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Smaller Fragments 
Appendices . 

569-61 S 



1. The distance from the strait and town of Rhegium to 
Tarentum is more than two thousand stades; ^^^ ^^^ coss. 
and that portion of the shore of Italy is en- Q. Fabiux Maii- 
tirely destitute of harbours, except those of "?"" Y- Q- ™" 
Tarentum : I mean the coast facing the Sicilian 
sea, and verging towards Greece, which contains the most 
populous barbarian tribes as well as the most famous of the 
Greek cities. For the Bruttii, Lucani, some portions of the 
Daunii, the Cabalii, and several others, occupy this quarter 
of Italy. So again this coast is lined by the Greek cities of 
Rhegium, Caulon, Locri, Croton, Metapontum, and Thurii: so 
that voyagers from Sicily or from Greece to any one of these 
cities are compelled to drop anchor in the harbours of 
Tarentum ; and the exchange and commerce with all who 
occupy this coast of Italy take place in this city. One may 
judge of the excellence of its situation from the prosperity 
attained by the people of Croton ; who, though only possessing 
roadsteads suitable for the summer, and enjoying therefore 
but a short season of mercantile activity, still have acquired 
great wealth, entirely owing, it seems, to the favourable situa- 
tion of their town and harbour, which yet cannot be compared 
with those of Tarentum. For, even at this day, Tarentum 
is in a most convenient position in respect to the harbours of 
the Adriatic, and was formerly still more so. Since, from the 



lapygian promontory as far as Sipontuni, every one coming 
from the other side and dropping anchor at Italy always crossed 
to Tarentum, and used that city for his mercantile transactions 
as an emporium ; for the town of Brundisium had not yet 
been founded in these times. ^ Therefore Fabius regarded 
the recovery of it as of great importance, and, omitting every- 
thing else, turned his whole thoughts to this. . . . 


2. Being about to narrate the exploits of Publius Scipio 

A common mis- ^^ Iberia, and in fact all the achievements in 

take as to Scipio's his life, I think it necessary to direct my 

character. readers' attention, to begin with, to his moral 
and mental qualities. ^ For as he is perhaps the most illus- 
trious man of any born before the present generation, every- 
body seeks to know what kind of man he was, and what 
advantages from natural ability or experience he enjoyed, to 
account for a career so crowded with brilliant achievement ; 
and yet is compelled to remain in the dark, or to entertain false 
opinions, because those who write about him have not kept to 
the truth. The soundness of this assertion will be rendered 
evident in the course of my narrative to all who are capable of 
estimating the noblest and most gallant of his exploits. Now 
all other writers represent him as a man favoured by fortune, 
who succeeded in his undertakings contrary to rational ex- 
pectatipn, and by the mere force of circumstances. They 
consider apparently such men to be, so to speak, more god- 
like and worthy of admiration, than those who act in every 
case by calculation. They do not seem to be aware of the 
distinction between credit for good fortune and credit for 
good conduct in the case of such men ; and that the former 
may be assigned to any one however commonplace, while the 
latter belongs to those alone who act from prudent calculation 
and clear intelligence : and it is these last whom we should 
look upon as the most god -like and god -beloved. 

Now it seems to me that in his character and views 

' The port of Brundisium was known long before. See Herod. 4, 99. The 
Romans colonised the town in b.c. 244. See Livy, epit. 19. 


Publius was very bke Lycurgus the legislator of the Lacedae- 
monians. For we must not suppose that it scip^a', u^e of 
was from superstition that Lycurgus continu- religion compared 
ally consulted the Pythian priestess in the wiihihaiof 
esUblishment of the Lacedaemonian constitu- y^urp"- 
tion; nor that Publius depended on dreams and ominous 
words for his success in securing empire for his country. But 
as both saw that the majority of mankind cannot be got to 
accept contentedly what is new and strange, nor to face dangeis 
with course, without some hope of divine favour, — Lycurgus, 
by always supporting his own schemes by an oracular response 
from the PytW, secured better acceptation and credit for his 
ideas ; and Publius, by always in like manner instilling into 
the minds of the vulgar an opinion of his acting on some 
divine suggestion in the formation of his designs, caused 
those under hia command to confront dangerous services with 
greater courage and cheerfulness. But that he invariably . 
acted on calculation and with foresight, and that the successful 
issue of his plans was always in harmony with rational expecta- 
tion, will be evident by what I am about to relate. 

S. For that he vras beneficent and high-minded is ac- 
knowledged ; but that he was acute, sober- scipio's lint 
minded, and earnest in pursuit of his aims, exploit. 
no one will admit, except those who have "-c. ai8. 
lived with him, and contemplated his character, so to speak, 
in broad daylight. Of such Gaius Laelius was one. He_^ 
took part in everything he did or said from boyhood to the 
day of his death ; and he it was who convinced me of this 
truth : because what he said appeared to me to be likely in 
in itself^ and in harmony with the achievements of that great 
man. He told me that the first brilliant exploit of Publius 
was when his father fought the cavalry engagement with 
Hannibal near the Padus. He was then, as it seems, eighteen 
years old and on his first campaign. His father had given 
him a squadron of picked cavalry for his protection ; but when 
in the course of the battle he saw his father surrounded by 
the enemy, with only two or three horsemen near him, and 
dangerously wounded, he first tried to cheer on his own 
squadron to go to his father's assistance, but when he found 


them considerably cowed by the numbers of the enemy 
surrounding them, he appears to have plunged by himself 
with reckless courage into the midst of the enemy : whereupon, 
his comrades being forced to charge also, the enemy were 
everawed and divided their ranks to let them pass; and 
Publius the elder, being thus unexpectedly saved, was the first 
to address his son as his preserver in the hearing of the whole 
army.^ Having gained an acknowledged reputation for bravery 
by this exploit, he ever afterwards freely exposed himself 
to every sort of personal danger, whenever his country rested 
its hope of safety on him. And this is not the conduct of a 
general who trusts to luck, but of one who has a clear head. 

4, Subsequently, when his elder brother Lucius was a 
candidate for the Aedileship, which is about the most honour- 
able office open to a " young " man at Rome : it being the 
custom for two patricians to be appointed, and there being 
many candidates, for some time he did not venture to stand 

for the same office as his brother. But as the 

demeanour of the people that his brother would 
easily obtain the office, and observing that his own popularity 
with the multitude was very great, he made up his mind that the 
only hope of his brother's success was that they should combine 
their candidatures. He therefore resolved to act as follows : 
His mother was going round to the temples and sacrificing 
to the gods in behalf of his brother, and was altogether in a 
state of eager cxi)ectation as to the result She was the only 
parent whose wishes he had to consult; for his father was 
then on his voyage to Iberia, having been appointed to command 
in the war there. He therefore said to her that he had seen 
the same dream twice : for he thought that he was coming home 
from the Forum after being elected Aedile with his brother, 
and that she met them at the door and threw her arms round 
them and kissed them. His mother with true womanly feeling 
exclaimed, " Oh, that I might see that day ! " He replied, " Do 
you wish us to try ** ? Upon her assenting, under the idea 
that he would not venture, but was only jesting on the spur 
of the moment (for of course he was quite a young man), he 

* Sm.'o on 3, 66. 


begged her to prepare him at once a white tc^a, such as it Is 
the custom for candidates for office to wear. 

6. His mother thought no more about it : but Fublius, 
having obtained a white toga, went to the Forum before his 
mother was awake. His boldness, as well as his previous 
popularity, secured him a brilliant reception from the people ; 
and when he advanced to the spot assigned for candidates, and 
took his place by the side of his brother, the people not only 
invested him with the office, but his brother also for his sake ; 
and both brothers returned home Aediles designate. The 
news having been suddenly brought to their mother, she 
rushed in the utmost delight to meet them at the door, and 
kissed the young men in an ecstasy of joy. Accordingly 
Fublius was believed by all who had heard previously about 
his dream to have held commune with the gods, not merely in 
his sleep, but rather in a waking vision, and by day. But in 
point of fact there was no dream at all : Scipio was kind, 
open-handed, and courteous, and by these means had con- 
ciliated the favour of the multitude. But by a dexterous use 
of the occasion, both with the people and his mother, he 
obtained his purpose, and moreover got the reputation of 
acting under divine inspiration. For those persons, who, from 
dulness or want of experience, or idleness, can never take a 
clear view of the occasions or causes or connexion of events, 
are apt to give the gods and chance the credit for what is 
really effected by sagacity and far-seeing calculation. I have 
thought it worth while to say thus much, that my readers may 
not be misled by unfounded gossip to pass over this great 
man's finest and most splendid qualities, I mean his wealth of 
resoiuxre and untiring diligence ; which will become still more 
apparent when we come to recount his actual achievements. 

6. Such was the man who now assembled the soldiers and 
exhorted them not to be dismayed by the„ . ,„ ... 
disaster which had befallen them. " For, said Scipio lo the 
he, " Romans have never been beaten by Carlha- soldiers in Spain, 
g^nians in a trial of valour. It was the result *-^- ""■ 
of treachery on the part of the Celtiberians, and of rash- 
ness, the two commanders getting cut off from each other 
owing to their trust in the alliance of these men. But now 


these two disadvantages are on the side of the enemy : for they 
are encamped at a wide distance from each other; and by 
their tyrannical conduct to their allies have alienated them all, 
and made them hostile to themselves. The consequence is 
that some of them are already sending messages to us ; while 
the rest, as soon as they dare, and see that we have crossed 
the river, will gladly join us ; not so much because they have 
any affection for us, as because they are eager to punish the 
outrages of the Carthaginians. Most important of all is 
the fact that the enemy are at variance with each other, and 
will refuse to fight against us in a body, and by thus engaging 
in detail will be more easily dealt with by us.'' Looking to 
these facts, therefore, he bade them cross the river with con- 
fidence, and undertook that he and the other officers would 
see to the next step to be taken. With these words he left 
his colleague, Marcus Silanus, with five hundred horse to 

« . . . guard the ford, and to protect the allies oo the 

Ebro, and swoops north of the river, while he himself began taking 

down upon New his army across, without revealing his design 
Carthage. ^^ ^^j^y ^^^ ^g ^ matter of fact he had resolved 

to do nothing of what he. gave out publicly, and had made 
up his mind to make a rapid attack upon the town called 
Iberian Carthage. This may be looked upon as the first 
and strongest proof of the judgment which I lately passed 
upon him. He was now only in his twenty-seventh year : and 
yet he, in the first place, undertook to accomplish what the 
magnitude of the previous disasters had made the world look 
upon as completely hopeless; and, in the second place, having 
undertaken it, he left on one side the plain and obvious course, 
and conceived and carried out a plan which was a surprise to 
the enemy himself. This could only be the result of the 
closest calculation. 

7. The fact is that he had made minute inquiries, before 

leaving Rome, both about the treason of the Celtiberians, and 

o . . , , y the separation of the two Roman armies : and 

Scipio s careful , , ,^ ^ . . ,./.,.,. 

inquiries as to the had mferred that his fathers disaster was 
state of things in entirely attributable to these^ He had not there- 
Spam. fQj.g shared the popular terror of the Carthagin- 
ians, nor allowed himself to be overcome by the general panic. 


And when he subsequently heard that the allies of Rome 
north of the Ebro were remaining loyal, while the Carthaginian 
commanders were quarrelling with each other, and maltreating 
the natives subject to ihem, he began to feei very cheerful 
about his expedition, not from a blind confidence in Fortune, 
but from dehberate calculation. Accordingly, when he arrived 
in Iberia, he leamt, by questioning everybody and making 
inquiries about the enemy from every one, that the forces of 
the Carthaginians were divided into three. Mago, he was in- 
formed, was lingering west of the pillars of Hercules among 
the Conii ; Hasdnibal, the son of Gesco, in Lusitania, near the 
mouth of the Tagus ; while the other Hasdnibal was besieging 
a certain city of the Caspetani ; and none of the three were less 
than ten days' march from the New Town. Now he cal- 
culated that, if he decided to give the enemy battle, it would 
be risking too much to do so against all three at once, be- 
cause his predecessors had been beaten, and because the enemy 
would vastly out-number him ; if, on the other hand, he were to 
march rapidly to engage one of the three, and should then find 
himself surrounded — which might happen by the one attacked 
retreating, and the others coming up to his relief,— he dreaded 
a disaster like that of his uncle Gnaeus and his father 

8. He therefore rejected that idea altogether: but being 
informed that New Carthage was the most ini- ^e determines 
portant source of supplies to the enemy and lo aitenipt 
of damage to the Romans in the present war, he ^'* Carthage. 
had taken the trouble to make minute inquiries about it during 
the winter from those who were well informed. He leamt 
that it was nearly the only town in Iberia which possessed a 
harbour suitable for a fleet and naval force ; that it lay 
very conveniently for the Carthaginians to make the sea 
passage from Libya; that they in fact had the bulk of their 
money and war material in it, as well as their hostages from 
the whole of Iberia; that, most important of all, the num- 
ber of fighting men garrisoning the citadei only amounted 
to a thousand, — because no one would ever suppose that, 
while the Carthaginians commanded nearly the whole of 
Iberia, any one would conceive the idea of assaulting this 


town ; that the other inhabitants were exceedingly numerous, 
but all consisted of craftsmen, mechanics, and fisher-folk, as 
far as possible removed from any knowledge of warfare. All 
this he regarded as being fatal to the town, in case of the 
sudden appearance of an enemy. Nor did he moreover fail 
to acquaint himself with the topography of New Carthage, or 
the nature of its defences, or the lie of the lagoon : but by 
means of certain fishermen who had worked there he had 
ascertained that the lagoon was quite shallow and fordable at 
most points; and that, generally speaking, the water ebbed 
every day towards evening sufficiently to secure this. These 
considerations convinced him that, if he could accomplish his 
purpose, he would not only damage his opponents, but gain a 
considerable advantage for himself; and that, if on the other 
hand he failed in effecting it, he would yet be able to secure 
the safety of his men owing to his command of the sea, pro- 
vided he had once made his camp secure, — and this was easy, 
because of the wide dispersion of the enemy's forces. He 
had therefore, during his residence in winter quarters, devoted 
himself to preparing for this operation to the exclusion of 
every other : and in spite of the magnitude of the idea which 
he had conceived, and in spite of his youth, he concealed it 
from all except Gaius Laelius, until he had himself decided to 
reveal it 

9. But although historians agree in attributing these cal- 
culations to him ; yet, when they come to narrate their issue, 
they somehow or another attribute the success obtained not 
to the man and his foresight, but to the gods and to Fortune, 
and that, in spite of all probability, and the evidence of those 
who lived with him ; and in spite of the fact that Publius 
himself in a letter addressed to Philip has distinctly set forth 
that it was upon the deliberate calculations, which I have just 
set forth, that he undertook the Iberian campaign generally, 
and the assault upon New Carthage in particular. 

However that may be, at the time specified he gave secret 
instructions to Gaius Laelius, who was in corn- 
Gams Laehus niand of the fleet, and who, as I have said, was 

proceeds to ^, , . ^, ^ m i • 

New Carthage '"^ ^"'y ^^^^ >" "^^ secret, to sail to this town ; 
with the fleet, while he himself marched his army at a rapid 


pace io the same direction. His force con- Scipio by land, 
sisted of twenty-five thousand infantry and ^^' ^°'' 
two thousand five hundred cavalry ; and arriving at New 
Carthage on the seventh day he pitched his camp on the 
north of the town;> defended its rear by a double trench 
and rampart stretching from sea to sea,* while on the side 
facing the town he made absolutely no defences, for the nature 
of the ground made him sufficiently secure. 

But as I am now about to describe the assault and capture 
of the town, I think I must explain to my readers the lie of 
the surrounding country, and the position of the town itself. 

10. It stands about halfway down the coast of Iberia in 
a gulf which faces south-west, running about ^^ . , 
twenty stades inland, and about ten stades ^^^ c^fcige. 
broad at its entrance. The whole gulf is made 
a harbour by the fact that an island * lies at its mouth and thus 
makes the entrance channels on each side of it exceedingly 
narrow. It breaks the force of the waves also, and the whole 
gulf has thus smooth water, except when south-west winds 
setting down the two channels raise a surf; with all other 
winds it is perfectly calm, from being so nearly landlocked. 
In the recess of the gulf a mountain juts out in the form of a 
Chersonese, and it is on this mountain that the city stands, 
surrounded by the sea on the east and south, and on the 
west by a lagoon extending so far northward that the 
remaining space to the sea on the other side, to connect it 
with the continent, is not more than two stades. The 
city itself has a deep depression in its centre, presenting 
on its south side a level approach from the sea; while the 
rest of it is hemmed in by hills, two of them mountainous 
and rough, three others much lower, but rocky and difficult of 
ascent ; the largest of which lies on the east of the town run- 

' Dr. Arnold dKlarcs fl ".itl but an impossibility thai an nrniy should have 
marched the distance (not less Ihan 325 Koman miles) in n week," Livy {36. 
41) accepts the slalemenl wiihoul question. 

* Mr. Slrachan-DnviUson eiplains this to mean [rom the sen to the Inke. as 
Scipio's linn would not have extended light round the lake to the other sea, 

* Escombreta (Zio^pofila). I mu&t refer my readers 10 Mr. Strachan- 
DavidsoD's appendix on TAt Silt 1/ the Spnnish Caiihage for a discussion oT 
tbcie delaiU. S«e above a, 13 ; Livy. ab. ^a, 


ning out into the sea, on which stands a temple of Asclepius. 
Exactly opposite this lies the western mountain in a closely- 
corresponding position, on which a palace had been erected at 
great cost, which it is said was built by Hasdrubal when he 
was aiming at establishing royal power. The remaining three 
lesser elevations bound it on the north, of which the western- 
most is called the hill of Hephaestus, the next to it that of 
Aletes, — who is believed to have attained divine honours from 
having been the discoverer of the silver mines, — ^and the third 
is called the hill of Cronus. The lagoon has been connected 
with the adjoining sea artificially for the sake of the maritime 
folk ; and over the channel thus cut between it and the sea a 
bridge has been built, for beasts of burden and carts to bring 
in provisions from the country. 

1 1 . Such is the nature of this city's situation. The side 
of the Roman camp which faced the city therefore was 
secured, without any artificial means, by the lagoon and the 
sea. The neck of land lying between these two, and con- 
necting the city with the continent, Scipio did not fence off 
with a stockade, although it abutted on the middle of his 
camp,— either for the sake of making an impression upon the 
enemy, or by way of suiting the arrangement to his own design, 
— that he might have nothing to hamper the free egress and 
return of his troops to and from the camp. The circuit of 
the city wall was not more than twenty stades formerly, — 
though I am aware that it has been stated at forty stades ; 
but this is false, as I know from personal inspection and not 
from mere report, — and in our day it has been still farther 

The fleet arrived to the hour, and Publius then thought it 
o . . ,. , time to summon a meeting of his men and to 

kScipio uiscloscs 

his intention of encourage them to the undertaking by the use 
assaulting of the same arguments by which he had con- 

New Carthage, yi^ced himself, and which I have just now 
detailed. He pointed out to them that the plan was practi- 
cable ; and briefly summing up the blow which their success 
would be to their enemies, and the advantage it would be to 
themselves, he ended by promising crowns of gold to those 
who first mounted the walls, and the usual rewards to those who 


displayed conspicuous gallantry. And finally he declared that 
"Poseidon had appeared to him in his sleep, and originally 
suggested his' plan to him ; and had promised to give him such 
signal aid in the actual hour of battle, that his assistance should 
be made manifest to all." The skilful mixture in this speech 
of accurate calculation with promises of gold crowns, and a 
reference to Divine Providence, created a great impression and 
enthusiasm in the minds of the young soldiers. 

12. Next morning he stationed ships supplied with missiles 
of every sort, all along the seaboard, under the command of 
Gaius Laelius ; and having told off two thousand .pj^^ assault 
of his strongest men to accompany the ladder- 
carriers, he begun the assault about the third hour. The 
commandant of the town, Mago, divided his garrison of a 
thousand men into two companies \ half he left upon the 
citadel, and the rest he stationed upon the eastern hill. 
Of the other inhabitants he accoutred about two thousand of 
the strongest men with such arms as there were in the city, 
and stationed them at the gate leading to the isthmus and 
the enemy's camp : the rest he ordered to assist to the best 
of their power at all points in the wall. As soon as the 
bugles of Publius sounded the moment of the 
assault, Mago caused those whom he had '^^fe^den" 
armed to sally from the gate, feeling con- 
fident that he should create a panic among the assailants 
and entirely baffle their design. These men vigorously at- 
tacked those of the Koman army who were drawn up opposite 
the isthmus, and a sharp engagement took place accompanied 
by loud cries of encouragement on both sides : the Romans in 
the camp cheering on their men, and the people in the city 
theirs. But the contest was an unequal one in the respect of 
the facility of bringing up reserves. The Carthaginians had all 
to come out by one gate, and had nearly two stades to 
march before they got on the ground ; whereas the Romans 
had their supports close at hand and able to come out over a 
wide area ; for Publius had purposely stationed his men close 
to the camp in order to induce the enemy to come out as far 
as possible : being quite aware that if he succeeded in destroy- 
ing these, who were so to speak the sharp edge of the uri 


population, universal consternation would be the result, an 

no more of those in the town would have th 
^^ ' courage to come out of the gate. The coi 
test however for a certain time was undecided, for it was be 
tween picked men on both sides ; but finally the Carthaginian 
were overpowered by the superior weight of their opponents 
owing to the constant reinforcements from the camp, and 
turned to flight A large number of them fell in the actual 
engagement, and during the retreat ; but the greater number 
were trampled to death by each other as they crowded through 
the gate. The city people were thrown into such a panic by 
these events, that even those who were guarding the walls 
fled. The Romans very nearly succeeded in forcing their 
way in through the gates with the fugitives ; and of course 
fixed their scaling-ladders against the wall in perfect security. 

13. Meanwhile Publius, though throwing himself heartily 
into the struggle, yet took all possible precautions to protect 
his life. He had three men with him carrying large shields, 
which they held in such a position as to completely protect 
him from the side of the wall ; and accordingly he went along 
the lines, or mounted on elevated ground, and contributed 
greatly to the success of the day. For he was enabled to see 
all that was going on, and at the same time, by being himself 
in view of all, inspired great zeal in the hearts of the combat- 
ants. The result was that nothing was omitted which could 
contribute to the success of the battle ; but any help he 
saw to be at any moment required was rapidly and thoroughly 

But though the leaders of the escalade had begun mount- 
ing the walls with great spirit, they found the 
^*®^J^^°^ ^® operation accompanied by some danger: not 

so much from the number of the defenders, as 
from the height of the wails. The defenders accordingly 
plucked up courage considerably when they saw the distress of 
the assailants : for some of the ladders were breaking under 
the weight of the numbers which, owing to their length, were on 
them at the same time ; while on others the first to mount 
turned giddy owing to their great height, and without requiring 
much resistance from the defenders threw themselves from 


the Udders : and when beams, or anything of that sort, were 
hurled upon ihero from the battlements, they were swept olT 
en masse and fell to the ground. In spite however of these 
difficulties nothing could check the zeal and fury of the 
Roman attack ; but as the (irst fell their place was always 
taken at once by the next in order. And now, as the day was 
far advanced, and the soldiers were worn out with fatigue, 
Scipio sounded a recall for the assaulting party. 

14. The men in the town were accordingly in high spirits 
at having, as they thought, repulsed the assault, xowaris evening 
But Scipio, who was conscious that the time Scipio renews ihe 
was now approaching for the ebb of the lagoon, ^^sauii on ihe 
had five hundred men stationed ready by itSg^J^ijonf^i^is 
edge with ladders ; and meanwhile massed some aiiBck by way 
fresh soldiers upon the gate and isthmus, and, "' '*'^ lagoon. 
after urging them to undertake the work, furnished them with 
a larger number of ladders than before : so that the wall was 
almost covered with men scaling it. When the signal for 
attack was sounded, and the men placed their ladders against 
the wall, and b^an ascending at every point, the excitement 
and consternation inside the walls was extreme ; for when 
they thought themselves released from the threatened danger, 
they saw it beginning all over again by another assault Be- 
sides, their missiles were beginning to fall short ; and the 
number of men they had lost greatly disheartened them. Still, 
though they were in great distress, they continued the defence 
as well as they could. 

Just when the struggle at the ladders was at its hottest the 
ebb of the tide began. The water began gradu- . 
ally to leave the edges of the lagoon, and the the'fagi^^d 
current ran with such violence, and in such a geis his mm 
mass through its channel into the adjoining "po" ihe wau. 
sea, that to those who were unprepared for the sight it ap- 
peared incredible. Being provided with guides, Scipio at 
once ordered his men, who had been stationed ready for this 
service, to step in and to fear nothing. His was a nature especi- 
ally fitted to inspire courage and sympathy with his own 
feelings. So now the men at once obeyed him, and when 
the army saw them racing each other across the marsh 


could not but suppose that the movement was a kind o 
heaven-sent inspiration. This reminded them of the refereno 
Scipio had made to Poseidon, and the promises contained it 
his harangue : and their enthusiasm rose to such a height that 
they locked their shields above their heads, and, charging up 
to the gate, they began trying to hew their way through the 
panels of the doors with their axes and hatchets. 

Meanwhile the party which had crossed the marsh had ap- 
proached the wall. They found the battlements unguarded : 
and therefore, not only fixed their ladders against the wall, 
but actually mounted and took it without striking a blow ; for 
the attention of the garrison was distracted to other points, 
especially to the isthmus and the gate leading to it, and they 
never expected that the enemy were likely to attack on the 
side of the lagoon : besides, and above all, there was such 
disorderly shouting, and such a scene of confusion within the 
wall, that they could neither hear nor see to any purpose. 

15. As soon as they found themselves in possession of 
The city entered ^^^ ^all, the Romans began making their 
and given up to way along the top of it, hurling off such of 

the sword, ^j^^ enemy as they met, the nature of 
their arms being especially suited for an operation of that 
sort But when they arrived at the gate they descended and 
began cutting through the bolts, while those without began 
forcing their way in, and those who were mounting the walls 
in the direction of the isthmus, beginning by this time to get 
the better of their opponents, were getting a footing on the 
battlements. Thus the walls were finally in possession of the 
enemy : and the troops, which entered by the gate, carried the 
eastern hill and drove off the garrison occupying it 

When Scipio thought that a sufficient number of troops 
had entered the town, he gave leave to the larger number of 
them to attack those in it, according to the Roman custom, 
with directions to kill everything they met, and to spare 
nothing; and not to begin looting until they got the order 
to do so. The object of this is, I suppose, to strike terror. 
Accordingly, one may often see in towns captured by the 
Romans, not only human beings who have been put to the 
sword, but even dogs cloven down the middle, and the limbs 


of Other animals hewn off. On this occasion the amount of 
such slaughter was exceedingly great, because of the numbers 
included in the city, 

Scipto himself with about a thousand men now pressed on 
towards the citadel. When he arrived there, 
Magoat firet thought of resistance; but after- "^heeU^ei"' 
wards, when he was satisfied that the city 
was completely in the power of the enemy, he sent to 
demand a promise of his life, and then surrendered. This 
being concluded, the signal was given to stop the slaughter : 
whereupon the soldiers left off slaying, and ,. , , . 
turned to plunder. When night fell those of ^ ° ^ "^^' 
the soldiers to whom this duty had been assigned remained 
in the camp, wbile Scipio with his thousand men bivouacked 
in the citadel ; and summoning the rest from the dwelling- 
houses by means of the 'i'ribunes, he ordered them to collect 
all their booty into the market-place by maniples, and to 
take up their quarters for the night by these several heaps. 
He then summoned the light-armed from the camp, and 
stationed them upon the eastern hill. 

Thus did the Romans become masters of Carthage in 

16. Next morning the baggage of those who had served 
in the Carthaginian ranks, as well as the pro- 
perty of the city-folk and the craftsmen, having cusioms in ihe 
been collected together in the market-place, diiinbiuionof 
the Tribunes divided it according to the Roman bowy- 
custom among their several legions. Now the Roman 
method of procedure in the capture of cities is the follow- 
ing : Sometimes certain soldiers taken from each maniple are 
told off for this duty, their numbers depending on the size of 
the city ; sometimes maniples are told off in turn for it : but 
there are never more than half the whole number assigned to 
the work. The rest remain in their own ranks in reserve, some- 
times outside, at others inside the city, for taking such pre- 
cautions as may be from time to time necessary. Sometimes, 
though rarely, four legions are massed together ; but generally 
speaking the whole force is divided into two legions of 
Romans and two of allies. This being settled, all who are 


told off for plundering carry all they get, each to his own 
legion ; and when this booty has been sold, the Tribunes dis- 
tribute the proceeds among all equally, including not only 
those who were thus held in reserve, but even those who 
were guarding the tents, or were invalided, or had been sent 
away anywhere on any service. But I have spoken fully 

g^g before, when discussing the Roman consti- 

tution, on the subject of the distribution of 
booty, showing how no one is excluded from a share in 
it, in accordance with the oath which all take upon first 
joining the camp. I may now add that the arrange- 
ment whereby the Roman army is thus divided, half being 
engaged in gathering booty and half remaining drawn up in 
reserve, precludes all danger of a general catastrophe arising 
from personal rivalry in greed. \ox as both parties feel ab- 
solute confidence in the fair dealing of each in respect to the 
booty, — the reserves no less than the plunderers, — no one 
leaves the ranks, which has been the most frequent cause of 
disaster in the case of other armies. 

1 7. For, as the majority of mankind encounter miseries and 
embrace dangers for the sake of gain, it is plain that when 
such opportunity is presented to them as this, the men in the re- 
serve or in the camp would be with difficulty induced to abstain 
from taking advantage of it; because the usual idea is that every- 
thing belongs to the man who actually takes it : and though a 
general or king may be careful to order all booty to be brought 
into the common stock, yet everybody considers that what he 
can conceal is his own. The result is that, while the ruck 
of the army cannot be prevented from eagerly devoting them- 
selves to plunder, they often run the risk of a complete over- 
throw : and it has often in fact happened that after a successful 
movement, such as the carrying of an entrenched camp or the 
capture of a city, the victorious army has, from no other cause 
but this, been not only ejected but even utterly defeated. 
Therefore there is nothing about which leaders ought to exercise 
more care or foresight, than that, on such an occasion, all 
may have an absolutely equal prospect of sharing in the booty. 

Thus on the present occasion, while the Tribunes were 
busied in the distribution of the spoil; the Roman com- 


mander caused the prisoners, who numbered little short of 

ten thousand, to be assembled ; and havine first „ „, 

ordered them to be divided mto two groups, of ihe prisoners. 
one containing the citizens and their wives and Tlie ciii^ns are 
children, the other the craftsmen, he exhorted '"^J^jj'" ^'' 
the first of these to be loyal to the Romans, 
and to remember the favour which they were now receiving, 
and allowed them ali to depart to their own houses. With 
tears of joy at this unexpected preservation, they bowed in 
reverence to Scipio and dispersed. He then -^^^ skilled slaves 
told the craftsmen that they were for the present are promised iheir 
public slaves of Rome, but that, if they showed f™dom ai the 
themselves loyal and zealous in their several 
crafts, he promised them their freedom, as soon as the war with 
the Carthaginians had been brought to a successful issue. He 
then bade them go get their names enrolled in the office of 
the Quaestor, and appointed a Roman overseer for every 
thirty of them, their whole number being about two thousand. 
From the remaining captives he selected the 
strongest, those who were in the prime of ^^ JJJ^ ^^'"^ 
youth and physical vigour, and assigned them 
to serve on board ship: and having thus increased the number 
of his naval allies by one half, he manned the ships taken from 
the enemy as well as his own ; so that the number of men on 
board each vessel were now little .short of double what it was 
before. For the captured ships numbered eighteen, his 
original tleet thirty-five. These men he also promised their 
freedom, if they showed themselves loyal and zealous, as soon 
as they had conquered the Carthaginians. By this treatment 
of the captives he inspired the citizens with warm feelings of 
loyalty and fidelity, and the handicraftsmen with great 
readiness to serve, from the hope held out to them of recovering 
their freedom. 

18. He next took Mago and the Carthaginians with him 
separately, consisting of one member of the 
Council of ancients and fifteen of the Senate.' ' ''^J^e"^'" 
These he put under the charge of Gaius I-aelius, 
with orders that he should take due care of them. He next 
' This seems to be the distinciion between the words ytfinvati. and 


summoned the hostages, who numbered more than thr© 
-m. u . -^ hundred. Such of them as were children hi 

1 ne nostages. n i « . « « i • i • 

called to him one by one, and strokmg thai 
heads told them not to be afraid, for in a few days they woulc 
see their parents. The others also he exhorted to be of gooc 
cheer, and to write word to their relations in their several cities, 
first, that they were safe and well; and, secondly, that the 
Romans were minded to restore them all unharmed to their 
homes, if only their relations adopted the Roman alliance. 
With these words, having already selected from the spoils such 
articles as were fitting for his purpose, he presented each with 
what was suitable to their sex and age : the girls with ear-rings 
and bracelets, the young men with daggers and swords. Among 
^ the captive women was the wife of Mandonius, 

brother of Andobalus king of the Ilergetes. 
Tins woman fell at his feet and besought him with tears to 
protect their honour better than the Carthaginians had done. 
Touched by her distress Scipio asked her in what respect she 
and the other women were left unprovided. She was a lady 
of advanced years and of a certain majestic dignity of appear- 
ance : and upon her meeting his question by perfect silence, 
he summoned the men who had been appointed to take charge 
of the women; and when they reported that they had supplied 
them with all necessaries in abundance, and when the woman 
again clasped his knees and repeated the same request, Scipio 
felt still more embarrassed ; and, conceiving the idea that their 
guardians had neglected them, and were now making a false 
report, he bade the women fear nothing, for that he would 
appoint different men to see to their interests, and secure that 
they were not left in want of anything. Then after a brief 
hesitation the woman said, " You mistake my meaning, General, 
if you think that we are asking you for food." Scipio then at 
length began to understand what she wished to convey ; and 
seeing under his eyes the youthful beauty of the daughters of 
Andobalus, and of many of the other nobles, he could not 

virfKkrrroi. Cp. 36, 4. The latter is the word used by Polybius for the 
Roman Senate : for the nature of the first see Bosworth Smith, Carthage and 
he Carthaginians, p. 27. It was usually called " The Hundred." Mommsen 
(Hist, tf Rome, vol. ii, p. 15) seems to doubt the existence of the larger coun- 
cil : its authority at any rate had been superseded by the oligarchical gerusia. 


refrain from tears, while the aged lady indicated in a few words 
the danger in which they were. He showed at once that he 
understood her words : and taking her by the hand, he bade 
her and the others also be of good cheer, for that he would 
watch over them as he would over his own sisters and 
daughters, and would accordingly put men in charge of them 
on whom he could rely. 

19. His next business was to pay over to the Quaestors 
such public money of the Carthaginians as had „ ^ ^^^^ 
been captured. It amounted to more than 
six hundred talents, so that when this was added to the four 
hundred which he had brought with him from Rome, he found 
himself in possession of more than one thousand talents. 

It was on this occasion that some young Romans fell in 
with a girl surpassing all the other women in 
bloom and beauty ; and seeing that Scipio was continence. 
fond of the society of women, they brought her 
to him, and, placing her before him, said that they desired to 
present the damsel to him. He was struck with admiration 
for her beauty, and replied that, if he had been in a private 
position, he could have received no present that would have 
given him greater pleasure ; hut as general it was the last in the 
world which he could receive. He meant to convey, I presume, 
by this ambiguous answer that, in hours of rest and idleness, 
such things are the most delightful enjoyments and pastimes 
for young men ; whereas in times of activity they are hindrances 
[diysically and mentally. However that may be, he thanked 
the young men ; but called the girl's father, and handing her 
over at once to him, told him to bestow her in marriage on 
whichever of the citizens he cliose. By this display of con- 
tinence and selfcontrol he gained the warm respect of his 

Having made these arrangements, and handed over the rest 
of the captives to the Tribunes, he despatched Laeiius sem 10 
Gatus Laeiius on board a quinquereme to Rome, Rome with the 
with the Carthaginian prisoners and the noblest ^^'^^ ^■'^- ^°9- 
of the others, to announce at home what had taken place. 
For as the prevailing feeling at Rome was one of despair of 
success in Iberia, he felt certain that on this news their spirit; 


would revive, and that they would make much more strenuoui 
efforts to support him. 

20. Scipio himself stayed a certain time in Nen 

Carthage and assiduously practised liis fleet; 
^r^dvanL.^"^ and drew up the foUowing scheme for his 

military Tribunes for training their men. The 
first day he ordered the men to go at the double for thirty 
stades in their full arms ; and on the second all of them to rub 
down, clean, and thoroughly examine their whole equipments ; 
on the third to rest and do nothing ; on the fourth to have a 
sham fight, some with wooden swords covered with leather and 
with a button at the end, others with javelins also buttoned at 
the end ; on the fifth the same march at the double as on the 
first That there might be no lack of weapons for the 
practises, or for the real fighting, he took the greatest pains with 
the handicraftsmen. He had, as I have already stated, appointed 
overseers over them in regular divisions to secure that this was 
done ; but he also personally inspected them every day, and 
saw that they were severally supplied with what was necessary. 
Thus while the legions were practising and training in the 
vicinity of the town, and the fleet manoeuvring and rowing in 
the sea, and the city people sharpening weapons or forging 
arms or working in wood, every one in short busily employed 
in making armour, the whole place must have presented the 
Xen. HeiUn, 3, appearance of what Xenophon called " a work- 
4, 17 : AegsiL shopof war.'* When he thought all these works 
I, 26. ^gyg sufficiently advanced for the requirements 
of the service, he secured the town by posting garrisons and 
repairing the walls, and got both his army and navy on the 
move, directing his advance upon Tarraco, and taking the 
hostages with him. . . . 


21. Euryleon, the Strategus of the Achaeans, was a man of 
Euryieon Achaean timid character, and quite unsuited for service 

Strategus, B.C. in the field. 

210-209. gy^ 2& my history has now arrived at a point 

at which the achievements of Philoi>oemen begin, I think it only 


proper that, as I have attempted to describe the habits and 
characters of the other men of eminence with whom we have 
had to deal, I should do the same for him. It is strangely in- 
consistent in historians to record in elaborate detail the founding 
of cities, stating when and how and by whom they were estab- 
lished, and even the circumstances and difficulties which 
accompanied the transaction, and yet to pass over in complete 
silence the characteristics and aims of the men by whom the 
whole thing was done, though these in fact are the points of 
the greatest value. For as one feels more roused to emulation 
and imitation by men [hat have life, than by buildings that 
have none, it is natural that the history of the former should 
have a greater educational value. If I had not therefore already 
composed a separate account of him, clearly setting forth who 
tie was, his origin, and his policy as a young man, it would 
have been necessary to have given an account now of each of 
these particulars. But since I have done this in a work in 
three books, unconnected with my present history, detailing the 
circumstances of his childhood and his most famous achieve- 
ments, it is clear that in my present narrative my proper 
course will be to remove anything like details from my account 
of his youthful characteristics and aims ; while I am careful to 
add details to the story of the achievements of his manhood, 
which in that treatise were only stated summarily. I shall thus 
preserve the proper features of both works. The former being 
in the nature of a panegyric demanded an account of his 
actions, put briefly and in a style deliberately intended to 
enhance their merits ; my present work, which is history, and 
therefore absolutely uncommitted to praise or blame, requires 
only a true statement, which puts the facts clearly, and traces 
the policy which dictated the several actions. 

22. Philopoemen, then, to begin with, was of good birth, 
descended from one of the noblest families gjnh. parentage, 
in Arcadia. He was also educated under that and education of 
most distinguished Mantinean, Cleander, who Philopoemen, b. 
had been his father's friend before, and happened 
at that time to be in exile. When he came to man's estate he 
attached himself to Ecdemus and Demophanes, who were by 
birth natives of Megalopolis, but who having been exiled by the 


tyrant, and having associated with the philosopher Arcesilaus 
during their exile, not only set their own country free by 
entering into an intrigue against Aristodemus the tyrant, but 
also helped in conjunction with Aratus to put down Nicocles, 
the tyrant of Sicyon. On another occasion also, on the in* 
vitation of the people of Cyrene, they stood forward as their 
champions and preserved their freedom for them. Such were 
the men with whom he passed his early life; and he at once began 
to show a superiority to his contemporaries, by his power of 
enduring hardships in hunting, and by his acts of daring in war. 
He was moreover careful in his manner of life, and moderate 
in the outward show which he maintained ; for he had im- 
bibed from these men the conviction, that it was impossible for 
a man to take the lead in public business with honour 
who neglected his own private affairs; nor again to abstain 
from embezzling public money if he lived beyond his private 

Being then appointed Hipparch by the Achaean league at 
Elected Hipparch, ^^ ^^xiit^ and finding the squadrons in a state 

B.C. 2IO. of utter demoralisation, and the men thoroughly 

^P* ^^"^- ^^^' 7. dispirited, he not only restored them to a better 

aftCT thc^'tUe State than they were, but in a short time made 

of Saiiasia, them even superior to the enemy's cavalry, by 

B.C. 222. bringing them all to adopt habits of real training 
and genuine emulation. The fact is that most of those who 
hold this office of Hipparch, either, from being without any 
genius themselves for cavalry tactics, do not venture to enforce 
necessary orders upon others ; or, because they are aiming at 
being elected Strategus, try all through their year of office to 
attach the young men to themselves and to secure their favour 
in the coming election: and accordingly never administer 
necessary reprimands, which are the salvation of the 
public interests, but hush up all transgressions, and, for the sake 
of gaining an insignificant popularity, do great damage to those 
who trust them. Sometimes again, commanders, though neither 
feeble nor corrupt, do more damage to the soldiers by intem- 
perate zeal than the negligent ones, and this is still oftener the 
case with regard to the cavalry. . . . 

23. Now the movements which he undertook to teach the 


horsemen as being universally applicable to cavalry warfare 

The cavalry 

were these. In the first place each separate 
horse was to be practised in wheeling first to laeilcs S'philo- 
the left and then to the right, and also to face poemen, b.c. 
right-about; and in the next place they were aio-aog. 
to be taught to wheel in squadrons, face-about, and by a 
treble movement to face-about right-turn. Next they were to 
learn to throw out flying columns of single or double com- 
panies at full speed from both wings or from the centre; 
and then to pull up and fall in again into troops, or squad- 
rons, or regiments : next to deploy into line on both wings, 
either by filling up the intervals in the line or by a lateral 
movement on the rear. Simply to forni an oblique line, 
he said, required no practice, for it was exactly the same 
order as that taken up on a march. After this they were to 
practice charging the enemy and retreating by every kind of 
movement, until they were able to advance at an alarming 
pace ; provided only that they kept together, both line and 
column, and preserved the proper intervals between the 
squadrons : for nothing is more dangerous and unserviceable 
than cavalry that have broken up their squadrons, and attempt 
to engage in this state. 

After giving these instructions both to the people and their 
magistrates, he went on a round of inspection through the 
towns, and inquired, first, whether the men obeyed the words of 
command ; and, secondly, whether the officers in the several 
towns knew how to give them clearly and properly : for he held 
that the first thing requisite was technical knowledge on the 
part of the commanders of each company. 

24. When he had thus made the proper preliminary 
preparations, he mustered the cavalry from the various cities 
into one place, and set about perfecting their evolutions 
under his own command, and personally directed the whole 
drill. He did not ride in front of the army, as generals now- 
adays do, from the notion that this is the proper position for 

I This and the following chapter were rormerl]' assigned lo Ihe description 
of Scipio's proceedings in Spain and (oUowed. ch. ao. Hultsch, however. 
iccms right in placing them thus, and assigning (hem (o the account of the 
lactic* of I'hllopocmen. 


a commander. For what can be less scientific or more 
dangerous than for a commander to be seen by all his men, 
and yet not to see one of them? In such manoeuvres a 
Hipparch should not make a display not of mere military dignity, 
but of the skill and ability of an officer, appearing at one time 
in the front, at another on the rear, and at another in the 
centre. This is what he did, riding along the lines, and 
personally seeing to all the men, giving them directions when 
they were at a loss what to do, and correcting at once every 
mistake that was being made. Such mistakes, however, were 
trifling and rare, owing to the previous care bestowed on every 
individual and company. Demetrius of Phalerum has, as far 
as words go, given expression to the same idea : " As in the 
case of building, if you lay each single brick rightly, and if 
proper care is taken in placing each successive course, all will 
be well ; so in an army, accuracy in the arrangement of each 
soldier and each company makes the whole strong. . . ." 

A fragment of a speech of some Macedonian orator as to the 
Aetolians making an alliance with Rome, 

25. " The case is just like that of the disposition of the 

Alliance between various kinds of tfoops on the field of battle. 

Aetolians and The light-armed and most active men bear the 

Rome ^g^'pst brunt of the danger, are the first to be engaged 

byScopas^andDor-^'^^ the first to perish, while the phalanx and 

imachus, RC.2II. the heavy-armed generally carry off the glory. 

See Livy, 26, 24. g^ ]^ jj^jg csiSty the AetoHans, and such of the 

Peloponnesians as are in alliance with them, are put in the post 
of danger; while the Romans, like the phalanx, remain in 
reserve. And if the former meet with disaster and perish, the 
Romans will retire unharmed from the struggle ; while if they 
are victorious, which Heaven forbid ! the Romans will get 
not only them but the rest of the Greeks also into their 
power. . . ."^ 

* On the margin of one MS, the following is written, which may be a 
sentence from the same speech, or a comment of the Epitomator : "A con- 
federacy with democratic institutions always stands in need of external sup- 
port, owing to the fickleness of the multitude." 


2S. After iinishlng the celebration of the Ncmean games, 
King Philip of Macedon returned to Argos and King Philip's 
laid aside his crown and purple robe, with conduci at Argos 
the view of making a display of democratic "^*J i^'^'"B "t 

,. , P -n I. the Nemean 

equahty and good nature. But the more games, b.c. 308. 
democratic the dress which he wore, the more See Livy, 3j. 
absolute and royal were the privileges which he 3°. 3'- 
claimed. He was not now content with seducing unmarried 
women, or even with intriguing with married women, but 
assumed the right of sending authoritatively for any woman 
whose appearance struck him ; and offered violence to those 
who did not at once obey, by leading a band of revellers to 
their houses; and, summoning their sons or their husbands, he 
trumped up iaise pretexts for menacing them. In fact his 
conduct was exceedingly outrageous and lawless. But though 
this abuse of his privileges as a guest was exceedingly annoying 
to many of the Achaeans, and especially to the orderly part of 
them, the wars that threatened them on every side compelled 
them to show a patience under it uncongenial to their 
character. . . . 

None of his predecessors had better qualifications for 
sovereignty, or more important defects, tlian this same Philip. 
And it appears to me that the good qualities were innate, 
while the defects grew upon him as he advanced in years, as 
happens to some horses as they grow old. Such remarks I 
do not, following some other historians, confine to prefaces ; 
but when the course of my narrative suggests it, I state my 
opinion of kings and eminent men, thinking that most con- 
venient for writer and reader alike. . . . 

War bettvetn Antiothus the Great {III.) and Arsaces 
III., King of the Parthians. B.C. 212-205. ^^ abeve 
8, !S- 

27. In regard to extent of territory Media is the most 
considerable of the kingdoms in Asia, as also in respect o' 


the number and excellent qualities of its men, and not less 
Description of SO of its horses. For, in fact, it supplies nearly 
Media, and of all Asia with these animals, the royal studs being 
tiw palace at entrusted to the Medes because of the rich pas- 

£cDatana« • < . * rr\ • r i 

tures m their country/ To protect it from the 
neighbouring barbarians a ring of Greek cities was built round 
it by the orders of Alexander. The chief exception to this b 
Ecbatana, which stands on the north of Media, in the district 
of Asia bordering on the Maeotis and Euxine. It was 
originally the royal city of the Medes, and vastly superior to 
the other cities in wealth and the splendour of its buildings. 
It is situated on the skirts of Mount Orontes, and is without 
walls, though containing an artificially formed citadel fortified 
to an astonishing strength. Beneath this stands the palace, 
which it is in some degree difficult to describe in detail, or to 
pass over in complete silence. To those authors whose aim 
is to produce astonishment, and who are accustomed to deal in 
exaggeration and picturesque writing, this city offers the best 
possible subject ; but to those who, like myself, are cautious 
when approaching descriptions which go beyond ordinary 
notions, it presents much difficulty and embarrassment. How- 
ever, as regards size, the palace covers ground the circuit of 
which is nearly seven stades; and by the costliness of the 
structure in its several parts it testifies to the wealth of its 
original builders : for all its woodwork being cedar or cypress 
not a single plank was left uncovered ; beams and fretwork 
in the ceilings, and columns in the arcades and peristyle, were 
overlaid with plates of silver or gold, while all the tiles were of 
silver. Most of these had been stripped off during the 
invasion of Alexander and the Macedonians, and the rest in the 
reigns of Antigonus and Seleucus Nicanor. However, even at 
the time of Antiochus's arrival, the temple of Aena^ still had its 
columns covered with gold, and a considerable number of 
silver tiles had been piled up in it, and some few gold bricks 
and a good many silver ones were still remaining. It was 

1 See 5, 44. 

' This goddess is variously called Anailis (Plut. Artax, 27) and Nanea 
(2 Mace. I, 13). And is identified by Plutarch with Artemis, and by others 
with Aphrodite. 


from these that the coinage bearing the king's impress was 
collected and struck, amounting to little less than four thousand 
talents. . . . 

28. Arsaces expected that Antiochus would come as far as 

this district (of Media), but that he would not .^ 

^ , " , ,. - - , The nature of the 

venture to proceed across the aajoining desert desert between 
with so lai^e a force, if for no other reason, yet Media and 
from the scarcity of water. For in this tract of Parthia. 
country there is no water appearing on the surface, though 
there are many subterranean channels which have well-shafts 
sunk to them, at spots in the desert unknown to persons un- 
acquainted with the district A true account of these channels 
has been preserved among the natives to the effect that, during 
the Persian ascendency, they granted the enjoyment of the 
profits of the land to the inhabitants of some of the waterless 
districts for five generations, on condition of their bringing 
fresh water in ; and that, there being many large streams flowing 
dowti Mount Taurus, these people at infinite toil and expense 
constructed these underground channels through a long tract 
of country, in such a way, that the very people who now use 
the water are ignorant of the sources from which the channels 
are originally supplied. 

When, however, Arsaces saw that Antiochus was deter- 
mined to attempt to cross the desert, he endeav- > ,- ), 
oured at once to choke up and spoil the wells, pares to cross it : 
But King Antiochus, upon this being reported Arsaces orders 
to him, despatched Nicomedes with a thousand ""j**"^" ^ 
horse ; who found that Arsaces had retired with 
his main army, but came upon some of his cavalry in the act 
of choking up the shafts which went down into the under- 
ground channels. They promptly attacked these men, and, 
having routed and forced them to fly, returned back again to 
Antiochus. The king, having thus accomplished Antiochus 
the journey across the desert, arrived before the arrives at 
city Hecatompylos, which is situated in the Hecatompylos. 
centre of Parthia, and derives its name from the fact that the 
roads which lead to all the surrounding districts convei^e there. 

29. Having rested his artny at this place, and having 
convinced himself that, had Arsaces been able to give him 


battle, he would not have abandoned his own country, nor have 
Antiochus deter- sought a ground more favourable to his own army 
mines to follow for fighting him than the district round Hecatom- 
Arsaces into pyios ; he concluded that, since he had done so, 
^^'^"**' it stood to reason that he had entirely changed 
his mind. He therefore decided to advance into Hyrcania* 
But having arrived at Tagae, he learnt from the natives that 
the country he had to cross, until he reached the ridges of 
Mount Labus sloping down into Hyrcania, was exceedingly 
rough and difficult, and that large numbers of barbarians were 
stationed at the narrowest points. He therefore resolved to 
divide his light-armed troops into companies, and distribute 
their officers among them, giving them directions as to 
the route they were severally to take. He did the same 
with the pioneers, whose business it was to make the positions 
occupied by the light -armed possible of approach for the 
phalanx and beasts of burden. Having made these arrange- 
ments, he entrusted the first division to Diogenes, strengthening 
him with bowmen and slingers and some mountaineers skilled 
in tlirowing javelines and stones, and who, without keeping 
any regular order, were always ready to skirmish at a 
moment's notice, and in any direction, and rendered the most 
effective assistance at the narrow passes. Next to these he 
ordered a company of about two thousand Cretans armed with 
shields to advance, under the command of Polyxenidas of 
Rhodes. The rear was to be brought up by companies armed 
with breastplate and shield, and commanded by Nicomedes of 
Cos, and Nicolaus the Aetolian. 

30. But as they advanced, the ruggedness of the ground 

and the narrowness of the passes were found to 
Mount*Labus. ^^'" c^c^^d the king's expectations. The length 

of the ascent was altogether about three hundred 
stades ; and a great part had to be made up the bed of a 
winter torrent of great depth, into which numerous rocks and 
trees had been hurled by natural causes from the overhanging 
precipices, and made a passage up it difficult, to say nothing of 
the obstacles which the barbarians had helped to construct 
expressly to impede them. These latter had felled a large 
number of trees and piled up heaps of huge rocks ; and had 


besides occupied all along the gully the high points, which 
were at once convenient for attack and capable of covering 
themselves ; so that, if it had not been for one glaring error on 
their part, Antiochus would have found the attempt beyond 
his powers, and would have desisted from it. The error was 
this. They assumed that the whole army would be obliged 
to march the entire way up the gully, and they accordingly 
occupied the points of vantige. But they did not perceive this 
fact, that, though the phalanx and the baggage could not possibly 
go by any other route than the one they supposed, there was yet 
nothing to make it impossible for the light-armed and active 
troops to accomplish the ascent of the bare rocks. Conse- 
quently, as soon as Diogenes had come upon the first outpost 
of the enemy, he and his men began climbing out of the gully, 
and the affair at once took a different aspect. For no sooner 
bad they come to close quarters, than, acting on the suggestion 
of the moment, Diogenes avoided the engagement by ascending 
the mountains that flanked the enemy's position, and so got 
above him ; and by pouring down volleys of darts and stones he 
seriously harassed the barbarians. Their most deadly weapons 
however proved to be the slings, which could carry a great 
distance ; and when by these means they had dislodged the 
first outpost and occupied their ])osition, an opportunity was 
secured for the pioneers to clear the way and level it, without 
being exposed to danger. Owing to the number of hands the 
work went on rapidly ; and meanwhile the slingers, bowmen, 
and javelin-men advanced in skirmishing order along the 
higher ground, every now and then reforming and seizing on 
strong points of vantage ; while the men with. shields formed a 
reserve, marching in order and at a regular pace along the side 
of the gully itself. The barbarians thereupon abandoned 
their positions, and, ascending the mountain, mustered in full 
force on the summit 

SI. Thus Antiochus effected this ascent without loss, but 
slowly and painfully, for it was not until the -j^g i^,^^ „„ ,<^^ 
eighth day that his army made the summit of summii of Mount 
Labus. The barbarians being mustered there, Labus. 
and resolved to dispute his passage, a severe engagement took 
place, in which the barbarians were eventually dislodged, anf" 


by the following manoeuvre. As long as they were engaged 
face to face with the phalanx, they kept well together and 
fought desperately ; but before daybreak the light-armed troops 
had made a wide circuit, and seized some high ground on the 
rear of the enemy, and as soon as the barbarians perceived this 
they fled in a panic. King Antiochus exerted himself actively 
to prevent a pursuit, and caused a recall to be sounded, 
because he wished his men to make the descent into Hyrcania, 

without scattering, and in close order. He 
Ta^t^" accomplished his object : reached Tambrax. an 

unwalled city of great size and contammg a 
royal palace, and there encamped. Most of the natives fled 

from the battle-fleld, and its immediate neigh- 
Sh-^.*^ bourhood, into a city called Sirynx, which was 

not far from Tambrax, and from its secure and 
convenient situation was considered as the capital of Hyrcania. 
Antiochus therefore determined to carry this town by assault ; 
and having accordingly advanced thither, and pitched his 
camp under its walls, he commenced the assault. The 
operation consisted chiefly of mining under pent-houses. For 
the city was defended by three trenches, thirty cubits broad 
and fifteen deep, with a double vallum on the edge of each ; 
and behind these there was a strong wall. Frequent struggles 
took place at the works, in which neither side were strong 
enough to carry off" their killed and wounded : for these hand- 
to-hand battles took place, not above ground only, but under- 
ground also in the mines. However, owing to the numbers 
employed and the activity of the king, it was not long before 
the trenches were choked up and the walls were undermined 
and fell. Upon this the barbarians, giving up all as lost, put to 
death such Greeks as were in the town ; and having plundered 
all that was most worth taking, made off" under cover of night. 
When the king saw this, he despatched Hyperbasus with the 
mercenaries ; upon whose approach the barbarians threw down 
their booty and fled back again into the city ; and when they 
found the peltasts pouring in energetically through the breach 
in the walls they gave up in despair and surrendered. 



S2. The Consuls, wishing to reconnoitre the slope of the 
hill towards the enemy's camp, ordered their ^^ ^^ 
main force to remain in position ; while they coss. M. Oaudiiw 
themselves with two troops of cavalry, their Marcellus, T. 
lictors,'and about thirty velites advanced to '^"'"'^"^''7:^ 
make the reconnaisance. Now some Numidians, consuls were en- 
who were accustomed to lie in ambush for those camped within 
who came on skirmishes, or any other services 'i"™ ""'== "' 
, , „ , , ■ , . each other, 

from the Roman camp, happened, as it chanced, between Venusia 
to have ensconced themselves at the foot of the and Baniia, 
hilL Being informed by their look-out man t^^ "f ^'^i^, 
that a body of men was coming over the brow „, Bmiiii, but 
of the hill above them, they rose from their had advanced 
place of concealment, ascended the hill by ^.'''t*>^Apiiiu. 
a side road, and got between the Consuls 
and their camp. At the very first charge they kilted 
Cbudius and some others, and having wounded Yitsxti of the Con- 
the rest, forced them to fly in different directions sui M. Claudius 
down the sides of the hill. Though the men WarcEUus- 
in camp saw what was happening they were unable to come to 
the relief of their endangered comrades ; for while they were 
still shouting out to get ready, and before they had recovered 
from the first shock of their surprise, while some were putting 
the bridles on their horses and others donning their armour, 
the affair was all over. The son of Claudius, though wounded, 
narrowly escaped with his life. 

Thus fell Marcus Marcellus from an act of incautiousness 
unworthy of a general. I am continually compelled in the 
course of my history to draw the attention of my readers to 
occurrences of this sort ; for I perceive that it is this, more 
than anything else connected with the science of tactics, that 
ruins commanders. And yet the blunder is a very obvious 
one. For what is the use of a commander or general, who has 
not learnt that the leader ought to keep as far as possible aloof 
from those minor operations, in which the whole fortune of the 
campaign is not involved ? Or of one who does not know th 


even if circumstances should at times force them to engage in 
such subordinate movements, the commanders-in-chief should 
not exjx)se themselves to danger until a large number of their 

Fiat cxperimen- company have fallen ? For, as the proverb has 

turn in corpore it, the experiment should be made " on the 

^^*- worthless Carian " ^ not on the general. For to 

say " I shouldn't have thought it," — " Who would have 

ex|)ected it ? " seems to me the clearest proof of strategical 

incompetence and dulness. 

83. And so, though HannibaFs claims to be reckoned a 
great general are manifold, there is none more conspicuous than 
this, that though engaged for a great length of time in an 
enemy's country, and though he experienced a great variety of 
fortune, he again and again inflicted a disaster on his opponents 
in minor encounters, but never suffered one himself in spite of 
the number and severity of the contests which he conducted : 
and the reason, we may suppose was, that he took great care 
of his personal safety. And very properly so : for if the leader 
escapes uninjured and safe, though a decisive defeat may 
have been sustained, fortune offers many opportunities for 
retrieving disasters ; but if he has fallen, the pilot as it were of 
the ship, even should fortune give the victory to the army, 
no real advantage is gained ; because all the hopes of the 
soldiers de[>end upon their leaders. So much for those who 
fall into such errors from foolish vanity, childish parade, 
ignorance, or contempt For it is ever one or the other of 

An incident in these that is at the bottom of such disasters. . . . 

iheaiiemptof They suddenly let down the portcullis, 

Hannibal to enter ^l^j^l^ they had raised somewhat by pulleys, 

balapia, under , . . • « . ri-«i_ ,i 

cover of a letter and thus closed up the gateway. 1 nen they 
scaie<i by the ring took the men and crucified them before the 

of the dead Consul ^^iij, 

Marcus. ^^"^ * ' • 

Livy, 27, 28. 

* This proverb perhaps arose from the frequent employment of tlie non- 
Hellenic Carians as mercenaries. Cp. Plato, Laches, 187 B; Euthydemus, 
285 B ; Euripides, Cyclops, 654. 


34. In Iberia Publius Scipio took up his winter quarters at 
Tarraco, as I have already stated ; and secured 
the fidelity and affection of the Iberians, to ^g°ao8°* ^ 
begin with, by the restoration of the hostages to mpra. ch. so. 
their respective families. He found a voluntary The aJhesion of 
supporter of his measures in the person of th^'fe^iara " 
Edeco, the prince of the Edetani; who no 
sooner heard that New Carthage had been taken, and that 
Scipio had got his wife and children into his hands, than, 
concluding that the Iberians would change sides, he resolved 
to take the lead in the movement : conceiving that, by acting 
thus, he would best be able to get back his wife and children, 
and at the same time have the credit of joining the Romans 
by deliberate choice, and not under compulsion. And so it 
turned out For as soon as the armies were dismissed to their 
winter quarters, he came to Tarraco, accompanied by his 
kinsfolk and friends ; and there being admitted to an inter- 
view with Scipio, he said that " he thanked the gods heartily 
that he was the first of the native princes to come to him \ for 
whereas the others were still sending ambassadors to the 
Carthaginians and looking to them for support, — even while 
stretching out their hands to the Romans, — he was come there 
to offer not only himself, but his friends and kinsfolk also, to 
the protection of Rome. If therefore he should have the 
honour to be regarded by him as a friend and ally, he would 
be able to render him important service both in the present 
and the future. For as soon as the Iberians saw that he had 
been admitted to Scipio's friendship, and had obtained what he 
asked, they would all come in with a similar object, hoping to 
have their relatives restored, and to enjoy the alliance of Rome. 
Their affection being secured for the future by receiving such 
a mark of honour and benevolence, he would have in them 
sincere and ready coadjutors in all his future undertakings. 
He therefore asked to have his wife and children restored to 
him, and to be allowed to return home an acknowledged friend 
of Rome ; in order that he might have a reasonable pretext 
VOL. ri D 


for showing, to the best of his power, his own and his friends' 
affection for Scipio himself and for the Roman cause." 

85, When Edeco had finished his speech, Scipio, who had 

Eileco is followed *^en ready to gratify him from the first, 

ijy other triixra. and took the same view as to the policy of 

iLc. ao9-8. ^hg proceeding, delivered him his wife 
and children, and granted the friendship which he asked. 
More than this, his subtle intellect made an extraordinary 
impression on the Iberian in the course of the interview ; and 
having held out splendid hopes to all his companions for the 
future, he allowed him to return to his own country. This 
afTair having rapidly got wind, all the tribes living north of the 
ICbro, such as had not done so before, joined the Romans with 
one consent. 

Thus so far everything was going well with Scipio. After 
the departure of these people, he broke up his naval force, 
seeing that there was nothing to resist him at sea ; and select- 
ing the Ixist of the crews, he distributed them among the 
maniples, and thus augmented his land forces. 

liut Andobales and Mandonius, the most powerful princes 

AiuIoImIm nnd ^^ ^^ ^Y '" Iberia, and believed to be the 

MitiuioniuH nimn. most sincerely devoted to the Carthaginians, 

don iluhdruUd. j^^j jQ^g \^^^ secretly discontented and on the 

lookout for an op|K>rtunity : ever since Hasdrubal, under a 
pretence of liaving a doubt of their loyalty, had demanded a 
large sum of money, and their wives and daughters as hostages, 
as 1 have already narrated.^ And thinking that a convenient 
opportunity had now come, they got together their own forces, 
and, (|uitting the C-arthaginian camp under cover of night, 
oi'i'upicil a |H)Mition sutlirieutly strong to secure their safety. 
Upon this, most of the other Iberians also abandoned 
llasilruiviil : having long boon annoyed at the overbearing 
ronduct of the ( \irthrtginians, and now seizing the first oppor- 
tunity to manilVst their feelings. 

86. This has ot\en hapiH*ned to |X}ople before. For though, 
as I have many tinies romarkal, success in a campaign and 
victory <wor one*H cnenuvs are great things, it requires much 
greater skill and caution to xisc such successes well Accord- 

* Sw 9. II. 


ingly, you will find that those who have gained victories are 
many times more numerous than those who have made good 
use of them. The Carthaginians at this crisis are an instance 
in point. After conquering the Roman armies, and slaying 
both the generals, Publius and Gnaeus Scipio, imagining that 
Iberia was their own without dispute, they began treating the 
natives tyrannically ; and accordingly found enemies in their 
subjects instead of allies and friends. And they were quite 
rightly served, for imagining that the conduct necessary for 
keeping power was something different from that necessary for 
obtaining it ; and for failing to understand that they keep 
empire best, who best maintain the same principles in virtue of 
which they gained it And yet it ts obvious enough, and has 
been again and again demonstrated, that men gain power by 
beneficent actions, and by holding out hopes of advantage to 
those with whom they are dealing ; hut that, as soon as ihey 
have got what they wanted, and begin to act wickedly and rule 
despotically, it is but natural that, as their rulers have changed, 
the feelings of the subjects should change too. So it was with 
the Carthaginians. 

37. Surrounded by such difficulties Hasdrubal was agitated 
by many conflicting emotions and anxieties. He was vexed 
by the desertion of Andobales ; vexed by the opposition and 
feud between himself and the other commanders ; and greatly 
alarmed as to the arrival of Scipio, expecting that he would 
immediately bring his forces to attack him. Perceiving there- 
fore that he was being abandoned by the Iberians, and that 
they were joining the Romans with one accord, he decided 
upon the following plan of action. He resolved that he must 
collect the best force he could, and give the enemy battle : if 
fortune declared in his favour he could then consider his next 
step in safety, but if the battle turned out unfavourably for 
him, he would retreat with those that survived into Gaul ; and 
collecting from that country as many of the natives as he could, 
would go to Italy, and take his share in the same fortune as his 
brother Hannibal. 

While Hasdrubal was arriving at this resolution, Publius 
ScipiowasrejoinedbyGaiusLaelius; and,heing Earifinacic" 
1 by him of the orders of the Senate, he sdpio mov 


southward to collected his forces from their winter quarters 
^iiTthe^^y^of ^"^ began his advance : the Iberians joining 

the Baetis. him on the march with great promptness and 
Livy, 27, 18-19. hearty enthusiasm. Andobales had long been 
in communication with Scipio : and, on the latter approaching 
the district in which he was entrenched, he left his camp with 
his friends and came to Scipio. In this interview he entered 
upon a defence of himself in regard to his former friendship 
with the Carthaginians, and spoke of the services he had done 
them, and the fidelity which he had shown to them. 
He then went on to narrate the injustice and tyranny 
which he had experienced at their hands ; and demanded that 
Scipio himself should be the judge of his pleas. If he were 
shown to be making ungrounded complaints against the 
Carthaginians, he might justly conclude him incapable of 
keeping faith with the Romans either : but if, on a review of 
these numerous acts of injustice he were proved to have had no 
other course than to desert the Carthaginians, Scipio might 
confidently expect that, if he now elected to join the Romans, 
he would be firm in his loyalty to them. 

38. Andobales added many more arguments before finish- 
ing his speech ; and when he had done, Scipio 
^^^^^p^J'^^ answered by saying that " he quite believed 

what he had said ; and that he had the strongest 
reason for knowing about the insolent conduct of the Cartha- 
ginians, both from their treatment of the other Iberians, and 
conspicuously from their licentious behaviour to their wives 
and daughters, whom he had found occupying the position, 
not of hostages, but of captives and slaves ; and to whom he 
had preserved such inviolable honour as could scarcely have 
been equalled by their very fathers themselves." And upon 
Andobales and his companions acknowledging that they were 
quite aware of this, and falling at his feet and calling him 
king, all present expressed approval. Whereupon Scipio with 
emotion bade them " fear nothing, for they would experience 
nothing but kindness at the hands of the Romans.*' He at 
once handed over his daughters to Andobales ; and next day 
made the treaty with him, the chief provision of which was 
that he should follow the Roman commanders and obey their 


commands. This being settled, he returned to his camp; 
brought over his army to Scipio; and, having joined camps 
with the Romans, advanced with them against Hasdmbal. 

Now the Carthaginian general was encamped at Baecula, 
in the district of Castulo, not far from the silver j. 

mines. But when he learnt the approach of the changes bis pow- 
Romans, he shifted his quarters ; and his rear Hon m one of 
being secured by a river, and having a stretch ^"P*"'"'*'""^"'- 
of tableland in front of his entrenchment of sufficient extent 
lot his troops to manceuvre, and bounded by a steep descent 
sufficiently deep for security, he stayed quietly in position : 
always taking care to post pickets on the brow of the descent. 
As soon as he came within distance, Scipio was 
eager to give him battle, but was baffled by the Scip.o anive.. 
strength of the enemy's position. After waiting two days, 
however, he became anxious, lest by the arrival of Mago and 
Hasdrubal, son of Gesco, he should find himself surrounded 
by hostile forces : he therefore determined to venture on an 
attack and make trial of the enemy. 

S9. His whole army having been got ready for battle, he 
confined the main body within his camp, but _ , . 
sent out the velites and , some picked men of fuHy assaults 
the infantry with orders to assault the brow of Hasdmbai's 
the hill and atUck the enemy's pickets. His position. 
orders were carried out with great spirit At first the Cartha- 
ginian commander watched what was happening without 
stirring : but when he saw that, owing to the fuiy of the Roman 
attack, his men were being hard pressed, he led out his army 
and drew them up along the brow of the hill, trusting to the 
strength of the position. Meanwhile Scipio despatched all his 
tight-armed troops with orders to support the advanced guard : 
and the rest of his army being ready for action, he took half of 
them under his own command, and going round the brow of 
the hill to the enemy's left, began assaulting the Carthaginians \ 
while he entrusted the other half to Laetius, with orders to 
make a similar attack on the right of the enemy. While this 
was going on, Hasdrubal was still engaged in getting his troops 
out of camp : for hitherto he had been waiting, because h' 
trusted in the strength of the position, and felt confident I 


the enemy would never venture to attempt it The attack, 
therefore, took him by surprise, before he was able to get his 
men on to the ground. As the Romans were now assaulting 
the two wings of the position which the enemy had not yet 
occupied, they not only mounted the brow of the hill in safety, 
but actually advanced to the attack while their opponents were 
still in all the confusion and bustle of falling in. Accordingly 
they killed some of them on their exposed flank ; while others, 
who were actually in the act of falling in, they forced to turn 
Hasdrubal re- ^^^ ^^' Seeing his army giving way and re- 
treats, and makes treating, Hasdrubal reverted to his preconceived 
for the Pyrenees. ^\^^ . ^cnd determining not to stake his all upon 

this one desperate hazard, he secured his money and his 
elephants, collected as many of his flying soldiers as he could, 
and commenced a retreat towards the Tagus, with a view of 
reaching the passes of the Pyrenees and the Gauls in that 

Scipio did not think it advisable to pursue Hasdrubal at 
once, for fear of being attacked by the other Carthaginian 
generals; but he gave up the enemy's camp to his men to 

40. Next morning he collected the prisoners, amounting to 
ten thousand foot and more than two thousand horse, and 
busied himself in making arrangements about them. All the 
Iberians of that district, who were in alliance at that time with 
the Carthaginians, came in and submitted to the Roman 
obedience, and in addressing Scipio called him "king." The 

first to do this and to bow the knee before him 

^t^m ^^ had been Edeco, and the next Andobales. On 
these occasions Scipio had passed the word over 
without remark ; but after the battle, when all alike addressed 
him by that title, his attention was drawn to it ; and he there- 
fore summoned the Iberians to a meeting, and told them that 
" he quite wished to be called a man of royal liberality by them 
all, and to be so in the truest sense, but that he had no wish 
to be a * king,' nor to be called one by any one ; they should 
address him as general." 

Even at this early period of his career, an observer might 
have remarked the loftiness of Scipio's character. He was 


Still quite young. His good fortune had been so persistent, 
that adl who came under his rule were led naturally to think 
and speak of him as a king. Yet he did not lose his self- 
control ; but deprecated this popular impulse and this show of 
dignity. But this same loftiness of character was still more 
admirable in the closing scenes of his life, when, in addition 
to his achievements in Iberia, he crushed the Carthaginians ; 
reduced the largest and fairest districts of Libya, from the 
Altars of Philaenus to the Pillars of Hercules, under the power 
of his country ; conquered Asia and the kings of Syria ; made 
the best and largest part of the world subject to Rome ; and 
in doing so had numerous opportunities of acquiring regal 
sway, in whatever parts of the world suited his purpose or 
wish. For such achievements were enough to have kindled 
pride, not merely in any human breast, but even, if I may say 
so without irreverence, in that of a god. But Scipio's great- 
ness of soul was so superior to the common standard of man- 
kind, that he again and again rejected what Fortune had put 
within his grasp, that prize beyond which men's boldest 
prayers do not go — ^the power of a king : and he steadily pre- 
ferred his country and his duty to that royalty, which men 
gaze at with such admiration and envy. 

Scipio next proceeded to select from the captives the 
native Iberians, and all these he dismissed to . 
their homes without ransom ; and bidding Ando- the position 
bales select three hundred of the horses, he dis- evacuated by the 
tributed the remainder among those who had Carthaginians, 
none. For the rest, he at once occupied the entrenchment of 
the Carthaginians, owing to its excellent situation ; and there he 
remained himself, waiting to see the movements of the other 
Carthaginian generals ; while he detached a body of men to 
the passes of the Pyrenees to keep a look-out for 
HasdrubaL After this, as it was getting late in ^'"og' 207^'''' 
the season, he retired with his army to Tarraco 
being bent on wintering there. . . . 



41. The Aetolians had recently become greatly encouraged 

by the arrival of the Romans and King Attalus : 

undCTtekes toxoid ^nd accordingly began menacing every one, and 

the Achaean threatening all with an attack by land, while 

league and other Attalus and Publius Sulpicius did the same by 

against a threat- ^^' Wherefore Achaean legates arrived at the 

cned attack of the court of King Philip entreating his help : for it 

Aetolians in ^yas not the Aetolians alone of whom they were 
Rorne?*B.c 208. Standing in dread, but Machanidas also, as he 
Cp. Livy, 27, 30. was encamped with his army on the frontier of 
See above Bk. 9, Argos. The Boeotians also, in fear of the 
'^^* enemy's fleet, were demanding a leader and 
help from the king. Most urgent of all, however, were the 
Euboeans in their entreaties to him to take some precaution 
against the enemy. A similar appeal was being made by the 
Acarnanians ; and there was an embassy even from the 
Epirotes. News had arrived that both Scerdilaidas and 
Pleuratus were leading out their armies : and, over and above 
this, that the Thracian tribes on the frontier of Macedonia, 
especially the Maedi, were planning to invade Macedonia, if 
the king were induced to slir from his realm however short a 
distance. Moreover the Aetolians were already securing the 
pass of Thermopylae with trenches and stockades and a 
formidable garrison, satisfied that they would thus shut out 
Philip, and entirely prevent him from coming to the assistance 
of his allies south of the pass. It appears to me that a crisis 
of this sort is well worth the observation and attention of my 
readers ; for it affords a trial and test of the vigour of the 
leader affected. As in the hunting- field the wild animals 
never show their full courage and strength until surrounded 
and brought to bay, — so it is with leaders. And no more 
conspicuous instance could be found than this of Philip. He 
dismissed the various embassies, promising each that he would 
do his best : and then devoted his attention to the war which 
surrounded him on all sides, watching to see in what direction, 
and against which enemy, he had best direct his first attack. 


42. Just then intelligence reached him thai Attalus bad 
crossed the sea and, dropping anchor at Peparethos, had 
occupied the island. He therefore despatched a body of men 
to the islanders to garrison their city ; and at the same time 
despatched Polyphonies with an adequate force into Phocis and 
Boeolta; and Menippus, with a thousand peltasts and five 
hundred Agrianes to Chalets and the rest of Euboea ; while he 
himself advanced to Scotusa, and sent word at the same time 
to the Macedonians to meet him at that town. But when he 
learnt that Attalus had sailed into the port of Nicaea, and that 
the leaders of the Aetolians were collecting at Heraclca, with 
the purpose of holding a conference together on the immediate 
steps to be taken, he started with his army from Scotusa, eager 
to hurry thither and break up their meeting. He arrived too 
late to interrupt the conference : but he destroyed or carried 
off the com belonging to the people along the Aenianian gulf, 
and then returned. After this he left his army in Scotusa 
once more ; and, with the light-armed troops and the royal 
guard, went to Demetrias, and there remained, waiting to see 
what the enemy would attempt To secure that he should be 
kept perfectly acquainted with all their movements, he sent 
messengers to the Peparethii, and to his troops in Phocis and 
Euboea, and ordered them to telegraph to him everything 
which happened, by means of fire signals directed to Mount 
Tisaeum, which is a mountain of Thessaly conveniently situated 
for commanding a view of those places. 

48. The method of signalling by fire, which is of the 
highest utility in the operations of war, has never 
before been clearly expounded ; and I think I '™ "^ 
shall be doing a service if I do not pass it over, but give an 
accountof it adequate to its importance. Nowthat opportuneness 
is of the utmost moment in all undertakings, and pre-eminently 
so in those of war, no one doubts ; and of all the things which 
contribute to enable us to hit the proper time nothing is more 
efHcacious than fire signals. For they convey intelligence 
sometimes of what has just happened, sometimes of what is 
actually going on ; and by paying proper attention to them one 
can get this information at three or four days' journey off, a 
even more : so that it continually happens that the 1 


required may be unexpectedly given, thanks to a message 
conveyed by fire signals. Now, formerly, as the art of signalling 
by fire was confined to a single method, it proved in very 
many cases unserviceable to those employing it. For as it 
was necessary to employ certain definite signals which had 
been agreed upon, and as possible occurrences are unlimited, 
the greater number of them were beyond the competence 
of the fire signals to convey. To take the present instance: 
it was possible by means of the isignals agreed upon to send 
the information that a fleet had arrived at Oreus or Peparethos 
or Chalcis; but it was impossible to express that "certain 
citizens had gone over to the enemy,*' or '* were betraying the 
town," or that " a massacre had taken place,'* or any of those 
things which often occur, but which cannot be all anticipated. 
Yet it is precisely the unexpected occurrences which demand 
instant consideration and succour. All such things then were 
naturally beyond the competence of fire signalling, inasmuch 
as it was impossible to adopt an arbitrary sign for things which 
it was impossible to anticipate. 

44. Aeneas, therefore, the writer of the treatise on tactics, 

The improve- wished to correct this defect, and did in fact 

ment introduced make some improvement ; but his invention 

by Aeneas gjju f^jj y^^y far short of what was wanted, 

Xactitus • • 

as the following passage from his treatise will 
show.^ " Let those who wish,'* he says, " to communicate any 
matter of pressing importance to each other by fire-signals 
prepare two earthenware vessels of exactly equal size both as 
to diameter and depth. Let the depth be three cubits, the 
diameter one. Then prepare corks of a little shorter diameter 
than that of the vessels : and in the middle of these corks fix 
rods divided into equal portions of three fingers* breadth, and 
let each of these portions be marked with a clearly distinguish- 
able line : and in each let there be written one of the most 
obvious and universal of those events which occur in war ; 
for instance in the first * cavalry have entered the country,' in 
the second * hoplites,' in the third * light-armed,' in the next 

' This passage does not occur in the extant treatise of Aeneas ; but is ap- 
parently referred to (ch. 7, § 4) as being contained in a preparatory treatise 
(Tapa(ric6i;a4rr(ic^ /9^/3Xof). 


'inianti; and cavalry,' in another 'ships,' in another 'corn,' 
and so on, until all the portions have written on them the 
events which may reasonably be expected to occur in the 
particular war. Then carefully pierce both the vessels in- such 
a way that the taps shall be exactly equal and cany ofT the 
same amount of water. Fill the vessels with water and lay the 
corks with their rods upon its surface, and set both taps running 
together. This being done, it is evident that if there is perfect 
equality in every respect between them, both corlts will sink 
exactly in proportion as the water runs away, and both rods 
will disappear to the same extent into the vessels. When they 
have been tested, and the rate of the discharge of water has 
been found to be exactly equal in both, then the vessels 
should be taken respectively to the two places from which the 
two parties intend to watch for fire signals. As soon as any 
one of those eventualities which are inscribed upon the rods 
takes place, raise a lighted torch, and wait until the signal is 
answered by a torch from the others : this being raised, both 
parties are to set the taps running together. When the cork 
and rod on the signalling side has sunk low enough to bring 
the ring containing the words which give (he desired informa- 
tion on a level with the nm of the vessel, a torch is to be 
raised again. Those on the receiving side are then at once 
to stop the tap, and to look at the words in the ring of the rod 
which is on a level with the rim of their vessel. This will be 
the same as that on the signalling side, assuming everythir^ to 
be done at the same speed on both sides." 

45. Now this method, though introducing a certain im- 
provement in the system of tire signalling, is 
still wanting in definitcness : for it is evident ^ih^'^jj^h^* 
that it is neither possible to anticipate, or, if you 
could anticipate, to write upon the rod every possible thing 
that may happen : and therefore, when anything unexpected in 
the chapter of accidents does occur, it is plainly impossible 
to communicate it by this method. Besides, even such state- 
ments as are written on the rods are quite indefinite ; for the 
number of cavalry or infantry that have come, or the particular 
point in the territory which they have entered, the number of 
ships, or the amount of com, cannot be expressed F 


what cannot be known before it happens cannot have an 
arrangement made for expressing it And this is the import- 
ant point. For how is one to take proper measures for relief 
without knowing the number or direction of the enemy? 
Or how can the party to be relieved feel confidence or the 
reverse, or indeed have any conception at all of the situa- 
tion, if it does not know how many ships or how much com 
have been despatched by the allies ? 

But the last method which was hit upon by Cleoxenus and 
Democlitus, and further elaborated by myself, is ,p. . ^ 
above all things definite, and made capable of method of 
indicating clearly whatever is needed at the Qeoxenusand 
moment; but in its working it requires attention DemocHtus. 
and more than ordinarily close observation. It is as follows : 
Divide the alphabet into five groups of five letters each (of 
course the last group will be one letter short, but this will not 
interfere with the working of the system). The parties about 
to signal to each other must then prepare five tablets each, on 
which the several groups of letters must be written. They 
must then agree that the party signalling shall first raise two 
torches, and wait until the other raises two also. The object 
of this is to let each other know that they are attending. 
These torches having been lowered, the signalling party raises 
first torches on the left to indicate which of the tablets he 
means : for instance, one if he means the first, two if he means 
the second, and so on. He next raises torches on the right 
showing in a similar manner by their number which of the 
letters in the tablet he wishes to indicate to the recipient 

46. This matter being agreed upon, the two parties must 
go to their respective points of observation ; and each must 
have, to begin with, a stenoscope with two funnels, to enable 
him to distinguish through one the right, through the other 
the left position of the signaller opposite him. Near this 
stenoscope the tablets must be fixed, and both points, to the 
right and to the left, must be defended by a fence ten feet 
long and about the height of a man, in order to make it clear 
on which side the torches are raised, and to hide them en- 
tirely when they are lowered. These preparations completed 
on both sides, when a man wishes, for instance, to send the 

nba;"«»*'r3h*-^"-^v» . ==5" — .-* 


message " Some of our soldiers to the number of a hundred 
have deserted to the enemy," — the first thing to do is to select 
words that may give the same information with the fewest 
letters, for instance, " A hundred Cretans have deserted," for 
thus the number of letters is diminished by more than a half 
and the same information is given. This sentence having been 
written on a tablet will be transmitted by five signals thus : 
The first letter is k, this comes in the second group of 
letters and therefore on the second tablet; the signaller 
therefore must raise two torches on the left to show the 
recipient that he must look at the second tablet ; then he will 
raise five on the right, because k is the fifth letter in the 
group,* which the recipient must thereupon write on his tablet. 
Then the signaller must raise four torches on the left, for p is 
in that group, and two on the right, because it is the second 
in the fourth group, and the recipient will write p on his tablet : 
and so on for the other letters. 

47. Now everything that happens can be definitely im- 
parted by means of this invention ; but the number of torches 
employed is large, because each letter has to be indicated by 
two series of them : still, if proper preparations are made, the 
thing can be adequately carried out But whichever method is 
employed, those who use it must practise beforehand, in order that 
when the actual occasion for putting it in use arises they may 
be able to give each other the information without any hitch. 
For there are plenty of instances to show what a wide difference 
there is between the way an operation is carried out by men 
who hear of it for the first time, and by men who have become 
habituated to it Many things which were considered not 
only difficult, but impossible at first, are, after an interval of 
time and practice, performed with the greatest ease. I could 
give many illustrations of the truth of this remark, but the 
clearest may be found in the art of reading. Put side by side 

* The grouping of these letters will be as follows : — 


































a man who has never learnt his letters, though otherwise acute, 
and a child who has acquired the habit, and give the latter a 
book, and bid him read it : the former will clearly not be in- 
duced to believe that the reader has first to attend to the look 
of each of the letters, secondly to their sound -value, and 
thirdly to their combinations with others, each of which 
operation requires a certain time. Therefore when he sees 
the boy, without a pause for thought, reading off seven or five 
lines at a breath, he will not easily be induced to believe 
that he has not read the book before ; and certainly not, if he 
is able also to obser\'e the appropriate enunciation, the 
proper separations of the words, and the correct use of the 
rough and smooth breathings. The moral is, not to give up 
any useful accomplishment on account of its apparent diffi- 
culties, but to persevere till it becomes a matter of habit, 
which is the way mankind have obtained all good things. And 
especially is this right when the matters in question are 
such as are often of decisive importance to our safety. 

I was led to say this much in connexion with my former 
assertion that *'all the arts had made such progress in our 
age that most of them were reduced in a manner to exact 
sciences." And therefore this too is a point in which history 
properly written is of the highest utility. . . . 

ANTIOCHUS IN PARTHIA, B.C. 209-5. See ch. 3 1. 

48. The Apasiacae live between the rivers Oxus and Tanais, 

The entrance of ^^ former of which falls into the Hyrcanian 

the Nomad Sea, the latter into the Palus Maeotis.^ Both 

Scythians into ^^ large enough to be navigable; and it 

^^^^^ seems surprising how the Nomads managed to 

come by land into Hyrcania along with their horses. Two 

accounts are given of this affair, one of them probable, the 

other very surprising yet not impossible. The Oxus rises in 

the Caucasus, and being much augmented by tributaries in 

Bactria, it rushes through the level plain with a violent and 

turbid stream. When it reaches the desert it dashes its 

* Polybius confuses the Tanais (Don) with another Tanais or laxartcs 
flowing into the south-east part of the Caspian. 


stream against some precipitous rocks with a force raised to 
such tiemendous proportions by the mass of its wateis, and 
thedeclivity down which it has descended, that it leaps from 
the rocks to the plain below leaving an interval of more than a 
stade between the rock and its falls. It is through this space 
that they say the Apasiacae went on foot with their horses 
into Hyrcania, under the faJl, and keeping close to the rock. 
The other account is more probable on the face of iL It is 
said that, as the basin of the, river has extensive flats into 
which it descends with violence, the force of the stream makes 
hollows in them, and opens chasms into which the water 
descends deep below the surface, and so is carried on for a 
short way, and then reappears : and that the barbarians, being 
well acquainted with the facts, make their way on horseback, 
over the space thus left dry, into Hyrcania. . , . 

49. News being brought that Euthydemus ' with his force 
was at Tapuria, and that a body of ten thou- 

, , '^ 1 - J . L Ballle on Ihe 

sand horsemen were keeping guard at the nverAriusbe- 
passage of the river Anus, he decided to iwem Amiochus 
abandon the siege and attack these last The r^"''.""' 
river was three days' march away. For two days wians. 

therefore he marched at a moderate speed ; but on the third, 
after dinner, he gave orders for the rest of his army to start 
next day at daybreak ; while he himself, with the cavalry and 
light-armed troops and ten thousand peltasts, started in the 
night and pushed on at a great rate. For he was informed 
that the cavalry of the enemy kept guard by day on the bank 
of the river, but at night retired to a city more than twenty 
stades off. Having completed therefore the rest of the way 
under cover of night, the plains being excellent for riding, he 
got the greater part of his array across the river by daybreak, 
before the enemy came back. When their scouts told them 
what had happened, the horsemen of the BacCrians hastened to 
the rescue, and fell in with their opponents while on the march. 
Seeing that he must stand the first charge of the enemy, the king 
summoned the two thousand horsemen who were accustomed 
to fight round his own person; and issuing orders that the rest 
were to form their companies and squadrons, and take up the^' 
' King of Bactria, sec 11, 34. 


usual order on the ground on which they already were, he 
advanced with the two thousand cavalry, and met the charge 
of the advanced guard of the Bactrians. In this engagement 
Antiochus is reputed to have shown the greatest gallantry of 
any of his men. There was heavy loss on both sides : the 
king's men conquered the first squadron, but when a second 
and a third charged, they began to be hard pressed and to 
suffer seriously. At that juncture, most of the cavalry being 
by this time on the ground,. Panaetolus ordered a general 
advance ; relieved the king and his squadrons ; and, upon the 
Bactrians charging in loose order, forced them to turn and 
fly in confusion. They never drew rein before the charge of 
Panaetolus, until they rejoined Euthydemus, with a loss of more 
than half their number. The king's cavalry on the contrary 
retired, after killing large numbers and taking a great many 
prisoners, and bivouacked by the side of the river. In this 
action the king had a horse killed under him, and lost some of 
his teeth by a blow on the mouth ; and his whole bearing ob- 
tained him a reputation for bravery of the highest description. 
After this battle Euthydemus retreated in dismay with his 
army to the city of Zariaspa in Bactria. . . . 


t. Mv reason for prefixing a table of contents to each book, 
rather than a pre&ce, is not because I do not recognise the 
usefulness of a preface in arresting attention and rousing 
interest, and also giving facilities for finding any passage t1iat is 
wanted, but because I find prefaces viewed, though from many 
inadequate reasons, with contempt and neglect. I therefore 
had recourse to a table of contents throughout my history, 
except the first six books, arranged according to Olympiads, 
as being as effective, or even more so, than a preface, and at 
the same time as less subject to the objection of being out 
of place, for it is closely connected with the subject-matter. 
In the first six books I wrote prefaces, because I thought a 
mere table of contents less suitable. . . . 

Afler the battle at Baecula, Hasdnibal made good his passage 
over the Western Pyrenees, and thence through the Cntnnes, B.C. 
208. In the sjiring of S.c 207 he eras sed the Alps and descended 
into Italy, crossed the Po, and besieged Placenlia. Thence he 
sent a letter to his brother Hannibal announcing that he ivould 
march southward by Ariminum and meet him in Umbria. The 
Utter fell into the hands of the Consul Nero, who was at Venusia, 
and who immediately made a forced march northward, joined his 
colleague at Sena, and the next day attacked Hasdrubal. Sre 
above, 10, 39; Livy, 27, 39-49. 

Much easier and shorter was Hasdrubal's journey into 
Italy. ...» 

Never at any other time had Rome been in a greater state 
of excitement and terrified expectation of the result. . . ? 

' See Livy, a?, 39. ' Livy, 37, 44. 


•• 4 


None of these arrangements satisfied HasdrubaL But 
„ , , , circumstances no longer admitted of delay. He 

Battle of the ^, j ^ • u ..^.i j 

Metaurus, ^^^ ^"^ enemy drawn out m battle array and 

B.C. 207. advancing; and he was obHged to get the 

Coss. c. Claudius Iberians and the Gauls who were serving with 

Sai'inator II. ^^"^ ^'^^^ ^^'^^^ ^^ therefore stationed his ten 
elephants on the front, increased the depth of 
his lines, and so had his whole army covering a somewhat 
small ground. He took up a position himself in the centre of 
the line, immediately behind the elephants, and commenced 
an advance upon the Roman left, with a full resolution that in 
this battle he must either conquer or die. Livius advanced to 
meet the enemy with proud confidence, and having come to 
close quarters with him was fighting with great gallantry. Mean- 
while Claudius, who was stationed on the right wing, found him- 
self unable to advance and outflank the enemy, owing to the 
rough ground in fronjt of him, relying on which Hasdrubal 
had directed his advance upon the Roman left: and being 
embarrassed by his inability to strike a blow, he promptly 
decided what the circumstances pointed out as the tactics to 
pursue. He withdrew his men from the right wing, and 
marched them on the rear of the field of battle ; and, after 
passing the left of the Roman line, fell upon the flank of the 
Carthaginians who were fighting near the elephants. Up to 
this point the victory had been doubtful ; for both sides fought 
with desperation, the Romans believing that all would be over 
with them if they failed, and the Iberians and Carthaginians 
holding exactly the same conviction for themselves. Moreover 
the elephants were being of disservice to both sides alike ; for 
finding themselves between two forces, and exposed to a cross- 
fire of javelins, they kept throwing both the Carthaginian and 
Roman lines into confusion. But as soon as Claudius fell 
upon the rear of the enemy the battle ceased to be equal : for 
the Iberians found themselves attacked on front and rear at 
once, which resulted in the greater part of them being cut 
down on the ground. Six of the elephants were killed with 
the men on them, four forced their way through the lines and 
were afterwards captured, having been abandoned by their 
Indian drivers. 


2. Hasdnibal had behaved on this occasion, as throughout 
his whole life, like a brave man, and died 
lighting : and he deserves not to be passed over |^ ,j,™bai(te * 
without remark. I have already stated that 
Hannibal was his brother, and on his departure to Italy 
entrusted the command in Iberia to him. I have also described 
his many contests with the Romans, and the many embarrassing 
difficulties with which he had to struggle, caused by the generals 
sent from Carthage to Iberia ; and how in all these matters he 
had supported these vicissitudes and reverses in a noble spirit 
worthy of a son of Barcas. But I will now speak of his last 
contest, and explain why he seems to me pre-eminently to 
deserve respectful attention and imitation, Most generals and 
kings, when entering upon decisive battles, place before their 
eyes the glory and advantages to be obtained from victory, and 
frequently consider and contrive what use they will make of 
every success ; but they do not go on to review the chances 
of failure, nor contemplate the plan to be adopted, or the 
action to be taken, in the case of reverse. Vet the former is 
obvious, the latter requires foresight. Therefore it is that most 
of them, though in many instances their soldiers have fought 
nobly, by their own folly and imprudence in this respect have 
added dishonour to defeat : have disgraced their previous 
achievements, and rendered themselves, during the remainder 
of their lives, objects of reproach and contempt. It is easy to 
see that many leaders make this fatal mistake, and that the 
difference between one man and another in these points is 
most signal ; for history is full of such instances. Hasdnibal, 
on the contrary, as long as there was reasonable hope of being 
able to accomplish anything worthy of his former achievements, 
regarded bis personal safety in battle as of the highest conse- 
quence ; but when Fortune deprived him of all hopes for the 
future, and reduced him to the last extremities, though 
neglecting nothing either in his preparations or on the field 
that might secure him the victory, nevertheless considered 
how, in case of total overthrow, he might face his fate and 
suffer nothing unworthy of his past career. 

These remarks are meant for those engaged in active 
Operations, that they may neither dash the hopes of those whr 


rely upon them by a heedless seeking of danger, nor by an 
unworthy clinging to life add disgrace and shame to the 
catastrophies which befall them. 

8. Having won the victory, the Romans began pillaging the 
enemy's camp ; and killed a number of the Celts, as they lay 
stupefied with drunkenness in their beds, like unresisting 
victims. Then they collected the rest of the booty, from 
which more than three hundred talents were paid into the 
treasury. Taking Carthaginians and Celts together, not less 
than ten thousand were killed, and about two thousand 
Romans. Some of the principal Carthaginians were taken 
prisoners, but the rest were put to the sword. When the 
report reached Rome, people at first could not believe it, from 
the intensity of their wish that it might be true ; but when still 
more men arrived, not only stating the fact, but giving full 
details, then indeed the city was filled with overpowering joy ; 
every temple -court was decked, and every shrine full of 
sacrificial cakes and victims : and, in a word, they were raised 
to such a pitch of hopefulness and confidence, that every one 
felt sure that Hannibal, formerly the object of their chief 
terror, could not after that stay even in Italy. . . . 

A speech of iJu legate from Rhodes ^ before an assembly Oj 
Aetolians at Heraclea in the autumn of B.C. 207 {see Lii% 28, 
7), at the end of the summer campaign, 

4. " Facts I imagine, Aetolians, have made it clear to you 
that neither King Ptolemy nor the community of Rhodes, 
Byzantium, Chios, or Mitylene, regard a composition with you 
as unimportant. For this is not the first or the second time 
that we have introduced the subject of peace to your assembly ; 
but ever since you entered upon the war we have beset you 
with entreaties, and have never desisted from warning you on this 
subject ; because we saw that its immediate result would be 
the destruction of yourselves and of Macedonia, and because 

^ There is nothing to show positively that a Rhodian is the speaker : but 
Livy mentions envoys from Rhodes and Ptolemy this year. For the special 
attempts of the Rhodians to bring about a peace between Philip and the 
Aetolians, see 5, 24, 100. 


we foresaw in the future danger to our own countries and to that 
of ail other Greeks. For as, when a man has once set a fire 
alight, the result is no longer dependent upon his choice, but 
it spreads in whatever direction chance may direct, guided for 
the most part by the wind and the combustible nature of the 
material, and frequently attacks the first author of the conflagra- 
tion himself: so too, war, when once it has been kindled by a 
nation, sometimes devours the first those who kindled it ; and 
soon rushes along destroying everything that falls in its way, 
continually gathering fresh strength, and blown into greater 
heat by the folly of the people in its neighbourhood, as though 
by the wind. Wherefore, men of Aelolia, considering that we, 
as representatives of the whole body of the islanders and of the 
Greek inhabitants of Asia, are here to beseech you to put an 
end to war and to choose peace, because the matter affects 
us as well as you, show your wisdom by listening to us and 
yielding to our entreaties. For if you were carrying on a war 
which, though profitless (and most wars are that), was yet 
glorious from the motive which prompted it, and the reputa- 
tion Ukely to accrue from it, you might he pardoned perhaps 
for a fixed determination to continue it ; but if it is a war 
of the most signal, infamy, which can bring you nothing 
but discredit and obloquy, — does not such an undertaking 
claim considerable hesitation on your part ? We will speak 
our opinion frankly ; and you, if you are wise, will give us a 
quiet hearing. For it is much better to hear a disagreeable 
truth now and thereby be preserved, than to listen to smooth 
things now, and soon afterwards to be ruined yourselves, and to 
ruin the rest of the Greeks with you. 

6. " Put then before your eyes your own folly. You 
profess to be at war against Philip on behalf of the Greeks, 
that they may escape from servitude to him ; but your war is 
really for the enslavement and ruin of Greece. That is the 
tale told by your treaty with Rome, which formerly existed 
only in written words, but is now seen in full operation. 
Heretofore, though mere written words, it was a disgrace to 
you : but now your execution of it has made that disgrace 
palpable to the eyes of all the world. Moreover, Philip merely 
lends his name and serves as a pretext for the war : he is o 


exposed to any attack : it is against his allies, — the majority of 
the Peloponnesian states, Boeotia, Euboea, Phocis, Locris^ 
Thessaly, Epirus, — that you have made this treaty, bargaining 

^ that their bodies and their goods shall belong to 

the Romans, their cities and their territory to 
the Aetolians. And though personally, if you took a city, you 
would not stoop to violate the freebom, or to bum the build- 
ings, because you look upon such conduct as cruel and bar- 
barous ; yet you have made a treaty by which you have handed 
over all other Greeks to the barbarians, to be exposed to the 
most shameful violence and lawlessness. And all this was 
hitherto kept a secret But now the fate of the people of 
Oreus, and of the miserable Aeginetans, has betrayed you to 
every one, — Fortune having, as though of set purpose, suddenly 
brought your infatuation before the scenes. 

" So much for the origin of the war and its events up to 
now. But as to its result, — supposing everything to go to 
your wish, — what do you expect that to be ? Will it not be 
the beginning of great miseries to all Greece ? 

6. " For I presume no one can fail to see that, if once the 
Romans get rid of the war in Italy, — ^and this is all but done, 
now that Hannibal has been confined to a narrow district in 
Bruttii, — they will direct their whole power upon Greece : 
professedly, indeed, in aid of the Boeotians against Philip, but 
really with the view of reducing it entirely under their own 
power. And if they design to treat it well when they have 
conquered it, theirs will be the honour and glory; and if 
badly, theirs too will be the plunder from the states they destroy, 
and the power over those which they allow to survive : while 
you will be calling upon the gods to witness your wrongs, when 
no god will be any longer willing, nor any man be able to 
help you. Now, perhaps, you ought to have foreseen all this 
from the first, for that would have been your best course. 
But since the future often escapes human foresight, now, at 
any rate, that you have seen by actual experience what has 
happened, it must be your duty to take better measures for the 
future. In any case we have omitted nothing which it becomes 
sincere friends to say or do. We have spoken our opinion 
about the future with absolute frankness; and you we 



u^ and entreat not to stand in the way of the freedom and 
safety of yourselves or of the rest of Greece." 

This speaker having, as it seemed, made a considerable 
impression, he was followed by the ambassadors of Philip, who, 
without malting a long speech, merely said that they were 
commissioned to do one of two things, — if the Aetolians chose 
peace, to accept it readily : if not, to call the gods and the 
ambassadors from Greece to witness that the Aetolians, and 
not Philip, ought to be held responsible for what happened 
thereafter, and so to depart. . . , 

7. Philip loudly lamented his ill-fortune in having so 
narrowly missed getting Altalus into his Auaius eludes 
hands. . . . Philip. 

Uvy, aS, 7, 8, 

OnhiswaytothelakeTrichonisPhiliparrived ' '°^' 

at Thermus, where there was a temple of Apollo ; phiup ai Ther- 
and there he once more defaced all the sacred mua. See 5. 
buildings which he had spared on his former *■'^■ 

occupation of the town. In both instances it was an ill- 
advised indulgence of temper: for it is a mark of utter un- 
reasonabTShess to commit an act of impiety against heaven 
in order to gratify one's wrath against man. . . . 

B.C 207 

8. There are three methods followed by those who wish to 
arrive at an intelligent knowledge of tactics. 

The f«st iii by the sludy of history, the second ^SIS^S. 
by the use of scientific treatises composed by 
specblists, the third by actual experience on the field. But 
of all three of these methods the Achaean commanders were 
equally ignorant. . . . 

A very general fault in the men was an unfortunate rivalry, 
engendered by the ostentation and bad taste of the others. 
They were very particular about their attendants and their 
dress ; and there was a show of splendour in this, kept up by 
the majority beyond their means. But to their arms they [Kiid 
no attention whatever. . . . 



Most people, indeed, do not so much as attempt to 
imitate the real achievements of those who obtain success, but, 
while trying to reproduce their unimportant peculiarities^ 
succeed only in displaying their own frivolity. . . . 

9. " Brightness in the armour," he said, " contributes much 
Speech of ^o inspire dismay in the enemy ; and care 

Phiiopoemen bestowed on having it made to fit properly is 
urging reform, ^f ^^^^ service in actual use. This will best 
be secured if you give to your arms the attention which you 
now bestow on your dress, and transfer to your dress the 
neglect which you now show of your arms. By thus acting, 
you will at once save your money, and be undoubtedly able to 
maintain the interests of your country. Therefore the man- 
who is going to take part in manoeuvres or a campaign ought, 
when putting on his greaves, to see that they are bright and 
well-fitting, much more than that his shoes and boots are ; and 
when he takes up his shield and helmet, to take care that they 
are cleaner and more costly than his cloak and shirt: for 
when men take greater care of what is for show, than of what 
is for use, there can be no doubt of what will happen to them 
on the field. I beg you to consider that elaboration in dress 
is a woman's weakness, and a woman of no very high character 
either ; but costliness and splendour in armour are the charac- 
teristics of brave men who are resolved on saving themselves 
and their country with glory." 

The whole audience were so convinced by this speech and 
so much struck with the wisdom of the advice, that, immediately 
after leaving the council-chamber, they began pointing with scorn 
at the over-dressed dandies, and forced some of them to quit 
the market-place ; and what is more, in future manoeuvres and 
campaigns they kept a stricter watch on each other in these 

10. So true it is that a single word spoken by a man of 

credit is often sufficient not only to turn men 
^Il!l,°^I!!«?/ ^^om the worst courses, but even to incite 

own example. ' 

them to the noblest But when such a 
speaker can appeal to his own life as in harmony with his 
words, then indeed his exhortation carries a weight which 
nothing can exceed. And this was above all others the case 


' with Philopoemen. For in his dress and eating, as well as in 
all that concerned his bodily wants, he was plain and simple ; 
in his manners to others without ceremony or pretence ; and 
throughout his life he made it his chief aim to be absolutely 
sincere. Consequently a few unstudied words from him were 
sufficient to raise a firm conviction in the minds of his hearers; 
for as he could point to his own life as an example, they 
wanted little more to convince them. Thus it happened on 
several occasions, that the confidence he inspired, and the 
consciousness of his achievements, enabled him in a few words 
to overthrow long and, as his opponents thought, skilfully 
argued speeches. 

