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THE   HISTORIES  OF   POLYBIUS 


1 


STORIES  OF  POLYBIUS 


RANSLATED  FROM  THE  TEXT  OF  F.  HULTSCH 


EVELYN  S.  SHUCKBURGH,  M.A. 


IN  TWO  VOLUMES 
VOL.   II 


llonnoi) 
MACMILLAN    AND    CO. 

AND  NEW  YORK 


Ry^% 


CONTENTS 


BOOKS  X  TO  XXXIX 

Smaller  Fragments 
Appendices  . 
Index 


i-S4> 
S42-SS9 
S60-568 
569-61 S 


THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS 


THE    HANNIBALIAN   WAR — THE    RECOVERY   OF   TARENTUM 

1.  The  distance  from  the  strait  and  town  of  Rhegium  to 
Tarentum  is  more  than  two  thousand  stades;  ^^^  ^^^  coss. 
and  that  portion  of  the  shore  of  Italy  is  en-  Q.  Fabiux  Maii- 
tirely  destitute  of  harbours,  except  those  of "?""  Y-  Q-  ™" 
Tarentum :  I  mean  the  coast  facing  the  Sicilian 
sea,  and  verging  towards  Greece,  which  contains  the  most 
populous  barbarian  tribes  as  well  as  the  most  famous  of  the 
Greek  cities.  For  the  Bruttii,  Lucani,  some  portions  of  the 
Daunii,  the  Cabalii,  and  several  others,  occupy  this  quarter 
of  Italy.  So  again  this  coast  is  lined  by  the  Greek  cities  of 
Rhegium,  Caulon,  Locri,  Croton,  Metapontum,  and  Thurii:  so 
that  voyagers  from  Sicily  or  from  Greece  to  any  one  of  these 
cities  are  compelled  to  drop  anchor  in  the  harbours  of 
Tarentum  ;  and  the  exchange  and  commerce  with  all  who 
occupy  this  coast  of  Italy  take  place  in  this  city.  One  may 
judge  of  the  excellence  of  its  situation  from  the  prosperity 
attained  by  the  people  of  Croton  ;  who,  though  only  possessing 
roadsteads  suitable  for  the  summer,  and  enjoying  therefore 
but  a  short  season  of  mercantile  activity,  still  have  acquired 
great  wealth,  entirely  owing,  it  seems,  to  the  favourable  situa- 
tion of  their  town  and  harbour,  which  yet  cannot  be  compared 
with  those  of  Tarentum.  For,  even  at  this  day,  Tarentum 
is  in  a  most  convenient  position  in  respect  to  the  harbours  of 
the  Adriatic,  and  was  formerly  still  more  so.     Since,  from  the 

VOL.  II  B 


2  THE  HISTORIES  OE  POLYBIUS  B(»ok 

lapygian  promontory  as  far  as  Sipontuni,  every  one  coming 
from  the  other  side  and  dropping  anchor  at  Italy  always  crossed 
to  Tarentum,  and  used  that  city  for  his  mercantile  transactions 
as  an  emporium ;  for  the  town  of  Brundisium  had  not  yet 
been  founded  in  these  times.  ^  Therefore  Fabius  regarded 
the  recovery  of  it  as  of  great  importance,  and,  omitting  every- 
thing else,  turned  his  whole  thoughts  to  this.  .  .  . 

PUBLIUS    CORNELIUS  SCIPIO  AFRICANUS  IN  SPAIN,  B.C.   2IO-2o6 

2.  Being  about  to  narrate  the  exploits  of  Publius  Scipio 

A  common  mis-  ^^  Iberia,  and  in  fact  all  the  achievements  in 

take  as  to  Scipio's  his  life,    I    think   it  necessary   to    direct    my 

character.  readers'  attention,  to  begin  with,  to  his  moral 
and  mental  qualities.  ^  For  as  he  is  perhaps  the  most  illus- 
trious man  of  any  born  before  the  present  generation,  every- 
body seeks  to  know  what  kind  of  man  he  was,  and  what 
advantages  from  natural  ability  or  experience  he  enjoyed,  to 
account  for  a  career  so  crowded  with  brilliant  achievement ; 
and  yet  is  compelled  to  remain  in  the  dark,  or  to  entertain  false 
opinions,  because  those  who  write  about  him  have  not  kept  to 
the  truth.  The  soundness  of  this  assertion  will  be  rendered 
evident  in  the  course  of  my  narrative  to  all  who  are  capable  of 
estimating  the  noblest  and  most  gallant  of  his  exploits.  Now 
all  other  writers  represent  him  as  a  man  favoured  by  fortune, 
who  succeeded  in  his  undertakings  contrary  to  rational  ex- 
pectatipn,  and  by  the  mere  force  of  circumstances.  They 
consider  apparently  such  men  to  be,  so  to  speak,  more  god- 
like and  worthy  of  admiration,  than  those  who  act  in  every 
case  by  calculation.  They  do  not  seem  to  be  aware  of  the 
distinction  between  credit  for  good  fortune  and  credit  for 
good  conduct  in  the  case  of  such  men ;  and  that  the  former 
may  be  assigned  to  any  one  however  commonplace,  while  the 
latter  belongs  to  those  alone  who  act  from  prudent  calculation 
and  clear  intelligence :  and  it  is  these  last  whom  we  should 
look  upon  as  the  most  god -like  and  god -beloved. 

Now  it   seems   to  me   that  in  his   character  and  views 

'  The  port  of  Brundisium  was  known  long  before.     See  Herod.  4,  99.     The 
Romans  colonised  the  town  in  b.c.  244.     See  Livy,  epit.  19. 


CHARACTER  OF  AI-RICANUS 


Publius  was  very  bke  Lycurgus  the  legislator  of  the  Lacedae- 
monians.     For  we  must   not  suppose  that    it    scip^a',  u^e  of 
was  from  superstition  that  Lycurgus  continu- religion  compared 
ally   consulted   the    Pythian   priestess   in   the     wiihihaiof 
esUblishment  of  the  Lacedaemonian  constitu-        y^urp"- 
tion;   nor  that  Publius  depended  on  dreams  and  ominous 
words  for  his  success  in  securing  empire  for  his  country.     But 
as  both  saw  that  the  majority  of  mankind  cannot  be  got  to 
accept  contentedly  what  is  new  and  strange,  nor  to  face  dangeis 
with  course,  without  some  hope  of  divine  favour, — Lycurgus, 
by  always  supporting  his  own  schemes  by  an  oracular  response 
from  the  PytW,  secured  better  acceptation  and  credit  for  his 
ideas ;  and  Publius,  by  always  in  like  manner  instilling  into 
the  minds  of  the  vulgar  an  opinion  of  his  acting  on  some 
divine  suggestion   in   the    formation   of  his   designs,    caused 
those  under  hia  command  to  confront  dangerous  services  with 
greater  courage  and  cheerfulness.       But  that   he  invariably    . 
acted  on  calculation  and  with  foresight,  and  that  the  successful 
issue  of  his  plans  was  always  in  harmony  with  rational  expecta- 
tion, will  be  evident  by  what  I  am  about  to  relate. 

S.  For  that  he  vras  beneficent  and  high-minded  is  ac- 
knowledged ;    but   that  he   was   acute,  sober-     scipio's  lint 
minded,  and  earnest   in   pursuit  of  his  aims,        exploit. 
no   one   will  admit,  except   those   who   have       "-c.  ai8. 
lived  with  him,  and  contemplated  his  character,  so  to  speak, 
in  broad  daylight.     Of  such  Gaius  Laelius  was  one.      He_^ 
took  part  in  everything  he  did  or  said  from  boyhood  to  the 
day  of  his  death ;  and  he  it  was  who  convinced  me  of  this 
truth :  because  what  he  said  appeared  to  me  to  be  likely  in 
in  itself^  and  in  harmony  with  the  achievements  of  that  great 
man.     He  told  me  that  the  first  brilliant  exploit  of  Publius 
was  when   his   father   fought   the   cavalry  engagement  with 
Hannibal  near  the  Padus.     He  was  then,  as  it  seems,  eighteen 
years  old  and  on  his  first  campaign.     His  father  had  given 
him  a  squadron  of  picked  cavalry  for  his  protection  ;  but  when 
in  the  course  of  the  battle  he  saw  his  father  surrounded  by 
the  enemy,  with  only  two  or  three  horsemen  near  him,  and 
dangerously  wounded,  he  first   tried  to  cheer  on  his   own 
squadron  to  go  to  his  father's  assistance,  but  when  he  found 


4  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  book 

them  considerably  cowed  by  the  numbers  of  the  enemy 
surrounding  them,  he  appears  to  have  plunged  by  himself 
with  reckless  courage  into  the  midst  of  the  enemy :  whereupon, 
his  comrades  being  forced  to  charge  also,  the  enemy  were 
everawed  and  divided  their  ranks  to  let  them  pass;  and 
Publius  the  elder,  being  thus  unexpectedly  saved,  was  the  first 
to  address  his  son  as  his  preserver  in  the  hearing  of  the  whole 
army.^  Having  gained  an  acknowledged  reputation  for  bravery 
by  this  exploit,  he  ever  afterwards  freely  exposed  himself 
to  every  sort  of  personal  danger,  whenever  his  country  rested 
its  hope  of  safety  on  him.  And  this  is  not  the  conduct  of  a 
general  who  trusts  to  luck,  but  of  one  who  has  a  clear  head. 

4,  Subsequently,  when  his  elder  brother  Lucius  was  a 
candidate  for  the  Aedileship,  which  is  about  the  most  honour- 
able office  open  to  a  "  young "  man  at  Rome :  it  being  the 
custom  for  two  patricians  to  be  appointed,  and  there  being 
many  candidates,  for  some  time  he  did  not  venture  to  stand 

for  the  same  office  as  his  brother.     But  as  the 

demeanour  of  the  people  that  his  brother  would 
easily  obtain  the  office,  and  observing  that  his  own  popularity 
with  the  multitude  was  very  great,  he  made  up  his  mind  that  the 
only  hope  of  his  brother's  success  was  that  they  should  combine 
their  candidatures.  He  therefore  resolved  to  act  as  follows : 
His  mother  was  going  round  to  the  temples  and  sacrificing 
to  the  gods  in  behalf  of  his  brother,  and  was  altogether  in  a 
state  of  eager  cxi)ectation  as  to  the  result  She  was  the  only 
parent  whose  wishes  he  had  to  consult;  for  his  father  was 
then  on  his  voyage  to  Iberia,  having  been  appointed  to  command 
in  the  war  there.  He  therefore  said  to  her  that  he  had  seen 
the  same  dream  twice :  for  he  thought  that  he  was  coming  home 
from  the  Forum  after  being  elected  Aedile  with  his  brother, 
and  that  she  met  them  at  the  door  and  threw  her  arms  round 
them  and  kissed  them.  His  mother  with  true  womanly  feeling 
exclaimed,  "  Oh,  that  I  might  see  that  day  ! "  He  replied,  "  Do 
you  wish  us  to  try  **  ?  Upon  her  assenting,  under  the  idea 
that  he  would  not  venture,  but  was  only  jesting  on  the  spur 
of  the  moment  (for  of  course  he  was  quite  a  young  man),  he 

*  Sm.'o  on  3,  66. 


X  HIS  ELECTION  TO  THE  AEDILESHIP  S 

begged  her  to  prepare  him  at  once  a  white  tc^a,  such  as  it  Is 
the  custom  for  candidates  for  office  to  wear. 

6.  His  mother  thought  no  more  about  it :  but  Fublius, 
having  obtained  a  white  toga,  went  to  the  Forum  before  his 
mother  was  awake.  His  boldness,  as  well  as  his  previous 
popularity,  secured  him  a  brilliant  reception  from  the  people ; 
and  when  he  advanced  to  the  spot  assigned  for  candidates,  and 
took  his  place  by  the  side  of  his  brother,  the  people  not  only 
invested  him  with  the  office,  but  his  brother  also  for  his  sake ; 
and  both  brothers  returned  home  Aediles  designate.  The 
news  having  been  suddenly  brought  to  their  mother,  she 
rushed  in  the  utmost  delight  to  meet  them  at  the  door,  and 
kissed  the  young  men  in  an  ecstasy  of  joy.  Accordingly 
Fublius  was  believed  by  all  who  had  heard  previously  about 
his  dream  to  have  held  commune  with  the  gods,  not  merely  in 
his  sleep,  but  rather  in  a  waking  vision,  and  by  day.  But  in 
point  of  fact  there  was  no  dream  at  all :  Scipio  was  kind, 
open-handed,  and  courteous,  and  by  these  means  had  con- 
ciliated the  favour  of  the  multitude.  But  by  a  dexterous  use 
of  the  occasion,  both  with  the  people  and  his  mother,  he 
obtained  his  purpose,  and  moreover  got  the  reputation  of 
acting  under  divine  inspiration.  For  those  persons,  who,  from 
dulness  or  want  of  experience,  or  idleness,  can  never  take  a 
clear  view  of  the  occasions  or  causes  or  connexion  of  events, 
are  apt  to  give  the  gods  and  chance  the  credit  for  what  is 
really  effected  by  sagacity  and  far-seeing  calculation.  I  have 
thought  it  worth  while  to  say  thus  much,  that  my  readers  may 
not  be  misled  by  unfounded  gossip  to  pass  over  this  great 
man's  finest  and  most  splendid  qualities,  I  mean  his  wealth  of 
resoiuxre  and  untiring  diligence  ;  which  will  become  still  more 
apparent  when  we  come  to  recount  his  actual  achievements. 

6.  Such  was  the  man  who  now  assembled  the  soldiers  and 
exhorted   them   not  to  be   dismayed   by  the„      .    ,„  ... 
disaster  which  had  befallen  them.     "  For,    said    Scipio  lo  the 
he,  "  Romans  have  never  been  beaten  by  Carlha-  soldiers  in  Spain, 
g^nians  in  a  trial  of  valour.     It  was  the  result       *-^-  ""■ 
of  treachery  on  the  part  of  the  Celtiberians,  and   of  rash- 
ness, the  two  commanders  getting  cut   off  from  each  other 
owing  to  their  trust  in  the  alliance  of  these  men.     But  now 


6  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  book 

these  two  disadvantages  are  on  the  side  of  the  enemy :  for  they 
are  encamped  at  a  wide  distance  from  each  other;  and  by 
their  tyrannical  conduct  to  their  allies  have  alienated  them  all, 
and  made  them  hostile  to  themselves.  The  consequence  is 
that  some  of  them  are  already  sending  messages  to  us ;  while 
the  rest,  as  soon  as  they  dare,  and  see  that  we  have  crossed 
the  river,  will  gladly  join  us ;  not  so  much  because  they  have 
any  affection  for  us,  as  because  they  are  eager  to  punish  the 
outrages  of  the  Carthaginians.  Most  important  of  all  is 
the  fact  that  the  enemy  are  at  variance  with  each  other,  and 
will  refuse  to  fight  against  us  in  a  body,  and  by  thus  engaging 
in  detail  will  be  more  easily  dealt  with  by  us.''  Looking  to 
these  facts,  therefore,  he  bade  them  cross  the  river  with  con- 
fidence, and  undertook  that  he  and  the  other  officers  would 
see  to  the  next  step  to  be  taken.  With  these  words  he  left 
his  colleague,   Marcus  Silanus,  with   five   hundred  horse  to 

«  .  .  .    guard  the  ford,  and  to  protect  the  allies  oo  the 

Ebro,  and  swoops  north  of  the  river,  while  he  himself  began  taking 

down  upon  New  his  army  across,  without  revealing  his  design 
Carthage.      ^^  ^^j^y  ^^^     ^g  ^  matter  of  fact  he  had  resolved 

to  do  nothing  of  what  he.  gave  out  publicly,  and  had  made 
up  his  mind  to  make  a  rapid  attack  upon  the  town  called 
Iberian  Carthage.  This  may  be  looked  upon  as  the  first 
and  strongest  proof  of  the  judgment  which  I  lately  passed 
upon  him.  He  was  now  only  in  his  twenty-seventh  year :  and 
yet  he,  in  the  first  place,  undertook  to  accomplish  what  the 
magnitude  of  the  previous  disasters  had  made  the  world  look 
upon  as  completely  hopeless;  and,  in  the  second  place,  having 
undertaken  it,  he  left  on  one  side  the  plain  and  obvious  course, 
and  conceived  and  carried  out  a  plan  which  was  a  surprise  to 
the  enemy  himself.  This  could  only  be  the  result  of  the 
closest  calculation. 

7.  The  fact  is  that  he  had  made  minute  inquiries,  before 

leaving  Rome,  both  about  the  treason  of  the  Celtiberians,  and 

o  .  .  ,        ,  y  the  separation  of  the  two  Roman  armies :  and 

Scipio  s  careful    ,      ,     ,^ ^         .       .  ,./.,.,. 

inquiries  as  to  the  had    mferred    that    his    fathers   disaster    was 
state  of  things  in  entirely  attributable  to  these^    He  had  not  there- 
Spam.        fQj.g  shared  the  popular  terror  of  the  Carthagin- 
ians, nor  allowed  himself  to  be  overcome  by  the  general  panic. 


X  HE  DETERMINES  TO  ATTACK  CARTHAGENA  j 

And  when  he  subsequently  heard  that  the  allies  of  Rome 
north  of  the  Ebro  were  remaining  loyal,  while  the  Carthaginian 
commanders  were  quarrelling  with  each  other,  and  maltreating 
the  natives  subject  to  ihem,  he  began  to  feei  very  cheerful 
about  his  expedition,  not  from  a  blind  confidence  in  Fortune, 
but  from  dehberate  calculation.  Accordingly,  when  he  arrived 
in  Iberia,  he  leamt,  by  questioning  everybody  and  making 
inquiries  about  the  enemy  from  every  one,  that  the  forces  of 
the  Carthaginians  were  divided  into  three.  Mago,  he  was  in- 
formed, was  lingering  west  of  the  pillars  of  Hercules  among 
the  Conii ;  Hasdnibal,  the  son  of  Gesco,  in  Lusitania,  near  the 
mouth  of  the  Tagus ;  while  the  other  Hasdnibal  was  besieging 
a  certain  city  of  the  Caspetani ;  and  none  of  the  three  were  less 
than  ten  days'  march  from  the  New  Town.  Now  he  cal- 
culated that,  if  he  decided  to  give  the  enemy  battle,  it  would 
be  risking  too  much  to  do  so  against  all  three  at  once,  be- 
cause his  predecessors  had  been  beaten,  and  because  the  enemy 
would  vastly  out-number  him ;  if,  on  the  other  hand,  he  were  to 
march  rapidly  to  engage  one  of  the  three,  and  should  then  find 
himself  surrounded — which  might  happen  by  the  one  attacked 
retreating,  and  the  others  coming  up  to  his  relief,— he  dreaded 
a  disaster  like  that  of  his  uncle  Gnaeus  and  his  father 
Publius. 

8.  He  therefore  rejected  that  idea  altogether:  but  being 
informed  that  New  Carthage  was  the  most  ini-  ^e  determines 
portant  source  of  supplies  to  the  enemy  and  lo  aitenipt 
of  damage  to  the  Romans  in  the  present  war,  he  ^'*  Carthage. 
had  taken  the  trouble  to  make  minute  inquiries  about  it  during 
the  winter  from  those  who  were  well  informed.  He  leamt 
that  it  was  nearly  the  only  town  in  Iberia  which  possessed  a 
harbour  suitable  for  a  fleet  and  naval  force ;  that  it  lay 
very  conveniently  for  the  Carthaginians  to  make  the  sea 
passage  from  Libya;  that  they  in  fact  had  the  bulk  of  their 
money  and  war  material  in  it,  as  well  as  their  hostages  from 
the  whole  of  Iberia;  that,  most  important  of  all,  the  num- 
ber of  fighting  men  garrisoning  the  citadei  only  amounted 
to  a  thousand, — because  no  one  would  ever  suppose  that, 
while  the  Carthaginians  commanded  nearly  the  whole  of 
Iberia,  any  one  would  conceive  the  idea  of  assaulting   this 


8  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  book 

town ;  that  the  other  inhabitants  were  exceedingly  numerous, 
but  all  consisted  of  craftsmen,  mechanics,  and  fisher-folk,  as 
far  as  possible  removed  from  any  knowledge  of  warfare.  All 
this  he  regarded  as  being  fatal  to  the  town,  in  case  of  the 
sudden  appearance  of  an  enemy.  Nor  did  he  moreover  fail 
to  acquaint  himself  with  the  topography  of  New  Carthage,  or 
the  nature  of  its  defences,  or  the  lie  of  the  lagoon :  but  by 
means  of  certain  fishermen  who  had  worked  there  he  had 
ascertained  that  the  lagoon  was  quite  shallow  and  fordable  at 
most  points;  and  that,  generally  speaking,  the  water  ebbed 
every  day  towards  evening  sufficiently  to  secure  this.  These 
considerations  convinced  him  that,  if  he  could  accomplish  his 
purpose,  he  would  not  only  damage  his  opponents,  but  gain  a 
considerable  advantage  for  himself;  and  that,  if  on  the  other 
hand  he  failed  in  effecting  it,  he  would  yet  be  able  to  secure 
the  safety  of  his  men  owing  to  his  command  of  the  sea,  pro- 
vided he  had  once  made  his  camp  secure, — and  this  was  easy, 
because  of  the  wide  dispersion  of  the  enemy's  forces.  He 
had  therefore,  during  his  residence  in  winter  quarters,  devoted 
himself  to  preparing  for  this  operation  to  the  exclusion  of 
every  other :  and  in  spite  of  the  magnitude  of  the  idea  which 
he  had  conceived,  and  in  spite  of  his  youth,  he  concealed  it 
from  all  except  Gaius  Laelius,  until  he  had  himself  decided  to 
reveal  it 

9.  But  although  historians  agree  in  attributing  these  cal- 
culations to  him ;  yet,  when  they  come  to  narrate  their  issue, 
they  somehow  or  another  attribute  the  success  obtained  not 
to  the  man  and  his  foresight,  but  to  the  gods  and  to  Fortune, 
and  that,  in  spite  of  all  probability,  and  the  evidence  of  those 
who  lived  with  him ;  and  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  Publius 
himself  in  a  letter  addressed  to  Philip  has  distinctly  set  forth 
that  it  was  upon  the  deliberate  calculations,  which  I  have  just 
set  forth,  that  he  undertook  the  Iberian  campaign  generally, 
and  the  assault  upon  New  Carthage  in  particular. 

However  that  may  be,  at  the  time  specified  he  gave  secret 
instructions  to  Gaius  Laelius,  who  was  in  corn- 
Gams  Laehus    niand  of  the  fleet,  and  who,  as  I  have  said,  was 

proceeds  to      ^,  ,  .    ^,  ^  m  i  • 

New  Carthage    '"^  ^"'y  ^^^^  >"  "^^  secret,  to  sail  to  this  town  ; 
with  the  fleet,    while  he  himself  marched  his  army  at  a  rapid 


X  TOPOGRAPHY  OF  CARTHAGENA  9 

pace  io  the  same  direction.  His  force  con-  Scipio  by  land, 
sisted  of  twenty-five  thousand  infantry  and  ^^'  ^°'' 
two  thousand  five  hundred  cavalry ;  and  arriving  at  New 
Carthage  on  the  seventh  day  he  pitched  his  camp  on  the 
north  of  the  town;>  defended  its  rear  by  a  double  trench 
and  rampart  stretching  from  sea  to  sea,*  while  on  the  side 
facing  the  town  he  made  absolutely  no  defences,  for  the  nature 
of  the  ground  made  him  sufficiently  secure. 

But  as  I  am  now  about  to  describe  the  assault  and  capture 
of  the  town,  I  think  I  must  explain  to  my  readers  the  lie  of 
the  surrounding  country,  and  the  position  of  the  town  itself. 

10.  It  stands  about  halfway  down  the  coast  of  Iberia  in 
a  gulf  which  faces  south-west,  running  about  ^^  .  , 
twenty  stades  inland,  and  about  ten  stades  ^^^  c^fcige. 
broad  at  its  entrance.  The  whole  gulf  is  made 
a  harbour  by  the  fact  that  an  island  *  lies  at  its  mouth  and  thus 
makes  the  entrance  channels  on  each  side  of  it  exceedingly 
narrow.  It  breaks  the  force  of  the  waves  also,  and  the  whole 
gulf  has  thus  smooth  water,  except  when  south-west  winds 
setting  down  the  two  channels  raise  a  surf;  with  all  other 
winds  it  is  perfectly  calm,  from  being  so  nearly  landlocked. 
In  the  recess  of  the  gulf  a  mountain  juts  out  in  the  form  of  a 
Chersonese,  and  it  is  on  this  mountain  that  the  city  stands, 
surrounded  by  the  sea  on  the  east  and  south,  and  on  the 
west  by  a  lagoon  extending  so  far  northward  that  the 
remaining  space  to  the  sea  on  the  other  side,  to  connect  it 
with  the  continent,  is  not  more  than  two  stades.  The 
city  itself  has  a  deep  depression  in  its  centre,  presenting 
on  its  south  side  a  level  approach  from  the  sea;  while  the 
rest  of  it  is  hemmed  in  by  hills,  two  of  them  mountainous 
and  rough,  three  others  much  lower,  but  rocky  and  difficult  of 
ascent ;  the  largest  of  which  lies  on  the  east  of  the  town  run- 

'  Dr.  Arnold  dKlarcs  fl  ".itl  but  an  impossibility  thai  an  nrniy  should  have 
marched  the  distance  (not  less  Ihan  325  Koman  miles)  in  n  week,"  Livy  {36. 
41)  accepts  the  slalemenl  wiihoul  question. 

*  Mr.  Slrachan-DnviUson  eiplains  this  to  mean  [rom  the  sen  to  the  Inke.  as 
Scipio's  linn  would  not  have  extended  light  round  the  lake  to  the  other  sea, 

*  Escombreta  (Zio^pofila).  I  mu&t  refer  my  readers  10  Mr.  Strachan- 
DavidsoD's  appendix  on  TAt  Silt  1/  the  Spnnish  Caiihage  for  a  discussion  oT 
tbcie  delaiU.     S«e  above  a,  13  ;  Livy.  ab.  ^a, 


lo  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  VBli/S  book 

ning  out  into  the  sea,  on  which  stands  a  temple  of  Asclepius. 
Exactly  opposite  this  lies  the  western  mountain  in  a  closely- 
corresponding  position,  on  which  a  palace  had  been  erected  at 
great  cost,  which  it  is  said  was  built  by  Hasdrubal  when  he 
was  aiming  at  establishing  royal  power.  The  remaining  three 
lesser  elevations  bound  it  on  the  north,  of  which  the  western- 
most is  called  the  hill  of  Hephaestus,  the  next  to  it  that  of 
Aletes, — who  is  believed  to  have  attained  divine  honours  from 
having  been  the  discoverer  of  the  silver  mines, — ^and  the  third 
is  called  the  hill  of  Cronus.  The  lagoon  has  been  connected 
with  the  adjoining  sea  artificially  for  the  sake  of  the  maritime 
folk ;  and  over  the  channel  thus  cut  between  it  and  the  sea  a 
bridge  has  been  built,  for  beasts  of  burden  and  carts  to  bring 
in  provisions  from  the  country. 

1 1 .  Such  is  the  nature  of  this  city's  situation.  The  side 
of  the  Roman  camp  which  faced  the  city  therefore  was 
secured,  without  any  artificial  means,  by  the  lagoon  and  the 
sea.  The  neck  of  land  lying  between  these  two,  and  con- 
necting the  city  with  the  continent,  Scipio  did  not  fence  off 
with  a  stockade,  although  it  abutted  on  the  middle  of  his 
camp,— either  for  the  sake  of  making  an  impression  upon  the 
enemy,  or  by  way  of  suiting  the  arrangement  to  his  own  design, 
— that  he  might  have  nothing  to  hamper  the  free  egress  and 
return  of  his  troops  to  and  from  the  camp.  The  circuit  of 
the  city  wall  was  not  more  than  twenty  stades  formerly, — 
though  I  am  aware  that  it  has  been  stated  at  forty  stades ; 
but  this  is  false,  as  I  know  from  personal  inspection  and  not 
from  mere  report, — and  in  our  day  it  has  been  still  farther 
contracted. 

The  fleet  arrived  to  the  hour,  and  Publius  then  thought  it 
o  .  .    ,.  ,        time  to  summon  a  meeting  of  his  men  and  to 

kScipio  uiscloscs 

his  intention  of  encourage  them  to  the  undertaking  by  the  use 
assaulting      of  the  same  arguments  by  which  he  had  con- 

New  Carthage,  yi^ced  himself,  and  which  I  have  just  now 
detailed.  He  pointed  out  to  them  that  the  plan  was  practi- 
cable ;  and  briefly  summing  up  the  blow  which  their  success 
would  be  to  their  enemies,  and  the  advantage  it  would  be  to 
themselves,  he  ended  by  promising  crowns  of  gold  to  those 
who  first  mounted  the  walls,  and  the  usual  rewards  to  those  who 


I  THE  ATTACK  ON  CARTHACENA  BEGUN  ii 

displayed  conspicuous  gallantry.  And  finally  he  declared  that 
"Poseidon  had  appeared  to  him  in  his  sleep,  and  originally 
suggested  his'  plan  to  him ;  and  had  promised  to  give  him  such 
signal  aid  in  the  actual  hour  of  battle,  that  his  assistance  should 
be  made  manifest  to  all."  The  skilful  mixture  in  this  speech 
of  accurate  calculation  with  promises  of  gold  crowns,  and  a 
reference  to  Divine  Providence,  created  a  great  impression  and 
enthusiasm  in  the  minds  of  the  young  soldiers. 

12.  Next  morning  he  stationed  ships  supplied  with  missiles 
of  every  sort,  all  along  the  seaboard,  under  the  command  of 
Gaius  Laelius ;  and  having  told  off  two  thousand  .pj^^  assault 
of  his  strongest  men  to  accompany  the  ladder- 
carriers,  he  begun  the  assault  about  the  third  hour.  The 
commandant  of  the  town,  Mago,  divided  his  garrison  of  a 
thousand  men  into  two  companies  \  half  he  left  upon  the 
citadel,  and  the  rest  he  stationed  upon  the  eastern  hill. 
Of  the  other  inhabitants  he  accoutred  about  two  thousand  of 
the  strongest  men  with  such  arms  as  there  were  in  the  city, 
and  stationed  them  at  the  gate  leading  to  the  isthmus  and 
the  enemy's  camp :  the  rest  he  ordered  to  assist  to  the  best 
of  their  power  at  all  points  in  the  wall.  As  soon  as  the 
bugles  of  Publius  sounded  the  moment  of  the 
assault,  Mago  caused  those  whom  he  had  '^^fe^den" 
armed  to  sally  from  the  gate,  feeling  con- 
fident that  he  should  create  a  panic  among  the  assailants 
and  entirely  baffle  their  design.  These  men  vigorously  at- 
tacked those  of  the  Koman  army  who  were  drawn  up  opposite 
the  isthmus,  and  a  sharp  engagement  took  place  accompanied 
by  loud  cries  of  encouragement  on  both  sides :  the  Romans  in 
the  camp  cheering  on  their  men,  and  the  people  in  the  city 
theirs.  But  the  contest  was  an  unequal  one  in  the  respect  of 
the  facility  of  bringing  up  reserves.  The  Carthaginians  had  all 
to  come  out  by  one  gate,  and  had  nearly  two  stades  to 
march  before  they  got  on  the  ground ;  whereas  the  Romans 
had  their  supports  close  at  hand  and  able  to  come  out  over  a 
wide  area  ;  for  Publius  had  purposely  stationed  his  men  close 
to  the  camp  in  order  to  induce  the  enemy  to  come  out  as  far 
as  possible  :  being  quite  aware  that  if  he  succeeded  in  destroy- 
ing these,  who  were  so  to  speak  the  sharp  edge  of  the  uri 


12  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  BO 

population,  universal  consternation  would  be  the  result,  an 

no  more  of  those  in  the  town  would  have  th 
^^     '       courage  to  come  out  of  the  gate.     The  coi 
test  however  for  a  certain  time  was  undecided,  for  it  was  be 
tween  picked  men  on  both  sides ;  but  finally  the  Carthaginian 
were  overpowered  by  the  superior  weight  of  their  opponents 
owing  to  the  constant  reinforcements  from  the  camp,  and 
turned  to  flight     A  large  number  of  them  fell  in  the  actual 
engagement,  and  during  the  retreat ;  but  the  greater  number 
were  trampled  to  death  by  each  other  as  they  crowded  through 
the  gate.     The  city  people  were  thrown  into  such  a  panic  by 
these  events,  that  even  those  who  were  guarding  the  walls 
fled.     The  Romans    very  nearly  succeeded  in  forcing  their 
way  in  through  the  gates  with  the  fugitives ;   and  of  course 
fixed  their  scaling-ladders  against  the  wall  in  perfect  security. 

13.  Meanwhile  Publius,  though  throwing  himself  heartily 
into  the  struggle,  yet  took  all  possible  precautions  to  protect 
his  life.  He  had  three  men  with  him  carrying  large  shields, 
which  they  held  in  such  a  position  as  to  completely  protect 
him  from  the  side  of  the  wall ;  and  accordingly  he  went  along 
the  lines,  or  mounted  on  elevated  ground,  and  contributed 
greatly  to  the  success  of  the  day.  For  he  was  enabled  to  see 
all  that  was  going  on,  and  at  the  same  time,  by  being  himself 
in  view  of  all,  inspired  great  zeal  in  the  hearts  of  the  combat- 
ants. The  result  was  that  nothing  was  omitted  which  could 
contribute  to  the  success  of  the  battle ;  but  any  help  he 
saw  to  be  at  any  moment  required  was  rapidly  and  thoroughly 
supplied. 

But  though  the  leaders  of  the  escalade  had  begun  mount- 
ing the  walls  with  great  spirit,  they  found  the 
^*®^J^^°^ ^® operation  accompanied  by  some  danger:  not 

so  much  from  the  number  of  the  defenders,  as 
from  the  height  of  the  wails.  The  defenders  accordingly 
plucked  up  courage  considerably  when  they  saw  the  distress  of 
the  assailants :  for  some  of  the  ladders  were  breaking  under 
the  weight  of  the  numbers  which,  owing  to  their  length,  were  on 
them  at  the  same  time ;  while  on  others  the  first  to  mount 
turned  giddy  owing  to  their  great  height,  and  without  requiring 
much  resistance  from  the  defenders  threw  themselves  from 


X  DOUBLE  ASSAULT  BY  THE  ROMANS  13 

the  Udders :  and  when  beams,  or  anything  of  that  sort,  were 
hurled  upon  ihero  from  the  battlements,  they  were  swept  olT 
en  masse  and  fell  to  the  ground.  In  spite  however  of  these 
difficulties  nothing  could  check  the  zeal  and  fury  of  the 
Roman  attack ;  but  as  the  (irst  fell  their  place  was  always 
taken  at  once  by  the  next  in  order.  And  now,  as  the  day  was 
far  advanced,  and  the  soldiers  were  worn  out  with  fatigue, 
Scipio  sounded  a  recall  for  the  assaulting  party. 

14.  The  men  in  the  town  were  accordingly  in  high  spirits 
at  having,  as  they  thought,  repulsed  the  assault,  xowaris  evening 
But  Scipio,  who  was  conscious  that  the  time  Scipio  renews  ihe 
was  now  approaching  for  the  ebb  of  the  lagoon,  ^^sauii  on  ihe 
had  five  hundred  men  stationed  ready  by  itSg^J^ijonf^i^is 
edge  with  ladders ;  and  meanwhile  massed  some  aiiBck  by  way 
fresh  soldiers  upon  the  gate  and  isthmus,  and,  "'  '*'^  lagoon. 
after  urging  them  to  undertake  the  work,  furnished  them  with 
a  larger  number  of  ladders  than  before  :  so  that  the  wall  was 
almost  covered  with  men  scaling  it.  When  the  signal  for 
attack  was  sounded,  and  the  men  placed  their  ladders  against 
the  wall,  and  b^an  ascending  at  every  point,  the  excitement 
and  consternation  inside  the  walls  was  extreme ;  for  when 
they  thought  themselves  released  from  the  threatened  danger, 
they  saw  it  beginning  all  over  again  by  another  assault  Be- 
sides, their  missiles  were  beginning  to  fall  short ;  and  the 
number  of  men  they  had  lost  greatly  disheartened  them.  Still, 
though  they  were  in  great  distress,  they  continued  the  defence 
as  well  as  they  could. 

Just  when  the  struggle  at  the  ladders  was  at  its  hottest  the 
ebb  of  the  tide  began.    The  water  began  gradu-         . 
ally  to  leave  the  edges  of  the  lagoon,  and  the  the'fagi^^d 
current  ran  with  such  violence,  and  in  such  a    geis  his  mm 
mass  through  its    channel  into  the  adjoining   "po"  ihe  wau. 
sea,  that  to  those  who  were  unprepared  for  the  sight  it  ap- 
peared incredible.      Being   provided  with  guides,  Scipio  at 
once  ordered  his  men,  who  had  been  stationed  ready  for  this 
service,  to  step  in  and  to  fear  nothing.    His  was  a  nature  especi- 
ally fitted  to  inspire  courage  and  sympathy  with  his   own 
feelings.     So  now  the  men  at  once  obeyed  him,  and  when 
the  army  saw  them  racing  each  other  across  the  marsh 


14  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  boo 

could  not  but  suppose  that  the  movement  was  a  kind  o 
heaven-sent  inspiration.  This  reminded  them  of  the  refereno 
Scipio  had  made  to  Poseidon,  and  the  promises  contained  it 
his  harangue :  and  their  enthusiasm  rose  to  such  a  height  that 
they  locked  their  shields  above  their  heads,  and,  charging  up 
to  the  gate,  they  began  trying  to  hew  their  way  through  the 
panels  of  the  doors  with  their  axes  and  hatchets. 

Meanwhile  the  party  which  had  crossed  the  marsh  had  ap- 
proached the  wall.  They  found  the  battlements  unguarded  : 
and  therefore,  not  only  fixed  their  ladders  against  the  wall, 
but  actually  mounted  and  took  it  without  striking  a  blow ;  for 
the  attention  of  the  garrison  was  distracted  to  other  points, 
especially  to  the  isthmus  and  the  gate  leading  to  it,  and  they 
never  expected  that  the  enemy  were  likely  to  attack  on  the 
side  of  the  lagoon :  besides,  and  above  all,  there  was  such 
disorderly  shouting,  and  such  a  scene  of  confusion  within  the 
wall,  that  they  could  neither  hear  nor  see  to  any  purpose. 

15.  As  soon  as  they  found  themselves  in  possession  of 
The  city  entered  ^^^  ^all,  the  Romans  began  making  their 
and  given  up  to  way  along  the  top  of  it,  hurling  off  such  of 

the  sword,  ^j^^  enemy  as  they  met,  the  nature  of 
their  arms  being  especially  suited  for  an  operation  of  that 
sort  But  when  they  arrived  at  the  gate  they  descended  and 
began  cutting  through  the  bolts,  while  those  without  began 
forcing  their  way  in,  and  those  who  were  mounting  the  walls 
in  the  direction  of  the  isthmus,  beginning  by  this  time  to  get 
the  better  of  their  opponents,  were  getting  a  footing  on  the 
battlements.  Thus  the  walls  were  finally  in  possession  of  the 
enemy  :  and  the  troops,  which  entered  by  the  gate,  carried  the 
eastern  hill  and  drove  off  the  garrison  occupying  it 

When  Scipio  thought  that  a  sufficient  number  of  troops 
had  entered  the  town,  he  gave  leave  to  the  larger  number  of 
them  to  attack  those  in  it,  according  to  the  Roman  custom, 
with  directions  to  kill  everything  they  met,  and  to  spare 
nothing;  and  not  to  begin  looting  until  they  got  the  order 
to  do  so.  The  object  of  this  is,  I  suppose,  to  strike  terror. 
Accordingly,  one  may  often  see  in  towns  captured  by  the 
Romans,  not  only  human  beings  who  have  been  put  to  the 
sword,  but  even  dogs  cloven  down  the  middle,  and  the  limbs 


X  CAKTHAGENA  CAPTUA'BD  AND  LOOTED  15 

of  Other  animals  hewn  off.  On  this  occasion  the  amount  of 
such  slaughter  was  exceedingly  great,  because  of  the  numbers 
included  in  the  city, 

Scipto  himself  with  about  a  thousand  men  now  pressed  on 
towards  the  citadel.  When  he  arrived  there, 
Magoat  firet  thought  of  resistance;  but  after-  "^heeU^ei"' 
wards,  when  he  was  satisfied  that  the  city 
was  completely  in  the  power  of  the  enemy,  he  sent  to 
demand  a  promise  of  his  life,  and  then  surrendered.  This 
being  concluded,  the  signal  was  given  to  stop  the  slaughter : 
whereupon  the  soldiers  left  off  slaying,  and  ,.  ,  ,  . 
turned  to  plunder.  When  night  fell  those  of  ^  °  ^  "^^' 
the  soldiers  to  whom  this  duty  had  been  assigned  remained 
in  the  camp,  wbile  Scipio  with  his  thousand  men  bivouacked 
in  the  citadel ;  and  summoning  the  rest  from  the  dwelling- 
houses  by  means  of  the  'i'ribunes,  he  ordered  them  to  collect 
all  their  booty  into  the  market-place  by  maniples,  and  to 
take  up  their  quarters  for  the  night  by  these  several  heaps. 
He  then  summoned  the  light-armed  from  the  camp,  and 
stationed  them  upon  the  eastern  hill. 

Thus  did   the   Romans  become  masters  of  Carthage  in 
Iberia. 

16.  Next  morning  the  baggage  of  those  who  had  served 
in  the  Carthaginian  ranks,  as  well  as  the  pro- 
perty  of  the  city-folk  and  the  craftsmen,  having  cusioms  in  ihe 
been  collected   together  in  the  market-place,    diiinbiuionof 
the  Tribunes  divided  it  according  to  the  Roman        bowy- 
custom    among   their    several    legions.       Now    the    Roman 
method  of  procedure  in  the  capture  of  cities  is  the  follow- 
ing :  Sometimes  certain  soldiers  taken  from  each  maniple  are 
told  off  for  this  duty,  their  numbers  depending  on  the  size  of 
the  city ;  sometimes  maniples  are  told  off  in  turn  for  it :  but 
there  are  never  more  than  half  the  whole  number  assigned  to 
the  work.    The  rest  remain  in  their  own  ranks  in  reserve,  some- 
times outside,  at  others  inside  the  city,  for  taking  such  pre- 
cautions as  may  be  from  time  to  time  necessary.      Sometimes, 
though  rarely,  four  legions  are  massed  together ;  but  generally 
speaking    the    whole    force    is    divided    into    two    legions    of 
Romans  and  two  of  allies.     This  being  settled,  all  who  are 
( 
/ 


i6  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  book 

told  off  for  plundering  carry  all  they  get,  each  to  his  own 
legion ;  and  when  this  booty  has  been  sold,  the  Tribunes  dis- 
tribute the  proceeds  among  all  equally,  including  not  only 
those  who  were  thus  held  in  reserve,  but  even  those  who 
were  guarding  the  tents,  or  were  invalided,  or  had  been  sent 
away  anywhere  on   any  service.     But  I  have  spoken  fully 

g^g  before,    when   discussing    the   Roman   consti- 

tution, on  the  subject  of  the  distribution  of 
booty,  showing  how  no  one  is  excluded  from  a  share  in 
it,  in  accordance  with  the  oath  which  all  take  upon  first 
joining  the  camp.  I  may  now  add  that  the  arrange- 
ment whereby  the  Roman  army  is  thus  divided,  half  being 
engaged  in  gathering  booty  and  half  remaining  drawn  up  in 
reserve,  precludes  all  danger  of  a  general  catastrophe  arising 
from  personal  rivalry  in  greed.  \ox  as  both  parties  feel  ab- 
solute confidence  in  the  fair  dealing  of  each  in  respect  to  the 
booty, — the  reserves  no  less  than  the  plunderers, — no  one 
leaves  the  ranks,  which  has  been  the  most  frequent  cause  of 
disaster  in  the  case  of  other  armies. 

1 7.  For,  as  the  majority  of  mankind  encounter  miseries  and 
embrace  dangers  for  the  sake  of  gain,  it  is  plain  that  when 
such  opportunity  is  presented  to  them  as  this,  the  men  in  the  re- 
serve or  in  the  camp  would  be  with  difficulty  induced  to  abstain 
from  taking  advantage  of  it;  because  the  usual  idea  is  that  every- 
thing belongs  to  the  man  who  actually  takes  it :  and  though  a 
general  or  king  may  be  careful  to  order  all  booty  to  be  brought 
into  the  common  stock,  yet  everybody  considers  that  what  he 
can  conceal  is  his  own.  The  result  is  that,  while  the  ruck 
of  the  army  cannot  be  prevented  from  eagerly  devoting  them- 
selves to  plunder,  they  often  run  the  risk  of  a  complete  over- 
throw :  and  it  has  often  in  fact  happened  that  after  a  successful 
movement,  such  as  the  carrying  of  an  entrenched  camp  or  the 
capture  of  a  city,  the  victorious  army  has,  from  no  other  cause 
but  this,  been  not  only  ejected  but  even  utterly  defeated. 
Therefore  there  is  nothing  about  which  leaders  ought  to  exercise 
more  care  or  foresight,  than  that,  on  such  an  occasion,  all 
may  have  an  absolutely  equal  prospect  of  sharing  in  the  booty. 

Thus  on  the  present  occasion,  while  the  Tribunes  were 
busied  in  the  distribution  of  the  spoil;   the  Roman  com- 


3t  SCiPJ&S  TREATMENT  OF  THE  P/i/SONEFS  17 

mander  caused  the  prisoners,  who  numbered  little  short  of 

ten  thousand,  to  be  assembled ;  and  havine  first  „ „, 

ordered  them  to  be  divided  mto  two  groups,  of  ihe  prisoners. 
one  containing  the  citizens  and  their  wives  and  Tlie  ciii^ns  are 
children,  the  other  the  craftsmen,  he  exhorted  '"^J^jj'"  ^'' 
the  first  of  these  to  be  loyal  to  the  Romans, 
and  to  remember  the  favour  which  they  were  now  receiving, 
and  allowed  them  ali  to  depart  to  their  own  houses.  With 
tears  of  joy  at  this  unexpected  preservation,  they  bowed  in 
reverence  to  Scipio  and  dispersed.  He  then  -^^^  skilled  slaves 
told  the  craftsmen  that  they  were  for  the  present  are  promised  iheir 
public  slaves  of  Rome,  but  that,  if  they  showed  f™dom  ai  the 
themselves  loyal  and  zealous  in  their  several 
crafts,  he  promised  them  their  freedom,  as  soon  as  the  war  with 
the  Carthaginians  had  been  brought  to  a  successful  issue.  He 
then  bade  them  go  get  their  names  enrolled  in  the  office  of 
the  Quaestor,  and  appointed  a  Roman  overseer  for  every 
thirty  of  them,  their  whole  number  being  about  two  thousand. 
From  the  remaining  captives  he  selected  the 
strongest,  those  who  were  in  the  prime  of  ^^  JJJ^  ^^'"^ 
youth  and  physical  vigour,  and  assigned  them 
to  serve  on  board  ship:  and  having  thus  increased  the  number 
of  his  naval  allies  by  one  half,  he  manned  the  ships  taken  from 
the  enemy  as  well  as  his  own ;  so  that  the  number  of  men  on 
board  each  vessel  were  now  little  .short  of  double  what  it  was 
before.  For  the  captured  ships  numbered  eighteen,  his 
original  tleet  thirty-five.  These  men  he  also  promised  their 
freedom,  if  they  showed  themselves  loyal  and  zealous,  as  soon 
as  they  had  conquered  the  Carthaginians.  By  this  treatment 
of  the  captives  he  inspired  the  citizens  with  warm  feelings  of 
loyalty  and  fidelity,  and  the  handicraftsmen  with  great 
readiness  to  serve,  from  the  hope  held  out  to  them  of  recovering 
their  freedom. 

18.  He  next  took  Mago  and  the  Carthaginians  with  him 
separately,   consisting  of  one  member  of  the 
Council  of  ancients  and  fifteen  of  the  Senate.' '  ''^J^e"^'" 
These  he  put  under  the  charge  of  Gaius  I-aelius, 
with  orders  that  he  should  take  due  care  of  them.      He  next 
'  This  seems  to   be  the  distinciion    between   the   words   ytfinvati.  and 


1 8  THE  HISTORIES  OE  POLYBWS  boo 

summoned    the  hostages,  who   numbered   more   than    thr© 
-m.  u   .  -^     hundred.     Such  of  them  as  were  children  hi 

1  ne  nostages.         n    i         «  .  «  «  i  •  i    • 

called  to  him  one  by  one,  and  strokmg  thai 
heads  told  them  not  to  be  afraid,  for  in  a  few  days  they  woulc 
see  their  parents.     The  others  also  he  exhorted  to  be  of  gooc 
cheer,  and  to  write  word  to  their  relations  in  their  several  cities, 
first,  that  they  were  safe  and  well;  and,  secondly,  that  the 
Romans  were  minded  to  restore  them  all  unharmed  to  their 
homes,  if  only  their  relations  adopted  the  Roman  alliance. 
With  these  words,  having  already  selected  from  the  spoils  such 
articles  as  were  fitting  for  his  purpose,  he  presented  each  with 
what  was  suitable  to  their  sex  and  age  :  the  girls  with  ear-rings 
and  bracelets,  the  young  men  with  daggers  and  swords.    Among 
^  the  captive  women  was  the  wife  of  Mandonius, 

brother  of  Andobalus  king  of  the  Ilergetes. 
Tins  woman  fell  at  his  feet  and  besought  him  with  tears  to 
protect  their  honour  better  than  the  Carthaginians  had  done. 
Touched  by  her  distress  Scipio  asked  her  in  what  respect  she 
and  the  other  women  were  left  unprovided.  She  was  a  lady 
of  advanced  years  and  of  a  certain  majestic  dignity  of  appear- 
ance :  and  upon  her  meeting  his  question  by  perfect  silence, 
he  summoned  the  men  who  had  been  appointed  to  take  charge 
of  the  women;  and  when  they  reported  that  they  had  supplied 
them  with  all  necessaries  in  abundance,  and  when  the  woman 
again  clasped  his  knees  and  repeated  the  same  request,  Scipio 
felt  still  more  embarrassed  ;  and,  conceiving  the  idea  that  their 
guardians  had  neglected  them,  and  were  now  making  a  false 
report,  he  bade  the  women  fear  nothing,  for  that  he  would 
appoint  different  men  to  see  to  their  interests,  and  secure  that 
they  were  not  left  in  want  of  anything.  Then  after  a  brief 
hesitation  the  woman  said,  "  You  mistake  my  meaning,  General, 
if  you  think  that  we  are  asking  you  for  food."  Scipio  then  at 
length  began  to  understand  what  she  wished  to  convey ;  and 
seeing  under  his  eyes  the  youthful  beauty  of  the  daughters  of 
Andobalus,  and  of  many  of  the  other  nobles,  he  could  not 

virfKkrrroi.  Cp.  36,  4.  The  latter  is  the  word  used  by  Polybius  for  the 
Roman  Senate  :  for  the  nature  of  the  first  see  Bosworth  Smith,  Carthage  and 
he  Carthaginians,  p.  27.  It  was  usually  called  "  The  Hundred."  Mommsen 
(Hist,  tf  Rome,  vol.  ii,  p.  15)  seems  to  doubt  the  existence  of  the  larger  coun- 
cil :  its  authority  at  any  rate  had  been  superseded  by  the  oligarchical  gerusia. 


X  SClPKfS  TREATMENT  OF  WOMEN  19 

refrain  from  tears,  while  the  aged  lady  indicated  in  a  few  words 
the  danger  in  which  they  were.  He  showed  at  once  that  he 
understood  her  words :  and  taking  her  by  the  hand,  he  bade 
her  and  the  others  also  be  of  good  cheer,  for  that  he  would 
watch  over  them  as  he  would  over  his  own  sisters  and 
daughters,  and  would  accordingly  put  men  in  charge  of  them 
on  whom  he  could  rely. 

19.  His  next  business  was  to  pay  over  to  the  Quaestors 
such  public  money  of  the  Carthaginians  as  had     „  ^  ^^^^ 
been    captured.      It  amounted  to  more  than 
six  hundred  talents,  so  that  when  this  was  added  to  the  four 
hundred  which  he  had  brought  with  him  from  Rome,  he  found 
himself  in  possession  of  more  than  one  thousand  talents. 

It  was  on  this  occasion  that  some  young  Romans  fell  in 
with  a  girl  surpassing  all  the  other  women  in 
bloom  and  beauty  ;  and  seeing  that  Scipio  was  continence. 
fond  of  the  society  of  women,  they  brought  her 
to  him,  and,  placing  her  before  him,  said  that  they  desired  to 
present  the  damsel  to  him.  He  was  struck  with  admiration 
for  her  beauty,  and  replied  that,  if  he  had  been  in  a  private 
position,  he  could  have  received  no  present  that  would  have 
given  him  greater  pleasure ;  hut  as  general  it  was  the  last  in  the 
world  which  he  could  receive.  He  meant  to  convey,  I  presume, 
by  this  ambiguous  answer  that,  in  hours  of  rest  and  idleness, 
such  things  are  the  most  delightful  enjoyments  and  pastimes 
for  young  men ;  whereas  in  times  of  activity  they  are  hindrances 
[diysically  and  mentally.  However  that  may  be,  he  thanked 
the  young  men ;  but  called  the  girl's  father,  and  handing  her 
over  at  once  to  him,  told  him  to  bestow  her  in  marriage  on 
whichever  of  the  citizens  he  cliose.  By  this  display  of  con- 
tinence and  selfcontrol  he  gained  the  warm  respect  of  his 
mea 

Having  made  these  arrangements,  and  handed  over  the  rest 
of  the  captives  to  the  Tribunes,  he  despatched  Laeiius  sem  10 
Gatus  Laeiius  on  board  a  quinquereme  to  Rome,  Rome  with  the 
with  the  Carthaginian  prisoners  and  the  noblest  ^^'^^  ^■'^-  ^°9- 
of  the  others,  to  announce  at  home  what  had  taken  place. 
For  as  the  prevailing  feeling  at  Rome  was  one  of  despair  of 
success  in  Iberia,  he  felt  certain  that  on  this  news  their  spirit; 


20  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  BOO 

would  revive,  and  that  they  would  make  much  more  strenuoui 
efforts  to  support  him. 

20.  Scipio    himself    stayed     a     certain    time    in    Nen 

Carthage  and  assiduously  practised  liis  fleet; 
^r^dvanL.^"^  and    drew  up  the  foUowing  scheme   for  his 

military  Tribunes  for  training  their  men.  The 
first  day  he  ordered  the  men  to  go  at  the  double  for  thirty 
stades  in  their  full  arms ;  and  on  the  second  all  of  them  to  rub 
down,  clean,  and  thoroughly  examine  their  whole  equipments ; 
on  the  third  to  rest  and  do  nothing ;  on  the  fourth  to  have  a 
sham  fight,  some  with  wooden  swords  covered  with  leather  and 
with  a  button  at  the  end,  others  with  javelins  also  buttoned  at 
the  end ;  on  the  fifth  the  same  march  at  the  double  as  on  the 
first  That  there  might  be  no  lack  of  weapons  for  the 
practises,  or  for  the  real  fighting,  he  took  the  greatest  pains  with 
the  handicraftsmen.  He  had,  as  I  have  already  stated,  appointed 
overseers  over  them  in  regular  divisions  to  secure  that  this  was 
done ;  but  he  also  personally  inspected  them  every  day,  and 
saw  that  they  were  severally  supplied  with  what  was  necessary. 
Thus  while  the  legions  were  practising  and  training  in  the 
vicinity  of  the  town,  and  the  fleet  manoeuvring  and  rowing  in 
the  sea,  and  the  city  people  sharpening  weapons  or  forging 
arms  or  working  in  wood,  every  one  in  short  busily  employed 
in  making  armour,  the  whole  place  must  have  presented  the 
Xen.  HeiUn,  3,  appearance  of  what  Xenophon  called  "  a  work- 
4,  17 :  AegsiL  shopof  war.'*  When  he  thought  all  these  works 
I,  26.  ^gyg  sufficiently  advanced  for  the  requirements 
of  the  service,  he  secured  the  town  by  posting  garrisons  and 
repairing  the  walls,  and  got  both  his  army  and  navy  on  the 
move,  directing  his  advance  upon  Tarraco,  and  taking  the 
hostages  with  him.  .  .  . 

PHILOPOEMEN   OF   MEGALOPOLIS 

21.  Euryleon,  the  Strategus  of  the  Achaeans,  was  a  man  of 
Euryieon  Achaean  timid  character,  and  quite  unsuited  for  service 

Strategus,  B.C.  in  the  field. 

210-209.  gy^  2&  my  history  has  now  arrived  at  a  point 

at  which  the  achievements  of  Philoi>oemen  begin,  I  think  it  only 


PIIILOPOEMEN 


proper  that,  as  I  have  attempted  to  describe  the  habits  and 
characters  of  the  other  men  of  eminence  with  whom  we  have 
had  to  deal,  I  should  do  the  same  for  him.  It  is  strangely  in- 
consistent in  historians  to  record  in  elaborate  detail  the  founding 
of  cities,  stating  when  and  how  and  by  whom  they  were  estab- 
lished, and  even  the  circumstances  and  difficulties  which 
accompanied  the  transaction,  and  yet  to  pass  over  in  complete 
silence  the  characteristics  and  aims  of  the  men  by  whom  the 
whole  thing  was  done,  though  these  in  fact  are  the  points  of 
the  greatest  value.  For  as  one  feels  more  roused  to  emulation 
and  imitation  by  men  [hat  have  life,  than  by  buildings  that 
have  none,  it  is  natural  that  the  history  of  the  former  should 
have  a  greater  educational  value.  If  I  had  not  therefore  already 
composed  a  separate  account  of  him,  clearly  setting  forth  who 
tie  was,  his  origin,  and  his  policy  as  a  young  man,  it  would 
have  been  necessary  to  have  given  an  account  now  of  each  of 
these  particulars.  But  since  I  have  done  this  in  a  work  in 
three  books,  unconnected  with  my  present  history,  detailing  the 
circumstances  of  his  childhood  and  his  most  famous  achieve- 
ments, it  is  clear  that  in  my  present  narrative  my  proper 
course  will  be  to  remove  anything  like  details  from  my  account 
of  his  youthful  characteristics  and  aims  ;  while  I  am  careful  to 
add  details  to  the  story  of  the  achievements  of  his  manhood, 
which  in  that  treatise  were  only  stated  summarily.  I  shall  thus 
preserve  the  proper  features  of  both  works.  The  former  being 
in  the  nature  of  a  panegyric  demanded  an  account  of  his 
actions,  put  briefly  and  in  a  style  deliberately  intended  to 
enhance  their  merits ;  my  present  work,  which  is  history,  and 
therefore  absolutely  uncommitted  to  praise  or  blame,  requires 
only  a  true  statement,  which  puts  the  facts  clearly,  and  traces 
the  policy  which  dictated  the  several  actions. 

22.  Philopoemen,  then,  to  begin  with,  was  of  good  birth, 
descended  from  one  of  the  noblest  families  gjnh.  parentage, 
in  Arcadia.  He  was  also  educated  under  that  and  education  of 
most  distinguished  Mantinean,  Cleander,  who  Philopoemen,  b. 
had  been  his  father's  friend  before,  and  happened 
at  that  time  to  be  in  exile.  When  he  came  to  man's  estate  he 
attached  himself  to  Ecdemus  and  Demophanes,  who  were  by 
birth  natives  of  Megalopolis,  but  who  having  been  exiled  by  the 


22  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  BOOl 

tyrant,  and  having  associated  with  the  philosopher  Arcesilaus 
during  their  exile,  not  only  set  their  own  country  free  by 
entering  into  an  intrigue  against  Aristodemus  the  tyrant,  but 
also  helped  in  conjunction  with  Aratus  to  put  down  Nicocles, 
the  tyrant  of  Sicyon.  On  another  occasion  also,  on  the  in* 
vitation  of  the  people  of  Cyrene,  they  stood  forward  as  their 
champions  and  preserved  their  freedom  for  them.  Such  were 
the  men  with  whom  he  passed  his  early  life;  and  he  at  once  began 
to  show  a  superiority  to  his  contemporaries,  by  his  power  of 
enduring  hardships  in  hunting,  and  by  his  acts  of  daring  in  war. 
He  was  moreover  careful  in  his  manner  of  life,  and  moderate 
in  the  outward  show  which  he  maintained ;  for  he  had  im- 
bibed from  these  men  the  conviction,  that  it  was  impossible  for 
a  man  to  take  the  lead  in  public  business  with  honour 
who  neglected  his  own  private  affairs;  nor  again  to  abstain 
from  embezzling  public  money  if  he  lived  beyond  his  private 
income. 

Being  then  appointed  Hipparch  by  the  Achaean  league  at 
Elected  Hipparch,  ^^  ^^xiit^  and  finding  the  squadrons  in  a  state 

B.C.  2IO.       of  utter  demoralisation,  and  the  men  thoroughly 

^P*  ^^"^-  ^^^'  7.  dispirited,  he  not  only  restored  them  to  a  better 

aftCT  thc^'tUe  State  than  they  were,  but  in  a  short  time  made 

of  Saiiasia,     them  even  superior  to  the  enemy's  cavalry,  by 

B.C.  222.  bringing  them  all  to  adopt  habits  of  real  training 
and  genuine  emulation.  The  fact  is  that  most  of  those  who 
hold  this  office  of  Hipparch,  either,  from  being  without  any 
genius  themselves  for  cavalry  tactics,  do  not  venture  to  enforce 
necessary  orders  upon  others ;  or,  because  they  are  aiming  at 
being  elected  Strategus,  try  all  through  their  year  of  office  to 
attach  the  young  men  to  themselves  and  to  secure  their  favour 
in  the  coming  election:  and  accordingly  never  administer 
necessary  reprimands,  which  are  the  salvation  of  the 
public  interests,  but  hush  up  all  transgressions,  and,  for  the  sake 
of  gaining  an  insignificant  popularity,  do  great  damage  to  those 
who  trust  them.  Sometimes  again,  commanders,  though  neither 
feeble  nor  corrupt,  do  more  damage  to  the  soldiers  by  intem- 
perate zeal  than  the  negligent  ones,  and  this  is  still  oftener  the 
case  with  regard  to  the  cavalry.  .  .  . 

23.  Now  the  movements  which  he  undertook  to  teach  the 


PHILOPOEMEN  S  REFORMS  as 

horsemen  as  being  universally  applicable  to  cavalry  warfare 


The  cavalry 


were  these.  In  the  first  place  each  separate 
horse  was  to  be  practised  in  wheeling  first  to  laeilcs  S'philo- 
the  left  and  then  to  the  right,  and  also  to  face  poemen,  b.c. 
right-about;  and  in  the  next  place  they  were  aio-aog. 
to  be  taught  to  wheel  in  squadrons,  face-about,  and  by  a 
treble  movement  to  face-about  right-turn.  Next  they  were  to 
learn  to  throw  out  flying  columns  of  single  or  double  com- 
panies at  full  speed  from  both  wings  or  from  the  centre; 
and  then  to  pull  up  and  fall  in  again  into  troops,  or  squad- 
rons, or  regiments  :  next  to  deploy  into  line  on  both  wings, 
either  by  filling  up  the  intervals  in  the  line  or  by  a  lateral 
movement  on  the  rear.  Simply  to  forni  an  oblique  line, 
he  said,  required  no  practice,  for  it  was  exactly  the  same 
order  as  that  taken  up  on  a  march.  After  this  they  were  to 
practice  charging  the  enemy  and  retreating  by  every  kind  of 
movement,  until  they  were  able  to  advance  at  an  alarming 
pace ;  provided  only  that  they  kept  together,  both  line  and 
column,  and  preserved  the  proper  intervals  between  the 
squadrons  :  for  nothing  is  more  dangerous  and  unserviceable 
than  cavalry  that  have  broken  up  their  squadrons,  and  attempt 
to  engage  in  this  state. 

After  giving  these  instructions  both  to  the  people  and  their 
magistrates,  he  went  on  a  round  of  inspection  through  the 
towns,  and  inquired,  first,  whether  the  men  obeyed  the  words  of 
command ;  and,  secondly,  whether  the  officers  in  the  several 
towns  knew  how  to  give  them  clearly  and  properly  :  for  he  held 
that  the  first  thing  requisite  was  technical  knowledge  on  the 
part  of  the  commanders  of  each  company. 

24.  When  he  had  thus  made  the  proper  preliminary 
preparations,  he  mustered  the  cavalry  from  the  various  cities 
into  one  place,  and  set  about  perfecting  their  evolutions 
under  his  own  command,  and  personally  directed  the  whole 
drill.  He  did  not  ride  in  front  of  the  army,  as  generals  now- 
adays do,  from  the  notion  that  this  is  the  proper  position  for 

I  This  and  the  following  chapter  were  rormerl]'  assigned  lo  Ihe  description 
of  Scipio's  proceedings  in  Spain  and  (oUowed.  ch.  ao.  Hultsch,  however. 
iccms  right  in  placing  them  thus,  and  assigning  (hem  (o  the  account  of  the 
lactic*  of  I'hllopocmen. 


24  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  book 

a  commander.  For  what  can  be  less  scientific  or  more 
dangerous  than  for  a  commander  to  be  seen  by  all  his  men, 
and  yet  not  to  see  one  of  them?  In  such  manoeuvres  a 
Hipparch  should  not  make  a  display  not  of  mere  military  dignity, 
but  of  the  skill  and  ability  of  an  officer,  appearing  at  one  time 
in  the  front,  at  another  on  the  rear,  and  at  another  in  the 
centre.  This  is  what  he  did,  riding  along  the  lines,  and 
personally  seeing  to  all  the  men,  giving  them  directions  when 
they  were  at  a  loss  what  to  do,  and  correcting  at  once  every 
mistake  that  was  being  made.  Such  mistakes,  however,  were 
trifling  and  rare,  owing  to  the  previous  care  bestowed  on  every 
individual  and  company.  Demetrius  of  Phalerum  has,  as  far 
as  words  go,  given  expression  to  the  same  idea :  "  As  in  the 
case  of  building,  if  you  lay  each  single  brick  rightly,  and  if 
proper  care  is  taken  in  placing  each  successive  course,  all  will 
be  well ;  so  in  an  army,  accuracy  in  the  arrangement  of  each 
soldier  and  each  company  makes  the  whole  strong.  .  .  ." 

A  fragment  of  a  speech  of  some  Macedonian  orator  as  to  the 
Aetolians  making  an  alliance  with  Rome, 

25.   "  The  case  is  just  like  that  of  the  disposition  of  the 

Alliance  between  various  kinds  of  tfoops  on  the  field  of  battle. 

Aetolians  and    The  light-armed  and  most  active  men  bear  the 

Rome  ^g^'pst    brunt  of  the  danger,  are  the  first  to  be  engaged 

byScopas^andDor-^'^^  the  first  to  perish,  while  the  phalanx  and 

imachus,  RC.2II.  the  heavy-armed  generally  carry  off  the  glory. 

See  Livy,  26,  24.  g^  ]^  jj^jg  csiSty  the  AetoHans,  and  such  of  the 

Peloponnesians  as  are  in  alliance  with  them,  are  put  in  the  post 
of  danger;  while  the  Romans,  like  the  phalanx,  remain  in 
reserve.  And  if  the  former  meet  with  disaster  and  perish,  the 
Romans  will  retire  unharmed  from  the  struggle ;  while  if  they 
are  victorious,  which  Heaven  forbid  !  the  Romans  will  get 
not  only  them  but  the  rest  of  the  Greeks  also  into  their 
power.  .  .  ."^ 

*  On  the  margin  of  one  MS,  the  following  is  written,  which  may  be  a 
sentence  from  the  same  speech,  or  a  comment  of  the  Epitomator  :  "A  con- 
federacy with  democratic  institutions  always  stands  in  need  of  external  sup- 
port, owing  to  the  fickleness  of  the  multitude." 


PHILIPS  INCREASING  DETEKI0HAT10N 


2S.  After  iinishlng  the  celebration  of  the  Ncmean  games, 
King  Philip  of  Macedon  returned  to  Argos  and    King  Philip's 
laid  aside    his    crown    and    purple  robe,  with  conduci  at  Argos 
the  view  of  making  a  display  of  democratic  "^*J  i^'^'"B  "t 

,.  ,  P  -n  I.  the  Nemean 

equahty  and  good  nature.  But  the  more  games,  b.c.  308. 
democratic  the  dress  which  he  wore,  the  more  See  Livy,  3j. 
absolute  and  royal  were  the  privileges  which  he  3°.  3'- 
claimed.  He  was  not  now  content  with  seducing  unmarried 
women,  or  even  with  intriguing  with  married  women,  but 
assumed  the  right  of  sending  authoritatively  for  any  woman 
whose  appearance  struck  him ;  and  offered  violence  to  those 
who  did  not  at  once  obey,  by  leading  a  band  of  revellers  to 
their  houses;  and,  summoning  their  sons  or  their  husbands,  he 
trumped  up  iaise  pretexts  for  menacing  them.  In  fact  his 
conduct  was  exceedingly  outrageous  and  lawless.  But  though 
this  abuse  of  his  privileges  as  a  guest  was  exceedingly  annoying 
to  many  of  the  Achaeans,  and  especially  to  the  orderly  part  of 
them,  the  wars  that  threatened  them  on  every  side  compelled 
them  to  show  a  patience  under  it  uncongenial  to  their 
character.  .  .  . 

None  of  his  predecessors  had  better  qualifications  for 
sovereignty,  or  more  important  defects,  tlian  this  same  Philip. 
And  it  appears  to  me  that  the  good  qualities  were  innate, 
while  the  defects  grew  upon  him  as  he  advanced  in  years,  as 
happens  to  some  horses  as  they  grow  old.  Such  remarks  I 
do  not,  following  some  other  historians,  confine  to  prefaces ; 
but  when  the  course  of  my  narrative  suggests  it,  I  state  my 
opinion  of  kings  and  eminent  men,  thinking  that  most  con- 
venient for  writer  and  reader  alike.  .  .  . 

War  bettvetn  Antiothus  the  Great  {III.)  and  Arsaces 
III.,  King  of  the  Parthians.  B.C.  212-205.  ^^  abeve 
8,  !S- 

27.  In  regard  to  extent  of  territory  Media  is  the  most 
considerable  of  the  kingdoms  in  Asia,  as  also  in  respect  o' 


26  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  book 

the  number  and  excellent  qualities  of  its  men,  and  not  less 
Description  of  SO  of  its  horses.  For,  in  fact,  it  supplies  nearly 
Media,  and  of  all  Asia  with  these  animals,  the  royal  studs  being 
tiw  palace  at    entrusted  to  the  Medes  because  of  the  rich  pas- 

£cDatana«  •       <     .  *      rr\  •    r  i 

tures  m  their  country/  To  protect  it  from  the 
neighbouring  barbarians  a  ring  of  Greek  cities  was  built  round 
it  by  the  orders  of  Alexander.  The  chief  exception  to  this  b 
Ecbatana,  which  stands  on  the  north  of  Media,  in  the  district 
of  Asia  bordering  on  the  Maeotis  and  Euxine.  It  was 
originally  the  royal  city  of  the  Medes,  and  vastly  superior  to 
the  other  cities  in  wealth  and  the  splendour  of  its  buildings. 
It  is  situated  on  the  skirts  of  Mount  Orontes,  and  is  without 
walls,  though  containing  an  artificially  formed  citadel  fortified 
to  an  astonishing  strength.  Beneath  this  stands  the  palace, 
which  it  is  in  some  degree  difficult  to  describe  in  detail,  or  to 
pass  over  in  complete  silence.  To  those  authors  whose  aim 
is  to  produce  astonishment,  and  who  are  accustomed  to  deal  in 
exaggeration  and  picturesque  writing,  this  city  offers  the  best 
possible  subject ;  but  to  those  who,  like  myself,  are  cautious 
when  approaching  descriptions  which  go  beyond  ordinary 
notions,  it  presents  much  difficulty  and  embarrassment.  How- 
ever, as  regards  size,  the  palace  covers  ground  the  circuit  of 
which  is  nearly  seven  stades;  and  by  the  costliness  of  the 
structure  in  its  several  parts  it  testifies  to  the  wealth  of  its 
original  builders :  for  all  its  woodwork  being  cedar  or  cypress 
not  a  single  plank  was  left  uncovered ;  beams  and  fretwork 
in  the  ceilings,  and  columns  in  the  arcades  and  peristyle,  were 
overlaid  with  plates  of  silver  or  gold,  while  all  the  tiles  were  of 
silver.  Most  of  these  had  been  stripped  off  during  the 
invasion  of  Alexander  and  the  Macedonians,  and  the  rest  in  the 
reigns  of  Antigonus  and  Seleucus  Nicanor.  However,  even  at 
the  time  of  Antiochus's  arrival,  the  temple  of  Aena^  still  had  its 
columns  covered  with  gold,  and  a  considerable  number  of 
silver  tiles  had  been  piled  up  in  it,  and  some  few  gold  bricks 
and  a  good  many  silver  ones  were  still  remaining.     It  was 

1  See  5,  44. 

'  This  goddess  is  variously  called  Anailis  (Plut.  Artax,  27)  and  Nanea 
(2  Mace.  I,  13).  And  is  identified  by  Plutarch  with  Artemis,  and  by  others 
with  Aphrodite. 


X  ANTIOCHUS  THE  GREAT  m  MEDIA  a? 

from  these  that  the  coinage  bearing  the  king's  impress  was 
collected  and  struck,  amounting  to  little  less  than  four  thousand 
talents.  .  .  . 

28.  Arsaces  expected  that  Antiochus  would  come  as  far  as 

this  district  (of  Media),  but  that  he  would  not  .^ 

^  ,         "        ,  ,.   -   -         ,  The  nature  of  the 

venture  to  proceed  across  the  aajoining  desert  desert  between 
with  so  lai^e  a  force,  if  for  no  other  reason,  yet  Media  and 
from  the  scarcity  of  water.  For  in  this  tract  of  Parthia. 
country  there  is  no  water  appearing  on  the  surface,  though 
there  are  many  subterranean  channels  which  have  well-shafts 
sunk  to  them,  at  spots  in  the  desert  unknown  to  persons  un- 
acquainted with  the  district  A  true  account  of  these  channels 
has  been  preserved  among  the  natives  to  the  effect  that,  during 
the  Persian  ascendency,  they  granted  the  enjoyment  of  the 
profits  of  the  land  to  the  inhabitants  of  some  of  the  waterless 
districts  for  five  generations,  on  condition  of  their  bringing 
fresh  water  in  ;  and  that,  there  being  many  large  streams  flowing 
dowti  Mount  Taurus,  these  people  at  infinite  toil  and  expense 
constructed  these  underground  channels  through  a  long  tract 
of  country,  in  such  a  way,  that  the  very  people  who  now  use 
the  water  are  ignorant  of  the  sources  from  which  the  channels 
are  originally  supplied. 

When,  however,  Arsaces  saw  that   Antiochus  was    deter- 
mined to  attempt  to  cross  the  desert,  he  endeav-   >  ,-   ), 
oured  at  once  to  choke  up  and  spoil  the  wells,  pares  to  cross  it : 
But  King  Antiochus,  upon  this  being  reported   Arsaces  orders 
to  him,  despatched  Nicomedes  with  a  thousand   ""j**"^"  ^ 
horse ;  who  found  that  Arsaces  had  retired  with 
his  main  army,  but  came  upon  some  of  his  cavalry  in  the  act 
of  choking  up  the  shafts  which  went  down  into  the  under- 
ground channels.     They   promptly  attacked  these  men,  and, 
having  routed  and  forced  them  to  fly,  returned  back  again  to 
Antiochus.    The  king,  having  thus  accomplished      Antiochus 
the  journey  across  the  desert,  arrived  before  the      arrives  at 
city    Hecatompylos,   which  is   situated   in    the    Hecatompylos. 
centre  of  Parthia,  and  derives  its  name  from  the  fact  that  the 
roads  which  lead  to  all  the  surrounding  districts  convei^e  there. 

29.  Having  rested  his  artny   at   this  place,  and   having 
convinced  himself  that,  had  Arsaces  been  able  to  give  him 


2S  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  book 

battle,  he  would  not  have  abandoned  his  own  country,  nor  have 
Antiochus  deter-  sought  a  ground  more  favourable  to  his  own  army 
mines  to  follow  for  fighting  him  than  the  district  round  Hecatom- 
Arsaces  into  pyios ;  he  concluded  that,  since  he  had  done  so, 
^^'^"**'  it  stood  to  reason  that  he  had  entirely  changed 
his  mind.  He  therefore  decided  to  advance  into  Hyrcania* 
But  having  arrived  at  Tagae,  he  learnt  from  the  natives  that 
the  country  he  had  to  cross,  until  he  reached  the  ridges  of 
Mount  Labus  sloping  down  into  Hyrcania,  was  exceedingly 
rough  and  difficult,  and  that  large  numbers  of  barbarians  were 
stationed  at  the  narrowest  points.  He  therefore  resolved  to 
divide  his  light-armed  troops  into  companies,  and  distribute 
their  officers  among  them,  giving  them  directions  as  to 
the  route  they  were  severally  to  take.  He  did  the  same 
with  the  pioneers,  whose  business  it  was  to  make  the  positions 
occupied  by  the  light -armed  possible  of  approach  for  the 
phalanx  and  beasts  of  burden.  Having  made  these  arrange- 
ments, he  entrusted  the  first  division  to  Diogenes,  strengthening 
him  with  bowmen  and  slingers  and  some  mountaineers  skilled 
in  tlirowing  javelines  and  stones,  and  who,  without  keeping 
any  regular  order,  were  always  ready  to  skirmish  at  a 
moment's  notice,  and  in  any  direction,  and  rendered  the  most 
effective  assistance  at  the  narrow  passes.  Next  to  these  he 
ordered  a  company  of  about  two  thousand  Cretans  armed  with 
shields  to  advance,  under  the  command  of  Polyxenidas  of 
Rhodes.  The  rear  was  to  be  brought  up  by  companies  armed 
with  breastplate  and  shield,  and  commanded  by  Nicomedes  of 
Cos,  and  Nicolaus  the  Aetolian. 

30.  But  as  they  advanced,  the  ruggedness  of  the  ground 

and  the  narrowness  of  the  passes  were  found  to 
Mount*Labus.  ^^'"  c^c^^d  the  king's  expectations.     The  length 

of  the  ascent  was  altogether  about  three  hundred 
stades ;  and  a  great  part  had  to  be  made  up  the  bed  of  a 
winter  torrent  of  great  depth,  into  which  numerous  rocks  and 
trees  had  been  hurled  by  natural  causes  from  the  overhanging 
precipices,  and  made  a  passage  up  it  difficult,  to  say  nothing  of 
the  obstacles  which  the  barbarians  had  helped  to  construct 
expressly  to  impede  them.  These  latter  had  felled  a  large 
number  of  trees  and  piled  up  heaps  of  huge  rocks ;  and  had 


X  FIGHTING  ON  MOUNT  LABUS  19 

besides  occupied  all  along  the  gully  the  high  points,  which 
were  at  once  convenient  for  attack  and  capable  of  covering 
themselves ;  so  that,  if  it  had  not  been  for  one  glaring  error  on 
their  part,  Antiochus  would  have  found  the  attempt  beyond 
his  powers,  and  would  have  desisted  from  it.  The  error  was 
this.  They  assumed  that  the  whole  army  would  be  obliged 
to  march  the  entire  way  up  the  gully,  and  they  accordingly 
occupied  the  points  of  vantige.  But  they  did  not  perceive  this 
fact,  that,  though  the  phalanx  and  the  baggage  could  not  possibly 
go  by  any  other  route  than  the  one  they  supposed,  there  was  yet 
nothing  to  make  it  impossible  for  the  light-armed  and  active 
troops  to  accomplish  the  ascent  of  the  bare  rocks.  Conse- 
quently, as  soon  as  Diogenes  had  come  upon  the  first  outpost 
of  the  enemy,  he  and  his  men  began  climbing  out  of  the  gully, 
and  the  affair  at  once  took  a  different  aspect.  For  no  sooner 
bad  they  come  to  close  quarters,  than,  acting  on  the  suggestion 
of  the  moment,  Diogenes  avoided  the  engagement  by  ascending 
the  mountains  that  flanked  the  enemy's  position,  and  so  got 
above  him  ;  and  by  pouring  down  volleys  of  darts  and  stones  he 
seriously  harassed  the  barbarians.  Their  most  deadly  weapons 
however  proved  to  be  the  slings,  which  could  carry  a  great 
distance ;  and  when  by  these  means  they  had  dislodged  the 
first  outpost  and  occupied  their  ])osition,  an  opportunity  was 
secured  for  the  pioneers  to  clear  the  way  and  level  it,  without 
being  exposed  to  danger.  Owing  to  the  number  of  hands  the 
work  went  on  rapidly ;  and  meanwhile  the  slingers,  bowmen, 
and  javelin-men  advanced  in  skirmishing  order  along  the 
higher  ground,  every  now  and  then  reforming  and  seizing  on 
strong  points  of  vantage ;  while  the  men  with. shields  formed  a 
reserve,  marching  in  order  and  at  a  regular  pace  along  the  side 
of  the  gully  itself.  The  barbarians  thereupon  abandoned 
their  positions,  and,  ascending  the  mountain,  mustered  in  full 
force  on  the  summit 

SI.  Thus  Antiochus  effected  this  ascent  without  loss,  but 
slowly  and  painfully,  for  it  was  not  until  the  -j^g  i^,^^  „„  ,<^^ 
eighth  day  that  his  army  made  the  summit  of  summii  of  Mount 
Labus.  The  barbarians  being  mustered  there,  Labus. 
and  resolved  to  dispute  his  passage,  a  severe  engagement  took 
place,  in  which  the  barbarians  were  eventually  dislodged,  anf" 


30  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  book 

by  the  following  manoeuvre.  As  long  as  they  were  engaged 
face  to  face  with  the  phalanx,  they  kept  well  together  and 
fought  desperately ;  but  before  daybreak  the  light-armed  troops 
had  made  a  wide  circuit,  and  seized  some  high  ground  on  the 
rear  of  the  enemy,  and  as  soon  as  the  barbarians  perceived  this 
they  fled  in  a  panic.  King  Antiochus  exerted  himself  actively 
to  prevent  a  pursuit,  and  caused  a  recall  to  be  sounded, 
because  he  wished  his  men  to  make  the  descent  into  Hyrcania, 

without  scattering,  and  in  close  order.  He 
Ta^t^"     accomplished  his  object :  reached  Tambrax.  an 

unwalled  city  of  great  size  and  contammg  a 
royal  palace,  and  there  encamped.     Most  of  the  natives  fled 

from  the  battle-fleld,  and  its  immediate  neigh- 
Sh-^.*^       bourhood,  into  a  city  called  Sirynx,  which  was 

not  far  from  Tambrax,  and  from  its  secure  and 
convenient  situation  was  considered  as  the  capital  of  Hyrcania. 
Antiochus  therefore  determined  to  carry  this  town  by  assault ; 
and  having  accordingly  advanced  thither,  and  pitched  his 
camp  under  its  walls,  he  commenced  the  assault.  The 
operation  consisted  chiefly  of  mining  under  pent-houses.  For 
the  city  was  defended  by  three  trenches,  thirty  cubits  broad 
and  fifteen  deep,  with  a  double  vallum  on  the  edge  of  each ; 
and  behind  these  there  was  a  strong  wall.  Frequent  struggles 
took  place  at  the  works,  in  which  neither  side  were  strong 
enough  to  carry  off"  their  killed  and  wounded  :  for  these  hand- 
to-hand  battles  took  place,  not  above  ground  only,  but  under- 
ground also  in  the  mines.  However,  owing  to  the  numbers 
employed  and  the  activity  of  the  king,  it  was  not  long  before 
the  trenches  were  choked  up  and  the  walls  were  undermined 
and  fell.  Upon  this  the  barbarians,  giving  up  all  as  lost,  put  to 
death  such  Greeks  as  were  in  the  town  ;  and  having  plundered 
all  that  was  most  worth  taking,  made  off"  under  cover  of  night. 
When  the  king  saw  this,  he  despatched  Hyperbasus  with  the 
mercenaries ;  upon  whose  approach  the  barbarians  threw  down 
their  booty  and  fled  back  again  into  the  city ;  and  when  they 
found  the  peltasts  pouring  in  energetically  through  the  breach 
in  the  walls  they  gave  up  in  despair  and  surrendered. 


FALL  OF  M.   CLAUDIUS  MARCELLUS 


THE    HANNIBALIAN    WAR 

S2.  The  Consuls,  wishing  to  reconnoitre  the  slope  of  the 
hill  towards  the  enemy's  camp,  ordered  their       ^^  ^^ 
main  force  to  remain  in  position ;  while  they  coss.  M.  Oaudiiw 
themselves   with   two  troops   of  cavalry,  their    Marcellus,  T. 
lictors,'and   about   thirty  velites  advanced  to  '^"'"'^"^''7:^ 
make  the  reconnaisance.   Now  some  Numidians,  consuls  were  en- 
who  were  accustomed  to  lie  in  ambush  for  those   camped  within 
who  came  on  skirmishes,  or  any  other  services    'i"™  ""'== "' 
,  ,      „  ,  ,         ■      ,  .        each  other, 

from  the  Roman  camp,  happened,  as  it  chanced,  between  Venusia 
to  have  ensconced  themselves  at  the  foot  of  the     and  Baniia, 
hilL      Being  informed  by  their  look-out  man  t^^  "f  ^'^i^, 
that  a  body  of  men  was  coming  over  the  brow   „,  Bmiiii,  but 
of  the  hill  above  them,  they  rose  from  their   had  advanced 
place  of  concealment,  ascended   the   hill   by  ^.'''t*>^Apiiiu. 
a  side   road,   and  got   between  the   Consuls 
and     their    camp.       At    the    very    first    charge    they    kilted 
Cbudius  and  some  others,  and  having  wounded  Yitsxti  of  the  Con- 
the  rest,  forced  them  to  fly  in  different  directions  sui  M.  Claudius 
down  the  sides  of  the  hill.      Though  the  men      WarcEUus- 
in  camp  saw  what  was  happening  they  were  unable  to  come  to 
the  relief  of  their  endangered  comrades ;  for  while  they  were 
still  shouting  out  to  get  ready,  and  before  they  had  recovered 
from  the  first  shock  of  their  surprise,  while  some  were  putting 
the  bridles  on  their  horses  and  others  donning  their  armour, 
the  affair  was  all  over.     The  son  of  Claudius,  though  wounded, 
narrowly  escaped  with  his  life. 

Thus  fell  Marcus  Marcellus  from  an  act  of  incautiousness 
unworthy  of  a  general.  I  am  continually  compelled  in  the 
course  of  my  history  to  draw  the  attention  of  my  readers  to 
occurrences  of  this  sort ;  for  I  perceive  that  it  is  this,  more 
than  anything  else  connected  with  the  science  of  tactics,  that 
ruins  commanders.  And  yet  the  blunder  is  a  very  obvious 
one.  For  what  is  the  use  of  a  commander  or  general,  who  has 
not  learnt  that  the  leader  ought  to  keep  as  far  as  possible  aloof 
from  those  minor  operations,  in  which  the  whole  fortune  of  the 
campaign  is  not  involved  ?    Or  of  one  who  does  not  know  th 


32  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  boch 

even  if  circumstances  should  at  times  force  them  to  engage  in 
such  subordinate  movements,  the  commanders-in-chief  should 
not  exjx)se  themselves  to  danger  until  a  large  number  of  their 

Fiat  cxperimen-  company  have  fallen  ?     For,  as  the  proverb  has 

turn  in  corpore  it,  the  experiment  should  be  made  "  on  the 

^^*-  worthless  Carian  "  ^  not  on  the  general.     For  to 

say    "  I   shouldn't   have    thought   it," — "  Who   would   have 

ex|)ected  it  ? "  seems  to  me  the  clearest  proof  of  strategical 

incompetence  and  dulness. 

83.  And  so,  though  HannibaFs  claims  to  be  reckoned  a 
great  general  are  manifold,  there  is  none  more  conspicuous  than 
this,  that  though  engaged  for  a  great  length  of  time  in  an 
enemy's  country,  and  though  he  experienced  a  great  variety  of 
fortune,  he  again  and  again  inflicted  a  disaster  on  his  opponents 
in  minor  encounters,  but  never  suffered  one  himself  in  spite  of 
the  number  and  severity  of  the  contests  which  he  conducted  : 
and  the  reason,  we  may  suppose  was,  that  he  took  great  care 
of  his  personal  safety.  And  very  properly  so :  for  if  the  leader 
escapes  uninjured  and  safe,  though  a  decisive  defeat  may 
have  been  sustained,  fortune  offers  many  opportunities  for 
retrieving  disasters  ;  but  if  he  has  fallen,  the  pilot  as  it  were  of 
the  ship,  even  should  fortune  give  the  victory  to  the  army, 
no  real  advantage  is  gained ;  because  all  the  hopes  of  the 
soldiers  de[>end  upon  their  leaders.  So  much  for  those  who 
fall  into  such  errors  from  foolish  vanity,  childish  parade, 
ignorance,  or  contempt     For  it  is  ever  one  or  the  other  of 

An  incident  in   these  that  is  at  the  bottom  of  such  disasters.  .  .  . 

iheaiiemptof         They   suddenly   let    down    the    portcullis, 


Hannibal  to  enter  ^l^j^l^  they  had  raised  somewhat  by  pulleys, 

balapia,  under  ,     .  .         •  «  .  ri-«i_         ,i 

cover  of  a  letter  and  thus  closed  up  the  gateway.     1  nen  they 
scaie<i  by  the  ring  took  the  men  and  crucified  them  before  the 

of  the  dead  Consul  ^^iij, 

Marcus.  ^^"^    *    '    • 

Livy,  27,  28. 

*  This  proverb  perhaps  arose  from  the  frequent  employment  of  tlie  non- 
Hellenic  Carians  as  mercenaries.  Cp.  Plato,  Laches,  187  B;  Euthydemus, 
285  B ;  Euripides,  Cyclops,  654. 


THE  SUBMISSION  OF  THE  EDETANI 


34.  In  Iberia  Publius  Scipio  took  up  his  winter  quarters  at 
Tarraco,  as  I  have  already  stated ;  and  secured 
the  fidelity  and  affection  of  the  Iberians,  to  ^g°ao8°*  ^ 
begin  with,  by  the  restoration  of  the  hostages  to  mpra.  ch.  so. 
their  respective  families.  He  found  a  voluntary  The  aJhesion  of 
supporter  of  his  measures  in  the  person  of  th^'fe^iara " 
Edeco,  the  prince  of  the  Edetani;  who  no 
sooner  heard  that  New  Carthage  had  been  taken,  and  that 
Scipio  had  got  his  wife  and  children  into  his  hands,  than, 
concluding  that  the  Iberians  would  change  sides,  he  resolved 
to  take  the  lead  in  the  movement  :  conceiving  that,  by  acting 
thus,  he  would  best  be  able  to  get  back  his  wife  and  children, 
and  at  the  same  time  have  the  credit  of  joining  the  Romans 
by  deliberate  choice,  and  not  under  compulsion.  And  so  it 
turned  out  For  as  soon  as  the  armies  were  dismissed  to  their 
winter  quarters,  he  came  to  Tarraco,  accompanied  by  his 
kinsfolk  and  friends ;  and  there  being  admitted  to  an  inter- 
view with  Scipio,  he  said  that  "  he  thanked  the  gods  heartily 
that  he  was  the  first  of  the  native  princes  to  come  to  him  \  for 
whereas  the  others  were  still  sending  ambassadors  to  the 
Carthaginians  and  looking  to  them  for  support, — even  while 
stretching  out  their  hands  to  the  Romans, — he  was  come  there 
to  offer  not  only  himself,  but  his  friends  and  kinsfolk  also,  to 
the  protection  of  Rome.  If  therefore  he  should  have  the 
honour  to  be  regarded  by  him  as  a  friend  and  ally,  he  would 
be  able  to  render  him  important  service  both  in  the  present 
and  the  future.  For  as  soon  as  the  Iberians  saw  that  he  had 
been  admitted  to  Scipio's  friendship,  and  had  obtained  what  he 
asked,  they  would  all  come  in  with  a  similar  object,  hoping  to 
have  their  relatives  restored,  and  to  enjoy  the  alliance  of  Rome. 
Their  affection  being  secured  for  the  future  by  receiving  such 
a  mark  of  honour  and  benevolence,  he  would  have  in  them 
sincere  and  ready  coadjutors  in  all  his  future  undertakings. 
He  therefore  asked  to  have  his  wife  and  children  restored  to 
him,  and  to  be  allowed  to  return  home  an  acknowledged  friend 
of  Rome ;  in  order  that  he  might  have  a  reasonable  pretext 
VOL.  ri  D 


34  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  book 

for  showing,  to  the  best  of  his  power,  his  own  and  his  friends' 
affection  for  Scipio  himself  and  for  the  Roman  cause." 

85,  When  Edeco  had  finished  his  speech,  Scipio,  who  had 

Eileco  is  followed  *^en    ready   to    gratify    him    from    the   first, 

ijy  other  triixra.  and  took  the   same  view  as  to  the  policy  of 

iLc.  ao9-8.  ^hg  proceeding,  delivered  him  his  wife 
and  children,  and  granted  the  friendship  which  he  asked. 
More  than  this,  his  subtle  intellect  made  an  extraordinary 
impression  on  the  Iberian  in  the  course  of  the  interview ;  and 
having  held  out  splendid  hopes  to  all  his  companions  for  the 
future,  he  allowed  him  to  return  to  his  own  country.  This 
afTair  having  rapidly  got  wind,  all  the  tribes  living  north  of  the 
ICbro,  such  as  had  not  done  so  before,  joined  the  Romans  with 
one  consent. 

Thus  so  far  everything  was  going  well  with  Scipio.  After 
the  departure  of  these  people,  he  broke  up  his  naval  force, 
seeing  that  there  was  nothing  to  resist  him  at  sea ;  and  select- 
ing the  Ixist  of  the  crews,  he  distributed  them  among  the 
maniples,  and  thus  augmented  his  land  forces. 

liut  Andobales  and  Mandonius,  the  most  powerful  princes 

AiuIoImIm  nnd  ^^  ^^  ^Y  '"  Iberia,  and  believed  to  be  the 

MitiuioniuH  nimn.  most  sincerely  devoted  to   the  Carthaginians, 

don  iluhdruUd.  j^^j  jQ^g  \^^^  secretly  discontented  and  on  the 

lookout  for  an  op|K>rtunity :  ever  since  Hasdrubal,  under  a 
pretence  of  liaving  a  doubt  of  their  loyalty,  had  demanded  a 
large  sum  of  money,  and  their  wives  and  daughters  as  hostages, 
as  1  have  already  narrated.^  And  thinking  that  a  convenient 
opportunity  had  now  come,  they  got  together  their  own  forces, 
and,  (|uitting  the  C-arthaginian  camp  under  cover  of  night, 
oi'i'upicil  a  |H)Mition  sutlirieutly  strong  to  secure  their  safety. 
Upon  this,  most  of  the  other  Iberians  also  abandoned 
llasilruiviil :  having  long  boon  annoyed  at  the  overbearing 
ronduct  of  the  ( \irthrtginians,  and  now  seizing  the  first  oppor- 
tunity to  manilVst  their  feelings. 

86.  This  has  ot\en  hapiH*ned  to  |X}ople  before.  For  though, 
as  I  have  many  tinies  romarkal,  success  in  a  campaign  and 
victory  <wor  one*H  cnenuvs  are  great  things,  it  requires  much 
greater  skill  and  caution  to  xisc  such  successes  well     Accord- 

*  Sw  9.  II. 


