind  being  deprived 
from  playing  any  great  part,  either  in  the  grand  game 
of  politics  or  of  commerce.  The  love  of  distinction  is, 
therefore,  driven  to  open  out  other  channels  for  its  field 
of  operation ;  and  none  proves  more  inviting,  both  for 
social  honour  and  government  patronage,  than  a  logic 
chair,  filled  by  a  professor  who  can  collect  a  crowd 
about  him,  either  from  the  singularity  of  his  doctrines, 
or  his  brilliant  manner  of  developing  and  illustrating 
them.  Novelty  becomes  here  one  of  the  chief  ingre- 
dients in  a  popular  and  successful  logical  chair. 

Logic  is  more  generally  taught  in  Germany  at  the 
present  clay  than  in  any  other  country  in  the  world. 
All  matriculated  students  must  undergo  an  cxamina- 


IS  THE  SEVERAL  NATIONS  OF  THE  CONTINENT.       395 

tion  in  logic  previous  to  their  admission  to  the  univer- 
sities. The  Gymnasia,  or  public  schools  of  the  country, 
give  a  regular  course  of  logical  tuition  to  the  scholars. 
Indeed,  so  generally  is  the  science  of  logic  cultivated, 
that  it  has  been  estimated  that  there  are  not  ten  out 
of  every  hundred  of  the  gross  amount  of  students 
throughout  all  the  universities  who  have  not  had  logical 
instructions,  more  or  less  full  and  complete,  before  they 
go  to  college.  The  extent  of  the  study  may,  therefore, 
be  in  some  measure  calculated,  when  we  take  into 
account  the  number  of  universities,  and  the  number  of 
students  who  attend  them.  The  following  will,  I  con- 
ceive, prove  a  pretty  correct  statistical  account  of  the 
subject : — 

The  University  of  Berlin  has  2140  students;  Bonn 
700;  Halle  700;  Breslau  700;  Greifswalde  400; 
Konigsberg  450 ;  Tubingen  (Wirtemberg)  850  (in 
1844);  Munich  (Bavaria)  1330;  Leipsic  (Saxony) 
900  ;  Gottingen  (Hanover)  640  (in  1844) ;  Heidelberg 
(Baden)  698  (in  1844);  Jena  (Saxe- Weimar)  420; 
Erlangen  (Bavaria)  303 ;  Wiirzburgh  (Bavaria)  485 ; 
Giessen  (Hesse-Darmstadt)  446  ;  Marburgh  (Hesse- 
Cassel)  294  ;  and  Freiburg  (Baden)  273. 

There  are  the  Austrian  universities  of  Vienna, 
Prague,  and  Gratz  (Styria),  which  have  unitedly  2500 
students,  but  whose  constitution  is  different  from  the 
German  universities  of  the  West.  Then,  again,  there 
are  the  German  universities  of  Strasburg,  Rostock 
(Mecklenburg) ;  Keil  (Holstein) ;  and  those  of  the 
Swiss  towns  of  Basle,  Berne,  Freiburg,  and  Zurich, 
which  number  upwards  of  4000  students, — making  a 
grand  total  of  neariy  fourteen  thousand. 


396    NATURE  A^D  CHAEACTEll  OF  LOGICAL  LITERATURE 

Turning  now  to  France,  we  perceive,  during  the  last 
fifty  years,  an  increased  interest  felt  in  reference  to 
logical  science,  both  in  its  philosophical  and  educational 
character  and  relations.  More  elevated  views  have 
likewise  been  taken  of  it ;  so  that  it  is  not  now  the 
same  mechanical,  material,  or  instinctive  thing,  which 
most  of  the  French  logicians  made  it  during  the  last 
century.  The  principal  cause  of  this  favourable  change 
is  the  more  refined  and  spiritual  tone  which  has  been 
imparted,  in  this  country  of  late  years,  to  mental  philo- 
sophy generally.  Logical  science,  from  its  intimate 
relation  to  metaphysical  inquiries,  infallibly  partakes  of 
their  fortunes,  whether  they  be  for  good  or  for  ill. 

During  the  better  half  of  this  period,  France  pre- 
sents logical  studies  under  a  varied  and  unsettled 
aspect.  This  was  common  to  other  countries  as  well 
as  herself.  The  philosophical  opinions  of  a  nation  are 
but  slowly  changed  or  modified.  The  logical  notions 
of  the  preceding  century  had  sunk  deeply  into  the 
minds  of  the  learned,  and  had  tainted  the  ordinary 
channels  of  education  at  their  fountain-heads.  In 
attempting  to  return  to  a  healthier  condition  of  think- 
ing, a  mental  struggle  was  inevitable.  This  manifested 
itself  in  various  ways,  and  with  a  variable  intensity  at 
different  times ;  and  the  spirit  of  reformation  had  to 
fight  its  way,  step  by  step.  During  this  state  of  trial 
and  probation,  we  can  recognise,  with  sufficient  distinct- 
ness, four  orders  of  logical  philosophers: — those  who 
took  the  pure  sensualism  of  the  last  century  ;  those  who 
viewed  logical  science  through  the  medium  of  theolo- 
gical doctrines ;  those  who  favoured  a  logical  eclecticism ; 
and  a  fourth,  who  were  imbued  with  the  fanatical  and 


IN  THE  SEVERAL  NATIONS  OF  THE  CONTINENT.       397 

irrational  dogmas  of  St  Simonism.  If  we  cast  an  eye 
over  the  logical  productions  of  France,  from  the  com- 
mencement of  the  present  century  till  1830,  we  shall 
see  these  rival  and  struggling  classes  mapped  out  very 
clearly  and  distinctly.  After  this  period,  the  contest 
seemed  to  lie  between  the  rationalism  of  Descartes  and 
the  a  priori  school  of  intuition. 

Among  the  most  able  and  distinguished  French 
logicians  of  the  early  part  of  this  present  century,  we 
may  place  the  name  of  M.  De  Gerando.  His  work, 
Des  Signes  et  de  V Art  de  Penser  (1801),  enters  very 
fully  into  one  of  the  most  subtile  and  important  ques- 
tions connected  with  logical  science, — namely,  the 
relation  which  verbal  signs  bear  to  the  mental  faculties 
in  a  process  of  reasoning.  M.  De  Gerando  considers 
all  questions  as  to  the  precise  nature  and  province  of 
logic,  when  viewed  as  an  educational  instrument,  must 
remain  involved  in  darkness,  until  some  progress  is 
made  in  the  solution  of  this  problem.  It  is  impossible 
for  us  to  enter  into  this  question  in  a  full  and  regular 
manner  :  we  must,  therefore,  refer  the  reader  to  M.  De 
Gerando 's  pages  for  further  information  on  this  inte- 
resting though  perplexing  subject.  Suffice  it  to  say, 
that  this  learned  writer  has  successfully  and  clearly 
pointed  out  some  of  the  principal  errors  into  which 
Condillac  and  his  disciples  had  fallen,  relative  to  the 
use  of  language  as  a  medium  of  thought.  A  few 
observations  from  the  author's  work  must  close  our 
remarks  on  this  division  of  De  Gerando's  logical 
labours. 

"  The  same  task,"  says  he,  "  which  must  have  been 
executed  by  those  who  contributed  to  the  first  forma- 


398    NATURE  AND  CHARACTER  OF  LOGICAL  LITERATURE 

tion  of  a  language,  and  which  is  executed  by  every 
child  when  he  learns  to  speak  it,  is  repeated  over  in 
the  mind  of  every  adult  when  he  makes  use  of  his 
mother  tongue :  for  it  is  only  by  the  decomposition 
of  his  thoughts  that  he  can  learn  to  select  the  signs 
which  he  ought  to  employ,  and  to  dispose  them  in  a 
suitable  manner.  Accordingly,  those  external  actions, 
which  we  call  speaking  and  writing,  are  always  accom- 
panied with  a  philosophical  process  of  the  understand- 
ing, unless  we  content  ourselves,  as  too  often  happens, 
with  repeating  over  mechanically  what  has  been  said 
by  others.  It  is  in  this  respect  the  languages,  with 
their  forms  and  rules,  conducting  (so  to  speak)  those 
who  use  them  into  the  path  of  a  regular  analysis — 
tracing  out  to  them,  in  a  well-ordered  discourse,  the 
model  of  a  perfect  decomposition — may  be  regarded, 
in  a  certain  sense,  as  analytical  methods"  "  In  asserting 
that  languages  may  be  regarded  as  analytical  methods, 
I  have  added  the  qualifying  phrase,  in  a  certain  sense; 
for  the  word  method  cannot  be  employed  here  with  any 
exact  propriety.  Languages  furnish  the  occasions  and 
the  means  of  analysis — that  is  to  say,  they  afford  us 
assistance  in  following  that  method,  but  they  are  not 
the  method  itself.  They  resemble  signals  and  finger- 
posts, placed  on  a  road  to  enable  us  to  discover  our 
way ;  and  if  they  help  us  to  analyse,  it  is  because  they 
are  themselves  the  results,  and,  as  it  were,  the  monu- 
ments of  an  analysis  which  has  been  previously  made  : 
nor  do  they  contribute  to  keep  us  in  the  right  path, 
but  in  proportion  to  the  degree  of  judgment  with  which 
that  analysis  has  been  conducted."* 

*  Des  Signes,  pp.  138,  180. 


IN  THE  SEVERAL  NATIONS  OF  THE  CONTINENT.       3.99 

The  formation  of  a  philosophical  logic- — similar  in  its 
character  and  intended  offices  as  that  contemplated  by 
the  late  Dugald  Stewart,  of  which  we  have  previously 
given  some  account — was  a  favourite  speculation  of  M. 
De  Gerando.  He  expected  great  things  from  such  an 
extension  of  logical  science.  One  of  the  fundamental 
errors  connected  with  general  education,  he  contended, 
was,  that  the  reasoning  power  was  not  directed  in  a 
healthy  and  vigorous  manner  to  the  consolidation  of 
knowledge  in  general.  Truth  was  too  much  addressed 
to  the  memory,  and  too  little  to  the  understanding. 
Men  commonly  consider  the  memory  in  the  light  of  an 
inexhaustible  magazine,  from  which  a  plentiful  stock 
of  information  may  be  obtained  whenever  required; 
but  the  French  logician  conceives  this  is  but  one  part, 
and  comparatively  an  insignificant  part  too,  of  a  really 
sound  and  philosophical  education.  The  most  impor- 
tant thing  is  to  acquire  the  habit  of  employing  our 
knowledge  to  some  useful  end  or  purpose.  Unless  this 
be  steadily  kept  in  view,  acquired  information  is  but  of 
little  utility. 

M.  Noel's  work,  Loyique  de  Condillac  (1802),  is  a 
sort  of  running  commentary  on  the  system  of  Condillac. 
It  presents  nothing  that  is  new  or  interesting.  M. 
Mongin  throws  a  little  novelty  into  his  Philosophic 
JEUmentaire  (1803),  by  merging  all  logic  into  universal 
grammar.  He  considers  the  entire  force  of  mental 
propositions  to  lie  in  the  modes  of  disposing  of  the 
respective  terms  in  which  they  are  couched.  This 
doctrine  had  but  a  very  limited  number  of  admirers  in 
France.  Daube  (1805)  followed  in  nearly  the  same 
steps,  but  with  no  more  success.     His  system  is  now 


400    NATURE  AND  CHARACTER  OP  LOGICAL  LITERATURE 

almost  entirely  forgotten.  J.  S.  Flotte,  in  his  Logique 
(1805),  defines  the  science  to  be  "  a  collection  of 
observations  made  by  philosophers,  on  the  mode  of 
conducting  the  faculties  of  the  mind,  so  as  to  avoid 
error  and  arrive  at  truth." 

The  philosophical  writings  of  Lancelin,  Keratry, 
Laromiguiere,  Royer-Collard,  and  Maine  de  Biran, 
tended  greatly  to  direct  men's  minds  to  the  higher 
principles  of  logical  science,  and  to  fix  it  upon  a  more 
spiritual  and  refined  basis.  It  was  chiefly  through  the 
labours  of  Royer-Collard  that  the  logical  opinions  of 
the  common  sense  school  were  made  fully  known  to  the 
philosophic  mind  of  France.  He  gathered  around  him 
numerous  followers,  to  whom  he  imparted  his  zeal,  his 
method,  and  his  principles. 

Whilst  this  change  was  going  on  among  professed 
philosophers  and  logicians,  the  theologians  of  France 
were  not  idle.  They  viewed  the  science,  which  had 
for  its  aim  the  detection  of  error  and  the  discovery  of 
truth,  in  their  own  way  and  fashion.  They  felt,  and 
enlarged  upon,  the  insufficiency  of  mere  abstract 
philosophy  to  solve  all  the  problems  connected  with  a 
process  of  reasoning,  and  the  nature  and  character  of 
truth.  They  fell  back,  therefore,  on  those  a  priori 
notions  of  spiritual  knowledge  which  form  such  a  con- 
spicuous element  in  the  human  understanding,  and 
which  are  so  strikingly  developed,  illustrated,  and 
enforced,  in  the  system  of  revelation.  They  attempted 
to  form,  in  fact,  a  complete  theory  of  scientific  truth — 
a  regular  philosophical  organon — by  the  aid  of  such 
intuitive  conceptions,  joined  to  the  abstract  character 
of  a  revelation  itself,  and  the  positive  authority  of  the 


IN  THE  SEVEEAL  NATIONS  OF  THE  CONTINENT.       401 

Church.  These  respective  historical  and  mental  ele- 
ments were  amalgamated  and  combined  with  singular 
adroitness  and  ability,  and  brought  to  bear  on  the 
grand  object  in  view,  with  a  power  of  reasoning,  and  a 
copiousness  and  elegance  of  illustration,  never  surpassed 
in  any  similar  intellectual  enterprise.  We  can  do 
nothing  more,  however,  than  barely  draw  attention  to 
the  several  writings  of  Le  Maistre,  Lamenais,  Bonald, 
D'Eskstein,  Ballanche,  Battain,  and  the  philosophical 
disquisitions  published  from  time  to  time  in  the 
Universite  Catholique.  Here  a  great  mass  of  discussion 
will  be  found,  bearing  on  the  various  principles  of 
logical  philosophy,  and  throwing  no  inconsiderable 
degree  of  light  upon  the  nature  of  language  as  an 
instrument  of  reasoning,  on  the  standard  of  truth,  on 
the  sources  of  erroneous  judgments,  and  on  those 
various  powers  of  the  mind,  called  into  requisition  in 
every  process  of  argumentation  having  for  its  direct 
aim  the  establishment  of  the  vital  truths  which  engross 
the  attention  of  general  humanity. 

J.  P.  Brissot's  work,  De  la  Verite,  ou  Meditations  sur 
les  moyens  de  parvenir  a  la  Verite  dans  toutes  les  Con- 
naissances  Humaines,  is  a  species  of  logic  based  on  the 
common  sense  view  of  the  phenomena  of  reasoning.  It 
is  decidedly  practical  in  its  aim  and  matter,  and  contains 
many  highly  useful  statements  and  observations.  F. 
Perron  attempts  to  give  a  new  scheme  of  logic  in  his 
JEssai  d'une  Nouvelle  Theorie  sur  les  Idees  Fondamentales. 
He  affirms  that  all  previous  logical  systems  have  been 
erroneous  from  the  Grecian  downwards,  and  have  been 
founded  on  perfectly  gratuitous  and  arbitrary  principles. 
Writers  have  assumed  certain    logical    conditions    as 

2  c 


402    NATURE  AND  CHARACTER  OF  LOGICAL  LITERATURE 


the   relatii 


of 


,   among   tiie   relations    01   our   fundamental 
and  have  clothed  them  with  the  attributes  of 


subsisting 
ideas 

necessity,  universality,  immutability,  and  the  like.  This 
is  a  radical  error.  These  logical  conditions  do  not 
possess  a  more  a  priori  origin  than  any  thing  else 
belonging  to  the  understanding.  M.  Perron  also 
maintains  that  the  categories  of  the  intellect  have  been 
strangely  misunderstood  by  logicians  in  general. 

Man,  according  to  this  writer,  has  but  one  thinking 
faculty;  this  is,  however,  of  a  very  comprehensive 
character.  What  we  perceive  of  external  objects  con- 
stitutes their  veritable  properties  or  modes  of  existence. 
Our  knowledge  commences  with  concrete  perceptions ; 
and  what  are  usually  termed  the  categories  are  not 
certain  forms  of  thought — pure  conceptions  of  the 
reason — but  simply  generalizations  of  individual  objects 
or  things.  This  the  author  endeavours  to  demonstrate 
from  considerations  drawn  from  space  and  time,  cause 
and  effect,  the  finite  and  the  infinite,  &c. 

In  M.  Perron's  logical  system  there  are  nine  cate- 
gories which,  he  conceives,  embrace  every  relation 
subsisting  among  all  things  of  which  the  mind  can  be 
conversant.     These  are — 

1.  If  they  are?  .  .     Category  of  Existence. 

2,  What  are  they  ? 


3.  How  are  they  ? 

4.  By  What?     . 

5.  Why? 

6.  Where? 

7.  When? 

8.  How  many  ? 

9.  In  what  relations  ? 


Essence. 

Mode. 

Causality. 

End. 

Space. 

Time. 

Number. 

Eelation. 


IN  THE  SEVEEAL  NATIONS  OF  THE  CONTINENT.       403 

M.  Delariviere,  in  his  Logique  Classique  (1829),  says 
that  logic  is  the  science  of  internal  and  external  discourse 
— of  which  rhetoric  and  general  grammar  form  a  part. 
M.  Hauchecorne  founds  logic  on  a  knowledge  of 
the  mental  constitution.  It  is  both  natural  and  arti- 
ficial; and  is  that  science  or  art  which  guides  the 
understanding  in  all  the  affairs  of  life.  Logic,  accord- 
ing to  M.  Grentz,  is  the  entire  art  of  thinking,  or  that 
which  governs  the  mind  in  the  search  and  promulga- 
tion of  truth. 

A  portion  of  the  general  philosophy  of  Victor  Cousin 
(1831)  has  a  direct  and  important  bearing  on  logical 
science.  His  philosophical  method  rests  on  conscious- 
ness ;  observation  of  facts,  and  experiment  and  reasoning 
in  dealing  with  them,  constitute  the  foundation  of  all 
human  knowledge.  M.  Cousin  maintains  that  Des- 
cartes  and  Locke  developed  the  true  scientific  method 
of  philosophizing,  though  their  respective  speculations 
have  been  often  misunderstood  and  misrepresented. 
Logic  proper  is  based  on  psychology :  it  can  have  no 
other  basis.  To  place  it,  with  the  majority  of  German 
logicians,  on  ontology,  is  to  launch  at  once  into  every 
thing  theoretical  and  mystical.  Consciousness  has 
three  faculties, — sensibility,  activity,  and  reason  ;  to 
the  last,  logic  especially  belongs.  This  reason  is  not 
an  individual  thing:  it  is  impersonal;  it  is  governed 
by  necessary  and  absolute  conceptions.  Its  analysis  gives 
us  three  classes  of  these  conceptions, — 1st,  The  idea 
of  infinite,  variously  expressed  by  the  terms  unity,  abso- 
lute cause,  the  absolute,  &c. ;  2d,  The  idea  of  the  finite, 
expressed  likewise  by  the  words  plurality,  phenomenon, 
relative  cause,  the  conditioned,  the  limited,  &c. ;  and 


404    NATURE  AND  CHARACTER  OF  LOGICAL  LITERATURE 

3d,  The  idea  of  relation  between  what  is  infinite  and 
finite.  Those  three  elements  are  the  result  of  the  syn- 
thesis  of  thought,  and  constitute  the  unity  of  reason. 

The  convictions  of  this  reason  are  not  particular  or 
personal  convictions,  but  universal  truths — truths  for 
all  intelligences — truths  that  are  the  same  to  the  Divine 
mind  as  to  our  own.  They  are  truths  in  themselves 
— absolute,  unalterable  by  any  power  of  will. 

The  absolute  laws  of  thought  may  be  reduced  to  two 
categories, — the  law  of  causality  and  the  law  of  sub- 
stance. These  are  two  primary  principles,  from  which 
all  logical  deductions  proceed.  They  are  contem- 
poraneous unity  in  consciousness.  The  law  of  sub- 
stance is  logically  the  first  in  order  of  time,  and  that  of 
causality  the  second. 

Logic  is  defined  by  Cousin  to  be  the  legitimate  passage 
from  the  idea  to  being — that  is,  the  law  of  our  existence, 
which  authorizes  or  commands  us  to  say,  this  is;  it 
exists. 

Logic  may  be  considered  under  two  aspects, — natural 
and  reflective.  The  first  rests  on  facts,  and  is  purely 
affirmative  in  its  character;  the  second  on  reflective 
affirmation — that  is,  a  necessity  of  denying  or  affirm- 
ing. 

M.  Damiron,  in  his  Cours  de  Philosophic  (1836), 
devotes  an  entire  volume  to  logic,  which  he  discusses 
on  a  comprehensive  plan,  and  in  a  liberal  and  enlight- 
ened spirit.  He  commences  his  work  by  making  some 
preliminary  observations  on  the  nature  and  province  of 
logic  ;  then  on  the  character  of  our  judgments  and  the 
criterium  of  truth  ;  on  perception,  and  its  laws  and 
rules  ;  on  a  posteriori  generalizations  ;  on  reasoning  in 


IX  THE  SEVEKAL  NATIONS  OF  THE  CONTINENT.      405 

general ;  of  the  syllogism  ;  of  analogy  and  probability  ; 
on  language  considered  in  relation  to  thought;  on 
our  sensibility  connected  with  the  rules  of  judgment ; 
on  habit ;  on  the  sources  of  error ;  and  on  the  exposi- 
tion of  method,  relative  to  a  proper  history  of  philo- 
sophy. 

There  are  several  later  writers  on  logic  in  France 
whose  works  will  repay  perusal,  but  which  we  cannot 
notice  at  any  length.  The  principal  of  these  are, — 
Charma,  Dufour,  Larguet,  Perrard,  and  Javari. 

The  logical  disquisitions  of  Belgium  and  Holland 
have  been  influenced  to  some  extent,  since  the  com- 
mencement of  the  present  century,  by  the  prevailing 
systems  of  mental  philosophy  both  in  Germany  and 
France. 

In  Holland,  however,  the  change  is  less  perceptible 
than  in  Belgium.  Among  the  Dutch  philosophers  the 
logic  of  Wyttenbach  has  been  long  in  general  use,  and 
highly  esteemed.  Paul  Yan  Hermert  introduced  the 
logical  principles  of  Kant  into  this  country  during  the 
latter  part  of  the  last  and  the  beginning  of  the  present 
century.  We  shall  find  many  of  the  leading  views  of 
the  German  logician  discussed  with  great  ability  in  Van 
Hermert's  Elements  of  the  Philosophy  of  Kant.  The 
Dutch  writer  maintains  that  there  are  four  categories 
on  which  all  scientific  knowledge  rests, — namely,  the 
general,  the  special,  the  true,  and  the  necessary. 

M.  Aitzema,  in  1821,  translated  into  the  national 
language  the  logical  system  of  M.  Snell,  which  is 
founded  on  the  principles  of  Kant.  In  1828,  the 
Society  of  Public  Good  published  lessons  on  logic  for 
the  use  of  young  men  who  had  quitted  school.     This 


406    NATURE  AND  CHARACTER  OF  LOGICAL  LITERATURE 

is  a  short  and  popular  book,  the  author  of  which  was  M. 
Alex.  Bake,  rector  of  the  Latin  school  of  Leeuwarden. 

M.  BTieuwenhuis  is  one  of  the  most  able  philosophical 
logicians  in  Holland.  His  Commentary  on  the  system 
of  Descartes  (1828),  and  his  Initio,  Philosophies  Theo- 
retics (1833),  shew  an  intimate  acquaintance  both  with 
the  history  and  philosophy  of  logic.  And  the  same 
remarks  are  applicable  to  the  writings  of  Van  Heusde* 
— a  logician  whose  reputation  has  extended  far  beyond 
the  limits  of  his  own  country.  In  his  Initia  he  treats 
of  the  dialectics  of  Plato  ;  and  in  his  Socratic  School 
we  have  a  learned  dissertation  on  the  nature  of  scientific 
truth.  The  author  asks,  What  is  logic  ?  The  answer 
he  gives  is,  that  it  is  the  art  of  communicating  know- 
ledge according  to  the  principles  of  sound  reason. 
Logic  is  by  no  means  to  be  confounded  with  the  dia- 
lectics of  the  schools. 

There  have  been  two  parties  who  have  cultivated 
logical  science  in  Belgium, — one  connecting  it  with  a 
system  of  rationalistic  philosophy ;  and  the  other  dis- 
cussing it,  both  in  its  scientific  principles  and  formal 
arrangements,  with  an  especial  reference  to  certain 
theological  purposes  and  doctrines.  There  is  not, 
however,  such  a  wide  difference  between  the  logical 
treatises  of  these  two  parties  as  one  might  be  led  at 
first  sight  to  imagine.  In  their  leading  principles  and 
forms  there  is  a  great  resemblance  among  them  all. 

We  have  De  Meuport's  Essai  sur  la  Theorie  du 
Raisonnement  prefixed  to  his  edition  of  Condillac's 
Logic,  in   which  he  discusses   several  of  the  leading 

*  "De  Socratische  School  of  Wijsgeerte,  voor  de  Negentiende  Eeuw,"  Utrecht, 
1834.     "  Initia  Philosophise  Platonic®, "  1831. 


IN  THE  SEVERAL  NATIONS  OF  THE  CONTINENT.      407 

principles  of  the  science  of  reasoning.  Though  his 
opinions  are  attached  to  the  French  philosopher's  work, 
yet  he  differs  from  him  on  many  essential  points  in 
reference  to  logic.  Meuport  makes  reasoning  a  more 
spiritual  and  complex  operation  than  Condillac  does. 
Professor  Liebaert  filled  the  logic  chair  at  the  univer- 
sity of  Louvain  during  the  entire  period  that  the 
country  was  under  the  government  of  France.  The 
system  of  instruction  he  pursued  is  laid  down  in  his 
Tractatus  de  Logica  (1818),  which  is  divided  into  two 
parts, — the  one  lays  down  the  general  laws  of  thought ; 
and  the  second  treats  of  the  various  kinds  of  truth,  and 
the  various  degrees  of  certainty  which  belong  to  eachkind. 
About  the  same  period  we  have  Elements  de  Logique 
(1817),  from  the  pen  of  a  clergyman — a  work  which 
has  for  its  especial  object  to  direct  and  strengthen  the 
minds  of  youth  before  they  enter  upon  the  study  of  the 
higher  branches  of  philosophy. 

We  have  a  full  and  systematic  account  of  the  philo- 
sophy of  logic  in  M.  Ignt.  Deuzinger's  two  works,  Prima 
Lineamenta  Logices  (1818),  and  Compendium  Logices 
(1823).  These  are  both  treatises  of  great  merit. 
Logical  science  in  Belgium  owes  at  this  period  great 
obligations  to  the  several  writings  of  M.  Yan  Meenen, 
who  combated  with  zeal  and  talent  the  theory  of  logic 
propounded  by  Condillac  and  his  partisans,  which  had 
found  favour  in  that  country  among  some  influential 
cultivators  of  speculative  philosophy.  Jean  Herman 
Janssens,  in  his  Logique,  views  the  science  of  reasoning 
in  connexion  with  those  principles  of  philosophy  culti- 
vated by  the  Catholic  Church.  He  was  professor  at 
the  university  of  Louvain.     In  the  Expose  des  Facultes. 


408    NATURE  AND  CHARACTER  OF  LOGICAL  LITERATURE 

des  Lois,  el  des  Operations  de  V Ame  (1838)  of  M. 
Becart,  we  have  a  very  familiar  and  useful  dissertation 
on  logic. 

The  Principes  de  Logique  (1833)  of  Baron  ReifTen- 
berg  is  an  able  and  instructive  work.  He  looks  at 
logic  through  the  medium  of  philosophical  rationalism. 
He  defines  logic  to  be  the  science  of  those  laws  to  which 
we  submit  our  reason  in  the  search  after  truth.  It  is 
divided  into  four  portions, — namely,  the  Idea,  Judg- 
ment, Eeasoning,  and  Method.  M.  Gibon,  in  his 
Gouts  de  Philosophie  (1842),  maintains  that  all  the 
conceptions  of  the  human  understanding  may  be  classed 
under  three  heads, — Ontology,  Psychology,  and  Logic, 
We  have  two  works  proceeding  from  the  university  of 
Louvain,  —  namely,  E.  Tandel's  Cours  de  Logique 
(1841),  and  Logicce  seu  Philosophice  Pationalis  Elementa 
of  President  Ubaghs.  The  last  is  a  most  profound  and 
able  work. 

From  the  political  connexion  which  subsisted  between 
France  and  Italy,  from  the  commencement  of  the 
present  century  to  the  end  of  the  general  war,  there 
necessarily  arose  a  corresponding  philosophical  intimacy 
between  the  two  countries.  And  this  was  manifested 
in  reference  to  logical  literature,  as  well  as  in  many 
other  branches  of  science.  Most  of  the  prevailing 
systems  of  mental  philosophy  current  in  France  in 
modern  times,  have  now  found  their  way,  with  some 
little  interruptions  in  certain  localities,  to  most  of  the 
Italian  states,  and  form  a  certain  portion  of  the  current 
literature  of  the  day  in  the  several  universities  and 
seats  of  learning  in  the  kingdom. 

But  foreign  opinions  have  not  as   yet  effected  any 


IX  THE  SEVERAL  NATIONS  OF  THE  CONTINENT.       409 

great  change  in  modes  of  discussing  logical  science  in 
Italy.  In  most  of  the  Italian  works  on  the  subject,  the 
writers  discuss  the  science  from  a  religious  point  of 
view.  There  is  less  latitude  of  philosophical  inquiry 
on  the  vital  principles  of  the  art  of  reasoning  observable 
here,  than  in  England.  France,  or  Germany.  Nearly 
all  the  regular  text-books  in  common  use  in  colleges 
are  of  a  decidedly  scholastic  and  formal  stamp, — seldom 
venturing  beyond  the  rules  of  syllogism,  and  a  few 
scattered  remarks  on  the  nature  of  propositions,  the 
sources  of  error,  &c.  But  out  of  the  direct  range  and 
authority  of  the  colleges,  we  find  treatises  on  logic 
of  a  more  comprehensive  and  scientific  character ;  but- 
even  here  the  influence  and  power  of  the  Church  are 
brought  to  bear  upon  the  current  investigations  on  the 
subject,  and  to  impart  to  them  a  specific  form  and 
complexion. 

Cardinal  Gerdil,  Tamasia,  Lallebasque,  and  G. 
Grones,  were  not  strictly  logical  writers ;  but  in  their 
respective  treatises  on  mental  philosophy,  there  are 
many  of  the  first  principles  of  logic  discussed  in  an 
able  and  erudite  manner.  Yincenzo  Bini,  in  his  Corso 
JElementario  di  Lezioni  Logico-Metafisico-Morali  (1818), 
develops  the  principles  of  logic,  and  shews  their  depen- 
dence upon  mental  and  moral  science.  B.  Poli  follows 
nearly  in  the  same  path,  in  his  Corso  di  Filosofia  (1828), 
only  he  enters  more  fully  and  systematically  into  the 
nature  of  the  human  mind.  The  second  volume  is 
devoted  to  logic.  It  is  treated  in  a  purely  elementary 
manner — the  author  having  very  fully  discussed  the 
nature  of  the  reasoning  faculty  in  the  first  volume  of 
his  treatise.     Gaetano  Ventura  enters  profoundly  into 


410    NATURE  AND  CHARACTER  OF  LOGICAL  LITERATURE 

the  science  of  method.  In  his  De  Methodo  Philoso- 
phandi  (1828),  he  shews  that  method  in  logic  presup- 
poses a  previous  exercise  of  our  faculties,  and  that  a 
certain  stock  of  general  information  must  be  obtained 
before  it  can  be  put  in  operation.  This,  Yentura 
affirms,  is  implied  by  every  logician  when  he  speaks  of 
method.  We  must  know  various  kinds  of  truths  before 
we  can  discourse  upon  their  connexions  and  relations, 
or  take  any  step  in  arranging  them  in  such  a  manner 
as  to  carry  conviction  to  the  minds  of  others.  All 
logical  methods  proceed  on  the  principle  of  analysis. 
The  mind  looks  at  an  entire  system,  or  a  large 
assemblage  of  general  principles,  and  then  seems  to  set 
about  the  work  of  analysis  or  separation  with  a  view 
of  realizing  one  general  idea,  which  is  known  only  to 
itself,  and  which  is  often  obtained  by  a  mental  process, 
which  entirely  eludes  the  most  searching  efforts  of  con- 
sciousness. Every  thing  must  be  taken  to  pieces  ;  every 
corner  and  crevice  of  the  system  must  be  examined, 
before  the  several  parts  can  be  put  together  and  adjusted 
agreeably  to  the.  scientific  idea  which  we  have  in  our 
own  minds,  and  which  we  set  out  in  our  inquiries 
to  establish  and  realize.  These  are  the  leading  steps 
of  the  mental  process  in  every  philosophical  method.* 

The  Esercizio  Logico  (1824)  of  Sig.  Cuoco  is  a  plain 
and  familiar  work,  and  has  been  well  spoken  of  by 
Italian  critics.  Gr.  D.  Eomagnosi  was  one  of  the  ablest 
of  modern  Italian  writers  in  logic.  His  philosophical 
works  are  published  in  nineteen  volumes.  He  differed 
from  the  general  tenets  held  by  several  French  logicians ; 
especially   those    of   Cousin  and  Damiron.      On    the 

*  Do  Methodo.  §  6.     Edit,  Venice,  183,1 


IN  THE  SEVERAL  NATIONS  OF  THE  CONTINENT.       411 

subject  of  logic,  in  his  twelfth  volume,  many  profound 
and  just  remarks  are  to  be  found  on  the  operations  of 
the  mind :  more  particularly  in  the  second  book  on 
invention.  He  shews  the  intimate  connexion  which 
subsists  between  this  faculty  and  that  of  attention,  and 
how  the  concentration  of  the  latter  power  aids  the  mind 
in  its  creative  energies.  In  the  third  and  fourth 
books,  on  judgment  and  reasoning,  the  author  endea- 
vours to  prove  that,  though  these  two  powers  are  nearly 
allied  to  each  other,  yet  there  is  sufficient  ground  for 
a  logical  distinction  between  them. 

The  abstract  foundation  of  all  logical  truth  the 
author  develops  in  his  essay,  Vedute  Fondimentali  sulV 
Arte  Logica.  He  considers  the  phenomena  connected 
with  the  direct  investigation  of  truth  to  be  one  of  the 
most  difficult  to  analyse  of  any  presented  to  our  notice. 
It  is  only  by  the  most  patient  and  careful  attention  to 
the  inward  movements  of  the  mind,  that  we  can  possibly 
detect  any  of  those  laws  which  regulate  its  procedure 
in  abstract  reasonings.* 

The  opinions  of  Antonio  Eosmini,  as  to  the  founda- 
tion of  logical  science,  have  attracted  a  considerable 
share  of  attention,  both  in  Italy  and  in  other  continen- 
tal countries.  The  account  given  of  the  foundations  of 
human  knowledge  by  Condillac,  Eeid,  Hume,  Kant, 
and  Stewart,  did  not  appear  satisfactory  to  him  ;  and, 
in  consequence,  he  was  determined  to  set  out  in  search 
of  a  new  org  anon  for  himself.  He  seized  hold  of  the 
idea  of  Being,  and  made  it  the  starting-point  of  his 
system.  He  maintained,  in  his  Nuovo  Saggio  (1830), 
that  this  idea  was  an  innate  idea — a  notion,   indeed, 

*  Opera,  torn.  12. 


412    NATURE  AND  CHARACTER  OF  LOGICAL  LITERATURE 

which  had  often  been  entertained  before.  But  he 
commenced  to  split  this  idea  into  fragments  as  it  were, 
and  hence  arose  his  confusion  and  troubles.  In  the 
general  working  out  of  his  theory,  he  stated  matters 
which  gave  offence  to  some  leading  Catholic  philo- 
sophers, both  in  his  own  country  and  in  France,  who 
censured  his  doctrines,  and  represented  them  as  of  a 
decidedly  pantheistical  character.  Our  limits  will  not 
permit  entering  into  the  nature  or  merits  of  this  con- 
troversy; therefore  we  must  refer  the  reader  to  the 
works  on  the  subject.  We  shall  merely  give  Eosmini's 
definition  of  this  general  idea  of  Being,  which  he  affirms 
is  the  real  foundation  of  all  science  and  truth.  He 
says, — 1st,  This  idea  is  not  concrete,  but  abstract,  and 
the  ultimate  possible  abstraction.  2d,  It  is  not  indivi- 
dual or  particular,  but  generic  and  universal.  3d,  It 
is  not  personal,  but  common.  4th,  It  is  not  real,  but 
ideal ;  not  effective,  but  possible.  5th,  It  subsists  in 
itself,  and  is  not  a  derivation  from  the  resources  of  the 
human  mind.  6th,  It  is  not  determined,  but  entirely 
indetermined.  7-th,  It  is  not  God.  8th,  It  is  not  an 
idea  of,  or  any  thing  appertaining  to,  God.  And,  9th, 
It  is  not  the  word  (verb)  of  God.* 

Pietro  Bottura's  Logica  (1833)  is  a  work  which 
enters  fully  into  the  general  principles  of  logic.  We  have 
here  treated  of  the  nature  of  definition ;  the  grounds 
of  human  judgments,  which  are  intuition,  experience, 
and  testimony ;  on  the  nature  of  affirmative  and  nega- 
tive propositions ;  and  of  the  several  kinds  of  demon- 
stration which  arise  from  the  genera  and  species  of 
things.      In   addition   to  these   leading  points   of  his 

■    Tom.  ii.  pp.  712,  719,  722,  750. 


IN  THE  SEVERAL  NATIONS  OF  THE  CONTINENT.        413 

logic,  Bottura  points  out  at  some  length  the  errors  in- 
volved in  the  logical  theories  of  Condillac,  Tracy,  and 
others  of  the  French  school.  Sig.  Fabriano  makes 
logical  science  rest  on  one  of  the  great  and  primary 
divisions  of  the  mind  itself.  This  idea  is  developed  in 
his  Prospetto  degli  Studj  Filosofici  (1833). 