So on this occasion, as soon as the council of the league 
separated, all returned to their cities deeply impressed both by 
the words and the man himself, and convinced that no harm 
could happen to them with him at their head. Immediately 
afterwards Philopoemen set out on a visitation of the cities, 
which he performed with great energy and speed. He then 
summoned a levy of citizens and began forming them into 
companies and drilling them ; and at last, after ^^^ against 
eight months of this preparation and training, he Machanidas. 
mustered his forces at Mantinea, prepared to '>'™"' "f ^pana- 
fight the tyrant Machanidas in behalf of the ' " '"^' 
freedom of all the Peloponnesians. 

11. Machanidas had now acquired great confidence, and 
looked upon the determination of the Achaeans 

._ , , i_i . i_- 1 A Baltic of Mantinea. 

as extremely favourable to his plans. As soon ^^ ^ 
as he heard of their being in force at Mantinea, 
he duly harangued his Lacedaemonians at Tegea, and the very 
next morning at daybreak advanced upon Mantinea. He led 
the right wing of the phalanx himself; his mercenaries marched 
in two parallel columns on each side of his front ; and behind 
them were carts carrying quantities of field artillery and bolts for 
the catapults. Meanwhile Philopoemen too had arranged his 
army in three divisions, and was leading them out of Mantinea, 
the Illyrians and the men witli body armour by the gale lead- 
ing to the temple of Poseidon, and with them -^^ ^^^ ,„ 
all the rest of the foreign contingent and light- Tegea. Sec Paus. 
armed troops ; by the next gate, toward the west, ^' '*" ''■ 


the phalanx; and by the next the Achaean cavalry. He sent, 
his light-armed men forward to occupy the hill, which rises 
to a considerable height above the road called Xenis and the 
above-mentioned temple : he stationed the men with body 
armour next, resting on this hill to the south ; next them the 
Illyrians ; next them, in the same straight line, the phalanx, 
drawn up in companies, with an interval between each, along 
the ditch which runs towards the temple of Poseidon, right 
through the middle of the plain of Mantinea, until it touches 
the range of mountains that forms the boundary of the 
territory of the ElisphasiL Next to them, on the right wing, 
he stationed the Achaean cavalry, under the command of 
Aristaenetus of Dyme ; while on the left wing he led the whole 
of the foreign contingent, drawn up in lines one behind the 

12. As soon as the enemy were well in sight, Philopoemen 
went down the ranks of the phalanx, and addressed to them an 
exhortation which, though short, clearly pointed out to them 
the nature of the battle in which they were engaged But 
most of what he said was rendered inaudible by the answering 
shouts of the troops. The affection and confidence of the 
men rose to such a pitch of enthusiasm and zeal that they 
seemed to be almost acting under a divine inspiration, as 
they cried out to him to lead them on and fear nothing. 
However he tried, when he could get the opportunity, to 
make this much clear to them, that the battle on the one 
side was to establish a shameful and ignominious servitude, 
on the other to vindicate an ever- memorable and glorious 

Machanidas at first looked as though he meant to attack the 
enemy's right wing in column ; but when he got 
MachsmkiaT^ within moderate distance he deployed into line 
by the right, and by this extension movement 
made his right wing cover the same amount of ground as the 
left wing of the Achaeans, and fixed his catapults in front of 
the whole force at intervals. Philopoemen understood that 
the enemy's plan was, by pouring volleys from the catapults 
into his phalanx, to throw the ranks into confusion : he there- 
fore gave him no time or interval of repose, but opened the 


engagement by a vigorous charge of his TarentJnes^ close 
to the temple of Poseidon, where the ground 
was flat and suitable for cavalry. Whereupon '^'u^"!™'^" 
Machanidas was constrained to follow suit by charges. 
sending his Tarentines forward also. 

IS. At first the struggle was confined to these two forces, 
and was maintained with spirit But the light -armed 
troops coining gradually to the support of such of them as 
were wavering, in a very short time the whole of the mercen- 
aries on either side were engaged. They fought sometimes 
in close order, sometimes in pairs : and for a long time so en- 
tirely without decisive result, that the rest of the two armies, 
who were watching in which direction the cloud of dust inclined, 
could come to no conclusion, because both sides maintained 
for a long while exactly their original ground. Defeat of ihe 
But after a time the mercenaries of the tyrant Achaean right 
began to get the better of the struggle, from "'"8- 

their numbers, and the superiority in skill obtained by long 
practice. And this is the natural and usual resulL The 
citizens of a democracy no doubt bring more enthusiasm to 
their battles than the subjects of a tyrant ; but in the same 
proportion the mercenaries of sovereigns are naturally superior 
and more efficient than those of a democracy. For in the 
former case one side is fighting for liberty, the other for a 
condition of servitude ; but in the case of mercenaries, those 
of the tyrant are encouraged by the certain prospect of reward, 
those of a democracy know that they must lose by victory : 
for as soon as a democracy has crushed its assailants, it no 
longer employs mercenaries to protect its liberties ; while a 
tyranny requires more mercenaries in proportion as its field 
of ambition is extended : for as the persons injured by it are 
more numerous, those who plot against it are more numerous 
also; and the security of despots rests entirely on the 
loyalty and power of mercenaries. 

14. Thus it came about that the mercenaries in the army 
of Machanidas fought with such fury and violence, that even 


the Illyrians and men with body armour, who formed the 
reserve supporting the mercenaries of the Achaean army, were 
unable to withstand their assault; but were all driven from 
their position, and fled in confusion towards the city of 
Mantinea, which was about seven stades distant 

And now there occurred an undoubted instance of what 

some doubt, namely, that the issues in war are for the most p>art 

decided by the skill or want of skill of the commanders. For 

though perhaps it is a great thing to be able to follow up a 

first success properly, it is a greater thing still that, when the 

first step has proved a failure, a man should retain his presence 

of mind, keep a good look-out for any error of judgment on 

the part of the victors, and avail himself of their mistakes. 

At any rate one often sees the side, which imagines itself to 

have obtained a clear victory, ultimately lose the day ; while 

those who seemed at first to have failed recover themselves 

by presence of mind, and ultimately win an unexpected victory. 

Both happened on this occasion to the respective leaders. 

The whole of the Achaean mercenaries having been driven 

Machanidas ^o"^ ^^^^ ground, and their left wing having been 

pursues the fugi- thoroughly broken up, Machanidas abandoned 

lives, and thus jjjg original plan of winning the day by out- 

allows tne /vcnaean /^i*.« •.« ^i«^ « 

hopUtes to get nankmg the enemy with some of his forces and 
between him and charging their front with others, and did neither ; 
his quarters, jj^^ quite losing his head, rushed forward heed- 
lessly with all his mercenaries in pursuit of the fugitives, as 
though the panic was not in itself sufficient to drive those who 
had once given way up to the town gates. 

15* Meanwhile the Achaean general was doing all he could 
to rally the mercenaries, addressing the officers by name, and 
urging them to stand ; but when he saw that they were hope- 
lessly beaten, he did not run away in a panic nor give up the 
battle in despair, but, withdrawing under cover of his phalanx, 
waited until the enemy had passed him in their pursuit, and left 
the ground on which the fighting had taken place empty, and 
then immediately gave the word to the front companies of the 
phalanx to wheel to the left, and advance at the double, without 
breaking their ranks. He thus swiftly occupied the ground 
abandoned by his mercenaries, and at once cut off the pursuers 


from returning, and got on higher groun<l than the enemy's 
right wing. He exhorted the men to keep up their courage, 
and remain where they were, until he gave the word for a 
general advance ; and he ordered Folybius of Megalopohs ' to 
collect such of the Illyrians and body armour men and mer- 
cenaries as remained behind and had not taken part in the 
flight, and form a reserve on the flank of the phalanx, to Iceep 
a look-out against the return of the pursuers. 
Thereupon the Lacedaemonians, excited by the "^ dyk'c^' ' ' 
victory gained by the light-armed contingent, 
without waiting for the word of command, brought their sarissae 
to the charge and rushed upon the enemy. But when in the 
course of their advance they reached the edge of the dyke, 
beii^ unable at that point to change their purpose and retreat 
when at such close quarters with the enemy, and partly because 
they did not consider the dyke a serious obstacle, as the slope 
down to it was very gradual, and it was entirely without water 
or 'underwood growing in it, they continued their advance 
through it without stopping to think. 

16. The opportunity for attack which Fhilopoemen had 
long foreseen had now arrived. He at once ordered the 
phalanx to bring their sarissae to the charge and advance. The 
men obeyed with enthusiasm, and accompanied their charge 
with a ringing cheer. The ranks of the Lacedaemonians had 
been disorganised by the passage of the dyke, and as they 
ascended the opposite bank they found the enemy above them 
They lost courage and tried to fly ; but the greater number 
of them were killed in the ditch itself, partly by the Achaeans, 
and partly by trampling on each other. Now this result was 
not unpremeditated or accidental, but strictly owing to the 
acuteness of the general. For Fhilopoemen originally took 
ground behind the dyke, not to avoid fighting, as some 
supfKJsed, but from a very accurate and scientific calcu- 
lation of strategical advantages. He reckoned either that 
Machanidas when he arrived would advance without think- 
ing of the dyke, and that then his phalanx would get 
entangled, just as I have described their actually doing ; or 
that if he advanced with a full apprehension of the difficulty 


presented by the dyke, and then changing his mind and 
deciding to shrink from the attempt, were to retire in loose 
order and a long straggling column, ^ the victory would be his, 
without a general engagement, and the defeat his adversary's. 
For this has happened to many commanders, who having 
drawn up their men for battle, and then concluded that they 
were not strong enough to meet their opponents, either from 
the nature of the ground, the disparity of their numbers, or for 
other reasons, have drawn off in too long a line of march, and 
hoped in the course of the retreat to win a victory, or at least get 
safe away from the enemy, by means of then: rear guard alone. 
17. However, Philopoemen was not deceived in his prog- 
nostication of what would happen ; for the Lacedaemonians 
were thoroughly routed. Seeing therefore that his phalanx was 
victorious and that he had gained a complete and brilliant 
success, he set himself vigorously to secure the only thing 

wanting to complete it, that is, to prevent the 

mumi^' from escape of Machanidas. Seeing therefore that, 

the pursuit, is in the course of the pursuit, he was caught 

killed while trying between the dyke and the town with his 

^ '^ dyke^ ^ ^ mercenaries, he waited for him to attempt a 

return. But when Machanidas saw that his army 

was in full retreat, with the enemy at their heels, he knew that 

he had advanced too far, and had lost his chance of victory : 

he therefore rallied the mercenaries that he had with him, and 

tried to form close order, and cut his way through the enemy, 

while they were still scattered and engaged in the pursuit 

Some of his men, understanding his plan and seeing no other 

hope of safety, kept by him at first ; but when they came upon 

the ground, and saw the Achaeans guarding the bridge over the 

dyke, they lost heart ; and the whole company began falling 

away from him, each doing the best he could to preserve his 

own life. Thereupon the tyrant gave up all hope of making 

his way over the bridge ; and rode along the edge of the dyke, 

trying with all his might to find a place which he could cross. 

^ The text is certainly corrupt here, and it is not clear what the general 
sense of the passage is beyond this, — that Philopoemen calculated on defeating 
the enemy, as he did, while struggling through the dyke : or on their exposing 
themselves to attack if they retreated from the dyke without crossing it. 


18. Fhilopoemen recognised Machanidas by his purple 
cloak a.nd the trappings of his horse. He at Death of 
once left Anaxidamus, with orders to guard the Machanidas and 
bridge with vigilance, and give no quarter to '^^i""'^ "^ ^*8'*' 
any of the mercenaries ; because they were the men on whom 
the despots of Sparta always depended for supporting their 
power. Then taking Polyaenus of Cyprus and Simias, who were 
attending on him at the time, he rode along the edge of the 
ditch opposite to that in which the tyrant and his attendants 
were; for Machanidas had still two men with him, Arexidamus 
and one of the mercenaries. As soon as Machanidas had found 
a spot in the dyke which could be crossed, he put spurs to his 
horse, and tried to force it to go on and get over, I'hen 
Philopoemen turned suddenly round upon him and dealt him 
a mortal wound with his spear, and a second with a stab from 
the spike at the butt end of it, and thus killed the tyrant in a 
hand-to-hand encounter. Those who were riding with him 
did the same to Arexidamus ; but the third man seeing their 
fall gave up the idea of crossing the dyke and escaped, Simias 
immediately stripped the bodies of the two who had fallen, 
and with their armour carried off also the tyrant's head, and 
then hurried off to overtake the pursuing parly; being eager to 
give the soldiers ocular evidence of the fall of the enemy's 
commander, that they might continue the pursuit of their 
opponents with all the more confidence and spirit right up 
to Tegea, And this in fact added so greatly to the spirit of 
the men that it contributed more than anything else to their 
carrying Tegea by assault, and pitching their 
camp next day on the Eurotas, undisputed Lac™a '" 
masters of all the open country. For many 
years past they had been vainly trying to drive the enemy 
from their own borders, but now they were themselves de- 
vastating Laconia without resistance, without having lost any 
great number of their own men in the battle ; while they had 
killed not less than four thousand Lacedaemonians, taken even 
more prisoners, and possessed themselves of all their baggage 
and arms. . . . 

19. What profit is it to our re.iders to describe wars and 


battles, the storming of cities and the enslavement of their 
inhabitants, if they are to know nothing of the causes which 
conduce to success and failure ? The results of such operations 
merely touch the fancy : it is the tracing of the designs of the 
actors in such scenes that is really instructive ; and above all 
it is the following in detail of each step that can educate the 
ideas of the student . . . 

ABILITY OF HANNIBAL. See Livy, 28, 12 

Who could refrain from speaking in terms of admiration 01 
this great man's strategic skill, courage, and ability, when one 
looks to the length of time during which he displayed those 
qualities ; and realises to one's self the pitched battles, the 
skirmishes and sieges, the revolutions and counter-revolutions 
of states, the vicissitudes of fortune, and in fact the course of 
his design and its execution in its entirety ? For sixteen con- 
o tinuous years Hannibal maintained the war with 

Rome in Italy, without once releasing his army 
from service in the field, but keeping those vast numbers 
under control, like a good pilot, without any sign of disaffection 
towards himself or towards each other, though he had troops 
in his service who, so far from being of the same tribe, were not 
even of the same race. He had Libyans, Iberians, Ligurians, 
Celts, Phoenicians, Italians, Greeks, who had naturally nothing 
in common with each other, neither laws, nor customs, nor 
language. Yet the skill of the commander was such, that 
these differences, so manifold and so wide, did not disturb the 
obedience to one word of command and to a single will. And yet 
circumstances were not by any means unvarying : for though 
the breeze of fortune often set strongly in his favour, it as often 
also blew in exactly the opposite direction. There is therefore 
good ground for admiring Hannibal's display of ability in 
campaign ; and there can be no fear in saying that, if he had 
reserved his attack upon the Romans until he had first subdued 
other parts of the world, there is not one of his projects which 
would have eluded his grasp. As it was, he began with those 
whom he should have attacked last, and accordingly began 
and ended his career with them. . . . 



20. Hasdnibal having collected his forces from the various 
towns in which they had wintered, advanced to 

within a short distance of Hipa and there en-^^o^cITpf 
camped ; forming his entrenchment at the near iiipa (or 
foot of the mountains, with a plain in front of ^'P'^} '" ^^^o*- 
him well suited for a contest and battle. His Lj^'^aa'^fa-e 
infantry amounted to seventy thousand, his 
cavalry to four thousand, and his elephants to thirty-two. 
On his part, Scipio sent M. Junius Silanus to 
visit Colichas and take over from him the forces "^^1°^^^ 
that had been prepared by him. These 
amounted to three thousand infantry and five hundred horse. 
The other allies he received personally in the course of his 
march up the country to his destination. When he approached 
Castalo and Baecula, and had there been joined by Marcus 
Junius and the troops from Colichas, he found himself in a 
]>osition of great perplexity. For without their allied the 
Roman forces were not strong enough to risk a battle ; yet 
to do so, in dependence upon the allies for his hopes of ultimate 
success, appeared to him to be dangerous and too venturesome. 
In spite however of his perplexity, he was obliged to yield to 
the force of circumstances so far as to employ the Iberians ; 
but he resolved to do so only to make a show of numbers to 
the enemy, while he really fought the action ^^^ encamps 
with his own legions. With this purpose in his dose lo the 
mind he got his whole army on the march, Carthaginian 
forty-five thousand infantry and three thousand ""^^ 
cavalry ; and when he had come within the view of the 
Carthaginians, he pitched his camp on some low bills exactly 
opjwsite the enemy. 

21. Mago thought that it would be an excellent moment 
to attack the Romans while actually engaged 

in making their camp; he therefore rode up '"'""jt^g'^''' ^* 
to the entrenchment with the greater part of his 
own cavalry and Massanissa with the Numidians, persuaded 
that he should catch Scipio off his guard. Scipio had how- 



ever all along foreseen this, and had placed some cavalry 
equal in number to those of the Carthaginians under cover 
of some hills. Upon these making an unexpected charge, 
many of the enemy's horsemen at once took to flight at the 
startling appearance, and l>egan to make off"; while the rest 
closed with their opponents and fought with great gallantry. 
But the Carthaginians were disconcerted by the agility of some 
of the Roman horsemen in dismounting, and after a short 
resistance they retreated with considerable loss. The retreat 
was at first conducted in good order : but as the Romans 
pressed them hard, they broke up their squadrons, and fled for 
safety to their own camp. This affiair gave the Romans 
better spirits for engaging in a pitched battle, and had the 
contrary effect on the Carthaginians. However, during the 
next few days they both drew out on the intervening phin ; 
skirmished with their cavalry and light-armed troops ; and, after 
thus trying each other's mettle, were resolved to bring the matter 
to the test of a general engagement. 

22. On this occasion Scipio appears to have employed a 
two-fold stratagem. Hasdrubal had been accustomed to make 
his demonstrations in force somewhat late in the day, with the 
Libyans in his centre, and the elephants on either wing ; while 
his own practice had been to make his counter-movements some- 
what later still, with the Roman soldiers on his centre opposite 
the Libyans, and the Iberians on his two wings ; but the day 

on which he resolved upon a general engagement, 
^on^rgenerar ^\ reversing this arrangement, he greatly con- 
engagement, and tributed to secure the victory for his own men, and 
alters his dis- succeeded in putting the enemy at a consider- 
m'aJie Sir^tilT ^^^^ disadvantage. For directly it was light he 
depend upon the sent his aides with orders to the tribunes and 
Italians rather men to arm, as soon as they had got their 
Spa^niards breakfasts, and parade outside the camp. The 
order was obeyed with alacrity because the men 
suspected what was going to take place. He then sent the 
cavalry and light-armed forward, with orders to advance close 
to the enemy's camp, and skirmish boldly up to it ; while he 
himself marched out with the infantr}', just as the sun was 
appearing above the horizon ; and on reaching the middle of 



the plain, made his dispositions in the reverse order to his 
usual airangement, placing the Iberians in the centre and the 
Roman legionaries on the two wings. 

The sudden approach of the cavaliy to their camp, and tlie 
simultaneous appearance of the rest of the army getting into 
order, left the Carthaginians barely time to get under arms. 
Hasdrubal was therefore obliged, without waiting for the men 
to get breakfast, or making any preparations, to despatcli his 
cavalry and light-armed troops at once against tlie enemy's 
cavalry on the plain, and to get his infantry into order on 
some level ground not far from the skirts of the mountains, as 
was theii custom. For a time the Romans remained quiet ; 
but when the morning was getting on, and the engagement 
between the light-armed troops still continued undecided, 
because such of them as were forced from their ground re- 
tired on their own heavy infantry and then formed again for 
attack, Scipio at length thought that the time was come. He 
withdrew his skirmishers through the intervals of the maniples, 
and then distributed them equally between the two wings on 
rear of his line, first the velites and behind them the cavalry. 
He then advanced, at first in line direct ; but when he was 
about a stade ' from the enemy, he ordered the Iberians to 
continue the advance in the same order, while he commanded 
the maniples and squadrons on the right wing to turn out- 
wards to the tight, and those on the left wing to the left. 

2S. Scipio with the three leading squadrons of cavalry from 
the right wing, preceded by the usual number of velites and three 
maniples (a combination of troops which the Romans call a 
cohort), and Lucius Marcius and Marcus Junius with a similar 
force from the left wing, turned the one to the left the other to 
the right, and advanced at a great speed in column upon the 
enemy, the troops in succession forming up and following in 
column as they wheeled. When these troops were within a short 
distance of tiie enemy, — the Iberians in the line direct being 
still a considerable distance behind, because ihey were advanc- 
ing at a deliberate pace, — lliey came into contact with the two 
wings of the enemy simultaneously, the Roman forces being in 
" live stadvs." \Jv<y, aCl, 14. says qain- 


column, according to Scipio's original plan. The move- 
ments subsequent to this, which resulted in the troops 
on the rear finding themselves in the same line as the 
troops in front, and engaged like them with the enemy, 
were exactly the converse of each other — taking the right 
and left wings in general, and the cavalry and infantry in par- 
ticular. For the cavalry and velites on the right wing 
came into line on the right and tried to outflank the 
enemy, while the heavy infantry came into line on the left ; 
but on the left wing the heavy infantry came into line by the 
right, the cavalry and velites by the left The result of this 
movement was that, as far as the cavalry and light infantry 
were concerned, their right became their left. Scipio cared little 
for this, but was intent on something more important, namely, 
the outflanking of the enemy. For while a general ought 
to be quite alive to what is taking place, and rightly so, he 
ought to use whatever movements suit the circumstances. 
24. When these troops were at close quarters the elephants 
„- . , were severely handled, being wounded and 

harassed on every side by the velites and 
cavalry, and did as much harm to their friends as to their foes ; 
for they rushed about promiscuously and killed every one that 
fell in their way on either side alike. As to the infantry, — 
the Carthaginian wings began to be broken, but the centre 
occupied by the Libyans, and which was the best part of the 
army, was never engaged at all. It could not quit its ground 
to go to the support of the wings for fear of the attack of the 
Iberians, nor could it by maintaining its position do any actual 
fighting, because the enemy in front of it did not come to close 
quarters. However, for a certain time the two wings fought 
gallantly, because it was for them, as for the enemy, a struggle 
for life and death. But now the midday heat was become in- 
tense, and the Carthaginians began to feel faint, because the 
unusual time at which they had been forced to come on the 
field had prevented them from fortifying themselves with the 
proper food ; while the Romans had the advantage in physical 
vigour as well as in cheerfulness, which was especially promoted 
by the fact that the prudence of their general had secured his 
best men being pitted against the weakest troops of the enemy. 


'Ihus hard pressed Hasdrubal's centre began to retreat : at first 
step by step; but soon the ranks were broken, and the men 
rushed in confusion to the skirts of the mountain ; and on the 
Romans pressing in pursuit with still greater violence, they 
b^an a headlong flight into their entrenchments. Had not 
Providence interfered to save them, they would promptly have 
been driven from their camp too ; but a sudden storm 
gathered in the air, and a violent and prolonged torrent of 
rain descended, under which the Romans with difficulty 
elTected a return to their own camp. . . . 

Many Romans lost their lives by the fire in 7^,^ Romans in 
trying to gel the silver and gold which had been ihcminmgdistrici 
melted and fused. . . . ofSpnin. 


When every one complimented Scipio after he had 
driven the Carthaginians from Iberia, and sclpio's idea of 
advised him straightway to take some rest and imnsfemn^ ihc 
ease, as having put a period to the war, he *^'" '° Africa, 
answered that he "congratulated them on their sanguine 
hopes ; for himself he was now more than ever revolving in his 
mind how to begin the war with Carthage. Up to that time 
the Carthaginians had waged war upon the Romans ; but that 
now fortune put it in the power of the Romans to make war 
upon them. . . ." 


See Livy, 28, 17, 18 

In his conversation with Syphax, Scipio, who was eminently 
endowed by nature in this respect, conducted 
himself with so much kindness and tact, that ^ovCTsirJuix" 
Hasdrubal afterwards remarked to Syphax that 
" Scipio appeared more formidable to him in such an interview 
than in the field. ..." 



25i When a mutiny broke out among part of the troops 

Scipio appeases a »" the Roman camp, Scipio, though he had 

mutiny in the now had a very adequate experience of the 

Roman camp, at difficulties of administration, never felt him- 

"24! irTihe self more at a loss how to act or in greater 

autumn of B.C. embarrassment And naturally so. For as 

^°^' in the case of the body, causes of mischief, 

such as cold, heat, fatigue, or wounds, may be avoided 

by precautions, or easily relieved when they occur ; while those 

which arise from within the body itself, such as tumours or 

diseases, are difficult to foresee and difficult to relieve when 

they do exist, so it is, we must believe, with political and 

military administration. Against plots from without, and the 

attacks of enemies, the precautions to be taken and the 

measures for relief may readily be learned by those who pay 

the requisite attention ; but to decide on the right method of 

resisting intestine factions, revolutions, and disturbances is 

difficult, and requires great tact and extreme acuteness ; and, 

moreover, the observation of one maxim suitable in my 

opinion to all armies, states, and bodies alike, which is this : 

never in such cases to allow any lengthened idleness or repose, 

and least of all at a time of success and when provisions are 


Being, then, as I have all along said, a man eminently 
careful, acute, and prompt, Scipio summoned a meeting of the 
military tribunes and proposed a solution of the existing 
troubles as follows. He said that ** he must promise the 
soldiers the settlement of their pay ; and, in order to create a 
belief in his promise, he must now take public steps to exact 
with all speed the contributions which had been already 
imposed upon the cities for the support of the whole army, 
with the distinct understanding that the object of that measure 
was the settlement of the pay : and these same tribunes 
should return to the army and urge and entreat the men 
to abandon their rebellious spirit, and come to him to receive 
their pay, either singly or, if they preferred it, in a body. And 


when this was done he would consider, as circumstances arose, 
what measures it was necessary to take." 

26. With this suggestion in their minds these officers 
deliberated on the means of raising money ; and having 
communicated their decisions to Scipio, he said that he would 
now consult them on the next necessary step. They accord- 
ingly resolved that they would name a day on which all were 
to appear ; and that then they would pardon the general Uocly 
of the men, but severely punish the instigators of the mutiny, 
who were as many as thirty-five; The day having arrived, and 
the mutineers having appeared to make terms and receive their 
pay, Scipio gave secret instructions to the tribunes, who had 
been sent on the mission to them, to meet them ; and, each 
of them selecting five of the ringleaders, to greet them with 
politeness and invite them, if possible, to their own tent, or, 
if they could not do that, to dinner or some such enter- 
tainmcnL But to the troops with him he sent round orders 
to have provisions for a considerable period ready in three 
days' time, because ihey were to march against the deserter 
Andobales under Marcus Silanus. When they heard this 
the mutineers were much emboldened, because they im- 
agined that they would have everything in their own hands, 
as the other troops would be gone by the time they joined 
the general. 

27. Upon the approach of the mutineers, Scipio gave orders 
to his army to march out the next morning at _, 
daybreak with their baggage. But he instructed sup prea'^ andihe 
the tribunes and praefects that, as soon as they ringleaders eie- 
met the mutineers, they should order their men '^"c^ha'^^* 
to put down their baggage, and keep them 
under arms at the city gate ; and then, placing a detachment at 
each of the gates, take good care that none of the mutineers 
should leave the city. The officers who had been sent to 
meet the men fell in with them on their arrival, and took the 
ringleaders with every appearance of civility to their own tents, 
in accordance with the arrangement that had been made. At 
the same time orders had been given to them to arrest the 
thirty-five immediately after dinner, and to keep them in fetters : 
without allowing any one in the tent to go out, except the 


messenger who was to inform the general from each of them 
that this had been accomplished. 

The tribunes having done as they were ordered, at day- 
break next morning, seeing that the new arrivals were collected 
in the market-place, the general gave the signal for the assem- 
bly of the army. The signal was as usual promptly obeyed 
by all, for they were curious to see how the general would 
demean himself in their presence, and what he would say to 
them about the business in hand. As soon as they were come 
together, Scipio sent word to the tribunes to bring their 
soldiers under arms, and station them round the assembled 
men. He then came forward himself. His first appearance 

caused an immediate change of feeling. The 
the^mutinwrs.'^ soldiers Supposed that he was still unwell, and 

when they suddenly saw him, contrary to all 
expectations, with all the appearance of full health and strength, 
they were struck with terror. 

28. He began his speech by saying that he wondered what 
their grievances were, or what they looked for forward that 
induced them to mutiny. For that there were three motives 
only on which men usually venture to rebel against their 
country and their commanders, — discontent and anger with 
their officers ; dissatisfaction with their present position ; or, 
lastly, hopes of something better and more glorious. " Now, I 
ask you," he continued, " which of these can you allege ? It is 
with me, I presume, that you are dissatisfied, because I did not 
pay you your wages. But this cannot be laid to my charge ; for 
while I was in office your pay was never short. The fault then 
may lie with Rome that the accumulated arrears have not been 
settled. Which was your proper course then in that case? 
To have brought forward your complaint thus, as rebels and 
enemies to the country that nurtured you, or to have come 
personally to me and stated your case, and to have begged 
your friends to support and help you? The latter would 
have been the better plan in my opinion. In those who 
serve others for pay it is sometimes pardonable to revolt 
against their paymasters; but in the case of those who are 
fighting for themselves, for their own wives and children, it 
can in no circumstances be conceded. It is just as though, on 


the plea of being wronged in money matters by his own father, 
a man were to come in arms to slay him from whom he re- 
ceived his own life. Or perhaps you may allege that I 
imposed greater hardships and dangers on you than on the 
others, and gave the rest more than their share of profits and 
booty. But you can neither venture to say this, nor, if you 
did venture, could you prove it. What then is your grievance 
against me at this moment, I should like to ask, that you have 
mutinied ? I believe that not one of you will be able to express 
or even conceive it 

29. " Nor again can it have been any dissatisfaction with 
the position of affairs. For when was any prosperity greater? 
When has Rome won more victories, when have her arms 
had brighter prospects than now ? But perhaps some faint- 
heart will say that our enemies have more numerous advan- 
tages, fairer and more certain prospects than ourselves. 
Which, pray, of these enemies? Is it Andobales and 
Mandonius? But which of you is ignorant of the fact that 
these men first betrayed the Carthaginians and joined us, 
and now once more, in defiance of their oaths and pledges, 
have come forward as our opponents? It is a fine thing 
surely to become the enemies of your country in reliance on 
such men as these I Nor again had you any prospect of becom- 
ing masters of Iberia by your own prowess : for you would not 
have been strong enough, even in conjunction with Andobales, 
to meet us in the field, to say nothing of doing so without 
such aid. I should like then to ask, — what was it in which 
you trusted ? Surely not in the skill and valour of the leaders 
whom you have now elected, or in the fasces and axes which 
were borne in front of them, — men of whom I will not deign 
to say even another word. All this, my men, is absolutely 
futile ; nor will you be able to allege even the smallest just 
complaint against me or your country. Wherefore I will 
undertake your defence to Rome and myself, by putting for- 
ward a plea which all the world will acknowledge to hold good. 
And it is that, a crmcd is a'tr easily misled and easily inditced 
to any error. Therefore it is that crowds are like the sea, 
which in its own nature is safe and quiet; but, when winds fall 
violently upon it, assumes the character of the blasts which 


lash it into fury : thus a multitude also is ever found to be 
what its leaders and counsellors are. Acting on this con- 
sideration, I and all my fellow-officers hereby offer you pardon 
and amnesty for the past : but to the guilty authors of the 
mutiny we are resolved to show no mercy, but to punish them 
as their misconduct to their country and to ourselves deserves." 
80. Just as he said these words, the soldiers, who were 
posted under arms round the assembly, clashed their swords 

against their shields ; and at the same instant 
'ringiKiders! ^ ^^^ ringleaders of the mutiny were brought in, 

stripp>ed and in chains. But such terror was 
inspired in the men by the threatening aspect of the surround- 
ing troops, and by the dreadful spectacle before them, that, 
while the ringleaders were being scourged and beheaded, they 
neither changed countenance nor uttered a sound, but re- 
mained all staring open-mouthed and terrified at what was 
going on. So the ringleaders of the mischief were scourged 
and dragged off through the crowd dead ; but the rest of the 
men accepted with one consent the offer of an amnesty from 
the general and officers; and then voluntarily came forward, one 
by one, to take an oath to the tribunes that they would obey 
the orders of their commanders and remain loyal to Rome. 

Having thus crushed what might have been the beginning 
of serious danger, Scipio restored his troops to their former 
good disposition. ... 

Scipio at Nciv Carthage has heard of hostile mm^ements on 
the part of Andobales north of tlie Ebro^ B.C. 206. See Liv}\ 
28, 31-34 

81. Scipio at once summoned a meeting of the soldiers in 
New Carthage, and addressed them on the sub- 
ject of the audacious proceedings of Andobales, ^^jj? ^oi^t^ 
and his treachery to them ; and by dwelling at 
great length on these topics he inspired the men with a very 
great eagerness to attack these princes. He then proceeded 
to enumerate the battles they had already fought against the 
Iberians and Carthaginians combined, the Carthaginians act- 


ing as leaders in the campaigns. " Seeing," lie added, " that 
you always beat them, it does not now become you to 
fear defeat in a war against Iberians by themselves, and led 
by Andobales. I will not therefore even accept any Iberian 
of them all as a partner in the struggle, but I will undertake 
the campaign by the unassisted services of my Roman soldiers : 
in order to make it plain to all that it was not, as some 
assert, by the aid of Iberians that we defeated the Cartha- 
ginians and drove them from Iberia ; but that it was by Roman 
valout and your own gallantry that we have conquered Cartha- 
ginian and Celtiberian combined. Let nothing therefore dis- 
turb your confidence in each other: but, if you have ever done 
it before, approach this undertaking with courage undismayed. 
For securing the victory I will with God's help make every 
necessary provision." This speech filled the troops with such 
zeal and confidence, that they presented all the appearance of 
men whose enemies are in full view, and who are on the very 
point of closing with them. 

32. Scipio then dismissed the assembly, but on the next 
day got his troops on the march, and having 
reached the Ebro in ten days and crossed it, to'the'EtTO" 
on the fourth day after that pitched his cnuses ii, and'in 
camp near that of the enemy, with a valley be- fourteen days is 
tween his own and the enemy's lines. Next 'onhe'^in^J* 
day he turned some cattle that had accom- 
panied his army into this valley, after giving Calus Laelius 
instructions to have the cavalry ready, and some of the tri- 
bunes to prepare the velites. The Iberians having at once 
made an onslaught upon the cattle, he despatched some of 
the velites against them. These two forces became engaged, 
and reinforcements being sent to either party 
from time to time, a severe infantry skirmishing '""" 

took place in the valley. The proper moment for attack be- 
ing now come, Caius Laelius, having the cavalry prepared as 
directed, charged the skirmishers of the enemy, getting between 
them and the high ground, so that the greater number o{ 
them were scattered about the valley and killed by the cavalry. 
This event roused the barbarians to a furious desire to engage, 
that they might not appear to be entirely reduced to desps'- 


by tlieir previous defeat ; and accordingly by daybreak next 
day they drew out their whole army for battle. Scipio was 
quite ready to give them battle ; but when he saw that the 
Iberians had come down into the valley in an imprudent 
manner, and were stationing, not only their cavalry, but their 
infantry also on the level ground, he waited for a time, because 
he wished as many of the enemy as possible to take up a 
position like that He felt confidence in his cavalry, and still 
more in his infantry ; because, in such deliberate and hand-to- 
hand battles as this, his men were vastly superior to the Iberians 
both in themselves and in their arms. 

88. When he thought the right time had come he drew 

out [the velites]^ to oppose those of the 
^of 's^iSr'^ enemy who occupied the foot of the hills ; 

while against those who had descended 
into the valley he led his main force from the camp in four 
cohorts, and attacked the infantry. Caius Laelius at the 
same time made a de'tour with the cavalry by the hills, which 
stretched from the camp to the valley, and charged the enemy's 
horse on the rear ; and so kept them occupied with fighting 
him. The enemy's infantry therefore, being thus deprived ^f 
the support of the cavalry, on which they had relied in 
descending into the valley, were distressed and overmatched 
in the battle ; while their cavalry was in much the same plight : 
for, being surprised on ground of insufficient extent, they fell 
into confusion, and lost more men by hurting each other than 
by the hands of the enemy ; for their own infantry was pressing 
upon their flank, and the enemy's infantry on their front, while 
his cavalry were attacking on their rear. The battle having 
taken this course, the result was that nearly all those who 
had descended into the valley lost their lives ; while those who 
had been stationed on the foot of the hills managed to escape. 
These last were the light-armed troops, and formed about a 
third of the whole army : with whom Andobales himself con- 
trived to make good his escape to a certain stronghold of great 
security. . . . 

* The text is imperfect. 


By further operations in this year, B. c. ao6, Scipio had 
impelled Mago to abandon Spain : and towards the winter the 
Roman army went into winter-quarters at Tarraco. 

Having (hus put a finishing stroke to his campaigns in 
Iberia, Scipio arrived at Tarraco in high spirits, „ . 
bringing with him the materials of a brilliant lo Rome in 
triumph for himself, and a glorious victory for ihc autumn of 
his country. But being anxious to arrive in **^' ^'^- 
Rome before the consular elections, he arranged for the govern- 
ment of Iberia,' and, having put the army into the hands of 
Junius Silanus and L. Marcius, embarked with Caius Laelius 
and his other friends for Rome. . . . 


34. Euthydemus was himself a Magnesian, and he an- 
swered the envoy by saying that "Antiochus 
was acting unjustly in trying to expel him from Euih¥danus''[a 
his kingdom. He was not himself a revolted Magnesian), king 
subject, but had destroyed the descendant of of Bacina, to 
some who had been such, and so had obtained of^i'o^tw™'' 
the kingdom of Bactria," After adding more 
arguments to the same effect, he urged Teleas to act as a 
sincere mediator of peace, by urging Antiochus not to grudge 
him the royal title and dignity, "for if he did not yield to 
this demand, neither of them would be safe : seeing that great 
hords of Nomads were close at band, who were a danger to 
both ; and that if they admitted them into the country, it 
would certainly be utterly barbarised," With these words 
he sent Teleas back to Antiochus. The king had long been 
looking about for some means of ending the controversy; and 
when he was informed by Teleas of what Euthydemus had 
said, he readily admitted these picas for a pacification. And 
after several journeys of Teleas to and fro between the two, 
Euthydemus at last sent his son Demetrius to confirm the 

' Handing it over (o L. l^enlulus and I.. Manlius Acidinus, Livy. aS. 3B. 


terms of the treaty. Antiochus received the young prince; and 
judging from his appearance, conversation, and the dignity of 
his manners that he was worthy of royal power, he first pro- 
mised to give him one of his own daughters, and secondly 
conceded the royal title to his father. And having on the other 
points caused a written treaty to be drawn up, and the terms 
of the treaty to be confirmed on oath, he marched away ; after 
liberally provisioning his troops, and accepting the elephants 

. , belonging to Euthydemus. He crossed the 

tinues his march Caucasus^ and descended into India ; renewed 
into the interior his friendship with Sophagasenus the king of 

of Asia. jj^g Indians ; received more elephants, until he 
had a hundred and fifty altogether; and having once more 
provisioned his troops, set out again personally with his army : 
leaving Androsthenes of Cyzicus the duty of taking home the 
treasure which this king had agreed to hand over to him. 
Having traversed Arachosia and crossed the river Enymanthus, 
he came through Drangene to Carmania ; and, as it was now 
winter, he put his men into winter quarters there. This was 
the extreme limit of the march of Antiochus into the interior : 
in which he not only reduced the up-country Satraps to 

obedience to his authority, but also the coast 
B.C. 212-205 cities, and the princes on this side Taurus ; and, 
in a word, consolidated his kingdom by over- 
awing all his subjects with the exhibition of his boldness and 
energy. For this campaign convinced the Europeans as well 
as the Asiatics that he was worthy of royal power. . . . 

^ That is the Caucasus Indicus or Paropamisus : mod. Hindu Kush. 


1. BvzAciA is near the Syrtes; it has a circumference of two 
thousand stades, and is circular in shape. . . . 

Hippo, Singa, Tabraca, are cities in Libya. Chalkeia, 
however, is not, as E>emosthenes ignorantly stales, the name 
of a city, but memis only a " bronze-factory." . . . 

2. The lotus is not a large tree ; but it is rough and thorny, 
and has a green leaf, tike the rhamnus (black or 
white thorn), a little longer and broader. The i^J.'^"'"^ ,^ 
fruit is like white myrtle-berries when they are 
come to perfection; but, as it grows, it becomes purple in colour, 
and in size about equal to round olives, and has a very small 
stone. When it is ripe they gather it : and some of it they 
pound up with groats of spelt, and store in vessels for their 
slaves ; and the rest they also preserve for the free inhabitants, 
after taking out the stones, and use it for food. It tastes like 
a fig or a date, but is superior to them in aroma. A wine is 
made of it also by steeping it in water and crushing it, sweet 
and pleasant to the taste, like good mead ; and they diink it 
without mixing it with water. It will not keep, however, more 
than ten days, and they therefore only make It in small 
quantities as they want it Vinegar also is made out of it. , . . 

S. I'he excellence of the soil of Libya must excite our 


admiration. But one would feel inclined to say of Timaeus, 
Misstatements of "^t merely that he had never studied the 
Timaeus about country, but that he was childish and entirely 

Libya, unintelligent in his notions ; completely en- 

slaved to those old traditional stories of Libya being wholly 
sandy, parched, and barren. The same too holds good about 
its animals. The supply of horses, oxen, sheep, and goats 
in it is beyond anything to be found in any other part of the 
world ; because many of the tribes in Libya do not use culti- 
vated crops, but live on and with their flocks and herds. 
Again what writer has failed to mention the vast number and 
strength of its elephants, lions, and panthers, or the beauty of 
its buffalos, or the size of its ostriches ? Of these not one is 
to be found in Eurot)e, while Libya is full of them. But 
Timaeus, by passing them over without a word, gives, as though 
purposely, an impression exactly the reverse of the truth. 
And just in the same random way in which he has spoken 

, ^ about Libya, he has also done about the island 

and Corsica, n j ^ t- i .• . .^ . 

called Cyrnus. ror, when mentioning it m 
his second book, he says that wild goats, sheep, wild oxen, 
stags, hares, wolves, and some other animals are plentiful 
in it ; and that the inhabitants employ themselves in hunting 
them, and in fact spend most of their time in that pursuit. 
Whereas in this island there are not only no wild goats or wild 
oxen, but not even hare, wolf, or stag, or any animal of the 
sort, except some foxes, rabbits, and wild sheep. The rabbit 
indeed at a distance looks like a small. hare; but when taken 
in the hand, it is found to be widely different both in appear- 
ance and in the taste of its flesh ; and it also lives generally 

4. The idea, however, of all the animals in the island 

being wild, has arisen in the following way: 
bUmS°^ The caretakers cannot keep up with their 

animals, owing to the thick woods and rocky 
broken nature of the country; but, whenever they wish to collect 
them, they stand on some convenient spots and call the beasts 
together by the sound of a trumpet ; and all of them flock 
without fail to their own trumpets. Now, when ships arrive at 
the coast, and the sailors see goats or cattle grazing without 


any one with them, and thereupon try to catch them, the 
animals will not let them come near them, because they are not 
used to them, but will scamper off. But as soon as the keeper 
sees the men disembarking and sounds his trumpet, they alt 
set off running at full speed and collect round the trumpet 
This gives the appearance of wildness ; and Timaeus, who 
made only careless and |>erfunctory inquiries, committed him- 
self to a random statement. 

Now this obedience to the sound of a trumpet is 
nothing astonishing. For in Italy the swine- 
herds manage the feeding of their pigs in the ^^jn^ua^^"^ 
same way. They do not follow close behind 
the beasts, as in Greece, but keep some distance in front of 
them, sounding their horn every now and then ; and the ani- 
mals follow behind and run together at the sound. Indeed, 
the complete familiarity which the animals show with the 
particular hom to which they belong seems at first astonishing 
and almost incredible. For owing to the populousness and 
wealth of the country, the droves of swine in Italy are ex- 
ceedingly la^e, esjiecially along the sea' coast of the Tuscans 
and Gauls : for one sow will bring up a thousand pigs, or some- 
times even more. They therefore drive them out from their 
night styes t6 feed, according to their litters and ages. Whence, 
if several droves are taken to the same place, they cannot 
preserve these distinction of litters ; but they of course get 
mixed up with each other, both as they are being driven out, 
and as they feed, and as they are being brought home. 
Accordingly the device of the hom-btowing has been invented 
to separate them, when they have got mixed up together, with- 
out labour or trouble. For as they feed, one swineherd goes 
in one direction sounding his horn, and another in another : 
and thus the animals sort themselves of their own accord, and 
follow their own horns with such eagerness that it is impossible 
by any means to stop or hinder them. But in Greece, when 
the swine get mixed up in the oak forests in their search for 
the mast, the swineherd who has most assistants and the best 
help at his disposal, when collecting his own animals, drives off 
bis neighbour's also. Sometimes too a thief lies in wait, and 
drives them ofT without the swineherd knowing how he lost 


them ; because the beasts straggle a long way from their driven^ 
in their eagerness to find acorns, when they are just beginning 
to fall . . . 

4. (a) It is difficult to pardon such errors in Timaeus, 
False criticisms considering how Severe he is in criticising the 
of Timaeus on sHps of Others. For instance he finds fault with 
Thcopompus and 'j^heopompus for Stating that Dionysius sailed 
•p orus. {^Q,^ Sicily to Corinth in a merchant vessel, 
whereas he really arrived in a ship of war. And again he falsely 
charges Ephorus with contradicting himself, on the ground 
that he asserts that Dionysius the Elder ascended the throne 
at the age of twenty-three, reigned forty-two years, and died at 
sixty-three. Now no one would say, I think, that this was a 
blunder of the historian, but clearly one of the transcriber. 
For either Ephorus must be more foolish than Coroebus and 
Margites, if he were unable to calculate that forty-two added 
to twenty-three make sixty-five ; or, if that is incredible in the 
case of a man like Ephorus, it must be a mere mistake of the 
transcriber, and the carping and malevolent criticism of 
Timaeus must be rejected 

(b) Again, in his history of Pyrrhus, he says that the Romans 

His false account Still keep up the memory of the fall of Troy by 

of the October shooting to death with javelins a war-horse on 

horse. ^ certain fixed day, because the capture of Troy 

was accomplished by means of the " Wooden Horse." This 

is quite childish. On this principle, all non-Hellenic nations 

must be put down as descendants of the Trojans ; for nearly 

all of them, or at any rate the majority, when about to 

commence a war or a serious battle with an enemy, first kill 

and sacrifice a horse. In making this sort of ill-founded 

deduction, Timaeus seems to me to show not only want of 

knowledge, but, what is worse, a trick of misapplying knowledge. 

For, because the Romans sacrifice a horse, he immediately 

concludes that they do it because Troy was taken by means of 

a horse. 

if) These instances clearly show how worthless his account 
of Libya, Sardinia, and, above all, of Italy is ; and that, speak- 


ing generally, he has entirely neglected the most important 

element in historical investigation, namely, the _. 

, . , . ° „ ' .■ . 1 The reason of his 

makin g pereonal i iflTurmii. For as histoncal misiaites a want 
events take place in many different localities, and of care in making 
as it is impossible for the same man to be in inquiries. 
several places at the same time, and also impossible for him 
to see with his own eyes all places in the world and observe 
their peculiarities, the only resource left is to ask questions 
of as many people as possible ; and to believe those who are 
worthy of credit ; and to show critical sagacity in judging of 
their reports. 

(tf) And though Timaeus makes great professions on this 
head,heappearstometo be veryferfrom arriving j^^^ .^ he 10 be 
atthe truth. Indeed, so far from making accurate misted even in 
investigations of the truth through other people, maiiers that fell 
he does not tell us anything trustworthy even of T''^'^ ^\^ '™'' 
events of which he has been an eye-witness, or 
of places he has personally visited. This will be made evident, 
if we can convict him of being ignorant, even in his account 
of Sicily, of the facts which he brings forward. For it will 
require very little further proof of his inaccuracy, if he can be 
shown to be ill-informed and misled about the localities in 
which he was bom and bred, and that too the most famous 
of them. Now he asserts that the fountain Arethusa at 
Syracuse has its source in the Peloponnese, from . 

the river Alpheus, which flows through Arcadia 
and Olympia. For that this river sinks into the earth, and, 
after being carried for four thousand stades under the Sicilian 
Sea, comes to the surface again in Syracuse ; and that this was 
proved from the fact that on a certain occasion a storm of 
rain having come on during the Olympic festival, and the 
river having flooded the sacred enclosure, a quantity of dung 
from the animals used for sacrifice at the festival was thrown 
up by the fountain Arethusa ; as well as a certain gold cup, 
which was pi(!ked up and recognised as being one of the 
ornaments used at the festival. . . . 

6. I happened to have visited the city of the Ix>crians or 


several occasions, and to have been the means of doing them 
The traditions of important services. For it was I that secured 

the colonisation of their exemption from the service in Iberia and 
Locri Epizcphyrii Dalmatia, which, in accordance with the treaty, 

a^^ounrSn Ari^s- ^^^ ^'^'"^ bound to supply to the Romans. 

totie, rather than And being released thereby from considerable 
whh that of hardship, danger, and expense, they rewarded 
me with every mark of honour and kind- 
ness. I have therefore reason to speak well of the Locrians 
rather than the reverse. Still I do not shrink from saying 
and writing that the account of their colonisation given by 
Aristotle is truer than that of Timaeus. For I know for 
certain that the inhabitants themselves acknowledge that the 
report of Aristotle, and not of Timaeus, is the one which they 
have received from their ancestors. And they give the follow- 
ing proofs of this. In the first place, they stated that every 
ancestral distinction existing among them is traced by the female 
not the male side.^ For instance, those are reckoned noble 
among them who belong to "the hundred families"; and these 
** hundred families " are those which were marked out by the 
Ix)crians, before embarking upon their colonisation, as those 
from which they were in accordance with the oracle to select the 
virgins to be sent to Ilium. Further, that some of these women 
joined the colony : and that it is their descendants who are 
now reckoned noble, and called "the men of the hundred 
families." Again, the following account of the " cup-bearing " 
priestess had been received traditionally by them. When they 
ejected the Sicels who occupied this part of Italy, finding that 
it was a custom among them for the processions at their sacri- 
fices to be led by a boy of the most illustrious and high-bom 
family obtainable, and not having any ancestral custom of their 
own on the subject, they adopted this one, with no other improve- 
ment than that of substituting a girl for one of their boys as cup- 
bearer, because nobility with them went by the female line. 
6. And as to a treaty, none ever existed, or was said 

The trick of the to have existed, between them and the Lo- 

Locrians. crians in Greece ; but they all knew by 

tradition of one with the Sicels : of which they give the follow- 

' Cp. a similar custom of the Lycians, Herod, i, 173. 


ing account When they first appeared, and found the Sicels 
occupying the district in which they are themselves now 
dwelling, these natives were in terror of them, and admitted 
them through fear into the country ; and the newcomers made 
a sworn agreement with them that " they would be friendly 
and share the country with them, as long as they stood upon 
the ground they then stood upon, and kept heads upon their 
shoulders.'' But, while the oaths were being taken, they say 
that the Locrians put earth inside the soles of their shoes, 
and heads of garlic concealed on their shoulders, before they 
swore ; and that then they shook the earth out of their shoes, 
and threw the heads of garlic ofT their shoulders, arid soon 
afterwards expelled the Sicels firom the country. This is the 
story current at Locri. . . . 

By an extraordinary oversight Timaeus of Tauromenium 
commits himself to the statement that it was not customary 
with the Greeks to possess slaves.' . . . 

These considerations would lead us to trust Aristotle rather 
than Timaeus. His next statement is still more [^o^n Epiiephyni 
strange. For to suppose, with Timaeus, that it colonised by 
was unlikely that men, who had been the slaves '^^. b"*^^ 
of the allies of the Lacedaemonians, would con- ,|,eir btxAonx, and 
tinue the kindly feelings and adopt the friendships by some free 
of their late masters is foolish. For when they ''"^ women. 
have had the good fortune to recover their freedom, and a 
certain time has elapsed, men, who have been slaves, not only 
endeavour to adopt the friendships of their late masters, but 
also their ties of hospitality and blood : in fact, their aim is to 
keep them up even more than the ties of nature, for the express 
purpose of thereby wiping out the remembrance of their former 
degradation and humble position ; because they wish to pose as 
the descendants of their masters rather than as their freednien. 
And this is what in all probability happened in the case of the 
Locrians. They had removed to a great distance from all who 
knew their secret ; the lapse of time favoured their pretensions ; 
and they were not therefore so foolish as to maintain any 
customs likely to revive the memory of their own degradation, 

< He mar have been rcrerring to 


rather than such as would contribute to conceal it There- 
fore they very naturally called their city by the name of that 
from which the women came ; and claimed a relationship with 
those women : and, moreover, renewed the friendships which 
were ancestral to the families of the women. 

And this also indicates that there is no sign of Aristotle 

Th Loc • being wrong in saying that the Athenians 

then w^erenaSy ravaged their territory. For it being quite 

friends of Sparta natural, as I have shown, that the men who 

"^^^T^^T °^ s^^^^^ ^^^"^ ^^" ^^^ landed in Italy, if they 

were slaves ten times over, should adopt friendly 
relations with Sparta, it becomes also natural that the 
Athenians should be rendered hostile to them, not so much 
from regard to their origin as to their policy. 

It is not, again, likely that the Lacedaemonians should them- 
selves send their young men home from the 
I'omenTllSrcamp for the sake of begetting children, and 
(in Greece) should refuse to allow the Locrians to do the 
leaving their same. Two things in such a statement are not 
^''^'"^Jj^l' "^"^ only improbable but untrue. In the first place, 

they w^ere not likely to have prevented the 
Locrians doing so, when they did the same themselves, for 
that would be wholly inconsistent : nor were the Locrians, in 
obedience to orders from them, likely to have adopted a 
custom like theirs. (For in Sparta it is a traditional law, and a 
matter of common custom, for three or four men to have one 
wife, and even more if they are brothers ; and when a man 
has begotten enough children, it is quite proper and usual for 
him to sell his wife to one of his friends.) The fact is, that 
though the Locrians, not being bound by the same oath as 
the Lacedaemonians, that they would not return home till they 
had taken Messene, had a fair pretext for not taking part in 
the common expedition ; yet, by returning home only one by 
one, and at rare intervals, they gave their wives an opportunity 
of becoming familiar with the slaves instead of their original 
husbands, and still more so the unmarried women. And this 
was the reason of the migration. . . . 

7. Timaeus makes many untrue statements ; and he appears 


to have done so, not from ignorance, but because his view was 
distorted bypanyspirit When once he has made 
up his mind to blame or praise, he forgets every- 'Xrisioiie'' 
thing else and outsteps all bounds of propriety. 
So much for the nature of Aristotle's account of Locri, and the 
grounds on which it rested. But this naturally leads me to 
speak of Timaeus and his work as a whole, and generally of 
what is the duty of a man who undertakes to write history. 
Now I think that I have made it clear from what I have said, 
first, that both of them were writing conjecturally ; and, 
secondly, that the balance of probability was on the side of 
Aristotle. It is in fact impossible in such matters to be 
positive and definite. But let us even admit that Timaeus gives 
the more probable account Are the maintainers of the less 
probable theory, therefore, to be called by every possible term 
of abuse and obloquy, and all but be put on trial for their lives ? 
Certainly not. Those who make untrue statements in their ^ 
books from ignorance ought, I maintain, to be forgiven and 1 
corrected in a kindly spirit : it is only those who do so from I 
deliberate intention that ought to be attacked without mercy. 

8. It must then either be shown that Aristotle's account 
of Locri was prompted by partiality, corruption, or personal 
enmity ; or, if no one ventures to say that, then it must be 
acknowledged that those who dispkiy such personal animosity 
and bitterness to others, as Timaeus does to Aristotle, are wrong 
and ill advised. 

The epithets which he applies to him are "audacious," 
"unprincipled," "rash"j and besides, he says 
that he "has audaciously slandered Locri by '"'^■^j^^"" 
affirming that the colony was formed by runaway 
slaves, adulterers, and man-catchers." Further, he asserts that 
Aristotle made this statement, " in order that men might believe 
him to have been one of Alexander's generals, and to have lately 
conquered the Persians at the Cilician Gates in 
a pitched battle by his own ability ; and not to 
be a mere pedantic sophist, universally unpopular, who had a 
short time before shut up that admirable doctor's shop." Again, 
he says that he " pushed his way into every palace and tent : " 
and that he was " a glutton and a gourmand, who thought 


only of gratifying his appetite." Now it seems to me that such 
language as this would be intolerable in an impudent vagabond 
bandying abuse in a law court ; but an impartial recorder of 
public affairs, and a genuine historian, would not think such 
things to himself, much less venture to put them in writing. 

9. Let us now, then, examine the method of Timaeus, and 
^. , compare his account of this colony, that we may 

account of his learn which of the two better deserves such 

investigations in vituperation. He says in the same book : " I 

the history of the ^j^ j^^j ^^^ proceeding on conjecture, but have 

colony of Locn. . . , , , • i r i 

mvestigated the truth m the course of a personal 
visit to the Locrians in Greece. The Locrians first of all showed 
me a written treaty which began with the words, * as parents 
to children.' There are also existing decrees securing mutual 
rights of citizenship to both. In fine, when they were told of 
Aristotle's account of the colony, they were astonished at the 
audacity of that writer. I then crossed to the Italian Locri 
and found that the laws and customs there accorded with the 
theory of a colony of free men, not with the licentiousness of 
slaves. For among them there are penalties assigned to man- 
catchers, adulterers, and run-away slaves. And this would not 
have been the case if they were conscious of having been such 

10, Now the first point one would be inclined to raise is, as 
Criticism of the ^^ ^'^^^ Locrians he visited and questioned on 
above statement these subjects. If it had been the case that the 

of Timaeus. Locrians in Greece all lived in one city, as 
those in Italy do, this question would perhaps have been 
unnecessary, and everything would have been plain. But as 
there are two clans of Locrians, we may ask, Which of the two 
did he visit ? What cities of the one or the other ? In whose 
hands did he find the treaty? Yet we all know, I suppose, 
that this is a speciality of Timaeus's, and that it is in this that 
he has surpassed all other historians, and rests his chief claim 
to credit, — I mean his parade of accuracy in studying chronology 
and ancient monuments, and his care in that department of 
research. Therefore we may well wonder how he came to 
omit telling us the name of the city in which he found the 
treaty, the place in which it w*as inscribed, or the magistrates 


who showed him the inscription, and with whom he conversed : 
to pre\-ent all cavil, and, by defining the place and city, to 
enable those who doubted to ascertain the truth. By omitting 
these details he shows that he was conscious of having told a 
deliberate falsehood. For that 7'imaeus, if he really had 
obtained such proofs, would not have let them slip, but would 
have fastened upon them with both hands, as (he saying is, is 
proved by the following considerations. ^Vould a writer who 
tried to establish his credit on that of Echecrates, — he mention- 
ing him by name as the person with whom he had conversed, 
and from whom he had obtained his facts about the Italian 
Locri,^ — -tailing the trouble to add, by way of showing that he 
had been told them by no ordinary person, that this man's 
father had formerly been entrusted with an embassy by 
Dionysius, — would such a writer have remained silent about it 
if he had really got hold of a public record or an ancient 
ublet ? 

11. This is the man forsooth who drew out a comparative 
list of the Ephors and the kings of Sparta from _ 
the earliest times ; as well as one comparing the oi™pk iwisilra 
Archons at Athens and priestesses in Argos with 
the list of Olympic victors, and thereby convicted those cities 
of being in error about those records, because there was a 
discrepancy of three months between them ! This again is 
the man who discovered the engraved tablets in the inner 
shrines, and the records of the guest-friendships on the door- 
posts of the temples. And we cannot believe that such a man 
could have been ignorant of anything of this sort that existed, 
or would have omitted to mention it if he had found it Nor 
can he on any ground expect pardon, if he has told an untruth 
about it : for, as he has shown himself a bitter and uncompro- 
misii^ critic of others, he must naturally look for equally 
uncompromising attacks from them. 

Being then clearly convicted of falsehood in these points, he 
goes to the Italian Locri : and, first of all, says that the two 
Locrian peoples had a similar constitution and the same 
ties of amity, and that Aristotle and I'heophrastus have 
maligned the city. Now I am fully aware that in going into 
minute particulars and proofs on this point I shall be forced 


to digress from the course of my history. It was for that reason 
however that I postponed my criticism of Timaeus to a 
single section of my work, that I might not be forced again 
and again to omit other necessary matter. . . . 

12. Timaeus says that the greatest fault in history is want 

Timaeus con- ^f truth ; and he accordingly advises all, whom 

demned out of he may have convicted of making false state- 

his own mouth, p^gnts in their writings, to find some other 

name for their books, and to call them anything they like 

except history. . . . 

For example, in the case of a carpenter's rule, though it 
may be too short or too narrow for your purpose, yet if it have 
the essential feature of a rule, that of straightness, you may 
still call it a rule ; but if it has not this quality, and deviates 
from the straight line, you may call it anything you like except 
a rule. " On the same principle," says he, ** historical writings 
may fail in style or treatment or other details; yet if they hold 
fast to truth, such books may claim the title of history, but if 
they swerve from that, they ought no longer to be called 
history." Well, I quite agree that in such writings truth 
should be the first consideration : and, in fact, somewhere 
in the course of my work I have said " that as in a living 
body, when the eyes are out, the whole is rendered useless, so 

e, if you take truth from history what is left is 

but an idle tale." I said again, however, 
that "there were two sorts of falsehoods, the ignorant and 
the intentional ; and the former deserved indulgence, the 
latter uncompromising severity." . . . These points being 
agreed upon — the wide difference between the ignorant and 
intentional lie, and the kindly correction due to the one and 
the unbending denunciation to the other — it will be found 
that it is to the latter charge that Timaeus more than any one 
lays himself open. And the proof of his character in this 
respect is clear. . . . 

There is a proverbial expression for the breakers of an agree- 


ment, " Locrians and a treaty." An explanation given ot this, 
equally accepted by historians and the test of xh^ pmverb 
the world, is that, at the time of the invasion of AMpol r^ 
the Heracleidae, the Locrians agreed with the owff^iai. 
Peloponnesians that, if the Heracleidae did not enter by way of 
the isthmus, but crossed at Rhium, they would raise a war 
beacon, that they might have early intelligence and make 
provisions to oppose their entrance. The Locrians, however, 
did not do this, but, on the contrary, raised a beacon of peace ; 
and therefore, when the Heracleidae arrived opposite Rhium, 
tiiey crossed without resistance ; while the Peloponnesians, 
having taken no precautions, found that they had allowed 
their enemies to enter their country, because they had been 
betrayed by the Locrians. . . . 

Many remarks depreciatory of divination and dream inter- 
pretation may be found in his writings.' But Timaeus's 
writers who have introduced into their books a aitimde towaFds 
good deal of such foolish talk, so far from running '.''? "! "^ 
down others, should think themselves fortunate 
if they escape attack themselves. And this is just the position 
in which Timaeus stands. He remarks that „ „. , 
" Callisthenes was a mere sycophant for writmg 
stuff of this sort ; and acted in a manner utterly unworthy of 
his philosophy in giving heed to ravens and inspired women ; 
and that he richly deserved the punishment which he met with 
at the hands of Alexander, for having corrupted the mind of 
that monarch as far as he could." On the other hand, he 
commends Demosthenes, and the other orators who flourished 
at that time, and says that " they were worthy of Greece for 
speaking against the divine honours given to Alexander ; while 
this philosopher, for investing a mere mortal with the aegis and 
thunderbolt, justly met the fate which befel him from the hands 
ofprovidenca ..." 

IS. Timaeus asserts that Demochares was guilty of 
unnatural lust, and that his lips therefore were 
unfit to blow the sacred fire ; and that in morals 
' The leil is veiy imperfect here. 


he went beyond any stones told by Botrys and Philaenis 
and all other writers of indecent tales. Foul abuse and 
shameless accusations of this sort are not only what no man of 
cultivation would have uttered, they go beyond what you 
might expect from the lowest brothels. It is, however, to get 
credit for the foul and shameless accusations, which he is 
always bringing, that he has maligned this man : supporting his 
charge by dragging in an obscure comic poet. Now on what 
grounds do I conjecture the falsity of the accusation ? Well, 
first, from the fact of the good birth and education of 
Demochares ; for he was a nephew of Demosthenes. And in 
the second place, from the fact that he was thought worthy at 
Athens, not only of being a general, but of the other offices 
also ; which he certainly would not have obtained, if he had 
got into such troubles as these. Therefore it seems to me 
that Timaeus is accusing the people of Athens more than 
Demochares, if it is the fact that they committed the interests 
of the country and their own lives to such a man. For if it 
had been true, the comic poet Archedicus would not have 
been the only one to have made this statement concerning 
Demochares, as Timaeus alleges : it would have been repeated 
by many of the partisans of Antipater, against whom he has 
spoken with great freedom, and said many things calculated to 
annoy, not only Antipater himself, but also his successors and 
friends. It would have been repeated also by many of his poli- 
tical opponents : and among them, by Demetrius of Phalenun, 
against whom Demochares has inveighed with extraordinary 
bitterness in his History, alleging that "his conduct as a 
prince, and the political measures on which he prided himself, 
were such as a petty tax-gatherer might be proud of; for he 
boasted that in his city things were abundant and cheap, and 
every one had plenty to live upon." And he tells another 
story of Demetrius, that "He was not ashamed to have a 
procession in the theatre led by an artificial snail, worked by 
some internal contrivance, and emitting slime as it crawled, 
and behind it a string of asses ; meaning by this to indicate 
the slowness and stupidity of the Athenians, who had yielded 
to others the honour of defending Greece, and were tamely 
submissive to Cassander." Still, in spite of these taunts, 


neither Demetrius nor any one else has ever brought such a 
charge agsunst Demochares. 

14. Relying therefore on the testimony of his own country- 
men, as safer ground than the virulence o( Timaeus, I feel no 
hesitation in declaring that the life of Demochares is not 
chargeable with such enormities. But even supposing that 
Demochares had ever so disgraced himself, what need was 
there for Timaeus to insert this passage in his History ? Men 
of sense, when resolved to retaliate upon a personal enemy, 
think first, not of what he deserves, but of what it is becoming 
in them to do. So in the case of abusive language : the first 
consideration should be, not what our enemies deserve to be 
called, but what our self respect will allow us to call them. 
But if men measure everything by their own ill temper and 
jealousy, we are forced to be always suspicious of them, and 
lo be ever on our guard against their exaggeration. Where- 
fore, in the present instance, we may fairly reject the stories to 
the discredit of Philochares told by Timaeus ; for he has put 
himself out of the pale of indulgence or belief, by so obviously 
allowing his native virulence to carry him beyond all bounds 
of propriety in his invectives. 

Ifi. For my part I cannot feel satisfied with his abuse of 
Agathocles either, even admitting him to have 
been the worst of men. I refer to the passage d 
at the end of his History in which he asserts the aEpersiom oT 
that in his youth Agathocles was "a common I'maeus. 
stale, extravagantly addicted to every unnatural vice," and 
that " when he died, his wife in the course of her lamentations 
exclaimed 'Ah, what have I not done for you 1 what have you 
not done to me?'" To such language one can only repeat 
what has been already said in the case of Demochares, and 
express one's astonishment at such extravagant virulence. 
For that Agathocles must have had fine natural qualities is 
evident from the narrative of Timaeus itself. That a man who 
came as a runaway slave to Syracuse, from the potter's wheel 
and smolte and clay, at the early age of eighteen, should have 
within a short time advanced from that humble beginning to 
be master of all Sicily, and after being a terror to the Cartha- 
ginians, should have grown old in office and died in enjoyment o' 



the royal title, — does not this prove that Agathocles had some 
great and admirable qualities, and many endowments and talents 
for administration ? In view of these the historian ought not 
to have recounted to posterity only what served to discredit 
and defame this man, but those facts also which were to his 
honour. For. that is the proper function of history. Blinded, 
however, by personal malignity, he has recorded for us with 
bitterness and exaggeration all his defects ; while his eminent 
achievements he has passed over in entire silence : seeming 
not to be aware that in history such silence is as mendacious 
as misstatement The part of his history, therefore, which was 
added by him for the gratification of his personal spite I have 
passed over, but not what was really germane to his 
subject . . . 

16. Two young men had a dispute about the ownership of 

The laws of ^ slave. This slave had been in the possession 

Zaieucus. and an of one of them for a long time ; but two days 

incident in their before, as he was going to the farm without his 

^^for"wh?ch he" Piaster, the other laid violent hands upon him 

legislated, see and dragged him to his house. When the first 

Arist. PoL 2, 12). young man heard of this, he came to the house, 

seized the slave, and taking him before the magistrate asserted 

his ownership and offered sureties. For the law of Zaieucus 

ordained that the party from whom the abduction was made 

should have possession of the property in dispute, pending the 

decision of the suit But the other man in accordance with 

the same law, alleged that he was the party from whom the 

abduction had been made, for the slave had been brought 

before the magistrate from his house. The magistrates who 

were trying the case were in doubt, and calling in the Cos- 

mopolis ^ referred the point to him. He interpreted the law as 

meaning that "the abduction was always from that party in whose 

possession the property in dispute had last been for a certain 

period unquestioned; but that if another abducted this 

property from a holder, and then the original holder repossessed 

himself of it from the abductor, this was not abduction in the 

^ For this title see on 22, 19. It is found in inscriptions in Thasos, Crete, 
and Cibyra. C I. G. 2163, r ; 2583 ; 4380, b* 

^ M 


sense of the law." The young man, who thus lost his case, 
was not satisfied, and alleged that such was not the intention 
of the legislator. Thereupon the Cosmopolis summoned him 
to discuss the interpretation in accordance with the law of 
Zaleucus ; that is, to argue on the interpretation of the law 
with him before the court of the one thousand, and with a 
halter round the neck of each : whichever should be shown 
to be wrong in his interpretation was to lose his life in the sight 
of the thousand. But the young man asserted that the 
compact was not a fair one, for the Cosmopolis, who happened 
to be nearly ninety, had only two or three years of life left, 
while in all reasonable probability he had not yet lived half 
his life. By this adroit rejoinder the young man turned off the 
affair as a jest : but the magistrates adjudged the question 
of abduction in accordance n'ith the interpretation of the 
Cosmopolis. . . . 


17. That I may not be thought to detract wantonly from 
the credit of such great writers, I will mention ^ „. ^ 
one battle, which is at once one of the most and the baiile 
famous ever fought, and not too remote in ofluus, 
point of time ; and at which, above everything ^'^ 333- 
else, CaUisthenes was himself present I mean the battle 
between Alexander and Darius in Cilicia. He says that 
"Alexander had already got through the pass called the 
Cilician Gates : and that Darius, availing himself of that by the 
Amanid Gates, made his way with his army into Cilicia; but on 
learning from the natives that Alexander was on his way into 
Syria, he followed him; and having arrived at the pass leading 
to the south, pitched his camp on the bank of the river 
Pinarus. The width of the ground from the foot of the 
mountain to the sea was not more than fourteen stades, 
through which this river ran diagonally. On first issuing from 
the mountains its banks were broken, but in its course through 
the level down to the sea it ran between precipitous and steep 
hills." Starling with this description of the ground, he goes 
on to say that "When Alexander's army faced about, and, 


retracing its steps, was approaching to attack them, Darius 
and his officers determined to draw up their whole phalanx on 
the ground occupied by his encampment, as it then was, and to 
defend his front by the river, which flowed right along his 
camp." But he afterwards says that Darius "stationed his 
cavalry close to the sea, his mercenaries next along the river, 
and his peltasts next resting on the mountains." 

18. Now it is difficult to understand how he could have 
drawn up these troops in front of his phalanx, considering that 
the river ran immediately under the camp : ^ especially as their 
numbers were so great, amounting, on Callisthenes's own 
showing, to thirty thousand cavalry and thuty thousand 
mercenaries. Now it is easy to calculate how much ground 
such a force would require. At the most cavalry in a regular 
engagement is drawn up eight deep, and between each 
squadron a clear space must be left in the line to enable 
them to turn or face about Therefore eight hundred will 
cover a stade of front; eight thousand, ten stades;* three 
thousand two hundred, four stades ; and so eleven thousand 
two hundred would cover the whole of fourteen stades. If 
therefore he were to put his whole thirty thousand on the 
ground, he would have to mass his cavalry alone nearly three 
times the usual depth ; and then what room is left for his 
large force of mercenaries? None, indeed, unless on the 
rear of the cavalry. But Callisthenes says this was not the 
case, but that these latter engaged the Macedonians first. 
We must therefore understand half the front, that nearest 
the sea, to have been occupied by the cavalry; the other 
half, that nearest the mountains, by the mercenaries. We 
may by these data easily calculate the depth of the cavalry, 
and the distance the river must have been from the camp to 
allow of it. 

Again, he says that " on the approach of the enemy Darius 
himself, who was on the centre, ordered up the mercenaries 
from the wing." It is difficult to see what he means by this : 
for the point of junction of the mercenaries and the cavalry 

* Both Curtius and Arrion seem to have found in their authorities that 
Darius crossed the Pinarus. Curt. 3, 8 ; Arrian, 2, 8. 
- Reckoning the stade at 600 feet (Greek). 


must have been at the centre. Where and how then, and to 
what point could Darius, who was himself actually among the 
mercenaries, be said to " order them up " ? 

Lastly, he says that " the cavalry on the right wing charged 
Alexander ; and that his men stood the charge gallantly, and, 
making a counter charge, kept up an obstinate fight." But he 
quite forgets that there was a river between them, a river, too, 
of the nature that he had just himself described.^ 

19. His account of the movements of Alexander are 
equally vague. He says that "he crossed into Asia with 
forty thousand infantry and four thousand five hundred 
cavalry ; but that when he was about lo enter Cilicia he was 
joined by a reinforcement of live thousand infantry and eight 
hundred cavalry." From these numbers, if one were to make 
the liberal allowance of three thousand absentees from the 
infantry and three hundred from the cavalry on various 
services, there would still remain forty-two thousand infantry 
and five thousand cavalry. Starting with these numbers, he 
goes on to say "that Alexander heard of the entrance of 
Darius into Cilicia when he was a hundred stades away from 
him, having already marched through the pass : * that he there- 
fore retraced his steps through the pass, his phalanx on 
the van, his cavalry next, and his baggage on the rear. But 
that as soon as he had debouched upon the open country, he 
gave general orders to form up into a phalanx, at first thirty-two 
deep ; then sixteen ; and lastly, when they were nearing the 
enemy, eight deep." Now this is a worse blunder than the 
last. A stade, allowing for the distances which must be 
kept on a march, and reckoning the depth at sixteen, admits 
of one thousand six hundred men, each man covering six feet 
It is plain, therefore, that ten stades will admit of only sixteen 
thousand men, and twenty twice that number. Hence, when 
Alexander caused his men to form sixteen deep, he would 
have wanted a width of ground of twenty stades ; and even 
then, the whole of the cavalry and ten thousand infantry 
would have been unaccounted for. 

20. Again, he says that Alexander was marching in line 


when he was about forty stades from the enemy. A greater 
blunder it is difficult to conceive. For where could one find 
a ground, and especially in Cilicia, twenty stades broad by 
forty deep, for a phalanx armed with sarissae to march in line ? 
It would not be easy to count all the impossibilities in the 
way of such an arrangement and such a movement One 
that is mentioned by Callisthenes himself is sufficient to 
establish the point For he remarks that the winter torrents 
which descend from the hills make so many gullies in the 
plain, that, in the course of the flight, the chief part of the 
Persians are said to have lost their lives in deep places of 
that kind. But, it may be urged, Alexander wished to be ready 
for battle as soon as the enemy were in sight But what could 
be less ready than a phalanx in a disordered and straggling 
line? Is it not much easier to form up a phalanx from a 
proper column of route, than to bring a disordered and 
straggling line back into the same alignment, and get it into 
order of battle on a broken and woody ground? It was, 
therefore much better to march twice or four times the 
ordinary depth of a phalanx ^ in good order, for which sufficient 
ground could possibly be found. And it was easy to deploy his 
men quickly into the line of the phalanx, because he was able 
by means of scouts to ascertain the presence of the enemy 
in plenty of time. But in this case, beside other absurdities, 
while bringing his men in line across the level, he did not 
even (we are told) put the cavalry in front, but marched with 
them in the same alignment 

21. But the greatest blunder is still to come. "As soon 
as Alexander,*' he says, " was within distance of the enemy 
he caused his men to take up order eight deep," which would 
have necessitated ground forty stades wide for the length of 
the line ; and even had they, to use the poet's expression, 
" laid shield to shield and on each other leaned," still ground 
twenty stades wide would have been wanted, while he himself 
says that it was less than fourteen. [We have also to deduct 
from these fourteen stades the space occupied by the two 
divisions of the cavalry, one on the left next the sea, the other 
on the right] ; ^ and to allow for the fact that the whole force 

^ That is, sixteen or thirty -two deep. * The text here is in hopeless confusion. 

^ i 


was kept a considerable distance from the hills, to avoid being 
exposed to the enemy occupying the skirts of the mountains ; 
for ve know that Callisthencs represents the wing to have 
been facing these, at an angle with the centre. We are also 
leaving out of account the ten thousand foot, whom we showed 
to be too many according to his own calculation. 

The upshot is that eleven stades at most is left for the whole 
length of the phalanx, even taking Calljsthenes's own account, 
in which thirty-two thousand men standing shield to shield must 
necessarily be drawn up thirty deep ; while he asserts that they 
fought eight deep. Such blunders admit of no defence : for 
the facts at once demonstrate the impossibility of the assertion. 
We have only to compare the space occupied by each man, 
the width of the whole ground, and the number of the men, 
lo prove its falsity. 

22. It would be tedious to mention all his other absurdities 
in connexion with this battle. I must be content with a vei; few. 
He says, for instance, that " Alexander took care in arranging 
his order of battle to be himself personally opposed to Darius; 
and that at first Darius was equally anxious to be opposite 
Alexander, but afterwards altered his mind" But he does not 
vouchsafe to tell us how these kings leamt at what part of their 
respective forces they were each posted, or to what point in his 
own line Darius re-transferred himself Again, how could a 
phalanx mount to the edge of the river bank, when it was pre- 
cipitous and covered with brushwood ? Such a piece of bad 
generalship must not be attributed to Alexander, because he is 
acknowledged by all to have been a skilful strategist and to 
have studied the subject from childhood : we must rather 
attribute it to the historian's want of ability to descern between 
what is or is not practicable in such movements. So much 
for Ephorus and Callisthenes. . . . 

2S. Timaeus attacks Ephorus with great severity, though he 
is himself liable to two grave charges — bitterness Timaeuss 
in attacking others for faults of which he is him- over-esiimate or 
self guilty, and complete demoralisation, shown Timoieon. 
by the opinions which he expresses in his memoirs, and which 
he endeavours to implant in the minds of his readers. If we 
are to lay it down that Callisthencs deserved his death, what 


ought to happen to Timaeus? Surely there is much more 
reason for Providence to be wroth with him than with Callls- 
thenes. The latter wished to deify Alexander ; but Timaeus 
exalts Timoleon above the most venerable gods. The hero 
of Callisthenes, again, was a man by universal consent of a 
superhuman elevation of spirit; while Timoleon, far from 
.having accomplished any action of first-rate importance, never 
even undertook one. The one expedition which he achieved 
in the course of his life took him no farther than from Corinth 
to Syracuse; and how paltry is such a distance when compared 
with the extent of the world! I presume that Timaeus 
believed that if Timoleon, by gaining glory in such a mere 
saucer of a place as Sicily, should be thought comparable to 
the most illustrious heroes, he too himself, as the historian of 
only Italy and Sicily, might properly be considered on a par 
i with the writers of universal histor)'. This will be sufficient 
' defence of Aristotle, Theophrastus, Callisthenes, Ephorus, and 
Demochares against the attacks of Timaeus : and it is addressed 
to those who believe that this historian is impartial and 
truthful. . . . 

24. We may fairly judge Timaeus on the principles which 
Tlie incapacity ^^ ^^ himself laid down. According to him, 
of Timaeus " pocts and historLms betray their own tastes by 
for forming a ^^ incidents which they repeatedly record in 
ju gmtn . ^j^^.^ writings. Thus the poet ^ by his fondness 
for banqueting scenes shows that he is a glutton ; and in the 
same way Aristotle, by frequently describing rich food in his 
writings, betrays his love of dainty living and his greediness." 
On the same principle he judges Dionysius the tyrant because 
he " was always very particular in the ornamentation of his 
dining-couches, and had hangings of exquisite make and 
variegated colours." If we apply this principle to Timaeus, 
we shall have abundant reason to think badly of him. In 
attacking others he shows great acuteness and boldness ; when 
he comes to independent narrative he is full of dreams, 
miracles, incredible myths, — in a word, of miserable supersti- 
tion and old wives' tales. The truth is that Timaeus is a proof 

^ Homer, who is generally spoken of as " the poet. " We may remember 
Horace (Ep, i, 19, 6) Laudibus arguitur vini vinosus Homervs. 


of the fact, that at times, and in the case of many men, want 
of skill and want of judgment so completely destroy the value 
of their evidence, that though present at and eye-witnesses of 
the facts which they record, they might just as well have 
been absent or had no eyes. . . . 

26. The story of the brazen bull is this. It was made by 
Phalaris at ARrigentum ; and he used to force „ 

. . ° " J ' . , , - , Tbe braien bull 

men to get into it, and then by way of punish- ^^ phaiaris. 
ment light a fire underneath. The metal becom- 
ing thus red hot, the man inside was roasted and scorched to 
death ; and when he screamed in his agony, the sound from 
the machine was very like the bellowing of a bull When the 
Carthaginians conquered Sicily this bull was removed from 
Agrigentum to Carthage. The trap door between the shoulders, 
through which the victims used to be let down, still remains ; 
and no other reason for the construction of such a bull in Car- 
thage can be discovered at all ; yet Timaeus has undertaken to 
upset the common story, and to refute the declarations of poets 
and historians, by alleging that the bull at Carthage did not come 
from Agrigentum, and that no such figure ever existed there ; 
and he has composed a lengthy treatise to prove this. , . . 


\Vhat epithet ought one to apply to Timaeus, and what word 
will properly characterise him? A man of his kind appears to me 
to deserve the very bitterest of the terms which he has applied 
to others. It has already been sufficiently proved that he is a 
carping, false and impudent writer ; and from what remains to 
be said he will be shown to be un philosophical, and, in short, 
utterly uninstructed. For towards the end of his twenty-first 
book, in the course of his " harangue of Timoleon," he remarks 
that " the whole sublunary world being divided into three parts 
— Asia, Libya, and Europe. . . ."' One could scarcely be- 
lieve such a remark to have come, I don't say from Timaeus, 
but even from the proverbial Margites. . . . 


25. (a) The proverb tells us that one drop from the largest 
vessel is sufficient to show the whole contents. This is 
applicable to the present case. When one or two false state- 
ments have been discovered in a history, and they have been 
shown to be wilful, it is clear that nothing which such an 
historian may say can be regarded as certain or trustworthy. 
But in order to convince the more careful student, I must 
speak on his method and practice in regard to public speeches, 
military harangues, ambassador's orations, and all compositions 
of that class; which are, as it were, a compendium of events and 
an epitome of all history. Now that he has given these in his 
writings with entire disregard of truth, and that of set purpose, 
can any reader of Timaeus fail to be aware? He has not 
written down the words actually used, nor the real drift of 
these speeches ; but imagining how they ought to have been 
expressed, he enumerates all the arguments used, and makes the 
words tally with the circumstances, like a school-boy declaim- 
ing on a set theme : as though his object were to display his own 
ability, not to give a report of what was in reality said. . . . 

(b) The special province of history is, first, to ascertain what 
the actual words used were ; and secondly, to learn why it was 
that a particular policy or argument failed or succeeded. For 
a bare statement of an occurrence is interesting indeed, but not 
instructive : but when this is supplemented by a statement of 
cause, the study of history becomes fruitful. For it is by 
applying analogies to our own circumstances that we get the 
means and basis for calculating the future ; and for learning 
from the past when to act with caution, and when with greater 
boldness, in the present. The historian therefore who omits 
the words actually used, as w^ell as all statement of the 
determining circumstances, and gives us instead conjectures and 
mere fancy compositions, destroys the special use of history. 
In this respect Timaeus is an eminent offender, for we all 
know that his books are full of such writing. 

(c) But perhaps some one may raise the question as to how 
it comes about that, being the sort of writer that I am showing 
him to be, he has obtained acceptance and credit among 
certain people. The reason is that his work abounds with 
hostile criticism and invective against others : and he has been 


judged, not by the positive merits of his own composition and 
his independent narrative, but by his skill in refuting his 
fellow historians ; to which department he appears to me to 
have brought great diligence and an extraordinary natural 
aptitude. The case of the physicist Strato is almost precisely 
similar. As long as this man is endeavouring to descredit 
and refute the opinions of others, he is admirable : directly he 
brings forward anything of his own, or expounds any of his 
own doctrines, he at once seems to men of science to lose his 
£iculties and become stupid and unintelligent And for my 
part, I look upon this difference in writers as strictly analogous 
to the facts of everyday life. In this too it is easy to criticise 
our neighbours, but to be faultless ourselves is hard. One 
might almost say that those who are most ready at finding 
fault with others are most prone to errors in their own life. 

(1/) Besides these I may mention another error of Timaeus. 
Having stayed quietly at Athens for about fifty years, during 
which he devoted himself to the study of written history, he 
imagined that he was in possession of the most important 
means of writing it To my mind this was a great mistake. 
History and the science of medicine are alike in this respect, 
that both may be divided broadly into three departments ; and 
therefore those who study either must approach them in three 
ways. For instance the three departments of medicine are the 
rhetorical, the dietetic, and the surgical and pharmaceutical. 
[The second of these though important is discredited by some.]' 
The first, which takes its rise from the school of Herophilus 
and CalUmachus of Alexandria, does indeed rightly claim a 
certain position in medical science; but by its speciousness 
and liberal promises acquires so much reputation that those 
who are occupied with other branches of the art are supposed to 
be completely ignorant. But just bring one of these jirofessors to 
an actual invalid : you will find that they are as completely 
wanting in the necessary skill as men who have never read a 
medical treatise. Nay, it has happened before now that certain 
persons, who had really nothing serious the matter with them, 
have been persuaded by their powerful arguments to commit 
themselves to their treatment, and have thereby endangered 
1 Tbe text is again hopeless. 


their lives : for they are like men trying to steer a ship out of 
a book. Still such men go from city to city with great kclAty 
and get the common people together to listen to them. But 
if, when this is done, they induce certain people to submit as a 
specimen to their practical treatment ; they only succeed in 
reducing them to a state of extreme discomfort, and making 
them a laughing stock to the audience.^ So completely does 
a persuasive address frequently get the advantage over practical 
experience. The third branch of the medical science, though 
it involves genuine skill in the treatment of the several cases, is 
not only rare in itself, but is also frequently cast into the shade, 
thanks to the folly of popular judgment, by volubility and 

26. (e) In the same way the science of genuine history is 
threefold : first, the dealing with written documents and the 
arrangement of the material thus obtained ; second, topography, 
the appearance of cities and localities, the description of rivers 
and harbours, and, speaking generally, the peculiar features of 
seas and countries and their relative distances ; thirdly, political 
affairs. Now, as in the case of medicine, it is the last branch 
that many attach themselves to, owing to their preconceived 
opinions on the subject. And the majority of writers bring 
to the undertaking no spirit of fairness at all : nothing but 
dishonesty, impudence and unscrupulousness. Like vendors 
of drugs, their aim is to catch popular credit and favour, and 
to seize every opportunity of enriching themselves. About such 
writers it is not worth while to say more. 

(/) But some of those who have the reputation of 
approaching history in a reasonable spirit are like the theoretical 
physicians. They spend all their time in libraries, and acquire 
generally all the learning which can be got from books, and 
then persuade themselves that they are adequately equipped 
for their task. . . . Yet in my opinion they are only partially 
qualified for the production of genuine history. To inspect 
ancient records indeed, with the view of ascertaining the notions 
entertained by the ancient's of certain places, nations, polities 

^ The text is uncertain, and I am not at all sure of the meaning of I-k 
dvdfiaTos, cp. 25 k, 27. These public harangues of doctors to attract patients 
arc noticed in Xcnophon, Mitnorab. 4, 2, 5. 


and events, and of understanding the several circumstances and 
contingencies experienced in former times, is useful ; for the 
history of the past directs our attention in a proper spirit to 
the future, if a writer can be found to give a stG.tement of facts ' 
as they really occurred. But to persuade one's self, as Timaeus 
does, that such ability in research is sufficient to enable a roan 
to describe subsequent transactions with success is quite 
foolish. It is as though a man were to imagine that an 
inspection of the works of the old masters would enable him 
to become a painter and a master of the art himself. 

This will be rendered still more evident froro what I have 
now to say, particularly from certain passages j^ ^^^^ ^.^ 
in the history of Ephoms. This writer in his fajriy acquainied 
history of war seems to me to have had some with naval, but 
idea of naval tactics, but to be quite unacquaint- """ ^aeii""''''^ 
ed with fighting on shore. Accordingly, if one 
turns one's attention to the naval battles at Cyprus and Cnidus, 
in which the generals of the king were engaged against Evagoras 
of Salamis ' and then against the Lacedaemonians, one will be 
struck with admiration of the historian, and will learn many 
useful lessons as to what to do in similar circumstances. But 
when he tells the story of the battle of 
LeucHa between the Thebans and Lacedae- g'^" ^^j' 
monians, or again that of Mantinea be- 
tween the same combatants, in which Epaminondas lost his 
life, if in these one examines attentively and in detail the 
arrangements and evolutions in the line of battle, the historian 
will appear quite ridiculous, and betray his entire ignorance 
and want of personal experience of such matters. The battle 
of I.,euctra indeed was simple, and confined to one division of 
the forces engaged, and therefore does not make the writer's 
lack of knowledge so very glaring : but that of Mantinea was 
complicated and technical, and is accordingly unintelligible, 
and indeed completely inconceivable, to the historian. This 
will be rendered clear by first laying down a correct plan of 
the ground, and then measuring the extent of the movements 
as described by him. The same is the case with Theopompus, 
and above all with Timaeus, the subject of this book. These 

' Tyrant of SalBmli in Cyprus, d.c. 404-374, See Isocrates, Oral. x. 


latter writers also can conceal their ignorance, so long as they 
deal with generalities ; but directly they attempt minute and 
detailed description, they show that they are no better than 
Ephorus. . . . 

25. (^) It is in fact as impossible to write well on the opera- 
tions in a war, if a man has had no experience of actual service, 
as it is to write well on politics without having been engaged 
in political transactions and vicissitudes. And when history is 
written by the book -learned, without technical knowledge, and 
without clearness of detail, the work loses all its value. For 
if you take from history its element of practical instruction, 
, what is left of it has nothing to attract and nothing to teach. 
Again, in the topography of cities and localities, when such 
men attempt to go into details, being entirely without personal 
knowledge, they must in a similar manner necessarily pass 
over many points of importance ; while they waste words on 
many that are not worth the trouble. And this is what his 
failure to make personal inspection brings upon Timaeus. . . . 

(K) In his thirty- fourth book Timaeus says that "he 
Timaeus's want spent fifty continuous years at Athens as 

of practical an alien, and never took part in any mili- 

knowiedge. ^^ service, or went to inspect the localities." 
Accordingly, when he comes upon any such matters in the 
course of his history, he shows much ignorance and makes 
many misstatements; and if he ever does come near the 
truth, he is like one of those animal -painters who draw from 
models of stuffed skins. Such artists sometimes preserve the 
correct outline, but the vivid look and life-like portraiture of 
the real animal, the chief charm of the painter's art, are quite 
wanting. This is just the case with Timaeus, and in fact with 
all who start with mere book-learning; there is nothing vivid 
in their presentment of events, for that can only come from 
the personal experience of the writers. And hence it is, that 
those who have gone through no such course of actual ex- 
perience produce no genuine enthusiasm in the minds of their 
readers. Former historians showed their sense of the necessity 
of making professions to this effect in their writings. For when 
their subject was political, they were careful to state that the 
writer had of course been engaged in politics, and had had 


experience in matters of the son; or if the subject was 
military, that he had served a campaign and been actually 
engaged ; and again, when the matter was one of everyday life, 
that he had brought up children and had been married ; and 
so on in every department of life, which we may expect to find 
adequately treated by those writers alone who have had per- 
son^ experience, and have accordingly made that branch of 
history their own. It is difficult perhaps for a man to have 
been actually and literally eng^ed in everything : but in the 
most important actions and most frequently occurring he must 
have been so. 

(0 And that this is no impossibility. Homer is a convincing 
instance ; for in him you may see this quality of personal 
knowledge frequently and conspicuously displayed. The 
upshot of all this is that the study of documents is only one of 
three elements in the preparation of an historian, and is only 
third in importance. And no clearer proof of this could be 
given than that furnished by the deliberative speeches, haran- 
gues of commanders, and orations of ambassadors as recorded 
by Timaeus. For the truth is, that the occasions are rare 
which admit of all possible arguments being set forth ; as a 
rule, the circumstances of the case confine them to narrow 
limits. And of such speeches one sort are regarded with 
favour by men of our time, another by those of an earlier age ; 
different styles again are popular with Aetolians, Peloponnes- 
ians, and Athenians. But to make digressions, in season and 
out of season, for the purpose of setting forth every possible 
speech that could be made, as Timaeus does by his trick of in- 
venting words to suit every sort of occasion, is utterly mislead- 
ing, pedantic, and worthy of a schoolboy essayist. And this 
practice has brought failure and discredit on many writers. 
Of course to select from time to time the proper and appro- 
priate language is a necessary part of our art : but as there is 
no fixed rule to decide the quantity and quality of the words 
to be used on a particular occasion, great care and training is 
required if we are to instruct and not mislead our readers. 
The exact nature of the situation is difficult to communicate 
always; still it may be brought home to the mind by means of 
systematic demonstration, founded on personal and habiti> 


experience. The best way of securing that this should be 
realised is for historians, first, to state clearly the position, the 
aims, and the circumstances of those deliberating ; and then, 
recording the real speeches made, to explain to us the causes 
which contributed to the success or failure of the several 
speakers. Thus we should obtain a true conception of the 
situation . and by exercising our judgment upon it, and drawing 
analogies from it, should be able to form a thoroughly sound 
opinion upon the circumstances of the hour. But I suppose 
that tracing causes is difficult, while stringing words together in 
books is easy. Few again have the faculty of speaking briefly 
to the point, and getting the necessary training for doing so ; 
while to produce a long and futile composition is within most 
people's capacity and is common enough. 

25. {Ji) To confirm the judgment I have expressed of Timaeus, 

_. on his wilful misstatements as well as his ignor- 

Sicilian history, ^'^ce, I shall now quote certam short passages 

from his acknowledged works as specimens. . . . 
Of all the men who have exercised sovereignty in Sicily, since 
the elder Gelo, tradition tells us that the most able have been 
Hermocrates, Timoleon, and Pyrrhus of Epirus, who are the 
last persons in the world on whom to father pedantic and 
B.C. 413. scholastic speeches. Now Timaeus tells us in 
Thucyd.7, 42 Jj^^-his twenty-first book that on his arrival in Sicily 
Eurymedon urged the cities there to undertake the war against 
Syracuse; that subsequently the people of Gela becoming 
tired of the war, sent an embassy to Camarina to make a 
truce; that upon the latter gladly welcoming the proposal, 
each state sent ambassadors to their respective allies begging 
them to despatch men of credit to Gela to deliberate on a 
pacification, and to secure the common interests. Upon the 
arrival of these deputies in Gela and the opening of the 
conference, he represents Hermocrates as speaking to the 
following effect : " He praised the people of Gela and Camarina 
first, for having made the truce ; secondly, because they were 
the cause of the assembling of this peace congress ; and thirdly 
because they had taken precautions to prevent the mass of the 
citizens from taking part in the discussion, and had secured 
that it should be confined to the leading men in the states, who 


knew the difTerence between peace and war." Then after making 
two or three practical suggestions, Hennocrates is represented 
as expressing an opinion that "if they seriously consider the 
matter they will learn the profound difference between peace 
and war," — although just before he had said that it was pre- 
cisely this which moved his gratitude to the men of Gela, that 
" the discussion did not take place in the mass assembly, t)ut in 
a congress of men who knew the difference between peace and 
war." This is an instance in which Timaeus not only fails to 
show the ability of an historian, but sinks below the level of a 
school theme. For, I presume, it will be universally admitted 
that what an audience requires is a demonstration of that 
about which they are in ignorance ot uncertainty ; but to 
exhaust one's ingenuity in finding arguments to prove what is 
known already is the most futile waste of time. But besides 
his cardinal mistake of directing the greater part of the speech 
to points which stood in need of no ai^uments at all, Timaeus 
also puts into the mouth of Hermocratcs certain ^.c. 405. 
sentences of which one could scarcely believe Hermocrates was 
that any commonplace youth would have been "oyhete. Xen, 
Capable, much less the colleague of the I^cedae- ' "'■■. ■■=7-3>- 
monians in the battle of Aegospotami, and the sole conqueror 
of the Athenian armies and generals in Sicily. 

26. For first he " thinks that he should remind the congress 
that in war sleepers are woke at dawn by bugles, in peace by 
cocks." ' Then he says that " Hercules established the Olympic 
games and the sacred truce during them, as an exemplification 
of his own principles ; " and that " he had injured all those 
persons against whom he waged war, under compulsion and in 
obedience to the order of another, but was never voluntarily 
the author of harm to any man." ' Next he quotes the instance 
of Zeus in Homer as being displeased with Ares, and saying* — 
" Of all the gods Ihat on Olympus dwell 

I hold Ihee most detested ; foi thy joy 

ts ever stiife and wai and bailie." 
And again the wisest of the heroes says* — 

' For [his proverb see Pluwrch, Nuias, ch. 9, ^i^iot iufin}iiinH ToC tlw6rTtt 
in rait (t tlpiprii KoSciKto'Tat oi aikwiyyft dXV dXcirpviSrEt iipmrtiS^vai. 
* n. ch. 35. • Homer, II. s, 890. * Homer, il 9, 63. 


*' He is a wretch, insensible and dead 
To all the charities of social life, 
Whose pleasure is in civil broil and war." 

Then he goes on to allege that Euripides agrees with Homer 
in the lines ^ — 

" O well of infinite riches 1 
O fairest of beings divine 1 

Peace, how alas ! thou delayest ; 
My heart for thy coming is fain. 

1 tremble lest age overtake me. 

Ere thy l)eauty and grace I behold ; 
Ere the maidens shall sing in their dancing, 
And revels be gladsome with flowers." 

Next he remarks that "war is like disease, peace like 
health ; for that the latter restores those that are sick, while 
in the former even the healthy perish. Moreover, in time of 
peace, the old are buried by the young as nature directs, while 
in war the case is reversed ; and above all in war there is no 
security even as far as the city walls, while in peace it extends 
to the frontier of the territory " — and so on. I wonder what 
other arguments would have been employed by a youth who 
had just devoted himself to scholastic exercises and studies in 
history ; and who wished, according to the rules of the art, to 
adapt his words to the supposed speakers ? Just these I 
think which Timaeus represents Hermocrates as using. 

(tf) Again, in the same book, Timoleon is exhorting the 

Timoieon's Greeks to engage the Carthaginians;* and 

victory over the when they are on the very point of coming 

Carthaginians, jq ^lose quarters with the enemy, who are 

344. many times superior to them in number, 

Timaeus represents him as saying, " Do not look to the 

numbers of the foe, but to their cowardice. For though 

Libya is fully settled and abounds in inhabitants, yet 

when we wish to express complete desolation we say *more 

desolate than Libya,' not meaning to refer to its emptiness, but 

to the poor spirit of its inhabitants. And after all, who would 

be afraid of men who, when nature gives hands as the 

distinctive feature of man among all living creatures, carry 

^ Euripides, fr. ^ Battle of the Crimcsus. See Plutarch, Timol. ch. 27. 


them about all their life inside their tunics idle P ' And more 
than all, who wear shirts under their inner tunics, that they 
may not even when they fall in battle show their nakedness to 
their enemies ? . . . " 

(S) When Gelo promised to help the Greeks with twenty 
thousand land forces and two hundred decked q^^_ 

ships, if they would concede to him the chief See Herod, 
command either by land or sea, they say that ?■ 'S7-'*s. 
the congress of Greeks, sitting at Corinth, gave ' * '' 

Gelo's envoys a most spirited answer. They urged Gelo to come 
to their aid with his forces, and observed that the logic of facta 
would give the command to the bravest. This is not the language 
of men depending for succour on the Syracusans, as a last 
resource; but of men who felt confidence in themselves, and 
challenged all comers to a rivalry of courage and for the crown 
of valour. In spite of this, Timaeus spends such a wealth of 
rhetoric and earnestness on these points, in his desire to exalt 
the importance of Sicily above all the rest of Greece, to 
represent its history as the most splendid and glorious of all 
the world, its men as the wisest of all who have been great in 
philosophy, and the Syracusans as the most consummate and 
divine of statesmen, that he could scarcely be surpassed by 
the cleverest schoolboy declaimers when undertaking to prove 
such paradoxes as that " Thersites was an excellent man," or 
" Penelope a bad wife," or other thesis of that description. 

(r) However, the only effect of such extravagant exaggera- 
tion is to bring ridicule upon the men and the transactions 
which it is his intention to champion ; while he himself incurs 
the same discredit as ill-trained disputants in the Academy ; 
some of whom, in their desire to embarrass their opponents on 
all subjects, possible or impossible alike, carry their paradoxical 
and sophistical arguments to such a length as to dispute 
whether it is possible for people at Athens to smell eggs 
cooking at Ephesus : and to offer to maintain that, while they 
are discussing these points, they are lying on their couches at 
home and carrying on a second discussion on other subjects. 
This extravagance of paradox has brought the whole school 


into such disrepute, that even reasonable discussions have lost 
credit with the world. And apart from their own futility, these 
persons have inspired our young men with so depraved a taste, 
that they pay no attention whatever to questions of ethics and 
politics, which bring benefit to those who study them; but 
spend their lives in pursuit of an empty reputation for useless 
and paradoxical verbiage. 

(//) This is just the case with Tiraaeus and his imitators in 
history. Paradoxical and tenacious, he has dazzled the 
multitude by skill in words ; and has forced attention to him- 
self by a show of veracity, or has conciliated confidence by a 
pretence of producing proof of his assertions. The most conspi- 
cuous instances of his success in inspiring this confidence are 
those parts of his work which treat of colonies, founding of 
cities, and the relationships of nations. In these points he 
makes such a parade of minute accuracy, and inveighs so 
bitterly when refuting others, that people came to imagine that 
all other historians have been mere dreamers, and have spoken 
at random in describing the world ; and that he is the only 
man who has made accurate investigations, and unravelled every 
history with intelligence. 

{e) As a matter of fact, his books contain much that is sound, 
but also much that is false. Those, however, who have spent 
much time on his earlier books, in which the passages I have 
alluded to occur, when the confidence which they have fully 
given to his exaggerated professions is disturbed by some one 
pointing out that Timaeus is obnoxious to the same reproaches 
which he has brought with such bitterness against others (as, 
for instance, in the misstatements as to the Locrians, and other 
instances lately mentioned by me), become angry and obstinate 
in controversy, and difficult to convince. And that, I might 
almost say, is all the benefit which the most diligent students 
of his history get from their reading. While those who devote 
their attention to his speeches, and generally to the didactic 
part of his work, become pedantic, sophistical, and wholly in- 
sensible to truth, for reasons which I have already stated. 