X  GENERAL  DEFECTION  TO  THE  ROMANS  35 

ingly,  you  will  find  that  those  who  have  gained  victories  are 
many  times  more  numerous  than  those  who  have  made  good 
use  of  them.  The  Carthaginians  at  this  crisis  are  an  instance 
in  point.  After  conquering  the  Roman  armies,  and  slaying 
both  the  generals,  Publius  and  Gnaeus  Scipio,  imagining  that 
Iberia  was  their  own  without  dispute,  they  began  treating  the 
natives  tyrannically ;  and  accordingly  found  enemies  in  their 
subjects  instead  of  allies  and  friends.  And  they  were  quite 
rightly  served,  for  imagining  that  the  conduct  necessary  for 
keeping  power  was  something  different  from  that  necessary  for 
obtaining  it ;  and  for  failing  to  understand  that  they  keep 
empire  best,  who  best  maintain  the  same  principles  in  virtue  of 
which  they  gained  it  And  yet  it  ts  obvious  enough,  and  has 
been  again  and  again  demonstrated,  that  men  gain  power  by 
beneficent  actions,  and  by  holding  out  hopes  of  advantage  to 
those  with  whom  they  are  dealing ;  hut  that,  as  soon  as  ihey 
have  got  what  they  wanted,  and  begin  to  act  wickedly  and  rule 
despotically,  it  is  but  natural  that,  as  their  rulers  have  changed, 
the  feelings  of  the  subjects  should  change  too.  So  it  was  with 
the  Carthaginians. 

37.  Surrounded  by  such  difficulties  Hasdrubal  was  agitated 
by  many  conflicting  emotions  and  anxieties.  He  was  vexed 
by  the  desertion  of  Andobales ;  vexed  by  the  opposition  and 
feud  between  himself  and  the  other  commanders ;  and  greatly 
alarmed  as  to  the  arrival  of  Scipio,  expecting  that  he  would 
immediately  bring  his  forces  to  attack  him.  Perceiving  there- 
fore that  he  was  being  abandoned  by  the  Iberians,  and  that 
they  were  joining  the  Romans  with  one  accord,  he  decided 
upon  the  following  plan  of  action.  He  resolved  that  he  must 
collect  the  best  force  he  could,  and  give  the  enemy  battle :  if 
fortune  declared  in  his  favour  he  could  then  consider  his  next 
step  in  safety,  but  if  the  battle  turned  out  unfavourably  for 
him,  he  would  retreat  with  those  that  survived  into  Gaul ;  and 
collecting  from  that  country  as  many  of  the  natives  as  he  could, 
would  go  to  Italy,  and  take  his  share  in  the  same  fortune  as  his 
brother  Hannibal. 

While  Hasdrubal  was  arriving  at  this  resolution,  Publius 
ScipiowasrejoinedbyGaiusLaelius;  and,heing  Earifinacic" 
1  by  him  of  the  orders  of  the  Senate,  he    sdpio  mov 


36  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  book 

southward  to    collected  his  forces  from  their  winter  quarters 
^iiTthe^^y^of  ^"^  began  his  advance :  the  Iberians  joining 

the  Baetis.  him  on  the  march  with  great  promptness  and 
Livy,  27,  18-19.  hearty  enthusiasm.  Andobales  had  long  been 
in  communication  with  Scipio :  and,  on  the  latter  approaching 
the  district  in  which  he  was  entrenched,  he  left  his  camp  with 
his  friends  and  came  to  Scipio.  In  this  interview  he  entered 
upon  a  defence  of  himself  in  regard  to  his  former  friendship 
with  the  Carthaginians,  and  spoke  of  the  services  he  had  done 
them,  and  the  fidelity  which  he  had  shown  to  them. 
He  then  went  on  to  narrate  the  injustice  and  tyranny 
which  he  had  experienced  at  their  hands  ;  and  demanded  that 
Scipio  himself  should  be  the  judge  of  his  pleas.  If  he  were 
shown  to  be  making  ungrounded  complaints  against  the 
Carthaginians,  he  might  justly  conclude  him  incapable  of 
keeping  faith  with  the  Romans  either :  but  if,  on  a  review  of 
these  numerous  acts  of  injustice  he  were  proved  to  have  had  no 
other  course  than  to  desert  the  Carthaginians,  Scipio  might 
confidently  expect  that,  if  he  now  elected  to  join  the  Romans, 
he  would  be  firm  in  his  loyalty  to  them. 

38.  Andobales  added  many  more  arguments  before  finish- 
ing his  speech ;  and  when  he  had  done,  Scipio 
^^^^^p^J'^^  answered  by  saying  that   "  he  quite  believed 

what  he  had  said ;  and  that  he  had  the  strongest 
reason  for  knowing  about  the  insolent  conduct  of  the  Cartha- 
ginians, both  from  their  treatment  of  the  other  Iberians,  and 
conspicuously  from  their  licentious  behaviour  to  their  wives 
and  daughters,  whom  he  had  found  occupying  the  position, 
not  of  hostages,  but  of  captives  and  slaves ;  and  to  whom  he 
had  preserved  such  inviolable  honour  as  could  scarcely  have 
been  equalled  by  their  very  fathers  themselves."  And  upon 
Andobales  and  his  companions  acknowledging  that  they  were 
quite  aware  of  this,  and  falling  at  his  feet  and  calling  him 
king,  all  present  expressed  approval.  Whereupon  Scipio  with 
emotion  bade  them  "  fear  nothing,  for  they  would  experience 
nothing  but  kindness  at  the  hands  of  the  Romans.*'  He  at 
once  handed  over  his  daughters  to  Andobales ;  and  next  day 
made  the  treaty  with  him,  the  chief  provision  of  which  was 
that  he  should  follow  the  Roman  commanders  and  obey  their 


X  SCIPIO  ATTACKS  HASDRUBAL  37 

commands.  This  being  settled,  he  returned  to  his  camp; 
brought  over  his  army  to  Scipio;  and,  having  joined  camps 
with  the  Romans,  advanced  with  them  against  Hasdmbal. 

Now  the  Carthaginian  general  was  encamped  at  Baecula, 
in  the  district  of  Castulo,  not  far  from  the  silver  j. 

mines.     But  when  he  learnt  the  approach  of  the  changes  bis  pow- 
Romans,  he  shifted  his  quarters ;  and  his  rear    Hon  m  one  of 
being  secured  by  a  river,  and  having  a  stretch  ^"P*"'"'*'""^"'- 
of  tableland  in  front  of  his  entrenchment  of  sufficient  extent 
lot  his  troops  to  manceuvre,  and  bounded  by  a  steep  descent 
sufficiently  deep  for  security,  he  stayed  quietly  in  position : 
always  taking  care  to  post  pickets  on  the  brow  of  the  descent. 
As  soon  as  he  came  within  distance,  Scipio  was 
eager  to  give  him  battle,  but  was  baffled  by  the   Scip.o  anive.. 
strength  of  the   enemy's   position.     After   waiting  two  days, 
however,  he  became  anxious,  lest  by  the  arrival  of  Mago  and 
Hasdrubal,  son  of  Gesco,  he  should  find  himself  surrounded 
by  hostile  forces :  he  therefore  determined  to  venture  on  an 
attack  and  make  trial  of  the  enemy. 

S9.  His  whole  army  having  been  got  ready  for  battle,  he 
confined  the  main  body  within  his  camp,  but    _  ,  . 
sent  out  the  velites  and ,  some  picked  men  of    fuHy  assaults 
the  infantry  with  orders  to  assault  the  brow  of     Hasdmbai's 
the  hill  and  atUck  the  enemy's  pickets.     His       position. 
orders  were  carried  out  with  great  spirit     At  first  the  Cartha- 
ginian    commander   watched   what    was     happening    without 
stirring :  but  when  he  saw  that,  owing  to  the  fuiy  of  the  Roman 
attack,  his  men  were  being  hard  pressed,  he  led  out  his  army 
and  drew  them  up  along  the  brow  of  the  hill,  trusting  to  the 
strength  of  the  position.     Meanwhile  Scipio  despatched  all  his 
tight-armed  troops  with  orders  to  support  the  advanced  guard : 
and  the  rest  of  his  army  being  ready  for  action,  he  took  half  of 
them  under  his  own  command,  and  going  round  the  brow  of 
the  hill  to  the  enemy's  left,  began  assaulting  the  Carthaginians  \ 
while  he  entrusted  the  other  half  to  Laetius,  with  orders  to 
make  a  similar  attack  on  the  right  of  the  enemy.      While  this 
was  going  on,  Hasdrubal  was  still  engaged  in  getting  his  troops 
out  of  camp :  for  hitherto  he  had  been  waiting,  because  h' 
trusted  in  the  strength  of  the  position,  and  felt  confident  I 


38  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  book 

the  enemy  would  never  venture  to  attempt  it  The  attack, 
therefore,  took  him  by  surprise,  before  he  was  able  to  get  his 
men  on  to  the  ground.  As  the  Romans  were  now  assaulting 
the  two  wings  of  the  position  which  the  enemy  had  not  yet 
occupied,  they  not  only  mounted  the  brow  of  the  hill  in  safety, 
but  actually  advanced  to  the  attack  while  their  opponents  were 
still  in  all  the  confusion  and  bustle  of  falling  in.  Accordingly 
they  killed  some  of  them  on  their  exposed  flank ;  while  others, 
who  were  actually  in  the  act  of  falling  in,  they  forced  to  turn 
Hasdrubal  re-  ^^^  ^^'  Seeing  his  army  giving  way  and  re- 
treats, and  makes  treating,  Hasdrubal  reverted  to  his  preconceived 
for  the  Pyrenees.  ^\^^  .  ^cnd  determining  not  to  stake  his  all  upon 

this  one  desperate  hazard,  he  secured  his  money  and  his 
elephants,  collected  as  many  of  his  flying  soldiers  as  he  could, 
and  commenced  a  retreat  towards  the  Tagus,  with  a  view  of 
reaching  the  passes  of  the  Pyrenees  and  the  Gauls  in  that 
neighbourhood. 

Scipio  did  not  think  it  advisable  to  pursue  Hasdrubal  at 
once,  for  fear  of  being  attacked  by  the  other  Carthaginian 
generals;  but  he  gave  up  the  enemy's  camp  to  his  men  to 
pillage. 

40.  Next  morning  he  collected  the  prisoners,  amounting  to 
ten  thousand  foot  and  more  than  two  thousand  horse,  and 
busied  himself  in  making  arrangements  about  them.  All  the 
Iberians  of  that  district,  who  were  in  alliance  at  that  time  with 
the  Carthaginians,  came  in  and  submitted  to  the  Roman 
obedience,  and  in  addressing  Scipio  called  him  "king."     The 

first  to  do  this  and  to  bow  the  knee  before  him 

^t^m  ^^  had  been  Edeco,  and  the  next  Andobales.  On 
these  occasions  Scipio  had  passed  the  word  over 
without  remark ;  but  after  the  battle,  when  all  alike  addressed 
him  by  that  title,  his  attention  was  drawn  to  it ;  and  he  there- 
fore summoned  the  Iberians  to  a  meeting,  and  told  them  that 
"  he  quite  wished  to  be  called  a  man  of  royal  liberality  by  them 
all,  and  to  be  so  in  the  truest  sense,  but  that  he  had  no  wish 
to  be  a  *  king,'  nor  to  be  called  one  by  any  one ;  they  should 
address  him  as  general." 

Even  at  this  early  period  of  his  career,  an  observer  might 
have  remarked  the  loftiness  of  Scipio's  character.      He  was 


X  HASDRUBAL  RETREATS  TO  THE  PYRENEES         39 

Still  quite  young.  His  good  fortune  had  been  so  persistent, 
that  adl  who  came  under  his  rule  were  led  naturally  to  think 
and  speak  of  him  as  a  king.  Yet  he  did  not  lose  his  self- 
control  ;  but  deprecated  this  popular  impulse  and  this  show  of 
dignity.  But  this  same  loftiness  of  character  was  still  more 
admirable  in  the  closing  scenes  of  his  life,  when,  in  addition 
to  his  achievements  in  Iberia,  he  crushed  the  Carthaginians ; 
reduced  the  largest  and  fairest  districts  of  Libya,  from  the 
Altars  of  Philaenus  to  the  Pillars  of  Hercules,  under  the  power 
of  his  country ;  conquered  Asia  and  the  kings  of  Syria ;  made 
the  best  and  largest  part  of  the  world  subject  to  Rome ;  and 
in  doing  so  had  numerous  opportunities  of  acquiring  regal 
sway,  in  whatever  parts  of  the  world  suited  his  purpose  or 
wish.  For  such  achievements  were  enough  to  have  kindled 
pride,  not  merely  in  any  human  breast,  but  even,  if  I  may  say 
so  without  irreverence,  in  that  of  a  god.  But  Scipio's  great- 
ness of  soul  was  so  superior  to  the  common  standard  of  man- 
kind, that  he  again  and  again  rejected  what  Fortune  had  put 
within  his  grasp,  that  prize  beyond  which  men's  boldest 
prayers  do  not  go — ^the  power  of  a  king  :  and  he  steadily  pre- 
ferred his  country  and  his  duty  to  that  royalty,  which  men 
gaze  at  with  such  admiration  and  envy. 

Scipio   next   proceeded   to   select   from  the  captives  the 
native  Iberians,  and  all  these  he  dismissed  to         . 
their  homes  without  ransom ;  and  bidding  Ando-     the  position 
bales  select  three  hundred  of  the  horses,  he  dis-  evacuated  by  the 
tributed  the  remainder  among  those  who  had   Carthaginians, 
none.     For  the  rest,  he  at  once  occupied  the  entrenchment  of 
the  Carthaginians,  owing  to  its  excellent  situation ;  and  there  he 
remained  himself,  waiting  to  see  the  movements  of  the  other 
Carthaginian  generals ;  while  he  detached  a  body  of  men  to 
the  passes  of  the  Pyrenees  to  keep  a  look-out  for 
HasdrubaL     After  this,  as  it  was  getting  late  in   ^'"og' 207^'''' 
the  season,  he  retired  with  his  army  to  Tarraco 
being  bent  on  wintering  there.  .  .  . 


40  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  book 


AFFAIRS    IN    GREECE 

41.  The  Aetolians  had  recently  become  greatly  encouraged 

by  the  arrival  of  the  Romans  and  King  Attalus  : 

undCTtekes  toxoid  ^nd  accordingly  began  menacing  every  one,  and 

the  Achaean     threatening  all  with  an  attack  by  land,  while 

league  and  other  Attalus  and  Publius  Sulpicius  did  the  same  by 

against  a  threat-  ^^'    Wherefore  Achaean  legates  arrived  at  the 

cned  attack  of  the  court  of  King  Philip  entreating  his  help  :  for  it 

Aetolians  in  ^yas  not  the  Aetolians  alone  of  whom  they  were 
Rorne?*B.c  208.  Standing  in  dread,  but  Machanidas  also,  as  he 
Cp.  Livy,  27,  30.  was  encamped  with  his  army  on  the  frontier  of 
See  above  Bk.  9,  Argos.  The  Boeotians  also,  in  fear  of  the 
'^^*  enemy's  fleet,  were  demanding  a  leader  and 
help  from  the  king.  Most  urgent  of  all,  however,  were  the 
Euboeans  in  their  entreaties  to  him  to  take  some  precaution 
against  the  enemy.  A  similar  appeal  was  being  made  by  the 
Acarnanians ;  and  there  was  an  embassy  even  from  the 
Epirotes.  News  had  arrived  that  both  Scerdilaidas  and 
Pleuratus  were  leading  out  their  armies  :  and,  over  and  above 
this,  that  the  Thracian  tribes  on  the  frontier  of  Macedonia, 
especially  the  Maedi,  were  planning  to  invade  Macedonia,  if 
the  king  were  induced  to  slir  from  his  realm  however  short  a 
distance.  Moreover  the  Aetolians  were  already  securing  the 
pass  of  Thermopylae  with  trenches  and  stockades  and  a 
formidable  garrison,  satisfied  that  they  would  thus  shut  out 
Philip,  and  entirely  prevent  him  from  coming  to  the  assistance 
of  his  allies  south  of  the  pass.  It  appears  to  me  that  a  crisis 
of  this  sort  is  well  worth  the  observation  and  attention  of  my 
readers ;  for  it  affords  a  trial  and  test  of  the  vigour  of  the 
leader  affected.  As  in  the  hunting- field  the  wild  animals 
never  show  their  full  courage  and  strength  until  surrounded 
and  brought  to  bay, — so  it  is  with  leaders.  And  no  more 
conspicuous  instance  could  be  found  than  this  of  Philip.  He 
dismissed  the  various  embassies,  promising  each  that  he  would 
do  his  best :  and  then  devoted  his  attention  to  the  war  which 
surrounded  him  on  all  sides,  watching  to  see  in  what  direction, 
and  against  which  enemy,  he  had  best  direct  his  first  attack. 


X    PHILIP  V.  CALLED  /.V  AGAINST  THE  AETOLIANS    41 

42.  Just  then  intelligence  reached  him  thai  Attalus  bad 
crossed  the  sea  and,  dropping  anchor  at  Peparethos,  had 
occupied  the  island.  He  therefore  despatched  a  body  of  men 
to  the  islanders  to  garrison  their  city ;  and  at  the  same  time 
despatched  Polyphonies  with  an  adequate  force  into  Phocis  and 
Boeolta;  and  Menippus,  with  a  thousand  peltasts  and  five 
hundred  Agrianes  to  Chalets  and  the  rest  of  Euboea  ;  while  he 
himself  advanced  to  Scotusa,  and  sent  word  at  the  same  time 
to  the  Macedonians  to  meet  him  at  that  town.  But  when  he 
learnt  that  Attalus  had  sailed  into  the  port  of  Nicaea,  and  that 
the  leaders  of  the  Aetolians  were  collecting  at  Heraclca,  with 
the  purpose  of  holding  a  conference  together  on  the  immediate 
steps  to  be  taken,  he  started  with  his  army  from  Scotusa,  eager 
to  hurry  thither  and  break  up  their  meeting.  He  arrived  too 
late  to  interrupt  the  conference :  but  he  destroyed  or  carried 
off  the  com  belonging  to  the  people  along  the  Aenianian  gulf, 
and  then  returned.  After  this  he  left  his  army  in  Scotusa 
once  more ;  and,  with  the  light-armed  troops  and  the  royal 
guard,  went  to  Demetrias,  and  there  remained,  waiting  to  see 
what  the  enemy  would  attempt  To  secure  that  he  should  be 
kept  perfectly  acquainted  with  all  their  movements,  he  sent 
messengers  to  the  Peparethii,  and  to  his  troops  in  Phocis  and 
Euboea,  and  ordered  them  to  telegraph  to  him  everything 
which  happened,  by  means  of  fire  signals  directed  to  Mount 
Tisaeum,  which  is  a  mountain  of  Thessaly  conveniently  situated 
for  commanding  a  view  of  those  places. 

48.  The  method  of  signalling   by  fire,  which  is  of  the 
highest  utility  in  the  operations  of  war,  has  never 
before  been  clearly  expounded ;  and  I  think  I       '™  "^ 
shall  be  doing  a  service  if  I  do  not  pass  it  over,  but  give  an 
accountof  it  adequate  to  its  importance.    Nowthat  opportuneness 
is  of  the  utmost  moment  in  all  undertakings,  and  pre-eminently 
so  in  those  of  war,  no  one  doubts ;  and  of  all  the  things  which 
contribute  to  enable  us  to  hit  the  proper  time  nothing  is  more 
efHcacious  than   fire  signals.      For  they  convey  intelligence 
sometimes  of  what  has  just  happened,  sometimes  of  what  is 
actually  going  on ;  and  by  paying  proper  attention  to  them  one 
can  get  this  information  at  three  or  four  days'  journey  off,  a 
even   more :     so  that  it  continually  happens  that  the  1 


42  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  book 

required  may  be  unexpectedly  given,  thanks  to  a  message 
conveyed  by  fire  signals.  Now,  formerly,  as  the  art  of  signalling 
by  fire  was  confined  to  a  single  method,  it  proved  in  very 
many  cases  unserviceable  to  those  employing  it.  For  as  it 
was  necessary  to  employ  certain  definite  signals  which  had 
been  agreed  upon,  and  as  possible  occurrences  are  unlimited, 
the  greater  number  of  them  were  beyond  the  competence 
of  the  fire  signals  to  convey.  To  take  the  present  instance: 
it  was  possible  by  means  of  the  isignals  agreed  upon  to  send 
the  information  that  a  fleet  had  arrived  at  Oreus  or  Peparethos 
or  Chalcis;  but  it  was  impossible  to  express  that  "certain 
citizens  had  gone  over  to  the  enemy,*'  or  '*  were  betraying  the 
town,"  or  that  "  a  massacre  had  taken  place,'*  or  any  of  those 
things  which  often  occur,  but  which  cannot  be  all  anticipated. 
Yet  it  is  precisely  the  unexpected  occurrences  which  demand 
instant  consideration  and  succour.  All  such  things  then  were 
naturally  beyond  the  competence  of  fire  signalling,  inasmuch 
as  it  was  impossible  to  adopt  an  arbitrary  sign  for  things  which 
it  was  impossible  to  anticipate. 

44.  Aeneas,  therefore,  the  writer  of  the  treatise  on  tactics, 

The  improve-    wished  to  correct  this  defect,  and  did  in  fact 

ment  introduced  make   some  improvement ;  but   his   invention 

by  Aeneas      gjju  f^jj  y^^y  far  short  of  what  was  wanted, 

Xactitus  •  • 

as  the  following  passage  from  his  treatise  will 
show.^  "  Let  those  who  wish,'*  he  says,  "  to  communicate  any 
matter  of  pressing  importance  to  each  other  by  fire-signals 
prepare  two  earthenware  vessels  of  exactly  equal  size  both  as 
to  diameter  and  depth.  Let  the  depth  be  three  cubits,  the 
diameter  one.  Then  prepare  corks  of  a  little  shorter  diameter 
than  that  of  the  vessels :  and  in  the  middle  of  these  corks  fix 
rods  divided  into  equal  portions  of  three  fingers*  breadth,  and 
let  each  of  these  portions  be  marked  with  a  clearly  distinguish- 
able line :  and  in  each  let  there  be  written  one  of  the  most 
obvious  and  universal  of  those  events  which  occur  in  war ; 
for  instance  in  the  first  *  cavalry  have  entered  the  country,'  in 
the  second  *  hoplites,'  in  the  third  *  light-armed,'  in  the  next 

'  This  passage  does  not  occur  in  the  extant  treatise  of  Aeneas  ;  but  is  ap- 
parently referred  to  (ch.  7,  §  4)  as  being  contained  in  a  preparatory  treatise 
(Tapa(ric6i;a4rr(ic^  /9^/3Xof). 


X  METHODS  OF  SIGNALLING  43 

'inianti;  and  cavalry,'  in  another  'ships,'  in  another  'corn,' 
and  so  on,  until  all  the  portions  have  written  on  them  the 
events  which  may  reasonably  be  expected  to  occur  in  the 
particular  war.  Then  carefully  pierce  both  the  vessels  in-  such 
a  way  that  the  taps  shall  be  exactly  equal  and  cany  ofT  the 
same  amount  of  water.  Fill  the  vessels  with  water  and  lay  the 
corks  with  their  rods  upon  its  surface,  and  set  both  taps  running 
together.  This  being  done,  it  is  evident  that  if  there  is  perfect 
equality  in  every  respect  between  them,  both  corlts  will  sink 
exactly  in  proportion  as  the  water  runs  away,  and  both  rods 
will  disappear  to  the  same  extent  into  the  vessels.  When  they 
have  been  tested,  and  the  rate  of  the  discharge  of  water  has 
been  found  to  be  exactly  equal  in  both,  then  the  vessels 
should  be  taken  respectively  to  the  two  places  from  which  the 
two  parties  intend  to  watch  for  fire  signals.  As  soon  as  any 
one  of  those  eventualities  which  are  inscribed  upon  the  rods 
takes  place,  raise  a  lighted  torch,  and  wait  until  the  signal  is 
answered  by  a  torch  from  the  others :  this  being  raised,  both 
parties  are  to  set  the  taps  running  together.  When  the  cork 
and  rod  on  the  signalling  side  has  sunk  low  enough  to  bring 
the  ring  containing  the  words  which  give  (he  desired  informa- 
tion on  a  level  with  the  nm  of  the  vessel,  a  torch  is  to  be 
raised  again.  Those  on  the  receiving  side  are  then  at  once 
to  stop  the  tap,  and  to  look  at  the  words  in  the  ring  of  the  rod 
which  is  on  a  level  with  the  rim  of  their  vessel.  This  will  be 
the  same  as  that  on  the  signalling  side,  assuming  everythir^  to 
be  done  at  the  same  speed  on  both  sides." 

45.  Now  this  method,  though  introducing  a  certain  im- 
provement in   the  system  of  tire  signalling,  is 
still  wanting  in  definitcness :  for  it  is  evident  ^ih^'^jj^h^* 
that  it  is  neither  possible  to  anticipate,  or,  if  you 
could  anticipate,  to  write  upon  the  rod  every  possible  thing 
that  may  happen :  and  therefore,  when  anything  unexpected  in 
the  chapter  of  accidents  does  occur,  it  is  plainly  impossible 
to  communicate  it  by  this  method.     Besides,  even  such  state- 
ments as  are  written  on  the  rods  are  quite  indefinite ;  for  the 
number  of  cavalry  or  infantry  that  have  come,  or  the  particular 
point  in  the  territory  which  they  have  entered,  the  number  of 
ships,   or  the  amount  of  com,  cannot  be  expressed     F 


44  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YEWS  book: 

what  cannot  be  known  before  it  happens  cannot  have  an 
arrangement  made  for  expressing  it  And  this  is  the  import- 
ant point.  For  how  is  one  to  take  proper  measures  for  relief 
without  knowing  the  number  or  direction  of  the  enemy? 
Or  how  can  the  party  to  be  relieved  feel  confidence  or  the 
reverse,  or  indeed  have  any  conception  at  all  of  the  situa- 
tion, if  it  does  not  know  how  many  ships  or  how  much  com 
have  been  despatched  by  the  allies  ? 

But  the  last  method  which  was  hit  upon  by  Cleoxenus  and 
Democlitus,  and  further  elaborated  by  myself,  is   ,p.    .       ^ 
above  all  things  definite,  and  made  capable  of      method  of 
indicating  clearly  whatever  is    needed  at  the   Qeoxenusand 
moment;  but  in  its  working  it  requires  attention     DemocHtus. 
and  more  than  ordinarily  close  observation.     It  is  as  follows  : 
Divide  the  alphabet  into  five  groups  of  five  letters  each  (of 
course  the  last  group  will  be  one  letter  short,  but  this  will  not 
interfere  with  the  working  of  the  system).     The  parties  about 
to  signal  to  each  other  must  then  prepare  five  tablets  each,  on 
which  the  several  groups  of  letters  must  be  written.     They 
must  then  agree  that  the  party  signalling  shall  first  raise  two 
torches,  and  wait  until  the  other  raises  two  also.     The  object 
of  this  is  to  let  each  other  know  that  they  are  attending. 
These  torches  having  been  lowered,  the  signalling  party  raises 
first  torches  on  the  left  to  indicate  which  of  the  tablets  he 
means  :  for  instance,  one  if  he  means  the  first,  two  if  he  means 
the  second,  and  so  on.     He  next  raises  torches  on  the  right 
showing  in  a  similar  manner  by  their  number  which  of  the 
letters  in  the  tablet  he  wishes  to  indicate  to  the  recipient 

46.  This  matter  being  agreed  upon,  the  two  parties  must 
go  to  their  respective  points  of  observation ;  and  each  must 
have,  to  begin  with,  a  stenoscope  with  two  funnels,  to  enable 
him  to  distinguish  through  one  the  right,  through  the  other 
the  left  position  of  the  signaller  opposite  him.  Near  this 
stenoscope  the  tablets  must  be  fixed,  and  both  points,  to  the 
right  and  to  the  left,  must  be  defended  by  a  fence  ten  feet 
long  and  about  the  height  of  a  man,  in  order  to  make  it  clear 
on  which  side  the  torches  are  raised,  and  to  hide  them  en- 
tirely when  they  are  lowered.  These  preparations  completed 
on  both  sides,  when  a  man  wishes,  for  instance,  to  send  the 


nba;"«»*'r3h*-^"-^v»    .   ==5" — .-* 


X  IMPROVEMENTS  IN  SIGNALLING  45 

message  "  Some  of  our  soldiers  to  the  number  of  a  hundred 
have  deserted  to  the  enemy," — the  first  thing  to  do  is  to  select 
words  that  may  give  the  same  information  with  the  fewest 
letters,  for  instance,  "  A  hundred  Cretans  have  deserted,"  for 
thus  the  number  of  letters  is  diminished  by  more  than  a  half 
and  the  same  information  is  given.  This  sentence  having  been 
written  on  a  tablet  will  be  transmitted  by  five  signals  thus : 
The  first  letter  is  k,  this  comes  in  the  second  group  of 
letters  and  therefore  on  the  second  tablet;  the  signaller 
therefore  must  raise  two  torches  on  the  left  to  show  the 
recipient  that  he  must  look  at  the  second  tablet ;  then  he  will 
raise  five  on  the  right,  because  k  is  the  fifth  letter  in  the 
group,*  which  the  recipient  must  thereupon  write  on  his  tablet. 
Then  the  signaller  must  raise  four  torches  on  the  left,  for  p  is 
in  that  group,  and  two  on  the  right,  because  it  is  the  second 
in  the  fourth  group,  and  the  recipient  will  write  p  on  his  tablet : 
and  so  on  for  the  other  letters. 

47.  Now  everything  that  happens  can  be  definitely  im- 
parted by  means  of  this  invention ;  but  the  number  of  torches 
employed  is  large,  because  each  letter  has  to  be  indicated  by 
two  series  of  them :  still,  if  proper  preparations  are  made,  the 
thing  can  be  adequately  carried  out  But  whichever  method  is 
employed,  those  who  use  it  must  practise  beforehand,  in  order  that 
when  the  actual  occasion  for  putting  it  in  use  arises  they  may 
be  able  to  give  each  other  the  information  without  any  hitch. 
For  there  are  plenty  of  instances  to  show  what  a  wide  difference 
there  is  between  the  way  an  operation  is  carried  out  by  men 
who  hear  of  it  for  the  first  time,  and  by  men  who  have  become 
habituated  to  it  Many  things  which  were  considered  not 
only  difficult,  but  impossible  at  first,  are,  after  an  interval  of 
time  and  practice,  performed  with  the  greatest  ease.  I  could 
give  many  illustrations  of  the  truth  of  this  remark,  but  the 
clearest  may  be  found  in  the  art  of  reading.     Put  side  by  side 

*  The  grouping  of  these  letters  will  be  as  follows  : — 


I 

2 

3 

4 

5 

I 

a 

i 

X 

T 

0 

2 

/» 

V 

f^ 

P 

X 

3 

7 

e 

V 

O 

^ 

4 

9 

I 

^ 

T 

(tf 

5 

€ 

K 

0 

U 

46  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  book 

a  man  who  has  never  learnt  his  letters,  though  otherwise  acute, 
and  a  child  who  has  acquired  the  habit,  and  give  the  latter  a 
book,  and  bid  him  read  it :  the  former  will  clearly  not  be  in- 
duced to  believe  that  the  reader  has  first  to  attend  to  the  look 
of  each  of  the  letters,  secondly  to  their  sound -value,  and 
thirdly  to  their  combinations  with  others,  each  of  which 
operation  requires  a  certain  time.  Therefore  when  he  sees 
the  boy,  without  a  pause  for  thought,  reading  off  seven  or  five 
lines  at  a  breath,  he  will  not  easily  be  induced  to  believe 
that  he  has  not  read  the  book  before ;  and  certainly  not,  if  he 
is  able  also  to  obser\'e  the  appropriate  enunciation,  the 
proper  separations  of  the  words,  and  the  correct  use  of  the 
rough  and  smooth  breathings.  The  moral  is,  not  to  give  up 
any  useful  accomplishment  on  account  of  its  apparent  diffi- 
culties, but  to  persevere  till  it  becomes  a  matter  of  habit, 
which  is  the  way  mankind  have  obtained  all  good  things.  And 
especially  is  this  right  when  the  matters  in  question  are 
such  as  are  often  of  decisive  importance  to  our  safety. 

I  was  led  to  say  this  much  in  connexion  with  my  former 
assertion  that  *'all  the  arts  had  made  such  progress  in  our 
age  that  most  of  them  were  reduced  in  a  manner  to  exact 
sciences."  And  therefore  this  too  is  a  point  in  which  history 
properly  written  is  of  the  highest  utility.  .  .  . 

ANTIOCHUS    IN    PARTHIA,    B.C.    209-5.       See  ch.  3 1. 

48.  The  Apasiacae  live  between  the  rivers  Oxus  and  Tanais, 

The  entrance  of  ^^  former  of  which  falls  into  the  Hyrcanian 

the  Nomad     Sea,  the  latter  into  the  Palus  Maeotis.^     Both 

Scythians  into    ^^   large    enough   to    be  navigable;    and    it 

^^^^^       seems  surprising  how  the  Nomads  managed  to 

come  by  land  into  Hyrcania  along  with  their  horses.     Two 

accounts  are  given  of  this  affair,  one  of  them  probable,  the 

other  very  surprising  yet  not  impossible.     The  Oxus  rises  in 

the  Caucasus,   and  being  much  augmented  by  tributaries  in 

Bactria,  it  rushes  through  the  level  plain  with  a  violent  and 

turbid   stream.      When    it    reaches  the  desert  it  dashes   its 

*  Polybius  confuses  the  Tanais  (Don)  with  another  Tanais  or  laxartcs 
flowing  into  the  south-east  part  of  the  Caspian. 


X  ANTIOCHVS  CROSSES  THE  ARIUS  4; 

stream  against  some  precipitous  rocks  with  a  force  raised  to 
such  tiemendous  proportions  by  the  mass  of  its  wateis,  and 
thedeclivity  down  which  it  has  descended,  that  it  leaps  from 
the  rocks  to  the  plain  below  leaving  an  interval  of  more  than  a 
stade  between  the  rock  and  its  falls.  It  is  through  this  space 
that  they  say  the  Apasiacae  went  on  foot  with  their  horses 
into  Hyrcania,  under  the  faJl,  and  keeping  close  to  the  rock. 
The  other  account  is  more  probable  on  the  face  of  iL  It  is 
said  that,  as  the  basin  of  the,  river  has  extensive  flats  into 
which  it  descends  with  violence,  the  force  of  the  stream  makes 
hollows  in  them,  and  opens  chasms  into  which  the  water 
descends  deep  below  the  surface,  and  so  is  carried  on  for  a 
short  way,  and  then  reappears  :  and  that  the  barbarians,  being 
well  acquainted  with  the  facts,  make  their  way  on  horseback, 
over  the  space  thus  left  dry,  into  Hyrcania.  .  ,   . 

49.  News  being  brought  that  Euthydemus '  with  his  force 
was  at  Tapuria,  and  that  a  body  of  ten  thou- 

,     ,         '^  1  -  J        .       L         Ballle  on  Ihe 

sand   horsemen  were   keeping  guard    at    the   nverAriusbe- 
passage    of    the  river   Anus,   he   decided   to  iwem  Amiochus 
abandon  the  siege  and  attack  these  last     The      r^"''.""' 
river  was  three  days'  march  away.    For  two  days  wians. 

therefore  he  marched  at  a  moderate  speed  ;  but  on  the  third, 
after  dinner,  he  gave  orders  for  the  rest  of  his  army  to  start 
next  day  at  daybreak ;  while  he  himself,  with  the  cavalry  and 
light-armed  troops  and  ten  thousand  peltasts,  started  in  the 
night  and  pushed  on  at  a  great  rate.  For  he  was  informed 
that  the  cavalry  of  the  enemy  kept  guard  by  day  on  the  bank 
of  the  river,  but  at  night  retired  to  a  city  more  than  twenty 
stades  off.  Having  completed  therefore  the  rest  of  the  way 
under  cover  of  night,  the  plains  being  excellent  for  riding,  he 
got  the  greater  part  of  his  array  across  the  river  by  daybreak, 
before  the  enemy  came  back.  When  their  scouts  told  them 
what  had  happened,  the  horsemen  of  the  BacCrians  hastened  to 
the  rescue,  and  fell  in  with  their  opponents  while  on  the  march. 
Seeing  that  he  must  stand  the  first  charge  of  the  enemy,  the  king 
summoned  the  two  thousand  horsemen  who  were  accustomed 
to  fight  round  his  own  person;  and  issuing  orders  that  the  rest 
were  to  form  their  companies  and  squadrons,  and  take  up  the^' 
'  King  of  Bactria,  sec  11,  34. 


48  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  book  x 

usual  order  on  the  ground  on  which  they  already  were,  he 
advanced  with  the  two  thousand  cavalry,  and  met  the  charge 
of  the  advanced  guard  of  the  Bactrians.  In  this  engagement 
Antiochus  is  reputed  to  have  shown  the  greatest  gallantry  of 
any  of  his  men.  There  was  heavy  loss  on  both  sides :  the 
king's  men  conquered  the  first  squadron,  but  when  a  second 
and  a  third  charged,  they  began  to  be  hard  pressed  and  to 
suffer  seriously.  At  that  juncture,  most  of  the  cavalry  being 
by  this  time  on  the  ground,.  Panaetolus  ordered  a  general 
advance ;  relieved  the  king  and  his  squadrons ;  and,  upon  the 
Bactrians  charging  in  loose  order,  forced  them  to  turn  and 
fly  in  confusion.  They  never  drew  rein  before  the  charge  of 
Panaetolus,  until  they  rejoined  Euthydemus,  with  a  loss  of  more 
than  half  their  number.  The  king's  cavalry  on  the  contrary 
retired,  after  killing  large  numbers  and  taking  a  great  many 
prisoners,  and  bivouacked  by  the  side  of  the  river.  In  this 
action  the  king  had  a  horse  killed  under  him,  and  lost  some  of 
his  teeth  by  a  blow  on  the  mouth ;  and  his  whole  bearing  ob- 
tained him  a  reputation  for  bravery  of  the  highest  description. 
After  this  battle  Euthydemus  retreated  in  dismay  with  his 
army  to  the  city  of  Zariaspa  in  Bactria.  .  .  . 


BOOK   XI 

t.  Mv  reason  for  prefixing  a  table  of  contents  to  each  book, 
rather  than  a  pre&ce,  is  not  because  I  do  not  recognise  the 
usefulness  of  a  preface  in  arresting  attention  and  rousing 
interest,  and  also  giving  facilities  for  finding  any  passage  t1iat  is 
wanted,  but  because  I  find  prefaces  viewed,  though  from  many 
inadequate  reasons,  with  contempt  and  neglect.  I  therefore 
had  recourse  to  a  table  of  contents  throughout  my  history, 
except  the  first  six  books,  arranged  according  to  Olympiads, 
as  being  as  effective,  or  even  more  so,  than  a  preface,  and  at 
the  same  time  as  less  subject  to  the  objection  of  being  out 
of  place,  for  it  is  closely  connected  with  the  subject-matter. 
In  the  first  six  books  I  wrote  prefaces,  because  I  thought  a 
mere  table  of  contents  less  suitable.  .  .  . 

Afler  the  battle  at  Baecula,  Hasdnibal  made  good  his  passage 
over  the  Western  Pyrenees,  and  thence  through  the  Cntnnes,  B.C. 
208.  In  the  sjiring  of  S.c  207  he  eras sed  the  Alps  and  descended 
into  Italy,  crossed  the  Po,  and  besieged  Placenlia.  Thence  he 
sent  a  letter  to  his  brother  Hannibal  announcing  that  he  ivould 
march  southward  by  Ariminum  and  meet  him  in  Umbria.  The 
Utter  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  Consul  Nero,  who  was  at  Venusia, 
and  who  immediately  made  a  forced  march  northward,  joined  his 
colleague  at  Sena,  and  the  next  day  attacked  Hasdrubal.  Sre 
above,  10,  39;  Livy,  27,  39-49. 

Much  easier  and  shorter  was  Hasdrubal's  journey  into 
Italy.   ...» 

Never  at  any  other  time  had  Rome  been  in  a  greater  state 
of  excitement  and  terrified  expectation  of  the  result.  .  .  ? 

'  See  Livy,  a?,  39.  '  Livy,  37,  44. 

VOL.  II  U 


••  4 


50  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  BOO» 

None   of  these   arrangements  satisfied   HasdrubaL      But 
„    ,     ,  ,       circumstances  no  longer  admitted  of  delay.    He 

Battle  of  the  ^,  j  ^    •      u  ..^.i  j 

Metaurus,      ^^^  ^"^  enemy  drawn  out  m  battle  array  and 

B.C.  207.       advancing;   and   he   was  obHged   to  get   the 

Coss.  c.  Claudius  Iberians  and  the  Gauls  who  were  serving  with 

Sai'inator  II.  ^^"^  ^'^^^  ^^'^^^  ^^  therefore  stationed  his  ten 
elephants  on  the  front,  increased  the  depth  of 
his  lines,  and  so  had  his  whole  army  covering  a  somewhat 
small  ground.  He  took  up  a  position  himself  in  the  centre  of 
the  line,  immediately  behind  the  elephants,  and  commenced 
an  advance  upon  the  Roman  left,  with  a  full  resolution  that  in 
this  battle  he  must  either  conquer  or  die.  Livius  advanced  to 
meet  the  enemy  with  proud  confidence,  and  having  come  to 
close  quarters  with  him  was  fighting  with  great  gallantry.  Mean- 
while Claudius,  who  was  stationed  on  the  right  wing,  found  him- 
self unable  to  advance  and  outflank  the  enemy,  owing  to  the 
rough  ground  in  fronjt  of  him,  relying  on  which  Hasdrubal 
had  directed  his  advance  upon  the  Roman  left:  and  being 
embarrassed  by  his  inability  to  strike  a  blow,  he  promptly 
decided  what  the  circumstances  pointed  out  as  the  tactics  to 
pursue.  He  withdrew  his  men  from  the  right  wing,  and 
marched  them  on  the  rear  of  the  field  of  battle ;  and,  after 
passing  the  left  of  the  Roman  line,  fell  upon  the  flank  of  the 
Carthaginians  who  were  fighting  near  the  elephants.  Up  to 
this  point  the  victory  had  been  doubtful ;  for  both  sides  fought 
with  desperation,  the  Romans  believing  that  all  would  be  over 
with  them  if  they  failed,  and  the  Iberians  and  Carthaginians 
holding  exactly  the  same  conviction  for  themselves.  Moreover 
the  elephants  were  being  of  disservice  to  both  sides  alike ;  for 
finding  themselves  between  two  forces,  and  exposed  to  a  cross- 
fire of  javelins,  they  kept  throwing  both  the  Carthaginian  and 
Roman  lines  into  confusion.  But  as  soon  as  Claudius  fell 
upon  the  rear  of  the  enemy  the  battle  ceased  to  be  equal :  for 
the  Iberians  found  themselves  attacked  on  front  and  rear  at 
once,  which  resulted  in  the  greater  part  of  them  being  cut 
down  on  the  ground.  Six  of  the  elephants  were  killed  with 
the  men  on  them,  four  forced  their  way  through  the  lines  and 
were  afterwards  captured,  having  been  abandoned  by  their 
Indian  drivers. 


XI  DEATH  OF  HASDRUBAL  51 

2.  Hasdnibal  had  behaved  on  this  occasion,  as  throughout 
his  whole  life,  like  a  brave  man,  and  died 
lighting :  and  he  deserves  not  to  be  passed  over  |^  ,j,™bai(te  * 
without  remark.  I  have  already  stated  that 
Hannibal  was  his  brother,  and  on  his  departure  to  Italy 
entrusted  the  command  in  Iberia  to  him.  I  have  also  described 
his  many  contests  with  the  Romans,  and  the  many  embarrassing 
difficulties  with  which  he  had  to  struggle,  caused  by  the  generals 
sent  from  Carthage  to  Iberia ;  and  how  in  all  these  matters  he 
had  supported  these  vicissitudes  and  reverses  in  a  noble  spirit 
worthy  of  a  son  of  Barcas.  But  I  will  now  speak  of  his  last 
contest,  and  explain  why  he  seems  to  me  pre-eminently  to 
deserve  respectful  attention  and  imitation,  Most  generals  and 
kings,  when  entering  upon  decisive  battles,  place  before  their 
eyes  the  glory  and  advantages  to  be  obtained  from  victory,  and 
frequently  consider  and  contrive  what  use  they  will  make  of 
every  success ;  but  they  do  not  go  on  to  review  the  chances 
of  failure,  nor  contemplate  the  plan  to  be  adopted,  or  the 
action  to  be  taken,  in  the  case  of  reverse.  Vet  the  former  is 
obvious,  the  latter  requires  foresight.  Therefore  it  is  that  most 
of  them,  though  in  many  instances  their  soldiers  have  fought 
nobly,  by  their  own  folly  and  imprudence  in  this  respect  have 
added  dishonour  to  defeat :  have  disgraced  their  previous 
achievements,  and  rendered  themselves,  during  the  remainder 
of  their  lives,  objects  of  reproach  and  contempt.  It  is  easy  to 
see  that  many  leaders  make  this  fatal  mistake,  and  that  the 
difference  between  one  man  and  another  in  these  points  is 
most  signal ;  for  history  is  full  of  such  instances.  Hasdnibal, 
on  the  contrary,  as  long  as  there  was  reasonable  hope  of  being 
able  to  accomplish  anything  worthy  of  his  former  achievements, 
regarded  bis  personal  safety  in  battle  as  of  the  highest  conse- 
quence ;  but  when  Fortune  deprived  him  of  all  hopes  for  the 
future,  and  reduced  him  to  the  last  extremities,  though 
neglecting  nothing  either  in  his  preparations  or  on  the  field 
that  might  secure  him  the  victory,  nevertheless  considered 
how,  in  case  of  total  overthrow,  he  might  face  his  fate  and 
suffer  nothing  unworthy  of  his  past  career. 

These   remarks  are   meant  for  those    engaged    in    active 
Operations,  that  they  may  neither  dash  the  hopes  of  those  whr 


52  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  book 

rely  upon  them  by  a  heedless  seeking  of  danger,  nor  by  an 
unworthy  clinging  to  life  add  disgrace  and  shame  to  the 
catastrophies  which  befall  them. 

8.  Having  won  the  victory,  the  Romans  began  pillaging  the 
enemy's  camp ;  and  killed  a  number  of  the  Celts,  as  they  lay 
stupefied  with  drunkenness  in  their  beds,  like  unresisting 
victims.  Then  they  collected  the  rest  of  the  booty,  from 
which  more  than  three  hundred  talents  were  paid  into  the 
treasury.  Taking  Carthaginians  and  Celts  together,  not  less 
than  ten  thousand  were  killed,  and  about  two  thousand 
Romans.  Some  of  the  principal  Carthaginians  were  taken 
prisoners,  but  the  rest  were  put  to  the  sword.  When  the 
report  reached  Rome,  people  at  first  could  not  believe  it,  from 
the  intensity  of  their  wish  that  it  might  be  true ;  but  when  still 
more  men  arrived,  not  only  stating  the  fact,  but  giving  full 
details,  then  indeed  the  city  was  filled  with  overpowering  joy ; 
every  temple -court  was  decked,  and  every  shrine  full  of 
sacrificial  cakes  and  victims  :  and,  in  a  word,  they  were  raised 
to  such  a  pitch  of  hopefulness  and  confidence,  that  every  one 
felt  sure  that  Hannibal,  formerly  the  object  of  their  chief 
terror,  could  not  after  that  stay  even  in  Italy.  .  .  . 

A  speech  of  iJu  legate  from  Rhodes  ^  before  an  assembly  Oj 
Aetolians  at  Heraclea  in  the  autumn  of  B.C.  207  {see  Lii%  28, 
7),  at  the  end  of  the  summer  campaign, 

4.  "  Facts  I  imagine,  Aetolians,  have  made  it  clear  to  you 
that  neither  King  Ptolemy  nor  the  community  of  Rhodes, 
Byzantium,  Chios,  or  Mitylene,  regard  a  composition  with  you 
as  unimportant.  For  this  is  not  the  first  or  the  second  time 
that  we  have  introduced  the  subject  of  peace  to  your  assembly ; 
but  ever  since  you  entered  upon  the  war  we  have  beset  you 
with  entreaties,  and  have  never  desisted  from  warning  you  on  this 
subject ;  because  we  saw  that  its  immediate  result  would  be 
the  destruction  of  yourselves  and  of  Macedonia,  and  because 

^  There  is  nothing  to  show  positively  that  a  Rhodian  is  the  speaker :  but 
Livy  mentions  envoys  from  Rhodes  and  Ptolemy  this  year.  For  the  special 
attempts  of  the  Rhodians  to  bring  about  a  peace  between  Philip  and  the 
Aetolians,  see  5,  24,  100. 


XI  A  PLEA  FOX  UNION  IN  GREECE  S3 

we  foresaw  in  the  future  danger  to  our  own  countries  and  to  that 
of  ail  other  Greeks.  For  as,  when  a  man  has  once  set  a  fire 
alight,  the  result  is  no  longer  dependent  upon  his  choice,  but 
it  spreads  in  whatever  direction  chance  may  direct,  guided  for 
the  most  part  by  the  wind  and  the  combustible  nature  of  the 
material,  and  frequently  attacks  the  first  author  of  the  conflagra- 
tion himself:  so  too,  war,  when  once  it  has  been  kindled  by  a 
nation,  sometimes  devours  the  first  those  who  kindled  it ;  and 
soon  rushes  along  destroying  everything  that  falls  in  its  way, 
continually  gathering  fresh  strength,  and  blown  into  greater 
heat  by  the  folly  of  the  people  in  its  neighbourhood,  as  though 
by  the  wind.  Wherefore,  men  of  Aelolia,  considering  that  we, 
as  representatives  of  the  whole  body  of  the  islanders  and  of  the 
Greek  inhabitants  of  Asia,  are  here  to  beseech  you  to  put  an 
end  to  war  and  to  choose  peace,  because  the  matter  affects 
us  as  well  as  you,  show  your  wisdom  by  listening  to  us  and 
yielding  to  our  entreaties.  For  if  you  were  carrying  on  a  war 
which,  though  profitless  (and  most  wars  are  that),  was  yet 
glorious  from  the  motive  which  prompted  it,  and  the  reputa- 
tion Ukely  to  accrue  from  it,  you  might  he  pardoned  perhaps 
for  a  fixed  determination  to  continue  it ;  but  if  it  is  a  war 
of  the  most  signal,  infamy,  which  can  bring  you  nothing 
but  discredit  and  obloquy, — does  not  such  an  undertaking 
claim  considerable  hesitation  on  your  part  ?  We  will  speak 
our  opinion  frankly ;  and  you,  if  you  are  wise,  will  give  us  a 
quiet  hearing.  For  it  is  much  better  to  hear  a  disagreeable 
truth  now  and  thereby  be  preserved,  than  to  listen  to  smooth 
things  now,  and  soon  afterwards  to  be  ruined  yourselves,  and  to 
ruin  the  rest  of  the  Greeks  with  you. 

6.  "  Put  then  before  your  eyes  your  own  folly.  You 
profess  to  be  at  war  against  Philip  on  behalf  of  the  Greeks, 
that  they  may  escape  from  servitude  to  him  ;  but  your  war  is 
really  for  the  enslavement  and  ruin  of  Greece.  That  is  the 
tale  told  by  your  treaty  with  Rome,  which  formerly  existed 
only  in  written  words,  but  is  now  seen  in  full  operation. 
Heretofore,  though  mere  written  words,  it  was  a  disgrace  to 
you :  but  now  your  execution  of  it  has  made  that  disgrace 
palpable  to  the  eyes  of  all  the  world.  Moreover,  Philip  merely 
lends  his  name  and  serves  as  a  pretext  for  the  war :  he  is  o 


54  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  book 

exposed  to  any  attack  :  it  is  against  his  allies, — the  majority  of 
the  Peloponnesian  states,  Boeotia,  Euboea,  Phocis,  Locris^ 
Thessaly,  Epirus, — that  you  have  made  this  treaty,  bargaining 

^  that  their  bodies  and  their  goods  shall  belong  to 

the  Romans,  their  cities  and  their  territory  to 
the  Aetolians.  And  though  personally,  if  you  took  a  city,  you 
would  not  stoop  to  violate  the  freebom,  or  to  bum  the  build- 
ings, because  you  look  upon  such  conduct  as  cruel  and  bar- 
barous ;  yet  you  have  made  a  treaty  by  which  you  have  handed 
over  all  other  Greeks  to  the  barbarians,  to  be  exposed  to  the 
most  shameful  violence  and  lawlessness.  And  all  this  was 
hitherto  kept  a  secret  But  now  the  fate  of  the  people  of 
Oreus,  and  of  the  miserable  Aeginetans,  has  betrayed  you  to 
every  one, — Fortune  having,  as  though  of  set  purpose,  suddenly 
brought  your  infatuation  before  the  scenes. 

"  So  much  for  the  origin  of  the  war  and  its  events  up  to 
now.  But  as  to  its  result, — supposing  everything  to  go  to 
your  wish, — what  do  you  expect  that  to  be  ?  Will  it  not  be 
the  beginning  of  great  miseries  to  all  Greece  ? 

6.  "  For  I  presume  no  one  can  fail  to  see  that,  if  once  the 
Romans  get  rid  of  the  war  in  Italy, — ^and  this  is  all  but  done, 
now  that  Hannibal  has  been  confined  to  a  narrow  district  in 
Bruttii, — they  will  direct  their  whole  power  upon  Greece : 
professedly,  indeed,  in  aid  of  the  Boeotians  against  Philip,  but 
really  with  the  view  of  reducing  it  entirely  under  their  own 
power.  And  if  they  design  to  treat  it  well  when  they  have 
conquered  it,  theirs  will  be  the  honour  and  glory;  and  if 
badly,  theirs  too  will  be  the  plunder  from  the  states  they  destroy, 
and  the  power  over  those  which  they  allow  to  survive :  while 
you  will  be  calling  upon  the  gods  to  witness  your  wrongs,  when 
no  god  will  be  any  longer  willing,  nor  any  man  be  able  to 
help  you.  Now,  perhaps,  you  ought  to  have  foreseen  all  this 
from  the  first,  for  that  would  have  been  your  best  course. 
But  since  the  future  often  escapes  human  foresight,  now,  at 
any  rate,  that  you  have  seen  by  actual  experience  what  has 
happened,  it  must  be  your  duty  to  take  better  measures  for  the 
future.  In  any  case  we  have  omitted  nothing  which  it  becomes 
sincere  friends  to  say  or  do.  We  have  spoken  our  opinion 
about    the    future    with    absolute    frankness;    and   you   we 


..^ 


XI  PHILIP  IN  AETOLIA  AGAIN  55 

u^  and  entreat  not  to  stand  in  the  way  of  the  freedom  and 
safety  of  yourselves  or  of  the  rest  of  Greece." 

This  speaker  having,  as  it  seemed,  made  a  considerable 
impression,  he  was  followed  by  the  ambassadors  of  Philip,  who, 
without  malting  a  long  speech,  merely  said  that  they  were 
commissioned  to  do  one  of  two  things, — if  the  Aetolians  chose 
peace,  to  accept  it  readily :  if  not,  to  call  the  gods  and  the 
ambassadors  from  Greece  to  witness  that  the  Aetolians,  and 
not  Philip,  ought  to  be  held  responsible  for  what  happened 
thereafter,  and  so  to  depart.   .  .  , 

7.  Philip    loudly   lamented    his   ill-fortune    in    having    so 
narrowly    missed     getting     Altalus     into    his   Auaius  eludes 
hands.  .  .  .  Philip. 

Uvy,  aS,  7,  8, 

OnhiswaytothelakeTrichonisPhiliparrived  ' '°^' 

at  Thermus,  where  there  was  a  temple  of  Apollo ;  phiup  ai  Ther- 
and  there  he  once  more  defaced  all  the  sacred  mua.  See  5. 
buildings  which  he  had  spared  on  his  former  *■'^■ 

occupation  of  the  town.  In  both  instances  it  was  an  ill- 
advised  indulgence  of  temper:  for  it  is  a  mark  of  utter  un- 
reasonabTShess  to  commit  an  act  of  impiety  against  heaven 
in  order  to  gratify  one's  wrath  against  man.  .  .   . 

PHILOPOEHEN    IN    THE    PELOPONNESE, 
B.C   207 

8.  There  are  three  methods  followed  by  those  who  wish  to 
arrive  at  an  intelligent  knowledge  of  tactics. 

The  f«st  iii  by  the  sludy  of  history,  the  second  ^SIS^S. 
by  the  use  of  scientific  treatises  composed  by 
specblists,  the  third  by  actual  experience  on  the  field.     But 
of  all  three  of  these  methods  the  Achaean  commanders  were 
equally  ignorant.  .  .  . 

A  very  general  fault  in  the  men  was  an  unfortunate  rivalry, 
engendered  by  the  ostentation  and  bad  taste  of  the  others. 
They  were  very  particular  about  their  attendants  and  their 
dress ;  and  there  was  a  show  of  splendour  in  this,  kept  up  by 
the  majority  beyond  their  means.  But  to  their  arms  they  [Kiid 
no  attention  whatever.  .  .  . 


■i 


56  T^£  II/STOKJES  OF  POLYBIUS  book 

Most  people,  indeed,  do  not  so  much  as  attempt  to 
imitate  the  real  achievements  of  those  who  obtain  success,  but, 
while  trying  to  reproduce  their  unimportant  peculiarities^ 
succeed  only  in  displaying  their  own  frivolity.  .  .  . 

9.  "  Brightness  in  the  armour,"  he  said,  "  contributes  much 
Speech  of      ^o   inspire  dismay   in   the   enemy ;    and  care 

Phiiopoemen  bestowed  on  having  it  made  to  fit  properly  is 
urging  reform,  ^f  ^^^^  service  in  actual  use.  This  will  best 
be  secured  if  you  give  to  your  arms  the  attention  which  you 
now  bestow  on  your  dress,  and  transfer  to  your  dress  the 
neglect  which  you  now  show  of  your  arms.  By  thus  acting, 
you  will  at  once  save  your  money,  and  be  undoubtedly  able  to 
maintain  the  interests  of  your  country.  Therefore  the  man- 
who  is  going  to  take  part  in  manoeuvres  or  a  campaign  ought, 
when  putting  on  his  greaves,  to  see  that  they  are  bright  and 
well-fitting,  much  more  than  that  his  shoes  and  boots  are ;  and 
when  he  takes  up  his  shield  and  helmet,  to  take  care  that  they 
are  cleaner  and  more  costly  than  his  cloak  and  shirt:  for 
when  men  take  greater  care  of  what  is  for  show,  than  of  what 
is  for  use,  there  can  be  no  doubt  of  what  will  happen  to  them 
on  the  field.  I  beg  you  to  consider  that  elaboration  in  dress 
is  a  woman's  weakness,  and  a  woman  of  no  very  high  character 
either ;  but  costliness  and  splendour  in  armour  are  the  charac- 
teristics of  brave  men  who  are  resolved  on  saving  themselves 
and  their  country  with  glory." 

The  whole  audience  were  so  convinced  by  this  speech  and 
so  much  struck  with  the  wisdom  of  the  advice,  that,  immediately 
after  leaving  the  council-chamber,  they  began  pointing  with  scorn 
at  the  over-dressed  dandies,  and  forced  some  of  them  to  quit 
the  market-place ;  and  what  is  more,  in  future  manoeuvres  and 
campaigns  they  kept  a  stricter  watch  on  each  other  in  these 
points. 

10.  So  true  it  is  that  a  single  word  spoken  by  a  man  of 

credit  is  often  sufficient  not  only  to  turn  men 
^Il!l,°^I!!«?/    ^^om  the  worst   courses,    but   even   to    incite 

own  example.  ' 

them  to  the  noblest  But  when  such  a 
speaker  can  appeal  to  his  own  life  as  in  harmony  with  his 
words,  then  indeed  his  exhortation  carries  a  weight  which 
nothing  can  exceed.     And  this  was  above  all  others  the  case 


XI  PHILOPOEMEN  AND  MACHANIDAS  yj 

'  with  Philopoemen.  For  in  his  dress  and  eating,  as  well  as  in 
all  that  concerned  his  bodily  wants,  he  was  plain  and  simple ; 
in  his  manners  to  others  without  ceremony  or  pretence ;  and 
throughout  his  life  he  made  it  his  chief  aim  to  be  absolutely 
sincere.  Consequently  a  few  unstudied  words  from  him  were 
sufficient  to  raise  a  firm  conviction  in  the  minds  of  his  hearers; 
for  as  he  could  point  to  his  own  life  as  an  example,  they 
wanted  little  more  to  convince  them.  Thus  it  happened  on 
several  occasions,  that  the  confidence  he  inspired,  and  the 
consciousness  of  his  achievements,  enabled  him  in  a  few  words 
to  overthrow  long  and,  as  his  opponents  thought,  skilfully 
argued  speeches. 

So  on  this  occasion,  as  soon  as  the  council  of  the  league 
separated,  all  returned  to  their  cities  deeply  impressed  both  by 
the  words  and  the  man  himself,  and  convinced  that  no  harm 
could  happen  to  them  with  him  at  their  head.     Immediately 
afterwards  Philopoemen  set  out  on  a  visitation  of  the  cities, 
which  he  performed  with  great  energy  and  speed.     He  then 
summoned  a  levy  of  citizens  and  began  forming  them  into 
companies  and  drilling  them  ;  and  at  last,  after     ^^^  against 
eight  months  of  this  preparation  and  training,  he     Machanidas. 
mustered  his  forces  at  Mantinea,  prepared  to  '>'™"'  "f  ^pana- 
fight  the  tyrant  Machanidas  in  behalf  of  the        '  "    '"^' 
freedom  of  all  the  Peloponnesians. 

11.  Machanidas  had  now  acquired  great  confidence,  and 
looked  upon  the  determination  of  the  Achaeans 

._  ,     ,  i_i     .      i_-        1  A  Baltic  of  Mantinea. 

as  extremely  favourable  to  his  plans.     As  soon        ^^  ^ 
as  he  heard  of  their  being  in  force  at  Mantinea, 
he  duly  harangued  his  Lacedaemonians  at  Tegea,  and  the  very 
next  morning  at  daybreak  advanced  upon  Mantinea.      He  led 
the  right  wing  of  the  phalanx  himself;  his  mercenaries  marched 
in  two  parallel  columns  on  each  side  of  his  front ;  and  behind 
them  were  carts  carrying  quantities  of  field  artillery  and  bolts  for 
the  catapults.     Meanwhile  Philopoemen  too  had  arranged  his 
army  in  three  divisions,  and  was  leading  them  out  of  Mantinea, 
the  Illyrians  and  the  men  witli  body  armour  by  the  gale  lead- 
ing to  the  temple  of  Poseidon,  and  with  them     -^^  ^^^  ,„ 
all  the  rest  of  the  foreign  contingent  and  light- Tegea.   Sec  Paus. 
armed  troops ;  by  the  next  gate,  toward  the  west,       ^'  '*"  ''■ 


58  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  book 

the  phalanx;  and  by  the  next  the  Achaean  cavalry.  He  sent, 
his  light-armed  men  forward  to  occupy  the  hill,  which  rises 
to  a  considerable  height  above  the  road  called  Xenis  and  the 
above-mentioned  temple  :  he  stationed  the  men  with  body 
armour  next,  resting  on  this  hill  to  the  south ;  next  them  the 
Illyrians ;  next  them,  in  the  same  straight  line,  the  phalanx, 
drawn  up  in  companies,  with  an  interval  between  each,  along 
the  ditch  which  runs  towards  the  temple  of  Poseidon,  right 
through  the  middle  of  the  plain  of  Mantinea,  until  it  touches 
the  range  of  mountains  that  forms  the  boundary  of  the 
territory  of  the  ElisphasiL  Next  to  them,  on  the  right  wing, 
he  stationed  the  Achaean  cavalry,  under  the  command  of 
Aristaenetus  of  Dyme ;  while  on  the  left  wing  he  led  the  whole 
of  the  foreign  contingent,  drawn  up  in  lines  one  behind  the 
other. 

12.  As  soon  as  the  enemy  were  well  in  sight,  Philopoemen 
went  down  the  ranks  of  the  phalanx,  and  addressed  to  them  an 
exhortation  which,  though  short,  clearly  pointed  out  to  them 
the  nature  of  the  battle  in  which  they  were  engaged  But 
most  of  what  he  said  was  rendered  inaudible  by  the  answering 
shouts  of  the  troops.  The  affection  and  confidence  of  the 
men  rose  to  such  a  pitch  of  enthusiasm  and  zeal  that  they 
seemed  to  be  almost  acting  under  a  divine  inspiration,  as 
they  cried  out  to  him  to  lead  them  on  and  fear  nothing. 
However  he  tried,  when  he  could  get  the  opportunity,  to 
make  this  much  clear  to  them,  that  the  battle  on  the  one 
side  was  to  establish  a  shameful  and  ignominious  servitude, 
on  the  other  to  vindicate  an  ever- memorable  and  glorious 
liberty. 

Machanidas  at  first  looked  as  though  he  meant  to  attack  the 
enemy's  right  wing  in  column  ;  but  when  he  got 
MachsmkiaT^   within  moderate  distance  he  deployed  into  line 
by  the  right,  and  by  this  extension  movement 
made  his  right  wing  cover  the  same  amount  of  ground  as  the 
left  wing  of  the  Achaeans,  and  fixed  his  catapults  in  front  of 
the  whole  force  at  intervals.     Philopoemen  understood  that 
the  enemy's  plan  was,  by  pouring  volleys  from  the  catapults 
into  his  phalanx,  to  throw  the  ranks  into  confusion  :  he  there- 
fore gave  him  no  time  or  interval  of  repose,  but  opened  the 


XI  BATTLE  OF  MANTJNEA  S9 

engagement  by  a  vigorous  charge  of  his  TarentJnes^  close 
to  the  temple  of  Poseidon,  where  the  ground 
was  flat  and  suitable  for  cavalry.     Whereupon  '^'u^"!™'^" 
Machanidas  was  constrained  to  follow  suit  by       charges. 
sending  his  Tarentines  forward  also. 

IS.  At  first  the  struggle  was  confined  to  these  two  forces, 
and  was  maintained  with  spirit  But  the  light -armed 
troops  coining  gradually  to  the  support  of  such  of  them  as 
were  wavering,  in  a  very  short  time  the  whole  of  the  mercen- 
aries on  either  side  were  engaged.  They  fought  sometimes 
in  close  order,  sometimes  in  pairs :  and  for  a  long  time  so  en- 
tirely without  decisive  result,  that  the  rest  of  the  two  armies, 
who  were  watching  in  which  direction  the  cloud  of  dust  inclined, 
could  come  to  no  conclusion,  because  both  sides  maintained 
for  a  long  while  exactly  their  original  ground.  Defeat  of  ihe 
But  after  a  time  the  mercenaries  of  the  tyrant  Achaean  right 
began  to  get  the  better  of  the  struggle,  from  "'"8- 

their  numbers,  and  the  superiority  in  skill  obtained  by  long 
practice.  And  this  is  the  natural  and  usual  resulL  The 
citizens  of  a  democracy  no  doubt  bring  more  enthusiasm  to 
their  battles  than  the  subjects  of  a  tyrant ;  but  in  the  same 
proportion  the  mercenaries  of  sovereigns  are  naturally  superior 
and  more  efficient  than  those  of  a  democracy.  For  in  the 
former  case  one  side  is  fighting  for  liberty,  the  other  for  a 
condition  of  servitude ;  but  in  the  case  of  mercenaries,  those 
of  the  tyrant  are  encouraged  by  the  certain  prospect  of  reward, 
those  of  a  democracy  know  that  they  must  lose  by  victory : 
for  as  soon  as  a  democracy  has  crushed  its  assailants,  it  no 
longer  employs  mercenaries  to  protect  its  liberties ;  while  a 
tyranny  requires  more  mercenaries  in  proportion  as  its  field 
of  ambition  is  extended  :  for  as  the  persons  injured  by  it  are 
more  numerous,  those  who  plot  against  it  are  more  numerous 
also;  and  the  security  of  despots  rests  entirely  on  the 
loyalty  and  power  of  mercenaries. 

14.  Thus  it  came  about  that  the  mercenaries  in  the  army 
of  Machanidas  fought  with  such  fury  and  violence,  that  even 


6o  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  noojt. 

the  Illyrians  and  men  with  body  armour,  who  formed  the 
reserve  supporting  the  mercenaries  of  the  Achaean  army,  were 
unable  to  withstand  their  assault;  but  were  all  driven  from 
their  position,  and  fled  in  confusion  towards  the  city  of 
Mantinea,  which  was  about  seven  stades  distant 

And  now  there  occurred  an  undoubted  instance  of  what 

some  doubt,  namely,  that  the  issues  in  war  are  for  the  most  p>art 

decided  by  the  skill  or  want  of  skill  of  the  commanders.     For 

though  perhaps  it  is  a  great  thing  to  be  able  to  follow  up  a 

first  success  properly,  it  is  a  greater  thing  still  that,  when  the 

first  step  has  proved  a  failure,  a  man  should  retain  his  presence 

of  mind,  keep  a  good  look-out  for  any  error  of  judgment  on 

the  part  of  the  victors,  and  avail  himself  of  their  mistakes. 

At  any  rate  one  often  sees  the  side,  which  imagines  itself  to 

have  obtained  a  clear  victory,  ultimately  lose  the  day ;  while 

those  who  seemed  at  first  to  have  failed  recover  themselves 

by  presence  of  mind,  and  ultimately  win  an  unexpected  victory. 

Both  happened  on  this  occasion  to  the  respective  leaders. 

The  whole  of  the  Achaean  mercenaries  having  been  driven 

Machanidas     ^o"^  ^^^^  ground,  and  their  left  wing  having  been 

pursues  the  fugi-  thoroughly  broken  up,  Machanidas  abandoned 

lives,  and  thus   jjjg  original  plan  of  winning  the  day  by  out- 

allows  tne  /vcnaean  /^i*.«  •.«  ^i«^  « 

hopUtes  to  get    nankmg  the  enemy  with  some  of  his  forces  and 
between  him  and  charging  their  front  with  others,  and  did  neither ; 
his  quarters,     jj^^  quite  losing  his  head,  rushed  forward  heed- 
lessly with  all  his  mercenaries  in  pursuit  of  the  fugitives,  as 
though  the  panic  was  not  in  itself  sufficient  to  drive  those  who 
had  once  given  way  up  to  the  town  gates. 

15*  Meanwhile  the  Achaean  general  was  doing  all  he  could 
to  rally  the  mercenaries,  addressing  the  officers  by  name,  and 
urging  them  to  stand ;  but  when  he  saw  that  they  were  hope- 
lessly beaten,  he  did  not  run  away  in  a  panic  nor  give  up  the 
battle  in  despair,  but,  withdrawing  under  cover  of  his  phalanx, 
waited  until  the  enemy  had  passed  him  in  their  pursuit,  and  left 
the  ground  on  which  the  fighting  had  taken  place  empty,  and 
then  immediately  gave  the  word  to  the  front  companies  of  the 
phalanx  to  wheel  to  the  left,  and  advance  at  the  double,  without 
breaking  their  ranks.  He  thus  swiftly  occupied  the  ground 
abandoned  by  his  mercenaries,  and  at  once  cut  off  the  pursuers 


Xt  DEFEAT  OF  THE  LACEDAEMONIANS  6i 

from  returning,  and  got  on  higher  groun<l  than  the  enemy's 
right  wing.  He  exhorted  the  men  to  keep  up  their  courage, 
and  remain  where  they  were,  until  he  gave  the  word  for  a 
general  advance ;  and  he  ordered  Folybius  of  Megalopohs '  to 
collect  such  of  the  Illyrians  and  body  armour  men  and  mer- 
cenaries as  remained  behind  and  had  not  taken  part  in  the 
flight,  and  form  a  reserve  on  the  flank  of  the  phalanx,  to  Iceep 
a  look-out  against  the  return  of  the  pursuers. 
Thereupon  the  Lacedaemonians,  excited  by  the  "^  dyk'c^' '  ' 
victory  gained  by  the  light-armed  contingent, 
without  waiting  for  the  word  of  command,  brought  their  sarissae 
to  the  charge  and  rushed  upon  the  enemy.  But  when  in  the 
course  of  their  advance  they  reached  the  edge  of  the  dyke, 
beii^  unable  at  that  point  to  change  their  purpose  and  retreat 
when  at  such  close  quarters  with  the  enemy,  and  partly  because 
they  did  not  consider  the  dyke  a  serious  obstacle,  as  the  slope 
down  to  it  was  very  gradual,  and  it  was  entirely  without  water 
or  'underwood  growing  in  it,  they  continued  their  advance 
through  it  without  stopping  to  think. 

16.  The  opportunity  for  attack  which  Fhilopoemen  had 
long  foreseen  had  now  arrived.  He  at  once  ordered  the 
phalanx  to  bring  their  sarissae  to  the  charge  and  advance.  The 
men  obeyed  with  enthusiasm,  and  accompanied  their  charge 
with  a  ringing  cheer.  The  ranks  of  the  Lacedaemonians  had 
been  disorganised  by  the  passage  of  the  dyke,  and  as  they 
ascended  the  opposite  bank  they  found  the  enemy  above  them 
They  lost  courage  and  tried  to  fly ;  but  the  greater  number 
of  them  were  killed  in  the  ditch  itself,  partly  by  the  Achaeans, 
and  partly  by  trampling  on  each  other.  Now  this  result  was 
not  unpremeditated  or  accidental,  but  strictly  owing  to  the 
acuteness  of  the  general.  For  Fhilopoemen  originally  took 
ground  behind  the  dyke,  not  to  avoid  fighting,  as  some 
supfKJsed,  but  from  a  very  accurate  and  scientific  calcu- 
lation of  strategical  advantages.  He  reckoned  either  that 
Machanidas  when  he  arrived  would  advance  without  think- 
ing of  the  dyke,  and  that  then  his  phalanx  would  get 
entangled,  just  as  I  have  described  their  actually  doing ;  or 
that  if  he  advanced  with  a  full  apprehension  of  the  difficulty 


62  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  boom 

presented  by  the  dyke,  and  then  changing  his  mind  and 
deciding  to  shrink  from  the  attempt,  were  to  retire  in  loose 
order  and  a  long  straggling  column, ^  the  victory  would  be  his, 
without  a  general  engagement,  and  the  defeat  his  adversary's. 
For  this  has  happened  to  many  commanders,  who  having 
drawn  up  their  men  for  battle,  and  then  concluded  that  they 
were  not  strong  enough  to  meet  their  opponents,  either  from 
the  nature  of  the  ground,  the  disparity  of  their  numbers,  or  for 
other  reasons,  have  drawn  off  in  too  long  a  line  of  march,  and 
hoped  in  the  course  of  the  retreat  to  win  a  victory,  or  at  least  get 
safe  away  from  the  enemy,  by  means  of  then:  rear  guard  alone. 
17.  However,  Philopoemen  was  not  deceived  in  his  prog- 
nostication of  what  would  happen ;  for  the  Lacedaemonians 
were  thoroughly  routed.  Seeing  therefore  that  his  phalanx  was 
victorious  and  that  he  had  gained  a  complete  and  brilliant 
success,  he  set  himself  vigorously  to  secure  the  only  thing 

wanting  to  complete  it,  that  is,  to  prevent  the 

mumi^' from   escape  of  Machanidas.     Seeing  therefore  that, 

the  pursuit,  is   in  the  course  of  the  pursuit,  he  was   caught 

killed  while  trying  between    the    dyke   and   the    town   with   his 

^  '^  dyke^  ^  ^    mercenaries,  he  waited  for  him  to  attempt  a 

return.    But  when  Machanidas  saw  that  his  army 

was  in  full  retreat,  with  the  enemy  at  their  heels,  he  knew  that 

he  had  advanced  too  far,  and  had  lost  his  chance  of  victory : 

he  therefore  rallied  the  mercenaries  that  he  had  with  him,  and 

tried  to  form  close  order,  and  cut  his  way  through  the  enemy, 

while  they  were  still  scattered  and  engaged  in  the  pursuit 

Some  of  his  men,  understanding  his  plan  and  seeing  no  other 

hope  of  safety,  kept  by  him  at  first ;  but  when  they  came  upon 

the  ground,  and  saw  the  Achaeans  guarding  the  bridge  over  the 

dyke,  they  lost  heart ;  and  the  whole  company  began  falling 

away  from  him,  each  doing  the  best  he  could  to  preserve  his 

own  life.     Thereupon  the  tyrant  gave  up  all  hope  of  making 

his  way  over  the  bridge ;  and  rode  along  the  edge  of  the  dyke, 

trying  with  all  his  might  to  find  a  place  which  he  could  cross. 

^  The  text  is  certainly  corrupt  here,  and  it  is  not  clear  what  the  general 
sense  of  the  passage  is  beyond  this, — that  Philopoemen  calculated  on  defeating 
the  enemy,  as  he  did,  while  struggling  through  the  dyke  :  or  on  their  exposing 
themselves  to  attack  if  they  retreated  from  the  dyke  without  crossing  it. 


Xt  FALL  OF  MACHANIDAS  63 

18.  Fhilopoemen  recognised  Machanidas  by  his  purple 
cloak  a.nd  the  trappings  of  his  horse.  He  at  Death  of 
once  left  Anaxidamus,  with  orders  to  guard  the  Machanidas  and 
bridge  with  vigilance,  and  give  no  quarter  to '^^i""'^  "^  ^*8'*' 
any  of  the  mercenaries ;  because  they  were  the  men  on  whom 
the  despots  of  Sparta  always  depended  for  supporting  their 
power.  Then  taking  Polyaenus  of  Cyprus  and  Simias,  who  were 
attending  on  him  at  the  time,  he  rode  along  the  edge  of  the 
ditch  opposite  to  that  in  which  the  tyrant  and  his  attendants 
were;  for  Machanidas  had  still  two  men  with  him,  Arexidamus 
and  one  of  the  mercenaries.  As  soon  as  Machanidas  had  found 
a  spot  in  the  dyke  which  could  be  crossed,  he  put  spurs  to  his 
horse,  and  tried  to  force  it  to  go  on  and  get  over,  I'hen 
Philopoemen  turned  suddenly  round  upon  him  and  dealt  him 
a  mortal  wound  with  his  spear,  and  a  second  with  a  stab  from 
the  spike  at  the  butt  end  of  it,  and  thus  killed  the  tyrant  in  a 
hand-to-hand  encounter.  Those  who  were  riding  with  him 
did  the  same  to  Arexidamus ;  but  the  third  man  seeing  their 
fall  gave  up  the  idea  of  crossing  the  dyke  and  escaped,  Simias 
immediately  stripped  the  bodies  of  the  two  who  had  fallen, 
and  with  their  armour  carried  off  also  the  tyrant's  head,  and 
then  hurried  off  to  overtake  the  pursuing  parly;  being  eager  to 
give  the  soldiers  ocular  evidence  of  the  fall  of  the  enemy's 
commander,  that  they  might  continue  the  pursuit  of  their 
opponents  with  all  the  more  confidence  and  spirit  right  up 
to  Tegea,  And  this  in  fact  added  so  greatly  to  the  spirit  of 
the  men  that  it  contributed  more  than  anything  else  to  their 
carrying  Tegea  by  assault,  and  pitching  their 
camp  next  day  on  the  Eurotas,  undisputed  Lac™a '" 
masters  of  all  the  open  country.  For  many 
years  past  they  had  been  vainly  trying  to  drive  the  enemy 
from  their  own  borders,  but  now  they  were  themselves  de- 
vastating Laconia  without  resistance,  without  having  lost  any 
great  number  of  their  own  men  in  the  battle ;  while  they  had 
killed  not  less  than  four  thousand  Lacedaemonians,  taken  even 
more  prisoners,  and  possessed  themselves  of  all  their  baggage 
and  arms.  .  .  . 

19.  What  profit  is  it  to  our  re.iders  to  describe  wars  and 


64  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  book 

battles,  the  storming  of  cities  and  the  enslavement  of  their 
inhabitants,  if  they  are  to  know  nothing  of  the  causes  which 
conduce  to  success  and  failure  ?  The  results  of  such  operations 
merely  touch  the  fancy  :  it  is  the  tracing  of  the  designs  of  the 
actors  in  such  scenes  that  is  really  instructive ;  and  above  all 
it  is  the  following  in  detail  of  each  step  that  can  educate  the 
ideas  of  the  student  .  .  . 

ABILITY  OF  HANNIBAL.     See  Livy,  28,  12 

Who  could  refrain  from  speaking  in  terms  of  admiration  01 
this  great  man's  strategic  skill,  courage,  and  ability,  when  one 
looks  to  the  length  of  time  during  which  he  displayed  those 
qualities ;  and  realises  to  one's  self  the  pitched  battles,  the 
skirmishes  and  sieges,  the  revolutions  and  counter-revolutions 
of  states,  the  vicissitudes  of  fortune,  and  in  fact  the  course  of 
his  design  and  its  execution  in  its  entirety  ?  For  sixteen  con- 
o  tinuous  years  Hannibal  maintained  the  war  with 

Rome  in  Italy,  without  once  releasing  his  army 
from  service  in  the  field,  but  keeping  those  vast  numbers 
under  control,  like  a  good  pilot,  without  any  sign  of  disaffection 
towards  himself  or  towards  each  other,  though  he  had  troops 
in  his  service  who,  so  far  from  being  of  the  same  tribe,  were  not 
even  of  the  same  race.  He  had  Libyans,  Iberians,  Ligurians, 
Celts,  Phoenicians,  Italians,  Greeks,  who  had  naturally  nothing 
in  common  with  each  other,  neither  laws,  nor  customs,  nor 
language.  Yet  the  skill  of  the  commander  was  such,  that 
these  differences,  so  manifold  and  so  wide,  did  not  disturb  the 
obedience  to  one  word  of  command  and  to  a  single  will.  And  yet 
circumstances  were  not  by  any  means  unvarying :  for  though 
the  breeze  of  fortune  often  set  strongly  in  his  favour,  it  as  often 
also  blew  in  exactly  the  opposite  direction.  There  is  therefore 
good  ground  for  admiring  Hannibal's  display  of  ability  in 
campaign ;  and  there  can  be  no  fear  in  saying  that,  if  he  had 
reserved  his  attack  upon  the  Romans  until  he  had  first  subdued 
other  parts  of  the  world,  there  is  not  one  of  his  projects  which 
would  have  eluded  his  grasp.  As  it  was,  he  began  with  those 
whom  he  should  have  attacked  last,  and  accordingly  began 
and  ended  his  career  with  them.  .  .  . 


THE  HANNIBALIAN  WAR  CONTINUED 


SCIPIO   IN    SPAIN,  AFTER    THt    BATTLE   OF  THE    METAURUS 

20.  Hasdnibal  having  collected  his  forces  from  the  various 
towns  in  which  they  had  wintered,  advanced  to 

within  a  short  distance  of  Hipa  and  there  en-^^o^cITpf 
camped ;    forming    his   entrenchment    at   the    near  iiipa  (or 
foot  of  the  mountains,  with  a  plain  in  front  of  ^'P'^} '"  ^^^o*- 
him  well  suited  for  a  contest  and  battle.      His    Lj^'^aa'^fa-e 
infantry    amounted    to    seventy    thousand,   his 
cavalry  to    four    thousand,  and  his  elephants   to   thirty-two. 
On  his  part,  Scipio  sent  M.  Junius  Silanus  to 
visit  Colichas  and  take  over  from  him  the  forces  "^^1°^^^ 
that    had    been    prepared    by   him.      These 
amounted  to  three  thousand  infantry  and  five  hundred  horse. 
The  other  allies  he  received  personally  in  the  course  of  his 
march  up  the  country  to  his  destination.    When  he  approached 
Castalo  and  Baecula,  and  had  there  been  joined  by  Marcus 
Junius  and  the  troops  from  Colichas,  he  found  himself  in  a 
]>osition    of  great  perplexity.       For  without   their  allied   the 
Roman  forces  were  not  strong  enough  to  risk  a  battle ;  yet 
to  do  so,  in  dependence  upon  the  allies  for  his  hopes  of  ultimate 
success,  appeared  to  him  to  be  dangerous  and  too  venturesome. 
In  spite  however  of  his  perplexity,  he  was  obliged  to  yield  to 
the  force  of  circumstances  so  far  as  to  employ  the  Iberians ; 
but  he  resolved  to  do  so  only  to  make  a  show  of  numbers  to 
the  enemy,  while  he  really  fought  the  action     ^^^  encamps 
with  his  own  legions.     With  this  purpose  in  his     dose  lo  the 
mind  he  got   his  whole  army  on   the   march,     Carthaginian 
forty-five  thousand  infantry  and  three  thousand         ""^^ 
cavalry ;    and  when   he    had    come  within  the  view  of  the 
Carthaginians,  he  pitched  his  camp  on  some  low  bills  exactly 
opjwsite  the  enemy. 

21.  Mago  thought  that  it  would  be  an  excellent  moment 
to  attack  the  Romans  while  actually  engaged 

in  making  their  camp;    he  therefore  rode  up  '"'""jt^g'^''' ^* 
to  the  entrenchment  with  the  greater  part  of  his 
own  cavalry  and  Massanissa  with  the  Numidians,  persuaded 
that  he  should  catch  Scipio  off  his  guard.     Scipio  had  how- 

VOL.  II  F 


66  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  nooK 

ever  all  along  foreseen  this,  and  had  placed  some  cavalry 
equal  in  number  to  those  of  the  Carthaginians  under  cover 
of  some  hills.  Upon  these  making  an  unexpected  charge, 
many  of  the  enemy's  horsemen  at  once  took  to  flight  at  the 
startling  appearance,  and  l>egan  to  make  off";  while  the  rest 
closed  with  their  opponents  and  fought  with  great  gallantry. 
But  the  Carthaginians  were  disconcerted  by  the  agility  of  some 
of  the  Roman  horsemen  in  dismounting,  and  after  a  short 
resistance  they  retreated  with  considerable  loss.  The  retreat 
was  at  first  conducted  in  good  order :  but  as  the  Romans 
pressed  them  hard,  they  broke  up  their  squadrons,  and  fled  for 
safety  to  their  own  camp.  This  affiair  gave  the  Romans 
better  spirits  for  engaging  in  a  pitched  battle,  and  had  the 
contrary  effect  on  the  Carthaginians.  However,  during  the 
next  few  days  they  both  drew  out  on  the  intervening  phin  ; 
skirmished  with  their  cavalry  and  light-armed  troops  ;  and,  after 
thus  trying  each  other's  mettle,  were  resolved  to  bring  the  matter 
to  the  test  of  a  general  engagement. 

22.  On  this  occasion  Scipio  appears  to  have  employed  a 
two-fold  stratagem.  Hasdrubal  had  been  accustomed  to  make 
his  demonstrations  in  force  somewhat  late  in  the  day,  with  the 
Libyans  in  his  centre,  and  the  elephants  on  either  wing ;  while 
his  own  practice  had  been  to  make  his  counter-movements  some- 
what later  still,  with  the  Roman  soldiers  on  his  centre  opposite 
the  Libyans,  and  the  Iberians  on  his  two  wings ;  but  the  day 

on  which  he  resolved  upon  a  general  engagement, 
^on^rgenerar   ^\  reversing  this  arrangement,  he  greatly  con- 
engagement,  and  tributed  to  secure  the  victory  for  his  own  men,  and 
alters  his  dis-    succeeded  in  putting  the  enemy  at  a  consider- 
m'aJie  Sir^tilT  ^^^^  disadvantage.     For  directly  it  was  light  he 
depend  upon  the  sent  his  aides  with  orders  to  the  tribunes  and 
Italians  rather   men   to  arm,  as  soon  as  they  had  got  their 
Spa^niards       breakfasts,  and  parade  outside  the  camp.     The 
order  was  obeyed  with  alacrity  because  the  men 
suspected  what  was  going  to  take  place.     He  then  sent  the 
cavalry  and  light-armed  forward,  with  orders  to  advance  close 
to  the  enemy's  camp,  and  skirmish  boldly  up  to  it ;  while  he 
himself  marched  out  with  the  infantr}',  just  as  the  sun  was 
appearing  above  the  horizon ;  and  on  reaching  the  middle  of 


DEFEAT  OF  MASDRUBAL  SON  OF  CESCO 


(,^ 


the  plain,  made  his  dispositions  in  the  reverse  order  to  his 
usual  airangement,  placing  the  Iberians  in  the  centre  and  the 
Roman  legionaries  on  the  two  wings. 

The  sudden  approach  of  the  cavaliy  to  their  camp,  and  tlie 
simultaneous  appearance  of  the  rest  of  the  army  getting  into 
order,  left  the  Carthaginians  barely  time  to  get  under  arms. 
Hasdrubal  was  therefore  obliged,  without  waiting  for  the  men 
to  get  breakfast,  or  making  any  preparations,  to  despatcli  his 
cavalry  and  light-armed  troops  at  once  against  tlie  enemy's 
cavalry  on  the  plain,  and  to  get  his  infantry  into  order  on 
some  level  ground  not  far  from  the  skirts  of  the  mountains,  as 
was  theii  custom.  For  a  time  the  Romans  remained  quiet ; 
but  when  the  morning  was  getting  on,  and  the  engagement 
between  the  light-armed  troops  still  continued  undecided, 
because  such  of  them  as  were  forced  from  their  ground  re- 
tired on  their  own  heavy  infantry  and  then  formed  again  for 
attack,  Scipio  at  length  thought  that  the  time  was  come.  He 
withdrew  his  skirmishers  through  the  intervals  of  the  maniples, 
and  then  distributed  them  equally  between  the  two  wings  on 
rear  of  his  line,  first  the  velites  and  behind  them  the  cavalry. 
He  then  advanced,  at  first  in  line  direct ;  but  when  he  was 
about  a  stade  '  from  the  enemy,  he  ordered  the  Iberians  to 
continue  the  advance  in  the  same  order,  while  he  commanded 
the  maniples  and  squadrons  on  the  right  wing  to  turn  out- 
wards to  the  tight,  and  those  on  the  left  wing  to  the  left. 

2S.  Scipio  with  the  three  leading  squadrons  of  cavalry  from 
the  right  wing,  preceded  by  the  usual  number  of  velites  and  three 
maniples  (a  combination  of  troops  which  the  Romans  call  a 
cohort),  and  Lucius  Marcius  and  Marcus  Junius  with  a  similar 
force  from  the  left  wing,  turned  the  one  to  the  left  the  other  to 
the  right,  and  advanced  at  a  great  speed  in  column  upon  the 
enemy,  the  troops  in  succession  forming  up  and  following  in 
column  as  they  wheeled.  When  these  troops  were  within  a  short 
distance  of  tiie  enemy, — the  Iberians  in  the  line  direct  being 
still  a  considerable  distance  behind,  because  ihey  were  advanc- 
ing at  a  deliberate  pace, —  lliey  came  into  contact  with  the  two 
wings  of  the  enemy  simultaneously,  the  Roman  forces  being  in 
"  live  stadvs."    \Jv<y,  aCl,  14.  says  qain- 


68  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  book 

column,  according  to  Scipio's  original  plan.  The  move- 
ments subsequent  to  this,  which  resulted  in  the  troops 
on  the  rear  finding  themselves  in  the  same  line  as  the 
troops  in  front,  and  engaged  like  them  with  the  enemy, 
were  exactly  the  converse  of  each  other — taking  the  right 
and  left  wings  in  general,  and  the  cavalry  and  infantry  in  par- 
ticular. For  the  cavalry  and  velites  on  the  right  wing 
came  into  line  on  the  right  and  tried  to  outflank  the 
enemy,  while  the  heavy  infantry  came  into  line  on  the  left  ; 
but  on  the  left  wing  the  heavy  infantry  came  into  line  by  the 
right,  the  cavalry  and  velites  by  the  left  The  result  of  this 
movement  was  that,  as  far  as  the  cavalry  and  light  infantry 
were  concerned,  their  right  became  their  left.  Scipio  cared  little 
for  this,  but  was  intent  on  something  more  important,  namely, 
the  outflanking  of  the  enemy.  For  while  a  general  ought 
to  be  quite  alive  to  what  is  taking  place,  and  rightly  so,  he 
ought  to  use  whatever  movements  suit  the  circumstances. 
24.  When  these  troops  were  at  close  quarters  the  elephants 
„-     .    ,  were   severely   handled,    being    wounded   and 

harassed  on  every  side  by  the  velites  and 
cavalry,  and  did  as  much  harm  to  their  friends  as  to  their  foes ; 
for  they  rushed  about  promiscuously  and  killed  every  one  that 
fell  in  their  way  on  either  side  alike.  As  to  the  infantry, — 
the  Carthaginian  wings  began  to  be  broken,  but  the  centre 
occupied  by  the  Libyans,  and  which  was  the  best  part  of  the 
army,  was  never  engaged  at  all.  It  could  not  quit  its  ground 
to  go  to  the  support  of  the  wings  for  fear  of  the  attack  of  the 
Iberians,  nor  could  it  by  maintaining  its  position  do  any  actual 
fighting,  because  the  enemy  in  front  of  it  did  not  come  to  close 
quarters.  However,  for  a  certain  time  the  two  wings  fought 
gallantly,  because  it  was  for  them,  as  for  the  enemy,  a  struggle 
for  life  and  death.  But  now  the  midday  heat  was  become  in- 
tense, and  the  Carthaginians  began  to  feel  faint,  because  the 
unusual  time  at  which  they  had  been  forced  to  come  on  the 
field  had  prevented  them  from  fortifying  themselves  with  the 
proper  food ;  while  the  Romans  had  the  advantage  in  physical 
vigour  as  well  as  in  cheerfulness,  which  was  especially  promoted 
by  the  fact  that  the  prudence  of  their  general  had  secured  his 
best  men  being  pitted  against  the  weakest  troops  of  the  enemy. 


II  CARTHAGINIANS  DRIVEN  FROM  SPAIN  69 

'Ihus  hard  pressed  Hasdrubal's centre  began  to  retreat :  at  first 
step  by  step;  but  soon  the  ranks  were  broken,  and  the  men 
rushed  in  confusion  to  the  skirts  of  the  mountain ;  and  on  the 
Romans  pressing  in  pursuit  with  still  greater  violence,  they 
b^an  a  headlong  flight  into  their  entrenchments.  Had  not 
Providence  interfered  to  save  them,  they  would  promptly  have 
been  driven  from  their  camp  too ;  but  a  sudden  storm 
gathered  in  the  air,  and  a  violent  and  prolonged  torrent  of 
rain  descended,  under  which  the  Romans  with  difficulty 
elTected  a  return  to  their  own  camp.  .  .  . 

Many  Romans  lost  their  lives  by  the  fire  in  7^,^  Romans  in 
trying  to  gel  the  silver  and  gold  which  had  been  ihcminmgdistrici 
melted  and  fused.  .  .  .  ofSpnin. 


SCIPIO   ON  THE  EXPULSION  OF  THE  CARTHAGINIANS  FROM  SPAIN 
IN  CONSEQUENCE  OF  THE  ABOVE  VICTORY 

When  every  one  complimented  Scipio  after  he  had 
driven  the  Carthaginians  from  Iberia,  and  sclpio's  idea  of 
advised  him  straightway  to  take  some  rest  and  imnsfemn^  ihc 
ease,  as  having  put  a  period  to  the  war,  he  *^'" '°  Africa, 
answered  that  he  "congratulated  them  on  their  sanguine 
hopes  ;  for  himself  he  was  now  more  than  ever  revolving  in  his 
mind  how  to  begin  the  war  with  Carthage.  Up  to  that  time 
the  Carthaginians  had  waged  war  upon  the  Romans ;  but  that 
now  fortune  put  it  in  the  power  of  the  Romans  to  make  war 
upon  them.  .  .  ." 


SCIPIO  S  VISIT  TO  SVPHAX,  KING  OF  MASAESVLIANS, 

See  Livy,  28,  17,  18 

In  his  conversation  with  Syphax,  Scipio,  who  was  eminently 
endowed  by  nature  in  this  respect,  conducted 
himself  with  so  much  kindness  and  tact,  that  ^ovCTsirJuix" 
Hasdrubal  afterwards  remarked  to  Syphax  that 
"  Scipio  appeared  more  formidable  to  him  in  such  an  interview 
than  in  the  field.  ..." 