The  Lezioni  di  Logica  e  di  Metafisica  (1841)  of 
Baron  Pasquale  Grallupi  is  an  important  Italian  work. 
The  part  devoted  exclusively  to  logic  is  in  the  first 
volume.  He  takes  a  wide  range  in  the  treatment  of 
his  subject.  In  the  respective  works  of  Tommaseo, 
Sig.  Manio,  Salvatore  Mancino,  and  Gioberti,  there  are 
important  discussions  on  many  of  the  leading  principles 
of  logical  science.  Count  Terenzio  Mamiani  discusses 
the  nature  of  method  in  his  DeW  Ontologia  del  Metodo 
(1841)  at  considerable  length.  He  makes  it  rest  on 
five  principles, — namely,  invention,  induction,  demon- 
stration, synthesis,  and  analysis. 

Logical  speculations  in  Spain  have  undergone  con- 
siderable change  within  these  fifty  years.  In  the  first 
quarter  of  the  present  century,  several  of  the  French 
systems  of  logic  found  their  way  into  the  universities  of 
the  country  ;  chiefly  with  the  view,  however,  to  com- 
ment and  refutation.  The  leading  principles  of  Bacon, 
Descartes,  and  Locke,  relative  to  logic,  were  discussed 
in  a  small  work  called  Logica  (1815),  written  by  a 
Father  Bostos.  It  displays  a  philosophical  mind,  and 
a  candid  and  ingenuous  spirit.  The  work  points  out 
what  the  writer  conceived  were  the  leading  errors  of 
the  Novum  Organum ;  and  then  passes  on  to  the 
consideration  of  Descartes  and  Locke,  who  find  more 
favour  in  his  eyes.    The  Elementos  de  Logica  (1847)  of 


414    NATURE  AND  CHARACTER  OF  LOGICAL  LITERATURE 

D.  Teodoro  de  Almeida  is  a  popular  treatise,  written 
expressly  for  the  instruction  of  young  persons.  It  is  a 
sensible  work. 

We  have  a  volume  on  logic  from  the  pen  of  D.  Ramon 
Marti  de  Eixala,  one  of  the  professors  in  the  university 
of  Barcelona,  entitled,  Corso  di  Filosofia  Elemental- 
Compriendiendo  la  Theoria  de  las  Ideas,  la  Gramatica 
general  y  la  Logica  (1847).  The  work  is  divided  into 
three  parts — Ontology,  Grammar,  and  Logic.  The 
last  division  contains  a  definition  of  logic ;  the  nature 
of  perception,  abstraction,  analogy,  &c. ;  the  nature  of 
reasoning  and  judgment ;  on  authority  and  testimony, 
and  the  several  kinds  of  demonstrative  proofs ;  and, 
finally,  on  method. 

The  Logica  (1850)  of  Don  Jaime  Balmes  of  Barce- 
lona is  a  work  of  talent,  and  displays  an  enlightened 
spirit.  He  thinks  the  syllogistic  logic  does  not  com- 
prehend the  entire  science  :  a  knowledge  of  the  opera- 
tions of  the  mind,  and  the  particular  evidence  belonging 
to  individual  sciences,  should  be  taken  into  account  in 
every  system  of  logical  tuition. 

In  most  of  the  colleges  of  Spain  the  old  scholastic 
logic  prevails.  It  is  very  rare  that  we  find  any  new 
principle  introduced  into  the  ordinary  text-books  used 
for  university  purposes. 

The  state  of  logical  literature  in  Portugal  at  the 
present  time,  is  much  upon  a  par  with  that  of  Spain. 
Some  translations  of  French  systems  of  logic,  of  the 
early  part  of  the  present  century,  are  to  be  met  with ; 
but  most  of  the  treatises  on  the  science  for  educational 
purposes  are  of  the  ordinary  scholastic  character.  A 
knowledge  of  logic  is  rendered  imperative  in  the  pro- 


IN  THE  SEVEEAL  NATIONS  OF  THE  CONTINENT.        415 

fessions  of  law  and  divinity  in  all  the  universities  of  the 
kingdom. 

In  Sweden,  at  the  early  part  of  this  century,  we  find 
B.  H.  Hoijer  prosecuting  logical  subjects  with  great 
zeal  and  success.  He  wrote  several  able  works  on 
mental  science  generally,  in  which  there  are  many 
scattered  dissertations  connected  with  the  philosophy 
of  reasoning.  His  aphorisms  of  transcendental  logic 
was  published  at  Upsal  in  1812.  He  founds  all 
operations  connected  with  the  especial  prosecution  of 
truth,  no  matter  on  what  science,  on  the  faculties  of 
the  mind,  particularly  those  of  an  intuitive  and  reflec- 
tive character.  Samuel  Grubbe,  a  professor  in  the 
university  of  Upsal,  undertook  to  develop  the  intellec- 
tual intuition  of  Schelling,  and  to  apply  it  to  the  science 
of  logical  method.  Grubbe  attempted  to  reduce  every 
thing  to  one  single  idea,  and  maintained  the  possibility 
of  rearing  upon  it  a  complete  system  of  knowledge, 
both  as  to  mind  and  matter.  He  argues  that  this 
intellectual  intuition,  though  admitted  to  be  a  pure 
assumption,  does  not  place  the  speculations  of  Schelling 
upon  a  more  insecure  foundation  than  almost  every 
other  theory  of  knowledge  is  reared  upon,  however 
rational  and  popular  it  may  appear  to  be.  The  great 
problem  is,  to  demonstrate  the  finite  from  the  infinite ; 
the  relative  from  the  absolute  ;  and  the  particular  from 
the  general.  This,  Grubbe  thought  he  had  accom- 
plished by  his  fuller  illustration  of  this  celebrated 
German  theory. 

A.  Lidbeck  approved  of  the  general  logical  theory  of 
Schelling,  and  the  commentaries  upon  it  by  Grubbe ; 
but  he  likewise  thought  that  an  eclectic  system,  framed 


416    NATURE  AND  CHARACTER  OF  LOGICAL  LITERATURE 

out  of  the  several  systems  of  Wolff,  Baumgarten,  Sul- 
zer,  and  Kant,  would  be  a  near  approximation  to  the 
true  method  of  philosophizing.  This  system  he  deve- 
loped, and  it  proved  popular  for  a  time,  but  soon  gave 
way  to  other  more  exciting  novelties.  Among  the 
number  of  these,  was  G-eyer's  treatise  on  the  Nature  of 
Truth.  This  is  conducted  much  upon  the  same  plan 
as  Dr  Beattie's  Essay  on  Truth.  Geyer  connected  the 
discussion  as  to  the  distinct  nature  of  truth,  and  our 
specific  faculties  and  powers  of  discerning  and  commu- 
nicating it,  with  the  leading  principles  of  theology. 
He  treats  of  the  evidence  from  the  external  senses ;  of 
mathematical  demonstration ;  of  cause  and  effect ;  of 
analogy,  testimony,  &c. ;  and  shews  their  several  logi- 
cal dependences  upon  the  leading  principles  of  religion. 
In  1820,  Sodensten  attempted,  and  with  some  success, 
to  frame  a  system  of  logic  out  of  the  joint  views  of 
Wolff  and  Locke. 

C.  M.  Schoerbing,  in  attempting  to  dispense  with 
all  empirical  sources  of  scientific  evidence,  ran  into  the 
opposite  extreme  of  spiritual  pantheism.  He  identifies 
truth  and  the  Deity,  thus  destroying  those  notions  of 
identity  and  personality  requisite  to  purposes  of  all 
sound  reasoning.  In  the  logical  philosophy  of  Atter- 
born  and  Almquist,  two  modern  writers  of  great  abi- 
lities and  reputation,  some  subtile  and  original  views 
are  developed. 

In  most  of  the  logical  works  used  in  the  Swedish 
universities  within  the  last  fifty  years,  there  is  more 
metaphysical  matter  introduced  than  is  observable  in 
similar  works  in  this  country  published  during  the  last 
century.     The  French  theories  of  reasoning  seem  to 


IN  THE  SEVERAL  NATIONS  OF  THE  CONTINENT.       417 

have    gained   some    ground    in    Sweden,     particularly 
within  the  last  ten  or  fifteen  years. 

Henry  StefFens,  in  the  early  part  of  this  century, 
made  the  several  logical  theories  of  Germany  pretty 
well  known  in  Denmark  and  JSTorway.  His  writings 
are  of  an  eclectic  character,  Fred.  C.  Sibbern  took 
Hegel  for  his  guide ;  and  in  his  Logik  als  Denklehre, 
&c.  (1835),  attempted  to  illustrate  the  system  of  the 
German  philosophers,  but  with  little  success.  The 
mystical  views  of  Sibbern  fell  into  disrepute.  Heiberg 
was  somewhat  more  successful.  Though  professing 
himself  generally  favourable  to  Hegel's  doctrines,  yet 
he  gave  them  a  more  solid  and  common-sense  direc- 
tion, in  his  Einleitenden  Vortrag  zum  Logischen  Cursus 
(1840). 

There  are  about  700  students  in  the  University  of 
Copenhagen,  and  nearly  two-thirds  of  them  attend  the 
logic  class. 

The  German  systems  of  logic  have  made  some  pro- 
gress within  these  thirty  or  forty  years  in  Poland. 
J.  S.  Fuchs  is  a  commentator  of  Kant's  Critique  of 
Pure  Reason;  and  Etienne  Gyorgyi  has  a  work  on 
logic,  which  is  a  compound  of  the  notions  of  Kant, 
and  those  of  Locke  and  Wolff.  This  work  was  pub- 
lished at  Posen  in  1805.  Sioism.  Carlowszkv  is  a  later 
Polish  logician,  whose  works  bear  the  date  of  1830, 
and  are  of  popular  and  academical  character.  There 
were  public  lectures  in  several  districts  of  Poland  in 
1840-41,  on  the  logical  systems  of  Schelling  and 
Hegel ;  but  they  are  said  to  have  failed  in  rendering 
these  respective  systems  clearly  understood. 

Logical  literature  has  made  great  advances  in  seve- 

2d 


418    NATURE  AND  CHARACTER  OF  LOGICAL  LITERATURE. 

ral  districts  of  the  Eussian  dominions  within  the  last 
fifty  years.  There  are  few  works  published  on  the 
subject  in  Germany  and  France  but  what  find  their 
way  to  some  of  the  seats  of  learning  in  that  country. 
In  the  universities  of  Moscow,  Krakow,  Kiew,  Kasan, 
St  Petersburg,  and  Dorpat,  regular  courses  of  logical 
instruction  are  given  every  year ;  and  the  general  sys- 
tem followed  in  most  of  these  places,  is  that  of  a  mix- 
ture of  formal  with  theoretical  logic — the  latter  element 
varying  with  the  opinions  of  the  teacher. 


BRIEF  ACCOUNT  OF  THE  SYSTEMS  OF  LOGIC.  419 


CHAPTER  XXL 

A  BRIEF  ACCOUNT  OF  THE  DIFFERENT  SYSTEMS  OF  LOGIC 
TAUGHT  IN  THE  UNIVERSITIES  OF  GREAT  BRITAIN  AND 
IRELAND  DURING  THE  LAST  HUNDRED  YEARS. 

We  purpose  confining  the  following  statements  solely 
to  the  manner  in  which  logic  has  been  taught  in  the 
several  seminaries  and  seats  of  learning  in  our  own 
country.  We  shall  not  make  any  direct  allusion  to 
such  logical  works  as  legitimately  belong  to  the  philo- 
sophical literature  of  the  kingdom,  and  which  are 
intended  for  general  study  and  perusal.  These  will 
afterwards  be  noticed  in  due  order. 

Cambridge  and  Oxford,  being  among  the  earliest 
university  foundations  of  Europe,  naturally,  in  reference 
to  their  studies  and  plans  of  education,  partook  of  the 
spirit  of  ancient  times;  and  the  predominating  elements 
in  that  spirit  were,  controversial  divinity  and  dialectical 
or  logical  disputation.  As  has  already  been  noticed, 
the  Grecian  logic  became,  after  the  introduction  of  the 
Christian  religion,  one  of  the  chief  instruments  in  the 
hands  of  theological  disputants.  There  were,  from 
the  first,  considerable  difference  of  opinion  relative  to 
the  Christian  system,  both  as  to  doctrine  and  ritual 


420  BRIEF  ACCOUNT  OF  THE  SYSTEMS  OF  LOGIC 

observances ;  and  the  ancient  logic,  with  its  forms, 
essences,  entities,  categories,  and  predicables,  was 
soon  found  to  be  a  powerful  engine  in  disputatious 
warfare  by  every  heated  and  zealous  partisan.  The 
consequence  was,  that  logic  became  cultivated  in  all 
the  universities  in  Europe  more  than  any  other  art  or 
science;  and  Cambridge  and  Oxford,  from  their  very 
foundation,  lay  claim  to  a  fair  share  of  these  logical 
honours. 

The  University  of  Cambridge  was  at  a  very  early 
period  a  logical  seminary.  We  are  told  that,  in 
the  year  1109,  Joffred,  abbot  of  Croyland,  intending 
to  rebuild  his  monastery,  which  had  been  destroyed 
by  fire,  deputed  G-islebert,  with  three  other  monks, 
to  the  manor  of  Cottingham,  near  Cambridge.  These 
persons,  it  is  stated,  were  talented  and  learned,  well 
skilled  in  philosophical  problems  and  in  dialectics. 
They  went  daily  to  Cambridge,  and  hired  a  barn,  in 
which  they  gave  public  lectures.  As  a  part  of  this 
instruction  it  was  appointed  that,  at  ten  o'clock,  brother 
Terricus,  an  abl'e  sophist,  should  read  to  the  elder  por- 
tion of  the  audience  Aristotle's  Logic,  according  to  the 
commentaries  of  Porphyry  and  Averroes. 

In  the  reign  of  Henry  VIII.  a  change  was  made  in 
logical  studies  at  this  university,  by  order  of  that 
monarch.  He  ordered  the  work  of  Eudolphus  Agri- 
cola,  De  Dialectica  Inventione,  to  be  used  in  conjunction 
with  the  works  of  Aristotle,  instead  of  the  logical  com- 
mentaries of  Duns  Scotus  and  Barleses.  It  is  said  that 
the  writings  of  Agricola,  which  had  then  become  very 
popular  in  many  parts  of  Europe,  and  had  been  trans- 
lated into  French  and  Italian,  exercised  a  considerable 


TAUGHT  IN  THE  UNIVERSITIES  OF  GREAT  BRITAIN.    421 

influence  in  effecting  a  change  in  the  philosophical 
opinions  of  this  seat  of  learning. 

Sir  Eobert  Read  was  a  very  popular  lecturer  on  logic 
at  Cambridge  in  1584.  It  is  said  that  there  were  very 
few  students  who  did  not  avail  themselves  of  his  public 
instructions,  which  consisted  of  an  hour  five  days  of 
the  week. 

In  the  course  of  the  seventeenth  century,  the  logical 
views  of  Bacon,  Descartes,  Locke,  and  Leibnitz,  became 
known  in  Cambridge ;  but  they  were  not  by  any  means 
generally  adopted.  Bacon  was  better  known  than  any 
of  the  other  three  philosophers ;  and  about  the  middle 
of  this  century  his  Novum  Organum  seems  to  have  been 
rather  popular  than  otherwise.  Anthony  Wood  says, 
Glanvil  lamented  that  his  friends  did  not  send  him  to 
Cambridge ;  because  he  used  to  say,  that  the  new  philo- 
sophy, and  the  art  of  philosophizing,  were  more  culti- 
vated there  than  at  Oxford. 

For  more  than  a  century,  Cambridge  has  been  greatly 
behind  in  the  study  and  cultivation  of  logical  philo- 
sophy; so  much  so,  indeed,  as  to  have  become  the 
object  of  reproachful  contumely  and  scorn.  The  Edin- 
burgh Review  of  1833  observes,  "  In  Cambridge  the 
fortune  of  the  study  is  indicated  by  the  fact,  that  the 
Elements  of  Logic  of  William  Duncan  of  Aberdeen  have 
long  dispensed  a  muddy  scantling  of  metaphysic, 
psychology,  and  dialectic,  in  the  university  where 
Downam  taught." 

Oxford,  as  well  as  Cambridge,  is  highly  celebrated 
for  its  early  logical  history.  It  occupies  a  conspicuous 
position  in  the  scholastic  ages.  Anthony  Wood,  in  his 
account  of  Oxford,  revels  with  delight  at  its  logical  skill 


422  BRIEF  ACCOUNT  OF  THE  SYSTEMS  OF  LOGIC 

and  reputation  in  the  middle  ages.  "  What  university/' 
says  he,  "  I  pray,  can  produce  an  invincible  Hales,  an 
admirable  Bacon,  an  excellent  well-grounded  Middleton, 
a  subtile  Scotus,  an  approved  Burley,  a  resolute  Bacon- 
thorpe  ?  all  which  persons  flourished  within  the  compass 
of  one  century.  I  doubt  that  neither  Paris,  Bologna, 
nor  Rome,  that  great  mistress  of  the  Christian  world,  or 
any  place  else,  can  do  what  the  renowned  Bellosite 
(Oxford)  hath  done.  And,  without  doubt,  all  impartial 
men  may  receive  it  for  an  undeniable  truth,  that  the 
most  able  arguing  in  school  divinity  did  take  its  begin- 
ning in  England,  and  from  Englishmen."  * 

In  the  middle  of  the  thirteenth  century,  Robert 
Gros  teste,  afterwards  Bishop  of  Lincoln,  lectured  at 
Oxford  on  scholastic  logic  to  large  audiences.  A  short 
time  after  (in  1308)  we  find  Duns  Scotus  teaching 
logic  at  Clare  Hall. 

The  Baconian  logic  had  made  some  progress  at 
Oxford  in  1623,  when  the  university  presented  an 
address  to  Bacon,  who  is  represented  "  as  a  mighty 
Hercules,  who  had  by  his  own  hand  greatly  advanced 
those  pillars  in  the  learned  world,  which,  by  the  rest  of 
the  world,  were  supposed  irremoveable." 

Edward  Sandys  was  a  popular  teacher  of  logic  at 
Oxford  in  1629,  according  to  the  system  of  Aristotle. 
He  did  not,  however,  adhere  strictly  to  this  system; 
for  it  is  said  that  he  was  very  partial  to  both  Bacon 
and  Locke,  and  frequently  alluded  to  their  respective 
logical  views  in  his  public  lectures. 

In  the  fourth  of  Archbishop  Laud's  Statutes  of 
Oxford  (1636)  it  appears,  "that  the  lecturer  in  logic 

*  A  the.  Oxoniensis.  vol.  i. 


TAUGHT  IN  THE  UNIVERSITIES  OF  GREAT  BRITAIN.    423 

is,  on  Mondays  and  Thursdays,  at  eight  o'clock  in  the 
morning,  publicly  to  expound  either  the  introduction 
of  Porphyry,  or  some  part  of  Aristotle's  logic,  by 
clearly  and  tersely  explaining  the  text ;  and  he  is  not 
to  dwell  long  on  questions  about  the  method  or  analysis 
of  the  book  or  text,  but  in  the  usual  way  to  raise  ques- 
tions pertinent  to  the  subject  of  the  book,  and  to  resolve 
them  with  brevity  and  force."  "  The  auditors  of  this 
lecturer  are  to  be  all  scholars,  from  the  end  of  their 
first  year  till  they  are  presented  for  the  degree  of 
Bachelor  of  Arts." 

These  Statutes  were,  however,  gradually  lost  sight  of; 
and  a  general  laxity  as  to  logical  studies  and  philo- 
sophy was  induced  throughout  the  entire  university. 
This  subject  has  been  of  late  so  fully  and  accurately 
depicted  by  Sir  William  Hamilton,  that  I  shall  make 
no  apology,  on  the  present  occasion,  for  quoting  his 
remarks. 

"  During  the  scholastic  ages,"  says  he,  "  Oxford  was 
held  inferior  to  no  university  throughout  Europe ;  and 
it  was  celebrated,  more  especially,  for  its  philosophers 
and  dialecticians.  But  it  was  neither  the  recollection 
of  old  academical  renown,  nor  any  enlightened  per- 
suasions of  its  importance,  that  preserved  logic  among 
the  subjects  of  academical  tuition,  when  the  kindred 
branches  of  philosophy,  with  other  statutory  studies, 
were  dropt  from  the  course  of  instruction  actually 
given.  These  were  abandoned  from  no  conviction  of 
their  inutility,  nor  even  in  favour  of  others  of  superior 
value :  they  were  abandoned  when  the  system  under 
which  they  could  be  taught  was,  for  a  private  interest, 
illegally  superseded  by  another,  under  which  they  could 


424  BRIEF  ACCOUNT  OF  THE  SYSTEMS  OF  LOGIC 

rest.  When  the  college  fellows  supplanted  the  univer- 
sity professors,  the  course  of  statutory  instruction 
necessarily  fell  with  the  statutory  instruments  by  which 
it  had  been  carried  through.  The  same  extensive,  the 
same  intensive,  education  which  had  once  been  possible 
when  the  work  was  distributed  among  a  body  of  pro- 
fessors— each  chosen  for  his  ability,  and  each  concen- 
trating his  attention  on  a  single  study — could  no  longer 
be  attempted  when  the  collegiate  corporations,  a  for- 
tuitous assemblage  of  individuals,  were  authorized  to 
become  sole  teacher  of  the  whole  academical  encyclo- 
paedia. But  while  the  one  unqualified  fellow-tutor 
could  not  perform  the  work  of  a  large  body  of  quali- 
fied professors,  it  is  evident  that,  as  he  could  not 
rise  and  expand  himself  to  the  former  system,  the 
present,  existing  only  for  his  behoof,  must  be  con- 
tracted and  brought  down  to  hirn.  This  was  accord- 
ingly done.  The  mode  of  teaching,  and  the  subjects 
taught,  were  reduced  to  the  required  level  and  extent. 
The  capacity  of  lecturing,  that  is,  of  delivering  an 
original  course  Df  instruction,  was  not  now  to  be 
expected  in  the  tutor.  The  pupil,  therefore,  read  to 
his  tutor  a  lesson  out  of  a  book — on  this  lesson  the 
tutor  might,  at  his  discretion,  interpose  an  observa- 
tion, or  preserve  silence  ;  and  he  was  thus  effectually 
guaranteed  from  all  demands  beyond  his  ability  or 
inclination  to  meet.  This  reversed  process  was  still 
denominated  a  lecture.  In  like  manner,  all  subjects 
which  required  in  the  tutor  more  than  the  fellow's 
average  of  learning  or  acuteness,  were  eschewed.  Many 
of  the  most  important  branches  of  education  in  the 
legal  system  were  thus  discarded ;  and  those  which  it 


TAUGHT  IN  THE  UNIVERSITIES  OF  GREAT  BRITAIN.    425 

was  found  necessary  or  convenient  to  retain  in  the 
intrusive,  were  studied  in  easier  and  more  superficial 
treatises.    This,  in  particular,  was  the  case  with  logic. 

66  Until  the  statutory  system  was  superseded,  an 
energetic  and  improving  exercise  of  mind,  from  the 
intelligent  study  of  the  most  remarkable  monument  of 
philosophical  genius  imposed  on  all,  was  more  especially 
secured  in  those  who  would  engage  in  the  subsidiary 
business  of  tuition.  This,  and  other  conditions  of  that 
system,  thus  demanded  a  far  higher  standard  of  quali- 
fication in  the  tutor,  when  the  tutor  was  still  only  a 
subordinate  instructor,  than  remained  when  he  had 
become  the  exclusive  organ  of  academical  education. 
When,  at  last,  the  voice  of  the  professors  were  silenced 
in  the  university  and  in  the  colleges,  the  fellows  had 
been  able  to  exclude  all  other  graduates  from  the  new 
principal  office  of  tutor,  the  study  of  logic  declined  with 
the  ability  of  those  by  whom  the  science  was  taught. 
The  original  treatises  of  Aristotle  were  now  found  to 
transcend  the  college  complement  of  erudition  and 
intellect.  They  were  accordingly  abandoned ;  and  with 
these  the  various  logical  works  previously  in  academical 
use,  which  supposed  any  reach  of  thought,  or  an 
original  acquaintance  with  the  organon.  The  Compend 
of  Sanderson  stood  its  ground  for  a  season,  when  the 
more  elaborate  treatises  of  Brerewood,  Crakanthorpe, 
and  Smiglecius  were  forgotten.  But  this  treatise,  the 
excellent  work  of  an  accomplished  logician,  was  too 
closely  related  to  the  Organon,  and  demanded  too 
frequently  an  inconvenient  explanation,  to  retain  its 
place,  so  soon  as  another  text-book  could  be  introduced, 
more  accommodated  to  the  fallen  and  falling  standard 


426  BRIEF  ACCOUNT  OF  THE  SYSTEMS  OF  LOGIC 

of  tutorial  competency.  Such  a  text-book  was  soon 
found  in  the  Compendium  of  Aldrich."* 

Oxford's  modern  logical  history  is  brief,  and  soon 
told.  Aldrich's  logic  appeared  in  1691.  Of  the  nature 
and  merits  of  this  work,  the  learned  and  able  writer 
we  have  just  quoted,  observes,  "  Absolutely  considered, 
it  has  little  or  no  value :  it  is  but  a  slight  eclectic 
epitome  of  one  or  two  logical  treatises  in  common  use 
(that  it  is  exclusively  abridged  from  Wallis  is  incorrect); 
and  when  he  wanders  from,  or  mistakes  his  authorities, 
he  displays  a  want  of  information  to  be  expected, 
perhaps,  in  our  generation,  but  altogether  marvellous 
in  his.  It  is  clear  that  he  knew  nothing  of  the  organon, 
and  very  little  of  the  modern  logicians.  The  treatise 
likewise  omits  a  large  portion  of  the  most  important 
matters ;  and  those  it  does  not  exclude  are  treated  with 
a  truly  modifying  brevity.  As  a  slender  introduction 
to  the  after  study  of  logic  (were  there  not  a  hundred 
better),  it  is  not  to  be  despised;  as  a  full  course  of 
instruction,  as  an  independent  system  of  the  science,  it 
is  utterly  contemptible.  Yet,  strange  to  say,  the  Com- 
pend  of  Aldrich,  having  gradually  supplanted  the  Com- 
pend  of  Sanderson,  has  furnished,  for  above  a  century, 
the  little  all  of  logic  taught  in  these  latter  clays  by  the 
university  of  Bradwardin  and  Scotus."f 

About  five  and  twenty  years  ago,  Dr  Whately's 
Elements  of  Logic  made  their  appearance  at  Oxford, 
and  were  instantly  effective  in  giving  a  new  and  vigo- 
rous impulse  to  dialectic  pursuits.  We  shall  notice  this 
work  in  the  following  chapter.  In  the  mean  time  we 
may  mention,  that  the  doctor  informs  us  that  at  the 

*  Edin.  Review,  1833.  t  Ibid. 


TAUGHT  IN  THE  UNIVERSITIES  OF  GREAT  BRITAIN.    427 

period  of  the  publication  of  his  work  logical  studies 
were  at  the  lowest  ebb  at  the  university.  He  says,  "  a 
very  small  proportion  even  of  distinguished  students 
ever  became  proficients  in  logic,  and  by  far  the  greater 
proportion  pass  through  the  university  without  knowing 
any  thing  at  all  of  the  subject.  I  do  not  mean  that 
they  have  not  learned  by  rote  a  string  of  technical 
terms,  but  that  they  understand  absolutely  nothing 
whatever  of  the  principles  of  the  science." 

A  great  change  has  been  effected  in  Oxford  of  late 
years,  and  almost  solely  through  the  labours  of  Dr 
Whately.  Since  the  publication  of  his  Elements,  many 
excellent  works  have  made  their  appearance  from  this 
venerable  seat  of  learning,  in  different  departments  of 
logical  science,  some  of  which  will  be  noticed  more 
particularly  in  the  following  chapter  of  this  volume. 

The  logical  systems  taught  in  King's  College,  and 
University  College,  London,  since  their  respective  esta- 
blishment about  twenty  years  ago,  have  been  of  an 
eclectic  character,  partly  philosophical,  and  partly 
formal  or  syllogistic. 

We  shall  now  briefly  direct  attention  to  the  Scottish 
universities  in  reference  to  logical  studies.  These  are 
Edinburgh,  Glasgow,  St  Andrews,  and  Aberdeen. 

As  we  have  already  noticed,  the  leading  Scottish 
divines,  at  the  time  of  the  Reformation,  took  a  decided 
part  against  the  scholastic  logic,  and  did  every  thing 
they  could  to  effect  a  change  in  the  general  routine  of 
logical  studies  within  the  boundaries  of  their  jurisdic- 
tion. The  feeling  against  what  was  then  considered 
one  of  the  chief  instruments  of  papal  power,  still  mani- 
fested itself  long  after  the  principal  events  of  the  Eefor- 


428  BRIEF  ACCOUNT  OF  THE  SYSTEMS  OF  LOGIC 

mation  had  become  merely  matters  of  history.  But 
so  far  back  as  1647,  more  than  two  hundred  years  ago, 
the  General  Assembly  of  the  Church  of  Scotland,  on 
account  of  several  complaints  having  reached  it  relative 
to  the  manner  of  teaching  the  Aristotelian  logic, 
appointed  commissioners  to  inquire  into  the  alleged 
grievances,  and  to  suggest  a  remedy.  In  one,  among 
the  several  acts  of  this  commission,  it  is  declared,  "  that 
the  dyting  (dictating)  of  long  notes  has,  ill  times  past, 
proved  not  only  a  hindrance  to  the  necessary  studies, 
but  also  to  the  knowledge  of  the  text  itself,  and  to  the 
examination  of  such  things  as  are  taught ;  it  is  therefore 
recommended  by  the  commissioners  to  the  dean  and 
faculty  of  arts,  that  the  regents  (the  professors  who  had 
charge  of  educating  the  youth)  spend  not  so  much 
time  in  dyting  of  their  notes ;  that  no  new  lesson  be 
taught  till  the  former  be  examined ;  that  every  student 
have  the  text  of  Aristotle  in  Greek ;  and  that  the 
regent  first  analyse  the  text,  viva  voce,  and  thereafter 
give  the  sum  thereof  in  writing." 

In  1696,  a  parliamentary  commission  issued  a  variety 
of  particular  regulations  respecting  the  course  of  logic 
and  metaphysics  in  all  the  universities  of  Scotland. 
These  regulations  had  for  their  object  the  purging  of 
those  institutions  of  heresy  and  infidelity.  In  1699, 
this  commission  orders  the  several  principals  of  univer- 
sities "  to  go  through  the  whole  system  of  philosophy 
(logic  and  metaphysics),  to  compendize  it,  and  to  make 
their  remarks  thereon,  as  they  shall  think  fit ;  and  to 
present  their  remarks  to  the  commission  against  their 
first  meeting  in  June  next,  with  certification ;  if  they 
fail,  the  commission  will   censure  them  for  their  con- 


TAUGHT  IN  THE  UNIVERSITIES  OF  GREAT  BRITAIN.    429 

tempt."  In  a  second  meeting  of  the  commissioners,  a 
few  days  after  the  promulgation  of  this  order,  they 
enumerated  sixteen  separate  propositions  in  the  pre- 
scribed courses  of  logic  and  metaphysics,  which  they 
find  to  be  erroneous,  and  which  they  forbid  to  be 
taught,  because  they  were  contra  fidem  et  bonos  mores. 
About  the  same  date,  this  same  commission  ordered 
the  university  of  St  Andrews  to  send  to  the  university 
of  Edinburgh  copies  of  the  systems  of  logic  and  meta- 
physics taught  at  St  Andrews. 

The  causes  of  these  alleged  heresies  arose  from  cer- 
tain tenets  which  had  been  industriously  circulated 
throughout  the  Scottish  universities  on  the  Epicurean 
philosophy,  taken  from  the  commentaries  on  it,  pub- 
lished by  the  celebrated  Gassendi. 

It  does  not,  however,  appear  that  any  very  great 
changes  in  the  abstract  principles  of  logical  studies 
were  ever  recommended  by  the  Scottish  divines  as  a 
body.  What  changes  were  subsequently  effected  in 
the  several  universities  of  Scotland,  of  a  systematic 
character,  arose  from  individual  teachers  of  the  science, 
and  the  progress  of  philosophy  in  general. 

We  shall  now  make  a  few  statements  and  remarks 
on  the  several  universities  of  Scotland  in  regular  order. 

Glasgow  University.  —  This  university  has  been 
distinguished,  for  the  last  century  especially,  for  the 
importance  attached  to  logical  studies  ;  and  also  for  the 
great  and,  in  the  opinion  of  many,  judicious  changes 
introduced  into  the  mode  of  treating  the  science  of 
logic  generally,  both  as  to  its  principles  and  forms. 

The  logic  of  Ramus  was  introduced  here  at  the  time 


430  BRIEF  ACCOUNT  OF  THE  SYSTEMS  OF  LOGIC 

of  the  Reformation ;  and,  up  to  a  comparatively  modern 
date,  continued  to  be  exclusively  taught  within  the 
walls  of  this  university. 

In  1727,  a  royal  visitation  of  the  university  took 
place,  and  certain  changes  in  the  mode  and  times  of 
giving  lectures  on  logic  and  metaphysics  were  recom- 
mended by  it ;  but  these  alterations  only  effected  the 
plan  of  teaching  logic,  and  did  not  in  the  least  effect 
any  alteration  in  the  mode  of  discussing  the  principles 
of  the  science. 

In  1750,  Adam  Smith,  the  author  of  The  Wealth  of 
Nations,  was  appointed  to  the  logic  chair  in  Glasgow, 
but  he  only  held  it  for  one  year. 

In  1774,  Dr  Jardin  was  appointed  professor  of 
logic  in  Glasgow  university — a  man  of  active  mind  and 
sound  judgment.  He  made  great  alterations  in  the 
mode  of  studying  logic.  He  tells  us  that  his  "  class 
opened  on  the  10th  October  with  reading  and  com- 
menting on  some  portions  of  the  memorabilia  of  So- 
crates, which  exercise  continued  two  or  three  weeks, 
until  the  greater  part  of  the  students  were  assembled. 
On  the  1st  of  November,  the  proper  business  of  the 
course  began  with  an  explanation  of  Aristotle's  logic. 
This  subject  occupied  the  attention  of  the  class  till 
about  the  beginning  of  February,  when  the  professor 
entered  upon  metaphysics"  The  doctor  goes  on  to 
inform  us  how  the  public  feeling  against  the  scholastic 
or  old  logic  gradually  increased,  until  it  was  found 
absolutely  necessary  to  make  great  changes  in  the 
mode  of  teaching  logical  science.  He  says  :  "  Having 
myself  attended  the  logic  class  in  this  university,  I 
remember  well  the  general  impression  which  was  made 


TAUGHT  IN  THE  UNIVERSITIES  OF  GREAT  BRITAIN.    431 

upon  my  mind  by  the  lectures  then  delivered,  and  also 
the  opinion  which  was  entertained  of  them  by  the  more 
intelligent  of  my  fellow-students.  The  sentiment  which 
universally  prevailed  among  us  was,  that  though  the  pro- 
fessor explained  the  subjects  of  which  he  treated  with 
great  perspicuity  and  distinctness,  yet  no  useful  or  per- 
manent effects  could  possibly  result  from  his  prelections, 
either  in  the  way  of  promoting  activity  of  mind,  or  of 
establishing  sound  scientific  principles."  .  .  .  -  "  This 
conviction  of  the  general  uselessness,  and  even  positively 
hurtful  consequences,  of  spending  six  or  seven  months 
in  the  study  of  logic  and  metaphysics,  was  not  confined 
to  the  youth  within  the  walls  of  the  college.  From  the 
time  that  the  lectures  began  to  be  delivered  in  English, 
the  eyes  of  men  were  opened  to  the  unsuitable  nature 
of  the  subjects  of  which  they  treated ;  and  the  defects 
of  the  system,  as  embracing  a  very  important  part  of 
public  education,  became  every  day  more  striking,  and 
called  more  loudly  for  a  radical  reform.  It  was  ob- 
served by  those  who  interested  themselves  in  this 
question,  that  the  subjects  introduced  in  the  logic 
class,  even  when  perfectly  understood,  had  little  or  no 
connexion  with  that  species  of  knowledge  which  was 
necessary  to  prepare  the  student  either  for  the  specu- 
lative pursuits  of  science,  or  for  the  active  business  of 
life.  The  local  situation,  too,  of  this  university — in 
a  great  commercial  city,  where  a  quick  perception  of 
utility,  and  a  clear  insight  into  the  adaptation  of  means 
to  ends,  may  be  supposed  to  predominate — gave  fre- 
quent occasion  to  animadversions  on  our  scheme  of 
preparatory  instruction.  Intelligent  persons  who  sent 
their  sons  to  the  logic  class,  although  not  themselves 


432  BRIEF  ACCOUNT  OF  THE  SYSTEMS  OF  LOGIC 

proficient  in  literature,  could  not  fail  to  observe  that 
the  subjects  to  which  their  attention  was  directed  had 
no  relation  to  any  profession  or  employment  whatever ; 
that  the  discussions  connected  with  them  had  no  ana- 
logy to  those  trains  of  thinking  which  prevail  in  the 
ordinary  intercourse  of  society ;  and,  in  short,  that 
nothing  could  be  derived  from  prelections  on  such 
topics  which  was  likely  in  the  smallest  degree  either  to 
adorn  conversation,  or  to  qualify  the  student  for  the 
concerns  of  life."* 

Dy  Jar  din  goes  on,  in  his  Essay,  to  state  that  he 
found  it  was  absolutely  necessary  to  effect  a  great 
change  in  his  logical  instructions;  and,  after  much 
anxious  thought,  he  came  to  the  conclusion  of  ground- 
ing his  system  entirely  upon  an  analysis  of  the  mental 
faculties.  "The  particular  department,"  says  he,  " of 
mental  science  I  have  selected  for  the  business  of  this 
class,  is  an  analysis  of  the  powers  of  the  understanding, 
— perception,  attention,  consciousness,  reflection,  me- 
mory, imagination,  abstraction,  judgment,  and  reason- 
ing. The  object  of  this  analysis,  I  need  hardly  observe, 
is  to  communicate  distinct  notions  of  those  original 
faculties — their  operations  and  offices — their  connexion 
and  intimate  dependence  upon  each  other." 

This  formed  the  basis  of  Dr  Jardin's  logical  theory. 
He  did  not,  however,  altogether  discard  the  syllogism. 
He  thought  it  a  useful  instrument  in  particular  cases. 
The  following  remarks  convey  his  views  on  the  subject 
of  logic  generally,  as  fully  as  can  well  be  done  in  so 
short  a  compass  : — 

te  It   is  by  minute  attention  to  the  progress  of  the 

*  Outlines  of  a  Philo.  Education,  p.  25. 