27. Moreover, when he comes to deal with facts in his 
history, we find a combination of all the faults which I have 
mentioned. The reason I will now proceed to state. It will 


not, perhaps, to most people seem to his credit, and it is in 
truth the real source of his enors. For whereas he is thought 
to have possessed great and wide knowledge, a faculty for histori- 
cal inquiry, and extiaordinary industry in the execution of his 
work, in certain cases he appears to have been the most ignorant 
and indolent person that ever called himself an historian. And 
the following considerations will prove it. Nature has bestowed 
on us two instruments of inquiry and research, hearing and sight 
Of these sight is, according to Heraclcitus, by far 
the truer ; for eyes arc surer witnesses than ears, -^^ ^ p' \^^ ' 
And of these charmels of learning Timacus has 
chosen the pleasanter and the worse; for he entirely refrained 
from looking at things with his own eyes, and devoted himself 
to learning by hearsay. But even the ear may be instructed in 
two ways, reading and answers to personal inquiries : and in 
the latter of these he was very indolent, as I have already 
shown. The reason of his preference for the other it is easy 
to divine. Study of documents involves no danger or fatigue, 
if one only takes care to lodge in a city rich in such records, 
or to have a library in one's neighbourhood. You may then 
investigate any question while reclining on your couch, and 
compare the mistakes of former historians without any fatigue 
to yourself. But personal investigation demands great exertion 
and expense ; though it is exceedingly advantageous, and in 
fact is the very corner-stone of history. This is evident from 
the writers of history themselves. Ephorus says, " if writers 
could only be present at the actual transactions, it would be far 
the best of all modes of learning." Theopompus says, " the best 
military historian is he who has been present at the greatest 
number of battles ; the best speech maker is he who has been 
engaged in most political contests." The same might be said 
of the art of healing and of steering. Homer has spoken even 
more emphatically than these writers on this point. For when 
he wishes to describe what the man of light and leading should 
be, he introduces Odysseus in these words — 

and then goes on— 



'* And towns of many saw, and learnt their mind. 
And suffered much in heart by land and sea.** 

and again ^ — 

** Passing through wars of men and grieyous waves.* 

28. It is such a man that the dignity of history appears to 

me to require. Plato says that " human affairs will not go well 

Historians must ^^^^ either philosophers become kings or kings 

be practical become philosophers." * So I should say that 
™*^"- history will never be properly written, until either 

men of action undertake to write it (not as they do now, as a 
matter of secondary importance; but, with the conviction that 
it is their most necessary and honourable employment, shall 
devote themselves through life exclusively to it), or historians 
become convinced that practical experience is of the first import- 
ance for historical composition. Until that time arrives there 
will always be abundance of blunders in the writings of historians. 
Timaeus, however, quite disregarded all this. He spent his 
life in one place, of which he was not even a citizen ; and thus 
deliberately renounced all active career either in war or politics, 
and all personal exertion in travel and inspection of localities : 
and yet, somehow or another, he has managed to obtain the 
reputation of a master in the art of history. To prove that 
I have not misrepresented him, it is easy to bring the 

evidence of Timaeus himself. In the preface 

^E™hol!L'!" to his sixth book he says that " some people 
suppose that more genius, industry, and 
preparation are required for rhetorical than for historical 
composition." And that "this opinion had been formerly 
advanced against Ephorus." Then because this writer had 
been unable to refute those who held it, he undertakes himself 
to draw a comparison between history and rhetorical composi- 
tions : a most unnecessary proceeding altogethei. In the first 
place he misrepresents Ephorus. For in truth, admirable as 
Ephorus is throughout his whole work, in style, treatment, and 
argumentative acuteness, he is never more brilliant than in his 
digressions and statements of his personal views : in fact, when- 
ever he is adding anything in the shape of a commentary or a 

^ Homer, OJyss. i, 1-4; 8, 183. 
* Republic, v. 473 C. vi. 499 B. 


note. And it so happens that his most elegant and convincing 
digression is on this very subject of a comparison between 
historians and speech-writers. But Timaeus is anxious not 
to be thought to follow Ephorus. Therefore, in addition to 
misrepresentin;; him and condemning the rest, he enters upon 
a long, confused, and in eveiy way inferior, discussion of what 
had been already sufficiently handled by others ; and expected 
that no one living would detect him. 

{a) However, he wished to exalt history ; and, in order to 
do so, he says that " history differs from rhetorical composi- 
tion as much as real buildings differ from those represented 
in scene-paintings." And again, that "to collect the neces- 
sary materials for writing history is by itself more laborious 
than the whole process of producing rhetorical compositions." 
He mentions, for instance, the expense and labour which he 
underwent in collecting records from Assyria, and in studying 
the customs of the Ligures, Celts, and Iberians. But he ex- 
aggerates these so much, that he could not have himself 
expected to be believed. One would be glad to asic the 
historian which of the two he thinks is the more expensive 
and laborious, — to remain quietly at home and collect records 
and study the customs of Ligures and Celts, or to obtain 
personal experience of all the tribes possible, and see them 
with his own eyes ? To ask questions about manceuvres on 
the field of battle and the sieges of cities and fights at sea 
from those who were present, or to take personal part in the 
dangers and vicissitudes of these operations as they occur? 
For my part I do not think that real buildings differ so much 
from those in stage - scenery, nor history from rhetorical 
compositions, as a narrative drawn from actual and personal 
experience differs from one derived from hearsay and the 
report of others. But Timaeus had no such experience : and 
he therefore naturally supposed that the part of an historian's 
labour which is the least important and lightest, that namely 
of collecting records and making inquiries from those who had 
knowledge of the several events, was in reality the most 
important and most difficult. And, indeed, in this particular 
department of research, men who have had no personal experi- 
ence must necessarily fall into grave errors. For how is - 




man, who has no knowledge of such things, to put the right 
questions as to manoeuvering of troops, sieges of cities, and 
fights at sea? And how can he understand the details of 
what is told him ? Indeed, the questioner is as important as 
the narrator for getting a clear story. For in the case of men 
who have had experience of real action, memory is a sufficient 
guide from point to point of a narrative : but a man who has 
had no such experience can neither put the right questions, 
nor understand what is happening before his eyes. Though he 
is on the spot, in fact, he is as good as absent. . . . 

TZ2^ "^ 



1. From the unbroken continuity of their wars, and the ex- 
travagance of their daily lives, the Aetolians became involved 
in debt, not only without others noticing it, but 
without being sensible of it thenoselves. Being saa 
therefore naturally disposed to a change in loliacausea 
their constitution, they elected Dorimachus and reroiu"'"'. 
Scopas to draw out a code of laws, because they 
saw thai they were not only innovators by disposition, but were 
themselves deeply involved in private debt. These men accord- 
ingly were admitted to the office and drew up the laws. . . . 

When they produced them they were opposed by Alexander 
of Aetolia, who tried to show by many instances that innovation 
was a dangerous growth which could not be checked, and in- 
variably ended by inflicting grave evils upon those who fostered 
it He urged them therefore not to look solely to the ex- 
igencies of the hour, and the relief from their existing contracts, 
but to the future also. For it was a strange inconsistency to 
be ready to forfeit their very lives in war to preserve their 
children, and yet in their deliberations to be entirely careless 
of the future. . . . 

2. Having failed to obtain the office, for the sake of which 
he had had the boldness to draw up these laws, Scopas 
turned his hopes to Alexandria, in the expecta- scopas uroes to 
tion of finding means there of restoring his Egypt See i6, 
broken fortunes, and satisfying to a fuller extent '*"'' ■ '*■ S3- 
his grasping spirit. He little knew that it is impossible to 
assuage the ever-rising desires of the soul without correcting 
this passion by reason, any more than it is to stay or quench 


the thirst of the dropsical body by supplying it with drink, 
without radically restoring its healthy condition. Scopas, 
indeed, is a conspicuous example of this truth ; for though on 
his arrival at Alexandria, in addition to his military pay, which 
he possessed independently as commander-in-chief, the king 
assigned him ten minae a day, and one mina a day to those 
next him in rank, still he was not satisfied ; but continued to 
demand more, until he disgusted his paymasters by his cupidity, 
and lost his life and his gold together. 

Philip's treacherous conduci', b.c 204 

8. Philip now entered upon a course of treachery which no 
one would venture to say was worthy of a king ; but which 
some would defend on the ground of its necessity in the con- 
duct of public affairs, owing to the prevailing bad faith of the 
time. For the ancients, so far from using a fraudulent policy 
towards their friends, were scrupulous even as to using it to 
conquer their enemies ; because they did not regard a success 
as either glorious or secure, which was not obtained by such a 
victory in the open field as served to break the confidence of 
their enemies. They therefore came to a mutual understand- 
ing not to use hidden weapons against each other, nor such as 
could be projected from a distance ; and held the opinion that 
the only genuine decision was that arrived at by a battle fought 
at close quarters, foot to foot with the enemy. It was for this 
reason also that it was their custom mutually to proclaim their 
wars, and give notice of battles, naming time and place at which 
they meant to be in order of battle. But nowadays people 
say that it is the mark of an inferior general to perform any 
operation of war openly. Some slight trace, indeed, of the 
old-fashioned morality still lingers among the Romans; for 
they do proclaim their wars, and make sparing use of am- 
buscades, and fight their battles hand to hand and foot to foot. 
So much for the unnecessary amount of artifice which it is the 
fashion for commanders in our days to employ both in politics 
and war. 

4. Philip gave Heracleides a kind of problem to work out, 
— how to circumvent and destroy the Rhodian fleet. At the 


same time he sent envoys to Crete to excite and provoke them 
to go to war with the Rhodians. Heracleides, pj,iiip employs 
who was a born traitor, looked upon the com- Heracleides 
mission as the very thing to suit his plans ; and "' Tarcmum. 
after revolving various methods in his mind, presently started 
and sailed to Rhodes, He was by origin a Tarentine, of a 
low family of mechanics, and he had many qualities which 
fitted him for bold and unscrupulous undertakings. His boy- 
hood had been stained by notorious immorality ; he had great 
acuteness and a retentive memory ; in the presence of the 
vulgar no one could be more bullying and audacious ; to those in 
high position no one more insinuating and servile. He had been 
originally banished from his native city from a suspicion of 
being engaged in an intrigue to hand over Tarentum to the 
Romans : not that he had any political influence, but being an 
architect, and employed in some repairs of the walls, he got 
possession of the keys of the gate on the landward side of the 
town. He thereupon fled for his life to the Romans. From 
them, being detected in making communications by letters and 
messages with Tarentum and Hannibal, he again Bed for fear 
of consequences to Philip. With him he obtained so much 
credit and influence that he eventually was the most powerful 
element in the overthrow of that great monarchy. 

6. The Prytanies of Rhodes were now distrustful of Philip, 
owing to his treacherous policy in Crete,' and they began to 
suspect tliat Heracleides was his agent . . . -^^^ fg^g 

But Heracleides came before them and ex- preiences of 
plained the reasons which had caused him to Heraciddci ai 
f, r T.1 ■!- Rhodes, 

fly from Phdip. . . . 

Philip was anxious above ever^-thing that the Rhodians 
should not discover his purpose in these transactions ; whereby 
he succeeded in freeing Heracleides from suspicion. , , . 

Nature, as it seems to me, has ordained that Truth should 
be a most mighty goddess among men, and has 
endowed her with extraordinary power. 
least, I notice that though at times everything combines to 

' The Rhodians had proclaimed war against Ihe Crelan piialcs. Philip 
had secretly commissioned one of his agents, (he Actolian Dicaearchus, 10 aid 
Ihe Cretans. Diodor, fr. iivlii. 


crush her, and every kind of specious argument is on the side 
of falsehood, she somehow or another insinuates herself by 
her own intrinsic virtue into the souls of mea Sometimes 
she displays her power at once ; and sometimes, though ob- 
scured for a length of time, she at last prevails and overpowers 
falsehood. Such was the case with Heracleides when he came 
from king Philip to Rhodes.^ . . . 

Damocles, who was sent with Pythio as a spy upon the 
Romans, was a person of ability, and possessed of many 
endowments fitting him for the conduct of affairs. . . . 


6. Nabis, tyrant of Sparta, being now in the third year of 
his reign, ventured upon no undertaking of importance, owing 

to the recent defeat of Machanidas by the 
Nabis^^nn? Achaeans; but employed himself in laying the 

foundations of a long and grinding tyranny. He 
destroyed the last remains of the old Spartan nobles ; drove 
into banishment all men eminent for wealth or ancestral glory ; 
and distributed their property and wives among the chief men 
of those who remained, or among his own mercenary soldiers. 
These last were composed of murderers, housebreakers, foot- 
pads, and burglars. For this was, generally speaking, the class 
of men which he collected out of all parts of the world, whose 
own country was closed to them owing to their crimes and 
felonies. As he put himself forward as the patron and king of 
such wretches, and employed them as attendants and body- 
guards, there is evidently no cause for surprise that his impious 
character and reign should have been long remembered. For, 
besides this, he was not content with driving the citizens into 
banishment, but took care no place should be secure, and no 
refuge safe for the exiles. Some he caused to be pursued and 
killed on the road, while others he dragged from their place of 
retreat and murdered. Finally, in the cities where they w^ere 
living, he hired the houses next door to these banished men, 

1 Heracleides having gained credence at Rhodes by pretending to betray 
Philip's intrigue with the Cretans, waited for an opportunity, and, setting fire 
to their arsenal, escaped in a boat. Polyacn, 5, 17, 2. 


wherever they might be, by means of agents who were not 
suspected ; and then sent Cretans into these houses, who made 
breaches in the party walls, and through them, or through such 
windows as already existed, shot down the exiles as they stood 
or lay down in their own houses ; so that there was no place 
of retreat, and no moment of security for the unfortunate 

7. When he had by these means put the greater number of 
them out of the .way, he next had constructed »■ h- ■ f 
a kind of machine, if machine it may be called, 
which was the figure of a woman, clothed in costly garments, 
and made to resemble with extraordinary fidelity the wife of 
Nabis. Whenever then he summoned one of the citizens 
with a view of getting some money from him, he used first to 
employ a number of arguments politely expressed, pointing 
out the danger in which the city stood from the threatening 
attitude of the Achaeans, and explaining what a number of 
mercenaries he had to support for their security, and the ex- 
penses which fell upon him for the maintenance of the national 
religion and the needs of the State. If the listeners gave in 
he was satisfied ; but if they ever refused to comply with his 
demand, he would say, " Perhaps I cannot persuade you, but I 
think this lady Ap^ga will succeed in doing so." Ap^ga was 
the name of his wife. Immediately on his saying these words, 
the figure I have described was brought in. As soon as the 
man offered his hand to the supposed lady to raise her from 
her seat, the figure threw its arms round him and began draw- 
ing him by degrees towards its breasts. Now its arms, hands, 
and breasts were full of iron spikes under its clothes. When 
the tyrant pressed his hands on the back of the figure, and 
then by means of the works dragged the man by degrees 
closer and closer to its breasts, he forced him under this 
torture to say anything. A good number of men who refused 
his demands he destroyed in this way.* 

S. The rest of his conduct was on a par with this beginning. 
He made common cause with the Cretan pirates. The beginning of 
and kept temple-breakers, highway-robbers, and the war iwiween 


Nabis and the murderers all over the Peloponnese ; and as he 
Achaeans. ghared in the profits of their nefarious trades, he 
allowed them to use Sparta as their base of operations. More- 
over, about this time some visitors from Boeotia, who happened 
to be staying at Lacedaemon, enticed one of his grooms to 
make off with them, taking a certain white horse which was 
considered the finest in the royal stud They were pursued 
by a party sent by Nabis as far as Megalopolis, where the 
tyrants found the horse and groom, and took them off with- 
out any one interfering. But they then laid hands on the 
Boeotians, who at first demanded to be taken before the 
magistrate ; but as no attention was paid to the demand, one 
of them shouted out " Help ! " Upon a crowd of the people 
of the place collecting and protesting that the men should be 
taken before the magistrate, Nabis's party were obliged to let 
them go and retire. Nabis, however, had been long looking 
out for a ground of complaint and a reasonable pretext for a 
quarrel, and having seized on this one, he harried the cattle 
belonging to Proagoras and some others ; which was a com- 
mencement of the war.^ . . . 


9. Labac, like Sabae, is a city of Chattenia, which is a 
territory of the Gerraei. ... In other respects, Chattenia is a 
rugged country, but the wealth of the Gerraei who inhabit it 
has adorned it with villages and towers. It lies along the 
Arabian Sea, and Antiochus gave orders to spare it. . . . 

In a letter to Antiochus the Gerraei demanded that he should 
not destroy what the gods had given them — perpetual peace 
and freedom ; and this letter having been interpreted to him 
he granted the request. . . . 

Their freedom having been confirmed to the Gerraei, they 
presented King Antiochus at once with five hundred talents 
of silver, one thousand of frankincense, and two hundred of 
oil of cinnamon, called stacte, all of them spices of the country 
on the Arabian Sea, He then sailed to the island of Tylos, 
and thence to Seleucia. . . . 

' These raids on the territory of Megalopolis, however, did not lead to 
open war till B.C. 202. Sec 16, 16. 

Perhaps a resumk of events in each Olympiad may arrest the 
attention of my readers i^oth by their number and importance, 
the transactions in every part of the world being 
brought under one view. However, I think the ^*f^ al^f^' 
events of this Olympiad especially will do so ; 
because in it the wars in Italy and Libya came to an end ; and 
I cannot imagine any one not caring to inquire what sort of 
catastrophe and conclusion they had. For everybody, though 
extremely interested in details and particulars, naturally longs 
to be told the end of a story. I may add that it was in this 
period also that the kings gave the clearest indication of their 
character and policy. For what was only rumour in regard to 
them before was now become a matter of clear and universal 
knowlec^e, even to those who did not care to take part in 
public business. Therefore, as I wished to make my narrative 
worthy of its subject, I have not, as in former instances, in- 
cluded the history of two years in one book. . . . 

EletUd Consul for B.C. 205 (see 11, 33) Scipio had Sicily 
assigned as his provincia, with leave to cross to Africa if necessary 
{Livy, 38, 4S), Ife sent Laelius to Africa in b.C, 205, but re- 
mained himself in Sicily. Next spring (b.c. 204) he crossed to 
Africa with a year's additional imperium. In tlte course of this 
year ke ravaged the Carthaginian territory and besieged Vtica 
(Livy, 39, 3S), and at the beginning of u.c. 203 his imperium 
was prolonged till he should have finished the war {id. 30, i). 

1. While the Consuls were thus engaged,* Scipio in Libya 
' Caepio was commanding in Bmllium, Scrvilius in Etniria and Liguria. 
Livy, 30, I. 


learnt during the winter that the Carthaginians were fitting 

out a fleet; he therefore devoted himself to 

Cn. Serviiius similar preparations as well as to pressing on 

Cacpio, c. the siege of Utica. He did not, however, give 

ServUius Geminus y ^^ j^^p^g ^f Svphax; but as their forces 

Coss. Livy, 30, 1. ^ ^/ .. u 1 *. J- 

were not far apart he kept sendmg messages to 
him, convinced that he would be able to detach him from the 
Carthaginians. He still cherished the belief that Syphax was 
getting tired of the girP for whose sake he had joined the 
Carthaginians, and of his alliance with the Punic people 
generally ; for the Numidians, he knew, were naturally quick 
to feel satiety, and constant neither to gods nor men. Scipio's 
mind, however, was distracted with various anxieties, and his 
prospects were far from seeming secure to him ; for he shrank 
from an engagement in the open field on account of the 
enemy's great superiority in numbers. He therefore seized an 
opportunity which now presented itself. Some of his mes- 
sengers to Syphax reported to him that the Carthaginians had 
constructed their huts in their winter camp of various kinds of 
wood and boughs without any earth ; while the old army of the 
Numidians made theirs of reeds, and the reinforcements which 
were now coming in from the neighbouring townships constructed 
theirs of boughs only, some of them inside the trench arid pali- 
sade, but the greater number outside. Scipio therefore made up 
his mind that the manner of attacking them, which would be 
most unexpected by the enemy and most successful for himself, 
would be by fire. He therefore turned his attention to 
organising such an attack. Now, in his communications with 

Scipio, Syphax was continually harping upon his 
SypiMix. ° proposal that the Carthaginians should evacuate 

Italy and the Romans Libya ; and that the pos- 
sessions held by either between these two countries should 
remain in statu quo. Hitherto Scipio had refused to listen to 
this suggestion, but he now gave Syphax a hint by the mouth 
of his messengers that the course he wished to see followed 
was not impossible. Greatly elated at this, Syphax became 
much bolder than before in his communications with Scipio ; 

^ Sophanisba, the daughter of Hasdrubal son of Gcsco. Livy, 29, 23 ; 30, 
12, IS- 


the numbers of the messengers sent backwards and forwards, 
and the frequency of their visits, were redoubled ; and they 
sometimes even stayed several days in each other's camps 
without any thought of precaution. On these occasions 
Scipto always took care to send, with the envoys, some men of 
tried experience or of military knowledge, dressed up as slaves 
in rough and common clothes, that they might examine and 
investigate in security the approaches and entrances to both 
the entrenchments. For there were two camps, one that of 
Hasdrubal, containing thirty thousand infantry and three thou- 
sand cavalry; and another about ten stades distant from it of the 
Numidians, containing ten thousand cavalry and about fifty thou- 
sand infantry. The latter was the easier of approach, and its 
huts were well calculated for being set on fire, because, as 1 
said before, the Numidians had not made theirs of timber and 
earth, but used simply reeds and thatch in their construction. 
2. By the beginning of spring Scipio had completed the 
reconnaissances necessary for this attempt upon 
the enemy ; and he began launching his ships, ^'^°™ 
and getting the engines on them into working 
order, as though with the purpose of assaulting Utica by sea. 
With his land forces he once more occupied the high ground 
overlooking the town, and carefully fortified it and secured it 
by trenches. He wished the enemy to believe that he was 
doing this for the sake of carrying on the siege ; but he really 
meant it as a cover for his men, who were to be engaged in the 
undertaking described above, to prevent the garrison sallying 
out, when the legions were separated from their lines, 
assaulting the palisade which was so near to them, and attack- 
ing the division left in charge of it. Whilst in the midst of 
these preparations, he sent to Syphax inquiring whether, " in 
case he agreed to his proposab, the Carthaginians would 
assent, and not say again that they would deliberate on the 
terms }" He ordered these legates at the same time not to 
return to him, until they had received an answer on these 
points. When the envoys arrived, the Numtdian king was 
convinced that Scipio was on the point of concluding the 
agreement, partly from the fact that the ambassadors said that 
they would not go away until they got his answer, and partly 


because of the anxiety expressed as to the disposition of the 
Carthaginians. He therefore sent immediately to Hasdrubal, 
stating the facts and urging him to accept the peace. Mean- 
while he neglected all precautions himself, and allowed the 
Numidians, who were now joining, to pitch their tents where 
they were, outside the lines. Scipio in appearance acted in 
the same way, while in reality he was pushing on his prepara- 
tions with the utmost care. When a message was returned 
from the Carthaginians bidding Syphax complete the treaty of 
peace, the Numidian king, in a state of great exaltation, com- 
municated the news to the envoys ; who immediately departed 
to their own camp to inform Scipio from the king of what 
had been clone. As soon as he heard it, the Roman general 
at once sent fresh envoys to inform Syphax that Scipio was 
quite satisfied and was anxious for the peace; but that the 
members of his council differed from him, and held that they 
should remain as they were. The ambassadors duly arrived 
and informed the Numidians of this. Scipio sent this mission to 

avoid the appearance of a breach of truce, if he 
^^e^l should perform any act of hostility while negoti- 
ations for peace were still going on between 
the parties. He considered that, by making this statement, he 
would be free to act in whatever way he chose without laying 
himself open to blame. 

8. Syphax's annoyance at this message was great, in pro- 
portion to the hopes he had previously entertained of making 
the peace. He had an interview with Hasdrubal, and told 
him of the message he had received from the Romans ; but 
though they deliberated long and earnestly as to what they 
ought to do, they neither had any idea or conjecture as to 
what was really going to happen. For they had no anticipa- 
tion whatever as to the need of taking precautions, or of any 
danger threatening them, but were all eagerness and excite- 
ment to strike some blow, and thus provoke the enemy to 
descend into the level ground. Meanwhile Scipio allowed his 

army generally, by the preparations he was making 

^iiisprojecT^ ^^^ ^^^ Orders he was issuing, to imagine that 

his aim was the capture of Utica; but sum- 
moning the most able and trusty Tribunes at noon, he im- 


parted to tbem his design, and ordered them to cause their 
men to get their supper early, and then to lead the legions 
outside the camp as soon as the buglers gave the usual signal 
by a simultaneous blast of their bugles. For it is a custom in 
the Roman army for the trumpeters and buglers to sound a 
call near the commander's tent at supper time, that the night 
pickets may then take up their proper positions. Scipio next 
summoned the spies whom he had sent at difierent times to 
reconnoitre the enemy's quarters, and carefully compared and 
studied the accounts they gave about the roads leading to the 
hostile camps and the entrances to them, employing Massanissa 
to criticise their words and assist him with his advice, because 
he was acquainted with the locality. 

4. Everything being prepared for his expedition, Scipio 
left a sufficiently strong guard in the camp, and got the rest of 
the men on the march towards the end of the first watch, the 
enemy being about sixty stades distant Arrived in the neigh- 
bourhood of the enemy, about the end of the third watch, he 
assigned to Gains Laehus and Massanissa half his Roman 
. soldiers and all his Numidians, with orders to attack the camp 
of Syphax, urging them to quit themselves like brave men and 
do nothing carelessly; with the clear understanding that, as the 
darkness hindered and prevented the use of the eyes, a night 
attack required all the more the assistance of a cool head and 
a firm heart The rest of the army he took the command of 
in person, and led against HasdrubaL Ke had calculated on 
not beginning his assault until Laelius's division had set fire to 
the enemy's huts; he therefore proceeded slowly, Destmction of the 
The latter meanwhile advanced in two divisions, camp of Sypbax 
which attacked the enemy simultaneously. The byCLaeiius 
construction of the huts being as though pur- ^ ^''^ 
posely contrived to be susceptible of a conHagmtion, as I have 
already explained, as soon as the front rank men began to set 
light to them, the fire caught all the first row of huts fiercely, 
and soon got beyond all control, from the closeness of the huts 
to each other, and the amount of combustible material which 
they contained. Laelius remained in the rear as a reserve ; 
but Massanissa, knowing the localities through which those 
who fled from the fire would be sure to retreat, stationed his 


own soldiers at those spots. Not a single Numidian had any 
suspicion of the true state of the case, not even Syphax 
himself; but thinking that it was a mere accidental confla- 
gration of the rampart, some of them started unsuspiciously 
out of bed, others sprang out of their tents in the midst of a 
carouse and with the cup actually at their lips. The result 
was that numbers of them got trampled to death by their own 
friends at the exits from the camp ; many were caught by the 
flames and burnt to death ; while all those who escaped the 
flame fell into the hands of the enemy, and were killed, 
without knowing what was happening to them or what they 
were doing. 

5. At the same time the Carthaginians, observing the 

proportions of the conflagration and the huge- 
and ofHasdru- ^^^^ ^^ ^^^ ^^^^ ^^^ ^^ ^.j^j^^^^ imagined that 

the Numidian camp had been accidentally 
set on fire. Some of them therefore started at once to 
render assistance, and all the rest hurried outside their own 
camp unarmed, and stood there gazing in astonishment at 
the spectacle. Everything having thus succeeded to his best 
wishes, Scipio fell upon these men outside their camp, and 
either put them to the sword, or, driving them back into 
the camp, set fire to their huts. The disaster of the Punic 
army was thus very like that which had just befallen the 
Numidians, fire and sword in both cases combining to destroy 
them. Hasdrubal immediately gave up all idea of combating 
the fire, for he knew from the coincidence of the two that the 
fire in the Numidian camp was not accidental, as he had 
supposed, but had originated from some desperate design of 
the enemy. He therefore turned his attention to saving his 
own life, although there was now little hope left of doing so. 
For the fire was spreading rapidly and was catching every- 
where ; while the camp gangways were full of horses, beasts of 
burden, and men, some of them half dead and devoured by 
the fire, and others in a state of such frantic terror and mad 
excitement that they prevented any attempts at making a 
defence, and by the utter tumult and confusion which they 
created rendered all chance of escape hopeless. The case of 
Syphax was the same as that of Hasdrubal, as it was also that 


of the other officers. The two former, however, did manage 
to escape, accompanied by a few horsemen : but all those 
myriads of men, horses, and beasts of burden, either met a 
miserable and pitiable death from the fire, or, if they escaped 
the violence of that, some of the men perished ignominiously 
at the hands of the enemy, cut down naked and defenceless, not 
only without their aims, but without so much as their clothes 
to cover them. The whole place was filled with yells of pain, 
confused cries, terror, and unspeakable din, mingled with a 
conflagration which spread rapidly and blazed with the utmost 
fierceness. It was the combination and suddenness of these 
horrors that made them so awful, any one of which by itself 
would have been sufficient to strike terror into the hearts of 
men. It is accordingly impossible for the imagination to 
exa^erate the dreadful scene, so completely did it surpass 
in horror everything hitherto recorded Of all the brilliant 
achievements of Scipio this appears to me to have been the 
most brilliant and the most daring. . . . 

6. When day broke, and he found the enemy either killed 
or in headlong flight, Scipio exhorted his Hasdnjl>al at 
Tribunes to activity, and at once started in pur- Anda, see Appian, 
suit. At first the Carthaginian general seemed ^' "* 
inclined to stand his ground, though told of Scipio's approach, 
trusting in the strength of the town [of Anda] ; but when he 
saw that the inhabitants were in a mutinous state, he shrank 
from meeting the attack of Scipio, and fled with the relics of his 
army, which consisted of as many as five hundred cavalry and 
about two thousand infantry. The inhabitants of the town 
thereupon submitted unconditionally to the Romans, and were 
spared by Scipio, who, however, gave up two neighbouring towns 
to the legions to plunder. This being done he returned to his 
original entrenchment. Baffled in the hopes which they had 
entertained of the course which the campaign 
would take, the Carthaginians were deeply de- cmi^gc. 
pressed. They had expected to shut up the 
Romans on the promontory near Utica, which had been 
the site of their winter quarters, and besiege them there 
with their army and fleet both by sea and land. With this 
view all their preparations had been made ; and when they 

VOt. II K 


saw, quite contrary to their calculations, that they were not 
only driven from the open country by the enemy, but were 
in hourly expectation of an attack upon themselves and their 
city, they became completely disheartened and panic-stricken. 
Their circumstances, however, admitted of no delay. They 
were compelled at once to take precautions and adopt some 
measures for the future. But the senate was filled with doubt 
and varied and confused suggestions. Some said that they 
ought to send for Hannibal and recall him from Italy, their 
one hope of safety being now centred in that general and his 
forces. Others were for an embassy to Scipio to obtain a truce 
and discuss with him the terms of a pacification and treaty. 
The Senate, how- Others again were for keeping up their courage 
ever, resolves to and Collecting their forces, and sending a mes- 
continue their gage to Syphax; who, they said, was at the neigh- 
bouring town of Abba, engaged in collecting 
the remnants of his army. This last suggestion was the one 
which ultimately prevailed. The Government of Carthage 
accordingly set about collecting troops, and sent a despatch to 
Syphax begging him to support them and abide by his original 
policy, as a general with an army would presently join him. 

7. Meanwhile the Roman commander was pressing on the 
seige of Utica. But when he heard that Syphax was still in 
position, and that the Carthaginians were once more collecting 
an army, he led out his forces and pitched his camp close 
under the walls of Utica. At the same time he divided the 
booty among the soldiers. . . } The merchants who pur- 
chased them from the soldiers went away with very profitable 
bargains; for the recent victory inspired the soldiers with 
high hopes of a successful conclusion of the campaign, and 
they therefore thought little of the spoils already obtained, 
and made no difficulties in selling them to the merchants. 
Q„,.K«^ ;e «^ The Numidian king and his friends were at 

oypnax is per- • j ^ • « 

suaded by Sophan- "fst mmdcd to contmue their retreat to their own 

isba to stand by land. But while deliberating on this, certain 

^^^ ^"^^^^^"^ Celtiberes, over four thousand in number, who 

had been hired as soldiers by the Carthaginians, 
arrived in the vicinity of Abba. Encouraged by this addi- 

^ Some words are lost from the text. 


tiooal strength the Numidians stopped on their retreat. And 
when the young lady, who was daughter of Hasdrubal and 
wife of Syphax, added her earnest entreaties that he would 
remain and not abandon the Carthaginians at such a crisis, the 
Numidian king gave way and consented to her prayer. The 
approach of these Celtiberes did a great deal also to encourage 
the hopes of the Carthaginians : for instead of four thousand, 
it was reported at Carthage that they were ten thousand, and 
that their bravery and the excellency of their arms made them 
irresistible in the field. Excited by this rumour, and by the 
boastful talk which was current among the common people, 
the Carthaginians felt their resolution to once xhe Canhaginians 
more take the field redoubled. And finally, again take the 
within thirty days, they pitched a camp in con- ''^'''■ 
junction with the Numidians and Celtiberes on what are 
called the Great Plains, with an army amounting to no less 
than thirty thousand. 

8. Wiien news of these proceedings reached the Roman 
camp Scipio immediately determined to attack. Leaving 
orders, therefore, to the army and navy, which were besieg- 
ing Utica, as to what they were to do, he started with all his 
army in light marching order. On the fifth day he reached 
the Great Plains, and during the first day after his arrival 
encamped on a piece of rising ground about thirty stades from 
the enemy. Next day he descended into the plain and drew up 
his army ^ at a distance of seven stades from the enemy, with 
his cavalry forming an advanced guard. After skirmishing 
attacks carried on by both sides during the next two days, on 
the fourth both armies were deliberately brought out into 
position and drawn up in order of battle, xhc baiiie on the 
Scipio followed exactly the Roman system. Great Plains. 
stationing the maniples of hastati in the front,''^"'J"""i°''~""3- 
behind them the principes, and lastly the Iriarii in the rear. 
Of his cavalry he stationed the Italians on the right wing, the 
Numidians and Massanissa on the left. Syphax and Hasdmbal 

' irap«F/|9oXX«, whioh Schweig. tmnslatra castra locavil .- but though the 
word does sometimes bear that meaning, I cannot think that it does so here. 
Scipio Hxms to hat-c retained his camp on the hill, only (wo and a half miles' 
distant, and to have come down into the plain to offer bailie each of the 
three days. Hence Ibc imperial. 


stationed the Celtiberes in the centre opposite the Roman 

cohorts, the Numidians on the left, and the Carthaginians on 

the right At the very first chaige the Numidians reeled 

The Roman before the Italian cavalry, and the Carthaginians 

wings arc both before those under Massanissa ; for their many 

victorious. previous defeats had completely demoralised 

them. But the Celtiberes fought gallantly, for they had no 

hope of saving themselves by flight, being entirely unacquainted 

with the country ; nor any expectation of being spared if they 

were taken prisoners on account of their perfidy to Scipio : for 

they were regarded as having acted in defiance of justice and 

of their treaty in coming to aid the Carthaginians against the 

Romans, though they had never suffered any act of hostility at 

The Celtiberes, on Scipio's hands during the campaigns in Iberia. 

the centre, are cut When, however, the two wings gave way these 

to pieces after a jj^gj^ ^.gj^ surrounded by the principes and 

gallant resistance, ^^.^j^ ^^^ ^^^ ^^ p.^^^^ ^^ ^^ ^^j^ ^^^^^ ^^ 

a man. Thus perished the Celtiberes, who yet did very 
effective service to the Carthaginians, not only during the 
whole battle, but during the retreat also; for, if it had not 
been for the hindrance caused by them, the Romans would 
have pressed the fugitives closely, and very few of the enemy 
would have escaped. As it was, owing to the delay caused 

by these men, Syphax and his cavalry effected 

Hasdmb^ie. ^^^^^ ^^^^^^^ ^^ ^^^ o^'^ kingdom in safety ; 

while Hasdrubal with the survivors of his army 
did the same to Carthage. 

9. After making the necessary arrangements as to the booty 
J, . . . .u and prisoners, Scipio summoned a council of 

ocipio receives ine . _ _ 

submission of the war to consult as to what to do next It was 
country, while resolved that Scipio himself and one part of the 
Laciius goes in ^^^^ g^ould Stay in the country and visit the 

pursuit of Syphax. / i.'i t v j •»* • 

various towns; while Laelius and Massanissa, 
with the Numidians and the rest of the Roman legions, 
should pursue Syphax and give him no time to deliberate or 
make any preparations. This being settled the commanders 
separated ; the two latter going with their division in pursuit 
of Syphax, Scipio on a round of the townships. Some of 
these were terrified into a voluntary submission to the Romans, 


Others he jwompdy took by assault The whole country was 
ripe for a change, owing to the constant series of miseries and 
contributions, under which it had been groaning from the pro- 
tracted wars in Iberia. 

In Carthage meanwhile, where the panic had been great 
enough before, a still wilder state of excitement 
prevailed, after this second disaster, and the dis- c^thaee' 
appointment of the hopes of success which they 
had entertained. However, those of the counsellors who 
claimed the highest character for courage urged that they 
should go on board their ships and attack the besiegers of 
Utica, try to raise the blockade, and engage the enemy at sea, 
who were not in a forward state of preparation in that depart- 
ment; that they should recall Hannibal, and without delay 
test to the utmost this one more chance : for both these 
measures offered great and reasonable opportunities of secur- 
ing their safety. Others declared that their circumstances no 
longer admitted of these measures : what they had to do was 
to fortify their town and prepare to stand a siege ; for chance 
would give them many occasions of striking a successful blow 
if they only held together. At the same time they advised 
that they should deliberate on coming to terms and making a 
treaty, and see on what conditions and by what means they 
might extricate themselves from the danger. After a long 
debate, all these proposals were adopted together. 

10. Upon this decision being come to, those who were to 
sail to Italy went straight from the council chamber to the sea, 
while the Navarch went to prepare the ships. The rest began 
to take measures for securing the city, and remained in con- 
stant consultation on the measures necessary for the purpose. 

Meanwhile Scipio's camp was getting gorged with booty ; 
for he found no one to resist him, and everybody yielded to 
bis attacks. He therefore determined to despatch the greater 
part of the booty to his original camp; while he advanced with 
his army in light marching order to seize the entrenchment 
near Tunes, and pitched his camp within the view of the in- 
habitants of Carthage, thinking that this would do more than 
anything else to strike terror into their hearts and lower their 


The Carthaginians had in a few days manned and pro- 
visioned their ships, and were engaged in getting under 
sail and carrying out their plan of operations, when Scipio 
arrived at Tunes, and, the garrison flying at his approach, 
occupied the town, which is about a hundred stades from Car- 
thage, of remarkable strength both natural and artificial, and 
visible from nearly every point of Carthage. 

Just as the Romans pitched their camp there, the Cartha- 
Scipio rccaUed to ginians were putting out to sea on board thieir 
utica by the fear ships to sail to Utica. Seeing the enemy thus 

of an attack putting out, and fearing some misfortune to his 

upon Ills tleet. <i.r^** jj j*i 

own fleet, Scipio was rendered exceedingly 
anxious, because no one there was prepared for such an attack, 
or had anything in readiness to meet the danger. He there- 
fore broke up his camp and marched back in haste to support 
his men. There he found his decked ships thoroughly well 
fitted out for raising siege-engines and applying them to walls, 
and generally for all purposes of an assault upon a town, but 
not in the least in the trim for a sea-fight ; while the enemy's 
fleet had been under process of rigging for this purpose tiie 
whole winter. He therefore gave up all idea of putting to sea 
to meet the enemy and accepting battle there ; but anchoring 
his decked ships side by side he moored the transports round 
them, three or four deep ; and then, taking down the masts and 
yard-arms, he lashed the vessels together firmly by means of 
these, keeping a space between each sufficient to enable the 
light craft to sail in and out . . . 


1 1. Philo was a parasite of Agathocles, the son of Oenanthe, 
and the friend of king Philopator. . . . 

Many statues of Cleino, the girl who acted as cupbearer 

The extra- ^^ Ptolemy Philadelphus, were set up at Alex- 
ordinary influence andria, draped in a single tunic and holding a 
of women of low cup in the hands. And are not the most splen- 

Ai^andri^ ^^^ bouses there those which go by the names 

of Murtium, Mnesis, and Pothine ? And yet 

Mnesis was a flute -girl, as was Pothine, and Murtium was a 


public prostitute. And was not Agathocleia, the mistress of 
kir^ Ptolemy Fhilopator, an influential personage, — she who 
was the niin of the whole kingdom ? . . . 

12. The question may be asked, perhaps, why I have 
chosen to give a sketch of Egyptian history The feeble char- 
here, going back a considerable period ; whereas, acta- of Ptolemy 
in the case of the rest of my history, I havQ Phi'opaior. 
recorded the events of each year in the several countries side 
by side ? I have done so for the following reasons : Ptolemy 
Philopator, of whom I am now speaking, after the conclusion 
of the war for the possession of Coele-Syria,^ abandoned all 
noble pursuits and gave himself up to the hfe of debauchery 
which I have just described. But late in life he was com- 
pelled by circumstances to engage in the war 1 have men- 
tioned,* which, over and above the mutual cruelty and lawless- 
ness with which it was conducted, witnessed neither pitched 
battle, sea fight, siege, or anything else worth recording. I 
thought, therefore, that it would be easier for me as a writer, 
and more intelligible to my readers, if I did not touch upon 
everything year by year as it occurred, or give a full account 
of transactions which were insignificant and undeserving of 
serious attention ; but should once for all sum up and describe 
the character and policy of this king. 

' The war with Antiochus, B.C. aiB-ai7. See s, 40, 58-71, 79-87. 
* A civil vk'ar, apparently in a rebellion caused by bis own feeble and vicious 
character. It seems lo be that referred to in 5, 107, 


A slight success on the part of the Carthaginian fleet at 

Utica (14, 10) had been more than outweighed by the capture 

of Syphax by Laelius \Livy^ 39, 11} Negotiations for peace 

followed^ and an armistice^ in tlie course of which occurred the 

incident referred to in the first extract of this book, 

1. The Carthaginians having seized the transports as prizes 
Some transports ^f war, and with them an extraordinary quantity 
under Cn. Octa- of provisions, Scipio was extremely enraged, 
h"^ i^*^^^r ^" "^^^ ^° much at the loss of the provisions, as by 
thage, and tak^n the fact that the enemy had thereby obtained 
possession of by a vast supply of necessaries ; and still more at 
the Carthaginians ^l^g Carthaginians having violated the sworn 

m spite of the . , r * ^ t 

truce. Autumn articles of truce, and commenced the war 
of B.C. 203. afresh. He therefore at once selected Lucius 

^^' ^"*^» 30. 24. Sergius, Lucius Baebius, and Lucius Fabius to 
go to Carthage, to remonstrate on what had taken place, and 
at the same time to announce that the Roman people had 
ratified the treaty ; for he had lately received a despatch from 
home to that effect Upon their arrival in Carthage these 
envoys first had an audience of the Senate, and then were 
introduced to a meeting of the people. On both occasions 

they spoke with great freedom on the situation 

Roi^nc'liVoys. °^ ^^^^^^' reminding their hearers that "Their 

ambassadors who had come to the Roman 
camp at Tunes, on being admitted to the council of officers, 
had not been content with appealing to the gods and 
kissing the ground, as other people do, but had thrown 
themselves upon the earth, and in abject humiliation 
had kissed the feet of the assembled officers ; and then, rising 


from the ground, had reproached themselves for breaking the 
existing treaty between the Romans and Carthaginians, and 
acknowledged that they deserved every severity at the hands 
of the Romans ; but intreated to be spared the last severities, 
from a regard to the vicissitudes of hupian fortune, for their 
folly would be the means of displaying the generosity of the 
Romans. Remembering all this, the general and the officers 
then present in the council were at a loss to understand what 
had encouraged them to forget what they then said, and to 
venture to break their sworn articles of agreement. Plainly it 
was this — they trusted in Hannibal and the Hannibal leaves 
forces that had arrived with him. But they iraiy, aadjune, 
were very ill advised All the world knew ^■'^- *°3- 
that he and his army had been driven these two years past 
from every port of Italy, and had retreated into the neighbour- 
hood of the Lacinian promontory, where they had been so 
closely shut up and almost besieged, that they had barely 
been able to get safe away home, Not that, even if they ' 
had come fiack," he added, " as conquerors, and were minded 
to engage us who have already defeated you in two con- 
secutive battles, ought you to entertain any doubt as to the 
result, or to speculate on the chance of victory. The certainty 
of defeat were a better subject for your reflections : and when 
that takes place, what are the gods that you will summon to 
your aid? And what arguments will you use to move the pity 
of the victors for your misfortunes ? You must needs expect 
to be debarred from all hope of mercy from gods and men 
alike by your perfidy and folly." 

2. After delivering this speech the envoys retired. Some 
few of the citizens were against breaking the Treacherous 
treaty j but the majority, both of the poli- aitempi on ihc 
ticians and the Senate, Ti'ere much annoyed "''esodhe 
by its terms, and irritated by the plain speak- 
ing of the envoys ; and, moreover, could not make up their 
minds to surrender the captured transports and the provisions 
which were on board them. But their main motive was a con- 
fident hope that they might yet conquer by means of Hannibal 
The people therefore voted to dismiss the envoys without an 
answer. Moreover, the political party, whose aim it was to 


bring on the war at all hazards, held a meeting and arranged 
the following act of treachery. They gave out that it was neces- 
sary to make provision for conducting the envo]^ back to their 
camp in safety. They therefore at once caused two triremes 
to be got ready to convoy them ; but at the same time sent a 
message to the Navarch Hasdrubal to have some vessels ready 
at no great distance from the Roman camp, in order that, as 
soon as the convoys had taken leave of the Roman envoj^ he 
might bear down upon their ships and sink them; for the 
Carthaginian fleet was stationed at the time close under 
Utica. Having made this arrangement with Hasdrubal, they 
despatched the envoys, with instructions to the officers of the 
convoys to leave them and return, as soon as they had passed 
the mouth of the River Macara ; for it was from this point that 
the enemy's camp came into sight Therefore, according to their 
instructions, as soon as they had passed this point, the officers 
of the convoys made signs of farewell to the Roman envoys 
and returned. Lucius and his colleagues suspected no danger, 
and felt no other annoyance at this proceeding than as re- 
garding it as a mark of disrespect But no sooner were they 
left thus alone, than three Carthaginian vessels suddenly started 
out to attack them, and came up with the Roman quinquereme. 
They failed, indeed, to stave her in, because she evaded them ; 
nor did they succeed in boarding her, because the men resisted 
them with great spirit But they ran up alongside of the 
vessel, and kept attacking her at various points, and managed 
to wound the marines with their darts and kill a considerable 
number of them ; until at last the Romans, observing that their 
forage parties along the shore were rushing down to the beach 
to their assistance, ran their ships upon land. Most of the 
marines were killed, but the envoys had the unexpected good 
fortune to escape with their lives. 

8. This was the signal for the recommencement of the war 
in a fiercer and more angry spirit than before. 

hc«uutie^ ^^^ Romans on their part, looking upon them- 
selves as having been treated with perfidy, were 
possessed with a furious determination to conquer the Car- 
thaginians ; while the latter, conscious of the consequences of 
what they had done, were ready to go all lengths to avoid 


Calling under the power of the enemy. With such feelings 
animating both sides, it was quite evident that the result 
would have to be decided on the field of battle Conse- 
quently everybody, not only in Italy and Libya, but in Iberia, 
Sicily, and Sardinia, was in a state of excited expectation, 
watching with conflicting feelings to see what would happen. 
But meanwhile Hannibal, finding himself too Hannibal's 
weak in cavalry, sent to a certain Numidian cavalry reinforced 
named Tychaeus, who was a friend of Syphax, *''' Tychaeus. 
and was reputed to possess the most warlike cavalry in Libya, 
urging him "to lend his aid, and not let the present opportunity 
slip ; as he must be well aware that, if the Carthaginians won 
the day, he would be able to maintain his rule; but if the Romans 
proved victorious, his very life would be in danger, owing to the 
ambition of Massanissa." This prince was convinced by these 
arguments, and joined Hannibal with two thousand horsemen. 

4. Having secured his fieet, Scipio left Baebius in 
command of it in his place, while he him- 
self went a round of the cities. This time scjpi^,^'^iji.sjj 
he did not admit to mercy those who volun- the CartiiBginian 
tarily surrendered, but carried all the towns by temiory, and 
force, and enslaved the inhabitants, to show his j^^J^'^yj^j 
anger at the treachery of the Carthaginians. To 
Massanissa he sent message after message, explaining to him 
how the Punic government had broken the terms, and urging 
him to collect the largest army he was able and join him with 
all speed. For as soon as the treaty had been made, Massan- 
issa, as I have said, had immediately departed with his own 
army and ten Roman cohorts, infantry and cavalry, accom- 
panied by some commissioners from Scipio, that he might not 
only recover his own kingdom, but secure the addition of that 
of Syphax also, by the assistance of the Romans. And this 
purpose was eventually effected. 

It happened that just at this time the envoys from Rome 
arrived at the naval camp. Those of them scipio orders 
who had been sent by the Roman government, ihe Carthaginian 
Baebius at once caused to be escorted to e"™ysiob« 
Scipio, while he retained those who were Car- 
thaginians. The latter were much cast down, and regarded 


their position as one of great danger; for when they were 
informed of the impious outrage committed by their countr3rmen 
on the persons of the Roman envoys, they thought there could 
be no doubt that the vengeance for it would be wreaked upon 
themselves. But when Scipio learnt from the recently-arrived 
commissioners that the senate and people accepted with en- 
thusiasm the treaty which he had made with the Carthaginians, 
and were ready to grant everything he asked, he was highly 
delighted, and ordered Baebius to send the envoys home with 
all imaginable courtesy. And he was very well advised to do 
so, in my opinion. For as he knew that his countrymen 
made a great point of respecting the rights of ambassadors, he 
considered in his own mind, not what the Carthaginians de- 
served to have done to them, but what it was becoming in 
Romans to inflict Therefore, though he did not relax his 
own indignation and anger at what they had done, he yet 
endeavoured, in the words of the proverb, "to maintain the 
good traditions of his sires." The result was that, by this 
superiority in his conduct, a very decided impression was 
made upon the spirits of the Carthaginians and of Hannibal 

6. When the people of Carthage saw the cities in their 
• '. -territory being sacked, they sent a message to Hannibal beg- 
ging him to act without delay, to come to close quarters with 
the enemy, and bring the matter to the decision of battle. 
He bade the messengers in answer "to confine their attention 
to other matters, and to leave such things to him, for he 
would choose the time for fighting himself." Some days 
afterwards he broke up his quarters at Adrumetum, and 

pitched his camp near Zama, a town about five 
"''to'^mT''^ days' march to the west of Carthage. From 

that place he sent spies to ascertain the place, 
nature, and strength of the Roman general's encampment 
These spies were caught and brought to Scipio, who, so far 
from inflicting upon them the usual punishment of spies, 
appointed a tribune to show them everything in the camp 
thoroughly and without reserve ; and when this had been done, 
he asked the men whether the appointed officer had been care- 
ful to point out everything to them. Upon their replying that 


he had, be gave them provisions and an escort, and despatched 
them with injunctions to be careful to tell Hannibal every- 
thing they had seen. On their return to his camp, Hannibal 
was so much struck with the magnanimity and high courage ' 
of Scipio, that he conceived a lively desire for a personal in- 
terview with him. With this purpose he sent a herald to say 
that he was desirous of a parley to discuss the matters at issue. 
When the herald had delivered his message, Scipio at once 
expressed his consent, and said that he would himself send 
him a message when it suited him to meet, naming the time 
and place. The herald returned to Hannibal with this answer. 
Next day Massanissa arrived with six thousand 
infantry and about four thousand cavalry. Scipio M^^tmi^ 
received him with cordiality, and congratulated 
him on having added to his sway all those who had previously 
been subject to Syphax. Thus reinforced, he removed bis 
camp to Naragara : selecting it as a place which, among 
other advantages, enabled him to get water within a javelin's 

6. From this place he sent to the Carthaginian general, 
informing him that he was ready to meet him, and discuss 
matters with him. On hearing this, Hannibal moved his quar- 
ters to within thirty stades of Scipio, and pitched his camp on 
a hill, which seemed a favourable position for his present pur- 
pose, except that water had to be fetched from a considerable 
distance which caused his soldiers great fatigue. 

Next day both commanders advanced from their camps 
attended by a few horsemen. Presently they 
left these escorts and met in the intervening *^d HaS," 
space by themselves, each accompanied by an 
interpreter. Hannibal was the 6rst to speak, after the usual 
salutation. He said that " He wished that the 
Romans had never coveted any possession ^^[j ' 
outside Italy, nor the Carthaginians outside 
Libya ; for these were both noble empires, and were, so to 
speak, marked out by nature. But since," he continued, " our 
rival claims to Sicily first made us enemies, and then those 
for Iberia; and since, finally, unwarned by the lessons of mis- 
fortune, we have gone so far that the one nation has eo- 


dangered the very soil of its native land, and the other is 
now actually doing so, all that there remains for us to do is 
to try our best to deprecate the wrath of the gods, and to put 
an end, as far as in us lies, to these feelings of obstinate hos- 
tility. I personally am ready to do this, because I have learnt 
by actual experience that Fortune is the most fickle thing in 
the world, and inclines with decisive favour now to one side 
and now to the other on the slightest pretext, treating man- 
kind like young children. 

7. " But it is about you that I am anxious, Scipia For 
you are still a young man, and everything has succeeded to 
your wishes both in Iberia and Libya, and you have as yet 
never experienced the ebb tide of Fortune ; I fear, therefore, 
that my words, true as they are, will not influence you. But 
do look at the facts in the light of one story, and that not 
connected with a former generation, but our owa Look at 
me ! I am that Hannibal who, after the battle of Cannae, 
became master of nearly all Italy ; and presently advancing to 
Rome itself, and pitching my camp within forty stades of it, 
deliberated as to what I should do with you and your country ; 
but now I am in Libya debating with you, a Roman, as to the 
bare existence of myself and my countrymen. With such 
a reverse as that before your eyes, I beg you not to entertain 
high thoughts, but to deliberate with a due sense of human 
weakness on the situation ; and the way to do that is among 
good things to choose the greatest, among evils the least. 
What man of sense, then, would deliberately choose to incur 
the risk which is now before you. If you conquer, you will 
add nothing of importance to your glory or to that of your 
country ; while, if you are worsted, you will have been your- 
self the means of entirely cancelling all the honours and 
glories you have already won. What then is the point that I 
am seeking to establish by these arguments ? It is that the 
Romans should retain all the countries for which we have 
hitherto contended — I mean Sicily, Sardinia, and Iberia ; and 
that the Carthaginians should engage never to go to war with 
Rome for these ; and also that all the islands lying between 
Italy and Libya should belong to Rome. For I am per- 
suaded that such a treaty will be at once safest for the 


Carthaginians, and most glorious for you and the entire people 
of Rome." 

8. In reply to this speech of Hannibal, Scipio said "That 

neither in the Sicilian nor Iberian war were the ,.■■._, 
_ , , - 1 . Scipio s reply, 

Romans the aggressors, but notoriously the 
Carthaginians, which no one knew better than Hannibal him- 
self. That the gods themselves had confirmed this by giving 
the victory, not to those who struck the first and unprovoked 
blow, but to those who only acted in self defence. That he 
was as ready as any one to keep before his eyes the uncertainty 
of Fortune, and tried his best to confine his efforts within the 
range of human infirmity. But if," he continued, "you had 
yourself quitted Italy before the Romans crossed to Libya 
with the offer of these terms in your hands, I do not think 
that you would have been disappointed in your expectation. 
But now that your departure from Italy has been involuntary, 
and we have crossed into Libya and conquered the country, 
it is clear that matters stand on a very different footing. But 
above all, consider the point which affairs have reached now. 
Your countrymen have been beaten, and at their earnest 
prayer we arranged a written treaty, in which, besides the 
offer now made by you, it was provided that the Carthaginians 
should restore prisoners without ransom, should surrender all 
their decked vessels, pay five thousand talents, and give 
hostages for their performance of these articles. These were 
the terms which I and they mutually agreed upon ; we both 
despatched envoys to our respective Senates and people, — we 
consenting to grant these terms, the Carthaginians begging to 
have them granted. The Senate agreed : the people ratified 
the treaty. But though they had got what they asked, the 
Carthaginians annulled the compact by an act of perfidy 
towards us. What course is left to me ? Put yourself in my 
place and say. To withdraw the severest clauses of the treaty ? 
Are we to do this, say you, not in order that by reaping the 
reward of treachery they may learn in future to outrage their 
benefactors, but in order that by getting what they ask for 
they may be grateful to us ? Why, only the other day, after 
obtaining what they begged for as suppliants, because your 
presence gave them a slender hope of success, they at once 


treated us as hated foes and public enemies. In these circum- 
stances, if a still severer clause were added to the conditioni 
imposed, it might be possible to refer the treaty back to the 
people ; but, if I were to withdraw any of these conditions, such 
a reference does not admit even of discussion. What then is 
the conclusion of my discourse ? It is, that you must sub- 
mit yourselves and your country to us unconditionally, or 
conquer us in the field" 

9. After these speeches Hannibal and Scipio parted without 

The momentous coming to any terms ; and next morning by 

issues depending daybreak both generals drew out their forces 

onthe battle of ^^d engaged To the Carthaginians it was a 

' * ^°** struggle for their own lives and the sovereignty 

of Libya; to the Romans for universal dominion and supremacy. 

And could any one who grasped the situation fail to be moved 

at the story? Armies more fitted for war than these, or 

generals who had been more successful or more thoroughly 

trained in all the operations of war, it would be impossible to 

find, or any other occasion on which the prizes proposed by 

destiny to the combatants were more momentous. For it was 

not merely of Libya or Europe that the victors in this battle 

were destined to become masters, but of all other parts of the 

world known to history, — a destiny which had not to wait 

long for its fulfilment. 

Scipio placed his men on the field in the following order : 

the hastati first, with an interval between their 

^ofbatU^^ maniples; behind them the principeSy their 

maniples not arranged to cover the intervals 

between those of the hastati as the Roman custom is, but 

immediately behind them at some distance, because the enemy 

was so strong in elephants. In the rear of these he stationed 

the triarii. On his left wing he stationed Gaius Laelius with 

the Italian cavalry, on the right Massanissa with all his 

Numidians. The intervals between the front maniples he 

filled up with maniples of velitesy who were ordered to begin 

the battle ; but if they found themselves unable to stand the 

charge of the elephants, to retire quickly either to the rear of 

the whole army by the intervals between the maniples, which 

went straight through the ranks, or, if they got entangled with 


the elephants, to step aside into the lateral spaces between the 

10. These dispositions made, he went along the ranks 
delivering an exhortation to the men, which, 

though short, was much to the point in the ^ohj^*^^^ 
circumstances in which they were placed. He 
called upon them, "Remembering their former victories, to 
show themselves to be men of mettle and worthy their repu- 
tation and their country. To put before their eyes that the 
effect of their victory would be not only to make them complete 
masters of Libya, but to give them and their country the 
supremacy and undisputed lordship of the world. But if the 
result of the battle were unfavourable, those who fell fighting 
gallantly would have the record of having died for their 
country, while those that saved themselves by flight would 
spend the rest of their days as objects of pitying contempt 
and scorn. For there was no place in Libya which could 
secure their safety if they fled; while, if they fell into the hands 
of the Carthaginians, no one who looked facts in the face 
could doubt what would happen to them. May none of you," 
he added, "learn that by experience! Since, then, Fortune 
puts before us the most glorious of rewards, in whichever way 
the batde is decided, should we not be at once the most 
mean-spirited and foolish of mankind if we abandon the most 
glorious alternative, and from a paltry clinging to life deli- 
berately choose the worst of misfortunes ? Charge the enemy 
then with the steady resolve to do one of two things, to 
conquer or to die ! For it is men thus minded who invariably 
conquer their opponents, since they enter the field with no 
other hope of life." 

11. Such was Scipio's address to his men. Meanwhile 
Hannibal had put his men also into position. His 

elephants, which numbered more than eighty, he ""^'^X"^" 
placed in the van of the whole army. Next his 
mercenaries, amounting to twelve thousand, and consisting of 
Ltgurians, Celts, Baliarians, and Mauretani; behind them 
the native Libyans and Carthaginians ; and on the rear of the 
whole the men whom he had brought from Italy, at a distance 
of somewhat more than a stade. His wings he strengthened 


with cavalry, stationing the Numidian allies on the left wing; 

and the Carthaginian horsemen on the right He ordered 

each officer to address his own men, bidding them rest their 

hopes of victory on him and the army he had brought with 

him; while he bade their officers remind the Carthaginians 

in plain terms what would happen to their wives and children 

if the battle should be lost While these orders were carried 

out by the officers, Hannibal himself went along the lines of 

his Italian army and urged them " to remember the seventeen 

Hannibal's years during which they had been brothers-in- 

speech to the arms, and the number of battles they had fought 

•army of Italy." ^^^j^ ^j^^ Romans, in which they had never been 

beaten or given the Romans even a hope of victory. Above 
all, putting aside minor engagements and their countless suc- 
cesses, let them place before their eyes the battle of the River 
Trebia against the father of the present Roman commander ; 
and again the battle in Etruria against Flaminius; and 
lastly that at Cannae against Aemilius, with none of which 
was the present struggle to be compared, whether in regard 
to the number or excellence of the enemy's men. Let 
them only raise their eyes and look at the ranks of the 
enemy ; they would see that they were not merely fewer, but 
many times fewer than those with whom they had fought 
before, while, as to their soldierly qualities, there was no com- 
parison. The former Roman armies had come to the struggle 
with them untainted by memories of past defeats : while these 
men were the sons or the remnants of those who had been 
beaten in Italy, and fled before him again and again. They 
ought not therefore," he said, " to undo the glory and fame 
of their previous achievements, but to struggle with a firm and 
brave resolve to maintain their reputation of invincibility." 

Such were the addresses of the two commanders. 

12. All arrangements for the battle being complete, and 
the two opposing forces of Numidian cavalry 
fhe'eSntsf ^^^ing been for some time engaged in skirmish- 
ing attacks upon each other, Hannibal gave the 
word to the men on the elephants to charge the enemy. But 
as they heard the horns and trumpets braying all round them, 
some of the elephants became unmanageable and rushed back 


upon the Numidian contingents of the Carthaginian army; 
and this enabled Massanissa with great speed to deprive the 
Carthaginian left wing of its cavalry support The rest of the 
elephants charged the Roman veUtes in the spaces between the 
maniples of the line, and while inflicting much damage on the 
enemy suffered severely themselves ; until, becoming frightened, 
some of them ran away down the vacant spaces, the Romans 
letting them pass harmlessly along, according to Scipio's 
orders, while others ran away to the right under a shower of 
darts from the cavalry, until they were finally driven clear off 
the field. It was just at the moment of this might of ibe 
stampede of the elephants, that Laelius forced Canhaginian 
the Carthaginian cavalry into headlong flight, ca™lry. 
and along with Massanissa pressed them with a vigorous 
pursuit While this was going on, the opposing lines of heavy 
infantry were advancing to meet others with deliberate step and 
proud confidence, except Hannibal's "army of Italy," which 
remained in its or^nal position. When they came within 
distance the Roman soldiers charged the enemy, shouting as 
usual their war-cry, and clashing their swords against their 
shields : while the Carthaginian mercenaries uttered a strange 
confusion of cries, the effect of which was indescribable, for, in 
the words of the poet,' the " voice of all was not one " — 

18. The whole affair being now a trial of strength between 
man and man at close quarters, as the combat- 
ants used their swords and not their spears, the ^^^f^tj* 
superiority was at first on the side of the dexterity 
and daring of the mercenaries, which enabled them to wound 
a considerable number of the Romans. The latter, however, 
trusting to the steadiness of their ranks and the excellence of 
their arms, still kept gaining ground, their rear ranks keeping 
close up with them and encouraging them to advance ; while 
the Carthaginians did not keep up with their mercenaries nor 
support them, but showed a thoroughly cowardly spirit. The 
result was that the foreign soldiers gave way : and, believing that 
they had been shamelessly abandoned by their own side, ff" 
' Homer, Iliad, 4, 437. 


upon the men on their rear as they were retreating, and began 
killing them ; whereby many of the Carthaginians were com- 
pelled to meet a gallant death in spite of themselves. For as 
they were being cut down by their mercenaries they had, much 
against their inclination, to fight with their own men and the 
Romans at the same time ; and as they now fought with 
desperation and fury they killed a good many both of their 
own men and of the enemy also. Thus it came about that their 
charge threw the maniples of the hastati into confusion ; where- 
upon the officers of the principes caused their lines to advance 
to oppose them. However, the greater part of the mercenaries 
and Carthaginians had fallen either by mutual slaughter or by the 
sword of the hastati. Those who survived and fled Hannibal 
would not allow to enter the ranks of his army, but ordered 
his men to lower their spears and keep them back as they 
approached ; and they were therefore compelled to take refuge 
on the wings or make for the open country. 

14. The space between the two armies that still remained 

Final struggle in position was full of blood, wounded men, and 

between dead corpses ; and thus the rout of the enemy 

Hannibal s proved an impediment of a perplexing nature to 

reserves his * r o 

•' army of Italy," the Roman general. Everything was calculated 
and the whole to make an advance in order difficult, — the 
Roman infantry, ground slippery with gore, the corpses lying 
piled up in bloody heaps, and with the corpses arms flung 
about in every direction. However Scipio caused the wounded 
to be carried to the rear, and the hastati to be recalled from 
the pursuit by the sound of a bugle, and drew them up where 
they were in advance of the ground on which the fighting had 
taken place, opposite the enemy's centre. He then ordered 
the principes and triarii to take close order, and, threading their 
way through the corpses, to deploy into line with the hastati on 
either flank. When they had surmounted the obstacles and 
got into line with the hastatiy the two lines charged each other 
with the greatest fire and fury. Being nearly equal in numbers, 
spirit, courage, and arms, the battle was for a long time un- 
decided, the men in their obstinate valour falling dead without 
The battle is S^^ing way a step ; until at last the divisions of 
decided by the Massanissa and Laelius, returning from the 


pursuit, arrived providentially in the very nick reiumorihe 
of time. Upon their charging Hannibal's rear, Roman and 
the greater part of his men were cut down in ra™i™" 
their ranks ; while of those who attempted to fly 
very few escaped with their life, because the horsemen were 
close at their heels and the ground was quite level. On the 
Roman side there fell over fifteen hundred, on the Cartha- 
ginian over twenty thousand, while the prisoners taken were 
almost as numerous. 

16. Such was the end of this battle, fought under these 
famous commanders : a battle on which everything depended, 
and which assigned universal dominion to Rome, After it had 
come to an end, Scipio pushed on in pursuit as far as the 
Carthaginian camp, and, a(ler plundering that, 
returned to his own, Hannibal, escaping with to^drum^m^ 
a few horsemen, did not draw rein until he 
arrived safely at Adrumetum. He had done in the battle all 
that was to be expected of a good and experienced general 
First, he had tried by an interview with his opponent to see 
what he could do to procure a pacification ; and that was the 
right course for a man, who, while fully conscious of his former 
victories, yet mistrusts Fortune, and has an eye to all the possible 
and unexpected contingencies of war. Next, having accepted 
battle, the excellence of his dispositions for a contest with 
the Romans, considering the identity of the arms on each side, 
could not have been surpassed. For though the Roman line ~ 
is hard to break, yet each individual soldier and each company, 
owing to the uniform tactic employed, can fight in any direction, 
those companies, which happen to be in nearest contact with 
the danger, wheeling round to the point required. Again, the 
nature of their arms gives at once protection and confidence, for 
their shield is large and their sword will not bend : the Romans 
therefore are formidable on the field and hard to conquer, 

16. Still Hannibal took his measures against each of these 
difficulties in a manner that could not be surpassed. He pro- 
vided himself with those numerous elephants, and put them in 
the van, for the express purpose of throwing the enemy's ranks 
into confusion and breaking their order. Again he stationed 
the mercenaries in firont and the Carthaginians behind them, in 


order to wear out the bodies of the enemy with &tigue before- 
hand, and to blunt the edge of their swords by the numbers 
that would be killed by them ; and moreover to compel the 
Carthaginians, by being in the middle of the army, to stay 
where they were and fight, as the poet says^ — 

** That howsoe'er unwilling fight he must.** 

But the most warlike and steady part of his army he held in 
reserve at some distance, in order that they might not see 
what was happening too closely, but, with strength and spirit 
unimpaired, might use their courage to the best advantage 
when the moment arrived. And, if in spite of having done 
everything that could be done, he who had never been beaten 
before failed to secure the victory now, we must excuse him. 
For there are times when chance thwarts the plans of the 
brave ; and there are others again, when a man 

** Though great and brave has met a greater stilL**' 

And this we might say was the case with Hannibal on this 
occasion. . . . 

17. Manifestations of emotion which go beyond what is 
customary among a particular people, if they 

^'^ht'eTvo'J^' a^e ^ho"g^^ ^o t)e the result of genuine feeling 

from Carthage evoked by extraordinary disasters, excite pity 

after Zama, who in the minds of those who see or hear them ; 

!;i^nH^''n?3!l? and we are all in a manner moved by the 

displays of sorrow. , - , , -r^ i i i • 

novelty of the spectacle. But when such thmgs 
appear to be assumed for the purpose of taking in the spec- 
tators and producing a dramatic effect, they do not provoke 
pity, but anger and dislike. And this was the case in regard 
to the Carthaginian envoys. Scipio deigned to give a very 
brief answer to their prayers, saying that " They, at any rate, 
deserved no kindness at the hands of the Romans, since 
they had themselves confessed that they were the aggres- 
sors in the war, by having, contrary to their treaty obliga- 
tions, taken Saguntum and enslaved its inhabitants, and had 
recently been guilty of treachery and breaking the terms of a 
treaty to which they had subscribed and sworn. It was from 

^ Homer, Iliad, 4, 300. 
'^ A line of which the author is unknown ; perhaps it was Theognis. 


a regard to their own dignity, to the vicissitudes of Fortune, and 
to the dictates of humanity that the Romans had determined 
to treat them with lenity and behave with magnanimity. And 
of this they would be convinced if they would take a right 
view of the case. For they ought not to consider it a hard- 
ship if they found themselves charged to submit to any punish- 
ment, to follow a particular line of conduct, or to give up 
this or that ; they ought rather to regard it as an unexpected 
favour that any kindness was conceded to them at all ; since 
Fortune, after depriving them of all right to pity and considera- 
tion, owing to their own unrighteous conduct, had put them in 
the power of their enemies." After this preamble he men- 
tioned the concessions to be made to them, and the penalties 
to which they were to submit 

18. The following are the heads of the terms offered 
them: — The Carthaginians to retain tite towns Terms imposed 
in Libya, of which they were possessed be/ore fhpf on Canhage after 
commenced the last war against Rome, and /A*'''^*""'^'''^'™'' 
territory which they also heretofore held, with 
its cattle, slaves, and olher stock : and from that day should not 
be subject to ads of hostility, should enjoy their own laws and 
customs, and not have a Roman garrison in their city. These 
were the concessions favourable to them. The clauses of an 
opposite character were as follows : — The Carthaginians to pay 
an indemnify to the Romans for all wrongs committed during 
the truee ; to restore all captives and runaway slaves without 
limit of time ; to hand aver all their ships of war except ten 
triremes, and all elephants ; to go to war with no people outside 
Libya at all, and with none in Libya without consent from 
Rome ; to restore to Massanissa all houses, territory, and cities 
belonging to him or his ancestors within the frontiers assigned to 
that king ; to supply the Roman army with proiisions for three 
months, and with pay, until such time as an answer shall be 
returned from Rome on the subject of the treaty ; to pay ten 
thousand talents of silver in fifty years, two hundred Euboic 
talents every year ; to give a hundred hostages of thar good faith, 
— such hostages to be selected from the young men of the country 
fy the Roman general, and to be not younger than fourteen or 
older than thirty years. 


19. This was the nature of Scipio*s answer to the envoys, 

who hastened home and communicated its 

(^rtt^iglnki^;^-. ^^™^ ^^ *^^*^ countrymen. It was then that 
sembiy. Hannibal the story goes that, upon a certain Senator 

persuades them intending to speak against accepting the terms 
^""t^w^^ and actually beginning to do so, Hannibal 
^* came forward and pulled the man down from 
the tribune ; and when the other senators showed anger at 
this breach of custom, Hannibal rose again and " owned that 
he was ignorant of such things ; but said that they must pardon 
him if he acted in any way contrary to their customs, remem- 
bering that he had left the country when he was but fourteen, 
and had only returned when now past forty-five. Therefore 
he begged them not to consider whether he had committed 
a breach of custom, but much rather whether he were genuinely 
feeling for his country's misfortunes ; for that was the real 
reason for his having been guilty ^of this breach of manners. 
For it appeared to him to be astonishing, and, indeed, quite 
unaccountable, that any one calling himself a Carthaginian, 
and being fully aware of the policy which they had individually 
and collectively adopted against the Romans, should do other- 
wise than adore the kindness of Fortune for obtaining such 
favourable terms, when in their power, as a few days ago no 
one — considering the extraordinary provocation they had 
given — would have ventured to mention, if they had been 
asked what they expected would happen to their country, in 
case of the Romans proving victorious. Therefore he called 
upon them now not to debate, but unanimously to accept the 
terms offered, and with sacrifices to the gods to pray with one 
accord that the Roman people might confirm the treaty." His 
advice being regarded as both sensible and timely, they resolved 
to sign the treaty on the conditions specified ; and the senate 
at once despatched envoys to notify their consent. . . . 

The intrigues of Philip V, and Antiochus the Great to di- 
vide the dominions of the infant king of Egypty Ptolemy Epi- 
phanes, B.C. 204. 

20. Is it not astonishing that while Ptolemy Philopator 
was alive and did not need such assistance, these two kings 


were ready with offers of aid, but that as soon as he was dead, 
leaving his heir a mere child, whose kingdom shameless 
they were bound by the ties of nature to have ambition of Philip 
defended, they then egged each other on to and Antiocbus. 
adopt the policy of partitioning the boy's kingdom between 
themselves, and getting rid entirely of the heir ; and that too 
without putting forward any decent pretext to cover their 
iniquity, but acting so shamelessly, and so like beasts of prey,* 
that one can only compare their habits to those ascribed to 
fishes, among which, though they may be of the same species, 
the destruction of the smaller is the food and sustenance of 
the larger. This treaty of theirs shows, as though in a mirror, 
the impiety to heaven and cruelty to man of these two 
kings, as well as their unbounded ambition. However, If a 
man were disposed to find fault with Fortune for her adminis- 
tration of human affairs, he might fairly become reconciled to 
her in this case ; for she brought upon those monarchs the 
punishment they so well deserved, and by the signal example 
she made of them taught posterity a lesson in righteousness, 
For while they were engaged in acts of treachery against each 
Other, and in dismembering the child's kingdom in their own 
interests, she brought the Romans upon them, and the very 
measures which they had lawlessly designed against another, 
she justly and properly carried out against them. For both of 
them, being promptly beaten in the field, were 
not only prevented from gratifying their desire ^^' J^^' 
for the dominions of another, but were them- 
selves made tributary and forced to obey orders from Rome. 
Finally, within a very short time Fortune restored the kingdom 
of Ptolemy to prosperity ; while as to the dynasties and suc- 
cessors of these two monarchs, she either utterly abolished and 
destroyed them, or involved them in misfortunes which were 
little short of that . , . 

21. There was a certain man at Cius named Molpagoras, 
a ready speaker and of considerable ability in The imrigues and 
affairs, but at heart a mere demagogue and tyranny of Mol- 
selfish intriguer. By flattering the mob, and P«Boras at Cius, 

., ° . , '... . ° . ' , in Bithynia, 

putting the richer citizens mto its power, he 

either got them put to death right out, or drove them into exile 


and distributed their confiscated goods among the common 
people, and thus rapidly secured for himself a position of 
despotic power. . . . 

The miseries which befel the Cians were not so much 

owing to Fortune or the aggressions of their 

'^^,!^^?^*^ neighbours, as to their own folly and perverse 

policy. For by steadily promoting their worst 
men, and punishing all who were opposed to these, that they 
might divide their property among themselves, they seemed as 
it were to court the disasters into which they fell. These are 
disasters into which, somehow or another, though all men &ll,they 
yet not only cannot learn wisdom, but seem not even to acquire 
the cautious distrust of brute beasts. The latter, if they have 
once been hurt by bait or trap, or even if they have seen another 
in danger of being caught, you would find it difficult to induce 
to approach anything of the sort again : they are shy of the 
place, and suspicious of everything they see. But as for men, 
though they have been told of cities utterly ruined by their 
policy, and sec others actually doing so before their eyes, yet 
directly any one flatters their wishes by holding out to them 
the prospect of recruiting their fortunes at the cost of others, 
they rush thoughtlessly to the bait : although they know quite 
well that no one, who has ever swallowed such baits, has ever 
survived ; and that such political conduct has notoriously been 
the ruin of all who have adopted it. 

22. Philip was delighted at taking the city, as though 
Capture of Cius ^^ ^^^ performed a glorious and honourable 

by Philip V. achievement ; for while displaying great zeal in 

B.C. 202.1 behalf of his brother-in-law (Prusias), and over- 
awing all who opposed his policy, he had secured for himself in 
fair warfare a large supply of slaves and money. But the reverse 
of this picture he did not see in the least, although it was quite 
plain. In the first place, that he was assisting his brother-in- 
law, who, without receiving any provocation, was treacherously 
assailing his neighbours. In the second place, that by involving 
a Greek city without just cause in the most dreadful misfortunes, 
he was sure to confirm the report, which had been widely 
spread, of his severity to his friends ; and by both of these 

* See Livy, 31, 31 ; Strabo, 12, c. 4. Philip handed over Cius to Prusias. 


actions would justly gain throughout Greece the reputation of a 
man reckless of the dictates of piety. In the third place, that 
he had outraged the envoys from the above-mentioned states,' 
who had come with the hope of saving the Cians from the 
danger which threatened them, and who, after being day after 
day mocked by his professions, had been at length compelled 
to witness what they most abhorred. And lastly, that he had so 
infuriated the Rhodians, that they would never henceforth 
listen to a word in his favour: a circumstance for which 
Philip had to thank Fortune as well as himself 

2S. For it happened that just when his ambassador was 
defending his master before the Rhodians in The anger of the 
the theatre, — enlarging on " the magnanimity of Rhodians ai the 
Philip," and announcing that " though already in f^' °^ ^"^ 
a manner master of Cius, he conceded its safety to the wishes 
of the Rhodian people ; and did so because he desired to 
refute the calumnies of his enemies, and to establish the 
honesty of his intentions in the eyes of Rhodes," — ^just then a' 
man entered the Prytaneum who had newly arrived in the 
island, and brought the news of the enslavement of the Cians 
and the cruelty which Philip had exercised upon them. The 
Prytanis coming into the theatre to announce this news, while 
the ambassador was absolutely in the middle of his speech, 
the Rhodians could scarcely make up their minds to believe 
a report which involved such monstrous treachery. 

He had then betrayed himself quite as grossly as the 
Cians ; and so blind or misguided had he become as to the 
principles of right and wrong, that he boasted of actions of 
which he ought to have been most heartily ashamed, and 
plumed himself upon them as though they were to his credit 
But the people of Rhodes from that day forth regarded 
Philip as their enemy, and made their preparations with that 
view. And no less by this course had he gained i, causes a. 
the hatred of the Aetolians. He had but breach with the 
lately made terms with,' and held out the hand Aeiolians. 
of friendship to that nation : no excuse for a breach had 
arisen ; and the Lysimachians, Calchedonians, and Cianians 
were friends and allies of the Aetolians, Nevertheless only 

' Thai is, (rom Rhodes antl other stales. 


short time before he had separated LysimachJa from the 
Aetolian alliance, and induced it to submit to him : then he 
had done the same to Cakhedon : and lastly he had enslaved 
the Cians, though there was an Aetolian officer actually in Cius 
and conducting the government. Prusias, however, in so far 
as his policy was accomplished, was delighted ; but inasmuch 
as another was in possession of the prizes of the operations, 
while he himself got as his share nothing but the bare site 
of a city, was extremely annoyed, but was yet unable to do 
anything. . . . 

24. During his return voyage Philip engaged in one act of 

treachery after another, and among others put in 

^'Jf a'o^^^' "•^"^ mid-day at the town of Thasos, and 

though it was on good terms with him, took it 

and enslaved its inhabitants. . . . 

The Thasians answered Philip's general Metrodorus, that 
they would surrender their city, on condition that he would 
guarantee them freedom from a garrison, tribute, or billeting 
of soldiers, and the enjoyment of their own laws. Metrodorus 
having declared the king's consent to this, the whole assembly 
signified their approval of the words by a loud shout, where- 
upon they admitted Philip into the town. . . . 

All kings perhaps at the beginning of their reign dangle the 
name of liberty before their subjects' eyes, and address as 
friends and allies those who combine in pursuing the same 
objects as themselves ; but when they come to actual 
administration of affairs they at once cease to treat these 
as allies, and assume the airs of a master. Such persons 
accordingly find themselves deceived as to the honourable 
position they expected to occupy, though as a rule not as 
to the immediate advantage which they sought. But if a 
king is meditating undertakings of the greatest importance, 
and only bounding his hopes by the limits of the world, and 
has as yet had nothing to cast a damp upon his projects, 
would it not seem the height of folly and madness to proclaim 
his own fickleness and untrust worthiness in matters which are 
of the smallest consequence, and lie at the very threshold of 
his enterprise ? . . . 


24 {a). My plan being to narrate under each year all the 
events in the several parts of the world which were contem- 
porary, it is clear that In some cases it will be necessary to 
mention the end before the beginning ; when, that is to say, 
that particular part of the subject calls for mention, first as 
being in place in the general course of my narrative, and the 
events which embrace the end of an episode fit in sooner than 
those which belong to its beginning and first conceptioa . . . 

26, Sosibius, the unfaithful guardian of Ptolemy Epiphanes, 
was a creature of extraordinary cunning, who 
long retained his power, and was the instrument ^^^^^J^^^^i^ 
of many crimes at court : he contrived first the 
murder of Lysimachus, son of Arsinoe, daughter of Ptolemy 
and Berenice ; secondly, that of Maga, son of Ptolemy and 
Berenice the daughter of Maga ; thirdly, that of Berenice the 
mother of Ptolemy Pbilopator ; fourthly, that of Cleomenes of 
Sparta'; and fifthly, that of Arsinoe the daughter of Berenice; . . . 

Three or four days after the death of Ptolemy Philopatot, 
having caused a platform to be erected in the 
largest court of the palace Agathocles and ■j^'j^^'of 
Sosibius summoned a meeting of the foot- pioiemy Phiio- 
guards and the household, as well as the P^tor announced, 
officers Of the infantry and cavalry. The '^^^^^^ 
assembly being formed, they mounted the plat- 
form, and first of all announced the deaths of the king and 
queen, and proclaimed the customary period of mourning for 
the people. After that they placed a diadem upon the head 
of the child, Ptolemy Epiphanes, proclaimed him king, 
and read a forged will, in which the late king nominated 
Agathocles and Sosibius guardians of his son. They ended by 
an exhortation to the ofBcers to be loyal to the boy and maintain 
his sovereignty. They next brought in two silver urns, one of 
which they declared contained the ashes of the king, the other 
those of Arsinoe. Andin fact one of them did really contain 
the king's ashes, the other was filled with spices. Having done 
this they proceeded to complete the funeral ceremonies. It 
was then that all the world at last learnt the truth about the 


death of Arsinoe. For now that her death was clearly 
established, the manner of it began to be a matter of specu- 
lation. Though rumours which turned out to be true hmi 
found their way among the people, they had up to this time 
been disputed; now there was no possibility of hiding the 
truth, and it became deeply impressed in the minds of alU 
Indeed there was great excitement among the populace : no one 
thought about the king ; it was the fate of Arsinoe that 
moved them. Some recalled her orphanhood; others the 
tyranny and insult she had endured from her earliest days ; 
and when her miserable death was added to these misfortunes, 
it excited such a passion of pity and sorrow that the city was 
filled with sighs, tears, and irrepressible lamentation. Yet it was 
clear to the thoughtful observer that these were not so much 
signs of affection for Arsinoe as of hatred towards Agathodes. 
The first measure of this minister, after depositing the urns 
Agaihociet pro- '" ^^^ royal mortuary, and giving orders for the 
pitiaies tbe army laying aside of mourning, was to gratify the 
and gets rid of army with two months' pay ; for he was con- 
vinced that the way to deaden the resentment 
of the common soldiers was to appeal to their interests. He 
then caused them to take the oath customary at the pro- 
clamation of a new king ; and next took measures to get all 
who were likely to be formidable out of the country. 
Philammon, who had been employed in the murder of Arsinoe, 
he sent out as governor of Cyrene, while he committed the 
young king to the chaise of Oenanthe and Agathocleia. 
Next, Pelops the son of Pelops he despatched to the court of 
Antiochus in Asia, to urge him to maintain his friendly 
relations with the court of Alexandria, and not to violate the 
treaty he had made with the young king's father. Ptolemy, 
son of Sosibius, he sent to Philip to arrange for a treaty of 
intermarriage between the two countries, and to ask for assist- 
ance in case Antiochus should make a serious attempt to play 
them false in any matter of importance. 

He also selected Ptolemy, son ■ of Agesarchus, as am- 
bassador to Rome : not with a view of his seriously prosecuting 
the embassy, but because he thought that, if he once entered 
Greece, he would find himself among friends and kinsfolk, 


and would stay there ; which would suit his policy of getting 
rid of eminent men. Scopas the Aelolian also he sent to 
Greece to recruit foreign mercenaries, giving him a large 
sum in gold for bounties. He had two objects in view 
in this measure : one was to use the soldiers so recruited 
in the war with Antiochus ; another was to get rid of the 
mercenary troops already existing, by sending them on garrison 
duty in the various farts and settlements about the country ; 
while he used tbe new recruits to fill up the numbers of the 
household regiments with new men, as well as the pickets 
immediately round the palace, and in other parts of the city. 
For he believed that men who had been hired by himself, and 
were taking his pay, would have no feehngs in common with 
the old soldiers, with whom they would be totally unacquainted ; 
but that, having all their hopes of safety and profit in him, he 
would find them ready to co-operate with him and carry out 
his orders. 

Now all this took place before the intrigue of Philip, though 
it was necessary for the sake of clearness to speak of that first, 
and to describe the transactions which took place, both at the 
audience and the dispatch of the ambassadors. 

To return to Agathocles : when he had thus got rid of the 
most eminent men, and had to a great degree 

way of hfe. Drawing round him a body of friends, whom he 
selected from the most frivolous and shameless of his personal 
attendants or servants, he devoted the chief part of the day 
and night to drunkenness and all the excesseswhich accompany 
drunkenness, sparing neither matron, nor bride, nor virgin, and 
doing all this with tbe most offensive ostentation. The result 
was a widespread outburst of discontent; and when there 
appeared no prospect of reforming this state of things, or of 
obtaining protection against the violence, insolence and 
debauchery of the court, which on the contrary grew daily 
more outrageous, their old hatred blazed up once more in the 
hearts of the common people, and all began again to recall the 
misfortunes which the kingdom already owed to these very 
men. But the absence of any one fit to take the lead, and 


by whose means they coutd vent their wrath upon Agathocles 
and Agathocleia, kept them quiet. Their one remaining hope 
rested upon Tlepolemus, and on this they fixed their con- 

As long as the late king was alive Tlepolemus remained in 

„ retirement ; but upon his death he quickly pro- 

govemor of Peiu- pitiated the common soldiers, and became once 

sium.tltiermincsiomore governor of Pelusium. At first he directed 

depose Agaiho- ^ ^is actions With a view to the interest of the 

cles, B.C, aoj-ioi. , . . .- . , . i , ■ 

king, believing that there would be some 
council of regency to take charge of the boy and administer 
the government But when he saw that all those who were 
fit for this charge were got out of the way, and that Agathocles 
was boldly monopolising the supreme power, he quickly 
changed his purpose ; because he suspected the danger that 
threatened him from the hatred which they mutually enter- 
tained. He therefore began to draw his troops together, and 
bestir himself to collect money, that he might not be an easy 
prey to any one of his enemies. At the same time he was not 
without hope that the guardianship of the young king, and 
the chief power in the state might devolve upon him ; both 
because, in his own private opinion, he was much more fit for 
it in every respect than Agathocles, and because he was 
informed that his own troops and those in Alexandria were 
looking to him to put an end to the minister's outrageous 
conduct. When such ideas were entertained by Tlepolemus, 
it did not take long to make the quarrel grow, especially as the 
partisans of both helped to inflame it. Being eager to secure 
the adhesion of the generals of divisions and the captains of 
companies, he frequently invited them to banquets; and at 
these assemblies, instigated partly by the flattery of his guests 
and partly by his own impulse (for he was a young man 
and the conversation was over the wine), he used to throw 
out sarcastic remarks against the family of Agathocles. At 
first they were covert and enigmatic, then merely ambiguous, 
and finally undisguised, and containing the bitterest reflections. 
He proposed the health of the scribbler of pasquinades, the 
sackbut-gtrl and waiting-woman ; and spoke of his shameful 
boyhood, when as cupbearer of the king he had submitted 


to the foulest treatment. His guests were always leady to 
laugh at his words and add theiT quota to the sum of vitupera- 
tion. Il was not long before this reached the ears of 
Agalhocles : and the breach between the two 
thus becoming an open one, Agathocles im- ^'f^^hi^" 
mediately began bringing charges against 
Tlepolemus, declaring that he was a traitor to the king, and 
was inviting Antiochus to come and seize the government. 
And he brought many plausible proofs of this forward, some of 
which he got by distorting facts that actually occurred, while 
others were pure invention. His object in so doing was to 
excite the wrath of the common people against Tlepolemus. 
But the result was the reverse ; for the populace had long fixed 
their hopes on Tlepolemus, and were only too delighted to see 
the quarrel growing hot between them. The actual popular 
outbreak which did occur began from the following circum- 
stances. Nlcon, a relation of Agathocles, was in the lifetime of 
the late king commander of the navy. . . . 

26 (n). Another, murder committed by Agathocles was that 
of Deinon, son of Deinon. But this, as the pro- a fragmeni from 
verb has it, was the fairest of his foul deeds, the earlier hiaiory 
For the letter ordering the murder of Arsiroe of AgaUiodcs. 
had fallen into this man's hands, and he might have given 
information about the plot and saved the Queen ; but at the 
time he chose rather to help Philammon, and so became the 
cause of all the misfortunes which followed ; while, after the 
murder was committed, he was always recalling the circum- 
stances, commiserating the unhappy woman, and expressing 
repentance at having let such an opportunity slip : and this he 
repeated in the hearing of many, so that Agathocles heard of 
it, and he met with his just punishment In losing his life. . . . 


26. (^) The first step of Agathocles was to summon a meet- 
ing of the Macedonian guards. He entered the Agaihocies pre- 
assembly accompanied by the young king andtendsaploiofTle- 
his own sister Agathocleia. At first he feigned po'emus against 
not to be able to say what he wished for tears ; "^ '"^' 
but after again and again wiping his eyes with his chlamys he 



at length mastered his emotion, and, taking the young king in 
his arms, spoke as follows : " Take this boy, whom his father 
on his death-bed placed in this lady's arms " (pointing to his 
sister) " and confided lo your loyalty, men of Macedonia ! That 
lady's affection has but little influence in securing the child's 
safety : it is on you that that safety now depends ; his fortunes 
are in your hands. It has long been evident to those who 
had eyes to see, that Tlepolemus was aiming at something 
higher than his natural rank ; but now he has named the day 
and hour on which he intends to assume the crown. Do not 
let your belief of this depend upon my words ; refer to those 
who know the real truth and have but just come from the 
very scene of his treason." With these words he brought 
forward Critolaus, who deposed that he had seen with his own 
eyes the allars being decked, and the victims being got ready 
by the common soldiers for the ceremony of a coronation. 
When the Macedonian guards had heard all this, far from 
Anger of the being moved by his appeal, they showed their 
pojiuiace and contempt by hooting and loud murmurs, and 
^J^"'" "fj""^' drove him away under such a fire of derision 
that he got out of the assembly without being 
conscious how he did it. And similar scenes occurred among 
other corps of the army at their meetings. Meanwhile great 
crowds kept pouring into Alexandria from the up-country 
stations, calling upon kinsmen or friends to help the move- 
ment, and not to submit to the unbridled tyranny of such 
unworthy men. But what inflamed the populace against the 
government more than anything else was the knowledge that, 
as Tlepolemus had the absolute command of all the imports 
into Alexandria, delay would be a cause of suffering to Uiem- 

27. Moreover, an action of Agathocles himself served to 
heighten the anger of the multitude and of Tlepolemus. For 
he took Danae, the latter's mother-in-law, from the temple of 
Demeler, dragged her through the middle of the city unveiled, 
and cast her into prison. His object in doing this was to 
manifest his hostility to Tlepolemus ; but its effect was to 
loosen the tongues of the people. In their anger they no 
longer confined themselves to secret murmurs : but some of 


them in the night covered the walls in every part of the city 
with pasquinades ; while others in the day time collected in 
groups and openly expressed their loathing for the government 

Seeing what was taking place, and beginning to fear the 
worst, Agathocles at one time meditated making 
his escape by secret flight; but as he had '^'^^^^' 
nothing ready for such a measure, thanks to his 
own imprudence, he had to give up that idea. At another 
time he set himself to drawing out lists of men likely to assist 
him in a bold coup d'etat, by which he should put to death 
or arrest his enemies, and then possess himself of absolute 
power. While still meditating these plans he received in- 
formation that Moeragenes, one of the body-guard, was 
betraying all the secrets of the palace to Tlepolemus, and was 
co-operating with him on account of his relationship with 
Adaeus, at that time the commander of Bubastus. Agathocles 
immediately ordered his secretary Nicostratus 
tp arrest Moeragenes, and extract the truth ■'^™^°J^°^' 
from him by every possible kind of torture. 
Being promptly arrested by Nicostratus, and taken to a retired 
part of the palace, he was at first examined directly as to the 
facts alleged ; but, refusing to confess anything, he was stripped. 
And now some of the torturers were preparing their instru- 
ments, and others with scourges in their bands were just 
taking off their outer garments, when just at that very moment 
a servant ran in, and, whispering something in the ear of 
Nicostratus, hurried out again. Nicostratus followed close 
behind him, without a word, frequently slapping his thigh with 
his hand. 

28. The predicament of Moeragenes was now indescrib- 
ably strange. There stood the executioners 
by his side on the point of raising their "^^^f^^^"^ 
scourges, while others close to him were 
getting ready their instruments of torture : but when Nicos- 
tratus withdrew they all stood silently staring at each other's 
faces, expecting him every moment to return; but as time 
went on they one by one slipped away, until Moeragenes was 
left alone. Having made his way through the palace, after 
this unhoped-for escape, he rushed in his half-clothed state 


into a tent of the Macedonian guards whjdi was situated 
close to the palace. They chanced to be at breaUast, and 
therefore a good many were collected together j and to them 
he narrated the story of his wonderful escape. At first they 
would not believe it, but ultimately were convinced by his 
appearing without his clothes. Taking advantage of this 
extraordinary occurrence, Moeragenes besought the Macedonian 
guards with tears not only to help him to secure his own 
safety, but the king's also, and above all their own, "For 
certain destruction stared them in the face," he said, "unless 
they seized the moment when the hatred of the populace iras 
at its height, and every one was ready to wreak vengeance on 
Agathocles. That moment was now, and all that was wanted 
was some one to begin." 

29. The passions of the Macedonians were roused by these 
words, and they finally agreed to do as Moeragenes advised. 
They at once went round to the tents, first those of their own 
corps, and then those of the other soldiers ; which were all 
close together, facing the same quarter of the city. The wish 
was one which had for a long time been formed in the minds 
of the soldiery, wanting nothing but some one to call it forth, 
and with courage to begin. No sooner, therefore, had a com- 
mencement been made than it blazed out like a fire : and 
before four hours had elapsed every class, whether military or 
civil, had agreed to make the attempt 

At this crisis, too, chance contributed a great deal to the 
final catastrophe. For a letter addressed by 

^^^^ Tlepolemus to the army as well as some of 
his spies, had fallen into the hands of 
Agathocles. The letter announced that he would be at 
Alexandria shortly, and the spies informed Agathocles that 
he was already there. This news so distracted Agathocles 
that he gave up taking any measures at all or even thinking 
about the dangers which surrounded him, but departed at his 
usual hour to his wine, and kept up the carouse to the end 
Ocnamho in the '" his usual licentious fashioa But his 

temple of mother Oenanthe went in great distress to the 

^**°'^"^'- temple of Demeter and Persephone, which was 
open on account of a certain annual sacrifice ; and there first 


of all she besought the aid of those goddesses with bend- 
ings of the knee and strange incantations, and then sat down 
close to the altar and remained motionless. Most of 
the women present, delighted to witness her dejection and 
distress, kept silence : but the ladies of the family of Poly- 
crates, and certain others of the nobility, being as yet unaware 
of what was going on around thetn, approached Oenanthe and 
tried to comfort her. But she cried out in a loud voice : 
" Do not come near me, you monsters ! I know you well ! 
Vour hearts are always against us ; and you pray the goddess 
for all imaginable evil upon us. Still I trust and believe that, 
God willing, you shall one day taste the flesh of your own 
children." With these words she ordered her female 
attendants to drive them away, and strike them with their 
staves if they refused to go. The ladies availed thereiselves of 
this excuse for quitting the temple in a body, raising their 
hands and praying that she might herself have experience of 
those very miseries with which she had threatened her 

SO. The men having by this time decided upon a re- 
volution, now that in every house the anger of the women was 
added to the general resentment, the popular 
hatred blazed out with redoubled violence. As 
soon as night fell the whole city was filled with tumult, torches, 
and hurrying feet. Some were assembling with shouts in the 
stadium ; some were calling upon others to join them ; some 
were running backwards and forwards seeking to conceal them- 
selves in houses and places least likely to be suspected. And 
now the open spaces round the palace, the stadium, and the 
street were filled with a motley crowd, as well as the area in 
front of the Dionysian Theatre. Being informed of this, 
Agathocles roused himself from a drunken lethargy, — for he had 
just dismissed his drinking party, — and, accompanied by all his 
family, with the exception of Fhilo, went to the king. After 
a few words of lamentation over his misfortunes addressed to 
the child, he took him by the hand, and proceeded to the 
covered walk which runs between the Maeander garden and the 
Palaestra, and leads to the entrance of the theatre. Having 
securely fastened the two first doors through which be passe 


he entered the third with two or three bodyguards, his own 
family, and the king. The doors, however, which were secured 
by double bars, were only of lattice work and could therefore 
be seen through. 

By this time the mob had collected frona every part of the 
city in such numbers, that, not only was every foot of ground 
occupied, but the doorsteps and roofs also were crammed with 
human beings ; and such a mingled storm of shouts and cries 
arose, as might be expected from a crowd in which women and 
children were mixed with men : for in Alexandria, as in Car- 
thage, the children perform as conspicuous a part in such 
commotions as the men. 

81. Day now began to break and the uproar was still a 
confused hibet of voices ; but one cry made itself heard con- 
Cries for the liine SP'^^^^^'X *bove the rest, it was a call for THE 
' King. The first thing actually done was by the 
Macedonian guard : they le(^ their quarters and seized the 
vestibule which served as the audience hall of the palace ; then, 
after a brief pause, having ascertained whereabouts in the 
palace the king was, they went round to the covered walk, 
burst open the first doors, and, when they came to the next, 
demanded with loud shouts that the young king should be 
surrendered to them. Agathocles, recognising his danger, 
begged his bodyguards to go in his name to the Macedonians, 
to inform them that "he resigned the guardianship of the 
king, and all offices, honours, or emoluments which he 
possessed, and only asked that his life should be granted him 
with a bare maintenance ; that by sinking to his original situa- 
tion in life he would be rendered incapable, even if he wished 
it, of being henceforth oppressive to any one." All the body- 
guards refused except Aristomenes, who afterwards obtained the 
chief power in the state. 

This man was an Acamanian, and, though far advanced in 
^ life when he obtained supreme power, he is 

thought to have made a most excellent and 
blameless guardian of the king and kingdom. And as he was 
distinguished in that capacity, so had he been remarkable 
before for his adulation of Agathocles in the time of his pros- 
perity. He was the first, when entertaining Agathocles at his 


braced events of such magnitude and importance. In describing 
them I shall start from the 1 40th Olympiad and , 

shall arrange myexpositionin thefoUowing order: 

2. First I shall indicate the causes of the Punic or 
Hannibalian war : and shall have to describe ,_ xi,e cause and 
how the Carthaginians entered Italy; broke up course of the 
the Roman power there ; made the Romans Hannibalian war. 
tremble for their safety and the very soil of their country; 
and contrary to all calculation acquired a good prospect of 
surprising Rome itself 

I shall next try to make it clear how in the same period 
Philip of Macedon, after finishing his war with 3 Macedonian 
the Aetolians, and subsequently settling the ireaiy with Cai- 
affairs of Greece, entered upon a design of *W*. ^.c. 316. 
forming an offensive and defensive alliance with Carthage. 

Then I shall tell how Antiochus and Ptolemy Phitopator 
first quarrelled and finally went to war with 3. Syrian war, 
each other for ihe possession of Coele-Syria. b-c. aia 

Next how the Rhodians and Frusias went to war with the 
Byzantines, and compelled them to desist from 4. Byiantine srar. 
exacting dues from ships sailing into the Pontus. ^c. aao. 

At this point I shall pause in my narrative to introduce a 
disquisition upon the Roman Constitution, in f^^ digression 
which I shall show that its peculiar character on the Rtman 
contributed largely to their success, not only in ConsUtuiion, 
reducing all Italy to their authority, and in acquiring a 
supremacy over the Iberians and Gauls besides, but also at 
last, after their conquest of Carthage, to their conceiving the 
idea of universal dominion. 

Along with this I shall introduce another second on Hiero . 
digression on tiie fall of Hiero of Syracuse. of Syracuse. 

After these digressions will come the disturbances in 
Egypt ; how, after the death of King Ptolemy, 
Antiochus and Philip entered into a compact ^*^|^jono7ilie 
for the partition of the dominions of thatdominionsofPioi- 
monarch's infant son. I shall describe their ■^"'J' Epiphanes, 
treacherous dealings, Philip laying hands upon ^^ ^°^' 
the islands of the Aegean, and Caria and Samos, Antiochus 
upon Coele-Syria and Phoenicia. 


3. Next, after a summarj- cecapitulalion of the proceedings of 
6. War H'iih ''^'^ Carthaginians and Komatis in Iberia, Libya, 

Philip, acaoi- and Sicily, I shall, following the changes of 

'9'* events, sliift the scene of my story entirely to 

Greece. Here I shall first descrilie the naval battles of Attalus 

and the Rhodiatis against Philip ; and the war between Philip 

and Rome, the persons engaged, its circumstances, ^fid result 

Next to this I shall have to record the wrath of the Actolians, 

, in consequence of which they invited the aid of 

kc^'ioa-igi ' Antiochus, and tliereby gave rise to what is 

called the Asiatic war against Rome and the 

Achaean league. Having stated the causes of this war, and 

described the crossing of Antiochus into Europe, I shall Have 

to show first in what manner he was driven from Greece; 

secondly, how, being defeated in the war, he was forced to 

cede all his territory west of Taurus; and thirdly, how the 

Romans, after crushing the insolence of the Gauls, secured 

undisputed possession of Asia, and freed all the nations on 

the west of Taurus from the fear of barbarian inroads and 

the lawless violence of the Gauls. 

Next, after reviewing the disasters of the Aetolians and 

8. Gallic wari of Cephalic nians, I shall pass to the wars waged 

Eumenes and by Eumcnes against Prusias and the Gauls; as 

Prasias. „g][ ^ (hat carried on in alliance with Ariarathes 

against Ph a maces. 

Pinally, after speaking of the unity and settlement of the 

Union erf ih P^'op**"'*^''^! ^^^ ^f t^e gTowth of the common- 

Pcloponnese. wealth of Rhodes, I shall add a summary of 

Aniiochus my whole work, concluding by an account 

E^t"""^!! of °'' ^^^ expedition of Antiochus Epiphanes 

the Macedonian against Egypt ; of the war against Perseus ; 

monnrehy, and the destruction of the Macedonian 

B.C. 1B8-168. jnonarchy. Throughout the whole narrative it 

Iwill be shown how the policy adopted by the Romans in one 

iafler another of these cases, as they arose, led to their eventual 

ponquest of the whole world. 

4. And if our judgment of individuals and constitutions, 
for praise or blame, could be adequately formed from a simple 
consideration of their successesior defeats, I must necessarily 


have stopped at this point, and have concluded my history as 
soon as I reached these last events in accordance with my 
original plan. For at this point the fifty-three years were 
coming to an end, and the progress of the Roman power bad 
arrived at its consummation. And, besides, by this time 
the acknowledgment had been extorted from all that the v" 
supremacy of Rome must be accepted, and her commands 
obeyed. But in truth, judgments of either side -^^ ^^^ g^. 
founded on the bare facts of success or failure tended loembrace 
in the field are by no means final. It has "" P*""^ f™™ 
often happened that what seemed the most ^''^' ' '* ' 
signal successes have, from ill management, brought the 
most crushing disasters in their train ; while not unfre- 
quentjy the most terrible calamities, sustained with spirit, 
have been turned to actual advantage, I am bound, there- 
fore, to add to my statement of facts a discussion on the 
subsequent policy of the conquerors, and their admini- ' 
stfaHon of "tlTelr universal dominion: and again on the 
various feelings and opinions entertained by other nations 
towards their rulers. And I must also describe the tastes 
and aims of the several nations, whether in their private 
lives or public policy. The present generation will learn) 
from this whether they should shun or seek the rule 
of Rome; and future generations "will fie taught whether tol 
praise and imitate, or to decry it. The useftjloess of my 
history, whether for the present or the future, will mainly lie 
in this. For the end of a policy should not be, in the"^yea 
either of the actors or their historians, simply to conquer other^ ' 
and bring all into subjection. Nor does any man of sense 
go to war with his neighbours for the mere purpose of 
mastering his opponents ; nor go to sea for the mere sake of 
the voyage ; nor engage in professions and trades for the sole 
purpose of learning them. In all these cases the objects are 
invariably the pleasure, honour, or jirijfit which are the results 
of the several employments. Accordingly the object of this 
work shall be to ascertain exactly what the position of the several 
states was, after the universal conquest by which they fell under 
the power of Rome, until the commotions and disturbances 
which broke out at a later period. These I designed 


make the . starting-point of what may almost be called a new 
work, partly because of the greatness and suqirising nature of 
the events themselves, but chiefly because, in the case of most 
of them, I was not only an eye-witness, but in some cases one 
of the actors, and in others the chief director. 