70  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  book 


A    MUTINY    IN    SPAIN 

25i  When  a  mutiny  broke  out  among  part  of  the  troops 

Scipio  appeases  a  »"   the  Roman  camp,  Scipio,    though  he  had 

mutiny  in  the    now   had  a  very  adequate  experience  of  the 

Roman  camp,  at  difficulties  of  administration,  never   felt  him- 

"24!    irTihe     self  more  at  a  loss  how  to  act  or  in  greater 

autumn  of  B.C.  embarrassment      And   naturally  so.      For  as 

^°^'  in  the   case  of  the  body,  causes  of  mischief, 

such   as   cold,    heat,    fatigue,    or   wounds,    may  be   avoided 

by  precautions,  or  easily  relieved  when  they  occur ;  while  those 

which  arise  from  within  the  body  itself,  such  as  tumours  or 

diseases,  are  difficult  to  foresee  and  difficult  to  relieve  when 

they  do  exist,  so  it  is,  we  must  believe,  with  political  and 

military  administration.     Against  plots  from  without,  and  the 

attacks  of  enemies,  the   precautions  to   be   taken   and   the 

measures  for  relief  may  readily  be  learned  by  those  who  pay 

the  requisite  attention ;  but  to  decide  on  the  right  method  of 

resisting  intestine  factions,    revolutions,    and   disturbances  is 

difficult,  and  requires  great  tact  and  extreme  acuteness ;  and, 

moreover,   the   observation   of    one   maxim   suitable   in   my 

opinion  to  all  armies,  states,  and  bodies  alike,  which  is  this : 

never  in  such  cases  to  allow  any  lengthened  idleness  or  repose, 

and  least  of  all  at  a  time  of  success  and  when  provisions  are 

abundant. 

Being,  then,  as  I  have  all  along  said,  a  man  eminently 
careful,  acute,  and  prompt,  Scipio  summoned  a  meeting  of  the 
military  tribunes  and  proposed  a  solution  of  the  existing 
troubles  as  follows.  He  said  that  **  he  must  promise  the 
soldiers  the  settlement  of  their  pay  ;  and,  in  order  to  create  a 
belief  in  his  promise,  he  must  now  take  public  steps  to  exact 
with  all  speed  the  contributions  which  had  been  already 
imposed  upon  the  cities  for  the  support  of  the  whole  army, 
with  the  distinct  understanding  that  the  object  of  that  measure 
was  the  settlement  of  the  pay :  and  these  same  tribunes 
should  return  to  the  army  and  urge  and  entreat  the  men 
to  abandon  their  rebellious  spirit,  and  come  to  him  to  receive 
their  pay,  either  singly  or,  if  they  preferred  it,  in  a  body.     And 


SCIP/0  SUPPRESSES  A  MUTINY 


when  this  was  done  he  would  consider,  as  circumstances  arose, 
what  measures  it  was  necessary  to  take." 

26.  With  this  suggestion  in  their  minds  these  officers 
deliberated  on  the  means  of  raising  money ;  and  having 
communicated  their  decisions  to  Scipio,  he  said  that  he  would 
now  consult  them  on  the  next  necessary  step.  They  accord- 
ingly resolved  that  they  would  name  a  day  on  which  all  were 
to  appear ;  and  that  then  they  would  pardon  the  general  Uocly 
of  the  men,  but  severely  punish  the  instigators  of  the  mutiny, 
who  were  as  many  as  thirty-five;  The  day  having  arrived,  and 
the  mutineers  having  appeared  to  make  terms  and  receive  their 
pay,  Scipio  gave  secret  instructions  to  the  tribunes,  who  had 
been  sent  on  the  mission  to  them,  to  meet  them ;  and,  each 
of  them  selecting  five  of  the  ringleaders,  to  greet  them  with 
politeness  and  invite  them,  if  possible,  to  their  own  tent,  or, 
if  they  could  not  do  that,  to  dinner  or  some  such  enter- 
tainmcnL  But  to  the  troops  with  him  he  sent  round  orders 
to  have  provisions  for  a  considerable  period  ready  in  three 
days'  time,  because  ihey  were  to  march  against  the  deserter 
Andobales  under  Marcus  Silanus.  When  they  heard  this 
the  mutineers  were  much  emboldened,  because  they  im- 
agined that  they  would  have  everything  in  their  own  hands, 
as  the  other  troops  would  be  gone  by  the  time  they  joined 
the  general. 

27.  Upon  the  approach  of  the  mutineers,  Scipio  gave  orders 
to  his  army  to  march  out  the  next  morning  at     _, 
daybreak  with  their  baggage.     But  he  instructed  sup prea'^  andihe 
the  tribunes  and  praefects  that,  as  soon  as  they  ringleaders  eie- 
met  the  mutineers,  they  should  order  their  men    '^"c^ha'^^* 
to   put   down   their  baggage,  and   keep  them 
under  arms  at  the  city  gate ;  and  then,  placing  a  detachment  at 
each  of  the  gates,  take  good  care  that  none  of  the  mutineers 
should  leave  the  city.      The  officers  who  had  been  sent    to 
meet  the  men  fell  in  with  them  on  their  arrival,  and  took  the 
ringleaders  with  every  appearance  of  civility  to  their  own  tents, 
in  accordance  with  the  arrangement  that  had  been  made.     At 
the  same  time  orders  had  been  given  to  them  to  arrest  the 
thirty-five  immediately  after  dinner,  and  to  keep  them  in  fetters : 
without  allowing  any  one  in  the  tent  to  go  out,  except  the 


72  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  book 

messenger  who  was  to  inform  the  general  from  each  of  them 
that  this  had  been  accomplished. 

The  tribunes  having  done  as  they  were  ordered,  at  day- 
break next  morning,  seeing  that  the  new  arrivals  were  collected 
in  the  market-place,  the  general  gave  the  signal  for  the  assem- 
bly of  the  army.  The  signal  was  as  usual  promptly  obeyed 
by  all,  for  they  were  curious  to  see  how  the  general  would 
demean  himself  in  their  presence,  and  what  he  would  say  to 
them  about  the  business  in  hand.  As  soon  as  they  were  come 
together,  Scipio  sent  word  to  the  tribunes  to  bring  their 
soldiers  under  arms,  and  station  them  round  the  assembled 
men.     He  then  came  forward  himself.     His  first  appearance 

caused  an  immediate  change  of  feeling.     The 
the^mutinwrs.'^  soldiers  Supposed  that  he  was  still  unwell,  and 

when  they  suddenly  saw  him,  contrary  to  all 
expectations,  with  all  the  appearance  of  full  health  and  strength, 
they  were  struck  with  terror. 

28.  He  began  his  speech  by  saying  that  he  wondered  what 
their  grievances  were,  or  what  they  looked  for  forward  that 
induced  them  to  mutiny.  For  that  there  were  three  motives 
only  on  which  men  usually  venture  to  rebel  against  their 
country  and  their  commanders, — discontent  and  anger  with 
their  officers ;  dissatisfaction  with  their  present  position ;  or, 
lastly,  hopes  of  something  better  and  more  glorious.  "  Now,  I 
ask  you,"  he  continued,  "  which  of  these  can  you  allege  ?  It  is 
with  me,  I  presume,  that  you  are  dissatisfied,  because  I  did  not 
pay  you  your  wages.  But  this  cannot  be  laid  to  my  charge  ;  for 
while  I  was  in  office  your  pay  was  never  short.  The  fault  then 
may  lie  with  Rome  that  the  accumulated  arrears  have  not  been 
settled.  Which  was  your  proper  course  then  in  that  case? 
To  have  brought  forward  your  complaint  thus,  as  rebels  and 
enemies  to  the  country  that  nurtured  you,  or  to  have  come 
personally  to  me  and  stated  your  case,  and  to  have  begged 
your  friends  to  support  and  help  you?  The  latter  would 
have  been  the  better  plan  in  my  opinion.  In  those  who 
serve  others  for  pay  it  is  sometimes  pardonable  to  revolt 
against  their  paymasters;  but  in  the  case  of  those  who  are 
fighting  for  themselves,  for  their  own  wives  and  children,  it 
can  in  no  circumstances  be  conceded.     It  is  just  as  though,  on 


XI         SCiriO  HARAHCUES  THE  MUTINOUS  TROOPS         73 

the  plea  of  being  wronged  in  money  matters  by  his  own  father, 
a  man  were  to  come  in  arms  to  slay  him  from  whom  he  re- 
ceived his  own  life.  Or  perhaps  you  may  allege  that  I 
imposed  greater  hardships  and  dangers  on  you  than  on  the 
others,  and  gave  the  rest  more  than  their  share  of  profits  and 
booty.  But  you  can  neither  venture  to  say  this,  nor,  if  you 
did  venture,  could  you  prove  it.  What  then  is  your  grievance 
against  me  at  this  moment,  I  should  like  to  ask,  that  you  have 
mutinied  ?  I  believe  that  not  one  of  you  will  be  able  to  express 
or  even  conceive  it 

29.  "  Nor  again  can  it  have  been  any  dissatisfaction  with 
the  position  of  affairs.  For  when  was  any  prosperity  greater? 
When  has  Rome  won  more  victories,  when  have  her  arms 
had  brighter  prospects  than  now  ?  But  perhaps  some  faint- 
heart will  say  that  our  enemies  have  more  numerous  advan- 
tages, fairer  and  more  certain  prospects  than  ourselves. 
Which,  pray,  of  these  enemies?  Is  it  Andobales  and 
Mandonius?  But  which  of  you  is  ignorant  of  the  fact  that 
these  men  first  betrayed  the  Carthaginians  and  joined  us, 
and  now  once  more,  in  defiance  of  their  oaths  and  pledges, 
have  come  forward  as  our  opponents?  It  is  a  fine  thing 
surely  to  become  the  enemies  of  your  country  in  reliance  on 
such  men  as  these  I  Nor  again  had  you  any  prospect  of  becom- 
ing masters  of  Iberia  by  your  own  prowess  :  for  you  would  not 
have  been  strong  enough,  even  in  conjunction  with  Andobales, 
to  meet  us  in  the  field,  to  say  nothing  of  doing  so  without 
such  aid.  I  should  like  then  to  ask, — what  was  it  in  which 
you  trusted  ?  Surely  not  in  the  skill  and  valour  of  the  leaders 
whom  you  have  now  elected,  or  in  the  fasces  and  axes  which 
were  borne  in  front  of  them, — men  of  whom  I  will  not  deign 
to  say  even  another  word.  All  this,  my  men,  is  absolutely 
futile ;  nor  will  you  be  able  to  allege  even  the  smallest  just 
complaint  against  me  or  your  country.  Wherefore  I  will 
undertake  your  defence  to  Rome  and  myself,  by  putting  for- 
ward a  plea  which  all  the  world  will  acknowledge  to  hold  good. 
And  it  is  that,  a  crmcd  is  a'tr  easily  misled  and  easily  inditced 
to  any  error.  Therefore  it  is  that  crowds  are  like  the  sea, 
which  in  its  own  nature  is  safe  and  quiet;  but,  when  winds  fall 
violently  upon  it,  assumes  the  character  of  the  blasts  which 


74  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLY BI US  book 

lash  it  into  fury :  thus  a  multitude  also  is  ever  found  to  be 
what  its  leaders  and  counsellors  are.  Acting  on  this  con- 
sideration, I  and  all  my  fellow-officers  hereby  offer  you  pardon 
and  amnesty  for  the  past :  but  to  the  guilty  authors  of  the 
mutiny  we  are  resolved  to  show  no  mercy,  but  to  punish  them 
as  their  misconduct  to  their  country  and  to  ourselves  deserves." 
80.  Just  as  he  said  these  words,  the  soldiers,  who  were 
posted  under  arms  round  the  assembly,  clashed  their  swords 

against  their  shields ;  and  at  the  same  instant 
'ringiKiders!  ^  ^^^  ringleaders  of  the  mutiny  were  brought  in, 

stripp>ed  and  in  chains.  But  such  terror  was 
inspired  in  the  men  by  the  threatening  aspect  of  the  surround- 
ing troops,  and  by  the  dreadful  spectacle  before  them,  that, 
while  the  ringleaders  were  being  scourged  and  beheaded,  they 
neither  changed  countenance  nor  uttered  a  sound,  but  re- 
mained all  staring  open-mouthed  and  terrified  at  what  was 
going  on.  So  the  ringleaders  of  the  mischief  were  scourged 
and  dragged  off  through  the  crowd  dead ;  but  the  rest  of  the 
men  accepted  with  one  consent  the  offer  of  an  amnesty  from 
the  general  and  officers;  and  then  voluntarily  came  forward,  one 
by  one,  to  take  an  oath  to  the  tribunes  that  they  would  obey 
the  orders  of  their  commanders  and  remain  loyal  to  Rome. 

Having  thus  crushed  what  might  have  been  the  beginning 
of  serious  danger,  Scipio  restored  his  troops  to  their  former 
good  disposition.  ... 


Scipio  at  Nciv  Carthage  has  heard  of  hostile  mm^ements  on 
the  part  of  Andobales  north  of  tlie  Ebro^  B.C.  206.  See  Liv}\ 
28,  31-34 

81.  Scipio  at  once  summoned  a  meeting  of  the  soldiers  in 
New  Carthage,  and  addressed  them  on  the  sub- 
ject of  the  audacious  proceedings  of  Andobales,  ^^jj?  ^oi^t^ 
and  his  treachery  to  them ;  and  by  dwelling  at 
great  length  on  these  topics  he  inspired  the  men  with  a  very 
great  eagerness  to  attack  these  princes.     He  then  proceeded 
to  enumerate  the  battles  they  had  already  fought  against  the 
Iberians  and  Carthaginians  combined,  the  Carthaginians  act- 


XI  SCIPIO  DEFEATS  ANDQBALES  ^l 

ing  as  leaders  in  the  campaigns.  "  Seeing,"  lie  added,  "  that 
you  always  beat  them,  it  does  not  now  become  you  to 
fear  defeat  in  a  war  against  Iberians  by  themselves,  and  led 
by  Andobales.  I  will  not  therefore  even  accept  any  Iberian 
of  them  all  as  a  partner  in  the  struggle,  but  I  will  undertake 
the  campaign  by  the  unassisted  services  of  my  Roman  soldiers : 
in  order  to  make  it  plain  to  all  that  it  was  not,  as  some 
assert,  by  the  aid  of  Iberians  that  we  defeated  the  Cartha- 
ginians and  drove  them  from  Iberia  ;  but  that  it  was  by  Roman 
valout  and  your  own  gallantry  that  we  have  conquered  Cartha- 
ginian and  Celtiberian  combined.  Let  nothing  therefore  dis- 
turb your  confidence  in  each  other:  but,  if  you  have  ever  done 
it  before,  approach  this  undertaking  with  courage  undismayed. 
For  securing  the  victory  I  will  with  God's  help  make  every 
necessary  provision."  This  speech  filled  the  troops  with  such 
zeal  and  confidence,  that  they  presented  all  the  appearance  of 
men  whose  enemies  are  in  full  view,  and  who  are  on  the  very 
point  of  closing  with  them. 

32.  Scipio  then  dismissed  the  assembly,  but  on  the  next 
day  got  his  troops  on  the  march,  and  having 
reached  the  Ebro  in  ten  days  and  crossed  it,     to'the'EtTO" 
on    the    fourth    day    after    that    pitched    his  cnuses  ii,  and'in 
camp  near  that  of  the  enemy,  with  a  valley  be-  fourteen  days  is 
tween  his  own  and  the  enemy's  lines.      Next  'onhe'^in^J* 
day  he  turned    some  cattle   that    had  accom- 
panied his  army  into  this  valley,  after  giving  Calus   Laelius 
instructions  to  have  the  cavalry  ready,  and  some  of  the  tri- 
bunes to  prepare  the  velites.     The  Iberians  having  at  once 
made  an  onslaught  upon  the  cattle,  he  despatched  some  of 
the  velites  against  them.     These  two  forces  became  engaged, 
and  reinforcements  being  sent  to  either  party 
from  time  to  time,  a  severe  infantry  skirmishing  '""" 

took  place  in  the  valley.  The  proper  moment  for  attack  be- 
ing now  come,  Caius  Laelius,  having  the  cavalry  prepared  as 
directed,  charged  the  skirmishers  of  the  enemy,  getting  between 
them  and  the  high  ground,  so  that  the  greater  number  o{ 
them  were  scattered  about  the  valley  and  killed  by  the  cavalry. 
This  event  roused  the  barbarians  to  a  furious  desire  to  engage, 
that  they  might  not  appear  to  be  entirely  reduced  to  desps'- 


76  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  book 

by  tlieir  previous  defeat ;  and  accordingly  by  daybreak  next 
day  they  drew  out  their  whole  army  for  battle.  Scipio  was 
quite  ready  to  give  them  battle ;  but  when  he  saw  that  the 
Iberians  had  come  down  into  the  valley  in  an  imprudent 
manner,  and  were  stationing,  not  only  their  cavalry,  but  their 
infantry  also  on  the  level  ground,  he  waited  for  a  time,  because 
he  wished  as  many  of  the  enemy  as  possible  to  take  up  a 
position  like  that  He  felt  confidence  in  his  cavalry,  and  still 
more  in  his  infantry ;  because,  in  such  deliberate  and  hand-to- 
hand  battles  as  this,  his  men  were  vastly  superior  to  the  Iberians 
both  in  themselves  and  in  their  arms. 

88.  When  he  thought  the  right  time  had  come  he  drew 

out    [the   velites]^    to   oppose   those   of    the 
^of 's^iSr'^  enemy  who  occupied  the  foot   of  the   hills ; 

while  against  those  who  had  descended 
into  the  valley  he  led  his  main  force  from  the  camp  in  four 
cohorts,  and  attacked  the  infantry.  Caius  Laelius  at  the 
same  time  made  a  de'tour  with  the  cavalry  by  the  hills,  which 
stretched  from  the  camp  to  the  valley,  and  charged  the  enemy's 
horse  on  the  rear ;  and  so  kept  them  occupied  with  fighting 
him.  The  enemy's  infantry  therefore,  being  thus  deprived  ^f 
the  support  of  the  cavalry,  on  which  they  had  relied  in 
descending  into  the  valley,  were  distressed  and  overmatched 
in  the  battle ;  while  their  cavalry  was  in  much  the  same  plight : 
for,  being  surprised  on  ground  of  insufficient  extent,  they  fell 
into  confusion,  and  lost  more  men  by  hurting  each  other  than 
by  the  hands  of  the  enemy ;  for  their  own  infantry  was  pressing 
upon  their  flank,  and  the  enemy's  infantry  on  their  front,  while 
his  cavalry  were  attacking  on  their  rear.  The  battle  having 
taken  this  course,  the  result  was  that  nearly  all  those  who 
had  descended  into  the  valley  lost  their  lives ;  while  those  who 
had  been  stationed  on  the  foot  of  the  hills  managed  to  escape. 
These  last  were  the  light-armed  troops,  and  formed  about  a 
third  of  the  whole  army :  with  whom  Andobales  himself  con- 
trived to  make  good  his  escape  to  a  certain  stronghold  of  great 
security.  .  .  . 

*  The  text  is  imperfect. 


SCIF/OS  RETUKN  TO  ROME 


By  further  operations  in  this  year,  B.  c.  ao6,  Scipio  had 
impelled  Mago  to  abandon  Spain  :  and  towards  the  winter  the 
Roman  army  went  into  winter-quarters  at  Tarraco. 

Having  (hus  put  a  finishing  stroke  to  his  campaigns  in 
Iberia,  Scipio  arrived  at  Tarraco  in  high  spirits,    „    . 
bringing  with  him  the  materials  of  a  brilliant      lo  Rome  in 
triumph  for  himself,  and  a  glorious  victory  for    ihc  autumn  of 
his  country.      But  being  anxious  to  arrive  in        **^'  ^'^- 
Rome  before  the  consular  elections,  he  arranged  for  the  govern- 
ment of  Iberia,'  and,  having  put  the  army  into  the  hands  of 
Junius  Silanus  and  L.  Marcius,  embarked  with  Caius  Laelius 
and  his  other  friends  for  Rome.  .  .  . 


ANTIOCHUS  IN  BACTRIA.       See  lO,  48,  49 

34.  Euthydemus  was  himself  a  Magnesian,  and  he  an- 
swered the  envoy  by  saying  that  "Antiochus 
was  acting  unjustly  in  trying  to  expel  him  from  Euih¥danus''[a 
his  kingdom.  He  was  not  himself  a  revolted  Magnesian),  king 
subject,  but  had  destroyed  the  descendant  of  of  Bacina,  to 
some  who  had  been  such,  and  so  had  obtained  of^i'o^tw™'' 
the  kingdom  of  Bactria,"  After  adding  more 
arguments  to  the  same  effect,  he  urged  Teleas  to  act  as  a 
sincere  mediator  of  peace,  by  urging  Antiochus  not  to  grudge 
him  the  royal  title  and  dignity,  "for  if  he  did  not  yield  to 
this  demand,  neither  of  them  would  be  safe  :  seeing  that  great 
hords  of  Nomads  were  close  at  band,  who  were  a  danger  to 
both ;  and  that  if  they  admitted  them  into  the  country,  it 
would  certainly  be  utterly  barbarised,"  With  these  words 
he  sent  Teleas  back  to  Antiochus.  The  king  had  long  been 
looking  about  for  some  means  of  ending  the  controversy;  and 
when  he  was  informed  by  Teleas  of  what  Euthydemus  had 
said,  he  readily  admitted  these  picas  for  a  pacification.  And 
after  several  journeys  of  Teleas  to  and  fro  between  the  two, 
Euthydemus  at  last  sent  his  son  Demetrius  to  confirm  the 

'  Handing  it  over  (o  L.  l^enlulus  and  I..  Manlius  Acidinus,  Livy.  aS.  3B. 


78  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  book  xi 

terms  of  the  treaty.  Antiochus  received  the  young  prince;  and 
judging  from  his  appearance,  conversation,  and  the  dignity  of 
his  manners  that  he  was  worthy  of  royal  power,  he  first  pro- 
mised to  give  him  one  of  his  own  daughters,  and  secondly 
conceded  the  royal  title  to  his  father.  And  having  on  the  other 
points  caused  a  written  treaty  to  be  drawn  up,  and  the  terms 
of  the  treaty  to  be  confirmed  on  oath,  he  marched  away ;  after 
liberally  provisioning  his  troops,  and  accepting  the  elephants 

.    ,  belonging   to  Euthydemus.      He  crossed   the 

tinues  his  march  Caucasus^  and  descended  into  India ;  renewed 
into  the  interior  his  friendship  with  Sophagasenus  the  king  of 

of  Asia.  jj^g  Indians ;  received  more  elephants,  until  he 
had  a  hundred  and  fifty  altogether;  and  having  once  more 
provisioned  his  troops,  set  out  again  personally  with  his  army : 
leaving  Androsthenes  of  Cyzicus  the  duty  of  taking  home  the 
treasure  which  this  king  had  agreed  to  hand  over  to  him. 
Having  traversed  Arachosia  and  crossed  the  river  Enymanthus, 
he  came  through  Drangene  to  Carmania ;  and,  as  it  was  now 
winter,  he  put  his  men  into  winter  quarters  there.  This  was 
the  extreme  limit  of  the  march  of  Antiochus  into  the  interior : 
in  which  he  not    only  reduced    the    up-country  Satraps  to 

obedience  to  his  authority,  but  also  the  coast 
B.C.  212-205  cities,  and  the  princes  on  this  side  Taurus ;  and, 
in  a  word,  consolidated  his  kingdom  by  over- 
awing all  his  subjects  with  the  exhibition  of  his  boldness  and 
energy.  For  this  campaign  convinced  the  Europeans  as  well 
as  the  Asiatics  that  he  was  worthy  of  royal  power.  .  .  . 

^  That  is  the  Caucasus  Indicus  or  Paropamisus  :  mod.  Hindu  Kush. 


CRITICISM  OF  TIMAEUS 

1.  BvzAciA  is  near  the  Syrtes;  it  has  a  circumference  of  two 
thousand  stades,  and  is  circular  in  shape.  .  .  . 

Hippo,  Singa,  Tabraca,  are  cities  in  Libya.  Chalkeia, 
however,  is  not,  as  E>emosthenes  ignorantly  stales,  the  name 
of  a  city,  but  memis  only  a  "  bronze-factory."  .  .  . 

2.  The  lotus  is  not  a  large  tree ;  but  it  is  rough  and  thorny, 
and  has  a  green  leaf,  tike  the  rhamnus  (black  or 
white  thorn),  a  little  longer  and  broader.  The  i^J.'^"'"^  ,^ 
fruit  is  like  white  myrtle-berries  when  they  are 
come  to  perfection;  but,  as  it  grows,  it  becomes  purple  in  colour, 
and  in  size  about  equal  to  round  olives,  and  has  a  very  small 
stone.  When  it  is  ripe  they  gather  it :  and  some  of  it  they 
pound  up  with  groats  of  spelt,  and  store  in  vessels  for  their 
slaves ;  and  the  rest  they  also  preserve  for  the  free  inhabitants, 
after  taking  out  the  stones,  and  use  it  for  food.  It  tastes  like 
a  fig  or  a  date,  but  is  superior  to  them  in  aroma.  A  wine  is 
made  of  it  also  by  steeping  it  in  water  and  crushing  it,  sweet 
and  pleasant  to  the  taste,  like  good  mead ;  and  they  diink  it 
without  mixing  it  with  water.  It  will  not  keep,  however,  more 
than  ten  days,  and  they  therefore  only  make  It  in  small 
quantities  as  they  want  it     Vinegar  also  is  made  out  of  it.  ,  .  . 


S.  I'he  excellence  of  the  soil  of  Libya  must  excite  our 


8o  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS 

admiration.  But  one  would  feel  inclined  to  say  of  Timaeus, 
Misstatements  of  "^t  merely  that  he  had  never  studied  the 
Timaeus  about    country,  but  that  he  was  childish  and  entirely 

Libya,  unintelligent   in   his   notions ;   completely   en- 

slaved to  those  old  traditional  stories  of  Libya  being  wholly 
sandy,  parched,  and  barren.  The  same  too  holds  good  about 
its  animals.  The  supply  of  horses,  oxen,  sheep,  and  goats 
in  it  is  beyond  anything  to  be  found  in  any  other  part  of  the 
world ;  because  many  of  the  tribes  in  Libya  do  not  use  culti- 
vated crops,  but  live  on  and  with  their  flocks  and  herds. 
Again  what  writer  has  failed  to  mention  the  vast  number  and 
strength  of  its  elephants,  lions,  and  panthers,  or  the  beauty  of 
its  buffalos,  or  the  size  of  its  ostriches  ?  Of  these  not  one  is 
to  be  found  in  Eurot)e,  while  Libya  is  full  of  them.  But 
Timaeus,  by  passing  them  over  without  a  word,  gives,  as  though 
purposely,  an  impression  exactly  the  reverse  of  the  truth. 
And  just  in  the  same  random  way  in  which  he  has  spoken 

,  ^  about  Libya,  he  has  also  done  about  the  island 

and  Corsica,  n    j    ^  t-  i  .•      .         .^    . 

called  Cyrnus.  ror,  when  mentioning  it  m 
his  second  book,  he  says  that  wild  goats,  sheep,  wild  oxen, 
stags,  hares,  wolves,  and  some  other  animals  are  plentiful 
in  it ;  and  that  the  inhabitants  employ  themselves  in  hunting 
them,  and  in  fact  spend  most  of  their  time  in  that  pursuit. 
Whereas  in  this  island  there  are  not  only  no  wild  goats  or  wild 
oxen,  but  not  even  hare,  wolf,  or  stag,  or  any  animal  of  the 
sort,  except  some  foxes,  rabbits,  and  wild  sheep.  The  rabbit 
indeed  at  a  distance  looks  like  a  small. hare;  but  when  taken 
in  the  hand,  it  is  found  to  be  widely  different  both  in  appear- 
ance and  in  the  taste  of  its  flesh ;  and  it  also  lives  generally 
underground. 

4.  The  idea,  however,  of  all  the  animals  in  the   island 

being  wild,  has  arisen  in  the   following  way: 
bUmS°^    The   caretakers    cannot    keep   up    with    their 

animals,  owing  to  the  thick  woods  and  rocky 
broken  nature  of  the  country;  but,  whenever  they  wish  to  collect 
them,  they  stand  on  some  convenient  spots  and  call  the  beasts 
together  by  the  sound  of  a  trumpet ;  and  all  of  them  flock 
without  fail  to  their  own  trumpets.  Now,  when  ships  arrive  at 
the  coast,  and  the  sailors  see  goats  or  cattle  grazing  without 


XII  THE  ITALIAN  SWINEHERDS  8i 

any  one  with  them,  and  thereupon  try  to  catch  them,  the 
animals  will  not  let  them  come  near  them,  because  they  are  not 
used  to  them,  but  will  scamper  off.  But  as  soon  as  the  keeper 
sees  the  men  disembarking  and  sounds  his  trumpet,  they  alt 
set  off  running  at  full  speed  and  collect  round  the  trumpet 
This  gives  the  appearance  of  wildness  ;  and  Timaeus,  who 
made  only  careless  and  |>erfunctory  inquiries,  committed  him- 
self to  a  random  statement. 

Now  this  obedience  to  the  sound  of  a  trumpet  is 
nothing  astonishing.  For  in  Italy  the  swine- 
herds manage  the  feeding  of  their  pigs  in  the  ^^jn^ua^^"^ 
same  way.  They  do  not  follow  close  behind 
the  beasts,  as  in  Greece,  but  keep  some  distance  in  front  of 
them,  sounding  their  horn  every  now  and  then ;  and  the  ani- 
mals follow  behind  and  run  together  at  the  sound.  Indeed, 
the  complete  familiarity  which  the  animals  show  with  the 
particular  hom  to  which  they  belong  seems  at  first  astonishing 
and  almost  incredible.  For  owing  to  the  populousness  and 
wealth  of  the  country,  the  droves  of  swine  in  Italy  are  ex- 
ceedingly la^e,  esjiecially  along  the  sea' coast  of  the  Tuscans 
and  Gauls  :  for  one  sow  will  bring  up  a  thousand  pigs,  or  some- 
times even  more.  They  therefore  drive  them  out  from  their 
night  styes  t6  feed,  according  to  their  litters  and  ages.  Whence, 
if  several  droves  are  taken  to  the  same  place,  they  cannot 
preserve  these  distinction  of  litters ;  but  they  of  course  get 
mixed  up  with  each  other,  both  as  they  are  being  driven  out, 
and  as  they  feed,  and  as  they  are  being  brought  home. 
Accordingly  the  device  of  the  hom-btowing  has  been  invented 
to  separate  them,  when  they  have  got  mixed  up  together,  with- 
out labour  or  trouble.  For  as  they  feed,  one  swineherd  goes 
in  one  direction  sounding  his  horn,  and  another  in  another : 
and  thus  the  animals  sort  themselves  of  their  own  accord,  and 
follow  their  own  horns  with  such  eagerness  that  it  is  impossible 
by  any  means  to  stop  or  hinder  them.  But  in  Greece,  when 
the  swine  get  mixed  up  in  the  oak  forests  in  their  search  for 
the  mast,  the  swineherd  who  has  most  assistants  and  the  best 
help  at  his  disposal,  when  collecting  his  own  animals,  drives  off 
bis  neighbour's  also.  Sometimes  too  a  thief  lies  in  wait,  and 
drives  them  ofT  without  the  swineherd  knowing  how  he  lost 


82  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  BOOK 


them  ;  because  the  beasts  straggle  a  long  way  from  their  driven^ 
in  their  eagerness  to  find  acorns,  when  they  are  just  beginning 
to  fall  .  .  . 


4.  (a)  It  is  difficult  to  pardon  such  errors  in  Timaeus, 
False  criticisms  considering  how  Severe  he  is  in  criticising  the 
of  Timaeus  on  sHps  of  Others.  For  instance  he  finds  fault  with 
Thcopompus  and 'j^heopompus  for  Stating  that  Dionysius  sailed 
•p  orus.  {^Q,^  Sicily  to  Corinth  in  a  merchant  vessel, 
whereas  he  really  arrived  in  a  ship  of  war.  And  again  he  falsely 
charges  Ephorus  with  contradicting  himself,  on  the  ground 
that  he  asserts  that  Dionysius  the  Elder  ascended  the  throne 
at  the  age  of  twenty-three,  reigned  forty-two  years,  and  died  at 
sixty-three.  Now  no  one  would  say,  I  think,  that  this  was  a 
blunder  of  the  historian,  but  clearly  one  of  the  transcriber. 
For  either  Ephorus  must  be  more  foolish  than  Coroebus  and 
Margites,  if  he  were  unable  to  calculate  that  forty-two  added 
to  twenty-three  make  sixty-five ;  or,  if  that  is  incredible  in  the 
case  of  a  man  like  Ephorus,  it  must  be  a  mere  mistake  of  the 
transcriber,  and  the  carping  and  malevolent  criticism  of 
Timaeus  must  be  rejected 

(b)  Again,  in  his  history  of  Pyrrhus,  he  says  that  the  Romans 

His  false  account  Still  keep  up  the  memory  of  the  fall  of  Troy  by 

of  the  October   shooting  to  death  with  javelins  a  war-horse  on 

horse.         ^  certain  fixed  day,  because  the  capture  of  Troy 

was  accomplished  by  means  of  the  "  Wooden  Horse."     This 

is  quite  childish.     On  this  principle,  all  non-Hellenic  nations 

must  be  put  down  as  descendants  of  the  Trojans ;  for  nearly 

all   of  them,  or  at   any  rate  the   majority,  when   about   to 

commence  a  war  or  a  serious  battle  with  an  enemy,  first  kill 

and  sacrifice  a  horse.      In  making  this  sort  of  ill-founded 

deduction,  Timaeus  seems  to  me  to  show  not  only  want  of 

knowledge,  but,  what  is  worse,  a  trick  of  misapplying  knowledge. 

For,  because  the  Romans  sacrifice  a  horse,  he  immediately 

concludes  that  they  do  it  because  Troy  was  taken  by  means  of 

a  horse. 

if)  These  instances  clearly  show  how  worthless  his  account 
of  Libya,  Sardinia,  and,  above  all,  of  Italy  is ;  and  that,  speak- 


XII  THE  ERRORS  OF  TIMAEVS  83 

ing  generally,  he  has  entirely  neglected  the  most  important 

element  in  historical  investigation,  namely,  the  _. 

,  .  ,    .  °  „      '        .■        .     1  The  reason  of  his 

making  pereonal  iiflTurmii.  For  as  histoncal  misiaites  a  want 
events  take  place  in  many  different  localities,  and  of  care  in  making 
as  it  is  impossible  for  the  same  man  to  be  in  inquiries. 
several  places  at  the  same  time,  and  also  impossible  for  him 
to  see  with  his  own  eyes  all  places  in  the  world  and  observe 
their  peculiarities,  the  only  resource  left  is  to  ask  questions 
of  as  many  people  as  possible ;  and  to  believe  those  who  are 
worthy  of  credit ;  and  to  show  critical  sagacity  in  judging  of 
their  reports. 

(tf)  And  though  Timaeus  makes  great  professions  on  this 
head,heappearstometo  be veryferfrom  arriving  j^^^  .^  he  10  be 
atthe  truth.  Indeed,  so  far  from  making  accurate  misted  even  in 
investigations  of  the  truth  through  other  people,  maiiers  that  fell 
he  does  not  tell  us  anything  trustworthy  even  of  T''^'^  ^\^  '™'' 
events  of  which  he  has  been  an  eye-witness,  or 
of  places  he  has  personally  visited.  This  will  be  made  evident, 
if  we  can  convict  him  of  being  ignorant,  even  in  his  account 
of  Sicily,  of  the  facts  which  he  brings  forward.  For  it  will 
require  very  little  further  proof  of  his  inaccuracy,  if  he  can  be 
shown  to  be  ill-informed  and  misled  about  the  localities  in 
which  he  was  bom  and  bred,  and  that  too  the  most  famous 
of  them.  Now  he  asserts  that  the  fountain  Arethusa  at 
Syracuse  has  its  source  in  the  Peloponnese,  from  . 

the  river  Alpheus,  which  flows  through  Arcadia 
and  Olympia.  For  that  this  river  sinks  into  the  earth,  and, 
after  being  carried  for  four  thousand  stades  under  the  Sicilian 
Sea,  comes  to  the  surface  again  in  Syracuse ;  and  that  this  was 
proved  from  the  fact  that  on  a  certain  occasion  a  storm  of 
rain  having  come  on  during  the  Olympic  festival,  and  the 
river  having  flooded  the  sacred  enclosure,  a  quantity  of  dung 
from  the  animals  used  for  sacrifice  at  the  festival  was  thrown 
up  by  the  fountain  Arethusa ;  as  well  as  a  certain  gold  cup, 
which  was  pi(!ked  up  and  recognised  as  being  one  of  the 
ornaments  used  at  the  festival.  .  .  . 


6.  I  happened  to  have  visited  the  city  of  the  Ix>crians  or 


84  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  book 

several  occasions,  and  to  have  been  the  means  of  doing  them 
The  traditions  of  important  services.     For  it  was  I  that  secured 

the  colonisation  of  their  exemption  from  the  service  in  Iberia  and 
Locri  Epizcphyrii  Dalmatia,  which,  in  accordance  with  the  treaty, 

a^^ounrSn  Ari^s-  ^^^  ^'^'"^   bound  to  supply  to  the   Romans. 

totie,  rather  than  And  being  released  thereby  from  considerable 
whh  that  of  hardship,  danger,  and  expense,  they  rewarded 
me  with  every  mark  of  honour  and  kind- 
ness. I  have  therefore  reason  to  speak  well  of  the  Locrians 
rather  than  the  reverse.  Still  I  do  not  shrink  from  saying 
and  writing  that  the  account  of  their  colonisation  given  by 
Aristotle  is  truer  than  that  of  Timaeus.  For  I  know  for 
certain  that  the  inhabitants  themselves  acknowledge  that  the 
report  of  Aristotle,  and  not  of  Timaeus,  is  the  one  which  they 
have  received  from  their  ancestors.  And  they  give  the  follow- 
ing proofs  of  this.  In  the  first  place,  they  stated  that  every 
ancestral  distinction  existing  among  them  is  traced  by  the  female 
not  the  male  side.^  For  instance,  those  are  reckoned  noble 
among  them  who  belong  to  "the  hundred  families";  and  these 
**  hundred  families  "  are  those  which  were  marked  out  by  the 
Ix)crians,  before  embarking  upon  their  colonisation,  as  those 
from  which  they  were  in  accordance  with  the  oracle  to  select  the 
virgins  to  be  sent  to  Ilium.  Further,  that  some  of  these  women 
joined  the  colony :  and  that  it  is  their  descendants  who  are 
now  reckoned  noble,  and  called  "the  men  of  the  hundred 
families."  Again,  the  following  account  of  the  "  cup-bearing  " 
priestess  had  been  received  traditionally  by  them.  When  they 
ejected  the  Sicels  who  occupied  this  part  of  Italy,  finding  that 
it  was  a  custom  among  them  for  the  processions  at  their  sacri- 
fices to  be  led  by  a  boy  of  the  most  illustrious  and  high-bom 
family  obtainable,  and  not  having  any  ancestral  custom  of  their 
own  on  the  subject,  they  adopted  this  one,  with  no  other  improve- 
ment than  that  of  substituting  a  girl  for  one  of  their  boys  as  cup- 
bearer, because  nobility  with  them  went  by  the  female  line. 
6.  And  as  to  a  treaty,  none  ever  existed,  or  was  said 

The  trick  of  the  to  have  existed,  between  them  and  the    Lo- 

Locrians.       crians    in    Greece ;    but    they   all    knew    by 

tradition  of  one  with  the  Sicels  :  of  which  they  give  the  follow- 

'  Cp.  a  similar  custom  of  the  Lycians,  Herod,  i,  173. 


X?I  THE  EPIZEPHYRIAN  LOCRIANS  85 

ing  account  When  they  first  appeared,  and  found  the  Sicels 
occupying  the  district  in  which  they  are  themselves  now 
dwelling,  these  natives  were  in  terror  of  them,  and  admitted 
them  through  fear  into  the  country ;  and  the  newcomers  made 
a  sworn  agreement  with  them  that  "  they  would  be  friendly 
and  share  the  country  with  them,  as  long  as  they  stood  upon 
the  ground  they  then  stood  upon,  and  kept  heads  upon  their 
shoulders.''  But,  while  the  oaths  were  being  taken,  they  say 
that  the  Locrians  put  earth  inside  the  soles  of  their  shoes, 
and  heads  of  garlic  concealed  on  their  shoulders,  before  they 
swore ;  and  that  then  they  shook  the  earth  out  of  their  shoes, 
and  threw  the  heads  of  garlic  ofT  their  shoulders,  arid  soon 
afterwards  expelled  the  Sicels  firom  the  country.  This  is  the 
story  current  at  Locri.   .   .   . 

By  an  extraordinary  oversight  Timaeus  of  Tauromenium 
commits  himself  to  the  statement  that  it  was  not  customary 
with  the  Greeks  to  possess  slaves.'  .  .  . 

These  considerations  would  lead  us  to  trust  Aristotle  rather 
than  Timaeus.  His  next  statement  is  still  more  [^o^n  Epiiephyni 
strange.  For  to  suppose,  with  Timaeus,  that  it  colonised  by 
was  unlikely  that  men,  who  had  been  the  slaves  '^^.  b"*^^ 
of  the  allies  of  the  Lacedaemonians,  would  con-  ,|,eir  btxAonx,  and 
tinue  the  kindly  feelings  and  adopt  the  friendships  by  some  free 
of  their  late  masters  is  foolish.  For  when  they  ''"^  women. 
have  had  the  good  fortune  to  recover  their  freedom,  and  a 
certain  time  has  elapsed,  men,  who  have  been  slaves,  not  only 
endeavour  to  adopt  the  friendships  of  their  late  masters,  but 
also  their  ties  of  hospitality  and  blood :  in  fact,  their  aim  is  to 
keep  them  up  even  more  than  the  ties  of  nature,  for  the  express 
purpose  of  thereby  wiping  out  the  remembrance  of  their  former 
degradation  and  humble  position ;  because  they  wish  to  pose  as 
the  descendants  of  their  masters  rather  than  as  their  freednien. 
And  this  is  what  in  all  probability  happened  in  the  case  of  the 
Locrians.  They  had  removed  to  a  great  distance  from  all  who 
knew  their  secret ;  the  lapse  of  time  favoured  their  pretensions  ; 
and  they  were  not  therefore  so  foolish  as  to  maintain  any 
customs  likely  to  revive  the  memory  of  their  own  degradation, 

<  He  mar  have  been  rcrerring  to 


86  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  book 

rather  than  such  as  would  contribute  to  conceal  it  There- 
fore they  very  naturally  called  their  city  by  the  name  of  that 
from  which  the  women  came ;  and  claimed  a  relationship  with 
those  women :  and,  moreover,  renewed  the  friendships  which 
were  ancestral  to  the  families  of  the  women. 

And  this  also  indicates  that  there  is  no  sign  of  Aristotle 

Th  Loc  •        being  wrong    in    saying   that    the    Athenians 

then  w^erenaSy  ravaged   their   territory.      For  it  being   quite 

friends  of  Sparta  natural,  as  I  have  shown,  that  the  men  who 

"^^^T^^T  °^  s^^^^^  ^^^"^  ^^"  ^^^  landed  in  Italy,  if  they 

were  slaves  ten  times  over,  should  adopt  friendly 
relations  with  Sparta,  it  becomes  also  natural  that  the 
Athenians  should  be  rendered  hostile  to  them,  not  so  much 
from  regard  to  their  origin  as  to  their  policy. 

It  is  not,  again,  likely  that  the  Lacedaemonians  should  them- 
selves send   their  young  men  home  from  the 
I'omenTllSrcamp  for  the  sake  of  begetting  children,  and 
(in  Greece)      should  refuse  to  allow  the  Locrians  to  do  the 
leaving  their     same.     Two  things  in  such  a  statement  are  not 
^''^'"^Jj^l'  "^"^  only  improbable  but  untrue.     In  the  first  place, 

they  w^ere  not  likely  to  have  prevented  the 
Locrians  doing  so,  when  they  did  the  same  themselves,  for 
that  would  be  wholly  inconsistent :  nor  were  the  Locrians,  in 
obedience  to  orders  from  them,  likely  to  have  adopted  a 
custom  like  theirs.  (For  in  Sparta  it  is  a  traditional  law,  and  a 
matter  of  common  custom,  for  three  or  four  men  to  have  one 
wife,  and  even  more  if  they  are  brothers ;  and  when  a  man 
has  begotten  enough  children,  it  is  quite  proper  and  usual  for 
him  to  sell  his  wife  to  one  of  his  friends.)  The  fact  is,  that 
though  the  Locrians,  not  being  bound  by  the  same  oath  as 
the  Lacedaemonians,  that  they  would  not  return  home  till  they 
had  taken  Messene,  had  a  fair  pretext  for  not  taking  part  in 
the  common  expedition ;  yet,  by  returning  home  only  one  by 
one,  and  at  rare  intervals,  they  gave  their  wives  an  opportunity 
of  becoming  familiar  with  the  slaves  instead  of  their  original 
husbands,  and  still  more  so  the  unmarried  women.  And  this 
was  the  reason  of  the  migration.  .  .  . 

7.  Timaeus  makes  many  untrue  statements ;  and  he  appears 


Jttl  riMAEUS  CRITICISES  AKISTOTLE  87 

to  have  done  so,  not  from  ignorance,  but  because  his  view  was 
distorted  bypanyspirit  When  once  he  has  made 
up  his  mind  to  blame  or  praise,  he  forgets  every-      'Xrisioiie'' 
thing  else  and  outsteps  all  bounds  of  propriety. 
So  much  for  the  nature  of  Aristotle's  account  of  Locri,  and  the 
grounds  on  which  it  rested.     But  this  naturally  leads  me  to 
speak  of  Timaeus  and  his  work  as  a  whole,  and  generally  of 
what  is  the  duty  of  a  man  who  undertakes  to  write  history. 
Now  I  think  that  I  have  made  it  clear  from  what  I  have  said, 
first,    that    both    of  them    were    writing    conjecturally ;    and, 
secondly,  that  the  balance  of  probability  was  on  the  side  of 
Aristotle.     It  is  in  fact  impossible  in   such  matters  to  be 
positive  and  definite.    But  let  us  even  admit  that  Timaeus  gives 
the  more  probable  account     Are  the  maintainers  of  the  less 
probable  theory,  therefore,  to  be  called  by  every  possible  term 
of  abuse  and  obloquy,  and  all  but  be  put  on  trial  for  their  lives  ? 
Certainly  not.     Those  who  make  untrue  statements  in  their  ^ 
books  from  ignorance  ought,  I  maintain,  to  be  forgiven  and  1 
corrected  in  a  kindly  spirit :  it  is  only  those  who  do  so  from  I 
deliberate  intention  that  ought  to  be  attacked  without  mercy. 

8.  It  must  then  either  be  shown  that  Aristotle's  account 
of  Locri  was  prompted  by  partiality,  corruption,  or  personal 
enmity  ;  or,  if  no  one  ventures  to  say  that,  then  it  must  be 
acknowledged  that  those  who  dispkiy  such  personal  animosity 
and  bitterness  to  others,  as  Timaeus  does  to  Aristotle,  are  wrong 
and  ill  advised. 

The  epithets  which  he  applies  to  him  are  "audacious," 
"unprincipled,"  "rash"j  and  besides,  he  says 
that  he  "has  audaciously  slandered  Locri  by '"'^■^j^^"" 
affirming  that  the  colony  was  formed  by  runaway 
slaves,  adulterers,  and  man-catchers."     Further,  he  asserts  that 
Aristotle  made  this  statement,  "  in  order  that  men  might  believe 
him  to  have  been  one  of  Alexander's  generals,  and  to  have  lately 
conquered  the  Persians  at  the  Cilician  Gates  in 
a  pitched  battle  by  his  own  ability ;  and  not  to 
be  a  mere  pedantic  sophist,  universally  unpopular,  who  had  a 
short  time  before  shut  up  that  admirable  doctor's  shop."    Again, 
he  says  that  he  "  pushed  his  way  into  every  palace  and  tent : " 
and  that  he  was  "  a  glutton  and  a  gourmand,  who  thought 


88  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  BOOK 

only  of  gratifying  his  appetite."  Now  it  seems  to  me  that  such 
language  as  this  would  be  intolerable  in  an  impudent  vagabond 
bandying  abuse  in  a  law  court ;  but  an  impartial  recorder  of 
public  affairs,  and  a  genuine  historian,  would  not  think  such 
things  to  himself,  much  less  venture  to  put  them  in  writing. 

9.  Let  us  now,  then,  examine  the  method  of  Timaeus,  and 
^.         ,       compare  his  account  of  this  colony,  that  we  may 

account  of  his    learn  which  of  the  two  better  deserves  such 

investigations  in  vituperation.     He  says  in  the  same  book  :  "  I 

the  history  of  the  ^j^  j^^j  ^^^  proceeding  on  conjecture,  but  have 

colony  of  Locn.   .  .  ,    ,  ,    •      i  r  i 

mvestigated  the  truth  m  the  course  of  a  personal 
visit  to  the  Locrians  in  Greece.  The  Locrians  first  of  all  showed 
me  a  written  treaty  which  began  with  the  words,  *  as  parents 
to  children.'  There  are  also  existing  decrees  securing  mutual 
rights  of  citizenship  to  both.  In  fine,  when  they  were  told  of 
Aristotle's  account  of  the  colony,  they  were  astonished  at  the 
audacity  of  that  writer.  I  then  crossed  to  the  Italian  Locri 
and  found  that  the  laws  and  customs  there  accorded  with  the 
theory  of  a  colony  of  free  men,  not  with  the  licentiousness  of 
slaves.  For  among  them  there  are  penalties  assigned  to  man- 
catchers,  adulterers,  and  run-away  slaves.  And  this  would  not 
have  been  the  case  if  they  were  conscious  of  having  been  such 
themselves." 

10,  Now  the  first  point  one  would  be  inclined  to  raise  is,  as 
Criticism  of  the  ^^  ^'^^^  Locrians  he  visited  and  questioned  on 
above  statement  these  subjects.     If  it  had  been  the  case  that  the 

of  Timaeus.  Locrians  in  Greece  all  lived  in  one  city,  as 
those  in  Italy  do,  this  question  would  perhaps  have  been 
unnecessary,  and  everything  would  have  been  plain.  But  as 
there  are  two  clans  of  Locrians,  we  may  ask,  Which  of  the  two 
did  he  visit  ?  What  cities  of  the  one  or  the  other  ?  In  whose 
hands  did  he  find  the  treaty?  Yet  we  all  know,  I  suppose, 
that  this  is  a  speciality  of  Timaeus's,  and  that  it  is  in  this  that 
he  has  surpassed  all  other  historians,  and  rests  his  chief  claim 
to  credit, — I  mean  his  parade  of  accuracy  in  studying  chronology 
and  ancient  monuments,  and  his  care  in  that  department  of 
research.  Therefore  we  may  well  wonder  how  he  came  to 
omit  telling  us  the  name  of  the  city  in  which  he  found  the 
treaty,  the  place  in  which  it  w*as  inscribed,  or  the  magistrates 


XII  THE  INVESTIGATIONS  OF  TIMAEUS  89 

who  showed  him  the  inscription,  and  with  whom  he  conversed  : 
to  pre\-ent  all  cavil,  and,  by  defining  the  place  and  city,  to 
enable  those  who  doubted  to  ascertain  the  truth.  By  omitting 
these  details  he  shows  that  he  was  conscious  of  having  told  a 
deliberate  falsehood.  For  that  7'imaeus,  if  he  really  had 
obtained  such  proofs,  would  not  have  let  them  slip,  but  would 
have  fastened  upon  them  with  both  hands,  as  (he  saying  is,  is 
proved  by  the  following  considerations.  ^Vould  a  writer  who 
tried  to  establish  his  credit  on  that  of  Echecrates, — he  mention- 
ing him  by  name  as  the  person  with  whom  he  had  conversed, 
and  from  whom  he  had  obtained  his  facts  about  the  Italian 
Locri,^ — -tailing  the  trouble  to  add,  by  way  of  showing  that  he 
had  been  told  them  by  no  ordinary  person,  that  this  man's 
father  had  formerly  been  entrusted  with  an  embassy  by 
Dionysius, — would  such  a  writer  have  remained  silent  about  it 
if  he  had  really  got  hold  of  a  public  record  or  an  ancient 
ublet  ? 

11.  This  is  the  man  forsooth  who  drew  out  a  comparative 
list  of  the  Ephors  and  the  kings  of  Sparta  from  _ 
the  earliest  times ;  as  well  as  one  comparing  the  oi™pk  iwisilra 
Archons  at  Athens  and  priestesses  in  Argos  with 
the  list  of  Olympic  victors,  and  thereby  convicted  those  cities 
of  being  in  error  about  those  records,  because  there  was  a 
discrepancy  of  three  months  between  them  !  This  again  is 
the  man  who  discovered  the  engraved  tablets  in  the  inner 
shrines,  and  the  records  of  the  guest-friendships  on  the  door- 
posts of  the  temples.  And  we  cannot  believe  that  such  a  man 
could  have  been  ignorant  of  anything  of  this  sort  that  existed, 
or  would  have  omitted  to  mention  it  if  he  had  found  it  Nor 
can  he  on  any  ground  expect  pardon,  if  he  has  told  an  untruth 
about  it :  for,  as  he  has  shown  himself  a  bitter  and  uncompro- 
misii^  critic  of  others,  he  must  naturally  look  for  equally 
uncompromising  attacks  from  them. 

Being  then  clearly  convicted  of  falsehood  in  these  points,  he 
goes  to  the  Italian  Locri  :  and,  first  of  all,  says  that  the  two 
Locrian  peoples  had  a  similar  constitution  and  the  same 
ties  of  amity,  and  that  Aristotle  and  I'heophrastus  have 
maligned  the  city.  Now  I  am  fully  aware  that  in  going  into 
minute  particulars  and  proofs  on  this  point  I  shall  be  forced 


90  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLY B I  US  book 

to  digress  from  the  course  of  my  history.  It  was  for  that  reason 
however  that  I  postponed  my  criticism  of  Timaeus  to  a 
single  section  of  my  work,  that  I  might  not  be  forced  again 
and  again  to  omit  other  necessary  matter.  .  .  . 

12.  Timaeus  says  that  the  greatest  fault  in  history  is  want 

Timaeus  con-    ^f  truth  ;  and  he  accordingly  advises  all,  whom 

demned  out  of  he  may  have  convicted  of  making  false  state- 

his  own  mouth,  p^gnts   in    their  writings,   to  find  some  other 

name  for  their  books,  and  to  call  them  anything  they  like 

except  history.  .  .  . 

For  example,  in  the  case  of  a  carpenter's  rule,  though  it 
may  be  too  short  or  too  narrow  for  your  purpose,  yet  if  it  have 
the  essential  feature  of  a  rule,  that  of  straightness,  you  may 
still  call  it  a  rule ;  but  if  it  has  not  this  quality,  and  deviates 
from  the  straight  line,  you  may  call  it  anything  you  like  except 
a  rule.  "  On  the  same  principle,"  says  he,  **  historical  writings 
may  fail  in  style  or  treatment  or  other  details;  yet  if  they  hold 
fast  to  truth,  such  books  may  claim  the  title  of  history,  but  if 
they  swerve  from  that,  they  ought  no  longer  to  be  called 
history."  Well,  I  quite  agree  that  in  such  writings  truth 
should  be  the  first  consideration :  and,  in  fact,  somewhere 
in  the  course  of  my  work  I  have  said  "  that  as  in  a  living 
body,  when  the  eyes  are  out,  the  whole  is  rendered  useless,  so 

e,  if  you  take  truth  from  history  what  is  left  is 

but  an  idle  tale."  I  said  again,  however, 
that  "there  were  two  sorts  of  falsehoods,  the  ignorant  and 
the  intentional ;  and  the  former  deserved  indulgence,  the 
latter  uncompromising  severity."  .  .  .  These  points  being 
agreed  upon — the  wide  difference  between  the  ignorant  and 
intentional  lie,  and  the  kindly  correction  due  to  the  one  and 
the  unbending  denunciation  to  the  other — it  will  be  found 
that  it  is  to  the  latter  charge  that  Timaeus  more  than  any  one 
lays  himself  open.  And  the  proof  of  his  character  in  this 
respect  is  clear.  .  .  . 

There  is  a  proverbial  expression  for  the  breakers  of  an  agree- 


Xil  TIMAEUS  ON  DIVINATION  91 

ment,  "  Locrians  and  a  treaty."     An  explanation  given  ot  this, 
equally  accepted  by  historians  and  the  test  of    xh^  pmverb 
the  world,  is  that,  at  the  time  of  the  invasion  of      AMpol  r^ 
the  Heracleidae,  the  Locrians  agreed  with  the       owff^iai. 
Peloponnesians  that,  if  the  Heracleidae  did  not  enter  by  way  of 
the  isthmus,  but  crossed  at  Rhium,  they  would  raise  a  war 
beacon,  that  they  might   have  early   intelligence  and  make 
provisions  to  oppose  their  entrance.     The  Locrians,  however, 
did  not  do  this,  but,  on  the  contrary,  raised  a  beacon  of  peace ; 
and  therefore,  when  the  Heracleidae  arrived  opposite  Rhium, 
tiiey  crossed  without  resistance ;   while  the  Peloponnesians, 
having  taken   no  precautions,  found  that  they  had  allowed 
their  enemies  to  enter  their  country,  because  they  had  been 
betrayed  by  the  Locrians.  .  .  . 

Many  remarks  depreciatory  of  divination  and  dream  inter- 
pretation may  be  found  in  his  writings.'     But      Timaeus's 
writers  who  have  introduced  into  their  books  a  aitimde  towaFds 
good  deal  of  such  foolish  talk,  so  far  from  running       '.''?  "!  "^ 
down  others,  should  think  themselves  fortunate 
if  they  escape  attack  themselves.     And  this  is  just  the  position 
in  which  Timaeus  stands.      He  remarks  that     „  „.  , 
"  Callisthenes  was  a  mere  sycophant  for  writmg 
stuff  of  this  sort ;  and  acted  in  a  manner  utterly  unworthy  of 
his  philosophy  in  giving  heed  to  ravens  and  inspired  women ; 
and  that  he  richly  deserved  the  punishment  which  he  met  with 
at  the  hands  of  Alexander,  for  having  corrupted  the  mind  of 
that  monarch  as  far  as  he  could."     On  the  other  hand,  he 
commends  Demosthenes,  and  the  other  orators  who  flourished 
at  that  time,  and  says  that  "  they  were  worthy  of  Greece  for 
speaking  against  the  divine  honours  given  to  Alexander  ;  while 
this  philosopher,  for  investing  a  mere  mortal  with  the  aegis  and 
thunderbolt,  justly  met  the  fate  which  befel  him  from  the  hands 
ofprovidenca  ..." 

IS.  Timaeus    asserts    that     Demochares    was    guilty    of 
unnatural  lust,  and  that  his  lips  therefore  were 
unfit  to  blow  the  sacred  fire ;  and  that  in  morals 
'  The  leil  is  veiy  imperfect  here. 


92  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  took 

he  went  beyond  any  stones  told  by  Botrys  and  Philaenis 
and  all  other  writers  of  indecent  tales.  Foul  abuse  and 
shameless  accusations  of  this  sort  are  not  only  what  no  man  of 
cultivation  would  have  uttered,  they  go  beyond  what  you 
might  expect  from  the  lowest  brothels.  It  is,  however,  to  get 
credit  for  the  foul  and  shameless  accusations,  which  he  is 
always  bringing,  that  he  has  maligned  this  man  :  supporting  his 
charge  by  dragging  in  an  obscure  comic  poet.  Now  on  what 
grounds  do  I  conjecture  the  falsity  of  the  accusation  ?  Well, 
first,  from  the  fact  of  the  good  birth  and  education  of 
Demochares ;  for  he  was  a  nephew  of  Demosthenes.  And  in 
the  second  place,  from  the  fact  that  he  was  thought  worthy  at 
Athens,  not  only  of  being  a  general,  but  of  the  other  offices 
also ;  which  he  certainly  would  not  have  obtained,  if  he  had 
got  into  such  troubles  as  these.  Therefore  it  seems  to  me 
that  Timaeus  is  accusing  the  people  of  Athens  more  than 
Demochares,  if  it  is  the  fact  that  they  committed  the  interests 
of  the  country  and  their  own  lives  to  such  a  man.  For  if  it 
had  been  true,  the  comic  poet  Archedicus  would  not  have 
been  the  only  one  to  have  made  this  statement  concerning 
Demochares,  as  Timaeus  alleges  :  it  would  have  been  repeated 
by  many  of  the  partisans  of  Antipater,  against  whom  he  has 
spoken  with  great  freedom,  and  said  many  things  calculated  to 
annoy,  not  only  Antipater  himself,  but  also  his  successors  and 
friends.  It  would  have  been  repeated  also  by  many  of  his  poli- 
tical opponents  :  and  among  them,  by  Demetrius  of  Phalenun, 
against  whom  Demochares  has  inveighed  with  extraordinary 
bitterness  in  his  History,  alleging  that  "his  conduct  as  a 
prince,  and  the  political  measures  on  which  he  prided  himself, 
were  such  as  a  petty  tax-gatherer  might  be  proud  of;  for  he 
boasted  that  in  his  city  things  were  abundant  and  cheap,  and 
every  one  had  plenty  to  live  upon."  And  he  tells  another 
story  of  Demetrius,  that  "He  was  not  ashamed  to  have  a 
procession  in  the  theatre  led  by  an  artificial  snail,  worked  by 
some  internal  contrivance,  and  emitting  slime  as  it  crawled, 
and  behind  it  a  string  of  asses ;  meaning  by  this  to  indicate 
the  slowness  and  stupidity  of  the  Athenians,  who  had  yielded 
to  others  the  honour  of  defending  Greece,  and  were  tamely 
submissive   to   Cassander."     Still,   in  spite   of  these  taunts, 


XII      TIMAEUS  ON  DEMOCHARES  AND  AGATHOCLES      93 

neither  Demetrius  nor  any  one  else  has  ever  brought  such  a 
charge  agsunst  Demochares. 

14.  Relying  therefore  on  the  testimony  of  his  own  country- 
men, as  safer  ground  than  the  virulence  o(  Timaeus,  I  feel  no 
hesitation  in  declaring  that  the  life  of  Demochares  is  not 
chargeable  with  such  enormities.  But  even  supposing  that 
Demochares  had  ever  so  disgraced  himself,  what  need  was 
there  for  Timaeus  to  insert  this  passage  in  his  History  ?  Men 
of  sense,  when  resolved  to  retaliate  upon  a  personal  enemy, 
think  first,  not  of  what  he  deserves,  but  of  what  it  is  becoming 
in  them  to  do.  So  in  the  case  of  abusive  language :  the  first 
consideration  should  be,  not  what  our  enemies  deserve  to  be 
called,  but  what  our  self  respect  will  allow  us  to  call  them. 
But  if  men  measure  everything  by  their  own  ill  temper  and 
jealousy,  we  are  forced  to  be  always  suspicious  of  them,  and 
lo  be  ever  on  our  guard  against  their  exaggeration.  Where- 
fore, in  the  present  instance,  we  may  fairly  reject  the  stories  to 
the  discredit  of  Philochares  told  by  Timaeus  ;  for  he  has  put 
himself  out  of  the  pale  of  indulgence  or  belief,  by  so  obviously 
allowing  his  native  virulence  to  carry  him  beyond  all  bounds 
of  propriety  in  his  invectives. 

Ifi.  For  my  part  I  cannot  feel  satisfied  with  his  abuse  of 
Agathocles  either,  even  admitting  him  to  have 
been  the  worst  of  men.  I  refer  to  the  passage  d 
at  the  end  of  his  History  in  which  he  asserts  the  aEpersiom  oT 
that  in  his  youth  Agathocles  was  "a  common  I'maeus. 
stale,  extravagantly  addicted  to  every  unnatural  vice,"  and 
that  "  when  he  died,  his  wife  in  the  course  of  her  lamentations 
exclaimed  'Ah,  what  have  I  not  done  for  you  1  what  have  you 
not  done  to  me?'"  To  such  language  one  can  only  repeat 
what  has  been  already  said  in  the  case  of  Demochares,  and 
express  one's  astonishment  at  such  extravagant  virulence. 
For  that  Agathocles  must  have  had  fine  natural  qualities  is 
evident  from  the  narrative  of  Timaeus  itself.  That  a  man  who 
came  as  a  runaway  slave  to  Syracuse,  from  the  potter's  wheel 
and  smolte  and  clay,  at  the  early  age  of  eighteen,  should  have 
within  a  short  time  advanced  from  that  humble  beginning  to 
be  master  of  all  Sicily,  and  after  being  a  terror  to  the  Cartha- 
ginians, should  have  grown  old  in  office  and  died  in  enjoyment  o' 


Agalhoclra 


94  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  BOOK 

the  royal  title, — does  not  this  prove  that  Agathocles  had  some 
great  and  admirable  qualities,  and  many  endowments  and  talents 
for  administration  ?  In  view  of  these  the  historian  ought  not 
to  have  recounted  to  posterity  only  what  served  to  discredit 
and  defame  this  man,  but  those  facts  also  which  were  to  his 
honour.  For.  that  is  the  proper  function  of  history.  Blinded, 
however,  by  personal  malignity,  he  has  recorded  for  us  with 
bitterness  and  exaggeration  all  his  defects ;  while  his  eminent 
achievements  he  has  passed  over  in  entire  silence :  seeming 
not  to  be  aware  that  in  history  such  silence  is  as  mendacious 
as  misstatement  The  part  of  his  history,  therefore,  which  was 
added  by  him  for  the  gratification  of  his  personal  spite  I  have 
passed  over,  but  not  what  was  really  germane  to  his 
subject  .  .  . 

16.  Two  young  men  had  a  dispute  about  the  ownership  of 

The  laws  of     ^  slave.     This  slave  had  been  in  the  possession 

Zaieucus.  and  an  of  one  of  them  for  a  long  time ;  but  two  days 

incident  in  their  before,  as  he  was  going  to  the  farm  without  his 

^^for"wh?ch  he"  Piaster,  the  other  laid  violent  hands  upon  him 

legislated,  see    and  dragged  him  to  his  house.     When  the  first 

Arist.  PoL  2, 12).  young  man  heard  of  this,  he  came  to  the  house, 

seized  the  slave,  and  taking  him  before  the  magistrate  asserted 

his  ownership  and  offered  sureties.     For  the  law  of  Zaieucus 

ordained  that  the  party  from  whom  the  abduction  was  made 

should  have  possession  of  the  property  in  dispute,  pending  the 

decision  of  the  suit     But  the  other  man  in  accordance  with 

the  same  law,  alleged  that  he  was  the  party  from  whom  the 

abduction  had  been  made,  for  the  slave  had  been  brought 

before  the  magistrate  from  his  house.     The  magistrates  who 

were  trying  the  case  were  in  doubt,  and  calling  in  the  Cos- 

mopolis  ^  referred  the  point  to  him.    He  interpreted  the  law  as 

meaning  that  "the  abduction  was  always  from  that  party  in  whose 

possession  the  property  in  dispute  had  last  been  for  a  certain 

period   unquestioned;    but   that   if   another    abducted    this 

property  from  a  holder,  and  then  the  original  holder  repossessed 

himself  of  it  from  the  abductor,  this  was  not  abduction  in  the 

^  For  this  title  see  on  22,  19.     It  is  found  in  inscriptions  in  Thasos,  Crete, 
and  Cibyra.     C  I.  G.  2163,  r  ;  2583  ;  4380,  b* 


^     M 


XII  THE  LAfVS  OF  ZALEUCUS  95 

sense  of  the  law."  The  young  man,  who  thus  lost  his  case, 
was  not  satisfied,  and  alleged  that  such  was  not  the  intention 
of  the  legislator.  Thereupon  the  Cosmopolis  summoned  him 
to  discuss  the  interpretation  in  accordance  with  the  law  of 
Zaleucus ;  that  is,  to  argue  on  the  interpretation  of  the  law 
with  him  before  the  court  of  the  one  thousand,  and  with  a 
halter  round  the  neck  of  each  :  whichever  should  be  shown 
to  be  wrong  in  his  interpretation  was  to  lose  his  life  in  the  sight 
of  the  thousand.  But  the  young  man  asserted  that  the 
compact  was  not  a  fair  one,  for  the  Cosmopolis,  who  happened 
to  be  nearly  ninety,  had  only  two  or  three  years  of  life  left, 
while  in  all  reasonable  probability  he  had  not  yet  lived  half 
his  life.  By  this  adroit  rejoinder  the  young  man  turned  off  the 
affair  as  a  jest :  but  the  magistrates  adjudged  the  question 
of  abduction  in  accordance  n'ith  the  interpretation  of  the 
Cosmopolis.  .  .  . 

A    CRITICISM    ON    EPHORUS   AND    CALUSTHENES 

17.  That  I  may  not  be  thought  to  detract  wantonly  from 
the  credit  of  such  great  writers,  I  will  mention      ^  „.  ^ 
one  battle,  which  is  at  once  one  of  the  most    and  the  baiile 
famous   ever  fought,  and  not   too   remote  in       ofluus, 
point  of  time ;  and  at  which,  above  everything      ^'^  333- 
else,  CaUisthenes  was  himself  present      I  mean  the  battle 
between   Alexander  and  Darius  in    Cilicia.      He  says  that 
"Alexander  had  already  got   through   the   pass   called   the 
Cilician  Gates  :  and  that  Darius,  availing  himself  of  that  by  the 
Amanid  Gates,  made  his  way  with  his  army  into  Cilicia;  but  on 
learning  from  the  natives  that  Alexander  was  on  his  way  into 
Syria,  he  followed  him;  and  having  arrived  at  the  pass  leading 
to   the  south,  pitched  his   camp   on  the  bank  of  the  river 
Pinarus.     The  width  of  the  ground   from  the   foot   of  the 
mountain   to   the  sea   was  not   more  than  fourteen  stades, 
through  which  this  river  ran  diagonally.     On  first  issuing  from 
the  mountains  its  banks  were  broken,  but  in  its  course  through 
the  level  down  to  the  sea  it  ran  between  precipitous  and  steep 
hills."     Starling  with  this  description  of  the  ground,  he  goes 
on  to  say  that  "When  Alexander's  army  faced  about,  and, 


96  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  DOOK 

retracing  its  steps,  was  approaching  to  attack  them,  Darius 
and  his  officers  determined  to  draw  up  their  whole  phalanx  on 
the  ground  occupied  by  his  encampment,  as  it  then  was,  and  to 
defend  his  front  by  the  river,  which  flowed  right  along  his 
camp."  But  he  afterwards  says  that  Darius  "stationed  his 
cavalry  close  to  the  sea,  his  mercenaries  next  along  the  river, 
and  his  peltasts  next  resting  on  the  mountains." 

18.  Now  it  is  difficult  to  understand  how  he  could  have 
drawn  up  these  troops  in  front  of  his  phalanx,  considering  that 
the  river  ran  immediately  under  the  camp :  ^  especially  as  their 
numbers  were  so  great,  amounting,  on  Callisthenes's  own 
showing,  to  thirty  thousand  cavalry  and  thuty  thousand 
mercenaries.  Now  it  is  easy  to  calculate  how  much  ground 
such  a  force  would  require.  At  the  most  cavalry  in  a  regular 
engagement  is  drawn  up  eight  deep,  and  between  each 
squadron  a  clear  space  must  be  left  in  the  line  to  enable 
them  to  turn  or  face  about  Therefore  eight  hundred  will 
cover  a  stade  of  front;  eight  thousand,  ten  stades;*  three 
thousand  two  hundred,  four  stades ;  and  so  eleven  thousand 
two  hundred  would  cover  the  whole  of  fourteen  stades.  If 
therefore  he  were  to  put  his  whole  thirty  thousand  on  the 
ground,  he  would  have  to  mass  his  cavalry  alone  nearly  three 
times  the  usual  depth  ;  and  then  what  room  is  left  for  his 
large  force  of  mercenaries?  None,  indeed,  unless  on  the 
rear  of  the  cavalry.  But  Callisthenes  says  this  was  not  the 
case,  but  that  these  latter  engaged  the  Macedonians  first. 
We  must  therefore  understand  half  the  front,  that  nearest 
the  sea,  to  have  been  occupied  by  the  cavalry;  the  other 
half,  that  nearest  the  mountains,  by  the  mercenaries.  We 
may  by  these  data  easily  calculate  the  depth  of  the  cavalry, 
and  the  distance  the  river  must  have  been  from  the  camp  to 
allow  of  it. 

Again,  he  says  that  "  on  the  approach  of  the  enemy  Darius 
himself,  who  was  on  the  centre,  ordered  up  the  mercenaries 
from  the  wing."  It  is  difficult  to  see  what  he  means  by  this : 
for  the  point  of  junction  of  the  mercenaries  and  the  cavalry 

*  Both  Curtius  and  Arrion  seem  to  have  found  in  their  authorities  that 
Darius  crossed  the  Pinarus.     Curt.  3,  8  ;  Arrian,  2,  8. 
-  Reckoning  the  stade  at  600  feet  (Greek). 


xu  THE  BATTLE  OF  ISSUS  9? 

must  have  been  at  the  centre.  Where  and  how  then,  and  to 
what  point  could  Darius,  who  was  himself  actually  among  the 
mercenaries,  be  said  to  "  order  them  up  "  ? 

Lastly,  he  says  that  "  the  cavalry  on  the  right  wing  charged 
Alexander ;  and  that  his  men  stood  the  charge  gallantly,  and, 
making  a  counter  charge,  kept  up  an  obstinate  fight."  But  he 
quite  forgets  that  there  was  a  river  between  them,  a  river,  too, 
of  the  nature  that  he  had  just  himself  described.^ 

19.  His  account  of  the  movements  of  Alexander  are 
equally  vague.  He  says  that  "he  crossed  into  Asia  with 
forty  thousand  infantry  and  four  thousand  five  hundred 
cavalry ;  but  that  when  he  was  about  lo  enter  Cilicia  he  was 
joined  by  a  reinforcement  of  live  thousand  infantry  and  eight 
hundred  cavalry."  From  these  numbers,  if  one  were  to  make 
the  liberal  allowance  of  three  thousand  absentees  from  the 
infantry  and  three  hundred  from  the  cavalry  on  various 
services,  there  would  still  remain  forty-two  thousand  infantry 
and  five  thousand  cavalry.  Starting  with  these  numbers,  he 
goes  on  to  say  "that  Alexander  heard  of  the  entrance  of 
Darius  into  Cilicia  when  he  was  a  hundred  stades  away  from 
him,  having  already  marched  through  the  pass  :  *  that  he  there- 
fore retraced  his  steps  through  the  pass,  his  phalanx  on 
the  van,  his  cavalry  next,  and  his  baggage  on  the  rear.  But 
that  as  soon  as  he  had  debouched  upon  the  open  country,  he 
gave  general  orders  to  form  up  into  a  phalanx,  at  first  thirty-two 
deep ;  then  sixteen ;  and  lastly,  when  they  were  nearing  the 
enemy,  eight  deep."  Now  this  is  a  worse  blunder  than  the 
last.  A  stade,  allowing  for  the  distances  which  must  be 
kept  on  a  march,  and  reckoning  the  depth  at  sixteen,  admits 
of  one  thousand  six  hundred  men,  each  man  covering  six  feet 
It  is  plain,  therefore,  that  ten  stades  will  admit  of  only  sixteen 
thousand  men,  and  twenty  twice  that  number.  Hence,  when 
Alexander  caused  his  men  to  form  sixteen  deep,  he  would 
have  wanted  a  width  of  ground  of  twenty  stades ;  and  even 
then,  the  whole  of  the  cavalry  and  ten  thousand  infantry 
would  have  been  unaccounted  for. 

20.  Again,  he  says  that  Alexander  was  marching  in  line 


98  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  BOOE 

when  he  was  about  forty  stades  from  the  enemy.  A  greater 
blunder  it  is  difficult  to  conceive.  For  where  could  one  find 
a  ground,  and  especially  in  Cilicia,  twenty  stades  broad  by 
forty  deep,  for  a  phalanx  armed  with  sarissae  to  march  in  line  ? 
It  would  not  be  easy  to  count  all  the  impossibilities  in  the 
way  of  such  an  arrangement  and  such  a  movement  One 
that  is  mentioned  by  Callisthenes  himself  is  sufficient  to 
establish  the  point  For  he  remarks  that  the  winter  torrents 
which  descend  from  the  hills  make  so  many  gullies  in  the 
plain,  that,  in  the  course  of  the  flight,  the  chief  part  of  the 
Persians  are  said  to  have  lost  their  lives  in  deep  places  of 
that  kind.  But,  it  may  be  urged,  Alexander  wished  to  be  ready 
for  battle  as  soon  as  the  enemy  were  in  sight  But  what  could 
be  less  ready  than  a  phalanx  in  a  disordered  and  straggling 
line?  Is  it  not  much  easier  to  form  up  a  phalanx  from  a 
proper  column  of  route,  than  to  bring  a  disordered  and 
straggling  line  back  into  the  same  alignment,  and  get  it  into 
order  of  battle  on  a  broken  and  woody  ground?  It  was, 
therefore  much  better  to  march  twice  or  four  times  the 
ordinary  depth  of  a  phalanx  ^  in  good  order,  for  which  sufficient 
ground  could  possibly  be  found.  And  it  was  easy  to  deploy  his 
men  quickly  into  the  line  of  the  phalanx,  because  he  was  able 
by  means  of  scouts  to  ascertain  the  presence  of  the  enemy 
in  plenty  of  time.  But  in  this  case,  beside  other  absurdities, 
while  bringing  his  men  in  line  across  the  level,  he  did  not 
even  (we  are  told)  put  the  cavalry  in  front,  but  marched  with 
them  in  the  same  alignment 

21.  But  the  greatest  blunder  is  still  to  come.  "As  soon 
as  Alexander,*'  he  says,  "  was  within  distance  of  the  enemy 
he  caused  his  men  to  take  up  order  eight  deep,"  which  would 
have  necessitated  ground  forty  stades  wide  for  the  length  of 
the  line  ;  and  even  had  they,  to  use  the  poet's  expression, 
"  laid  shield  to  shield  and  on  each  other  leaned,"  still  ground 
twenty  stades  wide  would  have  been  wanted,  while  he  himself 
says  that  it  was  less  than  fourteen.  [We  have  also  to  deduct 
from  these  fourteen  stades  the  space  occupied  by  the  two 
divisions  of  the  cavalry,  one  on  the  left  next  the  sea,  the  other 
on  the  right] ;  ^  and  to  allow  for  the  fact  that  the  whole  force 

^  That  is,  sixteen  or  thirty -two  deep.     *  The  text  here  is  in  hopeless  confusion. 


^    i 


XII  MISSTATEMENTS   OF   CALLISTHENES  99 

was  kept  a  considerable  distance  from  the  hills,  to  avoid  being 
exposed  to  the  enemy  occupying  the  skirts  of  the  mountains ; 
for  ve  know  that  Callisthencs  represents  the  wing  to  have 
been  facing  these,  at  an  angle  with  the  centre.  We  are  also 
leaving  out  of  account  the  ten  thousand  foot,  whom  we  showed 
to  be  too  many  according  to  his  own  calculation. 

The  upshot  is  that  eleven  stades  at  most  is  left  for  the  whole 
length  of  the  phalanx,  even  taking  Calljsthenes's  own  account, 
in  which  thirty-two  thousand  men  standing  shield  to  shield  must 
necessarily  be  drawn  up  thirty  deep  ;  while  he  asserts  that  they 
fought  eight  deep.  Such  blunders  admit  of  no  defence :  for 
the  facts  at  once  demonstrate  the  impossibility  of  the  assertion. 
We  have  only  to  compare  the  space  occupied  by  each  man, 
the  width  of  the  whole  ground,  and  the  number  of  the  men, 
lo  prove  its  falsity. 

22.  It  would  be  tedious  to  mention  all  his  other  absurdities 
in  connexion  with  this  battle.  I  must  be  content  with  a  vei;  few. 
He  says,  for  instance,  that  "  Alexander  took  care  in  arranging 
his  order  of  battle  to  be  himself  personally  opposed  to  Darius; 
and  that  at  first  Darius  was  equally  anxious  to  be  opposite 
Alexander,  but  afterwards  altered  his  mind"  But  he  does  not 
vouchsafe  to  tell  us  how  these  kings  leamt  at  what  part  of  their 
respective  forces  they  were  each  posted,  or  to  what  point  in  his 
own  line  Darius  re-transferred  himself  Again,  how  could  a 
phalanx  mount  to  the  edge  of  the  river  bank,  when  it  was  pre- 
cipitous and  covered  with  brushwood  ?  Such  a  piece  of  bad 
generalship  must  not  be  attributed  to  Alexander,  because  he  is 
acknowledged  by  all  to  have  been  a  skilful  strategist  and  to 
have  studied  the  subject  from  childhood :  we  must  rather 
attribute  it  to  the  historian's  want  of  ability  to  descern  between 
what  is  or  is  not  practicable  in  such  movements.  So  much 
for  Ephorus  and  Callisthenes.   .   .  . 

2S.  Timaeus  attacks  Ephorus  with  great  severity,  though  he 
is  himself  liable  to  two  grave  charges — bitterness  Timaeuss 
in  attacking  others  for  faults  of  which  he  is  him-  over-esiimate  or 
self  guilty,  and  complete  demoralisation,  shown  Timoieon. 
by  the  opinions  which  he  expresses  in  his  memoirs,  and  which 
he  endeavours  to  implant  in  the  minds  of  his  readers.  If  we 
are  to  lay  it  down  that  Callisthencs  deserved  his  death,  what 


lOO  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  book 

ought  to  happen  to  Timaeus?  Surely  there  is  much  more 
reason  for  Providence  to  be  wroth  with  him  than  with  Callls- 
thenes.  The  latter  wished  to  deify  Alexander ;  but  Timaeus 
exalts  Timoleon  above  the  most  venerable  gods.  The  hero 
of  Callisthenes,  again,  was  a  man  by  universal  consent  of  a 
superhuman  elevation  of  spirit;  while  Timoleon,  far  from 
.having  accomplished  any  action  of  first-rate  importance,  never 
even  undertook  one.  The  one  expedition  which  he  achieved 
in  the  course  of  his  life  took  him  no  farther  than  from  Corinth 
to  Syracuse;  and  how  paltry  is  such  a  distance  when  compared 
with  the  extent  of  the  world!  I  presume  that  Timaeus 
believed  that  if  Timoleon,  by  gaining  glory  in  such  a  mere 
saucer  of  a  place  as  Sicily,  should  be  thought  comparable  to 
the  most  illustrious  heroes,  he  too  himself,  as  the  historian  of 
only  Italy  and  Sicily,  might  properly  be  considered  on  a  par 
i  with  the  writers  of  universal  histor)'.  This  will  be  sufficient 
'  defence  of  Aristotle,  Theophrastus,  Callisthenes,  Ephorus,  and 
Demochares  against  the  attacks  of  Timaeus  :  and  it  is  addressed 
to  those  who  believe  that  this  historian  is  impartial  and 
truthful.  .  .  . 

24.  We  may  fairly  judge  Timaeus  on  the  principles  which 
Tlie  incapacity   ^^  ^^  himself  laid  down.     According  to  him, 
of  Timaeus     "  pocts  and  historLms  betray  their  own  tastes  by 
for  forming  a    ^^  incidents  which  they  repeatedly  record  in 
ju  gmtn  .      ^j^^.^  writings.     Thus  the  poet  ^  by  his  fondness 
for  banqueting  scenes  shows  that  he  is  a  glutton ;  and  in  the 
same  way  Aristotle,  by  frequently  describing  rich  food  in  his 
writings,  betrays  his  love  of  dainty  living  and  his  greediness." 
On  the  same  principle  he  judges  Dionysius  the  tyrant  because 
he  "  was  always  very  particular  in  the  ornamentation  of  his 
dining-couches,  and   had  hangings  of  exquisite   make    and 
variegated  colours."     If  we  apply  this  principle  to  Timaeus, 
we  shall  have  abundant  reason  to  think  badly  of  him.     In 
attacking  others  he  shows  great  acuteness  and  boldness ;  when 
he  comes   to   independent   narrative  he  is   full   of  dreams, 
miracles,  incredible  myths, — in  a  word,  of  miserable  supersti- 
tion and  old  wives'  tales.    The  truth  is  that  Timaeus  is  a  proof 

^  Homer,  who  is  generally  spoken  of  as  "  the  poet. "     We  may  remember 
Horace  (Ep,  i,  19,  6)  Laudibus  arguitur  vini  vinosus  Homervs. 


TU  TIMOLEON.       PflALARIS  loi 

of  the  fact,  that  at  times,  and  in  the  case  of  many  men,  want 
of  skill  and  want  of  judgment  so  completely  destroy  the  value 
of  their  evidence,  that  though  present  at  and  eye-witnesses  of 
the  facts  which  they  record,  they  might  just  as  well  have 
been  absent  or  had  no  eyes.  .  .  . 

26.  The  story  of  the  brazen  bull  is  this.  It  was  made  by 
Phalaris  at  ARrigentum ;  and  he  used  to  force  „ 

.  .  °    "  J   ' .  ,  ,  -  ,       Tbe  braien  bull 

men  to  get  into  it,  and  then  by  way  of  punish-  ^^  phaiaris. 
ment  light  a  fire  underneath.  The  metal  becom- 
ing thus  red  hot,  the  man  inside  was  roasted  and  scorched  to 
death ;  and  when  he  screamed  in  his  agony,  the  sound  from 
the  machine  was  very  like  the  bellowing  of  a  bull  When  the 
Carthaginians  conquered  Sicily  this  bull  was  removed  from 
Agrigentum  to  Carthage.  The  trap  door  between  the  shoulders, 
through  which  the  victims  used  to  be  let  down,  still  remains ; 
and  no  other  reason  for  the  construction  of  such  a  bull  in  Car- 
thage can  be  discovered  at  all ;  yet  Timaeus  has  undertaken  to 
upset  the  common  story,  and  to  refute  the  declarations  of  poets 
and  historians,  by  alleging  that  the  bull  at  Carthage  did  not  come 
from  Agrigentum,  and  that  no  such  figure  ever  existed  there ; 
and  he  has  composed  a  lengthy  treatise  to  prove  this.  ,   .  . 

GENERAL    REMARKS   ON   TIMAEUS    AS   AN    HISTORIAN 

\Vhat  epithet  ought  one  to  apply  to  Timaeus,  and  what  word 
will  properly  characterise  him?  A  man  of  his  kind  appears  to  me 
to  deserve  the  very  bitterest  of  the  terms  which  he  has  applied 
to  others.  It  has  already  been  sufficiently  proved  that  he  is  a 
carping,  false  and  impudent  writer ;  and  from  what  remains  to 
be  said  he  will  be  shown  to  be  un philosophical,  and,  in  short, 
utterly  uninstructed.  For  towards  the  end  of  his  twenty-first 
book,  in  the  course  of  his  "  harangue  of  Timoleon,"  he  remarks 
that  "  the  whole  sublunary  world  being  divided  into  three  parts 
— Asia,  Libya,  and  Europe.  .  .  ."'  One  could  scarcely  be- 
lieve such  a  remark  to  have  come,  I  don't  say  from  Timaeus, 
but  even  from  the  proverbial  Margites.  .  .  . 


I02  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  book 

25.  (a)  The  proverb  tells  us  that  one  drop  from  the  largest 
vessel  is  sufficient  to  show  the  whole  contents.  This  is 
applicable  to  the  present  case.  When  one  or  two  false  state- 
ments have  been  discovered  in  a  history,  and  they  have  been 
shown  to  be  wilful,  it  is  clear  that  nothing  which  such  an 
historian  may  say  can  be  regarded  as  certain  or  trustworthy. 
But  in  order  to  convince  the  more  careful  student,  I  must 
speak  on  his  method  and  practice  in  regard  to  public  speeches, 
military  harangues,  ambassador's  orations,  and  all  compositions 
of  that  class;  which  are,  as  it  were,  a  compendium  of  events  and 
an  epitome  of  all  history.  Now  that  he  has  given  these  in  his 
writings  with  entire  disregard  of  truth,  and  that  of  set  purpose, 
can  any  reader  of  Timaeus  fail  to  be  aware?  He  has  not 
written  down  the  words  actually  used,  nor  the  real  drift  of 
these  speeches ;  but  imagining  how  they  ought  to  have  been 
expressed,  he  enumerates  all  the  arguments  used,  and  makes  the 
words  tally  with  the  circumstances,  like  a  school-boy  declaim- 
ing on  a  set  theme :  as  though  his  object  were  to  display  his  own 
ability,  not  to  give  a  report  of  what  was  in  reality  said.  .  .  . 

(b)  The  special  province  of  history  is,  first,  to  ascertain  what 
the  actual  words  used  were ;  and  secondly,  to  learn  why  it  was 
that  a  particular  policy  or  argument  failed  or  succeeded.  For 
a  bare  statement  of  an  occurrence  is  interesting  indeed,  but  not 
instructive :  but  when  this  is  supplemented  by  a  statement  of 
cause,  the  study  of  history  becomes  fruitful.  For  it  is  by 
applying  analogies  to  our  own  circumstances  that  we  get  the 
means  and  basis  for  calculating  the  future ;  and  for  learning 
from  the  past  when  to  act  with  caution,  and  when  with  greater 
boldness,  in  the  present.  The  historian  therefore  who  omits 
the  words  actually  used,  as  w^ell  as  all  statement  of  the 
determining  circumstances,  and  gives  us  instead  conjectures  and 
mere  fancy  compositions,  destroys  the  special  use  of  history. 
In  this  respect  Timaeus  is  an  eminent  offender,  for  we  all 
know  that  his  books  are  full  of  such  writing. 

(c)  But  perhaps  some  one  may  raise  the  question  as  to  how 
it  comes  about  that,  being  the  sort  of  writer  that  I  am  showing 
him  to  be,  he  has  obtained  acceptance  and  credit  among 
certain  people.  The  reason  is  that  his  work  abounds  with 
hostile  criticism  and  invective  against  others  :  and  he  has  been 


XII  INVECTIVE  ALWAYS  POPULAR  103 

judged,  not  by  the  positive  merits  of  his  own  composition  and 
his  independent  narrative,  but  by  his  skill  in  refuting  his 
fellow  historians ;  to  which  department  he  appears  to  me  to 
have  brought  great  diligence  and  an  extraordinary  natural 
aptitude.  The  case  of  the  physicist  Strato  is  almost  precisely 
similar.  As  long  as  this  man  is  endeavouring  to  descredit 
and  refute  the  opinions  of  others,  he  is  admirable  :  directly  he 
brings  forward  anything  of  his  own,  or  expounds  any  of  his 
own  doctrines,  he  at  once  seems  to  men  of  science  to  lose  his 
£iculties  and  become  stupid  and  unintelligent  And  for  my 
part,  I  look  upon  this  difference  in  writers  as  strictly  analogous 
to  the  facts  of  everyday  life.  In  this  too  it  is  easy  to  criticise 
our  neighbours,  but  to  be  faultless  ourselves  is  hard.  One 
might  almost  say  that  those  who  are  most  ready  at  finding 
fault  with  others  are  most  prone  to  errors  in  their  own  life. 

(1/)  Besides  these  I  may  mention  another  error  of  Timaeus. 
Having  stayed  quietly  at  Athens  for  about  fifty  years,  during 
which  he  devoted  himself  to  the  study  of  written  history,  he 
imagined  that  he  was  in  possession  of  the  most  important 
means  of  writing  it  To  my  mind  this  was  a  great  mistake. 
History  and  the  science  of  medicine  are  alike  in  this  respect, 
that  both  may  be  divided  broadly  into  three  departments ;  and 
therefore  those  who  study  either  must  approach  them  in  three 
ways.  For  instance  the  three  departments  of  medicine  are  the 
rhetorical,  the  dietetic,  and  the  surgical  and  pharmaceutical. 
[The  second  of  these  though  important  is  discredited  by  some.]' 
The  first,  which  takes  its  rise  from  the  school  of  Herophilus 
and  CalUmachus  of  Alexandria,  does  indeed  rightly  claim  a 
certain  position  in  medical  science;  but  by  its  speciousness 
and  liberal  promises  acquires  so  much  reputation  that  those 
who  are  occupied  with  other  branches  of  the  art  are  supposed  to 
be  completely  ignorant.  But  just  bring  one  of  these  jirofessors  to 
an  actual  invalid  :  you  will  find  that  they  are  as  completely 
wanting  in  the  necessary  skill  as  men  who  have  never  read  a 
medical  treatise.  Nay,  it  has  happened  before  now  that  certain 
persons,  who  had  really  nothing  serious  the  matter  with  them, 
have  been  persuaded  by  their  powerful  arguments  to  commit 
themselves  to  their  treatment,  and  have  thereby  endangered 
1  Tbe  text  is  again  hopeless. 


104  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  book 

their  lives :  for  they  are  like  men  trying  to  steer  a  ship  out  of 
a  book.  Still  such  men  go  from  city  to  city  with  great  kclAty 
and  get  the  common  people  together  to  listen  to  them.  But 
if,  when  this  is  done,  they  induce  certain  people  to  submit  as  a 
specimen  to  their  practical  treatment ;  they  only  succeed  in 
reducing  them  to  a  state  of  extreme  discomfort,  and  making 
them  a  laughing  stock  to  the  audience.^  So  completely  does 
a  persuasive  address  frequently  get  the  advantage  over  practical 
experience.  The  third  branch  of  the  medical  science,  though 
it  involves  genuine  skill  in  the  treatment  of  the  several  cases,  is 
not  only  rare  in  itself,  but  is  also  frequently  cast  into  the  shade, 
thanks  to  the  folly  of  popular  judgment,  by  volubility  and 
impudence. 

26.  (e)  In  the  same  way  the  science  of  genuine  history  is 
threefold :  first,  the  dealing  with  written  documents  and  the 
arrangement  of  the  material  thus  obtained  ;  second,  topography, 
the  appearance  of  cities  and  localities,  the  description  of  rivers 
and  harbours,  and,  speaking  generally,  the  peculiar  features  of 
seas  and  countries  and  their  relative  distances ;  thirdly,  political 
affairs.  Now,  as  in  the  case  of  medicine,  it  is  the  last  branch 
that  many  attach  themselves  to,  owing  to  their  preconceived 
opinions  on  the  subject.  And  the  majority  of  writers  bring 
to  the  undertaking  no  spirit  of  fairness  at  all :  nothing  but 
dishonesty,  impudence  and  unscrupulousness.  Like  vendors 
of  drugs,  their  aim  is  to  catch  popular  credit  and  favour,  and 
to  seize  every  opportunity  of  enriching  themselves.  About  such 
writers  it  is  not  worth  while  to  say  more. 

(/)  But  some  of  those  who  have  the  reputation  of 
approaching  history  in  a  reasonable  spirit  are  like  the  theoretical 
physicians.  They  spend  all  their  time  in  libraries,  and  acquire 
generally  all  the  learning  which  can  be  got  from  books,  and 
then  persuade  themselves  that  they  are  adequately  equipped 
for  their  task.  .  .  .  Yet  in  my  opinion  they  are  only  partially 
qualified  for  the  production  of  genuine  history.  To  inspect 
ancient  records  indeed,  with  the  view  of  ascertaining  the  notions 
entertained  by  the  ancient's  of  certain  places,  nations,  polities 

^  The  text  is  uncertain,  and  I  am  not  at  all  sure  of  the  meaning  of  I-k 
dvdfiaTos,  cp.  25  k,  27.  These  public  harangues  of  doctors  to  attract  patients 
arc  noticed  in  Xcnophon,  Mitnorab.  4,  2,  5. 