TAUGHT  IN  THE  UNIVERSITIES  OF  GREAT  BRITAIN.    433 

reasoning  faculties,  in  the  different  situations  in  which 
man  is  placed,  that  we  shall  most  successfully  lay  the 
foundations  of  an  act  of  reasoning  ;  for  here  especially, 
according  to  Lord  Bacon,  we  must  obey  nature,  observe 
her  dictates,  and  follow  the  course  she  prescribes.  She 
imperatively  enjoins  that  the  first  efforts  of  art  should 
be  directed  to  the  improvement  of  those  powers  of  the 
mind  by  which  we  form  clear,  just,  and  distinct  notions 
— by  which  we  discriminate  likewise  differences  and 
relation  among  the  various  subjects  of  our  knowledge — 
as  being  the  only  solid  basis  for  an  enlightened  educa- 
tion. It  is  indeed  impossible  to  teach  men  to  reason 
until  they  have  been  first  taught  to  know — that  is,  to 
form  clear  and  accurate  conceptions  of  the  things  about 
which  they  are  to  reason ;  and,  when  the  former  pro- 
cess shall  be  correctly  accomplished,  few  rules  will  be 
necessary  to  direct  them  to  the  latter.  Thus,  in  the 
different  professions  and  occupations  of  life,  we  find 
that  men  reason  easily  and  justly  from  mere  habit,  and 
without  any  assistance  of  an  artificial  logic ;  because, 
from  their  daily  pursuits,  they  have  formed  distinct 
notions  relative  to  the  several  objects  about  which  their 
reason  is  employed. 

"  But  though,  by  this  natural  logic,  as  it  may  be 
called,  the  understanding  may  be  so  improved  as  to 
answer  all  the  practical  purposes  of  life,  it  frequently 
happens,  in  certain  cases  where  a  man  is  called  upon 
to  exercise  his  reason,  that  the  assistance  of  art  may  be 
extremely  useful.  When  the  objects  presented  to  the 
mind  are  of  an  abstract,  general,  or  complicated  nature, 
the    logical    instruments    of   definition,    division,    and 

2  E 


434  BRIEF  ACCOUNT  OF  THE  SYSTEMS  OF  LOGIC 

classification,  may  be  applied  with  great  advantage ; 
and  when,  in  the  comparison  of  different  objects,  of 
which  the  relations  are  so  remote  or  obscure  that 
they  cannot  be  discovered  but  by  means  of  intermediate 
ideas  connected  with  both  extremes,  the  faculty  of 
reason  finds  again  resources  in  art,  which,  by  suggesting 
certain  positions  and  arrangements  of  thought,  lead  the 
mind  by  safe  and  easy  steps  to  the  perception  of  truth. 
We  have  accordingly  received  from  the  philosophers 
of  Greece  an  art  for  improving  and  directing  the  power 
of  reason — a  system  of  rules  according  to  which,  in 
particular  cases  at  least,  comparison  may  be  fairly 
made,  and  conclusions  justly  deduced."* 

We  have  thus  been  induced  to  dwell  upon  the  system 
which  Dr  Jardin  introduced  into  the  university  of  Glas- 
gow at  some  length, — partly  from  the  extended  period 
he  occupied  the  logic  chair,  full  fifty  years,  and  partly 
from  the  widely  spread  and  distinguished  reputation  he 
has  left  behind  him  as  a  teacher  and  logician. 

We  shall  now  merely  add  a  few  remarks  from  the 
Commissioners'  Eeport  of  1830  relative  to  this  univer- 
sity : — "  Logic  is  here  taught  with  rhetoric.  The  first 
division  of  the  logical  course  contains  an  analysis  of  the 
powers  of  the  understanding,  with  the  means  of  im- 
proving, assisting,  and  directing  them  in  the  acquisition 
of  knowledge,  and  in  the  investigation  of  truth.  Dr 
Buchanan  continues  the  system  of  Dr  Jardin,  with 
such  alterations  as  his  own  experience  has  suggested 
to  him.  He  thinks  logic  could  not  be  taught  to 
young  persons  without  examination  ;  and  he  conceives 
the  examinations  and  the  hearing  of  essays  to  be  more 

*  Essay,  126. 


TAUGHT  IN  THE  UNIVERSITIES  OF  GREAT  BRITAIN.    435 

useful  than  delivering  lectures.     Average  number  of 
students  (1828),  150." 

Marischal  College,  Aberdeen. — This  college  was 
founded  in  1593.  Logic  was  here  originally  taught  in 
the  first  course  as  a  necessary  study  to  every  other. 
This  has  been  reversed  for  many  years,  and  it  now 
takes  the  last  place.  Logical  tuition  is  given  here  in 
conjunction  with  moral  philosophy. 

The  Commissioners'  Eeport  of  1830  states,  that  "  the 
system  followed  here  as  to  logical  studies  is,  that  the 
lecturer  must  shew  that  the  foundation  of  a  proper 
system  of  logic  must  be  laid  in  an  analysis  of  the  mental 
faculties ;  the  distinction  of  the  various  kinds  of  terms 
and  the  right  use  of  them  are  explained ;  the  nature 
and  varieties  of  propositions  are  pointed  out ;  there  is 
given  an  analysis  of  arguments,  shewing  how  then-  truth 
may  be  discovered,  or  their  fallacy  detected ;  and  there 
is  subjoined  a  description  of  the  methods  of  classifica- 
tion and  arrangement,  which  best  enables  us  to  retain 
and  to  apply  the  knowledge  we  have  acquired.  Ave- 
rage number  of  students  in  logic  class,  34." 

King's  College,  Aberdeen. — This  college  was  found- 
ed in  1506.  Logic  is  taught  in  this  establishment  in 
conjunction  with  rhetoric.  The  scholastic  system  was 
the  established  one  here  till  about  the  middle  of  the 
last  century. 

In  the  new  regulations  of  King's  College  in  1753,  it 
was,  among  other  things,  recommended  that  the  study 
of  logic  should  be  shortened,  to  give  more  time  for  the 
acquisition  of  historical  knowledge. 


436  BRIEF  ACCOUNT  OF  THE  SYSTEMS  OF  LOGIC 

Till  about  1760,  logic,  with  the  abstract  sciences, 
took  precedence  over  mathematics  and  natural  philo- 
sophy ;  because  it  was  alleged  that  these  sciences  could 
not  be  successfully  taught  while  men  were  ignorant  of 
the  art  of  reasoning  and  the  rules  of  judging.  But 
this  rule  was  altered  upon  the  ground,  "  that  mankind 
are  now  fully  convinced  of  the  inefficiency  of  the  syllo- 
gistic art  to  guide  the  understanding  in  the  discovery 
of  truth.  The  logic  which  can  answer  this  end  must 
have  for  its  groundwork  all  arts  and  sciences,  and  be 
founded  on  an  analysis  and  natural  history  of  the  in- 
tellectual faculties.  Every  illustration  and  maxim 
must  be  derived  from  these  sources ;  and  its  rules  can 
be  understood  no  further  than  the  several  sciences 
which  it  reviews  and  criticizes  are  understood.  Nor  is 
the  previous  knowledge  of  logical  rules  necessary  to- 
wards acquiring  the  elements  of  science.  Man  exercises 
his  understanding  before  he  is  formally  instructed  in 
the  rules  of  reasoning.  Upon  these  grounds,  logic 
was  considered  to  belong  more  naturally  to  the  last 
than  the  first  part  of  a  philosophical  course  of  educa- 
tion." 

St  Andrew's  University. — Up  to  the  period  of  the 
appointment  of  Mr  Henry  Bymer  to  the  logic  chair  of 
St  Andrews  in  1747,  the  logical  system  of  Peter  Ramus 
had  been  generally  taught  in  the  university.  Rymer, 
however,  was  a  zealous  disciple  of  Locke's,  and  a  great 
admirer,  too,  of  Bacon's  Novum  Organum ;  and  he 
made  the  first  regular  departure  from  the  old  formal 
system.  He  introduced,  as  a  course  of  preliminary 
lectures,  the  leading  logical  views  of  both  Bacon  and 


TAUGHT  IN  THE  UNIVERSITIES  OF  GREAT  BRITAIN.    437 

Locke.  Still,  however,  the  formal  or  syllogistic  rules 
were  retained,  but  made  to  follow  as  a  sort  of  secondary 
course  of  logical  study.  Mr  Kobert  Watson  succeeded 
Professor  Rymer  in  1756,  and  followed  the  same  gene- 
ral plan  of  tuition  as  his  predecessor. 

Mr  William  Barron  succeeded  Mr  Watson  in  1778. 
The  logical  system  which  Mr  Barron  taught  is  founded 
on  the  doctrines  of  the  common  sense  school  of  thinking. 
The  cultivation  of  the  understanding  or  reason,  he 
says,  ought  to  be  the  great  object  of  all  mental  im- 
provements. "  It  is  the  faculty  by  which  we  are  most 
distinguished  above  the  creatures  of  this  world,  and  by 
which,  perhaps,  we  partake  most  of  the  constitution  of 

superior    natures." "  Of  all   arts,   then,  that 

surely  is  entitled  to  attention  which  pretends  to  tell  us 
how  we  may  improve  and  properly  employ  this  most 
useful  faculty ;  and  logic  is  that  art.  The  professed 
purpose  of  it  is  to  teach  the  right  use  of  reason,  both 
in  the  investigation  and  in  the  communication  of  truth ; 
to  inform  us  how  to  introduce  clearness  and  good  order 
among  our  ideas ;  to  explain  the  operations  of  the 
mind  which  are  conversant  about  them ;  and  by  the 
proper  exercise  of  which  operations  we  shall  be  least  in 
danger  of  deviating  into  error."* 

According  to  this  view  of  the  object  of  logic,  he 
treats  it  under  two  leading  divisions : — the  nature  of 
ideas,  which  are  the  materials  on  which  the  reason  or 
understanding  acts ;  and  the  nature  of  the  faculties  or 
powers  of  the  mind  which  are  immediately  engaged 
in    the    act    of   reasoning.      The    explanations    under 

*  Barron's  Lectures,  vol.  ii.  p.  362. 


438  BRIEF  ACCOUNT  OF  THE  SYSTEMS  OF  LOGIC 

these  two  heads,  embrace  the  whole  science  or  art  of 
logic  which  can  be  of  any  utility  whatever. 

On  the  nature  of  the  syllogistic  logic,  Mr  Barron 
makes  the  following  remarks : — "  The  principal  opera- 
tions of  any  investigation  are  the  invention  of  inter- 
mediate ideas,  and  the  comparison  of  them  with  one 
another,  and  with  the  extremes.  The  invention  of 
middle  terms  is  the  chief  operation,  and  excellence  in 
it  is  the  most  important  qualification  any  inquirer  can 
possess.  It  seems  to  depend  on  natural  sagacity  and 
acuteness,  fortified  and  improved  by  exercise.  ~No  art 
can  be  of  any  use.  From  syllogism,  in  particular,  no 
aid  can  be  derived.  It  does  not  even  pretend  to  give 
any  aid.  Its  only  object  is  to  assist  in  the  second 
operation,  the  comparison  of  ideas ;  and  we  have  seen 
that  the  syllogistic  exhibition  is  not  more  perspicuous 
than  the  natural  one."  .  .  .  "  What  is  the  mystery  of 
this  mighty  syllogistic  art,  which  has  so  long  engaged 
the  attention  of  learned  men,  and  is  still  accounted 
by  many  of  that  description  to  contain  something 
mysterious,  or  to  be  an  analysis  of  the  art  of  reason- 
ing ?  It  is  no  more  than  this  :  whatever  agrees  with 
any  genus,  will  agree  with  ever  species  of  that  genus ; 
or  whatever  disagrees  with  any  genus,  will  disagree 
with  every  species  of  that  genus.  If  this  be  the  prin- 
ciple of  the  art,  can  we  wonder  at  the  self-evidence  of 
all  the  conclusions  of  all  its  syllogisms,  or  that  it  never 
gratified  science  or  business  with  the  discovery  of  any 
useful  truth?"* 

Mr  Joseph  Hunter  succeeded  Mr  Barron  as  profes- 

*  Lect.,  vol,  ii.  p.  540. 


TAUGHT  IK  THE  UNIVERSITIES  OF  GREAT  BRITAIN.    439 

sor  of  logic  in  1806.  He  followed  his  immediate  pre- 
decessor in  the  mode  of  treating  the  science,  making 
it  dependent  upon  a  knowledge  of  the  faculties  of  the 
understanding. 

The  Eeport  of  the  Parliamentary  Commission  of 
1830,  makes  the  following  statements  on  the  logical 
tuition  of  St  Andrews : — "  The  professor  of  logic 
teaches  one  class  on  five  days  of  the  week  one  hour, 
from  eleven  to  twelve  each  day.  He  commences  his 
prelections  with  an  investigation  of  the  powers  of  ex- 
ternal perception,  as  exercised  through  the  medium  of 
the  five  senses;  passing  thence  to  an  analysis  of  the 
intellectual  operations  of  attention,  conception,  ab- 
straction, association  of  ideas,  memory,  imagination, 
judgment,  and  reasoning,  he  next  considers  the  various 
sources  of  our  prejudices  and  errors,  and  the  means 
which  have  been  devised  to  guard  against  them ;  tak- 
ing here  a  hasty  survey  of  the  syllogistic  logic  of 
Aristotle,  and  pointing  out  the  advantages  which  in- 
duction, or  the  study  of  facts,  must  ever  possess  over 
the  multiplication  of  verbal  distinctions.  He  then 
concludes  his  logic  course  with  some  lectures  on 
method,  explaining  its  nature,  and  shewing  its  import- 
ance as  an  indispensable  preparation  for  profitable 
study,  and  for  perspicuous  and  persuasive  writing." 

Among  the  general  suggestions  of  the  Commissioners 
in  treating  of  the  university  of  St  Andrews,  is  one  point- 
ing out  the  advantages  which  would  follow  from  a  system 
of  examination  on  the  logical  lectures  delivered.  The 
report  states  :  "  Eow,  mere  lecturing  is  a  very  imperfect 
mode  of  teaching.  Addressing  itself  in  the  same  way 
to  minds  of  the  greatest  variety  as  to  acumen,  it  must 


440  BRIEF  ACCOUNT  OF  THE  SYSTEMS  OF  LOGIC 

necessarily  leave  a  multiplicity  of  matters  obscure  to 
some  that  may  be  perfectly  clear  and  comprehensible 
to  others,  and  may  thus  be  available  in  many  cases  to 
communicate  only  the  most  superficial  information.  It 
does  not,  moreover,  supply  necessarily  any  stimulus 
whatever  to  mental  exertion — any  excitement  to  culti- 
vate habits  of  reflection,  of  judging,  of  reasoning,  of 
arrangement,  of  statement  and  communication,  the 
great  object  of  all  academical  tuition.  Very  advanced 
students  may  perhaps  find  no  other  aid  necessary  for 
forwarding  them  in  their  course.  But  the  great  mass 
of  students  are  not  singularly  gifted  persons,  and  must 
be  catechised — must  be  dealt  with  in  easy  colloquy- — 
must  be  indulged  with  explanations — must  frequently 
perform  exercises,  in  order  to  insure  to  them  the  most 
ordinary  portion  of  learned  attainment."* 

Mr  William  Spalding  was  successor  to  Mr  Hunter, 
and  entered  on  his  duties  in  1845.  Professor  Spalding 
enters  more  fully  into  the  syllogistic  logic  in  his  lec- 
tures than  any  of  his  predecessors  for  the  last  century. 
The  number  of  logical  students  average  about  forty 
annually. 

Thus  we  see  that,  till  within  these  few  years,  the 
mere  formal  logic  was  almost  entirely  banished  from 
the  Scottish  colleges,  and  a  system  adopted  in  its  stead 
which  had  for  its  direct  object  the  improvement  of  the 
entire  mental  faculties,  with  a  view  of  conducting  the 
mind  to  the  highest  logical  manifestations.  This  mode 
of  teaching  logic  had  a  powerful  and  direct  tendency 
to  uphold  the  speculative  views  of  the  common  sense 
philosophy.    Indeed,  the  mode  of  teaching  this  science 

*  Report,  p.  51. 


TAUGHT  IN  THE  UNIVERSITIES  OF  GREAT  BRITAIN.    441 

was  a  pure  exponent  of  the  mental  principles  of  this 
school  relative  to  reasoning  generally. 

Edinburgh  University. — The  foundation  of  this  seat 
of  learning  is  intimately  associated  with  the  science  of 
logic.  It  may  be  said  to  have  been  founded  by  the 
labours  and  munificence  of  a  Mr  James  Lawson,  a 
minister  of  Edinburgh,  who  was  a  passionate  admirer 
of  logical  studies,  and  whose  aim  was  to  introduce  them 
to  public  notice  and  favour  through  the  medium  of  a 
school  on  an  extended  scale.  General  philosophy  was 
to  be  taught  in  it ;  but  the  scholars  were  to  be  instructed, 
in  an  effective  and  careful  manner,  in  every  thing  that 
appertained  to  dialectical  knowledge  and  skill. 

The  logical  system  of  Peter  Ramus  was  countenanced 
at  an  early  period  in  the  history  of  this  seat  of  learning. 
In  1604,  we  find  the  students  were  interrogated  on  his 
Dialectics  and  the  Ars  Syllogistica.  Porphyry  and  the 
categories  were  also  used — together  with  Aristotle's 
Topics  and  book  of  Sophisms.  In  1615,  we  find  a  Mr 
Young  professor  of  logic  in  this  university — a  gentle- 
man who  enjoyed  an  unrivalled  reputation  as  an  able 
and  subtile  expounder  of  Aristotle's  system. 

The  formal  appointment  of  the  logic  chair  in  Edin- 
burgh, bears  date  from  the  year  1708.  Up  to  a  certain 
period  this  chair  was  held  in  conjunction  with  that  of 
rhetoric. 

Mr  John  Stevenson  was  appointed  logical  professor 
in  1730.  The  science  of  metaphysics  was  likewise 
joined  to  his  chair.  The  logic  class  was  the  second  in 
the  course,  and  the  lectures  were  given  in  the  Latin 
language.     Mr  Stevenson,  it  appears,  did  not  admire 


442  BRIEF  ACCOUNT  OF  THE  SYSTEMS  OF  LOGIC 

the  scholastic  logic ;  but  he,  at  the  same  time,  thought 
it  his  duty  to  give  a  distinct  sketch  of  its  history  and 
nature,  and  to  render  that  art  which  had  been  the 
admiration  of  ages  in  some  measure  understood  by  his 
students.  His  conviction  was,  that  the  Aristotelian 
logic  presented  a  formidable  barrier  to  the  free  and 
expansive  movements  of  the  human  mind,  and  to  the 
extension  of  useful  and  popular  information;  and  he 
was,  consequently,  particularly  anxious  to  impress  upon 
the  minds  of  his  young  auditory,  that  truth  was  not  to 
be  discovered  by  the  employment  of  such  an  instru- 
ment. The  work  he  used  as  a  text-book  was  the  logical 
treatise  of  Heineccius.  He  did  not,  however,  follow  it 
slavishly,  as  may  readily  be  surmised — inasmuch  as  this 
work  is  strongly  tinged  with  Aristotelian  principles  and 
forms.  At  the  time  Mr  Stevenson  was  appointed  to  the 
logic  chair,  the  philosophy  of  Locke  had  just  reached 
the  university.  Mr  Stevenson  entered  warmly  into  its 
spirit,  and  was,  in  fact,  the  first  person  of  any  note  who 
introduced  to  academical  students  the  Essay  on  the 
Human  Understanding.  He  also  introduced  to  his 
class  Dr  Wynne's  abridgement  of  the  Essay,  which  he 
considered  a  highly  useful  publication.  A  short  time 
after,  Professor  Stevenson  adopted  this  abridgement  of 
Locke's  work  as  a  text-book,  and  was  thus  instrumental 
in  laying  the  foundation  of  the  English  philosophical 
system  in  the  university.  He  died  in  1775,  having 
held  the  logic  chair  £ov  forty -four  years. 

Mr  John  Bruce  was  appointed  Mr  Stevenson's  suc- 
cessor. His  system  of  logical  tuition  was  founded  on 
Locke  and  Bacon's  philosophy.  According  to  Bruce, 
scientific  evidence  rested  on  three  general  principles, — 


TAUGHT  IN, THE  UNIVERSITIES  OF  GREAT  BRITAIN.    443 

the  evidence  of  consciousness  or  attention,  the  evidence 
of  sensation,  and  the  evidence  of  cause  and  effect.  Mr 
Bruce  resigned  his  chair  in  1792. 

Dr  James  Finlayson  succeeded  Mr  Bruce,  and  held 
the  logic  chair  till  1808.  His  general  logical  instruc- 
tions were  grounded  on  the  principles  of  the  common 
sense  philosophy,  then  all  prevalent  in  Scotland.  Dr 
Finlayson  was  an  ardent  admirer  of  the  opinions  of  the 
late  Dugald  Stewart,  on  the  practicability  and  useful- 
ness of  a  philosophical  logic. 

Dr  David  Ritchie  was  Dr  Finlayson's  successor,  and 
filled  the  chair  till  the  appointment  of  Sir  William 
Hamilton  in  1836. 

The  Commissioners  appointed  to  examine  into  the 
Scotch  colleges  in  1830,  make  the  following  observa- 
tions, in  their  Report,  on  the  subject  of  logical  studies 
in  the  university  of  Edinburgh : — "  The  logic  class 
meets  one  hour  each  day,  for  five  days  of  the  week, 
during  the  session  of  five  months  and  a  half.  Some 
students  so  young  as  thirteen  have  entered  this  class ; 
but  in  general  they  are  about  fifteen  years  of  age,  and 
many  of  them  older.  The  average  number  who  attend 
is  from  170  to  175,  or  180.  The  lectures  are  divided 
into  four  parts, — the  first  consists  of  a  view  of  intellec- 
tual philosophy,  or  a  description  of  the  faculties  by 
which  we  acquire  the  elements  of  our  knowledge,  the 
laws  which  regulate  their  operation,  and  the  imperfec- 
tions to  which  they  are  liable,  with  hints  for  their 
improvement.  The  second  part  comprehends  the 
theory  of  evidence,  and  includes  a  view  of  demonstra- 
tive evidence,  of  the  evidence  of  sense,  consciousness, 
memory,  testimony,  experience,  analogy,  mixed  mathe- 


444    BRIEF  ACCOUNT  OF  THE  SYSTEMS  OF  LOGIC 

matics,  and  the  calculation  of  chances.  The  third 
includes  reasoning,  and  explaining  syllogistic  reason- 
ing, with  the  various  abridged  modes  of  it  in  common 
use,  and  the  sophisms  or  fallacious  reasonings  connected 
with  it ;  and,  secondly,  inductive  reasoning,  and  a  view 
of  the  prejudices  which  are  apt  to  mislead  the  mind. 
The  fourth  part  explains  the  analytical  and  synthetic 
method  of  conducting  our  reasonings,  as  well  as  the 
Socratic  and  controversial  method,  and  the  principles 
of  interpreting  written  documents.  The  course  con- 
cludes with  a  view  of  the  theory  of  language,  or  prin- 
ciples of  universal  grammar."* 

About  three  years  after  the  Report  of  the  Govern- 
ment Commissioners  on  the  state  of  the  Scotch  univer- 
sities, from  which  we  have  taken  some  passages,  there 
appeared  in  the  Edinburgh  Review  some  pungent 
remarks  on  the  state  of  logical  knowledge  and  tuition 
in  Scotland  generally.  The  writer,  Sir  William  Hamil- 
ton, observes,  that  in  the  colleges  "  of  Scotland  the 
chairs  of  logic  have  for  generations  taught  any  thing 
rather  than  the  science  which  they  nominally  profess — 
a  science,  by  the  way,  in  which  the  Scots  have  not 
latterly  maintained  the  reputation  once  established  by 
them  in  all,  and  still  retained  in  other  departments  of 
philosophy.  To  the  philosophers  of  our  country  we 
must  confess,  that  in  part  at  least  is  to  be  attributed 
the  prevalence  of  the  erroneous  notions  on  this  subject 
promulgated  by  Locke.  ~No  system  of  logic  deserving 
of  notice  ever  appeared  in  Scotland ;  and  for  Scottish 
writers  of  any  merit  we  must  travel  back  for  more 
than   two  centuries,   to   three   contemporary   authors. 

'  Report,  1830. 


TAUGHT  IN  THE  UNIVERSITIES  OF  GREAT  BRITAIN.    445 

whose  abilities,  like  those  indeed  of  almost  all  the 
more  illustrious  scholars  of  their  nation,  were  developed 
under  foreign  influence  —  to  Robert  Balfour,  Mark 
Duncan,  and  William  Chalmers,  professors  in  the 
universities  of  Bordeaux,  Samur,  and  Angers." 

Sir  William  Hamilton  succeeded  Dr  Ritchie  in  1836 
in  the  Edinburgh  University.  About  fours  years  after 
this,  it  is  said  that  the  professor  introduced  what  is 
termed  his  new  analytic  method  of  teaching  formal  logic. 
This  method  proceeds  on  a  thoroughgoing  quantification 
of  the  predicate.  By  the  adoption  of  this  principle  we  are 
told  that  "  past  evils  are  corrected,  past  omissions  sup- 
plied, and  logic  receives  its  highest  development  in  the 
perfection  and  simplicity  of  its  form." 

The  entire  doctrine  of  the  conversion  of  svlloo-isms 
is,  on  the  principle  of  this  new  analytic  method  of  Sir 
William's,  pronounced  to  be  useless  and  false.  "  This 
inconsistent  and  cumbrous  doctrine  resulted,  as  we 
have  said,  from  a  false  analvsis  bv  logicians  of  the  ele- 
ments  with  which  they  had  to  deal.  The  whole  doc- 
trine is  founded  upon  the  relation  of  quantity  between 
the  subject  and  predicate  in  a  proposition ;  but  if  a 
principal  element  of  that  relation  be  left  out,  the  doc- 
trine will  of  course  be  defective.  Logicians  stand 
chargeable  with  this  neglect.  They  commenced  to 
recompose  their  system  before,  by  thorough  decompo- 
sition, they  had  obtained  all  the  elements  requisite  for 
that  purpose."* 

In  Ireland  there  are  three  collegiate  institutions  where 

*  New  Analytic  of  Logical  Forms,  p.  30,  Edinburgh,  1850,  to  which  the  reader 
is  referred  for  a  full  account  of  the  system . 


446  BRIEF  ACCOUNT  OF  THE  SYSTEMS  OF  LOGIC 

logic  forms  an  essential  part  of  academical  learning  : 
Trinity  College,  Dublin,  the  Eoman  Catholic  College 
of  Maynooth,  and  the  three  Queen's  Colleges  of  Cork, 
Galway,  and  Belfast,  now  embodied  into  one  university. 

In  Trinity  College,  Dublin,  logic  has  been  taught 
from  the  system  of  Archbishop  Murray,  enlarged  and 
commented  on  by  Mr  Walker  and  other  writers.  In 
the  preface  to  the  edition  of  his  book  of  1847,  it  is 
stated  that  "  many  writers  consider  the  study  of  logic 
as  the  proper  introduction  to  a  metaphysic,  others  as 
intended  as  a  prelude  to  mathematical  pursuits,  and 
accordingly  works  on  logic  have  been  composed  with 
reference  to  either  of  these  views ;  but  until  some  sys- 
tem of  logic  is  produced  in  our  language,  which  is 
founded  upon,  and  grows  out  of  some  philosophical 
system,  it  is  surely  better  for  the  student  to  study  a 
purely  formal  logic,  independent  of  any  philosophical 
system,  and  yet  applicable  to  all.  Such  are  the  senti- 
ments of  a  celebrated  writer,  and  such  have  been  the 
views  of  the  University  of  Dublin  in  their  adoption  of 
the  present  treatise." 

In  the  introduction  to  the  archbishop's  work,  now 
used  as  a  text-book,  it  is  stated,  that  after  the  student 
goes  through  the  syllogistic  logic,  he  is  introduced  to 
the  new  or  modern  logic  of  Mr  Locke's  Essay  on  the 
Human  Understanding. 

In  the  Catholic  College  of  Maynooth,  in  Ireland, 
logic  is  taught  with  great  care  and  erudition.  All 
students  are  examined  on  the  science  when  they  enter 
the  college.  The  system  taught  is  of  a  comprehensive 
character,  although  the  text-books  in  common  use  pre- 
sent  but   a   meagre  outline   of  the  study.      But   the 


TAUGHT  IN  THE  UNIVERSITIES  OF  GEE  AT  BRITAIN.    447 

professor  of  logic  invariably  examines  the  students  in 
reference  to  their  knowledge  of  the  most  elaborate 
and  systematic  works.  The  logical  philosophy  coun- 
tenanced, however,  has  a  decided  leaning  to  theological 
science,  as  well  as  to  those  particular  views  of  scientific 
truth  which  the  Catholic  clergy  generally  entertain 
and  promulgate  in  their  ordinary  channels  of  philo- 
sophical literature.  The  number  of  logical  students 
amounts  to  about  sixty  annually. 

In  the  Queen's  Colleges,  the  logic  class  is  only  now 
about  to  open.  There  is  no  prescribed  mode  of  teach- 
ing the  science  ;  and  it  is  quite  open  to  the  several 
logical  professors  to  adopt  any  system  of  tuition,  in 
accordance  with  their  own  individual  judgment. 


448  LOGICAL  LITERATURE  OF  GREAT  BRITAIN 


CHAPTEE  XXII. 

THE  LOGICAL  LITERATURE  OF  GREAT  BRITAIN  AND  THE 
UNITED  STATES  OF  AMERICA,  OF  A  PHILOSOPHIC  AND 
SYSTEMATIC  CAST,  FROM  THE  YEAR  1800  TILL  THE  PRESENT 
DAY. 

The  logical  works  of  Great  Britain  during  the  last  half 
century  have  been  both  numerous  and  important.  The 
first  twenty  years  of  this  period  were  comparatively 
unfruitful ;  but  since  then  both  logical  studies  and 
literature  have  received  fresh  impulses  and  a  somewhat 
new  direction. 

At  the  commencement  of  this  century  we  have  Mr 
Belsham's  Logic  (1801).  He  defines  his  subject  thus  : 
"  The  use  of  logic  is  to  guide  and  assist  the  intellectual 
powers  in  the  investigation  of  truth,  and  the  commu- 
nication of  it  to  others."  .  .  .  "  Logic  is  not,  as  some 
have  supposed,  a  mere  explanation  of  scholastic  phrases, 
nor,  as  others  have  imagined,  the  art  of  disputing  by 
mechanical  forms ;  but  it  is  one  branch  of  the  theory 
of  the  human  mind  applied  to  a  valuable  practical 
purpose." 

Mr  Belsham  keeps  to  the  old  division  of  his  subject 
into  four  parts — Perception,  Judgment.  Reasoning,  and 


AND  THE  UNITED  STATES  OF  AMERICA.  449 

Disposition ;  the  four  operations  of  the  mind  employed 
in  the  acquisition  and  communication  of  knowledge. 

Dr  Richard  Kirwan's  Logic  (1807)  is  a  highly  re- 
spectable and  useful  treatise.  He  defines  logic  thus  : — 
(;  Logic  is  both  a  science  and  an  art  ;  it  is  a  science 
inasmuch  as,  by  analysing  the  elements,  principles,  and 
structure  of  arguments,  it  teaches  us  how  to  discover 
their  truth,  or  detect  their  fallacies,  and  point  out  the 
sources  of  such  errors.  It  is  an  art,  inasmuch  as  it 
teaches  how  to  arrange  arguments  in  such  a  manner 
that  their  truth  may  be  most  readily  perceived,  or  their 
falsehood  detected.''  * 

Up  to  the  year  1820,  the  writings  of  Dngald  Stewart 
on  mental  philosophy  occupied  the  chief  place  in  public 
estimation,  relative  to  the  abstract  nature  and  application 
of  the  principles  of  logical  science.  Some  of  his  principal 
works  made  their  appearance  during  the  early  part  of  the 
present  century.  They  abound  with  many  most  ingeni- 
ous speculations  on  logical  studies  generally,  and  on  the 
varied  character  of  the  evidence  which  belongs  to  many 
individual  departments  of  scientific  investigation.  Much, 
valuable  instruction  is  to  be  derived  from  the  volumes  he 
published  within  the  period  now  mentioned.  We  shall 
not,  however,  refer  to  them  again,  as  we  have  already 
made  a  formal  allusion  to  them  in  a  previous  chapter. 
We  have  classed  their  highly-gifted  author  with  the 
philosophical  school  to  which  he  belonged,  and  to  which 
lie  was  so  great  an  ornament. 

When  Dr  Thomas  Brown's  Lectures  on  the  Philo- 
sophy of  the  Human  Mind  (1822)  made  their  appear- 
ance, a  new  direction  was  given  to  mental  science ;  and 

*  Vol.  i.  p.  1. 
2  F 


450  LOGICAL  LITERATURE  OF  GREAT  BRITAIN 

the  subject  of  reasoning,  and  logical  deduction  and 
inference,  were  handled  after  a  new  fashion.  Brown's 
theory  of  the  argumentative  process  was  altogether 
different  from  that  of  his  predecessor's,  Professor 
Stewart :  in  fact,  they  had  nothing  in  common,  save 
perhaps  the  unity  of  sentiment  which  both  philosophers 
expressed  on  the  inutility  of  the  syllogism,  or  all  mere 
formal  looic. 

The  science  of  looic  or  of  reasoning  forms  one  of  the 
divisions  in  Brown's  system  of  the  philosophy  of  mind. 
His  general  position  is,  that  there  are  no  independent 
or  distinct  faculties  of  the  intellect,  but  simply  different 
states  of  it.  Every  thing  is  merged  into  one  universal 
law,  which  he  calls  the  Jaiv  of  suggestion.  This  sugges- 
tion is  either  simple  or  relative.  All  reasoning  belongs 
to  the  latter.  Propositions  of  every  kind  are  but  the 
verbal  enunciation  of  the  relation  of  two  terms.  Every 
proposition  implies  an  analysis ;  and  there  may  be 
propositions  expressive  of  position,  of  resemblance,  of 
order,  of  proportion,  of  degree,  and  of  comprehension. 

Brown  makes  no  distinction  between  reason  and 
judgment — a  distinction  which  is  found  in  almost  every 
other  work  on  logic.  Eeasoning  with  him  is  nothing 
more  than  a  series  of  relative  suggestions,  or  feelings 
of  relation,  which,  in  being  expressed  in  formal  lan- 
guage, constitute  a  series  of  propositions.  The  terms 
reason  and  judgment,  may  be  indifferently  applied  to 
the  susceptibility  of  feeling  these  relations.  He  says, 
"  The  natural  progress  of  reasoning  I  have  already 
explained  to  you,  and  illustrated  by  examples,  both  of 
the  analytic  and  proportional  kind.  One  conception 
follows  another  conception,  according  to  certain  laws 


AXD  THE  UNITED  STATES  OF  AMERICA.  451 

of  suggestion,  to  which  our  Divine  Author  lias  adapted 
our  mental  constitution ;  and,  by  another  set  of  laws 
which  the  same  Divine  Author  has  established,  certain 
feelings  of  relation  arise  from  the  consideration  of  the 
suggesting  and  suggested  object.  This  is  all  in  which 
reasoning,  as  felt  by  us,  truly  consists.  We  have  the 
conception  of  A ;  it  suggests  B ;  and  these  two  con- 
ceptions coexisting,  we  feel  some  relation  which  they 
bear  to  each  other,  B,  thus  suggested,  suggests  C ; 
and  the  relation  of  these  is  felt  in  like  manner;  and 
thus,  through  the  longest  ratiocination,  analytical  or 
proportional,  each  subject  of  our  thought  suggests 
something  which  forms  a  part  of  it,  and  is  involved  in 
it,  or  something  which  has  to  it  a  certain  relation  of 
proportion ;  and  the  relation  of  comprehension  in  the 
one  case,  or  of  proportion  in  the  other  case,  is  felt 
accordingly  at  every  step.  Nothing,  surely,  can  be 
simpler  than  a  process  of  this  kind ;  and  it  is  not  easy 
to  conceive  how  the  process  could  be  made  shorter 
than  nature  herself  has  rendered  it,  unless  every 
truth  were  known  to  us  by  intuition.  Objects,  and 
the  relation  of  objects — these  are  all  which  reasoning 
involves ;  and  these  must  always  be  involved  in  every 
reasoning,  While  reasoning,  then,  or  a  series  of  pro- 
positions, is  necessary  for  the  development  of  truth, 
the  intervening  conceptions  which  form  the  subjects 
of  those  propositions  that  connect  one  remote  concep- 
tion with  another,  must  arise  successively  in  the  mind, 
and  their  relations  be  felt,  in  like  manner,  successively. 
What  is  it  which  the  syllogistic  art  would  confer  on  us 
in  addition  ?  To  shorten  the  process  of  arriving  at 
truth,  it  forces  us  to  use  in  every  case  three  proposi- 


452  LOGICAL  LITERATIM  OF  GREAT  BRITAIN 

tions,  instead  of  the  two  which  nature  directs  us  to 
use.  Instead  of  allowing  us  to  say,  i  Man  is  fallible;  be 
may  therefore  err  even  when  be  thinks  himself  most 
secure  from  error' — which  is  the  spontaneous  order  of 
analysis  in  reasoning — -the  syllogistic  art  compels  us  to 
take  a  longer  journey  to  the  same  conclusion  by  the 
use  of  what  it  calls  a  major  proposition — a  proposition 
which  never  rises  spontaneously,  for  the  best  of  all 
reasons,  that  it  cannot  rise  without  our  knowledge 
of  the  very  truth  which  is  by  supposition  unknown. 
To  proceed  in  the  regular  form  of  a  syllogism,  we 
must  say,  'All  beings  that  are  fallible  may  err  even 
when  they  think  themselves  most  secure  from  error. 
But  man  is  a  fallible  being ;  he  may  therefore  err  even 
when  he  thinks  himself  most  secure  from  error.'  In 
our  spontaneous  reasonings,  in  which  we  arrive  at 
precisely  the  same  conclusions,  and  with  a  feeling  of 
evidence  precisely  the  same,  there  are,  as  I  have  said, 
no  major  propositions,  but  simply  what,  in  this  futile 
art,  are  termed  technically  the  minor  and  the  conclu- 
sion. The  invention  and  formal  statement  of  a  major 
proposition,  then,  in  every  case,  serve  only  to  retard 
the  progress  of  discovery,  not  to  quicken  it,  or  render 
it  in  the  slightest  degree  more  sure."  Again,  he 
observes,  "  The  syllogism,  therefore,  which  proceeds 
from  the  axiom  to  the  demonstration  of  particulars, 
reverses  completely  the  order  of  reasoning,  and  begins 
with  the  conclusion  in  order  to  teach  us  how  we  may 
arrive  at  it.  It  is  in  the  great  journey  of  truth,  as  if,  in 
any  of  our  common  journeyings  from  place  to  place — 
from  Edinburgh  to  London,  for  example — we  were  to 
be  directed  first  to  go  to  London,  and  then  to  find  out 


AND  THE  UNITED  STATES  OF  AMERICA.  453 

York,  or  some  other  intermediate  town,  when  we 
might  be  quite  sure  of  knowing  the  way  from  York  to 
London,  because  we  must  already  have  travelled  it. 
Is  this  the  sort  of  direction  which  we  could  venture  to 
give  to  any  traveller  ?  or  would  not  every  traveller,  if 
we  were  to  venture  to  give  them  such  a  direction, 
smile  at  our  folly  ?"* 

On  the  nature  of  logical  science  generally,  Dr 
Brown  makes  the  following  remarks : — "  That  there 
may  be,  or  rather  that  there  is,  a  rational  logic,  I 
am  far  from  denying ;  and  many  useful  directions,  in 
conformity  with  a  certain  system  of  rules,  may  be 
given  to  the  inexperienced  student,  that  may  facilitate 
to  him  acquisition  of  knowledge,  which,  but  for  such 
directions,  he  would  have  made  only  more  slowly,  or 
perhaps  not  made  at  all.  The  art  of  reasoning,  how- 
ever, which  a  judicious  logic  affords,  is  not  so  much 
the  art  of  acquiring  knowledge  as  the  art  of  commu- 
nicating it  to  others,  or  recording  it  in  a  manner  that 
may  be  most  profitable  for  our  own  future  advance- 
ment in  the  track  which  we  have  been  pursuing."  .  .  . 
•'•  If  an  art  of  reasoning  is  to  be  given  to  us,  it  is  surely 
to  be  an  art  which  is  to  render  the  acquisition  of 
knowledge  more  easy,  not  more  difficult — an  art  which 
is  to  avail  itself  of  the  natural  tendency  of  the  mind  to 
the  discovery  of  truth,  not  to  counteract  this  tendency, 
and  to  force  the  mind,  if  it  be  possible,  to  suspend  the 
very  progress  which  was  leading  it  to  truth." 