6. The events I refei to are the wars of Rome against the 

A new departure : '-^'''^^"•'"5 and Vaccaei J those of Carthage 

ilie breaking-up against Massinissa, king of Libya ; and those 

oftheairang^ of Attalus and Prusias in Asia. Then also 

the faJi of Ariarathes, King of Cappadocia, having been 

Macedonia, ejected from his throne by Orophemes through 

^*". ""^"'^Ee the agency of King Demetrius, recovered his 

^sa! and^'f ancestral power by the help of Attalus ; while 

Rome against Demetrius, son of Seleucus, after twelve years' 

ilie CelUberians, possession of the throne of Syria, was deprived 

and a^insl^Car- ^^ ''■ ^^^ °^ ^'^ ''^^ ^' ^^^ ^'*'"^ ^™^' ''J' ^ ^°™" 
tkigc (3d Panic bination of the other kings against him. Then 
war, B.C. 149. i( -^f^s, too, that the Romans restored to their 
'■* '■ country those Greeks who had been charged 

with guih in the matter of the war with Perseus, after formally 
acquitting them of the crimes alleged against them. Not 
long afterwards the same people turned their hands against 
Carthage : at first with the intention of forcing its removal to 
some other spot, but finally, for reasons to be afterwards 
stated, with the resolution of utterly destroying it Con- 
temporaneous with this came the renunciation by the Mace- 
donians of their friendship to Rome, and by the Lacedae- 
monians of their membership of the Achaean league, to 
which the disaster that befel all Greece alike owed its be- 
ginning and end. 

This is my purpose : but its fulfilment must depend upon 
whether Fortune protracts my life to the necessary length. I am 
persuaded, however, that, even if the common human destiny 
does overtake me, this theme will not be allowed to lie idle 
for want of competent men to handle it ; for there are many 
besides myself who will readily undertake its completion. 
But having given the heads of the most remarkable events, 
with the object of enabling the reader to grasp the general 
scope of my history as well as the arrangement of its several 


house, to distinguish him among his guests by the present of a 
gold diadem, an honour reserved by custom to the kings alone ; 
he was the first too who ventured to wear his likeness on his 
ring ; and when a daughter was bora to him he named her 

But to return to my story. Aristomenes undertook the 
mission, received his message, and made his xhe guanis insist 
way through a certain wicket-gate to the on the summder 
Macedonians, He stated his business in few of the king. 
words : the first impulse of the Macedonians was to stab 
him to death on the spot ; but some of them held up their 
hands to protect him, and successfully be^ed his life. 
He accordingly returned with orders to bring the king or to 
come no more himself. Having dismissed Aristomenes with 
these words, the Macedonians proceeded to burst open the 
second door also. When convinced by their proceedings, no 
less than by the answers they had returned, of the fierce pur- 
pose of the Macedonians, the first idea of Agathocles was to 
thrust his hand through the latticed door, — while Agathocleia 
did the same with her breasts which she said had suckled the 
king, — and by every kind of entreaty to beg that the 
Macedonians would grant him bare life. 

32. But finding that his long and piteous appeals produced 
no effect, at last he sent out the young king with the body- 
guards. As soon as they had got the king, xhe ]^[„^ j^^. 
the Macedonians placed him on a horse and ducted to the 
conducted him to the stadium. His appear- siadium. 
ance being greeted with loud shouts and clapping of 
hands, they stopped the horse, and dismounting the child, 
ushered him to the royal stall and seated him there. But 
the feelings of the crowd were divided ; they were de- 
lighted that the young king had been brought, but they 
were dissatisfied that the guilty persons had not been arrested 
and met with the punishment they deserved. Accordingly, 
they continued with loud cries to demand that the authors of all 
the mischief should be brought out and made an example. The 
day was wearing away, and yet the crowd had found no one 
on whom^to wreak their vengeance, when Sosibius, who, though 
a son of the elder Sosibius, was at that time a member of the 


bodyguard, and as such had a special eye to the safety of the 
king and the State, — seeing that the furious desire of the 
multitude was implacable, and that the child was frightened at 
the unaccustomed faces that surrounded him and the uproar 
of the crowd, asked the king whether he would " surrender to 
the populace those who had injured him or his mother." The 
boy having nodded assent, Sosibius bade some of the body- 
guard announce the lung's decision, while he raised the young 
child from his seat and took him to his own house which 
was close by to receive proper attention and refreshment. 
When the message from the king was declared, the whole 
place broke out into a storm of cheering and clapping of 
hands. But meanwhile Agathoclcs and Agathocleia had 
separated and gone each to their own lodgings. Without loss 
of time soldiers, some voluntarily and others under pressure 
from the crowd, started in search of them. 

83. The beginning of actual bloodshed, however, was 
this. One of the servants and flatterers of Agathocles, whose 
name was Philo, came out to the stadium still flustered with 
wine. Seeing the fury of the multitude, he said to some by- 
standers that they would have cause to repent it again, as they 
had only the other day, if Agathocles were to come there. Of 
those who heard him some began to abuse him, while others 
pushed him about ; and on his attempting to defend himself, 
some tore his cloak off his back, while others thrust their 
spears into him and wounded him mortally. He was dragged 
into the middle of the crowd breathing his last gasp ; and, having 
thus tasted biood, the multitude began to look impatiently for 
Death of ^^ coming of the other victims. They had not 
Agathocles. to wait long. First appeared Agathocles dragged 
hissister, and along bound hand and foot. No sooner had 
he entered than some soldiers rushed at him 
and struck him dead. And in doing so they were his friends 
rather than enemies, for they saved him from the horrible 
death which he deserved. Nicon was brought next, and after 
him Agathocleia stripped naked, with her two sisters; and 
following them the whole family. Last of all some men came 
bringing Oenanthe, whom they had torn from the temple of 
Demeter and Persephone, riding stripped naked upon a horse. 


They were all given up to the populace, who bit, and stabbed 
them, and knocked out their eyes, and, as soon as any one 
of them fell, tore him limb from limb, until they had utterly 
annihilated them all : for the savagery of the Egyptians when 
their passions are roused is indeed terrible. At the same 
time some young girls who had been brought up with Arsinoe, 
having learnt that Philammon, the chief agent in the murder of 
that Queen, had arrived three days before from Cyrene, rushed 
to his house ; forced their way in ; killed Philammon with 
stones and sticks ; strangled his infant son ; and, not content 
with this, dragged his wife naked into the street and put her 
to death. 

Such was the end of Agathocles and Agathocleia and their 

84. I am quite aware of the miraculous occurrences and 
embellishments which the chroniclers of this 71,^ („n,en,pu-(je 
event have added to their narrative with a view chaiacier of 
of producing a striking effect upon their hearers, Aeaihode*. 
making more of their comments on the story than of the story 
itself and the main incidents. Some ascribe it entirely to 
Fortune, and take the opportunity, of expatiating on her fickle- 
ness and the difficulty of being on one's guard against her. 
Others dwell upon the unexpectedness of the event, and 
try to assign its causes and probabilities. It was not my pur- 
pose, however, to treat this episode in this way, because Aga- 
thocles was not a man of conspicuous courage or ability as a 
soldier; nor particularly successful or worth imitating as a 
Statesman ; nor, lastly, eminent for his acuteness as a courtier 
or cunning as an intriguer, by which latter accomplishments 
Sosibius and many others have managed to keep one king 
after another under their influence to the last day of their 
lives. The very opposite of all this may be said of this man. 
For though he obtained high promotion owing to Philopator's 
feebleness as a king ; and though after his death he had the 
most favourable opportunity of consolidating his power, he yet 
soon fell into contempt, and lost his position and his life at 
once, thanks to his own want of courage and vigour. 

SG. To such a story then no such dissertation is required, as 
was in place, for instance, in the case of the Sicilian monarchs. 


Agathocles and Dionysius, and certain others who have ad- 

g^ j^ ministered govemnients with repuUlion. Forthe 

former of these, starting from a plebeian and 
humble position — having been, as TJmacus sneeringly remarks, 
a potter — came from the wheel, clay, and smoke, quite a young 
man to Syracuse. And, to begin with, both these men in their re- 
spective generations became tyrants of Syracuse, a city that had 
obtained at that time the greatest reputation and the greatest 
wealth of any in the world ; and afterwards were regarded 
as suzerains of all Sicily, and lords of certain districts in Italy. 
While, for his part, Agathocles not only made an attempt 
upon Africa, but eventually died in possession of the greatness 
he had acquired. It is on this account that the story is told 
of Publius Scipio, the first conqueror of the Carthaginians, 
that being asked whom he considered to have been the most 
skilful administrators and most distinguished for boldness com- 
bined with prudence, he replied, "the Sicilians Agathocles 
and Dionysius." Now, in the case of such men as these, it is 
certainly right to try to arrest the attention of our readers, and, 
I suppose, to speak of Fortune and the mutability of human 
affairs, and in fact to point a moral : but in the case of such 
men as we have been speaking of, it is quite out of place to 
do so. 

38. For these reasons I have rejected all idea of making 
too much of tKe story of Agathocles. But another and the 
strongest reason was that all such wonderful and striking 
catastrophes are only worth listening to once ; not only are 
subsequent exhibitions of them unprofitable to ear and eye, but 
elaborate harping upon soon becomes simply troublesome. 
For those who are engaged on representing anything either to 
eye or ear can have only two objects to aim at, — pleasure and 
profit ; and in history, more than in anything else, excessive 
prolixity on events of tragic interest fails of both these objects. 
For, in the first place, who would wish to emulate extraordinary 
catastrophes? And next, no one likes to be continually seeing 
and hearing things that are unnatural and beyond the ordinary 
conceptions of mankind. We arc, indeed, eager to see and 
hear such things once and for the first time, because we want 
to know that a thing is possible which was supposed to be im- 


possible : but when once convinced on that point no one is 
pleased at lingering on the Unnatural ; but in fact would 
rather not come across it at all oftener than need be. In fact, 
the dwelling upon misfortunes which exceed the ordinary 
limits is more suitable to tragedy than to history. But per- 
haps we ought to make allowances for men who have studied 
neither nature nor universal history. They think, I presume, 
that the most important and astonishing events in all history are 
those which they happen to have come across themselves or to 
have heard from others, and they therefore give their attention 
exclusively to those. They accordingly do not perceive that 
they are making a mistake in expatiating on events which are 
neither novel, — for they have been narrated by others before, — 
nor capable of giving instruction or pleasure. So much on 
this point. . . . 

87. King Antiochus, at the beginning of his reign, was 
thought to be a man of great enterprise and Msappoinimenu 
courage, and great vigour in the execution of as to the cbanio 
his purposes ; but as he grew older his character '" of Anii™*™ 
evidently deteriorated in itself, and disappointed 
the expectation of the world. ... 



AND THii RHODIAHS. Sce supra 15, 20-24; Livy, 31, 

17. *??• 

1. King Philip having arrived at Pergamum, and believing 
Philip's impious ^^^ ^^ ^^^ ^ good as made an end of Attalus, 
conduci in Asia, gavc the reiti to every kind of outrage ; and 
B.C. aoi. ijy „ay of gratifying his almost insane fury he 
vented his wrath even more against the gods than against 
man. For his skirmishing attacks being easily repelled by the 
garrison of Pcrgamum, owing to the strength of the place, and 
being prevented by the precautions taken by Attalus from 
getting booty from the country, he directed his anger against 
the seats of the gods and the sacred enclosures ; in which, as 
it appears to me, he did not wrong Attalus so much as himself. 
He threw down the temples and the altars, and even had their 
stones broken to pieces that none of the buildings he had 
destroyed might be rebuilt After spoiling the Nicephorium, 
cutting down its grove, and demolishing its ring wall, and 
levelling with the ground many costly fanes, he first directed 
his attack upon Thyalira, and thence matched into the plain 
of Thebe, thinking that this district would supply him with the 
Zciuria, Satrap richest spoll. But finding himself again disap- 
of Aniiochus, fails pointed in this respect, on arriving at the 
to help Philip " Holy Village " he sent a message to Zeuxis, 

substantially. , ,■..?, u r ■ , , ■ - l 

demanding that he would furnish him with com, 
and render the other services stipulated for in the treaty.^ 
Zeuxis, however, though feigning to fulfil the obligations of 
the treaty, was not minded to give Philip real and substantial 
help, . . . 

' That is the treaty between Philip and Anlioctius. 



2. As the siege was not going on favourably for him, and 
the enemy were blockading him with an in- phiup failing to 
creasing number of decked vessels, he felt take Chios sails 
uncenain and uneasy as to the result But "" '" s^™"*- 
as the state of affairs left him no choice, he suddenly put to 
sea quite unexpectedly to the enemy ; for Attalus expected that 
he would persist in pushing on the mines he had commenced. 
But Philip was especially keen to make his putting to sea a 
surprise, because he thought that he would thus be able to out- 
strip the enemy, and complete the rest of his passage along 
the coast to Samos in security. But he was much aiihIus and 
disappointed in his calculations ; for Attalus and Theophiiiscus 
Theophiliscus (of Rhodes), directly they saw him foUowhim. 
putting to sea, lost no time in taking action. And although, 
from their previous conviction that Philip meant to stay where 
he was, they were not in a position to put to sea quite simul- 
taneously, still__by a vigorous use of their oars they managed to 
overtake him, and attacked, — Attalus the enemy's right wing, 
which was his leading squadron, and Theophiliscus his left. Thus 
intercepted and surrounded, Philip gave the signal to the ships 
of his right wing, ordering them to turn their prows towards 
the enemy and engage them boldly; while he himself retreated 
under cover of the smaller islands, which lay in the way, with 
some light galleys, and thence watched the result of the battle. 
The whole number of ships engaged were, on Philip's side, fifty- 
three decked, accompanied by some undecked vessels, and galleys 
and beaked ships to the number of one hundred and fifty ; for 
he had not been able to fit out all his ships in Samos. On 
the side of the enemy there were sixty-five decked vessels, 
besides those which came from Byzantium, and along with 
them nine triemioliae (light-decked vessels), and three triremes. 
S, The fight having been begun on the ship on which King 
Attalus was sailing, all the others near began 
charging each otiier without waiting for orders, '""^"^^^i^" ""* 
Attalus ran into an eight-banked ship, and 
having struck it a well-directed blow below the water-line, after 


a proloi^ed stiu^le between the combatants on the decks, at 
Loss of PhUip's length succeeded in sinking it. Philip's ten- 
Bagsbipand banked ship, which, moreover, was the ad- 
admirai, miral's, was captured by the enemy in an 
extraordinary manner. For one of the trietnieliae, having run 
close under her, she struck against her violently amidships, just 
beneath the thole of the topmost bank of oars, and got fast 
jammed on to her, the steersman being unable to check the way 
of his ship. The result was that, by this craft hanging sus- 
pended to her, she became unmanageable and unable to turn 
one way or another. While in this plight, two quinqueremes 
charged her on both sides at once, and destroyed the vessel it- 
self and the fighting men on her deck, among whom fell Demo- 
ciates, Philip's admiral At the same time Dionysodorus and 
Deinocrates, who were brothers and joint-admirals of the fleet of 
Attains, charged, the one upon a seven-banked, the other upon an 
e^ht-banked ship of the enemy, and had a most extraordinary 
T. . adventure in the battle. Deinocrates, in the 

first place, came into collision with an eight- 
banked ship, and had his ship struck above the water-line ; for 
the enemy's ship had its prow built high ; but he struck the 
enemy's ship below the water-line,^ and at first could not get 
himself clear, though he tried again and again to back water ; 
and, accordingly, when the Macedonian boarded him and fought 
with great gallantry, he was brought into the most imminent 
danger. Presently, upon Attains coming to his aid, and by a 
vigorous charge separating the two ships, Deinocrates unex- 
pectedly found himself free, and the enemy's boarders were all 
killed after a gallant resistance, while their own vessel being 
Donvsodorus. '^*^ without men was captured by Attalus. In 
the next place, Dionysodorus, making a furious 
chaise, missed his blow; but running up alongside of the enemy 
lost all the oars on his right side, and had the timbers sup- 
porting his towers smashed to pieces, and was thereupon imme- 
diately surrounded by the enemy. In the midst of loud shouts 
and great confusion, all the rest of his marines perished along 
with the ship, but he himself with two others managed to 


escape by swimming lo the triemiolia which was coming up to 
the rescue. 

4. The fight between the rest of the fleet, however, was an 
undecided one ; for the superiority in the num- 
bers of Philip's galleys was compensated for by ^^^"^-i^ 
Attalus's superiority in the number of his decked 
ships. Thus on the right wing of Philip's fleet the state of 
things was that the ultimate result was doubtful, but that, of 
the two, Attalus had the better hope of victory. As for the 
Rhodians, they were, at first starting, as I have said, far behind 
the enemy, but beingmuch their superiors inspeed they managed 
to come up with the rear of the Macedonians. At first they 
charged the vessels on the stem as they were retiring, and broke 
off their oars ; but upon Philip's ships swinging round and 
beginning to bring help to those in danger, while those of the 
Rhodians who had started later than the rest reached the 
squadron of Theophiliscus, both parties turned their ships in line 
prow to prow and charged gallantly, inciting each other to fresh 
exertions by the sound of trumpets and loud cheers. Had 
not the Macedonians placed their galleys between the opposing 
lines of decked ships, the battle would have been quickly de- 
cided ; but, as it was, these proved a hindrance to the Rhodians 
in various ways. For as soon as the first charge had disturbed 
the original order of the ships, they became all mixed up with 
each other in complete confusion, which made it difficult to 
sail through the enemy's line or to avail themselves of the 
points in which they were superior, because the galleys kept 
running sometimes against the blades of their oars so as to 
hinder the rowing, and sometimes upon their prows, or again 
upon their stems, thus hampering the service of steerers and 
rowers alike. In the direct charges, however, the Rhodians 
employed a particular manoeuvre. By depressing their bows 
they received the blows of the enemy above the water-line, 
while by staving in the enemy's ships below the water-line they 
rendered the blows fatal. Still it was rarely that they succeeded 
in doing this, for, as a rule, they avoided collisions, because the 
Macedonians fouglit gallantly from their decks when they came 
to close quarters. Their most frequent manoeuvre was to row 
through the Macedonian line, and disable the enemy's ships by 



breaking off their oars, and then, rowing round into position, 
again charge the enemy on the stem, or catch them broadside 
as they were in the act of turning ; and thus they either stove 
them in or broke away some necessary part of their ri^ng. 
By this manner of fighting they destroyed a great number of 
the enemy's ships. 

6. But the most brilliant and hazardous exploits were those 
Further incidenis °^ three quinqueremes : the flagship on which 
in ihe fight on Theophiliscus sailed, then that commanded by 
^■^'u*!"^" Philostratus, and lastly the one steered Iw 

The Rhodian . , , 1 , , , - , ■.,- 

adini[«i Theo- Autolycus, and on board of which was Nicos- 
phiiiscus mortally tratus. This last charged an enemy's ship, 
wounded. ^^^j [gj^ j^^ ^^^^ sticking in it. The ship thus 
struck sank with all hands ; but Autolycus and his comrades, 
as the sea poured into his vessel through the prow, was sur- 
rounded by the enemy. For a time they defended themselves 
gallantly, but at last Autolycus himself was wounded, and fell 
overboard in his armour, while the rest of the marines were 
killed fighting bravely. While this was going on, Theophiliscus 
came to the rescue with three quinqueremes, and though he 
could not save the ship, because it was now full of water, he 
yet stove in three hostile vessels, and forced their marines 
overboard. Being quickly surrounded by a number of galleys 
and decked ships, he lost the greater number of his marines 
after a gallant struggle on their part ; and after receiving three 
wounds himself, and performing prodigies of valour, just 
managed to get his own ship safely off with the assistance 
of Philostratus, who came to his aid and bravely took his share 
of the danger. Having thus rejoined his own squadron, he 
darted out once more and ran in upon the enemy, utterly 
prostrated in body by his wounds, but more dashing and 
vehement in spirit than before. 

So that there were really two sea-fights going on at a con- 
siderable distance from each other. For the right wing of 
Philip's fleet, continually making for land in accordance with 
his original plan, was not far from the Asiatic coast ; while 
the left wing, having to veer round to support the ships on 
the rear, were engaged with the Rhodians at no great distance 
from Chios. 


6. As the fleet of Attalus, however, was rapidly overpower- 
ing the right wing of Philip, and was now ap- Aiialus inter- 
proaching the small islands, under cover of ccpied by Philip, 

which Philip was moored watching the result ,='"! ^°''l^ !° 

r ,,_ ■ , . , t ^ ■ abaniion bis ship, 

oi the battle, Attalus saw one of his quin- 

queremes staved in and in the act of being sunk by an 
enemy's ship. He therefore hurried to its assistance with two 
quadriremes. The enemy's ship turning to flight, and making 
for the shore, he pursued it somewhat too eagerly in his 
ardent desire to effect its capture. Thereupon Philip, observ- 
ing that Attalus had become detached a considerable distance 
from his own fleet, took four quinqueremes and three hemioliae, 
as well as all the galleys within reach, and darting out got be- 
tween Attalus and his ships, and forced him in the utmost 
terror to run his three ships ashore. After this mishap the 
king himself and his crew made their way to Erythrae, while 
Philip captured his vessels and the royal equipage on board 
them. For in this emergency Attalus had employed an arti- 
fice. He caused the most splendid articles of the royal 
equipage to be spread out on the deck of his ship ; the conse- 
quence of which was that the first Macedonians who arrived on 
the galleys, seeing a quantity of flagons and purple robes and 
such like things, abandoned the pursuit, and turned their atten- 
tion to plundering these. Thus it came about that Atulus 
got safe away to Erythrae ; while Philip, though he had dis- 
tinctly got the worst of it in the general engagement, was so 
elated at the unexpected reverse which had befallen Attalus, 
that he put to sea again and exerted himself strenuously in 
collecting his ships and restoring the spirits of his men by 
assuring them that they were the victors. For when they 
saw Philip put to sea towing off the royal ship, they very 
naturally thought that Attalus had perished. But Dionyso- 
dorus, conjecturing what had really happened to the king, set 
about collecting his own ships by raising a signal ; and this 
being speedily done, he sailed away unmolested 
to their station in Asia. Meanwhile those RhSlians. 
Macedonians who were engaged with the 
Rhodians, having been for some time past in evil case, were 
gradually extricating themselves from the battle, one after the 



Other retiring on the pretence of being anxious to support their 
comrades. So the Rhodians, taking in tow some of their 
vessels, and having destroyed others by charging them, sailed 
away to Chios. 

7. In the battle with Attalus Philip had had destroyed a 
D.C. aoi. ten-banked, a nine-banked, a seven-banked, and 

The losses in a six-banked ship, ten other decked vessels, three 
ihe battle. iriemtoUae, twenty-five galleys and their crews. 
In the battle with the Rhodians ten decked vessels and 
about forty galleys. While two quadriremes and seven 
galleys with their crews were captured. In the fleet of Attalus 
one triemiolia and two quinqueremes were sunk, while two 
quadriremes besides that of the king were captured. Of the 
Rhodian fleet two quinqueremes and a trireme were destroyed, 
but no ship was taken. Of men the Rhodians lost sixty, 
Attalus seventy ; while Philip lost three thousand Mace- 
donians and six thousand rowers. And of the Macedonians 
and their allies two thousand were taken prisoners, and of 
their opponents six hundred. 

8. Such was the end of the battle of Chios ; in which 
Philip vainly pre- Philip claimed the victory on two pretexts. 

lends that he FJrst, because he had driven Attalus ashore and 
won the baiUe. j,^^ captured his ship ; and secondly, because, 
as he had anchored at the promontory of Argennum, he had 
the credit of having taken up his anchorage where the wrecks 
were floating. He acted in accordance with this assertion 
next day by collecting the wrecks, and causing the corpses 
which could be recognised to be picked up for burial, all for 
the sake of strengthening this pretence. For that he did not 
himself believe that he had won was shortly afterwards proved 
by the Rhodians and Dionysodorus. For on that very next 
day, while he was actually engaged on these operations, after 
communication with each other they sailed out to attack him, 
but, on nobody putting out to meet them, they returned to 
Chios. Philip indeed had never before lost so many men 
either by land or sea at one time, and was extremely mortified 
at what had happened and had lost much of his spirit for the 
enterprise. To the outside world, however, he tried to con- 
ceal his real sentiments : though this was forbidden by facts. 


Besides everything else, what happened after the battle im- 
pressed all who saw it too strongly. For the slaughter and 
destruction was so great that, on the day of battle itself the 
whole striit was filled with corpses, blood, arms, and 
wrecks ; while on the subsequent days the strands might be 
seen piled up with all these together in wild confusion. 
Hence the extreme consternation of the king could not be 
confined to himself, but was shared by all his Macedonians. 

9. Theophiliscus survived for one day; and then having 
written a despatch home with an account of the 

battle, and appointed Cleonaeus to succeed him xheophiiiscus 
in his command, died from his wounds. He had 
shown great valour in the engagement, and his far-sighted policy 
deserves to be remembered. If it had not been for bis bold- 
ness in attacking Philip in time, all the allies would have let 
the opportunity pass, in terror at Philip's audacity. But by 
beginning the war as he did he forced his countrymen to seize 
the opportunity, and compelled Attains not to lose time in 
mere preparatory measures for war, but to go to war ener- 
getically and grapple with the danger. The Rhodians, there- 
fore, were quite right to pay him, even after his death, such 
honours as were incentives, not only to men living at the time^ 
but to future generations also, to prompt service in their 
country's cause. . . . 


10. After the battle of Lade, the Rhodians being out of 
his way, and Attalus not having yet appeared on the scene, it 
is clear that Philip might have accomplished his voyage to 
Alexandria. And here we have evidence stronger than any 
other of Philip's infatuation in acting as he did. What, then, 
prevented his design ? Nothing in the world but what always 
occurs in the natural course of affairs. For at a distance 
many men at times desire the impossible from the extravagant 
prospects it holds out, their ambition over-mastering their reason; 

' Jam cum Shodiii et Allah navaiiius artaminiius. ntutre felidlir, vim 
txftriui. Livy, 31, 14. 


but when they appToach the moment of action they quite 
as irrationally abandon their purpose, because their calcula- 
tions are obscured and confused by the embarrassments and 
difficulties which meet them. . . . 


11. Having made some assaults which proved abortive 
The siraiiigem by owing to the Strength of the place, Philip went 
which Philip lookaway again, plundering the forts and villages in 

Prinassus. ti,^ country. Thence he marched to Prinassus 
and pitched his camp under its wall Having promptly got ready 
his pent-houses and other siege artillery, he began to attempt the 
town by mines. This plan proving impracticable, owing to 
the rocky nature of the soil, he contrived the following strata- 
gem. During the day he caused a noise to be made under 
ground, as though the mines were being worked at; while 
during the night he caused earth to be brought and piled up 
at the mouth of the mine, in order that the men in the city, 
by calculating the quantity of earth thrown up, might become 
alarmed. At first the Prinassians held out bravely : but when 
Philip sent them a message informing them that he had under- 
pinned two plethra of their walls, and asking them whether 
they preferred to march out with their lives, or one and all 
to perish with their town when he set fire to the props, then 
at last, believing that what he said was true, they surrendered 
the city. 

12. The town of lassus is situated in Asia on the gulf 
Leeends of between the temple of Poseidmen, the territory 
lassus and of Miletus, and the city of Myndus, called the 
BftTgylLa. gulf [of lassus by some], but by most the gulf of 

Bargylia, from the names of the cities built upon its inner coast 
The lassians boast of being originally colonists from Ai^os, 
and more recently from Miletus, their ancestors having invited 
to their town (he son of Neleus, the founder of Miletus, owing 
to their losses in the war with the Carians. The size of the 
town is ten stades. Among the people of Bargylia it is a 
common report widely believed that the statue of the Kindyan 
Artemis, though in the open air, is never touched by snow or 


rain ; and the same belief is held among the lassians as to 
the Artemis Astias.' All these stories have been repeated by 
certain historians. But, for my part, I have in the whole 
course of my work set myself against such statements of our 
historiographers and have had no toleration for them. For it 
appears to me that such tales are only fit to amuse children, 
when they transgress not only the limits of probability but even 
those of possibility. For instance, to say that certain bodies 
when placed in full light cast no shadow argues a state of quite 
deplorable folly. But Theopompus has done this; for he 
says that those who enter the holy precinct of Zeus in Arcadia 
cast no shadow, which is on a par with the statements to 
which I have just referred. Now, in so £ir as such tales tend 
to preserve the reverence of the vulgar for religion, a certain 
allowance may be made for some historians when they record 
these miraculous legends. But they must not be allowed to go 
too far. Perhaps it is difficult to assign a limit in such a 
matter ; still it is not impossible. Therefore, in my judgment, 
such displays of ignorance and delusion should be pardoned 
if they do not go very for, but anything like extravagance in 
them should be rejected. . . . 


IS. I have already described the deliberate policy of Nabis, 
tyrant of the Lacedaemonians ; how he drove xhe tyranny of 
the citizens into exile, freed the slaves, and gave Nobis. See 13, 
them the wives and daughters of their masters. *"'■ 

How also, by opening his kingdom as a kind of inviolable 
sanctuary for all who fled from their own countries, he col- 
lected a number of bad characters in Sparta. I will now 
proceed to tell how in the same period, being in alliance with 
Aelolians, Eleans, and Messenians, and being bound by oaths 
and treaties to support one and all of those ^ aoa-aoi 
peoples in case of any one attacking them, he ' ' 
yet in utter contempt of these obligations determined to make 
a treacherous attack on Messene. . . . 

' An inscriplion found at lassus [C.I.G. 36S3] has conlinned this name 
which u found in one MS. instead of Hesliai. Whether the meaning of the 
dtle ti Aitemis of the Cily, or some local desigDatiOD, i 



14t As some episodical historians have written on the 
period which embraces the affair at Messene and the sea-fights 
already described, it is my intention to discuss them briefly. 
I will not however speak of them all, but only those whom I 
suppose to be worthy of commemoration and full discussion. 

The necessity of These are the Rhodian writers Zeno and Antls- 
discussing ihe thenes, whom I judge to deserve this distinction, 

hinones of zcno f^^ xaox^ than one reason. They were contem- 

and Antislhenes. . , , i j ■ 

porary with the events, and were engaged in 
practical politics ; and, lastly, they composed their histories 
with no view to gain, but for the sake of fame, and as part of 
the business of politicians. Since then they write of the same 
events as myself, I cannot omit mentioning them ; lest, from 
the reputation of their country, and the idea that naval affairs 
are peculiarly the province of Khodians, some students may 
prefer their authority to mine where I differ from them. 

Now both these writers, to begin with, describe the battle of 

TTieir description I-ade as not less severe than that of Chios, but 
of the battle of more fiercely and daringly contested, both in 

Lade. Seech. lo. ^^.^^ ^nd as a whole, and finally assert that the 
victory was with the Rhodians. For my part I should be 
inclined to allow that historians must show some partiality to 
their own countries ; not however that they should state what 
is exactly opposite to the facts regarding them. There are 
quite enough mistakes which writers make from ignorance, 
and which it is difficult for poor human nature to avoid : but 
if we deliberately write what is false for the sake of country, 
friends, or favour, how do we differ from those who do the 
same to get a living? For as the latter, by measiiring every- 
thing by the standard of private gain, ruin the credit of their 
works, so your politicians often fall into the same discredit by 
yielding to the influence of hatred or affection. Therefore 
readers ought to be jealously watchful on this head; while 
writers ought to be on their guard for their own sakes. 

16. The present matter is an exampla When coming to de- 


tails of the battle of L^de, these writers confess that in it " two 
quinqueremes of Rhodes were captured by the enemy ; and that 
upon one ship raising its studding-sail to escape from the conflict, 
owing to its having being staved in and shipping sea, many of 
the vessels near it did the same and made for the open sea ; and 
that at last the admiral, being left with only a few vessels, was 
forced to follow their example. That for the present they were 
forced by unfavourable winds to drop anchor on the territory of 
Myndus, but next day put to sea and crossed to Cos ; while the 
enemy, having secured the quinqueremes, landed at Lade and 
took up their quarters in the Rhodian camp : that, moreover, 
the Milesians, deeply impressed by what had taken place, pre- 
sented not only Philip, but Heracleides also, with a garland 
of victory on his entrance to their territory," And yet, though 
they give all these particulars, which all evidently indicate the 
losing side, they still declare the Rhodians to have been vic- 
torious both in particular combats and in the whole battle ; and 
that too in spite of the fact that the original despatch from the 
admiral concerning the battle, sent to the Senate and Prytanies, 
still exists in their Prytaneium, which testifies to the truth, not 
of the statements of Antisthenes and Zeno, but of mine. 

16. Next as to their account of the treacherous attempt 

upon Messene. Zeno says that " Nabis started , . . . 

^^ f^ . , „ , -. Zeno s account of 

from Sparta, crossed the Eurotas near the tnbu- [he atiack of 
tary called the Hoplites, and advanced along Nabis upon 
the narrow road past Poliasium until he arrived ijlf^'*', 
at Sallasia, thence past Pharae to Thalamae, and 
so to the river Pamisus." About which I do not know what to 
say. It is just as if one were to say that a man started from 
Corinth and marched through the Isthmus and arrived at the 
Scironean way, and then came straight to the Contoporian road, 
and journeyed past Mycenae to Argos. For such a statement 
would not be merely slightly wrong but wholly contradictory. 
For the Isthmus and the Scironian rocks are east of Corinth, 
while the Contoporian road and Mycenae are nearly due 
south-west ; so that it is completely impossible to go by way 
of the former to the latter. The same may be said about 
Lacedaemon ; for the Eurotas and Sallasia are to the north- 
east of Sparta, while Thalamae, Pharae, and the Pamisus are 


to the south-west Therefore it is not possible to go to 
Sallasiii, nor necessary to cross the Eurotas, if a man means to 
go to Messenia by way of Thalamae, 

17. Besides these mistakes, he says that Nabis statted on 
his return from Messenia by the gate on the road to Tegea. 
This is another absurdity ; for Megalopolis is between Tegea 
and Messene, so that it is impossible that a gate at Messene 
should be called the " Gate to Tegea." The fact is that there 
is a gate there called the "Tegean Gate," by which Nabis 
commenced his return ; and this led Zeno into the mistake of 
supposing that Tegea was near Messene, which is not the 
fact : for the Laconian territory, as well as that of Megalopolis, 
lies between that of Messene and Tegea. Lastly, he says 
that the Alpheus flows undeiground from its source for a 
considerable distance, and comes up near Lycoa, in Arcadia. 
The truth is that this river does go down underground not far 
from its source, and, after remaining hidden for about ten 
stades, comes up again, and then flows through the territory 
of Megalopolis, at first with a gentle stream, and then gaining 
volume, and watering that whole district in a splendid manner 
for two hundred stades, at length reaches Lycoa, swollen by 
the tributary stream of the Lusius, and become unfordable 
and deep. . . . 

However, I think that the points I have mentioned, 
though all of them blunders, admit of some palliation and 
excuse ; for the latter arose from mere ignorance, those con- 
nected with the sea-fight from patriotic affection. But is it 
.not then a fault in Zeno, that he does not bestow as much 
pains on investigating the truth and thoroughly mastering his 
subject, as upon the ornaments of style ; and shows on many 
occasions that he particularly plumes himself on this, as many 
other famous writers do ? To my mind it is quite right to take 
great care and pay great attention to the presentation of one's 
fiicts in correct and adequate language, for this contributes in 
no small degree to the effectiveness of history ; still I do not 
think that serious writers should regard it as their primary 
and most important object. Far from it. Quite other are the 
parts of his history on which a practical politician should 
rather pride himself. 


IS. The best illustration of what I mean will be the 
following. This same writer, in his account of [he siege of 
Gaza and Antiochus's pitched battle with Scopas 
in Coele-Syria, at Mount Panium,' showed such [he tai^eof 
extreme anxiety about ornaments of style, that panium between 
he made it quite impossible even for professional Aniiochus the 
rhetoricians or mob-orators to outstrip him ;„ G'^a^^'J^Scopas. 
theatrical effect ; while he showed such a con- 
tempt of facts, as once more amounted to unsurpassable care- 
lessness and inaccuracy. For, intending to describe the first 
position in the field taken up by Scopas, he says that 
" the right extremity of his line, together with a few cavalry, 
rested on the slope of the mountain ; while its left with 
all the cavalry belonging to this wing, was in the plains 
below. That Antiochus, just before the morning watch, 
despatched his elder son Antiochus with a division of his army 
to occupy the high ground which commanded the enemy; 
and that at daybreak he led the rest of his army across the 
river which flowed between the two camps, and drew them up 
on the plain : arranging his heavy-armed infantry in one line, 
facing the enemy's centre, and his cavalry, some on the right 
and the rest on the left wing of the phalanx, among which 
were the heavy-armed horsemen, under the sole command of 
the younger of the king's sons Antiochus. That in advance 
of this line he stationed the elephants at certain intervals, and 
the Tarentines^ commanded by Antipater; while he filled up 
the spaces between the elephants with archers and slingers. 
And finally, that he took up his own station on the rear of the 
elephants with a squadron of household cavalry and body- 
guards." After this preliminary description he continues : " The 
younger Antiochus " — whom he had described as being on the 
level ground with the heavy-armed cavalry — " charged down 
from the high ground and put to flight and pursued the cavalry 
under Ptolemy, son of Aeropus, who was in command of the 
Aelolians in the plain on the left wing ; but the two lines, 

' Called Panion or Pandoiu See Joscphus D. Jud. 3, 10, 7, Iix>Jd*oii nfyi) 
rh nirtwr. The town near it was called Pnneas, and afterwards Paneaj 
Caesarea, and laler still Caesarea Philippi. Scopas, tbe Aelolian, was now 
serving Ptolemy Epiphanes ; see 13, a ; 18, 53. 


when they met, maintained a stubborn fight" But he fails to 
observe that, as the elephants, cavalry, and light-armed infantty 
were in front, the two hnes could not possibly meet at all. 

19. Next he says that "the phalanx, outmatched in 
agiiity and forced backwards by the Aetolians, retired step 
by step, while the elephants received the retreating line, and 
did great service in chaining the enemy." But how the 
elephants got on the rear of the phalanx it is not easy to 
understand, or how, if they had got there, they could have 
done good service. For as soon as the two lines were once 
at close quarters, the animals would no longer have been able 
to distinguish friend from foe among those that came in their 
way. Again, he says that " the Aetolian cavalry were thrown 
into a panic during the engagement, because they were un- 
accustomed to the look of the elephants," But, by his own 
account, the cavalry which was originally stationed on the 
light wing remained unbroken ; while the other division of 
the cavalry, that on the right wing, had all fled before the 
successful attack of Antiochus. What portion of the cavalry 
was it, then, that was on the centre of the phalanx, and was 
terrified by the elephants? And where was the king, or what 
part did he take in the batde, seeing that he had with him 
the very flower of the infantry and cavalry ? For not a word 
has been told us about these. And where was the elder 
of the young Antlochi, who, with a division of the troops, occu- 
pied the high ground 7 For this prince Is not represented even 
as returning to his quarters after the battle. And very natur- 
ally so. For Zeno started by assuming two sons of the king 
named Antiochus, whereas there was only one in the army 
on that occasion. How comes it, again, that according to 
him, Scopas returned fiist and also last from the field ? For 
he says : " when he saw the younger Antiochus, after return- 
ing from the pursuit, on the rear of his phalanx, and accord- 
ingly gave up all hopes of victory, he retired." But afterwards 
he says that " he sustained the most imminent peril when his 
phalanx got surrounded by the elephants and cavalry, and 
was the last man to retire from the field." 

20. These and similar blunders appear to me to reflect 
very great discredit upon writers. It is necessary, therefore. 


to endeavour to make one's self master of all departments of 
history alike. That is the ideal ; but if that is impossible, one 
ought at least to be excessively careful on the most essential 
and important points in it I have been induced to say this 
because I have observed that in history, as in other arts and 
sciences, there is a tendency to neglect the true and essential, 
while the ostentatious and the showy secure praise and emula- 
tion as something great and admirable. The fact being that 
in history, as in other departments of literature, these latter 
qualities require less trouble and gain a cheaper reputation. 
As to his ignorance of the topography of Pdybiuswroie 
Laconia, considering that his error was an im- lo Zeno on his 
iwrtant one, I did not hesitate to write to Zeno ^™??fi^'^ 
personally. For I thought it a point of honour 
not to look upon the mistakes of others as personal triumphs, 
as is the way with some writers \ but to do the best I could to 
secure correctness, not only of my own historical writings, but 
of those of others also, for the benefit of the world at Large. 
When Zeno received my letter and found that it was impossible 
to make the correction, because his history was already published, 
he was much vexed, but could do nothing. He, however, put the 
most friendly interpretation on my proceeding ; and, in regard 
to this point, I would beg my own readers, whether of my 
own or future generations, if I am ever detected in making a 
deliberate misstatement, and disregarding truth in any part of 
my history, to criticise me unmercifully ; but if I do so from 
lack of information, to make allowances : and I ask it for 
myself more than others, owing to the size of my history and 
the extent of ground covered by its transactions. . . . 


21. Tlepolemus,' the chief minister in the kingdom of 
Egypt, was a young man, but one who had characicrand 
spent all his life in the camp, and with reputa- extravagance of 
tion. By nature^ aspiring and ambitious, he had Tiepolemuj. 
done much that was glorious in the service of his country, 
but much that was evil also. As a general in a campaign, and 
as an administrator of military expeditions, he was a man of 
' See 15, as. 


great ability, high natural courage, and extremely well fitted to 
deal personally with soldiers. But on the other hand, for the 
management of complicated affairs, he was delicient in diligence 
and sobriety, and had the least faculty in the world for the 
keeping of money or the economical administration of finance. 
And it was this that before long not only caused his own fall, 
but seriously damaged the kingdom as well. For though he 
had complete control of the exchequer, he spent the greater 
part of the day in playing- ball and in matches in martial 
exercises with the young men ; and directly he left these 
sports he collected drinking parties, and spent the greater part 
of his life in these amusements and with these associates. 
But that part of his day which he devoted to business, he 
employed in distributing, or, I might rather say, in throwing 
away the royal treasures among the envoys from Greece 
and the Dionysian actors, and, more than all, among 
the officers and soldiers of the palace guard. He was utterly 
incapable of saying no, and bestowed anything there was at 
hand on any one who said anything to please him. The evil 
which he himself thus began continually increased. For 
every one who had received a favour expressed his gratitude 
in extravagant language, both for the sake of what he had got 
and of what he hoped to get in the future. And thus being 
informed of the universal praise which was bestowed on him, 
of the toasts proposed in his honour at banquets, of com- 
plimentary inscriptions, and songs sung in his praise by the 
public singers all through the town, he became entirely be- 
fooled, and grew daily more and more pufTed up with conceit, 
and more reckless in squandering favours upon foreigners and 

22. These proceedings were very offensive to the other 
Tiepoiemus sup- members of the court ; and, therefore, they 
presses & coun watched everything he did with a jealous eye, 
intriEue against gjjj] conceived a detestation for his insolence, 
which they began to compare unfavourably with 
the character of Sosibius. For the latter was considered to 
show more wisdom in his guardianship of the king than his age 
gave reason to expect ; and, in his dealings with other persons, 
to maintain the dignity proper to his high trust, which was the 


royal seal and person. Just at thb time, Ptolemy, the son of 
Sc^ibius, returned from his mission to Philip. Before he left 
Alexandria on his voyage, he had been full of foolish pride, 
partly from his own natural disposition and partly from his 
father's success. But upon landing in Macedonia, and mix- 
ing with the young men at court, he conceived the notion 
that the virtue of the Macedonians consisted in the better 
fashion of their boots and clothes ; he therefore came home 
got up in imitation of all these peculiarities, and fully per- 
suaded that his foreign tour and association with Macedonians 
had made a man of him. He therefore immediately began 
showing jealousy of Tlepolemus, and inveighing against him ; 
and as all the courtiers joined him, on the ground that 
Tlepolemus was treating the business and revenue of the 
state as though he were its heir and not its guardian, the 
quarrel quickly grew. Meanwhile llepolemus, being in- 
formed of certain unfriendly speeches, originating in the 
jealous observation and malignity of the courtiers, at first 
turned a deaf ear to them and affected to despise them ; but 
when at length they ventured to hold a meeting and openly 
express their disapproval of him in his absence, on the ground 
of his maladministration of the government of the kingdom, 
he grew angry ; and, summoning the council, came forward 
and said that " they brought their accusations against him 
secretly and in private, but he judged it right to accuse them 
in public and face to face." ... 

After making his public speech, Tlepolemus deprived 
Sosibius of the custody of the seal also, and having got that 
into his hands, thenceforth conducted the administration ex- 
actly as he chose, . . ■ 


22 (a). It seems to me to be at once just and proper to 
pve the people of Gaza' the praise which bc. 301. 
they deserve. For though they do not differ Vaioui of the 
as to bravery in war from the rest of the peop'e of Gaia. 
inhabitants of Coele-Syria, yet as parties to an intemadonal 


agreement, and in their fidelity to their promises, they 
far surpass them, and show altogether a courage in such 
matters that is irresistible. In the first place, when all the 
other people were terrified at the invasion of the Persians,^ in 
view of the greatness of their power, and one and all submitted 
themselves and their countries to the Medes, they alone faced the 
danger and stood a siege. Again, on the invasion 
of Alexander, when not only did the other cities 
surrender, but even Tyre was stormed and its inhabitants sold 
into slavery ; and when it seemed all but hopeless for any to 
escape destruction, who resisted the fierce and violent attack 
of Alexander, they alone of all the Syrians withstood him, 
and tested their powers of defence to the uttermost. Follow- 
ing the same line of conduct on the present occasion, they 
omitted nothing within their power in their determination to 
keep faith with Ptolemy, Therefore, just as we distinguish by 
special mention in our history individuals of eminent virtue, 
so ought we, in regard to states as such, to mention with 
commendation those which act nobly in any point from tra- 
ditional principles and deliberate policy. . , , 

ITALY {LIVV, 30, 4S) 

23. Publius Scipio returned from Libya soon after the 

Scipio's reiurn evcnts I have narrated. The expectation of the 

to Rome and people concerning him was proportionable to 

iriumph, B.C. aoi. ti^g magnitude of his achievements: and the 

=P- IS. 19- splendour of his reception, and the signs of 
popular favour which greeted him were extraordinary. Nor 
was this otherwise than reasonable and proper. For after 
despairing of ever driving Hannibal from Italy, or of averting 
that danger from themselves and their kinsfolk, they now 
looked on themselves as not only securely removed from every 
fear and every menace of attack, but as having conquered their 
enemies. Their joy therefore knew no bounds ; and when 
Scipio came into the city in triumph, and the actual sight of 

' Syria was conquered by the Assyrian king Tiglalh-Pileicr about B.C. 747, 
and was afterwards a part of the Babylonian and Persian empires. It does 
nM seem certain to what invasion Polybius is here refeiring. 


the prisoners who formed the procession brought stitl more 
clearly to their memories the dangers of the past, they became 
almost wild in the expression of their thanks to the gods, and 
their affection for the author of such a signal change. For 
among the prisoners who were led in the triumphal procession 
was Syphax, the Iting of the Masaesylii, who shortly afterwards 
died in prison. The triumph concluded, the citizens cele- 
brated games and festivals for several days running with great 
Splendour, Scipio, in his magnificent liberality, supplying the 
cost. . . . 


24^ At the beginning of the winter in which Publius Sul- 
picius was elected consul at Rome, king Philip, wiotcr of 
who was staying at Bargylia, was rendered ex- rc aoi-aoo. 
ceedingly uneasy and filled with many con- ^'^- '^- ^P'''"*' 
flicting anxieties for the future, when he Maiimus'll., 
observed that the Rhodlans and Attalus, far C. AureUus. 
from dismissing their navy, were actually man- '-°*'" 't?' 
ning additional ships and paying more earnest 
attention than ever to guarding the coasts. He had a double 
cause, indeed, for uneasiness : he was afraid of p^n ■. anneiies 
sailing from Bargylia, and foresaw that he would 
have to encounter danger at sea ; and at the same time he 
was not satisfied with the state of things in Macedonia, and 
therefore was unwilling on any consideration to spend the 
winter in Asia, being afraid both of the Aetolians and the 
Romans; for he was fully aware of the embassies sent to 
Rome to denounce him [as soon as it was known] that the 
war in Libya was ended. These considerations caused him 
overwhelming perplexity; but he was compelled for the 
present to remain where he was, leading the life of a wolf, to 
use the common expression : for he robbed and stole from 
some, and used force to others, while he did 
violence to his nature by fawning on others, be- ^^^ ^^^^^ ^J^ 
cause his army was suffering from famine ; and 
by these means managed sometimes to get meat to eat, some- 
times figs, and sometimes nothing but a very short allowance 
of com. Some of these provisions were supplied to him by 


Zeuxis, and some by the people of Mylae, Alabanda, and 
Magnesia, whom he flattered whenever they gave him any- 
thing, and barked at and plotted against when they did not 
Finally, he made a plot to seize Mylae by the agency of 
Philocles, but failed from the clumsiness with which the 
scheme was contrived. The territory of Alabanda he harried 
as though it were an enemy's, alleging that it was imperatively 
necessary to get food for his troops. . . . 

When this Philip, father of Perseus, was thus ovemmning 
Asia, being unable to get provisions for his army, he accepted 
a present of figs from the Magnesians, as they had no com. 
For which reason, when he conquered Myus, he granted its 
territory to the Magnesians in return for their figs. . . . 

25. The Athenian people sent envoys to king Attalus, both 
The visit of to thank him for the past, and to urge him to 
Attalus to Athens, come to Athens to consult with them on the 
B.C. 200. dangers that still threatened them.^ The king 
was informed a few days afterwards that Roman ambassadors 
had arrived at the Peiraeus ; and, believing that it was neces- 
sary to have an interview with them, he put to sea in haste. 
The Athenian people, being informed of his coming, passed very 
liberal votes as to the reception and general entertainment of the 
king. Arrived at the Peiraeus, Attalus spent the first day in 
transacting business with the Roman ambassadors, and was ex- 
tremely delighted to find that they were fully mindful of their 
ancient alliance with him, and quite prepared for the war with 
Philip. Next morning, in company with the Romans and the 
Athenian magistrates, he began his progress to the city in 
great state. For he was met, not only by all the magistrates 
and the knights, but by all the citizens with their children and 
wives. And when the two processions met, the warmth of the 
welcome given by the populace to the Romans, and still more 
to Attalus, could not have been exceeded. At his entrance 
into the city by the gate Dipylum the priests and priestesses 
lined the street on both sides : all the temples were then 
thrown open ; victims were placed ready at all the altars ; and 
the king was requested to offer sacrifice. Finally they voted 

* That is from the wars undertaken by them against Philip. Livy, 31, 
14, 24. 


him such high honours as they had never without great hesita- 
tion voted to any of their former benefactors : for, in addition 
to other compliments, they turned a tribe after Attalus, and 
classed him among their eponymous heroes. 

26. They next summoned an ecclesia and invited the king 
to address them. But upon his excusing him- xhe Athenians 
self, on the plea that il would be ill-bred for him vote for war 
to appear before the people and recount his '«*'"*' Philip. 
own good services in the presence of those on whom they had 
been bestowed, they gave up asking for his personal appear- 
ance ; but begged him to give them a written statement as to 
what he thought was the best thing to do in view of the exist- 
ing circumstances. On his consenting to do this, and writing 
the document, the m^istrates produced the despatch to the 
ecclesia. The cantents of this written communication were 
briefly these : he recalled the good services he had done the 
people in the past; enumerated the things he had accom- 
plished in ihe existing war against Philip ; and lastly exhorted 
them to activity in this war, and protested that, if they did not 
determine resolutely to adopt this policy of hostility to Philip 
in common with the Rhodians, Romans, and himself, and yet 
afterwards wished to share in the benefits which had been 
secured by others, they would miss securing the true interests 
of their country. As soon as this despatch had been read, the 
people, influenced both by its contents and by their warm 
feeling towards Attalus, were prepared to vote the war : and 
when the Rhodians also entered and argued at great length 
to the same efl'ect, the Athenians at once decreed the 
war against Philip. They gave the Rhodians also a mag- 
nificent reception, honoured their state with a crown of 
valour, and voted all Rhodians equal rights of citizenship at 
Athens, on the ground of their having, besides other things, 
restored the Athenian ships which had been captured with 
the men on board them. After concluding this arrangement, 
the Rhodian ambassadors sailed to Ceos with their fleet to 
visit the islands. . . . 

27. While the Roman ambassadors were still at Athens, 
Nicanor, by the command of Philip, made a ^j, ^^^^^^ 
raid upon Attica, and came as far as the Aca- wam rhiiip to 
vol. II o 


atrttnin from at- dcmy. Thereupon the Romans sent a herald 

amuo do'ji^ucc *^ ^^™» ^"^ ^^^ *^*™ announcc to his master 
* to AtMhis. on Philip that '* The Romans admonished him to 
i*;iiii of war. make HO war upon any Greek State, and to 
sul)mit to an arbitration l>efore a fair tribunal as to the injuries 
he had inflicted upon Attalus : that, if he did this, he might 
have iK*acc with Rome, but, if he refused to obey, the opposite 
would immediately follow." On the receipt of this message 
Nicanor retired. Then the Romans sailed along the coast of 
Ispinis and delivered a similar announcement in regard to 
Pliilii) in the town of Phoenice ; also to Amynandrus in the 
district of Athamania ; also to the Aetolians in Naupactusy and 
the Achaeans in Aegiuni. And having thus by the mouth of 
Nicanor j^iven Philip this clear warning, the Roman envoys 
thfinselves sailed away to visit Antiochus and Ptolemy with a 
view to settle their controversies. . . . 

28. It api>ears to me that to make a good beginning, and 

riic finiiiKss even to maintain enthusiasm long enough to 

niiii vi);ijur of securc a Considerable measure of success, is an 

''''•'''• '" "»'yt'»n: ac-hievemcnt of which many have been found 

< .mK< r. capable ; but to carr>' a purpose through to its 

end, and, even though fortune be adverse, to make up by cool 

reason for the deficiency of enthusiasm is within the power of 

few. r>om this i)oint of view one cannot but disparage the 

inactivity of Attalus and the Rhodians, while regarding with 

admiration the royal and lofty spirit displayed by Philip, and 

his constancy to his purpose, — not meaning to speak in praise 

of his character as a whole, but simply commending the 

vigour with which he acted on this occasion. I make this 

distinction to prevent any one supposmg that I contradict 

myself, because I recently praised Attalus and the Rhodians 

and found fault with Philip, whereas I am now doing 

the reverse. This is just such a case as I 
referred to at the beginning of my history, when 
I said that it was necessary sometimes to praise, and some- 
times to blame the same persons, since it frequently happens 
that changes of circumstances for the worse and calamities alter 
men*s original dispositions, and frequently also changes for the 
better ; and sometimes too it is the case that from natural 


temperament men are at one time inclined to what is right, at 
another to the reverse. And it is a variation of this sort that 
I think occurred to Philip in this instance. For, irritated by 
his defeats, and influenced in a great degree by anger and 
passion, he addressed himself with a kind of insane or inspired 
eagerness to meet the dangers of the hour ; and it was in this 
spirit that he rose to the attack upon the Rhodians and king 
Attalus, and gained the successes which followed. I was induced 
to make these remarks, because I observe that some men, like 
bad runners in the stadium, abandon their purposes when close 
to the goal ; while it is at that particular point, more than at any 
other, that others secure the victory over their rivals. . . . 

29. Philip was anxious to anticipate the Romans in 
seizing bases of operation and landing-places 
in this country (Asia). ... 

In order that, if it should be his purpose again to cross to 
Asia, he might have a landing-place at Abydos. . . . 

The position of Abydos and Sestos, and the advant^es of 
the situation of those towns it would, I think, __ _ . „ 
i_ . r .- t . . . ■ . J . -1 ^^ Dardanelles 

be waste of time for me to state m great detail, compared wiih 
liecause the singularity of those sites has made the Suaiu of 
them familiar to all persons of intelligence. Still G'brali"- 
I imagine that It will not be otherwise than useful to remind 
my readers briefly of the facts, by way of attracting their atten- 
tion. A man would best realise the advantages of these cities, 
not by regarding their sites by themselves, but by comparing 
and contrasting them with those about to be mentioned. For 
just as it is impossible to sail from the Ocean, — or as some 
call it the Atlantic, — into our sea, except by passing between 
the Pillars of Heracles, so is it impossible to sail from our sea 
into the Propontis and the Pontus except through the channel 
separating Sestos and Abydos. But as though Fortune had 
designed these two straits to counterbalance each other, the 
passage between the Pillars of Heracles is many times as broad 
as that of the Hellespont, — the former being sixty, the latter two 
stades; the reason being, as far as one may conjecture, the 
great superiority in size of the external Ocean to our sea : while 
the channel at Abydos is more convenient than that at the 
Pillars of Heracles. For the former being lined on both sides 


by human habitations is of the nature of a gate admitting 
mutual intercourse, sometimes being bridged over by those 
who determine to cross on foot, and at all times admitting a 
passage by sea. But the channel at the Pillars of Heracles is 
seldom used, and by very few persons, owing to the lack of 
intercourse between the tribes inhabiting those remote parts of 
Libya and Europe, and owing to the scantiness of our know- 
ledge of the external Ocean. The city of Abydos itself is 
enclosed on both sides by two European promontories, and 
possesses a harbour capable of sheltering ships anchoring in it 
from every wind ; while there is no possibility of anchoring at 
any point near the city outside the harbour mouth, owing to the 
rapidity and violence of the current setting through the strait. 
80. Having then invested Abydos partly by a palisade and 

Siege of Abydos. P^^^^^ ^^ ^^ earthwork, Philip began blockading 

it by land and sea together. This siege was not 
at all remarkable for the extent of the machinery employed, 
or the ingenuity displayed in those works on which besiegers 
and besieged are wont to exhaust all their invention and skill 
against each other ; but still it deserves, if any ever did, to be 
remembered and recorded for the noble spirit and extraordinary 
gallantry exhibited by the besieged. At first, feeling full 
confidence in themselves, the inhabitants of Abydos maintained 
a courageous resistance to the attempts of Philip ; struck and 
dislodged some of his engines, which he brought against their 
walls by sea, with stones from their catapults, and destroyed 
others by fire, and with such fierceness, that the enemy were 
barely able to drag their ships out of danger. Against the 
siege operations on land, too, up to a certain point they offered 
an undaunted resistance, not at all despairing of ultimately 
overpowering the enemy. But when their outer wall was 
undermined and fell, and when moreover the Macedonians by 
means of these same mines were approaching the inner wall, 
which had been erected by the besieged to cover the breach : 
then at length they send Iphiades and Pantacnotus as am- 
bassadors, with an offer to Philip that he should take over the 
city, on condition of letting the soldiers from Rhodes and 
Attains depart under a truce ; and of permitting all free persons 
to depart as they could, and wherever each might choose, with 


the clothes that each was wearing. But on Fhiltp bidding 
them " surrender at discretion or fight like men," the ambassa- 
dors returned to the town. 

31. On being informedof the message the people of Abydos 
met in public assembly, and with feelings of 3jspe„,e f^joiy. 
Utter despair deliberated upon their position, ton of ihe people 
They thereupon resolved, first to liberate the of Abydos. 
slaves, that they might secure their sincere interest and 
loyalty ; next, to collect all the women into the temple 
of Artemis, and the children with their nurses into the 
gymnasium ; and finally to bring together their silver and 
gold into the market-place, as well as collect their clothes 
which were of any value into the quadrireme of the 
Rhodians and the trireme of the Cyzicenes. Having formed 
these resolutions and acted on the decree with unanimity, they 
again assembled in public meeting, and elected fifty of the 
older and most trusted men, who at the same time were pos- 
sessed of sufficient bodily vigour to enable them to carry out 
what had been determined upon ; and these they bound on 
oath in the presence of the whole of the citizens, that " when- 
ever they saw the inner wall being captured by the enemy, they 
would kill the children and women, and would bum the above- 
mentioned ships, and, in accordance with the curses that had 
been invoked, would throw the silver and gold into the sea." 
After this they brought the priests forward, and all the citizens 
swore that they would conquer the enemy or die fighting for 
their country. To crown all, they slew victims and compelled 
the priests and priestesses to dictate the words of this impre- 
cation over the burnt offerings. Having bound themselves 
by this solemn agreement, they left off attempting to counter- 
mine the enemy, and resolved that, directly the interior wall fell, 
they would fight to the last in the breach with the enemy's 
storming party and there die. 

32. This would justify us in saying that the gallantry of the 
Abydenians outdid the proverbial Phocian 
recklessness and Acamanian courage.^ For the ^i^^lj^l^on^of 
Phocians have the repuUtion of having adopted the Abydenians 

' For Ihe Pbocians see Pausan. 10, i. 6. For (he A< 


with similar ones a similar resolution as to their families, but not 

aSdA^a^SS. because they despaired of victory, for they 

were about to fight a pitched battle with the 
Thessalians in the open field. So too the Acamanians, upon 
the mere prospect of an Aetolian invasion, adopted a like 
resolution ; the details of which I have already narrated. But 
the Abydenians, at a time when they were closely invested and 
in all but complete despair of being saved, elected by a 
unanimous resolution to meet their fate along with their child- 
ren and wives, rather than to live any longer with the knowledge 
that their children and wives would fall into the power of the 
enemy. Therefore one might justly complain of Fortune for 
having, in the former cases, given victory and safety to those 
who despaired of them, while she adopted the opposite decision 
in regard to the Abydenians. For the men were killed, and the 
city was taken, but the children with their mothers fell into 
the hands of the enemy. 

33. As soon as the interior wall had fallen, the men, 

H th t according to their oaths, sprang upon the ruins 

surrendered and and fought the enemy with such desperate 

the women and courage, that Philip, though he had kept sending 

^'^'^er^'X^ the Macedonians to the front in relays till 

nightfall, at last abandoned the contest in de- 
spair of accomplishing the capture at all. For not only did 
the Abydenian forlorn hope take their stand upon the dead , 
bodies of the fallen enemies, and maintain the battle with 
fury; nor was it only that they fought gallantly with mere 
swords and spears ; but when any of these weapons had been 
rendered useless, or had been knocked out of their hands, they 
grappled with the Macedonians, and either hurled them to the 
ground arms and all, or broke their sarissae, and stabbing their 
faces and exposed parts of their bodies with the broken ends, 
threw them into a complete panic But the fight being inter- 
rupted by nightfall, most of the citizens having now fallen in 
the breach, and the rest being utterly exhausted by fatigue and 
wounds, Glaucides and Theognetus collected a few of the 
older men together, and, instigated by hopes of personal safety, 
lowered the special eminence and unique glory which their 
fellow-citizens had acquired. For they resolved to save the 


chtldien and women alive, and at daybreak to send the priests 
and priestesses with garlands to Philip, to entreat his mercy 
and surrender the city to him. 

34. While this was going on, king Attatus, having heard 
that Abydos was being besieged, sailed through a Roman envoy 
the Aegean to Tenedos ; and similarly the arrives 10 warn 
youngest of the Roman ambassadors, Marcus ^'"''P '" '*=*'**■ 
Aemilius, arrived on board ship at Abydos itself. For 
the Roman ambassadors, having learnt at Rhodes the fact 
of the siege of Abydos, and wishing in accordance with their 
commission to deliver their message to Philip personally, put 
off their purpose of visiting the two kings, and despatched 
this man to him. Having found the king outside Abydos, he 
explained to him that "The Senate had resolved to order him 
not to wage war with any Greek state ; nor to interfere in the 
dominions of Ptolemy ; and to submit the injuries inflicted on 
Attalus and the Rhodians to arbitration ; and that if he did 
so he might have peace, but if he refused to obey he would 
promptly have war with Rome." Upon Philip endeavouring 
to show that the Rhodians had been the first to lay hands on 
him, Marcus interrupted him by saying : " But what about the 
Athenians ? And what about the Cianians ? And what 
about the Abydenians at this moment ? Did any one of them 
also lay hands on you first ? " The king, at a loss for a reply, 
said : " I pardon the offensive haughtiness of your manners for 
three reasons : first, because you are a young man and inex- 
perienced in affairs ; secondly, because you are the handsomest 
man of your time " (this was true) ; " and thirdly, because you 
are a Roman. But for my part, my first demand to the 
Romans is that they should not break their treaties or go to 
war with me; but if they do, I shall defend myself as 
courageously as I can, appealing to the gods to defend my 
cause." With these words they separated. On becoming 
master of Abydos, Philip found all the property -n,e voluntary 
of the citizens collected by themselves ready to death of ihe 
his hand. But when he saw the numbers and Abydenians. 
fury of those who were stabbing, burning, hanging, throwing into 
wells, or precipitating themselves from housetops, and their 
children and wives, he was overpowered with surprise; an'' 


resenting these proceedings he published a proclamation^ 
announcing, that "he gave three days' grace to those who 
wished to hang or stab themselves.'* The Abydenians, already 
bent on executing their original decree, and looking upon 
themselves as traitors to those who had fought and died for 
their country, could not endure remaining alive on any terms ; 
and, accordingly, with the exception of those who had previously 
been put in chains or some similar restraint, they all without 
delay hastened to their death, each family by itself. . . . 

85. After the capture of Abydos, envoys came from the 
The Rhodians Achaean nation to Rhodes urging the Rhodians 
resolve to side to make terms with Philip. But upon these 

with Rome, being followed by the arrival of the ambassadors 
from Rome, who argued that they should make no terms with 
Philip without consulting the Romans, the Rhodian people 
voted to listen to the latter and to hold to their friendship 
with them. . . . 


86. Philopoemcn calculated the distances of all the cities 

of the Achaean league, and from which of 

afwcc f^ToHcct- ^^^^ ^^^ ^^"^^ ^"""^^ ^^ Tegea along the same 

ingaii the Achaean roads. He then wrote despatches to each of 

levies at Tegea them, and sent them to the most distant cities, 

''Tc 2^"^^^' so dividing them that each city that was 

farthest on a particular road should get, not 
only the one addressed to itself, but those also of the other 
cities on the same road. The contents of these first despatches 
addressed to the chief magistrate were as follows : " As soon 
as ye receive this despatch, forthwith cause all the men of 
military age, with arms, and provisions, and money for five 
days, to assemble immediately in the market-place. And as 
soon as they are thus collected, march them out and lead them 
to the next city. As soon as ye have arrived there, deliver the 
despatch addressed to its chief magistrate and follow the in- 
structions therein contained." Now, this second despatch 
contained exactly the same words as the former, except of 
course that the name of the next town was changed to which 


they were to march. By this arrangement being repeated 
right along the road, in the first place no one knew for what 
purpose or undertaking the expedition was directed ; and in 
the next place, every one was absolutely ignorant where he was 
going, beyond the name of the next town, but all marched 
forward in a state of complete mystification, taking on the suc- 
cessive contingents as they went. But as of course the most 
remote towns were not equally distant from Tegea, the letters 
were not delivered to them all at the same time, but to each 
in proportion to its distance. By which arrangement, without 
either the Tegeans or the new arrivals knowing what was going 
to happen, all the Achaeans marched into Tcgea under amis 
by all the gates simultaneously. 

87. What suggested to Philopoemen this stratagem was the 
great number of the tyrant's eavesdroppers and 

spies. On the day then on which the main body L^nia?" 
of the Achaeans were to arrive at Tegea, he de- 
spatched a band of picked men, so timing their start, that they 
might pass the night near Sellasia and at daybreak begin a raid 
on Laconia. They had orders that, in case the mercenaries of 
Nabis left their quarters and attacked them, they were to retire 
on Scotita, and in other respects follow the directions of 
Didascalondas of Crete ; for Philopoemen had given his confi- 
dence to this officer, and full directions as to the whole ex- 
pedition. These men therefore set out in good spirits to the 
task assigned to them. Philopoemen himself having issued 
orders to the Achaeans to sup early, led out his army from 
Tegea, and after a rapid night's march halted it about the time 
of the morning watch in the neighbourhood of Scotita, wlitch 
is between Tegea and Lacedaemon. When day broke the 
mercenaries in Pellene, being informed by their scouts of the 
raid which the enemy were making, started at once to the 
rescue, as was their custom, and bore down upon them ; and 
when the Achaeans, in accordance with their instructions, re- 
tired, they followed, harassing them with bold and daring 
assaults. But as soon as they came to the place where 
PhDopoemen lay in ambush, the Achaeans sprang up and cut 
some of them to pieces, and took others prisoners. . . . 

88. Philip seeing that the Achaeans were disposed to ' 




tate about undertaking the war with Rome, tried earnestly by 
every means to rouse their feeling of hostility. . . . 


89. Ptolemy's general Scopas marched into the upper region 
during the winter and subdued the Jewish nation. . . . 

The siege having been conducted in a desultory msuiner, 
Scopas fell into bad repute and was attacked with all the 
petulance of youth. . . . 

Having conquered Scopas, Antiochus took Batanaea, 

B.C 200. Samaria, Abila, and Gadara ; and after a while 

Antiochus con- those of the Jews who inhabit the sacred town 

'^''^d^h!^ je^'^ ^^^^^ Jerusalem submitted to him also. On 

after beating Sco- the subject of this town I have a good deal 

pas at Panium. more to say, and especially on account of the 

^^ supra, ch. 18. splendour of its temple, but I shall put it off to 

another opportunity. 

BOOK xvmi . 


1. When the time appointed arrived, Philip put to sea rrom 
Demetrias and came into the Mehan Gulf, with 
five galleys and one beaked war-ship (pristis), Nicaea1nL<xais, 
on the latter of which he himself was sailing, wimerolB.c. ige- 
There met him the Macedonian secretaries '97- Cms- Titus 
ApoUodorus and Demosthenes, Brachylles from ^ininusrsext 
Bocotia, and the Achaean Cycliadas, who had Aeiius Paeios 
been driven from the Peloponnese for the Caius. 
reasons I have already described. With Fla- Cydiadas expelled 
mininus came king Amynandras, and Diony- f™ favouring 
sodonis, legate of king Attalus. The com-™"^^^^/-'''' 
missioners from cities and nations were 
Aristaenus and Xenophon from the Achaeans ; Acesimbrotus 
the navarch from the Rhodians; Phaeneas their Strategtis 
from the Actolians, and several others of their statesmen with 
him. Approaching the sea near Nicaea, Flamininus and those 
with him took their stand upon the very edge of the beach, 
while Philip, bringing his ship close to shore, remained afloat. 
Upon Flamininus bidding him disembark, he stood up on 
board and refused to leave his ship, Flamininus again asked 
him what he feared, he said that he feared no one but the 
gods, but he distrusted most of those who were there, especially 
the Aetolians. Upon the Roman expressing his surprise, and 
remarking that the danger was the same to all and the risk 
common, Philip retorted that " He was mistaken in saying that : 

' According to Hullseh no fragments or extracts ol book 17 are preserved. 
In it would have lieen contained the campaign of B.C. 199. in the war bclsveen 
Rome and Philip, (or ubich sec Livy. 31, 34-43. And Ihe operations of 
Flamininus in (he season of B.C. 198. Livy, 31, 9-18. The (iial seventeen 
chapters of this book arc generally classed in book 17. 


for that, if anything happened to Phaeneas, there were many 
who would act as Strategi for the Aetolians ; but if Philip were 
to perish at the present juncture, there was no one to be king of 
the Macedonians." Though all thought this an unconciliatory 
way of opening the discussion, Flamininus nevertheless bade 
him speak on the matters he had come to consider. Philip 
however said that " The word was not with himself but with 

Flamininus; and therefore begged that he would 

^emand^" State clearly what he was to do in order to have 

peace." The Roman consul replied that " What 

he had to say was simple and obvious : it was to bid him 

evacuate Greece entirely ; restore the prisoners and deserters 

in his hands to their several states ; hand over to the Romans 

those parts of Illyricum of which he had become possessed since 

Peace of Epirus, ^^^ peace of Epirus ; and, similarly, to restore to 

B.C. 205. Ptolemy all the cities which he had taken from 

^^ supra II, 5-7. j^i^ sjnce the death of Ptolemy Philopator. 

2. Having said this Flamininus refrained from any further 
speech of his own ; but turning to the others he bade them deliver 
what they had been severally charged to say by those who sent 

them. And first Dionysodorus, the envoy of 

^ Auaius °^ Attalus, took up the discourse by declaring that 

" Philip ought to restore the king's ships which 

had been captured in the battle at Chios and their crews with 

them ; and to restore also the temple of Aphrodite to its 

original state, as well as the Nicephorium, bo£h of which he had 

r.u Du ,• destroyed." He was followed by the Rhodian 

of the Rhodians, •; . . , , , , i ,, rr^, 

navarch Acesimbrotus, who demanded "That 
Philip should evacuate Peraea, which he had taken from them ; 
withdraw his garrisons from lasus, Bargylia, and Euromus; 
restore the Perinthians to their political union with Byzantium ; 
and evacuate Sestos, Abydos, and all commercial ports and 
r .u A u harbours in Asia." Following the Rhodians the 

' Achaeans demanded "The restoration of Corinth 
and Argos uninjuired." Then came the Aetolians, who first de- 
manded, like the Romans, that " Philip should 
Acto^fans! entirely evacuate Greece; and, secondly, that 
he should restore to them uninjured all cities 
formerly members of the Aetolian league." 


S. When Phaeneas the Aetolian strategus had delivered this 
demand, a man called Alexander Isius, who 
had the reputation of being an able politician Aieii^ndCT isi™. 
and good speaker, said that " Philip was neither 
sincere at the present moment in proposing teims, nor bold in 
his manner of making war, when he had to do that. In con- 
ferences and colloquies he was always setting ambushes and 
lying in wait, and using all the practices of war, but in actual 
war itself took up a position at once unjust and ignoble : for 
he avoided meeting his enemies face to face, and, as he fled 
before them, employed himself in burning and plundering the 
cities ; and by this policy, though himself beaten, he spoilt the 
value of the victor's reward. Yet former kings of Macedonia 
had not adopted this plan, but one exactly the reverse : for 
they were continually fighting with each other in the open 
field, but rarely destroyed and ruined cities. This was shown 
clearly by Alexander's war in Asia against king Darius; 
and again in the contentions between his successors, when 
they combined to fight Antlgonus for the possession of Asia. 
So too had the successors of these kings followed the same policy 
down to the time of Pyrrhus ; they had been prompt to war 
against each other in the open field, and to do everything they 
could to conquer each other in arms, but had spared the cities, 
that they might rule them if they conquered, and be honoured 
by their subjects. But that a nsan should abandon war, and 
yet destroy that for which the war was undertaken, seemed an 
act of madness, and madness of a very violent sort. And this 
was just what Philip was doing at that moment ; for he had 
destroyed more cities in Thessaly, on his rapid march from the 
pass of Epirus, though he was a friend and ally of that country, 
than any one who had ever been at war with the Thessalians." 
After a good deal more to the same effect he ended by 
asking Philip, " On what grounds he was holding the town of 
Lysimacheia with a garrison, having expelled the strategus sent 
by the Aetolian league, of which it was a member? Also 
on what grounds he had enslaved the Ciani who were also in 
alliance with the Aetolians ? T,astly, on what plea he was in 
actual occupation of Echinus, Phthioiid Thebes, Pharsalus, 
and Larisa?" 


4, When Alexander had concluded his speech, Philip came 

somewhat nearer to the shore than he was 

The JfJ^j^"*^^^ ° before, and, rising on board his ship, said that 

"Alexander had composed and delivered a 
speech in the true AetoHan and theatrical style. For every one 
knew quite well that nobody willingly destroys his own allies, 
but that, at times of special danger, military commanders are 
compelled to do many things contrary to their natural feelings." 
While the king was still speaking, Phaeneas, who was very 
short-sighted, interrupted him by saying, " You are trifling with 
us ; you must either fight and conquer, or obey the commands 
of the stronger." Philip, in spite of the unfortunate position of 
his affairs, could not refrain from his habitual humour: 
turning towards Phaeneas he said, " Even a blind man could 
see that" Such a knack had he of cutting repartee. Then he 
turned to Alexander again and said, " You ask me, Alexander, 
why I took possession of Lysimacheia. I reply, in order that it 
might not by your neglect be devastated by Thracians, as it has 
now actually been ; because I was compelled by this war to re- 
move my soldiers, who indeed were no hostile garrison, as you 
say, but were there for its protection. As for the Ciani, I did 
not go to war with them, but only assisted Prusias to take them 
who was at war with them. And of this you yourselves were the 
cause. For though I sent envoy after envoy to you desiring 
that you would repeal the law which allows you the privilege of 
taking * spoil from spoil,* you replied that rather than abolish 
this law you would remove Aetolia from Aetolia." 

5. When Flamininus expressed some wonder at what he 

Philip explains meant by this, the king tried to explain it to him 

the peculiar law by saying that " The Aetolian custom was this. 

of the Aeioiians. ^^^ey not Only plundered those with whom 

they were at war, and harried their country ; but, if certain 

other nations were at war with each other, even though both 

were friends and allies of the Aetolians, none the less the 

Aetolians might, without a formal decree of the people, take 

part with both combatants and plunder the territory of both. 

The result was that in the eyes of the Aetolians there were no 

defined limits of friendship or enmity, but they were ready to 

be the enemies and assailers of all who had a dispute on any- 


thing. " How then," he added, " have they any right to blame 
me if^ while on temis of friendship with the Aetolians, I did 
anything against the Ciani in support of my own allies ? But - 
the most outrageous part of their conduct is that they try to 
rival Rome, and bid me entirely evacuate Greece ! The 
demand in itself is sufHcientty haughty and dictatorial : still, in 
the mouths of Romans, it is tolerable, but in that of Aetolians 
quite intolerable. What is this Greece, pray, from which ye 
bid me depart ? How do you define it ? Why, most of the 
Aetolians themselves are not Greeks ; for neither the Agrai, 
nor the Apodoti, nor the Amphilochi are counted as Greek. 
Do you then give up those tribes to me ? " 

6. Upon Flamininus laughing at these words, Philip pro- 
ceeded : " Well, enough said to the Aetolians ! phiijp-s answer 
But to the Rhodians and Attalus I have to say to the Rbodians 
that, in the eyes of a fair judge. It would be held "'"' '^"^"*- 
more just that they should restore to me the ships captured, 
than I to them. For I did not begin the attack upon Attalus 
and the Rhodians, but they upon me, as everybody acknow- 
ledges. However, at your instance, Titus, I restore Peraea to 
the Rhodians, and to Attalus his ships and as many of the 
men as are still alive. As for the destruction of the Nice- 
phorium and the grove of Aphrodite, I am not able to do 
anything else towards their restoration, but I will send plants 
and gardeners to attend to the place and the growth of the 
trees that have been cut down." Flamininus once more 

lauehine at the king's sarcastic tone, Philip , . . . 

" ,° , , , ° ,, , r and ihe Aehaeans. 

turned to the Achaeans, and first went through 
the list of benefactions received by them from Antigonus and 
himself; then quoted the extraordinary honours Antigonus and 
he had received from them ; and concluded by reading their 
decree for abandoning him and joining Rome. Taking this for 
his text, he expatiated at great length on the fickleness and in- 
gratitude of the Achaeans. Still he said he would restore Argos 
to them, and as to Corinth would consult with Flamininus. 

7. Having thus concluded his conversation with the other 
envoys, he asked Flamininus, observing that 

the discussion was really confined to himself na^n^^ 
and the Romans, " Whether he considered that 


he was bound to evacuate only those places in Greece which 
he had himself acquired, or those also which he had inherited 
from his ancestors?" On Flamininus making no answer 
Aristaenus for the Achaeans, and Phaeneas for the Aetolians! 
were on the point of replying. But as the day was closing in 
time prevented them from doing so ; and Philip demanded 
that they should all hand into him a written statement of the 
terms on which peace was to be granted : for being there 
alone he had no one with whom to consult ; and therefore 
wished to turn their demands over in his own mind. Now 
Flamininus was much amused at Philip's sarcastic banter ; but 
not wishing the others to think so, he retaliated on him by a 
sarcasm also, saying : " Of course you are alone, Philip : for 
you have killed all the friends likely to give you the best 
advice !" The king smiled sardonically, but said nothing. 
And for the present, all having handed in the written state- 
ments of their demands as aforesaid, the conference broke up, 
after appointing to meet again next day at Nicaea. But next 
morning, though Flamininus came to the appointed place and 
found the others there, Philip did not arrive. 

8. When the day, however, had nearly come to an end, 

Second days and Titus and the others had almost given him 

conference, Philip up, Philip appeared accompanied as before, 

comes Lite. ^^^ excused himself by saying that he had 
spent the whole day in perplexit)' and doubt, caused by the 
severity of the demands made upon him. But every one else 
thought that he had acted thus from a wish to prevent, by the 
lateness of the hour, the delivery of invectives by the Achaeans 
and Aetolians : for he saw, as he was going away on the previous 
evening, that both were ready to attack him and state grievances. 
Therefore, as soon as he approached the meeting this time, 
he demanded that " The Roman Consul should discuss the 
matter with him in private ; that they might not have a mere 
war of words on both sides, but that a definite settlement 
should be come to on the points in dispute." On his several 
times repeating this request and pressing it strongly, Flamini- 
nus asked those present what he ought to do. On their 
bidding him meet the king and hear what he had to say, he 
took with him Appius Claudius, at that time a military Tribune, 


and telling the others to retire a short way from the sea and 
remain there, he himself bade Philip disembark. Accordingly 
the king, attended by Apollodorus and Demosthenes, left his 
ship, and, joining Flamininus, conversed with him for a con- 
siderable time. What was said by the one and the other on 
that occasion it is not easy to state. However, 
when Philip and he had parted, Flamininus, ^'■"'S^^^"^ 
in explaining the king's views to the others, 
said that he consented to restore Pharsalus and Larisa to the 
Aetolians, but not Thebes : and that to the Rhodians he 
surrendered Peraea, but not lasus and Bargylia: to the 
Achaeans he gave up Corinth and Argos : to the Romans he 
promised that he would surrender Itlyricum and all prisoners : 
and to Attalus the ships, and as many of the men captured in 
the sea-fights as survived. 

9. All present expressed their dissatisfaction at these terms, 
and alleged that it was necessary before all that 
he should perform the general injunction, that, ^coneraa 
namely, of evacuating all Greece : otherwise 
these particular concessions were vain and useless. Observing 
that there was an animated discussion going on among them, 
and fearing at the same time that they would indulge in 
accusations against himself, Philip requested Flamininus to 
adjourn the conference till next day, as the evening was 
closing in ; and promised that he would then either persuade 
them to accept his terms or submit to theirs. Flamininus 
consenting, they separated, after appointing to meet next day 
on the beach near Thronium, 

Next day al! came to the appointed place in good time. 
Philip in a short speech called on all, and ybird day's con- 
especially on Flamininus, " Not to break off the ference. A refer- 
negotiation for peace now that by far the ™™iJL'|jf Senate 
greater number were inclined to come to some 
arrangement ; but, if possible, to come to an understanding by 
themselves on the points in dispute ; or, if that could not be, 
to send envoys to the Senate, and either convince it as to this 
controversy, or submit to whatever it enjoined." 

On this proposition of the king, all the others declared that 
they preferred war to such a demand. But the Roman Coi^' ' ' 


said that " He was quite aware that it was improbable that 
Philip would submit to any of their demands, yet, as it did 
not in the least stand in the way of such action as they 
chose to lake to grant the favour demanded by the king, he 
would concede it. For not one of the proposals actually made at 
present could be confirmed without the authority of the Senate ; 
and besides the season now coming on was a favourable one 
for ascertaining its opinion ; for, even as things were, the 
armies could do nothing owing to the winter : it was therefore 
against no one's interests, but, on the contrary, very convenient 
for them all, to devote this time to a reference to the Senate 
on the present state of affairs." 

10. Seeing that Flamininus was not averse to referring the 

matter to the Senate, all the others presently 
'^loTo^'^ consented, and voted to allow Philip to send 

envoys to Rome, and that they too should 
severally send envoys of their own to plead their cause before 
the Senate, and stale their grievances against Philip. 

The business of the conference having thus been concluded 
in accordance with his views and the opinions he had origin- 
ally expressed, Flamininus at once set about carefully securing 
his own position, and preventing Philip from taking any 
undue advantage. For though he granted him three months* 
suspension of hostilities, he stipulated that he should complete 
his embassy to Rome within that time, and insisted on his 
immediately removing his garrisons from Phocis and Locris. 
He was also very careful to insist on behalf of the Roman 
allies, that no act of hostility should be committed against 
them during this period by the Macedonians. Having made 
these terms in writing with Philip, he immediately took the 
necessary steps himself to carry out his own policy. First, he 
sent Amynandrus to Rome at once, knowing that he was a 
man of pliable character, and would be easily persuaded by 
his own friends in the city to take any course they might 
propose ; and at the same lime would carry with him a certain 
prestige, and rouse men's curiosity and interest by his title of 
royalty. Next to him he sent as personal envoys his wife's 
nephew Quintus Fabius, Quintus Fulvius, and Appius Claudius 
Nero. From the Aetolians went Alexander Isius, Damocritus 


of Calydon, Dicaearchus of Trichonium, Polemarchus of 
Arsinoe, Lamius of Ambracia, Nicomachus of Acamania, — 
one of those who had fled from Thurium and settled in 
Ambracia, — and Theodgtus of Pherae, an exile from Thessaly 
who settled in Stratus : from the Achaeans Xenophon of 
Aegium : from King Attalus only Alexander : and from the 
Athenian people Cephisodorus and his colleagues. 

11. Now these envoys arrived in Rome before the Senate 
had settled the provinces of the Consuls ap- xhg speeches of 
pointed for this year, and whether it would be the Greek envoys 
necessary to send both to Gaul, or one of them '^ "■* Senate, 
against Philip, But the friends of Fiamininus having as- 
sured themselves that both Consuls would remain in Italy 
owing to the threat of an attack from the Celts, all the 
ambassadors appeared and bluntly stated their grievances 
against Philip. The bulk of their accusations was to the 
same effect as what they had before stated to the king himself; 
but they also endeavoured carefully to instil this idea in the 
minds of the Senators, "That so long as Chalcis, Corinth, and 
Demetrias were subject to Macedonia, it was impossible for the 
Greeks to think of liberty ; for Philip himself had spoken the 
exact truth when he called these places the ' fetters of Greece.' 
For neither could the Peloponnese breathe while a royal gar- 
rison was stationed in Comith, nor the Locrians, Boeotians, 
and Phocians feel any confidence while Philip was In occupa- 
tion of Chalcis and the rest of Euboea ; nor indeed could the 
Thessalians or Magnesians raise a spark of liberty^ while 
Philip and the Macedonians held Demetrias. That, therefore, 
Philip's offer to evacuate the other places was a mere pretence 
in order to escape the immediate danger; and that on the 
very first day he chose he would with ease reduce the Greeks 
again under his power, if he were in possession of these places." 
They accordingly urged the Senate "either to force Philip to 
evacuate the cities they had named, or to stand by the policy 
they had begun, and vigorously prosecute the war against 
him. For in truth the most difficult part of the war was 
already accomplished, the Macedonians having already been 
) represent, Is doubtful 


twice defeated, and most of their resources on land already 

They concluded by beseeching the Senate " not to beguile 
the Greeks of their hopes of liberty, nor deprive themselves 
of the most glorious renown." Such, or nearly so, were the 
arguments advanced by the Greek envoys. Philip's envoys 
were prepared to make a long speech in reply : but they were 
stopped at the threshold. P or being asked whether they were 
prepared to evacuate Chalcis, Corinth, and Demetrias, they 
declared that they had not any instructions as to those towns. 
They were accordingly rebuked by the Senate and obliged to 
discontinue their speech. 

12. The Senate then, as I have said before, assigned Gaul 
B.C. 197 Coss. *o \>o\S\ the consuls as their province, and 
G. Cornelius ordered that the war against Philip should go 
Caihagiw, Q. q^^ assigning to Titus Flamininus the entire 
uus. ^qj^jj.qJ Qf Greek aflfairs. These decrees 
having been quickly made known in Greece, Flamininus 
found everything settled to his mind, partly no doubt by the 
assistance of chance, but for the most part by his own fore- 
sight in the management of the whole business. For he 
was exceedingly acute, if ever Roman was. The skill and 
good sense with which he conducted public business and 
private negotiations could not be surpassed, and yet he was 
quite a young man, not yet more than thirty, and the first 
Roman who had crossed to Greece with an araiy. ... 

18. It has often and in many cases occurred to me to 
Was Aristaenus wonder at the mistakes men make ; but none 
a traitor or a wise seems to me SO surprising as that of traitors. 
Opportunist? j ^jgj^^ therefore, to say a word in season on 
the subject I know very well that it is one which does not 
admit of easy treatment or definition. For it is not at all 
easy to say whom we ought to regard as a real traitor. Plainly 
all those, who at a time of tranquillity make compacts with 
kings or princes, cannot be reckoned such off hand ; nor, again, 
those who in the midst of dangers transfer their country from 
existing friendships and alliances to others. Far from it. 
For such men have again and again been the authors of mani- 
fold advantages to their own countries. But not to go any 


further foi example, my meaning can be made clear by the 
circumstances of the present case. For, if Aristaenus had not 
at this time opportunely caused the Achaeans to leave their 
alliance with Philip and join that of Rome, it is clear that the 
whole league would have been utterly ruined. But as it was, 
this man and this policy were confessedly the sources, not only 
of security to individual Achaeans at the time, but of the 
aggrandisement of the whole league. Therefore he was not 
looked upon as a traitor, but universally honoured as a bene- 
factor and saviour of the country. The same principle will 
hold good in the case of all others who regulate their policy 
and measures by the necessities of the hour. 

14. From this point of view fault might be found 
with Demosthenes, admirable as he is in . , 

, . ■ ,, J - J' Compansoa of 

many respects, for havmg rashly and mdis- the pdicy of ihe 
criminately launched an exceedingly bitter Achaeans and 
charge at the most illustrious Greeks. For he °'^" Peiopon- 
asserted that in Arcadia, Cercidas, Hieronymus, phiiipv.wiihthat 
and Eucampidas were traitors to Greece for recommended 
making an alliance with Philip ; in Messene ''i' P^pjjj^ 
the sons of Philiades, Neon and Thraylochus ; '^ 

in Argos, Mystis, Teledamus, one Mnaseas ; in Thessaly, 
Daochus and Cineas ; in Boeotia, Theogeiton and Timolas : 
and many more besides he has included in the same category, 
naming them city by city ; and yet all these men have a 
weighty and obvious plea to urge in defence of their conduct, 
and above all those of Arcadia and Messene.^ For it was by 
their bringing Philip into the Peloponnese,' and humbling the 
Lacedaemonians, that these men in the first place enabled atl 
its inhabitants to breathe again, and conceive the idea of 
liberty ; and in the next place, by recovering the territory and 
cities which the Lacedaemonians in the hour of prosperity had 
taken from the Messenians, Megalopolitans, Tegeans, and 
Argives, notoriously raised the fortunes of their own coun- 
tries.' In return for this they were bound not to make war 

' Demosthenes, de Corona. g§ 43, 48. 395. 

* B.C. 338 aRerUio baltte of Chaeranea. See Thirlvrall, 6, 77 1 Grote, 11, 
3IS (ch. 9c) ; Kennedy's translation o( ihe de Corona, Appendix vl, The 
arsmneat of Polytdui is of course an ix foil facte one. It is open still to 


on Philip and the Macedonians, but to do all they could to 
promote his reputation and honour. Now, if they had been 
doing all this, or if they had admitted a garrison from Philip 
into their native cities, or had abolished their constitutions 
and deprived their fellow-citizens of liberty and freedom of 
speech, for the sake of their own private advantage or power, 
they would have deserved this name of traitor. But if, while 
carefully maintaining their duty to their countries, they yet 
diflfered in their judgment of politics, and did not consider 
that their interests were the same as those of the Athenians, 
it is not, I think, fair that they should have been called traitors 
on that account by Demosthenes. The man who measures 
everything by the interests of his own particular state, and 
imagines that all the Greeks ought to have their eyes fixed 
upon Athens, on the pain of being styled traitors, seems to me 
to be ill-informed and to be labouring under a strange delu- 
sion, especially as the course which events in Greece took at 
that time has borne witness to the wisdom, not of Demosthenes, 
but of Eucampidas, Hieronymus, Cercidas, and the sons of 
Philiades. For what did the Athenians eventually get by their 
8 opposition to Philip? Why, the crowning dis- 
aster of the defeat at Chaeronea. And had it not 
been for the king's magnanimity and regard for his own repu- 
tation, their misfortunes would have gone even further, thanks 
to the policy of Demosthenes. WTiereas, owing to the men I 
have mentioned, security and relief from attacks of the Lace- 
daemonians were obtained for Arcadia and Messenia generally, 
and many advantages accrued to their states separately. 

1 6. It is not easy then to define to whom one may properly 
Xh t It ^PP^y ^^^^ name. The nearest approach to truth 
is the man who would be to assign it to those who in times of 
actswith personal public danger, either for the sake of personal 
objects or from security or advantage, or to retaliate upon poli- 
tical opponents, put their cities into the hands 
of the enemy : or indeed to those who, by admitting a foreign 
garrison, and employing external assistance to carry out private 

maintain that, had the advice of Demosthenes been followed, these states might 
have been freed from the tyranny of Si>arta without becoming subject to 
another master in the king of Macedonia. 


aims and views, bring their country under the direction of a 
superior power. All such men as these one might include in 
the category of traitors with perfect reasonableness. Such men, 
indeed, gain neither profit nor honour, but the reverse, as 
every one acknowledges. And this brings me 
back to my original observation, that it is difficult '^,.^„"* "^ 
to understand with what object, and supported 
by what reasoning, men rush upon such a disastrous position. 
For no one ever yet betrayed his cily or camp or fort without 
being detected ; but even if a man here and there managed 
to conceal it at the moment of his crime, yet all have been 
detected in the course of time. Nor when known has any 
such ever had a happy life ; but, as a rule, they meet with the 
punishment they deserve from the very persons in whose 
favour they act. For, indeed, though generals and princes 
constantly employ traitors for their own purposes ; yet when 
they have got all they can out of them, they 

treat them thenceforth as traitors, as Demos- ,-„.„„ . „ 
, .1-1.1 Lonma. % 47. 

thenes says ; very naturally considering that 
those, who have put their country and original friends into the 
hands of their enemies, are never likely to be really loyal or 
to keep faith with themselves. Nay, even though they escape 
violence at the hands of these, yet they do not easily avoid 
the vengeance of those whom they betrayed. Or if, finally, 
they manage to evade the designs of both the one and the 
other, yet all over the world fame dogs their footsteps with 
vengeance to their lives' end, suggesting to their imaginations 
night and day numberless terrors, false and true ; helping and 
hounding on all who design any evil against them; and, finally, 
refusing to allow them even in sleep to forget their crimes, but 
forcing them to dream of every kind of plot and disaster, 
because they are aware of the universal loathing and hatred 
which attend them. Yet, though all this is true, nobody who 
wanted one was ever at a loss for a traitor, except in the rarest 
cases. From which one might say with some plausibility that 
man, reputed the most cunning of animals, gives considerable 
grounds for being regarded as the stupidest For the other 
animals, which obey their bodily appetites alone, can be 
decdved by these alone ; while man, though he has reason 


to guide him, is led into error by the failure of that reason no 
less than by his physical appetites. . . . 

16. King Attalus had for some time past been held in 

extraordinary honour by the Sicyonians, ever 

^^^^^c'^i?''"' since the time that he ransomed the sacred 

land of Apollo for them at the cost of a large 
sum of money ; in return for which they set up the colossal 
statue of him, ten cubits high, near the temple of Apollo in 
the market-place. But on this occasion, on his presenting 
them with ten talents and ten thousand medimni of wheat, 
their devotion to him was immensely increased; and they 
accordingly voted him a statue of gold, and passed a law to 
offer sacrifice in his honour every year. With these honours, 
then, Attalus departed to Cenchreae.^ . . . 

17. The tyrant Nabis, leaving Timocrates of Pellene at 
The cruelty of Argos, — because he trusted him more than any 
Apcga, wife of one else and employed him in his most im- 

Nabis. portant undertakings, — returned to Sparta : and 
thence, after some few days, despatched his wife with instruc- 
tions to go to Argos and raise money. On her arrival she far 
surpassed Nabis himself in cruelty. For she summoned women 
to her presence either privately or in families, and inflicted 
every kind of torture and violence upon them, until she had 
extorted from almost all of them, not only their gold ornaments, 
but also the most valuable parts of their clothing. . . . 

B.C. 197. In a speech of considerable length Attalus 

beforefhc^Ssem- reminded them of the ancient valour of their 

bled Boeotians, ancestors. . . . 
See Livy, 33, a. 


18. Flamininus being unable to ascertain where the enemy 

B.C. 197, at the were encamped, but yet being clearly informed 

beginning of that they had entered Thessaly, gave orders 

spring. ^Q ^ jjjg j^gj^ jQ ^y^ stakes to carry with them, 

ready for use at any moment. This seems im- 

' Attalus spent the winter of B.c. 198-197 at Aegina, in the course of which 
he seems to have visited Sicyon. 


possible to Greek habits, but to those of Rome it is easy. For 
the Greeks find it difficult to hold even their 1^^ meihods of 
sarissae on the march, and can scarcely bear forming palisades 
the fatigue of them; but the Romans strap """'"E'''*'^'*''" 
their shields to their shoulders with leathern 
thongs, and, having nothing but their javelins in their hands, 
can stand the additional burden of a stake. There is also 
a great difference between the slakes employed by the two 
peoples. The Greeks hold that the best slake is that which 
has the largest and most numerous shoots growing round the 
stem ; but the Roman stakes have only two or three side shoots, 
or at most four ; and those are selected which have these 
shoots on one side only. The result is that their porterage is 
very easy (for each man carries three or four packed together), 
and they make an exceedingly secure palisade when put 
into use. For the Greek palisading, when set in the front of 
the camp, in the first place can easily be pulled down; for 
since the part that is firm and tightly fixed in the ground IS 
single, while the projecting arms of it are many and large, two 
or three men can get hold of the same stake by its projecting 
arms, and easily pull it up ; and directly that is done, its 
breadth is so great that a regular gateway is made ; and because 
in such a palisade the stakes are not closely interlaced or 
interwoven with each other, when one is pulled up the part 
next to it is made insecure. With the Romans it is quite 
different. For as soon as they fix their stakes, they interlace 
them in such a manner that it is not easy to know to which of 
the stems fixed in the ground the branches belong nor on 
which of these branches the smaller shoots are growing. 
Moreover, it is impossible to insert the hand and grasp them, 
owing to the closeness of the interlacing of the branches and 
the way they lie one upon another, and because the main 
branches are also carefully cut so as to have sharp ends. Nor, 
if one is got hold of, is it easy to pull up : because, in the first 
place, all the stakes are sufficiently tightly secured in the 
ground to be self-supporting; and, in the second place, because 
the man who pulls away one branch must, owing to the close 
interlacing, be able to move several others in its train ; and it is 
quite unlikely that two or three men should happen to get hold 


of the same stake. But even if, by the exertion of enormous 
force, a man has succeeded in pulling one or another up, the 
gap is scarcely perceptible. Considering, therefore, the vast 
superiority of this method, both in the readiness with which 
such stakes are found, the ease with which they are carried, 
and the security and durability of the palisade made with 
them, it is plain, in my opinion, that if any military operation 
of the Romans deserves to be admired and imitated, it is this. 
19. After providing for contingencies by these preparations, 
Flamininus advanced with his whole force at a moderate pace, 
and, having arrived at about fifty stades from Pherae, pitched 
Flamininus ^ camp there; and next morning, just before 
marches to Pherae the moming watch, sent out some reconnoitring 

in Thessaiy. parties to see whether they could get any oppor- 
tunity of discovering the position and movements of the 
enemy. Philip, at the same time, being informed that the 

Romans were encamped near Thebes, started 

'^"'udeT^*''''' with his whole force from Larisa in the direc- 
tion of Pherae. When about thirty stades from 
that town, he pitched his camp there, and gave orders for all 
his men to make their preparations early next morning, and 
about the moming watch got his troops on the march. The 
division whose usual duty it was to form the advance guard he 
sent forward first, with instructions to cross the heights above 
Pherae, while he personally superintended the main army's 
advance from the camp as the day was breaking. The 
advanced guards of the two armies were within a very little of 

The advanced Coming into collision in the pass ; for the dark- 
guards of the two ness prevented their seeing each other until they 

armies meet, ^g^g quite a short distance apart Both sides 
halted, and sent speedy intelligence to their respective leaders 
of what had happened, and asking for instructions. . . . 

[The generals decided] to remain in their intrenchments, 
and recall these advanced guards. Next morning both sent 
out about three hundred cavalry and light infantry to recon- 
noitre, among which Flamininus also sent two squadrons of 
Aetolians, because they were acquainted with the country. 
These opposing reconnoitring parties fell in with each other 
on the road between Pherae and Larisa, and joined battle 


with great fuiy. The men under Eupolemus the Aetolian 
fighting gallantly, and urging the Italian troops to do the 
same, the Macedonians were repulsed; and, after skirmish- 
ing for a long while, both parties retired to their respective 

20. Dissatisfied with the country near Pherae, as being 
thickly wooded and full of walls and gardens, Auiumnof 
both parties broke up their camps next day. b.c 197. 
Philip directed his march towards Scotusa, be- ''°^!''l'P °"*^ 
cause he desired to supply himself with pro- advance towards 
visions from that town, and thus, with all his Scotusa, on 
preparations complete, to find a district more opposite sides of 
suitable to his army: while Flamininus, ^""B*" 
divining his intention, got his army on the march at the 
same time as Philip, in great haste to anticipate him in 
securing the corn in the territory of Scotusa. A range 
of hills intervening between their two lines of march, the 
Romans could not see in what direction the Macedonians were 
marching, nor the Macedonians the Romans. Both armies, 
however, continued their march during this day, Flamininus to 
Eretria in Phthiotis, and Philip to the river Onchestus ; and 
there they respectively pitched their camps. Next day they 
advanced again, and again encamped : Philip at Melambium 
in the territory of Scotusa, and Flamininus at the temple of 
Thetis in that of Pharsalus, being still ignorant of each other's 
whereabouts. A violent stonn of rain and thunder coming 
on next day, the whole atmosphere descended from the clouds 
to the earth about the time of the morning watch, so that the 
darkness was too dense to see even those who were quite 
close. In spite of this, Philip was so eager to accomplish his 
object, that he started with his whole army ; but finding him- 
self much embarrassed on the march by the mist, after accom- 
plishing a very small distance he again encamped ; but he sent 
his reserve back, with instructions to halt upon the summit of 
the intervening hills.' 

21. Flamininus, in his camp near the temple of Thetis, 

I Thai is of Cynoscephalae. Supergrnsi tttaittlos qui Cyiuattfhalat 
vocaiUur, nlicia iH stationi firma ptdilum equitumqur. pemerunt cattra. 
Uvjr, 33. 7- 


Another skirmish being Uncertain as to the position of the enemy, 
between detached sent out ten troops of cavalry and a thousand 
parties. M^i infantry in advance, with instructions to 
keep a careful look-out as they traversed the country. As 
these men were approaching the ridge of the hills they came 
upon the Macedonian reserve without expecting it, owing to 
the dimness of the light After a short interval of mutual 
alarm, both sides began irregular attacks on each other, and 
both despatched messengers to their respective chiefs to give 
information of what had occurred; and when the Romans 
began to get the worst of it in the encounter, and to suffer 
heavily at the hands of the Macedonian reserve, they sent to 
their camp begging for supports. Flamininus accordingly 
despatched the Aetolians under Archedamus and Eupolemus, 
as well as two of his own tribunes, with a force altogether of 
five hundred cavalry and two thousand infantry, after properly 
exhorting them to do their duty. On their arrival to the 
support of the skirmishing party already engaged, the aspect of 
affairs was promptly changed. For the Romans, inspired by 
the hope which this reinforcement gave, renewed the contest 
with redoubled spirit ; while the Macedonians, though offering 
a gallant defence, were now in their turn hard pressed, and 
being forced to make a general retreat, retired to the highest 
points in the hills, and despatched messengers to the king for 

22. But Philip, who had not expected, for reasons indi- 
cated above, that a general engagement would 
suppoS^^ take place on that day, happened to have sent 
a considerable part of his troops out of camp 
foraging. But when informed of what was taking place by 
these messengers, the mist at the same time beginning to lift, 
he despatched, with due exhortation, Heracleides of Gyrton, 
the commander of his Thessalian cavalry ; Leon, the general 
of his Macedonian horse ; and Athenagoras, with all the mer- 
cenaries except those from Thrace. The reserve being joined 
by these troops, and the Macedonian force having thus become 
a formidable one, they advanced against the enemy, and in 
their turn drove the Romans back from the heights. But what 
prevented them, more than anything else, from entirely routing 


the enemy was the gallantry of the Aetolian cavaliy, which 
fought wilh desperate fury and reckless valour. 
For the Aetolians are as superior to the rest of Aeioli*^ Lvaliy. 
the Greeks in cavalry for fighting in skirmishing 
order, troop to troop, or man to man, as they are inferior 
to them both in the arms and tactics of their infantry for the 
purpose of a general engagement The enemy being held in 
check therefore by these troops, the Romans were not forced 
back again quite on to the level ground, but, after retiring to a 
short distance, faced round and halted. But Cynascephalae. 
when Flamininus saw that not only had the FiHminmus offen 
cavalry and light infantry retire ' ' 
owing to them, his whole force v 
uneasy, he drew out his entire army a 
them into order of battle close to the hills. Meanwhile one 
man after another of the Macedonian reserve ran towards 
Philip shouting out, " King, the enemy are flying : do not let 
slip the opportunity. The barbarians cannot stand before us : 
now is the day for you to strike : now is your opportunity ! " 
The result was that he was induced to fight in spite of his dis- 
satisfaction with the ground. For these hills, which are 
called Cynoscephalae, are rough, precipitous, and of con- 
siderable height ; and it was because he foresaw the disadvan- 
tages of such a ground, that he was originally disinclined to 
accept battle there; but, being excited now by the extrava- 
gantly sanguine reports of these messengers, he gave the order 
for his army to be drawn out of camp. 