XII  MERE  BOOK-LEARNED  HISTORIANS  105 

and  events,  and  of  understanding  the  several  circumstances  and 
contingencies  experienced  in  former  times,  is  useful ;  for  the 
history  of  the  past  directs  our  attention  in  a  proper  spirit  to 
the  future,  if  a  writer  can  be  found  to  give  a  stG.tement  of  facts  ' 
as  they  really  occurred.  But  to  persuade  one's  self,  as  Timaeus 
does,  that  such  ability  in  research  is  sufficient  to  enable  a  roan 
to  describe  subsequent  transactions  with  success  is  quite 
foolish.  It  is  as  though  a  man  were  to  imagine  that  an 
inspection  of  the  works  of  the  old  masters  would  enable  him 
to  become  a  painter  and  a  master  of  the  art  himself. 

This  will  be  rendered  still  more  evident  froro  what  I  have 
now  to  say,  particularly  from  certain  passages     j^  ^^^^  ^.^ 
in  the  history  of  Ephoms.     This  writer  in  his  fajriy  acquainied 
history  of  war  seems  to  me  to  have  had  some  with  naval,  but 
idea  of  naval  tactics,  but  to  be  quite  unacquaint- """  ^aeii""''''^ 
ed  with  fighting  on  shore.     Accordingly,  if  one 
turns  one's  attention  to  the  naval  battles  at  Cyprus  and  Cnidus, 
in  which  the  generals  of  the  king  were  engaged  against  Evagoras 
of  Salamis '  and  then  against  the  Lacedaemonians,  one  will  be 
struck  with  admiration  of  the  historian,  and  will  learn  many 
useful  lessons  as  to  what  to  do  in  similar  circumstances.     But 
when    he    tells    the    story    of    the    battle    of 
LeucHa   between   the  Thebans  and   Lacedae-       g'^"  ^^j' 
monians,     or    again    that    of    Mantinea    be- 
tween the  same  combatants,  in  which  Epaminondas  lost  his 
life,  if  in  these  one  examines  attentively  and  in  detail  the 
arrangements  and  evolutions  in  the  line  of  battle,  the  historian 
will  appear  quite  ridiculous,  and  betray  his  entire  ignorance 
and  want  of  personal  experience  of  such  matters.      The  battle 
of  I.,euctra  indeed  was  simple,  and  confined  to  one  division  of 
the  forces  engaged,  and  therefore  does  not  make  the  writer's 
lack  of  knowledge  so  very  glaring :  but  that  of  Mantinea  was 
complicated  and  technical,  and  is  accordingly  unintelligible, 
and  indeed  completely  inconceivable,  to  the  historian.     This 
will  be  rendered  clear  by  first  laying  down  a  correct  plan  of 
the  ground,  and  then  measuring  the  extent  of  the  movements 
as  described  by  him.     The  same  is  the  case  with  Theopompus, 
and  above  all  with  Timaeus,  the  subject  of  this  book.     These 

'  Tyrant  of  SalBmli  in  Cyprus,  d.c.  404-374,    See  Isocrates,  Oral.  x. 


io6  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  book 

latter  writers  also  can  conceal  their  ignorance,  so  long  as  they 
deal  with  generalities ;  but  directly  they  attempt  minute  and 
detailed  description,  they  show  that  they  are  no  better  than 
Ephorus.  .  .  . 

25.  (^)  It  is  in  fact  as  impossible  to  write  well  on  the  opera- 
tions in  a  war,  if  a  man  has  had  no  experience  of  actual  service, 
as  it  is  to  write  well  on  politics  without  having  been  engaged 
in  political  transactions  and  vicissitudes.  And  when  history  is 
written  by  the  book -learned,  without  technical  knowledge,  and 
without  clearness  of  detail,  the  work  loses  all  its  value.  For 
if  you  take  from  history  its  element  of  practical  instruction, 
,  what  is  left  of  it  has  nothing  to  attract  and  nothing  to  teach. 
Again,  in  the  topography  of  cities  and  localities,  when  such 
men  attempt  to  go  into  details,  being  entirely  without  personal 
knowledge,  they  must  in  a  similar  manner  necessarily  pass 
over  many  points  of  importance ;  while  they  waste  words  on 
many  that  are  not  worth  the  trouble.  And  this  is  what  his 
failure  to  make  personal  inspection  brings  upon  Timaeus.  .  .  . 

(K)  In  his  thirty- fourth  book  Timaeus  says  that  "he 
Timaeus's  want  spent    fifty   continuous    years    at    Athens    as 

of  practical     an   alien,  and  never  took    part    in    any  mili- 

knowiedge.  ^^  service,  or  went  to  inspect  the  localities." 
Accordingly,  when  he  comes  upon  any  such  matters  in  the 
course  of  his  history,  he  shows  much  ignorance  and  makes 
many  misstatements;  and  if  he  ever  does  come  near  the 
truth,  he  is  like  one  of  those  animal -painters  who  draw  from 
models  of  stuffed  skins.  Such  artists  sometimes  preserve  the 
correct  outline,  but  the  vivid  look  and  life-like  portraiture  of 
the  real  animal,  the  chief  charm  of  the  painter's  art,  are  quite 
wanting.  This  is  just  the  case  with  Timaeus,  and  in  fact  with 
all  who  start  with  mere  book-learning;  there  is  nothing  vivid 
in  their  presentment  of  events,  for  that  can  only  come  from 
the  personal  experience  of  the  writers.  And  hence  it  is,  that 
those  who  have  gone  through  no  such  course  of  actual  ex- 
perience produce  no  genuine  enthusiasm  in  the  minds  of  their 
readers.  Former  historians  showed  their  sense  of  the  necessity 
of  making  professions  to  this  effect  in  their  writings.  For  when 
their  subject  was  political,  they  were  careful  to  state  that  the 
writer  had  of  course  been  engaged  in  politics,  and  had  had 


XII        /fECESSARV  EQUIPMENT  OF  AN  HISTORIAN       107 

experience  in  matters  of  the  son;  or  if  the  subject  was 
military,  that  he  had  served  a  campaign  and  been  actually 
engaged ;  and  again,  when  the  matter  was  one  of  everyday  life, 
that  he  had  brought  up  children  and  had  been  married ;  and 
so  on  in  every  department  of  life,  which  we  may  expect  to  find 
adequately  treated  by  those  writers  alone  who  have  had  per- 
son^ experience,  and  have  accordingly  made  that  branch  of 
history  their  own.  It  is  difficult  perhaps  for  a  man  to  have 
been  actually  and  literally  eng^ed  in  everything :  but  in  the 
most  important  actions  and  most  frequently  occurring  he  must 
have  been  so. 

(0  And  that  this  is  no  impossibility.  Homer  is  a  convincing 
instance ;  for  in  him  you  may  see  this  quality  of  personal 
knowledge  frequently  and  conspicuously  displayed.  The 
upshot  of  all  this  is  that  the  study  of  documents  is  only  one  of 
three  elements  in  the  preparation  of  an  historian,  and  is  only 
third  in  importance.  And  no  clearer  proof  of  this  could  be 
given  than  that  furnished  by  the  deliberative  speeches,  haran- 
gues of  commanders,  and  orations  of  ambassadors  as  recorded 
by  Timaeus.  For  the  truth  is,  that  the  occasions  are  rare 
which  admit  of  all  possible  arguments  being  set  forth ;  as  a 
rule,  the  circumstances  of  the  case  confine  them  to  narrow 
limits.  And  of  such  speeches  one  sort  are  regarded  with 
favour  by  men  of  our  time,  another  by  those  of  an  earlier  age ; 
different  styles  again  are  popular  with  Aetolians,  Peloponnes- 
ians,  and  Athenians.  But  to  make  digressions,  in  season  and 
out  of  season,  for  the  purpose  of  setting  forth  every  possible 
speech  that  could  be  made,  as  Timaeus  does  by  his  trick  of  in- 
venting words  to  suit  every  sort  of  occasion,  is  utterly  mislead- 
ing, pedantic,  and  worthy  of  a  schoolboy  essayist.  And  this 
practice  has  brought  failure  and  discredit  on  many  writers. 
Of  course  to  select  from  time  to  time  the  proper  and  appro- 
priate language  is  a  necessary  part  of  our  art :  but  as  there  is 
no  fixed  rule  to  decide  the  quantity  and  quality  of  the  words 
to  be  used  on  a  particular  occasion,  great  care  and  training  is 
required  if  we  are  to  instruct  and  not  mislead  our  readers. 
The  exact  nature  of  the  situation  is  difficult  to  communicate 
always;  still  it  may  be  brought  home  to  the  mind  by  means  of 
systematic  demonstration,  founded  on  personal  and  habiti> 


io8  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  BOOK 

experience.  The  best  way  of  securing  that  this  should  be 
realised  is  for  historians,  first,  to  state  clearly  the  position,  the 
aims,  and  the  circumstances  of  those  deliberating ;  and  then, 
recording  the  real  speeches  made,  to  explain  to  us  the  causes 
which  contributed  to  the  success  or  failure  of  the  several 
speakers.  Thus  we  should  obtain  a  true  conception  of  the 
situation .  and  by  exercising  our  judgment  upon  it,  and  drawing 
analogies  from  it,  should  be  able  to  form  a  thoroughly  sound 
opinion  upon  the  circumstances  of  the  hour.  But  I  suppose 
that  tracing  causes  is  difficult,  while  stringing  words  together  in 
books  is  easy.  Few  again  have  the  faculty  of  speaking  briefly 
to  the  point,  and  getting  the  necessary  training  for  doing  so ; 
while  to  produce  a  long  and  futile  composition  is  within  most 
people's  capacity  and  is  common  enough. 

25.  {Ji)  To  confirm  the  judgment  I  have  expressed  of  Timaeus, 

_.  on  his  wilful  misstatements  as  well  as  his  ignor- 

Sicilian  history,  ^'^ce,  I  shall  now  quote  certam  short  passages 

from  his  acknowledged  works  as  specimens.  .  .  . 
Of  all  the  men  who  have  exercised  sovereignty  in  Sicily,  since 
the  elder  Gelo,  tradition  tells  us  that  the  most  able  have  been 
Hermocrates,  Timoleon,  and  Pyrrhus  of  Epirus,  who  are  the 
last  persons  in  the  world  on  whom  to  father  pedantic  and 
B.C.  413.  scholastic  speeches.  Now  Timaeus  tells  us  in 
Thucyd.7, 42  Jj^^-his  twenty-first  book  that  on  his  arrival  in  Sicily 
Eurymedon  urged  the  cities  there  to  undertake  the  war  against 
Syracuse;  that  subsequently  the  people  of  Gela  becoming 
tired  of  the  war,  sent  an  embassy  to  Camarina  to  make  a 
truce;  that  upon  the  latter  gladly  welcoming  the  proposal, 
each  state  sent  ambassadors  to  their  respective  allies  begging 
them  to  despatch  men  of  credit  to  Gela  to  deliberate  on  a 
pacification,  and  to  secure  the  common  interests.  Upon  the 
arrival  of  these  deputies  in  Gela  and  the  opening  of  the 
conference,  he  represents  Hermocrates  as  speaking  to  the 
following  effect :  "  He  praised  the  people  of  Gela  and  Camarina 
first,  for  having  made  the  truce ;  secondly,  because  they  were 
the  cause  of  the  assembling  of  this  peace  congress  ;  and  thirdly 
because  they  had  taken  precautions  to  prevent  the  mass  of  the 
citizens  from  taking  part  in  the  discussion,  and  had  secured 
that  it  should  be  confined  to  the  leading  men  in  the  states,  who 


XII  TIMAEUS  FALSIFIES  SICILTAN  HISTOR  V  109 

knew  the  difTerence  between  peace  and  war."  Then  after  making 
two  or  three  practical  suggestions,  Hennocrates  is  represented 
as  expressing  an  opinion  that  "if  they  seriously  consider  the 
matter  they  will  learn  the  profound  difference  between  peace 
and  war," — although  just  before  he  had  said  that  it  was  pre- 
cisely this  which  moved  his  gratitude  to  the  men  of  Gela,  that 
"  the  discussion  did  not  take  place  in  the  mass  assembly,  t)ut  in 
a  congress  of  men  who  knew  the  difference  between  peace  and 
war."  This  is  an  instance  in  which  Timaeus  not  only  fails  to 
show  the  ability  of  an  historian,  but  sinks  below  the  level  of  a 
school  theme.  For,  I  presume,  it  will  be  universally  admitted 
that  what  an  audience  requires  is  a  demonstration  of  that 
about  which  they  are  in  ignorance  ot  uncertainty ;  but  to 
exhaust  one's  ingenuity  in  finding  arguments  to  prove  what  is 
known  already  is  the  most  futile  waste  of  time.  But  besides 
his  cardinal  mistake  of  directing  the  greater  part  of  the  speech 
to  points  which  stood  in  need  of  no  ai^uments  at  all,  Timaeus 
also  puts  into  the  mouth  of  Hermocratcs  certain  ^.c.  405. 
sentences  of  which  one  could  scarcely  believe  Hermocrates  was 
that  any  commonplace  youth  would  have  been  "oyhete.  Xen, 
Capable,  much  less  the  colleague  of  the  I^cedae-  '  "'■■.  ■■=7-3>- 
monians  in  the  battle  of  Aegospotami,  and  the  sole  conqueror 
of  the  Athenian  armies  and  generals  in  Sicily. 

26.  For  first  he  "  thinks  that  he  should  remind  the  congress 
that  in  war  sleepers  are  woke  at  dawn  by  bugles,  in  peace  by 
cocks." '  Then  he  says  that  "  Hercules  established  the  Olympic 
games  and  the  sacred  truce  during  them,  as  an  exemplification 
of  his  own  principles ; "  and  that  "  he  had  injured  all  those 
persons  against  whom  he  waged  war,  under  compulsion  and  in 
obedience  to  the  order  of  another,  but  was  never  voluntarily 
the  author  of  harm  to  any  man."  '  Next  he  quotes  the  instance 
of  Zeus  in  Homer  as  being  displeased  with  Ares,  and  saying* — 
"  Of  all  the  gods  Ihat  on  Olympus  dwell 

I  hold  Ihee  most  detested  ;  foi  thy  joy 

ts  ever  stiife  and  wai  and  bailie." 
And  again  the  wisest  of  the  heroes  says* — 

'  For  [his  proverb  see  Pluwrch,  Nuias,  ch.  9,  ^i^iot  iufin}iiinH  ToC  tlw6rTtt 
in  rait  (t  tlpiprii  KoSciKto'Tat  oi  aikwiyyft  dXV  dXcirpviSrEt  iipmrtiS^vai. 
*  n.  ch.  35.  •  Homer,  II.  s,  890.  *  Homer,  il  9,  63. 


no  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  book 

*'  He  is  a  wretch,  insensible  and  dead 
To  all  the  charities  of  social  life, 
Whose  pleasure  is  in  civil  broil  and  war." 

Then  he  goes  on  to  allege  that  Euripides  agrees  with  Homer 
in  the  lines  ^ — 

"  O  well  of  infinite  riches  1 
O  fairest  of  beings  divine  1 

0  Peace,  how  alas  !  thou  delayest ; 
My  heart  for  thy  coming  is  fain. 

1  tremble  lest  age  overtake  me. 

Ere  thy  l)eauty  and  grace  I  behold  ; 
Ere  the  maidens  shall  sing  in  their  dancing, 
And  revels  be  gladsome  with  flowers." 

Next  he  remarks  that  "war  is  like  disease,  peace  like 
health ;  for  that  the  latter  restores  those  that  are  sick,  while 
in  the  former  even  the  healthy  perish.  Moreover,  in  time  of 
peace,  the  old  are  buried  by  the  young  as  nature  directs,  while 
in  war  the  case  is  reversed ;  and  above  all  in  war  there  is  no 
security  even  as  far  as  the  city  walls,  while  in  peace  it  extends 
to  the  frontier  of  the  territory  " — and  so  on.  I  wonder  what 
other  arguments  would  have  been  employed  by  a  youth  who 
had  just  devoted  himself  to  scholastic  exercises  and  studies  in 
history ;  and  who  wished,  according  to  the  rules  of  the  art,  to 
adapt  his  words  to  the  supposed  speakers  ?  Just  these  I 
think  which  Timaeus  represents  Hermocrates  as  using. 

(tf)  Again,  in  the  same  book,  Timoleon  is  exhorting  the 

Timoieon's     Greeks    to    engage    the    Carthaginians;*   and 

victory  over  the  when  they  are  on  the  very  point  of  coming 

Carthaginians,    jq  ^lose  quarters   with   the   enemy,    who    are 

344.       many    times    superior    to    them   in    number, 

Timaeus   represents   him   as  saying,    "  Do  not  look   to  the 

numbers  of  the  foe,  but    to  their  cowardice.      For    though 

Libya    is    fully    settled    and    abounds    in    inhabitants,    yet 

when  we  wish  to  express  complete  desolation  we  say  *more 

desolate  than  Libya,'  not  meaning  to  refer  to  its  emptiness,  but 

to  the  poor  spirit  of  its  inhabitants.     And  after  all,  who  would 

be   afraid   of  men   who,  when    nature   gives   hands   as   the 

distinctive  feature  of  man  among   all  living  creatures,   carry 

^  Euripides,  fr.         ^  Battle  of  the  Crimcsus.     See  Plutarch,  Timol.  ch.  27. 


wi  SOPHISTICAL  COMMONPLACES  in 

them  about  all  their  life  inside  their  tunics  idle  P '  And  more 
than  all,  who  wear  shirts  under  their  inner  tunics,  that  they 
may  not  even  when  they  fall  in  battle  show  their  nakedness  to 
their  enemies  ?  .  .  .  " 

(S)  When  Gelo  promised  to  help  the  Greeks  with  twenty 
thousand  land  forces  and  two  hundred  decked  q^^_ 

ships,  if  they  would  concede  to  him  the  chief  See  Herod, 
command  either  by  land  or  sea,  they  say  that  ?■  'S7-'*s. 
the  congress  of  Greeks,  sitting  at  Corinth,  gave  '  *  '' 

Gelo's  envoys  a  most  spirited  answer.  They  urged  Gelo  to  come 
to  their  aid  with  his  forces,  and  observed  that  the  logic  of  facta 
would  give  the  command  to  the  bravest.  This  is  not  the  language 
of  men  depending  for  succour  on  the  Syracusans,  as  a  last 
resource;  but  of  men  who  felt  confidence  in  themselves,  and 
challenged  all  comers  to  a  rivalry  of  courage  and  for  the  crown 
of  valour.  In  spite  of  this,  Timaeus  spends  such  a  wealth  of 
rhetoric  and  earnestness  on  these  points,  in  his  desire  to  exalt 
the  importance  of  Sicily  above  all  the  rest  of  Greece,  to 
represent  its  history  as  the  most  splendid  and  glorious  of  all 
the  world,  its  men  as  the  wisest  of  all  who  have  been  great  in 
philosophy,  and  the  Syracusans  as  the  most  consummate  and 
divine  of  statesmen,  that  he  could  scarcely  be  surpassed  by 
the  cleverest  schoolboy  declaimers  when  undertaking  to  prove 
such  paradoxes  as  that  "  Thersites  was  an  excellent  man,"  or 
"  Penelope  a  bad  wife,"  or  other  thesis  of  that  description. 

(r)  However,  the  only  effect  of  such  extravagant  exaggera- 
tion is  to  bring  ridicule  upon  the  men  and  the  transactions 
which  it  is  his  intention  to  champion  ;  while  he  himself  incurs 
the  same  discredit  as  ill-trained  disputants  in  the  Academy ; 
some  of  whom,  in  their  desire  to  embarrass  their  opponents  on 
all  subjects,  possible  or  impossible  alike,  carry  their  paradoxical 
and  sophistical  arguments  to  such  a  length  as  to  dispute 
whether  it  is  possible  for  people  at  Athens  to  smell  eggs 
cooking  at  Ephesus :  and  to  offer  to  maintain  that,  while  they 
are  discussing  these  points,  they  are  lying  on  their  couches  at 
home  and  carrying  on  a  second  discussion  on  other  subjects. 
This  extravagance  of  paradox  has  brought  the  whole  school 


112  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  book 

into  such  disrepute,  that  even  reasonable  discussions  have  lost 
credit  with  the  world.  And  apart  from  their  own  futility,  these 
persons  have  inspired  our  young  men  with  so  depraved  a  taste, 
that  they  pay  no  attention  whatever  to  questions  of  ethics  and 
politics,  which  bring  benefit  to  those  who  study  them;  but 
spend  their  lives  in  pursuit  of  an  empty  reputation  for  useless 
and  paradoxical  verbiage. 

(//)  This  is  just  the  case  with  Tiraaeus  and  his  imitators  in 
history.  Paradoxical  and  tenacious,  he  has  dazzled  the 
multitude  by  skill  in  words ;  and  has  forced  attention  to  him- 
self by  a  show  of  veracity,  or  has  conciliated  confidence  by  a 
pretence  of  producing  proof  of  his  assertions.  The  most  conspi- 
cuous instances  of  his  success  in  inspiring  this  confidence  are 
those  parts  of  his  work  which  treat  of  colonies,  founding  of 
cities,  and  the  relationships  of  nations.  In  these  points  he 
makes  such  a  parade  of  minute  accuracy,  and  inveighs  so 
bitterly  when  refuting  others,  that  people  came  to  imagine  that 
all  other  historians  have  been  mere  dreamers,  and  have  spoken 
at  random  in  describing  the  world ;  and  that  he  is  the  only 
man  who  has  made  accurate  investigations,  and  unravelled  every 
history  with  intelligence. 

{e)  As  a  matter  of  fact,  his  books  contain  much  that  is  sound, 
but  also  much  that  is  false.  Those,  however,  who  have  spent 
much  time  on  his  earlier  books,  in  which  the  passages  I  have 
alluded  to  occur,  when  the  confidence  which  they  have  fully 
given  to  his  exaggerated  professions  is  disturbed  by  some  one 
pointing  out  that  Timaeus  is  obnoxious  to  the  same  reproaches 
which  he  has  brought  with  such  bitterness  against  others  (as, 
for  instance,  in  the  misstatements  as  to  the  Locrians,  and  other 
instances  lately  mentioned  by  me),  become  angry  and  obstinate 
in  controversy,  and  difficult  to  convince.  And  that,  I  might 
almost  say,  is  all  the  benefit  which  the  most  diligent  students 
of  his  history  get  from  their  reading.  While  those  who  devote 
their  attention  to  his  speeches,  and  generally  to  the  didactic 
part  of  his  work,  become  pedantic,  sophistical,  and  wholly  in- 
sensible to  truth,  for  reasons  which  I  have  already  stated. 

27.  Moreover,  when  he  comes  to  deal  with  facts  in  his 
history,  we  find  a  combination  of  all  the  faults  which  I  have 
mentioned.     The  reason  I  will  now  proceed  to  state.     It  will 


«i    AN  HISTORIAN  NEEDS  PRACTICAL  EXPERIENCE    1 13 

not,  perhaps,  to  most  people  seem  to  his  credit,  and  it  is  in 
truth  the  real  source  of  his  enors.  For  whereas  he  is  thought 
to  have  possessed  great  and  wide  knowledge,  a  faculty  for  histori- 
cal inquiry,  and  extiaordinary  industry  in  the  execution  of  his 
work,  in  certain  cases  he  appears  to  have  been  the  most  ignorant 
and  indolent  person  that  ever  called  himself  an  historian.  And 
the  following  considerations  will  prove  it.  Nature  has  bestowed 
on  us  two  instruments  of  inquiry  and  research,  hearing  and  sight 
Of  these  sight  is,  according  to  Heraclcitus,  by  far 
the  truer ;  for  eyes  arc  surer  witnesses  than  ears,  -^^  ^  p'  \^^ ' 
And  of  these  charmels  of  learning  Timacus  has 
chosen  the  pleasanter  and  the  worse;  for  he  entirely  refrained 
from  looking  at  things  with  his  own  eyes,  and  devoted  himself 
to  learning  by  hearsay.  But  even  the  ear  may  be  instructed  in 
two  ways,  reading  and  answers  to  personal  inquiries :  and  in 
the  latter  of  these  he  was  very  indolent,  as  I  have  already 
shown.  The  reason  of  his  preference  for  the  other  it  is  easy 
to  divine.  Study  of  documents  involves  no  danger  or  fatigue, 
if  one  only  takes  care  to  lodge  in  a  city  rich  in  such  records, 
or  to  have  a  library  in  one's  neighbourhood.  You  may  then 
investigate  any  question  while  reclining  on  your  couch,  and 
compare  the  mistakes  of  former  historians  without  any  fatigue 
to  yourself.  But  personal  investigation  demands  great  exertion 
and  expense ;  though  it  is  exceedingly  advantageous,  and  in 
fact  is  the  very  corner-stone  of  history.  This  is  evident  from 
the  writers  of  history  themselves.  Ephorus  says,  "  if  writers 
could  only  be  present  at  the  actual  transactions,  it  would  be  far 
the  best  of  all  modes  of  learning."  Theopompus  says, "  the  best 
military  historian  is  he  who  has  been  present  at  the  greatest 
number  of  battles  ;  the  best  speech  maker  is  he  who  has  been 
engaged  in  most  political  contests."  The  same  might  be  said 
of  the  art  of  healing  and  of  steering.  Homer  has  spoken  even 
more  emphatically  than  these  writers  on  this  point.  For  when 
he  wishes  to  describe  what  the  man  of  light  and  leading  should 
be,  he  introduces  Odysseus  in  these  words — 


and  then  goes  on— 

VOL  It 


114  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  BOOK 


'*  And  towns  of  many  saw,  and  learnt  their  mind. 
And  suffered  much  in  heart  by  land  and  sea.** 

and  again  ^ — 

**  Passing  through  wars  of  men  and  grieyous  waves.* 

28.  It  is  such  a  man  that  the  dignity  of  history  appears  to 

me  to  require.     Plato  says  that  "  human  affairs  will  not  go  well 

Historians  must  ^^^^  either  philosophers  become  kings  or  kings 

be  practical     become  philosophers."  *    So  I  should  say  that 
™*^"-  history  will  never  be  properly  written,  until  either 

men  of  action  undertake  to  write  it  (not  as  they  do  now,  as  a 
matter  of  secondary  importance;  but,  with  the  conviction  that 
it  is  their  most  necessary  and  honourable  employment,  shall 
devote  themselves  through  life  exclusively  to  it),  or  historians 
become  convinced  that  practical  experience  is  of  the  first  import- 
ance for  historical  composition.  Until  that  time  arrives  there 
will  always  be  abundance  of  blunders  in  the  writings  of  historians. 
Timaeus,  however,  quite  disregarded  all  this.  He  spent  his 
life  in  one  place,  of  which  he  was  not  even  a  citizen ;  and  thus 
deliberately  renounced  all  active  career  either  in  war  or  politics, 
and  all  personal  exertion  in  travel  and  inspection  of  localities  : 
and  yet,  somehow  or  another,  he  has  managed  to  obtain  the 
reputation  of  a  master  in  the  art  of  history.  To  prove  that 
I    have   not   misrepresented   him,  it   is   easy  to    bring  the 

evidence  of  Timaeus  himself.     In  the  preface 

^E™hol!L'!"  to  his  sixth  book  he  says  that  "  some  people 
suppose  that  more  genius,  industry,  and 
preparation  are  required  for  rhetorical  than  for  historical 
composition."  And  that  "this  opinion  had  been  formerly 
advanced  against  Ephorus."  Then  because  this  writer  had 
been  unable  to  refute  those  who  held  it,  he  undertakes  himself 
to  draw  a  comparison  between  history  and  rhetorical  composi- 
tions :  a  most  unnecessary  proceeding  altogethei.  In  the  first 
place  he  misrepresents  Ephorus.  For  in  truth,  admirable  as 
Ephorus  is  throughout  his  whole  work,  in  style,  treatment,  and 
argumentative  acuteness,  he  is  never  more  brilliant  than  in  his 
digressions  and  statements  of  his  personal  views :  in  fact,  when- 
ever he  is  adding  anything  in  the  shape  of  a  commentary  or  a 

^  Homer,  OJyss.  i,  1-4;  8,  183. 
*  Republic,  v.  473  C.  vi.  499  B. 


xn  MERE  INQUIRY  IS  INSUFFICIENT  115 

note.  And  it  so  happens  that  his  most  elegant  and  convincing 
digression  is  on  this  very  subject  of  a  comparison  between 
historians  and  speech-writers.  But  Timaeus  is  anxious  not 
to  be  thought  to  follow  Ephorus.  Therefore,  in  addition  to 
misrepresentin;;  him  and  condemning  the  rest,  he  enters  upon 
a  long,  confused,  and  in  eveiy  way  inferior,  discussion  of  what 
had  been  already  sufficiently  handled  by  others ;  and  expected 
that  no  one  living  would  detect  him. 

{a)  However,  he  wished  to  exalt  history ;  and,  in  order  to 
do  so,  he  says  that  "  history  differs  from  rhetorical  composi- 
tion as  much  as  real  buildings  differ  from  those  represented 
in  scene-paintings."  And  again,  that  "to  collect  the  neces- 
sary materials  for  writing  history  is  by  itself  more  laborious 
than  the  whole  process  of  producing  rhetorical  compositions." 
He  mentions,  for  instance,  the  expense  and  labour  which  he 
underwent  in  collecting  records  from  Assyria,  and  in  studying 
the  customs  of  the  Ligures,  Celts,  and  Iberians.  But  he  ex- 
aggerates these  so  much,  that  he  could  not  have  himself 
expected  to  be  believed.  One  would  be  glad  to  asic  the 
historian  which  of  the  two  he  thinks  is  the  more  expensive 
and  laborious, — to  remain  quietly  at  home  and  collect  records 
and  study  the  customs  of  Ligures  and  Celts,  or  to  obtain 
personal  experience  of  all  the  tribes  possible,  and  see  them 
with  his  own  eyes  ?  To  ask  questions  about  manceuvres  on 
the  field  of  battle  and  the  sieges  of  cities  and  fights  at  sea 
from  those  who  were  present,  or  to  take  personal  part  in  the 
dangers  and  vicissitudes  of  these  operations  as  they  occur? 
For  my  part  I  do  not  think  that  real  buildings  differ  so  much 
from  those  in  stage  -  scenery,  nor  history  from  rhetorical 
compositions,  as  a  narrative  drawn  from  actual  and  personal 
experience  differs  from  one  derived  from  hearsay  and  the 
report  of  others.  But  Timaeus  had  no  such  experience  :  and 
he  therefore  naturally  supposed  that  the  part  of  an  historian's 
labour  which  is  the  least  important  and  lightest,  that  namely 
of  collecting  records  and  making  inquiries  from  those  who  had 
knowledge  of  the  several  events,  was  in  reality  the  most 
important  and  most  difficult.  And,  indeed,  in  this  particular 
department  of  research,  men  who  have  had  no  personal  experi- 
ence must  necessarily  fall  into  grave  errors.     For  how  is  - 


ii6 


THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS 


BOOK   XI£ 


man,  who  has  no  knowledge  of  such  things,  to  put  the  right 
questions  as  to  manoeuvering  of  troops,  sieges  of  cities,  and 
fights  at  sea?  And  how  can  he  understand  the  details  of 
what  is  told  him  ?  Indeed,  the  questioner  is  as  important  as 
the  narrator  for  getting  a  clear  story.  For  in  the  case  of  men 
who  have  had  experience  of  real  action,  memory  is  a  sufficient 
guide  from  point  to  point  of  a  narrative :  but  a  man  who  has 
had  no  such  experience  can  neither  put  the  right  questions, 
nor  understand  what  is  happening  before  his  eyes.  Though  he 
is  on  the  spot,  in  fact,  he  is  as  good  as  absent.  .  .  . 


TZ2^      "^ 


BOOK  XIII 


THE    AETOUANS 

1.  From  the  unbroken  continuity  of  their  wars,  and  the  ex- 
travagance of  their  daily  lives,  the  Aetolians  became  involved 
in  debt,  not  only  without  others  noticing  it,  but 
without  being  sensible  of  it  thenoselves.     Being  saa 
therefore    naturally    disposed    to  a    change    in     loliacausea 
their  constitution,  they  elected  Dorimachus  and      reroiu"'"'. 
Scopas  to  draw  out  a  code  of  laws,  because  they 
saw  thai  they  were  not  only  innovators  by  disposition,  but  were 
themselves  deeply  involved  in  private  debt.    These  men  accord- 
ingly were  admitted  to  the  office  and  drew  up  the  laws.  .  .  . 

When  they  produced  them  they  were  opposed  by  Alexander 
of  Aetolia,  who  tried  to  show  by  many  instances  that  innovation 
was  a  dangerous  growth  which  could  not  be  checked,  and  in- 
variably ended  by  inflicting  grave  evils  upon  those  who  fostered 
it  He  urged  them  therefore  not  to  look  solely  to  the  ex- 
igencies of  the  hour,  and  the  relief  from  their  existing  contracts, 
but  to  the  future  also.  For  it  was  a  strange  inconsistency  to 
be  ready  to  forfeit  their  very  lives  in  war  to  preserve  their 
children,  and  yet  in  their  deliberations  to  be  entirely  careless 
of  the  future.  .  .  . 

2.  Having  failed  to  obtain  the  office,  for  the  sake  of  which 
he  had  had  the  boldness  to  draw  up  these  laws,  Scopas 
turned  his  hopes  to  Alexandria,  in  the  expecta-  scopas  uroes  to 
tion  of  finding  means  there  of  restoring  his  Egypt  See  i6, 
broken  fortunes,  and  satisfying  to  a  fuller  extent  '*"''  ■  '*■  S3- 
his  grasping  spirit.  He  little  knew  that  it  is  impossible  to 
assuage  the  ever-rising  desires  of  the  soul  without  correcting 
this  passion  by  reason,  any  more  than  it  is  to  stay  or  quench 


1 1 8  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  .  book 

the  thirst  of  the  dropsical  body  by  supplying  it  with  drink, 
without  radically  restoring  its  healthy  condition.  Scopas, 
indeed,  is  a  conspicuous  example  of  this  truth ;  for  though  on 
his  arrival  at  Alexandria,  in  addition  to  his  military  pay,  which 
he  possessed  independently  as  commander-in-chief,  the  king 
assigned  him  ten  minae  a  day,  and  one  mina  a  day  to  those 
next  him  in  rank,  still  he  was  not  satisfied ;  but  continued  to 
demand  more,  until  he  disgusted  his  paymasters  by  his  cupidity, 
and  lost  his  life  and  his  gold  together. 

Philip's  treacherous  conduci',  b.c  204 

8.  Philip  now  entered  upon  a  course  of  treachery  which  no 
one  would  venture  to  say  was  worthy  of  a  king ;  but  which 
some  would  defend  on  the  ground  of  its  necessity  in  the  con- 
duct of  public  affairs,  owing  to  the  prevailing  bad  faith  of  the 
time.  For  the  ancients,  so  far  from  using  a  fraudulent  policy 
towards  their  friends,  were  scrupulous  even  as  to  using  it  to 
conquer  their  enemies ;  because  they  did  not  regard  a  success 
as  either  glorious  or  secure,  which  was  not  obtained  by  such  a 
victory  in  the  open  field  as  served  to  break  the  confidence  of 
their  enemies.  They  therefore  came  to  a  mutual  understand- 
ing not  to  use  hidden  weapons  against  each  other,  nor  such  as 
could  be  projected  from  a  distance ;  and  held  the  opinion  that 
the  only  genuine  decision  was  that  arrived  at  by  a  battle  fought 
at  close  quarters,  foot  to  foot  with  the  enemy.  It  was  for  this 
reason  also  that  it  was  their  custom  mutually  to  proclaim  their 
wars,  and  give  notice  of  battles,  naming  time  and  place  at  which 
they  meant  to  be  in  order  of  battle.  But  nowadays  people 
say  that  it  is  the  mark  of  an  inferior  general  to  perform  any 
operation  of  war  openly.  Some  slight  trace,  indeed,  of  the 
old-fashioned  morality  still  lingers  among  the  Romans;  for 
they  do  proclaim  their  wars,  and  make  sparing  use  of  am- 
buscades, and  fight  their  battles  hand  to  hand  and  foot  to  foot. 
So  much  for  the  unnecessary  amount  of  artifice  which  it  is  the 
fashion  for  commanders  in  our  days  to  employ  both  in  politics 
and  war. 

4.  Philip  gave  Heracleides  a  kind  of  problem  to  work  out, 
— how  to  circumvent  and  destroy  the  Rhodian  fleet.     At  the 


Jtrii  PHILIP  INTRIGUES  AGAINST  RHODES  119 

same  time  he  sent  envoys  to  Crete  to  excite  and  provoke  them 
to  go  to  war  with  the  Rhodians.  Heracleides,  pj,iiip  employs 
who  was  a  born  traitor,  looked  upon  the  com-  Heracleides 
mission  as  the  very  thing  to  suit  his  plans  ;  and  "'  Tarcmum. 
after  revolving  various  methods  in  his  mind,  presently  started 
and  sailed  to  Rhodes,  He  was  by  origin  a  Tarentine,  of  a 
low  family  of  mechanics,  and  he  had  many  qualities  which 
fitted  him  for  bold  and  unscrupulous  undertakings.  His  boy- 
hood had  been  stained  by  notorious  immorality ;  he  had  great 
acuteness  and  a  retentive  memory ;  in  the  presence  of  the 
vulgar  no  one  could  be  more  bullying  and  audacious ;  to  those  in 
high  position  no  one  more  insinuating  and  servile.  He  had  been 
originally  banished  from  his  native  city  from  a  suspicion  of 
being  engaged  in  an  intrigue  to  hand  over  Tarentum  to  the 
Romans :  not  that  he  had  any  political  influence,  but  being  an 
architect,  and  employed  in  some  repairs  of  the  walls,  he  got 
possession  of  the  keys  of  the  gate  on  the  landward  side  of  the 
town.  He  thereupon  fled  for  his  life  to  the  Romans.  From 
them,  being  detected  in  making  communications  by  letters  and 
messages  with  Tarentum  and  Hannibal,  he  again  Bed  for  fear 
of  consequences  to  Philip.  With  him  he  obtained  so  much 
credit  and  influence  that  he  eventually  was  the  most  powerful 
element  in  the  overthrow  of  that  great  monarchy. 

6.  The  Prytanies  of  Rhodes  were  now  distrustful  of  Philip, 
owing  to  his  treacherous  policy  in  Crete,'  and  they  began  to 
suspect  tliat  Heracleides  was  his  agent  .  .  .  -^^^  fg^g 

But  Heracleides  came  before  them  and  ex-  preiences  of 
plained  the  reasons  which  had  caused  him  to  Heraciddci  ai 
f,     r         T.1  ■!-  Rhodes, 

fly  from  Phdip.   .  .  . 

Philip  was  anxious  above  ever^-thing  that  the  Rhodians 
should  not  discover  his  purpose  in  these  transactions  ;  whereby 
he  succeeded  in  freeing  Heracleides  from  suspicion.  ,  ,  . 

Nature,  as  it  seems  to  me,  has  ordained  that  Truth  should 
be  a  most  mighty  goddess  among  men,  and  has 
endowed   her   with   extraordinary  power. 
least,  I  notice  that  though  at  times  everything  combines  to 

'  The  Rhodians  had  proclaimed  war  against  Ihe  Crelan  piialcs.  Philip 
had  secretly  commissioned  one  of  his  agents,  (he  Actolian  Dicaearchus,  10  aid 
Ihe  Cretans.      Diodor,  fr.  iivlii. 


I20  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  book 


crush  her,  and  every  kind  of  specious  argument  is  on  the  side 
of  falsehood,  she  somehow  or  another  insinuates  herself  by 
her  own  intrinsic  virtue  into  the  souls  of  mea  Sometimes 
she  displays  her  power  at  once ;  and  sometimes,  though  ob- 
scured for  a  length  of  time,  she  at  last  prevails  and  overpowers 
falsehood.  Such  was  the  case  with  Heracleides  when  he  came 
from  king  Philip  to  Rhodes.^  .  .  . 

Damocles,  who  was  sent  with  Pythio  as  a  spy  upon  the 
Romans,  was  a  person  of  ability,  and  possessed  of  many 
endowments  fitting  him  for  the  conduct  of  affairs.  .  .  . 

NABIS,  TYRANT  OF  SPARTA,  B.C  207-I92 

6.  Nabis,  tyrant  of  Sparta,  being  now  in  the  third  year  of 
his  reign,  ventured  upon  no  undertaking  of  importance,  owing 

to   the   recent  defeat  of  Machanidas  by  the 
Nabis^^nn?  Achaeans;  but  employed  himself  in  laying  the 

foundations  of  a  long  and  grinding  tyranny.  He 
destroyed  the  last  remains  of  the  old  Spartan  nobles ;  drove 
into  banishment  all  men  eminent  for  wealth  or  ancestral  glory ; 
and  distributed  their  property  and  wives  among  the  chief  men 
of  those  who  remained,  or  among  his  own  mercenary  soldiers. 
These  last  were  composed  of  murderers,  housebreakers,  foot- 
pads, and  burglars.  For  this  was,  generally  speaking,  the  class 
of  men  which  he  collected  out  of  all  parts  of  the  world,  whose 
own  country  was  closed  to  them  owing  to  their  crimes  and 
felonies.  As  he  put  himself  forward  as  the  patron  and  king  of 
such  wretches,  and  employed  them  as  attendants  and  body- 
guards, there  is  evidently  no  cause  for  surprise  that  his  impious 
character  and  reign  should  have  been  long  remembered.  For, 
besides  this,  he  was  not  content  with  driving  the  citizens  into 
banishment,  but  took  care  no  place  should  be  secure,  and  no 
refuge  safe  for  the  exiles.  Some  he  caused  to  be  pursued  and 
killed  on  the  road,  while  others  he  dragged  from  their  place  of 
retreat  and  murdered.  Finally,  in  the  cities  where  they  w^ere 
living,  he  hired  the  houses  next  door  to  these  banished  men, 

1  Heracleides  having  gained  credence  at  Rhodes  by  pretending  to  betray 
Philip's  intrigue  with  the  Cretans,  waited  for  an  opportunity,  and,  setting  fire 
to  their  arsenal,  escaped  in  a  boat.     Polyacn,  5,  17,  2. 


wii  THE  TYRAfTNY  OF  NABIS  121 

wherever  they  might  be,  by  means  of  agents  who  were  not 
suspected ;  and  then  sent  Cretans  into  these  houses,  who  made 
breaches  in  the  party  walls,  and  through  them,  or  through  such 
windows  as  already  existed,  shot  down  the  exiles  as  they  stood 
or  lay  down  in  their  own  houses  ;  so  that  there  was  no  place 
of  retreat,  and  no  moment  of  security  for  the  unfortunate 
Lacedaemonians. 

7.  When  he  had  by  these  means  put  the  greater  number  of 
them  out  of  the  .way,  he  next  had  constructed  »■  h-  ■  f 
a  kind  of  machine,  if  machine  it  may  be  called, 
which  was  the  figure  of  a  woman,  clothed  in  costly  garments, 
and  made  to  resemble  with  extraordinary  fidelity  the  wife  of 
Nabis.  Whenever  then  he  summoned  one  of  the  citizens 
with  a  view  of  getting  some  money  from  him,  he  used  first  to 
employ  a  number  of  arguments  politely  expressed,  pointing 
out  the  danger  in  which  the  city  stood  from  the  threatening 
attitude  of  the  Achaeans,  and  explaining  what  a  number  of 
mercenaries  he  had  to  support  for  their  security,  and  the  ex- 
penses which  fell  upon  him  for  the  maintenance  of  the  national 
religion  and  the  needs  of  the  State.  If  the  listeners  gave  in 
he  was  satisfied ;  but  if  they  ever  refused  to  comply  with  his 
demand,  he  would  say,  "  Perhaps  I  cannot  persuade  you,  but  I 
think  this  lady  Ap^ga  will  succeed  in  doing  so."  Ap^ga  was 
the  name  of  his  wife.  Immediately  on  his  saying  these  words, 
the  figure  I  have  described  was  brought  in.  As  soon  as  the 
man  offered  his  hand  to  the  supposed  lady  to  raise  her  from 
her  seat,  the  figure  threw  its  arms  round  him  and  began  draw- 
ing him  by  degrees  towards  its  breasts.  Now  its  arms,  hands, 
and  breasts  were  full  of  iron  spikes  under  its  clothes.  When 
the  tyrant  pressed  his  hands  on  the  back  of  the  figure,  and 
then  by  means  of  the  works  dragged  the  man  by  degrees 
closer  and  closer  to  its  breasts,  he  forced  him  under  this 
torture  to  say  anything.  A  good  number  of  men  who  refused 
his  demands  he  destroyed  in  this  way.* 

S.  The  rest  of  his  conduct  was  on  a  par  with  this  beginning. 
He  made  common  cause  with  the  Cretan  pirates.  The  beginning  of 
and  kept  temple-breakers,  highway-robbers,  and  the  war  iwiween 


122  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  book  xiii 

Nabis  and  the  murderers  all  over  the  Peloponnese ;  and  as  he 
Achaeans.  ghared  in  the  profits  of  their  nefarious  trades,  he 
allowed  them  to  use  Sparta  as  their  base  of  operations.  More- 
over, about  this  time  some  visitors  from  Boeotia,  who  happened 
to  be  staying  at  Lacedaemon,  enticed  one  of  his  grooms  to 
make  off  with  them,  taking  a  certain  white  horse  which  was 
considered  the  finest  in  the  royal  stud  They  were  pursued 
by  a  party  sent  by  Nabis  as  far  as  Megalopolis,  where  the 
tyrants  found  the  horse  and  groom,  and  took  them  off  with- 
out any  one  interfering.  But  they  then  laid  hands  on  the 
Boeotians,  who  at  first  demanded  to  be  taken  before  the 
magistrate ;  but  as  no  attention  was  paid  to  the  demand,  one 
of  them  shouted  out  "  Help ! "  Upon  a  crowd  of  the  people 
of  the  place  collecting  and  protesting  that  the  men  should  be 
taken  before  the  magistrate,  Nabis's  party  were  obliged  to  let 
them  go  and  retire.  Nabis,  however,  had  been  long  looking 
out  for  a  ground  of  complaint  and  a  reasonable  pretext  for  a 
quarrel,  and  having  seized  on  this  one,  he  harried  the  cattle 
belonging  to  Proagoras  and  some  others ;  which  was  a  com- 
mencement of  the  war.^  .  .  . 

ANTIOCHUS    IN    ARABIA,    B.C.   205-204 

9.  Labac,  like  Sabae,  is  a  city  of  Chattenia,  which  is  a 
territory  of  the  Gerraei.  ...  In  other  respects,  Chattenia  is  a 
rugged  country,  but  the  wealth  of  the  Gerraei  who  inhabit  it 
has  adorned  it  with  villages  and  towers.  It  lies  along  the 
Arabian  Sea,  and  Antiochus  gave  orders  to  spare  it.  .  .  . 

In  a  letter  to  Antiochus  the  Gerraei  demanded  that  he  should 
not  destroy  what  the  gods  had  given  them — perpetual  peace 
and  freedom ;  and  this  letter  having  been  interpreted  to  him 
he  granted  the  request.  .   .  . 

Their  freedom  having  been  confirmed  to  the  Gerraei,  they 
presented  King  Antiochus  at  once  with  five  hundred  talents 
of  silver,  one  thousand  of  frankincense,  and  two  hundred  of 
oil  of  cinnamon,  called  stacte,  all  of  them  spices  of  the  country 
on  the  Arabian  Sea,  He  then  sailed  to  the  island  of  Tylos, 
and  thence  to  Seleucia.  .  .  . 

'  These  raids  on  the  territory  of  Megalopolis,  however,  did  not  lead  to 
open  war  till  B.C.  202.     Sec  16,  16. 


Perhaps  a  resumk  of  events  in  each  Olympiad  may  arrest  the 
attention  of  my  readers  i^oth  by  their  number  and  importance, 
the  transactions  in  every  part  of  the  world  being 
brought  under  one  view.  However,  I  think  the  ^*f^  al^f^' 
events  of  this  Olympiad  especially  will  do  so ; 
because  in  it  the  wars  in  Italy  and  Libya  came  to  an  end  ;  and 
I  cannot  imagine  any  one  not  caring  to  inquire  what  sort  of 
catastrophe  and  conclusion  they  had.  For  everybody,  though 
extremely  interested  in  details  and  particulars,  naturally  longs 
to  be  told  the  end  of  a  story.  I  may  add  that  it  was  in  this 
period  also  that  the  kings  gave  the  clearest  indication  of  their 
character  and  policy.  For  what  was  only  rumour  in  regard  to 
them  before  was  now  become  a  matter  of  clear  and  universal 
knowlec^e,  even  to  those  who  did  not  care  to  take  part  in 
public  business.  Therefore,  as  I  wished  to  make  my  narrative 
worthy  of  its  subject,  I  have  not,  as  in  former  instances,  in- 
cluded the  history  of  two  years  in  one  book.  .  .  . 

EletUd  Consul  for  B.C.  205  (see  11,  33)  Scipio  had  Sicily 
assigned  as  his  provincia,  with  leave  to  cross  to  Africa  if  necessary 
{Livy,  38,  4S),  Ife  sent  Laelius  to  Africa  in  b.C,  205,  but  re- 
mained himself  in  Sicily.  Next  spring  (b.c.  204)  he  crossed  to 
Africa  with  a  year's  additional  imperium.  In  tlte  course  of  this 
year  ke  ravaged  the  Carthaginian  territory  and  besieged  Vtica 
(Livy,  39,  3S),  and  at  the  beginning  of  u.c.  203  his  imperium 
was  prolonged  till  he  should  have  finished  the  war  {id.  30,  i). 

1.  While  the  Consuls  were  thus  engaged,*  Scipio  in  Libya 
'  Caepio  was  commanding  in  Bmllium,  Scrvilius  in  Etniria  and  Liguria. 
Livy,  30,  I. 


124  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YB I  US  book 

learnt  during  the  winter  that  the  Carthaginians  were  fitting 

out  a  fleet;   he  therefore  devoted  himself  to 

Cn.  Serviiius    similar  preparations  as  well  as  to  pressing  on 

Cacpio,  c.      the  siege  of  Utica.     He  did  not,  however,  give 

ServUius  Geminus  y     ^^  j^^p^g  ^f  Svphax;   but  as  their  forces 

Coss.    Livy,  30, 1.    ^  ^/  ..  u     1       *.         J- 

were  not  far  apart  he  kept  sendmg  messages  to 
him,  convinced  that  he  would  be  able  to  detach  him  from  the 
Carthaginians.  He  still  cherished  the  belief  that  Syphax  was 
getting  tired  of  the  girP  for  whose  sake  he  had  joined  the 
Carthaginians,  and  of  his  alliance  with  the  Punic  people 
generally ;  for  the  Numidians,  he  knew,  were  naturally  quick 
to  feel  satiety,  and  constant  neither  to  gods  nor  men.  Scipio's 
mind,  however,  was  distracted  with  various  anxieties,  and  his 
prospects  were  far  from  seeming  secure  to  him ;  for  he  shrank 
from  an  engagement  in  the  open  field  on  account  of  the 
enemy's  great  superiority  in  numbers.  He  therefore  seized  an 
opportunity  which  now  presented  itself.  Some  of  his  mes- 
sengers to  Syphax  reported  to  him  that  the  Carthaginians  had 
constructed  their  huts  in  their  winter  camp  of  various  kinds  of 
wood  and  boughs  without  any  earth ;  while  the  old  army  of  the 
Numidians  made  theirs  of  reeds,  and  the  reinforcements  which 
were  now  coming  in  from  the  neighbouring  townships  constructed 
theirs  of  boughs  only,  some  of  them  inside  the  trench  arid  pali- 
sade, but  the  greater  number  outside.  Scipio  therefore  made  up 
his  mind  that  the  manner  of  attacking  them,  which  would  be 
most  unexpected  by  the  enemy  and  most  successful  for  himself, 
would  be  by  fire.  He  therefore  turned  his  attention  to 
organising  such  an  attack.     Now,  in  his  communications  with 

Scipio,  Syphax  was  continually  harping  upon  his 
SypiMix.    °  proposal  that  the  Carthaginians  should  evacuate 

Italy  and  the  Romans  Libya ;  and  that  the  pos- 
sessions held  by  either  between  these  two  countries  should 
remain  in  statu  quo.  Hitherto  Scipio  had  refused  to  listen  to 
this  suggestion,  but  he  now  gave  Syphax  a  hint  by  the  mouth 
of  his  messengers  that  the  course  he  wished  to  see  followed 
was  not  impossible.  Greatly  elated  at  this,  Syphax  became 
much  bolder  than  before  in  his  communications  with  Scipio ; 

^  Sophanisba,  the  daughter  of  Hasdrubal  son  of  Gcsco.    Livy,  29,  23  ;  30, 
12,  IS- 


XIV      SCIPIO  PLANS  TO  ATTACK  THE  PUNIC  CAMP      125 

the  numbers  of  the  messengers  sent  backwards  and  forwards, 
and  the  frequency  of  their  visits,  were  redoubled ;  and  they 
sometimes  even  stayed  several  days  in  each  other's  camps 
without  any  thought  of  precaution.  On  these  occasions 
Scipto  always  took  care  to  send,  with  the  envoys,  some  men  of 
tried  experience  or  of  military  knowledge,  dressed  up  as  slaves 
in  rough  and  common  clothes,  that  they  might  examine  and 
investigate  in  security  the  approaches  and  entrances  to  both 
the  entrenchments.  For  there  were  two  camps,  one  that  of 
Hasdrubal,  containing  thirty  thousand  infantry  and  three  thou- 
sand cavalry;  and  another  about  ten  stades  distant  from  it  of  the 
Numidians,  containing  ten  thousand  cavalry  and  about  fifty  thou- 
sand infantry.  The  latter  was  the  easier  of  approach,  and  its 
huts  were  well  calculated  for  being  set  on  fire,  because,  as  1 
said  before,  the  Numidians  had  not  made  theirs  of  timber  and 
earth,  but  used  simply  reeds  and  thatch  in  their  construction. 
2.  By  the  beginning  of  spring  Scipio  had  completed  the 
reconnaissances  necessary  for  this  attempt  upon 
the  enemy ;  and  he  began  launching  his  ships,  ^'^°™ 
and  getting  the  engines  on  them  into  working 
order,  as  though  with  the  purpose  of  assaulting  Utica  by  sea. 
With  his  land  forces  he  once  more  occupied  the  high  ground 
overlooking  the  town,  and  carefully  fortified  it  and  secured  it 
by  trenches.  He  wished  the  enemy  to  believe  that  he  was 
doing  this  for  the  sake  of  carrying  on  the  siege  ;  but  he  really 
meant  it  as  a  cover  for  his  men,  who  were  to  be  engaged  in  the 
undertaking  described  above,  to  prevent  the  garrison  sallying 
out,  when  the  legions  were  separated  from  their  lines, 
assaulting  the  palisade  which  was  so  near  to  them,  and  attack- 
ing the  division  left  in  charge  of  it.  Whilst  in  the  midst  of 
these  preparations,  he  sent  to  Syphax  inquiring  whether,  "  in 
case  he  agreed  to  his  proposab,  the  Carthaginians  would 
assent,  and  not  say  again  that  they  would  deliberate  on  the 
terms }"  He  ordered  these  legates  at  the  same  time  not  to 
return  to  him,  until  they  had  received  an  answer  on  these 
points.  When  the  envoys  arrived,  the  Numtdian  king  was 
convinced  that  Scipio  was  on  the  point  of  concluding  the 
agreement,  partly  from  the  fact  that  the  ambassadors  said  that 
they  would  not  go  away  until  they  got  his  answer,  and  partly 


126  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YB I  US  book 

because  of  the  anxiety  expressed  as  to  the  disposition  of  the 
Carthaginians.  He  therefore  sent  immediately  to  Hasdrubal, 
stating  the  facts  and  urging  him  to  accept  the  peace.  Mean- 
while he  neglected  all  precautions  himself,  and  allowed  the 
Numidians,  who  were  now  joining,  to  pitch  their  tents  where 
they  were,  outside  the  lines.  Scipio  in  appearance  acted  in 
the  same  way,  while  in  reality  he  was  pushing  on  his  prepara- 
tions with  the  utmost  care.  When  a  message  was  returned 
from  the  Carthaginians  bidding  Syphax  complete  the  treaty  of 
peace,  the  Numidian  king,  in  a  state  of  great  exaltation,  com- 
municated the  news  to  the  envoys ;  who  immediately  departed 
to  their  own  camp  to  inform  Scipio  from  the  king  of  what 
had  been  clone.  As  soon  as  he  heard  it,  the  Roman  general 
at  once  sent  fresh  envoys  to  inform  Syphax  that  Scipio  was 
quite  satisfied  and  was  anxious  for  the  peace;  but  that  the 
members  of  his  council  differed  from  him,  and  held  that  they 
should  remain  as  they  were.  The  ambassadors  duly  arrived 
and  informed  the  Numidians  of  this.    Scipio  sent  this  mission  to 

avoid  the  appearance  of  a  breach  of  truce,  if  he 
^^e^l  should  perform  any  act  of  hostility  while  negoti- 
ations for  peace  were  still  going  on  between 
the  parties.     He  considered  that,  by  making  this  statement,  he 
would  be  free  to  act  in  whatever  way  he  chose  without  laying 
himself  open  to  blame. 

8.  Syphax's  annoyance  at  this  message  was  great,  in  pro- 
portion to  the  hopes  he  had  previously  entertained  of  making 
the  peace.  He  had  an  interview  with  Hasdrubal,  and  told 
him  of  the  message  he  had  received  from  the  Romans ;  but 
though  they  deliberated  long  and  earnestly  as  to  what  they 
ought  to  do,  they  neither  had  any  idea  or  conjecture  as  to 
what  was  really  going  to  happen.  For  they  had  no  anticipa- 
tion whatever  as  to  the  need  of  taking  precautions,  or  of  any 
danger  threatening  them,  but  were  all  eagerness  and  excite- 
ment to  strike  some  blow,  and  thus  provoke  the  enemy  to 
descend  into  the  level  ground.     Meanwhile  Scipio  allowed  his 

army  generally,  by  the  preparations  he  was  making 

^iiisprojecT^  ^^^  ^^^  Orders  he  was  issuing,  to  imagine  that 

his  aim  was  the  capture  of  Utica;  but  sum- 
moning the  most  able  and  trusty  Tribunes  at  noon,  he  im- 


XiT         SYPHAX  AND  HASDRUBAL  ARE  DELUDED  127 

parted  to  tbem  his  design,  and  ordered  them  to  cause  their 
men  to  get  their  supper  early,  and  then  to  lead  the  legions 
outside  the  camp  as  soon  as  the  buglers  gave  the  usual  signal 
by  a  simultaneous  blast  of  their  bugles.  For  it  is  a  custom  in 
the  Roman  army  for  the  trumpeters  and  buglers  to  sound  a 
call  near  the  commander's  tent  at  supper  time,  that  the  night 
pickets  may  then  take  up  their  proper  positions.  Scipio  next 
summoned  the  spies  whom  he  had  sent  at  difierent  times  to 
reconnoitre  the  enemy's  quarters,  and  carefully  compared  and 
studied  the  accounts  they  gave  about  the  roads  leading  to  the 
hostile  camps  and  the  entrances  to  them,  employing  Massanissa 
to  criticise  their  words  and  assist  him  with  his  advice,  because 
he  was  acquainted  with  the  locality. 

4.  Everything  being  prepared  for  his  expedition,  Scipio 
left  a  sufficiently  strong  guard  in  the  camp,  and  got  the  rest  of 
the  men  on  the  march  towards  the  end  of  the  first  watch,  the 
enemy  being  about  sixty  stades  distant  Arrived  in  the  neigh- 
bourhood of  the  enemy,  about  the  end  of  the  third  watch,  he 
assigned  to  Gains  Laehus  and  Massanissa  half  his  Roman 
.  soldiers  and  all  his  Numidians,  with  orders  to  attack  the  camp 
of  Syphax,  urging  them  to  quit  themselves  like  brave  men  and 
do  nothing  carelessly;  with  the  clear  understanding  that,  as  the 
darkness  hindered  and  prevented  the  use  of  the  eyes,  a  night 
attack  required  all  the  more  the  assistance  of  a  cool  head  and 
a  firm  heart  The  rest  of  the  army  he  took  the  command  of 
in  person,  and  led  against  HasdrubaL  Ke  had  calculated  on 
not  beginning  his  assault  until  Laelius's  division  had  set  fire  to 
the  enemy's  huts;  he  therefore  proceeded  slowly,  Destmction  of  the 
The  latter  meanwhile  advanced  in  two  divisions,  camp  of  Sypbax 
which  attacked  the  enemy  simultaneously.  The  byCLaeiius 
construction  of  the  huts  being  as  though  pur-  ^  ^''^ 
posely  contrived  to  be  susceptible  of  a  conHagmtion,  as  I  have 
already  explained,  as  soon  as  the  front  rank  men  began  to  set 
light  to  them,  the  fire  caught  all  the  first  row  of  huts  fiercely, 
and  soon  got  beyond  all  control,  from  the  closeness  of  the  huts 
to  each  other,  and  the  amount  of  combustible  material  which 
they  contained.  Laelius  remained  in  the  rear  as  a  reserve ; 
but  Massanissa,  knowing  the  localities  through  which  those 
who  fled  from  the  fire  would  be  sure  to  retreat,  stationed  his 


128  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YB I  US  book 

own  soldiers  at  those  spots.  Not  a  single  Numidian  had  any 
suspicion  of  the  true  state  of  the  case,  not  even  Syphax 
himself;  but  thinking  that  it  was  a  mere  accidental  confla- 
gration of  the  rampart,  some  of  them  started  unsuspiciously 
out  of  bed,  others  sprang  out  of  their  tents  in  the  midst  of  a 
carouse  and  with  the  cup  actually  at  their  lips.  The  result 
was  that  numbers  of  them  got  trampled  to  death  by  their  own 
friends  at  the  exits  from  the  camp ;  many  were  caught  by  the 
flames  and  burnt  to  death ;  while  all  those  who  escaped  the 
flame  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy,  and  were  killed, 
without  knowing  what  was  happening  to  them  or  what  they 
were  doing. 

5.  At   the  same  time  the   Carthaginians,   observing   the 

proportions  of  the  conflagration  and  the  huge- 
and ofHasdru-  ^^^^  ^^ ^^^  ^^^^  ^^^  ^^  ^.j^j^^^^  imagined  that 

the  Numidian  camp  had  been  accidentally 
set  on  fire.  Some  of  them  therefore  started  at  once  to 
render  assistance,  and  all  the  rest  hurried  outside  their  own 
camp  unarmed,  and  stood  there  gazing  in  astonishment  at 
the  spectacle.  Everything  having  thus  succeeded  to  his  best 
wishes,  Scipio  fell  upon  these  men  outside  their  camp,  and 
either  put  them  to  the  sword,  or,  driving  them  back  into 
the  camp,  set  fire  to  their  huts.  The  disaster  of  the  Punic 
army  was  thus  very  like  that  which  had  just  befallen  the 
Numidians,  fire  and  sword  in  both  cases  combining  to  destroy 
them.  Hasdrubal  immediately  gave  up  all  idea  of  combating 
the  fire,  for  he  knew  from  the  coincidence  of  the  two  that  the 
fire  in  the  Numidian  camp  was  not  accidental,  as  he  had 
supposed,  but  had  originated  from  some  desperate  design  of 
the  enemy.  He  therefore  turned  his  attention  to  saving  his 
own  life,  although  there  was  now  little  hope  left  of  doing  so. 
For  the  fire  was  spreading  rapidly  and  was  catching  every- 
where ;  while  the  camp  gangways  were  full  of  horses,  beasts  of 
burden,  and  men,  some  of  them  half  dead  and  devoured  by 
the  fire,  and  others  in  a  state  of  such  frantic  terror  and  mad 
excitement  that  they  prevented  any  attempts  at  making  a 
defence,  and  by  the  utter  tumult  and  confusion  which  they 
created  rendered  all  chance  of  escape  hopeless.  The  case  of 
Syphax  was  the  same  as  that  of  Hasdrubal,  as  it  was  also  that 


XIT      DREADFUL  SCENE  IN  THE  BURNING  CAMPS       129 

of  the  other  officers.  The  two  former,  however,  did  manage 
to  escape,  accompanied  by  a  few  horsemen :  but  all  those 
myriads  of  men,  horses,  and  beasts  of  burden,  either  met  a 
miserable  and  pitiable  death  from  the  fire,  or,  if  they  escaped 
the  violence  of  that,  some  of  the  men  perished  ignominiously 
at  the  hands  of  the  enemy,  cut  down  naked  and  defenceless,  not 
only  without  their  aims,  but  without  so  much  as  their  clothes 
to  cover  them.  The  whole  place  was  filled  with  yells  of  pain, 
confused  cries,  terror,  and  unspeakable  din,  mingled  with  a 
conflagration  which  spread  rapidly  and  blazed  with  the  utmost 
fierceness.  It  was  the  combination  and  suddenness  of  these 
horrors  that  made  them  so  awful,  any  one  of  which  by  itself 
would  have  been  sufficient  to  strike  terror  into  the  hearts  of 
men.  It  is  accordingly  impossible  for  the  imagination  to 
exa^erate  the  dreadful  scene,  so  completely  did  it  surpass 
in  horror  everything  hitherto  recorded  Of  all  the  brilliant 
achievements  of  Scipio  this  appears  to  me  to  have  been  the 
most  brilliant  and  the  most  daring.  .  .  . 

6.  When  day  broke,  and  he  found  the  enemy  either  killed 
or    in    headlong    flight,    Scipio    exhorted    his     Hasdnjl>al  at 
Tribunes  to  activity,  and  at  once  started  in  pur-  Anda,  see  Appian, 
suit.     At  first  the  Carthaginian  general  seemed         ^'  "* 
inclined  to  stand  his  ground,  though  told  of  Scipio's  approach, 
trusting  in  the  strength  of  the  town  [of  Anda] ;  but  when  he 
saw  that  the  inhabitants  were  in  a  mutinous  state,  he  shrank 
from  meeting  the  attack  of  Scipio,  and  fled  with  the  relics  of  his 
army,  which  consisted  of  as  many  as  five  hundred  cavalry  and 
about  two  thousand  infantry.     The  inhabitants  of  the  town 
thereupon  submitted  unconditionally  to  the  Romans,  and  were 
spared  by  Scipio,  who,  however,  gave  up  two  neighbouring  towns 
to  the  legions  to  plunder.    This  being  done  he  returned  to  his 
original  entrenchment.     Baffled  in  the  hopes  which  they  had 
entertained  of  the  course  which  the  campaign 
would  take,  the  Carthaginians  were  deeply  de-      cmi^gc. 
pressed.     They  had  expected  to  shut  up  the 
Romans    on    the  promontory    near    Utica,  which  had   been 
the    site   of  their  winter  quarters,  and  besiege   them   there 
with  their  army  and  fleet  both  by  sea  and  land.     With  this 
view  all  their  preparations  had  been  made ;  and  when  they 

VOt.  II  K 


I30  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  book 

saw,  quite  contrary  to  their  calculations,  that  they  were  not 
only  driven  from  the  open  country  by  the  enemy,  but  were 
in  hourly  expectation  of  an  attack  upon  themselves  and  their 
city,  they  became  completely  disheartened  and  panic-stricken. 
Their  circumstances,  however,  admitted  of  no  delay.     They 
were  compelled  at  once  to  take  precautions  and  adopt  some 
measures  for  the  future.     But  the  senate  was  filled  with  doubt 
and  varied  and  confused  suggestions.     Some  said  that  they 
ought  to  send  for  Hannibal  and  recall  him  from  Italy,  their 
one  hope  of  safety  being  now  centred  in  that  general  and  his 
forces.    Others  were  for  an  embassy  to  Scipio  to  obtain  a  truce 
and  discuss  with  him  the  terms  of  a  pacification  and  treaty. 
The  Senate,  how-  Others  again  were  for  keeping  up  their  courage 
ever,  resolves  to  and  Collecting  their  forces,  and  sending  a  mes- 
continue  their    gage  to  Syphax;  who,  they  said,  was  at  the  neigh- 
bouring town  of  Abba,  engaged  in   collecting 
the  remnants  of  his  army.     This  last  suggestion  was  the  one 
which  ultimately  prevailed.      The  Government  of  Carthage 
accordingly  set  about  collecting  troops,  and  sent  a  despatch  to 
Syphax  begging  him  to  support  them  and  abide  by  his  original 
policy,  as  a  general  with  an  army  would  presently  join  him. 

7.  Meanwhile  the  Roman  commander  was  pressing  on  the 
seige  of  Utica.  But  when  he  heard  that  Syphax  was  still  in 
position,  and  that  the  Carthaginians  were  once  more  collecting 
an  army,  he  led  out  his  forces  and  pitched  his  camp  close 
under  the  walls  of  Utica.  At  the  same  time  he  divided  the 
booty  among  the  soldiers.  .  .  }  The  merchants  who  pur- 
chased them  from  the  soldiers  went  away  with  very  profitable 
bargains;  for  the  recent  victory  inspired  the  soldiers  with 
high  hopes  of  a  successful  conclusion  of  the  campaign,  and 
they  therefore  thought  little  of  the  spoils  already  obtained, 
and  made  no  difficulties  in  selling  them  to  the  merchants. 
Q„,.K«^  ;e  «^         The  Numidian  king  and  his  friends  were  at 

oypnax  is  per-  •    j    ^  •  « 

suaded  by  Sophan-  "fst  mmdcd  to  contmue  their  retreat  to  their  own 

isba  to  stand  by  land.     But  while  deliberating  on  this,  certain 

^^^  ^"^^^^^"^  Celtiberes,  over  four  thousand  in  number,  who 

had  been  hired  as  soldiers  by  the  Carthaginians, 
arrived  in  the  vicinity  of  Abba.     Encouraged  by  this  addi- 

^  Some  words  are  lost  from  the  text. 


XIT    CARTBAGINIANS  REINFORCED  AND  RESOLUTE     131 

tiooal  strength  the  Numidians  stopped  on  their  retreat.  And 
when  the  young  lady,  who  was  daughter  of  Hasdrubal  and 
wife  of  Syphax,  added  her  earnest  entreaties  that  he  would 
remain  and  not  abandon  the  Carthaginians  at  such  a  crisis,  the 
Numidian  king  gave  way  and  consented  to  her  prayer.  The 
approach  of  these  Celtiberes  did  a  great  deal  also  to  encourage 
the  hopes  of  the  Carthaginians :  for  instead  of  four  thousand, 
it  was  reported  at  Carthage  that  they  were  ten  thousand,  and 
that  their  bravery  and  the  excellency  of  their  arms  made  them 
irresistible  in  the  field.  Excited  by  this  rumour,  and  by  the 
boastful  talk  which  was  current  among  the  common  people, 
the  Carthaginians  felt  their  resolution  to  once  xhe  Canhaginians 
more  take  the  field  redoubled.  And  finally,  again  take  the 
within  thirty  days,  they  pitched  a  camp  in  con-  ''^'''■ 
junction  with  the  Numidians  and  Celtiberes  on  what  are 
called  the  Great  Plains,  with  an  army  amounting  to  no  less 
than  thirty  thousand. 

8.  Wiien  news  of  these  proceedings  reached  the  Roman 
camp  Scipio  immediately  determined  to  attack.  Leaving 
orders,  therefore,  to  the  army  and  navy,  which  were  besieg- 
ing Utica,  as  to  what  they  were  to  do,  he  started  with  all  his 
army  in  light  marching  order.  On  the  fifth  day  he  reached 
the  Great  Plains,  and  during  the  first  day  after  his  arrival 
encamped  on  a  piece  of  rising  ground  about  thirty  stades  from 
the  enemy.  Next  day  he  descended  into  the  plain  and  drew  up 
his  army  ^  at  a  distance  of  seven  stades  from  the  enemy,  with 
his  cavalry  forming  an  advanced  guard.  After  skirmishing 
attacks  carried  on  by  both  sides  during  the  next  two  days,  on 
the  fourth  both  armies  were  deliberately  brought  out  into 
position  and  drawn  up  in  order  of  battle,  xhc  baiiie  on  the 
Scipio  followed  exactly  the  Roman  system.  Great  Plains. 
stationing  the  maniples  of  hastati  in  the  front,''^"'J"""i°''~""3- 
behind  them  the  principes,  and  lastly  the  Iriarii  in  the  rear. 
Of  his  cavalry  he  stationed  the  Italians  on  the  right  wing,  the 
Numidians  and  Massanissa  on  the  left.     Syphax  and  Hasdmbal 

'  irap«F/|9oXX«,  whioh  Schweig.  tmnslatra  castra  locavil .-  but  though  the 
word  does  sometimes  bear  that  meaning,  I  cannot  think  that  it  does  so  here. 
Scipio  Hxms  to  hat-c  retained  his  camp  on  the  hill,  only  (wo  and  a  half  miles' 
distant,  and  to  have  come  down  into  the  plain  to  offer  bailie  each  of  the 
three  days.     Hence  Ibc  imperial. 


132  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  book 

stationed  the  Celtiberes  in  the  centre  opposite  the  Roman 

cohorts,  the  Numidians  on  the  left,  and  the  Carthaginians  on 

the  right     At  the  very  first  chaige   the   Numidians  reeled 

The  Roman     before  the  Italian  cavalry,  and  the  Carthaginians 

wings  arc  both  before  those  under  Massanissa ;  for  their  many 

victorious.      previous  defeats  had  completely  demoralised 

them.     But  the  Celtiberes  fought  gallantly,  for  they  had  no 

hope  of  saving  themselves  by  flight,  being  entirely  unacquainted 

with  the  country ;  nor  any  expectation  of  being  spared  if  they 

were  taken  prisoners  on  account  of  their  perfidy  to  Scipio :  for 

they  were  regarded  as  having  acted  in  defiance  of  justice  and 

of  their  treaty  in  coming  to  aid  the  Carthaginians  against  the 

Romans,  though  they  had  never  suffered  any  act  of  hostility  at 

The  Celtiberes,  on  Scipio's  hands  during  the  campaigns  in  Iberia. 

the  centre,  are  cut  When,  however,  the  two  wings  gave  way  these 

to  pieces  after  a  jj^gj^  ^.gj^   surrounded   by  the   principes  and 

gallant  resistance,  ^^.^j^  ^^^  ^^^  ^^  p.^^^^  ^^  ^^  ^^j^  ^^^^^  ^^ 

a  man.  Thus  perished  the  Celtiberes,  who  yet  did  very 
effective  service  to  the  Carthaginians,  not  only  during  the 
whole  battle,  but  during  the  retreat  also;  for,  if  it  had  not 
been  for  the  hindrance  caused  by  them,  the  Romans  would 
have  pressed  the  fugitives  closely,  and  very  few  of  the  enemy 
would  have  escaped.     As  it  was,  owing  to  the  delay  caused 

by  these  men,  Syphax  and  his  cavalry  effected 

Hasdmb^ie.  ^^^^^  ^^^^^^^  ^^  ^^^  o^'^   kingdom   in  safety ; 

while  Hasdrubal  with  the  survivors  of  his  army 
did  the  same  to  Carthage. 

9.  After  making  the  necessary  arrangements  as  to  the  booty 
J,  .  .        .     .u  and  prisoners,  Scipio  summoned  a  council  of 

ocipio  receives  ine  .  _  _ 

submission  of  the  war  to  consult  as  to  what  to  do  next  It  was 
country,  while  resolved  that  Scipio  himself  and  one  part  of  the 
Laciius  goes  in  ^^^^    g^ould  Stay  in  the  country  and  visit  the 

pursuit  of  Syphax.         /  i.'i      t      v  j    •»*  • 

various  towns;  while  Laelius  and  Massanissa, 
with  the  Numidians  and  the  rest  of  the  Roman  legions, 
should  pursue  Syphax  and  give  him  no  time  to  deliberate  or 
make  any  preparations.  This  being  settled  the  commanders 
separated ;  the  two  latter  going  with  their  division  in  pursuit 
of  Syphax,  Scipio  on  a  round  of  the  townships.  Some  of 
these  were  terrified  into  a  voluntary  submission  to  the  Romans, 


XIV         SCIPrds  VICTORY  ON  THE  GREAT  PLAINS        133 

Others  he  jwompdy  took  by  assault  The  whole  country  was 
ripe  for  a  change,  owing  to  the  constant  series  of  miseries  and 
contributions,  under  which  it  had  been  groaning  from  the  pro- 
tracted wars  in  Iberia. 

In  Carthage  meanwhile,  where  the  panic  had  been  great 
enough  before,  a  still  wilder  state  of  excitement 
prevailed,  after  this  second  disaster,  and  the  dis-  c^thaee' 
appointment  of  the  hopes  of  success  which  they 
had  entertained.  However,  those  of  the  counsellors  who 
claimed  the  highest  character  for  courage  urged  that  they 
should  go  on  board  their  ships  and  attack  the  besiegers  of 
Utica,  try  to  raise  the  blockade,  and  engage  the  enemy  at  sea, 
who  were  not  in  a  forward  state  of  preparation  in  that  depart- 
ment; that  they  should  recall  Hannibal,  and  without  delay 
test  to  the  utmost  this  one  more  chance :  for  both  these 
measures  offered  great  and  reasonable  opportunities  of  secur- 
ing their  safety.  Others  declared  that  their  circumstances  no 
longer  admitted  of  these  measures :  what  they  had  to  do  was 
to  fortify  their  town  and  prepare  to  stand  a  siege ;  for  chance 
would  give  them  many  occasions  of  striking  a  successful  blow 
if  they  only  held  together.  At  the  same  time  they  advised 
that  they  should  deliberate  on  coming  to  terms  and  making  a 
treaty,  and  see  on  what  conditions  and  by  what  means  they 
might  extricate  themselves  from  the  danger.  After  a  long 
debate,  all  these  proposals  were  adopted  together. 

10.  Upon  this  decision  being  come  to,  those  who  were  to 
sail  to  Italy  went  straight  from  the  council  chamber  to  the  sea, 
while  the  Navarch  went  to  prepare  the  ships.  The  rest  began 
to  take  measures  for  securing  the  city,  and  remained  in  con- 
stant consultation  on  the  measures  necessary  for  the  purpose. 

Meanwhile  Scipio's  camp  was  getting  gorged  with  booty ; 
for  he  found  no  one  to  resist  him,  and  everybody  yielded  to 
bis  attacks.  He  therefore  determined  to  despatch  the  greater 
part  of  the  booty  to  his  original  camp;  while  he  advanced  with 
his  army  in  light  marching  order  to  seize  the  entrenchment 
near  Tunes,  and  pitched  his  camp  within  the  view  of  the  in- 
habitants of  Carthage,  thinking  that  this  would  do  more  than 
anything  else  to  strike  terror  into  their  hearts  and  lower  their 
courage. 


134  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  book 

The  Carthaginians  had  in  a  few  days  manned  and  pro- 
visioned their  ships,  and  were  engaged  in  getting  under 
sail  and  carrying  out  their  plan  of  operations,  when  Scipio 
arrived  at  Tunes,  and,  the  garrison  flying  at  his  approach, 
occupied  the  town,  which  is  about  a  hundred  stades  from  Car- 
thage, of  remarkable  strength  both  natural  and  artificial,  and 
visible  from  nearly  every  point  of  Carthage. 

Just  as  the  Romans  pitched  their  camp  there,  the  Cartha- 
Scipio  rccaUed  to  ginians  were  putting  out  to  sea  on  board  thieir 
utica  by  the  fear  ships  to  sail  to  Utica.      Seeing  the  enemy  thus 

of  an  attack     putting  out,  and  fearing  some  misfortune  to  his 

upon  Ills  tleet.  <i.r^**  jj  j*i 

own  fleet,  Scipio  was  rendered  exceedingly 
anxious,  because  no  one  there  was  prepared  for  such  an  attack, 
or  had  anything  in  readiness  to  meet  the  danger.  He  there- 
fore broke  up  his  camp  and  marched  back  in  haste  to  support 
his  men.  There  he  found  his  decked  ships  thoroughly  well 
fitted  out  for  raising  siege-engines  and  applying  them  to  walls, 
and  generally  for  all  purposes  of  an  assault  upon  a  town,  but 
not  in  the  least  in  the  trim  for  a  sea-fight ;  while  the  enemy's 
fleet  had  been  under  process  of  rigging  for  this  purpose  tiie 
whole  winter.  He  therefore  gave  up  all  idea  of  putting  to  sea 
to  meet  the  enemy  and  accepting  battle  there ;  but  anchoring 
his  decked  ships  side  by  side  he  moored  the  transports  round 
them,  three  or  four  deep ;  and  then,  taking  down  the  masts  and 
yard-arms,  he  lashed  the  vessels  together  firmly  by  means  of 
these,  keeping  a  space  between  each  sufficient  to  enable  the 
light  craft  to  sail  in  and  out  .  .  . 


PTOLEMY    PHILOPATOR,    B.C    2  2  2-205 

1 1.  Philo  was  a  parasite  of  Agathocles,  the  son  of  Oenanthe, 
and  the  friend  of  king  Philopator.  .  .  . 

Many  statues  of  Cleino,  the  girl  who  acted  as  cupbearer 

The  extra-  ^^  Ptolemy  Philadelphus,  were  set  up  at  Alex- 
ordinary  influence  andria,  draped  in  a  single  tunic  and  holding  a 
of  women  of  low  cup  in  the  hands.     And  are  not  the  most  splen- 

Ai^andri^     ^^^  bouses  there  those  which  go  by  the  names 

of  Murtium,  Mnesis,  and  Pothine  ?     And  yet 

Mnesis  was  a  flute -girl,  as  was  Pothine,  and  Murtium  was  a 


XiT  PTOLEMY  PHir.OPATOR  I3S 

public  prostitute.  And  was  not  Agathocleia,  the  mistress  of 
kir^  Ptolemy  Fhilopator,  an  influential  personage, — she  who 
was  the  niin  of  the  whole  kingdom  ?  .  .  . 

12.  The  question  may  be  asked,  perhaps,  why  I  have 
chosen  to  give  a  sketch  of  Egyptian  history  The  feeble  char- 
here,  going  back  a  considerable  period ;  whereas,  acta-  of  Ptolemy 
in  the  case  of  the  rest  of  my  history,  I  havQ  Phi'opaior. 
recorded  the  events  of  each  year  in  the  several  countries  side 
by  side  ?  I  have  done  so  for  the  following  reasons  :  Ptolemy 
Philopator,  of  whom  I  am  now  speaking,  after  the  conclusion 
of  the  war  for  the  possession  of  Coele-Syria,^  abandoned  all 
noble  pursuits  and  gave  himself  up  to  the  hfe  of  debauchery 
which  I  have  just  described.  But  late  in  life  he  was  com- 
pelled by  circumstances  to  engage  in  the  war  1  have  men- 
tioned,* which,  over  and  above  the  mutual  cruelty  and  lawless- 
ness with  which  it  was  conducted,  witnessed  neither  pitched 
battle,  sea  fight,  siege,  or  anything  else  worth  recording.  I 
thought,  therefore,  that  it  would  be  easier  for  me  as  a  writer, 
and  more  intelligible  to  my  readers,  if  I  did  not  touch  upon 
everything  year  by  year  as  it  occurred,  or  give  a  full  account 
of  transactions  which  were  insignificant  and  undeserving  of 
serious  attention ;  but  should  once  for  all  sum  up  and  describe 
the  character  and  policy  of  this  king. 

'  The  war  with  Antiochus,  B.C.  aiB-ai7.     See  s,  40,  58-71,  79-87. 
*  A  civil  vk'ar,  apparently  in  a  rebellion  caused  by  bis  own  feeble  and  vicious 
character.     It  seems  lo  be  that  referred  to  in  5,  107, 


BOOK   XV 

A  slight  success  on  the  part  of  the  Carthaginian  fleet  at 

Utica  (14,  10)  had  been  more  than  outweighed  by  the  capture 

of  Syphax  by  Laelius  \Livy^  39,  11}     Negotiations  for  peace 

followed^  and  an  armistice^  in  tlie  course  of  which  occurred  the 

incident  referred  to  in  the  first  extract  of  this  book, 

1.  The  Carthaginians  having  seized  the  transports  as  prizes 
Some  transports  ^f  war,  and  with  them  an  extraordinary  quantity 
under  Cn.  Octa-  of  provisions,  Scipio  was  extremely  enraged, 
h"^  i^*^^^r  ^"  "^^^  ^°  much  at  the  loss  of  the  provisions,  as  by 
thage,  and  tak^n  the  fact  that  the  enemy  had  thereby  obtained 
possession  of  by  a  vast  supply  of  necessaries ;  and  still  more  at 
the  Carthaginians  ^l^g   Carthaginians   having  violated   the  sworn 

m  spite  of  the  .  ,  r  *  ^      t 

truce.  Autumn  articles  of  truce,  and  commenced  the  war 
of  B.C.  203.     afresh.     He  therefore  at  once  selected  Lucius 

^^'  ^"*^»  30.  24.  Sergius,  Lucius  Baebius,  and  Lucius  Fabius  to 
go  to  Carthage,  to  remonstrate  on  what  had  taken  place,  and 
at  the  same  time  to  announce  that  the  Roman  people  had 
ratified  the  treaty ;  for  he  had  lately  received  a  despatch  from 
home  to  that  effect  Upon  their  arrival  in  Carthage  these 
envoys  first  had  an  audience  of  the  Senate,  and  then  were 
introduced  to  a  meeting  of  the  people.     On  both  occasions 

they  spoke  with  great  freedom  on  the  situation 

Roi^nc'liVoys.  °^  ^^^^^^'  reminding  their  hearers  that  "Their 

ambassadors  who  had  come  to  the  Roman 
camp  at  Tunes,  on  being  admitted  to  the  council  of  officers, 
had  not  been  content  with  appealing  to  the  gods  and 
kissing  the  ground,  as  other  people  do,  but  had  thrown 
themselves  upon  the  earth,  and  in  abject  humiliation 
had  kissed  the  feet  of  the  assembled  officers ;  and  then,  rising 


BOOK  XV   SPEECH  OF  ROMAN  ENVOYS  AT  CARTHAGE    137 

from  the  ground,  had  reproached  themselves  for  breaking  the 
existing  treaty  between  the  Romans  and  Carthaginians,  and 
acknowledged  that  they  deserved  every  severity  at  the  hands 
of  the  Romans ;  but  intreated  to  be  spared  the  last  severities, 
from  a  regard  to  the  vicissitudes  of  hupian  fortune,  for  their 
folly  would  be  the  means  of  displaying  the  generosity  of  the 
Romans.  Remembering  all  this,  the  general  and  the  officers 
then  present  in  the  council  were  at  a  loss  to  understand  what 
had  encouraged  them  to  forget  what  they  then  said,  and  to 
venture  to  break  their  sworn  articles  of  agreement.  Plainly  it 
was  this — they  trusted  in  Hannibal  and  the  Hannibal  leaves 
forces  that  had  arrived  with  him.  But  they  iraiy,  aadjune, 
were  very  ill  advised  All  the  world  knew  ^■'^-  *°3- 
that  he  and  his  army  had  been  driven  these  two  years  past 
from  every  port  of  Italy,  and  had  retreated  into  the  neighbour- 
hood of  the  Lacinian  promontory,  where  they  had  been  so 
closely  shut  up  and  almost  besieged,  that  they  had  barely 
been  able  to  get  safe  away  home,  Not  that,  even  if  they  ' 
had  come  fiack,"  he  added,  "  as  conquerors,  and  were  minded 
to  engage  us  who  have  already  defeated  you  in  two  con- 
secutive battles,  ought  you  to  entertain  any  doubt  as  to  the 
result,  or  to  speculate  on  the  chance  of  victory.  The  certainty 
of  defeat  were  a  better  subject  for  your  reflections  :  and  when 
that  takes  place,  what  are  the  gods  that  you  will  summon  to 
your  aid?  And  what  arguments  will  you  use  to  move  the  pity 
of  the  victors  for  your  misfortunes  ?  You  must  needs  expect 
to  be  debarred  from  all  hope  of  mercy  from  gods  and  men 
alike  by  your  perfidy  and  folly." 

2.  After  delivering  this  speech  the  envoys  retired.     Some 
few  of  the  citizens  were  against  breaking  the     Treacherous 
treaty  j    but  the   majority,   both   of  the  poli-  aitempi  on  ihc 
ticians  and  the   Senate,  Ti'ere   much   annoyed      "''esodhe 
by  its  terms,  and  irritated  by  the  plain  speak- 
ing of  the  envoys ;  and,  moreover,  could  not  make   up   their 
minds  to  surrender  the  captured  transports  and  the  provisions 
which  were  on  board  them.     But  their  main  motive  was  a  con- 
fident hope  that  they  might  yet  conquer  by  means  of  Hannibal 
The  people  therefore  voted  to  dismiss  the  envoys  without  an 
answer.     Moreover,  the  political  party,  whose  aim  it  was  to 


138  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  book 

bring  on  the  war  at  all  hazards,  held  a  meeting  and  arranged 
the  following  act  of  treachery.  They  gave  out  that  it  was  neces- 
sary to  make  provision  for  conducting  the  envo]^  back  to  their 
camp  in  safety.  They  therefore  at  once  caused  two  triremes 
to  be  got  ready  to  convoy  them ;  but  at  the  same  time  sent  a 
message  to  the  Navarch  Hasdrubal  to  have  some  vessels  ready 
at  no  great  distance  from  the  Roman  camp,  in  order  that,  as 
soon  as  the  convoys  had  taken  leave  of  the  Roman  envoj^  he 
might  bear  down  upon  their  ships  and  sink  them;  for  the 
Carthaginian  fleet  was  stationed  at  the  time  close  under 
Utica.  Having  made  this  arrangement  with  Hasdrubal,  they 
despatched  the  envoys,  with  instructions  to  the  officers  of  the 
convoys  to  leave  them  and  return,  as  soon  as  they  had  passed 
the  mouth  of  the  River  Macara ;  for  it  was  from  this  point  that 
the  enemy's  camp  came  into  sight  Therefore,  according  to  their 
instructions,  as  soon  as  they  had  passed  this  point,  the  officers 
of  the  convoys  made  signs  of  farewell  to  the  Roman  envoys 
and  returned.  Lucius  and  his  colleagues  suspected  no  danger, 
and  felt  no  other  annoyance  at  this  proceeding  than  as  re- 
garding it  as  a  mark  of  disrespect  But  no  sooner  were  they 
left  thus  alone,  than  three  Carthaginian  vessels  suddenly  started 
out  to  attack  them,  and  came  up  with  the  Roman  quinquereme. 
They  failed,  indeed,  to  stave  her  in,  because  she  evaded  them ; 
nor  did  they  succeed  in  boarding  her,  because  the  men  resisted 
them  with  great  spirit  But  they  ran  up  alongside  of  the 
vessel,  and  kept  attacking  her  at  various  points,  and  managed 
to  wound  the  marines  with  their  darts  and  kill  a  considerable 
number  of  them ;  until  at  last  the  Romans,  observing  that  their 
forage  parties  along  the  shore  were  rushing  down  to  the  beach 
to  their  assistance,  ran  their  ships  upon  land.  Most  of  the 
marines  were  killed,  but  the  envoys  had  the  unexpected  good 
fortune  to  escape  with  their  lives. 

8.  This  was  the  signal  for  the  recommencement  of  the  war 
in  a  fiercer  and  more  angry  spirit  than  before. 

hc«uutie^       ^^^  Romans  on  their  part,  looking  upon  them- 
selves as  having  been  treated  with  perfidy,  were 
possessed  with  a  furious  determination  to  conquer  the  Car- 
thaginians ;  while  the  latter,  conscious  of  the  consequences  of 
what  they  had  done,  were  ready  to  go  all  lengths  to  avoid 


XV  LAST  YEAR  OF  THE  SECOND  FUNIC  WAR  139 

Calling  under  the  power  of  the  enemy.  With  such  feelings 
animating  both  sides,  it  was  quite  evident  that  the  result 
would  have  to  be  decided  on  the  field  of  battle  Conse- 
quently everybody,  not  only  in  Italy  and  Libya,  but  in  Iberia, 
Sicily,  and  Sardinia,  was  in  a  state  of  excited  expectation, 
watching  with  conflicting  feelings  to  see  what  would  happen. 
But  meanwhile  Hannibal,  finding  himself  too  Hannibal's 
weak  in  cavalry,  sent  to  a  certain  Numidian  cavalry  reinforced 
named  Tychaeus,  who  was  a  friend  of  Syphax,  *'''  Tychaeus. 
and  was  reputed  to  possess  the  most  warlike  cavalry  in  Libya, 
urging  him  "to  lend  his  aid,  and  not  let  the  present  opportunity 
slip ;  as  he  must  be  well  aware  that,  if  the  Carthaginians  won 
the  day,  he  would  be  able  to  maintain  his  rule;  but  if  the  Romans 
proved  victorious,  his  very  life  would  be  in  danger,  owing  to  the 
ambition  of  Massanissa."  This  prince  was  convinced  by  these 
arguments,  and  joined  Hannibal  with  two  thousand  horsemen. 

4.   Having    secured    his    fieet,    Scipio    left    Baebius    in 
command  of  it    in  his    place,   while   he  him- 
self went  a  round  of  the  cities.      This  time  scjpi^,^'^iji.sjj 
he  did  not  admit  to  mercy  those  who  volun-  the  CartiiBginian 
tarily  surrendered,  but  carried  all  the  towns  by    temiory,  and 
force,  and  enslaved  the  inhabitants,  to  show  his  j^^J^'^yj^j 
anger  at  the  treachery  of  the  Carthaginians.    To 
Massanissa  he  sent  message  after  message,  explaining  to  him 
how  the  Punic  government  had  broken  the  terms,  and  urging 
him  to  collect  the  largest  army  he  was  able  and  join  him  with 
all  speed.     For  as  soon  as  the  treaty  had  been  made,  Massan- 
issa, as  I  have  said,  had  immediately  departed  with  his  own 
army  and  ten  Roman  cohorts,  infantry  and  cavalry,  accom- 
panied by  some  commissioners  from  Scipio,  that  he  might  not 
only  recover  his  own  kingdom,  but  secure  the  addition  of  that 
of  Syphax  also,  by  the  assistance  of  the  Romans.     And  this 
purpose  was  eventually  effected. 

It  happened  that  just  at  this  time  the  envoys  from  Rome 
arrived  at  the  naval  camp.     Those  of  them    scipio  orders 
who  had  been  sent  by  the  Roman  government,  ihe  Carthaginian 
Baebius  at  once   caused   to   be   escorted    to     e"™ysiob« 
Scipio,  while  he  retained  those  who  were  Car- 
thaginians.    The  latter  were  much  cast  down,  and  regarded 


I40  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBWS  book 

their  position  as  one  of  great  danger;  for  when  they  were 
informed  of  the  impious  outrage  committed  by  their  countr3rmen 
on  the  persons  of  the  Roman  envoys,  they  thought  there  could 
be  no  doubt  that  the  vengeance  for  it  would  be  wreaked  upon 
themselves.  But  when  Scipio  learnt  from  the  recently-arrived 
commissioners  that  the  senate  and  people  accepted  with  en- 
thusiasm the  treaty  which  he  had  made  with  the  Carthaginians, 
and  were  ready  to  grant  everything  he  asked,  he  was  highly 
delighted,  and  ordered  Baebius  to  send  the  envoys  home  with 
all  imaginable  courtesy.  And  he  was  very  well  advised  to  do 
so,  in  my  opinion.  For  as  he  knew  that  his  countrymen 
made  a  great  point  of  respecting  the  rights  of  ambassadors,  he 
considered  in  his  own  mind,  not  what  the  Carthaginians  de- 
served to  have  done  to  them,  but  what  it  was  becoming  in 
Romans  to  inflict  Therefore,  though  he  did  not  relax  his 
own  indignation  and  anger  at  what  they  had  done,  he  yet 
endeavoured,  in  the  words  of  the  proverb,  "to  maintain  the 
good  traditions  of  his  sires."  The  result  was  that,  by  this 
superiority  in  his  conduct,  a  very  decided  impression  was 
made  upon  the  spirits  of  the  Carthaginians  and  of  Hannibal 
himself. 