Thus  we  see,  that  it  is  the  distinctive  characteristic 
of  Dr  Brown's  theory  of  reasoning,  that  all  the  logical 
powers  of  the  understanding  are  absorbed  in  conscious^ 

*  Lecture  49  > 


454  LOGICAL  LITERATURE  OF  GREAT  BRITAIN 

ness,  and  tills  consciousness  is  again  resolved  into 
simple  feeling.  There  is  but  one  principle  or  law  of 
the  mind — that  of  suggestion — which  regulates  the 
several  combinations  and  successions  of  feelings,  and 
which  imparts  that  unity  of  operation  and  design 
which  enters  into  every  conception  we  can  form  of 
mind  or  intellect  as  a  whole.  In  reference  to  cause 
and  effect/  which  enter  into  the  logical  systems  of 
many  authors,  Dr  Brown  identifies  causation  with 
succession.  The  principle  he  holds  is  simply  this — 
Every  cause  is  an  invariable  antecedent ;  therefore 
every  invariable  antecedent  is  a  cause. 

Archbishop  Whately's  Elements  of  Logic  (1825), 
is  one  of  the  most  important  and  influential  logical 
publications  of  modern  times.  It  is  an  able  and 
popular  exposition  of  the  scholastic  logic ;  and  has, 
in  fact,  been  the  main  instrument  in  producing  the 
revival  of  the  syllogistic  system  in  Great  Britain.  The 
work  has  gone  through  many  editions,  and  is  used 
more  or  less,  in  several  seats  of  learning,  as  an  ordinary 
text-book  for  logical  students. 

The  archbishop  informs  us,  that  f(  logic,  in  the 
most  extensive  sense  which  the  name  can  with  pro- 
priety be  made  to  bear,  may  be  considered  as  the 
science,  and  also  as  the  art  of  reasoning.  It  investi- 
gates the  principles  on  which  argumentation  is  con- 
ducted, and  furnishes  rules  to  secure  the  mind  from 
error  in  its  deductions.  Its  most  appropriate  office, 
however,  is  that  of  instituting  an  analysis  of  the  pro- 
cess of  the  mind  in  reasoning,  and  in  this  point  of 
view  it  is,  as  has  been  stated,  strictly  a  science ;  while, 
considered  in  reference   to  the  practical  rules  above 


AND  THE  UNITED  STATES  OF  AMERICA.  455 

mentioned,  it  may  be  called  the  art  of  reasoning.  This 
distinction,  as  will  hereafter  appear,  has  been  over- 
looked, or  not  clearly  pointed  out,  by  most  writers  on 
the  subject ;  logic  having  been  in  general  regarded  as 
merely  an  art,  and  its  claim  to  hold  a  place  among  the 
sciences  having  been  expressly  denied." 

This  definition  of  the  nature  and  offices  of  logic  lias 
been  the  subject  of  numerous  criticisms,  embracing 
very  opposite  opinions  and  statements.  We  cannot 
enter  into  these,  except  by  merely  stating  that  this 
account  of  logic  is  very  incorrect,  and  in  some  points 
contradictory.  It  is  abundantly  proved  by  the  most 
cursory  glance  at  the  history  of  logic,  that,  in  opposi- 
tion to  the  statements  of  the  archbishop,  the  opinion  of 
its  ranking  as  a  science  is  almost  the  uniform  one  in 
all  ages.  This  error  of  the  definition  is  simply  an  error 
of  a  matter  of  fact.  The  contradiction  involved  in  it 
is  apparent.  The  author  says,  "  The  most  appropriate 
office  of  looic  is  that  of  instituting  an  analysis  of  the 
process  of  the  mind  in  reasoning ;"  and  then  again,  "that 
the  process  of  reasoning  is  alone  the  appropriate  pro- 
vince of  logic."  If  the  object  of  logic  is  to  analyse  the 
process  of  reasoning,  then  logic  must  be  identified  with 
the  science  of  mind ;  for  this  science  does,  among 
other  things,  profess  to  make  such  an  analysis.  But 
when  the  archbishop's  definition  is  contrasted  with 
other  portions  of  his  work,  the  contradiction  is  still 
more  marked  and  irrreconcilable.  He  says,  "  In 
introducing  the  mention  of  language  previously  to  the 
definitions  of  logic,  I  have  departed  from  established 
practice,  in  order  that  it  may  be  clearly  understood 
that  logic   is    entirely  conversant    about   language — a 


456  LOGICAL  LITERATURE  OF  GREAT  BRITAIN 

truth  which  most  writers  on  the  subject,  if  indeed  they 
were  fully  aware  of  it  themselves,  have  certainly  not 
taken  due  care  to  impress  on  their  readers."*  .  .  . 
"  Logic  is  wholly  concerned  in  the  use  of  lan- 
guage." f 

"  All  reasoning,"  says  the  author  again,  "  rests  on 
the  one  simple  principle,  that  what  is  predicated,  either 
affirmatively  or  negatively,  of  a  term  distributed,  may 
be  predicated  in  like  manner  of  any  thing  contained 
under  that  term."  .  .  .  "  Whatever  the  subject  matter 
of  an  argument  may  be,  the  reasoning  itself,  con- 
sidered by  itself,  is  in  every  case  the  same  process ;  and 
if  the  writers  against  logic  had  kept  this  in  mind,  they 
would  have  been  cautious  of  expressing  their  contempt 
of  what  they  call  '  syllogistic  reasoning,'  which  is  in 
truth  all  reasoning ;  and,  instead  of  ridiculing  Aristotle's 
principle  for  its  obviousness  and  simplicity,  would  have 
perceived  that  these  are  in  fact  its  highest  praise — the 
easiest,  shortest,  and  most  evident  theory,  provided  it 
answer  the  purpose  of  explanation,  being  ever  the 
best," 

The  archbishop,  however,  nearly  makes  a  complete 
shipwreck  of  this  doctrine,  so  decidedly  laid  down. 
On  the  nature  of  sophisms,  he  says,  "  It  is  to  be 
observed,  however,  that  in  all  correct  reasoning  the 
premises  virtually  imply  the  conclusion ;  so  that  it  is 
not  possible  to  make  precisely  the  distinction  between 
the  fallacy  in  question  (the  petitio  prindpii)  and  fair 
argument," 

Archbishop  A\  nately's  account  of  induction  is  as 
follows : — "  Logic  takes  no  cognisance  of  induction  for 

*  Elem.,  p.  5G.-  f  Ibid.,  p.  74. 


AND  THE  UNITED  STATES  OF  AMERICA.  457 

instance,  or  of  a  priori  reasoning;  &c,  as  distinct  forms 
of  argument ;  for  when  thrown  into  the  syllogistic 
form,  and  when  letters  of  the  alphabet  are  substituted 
for  the  terms  (and  it  is  thus  that  an  argument  is  pro- 
perly to  be  brought  under  the  cognisance  of  logic), 
there  is  no  distinction  between  them ;  e.  cj.y  c  a  property 
whicl i  belongs  to  all  horned  animals;  rumination  be- 
longs to  these  ;  therefore  to  all.'  This,  which  is  an 
inductive  argument,  is  evidently  a  syllogism  in  Bar- 
bara. The  essence  of  an  inductive  argument  (and  so 
of  the  other  kinds  which  are  distinguished  from  it) 
consists,  not  in  the  form  of  the  argument,  but  in  the 
relation  which  the  subject  matter  of  the  premises  bears 
to  the  conclusion.'' — (P.  110.)  And  again: — "In 
the  process  of  reasoning  by  which  we  deduce,  from  our 
observation  of  certain  known  cases,  an  inference  with 
respect  to  unknown  ones,  we  are  employing  a  syllogism 
in  Barbara  with  the  major  premiss  suppressed;  that 
being  always  substantially  the  same,  as  it  asserts  that 
4  what  belongs  to  the  individual  or  individuals  we  have 
examined,  belongs  to  the  whole  class  under  which  they 
come.'  "—(P.  216.) 

By  the  advocates  for  strictly  formal  logic,  the  arch- 
bishop has  been  charged  with  deviating  from  their, 
and  even  his  own  principles,  by  assigning  certain 
offices  to  the  syllogism  which  are  entirely  foreign  to 
its  nature.  He  observes,  "  It  belongs  exclusively  to  a 
syllogism,  properly  so  called  (i.  e.,  a  valid  argument  so 
stated  that  its  conclusiveness  is  evident  from  the  mere 
form  of  the  expression),  that  if  letters,  or  any  other 
unmeaning  symbols,  be  substituted  for  the  several 
terms,  the  validity  of  the  argument  shall  still  be  evi- 


458  LOGICAL  LITERATURE  OF  GREAT  BRITAIN 

dent."  The  following  statements  are,  however,  in 
direct  opposition  to  this  doctrine : — "  Should  there  be 
no  sign  at  all  to  the  common  term,  the  quantity  of  the 
proposition  (which  is  called  an  indefinite  proposition) 
is  ascertained  by  the  matter  ;  that  is,  the  nature  of  the 
connexion  between  the  extremes,  which  is  either  neces- 
sary, impossible,  or  contingent"  It  is  contended,  that 
by  here  admitting  the  matter  of  a  syllogism  as  an 
element  of  its  argumentative  conclusiveness,  the  entire 
principle  of  formal  logic  is  surrendered.  A,  B,  and  C, 
it  is  said,  know  nothing  whatever  of  what  is  necessary, 
impossible,  or  contingent. 

We  regret  we  cannot  enter  more  fully  into  the 
merits  of  the  Elements  of  Logic,  Particular  views  of 
the  author's  system,  as  a  whole,  will  fall  in  our  way  as 
we  proceed  to  notice  other  recent  logical  publications. 
We  cannot,  however,  refrain  from  giving  a  sentence  or 
two  from  the  pen  of  Sir  "William  Hamilton,  published 
a  few  years  after  the  appearance  of  the  archbishop's 
treatise : — "  The  work,  indeed,  never  transcends,  and 
generally  does  not  rise  to  the  actual  level  of  the 
science ;  nor,  with  all  its  ability,  can  it  justly  pretend 
to  more  than  a  relative  and  local  importance.  Its 
most  original  and  valuable  portion  is  but  the  insuffi- 
cient correction  of  mistakes  touching  the  nature  of 
logic,  long  exploded,  if  ever  harboured,  among  the 
countrymen  of  Leibnitz,  and  only  lingering  among  the 
disciples  of  Locke."  * 

There  were  several  writers  on  logic  immediately  fol- 
lowed Dr  Whately,  whose  treatises  may  be  consulted 
with  advantage.    Among  the  number,  we  may  mention 

*  Edin,  Rev.,  1833. 


ASD  THE  UNITED  STATES  OF  AMERICA.  459 

Introduction  to  Logic  (1827),  by  the  Eev.  Samuel 
Hinds ;  Questions  on  Aldriclrs  Logic  (1829) ;  An 
Examination  of  some  Passages  in  Dr  Whatehfs  '  Ele- 
ments,'' by  G.  C.  Lewis,  Esq. ;  and  Outline  of  a  New 
System  of  Logic  (1827),  by  G.  Bentham,  Esq. 

Though  not  assuming  the  shape  of  a  regular  treatise, 
we  feel  bound  to  give  a  formal  notice  of  Sir  William 
Hamilton's  article  on  several  logical  publications,  in 
the  Edinburgh  Review  for  April  183-3.  This  paper 
has  had  no  small  degree  of  influence  over  logical  specu- 
lations in  this  country  since  its  appearance  :  and  on 
this  account,  as  well  as  for  its  intrinsic  merits,  we  feel 
justified  in  giving  a  brief  and  passing  summary  of  the 
chief  points  discussed  in  the  article  in  question,  for  the 
especial  use  and  guidance  of  those  who  feel  an  interest 
in  the  subject.  This  periodical  communication  forms, 
in  fact,  a  distinct  landmark  in  the  modern  history  of 
logic. 

The  learned  author  gives  a  brief  sketch  of  the  state 
of  logical  science  in  Scotland,  Cambridge,  Oxford,  and 
Dublin.  He  then  commences  to  notice  Dr  Wnately'a 
Logic,  and  the  treatises  of  several  other  logicians, 
pointing  out,  as  he  proceeds,  some  of  the  chief  errors 
into  which  they  have  respectively  fallen.  Sir  "William's 
remarks  on  the  question,  whether  logic  be  a  science  or 
an  art,  or  both,  are  entitled  to  especial  notice.  He 
lavs  down  the  position,  that  the  laws  of  thought,  and 
not  the  laws  of  reasoning,  constitute  the  proper  objects 
of  logical  science.  On  the  real  nature  and  intrinsic 
value  of  Aristotle's  purely  iogical  works,  there  are 
many  important  statements  given   by  the  able  critic. 


460  LOGICAL  LITERATURE  OF  GREAT  BRITAIN 

Sir  William  denies  that  the  schoolmen  were  ever  guilty 
of  attempting  to  employ  logic  for  the  purpose  of  physi- 
cal discoveries — an  accusation  often  made  against  them, 
but  without  any  solid  foundation  whatever.  "  Logic  is 
a  formal  science  ;  it  takes  no  consideration  of  real 
existence,  or  of  its  relations,  but  is  occupied  solely 
about  that  existence  and  those  relations  which  arise 
through,  and  are  regulated  by,  the  conditions  of 
thought  itself.  Of  the  truth  or  falsehood  of  proposi- 
tions in  themselves,  it  knows  nothing,  and  takes  no 
account ;  all  in  logic  may  be  held  true  that  is  not  con- 
ceived as  contradictory.  In  reasoning,  logic  guarantees 
neither  the  premises  nor  the  conclusions,  but  merely 
the  consequence  of  the  latter  from  the  former ;  for  a 
syllogism  is  nothing  more  than  the  explicit  assertion  of 
the  truth  of  one  proposition,  on  the  hypothesis  of  other 
propositions  being  true  in  which  that  one  is  implicitly 
contained.  A  conclusion  may  thus  be  true  in  reality 
(as  an  assertion),  and  yet  logically  false  (as  an  infer- 
ence)." The  truth  or  falsehood  being  extra-logical, 
so  likewise  is  the  modality  of  the  syllogism.  The 
syllogistic  inference  is  always  necessary ;  it  comes 
under  no  extra-formal  condition,  but  is  equally  apo- 
dictic  in  contingent  as  in  necessary  matter." 

Our  critic,  after  having  disposed  of  some  minor 
matters,  proceeds  to  examine  some  positions  relative  to 
categorical,  hypothetical,  and  disjunctive  syllogisms, 
and  the  enthymeme,  and  lays  down  several  important 
rules  relative  to  their  nature  and  application.  On  the 
use  of  the  terms  induction  and  deduction,  and  of  their 
correct  philosophical  meaning,  we  have  many  excellent 


A XI)  THE  UNITED  STATES  OF   AMERICA.  461 

and  profound  critical  remarks.  This  part  of  Sir 
William's  critique  is  by  far  the  most  acute  and  most 
ably  argued. 

If  any  proof  were  wanting  of  the  opposite  and  irre- 
concilable opinions  men  entertain  at  the  present  day 
of  logical  science,  it  would  be  furnished  by  a  reference 
to  the  New  System  of  Logic  (1839)  of  Mr  Bosanquet. 
Here  we  have  the  scholastic  dogmatists  of  all  shades 
set  at  nought,  and  their  entire  system  considered  little 
better  than  a  piece  of  gross  and  mischievous  delusion. 

The  author  tells  us  that  the  Aristotelian  logic,  taken 
as  a  whole,  is  manifestly  inconsistent  with  a  Divine 
revelation,  because  it  adopts  a  style  of  reasoning  alto- 
gether opposed  to  its  special  character  and  offices. 
For  this  chief  reason,  the  existing  svstems  of  logic, 
which  are  founded  upon  it,  ought  to  be  set  aside,  and 
a  more  rational  and  perfect  one  substituted  in  its 
stead.  The  Grecian  dialectics  being  of  heathen  origin, 
they  weaken  the  proper  tone  of  the  mind,  run  counter 
to  Christian  principle,  and  give  a  wrong  direction  to 
those  processes  of  analysis  and  reasoning,  called  into 
requisition  in  all  theological  investigations  and  re- 
searches. "  The  mind  which  lias  been  trained  and 
formed  in  the  schools  of  Grecian  wisdom,  cannot  see 
the  truths  of  Christianity.  To  the  Greeks  they  must 
still  be  foolishness."*" 

As  Aristotle's  logic  is  one  of  the  main  supports  of 
this  heathen  system,  the  author's  object  is  to  refute  its 
chief  principle,  the  syllogism,  and  display  its  utter 
incompetency  to  accomplish  what  it  professes  to  per- 
form.    This  logic,  the  author  maintains,  is  founded  on 

*  Logic,  p,  10. 


4G2  LOGICAL  LITERATURE  OF  GREAT  BRITAIN 

a  false  principle ;  inasmuch  as  it  commences  with  a 
division  of  the  operations  of  the  mind,  the  proper  sub- 
jects of  which  are  thoughts  and  ideas ;  and  then  it 
abruptly  passes  on  to  language,  which  is  a  very  imper- 
fect means  of  representing  them.  The  consequence  of 
this  is,  that  the  logic  does  not  treat  of  thoughts  and 
ideas,  but  only  gives  us  rules  for  the  use  of  language — 
an  imperfect  substitute  for  an  instrument  which  is  itself 
imperfect.  Besides,  the  division  of  the  intellectual 
operations  is  absurdly  imperfect.  The  distinction  made 
between  judgment  and  reasoning  is  without  any  foun- 
dation. Judging  and  reasoning,  for  logical  purposes, 
are  one  and  the  same  thing.  In  order  to  support  the 
Aristotelian  division,  a  the  whole  province  of  judg- 
ment is  made  to  consist  in  the  mechanical  use  and 
estimate  of  such  forms  of  words  as  convey  a  simple 
affirmation  or  negation ;  being,  it  is  true,  by  a  fortui- 
tous and  figurative  coincidence  of  language,  an  expres- 
sion of  the  'judgment/  or  'sentence'  of  the  reason- 
ing faculty;  not  at  all,  however,  the  operation  of  judg- 
ment and  reasoning  itself."*  The  Aristotelian  logic, 
therefore,  "  leaves  the  whole  faculty  of  judgment  with- 
out use  or  office,  except  in  so  far  as  it  is  employed  in 
drawing  the  conclusion  from  the  syllogism — an  opera- 
tion which  it  performs  professedly  by  virtue  of  tlie 
mere  form  of  words,  and  not  by  the  full  exercise  of 
that  discretion  to  which  the  term  is  properly  applied, 
and  which  is  chiefly  requisite,  in  the  use  of  this  system, 
to  form  and  arrange  the  premises.  This  division, 
therefore,  is  wholly  specious,  and  falls  to  the  ground." 
Mr  Bosanquet  affirms,  that  the  syllogism  is  to  the 


AND  THE  UNITED  STATES  OF  AMERICA.  463 

processes  of  reasoning  what  language  is  to  ideas.  It 
is  an  imperfect  instrument,  and  used  for  the  purpose 
of  representing  these  processes  rapidly  and  compen- 
diously. 

Mathematical  reasoning  is  like  every  other  kind  of 
reasoning,  with  the  exception  of  its  subject-matter. 
This  distinguishes  a  mathematical  argument  from  every 
other.  The  author  likewise  maintains,  that  propositions 
in  this  science  cannot  be  reduced  to  the  syllogistic 
form,  "  except  only  by  distant  and  figurative  approxi- 
mation. For  every  mathematical  syllogism  would  have 
four  terms  in  it,  instead  of  three ;  namely,  the  two 
terms  which  are  compared,  the  term  of  comparison,  and 
the  term  of  equality  or  proportion ;  for  the  substitution 
of  the  term  '  greater,''  or  '  equal  to,'  for  the  only  legiti- 
mate logical  link  or  copula  '  is,'  at  once  removes  it 
beyond  the  application  and  principles  of  logic."* 

Mr  Bosanquet  differs  from  Mr  Locke  as  to  the  ab- 
stract character  of  knowledge  in  general.  He  considers 
that  Locke's  notion,  that  the  perception  of  the  agree- 
ment of  ideas  constitutes  knowledge,  is  entirely  erro- 
neous. Neither  does  truth  consist  in  the  joining  of 
signs,  according  to  their  actual  agreement.  These  are 
pronounced  as  pure  chimeras,  Ideas  themselves  are 
knowledge,  whether  of  a  simple  or  compound  charac- 
ter. Opinion  is  the  attaching  these  ideas  to  real 
things ;  and  truth  is  the  actual  agreement  of  these 
ideas  and  opinions  with  realities.  "  The  idea  of  colour 
is  knowledge.  The  idea  of  pleasure  and  of  pain  is 
knowledge.  The  idea  of  heat  is  knowledge.  The  idea 
of  pain  following  or  accompanying  heat  also  is  know- 

*  P.  45. 


4G4  LOGICAL  LITERATURE  OF  GREAT  BRITAIN 

ledge.  The  agreement  of  this  idea  with  reality  and 
experience  is  truth.  In  like  manner,  the  ideas  of 
virtue  and  of  duty  are  knowledge.  The  idea  of  God 
is  knowledge.  The  idea  of  God  rewarding  ns  for  the 
performance  of  our  duty  in  a  future  life  is  know- 
ledge."* 

The  Lectures  on  Logic  (1838)  by  Francis  W.  New- 
man, display  an  intimate  and  correct  knowledge  of 
logical  subjects,  and  contain  many  acute  and  valuable 
remarks  on  the  science  of  reasoning  generally.  He 
tells  us,  that  "  the  object-matter  of  logic  is  no  parti- 
cular set  of  phenomena  parallel  in  character  to  that 
which  other  sciences  contemplate,  but  is  proof  or 
evidence,  as  such.  And  in  discussing  evidence,  the  end 
in  view  is  to  investigate  the  laws  of  evidence — to  lay 
down  when  and  why  it  is  that  we  say  a  thing  has  been 
proved ;  its  evidence  is  good ;  it  is  therefore  to  be 
believed."  "  I  conceive  it  is  a  part  of  logic  to  inquire, 
both  why  we  believe  our  senses,  and  why  we  believe 
human  testimony." 

Mr  Newman  -throws  an  air  of  originality  over  every 
thing  he  discusses.  The  reader  will  find  this  observa- 
tion borne  out  by  a  reference  to  his  remarks  on  defini- 
tion, analogy,  cause  and  effect,  and  induction. 

We  shall  now  make  a  few  remarks  illustrative  of 
Mr  Stuart  Mill's  System  of  Logic,  Matioci  native  and 
Inductive  (1843).  From  the  voluminous  and  varied 
character  of  the  work,  we  can  do  little  more  than 
merely  advert,  and  that  very  briefly  indeed,  to  a  few  of 
the  leading  principles  on  which  the  author's  peculiar 
theory  of  reasoning  is  founded. 

*  r.  112. 


AND  THE  UNITED  STATES  OF  AMERICA.  4G5 

Mr  Mill  says,  that  "  Logic  comprises  the  science  of 
reasoning,  as  well  as  an  art  founded  on  that  science;" 
and  he  then  goes  on  to  shew  the  various  meanings, 
hoth  scientific  and  popular,  which  are  attached  to  the 
word  reasoning.  He  comes,  however,  to  the  conclu- 
sion, "  that  the  province  of  logic  will  include  several 
operations  of  the  intellect  not  usually  considered  to 
fall  within  the  meaning  of  the  terms — reasoning  and 
argumentation."  He  says  again,  "  The  sole  object  of 
logic  is  the  guidance  of  one's  own  thoughts."  "  Logic 
takes  cognisance  of  all  intellectual  operations  only  as 
they  conduce  to  our  own  knowledge,  and  to  the  com- 
mand of  that  knowledge  for  our  own  uses."  The  art 
of  communicating  knowledge  to  others.  Mr  Mill  refers 
to  rhetoric,  to  which,  he  conceives,  it  rightly  belongs. 

It  will  tend  greatly  to  give  an  insight  into  the  entire 
scope  and  drift  of  Mr  Mill's  system  of  logic,  to  pre- 
mise, at  the  outset,  that  there  are  two  important 
doctrines  which  lie,  as  it  were,  in  the  background  of 
all  his  reasonings  and  discussions  on  the  principles  of 
logical  science,  and  to  which  he  seems  indissolubly 
wedded  ; — namely,  the  theory  of  causation,  developed 
by  Hume,  and  illustrated  by  Dr  Brown ;  and  the  doc- 
trine of  the  association  of  ideas,  maintained  by  Hartley, 
Priestly,  and  others.  Upon  those  two  principles  or 
theories,  or  whatever  they  may  be  called,  Mr  Mill 
takes  his  stand,  under  a  firm  persuasion  that  no  one 
has  the  power  to  dislodge  him  frorn  his  fancied 
security. 

In  accordance  with  the  general  philosophy  embodied 
in  these  two  theories  of  our  mental  nature,  Mr  Mill 
speaks  of  truth  in  these  words : — "  Truths  are  known 

2g 


466  LOGICAL  LITERATURE  OF  GREAT  BRITAIN 

to  us  in  two  ways ;  some  are  known  directly,  and  of 
themselves ;  some  through  the  medium  of  other  truths. 
The  former  are  the  subject  of  intuition  or  conscious- 
ness; the  latter  of  inference.  The  truths  known  by 
intuition  are  the  original  premises  from  which  all 
others  are  inferred."  This  brings  us  by  a  short  route 
to  the  source  of  all  truth,  consciousness  or  feeling — 
the  same  conclusion  on  which  Dr  Brown's  logical 
theory  rests. 

The  first  chapter  of  Mr  Mill's  first  volume  is  chiefly 
occupied  with  discussions  on  the  nature  of  language, 
and  its  connexion  with  various  kinds  of  propositions. 
Mr  Mill  is  a  nominalist,  and  views  the  offices  which 
words  perform  in  our  reasoning,  in  strict  conformity 
with  the  canons  laid  down  in  the  verbal  school  of 
thinking.  There  are,  however,  in  this  division  of  the 
work,  many  excellent  and  profound  observations,  not 
to  be  met  with  in  other  treatises  on  logical  science. 

In  the  second  chapter  we  come  to  ratiocination,  or 
the  syllogism,  with  the  formal  rules  of  which  the 
author  enters  to"  some  limited  extent.  He  tells  us  in 
his  preface,  in  reference  to  the  syllogistic  logic  gene- 
rally, that  "  the  scientific  theory  on  which  its  defence 
is  usually  rested,  appears  to  him  erroneous."  He 
gives  his  reasons  for  this  in  the  part  of  his  work  now 
under  consideration.  The  reader  will  find  some  excel- 
lent .matter  here ;  and  we  regret  exceedingly  that 
want  of  space  forbids  our  giving  even  an  outline  of  all 
the  arguments  adduced  against  the  scientific  validity 
and  value  of  the  syllogism.  All  we  can  do  is  to  cull 
out  a  passage  or  two  at  random*  "  It  must  be 
granted,"  lays  Mr  Mill,  '"'  that  in  every  syllogism,  con- 


AND  THE  UNITED  STATES  OF  AMERICA.  46? 

sidered  as  an  argument  to  prove  the  conclusion,  there 
is  a  petiiio  principu.  "When  we  say,  '  All  men  are 
mortal ;  Socrates  is  a  man ;  therefore  Socrates  is 
mortal' — it  is  unanswerably  urged  by  the  adversaries 
of  the  syllogistic  theory,  that  the  proposition.  Socrates 
is  mortal;  is  presupposed  in  the  more  general  assump- 
tion, All  men  are  mortal ;  that  we  cannot  be  assured 
of  the  mortality  of  all  men,  unless  we  were  previously 
certain  of  the  mortality  of  every  individual  man  ;  that 
if  it  be  still  doubtful  whether  Socrates,  or  any  other 
individual  you  chose  to  name,  be  mortal  or  not,  i^ie 
same  degree  of  uncertainty  must  hang  over  the  asser- 
tion, All  men  are  mortal :  that  the  general  principle, 
instead  of  being  given  as  evidence  of  the  particular 
case,  cannot  itself  be  taken  for  true  without  exception, 
until  every  shadow  of  doubt  which  could  effect  any 
case  comprised  with  it,  is  dispelled  by  evidence  aliunde  ; 
and  then  what  remains  for  the  syllogism  to  prove  ? 
That,  in  short,  no  reasoning  from  generals  to  particu- 
lars can,  as  such,  prove  any  thing ;  since  from  a  gene- 
ral principle  you  cannot  infer  any  particulars,  but 
those  which  the  principle  itself  assumes  as  foreknown." 
.  .  .  "  This  doctrine  is  irrefragable."  * 

"  Archbishop  Whately  has  contended,  that  syllogis- 
ing, or  reasoning  from  generals  to  particulars,  is  not, 
agreeably  to  the  vulgar  idea,  a  peculiar  mode  of  reason- 
ing, but  the  philosophical  analysis  of  the  mode  in  which 
all  men  reason  who  reason  at  all.  With  the  deference 
due  to  so  high  an  authority,  I  cannot  help  thinking 
that  the  vulgar  notion  is,  in  this  case,  the  more  correct. 
If  from   our   experience  of  John,   Thomas,   &c,  who 

*  Vol.  i.  p.  216. 


468  LOGICAL  LITERATURE  OF  GREAT  BRITAIN 

once  were  living,  but  are  now  dead,  we  are  entitled  to 
conclude  that  all  human  beings  are  mortal,  we  might 
surely,  without  any  logical  inconsequence,  have  con- 
cluded at  once  from  these  instances  that  the  Duke  of 
Wellington  is  mortal.  The  mortality  of  John,  Thomas, 
and  Company,  is,  after  all,  the  whole  evidence  we  have 
for  the  mortality  of  the  Duke  of  Wellington.  £Tot  one 
iota  is  added  to  the  proof  by  interpolating  a  general 
proposition."  .  .  .  "  ~Not  only  may  we  reason  from 
particulars  to  particulars,  without  passing  throng] i 
generals;  but  we  perpetually  do  so.  All  our  earliest 
inferences  are  of  this  nature.  From  the  first  dawn  of 
intelligence  we  draw  inferences ;  but  years  elapse  be- 
fore we  learn  the  use  of  general  language." 

Leaving  the  doctrine  of  the  syllogism,  and  passing 
over  much  excellent  discussion  on  Trains  of  Keason- 
ings  and  the  Deductive  Sciences,  we  come  to  another 
leading  branch  of  Mr  Mill's  logic,  that  of  Induction; 
the  theory  of  which  is  as  follows  : — All  inference  is 
of  a  decidedly  inductive  character,  and  rests  upon  the 
great  principle  of  the  association  of  ideas.  One  event 
A,  is  a  mark  or  sign  of  another  event  B ;  for  this  sole 
and  simple  reason,  that  A  and  B  have  been  conjoined 
in  our  experience :  we  have  seen  the  one  follow  the 
other.  Reasoning  by  induction  is,  therefore,  just  the 
recording  of  the  connexion  (of  whatever  nature  that 
may  be)  subsisting  among  particular  objects  or  events ; 
the  mind  goes  from  one  particular  thing  to  another 
particular  thing,  without  the  intervention  of  any  gene- 
ral or  formal  proposition  whatever.  When  we  refer  an 
individual  thing  or  object  to  a  collection,  a  class,  or 
assortment  of  other  objects  or  events,  either  from  a 


AND  THE  UNITED  STATES  OF  AMERICA.  4G9 

principle  of  resemblance,  or  from  a  frequency  of  con- 
junction, tins  collection,  class,  or  assortment,  is  consi- 
dered bv  tlie  mind  as  a  single  or  individual  thing ; 
whether  it  be.  in  fact,  composed  of  only  two  units,  or 
two  millions  of  units.  The  totality  of  its  character  is 
never  broken  or  impaired ;  it  is  still,  in  the  mind's  eye, 
one  particular  and  individual  object  or  event.  Mr  Mill 
says,  "  If  reasoning  be  from  particulars  to  particulars, 
and  if  it  consists  in  recognising  one  fact  as  a  mark  of 
another,  or  a  mark  of  a  mark  of  another,  nothing  is 
required  to  render  reasoning  possible  except  senses  and 
association — senses  to  perceive  that  two  facts  are  con- 
joined ;  association,  as  the  Law  by  which  one  of  these 
two  facts  raises  up  the  idea  of  the  other.  For  these 
mental  phenomena,  as  well  as  for  the  belief  or  expec- 
tation which  follows,  and  by  which  we  recognise  as 
having  taken  place,  or  about  to  take  place,  that  of 
which  we  have  perceived  a  mark,  there  is  evidently  no 
need  of  language.  And  this  inference  of  one  particu- 
lar tact  from  another,  is  a  case  of  induction.  It  is  of 
this  sort  of  induction  that  brutes  are  capable ;  it  is  in 
this  shape  that  uncultivated  minds  make  almost  all 
their  inductions,  and  that  we  all  do  so  in  the  cases  in 
which  familiar  experience  forces  our  conclusions  upon 
us,  without  any  active  process  of  inquiry  on  our  part, 
and  in  which  the  belief  or  expectation  follows  the 
suggestion  of  the  evidence,  with  the  promptitude  and 
certainty  of  an  instinct."* 

This,  in  few  words,  is  the  sum  total  of  the  author's 
theory  of  inductive  logic,  It  is  simply  the  observing 
of  one  event  following  another  ;  which  act  of  observing 

*  Vol.  ii.  p.  233. 


470  LOGICAL  LITERATURE  OF  GREAT  BRITAIN 

resolves  itself  into  pure  consciousness  or  feeling;  or, 
to  speak  more  strictly,  it  is  nothing  but  this  conscious- 
ness or  feeling  itself.  This  law  of  antecedent  and  con- 
sequent gives  rise  (query,  how?)  to  a  certain  rule  of 
judging,  or  of  calculating  probable  events  or  circum- 
stances ;  but  the  law  can  never  give  any  thing  ap- 
proaching to  infallible  certainty  that  any  event,  or 
series  of  events,  will  actually  take  place.  It  is  only 
probable  evidence  which  we  have  to  deal  with  in  induc- 
tive philosophy;  which,  says  Mr  Mills,  is  founded  on 
this  rule  :  "  Certain  individuals  have  a  given  attribute  ; 
an  individual  or  individuals  resemble  the  former  in 
certain  other  attributes ;  therefore  they  resemble  them 
also  in  the  given  attribute." 

We  shall  now  make  a  remark  or  two  on  this  theory 
of  reasoning. 

Mr  Mill  has  a  deep  and  singular  abhorrence  of  any 
thing  being  considered  binding  on  the  minds  of  men 
to  believe.  His  scheme  will  admit  of  no  mental  com- 
pulsion or  dictation.  He  cannot  tolerate  any  who 
"  adduce  as  evidence  of  the  truth  of  fact  in  external 
nature,  any  necessity  that  the  human  mind  may  be 
conceived  to  be  under  of  believing  it."  His  whole 
inward  man  rises  up  in  open  rebellion  against  an  act 
of  such  licentious  and  unbridled  authority.  But  let  us 
see,  by  his  own  system,  how  he  stands  in  reference  to 
this  necessity  of  believing.  The  law  of  association, 
that  is,  the  law  by  which  A  suggests  B,  is  the  only  law 
of  an  intellectual  cast  which  enters  into  his  inductive 
theory.  It  is  the  only  law  which  he  thinks  necessary 
or  adequate  to  produce  the  effects  he  describes.  Is 
this  law  compulsory  ?     Does  it  imply  a  necessity  of  be- 


AXD  THE  I/XITED  STATES  OF  AMERICA.  471 

lieving  any  tiling?  Is  it  quite  optional  with  us  whether 
we  attend  either  to  antecedents  or  consequents,  or  pin 
the  slightest  degree  of  faith  upon  either  or  both? 
Surely  there  is  something  very  like  an  internal  necessity 
to  helieye  what  this  associating  law  of  antecedent  and 
consequent  is  said  to  teach  us.  It  must  be  borne  in 
mind,  that  Mr  Mill  has  here  left  us  no  choice  in  the 
matter ;  for  he  points  out  no  other  law  but  this  law  of 
association,  by  which  the  reality  of  that  which  he 
himself  calls  knowledge  can  be  substantiated.  If  we 
are  under  no  necessity  whatever  of  believing  any  thing 
upon  the  power  or  authority  of  this  law,  it  must  be  a 
law  without  authority,  and  by  whose  yoice  his  own 
system  cannot  be  sustained,  as  one  having  the  smallest 
particle  of  evidence  or  certainty  attached  to  it.  With 
all  due  deference,  we  conceive  Mr  Mill  is  bound,  for 
the  credit  of  his  own  theory,  to  place  this  matter  upon 
a  more  satisfactory  basis. 