23. Having got his main body into order, Flamininus gave 
his attention at the same time to relieving his Flaroininus 
advanced guard, and to going along the ranks addresses his men, 
to encourage his men. His exhortation was and advance 
short, but cleat and intelligible to the hearers : 
for, pointing to the enemy with his hand, he said to his sol- 
diers : " Are not these the Macedonians, my men, whom, when 
occupying in their own country the pass to Eordaea, you routed 
in open battle, under the command of Sulpicius, and drove to 
take refuge on the hills with the loss of many of their com- 
rades? Are not these the Macedonians whom, when defended 
by what seemed an impassable country in Epirus, you dis- 


lodged by sheer valour, and forced to throw away their shields 
and fly right into Macedonia ? Why then should you feel any 
hesitation when you are to fight the same men on equal 
ground ? Why look anxiously to the past, rather than let that 
past minister courage to you for the present ? Therefore, my 
men, rouse each other by mutual exhortations, and hasten in 
your might to the struggle ! For, with God's will, I am per- 
suaded that this battle will quickly have the same issue as the 
contests in the past'* With these words he ordered his right 
wing to remain where they were, and the elephants in front of 
The advanced them; while with his left, supported by the 
guard are light infantry, he advanced in gallant style to 
encouraged, attack the enemy. And the Roman troops 
already on the field, finding themselves thus reinforced by 
the legions on their rear, once more faced round and charged 
their opponents. 

24. Meanwhile, when he had seen the main part of his 

Philip ako army in position outside the camp, Philip him- 

advances and self advanced with his peltasts and the right 

occupies the hills, ^jj^g ^f j^jg phalanx, commencing the ascent of 

the hills with great rapidity, and having left instructions with 
Nicanor, surnamed the Elephant, to see that the rest of the 
army followed at once. As soon as his first files reached the 
summit, he deployed his men into line by the left, and occupied 
the range of high ground : for the Macedonians who had 
been sent in advance had forced the Romans a considerable 
distance down the other side of the hills, and therefore he 
found the ridges unoccupied by the enemy. But while he 
was still engaged in getting the right wing of his army into line, 
his mercenaries came on the ground, having been decisively 
repulsed by the enemy. For when the Roman light infantry 
found themselves supported by the heavy, as I said just now, 
with their assistance, which they regarded as turning the scale 
in their favour, they made a furious charge on the enemy, and 
killed a large number of them. When the king first came on 

the ground, and saw that the fighting between 

^I^^def^t^!^ ^^^ ^*g^' ^^"^^^ w^ g^i"g o*^ "^^ t^e enemy's 

camp, he was delighted: but when, on the 

other hand, he saw his own men giving ground and requiring 


support, he was compelled to give it, and allow the necessities 
of the moment to decide the fortunes of the whole day, in 
spite of the fact that the greater part of his phalanx was still 
on the march and engaged in mounting the hills. Receiving 
therefore the men who had been already engaged, he massed 
them all upon his right wing, both infantry and cavalry; 
while he ordered the peltasts and heavy armed to double their 
depth and close up to the right By the time this was effected 
the enemy were close at hand ; and, accordingly, the word was 
given to the phalanx to lower spears and charge ; to the l^hl 
infantry to cover their flank. At the same time Flamininus 
also, having received his advanced party into the intervals be- 
tween his maniples, charged the enemy. 

26. The charge was made with great violence and loud 
shouting on both sides : for both advancing .^^^ . . 
parties raised their war cry, while those who 
were not actually engaged shouted encouragement to those 
that were ; and the result was a scene of the wildest excite- 
ment, terrible in the last degree. Philip's right pbiup's right wing 
wing came off brilliantly in the encounter, for repulse the 
they were charging down hill and were superior "0"™° Icf- 
in weight, and their arms were far more suited for the actual 
conditions of the struggle ; but as for the rest of the army, that 
part of it which was in the rear of the actual tighters did not get 
into contact with the enemy; while the left wing, which had 
but just made the ascent, was only beginning to show on the 
ridge. Seeing that his men were unable to stand the charge 
of the phalanx, and that his left wing was losing ground, some 
having already fallen and the rest slowly retiring, but that 
hopes of saving himself still remained on the successful advance 
right, Flamininus hastily transferred himself to ofthf Roman 
the latter wing; and when he perceived that '"'s'"' 
the enemy's force was not well together — part being in contact 
with the actual fighters, part just in the act of mounting the 
ridge, and part halting on it and not yet beginning to descend,* — 
' I have given the meaning which I concdi'e this sentence to have ; but the 
editors generally suspect the loss of a word lilte drjMrra or dTpaYOJrfm 
after rk pit vvnyji roit Jia')'Ui-tfD^4^r<Ni. This is unnecessary if we regard 
o-tnx^ " predicative, and I think this way of taking it gives sufficient sense. 
PolyUu ii thinking of the Macedonian army as being so dislocated by the 


keeping the elephants in front he led the maniples of his right 
against the enemy. The Macedonians having no one to give 
them orders, and unable to form a proper phalanx, owing to 
the inequalities of the ground and to the fact that, being 
engaged in trying to come up with the actual combatants, they 
were still in column of march, did not even wait for the Romans 
to come to close quarters : but, thrown into confusion by the 
mere charge of the elephants, their ranks were disordered and 
they broke into flight 

26. The main body of the Roman right followed and 

The Macedonian slaughtered the flying Macedonians, But one 

phalanx of the tribunes, with about twenty maniples, 

outflanked, having made up his mind on his own account 
what ought to be done next, contributed by his action very 
greatly to the general victory. He saw that the division 
which was personally commanded by Philip was much farther 
forward than the rest of the enemy, and was pressing hard 
upon the Roman left by its superior weight ; he therefore left 
the right, which was by this time clearly victorious, and direct- 
ing his march towards the part of the field where a struggle 
was still going on, he managed to get behind the Macedonians 
and charge them on the rear. The nature of the phalanx is 
such that the men cannot face round singly and defend them- 
selves : this tribune, therefore, charged them and killed all he 
could get at; until, being unable to defend themselves, they 
were forced to throw down their shields and fly ; whereupon 
the Romans in their front, who had begun to yield, faced round 
again and charged them too. At first, as I have said, Philip, 
judging from the success of his own division, felt certain of a 
complete victory ; but when he saw his Macedonians all on a 
sudden throwing away their shields, and the enemy close upon 

their rear, he withdrew with a small body of foot 
.^,^^i'"^^^fl•oc and horse a short distance from the field and 

the field and flies. /. i , , i , 

took a general survey of the whole battle : and 
when he observed that the Romans in their pursuit of his left 
wing were already approaching the tops of the hills, he rallied as 
many Thracians and Macedonians as he could at the moment, 

nature of the ground, that, while some parts were in contact with the enemy, 
the rest had not arrived on the scene of the fighting. 


and Red. As Flamininus w^ pursuing the fugitives he came 
upon the lines of the Macedonian \^i, just as they were scaling 
the ridge in their attempt to cross the hills, and at first halted 
in some surprise because the enemy held their spears straight 
up, as is the custom of the Macedonians when surrendering 
themselves or intending to pass over to the enemy. Presently, 
having had the reason of this movement explained to him, he 
held his men back, thinking it best to spare the lives of those 
whom fear had induced to surrender. But whilst he was still 
reflecting on this matter, some of the advanced guard rushed 
upon these men from some higher ground and put most of 
them to the sword, whiie the few survivors threw away their 
shields and escaped by fiight, 

27. The battle was now at an end in every part of the 
field ; the Romans everywhere victorious ; and Philip in full 
retreat towards Tempe. The first night he 
passed at what is called Alexander's tower ; the Tramt" "* 
next day he got as far as Gonni, on the pass 
into Tempe, and there remained, with a view of collecting the 
survivors of the battle. 

fiut the Romans, after following the fiigitives for a certain 
distance, returned ; and some employed themselves in stripping 

the dead; others in collectine the captives ;,„ _ 

, ., """f ;., .,,, i*^,, 'The Romans soon 
while the majonty hurried to the plunder of the abandon pursuit 
enemy's camp. But there they found that the and devote them- 
Aetolians had been beforehand with them ; and "'^^ V" ""^ 
thinking, therefore, that they were deprived of 
their fair share of the booty, they began grumbling at the 
Aetolians and protesting to their general that " he imposed the 
dangers upon them, but yielded the spoil to others." For the 
present, however, they returned to their own camp, and passed 
the night in their old quarters : but next morning they em- 
ployed themselves in collecting the prisoners and the remainder 
of the spoils, and then started on the march towards Larisa. 
In the battle the Romans lost seven hundred 
men ; the Macedonians eight thousand killed, both^de^" 
and not less than five thousand taken prisoners. 

Such was the result of the battle at Cynoscephalae in 
Thessaly between the Romans and Philip. 



28. In my sixth book I made a promise, still unfulfilled, of 
taking a fitting opportunity of drawing a comparison between 
the arms of the Romans and Macedonians, and their re- 
spective system of tactics, and pointing out how they differ 
for better or worse from each other. I will now endeavour by 
a reference to actual facts to fulfil that promise. For since in 
former times the Macedonian tactics proved themselves by 
experience capable of conquering those of Asia and Greece ; 
while the Roman tactics sufficed to conquer the nations of 
Africa and all those of Western Europe ; and since in our 
own day there have been numerous opportunities of com- 
paring the men as well as their tactics, — it will be, I think, a 
useful and worthy task to investigate their differences, and dis- 
cover why it is that the Romans conquer and carry off the 
palm from their enemies in the operations of war : that we may 
not put it all down to Fortune, and congratulate them on their 
good luck, as the thoughtless of mankind do; but, from a 
knowledge of the true causes, may give their leaders the tribute 
of praise and admiration which they deserve. 

Now as to the battles which the Romans fought with Hanni- 
bal, and the defeats which they sustained in them, I need say no 
The Roman de- niore. It was not Owing to their anus or their 
feats in the Punic tactics, but to the skill and genius of Hannibal 

'fr^^nfcrkT/ ^^^^ ^^^ "^^^ ^^^^ ^^°^^ defeats : and that I made 
tactics, but owing quite clear in my account of the battles them- 

to the genius of selves. And my contention is supported by 
Hannibal. ^^^ facts. First, by the conclusion of the war : 
for as soon as the Romans got a general of ability compar- 
able with that of Hannibal, victory was not long in following 
their banners. Secondly, Hannibal himself, being dissatisfied 
with the original arms of his men, and having immediately after 
his first victory furnished his troops with the arms of the 
Romans, continued to employ them thenceforth to the end.^ 
Pyrrhus, again, availed himself not only of the arms, but also 
of the troops of Italy, placing a maniple of Italians and a 
company of his own phalanx alternately, in his battles against 
the Romans. Yet even this did not enable him to win ; the 
battles were somehow or another always indecisive. 

* See 3, 87. 


It was necessary to speak first on these points, to anticipate 
any instances which might seem to make against my theory. 
1 will now return to my comparison. 

29. Many considerations may easily convince us that, if 
only the phalanx has its proper foimation and strength, nothing 
can resist it face to face or withstand its charge. For as a mas 
in close order of battle occupies a space of three feet ; and as 
the length of the sarlssae is sixteen cubits according to the 
original design, which has been reduced in practice to fourteen ; 
and as of these fourteen four must be deducted, to allow for 
the distance between the two hands holding it, and to balance 
the weight in front; it follows clearly that each hopIitewiU have 
ten cubits of his sarissa projecting beyond his body, when he 
lowers it with both hands, as he advances against the enemy : 
hence, too, though the men of the second, third, and fourth 
rank will have their sarissac projecting farther beyond the front 
rank than the men of the fifth, yet even these last will have two 
cubits of their sarissae beyond the front rank ; if only the 
phalanx is properly formed and the men close up properly both 
flank and rear, like the description in Homer' — 

" So buckler pre&sed on buckler ; helm on helm ; 
And man on man: and waving hoise-hair plumes 
In polished head-piece mingled, as Ihey swayed 
In order : b such serried rank they stood." 

And if my description is true and exact, it is clear that in front 
of each man of the front rank there will be five sarissae projecting 
to distances varying by a descending scale of two cubits. 

SO. With this point in our minds, it will not be difficult to 
imagine what the appearance and strength of the whole phalanx 
is hkely to be, when, with lowered sarissae, it advances to the 
charge sixteen deep. Of these sixteen ranks, all above the fifth 
are unable to reach with their sarissae far enough to take actual 
part in the lighting. They, therefore, do not lower them, but 
hold them with the points inclined upwards over the shouldeis 
of the ranks in front of thera, to shield the heads of the whole 
phalanx ; for the sarissae are so closely serried, that they repel 
missiles which have carried over the front ranks and might fall 
upon the heads of those in the rear. These rear ranks, how- 

' Iliad, 13, 131. 


ever, during an advance, press forward those in front by the 
weight of their bodies ; and thus make the chaige very fordblei 
and at the same time render it impossible for the front ranks 
to face about 

Such is the arrangement, general and detailed, of the 

The Roman more phalanx. It remains now to compare with it 

open order com- the peculiarities and distinctive features of the 

^^^ai^*^^*^ Roman arms and tactics. Now, a Roman 
^ *' soldier in full armour also requires a space of 
three square feet But as their method of fighting admits of 
individual motion for each man — because he defends his body 
with a shield, which he moves about to any point from which 
a blow is coming, and because he uses his sword both for 
cutting and stabbing, — it is evident that each man must have 
a clear space, and an interval of at least three feet both on 
flank and rear, if he is to do his duty with any effect The 
result of this will be that each Roman soldier will face two of 
the front rank of a phalanx, so that he has to encounter and 
fight against ten spears, which one man cannot find time even 
to cut away, when once the two lines are engaged, nor force 
his way through easily — seeing that the Roman front ranks are 
not supported by the rear ranks, either by way of adding weight 
to their charge, or vigour to the use of their swords. Therefore 
it may readily be understood that, as I said before, it is im- 
possible to confront a charge of the phalanx, so long as it 
retains its proper formation and strength. 

81. Why is it then that the Romans conquer ? And what is 

it that brings disaster on those who employ the 
"^^^ V^lj;^^"^ phalanx ? Why, just because war is full of un- 

certainties both as to time and place ; whereas 
there is but one time and one kind of ground in which a 
phalanx can fully work. If, then, there were anything to com- 
pel the enemy to accommodate himself to the time and place 
of the phalanx, when about to fight a general engagement, it 
would be but natural to expect that those who employed the 
phalanx would always carry off the victory. But if the enemy 
finds it possible, and even easy, to avoid its attack, what 
becomes of its formidable character? Again, no one denies 
that for its employment it is indispensable to have a country 


flat, bare, and without such impediments as ditches, cavities, 
depressions, steep banks, or beds of rivers : foi all such 
ol^tacles are sufficient to hinder and dislocate this particular 
formation. And that it is, I may say, impossible, or at any rate 
exceedingly rare to find a piece of country of twenty stades, or 
sometimes of even greater extent, without any such obstacles, 
every one will also admit However, let us suppose that such 
a district has been found. If Che enemy decline to coroe 
down into it, but traverse the country sacking the towns and 
territories of the allies, what use will the phalanx be ? For if 
it remains on the ground suited to itself, it will not only fait 
to benefit its friends, but wiil be incapable even of preserving 
itself; for the carriage of provisions will be easily stopped by 
the enemy, seeing that they are in undisputed possession of 
the country : while if it quits its proper ground, from the wish 
to strike a blow, it will be an easy prey to the enemy. Nay, 
if a general does descend into the plain, and yet does not risk 
his whole army upon one charge of the phalanx or upon 
. one chance, but manoeuvres for a time to avoid coming to 
close quarters tn the engagement, it is easy to learn what will 
be the result from what the Romans are now actually doing. 

S2. For no speculation is any longer required to test the 
accuracy of what I am now saying : that can be done by re- 
ferring to accomplished facts. 

The Romans do not, then, attempt to extend their front to 
equal that, of a phalanx, and thep charge directly upon it with 
their whole force : but some of their divisions are kept in re- 
serve, while others join battle with the enemy at close quarters. 
Now, whether the phalanx in its charge drives its opponents 
from their ground, or is itself driven back, in either case its 
peculiar order is dislocated; for whether in following the 
retiring, or flying from the advancing enemy, they quit the 
rest of their forces : and when this takes place, the enemy's 
reserves can occupy the space thus left, and the ground which 
the phalanx had just before been holding, and so no longer 
charge them face to face, but fall upon them on their flank 
and rear. If, then, it is easy to take precautions against the 
opportunities and peculiar advantages of the phalanx, but im- 
possible to do so in the case of its disadvant^es, must it not 


follow that in practice the difference between these two systems is 
enormous ? Of course those generals who employ the phalanx 
must march over ground of every description, must pitch 
camps, occupy points of advantage, besiege, and be besieged, 
and meet with unexpected appearances of the enemy : for all 
these are part and parcel of war, and have an important and 
sometimes decisive influence on the ultimate victory. And 
in all these cases the Macedonian phalanx is difficult, and 
sometimes impossible to handle, because the men cannot act 
either in squads or separately. The Roman order on the 

other hand is flexible : for every Roman, once 
Romanonia'.^ armed and on the field, is equally well equipped 
for every place, time, or appearance of the 
enemy. He is, moreover, quite ready and needs to make no 
change, whether he is required to fight in the main body, or 
in a detachment, or in a single maniple, or even by himself. 
Therefore, as the individual members of the Roman force are 
so much more serviceable, their plans are also much more 
often attended by success than those of others. 

I thought it necessary to discuss this subject at some 
length, because at the actual time of the occurrence many 
Greeks supposed when the Macedonians were beaten that it 
was incredible; and many will afterwards be at a loss to 
account for the inferiority of the phalanx to the Roman 
system of arming. 

88. Philip having thus done all he could in the battle, 
but having been decisively beaten, after taking 

of Phmp "^^ ^P ^^ roany of the survivors as he could, pro- 
ceeded through Tempe into Macedonia. On 
the night previous to his start he sent one of his guard to 
Larisa, with orders to destroy and burn the king's correspond- 
ence. And it was an act worthy of a king to retain, even in 
the midst of disaster, a recollection of a necessary duty. For 
he knew well enough that, if these papers came into the pos- 
session of the Romans, they would give many handles to the 
enemy both against himself and his friends. It has, perhaps, 
been the case with others that in prosperity they could not use 
power with the moderation which becomes mortal men, while in 
disaster they displayed caution and good sense ; but certainly 


this was the case with PhJUp. And this will be made manifest 
by what I shall subsequently relate. For as I showed without 
reserve the justice of his measures at the beginning of his 
reign, and the change for the worse which they subsequently 
underwent ; and showed when and why and how this took 
place, with a detailed description of the actions in this part of 
his career;* in the same way am I bound to set forth his 
repentance, and the dexterity with which he changed with his 
change of fortune, and may be said to have shown the highest 
prudence in meeting this crisis in his affairs. 

As for Flamininus, having after the battle taken the 
necessary measures as to the captives and the rest of the 
spoils, he proceeded to Larisa, . . , 

34. Flamininus was much annoyed at the selfishness dis- 
played by the Aetolians in regard to the spoils ; 
and had no idea of leaving them to be masters ^'^^„^"^ *^ 
of Greece after he had deprived Philip of his 
supremacy there. He was irritated also by their braggadocio, 
when he saw that they claimed all the credit of the victory, 
and were filling Greece with the report of their valour. 
Wherefore, wherever he met them he behaved with hauteur, 
and never said a word on public business, but carried out all 
his measures independently or by the agency of his own 
friends. While the relations between these two were in this 
strained state, some few days after the battle Flamininus grants 
Demosthenes, Cycliadas, and Limnaeus came fifteen days' imce 
on a mission from Philip ; and, after consider- '" Philip, 
able discussion with them, Flamininus granted an immediate 
armistice of fifteen days, and agreed to have a personal inter- 
view also with Philip in the course of them to discuss the state of 
affairs. And this interview being conducted in a courteous and 
friendly manner, the suspicions entertained of Flamininus by tbe 
Aetolians blazed forth with double fury. For as corruption, and 
thehabitofnever doing anything without a bribe, had long been 
a common feature in Greek politics, and as this was the acknow- 
ledged characteristic of the Aetolians, they could not believe 
that Flamininus could so change in his relations with Philip 
vrithout a bribe They did not know the habits and principles 
' See 4, 77 ; 7. la ; 10, a6. 


of the Romans on this subject ; but judging from themselves 
they concluded that there was every probability of Philip in 
his present position offering a large sum of money, and of 
Flamininus being unable to resist the temptation. 

85. If I had been speaking of an earlier period, and expres- 
The disinterested-Sing what was generally true, I should have had 
ness of the Ro- no hesitation in asserting of the Romans as a 
mans generaUy nation that they would not be likely to do such 
as o money. ^ thing, — I mean in the period before they en- 
gaged in wars beyond the sea, and while they retained their 
own habits and principles uncontaminated.^ But in the pre- 
sent times I should not venture to say this of them all ; still, 
as individuals, I should be bold to say of the majority of the 
men of Rome that they are capable of preserving their honesty 
in this particular : and as evidence that I am making no im- 
possible assertion, I would quote two names which will command 

general assent, — I mean first, Lucius Aemilius 

^"^ Pauiur*""^ ^^^ conquered Perseus, and won the kingdom of 

Macedonia. In that kingdom, besides all the 
other splendour and wealth, there was found in the treasury 
more than six thousand talents of gold and silver : yet he was 
so far from coveting any of this, that he even refused to see it, 
and administered it by the hands of others ; though he was far 
from being superfluously wealthy himself, but, on the contrary, 
was very badly off. At least, I know that on his death, which 
occurred shortly after the war, when his own sons Publius 
Scipio and Quintus Maximus wished to pay his wife her dowry, 
amounting to twenty-five talents, they were reduced to such 
straits that they would have been quite unable to do so if they 
had not sold the household furniture and slaves, and some of 
the landed property besides. And if what I say shall appear 
incredible to any one, he may easily convince himself on the 
subject : for though there are many controversies at Rome, 
and especially on this particular point, arising from the an- 
Publius Cornelius, tagonistic parties among them, yet he will find 

Scipio Africanus that what I have just said about Aemilius is 

Minor. acknowledged by every one. Again, Publius 

Scipio, son by blood of this Aemilius, and son by adoption 

1 See 6. 56 ; 32, 11. 


of Fublius called tlie Great, when he got possession of Car- 
thage, reckoned the wealthiest city in the world, took abso- 
lutely nothing from it for his own private use, either by pur- 
chase or by any other manner of acquisition whatever, although 
he was by no means a very rich man, but very moderately so 
for a Roman. But he not only abstained from the wealth of 
Carthage itself, but refused to allow anything from Airica at 
all to be mixed up with his private property. Therefore, in 
regard to this man once more, any one who chooses to inquire 
will find that his reputation in this particular is absolutely 
undisputed at Rome. I shall, however, take a more suitable 
opportunity of treating this subject at greater length. 

86. Titus then having appointed Philip a day for the con- 
gress, immediately wrote to the allies announc- Tbe codbtcu of 
ing when they were to appear ; and a few days Tcmpe, b.c 197. 
afterwards came himself to the pass of Tempe at the appointed 
time. When the allies had assembled, and the congress met, 
the Roman imperator rose and bade each say on what terms 
they ought to make peace with Philip. King Amynandros 
then delivered a short and moderate speech, 
merely asking that " they would all have some ^A^^nd!^ 
consideration for him, to prevent Philip, as soon 
as the Romans left Greece, from turning the whole weight of his 
anger upon him ; for the Athamanes were always an easy prey 
to the Macedonians, because of their weakness and the close 
contiguity of their territory." When he had finished, Alexan- 
der the Aetolian rose and complimented Flami- 
ninus for " having assembled the allies in that '^'^^'*'* 
congress to discuss the terms of peace ; and, 
above all, for having on the present occasion called on each 
to express his opinion. But he was deluded and mistaken," 
he added, " if he believed that by making terms with Philip 
he would secure the Romans peace or the Greeks freedom. For 
neither of these was possible. But if he desired to accom- 
plish both the design of his own government and his own 
promises, which he had given to all the Greeks, there was one 
way, and one only, of making terms with Macedonia, and that 
was to eject Philip from his throne; and this could easily be 
done if he did not let slip the present opportunity." 


After some further ai^mcnls in support of this view he sat 

87. tlamintnus here took up the ai^ument, and said that 
"Alexander was mistaken not onlyas to the pohcy 

FianUn^nus. '^'^ Rome, but also 3s to the object which he pro- 
posed to himself, and above all as to the true 
interests of Greece. For it was not the Roman way to utterly 
destroy those with whom they had been at open war.- A proof of 
his assertion might be found in the war with Hannibal and the 
Carthaginians ; for though the Romans had received the sever- 
est provocation at their hands, and afterwards had it in their 
power to do absolutely what they pleased to them, yet they 
had adopted no extreme measures against the Carthaginians. 
For his part, moreover, he had never entertained the idea that 
it was necessary to wage an inexpiable war with Philip ; but on 
the contrary had been prepared before the battle to come to 
terms with him, if he would have submitted to the Roman 
demands. He was surprised, therefore, that those who had 
taken part in the former peace conference should now adopt a 
tone of such irreconcilable hostility. Have we not conquered ? 
(say they). Yes, but this is the niDst senseless of arguments. For 
brave men, when actually at war, should be terrible and full of 
fire ; when beaten, undaunted and courageous ; when victori- 
ous, on the other hand, moderate, placable, and humane. But 
your present advice is the reverse of all this. Yet, in truth, to 
the Greeks themselves it is greatly to their interest that Mace- 
donia should be humbled, but not at all so that she should 
be destroyed. For it might chance thereby that they would 
experience the barbarity of Thracians and Gauls, as has been 
the case more than once already." He then added that " the 
final decision of himself and Roman colleagues was, that, if 
Philip would consent to fulfil all the conditions formerly en- 
joined by the allies, they would grant him peace, subject, of 
course, to the 'approval of the Senate : and that the Aetolians 
were free to take what measures they chose for themselves" 
Upon Phaeneas attempting to reply that " Everything done 
hitherto went for nothing ; for if Philip managed to ex- 
tricate himself from his present difficulties, he would at once 
find some other occasion for hostilities," — Flamininus sprang 


at once from his seat, and said, wilh some heat, " Cease this 
trifling, Phaeneas ! For I will so settle the terms of the peace 
that Phihp will be unable, even if he wished it, to molest the 

38. After this they separated for that day. On the next the 
king arrived : and on the third, when all the on the third day 
delegates were met for discussion, Philip en- of the conference 
tered, and with great skill and tact diverted ^'"P "PPe=^ 
the anger which they all entertained against him. For he 
said that " He conceded the demands made on the former 
occasion by the Romans and the allies, and remitted the de- 
cision on the remaining points to the Senate." But Phaeneas, 
one of the Aetolians present, said : " Why then, Philip, do 
not you restore to us Larisa Cremaste, Pharsalus, Fhtfaiotid 
Thebes, and Echinus ? " Whereupon Philip bade them take 
them over. But Flamininus here interposed, The Aetolians 
and forbade the Aetolians to take over any of checkmated by 
the towns except Phthiotid Thebes ; " for upon fTanuninui. 
his approaching this town with his army, and summoning it to 
submit to the Roman protection, the Thebans had refused ; 
and, as it had now come into his hands in the course of war, 
he had the right of taking any measures he chose regarding it." 
Phaeneas and his colleagues indignantly protested at this, and 
asserted that it was their clear right to recover the towns pre- 
viously members of their league, " first on the ground that 
they had taken part in the recent war ; and secondly in virtue 
of their original treaty of alliance, according to which the mov- 
able property of the conquered belonged to the Romans, the 
towns to the Aetolians." To which Flamininus answered that 
" they were mistaken in both points ; for their treaty with 
Rome had been annulled when they abandoned the Romans, 
and made terms with Philip : and, even supposing that treaty 
to be still in force, they had no right to recover or take over 
such cities as had voluntarily put themselves under the protec- 
tion of Kome, as the whole of the cities in Thessaly had done, 
but only such as were taken by force,' 

* Livy (33, 13) has mistaken the ineitning of Polybius in this passage, re- 
pnsenling the quarrel of the Aetolians and Flaminiaus as being for the 
poMCSsion of Thebes,— the only town, in (acl, on which there was no dispnt- 


39. The other members of the congress were delighted 
iho tornis of t!»e ^' ^^^ spccch of Flamininus. But the Aetoli- 

pcacc settled, ans listened with indignation ; and what proved 
Winter of ^q \^ ^^ beginning of serious evils was 
'^^' engendered. For this quarrel was the spark 
from which, not long afterwards, both the war with the Aetol- 
ians and that with Antiochus flamed out The principal 
motive of Flamininus in being thus forward in' coming to 
terms was the information he had received that Antiochus 
had started from Syria with an army, with the intention of 
crossing over into Europe. Therefore he was anxious lest 
Philip, catching at this chance, should determine to defend 
the towns and protract the war ; and lest meanwhile he should 
himself be superseded by another commander from home, on 
whom the honour of all that he had achieved would be 
diverted. Therefore the terms which the king asked were 
granted : namely, that he should have four months* suspension 
of hostilities, paying Flamininus at once the two hundred 
talents ; delivering his son Demetrius and some others of his 
friends as hostages; and sending to Rome to submit the 
decision on the whole pacification to the Senate. Flamininus 
and Philip then separated, after interchanging mutual pledges 
of fidelity, on the understanding that, if thfe treaty were not 
confirmed, Flamininus was to restore to Philip the two hundred 
talents and the hostages. All the parties then sent ambas- 
sadors to Rome, some to support and others to oppose the 
settlement. . . . 

40. Why is it that, though deceived again and again by the 
same things and persons, we are unable to aban- Foolish credulity, 
don our blind folly ? For this particular kind see ch. 13 ; and 
of fraud has often been committed before now, 3i» «!• 
and by many. That other men should allow themselves to 
be taken in is perhaps not astonishing ; but it is wonderful 
that those should do so who are the authors and origin of the 
same kind of malpractice. But I suppose the cause is the 
absence of that rule so happily expressed by Epicharmus : 

*' Cool head and wise mistrust are wisdom's sinews." . . . 


41. [They endeavoured] to prevent Antiochus from sail- 
ing along their coast, not from enmity to him, but from a 
suspicion that by giving support to Philip he would become 
an obstacle in the way of Greek liberty. , , . 

King Antiochus was very desirous of possessing Ephesus, 
owing to its extremely convenient position ; for it appeared to 
occupy the position of an Acropolis for expeditions by land 
and sea against Ionia and the cities of the Hellespont, and to 
be always a most convenient base of operations for the kings 
of Asia against Europe. . . . 

Of King Attalus, who now died, I think I ought to 
speak a suitable word, as I have done in the ueaih of King 
case of others. Originally he had no other Atuiiu, who had 
externa] qualification for royalty except money _'^^™ '" "' 

, L- 1 ■ J J T L J. J -.t i Tliebes, before 

alone, which, mdeed, if handled with good ^^ baitie of Cy- 
sense and boldness, is of very great assistance noscephaiae. nnd 
in every undertaking, but without these qualities ^^ *>■*" brought 
. . . ... - -1 J . r . home 10 die u 

IS m Its nature the origin of evil, and, m fact, Pergamum, 
of utter ruin to very many. For tn the firstautumn, s.a 177. 
place it engenders envy and malicious plots, '-"T' 33. ai. 
and contributes lately to the destruction of body and soul. 
For few indeed are the souls that are able by the aid of 
wealth to repel dangers of this description. This king's great- 
ness of mind therefore deserves our admiration, because he 
never attempted to use his wealth for anything else but the 
acquisition of royal power, — an object than which none greater 
can be mentioned. Moreover he made the first step in this 
design, not only by doing services to his friends and gaining 
their affection, but also by achievements in war. For it was 
afrer conquering the Gauls, the most formidable and warlike 
nation at that time in Asia, that he assumed this rank and 
first puts himself forward as king And though he obtained 
this honour, and lived seventy-two years, of which he reigned 
forty-four, he passed a life of the utmost virtue and goodness 
towards his wife and children ; kept faith with all allies and 
friends ; and died in the midst of a most glorious campaign, 
fighting for the liberty of the Greeks i and what is more 


remarkable than all, though he left four grown-up sons, he so well 
settled the question of succession, that the crown was handed 
down to his children's children without a single dispute. . . . 


42. After Marcus Marcellus had entered upon the consul- 
ship the ambassadors from Philip, and from 
L^^F^Ilis^?- Flamininus and the allies, arrived at Rome to 
pureo, M. Claudius discuss the treaty with Philip ; and after a 
MarceUus. The lengthened hearing the confirmation of the 
^Tcon^™'^ terms was decreed in the Senate. But on the 

matter being brought before the people, Marcus 
Claudius, who was ambitious of being himself sent to Greece, 
spoke against the treaty, and did his best to get it rejected. 
The people however ratified the terms, in accordance with the 
wish of Flamininus ; and, upon this being settled, the Senate 
immediately despatched a commission of ten men of high 
rank to arrange the settlement of Greece in conjunction with 
Flamininus, and to confirm the freedom of the Greeks. 
Among others Damoxenus of Aegium and his colleagues, 
envoys from the Achaean league, made a proposal in the 
Senate for an alliance with Rome; but as some opposition 
was raised to this at the time, on account of a counter-claim of 
the Eleians upon Triphylia, and of the Messenians, who were 
at the time actually in alliance with Rome, upon Asine and 
Pylus, and of the Aetolians upon Heraea, — the decision was 
referred to the commission of ten. Such were the proceedings 
in the Senate. ... 


48. After the battle of Cynoscephalae, as Flamininus was 
Philip allows his wintering at Elateia, the Boeotians, being anxious 
Boeotian followers' to recover their citizens who had served in 
to return home, philip^s army, sent an embassy to Flamininus 
to try and secure their safety. Wishing to encourage the loyalty 
of the Boeotians to himself, because he was already anxious 
as to the action of Antiochus, he readily assented to their 
petition. These men were promptly restored from Macedonia, 
and one of them named Brachylles the Boeotians at once 
elected Boeotarch ; and in a similar spirit honoured and pro- 


moted, as much as before, such of the others as were thought 
to be well disposed to the rpyal house of Macedonia. They 
also sent an embassy to Philip to thank him for the return 
of the young men, thus derogating from the favour done them 
by Flamininus, — a measure highly disquieting' zeuxippus and 
to Zeuxippus and Peisistratus, and all who were Peisisiraius, heads 
regarded as partisans of Rome; because they of the Romanising 
foresaw what would happen to themselves and lo^'gei'^nd of 
their families, knowing quite well that if the Brachyiies, 
Romans quitted Greece, and Philip remained ^^' ''*■ 
closely supporting the political party opposed to themselves, it 
would be unsafe for them to remain citizens of Boeotia. They 
therefore agreed among themselves to send an embassy to 
Flamininus in Elateia : and having obtained an interview 
with him, they made a lengthy and elaborate statement on 
this subject, describing the state of popular feeling which nas 
now adverse to themselves, and discanting on the untrusl- 
worthiness of democratic assemblies. And finally, they 
ventured to say that " Unless they could overawe the common 
people by getting rid of Brachyiies, there could be no security 
for the party in favour of Rome as soon as the legions departed," 
After listening to these arguments Flamininus replied that 
" He would not personally take any part in such a measure, 
but he would not hinder those who wished to do so." Finally, 
he bade them speak to Alexamenus the Strategus of the 
Aetolians. Zeuxippus and his colleagues accepted the suggest- 
ion, and communicated with Alexamenus, who at once con- 
sented; and agreeing to carry out their proposal sent three 
Aetolians and three Italians, all young men, to assassinate 
Brachyiies. ... , 

There is no more terrible witness, or '"ore.demi^^y^ 
formidable accuser, than the conscience which own conscience, 
resides in each man's breast. ... See LLvy, 33, aS. 

44. About this same time the ten commissioners arrived 
from Rome who were to effect the settlement 
of Greece, bringing with them the decree of consuitum' 
the Senate on the peace with Philip. The 
main points of the decree were these : " All other Greeks, 
whether in Asia or Europe, to be free and enjoy their own 


laws ; but that Philip should hand over to the Romans those 
at present under his authority, and all towns in which he had 
a garrison, before the Isthmian games ; and restore Euromus, 
Pedasa, Bargylia, lasus, Abydos, Thasus, Marinus, and Perin- 
thus to freedom, and remove his garrisons from them. That 
Flamininus should write to Prusias commanding him to 
liberate Cius, in accordance with the decree of the Senate. 
That Philip should restore to the Romans within the same 
period all captives and deserters; and likewise all decked 
ships, except three and his one sixteen-banked vessel; and 
should pay a thousand talents, half at once, and half by 
instalments spread over ten years." 

45. Upon this decree being published in Greece, it created 

a feeling of confidence and gratification in all 
^'^^^^oi^i^ ^ ^ ^^ communities except the Aetolians, These 

last were annoyed at not getting all they ex- 
pected, and attempted to run down the decree by saying that 
it was mere words, without anything practical in it ; and they 
based upon the clauses of the decree itself some such argu- 
ments as follow, by way of disquieting those who would listen 
to them. They said " That there were two distinct clauses in 
the decree relating to the cities garrisoned by Philip: one 
ordering him to remove those garrisons and to hand over the 
cities to the Romans; the other bidding him withdraw his 
garrisons and set the cities free. Those that were to be set 
free were definitely named, and they were towns in Asia ; and 
it was plain, therefore, that those which were to be handed 
over to the Romans were those in Europe, namely, Oreus, 
Eretria, Chalcis, Demetrias, and Corinth. Hence it was 
plain that the Romans were receiving the * fetters of Greece ' 
from the hand;5 of Philip, and that the Greeks were getting, 
not freedom, but a change of masters." 

These arguments of the Aetolians were repeated ad 
nauseatn. But, meanwhile, Flamininus left Elateia with the 
ten commissioners, and having crossed to Anticyra, sailed 
straight to Corinth, and there sat in council with the com- 
missioners, and considered the whole settlement to be made. 

The commis- "^"^ ^^ ^^ adverse comments of the Aetolians 
sioners sit at obtained wide currency, and were accepted by 


some, Flamininus was forced to enter upon Corinth, and de- 
many elaborate arcuments in the meetings of ciare ail Greek 
. ' ° . . . . " cities free, except 

the commission, trymg to convince the com-theAcrocoriaihus. 
missioners that if they wished to acquire un- Demeinas, and 
alloyed praise from the Greeks, and to establish Chalds, 
firmly in the minds of all that they had originally come into 
the country not to gain any advantage for Rome, but simply 
to secure the freedom of Greece, they must abandon every 
district and free all the cities now garrisoned by Philip. But 
this was just the point in dispute among the commissioners ; 
for, as lo all other cities, a decision had been definitely arrived 
at in Rome, and the ten commissioners had express instruc- 
tions; but about Chalcis, Corinth, and Demetrias they had 
been allowed a discretion on account of Antiochus, in order 
that they might take such measures as they thought best from 
a view of actual events. For it was notorious that this king 
had for some time past been meditating an interference in 
Europe. However, as far as Corinth was concerned, Flamini- 
nus prevailed on the commissioners to free it at once and 
restore it to the Achaean league, from respect to the terms of 
the original agreement; but he retained the Acrocorinthus, 
Demetrias, and Chalcis. 

46. When these decisions had been come to, the time for 
the celebration of the Isthmian games arrived, xbe isthmian 
The expectation of what would happen there eames, July b.c. 
drew the men of highest rank from nearly every '9*- 

quarter of the world ; and there was a great deal of talk on the 
subject from one end of the assembled multitude to the 
other, and expressed in varied language. Some said that 
from certain of the places and towns it was impossible that 
the Romans could withdraw ; while others asserted that they 
would withdraw from those considered most important, but 
would retain others that were less prominent, though capable 
of being quite as serviceable. And such persons even took 
upon themselves in their ingenuity to designate the precise 
places which would be thus treated. While people were still 
in this state of uncertainty, all the world being assembled on 
the stadium to watch the games, the herald came forward, 
and having proclaimed silence by the sound of a trumpet. 


delivered the following proclamation : '* The senate of Rome 

ProciamaUon of ^^^ Titus Quintus, procoHsul and imperator, 

the freedom of having conquered King Philip and the Mace- 

the Greek cities, donians in war, declare the following peoples 

free, without garrison, or tribute, in full enjoyment of the laws 

of their respective countries : namely, Corinthians, Phociansy 

Locrians, Euboeans, Achaeans of Phiotis, Magnesians, Thes- 

salians, Perrhaebians." 

Now as the first words of the proclamation were the signal 
for a tremendous outburst of clappintr, some of 

An exciting scene. , , ,, , . ,, , 

the people could not hear it at all, and some 
wanted to hear it again ; but the majority feeling incredulous, 
and thinking that they heard the words in a kind of dream, so 
utterly unexpected was it, another impulse induced every one 
to shout to the herald and trumpeter to come into the middle 
of the stadium and repeat the words : I suppose because the 
people wished not only to hear but to see the speaker, in their 
inability to credit the announcement. But when the herald, 
having advanced into the middle of the crowd, once more, by 
his trumpeter, hushed the clamour, and repeated exactly the 
same proclamation as before, there was such an outbreak of clap- 
ping as is difficult to convey to the imagination of my readers 
at this time. When at length the clapping ceased, no one paid 
any attention whatever to the athletes, but all were talking to 
themselves or each other, and seemed like people bereft of 
their senses. Nay, after the games were over, in the extrava- 
gance of their joy, they nearly killed Flamininus by the ex- 
hibition of their gratitude. Some wanted to look him in 
the face and call him their preserver; others were eager 
to touch his hand ; most threw garlands and fillets upon him ; 
until between them they nearly crushed him to death. But 
though this expression of popular gratitude was thought to 
have been extravagant, one might say with confidence that it fell 
short of the importance of the actual event. For that the Romans 
and their leader Flamininus should have deliberately incurred 
unlimited expense and danger, for the sole purpose of freeing 
Greece, deserved their admiration ; and it was also a great thing 
that their power was equal to their intention. But the greatest 
thing of all is that Fortune foiled their attempt by none of her 


usgal caprices, but that every single thing came to a success- 
Tul issue at the same time ; so that all Greeks, Asiatic and 
European alike, were by a single proclamation become "free, 
without garrison or tribute, and enjoying their own laws." 

47. The Isthmian festival having come to an end, the 
first persons with whom the commissioners Answer of com- 
dealt were the ambassadors from Antiochus. misslonersto 
They instructed them that "Their master must '^'"8 Awiochai. 
abstain from attacking those cities in Asia which were autono- 
mous, and go to war with none of them ; and must evacuate 
those that had been subject to Ptolemy or Philip. In addi- 
tion to this they forbade him to cross over into Europe with 
an army ; for no Greek henceforth was to be attacked in war 
or to be enslaved to any one. Finally, they said that some of 
their own number would go to visit Antiochus." With this 
answer Hegesianax and Lysias returned to Antiochus. They 
next summoned the representatives of all the 
nations and cities, and declared to them the ^'"^i^J^**" 
decisions of the commissioners. The Mace- 
donian tribe of the Orestae, on the ground of their having 
joined Rome during the war, they declared autonomous ; the 
Penhaebians, Dotopes, and Magnesians they declared to be free. 
To the Thessalians, in addition to their freedom, they assigned 
the Phiotid Achaeans, with the exception, however, of Phthiotid 
Thebes and Pharsalus : for the Aetolians made such a point 
of their claim to Pharsalus, as also to Leucas, on the ground 
of the rights secured them by the original treaty, that the 
commissioners referred the consideration of their demand in 
regard to these places back again to the Senate, but allowed 
them to retain Phocis and Locris as members of their league 
as they had been before. Corinth, Triphylia, and Heraea 
they handed over to the Achaeans. Oreus and Eretria the 
majority wished to give to King Eumenes, but on the instance 
of Flamininus this design was not confirmed ; and, accordingly, 
a short time afterwards these towns, with Caiystus, were de- 
clared free by the Senate. To Pleuratus they assigned Lychnis 
and Parthus in Illyria, towns which had been subject to 
Philip; and Amynandros they allowed to retain all such strong- 
holds as he had taken firom Philip during the war. 


48. This business completed, the commissioners separated 

in various directions: Publius Lentulus sailed 

sioners^semrate to Bargylia and announced its freedom; Leucius 

and go to various Stertinius did the same to Hephaestia, Thasus, 

parts of Greece, and the cities in Thrace ; while Publius Ven- 

Twogoto tilius and Lucius Terentius started to visit 

Antiochusand Antiochus ; and Gnaeus Cornelius with his 

o ers o 11. ^Qjjgagues went to king Philip. They met him 

near Tempe, and after speaking with him on the other 

matters about which they had instructions, they advised him to 

send an embassy to Rome, to ask for an alliance, in order to 

obviate all suspicion of being on the watch for an oppot^ 

tunity in expectation of the arrival of Antiochus. The king 

Gnaeus Cornelius ^g^^^^^S ^^ follow this advice, Comelius left 
at the congress of him and went to the league congress at Thermus; 
the Aetoiian ^nd Coming into the public assembly urged the 
eague. Aetolians in a lengthy speech to abide by the 
policy they had adopted, from the first, and maintain their good 
disposition towards the Romans. Many rose to answer : of 
whom some expressed dissatisfaction with the Romans in 
moderate and decorous language, for not having used their good 
fortune with sufficient regard to their joint interests, and for 
not observing the original compact; while others delivered 
violent invectives, asserting that the Romans would never have 
set foot on Greece or conquered Philip if it had not been for 
them. Cornelius disdained to answer these speeches in detail, 
but he advised them to send ambassadors to Rome, for they 
would get full justice in the Senate : which they accordingly 
did Such was the conclusion of the war with Philip. . . . 


49. A\Tienever they are reduced to the last extremity, as the 
phrase goes, they will fly to the Romans for protection and 
commit themselves and their city to them.^ . . . 

* Referring apparently to the conduct of the Hellenic cities in Asia in pre- 
sence of Antiochus, who, having wintered in Ephesus (B.C. 197-196), was 
endeavouring in 196 by force or stratagem to consolidate his power in Asia 
Minor. Livy, 33, 38. 


60. Just when the designs of Antiochus in Thrace were suc- 
ceeding to his heart's desire, Lucius Cornelius Amiochus in the 
and his party sailed into Selybria, These were Chereonesus and 
the envoys sent by the Senate to conclude a ''"'™™' s-c- 196- 
peace between Antiochus and Ptolemy. And at the same 
time there arrived Puhlius Lentulus from Bargylia, Lucius 
Terentius and Publius Villius from Thasus, three of the ten 
commissioners for Greece, Their arrival having been promptly 
announced to Antiochus, they all assembled within the next 
few days at Lysimacheia ; and it so happened that Hegesianax 
and Lysias, who had been on the mission to Flamininus, 
arrived about the same time. The private intercourse between 
the king and the Romans was informal and friendly ; but when 
presently they met in conference to discuss public affairs, 
things took quite another aspect. Lucius Cor- 
nelius demanded that Antiochus should ^P^^^^"" 
evacuate all the cities subject to Ptolemy which 

he had taken in Asia ; while he warned him in solemn and 
emphatic language that he must do so also to the cities subject 
to Philip, " for it was ridiculous that Antiochus should come in 
and take the prizes of the war which Rotne had waged with 
Philip," He also admonished him to abstain from attacking 
autonomous cities, and added that " He was at a loss to con- 
jecture with what view Antiochus had crossed over to Europe 
with such a powerful army and fleet ; for if it were not with 
the intention of attacking the Romans, there was no ex- 
planation left that any reasonable person could accept" 
With these words the Romans ceased speaking. 

61. The king began his reply by saying that " He did not 
understand by what right the Romans raised a 
controversy with him in regard to the cities in Anii^hus" 
Asia, They were the last people in the world 

who had any claim to do so." Next he chimed that " They 
should refrain entirely from interfering in the affairs of Asia, 
seeing that he never in the least degree interposed in those of 
Italy. He had crossed into Europe with his army to recover 
his possessions in the Chersonese and the cities in Thrace ; 
his right to the government of these places being superior to 
that of any one in the world. For this was originally the 



principality of Lysimachus ; and as Seleucus waged war with 
Lysimachus ^^^ conquered that prince, the whole domain 
conquered by of Lysimachus passed to Seleucus:^ then 
s^«^ Ni<»nor, o^ng to the multifarious interests which dis- 
tracted the attention of his predecessors, fir$t 
Ptolemy and then Philip had managed to wrest this country 
from them and secure it for themselves. He had not then 
availed himself of Philip's difficulties to take it, but had re- 
cai'ered possession of it in the exercise of his undoubted rights. 
It was no injury to the Romans that he should now be 
restoring to their homes, and settling again in their city, the 
people of Lysimacheia who had been expelled by an unexpected 
raid of the Thracians. He was doing this, not from any in- 
tention of attacking the Romans, but to prepare a place of 
residence for his son Seleucus. As for the autonomous cities 
of Asia, they must acquire their freedom by his free grace, not 
by an injunction from Rome.. As for Ptolemy, he was about 
to settle matters amicably with him : for it was his intention 
to confirm their friendship by a matrimonial alliance." 

52. But upon Lucius expressing an opinion that they ought 

Antiochus refuses ^^ ^^ i" ^^^ representatives of Lampsacus and 
to acknowledge Smyrna and give them a hearing, this was done. 
the Romans as 'pj^g envoys from Lampsacus were Parmenio 

and Pythodorus, and from Smyrna Coeranus. 
These men expressing themselves with much openness, Philip 
was irritated at the idea of defending himself against accusers 
before a tribunal of Romans, and interrupting Parmenio, said : 
" A truce to your long speeches : I do not choose to have my 
controversies with you decided before a Roman but before a 
Rhodian court." Thereupon they broke up the conference 
very far from pleased with each other. . . . 


58. Many people have a yearning for bold and glorious 

Death of Scopas. Undertakings, but few dare actually attempt them. 

See supra, Yet Scopas had much fairer opportunities for a 

> Justin. 17, 1-2 ; Appian Syr. 62. The battle was in the plain of Corns 
in Phiygia, 

iviii FALL OF SCOPAS 247 

hazardous and bold career than Cleomenes. i3< " ; '^i '8, 
For the latter, though circumvented by his "'^ '' " 
enemies, and reduced to depend upon such forces as his 
servants and friends could supply, yet left no chance untried, 
and tested every one to the best of his ability, valuing an 
honourable death more highly than a life of disgrace. But 
Scopas, with all the advantages of a formidable body of 
soldiers and of the excellent opportunity afforded by the youth 
of the king, by bis own delays and halting counsels allowed 
himself to be circumvented. For having ascertained that he 
was holding a meeting of his partisans at his own house, and 
was consulting with them, Aristomenes sent some of the royal 
bodyguards and summoned him to the king's council. 
\Vhereupon Scopas was so infatuated that he was neither bold 
enough to cany out his designs, nor able to make up his mind 
to obey the king's summons, — which is in itself the most 
extreme step, — until Aristomenes, understanding the blunder 
he had made, caused soldiers and elephants to surround his 
house, and sent Ptolemy son of Eumenes in with some young 
men, with orders to bring him quietly if he would come, but, if 
not, by force. When Ptolemy entered the house and in- 
formed Scopas that the king summoned him, he refused at 
first to obey, but remained looking fixedly at Ptolemy, and for 
a long while preserved a threatening attitude as though he 
wondered at his audacity; and when Ptolemy came boldly 
up to him and took hold of his cblamys, he called on the by- 
standers to help him. But seeing that the number of young 
men who had accompanied Ptolemy into the house was large, 
and being informed by some one of the military array surround- 
ing it outside, be yielded to circumstances, and went, accom- 
panied by his friends, in obedience to the summons. 

54. On his entering the council chamber the kingwas the first 
to state the accusation against him, which he did 
briefly. He was followed by Polycrates lately ^°^^°^ ^ 
arrived from Cyprus ; and he again by Aristo- 
menes. The charges made by them all were much to the 
same effect as what I have just stated ; but there was now 
added to them the seditious meeting with his friends, and his 
refusal to obey the summons of the king. On these charges 


he was unanimously condemned, not only by the members of 
the council, but also by the envoys of foreign nations who 
were present. And when Aristomenes was about to commence 
his accusation he brought in a large number of other Greeks 
of rank also to support him, as well as the Aetolian am- 
bassadors who had come to negotiate a peace, among whom 
was Dorimachus son of Nicostratus. When these speeches 
had been delivered, Scopas endeavoured to put forward certain 
pleas in his defence : but gaining no attention from any one, 
owing to the senseless nature of his proceedings, he was taken 
along with his friends to prison. There after nightfall Aristo- 
menes caused Scopas and his family to be put to death by poison; 
but did not allow Dicacarchus to die until he had had him 
racked and scourged, thus inflicting on him a punishment which 
he thoroughly descr\'ed in the name of all Greece. For this was 

the Dicaearchus whom Philip, when he resolved 
i)kncarciius "pon his trcachcrous attack on the Cyclades 

and the cities of the Hellespont, appointed 
leader of the whole fleet and the entire enterprise : who being 
thus sent out to perform an act of flagrant wickedness, not 
only thought that he was doing nothing wrong, but in the 
extravagance of his infatuation imagined that he would strike 
terror into the gods as well as man. For wherever he 
anchored he used to build two altars, to Impiety and Lawless- 
ness, and, ofl"ering sacrifice upon these altars, worshipped them 
as his gods. Therefore in my opinion he met with a just 
retribution both from gods and men : for as his hfe had been 
spent in defiance to the laws of nature, his end was properly 
also one of unnatural horror. All the other Aetolians who 
wished to depart were allowed by the king to go in possession 
of their property. 

56. As in the lifetime of Scopas his love of money had 

Enormous wealth been notorious, for his avarice did in fact surpass 

coiiccieci by that of any man in the world, so after his death 

Scopas. ^j^g i^ made still more conspicuous by the 

enormous amount of gold and other property found in his 

house; for by the assistance of the coarse manners and 

drunken habits of Charimortus he had absolutely pillaged the 



Having thus settled the AetoUan business to their likings 
the courtiers turned their attention to the cere- The anacieieria 
mony of instituting the king into the manage- of PtolEin)' 
ment of his office, called the Anadeteria. His EpiphaMs. 
age was not indeed yet so far advanced as to ' '' ' ' ■ '*" 
make this necessary ; but they thought that the kingdom 
would gain a certain degree of lirmness and a fresh impulse 
towards prosperity, if it were known that the king had assumed 
the independent direction of the government They then made 
the preparations for the ceremony with great splendour, and 
carried it out in a manner worthy of the greatness of the 
kingdom, Polycrates being considered to have contributed very 
largely to the accomplishment of their efforts. For this man 
had enjoyed even during his youth, in the reign of the late 
king, a reputation second to no one in the court for fidelity 
and practical ability; and this reputation he bad maintained 
during the present reign also. For having been entrusted with 
the management of Cyprus and its revenues, when its affairs 
were in a critical and complicate stale, he not only preserved 
the island for the young king, but collected a very considerable 
sum of money, with which hehad just arrived and had paid to the 
king, after handing over the government of Cyprus to Ptolemy 
of Megalopolis. But though he obtained great applause by 
this, and a large fortune immediately afterwards, yet, as he 
grew older, he drifted into extravagant debauchery and 
scandalous Indulgence. Nor was the reputation of Ptolemy, 
son of Agesarchus very different in the later part of his life. 
But in regard to these men, when we come to the proper time, 
I shall not shrink from stating the circumstances which dis- 
graced their official life. . . . 


The only fragment we possess of the nineteenth book of Polyixus is a 
statement quoted by Plutarch as to M. Porcius Cato, to the eflfect that by 
his orders the walls of all the numerous Spanish cities north of the Baetis 
were dismantled on the same day. Cato was in Spain B.C. 195. The 
means taken by him to secure this simultaneous destruction of fortifications 
are told by Frontinus, Strategy I, I, I. 

We thus lose the history of the years B.C. 195, 194, 193 ; as well as 
the greater part of that of B.C. 192, 191, contained in the early part of 
book 20, of which only a few fragments remain. Livy, however, has 
evidently translated from Polybius in his history of these years, and a 
brief al^tract of events in Greece may help the reader in following the 
fragmentary book which follows with more interest. 

B.C. 195. 
Lucius Valerius Flaccus, 1 ^ 
M. Porcius Cato, / 

Flamininus's imperium is extended for this year, because of the danger 
from Antiochus and Nabis. The Aetolians, still discontented, push their 
demand for Pharsalus and Leucas, and are referred by the Senate back to 
Flamininus. The latter summons a conference of Greek states at Corinth, 
and a war is decreed against Nabis, the Aetolians still expressing their dis- 
like of Roman interference. The levies are collected ; Argos is freed 
from Nabis ; Sparta all but taken ; and Nabis forced to submit to most 
humiliating terms : the Aetolians again objecting to his being allowed to 
remain at Sparta on any terms at all. In this year also legates from 
Antiochus visit Flamininus, but are referred to the Senate. 

B.C. 194. 
Publius Cornelius Scipio II., \p 
Tiberius Sempronius Longus, j 

Flamininus leaves Greece after a speech at Corinth to the assembled 
league advising internal peace and loyalty to Rome, and enters Rome in 
triumph. There is a time of comparative tranquillity in Greece. 

B.C. 193. 
L. Cornelius Mcrula, 
Q. Minucius Thermus, 

The legates from Antiochus are sent back with the final answer that, 
unless the king abstains from entering Europe in arms, the Romans will 

' l-Coss. 
us, j 


fiee ihe Asiatic Greek cities fiam him. Roman legates, P. Sulpicius, P. 
Villius, P. Aelius, are sent to him. Hannibal arrives at the court of 
Antiochas, and nrges him to resist ; and the Aetolians urge the same 
course, trying also to stir up Nabis and Philip of Macedon. Antiochus 
accordingly will give the Roman envoys no satisfactory answer. 

B.C. 192. 
L. Quintius Flamininus, \coss. 
Cn. Domitiua Aheoobarbus, J 

The Romans therefore prepare for war. A fleet under the praetor 
Atilius is sent against Nabis : commissioneis are sent into Greece — T. 
Quintius Flamininius, C. Octavius, Cn. Servilins, P. Villins — early in 
the year : M . Baebius is ordered to hold his army in readiness at Brun- 
disium. Then news is brought to Rome by Altalus of Pergamum 
(brother of king Eumeoes] thai Antiochus has crossed the Hellespont, 
and the Aetolians on the point of joioing him. Therefore Uaebitu ii 
ordered to transport bis army to Apollonia. 

Meanwhile Nabis lakes advantage of the alarm caused by Anliocbas 
to move. He besieges Gylhium, and ravages the Achaean territory. 
The league, under Philopoemen, proclaim war against him, and, after 
losing an unimportant naval battle, decisively defeat him on land and ihal 
him up in Sparta. 

The Aelolians now formally vole to call in Antiochus, " to liberale 
Greece and arbitrate between them and Rome." They occupy Demetrias ; 
and kill Nabis by a stratagem. Whereupon Philopoemen annexes Sparta 
to the Achaean league. Later in the year Antiochus meets the assembly 
of the Aetolians at Lamia in Thessoly, is proclaimed " Stiategus"; and 
after a vain attempt to conciliate (he Acbaeans seizes Chalcis, where he 
winters, and marries a young wife. 
B.C. 191. 

The Romans declare war with Antiochus. Manius Acilius is selected 
10 go to Greece, where he takes over the army of Baebius, and aAei taking 
many towns in Thessaly meets and defeats Antiochas at Thermopylae ; 
where the Aetolian league did after all little service lo the king, who 
retires to Ephesus. 

See Livy, 34, 43 36, 21. See also Plulaicli, I'Ulafoemeii, and 

Flamimma; Applan, Syriacae, 6 — 31. 



1. The Aetolians chose thirty of the Apocleti^ to confer 
Antiochus the with King Antiochus. . . . 
Great at a meet- He accordingly summoned a meeting of the 
ing of Aetolians Apocleti and consulted them on the state of 

ai j-«aiTiiai -^ . 

autumn of affairs. . . . 

B.C. 192. Livy, 
. 35. 43-46. 

2. When Antiochus sent an embassy to the Boeotians, 
they answered that they would not consider his proposals 
until the king came in person. . . . 

8. As Antiochus was staying at Chalcis, just as the winter 

was beginning, two ambassadors came to visit 

"^"thrwrmeT^r ^i'"' Charops from Epirus, and Callistiatus 

B.C. 192191 at from Elis. The prayer of the Epirotes was 

Chalcis. Visit of that " The king would not involve them in the 

Ep^^and^Elis. ^^^ ^^^^ ^^"^^' ^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^^ ^" ^^^ ^ide of 

" Greece immediately opposite Italy ; but that, if 
he could, he would secure their safety by defending the frontier 
of Epirus : in that case he should be admitted into all their 
towns and harbours : but if he decided not to do so at present, 
they asked his indulgence if they shrank from a war with Rome." 
The Eleans, in their turn, begged him " To send a reinforce- 
ment to their town ; for as the Achaeans had voted war against 
them, they were in terror of an attack from the troops of the 
league." The king answered the Epirotes by saying that he 
would send envoys to confer with them on their mutual* 

' The AfX)clcti, of the numbers of whom we have no information, acted as 
a consultative senate to prepare measures for the Aetolian Assembly. See 
Freeman, History of Federal Government » p. 335. Livy, 35, 34. 


interests ; but to Elis he despatched a thousand foot soldiers 
under the command of Euphanes of Crete. . . . 

4. The Boeotians had long been in a very depressed slate, 
which offered a strong contrast to the former 
prosperity and reputation of their country. Bii™tia^° 
They had acquired great glory as well as great 
material prosperity at the time of the battle of LeucCra ; but 
by some means or another from that time fo'-fro^Bc * 
ward they steadily diminished both the one 
and the other under the leadership of Amaeocritus ; and sub- 
sequently not only diminished them, but underwent a complete 
change of character, and did all that was possible to wipe out 
their previous reputation. For having been incited by the 
Achaeans to go to war with the Aetolians, they adopted the 
policy of the former and made an alliance with them, and 
thenceforth maintained a steady war with the ^x.. 345. 
Aetolians. But on the Aetolians invading See Plutarch. 
Boeotia, they marched out with their full '*'""• '^ 
available force, and without waiting for the arrival of the 
Achaeans, who had mustered their men and were on the 
point of marching to their assistance, they attacked the 
Aetolians ; and being worsted in the battle were so completely 
demoralised, that, from the time of that campaign, they never 
plucked up spirit to claim any position of honour whatever, 
and never shared in any enterprise or contest undertaken by 
the common consent of the Greeks. They devoted them- 
selves entirely to eating and drinking, and thus became effemi- 
nate in their souls as well as in their bodies, 

6. Such were, briefiy, the steps in the degeneracy of 
Boeotia. Immediately after the battle Just mentioned they 
abandoned the Achaeans and joined the Aetolians.^ But on 
the latter presently going to war with Philip's 
father Demetrius, they once more abandoned 
the Aetolians; and upon Demetrius entering "" 
Boeotia with an army, without attempting resistance they 
submitted completely to the Macedonians. But as a spark of 

' tpailTtifiar AlnjiXat rh (9rin, cp, a, 43. Some have Ihoughl thai a 
regular pc^lka] union with the Aetolian League is meant. But the spirit of 
the aarnthe teerot to point rather to an alliance. 


their ancestral glory still survived, there were found some 
who disliked the existing settlement and the complete 
subservience to Macedonia : and they accordingly main- 
tained a violent opposition to the policy of Ascondas and 

Neon, the ancestors of Brachylles, who were the 
hoi^"of Neon! "^^^' prominent in the party which favoured 

Macedonia. However, the party of Ascondas 
eventually prevailed, owing to the following circumstance. Anti- 
gonus (Doson), who, after the death of Demetrius, was PhUip's 
guardian, happened to be sailing on some business along the 
coast of Boeotia ; when off Larymna he was surprised by a 
sudden ebb of the tide, and his ships were left high and dry. 
Now just at that time a rumour had been spread that Anti- 
gonus meant to make a raid upon the country ; and therefore 
Neon, who was Hipparch at the time, was patrolling the 
country at the head of all the Boeotian cavalry to protect it, 
and came upon Antigonus in this helpless and embarrassed posi- 
tion : and having it thus in his power to inflict a serious blow 
upon the Macedonians, much to their surprise he resolved to 
spare them. His conduct in so doing was approved by the other 
Boeotians, but was not at all pleasing to the Thebans. An- 
tigonus, however, when the tide flowed again and his ships 
floated, proceeded to complete the voyage to Asia on which 
he was bound, with deep gratitude to Neon for having 
abstained from attacking him in his awkward position. 
Bc 222 Accordingly, when at a subsequent period 

he conquered the Spartan Cleomenes and 
became master of Lacedaemon, he left Brachylles in 
charge of the town, by way of paying him for the kindness 
done him by his father Neon. This proved to be the begin- 
ning of a great rise in importance of the family of Brachylles, 
But this was not all that Antigonus did for him : from that 
time forward either he personally, or king Philip, continually 
supported him with money and influence ; so that before long 
this family entirely overpowered the political party opposed to 
them in Thebes, and forced all the citizens, with very few ex- 
ceptions, to join the party of Macedonia. Such was the origin 
of the political adherence to Macedonia of the family of Neon, 
and of its rise to prosperity. 


6. But Boeotia as a nation had come to such a low pitch, 
that for nearly twenty-five years the administra- 
tion of justice liad been suspended in private jiai^i^oeoiia. 
and public suits alike. Their magistrates were 
engaged in despatching bodies of men to guard the country 
or in proclaiming national expeditions, and thus continually 
postponed their attendance at courts of law. Some of the 
Strat^ also dispensed allowances to the needy from the public 
treasuiy ; whereby the common people learnt to support and 
invest with office those who would help them to escape the 
penalties of their crimes and undischarged liabilities, and to 
be enriched from time to time with some portion of the public 
property obtained by official favour. No one contributed to 
this lamentable state of things more than Ophelias, who was 
always inventing some plan calculated to benefit the masses for 
the moment, while perfectly certain to ruin them in the future. 
To these evils was added another unfortunate fashion. It 
became the practice for those who died childless not to leave 
their property to the members of their family, as had been 
the custom of the country formerly, but to assign it for the 
maintenance of feasts and convivial entertainments to be shared 
in by the testator's friends in common ; and even many who 
did possess children left the larger part of their property to the 
members of their own club. The result was that there were 
many Boeotians who had more feasts to attend in the month 
than there were days in it. The people of Megara therefore, 
disliking this habit, and remembering their old connexion with 
the Achaean league, were inclined once more to renew their 
political alliance with it. For the Megarians had been 
members of the Achaean league since the time AntLgonus 
of Antigonus Gonatas ; but upon Cleomenes Gonaias. 0*. 
blockading the Isthmus, finding themselves cut '-^ "3* 
off from the Achaeans they joined the Boeotians, with the 
consent of the former. But a little before the 
time of which we are now speaking, becoming ^^^^I'i^^ 
dissatisfied with the Boeotian constitution, they 
again joined the Achaeans. Tlie Boeotians, incensed at what 
they considered acts of contempt, sallied out in fuU force to 
attack Megata ; and on the Megarians declining to listen to 


them, they determined in tlieir anger to besiege and assault 
their city. £ut being attacked by a panic, on a report spread- 
ing that Philopoemen was at hand at the head of a force of 
Achacaiis, they left their scaling ladders against the walls 
and fled back precipitately to their own country, 

7. Such being the state of Boeotian politics, it was only by 
extraordinary good fortune that they evaded destruction in the 
dangerous periods of the wars of Philip and Antiochus. But 
in the succeeding period they did not escape in the same way. 
Fortune, on the contrary, seemed determined to make them 
pay for their former good luck by a specialty severe retribution, 
as I shall relate hereafter. . . . 

Many of the Boeotians defended their alienation from 
Aniiochus re- ''■^ Romans by alleging the assassination of 
ceived in Thebes, Brachylles,^ and the expedition made by Flamini- 
B.C. 19a. j,us upon Coronea owing to the murders of 
Romans on the roads.^ But the real reason was their moral 
degeneracy, brought about by the causes I have mentioned. 
For as soon as the king approached, the Boeotian magistrates 
went out to meet him, and after holding a friendly conversa- 
tion with him conducted him into Thebes. . . . 

8. Antiochus the Great came to Chalcis in Euboea, and there 
Aniiochus completed his marriage, when he was fifty years 
wintering in old, and had already undertaken his two most 

Chalcis, B.C. important labours, the liberation of Greece — as 
"'"''''■ he called it — and the war with Rome. How- 
ever, having fallen in love with a young lady of Chalcis, he was 
bent on marrying her, though the war was still going on ; for 
he was much addicted to wine and delighted in excesses. The 
lady was a daughter of Cleoptolemus, a man of rank, and was pos- 
sessed of extraordinary beauty. He remained in Chalcis all the 
winter occupied in marriage festivities, utterly regardless of the 
pressing business of the time. He gave the giri the name of 
Euboea, and after his defeat' fled with his bride to Ephesus. . , . 

' Drachytlcs, whrn a Boeoiarch in B.C. 196, Has assassinaled by a band of 
sin nitn. of whom three wore Italians and three Aetohans, on his way home 
from a banquet. Livy. 33, 28. ' Livy, 33, 29. 

' Al Thermopylae, in which Ualtlc Uvy (36, 19) stales on the outbority 
of Polj'bius that only 500 men out of 10,000 brought by Antiochus into Greece 


9, When the Romans took Heracleia, Phaeneas the 
Aetolian Strategus, in view of the danger 
threatening Aetolia, and seeing what would ^ ^^ uto, 
happen to the other towns, determined to send by Adiiui after 
an embassy to Manius Acilius to demand a ''^^ ^im^ of 
truce and treaty of peace. With this purpose ^^^g^*™' 
he despatched Archidamus, Pantaleon and 
Chalesus, who on meeting the Roman consul were intending 
to enter upon a long argument, but were interrupted in the 
middle of their speech and prevented from finishing it. For 
Acilius remarked that " For the present he had 
no leisure to attend to them, being much engaged "AetoiUni. 
with the distribution of the spoils of Heracleia : 
he would, however, grant a ten days' truce and send Lucius 
Valerius Flaccus with them, with instructions as to what he 
was to say." The truce being thus made, and Valerius having 
come to Hypaia, a lengthened discussion took place on the 
state of aflairs. The Aetolians sought to estabhsh their case 
by referring to their previous services to Rome. But Valerius 
cut this line of argument short by saying that " Such justifica- 
tion did not apply to the present circumstances; for as these 
old friendly relations had been broken ofT by them, and the 
existing hostility was owing entirely to the Aetolians themselves, 
the services of the past could be of no assistance to them in 
the present. They must therefore abandon a!! idea of justifica- 
tion, and adopt a tone of supplication, and beseech the consul's 
pardon for their transgressions." After a long discussion on 
various details, the Aetolians eventually decided to leave the 
whole matter to Acilius, and commit themselves without reserve 
to the good lajth of the Romans. They had no comprehension 
of what this really involved ; but they were misled by the 
word " faith " into supposing that the Romans would thereby 
be more inclined to grant them terms. But with the Romans 
for a man " to commit himself to their good faith " is held to 
be equivalent to " surrendering unconditionally." 

10. Having come to this resolution, Phaeneas despatched 
legates with Valerius to announce the decision 
of the AetolUns to Acilius. On being admitted '^"'^XZ!^'' 
to the presence of the Consul, these legates, after 


once more entering upon a plea of self-justification, ended by 
announcing that the Aetolians had decided to commit them- 
selves to the good faith of the Romans. Hereupon Acillus 
interrupted them by saying, ** Is this really the case, men of 
Aetolia ? " And upon their answering in the affirmative, he 
o . said : " Well then, the first condition is that 

Koman terms. . • j^ • i ,i n .. i 

none of you, mdividually or collectively, must 
cross to Asia ; the second is that you must surrender Mene- 
stratus the Epirote" (who happened at that time to be at 
Naupactus, where he had come to the assistance of the 
Aetolians), "and also King Amynander, with such of the 
Athamanians as accompanied him in his desertion to your side." 
Here Phaeneas interrupted him by saying : " But it is neither 
just nor consonant with Greek customs, O Consul, to do what 
you order/' To which Acilius replied, — not so much because 
he was angry, as because he wished to show him the dangerous 
position in which he stood, and to thoroughly frighten him, — 
" Do you still presume to talk to me about Greek customs, 
and about honour and duty, after having committed your- 
selves to my good faith? Why, I might if I chose put 
you all in chains and commit you to prison ! *' With these 
words he ordered his men to bring a chain and an iron 
collar and put it on the neck of each of them. Thereupon 
Phaeneas and his companions stood in speechless amaze- 
ment, as though bereft of all power of thought or motion, at 
this unexpected turn of affairs. But Valerius and some 
others who were present besought Acilius not to inflict any 
severity upon the Aetolians then before him, as they were in 
the position of ambassadors. And on his yielding to these 
representations, Phaeneas broke silence by saying that " He and 
the Apocleti were ready to obey the injunctions, but they must 
consult the general assembly if they were to be confirmed." 
Upon Acilius agreeing to this, he demanded a truce often days 
to be granted. This also having been conceded, they departed 
with these terms, and on arrival at Hypata told the Apocleti 
what had been done and the speeches that had been made. 
This report was the first thing which made their error, and the 
compulsion under which they were placed, clear to the Aetolians. 
It was therefore decided to write round to the various cities 


and call the Aetolians together, to consult on the injunctions 
imposed upon them. When the news of the The Aetoiiana toil 
reception Phaeneas had met with was noised lo ratify ibe 
abroad, the Aetolian people were so infuriated peace, 
that no one would even attend the meeting to discuss the matter 
at all. It was thus Impossible to hold the discussion, lliey 
were further encouraged by the arrival of Nicandcr, who just 
at that time sailed into Phalara, on the Malian gulf, from 
Asia, bringing news of the warm reception given him by 
Antiochus, and the promises for the future which the king had 
made \ they therefore became quite indifferent as to the non- 
completion of the peac& Thus when the days of the truce had 
elapsed the Aetolians found themselves still at war with Rome. 
1 1, But I ought not to omit to describe the subsequent career 
and fate of Nlcander. He arrived back at Phalara 
on the twelfth day after leaving Ephesus, and ^i^'^^^'^ 
found the Romans still engaged in Heracleia, and 
the Macedonians having already evacuated Lamia, but encamped 
at no great distance from the town : he thereupon conveyed 
his money unexpectedly into Lamia, and attempted himself to 
make his way between the two camps into Hypata. But, 
falling into the hands of the Macedonian pickets, he was 
taken to Philip, while his evening party was still at the midst 
of their entertainment, greatly alarmed lest he should meet 
with rough treatment from having incurred Philip's resent- 
ment, or should be handed over to the Romans. But when 
the matter was reported to the king, he at once gave orders 
that the proper officers should offer Nicander refreshments, and 
show him every politeness and attention. After a time he got 
up from table and went personally to visit him; and after 
enlarging at great length on "the folly of the Aetolians, for 
having first brought the Romans into Greece, and afterwards 
Antiochus," he still, even at this hour, urged that " they should 
forget their past, adhere to their loyalty to himself, and not 
show a disposition to take advantage of each other's difficulties." 
He bade Nicander convey this message to the leaders of the 
Aetolians, and exhorting him personally to remember the favours 
which he had received at his hands, he despatched him with 
a sufGdent escort, which he ordered to see him safe into Hypi 


This result was far beyond Nicander's hopes or expectations. 
He was restored in due course to his friends, and from the 
moment of this adventure remained devoted to the royal 
family of Macedonia. Thus, in the subsequent period of the 
war with Perseus, the obligations which this favour had imposed 
upon him caused him to offer such an unwilling and luke- 
warm opposition to the designs of Perseus, that he exposed 
himself to suspicion and denunciation, and at last was sum- 
moned to Rome and died there. . . . 

12. The Spartans could not find one of their own citizens 

^, willing to address Philopoemen on this subject 

wish to oflfer '^ o ^^^ who for the most part undertake work for 

Philopoemen the what they can get by it there are plenty of people 

palace of Nabis, ^.q q^^^j. g^^j^ rewards, and to regard them as the 

as a ren-ard. and ^- ,. ' i-j .. r- ■« i . 

as an inducement means of founding and consolidating fnendship : 

to defend their but in the case of Philipoemen no one could be 

^^^^y.J*^"^^"^*^' found willing to convey this offer to him at all. 

Finally, being completely at a loss, they elected 
Timolaus to do it, as being his ancestral guest-friend and very 
intimate with him. Timolaus twice journeyed to Megalopolis 
for this express purpose, without daring to say a word to 
Philopoemen about it But having goaded himself to making 
a third attempt, he at length plucked up courage to mention 
the proposed gifts. Much to his surprise Philopoemen 
received the suggestion with courtesy ; and Timolaus was 
overjoyed by the belief that he had attained his object. 
Philopoemen, however, remarked that he would come to 
Si)arta himself in the course of the next few days; for he 
wished to offer all the magistrates his thanks for this favour. 
He accordingly came, and, being invited to attend the Senate, he 
said : " He had long been aware of the kindness with which the 
Lacedaemonians regarded him ; but was more convinced than 
ever by the compliments and extraordinary mark of honour 
they now offered him. But while gratefully accepting their 
intention, he disliked the particular manner of its exhibition. 
They should not bestow such honour and rewards on their 
friends, the poison of which would indelibly infect the receiver, 
but rather upon their enemies ; that the former might retain 
their freedom of si)eech and the confidence of the Achaeans 


when proposing to offer assistance to Sparta ; while the latter, 
by swallowing the bait, might be compelled either to support 
their cause, or at any rate to keep silence and do them no 
harm. ..." 

T/u remaining events of the war against Antiochus in this 
year are related by Livy, 36, 41-45. Acilius was engaged /or 
two months in the siege of Naupactus : white the Roman jUet 
under Gaius Livius defeated that of Aniioehus, under his admiral 
Polyxenidas, off Phocaea. 

To see an operation with one's own eyes is not like merely 
hearing a description of it. It is, indeed, quite another thing ; 
and the confidence which such vivid experience gives is always 
greatly advantageous. . . . 



1. At this time also it happened that the embassy, which the 

Lacedaemonians had sent to Rome, returned 

Embassy from disappointed. The subject of their mission 

Sparta, and the was the hostages and the villages. As to the 

i^ma^^nate ^^^^^8^^ ^^^ Senate answered that they would give 

instructions to envoys sent by themselves ; and 
as to the hostages they desired to consider further. But as to 
the exiles of past times, they said that they wondered why they 
were not recalled, now that Sparta had been freed from her 
tyrants. . . . 

2. At the same period the Senate dealt with the ambassadors 
from Philip. They had come to set forth the loyalty and zeal 
of the king, which he had shown to the Romans in the war 
against Antiochus. On hearing what the envoys had to say, 
the Senate released the king's son Demetrius from his position 
as hostage at once, and promised that they would also remit 
part of the yearly indemnity, if he kept faith with Rome in 
future. The Senate likewise released the Lacedaemonian 
hostages, except Armenas, son of Nabis; who subsequently 
fell ill and died. . . . 

'^ 3. Directly the news of the victory at sea reached Rome, 
Suppiicatio ^^^ Senate first decreed a public suppUcatio for 

for the victory nine days, — which means a public and universal 

off" Phocaea. holiday, accompanied by the sacrifice of thank- 
offerings to the gods for the happy success, — and next gave 
audience to the envoys from Aetolia and Manius Acilius. 

Answer to the When both parties had pleaded their cause 
Aetoiian Envoys at some length, the Senate decreed to offer the 

intercession of AetoUans the alternative of committing their 
FUimininus, when cause Unconditionally to the arbitration of the 


Senate, or of paying a thousand talents down and Acilius was about 
making an offensive and defensive alliance with '°.t*'« NaupKtus. 
Rome. But on the Aetolians desiring the "^'Ijl^*'^^' 
Senate to state definitely on what points they 
were to submit to such arbitration, the Senate refused to 
define them. Accordingly the war with the Aetolians went 
oa . . , 

^ 4. While Amphissa was still being besieged by Manius 
Acilius, the Athenians, hearing at that timegpnngofB.c. 100. 
both of the distress of the Amphissians and ofcoss. L. Coroeiius 
the arrival of Publius Scipio, despatched Eche-^'P'°' '^- Laei'os. 
demus and others on an embassy to him, with instructions to 

pay their respects to both Lucius and Publius „ „ 
' ; . , *^ , , . , ?■ Cornelius 

ijcipio, and at the same time to try what could scipio Africanus 
be done to get peace for the Aetolians, On in Greece as lega- 

their arrival Publius welcomed them gladly and ,'"* ."' *"* ''™'J'=y 
, , - , . . Luciua, (March.) 

treated them with great courtesy ; because he 
saw that they would be of assistance to him in carrying out 
his plans. For he was very desirous of effecting a settlement 
in Aetolia on good tenns ; but had resolved that, if the Aetoli- 
ans refused to comply, he would at all hazards relinquish that 
business for the present, and cross to Asia : for he was well 
aware that the ultimate object of the war and of the entire 
expedition was not to reduce the Aetolian nation to obedience, 
but to conquer Antiochus and take possession of Asia, 
Therefore, directly the Athenians mentioned the pacification, 
he accepted their suggestion with eagerness, and bade them 
sound the Aetolians also. Accordingly, Echedemus and his 
colleagues, having sent a preliminary deputation to Hypata, 
presently followed in person, and entered into a discussion 
with the Aetolian magistrates on the subject of 
a pacification. They, too, readily acquiesced ^^f^^e^^^. 
in the suggestion, and certain envoys were ap- ' 
pointed to meet the Romans. They found Publius and the army 
encamped sixty stades from Amphissa, and there discoursed 
at great length on their previous services to Rome. Publius 
Scipio adopted in reply a still milder and more conciliatory 
style, quoting his own conduct in Iberia and Libya, and 
explaining how he had treated all who in those countries had 


confided to his honour : and finally expressing an opinion that 
they had better put themselves in his hands. At first, all who 
were present felt very sanguine that the pacification was about 
to be accomplished. But when, in answer to the Aetolian 
demand to know on what terms they were to make the peace, 
Lucius Scipio explained that they had two alternatives — to 
submit their entire case unconditionally to the arbitrament of 
Rome, or to pay a thousand talents down and to make an 
offensive and defensive alliance with her — the Aetolians 
present were thrown into the state of the most painful per- 
plexity at the inconsistency of this announcement with the 
previous talk : but finally they said that they would consult 
the Aetolians on the terms imposed. 

5. On the return of the Aetolian envoys for the purpose of 
consulting their countrymen, Echedemus and his colleagues 
joined the council of the apocleti in their deliberations on 
this subject. One of the alternatives was impossible owing to 
the amount of money demanded, and the other was rendered 
alarming in their eyes by the deception they had experienced 
See%k 20 ch 10 ^^^°''^j when, after submitting to the surrender, 

they had narrowly escaped being thrown into 
chains. Being then much perplexed and quite unable to 
decide, they sent the same envoys back to beg the Scipios that 
they would either abate part of the money, so as to be within 
their power to pay, or except from the surrender the persons 
of citizens, men and women. But upon their arrival in the 
Roman camp and delivering their message, Lucius Scipio merely 
replied that " The only terms on which he was commissioned 
by the Senate to treat were those which he had recently 
stated." They therefore returned once more, and were followed 
by Echedemus and his colleagues to Hypata, who advised the 
Aetolians that "Since there was at present a hitch in the 
negotiations *for peace, they should ask for a truce ; and, 
having thus at least delayed the evils threatening them, should 
send an embassy to the Senate. If they obtained their 
request, all would be well ; but, if they did not, they must trust 
to the chapter of accidents : for their position could not be 
worse than it was now, but for many reasons might not im- 
possibly be better." The advice of Echedemus was thought 


sound, and the Aetolians accordingly voted to send envoys 
to obtain a truce ; who, upon reaching Lucius ^ six monihi' 
Scipio, begged that for the present a truce trace with the 
of six months might be granted them, that Aeiolian*. 
they might send an embassy to the Senate. Publius Scipio, 
who had for some time past been anxious to begin the 
campaign in Asia, quickly persuaded his brother to grant 
their request. The agreement therefore was reduced to 
writing, and thereupon Manius Acilius handed over his army 
to Lucius Scipio, and returned with his military tribunes to 
Rome. . . . 


6. Factions became rife at Phocaea,^ partly because they 
suffered from the Romans left with the ships a party at Pho- 
being quartered on them, and partly because caea wish to join 
they were annoyed at the tribute imposed on Antiochus, 
them. ... ''"' 

Then the Phocaean magistrates, alarmed at the state of 
popular excitement caused by the dearth of com, and the 
agitation kept up by the partisans of Antiochus, sent envoys 
to Seleucus,^ who was on Iheir frontiers, ordering him not to 
approach the town, as they were resolved to remain neutral 
and await the final decision of the quarrel, and then obey 
orders. Of these ambassadors the partisans of Seleucus and 
his faction were Aristarchus, Cassander, and Rhodon ; those, 
on the contrary, who inclined to Rome were Hegias and Gelias. 
On their arrival Seleucus at once showed every attention to 
Aristarchus and his partisans, but treated Hegias and Gelias 
with complete neglect. But when he was informed of the 
state of popular feeling, and the shortness of provisions in 
Phocaea, he threw aside all negotiation or discussion with the 
envoys, and marched towards the town. . . . 

Two Galli, with sacred images and figures The Roman fleet 
on their breasts, advanced from the town, and be- "^J^o/l'hf " 
sought them not to adopt any extreme measures caiii or priests 
against the city,* ... of Cybele. 

L'T. 37. 9- 

' Lh7.37.9. 


7. The fire-carrier used by Pausistratus, the navarch of 

the Rhodians, was a scoop or baskets On 

firing apparatus. ^^^^^^ ^^^^ ^^ ^^^ P^°^ ^^^ Staples were fixed 

into the inner part of the two sides of the ship, 

into which poles were fitted with their extremities extending 
out to sea. To the end of these the scoop filled with fire 
was attached by an iron chain, in such a way that in charging 
the enemy's ship, whether on the prow or the broadside, fire 
was thrown upon it, while it was kept a long way off from his 
own ship by the slope of the poles. . . . 

The Rhodian admiral Pamphilidas was thought to be 

Pa i t better capable than Pausistratus of adapting 

beaten by Poiyx- himself to all possible contingencies, because 

enidas. the ad- his character was more remarkable for its 

mirai of the king. ^^ ^j^ ^^^ solidity than for its boldness. For 

LiVy -ay jQ II, * ' 

' most men judge not from any fixed principle 
but by results. Thus, though they had recently elected 
Pausistratus to the command, on the ground of his possessing 
these very (jualities of energy and boldness, their opinions at 
once underwent a complete revolution when he met with his 
disaster. . . . 

8. At this time a letter arrived at Samos for Lucius 
The Actolian truce Acmilius and Eumcncs from the consul Lucius 

announced to Scipio, announcing the agreement made with 
Eunienes and jj^^ Aetolians for the truce, and the approach- 
ing advance of the land forces to the Helles- 
pont. Another to the same effect was sent to Antiochus and 
Seleucus from the Aetolians. . . . 

9. An embassy from King Eumenes having arrived in 
Achaean con- Achaia proposing an alliance, the Achaeans 
tingent sent to met in public assembly and ratified it, and 

the war.^ ^^^^ ^^ some soldiers, a thousand foot and a 
hundred horse, under the command of Dio- 
phanes of Megalopolis. . . . 

Diophanes was a man of great experience in war; for 
during the i)rotracted hostilities with Nabis in the neigh- 
bourhood of Megalopolis, he had served throughout under 

a brilHant emendation of Toupe, who reads €fcX^<irrft ftJkp FdXXoi for the 
meaningless i^€\Qb¥T€t luyiiKok. Livy calls them /anatici Galli, 


Philopoemen, and accordingly had gained a real familiarity 
with the operations of actual warfare. And besides this 
advantage, his appearance and physical prowess were im- 
pressive ; and, most important of all, he was a man of per- 
sonal courage and exceedingly expert in the use of arms. . . . 
10. King Antiochus had already penetrated into the terri- 
tory of Pergamum; but when he heard that Antiochus pro- 
king Eumenes was close at hand, and saw that poses peace with 
the land forces as well as the fleet were ready '*'""^'^'™«"''' 
to attack him, he began to consider the prt>- 
pricty of proposing a pacification with the Romans, Eumenes, 
and the Rhodians at once. He therefore removed with his 
whole army to Elaea, and having seized a hill facing that 
town, he encamped his infantry upon it, while he entrenched 
his cavalry, amounting to over six thousand, close under the 
walls of the town. He took up his own position between these 
two, and proceeded to send messengers to Lucius Aemilius 
in the town, proposing a peace. The Roman imperator 
thereupon called Eumenes and the Rhodians to a meeting, 
and desired them to give their opinions on the proposal. 
Eudemus and Pamphilidas were not averse to making terms ; 
but the king said that "To make peace at the present 
moment was neither honourable nor possible. „ 
How could it be an honourable conclusion of poses the peace, 
the war that they should make terms while on the grounds 
confined within the walls of a town ? And "' honour and 
how was it possible to give validity to those 
terms without waiting for the Consul and obtaining his 
consent ? Besides, even if they did give any indication of 
coming to an agreement with Antiochus, neither the naval nor 
military forces could of course return home until the Senate 
and people had ratified the terms of it. All that would be 
left for them to do would be to spend the winter where they 
were, waiting idly for the decision from home, doing nothing, 
and exhausting the wealth and resources of their allies. And 
then, if the Senate withheld its approval of the terms, they 
would have to begin the war all over again, having lei the 
opportunity pass, which, with God's help, would have enabled 
them to put a period to the whole war." Such was the speech 


of king Eumenes. Lucius Aemilius accepted the advice, and 
answered the envoys of Antiochus that the peace could not 
ix)ssibly be made until the Proconsul arrived. On hearing 
this Antiochus immediately began devastating the territory of 
Elaea ; and subsequently, while Seleucus remained in occupa- 
tion of that district, Antiochus continued his march through 
the country as far as the plain of Thebe, and having there 
entered upon an exceedingly fertile and wealthy district, he 
gorged his army with spoil of every description. . . . 

1 1. On his arrival at Sardis after this expedition, Antiochus 

at once sent to Prusias to urge him to an alliance. 
B^ynia.^ ° Now in former times Prusias had by no means 

been disinclined to join Antiochus, because he 
was much alarmed lest the Romans should cross over to Asia 
for the purpose of putting down all crowned heads. But the 
perusal of a letter received from Lucius and PubHus Scipio 
had served to a great extent to relieve his anxiety, and give 
him a tolerably correct forecast of the result of the war. For 
Letter of the ^^^ Scipios had put the case with great clearness 
Scipios to in their letter, and had supported their assertions 
Prusias. i^y numerous proofs. They entered not only 
upon a defence of the policy adopted by themselves, but of that 
also of the Roman people generally ; by which they showed 
that, so far from depriving any of the existing kings of their 
sovereignties, they had themselves been the authors in some 
\ cases of their establishment, in others of the extension of their 
. powers and the large increase of their dominions. To prove this 
they quoted the instances of Andobales and Colichas in Iberia, 
of Massanissa in Libya, and of Pleuratus in Illyria, all of whom 
they said they had raised from petty and insignificant princes 
to the position of undisputed royalty. They further mentioned 
the cases of Philip and Nabis in Greece. As to Philip, they had 
conquered him in war and reduced him to the necessity of 
giving hostages and paying tribute : yet, after receiving a slight 
proof of his good disposition, they had restored his son and 
the young men who were hostages with him, had remitted the 
tribute, and given him back several of the towns that had been 
taken in the course of war. While as for Nabis, though they 
might have utterly destroyed him, they had not done so, but 


had spared him, tyrant as he was, on receiving the usual 
security for his good faith. With these facts before his eyes 
they urged Prusias in their letter not to be in any fear for his 
kingdom, but to adopt the Roman alliance without misgiving, 
for he would never have reason to regret his choice. This 
letter worked an entire change in the feelings of Frusias ; and 
when, besides, Caius Livius and the other legates arrived at his 
court, after conversation with them, he entirely relinquished 
all ideas of looking for support from Antiochus. Foiled, 
therefore, of hope in this quarter, Antiochus retired to Ephesus : 
and being convinced on reflection that the only way of pre- 
venting the transport of the enemy's army, and in fact of 
repelling an invasion of Asia at all, was to keep 
a firm mastery of the sea, he determined to f^m'sMnos^io 
fight a naval battle and leave the issue of the t«>s the Roman 
struggle to be decided by his success in that. . , . fleei sight some 
12. When the pirates saw that the Roman ?iS^'^^ 
fleet was coming they turned and fled. ... 

The baUle between the fleets of Rome and Antiochus took 
place betiveen the promontories Myonnesus and Corycum, which 
form the bay of Teos, Atttiochus was beaten with a loss of forty- 
two ships early in b.c. 190. Livy, 37, 30. 

IS. After sustaining this defeat at sea, Andochus remained 
in Sardis, neglecting to avail himself of such 
opportunities as he had left, and taking no 
steps whatever to prosecute the war ; and when : 
he learnt that the enemy had crossed into seniu an envoy 
Asia he lost all heart, and determined in despair '°^^ ^'^^ 
to send an envoy to Lucius and Pubhus Scipio 
to treat of peace. He selected Heracleides of Byzantium for 
this purpose, and despatched him with instructions to offer to 
surrender the territories of lampsacus and Smyrna as well as 
Alexandria (Troas), which were the original cause of the war, 
and any other cities in Aeolis and Ionia of which they might 
wish to deprive him, as having embraced their side in the 
war ; and in addition to this to promise an indemnity of half 
the expenses they had incurred in their quarrel with him. Such 
were the offers which the envoy was instructed to make in his 


public audience ; but, besides these, there were others to be 
committed to Publius Scipio's private ear, of which I will speak 
in detail later on. On his arrival at the Hellespont the envoy 
found the Romans still occupying the camp which they had 
constructed immediately after crossing. At first he was much 
cheered by this fact, for he thought it would materially aid his 
negotiation that the enemy were exactly where they were at 
first, and had not as yet taken any further action. But when 
he learnt that Publius Scipio was still on the other side of the 
water he was much disturbed, because the turn which his 
negotiations were to take depended principally on Scipio's view 
of the matter. The reason of the army being still in their 
The laws relating first camp, and of Publius Scipio's absence 
to the Saiii or from the army, was that he was one of the Salii. 
priests of Mars, 'py^ggg ^re, as I have before stated, one of the 
three colleges of priests by whom the most important sacrifices 
to the gods are offered at Rome. And it is the law that, at 
the time of these sacrifices, they must not quit the spot for 
thirty days in which it happens to find them.^ This was the 
case at the present time with Publius Scipio ; for just as the 
army was on the point of crossing this season arrived, and 
prevented him from changing his place of abode. Thus it 
came about that he was separated from the legions and re- 
mained in Europe, while, though the army crossed, it remained 
encamped, and could take no further step, because they were 
waiting for him. 

14. However, Publius arrived a few days afterwards, and 

Heracleides being summoned to attend the 
Heradeides Council, delivered the message with which 

he was charged, announcing that Antiochus 
abandoned Lampsacus, Smyrna, and Alexandria ; and also all 
such towns in Aeolis and Ionia as had sided with Rome ; and 
that he oflered, further, an indemnity of half their expenses in 
the present war. He added many arguments besides, urging 
the Romans " Not to tempt fortune too far, as they were but 

* Dies forte, quibus ANiilia mcu'entur, religiosi ad iter inciderant. Livy, 
37t 33' The festival of Mars, during which the ancilia were carried about, 
was on the ist of March and following days. If this incident, therefore, took 
place in the late spring or summer of B.C. 190, the Roman Calendar must have 
been very far out. 


men ; nor to extend their empire indefinitely, but rather to keep 
it within limits, if possible those of Europe, — for even then 

they would have an tnormous and unprecedented dominion, 
such as no nation before them had attained ; — but if they were 
determined at all hazards to grasp parts of Asia also, let thetn 
say definitely what parts those were, for the king would go to 
the utmost stretch of his power to meet their wishes," After 
the delivery of this speech the council decided that the 
Consul should answer that " It was only fair 
that Antiochus should pay, not the half, but '^^^'^'' 
the whole expense of the war, seeing that he, 
and not they, had originally begun it ; and as to the cities, he 
must not only liberate those in Aeolis and Ionia, but must 
surrender his whole dominion on this side of Mount Taurus." 
On receiving this answer from the council, conveying de- 
mands which went far beyond his instructions, the envoy, 
without answering a word, abstained from a public audience 
thenceforth, but exerted himself to conciliate Publius Scipio. 

15. Having at length got a suitable opportunity, he disclosed 
to him the offers with which he was charged, xhe secrei offers. 
These were that the king would first restore his of Amiochua to 
son without ransom, who had been taken '^•"'"^ Scipi"- 
prisoner in the early part of the war ; and was prepared, secondly, 
to pay him any sum of money he might name, and thenceforth 
share with him the wealth of his kingdom, if he would 
only support the acceptance of the terms offered by the king. 
Publius replied that the promise as to his son g^. . . 
he accepted, and would feel under an obligation 
to the king if he fulfilled it ; but as to the rest he assured him 
that the king, among his other delusions, was under a complete 
mistake as to the course demanded by his own interests. 
" For if he had made these offers while still master of Lysima- 
cheia and the entrance into the Chersonese, he would at once 
have got what he asked : and so too, even after evacuating 
these places, if he had appeared with his army at the Helles- 
pont and shown that he meant to prevent our crossing, and 
then had sent his envoys, he might even thus have obtained 
his demands. But when he comes with his proposals of 
equitable terms, after allowing our troops to set foot in Asia, 


and having so not only submitted to the bridle, but allowed 
the rider to mount, he must expect to fail and be disappointed 
of his hopes. Therefore, I advise him to adopt wiser measure^ 
and look at the facts in their true light In return for his 
promise in regard to my son, I will give him a hint which is well 
worth the favour he olfers me : make any concession, do any- 
thing, rather than fight with the Romans." With this answer 
Heracleides returned and told the king everything. And 
Antiochus, considering that no severer terms could be imposed 
on him if he were beaten in the lield, abandoned all idea of 
negotiation, and began making preparations of all sorts and in 
every direction for the battle, . . . 

Antiochus sent Scipie^s son ba{k. The decisive battle took 
place in the neighbourhood of Thyatira, and proved a decisive 
victory for the Romans. This was in the late autumn of ac 
190. See Uvy, 37, 38-44. 

1 8. After the victory the Romans took Sardis and its Acro- 
polis, and there they were visited by Musaeus bringing a 
message from Antiochus. Being politely received by the 
Scipios, he announced that Antiochus wished to send envoys 
to treat on the terms of peace, and therefore desired that a 
safe conduct should be given them. This was granted and the* 
herald returned ; and some days after, Zeuxis, formerly Satrap 
of Lydia, and Antipater, his nephew, came as ambassadors 
from king Antiochus. Their first anxiety was to meet lung 
Eumenes, because they feared that his old quarrel would cause 
him to be only too ready to do them a bad turn. But when 
they found liim, contrary to their expectation, disposed to 
moderate and gentle methods, they at once addressed them- 
selves to meeting the council Being summoned to attend it 
they made a lengthy speech, among other things exhorting the 
Romans to use their victory with mildness and generosity; 
and alleging that such a course was still more to the interest 
of the Romans than of Antiochus, since Fortune had com- 
mitted to them the empire and lordship of the world. Finally, 
they asked " What they were to do to obtain peace and the 
friendship of Rome ? " The members of the council had 
already in a previous sitting discussed and agreed upon this 


point, and now bade Publius Scipio deliver their de- 

17. Scipio began by saying that victory never made the 
Romans more severe than before, and accord- xhe Roman tenns 

ingly the envoys would receive the same imposed on 
answer as they had previously received when they Aniiochus. 
came to the Hellespont before the battle. " They must 
evacuate Europe and all Asia this side Taurus : must pay the 
Romans iiftcen thousand Euboic talents as an indemnity for 
the expenses of the war, five hundred at once, two thousand 
five hundred on the ratification of the treaty by the people, 
and the rest in twelve yearly instalments of a thousand talents. 
Further, Antiochus must pay Eumenes the four hundred 
talents owing to him, and the balance of the corn due In 
accordance with the treaty made with his father Attalus. He 
must at the same time deliver Hannibal the Carthaginian, 
Thoas the Aetolian, Mnasilochus the Acarnanian, and Philo 
and Eubulides the Chalcidians. As security for the fulfilment 
of these terms, Antiochus must at once give twenty hostages 
named in the treaty." Such was the decision -phe terms are 
announced by Publius Scipio in the name of accepted, and 
the whole Council, Antiprater and Zeuxis having missions seni to 
expressed their consent to them, it was agreed 
by all to send envoys to Rome to appeal to the Senate and 
people to confirm the treaty. The ambassadors of Antiochus 
departed with this understanding : and during the following 
days the Roman commanders divided their forces into their 
winter quarters ; and when some few days later the hostages 
arrived, both Eumenes and the envoys of Antiochus started on 
their voyage to Rome. Nor were they alone in their mission j 
for Rhodes also, and Smyrna, and nearly all the nations and 
states on this side Taurus sent ambassadors to Rome. . . . 

\18.' At the beginning of the summer following the victory 
of the Romans over Antiochus, the ambassadors 
of that king, and those from Rhodes, as well as ^''^^_ Maniius^ 
from the other states arrived in Rome. For, as I Vulso, M. Fulvius 
e placed by Schwcighaeuscr and 


Nobiiior. Recep- said, nearly all the states in Asia began sending en- 
Eumenw and^the voystoRome immediately after the battle, because 
ambassadors at the hopes of all as to their future position rested 
Rome. at that time on the Senate. All who arrived 
were graciously received by the Senate ; but the most imposing 
reception was that accorded to king Eumenes, both in the com- 
plimentary processions sent out to meet him and the arrange- 
ments made for his entertainment ; and next in cordiality to 

his reception was that given to the Rhodians. 

^\^hrsllnaJr '" ^^^^" ^^^ ^^^^ ^^^ '^^ audiences came, they first 

called in the king and bade him say freely what 
„ he wished to obtain at the hands of the Senate. 

But Eumenes at first evaded the task by saying : 
" If I had been desirous of obtaining any favour from others, 
I should have looked to the Romans for advice, that I might 
neither desire anything that was wrong nor ask anything unfair ; 
but seeing that I am here to prefer my request to the Romans 
themselves, I think it better to leave the interests of myself and 
my brothers unreservedly in their hands." And though one 
of the Senators rose and begged him to have no apprehension, 
but to speak his mind, he still adhered to this view. And so 
after a certain time had elapsed the king withdrew ; and the 
Senate, remaining in the curia, debated what was to be done. 
Eventually it was decreed to call upon Eumenes to declare 
with his own mouth the objects of his visit without reserve, 
on the ground that he knew best what his own kingdom required, 
and what was the state of things in Asia. He was then called 
in ; and, one of the Senators having informed him of the vote, 
he was compelled to speak on the business. 

19. He said therefore that "He would not say another 

word on his own concerns, but would adhere 
Emn^n^ Strictly to his resolution of leaving the decision 

as to them entirely in the hands of the Romans. 
But there was one subject on which he felt anxiety, namely, 
the policy of Rhodes ; and it was this that induced him to 
address the Senate on the present occasion. These Rhodians 
had come to Rome to further the interests of their own 
country, and their own prosperity, quite as much as he had 
come to promote those of his own kingdom at that moment ; 


but their professions were entirely at variance with their real 
purpose. And it was easy to satisfy one's self of this : for, when 
they enter the Senate house, they will say that they come 
neither to ask anything for themselves nor to thwart Eumenes 
in any way whatever ; but are ambassadors for the liberty of 
the Greek inhabitants of Asia. ' To secure this,' they will say, 
'is not so much a favour to themselves as an act incumbent 
on the' Romans, and in consonance with their former achieve- 
ments.' Such will be their specious professions ; but the real 
truth of the case will be wholly different. For if these cities 
are once set free, the result will be that their dominion will 
be many times increased, while his own would be in a manner 
entirely broken up. For the attractive name of liberty and 
autonomy would draw from his rule not only the cities to be 
freed at present, but those also which had been under his rule 
from of old, directly it is made apparent that the Senate has 
adopted that policy, and would add them to the dominion of 
Rhodes. That was the natural course for things to take. 
Imagining that they owed their freedom to Rhodes, those 
cities would become in name its allies, but in reality entirely 
subservient, owing to the heavy obligation under which they will 
find themselves. He begged the Senators, therefore, to be on 
their guard on that point ; lest they should find that they had 
unwittingly aggrandised one friendly nation too much, and dis- 
proportionately weakened another ; or even that they were 
benefiting men who had once been their foes, to the neglect 
and contempt of their genuine friends." 

20. " For myself," he continued, " though in every other 
point I would yield, if it were necessary, to my neighbours, 
yet in the matter of your friendship and of my goodwill 
towards you I will never, if I can help it, yield to any one alive. 
And I think that my father, if he had been living, would have 
said the same : for as he was the first to become your friend 
and ally, so of all the inhabitants of Asia and Greece he was the 
most nobly loyal to you to the last day of his life, not only in 
heart but in deed. For he took his part in all your wars in 
Greece, and furnished the largest contingents of men and 
ships of all your allies ; contributed the largest share of sup- 
plies ; and laced the most serious dangers : and to sum up al' 


ended his life actually engaged in the war with Philip, while 
employed in urging the Boeotians to join your alliance. I, 
too, when I succeeded to his kingdom, while fully maintaining 
my father^s views, for it was impossible to do more, have yet 
gone even beyond him in actual achievements : for the state 
of the times brought me to a more fiery test than they did 
him. Antiochus offered me his daughter and a share in his 
whole kingdom : offered me immediate restoration of all the 
cities that had been before wrested from me : and finally 
promised me any price I chose if I would join him in his 
war with you. But so far from accepting any one of these 
offers, I joined you in your struggle against Antiochus with 
the largest military and naval contingents of any of your allies ; 
contributed the largest share of supplies at the time of your 
utmost need; and exposed myself unreservedly to every 
danger along with your generals. Finally, I submitted to 
being invested in Pergamos itself, and risked my life as well 
as my crown in my loyalty to your people. 