6.  When  the  people  of  Carthage  saw  the  cities  in  their 
• '.  -territory  being  sacked,  they  sent  a  message  to  Hannibal  beg- 
ging him  to  act  without  delay,  to  come  to  close  quarters  with 
the  enemy,  and  bring  the  matter  to  the  decision  of  battle. 
He  bade  the  messengers  in  answer  "to  confine  their  attention 
to  other  matters,  and  to  leave  such  things  to  him,  for  he 
would  choose  the  time  for  fighting  himself."  Some  days 
afterwards   he   broke   up   his   quarters   at  Adrumetum,  and 

pitched  his  camp  near  Zama,  a  town  about  five 
"''to'^mT''^  days'  march  to  the  west  of  Carthage.     From 

that  place  he  sent  spies  to  ascertain  the  place, 
nature,  and  strength  of  the  Roman  general's  encampment 
These  spies  were  caught  and  brought  to  Scipio,  who,  so  far 
from  inflicting  upon  them  the  usual  punishment  of  spies, 
appointed  a  tribune  to  show  them  everything  in  the  camp 
thoroughly  and  without  reserve ;  and  when  this  had  been  done, 
he  asked  the  men  whether  the  appointed  officer  had  been  care- 
ful to  point  out  everything  to  them.     Upon  their  replying  that 


XT  BOTH  SIDES  PREPARE  FOR  BATTLE  141 

he  had,  be  gave  them  provisions  and  an  escort,  and  despatched 
them  with  injunctions  to  be  careful  to  tell  Hannibal  every- 
thing they  had  seen.      On  their  return  to  his  camp,  Hannibal 
was  so  much  struck  with  the  magnanimity  and  high  courage  ' 
of  Scipio,  that  he  conceived  a  lively  desire  for  a  personal  in- 
terview with  him.     With  this  purpose  he  sent  a  herald  to  say 
that  he  was  desirous  of  a  parley  to  discuss  the  matters  at  issue. 
When  the  herald  had  delivered  his  message,  Scipio  at  once 
expressed  his  consent,  and  said  that  he  would  himself  send 
him  a  message  when  it  suited  him  to  meet,  naming  the  time 
and  place.    The  herald  returned  to  Hannibal  with  this  answer. 
Next  day  Massanissa  arrived  with  six  thousand 
infantry  and  about  four  thousand  cavalry.    Scipio     M^^tmi^ 
received  him  with  cordiality,  and  congratulated 
him  on  having  added  to  his  sway  all  those  who  had  previously 
been  subject  to  Syphax.     Thus  reinforced,  he  removed  bis 
camp    to  Naragara :  selecting    it    as    a    place  which,  among 
other  advantages,  enabled  him  to  get  water  within  a  javelin's 

6.  From  this  place  he  sent  to  the  Carthaginian  general, 
informing  him  that  he  was  ready  to  meet  him,  and  discuss 
matters  with  him.  On  hearing  this,  Hannibal  moved  his  quar- 
ters to  within  thirty  stades  of  Scipio,  and  pitched  his  camp  on 
a  hill,  which  seemed  a  favourable  position  for  his  present  pur- 
pose, except  that  water  had  to  be  fetched  from  a  considerable 
distance  which  caused  his  soldiers  great  fatigue. 

Next  day  both  commanders  advanced  from  their  camps 
attended  by  a  few  horsemen.     Presently  they 
left  these  escorts  and  met  in  the  intervening  *^d  HaS," 
space  by  themselves,  each  accompanied  by  an 
interpreter.     Hannibal  was  the  6rst  to  speak,  after  the  usual 
salutation.     He  said  that  "  He  wished  that  the 
Romans    had   never   coveted    any   possession        ^^[j  ' 
outside   Italy,   nor   the  Carthaginians  outside 
Libya ;  for  these  were  both  noble  empires,  and  were,  so  to 
speak,  marked  out  by  nature.     But  since,"  he  continued, "  our 
rival  claims  to  Sicily  first  made  us  enemies,  and  then  those 
for  Iberia;  and  since,  finally,  unwarned  by  the  lessons  of  mis- 
fortune, we  have  gone  so  far  that  the  one  nation  has  eo- 


142  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  book 

dangered  the  very  soil  of  its  native  land,  and  the  other  is 
now  actually  doing  so,  all  that  there  remains  for  us  to  do  is 
to  try  our  best  to  deprecate  the  wrath  of  the  gods,  and  to  put 
an  end,  as  far  as  in  us  lies,  to  these  feelings  of  obstinate  hos- 
tility. I  personally  am  ready  to  do  this,  because  I  have  learnt 
by  actual  experience  that  Fortune  is  the  most  fickle  thing  in 
the  world,  and  inclines  with  decisive  favour  now  to  one  side 
and  now  to  the  other  on  the  slightest  pretext,  treating  man- 
kind like  young  children. 

7.  "  But  it  is  about  you  that  I  am  anxious,  Scipia  For 
you  are  still  a  young  man,  and  everything  has  succeeded  to 
your  wishes  both  in  Iberia  and  Libya,  and  you  have  as  yet 
never  experienced  the  ebb  tide  of  Fortune ;  I  fear,  therefore, 
that  my  words,  true  as  they  are,  will  not  influence  you.  But 
do  look  at  the  facts  in  the  light  of  one  story,  and  that  not 
connected  with  a  former  generation,  but  our  owa  Look  at 
me !  I  am  that  Hannibal  who,  after  the  battle  of  Cannae, 
became  master  of  nearly  all  Italy ;  and  presently  advancing  to 
Rome  itself,  and  pitching  my  camp  within  forty  stades  of  it, 
deliberated  as  to  what  I  should  do  with  you  and  your  country ; 
but  now  I  am  in  Libya  debating  with  you,  a  Roman,  as  to  the 
bare  existence  of  myself  and  my  countrymen.  With  such 
a  reverse  as  that  before  your  eyes,  I  beg  you  not  to  entertain 
high  thoughts,  but  to  deliberate  with  a  due  sense  of  human 
weakness  on  the  situation ;  and  the  way  to  do  that  is  among 
good  things  to  choose  the  greatest,  among  evils  the  least. 
What  man  of  sense,  then,  would  deliberately  choose  to  incur 
the  risk  which  is  now  before  you.  If  you  conquer,  you  will 
add  nothing  of  importance  to  your  glory  or  to  that  of  your 
country ;  while,  if  you  are  worsted,  you  will  have  been  your- 
self the  means  of  entirely  cancelling  all  the  honours  and 
glories  you  have  already  won.  What  then  is  the  point  that  I 
am  seeking  to  establish  by  these  arguments  ?  It  is  that  the 
Romans  should  retain  all  the  countries  for  which  we  have 
hitherto  contended — I  mean  Sicily,  Sardinia,  and  Iberia ;  and 
that  the  Carthaginians  should  engage  never  to  go  to  war  with 
Rome  for  these ;  and  also  that  all  the  islands  lying  between 
Italy  and  Libya  should  belong  to  Rome.  For  I  am  per- 
suaded  that   such   a  treaty  will  be   at  once  safest  for  the 


IV  MEETING  OF  HANNIBAL  AND  SCIPIO  143 

Carthaginians,  and  most  glorious  for  you  and  the  entire  people 
of  Rome." 

8.  In  reply  to  this  speech  of  Hannibal,  Scipio  said  "That 

neither  in  the  Sicilian  nor  Iberian  war  were  the    ,.■■._, 
_  ,  ,  -       1        .        Scipio  s  reply, 

Romans  the  aggressors,  but  notoriously  the 
Carthaginians,  which  no  one  knew  better  than  Hannibal  him- 
self. That  the  gods  themselves  had  confirmed  this  by  giving 
the  victory,  not  to  those  who  struck  the  first  and  unprovoked 
blow,  but  to  those  who  only  acted  in  self  defence.  That  he 
was  as  ready  as  any  one  to  keep  before  his  eyes  the  uncertainty 
of  Fortune,  and  tried  his  best  to  confine  his  efforts  within  the 
range  of  human  infirmity.  But  if,"  he  continued,  "you  had 
yourself  quitted  Italy  before  the  Romans  crossed  to  Libya 
with  the  offer  of  these  terms  in  your  hands,  I  do  not  think 
that  you  would  have  been  disappointed  in  your  expectation. 
But  now  that  your  departure  from  Italy  has  been  involuntary, 
and  we  have  crossed  into  Libya  and  conquered  the  country, 
it  is  clear  that  matters  stand  on  a  very  different  footing.  But 
above  all,  consider  the  point  which  affairs  have  reached  now. 
Your  countrymen  have  been  beaten,  and  at  their  earnest 
prayer  we  arranged  a  written  treaty,  in  which,  besides  the 
offer  now  made  by  you,  it  was  provided  that  the  Carthaginians 
should  restore  prisoners  without  ransom,  should  surrender  all 
their  decked  vessels,  pay  five  thousand  talents,  and  give 
hostages  for  their  performance  of  these  articles.  These  were 
the  terms  which  I  and  they  mutually  agreed  upon ;  we  both 
despatched  envoys  to  our  respective  Senates  and  people, — we 
consenting  to  grant  these  terms,  the  Carthaginians  begging  to 
have  them  granted.  The  Senate  agreed  :  the  people  ratified 
the  treaty.  But  though  they  had  got  what  they  asked,  the 
Carthaginians  annulled  the  compact  by  an  act  of  perfidy 
towards  us.  What  course  is  left  to  me  ?  Put  yourself  in  my 
place  and  say.  To  withdraw  the  severest  clauses  of  the  treaty  ? 
Are  we  to  do  this,  say  you,  not  in  order  that  by  reaping  the 
reward  of  treachery  they  may  learn  in  future  to  outrage  their 
benefactors,  but  in  order  that  by  getting  what  they  ask  for 
they  may  be  grateful  to  us  ?  Why,  only  the  other  day,  after 
obtaining  what  they  begged  for  as  suppliants,  because  your 
presence  gave  them  a  slender  hope  of  success,  they  at  once 


144  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  BOOE 

treated  us  as  hated  foes  and  public  enemies.  In  these  circum- 
stances, if  a  still  severer  clause  were  added  to  the  conditioni 
imposed,  it  might  be  possible  to  refer  the  treaty  back  to  the 
people ;  but,  if  I  were  to  withdraw  any  of  these  conditions,  such 
a  reference  does  not  admit  even  of  discussion.  What  then  is 
the  conclusion  of  my  discourse  ?  It  is,  that  you  must  sub- 
mit yourselves  and  your  country  to  us  unconditionally,  or 
conquer  us  in  the  field" 

9.  After  these  speeches  Hannibal  and  Scipio  parted  without 

The  momentous  coming  to  any  terms ;  and  next  morning  by 

issues  depending  daybreak  both  generals  drew  out  their  forces 

onthe  battle  of  ^^d  engaged     To  the  Carthaginians  it  was  a 

'   *    ^°**  struggle  for  their  own  lives  and  the  sovereignty 

of  Libya;  to  the  Romans  for  universal  dominion  and  supremacy. 

And  could  any  one  who  grasped  the  situation  fail  to  be  moved 

at  the  story?     Armies  more  fitted  for  war  than   these,  or 

generals  who  had  been  more  successful  or  more  thoroughly 

trained  in  all  the  operations  of  war,  it  would  be  impossible  to 

find,  or  any  other  occasion  on  which  the  prizes  proposed  by 

destiny  to  the  combatants  were  more  momentous.     For  it  was 

not  merely  of  Libya  or  Europe  that  the  victors  in  this  battle 

were  destined  to  become  masters,  but  of  all  other  parts  of  the 

world  known  to  history, — a  destiny  which  had  not  to  wait 

long  for  its  fulfilment. 

Scipio  placed  his  men  on  the  field  in  the  following  order : 

the  hastati  first,  with  an  interval  between  their 

^ofbatU^^    maniples;    behind    them   the   principeSy   their 

maniples  not  arranged  to  cover  the  intervals 

between  those  of  the  hastati  as  the  Roman  custom  is,  but 

immediately  behind  them  at  some  distance,  because  the  enemy 

was  so  strong  in  elephants.     In  the  rear  of  these  he  stationed 

the  triarii.     On  his  left  wing  he  stationed  Gaius  Laelius  with 

the    Italian   cavalry,    on   the   right  Massanissa  with   all   his 

Numidians.     The  intervals  between  the  front  maniples   he 

filled  up  with  maniples  of  velitesy  who  were  ordered  to  begin 

the  battle ;  but  if  they  found  themselves  unable  to  stand  the 

charge  of  the  elephants,  to  retire  quickly  either  to  the  rear  of 

the  whole  army  by  the  intervals  between  the  maniples,  which 

went  straight  through  the  ranks,  or,  if  they  got  entangled  with 


XV  DISPOSITIONS  FOR  THE  BATTLE  OF  ZAMA  145 

the  elephants,  to  step  aside  into  the  lateral  spaces  between  the 
maniples. 

10.  These  dispositions   made,  he  went  along  the  ranks 
delivering  an  exhortation  to  the  men,  which, 

though  short,  was  much  to  the  point  in  the  ^ohj^*^^^ 
circumstances  in  which  they  were  placed.  He 
called  upon  them,  "Remembering  their  former  victories,  to 
show  themselves  to  be  men  of  mettle  and  worthy  their  repu- 
tation and  their  country.  To  put  before  their  eyes  that  the 
effect  of  their  victory  would  be  not  only  to  make  them  complete 
masters  of  Libya,  but  to  give  them  and  their  country  the 
supremacy  and  undisputed  lordship  of  the  world.  But  if  the 
result  of  the  battle  were  unfavourable,  those  who  fell  fighting 
gallantly  would  have  the  record  of  having  died  for  their 
country,  while  those  that  saved  themselves  by  flight  would 
spend  the  rest  of  their  days  as  objects  of  pitying  contempt 
and  scorn.  For  there  was  no  place  in  Libya  which  could 
secure  their  safety  if  they  fled;  while,  if  they  fell  into  the  hands 
of  the  Carthaginians,  no  one  who  looked  facts  in  the  face 
could  doubt  what  would  happen  to  them.  May  none  of  you," 
he  added,  "learn  that  by  experience!  Since,  then,  Fortune 
puts  before  us  the  most  glorious  of  rewards,  in  whichever  way 
the  batde  is  decided,  should  we  not  be  at  once  the  most 
mean-spirited  and  foolish  of  mankind  if  we  abandon  the  most 
glorious  alternative,  and  from  a  paltry  clinging  to  life  deli- 
berately choose  the  worst  of  misfortunes  ?  Charge  the  enemy 
then  with  the  steady  resolve  to  do  one  of  two  things,  to 
conquer  or  to  die !  For  it  is  men  thus  minded  who  invariably 
conquer  their  opponents,  since  they  enter  the  field  with  no 
other  hope  of  life." 

11.  Such  was  Scipio's  address  to  his  men.     Meanwhile 
Hannibal  had  put  his  men  also  into  position.  His 

elephants,  which  numbered  more  than  eighty,  he  ""^'^X"^" 
placed  in  the  van  of  the  whole  army.  Next  his 
mercenaries,  amounting  to  twelve  thousand,  and  consisting  of 
Ltgurians,  Celts,  Baliarians,  and  Mauretani;  behind  them 
the  native  Libyans  and  Carthaginians ;  and  on  the  rear  of  the 
whole  the  men  whom  he  had  brought  from  Italy,  at  a  distance 
of  somewhat  more  than  a  stade.  His  wings  he  strengthened 
VOL.  II  L 


146  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YB I  US  book 

with  cavalry,  stationing  the  Numidian  allies  on  the  left  wing; 

and  the  Carthaginian  horsemen  on  the  right     He  ordered 

each  officer  to  address  his  own  men,  bidding  them  rest  their 

hopes  of  victory  on  him  and  the  army  he  had  brought  with 

him;  while  he  bade  their  officers  remind  the  Carthaginians 

in  plain  terms  what  would  happen  to  their  wives  and  children 

if  the  battle  should  be  lost     While  these  orders  were  carried 

out  by  the  officers,  Hannibal  himself  went  along  the  lines  of 

his  Italian  army  and  urged  them  "  to  remember  the  seventeen 

Hannibal's      years  during  which  they  had  been  brothers-in- 

speech  to  the    arms,  and  the  number  of  battles  they  had  fought 

•army  of  Italy."  ^^^j^  ^j^^  Romans,  in  which  they  had  never  been 

beaten  or  given  the  Romans  even  a  hope  of  victory.  Above 
all,  putting  aside  minor  engagements  and  their  countless  suc- 
cesses, let  them  place  before  their  eyes  the  battle  of  the  River 
Trebia  against  the  father  of  the  present  Roman  commander ; 
and  again  the  battle  in  Etruria  against  Flaminius;  and 
lastly  that  at  Cannae  against  Aemilius,  with  none  of  which 
was  the  present  struggle  to  be  compared,  whether  in  regard 
to  the  number  or  excellence  of  the  enemy's  men.  Let 
them  only  raise  their  eyes  and  look  at  the  ranks  of  the 
enemy ;  they  would  see  that  they  were  not  merely  fewer,  but 
many  times  fewer  than  those  with  whom  they  had  fought 
before,  while,  as  to  their  soldierly  qualities,  there  was  no  com- 
parison. The  former  Roman  armies  had  come  to  the  struggle 
with  them  untainted  by  memories  of  past  defeats  :  while  these 
men  were  the  sons  or  the  remnants  of  those  who  had  been 
beaten  in  Italy,  and  fled  before  him  again  and  again.  They 
ought  not  therefore,"  he  said,  "  to  undo  the  glory  and  fame 
of  their  previous  achievements,  but  to  struggle  with  a  firm  and 
brave  resolve  to  maintain  their  reputation  of  invincibility." 

Such  were  the  addresses  of  the  two  commanders. 

12.  All  arrangements  for  the  battle  being  complete,  and 
the  two  opposing  forces  of  Numidian  cavalry 
fhe'eSntsf  ^^^ing  been  for  some  time  engaged  in  skirmish- 
ing attacks  upon  each  other,  Hannibal  gave  the 
word  to  the  men  on  the  elephants  to  charge  the  enemy.  But 
as  they  heard  the  horns  and  trumpets  braying  all  round  them, 
some  of  the  elephants  became  unmanageable  and  rushed  back 


XV  THE  BATTLE  OF  ZAMA  M7 

upon  the  Numidian  contingents  of  the  Carthaginian  army; 
and  this  enabled  Massanissa  with  great  speed  to  deprive  the 
Carthaginian  left  wing  of  its  cavalry  support  The  rest  of  the 
elephants  charged  the  Roman  veUtes  in  the  spaces  between  the 
maniples  of  the  line,  and  while  inflicting  much  damage  on  the 
enemy  suffered  severely  themselves ;  until,  becoming  frightened, 
some  of  them  ran  away  down  the  vacant  spaces,  the  Romans 
letting  them  pass  harmlessly  along,  according  to  Scipio's 
orders,  while  others  ran  away  to  the  right  under  a  shower  of 
darts  from  the  cavalry,  until  they  were  finally  driven  clear  off 
the  field.  It  was  just  at  the  moment  of  this  might  of  ibe 
stampede  of  the  elephants,  that  Laelius  forced  Canhaginian 
the  Carthaginian  cavalry  into  headlong  flight,  ca™lry. 
and  along  with  Massanissa  pressed  them  with  a  vigorous 
pursuit  While  this  was  going  on,  the  opposing  lines  of  heavy 
infantry  were  advancing  to  meet  others  with  deliberate  step  and 
proud  confidence,  except  Hannibal's  "army  of  Italy,"  which 
remained  in  its  or^nal  position.  When  they  came  within 
distance  the  Roman  soldiers  charged  the  enemy,  shouting  as 
usual  their  war-cry,  and  clashing  their  swords  against  their 
shields  :  while  the  Carthaginian  mercenaries  uttered  a  strange 
confusion  of  cries,  the  effect  of  which  was  indescribable,  for,  in 
the  words  of  the  poet,'  the  "  voice  of  all  was  not  one  " — 


18.  The  whole  affair  being  now  a  trial  of  strength  between 
man  and  man  at  close  quarters,  as  the  combat- 
ants used  their  swords  and  not  their  spears,  the  ^^^f^tj* 
superiority  was  at  first  on  the  side  of  the  dexterity 
and  daring  of  the  mercenaries,  which  enabled  them  to  wound 
a  considerable  number  of  the  Romans.  The  latter,  however, 
trusting  to  the  steadiness  of  their  ranks  and  the  excellence  of 
their  arms,  still  kept  gaining  ground,  their  rear  ranks  keeping 
close  up  with  them  and  encouraging  them  to  advance ;  while 
the  Carthaginians  did  not  keep  up  with  their  mercenaries  nor 
support  them,  but  showed  a  thoroughly  cowardly  spirit.  The 
result  was  that  the  foreign  soldiers  gave  way :  and,  believing  that 
they  had  been  shamelessly  abandoned  by  their  own  side,  ff" 
'  Homer,  Iliad,  4,  437. 


148  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  book 

upon  the  men  on  their  rear  as  they  were  retreating,  and  began 
killing  them ;  whereby  many  of  the  Carthaginians  were  com- 
pelled to  meet  a  gallant  death  in  spite  of  themselves.  For  as 
they  were  being  cut  down  by  their  mercenaries  they  had,  much 
against  their  inclination,  to  fight  with  their  own  men  and  the 
Romans  at  the  same  time ;  and  as  they  now  fought  with 
desperation  and  fury  they  killed  a  good  many  both  of  their 
own  men  and  of  the  enemy  also.  Thus  it  came  about  that  their 
charge  threw  the  maniples  of  the  hastati  into  confusion ;  where- 
upon the  officers  of  the  principes  caused  their  lines  to  advance 
to  oppose  them.  However,  the  greater  part  of  the  mercenaries 
and  Carthaginians  had  fallen  either  by  mutual  slaughter  or  by  the 
sword  of  the  hastati.  Those  who  survived  and  fled  Hannibal 
would  not  allow  to  enter  the  ranks  of  his  army,  but  ordered 
his  men  to  lower  their  spears  and  keep  them  back  as  they 
approached ;  and  they  were  therefore  compelled  to  take  refuge 
on  the  wings  or  make  for  the  open  country. 

14.  The  space  between  the  two  armies  that  still  remained 

Final  struggle    in  position  was  full  of  blood,  wounded  men,  and 

between       dead  corpses ;  and  thus  the  rout  of  the  enemy 

Hannibal  s      proved  an  impediment  of  a  perplexing  nature  to 

reserves   his  *      r  o 

•'  army  of  Italy,"  the  Roman  general.     Everything  was  calculated 
and  the  whole    to   make  an  advance  in   order   difficult, — the 
Roman  infantry,  ground  slippery  with  gore,   the  corpses  lying 
piled  up  in  bloody  heaps,  and  with  the  corpses  arms  flung 
about  in  every  direction.    However  Scipio  caused  the  wounded 
to  be  carried  to  the  rear,  and  the  hastati  to  be  recalled  from 
the  pursuit  by  the  sound  of  a  bugle,  and  drew  them  up  where 
they  were  in  advance  of  the  ground  on  which  the  fighting  had 
taken  place,  opposite  the  enemy's  centre.     He  then  ordered 
the  principes  and  triarii  to  take  close  order,  and,  threading  their 
way  through  the  corpses,  to  deploy  into  line  with  the  hastati  on 
either  flank.     When  they  had  surmounted  the  obstacles  and 
got  into  line  with  the  hastatiy  the  two  lines  charged  each  other 
with  the  greatest  fire  and  fury.    Being  nearly  equal  in  numbers, 
spirit,  courage,  and  arms,  the  battle  was  for  a  long  time  un- 
decided, the  men  in  their  obstinate  valour  falling  dead  without 
The  battle  is     S^^ing  way  a  step ;  until  at  last  the  divisions  of 
decided  by  the   Massanissa   and   Laelius,  returning   from   the 


XT    VICTORY  OF  SCIPIO  AND  FUGHT  OF  HANNIBAL    149 

pursuit,  arrived  providentially  in  the  very  nick     reiumorihe 
of  time.      Upon  their  charging  Hannibal's  rear,      Roman  and 
the  greater  part  of  his  men  were  cut  down  in       ra™i™" 
their  ranks ;  while  of  those  who  attempted  to  fly 
very  few  escaped  with  their  life,  because  the  horsemen  were 
close  at  their  heels  and  the  ground  was  quite  level.     On  the 
Roman  side  there  fell  over  fifteen  hundred,  on  the  Cartha- 
ginian over  twenty  thousand,  while  the  prisoners  taken  were 
almost  as  numerous. 

16.  Such  was  the  end  of  this  battle,  fought  under  these 
famous  commanders :  a  battle  on  which  everything  depended, 
and  which  assigned  universal  dominion  to  Rome,  After  it  had 
come  to  an  end,  Scipio  pushed  on  in  pursuit  as  far  as  the 
Carthaginian  camp,  and,  a(ler  plundering  that, 
returned  to  his  own,  Hannibal,  escaping  with  to^drum^m^ 
a  few  horsemen,  did  not  draw  rein  until  he 
arrived  safely  at  Adrumetum.  He  had  done  in  the  battle  all 
that  was  to  be  expected  of  a  good  and  experienced  general 
First,  he  had  tried  by  an  interview  with  his  opponent  to  see 
what  he  could  do  to  procure  a  pacification ;  and  that  was  the 
right  course  for  a  man,  who,  while  fully  conscious  of  his  former 
victories,  yet  mistrusts  Fortune,  and  has  an  eye  to  all  the  possible 
and  unexpected  contingencies  of  war.  Next,  having  accepted 
battle,  the  excellence  of  his  dispositions  for  a  contest  with 
the  Romans,  considering  the  identity  of  the  arms  on  each  side, 
could  not  have  been  surpassed.  For  though  the  Roman  line  ~ 
is  hard  to  break,  yet  each  individual  soldier  and  each  company, 
owing  to  the  uniform  tactic  employed,  can  fight  in  any  direction, 
those  companies,  which  happen  to  be  in  nearest  contact  with 
the  danger,  wheeling  round  to  the  point  required.  Again,  the 
nature  of  their  arms  gives  at  once  protection  and  confidence,  for 
their  shield  is  large  and  their  sword  will  not  bend  :  the  Romans 
therefore  are  formidable  on  the  field  and  hard  to  conquer, 

16.  Still  Hannibal  took  his  measures  against  each  of  these 
difficulties  in  a  manner  that  could  not  be  surpassed.  He  pro- 
vided himself  with  those  numerous  elephants,  and  put  them  in 
the  van,  for  the  express  purpose  of  throwing  the  enemy's  ranks 
into  confusion  and  breaking  their  order.  Again  he  stationed 
the  mercenaries  in  firont  and  the  Carthaginians  behind  them,  in 


ISO  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  book 

order  to  wear  out  the  bodies  of  the  enemy  with  &tigue  before- 
hand, and  to  blunt  the  edge  of  their  swords  by  the  numbers 
that  would  be  killed  by  them ;  and  moreover  to  compel  the 
Carthaginians,  by  being  in  the  middle  of  the  army,  to  stay 
where  they  were  and  fight,  as  the  poet  says^ — 

**  That  howsoe'er  unwilling  fight  he  must.** 

But  the  most  warlike  and  steady  part  of  his  army  he  held  in 
reserve  at  some  distance,  in  order  that  they  might  not  see 
what  was  happening  too  closely,  but,  with  strength  and  spirit 
unimpaired,  might  use  their  courage  to  the  best  advantage 
when  the  moment  arrived.  And,  if  in  spite  of  having  done 
everything  that  could  be  done,  he  who  had  never  been  beaten 
before  failed  to  secure  the  victory  now,  we  must  excuse  him. 
For  there  are  times  when  chance  thwarts  the  plans  of  the 
brave ;  and  there  are  others  again,  when  a  man 

**  Though  great  and  brave  has  met  a  greater  stilL**' 

And  this  we  might  say  was  the  case  with  Hannibal  on  this 
occasion.  .  .  . 

17.  Manifestations  of  emotion  which  go  beyond  what   is 
customary  among  a  particular  people,  if  they 

^'^ht'eTvo'J^'  a^e  ^ho"g^^  ^o  t)e  the  result  of  genuine  feeling 

from  Carthage   evoked  by  extraordinary  disasters,  excite   pity 

after  Zama,  who  in  the  minds  of  those  who  see  or  hear  them ; 

!;i^nH^''n?3!l?  and   we   are  all   in  a  manner  moved  by  the 

displays  of  sorrow.  ,         -   ,  ,         -r^         i  i     i  • 

novelty  of  the  spectacle.  But  when  such  thmgs 
appear  to  be  assumed  for  the  purpose  of  taking  in  the  spec- 
tators and  producing  a  dramatic  effect,  they  do  not  provoke 
pity,  but  anger  and  dislike.  And  this  was  the  case  in  regard 
to  the  Carthaginian  envoys.  Scipio  deigned  to  give  a  very 
brief  answer  to  their  prayers,  saying  that  "  They,  at  any  rate, 
deserved  no  kindness  at  the  hands  of  the  Romans,  since 
they  had  themselves  confessed  that  they  were  the  aggres- 
sors in  the  war,  by  having,  contrary  to  their  treaty  obliga- 
tions, taken  Saguntum  and  enslaved  its  inhabitants,  and  had 
recently  been  guilty  of  treachery  and  breaking  the  terms  of  a 
treaty  to  which  they  had  subscribed  and  sworn.     It  was  from 

^  Homer,  Iliad,  4,  300. 
'^  A  line  of  which  the  author  is  unknown  ;  perhaps  it  was  Theognis. 


XT        TERMS  M^DE  AFTER  TflE  BATTLE  OF  ZAMA       151 

a  regard  to  their  own  dignity,  to  the  vicissitudes  of  Fortune,  and 
to  the  dictates  of  humanity  that  the  Romans  had  determined 
to  treat  them  with  lenity  and  behave  with  magnanimity.  And 
of  this  they  would  be  convinced  if  they  would  take  a  right 
view  of  the  case.  For  they  ought  not  to  consider  it  a  hard- 
ship if  they  found  themselves  charged  to  submit  to  any  punish- 
ment, to  follow  a  particular  line  of  conduct,  or  to  give  up 
this  or  that ;  they  ought  rather  to  regard  it  as  an  unexpected 
favour  that  any  kindness  was  conceded  to  them  at  all ;  since 
Fortune,  after  depriving  them  of  all  right  to  pity  and  considera- 
tion, owing  to  their  own  unrighteous  conduct,  had  put  them  in 
the  power  of  their  enemies."  After  this  preamble  he  men- 
tioned the  concessions  to  be  made  to  them,  and  the  penalties 
to  which  they  were  to  submit 

18.  The  following  are  the  heads  of  the  terms  offered 
them: — The  Carthaginians  to  retain  tite  towns  Terms  imposed 
in  Libya,  of  which  they  were  possessed  be/ore  fhpf  on  Canhage  after 
commenced  the  last  war  against  Rome,  and  /A*'''^*""'^'''^'™'' 
territory  which  they  also  heretofore  held,  with 
its  cattle,  slaves,  and  olher  stock :  and  from  that  day  should  not 
be  subject  to  ads  of  hostility,  should  enjoy  their  own  laws  and 
customs,  and  not  have  a  Roman  garrison  in  their  city.  These 
were  the  concessions  favourable  to  them.  The  clauses  of  an 
opposite  character  were  as  follows  : — The  Carthaginians  to  pay 
an  indemnify  to  the  Romans  for  all  wrongs  committed  during 
the  truee ;  to  restore  all  captives  and  runaway  slaves  without 
limit  of  time  ;  to  hand  aver  all  their  ships  of  war  except  ten 
triremes,  and  all  elephants  ;  to  go  to  war  with  no  people  outside 
Libya  at  all,  and  with  none  in  Libya  without  consent  from 
Rome  ;  to  restore  to  Massanissa  all  houses,  territory,  and  cities 
belonging  to  him  or  his  ancestors  within  the  frontiers  assigned  to 
that  king  ;  to  supply  the  Roman  army  with  proiisions  for  three 
months,  and  with  pay,  until  such  time  as  an  answer  shall  be 
returned  from  Rome  on  the  subject  of  the  treaty ;  to  pay  ten 
thousand  talents  of  silver  in  fifty  years,  two  hundred  Euboic 
talents  every  year  ;  to  give  a  hundred  hostages  of  thar  good  faith, 
— such  hostages  to  be  selected  from  the  young  men  of  the  country 
fy  the  Roman  general,  and  to  be  not  younger  than  fourteen  or 
older  than  thirty  years. 


152  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  book 

19.  This  was  the  nature  of  Scipio*s  answer  to  the  envoys, 

who   hastened   home    and   communicated   its 

(^rtt^iglnki^;^-.  ^^™^  ^^  *^^*^  countrymen.  It  was  then  that 
sembiy.  Hannibal  the   story  goes  that,  upon   a   certain  Senator 

persuades  them  intending  to  speak  against  accepting  the  terms 
^""t^w^^  and  actually  beginning  to  do  so,  Hannibal 
^*  came  forward  and  pulled  the  man  down  from 
the  tribune ;  and  when  the  other  senators  showed  anger  at 
this  breach  of  custom,  Hannibal  rose  again  and  "  owned  that 
he  was  ignorant  of  such  things  ;  but  said  that  they  must  pardon 
him  if  he  acted  in  any  way  contrary  to  their  customs,  remem- 
bering that  he  had  left  the  country  when  he  was  but  fourteen, 
and  had  only  returned  when  now  past  forty-five.  Therefore 
he  begged  them  not  to  consider  whether  he  had  committed 
a  breach  of  custom,  but  much  rather  whether  he  were  genuinely 
feeling  for  his  country's  misfortunes ;  for  that  was  the  real 
reason  for  his  having  been  guilty  ^of  this  breach  of  manners. 
For  it  appeared  to  him  to  be  astonishing,  and,  indeed,  quite 
unaccountable,  that  any  one  calling  himself  a  Carthaginian, 
and  being  fully  aware  of  the  policy  which  they  had  individually 
and  collectively  adopted  against  the  Romans,  should  do  other- 
wise than  adore  the  kindness  of  Fortune  for  obtaining  such 
favourable  terms,  when  in  their  power,  as  a  few  days  ago  no 
one — considering  the  extraordinary  provocation  they  had 
given — would  have  ventured  to  mention,  if  they  had  been 
asked  what  they  expected  would  happen  to  their  country,  in 
case  of  the  Romans  proving  victorious.  Therefore  he  called 
upon  them  now  not  to  debate,  but  unanimously  to  accept  the 
terms  offered,  and  with  sacrifices  to  the  gods  to  pray  with  one 
accord  that  the  Roman  people  might  confirm  the  treaty."  His 
advice  being  regarded  as  both  sensible  and  timely,  they  resolved 
to  sign  the  treaty  on  the  conditions  specified ;  and  the  senate 
at  once  despatched  envoys  to  notify  their  consent.  .  .  . 

The  intrigues  of  Philip  V,  and  Antiochus  the  Great  to  di- 
vide the  dominions  of  the  infant  king  of  Egypty  Ptolemy  Epi- 
phanes,  B.C.  204. 

20.  Is  it  not  astonishing  that  while  Ptolemy  Philopator 
was  alive  and  did  not  need  such  assistance,  these  two  kings 


XT  LEAGUE  AGAINST  PTOLEMY  EPIPHANES  153 

were  ready  with  offers  of  aid,  but  that  as  soon  as  he  was  dead, 
leaving  his  heir  a  mere  child,  whose  kingdom  shameless 
they  were  bound  by  the  ties  of  nature  to  have  ambition  of  Philip 
defended,  they  then  egged  each  other  on  to  and  Antiocbus. 
adopt  the  policy  of  partitioning  the  boy's  kingdom  between 
themselves,  and  getting  rid  entirely  of  the  heir ;  and  that  too 
without  putting  forward  any  decent  pretext  to  cover  their 
iniquity,  but  acting  so  shamelessly,  and  so  like  beasts  of  prey,* 
that  one  can  only  compare  their  habits  to  those  ascribed  to 
fishes,  among  which,  though  they  may  be  of  the  same  species, 
the  destruction  of  the  smaller  is  the  food  and  sustenance  of 
the  larger.  This  treaty  of  theirs  shows,  as  though  in  a  mirror, 
the  impiety  to  heaven  and  cruelty  to  man  of  these  two 
kings,  as  well  as  their  unbounded  ambition.  However,  If  a 
man  were  disposed  to  find  fault  with  Fortune  for  her  adminis- 
tration of  human  affairs,  he  might  fairly  become  reconciled  to 
her  in  this  case  ;  for  she  brought  upon  those  monarchs  the 
punishment  they  so  well  deserved,  and  by  the  signal  example 
she  made  of  them  taught  posterity  a  lesson  in  righteousness, 
For  while  they  were  engaged  in  acts  of  treachery  against  each 
Other,  and  in  dismembering  the  child's  kingdom  in  their  own 
interests,  she  brought  the  Romans  upon  them,  and  the  very 
measures  which  they  had  lawlessly  designed  against  another, 
she  justly  and  properly  carried  out  against  them.  For  both  of 
them,  being  promptly  beaten  in  the  field,  were 
not  only  prevented  from  gratifying  their  desire  ^^'  J^^' 
for  the  dominions  of  another,  but  were  them- 
selves made  tributary  and  forced  to  obey  orders  from  Rome. 
Finally,  within  a  very  short  time  Fortune  restored  the  kingdom 
of  Ptolemy  to  prosperity ;  while  as  to  the  dynasties  and  suc- 
cessors of  these  two  monarchs,  she  either  utterly  abolished  and 
destroyed  them,  or  involved  them  in  misfortunes  which  were 
little  short  of  that  .  ,  . 

21.  There  was  a  certain  man  at  Cius  named  Molpagoras, 
a  ready  speaker  and  of  considerable  ability  in  The  imrigues  and 
affairs,  but  at  heart  a  mere  demagogue  and  tyranny  of  Mol- 
selfish  intriguer.      By  flattering  the  mob,  and  P«Boras  at  Cius, 

.,    °    .  ,  '...  .    °     .  '       ,  in  Bithynia, 

putting  the  richer  citizens  mto  its  power,  he 

either  got  them  put  to  death  right  out,  or  drove  them  into  exile 


154  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  book 

and  distributed  their  confiscated  goods  among  the  common 
people,  and  thus  rapidly  secured  for  himself  a  position  of 
despotic  power.  .  .  . 

The  miseries  which  befel  the  Cians  were  not  so  much 

owing  to  Fortune  or  the  aggressions  of  their 

'^^,!^^?^*^  neighbours,  as  to  their  own  folly  and  perverse 

policy.  For  by  steadily  promoting  their  worst 
men,  and  punishing  all  who  were  opposed  to  these,  that  they 
might  divide  their  property  among  themselves,  they  seemed  as 
it  were  to  court  the  disasters  into  which  they  fell.  These  are 
disasters  into  which,  somehow  or  another,  though  all  men  &ll,they 
yet  not  only  cannot  learn  wisdom,  but  seem  not  even  to  acquire 
the  cautious  distrust  of  brute  beasts.  The  latter,  if  they  have 
once  been  hurt  by  bait  or  trap,  or  even  if  they  have  seen  another 
in  danger  of  being  caught,  you  would  find  it  difficult  to  induce 
to  approach  anything  of  the  sort  again :  they  are  shy  of  the 
place,  and  suspicious  of  everything  they  see.  But  as  for  men, 
though  they  have  been  told  of  cities  utterly  ruined  by  their 
policy,  and  sec  others  actually  doing  so  before  their  eyes,  yet 
directly  any  one  flatters  their  wishes  by  holding  out  to  them 
the  prospect  of  recruiting  their  fortunes  at  the  cost  of  others, 
they  rush  thoughtlessly  to  the  bait :  although  they  know  quite 
well  that  no  one,  who  has  ever  swallowed  such  baits,  has  ever 
survived ;  and  that  such  political  conduct  has  notoriously  been 
the  ruin  of  all  who  have  adopted  it. 

22.  Philip  was  delighted   at   taking   the  city,  as  though 
Capture  of  Cius  ^^  ^^^  performed  a  glorious  and  honourable 

by  Philip  V.    achievement ;  for  while  displaying  great  zeal  in 

B.C.  202.1  behalf  of  his  brother-in-law  (Prusias),  and  over- 
awing all  who  opposed  his  policy,  he  had  secured  for  himself  in 
fair  warfare  a  large  supply  of  slaves  and  money.  But  the  reverse 
of  this  picture  he  did  not  see  in  the  least,  although  it  was  quite 
plain.  In  the  first  place,  that  he  was  assisting  his  brother-in- 
law,  who,  without  receiving  any  provocation,  was  treacherously 
assailing  his  neighbours.  In  the  second  place,  that  by  involving 
a  Greek  city  without  just  cause  in  the  most  dreadful  misfortunes, 
he  was  sure  to  confirm  the  report,  which  had  been  widely 
spread,  of  his  severity  to  his  friends  ;  and  by  both  of  these 

*  See  Livy,  31,  31  ;  Strabo,  12,  c.  4.     Philip  handed  over  Cius  to  Prusias. 


■   sv      PHILIP  ROUSES  TflE  ENMITY  OF  THE  GREEKS     155 

actions  would  justly  gain  throughout  Greece  the  reputation  of  a 
man  reckless  of  the  dictates  of  piety.  In  the  third  place,  that 
he  had  outraged  the  envoys  from  the  above-mentioned  states,' 
who  had  come  with  the  hope  of  saving  the  Cians  from  the 
danger  which  threatened  them,  and  who,  after  being  day  after 
day  mocked  by  his  professions,  had  been  at  length  compelled 
to  witness  what  they  most  abhorred.  And  lastly,  that  he  had  so 
infuriated  the  Rhodians,  that  they  would  never  henceforth 
listen  to  a  word  in  his  favour:  a  circumstance  for  which 
Philip  had  to  thank  Fortune  as  well  as  himself 

2S.  For  it  happened  that  just  when  his  ambassador  was 
defending  his  master  before  the  Rhodians  in  The  anger  of  the 
the  theatre, — enlarging  on  "  the  magnanimity  of  Rhodians  ai  the 
Philip,"  and  announcing  that "  though  already  in  f^'  °^  ^"^ 
a  manner  master  of  Cius,  he  conceded  its  safety  to  the  wishes 
of  the  Rhodian  people ;  and  did  so  because  he  desired  to 
refute  the  calumnies  of  his  enemies,  and  to  establish  the 
honesty  of  his  intentions  in  the  eyes  of  Rhodes," — ^just  then  a' 
man  entered  the  Prytaneum  who  had  newly  arrived  in  the 
island,  and  brought  the  news  of  the  enslavement  of  the  Cians 
and  the  cruelty  which  Philip  had  exercised  upon  them.  The 
Prytanis  coming  into  the  theatre  to  announce  this  news,  while 
the  ambassador  was  absolutely  in  the  middle  of  his  speech, 
the  Rhodians  could  scarcely  make  up  their  minds  to  believe 
a  report  which  involved  such  monstrous  treachery. 

He  had  then  betrayed  himself  quite  as  grossly  as  the 
Cians ;  and  so  blind  or  misguided  had  he  become  as  to  the 
principles  of  right  and  wrong,  that  he  boasted  of  actions  of 
which  he  ought  to  have  been  most  heartily  ashamed,  and 
plumed  himself  upon  them  as  though  they  were  to  his  credit 
But  the  people  of  Rhodes  from  that  day  forth  regarded 
Philip  as  their  enemy,  and  made  their  preparations  with  that 
view.  And  no  less  by  this  course  had  he  gained  i,  causes  a. 
the  hatred  of  the  Aetolians.  He  had  but  breach  with  the 
lately  made  terms  with,' and  held  out  the  hand  Aeiolians. 
of  friendship  to  that  nation :  no  excuse  for  a  breach  had 
arisen ;  and  the  Lysimachians,  Calchedonians,  and  Cianians 
were  friends  and  allies  of  the  Aetolians,     Nevertheless  only 

'  Thai  is,  (rom  Rhodes  antl  other  stales. 


1 56  THE  HISTORIES  OF  FOLYBWS  doox  • 

short  time  before  he  had  separated  LysimachJa  from  the 
Aetolian  alliance,  and  induced  it  to  submit  to  him  :  then  he 
had  done  the  same  to  Cakhedon  :  and  lastly  he  had  enslaved 
the  Cians,  though  there  was  an  Aetolian  officer  actually  in  Cius 
and  conducting  the  government.  Prusias,  however,  in  so  far 
as  his  policy  was  accomplished,  was  delighted ;  but  inasmuch 
as  another  was  in  possession  of  the  prizes  of  the  operations, 
while  he  himself  got  as  his  share  nothing  but  the  bare  site 
of  a  city,  was  extremely  annoyed,  but  was  yet  unable  to  do 
anything.  .  .  . 

24.  During  his  return  voyage  Philip  engaged  in  one  act  of 

treachery  after  another,  and  among  others  put  in 

^'Jf  a'o^^^'  "•^"^  mid-day  at  the   town  of  Thasos,  and 

though  it  was  on  good  terms  with  him,  took  it 

and  enslaved  its  inhabitants.  .  .  . 

The  Thasians  answered  Philip's  general  Metrodorus,  that 
they  would  surrender  their  city,  on  condition  that  he  would 
guarantee  them  freedom  from  a  garrison,  tribute,  or  billeting 
of  soldiers,  and  the  enjoyment  of  their  own  laws.  Metrodorus 
having  declared  the  king's  consent  to  this,  the  whole  assembly 
signified  their  approval  of  the  words  by  a  loud  shout,  where- 
upon they  admitted  Philip  into  the  town.  .  .  . 

All  kings  perhaps  at  the  beginning  of  their  reign  dangle  the 
name  of  liberty  before  their  subjects'  eyes,  and  address  as 
friends  and  allies  those  who  combine  in  pursuing  the  same 
objects  as  themselves ;  but  when  they  come  to  actual 
administration  of  affairs  they  at  once  cease  to  treat  these 
as  allies,  and  assume  the  airs  of  a  master.  Such  persons 
accordingly  find  themselves  deceived  as  to  the  honourable 
position  they  expected  to  occupy,  though  as  a  rule  not  as 
to  the  immediate  advantage  which  they  sought.  But  if  a 
king  is  meditating  undertakings  of  the  greatest  importance, 
and  only  bounding  his  hopes  by  the  limits  of  the  world,  and 
has  as  yet  had  nothing  to  cast  a  damp  upon  his  projects, 
would  it  not  seem  the  height  of  folly  and  madness  to  proclaim 
his  own  fickleness  and  untrust worthiness  in  matters  which  are 
of  the  smallest  consequence,  and  lie  at  the  very  threshold  of 
his  enterprise  ?  .  .  . 


XV  PTOLEMY EPIPHANES  SUCCEEDS  TO  THE  CROWN   157 


24  {a).  My  plan  being  to  narrate  under  each  year  all  the 
events  in  the  several  parts  of  the  world  which  were  contem- 
porary, it  is  clear  that  In  some  cases  it  will  be  necessary  to 
mention  the  end  before  the  beginning ;  when,  that  is  to  say, 
that  particular  part  of  the  subject  calls  for  mention,  first  as 
being  in  place  in  the  general  course  of  my  narrative,  and  the 
events  which  embrace  the  end  of  an  episode  fit  in  sooner  than 
those  which  belong  to  its  beginning  and  first  conceptioa  .  .  . 

26,  Sosibius,  the  unfaithful  guardian  of  Ptolemy  Epiphanes, 
was  a  creature  of  extraordinary  cunning,  who 
long  retained  his  power,  and  was  the  instrument  ^^^^^J^^^^i^ 
of  many  crimes  at  court :  he  contrived  first  the 
murder  of  Lysimachus,  son  of  Arsinoe,  daughter  of  Ptolemy 
and  Berenice ;  secondly,  that  of  Maga,  son  of  Ptolemy  and 
Berenice  the  daughter  of  Maga ;  thirdly,  that  of  Berenice  the 
mother  of  Ptolemy  Pbilopator ;  fourthly,  that  of  Cleomenes  of 
Sparta';  and  fifthly,  that  of  Arsinoe  the  daughter  of  Berenice; . . . 

Three  or  four  days  after  the  death  of  Ptolemy  Philopatot, 
having  caused  a  platform  to  be  erected  in  the 
largest   court   of  the   palace   Agathocles   and    ■j^'j^^'of 
Sosibius   summoned  a   meeting   of  the   foot-  pioiemy  Phiio- 
guards    and    the    household,    as    well    as    the  P^tor  announced, 
officers    Of  the    infantry    and    cavalry.       The   '^^^^^^ 
assembly  being  formed,  they  mounted  the  plat- 
form, and  first  of  all  announced  the  deaths  of  the  king  and 
queen,  and  proclaimed  the  customary  period  of  mourning  for 
the  people.     After  that  they  placed  a  diadem  upon  the  head 
of  the    child,    Ptolemy    Epiphanes,    proclaimed    him    king, 
and   read   a  forged  will,  in  which   the  late  king  nominated 
Agathocles  and  Sosibius  guardians  of  his  son.    They  ended  by 
an  exhortation  to  the  ofBcers  to  be  loyal  to  the  boy  and  maintain 
his  sovereignty.     They  next  brought  in  two  silver  urns,  one  of 
which  they  declared  contained  the  ashes  of  the  king,  the  other 
those  of  Arsinoe.     Andin  fact  one  of  them  did  really  contain 
the  king's  ashes,  the  other  was  filled  with  spices.     Having  done 
this  they  proceeded  to  complete  the  funeral  ceremonies.     It 
was  then  that  all  the  world  at  last  learnt  the  truth  about  the 


158  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  book 

death  of  Arsinoe.  For  now  that  her  death  was  clearly 
established,  the  manner  of  it  began  to  be  a  matter  of  specu- 
lation. Though  rumours  which  turned  out  to  be  true  hmi 
found  their  way  among  the  people,  they  had  up  to  this  time 
been  disputed;  now  there  was  no  possibility  of  hiding  the 
truth,  and  it  became  deeply  impressed  in  the  minds  of  alU 
Indeed  there  was  great  excitement  among  the  populace :  no  one 
thought  about  the  king ;  it  was  the  fate  of  Arsinoe  that 
moved  them.  Some  recalled  her  orphanhood;  others  the 
tyranny  and  insult  she  had  endured  from  her  earliest  days ; 
and  when  her  miserable  death  was  added  to  these  misfortunes, 
it  excited  such  a  passion  of  pity  and  sorrow  that  the  city  was 
filled  with  sighs,  tears,  and  irrepressible  lamentation.  Yet  it  was 
clear  to  the  thoughtful  observer  that  these  were  not  so  much 
signs  of  affection  for  Arsinoe  as  of  hatred  towards  Agathodes. 
The  first  measure  of  this  minister,  after  depositing  the  urns 
Agaihociet  pro-  '"  ^^^  royal  mortuary,  and  giving  orders  for  the 
pitiaies  tbe  army  laying  aside  of  mourning,  was  to  gratify  the 
and  gets  rid  of  army  with  two  months'  pay  ;  for  he  was  con- 
vinced that  the  way  to  deaden  the  resentment 
of  the  common  soldiers  was  to  appeal  to  their  interests.  He 
then  caused  them  to  take  the  oath  customary  at  the  pro- 
clamation of  a  new  king ;  and  next  took  measures  to  get  all 
who  were  likely  to  be  formidable  out  of  the  country. 
Philammon,  who  had  been  employed  in  the  murder  of  Arsinoe, 
he  sent  out  as  governor  of  Cyrene,  while  he  committed  the 
young  king  to  the  chaise  of  Oenanthe  and  Agathocleia. 
Next,  Pelops  the  son  of  Pelops  he  despatched  to  the  court  of 
Antiochus  in  Asia,  to  urge  him  to  maintain  his  friendly 
relations  with  the  court  of  Alexandria,  and  not  to  violate  the 
treaty  he  had  made  with  the  young  king's  father.  Ptolemy, 
son  of  Sosibius,  he  sent  to  Philip  to  arrange  for  a  treaty  of 
intermarriage  between  the  two  countries,  and  to  ask  for  assist- 
ance in  case  Antiochus  should  make  a  serious  attempt  to  play 
them  false  in  any  matter  of  importance. 

He  also  selected  Ptolemy,  son  ■  of  Agesarchus,  as  am- 
bassador to  Rome :  not  with  a  view  of  his  seriously  prosecuting 
the  embassy,  but  because  he  thought  that,  if  he  once  entered 
Greece,  he  would  find  himself  among  friends  and  kinsfolk, 


XV  MISCONDUCT  OF  AGATHOCLES  159 

and  would  stay  there ;  which  would  suit  his  policy  of  getting 
rid  of  eminent  men.  Scopas  the  Aelolian  also  he  sent  to 
Greece  to  recruit  foreign  mercenaries,  giving  him  a  large 
sum  in  gold  for  bounties.  He  had  two  objects  in  view 
in  this  measure :  one  was  to  use  the  soldiers  so  recruited 
in  the  war  with  Antiochus ;  another  was  to  get  rid  of  the 
mercenary  troops  already  existing,  by  sending  them  on  garrison 
duty  in  the  various  farts  and  settlements  about  the  country ; 
while  he  used  tbe  new  recruits  to  fill  up  the  numbers  of  the 
household  regiments  with  new  men,  as  well  as  the  pickets 
immediately  round  the  palace,  and  in  other  parts  of  the  city. 
For  he  believed  that  men  who  had  been  hired  by  himself,  and 
were  taking  his  pay,  would  have  no  feehngs  in  common  with 
the  old  soldiers,  with  whom  they  would  be  totally  unacquainted ; 
but  that,  having  all  their  hopes  of  safety  and  profit  in  him,  he 
would  find  them  ready  to  co-operate  with  him  and  carry  out 
his  orders. 

Now  all  this  took  place  before  the  intrigue  of  Philip,  though 
it  was  necessary  for  the  sake  of  clearness  to  speak  of  that  first, 
and  to  describe  the  transactions  which  took  place,  both  at  the 
audience  and  the  dispatch  of  the  ambassadors. 

To  return  to  Agathocles :  when  he  had  thus  got  rid  of  the 
most  eminent  men,  and  had  to  a  great  degree 


way  of  hfe.  Drawing  round  him  a  body  of  friends,  whom  he 
selected  from  the  most  frivolous  and  shameless  of  his  personal 
attendants  or  servants,  he  devoted  the  chief  part  of  the  day 
and  night  to  drunkenness  and  all  the  excesseswhich  accompany 
drunkenness,  sparing  neither  matron,  nor  bride,  nor  virgin,  and 
doing  all  this  with  tbe  most  offensive  ostentation.  The  result 
was  a  widespread  outburst  of  discontent;  and  when  there 
appeared  no  prospect  of  reforming  this  state  of  things,  or  of 
obtaining  protection  against  the  violence,  insolence  and 
debauchery  of  the  court,  which  on  the  contrary  grew  daily 
more  outrageous,  their  old  hatred  blazed  up  once  more  in  the 
hearts  of  the  common  people,  and  all  began  again  to  recall  the 
misfortunes  which  the  kingdom  already  owed  to  these  very 
men.     But  the  absence  of  any  one  fit  to  take  the  lead,  and 


l6o  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYhWS  bom 

by  whose  means  they  coutd  vent  their  wrath  upon  Agathocles 
and  Agathocleia,  kept  them  quiet.  Their  one  remaining  hope 
rested  upon  Tlepolemus,  and  on  this  they  fixed  their  con- 
fidence. 

As  long  as  the  late  king  was  alive  Tlepolemus  remained  in 

„  retirement ;  but  upon  his  death  he  quickly  pro- 

govemor  of  Peiu-  pitiated  the  common  soldiers,  and  became  once 

sium.tltiermincsiomore  governor  of  Pelusium.    At  first  he  directed 

depose  Agaiho-  ^  ^is  actions  With  a  view  to  the  interest  of  the 

cles,  B.C,  aoj-ioi. ,  .  .     .-      .  ,  .  i ,      ■ 

king,  believing  that  there  would  be  some 
council  of  regency  to  take  charge  of  the  boy  and  administer 
the  government  But  when  he  saw  that  all  those  who  were 
fit  for  this  charge  were  got  out  of  the  way,  and  that  Agathocles 
was  boldly  monopolising  the  supreme  power,  he  quickly 
changed  his  purpose ;  because  he  suspected  the  danger  that 
threatened  him  from  the  hatred  which  they  mutually  enter- 
tained. He  therefore  began  to  draw  his  troops  together,  and 
bestir  himself  to  collect  money,  that  he  might  not  be  an  easy 
prey  to  any  one  of  his  enemies.  At  the  same  time  he  was  not 
without  hope  that  the  guardianship  of  the  young  king,  and 
the  chief  power  in  the  state  might  devolve  upon  him ;  both 
because,  in  his  own  private  opinion,  he  was  much  more  fit  for 
it  in  every  respect  than  Agathocles,  and  because  he  was 
informed  that  his  own  troops  and  those  in  Alexandria  were 
looking  to  him  to  put  an  end  to  the  minister's  outrageous 
conduct.  When  such  ideas  were  entertained  by  Tlepolemus, 
it  did  not  take  long  to  make  the  quarrel  grow,  especially  as  the 
partisans  of  both  helped  to  inflame  it.  Being  eager  to  secure 
the  adhesion  of  the  generals  of  divisions  and  the  captains  of 
companies,  he  frequently  invited  them  to  banquets;  and  at 
these  assemblies,  instigated  partly  by  the  flattery  of  his  guests 
and  partly  by  his  own  impulse  (for  he  was  a  young  man 
and  the  conversation  was  over  the  wine),  he  used  to  throw 
out  sarcastic  remarks  against  the  family  of  Agathocles.  At 
first  they  were  covert  and  enigmatic,  then  merely  ambiguous, 
and  finally  undisguised,  and  containing  the  bitterest  reflections. 
He  proposed  the  health  of  the  scribbler  of  pasquinades,  the 
sackbut-gtrl  and  waiting-woman  ;  and  spoke  of  his  shameful 
boyhood,  when  as  cupbearer  of  the  king  he  had  submitted 


XV  INTERVENTION  OF  TLEPOLEMUS  i6i 

to  the  foulest  treatment.  His  guests  were  always  leady  to 
laugh  at  his  words  and  add  theiT  quota  to  the  sum  of  vitupera- 
tion. Il  was  not  long  before  this  reached  the  ears  of 
Agalhocles :  and  the  breach  between  the  two 
thus  becoming  an  open  one,  Agathocles  im-  ^'f^^hi^" 
mediately  began  bringing  charges  against 
Tlepolemus,  declaring  that  he  was  a  traitor  to  the  king,  and 
was  inviting  Antiochus  to  come  and  seize  the  government. 
And  he  brought  many  plausible  proofs  of  this  forward,  some  of 
which  he  got  by  distorting  facts  that  actually  occurred,  while 
others  were  pure  invention.  His  object  in  so  doing  was  to 
excite  the  wrath  of  the  common  people  against  Tlepolemus. 
But  the  result  was  the  reverse ;  for  the  populace  had  long  fixed 
their  hopes  on  Tlepolemus,  and  were  only  too  delighted  to  see 
the  quarrel  growing  hot  between  them.  The  actual  popular 
outbreak  which  did  occur  began  from  the  following  circum- 
stances. Nlcon,  a  relation  of  Agathocles,  was  in  the  lifetime  of 
the  late  king  commander  of  the  navy.  .  .  . 

26  (n).  Another,  murder  committed  by  Agathocles  was  that 
of  Deinon,  son  of  Deinon.  But  this,  as  the  pro-  a  fragmeni  from 
verb  has  it,  was  the  fairest  of  his  foul  deeds,  the  earlier  hiaiory 
For  the  letter  ordering  the  murder  of  Arsiroe  of  AgaUiodcs. 
had  fallen  into  this  man's  hands,  and  he  might  have  given 
information  about  the  plot  and  saved  the  Queen  ;  but  at  the 
time  he  chose  rather  to  help  Philammon,  and  so  became  the 
cause  of  all  the  misfortunes  which  followed ;  while,  after  the 
murder  was  committed,  he  was  always  recalling  the  circum- 
stances, commiserating  the  unhappy  woman,  and  expressing 
repentance  at  having  let  such  an  opportunity  slip :  and  this  he 
repeated  in  the  hearing  of  many,  so  that  Agathocles  heard  of 
it,  and  he  met  with  his  just  punishment  In  losing  his  life.  .  .  . 

THE  DEATH  OF  AGATHOCLES  AND  HIS  FAMILY 

26.  (^)  The  first  step  of  Agathocles  was  to  summon  a  meet- 
ing of  the  Macedonian  guards.  He  entered  the  Agaihocies  pre- 
assembly  accompanied  by  the  young  king  andtendsaploiofTle- 
his  own  sister  Agathocleia.  At  first  he  feigned  po'emus  against 
not  to  be  able  to  say  what  he  wished  for  tears ;  "^  '"^' 
but  after  again  and  again  wiping  his  eyes  with  his  chlamys  he 

VOL.  II  H 


i6i  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  «»» 

at  length  mastered  his  emotion,  and,  taking  the  young  king  in 
his  arms,  spoke  as  follows :  "  Take  this  boy,  whom  his  father 
on  his  death-bed  placed  in  this  lady's  arms  "  (pointing  to  his 
sister) "  and  confided  lo  your  loyalty,  men  of  Macedonia !  That 
lady's  affection  has  but  little  influence  in  securing  the  child's 
safety :  it  is  on  you  that  that  safety  now  depends ;  his  fortunes 
are  in  your  hands.  It  has  long  been  evident  to  those  who 
had  eyes  to  see,  that  Tlepolemus  was  aiming  at  something 
higher  than  his  natural  rank  ;  but  now  he  has  named  the  day 
and  hour  on  which  he  intends  to  assume  the  crown.  Do  not 
let  your  belief  of  this  depend  upon  my  words ;  refer  to  those 
who  know  the  real  truth  and  have  but  just  come  from  the 
very  scene  of  his  treason."  With  these  words  he  brought 
forward  Critolaus,  who  deposed  that  he  had  seen  with  his  own 
eyes  the  allars  being  decked,  and  the  victims  being  got  ready 
by  the  common  soldiers  for  the  ceremony  of  a  coronation. 
When  the  Macedonian  guards  had  heard  all  this,  far  from 
Anger  of  the  being  moved  by  his  appeal,  they  showed  their 
pojiuiace  and  contempt  by  hooting  and  loud  murmurs,  and 
^J^"'"  "fj""^'  drove  him  away  under  such  a  fire  of  derision 
that  he  got  out  of  the  assembly  without  being 
conscious  how  he  did  it.  And  similar  scenes  occurred  among 
other  corps  of  the  army  at  their  meetings.  Meanwhile  great 
crowds  kept  pouring  into  Alexandria  from  the  up-country 
stations,  calling  upon  kinsmen  or  friends  to  help  the  move- 
ment, and  not  to  submit  to  the  unbridled  tyranny  of  such 
unworthy  men.  But  what  inflamed  the  populace  against  the 
government  more  than  anything  else  was  the  knowledge  that, 
as  Tlepolemus  had  the  absolute  command  of  all  the  imports 
into  Alexandria,  delay  would  be  a  cause  of  suffering  to  Uiem- 
selves. 

27.  Moreover,  an  action  of  Agathocles  himself  served  to 
heighten  the  anger  of  the  multitude  and  of  Tlepolemus.  For 
he  took  Danae,  the  latter's  mother-in-law,  from  the  temple  of 
Demeler,  dragged  her  through  the  middle  of  the  city  unveiled, 
and  cast  her  into  prison.  His  object  in  doing  this  was  to 
manifest  his  hostility  to  Tlepolemus  ;  but  its  effect  was  to 
loosen  the  tongues  of  the  people.  In  their  anger  they  no 
longer  confined  themselves  to  secret  murmurs :  but  some  of 


XV  GROWING  HATRED  OF  AGATHOCLBS  163 

them  in  the  night  covered  the  walls  in  every  part  of  the  city 
with  pasquinades ;  while  others  in  the  day  time  collected  in 
groups  and  openly  expressed  their  loathing  for  the  government 

Seeing  what  was  taking  place,  and  beginning  to  fear  the 
worst,  Agathocles  at  one  time  meditated  making 
his  escape  by  secret  flight;  but  as  he  had  '^'^^^^' 
nothing  ready  for  such  a  measure,  thanks  to  his 
own  imprudence,  he  had  to  give  up  that  idea.  At  another 
time  he  set  himself  to  drawing  out  lists  of  men  likely  to  assist 
him  in  a  bold  coup  d'etat,  by  which  he  should  put  to  death 
or  arrest  his  enemies,  and  then  possess  himself  of  absolute 
power.  While  still  meditating  these  plans  he  received  in- 
formation that  Moeragenes,  one  of  the  body-guard,  was 
betraying  all  the  secrets  of  the  palace  to  Tlepolemus,  and  was 
co-operating  with  him  on  account  of  his  relationship  with 
Adaeus,  at  that  time  the  commander  of  Bubastus.  Agathocles 
immediately  ordered  his  secretary  Nicostratus 
tp  arrest  Moeragenes,  and  extract  the  truth  ■'^™^°J^°^' 
from  him  by  every  possible  kind  of  torture. 
Being  promptly  arrested  by  Nicostratus,  and  taken  to  a  retired 
part  of  the  palace,  he  was  at  first  examined  directly  as  to  the 
facts  alleged ;  but,  refusing  to  confess  anything,  he  was  stripped. 
And  now  some  of  the  torturers  were  preparing  their  instru- 
ments, and  others  with  scourges  in  their  bands  were  just 
taking  off  their  outer  garments,  when  just  at  that  very  moment 
a  servant  ran  in,  and,  whispering  something  in  the  ear  of 
Nicostratus,  hurried  out  again.  Nicostratus  followed  close 
behind  him,  without  a  word,  frequently  slapping  his  thigh  with 
his  hand. 

28.  The  predicament  of  Moeragenes  was  now  indescrib- 
ably strange.  There  stood  the  executioners 
by  his  side  on  the  point  of  raising  their  "^^^f^^^"^ 
scourges,  while  others  close  to  him  were 
getting  ready  their  instruments  of  torture :  but  when  Nicos- 
tratus withdrew  they  all  stood  silently  staring  at  each  other's 
faces,  expecting  him  every  moment  to  return;  but  as  time 
went  on  they  one  by  one  slipped  away,  until  Moeragenes  was 
left  alone.  Having  made  his  way  through  the  palace,  after 
this  unhoped-for  escape,  he  rushed  in  his  half-clothed  state 


■64  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIVS  book 

into  a  tent  of  the  Macedonian  guards  whjdi  was  situated 
close  to  the  palace.  They  chanced  to  be  at  breaUast,  and 
therefore  a  good  many  were  collected  together  j  and  to  them 
he  narrated  the  story  of  his  wonderful  escape.  At  first  they 
would  not  believe  it,  but  ultimately  were  convinced  by  his 
appearing  without  his  clothes.  Taking  advantage  of  this 
extraordinary  occurrence,  Moeragenes  besought  the  Macedonian 
guards  with  tears  not  only  to  help  him  to  secure  his  own 
safety,  but  the  king's  also,  and  above  all  their  own,  "For 
certain  destruction  stared  them  in  the  face,"  he  said,  "unless 
they  seized  the  moment  when  the  hatred  of  the  populace  iras 
at  its  height,  and  every  one  was  ready  to  wreak  vengeance  on 
Agathocles.  That  moment  was  now,  and  all  that  was  wanted 
was  some  one  to  begin." 

29.  The  passions  of  the  Macedonians  were  roused  by  these 
words,  and  they  finally  agreed  to  do  as  Moeragenes  advised. 
They  at  once  went  round  to  the  tents,  first  those  of  their  own 
corps,  and  then  those  of  the  other  soldiers  ;  which  were  all 
close  together,  facing  the  same  quarter  of  the  city.  The  wish 
was  one  which  had  for  a  long  time  been  formed  in  the  minds 
of  the  soldiery,  wanting  nothing  but  some  one  to  call  it  forth, 
and  with  courage  to  begin.  No  sooner,  therefore,  had  a  com- 
mencement been  made  than  it  blazed  out  like  a  fire :  and 
before  four  hours  had  elapsed  every  class,  whether  military  or 
civil,  had  agreed  to  make  the  attempt 

At  this  crisis,  too,  chance  contributed  a  great  deal  to  the 
final  catastrophe.      For  a  letter  addressed  by 

^^^^  Tlepolemus  to  the  army  as  well  as  some  of 
his  spies,  had  fallen  into  the  hands  of 
Agathocles.  The  letter  announced  that  he  would  be  at 
Alexandria  shortly,  and  the  spies  informed  Agathocles  that 
he  was  already  there.  This  news  so  distracted  Agathocles 
that  he  gave  up  taking  any  measures  at  all  or  even  thinking 
about  the  dangers  which  surrounded  him,  but  departed  at  his 
usual  hour  to  his  wine,  and  kept  up  the  carouse  to  the  end 
Ocnamho  in  the  '"    his    usual    licentious    fashioa      But    his 

temple  of      mother  Oenanthe  went  in  great  distress  to  the 

^**°'^"^'-  temple  of  Demeter  and  Persephone,  which  was 
open  on  account  of  a  certain  annual  sacrifice ;  and  there  first 


XV  A  REVOLT  DECIDED  UPON  BY  THE  ARMY         165 

of  all  she  besought  the  aid  of  those  goddesses  with  bend- 
ings  of  the  knee  and  strange  incantations,  and  then  sat  down 
close  to  the  altar  and  remained  motionless.  Most  of 
the  women  present,  delighted  to  witness  her  dejection  and 
distress,  kept  silence :  but  the  ladies  of  the  family  of  Poly- 
crates,  and  certain  others  of  the  nobility,  being  as  yet  unaware 
of  what  was  going  on  around  thetn,  approached  Oenanthe  and 
tried  to  comfort  her.  But  she  cried  out  in  a  loud  voice : 
"  Do  not  come  near  me,  you  monsters !  I  know  you  well ! 
Vour  hearts  are  always  against  us ;  and  you  pray  the  goddess 
for  all  imaginable  evil  upon  us.  Still  I  trust  and  believe  that, 
God  willing,  you  shall  one  day  taste  the  flesh  of  your  own 
children."  With  these  words  she  ordered  her  female 
attendants  to  drive  them  away,  and  strike  them  with  their 
staves  if  they  refused  to  go.  The  ladies  availed  thereiselves  of 
this  excuse  for  quitting  the  temple  in  a  body,  raising  their 
hands  and  praying  that  she  might  herself  have  experience  of 
those  very  miseries  with  which  she  had  threatened  her 
neighbours. 

SO.  The  men  having  by  this  time  decided  upon  a  re- 
volution, now  that  in  every  house  the  anger  of  the  women  was 
added  to  the  general  resentment,  the  popular 
hatred  blazed  out  with  redoubled  violence.  As 
soon  as  night  fell  the  whole  city  was  filled  with  tumult,  torches, 
and  hurrying  feet.  Some  were  assembling  with  shouts  in  the 
stadium ;  some  were  calling  upon  others  to  join  them ;  some 
were  running  backwards  and  forwards  seeking  to  conceal  them- 
selves in  houses  and  places  least  likely  to  be  suspected.  And 
now  the  open  spaces  round  the  palace,  the  stadium,  and  the 
street  were  filled  with  a  motley  crowd,  as  well  as  the  area  in 
front  of  the  Dionysian  Theatre.  Being  informed  of  this, 
Agathocles  roused  himself  from  a  drunken  lethargy, — for  he  had 
just  dismissed  his  drinking  party, — and,  accompanied  by  all  his 
family,  with  the  exception  of  Fhilo,  went  to  the  king.  After 
a  few  words  of  lamentation  over  his  misfortunes  addressed  to 
the  child,  he  took  him  by  the  hand,  and  proceeded  to  the 
covered  walk  which  runs  between  the  Maeander  garden  and  the 
Palaestra,  and  leads  to  the  entrance  of  the  theatre.  Having 
securely  fastened  the  two  first  doors  through  which  be  passe 


lU  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  book 

he  entered  the  third  with  two  or  three  bodyguards,  his  own 
family,  and  the  king.  The  doors,  however,  which  were  secured 
by  double  bars,  were  only  of  lattice  work  and  could  therefore 
be  seen  through. 

By  this  time  the  mob  had  collected  frona  every  part  of  the 
city  in  such  numbers,  that,  not  only  was  every  foot  of  ground 
occupied,  but  the  doorsteps  and  roofs  also  were  crammed  with 
human  beings  ;  and  such  a  mingled  storm  of  shouts  and  cries 
arose,  as  might  be  expected  from  a  crowd  in  which  women  and 
children  were  mixed  with  men  :  for  in  Alexandria,  as  in  Car- 
thage, the  children  perform  as  conspicuous  a  part  in  such 
commotions  as  the  men. 

81.  Day  now  began  to  break  and  the  uproar  was  still  a 
confused  hibet  of  voices ;  but  one  cry  made  itself  heard  con- 
Cries  for  the  liine  SP'^^^^^'X  *bove  the  rest,  it  was  a  call  for  THE 
'  King.  The  first  thing  actually  done  was  by  the 
Macedonian  guard  :  they  le(^  their  quarters  and  seized  the 
vestibule  which  served  as  the  audience  hall  of  the  palace ;  then, 
after  a  brief  pause,  having  ascertained  whereabouts  in  the 
palace  the  king  was,  they  went  round  to  the  covered  walk, 
burst  open  the  first  doors,  and,  when  they  came  to  the  next, 
demanded  with  loud  shouts  that  the  young  king  should  be 
surrendered  to  them.  Agathocles,  recognising  his  danger, 
begged  his  bodyguards  to  go  in  his  name  to  the  Macedonians, 
to  inform  them  that  "he  resigned  the  guardianship  of  the 
king,  and  all  offices,  honours,  or  emoluments  which  he 
possessed,  and  only  asked  that  his  life  should  be  granted  him 
with  a  bare  maintenance  ;  that  by  sinking  to  his  original  situa- 
tion in  life  he  would  be  rendered  incapable,  even  if  he  wished 
it,  of  being  henceforth  oppressive  to  any  one."  All  the  body- 
guards refused  except  Aristomenes,  who  afterwards  obtained  the 
chief  power  in  the  state. 

This  man  was  an  Acamanian,  and,  though  far  advanced  in 
^  life  when  he  obtained  supreme  power,  he  is 

thought  to  have  made  a  most  excellent  and 
blameless  guardian  of  the  king  and  kingdom.  And  as  he  was 
distinguished  in  that  capacity,  so  had  he  been  remarkable 
before  for  his  adulation  of  Agathocles  in  the  time  of  his  pros- 
perity.    He  was  the  first,  when  entertaining  Agathocles  at  his 


iwox  III  SUMMARY  OF  THE  WORK  167 

braced  events  of  such  magnitude  and  importance.    In  describing 
them  I  shall  start  from  the  1 40th  Olympiad  and  , 

shall  arrange  myexpositionin  thefoUowing  order: 

2.  First  I  shall  indicate  the  causes  of  the  Punic  or 
Hannibalian  war  :  and  shall  have  to  describe ,_  xi,e  cause  and 
how  the  Carthaginians  entered  Italy;  broke  up  course  of  the 
the  Roman  power  there ;  made  the  Romans  Hannibalian  war. 
tremble  for  their  safety  and  the  very  soil  of  their  country; 
and  contrary  to  all  calculation  acquired  a  good  prospect  of 
surprising  Rome  itself 

I  shall  next  try  to  make  it  clear  how  in  the  same  period 
Philip  of  Macedon,  after  finishing  his  war  with   3  Macedonian 
the   Aetolians,    and    subsequently  settling   the  ireaiy  with  Cai- 
affairs  of  Greece,  entered    upon    a    design    of  *W*.  ^.c.  316. 
forming  an  offensive  and  defensive  alliance  with  Carthage. 

Then  I  shall  tell  how  Antiochus  and  Ptolemy  Phitopator 
first    quarrelled  and   finally  went  to  war  with   3.  Syrian  war, 
each  other  for  ihe  possession  of  Coele-Syria.  b-c.  aia 

Next  how  the  Rhodians  and  Frusias  went  to  war  with  the 
Byzantines,  and  compelled  them  to  desist  from  4.  Byiantine  srar. 
exacting  dues  from  ships  sailing  into  the  Pontus.        ^c.  aao. 

At  this  point  I  shall  pause  in  my  narrative  to  introduce  a 
disquisition   upon  the  Roman  Constitution,  in  f^^  digression 
which  I  shall  show  that  its  peculiar  character   on  the  Rtman 
contributed  largely  to  their  success,  not  only  in     ConsUtuiion, 
reducing   all    Italy   to    their    authority,   and    in    acquiring    a 
supremacy  over  the  Iberians  and  Gauls  besides,  but  also  at 
last,  after  their  conquest  of  Carthage,  to  their  conceiving  the 
idea  of  universal  dominion. 

Along  with  this   I   shall   introduce  another  second  on  Hiero    . 
digression  on  tiie  fall  of  Hiero  of  Syracuse.  of  Syracuse. 

After  these  digressions  will  come  the  disturbances  in 
Egypt ;  how,  after  the  death  of  King  Ptolemy, 
Antiochus  and  Philip  entered  into  a  compact  ^*^|^jono7ilie 
for  the  partition  of  the  dominions  of  thatdominionsofPioi- 
monarch's  infant  son.  I  shall  describe  their  ■^"'J'  Epiphanes, 
treacherous  dealings,  Philip  laying  hands  upon  ^^  ^°^' 
the  islands  of  the  Aegean,  and  Caria  and  Samos,  Antiochus 
upon  Coele-Syria  and  Phoenicia. 


i68  TJJE  ff/STOKIES  OF  POLYBWS  book 

3.  Next,  after  a  summarj-  cecapitulalion  of  the  proceedings  of 
6.  War  H'iih     ''^'^  Carthaginians  and  Komatis  in  Iberia,  Libya, 

Philip,  acaoi- and    Sicily,    I   shall,    following  the  changes  of 

'9'*  events,  sliift  the  scene  of  my  story  entirely  to 

Greece.      Here  I  shall  first  descrilie  the  naval  battles  of  Attalus 

and  the  Rhodiatis  against  Philip ;  and  the  war  between  Philip 

and  Rome,  the  persons  engaged,  its  circumstances,  ^fid  result 

Next  to  this  I  shall  have  to  record  the  wrath  of  the  Actolians, 

,  in  consequence  of  which  they  invited  the  aid  of 

kc^'ioa-igi  '    Antiochus,  and  tliereby  gave   rise  to  what   is 

called  the  Asiatic  war  against  Rome  and  the 

Achaean  league.     Having  stated  the  causes  of  this  war,  and 

described  the  crossing  of  Antiochus  into  Europe,  I  shall  Have 

to  show  first  in  what  manner  he  was   driven  from   Greece; 

secondly,  how,  being  defeated  in  the  war,  he  was  forced  to 

cede  all  his  territory  west  of  Taurus;  and  thirdly,  how  the 

Romans,  after  crushing  the  insolence  of  the  Gauls,  secured 

undisputed  possession  of  Asia,  and  freed  all  the  nations  on 

the  west  of  Taurus  from  the  fear  of  barbarian  inroads  and 

the  lawless  violence  of  the  Gauls. 

Next,  after  reviewing  the  disasters  of  the  Aetolians  and 

8.  Gallic  wari  of  Cephalic nians,  I  shall  pass  to  the  wars  waged 

Eumenes  and    by  Eumcnes  against  Prusias  and  the  Gauls;  as 

Prasias.        „g][  ^  (hat  carried  on  in  alliance  with  Ariarathes 

against  Ph  a  maces. 

Pinally,  after  speaking  of  the  unity  and  settlement  of  the 

Union  erf  ih    P^'op**"'*^''^!  ^^^  ^f  t^e  gTowth  of  the  common- 

Pcloponnese.     wealth  of  Rhodes,  I  shall  add  a  summary  of 

Aniiochus      my    whole    work,    concluding    by  an    account 

E^t"""^!!  of  °''  ^^^    expedition    of    Antiochus    Epiphanes 

the  Macedonian  against    Egypt ;    of  the   war    against   Perseus ; 

monnrehy,      and     the     destruction     of     the     Macedonian 

B.C.  1B8-168.    jnonarchy.     Throughout  the  whole  narrative  it 

Iwill  be  shown  how  the  policy  adopted  by  the  Romans  in  one 

iafler  another  of  these  cases,  as  they  arose,  led  to  their  eventual 

ponquest  of  the  whole  world. 

4.  And  if  our  judgment  of  individuals  and  constitutions, 
for  praise  or  blame,  could  be  adequately  formed  from  a  simple 
consideration  of  their  successesior  defeats,  I  must  necessarily 


Ill    EXTENSIO!^  OF  THE  FIRST  PLAN  OF  THE  WORK  169 

have  stopped  at  this  point,  and  have  concluded  my  history  as 
soon  as  I  reached  these  last  events  in  accordance  with  my 
original  plan.  For  at  this  point  the  fifty-three  years  were 
coming  to  an  end,  and  the  progress  of  the  Roman  power  bad 
arrived  at  its  consummation.  And,  besides,  by  this  time 
the  acknowledgment  had  been  extorted  from  all  that  the  v" 
supremacy  of  Rome  must  be  accepted,  and  her  commands 
obeyed.  But  in  truth,  judgments  of  either  side  -^^  ^^^  g^. 
founded  on  the  bare  facts  of  success  or  failure  tended  loembrace 
in  the  field  are  by  no  means  final.  It  has  ""  P*""^  f™™ 
often  happened  that  what  seemed  the  most  ^''^'  '  '*  ' 
signal  successes  have,  from  ill  management,  brought  the 
most  crushing  disasters  in  their  train ;  while  not  unfre- 
quentjy  the  most  terrible  calamities,  sustained  with  spirit, 
have  been  turned  to  actual  advantage,  I  am  bound,  there- 
fore, to  add  to  my  statement  of  facts  a  discussion  on  the 
subsequent  policy  of  the  conquerors,  and  their  admini-  ' 
stfaHon  of  "tlTelr  universal  dominion:  and  again  on  the 
various  feelings  and  opinions  entertained  by  other  nations 
towards  their  rulers.  And  I  must  also  describe  the  tastes 
and  aims  of  the  several  nations,  whether  in  their  private 
lives  or  public  policy.  The  present  generation  will  learn) 
from  this  whether  they  should  shun  or  seek  the  rule 
of  Rome;  and  future  generations  "will  fie  taught  whether  tol 
praise  and  imitate,  or  to  decry  it.  The  useftjloess  of  my 
history,  whether  for  the  present  or  the  future,  will  mainly  lie 
in  this.  For  the  end  of  a  policy  should  not  be,  in  the"^yea 
either  of  the  actors  or  their  historians,  simply  to  conquer  other^  ' 
and  bring  all  into  subjection.  Nor  does  any  man  of  sense 
go  to  war  with  his  neighbours  for  the  mere  purpose  of 
mastering  his  opponents ;  nor  go  to  sea  for  the  mere  sake  of 
the  voyage ;  nor  engage  in  professions  and  trades  for  the  sole 
purpose  of  learning  them.  In  all  these  cases  the  objects  are 
invariably  the  pleasure,  honour,  or  jirijfit  which  are  the  results 
of  the  several  employments.  Accordingly  the  object  of  this 
work  shall  be  to  ascertain  exactly  what  the  position  of  the  several 
states  was,  after  the  universal  conquest  by  which  they  fell  under 
the  power  of  Rome,  until  the  commotions  and  disturbances 
which  broke  out  at  a  later  period.     These  I  designed 


i;o  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  book 

make  the .  starting-point  of  what  may  almost  be  called  a  new 
work,  partly  because  of  the  greatness  and  suqirising  nature  of 
the  events  themselves,  but  chiefly  because,  in  the  case  of  most 
of  them,  I  was  not  only  an  eye-witness,  but  in  some  cases  one 
of  the  actors,  and  in  others  the  chief  director. 

6.  The  events  I  refei  to  are  the  wars  of  Rome  against  the 

A  new  departure : '-^'''^^"•'"5   and  Vaccaei  J    those  of  Carthage 

ilie  breaking-up  against  Massinissa,  king  of  Libya ;  and  those 

oftheairang^    of  Attalus  and   Prusias  in   Asia.      Then   also 

the  faJi  of      Ariarathes,  King  of  Cappadocia,  having  been 

Macedonia,     ejected  from  his  throne  by  Orophemes  through 

^*".  ""^"'^Ee  the  agency  of  King  Demetrius,  recovered  his 

^sa!  and^'f   ancestral  power  by  the  help  of  Attalus ;  while 

Rome  against    Demetrius,  son  of  Seleucus,  after  twelve  years' 

ilie  CelUberians,  possession  of  the  throne  of  Syria,  was  deprived 

and  a^insl^Car-  ^^  ''■  ^^^  °^  ^'^  ''^^  ^'  ^^^  ^'*'"^  ^™^'  ''J'  ^  ^°™" 
tkigc  (3d  Panic  bination  of  the  other  kings  against  him.     Then 
war,  B.C.  149.    i(  -^f^s,  too,  that  the  Romans  restored  to  their 
'■*  '■  country  those  Greeks  who  had   been  charged 

with  guih  in  the  matter  of  the  war  with  Perseus,  after  formally 
acquitting  them  of  the  crimes  alleged  against  them.  Not 
long  afterwards  the  same  people  turned  their  hands  against 
Carthage :  at  first  with  the  intention  of  forcing  its  removal  to 
some  other  spot,  but  finally,  for  reasons  to  be  afterwards 
stated,  with  the  resolution  of  utterly  destroying  it  Con- 
temporaneous with  this  came  the  renunciation  by  the  Mace- 
donians of  their  friendship  to  Rome,  and  by  the  Lacedae- 
monians of  their  membership  of  the  Achaean  league,  to 
which  the  disaster  that  befel  all  Greece  alike  owed  its  be- 
ginning and  end. 

This  is  my  purpose :  but  its  fulfilment  must  depend  upon 
whether  Fortune  protracts  my  life  to  the  necessary  length.  I  am 
persuaded,  however,  that,  even  if  the  common  human  destiny 
does  overtake  me,  this  theme  will  not  be  allowed  to  lie  idle 
for  want  of  competent  men  to  handle  it ;  for  there  are  many 
besides  myself  who  will  readily  undertake  its  completion. 
But  having  given  the  heads  of  the  most  remarkable  events, 
with  the  object  of  enabling  the  reader  to  grasp  the  general 
scope  of  my  history  as  well  as  the  arrangement  of  its  several 


XV        THE  KING  SURRENDERED  TO  THE  SOLDIERS        167 

house,  to  distinguish  him  among  his  guests  by  the  present  of  a 
gold  diadem,  an  honour  reserved  by  custom  to  the  kings  alone  ; 
he  was  the  first  too  who  ventured  to  wear  his  likeness  on  his 
ring ;  and  when  a  daughter  was  bora  to  him  he  named  her 
Agathocleia. 

But  to  return  to  my  story.  Aristomenes  undertook  the 
mission,  received  his  message,  and  made  his  xhe  guanis  insist 
way  through  a  certain  wicket-gate  to  the  on  the  summder 
Macedonians,  He  stated  his  business  in  few  of  the  king. 
words :  the  first  impulse  of  the  Macedonians  was  to  stab 
him  to  death  on  the  spot ;  but  some  of  them  held  up  their 
hands  to  protect  him,  and  successfully  be^ed  his  life. 
He  accordingly  returned  with  orders  to  bring  the  king  or  to 
come  no  more  himself.  Having  dismissed  Aristomenes  with 
these  words,  the  Macedonians  proceeded  to  burst  open  the 
second  door  also.  When  convinced  by  their  proceedings,  no 
less  than  by  the  answers  they  had  returned,  of  the  fierce  pur- 
pose of  the  Macedonians,  the  first  idea  of  Agathocles  was  to 
thrust  his  hand  through  the  latticed  door, — while  Agathocleia 
did  the  same  with  her  breasts  which  she  said  had  suckled  the 
king,  —  and  by  every  kind  of  entreaty  to  beg  that  the 
Macedonians  would  grant  him  bare  life. 

32.  But  finding  that  his  long  and  piteous  appeals  produced 
no  effect,  at  last  he  sent  out  the  young  king  with  the  body- 
guards. As  soon  as  they  had  got  the  king,  xhe  ]^[„^  j^^. 
the  Macedonians  placed  him  on  a  horse  and  ducted  to  the 
conducted  him  to  the  stadium.  His  appear-  siadium. 
ance  being  greeted  with  loud  shouts  and  clapping  of 
hands,  they  stopped  the  horse,  and  dismounting  the  child, 
ushered  him  to  the  royal  stall  and  seated  him  there.  But 
the  feelings  of  the  crowd  were  divided ;  they  were  de- 
lighted that  the  young  king  had  been  brought,  but  they 
were  dissatisfied  that  the  guilty  persons  had  not  been  arrested 
and  met  with  the  punishment  they  deserved.  Accordingly, 
they  continued  with  loud  cries  to  demand  that  the  authors  of  all 
the  mischief  should  be  brought  out  and  made  an  example.  The 
day  was  wearing  away,  and  yet  the  crowd  had  found  no  one 
on  whom^to  wreak  their  vengeance,  when  Sosibius,  who,  though 
a  son  of  the  elder  Sosibius,  was  at  that  time  a  member  of  the 


168  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  book 

bodyguard,  and  as  such  had  a  special  eye  to  the  safety  of  the 
king  and  the  State, — seeing  that  the  furious  desire  of  the 
multitude  was  implacable,  and  that  the  child  was  frightened  at 
the  unaccustomed  faces  that  surrounded  him  and  the  uproar 
of  the  crowd,  asked  the  king  whether  he  would  "  surrender  to 
the  populace  those  who  had  injured  him  or  his  mother."  The 
boy  having  nodded  assent,  Sosibius  bade  some  of  the  body- 
guard announce  the  lung's  decision,  while  he  raised  the  young 
child  from  his  seat  and  took  him  to  his  own  house  which 
was  close  by  to  receive  proper  attention  and  refreshment. 
When  the  message  from  the  king  was  declared,  the  whole 
place  broke  out  into  a  storm  of  cheering  and  clapping  of 
hands.  But  meanwhile  Agathoclcs  and  Agathocleia  had 
separated  and  gone  each  to  their  own  lodgings.  Without  loss 
of  time  soldiers,  some  voluntarily  and  others  under  pressure 
from  the  crowd,  started  in  search  of  them. 

83.  The  beginning  of  actual  bloodshed,  however,  was 
this.  One  of  the  servants  and  flatterers  of  Agathocles,  whose 
name  was  Philo,  came  out  to  the  stadium  still  flustered  with 
wine.  Seeing  the  fury  of  the  multitude,  he  said  to  some  by- 
standers that  they  would  have  cause  to  repent  it  again,  as  they 
had  only  the  other  day,  if  Agathocles  were  to  come  there.  Of 
those  who  heard  him  some  began  to  abuse  him,  while  others 
pushed  him  about ;  and  on  his  attempting  to  defend  himself, 
some  tore  his  cloak  off  his  back,  while  others  thrust  their 
spears  into  him  and  wounded  him  mortally.  He  was  dragged 
into  the  middle  of  the  crowd  breathing  his  last  gasp ;  and,  having 
thus  tasted  biood,  the  multitude  began  to  look  impatiently  for 
Death  of  ^^  coming  of  the  other  victims.  They  had  not 
Agathocles.  to  wait  long.  First  appeared  Agathocles  dragged 
hissister,  and  along  bound  hand  and  foot.  No  sooner  had 
he  entered  than  some  soldiers  rushed  at  him 
and  struck  him  dead.  And  in  doing  so  they  were  his  friends 
rather  than  enemies,  for  they  saved  him  from  the  horrible 
death  which  he  deserved.  Nicon  was  brought  next,  and  after 
him  Agathocleia  stripped  naked,  with  her  two  sisters;  and 
following  them  the  whole  family.  Last  of  all  some  men  came 
bringing  Oenanthe,  whom  they  had  torn  from  the  temple  of 
Demeter  and  Persephone,  riding  stripped  naked  upon  a  horse. 


XV     THE  MASSACRE  OF  AGATHOCLES  AND  FAMILY    169 

They  were  all  given  up  to  the  populace,  who  bit,  and  stabbed 
them,  and  knocked  out  their  eyes,  and,  as  soon  as  any  one 
of  them  fell,  tore  him  limb  from  limb,  until  they  had  utterly 
annihilated  them  all :  for  the  savagery  of  the  Egyptians  when 
their  passions  are  roused  is  indeed  terrible.  At  the  same 
time  some  young  girls  who  had  been  brought  up  with  Arsinoe, 
having  learnt  that  Philammon,  the  chief  agent  in  the  murder  of 
that  Queen,  had  arrived  three  days  before  from  Cyrene,  rushed 
to  his  house ;  forced  their  way  in ;  killed  Philammon  with 
stones  and  sticks  ;  strangled  his  infant  son  ;  and,  not  content 
with  this,  dragged  his  wife  naked  into  the  street  and  put  her 
to  death. 

Such  was  the  end  of  Agathocles  and  Agathocleia  and  their 
kinsfolk. 

84.  I  am  quite  aware  of  the  miraculous  occurrences  and 
embellishments  which  the  chroniclers  of  this  71,^  („n,en,pu-(je 
event  have  added  to  their  narrative  with  a  view  chaiacier  of 
of  producing  a  striking  effect  upon  their  hearers,  Aeaihode*. 
making  more  of  their  comments  on  the  story  than  of  the  story 
itself  and  the  main  incidents.  Some  ascribe  it  entirely  to 
Fortune,  and  take  the  opportunity,  of  expatiating  on  her  fickle- 
ness and  the  difficulty  of  being  on  one's  guard  against  her. 
Others  dwell  upon  the  unexpectedness  of  the  event,  and 
try  to  assign  its  causes  and  probabilities.  It  was  not  my  pur- 
pose, however,  to  treat  this  episode  in  this  way,  because  Aga- 
thocles was  not  a  man  of  conspicuous  courage  or  ability  as  a 
soldier;  nor  particularly  successful  or  worth  imitating  as  a 
Statesman ;  nor,  lastly,  eminent  for  his  acuteness  as  a  courtier 
or  cunning  as  an  intriguer,  by  which  latter  accomplishments 
Sosibius  and  many  others  have  managed  to  keep  one  king 
after  another  under  their  influence  to  the  last  day  of  their 
lives.  The  very  opposite  of  all  this  may  be  said  of  this  man. 
For  though  he  obtained  high  promotion  owing  to  Philopator's 
feebleness  as  a  king ;  and  though  after  his  death  he  had  the 
most  favourable  opportunity  of  consolidating  his  power,  he  yet 
soon  fell  into  contempt,  and  lost  his  position  and  his  life  at 
once,  thanks  to  his  own  want  of  courage  and  vigour. 

SG.  To  such  a  story  then  no  such  dissertation  is  required,  as 
was  in  place,  for  instance,  in  the  case  of  the  Sicilian  monarchs. 


tro  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  book 

Agathocles  and  Dionysius,  and  certain  others  who  have  ad- 

g^  j^  ministered  govemnients  with  repuUlion.   Forthe 

former  of  these,  starting  from  a  plebeian  and 
humble  position — having  been,  as  TJmacus  sneeringly  remarks, 
a  potter — came  from  the  wheel,  clay,  and  smoke,  quite  a  young 
man  to  Syracuse.  And,  to  begin  with,  both  these  men  in  their  re- 
spective generations  became  tyrants  of  Syracuse,  a  city  that  had 
obtained  at  that  time  the  greatest  reputation  and  the  greatest 
wealth  of  any  in  the  world ;  and  afterwards  were  regarded 
as  suzerains  of  all  Sicily,  and  lords  of  certain  districts  in  Italy. 
While,  for  his  part,  Agathocles  not  only  made  an  attempt 
upon  Africa,  but  eventually  died  in  possession  of  the  greatness 
he  had  acquired.  It  is  on  this  account  that  the  story  is  told 
of  Publius  Scipio,  the  first  conqueror  of  the  Carthaginians, 
that  being  asked  whom  he  considered  to  have  been  the  most 
skilful  administrators  and  most  distinguished  for  boldness  com- 
bined with  prudence,  he  replied,  "the  Sicilians  Agathocles 
and  Dionysius."  Now,  in  the  case  of  such  men  as  these,  it  is 
certainly  right  to  try  to  arrest  the  attention  of  our  readers,  and, 
I  suppose,  to  speak  of  Fortune  and  the  mutability  of  human 
affairs,  and  in  fact  to  point  a  moral :  but  in  the  case  of  such 
men  as  we  have  been  speaking  of,  it  is  quite  out  of  place  to 
do  so. 