With  respect  to  the  nature  of  mathematic  evidence, 
a  subject  which  forms  a  conspicuous  element  of  discus- 
sion in  several  sections  of  his  work,  Mr  Mill  main- 
tains the  position,  that  it  is  decidedly  of  an  experi- 
mental character,  and  by  no  means  what  is  termed 
necessary  or  intuitive.  "'What  is  the  ground,"  he  asks, 
"  of  our  belief  in  axioms  ?  What  is  the  evidence  on  which 
they  rest  ?  I  answer,  they  are  experimental  truths  J 
generalizations  from  observation.  The  proposition, 
6  Two  straight  lines  cannot  inclose  a  space ;  or,  in  other 
words,  Two  straight  lines  which  have  once  met,  do  not 
meet  again,  but  continue  to  diverge,'  is  an  induction 
from  the  evidence  of  our  senses."  The  author  also 
affirms,  that  arithmetical  science  is  a  science  of  expe- 


472  LOGICAL  LITERATURE  OF  GREAT  BRITAIN 

rience  and  observation.  "  The  fundamental  truths  of 
that  science  all  rest  upon  the  evidence  of  sense ;  they 
are  proved  by  shewing  to  our  eyes  and  our  fingers,  that 
any  given  number  of  objects, — ten  balls  for  example 
may, — by  separation  and  re-arrangement,  exhibit  to 
our  senses  all  the  different  sets  of  numbers,  the  sum  of 
which  is  equal  to  ten." 

On  the  categories  of  Aristotle  Mr  Mill  remarks  : 
"  The  imperfections  of  this  classification  are  too  obvious 
to  require,  and  its  merits  are  not  sufficient  to  reward,  a 
minute  examination.  It  is  a  mere  catalogue  of  the 
distinctions  rudely  marked  out  by  the  language  of 
familiar  life,  with  little  or  no  attempt  to  penetrate,  by 
philosophic  analysis,  to  the  rationale  even  of  these 
common  distinctions."  He  gives  us  four  categories  of 
his  own,  which  he  conceives  embrace  all  nameable 
things.  1st,  Feelings,  or  states  of  consciousness.  2d, 
The  minds  which  experience  those  feelings.  3d,  The 
bodies  or  external  objects  which  excite  certain  of  those 
feelings,  together  with  the  powers  or  properties  whereby 
they  excite  them;  And  4th,  The  successions  and  co- 
existences, the  likenesses  and  unlikenesses,  between 
states  of  consciousness. 

We  should  have  liked  to  have  examined  Mr  Mill's 
theory  of  causation ;  but  we  are  compelled  to  cut  short 
our  observations  on  his  work.  We  venture  to  affirm, 
however,  that  in  our  humble  opinion  this  is  a  very 
unsound  part  of  his  system.  It  is  ill  reasoned,  and 
presents  flagrant  inconsistencies  and  contradictions  at 
every  turn.  We  are  fully  aware  that  he  was  under  the 
necessity  of  adopting  and  carrying  out  these  views  on 
cause  and  effect,   in  order  to  impart  a  semblance  of 


AKB  THE  UNITED  STATES  OF  AMERICA.    '  473 

unity  to  liis  entire  theory ;  which,  being  of  an  entirely 
material  character,  could  admit  no  spiritual  or  purely 
mental  element  to  come  in  contact  with  it.  But  we 
feel  confident  that  when  the  question  as  to  causation 
is  dispassionately  examined,  and  upon  strictly  philo- 
sophical grounds,  it  will  be  found  that  there  is  a  prin- 
ciple implanted  in  human  nature,  of  steady  and  un- 
erring operation,  that  refers  every  true  cause  to  some 
power,  faculty,  or  mental  influence.  This  position,  we 
conceive,  is  as  susceptible  of  complete  demonstration 
as  any  thing  in  the  whole  circle  of  human  knowledge 
can  manifest. 

Among  the  number  of  English  writers  on  the  philo- 
sophical principles  of  logical  science,  we  must  include 
Mr  Hallam,  who,  in  his  Introduction  to  the  Literature 
of  Europe,  has  entered  into  the  subject,  not  only  as  a 
commentator  on  writers  on  logic  generally  but  as  an 
original  thinker  on  some  of  the  main  points  connected 
with  modern  controversies  on  the  nature  of  the  reason- 
ing process.  Mr  Hallanvs  opinions  are  of  very  recent 
date  (1847),  and  are  entitled  to  attentive  considera- 
tion, both  from  his  unquestionable  learning  and  dis- 
passionate judgment.  The  passage  we  are  about  to 
quote,  though  somewhat  long,  is  valuable ;  because  it 
contains  his  matured  and  settled  opinions  on  the 
nature  and  utility  of  the  syllogistic  theory,  now  a  gene- 
ral  topic  of  interest  and  discussion. 

Mr  Hallam  observes,  "  It  by  no  means  is  to  be 
inferred,  that  because  the  actual  text  of  Bacon  is  not 
always  such  as  can  be  well  understood  by  very  young 
men,  I  object  to  their  being  led  to  the  real  principles 
of  inductive  philosophy,  which  alone  will  teach  them  to 


474  LOGICAL  LITERATURE  OF  GREAT  BRITAIN" 

think,  firmly  but  not  presumptuously,  for  themselves, 
Few  defects,  on  the  contrary,  in  our  system  of  educa- 
tion, are  more  visible  than  the  want  of  an  adequate 
course  of  logic ;  and  this  is  not  likely  to  be  rectified, 
so  long  as  the  Aristotelian  methods  challenge  that 
denomination,  exclusively  of  all  other  aids  to  the  rea- 
soning faculties.  The  position,  that  nothing  else  is  to 
be  called  logic,  were  it  even  agreeable  to  the  derivation 
of  the  word,  which  it  is  not,  or  to  the  usage  of  the 
ancients,  which  is  by  no  means  uniformly  the  case,  or 
to  that  of  modern  philosophy  and  correct  language, 
which  is  certainly  not  at  all  the  case,  is  no  answer  to 
the  question,  Whether  what  ice  call  logic  does  not 
deserve  to  be  taught  at  all  ? 

"  A  living  writer  of  high  reputation,  who  has  at  least 
fully  understood  his  own  subject,  and  illustrated  it 
better  than  his  predecessors,  from  a  more  enlarged 
reading  and  thinking,  wherein  his  own  acuteness  has 
been  improved  by  the  writers  of  the  Baconian  school, 
has  been  unfortunately  instrumental,  by  the  very 
merits  of  his  treatise  on  logic,  in  keeping  up  the  pre- 
judices on  this  subject,  which  have  generally  been 
deemed  characteristic  of  the  university  to  which  he 
belonged.  All  the  reflection  I  have  been  able  to  give 
to  the  subject,  has  convinced  me  of  the  inefficacy  of 
the  syllogistic  art  in  enabling  us  to  think  rightly  for 
ourselves,  or,  which  is  part  of  thinking  rightly,  to 
detect  those  fallacies  of  others  which  might  impose  on 
our  understanding  before  we  have  acquired  that  art. 
It  has  been  often  alleged,  and,  as  far  as  I  can  judge, 
with  perfect  truth,  that  no  man  who  can  be  worth 
answering  ever    commits,  except  through  mere  mad- 


AXD  THE  UNITED  STATES  OE  AMERICA.  475 

vertence,  any  paralogisms  which  the  common  logic 
serves  to  point  out.  It  is  easy  enough  to  construct 
syllogisms  which  sin  against  its  rules ;  but  the  question 
is,  By  whom  were  they  employed  ?  For  though  it  is 
not  uncommon,  as  I  am  aware,  to  represent  an  adver- 
sary as  reasoning  illogically,  this  is  generally  effected 
by  putting  his  argument  into  our  own  words.  The 
great  fault  of  all,  over-induction,  or  the  assertion  of  a 
general  premiss  upon  an  insufficient  examination  of 
particulars,  cannot  be  discovered  or  cured  by  any 
logical  skill ;  and  this  is  the  error  into  which  men 
really  fall,  not  that  of  omitting  to  distribute  the  middle 
term,  though  it  comes  in  effect,  and  often  in  appear- 
ance, to  the  same  thing.  I  do  not  contend  that  the 
rules  of  syllogism,  which  are  very  short  and  simple, 
ought  not  be  learned ;  or  that  there  may  not  be  some 
advantage  in  occasionally  stating  our  own  argument, 
or  calling  on  another  to  state  his  in  a  regular  form 
(an  advantage,  however,  rather  dialectical,  which  is, 
in  other  words,  rhetorical,  than  one  which  affects  the 
reasoning  faculties  themselves) ;  nor  do  I  deny  that  it 
is  philosophically  worth  while  to  know,  that  all  general 
reasoning  by  words  may  be  reduced  into  syllogism,  as 
it  is  to  know  that  most  of  plane  geometry  may  be 
resolved  into  the  superposition  of  equal  triangles ;  but 
to  represent  this  portion  of  logical  science  as  the  whole, 
appears  to  me  almost  like  teaching  the  scholar  Euclid's 
axioms  and  the  axiomatic  theorem  to  which  I  have 
alluded,  and  calling  this  the  science  of  geometry.  The 
following  passage  from  the  Port-Royal  logic  is  very 
judicious  and  candid,  giving  as  much  to  the  Aristo- 
telian system  as  it  deserves :— '  That  part  of  which  we 


476  LOGICAL  LITERATURE  OF  GREAT  BRITAIN 

now  have  to  treat,  and  which  comprehends  the  rules 
of  reasoning,  is  regarded  as  the  most  important  in 
logic,  and  is  almost  the  only  one  which  has  been 
treated  of  with  any  care.  But  it  may  be  doubted 
whether  it  is  really  as  useful  as  it  has  been  supposed 
to  be.  The  greater  part  of  the  errors  of  men,  as  we 
have  already  said  elsewhere,  arises  much  more  from 
their  reasoning  on  false  principles,  than  from  their 
reasoning  wrongly  on  their  principles.  It  rarely  hap- 
pens that  men  allow  themselves  to  be  deceived  by 
reasonings  which  are  false,  only  because  the  conse- 
quences are  ill  deduced ;  and  those  who  are  not 
capable  of  discovering  such  errors  by  the  light  of 
reason  alone,  would  not  commonly  understand  the 
rules  which  are  given  for  this  purpose,  much  less  the 
application  of  them.  Nevertheless,  considering  these 
rules  simply  as  speculative  truths,  they  may  always  be 
useful  as  mental  discipline ;  and,  further  than  this,  it 
cannot  be  denied  that  they  are  of  service  on  some 
occasions,  and  in  relation  to  those  persons  who,  being 
of  a  lively  and  inquiring  turn  of  mind,  allow  themselves 
at  times,  for  want  of  attention,  to  be  deceived  by  false 
consequences,  which  attention  to  these  rules  would 
probably  rectify.'  How  different  is  this  sensible  pas- 
sage from  one  quoted  from  some  anonymous  writer  in 
AVhately's  Logic,  p.  34 : — '  A  fallacy  consists  of  an 
ingenious  mixture  of  truth  and  falsehood,  so  entangled, 
so  intimately  blended,  that  the  fallacy  is,  in  the  che- 
mical phrase,  held  in  solution  ;  one  drop  of  sound  logic 
is  tliat  test  which  immediately  disunites  them,  makes 
the  foreign  substance  visible,  and  precipitates  it  to  the 
bottom.'     One  fallacy,  it  alight  be  answered,  as  com- 


AND  THE  UNITED  STATES  OF  AMERICA,  477 

mon  as  any,  is  the  false  analogy,  the  misleading  the 
mind  by  comparison,  where  there  is  no  real  proportion 
or  resemblance.  The  chemist's  test  is  the  necessary 
means  of  detecting  the  foreign  substance.  If  the  6  drop 
of  sound  logic'  be  such,  it  is  strange  that  lawyers, 
mathematicians,  and  mankind  in  general,  should  so 
sparingly  employ  it — the  fact  being  notorious,  that 
those  most  eminent  for  strong  reasoning  powers  are 
rarely  conversant  with  the  syllogistic  method.  It  is 
also  well  known,  that  these  i  intimately  blended  mix- 
tures of  truth  and  falsehood,'  perplex  no  man  of  plain 
sense,  except  when  they  are  what  is  called  extra- 
logical — cases  wherein  the  art  of  syllogism  is  of  no 
use." 

Oxford,  for  the  last  fifteen  years,  has  taken  a  lead- 
ing part  in  the  cultivation  and  extension  of  logical 
science.  Mr  Huyshe's  work  on  the  subject  (183-3) 
contains  many  valuable  and  acute  observations  on  the 
principles  of  reasoning  generally.  But,  in  our  humble 
opinion,  Mr  Chretien's  Essay  on  Logical  Method 
(1848)  is  by  far  the  most  philosophical  treatise  which 
lias  hitherto  appeared  from  this  venerable  seminary  of 
learning.  The  grand  aim  of  the  work  is  to  shew  the 
connexion  of  logical  methods  with  science  in  general. 
In  the  preliminary  parts  of  the  treatise,  the  author 
gives  us  the  view  which  the  ancient  logicians  took  of 
the  connexion  of  method  with  scientific  knowledge  : 
the  opinions  which  the  scholastic  reasoners  entertained 
on  the  matter ;  and  then,  lastly,  the  discussions  of 
modern  philosophers  on  the  subject.  In  every  part  of 
this  extended  inquiry,  we  see  displayed  a  perfect  know- 
ledge of  logical  history,  and  a  philosophical  spirit  of 


w 


478  LOGICAL  LITERATURE  OF  GREAT  BRITAIN 

the  highest  and  most  genial  kind — genial  in  all  that  is 
elevating,  noble,  and  improving. 

In  reference  to  logical  method  generally,  Mr  Chre- 
tien observes :  "  Logic  is  no  part  of  philosophy ;  or, 
in  other  words,  it  is  not  a  science.  The  student  of 
pure  logic  has,  as  such,  no  more  speculative  know- 
ledge on  any  particular  subject  of  investigation,  when 
he  concludes  his  course,  than  when  he  began  it. 
The  basis  of  logic  may  shew  through,  indeed,  and  so 
some  insight  into  metaphysics  be  gained ;  or  its  appli- 
cation, by  way  of  example,  may  inform  him  of  physical 
truths,  before  unknown,  as  the  case  may  be,  in  art,  or 
morals,  or  theology.  But  this  does  not  really  effect  its 
proper  nature  as  a  system  of  rules,  implying  previous 
knowledge,  and  ministering  to  its  further  attainment, 
but  of  little  value  in  themselves  as  theoretic  truths, 
and  even  assuming  an  imperative  form  more  naturally 
than  that  of  a  proposition."" 

The  author  divides  logical  method  into  three  distinct 
branches ;  the  method  of  science,  art,  and  of  practical 
evidence.  All  science  is  made  up  of  general  concep- 
tions of  the  mind ;  and  the  grouping  of  several  of 
these  conceptions  together  under  one  idea,  constitutes 
a  science.  And  the  same  thing  may  be  applied  to 
method,  when  considered  in  reference  to  the  fine  arts, 
and  to  the  nature  and  application  of  practical  evidence 
of  every  kind  and  degree.  For  the  full  illustration  of 
this  subject,  we  must  refer  to  the  author's  work  itself. 

The  following  general  observations  on  the  nature  of 
the  verbal  school  of  logic,  must  conclude  our  notice  of 
this  able  treatise  : — "  It  is  much  to  be  regretted,  that 

*  P,  128. 


AND  THE  UNITED  STATES  OF  AMERICA.  479 

so  many  symptoms  of  an  adhesion  to  the  opinions  of 
this  moderate  section  of  the  verbal  school,  are  to  he 
found  in  the  able  treatise  of  Archbishop  Whately. 
His  definition  of  logic,  as  the  "  art  of  employing  lan- 
guage properly  for  the  purpose  of  reasoning/  is  con- 
ceived quite  in  this  spirit.  To  trace  this  evil  tendency 
in  detail  through  his  work,  would  be  quite  foreign  to 
our  present  purpose.  Two  of  the  more  general  features 
may,  however,  be  mentioned  here,  as  illustrative  of  the 
turn  of  mind  with  which  this  logical  theory  is  asso- 
ciated. In  the  first  place,  he  is  led  to  attach  far  too 
much  importance  to  the  mere  arrangements  of  words, 
and  to  measure  the  elasticity  and  pliability  of  thought 
by  that  of  the  raw  material  out  of  which  its  finished 
representations  are  fabricated.  The  most  striking  in- 
stance of  this  defect  is  found  in  his  way  of  treating; 
hypothetical  and  inductive  arguments.  He  compels 
methods  of  reasoning,  which,  when  viewed  in  the 
thinking  mind,  are  clearly  distinct  from  the  deductive 
process  and  from  each  other,  to  bow  to  an  artifice  of 
language,  and  submit  to  the  one  unvarying  formula  of 
syllogism.  And,  secondly,  he  shews  a  continual  dis- 
position to  underrate  the  number  of  real  questions  at 
issue  among  mankind,  and  to  increase  in  proportion 
the  number  of  merely  verbal  differences.  His  com- 
mon way  of  dealing  with  contending  disputants,  is  to 
accuse  them  of  an  equivocation,  to  assure  them  that' 
they  either  mean  the  same  thing  by  different  words, 
or  use  the  same  words  to  signify  distinct  things.  Or, 
if  this  plan  will  not  succeed,  he  looks  for  some  formal 
error  in  the  argument  of  one  of  the  parties,  and  is 
ready  to  assign  the  discrepancy  to  any  cause  except 


480  LOGICAL  LITERATURE  OF  GREAT  BRITAIN 

that  which  is  really  probably  the  real  one — some  broad 
difference  of  principle  underlying  the  whole  discussion, 
and  forcing,  as  it  were,  the  superficial  strata  of  thought 
from  what  would  be  else  their  level  and  unbroken 
direction.  This  is  in  fact  to  assume,  that  men  can 
with  equal  ease  be  made  to  be  of  one  mind  and  of  one 
vocabulary. 

"  The  truth  is,  that  the  minds  of  men  differ  in  actual 
constitution  as  widely  as  their  bodies.  As  we  do  not 
all  spontaneously  move  our  limbs  in  the  same  manner, 
so  neither  do  we  think  alike.  When  discipline  makes 
men  uniform  and  simultaneous  in  their  motions,  it 
only  suspends  their  natural  peculiarities,  and  does  not 
destroy  them.  Though  the  effect  of  the  drill-ser- 
geant's labours  may  be  observable  when  the  soldier  is 
off  parade,  they  no  longer  produce  an  exact  uniformity. 
Those  differences  of  gait  and  bearing  then  display  them- 
selves once  more,  which  at  the  time  seemed  oblite- 
rated." 

Mr  Moberly's  Lectures  on  Logic  (1848)  is  a  work 
of  considerable  merit.  He  divides  the  science  of  logic 
into  two  branches ;  the  first  considers  the  forms  of 
reasoning ;  and  the  second  makes  clear  the  method  of 
their  application.  The  author  expresses  a  hope,  that 
the  Latin  manual  of  Aldrich  "  may  still  be  retained 
in  our  (Oxford)  university,  without  much  actual  alter- 
ation of  the  text,  but  vivified  and  made  practical  by 
continual  increase  of  knowledge,  as  to  botli  the  forms 
of  reasoning  and  their  matter/' 

Mr  Mansel's  work  on  logic  (1840),  is  another 
Oxford  publication  of  fair  reputation  and  importance. 
He  is  inclined  to   think,   that  the  benefits   derivable 


AND  THE  UNITED  STATES  OP  AMEEICA.  48 1 

from  logic  are  of  a  secondary,  and  not  of  a  primary 
character.  He  says,  "  It  is  not  intended  to  deny  the 
usefulness  of  logic ;  but  it  may  safely  be  asserted,  that 
its  more  valuable  fruits  are  to  be  found  in  the  training 
which  the  mind  unconsciously  receives,  rather  than  in 
the  conscious  employment  of  knowledge  in  the  forma- 
tion and  examination  of  reasonings,  and  that  both, 
in  respect  of  the  true  character  of  the  science,  are 
secondary  and  accidental  results,  not  primary  and 
essential  features."* 

Mr  Thomson's  Outline  of  the  Necessary  Laws  of 
Thought  (1849),  is  another  Oxford  publication,  of  a 
profound  and  scientific  character.  His  categories  of 
the  rational  understanding  are  quantity,  quality,  rela- 
tion ;  and  relation  he  resolves  again  into  time,  space, 
causation,  composition,  agreement  and  repugnance, 
polar  opposition  of  finite  to  infinite.  The  author  con- 
siders logic  as  a  science  rather  than  an  art,  that  it  is  the 
science  of  the  necessary  laws  or  forms  of  thought,  and 
has  thought  rather  than  language  for  its  object-matter. 

While  Oxford  has  been  displaying  of  late  so  much 
zeal  and  well-directed  labour  in  the  field  of  logical 
science,  Cambridge  has  not  been  altogether  idle.  Mr 
Soly's  work  is  highly  spoken  of ;  and  Mr  De  Morgan's 
Formal  Logic  (1847),  is  a  treatise  of  acknowledged 
ability.  The  chapter  on  Probabilities,  and  that  on 
Fallacies,  are  the  two  most  interesting  in  his  book. 
Mr  Boole's  Mathematical  Analysis  of  Logic  (1848),  is 
an  attempt  to  resolve  the  ordinary  proposition  and 
syllogism  to  such  a  form  as  will  admit  of  the  applica- 
tion of  symbolical  notation.    We  regret  that  his  system 

*  Artis  Log.  Rud.  .  Oxford,  1849, 

2h 


482  LOGICAL  LITERATURE  OF  GREAT  BRITAIN 

requires  more  attention  to  matters  of  detail  than  we 
can  now  devote  to  it. 

In  Scotland  we  have  recently  had  Mr  Leechman's 
Logic  (1847),  and  Mr  Munro's  Manual  of  Logic 
(1850),  both  good  works  of  their  kind,  and  embodying 
many  acute  and  valuable  observations  on  logic,  viewed 
as  a  philosophical  instrument. 

Mr  Bayne's  Essay  (1850)  we  have  already  alluded 
to  in  connexion  with  Sir  William  Hamilton's  system  of 
logic.  We  subjoin  the  following  letter  which  appeared 
in  the  Athenceum  of  21st  December  last,  on  the  sub- 
ject to  which  the  work  especially  refers: — 

"Quantification  of  the  Predicate. — I  trust  you  will 
oblige  me  by  giving  insertion  to  the  following  remarks 
on  the  discovery  of  the  doctrine  of  a  thorough-going 
quantification  of  the  predicate  by  Sir  W.  Hamilton : — 
Having  lately  perused  Mr  Bayne's  Essay  on  the  new 
analytic  of  logical  forms,  it  occurred  to  me  that  I  had  long 
since  seen  the  same  doctrine  advanced  and  carried  quite 
as  far  in  a  work"  on  logic  which  I  rather  think  fell  still- 
born from  the  press.  The  work  in  question  was  pub- 
lished in  the  year  1827,  under  the  title  of  An  Outline 
of  a  New  System  of  Logic,  with  a  critical  examination 
of  Dr  Whately's  Elements  of  Logic,  by  George  Ben- 
tham,  Esq.  It  is  strange  that  the  title  of  this  book 
never  attracted  the  attention  of  the  Edinburgh  pro- 
fessor of  logic,  and  is  not  mentioned  in  the  Historical 
Notice  touching  the  Quantification  of  the  Predicate, 
appended  to  Mr  Bayne's  Essay.  I  invite  logicians 
carefully  to  examine  chapters  eight  and  nine  of  Mr 
Bentham's  Outline,  and  to  compare  the  views  therein 


AXD  THE  UNITED  STATES  OF  AMERICA.  483 

contained  with  the  pages  of  the  above-named  Essay, 
and  then  to  state  in  what  respect  they  fall  short  of  Sir 
W.  Hamilton's  doctrine.  The  Outline  was  evidently 
written  in  haste  and  for  a  temporary  purpose.  More- 
over, it  contains  many  errors ;  but  in  it  the  principle 
'of  a  thorough-going  quantification'  is  as  clearly  laid 
down  and  carried  into  practice  as  it  is  in  the  essay 
which  so  ably  expounds  the  doctrine  of  Sir  W.  Ha- 
milton. Unfortunately,  the  author  has  never  since 
furnished  us  $  with  a  summary  of  his  more  matured 
views.'  I  should  not  have  spoken  of  the  quantifica- 
tion of  the  predicate  as  a  discovery,  but  for  the  follow- 
ing passage  in  Mr  Bayne's  Essaij : — '  We  cannot,  how- 
ever, close,  without  expressing  the  true  joy  we  feel, 
that  in  our  country,  and  in  our  time,  this  discovery 
has  been  made.' — I  am,  &c.  W.  Warlow." 

"  Haverfordwest." 

The  logical  literature  of  the  United  States  is  not  of 
any  great  or  original  value.  It  has,  however,  been 
cultivated  with  some  zeal  within  the  last  half-century. 
Levi  Hedge,  of  Harvard  College,  published  his  Ele- 
ments of  Logic  (1816),  a  work  founded  on  the  common 
sense  views  of  Eeid  and  Stewart.  The  subject  is  divided 
into  three  branches.  In  the  first  the  author  gives  an 
account  of  the  various  powers  or  faculties  of  the  mind ; 
in  the  second,  he  discusses  the  nature  of  general  terms 
and  propositions ;  and  in  the  third,  he  points  out  those 
intellectual  instruments  more  immediately  engaged  in 
the  operation  of  reasoning  or  argumentation,  "  Inductive 
reasoning,"  says  the  author,  "  is  founded  on  the  belief 
that  the  course  of  nature  is  based  on  uniform  laws, 


484      LOGICAL  LITERATURE  OF  GREAT  BRITAIN,  ETC. 

and  that  things  will  happen  in  future  as  we  have 
observed  them  to  happen  in  times  past.  We  can  give 
no  proof  of  a  permanent  connexion  between  any  events, 
or  between  any  two  qualities  either  of  body  or  of  mind. 
The  only  reason  for  supposing  such  a  connexion  in  any 
instance  is,  that  we  have  invariably  found  certain  things 
to  have  been  conjoined  in  fact ;  and  this  experience,  in 
many  cases,  produces  a  conviction  equal  to  that  of 
demonstration."     (P.  61.) 

The  Elements  of  Logic  (1840)  of  Charles  K.  True, 
of  Boston,  is  a  treatise  of  considerable  talent.  His 
definition  of  logic  is,  that  it  is  the  science  of  enabling 
us  to  discover  truth,  and  communicate  it  to  others. 
That  part  of  the  work  devoted  to  the  consideration  of 
general  propositions,  general  terms,  and  the  principles 
of  induction,  are  the  most  interesting  and  useful. 

Henry  P.  Tappan's  Elements  of  Logic  (1844)  con- 
tain, independent  of  logical  matters,  an  introductory 
view  of  the  philosophy  of  mind  generally.  Logic  is 
treated  of  in  the  eleventh  section  of  the  first  part,  and 
is  founded  on  the  German  transcendental  philosophy. 


THE  ESD. 


INDEX  OF  NAMES. 


Abelard,  139,  140. 

Abicht,  306. 

jEnesidemus,  103. 

Agricola,  Rudolphus,  168,  420. 

Agrippa,  103. 

Aitzema,  M.,  405. 

Alcinous,  65. 

Alcuinus,  Alblnus  Flaccus,  110. 

Aldeburgus,  J.,  185. 

Aldrich,  263,  426. 

Alembert,  D',  317. 

Alexander,  65. 

Alfarabi,  113. 

Algazeli,  115. 

Alkendi,  113. 

Almeida,  De  T.,  414. 

Almquist,  416. 

Alphonso  X.,  141. 

Alphoxsus  de  Cepeda,  155. 

Amaury  de  Chartres,  147. 

Ammonius,  103. 

Ancillon,  307. 

Andreas,  A.  John,  184. 

Anselm,  St,  135. 

Antiphon,  9. 

Antisthenes,  16. 

Apelion,  49. 

Aquinas,  St  Thomas,  125,  149. 

Arcesilaus,  62. 

Arcisius,  G.  V.,  184. 

Ariston,  53. 

Aristotle,  19,  26,  34,  49,  79. 

Aristoxenus.  52. 

Arnauld,  253. 

Arnobius,  101. 


Athenagoras  (St),  96,  99, 
Atterborn,  416. 
Atticus,  49. 
Augustine,  St,  102. 
auriytllius,  p.,  270. 

AVENTINUS,   134. 

Ayenpace,  116. 
Ayeroes,  117. 
Ayicenna,  114. 

Axelson,  A.,  375. 

Baader,  391. 
Bacon,  Lord,  200. 
Baconthorpe,  422. 
Bake,  Alex.,  406. 
Baldlnotti,  337. 
Balfour,  E.,  445. 
Ballanche,  401. 
Balmes,  Don.  J.,  414. 
Bardili,  389. 
Barrol,  M.  F.,  337. 
Barron,  TF.,  437. 
Battam,  401. 
Bayle,  Peter,  266. 
Beattie,  Dr,  351,  357. 
Beausobre,  307. 
Becart,  M.,  408. 
Beck,  Sigis.,  306. 
Begnelin,  307. 
Belsham,  449. 
Bentham,  G.,  459. 
Bertius,  Joh.,  185. 
Bessarion,  164. 
Bilberg,  John,  374. 
Bini,  Vin.,  409. 


486 


INDEX  OF  NAMES. 


Biran,  Maine  de,  400. 
Biyar,  Fran,  de,  184. 
Blamede,  109. 
Block,  M.  G.,  373. 
BOETHIU3,  J.,  270. 
Boilme,  Jacob,  198. 
Bonald,  401. 

BONAVENTURE,   St,   152. 

Boxxoxia,  John,  185. 
Boole,  Mr,  481. 
Boot,  G.  de,  270. 
Bosanquet,  459. 
Bossuet,  266. 
Bostos,  F.,  413. 
Bottura,  P.,  412. 
Bouterweck,  Fred.,  388. 
Boter,  307. 
Bradwardln,  426. 
Brederod,  R.  C.,  270. 
Brerewood,  423. 
Brissot,  J.  P.,  401. 
Beown,  Dr  Thos.,  449. 
Bruce,  John,  442. 
Brunnmark,  289. 
Bruxella,  Peterus  de,  185. 
Bijdeus,  290. 
Buffler,  Father,  313. 
Bltleus,  John,  199. 
Burger sdicius,  Fran.,  263. 
Buridanus,  Th.,  185. 
Burley,  422. 
Butler,  Sam.,  205." 
Byrs^us,  F.,  185. 

Calker,  F.  V.,  389. 
Campanella,  Thomas,  181. 
Campbell,  Dr,  348. 
Carlowszky,  S.,  417. 
Carneades,  62,  63. 
Caeonelli,  Antonius,  184. 

CarPEXTARIUS,  P.,   185. 
CiESARIUS,  J.,  185. 
Cassiodorus,  107. 
Crakanthorpe,  423. 
Chalmers,  W.,  445. 
Charma,  405. 


Chesneiophorus,  John,  270. 
Chretien,  126,  477. 
Christernlx,  375. 
Cicero,  24,  64. 
Clement,  St,  100. 
Clemextis,  Johx,  194. 
Clerc,  J.  Le,  323. 
Clitomachus,  63. 
Coxcio,  James,  178. 
coxdlllac,  318. 
Coxrlxg,  Her.,  193. 
Cousin,  Y.  243,  402. 
Critolaus,  53. 
Crousaz,  M.,  258,  311. 
Crusius,  291. 
Cuoco,  411. 
Cusa,  Nicolas  de,  197. 
Cyprius,  George,  108. 

Damascenus,  108. 
Damlron,  404. 
Damon,  10. 
Daube,  399. 
David  of  Leon,  109. 
Dated  de  Dlnaut,  147. 
Daytes,  291. 
Deiariyieee,  M.,  402. 
Democrttus,  54. 
Dexixa,  339. 
Derodon,  Dayid,  265. 
Descartes,  Rexe,  231. 
Desciiamps,  288. 
Destutt-Tracy,  321. 
Deuslxghius,  A.,  270. 
Deuzixger,  M.  J.,  407. 
Dic^archus,  52. 
Diderot,  316. 
Digby,  Edward,  261. 
Digby,  Sir  Kenelm,  262. 
Diogexes  Laertius,  35,  64. 
Dioxysodorus,  9. 
Dioxysius,  Father,  184. 
Dorpius,  M.  185. 
Doytcam,  421. 
Dreyer,  Ch.,  193. 
Dufour,  405. 


INDEX  OF  NAMES. 


487 


DuHAMEL,  265. 

Dumarsais,  312. 
Dukcak,  De,  346,  421. 
Duxcax,  Mark,  445. 

Eberhard,  307. 
Eisenach,  J.  J.,  189. 
Elxala,  D.  R.,  414. 
Empiricus,  Sextus,  104. 
Exaxder,  270. 
Erasmus,  166. 
Erigexa,  John  Scotus,  130. 
eskharshausex,  392. 
eskstelx,  d 
Euclid,  16. 
Eudemus,  51. 
euthydemus,  9. 

Faber,  James,  168. 
Fabriano,  Sig.,  413. 
Facciolati,  338. 
Faclnus,  Marcelius,  164. 
Fayorin,  104. 
Fexelox,  268. 
Fickte,  389. 

Fichte,  J.  Hermann,  393. 
Fixlaysox,  Dr,  443. 
Flotte,  J.  L.,  400. 
Foxtexelle,  269. 
Forge,  Louis  de  la,  263. 
Foucher,  Abbe,  264. 
Fraxkoxius,  F.  A.,  199. 
Frederic  II.,  141. 
Fries,  J.  F.,  389. 
Fromoxd,  Claude,  337. 
Fughs,  J.  S.,  417. 

Galex,  65,  104. 
Gallardius,  P.,  185. 
Gallupi,  B.  P.,  413. 
Gassexdi,  229. 
Gaza,  Theodore,  165,  167. 
Gexoyesi,  334. 
Gextz,  M.,  402. 
Geraxdo,  397. 
Gerdel,  Cardlnal,  409. 


Gerson,  147,  157. 
Geyer,  416. 
Gezelius,  270. 
Gilbert  de  la  Poree,  145. 
Gioberti,  413. 
Gibox,  M.,  408. 
Glaxytl,  Joseph,  261. 
Goxzalez,  Fraxcis,  184. 
Gorgias,  9,  10. 
Gotama,  380. 
Gothus,  Bishop,  185. 
Gottsched,  291. 
Gravesaxde,  324. 
Groxes,  G.,  409. 
Grostete,  R.,  422. 
Grote,  Mr,  6,  9,  23. 
Grubbe,  S.,  415. 
Gulxalox,  138. 
Gyorgyi,  E.,  417. 

Hales,  422. 

Hallam,Mr,  118, 173,  181,  183, 

217,  239,  240,  241,  242,  243, 

258,  281,  473. 
Hamiltox,  SmW.,  423,  443,  459, 

482. 
Hauchecorxe,  M.,  402. 
Hedge,  Levi,  483. 
Hegel,  391. 
Heiberg,  417. 
Helmoxt,  Tax,  198. 
Herbert,  Lord,  250. 
Herbert,  J.  F.,  392. 
Hermas,  101. 
Hermext,  Yax,  326,  405. 
Heerera,  J.  A.  de,  155. 
Heusde,  Yax,  406. 
Hlxds,  Key.  S.,  459. 
Hlppias,  9. 

Hlrxham,  Jero:»ie,  265. 
Hobbes,  Til,  224. 
Holier,  B.  H.,  415. 
Hollmaxn,  293. 
Holstroux,  P.,  375. 
Hooghelaxde,  Cor.  Ab.,  270. 
Horxessis,  C,  193. 


488 


INDEX  OF  NAMES. 


Huet,  Bishop,  264. 
Huexs,  Aug.,  185. 
Hugo,  St  Victor,  143. 
Hulschoff,  A.,  325. 
Hume,  David,  214,  355. 
Hunter,  J.,  438. 
IIuygexs,  2G8. 
Huysche,  477. 
Hyphoff,  E.,  375. 

Irenjeus,  101. 

Isaac,  Abraham  Ben,  120. 

Isidore  of  Seville,  108. 

Janssexs,  J.  H.,  407. 

Jardin,  212. 

Jardin,  Dr,  430. 

Javari,  405. 

Javelin,  270. 

Jina,  385. 

Joffred,  Abbot,  420. 

John  the  Grammarian,  108. 

John  of  Salisbury,  141,  145. 

Junius,  B.,  270. 

Kames,  Lord,  350. 
Kant,  295. 

Katzchexofskj,  M.,  378. 
Keckerman,  184. 
Kempe,  Alex.,  270. 
Keratry,  400. 
Klxker,  327. 

Kirwan,  Dr  Richard,  449. 
Klein,  390. 
Kolmack,  P.,  375. 
Krause,  392. 
Krug,  388. 
Kyrger,  289. 

Lactantius,  101. 
Lallebasque,  409. 
Lallersted,  374. 
Lamexais,  Abbe,  401. 
Lampredi,  337. 
Lancelot,  253. 
Lancelot,  400. 


Lanfranc,  131. 

Larguet,  M.,  405. 

Laromiguiere,  400. 

Latonius,  Bart.,  185. 

Lawrens,  270. 

Lawson,  J.,  441. 

Lee,  Dr,  343. 

Leechman,  Mr,  482. 

Leibnitz,  G.  W.,  247. 

Leopold,  G.  P.,  375. 

Lesbos,  51. 

Lewis,  G.  C.,  459. 

Lidbeck,  A.,  415. 

Liebaert,  M.,  407. 

Listrius,  G.,  185. 

Llaxa,  Fran.  Murcta  de  la,  184. 

Locke,  John,  271. 

Lully,  Raymond,  153. 

Luther,  186. 

Luzac,  E.,  326. 

Lycon,  53. 

Maas,  307. 
Macaulay,  216. 
Magentixus,  109. 
Maimonides,  Moses,  120. 
Maimon,  S.,  306. 
Maistre,  Le,  401. 
Malebranche,  Father,  259. 
Mamertus,  Claudianus,  103. 
Mamiani,  Count  T.,  413. 
Mancio,  S.,  413. 
Manio,  Sig.,  413. 
Manettus,  166. 
Mansel,  480. 
Mariotte,  Abbe,  269. 
Marsenxe,  P.,  265. 
Martin  Capella,  107. 
Martini,  C,  193. 
Martyr,  Justin,  95,  97. 
Maupertuis,  307. 
Maxim  us,  65. 
Mazzarelli,  339. 
M'Cree,  177,  195,  197. 
Medici,  Cosmo  di,  164. 
Meexex,  M.  Van,  407. 


INDEX  OF  NAMES. 


489 


Melancthon,  173,  191. 
Melville,  Andrew,  173,  194. 
Melville,  James,  19-4. 
Mendorius,  Joh.  B.,  184. 
Mendoza,  P.  H.  de,  184. 
Merian,  307. 
Mesne,  John,  113. 
Mesterton,  C,  375. 
Metachita,  Theodorus,  109. 
Mill,  Mr  Stuart,  464. 
Moberly,  480. 
Molander,  A.  J.,  375. 
Moller,  H.,  375. 
Monboddo,  Lord,  352. 
Mongin,  M.,  399. 
Morgan,  A.  de,  481. 
Muller,  Aug.  P.,  293. 
Munro,  Mr,  482. 
Murmellius,  J.,  185. 
Murray,  Arch.,  44 G. 