21. " Therefore, men of Rome, as many of you have been 
eye-witnesses of the truth of my words, and all of you know it, 
it is but just that you should have a corresponding regard for 
my interests. You have made Massanissa king of the greater 
part of Libya, though he had once been your enemy and at 
last deserted to your side accompanied only by a few horse- 
men, only because he kept faith with you in one war : you 
have raised Pleuratus to the first position among the princes 
of Illyria, though he had done absolutely nothing for you 
beyond keeping loyal ; it would be the height of inconsistency 
if you should neglect me and my family, who from generation to 
generation have co-operated in your most important and glorious 
undertakings. What is it, then, that I am asking you to do, and 
what do I claim at your hands ? I will tell you openly, since 
you have called upon me to speak my mind to you. If you 
decide, then, to continue holding certain parts of Asia which 
are on this side Taurus, and were formerly subject to Antiochus, 
that is what I should wish to see best of all : for I consider 
that the security of my realm would best be secured by having 
you for neighbours, and especially by my sharing in your 
prestige. But if you decide not to do this, but to evacuate 


Asia entirely, there is no one to whom you may with greater 
justice sunender the prizes you have won in the field than to 
mc. But it may be said, it is a more honourable thing still 
to set the enslaved free. Yes ! if they had rot ventured to 
join Antiochus in the war against yoa But since they had 
the hardihood to do so, it is a much more honourable couree 
to make a proper return to your sincere friends, than to 
benefit those who have shown themselves your enemies," 

22. After the delivery of this effective speech Eumenes 
retired. The Senate received both the king himself and the 
speech with every mark of favour, and were enthusiastic for 
doing everything in their power to gratify him. 
They wished to call in the Rhodians next after '™^^^^'™°' 
him ; but one of the Rhodian ambassadors not 
being there in time, they called in those from Smyrna, who 
delivered a long disquisition on the goodwill and zeal which 
they had displayed towards Rome during the late war. But 
as there are no two opinions about the fact of their having 
been, of all the autonomous states in Asia, the most strenuous 
in the cause, 1 do not think it necessary to set forth their 
speech In detail. 

But next to them came in the Rhodians : who, after a short 
preamble as to their services to the Romans, 
quickly came to the discussion of the position RhadianL 
of their own country. They said that " It was 
a very great embarrassment to them, in the discharge of their 
ambassadorial duties, to find themselves placed by the necessities 
of the case in opposition to a sovereign with whom their 
public and private relations were of the most friendly descrip- 
tion. It was the opinion of their countrymen that the most 
honourable course, and the one which above all others would 
redound to the credit of Rome, was, that the Greeks in Asia 
should be set free, and should recover that possession dearest 
to all mankind^autonomy : but this was the last thing to suit 
Eumenes and his brothers. It was the nature of monarchy 
to hate equality, and to endeavour to have everybody, or at 
least as many as possible, subject and obedient. But though 
that was the case now, still they felt convinced that they should 
gain their object, not because they had greater influetice will" 


the Romans than Eumenes, but because they would be shown 
to be suggesting a course more just in itself and more in- 
disputably advantageous to all concerned. If^ indeed, the 
only way the Romans could requite Eumenes was by handing 
over to him the autonomous towns, they might reasonably be 
at a loss to determine what to do ; for they would have had 
to decide between neglecting a sincere friend and disregard- 
ing their own honour and duty, and thus entirely obscuring 
and degrading the glory of their great achievements. But if, 
on the other hand, it were possible adequately to consult for 
both these objects at the same time, who could doubt about 
the matter any longer ? Yet the fact was that, as in a costly 
banquet, there was enough and to spare for alL Lycaonia, 
Phrygia on the Hellespont, and Pisidia, the Chersonese also 
and the districts bordering on it, were at the disposal of the 
Romans to give to whom they chose ; only a few of which 
added to the kingdom of Eumenes would double its present 
extent, while if all, or even the great part were assigned to him, 
it would become second to that of no other prince in Asia. 

23. **It was therefore in the power of the Romans to 
strengthen their friends very materially without destroying the 
glory of their own policy. For the end which they pro- 
posed to themselves in their war was not the same as that of 
other nations, but widely different. The rest of the world all 
entered upon war with the view of conquering and seizing 
cities, wealth, or ships : but heaven had ordained that they 
should want none of these things, by having put everything 
in the whole world under their rule. What was it, then, that 
they had still occasion to wish for, and to take the securest 
means to obtain ? Plainly praise and glory among mankind ; 
which it was difficult indeed to gain, but most difficult of 
all to preserve when gained. Their war with Philip might 
show them their meaning. That war they had, as they 
professed, undertaken with the sole object of liberating 
Greece ; and that was in fact the only prize they gained in it, 
and no other whatever : yet the glory they got by it was 
greater than that which the tribute of the Carthaginians had 
brought them. And justly so : for money is a possession 
common to all mankind, but honour and praise and glory are 


attributes of the gods and of those men who approach nearest 
to them. Therefore, the most glorious of all their achieve- 
ments was the liberation of Greece; and if they now com- 
pleted that work their fame would receive its consummation ; 
but if they neglected to do so, even what they had already 
accomplished would lose its lustre." They finally wound up 
by saying, " As for us, gentlemen, having once deliberately 
adopted this policy and joined with you in the severest battles 
and in genuine dangers, we do not now propose to abandon the 
part of friends ; but have not hesitated to say openly what we 
believe to be for your honour and your interests alike, with no 
ulterior design whatever, and with a single eye to our duty as 
the highest earthly object." 

24. This speech of the Rhodians was universally regarded 
as temperate and fair. The Senate next Treaty with 
caused Antipater and Zeuxis, the ambassa- Antiocbus 
dors of Antiochus, to be introduced: and «"'>™n'- 
on their speaking in a tone of entreaty and supplication, 
an approval of the agreement made by him with Scipio in 
Asia was voted. A few days later the people also ratified it, 
and oaths were accordingly interchanged with Antipater and 
his colleague. This done, the other ambassadors from Asia 
were introduced into the Senate : but a very brief hearing was 
given to each, and the same answer was returned to all ; namely, 
that ten commissioners would be sent to decide on ail points 
of dispute between the cities. The Senate seiilemeni of 
then appointed ten commissioners, to whom Asia, 

they gave the entire settlement of particulars; ^'^ '^'^ 
while as a general principle they decided that of Asia 
this side Taurus such inhabitants as had been subject to 
Antiochus were to be assigned to Eumenes, except Lycia and 
Caria up to the Maeandcr, which were to belong to the 
Rhodians; while of the Greek cities, such of them as had 
been accustomed to pay tribute to Attalus were to pay the 
same to Eumenes ; and only those who had done so to 
Antiochus were to be relieved of tribute altogether. Having 
given the ten commissioners these outlines of the general 
settlement, they sent them out to join the consul, Cnaeus 
Manlius Vulso, in Asia. 


After these arrangements had been completed, the Rhodian 
c ,. . ^.,. . envoys came to the Senate again with a request 

Soli in Cihcia. . a ^ a v - or • n • *u ^ *u 

m regard to Soh m Cihcia, allegmg that they 
were called upon by ties of kindred to think of the interests 
of that city ; for the people of Soli were, like the Rhodians, 
colonists from Argos. Having listened to what they had to 
say, the Senate invited the attendance of the ambassadors 
from Antiochus, and at first were inclined to order Antiochus 
to evacuate the whole of Cilicia ; but upon these ambassadors 
resisting this order, on the ground of its being contrary to the 
treaty, they once more discussed the case of Soli by itself. 
The king's ambassadors still vehemently maintaining their 
rights, the Senate dismissed them and called in the Rhodians. 
Having informed them of the opposition raised by Antipater, 
they added that they were ready to go any length in the 
matter, if the Rhodians, on a review of the whole case, deter- 
mined to push their claim. The Rhodian envoys, however, 
were much gratified by the spirit shown by the Senate, and 
said that they would ask nothing more. This question, there- 
fore, was left as it was ; and just as the ten commissioners 
and the other ambassadors were on the point of starting, the 
e « ^ o two Scipios, and Lucius Aemilius, the victor 

Summer RC. 189.. . ^ /-, .,a-i - ^ 

m the sea fight with Antiochus, amved at 
Brundisium ; and after certain days all three entered Rome in 
triumph. . . . 

Amynandrus was restored to the kingdom of Aihamania^ 
which was occupied by a garrison of Philifs, by the aid of the 
AetolianSy who tJien proceeded to invade Amphilochia and the 
Dolopes. Hence the Aetolian 7var^ beginning with the siege of 
Ambracia by M, Fulvius A^obilior, Livy^ 38, i-i i. 

25. Amynandrus, king of the Athamanes, thinking that he 

had now permanently recovered his kingdom, 

^'^Tgo''^^'^ sent envoys to Rome and to the Scipios in 

Asia, for they were still in the neighbourhood 
of Ephesus, partly to excuse himself for having, as it appeared, 
secured his recall by the help of the Aetolians, but chiefly to 
entreat that he might be received again into the Roman 
alliance. But the Aetolians, imagining that they had now a 


good opportunity of once more annexing Atnphilochia and 
Aperantia, detennined on an expedition against those coun- 
tries ; and when Nicander their Strategus had; mustered the 
league army, they invaded Amphilochia. Finding most of the 
people willing to join them, they advanced into Aperantia; 
and the Aperantians also willingly yielding to them, they con- 
tinued their expedition into Dolopia. The Dolopians for a 
time made a show of resistance, and of keeping loyal to 
Philip ; but on considering what had happened to the Atha- 
manes, and the check which Philip had received there, they 
quickly changed their minds and gave in their adhesion to 
the Aetolians. After this successful issue of his expedition 
Nicander led his army home, believing that Aetolia was 
secured by the subjection of these tribes and places, against 
the possibility of any one injuring its territory. But im- 
mediately after these events, and when the Aetolians were 
still in the full elation of their successes, a 
report reached them of the battle in Asia, in ^r" i^ ° 
which they learnt that Antiochus had been 
utterly defeated. This caused a great revulsion of feeling; 
and when presently Damoteles came from Rome and an- 
nounced that a continuation of the war was decreed against 
them, and that Marcus Fulvius and an army had 
crossed to attack them, they were reduced to ''""fgo ^'^ 
a state of complete despair ; and not knowing 
how to meet the danger which was impending over them, 
they resolved to send to Rhodes and Athens, begging them to 
despatch envoys to Rome 10 intercede in their behalf, and, by 
softening the anger of the Romans, to find some means of 
averting the evils that threatened Aetolia. They also sent 
ambassadors of their own to Rome once more, Alexander, 
Isius, and Phaeneas, accompanied by Callippus of Ambracia 
and Lycopus. . . . 

26. Some envoys from Epirus having visited the Roman 
Consul, he consulted with them as to the best 
way of attacking the Aetolians. They advised "OT^A^llonb" 
that he should begin by attacking Ambracia, 
which was at that time a member of the Aetolian league. They 
gave as their reasons that, if the Aetolians ventured to give 


battle, the neighbourhood of Ambracia was very &vourable for 
the legions to fight in ; and that if, on the other hand, the 
Aetolians avoided an engagement, the town was an excellent one 
to besiege : for the district round it would supply abundant timber 
for the construction of siege artillery ; and the river Arachthusi 
which flowed right under the walls, would be of great use in con- 
veying supplies to the army in the summer season, and serve 

as a protection to their works. Fulvius thought 

uSlmti^iT ^^^ ^^^^^^ g^>^ "^^^ accordingly marched 

through Epirus to attack Ambracia. On his 
arrival there, as the Aetolians did not venture to meet him', 
he reconnoitred the city, and set vigorously to work on the 

siege. Meanwhile the Aetolian envoys that 
S.tnStS>ad been sent to Rome were caught off 

Cephallenia by Sibyrtus, son of Petraeus, and 
brought into Charadrus. The Epirotes first resolved to place 
these men at Buchetus and keep them under strict guard. 
But a few days afterwards they demanded a ransom of them 
on the ground that they were at war with the Aetolians. It 
happened that one of them, Alexander, was the richest man 
in Greece, while the others were badly off, and far inferior to 
Alexander in the amount of their property. At first the 
Epirotes demanded five talents from each. The others did 
not absolutely refuse this, but were willing to pay if they 
could, because they cared above everything to secure their 
own safety. But Alexander refused to consent, for it seemed 
a large sum of money, and he lay awake at night bewailing 
himself at the idea of being obliged to pay five talents. The 
Epirotes, however, foresaw what would happen, and were 
extremely alarmed lest the Romans should hear that they had 
detained men who were on a mission to themselves, and 
should send a despatch ordering their release ; they, therefore, 
lowered their demand to three talents a-piece. The others 
gladly accepted the offer, gave security, and departed : but 
Alexander said that he would not pay more than a talent, and 
that was too much ; and at last, giving up all thought of saving 
himself, remained in custody, though he was an old man, and 
possessed property worth more than two hundred talents; 
and I think he would have died rather than pay the three 


talents. So extraordinarily strong in some meti is the passion 
for accumulating money. But On this occasion Fortune so 
favoured his greed, that the result secured all men's praise and 
approval for his infatuation. For, a few days afterwards, a 
despatch arrived from Rome ordering the release of the 
ambassadors ; and, accordingly, he was the only one of them 
that was set free without ransom. When the Aetolians learnt 
what had happened to him, they elected Damoteles as their 
ambassador to Rome ; who, however, when as far as Leucas 
on his voyage, was informed that Marcus Fulvius was march- 
ing through Epirus upon Ambracia, and, therefore, gave up 
the mission as useless, and returned back to Aetolia. . . . 

27. The Aetolians being besieged by the consul Marcus 
Fulvius, offered a gallant resistance to the assault of the siege 
artillery and battering rams. Marcus having sijge„fAn,brada. 
first strongly secured his camp began the siege and the gaiuw 
on an extensive scale ; he opened three separate resistance of the 
parallel works across the plain against the 
Pyrrheium, and a fourth opposite the temple of Asclepius, and 
a ^flh directed against the Acropolis. And the attack being 
pushed on energetically at all these points at once, the besieged 
became terribly alarmed at the prospect before them. Still, as 
the rams vigorously battered the walls, and the long poles with 
their iron sickles tore oiT the battlements, they tried to invent 
machines to bafHe them, letting down huge masses of lead and 
stones and oak logs by means of levers upon the battering 
rams ; and putting iron hooks upon the sickles and hauling 
them inside the walls, so that the poles to which they were 
fastened broke against the battlements, and the sickles fell into 
their hands. Moreover they made frequent sallies, in which 
they fought with great courage : sometimes making a descent 
by night upon the pickets quartered at the works, and at others 
attacking in broad daylight the day-parties of the besiegers ; 
and by these means they managed to protract the siege, . . , 

Nicander was outside the city, and sent five hundred horse 
into it They carried the intervening entrenchment of the 
enemy and forced their way into the town. With these he 
had fixed on a day on which they were to sally out, and he was 
to be ready to support them. They accordingly made the sally 


with great courage and fought gallantly ; but either from fear of 
the danger, or because he conceived that what he was engaged 
uix)n at the time could not be neglected, Nicander failed to 
come up to time, and accordingly the attempt failed. . . y 

28. By assiduously working the battering rams the Romans 

were always breaking down this or that part of 'the wall. But 

yet they could not succeed in storming any of these breaches, 

because the besieged were energetic in raising counter walls, 

and the Aetolians fought with determined gallantry on the 

debris. They, therefore, in despair had recourse to mines and 

The Romans underground tunnels. Having safely secured 

begin mining the central one of their three works, and carefully 

operations, concealed the shaft with wattle screens, they 

erected in front of it a covered walk or stoa about two hundred 

feet long, parallel with the wall ; and beginning their digging 

from that, they carried it on unceasingly day and night, working 

in relays. For a considerable number of days the besieged 

did not discover them carrying the earth away through the 

shaft ; but when the heap of earth thus brought out became 

too high to be concealed from those inside the 

^Tc'tekgc?i.^'^^^^y» the commanders of the besieged garrison 

set to work vigorously digging a trench inside, 
parallel to the wall and to the stoa which faced the towers. 
When the trench was made to therequired depth, they next placed 
in a row along the side of the trench nearest the wall a number 
of brazen vessels made very thin ; and, as they walked along the 
bottom of the trench past these, they listened for the noise of 
the digging outside. Having marked the spot indicated by 
any of these brazen vessels, which were extraordinarily .sensitive 
and vibrated to the sound outside, they began digging from 
within, at right angles to the trench, another underground 
tunnel leading under the wall, so calculated as to exactly hit 
the enemy's tunnel. This was soon accomplished, for the 
Romans had not only brought their mine up to the wall, but 
had under-pinned a considerable length of it on either side of 
their mine ; and thus the two parties found themselves face to 
face. At first they conducted this underground fighting with 
their spears : but as neither side could do much good, because 

^ The text of this fragment is much dislocated. 


both parties protected themselves with shidds and wattles, 
some one suggested another plan to the defenders. Putting in 
front of them an earthenware jar, made to the width of the 
mine, they bored a hole in its bottom, and, in- 
serting an iron funnel of the same length as the "^^f^^ 
depth of the vessel, they filled the jar itself with 
fine feathers, and putting a little fire in it close to the mouth 
of the jar, they clapped on an iron lid pierced full of holes. 
They carried this without accident through the mine with its 
mouth towards the enemy. When they got near the besiegers 
they stopped up the space all round the rim of the jar, leaving 
only two holes on each side through which they thrust spears 
to prevent the enemy coming near the jar. They then took a 
pair of bellows such as blacksmiths use, and, having attached 
them to the orifice of the funnel, they vigorously blew up the 
fire placed on the feathers near the mouth of the jar, con- 
tinually withdrawing the funnel in proportion as the feathers 
became ignited lower down. Tlie plan was successfully exe- 
cuted ; the volume of smoke created was very great, and, from 
the peculiar nature of feathers, exceedingly pungent, and was 
all carried into the faces of the enemy. The Romans, there- 
fore, found themselves in a very distressing and embarrassing 
position, as they could neither stop nor endure the smoke in 
the mines.^ The siege being thus still further protracted the 
Aetolian commander determined to send an envoy to the 
Consul. . . . 

29. About this time the ambassadors from Athens and 
Rhodes came to the Roman camp for the pur- imetees^on of 
pose of furthering, if they could, the conclusion Athens, Rhodes, 
of a peace. The Athamanian king, Amynan- """ ^'"B 
dnis, also arrived, very eager to relieve the 
Ambraciots from their miserable position, and having received 
a safe conduct from Marcus Fulvius in consideration of the 
urgent nature of the business : For he had a very friendly 
feeling towards the Ambraciots, from having passed most of the 

' Smoking oul an enemy in a mine wiis one of the regular manccuvrcl. 
See Aen. Tact. 37. It was perhaps suggested by the illegal means laken by 
worlunen in the silver mines to annoy a rival ; for we find an Athenian law 
directed against il. Sec Deniostb. in PaiilatH. j 36. 


time of his exile in that town.^ A few days afterwards also 
some Acamanians arrived, bringing Damoteles and his fellow 
envoys. For Marcus Fulvius, having been informed of their 
misfortunes, had written to the people of Thyreum to bring the 
men to him. All these various persons, therefore, having 
assembled, the negotiations for peace were pushed on energetic- 
ally. For his part, Amynandrus was urgent in his advice to 
the Ambraciots to save themselves from the destruction which 
would not be long in coming to them unless they adopted 
wiser counsels. On his coming again and again up to the wall 
and conversing with them on this subject, the Ambraciots 
decided to invite him inside the town. The consul having 
given the king leave to enter the walls, he went in and discussed 
the situation with the inhabitants. Meanwhile the Athenian 
and Rhodian envoys got hold of the consul and tried by in- 
genious arguments to mollify his anger. Some one also sug- 
gested to Damoteles and Phaeneas to apply to Caius Valerius and 
endeavour to win him over. He was the son of that Marcus 
Valerius Laevinus who made the first alliance with the Aetolians ; 
and half brother, by the mother's side, of the consul Marcus 
Fulvius, and being a young man of vigorous character enjoyed 
the greatest confidence of the consul. Being appealed to by 
Damoteles, and thinking that in a way he had a family interest 
in the matter, and was bound to undertake the patronage of 
the Aetolians, he exerted himself with the greatest zeal and 
enthusiasm to rescue that people from their perilous position. 
The matter then being vigorously pushed forward on all sides at 
once was at length accomplished. For the Ambraciots, by the 
persuasion of the king, surrendered to the consul unreservedly 
as far as they themselves were concerned, and gave up the 
town, on the one condition that the Aetolian garrison should 
march out under truce. This primary exception they made 
that they might keep faith with their allies. 

80. So the consul agreed to grant the Aetolians peace on 
condition of receiving two hundred Euboic talents down, and 

* Nothing seems to be known of this exile of Fulvius, who had been 
granted an ovation in B.c. 191 for his victories in Spain. He was, however, 
in opposition to Cato, one of whose numerous prosecutions may have been 
against him. 


three hundred in six yearly instalments of fifty : of the 
restoration to the Romans of all prisoners and 
deserters within six months without ransom: ,t^Aarollans '^ 
of their retaining no city in their league, nor 
thenceforth admitting any fresh one, of such as had been 
captured by the Romans, or had voluntarily embraced their 
friendship since Titus Quinctius crossed into Greece : the 
Cephallenians not to be included in these terms. 

Such was the sketch in outline of the main points of the treaty. 
But it required first the consent of the Aetolians, -^^ Aetolian 
and then to be referred to Rome ; and meanwhile people confirm 
the Athenian and Rhodian envoys remained "'^ 'rcaiy, 
where they were, waiting for the decision of the Aetolians. On 
being informed by Damoteles and his colleagues on their 
return of the nature of the terms that had been granted them, 
the Aetolians consented to the general principle — for they 
were in fact much better than they had ejtpected, — but in regard 
to the towns formerly included in their league they hesitated for 
some time ; finally, however, they acquiesced. Marcus Fulvius 
accordingly took over Ambracia, and allowed the Aetolian 
garrison to depart under terms ; but removed from the town 
the statues and pictures, of which there was a great number, 
owing to the fact of Ambracia having been a royal residence 
of Pyrrhus. He was also presented with a crown ^ weighing 
one hundred and fifty talents. Ailer this settlement of affairs 
he directed his march into the interior of Aetolia, feehng 
surprised at meeting with no communication from the Aetolians. 
But on arriving at Amphilochian Argos, a hundred and eighty 
stades from Ambracia, he pitched his camp ; and being there 
met by Damoteles and his colleagues with the information 
that the Aetolians had resolved to ratify the treaty which they 
had concluded, they went their several ways, the Aetolians back 
to their own country, and Marcus to Ambracia, where he 
busied himself about getting his army across to Cephallenia ; 
while the Aetolians appointed Phaeneas and Nicander ambassa- 
dors to go to Rome about the peace : for not a single line of 
the above treaty held good until ratified by the Roman people. 
I Or "a complimenl." The Greek word ari^atot seems 10 be usa] for 
any present mode 10 a victor. So also ia cb. 34, and elsewhere. 


81 . While these envoys, accompanied by those from Rhodes 
and Athens, were on their voyage with this object, Marcus 
Fulvius sent Caius Valerius also, and some others of his friends 
to Rome to secure the ratification of the treaty. But when 
they arrived at Rome they found that a fresh cause of anger 
with the Aetolians had arisen by the instrumentality of king 
Philip ; who, looking upon himself as wronged by the Aetolians 
having taken Athamania and Dolopia from him, had sent to 
some of his friends at Rome, urging them to share his dis- 
pleasure and secure the rejection of the pacification. Accord- 
ingly, on the first arrival of the Aetolians, the Senate would not 
listen to them ; but afterwards, at the intercession of the 
Rhodians and Athenians, changed its mind and consented to 
their request : for Damis,^ besides other excellences dis- 
played in his speech, was thought to have introduced a very 
apt simile, extremely applicable to the case in hand. He said 
o u r T^ • " The Romans had good cause for anger with 

Speech of Damis. , . ,. ^ .° ,^,. ^ y ^ 

the Aetolians ; for, mstead of bemg grateful for 
the many kindnesses received at their hands, they had brought 
the Roman Empire into great danger by causing the war with 
Antiochus to break out. But the Senate were wrong in one 
point, namely in directing their anger against the masses. For 
in states the common people were like the sea, which left to 
its own nature was ever calm and unmoved, and not in the 
least likely ever to trouble any of those who approached or 
used it ; but directly violent winds blew upon and disturbed 
it, and forced it against its nature to become agitated, then 
indeed nothing could be more dreadful or formidable than the 
sea. This was just the case with the Aetolians. As long 
as they were left to themselves, no people in Greece were 
more loyal to you or more staunch in supporting your active 
measures. But when Thoas and Dicaearchus brought a 
storm from Asia, and Mnestas and Damocritus from Europ)e, 
and, disturbing the calm of the Aetolian masses, compelled 

^ Hultsch's text, supported by the MSS., has Ad/xts 6 Kixn<r^<^^> from which 
no sense scenis obtainable. According to Suidas, Damis was a philosopher 
from Nineveh who had settled in Athens. Livy (38, 10), has Leon Hicesiac 
Jilius. He must therefore have found the name Leon in his copy, which could 
hardly have lieen substituted for Aofus by mistake, though *IKE2^ov may have 
become «ctx'70"^«>'. 


them to become reckless of what they said or did, — then 
indeed their good disposition gave way to bad, and while in- 
tending to do mischief to you they really inflicted damage 
upon themselves. It is against these mischief-makers there- 
fore that you should be implacable; while you should take 
pity on the masses and make peace with them : with the assur- 
ance that, if once more left to themselves, with the additional 
feeling of having owed their safety on the present occasion to 
you, their attachment to you will be the warmest in Greece." 
' 82. By these arguments the Athenian envoy persuaded the 
Senate to make pwace with the Aetolians, The Treaty with 
decree therefore having been passed and con- Aetolia, 
firmed by a vote of the people, the treaty was ^^- '^* 
formally ratified, of which the text was as follows: "The 
people of the Aetolians shall in good faith maintain the 
empire and majesty of the people of Rome. 

" They shall not allow hostile forces to pass through their 
territory or cities against the Romans, their allies or friends ; 
nor grant them any supplies from the public fiind. 

"They shall have the same enemies as the people of Rome; 
and if the Roman people go to war with any, the Aetolian 
people shall do so also. 

" The Aetolians shall surrender to the praefectus in Corcyra, 
within a hundred days from the completion of the treaty, 
runaway slaves, and prisoners of the Romans and their allies, 
except such as having been taken during the war have re- 
turned to their own land and been subsequently captured; 
and except such as were in arms against Rome during the 
time that the Aetolians were fighting on the side of the 

" If there should be any not found within that time, they 
shall hand them over as soon as they are forthcoming, without 
deceit or fraud And such persons, after the completion of 
the treaty, shall not be allowed to return to Aetolia. 

" The Aetolians shall pay the consul in Greece at once two 
hundred Euboic talents of silver, of a standard not inferior to 
the Attic. In place of one third of this silver, they may, if 
they so choose, pay gold, at the rate of a mina of gold to ten 
minae of silver. They shall pay the money in the six year 
VOL. 11 u 


next following the completion of the treaty in yearly instal- 
ments of fifty talents ; and shall deliver the money in Rome. 

" The Aetolians shall give the Consul forty hostages, not 
less than ten or more than forty years old, to remain for the 
six years ; they shall be selected by the Romans freely, except- 
ing only the Stiategus, Hipparch, public secretary, and such as 
have already been hostages at Rome. 

"The Aetolians shall deliver such hostages in Rome; and 
if any one of them die, they shall give another in his place. 

" Cephallenia shall not be included in this treaty. 

"Of such territories, cities, and men as once belonged 

to the Aetolians, and, in the consulship of Titus 

Quinctius and CnaeusDomitius, or subsequently, 

were either captured by the Roman or voluntarily embraced 

their friendship, the Aetolians shall not annex any, whether 

city or men therein. 

■ " The city and territory of Oeniadae shall belong to the 

The treaty having been solemnly sworn, peace was con- 
cluded, and the war in Aetolia, as is in the rest of Greece, 
thus came to an end. . . . 


88. While the negotiations for peace with Antiochus, and 
for the settlement of Asia generally were going on at Rome, 
and the Aetolian war was being fought in Greece, it happened 
that another war in Asia, Cliat, namely, against the Gauls, was 
brought to a conclusion, the account of which I am now about 
to give . . . 

84. MoagStes was Tyrant of Cibyra, a cruel and crafty man, 
whose career deserves somewhat more than a passing refer- 
ence. . . . 

When Cnaeus Manlius was approaching Cibyra and had 
sent Helvius to find out the intentions of 
^r«"-v^L."M?" Moag^tes, the latter begged him by ambassa- 
Fulvius Nobiiior. dors not to damage the country, because he was 
Rc. 189; Moa-a friend of Rome, and ready to do anything 
^rahl^Mi^ '" ^'"^ ^^^ required of him ; and, at the same 
time, he offered Helvius a compliment of fifteen 


talents. In ansvei to this, Helvius said that he would refrain 
from damaging the territory ; but that as to the general question 
MoagStes must communicate with the Consul, for he was 
close behind with his army. MoagStes accordingly sent am- 
bassadors to Cnaeus, his own brother being one of them. 
When the Consul met them in the road, he addressed them 
in threatening and reproachful terms, asserting that "Not only 
had Moag^tes shown himself the most determined enemy of 
Rome, of all the princes in Asia, but had done his very best 
to overthrow their empire, and deserved punishment rather 
than friendship." ' Terrified by this display of anger, the am- 
bassadors abstained from delivering the rest of the message 
with which they were charged, and merely begged him to have 
an interview with Moag^tes : and when Cnaeus consented they 
returned to Cibyra. Next morning the Tyrant came out of 
the town accompanied by his friends, displaying his humility 
by a mean dress and absence of all pomp ; and, in conducting 
his defence, descanted in melancholy terms on his own helpless- 
ness and the poverty of the towns under his rule (which con- 
sisted of Cibyra, Syleium, and the town in the Marsh), and 
entreated Cnaeus to accept the fifteen talents. Astonished at 
his assurance, Cnaeus made no answer, except that, " If he did 
not pay five hundred talents, and be thankful that he was 
allowed to do so, he would not loot the country, but he would 
storm and sack the city." In abject terror Mo^fites begged 
him not to do anything of the sort ; and kept adding to his 
offer little by little, until at last he persuaded Cnaeus to take 
one hundred talents, and one thousand medimni of com, and 
admit him to friendship.^ . . . 

86. When Cnaeus Manljus was crossing the River Colo- 
batus, ambassadors came to him from the town 
of Sinda (in Pisidia) begging for help, because ^p^^^^j' 
the people of Termessus had called in the aid of 
the people of PhilomeJus, and had depopulated thetr territory 
and 5acke,d their town ; and were at that very moment besieg- 

' The Gtcck icxt is corrupt. Tbe sense is given from Livy, 38, 14. 
> The dynaslf lasted until the time of the Milhridnlic wais. llic last 
MoagCtcs being deposed b; Mureena, when Cibyra was joined 10 Lyda. 


ing its citadel, into which all the citizens, with wives and child- 
ren, had retreated. On hearing this, Cnaeus immediately 
promised them aid with the greatest readiness ; and thinking 
the aflfair was a stroke of luck for himself, directed his march 
towards Pamphylia. On his arrival in the neighbourhood of 
Termessus, he admitted the Termessians to friendship on the 
payment of fifty talents. He did the same with the Aspendians : 
and having received the ambassadors of the other towns in 
Pamphylia, he impressed on them in tliese interviews the con- 
viction mentioned above,' and having relieved the Sindians 
from their siege, he once more directed his march against the 
Gauls. . . . 

86. After taking the town of Cyrmasa (in Pisidia), and a 

very large booty, Cnaeus Manlius continued his 
pSiiSi.° advance. And as he was marching along the 

marsh, envoys came from Lysinoe, offering an 
unconditional surrender. After accepting this, Cnaeus entered 
the territory of Sagalassus, and having driven off a vast quantity 
of spoil waited to see what the SagaJassians were prepared 
to do. When their ambassadors arrived he received them ; 
and accepting a compliment of fifty talents, twenty thousand 
medinmi of barky, and twenty thousand of wheat, admitted 
them to friendship with Rome. . . . 

87. Cnaeus sent envoys to Eposognatus the Gaul, desiring 

him to send embassies to the kings of the Gaula 
"in Gala^a. "" Eposognatus in his turn sent envoys to Cnaeus 

begging him not to move his quarters or attack 
the Tolistobogian Gauls ; and assuring him that he would send 
embassies to the kings, and propose peace to them, and felt 
quite certain that he would be able to bring them to a proper 
view of affairs in all respects. . . . 

In the course of his march through the country Cnaeus 
made a bridge over the River Sangorius, which was extremely 
deep and difficult to cross. And having encamped on the bank 
of the river, he was visited by some Galli^ sent by.Attis and 
Battacus, the priests of the mother of the gods at Pesinus, 
wearing figures and images on their breasts, and announcing 

' ' is probably ■■ of the necessily of submiiiing to Rome ;" but Ihe 


that the goddess promised him victory and power ; to whom 
Cnaeus gave a courteous reception. . . . 

When Cnaeus was at the small town of Gordieium, am- 
bassadors came from Eposognatus, announcing that he had 
been round and talked with the kings of the Gauls, but that 
they would not consent to make any overtures of friendship 
whatever ; on the contrary, they had collected their children 
and women on Mount Olympus, and were prepared to give 
battle. . . . 

The victory of l/ie Jiomans ever the ToUstoboU at Mount 
Olympus is described by Lhy, ^%, 19-23; that over the Tectosages, 
a feio miles from Ancyra, in 38, 24-27. The second baHle took 
place in mid-autumn, n.c. 189; and the result was that the 
Gauls gave in their submission at Ephesus, and were forced to 
engage to leave off predatory excursions, and to confine themselves 
to their 07vn frontiers. Livy, 38, 27 and 40. 

'38. It chanced that among the prisoners made when 

the Romans won the victory at Olympus _, , 

. ', ' * The vengeance of 

over the Gauls of Asia, was Chiomara, wife of chiomara, wife of 
Ortiago. The centurion who had charge of the Gallic chief 
her availed himself of his chance in soldierly Lf'^ts ^T 
fashion, and violated her. 

He was a slave indeed both to lust and money: but 
eventually his love of money got the upper hand ; and, on 
a lai^e sum of gold being agreed to be paid for the woman, 
he led her off to put her to ransom. There being a river 
between the two camps, when the Gauls had crossed it, paid 
the man the money, and received the woman, she ordered 
one of them by a nod to strike the Roman as he was in the 
act of taking a polite and affectionate farewell of her. The 
man obeyed, and cut off the centurion's head, which she 
picked up and drove off with, wrapped in the folds of her 
dress. On reaching her husband she threw the head at his 
feet ; and when he expressed astonishment and said : " Wife to 
keep faith ts a good thing," she replied: "Yes; but it is a 
better thing that there should be only one man alive who has 
lain with me ! " [Polybius says that he conversed with the 


woman at Sardis, and was Struck with het digniRed demeaaour 
and intelligence.] ' ... 

89. After the victory over the Gauls at Olyropus, when the 

Romans were cncami>ed at Ancyra, and Cnaeus 

litlwCi^eiL'Man- **'^^ "" ^^ point of continuing his advance, 

lii» by n itniia- ambassadors came from the Tectosages asking 

gom, init are that Cnaeus would leave his troops in their 

"' "^ _g ^ ''*'''■ quarters, and advance himself in the course of 

the next day into the space between the two 
camps ; and promising that their kings would come to meet 
him, and discuss the terms of a peace. But when Cnaeus 
consented, and duly arrived at the appointed place with five 
hundred horse, the kings did not a]}pear. After his return 
to the camp, however, the ambassadors came again, and, offering 
some excuses for the kings, begged him to come once more, 
as they would send some of their chief men to discuss the 
whole question. Cnaeus consented ; but, without leaving the 
camp himself, sent Attalus and some tribunes with three 
hundred horse. 'l"he envoys of the Gauls duly appeared and 
discussed the business : but finally said that it was impossible 
for them to conclude the matter or ratify anything they agreed 
upon ; but they engaged that the kings would come next day 
to agree on the terms, and finally settle the treaty, if the 
Consul would also come to them. Attalus promised that 
Cnaeus would come, and they separated for that day. But 
the Gauls were deliberately contriving these postponements, 
and amusing the Romans, because they wanted to get some 
twrt of their families and property beyond the river Halys ; 
and, first of all, to get the Roman Consul into their hands if 
they could, but if not, at any rate to kill him. With this 
purpose they watched next day for the coming of the Romans, 
with a thousand horse ready to fall upon him. When Cnaeus 
heard the result of Attalus's interview, believing that the kings 
would come, he left the camp, attended as usual by five 
hundred horse. Now it happened that, on the days of the 
previous interviews, the foraging parties which went out 

' This is rtally Plutarch's version of a story be found in Polybius, and, lo 
judge from Livy, 38, 34. nol a very complete ont It tot* place near 
Ancyra. Plutarch di mutierum virlulitta. 


from the Roman camp to fetch wood and hay had gone in 
the same direction, in order to have the protection of the 
squadron which went to the parley. A numerous foraging party 
acted in the same way on this third occasion, and the tribunes 
ordered them to proceed in the same direction, with the usual 
number of horsemen to protect them as they advanced. And 
their being out on this duty proved accidentally to be the 
salvation of their comrades in the danger which threatened 
them. . . . 


40. M. Fulvius took the quarter of the town y^^ ciiadd of 
in which was the ciladel by a night surprise, SjH™ iT.' 
and introduced the Romans into the town,^ night smprUe. 

41. I'he good and the expedient are seldom compatible, 
and rare indeed are those who can combine and phiiopoemen"! 
reconcile them. For as a general rule we all policy lowaids 
know that the good shuns the principles of imme- ^"^'.^k^" 
diate profit, and profit those of the good. " ""' "'' 
However, Philopoemen attempted this task, and succeeded 
in his aim. For it was a good thing to restore the captive 
exiles to Sparta ; and it was an expedient thing to humble 
the Lacedaemonian state, and to punish those who had served 
as bodyguards to a tyrant But seeing clearly that money is 
ever the support on which every dynasty rests, and having a 
clear head and the instincts of a ruler, he took measures to 
prevent the introduction into the town of money from out- 
side. . . . 

48. * Meanwhile in Asia the Roman consul Cnaeus Man- 
lius wintered at Ephesus, in the last year of this 
Olympiad, and was there visited by embassies s^n^,h"tinl^ 
from the Greek cities in Asia and many others, of iSg-iss b.c 

• Sec Livy, 38, 38, 39, The Iragmenl ht-rc seems 10 be Ihat Imnslaled by 
Uvy in ch. 39, Romarti nocte ptr arcem, quam Cyatidem vacant {naiK urti in 
mare daxxa in Occidenltat vergit) murv iuperalo in forum ptntncritnt. 'Ilio 
people of Some suddenly threw off Ibe lerms under which the rest of Cephal- 
lania had lubmiltcd and stood a lour monlbs' siege. 

* A fragnietil, arranged iti Hullsch's text as ch. 41, is too much mutilated t<> 
be tmulaled wiih any appnneh to coirccincss. 


at Ephesus, the bringing complimentary crowns to him for his 
i^k^oiympkd. victories over the Gauls. For the entire inhabi- 
and arranges the tants of Asia this side Taurus were not so much 
settlement of Asia, rejoiced at the prospect given them by An- 
tiochus's defeat of being relieved from tribute, garrisons, or 
other royal exactions, as at the removal of all fear of the 
barbarians, and at their escape from their insolence and law- 
lessness. Among the rest Musaeus came from Antiochus, 
and some envoys from the Gauls, desiring to ascertain the terms 
upon which friendship would be granted them; and also from 
Ariarathes, the king of Cappadocia. For this latter prince, 
having attached himself to the fortunes of Antiochus, and having 
taken part in his battle with the Romans, had become alarmed 
and dismayed for his own fate, and therefore was endeavouring 
by frequent embassies to ascertain what he would have to pay or 
do to get pardon for his error. The Consul complimented the 
ambassadors from the cities, and dismissed them after a very 
favourable reception ; but he replied to the Gauls that he would 
not make a treaty with them until king Eumenes, whom he 
expected, had arrived. To the envoys from Ariarathes he said 
that they might have peace on the payment of six hundred 
talents. With the ambassador of Antiochus he arranged that he 
would come with his army to the frontier of Pamphylia, to receive 
the two thousand five hundred talents, and the com with which 
the king had undertaken to furnish the Roman soldiers before 
his treaty with Lucius Scipio. This business being thus 
settled, he solemnly purified his army ; and, as the season for 
o • f « ^ oo military operations was now beginning, he broke 

SpnngofB.c. i88. u- .. ^ * i • a.*, i -.u u- 

up his quarters, and, takmg Attalus with him, 
arrived at Apamcia in eight days' march, and remained there 
three days. On the fourth he continued his advance ; and, 
pushing on at great speed, arrived on the third day at the 
rendezvous with Antiochus, and there pitched his camp. Here 
he was visited by Musaeus, who begged him to wait, as the 
carts and cattle that were bringing the com and money were 
late. He consented to wait : and, when the supply arrived, he 
distributed the corn among the soldiers, and handed over the 
money to one of his tribunes, with orders to convey it to 


44k He himself started in full force for Perga, where he 
heard that a commander of a garrison placed in 
that town by Antiochus had neither left it him- ^ ^3''}^^^'^ 
self nor withdrawn his garrison. When he 
came within a short distance of the place he was met by 
the captain of the garrison, who begged Cnaeus not to con- 
demn him unheard. " He had received the city from 
Antiochus in trust, and was holding it until he should be 
instructed what to do by the sovereign who had entrusted it 
to him." And he therefore begged for thirty days' respite, to 
enable him to send and ask the king for instructions. 
Observing that Antiochus was behaving straightforwardly in 
other particulars, Cnaeus consented to allow him to send and 
ask the king the question. After some days the ofGcer 
accordingly received an answer, and surrendered the city. 

About this time, just at the beginning of summer, the ten 
commissioners and king Eumenes arrived tiysiiniiQcr rc 188 
sea at Ephesus; and, after giving themselves The leii Roman ' 
two days to recover from the voyage, proceeded 
up the country to Apameia, When their arrival 
was known to Cnaeus Manlius, he sent his 
brother Lucius with four thousand men to Oroanda (in Pisidia), 
as a forcible hint that they must pay the money owing, in accord- 
ance with the terms agreed on ; while he himself marched his 
array at full speed to meet Eumenes and the commissioners. 
On his arrival he found the king and the ten commissioners, 
and immediately held a consultation with them on the 
measures to be taken. The first resolution come to was to 
confirm the sworn agreement and treaty with Antiochus, about 
which I need say no more, beyond giving the actual text of 
the treaty, which was as follows ; — 

45. "There shall be perpetual peace between Antiochus 
and the Romans if he fulfils the provisions of Ttxt of ihe ircaiy 
the treaty. belwcen Antio- 

" Neither Antiochus nor any subject to him =''"' '"■^ '*°"'*- 
shall allow any to pass through their territories to attack the 
Romans or their allies, nor supply them with aught Neither 
shall the Romans or their allies do the like for those attack- 
ing Antiochus or those subject to him. 


" Antiochus shall not wage war upon the Islanders or the 
dwellers in Europe. 

"He shall evacuate all cities and territory (this side Taurus^). 
His soldiers shall take nothing out with them except the arms 
they are carrying. If they chance to have taken anything 
away they shall restore it to the same cities. 

" He shall receive neither soldiers nor other men from the 
territory of king Eumenes. 

" If there be any men in the army of Antiochus coming 
from any of the cities taken over by the Romans, he shall 
deliver them up at Apameia. 

"If there be any from the kingdom of Antiochus with the 
Romans or their allies, they may remain or depart as they 

" Antiochus and those subject to him shall give back the 
slaves, captives, and deserters of the Romans or their allies 
and any captive received from any quarter. Antiochus shall 
give up, if it be within his power so to do, Hannibal, son of 
Hamilcar, the Carthaginian, Mnesilochus the Acarnanian, 
Thoas the Aetolian, Euboulidas and Philo the Chalcidians, 
and such of the Aetolians as have held national offices. 

" Antiochus shall give up all his elephants, and shall have 
none henceforth. 

" Antiochus shall surrender his ships of war, their tackle, 
and fittings, and henceforth have only ten decked ships. He 
shall not have a vessel rowed by thirty oars, [or by less] ^ for 
purposes of war begun by himself. 

"He shall not sail west of the river Calycadnus and 
the promontory of Sarpedon, except to convey tribute or 
ambassadors or hostages. 

" It shall not be lawful for Antiochus to enlist soldiers or 
receive exiles from the territory subject to Rome. 

" Such houses as belonged to the Rhodians or their allies, 
in the territory subject to Antiochus, shall continue to belong 
to the Rhodians as before the war : any money owed to them 

^ These words are wanting in the text. From Livy {38, 38) it appears 
that the territory was defined as between the Taurus and the R. Halys as far 
as the borders of Lycaonia. 

* Livy (/.r.) has nrve monerem ex belli causa quod ipse illaturus erit. 


shall still be recoverable : and any properly left behind by 
them, if sought for, shall be restored. 

"The Rhodians shall, as before the war, be free from 

" If Antiochus has given any of the towns to others which 
he is bound to restore, he shall remove from them also his 
garrisons and men. And if any shall wish hereafter to desert 
to him, he shall not receive them. 

" Antiochus shall pay to the Romans ten thousand talents, 
in ten yearly instalments, of the best Attic silver, each talent 
to weigh not less than eighty Roman pounds, and ninety 
thousand medemni of com. 

" Antiochus shall pay to king Eumenes three hundred and 
fifty talents in the five years next following, in yearly instal- 
ments of seventy talents ; and in lieu of the corn, according 
to the valuation of Antiochus himself, one hundred and 
twenty-seven talents, two hundred and eight drachmae, which 
sum Eumenes has consented to accept 'as satisfying his claims.' 

"Antiochus shall give twenty hostages, not less than 
eighteen nor more than forty-five years old, and change them 
every three years. 

"If there be in any year a deficit in the instalment paid, 
Antiochus shall make it good in the next year. 

" If any of the cities or nations, against whom it has been 
hereby provided that Antiochus should not make war, should 
commence war against hin), it shall be lawful for Antiochus to 
war with them ; but of such nations and cities he shall not 
have sovereignty nor attach them as friends to himselC 

"Such complaints as arise between the parties to this 
treaty shall be referred to arbitration. 

" If both parties agree in wishing anything to be added to 
or taken from this treaty, it shall be lawful so to do." 

46. Immediately after this treaty had been solemnly sworn 
to, the proconsul Cnaeus sent Quintus Minucius Burning of Antio- 
Thermus and his brother Lucius, who had just chus's ships ai 
brought the money from Oroanda to Syria, with l'"'^™ ■" ^yda. 
orders to receive the oath from the king, and confirm the 
several clauses of the treaty. And to Quintus Fabius Lab*^ 
who was in command of the fleet, he sent a despatch oid< 


him to sail back to Patara, and take over and bum the ships 
there. . . . 

Ariarathcs V.King 47. The proconsul Cnaeus Manlius made 
of Cappadocia. Ariarathes a friend of Rome on receipt of 
three hundred talents. . . . 

48. At Apameia the Proconsul and the ten commissioners, 

Final settlement ^^'^'^ listening to all who appealed to them, 

of the affairs of assigned in the case of disputed claims to terri- 

Asia Minor by the tory, money. Or anything else, certain cities in 

A*!?.!?rn'n n"^^« ^hich the paTtics might have their claims settled 

Autumn B.C. i88. , , . f rr^i ,1 1 . 1 f 

by arbitration. The general scheme which they 
drew out was as follows : Those of the autonomous cities 
which, having formerly paid tribute to Antiochus, had remained 
faithful to Rome, they relieved from tribute altogether. 
Those that had been tributary to Attalus they ordered to pay 
the same tribute to his successor Eumenes. Such as had 
abandoned the Roman friendship and joined Antiochus in the 
war, they ordered to pay Eumenes the amount of tribute im- 
ix)sed on them by Antiochus. The people of Colophon, 
Notium, Cymae, and Mylae, they freed from tribute. To 
the Clazomenians, besides this relief, they gave the Island 
Drymussa. To the Ephesians they restored the sacred district 
which they had been obliged by the enemy to evacuate. . . } 
To the people of Chios, Smyrna, and Erythrae, besides other 
marks of honour, they assigned the territory which they 
severally expressed a wish to have at the time, and alleged 
was their right, from regard for their loyalty and zeal which 
they had shown to Rome during the war. To the Phocaeans 
they restored their ancestral city and the territory which they 
possessed of old. They next transacted business with the 
Rhodians, giving them Lycia and Caria up to the river 
Maeander, except Telmissus. As to king Eumenes and his 
brothers, not content with the liberal provision made for them 
in their treaty with Antiochus, they now assigned him in 
addition the Chersonese, Lysimacheia, and the castles on the 
borders of these districts, and such country as had been sub- 
ject to Antiochus in Europe; and in Asia, Phrygia on the 

^ See Livy, 38, 39. Some words are lost referring to grants to the people 
of Ilium. 



Hellespont, Great Fhrygia, so much of MysJa as he had before 
subjugated, Lycaonia, Milyas, Lydia, Tralles, Ephesus, and 
Telmissus : all these they gave to Eumenes. As to Fam- 
phylia, Eumenes alleged that it was on this side Taurus, the 
amijassadors of Antiochus on the other ; and the commissioners 
feeling unable to decide, referred the question to the Senate. 
Having thus decided the largest number and most important 
of the matters brought before them, they started on the road 
towards the Hellespont, intending on their journey to still 
further secure the settlement arrived at with the Gauls. . . . 



In the \\%th Ofympiad {b,c, 188-184) embassies came from 
Philip and the tribes bordering on Macedonia to Rome, The decrees 
of the Senate concerning them. In Greece the quarrel of Philip 
with the Thessalians and Perrhaebians about the cities held by 
Philip in their countries from the time of the war with Antiochus, 
TJu decision concerning them before Q. Caecilius at Tempe, Dect- 
sions of Caecilius. A dijferenct of Philip with the ambassadors 
of Eumenes and the exiles from Maroneia ; the pleadings on 
tliese points at Thessalonica and the decision of Caecilius, The 
massacre at Afaroneia instigated by king Philip, The arrival 
of the Roman legates^ and their decisions. The causes of the 
war betiveen the Romans and Perseus, Arrival of ambassadors 
from kings Ptolemy and Eumenes and Seleucus in the Pelopon- 
nese. The decision of the Achaeans on the alliance with Ptolemy ^ 
and on the gifts offered them by these kings. Arrival of Q. 
Caecilius and his disapprobation of the measures taken in regard 
to Sparta, Embassy of A reus and Alcibiades^ t7uo of tlie earlier 
exiles from Sparta, to Rome, and their accusations against Philo- 
poemen and the Achaeans, The Roman envoys come to Cleitor, 
where there is an Achaean assembly. The speeches delivered for 
both parties, and the Achaean decrees in the affair of Sparta} 

8. After the execution of the men at Compasium,^ some of 
the Lacedaemonians, incensed at what had been done, and 

^ This summary is arranged by Hultsch as chs. i and 2 of book 22. 
It appears as book 23, chs. 4, 5 in Schweighacuscr's text. 

* In ac. 191 Philopocmcn secured the adhesion of Sparla to the Achaean 
league : Init the Spartans were never united in their loyalty to it, and during 
his year as Strategus (b.c. 189) he punished a massacre of some Achaean 


believing that the power and authority of the Romans had 
been set at naught by Philopoemen, went to 

Rome and accused Philopoemen and his pro- „ °'''^"'. 
,,,,,.,, .11 Komc against 

ceedmgs; and finally obtaineda letteraddressed philopoemen. 
to the Achaeans from Marcus I-epidus, theB-f^'S?, Cost M. 
consul of the year, and afterwards Pont'fex'^™'^^'^ 
Maximus, in which he told the Achaeans that 
they had not acted equitably in the matters of the I^cedae- 
monians. At the same time as this mission from Sparta, 
Philopoemen also appointed Nicodemus of Elis and others to 
go on an embassy to Rome. 

Just at that time Demetrius of Athens came on a mission 
from Ptolemy, to renew the existing alliance Rene^^of^^le 
between the king and the Achaean league, treaty between 
This was eagerly accepted, and my father, >he Achaean 
Lycortas, and Theodoridas, and Rositeles of '^„""' 
Sicyon were appointed ambassadors to take the 
oaths on behalf of the Achaeans, and receive those of the 
king. And on that occasion a circumstance xhe accomplish- 
occurred, which, though not important perhaps, mews of Ptolemy 
is still worth recording. After the completion Epipt>anes. 
of this renewal of alliance on behalf of the Achaeans, Philo- 
poemen entertained the ambassador ; and in the course of the 
banquet the ambassador introduced the king's name, and said 
a great deal in his praise, quoting anecdotes of his skill and 
boldness in hunting, as well as his excellence in riding and the 
use of arms ; and ended by quoting, as a proof of what he said, 
that the king on horseback once transfixed a bull with a 
javelin. . . . 

4. In Bocotia, after the formation of the treaty between 
Rome and Antiochus, the hopes of the whole nie effect of the 
revolutionary party were destroyed. Politics coll.tpse of 
therefore began to assume a new aspect; and Antiochus upon 
whereas the administration of justice among 
them had been postponed for nearly the last twenty years, 
voices began to make themselves heard in the cities to the 

sympathisers In Spariaby an execution of eighty Spartans at Compasium on the 
frontier of Lnconia. This number Plutarch gives on the aulhority of Poly- 
tnux, Init another account stated it at three hundred and fifty. Plut. Phil, 16. 


effect that " there ought to be an end and settlement of their 
mutual disputes." But after considerable controversy on this 
point, because the discontented were more numerous than the 
wealthy, the following circumstance occurred which helped 
accidently to support the party of order. Titus Flamininus 
had for some time past been zealously working in Rome to 
Resistance to the sccure the restoration of Zeuxippus to Boeotia, 
recall of bccause he had found him serviceable on many 
Zeuxippus. occasions during the wars with Antiochus and 
Philip. And just at this time he had induced the Senate to 
send a despatch to the Boeotians ordering them to recall 
Zeuxippus and his fellow exiles. When this despatch arrived, 
the Boeotians, fearing that, if these men were restored, they 
would become detached from their good understanding with 
Macedonia, determined that the legal sentence upon 
Zeuxippus and the rest should be publicly proclaimed,^ 
which they had formerly drawn up against them. Thus they 
condemned them on two charges, first, of sacrilege for 
having stripped off the silver from the plated table of Zeus, 
See 1 8, 43. Livy, and, secondly, of murder for having killed 
33. 28. Brachylles. Having made this arrangement, 
they assumed that they need pay no further attention to the 
despatch of the Senate, but contented themselves with sending 
Callicritus and others to Rome with the message that they 
were unable to rescind what had been settled by their laws. 
Zeuxippus having sent an embassy to the Senate at the same 
time, the Romans wrote to the Aetolians and Achaeans an 
account of the attitude assumed by the Boeotians, and ordered 
them to restore Zeuxippus to his country. The Achaeans re- 
frained from invading the country with an army, but selected 
some ambassadors to go and persuade the Boeotians to obey 
the orders from Rome \ and also to settle the legal disputes 
existing between them and the Achaeans, on the same prin- 
ciples as they conducted the administration of justice at home : 
for it happened that there were some controversies between 
the two nations that had been dragging on for a long time. 
On receiving this message the Boeotians, whose Strategus was 
then Hippias, promised at the moment that they would do 

* Some words arc lost from the text describing their method of procedure. 


what was demanded of them, but shortly afterwards neglected 
it at every point. Therefore, when Hippias had laid down his 
office and Alcetas had succeeded him, Philopoemen gave all 
who chose license to make reprisals on the territories of the 
Boeotians ; which proved the beginning of a serious quarrel 
between the two nations. For on the cattle of Mymchus and 
Simon being driven off,' and a struggle arising over this 
transaction, the contest soon ceased to be political, and be- 
came the beginning and prelude of open war. If indeed the 
Senate had persisted in carrying out the restoration of 
Zeuxippus, war would quickly have been kindled ; but as it 
maintained silence on the subject, the Megareans were induced 
by an embassy proposing terms to stop the reprisals. . . ?■ 

6. A quarrel arose between the Lycians and Rhodians from 
the following causes. When the ten commis- 
sioners were employed in the settlement of Asia, '^^^j;;^ *° 
they were visited by Theaetetus and Philo- 
phron on a mission from Rhodes, demanding that Lycia and 
Caria should be given to them in return for the goodwill 
and zeal displayed by them in the war with Antiochus. At 
the same time Hipparchus and Satyrus came from Ilium 
begging, on the ground of their kindred with the Lycians, that 
the latter should receive pardon for their transgressions. The 
commissioners listened to these pleadings, and tried to do what 
they could to satisfy both. For the sake of the people of 
Ilium, they inflicted no severity on the Lycians, but gratified 
the Rhodians by presenting them with the sovereignty over 
that people. This decision was the origin of a serious division 
and controversy between the Lycians and Rhodians. For the 
envoys of lUum visited the Lycian cities, giving out that they 
had succeeded in pacifying the Roman anger, and that they 
owed their liberty to them ; while Theaetetus and his colleague 
took back word to their countrymen that Lycia and all Caria 
south of the Maeander had been given as a free gift by the 
Romans to Rhodes. Presently an embassy came from Lycia to 
Rhodes desiring an alliance; while the Rhodians on their part 
had elected certain of their citizens to go to Lycia and give 
' Some words ore toat in the text which would more lulty explain the 


orders to the several cities as to what they were to do. They 
were thus entirely at cross purposes, and for some time the 
cause of the misunderstanding was not generally intelligible. 
But when the Lycian ambassadors appeared in the assembly 
and began talking about an alliance, and Pothion the Prytanis 
rose after them and explained the different ideas which the two 
people entertained on the subject, and moreover, sternly re- 
buked the Lycian envoys,^ the latter declared that they would 
endure anything rather than be subject to the Rhodians. . . . 


ARISTOMENES (l8, 53, 54) 

6. All men admire the magnanimity of Philip towards 

Athens ; for though he had been injured as well as 

condi!^of'phiiip abused by them, yet when he conquered them at 

II. of Macedon to Chaeroneia, so far from using this opportunity 

Aihcns in n.c. 338 for injuring his opponents, he caused the corpses 

''inoiemy''^ of the Athenians to be buried with the proper 

ceremonies ; while those of them who had been 
taken prisoners he actually presented with clothes, and 
restored to their friends without ransom. But though men 
praise tliey do not imitate such conduct. They rather try to 
outdo those with whom they are at war, in bitterness of passion 
and severity of vengeance. Ptolemy, for instance, had men 
tied naked to carts and dragged at their tail, and then put to 
death with torture. . . . 

7. When this same Ptolemy was besieging Lycopolis, the 
Suppression of Egyptian nobles surrendered to the king at 

the revolt in discretion ; and his cruel treatment of them in- 
lower F^P^ volved him in manifold dangers. The same was 
the result at the time Polycrates suppressed the 
Lycopolis in the revolt. For Athinis, Pausiras, Chesuphus, and 
Thcbaid. Irobastus, who still survived of the rebellious 
nobles, yielding to necessity, appeared at the city of Sais and 
surrendered at discretion to the king. But Ptolemy, regardless 
of all pledges, had them tied naked to the carts and dragged 
off, and then put to death with torture. He then went to 

^ Something is lost in the text. 


Naucratis with his army, where he received the mercenaries 
enHsted for him by Aristonicus from Greece, and thence sailed 
to Alexandria, without having taken any part whatever in the 
actual operations of the war, thanks to the dishonest advice of 
Polycratcs, though he was now twenty-five years old. . . . 

8. At this time were sowed the seeds of fatal evils to the 
royal house of Macedonia. I am aware that ^^_ ,35, 1^ 
some historians of the war between Rome and origin of the bsi 
Perseus, when they wish to set forth the causes M»<*<ionian war. 
of the quarrel for our information, assign as the primary one 
the expulsion of AbrupoUs from his principality, Abrupolis, a 
on the ground of having made a raid upon the Thracian prmcc 
mines at Pangaeum after the death of Philip, ^"^^^f °'^ 
which Perseus repulsed, finally expelling him ^ivy, 43. 13, 40. 
entirely out of his own dominions. Next they Death of i-hiiip 
mention the invasion of Dolopia, and the visit ^- ^'^ ''9- 
of Perseus Co Delphi, the plot against Eumenes at Delphi, and 
the murder of the ambassadors in Boeolia ; and 
from these they say sprang the war between 
Perseus and the Romans. But my contention is that it is of 
most decisive advantage, both to historians and their readers, 
to know the causes from which the several events are bom and 
spring. Most historians confound these, because they do not 
keep a firm hold upon the distinction between a pretext and 
a cause, or again between a pretext and a beginning of a war. 
And since events at the present time recall this distinction 
I feel compelled to renew my discussion of this subject For 
instance, of the events just referred to, the first „„ . , ^ , 

, , . , , . Sec bk, 3, en. 6. 

three are pretexts ; the last two — the plot agamst 
Eumenes, the murder of the ambassadors, and other similar 
things that happened during the same period — are clear Ixgin- 
nings of the war between Rome and Perseus, and of the final 
overthrow of the Macedonian kingdom ; but not one of them 
is a cause of these things. I will illustrate by examples. Just 
as we say that Philip son of Amyntas contemplated and 
determined upon accomplishing the war with Persia, while 
Alexander put into execution what he had projected, so in the 
present instance we say that Philip son of Demetrius first pro- 


jected the last war against Rome, and had all his preparations 
ready for the execution of his design, but that after his death 
Perseus became the agent in carrying out the undertaking 
itsel£ If this be true, the following also is clear : it is im- 
possible that the causes of the war should have been subse- 
quent to the death of him who resolved upon and projected it ; 
which would be the case if we accepted the account of these 
historians ; for the events alleged by them as its causes were 
subsequent to the death of Philip. . . . 

9. About the same time ambassadors came to Rome from 

Complaints ^^^g Eumenes, informing the Senate of the 

lodged against encroachment of Philip upon the cities in 

Philip at Rome. Thrace. There came also the exiles of the 

Maronitae denouncing Philip, and charging him 

with being the cause of their expulsion. These were followed 

by Athamanians, Perrhaebians, and Thessalians, demanding the 

restoration of their cities which Philip had taken from them 

during the war with Antiochus. Ambassadors also came from 

Philip to make answer to all accusers. After repeated debates 

between all these envoys and the ambassadors of Philip, the 

A commission Senate decided to appoint a commission at once, 

of investigation to investigate the actions of Philip, and to pro- 

appomted. ^^^^ ^ ^y^o chose to State their views and their 

complaints of the king to his face. The legates thus appointed 

were Quintus Caecilius, Marcus Baebius, and Tiberius 

Claudius.^ . . . 

There was again a war of parties among the 
Thrace" Aenii, one side inclining to Eumenes, the other 
to Macedonia. . . . 

Tfu result of these embassies was the Congress of Tenipe^ at 
which no definite settlement was made, Livy\ 39, 25-28. 


Phiiopoemen iQ. I have already stated that in the Pelo- 

te^^oTtwo^rs P°"^^^^' ^^^^^ Philopoemen was still Strategus, 
running, from the Achaean league sent an embassy to Rome 

* Livy (39, 24) gives the names as Q. Caecilius Mctellus, M. Baebius 
Tamphilus, Ti. Sempronius. 


on the subject of Sparta, and another to king "v "■<=■ '*9 "> 
Ptolemy to renew their ancient alliance. ""*■ ^'^' '^'■ 

Immediately after Philopoemen had been succeeded by 
Aristaenus as Strategus, the ambassadors of king Ptolemy 
arrived, while the league meeting was assembled Arisiaenus. 
at Megalopolis. King Eumenes also had de-Mny, b,c. 16710 
spatchedanembassyofferingtogivetheAchaeans ^'^y. ^.c 186, 
one hundred and twenty talents, on condition that it was invested 
and the interest used to pay the council of the league at the time 
of the federal assemblies. Ambassadors came sji^m^ VhWa- 
ateo from king Seieucus, to renew his friendship paior succeeded 
with them, and offering a present of a fleet often his father 
ships of war. But when the assembly got to cral^Rc* I'Si 
business, the first to come forward to speak 
was Nicodemus of Elis, who recounted to the Business of ihe 
Achaeans what he and his colleagues had said asse^ly 
in the Roman Senate about Sparta, and read 
the answer of the Senate; which was to the Uuer from the 
effect that the Senate disapproved of the destnic- ^„bj^<rf 
tion of the walls, and of the execution of the rhiiopocmen's 
men put to death at Compasium, but that it anions ai 
did not rescind any arrangement made. No v^^'^ 
one saying a word for or against this, the subject was allowed 
to pass. 

Next came the ambassadors from Eumenes, who renewed 
the ancestral friendship of the king with the 
Achaeans, and stated to the assembly the offer ^^'^"^ 
made by him. They spoke at great length on 
these subjects, and retired after setting forth the greatness of 
the king's kindness and affection to the nation. 

1 1. After they had finished their speech, ApoUonidas ofSicyon 
rose and said that : "As far as the amount of the 
money was concerned, it was a present worthy ^p^Hon^j^ 
of the Achaeans. But if they looked to the 
intention of the donor, or the purpose to which the gift was to 
be applied, none could well be more insulting and more unconsti- 
tutional. The laws prohibited any one, whether a private 
individual or magistrate, from accepting presents from a king 
on any pretence whatever ; but if they took this money they 


would every one of them be plainly accepting a present, which 
was at once the gravest possible breach of the law, and con- 
fessedly the deepest possible personal disgrace. For that the 
council should lake a great wage from Eumenes, and meet to 
deliberate on the interests of the league after swallowing such a 
bait, was manifestly disgraceful and injurious. It was Eumenes 
that offered money now ; presently it would be Prusias ; 
and then Seleucus. Bat as the interests of democracies and of 
kings are quite opposite to each other, and as our most frequent 
and most important deliberations concern the points of contro- 
versy arising between us and the kings, one of two things must 
necessarily happen ; either the interests of the king will have 
precedence over our own, or we must incur tlie reproach of 
ingratitude for opposing our paymasters." He therefore urged 
the Achaeans not only to decline the offer, but to hold 
Eumenes in detestation for thinking of making it. 

Next rose Cassander of Aegina and reminded the Achaeans 

speech of of " The misfortunes which the Aeginetans had 
Cnssandcr of met With through being members of the Achaean 
Aegina. league ; when Publius Sulpicius sailed against 
them with the Roman fleet, and sold all the unhappy Aeginetans 
into slavery." In regard to this subject I have already related 
how [he Aetolians, having got possession of Aegina in virtue of 
their treaty with Rome, sold it to Attalus for thirty talents. 
Cassander therefore drew the attention of the Achaeans to 
these facts ; and demanded that Eumenes should not seek to 
gain the afTection of the Achaeans by offering them money, but 
that he should establish an incontestable claim to every sign of 
devotion by giving back Aegina, He urged the Achaeans not 
to accept presents which would place them in the position of 
l>eing the destroyers of the hopes of Aeginetan restoration for 
all time. 

After these speeches had been delivered, the people showed 
The preseni of such signs of enthusiastic approval that no one 

Eumcnos is ventured to speak on the side of the king ; but 
refused. ([,g whole assembly rejected the offer by acclama- 
tion, though its amount certainly made it exceedingly tempting. 

12. The next subject introduced for debate was that of 
king Ptolemy. The ambassadors who had been on the mission 


to Ptolemy were called forward, and Lycortas, acting as spokes- 
man, began by stating how they had interchanged piolemy. The 
oaths of alliance with the king; and next an- speech of 
nounced that they brought a present from the Lycortas, 
king to the Achaean league of six thousand stands of arms for 
pelcasts, and two thousand talents in bronze coinage; He 
added a panegyric on the king, and finished his speech by a 
brief reference to the goodwill and active benevolence of the 
king towards the Achaeans. Upon this the Strategus of the 
Achaeans, Aristaenus, stood up and asked a miMake 
Lycortas and his colleagues in the embassy to discovered. 
Ptolemy " which alliance it was that he had thus renewed ? " 

No one answering the question, but all the assembly 
beginning to converse with each other, the Council chambo' 
was filled with confusion. The cause of this absurd state 
of things was this. There had been several treaties of 
alliance formed between the Achaeans and Ptolemy's 
kingdom, as widely different in their provision as in the 
circumstances which gave rise to them -. but neither had 
Ptolemy's envoy made any distinction when arranging for the 
renewal, merely speaking in general terms on the matter, nor had 
the ambassadors sent from Achaia; but they had interchanged 
the oaths on the assumption of there being but one treaty. 
The result was, that, on the Strategus quoting all the treaties, 
and pointing out in detail the differences between them, which 
turned out to be important, the assembly demanded to know 
which it was that it was renewing. And when no one was able 
to explain, not even Philopoemcn himself, who had been in office 
when the renewal was made, nor Lycortas and his colleagues 
who had been on the mission to Alexandria, these men all 
began to be regarded as careless in conducting the business of 
the league ; while Aristaenus acquired great reputation as being 
the only man who knew what he was talking about j and finally, 
the assembly refused to allow the ratification, voting on account 
of this blunder that the business should be postponed. 

Then the ambassadors from Seleucus entered with their 
proposal. The Achaeans, however, voted to Offer of 
renew the friendship with Seleucus, but to Sdcucus. 
decline for the present the gifl of the ships. 


18. Having thus finished their deliberations, the assembly 
broke up and the people separated to their 
^cT^iSs*^ several cities. But subsequently, while the 
(Nemean) games were in course of celebration, 
Quintus Caecilius arrived from Macedonia, on his way back 
from the embassy which he had been conducting to Philip. 
Aristaenus having called a meeting of the league magistrates in 
Argos, Quintus attended and upbraided them for having ex- 
ceeded justice in the harshness and severity with which they had 
treated the Lacedaemonians, and urged them strongly to repair 
the error. Aristaenus said not a word, showing clearly by his 
silence that he disapproved of what had been done and agreed 
with the words of Caecilius. But Diophanes of Megalopolis, 
who was more of a soldier than a statesman, stood up to speak, 
and so far from offering any defence of the Achaeans, suggested 
to Caecilius, from hostility to Philopoemen, another charge that 
might be brought against them. For he said that "the Lacedae- 
monians were not the only people who had been badly treated ; 
the Messenians had been so also." There were as a fact some 
controversies going on among the Messenians, in regard to the 
decree of FJamininus concerning the exiles, and the execu- 
tion of it by Philopoemen : and Caecilius, thinking that he 
now had a party among the Achaeans themselves of the same 
opinion as himself, expressed still greater anger at the hesita- 
tion on the part of the assembled magistrates in obeying his 
orders. However, when Philopoemen, Lycortas, and Archon 
argued long and elaborately to prove that what had been done 
at Sparta was right, and advantageous to the Lacedaemonians 
themselves more than to any one else, and that it was impossible 
to disturb any existing arrangements without violating justice 
to man and piety to the gods, they came to the decision that 
they would maintain them, and give an answer to that 
effect to the Roman legate. Seeing what the disposition of 
the magistrates was, Caecilius demanded that the public 
assembly should be summoned, to which the Achaean magis- 
trates demanded to see the instructions which he had from the 
Senate on these points : and when he gave no answer to this 
demand, they said that they would not summon the assembly 
for him, as their laws forbade them to do so unless a man 


brought written instructions from the Senate, stating the subject 
on which they were to summon it. Caecilius was so angry at 
this uncompromising opposition to his orders, that he refused 
to receive his answer from the magistrates, and so departed 
without any answer at all The Achaeans laid the blame 
both of the former visit of Marcus Fulvius and the present 
one of Caecilius on Aristacnus and Diophanes, on the ground 
that they had invited them on account of their political oppo- 
sition to Fhilopoemen ; and accordingly the general public felt 
a certain suspicion of these two men. Such was the state of 
the Peloponnese. . . . 

14. Fhilopoemen had a sharp difference in debate with 
Archon the Strategus. In course of time, how- 
ever, Fhilopoemen was convinced by Archon's '^ ^^^^ 
arguments, and, changing his mind, spoke in 
warm commendation of Archon as having managed his business 
with skill and address. But when 1 heard the speech at the 
time it did not seem to me right' to praise a man and yet do 
him an injury, nor do I think so now in my maturer years. For 
I think that there is as wide a distinction in point of morality 
between practical ability and success secured by absence of 
scruples, as there is between skill and mere cunning. The former 
are in a manner the highest attainments possible, the latter the 
reverse. But owing to the lack of discernment so general in 
our day, these qualities, which have little in common, excite 
the same amount of commendation and emulation in the 
world. . . ■ 

16. When Caecilius returned from Greece and made his 
report to the Senate concerning Macedonia and 
the Peloponnese, the ambassadors who had f'^™''^-'*"" . 
come to Rome on these matters were inCro- "SiT Achoran" 
duced into the Senate. First came those from heard on the 
Philip and Eumenes, as well as the exiles from !?P*''' °' 
Aenus and Maroneia; and on their saying ^^^ 185-184, 
much the same as they had said before Caecilius 
and his colleagues at Thessalonica, the Senate voted to send 
another deputation to Philip, to see first of all whether he 
had evacuated the cities in Perrhaebia in conformity with the 
answer he gave to Caecilius : and secondly, to order him to 


remove his garrison from Aenus and Maroneia ; and in a word, 
to abandon all fortresses, positions, and towns on the sea-board 
of Thrace. 

After these the ambassadors from the Peloponnese were 

The Achaean introduced. For the Achaeans on their part 

aniiiass.Tdors had sent Apollonidas of Sicyon, and others, to 

make thtir justify thcmselves to Caecilius for his having 

received no answer, and generally to inform the 

Senate on the question of Sparta ; and at the same time Areus 

and Alcibiades had come from Sparta as ambassadors, — two 

of the old exiles recently restored by Philopoemen and the 

Achaeans. And this was a circumstance that particularly roused 

the anger of the Achaeans ; because they thought it the height of 

ingratitude on the part of the exiles, after receiving so important 

and recent a service at their hands, to be now sending a 

hostile embassy, and accusing to the sovereign people those 

who had been the authors of their unlooked-for preservation 

and restoration to their country, 

16. Both parties were heard in their defence in each 

Other's presence. Apollonidas of Sicyon and his colleagues 

tried to convince the Senate that the affairs of 

'^env^f" Sparta could not have been better managed 

than they were managed by Philopoemen. 

Areus and his colleagues attempted to establish the reverse : 

alleging, first of all, that the power of the city was entirely 

destroyed by the violent withdrawal of so large a number ; 

and, in the second place, that even those that were left were 

so few that their position was insecure, now that the walls 

were pulled down ; and that their freedom of speech was 

entirely destroyed by the fact that they were not only amenable 

to the general decrees of the Achaean league, but were also 

made specially subject to the magistrates set over them from 

time to time. After hearing these envoys also, the Senate 

_, . . . decided to give the same legates instructions 
The decision, ,• , „ , , . 

regardmg them as well as the others, and ap- 
pointed Appius Claudius and his colleagues commissioners for 

But the ambassadors from the Achaeans offered an ex- 
planation also to Caecilius in the Senate, on behalf of the 


magistrates, asserting that " They did not act wrongly or deserve 
blame for refusing to summon the assembly, Defence of ihe 
unless it were requisite to decide on an alliance refusal lo call ibe 
or a war, or unless some one brought a letter Achaean assembly, 
from the Senate. The magistrates had therefore impartially 
considered the subject of summoning the assembly, but were 
prevented from doing so by the laws, because he neither 
brought a despatch from the Senate nor would show them any 
written instructions." At the conclusion of this speech 
Caecilius rose and made an attack on Philopoemen and 
Lycortas, and the Achaeans generally, and on the policy they 
had pursued towards the city of Sparta. After listening to 
the arguments, the Senate answered the Achaeans by saying 
that they would send commissioners to investigate the matter 
of Sparta ; and they accompanied this answer by an admoni- 
tion to them to pay attention to the ambassadors sent by them 
from time to time, and show them proper respect, as the 
Romans did to ambassadors who came to them. . . . 

17. \Vhen Philip learnt, by a message from his own 
ambassadors at Rome, that he would be obliged . , 
to evacuate the cities in Thrace, he was ex- on'lhe^^^ 
tremely annoyed, because he regarded his Maronda. early 
kingdom as being now curtailed on every side ; '? ■■'^- '^*- 
and hevenled his wrath upon the unhappy people "^' ''' ^' 
of Maroneia. He sent for Onomastus, his governor in Thrace, 
and communicated with him on the subject And Onomastus 
on his return sent Cassander to Maroneia, who, from long 
residence there, was familiar with the inhabitants, — for Philip's 
practice had long been to place members of his court in these 
cities, and accustom the people to their residence among 
them. Some few days after his arrival, the Thracians having 
been prepared for what they had to do, and having obtained 
entrance to the city by night through the instrumentality of 
Cassander, a great massacre took place, and many of the 
Maronites were killed. Having wreaked this vengeance on 
those who opposed him, and satisfied his own anger, Philip 
waited for the arrival of the Roman legates, persuaded that no 
one would venture for fear of him to denounce his crime. 
But when Appius and his colleagues presently arrived, they 


were promptly informed of what had happened at Maroneia, 
He attempts to ^^^ expostulated in severe terms with Philip for 
evade responsi- it. The king attempted to defend himself by 
bihty for it. asserting that he had nothing to do with this act 
of violence ; but that the Maronites, being divided into two 
hostile parties, one inclined to Eumenes and the other to 
himself, inflicted this misfortune upon themselves. He more- 
over bade them confront him with any one who wished to 
accuse him. He said this from a conviction that no one 
would venture to do so; because they would consider that 
Philip's vengeance upon those w^ho opposed him would be 
near at hand, while assistance from Rome would have a long 
way to come. But when Appius and his colleagues said that 
" they required to hear no defence, for they were well aware of 
what had happened, and who was the cause of it," Philip 
became much confused. 

1 8. They went no further than this in the first interview : but 

The guilty agents during the ncxt day Appius ordered Philip to 

are to be sent send Onomastus and Cassander at once to 

to Rome. Rome, that the Senate might inform itself on 

what had happened. The king was disturbed at this to the 

greatest possible degree, and for some time did not know what 

to say ; but at last he said that he would send Cassander, who 

was the actual author of the business, that the Senate might 

learn the truth from him ; but he tried to get Onomastus 

excused, both in this and subsequent interviews with the 

legates, alleging as a reason that not only had Onomastus not 

been in Maroneia at the time of the massacre, but not even 

in any part of the country in its neighbourhood. His real 

motive, however, was fear lest, if he got to Rome, 

Anoincr crime. !•» i*ii*« ••« 

havmg been engaged with him m many similar 
transactions, he would not only tell the Romans the story of 
Maroneia, but all the others also. Eventually he did get 

Onomastus excused ; and having, after the de- 
^*"lo Romc."''^ parture of the legates, sent off Cassander, he 

sent some agents with him as far as Epirus, 
and there had him poisoned.^ But Appius and his colleagues 

^ Livy (39, 34) more cautiously says : veneno creditur sublatus. Such 
accusations were easily made, and not easily proved or confuted. 


left Philip with their minds fully made up both as to his guilt 
in the matter of Maroneia and his alienation from Rome. 

The king, thus relieved of the presence of the legates, after 
consulting with his friends Apelles and Philocles j^ing Philip medi. 
became clearly conscious that his quarrel with tales a breach 
Rome had now become serious, and that it ""'' Ro^^- 
could no longer be concealed, but was become notorious to 
most people in the world. He was therefore now wholly bent 
on measures of self-defence and retaliation. But as he was as 
yet unprepared for some of the plans which he had in his 
mind, he cast about to hnd some means of putting matters off, 
and gaining time for making his preparations for war. He 

accordingly resolved to send his youngest son ___ . . . 
i> . T. 1 I 1 ■ I 1- Sends bis son 

Demetrius to Rome : partly to make his defence Demetrius ihec^ 
on the charges brought against him, and partly in hopes of 
also to beg pardon for any error which he ^^^'^f^^^^ 
might have committed. He felt certain that 
everything he wished would be obtained from the Senate by 
means of this young prince, because of the extraordinary 
attentions which had been shown him when he was acting as 
a hostage. He no sooner conceived this idea than he set 
about making preparations for sending the prince and those 
of his own friends destined to accompany him on his missioiL 
At the same time he promised the Byzantines to give them 
help : not so much because he cared for them, as from a wish 
under cover of their name to strike terror into the princes of 
the Thracians living beyond the Propontis, as a step towards 
the fulfilment of his main purpose. . . . 

19. In Crete, while Cydas son of Antalces was Cosmus^ 
the Gortynians, who sought in every way to , 

depress the Gnossians, deprived them of a '*™ "^ '" ^ 
portion of their territory called Lycastium, and assigned it 
to the Rhaucii, and another portion called Diatonium to 
the Lyctii. But when about this time Appius and his 
colleagues arrived in the island from Rome, with the 

' For Ihc ten Cosmi of Crete, sec AriBtol, Pol. 3, 10 ; and MUUer's Dorians. 
vol. ii. p. 133 iq. Cydas gives his name to ibc year as Tpbn-dmr/ioi, s«e 
C. I, G. 1583. The same inscription contains the litle KotfjiiimXii. apparenUy 
like i-oXioCxot, as a name for a guardian hero of the city. We have already 
had this latter title 01 that of a chief mai^trale at Locri. See bk. la, cfa. 16. 


view of settling the controversies which existed among 
them, and addressed remonstrances to the cities of Gnossus 
and Gortyn on these points, the Cretans gave in, and 
submitted the settlement of their disputes to Appius. He 
accordingly ordered the restoration of their territory to the 
Gnossians ; and that the Cydoniates should receive back the 
hostages which they had formerly left in the hands of 
Charmion, and should surrender Phalasarna, without taking 
anything out of it As to sharing in the legal jurisdiction of 
the whole island, he left it free lo the several cities to do so 
or not as they pleased, on condition that in the latter case 
they abstained from entering the rest of Crete, they and the 
exiles from Phalasarna who murdered Menochtus and his 
friends, their most illustrious citizens. . . . 

20. ApoUonias, the wife of Atlalus, father of king 
The Queen- Eumenes, was a native of Cyzicus, and a woman 

Dowager, widow who for many reasons deserves to be remem- 
of AitiJus, and bered, and with honour. Her claims upon a 
favourable recollection are that, though bom of 
a private family, she became a queen, and retained that exalted 
rank to the end of her life, not by the use of meretricious fascina- 
tions, but by the virtue and integrity of her conduct in private 
and public life alike.. Above all, she was the mother of four 
sons with whom she kept on terms of the most perfect affection 
and motherly love to the last day of her life. And so Attalus 
and his brother gained a high character, while staying at 
Cyzicus, by showing their mother proper respect and honour. 
For they took each of them one of her hands and led her 
between them on a visit to the temples and on a tour of the 
town, accompanied by their suite. At this sight all who saw 
it received the young princes with very warm marks of approval, 

Hoodotus I ai ^"'^' '^'^""g tl^c story of Cleobis and Biton, 
' compared their conduct with theirs ; and re- 
marked that the affectionate zeal shown by the young princes, 
though perhaps not going so far as theirs, was rendered quite 
as illustrious by the fact of their more exalted position. 
This took place in Cyzicus, after the peace made with king 
Prusias. . . . 

21. Ostiagon the Gaul, king of the Gauls of Asia, en- 


deavourcd to transfer to himself the sovereignty of all the 
Gauls i and he had many qualifications for such a post, both 
natural and acquired. For he was open-handed xhe poiioy of 
and generous, a man of popular manners and Osiiogom in 
ready tact ; and, what was most important in Galana. 
the eyes of the Gauls, he was a man of courage and skill in 

22. Aristonicus was one of the eunuchs of Rolemy, king 
of Egypt, and had been brought up from child- character of 
hood with the king. As he grew up he dis- Arisionkus. See 
played more manly courage and tastes than are "l^™' ^- ?■ 
generally found in an eunuch. For he had a natural predilection 
for a military life, and devoted himself almost exclusively to that 
and all that it involved. He was also skilful in dealing with 
men, and, what is very rare, took lai^e and liberal views, and 
was naturally inclined to bestow favours and kindnesses. . . . 


1. In the 149th Olympiad a greater number of em- 
bassies came to Rome from Greece than were 
^Tr f^rrRo"^' almost ever seen before. For as Philip was 

compelled by treaty to submit disputes with 
his neighbours to arbitration, and as it was known that the 
Romans were willing to receive accusations against Philip, 
Coss. P. Claudius ^nd would secure the safety of those who had 
Puicher, L. Por- controversies with him, all who lived near the 
ciusLicinus, B.a frontier of Macedonia came to Rome, some in 

their private capacity, some from cities, others 
from whole tribes, with complaints against Philip. At the 
same time also came ambassadors from Eumenes, accom- 
panied by his brother Athenaeus, to accuse Philip in regard 
to the Thracian cities and the aid sent to Prusias. Philip's 
son, Demetrius, also came to make answer to all these various 
envoys, accompanied by Apelles and Philocles, who were at 
that time considered the king's first friends. Ambassadors 
also came from Sparta, representatives of each faction of the 

The first summoned to the Senate was Athenaeus, from whom 
B.C. 183, Coss. ^^^ Senate accepted the compliments of fifteen 
M. Claudius thousand gold pieces, and passed a decree highly 
Marceiius Q. extolling Eumenes and his brothers for their 
answer, and exhorting them to continue in the 
same mind. Next the praetors called upon all the accusers 
of Philip, and brought them forward by one embassy at a 
time. But as they were numerous, and their entry occupied 
three days, the Senate became embarrassed as to the settle- 
ment to be made in each case. For from Thessaly there 
were ambassadors from the whole nation, and also from each 


city separately ; so also from the Perrhaebians, Athamanians, 
Epirotes, and lUyrians. And of these some brought cases of 
dispute as to territory, slaves, or cattle ; and some about con- 
tracts or injuries sustained by themselves. Some alleged that 
they could not get their rights in accordance with the treaty, 
because Philip prevented the administration of justice ; while 
others impeached the justice of the decisions given, on the 
ground that Philip had corrupted the arbitrators. And, in 
fact, there was an inextricable confusion and multiplicity of 

2. In such a state of things the Senate felt unable to come 
to a clear decision itself, and did not think it Demetrius in the 
fair that Demetrius should have to answer each Senaie. 
of the several indictments ; for it regarded him ^'T' 39. 47- 
with great favour, and saw at the same time that his extreme 
youth unfitted him to cope with business of such intricacy and 
complexity. Besides, what it desired most was not to hear 
speeches of Demetrius, but to ascertain with certainty the dis- 
position of Philip. Excusing him therefore from pleading 
his cause, the Senate asked the young man and his friends 
whether they were the bearers of any written memoir from 
the king; and upon Demetrius answering that he was, and 
holding out a paper of no great size, the Senate bade him 
give a summary of what the paper contained in answer to 
the accusations alleged. It amounted to this, that on each 
point Philip asserted that he had carried out the injunc- 
tions of the Senate, or, if he had not done so, laid the 
blame upon his accusers ; while to the greater number of his 
declarations he had added the words, "though the commis- 
sioners with Caecihus were unfair to me in this point," or 
again, " though I am unjustly treated in this respect." Such 
being Philip's mind, as expressed in the several clauses of the 
paper, the Senate, alter hearing the ambassadors who were 
come to Rome, comprehended them all under one measure. 
By the mouth of the praetor it offered an honourable and cor- 
dial reception to Demetrius, expressed in ample and emphatic 
language, and answered his speech by saying that " The Senate 
fully believe that on all the points mentioned by Demetrius, or 
read by him from his paper of instructions, full justice was 
VOL. 11 y 


already done or would be done. But, in order that Philip 
might be made aware that the Senate paid this honour to 
Demetrius, ambassadors would be sent to see that everything 
was being done in accordance with the will of the Senate, and 
at the same time to inform the king that he owed this grace 
to his son Demetrius." Such was the arrangement come to 
on this part of the business. 

3. The next to enter the Senate were the ambassadors ol 

Theamb. d ^^"^ Eumenes, who denounced Philip on 

of Eumenes com- account of the assistance sent to Prusias, and 

plain that Philip concerning his actions in Thrace, alleging that 

*^ Th^cr^*^ ^^^'^ ^' ^^^' moment he had not withdrawn his 

garrisons from the cities. But upon Philocles 
showing his wish to offer a defence on these points, as having 
been formerly charged with a mission to Prusias, and being 
now sent to the Senate to represent Philip on this business, 
the Senate, without listening very long to his speech, answered 
that " With regard to Thrace, unless the legates found every- 
thing there settled in accordance with its will, and all the 
cities restored to the entire control of Eumenes, the Senate 
would be unable any longer to allow it to pass, or to submit to 
being continually disobeyed." 

Though the ill-feeling between the Romans and Phihp 
The high honour was becoming serious, a check was put to it for 
paid to Demetrius the time by the presence of Demetrius. And yet 
at Rwne, and its jj^jg young prince's mission to Rome proved 

eventually no slight link in the chain of events 
which led to the final ruin of his house. For the Senate, by 
thus making much of Demetrius, somewhat turned the young 
man's head, and at the same time gravely annoyed Perseus 
and the king, by making them feel that the kindness they 
received from the Romans was not for their own sakes, but 
for that of Demetrius. And T. Quintius Flamininus con- 
tributed not a little to the same result by taking the young 
prince aside and communicating with him in confidence. 
For he flattered him by suggesting that the Romans meant 
before long to invest him with the kingdom ; while he irritated 
Philip and Perseus by sending a letter ordering the king to 
send Demetrius to Rome again, with as many friends of the 


highest character as possible. It was, in fact, by taking ad- 
vantage of these circumstances that Perseus shortly afterwards 
induced his father to consent to the death of Demetrius. 
But I shall relate that event in detail later on. 

4. The next ambassadors called in were the Lacedaemonians. 
Of these there were four distinct factions. -^^ f^ur gpanan 
Lysis and his colleagues represented the old embassies, 
exiles, and their contention was that they ought '■ '-^; ^^l^ 
to have back the possessions from which they Nabis. 
had originally been driven. Areus and AIci- a. Areusand 
biades, on the contrary, contended that they Aleibiades. 
should receive the value of a talent from their original pro- 
perty, and divide the rest among deserving citizens. Serippus 
pleaded that things should be left in exactly the serinDus 
state in which they were when they formerly 
belonged to the Achaean league. Lastly, Chaeron and his 
colleagues represented those who had been 
condemned to death or exile by the votes of ;};^^';°^'^'" 
the Achaean league, and demanded their own 
recall and the . restoration of the constitution. These all 
delivered speeches against the Achaeans in conformity with 
their several objects. The Senate, finding itself unable to 
come to a clear decision on these particular controversies, 
appointed a committee of investigation, consisting of the three 
who had already been on a mission to the Peloponnese on 
these matters, namely Titus Flamininus, Q. Caecilius, and 
Appius Claudius Pulcher.^ After long discussions before 
this committee it was unanimously decided that 
the exiles and the condemned were to be re- '^'jj^^ri.^ "" 
called, and that the city should remain a 
member of the Achaean league. But as to the property, 
whether the exiles were each to select a talent's worth from 
what had been theirs [or to receive it all back], on this point 
they continued to dispute. That they might not, however, 
have to begin the whole controversy afresh [the committee] 
caused the points agreed upon to be reduced to writing, to 

I There is some loss In the leiLl as 10 these n; 
on a Geeek embassjr in aa, 16. See also tb 
notliiilg of thil commillee of Itlc«c 


which all affixed their seals. But the committee, also wishing 

to include the Achaeans in the agreement, called in Xenarchus 
and his colleagues, who were at that time on a mission from 
the Achaeans, to renew their alliance with Rome, and at the 
same time to give an eye to their controversy with the Lace- 
daemonians. These men, being unexpectedly asked whether 
they consented to the terms contained in the written docu- 
ment, were somewhat at a loss what to answer. For they did 
not approve of the restoration of the exiles and the con- 
demned persons, as being contrary to the decree of the league 
and the contents of the tablet on which that decree was en- 
graved ; and yet they approved of the document as a whole, 
because it contained the clause providing that Sparta should 
remain a member of the league. Finally, however, partly 
from this difficulty, and partly from awe of the Roman com- 
missioners, they affixed their seal The Senate, therefore, 
selected Quintus Marcius to go as legate to settle the afiairs 
of Macedonia and the Peloponnese. . . . 

5. When Deinocrates of Messene arrived on a mission at 

Rome, he was delighted to find that Titus 
M^en? " Flamininus had been appointed by the Senate 

to go as ambassador to Frusias and Seleucus. 
For having been very intimate with Titus during the I^cedae- 
monian war, he thought that this friendship, combined with 
his disagreements with PhJIopoemen, would induce him on 
his arrival in Greece to settle the affairs of Messene in accord- 
ance with his own views. He therefore gave up everything 
else to attach himself exclusively to Titus, on whom he rested 
all his hopes. . . . 

This same Deinocrates was a courtier and a soldier by nature 
as well as habit, but he assumed the air of consummate 
statesmanship. His parts, however, were showy rather than 
solid. In war his fertility of resource and boldness were 
beyond the common run ; and he shone in feats of personal 
bravery. Nor were these his only accomplishments ; he was 
attractive and ready in conversation, versatile and courteous 
'in society. But at the same time he was devoted to licentious 
intrigue, and in public affairs and questions of policy was quite 
incapable of sustained attention or far-sighted views, of forti- 


fying himself with well-considered arguments, or putting them 
before the public On this occasion, for instance, though he 
had really given the initiative to grave misfortunes, he did not 
think that he was doing anything of importance ; but followed 
his usual manner of life, quite regardless of the future, indulg- 
ing day after day in amours, wine, and song. Flamininus, 
however, did once force him to catch a glimpse of the serious- 
ness of his position. For seeing him on a certain occasion in 
a party of revellers dancing in Jong robes, he said nothing at 
the time ; but next morning, being visited by him with some 
request in behalf of his country, he said : " I will do my best, 
Deinocrates; but it does astonish me that you can drink and 
dance after having given the start to such serious troubles for 
Greece." He appears, indeed, at that to have a little recovered 
his soberer senses, and to have understood what an improper 
display he had been making of his tastes and habits. However, 
he arrived at this period in Greece in company with Flamin- 
inus, fully persuaded that the affairs of Messene would be 
settled at a blow in accordance with his views. But Philopoe- 
men and his party were fully aware that Flamininus had no 
commission from the Senate in regard to affairs in Greece ; 
they therefore awaited his arrival without taking any step of any 
sort. Having landed at Naupactus, Flamininus addressed a 
despatch to the Strategus and Demiui^i' bidding them summon 
the Achaeans to an assembly ; to which they wrote back that 
"they would do so, if he would write them word what the 
subjects were on which he wished to confer with the Achaeans; 
for the laws enjoined that limitation on the magistrates." As 
Flamininus did not venture to write this, the hopes of Deino- 
crates and the so-called " old exiles," but who had at that time 
been recently banished from Sparta, came to nothing, as in fact 
did the visit of Flamininus and the plans which he had formed. . . . 

' The ten Icderal roagistmles of the league, who fonned a council to act 
with the general. Their number probably arose from the number of the 
Achaean cantons or lowni, after two of the twelve — Helice and Otenus — were 
deslroyed. Polybius nowhere else gives them this lillc in any part of the history 
we possess, but its use by Livy, 33, aa, seems to point to bis having used it in 
other places, li also occurs in a teller of Philip II. (perhaps genuine) tguotcd in 
DcmosUi. di Cor. 157. Polybius calls tbem aUo si Ifixotrtt, ifxdii rpomrirtt 
ffurifixo^m, vvrapjifai. See Freeman's Ftderal Gov. p. aSa. 


6. About the same period some ambassadors were sent by 
the exiled citizens of Sparta to Rome, among whom was 

g^ Arcesilaus and Agesipolis who, when quite a boy, 

had been made king in Sparta. These two 
men were fallen upon and killed by pirates on the high seas ; 
but their colleagues arrived safely at Rome. . . . 

7. On the return of Demetrius from Rome, bringing with 

him the formal reply, in which the Romans re- 
'^?^^?!fl!V^ ferred all the favour and confidence which they 

Demetnus in , , . , .- ^ • • 

Macedonia. His avowed to their regard for Demetrius, saying 
fathers anger and that all they had done or would do was for his 
**'jealousr^ sake, — the Macedonians gave Demetrius a 
cordial reception, believing that they were re- 
lieved from all fear and danger : for they had looked upon 
war with Rome as all but at their doors, owing to the provoca- 
tions given by Philip. But Philip and Perseus were far from 
pleased, and were much offended at the idea of the Romans 
taking no account of them, and referring all their favour to 
Demetrius. Philip however concealed his displeasure; but 
Perseus, who was not only behind his brother in good feelings 
to Rome, but much his inferior in other respects, both in 
natural ability and acquired accomplishments, made no secret 
of his anger : and was beginning to be thoroughly alarmed as 
to his succession to the crown, and lest, in spite of being the 
elder, he should be excluded. Therefore he commenced by 
bribing the friends of Demetrius. . . . 

The end of this fraternal jealousy is described in Liiy^ 40, 
5-24. By a forged letter purporting to come from Flamininus^ 
Philip is persuaded that his son played the traitor at Rome and 
gives an order or a permission for his being put to death ; which 
is accordingly donCy partly by poison and partly by violence^ at 
Heracleia, b.c 181. 

8. Upon Quintus Marcius arriving on his mission in 
Philip feigns sub- Macedonia, Philip evacuated the Greek cities in 
mission to Rome, Thrace entirely and withdrew his garrisons, 

B.C. 183. though in deep anger and heaviness of spirit ; 
and he put on a right footing everything else to which the 
Roman injunctions referred, wishing to give them no indica- 


tion of his estrangement, but to secure time for malting his 
preparations for war. In puisuance of this design he led Out 
an array against the barbarians, and marching through the 
centre of Thrace he invaded the Odrysae, Bessi, and Dentheletl 
Coming to Phihppopolis, the inhabitants flying for safety to 
the heights, he took it without a blow. And thence, after 
traversing the plain, and sacking some of the 
villages, and exacting a pledge of submission 'nebnis 
from others, he returned home, leaving a garri- 
son in Fhilippopolis, which was after a time expelled by the 
Odrysae in defiance of their pledge of fidelity to Philip. . . . 

9. In the second year of this Olympiad, on the arrival of 
ambassadors from Eumenes, Pharnaces, and After mld- 
the Achaean league, and also from the Lace- aummer of b.c 
daemonians who had been banished from '^3- 

Sparta,^ and from those who were in actual possession of it, the 
Senate despatched their business. But there came after them 
a mission from Rhodes in regard to the disaster at Sinope; 
to whom the Senate replied that it would send legates to in- 
vestigate the case of the Sinopeans and their grievances against 
those kings. And Quintus Marcius having recently arrived 
from Greece and made his report on the state of affairs in 
Macedonia and the Peloponnese, the Senate did not require 
to hear much more; but having called in the envoys from 
the Peloponnese and Macedonia they listened indeed to what 
they had to say, but founded its reply, without 
any reference to their speeches, wholly on the ^^bT' ^^' 
report of Marcius, in which he had stated, in 
reference to king Philip, that he had indeed done all that 
was enjoined on him, but with great reluctance ; and that, if he 
got an opportunity, he would go all lengths against the Romans. 
The Senate accordingly composed a reply to the king's envoys 
in which, while praising Philip for what he had done, they 
warned him for the future to be careful not to be found acting 
in opposition to the Romans. As to the Peloponnese, Marcius 
had reported that, as the Achaeans were unwilling to refer any 
matter whatever to the Senate, but were haughtily inclined 


and desirous of managing all their affairs themselves, if the 
Senate would only reject their present application and give 
ever so slight an indication of displeasure, Sparta would 
promptly come to an understanding with Messene ; and then 
the Achaeans would be glad enough to appeal to the protec- 
tion of Rome. In consequence of this report they answered 
the Lacedaemonian Scrippus and his colleagues, wishing to 
leave this city in a state of suspense, that they had done their 
best for them, but that for the present they did not think this 
matter concerned them. But when the Achaeans besought 
for help against the Messenians^ in virtue of their alliance with 
Rome, or at least that they would take precautions to prevent 
any arms or com from being brought from Italy into Messene, 
the Senate refused compliance with either request and 
answered that the Achaeans ought not to be surprised if 
Sparta or Corinth or Argos renounced their league, if they 
would not conduct their hegemony in accordance with the 
Senate's views. This answer the Senate made public, as 
a kind of proclamation that any people who chose might 
break off from the Achaeans for all the Romans cared ; 
and they further retained the ambassadors in Rome, waiting 
to see the issue of the quarrel between the Achaeans and 
Messenians. . . . 

10. In this period a certain dreadful foreshadowing of mis- 
Thc conflict of fortune fell upon king Philip and the whole of 

feelings in Macedonia, of a kind well worthy of close atten- 
Phiiip's mind. ^iQj^ ^^^ record. As though Fortune had 

resolved to exact from him at once the penalties for all the 
impieties and crimes which he had committed in the whole 
course of his life, she now visited him with furies, those deities 
of retribution, those powers that had listened to the prayers of 
the victims of his cruelties, who, haunting him day and night, 
so plagued him to the last day of his life, that all the world was 
forced to acknowledge the truth of the proverb, that "Justice 
has an eye " which mere men should never despise. The first 
idea suggested to him by this evil power was that, as he 

* The Messenians revolted from the league B.C. 183, and in the course of 
the fighting which ensued Philopoemen fell into an ambush, was taken 
prisoner, and put to death by them. See ch. 12. 


was about to go to war with Rome, he had better remove from 
the most important cities, and those along the sea-coast, the 
leading citizens, with theii wives and children, and place them 
in Ennathia, formerly called Paeonia, and 611 up the cities with 
Thracians and other barbarians, as likely to be more securely 
loyal to him in the coming hour of danger. The actual 
carrying out of this measure, and the uprooting of these men 
and their families, caused such an outburst of grief, and so 
violent an outcry, that one might have supposed the whole dis- 
trict to have been taken by the sword Curses and appeals to 
heaven were rained upon the head of the king without any 
further attempt at concealment His next step, prompted by 
the wish to leave no element of hostility or disaffection in the 
kingdom, was to write to the governors of the several cities 
ordering them to search out the sons and daughters of such 
Macedonians as had been put to death by him, and place them 
in ward ; in which he referred especially to %—, 
Admetus, Pyrrhicus, and Samus, and those who 
had perished with them : but he also included all others who- 
soever that had been put to death by order of the king, quoting 
this verse, we are told : — ' 

" Oh fool 1 to slay tbe sire and leave the soni." 
Most of these men being persons of distinguished families, their 
fate made a great noise and excited universal pity. But Fortune 
had a third act in this bloody drama in reserve for Philip, in 
which the young princes plotted against each other; and their 
quarrels being referred to him, he was forced to choose between 
becoming the murderer of his sons and living the rest of his 
life in dread of being murdered by them in his old age; and 
to decide which of the two he had the greater reason to fear. 
Tortured day and night by these anxieties, the miseries and 
perturbations of his spirit lead to the inevitable reflection that 
the wrath of heaven fell upon his old age for the sins of his 
previous life : which will be rendered still more evident by 
what remains to be told . . . Just when his soul was stung 
to madness by these circumstances, the quarrel between his 
sons blazed out : Fortune, as It were of set purpose, bringing 
their misfortunes upon the scene all at one time. . . . 
' Suuiniu^. 


Fragment referring The Macedonians make offerings to Xanthus 

^shamfight^ ^^ ^ ^^^^» ^^'^ perform a purification of the 
which Perseus army with horses fully equipped. . . . 

and Demetrius 


B.C. 182. 

Sec Livy, 40, 6. 

11. "One should not merely read tragedies, tales, and 

histories, but should understand and ponder over 

^Tphliip to^s* ^^^' ^" ^^ ^^ ^^^ ^^^ ^^y ^^^^ ^^^ when- 
two sons after the ever brothers fall out and allow their quarrel to 

quarrel at the go any great length, they invariably end not only 
^wKEuvrM. ^ ^y destroying themselves but in the utter ruin 

of their property, children, and cities ; while 
those who keep their self-love within reasonable bounds, and 
put up with each other's weaknesses, are the preservers of 
these, and live in the fairest reputation and fame. I have 
often directed your attention to the kings in Sparta, telling you 
that they preserved the hegemony in Greece for their country 
just so long as they obeyed the ephors, as though they were 
their parents, and were content to reign jointly. But directly 
they in their folly tried to change the government to a 
monarchy, they caused Sparta to experience every misery 
possible. Finally, I have pointed out to you as an example 
the case of Eumenes and Attalus ; showing you that, though 
they succeeded to but a small and insignificant realm, they 
have raised it to a level with the best, simply by the harmony and 
unity of sentiment, and mutual respect which they maintained 
towards each other. But so far from taking my words to heart, 
you are, as it seems to me, whetting your angry passions against 
each other. ..." 


12. Philopoemen rose^ and proceeded on his way, though he 
Th d th f ^^^ oppressed at once by illness and the weight 
Philopoemen, o^ years, being now in the seventieth year of 

B.C. 183, his age. Conquering his weakness, however, 
orpCThapseariyinj^y ^j^^ f^^ce of his previous habits he reached 

Megalopolis, from Argos, in one day's journey 

^ He was ill with fever. Plutarch, Phil. 18. 