38.  For  these  reasons  I  have  rejected  all  idea  of  making 
too  much  of  tKe  story  of  Agathocles.  But  another  and  the 
strongest  reason  was  that  all  such  wonderful  and  striking 
catastrophes  are  only  worth  listening  to  once ;  not  only  are 
subsequent  exhibitions  of  them  unprofitable  to  ear  and  eye,  but 
elaborate  harping  upon  soon  becomes  simply  troublesome. 
For  those  who  are  engaged  on  representing  anything  either  to 
eye  or  ear  can  have  only  two  objects  to  aim  at, — pleasure  and 
profit ;  and  in  history,  more  than  in  anything  else,  excessive 
prolixity  on  events  of  tragic  interest  fails  of  both  these  objects. 
For,  in  the  first  place,  who  would  wish  to  emulate  extraordinary 
catastrophes?  And  next,  no  one  likes  to  be  continually  seeing 
and  hearing  things  that  are  unnatural  and  beyond  the  ordinary 
conceptions  of  mankind.  We  arc,  indeed,  eager  to  see  and 
hear  such  things  once  and  for  the  first  time,  because  we  want 
to  know  that  a  thing  is  possible  which  was  supposed  to  be  im- 


XV   AG ATHOCLES  WAS  NOT  AN  IMPORTANT  PERSON   171 

possible :  but  when  once  convinced  on  that  point  no  one  is 
pleased  at  lingering  on  the  Unnatural ;  but  in  fact  would 
rather  not  come  across  it  at  all  oftener  than  need  be.  In  fact, 
the  dwelling  upon  misfortunes  which  exceed  the  ordinary 
limits  is  more  suitable  to  tragedy  than  to  history.  But  per- 
haps we  ought  to  make  allowances  for  men  who  have  studied 
neither  nature  nor  universal  history.  They  think,  I  presume, 
that  the  most  important  and  astonishing  events  in  all  history  are 
those  which  they  happen  to  have  come  across  themselves  or  to 
have  heard  from  others,  and  they  therefore  give  their  attention 
exclusively  to  those.  They  accordingly  do  not  perceive  that 
they  are  making  a  mistake  in  expatiating  on  events  which  are 
neither  novel, — for  they  have  been  narrated  by  others  before, — 
nor  capable  of  giving  instruction  or  pleasure.  So  much  on 
this  point.   .  .   . 


87.  King  Antiochus,  at  the  beginning  of  his  reign,  was 
thought  to  be  a  man  of  great  enterprise  and  Msappoinimenu 
courage,  and  great  vigour  in  the  execution  of  as  to  the  cbanio 
his  purposes ;  but  as  he  grew  older  his  character  '"  of  Anii™*™ 
evidently  deteriorated  in  itself,  and  disappointed 
the  expectation  of  the  world.  ... 


BOOK   XVI 

PHILIP    V.   WAGES    WAR   WITH    ATTALUS,    KING    OF    ] 

AND  THii  RHODIAHS.     Sce  supra  15,  20-24;  Livy,  31, 

17.  *??• 

1.  King  Philip  having  arrived  at  Pergamum,  and  believing 
Philip's  impious  ^^^  ^^  ^^^  ^  good  as  made  an  end  of  Attalus, 
conduci  in  Asia,  gavc  the  reiti  to  every  kind  of  outrage ;  and 
B.C.  aoi.  ijy  „ay  of  gratifying  his  almost  insane  fury  he 
vented  his  wrath  even  more  against  the  gods  than  against 
man.  For  his  skirmishing  attacks  being  easily  repelled  by  the 
garrison  of  Pcrgamum,  owing  to  the  strength  of  the  place,  and 
being  prevented  by  the  precautions  taken  by  Attalus  from 
getting  booty  from  the  country,  he  directed  his  anger  against 
the  seats  of  the  gods  and  the  sacred  enclosures ;  in  which,  as 
it  appears  to  me,  he  did  not  wrong  Attalus  so  much  as  himself. 
He  threw  down  the  temples  and  the  altars,  and  even  had  their 
stones  broken  to  pieces  that  none  of  the  buildings  he  had 
destroyed  might  be  rebuilt  After  spoiling  the  Nicephorium, 
cutting  down  its  grove,  and  demolishing  its  ring  wall,  and 
levelling  with  the  ground  many  costly  fanes,  he  first  directed 
his  attack  upon  Thyalira,  and  thence  matched  into  the  plain 
of  Thebe,  thinking  that  this  district  would  supply  him  with  the 
Zciuria,  Satrap  richest  spoll.  But  finding  himself  again  disap- 
of  Aniiochus,  fails  pointed  in  this  respect,  on  arriving  at  the 
to  help  Philip     "  Holy  Village  "  he  sent  a  message  to  Zeuxis, 

substantially.        ,  ,■..?,  u  r        ■  ,    ,  ■  -  l 

demanding  that  he  would  furnish  him  with  com, 
and  render  the  other  services  stipulated  for  in  the  treaty.^ 
Zeuxis,  however,  though  feigning  to  fulfil  the  obligations  of 
the  treaty,  was  not  minded  to  give  Philip  real  and  substantial 
help,  .  .  . 

'  That  is  the  treaty  between  Philip  and  Anlioctius. 


THE  SEA-FIGHT  OFF  CHIOS 


GREAT   SEA-FIGHT    OFF   CHIOS    BETWEEN    PHILIP   AND  THE 
ALLIED    FLEETS    OF   ATTALUS    AND    RHODES,    EC  20I 

2.  As  the  siege  was  not  going  on  favourably  for  him,  and 
the  enemy  were  blockading  him  with  an  in-  phiup  failing  to 
creasing  number    of  decked  vessels,   he   felt  take  Chios  sails 
uncenain  and  uneasy  as  to  the  result     But    "" '"  s^™"*- 
as  the  state  of  affairs  left  him  no  choice,  he  suddenly  put  to 
sea  quite  unexpectedly  to  the  enemy  ;  for  Attalus  expected  that 
he  would  persist  in  pushing  on  the  mines  he  had  commenced. 
But  Philip  was  especially  keen  to  make  his  putting  to  sea  a 
surprise,  because  he  thought  that  he  would  thus  be  able  to  out- 
strip the  enemy,  and  complete  the  rest  of  his  passage  along 
the  coast  to  Samos  in  security.    But  he  was  much     aiihIus  and 
disappointed  in  his  calculations ;  for  Attalus  and    Theophiiiscus 
Theophiliscus  (of  Rhodes),  directly  they  saw  him     foUowhim. 
putting  to  sea,  lost  no  time  in  taking  action.     And  although, 
from  their  previous  conviction  that  Philip  meant  to  stay  where 
he  was,  they  were  not  in  a  position  to  put  to  sea  quite  simul- 
taneously, still__by  a  vigorous  use  of  their  oars  they  managed  to 
overtake  him,  and  attacked, — Attalus  the  enemy's  right  wing, 
which  was  his  leading  squadron,  and  Theophiliscus  his  left.  Thus 
intercepted  and  surrounded,  Philip  gave  the  signal  to  the  ships 
of  his  right  wing,  ordering  them  to  turn  their  prows  towards 
the  enemy  and  engage  them  boldly;  while  he  himself  retreated 
under  cover  of  the  smaller  islands,  which  lay  in  the  way,  with 
some  light  galleys,  and  thence  watched  the  result  of  the  battle. 
The  whole  number  of  ships  engaged  were,  on  Philip's  side,  fifty- 
three  decked,  accompanied  by  some  undecked  vessels,  and  galleys 
and  beaked  ships  to  the  number  of  one  hundred  and  fifty ;  for 
he  had  not  been  able  to  fit  out  all  his  ships  in  Samos.     On 
the  side  of  the  enemy  there  were  sixty-five  decked  vessels, 
besides  those  which  came  from  Byzantium,  and  along  with 
them  nine  triemioliae  (light-decked  vessels),  and  three  triremes. 
S,  The  fight  having  been  begun  on  the  ship  on  which  King 
Attalus  was  sailing,  all  the  others  near  began 
charging  each  otiier  without  waiting  for  orders,  '""^"^^^i^"  ""* 
Attalus  ran    into  an    eight-banked    ship,  and 
having  struck  it  a  well-directed  blow  below  the  water-line,  after 


174  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  BOOK 

a  proloi^ed  stiu^le  between  the  combatants  on  the  decks,  at 
Loss  of  PhUip's  length  succeeded  in  sinking  it.     Philip's  ten- 
Bagsbipand     banked   ship,   which,   moreover,  was   the   ad- 
admirai,       miral's,    was   captured   by   the   enemy   in   an 
extraordinary  manner.     For  one  of  the  trietnieliae,  having  run 
close  under  her,  she  struck  against  her  violently  amidships,  just 
beneath  the  thole  of  the  topmost  bank  of  oars,  and  got  fast 
jammed  on  to  her,  the  steersman  being  unable  to  check  the  way 
of  his  ship.     The  result  was  that,  by  this  craft  hanging  sus- 
pended to  her,  she  became  unmanageable  and  unable  to  turn 
one  way  or  another.     While  in  this  plight,  two  quinqueremes 
charged  her  on  both  sides  at  once,  and  destroyed  the  vessel  it- 
self and  the  fighting  men  on  her  deck,  among  whom  fell  Demo- 
ciates,  Philip's  admiral     At  the  same  time  Dionysodorus  and 
Deinocrates,  who  were  brothers  and  joint-admirals  of  the  fleet  of 
Attains,  charged,  the  one  upon  a  seven-banked,  the  other  upon  an 
e^ht-banked  ship  of  the  enemy,  and  had  a  most  extraordinary 
T.  .  adventure  in  the  battle.      Deinocrates,  in  the 

first  place,  came  into  collision  with  an  eight- 
banked  ship,  and  had  his  ship  struck  above  the  water-line ;  for 
the  enemy's  ship  had  its  prow  built  high ;  but  he  struck  the 
enemy's  ship  below  the  water-line,^  and  at  first  could  not  get 
himself  clear,  though  he  tried  again  and  again  to  back  water ; 
and,  accordingly,  when  the  Macedonian  boarded  him  and  fought 
with  great  gallantry,  he  was  brought  into  the  most  imminent 
danger.  Presently,  upon  Attains  coming  to  his  aid,  and  by  a 
vigorous  charge  separating  the  two  ships,  Deinocrates  unex- 
pectedly found  himself  free,  and  the  enemy's  boarders  were  all 
killed  after  a  gallant  resistance,  while  their  own  vessel  being 
Donvsodorus.  '^*^  without  men  was  captured  by  Attalus.  In 
the  next  place,  Dionysodorus,  making  a  furious 
chaise,  missed  his  blow;  but  running  up  alongside  of  the  enemy 
lost  all  the  oars  on  his  right  side,  and  had  the  timbers  sup- 
porting his  towers  smashed  to  pieces,  and  was  thereupon  imme- 
diately surrounded  by  the  enemy.  In  the  midst  of  loud  shouts 
and  great  confusion,  all  the  rest  of  his  marines  perished  along 
with  the  ship,  but  he  himself  with  two  others  managed  to 


XYI  INCIDENTS  OF  THE  SEA-FIGHT  175 

escape  by  swimming  lo  the  triemiolia  which  was  coming  up  to 
the  rescue. 

4.  The  fight  between  the  rest  of  the  fleet,  however,  was  an 
undecided  one ;  for  the  superiority  in  the  num- 
bers of  Philip's  galleys  was  compensated  for  by  ^^^"^-i^ 
Attalus's  superiority  in  the  number  of  his  decked 
ships.  Thus  on  the  right  wing  of  Philip's  fleet  the  state  of 
things  was  that  the  ultimate  result  was  doubtful,  but  that,  of 
the  two,  Attalus  had  the  better  hope  of  victory.  As  for  the 
Rhodians,  they  were,  at  first  starting,  as  I  have  said,  far  behind 
the  enemy,  but  beingmuch  their  superiors  inspeed  they  managed 
to  come  up  with  the  rear  of  the  Macedonians.  At  first  they 
charged  the  vessels  on  the  stem  as  they  were  retiring,  and  broke 
off  their  oars ;  but  upon  Philip's  ships  swinging  round  and 
beginning  to  bring  help  to  those  in  danger,  while  those  of  the 
Rhodians  who  had  started  later  than  the  rest  reached  the 
squadron  of  Theophiliscus,  both  parties  turned  their  ships  in  line 
prow  to  prow  and  charged  gallantly,  inciting  each  other  to  fresh 
exertions  by  the  sound  of  trumpets  and  loud  cheers.  Had 
not  the  Macedonians  placed  their  galleys  between  the  opposing 
lines  of  decked  ships,  the  battle  would  have  been  quickly  de- 
cided ;  but,  as  it  was,  these  proved  a  hindrance  to  the  Rhodians 
in  various  ways.  For  as  soon  as  the  first  charge  had  disturbed 
the  original  order  of  the  ships,  they  became  all  mixed  up  with 
each  other  in  complete  confusion,  which  made  it  difficult  to 
sail  through  the  enemy's  line  or  to  avail  themselves  of  the 
points  in  which  they  were  superior,  because  the  galleys  kept 
running  sometimes  against  the  blades  of  their  oars  so  as  to 
hinder  the  rowing,  and  sometimes  upon  their  prows,  or  again 
upon  their  stems,  thus  hampering  the  service  of  steerers  and 
rowers  alike.  In  the  direct  charges,  however,  the  Rhodians 
employed  a  particular  manoeuvre.  By  depressing  their  bows 
they  received  the  blows  of  the  enemy  above  the  water-line, 
while  by  staving  in  the  enemy's  ships  below  the  water-line  they 
rendered  the  blows  fatal.  Still  it  was  rarely  that  they  succeeded 
in  doing  this,  for,  as  a  rule,  they  avoided  collisions,  because  the 
Macedonians  fouglit  gallantly  from  their  decks  when  they  came 
to  close  quarters.  Their  most  frequent  manoeuvre  was  to  row 
through  the  Macedonian  line,  and  disable  the  enemy's  ships  by 


i 


176  r/fE  HrSTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  book 

breaking  off  their  oars,  and  then,  rowing  round  into  position, 
again  charge  the  enemy  on  the  stem,  or  catch  them  broadside 
as  they  were  in  the  act  of  turning ;  and  thus  they  either  stove 
them  in  or  broke  away  some  necessary  part  of  their  ri^ng. 
By  this  manner  of  fighting  they  destroyed  a  great  number  of 
the  enemy's  ships. 

6.  But  the  most  brilliant  and  hazardous  exploits  were  those 
Further  incidenis  °^  three  quinqueremes :  the  flagship  on  which 
in  ihe  fight  on  Theophiliscus  sailed,  then  that  commanded  by 
^■^'u*!"^"     Philostratus,  and    lastly  the   one   steered    Iw 

The  Rhodian       .         ,  ,  1  ,      ,      ,  -   ,  ■.,- 

adini[«i  Theo-  Autolycus,  and  on  board  of  which  was  Nicos- 
phiiiscus  mortally  tratus.  This  last  charged  an  enemy's  ship, 
wounded.  ^^^j  [gj^  j^^  ^^^^  sticking  in  it.  The  ship  thus 
struck  sank  with  all  hands ;  but  Autolycus  and  his  comrades, 
as  the  sea  poured  into  his  vessel  through  the  prow,  was  sur- 
rounded by  the  enemy.  For  a  time  they  defended  themselves 
gallantly,  but  at  last  Autolycus  himself  was  wounded,  and  fell 
overboard  in  his  armour,  while  the  rest  of  the  marines  were 
killed  fighting  bravely.  While  this  was  going  on,  Theophiliscus 
came  to  the  rescue  with  three  quinqueremes,  and  though  he 
could  not  save  the  ship,  because  it  was  now  full  of  water,  he 
yet  stove  in  three  hostile  vessels,  and  forced  their  marines 
overboard.  Being  quickly  surrounded  by  a  number  of  galleys 
and  decked  ships,  he  lost  the  greater  number  of  his  marines 
after  a  gallant  struggle  on  their  part ;  and  after  receiving  three 
wounds  himself,  and  performing  prodigies  of  valour,  just 
managed  to  get  his  own  ship  safely  off  with  the  assistance 
of  Philostratus,  who  came  to  his  aid  and  bravely  took  his  share 
of  the  danger.  Having  thus  rejoined  his  own  squadron,  he 
darted  out  once  more  and  ran  in  upon  the  enemy,  utterly 
prostrated  in  body  by  his  wounds,  but  more  dashing  and 
vehement  in  spirit  than  before. 

So  that  there  were  really  two  sea-fights  going  on  at  a  con- 
siderable distance  from  each  other.  For  the  right  wing  of 
Philip's  fleet,  continually  making  for  land  in  accordance  with 
his  original  plan,  was  not  far  from  the  Asiatic  coast ;  while 
the  left  wing,  having  to  veer  round  to  support  the  ships  on 
the  rear,  were  engaged  with  the  Rhodians  at  no  great  distance 
from  Chios. 


ivi  AT^ALUS  BARELY  ESCAPES  CAPTURE  \TJ 

6.  As  the  fleet  of  Attalus,  however,  was  rapidly  overpower- 
ing the  right  wing  of  Philip,  and  was  now  ap-     Aiialus  inter- 
proaching   the    small    islands,  under  cover    of  ccpied  by  Philip, 

which  Philip  was  moored  watching  the  result  ,='"!  ^°''l^ !° 

r   ,,_       ■       ,        .       ,  t   ^  ■  abaniion  bis  ship, 

oi   the   battle,   Attalus  saw  one   of  his  quin- 

queremes  staved  in  and  in  the  act  of  being  sunk  by  an 
enemy's  ship.  He  therefore  hurried  to  its  assistance  with  two 
quadriremes.  The  enemy's  ship  turning  to  flight,  and  making 
for  the  shore,  he  pursued  it  somewhat  too  eagerly  in  his 
ardent  desire  to  effect  its  capture.  Thereupon  Philip,  observ- 
ing that  Attalus  had  become  detached  a  considerable  distance 
from  his  own  fleet,  took  four  quinqueremes  and  three  hemioliae, 
as  well  as  all  the  galleys  within  reach,  and  darting  out  got  be- 
tween Attalus  and  his  ships,  and  forced  him  in  the  utmost 
terror  to  run  his  three  ships  ashore.  After  this  mishap  the 
king  himself  and  his  crew  made  their  way  to  Erythrae,  while 
Philip  captured  his  vessels  and  the  royal  equipage  on  board 
them.  For  in  this  emergency  Attalus  had  employed  an  arti- 
fice. He  caused  the  most  splendid  articles  of  the  royal 
equipage  to  be  spread  out  on  the  deck  of  his  ship ;  the  conse- 
quence of  which  was  that  the  first  Macedonians  who  arrived  on 
the  galleys,  seeing  a  quantity  of  flagons  and  purple  robes  and 
such  like  things,  abandoned  the  pursuit,  and  turned  their  atten- 
tion to  plundering  these.  Thus  it  came  about  that  Atulus 
got  safe  away  to  Erythrae ;  while  Philip,  though  he  had  dis- 
tinctly got  the  worst  of  it  in  the  general  engagement,  was  so 
elated  at  the  unexpected  reverse  which  had  befallen  Attalus, 
that  he  put  to  sea  again  and  exerted  himself  strenuously  in 
collecting  his  ships  and  restoring  the  spirits  of  his  men  by 
assuring  them  that  they  were  the  victors.  For  when  they 
saw  Philip  put  to  sea  towing  off  the  royal  ship,  they  very 
naturally  thought  that  Attalus  had  perished.  But  Dionyso- 
dorus,  conjecturing  what  had  really  happened  to  the  king,  set 
about  collecting  his  own  ships  by  raising  a  signal ;  and  this 
being  speedily  done,  he  sailed  away  unmolested 
to  their  station  in  Asia.  Meanwhile  those  RhSlians. 
Macedonians  who  were  engaged  with  the 
Rhodians,  having  been  for  some  time  past  in  evil  case,  were 
gradually  extricating  themselves  from  the  battle,  one  after  the 

VOL.  II  N 


178  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  BOOK 

Other  retiring  on  the  pretence  of  being  anxious  to  support  their 
comrades.  So  the  Rhodians,  taking  in  tow  some  of  their 
vessels,  and  having  destroyed  others  by  charging  them,  sailed 
away  to  Chios. 

7.  In  the  battle  with  Attalus  Philip  had  had  destroyed  a 
D.C.  aoi.       ten-banked,  a  nine-banked,  a  seven-banked,  and 

The  losses  in  a  six-banked  ship,  ten  other  decked  vessels,  three 
ihe  battle.  iriemtoUae,  twenty-five  galleys  and  their  crews. 
In  the  battle  with  the  Rhodians  ten  decked  vessels  and 
about  forty  galleys.  While  two  quadriremes  and  seven 
galleys  with  their  crews  were  captured.  In  the  fleet  of  Attalus 
one  triemiolia  and  two  quinqueremes  were  sunk,  while  two 
quadriremes  besides  that  of  the  king  were  captured.  Of  the 
Rhodian  fleet  two  quinqueremes  and  a  trireme  were  destroyed, 
but  no  ship  was  taken.  Of  men  the  Rhodians  lost  sixty, 
Attalus  seventy ;  while  Philip  lost  three  thousand  Mace- 
donians and  six  thousand  rowers.  And  of  the  Macedonians 
and  their  allies  two  thousand  were  taken  prisoners,  and  of 
their  opponents  six  hundred. 

8.  Such   was  the  end  of  the  battle  of  Chios ;  in   which 
Philip  vainly  pre-  Philip   claimed   the   victory  on   two   pretexts. 

lends  that  he  FJrst,  because  he  had  driven  Attalus  ashore  and 
won  the  baiUe.  j,^^  captured  his  ship  ;  and  secondly,  because, 
as  he  had  anchored  at  the  promontory  of  Argennum,  he  had 
the  credit  of  having  taken  up  his  anchorage  where  the  wrecks 
were  floating.  He  acted  in  accordance  with  this  assertion 
next  day  by  collecting  the  wrecks,  and  causing  the  corpses 
which  could  be  recognised  to  be  picked  up  for  burial,  all  for 
the  sake  of  strengthening  this  pretence.  For  that  he  did  not 
himself  believe  that  he  had  won  was  shortly  afterwards  proved 
by  the  Rhodians  and  Dionysodorus.  For  on  that  very  next 
day,  while  he  was  actually  engaged  on  these  operations,  after 
communication  with  each  other  they  sailed  out  to  attack  him, 
but,  on  nobody  putting  out  to  meet  them,  they  returned  to 
Chios.  Philip  indeed  had  never  before  lost  so  many  men 
either  by  land  or  sea  at  one  time,  and  was  extremely  mortified 
at  what  had  happened  and  had  lost  much  of  his  spirit  for  the 
enterprise.  To  the  outside  world,  however,  he  tried  to  con- 
ceal his  real  sentiments :  though  this  was  forbidden  by  facts. 


2jri    PHILIP  VAINLY  CLAIMS  THE  VICTORY  AT  CHIOS  179 

Besides  everything  else,  what  happened  after  the  battle  im- 
pressed all  who  saw  it  too  strongly.  For  the  slaughter  and 
destruction  was  so  great  that,  on  the  day  of  battle  itself  the 
whole  striit  was  filled  with  corpses,  blood,  arms,  and 
wrecks  ;  while  on  the  subsequent  days  the  strands  might  be 
seen  piled  up  with  all  these  together  in  wild  confusion. 
Hence  the  extreme  consternation  of  the  king  could  not  be 
confined  to  himself,  but  was  shared  by  all  his  Macedonians. 

9.  Theophiliscus  survived  for  one  day;  and  then  having 
written  a  despatch  home  with  an  account  of  the 

battle,  and  appointed  Cleonaeus  to  succeed  him  xheophiiiscus 
in  his  command,  died  from  his  wounds.  He  had 
shown  great  valour  in  the  engagement,  and  his  far-sighted  policy 
deserves  to  be  remembered.  If  it  had  not  been  for  bis  bold- 
ness in  attacking  Philip  in  time,  all  the  allies  would  have  let 
the  opportunity  pass,  in  terror  at  Philip's  audacity.  But  by 
beginning  the  war  as  he  did  he  forced  his  countrymen  to  seize 
the  opportunity,  and  compelled  Attains  not  to  lose  time  in 
mere  preparatory  measures  for  war,  but  to  go  to  war  ener- 
getically and  grapple  with  the  danger.  The  Rhodians,  there- 
fore, were  quite  right  to  pay  him,  even  after  his  death,  such 
honours  as  were  incentives,  not  only  to  men  living  at  the  time^ 
but  to  future  generations  also,  to  prompt  service  in  their 
country's  cause.  .  .  . 

THE  INDECISIVE  BATTLE  OF  CHIOS  WAS  FOLLOWED  BY  ANOTHER 
OFF  LADE,  IN  WHICH  PHILIP  WAS  PARTLY  SUCCESSFUL' 

10.  After  the  battle  of  Lade,  the  Rhodians  being  out  of 
his  way,  and  Attalus  not  having  yet  appeared  on  the  scene,  it 
is  clear  that  Philip  might  have  accomplished  his  voyage  to 
Alexandria.  And  here  we  have  evidence  stronger  than  any 
other  of  Philip's  infatuation  in  acting  as  he  did.  What,  then, 
prevented  his  design  ?  Nothing  in  the  world  but  what  always 
occurs  in  the  natural  course  of  affairs.  For  at  a  distance 
many  men  at  times  desire  the  impossible  from  the  extravagant 
prospects  it  holds  out,  their  ambition  over-mastering  their  reason; 

'  Jam  cum  Shodiii  et  Allah  navaiiius  artaminiius.  ntutre  felidlir,  vim 
txftriui.     Livy,  31,  14. 


l8o  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBI US  hook 

but  when  they  appToach  the  moment  of  action  they  quite 
as  irrationally  abandon  their  purpose,  because  their  calcula- 
tions are  obscured  and  confused  by  the  embarrassments  and 
difficulties  which  meet  them.  .  .  . 

PHILIP'S  OPERATIONS  IN  CARIA,  B.C.   SOI 

11.  Having  made  some  assaults  which  proved  abortive 
The  siraiiigem  by  owing  to  the  Strength  of  the  place,  Philip  went 
which  Philip  lookaway  again,  plundering  the  forts  and  villages  in 

Prinassus.  ti,^  country.  Thence  he  marched  to  Prinassus 
and  pitched  his  camp  under  its  wall  Having  promptly  got  ready 
his  pent-houses  and  other  siege  artillery,  he  began  to  attempt  the 
town  by  mines.  This  plan  proving  impracticable,  owing  to 
the  rocky  nature  of  the  soil,  he  contrived  the  following  strata- 
gem. During  the  day  he  caused  a  noise  to  be  made  under 
ground,  as  though  the  mines  were  being  worked  at;  while 
during  the  night  he  caused  earth  to  be  brought  and  piled  up 
at  the  mouth  of  the  mine,  in  order  that  the  men  in  the  city, 
by  calculating  the  quantity  of  earth  thrown  up,  might  become 
alarmed.  At  first  the  Prinassians  held  out  bravely  :  but  when 
Philip  sent  them  a  message  informing  them  that  he  had  under- 
pinned two  plethra  of  their  walls,  and  asking  them  whether 
they  preferred  to  march  out  with  their  lives,  or  one  and  all 
to  perish  with  their  town  when  he  set  fire  to  the  props,  then 
at  last,  believing  that  what  he  said  was  true,  they  surrendered 
the  city. 

12.  The  town  of  lassus  is  situated  in  Asia  on  the  gulf 
Leeends  of  between  the  temple  of  Poseidmen,  the  territory 
lassus  and  of  Miletus,  and  the  city  of  Myndus,  called  the 
BftTgylLa.        gulf  [of  lassus  by  some],  but  by  most  the  gulf  of 

Bargylia,  from  the  names  of  the  cities  built  upon  its  inner  coast 
The  lassians  boast  of  being  originally  colonists  from  Ai^os, 
and  more  recently  from  Miletus,  their  ancestors  having  invited 
to  their  town  (he  son  of  Neleus,  the  founder  of  Miletus,  owing 
to  their  losses  in  the  war  with  the  Carians.  The  size  of  the 
town  is  ten  stades.  Among  the  people  of  Bargylia  it  is  a 
common  report  widely  believed  that  the  statue  of  the  Kindyan 
Artemis,  though  in  the  open  air,  is  never  touched  by  snow  or 


XVI  PHILIP  IN  CARJA  iSl 

rain ;  and  the  same  belief  is  held  among  the  lassians  as  to 
the  Artemis  Astias.'  All  these  stories  have  been  repeated  by 
certain  historians.  But,  for  my  part,  I  have  in  the  whole 
course  of  my  work  set  myself  against  such  statements  of  our 
historiographers  and  have  had  no  toleration  for  them.  For  it 
appears  to  me  that  such  tales  are  only  fit  to  amuse  children, 
when  they  transgress  not  only  the  limits  of  probability  but  even 
those  of  possibility.  For  instance,  to  say  that  certain  bodies 
when  placed  in  full  light  cast  no  shadow  argues  a  state  of  quite 
deplorable  folly.  But  Theopompus  has  done  this;  for  he 
says  that  those  who  enter  the  holy  precinct  of  Zeus  in  Arcadia 
cast  no  shadow,  which  is  on  a  par  with  the  statements  to 
which  I  have  just  referred.  Now,  in  so  £ir  as  such  tales  tend 
to  preserve  the  reverence  of  the  vulgar  for  religion,  a  certain 
allowance  may  be  made  for  some  historians  when  they  record 
these  miraculous  legends.  But  they  must  not  be  allowed  to  go 
too  far.  Perhaps  it  is  difficult  to  assign  a  limit  in  such  a 
matter ;  still  it  is  not  impossible.  Therefore,  in  my  judgment, 
such  displays  of  ignorance  and  delusion  should  be  pardoned 
if  they  do  not  go  very  for,  but  anything  like  extravagance  in 
them  should  be  rejected.  .  .  . 

AFFAIRS  IN  GREECE 

IS.  I  have  already  described  the  deliberate  policy  of  Nabis, 
tyrant  of  the  Lacedaemonians ;  how  he  drove  xhe  tyranny  of 
the  citizens  into  exile,  freed  the  slaves,  and  gave  Nobis.  See  13, 
them  the  wives  and  daughters  of  their  masters.  *"'■ 

How  also,  by  opening  his  kingdom  as  a  kind  of  inviolable 
sanctuary  for  all  who  fled  from  their  own  countries,  he  col- 
lected a  number  of  bad  characters  in  Sparta.  I  will  now 
proceed  to  tell  how  in  the  same  period,  being  in  alliance  with 
Aelolians,  Eleans,  and  Messenians,  and  being  bound  by  oaths 
and  treaties  to  support  one  and  all  of  those  ^  aoa-aoi 
peoples  in  case  of  any  one  attacking  them,  he  '  ' 
yet  in  utter  contempt  of  these  obligations  determined  to  make 
a  treacherous  attack  on  Messene.  .   .  . 

'  An  inscriplion  found  at  lassus  [C.I.G.  36S3]  has  conlinned  this  name 
which  u  found  in  one  MS.  instead  of  Hesliai.  Whether  the  meaning  of  the 
dtle  ti  Aitemis  of  the  Cily,  or  some  local  desigDatiOD,  i 


THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIVS 


DIGRESSION  ON  THE  MERITS  OF  THE  HISTORIANS 
ZENO  AND  ANTISTHENES  OF  RHODES 

14t  As  some  episodical  historians  have  written  on  the 
period  which  embraces  the  affair  at  Messene  and  the  sea-fights 
already  described,  it  is  my  intention  to  discuss  them  briefly. 
I  will  not  however  speak  of  them  all,  but  only  those  whom  I 
suppose  to  be  worthy  of  commemoration  and  full  discussion. 

The  necessity  of  These  are  the  Rhodian  writers  Zeno  and  Antls- 
discussing  ihe   thenes,  whom  I  judge  to  deserve  this  distinction, 

hinones  of  zcno  f^^  xaox^  than  one  reason.     They  were  contem- 

and  Antislhenes.  .  ,      ,  i  j   ■ 

porary  with  the  events,  and  were  engaged  in 
practical  politics ;  and,  lastly,  they  composed  their  histories 
with  no  view  to  gain,  but  for  the  sake  of  fame,  and  as  part  of 
the  business  of  politicians.  Since  then  they  write  of  the  same 
events  as  myself,  I  cannot  omit  mentioning  them  ;  lest,  from 
the  reputation  of  their  country,  and  the  idea  that  naval  affairs 
are  peculiarly  the  province  of  Khodians,  some  students  may 
prefer  their  authority  to  mine  where  I  differ  from  them. 

Now  both  these  writers,  to  begin  with,  describe  the  battle  of 

TTieir  description  I-ade  as  not  less  severe  than  that  of  Chios,  but 
of  the  battle  of  more  fiercely  and  daringly  contested,   both  in 

Lade.  Seech.  lo.  ^^.^^  ^nd  as  a  whole,  and  finally  assert  that  the 
victory  was  with  the  Rhodians.  For  my  part  I  should  be 
inclined  to  allow  that  historians  must  show  some  partiality  to 
their  own  countries ;  not  however  that  they  should  state  what 
is  exactly  opposite  to  the  facts  regarding  them.  There  are 
quite  enough  mistakes  which  writers  make  from  ignorance, 
and  which  it  is  difficult  for  poor  human  nature  to  avoid :  but 
if  we  deliberately  write  what  is  false  for  the  sake  of  country, 
friends,  or  favour,  how  do  we  differ  from  those  who  do  the 
same  to  get  a  living?  For  as  the  latter,  by  measiiring  every- 
thing by  the  standard  of  private  gain,  ruin  the  credit  of  their 
works,  so  your  politicians  often  fall  into  the  same  discredit  by 
yielding  to  the  influence  of  hatred  or  affection.  Therefore 
readers  ought  to  be  jealously  watchful  on  this  head;  while 
writers  ought  to  be  on  their  guard  for  their  own  sakes. 

16.  The  present  matter  is  an  exampla   When  coming  to  de- 


XVI  ZENO  AtfD  ANTJSTHENES  \%\ 

tails  of  the  battle  of  L^de,  these  writers  confess  that  in  it  "  two 
quinqueremes  of  Rhodes  were  captured  by  the  enemy ;  and  that 
upon  one  ship  raising  its  studding-sail  to  escape  from  the  conflict, 
owing  to  its  having  being  staved  in  and  shipping  sea,  many  of 
the  vessels  near  it  did  the  same  and  made  for  the  open  sea  ;  and 
that  at  last  the  admiral,  being  left  with  only  a  few  vessels,  was 
forced  to  follow  their  example.  That  for  the  present  they  were 
forced  by  unfavourable  winds  to  drop  anchor  on  the  territory  of 
Myndus,  but  next  day  put  to  sea  and  crossed  to  Cos ;  while  the 
enemy,  having  secured  the  quinqueremes,  landed  at  Lade  and 
took  up  their  quarters  in  the  Rhodian  camp :  that,  moreover, 
the  Milesians,  deeply  impressed  by  what  had  taken  place,  pre- 
sented not  only  Philip,  but  Heracleides  also,  with  a  garland 
of  victory  on  his  entrance  to  their  territory,"  And  yet,  though 
they  give  all  these  particulars,  which  all  evidently  indicate  the 
losing  side,  they  still  declare  the  Rhodians  to  have  been  vic- 
torious both  in  particular  combats  and  in  the  whole  battle ;  and 
that  too  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  the  original  despatch  from  the 
admiral  concerning  the  battle,  sent  to  the  Senate  and  Prytanies, 
still  exists  in  their  Prytaneium,  which  testifies  to  the  truth,  not 
of  the  statements  of  Antisthenes  and  Zeno,  but  of  mine. 

16.  Next  as  to  their  account  of  the  treacherous  attempt 

upon  Messene.     Zeno  says  that  "  Nabis  started  ,     .    .   . 

^^       f^  .    ,      „  ,         -.       Zeno s  account  of 

from  Sparta,  crossed  the  Eurotas  near  the  tnbu-     [he  atiack  of 
tary  called  the  Hoplites,  and  advanced  along     Nabis  upon 
the  narrow  road  past  Poliasium  until  he  arrived      ijlf^'*', 
at  Sallasia,  thence  past  Pharae  to  Thalamae,  and 
so  to  the  river  Pamisus."     About  which  I  do  not  know  what  to 
say.     It  is  just  as  if  one  were  to  say  that  a  man  started  from 
Corinth  and  marched  through  the  Isthmus  and  arrived  at  the 
Scironean  way,  and  then  came  straight  to  the  Contoporian  road, 
and  journeyed  past  Mycenae  to  Argos.      For  such  a  statement 
would  not  be  merely  slightly  wrong  but  wholly  contradictory. 
For  the  Isthmus  and  the  Scironian  rocks  are  east  of  Corinth, 
while    the    Contoporian  road  and    Mycenae  are  nearly  due 
south-west ;  so  that  it  is  completely  impossible  to  go  by  way 
of  the  former  to  the  latter.     The  same  may  be  said  about 
Lacedaemon ;  for  the  Eurotas  and  Sallasia  are  to  the  north- 
east of  Sparta,  while  Thalamae,  Pharae,  and  the  Pamisus  are 


l84  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  book 

to  the  south-west  Therefore  it  is  not  possible  to  go  to 
Sallasiii,  nor  necessary  to  cross  the  Eurotas,  if  a  man  means  to 
go  to  Messenia  by  way  of  Thalamae, 

17.  Besides  these  mistakes,  he  says  that  Nabis  statted  on 
his  return  from  Messenia  by  the  gate  on  the  road  to  Tegea. 
This  is  another  absurdity ;  for  Megalopolis  is  between  Tegea 
and  Messene,  so  that  it  is  impossible  that  a  gate  at  Messene 
should  be  called  the  "  Gate  to  Tegea."  The  fact  is  that  there 
is  a  gate  there  called  the  "Tegean  Gate,"  by  which  Nabis 
commenced  his  return  ;  and  this  led  Zeno  into  the  mistake  of 
supposing  that  Tegea  was  near  Messene,  which  is  not  the 
fact :  for  the  Laconian  territory,  as  well  as  that  of  Megalopolis, 
lies  between  that  of  Messene  and  Tegea.  Lastly,  he  says 
that  the  Alpheus  flows  undeiground  from  its  source  for  a 
considerable  distance,  and  comes  up  near  Lycoa,  in  Arcadia. 
The  truth  is  that  this  river  does  go  down  underground  not  far 
from  its  source,  and,  after  remaining  hidden  for  about  ten 
stades,  comes  up  again,  and  then  flows  through  the  territory 
of  Megalopolis,  at  first  with  a  gentle  stream,  and  then  gaining 
volume,  and  watering  that  whole  district  in  a  splendid  manner 
for  two  hundred  stades,  at  length  reaches  Lycoa,  swollen  by 
the  tributary  stream  of  the  Lusius,  and  become  unfordable 
and  deep.  .  .  . 

However,  I  think  that  the  points  I  have  mentioned, 
though  all  of  them  blunders,  admit  of  some  palliation  and 
excuse ;  for  the  latter  arose  from  mere  ignorance,  those  con- 
nected with  the  sea-fight  from  patriotic  affection.  But  is  it 
.not  then  a  fault  in  Zeno,  that  he  does  not  bestow  as  much 
pains  on  investigating  the  truth  and  thoroughly  mastering  his 
subject,  as  upon  the  ornaments  of  style  ;  and  shows  on  many 
occasions  that  he  particularly  plumes  himself  on  this,  as  many 
other  famous  writers  do  ?  To  my  mind  it  is  quite  right  to  take 
great  care  and  pay  great  attention  to  the  presentation  of  one's 
fiicts  in  correct  and  adequate  language,  for  this  contributes  in 
no  small  degree  to  the  effectiveness  of  history ;  still  I  do  not 
think  that  serious  writers  should  regard  it  as  their  primary 
and  most  important  object.  Far  from  it.  Quite  other  are  the 
parts  of  his  history  on  which  a  practical  politician  should 
rather  pride  himself. 


XVI    ZENdS  ACCOUNT  OF  THE  BATTLE  OF  PANIUM    185 

IS.  The  best  illustration  of  what  I  mean  will  be  the 
following.  This  same  writer,  in  his  account  of  [he  siege  of 
Gaza  and  Antiochus's  pitched  battle  with  Scopas 
in  Coele-Syria, at  Mount  Panium,' showed  such  [he tai^eof 
extreme  anxiety  about  ornaments  of  style,  that  panium  between 
he  made  it  quite  impossible  even  for  professional  Aniiochus  the 
rhetoricians  or  mob-orators  to  outstrip  him  ;„  G'^a^^'J^Scopas. 
theatrical  effect ;  while  he  showed  such  a  con- 
tempt of  facts,  as  once  more  amounted  to  unsurpassable  care- 
lessness and  inaccuracy.  For,  intending  to  describe  the  first 
position  in  the  field  taken  up  by  Scopas,  he  says  that 
"  the  right  extremity  of  his  line,  together  with  a  few  cavalry, 
rested  on  the  slope  of  the  mountain ;  while  its  left  with 
all  the  cavalry  belonging  to  this  wing,  was  in  the  plains 
below.  That  Antiochus,  just  before  the  morning  watch, 
despatched  his  elder  son  Antiochus  with  a  division  of  his  army 
to  occupy  the  high  ground  which  commanded  the  enemy; 
and  that  at  daybreak  he  led  the  rest  of  his  army  across  the 
river  which  flowed  between  the  two  camps,  and  drew  them  up 
on  the  plain  :  arranging  his  heavy-armed  infantry  in  one  line, 
facing  the  enemy's  centre,  and  his  cavalry,  some  on  the  right 
and  the  rest  on  the  left  wing  of  the  phalanx,  among  which 
were  the  heavy-armed  horsemen,  under  the  sole  command  of 
the  younger  of  the  king's  sons  Antiochus.  That  in  advance 
of  this  line  he  stationed  the  elephants  at  certain  intervals,  and 
the  Tarentines^  commanded  by  Antipater;  while  he  filled  up 
the  spaces  between  the  elephants  with  archers  and  slingers. 
And  finally,  that  he  took  up  his  own  station  on  the  rear  of  the 
elephants  with  a  squadron  of  household  cavalry  and  body- 
guards." After  this  preliminary  description  he  continues :  "  The 
younger  Antiochus  " — whom  he  had  described  as  being  on  the 
level  ground  with  the  heavy-armed  cavalry — "  charged  down 
from  the  high  ground  and  put  to  flight  and  pursued  the  cavalry 
under  Ptolemy,  son  of  Aeropus,  who  was  in  command  of  the 
Aelolians  in  the  plain  on  the  left  wing ;  but  the  two  lines, 

'  Called  Panion  or  Pandoiu  See  Joscphus  D.  Jud.  3,  10,  7,  Iix>Jd*oii  nfyi) 
rh  nirtwr.  The  town  near  it  was  called  Pnneas,  and  afterwards  Paneaj 
Caesarea,  and  laler  still  Caesarea  Philippi.  Scopas,  tbe  Aelolian,  was  now 
serving  Ptolemy  Epiphanes  ;  see  13,  a  ;  18,  53. 


■86  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBWS  book 

when  they  met,  maintained  a  stubborn  fight"  But  he  fails  to 
observe  that,  as  the  elephants,  cavalry,  and  light-armed  infantty 
were  in  front,  the  two  hnes  could  not  possibly  meet  at  all. 

19.  Next  he  says  that  "the  phalanx,  outmatched  in 
agiiity  and  forced  backwards  by  the  Aetolians,  retired  step 
by  step,  while  the  elephants  received  the  retreating  line,  and 
did  great  service  in  chaining  the  enemy."  But  how  the 
elephants  got  on  the  rear  of  the  phalanx  it  is  not  easy  to 
understand,  or  how,  if  they  had  got  there,  they  could  have 
done  good  service.  For  as  soon  as  the  two  lines  were  once 
at  close  quarters,  the  animals  would  no  longer  have  been  able 
to  distinguish  friend  from  foe  among  those  that  came  in  their 
way.  Again,  he  says  that  "  the  Aetolian  cavalry  were  thrown 
into  a  panic  during  the  engagement,  because  they  were  un- 
accustomed to  the  look  of  the  elephants,"  But,  by  his  own 
account,  the  cavalry  which  was  originally  stationed  on  the 
light  wing  remained  unbroken ;  while  the  other  division  of 
the  cavalry,  that  on  the  right  wing,  had  all  fled  before  the 
successful  attack  of  Antiochus.  What  portion  of  the  cavalry 
was  it,  then,  that  was  on  the  centre  of  the  phalanx,  and  was 
terrified  by  the  elephants?  And  where  was  the  king,  or  what 
part  did  he  take  in  the  batde,  seeing  that  he  had  with  him 
the  very  flower  of  the  infantry  and  cavalry  ?  For  not  a  word 
has  been  told  us  about  these.  And  where  was  the  elder 
of  the  young  Antlochi,  who,  with  a  division  of  the  troops,  occu- 
pied the  high  ground  7  For  this  prince  Is  not  represented  even 
as  returning  to  his  quarters  after  the  battle.  And  very  natur- 
ally so.  For  Zeno  started  by  assuming  two  sons  of  the  king 
named  Antiochus,  whereas  there  was  only  one  in  the  army 
on  that  occasion.  How  comes  it,  again,  that  according  to 
him,  Scopas  returned  fiist  and  also  last  from  the  field  ?  For 
he  says :  "  when  he  saw  the  younger  Antiochus,  after  return- 
ing from  the  pursuit,  on  the  rear  of  his  phalanx,  and  accord- 
ingly gave  up  all  hopes  of  victory,  he  retired."  But  afterwards 
he  says  that  "  he  sustained  the  most  imminent  peril  when  his 
phalanx  got  surrounded  by  the  elephants  and  cavalry,  and 
was  the  last  man  to  retire  from  the  field." 

20.  These  and  similar  blunders  appear  to  me  to  reflect 
very  great  discredit  upon  writers.     It  is  necessary,  therefore. 


XVI  ZENO  ACKNOWLEDGES  HIS  ERROU  187 

to  endeavour  to  make  one's  self  master  of  all  departments  of 
history  alike.  That  is  the  ideal ;  but  if  that  is  impossible,  one 
ought  at  least  to  be  excessively  careful  on  the  most  essential 
and  important  points  in  it  I  have  been  induced  to  say  this 
because  I  have  observed  that  in  history,  as  in  other  arts  and 
sciences,  there  is  a  tendency  to  neglect  the  true  and  essential, 
while  the  ostentatious  and  the  showy  secure  praise  and  emula- 
tion as  something  great  and  admirable.  The  fact  being  that 
in  history,  as  in  other  departments  of  literature,  these  latter 
qualities  require  less  trouble  and  gain  a  cheaper  reputation. 
As  to  his  ignorance  of  the  topography  of  Pdybiuswroie 
Laconia,  considering  that  his  error  was  an  im-  lo  Zeno  on  his 
iwrtant  one,  I  did  not  hesitate  to  write  to  Zeno  ^™??fi^'^ 
personally.  For  I  thought  it  a  point  of  honour 
not  to  look  upon  the  mistakes  of  others  as  personal  triumphs, 
as  is  the  way  with  some  writers  \  but  to  do  the  best  I  could  to 
secure  correctness,  not  only  of  my  own  historical  writings,  but 
of  those  of  others  also,  for  the  benefit  of  the  world  at  Large. 
When  Zeno  received  my  letter  and  found  that  it  was  impossible 
to  make  the  correction,  because  his  history  was  already  published, 
he  was  much  vexed,  but  could  do  nothing.  He,  however,  put  the 
most  friendly  interpretation  on  my  proceeding ;  and,  in  regard 
to  this  point,  I  would  beg  my  own  readers,  whether  of  my 
own  or  future  generations,  if  I  am  ever  detected  in  making  a 
deliberate  misstatement,  and  disregarding  truth  in  any  part  of 
my  history,  to  criticise  me  unmercifully ;  but  if  I  do  so  from 
lack  of  information,  to  make  allowances :  and  I  ask  it  for 
myself  more  than  others,  owing  to  the  size  of  my  history  and 
the  extent  of  ground  covered  by  its  transactions.  .  .  . 

EGYPT 

21.  Tlepolemus,'  the  chief  minister  in   the  kingdom  of 
Egypt,  was  a  young   man,  but  one  who  had    characicrand 
spent  all  his  life  in  the  camp,  and  with   reputa-  extravagance  of 
tion.     By  nature^ aspiring  and  ambitious,  he  had     Tiepolemuj. 
done  much  that  was  glorious  in  the  service  of  his  country, 
but  much  that  was  evil  also.     As  a  general  in  a  campaign,  and 
as  an  administrator  of  military  expeditions,  he  was  a  man  of 
'  See  15,  as. 


i88  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBWS  ik)ok 

great  ability,  high  natural  courage,  and  extremely  well  fitted  to 
deal  personally  with  soldiers.  But  on  the  other  hand,  for  the 
management  of  complicated  affairs,  he  was  delicient  in  diligence 
and  sobriety,  and  had  the  least  faculty  in  the  world  for  the 
keeping  of  money  or  the  economical  administration  of  finance. 
And  it  was  this  that  before  long  not  only  caused  his  own  fall, 
but  seriously  damaged  the  kingdom  as  well.  For  though  he 
had  complete  control  of  the  exchequer,  he  spent  the  greater 
part  of  the  day  in  playing-  ball  and  in  matches  in  martial 
exercises  with  the  young  men ;  and  directly  he  left  these 
sports  he  collected  drinking  parties,  and  spent  the  greater  part 
of  his  life  in  these  amusements  and  with  these  associates. 
But  that  part  of  his  day  which  he  devoted  to  business,  he 
employed  in  distributing,  or,  I  might  rather  say,  in  throwing 
away  the  royal  treasures  among  the  envoys  from  Greece 
and  the  Dionysian  actors,  and,  more  than  all,  among 
the  officers  and  soldiers  of  the  palace  guard.  He  was  utterly 
incapable  of  saying  no,  and  bestowed  anything  there  was  at 
hand  on  any  one  who  said  anything  to  please  him.  The  evil 
which  he  himself  thus  began  continually  increased.  For 
every  one  who  had  received  a  favour  expressed  his  gratitude 
in  extravagant  language,  both  for  the  sake  of  what  he  had  got 
and  of  what  he  hoped  to  get  in  the  future.  And  thus  being 
informed  of  the  universal  praise  which  was  bestowed  on  him, 
of  the  toasts  proposed  in  his  honour  at  banquets,  of  com- 
plimentary inscriptions,  and  songs  sung  in  his  praise  by  the 
public  singers  all  through  the  town,  he  became  entirely  be- 
fooled, and  grew  daily  more  and  more  pufTed  up  with  conceit, 
and  more  reckless  in  squandering  favours  upon  foreigners  and 
soldiers. 

22.  These  proceedings  were  very  offensive  to  the  other 
Tiepoiemus  sup-  members  of  the  court ;  and,  therefore,  they 
presses  &  coun  watched  everything  he  did  with  a  jealous  eye, 
intriEue  against  gjjj]  conceived  a  detestation  for  his  insolence, 
which  they  began  to  compare  unfavourably  with 
the  character  of  Sosibius.  For  the  latter  was  considered  to 
show  more  wisdom  in  his  guardianship  of  the  king  than  his  age 
gave  reason  to  expect ;  and,  in  his  dealings  with  other  persons, 
to  maintain  the  dignity  proper  to  his  high  trust,  which  was  the 


XVI  INTRIGUES  AT  ALEXANDRIA  189 

royal  seal  and  person.  Just  at  thb  time,  Ptolemy,  the  son  of 
Sc^ibius,  returned  from  his  mission  to  Philip.  Before  he  left 
Alexandria  on  his  voyage,  he  had  been  full  of  foolish  pride, 
partly  from  his  own  natural  disposition  and  partly  from  his 
father's  success.  But  upon  landing  in  Macedonia,  and  mix- 
ing with  the  young  men  at  court,  he  conceived  the  notion 
that  the  virtue  of  the  Macedonians  consisted  in  the  better 
fashion  of  their  boots  and  clothes ;  he  therefore  came  home 
got  up  in  imitation  of  all  these  peculiarities,  and  fully  per- 
suaded that  his  foreign  tour  and  association  with  Macedonians 
had  made  a  man  of  him.  He  therefore  immediately  began 
showing  jealousy  of  Tlepolemus,  and  inveighing  against  him ; 
and  as  all  the  courtiers  joined  him,  on  the  ground  that 
Tlepolemus  was  treating  the  business  and  revenue  of  the 
state  as  though  he  were  its  heir  and  not  its  guardian,  the 
quarrel  quickly  grew.  Meanwhile  llepolemus,  being  in- 
formed of  certain  unfriendly  speeches,  originating  in  the 
jealous  observation  and  malignity  of  the  courtiers,  at  first 
turned  a  deaf  ear  to  them  and  affected  to  despise  them ;  but 
when  at  length  they  ventured  to  hold  a  meeting  and  openly 
express  their  disapproval  of  him  in  his  absence,  on  the  ground 
of  his  maladministration  of  the  government  of  the  kingdom, 
he  grew  angry ;  and,  summoning  the  council,  came  forward 
and  said  that  "  they  brought  their  accusations  against  him 
secretly  and  in  private,  but  he  judged  it  right  to  accuse  them 
in  public  and  face  to  face."  ... 

After  making  his  public  speech,  Tlepolemus  deprived 
Sosibius  of  the  custody  of  the  seal  also,  and  having  got  that 
into  his  hands,  thenceforth  conducted  the  administration  ex- 
actly as  he  chose,  .  .  ■ 

THE  WAR  IN  COELE-SYRIA 

22  (a).  It  seems  to  me  to  be  at  once  just  and  proper  to 
pve  the   people   of  Gaza'  the  praise   which       bc.  301. 
they  deserve.     For  though  they  do  not  differ    Vaioui  of  the 
as   to   bravery  in  war   from  the   rest  of  the  peop'e  of  Gaia. 
inhabitants  of  Coele-Syria,  yet  as  parties  to  an  intemadonal 


190  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIVS  book 

agreement,  and  in  their  fidelity  to  their  promises,  they 
far  surpass  them,  and  show  altogether  a  courage  in  such 
matters  that  is  irresistible.  In  the  first  place,  when  all  the 
other  people  were  terrified  at  the  invasion  of  the  Persians,^  in 
view  of  the  greatness  of  their  power,  and  one  and  all  submitted 
themselves  and  their  countries  to  the  Medes,  they  alone  faced  the 
danger  and  stood  a  siege.  Again,  on  the  invasion 
of  Alexander,  when  not  only  did  the  other  cities 
surrender,  but  even  Tyre  was  stormed  and  its  inhabitants  sold 
into  slavery ;  and  when  it  seemed  all  but  hopeless  for  any  to 
escape  destruction,  who  resisted  the  fierce  and  violent  attack 
of  Alexander,  they  alone  of  all  the  Syrians  withstood  him, 
and  tested  their  powers  of  defence  to  the  uttermost.  Follow- 
ing the  same  line  of  conduct  on  the  present  occasion,  they 
omitted  nothing  within  their  power  in  their  determination  to 
keep  faith  with  Ptolemy,  Therefore,  just  as  we  distinguish  by 
special  mention  in  our  history  individuals  of  eminent  virtue, 
so  ought  we,  in  regard  to  states  as  such,  to  mention  with 
commendation  those  which  act  nobly  in  any  point  from  tra- 
ditional principles  and  deliberate  policy.  .  ,  , 

ITALY  {LIVV,  30,  4S) 

23.  Publius  Scipio  returned  from   Libya  soon  after  the 

Scipio's  reiurn   evcnts  I  have  narrated.     The  expectation  of  the 

to  Rome  and     people  concerning  him  was  proportionable  to 

iriumph,  B.C.  aoi.  ti^g  magnitude   of  his  achievements:  and  the 

=P-  IS.  19-  splendour  of  his  reception,  and  the  signs  of 
popular  favour  which  greeted  him  were  extraordinary.  Nor 
was  this  otherwise  than  reasonable  and  proper.  For  after 
despairing  of  ever  driving  Hannibal  from  Italy,  or  of  averting 
that  danger  from  themselves  and  their  kinsfolk,  they  now 
looked  on  themselves  as  not  only  securely  removed  from  every 
fear  and  every  menace  of  attack,  but  as  having  conquered  their 
enemies.  Their  joy  therefore  knew  no  bounds  ;  and  when 
Scipio  came  into  the  city  in  triumph,  and  the  actual  sight  of 

'  Syria  was  conquered  by  the  Assyrian  king  Tiglalh-Pileicr  about  B.C.  747, 
and  was  afterwards  a  part  of  the  Babylonian  and  Persian  empires.  It  does 
nM  seem  certain  to  what  invasion  Polybius  is  here  refeiring. 


xvi  SCJPIOS  TRIUMPH  igt 

the  prisoners  who  formed  the  procession  brought  stitl  more 
clearly  to  their  memories  the  dangers  of  the  past,  they  became 
almost  wild  in  the  expression  of  their  thanks  to  the  gods,  and 
their  affection  for  the  author  of  such  a  signal  change.  For 
among  the  prisoners  who  were  led  in  the  triumphal  procession 
was  Syphax,  the  Iting  of  the  Masaesylii,  who  shortly  afterwards 
died  in  prison.  The  triumph  concluded,  the  citizens  cele- 
brated games  and  festivals  for  several  days  running  with  great 
Splendour,  Scipio,  in  his  magnificent  liberality,  supplying  the 
cost.  .  .  . 

WAR    BETWEEN    ROME   AND   PHILIP   V. 

24^  At  the  beginning  of  the  winter  in  which  Publius  Sul- 
picius  was  elected  consul  at  Rome,  king  Philip,      wiotcr  of 
who  was  staying  at  Bargylia,  was  rendered  ex-    rc  aoi-aoo. 
ceedingly   uneasy  and    filled  with   many  con- ^'^- '^- ^P'''"*' 
flicting    anxieties    for    the    future,    when    he     Maiimus'll., 
observed  that  the  Rhodlans  and  Attalus,  far     C.  AureUus. 
from  dismissing  their  navy,  were  actually  man-       '-°*'"  't?' 
ning  additional  ships  and  paying  more  earnest 
attention  than  ever  to  guarding  the  coasts.      He  had  a  double 
cause,  indeed,  for  uneasiness  :  he  was  afraid  of  p^n  ■.  anneiies 
sailing  from  Bargylia,  and  foresaw  that  he  would 
have  to  encounter  danger  at  sea ;  and  at  the  same  time  he 
was  not  satisfied  with  the  state  of  things  in  Macedonia,  and 
therefore  was   unwilling  on  any  consideration   to   spend  the 
winter  in  Asia,  being  afraid  both  of  the  Aetolians  and  the 
Romans;    for  he  was   fully  aware  of  the  embassies  sent  to 
Rome  to  denounce  him  [as  soon  as  it  was  known]  that  the 
war  in  Libya  was  ended.     These  considerations  caused  him 
overwhelming   perplexity;    but    he   was   compelled   for   the 
present  to  remain  where  he  was,  leading  the  life  of  a  wolf,  to 
use  the  common  expression  :  for  he  robbed  and  stole  from 
some,  and  used  force  to  others,  while  he  did 
violence  to  his  nature  by  fawning  on  others,  be-  ^^^  ^^^^^  ^J^ 
cause  his  army  was  suffering  from  famine ;  and 
by  these  means  managed  sometimes  to  get  meat  to  eat,  some- 
times figs,  and  sometimes  nothing  but  a  very  short  allowance 
of  com.     Some  of  these  provisions  were  supplied  to  him  by 


192  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  book 

Zeuxis,  and  some  by  the  people  of  Mylae,  Alabanda,  and 
Magnesia,  whom  he  flattered  whenever  they  gave  him  any- 
thing, and  barked  at  and  plotted  against  when  they  did  not 
Finally,  he  made  a  plot  to  seize  Mylae  by  the  agency  of 
Philocles,  but  failed  from  the  clumsiness  with  which  the 
scheme  was  contrived.  The  territory  of  Alabanda  he  harried 
as  though  it  were  an  enemy's,  alleging  that  it  was  imperatively 
necessary  to  get  food  for  his  troops.  .  .  . 

When  this  Philip,  father  of  Perseus,  was  thus  ovemmning 
Asia,  being  unable  to  get  provisions  for  his  army,  he  accepted 
a  present  of  figs  from  the  Magnesians,  as  they  had  no  com. 
For  which  reason,  when  he  conquered  Myus,  he  granted  its 
territory  to  the  Magnesians  in  return  for  their  figs.  .  .  . 

25.  The  Athenian  people  sent  envoys  to  king  Attalus,  both 
The  visit  of  to  thank  him  for  the  past,  and  to  urge  him  to 
Attalus  to  Athens,  come  to  Athens  to  consult  with  them  on  the 
B.C.  200.  dangers  that  still  threatened  them.^  The  king 
was  informed  a  few  days  afterwards  that  Roman  ambassadors 
had  arrived  at  the  Peiraeus ;  and,  believing  that  it  was  neces- 
sary to  have  an  interview  with  them,  he  put  to  sea  in  haste. 
The  Athenian  people,  being  informed  of  his  coming,  passed  very 
liberal  votes  as  to  the  reception  and  general  entertainment  of  the 
king.  Arrived  at  the  Peiraeus,  Attalus  spent  the  first  day  in 
transacting  business  with  the  Roman  ambassadors,  and  was  ex- 
tremely delighted  to  find  that  they  were  fully  mindful  of  their 
ancient  alliance  with  him,  and  quite  prepared  for  the  war  with 
Philip.  Next  morning,  in  company  with  the  Romans  and  the 
Athenian  magistrates,  he  began  his  progress  to  the  city  in 
great  state.  For  he  was  met,  not  only  by  all  the  magistrates 
and  the  knights,  but  by  all  the  citizens  with  their  children  and 
wives.  And  when  the  two  processions  met,  the  warmth  of  the 
welcome  given  by  the  populace  to  the  Romans,  and  still  more 
to  Attalus,  could  not  have  been  exceeded.  At  his  entrance 
into  the  city  by  the  gate  Dipylum  the  priests  and  priestesses 
lined  the  street  on  both  sides :  all  the  temples  were  then 
thrown  open ;  victims  were  placed  ready  at  all  the  altars ;  and 
the  king  was  requested  to  offer  sacrifice.     Finally  they  voted 

*  That  is  from  the  wars  undertaken  by  them  against  Philip.     Livy,  31, 
14,  24. 


XVI  KING  ATTALUS  AT  ATHENS  193 

him  such  high  honours  as  they  had  never  without  great  hesita- 
tion voted  to  any  of  their  former  benefactors :  for,  in  addition 
to  other  compliments,  they  turned  a  tribe  after  Attalus,  and 
classed  him  among  their  eponymous  heroes. 

26.  They  next  summoned  an  ecclesia  and  invited  the  king 
to  address  them.  But  upon  his  excusing  him-  xhe  Athenians 
self,  on  the  plea  that  il  would  be  ill-bred  for  him  vote  for  war 
to  appear  before  the  people  and  recount  his  '«*'"*'  Philip. 
own  good  services  in  the  presence  of  those  on  whom  they  had 
been  bestowed,  they  gave  up  asking  for  his  personal  appear- 
ance ;  but  begged  him  to  give  them  a  written  statement  as  to 
what  he  thought  was  the  best  thing  to  do  in  view  of  the  exist- 
ing circumstances.  On  his  consenting  to  do  this,  and  writing 
the  document,  the  m^istrates  produced  the  despatch  to  the 
ecclesia.  The  cantents  of  this  written  communication  were 
briefly  these :  he  recalled  the  good  services  he  had  done  the 
people  in  the  past;  enumerated  the  things  he  had  accom- 
plished in  ihe  existing  war  against  Philip ;  and  lastly  exhorted 
them  to  activity  in  this  war,  and  protested  that,  if  they  did  not 
determine  resolutely  to  adopt  this  policy  of  hostility  to  Philip 
in  common  with  the  Rhodians,  Romans,  and  himself,  and  yet 
afterwards  wished  to  share  in  the  benefits  which  had  been 
secured  by  others,  they  would  miss  securing  the  true  interests 
of  their  country.  As  soon  as  this  despatch  had  been  read,  the 
people,  influenced  both  by  its  contents  and  by  their  warm 
feeling  towards  Attalus,  were  prepared  to  vote  the  war :  and 
when  the  Rhodians  also  entered  and  argued  at  great  length 
to  the  same  efl'ect,  the  Athenians  at  once  decreed  the 
war  against  Philip.  They  gave  the  Rhodians  also  a  mag- 
nificent reception,  honoured  their  state  with  a  crown  of 
valour,  and  voted  all  Rhodians  equal  rights  of  citizenship  at 
Athens,  on  the  ground  of  their  having,  besides  other  things, 
restored  the  Athenian  ships  which  had  been  captured  with 
the  men  on  board  them.  After  concluding  this  arrangement, 
the  Rhodian  ambassadors  sailed  to  Ceos  with  their  fleet  to 
visit  the  islands.  .  .  . 

27.  While  the  Roman  ambassadors  were  still  at  Athens, 
Nicanor,  by  the  command  of  Philip,  made  a    ^j,  ^^^^^^ 
raid  upon  Attica,  and  came  as  far  as  the  Aca-  wam  rhiiip  to 
vol.  II  o 


194  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBWS  book 


atrttnin  from  at-  dcmy.     Thereupon  the  Romans  sent  a  herald 

amuo  do'ji^ucc  *^  ^^™»  ^"^  ^^^  *^*™  announcc  to  his  master 
*  to  AtMhis.  on  Philip  that  '*  The  Romans  admonished  him  to 
i*;iiii  of  war.  make  HO  war  upon  any  Greek  State,  and  to 
sul)mit  to  an  arbitration  l>efore  a  fair  tribunal  as  to  the  injuries 
he  had  inflicted  upon  Attalus :  that,  if  he  did  this,  he  might 
have  iK*acc  with  Rome,  but,  if  he  refused  to  obey,  the  opposite 
would  immediately  follow."  On  the  receipt  of  this  message 
Nicanor  retired.  Then  the  Romans  sailed  along  the  coast  of 
Ispinis  and  delivered  a  similar  announcement  in  regard  to 
Pliilii)  in  the  town  of  Phoenice ;  also  to  Amynandrus  in  the 
district  of  Athamania ;  also  to  the  Aetolians  in  Naupactusy  and 
the  Achaeans  in  Aegiuni.  And  having  thus  by  the  mouth  of 
Nicanor  j^iven  Philip  this  clear  warning,  the  Roman  envoys 
thfinselves  sailed  away  to  visit  Antiochus  and  Ptolemy  with  a 
view  to  settle  their  controversies.  .  .  . 

28.   It  api>ears  to  me  that  to  make  a  good  beginning,  and 

riic finiiiKss    even  to  maintain  enthusiasm  long  enough  to 

niiii  vi);ijur  of    securc  a  Considerable  measure  of  success,  is  an 

''''•'''• '"  "»'yt'»n:  ac-hievemcnt  of  which  many  have  been  found 

<  .mK<  r.      capable ;  but  to  carr>'  a  purpose  through  to  its 

end,  and,  even  though  fortune  be  adverse,  to  make  up  by  cool 

reason  for  the  deficiency  of  enthusiasm  is  within  the  power  of 

few.     r>om  this  i)oint  of  view  one  cannot  but  disparage  the 

inactivity  of  Attalus  and  the  Rhodians,  while  regarding  with 

admiration  the  royal  and  lofty  spirit  displayed  by  Philip,  and 

his  constancy  to  his  purpose, — not  meaning  to  speak  in  praise 

of  his   character  as  a  whole,  but   simply  commending   the 

vigour  with  which  he  acted  on  this  occasion.     I  make  this 

distinction  to  prevent  any  one  supposmg  that  I  contradict 

myself,  because  I  recently  praised  Attalus  and  the  Rhodians 

and   found    fault   with    Philip,    whereas   I   am    now    doing 

the  reverse.  This  is  just  such  a  case  as  I 
referred  to  at  the  beginning  of  my  history,  when 
I  said  that  it  was  necessary  sometimes  to  praise,  and  some- 
times to  blame  the  same  persons,  since  it  frequently  happens 
that  changes  of  circumstances  for  the  worse  and  calamities  alter 
men*s  original  dispositions,  and  frequently  also  changes  for  the 
better ;  and  sometimes  too  it  is  the  case  that  from  natural 


XTi  ACTIVITY  AND  ENERGY  OF  PHILIP  195 

temperament  men  are  at  one  time  inclined  to  what  is  right,  at 
another  to  the  reverse.  And  it  is  a  variation  of  this  sort  that 
I  think  occurred  to  Philip  in  this  instance.  For,  irritated  by 
his  defeats,  and  influenced  in  a  great  degree  by  anger  and 
passion,  he  addressed  himself  with  a  kind  of  insane  or  inspired 
eagerness  to  meet  the  dangers  of  the  hour ;  and  it  was  in  this 
spirit  that  he  rose  to  the  attack  upon  the  Rhodians  and  king 
Attalus,  and  gained  the  successes  which  followed.  I  was  induced 
to  make  these  remarks,  because  I  observe  that  some  men,  like 
bad  runners  in  the  stadium,  abandon  their  purposes  when  close 
to  the  goal ;  while  it  is  at  that  particular  point,  more  than  at  any 
other,  that  others  secure  the  victory  over  their  rivals.  .  .  . 

29.  Philip    was    anxious    to    anticipate    the    Romans     in 
seizing  bases  of  operation  and  landing-places 
in  this  country  (Asia).  ... 

In  order  that,  if  it  should  be  his  purpose  again  to  cross  to 
Asia,  he  might  have  a  landing-place  at  Abydos.  .  .  . 

The  position  of  Abydos  and  Sestos,  and  the  advant^es  of 
the  situation  of  those  towns  it  would,  I  think,  __  _    .     „ 
i_  .       r .-        t  .      .  .     ■  .  J  .  -1    ^^  Dardanelles 

be  waste  of  time  for  me  to  state  m  great  detail,  compared  wiih 
liecause  the  singularity  of  those  sites  has  made  the  Suaiu  of 
them  familiar  to  all  persons  of  intelligence.  Still  G'brali"- 
I  imagine  that  It  will  not  be  otherwise  than  useful  to  remind 
my  readers  briefly  of  the  facts,  by  way  of  attracting  their  atten- 
tion. A  man  would  best  realise  the  advantages  of  these  cities, 
not  by  regarding  their  sites  by  themselves,  but  by  comparing 
and  contrasting  them  with  those  about  to  be  mentioned.  For 
just  as  it  is  impossible  to  sail  from  the  Ocean, — or  as  some 
call  it  the  Atlantic, — into  our  sea,  except  by  passing  between 
the  Pillars  of  Heracles,  so  is  it  impossible  to  sail  from  our  sea 
into  the  Propontis  and  the  Pontus  except  through  the  channel 
separating  Sestos  and  Abydos.  But  as  though  Fortune  had 
designed  these  two  straits  to  counterbalance  each  other,  the 
passage  between  the  Pillars  of  Heracles  is  many  times  as  broad 
as  that  of  the  Hellespont, — the  former  being  sixty,  the  latter  two 
stades;  the  reason  being,  as  far  as  one  may  conjecture,  the 
great  superiority  in  size  of  the  external  Ocean  to  our  sea :  while 
the  channel  at  Abydos  is  more  convenient  than  that  at  the 
Pillars  of  Heracles.    For  the  former  being  lined  on  both  sides 


196  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  book 

by  human  habitations  is  of  the  nature  of  a  gate  admitting 
mutual  intercourse,  sometimes  being  bridged  over  by  those 
who  determine  to  cross  on  foot,  and  at  all  times  admitting  a 
passage  by  sea.  But  the  channel  at  the  Pillars  of  Heracles  is 
seldom  used,  and  by  very  few  persons,  owing  to  the  lack  of 
intercourse  between  the  tribes  inhabiting  those  remote  parts  of 
Libya  and  Europe,  and  owing  to  the  scantiness  of  our  know- 
ledge of  the  external  Ocean.  The  city  of  Abydos  itself  is 
enclosed  on  both  sides  by  two  European  promontories,  and 
possesses  a  harbour  capable  of  sheltering  ships  anchoring  in  it 
from  every  wind ;  while  there  is  no  possibility  of  anchoring  at 
any  point  near  the  city  outside  the  harbour  mouth,  owing  to  the 
rapidity  and  violence  of  the  current  setting  through  the  strait. 
80.  Having  then  invested  Abydos  partly  by  a  palisade  and 

Siege  of  Abydos.  P^^^^^  ^^  ^^  earthwork,  Philip  began  blockading 

it  by  land  and  sea  together.  This  siege  was  not 
at  all  remarkable  for  the  extent  of  the  machinery  employed, 
or  the  ingenuity  displayed  in  those  works  on  which  besiegers 
and  besieged  are  wont  to  exhaust  all  their  invention  and  skill 
against  each  other ;  but  still  it  deserves,  if  any  ever  did,  to  be 
remembered  and  recorded  for  the  noble  spirit  and  extraordinary 
gallantry  exhibited  by  the  besieged.  At  first,  feeling  full 
confidence  in  themselves,  the  inhabitants  of  Abydos  maintained 
a  courageous  resistance  to  the  attempts  of  Philip ;  struck  and 
dislodged  some  of  his  engines,  which  he  brought  against  their 
walls  by  sea,  with  stones  from  their  catapults,  and  destroyed 
others  by  fire,  and  with  such  fierceness,  that  the  enemy  were 
barely  able  to  drag  their  ships  out  of  danger.  Against  the 
siege  operations  on  land,  too,  up  to  a  certain  point  they  offered 
an  undaunted  resistance,  not  at  all  despairing  of  ultimately 
overpowering  the  enemy.  But  when  their  outer  wall  was 
undermined  and  fell,  and  when  moreover  the  Macedonians  by 
means  of  these  same  mines  were  approaching  the  inner  wall, 
which  had  been  erected  by  the  besieged  to  cover  the  breach  : 
then  at  length  they  send  Iphiades  and  Pantacnotus  as  am- 
bassadors, with  an  offer  to  Philip  that  he  should  take  over  the 
city,  on  condition  of  letting  the  soldiers  from  Rhodes  and 
Attains  depart  under  a  truce ;  and  of  permitting  all  free  persons 
to  depart  as  they  could,  and  wherever  each  might  choose,  with 


XVI  THE  SIEGE  OF  ABYDOS  197 

the  clothes  that  each  was  wearing.  But  on  Fhiltp  bidding 
them  "  surrender  at  discretion  or  fight  like  men,"  the  ambassa- 
dors returned  to  the  town. 

31.  On  being  informedof  the  message  the  people  of  Abydos 
met  in  public  assembly,  and  with  feelings  of  3jspe„,e  f^joiy. 
Utter  despair  deliberated  upon  their  position,  ton  of  ihe  people 
They  thereupon  resolved,  first  to  liberate  the  of  Abydos. 
slaves,  that  they  might  secure  their  sincere  interest  and 
loyalty ;  next,  to  collect  all  the  women  into  the  temple 
of  Artemis,  and  the  children  with  their  nurses  into  the 
gymnasium ;  and  finally  to  bring  together  their  silver  and 
gold  into  the  market-place,  as  well  as  collect  their  clothes 
which  were  of  any  value  into  the  quadrireme  of  the 
Rhodians  and  the  trireme  of  the  Cyzicenes.  Having  formed 
these  resolutions  and  acted  on  the  decree  with  unanimity,  they 
again  assembled  in  public  meeting,  and  elected  fifty  of  the 
older  and  most  trusted  men,  who  at  the  same  time  were  pos- 
sessed of  sufficient  bodily  vigour  to  enable  them  to  carry  out 
what  had  been  determined  upon ;  and  these  they  bound  on 
oath  in  the  presence  of  the  whole  of  the  citizens,  that  "  when- 
ever they  saw  the  inner  wall  being  captured  by  the  enemy,  they 
would  kill  the  children  and  women,  and  would  bum  the  above- 
mentioned  ships,  and,  in  accordance  with  the  curses  that  had 
been  invoked,  would  throw  the  silver  and  gold  into  the  sea." 
After  this  they  brought  the  priests  forward,  and  all  the  citizens 
swore  that  they  would  conquer  the  enemy  or  die  fighting  for 
their  country.  To  crown  all,  they  slew  victims  and  compelled 
the  priests  and  priestesses  to  dictate  the  words  of  this  impre- 
cation over  the  burnt  offerings.  Having  bound  themselves 
by  this  solemn  agreement,  they  left  off  attempting  to  counter- 
mine the  enemy,  and  resolved  that,  directly  the  interior  wall  fell, 
they  would  fight  to  the  last  in  the  breach  with  the  enemy's 
storming  party  and  there  die. 

32.  This  would  justify  us  in  saying  that  the  gallantry  of  the 
Abydenians    outdid    the    proverbial    Phocian 
recklessness  and  Acamanian  courage.^     For  the  ^i^^lj^l^on^of 
Phocians  have  the  repuUtion  of  having  adopted   the  Abydenians 

'  For  Ihe  Pbocians  see  Pausan.  10,  i.  6.     For  (he  A< 


198  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  book 

with  similar  ones  a  similar  resolution  as  to  their  families,  but  not 

aSdA^a^SS.  because  they  despaired  of  victory,   for  they 

were  about  to  fight  a  pitched  battle  with  the 
Thessalians  in  the  open  field.  So  too  the  Acamanians,  upon 
the  mere  prospect  of  an  Aetolian  invasion,  adopted  a  like 
resolution ;  the  details  of  which  I  have  already  narrated.  But 
the  Abydenians,  at  a  time  when  they  were  closely  invested  and 
in  all  but  complete  despair  of  being  saved,  elected  by  a 
unanimous  resolution  to  meet  their  fate  along  with  their  child- 
ren and  wives,  rather  than  to  live  any  longer  with  the  knowledge 
that  their  children  and  wives  would  fall  into  the  power  of  the 
enemy.  Therefore  one  might  justly  complain  of  Fortune  for 
having,  in  the  former  cases,  given  victory  and  safety  to  those 
who  despaired  of  them,  while  she  adopted  the  opposite  decision 
in  regard  to  the  Abydenians.  For  the  men  were  killed,  and  the 
city  was  taken,  but  the  children  with  their  mothers  fell  into 
the  hands  of  the  enemy. 

33.  As   soon   as   the  interior  wall  had  fallen,  the  men, 

H     th     t        according  to  their  oaths,  sprang  upon  the  ruins 

surrendered  and  and   fought   the  enemy   with   such   desperate 

the  women  and  courage,  that  Philip,  though  he  had  kept  sending 

^'^'^er^'X^    the  Macedonians   to   the   front   in   relays   till 

nightfall,  at  last  abandoned  the  contest  in  de- 
spair of  accomplishing  the  capture  at  all.  For  not  only  did 
the  Abydenian  forlorn  hope  take  their  stand  upon  the  dead , 
bodies  of  the  fallen  enemies,  and  maintain  the  battle  with 
fury;  nor  was  it  only  that  they  fought  gallantly  with  mere 
swords  and  spears ;  but  when  any  of  these  weapons  had  been 
rendered  useless,  or  had  been  knocked  out  of  their  hands,  they 
grappled  with  the  Macedonians,  and  either  hurled  them  to  the 
ground  arms  and  all,  or  broke  their  sarissae,  and  stabbing  their 
faces  and  exposed  parts  of  their  bodies  with  the  broken  ends, 
threw  them  into  a  complete  panic  But  the  fight  being  inter- 
rupted by  nightfall,  most  of  the  citizens  having  now  fallen  in 
the  breach,  and  the  rest  being  utterly  exhausted  by  fatigue  and 
wounds,  Glaucides  and  Theognetus  collected  a  few  of  the 
older  men  together,  and,  instigated  by  hopes  of  personal  safety, 
lowered  the  special  eminence  and  unique  glory  which  their 
fellow-citizens  had  acquired.     For  they  resolved  to  save  the 


XVI  THE  FALL  OF  ABYDOS  199 

chtldien  and  women  alive,  and  at  daybreak  to  send  the  priests 
and  priestesses  with  garlands  to  Philip,  to  entreat  his  mercy 
and  surrender  the  city  to  him. 

34.  While  this  was  going  on,  king  Attatus,  having  heard 
that  Abydos  was  being  besieged,  sailed  through  a  Roman  envoy 
the  Aegean  to  Tenedos ;  and  similarly  the  arrives  10  warn 
youngest  of  the  Roman  ambassadors,  Marcus  ^'"''P '"  '*=*'**■ 
Aemilius,  arrived  on  board  ship  at  Abydos  itself.  For 
the  Roman  ambassadors,  having  learnt  at  Rhodes  the  fact 
of  the  siege  of  Abydos,  and  wishing  in  accordance  with  their 
commission  to  deliver  their  message  to  Philip  personally,  put 
off  their  purpose  of  visiting  the  two  kings,  and  despatched 
this  man  to  him.  Having  found  the  king  outside  Abydos,  he 
explained  to  him  that  "The  Senate  had  resolved  to  order  him 
not  to  wage  war  with  any  Greek  state ;  nor  to  interfere  in  the 
dominions  of  Ptolemy  ;  and  to  submit  the  injuries  inflicted  on 
Attalus  and  the  Rhodians  to  arbitration ;  and  that  if  he  did 
so  he  might  have  peace,  but  if  he  refused  to  obey  he  would 
promptly  have  war  with  Rome."  Upon  Philip  endeavouring 
to  show  that  the  Rhodians  had  been  the  first  to  lay  hands  on 
him,  Marcus  interrupted  him  by  saying  :  "  But  what  about  the 
Athenians  ?  And  what  about  the  Cianians  ?  And  what 
about  the  Abydenians  at  this  moment  ?  Did  any  one  of  them 
also  lay  hands  on  you  first  ?  "  The  king,  at  a  loss  for  a  reply, 
said :  "  I  pardon  the  offensive  haughtiness  of  your  manners  for 
three  reasons  :  first,  because  you  are  a  young  man  and  inex- 
perienced in  affairs  ;  secondly,  because  you  are  the  handsomest 
man  of  your  time  "  (this  was  true)  ;  "  and  thirdly,  because  you 
are  a  Roman.  But  for  my  part,  my  first  demand  to  the 
Romans  is  that  they  should  not  break  their  treaties  or  go  to 
war  with  me;  but  if  they  do,  I  shall  defend  myself  as 
courageously  as  I  can,  appealing  to  the  gods  to  defend  my 
cause."  With  these  words  they  separated.  On  becoming 
master  of  Abydos,  Philip  found  all  the  property  -n,e  voluntary 
of  the  citizens  collected  by  themselves  ready  to  death  of  ihe 
his  hand.  But  when  he  saw  the  numbers  and  Abydenians. 
fury  of  those  who  were  stabbing,  burning,  hanging,  throwing  into 
wells,  or  precipitating  themselves  from  housetops,  and  their 
children  and  wives,  he  was  overpowered  with  surprise;  an'' 


200  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  »00k 


resenting  these  proceedings  he  published  a  proclamation^ 
announcing,  that  "he  gave  three  days'  grace  to  those  who 
wished  to  hang  or  stab  themselves.'*  The  Abydenians,  already 
bent  on  executing  their  original  decree,  and  looking  upon 
themselves  as  traitors  to  those  who  had  fought  and  died  for 
their  country,  could  not  endure  remaining  alive  on  any  terms ; 
and,  accordingly,  with  the  exception  of  those  who  had  previously 
been  put  in  chains  or  some  similar  restraint,  they  all  without 
delay  hastened  to  their  death,  each  family  by  itself.  .  .  . 

85.  After  the  capture  of  Abydos,  envoys  came  from  the 
The  Rhodians  Achaean  nation  to  Rhodes  urging  the  Rhodians 
resolve  to  side    to  make  terms  with  Philip.     But  upon  these 

with  Rome,  being  followed  by  the  arrival  of  the  ambassadors 
from  Rome,  who  argued  that  they  should  make  no  terms  with 
Philip  without  consulting  the  Romans,  the  Rhodian  people 
voted  to  listen  to  the  latter  and  to  hold  to  their  friendship 
with  them.  .  .  . 

THE    PELOPONNESE — WAR    WITH    NABIS 

86.  Philopoemcn  calculated  the  distances  of  all  the  cities 

of  the   Achaean    league,  and   from   which   of 

afwcc  f^ToHcct-  ^^^^  ^^^  ^^"^^  ^"""^^  ^^  Tegea  along  the  same 

ingaii  the  Achaean  roads.     He  then  wrote  despatches  to  each  of 

levies  at  Tegea   them,  and  sent  them  to  the  most  distant  cities, 

''Tc  2^"^^^'  so   dividing  them    that    each   city   that   was 

farthest  on  a  particular  road  should  get,  not 
only  the  one  addressed  to  itself,  but  those  also  of  the  other 
cities  on  the  same  road.  The  contents  of  these  first  despatches 
addressed  to  the  chief  magistrate  were  as  follows :  "  As  soon 
as  ye  receive  this  despatch,  forthwith  cause  all  the  men  of 
military  age,  with  arms,  and  provisions,  and  money  for  five 
days,  to  assemble  immediately  in  the  market-place.  And  as 
soon  as  they  are  thus  collected,  march  them  out  and  lead  them 
to  the  next  city.  As  soon  as  ye  have  arrived  there,  deliver  the 
despatch  addressed  to  its  chief  magistrate  and  follow  the  in- 
structions therein  contained."  Now,  this  second  despatch 
contained  exactly  the  same  words  as  the  former,  except  of 
course  that  the  name  of  the  next  town  was  changed  to  which 


XVI  A  MUSTER  OF  ACHAEANS  AGAINST  HABIS        »I 

they  were  to  march.  By  this  arrangement  being  repeated 
right  along  the  road,  in  the  first  place  no  one  knew  for  what 
purpose  or  undertaking  the  expedition  was  directed ;  and  in 
the  next  place,  every  one  was  absolutely  ignorant  where  he  was 
going,  beyond  the  name  of  the  next  town,  but  all  marched 
forward  in  a  state  of  complete  mystification,  taking  on  the  suc- 
cessive contingents  as  they  went.  But  as  of  course  the  most 
remote  towns  were  not  equally  distant  from  Tegea,  the  letters 
were  not  delivered  to  them  all  at  the  same  time,  but  to  each 
in  proportion  to  its  distance.  By  which  arrangement,  without 
either  the  Tegeans  or  the  new  arrivals  knowing  what  was  going 
to  happen,  all  the  Achaeans  marched  into  Tcgea  under  amis 
by  all  the  gates  simultaneously. 

87.  What  suggested  to  Philopoemen  this  stratagem  was  the 
great  number  of  the  tyrant's  eavesdroppers  and 

spies.  On  the  day  then  on  which  the  main  body  L^nia?" 
of  the  Achaeans  were  to  arrive  at  Tegea,  he  de- 
spatched a  band  of  picked  men,  so  timing  their  start,  that  they 
might  pass  the  night  near  Sellasia  and  at  daybreak  begin  a  raid 
on  Laconia.  They  had  orders  that,  in  case  the  mercenaries  of 
Nabis  left  their  quarters  and  attacked  them,  they  were  to  retire 
on  Scotita,  and  in  other  respects  follow  the  directions  of 
Didascalondas of  Crete  ;  for  Philopoemen  had  given  his  confi- 
dence to  this  officer,  and  full  directions  as  to  the  whole  ex- 
pedition. These  men  therefore  set  out  in  good  spirits  to  the 
task  assigned  to  them.  Philopoemen  himself  having  issued 
orders  to  the  Achaeans  to  sup  early,  led  out  his  army  from 
Tegea,  and  after  a  rapid  night's  march  halted  it  about  the  time 
of  the  morning  watch  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Scotita,  wlitch 
is  between  Tegea  and  Lacedaemon.  When  day  broke  the 
mercenaries  in  Pellene,  being  informed  by  their  scouts  of  the 
raid  which  the  enemy  were  making,  started  at  once  to  the 
rescue,  as  was  their  custom,  and  bore  down  upon  them ;  and 
when  the  Achaeans,  in  accordance  with  their  instructions,  re- 
tired, they  followed,  harassing  them  with  bold  and  daring 
assaults.  But  as  soon  as  they  came  to  the  place  where 
PhDopoemen  lay  in  ambush,  the  Achaeans  sprang  up  and  cut 
some  of  them  to  pieces,  and  took  others  prisoners.  .  .  . 

88.  Philip  seeing  that  the  Achaeans  were  disposed  to  ' 


202 


THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS 


BOOK  XYI 


tate  about  undertaking  the  war  with  Rome,  tried  earnestly  by 
every  means  to  rouse  their  feeling  of  hostility.  .  .  . 


COELE-SYRIA 

89.  Ptolemy's  general  Scopas  marched  into  the  upper  region 
during  the  winter  and  subdued  the  Jewish  nation.  .  .  . 

The  siege  having  been  conducted  in  a  desultory  msuiner, 
Scopas  fell  into  bad  repute  and  was  attacked  with  all  the 
petulance  of  youth.  .  .  . 

Having    conquered    Scopas,    Antiochus    took    Batanaea, 

B.C  200.       Samaria,  Abila,  and  Gadara ;  and  after  a  while 

Antiochus  con-  those  of  the  Jews  who  inhabit  the  sacred  town 

'^''^d^h!^  je^'^  ^^^^^  Jerusalem  submitted  to  him  also.     On 

after  beating  Sco-  the  subject  of  this  town  I  have  a  good  deal 

pas  at  Panium.  more  to  say,  and  especially  on  account  of  the 

^^  supra,  ch.  18.  splendour  of  its  temple,  but  I  shall  put  it  off  to 

another  opportunity. 


BOOK  xvmi     . 

THE   WAR    WITH    PHILIP 

1.  When  the  time  appointed  arrived,  Philip  put  to  sea  rrom 
Demetrias  and  came  into  the  Mehan  Gulf,  with 
five  galleys  and  one  beaked  war-ship  (pristis), Nicaea1nL<xais, 
on  the  latter  of  which  he  himself  was  sailing,  wimerolB.c.  ige- 
There  met   him   the   Macedonian    secretaries  '97-  Cms-  Titus 
ApoUodorus  and  Demosthenes,  Brachylles  from    ^ininusrsext 
Bocotia,  and  the  Achaean  Cycliadas,  who  had    Aeiius  Paeios 
been   driven    from   the   Peloponnese    for  the        Caius. 
reasons  I  have  already  described.     With  Fla-  Cydiadas  expelled 
mininus  came  king  Amynandras,  and  Diony-     f™  favouring 
sodonis,  legate  of  king   Attalus.      The   com-™"^^^^/-'''' 
missioners     from    cities     and     nations     were 
Aristaenus  and  Xenophon  from  the  Achaeans ;  Acesimbrotus 
the   navarch    from  the   Rhodians;    Phaeneas  their  Strategtis 
from  the  Actolians,  and  several  others  of  their  statesmen  with 
him.     Approaching  the  sea  near  Nicaea,  Flamininus  and  those 
with  him  took  their  stand  upon  the  very  edge  of  the  beach, 
while  Philip,  bringing  his  ship  close  to  shore,  remained  afloat. 
Upon  Flamininus  bidding  him  disembark,  he  stood  up  on 
board  and  refused  to  leave  his  ship,     Flamininus  again  asked 
him  what  he  feared,  he  said  that  he  feared  no  one  but  the 
gods,  but  he  distrusted  most  of  those  who  were  there,  especially 
the  Aetolians.     Upon  the  Roman  expressing  his  surprise,  and 
remarking  that  the  danger  was  the  same  to  all  and  the  risk 
common,  Philip  retorted  that  "  He  was  mistaken  in  saying  that : 

'  According  to  Hullseh  no  fragments  or  extracts  ol  book  17  are  preserved. 
In  it  would  have  lieen  contained  the  campaign  of  B.C.  199.  in  the  war  bclsveen 
Rome  and  Philip,  (or  ubich  sec  Livy.  31,  34-43.  And  Ihe  operations  of 
Flamininus  in  (he  season  of  B.C.  198.  Livy,  31,  9-18.  The  (iial  seventeen 
chapters  of  this  book  arc  generally  classed  in  book  17. 


204  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  book 

for  that,  if  anything  happened  to  Phaeneas,  there  were  many 
who  would  act  as  Strategi  for  the  Aetolians ;  but  if  Philip  were 
to  perish  at  the  present  juncture,  there  was  no  one  to  be  king  of 
the  Macedonians."  Though  all  thought  this  an  unconciliatory 
way  of  opening  the  discussion,  Flamininus  nevertheless  bade 
him  speak  on  the  matters  he  had  come  to  consider.  Philip 
however  said  that  "  The  word  was  not  with  himself  but  with 

Flamininus;  and  therefore  begged  that  he  would 

^emand^"     State  clearly  what  he  was  to  do  in  order  to  have 

peace."   The  Roman  consul  replied  that  "  What 

he  had  to  say  was  simple  and  obvious :  it  was  to  bid  him 

evacuate  Greece  entirely ;  restore  the  prisoners  and  deserters 

in  his  hands  to  their  several  states ;  hand  over  to  the  Romans 

those  parts  of  Illyricum  of  which  he  had  become  possessed  since 

Peace  of  Epirus,  ^^^  peace  of  Epirus ;  and,  similarly,  to  restore  to 

B.C.  205.       Ptolemy  all  the  cities  which  he  had  taken  from 

^^ supra  II,  5-7.  j^i^  sjnce  the  death  of  Ptolemy  Philopator. 

2.  Having  said  this  Flamininus  refrained  from  any  further 
speech  of  his  own ;  but  turning  to  the  others  he  bade  them  deliver 
what  they  had  been  severally  charged  to  say  by  those  who  sent 

them.     And  first  Dionysodorus,  the  envoy  of 

^  Auaius  °^     Attalus,  took  up  the  discourse  by  declaring  that 

"  Philip  ought  to  restore  the  king's  ships  which 

had  been  captured  in  the  battle  at  Chios  and  their  crews  with 

them ;    and  to  restore  also  the  temple  of  Aphrodite  to  its 

original  state,  as  well  as  the  Nicephorium,  bo£h  of  which  he  had 

r.u   Du  ,•       destroyed."     He  was  followed  by  the  Rhodian 

of  the  Rhodians,  •;      .        .     ,  ,        ,  ,    i    ,,  rr^, 

navarch  Acesimbrotus,  who  demanded  "That 
Philip  should  evacuate  Peraea,  which  he  had  taken  from  them ; 
withdraw  his  garrisons  from  lasus,  Bargylia,  and  Euromus; 
restore  the  Perinthians  to  their  political  union  with  Byzantium  ; 
and  evacuate  Sestos,  Abydos,  and  all  commercial  ports  and 
r  .u    A  u  harbours  in  Asia."    Following  the  Rhodians  the 

'  Achaeans  demanded  "The  restoration  of  Corinth 
and  Argos  uninjuired."    Then  came  the  Aetolians,  who  first  de- 
manded, like  the  Romans,  that  "  Philip  should 
Acto^fans!      entirely  evacuate  Greece;   and,  secondly,  that 
he  should  restore  to  them  uninjured  all  cities 
formerly  members  of  the  Aetolian  league." 


xTiii  CONGRESS  OF  NICAEA  aos 

S.  When  Phaeneas  the  Aetolian  strategus  had  delivered  this 
demand,  a  man  called  Alexander  Isius,  who 
had  the  reputation  of  being  an  able  politician  Aieii^ndCT  isi™. 
and  good  speaker,  said  that  "  Philip  was  neither 
sincere  at  the  present  moment  in  proposing  teims,  nor  bold  in 
his  manner  of  making  war,  when  he  had  to  do  that.  In  con- 
ferences and  colloquies  he  was  always  setting  ambushes  and 
lying  in  wait,  and  using  all  the  practices  of  war,  but  in  actual 
war  itself  took  up  a  position  at  once  unjust  and  ignoble  :  for 
he  avoided  meeting  his  enemies  face  to  face,  and,  as  he  fled 
before  them,  employed  himself  in  burning  and  plundering  the 
cities ;  and  by  this  policy,  though  himself  beaten,  he  spoilt  the 
value  of  the  victor's  reward.  Yet  former  kings  of  Macedonia 
had  not  adopted  this  plan,  but  one  exactly  the  reverse  :  for 
they  were  continually  fighting  with  each  other  in  the  open 
field,  but  rarely  destroyed  and  ruined  cities.  This  was  shown 
clearly  by  Alexander's  war  in  Asia  against  king  Darius; 
and  again  in  the  contentions  between  his  successors,  when 
they  combined  to  fight  Antlgonus  for  the  possession  of  Asia. 
So  too  had  the  successors  of  these  kings  followed  the  same  policy 
down  to  the  time  of  Pyrrhus  ;  they  had  been  prompt  to  war 
against  each  other  in  the  open  field,  and  to  do  everything  they 
could  to  conquer  each  other  in  arms,  but  had  spared  the  cities, 
that  they  might  rule  them  if  they  conquered,  and  be  honoured 
by  their  subjects.  But  that  a  nsan  should  abandon  war,  and 
yet  destroy  that  for  which  the  war  was  undertaken,  seemed  an 
act  of  madness,  and  madness  of  a  very  violent  sort.  And  this 
was  just  what  Philip  was  doing  at  that  moment ;  for  he  had 
destroyed  more  cities  in  Thessaly,  on  his  rapid  march  from  the 
pass  of  Epirus,  though  he  was  a  friend  and  ally  of  that  country, 
than  any  one  who  had  ever  been  at  war  with  the  Thessalians." 
After  a  good  deal  more  to  the  same  effect  he  ended  by 
asking  Philip,  "  On  what  grounds  he  was  holding  the  town  of 
Lysimacheia  with  a  garrison,  having  expelled  the  strategus  sent 
by  the  Aetolian  league,  of  which  it  was  a  member?  Also 
on  what  grounds  he  had  enslaved  the  Ciani  who  were  also  in 
alliance  with  the  Aetolians  ?  T,astly,  on  what  plea  he  was  in 
actual  occupation  of  Echinus,  Phthioiid  Thebes,  Pharsalus, 
and  Larisa?" 