Nannius,  P.,  270. 
Napier,  Prof.,  213. 
Naricius,  Ol.  N.,  185. 
Newman,  Francis  W.,  4G4. 
Nicole,  M.,  253. 
Nieuport,  De,  406. 
Nieuwenhuis,  M.,  406. 
Nizolini,  M.,  184. 
Noel,  M.,  399.. 
Norms,  John,  262-344. 
Nuesslein,  F.  A.,  391. 

Occam,  William,  155. 
Oldfield,  262.  .■ 
Oswald,  357. 

paladanus,  m.,.270.. 
Paracelsus,  198. 
Parmenides  ,  5 , .  1 7 . 
Pascal,  Blaise,  251. 
Paschius,  Barth.  J.,  184. 
Pelagius,  109. 
Perrard,  M.,  405. 
Perron,  401. 
Peter  Lombard,  145, 


Petrus  Cirnelo,  155. 
Picart,  M.,  193. 
Philo,  63. 
Philippi,  G.,  270. 
Plato,  26,  45,  95. 
Plattner,  307. 
Playfair,  Prof.,  214. 
Plenning,  J.,  374. 
Pletho,  George  G.,  163. 
Plotinus,  100. 
Ploucquet,  293. 
PODSCHrWALOFF,  W.  S.,  379. 
Poli,  B.,  410. 
Polus,  9. 

polyander,  j.,  185. 
Popofskj,  N.,  378. 

POKPHYRY,   101. 
POTAMON,    64.  ' 

Pkoclus,  102. 

Prodicus,  9. 

Protagoras  (of  Abdera),  9,  10. 

Psellxts,  109. 

Pyrrho,  54,  103,  104. 

Ramus,  Peter,  169. 
Read,  Sir  R.,  421 
Rebus,  Tho.,  185. 
Regis,  Pierre . Sylvain,  263. 
Regnault,  Father,  316. 
Reid,  Dr,  357. 
Retffexbeeg,  Baron,  408. 
Reimarius,  .293. 
Relxhold,  306. 
Reuchlin,  John,  190. 
Reusch,  293. 
Richai{d,  St  Victor,  143. 
Ritchie,  Dr,  443. 
Rixxer,  393.. 
Romagnosi,  G.  D.,  411. 
Ronigk,  O.,  375. 
Roscellinus,  134. 
Roscoe,  164. 
Rosmlni,  Ant.,  411. 

R.OYER  COLLARD,   400. 

Rubeo,  Antonius,  184. 
Rudbeckius,  J.,  185. 


490 


INDEX  OP  NAMES. 


Rudigee,  And.,  289. 

RUTHEEFOED,  JOHN,   194. 

Rydelius,  Andbew,  373. 
Rymee,  H.,  436. 

Sacy,  253. 
Saint-Raphael,  339. 
Sanchez,  182. 
Sandeeson,  425. 
Sandys,  C,  422. 
Saeia,  G.  de,  337. 

SCAEELLA,  J.  B.,  337. 
SCHALEEUS,  JOH.,  270, 
SCHAUMANN,   307. 
SCHEGK,  J.,   193. 
SCHEIBLE,  CH.,   193. 
SCHELLLNG,  389. 
SCHEEBIUS,  P.,    193. 
SCHLETEWEIN,   293. 
SCHOEEBLNG,  C.   M.,  416. 
Scholaeius,  GEOEGroSjl65,  167. 
Schookius,  M.,  270. 
Scotus,  Duns,  153. 
Sell j,  N.,  378. 
Sengueedius,  Anth.,  270. 

SlBBEEN,  F.   C,  417. 

Sigwabt,  393. 

Slmonius,  S.,  193. 

Sinus,  S.,  375. 

Skitte,  J.,  185. 

Smiglecius,  263. 

Smith,  Adam,  212,  450. 

Snellius,  R.,  185. 

Socbates,  17. 

Sodensten,  416. 

Soly,  Me,  481. 

Somnee,  Eenest,  193. 

Soto,  Domlnic,  184. 

Spalding,  W.,  440. 

Speecq,  G.,  270. 

Stahl,  D.,  193. 

Steffexs,  Henry,  391,  417. 

Stevenson,  Me,  441. 

Stewaet,  Dug.,  177,  218,  357. 

Stilpo,  54. 

Stjebahjelm,  G.,  199. 


Steato,  53. 

Steokwich,  M.  Van,  375. 
Stuemius,  J.,  185. 
Sylla,  49. 
Synesius,  103. 
Syebius,  290. 

Tappan,  H.  P.,  484. 

Tamasia,  409. 

Tandel,  E.,  408. 

Tatian,  98. 

Teissieb,  170. 

Teebason,  Abbe,  313. 

Teetullian,  95,  101. 

Tetens,  307. 

Theophbastus,  51. 

Thibon  Maebion,  Jehudah  Ben, 

128. 
Thomasius,  286. 
Thomson,  Me,  481. 
Theasymachus,  9. 
Tibon,  Moses  Eben.,  120. 
Tlmon,  54. 
Tibabochi,  339. 
Titelmannus,  F.,  185. 
Toledo,  Feancis,  184. 
Tommasio,  413. 

TOPHAIL,   116. 

Teebizond,  Geoege  of,  165,  167. 
Teue,  C.  K.,  484. 
tschienhausen,  286. 
Tyeannion,  49. 
Tybwitt,  T.,  343. 

Ubaghs,  M.,  408. 

Valla,  Laueentius,  166. 

Velsius,  J.,  185. 

Ventuea,  G.,  410. 

Veebel,  A.,  270. 

Vico,  331. 

Vincent  de  Beauvais,  148. 

Viyes,  Ludoyicus,  167. 

TVagneb,  391. 
Wahlsteom,  A.,  375. 


INDEX  OF  NAMES. 


491 


Walch,  293. 
"Walker,  446. 
Wallachius,  289. 
Wallarius,  374. 
Wallis,  262,  426. 
Warlow,  W.,  483. 
Watson,  Robert,  437. 
Watts,  Isaac,  344. 
Westtersten,  B.,  375. 
Whately,  Archbishop,  426,  454. 
White,  Thomas,  261. 
William  of  Champ aux,  138. 
William  of  Paris,  149. 
Winperse,  D.  Van,  326. 


Wolff,  287. 

Wood,  Anthony,  421. 

Wyttenbach,  Dan.,  326,  405, 

Xenophon,  19. 

Yocng,  441. 


Zabarella,  James,  181, 
Zeno  of  Elea,  5,  17. 
Ziedler,  Mel.,  193. 
Zuxica,  Father,  184. 


A  LIST  OF  WORKS  ON  LOGIC, 

ALPHABETICALLY  ARRANGED. 


Abicht  (Joh.  Tieinr.),  Philosophic  cler  Erkenntnisse.     Bayr.,  1791. 
Idem,  Von  dem  Nutzen  und  der  Einrichtung  eines  zu  Logischen  Uebun- 

gen  bestimmten  Collegium.     Leipsic.  1790. 
Idem,  Yerbcsserte  Logik  oder  Wahrheits,  &c.     Fuerth.,  1802. 
Idem,  Anleitung  und  materialien  zu  einem  Logisch-practischen  Insti- 
tute.     Erlangen,  1796. 
Academle  Lovaxiexsis  Comment  aria  in  Isagogen  Porphyrii,  et  in  omnes 

libros  Aristotelis  de  dialectica.     Loi\,  1568.    Fol. 
Acevedo,  Dialectica  et  Logica.     Madrid,  1563. 
Ackeksdyck  (Corn,  ab),  Logica.  Traj.  ad  R.  1666. 
Acoxtius  (Jac.),  De  methodo,  sive  de  recta  investigaudarum  traden- 

darumque  artium  ac  scientiarnm  ratione.     Basil,  1558. 
Agraxa  (Nicol.),  Disquisitiones  in  V.  Porphyrii  univcrsalia.     Franc, 

1601. 
Ageicola  (Rudolphus),  De  dialectica  inventione,  libri  III.    Colon.,  1527  ; 

Paris,  1554. 
Alcuixts  sive  Albixus  Flaccus,  Dialectica  et  grammatica.     Ingolst., 

1604. 
Albeetes  Magnus,  Opera  ad  logicam  pertinentia.      Venet,  1494. 
Idem,  Coinmentaria  in  IV.  libros  logicaj  Aristot.     Colon.,  1490.    Fol. 
Idem,  Epitornata  sive  reparationes  logics  veteris  et  novse  Aristot. 

Cot.,  1496.     4to. 
Idem,  Commentaria  in  Isagogen  Porphyrii,  et  in  omnes  libros  Aristot, 
de  vetere  logica.      Col.  Agr.,  1494.     Fol. 
Aldrich,  Artis  Logicaj  Comp*     Oxford,  1846* 


494  LIST  OF  WORKS  ON  LOGIC. 

Alemanus  (Ad.),  De  optimo  genere  disputandi,  libri  III.    Paris,  1546. 
Aler  (P.  Paul.),  Dialectica  nova.     Trev. 

Idem,  Logica.      Colog.,  1710. 
Alexander,  Aplirod.  in  pr.  anal.  Aristot.  comment.      Venet.,  1520. 
Algazeli  (Abou  Ham  Mohammed),  Pliilos.  et  Logica.    Colog.,  1506. 
Almeida  (D.  Teodoro  de),  Elementos  de  Logica.     Madrid,  1847. 
Alphonsus  de  Corduba,  Principia  Dialectices. 
Alphoxsus  de  Prado,  Qua?st.  Dialec. 
Alphoxsus  de  Veracruz,  De  Topicis  Dialec. 

Alstedius  (Jo.  Henr.),  Logica?  systema  harmonicum.    Herborn,  Nassov. 
1614-1623. 

Idem,  Nucleus  logics.     Herb.  1628. 

Idem,  Theatrum  scholasticum.     Ed.  alt.  Herb.  1620. 

Idem,  Compendium  lexici  pliilosopliici.     Herbornoe,  1626. 
Alvaradus  (Alp.),  Ars  disserendi  ac  dicendi,  lib  ii.     Basil,  1600. 
Ammoxius  Hermeas,  Comment,  in  Aristotelis,  &c.     Gr.      Tenet.,  1545. 

Idem,  Comment,  in  Aristotelis  librum  de  interpretatione.    Gr.    Venet., 
1545. 
Ancillox,  Memoire  sur  la  certitude,  et  en  particulier  sur  la  nature  de 
la  certitude  liumaine.     Mum.  de  l'Acad.  de  Berlin.     1792,  1793. 

Idem,  Doute  sur  les  bases  du  calcul  des  probabilites.     lb.,  1794- 
1795. 
Andrea  (Antoninus),  Questiones  in  Aristotelis  Logicam.     1489. 
Anepoxymus  (Georg.),  Compendium  philosophic  sive  organi  Aristotelis. 

Gr.  et  Lat.     Aug.  Vind.,  1600. 
Axgest  (PL),  Problemata  logicalia.     Par.,  1507  et  1511. 
Axtoxius  (Coronel),  Quest.  Logica3. 
Axtonius  de  Espixosa,  In  Summulas. 
Axtoxius  (Ramirez  de  V.),  Abbre.  Parv.  Logicaiium. 
Antoxius  Gexuexsis,  Ars  logico-critica.     Neapoli,  1758. 
Arboreus,  Scholia  ad  Predicamenta  Aristotelis.     Paris,  1582. 

Idem,  Dialectica.     Paris,  1530  et  1536. 
Argall  (John),  Introd.  ad  Artem  Dialecticann     London,  1605. 
Amesius  (William),  Dcmonst.  Logica?  vera?.     Lugd.,  1632. 
Aristoteles,  Organon.     Franc,  1592. 

Arxauld  (Ant.),  Des  vraies  et  des  fausses  idees,  contre  ce  qu'enseigne 
rauteur  dela  recherche  de  la  verite.     Cologne,  1683. 

Idem,  L'art  de  penser.     Paris,  1664. 
Arxdt  (Chris.),  De  vero  usu  Logices  in  theoiogia.     Rostock,  1650. 
Arxoult   (Gatien),   Programme  d'un   cours   complct    de   philosophic. 

Paris,  1831. 
Apaczai  (A.  J.),  A  System  of  Logic.      Weissenburg,  1636. 
Augustixus,  Tractatus  de  dialectica.     Antv.,  1700. 
Augustixus  (Perez  de  Olivan),  In  poster!  Arist. 
Augustixus  (de  Sbarroia),  Dialectica?. 
Aurivillius  (Pctr.),  Principii  Logicorum.      1630. 
Averroes,  Uni.  res  logica.      Venice,  1560. 


LIST  OF  WORKS  ON  LOGIC.  493 


B 

Baader  (F.),  Ferraenta  cognitionis.     Berl,  1822. 

Bacon   (Franc),    Op.   omnia.      Amstel,    1730.;    fol.   1823.      Wurtz* 

bourg,  1770-1789.     3  vols.  8vo. 
Bake  (Alex.),  Lessen  over  de  Redekunde,  ten  dienste  van  jonge  lieden, 

die  de  scbolen  liebben  verlaten.     Ley  den,  1828. 
Baldixotti,  De  Recta  Mentis  Institutione.     1787. 
Balduixus  (Junius),  De  tota  Aristotelis  Logica.     1634. 
Balmes  (Don.  J.),  Logica.     Barcelona,  1850. 
Balfour  (Robert),  Logiertia  et  Ethica.     Burd.,  1616. 
Barbat  (Petr.),  Comm.  in  Arist.  Logicam.     Paris,  1680. 
Barby  (Petr.),  Com aientarius  in  Aristotelis  logicam.     Lugd.,  1692. 
Bardilus  (C.  G.),  Grundriss  der  ersten  Logik  gereinigt  von  den  Irr- 
thuemern  bisheriger  Logiken  ueberhaupt,  der  Kantischen  insbe- 
sondre.     Stuttgart,  1  800. 
Idem,  Beytrag  zur  Beurtheikmg  des  gegenwaertigen  Zustandes  der 
Vernunftlehre  in  einigen  Bemerkungen  ueber  die  Tieftrunk'sche 
und  Schulze'sche  Logik.     Landshut,  1803. 
Barlaam,  Logistica.     Paris,  1594. 

Barron  (Profess.),  Lee.  on  the  Belles  Lettres  and  Logic,  1806. 
■  Barthollxe  (Caspar),  Natura  Logical,  1624. 
Barxabas  (Gallego  de  Vera),  Controv.  Logicales. 
Bastos  (Father),  Logica.     Salamanca,  1815. 
Batesox  (George),  Plain  Logick  for  Plain  Men.     London,  1702. 
Baumeister  (Fr.  Chr.),  Institutiones  philos.  rationalis  methodo  Wolfii 
conscripta3.      Wittenb.  1735,  ed.  decima  1769,  item  1798. 
Idem,  Philosophia  definitiva  ex  syst.  "Wolfii.      Wittenb.,   1758  et 

1789. 
Idem,  Philosophia  rccens  controversa.     Lips,  et  Gorlicii,  1749  et 

1766. 
Idem,  Logica.      Wittenb.,  1780. 

Idem,  De  fallaci  expectatione  casuum  similium.    Lips,  et  Gorl,  1741. 
4to. 
Baidigaeten  (Alex.  Gottl.),  Acroasis  logica,  in  Christ,  L.  B.  De  Wolf. 
Halce,  1761. 
Idem,  Logica.     Halle,  1773. 

Idem,  Acroasis  logica  aucta  et  in  systema  redacta  a  J.  Gott.  T^ll- 
nero.     Ed.  ii.     Halce,  1773. 
Bayle  (P.),  Systeme  de  philosophic,  contenant  la  loqique  et  la  meta- 

physique.     Imprime  par  ordre  du  roi.     Berlin,  1785. 
Bayxes  (T.  S.),  An  Essay  on  the  New  Analytic  of  Logical  Forms. 

Edinburgh,  1850. 
Beattie  (James),  Logic,  &c.      1804. 

Beausobee,  Reflexions  philos.  sur  la  certitude.     Mem.  de  1'Acad.  de 
Berlin,  1776.     Pp.  306-370. 


496  LIST  OF  WORKS  ON"  LOGIC. 

Becart,  Expose  des  Facultes,  des  Lois,  et  des  Operations  de  l'Ame. 

Bruxelles,  1838. 
Beck  (J.  S.),  Lelirbuch  der  Logik.     Rostock  und  Schwerin,  1820. 
Beck  (D.),  Institutiones  logicae.     Salzb.,  1784. 

Idem,  Philosophia  rationalis.  1764.  4to. 
Beck,  Psychologie  und  Logik.  Stuttgard,  1846. 
Becmannus  (C.  B.),  Usu  Logices.  Han.,  1619. 
Bems  (Venerabilis),  Opera  Omnia.  Col.,  1688. 
Bejer  (0.  F.  A.),  De  formis  cogitandi  disjunctivis.  Lips.,  1813. 
Belloyisius  (Amandus),  Logica.  Venice,  1535. 
Belsham  (Dr  Thomas),  Compend.  Logic.  1801. 
Bendavid    (Laz.),    Versuch    einer   logischen  Auseinandersetzung   der 

Mathem.  Unendlichen.     Berlin,  1796. 
Benedictus  (Majoricensis),  In  Logicam. 
Beneke  (Fr.  Ed.),  Erkenntnisslehre  nacli  dem  Bewusstseyn  der  reinen 

Vernunft.     Jena,  1820. 
Bentham  (Dr  Edward),    An  Introduction  to   Logic,    Scholastic  and 

Rational.      Oxford,  1773.     Reflexions  on  Logic.      Oxon,  1770. 
Bentham  (George),  Outlines  of  a  System  of  Logic.     London,  1827. 
Berard  (Fred.),  Doctrine  des  rapports  du  physique  et  du  moral  de 

rhomme.     Paris,  1823. 
Berg  (Franz.),  Epikritik  der  philosophic.     Auerstadt  und  Rudolstadt, 

1805. 
Bergk  (J.  A.),  Die  Kunst  zu  Denken.     Leipz.,  1802. 
Bertius  (P.),  Logical  peripatetics  lib.  VI.     Lugd.  Bat.,  1604. 
Beurhusius  (Krid.),  Dialectical  Rami. 
Idem,  Paedagogia  logica.     Colon.,  1583. 
Idem,  Defensio  P.  Rami  dialectics.     Franco/.,  1589. 
Idem,  Ad  P.  Rami  dialectic*  praxin  introductio.     Franco/.,  1598. 
Idem,  Disputatio  pro  Ramea  hoc  est  Socratica  et  Aristotelica  philoso- 
phia.     Col,  1610. 
Bm    (Vincenzo),    Corso    Elementario    di   Lezioni    Logico-Metafisico- 

Morali.     Perugia,  1818. 
Bilstenius  (Joach.), -Dialectica.     Hanov.,  1592. 
Blakey  (Robert),  Essay  on  Logic.     Second  Edition.     London,  1848. 
Blanchet  (Jean),  Logique  de  l'espv     et  du  cceur.     La  Haye  et  Paris, 

1760. 
Blemmid^e  (Nicephori),  Epitome  logica.     Opera  Wegelini.    Aug.     Vind. 

1605. 
Blundeyille  (Thomas),  Arte  of  Logicke.     1599. 
Boeiime  (C.  F.),  Beantwortung  der  Frage  :  Was  ist  Wahrheit  ?    Altenb., 

1803. 
Boehme  (And.),  Logica.     Franc,  1749. 
Boethius,  Opera  cum  notis  varior.     Basil,  1546. 
Boisgelin  (le  Cardinal  de),  L'art  de  juger  par  l'analyse  des  ide'ce, 

Paris,  1789. 
Bononia  (John),  Compendium  Dialectices.     1550. 


LIST  OF  WORKS  OX  LOGIC.  497 

Boxstettex  (Cli.  Victor  de),  Etudes  cle  l'homme,      Geneve  et  Fan's, 

1821. 
Boole  (George),   The  Mathematical  Analysis   of  Logic.     Cambridge, 

1847. 
Boot  (Gerardns  cle),  Philosophic  Aristotiliea?  accurata  Examinatio  ac 

Bolida  Confusio.     1640. 
Borelly,  Elemcns  de  l'art  cle  penser,  on  la  logique  reduite  a  cc  qu'elle 

a  cle  plus  utile.     Noiiv.  edit.     Liege,  1821. 
Borx  (F.  G.),  De  scientia  et  conjectura.     Leipz.,  1805. 
Boscherus  (Hiezo),  Harmonia  Logica.     1595. 
Bottuka  (Pietro),  Logica.      1833. 

Bosaxquet  (S.  R.),  New  System  of  Logic.     London,  1839. 
Bouteeweck  (Fred.),  Lehrb.  cler  philos.  Vorkenntnisse.     Goett.,  1810 

et  1820. 
Idem,  Lehrbuch  cler  pliilos.  Wissenschaften.     Goett.,  1820. 
Braxiss  (Jul.),  Die  Logik.     Berl,  1823. 
Beederodius  (Petrus   Cornelius),  Analysis,  sou  Resolutiones  Dialect. 

1634. 
Bkerewood  (Edw.),  Elementa  Logica?.     Oxon.,  1614. 
Bricot,  Textus  logices. 

Bricotds  (Thomas),  Abbre.  Textus  totius  Logices.     Paris,  1494. 
Brightlaxd  (John),  Art  of  Rhetoric  and  Logic.     Lond.,  1712. 
Brissot  (J.  P.),  De  la  Verite,  &c.     1825. 
Brooke  (Sir  Robert),  The  Nature  of  Truth.     London,  1640. 
Bruce  (John),  Syllabus  of  Logic.     Edinburgh. 
Bruckerus  (Jac),  Observatio  cle  Pyrrhone. 
Bruxo   (Jord.),   De   compendiosa   architectura   et    complemento  artis 

Lullii.     Parisiis,  1580. 
Ldem,  Ars  memoria?,  sivc  de  umbris  idearum.     Parisiis,  1582. 
Ldem,  De  lampade  coinbinatoria  Lulliana.      Yitemb.,  1587. 
Ldem,  De  progressu  et  lampade  venatoria  logicorum.     Yitemb.,  15S7. 
Ldem,  De  imaginum,  signoruin,  et  idearum  compositione  ad  omnia 

inventionum,  dispositionum,  et  memoria?  genera,  lib.  iii.     Franco/., 

1591. 
Bri'xellexsis  (Georgius),  ou  Vax  Breussel,  Facillima  in  Aristotclis 

logica  interpretatio.     Parisiis,  1496.     4to. 
Buchker  (A.),  Erkenntniss  und  Philosophic.     Landsli.,  1806. 
Buddeus  (Jo.  Fr.),  Elementa  pliilos.     Hala>,  1703. 
Buffier  (Claude),  Traite  des  premieres  verites.     Avignon,  1822. 
Ldem,  Logiques  Nouvelles.     Paris,  1714. 
Ldem,  Les  principcs  du  raisonnement  exposes  en  deux  logiques.    Paris, 

1714. 
Bchle    (Jo.   Theoph.),   Aristotclis.   op.,   vol.   i.-iv.      Bipont.,   1761- 

1793. 
Ldem,  Antiquorum  Gra?corum,  &c. 
Ldem,  Einleitung  in  die  alls'.  Losfik  und  die  Kritik  der  reinen  Yer- 


nunft.      Goett.,  1795. 


498  LIST  OP  WORKS  ON  LOGIC. 

Bullfinger  (G.  B.),  Prsscepta  logica.     Jena,  1720. 
Buefoed  (John),  Insti.  logicae.     Camb.,  1680. 

Buegeesdicifs  (Franc),  institt.  logicae  ad  Aristotclis.  &c.     Cantabr. 
1647. 

Idem,  Logic.      1685. 
Bueeoaxus  (J.),  Summula  in  logicam.     S.  L.     1487.     4to. 

Idem,  Compendium  logics.      Venet.,  1499. 
Buekhaeusee  (Nic),  Institt.  logica?.      Wirceb.,  1772. 
Bueleius  (Walterus,  Anglicus),  Scripta  in  Isagogen  Forphyrii  et  artem 

veterem  Aristotelis.      Venet.,  1509. 
Buesius  (Adamus),  Dialectica  Ciceronis.     Samosci,  1604. 
Buschehus  (Heiz.),   Do  ratione  solvendi  sophismata  ex  Rami  logica 
deducta,  lib.  ii.     Hamb.,  1597. 

Idem,  Hahnoniaj  logics  Philippo-Rameae,  lib.  ii.     lemgov.,  1597. 
Bf/tner  (M.  Guolf.),  Dialectica  Germanica.     Lips.,  1576. 
Buzenkay  (Mich.),  Compendii  logici.     1696. 


c 

C-esaetus  (J.),  Dialectica.     Paris,  1541. 

Idem,  Dialectica,  acccd.  Jo.  Murmellii  Isagogen  in  decern  Aristotelis 
praedicamenta.     Moguntice,  1550. 

Calkee  (Fr.  Yon),  Dcnklehre,  oder  Logik  und  Dialektik,  &c.     Bonn, 
1822. 

Callisen  (Ch.   Fried.),   Kurzer  Abriss    der   Logik   und   Metaphysik. 
Nureb.  und  Sidzbach,  1805. 

Camerarius  (Guli.),  Selectaj  disputationes  philos.     Paris,  1630. 

Cameaxella  (Th.),  Pliilosophia  rationalis.     Paris,  1638. 

Caxtifxcfla  (Claudius),  Topica.     Basil,  1520.     Fol. 

Capea  (Balth.),  Disp,  Logica.     Patav.,  1606. 

Caramfel  (J.),  Herculis  labores  logici.     Franco/.,  1655. 
Idem,  Philosophia  rationalis  et  realis.     Lovanii,  1642. 

Caramuel  (de  Lob.),  Precursor  Logicus.     Franc.,  1654. 

Caebonel  (Hug.),  Ars  Lulliana  seu  memoria  artificialis.     Paris,  1621 . 

Cardaillac  (De),  Cours  elcmentaire  de  philosophic.   Paris,  1881.   2  vols. 

Caedaxus  (Hier.),  Dialectica.     Basil,  1566. 

Carlo  wszky  (Sigism.)  Logica.      Cassovics,  1820. 

Caeo  (J.),  Cours  elcmentaire  de  philosophic.     Paris,  1831. 

Carpentaria  (Jac),  Dcscriptio  universal  artis  disserendi  ex  Aristo- 
telis organo  logico.     Parisiis,  1552. 

Cartesius  (Renatus),  Op,  omnia.     Amst.,  1692. 

Gaetiee  (P.  G.),  Logica.      Wirceb.,  1756. 

Caevill,  Manual  of  Logic.      1821. 

Care  (John),  In  Aristotelis  Dialccticam.     London,  1584. 

Cas.uaxxus  (Oth.),  P.  Rami  dialectica!  et  Mclancthonis  collata?.    Ilanov., 
159-1. 


LIST  OF  WORKS  ON  LOGIC.  499 

Cassaxder  (G.),  Tabula?  pra?ceptionum  dialecticarum.     Paris,  1548. 
Cassiodorus  Opp.  ed.  Joh.  Garatius.     Rotomagi,  1679. 
Castillox  (De),  Sur  la  maniere  d'enseigner  de   Socrate.      Mem.  de 
l'Acad.  de  Berlin.     1779. 
Idem,  Reflexions  sur  la  logique.     Mem.  de  l'Acad.  de  Berlin.     1802. 
Idem,  Menioire  sur  un  nouvel  algorithme  logique.     1803. 
Chambers  (R.  and  W.),  Logic  for  the  People.     Edinburgh,  1849. 
Chambre  (F.  I.),  La  Logique.     Paris,  1754. 
Champaigxac  (Jean  de),  Logique.     Paris,  1606. 
Chaxgeux,  Traite  des  extremes  ou  des  elemens  de  la  science  de  la 

realite.     Amst.,  1767. 
Charma,  Lemons  de  Logique.     Paris,  1842. 
Chaestadius  (Val.),  Syn.  Logica.     Norib.,  1622. 
Chauvix  (Steph.),  Lexicon  philos.     Rotterod.,  1692. 
Chesxeiophorus  (Joh.),  Logica.     Stockholm,  1629. 
Chladexius  (Job.  Nart.),  Dissert,  de  vita  et  ha?resi  Roscellini.    Etlang., 

1756. 
Chxichtov-eus  (Jud.),  Fundamentum  logica?.     Paris,  1534. 

Idem,  Iutroductio  in  terminorum  cognitionem,  in  libros  logicorum. 
Paris,  1520. 
Choul  (John  Rob.),  Introd.  to  Logic.     1672. 

Chretiex  (Charl.  F.),  An  Essay  on  Logical  Method.      Oxford,  1848. 
Christierx  (P.  N.),  Diss,  de  usu  logica?  in  ideis  acquirendis.      UpsaL, 

1788. 
Chrysoveloxe,  Traite  de  Logique  et  de  morale.      Vienne,  1800. 
Claubergius  (Joh.),  Logica.     Amst.,  1658. 

Idem,  Ontosophia  nova  et  accedit  logica  contracta.     Duisburgi  ad 

Rh.,  1660. 
Idem,   Onderscheijt  tusschen  de  Cartesiaensche  ende  de  anders  in  de 

schoolen  gebruijckelijkc  philosophic     Nijmegen,  1661. 
Idem,  Initiatio  philosophi,  sive  dubitatio  Cartesiana.     Dirisb.,  1655. 
Idem,  Differentia  inter  Cartesianam  et  alias  in  scholis  usitatas  phi- 

losophias.     1680. 
Idem,  Defensio  Cartesiana  adversus  Revium.     Amst.,  1652. 
Idem,  Specimen  logica?  Cartesians. 
Clericus  (Joan.),  Opp.  philos.     Lips.,  1710. — Sebast.  Edzard  a  pub- 
lie :  Examen  logica?  Joannis  Clerici.     Hamb.,  1699. 
Idem,  Logica.     Amst.,  1693. 
Clerc  (John  le),  Logica.     Lond.,  1692. — Logica.     Amst.,  1692. 
Clightoveus  (J.  N.),  Logica?  Introd.     1520. — Fundamentum  Logica?. 

Paris,  1554. 
Cceuret  de  St  Georges,  Prmcipes  de  logique.     Paris,  1822. 
Coke  (Zac),  Art  of  Logic.     1687. 
Collar©  (John),  Logic.     1796. 

Idem,  A  praxis  of  Logic.     1799. 
Complutexsis  Collegii  FF.  discalceati  in  Aristotelis,  &c,  Lugd.,  1668. 
2  vols. 


500  LIST  OF  WORKS  ON  LOGIC. 

Condillac,  CEuvres  completes.     Paris,  1822.      16  vols. 
Contmbricensis  collegii  Comment,  in  Isagogen  Porphyrii  et  omnes 

libros  Aristotelis  de  dialectica.     Lovan.,  1569. 
Contzen  (Adam),  Prrelectiones  logics.     Mechlinice,  1822. 
Coronel  (Vincentius),  Quaest.  Logicales.     Paris,  1520. 
Coronel  (Ant.),  Logica.     Paris,  1530. 
Corvinus  (Chr.  Ant.  Jo.).  Institutiones  philos.     Jence,  1739. 
Cosmus  Alem.  (Algazelis  Arabis),  Logica  et  philos.      Colon.,  1501. 
Costacciaro,  Introd.  in  Logicam.     1597. 
Crakanthorp  (Richard),  Logica.     London,  1622. 
Crassotius  (Jo.),  Logica.     Paris,  1617. 
Crellius  (Fort.),  Isagoge  logica.     Neustad.,  1592. 

Idem,  Isagoge  logica.     Stett.,  1621. 
Crousaz  (J.  P.  de),  Systeme  des  reflexions,  ou  nouvel  essai  de  logique. 
Amst,  1725. 
Idem,  Logicas  compendium.     Groningce,  1725. 
Idem,  Logicas  sy sterna.      Genevce,  1724. 
Idem,  Examen  du  Pyrhonisme  ancien  et  moderne.     La  Haije,  1733. 

Fol. 
Idem,  Observations  critiques  sur  Tabrege  de  la  logique  de  M.  Wolf. 
Geneve,  1744. 
Crucii  (Jacobi),  Medulla  Logics.     Lugd.  1640. 
Crusius  (Chr.  A.),  Weg  zur  Gewissheit  und  Zuverlaessigkeit  der  men- 
schlichen  Erkenntnisse.     Leipz.,  1747. 

jen  Yernunffcwahrheiten.    Leipz.,  1745. 
de  usu  et  lhnitibiis  rationis  sufficients.     Lips.,  1752. 
Idem,  De  summis  rationis  principiis.     Lips.,  1775. 
Cuoco,  Esercizio  Logico.     1824. 
Cyprianus  (Benedictus),  Clavis  Logica?. 


D 

Dagoumer  (Guill.),  Philosophia  ad  usum  scholar  adornata.    Vind.  Lugd., 

1746. 
D'Alembert,  Histoire  de  Philosophic     Paris,  1760. 
Dalham  (FL),  De  ratione  recte  cogitandi.     Aug.  Vind.,  1762. 
Damascenus  (Joh.),  Capita  philos.  sive  dialectica.    Paris,  1712.    Vol.  I. 
Damiron  (Ph.),  Cours  de  philosophic     Paris,  1831. 
Danhauerus  (Jo.  Conr.),  De  syllogismo  infmito.     Argent.,  1631. 
Daniel  (Gabriel),  Voyage  du  monde  de  Descartes.     Paris,  1691. 
Daniel  (G.),  Some  Words  on  the  Logick  of  my  Lord  Bacon.     London, 

1645. 
Daube  (L.  J.  J.),  Essai  d'ideologie,  ou  introduction  a  la  grammaire 

generalc     Paris,  1805. 
Davies  (Charles),  The  Logic  and  Utility  of  Mathematics.     New  York, 

1850. 


LIST  OF  WORKS  OX  LOGIC.  501 

Date  (Ant.),  Dialectica  peripatetiea.     Lov.,  1652. 
Deddeley  (P.  Jac),  Sum  inula?  logica?.     Ingolstd.  etAug.  Vind.,  1751. 
Degeraxdo,  Des  signcs  et  de  Fart  de  penscr,  considered  dans  leurs  rap- 
ports mutuels.     Paris,  1800.      -1  vols. 
Delariyiere,  Logique  classique.      Clermont,  1829. 
De  Morgan,  on  the  Structure  of  the  Syllogism.     1817. 
Dexzixger  (Ign.),  Prima  lineamenta  logices.     Leod.,  1818. 

Idem,  Institutiones  logiere.     Leod.,  1821.      2  vols.  8vo. 

Idem,   Prima  elementa  logices,   secundum  institutiones  logicas  ex- 
posita.     Leod.,  182G. 
Derodox  (David),  Logica.      Geneva,  1659. 

Idem,  Compend.  logicse.     1663. 

Idem,  Phil.  Cent.  Logica.      Geneva,  1661. 

Idem,  Logica  Metaphysica.      Geneva,  1669. 
Deschamps,  Logique.     Berlin,  1736. 
Destutt  (Comte  de  Tracy),  Elemens  d'ideologie,  logique.    Paris,  1818. 

Idem,  Principes  logiques.     Parts,  1817. 
Dexippus,  Qiupstionum  in  Aristotelis  categorias.     Paris,  1519. 
Dicker  (Conrad),  Logica.      Oppcn.,  1620. 
DroAcus  (a  Jesu),  In  Logicam. 
Didacus  de  Ledesma,  Dialectica. 
Dbdacus  de  Zuxiga,  Dialectica. 
Didacts  Masius,  Dialectica. 
Didacus  Naverus,  Dialectica. 
Di  daces  Ortiz,  Dialectica. 

Deoerot  (Den.),  CEuvrcs  philos.     Paris,  1819.      7  \o\<. 
Digby  (Edward),  De  Duplici  methodo  libri  duo,  unicam  P.  Kami  Metbo* 

dum  Refutantes.     1589. 
Diekserx  (E.  H.),  Organon  des  gesammten  transcendenten  Analysis. 

Berlin,  1845. 
Dolz  (Joh.  A.),  Opus  Syll.  sive  Logices.     Paris,  1512. 
Dolz  (J.  Chr.),  Kleinc  Denkk 
Domtnicus  Baxez,  Dialectica. 
Dominicus  Soto,  Dialectica. 

Dorpius  (Martinus),  Orationes  de  Laudibus  xVristotelis.     151-1. 
Drallac,  Epitome  of  Logic.     1795. 

Drew  (James),  Logick.     London,  1702.  v/ 

Drobitsch  (W.),  Kcue  Darstcllung  der  Logik.     Leipsic,  1836. 
Dullardus  (J.),  Quai'Stiones  in  Aristotelis.     Paris,  1509.     Fol. 

Idem,  Qnajstiones  in  librum  prsedicabilium  Porphyrii,  cura  Joannis 
Drabbii  Bonicollii.     Paris,  1520. 

Idem,  Prsefatio  ad  Logicam  Joaunis  Buridani. 
Du  Marsais,  Logique.     1769. 

Duncan  (Mark),  A  Latin  System  of  Logic.     Salmur.,  1612. 
Duncan  (Dr  William),  Logic.     London,  1759. 
Dutexs,  Logique.     Paris,  1773. 
Du  Trieu  (Phil.),  Manductio  ad  Logicam.     Oxon.,  1826; 


502  LIST  OF  WORKS  ON  LOGIC. 


E 

Ebeldtg  (H.  M.  F.),  Yersucli  einer  Logik  fur  dcu  gemeinen  Yerstand. 

Berlin,  1797. 
Ebelius  (J.  P.),  Hermes  logicus.     1620. 
Ebeehaed  (J.  A.),  Allgemeine  Theorie  cler  Denkens  imd  Empfindeus. 

Berlin,  1786;  Leipz.,  1786. 
Ebeet  (P.  C),  Elementa  logica?  cclectica.\     Franco/.,  1763.     4to. 
Eisenach  (J.  J.),  Summa  totius  Logics.     Erfurt,  1501. 