He was captured, when Achaean Strategus, by the Messenians 
and poisoned. Thus, though second to none Phiiopoemen was 
that ever hved before him in excellence, his mutdered by Uie 
fortune was less happy ; yet in his previous life Messenians, who 
he seemed ever to have enjoyed her favour and league and were 
assistance. But it was, I suppose, a case of the at war wiih it. See 
common proverb, "a man may have a stroke of ^"^' 3S' ■ts-so- 
luck, but no man can be lucky always." We must, therefore, 
call our predecessors fortunate, without pretending that they 
were so invariably — for what need is there to flatter Fortune 
by a meaningless and false compliment? It is those who 
have enjoyed Fortune's smiles in their life for the longest 
time, and who, when she changes her mind, meet with only 
moderate mishaps, that we must speak of as fortunate. . . . 

Phiiopoemen was succeeded by Lycortas,^ . . , and though 
he had spent forty years of an active career in charact 
a state at once democratic and composed of phiiopoemen. He 
many various elements, he had entirely avoided 's succeeded by 
giving rise to the jealousy of the citizens in any ^^^ "* 
direction : and yet he had not flattered their 
inclinations, but for the most part had used great freedom of 
speech, which is a case of very rare occurrence. . . . 

IS. An admirable feature in Hannibal's character of 
character, and the strongest proof of his having Hannibal, who 
been a born ruler of men, and having possessed ^,'^" ^^^ ^ 
statesmanlike qualities of an unusual kind, is Pmsias, ».c.i83. 
that, though he was for seventeen years engaged See Livy, 39, i. 
in actual warfare, and though he had to make his way through 
numerous barbaric tribes, and to employ innumerable men of 
diflerent nationalities in what appeared desperate and hazardous 
enterprises, he was never made the object of a conspiracy by 
any of them, nor deserted by any of those who had joined him 
and put themselves under his command. . . . 

14. Publius Scipio, in the course of an active career in 

' Liv7 (39, so) speaks of Lycortas at Ihe time of Philopoemen's dealh ai 
alttr imftralor Achatorum. If he had been Ihe irarrpoTTfyit we know ibat 
he would nol by law have succeeded on (he dcaih of Ihe Stralegiu. Plutarch, 
Pkit. 31, seems to assert that an election was held at once, but not ihe 
ordinary popular election. 


an aristocratic state, secured such popularity with the multi- 
character of p. tude and such credit with the Senate, that when 
Cornelius Scipio some one took upon himself to bring him to 

^^^TpoiX^^ ^"^^ ^^^^'^ ^^ people in the manner usual at 

places in this year, Rome, and produced many bitter accusations 

but according to against him, he came forward and said nothing 

^Sriftorhe*"^"^ ^^^^ "^^ ill-became the Roman people to 
previous year Hsten to accusations against P. Cornelius 
(39. 52-) Scipio, to whom his accusers owed it that they 
had the power of speech at all." At this the populace dis- 
persed, and quitting the assembly, left the accuser alone. . . . 
Once when there was a sum of money required in the Senate 
for some pressing business, and the quaestor, on the ground 
of a legal difficulty, refused to open the treasury on that par- 
ticular day, Scipio said that '^ he would take the keys himself and 
open it ; for he was the cause of the treasury being locked at alL" 
And again, when some one in the Senate demanded an account 
of the money which he had received from Antiochus before the 
treaty for the pay of his army, he said that he had the ledger, 
but that he ought not to be called to account by any one. But 
on his questioner persisting, and urging him to produce it, he 
bade his brother bring it When the schedule was brought, he 
held it out in front of him, and tearing it to pieces in the sight 
of everybody bade the man who asked for it seek it out of these 
fragments, and he demanded of the rest "How they could ask 
for the items of the expenditure of these three thousand talents, 
and yet no longer ask for an account of how and by whose 
agency the fifteen thousand talents which they received from 
Antiochus came into the treasury, nor how it is that they have 
become masters of Asia, Libya, and Iberia?" This speech 
not only made a strong impression on the rest, but also reduced 
the man who demanded the account to silence. 

These anecdotes have been related by me for the double 
purpose of enhancing the fame of the departed, and of en- 
couraging future generations in the paths of honour. . . . 

16. For my part, I never concur with those who indulge 
their anger against men of their own blood to the length of 
not only depriving them of the year's harvest when at war with 
them, but even of cutting down their trees and destroying 


their buildings, and of leaving them no opportunity for repent- 
ance. Such proceedings seem to me to be rank folly. For, 
while they imagine that they are dismaying the enemy by the 
devastation of their territory, and the deprivation of their future 
as well as their present means of getting the necessaries of life, 
they are all the while exasperating the men, and converting an 
isolated ebullition of anger into a lasting hatred. . . . 

IS. Lycortas the Achaean Strategus crushed the spirits of 
the Messenians in the war. Up to this time Lyeortas, ihe 
the populace at Messene had been afraid of successor of 
their magistrates ; but now at length, relying on Ptiilopocmen, 

,, ° . ' ,, ° ' ' °_ compels He Mes- 

tne protection of the enemy, some of them seniani to sue 
plucked up courage to break silence and to say foi peace, 
that the time was come to send an embassy "■'^ iSj-iSa. 
to negotiate a peace. Deinocrates and his colleagues, being 
no longer able to face the people under this storm of popular 
odium, yielded to circumstances and retired to their own houses. 
Thereupon the people, acting under the advice of the older 
men, and especially under that of Epaenetus and Apollodorus, 
the ambassadors from Boeotia, — who, having arrived some 
time before to negotiate a peace, happened fortunately to be at 
that time at Messene, — appointed and despatched envoys, 
beting forgiveness for their transgressions. The Achaean 
Strategus, having summoned his colleagues ' to council, and 
given the envoys a hearing, answered that "There was but 
one way in which the Messenians could reconcile themselves to 
the league, and that was by at once surrendering to him the 
authors of the revolt and of the murder of Philopoemen, leave 
the rest to the authority of the league assembly, and at once 
receive a garrison into their citadel" When this message was 
announced to the Messenian populace, those who had long 
been bitterly opposed to the authors of the war were ready 
enough to surrender them and to arrest them ; while the rest, 
being persuaded that they would not be severely dealt with by 
the Achaeans, readily consented to submit the general question 
to the decision of the assembly. But what chiefly induced 
them to unanimously accept the proposal was, that they in 
fact had no choice in the matter. The Strategus accordingly 
> That is the 'ten Demiiirgl. 


at once took over the citadel and marched his peltasts into it ; 
and then, taking some picked troops with him, entered the city ; 
and having summoned a meeting of the people, addressed them 
in terms befitting the occasion, promising that '^ they would 
never have reason to repent having committed themselves 
to the honour of the Achaeans." The general question ot 
what was to be done he thus referred to the league, — for it 
happened conveniently that the Achaeans were just then re- 
assembling at Megalopolis for the second Congress,^ — but ot 
o „ ^ o those who were guilty of the disturbances, he 

Summer B.C. 182. , , „ , 1, • !• . J • 

ordered all such as were actually impucated in 
the summary execution of Philopoemen to put an end to their 
own lives. . . . 

17. The Messenians were reduced by their own folly to 
Abia, Thuria, and ^^ brink of ruin, but were restored to their 
Pharae make a former position in the league by the magna- 
separate league, nimity of Lycortas and the Achaeans. But the 
towns of Abia, Thuria, and Pharae during these transactions 
abandoned their connection with Messene, and, setting up a pillar 
engraved with a treaty of alliance between themselves, formed 
a separate league. When the Romans were informed that 
the Messenian war had turned out successfully for the Achaeans, 
without taking any account of their previous declaration they 
gave a different answer to the same ambassadors, asserting 
that they had taken measures to prevent any one from convey- 
ing arms or corn from Italy into Messene. By this they 
showed clearly that, so far from avoiding or disregarding the 
affairs of foreign nations not directly concerning themselves, 
they were, on the contrary, annoyed at everything not being 
referred to them and carried out in accordance with their 

When the ambassadors arrived in Sparta with their answer, 

the Achaean Strategus as soon as he had settled 
Achaean mcetmg ^^ Messenian business, summoned a congress 

at Sicyon, and on its assembling, proposed a 
resolution for the reception of Sparta into the league, alleging 

* The second congress of the year seems to mean not that held for election 
of the Strategus for the next year, which met about 12th May, but the second 
regular meeting in August. 


that "The Romans had declined the arbitration which had 
previously been offered to them in regard to this city, — for 
they had answered that they had now no concern with any 
of the affairs of Sparta. Those, however, at present in power 
at Sparta were desirous of being admitted to the privileges 
of the league. Therefore he advised that they should 
admit the town ; for this would be advantageous in two 
ways : first, because they would be thus admitting men who 
had remained unshaken in their loyalty to the league ; and 
secondly, because they would not be admitting those of the 
old exiles, who had behaved with ingratitude and impiety 
towards them, to any share of their privileges ; but by confirming 
the measures of those who had excluded them, would at the 
same time be showing, with God's help, due gratitude to the 
latter." With these words Lycortas exhorted the Achaeans to 
receive the city of Sparta into the league. But Diophanes 
and some others attempted to put in a word for the exiles, and 
urged the Achaeans " Not to join in pressing heavily upon these 
banished men; and not to t>e influenced by a mere handful of 
men to strengthen the hands of those who had impiously and 
lawlessly expelled them from their country." 

18, Such were the arguments employed on either side. 
The Achaeans, after listening to both, decided 
to admit the city, and accordingly the agreement ^^1^^'^. 
was engraved on a tablet, and Sparta became 
a member of the Achaean league : the existing citizens having 
agreed to admit such of the old exiles as were not considered 
to have acted in a hostile spirit against the Achaeans. After 
confirming this arrangement the Achaeans sent Bippus of 
Argos and others as ambassadors to Rome, to explain to the 
Senate what had been done in the matter. The Lacedae- 
monians also sent Chaeron and others ; while the exiles too 
sent a mission led by Oetis Diactorius^ to oppose the Achaean 
ambassadors in the Senate. 

' This looks like a local name, bul no place is known coiresponding [0 it. 
A Diaclorida of Sparta is mentioned in Herodotus, 6, 137 ; and perhaps, as 
Hultscb suggests, we ought lo read ' ' CIctii and Diaclorius. " 


1. The ambassadors from the Spartan exiles and from the 
. Achaeans arrived in Rome simultaneously 

Rome from the ^^^^ those of Eumenes, king Ariarathes, and 
Achaeans, the Pharnaces ; and the Senate attended to these 
Spartan exiles, latter first A short time previously a report 
^^^"^arathS" ^ad been made to the Senate by Marcus,^ who 
king of Cappado- had been despatched on a mission respecting 
cia, and Pharnaces, ^^g ^^r that had broken out between Eumenes 
*°B.c. 182.^"*' ^"^ Pharnaces, speaking highly of the modera- 
tion of Eumenes in every particular, and the 
grasping temper and insolence of Pharnaces. The Senate 
accordingly did not require any lengthened arguments ; but, 
after listening to the ambassadors, answered that they would 
once more send legates to examine more minutely into the 
points in dispute between the kings. Then came in the am- 
bassadors from the Lacedaemonian exiles, and with them the 
ambassadors from the citizens actually in the city ; and after 
giving them a long hearing, the Senate expressed no dis- 
approval of what had been done, but promised the exiles to 
write to the Achaeans on the subject of their restoration to 
their country. Some days afterwards, Bippus of Argos and his 
colleagues, sent by the Achaeans, entered the Senate with a 
statement as to the restoration of order in Messene ; and the 
Senate, without showing displeasure at any part of the arrange- 
ment, gave the ambassadors a cordial reception. . . . 

* The mission to Eumenes and Pharnaces has been already mentioned in 
bk. 23, ch. 9, but the name of the ambassador was not given ; nor is it men- 
tioned by Livy (40, 20), who records the mission. It is uncertain who is 
meant by Marcus, some editors have altered it to Marcius, i,e, Q. Marcius 
Philippus, who had been sent to Macedonia, imagining him to have fulfilled 
both missions. 


Z When the ambassadors of the Spartan exiles arrived ia 
the Peloponnese from Rome with a letter from xemis granted 
the Senate to the Achaeans, desiring that mea- w the 
sures should be taken for their recall and restora- Messeniana 
tion to their country, the Achaeans resolved to postpone the 
consideration of the question until their own ambassadors 
should return. After making this answer, they caused the 
agreement between themselves and the Messenians to be 
engraved on a tablet : granting them, among other favours, a 
three years' remission of taxes, in order that the damage done 
to their territory should fall upon the Achaeans equally with 
the Messenians. But when Bippus and his f],, requtst of 
colleagues arrived from Rome, and reported that ihe Spanan 
the letter in regard to the exiles was not due to '="'1** ^^o'^- 
any strong feeling on the part of the Senate, but to the 
importunity of the exiles themselves, the Achaeans voted to 
make no change . . . 

3. Mount Haemus is close to the Pontus, the most extensive 
and loftiest of the ranges in Thrace, which it ^ Hacmns. 
divides Into two nearly equal parts, from which Livy, 46, ai. 

a view of both seas may be obtained. . , .' 

4, In Crete there was the beginning of great troubles set 
in motion, if one should speak of " a beginning creie in 

of troubles " in Crete : for owing to the per- b.g 18a. See 
sistency of civil wars and the acts of savagery **■ '^' '^'^ '* 
practised against each other, beginning and end are much the 
same in Crete ; and what appears to some people to be an 
incredible story is a spectacle of everyday occurrence 
there. . . . 

6. Having come to terras with each other, Phamaces, 
Attains, and the rest returned home. While End of the war 
this was going on, Eumenes had recovered'*"***?^'™™'' 
from his illness, and was staying at Pergamus ; ^^^^ ^^ fofmer 
and when his brother arrived to announce the had undertaken 
arrangements that had been made, he approved '° support his 
of what had been done, and resolved to send Ariaraibts. See 

^ From Slrabo {vlL 5, 13}, vrhoadds : " But this is not (nie, for the distance 
from the Adriatic is iinroense, and there are many obalades in the way to 
otMCore the view." 


Livy, 38, 39, his brothers to Rome : partly because he hoped 
B.C. 182-181. ^Q py^ ^^ g^^ ^Q ^YiQ war with Phamaces by 

means of their mission, and partly because he wished to intro> 
duce his brothers to his own private friends at Rome, and 
officially to the Senate. Attalus and his brother were eager 
for this tour ; and when they arrived in Rome the young men 
met with a cordial reception from everybody in private society, 
owing to the intimacies which they had formed during the 
Roman wars in Asia, and a still more honourable welcome 
from the Senate, which made liberal provision for their enter- 
tainment and maintenance, and treated them with marked 
respect in such conferences as it had with them. Thus, 
when the young men came formally before the Senate, and, 
after speaking at considerable length of the renewal of their 
ancient ties of friendship with Rome and inveighing against 
Pharnaces, begged the Senate to adopt some active measures 
to inflict on him the punishment he deserved, the Senate gave 
them a favourable hearing, and promised in reply to send 
legates to use every possible means of putting an end to 
the war. . . . 

6. About the same time king Ptolemy, wishing to make 

Ptolemy friends with the Achaean league, sent an am- 

Epiphancs sends bassador to them with an offer of a fleet of ten 

a present to pentccontcrs fully equipped ; and the Achaeans, 

^^ Lycort^r^* ^^linking the present worthy of their thanks, for 

Poiybius, and the cost could not be much less than ten talents, 

Aratus sent to gladly accepted the ofler. Having come to this 

"^^^ RXJ.^^i!^' resolution, they selected Lycortas, Poiybius, and 

Aratus, son of Aratus of Sicyon, to go on a 

mission to the king, partly to thank him for the arms which 

. he had sent on a former occasion, and partly to 

* * receive the ships and make arrangements for 

bringing them across. They appointed Lycortas, because, as 

Strategus at the time that Ptolemy renewed the alliance, he 

had worked energetically on the king's side; and Poiybius, 

though below the legal age for acting as ambassador,^ because 

his father has been ambassador at the renewal of the alliance 

^ Perhaps thirty, which^ seems to have been the legal age for admission to 
political functions. See 29, 34. 


with Ptolemy, and had brought the present of arms and of 
money to the Achaeans; and Aratus, similarly, ptolemy 
on account of his former intercourse with the Epiphanes 
king. However, this mission never went after poisoned in 
all, as Ptolemy died just at this time. ... ..11. 

7. There was at this time in Sparta a man named Chaeron, 
who in the previous year had been on an chaeron's 
embassy to Rome, a man of ready wit and great malversations 
ability in affairs, but still young, in a humble at Sparta, 
position of life, and without the advantages of a liberal educa- 
tion. By flattering the mob, and starting questions which no 
one else had the assurance to move, he soon acquired a certain 
notoriety with the people. The first use he made of his power 
was to confiscate the land granted by the tyrants to the sisters, 
wives, mothers, and children of the exiles, and to distribute it 
on his own authority among the poor without any fixed rule or 
regard to equality. He next squandered the revenue, using the 
public money as though it were his own, without the authority 
of law, public decree, or magistrate. Annoyed at these pro- 
ceedings, certain men managed to get themselves appointed 
auditors of the treasury in accordance with the laws. Seeing 
this, and conscious of his mal-administration of the government, 
Chaeron sent some men to attack Apollonides, 

the most illustrious of the auditors, and the most AroUooito^ 
able to expose his embezzlements, who stabbed 
him to death in broad daylight as he was coming from the 
bath. Upon this being reported to the Achaeans, and the 
people expressing great indignation at what had been done, 
the Strategus at once started for Sparta ; and when he arrived 
there he brought Chaeron to trial for the murder of Apollonides, 
and having condemned him, threw him into prison; He then 
incited the remaining auditors to make a real investigation into 
the public funds, and to see that the relations of the exiles got 
back the property of which Chaeron had shortly before deprived 
them. . . . 

8. In Asia king Phamaces, once more treating the refer- 
ence to Rome with contempt, sent Leocritus in 

the course of the winter with ten thousand men ^^igT-i^So!*^ 
to ravage Galatia, while he himself at the begin- 


ning of spring collected his forces and invaded Cappadocia. 

When Eumenes heard of it, he was much enraged 

'"^^""fso^ "*^ ^^ Pharnaces thus breaking through the terms 

of the agreement to which he was pledged, but 

was compelled to retaliate by acting in the same way. When 

he had already collected his forces, Attalus and 
^cTp^<^U!" ^^s brother landed from their voyage from Rome, 

and the three brothers, after meeting and inter- 
changing views, marched out at once with the army. But on 
reaching Galatia they found Leocritus no longer there ; and 

when Carsignatus and Gaesotorius, who had 

^ chicfs^^^" before embraced the cause of Pharnaces, sent 

them a message desiring that their lives might 

be spared, and promising that they would do anything that 

might be required of them, they refused the request on the 

ground of the treachery of which they had been guilty, and 

advanced with their full force against Pharnaces; 

Gaiaiia (?). ^^d having performed the distance from Cal- 

Pamassus, a pitus to the river Halys in five days, they 

town on the reached Parnassus in six more, and being there 

joined by Ariarathes, the king of the Cappa- 

docians, with his own army, they entered the territory of the 

Mocissians. Just as they had pitched their 
of^'c Halys ^"^P» ^^ws Came that the ambassadors from 
Rome had arrived to effect a pacification. 
When he heard this, Eumenes sent his brother Attalus to 
receive them ; while he devoted himself to doubling the number 
of his troops, and improving them to the utmost : partly with a 
view to prepare them for actual service, and partly to impress 
the Romans with the behef that he was able to defend himself 
against Pharnaces, and beat him in war. 

9, When the Roman legates arrived and urged the putting 

The Roman ^^ ^nd to the war, Eumenes and Ariarathes 

legates arrive professed to be ready to obey ; but begged the 

and undertake Romans to bring them, if possible, to an inter- 

o nego a e. ^^.^^ ^.^j^ Phamaces, that they might see fully 

from what was said in their own presence how faithless and cruel 

a man Pharnaces was ; and, if this proved to be impossible, 

to take a fair and impartial view of the controversy and 


decide it themselves. The legates replied that they would 
do everything that was in their power and was consistent 
with honour; but they required the kings to remove their 
army from the country : for it was inconsistent that, when 
they were there with proposals for a peace, operations of war 
should be going on and mutual acts of hostility be committed. 
Eumenes and his ally yielded to this representation, and imme- 
diately marched off in the direction of Galatia, The Roman 
legates then visited Pharnaces, and first demanded that he 
should meet Eumenes and Ariarathes in a conference, as thai 
would be the surest way of settling the affair ; but when he 
expressed repugnance to that measure, and absolutely refused 
to do so, the Romans at once perceived that he plainly thought 
himself in the wrong, and distrusted his own cause ; but, being 
anxious in any and every way to put an end to the war, they con- 
tinued to press him until he consented to send plenipotentiaries 
to the coast, to conclude a peace on such terms as the legates 
might command. When these plenipotentiaries, 
the Roman legates, and Eumenes and Aria- * "fafi^""" 
rathes met, the latter showed themselves ready 
to consent to any proposal for the sake of concluding a peace. 
But the envoys of Pharnaces disputed every point, and did 
not hold even to what they, had once accepted, but con- 
tinually brought forward some fresh demand, and altered their 
mind again and again. The Roman legates, therefore, quickly 
came to the conclusion that they were wasting their labour, as 
Pharnaces could not be induced to consent to the pacification. 
The conference accordingly having come to nothing, and the 
Roman legates having left Pergamum, and the envoys of 
Pharnaces having gone home, the war went on, 
Eumenes and his allies proceeding in their eneairedhi" 
preparations for it Meanwhile, however, the putiing down a 
Rhodians earnestly requested Eumenes to help "sing ot ihe 
them ; and he accordingly set out in great haste ^J'^'ja^'ch^ 
to carry on a war against the Lycians. . . . 

10. This year the Achaean Strategus Hyperbat us brought 
before the assembly the question of the letter 
from Rome as to the recall of the Lacedae- De^,,'n ^,e 
monian exiles. Lycortas and his party recom- Achaean assembij' 


on the Roman mended that no change should be made, on 
despatch. ^^ ground that " The Romans had only acted 
as they were bound to do in listening to the petition of men 
who, on the face of it, were deprived of their rights, so ^ as 
that petition seemed reasonable ; but when they were con- 
vinced that of a petition some points were impossible, and 
others such as to inflict great disgrace and damage upon their 
friends, it had never been their custom to insist upon them 
peremptorily, or force their adoption. So in this case also, if 
it were shown to them that the Achaeans by obeying their 
letter would be breaking their oaths, their laws, and the pro- 
visions engraved on the tablets, the very bonds of our league, 
they will retract their orders, and will admit that we are right 
to hesitate and to ask to be excused from carrying out its in- 
junctions." Such was the speech of Lycortas. But H3rper- 
batus and Callicrates advised submission to the letter, and 
that they should hold its authority superior to law or tablet or 
anything else. Such being the division of opinion, the 
Achaeans voted to send ambassadors to the Senate, to put 
before it the points contained in the speech of Lycortas. 
Callicrates of Leontium, Lydiades of Megalopolis, and Aratus 
of Sicyon were forthwith nominated for this mission, and were 
despatched with instructions to this effect. But on their 
arrival at Rome Callicrates went before the Senate, and, so far 
from addressing it in accordance with his instructions, he on 
the contrary entered upon an elaborate denunciation of his 
political opponents ; and, not contented with that, he under- 
took to rebuke the Senate itself. 

11. For he said tliat "The Romans were themselves re- 

^ „. sponsible for the Greeks neglecting their letters 

Calhcratcs. in- , , • ^ j r i. • ^i. -r" 

stead of obeying ^^^ Orders mstead of obeymg them. For m 

his instructions, all the democratic states of the day there were 

denounces his ^^q parties,^-one recommending obedience to 

%^uadS'the ^^^ Roman rescripts, and holding neither law 

Senate that their nor tablet nor anything else to be superior to the 

interference is ^ju Qf Rome ; the Other always quoting oaths and 

necessary. tablets, and exhorting the people to be careful 

about breaking them. Now the latter policy was by far the 

most popular in Achaia, and the most influential with the 


multitude; consequently the Romanisers were discredited and 
denounced among the populace — their opponents glorified. 
If then the Senate would give some sign of their interest in 
the matter, the leaders, in the first place, would quickly change 
to the Romanising party, and, in the next place, would be 
followed by the populace from fear. But if this were neglected 
by the Senate, the tendency towards the latter of the two 
parties would be universal, as the more creditable and honour- 
able in the eyes of the populace. Thus it came about that at 
that very time certain statesmen, without any other claims what- 
ever, had obtained the highest offices in their own cities, merely 
from coming forward to speak against the rescripts of the 
Senate, with the view of maintaining the validity of the laws 
and decrees made in the country. If then the Senate was 
indifferent about having their rescripts obeyed by the Greeks, by 
all means let it go on as it is now doing. £ut if the Senate 
wished that its orders should be carried out, and its rescripts 
be despised by no one, it must give serious attention to that 
subject. If it did not do so, he knew only too well that the 
exact opposite of the Senate's wishes would come about, as 
in fact had already been the case. For but lately, in the 
Messenian disturbance, though Quintus Marcius had taken 
many precautions to prevent the Achaeans adopting any 
measures with regard to the Messenians without the consent of 
the Romans, they bad disobeyed that order ; had voted the war 
on their own authority; bad not only wasted the whole country 
in defiance of justice, but had in some cases driven its noblest 
citizens into exile, and in others put them to death with every 
extremity of torture, though they had surrendered, and were 
guilty of no crime but that of appealing to Rome on the points 
in dispute. Again, too, though the Senate had repeatedly 
written to order the restoration of the Lacedaemonian exiles, 
the Achaeans were so far from obeying, that they had actually 
set up an engraved tablet, and made a sworn agreement with the 
men actually in possession of the city that these exiles should 
never return. With these instances before their eyes, the 
Romans should take measures of precaution for the future." 

12. After delivering a speech in these words, or to this 
effect, Callicrates left the Senate-house. He was followed by 


the envoys of the exiles, who retired after delivering a short 
address, stating their case, and containing some of the ordinary 

appeals to pity. The Senate was persuaded that 
The Romans j^ ^ y^^^ CalHcrates had said touched the 

adopt the pobcy . ^ _ , , . .1 

of raising a party interests of Rome, and that it was incumbent 
in Greece against upon it to exalt those who supported its own 
^^^loi^^e*^'* decrees, and to humble those who resisted them. 
It was with this conviction, therefore, and at this 
time that it first adopted the policy of depressing those who in 
their several states took the patriotic and honourable side, and 
promoting those who were for appealing to its authority on 
every occasion, right or wrong. The result of which was that 
gradually, as time went on, the Senate had abundance of flatterers, 
but a great scarcity of genuine friends. How^ever, on this 
occasion the Senate did not write about the restoration of the 
exiles to the Achaeans only, but also to the Aetolians, Epirotes, 
Athenians, Boeotians, and Acamanians, calling them all as it 
were to witness, in order to break down the power of the 
Achaeans. Moreover, they added to their answer, without say- 
ing a word to his colleagues, a remark confined entirely to Calli- 
crates himself, that " everybody in the various states should be 
as Callicrates." This man accordingly arrived in Greece with 
his answer, in a great state of exultation, little thinking that 
he had become the initiator of great miseries to all the Greeks, 
but especially to the Achaeans. This nation had still at that 
time the privilege of dealing on something like equal terms with 
Rome, because it had kept faith with her from the time that it 
had elected to maintain the Roman cause, in the hour of her 
greatest danger — I mean during the wars \s'ith Philip and 
Antiochus. . . . The league, too, had made progress in material 
strength and in every direction from the period from which my 
history commences ; but the audacious proceeding of Callicrates 
proved the beginning of a change for the worse. . . . 

The Romans having the feelings of men, with a noble 
spirit and generous principles, commiserate all who have met 
with misfortunes, and show favour to all who fly to them for 
protection ; but directly any one claims anything as of right, 
on the ground of having been faithful to their alliance, they 
at once draw in and correct their error to the best of their 

B.C i3o-i79- 


ability. Thus then Callicrates, who had been sent to Rome to 
plead for the rights of the Achaeans, acted in exactly the 
opposite spirit ; and dragging in the subject of the Messenian 
war, on which the Romans themselves had made no com- 
plaint, returned to Achaia to overawe the people with the 
threat of the hostility of Rome. Having therefore by his official 
report frightened and dismayed the spirits of the populace, 
who were of course ignorant of what he had really said in the 
Senate, he was first of all elected Strategus, and, 
to make matters worse, proved to be open to 
bribery; and then, having got the office, carried out the 
restoration of the Lacedaemonian and Messenian exiles,' . , . 

IS. Philopoemen and Aristaenus, the Achaeans, were un- 
like both in character and policy. Philopoemen „ 

, , , . , 1 ■ . I , T Comparison be- 

was formed by nature in body and mmd for the tween ihe char- 
life of a soldier, Aristaenus for a statesman and aders of Philo. 
debater. In politics they differed in this, that Poemen and 
whereas during the penods of the wars with 
Philip and Antiochus, Roman influence had become supreme 
in Greece, Aristaenus directed his policy with the idea of 
carrying out with alacrity every order from Rome, and some- 
times even of anticipating it Still he endeavoured to keep 
up the appearance of abiding by the laws, and did, in fact, 
maintain the reputation of doing so, only giving way when any 
one of them proved to plainly militate against the rescripts 
from Rome. But Philopoemen accepted, and loyally per- 
formed, alt Roman orders which were in harmony with the 
laws and the terms of their alliance ; but when such orders 
exceeded these limits, he could not make up his mind to yield 
a wilting obedience, but was wont first to demand an arbitra- 
tion, and to repeat the demand a second time; and if this 
proved unavailing, to give in at length under protest, and so 
finally carry out the order. . . . 

14. Aristaenus used to defendhispolicy before the Achaeans 
by some such arguments as these: "It wasimpos-TT,^ ^j^^ of Ans- 
sible to maintain the Roman friendship by hold- taenus on the 
ing out the spear and the herald's staff together. '*?^'g"^ 
If we have the resolution to withstand them face 
> See Hidu'a Gnei Imcriplians, p. 330. 


to face, and can do so, well and good. But if Philopoemen 
himself does not venture to assert this,^ . . . why should we 
lose what is possible in striving for the impossible? There 
are but two marks that every policy must aim at — honour and 
expediency. Those to whom honour is a possible attainment 
should stick to that, if they have political wisdom ; those to 
whom it is not must take refuge in expediency. To miss 
both is the surest proof of unwisdom : and the men to do 
that are clearly those who, while ostensibly consenting to obey 
orders, carry them out with reluctance and hesitation. There- 
fore we must either show that we are strong enough to refuse 
obedience, or, if we dare not venture even to suggest that, we 
must give a ready submission to orders." 

16. Philopoemen, however, said that "People should not 

Phiiopoemen's suppose him SO Stupid as not to be able to 
answer in defence estimate the difference between the Achaean 

of his policy, r^^^ Roman states, or the superiority of the 
power of the latter. But as it is the inevitable tendency of 
the stronger to oppress the weaker, can it be expedient to assist 
the designs of the superior power, and to put no obstacle in 
their way, so as to experience as soon as possible the utmost 
of their tyranny ? Is it not, on the contrary, better to resist 
and struggle to the utmost of our power? . . . And if they 
persist in forcing their * injunctions upon us,^ . . . and if, by 
reminding them of the facts we do something to soften their 
resolution, we shall at any rate mitigate the harshness of their 
rule to a certain extent; especially as up to this time the 
Romans, as you yourself say, Aristaenus, have always made a 
great point of fidelity to oaths, treaties, and promises to allies. 
But if we at once condemn the justice of our own cause, and, 
like captives of the spear, offer an unquestioning submission 
to every order, what will be the difference between the 
Achaeans and the Sicilians or Capuans, who have been notori- 
ously slaves this long time past ? Therefore it must either be 
admitted that the justice of a cause has no weight with the 
Romans, or, if we do not venture to say that, we must stand 
by our rights, and not abandon our own cause, especially as 
our position in regard to Rome is exceedingly strong and 

^ Something is lost from the text. 


honourable. That the time will come when the Greeks will 
be forced to give unlimited obedience, I know full well. But 
would one wish to see this time as soon or as late as possible ? 
Surely as late as possible ! In this, then, my policy differs 
from that of Aristaenus. He wishes to see the inevitable 
arrive as quickly as possible, and even to help it to come : I 
wish to the best of my power to resist and ward it off" 

From these speeches it was made clear that while the 
policy of the one was honourable, of the other undignified, both 
were founded on considerations of safety. Wherefore while 
both Romans and Greeks were at that time threatened with 
serious dangers from Philip and Antiochus, yet both these 
statesmen maintained the rights of the Achaeans in regard to 
the Romans undiminished ; though a repott found its way 
about that Aristaenus was better affected to the Romans than 
Philopoemen. . . . 


1. Tiberius Gracchus destroyed three hundred cities of the 

Celtiberes.^ . . . 

Q^* Mviusf lT* 2* ^^^ attack upon him being sudden and 

Maniius. formidable, Pharnaces was reduced to submit 

The ex-praetors to almost any terms ; and on his sending an 

SSrit embassy. Eumenes and Ariarathes immediately 

Postumius were accepted his proposals, and sent ambassadors 

still in Spain, to Pharnaces in return. When this had been 

beerTsinccBc repeated several times, the pacification was 

182. Livy, 40, 1, concluded on the following terms : " Eumenes, 

44- Prusias, and Ariarathes, shall maintain perpetual 

''e'::^^^:' peace with Pharnaces and Mithridates. 

Ariarathes upon " Phamaces shall not enter Galatia on any 

Pharnaces. See pretence. 

bk. 24. chs. 8, 9. « g^^j^ treaties as exist between Pharnaces 

and Gauls are hereby rescinded. 

"Phamaces shall likewise evacuate Paphlagonia, after re- 
storing the inhabitants whom he had previously expelled, with 
their shields, javelins, and other equipment 

" Pharnaces shall restore to Ariarathes all territory of which 
he has deprived him, with the property thereon and the hos- 

" He shall restore Tium by the Pontus, which some time 
<^ Ki, », before was given freely and Hberally by Eumenes 

to Prusias. 

" Pharnaces shall restore, without ransom, all prisoners of 
war and all deserters. 

^ From Strabo 3, ch. 4, who quotes Poseidonias as criticising this state- 
ment by remaridiig that Poljrbitii must count every tower as a city. 


" He shall repay to Morzius and Ariarathes, in lieu of all 
money and treasure taken from them, the sum of nine hun- 
dred talents, and shall add thereto three hundred talents for 
Eumenes towards the expenses of the war. 

" Mithridates, the Satrap of Armenia, shall also pay three 
hundred talents, because he attacked Ariarathes in defiance of 
the treaty with Eumenes, 

"The persons included under this treaty are, of the princes 
in Asia, Artaxias, lord of the greater part of Armenia, and 
Acusilochus ; of those in Europe, Gatalus the Sarmatian : of 
the autonomous peoples, the Heracleotes, the Mesembrians in 
the Chersonese, and the Cyzicenes;" 

The number and quality of hostages to be given by 
Phamaces was also specified. The armies of the several 
parties then marched away, and thus was concluded the war 
of Eumenes and Ariarathes against Phamaces. 

Philip V. died at AmphipoUs towards the end of B.C. 179. 
His last days were embittered by remorse for the death of his son 
Demetrius, whose innocence had been demonstrated to him. He 
wished to leave his crown to Antigonus, Ih^ son of Echecrates and 
nephew of Antigonus Doson, in order to punish his elder son 
Perseus for his treachery in securing his brother's death. But 
Philip died suddenly before this could be secured, and Perseus 
succeeded him without opposition. See Livy, 40, 55-57. 

3. Having renewed the alliance with Rome, Perseus im- 
mediately began intriguing in Greece. He TheopeninRof 
invited back into Macedonia absconding debtors, tho reign of 
condemned exiles, and those who had been Peraeua. 
compelled to leave their country on charges of treason. He 
caused notices to be put up to that effect at Delos, Delphi, 
and the temple of Athena at Iton,^ offering not only indemnity 

' The notices are put up al Ihe three places visited yearly by gieat numbera, 
and by many leparale pilgrims. It is inleresling 10 nclice the persistence in 
a custom common from the earliest times, at any latc as far as Delos and 
Delphi are concerned. Iton was in Thess.ily, and the temple and oracle of 
AtbetiA tbere was celebrated throughout Greece, und was the central place of 
wonhip for the Tbessalians. The (own stood tn a rich plain on the river 
Coarius, and hence its name — sometimes urillen Silon — was connected by 
■ome with viTi^opof, " coni-t>earing" {Steph. Byz.) Homer calls it /tiTr/pa 
fd^ittr, " motber of sheep." Pynhus hung up in this temple tbe spoils of 


to all who returned, but also the restoration of the property 
lost by their exile. Such also as still remained in Macedonia 
he released from their debts to the Royal exchequer, and set 
free those who had been confined in fortresses upon charges of 
treason. By these measures he raised expectations in the 
minds of many, and was considered to be holding out great 
hopes to all the Greeks. Nor were other parts of his life 
and habits wanting in a certain ro)ral magnificence. His 
outward appearance was striking, and he was well endowed 
with all the physical advantages requisite for a statesman. His 
look and mien were alike dignified and such as became his 
age. He had moreover avoided his father's weakness for wine 
and women, and not only drank moderately at dinner himself, 
but was imitated in this respect by his intimates and friends. 
Such was the commencement of the reign of Perseus. . . . 

When king Philip had become powerful and had obtained 
supremacy over the Greeks, he showed the most 

misfortune" "'*^'" disregard of faith and principle ; but when 

the breeze of fortune again set against him, his 

moderation was as conspicuous in its turn. But after his final 

and complete defeat, he tried by every possible expedient to 

consolidate the strength of his kingdom. 

4. After despatching the consuls Tiberius and Claudius 
B,c. 177. Coss. against the Istri and Agrii,^ the Senate towards 

C. Claudius the end of summer transacted business with 

Sempronius ^^ ambassadors that had come from the 

Gracchus. Lycians. They had not arrived at Rome until 

the Lycians had been completely conquered, 

L^dTS^s'T but they had been despatched a considerable 

Rhodes. See bk. time before. For the people of Xanthus in 

24, ch. 9. Lycia, when about to embark upon the war, had 
sent Nicostratus and others to Achaia and Rome as ambassa- 
dors : who coming to Rome at that time moved many of the 
Senators to pity them, by laying before them the oppressiveness 
of the Rhodians and their own danger; and at length induced the 

Antigonus and his Gallic soldiers about B.C. 273. [Pausan. i, 13, 2]. 
' ' Itonian Athena " had temples in other parts of Greece also, e,g. in Boeotia 
[Paus. 91, 34, \\ 

^ The war in Istria, and the mutiny of the troops against the consul 
Manlius, are described in Livy, 41, 8-1 1. 


Senate to send envoys to Rhodes to declare that "On inspecting 
the record of the arrangements made by the ten commissioners 
in Asia, when settling the dominions of Antiochus, it appeared 
that the Lycians had been given to the Rhodians, not as a 
gift, but rather as friends and allies." But many were still dis- 
satisfied with this solution of the matter. For the Romans 
seemed to wish, by thus pitting Rhodes against Lycia, to exhaust 
the accumulations and treasures of the Rhodians, because they 
had heard of the recent conveyance of the bride of Perseus by 
the Rhodians, and of their grand naval review. For shortly 
before this the Rhodians had been holding, with great splen- 
dour and elaboration of equipment, a review of all vessels be- 
longing to them ; the fact being that a vast quantity of timber 
for ship-building had been presented to them by Perseus. More- 
over he had presented a gold tiara to each Laodice, dai^hiei 
of the rowers on the upper bench in the ship of Sdeueus IV. 
that had brought him his bride Laodice.' . . . ^''T' *'■ "■ 

6. When the envoys from Rome reached Rhodes and 
announced the decrees of the Senate, there was 
a great excitement in the island, and much con- ^''""^■"'"' *' 
- ° , ,. . , , ,. ,. • . Rhodes; and a 

fused discussion among the leadmg politicians, fresh deietmina- 
They were much annoyed at the allegation that ■ion "f te 
the Lycians had not been given them as a gift ^fndewnde^^r' 
but as allies ; for having just satisfied themselves 
that the Lycian war was successfully concluded, they saw the 
commencement of fresh trouble for themselves growing up. 
For no sooner had the Romans artived and made this 
announcement to the Rhodians, than the Lycians began a 
fresh revolt, and showed a determination of fighting to the last 
extremity for autonomy and freedom. However, after hearing 
the Roman envoys, the Rhodians made up their minds that the 
Romans had been deceived by the Lycians, and forthwith 
appointed Lycophron to lead an embassy to offer an explana- 
tion to the Senate. And the state of affairs was such that 
there was momentary expectation of a fresh rising of the 
Lycians. . . . 

' Besides tbii connexion with Sdeueus of Syria, sure to be oflen^ve 10 
Rome, Peneiu gave 1 sister to Prusbs, another enemy of Rome and Eumenes. 
Li»y. 4a, in. 



Rhcxlian question 

6. When the Rhodian envoys arrived in Rome the Senate^ 
after listening to their address, deferred its 
answer. Meanwhile the Daidanian envoys 
came with reports as to the number of the 
Bastamae, the size of their men, and their courage in the field. 

lliey gave information also of the treacherous 
practices of Perseus and the Gauls, and said 
that they were more afraid of him than ci the 
Bastamae, and therefore begged the help of the 
Romans. The report of the Dardani being 
supported by that of the Thessalian envoys who arrived at that 
time, and who also begged for help, the Senators determined 
to send some commissioners to see with their own eyes the 
truth of these reports; and they accordingly at once appointed 
and despatched Aulus Postumius, accompanied by some 
young men. . . 

Reports of the 
intrigues of 
P<Tseus. See 
Livy, 41, 19, 
B.C. 176-175. 


Selbucus Philopator, whom we last heard of as king of Syria, was 
assassioiited by one of his nobles — Ueliodorus— in the twelfth year of his 
reign. Anliochua his younger brother bad been a hostage at Kome, and 
being, according to agreement, exchanged in b,c. 175 for Philopalor's son 
Demetrius, he was reluming to Syria. At Athens, on his journey home, he 
beard of the death of Seleucus, and the allempt of Hcliodorus to usurp the 
kingdom. By the help of Eumenes Heliodorus was expelled and Aniiochus 
installed, to the satisfaction of the people, who gave him at first the surname 
of Epiphanes. He is the Antiochus Epiphanes whose cruelties are recorded 
in the books of the Maccabees. He died mad at Tabae in Persia, B.C. 164. 
Hee 31, II. For the following entracl preserved by Athenaeus, sec the 
translation of Livy, 4 1, 19. 

1. Antiochus EpIphanes, nicknamed from his actions 
Epitnanes (the Madman), would sometimes Antiochus 
steal from the court, avoiding his attendants, Epiphanes, b.c. 
and appear roaming wildly about in any '75->64. 
chance part of the city with one or two companions. His 
favourite place to be found was the shops of the silver- 
smiths or goldsmiths, chatting and discussing questions of art 
with the workers in relief and other artists ; at another time he 
would join groups of the people of the town and converse with 
any one he came across, and would drink with foreign visitors 
of the humblest description. Whenever he found any young 
men carousing together he would come to the place without 
giving notice, with fife and band, like a rout of revellers, and 
oflen by his unexpected appearance cause the guests to rise and 
run away. He would often also lay aside his royal robes, and, 
putting on a tebenna,^ go round the market-place as though 
a candidate for office, shaking hands and embracing various 

' This word, ot unknown origin, seems to be used here for the (ogn, or 
lome dreu equivalent to i(. See ro, 4, 

VOL. II 3 A 


people whom he intreated to vote for him, sometime as aedile, 
and sometimes as tribune. And when he got the office and 
took his seat on an ivory cunile chair, after the fashion of the 
Romans, he heard law cases which came on in the agora, and 
decided them with the utmost seriousness and attention. This 
conduct was very embarrassing to respectable people, some of 
whom regarded him as a good natured easy-going man, and others 
as a madman. In regard to making presents, too, his behaviour 
was on a par with this. Some he presented with dice made 
of gazelle horn, some with dates, others with gold There 
were even instances of his making unexpected presents to 
men whom he met casually, and whom he had never seen 
before. In regard to public sacrifices and the honours paid to 
the gods, he surpassed all his predecessors on the throne ; as 
witness the Olympieium at Athens and the statues placed 
round the altar at Delos. He used also to bathe in the 
public baths, when they were full of the townspeople, p>ots of 
the most expensive unguents being brought in for him ; and on 
one occasion on some one saying, " Lucky fellows you kings, 
to use such things and smell so sweet ! '' without saying a 
word to the man, he waited till he was bathing the next day, 
and then coming into the bath caused a pot of the largest 
size and of the most costly kind of unguent called stact} to be 
poured over his head, so that there was a general rush of the 
bathers to roll themselves in it ; and when they all tumbled 
down, the king himself among them, from its stickiness, there 
was loud laughter. . . . 


TTie foenis of the yean B.C. 174, 173, 172, tiihifh gradually led up ta 
the vtar vrilh Perseut, to be described in the taienty-ieveitth bosk, viere briery 
tAeie :~~ 

Id B.C. 174 Perseus Toiced the Dolopes, who had appealed against him 
to Rome, (o submit Id his authority. ATler Ihls successful expedllion he 
inarched through Central and Northern Greece, visiting Delphi, where he 
stayed three days, Phlhiolid Achaia, and Thessaly, He carefully aU- 
slained from inRicling any dam^e in the districts through which he 
passed, and tried to gain the conRdcnce of the various slates. In the 
same year he made friendly advances to the Achaeans, who had forbidden 
any Lacedaemaniac ID enter their leriitoiy, by oifering to restore their 
fugitive staves. But in spite of the exertions of Xenarchus the Strategus, 
the Achaeans refuse to make any change (Livy, 41, 12-24), 

The same year saw also commotions in Aelolia, which were settled by 
five Rotnan commissioners : and in Crete, on the old score of the status 
of the Lycians. Q, Mbucius was sent to settle this also (Livy, 41, 2$). 

In B.C. 173 Petseus entered on still more active intrigues in Greece, 
and in spite of the wildest scandals that were afloat as to his tyranny, he 
gained a powerful hold in Aetolia, Thessaly, and Perrhaebia. The Senate 
accordingly sent Marcellus to Aetolia and Achaia, and App. Claudius to 
Thessaly, to inquire into the facts ; and a commission of five into Mace- 
donia, with directions to proceed afterwards lo Alexandria (Livy, 42, 5, 6). 

In B.C. 173 king Eumenes visited Rome and urged the Senate to lake 
nteasures in time to counteract the attempts of Perseus ; warning them thai 
he had already obtained strong hold upon (he Boeotians and Actolians, 
and had an inexhaustible recruiting ground in Thrace. That everywhere 
he had secured the death or exile of the pailisana of Rome, and was over- 
running in arms Thessaly and Penhoebia (Livy, 42, 11-13). 

The Senate, already inclined to listen to these represenlalions, was 
still more inclined to do so by the defiant tone of Ilarpatus, the repre- 
sentative of king Perseus ; by the attempted assassination of Eumenes by 

port from Greece from C, Valerius confirming the speech of Eumenes ; and 
lastly by the confession of one L. Rammius of Brundisium, that he had been 
leqneiled to poison certain Roman envoys who were accustomed to slay 
at bis house on their journeys 10 and from Macedonia and Greece (Livy, 
4a. li-17J. 


War was now determined on for the next year, and the praetor ordered 
to enroll troops. And Eumenes also, now recovered from the wounds of 
the assassins, made preparations to join in the struggle (Livy, 42, 18-27). 

In B.C. 171, fresh legions having been enrolled, and an army of sixteen 
thousand infantry and eight hundred cavalry ordered to Macedonia, envoys 
appeared from Perseus demanding the reason. The Senate would not allow 
them to enter the Pomoerium, but received them in the temple of Bellona : 
and after listening to a report from Sp. Ca\iUus that Perseus had, among 
other acts of hostility, taken cities inThessaly and entered Perrhaebia in arms, 
the Senate answered the Macedonian envoys that any complaint they had to 
make must be made to the consul, P. Licinius, who would presently be in 
Macedonia, but that they must not come into Italy again (Livy, 42, 36). 

A few da}'s afterwards five commissioners were sent into Greece, who 
distributed the districts to be visited among themselves : Servius and 
Publius Lentulus and Lucius Dccimius were to go to Cephallenia, the 
Peloponncse, and the west coast generally ; Q. Marcius and Aulus Atilius 
to Epirus, Aetolia, Thessaly, and thence to Boeotia and Euboea, where they 
were to meet the Lentuli. Meanwhile a letter from Perseus, demanding the 
cause of their coming and of the presence of troops in Macedonia, was re- 
ceived and left unanswered. Aflcr visiting the districts assigned to them, 
in the course of doing which Marcius and Atilius had met Perseus on the 
river Peneus, and granted him a truce to enable him to send envoys to 
Rome (Marcius knowing well that the Romans were not yet fully prepared 
for war^), the commissioners reached their destination at Chalcis, where the 
earlier events narrated in the following extracts occurred (Livy, 42, 36-43). 


1. At this time Lases and Callias arrived at the head of 

B.C. 171. Coss. ^^ embassy from the Thespians, and Ismenias* 

p. Licinius Crassus from Neon. Lases and his colleagues offered 

c. Cassius ^Q pm jjjgjj. ^.jjy wholly into the hands of the 

ngmus. Romans ; Ismenias proposed to submit all the 

^ Marcius on his reliuii to Rome gloried in having thus deceived the king 
and gained time for preparations at Rome, but his action was repudiated by 
the Senate. Livy, 42, 47. 

* Ismenias had just been elected Strategus of Boeotia ; but the parly who 
had supported a rival candidate had in revenge obtained a decree of the 
league banishing the Boeotarchs from all the Boeotian cities. They had, 
however been received at Thcspiae, whence they were recalled to Thebes and 
reinstated by a reaction in popular feeling. Then they obtained another decree 
banisliing the twelve men who, though not in office, had convened the league 
assembly ; and Ismenias as Strategus sentenced them to the loss of all rights 
in their absence. These are the "exiles" here meant (Livy, 43, 43). Who 
Neon was is not certain ; but we find in the next chapter that he liad been 
a leader in the Macedonising party at Thebes, i)erhaps a son of Brachylles, 
whose father's name was Neon (sec 20, 5). He was captured in B.c. 167 
and put to death by the Romans (Livy, 45, 31). 


cities of fioeotia as one nation to the discretion of the commis- 
sioners. But this latter proposal was diametri- 
cally opposed to the policy of Marcius and his ^l^i^^^^ ^^ 
colleagues. What suited that policy best was chaicis : am- 
to split up Boeotia into separate cities ; and bassadors from 
they therefore received Loses and his party, as NmrTo^^ieod 
well as the envoys from Chaeronea and Lebadea, 
and all who came from single cities, with great favour and bvish 
courtesyj but treated Ismenias with ostentatious neglect and 
coldness. Some of the exiles^ also attacked Ismenias and were 
very near stoning him to death, and would have done so if he 
had not saved himself by taking refuge through the door* of the 
chamber where the commissioners were sitting. At the same 
period there were disturbances and party con- xhebes, 
tests at Thebes. One party were for commit- 
ting the town unconditionally to Rome ; but the Coroneans 
and Haliartians flocked to Thebes and vehemently maintained 
that they ought to m^ntain the alliance with Perseus. For a 
time neither of the two parties showed any disposition to give 
in to each other ; but when Olympichus of Coronea set the 
example of changing sides and asserting that they ought to 
cleave to the Romans, a great change and revolution came 
over the feelings of the populace. First, they compelled 
Dicetas to go on an embassy to Marcius and the other com- 
missioners to excuse them for their alliance with Perseus. Next, 
they expelled Neon and Hippias, crowding to their houses, and 
bidding them go and make their own defence for the terms that 
they had made ; for they were the men who had negotiated the 
alliance. When these men had left the town, the people imme- 
diately collected into the assembly and lirst voted honours and 
gifts to the Romans, and then ordered the magistrates to push 
on the alliance. Last of all they appointed ambassadors to 
hand over the city to the Romans and to restore their exiles. 

' See note 3, page 356. 

* t4 JHflnpo, Livy (41, 44) says in tribunal legalorum, and Cas-mbon con- 
tents himseir wilh the same word. Schweighacuser Imnslalcs Afodium. as 
if a "raised plaifomi ■' on which the commissioncra sat was meant. I think 
it ii used in the natural sense of a " door" leading into the hall in which ihey 
wereiltting. and into which Ismenias fled for refuge. Liiy used frijunii/ ftom 
the ideu <i his >£c as to the constraction of such a liuilding. 


2. Whilst these things were being accomplished at Thebes, 
The cause of die '^^ exiles in Chalcis appointed Pompides to 
exiles' iriumph state their grievances against Ismenias, Neon, 

at Chalcis. g^^j Djcetas. The bad policy of these men 
being manifest, and the Romans lending their support to the 
exiles, Hippias and his party were rendered so odious that 
thejr were in danger of falling victims to the fury of the popu- 
lace, until the Romans, by checking the assaults of the roob, 
secured them a certain degree of safely. 

When the Theban envoys arrived, bringing with them to 
Dissoiuiion of ^^ Commissioners the decrees and honours I 

the Bocoiian have mentioned, a rapid change passed over 
league, B.C. 171. ^^ f^^g ^f things in each of the towns, for 
they were separated by a very narrow interval from each other. 
The commissioners with Marcius received the Theban en- 
voys, complimented their town and counselled them to restore 
the exiles, and bade the several towns send embassies to Rome 
submitting themselves individually and unreservedly to the 
protection of the Romans, Their policy, therefore, of splitting 
up the league of the Boeotian towns, and of destroying the 
popularity of the Macedonian royal house with the Boeotian 
populace having thus completely succeeded, the commissioners 
sent for Servius Lcntulus from Argos, and leaving him in 
charge at Chalcis went themselves to the Peloponnese ; while 
Neon a few days afterwards retired to Macedonia ; and 
Ismenias and Dicetas, being thrown at once into prison, 
shortly afterwards put an end to their lives. Thus it came 
about that the Boeotians, who had for a long period of 
years, and through many strange vicissitudes, maintained a 
national league, by now rashly and inconsiderately adopting 
the cause of Perseus, and giving way to an outburst of un- 
reasoning excitement, were entirely disintegrated and split up 
into separate cities 

When Aulus and Marcius arrived at Argos, after communi- 
Tho Comniis- catioti "ith the council of the Achaean league, 

sioncrs in the they called upon Archon the Strategus to de- 

Pcloponnese. jpatch a thousand men to Chalcis, to garrison 
the town until the arrival of the Romans ; an order which 
Archon readily obeyed. Having thus settled affairs in Greece 


during the winter, and met Publius Lentulus and his two 
colleagues, the commissioners sailed back to Rome. . . . 

S. Meanwhile Tiberius Claudius and Aulas PosCumius 
had been engaged on a visitation of the islands ^1,^ Rhoditms 
and Greek cities in Asia, and had spent the prepare lo 
lon(;cst time in Rhodes : though the Rhodians co-operate 
. S. . .■ j-j . ■ ■ ■ r wi"i Rome, 

at that time did not require any supervision, for 

the prytanis that year was Agesilochus, a man of high rank, 
who had once been on an embassy to Rome, Even before 
the legates came, as soon as it became clear that the Romans 
intended to go to war with Perseus he had urged his people 
to throw in their fortunes with those of Rome ; and, among 
other things, had counselled them to repair forty ships, in order 
that, if any occasion for using them should arise, it should not 
find them still in the midst of preparations, but ready to 
answer to the call and to carry out their resolve at once. By 
stating these fects to the Roman envoys, and showing them 
the preparations visibly progressing, he let them return to 
Rome in a high state of satisfaction with Rhodes. . . . 

4. After the conferences had been held between the Roman 
envoys and the Greeks, Perseus drew up a Pereeus sends a 
despatch containing a statement of his case, and circular despatch 
the arguments employed on either side ; partly '" J?"* Gm-k 
from an idea that he would thus be shown to ^ 

have the superiority of right on his side, and partly because he 
wished to test the feelings of the several states. Copies of 
this despatch he sent to the other slates by his 
ordinary letter-carriers ; but to Rhodes he sent ^R^^'fa^"" 
also Antenor and Philip as ambassadors, who, on 
their arrival in the island, handed over the document to the 
magistrates, and a few days afterwards entered the Council 
chamber and urged the Rhodians "To remain neutral for the 
present andwatch what happened; and, if the Romans attacked 
Perseus in violation of the treaty, to endeavour to mediate. 
For this was the interest of all, and pre-eminently of the 
Rhodians, who more than most peoples desired equality and 
freedom of speech, and were ever the protectors, not only of 
their own liberty, but of that of the rest of Greece also ; and 
therefore ought to be proportionally careful to provide and 


guard against a policy of an opposite tendency." These and 
similar arguments of the envoys found favour with the Rhodian 
people. But, as they were already pledged to an attitude of 
friendship to Rome, the influence of the upper classes so far 
prevailed that, though a friendly reception was given to the 
Macedonian envoys, they demanded in their formal answer 
that Perseus should not ask them to take any measure which 
would involve the appearance of hostility to Rome. Antenor 
and his colleagues would not accept this reply, but with thanks 
for the kindness of their general reception, sailed back to 
Macedonia. . . . 

6. Being informed that some of the cities of Boeotia re- 
mained faithful to him, Perseus sent Alexander 
^^^^^^^^^"'on a mission to them. On his arrival in 

Boeotia, Alexander was obliged to abstain from 

visiting any of the cities except Coronea, Thisbae,^ and 

Haliartus, finding that they offered him no facilities for securing 

close relations. But he entered those three towns and exhorted 

their inhabitants to cling to their loyalty to the Macedonians. 

They received his words with enthusiasm, and voted to send 

ambassadors to Macedonia. Alexander accordingly returned 

to the king and reported the state of things in Boeotia. A 

short time afterwards the ambassadors arrived, desiring the 

king to send aid to the cities which favoured the Macedonian 

cause ; for the Thebans were oppressing them severely, because 

Truce made with ^^1 would not agree with them and side with 

Q. Marcius. Rome. But Perseus replied that he was pre- 

See Li\7, 42, 43, ^^luded by the truce from sending any aid to any 

' ■ '^ * one; but he begged them to resist the Thebans 

to the best of their power, and yet not to go to war with the 

Romans, but to remain neutral. . . . 

6. When the report of the commissioners from Asia con- 
War is decided cerning Rhodes and the other states had been 
uponatthecxpira-made at Rome, the Senate called in theambas- 
tion of the truce, sadors of Perseus, Solon and^Hippias : who en- 
deavoured to argue the whole case and to deprecate the anger 

^ The text has GjJ^ay, which is inconsistent with what follows as to the 
Thebans. An inscription found on the site of Thisbae supplies the correction 
of an error as old as Livy (42, 46, 47). See Hicks's, G, /. p. 330. 


of the Senate ; and particularly to defend their master on the 
subject of the attempt upon the life of Eumenes. When 

they had finished all they had to ui^e, '^^S^"^*^' Atiemniedassassi- 
which had all the while been resolved on war, nation of Eumenes 
bade them depart forthwith from Rome ; and ai Delphi. 
ordered all other Macedonians also that hap- ^'^J'^^ija*' 
pened to be staying in the country to quit Italy 
within thirty days. The Senate then called upon the Consuls 
to act at once and see that they moved in good time, . . . 
7. Caius Lucretius ' being at anchor off Cephallenia, wiote 

a letter to the Rhodians, requesting them to„,. . .„. ._ 
, , , . , J . . Politics at Rhodes, 

despatch some ships, and entrusted the letter 
to a certain trainer named Socrates. This letter arrived at 
Rhodes in the second six months of the Prytany of Stratocles. 
When the question came on for discussion, 
Agathagetus, Rhodophon, Astymedes, and ""* ^^""'^"^ 
many others were for sending the ships and 
taking part in the war from the first, without 
any further pretence ; but Deinon and Polyaratus, "^^ ".^°"'"" 
though really displeased at the favour already 
shown to Rome, now for the present used the case of Eumenes 
as their pretext, and began by that means to alienate the feelings 
of the populace. There had in fact been a long standing feeling 
of suspicion and dislike in the minds of the Rhodians against 
Eumenes, dating from the time of his war with Fharnaces; when, 
Upon king Eumenes blockading the entrance 
of the Hellespont to prevent ships sailing into ^^^^^ 
the Pontus, the Rhodians had interfered with 
his design and thwarted him. This ill-feeling had again been 
recently exasperated during the Lycian war on the question of 
certain forts, and a strip of territory on the frontier of the 
Rhodian Peraea, which was being damaged by some of 
Eumenes's subjects. These incidents taken together made 
the Rhodians ready to listen to anything against the king. 
Seizing on this pretext, the patty of Deinon tried to dis- 
credit the despatch, asserting that it did not come from the 

I Gains Lucretius had seen naval service as duumvir navalis on the coast 
of Ligoria in B.C. 181. Livy, 40, a6. He was now (B.C. 171) Praelor, his 
fmriiuia tieiDg the fleet, and commanded 40 quin<)uerenics. id, 43. 48. 


Romans but from Eumenes, who wished to involve them 
on any possible pretext in- a war, and bring expense and 
perfectly unnecessary suffering upon the people. In support 
of their contention they put forward the fact that the man who 
brought the letter was some obscure trainer or another ; and 
asserted that the Romans were not accustomed to employ such 
messengers, but were rather inclined to act with unnecessary 
care and dignity in the despatch of such missives. When 
they said this they were perfectly aware that the letter had 
really been written by Lucretius : their object was to persuade 
the Rhodian people to do nothing for the Romans readily, but 
rather to perpetually make difficulties, and thus give occasions 
for offence and displeasure to crop up betw^een the two nations. 
For their deliberate purpose was to alienate Rhodes from the 
Roman friendship, and to join it to that of Perseus, by every 
means in their power. Their motives for thus clinging to 
Perseus were that Polyaratus, who was ostentatious and vain, 
had become heavily in debt; and that Deinon, who was 
avaricious and unscrupulous, had from the first relied on 
increasing his wealth by getting presents from princes and 
kings. These speeches having been delivered, the Prytanis 
Stratocles rose, and, after inveighing at some length against 
Perseus, and speaking with equal warmth in praise of the 
Romans, induced the people to confirm the decree for the 
despatch of the ships. Forthwith six quadriremes were pre- 
pared, five of which were sent to Chalcis under the command 
of Timagoras, and the other under the command of another 
Timagoras to Tenedos. This latter commander fell in at 
Tenedos with Diophanes, who had been despatched by 
Perseus to Antiochus, and captured both him and his crew. 
All such allies as arrived with offers of help by sea Lucretius 
thanked warmly, but excused from taking part in this service, 
observing that the Romans had no need of naval support. . . . 

Perseus now collected a large army at Citium^ thirty -nine 
thousand foot and four thousand horse ^ and advanced through the 
north of Thessaly taking many towns ^ and finally taking up 
his quarters at Sicyrium^ at the foot of Mount Ossa, The Roman 
consul^ P, Liciniusy marched from the south-west through Gomphiy 


and thence to Larisa, where he crossed the river Peneus, After 
some cavalry skirmishes, which u-ere generally favourable to the 
king, Perseus advanced nearer to the Roman camp, and a more 
important battle was fought, in which the king again scored a con- 
siderable success with his cavalry and light-armed troops. The 
Romans lost two hundred cavalry killed and as many prisoners 
and tivo thousand infantry, while Perseus only had twenty cavalry 
and forty infantry killed. He did not, however, follow up the 
victory sufficiently to inflict a crushing blo^v upon tlie Roman 
army ; and though the Consul withdrew to the south of the Pencus, 
after some days' reflection the king made proposals of peace. See 
Lhy, 42, 51-62. B.C 171 {summer). 

8. After the Macedonian victory Perseus summoned 

his Council, when some of his friends ex- ... . 

, ' . . , , , , After bealing Ihe 

pressed an Opinion that he ought to send ^n Roman cavaiiy on 
embassy to the Roman general, to signify his the Peneus, and 
readiness even now to pay the Romans the obligmg Licimus 

r. ■!_ > L' r .i_ L J ,- 1 W rclira south of 

same amount of tribute as his father had forraerly ^he river, Perseus 
undertaken to pay when beaten in war, and to endeavours to 
evacuate the same places. "For if," they argued, ""^' tmns. 
" the Romans accept the terms the war will be ended in a 
manner honourable to the king after his victory in the field ; 
and the Romans, after this taste of Macedonian valour, will be 
much more careful in the future not to impose an unjust or 
harsh burden upon the Macedonians. And if, on the other 
hand, in spite of the past, they prove obstinate and refuse to 
accept them, the anger of heaven will with justice fall on them ; 
while* the king by his moderation will gain the support of 
Gods and men alike." The majority of his friends held this 
view, and Perseus expressing his assent to il, Pantauchus, son 
of Balacrus, and Midon of fieroea, were forthwith sent as 
ambassadors to Ltcinius. On their arrival, 
Licinius summoned his Council, and the ambas- i^,ora™c "^ 
sadors having stated their proposals in accord- 
ance with their instructions, Pantauchus and his colleague 
were requested to withdraw, and they deliberated on the pro- 
position thus made to them. They decided unanimously to 
return as stern an answer as possible. For this is a peculiarity 


of the Romans, which they have inherited from their ancestors, 
and are continually displaying, — to show themselves most 
peremptory and imperious in the presence of defeat, and most 
moderate when successful : a very noble peculiarity, as ever)' 
one will acknowledge ; but whether it be feasible under certain 
circumstances may be doubted. However that may be, on the 
present occasion they made answer that Perseus must submit 
without reserve himself, and give the Senate full power to take 
whatever measures it might think good concerning Macedonia 
and all in it On this being communicated to Pantauchus and 
Midon, they returned and informed Perseus and his friends ; 
some of whom were roused to anger at this astonishing display 
of haughtiness, and advised Perseus to send no more embassies 
or messages about anything whatever. Perseus, however, 
was not the man to take such a line. He sent again and 
again to Licinius, with continually enhanced offers, and promising 
a larger and larger sum of money. But as nothing that he 
could do had any effect, and as his friends found fault with 
him, and told him that, though he had won a victory, he was 

acting like one who had been defeated and lost 

^^Tc^Tum™'^''^"' ^^ w^ ^^ ^^'^g*^ compelled to renounce the 

sending of embassies, and remove his camp back 
to Sicyrium. Such was the position of the campaign. . . . 

9. When the report of the favourable result for Perseus of 

The effect of the ^he cavalry engagement, and of the victory of 

success of Per- the Macedonians, spread through Greece, the 

seus upon the inclination of the populace to the cause of 

Perseus blazed out like a fire, most of them 

having up to that time concealed their real feelings. Their 

conduct, to ray mind, was like what one sees at gymnastic 

contests. When some obscure and far inferior combatant 

descends into the arena with a famous champion reputed to 

be invincible, the spectators immediately bestow their favour 

upon the weaker of the two, and try to keep up his spirits by 

applause, and eagerly second his efforts by their enthusiasm. 

And if he succeeds so far as even to touch the face of his 

opponent, and make a mark to prove the blow, the whole of 

the spectators again show themselves on his side. Sometimes 

they even jeer at his antagonist : not because they dislike or 


UDdervalue him, but because their sympathies are roused by the 
unexpected, and they are naturally inclined to take the weaker 
side. But if any one checks them at the right moment, they 
are quick to change and see their mistake. And this is what 
Cleitomachus is said to have done. He had 
the character of being an invincible athlete, owm^" 
and, as his reputation was spread all over the 
world. King Ptolemy is said to have been inspired with the 
ambition of putting an end to it. He therefore had Aris- 
tonicus the boxer, who was thought to have unusual 
physical capabilities for that kind of thing trained with extra- 
ordinary care, and sent to Greece. When he appeared on the 
arena at Olympia a great number of the spectators, it seems, 
immediately showed their favour for him, and cheered him on, 
being rejoiced that some one should have had the courage to 
make some sort of stand against Cleitomachus. But when, as 
the fight went on, he showed that he was a match for his 
antagonist, and even gave him a well-placed wound, there was 
a general clapping of hands, and the popular enthusiasm 
showed itself loudly on his side, the spectators calling out to 
Aristonicus to keep up his spirits. Thereupon they say that 
Cleitomachus stepped aside, and after waiting a short time to 
recover his breath, turned to the crowd and asked them 
" Why, they cheered Aristonicus, and supported him all they 
could ? Had they detected him in playing foul in the combat ? 
Or were they not aware that Cleitomachus was at that moment 
fighting for the honour of Greece, Aristonicus for that of king 
Ptolemy ? Would they prefer an Egyptian to carry off the 
crown by beating Greeks, or that a Theban and Boeotian 
should be proclaimed victor in boxing over all comers?" 
Upon this speech of Cleitomachus, they say that such a revul- 
don of feehng came over the spectators, that Aristonicus in 
his turn was conquered more by the display of popular feeling 
than by Cleitomachus. 

10, What happened in the case of Perseus in regard to the 
feeling of the multitude was very similar to this. For if any one 
had pulled them up and asked them plainly, in so many words, 
whether they wished such great power to fall to one man, and 
were desirous of trying the effect of an utterly irresponsible des- 


potism, I presume that they would have promptly bethought 
themselves, recanted all they had said, and gone to the other 
extreme of feeling. Or if some one had briefly recalled to their 
recollection all the tyrannical acts of the royal house of Macedonia 
from which the Greeks had suffered, and all the benefits they 
had received from the Romans, I imagine they would have at 
once and decisively changed their minds. However, for the 
present, at the first burst of thoughtless enthusiasm, the people 
showed unmistakable signs of joy at the news, being delighted at 
the unlooked-for appearance of a champion able to cope with 
Rome. I say this much to prevent anyone, in ignorance of human 
nature, from bringing a rash charge of ingratitude against the 
Greeks for the feelings which they displayed at that time. . . . 

11. The cestros was a novel invention, made during the war 
A new kind of with Perseus. This weapon consisted of an 

missile used in the iron bolt two palms long, half of which was 
army of Perseus, gpjke, and half a tube for the reception of the 
wooden shaft which was fixed into the tube, and measured a 
span in length and a finger- breadth in diameter. At the 
middle point of the shaft three wooden "plumes" were 
morticed in. The sling had thongs of unequal length, and 
on the leather between them the missile was loosely set. 
When the sling was being swung round, with the two thongs 
taut, the missile kept its place; but when the slinger let go one 
of the thongs, it flew from the leather like a leaden bullet, and 
was projected from the sling with such force as to inflict a 
very grievous wound upon any one whom it hit.^ 

12. Cotys was a man of distinguished appearance and of 
Character of gr^at ability in military affairs, and besides, 

Cotys, king of the quite unlike a Thracian in character. For he 
Odrj'sae, an ally ^j^g of sober habits, and gave evidence of a 

of Perseus 

gentleness of temper and a steadiness of dis- 
position worthy of a man of gentle birth. . . . 

13. Ptolemy, the general serving in Cyprus, was by no 
A prudent gover- "^cans like an Egyptian, but was a man of sense 

nor of Cyprus, and administrative ability. He received the 

^^8^^ *^' ^^' governorship of the island when the king of 

Egypt was quite a child, and devoted himself 

' Livy, who translates this passage, calls the missile a ctitrosphendona (43, 65). 


with great zeal to the collection of money, refusing payments of 
any kind to any one, though he was often asked for them by 
the king's agents, and subjected to bitter abuse for refusing to 
part with any. But when the king came of age he made up 
a lai^e sum and sent it to Alexandria, so that both king 
Ptolemy himself and his courtiers expressed their approval of 
his previous parsimony and determination not to part with 
any money. . , , 

The battle on the Peneus was followed by ot/ur engagemtnts 
of no great importance ; and finally Peneus returned to Mace- 
donia, and the Romans went into winter quarters in various 
towns in Tlussaly, without a decisive blow having been struck on 
either side. Winter of R.C 171-170. Z;?^, 42, 64-67. 

14, Just about the time when Perseus retired for the 
winter from the Roman war, Antenor arrived ^. 

at Rhodes from him, to negotiate for the ransom i^i.i^o. Dis- 
of Diophares and those who were on board pute at Rhodes as 
with him. Thereupon there arose a great dis- w tiie f eiease of 

, .' . . ° Diophanes, Ihe 

pute among the statesmen as to what course envo)- of Perseus, 
they ought to take. Philophron, Thcaetetus,cap(iiredai Tene- 
and their party were against entering into such **■"■ ^**' *■ ?■ 
an arrangement on any terms; Deinon and Polyaratus and 
their party were for doing so. Finally they did enter upon an 
arrangement with Perseus for their redemptioa . . . 

15. Cephalus came [to Pella] from Epinis. He had long 
been connected by friendship with the royal what induced the 
house of Macedonia, but was now compelled I'^ding men in 
by the force of circumstances to embrace the Epin" w join 
side of Perseus, the cause of which was as 

follows : There was a certain Epirote named Charops, a man 
of high character, and well disposed to Rome, who, when 
Philip was holding the passes into Epirus, was the cause of 
his being driven from the country, and of Titus Flamininus 
conquering Epirus and Macedonia. Charops had a son 
named Machatus, who had a son also named Charops. 
Machatus having died when this son was quite a youth, the 
elder Charops sent his grandson with a suitable retinue to 
Rome to learn to speak and read Latin. In the course of 


time the young man returned home, having made many inti- 
^. mate friendships at Rome. The elder Charops 

then died, and the young man, bemg of a restless 
and designing character, began giving himself airs and attack- 
ing the distinguished men in the country. At first he was not 
much noticed, Antinous and Cephalus, his superiors in age and 
reputation, managing public affairs as they thought right But 
when the war with Perseus broke out, the young man at once 
began laying information against these statesmen at Rome, 
grounding his accusations on their former intimacy with the 
Macedonian royal family; and by watching everything they said 
or did, and putting the worst construction on it, suppressing 
some facts and adding others, he succeeded in getting his accusa- 
tions against them believed. Now Cephalus had always shown 
good sense and consistency, and at the present crisis had 
adhered to a course of the highest wisdom. He had begun 
by praying heaven that the war might not take place, or the 
question come to the arbitrament of arms ; but when the war 
was actually begun, he was for performing all treaty obligations 
towards Rome, but for not going a step beyond this, or show- 
ing any unbecoming subservience or officiousness. When 
Charops then vehemently accused Cephalus at Rome, and repre- 
sented everything that happened contrary to the wishes of the 
Romans as malice prepense on his part, at first he and others 
like him thought little of the matter, being not conscious of 
entertaining any designs hostile to Rome. But when they saw 

Hippolochus, Nicander, and Lochagus arrested 
"^^^ti^^JSf^ without cause, and conveyed to Rome after 

the cavalry battle, and that the accusations 
made against them by Lyciscus were believed, — Lyciscus 
being a leader of the same party in Aetolia as Charops was 
in Epirus, — they at length began to be anxious about what 
would happen, and to consider their position. They resolved 
therefore to try every possible means to prevent themselves 
from being similarly arrested without trial and carried to 
Rome, owing to the slanders of Charops. It was thus that 
Cephalus and his friends were compelled, contrary to their 
original policy, to embrace the cause of Perseus. . . . 

16. Theodotus and Philostratus committed an act of 


fiagrant impiety and treachery. They learnt that the Roman 
consul Aulus Hostilius was on his way to coss.A,HostUius, 
Thessaly to join the army ; and thinking that, Mancinus. A. 
if they could deliver Aulus to Perseus, they would ■*'■''"= Semnus, 
have given the latter the strongest possible 
proof of their devotion, and have done the Attempt of two 
greatest possible damage to the Romans at this Moiossian leaden 
crisis, they wrote urgently to Perseus to make '°*''"''^'°'""'- 
haste. The king was desirous of advancing at once and join- 
ing them ; but he was hindered by the fact that the Molossians 
had seized the bridge over the Aous, and was obliged to give 
them battle first Now it chanced that Aulus had arrived at 
Fhanota,^ and put up at the house of Nestor the Ctopian,* 
and thus gave his enemies an excellent opportunity ; and had 
not fortune interfered 00 his behalf, I do not think that he 
would have escaped. But, in fact, Nestor providentially 
suspected what was brewing, and compelled him to change 
his quarters for the night to the house of a neighbour. 
Accordingly he gave up the idea of going by land through 
Epirus, and, having sailed to Anticyra,* thence made his way 
into Thessaly. . . . 

" 17. Pharnaces was the worst of all his pre- Ptamace^ king 
decessors on the throne. . . . of Pontus. 

18. While Attains was spending the winter in Elateia (in 
Phocis), knowing that his brother Eumenes was 
annoyed in the highest possible degree at the ^^^^^ ^'t^ 
splendid honours which had been awarded tohim Eumenes should 
having been annulled by a public decree of the •* nsiored to 
Peloponnesians, though he concealed his annoy- p^™n"£j(f 
ance from every one, — he took upon himself to 
send messages to certain of the Achaeans, urging that not 
only the statues of honour, but the complimentary inscriptions 

' In Pbocjs. The name was variously given as Phanoteis. Phanole, 
Pbanota (Sleph. By%J) 

' Schwdghaeuser seems to regard this as a second name. But the Greeks 
seldom had such, and it is more likely the designation of some unknown 
localily. There was an Attic deme named Cropia, and tbcrefore the name is 
a recognised one {Steph. B/i.) Gronovius conjeclural 'npwirfy "of Oropns." 

' Appwendy the Anticyra on the Sperchius. on (he boiilers of Achaia 

VOL. II 3 B 


also, which had been placed in his brother's honour, should be 
restored. His motive in acting thus was the belief that he 
could give his brother no greater gratification, and at the same 
time would display to the Greeks by this act his own brotherly 
affection and generosity.^ . . . 

19. When Antiochus saw that the government of Alexan- 

dria was openly making preparations for a war 
the attack upon ^^ annexation in Coele-Syria, he sent Meleager 
Code-Syria by at the head of an embassy to Rome, with in- 
thc ministers of structions to inform the Senate of the fact, and 
Phiiometor. ^° protest that Ptolemy was attackmg him with- 
out the least justification. . . . 

20. In all human affairs perhaps one ought to regulate 

every undertaking by considerations of time; 

JLpl^e^! but this is especially tme in war, in which a 

moment makes all the dinerence between success 

and failure, and to miss this is the most fatal of errors. . . . 

Many men desire honour, but it is only the few who 

venture to attempt it ; and of those who do so, 

^^ aicj^*^*^' ^^ ^^ ^^^ *^ ^"^ ^"y ^^^ ^^^^ *^^ resolution to 
persevere to the end. . . . 

^ Hence Attalus obtained the name of Philadelphns. The origin ot 
Eumencs's loss of popularity in the Peloponncse is referred to in 28, 7, but no 
adequate cause is alleged. A reference to Achaia in his speech at Rome was 
not perhaps altogether friendly (Livy, 42, 12), and we shall see that he was 
afterwards suspected of intriguing with Perseus ; but if this extract is rightly 
placed, it can hardly be on this latter ground that the Achaeans had renoimccd 


1. When the war between the kings Antiochus and Ptolemy^ 
for the possession of Coele-Syria had just g^. ^^ . ,,_ 
begun, Meleager, Sosiphanes, and Heracletdes cbus and Ptolemy 
came as ambassadors from Antiochus, and both appeal to 
Timotheos and Damon from Ptolemy. The .'*°"'t°" '''*/||J'- 
one actually in possession of Coele-Syna and 
Phoenicia was Antiochus; for ever since his father's victory 
over the generals of Ptolemy at Panium * all those districts had 
been subject to the Syrian kings. Antiochus, accordingly, 
regarding the right of conquest as the strongest and most 
honourable of all claims, was now eager to defend these places 
as unquestionably belonging to himself : while Ptolemy, con- 
ceiving that the late king Antiochus had unjustly taken 
advantage of his father's orphan condition to wrest the cities in 
Coele-Syria from him, was resolved not to acquiesce in his 
possession of them. Therefore Meleager and his colleagues 
came to Rome with instructions to protest before the Senate 
that Ptolemy had, in breach of all equity, attacked him first ; 
while Timotheos and Damon came to renew their master's 
friendship with the Romans, and to offer their mediation for 
putting an end to the war with Perseus; but, above all, to 
watch the communications made by Meleagcr's embassy. As 
to putting an end to the war, by the advice of Marcus 
Aeinilius they did not venture to speak of it ; but afrei form- 
ally renewing the friendly relations between Ptolemy and Rome, 
and receiving a favourable answer, they returned to Alexan- 
dria. To Meleager and his colleagues the Senate answered 
that Quintus Marcius should be commissioned to write to 
175-164; Plolemy VI. Philomelor, 


Rolemy on the subject, as he should think it most to the 
interest of Rome and his own honour. Thus was the business 
settled for the time. . . . 

2. About this time there came also ambassadors from the 

TheRhodiansask^^odians towards the end of summer, Agesilo- 

for license to chus, Nicagoras, and Nicander. The objects 

import com. Qf ^^y^ mission were to renew the friendship 

of Rhodes and Rome; to obtain a license for importing 

com from the Roman dominions; and to defend their 

state from certain charges that had been brought against 

it. For there were most violent party contests going on in 

Rhodes : Agathagetus, Philophron, Rhodophon, and Theaete- 

tus resting all their hopes on the Romans, and Deinon and 

Polyaratus on Perseus and the Macedonians; and as these 

divisions gave rise to frequent debates in the course of their 

public business, and many contradictory expressions were 

used in their deliberations, plenty of opportunities were 

afforded to those who wished to make up stories against the 

state. On this occasion, however, the Senate affected to be 

ignorant of all this, though perfectly acquainted with what 

went on in the island, and granted them a license to import 

one hundred thousand medimini of com from Sicily. This 

answer was given by the Senate to the Rhodians separately. 

Audience was then given collectively to all the envoys from 

the rest of Greece that were united in the same policy. . . . 

8. Aulus being thus Proconsul, and wintering in Thessaly 

with the army, sent Gains Popilius and Gnaeus 

Auius^HosUiius, Octavius to visit certain places in Greece. 

in Greece with' They first Came to Thebes, where, after speaking 

proconsular in complimentary terms of the Thebans, they ex- 

^ Popm^ and^' ^o^^^ t^^"^ to maintain their good disposition 
Octavius to visit towards Rome. They then went a round of 
the Greek towns the cities in the Peloponnese, and endeavoured 
c^J?^e^s^ convince the people of the clemency and 

humanity of the Senate by producing the^ de- 

* The decree referred to is given in Livy, 43, 17. "No one shall 
supply any war material to the Roman magistrates other than that which the 
Senate has decreed." This had been extracted from the Senate by vehement 
complaints reaching Rome of the cruel extortions of the Roman officers in the 
previous two years. 


cree which I recently mentioned. At the same time they 
made it clearly understood that the Senate was They visii the 
aware who in the several stales were hanging Peloponncse, and 
back and trying to evade their obligations, and x^^^-^^^tA 
who were forward and zealous ; and they let it be .ihe backward 
seen that they were as much displeased with those policy of certain 
who thus hung back as with those who openly ^chaeans, 
took the opposite side. This brought hesitation and doubt to 
the minds of the people at large, as to how to frame their 
words and actions so as to exactly suit the necessities of the 
tiroes. Gaius and Gnaeus were reported to have resolved, as 
soon as the Achaean congress was assembled, to accuse Lycor- 

tas, Archon, and Folybius, and to point out, ,_, 

that they were opposed to the policy of Rome ; smU Poiybius are 
and were at the present moment refraining from supposed lo be 
active measures, not because that was their '™^'!^'^''' 
genuine inclination, but because they were watch- 
ing the turn of events, and waiting their opportunity. They did 
not, however, venture to do this, because they had no well- 
founded pretext for attacking these men. Accordingly, when 
the counol^ met at Aegium, after delivering a speech of mingled 
compliments and exhortation, they took ship for Aetolia. 

4. The Aetolian congress being summoned to meet them 
at Thermum, they came before the assembled 
people, and again delivered a speech in which "f^sa '" 
expressions of benevolence were mixed with 
exhortations. But the real cause of summoning the congress 
was to announce that the Aetolians must give 
hosUges. On their leaving the speakers' plat- ^^;;j^'^'^'°|h^ 
form, Proandrus stood forward and desired 
leave to mention certain services performed by himself to the 

Romans, and to denounce those who accused ^ . 

him. Gams thereupon rose; and, though he well 
knew that Proandrus was opposed to Rome, he paid him some 
compliments, and acknowledged the truth of everything he 
had said. After this, Lyciscus stood forward, , . 
and, without accusing any one person by name, 


yet cast suspicion on a great many. For he said that " The 
Romans had been quite right to arrest the ringleaders and 
take them to Rome " (whereby he meant Eupolemus, Nican- 
der, and the rest) : " but members of their party still remained 
in Aetolia, all of whom ought to meet with the same correction, 
unless they gave up their children as hostages to the Romans." 
In these words he meant to point especially to Archedamus 
and Pantaloon ; and, accordingly, when he retired, Pantaleon 
p ^ J stood up, and, after a brief denunciation of 

Lyciscus for his shameless and despicable flattery 
of the stronger side, turned to Thoas, conceiving him to be the 
man whose accusations of himself obtained the greater credit 
from the fact that he had never been supposed to be at en- 
mity with him. He reminded Thoas first of the events in 
the time of Antiochus ; and then reproached him for ingrati- 
tude to himself, because, when he had been surrendered to 
Rome, he obtained an unexpected release at the intercession 
of Nicander and himself He ended by calling upon the 
Aetolians, not only to hoot Thoas down if he tried to speak, 
but to join with one accord in stoning him. This was done ; 
,j- t cd ^^^ Gaius, after administering a brief reproof 
to the Aetolians for stoning Thoas, departed 
with his colleague to Acarnania, without any more being said 
about hostages. Aetolia, however, was filled with mutual 
suspicions and violent factions. 

6. In Acarnania the assembly was held at Thurium, at 
which Aeschrion, Glaucus, and Chremes, who were all parti- 
sans of Rome, begged Gaius and Gnaeus to 
place a garrison in Acarnania; for they had 
among them certain persons who were for putting the 
country in the hands of Perseus and the Macedonians. The 
advice of Diogenes was the opposite. "A garrison," he 
said, "ought not to be put into any of their cities, for that 
was what was done to those who had been at war with 
Rome and had been beaten; whereas the Acarnanians had 
done no wrong, and did not deserve in any respect to have 
a garrison thrust upon them. Chremes and Glaucus and 
their partisans were slandering their political opponents, and 
desired to bring in a garrison which would support their self- 


seeking policy, in order to establish their own tyrannical 
power." After these speeches, Gaius and his colleague, seeing 
that the populace disliked the idea of having garrisons, and 
wishing to follow the line of policy marked out by the Senate, 
expressed their adherence to the view of Diogenes ; and de- 
parted to join the Proconsul at Larisa, after paying some 
compliments to the Acamanians. . . . 

6. The Greeks made up their minds that this embassy 
required much consideration on their part Meeting of 
They therefore called to council such men as Achaean states. 
were of one mind in other political questions, — '"^^JJ ^? consider 
Arcesilaus and Ariston of Megalopolis, Stratius B.c.^9.^' 
of Tritaea, Xenon of Patrae and Apollonides of 
Sicyon. But Lycortas stood firm to his original Lyconas is for 
view : which was that they should send no help complete neu- 
to either Perseus or Rome in any way, nor, on traiity. 
the other hand, take part against either. For he held that 
co-operation with either would be disadvantageous to the 
Greeks at large, because he foresaw the overwhelming power 
which the successful nation would possess; while active 
hostility, he thought, would be dangerous, because they had 
already in former times been in opposition to many of the 
most illustrious Romans in their state policy. Apollonides 
and Stratius did not recommend open and Apollonides and 
avowed hostility to Rome, but thought that stratius for sup- 
" Those who were for plunging headlong into ^"^^j^^^ ^ ^^' 
the contest, and wished to use the action Rome, and yet 
of the nation to secure their own personal not openly oppos- 
favour at Rome, ought to be put down and »ngher. 
boldly resisted." Archon said that "They must yield to 
circumstances, and not give their personal ,-^ «. . 

' 4.- 11 ^^ Strategus 

enemies a handle for accusations; nor allow Archon is for 
themselves to fall into the same misfortune as bending to the 
Nicander, who, before he had learnt what the^/°™;^"^^*^^'"K 

1^ „ , , -11 frankly for Rome. 

power of Rome really was, had met with the 
gravest calamities." With this last view, Polyaenus, Arcesi- 
laus, Ariston, and Xenon agreed. It was thereupon decided 
that Archon should go without delay to his duties poiybius 
as Strategus, and Poiybius to those of Hipparch. Hipparch. 


7. Very soon after these events, and when Archon had made 

hass fr ^P ^^^ mind that the Achaeans must take active 

Atiaius^to the P^"^ with Rome and her allies, it happened most 

Achaeans desiring conveniently that Attains made his proposal to 

^he'S^nJ^lTfor-^ him and found him ready to accept it Archon 
maiiy decreed to his at once eagerly promised his support to Attalus's 
brother Eumencs, request: and when thereupon that prince's en voys 
See 27. 18. appeared at the next congress, and addressed 
the Achaeans about the restoration of king Eumenes's honours, 
begging them to do this for the sake of Attains, the people did 
not show clearly what their feeling was, but a good many rose 
to s[^ak against the proposal from many various motives. 
Those who were originally the advisers of the honours being 
paid to the king were now desirous to confirm the wisdom of 
their own policy ; while those who had private reasons for 
animosity against the king thought this a good opportunity 
for revenging themselves upon him ; while others again, from 
spite against those who supported him, were determined that 
Attains should not obtain his request. Archon, however, the 
Strategus, rose to support the envoys, — for it was a matter 
that called for an expression of opinion from the Strategus, — 
but after a few words he stood down, afraid of being thought 
to be giving his advice from interested motives and the hope 
of making money, because he had spent a large sum on his 
office. Amidst a general feeling of doubt and hesitation, 
Polybius rose and delivered a long speech. But that part of it 
which best fell in with the feelings of the populace was that in 

which he showed that "The original decree of the 
Pdybius* Achaeans in regard to these honours enacted that 

such honours as were improper and contrary to latv 
were to be abolished, but not all honours by any means. That 
Sosigenes and Diopeithes and their colleagues, however, who 
were at the time judges, and for private reasons personally hostile 
to Eumenes, seized the opportunity of overturning all the erec- 
tions put up in honour of the king ; and in doing so had gone 
beyond the meaning of the decree of the Achaeans, and beyond 
the powers entrusted to them, and, what was worst of all, be- 
yond the demands of justice and right. For the Achaeans 
had not resolved upon doing away with the honours of 

xrviii A SPEECH OF POL YBIUS ■ 377 

Eumenes on the ground of having received any injury at his 
hands ; but had taken ofTence at his making demands beyond 
what his services warranted, and had accordingly voted to 
remove everything that seemed excessive. As then these 
judges had overthrown these honours, because they had a greater 
regard for the gratification of their private enmity than for the 
honour of the Achaeans, so the Achaeans, from the conviction 
that duty and honour must be their highest consideration, were 
bound to correct the error of the judges, and the unjustiliable 
insult inflicted upon Eumenes : especially as, in doing so, they 
would not be bestowing this favour on Eumenes only, but on 
his brother Attalus also." The assembly having expressed their 
agreement with this speech, a decree was written out ordering 
the magistrates to restore all the honours of king Eumenes, 
except such as were dishonourable to the Achaean league or 
contrary to their law. It was thus, and at this time, that 
Attalus secured the reversal of the insult to his brother 
Eumenes in regard to the honours once given him in the 
Peloponnese. . , . 

8. Perseus sent Pleuratus the Illyrian, an exile living at his 
court, and Adaeus of Beroea on a mission to 
king Genthius, with instructions to inform him after taking Hy- 
of what he had achieved in his war with the scana in liiy- 
Romans, Dardani, Epirotes, and Illyrians up to "^' ^"^f^' 
the present time; and to urge him to make a ^d'^ence senS 
friendship and alliance with him in Macedonix envoys to king 
These envoys journeyed beyond Mount Scardus,'^*"','"'''"""'"'"' 
through lUyria Deserta, as It is called, — a region '*''' *^' ''' 
a short time back depopulated by the Macedonians, in order 
to make an invasion of Illyria and Macedonia dilHcult for the 
Dardani. Their journey through this region was accompanied 
by much suffering ; but they reached Scodra, and being there 
informed that Genthius was at Lissus, they sent a message to 
him. He promptly responded : and having been admitted to an 
interview with him, they discussed the business 
to which their instructions referred. Genthius '""' 


but he alleged want of means as an excuse for not complying 
with the request at once, and his inability to undertake a war 
with Rome without money. With this answer, Adaeus and his 
colleagues returned home. Meanwhile Perseus arrived at 
Stubera, and sold the booty and gave his army a rest while 
waiting for the return of Pleuratus and Adaeus. On their 

arrival with the answer from Genthius, he inmie- 
iTG^nihiS^" diately sent another mission, consisting again of 
Adaeus, Glaucias, one of his body-guards, and 
the lUyrian (Pleuratus) also, because he knew the Illyrian lan- 
guage, with the same instructions as before : on the ground that 
Perseus goes Genthius had not stated distinctly what he 
back to Hyscana wanted, and what would enable him to consent 
in iiiyria. ^q ^|^g proposals. When these envoys had 
started the king himself removed with his army to Hyscana.^ . . . 
9. The ambassador sent to Genthius returned without 
Genthius being having accomplished anything more than the 
unpersuaded by previous envoys, and without any fresh answer; 
the second mis- for Gcnthius remained of the same mind, — 

sion, Perseus .,!• * • • •*.!_ -n • i.* u -. 

sends a third, but wiUmg to jom With Perseus m his war, but pro- 
stiii without offer, fessing to be in want of money. Perseus dis- 
ing money, regarded the hint, and sent another mission 
under Hippias to conclude the treaty, without taking any notice 
of the main point, while professing a wish to do whatever 
Genthius wished. It is not easy to decide whether to ascribe 
such conduct to mere folly, or to a spiritual delusion. For my 
part, I am inclined to regard it as a sheer spiritual delusion when 
men aim at bold enterprises, and risk their life, and yet ne- 
glect the most important point in their plans, though they see it 
T-u -111 t all the time and have the power to execute it. 

The dishke of _ _ , , • i • .,,1 , . , 1 

Perseus to give ^ox I do not think it Will be denied by any 
money turned out man of reflection that, had Perseus at that time 
^^Gre©ce°^ been willing to make grants of money either to 
states as such, or individually to kings and 
statesmen, I do not say on a great scale, but even to a mode- 
rate extent, they would all — Greeks and kings alike — have 
yielded to the temptation. As it was, he happily did not take 
that course, which would have given him, if successful, an 

* Hyscana, or Uscana, a town of the lUyrian tribe Penestae. 


overweening supremacy ; or, if unsuccessful, would have in- 
volved many others in his disaster. But he took the opposite 
course : which resulted in confining the numbers of the Greeks 
who adopted the unwise policy at this crisis to very narrow 
limits. . . . 

[Peiseus now returned from Stubera. to Hyscana, and after a vain 
ollempt upoD Stratus in Aetolia, retired into Macedonia for (he rest of the 
winter. In the early spring of B.C. 169 Q. Marciu3 Phitippus began his 
advance upon Macedonia from his permanent camp in Perrliaebia. Per- 
seus stationed Asclepiodotus and Hippias (o defend two passes of the Cam- 
banian mountains, white he himself held Dium, which commanded the 
coast Toad from Thessaly into Macedonia. Marcius however, after only a 
rather severe skirmish with the light-armed troops of Hippias, effected the 
passage of the mountains and descended upon Dium. The king was taken 
by suiprise ; he had not secured the pass of Tempe, which would have cut 
olf ihe Romans from retreat ; and he now hastily retired to Pydna. Q. 
Marcius occupied Dium, but after a short stay there retired upon Phila, 10 
get provisions and secure the coast road. Whereupon Perseus reoccupled 
Dium, and contemplated staying there to the end of the summer. Q. 
Marcius took Ileracleum, which was l>etween I'hila and Dium, and made 
preparations for a second advance on Dium. But the winter (B.C. 1G9- 
16S) was now approaching, and he contented himself with seeing (hal the 
roads through Thessaly were put in a proper slate for (he conveyance of 
provisions. Livy, 43, 19-23; 44, 1-9.] 

10. Having been completely worsted on the entrance of the 

Romans into Macedonia, Perseus found fault „ , .. 

. , „. . „ ■ ■ - . . Perseus lays the 

with Hippias. But m my opinion it is easy to t>lameofhis 
find feult with others and to see their mistakes, failure on his 
but it is the hardest thing in the world 10 do ^"""^'^ 
everything that can be done one's self, and to 
be thoroughly acquainted with one's own affairs. And Perseus 
was now an instance in point. . . . 

11. The capture of Heracleum was effected in a very 
peculiar manner. The city wall at one part The tesiudo. 
and for a short distance was low. The Romans ^ivy, 44, q. 
attacked with three picked maniples: and the first made a 
protection for their heads by locking their shields together 
over them so closely, that they presented the appearance of a 
sloping tiled roof. . - . 

This manceuvre the Romans used also in mock lights. . . . 

While C. Marcius Fibulas, the praetor, was engaged in 


Chalddice, Q. Marcius sent M, Popilius to besiege Meliboea in 
Magnesia, Perseus sent Euphranor to relieve ity andy if he 
succeeded, to enter Demetrias, This he did, and was not 
attacked at the latter place by Popilius or Eumenes — scandcU 
saying that the latter was in secret communication with Perseus, 
Livy, 44, 10-13, b.c. 169. 

12. Upon Perseus designing to come into Thessaly and 

Th A h there decide the war by a general engagement, 

decide to co- ^s he probably would have done, Archon and his 

operate actively colleagues resolved to defend themselves against 

^*^^^^^^^the suspicions and slanders that had been 

thrown upon them, by taking some practical 
steps. They therefore brought a decree before the Achaean 
congress, ordering an advance into Thessaly, with the full force 
of the league, to co-operate energetically with the Romans. The 
decree being confirmed, the Achaeans also voted that Archon 
should superintend the collection of the army and the necessary 
preparations for the expedition, and should also send envoys to 
the Consul in Thessaly, to communicate to him the decree of 

the Achaeans, and to ask when and where their 

^*°i^c Consul. ^° ^^^y ^^^ ^^ J^^" ^^"^- Polybius and others 

were forthwith appointed, and strictly instructed 
that, if the Consul approved of the army joining him, they 
should at once send some messengers to communicate the fact, 
that they might not be too late on the field ; and meanwhile, 
that Polybius himself should see that the whole army found 
provisions in the various cities through which it was to pass, 
and that the soldiers should have no lack of any necessaries. 
With these instructions the envoys started. The Achaeans 
also appointed Telocritus to conduct an embassy to Attains, 
bearing the decree concerning the restoration of the honours 
Ptolemy Physcon ^^ Eumenes. And as news arrived about the 
celebrates his same time that king Ptolemy had just celebrated 
anacietena. j^jg anacleteria, the usual ceremony when the 
kings come of age, they voted to send some ambassadors to 
confirm the friendly relations existing between the league and 
the kingdom of Egypt, and thereupon appointed Alcithus and 
Pasiadas for this duty. 


18. Polybius and his colleagues found the Romans moved 
from Thessaly, and encamped in Perrhaebia, 
between Azorium and Dolicha They therefore """"J" ^'^ 
postponed communication with the Consul, 
owing to the critical nature of the occasion, but shared in the 
dangers of the invasion of Macedonia. When the Roman army 
at length reached the district of Hcracleum, it 
seemed the right moment for their interview ^^60" 
with Q. Marcius, because he considered that the 
most serious part of his undertaking was accomplished. The 
Achaean envoys therefore took the opportunity of presenting 
the decree to Marcius, and declaring the intention of the 
Achaeahs, to the effect that they wished with their full force to 
take part in his contests and dangers. In addition to this they 
demonstrated to him that every command of q^ Marcioide- 
the Romans, whether sent by letter or messenger, dines the offered 
had been during the present war accepted by "^yf ^^ii^^^^ 
the Achaeans without dispute. Marcius acknowledged with 
great warmth the good feeling of the Achaeans, but excused 
them from taking part in his labours and expenses, as there 
was no longer any need for the assistance of allies. The other 
ambassadors accordingly returned home ; but Polybius stayed 
there and took part in the campaign, until ^ppLus Claudius 
Marcius, hearing that Appi us Cento asked for five Cemo defeated at 
thousand Achaean soldiers to be sent to Epirus, Hystana m b.c. 
despatched Polybius with orders to prevent the ''°' '^' *^' '"■ 
soldiers being granted, or such a heavy expense being cause- 
lessly imposed on the Achaeans ; for Appius had no reason 
whatever for asking for these soldiers. Whether he did this 
from consideration for the Achaeans, or from a desire to prevent 
Appius from obtaining any success, it is difficult to say. Poly- 
bius, however, returned to the Peloponnese and found that the 
letter from Epirus had arrived, and that the Achaean congress 
had been soon afterwards assembled at Sicyon. He was 
therefore in a situation of great embarrassment When Cento's 
demand of soldiers was brought before the Congress he did 
not think it by any means proper to reveal the charge which 
Q. Marcius had given him privately : and on the other hand to 
oppose the demand, without some clear pretext, was exceedingly 


dangerous. In this difficult and delicate position he called to 

his aid the decree of the Roman Senate, for- 

^iT ^^jtT^* bidding compliance with the written demands of 

commanders unless made in accordance with its 

own dci rec. Now, no mention of such a decree occurred in the 

dcsiKitch from Appius. By this argument he prevailed with the 

|H\>plc to refer the matter to the Consul, and by his means to 

^el the nation relieved of an expense which would amount to 

OUT a hundred and twenty talents. Still he gave a great 

hanille to those who wished to denounce him to Appius, as 

havin^v: thwarted his design of obtaining a reinforcement . . . 

14* The |HX>ple of Cydon at this time committed a shock- 

i^vu\ l-he ^^^ ^^^ ^^ indisputable treachery. Though 

i>M»wn* attack niany such have occurred in Crete, yet this 

Aiui tAkf? appeared to go beyond them alL For though 

'^^ CiKvvsur '' ^^^7 ^'^"^ ^""^ ^^ Apollonia, not only by the ties 
of friendship, but by those of common institutions 
ftlsi\ and \\\ fill I l>y everything which mankind regard as sacred, 
anvl though these obligations were confirmed by a sworn treaty 
engraved and presented in the temple of Idaean Zeus, yet they 
treacherously seized Ajwllonia, put the men to the sword, 
plundered the proj^erty, and divided among themselves the 
women, children, city, and territory. . . . 

16. Afraid of the Gortynians, because they had narrowly 
The Cydonians escaped losing their city in the previous year 
ask help from by an attack led by Nothocrates, the Cydonians 
Eumencs, g^j^j envoys to Eumenes demanding his assist- 
ance in virtue of their alliance with him. The king selected 
Leon and some soldiers, and sent them in haste to Crete ; and 
on their arrival the Cydonians delivered the keys of their city 
to Leon, and put the town entirely in his hands. . . . 

16. The factions in Rhodes kept continually becoming 
The Rhodians "lo^e and more violent. For when the decree 
determine to send of the Senate, directing that they should no 
a mission to longer conform to the demands of the military 
omc, . . 170. magistrates but only to those contained in the 
Senate's decrees, was communicated to them, and the people at 
large expressed satisfaction at the care of the Senate for their in- 
terests ; Philophron and Theaetetus seized the occasion to carry 


out their policy further, declaring that they ought to send envoys 
to the Senate, and to Q. Marcius Philippus the Consul, and 
Gains Maicius Figulus, the commander of the fleet For it 
was by that time known to everybody which of the magistrates 
designate in Rome were to come to Greece. The proposal 
was loudly applauded, though some dissent was ^^ 
expressed : and at the beginning of the summer 
Agesilochus, son of Hegesias, and Nicagoras, son of Nicander, 
were sent to Rome ; Agepolis, Ariston, and Pancrates to the 
Consul and commander of the fleet, with instructions to renew 
the friendship of the Cretans with Rome, and to make their 
defence against the accusations that were being uttered against 
their state ; while Agesilochus and his colleagues were at the 
same time to make a proposal about a license to export com 
from the Roman dominions. The speech made by these 
envoys to the Senate, and the reply made by the Senate, and 

the successful termination of their mission, I „„ ^ t 

- , , - , . , - , , ^™? supra, CD. 9. 

have aheady mentioned m the section devoted 
to Italian afTairs. But it is useful to repeat such points, as I 
am careful to do, because I am obliged frequently to record 
the actual negotiations of ambassadors before mentioning the 
circumstances attending their appointment and despatch. 
For since I am recording under each year the contemporary 
events in several countries, and endeavouring to take a sum- 
mary review of them all together at the end, this must of neces- 
sity form a feature in my history. 