2o6  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  book 

4,  When  Alexander  had  concluded  his  speech,  Philip  came 

somewhat   nearer  to  the   shore   than  he  was 

The  JfJ^j^"*^^^  °  before,  and,  rising  on  board  his  ship,  said  that 

"Alexander  had  composed  and  delivered  a 
speech  in  the  true  AetoHan  and  theatrical  style.  For  every  one 
knew  quite  well  that  nobody  willingly  destroys  his  own  allies, 
but  that,  at  times  of  special  danger,  military  commanders  are 
compelled  to  do  many  things  contrary  to  their  natural  feelings." 
While  the  king  was  still  speaking,  Phaeneas,  who  was  very 
short-sighted,  interrupted  him  by  saying,  "  You  are  trifling  with 
us ;  you  must  either  fight  and  conquer,  or  obey  the  commands 
of  the  stronger."  Philip,  in  spite  of  the  unfortunate  position  of 
his  affairs,  could  not  refrain  from  his  habitual  humour: 
turning  towards  Phaeneas  he  said,  "  Even  a  blind  man  could 
see  that"  Such  a  knack  had  he  of  cutting  repartee.  Then  he 
turned  to  Alexander  again  and  said,  "  You  ask  me,  Alexander, 
why  I  took  possession  of  Lysimacheia.  I  reply,  in  order  that  it 
might  not  by  your  neglect  be  devastated  by  Thracians,  as  it  has 
now  actually  been  ;  because  I  was  compelled  by  this  war  to  re- 
move my  soldiers,  who  indeed  were  no  hostile  garrison,  as  you 
say,  but  were  there  for  its  protection.  As  for  the  Ciani,  I  did 
not  go  to  war  with  them,  but  only  assisted  Prusias  to  take  them 
who  was  at  war  with  them.  And  of  this  you  yourselves  were  the 
cause.  For  though  I  sent  envoy  after  envoy  to  you  desiring 
that  you  would  repeal  the  law  which  allows  you  the  privilege  of 
taking  *  spoil  from  spoil,*  you  replied  that  rather  than  abolish 
this  law  you  would  remove  Aetolia  from  Aetolia." 

5.  When  Flamininus  expressed  some  wonder  at  what  he 

Philip  explains  meant  by  this,  the  king  tried  to  explain  it  to  him 

the  peculiar  law  by  saying  that  "  The  Aetolian  custom  was  this. 

of  the  Aeioiians.  ^^^ey  not  Only  plundered   those   with   whom 

they  were  at  war,  and  harried  their  country ;  but,  if  certain 

other  nations  were  at  war  with  each  other,  even  though  both 

were  friends  and  allies  of  the  Aetolians,  none  the  less  the 

Aetolians  might,  without  a  formal  decree  of  the  people,  take 

part  with  both  combatants  and  plunder  the  territory  of  both. 

The  result  was  that  in  the  eyes  of  the  Aetolians  there  were  no 

defined  limits  of  friendship  or  enmity,  but  they  were  ready  to 

be  the  enemies  and  assailers  of  all  who  had  a  dispute  on  any- 


XTIII  PHILIP  RETORTS  ON  HIS  ACCUSERS  207 

thing.  "  How  then,"  he  added,  "  have  they  any  right  to  blame 
me  if^  while  on  temis  of  friendship  with  the  Aetolians,  I  did 
anything  against  the  Ciani  in  support  of  my  own  allies  ?  But  - 
the  most  outrageous  part  of  their  conduct  is  that  they  try  to 
rival  Rome,  and  bid  me  entirely  evacuate  Greece !  The 
demand  in  itself  is  sufHcientty  haughty  and  dictatorial :  still,  in 
the  mouths  of  Romans,  it  is  tolerable,  but  in  that  of  Aetolians 
quite  intolerable.  What  is  this  Greece,  pray,  from  which  ye 
bid  me  depart  ?  How  do  you  define  it  ?  Why,  most  of  the 
Aetolians  themselves  are  not  Greeks ;  for  neither  the  Agrai, 
nor  the  Apodoti,  nor  the  Amphilochi  are  counted  as  Greek. 
Do  you  then  give  up  those  tribes  to  me  ?  " 

6.  Upon  Flamininus  laughing  at  these  words,  Philip  pro- 
ceeded :  "  Well,  enough  said  to  the  Aetolians  !  phiijp-s  answer 
But  to  the  Rhodians  and  Attalus  I  have  to  say  to  the  Rbodians 
that,  in  the  eyes  of  a  fair  judge.  It  would  be  held  "'"'  '^"^"*- 
more  just  that  they  should  restore  to  me  the  ships  captured, 
than  I  to  them.  For  I  did  not  begin  the  attack  upon  Attalus 
and  the  Rhodians,  but  they  upon  me,  as  everybody  acknow- 
ledges. However,  at  your  instance,  Titus,  I  restore  Peraea  to 
the  Rhodians,  and  to  Attalus  his  ships  and  as  many  of  the 
men  as  are  still  alive.  As  for  the  destruction  of  the  Nice- 
phorium  and  the  grove  of  Aphrodite,  I  am  not  able  to  do 
anything  else  towards  their  restoration,  but  I  will  send  plants 
and  gardeners  to  attend  to  the  place  and  the  growth  of  the 
trees  that  have   been   cut   down."       Flamininus  once   more 

lauehine  at  the  king's  sarcastic  tone,   Philip     ,  .    .  . 

"    ,°     ,       ,    ,       °  ,,  ,  r  and  ihe  Aehaeans. 

turned  to  the  Achaeans,  and  first  went  through 
the  list  of  benefactions  received  by  them  from  Antigonus  and 
himself;  then  quoted  the  extraordinary  honours  Antigonus  and 
he  had  received  from  them ;  and  concluded  by  reading  their 
decree  for  abandoning  him  and  joining  Rome.  Taking  this  for 
his  text,  he  expatiated  at  great  length  on  the  fickleness  and  in- 
gratitude of  the  Achaeans.  Still  he  said  he  would  restore  Argos 
to  them,  and  as  to  Corinth  would  consult  with  Flamininus. 

7.  Having  thus  concluded  his  conversation  with  the  other 
envoys,  he  asked    Flamininus,  observing   that 

the  discussion  was  really  confined  to  himself     na^n^^ 
and  the  Romans,  "  Whether  he  considered  that 


2o8  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  book 

he  was  bound  to  evacuate  only  those  places  in  Greece  which 
he  had  himself  acquired,  or  those  also  which  he  had  inherited 
from  his  ancestors?"      On  Flamininus  making  no   answer 
Aristaenus  for  the  Achaeans,  and  Phaeneas  for  the  Aetolians! 
were  on  the  point  of  replying.     But  as  the  day  was  closing  in 
time  prevented  them  from  doing  so ;  and  Philip  demanded 
that  they  should  all  hand  into  him  a  written  statement  of  the 
terms  on  which  peace  was  to  be  granted :  for  being   there 
alone  he  had  no  one  with  whom  to  consult ;  and  therefore 
wished  to  turn  their  demands  over  in  his  own  mind.      Now 
Flamininus  was  much  amused  at  Philip's  sarcastic  banter ;  but 
not  wishing  the  others  to  think  so,  he  retaliated  on  him  by  a 
sarcasm  also,  saying :  "  Of  course  you  are  alone,  Philip  :  for 
you  have  killed  all  the  friends  likely  to  give  you  the   best 
advice  !"     The  king  smiled  sardonically,  but  said  nothing. 
And  for  the  present,  all  having  handed  in  the  written  state- 
ments of  their  demands  as  aforesaid,  the  conference  broke  up, 
after  appointing  to  meet  again  next  day  at  Nicaea.     But  next 
morning,  though  Flamininus  came  to  the  appointed  place  and 
found  the  others  there,  Philip  did  not  arrive. 

8.  When  the  day,  however,  had  nearly  come  to  an  end, 

Second  days    and  Titus  and  the  others  had  almost  given  him 

conference,  Philip  up,   Philip  appeared  accompanied   as   before, 

comes  Lite.  ^^^  excused  himself  by  saying  that  he  had 
spent  the  whole  day  in  perplexit)'  and  doubt,  caused  by  the 
severity  of  the  demands  made  upon  him.  But  every  one  else 
thought  that  he  had  acted  thus  from  a  wish  to  prevent,  by  the 
lateness  of  the  hour,  the  delivery  of  invectives  by  the  Achaeans 
and  Aetolians  :  for  he  saw,  as  he  was  going  away  on  the  previous 
evening,  that  both  were  ready  to  attack  him  and  state  grievances. 
Therefore,  as  soon  as  he  approached  the  meeting  this  time, 
he  demanded  that  "  The  Roman  Consul  should  discuss  the 
matter  with  him  in  private ;  that  they  might  not  have  a  mere 
war  of  words  on  both  sides,  but  that  a  definite  settlement 
should  be  come  to  on  the  points  in  dispute."  On  his  several 
times  repeating  this  request  and  pressing  it  strongly,  Flamini- 
nus asked  those  present  what  he  ought  to  do.  On  their 
bidding  him  meet  the  king  and  hear  what  he  had  to  say,  he 
took  with  him  Appius  Claudius,  at  that  time  a  military  Tribune, 


xvm      THE  DISPUTE  REFERRED  TO  THE  SENATE        209 

and  telling  the  others  to  retire  a  short  way  from  the  sea  and 
remain  there,  he  himself  bade  Philip  disembark.     Accordingly 
the  king,  attended  by  Apollodorus  and  Demosthenes,  left  his 
ship,  and,  joining  Flamininus,  conversed  with  him  for  a  con- 
siderable time.      What  was  said  by  the  one  and  the  other  on 
that  occasion  it  is  not  easy  to  state.      However, 
when  Philip  and  he  had  parted,    Flamininus,     ^'■"'S^^^"^ 
in   explaining  the   king's  views  to  the  others, 
said  that  he  consented  to  restore  Pharsalus  and  Larisa  to  the 
Aetolians,  but  not  Thebes :    and  that  to  the  Rhodians  he 
surrendered   Peraea,   but   not   lasus   and   Bargylia:    to   the 
Achaeans  he  gave  up  Corinth  and  Argos  :  to  the  Romans  he 
promised  that  he  would  surrender  Itlyricum  and  all  prisoners  : 
and  to  Attalus  the  ships,  and  as  many  of  the  men  captured  in 
the  sea-fights  as  survived. 

9.  All  present  expressed  their  dissatisfaction  at  these  terms, 
and  alleged  that  it  was  necessary  before  all  that 
he  should  perform  the  general  injunction,  that,    ^coneraa 
namely,   of  evacuating  all  Greece :    otherwise 
these  particular  concessions  were  vain  and  useless.     Observing 
that  there  was  an  animated  discussion  going  on  among  them, 
and  fearing  at  the  same  time  that  they  would  indulge  in 
accusations  against  himself,  Philip  requested  Flamininus  to 
adjourn   the  conference  till    next    day,   as    the  evening  was 
closing  in ;  and  promised  that  he  would  then  either  persuade 
them  to  accept  his  terms  or  submit  to  theirs.     Flamininus 
consenting,  they  separated,  after  appointing  to  meet  next  day 
on  the  beach  near  Thronium, 

Next  day  al!  came  to  the  appointed  place  in  good  time. 
Philip  in  a  short  speech  called  on  all,  and  ybird  day's  con- 
especially  on  Flamininus,  "  Not  to  break  off  the  ference.  A  refer- 
negotiation  for  peace  now  that  by  far  the  ™™iJL'|jf  Senate 
greater  number  were  inclined  to  come  to  some 
arrangement ;  but,  if  possible,  to  come  to  an  understanding  by 
themselves  on  the  points  in  dispute ;  or,  if  that  could  not  be, 
to  send  envoys  to  the  Senate,  and  either  convince  it  as  to  this 
controversy,  or  submit  to  whatever  it  enjoined." 

On  this  proposition  of  the  king,  all  the  others  declared  that 
they  preferred  war  to  such  a  demand.     But  the  Roman  Coi^' ' ' 


2IO  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  book 


said  that  "  He  was  quite  aware  that  it  was  improbable  that 
Philip  would  submit  to  any  of  their  demands,  yet,  as  it  did 
not  in  the  least  stand  in  the  way  of  such  action  as  they 
chose  to  lake  to  grant  the  favour  demanded  by  the  king,  he 
would  concede  it.  For  not  one  of  the  proposals  actually  made  at 
present  could  be  confirmed  without  the  authority  of  the  Senate ; 
and  besides  the  season  now  coming  on  was  a  favourable  one 
for  ascertaining  its  opinion ;  for,  even  as  things  were,  the 
armies  could  do  nothing  owing  to  the  winter  :  it  was  therefore 
against  no  one's  interests,  but,  on  the  contrary,  very  convenient 
for  them  all,  to  devote  this  time  to  a  reference  to  the  Senate 
on  the  present  state  of  affairs." 

10.  Seeing  that  Flamininus  was  not  averse  to  referring  the 

matter  to  the  Senate,  all  the  others  presently 
'^loTo^'^  consented,  and  voted  to  allow  Philip  to  send 

envoys  to  Rome,  and  that  they  too  should 
severally  send  envoys  of  their  own  to  plead  their  cause  before 
the  Senate,  and  stale  their  grievances  against  Philip. 

The  business  of  the  conference  having  thus  been  concluded 
in  accordance  with  his  views  and  the  opinions  he  had  origin- 
ally expressed,  Flamininus  at  once  set  about  carefully  securing 
his  own  position,  and  preventing  Philip  from  taking  any 
undue  advantage.  For  though  he  granted  him  three  months* 
suspension  of  hostilities,  he  stipulated  that  he  should  complete 
his  embassy  to  Rome  within  that  time,  and  insisted  on  his 
immediately  removing  his  garrisons  from  Phocis  and  Locris. 
He  was  also  very  careful  to  insist  on  behalf  of  the  Roman 
allies,  that  no  act  of  hostility  should  be  committed  against 
them  during  this  period  by  the  Macedonians.  Having  made 
these  terms  in  writing  with  Philip,  he  immediately  took  the 
necessary  steps  himself  to  carry  out  his  own  policy.  First,  he 
sent  Amynandrus  to  Rome  at  once,  knowing  that  he  was  a 
man  of  pliable  character,  and  would  be  easily  persuaded  by 
his  own  friends  in  the  city  to  take  any  course  they  might 
propose ;  and  at  the  same  lime  would  carry  with  him  a  certain 
prestige,  and  rouse  men's  curiosity  and  interest  by  his  title  of 
royalty.  Next  to  him  he  sent  as  personal  envoys  his  wife's 
nephew  Quintus  Fabius,  Quintus  Fulvius,  and  Appius  Claudius 
Nero.     From  the  Aetolians  went  Alexander  Isius,  Damocritus 


XVIII  PLEADINGS  BEFORE  THE  SENATE  an 

of  Calydon,  Dicaearchus  of  Trichonium,  Polemarchus  of 
Arsinoe,  Lamius  of  Ambracia,  Nicomachus  of  Acamania, — 
one  of  those  who  had  fled  from  Thurium  and  settled  in 
Ambracia, — and  Theodgtus  of  Pherae,  an  exile  from  Thessaly 
who  settled  in  Stratus :  from  the  Achaeans  Xenophon  of 
Aegium :  from  King  Attalus  only  Alexander :  and  from  the 
Athenian  people  Cephisodorus  and  his  colleagues. 

11.  Now  these  envoys  arrived  in  Rome  before  the  Senate 
had  settled  the  provinces  of  the  Consuls  ap-  xhg  speeches  of 
pointed  for  this  year,  and  whether  it  would  be  the  Greek  envoys 
necessary  to  send  both  to  Gaul,  or  one  of  them  '^  "■*  Senate, 
against  Philip,  But  the  friends  of  Fiamininus  having  as- 
sured themselves  that  both  Consuls  would  remain  in  Italy 
owing  to  the  threat  of  an  attack  from  the  Celts,  all  the 
ambassadors  appeared  and  bluntly  stated  their  grievances 
against  Philip.  The  bulk  of  their  accusations  was  to  the 
same  effect  as  what  they  had  before  stated  to  the  king  himself; 
but  they  also  endeavoured  carefully  to  instil  this  idea  in  the 
minds  of  the  Senators,  "That  so  long  as  Chalcis,  Corinth,  and 
Demetrias  were  subject  to  Macedonia,  it  was  impossible  for  the 
Greeks  to  think  of  liberty ;  for  Philip  himself  had  spoken  the 
exact  truth  when  he  called  these  places  the  '  fetters  of  Greece.' 
For  neither  could  the  Peloponnese  breathe  while  a  royal  gar- 
rison was  stationed  in  Comith,  nor  the  Locrians,  Boeotians, 
and  Phocians  feel  any  confidence  while  Philip  was  In  occupa- 
tion of  Chalcis  and  the  rest  of  Euboea ;  nor  indeed  could  the 
Thessalians  or  Magnesians  raise  a  spark  of  liberty^  while 
Philip  and  the  Macedonians  held  Demetrias.  That,  therefore, 
Philip's  offer  to  evacuate  the  other  places  was  a  mere  pretence 
in  order  to  escape  the  immediate  danger;  and  that  on  the 
very  first  day  he  chose  he  would  with  ease  reduce  the  Greeks 
again  under  his  power,  if  he  were  in  possession  of  these  places." 
They  accordingly  urged  the  Senate  "either  to  force  Philip  to 
evacuate  the  cities  they  had  named,  or  to  stand  by  the  policy 
they  had  begun,  and  vigorously  prosecute  the  war  against 
him.  For  in  truth  the  most  difficult  part  of  the  war  was 
already  accomplished,  the  Macedonians  having  already  been 
)  represent,  Is  doubtful 


212  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  book 

twice  defeated,  and  most  of  their  resources  on  land  already 
expended" 

They  concluded  by  beseeching  the  Senate  "  not  to  beguile 
the  Greeks  of  their  hopes  of  liberty,  nor  deprive  themselves 
of  the  most  glorious  renown."  Such,  or  nearly  so,  were  the 
arguments  advanced  by  the  Greek  envoys.  Philip's  envoys 
were  prepared  to  make  a  long  speech  in  reply :  but  they  were 
stopped  at  the  threshold.  P  or  being  asked  whether  they  were 
prepared  to  evacuate  Chalcis,  Corinth,  and  Demetrias,  they 
declared  that  they  had  not  any  instructions  as  to  those  towns. 
They  were  accordingly  rebuked  by  the  Senate  and  obliged  to 
discontinue  their  speech. 

12.  The  Senate  then,  as  I  have  said  before,  assigned  Gaul 
B.C.  197  Coss.   *o   \>o\S\   the  consuls   as   their  province,   and 
G.  Cornelius     ordered  that  the  war  against  Philip  should  go 
Caihagiw,  Q.    q^^  assigning  to  Titus  Flamininus  the  entire 
uus.  ^qj^jj.qJ    Qf    Greek     aflfairs.      These    decrees 
having   been   quickly   made   known   in   Greece,    Flamininus 
found  everything  settled  to  his  mind,  partly  no  doubt  by  the 
assistance  of  chance,  but  for  the  most  part  by  his  own  fore- 
sight  in  the   management  of  the  whole  business.      For  he 
was  exceedingly  acute,  if  ever  Roman  was.     The  skill  and 
good  sense  with  which  he   conducted   public  business  and 
private  negotiations  could  not  be  surpassed,  and  yet  he  was 
quite  a  young  man,  not  yet  more  than  thirty,  and  the  first 
Roman  who  had  crossed  to  Greece  with  an  araiy.  ... 

18.  It  has  often  and  in  many  cases  occurred  to  me  to 
Was  Aristaenus  wonder  at  the  mistakes  men  make ;  but  none 
a  traitor  or  a  wise  seems  to  me  SO  surprising  as  that  of  traitors. 
Opportunist?    j  ^jgj^^  therefore,  to  say  a  word  in  season  on 
the  subject     I  know  very  well  that  it  is  one  which  does  not 
admit  of  easy  treatment  or  definition.     For  it  is  not  at  all 
easy  to  say  whom  we  ought  to  regard  as  a  real  traitor.     Plainly 
all  those,  who  at  a  time  of  tranquillity  make  compacts  with 
kings  or  princes,  cannot  be  reckoned  such  off  hand ;  nor,  again, 
those  who  in  the  midst  of  dangers  transfer  their  country  from 
existing  friendships   and    alliances  to  others.      Far  from  it. 
For  such  men  have  again  and  again  been  the  authors  of  mani- 
fold advantages  to  their  own  countries.     But  not  to  go  any 


XTiii  W/SE  PATRIOTS  OR  TRAITORS  t  213 

further  foi  example,  my  meaning  can  be  made  clear  by  the 
circumstances  of  the  present  case.  For,  if  Aristaenus  had  not 
at  this  time  opportunely  caused  the  Achaeans  to  leave  their 
alliance  with  Philip  and  join  that  of  Rome,  it  is  clear  that  the 
whole  league  would  have  been  utterly  ruined.  But  as  it  was, 
this  man  and  this  policy  were  confessedly  the  sources,  not  only 
of  security  to  individual  Achaeans  at  the  time,  but  of  the 
aggrandisement  of  the  whole  league.  Therefore  he  was  not 
looked  upon  as  a  traitor,  but  universally  honoured  as  a  bene- 
factor and  saviour  of  the  country.  The  same  principle  will 
hold  good  in  the  case  of  all  others  who  regulate  their  policy 
and  measures  by  the  necessities  of  the  hour. 

14.  From  this  point  of  view  fault  might  be  found 
with    Demosthenes,    admirable   as   he    is    in  .        , 

,       .      ■  ,,  J    -    J'       Compansoa  of 

many  respects,  for  havmg  rashly  and  mdis- the  pdicy  of  ihe 
criminately  launched  an  exceedingly  bitter  Achaeans  and 
charge  at  the  most  illustrious  Greeks.  For  he  °'^"  Peiopon- 
asserted  that  in  Arcadia,  Cercidas,  Hieronymus,  phiiipv.wiihthat 
and  Eucampidas  were  traitors  to  Greece  for  recommended 
making  an  alliance  with  Philip ;  in  Messene  ''i'  P^pjjj^ 
the  sons  of  Philiades,  Neon  and  Thraylochus ;  '^ 

in  Argos,  Mystis,  Teledamus,  one  Mnaseas ;  in  Thessaly, 
Daochus  and  Cineas ;  in  Boeotia,  Theogeiton  and  Timolas : 
and  many  more  besides  he  has  included  in  the  same  category, 
naming  them  city  by  city ;  and  yet  all  these  men  have  a 
weighty  and  obvious  plea  to  urge  in  defence  of  their  conduct, 
and  above  all  those  of  Arcadia  and  Messene.^  For  it  was  by 
their  bringing  Philip  into  the  Peloponnese,' and  humbling  the 
Lacedaemonians,  that  these  men  in  the  first  place  enabled  atl 
its  inhabitants  to  breathe  again,  and  conceive  the  idea  of 
liberty ;  and  in  the  next  place,  by  recovering  the  territory  and 
cities  which  the  Lacedaemonians  in  the  hour  of  prosperity  had 
taken  from  the  Messenians,  Megalopolitans,  Tegeans,  and 
Argives,  notoriously  raised  the  fortunes  of  their  own  coun- 
tries.'    In  return  for  this  they  were  bound  not  to  make  war 

'  Demosthenes,  de  Corona.  g§  43,  48.  395. 

*  B.C.  338  aRerUio  baltte  of  Chaeranea.  See  Thirlvrall,  6,  77  1  Grote,  11, 
3IS  (ch.  9c)  ;  Kennedy's  translation  o(  ihe  de  Corona,  Appendix  vl,  The 
arsmneat  of  Polytdui  is  of  course  an  ix  foil  facte  one.     It  is  open  still  to 


214  T'^^  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  book 

on  Philip  and  the  Macedonians,  but  to  do  all  they  could  to 
promote  his  reputation  and  honour.  Now,  if  they  had  been 
doing  all  this,  or  if  they  had  admitted  a  garrison  from  Philip 
into  their  native  cities,  or  had  abolished  their  constitutions 
and  deprived  their  fellow-citizens  of  liberty  and  freedom  of 
speech,  for  the  sake  of  their  own  private  advantage  or  power, 
they  would  have  deserved  this  name  of  traitor.  But  if,  while 
carefully  maintaining  their  duty  to  their  countries,  they  yet 
diflfered  in  their  judgment  of  politics,  and  did  not  consider 
that  their  interests  were  the  same  as  those  of  the  Athenians, 
it  is  not,  I  think,  fair  that  they  should  have  been  called  traitors 
on  that  account  by  Demosthenes.  The  man  who  measures 
everything  by  the  interests  of  his  own  particular  state,  and 
imagines  that  all  the  Greeks  ought  to  have  their  eyes  fixed 
upon  Athens,  on  the  pain  of  being  styled  traitors,  seems  to  me 
to  be  ill-informed  and  to  be  labouring  under  a  strange  delu- 
sion, especially  as  the  course  which  events  in  Greece  took  at 
that  time  has  borne  witness  to  the  wisdom,  not  of  Demosthenes, 
but  of  Eucampidas,  Hieronymus,  Cercidas,  and  the  sons  of 
Philiades.  For  what  did  the  Athenians  eventually  get  by  their 
8  opposition  to  Philip?  Why,  the  crowning  dis- 
aster of  the  defeat  at  Chaeronea.  And  had  it  not 
been  for  the  king's  magnanimity  and  regard  for  his  own  repu- 
tation, their  misfortunes  would  have  gone  even  further,  thanks 
to  the  policy  of  Demosthenes.  WTiereas,  owing  to  the  men  I 
have  mentioned,  security  and  relief  from  attacks  of  the  Lace- 
daemonians were  obtained  for  Arcadia  and  Messenia  generally, 
and  many  advantages  accrued  to  their  states  separately. 

1 6.  It  is  not  easy  then  to  define  to  whom  one  may  properly 
Xh  t      It     ^PP^y  ^^^^  name.    The  nearest  approach  to  truth 
is  the  man  who  would  be  to  assign  it  to  those  who  in  times  of 
actswith  personal  public  danger,  either  for  the  sake  of  personal 
objects  or  from  security  or  advantage,  or  to  retaliate  upon  poli- 
tical opponents,  put  their  cities  into  the  hands 
of  the  enemy  :  or  indeed  to  those  who,  by  admitting  a  foreign 
garrison,  and  employing  external  assistance  to  carry  out  private 

maintain  that,  had  the  advice  of  Demosthenes  been  followed,  these  states  might 
have  been  freed  from  the  tyranny  of  Si>arta  without  becoming  subject  to 
another  master  in  the  king  of  Macedonia. 


XTiii  THE  FATE  OF  TRAITORS  215 

aims  and  views,  bring  their  country  under  the  direction  of  a 
superior  power.  All  such  men  as  these  one  might  include  in 
the  category  of  traitors  with  perfect  reasonableness.  Such  men, 
indeed,  gain  neither  profit  nor  honour,  but  the  reverse,  as 
every  one  acknowledges.  And  this  brings  me 
back  to  my  original  observation,  that  it  is  difficult  '^,.^„"*  "^ 
to  understand  with  what  object,  and  supported 
by  what  reasoning,  men  rush  upon  such  a  disastrous  position. 
For  no  one  ever  yet  betrayed  his  cily  or  camp  or  fort  without 
being  detected ;  but  even  if  a  man  here  and  there  managed 
to  conceal  it  at  the  moment  of  his  crime,  yet  all  have  been 
detected  in  the  course  of  time.  Nor  when  known  has  any 
such  ever  had  a  happy  life ;  but,  as  a  rule,  they  meet  with  the 
punishment  they  deserve  from  the  very  persons  in  whose 
favour  they  act.  For,  indeed,  though  generals  and  princes 
constantly  employ  traitors  for  their  own  purposes ;  yet  when 
they  have  got  all  they  can  out  of  them,  they 

treat  them  thenceforth  as  traitors,  as  Demos-    ,-„.„„  .  „ 
,  .1-1.1         Lonma.  %  47. 

thenes  says ;  very  naturally  considering  that 
those,  who  have  put  their  country  and  original  friends  into  the 
hands  of  their  enemies,  are  never  likely  to  be  really  loyal  or 
to  keep  faith  with  themselves.  Nay,  even  though  they  escape 
violence  at  the  hands  of  these,  yet  they  do  not  easily  avoid 
the  vengeance  of  those  whom  they  betrayed.  Or  if,  finally, 
they  manage  to  evade  the  designs  of  both  the  one  and  the 
other,  yet  all  over  the  world  fame  dogs  their  footsteps  with 
vengeance  to  their  lives'  end,  suggesting  to  their  imaginations 
night  and  day  numberless  terrors,  false  and  true ;  helping  and 
hounding  on  all  who  design  any  evil  against  them;  and,  finally, 
refusing  to  allow  them  even  in  sleep  to  forget  their  crimes,  but 
forcing  them  to  dream  of  every  kind  of  plot  and  disaster, 
because  they  are  aware  of  the  universal  loathing  and  hatred 
which  attend  them.  Yet,  though  all  this  is  true,  nobody  who 
wanted  one  was  ever  at  a  loss  for  a  traitor,  except  in  the  rarest 
cases.  From  which  one  might  say  with  some  plausibility  that 
man,  reputed  the  most  cunning  of  animals,  gives  considerable 
grounds  for  being  regarded  as  the  stupidest  For  the  other 
animals,  which  obey  their  bodily  appetites  alone,  can  be 
decdved  by  these  alone ;  while  man,  though  he  has  reason 


2i6  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  BOOK 

to  guide  him,  is  led  into  error  by  the  failure  of  that  reason  no 
less  than  by  his  physical  appetites.  .  .  . 

16.  King  Attalus  had  for  some  time  past  been  held  in 

extraordinary  honour   by  the  Sicyonians,  ever 

^^^^^c'^i?''"'  since  the  time  that  he  ransomed  the  sacred 

land  of  Apollo  for  them  at  the  cost  of  a  large 
sum  of  money ;  in  return  for  which  they  set  up  the  colossal 
statue  of  him,  ten  cubits  high,  near  the  temple  of  Apollo  in 
the  market-place.  But  on  this  occasion,  on  his  presenting 
them  with  ten  talents  and  ten  thousand  medimni  of  wheat, 
their  devotion  to  him  was  immensely  increased;  and  they 
accordingly  voted  him  a  statue  of  gold,  and  passed  a  law  to 
offer  sacrifice  in  his  honour  every  year.  With  these  honours, 
then,  Attalus  departed  to  Cenchreae.^  .  .  . 

17.  The  tyrant  Nabis,  leaving  Timocrates  of  Pellene  at 
The  cruelty  of  Argos, — because  he  trusted  him  more  than  any 
Apcga,  wife  of  one  else  and  employed  him  in  his  most  im- 

Nabis.  portant  undertakings, — returned  to  Sparta :  and 
thence,  after  some  few  days,  despatched  his  wife  with  instruc- 
tions to  go  to  Argos  and  raise  money.  On  her  arrival  she  far 
surpassed  Nabis  himself  in  cruelty.  For  she  summoned  women 
to  her  presence  either  privately  or  in  families,  and  inflicted 
every  kind  of  torture  and  violence  upon  them,  until  she  had 
extorted  from  almost  all  of  them,  not  only  their  gold  ornaments, 
but  also  the  most  valuable  parts  of  their  clothing.  .  .  . 

B.C.  197.  In  a  speech  of  considerable  length  Attalus 

beforefhc^Ssem-  reminded  them  of  the  ancient  valour  of  their 

bled  Boeotians,    ancestors.    .    .    . 
See  Livy,  33,  a. 


THE    END    OF   THE    FIRST    MACEDONIAN    WAR 

18.  Flamininus  being  unable  to  ascertain  where  the  enemy 

B.C.  197,  at  the  were  encamped,  but  yet  being  clearly  informed 

beginning  of     that  they  had  entered  Thessaly,  gave  orders 

spring.         ^Q  ^  jjjg  j^gj^  jQ  ^y^  stakes  to  carry  with  them, 

ready  for  use  at  any  moment.     This  seems  im- 

'  Attalus  spent  the  winter  of  B.c.  198-197  at  Aegina,  in  the  course  of  which 
he  seems  to  have  visited  Sicyon. 


xvm  ROMAN  AND  GREEK  PALISADING  117 

possible  to  Greek  habits,  but  to  those  of  Rome  it  is  easy.  For 
the  Greeks  find  it  difficult  to  hold  even  their  1^^  meihods  of 
sarissae  on  the  march,  and  can  scarcely  bear  forming  palisades 
the  fatigue  of  them;  but  the  Romans  strap  """'"E'''*'^'*''" 
their  shields  to  their  shoulders  with  leathern 
thongs,  and,  having  nothing  but  their  javelins  in  their  hands, 
can  stand  the  additional  burden  of  a  stake.  There  is  also 
a  great  difference  between  the  slakes  employed  by  the  two 
peoples.  The  Greeks  hold  that  the  best  slake  is  that  which 
has  the  largest  and  most  numerous  shoots  growing  round  the 
stem ;  but  the  Roman  stakes  have  only  two  or  three  side  shoots, 
or  at  most  four ;  and  those  are  selected  which  have  these 
shoots  on  one  side  only.  The  result  is  that  their  porterage  is 
very  easy  (for  each  man  carries  three  or  four  packed  together), 
and  they  make  an  exceedingly  secure  palisade  when  put 
into  use.  For  the  Greek  palisading,  when  set  in  the  front  of 
the  camp,  in  the  first  place  can  easily  be  pulled  down;  for 
since  the  part  that  is  firm  and  tightly  fixed  in  the  ground  IS 
single,  while  the  projecting  arms  of  it  are  many  and  large,  two 
or  three  men  can  get  hold  of  the  same  stake  by  its  projecting 
arms,  and  easily  pull  it  up ;  and  directly  that  is  done,  its 
breadth  is  so  great  that  a  regular  gateway  is  made ;  and  because 
in  such  a  palisade  the  stakes  are  not  closely  interlaced  or 
interwoven  with  each  other,  when  one  is  pulled  up  the  part 
next  to  it  is  made  insecure.  With  the  Romans  it  is  quite 
different.  For  as  soon  as  they  fix  their  stakes,  they  interlace 
them  in  such  a  manner  that  it  is  not  easy  to  know  to  which  of 
the  stems  fixed  in  the  ground  the  branches  belong  nor  on 
which  of  these  branches  the  smaller  shoots  are  growing. 
Moreover,  it  is  impossible  to  insert  the  hand  and  grasp  them, 
owing  to  the  closeness  of  the  interlacing  of  the  branches  and 
the  way  they  lie  one  upon  another,  and  because  the  main 
branches  are  also  carefully  cut  so  as  to  have  sharp  ends.  Nor, 
if  one  is  got  hold  of,  is  it  easy  to  pull  up  :  because,  in  the  first 
place,  all  the  stakes  are  sufficiently  tightly  secured  in  the 
ground  to  be  self-supporting;  and,  in  the  second  place,  because 
the  man  who  pulls  away  one  branch  must,  owing  to  the  close 
interlacing,  be  able  to  move  several  others  in  its  train  ;  and  it  is 
quite  unlikely  that  two  or  three  men  should  happen  to  get  hold 


2i8  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  book 

of  the  same  stake.  But  even  if,  by  the  exertion  of  enormous 
force,  a  man  has  succeeded  in  pulling  one  or  another  up,  the 
gap  is  scarcely  perceptible.  Considering,  therefore,  the  vast 
superiority  of  this  method,  both  in  the  readiness  with  which 
such  stakes  are  found,  the  ease  with  which  they  are  carried, 
and  the  security  and  durability  of  the  palisade  made  with 
them,  it  is  plain,  in  my  opinion,  that  if  any  military  operation 
of  the  Romans  deserves  to  be  admired  and  imitated,  it  is  this. 
19.  After  providing  for  contingencies  by  these  preparations, 
Flamininus  advanced  with  his  whole  force  at  a  moderate  pace, 
and,  having  arrived  at  about  fifty  stades  from  Pherae,  pitched 
Flamininus  ^  camp  there;  and  next  morning,  just  before 
marches  to  Pherae  the  moming  watch,  sent  out  some  reconnoitring 

in  Thessaiy.  parties  to  see  whether  they  could  get  any  oppor- 
tunity of  discovering  the  position  and  movements  of  the 
enemy.     Philip,  at  the  same  time,  being  informed  that  the 

Romans  were  encamped  near  Thebes,  started 

'^"'udeT^*'''''  with  his  whole  force  from  Larisa  in  the  direc- 
tion  of  Pherae.  When  about  thirty  stades  from 
that  town,  he  pitched  his  camp  there,  and  gave  orders  for  all 
his  men  to  make  their  preparations  early  next  morning,  and 
about  the  moming  watch  got  his  troops  on  the  march.  The 
division  whose  usual  duty  it  was  to  form  the  advance  guard  he 
sent  forward  first,  with  instructions  to  cross  the  heights  above 
Pherae,  while  he  personally  superintended  the  main  army's 
advance  from  the  camp  as  the  day  was  breaking.  The 
advanced  guards  of  the  two  armies  were  within  a  very  little  of 

The  advanced  Coming  into  collision  in  the  pass ;  for  the  dark- 
guards  of  the  two  ness  prevented  their  seeing  each  other  until  they 

armies  meet,  ^g^g  quite  a  short  distance  apart  Both  sides 
halted,  and  sent  speedy  intelligence  to  their  respective  leaders 
of  what  had  happened,  and  asking  for  instructions.  .  .  . 

[The  generals  decided]  to  remain  in  their  intrenchments, 
and  recall  these  advanced  guards.  Next  morning  both  sent 
out  about  three  hundred  cavalry  and  light  infantry  to  recon- 
noitre, among  which  Flamininus  also  sent  two  squadrons  of 
Aetolians,  because  they  were  acquainted  with  the  country. 
These  opposing  reconnoitring  parties  fell  in  with  each  other 
on  the  road  between  Pherae  and  Larisa,  and  joined  battle 


XVIII    FLAMimNVS  &■  PHILIP  NBARING  EACH  OTHER    J19 

with  great  fuiy.  The  men  under  Eupolemus  the  Aetolian 
fighting  gallantly,  and  urging  the  Italian  troops  to  do  the 
same,  the  Macedonians  were  repulsed;  and,  after  skirmish- 
ing for  a  long  while,  both  parties  retired  to  their  respective 
camps. 

20.  Dissatisfied  with  the  country  near  Pherae,  as  being 
thickly  wooded  and  full  of  walls  and  gardens,  Auiumnof 
both  parties  broke  up  their  camps  next  day.  b.c  197. 
Philip  directed  his  march  towards  Scotusa,  be-  ''°^!''l'P  °"*^ 
cause  he  desired  to  supply  himself  with  pro-  advance  towards 
visions  from  that  town,  and  thus,  with  all  his  Scotusa,  on 
preparations  complete,  to  find  a  district  more  opposite  sides  of 
suitable  to  his  army:  while  Flamininus,  ^""B*" 
divining  his  intention,  got  his  army  on  the  march  at  the 
same  time  as  Philip,  in  great  haste  to  anticipate  him  in 
securing  the  corn  in  the  territory  of  Scotusa.  A  range 
of  hills  intervening  between  their  two  lines  of  march,  the 
Romans  could  not  see  in  what  direction  the  Macedonians  were 
marching,  nor  the  Macedonians  the  Romans.  Both  armies, 
however,  continued  their  march  during  this  day,  Flamininus  to 
Eretria  in  Phthiotis,  and  Philip  to  the  river  Onchestus ;  and 
there  they  respectively  pitched  their  camps.  Next  day  they 
advanced  again,  and  again  encamped :  Philip  at  Melambium 
in  the  territory  of  Scotusa,  and  Flamininus  at  the  temple  of 
Thetis  in  that  of  Pharsalus,  being  still  ignorant  of  each  other's 
whereabouts.  A  violent  stonn  of  rain  and  thunder  coming 
on  next  day,  the  whole  atmosphere  descended  from  the  clouds 
to  the  earth  about  the  time  of  the  morning  watch,  so  that  the 
darkness  was  too  dense  to  see  even  those  who  were  quite 
close.  In  spite  of  this,  Philip  was  so  eager  to  accomplish  his 
object,  that  he  started  with  his  whole  army ;  but  finding  him- 
self much  embarrassed  on  the  march  by  the  mist,  after  accom- 
plishing a  very  small  distance  he  again  encamped  ;  but  he  sent 
his  reserve  back,  with  instructions  to  halt  upon  the  summit  of 
the  intervening  hills.' 

21.  Flamininus,  in  his  camp  near  the  temple  of  Thetis, 

I  Thai  is  of  Cynoscephalae.  Supergrnsi  tttaittlos  qui  Cyiuattfhalat 
vocaiUur,  nlicia  iH  stationi  firma  ptdilum  equitumqur.  pemerunt  cattra. 
Uvjr,  33.  7- 


220  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  book 

Another  skirmish  being  Uncertain  as  to  the  position  of  the  enemy, 
between  detached  sent  out  ten  troops  of  cavalry  and  a  thousand 
parties.  M^i  infantry  in  advance,  with  instructions  to 
keep  a  careful  look-out  as  they  traversed  the  country.  As 
these  men  were  approaching  the  ridge  of  the  hills  they  came 
upon  the  Macedonian  reserve  without  expecting  it,  owing  to 
the  dimness  of  the  light  After  a  short  interval  of  mutual 
alarm,  both  sides  began  irregular  attacks  on  each  other,  and 
both  despatched  messengers  to  their  respective  chiefs  to  give 
information  of  what  had  occurred;  and  when  the  Romans 
began  to  get  the  worst  of  it  in  the  encounter,  and  to  suffer 
heavily  at  the  hands  of  the  Macedonian  reserve,  they  sent  to 
their  camp  begging  for  supports.  Flamininus  accordingly 
despatched  the  Aetolians  under  Archedamus  and  Eupolemus, 
as  well  as  two  of  his  own  tribunes,  with  a  force  altogether  of 
five  hundred  cavalry  and  two  thousand  infantry,  after  properly 
exhorting  them  to  do  their  duty.  On  their  arrival  to  the 
support  of  the  skirmishing  party  already  engaged,  the  aspect  of 
affairs  was  promptly  changed.  For  the  Romans,  inspired  by 
the  hope  which  this  reinforcement  gave,  renewed  the  contest 
with  redoubled  spirit ;  while  the  Macedonians,  though  offering 
a  gallant  defence,  were  now  in  their  turn  hard  pressed,  and 
being  forced  to  make  a  general  retreat,  retired  to  the  highest 
points  in  the  hills,  and  despatched  messengers  to  the  king  for 
help. 

22.  But  Philip,  who  had  not  expected,  for  reasons  indi- 
cated above,  that  a  general  engagement  would 
suppoS^^     take  place  on  that  day,  happened  to  have  sent 
a  considerable  part  of  his  troops  out  of  camp 
foraging.     But  when  informed  of  what  was  taking  place  by 
these  messengers,  the  mist  at  the  same  time  beginning  to  lift, 
he  despatched,  with  due  exhortation,  Heracleides  of  Gyrton, 
the  commander  of  his  Thessalian  cavalry ;  Leon,  the  general 
of  his  Macedonian  horse ;  and  Athenagoras,  with  all  the  mer- 
cenaries except  those  from  Thrace.     The  reserve  being  joined 
by  these  troops,  and  the  Macedonian  force  having  thus  become 
a  formidable  one,  they  advanced  against  the  enemy,  and  in 
their  turn  drove  the  Romans  back  from  the  heights.     But  what 
prevented  them,  more  than  anything  else,  from  entirely  routing 


XVIII        SKIRAflSHES  BEFORE  THE  MAIN  BATTLE         321 

the  enemy  was  the  gallantry  of  the  Aetolian  cavaliy,  which 
fought  wilh  desperate  fury  and  reckless  valour. 
For  the  Aetolians  are  as  superior  to  the  rest  of  Aeioli*^  Lvaliy. 
the  Greeks  in  cavalry  for  fighting  in  skirmishing 
order,  troop  to  troop,  or  man  to  man,  as  they  are  inferior 
to  them  both  in  the  arms  and  tactics  of  their  infantry  for  the 
purpose  of  a  general  engagement  The  enemy  being  held  in 
check  therefore  by  these  troops,  the  Romans  were  not  forced 
back  again  quite  on  to  the  level  ground,  but,  after  retiring  to  a 
short  distance,  faced  round  and  halted.  But  Cynascephalae. 
when  Flamininus  saw  that  not  only  had  the  FiHminmus  offen 
cavalry  and  light  infantry  retire '  ' 
owing  to  them,  his  whole  force  v 
uneasy,  he  drew  out  his  entire  army  a 
them  into  order  of  battle  close  to  the  hills.  Meanwhile  one 
man  after  another  of  the  Macedonian  reserve  ran  towards 
Philip  shouting  out,  "  King,  the  enemy  are  flying :  do  not  let 
slip  the  opportunity.  The  barbarians  cannot  stand  before  us : 
now  is  the  day  for  you  to  strike :  now  is  your  opportunity ! " 
The  result  was  that  he  was  induced  to  fight  in  spite  of  his  dis- 
satisfaction with  the  ground.  For  these  hills,  which  are 
called  Cynoscephalae,  are  rough,  precipitous,  and  of  con- 
siderable height ;  and  it  was  because  he  foresaw  the  disadvan- 
tages of  such  a  ground,  that  he  was  originally  disinclined  to 
accept  battle  there;  but,  being  excited  now  by  the  extrava- 
gantly sanguine  reports  of  these  messengers,  he  gave  the  order 
for  his  army  to  be  drawn  out  of  camp. 

23.   Having  got  his  main  body  into  order,  Flamininus  gave 
his  attention  at  the  same  time  to  relieving  his      Flaroininus 
advanced  guard,  and  to  going  along  the  ranks  addresses  his  men, 
to   encourage  his  men.     His  exhortation  was     and  advance 
short,  but  cleat  and  intelligible  to  the  hearers  : 
for,  pointing  to  the  enemy  with  his  hand,  he  said  to  his  sol- 
diers :  "  Are  not  these  the  Macedonians,  my  men,  whom,  when 
occupying  in  their  own  country  the  pass  to  Eordaea,  you  routed 
in  open  battle,  under  the  command  of  Sulpicius,  and  drove  to 
take  refuge  on  the  hills  with  the  loss  of  many  of  their  com- 
rades?   Are  not  these  the  Macedonians  whom,  when  defended 
by  what  seemed  an  impassable  country  in  Epirus,  you  dis- 


222  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  BOOK 

lodged  by  sheer  valour,  and  forced  to  throw  away  their  shields 
and  fly  right  into  Macedonia  ?  Why  then  should  you  feel  any 
hesitation  when  you  are  to  fight  the  same  men  on  equal 
ground  ?  Why  look  anxiously  to  the  past,  rather  than  let  that 
past  minister  courage  to  you  for  the  present  ?  Therefore,  my 
men,  rouse  each  other  by  mutual  exhortations,  and  hasten  in 
your  might  to  the  struggle  !  For,  with  God's  will,  I  am  per- 
suaded that  this  battle  will  quickly  have  the  same  issue  as  the 
contests  in  the  past'*  With  these  words  he  ordered  his  right 
wing  to  remain  where  they  were,  and  the  elephants  in  front  of 
The  advanced  them;  while  with  his  left,  supported  by  the 
guard  are  light  infantry,  he  advanced  in  gallant  style  to 
encouraged,  attack  the  enemy.  And  the  Roman  troops 
already  on  the  field,  finding  themselves  thus  reinforced  by 
the  legions  on  their  rear,  once  more  faced  round  and  charged 
their  opponents. 

24.  Meanwhile,  when  he  had  seen  the  main  part  of  his 

Philip  ako      army  in  position  outside  the  camp,  Philip  him- 

advances  and    self  advanced  with  his  peltasts  and  the  right 

occupies  the  hills,  ^jj^g  ^f  j^jg  phalanx,  commencing  the  ascent  of 

the  hills  with  great  rapidity,  and  having  left  instructions  with 
Nicanor,  surnamed  the  Elephant,  to  see  that  the  rest  of  the 
army  followed  at  once.  As  soon  as  his  first  files  reached  the 
summit,  he  deployed  his  men  into  line  by  the  left,  and  occupied 
the  range  of  high  ground  :  for  the  Macedonians  who  had 
been  sent  in  advance  had  forced  the  Romans  a  considerable 
distance  down  the  other  side  of  the  hills,  and  therefore  he 
found  the  ridges  unoccupied  by  the  enemy.  But  while  he 
was  still  engaged  in  getting  the  right  wing  of  his  army  into  line, 
his  mercenaries  came  on  the  ground,  having  been  decisively 
repulsed  by  the  enemy.  For  when  the  Roman  light  infantry 
found  themselves  supported  by  the  heavy,  as  I  said  just  now, 
with  their  assistance,  which  they  regarded  as  turning  the  scale 
in  their  favour,  they  made  a  furious  charge  on  the  enemy,  and 
killed  a  large  number  of  them.     When  the  king  first  came  on 

the  ground,  and  saw  that  the  fighting  between 

^I^^def^t^!^  ^^^  ^*g^'  ^^"^^^  w^  g^i"g  o*^  "^^  t^e  enemy's 

camp,   he  was  delighted:   but  when,   on  the 

other  hand,  he  saw  his  own  men  giving  ground  and  requiring 


XVIII  THE  BATTLE  OF  CYNOSCEPHALAE  1*3 

support,  he  was  compelled  to  give  it,  and  allow  the  necessities 
of  the  moment  to  decide  the  fortunes  of  the  whole  day,  in 
spite  of  the  fact  that  the  greater  part  of  his  phalanx  was  still 
on  the  march  and  engaged  in  mounting  the  hills.  Receiving 
therefore  the  men  who  had  been  already  engaged,  he  massed 
them  all  upon  his  right  wing,  both  infantry  and  cavalry; 
while  he  ordered  the  peltasts  and  heavy  armed  to  double  their 
depth  and  close  up  to  the  right  By  the  time  this  was  effected 
the  enemy  were  close  at  hand  ;  and,  accordingly,  the  word  was 
given  to  the  phalanx  to  lower  spears  and  charge  ;  to  the  l^hl 
infantry  to  cover  their  flank.  At  the  same  time  Flamininus 
also,  having  received  his  advanced  party  into  the  intervals  be- 
tween his  maniples,  charged  the  enemy. 

26.  The  charge  was  made  with  great  violence  and  loud 
shouting  on  both  sides :   for  both  advancing     .^^^ .     . 
parties  raised  their  war  cry,  while  those  who 
were  not   actually  engaged  shouted  encouragement  to  those 
that  were ;  and  the  result  was  a  scene  of  the  wildest  excite- 
ment, terrible  in  the  last  degree.     Philip's  right  pbiup's  right  wing 
wing  came  off  brilliantly  in  the  encounter,  for      repulse  the 
they  were  charging  down  hill  and  were  superior     "0"™°  Icf- 
in  weight,  and  their  arms  were  far  more  suited  for  the  actual 
conditions  of  the  struggle ;  but  as  for  the  rest  of  the  army,  that 
part  of  it  which  was  in  the  rear  of  the  actual  tighters  did  not  get 
into  contact  with  the  enemy;  while  the  left  wing,  which  had 
but  just  made  the  ascent,  was  only  beginning  to  show  on  the 
ridge.      Seeing  that  his  men  were  unable  to  stand  the  charge 
of  the  phalanx,  and  that  his  left  wing  was  losing  ground,  some 
having  already   fallen  and   the  rest   slowly  retiring,  but  that 
hopes  of  saving  himself  still  remained  on  the  successful  advance 
right,  Flamininus  hastily  transferred  himself  to    ofthf  Roman 
the  latter  wing;  and  when  he  perceived  that         '"'s'"' 
the  enemy's  force  was  not  well  together — part  being  in  contact 
with  the  actual  fighters,  part  just  in  the  act  of  mounting  the 
ridge,  and  part  halting  on  it  and  not  yet  beginning  to  descend,* — 
'  I  have  given  the  meaning  which  I  concdi'e  this  sentence  to  have  ;  but  the 
editors  generally  suspect   the  loss  of  a  word  lilte  drjMrra  or  dTpaYOJrfm 
after  rk  pit  vvnyji  roit  Jia')'Ui-tfD^4^r<Ni.     This  is  unnecessary  if  we  regard 
o-tnx^  "  predicative,  and  I  think  this  way  of  taking  it  gives  sufficient  sense. 
PolyUu  ii  thinking  of  the  Macedonian  army  as  being  so  dislocated  by  the 


224  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  book 

keeping  the  elephants  in  front  he  led  the  maniples  of  his  right 
against  the  enemy.  The  Macedonians  having  no  one  to  give 
them  orders,  and  unable  to  form  a  proper  phalanx,  owing  to 
the  inequalities  of  the  ground  and  to  the  fact  that,  being 
engaged  in  trying  to  come  up  with  the  actual  combatants,  they 
were  still  in  column  of  march,  did  not  even  wait  for  the  Romans 
to  come  to  close  quarters :  but,  thrown  into  confusion  by  the 
mere  charge  of  the  elephants,  their  ranks  were  disordered  and 
they  broke  into  flight 

26.  The  main  body  of  the  Roman   right   followed   and 

The  Macedonian  slaughtered  the  flying  Macedonians,     But  one 

phalanx       of  the  tribunes,  with  about  twenty  maniples, 

outflanked,  having  made  up  his  mind  on  his  own  account 
what  ought  to  be  done  next,  contributed  by  his  action  very 
greatly  to  the  general  victory.  He  saw  that  the  division 
which  was  personally  commanded  by  Philip  was  much  farther 
forward  than  the  rest  of  the  enemy,  and  was  pressing  hard 
upon  the  Roman  left  by  its  superior  weight ;  he  therefore  left 
the  right,  which  was  by  this  time  clearly  victorious,  and  direct- 
ing his  march  towards  the  part  of  the  field  where  a  struggle 
was  still  going  on,  he  managed  to  get  behind  the  Macedonians 
and  charge  them  on  the  rear.  The  nature  of  the  phalanx  is 
such  that  the  men  cannot  face  round  singly  and  defend  them- 
selves :  this  tribune,  therefore,  charged  them  and  killed  all  he 
could  get  at;  until,  being  unable  to  defend  themselves,  they 
were  forced  to  throw  down  their  shields  and  fly ;  whereupon 
the  Romans  in  their  front,  who  had  begun  to  yield,  faced  round 
again  and  charged  them  too.  At  first,  as  I  have  said,  Philip, 
judging  from  the  success  of  his  own  division,  felt  certain  of  a 
complete  victory ;  but  when  he  saw  his  Macedonians  all  on  a 
sudden  throwing  away  their  shields,  and  the  enemy  close  upon 

their  rear,  he  withdrew  with  a  small  body  of  foot 
.^,^^i'"^^^fl•oc  and  horse  a  short  distance  from  the  field  and 

the  field  and  flies.  /.    i         ,     ,     i       , 

took  a  general  survey  of  the  whole  battle :  and 
when  he  observed  that  the  Romans  in  their  pursuit  of  his  left 
wing  were  already  approaching  the  tops  of  the  hills,  he  rallied  as 
many  Thracians  and  Macedonians  as  he  could  at  the  moment, 

nature  of  the  ground,  that,  while  some  parts  were  in  contact  with  the  enemy, 
the  rest  had  not  arrived  on  the  scene  of  the  fighting. 


XViii  PHILIP'S  DEFEAT  AND  FLIGHT  aas 

and  Red.  As  Flamininus  w^  pursuing  the  fugitives  he  came 
upon  the  lines  of  the  Macedonian  \^i,  just  as  they  were  scaling 
the  ridge  in  their  attempt  to  cross  the  hills,  and  at  first  halted 
in  some  surprise  because  the  enemy  held  their  spears  straight 
up,  as  is  the  custom  of  the  Macedonians  when  surrendering 
themselves  or  intending  to  pass  over  to  the  enemy.  Presently, 
having  had  the  reason  of  this  movement  explained  to  him,  he 
held  his  men  back,  thinking  it  best  to  spare  the  lives  of  those 
whom  fear  had  induced  to  surrender.  But  whilst  he  was  still 
reflecting  on  this  matter,  some  of  the  advanced  guard  rushed 
upon  these  men  from  some  higher  ground  and  put  most  of 
them  to  the  sword,  whiie  the  few  survivors  threw  away  their 
shields  and  escaped  by  fiight, 

27.  The  battle  was  now  at  an  end  in  every  part  of  the 
field ;  the  Romans  everywhere  victorious ;  and  Philip  in  full 
retreat  towards  Tempe.  The  first  night  he 
passed  at  what  is  called  Alexander's  tower ;  the  Tramt"  "* 
next  day  he  got  as  far  as  Gonni,  on  the  pass 
into  Tempe,  and  there  remained,  with  a  view  of  collecting  the 
survivors  of  the  battle. 

fiut  the  Romans,  after  following  the  fiigitives  for  a  certain 
distance,  returned  ;  and  some  employed  themselves  in  stripping 

the    dead;    others   in  collectine  the  captives  ;,„  _ 

,  .,  """f     ;.,        .,,,       i*^,,   'The  Romans  soon 
while  the  majonty  hurried  to  the  plunder  of  the  abandon  pursuit 
enemy's  camp.     But  there  they  found  that  the  and  devote  them- 
Aetolians  had  been  beforehand  with  them ;  and     "'^^  V"  ""^ 
thinking,  therefore,  that  they  were  deprived  of 
their  fair  share  of  the  booty,  they  began  grumbling  at  the 
Aetolians  and  protesting  to  their  general  that  "  he  imposed  the 
dangers  upon  them,  but  yielded  the  spoil  to  others."     For  the 
present,  however,  they  returned  to  their  own  camp,  and  passed 
the  night  in  their  old  quarters :  but  next  morning  they  em- 
ployed themselves  in  collecting  the  prisoners  and  the  remainder 
of  the  spoils,  and  then  started  on  the  march  towards  Larisa. 
In  the  battle  the  Romans  lost  seven  hundred 
men ;  the  Macedonians  eight  thousand  killed,      both^de^" 
and  not  less  than  five  thousand  taken  prisoners. 

Such  was  the  result  of  the  battle  at  Cynoscephalae   in 
Thessaly  between  the  Romans  and  Philip. 

VOL.  II  Q 


226  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  BOOK 

28.  In  my  sixth  book  I  made  a  promise,  still  unfulfilled,  of 
taking  a  fitting  opportunity  of  drawing  a  comparison  between 
the  arms  of  the  Romans  and  Macedonians,  and  their  re- 
spective system  of  tactics,  and  pointing  out  how  they  differ 
for  better  or  worse  from  each  other.  I  will  now  endeavour  by 
a  reference  to  actual  facts  to  fulfil  that  promise.  For  since  in 
former  times  the  Macedonian  tactics  proved  themselves  by 
experience  capable  of  conquering  those  of  Asia  and  Greece ; 
while  the  Roman  tactics  sufficed  to  conquer  the  nations  of 
Africa  and  all  those  of  Western  Europe ;  and  since  in  our 
own  day  there  have  been  numerous  opportunities  of  com- 
paring the  men  as  well  as  their  tactics, — it  will  be,  I  think,  a 
useful  and  worthy  task  to  investigate  their  differences,  and  dis- 
cover why  it  is  that  the  Romans  conquer  and  carry  off  the 
palm  from  their  enemies  in  the  operations  of  war :  that  we  may 
not  put  it  all  down  to  Fortune,  and  congratulate  them  on  their 
good  luck,  as  the  thoughtless  of  mankind  do;  but,  from  a 
knowledge  of  the  true  causes,  may  give  their  leaders  the  tribute 
of  praise  and  admiration  which  they  deserve. 

Now  as  to  the  battles  which  the  Romans  fought  with  Hanni- 
bal, and  the  defeats  which  they  sustained  in  them,  I  need  say  no 
The  Roman  de-  niore.     It  was  not  Owing  to  their  anus  or  their 
feats  in  the  Punic  tactics,  but  to  the  skill  and  genius  of  Hannibal 

'fr^^nfcrkT/  ^^^^  ^^^  "^^^  ^^^^  ^^°^^  defeats :  and  that  I  made 
tactics,  but  owing  quite  clear  in  my  account  of  the  battles  them- 

to  the  genius  of  selves.  And  my  contention  is  supported  by 
Hannibal.  ^^^  facts.  First,  by  the  conclusion  of  the  war : 
for  as  soon  as  the  Romans  got  a  general  of  ability  compar- 
able with  that  of  Hannibal,  victory  was  not  long  in  following 
their  banners.  Secondly,  Hannibal  himself,  being  dissatisfied 
with  the  original  arms  of  his  men,  and  having  immediately  after 
his  first  victory  furnished  his  troops  with  the  arms  of  the 
Romans,  continued  to  employ  them  thenceforth  to  the  end.^ 
Pyrrhus,  again,  availed  himself  not  only  of  the  arms,  but  also 
of  the  troops  of  Italy,  placing  a  maniple  of  Italians  and  a 
company  of  his  own  phalanx  alternately,  in  his  battles  against 
the  Romans.  Yet  even  this  did  not  enable  him  to  win ;  the 
battles  were  somehow  or  another  always  indecisive. 

*  See  3,  87. 


xviti  THE  MACEDONIAN  PHALANX  tXJ 

It  was  necessary  to  speak  first  on  these  points,  to  anticipate 
any  instances  which  might  seem  to  make  against  my  theory. 
1  will  now  return  to  my  comparison. 

29.  Many  considerations  may  easily  convince  us  that,  if 
only  the  phalanx  has  its  proper  foimation  and  strength,  nothing 
can  resist  it  face  to  face  or  withstand  its  charge.  For  as  a  mas 
in  close  order  of  battle  occupies  a  space  of  three  feet ;  and  as 
the  length  of  the  sarlssae  is  sixteen  cubits  according  to  the 
original  design,  which  has  been  reduced  in  practice  to  fourteen ; 
and  as  of  these  fourteen  four  must  be  deducted,  to  allow  for 
the  distance  between  the  two  hands  holding  it,  and  to  balance 
the  weight  in  front;  it  follows  clearly  that  each  hopIitewiU  have 
ten  cubits  of  his  sarissa  projecting  beyond  his  body,  when  he 
lowers  it  with  both  hands,  as  he  advances  against  the  enemy : 
hence,  too,  though  the  men  of  the  second,  third,  and  fourth 
rank  will  have  their  sarissac  projecting  farther  beyond  the  front 
rank  than  the  men  of  the  fifth,  yet  even  these  last  will  have  two 
cubits  of  their  sarissae  beyond  the  front  rank ;  if  only  the 
phalanx  is  properly  formed  and  the  men  close  up  properly  both 
flank  and  rear,  like  the  description  in  Homer' — 

"  So  buckler  pre&sed  on  buckler  ;  helm  on  helm  ; 
And  man  on  man:  and  waving  hoise-hair  plumes 
In  polished  head-piece  mingled,  as  Ihey  swayed 
In  order  :  b  such  serried  rank  they  stood." 

And  if  my  description  is  true  and  exact,  it  is  clear  that  in  front 
of  each  man  of  the  front  rank  there  will  be  five  sarissae  projecting 
to  distances  varying  by  a  descending  scale  of  two  cubits. 

SO.  With  this  point  in  our  minds,  it  will  not  be  difficult  to 
imagine  what  the  appearance  and  strength  of  the  whole  phalanx 
is  hkely  to  be,  when,  with  lowered  sarissae,  it  advances  to  the 
charge  sixteen  deep.  Of  these  sixteen  ranks,  all  above  the  fifth 
are  unable  to  reach  with  their  sarissae  far  enough  to  take  actual 
part  in  the  lighting.  They,  therefore,  do  not  lower  them,  but 
hold  them  with  the  points  inclined  upwards  over  the  shouldeis 
of  the  ranks  in  front  of  thera,  to  shield  the  heads  of  the  whole 
phalanx ;  for  the  sarissae  are  so  closely  serried,  that  they  repel 
missiles  which  have  carried  over  the  front  ranks  and  might  fall 
upon  the  heads  of  those  in  the  rear.      These  rear  ranks,  how- 

'  Iliad,  13,  131. 


228  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  BOOK 

ever,  during  an  advance,  press  forward  those  in  front  by  the 
weight  of  their  bodies ;  and  thus  make  the  chaige  very  fordblei 
and  at  the  same  time  render  it  impossible  for  the  front  ranks 
to  face  about 

Such  is  the   arrangement,    general   and  detailed,  of  the 

The  Roman  more  phalanx.     It  remains  now  to  compare  with  it 

open  order  com-  the  peculiarities  and  distinctive  features  of  the 

^^^ai^*^^*^  Roman  arms  and  tactics.  Now,  a  Roman 
^  *'  soldier  in  full  armour  also  requires  a  space  of 
three  square  feet  But  as  their  method  of  fighting  admits  of 
individual  motion  for  each  man — because  he  defends  his  body 
with  a  shield,  which  he  moves  about  to  any  point  from  which 
a  blow  is  coming,  and  because  he  uses  his  sword  both  for 
cutting  and  stabbing, — it  is  evident  that  each  man  must  have 
a  clear  space,  and  an  interval  of  at  least  three  feet  both  on 
flank  and  rear,  if  he  is  to  do  his  duty  with  any  effect  The 
result  of  this  will  be  that  each  Roman  soldier  will  face  two  of 
the  front  rank  of  a  phalanx,  so  that  he  has  to  encounter  and 
fight  against  ten  spears,  which  one  man  cannot  find  time  even 
to  cut  away,  when  once  the  two  lines  are  engaged,  nor  force 
his  way  through  easily — seeing  that  the  Roman  front  ranks  are 
not  supported  by  the  rear  ranks,  either  by  way  of  adding  weight 
to  their  charge,  or  vigour  to  the  use  of  their  swords.  Therefore 
it  may  readily  be  understood  that,  as  I  said  before,  it  is  im- 
possible to  confront  a  charge  of  the  phalanx,  so  long  as  it 
retains  its  proper  formation  and  strength. 

81.  Why  is  it  then  that  the  Romans  conquer  ?     And  what  is 

it  that  brings  disaster  on  those  who  employ  the 
"^^^  V^lj;^^"^  phalanx  ?     Why,  just  because  war  is  full  of  un- 

certainties  both  as  to  time  and  place ;  whereas 
there  is  but  one  time  and  one  kind  of  ground  in  which  a 
phalanx  can  fully  work.  If,  then,  there  were  anything  to  com- 
pel the  enemy  to  accommodate  himself  to  the  time  and  place 
of  the  phalanx,  when  about  to  fight  a  general  engagement,  it 
would  be  but  natural  to  expect  that  those  who  employed  the 
phalanx  would  always  carry  off  the  victory.  But  if  the  enemy 
finds  it  possible,  and  even  easy,  to  avoid  its  attack,  what 
becomes  of  its  formidable  character?  Again,  no  one  denies 
that  for  its  employment  it  is  indispensable  to  have  a  country 


xviil  CUMBROUS  NATURE  OF  THE  PHALANX  329 

flat,  bare,  and  without  such  impediments  as  ditches,  cavities, 
depressions,  steep  banks,  or  beds  of  rivers :  foi  all  such 
ol^tacles  are  sufficient  to  hinder  and  dislocate  this  particular 
formation.  And  that  it  is,  I  may  say,  impossible,  or  at  any  rate 
exceedingly  rare  to  find  a  piece  of  country  of  twenty  stades,  or 
sometimes  of  even  greater  extent,  without  any  such  obstacles, 
every  one  will  also  admit  However,  let  us  suppose  that  such 
a  district  has  been  found.  If  Che  enemy  decline  to  coroe 
down  into  it,  but  traverse  the  country  sacking  the  towns  and 
territories  of  the  allies,  what  use  will  the  phalanx  be  ?  For  if 
it  remains  on  the  ground  suited  to  itself,  it  will  not  only  fait 
to  benefit  its  friends,  but  wiil  be  incapable  even  of  preserving 
itself;  for  the  carriage  of  provisions  will  be  easily  stopped  by 
the  enemy,  seeing  that  they  are  in  undisputed  possession  of 
the  country  :  while  if  it  quits  its  proper  ground,  from  the  wish 
to  strike  a  blow,  it  will  be  an  easy  prey  to  the  enemy.  Nay, 
if  a  general  does  descend  into  the  plain,  and  yet  does  not  risk 
his  whole  army  upon  one  charge  of  the  phalanx  or  upon 
.  one  chance,  but  manoeuvres  for  a  time  to  avoid  coming  to 
close  quarters  tn  the  engagement,  it  is  easy  to  learn  what  will 
be  the  result  from  what  the  Romans  are  now  actually  doing. 

S2.  For  no  speculation  is  any  longer  required  to  test  the 
accuracy  of  what  I  am  now  saying :  that  can  be  done  by  re- 
ferring to  accomplished  facts. 

The  Romans  do  not,  then,  attempt  to  extend  their  front  to 
equal  that, of  a  phalanx,  and  thep  charge  directly  upon  it  with 
their  whole  force :  but  some  of  their  divisions  are  kept  in  re- 
serve, while  others  join  battle  with  the  enemy  at  close  quarters. 
Now,  whether  the  phalanx  in  its  charge  drives  its  opponents 
from  their  ground,  or  is  itself  driven  back,  in  either  case  its 
peculiar  order  is  dislocated;  for  whether  in  following  the 
retiring,  or  flying  from  the  advancing  enemy,  they  quit  the 
rest  of  their  forces :  and  when  this  takes  place,  the  enemy's 
reserves  can  occupy  the  space  thus  left,  and  the  ground  which 
the  phalanx  had  just  before  been  holding,  and  so  no  longer 
charge  them  face  to  face,  but  fall  upon  them  on  their  flank 
and  rear.  If,  then,  it  is  easy  to  take  precautions  against  the 
opportunities  and  peculiar  advantages  of  the  phalanx,  but  im- 
possible to  do  so  in  the  case  of  its  disadvant^es,  must  it  not 


230  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  book 

follow  that  in  practice  the  difference  between  these  two  systems  is 
enormous  ?  Of  course  those  generals  who  employ  the  phalanx 
must  march  over  ground  of  every  description,  must  pitch 
camps,  occupy  points  of  advantage,  besiege,  and  be  besieged, 
and  meet  with  unexpected  appearances  of  the  enemy :  for  all 
these  are  part  and  parcel  of  war,  and  have  an  important  and 
sometimes  decisive  influence  on  the  ultimate  victory.  And 
in  all  these  cases  the  Macedonian  phalanx  is  difficult,  and 
sometimes  impossible  to  handle,  because  the  men  cannot  act 
either  in  squads  or  separately.      The  Roman  order  on  the 

other  hand  is  flexible :  for  every  Roman,  once 
Romanonia'.^  armed  and  on  the  field,  is  equally  well  equipped 
for  every  place,  time,  or  appearance  of  the 
enemy.  He  is,  moreover,  quite  ready  and  needs  to  make  no 
change,  whether  he  is  required  to  fight  in  the  main  body,  or 
in  a  detachment,  or  in  a  single  maniple,  or  even  by  himself. 
Therefore,  as  the  individual  members  of  the  Roman  force  are 
so  much  more  serviceable,  their  plans  are  also  much  more 
often  attended  by  success  than  those  of  others. 

I  thought  it  necessary  to  discuss  this  subject  at  some 
length,  because  at  the  actual  time  of  the  occurrence  many 
Greeks  supposed  when  the  Macedonians  were  beaten  that  it 
was  incredible;  and  many  will  afterwards  be  at  a  loss  to 
account  for  the  inferiority  of  the  phalanx  to  the  Roman 
system  of  arming. 

88.  Philip  having  thus  done  all  he  could  in  the  battle, 
but  having  been  decisively  beaten,  after  taking 

of  Phmp  "^^  ^P  ^^  roany  of  the  survivors  as  he  could,  pro- 
ceeded through  Tempe  into  Macedonia.  On 
the  night  previous  to  his  start  he  sent  one  of  his  guard  to 
Larisa,  with  orders  to  destroy  and  burn  the  king's  correspond- 
ence. And  it  was  an  act  worthy  of  a  king  to  retain,  even  in 
the  midst  of  disaster,  a  recollection  of  a  necessary  duty.  For 
he  knew  well  enough  that,  if  these  papers  came  into  the  pos- 
session of  the  Romans,  they  would  give  many  handles  to  the 
enemy  both  against  himself  and  his  friends.  It  has,  perhaps, 
been  the  case  with  others  that  in  prosperity  they  could  not  use 
power  with  the  moderation  which  becomes  mortal  men,  while  in 
disaster  they  displayed  caution  and  good  sense ;  but  certainly 


JCVIil         PHTLIP^S  CONDUCT  AFTER  THE  BATTLE  131 

this  was  the  case  with  PhJUp.  And  this  will  be  made  manifest 
by  what  I  shall  subsequently  relate.  For  as  I  showed  without 
reserve  the  justice  of  his  measures  at  the  beginning  of  his 
reign,  and  the  change  for  the  worse  which  they  subsequently 
underwent ;  and  showed  when  and  why  and  how  this  took 
place,  with  a  detailed  description  of  the  actions  in  this  part  of 
his  career;*  in  the  same  way  am  I  bound  to  set  forth  his 
repentance,  and  the  dexterity  with  which  he  changed  with  his 
change  of  fortune,  and  may  be  said  to  have  shown  the  highest 
prudence  in  meeting  this  crisis  in  his  affairs. 

As  for  Flamininus,  having  after  the  battle  taken  the 
necessary  measures  as  to  the  captives  and  the  rest  of  the 
spoils,  he  proceeded  to  Larisa,  .  .  , 

34.  Flamininus  was  much  annoyed  at  the  selfishness  dis- 
played by  the  Aetolians  in  regard  to  the  spoils ; 
and  had  no  idea  of  leaving  them  to  be  masters  ^'^^„^"^  *^ 
of  Greece  after  he  had  deprived  Philip  of  his 
supremacy  there.  He  was  irritated  also  by  their  braggadocio, 
when  he  saw  that  they  claimed  all  the  credit  of  the  victory, 
and  were  filling  Greece  with  the  report  of  their  valour. 
Wherefore,  wherever  he  met  them  he  behaved  with  hauteur, 
and  never  said  a  word  on  public  business,  but  carried  out  all 
his  measures  independently  or  by  the  agency  of  his  own 
friends.  While  the  relations  between  these  two  were  in  this 
strained  state,  some  few  days  after  the  battle  Flamininus  grants 
Demosthenes,  Cycliadas,  and  Limnaeus  came  fifteen  days'  imce 
on  a  mission  from  Philip ;  and,  after  consider-  '"  Philip, 
able  discussion  with  them,  Flamininus  granted  an  immediate 
armistice  of  fifteen  days,  and  agreed  to  have  a  personal  inter- 
view also  with  Philip  in  the  course  of  them  to  discuss  the  state  of 
affairs.  And  this  interview  being  conducted  in  a  courteous  and 
friendly  manner,  the  suspicions  entertained  of  Flamininus  by  tbe 
Aetolians  blazed  forth  with  double  fury.  For  as  corruption,  and 
thehabitofnever  doing  anything  without  a  bribe,  had  long  been 
a  common  feature  in  Greek  politics,  and  as  this  was  the  acknow- 
ledged characteristic  of  the  Aetolians,  they  could  not  believe 
that  Flamininus  could  so  change  in  his  relations  with  Philip 
vrithout  a  bribe  They  did  not  know  the  habits  and  principles 
'  See  4,  77  ;  7.  la  ;  10,  a6. 


232  *  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  BOOK 

of  the  Romans  on  this  subject ;  but  judging  from  themselves 
they  concluded  that  there  was  every  probability  of  Philip  in 
his  present  position  offering  a  large  sum  of  money,  and  of 
Flamininus  being  unable  to  resist  the  temptation. 

85.  If  I  had  been  speaking  of  an  earlier  period,  and  expres- 
The  disinterested-Sing  what  was  generally  true,  I  should  have  had 
ness  of  the  Ro-  no  hesitation  in  asserting  of  the  Romans  as  a 
mans  generaUy  nation  that  they  would  not  be  likely  to  do  such 
as  o  money.    ^  thing, — I  mean  in  the  period  before  they  en- 
gaged in  wars  beyond  the  sea,  and  while  they  retained  their 
own  habits  and  principles  uncontaminated.^     But  in  the  pre- 
sent times  I  should  not  venture  to  say  this  of  them  all ;  still, 
as  individuals,  I  should  be  bold  to  say  of  the  majority  of  the 
men  of  Rome  that  they  are  capable  of  preserving  their  honesty 
in  this  particular :  and  as  evidence  that  I  am  making  no  im- 
possible assertion,  I  would  quote  two  names  which  will  command 

general  assent, — I  mean  first,  Lucius  Aemilius 

^"^  Pauiur*""^  ^^^  conquered  Perseus,  and  won  the  kingdom  of 

Macedonia.  In  that  kingdom,  besides  all  the 
other  splendour  and  wealth,  there  was  found  in  the  treasury 
more  than  six  thousand  talents  of  gold  and  silver  :  yet  he  was 
so  far  from  coveting  any  of  this,  that  he  even  refused  to  see  it, 
and  administered  it  by  the  hands  of  others  ;  though  he  was  far 
from  being  superfluously  wealthy  himself,  but,  on  the  contrary, 
was  very  badly  off.  At  least,  I  know  that  on  his  death,  which 
occurred  shortly  after  the  war,  when  his  own  sons  Publius 
Scipio  and  Quintus  Maximus  wished  to  pay  his  wife  her  dowry, 
amounting  to  twenty-five  talents,  they  were  reduced  to  such 
straits  that  they  would  have  been  quite  unable  to  do  so  if  they 
had  not  sold  the  household  furniture  and  slaves,  and  some  of 
the  landed  property  besides.  And  if  what  I  say  shall  appear 
incredible  to  any  one,  he  may  easily  convince  himself  on  the 
subject :  for  though  there  are  many  controversies  at  Rome, 
and  especially  on  this  particular  point,  arising  from  the  an- 
Publius  Cornelius,  tagonistic  parties  among  them,  yet  he  will  find 

Scipio  Africanus  that  what  I  have  just  said  about  Aemilius  is 

Minor.        acknowledged   by  every  one.     Again,  Publius 

Scipio,  son  by  blood  of  this  Aemilius,  and  son  by  adoption 

1  See  6.  56  ;  32,  11. 


XVIII  COMPARATIVE  INCORRUPTIBILITY  OF  ROMANS  333 

of  Fublius  called  tlie  Great,  when  he  got  possession  of  Car- 
thage, reckoned  the  wealthiest  city  in  the  world,  took  abso- 
lutely nothing  from  it  for  his  own  private  use,  either  by  pur- 
chase or  by  any  other  manner  of  acquisition  whatever,  although 
he  was  by  no  means  a  very  rich  man,  but  very  moderately  so 
for  a  Roman.  But  he  not  only  abstained  from  the  wealth  of 
Carthage  itself,  but  refused  to  allow  anything  from  Airica  at 
all  to  be  mixed  up  with  his  private  property.  Therefore,  in 
regard  to  this  man  once  more,  any  one  who  chooses  to  inquire 
will  find  that  his  reputation  in  this  particular  is  absolutely 
undisputed  at  Rome.  I  shall,  however,  take  a  more  suitable 
opportunity  of  treating  this  subject  at  greater  length. 

86.  Titus  then  having  appointed  Philip  a  day  for  the  con- 
gress, immediately  wrote  to  the  allies  announc-  Tbe  codbtcu  of 
ing  when  they  were  to  appear ;  and  a  few  days  Tcmpe,  b.c  197. 
afterwards  came  himself  to  the  pass  of  Tempe  at  the  appointed 
time.  When  the  allies  had  assembled,  and  the  congress  met, 
the  Roman  imperator  rose  and  bade  each  say  on  what  terms 
they  ought  to  make  peace  with  Philip.  King  Amynandros 
then  delivered  a  short  and  moderate  speech, 
merely  asking  that  "  they  would  all  have  some  ^A^^nd!^ 
consideration  for  him,  to  prevent  Philip,  as  soon 
as  the  Romans  left  Greece,  from  turning  the  whole  weight  of  his 
anger  upon  him  ;  for  the  Athamanes  were  always  an  easy  prey 
to  the  Macedonians,  because  of  their  weakness  and  the  close 
contiguity  of  their  territory."  When  he  had  finished,  Alexan- 
der the  Aetolian  rose  and  complimented  Flami- 
ninus  for  "  having  assembled  the  allies  in  that  '^'^^'*'* 
congress  to  discuss  the  terms  of  peace ;  and, 
above  all,  for  having  on  the  present  occasion  called  on  each 
to  express  his  opinion.  But  he  was  deluded  and  mistaken," 
he  added,  "  if  he  believed  that  by  making  terms  with  Philip 
he  would  secure  the  Romans  peace  or  the  Greeks  freedom.  For 
neither  of  these  was  possible.  But  if  he  desired  to  accom- 
plish both  the  design  of  his  own  government  and  his  own 
promises,  which  he  had  given  to  all  the  Greeks,  there  was  one 
way,  and  one  only,  of  making  terms  with  Macedonia,  and  that 
was  to  eject  Philip  from  his  throne;  and  this  could  easily  be 
done  if  he  did  not  let  slip  the  present  opportunity." 


234  T'^-E  HTSTOJilES  OF  POLYBIUS  book 

After  some  further  ai^mcnls  in  support  of  this  view  he  sat 
down. 

87.  tlamintnus  here  took  up  the  ai^ument,  and  said  that 
"Alexander  was  mistaken  not  onlyas  to  the  pohcy 

FianUn^nus.  '^'^  Rome,  but  also  3s  to  the  object  which  he  pro- 
posed to  himself,  and  above  all  as  to  the  true 
interests  of  Greece.  For  it  was  not  the  Roman  way  to  utterly 
destroy  those  with  whom  they  had  been  at  open  war.-  A  proof  of 
his  assertion  might  be  found  in  the  war  with  Hannibal  and  the 
Carthaginians ;  for  though  the  Romans  had  received  the  sever- 
est provocation  at  their  hands,  and  afterwards  had  it  in  their 
power  to  do  absolutely  what  they  pleased  to  them,  yet  they 
had  adopted  no  extreme  measures  against  the  Carthaginians. 
For  his  part,  moreover,  he  had  never  entertained  the  idea  that 
it  was  necessary  to  wage  an  inexpiable  war  with  Philip ;  but  on 
the  contrary  had  been  prepared  before  the  battle  to  come  to 
terms  with  him,  if  he  would  have  submitted  to  the  Roman 
demands.  He  was  surprised,  therefore,  that  those  who  had 
taken  part  in  the  former  peace  conference  should  now  adopt  a 
tone  of  such  irreconcilable  hostility.  Have  we  not  conquered  ? 
(say  they).  Yes,  but  this  is  the  niDst  senseless  of  arguments.  For 
brave  men,  when  actually  at  war,  should  be  terrible  and  full  of 
fire  ;  when  beaten,  undaunted  and  courageous ;  when  victori- 
ous, on  the  other  hand,  moderate,  placable,  and  humane.  But 
your  present  advice  is  the  reverse  of  all  this.  Yet,  in  truth,  to 
the  Greeks  themselves  it  is  greatly  to  their  interest  that  Mace- 
donia should  be  humbled,  but  not  at  all  so  that  she  should 
be  destroyed.  For  it  might  chance  thereby  that  they  would 
experience  the  barbarity  of  Thracians  and  Gauls,  as  has  been 
the  case  more  than  once  already."  He  then  added  that  "  the 
final  decision  of  himself  and  Roman  colleagues  was,  that,  if 
Philip  would  consent  to  fulfil  all  the  conditions  formerly  en- 
joined by  the  allies,  they  would  grant  him  peace,  subject,  of 
course,  to  the  'approval  of  the  Senate  :  and  that  the  Aetolians 
were  free  to  take  what  measures  they  chose  for  themselves" 
Upon  Phaeneas  attempting  to  reply  that  "  Everything  done 
hitherto  went  for  nothing ;  for  if  Philip  managed  to  ex- 
tricate himself  from  his  present  difficulties,  he  would  at  once 
find  some  other  occasion  for  hostilities," — Flamininus  sprang 


xviii        DEBATE  IN  THE  CONGRESS  AT  TBMPE  235 

at  once  from  his  seat,  and  said,  wilh  some  heat,  "  Cease  this 
trifling,  Phaeneas !  For  I  will  so  settle  the  terms  of  the  peace 
that  Phihp  will  be  unable,  even  if  he  wished  it,  to  molest  the 
Greeks." 

38.  After  this  they  separated  for  that  day.  On  the  next  the 
king  arrived :  and  on  the  third,  when  all  the  on  the  third  day 
delegates  were  met  for  discussion,  Philip  en-  of  the  conference 
tered,  and  with  great  skill  and  tact  diverted  ^'"P  "PPe=^ 
the  anger  which  they  all  entertained  against  him.  For  he 
said  that  "  He  conceded  the  demands  made  on  the  former 
occasion  by  the  Romans  and  the  allies,  and  remitted  the  de- 
cision on  the  remaining  points  to  the  Senate."  But  Phaeneas, 
one  of  the  Aetolians  present,  said  :  "  Why  then,  Philip,  do 
not  you  restore  to  us  Larisa  Cremaste,  Pharsalus,  Fhtfaiotid 
Thebes,  and  Echinus  ?  "  Whereupon  Philip  bade  them  take 
them  over.  But  Flamininus  here  interposed,  The  Aetolians 
and  forbade  the  Aetolians  to  take  over  any  of  checkmated  by 
the  towns  except  Phthiotid  Thebes ;  "  for  upon  fTanuninui. 
his  approaching  this  town  with  his  army,  and  summoning  it  to 
submit  to  the  Roman  protection,  the  Thebans  had  refused ; 
and,  as  it  had  now  come  into  his  hands  in  the  course  of  war, 
he  had  the  right  of  taking  any  measures  he  chose  regarding  it." 
Phaeneas  and  his  colleagues  indignantly  protested  at  this,  and 
asserted  that  it  was  their  clear  right  to  recover  the  towns  pre- 
viously members  of  their  league,  "  first  on  the  ground  that 
they  had  taken  part  in  the  recent  war  ;  and  secondly  in  virtue 
of  their  original  treaty  of  alliance,  according  to  which  the  mov- 
able property  of  the  conquered  belonged  to  the  Romans,  the 
towns  to  the  Aetolians."  To  which  Flamininus  answered  that 
"  they  were  mistaken  in  both  points ;  for  their  treaty  with 
Rome  had  been  annulled  when  they  abandoned  the  Romans, 
and  made  terms  with  Philip :  and,  even  supposing  that  treaty 
to  be  still  in  force,  they  had  no  right  to  recover  or  take  over 
such  cities  as  had  voluntarily  put  themselves  under  the  protec- 
tion of  Kome,  as  the  whole  of  the  cities  in  Thessaly  had  done, 
but  only  such  as  were  taken  by  force,' 

*  Livy  (33,  13)  has  mistaken  the  ineitning  of  Polybius  in  this  passage,  re- 
pnsenling  the  quarrel  of  the  Aetolians  and  Flaminiaus  as  being  for  the 
poMCSsion  of  Thebes,— the  only  town,  in  (acl,  on  which  there  was  no  dispnt- 


236  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  BOOK 

39.  The  other  members  of  the  congress  were  delighted 
iho  tornis  of  t!»e  ^'  ^^^  spccch  of  Flamininus.     But  the  Aetoli- 

pcacc  settled,  ans  listened  with  indignation ;  and  what  proved 
Winter  of  ^q  \^  ^^  beginning  of  serious  evils  was 
'^^'  engendered.  For  this  quarrel  was  the  spark 
from  which,  not  long  afterwards,  both  the  war  with  the  Aetol- 
ians  and  that  with  Antiochus  flamed  out  The  principal 
motive  of  Flamininus  in  being  thus  forward  in'  coming  to 
terms  was  the  information  he  had  received  that  Antiochus 
had  started  from  Syria  with  an  army,  with  the  intention  of 
crossing  over  into  Europe.  Therefore  he  was  anxious  lest 
Philip,  catching  at  this  chance,  should  determine  to  defend 
the  towns  and  protract  the  war ;  and  lest  meanwhile  he  should 
himself  be  superseded  by  another  commander  from  home,  on 
whom  the  honour  of  all  that  he  had  achieved  would  be 
diverted.  Therefore  the  terms  which  the  king  asked  were 
granted  :  namely,  that  he  should  have  four  months*  suspension 
of  hostilities,  paying  Flamininus  at  once  the  two  hundred 
talents ;  delivering  his  son  Demetrius  and  some  others  of  his 
friends  as  hostages;  and  sending  to  Rome  to  submit  the 
decision  on  the  whole  pacification  to  the  Senate.  Flamininus 
and  Philip  then  separated,  after  interchanging  mutual  pledges 
of  fidelity,  on  the  understanding  that,  if  thfe  treaty  were  not 
confirmed,  Flamininus  was  to  restore  to  Philip  the  two  hundred 
talents  and  the  hostages.  All  the  parties  then  sent  ambas- 
sadors to  Rome,  some  to  support  and  others  to  oppose  the 
settlement.  .  .  . 

40.  Why  is  it  that,  though  deceived  again  and  again  by  the 
same  things  and  persons,  we  are  unable  to  aban-  Foolish  credulity, 
don  our  blind  folly  ?     For  this  particular  kind  see  ch.  13 ;  and 
of  fraud  has  often  been  committed  before  now,        3i»  «!• 
and  by  many.     That  other  men  should  allow  themselves  to 
be  taken  in  is  perhaps  not  astonishing ;  but  it  is  wonderful 
that  those  should  do  so  who  are  the  authors  and  origin  of  the 
same  kind  of  malpractice.     But  I  suppose  the  cause  is  the 
absence  of  that  rule  so  happily  expressed  by  Epicharmus : 

*'  Cool  head  and  wise  mistrust  are  wisdom's  sinews."  .  .  . 


KING  ATTALUS  I 


41.  [They  endeavoured]  to  prevent  Antiochus  from  sail- 
ing along  their  coast,  not  from  enmity  to  him,  but  from  a 
suspicion  that  by  giving  support  to  Philip  he  would  become 
an  obstacle  in  the  way  of  Greek  liberty.  ,  ,  . 

King  Antiochus  was  very  desirous  of  possessing  Ephesus, 
owing  to  its  extremely  convenient  position ;  for  it  appeared  to 
occupy  the  position  of  an  Acropolis  for  expeditions  by  land 
and  sea  against  Ionia  and  the  cities  of  the  Hellespont,  and  to 
be  always  a  most  convenient  base  of  operations  for  the  kings 
of  Asia  against  Europe.  .  .  . 

Of    King    Attalus,   who  now  died,    I   think    I    ought   to 
speak  a  suitable  word,  as  I  have  done  in  the   ueaih  of  King 
case  of  others.      Originally  he  had  no  other  Atuiiu,  who  had 
externa]  qualification  for  royalty  except  money  _'^^™ '"  "' 

,  L-   1       ■    J      J      T    L       J.    J        -.t  i    Tliebes,  before 

alone,  which,   mdeed,  if   handled   with   good  ^^  baitie  of  Cy- 
sense  and  boldness,  is  of  very  great  assistance  noscephaiae.  nnd 
in  every  undertaking,  but  without  these  qualities  ^^  *>■*"  brought 
.     .     .  ...        -       -1         J    .      r    .     home  10  die  u 

IS  m  Its  nature  the  origin  of  evil,  and,  m  fact,  Pergamum, 
of  utter  ruin  to  very  many.  For  tn  the  firstautumn,  s.a  177. 
place  it  engenders  envy  and  malicious  plots,  '-"T'  33.  ai. 
and  contributes  lately  to  the  destruction  of  body  and  soul. 
For  few  indeed  are  the  souls  that  are  able  by  the  aid  of 
wealth  to  repel  dangers  of  this  description.  This  king's  great- 
ness of  mind  therefore  deserves  our  admiration,  because  he 
never  attempted  to  use  his  wealth  for  anything  else  but  the 
acquisition  of  royal  power, — an  object  than  which  none  greater 
can  be  mentioned.  Moreover  he  made  the  first  step  in  this 
design,  not  only  by  doing  services  to  his  friends  and  gaining 
their  affection,  but  also  by  achievements  in  war.  For  it  was 
afrer  conquering  the  Gauls,  the  most  formidable  and  warlike 
nation  at  that  time  in  Asia,  that  he  assumed  this  rank  and 
first  puts  himself  forward  as  king  And  though  he  obtained 
this  honour,  and  lived  seventy-two  years,  of  which  he  reigned 
forty-four,  he  passed  a  life  of  the  utmost  virtue  and  goodness 
towards  his  wife  and  children ;  kept  faith  with  all  allies  and 
friends ;  and  died  in  the  midst  of  a  most  glorious  campaign, 
fighting  for   the  liberty  of  the  Greeks  i   and  what  is  more 


238  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  book 


remarkable  than  all,  though  he  left  four  grown-up  sons,  he  so  well 
settled  the  question  of  succession,  that  the  crown  was  handed 
down  to  his  children's  children  without  a  single  dispute.  .  .  . 

ITALY 

42.  After  Marcus  Marcellus  had  entered  upon  the  consul- 
ship  the  ambassadors  from  Philip,   and  from 
L^^F^Ilis^?-  Flamininus  and  the  allies,  arrived  at  Rome  to 
pureo,  M.  Claudius  discuss  the  treaty  with    Philip ;    and   after   a 
MarceUus.    The  lengthened   hearing    the   confirmation   of  the 
^Tcon^™'^  terms  was  decreed  in  the  Senate.     But  on  the 

matter  being  brought  before  the  people,  Marcus 
Claudius,  who  was  ambitious  of  being  himself  sent  to  Greece, 
spoke  against  the  treaty,  and  did  his  best  to  get  it  rejected. 
The  people  however  ratified  the  terms,  in  accordance  with  the 
wish  of  Flamininus ;  and,  upon  this  being  settled,  the  Senate 
immediately  despatched  a   commission  of  ten  men  of  high 
rank  to  arrange  the  settlement  of  Greece  in  conjunction  with 
Flamininus,    and    to   confirm   the   freedom   of   the  Greeks. 
Among   others    Damoxenus  of  Aegium  and  his  colleagues, 
envoys  from  the  Achaean   league,  made   a  proposal  in  the 
Senate  for  an  alliance  with  Rome;  but  as  some  opposition 
was  raised  to  this  at  the  time,  on  account  of  a  counter-claim  of 
the  Eleians  upon  Triphylia,  and  of  the  Messenians,  who  were 
at  the  time  actually  in  alliance  with  Rome,  upon  Asine  and 
Pylus,  and  of  the  Aetolians  upon  Heraea, — the  decision  was 
referred  to  the  commission  of  ten.    Such  were  the  proceedings 
in  the  Senate.  ... 