Idem,  Epitome  seu  Breviarinm  Dialectics. 
Eixala  (D.  Eamon  Marti  de),  Corso  di  Filosofia  de  las  Ideas,  la  Gra- 

matica  general,  y  la  Logica.     Benel.,  1847. 
Eliot  (John),  The  Logick  Primer,  for  the  use  of  the  Indians.     1672. 
Enandeb  (S.  N.),  Logica.      1641. 
Endfield  (William),  Elements  of  Logic.     Lond.,  1810. 
Exgel  (J.  J.),  Yersucli  einer  Methode  die  Yernunftlehre  aus  den  Pla- 

tonischen  Dialogen  zu  cntwickeln.     Berlin,  1780. 
Excel,  Sur  la  realite  dcs  idees  generates  on  abstraitcs.     Memoirs  do 

l'Acad.  de  Berlin.      1801. 
Exgelhaed  (Nicol.),  Institutionum  philosophise  theoretics,  complectans 

logicam.      Groningce,  1748. 
Ernestus  (Jo.  Aug.),  Initia  doctrinae  solidioris.     Lips.  1796, 
Eexsthaesen  (Y.  T.  E.  von),  Inhalt  der  logischen  Wahrheit,     Berlu, 

1804. 
Eschenbach  (J.  C),  Logik,  oder  Denkungswissensehaft.  Bostock,  1756. 
Essee  (Willi.),  System  der  Logik.     Eberfeld,  1823. 
Eufaeler,  Specimen  artis  ratiocinandi  naturalis  et  artificialis.     Harnb. 

1684. 
Eulee,  Lettres  a  une  princesse  d'Allemagne.    Nouv.  ed.    Paris,  1812. 

— Logique,  t.  i. 
Eustachius  (Fran.),  De  Rebus  Diaiecticis.      Cant.,  1648. 
Eveeaedus  (Nicolaus-),  Topica  de  Locis  Logicalibus.     Malines,  1493. 
Ewtck  (J.  van),  Dissertatio  inaug.   de  cognitionis  in  mathesi  ct  in 

philosophia  indole.      Traj.  ad  Rh .,  1810. 

F 

Fabeb  (John  R.),  Totius  Logics,  &c.     AureL,  1623. 

Fabeiaxo,  Prospetto  degli  Studj  Filosofici.     1833. 

Fabricius  (Joh.  Alb.),  Diss,  de  cavillationibus  Stoicorum.    Lips,,  1692, 

Facciolati  (Jac),  Logical  discipline?,  &c.      Venet.,  1728. 

Idem,  Institutiones  schola?  peripateticae.      Tenet.,  1729. 
Faedella  (Michel  Aug.),  Logica.      Venet.,  1696. 
Feciixee  (G.  Th.),  Katcchismus  der  Logik  oder  Denklehre.    Lips.,  1823; 
Fedee  (J.  G.  II.),  Logik  und  Metaph.     Goett.,  1790. 

Idem,  Grundsaetzc  der  Logik  und  Mciaphysik.     Goett.,  1794. 


LIST  OF  VfOEKS  ON  LOGIC.  OOd 

Fedku  (J.  G.  H.),  Yorlesimgen  ueber  die  Federschc  Logik  mid  Metaph. 

Lemgo,  1793-1794. 
Idem,  Erklaerung der  Logik,  Metaph.  imdpract.Philosopli.  naeli  Feder. 

Wien,  1793-1794. 
Idem,  Institutiones  logica}  ct  metaph.      Goeit.,  1797. 
Fellx,  Lecons  de  logique.      Yverdon,  1770. 
Fell  (Dr  John),  Artis  Logica?,  &c. 
Felwinger  (Jo.  Paul.),  Philosophia  Altdorfiana,  hoc  est  disputationcs 

collectse  Scherbi,  Soneri,  Piccarti.     Xorimb.,  1644. 
Ferdixaxdus  Encias,  Princip.  Dialectica?. 
Ferrer  (J.  C.  F.),  Vernimftlehrc.     1770. 

Idem,  Grundriss  der  Vemunftlehre.     Ilelmst.,  1774. 
Feuerldjus  (J.  G.),  Diss,  do  variis  modi's  logicam  tradendi.      Jena;, 

1712. 
Idem,  De  logic*  Meroglypliiea.     Lips.,  1712. 
Idem,  Orat.  inaug.  de  prudent ia  logica  ex  vitis  cruditorum  addis- 

ccnda.     Alt.,  1715. 
Fichte  (J.  G.),  Leber  den  Begriff  der  Wissenschaftslehre  oder  soge- 

nannten  Philosophic.      Weimar,  1794-1798. 
Idem,  Grundlage  der  gesammten  Wissenschaftslelire.     Lips.,  1794- 

1802. 
Fillasier,  Eraste,  on  l'amidela  jcunesse.    Cinquieme  ed.    Paris,  1803. 

— Les  entretiens  2  et  3  contiennent  des  elemens  de  logique. 
Fischhaber  (G.  E.  F.),  Lt'lirbuch  der  Logik.     Stuttg.,  1818. 
Flatt  (K.  Ch.),  Bemerkungen  gegen  den  Kantischen  mid  Kiesewetter- 

ischen    Grundriss    der    reinen    allgemeinen    Logik.       Tuebingen, 

1802. 
Flotte  (J.  S.),  Lecons  elementaires  de  philos.,  t.   ler,  Logique.      2me 

ed.  Paris,  1805. 
Fonseca  (Petr.),  Institutt.  dialectics,  lib.  viii.     Basil,   1590;   Colon., 

1591  ;  Leod.,  1608. 
Formey,  Examen  de  la  question:  Si  toutes  les  verifces  sout  bonnes  a 

dire.     Mem.  de  l'Acad.  de  Berlin,  1777,  pp.  333-354. 
Foestee  (Chr.),  A.  G.  Baumgarten  philos.  gen.  cum  dissert,  prcemiali 

de  dubitatione  et  certitudine.  Halco,  1770. 
Foucher,  Philosophia  academica.  Paris,  1692. 
Feaxcke  (G.  S.),  Institutiones  psychologiaj  empiriere  et  logica?.     Kilice, 

1814. 
Fraxcke  (F.  J.  C),  De  sensu  proprio  quo  Aristotelis  usus  est  in  argu- 

mentandi  modis.     Diss.  acad.  Rostochii,  1824.     4to. 
Franctscus  Alphonsus,  Disputa  in  Logicam. 
Fraxciscus  Bivaries,  Dialectica, 
Franctscus  del  Fresno,  In  Univcrs.  et  Prredieamenta, 
Fraxciscus  Fuetado,  Dialectica. 
Franciscus  Loscos,  De  Logica  Arte. 
Fraxciscus  Mubgia,  Selecta  ad  Dialect.- 
Fraxciscus  Nunez,  Dialectics. 


504  LIST  OF  WORKS  ON  LOGIC. 

Franciscus  de  Oyiedo  (Maclritanus),  Soc.  Jcsn,  cursus  pliilos.  ad  unum 
corpus  redactus,  t.  I.,  complectcns  summulas,  logicam,  physicam, 
&c.     Lugd.,  1651. 

Franciscus  Sanchez,  Organum  Dialec. 

Franciscus  Satjrez,  Iii  Logicam. 

Franciscus  Satjrez  de  Yillegas,  Dialcctica. 

Franciscus  de  Toledo,  Logica. 

Fraunce  (Abraham),  Lawier's  Logike.     London,  1588. 

Freights  (Jo.  Th.),  Artium  logicarum  schematism!  logici.    Bas.,  1560. 

Fries  (Jac.  Fred.),  Grundriss  der  Logik.     Heidelb.,  1811-1819. 

Frischlinus  (Nic),  Dialogus  contra  P.  Rami  sophisticam  pro  Aristotclc. 
Franco/.,  1590. 

Frfsius  (Paulus),  Comparationum  logicarum  lib.  III.     Franco/,  1596. 

Frommenius  (Andrew),  Synopsis  Metaphysica.     Oxford,  1649. 

Fromond  (Claude),  Delia  Logica.     1762. 

Fuller,  Art  of  Thinking.     London,  1731. 

Foiana  (Adam),  System  of  Logic.     Padua,  1739. 


G 

Gallandius   (Petrus),   Oration,    desert,   pro  Aristotele    et    Parisiensi 

Scliola,  contra  novam  Petri  Eami  Academiam.     1551. 
Gallupi  (Baron  Pasquale),  Lczioni  di  Logica,  c  di  Metafisica.    Firenze, 

1841. 
Gammarus  (P.  A.),  Ehetorica  ac  dialcctica  lcgalis. 
Garniee  (Adr.),  Precis  d'nn  cours  de  psychologic.    Paris,  1831.    8vo. 
Garrigues,  Cours  de  philosophic     Paris,  1821. 
Garve,  De  nonnullis  qua?  pertinent  ad  logicam  probabilium.     1766. 
Gascon  (Johannes),  In  Logicam. 
Gaspar  Cardillo,  Intro,  in  Dialecticam.     Smnma  Summularum.     In 

Univ.  Praedi.  et  alia  Dialectica. 
Gaspar  de  la  Fuexte,  Dialectica. 
Caspar  Lax,  Dialectica. 
Gaspar  Vaz,  Dialectica. 
Gassendi  (P.),  Opera  omnia.     Lugd.,  1658. 

Idem,  Syntagma  philosophic  Epicuri.     Hayoz  Comit.,  1659. 
Idem,   Exercitationes  paradoxical    adversus   Aristotelem.      Amstet.^ 
Flzcv.,  1649. 
Gaultier  (I'Abbt'),  Methode  pour  analyser  la  peusec  et  pour  fairs  des 

abreges.     Paris.     ISmo* 
Gebwiller  (Jo.),  Par.  Artis  Logices  Compil.     Basil,  1511. 
Genovesi  (Antony),  Artis  Logicse.     Naples,  1744. 
Idem,  Elementa  Artis  Logic. -Critic.     1767. 
Idem,  Delia  Logica.      1799. 
Georghjs  Axeporymus,   Compendium  pliilos,   sire  organi  Aristotelis; 
Groccc  et  Latin.     Aug.  Yindel.,  1600/ 


LIST  OF  WORKS  ON  LOGIC.  505 

Georgius  (Brnxellensis),  Logica  secundum,  &c.     1512. 

Georgius  Dla.contjs,  Epitome  logics  Aristotelis.     Par.,  1548. 

Gexty  (F.  J.  H.),   Siemens  de  philosophic,  livre  premier,   Logique. 

Paris.  1819. 
Gerhard  (Ephr.),  Delineatio  philos.  rationalis  eclectica?.     Jena,  1703 

et  1716. 
Gerlach  (Glo.  Willi.),  Grundriss  der  Logik.     Halle,  1817,  1822. 

Idem,  Grundriss  der  Fundamental-Philosophic.     Halle,  1816. 
Georgius,  Expositiones  logicales.     S.  L.,  1504.     4to. 
Gesneb  (J.  M.),  Primae  Linea;  Isagoges  in  eruditionem  univcrsalem. 

Lips.,  1785. 
Geulixgius  ou  Geulixcx  (Arnold),  Logica  fundamentis,  &c.      Lugd. 

Bat,  1662. 
Idem,  Annotata  majora  in  principia  philosophic  R.  Descartes.     Dor- 

draci,  1691. 
Idem,  De  Geest-knnde.     Dordr.,  1696. 
Gezelius  (B.),  Artis  Logica?  Compil.     1661. 

Giiiffexe  (Laurent.),  Prodidagmata  sive  logica?,  &c.    Ioi\,  1627.    4to. 
Gillet  (R.),  Logic.     Lond.,  1796. 
Gibox,  Cours  de  Philosophic.     1842. 
Goclexius  (Rud.),  P.  Rami  dialectica  collecta  a  M.  Chst.  Cramero. 

Ursell,  1600. 
Idem,  Isagogc  in  organon  Aristotelis.     Franco/.,  1598. 
Idem,  Problemata  logica  et  philosophica.     Marb.,  1614. 
Goess  (G.  F.  D.  von),  Grundriss  der  Logik.     Amst.,  1795. 
Goxzalez  (Fr.),  Logica  Tripartita.     Romce,  1639.      4to. 
Goel.eus    (David),    Exereitationcs   philosophical.       1620.      Foppens, 

Bibl.  Belg. 
Goescius  (J.),  Commentariorum  artis  dialectica1.     Lips. 
Gothus  (L.  P.),  Institut.  Logica?.     1578. 
Gottigxies  (Mg.  F.),  Logistica  Univer.     Neap.,  1687. 
Gottsched  (J.  Chr.),  Erstc  griinde  der  gesammten  Wcltweishcit.    Leipz., 

1734. 
Goyeaxus  (Ant.),  Responsio  ad  Rami  calumnias  pro  Aristotele.     Paris, 

1543. 
Goyeaxus  (Th.),  Logica  elenchtica.     Dublini,  1683. 
Gray  (G.  T.),  Lessons  on  Logic.     London,  1850. 
Granger  (Thomas).  Diviue  logic.     London,  1620* 
Gravesaxde  (W.  J.),  Logic. 

Greexe  (Robert),  The  Principles  of  Philosophy.     Cambridge,  1717. 
Gregorius  de  Arcis,  Dialectica. 
Groeffe  (Joh.  Fr.  Chr.),  Die  Socratik  nach  ihrer  urspruenglichen  Bes- 

chanenhcit.      Goettingen,  1794. 
Gileter  (F.  D.),  Ausfuehrliche  Logik.     Esslingen,  1815. 
Grosserus   (Sam.),    Pharus  intellcctus  sive  logica  electiva".      Lipsice, 

1697. 
Gruithuisex  (F.  P.),  Grundriss  der  reinen  Logik,     Glogau,  1808. 


506  LIST  OF  WORKS  ON  LOGIC. 

Gkuyee  (L.   A.),   Systemc  des  facultes  dc  Lame,  par  Laromiguierc. 

Bruxelles,  1823. 
Gemellus  (Petr.),  Commentarius  de  doctrina  ct  arte  deinonstrandi. 

1554.     Bibl.  Belg.  II. 
Guischet  (P.),  Artis  Rationandi.     Sahnur.,  1650. 
Guxdlixg  (N.  H.),  Via  ad  veritatem  moralem.     Bailee,  1713  et  1726. 
Guxtherus   (J.   Casp.),   Dissertatio  dc  metliodo   disputandi  Megarica. 

Jence,  1707. 
Gutkius  (Gcorg.),  Logica  divina  sivc  peripatetica.     Colon.,  1631. 


H 

Hagek  (Joli.  Geor.),  Dissertatio  dc  metliodo  dispntandi  Euclidis.    Lips.. 

1736. 
Hallier  (Francis),  Analysis  Logica?.     Paris,  1630. 
Haxgestus  (Hier.),  Problemata  Logicalia,     Paris,  1516. 
Haxschius  (Mich.   Gottl.),  Principia  philosophic.     Franco/,  et  Lips., 

1728. 
Idem,  Ars  inveniendi,  sive  synopsis  regularum  prsecipuarnra  artis  in— 

veniendi.     Franc,  et  L/ps.,  1728. 
Haxslik  (J.),  Uebersicht  der  logischen  Formen,  3  Tabell.  gr.  fol.    Prag.. 

1823. 
HARDEnyriCExsis    (Gerardus),    Commentaria   in   Logicani    Aristotelis. 

1494. 
Harlay  (Fr.  de),  Artificii  logici  descriptio.     Paris,  1605. 
Hateaxus    (Stcph.),   Introductio    ad  principia  philosophies  solidioris. 

Debriezini,  1757. 
Hauchecorxe,   Abrege   latin  de  philosophic,  avec  nnc  introd.  et  des 

notes  francaises.     Paris,  1784.     2  vols.,  12mo. 
Idem,  Logique  francaise,  pour  preparer  les  jeuncs  gens  a  la  rhctorique, 

Paris,  1810. 
Haumoht,  Discours  sur  les  arts  et  les  sciences  en  general,  et  sur  leur 

laugue  en  particulier.     Brux,,  1818. 
Haughtox  (Sir  Graves  Chammig),  Prodromus,  or  an  Inquiry  into  the 

First  Principles  of  Reasoning,  including  an  Analysis  of  the  Human 

Mind.      London,  1859. 
Hauxoldus  (C),  Logica  practica  in  rcgulas  digesta.     Ingotst.,  1646. 
Hedge  (Levi),  Elements  of  Logic.     New  York,  1816. 
Heeeeboobd  (Adr.),  Ermenia  logica.     Lugd.Bat.,  1654  et  1656. 

Idem,  Philosophia  naturalis,  moralis,  rationalis.     Lugd.  Bat.,  1654. 
Heeueboord  (And.),  Synop.  Logica1.     Lond.,  1658. 
Hegel  (G.  W.  F.),  Wissenschaft  der  Logik.     Nurenberg,  1816. 

Idem,  Encyclopaedic  der  philos.  Wissenschaften  im  Grimdriss.    Heidelb. , 

1817. 
Hegendorphtnus  (C),  Dialectica  legalis  cum  scholiis.     Paris,  1547. 
Heiberg,  Einleit'T.'len  Yorirag  zran  Logischen  Csrsus.     1840. 


LIST  OF  WORKS  OX  LOGIC.  507 

Heigl  (G.  A.),  Die  platonisclie  Dialektik.     Landsh.,  1812. 

Heeseccius  (J.  G.),  Elemeuta  pfailos.     Amst.,  1730. 

Hemert  (P.  van),  Beginzels  der  Kantiaeusclie  wysgeerte,  naar  liet  hoog 

duitsch  vreylyk  gevolgd,  &c.     Amst,,  1796. 
Hbmstekhuys,  Aristee,  ou  de  la  verite.     Paris,  1779. 
Hex'xert  (Job.  Fred.),  Aphorismi  philosophici.      Traj.  ad  II.,  1718. 
Herbart  (J.  F.),  Lehrbuch  zurEinleitimgin  die  Philosophic    Kcenigsb., 

1813-1821. 
Herbert  (B.),  Elementa  logica?.      'Wurizb.,  1773. 
Hexser  (E.  J.),  Logics  pra?lectionibus  accommodata.      Colon.,  1815. 
Hesselbeinius  (Job.),  Theoria  Logica.     Franc,  1606. 
Hierius  (Joau.),  Precepta  Doctrina?  Logica?.     Cant.,  1617. 
HiERoxv:\irs  Moxtee,  Dialectica. 
HiERcomirs  Pardo,  Dialectica. 
HlE»03?T8fus  Pla.  Dialectica. 
HiEROXvurs  de  Valera,  Dialectica. 
Hilaire,  St  (J.  B.),  Logique  d'Aristote.     Paris,  1844. 
Hillebraxd  (Jos.),  Gi'iindriss  der  Logik.     Heidclb.,  1820. 
Hiller,  (J.  F.),  Curriculum  philosophise,  logicam  compl.      Wittenb. 
Hills  (T.  S.),  System  of  Logic.     1846. 
Hixd  (Samuel),  Introduction  to  Logic.      Oxford,  1827. 
Hrppius  (Fabianus),  Prob.  Physica  et  Logica.     Franc,  1603. 
Hutius    (M.   Fabianus),  Problemata   pliysica    et   logica   peripatetica. 

Witteb.,  1698. 
Hispanus  (P.),  Sum  inula?  logic  ales.      Colon.  Ayr.,  1622.     4to. 
Hobbes  (Th.),  Opera  omnia.     Amst.,  1668.      2  vols.,  4to. 
Hoeckelsiioyex  (Jo.),  Systema  logicum  in  versibus.     Franco/.,  1611. 
Hoex  (Math.),  Comp.  Logices.      Cologne,  1619. 
Hoffbaueb  (J.  C),  Anfangsgrueiiclc  der  Logik.     Halle,  1794-1810. 

Idem,  Analytik  der  Urtheile  und  Schluesse.     Halle,  1792. 
HonoLVx  (Don.),  De  usu  et  appli.  noti.  Logicarum.     Frankfort,  1596. 
Hogel  (Cli.),  Empirische  Psychologic  und  Logik.      Gera.,  1810. 
Hoijer  (B.  H.),  Aphorismi  Logic.  Transcendent.      Upsala,  1812. 
Hollmax^x  (S.  C),  Institutiones  philos.      Vitemb.,  1729. 
LIolyoake  (G.  L.),  The  Logic  of  Facts.     London,  1848. 
LTooke  (Dr),  The  True  Method  of  Building  a  Solid  Philosophy ;  or,  A 

Philosophical  Algebra.     London,  1645. 
Korxeius  (Con.),  Logicte.     Ilelmt.,  1621. 
IIortius  (Gregory),  Instit.  Logicarum.     1618. 
Horvatt  (J.  B.),  Institutiones  logics.     Aug.  Vind.,  1772  et  1781. 
Hotomaxxt:s  (F.),  Dialectica?  institutiones.     Hcerii,  1573. 
Huexs,  (Augustus,  a  native  of  Mechlin,  and  born  1521),  Dialectica. 

Idem,  Prodidagmata  Logices.     1578. 
Huetivs  (P.  D.),  Censura  philosophia?  Cartesian*.     Paris,  1689. 

Idem,  De  imbecilitate  mentis  humanse,  lib.  III.     Amst.,  1738. 
HrLscnorr  (Allard.),  Logica.     1772. 
Huxgar  (C.  F.),  Ueber  die  Natar  der  Wahrlieit     Dresden,  1786. 


508  LIST  OF  WORKS  ON  LOGIC. 

Hunnveus  (Aug.),  Dialectica.     Antverpice,  1566. 
Idem,  Prodidagmata  logics.     Antverp.,  1566. 
Hutcheson  (Fr.),  Compendium  logics  et  metaph.     Argent.,  1771. 
Huyche  (John),  A  Treatise  on  Logic.      Oxford,  1833. 
Hyacintiius  le  Sarasa,  In  Logicam. 

I 

Ignatius  Franciscus,  In  Arist.  Logicam. 

Isendooen  (Gisbertus),  Cursus  Logicus.     Oxford,  1658. 

J 

Jacob  (L.  H.),  Grundriss  tier  allgemeinen  Logik.     Halle,  1789. 
jAccHiBUs    (Gilb.),    Primae    Philosophise   Institutiones.     Lugd.    Bat., 

1616. 
Jacquier,  Elemens  de  Psychologic,  d'ideologie,  et  de  logiquc. 
Jameson,  Grammar  of  Logic.     1821:. 

Jankowsky  (J.  E.),  Logique  en  Polonaise.      Cracovie,  1822. 
Jani  i>i  Soeia,  Philosophia3  Kationalis  Institutiones.      1741. 
Janssens  (J.  H.),  Logique.     Louvain,  1825. 
Jardine,  Synopsis  of  Logic.      1820. 
Javelin  (H.  L.),  In  Arist.  Logicam.     1663. 
Joachimus  Climenti,  Disputa  Dialectics. 
Joannes  Bx\.ptista  Moullok,  Priorum  Analyticorum.     De  Nomine  En- 

telech. 
Joannes  Cantero,  In  Porph.  Isagogen. 
Joannes  Caramuel,  Pra3cnrsor  Logicus. 
Joannes  Clemens,  In  Prsdicamenta. 
Joannes  (Constan.),  Artis  Logicse.     Massil,  1671. 
Joannes  Dalz,  Syllogismi. 
Joannes  (Grammaticus),  Comment,  in  prior,  analyt.  Aristotelis.    Vend., 

1536. 
Josef-hus  Ferrer,  Logica. 
Julius  Pacius,    Commentarius   Analyticus  in  Porphyrii  Isagogen  et 

Aristotelis  Organon.     Francof,  1592. 
Jungius  (Joach.),  Logica  Hamburgensis.     Hamburg,  1638. 


Kalkreutii  (H.  W.  A.  von),  Was  ist  Wahrheit?     Leipz.,  1821. 
Kames  (Lord),  Sketches  of  the  History  of  Man.     1770. 
Kant  (Emm.),  Kritik  dcr  reinen  Vernunft.     Leipz.,  1781. 

Idem,   Die   falsche  Spizfindigkeit   der   vicr   syllogistichen   FigureiL 
Kccnigsb.,  1763. 

Idem,  Vermischte  Schriftcn.     Halle,  1799. 

Idem,  Logik,  herausg.     Kamigrb.,  1800. 


LIST  OF  WORKS  ON  LOGIC.  509 

Keckerman  (Barth.),  Systema  Logica.     Han.,  1600. 
Idem,  Prsecog.  Logica.     Han.,  1604. 
Idem,  Gymnasium  Logicum.     Han.,  1605. 
Idem,  Systema  Logicum.     Han.,  1613. 
Kempe  (Alex.),  Systema  Logica.     1623. 
Keslerus  (Andreas),  Tract.  Logicus.      Wittenb.,  1623. 

Idem,  Priucip.  Logicorum.      Wittenb.,  1642. 
Kept  (Henry),  Logic.     Lond.,  1809. 

Kiesewetter  (J.  G.  C),  Gruiidriss  einer  allgemeinen  Logik.     Berlin, 
1795. 
Idem,  Logik  zum  Gebrauch  fuer  Schulen.     Berlin,  1797. 
Idem,  Compendium  einer  allg.  Logik  nacli  Kant'schen  Grundsaetzen. 
Berlin,  1796. 
Kinker  (J.),  Essai  d'une  exposition  succincte  de  la  critique  de  la  raison 

pure.     Amst.,  1801. 
Kirby  (John),  Logic.     Lond.,  1752. 
Kirchman  (John),  Eudim.  Logics.     Lub.,  1669. 
Kirwant  (Rich.),  Logic.     Lond.,  1807. 
Klein  (G.  M.),  Verstandeslehre.     Bamb.,  1817. 

Idem,  Anschanungs  und  Denklehre,  ein  Handbuch  zu  Vorlesuugen. 
Bamb.  und  Wiirzb.,  1818. 
Knigge  (Phil.  Freih.  von),  Versuch  einer  Logik.     Hanov.,  1789. 
Knutzen   (Mart.),   Elementa  Philos.   Rationalis  sive  Logica.     Regio- 

monti,  1771. 
Koch  (C.  D.),  Specimen  Polyhistoris  Logici.     Jence,  1728. 

Idem,  Programma  de  Logices  Abusu.     lb. 
Koeppen  (Fred.),  Leitfaden  fuer  Logik  und  Metaphysic.      Landshut., 

1809. 
Kohler  (Lud.  Mar.),  Elementa  Logica?.      Gotting.,  1740. 
Kragius  (Andr.),  Schola  Ramea,  vel  defensio  P.  Rami  adversus  G. 

Leibleri  calumnias.     Basil,  1582. 
Krentz  (Albert),  Instit.  Logica?.     Leipsic,  1517. 
Krause  (C.  Christi  Fred.),  Grundriss  der  Historischen  Logik.  Jena,  1803. 
Krug  (Willi.  Traug.),  Denklehre  oder  Logik.     Kamigsb.,  1806. 

Idem,  Handbuch    der   Philos.  und  der  Philosophischen  Litteratur. 

Leipz.,  1820. 
Idem,  Fundamental  Philosophic     Zullichau  und  Freystadt,  1803. 
Idem,  Von  der  Ueberzengung  nach  ihren  verschiedenen  Graden.   Jena, 

1797. 
Idem,    System  der  theoret.  Philos: — Logik.     Kamigsb.,  1819. 


Lambert  (Joh.  Heinr.),  Neues  Organon.     Leipz.,  1764.     2  vols. 
Idem,  Neues  Organon.     1844. 

Idem,  Logische  und  Philosophische  Abhandlungen.     Dessau,  1786, 
1787.      2  vols. 


510  LIST  OP  WOEKS  ON  LOGIC. 

Lambert   (Joh.   Heinr.),  Anlage  zur  Architektonik,  oder  Theorie  des 

Erstern  und  Einfachen  in  der  Philos.  und  Mathemat.    Riga,  1771. 

2  vols. 
Idem,  Examen  d'une  espece  de  superstition  ramenee  au  calcul  des 

probability.     Mem.  de  l'Acad.  de  Berlin.     1771. 
Laxceux,  Introduction  a  l'analyse  des  systemes. 
Laxge  (Joh.  Joach.),  Medicina  mentis.     Halo?,  1703. 
Laxiolle  (De),  La  Logique  sans  epines,  et  ses  matieres  rendues  les  plus 

claires  du  monde,  par  des  exemples  sensibles.     2me  edit.     Paris, 

1670. 
Lapidaxtts  (Guill.),  Methodus  dialectics  Aristotelicas.     Lud.,  1542. 
Laromeguiere  (P.),  Lecons  de  Philosophie.     Paris,  1815. 
Larroque  (P.),  Elemens  de  Philosophic     Paris,  1831. 
Latham,  First  Lines  of  Logic. 
Latjr^us  (01.),  Elementa  Logical.     1655. 
Layritz  (P.),  Elementa  Logical.     Stuttg.,  1765. 
Lax  (Gasp.),  In  Logicam  Tractatus  varii.     Paris,  1511.     Fol. 
Le  Bretox  (le  P.),  La  Logique  adaptee  a  la  Rhetoriqtie.     Paris,  1788. 
Ledexo  (Joannes  Sanchez),  Logica. 
Leechmax  (John),  Logic.     Glasgow,  1847. 
Leewis  (Dion,  a),  De  Scientia  Universalium. 
Le   Graxd   (Ant,),    Philosophia   veterum  e  mente  Renati  Descartes. 

Lond.,  1671. 
Idem,  Institutio  Philosophica.     Lond.,  1672;  Norimb.,  1679. 
Lehmaxx    (J.  Jac),  Neue  und  Nuetzlichste  Art  der  Yernunftlehre, 

1723. 
Lehmtjs  (C.  D.),  Grundriss  des  gesunden  Menschenverstandes.    Heilbr., 

1785.     4  vols. 
Le  Moixe  (P.  J.),  Comment,  acad.   de  diversi  adsensus  formis  qua3 

dicuntur  scientia,  fides,  opinio,  nee  non  de  fiducia  in  rationis  hu- 

rnanas  auctoritate  collocanda.     Lugd.  Bat.,  1829. 
Leibxitius  (God.  Guil.),  Opp.  omnia.      1768. 
Lemoxier  (P.),  Cursus  Philosophicus,  ad  scholarum  usum  accommo- 

datus.     Paris,  1*750. 
Leo  (Ambrosius),  Ambrosii  Nolani  Castigationes,  adversus  Averroes. 

Ven.,  1517. 
Letomus  (Barth.),  Summa  totius  ratiouis  Disserendi.     Colon.,  1527. 
Idem,  Scholia  in  dialecticam  Georgii  Trapezuntii.     Lugd.,  1545. 
Idem,  Epitome  Commentar.  Agricolae.      Colon.,  1533. 
Lever  (Richard),  the  Art  of  Reason,  rightly  termed  Witcraft,  teaching 

a  perfect  way  to  argue  and  dispute.     London,  1573. 
Lewes  (G.  C),  An  Examination  of  some  passages  in  Dr  "Whately's 

Elements  of  Logic.      Oxford,  1829. 
LiBAvirs  (Andr.),  Collatio  dialectices  Melancthonis  et  Rami.     Norimb., 

1593. 
Liebaert  (M»),  Tractatus  de  Logica.     1818. 
Likawetz  (J.  C),  Elementa  Philos.     Grcecii,  1820. 


LIST  OF  WOKKS  ON  LOGIC,  511 

Lipsius  (J.),  Manndnctio  ad  Stoic.  Pliilos.     Paris,  1604. 

Listrius  (Gerd.),  Coinmontarium  in  Dialecticam  Petri  Hispani.     1520. 

Loewe  (J.  H.),  Ucber  den  Begriff  der  Logik.      YYien,  1848. 

Lorrrs  (Dudley),  Logica  Armeniaca.     Dublin,  1657. 

Lossius  (Joh.  Chr.),  Unterricht  der Gesimden  Vemunft.      Gotha,  1777. 

Idem,  De  arte  obstetrica  Socratis.     Erfurt.,  1785. 
Lott.  Zur  Logik.      184G. 

Lublam  (Rev.  Will.),  Essays  Logical.     Loud.,  1809. 
Ludoyices  (de  Lernos),  Paradox.  Dialectorum. 
Leshixgtox  (Thomas),  Logica  Analytica.     Land..  1650. 

M 

Maass  (J.  G.).  Grnndriss  der  Logik.     Halle,  1793. 

Mackexsex  (Vr.),  Grundriss  zu  einer  Theorie  des  Abstractions  vermoe- 

geus.     Halle,  1799. 
Mackestseus  (Geo.),  De  humanse  rationis  imbecilitate.      Ultraj.,  1690. 
Mackexzie  (Sir  James),  Reason,  an  Essay.     London,  1675. 
Madeitaxes  (P.),  Dialectica  sen  Logica  Minor.     Romce,  1711. 
Mailhat  (Raymond)  Sinnma  Philosophic.     Colon.,  1660. 
Madiox  (Salom.),  Vcrsneh  einer  neuen  Logik  oder  Theorie  des  Denkens. 
Berlin,  1792. 

Idem,  Die  Kategorien  des  Aristotelis.     Berl.,  1798. 

Idem,  Kritische  Untersuchungen  ueber  den  menschlichen  Geist.  Leipz., 
1787. 
Majeb  (G.  F.),  Vernunfthlehre.     Halle,  1752. 
Major  (John),  Logicos  et  Magistrum.     Lyons,  1514. 
Majoeagiis,  Reprcheusiones  contra  Xizolium.     1570. 

Idem,  Explanationes  in  Aristotelis  Rhetoricam.      1572. 
Makes  (P.),  Compend.  Logics  Institutio.      Yindobona?,  1760. 
MaJxBBRAJSiCHE  (Xic),  De  la  Recherche  de  la  Verite.     Ed.  Paris,  1712. 
Mamiani  (Terenzio),  Dell'  Ontologia  del  Metodo.     Parif/i,  1841. 
Manderston   (Gail.),   Tripartitam   epitoma  in  totius   dialectics  artis 

principia.     Paris,  1517. 
Mangold  (J.  M.),  Philosophia  rationalis.     Ingolst.,  1755. 
Maxsel  (H.  L.),  Artis  Logicee  Rndimenta,  from  the  text  of  Aldrich. 

Oxford,  1849. 
Maxsfelt  (Reg.),  Elementa recta?  ratiociuationis.      Ultraj.,  1668. 
Marcus  (de  los  Hnertos),  Quaest.  Dialecticam. 
Mariotte,  Essai  de  Logiqne.     Paris,  1678. 
Maries  (Xizolius),  Antibarbarns.     Pawnee,  1553. 
Mabsais  (C.  C),  Logic.     Paris,  1762. 
Mars.vis  (Dn),  Logiqne  et  principes  de  grammaire.     Paris,  1769. 

Idem,  Essais  snr  les  prejages,  on  de  l'iaflaence  de  l'opinion  snr  le 
bonheur  des  hommes.     Paris,  1822. 
Marsh  (Narciss.),  Manductio  ad  Logicam.     Oxon..  1678. 

Idem,  Instit.  Logieae.     Dublin,  1681. 


512  LIST  OF  WORKS  ON  LOGIC. 

Martiaxus  (Capelle),  Probate  et  sincere  latinitatis  auctoris  Dialectica, 

perutilis  acjucunda  omnibus  Ms  qui,  spretis  barbaricis  deviis,  rectum 

dialectices  querunt  iter.    M.  Tullii  Ciceronis  Topica.    Lyptzk.  ,1510. 
Martinet  (Carol.),  Logica  sen  ars  cogitancli  ad  publicum  scliolarum 

nsum.     Paris,  1771. 
Martinez  (Joannes),  In  Aristo. 
Martinez  (Joannes  Gonzalez),  In  Aristo. 

Martixus  (Corn.),  Disputatio  contra  Ramistas  de  subjecto  et  fine  logi- 
cs.    Lemgov.,  1597. 
Idem,  Commentarii  logici  adv.  Ramistas.     Helmst.,  1623. 
Martixus  (Perez),  In  Univer.  Porpliy. 
Mabtdjus  (de  Santolaria),  Dialectica. 
Massa  (N.),  Logica.      Venet.,  1559. 
Massias  (le  Baron),  Rapport  de  la  nature  a  1'homme.     Paris,  1821. 

Idem,  Probleme  de  Tesprit  humain.     Paris,  1825. 
Matthle  (Aug.),  Lehrbuch  fiir  der  ersten  Unterricht  in  der  pliilosopliie. 

Leipz.,  1823. 
Matthisius  (Ger.),  Scholia  in  organon  Aristotelis.     Colon.,  1565. 

Idem,  Epitome  logics  Aristotelica^,  gr.-lat.      Colon.,  1569. 
Math;eus  (Doniensis  Ormazius),  Instru.  Instrumentorum. 
Maugras,  Cours  de  pliilosopliie.     Paris,  1822. 
Mauterxus  (Jo.),  Pannonius,  rect.  scliol.  Cassov.,  tabella?  logica?.  Leuts- 

chovice,  1640. 
Mazeas  (J.  M.),  Institutiones  philosophica?  sen  elemcnta  logica?  et  meta- 

physica?.     Paris,  1777. 
Mazzarelli,  II  buon  uso  della  logica  in  materia  di  religione.     Foligno, 

1787. 
Mehmel  (G.  C.  A.),  Versucli  einer  volstaendigen  analytischen  Denk- 

lehre.     Erlangen,  1803. 
Meilixger  (Fl.),  Grundriss  der  Logik  und  Metaphysik.    Muenchen,  1826. 
Meixees  (Christ.),  De  nominalium  ac  realium  initiis.     Goetting.    T.  xi. 
Idem,  Untersuchungen  ucber  die  Denk-und-^Yillens-kraefte.      Goett., 

1806. 
Meisler  (W.),  Logica,     Vindob.,  1781. 
Meister,  Logique  a  mon  usage.     Amst.,  1772. 
Melaxcthox  (Phil.),  Compend.  dialectices  ratio.      Wittenb.,  1520. 
Idem,  Dialectica?.     Paris,  1522. 
Idem,  Erotematum  dialectica?.      Wittenb.,  1547. 
Melciiior  (de  Beleago),  Logicam. 
Melciiior  (de  Castro),  Logica, 
Mellix  (G.  S.  A.),  Encyclopaedische  Woerterbuch  der  kritischen  Philos. 

Zullichau  und  Leipz.,  1797. 
Mexdosa  (P.  H.  de),  Disputationes  logica?  ac  metaphysics.     Toloso?, 

1617. 
Mexzifs  (Fr.),  Diss,  de  Socratis  methodo  docendi  non  omnino  preescri- 

benda.     Lips.,  1740. 
Mercier,  Logique,  ou  l'art  de  penscr.      Geneve,  1766. 


LIST  OF  WORKS  ON  LOGIC.  513 

Merinero  (Joannes),  Logica. 

Metobius  (Burchardus),  Metaphysica  et  Logica.     1565. 
Metz  (Andr.),  Institutiones  logica?.     Bamb.  et  Wirceb.,  1796. 
Idem,  Handbuch  der  Logik.     Bamb.  et  Wirceb.,  1802. 
Idem,  Ueber  den  Werth  der  Logik  ein  Yerhaeltnisse  zur  Metapli3rsik 

und  Mathematik.      Wurzb.,  1813. 
Idem,  De  philos.  criticorum  de  logica.      Wirceb.,  1799. 
Meurisse  (Tr.  M.),  Systeina  logicum  figuris  emblematicis  representatum. 