17. Agepolis and his colleagues found Q. Marcius himself 
encamped near Heracleum in Macedonia, and ^^^ envoys visit 
delivered their commission to him there. In Q. Marcius 
answer, he said that " He himself paid no atten- [^^jJ^Pij^^"' 
tioQ to those calumnies, and advised them not 
to pay any to those who ventured to speak against Rome." 
He added many other expressions of kindness, and even wrote 
them in a despatch to the people of Rhodes. Agepolis was 
much charmed by his whole reception ; and observing this, the 
Consul took him aside and said to him privately that " He 
wondered at the Rhodians not trying to put an ^^ ^^ ji^^, ^^^^ 
end to the war,' which it would be eminently in Rhodians stop 
' That ii, ibe war twtweoi Anliochtu and Plo)eni]i. 


the war between their interests to da" Did the Consul act 

^"inoiX^?""^ thus because he was suspicious of Antiochus, 
and was afraid, if he conquered Alexandria, that 
he would prove a formidable second enemy to themselves, seeing 
that the war with Perseus was becoming protracted, and the war 
for Coele-Syria had already broken out ? Or was it because he 
saw that the war with Perseus was all but decided, now that 
the Roman legions had entered Macedonia, and because he 
had confident hopes of its result ; and therefore wished, by 
instigating the Rhodians to interfere between the kings, to give 
the Romans a pretext for taking any measures they might 
think good concerning them ? It would not be easy to say 
for certain ; but I am inclined to believe that it was the latter, 
judging from what shortly afterwards happened to the Rhodians. 
However, Agepolis and his colleagues immediately afterwards 
proceeded to visit Gaius Marcius Figulus : and, ha\ing received 
from him still more extraordinary marks of favour than from 
Quintus Marcius, returned with all speed to Rhodes. When 
they received the report of the embassy, and knew that the 
rffrct of the ^^^ commanders had vied with each other in 

warni reception warmth, both by word of mouth and in their 
of their formal answers, the Rhodians were universally 

ami^ssadors on j ^^ ^^^ ^^^ ^j^j^ pleasing expectation. But 

the Rhodians. ... , .11 ..i, 

not all m the same spirit: the sober-minded 
were delighted at the good feeling of the Romans towards 
them ; but the restless and fractious calculated in their own 
minds that this excessive complaisance was a sign that the 
Romans were alarmed at the dangers in which they found 
themselves, and at their success not having answered to their 
expectations. But when Agepolis communicated to his friends 

that he had a private message from Q. Marcius 

TS m^e^^^cc' ^^ ^^^ ^^^^^" Council about putting an end to 

between the war (in Syria), then Deinon and his friends 

Antiochus Epi- felt fully convinced that the Romans were in a 

Vio^myVhytcoxi. ^^^^^ ^^^"^^^ ' ^^"^ ^^^^ accordingly sent envoys 

also to Alexandria to put an end to the war 
then existing between Antiochus and Ptolemy. . . . 


Ptolemy Epiphana,who diedB.c. \%i,left two sons, Ptolemy 
Pkilometor and Ptolemy Physcon, and a daughter, Cleopatra, by 
his wife Cleopatra, sister of Antioekus Epiphanes. After the 
death of Ptolemy s mother Cleopatra, his ministers, Eulaeus and 
Lenaeiis, engaged in a war with Antiochus for the recovery of 
Code-Syria and Phoenicia, which had been taken by Aniiochus 
the Great, and which they alleged had been assigned as a dower 
to the late Cleopatra. Their war was singularly unsuccessful. 
Antieehus Epiphanes defeated their troops at Pelusium, took 
young Ptolemy Philometor captive, and advanced as far as 
Memphis. Thereupon Ptolemy Physcon assumed the royal title 
at Alexandria as Euergetes II., and sent envoys to Antiochus at 
Memphis. Antiochus, however, treated Ptolemy Philometor with 
kindness, established him as king at Memphis, and advanced to 
Naucratis, and thence to Alexandria, which he besieged on the 
pretext of re-estahlishing Philometor. b.c 171. See infra, 
bk. ag. ch. 23. 

18. King Antiochus was a man of ability in the field and 
daring in design, and showed himself worthy characier of 
of the royal name, except in regard to his Antiochus IV. 
manceuvres at Peiusium. . . . (Epiphanes). 

19. ^Vhen Antiochus was actually in occupation of Egypt, 
Comanus and Cineas, after consultation with comanus and 
king Ptolemy Physcon, determined upon sum- Cineas. Physcon s 
moning a conference of the most distinguished ""ni^wrap tieip- 
Egyptian nobles to consult about the danger embassies \o 
which threatened them. The first resolution Aniiochus, 
the conference came to was to send the Greek ^'^ '*'■ 
envoys who were then at Alexandria as envoys to Antiochus 
to conclude a pacification. There were at that time in the 
country two embassies from the Achaean league, one which 
had been sent to renew the alliance between the league and 
Egypt, and which was composed of Alcithus of Aegium, son of 
Xenephon, and Pasiodes, and another sent to give notice of 
the festival of the Antigoneia.' There was also an embassy 

' The Anligoneia was a festival established in honour of Antigonus Doson, 
who had been a benefactor of Ihc Achaeans. In 30, 33, il is mentioned as 
being celebrated in Sicyon. The benefaclions of this Macedonian king lo the 
Achaeans are mentioned by Pnusnnias (B, 8, la), 

VOL. 11 3 C 


from Athens led by Demaratus on the subject of some 
present, and two sacred embassies, one in connexion with the 
Panathenaea under the presidency of Callias the pancratiast, 
and the other on the subject of the mysteries, of which 
Cleostratus was the active member and spokesman. There 
were also there Eudemus and Hicesius from Miletus, and 
Apollonides and Apollonius from Clazomenae. The king 
also sent with them Tlepolemus and Ptolemy the rhetorician 
as envoys. These men accordingly sailed up the river to meet 
Antiochus. . . . 

20, While Antiochus was occupying Egypt,^ he was visited 
Th G ic ^y ^^ Greek envoys sent to conclude terms of 
envoys visit pcace. He received them courteously, devoted 
Antiochus and the first day to giving them a splendid enter- 
cndcavourto t^inment, and on the next granted them an 
interview, and bade them deliver their instruc- 
tions. The first to speak were the Achaeans, the next the 
Athenian Demaratus, and after him Eudemus of Miletus. And 
as the occasion and subject of their speeches were the same, 
the substance of them was also nearly identical. They all laid 
^. . the blame of what had occurred on Eulaeus, and 

' referring to Ptolemy's youth and his relationship 
to himself, they intreated the king to lay aside his anger. 
Tlicreupon Antiochus, after acknowledging the general truth 

of their remarks, and even supporting them by 
Antiochus additional arguments of his own, entered upon 
a defence of the justice of his original demands. 
He attempted to establish the claim of the king of Syria on 
Coele- Syria, " Insisting upon the fact that Antigonus, the 
founder of the Syrian kingdom, exercised authority in that 
country ; and referring to the formal cession of it to Seleucus,- 
after the death of Antigonus, by the sovereigns of Macedonia. 
Next he dwelt on the last conquest of it by his father 
Antiochus ; and finally he denied that any such agreement 
was made between the late king Ptolemy and his father as 
the Alexandrian ministers asserted, to the effect that Ptolemy 
was to take Coele-Syria as a dowry when he married Cleopatra, 

* Sec 27, 19 ; 18, I, 17. 
^ Selcucus Nicanor, B.C. 306-280. 


the mother of the present king." Having by these ai^uments 

not only persuaded himself, but the envoys also, . 

of the justice of his claim, he sailed down the pi^s Naucraiis" 

river to Naucraiis. There he treated the inhabi- and ihence 

tants with humanity, and gave each of the Greeks nflvances to 

living there a gold piece, and then advanced 

towards Alexandria, He told the envoys that he would give 

them an answer on the return of Aristeides and Thesis, whom 

he had sent on a mission to Ptolemy ; and he wished, he said, 

that the Greek envoys should all be cognisant and witnesses of 

their report, , . . 

21. The eunuch Eulaeus persuaded Rolemy to collect his 
money, Give up liis kingdom to his enemies, _. ., . . 
and retire to Samothrace. This will be to any of Eulaeus upon 
one who reflects upon it a convincing proof of Piolcmy 
the supreme mischief done by evil companions ^o™**?^. He 

, , f , ^, ; . "^ , advises hira 10 

of boyhood. That a monarch so entirely out of yidd 10 
reach of personal danger and so far removed Antiochus and 
from his enemies, should not make one effort to u^^''^ '" 
save his honour, while in possession too of such 
abundant resources, and master over such wide territory and 
such numerous subjects, but should at once without a blow 
surrender a most splendid and wealthy kingdom,^is not this 
the sign of a spirit utterly effeminate and corrupted? And if 
this had been Ptolemy's natural character, we must have laid 
the blame upon nature and not upon any external influence. 
But since by his subsequent achievements his natural character 
has vindicated itself, by proving Ptolemy to be sufficiently 
resolute and courageous in the hour of danger, we may clearly, 
without any improbability, attribute to this eunuch, and his com- 
panionship with the king in his boyhood, the ignoble spirit 
displayed by him on that occasion, and his idea of going to 
Samothrace. . . . 

22. After raising the siege of Alexandria, Antiochus sent 
envoys to Rome, whose names were Meleager, Amioehus leax-cs 
Sosiphanes, and Heracleides, agreeing to pay one Alexandria 
hundred and fifty talents, fifty as a compliment- ^'" = '™^' '*'"B 
ary present to the Romans, and the rest as a gift ^^^^^^^ 
to be divided among certain cities in Greece. ... See 29, 35. 

_, .^^.iiigs 10 Dom Kingao 
existini; hetwcen the two kings the 
wliii h a peace would be to both, 
the ervoy in the middle of his s\ 
was no need of much talking, for ll: 
elder Ptolemy, and with him he hac 
they were friends, and if the peo 
him Antiochus would not prevent 
word, . . . 


1. "Their one idea, expressed at parties or conversations in 
the street, was, that they should manage the war 
in Macedonia while remaining quietly at homec^j^^'j^e^iUuj 
in Rome, sometimes by criticising what the PauUus, c. 
generals were doing, at others what they were H^'?'"" ^"''"'=|?- 
leaving undone. From this the public interests ,[,g j^l^hof l. 
never got any good, and often a great deal of Aemiiius before 
harm. The generals themselves were at times ^'^'"e for '^<»- 
greatly hampered by this ill-timed loquacity. lJ^"^, 33. 
For as it is the invariable nature of slander to 
spread rapidly and slop at nothing, the people got thoroughly 
infected by this idle talk, and the generals were consequently 
rendered contemptible in the eyes of the enemy." . . . 

2. The Senate being informed that Antiochus , ^ ^^ 

had become master of Egypt, and all but taken embassy from 
Alexandria, and conceiving that the aggrandise- Piolcmy Physcon 
ment of that king was a matter affectins them- "I"' **" ^"'" 
■ - 1 .-. ■ T. ■•■ , ■ Cleopatra, the 

selves, appomted Gaius Popilms and others Senate sunds Gaius 
to go as ambassadors to put an end to the Popilius Laetias 
war, and generally to inspect the state of '^ Alexandria, 
affairs. . . . '"''■ "' '"■ 

S. Hippias, and the other ambassadors sent by Perseus, to 
Genthius to make an alliance with him, returned cemhius joins 
before the winter, and reported that Genthius Perseus on being 
would undertake to join in the war with Rome if ™ppii«i with 300 
he was paid three hundred talents and received 
proper securities. Thereupon Perseus sent Pantauchus, one 
of his chief friends, with the following instructions : He was 
to agree to pay Genthius the money ; to interchange oaths of 
alliance ; to take from Genthius such hostages as he himself 

...^ jMOjccisoi I'crseus. i 
to and reducx'd U) writing', (icnlhii 
whose names Pantaucluis had cai 
text of the treaty ; and with them 
receive the oaths and hostages froi 
were to have charge of the mone 

and also consents ^im to send also sor 
to join in a a mission to Rhodes ' 

"RhJS^ ^° ^" ^^^^^ ^^ negotiate ; 
the three states. Foi 

the Rodians consented to embark upc 
they would be easily able to conquer 
listened to the suggestion, and appoint 
to undertake the mission ; with instr 
they had received the oaths and host 
the question of the money had beei 
proceed on the embassy to Rhodes. 
4i. So these various ambassador 
Perseus meets Macedonia. ButPanU 
Uie envoys from of the young king, and 
Genihms ; ^^g necessity of makii 
and urging him not to be too lat< 
especially urgent that he should prepc 
for, as the Romans were quite unprep 
on the coasts both of Epirus and Illyr 
form would be easilv '* — 


in the presence of the whole body of cavalry ; for he was very 
anxious that the Macedonians should know of the adhesion of 
Genthius, hoping that this additional advantage would have 
the effect of raising their courage : and next he received the 
hostages and handed over his own to Olympion and his 
colleagues, the noblest of whom were Limnaeus, the son of 
Polemocrates, and Balacrus, son of Pantauchus. Lastly, he 
sent the agents who had come for the money to Pella, assuring 
them that they would receive it there : and appointed the am- 
bassadors for Rhodes to join Metrodorus at Thessalonica, and 
hold themselves in readiness to embark. 

This embassy succeeded in persuading the Rhodians to 
join in the war. And, having accomplished this, ^^^ sends others 
Perseus next sent Herophon, who had been to Eumenes and 
similarly employed before, on a mission to Amiochus. 
Eumenes; and Telemnastos of Crete to Antiochus to urge 
him " Not to let the opportunity escape ; nor to imagine that 
Perseus was the only person affected by the overbearing and 
oppressive conduct of Rome : but to be quite sure that, if he 
did not now assist Perseus, if possible by putting an end to 
the war, or, if not, by supporting him in it, he would quickly 
meet with the same fate himself." . . . 

6. In venturing upon a narrative of the intrigues of Perseus 
and Eumenes, I have felt myself in a position The intrigues of 
of great embarrassment. For to give full and Perseus and 
accurate details of the negotiations, which these Eumenes. 
two kings conducted in secret between themselves, appeared 
to me to be an attempt open to many obvious criticisms and 
exceedingly liable to error : and yet to pass over in complete 
silence what seemed to have exercised the most decisive in- 
fluence in the war, and which alone can explain many of the 
subsequent events, seemed to me to wear the appearance of 
a certain sluggishness and entire want of enterprise. On the 
whole, I decided to state briefly what I believed to be truth, 
and the probabilities and surmises on which I founded that 
opinion ; for I was, in fact, during this period more struck 
than most people at what happened. 

6. I have already stated^ that Cydas of Crete, while, serving 

* In a previous part of the book now lost. See Livy, 44, 25. 

X cibcus to EumenL'S, and that the 
began to have reasonable suspiei 
rendered clear from what hapjjen* 
allowed this prince to come to Ro 
I to transact the business he had on t 

a favourable answer and dismissed 
kindness, although he had done th( 
portance in the war with Perseus ; i 
rendered them the most important st 
them again and again in their wa 
Perseus, they not only prevented fron 
bade him leave Italy within a certain \ 
it was mid-winter. Therefore it is qu 
triguing had been taking place between 
to account for the alienation of the R 
What this was, and how far it went, is 

7. We can easily satisfy ourselves 
_ . . , , have wished Perseus to 1 

The ongin of the , , 

intrigue between ^"^ become supreme ir 
Eumenesand nothing of the traditioi 
Perseus was the existing between these 

idea of the former, , • 

that, both sides theu: respective powers ^ 
being tired of the distrust, jealousy, and, ii 
war, he might mosity between t^***^ 

intervene with ^,. 


result, because they made no real progress in the war until 
Paul us took the coiumand, and because 
Aetolia was in a dangerous state of excite- 
ment, he conceived that it would not be impossible that the 
Romans would consent to some means of ending the war and 
making terms : and he looked upon himself as the most proper 
person to act as mediator and elfcct the reconciliation. With 
these secret ideas in his mind, he began sounding Perseus by 
means of Cydas of Crete, the year before, to find out how 
much he would be inclined to pay for such a chance. This 
appear to me to be the origin of their connexion with each 

8. Two kings, one of whom was the most unprincipled 
and the other the most avaricious in the world, TheU-irgain 
being now pitted against each other, theiraiicmpiedbctwecn 
mutual stru^les presented a spectacle truly liumenesand 
ridiculous. Eumenes held out every kind of 
hope, and threw out every species of bait, believing that he 
would catch Perseus by such promises, Perseus, without 
waiting to be approached, rushed to the bait held out to him, 
and made for it greedily ; yet he could not make up his mind 
to swallow it, to such an extent as to give up any money. 
The sort of huckstering contest that went on between them 
was as follows. Eumenes demanded five hundred talents as 
the price of his abstention from co-operating with the Romans 
by land and sea during the fourth year of the war, and fifteen 
hundred for putting an end to the war altogether, and pro- 
mised to give hostages and securities for his promise at once. 
Perseus accepted the proposal of hostages, named the 
number, the time at which they were to be sent, and the 
manner of their safe custody at Cnosus. But as to the money, 
he said that it would be disgraceful to the one who paid, and 
still more to the one who received it, to be supposed to remain 
neutral for hire ; but the fifteen hundred talents he would 
send in charge of Folemocrates and others to Samothrace, 
to be held as a deposit there. Now Perseus was master of 
Samothrace ; but as Eumenes, like a poor physician, preferred 
a retatning-fee to a payment after work, he finally gave U|) 
the attempt, when he found that his own craftiness was no 


match for the meanness of Perseus. They thus parted on 
equal terms, leaving, like good athletes, the battle of avarice 
a drawn one. Some of these details leaked out at the time, 
and others were communicated subsequently to Perseus's 
intimate friends ; and he has taught us by them that every 
vice is clinched, so to speak, by avarice. 

9. I add the further question from my own reflexions, 
Reflexions on the whether avarice is not also short-sighted ? For 
blindness of the who could fail to remark the folly of both the 
avancious kings, kings ? How could Eumenes on the one hand 
expect to be trusted by a man with whom he was on such bad 
terms; and to get so large a sum of money, when he was 
able to give Perseus absolutely no security for recovering 
it, in case of his not carrying out his promises? And 
how could he expect not to be detected by the Romans in 
taking so large a sum ? If he had concealed it at the time he 
certainly would not have done so long. Moreover, he would 
have been bound at any rate, in return for it, to have adopted 
the quarrel with Rome ; in which he would have been certain 
to have lost the money and his kingdom together, and very 
probably his life also, by coming forward as an enemy of the 
Romans. For if, even as it was, when he accomplished 
nothing, but only imagined it, he fell into the gravest dangers, 
what would have happened to him if this design had been 
brought to perfection ? And again, as to Perseus — who could 
fail to be surprised at his thinking anything of higher import- 
ance, or more to his advantage, than to give the money and 
allow Eumenes to swallow the bait ? For if, on the one hand, 
Eumenes had performed any part of his promises, and had 
put an end to the war, the gift would have been well bestowed ; 
and if, on the other hand, he had been deceived of that 
hope, he could at least have involved him in the certain 
enmity of Rome; for he would have had it entirely in his 
own power to make these transactions public. And one may 
easily calculate how valuable this w^ould have been to Perseus, 
whether he succeeded or failed in the war : for he would 
have regarded Eumenes as the guilty cause of all his mis- 
fortunes, and could in no way have retaliated upon him more 
effectually than by making him an enemy of Rome. What 


then was the root of all this blind folly? Nothing but 

avarice. It could have been nothing else ; for, to save himself 

from giving money, Perseus was content to suffer 

anything, and neglect every other considera- ^cmiiiui"^ la 

tion. On a par too with this was his conduct 

to the Gauls and Genthius. . . . 

10. The question being put to the vote at Rhodes, it was 
carried to send envoys to negotiate a peace ; 

and this decree thus decided the relative mXe^afu^^jJ^ 
strength of the opposite political parties at to (onn a con- 
Rhodes [as has been stated in my essay on fedoraiion againsi 
public speaking], showing that the party for '["™^„|,",'o^^;' 
siding with Perseus was stronger than that 
which was for preserving their country and its laws. The 
Prytanies immediately appointed ambassadors to negotiate 
the cessation of the war : Agepolis, Diodes, and Cleombrotus 
were sent to Rome ; Damon, Nicostratus, Agesilochus, and 
Telephus to Perseus and the consul. The Rhodians went on 
in the same spirit to take farther steps, so that they eventually 
committed themselves past all excuse. For they at once 
sent ambassadors to Crete, to renew their friendly relations 
with the entire Cretan people, and to urge that, in view of the 
dangers that threatened them, they should throw in their lot with 
the people of Rhodes, and hold the same people to be friends 
and enemies as they did, and also to address the separate cities 
to the same effect. . . . 

11. When the embassy led by Parmenio and Morcus 
from Genthius, accompanied by those led by The manner in 
Metrodorus, arrived in Rhodes, the assembly which this vote of 
summoned to meet them proved very turbulent, ""^ >j°^'^'fia^* 
the party of Deinon venturing openly to plead ' ' ' 

the cause of Perseus, whilst that of Theaetetus was quite over- 
powered and dismayed. For the presence of the Illyrian 
galleys, the nunilier of the Roman cavalry that had been 
killed, and the fact of Genthius having changed sides, quite 
crushed them. Thus it was that the result of the meeting of 
the assembly was as I have described it. For the Rhodians 
voted to return a favourable answer to both kings, to state 
that they had resolved to put an end to the war, and to 


exhort the kings themselves to make no difficulty about the 
terms. They also received the ambassadors of Genthius 
at the common altar- hearth or Prytaneum of the city with 
every mark of friendship. . . . 

1 2. Other historians [have spoken in exaggerated terms] * 

of the Syrian war. And the reason is one 

P^y&mcth^ which I have Often mentioned. Though their 

in writing history, subjccts are simple and without complications, 

and his avoidance they seek the name and reputation of historians 

^^'d^t^iSr^ not from the truth of their facts, but the number 

of their books ; and accordingly they are obligod 
to give petty affairs an air of importance, and fill out and give 
rhetorical flourishes to what was originally expressed briefly; 
dress up actions and achievements which were originally quite 
secondary; expatiate on struggles; and describe pitched battles, 
in which sometimes ten or a few more infantry fell, and still 
fewer cavalry. As for sieges, local descriptions, and the like, 
one cannot say that their treatment is adequate, because they 
have no facts to give. But a writer of universal history must 
pursue a different plan ; and therefore I ought not to be con- 
demned for minimising the importance of events, if I some- 
times pass over affairs that have met with wicie fame and 
laboured description, or for mentioning them with brevity ; but 
I ought to be trusted to give to each subject the amount of dis- 
cussion which it deserves. Such historians as I refer to, when 
they are describing in the course of their work the siege, say 
of Phanoteia, or Coroneia, or [Haliartus], are forced to dis- 
play all the contrivances, bold strokes, and other features of a 
siege ; and when they come to the capture of Tarentum, the 
sieges of Corinth, Sardis, Gaza, Bactra, and, above all, of 
Carthage, they must draw on their own resources to prolong 
the agony and heighten the picture, and are not at ail satisfied 
with me for giving a more truthful relation of such events as they 
really occurred. Let this statement hold good also as to my 
description of pitched battles and public harangues, as well as 
other departments of history ; in all of which I might fairly 
claim considerable indulgence, as also in what is now about to 

* The extract begins in the middle of a sentence at the top of a page. I 
have supplied these words at a guess, giving what seems the sense. 


be narrated, if I am detected in some inconsistency in the 
substance of my story, the treatment of my facts, or the style 
of language ; and also if 1 make some mistakes in the names 
of mountains or rivers, or the special features of localities : for 
indeed the magnitude of my work is a sufficient excuse in all 
these points, unless, indeed, I am ever detected in deliberate 
or interested misstatements in my writings : for such I ask no 
indulgence, as I have repeatedly and explicitly remarked in 
the course of my history. . . . 

IS. Genthius, king of the lllyrians, disgraced himself by 
many abominable actions in the course of his intemperance 
life from his addiction to drink, in which he in- and bruiaiiiy of 
dulged continually day and night. Among other Genthius. 
things he killed his brother Plastor, who was about to marry 
the daughter of Monunius, and married the girl himsel£ He 
also behaved with great cruelty to his subjects. . . . 

In the spring of B.C. 1 68 Genthius was forced to surrender to 
the praetor L. Anidus Gallus {Livy, 44, 30-31). The consul 
L. Aemilius Paulus found Perseus on the left bank of the Mace- 
donian river Enipeus in a very strong position, which was how- 
ever turned by a gallant exploit of JVasica and Q. J^abius 
Maximus, who made their way with a considerable force oi^erthe 
mountains, thus getting on the rear of Perseus. Liiy, 44, 
30-35. Plutarch, Aemil. 15. 

14h The first man to volunteer to make the outflanking 
movement was Scipio Nasica, son-in-law of 

Scipio Africanus, who afterwards became the '^ri!^lZ'''''i'"' 
^ ^ , , II, ^^^ others volun- 

most mnuential man m the Senate,' and who iccr to cross the 
now undertook to lead the party. The second mouniaina into 
was Fabius Maximus, the eldest of the sons of q„|^JJIJ^ ^ 
the consul Aemilius Paulus,* still quite a young 
man, who stood forward and offered to join with great 

■ P. Corncliiu Scipio Nasica Corculum was afterwards Ponlifex Maximus 
(rc 150). See Cic de Sen. 3. ja 

' Of the two eldest sons o[ Aemilius. the elder was adopted by Quinlus 
Fabius Maximus. Ihc second by P. Cornelius Scipio, son of the elder Af ' 
his malemal uncle. 


enthusiasm. Aemilius was therefore delighted and assigned 
them a body of soldiers. ^ . . . 

Struggle in the 1^* The Romans offered a gallant resist- 
bedoftheEnipeus.ance by aid of their strong targets or Ligurian 

Livy. 44. 35- shields. . . . 

Perseus saw that Aemilius had not moved, and did not 

The Romans ^ckon on what was taking place, when suddenly 

force the heights a Cretan, who had deserted from the Roman 

by way of army on its march, came to him with the in- 
y eum. formation that the Romans were getting on his 
rear. Though thrown into the utmost panic he did not strike 
his camp, but despatched ten thousand mercenaries and two 
thousand Macedonians under Milo, with orders to advance with 
speed and seize the heights. The Romans fell upon these as 
they were lying asleep.* . . . 

16. An eclipse of the moon occurring, the report went 
abroad, and was believed by many, that it signified an eclipse 
of the king. And this circumstance raised the spirits of the 
Romans and depressed those of the Macedonians. So true is the 
common saying that "war has many a groundless scare. "^ . . . 

Perseus finding himself thus on the point of being outflanked 
retired on Pydna^ near which toivn Aemilius Paulus, after 
considerable delay , about midsummer inflicted a crushing defeat 
upon him. Perseus fled to Amphipolis, and thence to Samothrace^ 
7vliere lie was captured by Paulus and taken to Rome to adorn 
his triumph J and afterwards alloived to live as a private person 
at Alba, This was the end of tlie Mcuedonian kingdom, {Livy, 
44, 36-43; 45, 1-8. Plutarch, Aemil. 16-23.) 

^ From Plutarch, Aemilius, 15, who adds that Polybius made a mistake as 
to the number of soldiers told off for this service, which to- judge from Livy, 
44, 35, Polybius probably stated at 5000. Plutarch got his correction from an 
extant letter of Nasica (8000 Roman infantry, with 120 horse, and 200 
Thracians and Cretans). 

"^ From Plutarch, who again contradicts this last statement, on the authority 
of Nasica, who said that there was a sharp engagement on the heights. 

' The Roman was saved from a scare by the eclipse being foretold by Gaius 
Sulpicius Gallus, famous for his knowledge of Greek literature and astronomy. 
He is represented by Cicero as explaining the celestial globe {spkaera) which 
Marcellus brought from Syracuse. He was consul in B.C. 166. Livy, 44, 37 ; 
Cicero, Brut, § 78 ; <^ Repub, i, § 21. 

xiix BATTLE OF PYDN^A 399 

17. The consul Lucius Aemilius had never seen a phalanx 
until he saw it in the army of Perseus on this 1^ phalani at 
occasion ; and he often confessed to some of his the hatiie of 
friends at Rome subsequently, that he had never ^'''S 
beheld anything more alanning and terrible than 

the Macedonian phalanx: and yet he had been, if any one ever . 
had, not only a spectator but an actor in many battles. . . . 

Many plans which look plausible and feasible, when 
brought to the test of actual experience, tike base coins 
when brought to the furnace, cease to answer in any way to 
their original conceptions. . . . 

When Perseus came to the hour of trial his courage all left 
him, like that of an athlete in bad training. For when the 
danger was approaching, and it became necessary to fight a 
decisive battle, his resolution gave way. , . . 

As soon as the battle began, the Macedonian king played 
the coward and rode off to the town, under the pretext of 
sacrificing to Hercules, — who certainly does not accept craven 
gifts from cravens, nor fulfil unworthy prayers. . , . 

18. He was then very young, and it was his first experience 
of actual service in the field, and having but scipo Afncinus 
recently begun to taste the sweets of promotion, the younger, cf. 
he was keen, ambitious, and eager to be first. . . , ^"t- *''• <* ''' 

19. Just when Perseus had been beaten and was trying to 
save himself by flight, the Senate determined to xh^ Rhodbn 
admit the ambassadors, who had come from mission deliver 
Rhodes to negotiate a peace, to an audience : '^"^'^ i^ssage too 
Fortune thus appearing designedly to parade 

the folly of the Rhodians on the stage, — if we may say " of the 
Rhodians," and not rather " of the individuals who were then 
in the ascendant at Rhodes." VVhen Agesipolis and his 
colleagues entered the Senate, they said that " They had come 
to arrange an end to the war ; for the people of Rhodes, — see- 
ing that the war was become protracted to a considerable length 
of time, and seeing that it was disadvantageous to all the Greeks, 
as well as to the Romans themselves, on account of its enormous 
expenses, — had come to that conclusion. Hut as the war was 
already ended, and the wish of the Rhodians was thus fulfilled, 
they had only to congratulate the Romans." Such was the 


brief speech of Agesipolis. But the Senate seized the oppor- 
tunity of making an example of the Rhodians, and produced an 
answer of which the upshot was that "They did not regard this 
Uncompromising embassy as having been sent by the Rhodians 
answer of the in the interests either of the Greeks or them- 
Senate. selves, but in those of Perseus. For if they had 
meant to send an embassy in behalf of the Greeks, the proper 
time for doing so was when Perseus was plundering the territory 
and cities of Greece, while encamped for nearly two years in 
Thessaly. But to let that time pass without notice, and to 
come now desiring to put an end to the war, at a time when 
the Roman legions had entered Macedonia, and Perseus was 
closely beleagured and almost at the end of his hopes, was a 
clear proof to any one of observation that the Rhodians had 
sent their embassy, not with the desire of ending the war, but 
to rescue and save Perseus to the best of their ability. There- 
fore they deserved no indulgence at the hands of the Romans 
at this time, nor any favourable reply." Such was the Senate's 
answer to the Rhodians. . . . 

20. Then Aemilius Paulus speaking once more in Latin bade 
Perseus, being ^^ members of his council, " With such a sight 

brought a before their eyes,'* — pointing to Perseus, — " not 
prisoner before ^q ^g ^^^ boastful in thc hour of success, nor to 

and his council, ^^^ ^"X extreme or inhuman measures against 

refuses to reply any one, nor in fact ever to feel confidence in 

to his questions, ^^ permanence of their present good fortune. 

the king in Greek ^^t^er it was precisely at the time of greatest 

and then his success, either private or public, that a man 

council in Latin, should be most alive to the possibility of a 

»vy, 45. • reverse. Even so it was difficult for a man to 

exhibit moderation in good fortune. But the distinction 

between fools and wise was that the former only learnt by their 

own misfortunes, the latter by those of others." . . . 

21. One is often reminded of the words of Demetrius of 
Demetrius of Phalerum. In his treatise on Fortune, wishing 
Phaierum on to give the world a distinct view of her mutability, 

mutability, j^^ fixed upon the period of Alexander, when 
that monarch destroyed the Persian dynasty, and thus expresses 
himself: "If you will take, I don't say unlimited time or many 


generations, but only these last fifty years immediately preceding 
our generation, you will be able to understand the cruelty of 
Fortune. For can you suppose, If some god had warned 
the Persians or their king, or the Macedonians or their king, 
that in fifty years the very name of the Persians, who once 
were masters of the world, would have been lost, and that the 
Macedonians, whose name was before scarcely known, would 
become masters of it ail, that they would have believed it? 
Nevertheless it is true that Fortune, whose influence on our life 
is incalculable, who displays her power by surprises, is even 
now I think, showing all mankind, by her elevation of the 
Macedonians into the high prosperity once enjoyed by the 
Persians, that she has merely lent them these advantages until 
she may otherwise determine concerning them." And this has 
now come to pass in the person of Perseus ; and indeed 
Demetrius has spoken prophetically of the future as though he 
were inspired. And as the course of my history brought me to 
the period which witnessed theruinofthe Macedonian kingdom, 
I judged it to be right not to pass it over without proper 
remark, especially as I was an eye-witness of the transaction. 
It was a case I thought both for enlarging on the theme 
myself, and for recalling the words of Demetrius, who appeared 
to me to have shown something more than mere human 
sagacity in his remarks ; for he made a true forecast of the 
future almost a hundred and fifty years before the event. . . . 
2Z After the conclusion of the battle between Perseus and 
the Romans, king Eumenes found himself in 
what people call an unexpected and extraordin- ai„^ys"b^^!^ 
ary trouble, but what, if we regard the natural 
course of human concerns, was quite an everyday affair. For 
it is quite the way of Fortune to confound human calculations 
by surprises ; and when she has helped a man for a time, and 
caused her balance to incline in his favour, to turn round 
upon him as though she repented, throw her weight into the 
opposite scaJe, and mar all his successes. And i;umencs disnp. 
this was the case now with Eumenes. He im- poinicd ot his 
agined that at last his own kingdom was safe, """l" "^ l"'"' ^1 
and that he might look forward to a tmie of 
ease, now that Perseus and the whole kingdom of Macedonia 


23. In ihc Peloponnesu 
of the winter . 

This gave rist 
sions. The party of Callicr 
granting the help ; while Arc 
for sending it to the kings in . 
alliance. For by this time it 1 
Ptolemy had been proclaimed I 
owing to the danger which t. 
elder had subsequently retume< 
ing jointly with his sister. A 

tkind of assistance, they sent J 
the Achaeans, asking a thousar 
with Lycortas to command th< 
^ They sent a message also to ' 

him to hire them a thousand 

chanced to have become intims 

ticular men, owing to the tran 

The ambassadors arrived whei 

session in Corinth. They the 

' recalling the many evidences 

j Achaeans to the kingdom of ] 

! the danger in tri>!-»- 


forces for the service of Rome. For there was a general 
expectation just then of a decisive battle being fought, as Q. 
Philippus was wintering in Macedonia. 

24. The people were alarmed lest they should be thought 
to (ail the Romans in any way : and accordingly pdybius advo- 
LycoTtas and Polybius rose in their turn, and, cates the cause of 
among other advice which they impressed upon ""^ ftolenues. 
them, argued that " ^Vhen in the previous year the Achaeans 
had voted to join the Roman army with their full levy, and 
sent Polybius to announce that resolution, Quintus Marcius, 
while accepting the kindness of their intention, had yet stated 
that the assistance was not needed, since he had won the pass 
into Macedonia. Their opponents therefore were manifestly 
using the need of helping the Romans merely as a pretext for 
preventing this aid being sent to Alexandria. They entreated 
the Achaeans, in view of the greatness ofthe danger surrounding 
the king of Egypt, not to neglect the right moment for acting; 
but keeping in mind their mutual agreement and good services, 
and above all their oaths, to fulfil the terms of their agree- 

The people were once more inclined to grant the aid when 
ihey hear4 this : but Callicrates and his party 
managed to prevent the decree being passed, by *''^ j^^^^^'^'* 
staggering the magistrates with the assertion 
that it was unconstitutional to discuss the question of sending 
help abroad in public assembly.^ But a short time afterwards 
a meeting was summoned at Sicyon, which was ^^^ ^^ ^ smaller 
attended not only by the members of the coun- meeting ai Sicyon 
cil, but by all citizens over thirty years of age ; ^°^i^"^ prevails, 
and after a lengthened debate, Polybius especially dwelling on 
the fact that the Romansdid not require assistance, — inwhich he 
was believed not to be speaking without good reason, as he had 
spent the previous summer in Macedonia at the headquarters 

' ir irft^. The objection, though it served to divert the magistrates Irom 
going on with the proposilion Bl Ihc lime, seems 10 have been got over bcCore 
the meeting at Sicyon ; unless, indeed, the laller was considered to be of a 
diflcrenl nature in regard to the nge of those nttcnding. But we have no in- 
fonnalion as to Ihisrcstdclion of thiny years of .-ige, — wheihei it was universal. 
or confined to particular occasions. This passage would seem to point to the 
)Ut«r alternative; 


of Marcius Philippus, — and also alleging that, even supposing 
the Romans did turn out to require their active support, the 
Achaeans would not be rendered incapable of furnishing it by 
the two hundred horse and one thousand foot which were to 
be despatched to Alexandria, — for they could, without any in- 
convenience, put thirty or forty thousand men into the field, — 
the majority of the meeting were convinced, and were inclined 
to the idea of sending the aid Accordingly, on the second of 
the two days on which, according to the laws, those who 
wished to do so were bound to bring forward their motions, 
Lycortas and Polybius proposed that the aid should be sent 
Callicrates, on the other hand, proposed to send ambassadors 
to reconcile the two Eg>'ptian kings with Antiochus. So once 
more, on these two motions being put, there was an animated 
contest ; in which, however, Lycortas and Polybius got a con- 
siderable majority on their side. For there was a very wide 
distinction between the claims of the two kingdoms. There 
were very few instances to be found in past times of any act 
of friendship on the part of Syria to the Greeks, — though the 
liberality of the present king was well known in Greece, — but 
from Egypt the acts of kindness in past times to the Achaeans 
had been as numerous and important as any one could possibly 
expect. By dwelling on this point Lycortas made a great 
impression, because the distinction between the two kingdoms 
in this respect was shown to be immense. For it was as diffi- 
cult to count up all the benefactions of the Alexandrine kings, 
as it was impossible to find a single act of friendship done by 
the dynasty of Antiochus to the Achaeans. . . . 

25. For a time Andronidas and Callicrates kept on arguing 

The measure is ^^ support of the plan of putting an end to 
again defeated by the war : but as no One was persuaded by 

a trick of Caiii- them, they employed a stratagem. A letter- 
carrier came into the theatre (where the meet- 
ing was being held), who had just arrived with a despatch from 
Quintus Marcius, urging those Achaeans who were of the pro- 
Roman party to reconcile the kings ; for it was a fact that the 
Senate had sent a mission under T. Numisius to do so. But 
this really made against their argument : for Titus Numisius 
and his colleagues had been unable to effect the pacification, and 


had returned to Rome completely unsuccessful in the object 
of their mission. However, as Polybius and his party did 
not wish to speak against the despatch, from consideration for 
Marcius, they retired from the discussion : and it was thus 
that the proposal to send an aid to the kings fell througL The 
Achaeans voted to send ambassadors to effect The ^ngj ^\^ 
the pacification : and Archon of Aegeira, and for Lyconas and 
Arcesilaus and Ariston of Megalopolis were Polybius. 
appointed to the duty. Whereupon the envoys of Ptolemy, 
being disappointed of obtaining the help, handed over to the 
magistrate the despatch from the kings, in which they asked 
that they would send Lycortas and Polybius to take part in 
the war. . . . 

26. Forgetful of all he had written and said Anliochus 
began preparing for a renewal of the war 

against Rolemy. So true are the words of '^^'^."^rM^i™'^' 
Simonides, — " 'Tis hard to be good." For to ihus joining each 
have certain impulses towards virtue, and even oiher, Amiochus 
to hold to it up to a certain point, is easy ; but ^'^™^^ 'ils""' 
to be uniformly consistent, and to allow no 
circumstances of danger to shake a resolute integrity, which 
regards honour and justice as the highest considerations, is 
indeed difficult. ... 

27. WhenAntiochus had advanced to attack Ptolemy inorder 
to possess himself of Pelusium, he was met by *„,.,[,„_ j „ 
the Roman commander Gaius Popilius Laenas. near Alexandria 
Upon the king greeting him from some distance, (Li'7. 4S.,f»)by 
and holding out his right hand to him, Popilius \^fr^^^\,o 
answered by holding out the tablets which con- forces him to ab- 
tained the decree of the Senate, and bade s'ain from the 
Antiochus read that first : not thinking it right, '^"" 

I suppose, to give the usual sign of friendship until he knew 
the mind of the recipient, whether he were to be regarded as a 
friend or foe. On the king, after reading the despatch, saying 
that he desired to consult with his friends on the situation, 
Popilius did a thing which was looked upon as exceedingly 
overbearing and insolent Happening to have a vine stick in 
hb hand, he drew a circle round Antiochus with it, and ordered 
him to give his answer to the letter before he stepped out of 



that circumference. The king was taken aback by this haughty 
proceeding. After a brief interval of embarrassed silence, he 
replied that he would do whatever the Romans demanded. 
Then Popilius and his colleagues shook him by the hand, and 
one and all greeted him with warmth. The contents of the 
despatch was an order to put an end to the war with Ptolemy 
at once. Accordingly a stated number of days was allowed 
him, within which he withdrew his army into Syria, in high 
dudgeon indeed, and groaning in spirit, but yielding to the 
necessities of the time. 

Popilius and his colleagues then restored order in 

Popilius goes on Alexandria; and after exhorting the two kings to 

to Cyprus and maintain peaceful relations with each other, and 

forces the anny charging them at the same time to send Poly- 

ofAntiochusto ^^^^yg ^Q Rome, they took ship and sailed 

evacuate it > j ^ 

towards Cyprus, with the intention of promptly 
ejecting from the island the forces that were also gathered 
there. When they arrived, they found that Ptolemy's generals 
had already sustained a defeat, and that the whole island was 
in a state of excitement They promptly caused the invading 
army to evacuate the country, and remained there to keep 
watch until the forces had sailed away for Syria. Thus did 
the Romans save the kingdom of Ptolemy, when it was all but 
The previous sinking under its disasters. Fortune indeed so 
defeat of Perseus disposed of the fate of Perseus and the Mace- 
I^vlui^of^ ^^t ^^"^^'^s, that the restoration of Alexandria and 
gyp . ^^ ^^Qie Qf Egypt was decided by it ; that is 
to say, by the fate of Perseus being decided previously : for if 
that had not taken place, or had not been certain, I do not 
think that Antiochus would have obeyed these orders. 


1. Attalus, brother of king Eumenes, came to Rome this 
year, pretending that, even if the disaster of the b.c. 167. Coss.Q. 
Gallic rising had not happened to the kingdom, Aciius Pactus. M. 
he should have come to Rome, to congratulate J^^^ Pennus. 
the Senate, and to receive some mark of its ^ , 

, - , . , . , , Attains at Rome, 

approval for having been actively engaged on is persuaded to 
their side and loyally shared in all their dangers ; try by the Roman 
but, as it happened, he had been forced to come *^®^P ^Z ^"PP^***^ 

. , ' ^ . , , c »iis brother. 

at that time to Rome owing to the danger from 
the Gauls. Upon finding a general welcome from everybody, 
owing to the acquaintance formed with him on the campaign, 
and the belief that he was well disposed to them, and meeting 
with a reception that surpassed his expectation, the young 
man's hopes were extraordinarily raised, because he did not 
know the true reason of this friendly warmth. The result was 
that he narrowly escaped ruining his own and his brother's 
fortunes, and indeed the entire kingdom. The majority at Rome 
were thoroughly angry with king Eumenes, and believed that 
he had been playing a double game during the war, keeping up 
communications with Perseus, and watching his opportunity 
against them : and accordingly some men of high rank got 
Attalus under their influence, and urged him to lay aside the 
character of ambassador for his brother, and to speak in his 
own behalf; as the Senate was minded to secure a separate 
kingdom and royal government for him, because of their dis- 
pleasure with his brother. This excited the ambition of 
Attalus still more, and in private conversation he signified his 
assent to those who advised this course. Finally, he arranged 
with some men of position that he would actually appear 
before the Senate and deliver a speech on the subject. 


2. ^Vhile Attalus was engaged on this intrigue, Eumenes, 

Stratius is sent to faring what w^ould happen, sent his physician 

dissuade Attalus Stratius to Rome, putting him in possession of 

from his meditated ^j^^ facts, and charging him to employ every means 

to prevent Attalus from following the advice 
of those who wished to ruin their kingdom. On arriving at 
Rome and getting Attalus by himself, he used a great variety 
of arguments to him (and he was a man of great sense 
and powers of persuasion), and at length, with much trouble, 
succeeded in his object, and in recalling him from his 
mad project He represented to him that "he was already 
practically joint-king with his brother, and only differed from 
him in the fact that he wore no diadem, and was not called 
king, though in everything else he possessed an equal and 
identical authority : that in the future he was the acknowledged 
heir to the crown, and with no very distant prospect of posses- 
sion ; as the king, from tlie weak state of his health, was in con- 
stant expectation of his departure, and being childless could 
not, even if he wished it, leave the crown to any one else." 
(For in fact that natural son of his, who afterwards succeeded 
to the crown, had not as yet been acknowledged.) " Above all, 
he was surprised at the hindrance Attalus was thus interposing 
to the measures necessary at that particular crisis. For they 
ought to thank heaven exceedingly if they proved able, even 
with hearty co-operation and unanimity, to repel the threatened 
attack of the Gauls ; but if he should at such a time quarrel 
with and oppose his brother, it was quite clear that he would 
ruin the kingdom, and deprive himself both of his present 
power and his future expectations, and his other brothers also 
of the kingdom and the power they possessed in it," By these 
and similar arguments Stratius dissuaded Attalus from taking 
any revolutionary steps. 

8. Accordingly, when Attalus appeared before the Senate, 
he congratulated it on what had happened ; expatiated on the 
loyalty and zeal shown by himself in the war with Perseus ; and 
urged at some length that the Senate should send envoys to 
restrain the audacity of the (iauls, and compel them to confine 
themselves once more to their original boundaries. He also 
said something about the cities of Aeneus and Maronea, desiring 


that they might be given as a free gift to himself But he said 
not a single word against the Icing, or about the partition of the 
kingdom. The senators, supposing that he would interview 
them privately on a future occasion upon these points, pro- 
mised to send the envoys, and loaded him lavishly with the 
customary presents, and, moreover, promised him these cities. 
But when, after receiving these marks of favour, he at once 
left Rome without fulfilling any of its expectations, the 
Senate, though foiled in its hopes, had nothing else which it 
could do ; but before he had got out of Italy it declared 
Acneus and Maronea free cities, — thus rescind- 
ing its promise, — and sent Publius Licinius at oaLiUa '° 
the head of a mission to the Gauls. And what 
instructions these ambassadors had given to them it is not easy 
to say, but it may be guessed without difficulty from what sub- 
sequently happened. And this will be rendered clear from the 
transactions themselves. 

4, There also came embassies from Rhodes, the first headed 
by Philocrates, the second by Philophron 
and Astymrfo. For when the Rhodans re- ",^'^^ 
ceived the answer given to the embassy of b.c. 167. 
Agesipolis immediately after the battle of Pydna, g^ ^ ^ 
they understood the anger and threatening 
attitude of the Senate towards them, and promptly despatched 
these embassies. Aslymedes and Philophron, observing in 
the course of public and private conversations the suspicions 
and anger entertained towards them at Rome, were reduced to 
a stale of great discouragement and distress. Terror of ihe 
But when one of the praetors mounted the Rhodian envoys ai 
Rostra and urged the people to declare war""'"'"^' °'"^''- 
a;;ainst Rhodes, then indeed they were beside themselves with 
terror at the danger that threatened their country. They 
assumed mourning garments, and in their various interviews 
with their friends dropped the tone of persuasion or demand, 
and pleaded instead, with tears and prayers, that they would not 
adopt any measure of supreme severity towards them. A few 
days afterwards Antony, one of the tribimes, introduced them 
to the Senate, and dragged the praetor who advised the war 
down from the Rostra. Philophron spoke first, and was 


followed by Astymedcs ; and, having thus uttered the 
proverbial " swan's song,** they received an answer which, while 
freeing them from actual fear of war, conveyed a bitter and 
stern rebuke from the Senate for their conduct. Now Asty- 
medes considered himself to have made a good speech on 
A criticism on the behalf of his country, but did not at all satisfy 

speech of the the Greeks visiting or residing at Rome. For 
Rhodian jjg aftcrwards published the speech contain- 
s >mtc cs. .^^ j^.^ argument in defence, which, to all those 
into whose hands it fell, appeared absurd and quite uncon- 
vincing. For he rested his plea not alone on the merits of his 
country, but still more on an accusation of others. Comparing 
the good services done and the co-operation undertaken by 
the others, he endeavoured to deny or minimise them ; while 
he exaggerated those of Rhodes as far above their actual 
amount as he could. The errors of others, on the contrary, 
he inveighed against in bitter and hostile terms, while those of 
the Rhodians he attempted to cloak and conceal, in order 
that, by this comparison, those of his own country might appear 
insignificant and pardonable, those of others grave and beyond 
excuse, "all of whom," he added, ** had already been pardoned 
before." But this sort of pleading can in no circumstances be 
considered becoming to a statesman. Take the case of the 
betrayal of secrets. It is not those who, for fear or gain, turn 
informers that we commend ; but those who endure any torture 
and punishment rather than involve an accomplice in the same 
misfortune. These are the men whom we approve and con- 
sider noble. But a man who, from some undefined alarm, 
exposes to the view of the party in power all the errors of 
others, and who recalls what time had obliterated from the 
minds of the ruling people, cannot fail to be an object of dis- 
like to all who hear of it. 

5. After receiving the above answer Philocrates and his 

colleagues immediately started home ; but Asty- 

^^'^ansvv^r ihc^ "^ medes and his fellows stayed where they were and 

Rhodians endea- kept on the watch, that no report or observation 

vour to propitiate against thcir country might be made unknown 

1 k^'^^^rorr to them. But when this answer of the Senate 
was reported at Rhodes, the people, considering 


themselves relieved of the worst fear — that, namely, of war — 
made light of the rest, though extremely unfavourable. So true 
it ever is that a dread of worse makes men forget lighter mis- 
fortunes. They immediately voted a complimentary crown 
worth ten thousand gold pieces^ to Rome, and appointed 
Theaetetus at once envoy and navarch to convey it at the be- 
ginning of summer, accompanied by an embassy under Rhodo- 
phon, to attempt in every possible way to make an alliance 
with the Romans. They acted thus because they wished that, 
if the embassy failed by an adverse answer at Rome, the failure 
might take place without the people having passed a formal 
decree, the attempt being made solely on the initiative of the 
navarch, and the navarch having by the law power to act in 
such a case. For the fact was that the republic xhe astuteness of 
of Rhodes had been administered with such the Rhodian 
consummate statesmanship, that, though it had po^cy. 
for nearly a hundred and forty years been engaged in con- 
junction with Rome in actions of the greatest importance and 
glory, it had never yet made an alliance with her. Nor 
ought I to omit stating the reason of this policy of the 
Rhodians. They wished that no ruler or prince should be 
entirely without hope of gaining their support or alliance ; and 
they therefore did not choose to bind or hamper themselves 
beforehand with oaths and treaties ; but, by remaining uncom- 
mitted, to be able to avail themselves of all advantages as they 
arose. But on this occasion they were much bent upon 
securing this mark of honour from Rome, not because they 
were anxious for the alliance, or because they were afraid of 
any one else at the time except the Romans, but because they 
wished, by giving an air of special importance to their design, 
to remove the suspicions of such as were inclined to entertain 
unfavourable thoughts of their state. For immediately after 
the return of the ambassadors under Theaetetus, Peraca, 
the Caunians revolted and the Mylassians seized and Myiassa. in 
on the cities in Euromus. And about the same ^''^^' ''*^^°^^* 
time the Roman Senate published a decree declaring all 

* Livy says viginii millia. By "xpwTov^ Polybius appears to mean 
"staters," worth about 20 drachmae (20 francs). This would give a rough 
value of the present as ;f 8000, or on Livy's computation twice that amount. 


Carians and Lycians free who had been assigned to the Rhodians 
The Senate de- ^^^^^ ^^^ war with Antiochus. The Caunian and 
Clare Caria and Mylassian revolts were speedily put down by 
Lycia free. See jj^g Rhodians ; for they compelled the Caunians, 

by sending Lycus with a body of soldiers, to 
return to their allegiance, though the people of Cib)rra had 
come to their assistance ; and in an expedition into Euromus 
they conquered the Mylassians and Alabandians in the field, 
these two peoples having combined their forces to attack 
Orthosia. But when the decree concerning the Lycians and 
Carians was announced they were once more in a state of 
dismay, fearing that their gift of the crown had proved in 
vain, as well as their hopes of an alliance. . . . 

6. I have already directed my readers' attention to the 
The three classes poHcy of Deinon and Polyaratus. For Rhodes 
of men who in the was not the only place which experienced grave 
various states got (jancrer and important changes. Nearly all the 

into trouble for «• j • i -r -n i 

their conduct States sufTcred m the same way. It will there- 
during the Mace- fore be instructive to take a review of the 
donian war. policy adopted by the statesmen in the several 
countries, and to ascertain which of them will be proved to 
have acted with wisdom, and which to have done otherwise : 
in order that posterity in similar circumstances of danger may, 
with these examples as models, so to speak, before their eyes, 
be able to choose the good and avoid the bad with a genuine 
insight ; and may not in the last hour of their lives dishonour 
their previous character and achievements, from failing to per- 
ceive where the path of honour lies. There were, then, 
three different classes of persons who incurred blame for their 
conduct in the war with Perseus. One consisted of those 
who, while displeased at seeing the controversy brought to a 
decisive end, and the control of the world fall into the power of 
one government, nevertheless took absolutely no active steps for 
or against the Romans, but left the decision entirely to Fortune. 
A second consisted of those who were glad to see the 
question settled, and wished Perseus to win, but were unable to 
convert the citizens of their own states or the members of 
their race to their sentiments. And a third class consisted of 
those who actually succeeded in inducing their several states 


to change round and join the alliance of Perseus. Our 
present task is to examine how each of these conducted their 
respective policies, 

7. In the last class were Antinous, Theodotus, and Cephalus, 
who induced the Molossians to join Perseus. . 

These men, when the results of the campaign ^j^J^^^^j^^^^ (-^.p^, 
went completely against them, and they found lus of the Moiossi 
themselves in imminent danger of the worst ^"^ instances of 

X yy e '^ J ^ the third class. 

consequences, put a bold face upon it and met 
an honourable death in the field. These men deserve our 
commendation for their self-respect, in refusing to allow them- 
selves to lapse into a position unworthy of their previous life. 

Again, in Achaia and Thessaly and Perrhaebia several 
persons incurred blame by remaining neutral, ^ 

^1 J .» ^ ^v ^ r^« ^u • Several instances 

on the ground that they were watching their ^f j^e first class 
opportunity, and were in heart on the side of in Achaia 
Perseus : and yet they never let a word to that P^^io^Js, Thessaly, 

rt- «t 1 !• iincl Perrhaebia, 

effect get abroad, nor were ever detected m 
sending letter or message to Perseus on any subject whatever, 
but conducted themselves with unexceptionable discretion. 
Such men as these therefore very properly determined to face 
judicial inquiry and stand their judgment, and to make every 
effort to save themselves. For it is quite as great a sign of 
cowardice to abandon life voluntarily when a man is conscious 
of no crime, from fear of the threats of political opponents or 
of the power of the conquerors, as it is to cling to life to the 
loss of honour. 

Again, in Rhodes and Cos, and several other cities, there 
were men who favoured the cause of Perseus, instances of the 
and who were bold enough to speak in behalf second class in 
of the Macedonians in their own cities, and to ^*^ojJ«S' ^os, and 
inveigh against the Romans, and to actually ° er paces, 
advise active steps in alliance with Perseus, but who were not 
able to induce their states to transfer themselves to alliance 
with the king. The most conspicuous of such men were in 
Cos the two ^brothers Hippias and Diomedon, and in Rhodes 
Deinon and Polyaratus. 

8, And it is impossible not to view the policy of these 
men with disapproval. To begin with, all their fellow- 


citizens were aware of everything they had done or said ; 
in the next place, the letters were intercepted and made 
public which were coming from Perseus to them, and 
from themselves to Perseus, as well as the messengers from 
both sides : yet they could not make up their minds to 
yield and put themselves out of the way, but still disputed 
the point. The result of this persistence and dinging 
to life, in the face of a desperate position, was that they 
quite ruined their character for courage and resolution, 
and left not the least ground for pity or sympathy in the 
minds of posterity. For being confronted with their own 
letters and agents, they were regarded as not merely un- 
fortunate, but rather as shameless. One of those who went 
on these voyages was a man named Thoas. He had frequently 
sailed to Macedonia on a mission from these men, and when 
the decisive change in the state of affairs took place, conscious 
of what he had done, and fearing the consequences, he retired 
to Cnidos. But the Cnidians having thrown him into prison, 
he was demanded by the Rhodians, and on coming to Rhodes 
and being put to the torture, confessed his crime ; and his 
story was found to agree with everything in the cipher of 
the intercepted letters, and with the despatches from Perseus 
to Deinon, and from Deinon and Polyaratus to him. There- 
fore it was a matter of surprise that Deinon persuaded himself 
to cling to life and submit to so signal an exposure. 

9. But in respect to folly and baseness of spirit, Polyaratus 
The vain attempts surpassed Deinon. P'or when PopUius Laenas 
of Polyaratus to charged king Ptolemy to send Polyaratus to 
escape, Rome, the king, from a regard both to Poly- 
aratus himself and his country, determined not to send him 
to Rome but to Rhodes, this being also what Polyaratus him- 
self asked him to do. Having therefore caused a galley to 
be prepared, the king handed him over to Demetrius, one of 
his own friends, and despatched him, and wrote a despatch to 
the Rhodians notifying the fact But touching at Phaselis in 
Ph r ^^ course of the voyage, Polyaratq^, from some 
notion or another which he had conceived, 
took suppliant branches in his hand, and fled for safety to the 
city altar. If any one had asked him his intention in thus 


acting, I am persuaded that he could not have told it. For If 
he wanted to go to his own country, where was the need of sup- 
pliant branches ? For his conductors were charged _to take him 
there. But if he wished to go to Rome, that was sure to take 
place whether he wished it or no. What other alternative was 
there? Other place that could receive him with safety to himself 
there was none. However, on the people of Phasclis sending 
to Rhodes to beg that they would receive Polyaratus, and take 
him away, the Rhodians came to the pradent resolution of 
sending an open vessel to convoy him ; but forbade the captain 
of it to actually take him on board, on the ground that the 
officers from Alexandria had it in charge to deliver the man 
in Rhodes. When the vessel arrived at Phaselis, and its cap- 
tain, Epichares, refused to take the man on board, and 
Demetrius, who had been deputed by the king for that busi- 
ness, urged him to leave the altar and resume his voyage ; and 
when the people of Phaselis supported his command, because 
they were afraid they would incur some blame from Rome on 
that account, Polyaratus could no longer resist the pressure of 
circumstances, but once more went on board Demetrius's galley. 
But in the course of the voyage he seized an opportunity 0/ 
doing the same again at Caunus, flying for 
safety there in the same way, and begging the 
Caunians to save him. Upon the Caunians rejecting him, on 
the grounds of their being leagued with Rhodes, he sent 
messages to Cibyra, begging them to receive him in their 
city, and to send him an escort. He had some claim upon 
this city, because the sons of its tyrant, Pancrales, had been 
educated at his house ; accordingly, they listened to his re- 
quest, and did what he asked. But when he . „ . 

^-. ■ ■ ■ . - ,, .1 and "l Cibym. 

got to Cibyra, he placed himself and the 

Cibyratae into a still greater difficulty than that which he 
caused before when at Phaselis. For they neither dared to 
retain him in their town for fear of Rome, nor had the 
power of sending him to Rome, because of their ignor- 
ance of thf sea, being an entirely inland folk. Eventu- 
ally they were reduced to send envoys to Rhodes and the 
Roman proconsul in Macedonia, begging them to take over 
the man. Lucius Aemilius wrote to the Cibyratae, ordering 


them to keep Polyaratus in safe custody; and to the Rhodians 
to make provision for his conveyance by sea and his safe 
delivery upon Roman territory. Both peoples obeyed the 
despatch : and thus Polyaratus eventually came to Rome, after 
making a spectacle of his folly and cowardice to the best of 
his ability ; and after having been, thanks to his own folly, 
four times surrendered — by king Ptolemy, the people of 
Phaselis, the Cibyratae, and the Rhodians. 

The reason of my having dwelt at some length on the 
Story of Polyaratus and Deinon is not that I have any desire 
to trample upon their misfortunes, for that would be ungener- 
ous in the last degree ; but in order that, by clearly showing 
their folly, I might instruct those who fall into similar difficulties 
and dangers how to take a better and wiser course. . . . 

10. The most striking illustration of the mutability and 
The columns con- capriciousness of Fortune is when a man, within 
structed ai Delphi a brief period, turns out to have been preparing 
for statucsof Per- |q,. ^^ ygg q£ jjjg enemies the very things which 

*Aemiiius.^ he imagined that he was elaborating in his own 

Autumn of B.C. honour. Thus Perseus was having some columns 

167. Livy, 45, 27- made, which Lucius Aemilius, finding unfinished, 

caused to be completed, and placed statues of himself on 

them. . . . 

He admired the situation of the city, and the excellent 
.... . position of the acropolis for commanding the 
Corinih. districts on both sides of the Isthmus. . . . 
. _, Having been long anxious to see Olympia, 

AtOlympia. 1 ^ f^u«.u / r > 

^ he set out thither. . . 
Aemilius entered the sacred enclosure at Olympia, and 
was struck with admiration at the statue of the god, remark- 
ing that, to his mind, Pheidias was the only artist who had 
represented the Zeus of Homer ; and that, though he had had 
great expectations of Olympia, he found the reality far sur- 
passed them. . . . 

11. The Aetolians had been accustomed to get their live- 

lihood from plundering and such like lawless 
st^e ©rActoi^ occupations ; and as long as they were permitted 

to plunder and loot the Greeks, they got all 
they required from them, regarding every country as that of 


an enemy. But subsequently, when the Romans obtained the 
supremacy, they were prevented from this means of support, 
and accordingly turned upon each other. Even before this, 
in their civil war, there was no horror which they did not com- 
mit ; and a little earlier still they had had a taste of mutual 
slaughter in the massacres at Arsinoe ; ^ they were, therefore, 
ready for anything, and their minds were so infuriated that 
they would not allow their magistrates to have even a voice in 
their business. Aetolia, accordingly, was a scene of turbu- 
lence, lawlessness, and blood : nothing they undertook was 
done on any calculation or fixed plan ; everything was con- 
ducted at haphazard and in confusion, as though a hurricane 
had burst upon them. . . . 

12. The state of Epirus was much the same. For in pro- 
portion as the majority of its people are more 
law-abiding than those of Aetolia, so their chief ^^"^y^^^™"' 
magistrate surpassed every one else in wicked- 
ness and contempt for law. For, I think, there never was 
and never will be a character more ferocious and brutal than 
that of Charops. . . . 

18. After the destruction of Perseus, immediately after the 
decisive battle, embassies were sent on all sides 
to congratulate the Roman commanders on the^^^^^^^^^ 
event. And as now all power tended towards especially 
Rome, in every city those who were regarded Achaeans. to be 
as of the Romanising party were in the ^rV^^A^?'^' 

- , ^ ^ . ■' . , . B«C. 107. 

ascendant, and were appointed to embassies 
and other services. Accordingly they flocked into Mace- 
donia — from Achaia, Callicrates, Aristodamus, Agesias, and 
Philippus; from Boeotia, Mnasippos; from Acarnania, Chre- 
mas ; from Epirus, Charops and Nicias ; from Aetolia, Lyciscus 

* Called by Polybius in previous books Conope, 4, 64 ; 5, 6. Its name 
was changed to Arsinoe, from its having been rebuilt and enlarged by Arsinoe, 
sister and wife of Ptolemy Philadelphus (Strabo, 10, 2, 22). It was on the 
east bank of the Achelous. Its modem name is Angelokastro. The civil war 
in Aetolia alluded to here is mentioned in Li\y. 41, 25 (b.c. 174). This parti- 
cular massacre appears to have taken place in B.C. 168-167. Li\'y (45, 28) 
narrates that Acmilius was met during his Greek tour in B.C. 167 by a crowd 
of Aetolians, in a miserable state of destitution, who informed him that five 
hundred and fifty Aetolian nobles had been massacred by Lyciscus and Tisippus, 
besides many driven into exile, and that the goods of both had been confiscated. 

VOL. II 2 E 


and Tisippus. These all having met, and eagerly vieing with 
each other in attaining a common object ; and there being no 
one to oppose them, since their political opponents had all 
yielded to the times and completely retired, they accomplished 
their purpose without trouble. So the ten commissioners 
issued orders to the other cities and leagues through the 
mouths of the strategi themselves as to what citizens were to go 
to Rome. And these turned out to be, for the most part, those 
whom the men I have named had made a list of on party grounds, 
except a very few of such as had done something conspicuous. 
But to the Achaean league they sent two men of the high- 
est rank of their own number, Gaius Claudius and Gnaeus 
Domitius. They had two reasons for doing so : the first was 
that they were uneasy lest the Achaeans should refuse to obey 
the written order, and lest Callicrates and his colleagues should 
be in absolute danger from being reputed to be the authors 
of tlic accusations against all the Greeks, — which was about 
true ; and in the second place, because in the intercepted 
despatches nothing distinct had been discovered against any 
Achaean. Accordingly, after a while, the proconsul sent the 
letter and envoys with reference to these men, although in his 
private opinion he did not agree with the charges brought by 
Lyciscus and Callicrates, as was afterwards made clear by 
what took place. . . . 

14. Lucius Anicius, who had been praetor, after his vic- 
tory over the Illyrians, and on bringing Genthius 
aS*^^^^^^ prisoner to Rome with his children, while 
over the Illyrians celebrating his triumph, did a very ridiculous 
at the Quirinalia, thing. He sent for the most famous artists 

^uc^^i67^^' ^'"^"^ Greece, and having constructed an im- 
mense theatre in the circus, he brought all the 
flute players on the stage together first. Their names were 
Theodorus the Boeotian, Theopompus and Hermippus of 
Lysimacheia, the most celebrated of the day. He placed them 
on the proscenium with the chorus, and bid them all play at 

once. But on their beginning to play the 

A scene in a. -ju -^ . 

Roman theatre. ^""^» accompanied by appropnate movements, 

he sent to them to say that they were not play- 
ing well, and must put more excitement into it. At first they 


did not know what to make of this, until one of the lictors 
showed them that they must form themselves into two com- 
panies, and facing round, advance against each other as 
though in a battle. The fluteplayers caught the idea at 
once, and, adopting a motion suitable to their own wild strains, 
produced a scene of great confusion. They made the middle 
group of the chorus face round upon the two extreme groups, 
and the fluteplayers, blowing with inconceivable violence and 
discordance, led these groups against each other. The mem- 
bers of the chorus meanwhile rushed, with a violent stamp- 
ing which shook the stage, against those opposite them, and 
then faced round and retired. But when one of the chorus, 
whose dress was closely girt up, turned round on the spur of 
the moment and raised his hands, like a boxer, in the face of 
the fluteplayer who was approaching him, then the spectators 
clapped their hands and cheered loudly. Whilst this sort of 
sham tight was going on, two dancers were brought into the 
orchestra to the sound of music ; and four boxers mounted 
upon the stage, accompanied by trumpeters and clarion 
players. The effect of these various contests all going on 
together was indescribable. But if I were to speak about 
their tragic actors, I should be thought by some to be 
jesting.' ... 

16. It requires the same sort of spirit to arrange public 
games well, and to set out great banquets and wine with fitting 
splendour, as it does to draw up an army in presence of the 
enemy with strategic skill. . . . 

16. Aemilius Paulus took seventy cities in Epirus after the 
conquest of the Macedonians and Perseus, 

most of which were in the country of the '^"l^'^'" 
Molossi ; and enslaved one hundred and fifty 
thousand men. . . . 

17, Id Egypt the first thing the kings did after being 

' From Atfaeniieus. xiv. 4, p. 615. It seems 10 be pnrt of some strictures 
of Polybios on the coarseness of Ihe amustmcnls of the Romans. This noLsy 
■nd riotous scene in n thcaire would strike a Greek as barbarous .md rci'oll- 
ine : and may remind us of the complaints of the noise and interruption to 
their actors so often found in the prologues to the plays of Plaulus and Ter- 
ence. Though the substance of Ibis extract is doubtless froio Polybhis, 
Athenaens has evidently told the anecdote in his own langimge. 


relieved from the war with Antiochus was to send Numenius, 

one of their friends, as an envoy to Rome to 

Mai^^as return thanks for the favours received ; and 

they next released the Lacedaemonian Menal- 

cidas, who had made active use of the occasion against the 

kingdom for his own advantage ; Gains Popilius Laenas asked 

the king for his release as a favour to himself.^ . . . 

18. At this period Cotys, king of the Odrysae, sent am- 
Cotys, king of bassadors to Rome, asking for the restoration 

the Odrysae. cp. of his son, and pleading his defence for having 
bk. 27, ch. 12. acted on the side of Perseus. The Romans, 
considering that they had effected their purpose by the suc- 
cessful issue of the war against Perseus, and that they had no 
need to press their quarrel with Cotys any further, allowed 
him to take his son back — who, having been sent as a hostage 
to Macedonia, had been captured with the children of Perseus, 
— wishing to display their clemency and magnanimity, and with 
the idea at the same time of binding Cotys to themselves by 
so great a favour. . . . 

1 9. About the same time king Prusias also came to Rome 
The abject con- ^^ Congratulate the Senate and the generals on 

duct of king their success. This Prusias was in no sense 
Frusuxs. worthy of the royal title, as we may judge from 
the following facts : When the Roman envoys first appeared 
at his court, he met them with shorn head and wearing a cap, 
toga, and shoes, and in fact exactly in the garb worn by those 
recently manumitted at Rome, whom they call liberti: and 
greeting the envoys respectfully, he exclaimed, " Behold your 
freedman, who is willing to obey you in all things and to 
imitate your fashions ! " than which a more contemptible 
speech it would be difficult to imagine. And now, again, 
when he reached the entrance of the Senate-house he stopped 
at the door facing the senators, and, dropping both his hands 
he paid reverence to the threshold and the seated Fathers, 
exclaiming, " Hail, ye gods my preservers ! " seeming bent 
on surpassing all who might come after him in meanness of 

* Menalcidas was one of the Romanising party, who appears to have l^ecn 
Strategus of the league in B.C. 153 [Pausan. 7, 11, 7], and to have committtKi 
suicide in B.C. 148-147, in despair at his failure to wrest Sparta from the league. 


spirit, unmanliness, and servility. And his behaviour in the 
conference which he held when he had entered the Senate- 
house was on a par with this; and was such as might make 
one blush even to write. However this contemptible display 
served in itself to secure him a favourable answer. 

20. Just as he had got his answer, news came that 
Eumenes was on his way. This caused the 
Senators much embarrassment They were ,° STt-^ll"!!*" 
thoroughly incensed with him, and were en- the Senate pass a 
tirely fixed in their sentiments towards him ; dec™ fbtbidding 
and yet they did not wish to betray themselves. ^" ^^^^^ ™" 
For having proclaimed to all the world that 
this king was their foremost and most esteemed friend, if they 
now admitted him to an interview and allowed him to plead 
his cause, they must either, by answering as they really thought 
and in harmony with their sentiments, signalise their own 
folly in having marked out such a man in past times for 
special honour ; or i^ in deference to appearances, they gave 
him a friendly answer, they must disregard truth and the 
interests of their country. Therefore, as both these methods of 
proceeding could have consequences of a disagreeable nature, 
they hit upon the following solution of the difficulty. On the 
ground of a general dislike of the visits of kings, they published 
a decree that "no king was to visit Rome." Having been 
informed subsequently that Eumenes had landed Eumenea 
at Bnindisium in Italy, they sent the quaestor to stopped ai 
convey the decree to him, and to bid him to Bmnditium. 
communicate with himself if he wanted anything from the 
Senate ; or, if he did not want anything, to bid him depart at 
the earliest possible opportunity from Italy. When the 
quaestor met the king and informed him of the decree, the 
latter, thoroughly understanding the intention of the Senate, 
said not a single word, except that " he wanted nothing." 

This is the way in which Eumenes was prevented from 
coming to Rome. And it was not the only important 
result of this decree. For the Gauls were at that time threat- 
ening the kingdom of Eumenes ; and it was soon made 
apparent that by this repulse the king's allies were all greatly 
depressed, while the Gauls were doubly encouraged to press 


on the war. And it was in fact their desire to humiliate him 
in every possible way that induced the Senate to adopt this 

resolution. These things were going on at the 

B.^ *i67-i66 bcgi'^i^ii^g o^ the winter : but to all other am- 
bassadors who arrived — and there was no city 
or prince or king who had not at that time sent an embassy 
of congratulation — the Senate returned a gracious and friendly 
answer, except to the Rhodians; and these they dismissed 
with displeasure, and with ambiguous declarations as to the 
future. As to the Athenians again the Senate hesitated. . . . 
21. The first object of the Athenian embassy was the 
,_,... restoration of Haliartus : ^ but when they met 

The Athenians . , _ , , ' . , , ' . 

ask for the With a refusal on that point, they changed 

restoration of the subject of their appeal and put forward 

Haliartus; faihng ^j^^jj. ^^^ claim to the possession of Delos, 

territory, with Lemnos, and the territory of Haliartus. No 

Delos and one could properly find fault with them for this, 

Lemnos them- ^^ ^r^j ^s Delos and Lemnos were concerned, for 


they had of old laid claim to them ; but there 
is good reason for reproaching them in respect to the territory 
of Haliartus. Haliartus was nearly the most ancient city in 
Boeotia; had met wnth a heavy misfortune: instead of en- 
deavouring in every possible way to restore it, — to contribute 
to its utter annihilation, and to deprive its dispossessed in- 
habitants of even their hopes for the future, was an act which 
would be thought worthy of no Greek nation, and least of 
all of the Athenians. They open their own territory to all 
comers ; and to take away that of others can never appear 
consonant with the spirit of their State. However, the Senate 
granted them Delos and Lemnos. Such was the decision in 
the Athenian business. . . . 
The possession As to Lemnos and Delos they had, accord- 
° ml'sfortune^ ^ ^"^ ^° ^^ proverb, " got the wolf by the ears : " 
Athens. ^^^ ^^^Y suffered much ill fortune from their 
See 32, 17. quarrels with the Delians ; and from the 

' Haliartus had been taken by the praetor L. Lucretius Gallus in b.c. 
171, its inhabitants sold into slavery, and its houses and walls entirely de- 
stroyed. Its crime was siding with Perseus. Livy, 42, 63. Supra bk. 27, 
ch. 5 ; 29, 12. 


territory of Haliartus they reaped shame rather than 
profit. . . . 

22. At this time Theaetetus being admitted into the 
Senate spoke on the subject of the alliance. Death of 
The Senate, however, postponed the considera- Theaetetus of 
tion of the proposal, and in the meantime Rhodes. 
Theaetetus died in the course of nature, for he was more than 
eighty years old. But on the arrival in Rome caunus and 
of exiles from Caunus and Stratoniceia, and Stratoniceia in 
their admission to the Senate, a decree was Caria. 
passed orderihg the Rhodians to withdraw their garrisons 
from Caunus and Stratoniceia. And the embassy of Philo- 
phron and Astymedes having received this answer sailed with 
all speed home, alarmed lest the Rhodians should disregard 
the order for withdrawing the garrisons, and so give a fresh 
ground for complaints. . . . 

23. In the Peloponnese, when the ambassa- The effect of the 
dors arrived and announced the answers from |"^i*ff® ^^ 

_ - , - , the Romans in 

Rome, there was no longer mere clamour, but the Achaean 
downright rage and hatred against Callicrates league. Supra 
and his party. ... ^^' '3' 

An instance of the hatred entertained for Callicrates and 
Adronidas, and the others who agreed with ,. , . - 

1 \\ ' rr.1 r • 1 /• 1 A • • Unpopulantv of 

them, was this. The festival of the Antigoneia callicrates, 
was being held at Sicyon, — the baths being all Adronidas, and 
supplied with large public bathing tubs, and ^^^^^ party, 
smaller ones placed by them used by bathers of the better 
sort, — if Adronidas or Callicrates entered one of these, not a 
single one of the bystanders would get into it any more, until 
the bathman had let every drop of water run out and filled it 
with fresh. They did this from the idea that they would be 
polluted by entering the same water as these men. Nor 
would it be easy to describe the hissing and hooting that 
took place at the public games in Greece when any one 
attempted to proclaim one of them victor. The very children 
in the streets as they returned from school ventured to call 
them traitors to their faces. To such height did the anger 
and hatred of these men go. . . . 

24. The inhabitants of Peraea were like slaves unexpectedlv 




released from chains, who. are scarcely able to believe their 

present good fortune, thinking it a change 

^Sf^pirla ^^e ^^"^^st too great to be natural; and cannot 

Roman decree believe that those they meet can understand 

emancipating or fully see that they are really released, 

unless they do something strange and out of the 

ordinary course. . . . 

them from 


1. At this time the Cnosians, in alliance with the Bc. 165. Warin 
Gortynians, made war upon the Rhaucians, and Ctcieorcnouu 
swore a mutual oath that they would not end '-'ji^^'"' 
the war until they had Uken Rhaucus, "^ """' 

But when the Rhodians received the decree regarding 
Caunus, and saw that the anger of the Romans j]^ Rhodians are 
was not abating, after having scrupulously carried again refused an 
out the orders contained in the Senate's replies, alliance. 
they forthwith sent Aristotle at the head of an embassy to 
Rome, with instructions to make another attempt to secure the 
alUance. They arrived in Rome at the height of summer, and, 
having been admitted to the Senate, at once declared how 
their people had obeyed the Senate's orders, and pleaded for 
the alliance, using a great variety of arguments in a speech of 
considerable length. But the Senate returned them a reply in 
which, without a wcrd about their friendship, they said that, as 
to the alliance, it was not proper for them to grant the Rhodians 
this favour at present . . . 

2. To the ambassadors of the Gauls in Asia they granted 
autonomy, on condition that they remained Autonomy 10 
within their dwellings, and went on no warlike Gaiaiia on 
expeditions beyond their own frontiers. . , . conditions. 

S. When this same king (Antiochus Epiphanes) heard of the 
games in Macedonia held by the Roman proconsul Aemiltus 
Paulus, wishing to out-do Paulus by the splendour of his 
liberality, he sent envoys to the several cities The grand fesiival 
announcing games to be held by him at bdd t>]> Antiochus 
Daphne ; and it became the rage in Greece ^piph""" ai 
to attend them. The public ceremonies began ofAnt^och. wctwI 
with a procession composed as follows : first 10 Apoiio. 


came some men armed in the Roman fashion, with their 
coats made of chain armour, five thousand in the prime of 
Ufe. Next came five thousand Mysians, who were followed 
by three thousand Cilicians armed like light infantry, and 
wearing gold crowns. Next to them came three thousand 
Thracians and five thousand Gauls. They were followed by 
twenty-thousand Macedonians, and five thousand armed with 
brass shields, and others with silver shields, who were followed 
by two hundred and forty pairs of gladiators. Behind these 
were a thousand Nisaean cavalry and three thousand native 
horsemen, most of whom had gold plumes and gold crowns, 
the rest having them of silver. Next to them came what are 
called "companion cavalry," to the number of a thousand, 
closely followed by the corps of king's " friends " of about the 
same number, who were again followed by a thousand picked 
men ; next to whom came the Agetna or guard, which was 
considered the flower of the cavalry, and numbered about a 
thousand. Next came the "cataphract" cavalry, both men 
and horses acquiring that name from the nature of their 
panoply ; they numbered fifteen hundred. All the above men 
had purple surcoats, in many cases embroidered with gold and 
heraldic designs. And behind them came a hundred six-horsed, 
and forty four-horsed chariots; a chariot drawn by four elephants 
and another by two ; and then thirty-six elephants in single file 
with all their furniture on. 

The rest of the procession was almost beyond description, 
but I must give a summary account of it. It consisted of 
eight hundred young men wearing gold crowns, about a thousand 
fine oxen, foreign delegates to the number of nearly three 
hundred, and eight hundred ivory tusks. The number of 
images of the gods it is impossible to tell completely: for repre- 
sentations of every god or demigod or hero accepted by man- 
kind were carried there, some gilded and others adorned with 
gold-embroidered robes; and the myths, belonging to each, 
according to accepted tradition, were represented by the most 
costly symbols. Behind them were carried representations of 
Night and Day, Earth, Heaven, Morning and Noon. The best 
idea that I can give of the amount of gold and silver plate is this : 
One of the king's friends, Dionysius his secretary, had a thousand 


boys in the procession carrying stiver vessels, none of which 
weighed less than a thousand drachmae;^ and by their side 
walked six hundred young slaves of the king holding gold 
vessels. There were also two hundred women sprinkling un- 
guents from gold boxes ; and after them came eighty women 
sitting in litters with gold feet, and five hundred in litters with 
silver feet, aJl adorned with great costliness. These were the 
most remarkable features of the procession. 

4. The festival, including the gladiatorial shows and hunting, 
lasted thirty days, in the course of which there was continual 
round of spectacles. During the first five of these everybody 
in the gymnasium anointed himself with oil scented with 
saflVon in gold vessels, of which there were fifteen, and the 
same number scented with cinnamon and nard. On the 
following days other vessels were brought in scented with 
fenugreeic, marjoram, and lily, all of extraordinary fragiancy. 
Public banquets were also given, at which couches were pre- 
pared, sometimes for a thousand and sometimes for (ifiecn 
hundred, with the utmost splendour and costliness. 

The whole of the arrangements were made personally by the " 
king. He rode on an inferior horse by the side of the proces- 
sion, ordering one part to advance, and another to halt, as 
occasion required ; so that, if his diadem had been removed, 
no one would have believed that he was the king and the master 
of all ; for his appearance was not equal to that of a moderately 
good servant At the feasts also he stood himself at the 
entrance, and admitted some and assigned others their places ; 
he personally ushered in the servants bringing the dishes ; and 
walking about among the company sometimes sat down and 
sometimes lay down on the couches. Sometimes he would 
jump up, lay down the morsel of food or the cup that he was 
raising to his lips, and go to another part of the hall ; and 
walking among the guests acknowledge the compliment, as 
now one and now another pledged him in wine, or jest at any 
recitations that might be going on. And when the festivity 
had gone on for a long time, and a good many of the guests had 
departed, the king was carried in by the mummers, completely 
shrouded in a robe, and laid upon the ground, as though he 
' A drachma rray be laken as between a sixtb and a seventh of an ounce. 


were one of the actors ; then, at the signal given by the music, 
he leapt up, stripped, and began to dance with the jesters ; so 
that all the guests were scandalised and retired. In fact every 
one who attended the festival, when they saw the extraordinary 
wealth which was displayed at it, the arrangements made in the 
processions and games, and the scale of the splendour on which 
the whole was managed, were struck with amazement and 
wonder both at the king and the greatness of his kingdom : 
but when they fixed their eyes on the man himself, and the 
contemptible conduct to which he condescended, they could 
scarcely believe that so much excellence and baseness could 
exist in one and the same breast.^ . . . 

5. After the completion of the festival, the envoys with 
Roman envoys Tiberius Gracchus arrived, who had been sent 

at Antioch. from Rome to investigate the state of affairs in 
Antiochus affects gyna. Antiochus received them with such tact 

extreme cordiality. ,., . ri*j .1. 

and with so many expressions of kindness, that 
Tiberius not only had no suspicion that he was meditating any 
active step, or cherishing any sinister feeling on account of what 
had happened at Alexandria, but was even induced by the extra- 
ordinary kindness of his reception to discredit those who made 
any such suggestion. For, besides other courtesies, the king 
gave up his own hall for the use of the envoys, and almost his 
crown in appearance ; although his true sentiments were not at 
all of this kind, and he was on the contrary profoundly incensed 
with the Romans. . . . 

6. A large number of ambassadors from various quarters hav- 
B.C. 164. Com- i^g arrived at Rome, the most important of which 

plaints against were those with Astymedes from Rhodes, Eureus 
Eumencs at Rome ^jj^j^j^jjjjj^yg ^^^ Satyrus from the Achaeans, 

from 1 nisi'TS 01 

Bithynia, and ^^^ those with Pytho from Prusias, — the Senate 

other parts of gave audience to these last. The ambassadors 

Asia. ixoxd Prusias complained of king Eumenes, 

alleging that he had taken certain places belonging to their 

country, and had not in any sense evacuated Galatia, or obeyed 

the decrees of the Senate ; but had been supporting all who 

1 Hultsch prints in parallel columns the text of this fragment as it appears 
in Athenaeus and Diodorus. The English translation attempts to combine 


fitvoured himself, and depressing in every possible way those 
who wished to shape their policy in accordance with the 
Senate's decrees. There were also some ambassadors from 
certain towns in Asia, who accused the kir^ on the grounds of 
his intimate association with Antiochus, The Senate listened 
to the accusers, and neither rejected their accusations noi 
openly expressed its own opinion ; but acted with close reserve, 
thoroughly distrusting both Eumenes and Antio- 
chus : and meanwhile contented itself by con- p^'^i^^^a. 
tinually supporting Galatia and contriving some 
fresh security for its freedom. But the envoys under Tiberius 
Gracchus, on their return from their mission, had Failure of the 
no clearer idea themselves in regard to Eumenes mi&sion ot 
and Antiochus than before they left Rome, nor Gracchus. 
could they give the Senate one either. So completely had the 
kings hoodwinked them by the cordiality of their reception. 

7. The Senate next called In the Khodians and heard 
what they had to say. When Astymedes entered, phodiona appeal 
he adopted a more moderate and more effective againsi the injury 
line ofargument than on his formerembassy. He '*°""°'*™"™'*' 
omitted the invectives against others, and took 
the humble tone of men who are being fledged, begging to be for- 
given, and declaring that his country had suffered sufficient 
punishment, and a more severe one than its crime deserved. And 
losses. " First, they have lost Lycia and Caria, /^^^^^ 
which had already cost them a large sum of 
money, having been forced to support three wars against them ; 
while at the present moment they have been deprived of a con- 
siderable revenue which they used to draw from those countries. 
But perhaps," he added, " this is as it should be : you gave 
them to our people as a free gift, because you regarded us 
with favour ; and in now recalling your gift, because you suspect 
and are at variance with us, you may seem only to be acting 
reasonably. But Caunus, at any rate, we purchased from 
Ptolemy's officers for two hundred talents j and Stratoniceia we 
received as a great favour from Antiochus, son of Seleucus ; 
and from those two towns our people had a revenue of a 
hundred and twenty talents a year. All these sources of revenue 


we have surrendered, in our submission to your injunctions. 
From which it appears that you have imposed a heavier 
penalty on the Rhodians for one act of folly, than on the 
Macedonians that have been continually at war with you. But 
the greatest disaster of all to our State is that the revenue 
from its harbour has been abolished by your making Delos a 
free port ; and by your depriving our people of that independ- 
ence by which the harbour, as well as other interests of the 
States, were maintained in suitable dignity.^ And it is easy 
to satisfy yourselves of the truth of my words. Our revenue 
from harbour dues amounted in past years to one million 
drachmae, from which you have now taken one hundred 
and fifty thousand; so that it is only too true, gentle- 
men of Rome, that your anger has affected the resources 
of the country. Now, if the mistake committed, and the 
alienation from Rome, had been shared in by the entire 
people, you might perhaps have seemed to be acting rightly 
in maintaining a lasting and irreconcilable anger against 
us ; but if the fact is made clear to you that it was an exceed- 
ingly small number who shared in this foolish policy, and that 
these have all been put to death by this very people itself, 
why still be irreconcilable to those who are in no respect 
guilty ? Especially when to every one else you are reputed 
to exhibit the highest possible clemency and magnanimity. 
Wherefore, gentlemen, our people having lost their revenues, 
their freedom of debate, and their position of independence, in 
defence of which in time past they have been ever willing to 
make any sacrifices, now beg and beseech you all, as having 
been smitten sufficiently, to relax your anger, and to be recon- 
ciled and make this alliance with them : that it may be made 
manifest to all the world that you have put away your anger 
against Rhodes, and have returned to your old feelings and 
friendship towards them." Such among others were the 

words of Astymedes. He was thought to have 

moii?fied"by this ^poken much to the point in the circumstances ; 

speech and by but what helped the Rhodians to the alliance 

* lie means that, they being no longer able to decide in mercantile affairs 
independently of Rome, the prestige {rpwrra/rla), and consequently the popu- 
larity, of this harbour is destroyed. 


more than anything else was the recent return 'he report of 
of the embassy under Tiberius Gracchus. For *^^^^,\,e"^ 
he gave evidence, in the first place, that the alliance. 
Rhodians had obeyed all the decrees of the Senate ; and in 
the next place, that the men who were the authors of their 
hostile policy had all been condemned to death ; and by this 
testimony overcame all opposition, and secured the alliance 
between Rome and Rhodes. . . . 

8. After an interval the envoys of the Achaeans were 
admitted with instructions conformable to the g c. 165. 
last reply received, which was to ihe effect that Embassy from 
"The Senate were surprised that they should '^'^''^'.'■""'''"Bfor 
applyto them for a decision on matters which they g[ ^ Aci^ean 
had already decided for themselves." Accord- diunus. who 10 
inglyanother embassy under Eureas nowappeared '*" i"inii«r of 
to explain that " The league had neither heard teen Bummoned 
the defence of the accused persons, nor given 10 Italy in b.c. 
any decision whatever concerning them; but '^?- ^^030. 13. 
wished the Senate to take measures in regard "'^^' '' '"' "' 
to these men, that they might have a trial and not perish 
uncondemned. They begged thai, if possible, the Senate 
should itself conduct the investigation, and declare who are the 
persons guilty of those charges ; but, if its variety of business 
made it impossible to do this itself, that it should intrust the 
business to the Achaeans, who would show by their treatment 
of the guilty their detestation of their crime." The Senate 
reci^nised that the tone of the embassy was in conformity 
with its own injunctions, but still felt embarrassed how to acL 
Both courses were open to objection. To judge the case of 
the men was, it thought, not a task it ought to undertake ; and 
to release them without any trial at all evidently involved ruin 
to the friends of Rome. In this strait the Senate, wishing 
to take all hope from the Achaean people of the restitution of 
the men who were detained, in order that they might obey 
without a murmur Callicrates in Achaia, and in the other 
states those who sided with Rome, wrote the following answer : 
"We do not consider it advisable either for ourselves or 
for your nationalities that these men should return home." 
The publication of this answer not only reduced the men who 


had been summoned to Italy to complete despair and dejec- 
tion, but was regarded by all Greeks as a common sorrow, for 
it seemed to take away all hope of restoration from these 
unfortunate men. When it was announced in Greece the 
people were (juite crushed, and a kind of desperation in- 
vaded the minds of all; but Charops and Callicrates, and 
all who shared their policy, were once more in high 
spirits. . . . 

9. Tiberius Gracchus, partly by force and partly by per- 
Rcduction of tijc suasion, reduced the Cammani to obedience to 

Cammani in Rome. . . . 

CapiKidocia. ^ \;sx%Q, number of embassies having come to 

Rome, the Senate gave a reply to Attalus and Athenaeus. For 
Prusias, not content with earnestly pressing his accusations him- 
self against Eumenes and Attalus, had also instigated the Gauls 
and Sclgians (in Pisidia), and many others in Asia, to adopt 
the same policy; consequently king Eumenes had sent his 
brothers to defend him against the accusations thus brought. 
On their admission to the Senate they were thought to have 
made a satisfactory defence against all accusers; and finally 
returned to Asia, after not only rebutting the accusations, 
but with marks of special honour. The Senate, however, did 
not altogether cease to be suspicious of Eumenes and Antiochus. 
They sent (Jaius Sulpicius and Manias Sergius as envoys to 
investigate the state of Greece ; to decide the question of 
territory that had arisen between Megalopolis and the Lacedae- 
monians ; but, above all, to give attention to the proceedings 
of Antiochus and li^umenes, and to discover whether any 
warlike preparations were being made by either of them, or any 
combination being formed between them against Rome. . . . 

10. Besides his other follies, (iaius Sulpicius Gallus, on 
^ . . arriving in Asia, put up notices in the most 

Sulpicius ciaiiiis im|K)rtant cities, ordering any one who wished 
in Asia; he to bring any accusation against king Eumenes 
collects facts ^^ ^^^^ Y{\xi\ at Sardis within a specified time. 

ac^amsi i_<unien(.Sa •«. f\ y ii*i' • 

He then went to Sardis, and, takmg his seat in 
the Gymnasium, gave audience for ten days to those who had 
such accusations to make : admitting every kind of foul and 
abusive language against the king, and, generally, making the 


most of every fact and every accusation ; for he was frantic 
and inveterate in his hatred of Eumenes. . . . 

But the harder the Romans appeared to bear upon Eumenes, 
the more popular did he become in Greece, from the natural 
tendency of mankind to feel for the side that is oppressed. . . . 

11. In Syria king Antiochus, wishing to enrich himself, 
determined on an armed attack upon the temple , 

of Artemis, in Elymais. But having arrived in Death of Antiochus 
this country and failed in his purpose, because Epiphanes on his 
the native barbarians resisted his lawless attempt, ^ 'l®^*^™ J"^*^"^ 

, ,. , . ,. ^ rT> u \ 'Susiana. See26,i. 

he died m the course of his return at Tabae, in 
Persia, driven mad, as some say, by some manifestations of 
divine wrath in the course of his wicked attempt upon this 
temple. . . . 

Antiochus Epiphanes left a son and daughter ; tht former^ 
nine years oldy was called Antiochus Eupator^ and succeeded to the 
kingdom^ Lysias acting as his guardian, Demetrius^ his cousin^ 
son of Seleucus Philopator, being at Rome as a hostage in place of 
the late Antiochus Epiphanes^ endeavoured to persuade the Senate 
to make him king of Syria instead of the boy, 

12. Demetrius, son of Seleucus, who had been long 
detained at Rome as an hostage, had been for Demetrius, son of 
some time past of opinion that his detention Seleucus, and 
was unjust. He had been given by his father &»\"dson of Anti- 

-> , •' , , /. , • 1 /. . 1 1 ochus the Great, 

Seleucus as a pledge of his good faith ; but, wishes to be re- 
when Antiochus (Epiphanes) succeeded to the stored to the king- 
throne, he considered that he ought not to be a ^°"^ °^ ^^"^ 
hostage in behalf of that monarch's children. However, up to 
this time he kept quiet, especially as he was unable, being still 
a mere boy, to do anything. But now, being in the very prime 
of youthful manhood, he entered the Senate and made a speech : 
demanding that the Romans should restore him to his king- 
dom, which belonged to him by a far better right than to the 
children of Antiochus. He entered at great length upon 
arguments to the same effect, affirming that Rome was his 
country and the nurse of his youth; that the sons of the 
Senators were all to him as brothers, and the Senators as 
fathers, because he had come to Rome a child, and was then 

VOL. II 2 F 


twenty-three years old.^ All who heard him were disposed in 
their hearts to take his part : the Senate however, as a body 
voted to detain Demetrius, and to assist in securing the crown 
for the boy left by the late king. Their motive in thus acting 
was, it seems to me, a mistrust inspired by the vigorous time 
of life to which Demetrius had attained, and an opinion that 
the youth and weakness of the boy who had succeeded to the 
kingdom were more to their interest And this was presently 

made manifest. For they appointed Gnaeus 
^^A^Z^^^'^' Octavius, Spurius Lucretius, and Lucius Aurel- 

sion appointed. . » r , .1 ir • r 

ms as commissioners to arrange the anairs of 
the kingdom in accordance with the will of the Senate, on the 
ground that no one would resist their injunctions, the king 
being a mere child, and the nobles being quite satisfied at the 
government not being given to Demetrius, for that was what 
they had been most expecting. Gnaeus and his colleagues there- 
fore started with instructions, first of all to burn the decked ships, 
next to hamstring the elephants, and generally to weaken the 
. forces of the kingdom. They were also charged 
sioncrs arc also with the additional task of making an inspec- 
to visit Gaiatia, tion of Macedonia ; for the Macedonians, un- 
Cappaciocia. and accustomed to democracy and a government 


by popular assembly, were splitting up into 
hostile factions.^ Gnaeus and his colleagues were also to 
inspect the state of Gaiatia and of the kingdom of Ariarathes. 
After a time the further task was imposed on them, by despatch 
from the Senate, of reconciling as well as they could the two 
kings in Alexandria. . . . 

18. While this was going on at Rome, envoys from the 

Missions to Aria- ^^^y* ""^^^ Marcus Junius, had arrived to 
rathes, king of arbitrate on the disputes between the Gauls 

* Demetrius had been exchanged for his uncle Antiochus Epiphanes in B.C. 
175, just eleven years before. * 

'^ The Senatus Consultum de Macedonibus (Livy, 45, 29) had declared all 
Macedonians free ; each city to enjoy its own laws, create its own annual 
magistrates, and pay a tribute to Rome — half the amount that it had paid to the 
king. Macedonia was divided into four regions, at the respective capitals of 
which— Amphipolis, Thessalonica, Pella, and PeLigonia — the district assem- 
blies (concilia) were to be held, the revenue of the district was to be collected, 
and the district magistrates elected ; and there was to be no inter-marriage 
or mutual rights of owning property between the regions. 


and king Ariarathes. For the Trocmi, having Cappadocia, in 
found themselves unable to annex any portion regard to the en- 
of Cappadocia by their unaided efforts, and *^^^heGadte. ° 
having been promptly foiled in their audacious 
attempts,^ sought refuge with the Romans, and endeavoured 
to bring Ariarathes into discredit there. On this account an 
embassy under M. Junius was sent to Cappadocia. The 
king gave them a satisfactory account of the affair, treated 
them with great courtesy, and sent them away loud in his 
praises. And when subsequently Gnaeus Octavius and 
Spurius Lucretius arrived, and again addressed the king on 
the subject of his controversies with the Gauls, after a brief 
conversation on that subject, and saying that he would 
acquiesce in their decision without difficulty, he Ariarathes warns 
directed the rest of his remarks to the state of Octavius of the 
Syria, being aware that Octavius and his dangerousjtate 
colleagues were going thither. He pointed ° ^^ 
out to them the unsettled state of the kingdom and the un- 
principled character of the men at the head of affairs there ; 
and added that he would escort them with an army, and 
remain on the watch for all emergencies, until they returned 
from Syria in safety. Gnaeus and his colleagues acknowleged 
the king's kindness and zeal, but said that for the present 
they did not need the escort : on a future occasion, however, 
if need should arise, they would let him know without delay; 
for they considered him as one of the true friends of Rome. . . . 
Ariarathes died soon after this embassy^ and was succeeded by 
his son Ariarathes Philopator, B.C. 164. Z/V^, Ep. 46. 

14. About this time ambassadors arrived from Ariarathes, 
who had recently succeeded to the kingdom of 
Cappadocia, to renew the existing friendship .xri.^ra^hcs Phiio- 
and alliance with Rome, and in general to pator continues 
exhort the Senate to accept the king's affection *^>s fathers policy 
and goodwill, which he entertained, both in their ° "*Rome!' ^* 
private and public capacity, for all the Romans. 
The Senate, on hearing this, acceded to the request for the 
renewal of the friendship and alliance, and graciously acknow- 

^ The Greek of this sentence is certainly corrupt, and no satisfactory sense 
can be elicited from it. 


ledged the general amity of the king. The chief reason for 
this warmth on the part of the Senate was the report of the 
envoys under Tiberius, who, when sent to inspect the state of 
Cappadocia, had returned full of the praises of the late king 
and of his kingdom generally. It was on the credit of this 
report that the Senate received the ambassadors of Ariarathes 
graciously, and acknowledged the goodwill of the king. . . . 

15. Having somewhat recovered from their previous 

disaster, the Rhodians sent Cleagoras with 

'^^^^^j^^^'^*' ambassadors to Rome to ask that Calynda 

Caria, and for should be Ceded to them, and to petition the 

the retention of Senate that those of their citizens who had pro- 

^C^a ^nd^yci^ P^'"^*^^ '^^ ^^^^^ ^^ ^^^ "^^S^t be allowed to 

retain them as before. They had also voted 

to raise a colossal statue of the Roman people, 

^ ''of'^Jnf ^''*' thirty cubits high, to be set up in the temple 

of Athene. . . . 

16. The Calyndians having broken off from Caunus, and 
The Rhodians ^^^ Caunians being about to besiege Calynda, 

undertake the pro- the Calyndians first called in the aid of the 
tection of Calynda. Cnidians ; and, on their sending the required 
support, they held out against their enemies for a time : but 
becoming alarmed as to what would happen, they sent an 
embassy to Rhodes, putting themselves and their city in its 
hands. Thereupon the Rhodians sent a naval and military 
force to their relief, forced the Caunians to raise the siege, 
and took over the city. . . . 

17. When Ariarathes, king of Cappadocia, had received his 
Ariarathes's joy at ambassadors on their return from Rome, judg- 

the favourable ing from the answers they brought that his 
answer from Rome, kingdom was secured, because he had gained 
the goodwill of Rome, he offered a thank-offering to the gods 
for what had happened, and entertained his nobles at a feast 
He then sent ambassadors to Lysias in Antioch, desiring to 
He recovers the ^^ allowed to bring away the bones of his sister 
ashes of his and mother. He determined not to say a word 
mother and sister of blame as to the Crime that had been com- 
mitted, lest he should irritate Lysias, and so 
fail to effect his present object, though he was in fact greatly 


incensed at it. He gave his envoys therefore instructions 
couched in terms of courteous request Lysias and his friends 
acceded to his wishes ; and the bones having been conveyed 
to Cappadocia, the king received them in great state, and 
buried them next the tomb of his father with affectionate 
reverence. . . } 

Artaxias wished to kill a man, but on the remonstrances of 
Ariarathes did not do so, and held him on the t,. . ^ r 

. ... ' , o. , • The influence of 

contrary m higher respect than ever. So deci- good men, 
sive is the influence of justice, and of the Artaxias of 
opinions and advice of good men, that they Armenia. 
often prove the salvation of foes as well as of 
friends, and change their whole characters for the better. . . . 

Good looks are a better introduction than any letter. . . . 

The quarrels of the two kings of Egypt^ Ptolemy VI, 
Philometor and Euergetes IL {or Ptolemy VIL) Physcon, The 
former had been expelled by the latter ^ and had taken refuge in 
Cyprus^ but had been restored by a popular outbreak in his 
favour^ and under the authority of Commissioners sent from 
Rome, B.C 164. (Z/7{y, Ep. 46. Diod, Sic. fr, xi.) Fresh 
quarrels however broke out, in the course of which Physcon was 
much worsted by his brother, {Diod, Sic fr. of^i), and at length it 
was arranged that one should reign in Egypt the other in Cyrene, 
B.C 162. {Livy, Ep. 47.) 

18. After the Ptolemies had made their partition of the 
kingdom, the younger brother arrived in Rome 
desiring to set aside the division made between E^rcetes^ii 
himself and his brother, on the ground that he had ( Ptoiemy Phys- 
not acceded to the arrangement voluntarily, but co"). who had 
under compulsion, and yielding to the force oi^^^^^^^^^ 
circumstances. He therefore begged the Senate 
to assign Cyprus to his portion ; for, even if that were done, he 
should still have a much poorer share than his -^he members of 
brother. Canuleius and Quintus supported the Commission 

* Ariarathes. the elder, had been in alliance with Antiochus the Great, 
and had apparently given him one of his daughters in marriage, who had 
been accompanied by her mother to Antioch, where both had now fallen 
victims to the jealousy of Eupator's minister, Lysias. Sec 21. 43. 

.J..V, lo nim ' ; anci inai, ace 

^t^lad to rorcivc the L^^ovornmL 

not hoj)c(l for or expected ; a 

his brother with the customary 

^ \ gave a positive denial : and the 

•' was clearly an unequal one, an 

that, as the brothers themselvt 
division being made at all, it sho\ 

The Senate decide advantageous tO I 

in favour of the younger Ptolen 
f Physcon. interest Measures 

among the Romans, by which the> 
found policy of the mistakes ol 
strengthen their own empire, unc 
favours and benefiting those who cc 
{ The object of the principle they acted i 

t Senate is to divide the power of the Eg 

an^^^en fearing lest, if it ever 
^^ petent head, he- wouk 

pointed Titus Torquatus and Gnj 
Ptolemy Physcon in Cyprus, and th 
policy while satisfying his. These 
cordingly at once despatched with ii 
brothers to each other, and to secure 

When the Roman comtnissionen^ 
Syria^ and began carrying out their / 
and killing the elef*^""- '' 





burial^ and by sending an embassy to Rome to protest his 
innocence, Appian, Syr. 46. 

19. News having come to Rome of the disaster by which 
Gnaeus Octavius lost his life, ambassadors also g^c. 162. 
arrived from king Antiochus, sent by Lysias, The Senate pay 
who vehemently protested that the king's l»"^^ attention to 

r ' ji-juj _^'xi- • Tt ^ X. Lysias s excuses. 

friends had had no part m the cnme. But the 
Senate showed scant attention to the envoys, not wishing to 
make any open declaration on the subject or to allow their 
opinion to become public in any way. 

But Demetrius was much excited by the news, and imme- 
diately summoned Polybius to an interview, and Demetrius thinks 
consulted him as to whether he should once there is again a 
more bring his claims before the Senate. Poly- chance for him. 
bius advised him " not to stumble twice on the 
same stone," but to depend upon himself and .^act^fo^yotr^f." 
venture something worthy of a king; and he 
pointed out to him that the present state of affairs offered him 
many opportunities. Demetrius understood the hint, but said 
nothing at the time ; but a short while afterwards consulted 
Apollonius one of his intimate friends, on the same subject. 
This man, being simple minded and very young, hc however again 
advised him to make another trial of the appeals to the 
Senate. " He was convinced," he said, " that. Senate, 
since it had deprived him of his kingdom without any just 
expuse, it would at least release him from his position of 
hostage ; for it was absurd that, when the boy Antiochus had 
succeeded to the kingdom in Syria, Demetrius should be a 
hostage for him." Persuaded by these arguments he once 
more obtained a hearing of the Senate, and claimed to be 
relieved of his obligations as a hostage, since they had decided 
to secure the kingdom to Antiochus. But, 
though he pleaded his cause wnth many argu- ""refused^*" 
ments, the Senate remained fixed in the same 
resolve as before. And that was only what was to be ex- 
pected. For they had not, on the former occasion, adjudged 
the continuance of the kingdom to the child on the ground 
that the claim of Demetrius was not just, but because it was 


advantageous to Rome that it sh