J.  H.  Acker.     Struvii. 
Michael  (de  Trinitate),  Logica. 
Michael  (de  Villaverde),  Logica. 
Mells,  Logic.     1846. 

Milton  (Joh.),  Artis  logica?,  &c.     London,  1672. 
Molln^eus  (P.),  Elementa  logica.     Paris,  1609. 
Moberly  (0.  E.),  Lectures  on  Logic.     Oxford,  1848. 
Monboddo  (Lord),  Ancient  Metaphysics.     1779. 
Mongin,  Philosophic  elementaire  ou  methode  analytique.    Nancy,  1803. 
Monro,  Logic.      Glasgow,  1850. 

Monsnerius  (P.),  De  Methodo  Scientiarum.     Lugd.,  1626. 
Mooxey  (Daniel),  Veram  Logicam,  &c.     1812. 
Mueller  (J.  F.),  Zweifel  gegen  Hen-n  Christ.     "Wolfs  vernuenftige  Ge- 

denken.     Giesen.,  1731. 
Muench  (Jo.  Gottl.),  Diss,  de  notione  ac  indole  scepticismi,  nominatim 

Pyrrhonismi.     Altd.,  1797. 
Murmellius  (Joh.),  Isagoge  in  pra?dicamenta  seu  categorias  Aristotelis. 

Paris,  1535. 
Murker  (R.  P.  Th.),  Chartiludium  logicum. 
Murray,  Logic.     Dublin,  1812. 
Musschenbroek  (P.  van),  Institutiones  logica?.     Ludg. 


N 

Napalton,  Logic.     1793. 

Nason  (George),  Phil,  of  Logic.     Lond.,  1809. 

Nast  (J.  Jac),  Prog,  de  methodo  Platonis  philos.     Stuttg.,  1787. 

Naston  (John),  Introduction  to  the  Art  of  Logic.     London,  1671. 

Naverus  (Jacobus),  In  Arist. 

Naverus  (Joannes,)  Logica. 

Neander  (C),  Tabula?  in  dialecticam  Petri  Rami.     Franco/.,  1591. 

Neeb  (Joh.),  System  der  kritischen  Philos.     Bonn  und  Franco/.,  1795. 

Nehr  (Joh.  Geor.),  Logik.     Nuernberg,  1797. 

Neldelius   (Joh.),   Institutio  de  usu  organi  Aristotelici  in  disciplinis 

omnibus.     Helmst.,  1666. 
Nericius  (Olaus  Nicolai),  Logica.     1570. 
Newton  (John),  Introduction  to  the  Art  of  Logic.     London,  1671. 


514  LIST  OF  WORKS  ON  LOGIC. 

Nicephorus  Blemmydas,  Epitome  logics  doctrine  Aristotelis,  Gr.  et  Lat. 

1605. 
Nicolai  Cusanus,  Opp.     Basil,  1565. 
Nicolai,  Sur  les  abstractions,  les  imperfections  qui  en  sont  inseparables, 

et  leur  frequent  abus.     Mem.  de  l'Acad.  de  Berlin,  1803. 
Idem,  Sur  le  regressus  logique  et  sur  l'idee  qu'attachaient  a  ce  mot 

les  anciens  commentateurs  d'Aristote.     lb.,  1803. 
Nieuport  (C.  F.  de),  Essai  sur  la  tkeorie  du  raisonnement.     Bruxelles, 

1805. 
Nizolius,  De  Veris  Principiis  et  Yera  Ratione  Philosophandi.     Parma, 

1553. 
Nobilius  (Fl.),  Qurestiones  logic*  varise.     Amber g,  1611.     4to. 
Noel,  Logique  de  Condillac.     Paris,  1202. 
Noldius  (Christ.),  Logica. 

Nolentus  (Petr.),  Elementa  logica.     Amst,  1638. 
Nordin  (P.),  Theses  methodum  philosophandi  corrigentes.     Christianst., 

1820. 
Novaeia  (Thomas  de),  Scientiam  Logice,  &c.     Rome,  1626. 
Nuesslein  (Georg.),  Kritik  der  falschen  Ansichten  der  Logik.     Bamb., 

1803. 
Nuesslein  (Fr.  Ant.),  Begriff  und  Eintzeilung  der  Philosophic,  als  Ein- 

leitung  in  das  Stadium  derselben.     Bamb.,  1824. 
Idem,  Grundlinien  der  Logik.     Bamb.,  1824. 
Nunez  (Ludovicus),  De  Formatione  Syllogis. 


0 

Occam  (Guil.),  Doctoris  invincibilis  et  nominalium  parentis,   summa 

totius  logic*.      Venet.,  1532-1598. 
Oldfield,  Essay  towards  the  Improvement  of  Reason.     1707. 
Oosterga  (Cyp.  Reg.  _ab.),  Logica  juridica.      Ultraj.,  1638. 
Osterrieder  (H.),  Logica  critica.     Aug.  Vind.,  1760. 
Ozell,  Logic,  or  the  Art  of  Thinking.     1716. 


P 


Paciijs,  Comni.  in  Analy.  Pr.     Franco/.,  1564. 
Paiva  (Hiei\  de),  Comp.  Logices.     Lond.,  1627. 
Paludanus  (M.),  Dialectica.     Antverpice,  1628  et  1636. 
Pardus  (Hier.),  Medulla  dialectices.     Paris,  1505.     Fol. 
Perionius  (J.),  Dialectic*.     Basil,  1549. 
Idem,  Epitome  dialectic*.     Basil,  1551. 
Pedrolo  (Joannes),  Lectur*  Logicales. 


LIST  OF  WORKS  ON -LOGIC.  515 

Perrard  (J.  F.),  Introduction  a  la  Philosophie,  ou  Nouvelle  Logique 

Francaise.     Paris,  1844. 
Perron  (F.),  Essai  d'une  Nouvelle  Theorie  sur  les  Idees  Fondamen- 

tales.     Paris,  1830. 
Petrus  (Barth.),  Prseceptiones  logica?.     Duaci,  1625. 
Petrus  JEgedius,  Insti.  Dialectica3. 
Petrus  Ciruelo,  Logica. 
Petrus  de  Espinosa,  In  Summulas. 
Petrus  Fermosellus,  In  Logicam. 
Petrus  Fernandez  Torrenjon,  In  Arist.  Dialecticam. 
Petrus  de  Fonseca,  Dialectica. 
Petrus  (Hispanus),  Logica.     Hisp.,  1571. 
Petrus  a  Jesu  Maria,  In  Logicam. 
Petrus  Joannes  Monzon,  Logica. 
Petrus  de  Mercado,  In  Logicam. 
Petrus  Nunez  Vela,  Dialectica. 
Petrus  de  Ona,  Logica. 
Petrus  de  Oviedo,  Logica. 
Petrus  Simon  Abril,  Introd.  ad  Logicam. 

Petterman  (Aug.),  Philos.  Cartesians  adversus,  &c.     Lips.,  1690. 
Pfaffradius  (Casp.),  Commentatio  de  studiis  Rameis.     Franco/. 
Phild?pus  (Guil.),  Medulla  logicaj.     Lov.,  1661.     3  vols.,  4to. 

Idem.  Logica.     Lov.,  1658. 
Philoponus  (Job.),  Comment,  in  analyt.  prima.    Grrece.     Venet.,  1536. 

Idem,  Comment,  in  analytica  posteriori.     Gr.      Venet,  1534. 
Phoclylldes  (John  H.),  Logica.     Franc.,  1643. 
Plnk  (Rob.),  Qiues.  Selec.  in  Logicam.      Oxon,  1680. 
PrNNOCK,  Logic.     London,  1840. 
Platner  (Ern.),  Philosophische  Apliorismen.     Leipz.,  1776.     2  vols. 

Idem,  Lehrbuch  der  Logik  und  Metaphysik.     Leipz.,  1795. 
Ploucquet  (Gottf.),  Methodus  demonstrandi  directe  omnes  syllogisino- 

rum  species.      Tuebing.,  1763. 
Idem,  Principia  de  substantiis  et  phenomenis.     Accedit  methodus 

calculandi  in  logicis.      Tuebing.,  1773. 
Poelitz  (K.  H.  L.),  Elementar-Logik.     Dresden  und  Leipz.,  1802. 
Poggi  (T.  F.),  Lezioni  d'Ideologia,  di  Grammatica,  di  Logica,    Firenze, 

1842. 
Polanus  (A.),  Syntagma  Logicum.     Basle,  1605. 
Poli  (B.),  Corso  de  Filosofia.     Milano,  1828. 
Pomellus  (Alex.),  Methodus  syllogistica.      Venet.,  1572.     4to. 
Porphyrius,  In  categorias  Aristotelis  expositio  ;  Greece.     Paris,  1543. 
Priscianus  (Theod.),  Logicus.     Basle,  1532. 

Pselli  (Mich.),  Introductio  in  sex  philos.  modos  ;  GraBce.    Venet.,  1532. 
Idem,  Compendium  in  quinque  voces  Porphyrii  et  Aristotelis  praa- 

dicamenta.     Grsce.     Paris,  1541. 
Idem,  Paraphrasis  libri  Aristotelis  de  interprete  ;   Gr.  cum  Ammonii 

et  Magentini  comment.      Venet..  1503. 


516  LIST  OF  WORKS  ON  LOGIC. 

Pselli  (Mich.),  Synopsis  logics  Aristotelis ;  Gr.  et  Lat.  Aug.  Vind.,  1600. 
Polyander  (Johan.),  Theses  Logicae.     1602. 

R 

Radacus  (Phil.),  Disputatio  pneumatica  de  errore.     Traj.  ad  R.,  1720. 
Rambach  (J.  T.  F.),  Pract.  Yeraunftlehre.     Marb.,  1795. 
Ramus  (Petr.),  Institutiones  dialectics.     Paris,  1543. 
Idem,  Dialectica.      Colon.,  1572. 

Idem,  Animadversiones  in  dialecticam  Aristotelis.     Paris,  1543. 
Idem,  Schohe  in  artes  liberales.     Basil,  1569. 
Idem,  Opp.  elegantioris  methodi  philosophise,  studiosis  pernecessaria3. 
Basil,  1584. 
Rathe  (P.),  Instit.  Logica?.     1721. 
Rattiee,  Logique.     Paris,  1840. 
Raymundus  Lullius,  Opera  t.  X.     Moguntice,  1721  et  1742. 

Idem,  Opera  ea  quae  ad  inventam  ab  ipso  artem  universalem,  &c. 
Argentor.,  1609. 
Recemstius  (John  P.),  Parva  Logica.     1605. 
Regis  (P.  Sylvain),  Systeme  de  la  philosophic,  contenant  la  logique, 

&c.     Paris,  1690.     3  vols.  4to. 
Regius  (Job.  D.),  Comm.  Logici.     1603. 
Regnault  (le  P.),  Logique  en  forme  d'entretiens,  ou  Tart  de  trouver  la 

verite.     Paris,  1746. 
Reed  (Dr),  Works.     1780. 

Reiffenberg  (Baron),  Logique.     Bruxelles,  1839. 
Reemarus  (Herm.  Sam.),  Vernunftlehre  als  eine  Anweisung  zum  rich- 

tigen  Gebrauch,  &c.     Hamb.  und  Kiel,  1756. 
Reimmanus   (Jac.   Frid.),    Critiserender  Geschichts-Calender  von  der 

Logica.     Franco/.,  1698. 
Reinhold  (K.  L.),  Versuch  einer  neuen  Theorie  des  menschlichen  Vor- 
stellungsvermoegens.     Prag  und  Jena,  1789. 
Idem,  Ueber  das  Fundamente  der  philos.  Wissensch.     Jena,  1791. 
Idem,  Versuch  einer  kritik  der  Logik.     1806. 
Idem,  Die  alte  Frage,  Was  ist  die  Wahrheit?     Altona,  1820. 
Reuntiold  (Ernst),  Begruendung  und  neue  Darstellung  der  logischcn 

Formen.     Leipz.,  1819. 
Reisch  (Geor.),  Rhetorica  et  Logica.     Basil,  1508. 
Rennemaknus  (Herm.),  Enodatio  totius  philosophic  Ramea?.    Franco/., 

1599. 
Reusch  (J.  P.),  Via  ad  perfectionem  intellectus  compcndiaria.    Isenaci, 
1728. 
Idem,  Systema  logicum.     Jena,  1734. 
Reuss  (Matern.),  Logica  universalis.      Wirceb.,  1789. 

Idem,  Vorlesungen  ueber  die  theoretische  und  practische  Philosophic. 

1797. 
Idem,  Initia  philosophise  solidioris,  initia  Logicie.     Salzburgi,  1798. 


I 


LIST  OF  WORKS  ON  LOGIC.  517 

Reyxeau  (Charles  R.),  Logic. 

Richter  (K.  A.),  Logik.      Wien,  1800. 

Rixgelbergius  (Jo.),  Dialectica  et  Rhetorica.     Antv.,  1529. 

Idem,  De  disputatione  inter  disputautes  dialectice  instituenda  libellus. 

Lov.,  1551. 
Rnrus  (J.  A.),  Object,  et  Anno,  super  Logicam  Pauli  Yeneti.     Bonn, 

1517. 
Ritter  (Hein.),  Yorlesnngen  zur  Einleitung  in  die  Logik.    Berl.,  1823. 

Idem,  Abriss  der  philosophischen  Logik.     Berl.,  1824. 
Rrvrus  (Jo.),  Dialectic*.     Lov.,  1546. 
Rixxer  (Thad.  Ans.),  Aphorismen  der  gesammten  Philos.     Sulzbach, 

1818. 
Rochow  (F.  Ebh.  V.),  Kleine  Logik  fuer  Frauenzininier.    Braunschweig, 

1789. 
Rodericus  Sixetus,  Dialectica. 
Rodolphus  (C),  Dialectica.     Moguntice,  1548. 
Rodriguez  (Ludovicus),  Dialectica. 

Roeser  (Coliunb.),  Institutiones  Logic*.      Wirceb.,  1775. 
Romagxosus  (J.  D.),  Che  cosa  e  la  mente  saua?     Indovinello  massinio 

che  potrebbe  valere  poco  o  niente.     Milano,  1827. 
Rosexerextz,  Modifications  de  Logique.     1846. 

Rothius  (E.  R.),  Logica  practica  adjecta  Logic*  Paulina3.    TJlmce,  1172. 
Rubus  (Joah.),  Logices  Aristotelic*.     1572. 
Rudbeckius  (J.),  Elemen.  Logic*.     1580. 
Ruediger  (J.  A.),  Disp.  de  eo  quod  omnes  ide*  oriantur  a  sensione. 

Lips.,  1704. 
Idem,  De  sensu  veri  et  falsi,  lib.  IV.     Hales,  1709. 
Idem,  De  usu  et  abusu  terminorm,  de  novis  ratiocinandi  adminiculis. 
Rutherford  (John),  Commentarium  de  Arte  Disserendi.     Edinburgh, 

1577. 
Rydelius  (And.),  Compendium  Logices.     1690. 


Saccherus  (P.),  Logica  demonstrativa.     Aug.  Ubior.,  1735. 
Salat  (J.),  Grundzuege  der  allg.  Philos.     Muench.,  1820. 

Idem,  Vernunft  und  Verstand.      Tuebing.,  1808.      2  vols. 
Saxcius  Carraxza,  Logicolia. 
Saxdersox  (Bishop),  Logic*.     Oxon,  1841. 
Saria  (J.  G.),  De  Rationali  Philosophia  Institutiones.     1780. 
Saure,  Elemens  de  Logique,  a  l'usage  des  gens  du  monde.    Paris,  1794. 
Saxoxia  (Alb.  de),  Sophismata.     4to. 
Scarella  (J.  B.),  Elementa  Logica.     1762. 
Scayxus,  Paraphrasis  in  Organum.     1569. 
Schad  (J.  B.),  Neuer  Grundriss  der  Logik.      Coburg,  1801. 

Idem,  Institut.  philos.  univers*,  t.  L,  Logicam  compl.    Charkow,  1815. 


518  LIST  OF  WORKS  ON  LOGIC. 

Scharfhjs  (J.),  Manuale  Logicum.      Wittenb.,  1635. 

Schaumanx  (J.  Ch.  GL),  Elemente  der  allg.  Logik.     Marb.,  1795. 

Schegkius  (Jac),  Responsio  ad  quatuor  epistolas  P.  Rami  contra  se 

editas.     Tuebing.,  1570. — Rami  defensio  adv.  Schegkium.     Lau- 

san,  1517. 
Scheibler  (Chris.),  Logica,  Metaphysica,  &c.      Oxon,  1657. 
Scherbius  (Phil.),  Dissertatio  pro  philos.  peripat.  adversus  Raniistas. 

Giessen,  1610. 
Scherfer  (Car.),  Institutiones  Logics.      Vienna,  1753. 
Schiekhardus  (M.),  Logica  juridica.     Herb.  Nass.,  1615. 
Schmtdt-Phiseldek  (C.  F.  de),   Philosophise  criticae.      Alton.,  1796. 

2  vols. 
Schmidt  (K.  Chr.),  Grundriss  der  Logik.     Jena,  1797. 
Schookius  (Martinus),  Philosophia  Carthesiana,  sive  adrniranda  metho- 

dus  novae  philosophiae  Renati  Descartes.     1643.     Collegium  Lo- 
gicum.    1658. 
Schopenhauer   (Arthur),   Die  Welt  als  Wille  und  Vorstellung,  vier 

Buecher  nebst  einem  Anhange,  der  die  Kritik  der  Kant'sche  Philos. 

enthaelt.    Leipz.,  1819. 
Schotaxus  (Jo.),  Discussio  censurae  Huetianae,  cum  praefatione  Jacobi 

Romani.     Amstel.,  1702. 
Schulze  (G.  E.),  Grundsaetze  der  allg.  Logik.     Helmst.,  1802. 
Idem,  Kritik  der  theoretischen  Philosophic     Hamb.,  1802. 
Idem,  iEnesidenius,  oder  ueber  die  Fundamente,  der  von  Reinhold 

gelieferten  Elementar-Philosophie.     Helmst.,  1792. 
Idem,  Encyclopaedic  der  Philos.  Wissenschaften.      Goett.,  1818. 
Schutz  (C.  G.),  Grundsaetze  der  Kunst  zu  Denken.     1773. 
Scott  (R.  E.),  Principles  of  a  Rational  Logic.     Lond.,  1806. 
Scott  (Sir  Michael),  Commentarius  in  Aristot.      Venice,  1496. 
Scribonius  (G.  A.),  Triumphus  Logicae  Rameae.     Basil,  1583. 
Sebastiaxus  Couto,  Logica. 
Sebastiaxus  Foxius  Marzillo,  Dialectica. 
Sebastiaxus  Izquierdo.,  Dialectica. 
Sebastiaxus  de  Soto,  Summula. 

Seguy  (Ant.),  Philos.  ad  usum  schol.  accommod.  Logica.    Paris,  1762. 
Sels  (H.),  Initia  Logicae.  Confluent.      1778. 
Semler  (C.  A.),  Versuch  iiber  die  combinatorische  Methode,  ein  Bei- 

trag   zur  angewandten  Logik  und  Allgem.  Methodik.     Dresden, 

1811. 
Serraxo  (Johannes),  Dialectica. 

Sextus  Empiricus,  Pyrrhoniae  hypoth.  ed  Fabricio.     Lips.,  1718. 
Sibberx  (Fred.  C),  Logik  als  Denklehre.      Copenhagen,  1835. 
Sievers  (G.  J.),  De  methodo  Socratica.     Slesv.,  1810. 
Sigwart  (H.  C.  W.),  Handbuch  zu  Vrorlesungen  ueber  die  Logik.    Tuc- 

bing.,  1818. 
Simeox  (Rabbi),  Logica.     Basil,  1527. 
Simonius,  Varia  in  Aristotelcm  scripta.      Genev.,  1567. 


( 


LIST  OF  WORKS  ON  LOGIC.  519 

Simplicius,  Comment,  in  Aristotelis  categorias,  Gr.      Venet.,  1499. 

Smiglecius  (M.  Soc),  Logica.      Oxon,  1638. 

Smith  (P.),  Grammar,  Criticism,  and  Logic. 

Smith  (Samuel),  Aditus  ad  Logicam.     Oxon,  1658. 

Sxell  (F.  W.  D.),  Erste  Gruncllinein  der  Logik.      Giesen,  180-1. 

Sxell  (Ch.  W.  und  F.  W.),  Logik  nnd  Metaphysik.      Giesen,  1804. 

Sxell  (F.  W.  D.),  Leerboek  voor  het  eerste  onderwijs  in  de  wysbe- 

geerte,  nit  het  hoogduitsch  vertaald  door  A.  J.  Aitzema.      Win- 

scJwten,  1821. 
Sxell  (Eodolph),  De  Praxi  Logica.     1595. 

Idem,  Comment,  in  dialecticam  Rami.     Herborn,  1597. 
Idem,  Pra?lectiones  in  Rami  dialecticam.     Franco/.,  1596. 
Soaye  (F.),  Instituzioni  di  Logica,  Metafisica,  ed  Ethica.    Milan,  1831 . 
Soly,  Logic.      Cambridge,  1844. 

Soto  (Dom.),  Suinmula?  logica?  et  physical.     Salmanticce,  1547. 
Spaldlxg  (J.  L.),  Vindicia?  philosophorum  Megaricorum.    BeroL,  1795. 
Spexcer  (Thomas),  Arte  of  Logic.     Lond.,  1628. 
Spieghel,  Ruygh  bewerp  van  de  redenkaYeliug  ofte  nederduytsche  dia- 

lectike.     Amst.,  1585. 
Spixoza  (Bened.  de),  Opp.  qua?  supersunt,  edE.  H.  E.  G.  Paulus.    Jence, 

1802. 
Spruyt  (M.  H.),  Introduction  a  la  dialectique  legale.     Bruxelles,  1814. 
Spoibeeger  (J.  C),  Oratio  de  pra?stantia  et  utilitate  artis  dialectica\ 

Wittemb.,  1598. 
Stahlius  (Dan.),  Institutiones  Logics.     Jence,  1662. 
Stattler  (Bened.  J.  S.),  Philosophia  methodo  scientiis  propria  expla- 

nata,  t.  I.  Logica.     Aug.  Vind.,  1769-1772. 
Steele  (Sir  R.),  Grammar,  Logic,  &c.     London,  1728. 
Stelxbart  (G.  S.),  Gememnuetzige  Anleitung  des  Verstandes  zum  regel- 

rna?ssigen  Selbstdenken.     Dritten  Aufl.     Zullichau,  1793. 
Stexgelius  (G.),  Libellus  de  bono  etmalo  syllogismo.     1623. 
Sterxe  (Richard),  Summa  Logica?.     Lond.,  1685. 
Stierius  (J.),  Pra?cepta  logica?  peripatetica?.     S.  L.,  1632.     4to. 
Stierius,  Pra?cepta  Doc.  Logica?.      1689. 

Stoeger  (B.),  Introd.  in  studium  philos.  theor.  P.  1,  Logica.  S.  a. 
Stoechexau  (S.  Yon.),  Institut.  Logica?.     Ofenb.,  1795. 
Strauss  (K.  G.),  Lehrbuch  einer  system.  Logik.     Berlin,  1783. 
Strokirch  (M.  Van),  Logica,  eller  Stutkonsten,  &c.     Stockholm,  1721. 
Sturmius  (J.),  Disputationes  logica?  pro  veritate  et  Aristotele  concepta?. 

Gryphisw.,  1643. 
Idem,  Partitionem  dialecticarum,  lib.  IV.     Argent.,  1560. 
Syrbhts  (Jo.  Jac),  Institutiones  philos.  rationalis  eclectica*  una  cum 

historia  logices.     Jence,  nil. 


520  LIST  OF  WORKS  ON  LOGIC. 


Tal^us,  P.  Rami  dialectica  Audoni.     Colon.,  1578. 
Tandel  (E.),  Cours  de  Logique.     Louvain,  1841. 
Tappan  (Henry  P.),  Elements  of  Logic.     New  York,  1844, 
Tartakettus  (Petr.),  In  summulas  Patri  Hispani,  in  Isagogen  Porphyrii 

et  Aristotelis  logicam.      Venet.,  1592. 
Tatham,  Chart  and  Scale  of  Truth. 

Teeeason  (Abbe),  La  Philosophic  de  l'esprit.     Paris,  1770. 
Teeey  (John),  Theological  Logic.     Oxon,  1600. 
Teteks  (J.  M.),  Philosophische  Versuch  ueber  die  meuschliche  Natur, 

ihre  Entwickelung.     Leipz.,  1777. 
Thankee   (Ignat.),   Handbuch  der  Yorbereitung  und  Einleitung  zum 

selbstaendigen  wissenschaftlichen  Studium,  besonders  der  Philos. 

I  Th.,  die  Denklehre.     Mnenchen,  1807. 
Themistius,  Paraphrases  in  Arist.  analyt.  post.,  physica  de  anima,  de 

memoria  et  reminiscentia,  Gr.  ed.  Trincavelus.      Venet.,  1534. 
Thiebault  (Dieudonne),  Grammaire  philosophique,  ou  la  metaphysique, 

la  logique  en  un  seul  corps  de  doctrine.     Paris,  1802.     2  vols. 
Thomas  Coreea,  Logica. 
Thomas  de  Meecado,  Dialectica. 
Thomasius  (Chr.),  Introductio  in  philosophiam  aulicam.     Lips.,  1688; 

Halce,  1702. 
Idem,  Introd.  in  philos.  rationalem,  &c.     Lips.,  1601. 
Idem,  Einleitung  zu  der  Vernunftlehre.     Hal.,  1691. 
Idem,  Ausuebung  der  Vernunftlehre.     Hal.,  1710. 
Thomasius  (Jac),  Logica.     Lips.,  1692. 
Thomasius  (Joh.),  De  secta  nominalium  orat.     Lips.,  1683. 
Thompson  (Rev.  William),  Outlines  on  the  Laws  of  Thought.    London, 

1842. 
Theummig  (Lud.  Ph.),  Institutiones  philos.     Franco/.,  1725. 
Thynne,  Logic. 
Tiara  (Petreius),  Sophisten  Platonis,  sive,  de  eo  quod  vere  esse  dicitur. 

Lovaini,  1552. 
Tiefteunk  (J.  H.),  Grundriss  der  Logik.     Halle,  1801. 
Titelmannus  (Fr.),  Summa  Aristotelici  organi  cum  scholasticis  collati. 

Paris,  1545. 
Trrius  (J.  G.),  Ars  cogitandi.     Lips.,  1702. 
Tittel  (G.  A.),  Erlauterungen   der  theoretischen   und  pract.   Philos. 

nach  Feders  ordnung. — Logik.     Franco/.,  1783. 
Idem,  Kantsche  Denkformen  oder  Kategorien.     Franco/,  1786. 
Tittmann   (J.  A.  H.),  Grundriss  eines  Elementarlogik,  &c.     Leipsic, 

1785. 
Toellner  (A.  G.,  Baumgarten's  acroasis  logica  aucta.      1765. 
Trendelenberg  (F.  A.),  Elcmenta  Logices  Aristot.     Berol.,  1845. 
TrtESCiiow  (Niels),  Logik.      Copenhagen,  1813. 


LIST  OF  WORKS  ON  LOGIC.  521 

Trieu  (Ph.  du),  Manuductio  ad  logicam.     Luxemburg,  1690. 
Treutler  (Hier.),  Rudimenta  dialectica?  P.  Rami.     Herbom,  1589. 
True  (Charles  K.),  Elements  of  Logic.     Boston,  U.  S.,  1840. 
Tschirnhausen,  Medicina  mentis  sive  artis  inveniendi  prascepta  gene- 

ralia.     Amst.,  1687. 
Tullt  (Thomas),  Logica.      Oxon,  1662. 
Twesten  (A.  D.  Ch.),  Die  Logik,  insbesondere  die  Analytik.    Schiesicig, 

1825. 
Tyrwitt    (Thomas),   Solid  Reasons  for  Philosophizing.       Winchester, 

1652. 


u 

Ubaghs  (G.  C),  Precis  de  Logique  Elementaire.     Louvain,  1838. 
Ulrich  (J.  A.  H.),  Institutiones  logics  et  metaphysical.     Jence,  1785. 


Valerius  (C),  Dialectica.     Antv.,  1575. 

Valla  (Lanr.),  De  dialectica,  lib.  III.      Venet.,  1499. 

Idem,  Nicephori  compendiaria  de  arte  disserendi  ratio.     Basil,  1542. 
Valltus  (Paulus),  Logica.     Lugd.,  1622.     Fol. 
Velsius  (Justus),  ou  Welsens,  Disputatio  de  universalibus. 

Idem,  Tabulae  in  Aristotelis  topica. 
Ventura  (G.),  De  Methodo  Philosophandi.     1828. 
Veromanduus,  Institutionum  dialecticarum  lib.  III.     Paris,  1554.    4to. 
Verri  (Pietro),  Di  Logica.     Bolog.,  1760. 
Verney  (L.  Ant.),  Logica.     1750. 
Vico,  Scienza  Nuova.     1720. 
Villaume  (P.),  Practische  Logik.     Berlin  und  Libau,  1787. 

Idem,   Populaere  Logik   znr  Einleitung  in    die    Schuhvissenschaft, 
Hamb.  und  Mainz,  1805. 
Vincentius  Justinianus,  In  Logicam. 
Vincentius  Montanus,  In  Logicam. 

Viottus  (Barthol.),  De  demonstratione,  lib.  V.     Paris,  1560. 
Viyes  (Joannes  Ludovicus),  In  Dialecticos. 
Vives  (Lud.),  Opp.     Basil,  1555. 

Idem,  De  disputatione. 

Idem,  Anfuhrung  zu  der  Weisheit.  (trad.)      Wolffenb.,  1656. 
Vladeraccus  (Christ.),  Epitome  dialectices  Hunnaei.   Sylvce  Ducis,  1590. 
Vossrus  (J.  G.),  De  logices  et  rhetoricae  natura  et  constitutione,  lib.  II. 
Hagce,  1658.     4to. 


2l 


522  LIST  OF  WORKS  ON  LOGIC. 

w 

Wagnek  (L.  H.),  Grundriss  der  reinen  und  allg.  Logik.     Ho/.,  1806. 
Walch  (J.  G.),  Einleitung  in  die  Philos.     Leipz.,  1727. 

Idem,  Philos.  Lexikon.     Leipz.,  1726  and  1775. 
Walch  (J.  J.),  Commentatio  de  philosophiis  veterum  criticis. 
Walchius  (J.  GottL),  Novum  logica?  systema.     Jence,  1766. 
Walker  (J.),  Familiar  Commentary  on  Logic.     London. 
Wall,  Practical  Logic.     1838. 
Wallarkts  (N.),  Compen.  Logica?  Instit.     1706. 
Waxdelincourt  (Hubert),  Cours  d'education  pour  les  ecoles  du  second 

age,  t.  I.,  la  Logique  du  second  age,  ou  l'art  de  bien  diriger  les 

idees.     Paris,  1801. 
Watts  (Isaac),  Logic.     Lond.,  1736. 

Idem,  Supplement  to  his  treatise  of  Logic,  &c.      1741. 
Weber  (Jos.),  Logica  in  usum  eorum  qui  eidem  student  edita.     Land- 

shuti,  1799. 
Weise  (F.  C),  Architectonik  aller  menschlichen  Erkenntnisse.    Heidelb., 

1820.     Fol. 
Weisens  (Christ.),  Curieuse  Fragen  ueber  die  Logica.     Leipz.,  1676. 
Weishaupt  (A.),  Ueber  die  Gruende  und  die  Gewiszheit  der  menschl. 

Erkenntniss,  zur  pruefung  von  Kant's  Kritik  der  reinen  Vernunft. 

Nurenb.,  1788. 
Weiss  (Chr.),  Lehrbuch  der  Logik.     Leipz.,  1801. 
Wekdel  (J.  A.),  Skeptische  Logik.      Coburg  und  Leipz.,  1819. 
Wendelentus  (M.  F.),  Logics  institutiones.     Amst.,  1640. 

Idem,  Insti.  Logica?.     Amst.,  1654. 
Wenzel  (G.  J.),  Canonik  der  Verstandes  und  der  Yernunft.  ein  Com- 

mentar  ueber  Kant's  Logik.     1810. 
Werenfels  (S.),  De  logomachiis  eruditorum.     Amst.,  1716. 
Whately,  Logic.      1842. 

Wiedeburg  (Fr.  Aug.),  Ueber  die  practische  Logik.     Helmst.,  1789. 
Wild  (J.  C.  D.),  Logik  und  allg.  Encyclop.      Goett.,  1802. 
Willis  (Profess.),  Institutio  Logica?.      Oxon,  1715. 
Wilson  (Sir  Thomas),  Art  of  Logic.     London,  1580. 
Wittenbachitts,  Praecepta  Philos.  Logica?.     1823. 
Wittichius  (Chr.),  Anti-Spinozo.     Amst.,  1690. 
Wolf  (Chr.),  Vernuenftige  Gedenken  von  den  Kraeften  des  mensch- 
lichen Verstandes.     Halle,  1710. 
Idem,  Philosophia  rationalis  sive  logica  methodo  scientifica  pertrac- 

tata.     Franco/,  et  Lips.,  1728.      4to. 
Idem,   Philosophia  Wolfiani  contracta  logicam,   &c.      Halce,   1744, 

1745.     2  vols.  4to. 
Idem,  Logique,  ou  reflexions  sur  les  forces  de  l'entendement  humain. 
Woetzel  (J.  K.),  Versuch  der  einzig  zweckmaessigen  Prapaedeutik  der 

Vernunftlehre  oder  Logik,  &c.     Leipz.,  1802. 
Wotton  (Samuel),  The  Art  of  Logik.      Lond.,  1626. 


LIST  OF  WORKS  OX  LOGIC.  523 

Wottox  (Antony),  Logic  of  Peter  Ramus.     London,  1626. 
Wyxpersse  (Dion,    van  de),   Institutiones  logicae.      Groninga,   1767; 

Lugd.  Bat,  1779. 
Wrssrus  (Casp.),  Logica.      Geneva,  1609. 
Wyttenbach  (Dan.),  Prascepta  philosophise  logicae.     Amst.,  1781. 


X 

Xylander  (Will.),  Instit.  Aph.  Logicae.     Heidelb.,  1577. 


Yzexdoorx  (Gisb.  ab),  Compendium  logicae  peripateticae.     1640. 
Idem,  Logica  peripatetica.     1645.     4to. 


Zabauella  (Jacob),  Opera  logica.     Basil,  1594  ;   Colon.,  1597.     4to. 

Idem,  Tabulae  logical.     Patavii,  1580.     Fol. 
Zeidlerus,  Introductio  in  Aristot.     Gothce,  1684. 

Idem,  De  modo  solvendi  sophismata.     Rudolst.,  1679. 
Zeisoldus  (J.),  Collegium  logicum.     Jence,  1660. 


ANONYMOUS. 

A  Familiar  Commentary  on  Logic.      Oxford,  1793. 

A  Key  to  Questions  on  Aldrich's  Logic.      Oxford,  1829. 

A  Philosophical  Discourse  of  Speech,   conformable  to   the   Cartesian 

Principles.     London,  1668. 
A  Rational  Introduction  to  Bentham's  Logic.      Oxford,  1773. 
Ars  Rationis,  videlicet  Logica,  ad  mentem  nominalium.      Oxon,  1673. 
Ars  Sciendi  sive  Logica.     By  T.  G.     London,  1681. 
Artis  argumentandi  principia,  in  usum  stud,  juvent.  concinnata.     Lugd. 

Batav.,  1741. 
Artis  Logics  Rudimenta.      Oxon,  1837. 
Commentaria  in  quatuor  libros  novae  logicae  secimdum  processus  bursas 

Laurentianae  Coloniensis  ubi  doctrina  Alberti  magni,  &c.      Colon., 

1494.     Fol. 
De  Logica.     Madrid,  1563. 


524  LIST  OF  WORKS  ON  LOGIC. 

Dialogus   de  dialectica  Aristotelis  a  Melancthone  et  Ramo  exposita. 

Franco/.,  1600. 
Easy  Lessons  on  Reasoning.     London,  1847. 
Elementa  Logics.     1795. 
Elements  de  Logique.     Bruxelles,  1817. 
Essai  sur  les  prejuges,  ou  Ton  traite  principal ement  de  la  nature  et  de 

l'influence  des  prejuges  philos.     Neuchdtel,  1796.     (Attrib.  to  J. 

Tremble y,  Genevese.) 
Essai  sur  la  psychologie,  comprenant  la  theorie  du  raissonnement  et  du 

langage,  l'ontologie,  l'esthetique,  et  la  diceosyne.     Paris,  1826. 
Excerpta  ex  Aristotelis  Organon.      Oxford,  1802. 
Gramniatica  rationis,  sive  institutiones  logics.      Oxonis,  1685. 
Institutio  logics  ad  communes  usus  accommodata.     1687.     Fol. 
Institutiones  philosophies  in  novam  methodum  digests.     Antissiodori. 

1761.     3  vols.  12mo. 
Institutionum  philos.  cursus,  ad  usum  stud.  juv.  prssertimque  semina- 

riorum  accommodatus.     Paris,  1818. 
Introduction  to  Logic.      Oxford,  1830. 

Lectures  on  Locke;  or,  The  Principles  of  Logic.     London,  1840. 
Logic  by  Question  and  Answer.     London,  1790. 
Logic,  or  the  Key  of  Sciences.     1692. 
Logica,  sive  ars  Cogitandi.    Adjects  sunt  adnotationes  logics.    Ultruj.. 

1707. 
Logica,  pars  prima  Philos.  ad  usum  seminarii  Leodiensis.    Leod.,  1816. 

et  1817. 
Logica,  sive  ars  Cogitand.     Lug.  Bat.,  1682,  1694,  et  1702.     Arnst., 

1736. 
Logica,  sive  ars  Cogitandi ;  adj.  sunt  adnot.  logics.     Traj.  ad  R.,  17 '07. 
Logics  ;  sive  ars  Cogitandi,  e  Gallica  in  Latinum  sermonem  versa.    1674. 
Political  Logic.     Lond.,  1773. 

Prolegomena  zur  Analysis  in  der  Philos.      Gotha,  1804. 
Questions  on  Aldrich's  Logic.     Oxford,  1829. 
Specimen  artis  ratiocinandi  naturalis    et   artificialis    ad   Pantosophis 

principia  manuducons.     Hamb.,  1684. 
Systema  logicee  Dantiscanse.     Hanov.,  1618. 
Systeme  de  Logique.     Lausanne,  1735. 

Tractatus  de  logica  in  schol.  philos.  Lovanii  dictata.     Lovanii,  1817. 
Wit,  Interpreter,  or  New  Logic.     1655. 


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