GREECE    ' 

48.  After  the  battle  of  Cynoscephalae,  as  Flamininus  was 
Philip  allows  his  wintering  at  Elateia,  the  Boeotians,  being  anxious 
Boeotian  followers' to  recover  their  citizens  who  had  served  in 
to  return  home,  philip^s  army,  sent  an  embassy  to  Flamininus 
to  try  and  secure  their  safety.  Wishing  to  encourage  the  loyalty 
of  the  Boeotians  to  himself,  because  he  was  already  anxious 
as  to  the  action  of  Antiochus,  he  readily  assented  to  their 
petition.  These  men  were  promptly  restored  from  Macedonia, 
and  one  of  them  named  Brachylles  the  Boeotians  at  once 
elected  Boeotarch ;  and  in  a  similar  spirit  honoured  and  pro- 


xv»i  MURDER  OF  BRACHYLLES  839 

moted,  as  much  as  before,  such  of  the  others  as  were  thought 
to  be  well  disposed  to  the  rpyal  house  of  Macedonia.  They 
also  sent  an  embassy  to  Philip  to  thank  him  for  the  return 
of  the  young  men,  thus  derogating  from  the  favour  done  them 
by  Flamininus, — a  measure  highly  disquieting'  zeuxippus  and 
to  Zeuxippus  and  Peisistratus,  and  all  who  were  Peisisiraius,  heads 
regarded  as  partisans  of  Rome;  because  they  of  the  Romanising 
foresaw  what  would  happen  to  themselves  and  lo^'gei'^nd  of 
their  families,  knowing  quite  well  that  if  the  Brachyiies, 
Romans  quitted  Greece,  and  Philip  remained  ^^'  ''*■ 
closely  supporting  the  political  party  opposed  to  themselves,  it 
would  be  unsafe  for  them  to  remain  citizens  of  Boeotia.  They 
therefore  agreed  among  themselves  to  send  an  embassy  to 
Flamininus  in  Elateia :  and  having  obtained  an  interview 
with  him,  they  made  a  lengthy  and  elaborate  statement  on 
this  subject,  describing  the  state  of  popular  feeling  which  nas 
now  adverse  to  themselves,  and  discanting  on  the  untrusl- 
worthiness  of  democratic  assemblies.  And  finally,  they 
ventured  to  say  that  "  Unless  they  could  overawe  the  common 
people  by  getting  rid  of  Brachyiies,  there  could  be  no  security 
for  the  party  in  favour  of  Rome  as  soon  as  the  legions  departed," 
After  listening  to  these  arguments  Flamininus  replied  that 
"  He  would  not  personally  take  any  part  in  such  a  measure, 
but  he  would  not  hinder  those  who  wished  to  do  so."  Finally, 
he  bade  them  speak  to  Alexamenus  the  Strategus  of  the 
Aetolians.  Zeuxippus  and  his  colleagues  accepted  the  suggest- 
ion, and  communicated  with  Alexamenus,  who  at  once  con- 
sented; and  agreeing  to  carry  out  their  proposal  sent  three 
Aetolians  and  three  Italians,  all  young  men,  to  assassinate 
Brachyiies.  ...  , 

There  is  no  more  terrible  witness,  or  '"ore.demi^^y^ 
formidable  accuser,  than  the  conscience  which  own  conscience, 
resides  in  each  man's  breast.  ...  See  LLvy,  33,  aS. 

44.  About  this  same  time  the  ten  commissioners  arrived 
from  Rome  who  were  to  effect  the  settlement 
of  Greece,  bringing  with  them  the  decree  of     consuitum' 
the  Senate   on   the  peace  with  Philip.      The 
main  points  of  the  decree  were  these :   "  All  other  Greeks, 
whether  in  Asia  or  Europe,  to  be  free  and  enjoy  their  own 


240  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  BOOK 

laws ;  but  that  Philip  should  hand  over  to  the  Romans  those 
at  present  under  his  authority,  and  all  towns  in  which  he  had 
a  garrison,  before  the  Isthmian  games ;  and  restore  Euromus, 
Pedasa,  Bargylia,  lasus,  Abydos,  Thasus,  Marinus,  and  Perin- 
thus  to  freedom,  and  remove  his  garrisons  from  them.  That 
Flamininus  should  write  to  Prusias  commanding  him  to 
liberate  Cius,  in  accordance  with  the  decree  of  the  Senate. 
That  Philip  should  restore  to  the  Romans  within  the  same 
period  all  captives  and  deserters;  and  likewise  all  decked 
ships,  except  three  and  his  one  sixteen-banked  vessel;  and 
should  pay  a  thousand  talents,  half  at  once,  and  half  by 
instalments  spread  over  ten  years." 

45.  Upon  this  decree  being  published  in  Greece,  it  created 

a  feeling  of  confidence  and  gratification  in  all 
^'^^^^oi^i^  ^  ^  ^^  communities  except  the  Aetolians,     These 

last  were  annoyed  at  not  getting  all  they  ex- 
pected, and  attempted  to  run  down  the  decree  by  saying  that 
it  was  mere  words,  without  anything  practical  in  it ;  and  they 
based  upon  the  clauses  of  the  decree  itself  some  such  argu- 
ments as  follow,  by  way  of  disquieting  those  who  would  listen 
to  them.  They  said  "  That  there  were  two  distinct  clauses  in 
the  decree  relating  to  the  cities  garrisoned  by  Philip:  one 
ordering  him  to  remove  those  garrisons  and  to  hand  over  the 
cities  to  the  Romans;  the  other  bidding  him  withdraw  his 
garrisons  and  set  the  cities  free.  Those  that  were  to  be  set 
free  were  definitely  named,  and  they  were  towns  in  Asia ;  and 
it  was  plain,  therefore,  that  those  which  were  to  be  handed 
over  to  the  Romans  were  those  in  Europe,  namely,  Oreus, 
Eretria,  Chalcis,  Demetrias,  and  Corinth.  Hence  it  was 
plain  that  the  Romans  were  receiving  the  *  fetters  of  Greece ' 
from  the  hand;5  of  Philip,  and  that  the  Greeks  were  getting, 
not  freedom,  but  a  change  of  masters." 

These  arguments  of  the  Aetolians  were  repeated  ad 
nauseatn.  But,  meanwhile,  Flamininus  left  Elateia  with  the 
ten  commissioners,  and  having  crossed  to  Anticyra,  sailed 
straight  to  Corinth,  and  there  sat  in  council  with  the  com- 
missioners, and  considered  the  whole  settlement  to  be  made. 

The  commis-    "^"^  ^^  ^^  adverse  comments  of  the  Aetolians 
sioners  sit  at    obtained  wide  currency,  and  were  accepted  by 


xvm  THE  FREEDOM  OF  GREECE  241 

some,  Flamininus  was  forced  to  enter  upon  Corinth,  and  de- 
many  elaborate  arcuments  in  the  meetings  of  ciare  ail  Greek 
.      '  °   .        .  .  .      "  cities  free,  except 

the  commission,  trymg  to  convince  the  com-theAcrocoriaihus. 
missioners  that  if  they  wished  to  acquire  un-  Demeinas,  and 
alloyed  praise  from  the  Greeks,  and  to  establish  Chalds, 
firmly  in  the  minds  of  all  that  they  had  originally  come  into 
the  country  not  to  gain  any  advantage  for  Rome,  but  simply 
to  secure  the  freedom  of  Greece,  they  must  abandon  every 
district  and  free  all  the  cities  now  garrisoned  by  Philip.  But 
this  was  just  the  point  in  dispute  among  the  commissioners  ; 
for,  as  lo  all  other  cities,  a  decision  had  been  definitely  arrived 
at  in  Rome,  and  the  ten  commissioners  had  express  instruc- 
tions; but  about  Chalcis,  Corinth,  and  Demetrias  they  had 
been  allowed  a  discretion  on  account  of  Antiochus,  in  order 
that  they  might  take  such  measures  as  they  thought  best  from 
a  view  of  actual  events.  For  it  was  notorious  that  this  king 
had  for  some  time  past  been  meditating  an  interference  in 
Europe.  However,  as  far  as  Corinth  was  concerned,  Flamini- 
nus prevailed  on  the  commissioners  to  free  it  at  once  and 
restore  it  to  the  Achaean  league,  from  respect  to  the  terms  of 
the  original  agreement;  but  he  retained  the  Acrocorinthus, 
Demetrias,  and  Chalcis. 

46.  When  these  decisions  had  been  come  to,  the  time  for 
the  celebration  of  the  Isthmian  games  arrived,    xbe  isthmian 
The  expectation  of  what  would  happen  there  eames,  July  b.c. 
drew  the  men  of  highest  rank  from  nearly  every  '9*- 

quarter  of  the  world  ;  and  there  was  a  great  deal  of  talk  on  the 
subject  from  one  end  of  the  assembled  multitude  to  the 
other,  and  expressed  in  varied  language.  Some  said  that 
from  certain  of  the  places  and  towns  it  was  impossible  that 
the  Romans  could  withdraw ;  while  others  asserted  that  they 
would  withdraw  from  those  considered  most  important,  but 
would  retain  others  that  were  less  prominent,  though  capable 
of  being  quite  as  serviceable.  And  such  persons  even  took 
upon  themselves  in  their  ingenuity  to  designate  the  precise 
places  which  would  be  thus  treated.  While  people  were  still 
in  this  state  of  uncertainty,  all  the  world  being  assembled  on 
the  stadium  to  watch  the  games,  the  herald  came  forward, 
and  having  proclaimed  silence  by  the  sound  of  a  trumpet. 


242  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  book 

delivered  the  following  proclamation  :  '*  The  senate  of  Rome 

ProciamaUon  of  ^^^  Titus  Quintus,  procoHsul  and  imperator, 

the  freedom  of  having  conquered  King  Philip  and  the  Mace- 

the  Greek  cities,  donians  in  war,  declare  the  following  peoples 

free,  without  garrison,  or  tribute,  in  full  enjoyment  of  the  laws 

of  their  respective  countries :  namely,  Corinthians,  Phociansy 

Locrians,  Euboeans,  Achaeans  of  Phiotis,  Magnesians,  Thes- 

salians,  Perrhaebians." 

Now  as  the  first  words  of  the  proclamation  were  the  signal 
for  a  tremendous  outburst  of  clappintr,  some  of 

An  exciting  scene.    ,  ,  ,,  ,  .  ,,  , 

the  people  could  not  hear  it  at  all,  and  some 
wanted  to  hear  it  again ;  but  the  majority  feeling  incredulous, 
and  thinking  that  they  heard  the  words  in  a  kind  of  dream,  so 
utterly  unexpected  was  it,  another  impulse  induced  every  one 
to  shout  to  the  herald  and  trumpeter  to  come  into  the  middle 
of  the  stadium  and  repeat  the  words :  I  suppose  because  the 
people  wished  not  only  to  hear  but  to  see  the  speaker,  in  their 
inability  to  credit  the  announcement.  But  when  the  herald, 
having  advanced  into  the  middle  of  the  crowd,  once  more,  by 
his  trumpeter,  hushed  the  clamour,  and  repeated  exactly  the 
same  proclamation  as  before,  there  was  such  an  outbreak  of  clap- 
ping as  is  difficult  to  convey  to  the  imagination  of  my  readers 
at  this  time.  When  at  length  the  clapping  ceased,  no  one  paid 
any  attention  whatever  to  the  athletes,  but  all  were  talking  to 
themselves  or  each  other,  and  seemed  like  people  bereft  of 
their  senses.  Nay,  after  the  games  were  over,  in  the  extrava- 
gance of  their  joy,  they  nearly  killed  Flamininus  by  the  ex- 
hibition of  their  gratitude.  Some  wanted  to  look  him  in 
the  face  and  call  him  their  preserver;  others  were  eager 
to  touch  his  hand ;  most  threw  garlands  and  fillets  upon  him ; 
until  between  them  they  nearly  crushed  him  to  death.  But 
though  this  expression  of  popular  gratitude  was  thought  to 
have  been  extravagant,  one  might  say  with  confidence  that  it  fell 
short  of  the  importance  of  the  actual  event.  For  that  the  Romans 
and  their  leader  Flamininus  should  have  deliberately  incurred 
unlimited  expense  and  danger,  for  the  sole  purpose  of  freeing 
Greece,  deserved  their  admiration ;  and  it  was  also  a  great  thing 
that  their  power  was  equal  to  their  intention.  But  the  greatest 
thing  of  all  is  that  Fortune  foiled  their  attempt  by  none  of  her 


xvm      PROCLAMATION  AT  THE  ISTHMIAN  GAMES      243 

usgal  caprices,  but  that  every  single  thing  came  to  a  success- 
Tul  issue  at  the  same  time ;  so  that  all  Greeks,  Asiatic  and 
European  alike,  were  by  a  single  proclamation  become  "free, 
without  garrison  or  tribute,  and  enjoying  their  own  laws." 

47.  The  Isthmian  festival  having  come  to  an  end,  the 
first  persons  with  whom  the  commissioners  Answer  of  com- 
dealt  were  the  ambassadors  from  Antiochus.  misslonersto 
They  instructed  them  that  "Their  master  must  '^'"8  Awiochai. 
abstain  from  attacking  those  cities  in  Asia  which  were  autono- 
mous, and  go  to  war  with  none  of  them ;  and  must  evacuate 
those  that  had  been  subject  to  Ptolemy  or  Philip.  In  addi- 
tion to  this  they  forbade  him  to  cross  over  into  Europe  with 
an  army ;  for  no  Greek  henceforth  was  to  be  attacked  in  war 
or  to  be  enslaved  to  any  one.  Finally,  they  said  that  some  of 
their  own  number  would  go  to  visit  Antiochus."  With  this 
answer  Hegesianax  and  Lysias  returned  to  Antiochus.  They 
next  summoned  the  representatives  of  all  the 
nations  and  cities,  and  declared  to  them  the  ^'"^i^J^**" 
decisions  of  the  commissioners.  The  Mace- 
donian tribe  of  the  Orestae,  on  the  ground  of  their  having 
joined  Rome  during  the  war,  they  declared  autonomous ;  the 
Penhaebians,  Dotopes,  and  Magnesians  they  declared  to  be  free. 
To  the  Thessalians,  in  addition  to  their  freedom,  they  assigned 
the  Phiotid  Achaeans,  with  the  exception,  however,  of  Phthiotid 
Thebes  and  Pharsalus :  for  the  Aetolians  made  such  a  point 
of  their  claim  to  Pharsalus,  as  also  to  Leucas,  on  the  ground 
of  the  rights  secured  them  by  the  original  treaty,  that  the 
commissioners  referred  the  consideration  of  their  demand  in 
regard  to  these  places  back  again  to  the  Senate,  but  allowed 
them  to  retain  Phocis  and  Locris  as  members  of  their  league 
as  they  had  been  before.  Corinth,  Triphylia,  and  Heraea 
they  handed  over  to  the  Achaeans.  Oreus  and  Eretria  the 
majority  wished  to  give  to  King  Eumenes,  but  on  the  instance 
of  Flamininus  this  design  was  not  confirmed  ;  and,  accordingly, 
a  short  time  afterwards  these  towns,  with  Caiystus,  were  de- 
clared free  by  the  Senate.  To  Pleuratus  they  assigned  Lychnis 
and  Parthus  in  Illyria,  towns  which  had  been  subject  to 
Philip;  and  Amynandros  they  allowed  to  retain  all  such  strong- 
holds as  he  had  taken  firom  Philip  during  the  war. 


244  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  book 


48.  This  business  completed,  the  commissioners  separated 

in  various  directions:  Publius  Lentulus  sailed 

sioners^semrate  to  Bargylia  and  announced  its  freedom;  Leucius 

and  go  to  various  Stertinius  did  the  same  to  Hephaestia,  Thasus, 

parts  of  Greece,  and  the  cities  in  Thrace ;  while  Publius  Ven- 

Twogoto      tilius   and   Lucius   Terentius   started   to   visit 

Antiochusand   Antiochus ;    and   Gnaeus   Cornelius  with   his 

o  ers  o     11.  ^Qjjgagues  went  to  king  Philip.    They  met  him 

near    Tempe,  and   after   speaking  with  him   on   the    other 

matters  about  which  they  had  instructions,  they  advised  him  to 

send  an  embassy  to  Rome,  to  ask  for  an  alliance,  in  order  to 

obviate  all   suspicion  of  being  on  the  watch  for  an  oppot^ 

tunity  in  expectation  of  the  arrival  of  Antiochus.     The  king 

Gnaeus  Cornelius  ^g^^^^^S  ^^  follow  this  advice,  Comelius  left 
at  the  congress  of  him  and  went  to  the  league  congress  at  Thermus; 
the  Aetoiian  ^nd  Coming  into  the  public  assembly  urged  the 
eague.  Aetolians  in  a  lengthy  speech  to  abide  by  the 
policy  they  had  adopted,  from  the  first,  and  maintain  their  good 
disposition  towards  the  Romans.  Many  rose  to  answer :  of 
whom  some  expressed  dissatisfaction  with  the  Romans  in 
moderate  and  decorous  language,  for  not  having  used  their  good 
fortune  with  sufficient  regard  to  their  joint  interests,  and  for 
not  observing  the  original  compact;  while  others  delivered 
violent  invectives,  asserting  that  the  Romans  would  never  have 
set  foot  on  Greece  or  conquered  Philip  if  it  had  not  been  for 
them.  Cornelius  disdained  to  answer  these  speeches  in  detail, 
but  he  advised  them  to  send  ambassadors  to  Rome,  for  they 
would  get  full  justice  in  the  Senate :  which  they  accordingly 
did     Such  was  the  conclusion  of  the  war  with  Philip.  .  .  . 


ASIA 

49.  A\Tienever  they  are  reduced  to  the  last  extremity,  as  the 
phrase  goes,  they  will  fly  to  the  Romans  for  protection  and 
commit  themselves  and  their  city  to  them.^  .  .  . 

*  Referring  apparently  to  the  conduct  of  the  Hellenic  cities  in  Asia  in  pre- 
sence of  Antiochus,  who,  having  wintered  in  Ephesus  (B.C.  197-196),  was 
endeavouring  in  196  by  force  or  stratagem  to  consolidate  his  power  in  Asia 
Minor.     Livy,  33,  38. 


xviii  ROMAN  ENVOYS  TO  ANTIOCHVS  845 

60.  Just  when  the  designs  of  Antiochus  in  Thrace  were  suc- 
ceeding to  his  heart's  desire,  Lucius  Cornelius  Amiochus  in  the 
and  his  party  sailed  into  Selybria,  These  were  Chereonesus  and 
the  envoys  sent  by  the  Senate  to  conclude  a ''"'™™'  s-c- 196- 
peace  between  Antiochus  and  Ptolemy.  And  at  the  same 
time  there  arrived  Puhlius  Lentulus  from  Bargylia,  Lucius 
Terentius  and  Publius  Villius  from  Thasus,  three  of  the  ten 
commissioners  for  Greece,  Their  arrival  having  been  promptly 
announced  to  Antiochus,  they  all  assembled  within  the  next 
few  days  at  Lysimacheia  ;  and  it  so  happened  that  Hegesianax 
and  Lysias,  who  had  been  on  the  mission  to  Flamininus, 
arrived  about  the  same  time.  The  private  intercourse  between 
the  king  and  the  Romans  was  informal  and  friendly  ;  but  when 
presently  they  met  in  conference  to  discuss  public  affairs, 
things  took  quite  another  aspect.  Lucius  Cor- 
nelius demanded  that  Antiochus  should  ^P^^^^"" 
evacuate  all  the  cities  subject  to  Ptolemy  which 

he  had  taken  in  Asia ;  while  he  warned  him  in  solemn  and 
emphatic  language  that  he  must  do  so  also  to  the  cities  subject 
to  Philip,  "  for  it  was  ridiculous  that  Antiochus  should  come  in 
and  take  the  prizes  of  the  war  which  Rotne  had  waged  with 
Philip,"  He  also  admonished  him  to  abstain  from  attacking 
autonomous  cities,  and  added  that  "  He  was  at  a  loss  to  con- 
jecture  with  what  view  Antiochus  had  crossed  over  to  Europe 
with  such  a  powerful  army  and  fleet ;  for  if  it  were  not  with 
the  intention  of  attacking  the  Romans,  there  was  no  ex- 
planation left  that  any  reasonable  person  could  accept" 
With  these  words  the  Romans  ceased  speaking. 

61.  The  king  began  his  reply  by  saying  that  "  He  did  not 
understand  by  what  right  the  Romans  raised  a 
controversy  with  him  in  regard  to  the  cities  in      Anii^hus" 
Asia,     They  were  the  last  people  in  the  world 

who  had  any  claim  to  do  so."  Next  he  chimed  that  "  They 
should  refrain  entirely  from  interfering  in  the  affairs  of  Asia, 
seeing  that  he  never  in  the  least  degree  interposed  in  those  of 
Italy.  He  had  crossed  into  Europe  with  his  army  to  recover 
his  possessions  in  the  Chersonese  and  the  cities  in  Thrace ; 
his  right  to  the  government  of  these  places  being  superior  to 
that  of  any  one  in  the  world.     For  this  was  originally  the 


V 


246  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  book 

principality  of  Lysimachus ;  and  as  Seleucus  waged  war  with 
Lysimachus  ^^^  conquered  that  prince,  the  whole  domain 
conquered  by  of  Lysimachus  passed  to  Seleucus:^  then 
s^«^  Ni<»nor,  o^ng  to  the  multifarious  interests  which  dis- 
tracted the  attention  of  his  predecessors,  fir$t 
Ptolemy  and  then  Philip  had  managed  to  wrest  this  country 
from  them  and  secure  it  for  themselves.  He  had  not  then 
availed  himself  of  Philip's  difficulties  to  take  it,  but  had  re- 
cai'ered  possession  of  it  in  the  exercise  of  his  undoubted  rights. 
It  was  no  injury  to  the  Romans  that  he  should  now  be 
restoring  to  their  homes,  and  settling  again  in  their  city,  the 
people  of  Lysimacheia  who  had  been  expelled  by  an  unexpected 
raid  of  the  Thracians.  He  was  doing  this,  not  from  any  in- 
tention of  attacking  the  Romans,  but  to  prepare  a  place  of 
residence  for  his  son  Seleucus.  As  for  the  autonomous  cities 
of  Asia,  they  must  acquire  their  freedom  by  his  free  grace,  not 
by  an  injunction  from  Rome..  As  for  Ptolemy,  he  was  about 
to  settle  matters  amicably  with  him  :  for  it  was  his  intention 
to  confirm  their  friendship  by  a  matrimonial  alliance." 

52.  But  upon  Lucius  expressing  an  opinion  that  they  ought 

Antiochus  refuses  ^^  ^^  i"  ^^^  representatives  of  Lampsacus  and 
to  acknowledge  Smyrna  and  give  them  a  hearing,  this  was  done. 
the  Romans  as  'pj^g  envoys  from  Lampsacus  were  Parmenio 

and  Pythodorus,  and  from  Smyrna  Coeranus. 
These  men  expressing  themselves  with  much  openness,  Philip 
was  irritated  at  the  idea  of  defending  himself  against  accusers 
before  a  tribunal  of  Romans,  and  interrupting  Parmenio,  said  : 
"  A  truce  to  your  long  speeches :  I  do  not  choose  to  have  my 
controversies  with  you  decided  before  a  Roman  but  before  a 
Rhodian  court."  Thereupon  they  broke  up  the  conference 
very  far  from  pleased  with  each  other.  .  .  . 

EGYPT 

58.  Many  people  have  a  yearning  for  bold  and  glorious 

Death  of  Scopas.  Undertakings,  but  few  dare  actually  attempt  them. 

See  supra,     Yet  Scopas  had  much  fairer  opportunities  for  a 

>  Justin.  17,  1-2  ;  Appian  Syr.  62.     The  battle  was  in  the  plain  of  Corns 
in  Phiygia, 


iviii  FALL  OF  SCOPAS  247 

hazardous  and  bold  career  than  Cleomenes.  i3< " ;  '^i  '8, 
For  the  latter,  though  circumvented  by  his  "'^  ''  " 
enemies,  and  reduced  to  depend  upon  such  forces  as  his 
servants  and  friends  could  supply,  yet  left  no  chance  untried, 
and  tested  every  one  to  the  best  of  his  ability,  valuing  an 
honourable  death  more  highly  than  a  life  of  disgrace.  But 
Scopas,  with  all  the  advantages  of  a  formidable  body  of 
soldiers  and  of  the  excellent  opportunity  afforded  by  the  youth 
of  the  king,  by  bis  own  delays  and  halting  counsels  allowed 
himself  to  be  circumvented.  For  having  ascertained  that  he 
was  holding  a  meeting  of  his  partisans  at  his  own  house,  and 
was  consulting  with  them,  Aristomenes  sent  some  of  the  royal 
bodyguards  and  summoned  him  to  the  king's  council. 
\Vhereupon  Scopas  was  so  infatuated  that  he  was  neither  bold 
enough  to  cany  out  his  designs,  nor  able  to  make  up  his  mind 
to  obey  the  king's  summons, — which  is  in  itself  the  most 
extreme  step, — until  Aristomenes,  understanding  the  blunder 
he  had  made,  caused  soldiers  and  elephants  to  surround  his 
house,  and  sent  Ptolemy  son  of  Eumenes  in  with  some  young 
men,  with  orders  to  bring  him  quietly  if  he  would  come,  but,  if 
not,  by  force.  When  Ptolemy  entered  the  house  and  in- 
formed Scopas  that  the  king  summoned  him,  he  refused  at 
first  to  obey,  but  remained  looking  fixedly  at  Ptolemy,  and  for 
a  long  while  preserved  a  threatening  attitude  as  though  he 
wondered  at  his  audacity;  and  when  Ptolemy  came  boldly 
up  to  him  and  took  hold  of  his  cblamys,  he  called  on  the  by- 
standers to  help  him.  But  seeing  that  the  number  of  young 
men  who  had  accompanied  Ptolemy  into  the  house  was  large, 
and  being  informed  by  some  one  of  the  military  array  surround- 
ing it  outside,  be  yielded  to  circumstances,  and  went,  accom- 
panied by  his  friends,  in  obedience  to  the  summons. 

54.  On  his  entering  the  council  chamber  the  kingwas  the  first 
to  state  the  accusation  against  him,  which  he  did 
briefly.  He  was  followed  by  Polycrates  lately  ^°^^°^  ^ 
arrived  from  Cyprus ;  and  he  again  by  Aristo- 
menes. The  charges  made  by  them  all  were  much  to  the 
same  effect  as  what  I  have  just  stated ;  but  there  was  now 
added  to  them  the  seditious  meeting  with  his  friends,  and  his 
refusal  to  obey  the  summons  of  the  king.     On  these  charges 


248  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  book 


he  was  unanimously  condemned,  not  only  by  the  members  of 
the  council,  but  also  by  the  envoys  of  foreign  nations  who 
were  present.  And  when  Aristomenes  was  about  to  commence 
his  accusation  he  brought  in  a  large  number  of  other  Greeks 
of  rank  also  to  support  him,  as  well  as  the  Aetolian  am- 
bassadors who  had  come  to  negotiate  a  peace,  among  whom 
was  Dorimachus  son  of  Nicostratus.  When  these  speeches 
had  been  delivered,  Scopas  endeavoured  to  put  forward  certain 
pleas  in  his  defence :  but  gaining  no  attention  from  any  one, 
owing  to  the  senseless  nature  of  his  proceedings,  he  was  taken 
along  with  his  friends  to  prison.  There  after  nightfall  Aristo- 
menes caused  Scopas  and  his  family  to  be  put  to  death  by  poison; 
but  did  not  allow  Dicacarchus  to  die  until  he  had  had  him 
racked  and  scourged,  thus  inflicting  on  him  a  punishment  which 
he  thoroughly  descr\'ed  in  the  name  of  all  Greece.    For  this  was 

the  Dicaearchus  whom  Philip,  when  he  resolved 
i)kncarciius     "pon  his  trcachcrous  attack  on  the  Cyclades 

and  the  cities  of  the  Hellespont,  appointed 
leader  of  the  whole  fleet  and  the  entire  enterprise :  who  being 
thus  sent  out  to  perform  an  act  of  flagrant  wickedness,  not 
only  thought  that  he  was  doing  nothing  wrong,  but  in  the 
extravagance  of  his  infatuation  imagined  that  he  would  strike 
terror  into  the  gods  as  well  as  man.  For  wherever  he 
anchored  he  used  to  build  two  altars,  to  Impiety  and  Lawless- 
ness, and,  ofl"ering  sacrifice  upon  these  altars,  worshipped  them 
as  his  gods.  Therefore  in  my  opinion  he  met  with  a  just 
retribution  both  from  gods  and  men :  for  as  his  hfe  had  been 
spent  in  defiance  to  the  laws  of  nature,  his  end  was  properly 
also  one  of  unnatural  horror.  All  the  other  Aetolians  who 
wished  to  depart  were  allowed  by  the  king  to  go  in  possession 
of  their  property. 

56.  As  in  the  lifetime  of  Scopas  his  love  of  money  had 

Enormous  wealth  been  notorious,  for  his  avarice  did  in  fact  surpass 

coiiccieci  by     that  of  any  man  in  the  world,  so  after  his  death 

Scopas.        ^j^g  i^  made   still   more  conspicuous   by  the 

enormous  amount  of  gold  and  other  property  found  in  his 

house;    for   by  the   assistance  of  the   coarse  manners  and 

drunken  habits  of  Charimortus  he  had  absolutely  pillaged  the 

kingdom. 


xviii         AyACLBTERIA  OF  PTOLEMY  EP/PffANES         249 

Having  thus  settled  the  AetoUan  business  to  their  likings 
the  courtiers  turned  their  attention  to  the  cere-  The  anacieieria 
mony  of  instituting  the  king  into  the  manage-  of  PtolEin)' 
ment  of  his  office,  called  the  Anadeteria.  His  EpiphaMs. 
age  was  not  indeed  yet  so  far  advanced  as  to  '  ''  '  '  ■  '*" 
make  this  necessary ;  but  they  thought  that  the  kingdom 
would  gain  a  certain  degree  of  lirmness  and  a  fresh  impulse 
towards  prosperity,  if  it  were  known  that  the  king  had  assumed 
the  independent  direction  of  the  government  They  then  made 
the  preparations  for  the  ceremony  with  great  splendour,  and 
carried  it  out  in  a  manner  worthy  of  the  greatness  of  the 
kingdom,  Polycrates  being  considered  to  have  contributed  very 
largely  to  the  accomplishment  of  their  efforts.  For  this  man 
had  enjoyed  even  during  his  youth,  in  the  reign  of  the  late 
king,  a  reputation  second  to  no  one  in  the  court  for  fidelity 
and  practical  ability;  and  this  reputation  he  bad  maintained 
during  the  present  reign  also.  For  having  been  entrusted  with 
the  management  of  Cyprus  and  its  revenues,  when  its  affairs 
were  in  a  critical  and  complicate  stale,  he  not  only  preserved 
the  island  for  the  young  king,  but  collected  a  very  considerable 
sum  of  money,  with  which  hehad  just  arrived  and  had  paid  to  the 
king,  after  handing  over  the  government  of  Cyprus  to  Ptolemy 
of  Megalopolis.  But  though  he  obtained  great  applause  by 
this,  and  a  large  fortune  immediately  afterwards,  yet,  as  he 
grew  older,  he  drifted  into  extravagant  debauchery  and 
scandalous  Indulgence.  Nor  was  the  reputation  of  Ptolemy, 
son  of  Agesarchus  very  different  in  the  later  part  of  his  life. 
But  in  regard  to  these  men,  when  we  come  to  the  proper  time, 
I  shall  not  shrink  from  stating  the  circumstances  which  dis- 
graced their  official  life.  .  .  . 


BOOK   XIX 

The  only  fragment  we  possess  of  the  nineteenth  book  of  Polyixus  is  a 
statement  quoted  by  Plutarch  as  to  M.  Porcius  Cato,  to  the  eflfect  that  by 
his  orders  the  walls  of  all  the  numerous  Spanish  cities  north  of  the  Baetis 
were  dismantled  on  the  same  day.  Cato  was  in  Spain  B.C.  195.  The 
means  taken  by  him  to  secure  this  simultaneous  destruction  of  fortifications 
are  told  by  Frontinus,  Strategy  I,  I,  I. 

We  thus  lose  the  history  of  the  years  B.C.  195,  194,  193  ;  as  well  as 
the  greater  part  of  that  of  B.C.  192,  191,  contained  in  the  early  part  of 
book  20,  of  which  only  a  few  fragments  remain.  Livy,  however,  has 
evidently  translated  from  Polybius  in  his  history  of  these  years,  and  a 
brief  al^tract  of  events  in  Greece  may  help  the  reader  in  following  the 
fragmentary  book  which  follows  with  more  interest. 

B.C.  195. 
Lucius  Valerius  Flaccus,  1  ^ 
M.  Porcius  Cato,  / 

Flamininus's  imperium  is  extended  for  this  year,  because  of  the  danger 
from  Antiochus  and  Nabis.  The  Aetolians,  still  discontented,  push  their 
demand  for  Pharsalus  and  Leucas,  and  are  referred  by  the  Senate  back  to 
Flamininus.  The  latter  summons  a  conference  of  Greek  states  at  Corinth, 
and  a  war  is  decreed  against  Nabis,  the  Aetolians  still  expressing  their  dis- 
like of  Roman  interference.  The  levies  are  collected ;  Argos  is  freed 
from  Nabis ;  Sparta  all  but  taken ;  and  Nabis  forced  to  submit  to  most 
humiliating  terms  :  the  Aetolians  again  objecting  to  his  being  allowed  to 
remain  at  Sparta  on  any  terms  at  all.  In  this  year  also  legates  from 
Antiochus  visit  Flamininus,  but  are  referred  to  the  Senate. 

B.C.  194. 
Publius  Cornelius  Scipio  II.,  \p 
Tiberius  Sempronius  Longus,  j 

Flamininus  leaves  Greece  after  a  speech  at  Corinth  to  the  assembled 
league  advising  internal  peace  and  loyalty  to  Rome,  and  enters  Rome  in 
triumph.     There  is  a  time  of  comparative  tranquillity  in  Greece. 

B.C.  193. 
L.  Cornelius  Mcrula, 
Q.  Minucius  Thermus, 

The  legates  from  Antiochus  are  sent  back  with  the  final  answer  that, 
unless  the  king  abstains  from  entering  Europe  in  arms,  the  Romans  will 


'     l-Coss. 
us,  j 


BOOK  SIX  ABSTRACT  OF  EVENTS  251 

fiee  ihe  Asiatic  Greek  cities  fiam  him.  Roman  legates,  P.  Sulpicius,  P. 
Villius,  P.  Aelius,  are  sent  to  him.  Hannibal  arrives  at  the  court  of 
Antiochas,  and  nrges  him  to  resist ;  and  the  Aetolians  urge  the  same 
course,  trying  also  to  stir  up  Nabis  and  Philip  of  Macedon.  Antiochus 
accordingly  will  give  the  Roman  envoys  no  satisfactory  answer. 

B.C.  192. 
L.  Quintius  Flamininus,        \coss. 
Cn.  Domitiua  Aheoobarbus,  J 

The  Romans  therefore  prepare  for  war.  A  fleet  under  the  praetor 
Atilius  is  sent  against  Nabis  :  commissioneis  are  sent  into  Greece — T. 
Quintius  Flamininius,  C.  Octavius,  Cn.  Servilins,  P.  Villins — early  in 
the  year :  M .  Baebius  is  ordered  to  hold  his  army  in  readiness  at  Brun- 
disium.  Then  news  is  brought  to  Rome  by  Altalus  of  Pergamum 
(brother  of  king  Eumeoes]  thai  Antiochus  has  crossed  the  Hellespont, 
and  the  Aetolians  on  the  point  of  joioing  him.  Therefore  Uaebitu  ii 
ordered  to  transport  bis  army  to  Apollonia. 

Meanwhile  Nabis  lakes  advantage  of  the  alarm  caused  by  Anliocbas 
to  move.  He  besieges  Gylhium,  and  ravages  the  Achaean  territory. 
The  league,  under  Philopoemen,  proclaim  war  against  him,  and,  after 
losing  an  unimportant  naval  battle,  decisively  defeat  him  on  land  and  ihal 
him  up  in  Sparta. 

The  Aelolians  now  formally  vole  to  call  in  Antiochus,  "  to  liberale 
Greece  and  arbitrate  between  them  and  Rome."  They  occupy  Demetrias  ; 
and  kill  Nabis  by  a  stratagem.  Whereupon  Philopoemen  annexes  Sparta 
to  the  Achaean  league.  Later  in  the  year  Antiochus  meets  the  assembly 
of  the  Aetolians  at  Lamia  in  Thessoly,  is  proclaimed  "  Stiategus";  and 
after  a  vain  attempt  to  conciliate  (he  Acbaeans  seizes  Chalcis,  where  he 
winters,  and  marries  a  young  wife. 
B.C.  191. 


The  Romans  declare  war  with  Antiochus.  Manius  Acilius  is  selected 
10  go  to  Greece,  where  he  takes  over  the  army  of  Baebius,  and  aAei  taking 
many  towns  in  Thessaly  meets  and  defeats  Antiochas  at  Thermopylae ; 
where  the  Aetolian  league  did  after  all  little  service  lo  the  king,  who 
retires  to  Ephesus. 

See   Livy,  34,  43 36,  21.     See  also  Plulaicli,  I'Ulafoemeii,  and 

Flamimma;  Applan,  Syriacae,  6 — 31. 


BOOK   XX 

GREECE 

1.  The   Aetolians  chose  thirty  of  the  Apocleti^  to  confer 
Antiochus  the    with  King  Antiochus.  .  .  . 
Great  at  a  meet-        He  accordingly  summoned  a  meeting  of  the 
ing  of  Aetolians  Apocleti  and  consulted  them  on  the  state  of 

ai  j-«aiTiiai  -^  . 

autumn  of      affairs.  .  .  . 

B.C.  192.    Livy, 
.  35.  43-46. 

2.  When  Antiochus  sent  an  embassy  to  the  Boeotians, 
they  answered  that  they  would  not  consider  his  proposals 
until  the  king  came  in  person.  .  .  . 

8.  As  Antiochus  was  staying  at  Chalcis,  just  as  the  winter 

was  beginning,  two  ambassadors  came  to  visit 

"^"thrwrmeT^r  ^i'"'   Charops   from    Epirus,    and    Callistiatus 

B.C.  192191  at  from  Elis.      The  prayer  of  the  Epirotes  was 

Chalcis.    Visit  of  that  "  The  king  would  not  involve  them  in  the 

Ep^^and^Elis.  ^^^  ^^^^  ^^"^^'  ^^^  ^^^^  ^^^^^   ^"   ^^^   ^ide  of 

"  Greece  immediately  opposite  Italy ;  but  that,  if 
he  could,  he  would  secure  their  safety  by  defending  the  frontier 
of  Epirus :  in  that  case  he  should  be  admitted  into  all  their 
towns  and  harbours :  but  if  he  decided  not  to  do  so  at  present, 
they  asked  his  indulgence  if  they  shrank  from  a  war  with  Rome." 
The  Eleans,  in  their  turn,  begged  him  "  To  send  a  reinforce- 
ment to  their  town ;  for  as  the  Achaeans  had  voted  war  against 
them,  they  were  in  terror  of  an  attack  from  the  troops  of  the 
league."  The  king  answered  the  Epirotes  by  saying  that  he 
would  send  envoys  to  confer  with   them  on   their   mutual* 

'  The  AfX)clcti,  of  the  numbers  of  whom  we  have  no  information,  acted  as 
a  consultative  senate  to  prepare  measures  for  the  Aetolian  Assembly.  See 
Freeman,  History  of  Federal  Government »  p.  335.     Livy,  35,  34. 


BOOK  XX        DEGENERACY  OF  THE  BOEOTIANS  253 

interests ;  but  to  Elis  he  despatched  a  thousand  foot  soldiers 
under  the  command  of  Euphanes  of  Crete.  .  .  . 

4.  The  Boeotians  had  long  been  in  a  very  depressed  slate, 
which  offered  a  strong  contrast  to  the  former 
prosperity    and    reputation    of    their    country.        Bii™tia^° 
They  had  acquired  great  glory  as  well  as  great 
material  prosperity  at  the  time  of  the  battle  of  LeucCra ;  but 
by  some  means  or  another  from  that  time  fo'-fro^Bc  * 
ward  they  steadily  diminished  both   the  one 
and  the  other  under  the  leadership  of  Amaeocritus ;  and  sub- 
sequently not  only  diminished  them,  but  underwent  a  complete 
change  of  character,  and  did  all  that  was  possible  to  wipe  out 
their   previous   reputation.      For  having  been  incited  by  the 
Achaeans  to  go  to  war  with  the  Aetolians,  they  adopted  the 
policy  of  the  former  and  made  an  alliance  with  them,  and 
thenceforth  maintained  a  steady  war  with  the       ^x..  345. 
Aetolians.      But   on    the   Aetolians   invading    See  Plutarch. 
Boeotia,   they   marched    out   with    their    full      '*'""•  '^ 
available  force,  and  without  waiting  for  the  arrival  of  the 
Achaeans,  who  had  mustered  their  men  and  were  on  the 
point    of  marching    to    their    assistance,    they    attacked    the 
Aetolians ;  and  being  worsted  in  the  battle  were  so  completely 
demoralised,  that,  from  the  time  of  that  campaign,  they  never 
plucked  up  spirit  to  claim  any  position  of  honour  whatever, 
and  never  shared  in  any  enterprise  or  contest  undertaken  by 
the  common  consent  of  the  Greeks.      They  devoted  them- 
selves entirely  to  eating  and  drinking,  and  thus  became  effemi- 
nate in  their  souls  as  well  as  in  their  bodies, 

6.  Such  were,  briefiy,  the  steps  in  the  degeneracy  of 
Boeotia.  Immediately  after  the  battle  Just  mentioned  they 
abandoned  the  Achaeans  and  joined  the  Aetolians.^  But  on 
the  latter  presently  going  to  war  with  Philip's 
father  Demetrius,  they  once  more  abandoned 
the  Aetolians;  and  upon  Demetrius  entering  "" 
Boeotia  with  an  army,  without  attempting  resistance  they 
submitted  completely  to  the  Macedonians.     But  as  a  spark  of 

'  tpailTtifiar  AlnjiXat  rh  (9rin,  cp,  a,  43.  Some  have  Ihoughl  thai  a 
regular  pc^lka]  union  with  the  Aetolian  League  is  meant.  But  the  spirit  of 
the  aarnthe  teerot  to  point  rather  to  an  alliance. 


254  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  book 

their  ancestral  glory  still  survived,  there  were  found  some 
who  disliked  the  existing  settlement  and  the  complete 
subservience  to  Macedonia :  and  they  accordingly  main- 
tained a  violent  opposition  to  the  policy  of  Ascondas  and 

Neon,  the  ancestors  of  Brachylles,  who  were  the 
hoi^"of  Neon!  "^^^'  prominent  in  the  party  which  favoured 

Macedonia.  However,  the  party  of  Ascondas 
eventually  prevailed,  owing  to  the  following  circumstance.  Anti- 
gonus  (Doson),  who,  after  the  death  of  Demetrius,  was  PhUip's 
guardian,  happened  to  be  sailing  on  some  business  along  the 
coast  of  Boeotia ;  when  off  Larymna  he  was  surprised  by  a 
sudden  ebb  of  the  tide,  and  his  ships  were  left  high  and  dry. 
Now  just  at  that  time  a  rumour  had  been  spread  that  Anti- 
gonus  meant  to  make  a  raid  upon  the  country ;  and  therefore 
Neon,  who  was  Hipparch  at  the  time,  was  patrolling  the 
country  at  the  head  of  all  the  Boeotian  cavalry  to  protect  it, 
and  came  upon  Antigonus  in  this  helpless  and  embarrassed  posi- 
tion :  and  having  it  thus  in  his  power  to  inflict  a  serious  blow 
upon  the  Macedonians,  much  to  their  surprise  he  resolved  to 
spare  them.  His  conduct  in  so  doing  was  approved  by  the  other 
Boeotians,  but  was  not  at  all  pleasing  to  the  Thebans.  An- 
tigonus, however,  when  the  tide  flowed  again  and  his  ships 
floated,  proceeded  to  complete  the  voyage  to  Asia  on  which 
he  was  bound,  with  deep  gratitude  to  Neon  for  having 
abstained  from  attacking  him  in  his  awkward  position. 
Bc  222       Accordingly,   when    at    a    subsequent    period 

he  conquered  the  Spartan  Cleomenes  and 
became  master  of  Lacedaemon,  he  left  Brachylles  in 
charge  of  the  town,  by  way  of  paying  him  for  the  kindness 
done  him  by  his  father  Neon.  This  proved  to  be  the  begin- 
ning of  a  great  rise  in  importance  of  the  family  of  Brachylles, 
But  this  was  not  all  that  Antigonus  did  for  him :  from  that 
time  forward  either  he  personally,  or  king  Philip,  continually 
supported  him  with  money  and  influence ;  so  that  before  long 
this  family  entirely  overpowered  the  political  party  opposed  to 
them  in  Thebes,  and  forced  all  the  citizens,  with  very  few  ex- 
ceptions, to  join  the  party  of  Macedonia.  Such  was  the  origin 
of  the  political  adherence  to  Macedonia  of  the  family  of  Neon, 
and  of  its  rise  to  prosperity. 


XX  CONTINUED  DECLINE  OF  BOEOTIA  355 

6.  But  Boeotia  as  a  nation  had  come  to  such  a  low  pitch, 
that  for  nearly  twenty-five  years  the  administra- 
tion of  justice  liad  been  suspended  in  private  jiai^i^oeoiia. 
and  public  suits  alike.     Their  magistrates  were 
engaged  in  despatching  bodies  of  men  to  guard  the  country 
or  in  proclaiming  national  expeditions,  and  thus  continually 
postponed  their  attendance  at  courts  of  law.     Some  of  the 
Strat^  also  dispensed  allowances  to  the  needy  from  the  public 
treasuiy ;  whereby  the  common  people  learnt  to  support  and 
invest  with  office  those  who  would  help  them  to  escape  the 
penalties  of  their  crimes  and  undischarged  liabilities,  and  to 
be  enriched  from  time  to  time  with  some  portion  of  the  public 
property  obtained  by  official  favour.     No  one  contributed  to 
this  lamentable  state  of  things  more  than  Ophelias,  who  was 
always  inventing  some  plan  calculated  to  benefit  the  masses  for 
the  moment,  while  perfectly  certain  to  ruin  them  in  the  future. 
To  these  evils  was  added   another  unfortunate  fashion.     It 
became  the  practice  for  those  who  died  childless  not  to  leave 
their  property  to  the  members  of  their  family,  as  had  been 
the  custom  of  the  country  formerly,  but  to  assign  it  for  the 
maintenance  of  feasts  and  convivial  entertainments  to  be  shared 
in  by  the  testator's  friends  in  common ;  and  even  many  who 
did  possess  children  left  the  larger  part  of  their  property  to  the 
members  of  their  own  club.     The  result  was  that  there  were 
many  Boeotians  who  had  more  feasts  to  attend  in  the  month 
than  there  were  days  in  it.     The  people  of  Megara  therefore, 
disliking  this  habit,  and  remembering  their  old  connexion  with 
the  Achaean  league,  were  inclined  once  more  to  renew  their 
political   alliance   with   it.      For   the   Megarians    had   been 
members  of  the  Achaean  league  since  the  time      AntLgonus 
of  Antigonus  Gonatas ;  but   upon  Cleomenes     Gonaias.  0*. 
blockading  the  Isthmus,  finding  themselves  cut       '-^  "3* 
off  from  the  Achaeans  they  joined  the  Boeotians,  with  the 
consent  of  the  former.     But  a  little  before  the 
time  of  which  we  are  now  speaking,  becoming  ^^^^I'i^^ 
dissatisfied  with  the  Boeotian  constitution,  they 
again  joined  the  Achaeans.     Tlie  Boeotians,  incensed  at  what 
they  considered  acts  of  contempt,  sallied  out  in  fuU  force  to 
attack  Megata ;  and  on  the  Megarians  declining  to  listen  to 


as6  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  book 

them,  they  determined  in  tlieir  anger  to  besiege  and  assault 
their  city.  £ut  being  attacked  by  a  panic,  on  a  report  spread- 
ing that  Philopoemen  was  at  hand  at  the  head  of  a  force  of 
Achacaiis,  they  left  their  scaling  ladders  against  the  walls 
and  fled  back  precipitately  to  their  own  country, 

7.  Such  being  the  state  of  Boeotian  politics,  it  was  only  by 
extraordinary  good  fortune  that  they  evaded  destruction  in  the 
dangerous  periods  of  the  wars  of  Philip  and  Antiochus.  But 
in  the  succeeding  period  they  did  not  escape  in  the  same  way. 
Fortune,  on  the  contrary,  seemed  determined  to  make  them 
pay  for  their  former  good  luck  by  a  specialty  severe  retribution, 
as  I  shall  relate  hereafter.  .  .  . 

Many  of  the  Boeotians  defended  their  alienation  from 
Aniiochus  re-  ''■^  Romans  by  alleging  the  assassination  of 
ceived  in  Thebes,  Brachylles,^  and  the  expedition  made  by  Flamini- 
B.C.  19a.  j,us  upon  Coronea  owing  to  the  murders  of 
Romans  on  the  roads.^  But  the  real  reason  was  their  moral 
degeneracy,  brought  about  by  the  causes  I  have  mentioned. 
For  as  soon  as  the  king  approached,  the  Boeotian  magistrates 
went  out  to  meet  him,  and  after  holding  a  friendly  conversa- 
tion with  him  conducted  him  into  Thebes.  .  .  . 

8.  Antiochus  the  Great  came  to  Chalcis  in  Euboea,  and  there 
Aniiochus  completed  his  marriage,  when  he  was  fifty  years 
wintering  in     old,  and  had  already  undertaken  his  two  most 

Chalcis,  B.C.  important  labours,  the  liberation  of  Greece — as 
"'"''''■  he  called  it — and  the  war  with  Rome.  How- 
ever, having  fallen  in  love  with  a  young  lady  of  Chalcis,  he  was 
bent  on  marrying  her,  though  the  war  was  still  going  on ;  for 
he  was  much  addicted  to  wine  and  delighted  in  excesses.  The 
lady  was  a  daughter  of  Cleoptolemus,  a  man  of  rank,  and  was  pos- 
sessed of  extraordinary  beauty.  He  remained  in  Chalcis  all  the 
winter  occupied  in  marriage  festivities,  utterly  regardless  of  the 
pressing  business  of  the  time.  He  gave  the  giri  the  name  of 
Euboea,  and  after  his  defeat'  fled  with  his  bride  to  Ephesus. . , . 

'  Drachytlcs,  whrn  a  Boeoiarch  in  B.C.  196,  Has  assassinaled  by  a  band  of 
sin  nitn.  of  whom  three  wore  Italians  and  three  Aetohans,  on  his  way  home 
from  a  banquet.      Livy.  33,  28.  '  Livy,  33,  29. 

'  Al  Thermopylae,  in  which  Ualtlc  Uvy  (36,  19)  stales  on  the  outbority 
of  Polj'bius  that  only  500  men  out  of  10,000  brought  by  Antiochus  into  Greece 


XK         SUBSflSSION  OF  THE  AETOUAN  OFFICERS        3S7 

9,   When    the    Romans    took   Heracleia,    Phaeneas    the 
Aetolian     Strategus,    in    view    of    the    danger 
threatening    Aetolia,    and    seeing    what  would  ^  ^^   uto, 
happen  to  the  other  towns,  determined  to  send  by  Adiiui  after 
an  embassy  to  Manius  Acilius  to  demand   a     ''^^  ^im^  of 
truce  and  treaty  of  peace.     With  this  purpose    ^^^g^*™' 
he    despatched     Archidamus,    Pantaleon    and 
Chalesus,  who  on  meeting  the  Roman  consul  were  intending 
to  enter  upon  a  long  argument,  but  were  interrupted  in  the 
middle  of  their  speech  and  prevented  from  finishing  it.     For 
Acilius  remarked  that  "  For  the  present  he  had 
no  leisure  to  attend  to  them,  being  much  engaged     "AetoiUni. 
with  the  distribution  of  the  spoils  of  Heracleia  : 
he  would,  however,  grant  a  ten  days'  truce  and  send  Lucius 
Valerius  Flaccus  with  them,  with  instructions  as  to  what  he 
was  to  say."     The  truce  being  thus  made,  and  Valerius  having 
come  to  Hypaia,  a  lengthened  discussion  took  place  on  the 
state  of  aflairs.     The  Aetolians  sought  to  estabhsh  their  case 
by  referring  to  their  previous  services  to  Rome.     But  Valerius 
cut  this  line  of  argument  short  by  saying  that  "  Such  justifica- 
tion did  not  apply  to  the  present  circumstances;  for  as  these 
old  friendly  relations  had  been  broken  ofT  by  them,  and  the 
existing  hostility  was  owing  entirely  to  the  Aetolians  themselves, 
the  services  of  the  past  could  be  of  no  assistance  to  them  in 
the  present.    They  must  therefore  abandon  a!!  idea  of  justifica- 
tion, and  adopt  a  tone  of  supplication,  and  beseech  the  consul's 
pardon  for  their  transgressions."     After  a  long  discussion  on 
various  details,  the  Aetolians  eventually  decided  to  leave  the 
whole  matter  to  Acilius,  and  commit  themselves  without  reserve 
to  the  good  lajth  of  the  Romans.    They  had  no  comprehension 
of  what  this  really  involved ;  but  they  were   misled   by  the 
word  "  faith  "  into  supposing  that  the  Romans  would  thereby 
be  more  inclined  to  grant  them  terms.      But  with  the  Romans 
for  a  man  "  to  commit  himself  to  their  good  faith  "  is  held  to 
be  equivalent  to  "  surrendering  unconditionally." 

10.  Having  come  to  this  resolution,  Phaeneas  despatched 
legates  with  Valerius  to  announce  the  decision 
of  the  AetolUns  to  Acilius.    On  being  admitted  '^"'^XZ!^'' 
to  the  presence  of  the  Consul,  these  legates,  after 


2S8  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  BOOK 

once  more  entering  upon  a  plea  of  self-justification,  ended  by 
announcing  that  the  Aetolians  had  decided  to  commit  them- 
selves to  the  good  faith  of  the  Romans.  Hereupon  Acillus 
interrupted  them  by  saying,  **  Is  this  really  the  case,  men  of 
Aetolia  ? "  And  upon  their  answering  in  the  affirmative,  he 
o         .  said :   "  Well  then,  the  first  condition  is  that 

Koman terms.  .  •    j^   •  i      ,i  n     ..     i 

none  of  you,  mdividually  or  collectively,  must 
cross  to  Asia ;  the  second  is  that  you  must  surrender  Mene- 
stratus  the  Epirote"  (who  happened  at  that  time  to  be  at 
Naupactus,  where  he  had  come  to  the  assistance  of  the 
Aetolians),  "and  also  King  Amynander,  with  such  of  the 
Athamanians  as  accompanied  him  in  his  desertion  to  your  side." 
Here  Phaeneas  interrupted  him  by  saying  :  "  But  it  is  neither 
just  nor  consonant  with  Greek  customs,  O  Consul,  to  do  what 
you  order/'  To  which  Acilius  replied, — not  so  much  because 
he  was  angry,  as  because  he  wished  to  show  him  the  dangerous 
position  in  which  he  stood,  and  to  thoroughly  frighten  him, — 
"  Do  you  still  presume  to  talk  to  me  about  Greek  customs, 
and  about  honour  and  duty,  after  having  committed  your- 
selves to  my  good  faith?  Why,  I  might  if  I  chose  put 
you  all  in  chains  and  commit  you  to  prison  !  *'  With  these 
words  he  ordered  his  men  to  bring  a  chain  and  an  iron 
collar  and  put  it  on  the  neck  of  each  of  them.  Thereupon 
Phaeneas  and  his  companions  stood  in  speechless  amaze- 
ment, as  though  bereft  of  all  power  of  thought  or  motion,  at 
this  unexpected  turn  of  affairs.  But  Valerius  and  some 
others  who  were  present  besought  Acilius  not  to  inflict  any 
severity  upon  the  Aetolians  then  before  him,  as  they  were  in 
the  position  of  ambassadors.  And  on  his  yielding  to  these 
representations,  Phaeneas  broke  silence  by  saying  that  "  He  and 
the  Apocleti  were  ready  to  obey  the  injunctions,  but  they  must 
consult  the  general  assembly  if  they  were  to  be  confirmed." 
Upon  Acilius  agreeing  to  this,  he  demanded  a  truce  often  days 
to  be  granted.  This  also  having  been  conceded,  they  departed 
with  these  terms,  and  on  arrival  at  Hypata  told  the  Apocleti 
what  had  been  done  and  the  speeches  that  had  been  made. 
This  report  was  the  first  thing  which  made  their  error,  and  the 
compulsion  under  which  they  were  placed,  clear  to  the  Aetolians. 
It  was  therefore  decided  to  write  round  to  the  various  cities 


XK    THE  AETOLIANS  DO  NOT  CONFIRM  THE  TERMS   2S9 

and  call  the  Aetolians  together,  to  consult  on  the  injunctions 
imposed  upon  them.  When  the  news  of  the  The  Aetoiiana  toil 
reception  Phaeneas  had  met  with  was  noised  lo  ratify  ibe 
abroad,  the  Aetolian  people  were  so  infuriated  peace, 
that  no  one  would  even  attend  the  meeting  to  discuss  the  matter 
at  all.  It  was  thus  Impossible  to  hold  the  discussion,  lliey 
were  further  encouraged  by  the  arrival  of  Nicandcr,  who  just 
at  that  time  sailed  into  Phalara,  on  the  Malian  gulf,  from 
Asia,  bringing  news  of  the  warm  reception  given  him  by 
Antiochus,  and  the  promises  for  the  future  which  the  king  had 
made  \  they  therefore  became  quite  indifferent  as  to  the  non- 
completion  of  the  peac&  Thus  when  the  days  of  the  truce  had 
elapsed  the  Aetolians  found  themselves  still  at  war  with  Rome. 
1 1,  But  I  ought  not  to  omit  to  describe  the  subsequent  career 
and  fate  of  Nlcander.  He  arrived  back  at  Phalara 
on  the  twelfth  day  after  leaving  Ephesus,  and  ^i^'^^^'^ 
found  the  Romans  still  engaged  in  Heracleia,  and 
the  Macedonians  having  already  evacuated  Lamia,  but  encamped 
at  no  great  distance  from  the  town :  he  thereupon  conveyed 
his  money  unexpectedly  into  Lamia,  and  attempted  himself  to 
make  his  way  between  the  two  camps  into  Hypata.  But, 
falling  into  the  hands  of  the  Macedonian  pickets,  he  was 
taken  to  Philip,  while  his  evening  party  was  still  at  the  midst 
of  their  entertainment,  greatly  alarmed  lest  he  should  meet 
with  rough  treatment  from  having  incurred  Philip's  resent- 
ment, or  should  be  handed  over  to  the  Romans.  But  when 
the  matter  was  reported  to  the  king,  he  at  once  gave  orders 
that  the  proper  officers  should  offer  Nicander  refreshments,  and 
show  him  every  politeness  and  attention.  After  a  time  he  got 
up  from  table  and  went  personally  to  visit  him;  and  after 
enlarging  at  great  length  on  "the  folly  of  the  Aetolians,  for 
having  first  brought  the  Romans  into  Greece,  and  afterwards 
Antiochus,"  he  still,  even  at  this  hour,  urged  that  "  they  should 
forget  their  past,  adhere  to  their  loyalty  to  himself,  and  not 
show  a  disposition  to  take  advantage  of  each  other's  difficulties." 
He  bade  Nicander  convey  this  message  to  the  leaders  of  the 
Aetolians,  and  exhorting  him  personally  to  remember  the  favours 
which  he  had  received  at  his  hands,  he  despatched  him  with 
a  sufGdent  escort,  which  he  ordered  to  see  him  safe  into  Hypi 


26o  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  BOOK 

This  result  was  far  beyond  Nicander's  hopes  or  expectations. 
He  was  restored  in  due  course  to  his  friends,  and  from  the 
moment  of  this  adventure  remained  devoted  to  the  royal 
family  of  Macedonia.  Thus,  in  the  subsequent  period  of  the 
war  with  Perseus,  the  obligations  which  this  favour  had  imposed 
upon  him  caused  him  to  offer  such  an  unwilling  and  luke- 
warm opposition  to  the  designs  of  Perseus,  that  he  exposed 
himself  to  suspicion  and  denunciation,  and  at  last  was  sum- 
moned to  Rome  and  died  there.  .  .  . 

12.  The  Spartans  could  not  find  one  of  their  own  citizens 

^,  willing  to  address  Philopoemen  on  this  subject 

wish  to  oflfer    '^  o  ^^^  who  for  the  most  part  undertake  work  for 

Philopoemen  the  what  they  can  get  by  it  there  are  plenty  of  people 

palace  of  Nabis,  ^.q  q^^^j.  g^^j^  rewards,  and  to  regard  them  as  the 

as  a  ren-ard.  and  ^-         ,.  '  i-j   ..       r-       ■«  i  . 

as  an  inducement  means  of  founding  and  consolidating  fnendship  : 

to  defend  their  but  in  the  case  of  Philipoemen  no  one  could  be 

^^^^y.J*^"^^"^*^' found  willing  to  convey  this  offer  to   him  at  all. 

Finally,  being  completely  at  a  loss,  they  elected 
Timolaus  to  do  it,  as  being  his  ancestral  guest-friend  and  very 
intimate  with  him.  Timolaus  twice  journeyed  to  Megalopolis 
for  this  express  purpose,  without  daring  to  say  a  word  to 
Philopoemen  about  it  But  having  goaded  himself  to  making 
a  third  attempt,  he  at  length  plucked  up  courage  to  mention 
the  proposed  gifts.  Much  to  his  surprise  Philopoemen 
received  the  suggestion  with  courtesy ;  and  Timolaus  was 
overjoyed  by  the  belief  that  he  had  attained  his  object. 
Philopoemen,  however,  remarked  that  he  would  come  to 
Si)arta  himself  in  the  course  of  the  next  few  days;  for  he 
wished  to  offer  all  the  magistrates  his  thanks  for  this  favour. 
He  accordingly  came,  and,  being  invited  to  attend  the  Senate,  he 
said  :  "  He  had  long  been  aware  of  the  kindness  with  which  the 
Lacedaemonians  regarded  him ;  but  was  more  convinced  than 
ever  by  the  compliments  and  extraordinary  mark  of  honour 
they  now  offered  him.  But  while  gratefully  accepting  their 
intention,  he  disliked  the  particular  manner  of  its  exhibition. 
They  should  not  bestow  such  honour  and  rewards  on  their 
friends,  the  poison  of  which  would  indelibly  infect  the  receiver, 
but  rather  upon  their  enemies ;  that  the  former  might  retain 
their  freedom  of  si)eech  and  the  confidence  of  the  Achaeans 


SI  PHlLOPOEAfEN's  DISINTERESTEDNESS  a6i 

when  proposing  to  offer  assistance  to  Sparta ;  while  the  latter, 
by  swallowing  the  bait,  might  be  compelled  either  to  support 
their  cause,  or  at  any  rate  to  keep  silence  and  do  them  no 
harm.  ..." 

T/u  remaining  events  of  the  war  against  Antiochus  in  this 
year  are  related  by  Livy,  36,  41-45.  Acilius  was  engaged /or 
two  months  in  the  siege  of  Naupactus  :  white  the  Roman  jUet 
under  Gaius  Livius  defeated  that  of  Aniioehus,  under  his  admiral 
Polyxenidas,  off  Phocaea. 

To  see  an  operation  with  one's  own  eyes  is  not  like  merely 
hearing  a  description  of  it.  It  is,  indeed,  quite  another  thing ; 
and  the  confidence  which  such  vivid  experience  gives  is  always 
greatly  advantageous.  .  .  . 


t 


BOOK  XXI 

1.  At  this  time  also  it  happened  that  the  embassy,  which  the 

Lacedaemonians  had  sent  to  Rome,  returned 

Embassy  from   disappointed.      The  subject  of  their  mission 

Sparta,  and  the  was  the  hostages  and  the  villages.     As  to  the 

i^ma^^nate    ^^^^^8^^  ^^^  Senate  answered  that  they  would  give 

instructions  to  envoys  sent  by  themselves ;  and 
as  to  the  hostages  they  desired  to  consider  further.  But  as  to 
the  exiles  of  past  times,  they  said  that  they  wondered  why  they 
were  not  recalled,  now  that  Sparta  had  been  freed  from  her 
tyrants.  .  .  . 

2.  At  the  same  period  the  Senate  dealt  with  the  ambassadors 
from  Philip.  They  had  come  to  set  forth  the  loyalty  and  zeal 
of  the  king,  which  he  had  shown  to  the  Romans  in  the  war 
against  Antiochus.  On  hearing  what  the  envoys  had  to  say, 
the  Senate  released  the  king's  son  Demetrius  from  his  position 
as  hostage  at  once,  and  promised  that  they  would  also  remit 
part  of  the  yearly  indemnity,  if  he  kept  faith  with  Rome  in 
future.  The  Senate  likewise  released  the  Lacedaemonian 
hostages,  except  Armenas,  son  of  Nabis;  who  subsequently 
fell  ill  and  died.  .  .  . 

'^  3.  Directly  the  news  of  the  victory  at  sea  reached  Rome, 
Suppiicatio     ^^^  Senate  first  decreed  a  public  suppUcatio  for 

for  the  victory   nine  days, — which  means  a  public  and  universal 

off"  Phocaea.  holiday,  accompanied  by  the  sacrifice  of  thank- 
offerings  to  the  gods  for  the  happy  success, — and  next  gave 
audience  to  the   envoys  from  Aetolia  and   Manius  Acilius. 

Answer  to  the    When   both   parties  had  pleaded  their  cause 
Aetoiian  Envoys  at  some  length,  the  Senate  decreed  to  offer  the 

intercession  of  AetoUans  the  alternative  of  committing  their 
FUimininus,  when  cause  Unconditionally  to  the  arbitration  of  the 


BOOK  XXI  THE  SCfPIOS  fN  GKEECE  263 

Senate,  or  of  paying  a  thousand  talents  down  and  Acilius  was  about 
making  an  offensive  and  defensive  alliance  with  '°.t*'«  NaupKtus. 
Rome.  But  on  the  Aetolians  desiring  the  "^'Ijl^*'^^' 
Senate  to  state  definitely  on  what  points  they 
were  to  submit  to  such  arbitration,  the  Senate  refused  to 
define  them.  Accordingly  the  war  with  the  Aetolians  went 
oa  .  .  , 

^  4.  While  Amphissa  was  still  being  besieged  by  Manius 
Acilius,  the  Athenians,  hearing  at  that  timegpnngofB.c.  100. 
both  of  the  distress  of  the  Amphissians  and  ofcoss.  L.  Coroeiius 
the  arrival  of  Publius  Scipio,  despatched  Eche-^'P'°'  '^-  Laei'os. 
demus  and  others  on  an  embassy  to  him,  with  instructions  to 

pay  their  respects  to  both  Lucius  and  Publius     „  „ 
'    ;   .  ,    *^    ,  ,  .  ,      ?■  Cornelius 

ijcipio,  and  at  the  same  time  to  try  what  could  scipio  Africanus 
be  done  to  get  peace  for  the  Aetolians,     On  in  Greece  as  lega- 

their  arrival  Publius  welcomed  them  gladly  and  ,'"* ."'  *"*  ''™'J'=y 
,    ,  -  ,  .  .      Luciua,  (March.) 

treated  them  with  great  courtesy ;  because  he 
saw  that  they  would  be  of  assistance  to  him  in  carrying  out 
his  plans.  For  he  was  very  desirous  of  effecting  a  settlement 
in  Aetolia  on  good  tenns  ;  but  had  resolved  that,  if  the  Aetoli- 
ans refused  to  comply,  he  would  at  all  hazards  relinquish  that 
business  for  the  present,  and  cross  to  Asia :  for  he  was  well 
aware  that  the  ultimate  object  of  the  war  and  of  the  entire 
expedition  was  not  to  reduce  the  Aetolian  nation  to  obedience, 
but  to  conquer  Antiochus  and  take  possession  of  Asia, 
Therefore,  directly  the  Athenians  mentioned  the  pacification, 
he  accepted  their  suggestion  with  eagerness,  and  bade  them 
sound  the  Aetolians  also.  Accordingly,  Echedemus  and  his 
colleagues,  having  sent  a  preliminary  deputation  to  Hypata, 
presently  followed  in  person,  and  entered  into  a  discussion 
with  the  Aetolian  magistrates  on  the  subject  of 
a  pacification.  They,  too,  readily  acquiesced  ^^f^^e^^^. 
in  the  suggestion,  and  certain  envoys  were  ap-  ' 
pointed  to  meet  the  Romans.  They  found  Publius  and  the  army 
encamped  sixty  stades  from  Amphissa,  and  there  discoursed 
at  great  length  on  their  previous  services  to  Rome.  Publius 
Scipio  adopted  in  reply  a  still  milder  and  more  conciliatory 
style,  quoting  his  own  conduct  in  Iberia  and  Libya,  and 
explaining  how  he  had  treated  all  who  in  those  countries  had 


264  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  BOOK 

confided  to  his  honour :  and  finally  expressing  an  opinion  that 
they  had  better  put  themselves  in  his  hands.  At  first,  all  who 
were  present  felt  very  sanguine  that  the  pacification  was  about 
to  be  accomplished.  But  when,  in  answer  to  the  Aetolian 
demand  to  know  on  what  terms  they  were  to  make  the  peace, 
Lucius  Scipio  explained  that  they  had  two  alternatives — to 
submit  their  entire  case  unconditionally  to  the  arbitrament  of 
Rome,  or  to  pay  a  thousand  talents  down  and  to  make  an 
offensive  and  defensive  alliance  with  her  —  the  Aetolians 
present  were  thrown  into  the  state  of  the  most  painful  per- 
plexity at  the  inconsistency  of  this  announcement  with  the 
previous  talk :  but  finally  they  said  that  they  would  consult 
the  Aetolians  on  the  terms  imposed. 

5.  On  the  return  of  the  Aetolian  envoys  for  the  purpose  of 
consulting  their  countrymen,  Echedemus  and  his  colleagues 
joined  the  council  of  the  apocleti  in  their  deliberations  on 
this  subject.  One  of  the  alternatives  was  impossible  owing  to 
the  amount  of  money  demanded,  and  the  other  was  rendered 
alarming  in  their  eyes  by  the  deception  they  had  experienced 
See%k  20  ch  10  ^^^°''^j  when,  after  submitting  to  the  surrender, 

they  had  narrowly  escaped  being  thrown  into 
chains.  Being  then  much  perplexed  and  quite  unable  to 
decide,  they  sent  the  same  envoys  back  to  beg  the  Scipios  that 
they  would  either  abate  part  of  the  money,  so  as  to  be  within 
their  power  to  pay,  or  except  from  the  surrender  the  persons 
of  citizens,  men  and  women.  But  upon  their  arrival  in  the 
Roman  camp  and  delivering  their  message,  Lucius  Scipio  merely 
replied  that  "  The  only  terms  on  which  he  was  commissioned 
by  the  Senate  to  treat  were  those  which  he  had  recently 
stated."  They  therefore  returned  once  more,  and  were  followed 
by  Echedemus  and  his  colleagues  to  Hypata,  who  advised  the 
Aetolians  that  "Since  there  was  at  present  a  hitch  in  the 
negotiations  *for  peace,  they  should  ask  for  a  truce ;  and, 
having  thus  at  least  delayed  the  evils  threatening  them,  should 
send  an  embassy  to  the  Senate.  If  they  obtained  their 
request,  all  would  be  well ;  but,  if  they  did  not,  they  must  trust 
to  the  chapter  of  accidents :  for  their  position  could  not  be 
worse  than  it  was  now,  but  for  many  reasons  might  not  im- 
possibly be  better."     The  advice  of  Echedemus  was  thought 


XXI  TRUCE   WITH  THE  AETOLIANS  265 

sound,  and  the  Aetolians  accordingly  voted  to  send  envoys 
to  obtain  a  truce ;  who,  upon  reaching  Lucius    ^  six  monihi' 
Scipio,   begged   that   for  the   present  a  truce    trace  with  the 
of   six  months   might    be  granted  them,   that      Aeiolian*. 
they  might  send  an  embassy  to  the  Senate.     Publius  Scipio, 
who  had  for  some  time   past  been  anxious    to   begin  the 
campaign  in  Asia,  quickly  persuaded  his  brother  to  grant 
their   request.      The   agreement   therefore   was   reduced    to 
writing,  and  thereupon  Manius  Acilius  handed  over  his  army 
to  Lucius  Scipio,  and  returned  with  his  military  tribunes  to 
Rome.  .  .  . 

ASIA 

6.  Factions  became  rife  at  Phocaea,^  partly  because  they 
suffered  from  the  Romans  left  with  the  ships  a  party  at  Pho- 
being  quartered  on  them,  and  partly  because  caea  wish  to  join 
they  were  annoyed  at  the  tribute  imposed  on     Antiochus, 
them.  ...  ''"' 

Then  the  Phocaean  magistrates,  alarmed  at  the  state  of 
popular  excitement  caused  by  the  dearth  of  com,  and  the 
agitation  kept  up  by  the  partisans  of  Antiochus,  sent  envoys 
to  Seleucus,^  who  was  on  Iheir  frontiers,  ordering  him  not  to 
approach  the  town,  as  they  were  resolved  to  remain  neutral 
and  await  the  final  decision  of  the  quarrel,  and  then  obey 
orders.  Of  these  ambassadors  the  partisans  of  Seleucus  and 
his  faction  were  Aristarchus,  Cassander,  and  Rhodon ;  those, 
on  the  contrary,  who  inclined  to  Rome  were  Hegias  and  Gelias. 
On  their  arrival  Seleucus  at  once  showed  every  attention  to 
Aristarchus  and  his  partisans,  but  treated  Hegias  and  Gelias 
with  complete  neglect.  But  when  he  was  informed  of  the 
state  of  popular  feeling,  and  the  shortness  of  provisions  in 
Phocaea,  he  threw  aside  all  negotiation  or  discussion  with  the 
envoys,  and  marched  towards  the  town.   .  .  . 

Two  Galli,  with  sacred  images  and  figures  The  Roman  fleet 
on  their  breasts,  advanced  from  the  town,  and  be-  "^J^o/l'hf " 
sought  them  not  to  adopt  any  extreme  measures  caiii  or  priests 
against  the  city,*  ...  of  Cybele. 

L'T.  37.  9- 

'  Lh7.37.9. 


266  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  book 


7.  The  fire-carrier  used  by  Pausistratus,  the  navarch  of 

the  Rhodians,  was  a  scoop  or  baskets      On 

firing  apparatus.  ^^^^^^  ^^^^  ^^  ^^^  P^°^  ^^^  Staples  were  fixed 

into  the  inner  part  of  the  two  sides  of  the  ship, 

into  which  poles  were  fitted  with  their  extremities  extending 
out  to  sea.  To  the  end  of  these  the  scoop  filled  with  fire 
was  attached  by  an  iron  chain,  in  such  a  way  that  in  charging 
the  enemy's  ship,  whether  on  the  prow  or  the  broadside,  fire 
was  thrown  upon  it,  while  it  was  kept  a  long  way  off  from  his 
own  ship  by  the  slope  of  the  poles.  .  .  . 

The  Rhodian   admiral    Pamphilidas  was   thought   to   be 

Pa   i  t  better  capable  than  Pausistratus  of  adapting 

beaten  by  Poiyx-  himself  to  all  possible  contingencies,  because 

enidas.  the  ad-  his   character   was    more    remarkable   for    its 

mirai  of  the  king.  ^^  ^j^  ^^^  solidity  than  for  its  boldness.     For 

LiVy      -ay      jQ     II,  *  ' 

'  most  men  judge  not  from  any  fixed  principle 
but  by  results.  Thus,  though  they  had  recently  elected 
Pausistratus  to  the  command,  on  the  ground  of  his  possessing 
these  very  (jualities  of  energy  and  boldness,  their  opinions  at 
once  underwent  a  complete  revolution  when  he  met  with  his 
disaster.  .  .  . 

8.  At  this  time  a  letter  arrived  at  Samos  for  Lucius 
The  Actolian  truce  Acmilius  and  Eumcncs  from  the  consul  Lucius 

announced  to    Scipio,  announcing  the  agreement  made  with 
Eunienes  and    jj^^  Aetolians  for  the  truce,  and  the  approach- 
ing  advance  of  the  land  forces  to  the  Helles- 
pont.    Another  to  the  same  effect  was  sent  to  Antiochus  and 
Seleucus  from  the  Aetolians.  .  .  . 

9.  An  embassy  from  King  Eumenes  having  arrived  in 
Achaean  con-  Achaia  proposing  an  alliance,  the  Achaeans 
tingent  sent  to   met  in  public  assembly  and  ratified  it,  and 

the  war.^       ^^^^  ^^  some  soldiers,  a  thousand  foot  and  a 
hundred  horse,  under  the  command  of  Dio- 
phanes  of  Megalopolis.  .  .  . 

Diophanes  was  a  man  of  great  experience  in  war;  for 
during  the  i)rotracted  hostilities  with  Nabis  in  the  neigh- 
bourhood of  Megalopolis,  he  had  served  throughout  under 

a  brilHant  emendation  of  Toupe,  who  reads  €fcX^<irrft  ftJkp  FdXXoi  for  the 
meaningless  i^€\Qb¥T€t  luyiiKok.     Livy  calls  them /anatici  Galli, 


xxr  ANTIOCHUS  AT  PERGAMUM  afi; 

Philopoemen,  and  accordingly  had  gained  a  real  familiarity 
with  the  operations  of  actual  warfare.  And  besides  this 
advantage,  his  appearance  and  physical  prowess  were  im- 
pressive ;  and,  most  important  of  all,  he  was  a  man  of  per- 
sonal courage  and  exceedingly  expert  in  the  use  of  arms.  .  .  . 
10.  King  Antiochus  had  already  penetrated  into  the  terri- 
tory of  Pergamum;  but  when  he  heard  that  Antiochus  pro- 
king  Eumenes  was  close  at  hand,  and  saw  that  poses  peace  with 
the  land  forces  as  well  as  the  fleet  were  ready '*'""^'^'™«"''' 
to  attack  him,  he  began  to  consider  the  prt>- 
pricty  of  proposing  a  pacification  with  the  Romans,  Eumenes, 
and  the  Rhodians  at  once.  He  therefore  removed  with  his 
whole  army  to  Elaea,  and  having  seized  a  hill  facing  that 
town,  he  encamped  his  infantry  upon  it,  while  he  entrenched 
his  cavalry,  amounting  to  over  six  thousand,  close  under  the 
walls  of  the  town.  He  took  up  his  own  position  between  these 
two,  and  proceeded  to  send  messengers  to  Lucius  Aemilius 
in  the  town,  proposing  a  peace.  The  Roman  imperator 
thereupon  called  Eumenes  and  the  Rhodians  to  a  meeting, 
and  desired  them  to  give  their  opinions  on  the  proposal. 
Eudemus  and  Pamphilidas  were  not  averse  to  making  terms ; 
but  the  king  said  that  "To  make  peace  at  the  present 
moment  was  neither  honourable  nor  possible.  „ 
How  could  it  be  an  honourable  conclusion  of  poses  the  peace, 
the  war  that  they  should  make  terms  while  on  the  grounds 
confined  within  the  walls  of  a  town  ?  And  "'  honour  and 
how  was  it  possible  to  give  validity  to  those 
terms  without  waiting  for  the  Consul  and  obtaining  his 
consent  ?  Besides,  even  if  they  did  give  any  indication  of 
coming  to  an  agreement  with  Antiochus,  neither  the  naval  nor 
military  forces  could  of  course  return  home  until  the  Senate 
and  people  had  ratified  the  terms  of  it.  All  that  would  be 
left  for  them  to  do  would  be  to  spend  the  winter  where  they 
were,  waiting  idly  for  the  decision  from  home,  doing  nothing, 
and  exhausting  the  wealth  and  resources  of  their  allies.  And 
then,  if  the  Senate  withheld  its  approval  of  the  terms,  they 
would  have  to  begin  the  war  all  over  again,  having  lei  the 
opportunity  pass,  which,  with  God's  help,  would  have  enabled 
them  to  put  a  period  to  the  whole  war."     Such  was  the  speech 


268  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  book 

of  king  Eumenes.  Lucius  Aemilius  accepted  the  advice,  and 
answered  the  envoys  of  Antiochus  that  the  peace  could  not 
ix)ssibly  be  made  until  the  Proconsul  arrived.  On  hearing 
this  Antiochus  immediately  began  devastating  the  territory  of 
Elaea ;  and  subsequently,  while  Seleucus  remained  in  occupa- 
tion of  that  district,  Antiochus  continued  his  march  through 
the  country  as  far  as  the  plain  of  Thebe,  and  having  there 
entered  upon  an  exceedingly  fertile  and  wealthy  district,  he 
gorged  his  army  with  spoil  of  every  description.  .  .  . 

1 1.  On  his  arrival  at  Sardis  after  this  expedition,  Antiochus 

at  once  sent  to  Prusias  to  urge  him  to  an  alliance. 
B^ynia.^  °   Now  in  former  times  Prusias  had  by  no  means 

been  disinclined  to  join  Antiochus,  because  he 
was  much  alarmed  lest  the  Romans  should  cross  over  to  Asia 
for  the  purpose  of  putting  down  all  crowned  heads.  But  the 
perusal  of  a  letter  received  from  Lucius  and  PubHus  Scipio 
had  served  to  a  great  extent  to  relieve  his  anxiety,  and  give 
him  a  tolerably  correct  forecast  of  the  result  of  the  war.  For 
Letter  of  the  ^^^  Scipios  had  put  the  case  with  great  clearness 
Scipios  to  in  their  letter,  and  had  supported  their  assertions 
Prusias.  i^y  numerous  proofs.  They  entered  not  only 
upon  a  defence  of  the  policy  adopted  by  themselves,  but  of  that 
also  of  the  Roman  people  generally ;  by  which  they  showed 
that,  so  far  from  depriving  any  of  the  existing  kings  of  their 
sovereignties,  they  had  themselves  been  the  authors  in  some 
\  cases  of  their  establishment,  in  others  of  the  extension  of  their 
.  powers  and  the  large  increase  of  their  dominions.  To  prove  this 
they  quoted  the  instances  of  Andobales  and  Colichas  in  Iberia, 
of  Massanissa  in  Libya,  and  of  Pleuratus  in  Illyria,  all  of  whom 
they  said  they  had  raised  from  petty  and  insignificant  princes 
to  the  position  of  undisputed  royalty.  They  further  mentioned 
the  cases  of  Philip  and  Nabis  in  Greece.  As  to  Philip,  they  had 
conquered  him  in  war  and  reduced  him  to  the  necessity  of 
giving  hostages  and  paying  tribute :  yet,  after  receiving  a  slight 
proof  of  his  good  disposition,  they  had  restored  his  son  and 
the  young  men  who  were  hostages  with  him,  had  remitted  the 
tribute,  and  given  him  back  several  of  the  towns  that  had  been 
taken  in  the  course  of  war.  While  as  for  Nabis,  though  they 
might  have  utterly  destroyed  him,  they  had  not  done  so,  but 


XXI  PRUSIAS  REFUSES  TO  HELP  ANTIOCHUS  a69 

had  spared  him,  tyrant  as  he  was,  on  receiving  the  usual 
security  for  his  good  faith.  With  these  facts  before  his  eyes 
they  urged  Prusias  in  their  letter  not  to  be  in  any  fear  for  his 
kingdom,  but  to  adopt  the  Roman  alliance  without  misgiving, 
for  he  would  never  have  reason  to  regret  his  choice.  This 
letter  worked  an  entire  change  in  the  feelings  of  Frusias ;  and 
when,  besides,  Caius  Livius  and  the  other  legates  arrived  at  his 
court,  after  conversation  with  them,  he  entirely  relinquished 
all  ideas  of  looking  for  support  from  Antiochus.  Foiled, 
therefore,  of  hope  in  this  quarter,  Antiochus  retired  to  Ephesus  : 
and  being  convinced  on  reflection  that  the  only  way  of  pre- 
venting the  transport  of  the  enemy's  army,  and  in  fact  of 
repelling  an  invasion  of  Asia  at  all,  was  to  keep 
a  firm  mastery  of  the  sea,  he  determined  to  f^m'sMnos^io 
fight  a  naval  battle  and  leave  the  issue  of  the  t«>s  the  Roman 
struggle  to  be  decided  by  his  success  in  that.  .  ,  .  fleei  sight  some 
12.  When  the  pirates  saw  that  the  Roman  ?iS^'^^ 
fleet  was  coming  they  turned  and  fled.  ... 

The  baUle  between  the  fleets  of  Rome  and  Antiochus  took 
place  betiveen  the  promontories  Myonnesus  and  Corycum,  which 
form  the  bay  of  Teos,  Atttiochus  was  beaten  with  a  loss  of  forty- 
two  ships  early  in  b.c.  190.     Livy,  37,  30. 

IS.  After  sustaining  this  defeat  at  sea,  Andochus  remained 
in  Sardis,  neglecting  to  avail  himself  of  such 
opportunities  as  he  had  left,  and  taking  no 
steps  whatever  to  prosecute  the  war ;  and  when  : 
he  learnt  that  the  enemy  had  crossed  into  seniu  an  envoy 
Asia  he  lost  all  heart,  and  determined  in  despair  '°^^  ^'^^ 
to  send  an  envoy  to  Lucius  and  Pubhus  Scipio 
to  treat  of  peace.  He  selected  Heracleides  of  Byzantium  for 
this  purpose,  and  despatched  him  with  instructions  to  offer  to 
surrender  the  territories  of  lampsacus  and  Smyrna  as  well  as 
Alexandria  (Troas),  which  were  the  original  cause  of  the  war, 
and  any  other  cities  in  Aeolis  and  Ionia  of  which  they  might 
wish  to  deprive  him,  as  having  embraced  their  side  in  the 
war ;  and  in  addition  to  this  to  promise  an  indemnity  of  half 
the  expenses  they  had  incurred  in  their  quarrel  with  him.  Such 
were  the  offers  which  the  envoy  was  instructed  to  make  in  his 


270  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  book 

public  audience ;  but,  besides  these,  there  were  others  to  be 
committed  to  Publius  Scipio's  private  ear,  of  which  I  will  speak 
in  detail  later  on.  On  his  arrival  at  the  Hellespont  the  envoy 
found  the  Romans  still  occupying  the  camp  which  they  had 
constructed  immediately  after  crossing.  At  first  he  was  much 
cheered  by  this  fact,  for  he  thought  it  would  materially  aid  his 
negotiation  that  the  enemy  were  exactly  where  they  were  at 
first,  and  had  not  as  yet  taken  any  further  action.  But  when 
he  learnt  that  Publius  Scipio  was  still  on  the  other  side  of  the 
water  he  was  much  disturbed,  because  the  turn  which  his 
negotiations  were  to  take  depended  principally  on  Scipio's  view 
of  the  matter.  The  reason  of  the  army  being  still  in  their 
The  laws  relating  first  camp,  and  of  Publius  Scipio's  absence 
to  the  Saiii  or  from  the  army,  was  that  he  was  one  of  the  Salii. 
priests  of  Mars,  'py^ggg  ^re,  as  I  have  before  stated,  one  of  the 
three  colleges  of  priests  by  whom  the  most  important  sacrifices 
to  the  gods  are  offered  at  Rome.  And  it  is  the  law  that,  at 
the  time  of  these  sacrifices,  they  must  not  quit  the  spot  for 
thirty  days  in  which  it  happens  to  find  them.^  This  was  the 
case  at  the  present  time  with  Publius  Scipio ;  for  just  as  the 
army  was  on  the  point  of  crossing  this  season  arrived,  and 
prevented  him  from  changing  his  place  of  abode.  Thus  it 
came  about  that  he  was  separated  from  the  legions  and  re- 
mained in  Europe,  while,  though  the  army  crossed,  it  remained 
encamped,  and  could  take  no  further  step,  because  they  were 
waiting  for  him. 

14.  However,  Publius  arrived  a  few  days  afterwards,  and 

Heracleides   being    summoned    to   attend   the 
Heradeides      Council,    delivered    the    message   with   which 

he  was  charged,  announcing  that  Antiochus 
abandoned  Lampsacus,  Smyrna,  and  Alexandria ;  and  also  all 
such  towns  in  Aeolis  and  Ionia  as  had  sided  with  Rome ;  and 
that  he  oflered,  further,  an  indemnity  of  half  their  expenses  in 
the  present  war.  He  added  many  arguments  besides,  urging 
the  Romans  "  Not  to  tempt  fortune  too  far,  as  they  were  but 

*  Dies  forte,  quibus  ANiilia  mcu'entur,  religiosi  ad  iter  inciderant.  Livy, 
37t  33'  The  festival  of  Mars,  during  which  the  ancilia  were  carried  about, 
was  on  the  ist  of  March  and  following  days.  If  this  incident,  therefore,  took 
place  in  the  late  spring  or  summer  of  B.C.  190,  the  Roman  Calendar  must  have 
been  very  far  out. 


xiti  ANTIOCHUS  TRIES  TO  NEGOTIATE  271 

men ;  nor  to  extend  their  empire  indefinitely,  but  rather  to  keep 
it  within  limits,  if  possible  those  of  Europe, — for  even  then 

they  would  have  an  tnormous  and  unprecedented  dominion, 
such  as  no  nation  before  them  had  attained  ; — but  if  they  were 
determined  at  all  hazards  to  grasp  parts  of  Asia  also,  let  thetn 
say  definitely  what  parts  those  were,  for  the  king  would  go  to 
the  utmost  stretch  of  his  power  to  meet  their  wishes,"  After 
the  delivery  of  this  speech  the  council  decided  that  the 
Consul  should  answer  that  "  It  was  only  fair 
that  Antiochus  should  pay,  not  the  half,  but  '^^^'^'' 
the  whole  expense  of  the  war,  seeing  that  he, 
and  not  they,  had  originally  begun  it ;  and  as  to  the  cities,  he 
must  not  only  liberate  those  in  Aeolis  and  Ionia,  but  must 
surrender  his  whole  dominion  on  this  side  of  Mount  Taurus." 
On  receiving  this  answer  from  the  council,  conveying  de- 
mands which  went  far  beyond  his  instructions,  the  envoy, 
without  answering  a  word,  abstained  from  a  public  audience 
thenceforth,  but  exerted  himself  to  conciliate  Publius  Scipio. 

15.  Having  at  length  got  a  suitable  opportunity,  he  disclosed 
to  him  the  offers  with  which  he  was  charged,  xhe  secrei  offers. 
These  were  that  the  king  would  first  restore  his  of  Amiochua  to 
son  without  ransom,  who  had  been  taken  '^•"'"^  Scipi"- 
prisoner  in  the  early  part  of  the  war ;  and  was  prepared,  secondly, 
to  pay  him  any  sum  of  money  he  might  name,  and  thenceforth 
share  with  him  the  wealth  of  his  kingdom,  if  he  would 
only  support  the  acceptance  of  the  terms  offered  by  the  king. 
Publius  replied  that  the  promise  as  to  his  son  g^.  .  . 
he  accepted,  and  would  feel  under  an  obligation 
to  the  king  if  he  fulfilled  it ;  but  as  to  the  rest  he  assured  him 
that  the  king,  among  his  other  delusions,  was  under  a  complete 
mistake  as  to  the  course  demanded  by  his  own  interests. 
"  For  if  he  had  made  these  offers  while  still  master  of  Lysima- 
cheia  and  the  entrance  into  the  Chersonese,  he  would  at  once 
have  got  what  he  asked :  and  so  too,  even  after  evacuating 
these  places,  if  he  had  appeared  with  his  army  at  the  Helles- 
pont and  shown  that  he  meant  to  prevent  our  crossing,  and 
then  had  sent  his  envoys,  he  might  even  thus  have  obtained 
his  demands.  But  when  he  comes  with  his  proposals  of 
equitable  terms,  after  allowing  our  troops  to  set  foot  in  Asia, 


272  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  book 

and  having  so  not  only  submitted  to  the  bridle,  but  allowed 
the  rider  to  mount,  he  must  expect  to  fail  and  be  disappointed 
of  his  hopes.  Therefore,  I  advise  him  to  adopt  wiser  measure^ 
and  look  at  the  facts  in  their  true  light  In  return  for  his 
promise  in  regard  to  my  son,  I  will  give  him  a  hint  which  is  well 
worth  the  favour  he  olfers  me :  make  any  concession,  do  any- 
thing, rather  than  fight  with  the  Romans."  With  this  answer 
Heracleides  returned  and  told  the  king  everything.  And 
Antiochus,  considering  that  no  severer  terms  could  be  imposed 
on  him  if  he  were  beaten  in  the  lield,  abandoned  all  idea  of 
negotiation,  and  began  making  preparations  of  all  sorts  and  in 
every  direction  for  the  battle,  .  .  . 

Antiochus  sent  Scipie^s  son  ba{k.  The  decisive  battle  took 
place  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Thyatira,  and  proved  a  decisive 
victory  for  the  Romans.  This  was  in  the  late  autumn  of  ac 
190.     See  Uvy,  37,  38-44. 

1 8.  After  the  victory  the  Romans  took  Sardis  and  its  Acro- 
polis, and  there  they  were  visited  by  Musaeus  bringing  a 
message  from  Antiochus.  Being  politely  received  by  the 
Scipios,  he  announced  that  Antiochus  wished  to  send  envoys 
to  treat  on  the  terms  of  peace,  and  therefore  desired  that  a 
safe  conduct  should  be  given  them.  This  was  granted  and  the* 
herald  returned ;  and  some  days  after,  Zeuxis,  formerly  Satrap 
of  Lydia,  and  Antipater,  his  nephew,  came  as  ambassadors 
from  king  Antiochus.  Their  first  anxiety  was  to  meet  lung 
Eumenes,  because  they  feared  that  his  old  quarrel  would  cause 
him  to  be  only  too  ready  to  do  them  a  bad  turn.  But  when 
they  found  liim,  contrary  to  their  expectation,  disposed  to 
moderate  and  gentle  methods,  they  at  once  addressed  them- 
selves to  meeting  the  council  Being  summoned  to  attend  it 
they  made  a  lengthy  speech,  among  other  things  exhorting  the 
Romans  to  use  their  victory  with  mildness  and  generosity; 
and  alleging  that  such  a  course  was  still  more  to  the  interest 
of  the  Romans  than  of  Antiochus,  since  Fortune  had  com- 
mitted to  them  the  empire  and  lordship  of  the  world.  Finally, 
they  asked  "  What  they  were  to  do  to  obtain  peace  and  the 
friendship  of  Rome  ? "  The  members  of  the  council  had 
already  in  a  previous  sitting  discussed  and  agreed  upon  this 


Jtxi  THE  ROMAN  TERMS  TO  ANTIOCHUS  273 

point,    and    now    bade    Publius    Scipio    deliver    their  de- 
cision. 

17.  Scipio  began  by  saying  that  victory  never  made  the 
Romans  more  severe  than  before,  and  accord- xhe  Roman  tenns 

ingly  the  envoys  would  receive  the  same  imposed  on 
answer  as  they  had  previously  received  when  they  Aniiochus. 
came  to  the  Hellespont  before  the  battle.  "  They  must 
evacuate  Europe  and  all  Asia  this  side  Taurus :  must  pay  the 
Romans  iiftcen  thousand  Euboic  talents  as  an  indemnity  for 
the  expenses  of  the  war,  five  hundred  at  once,  two  thousand 
five  hundred  on  the  ratification  of  the  treaty  by  the  people, 
and  the  rest  in  twelve  yearly  instalments  of  a  thousand  talents. 
Further,  Antiochus  must  pay  Eumenes  the  four  hundred 
talents  owing  to  him,  and  the  balance  of  the  corn  due  In 
accordance  with  the  treaty  made  with  his  father  Attalus.  He 
must  at  the  same  time  deliver  Hannibal  the  Carthaginian, 
Thoas  the  Aetolian,  Mnasilochus  the  Acarnanian,  and  Philo 
and  Eubulides  the  Chalcidians.  As  security  for  the  fulfilment 
of  these  terms,  Antiochus  must  at  once  give  twenty  hostages 
named  in  the  treaty."  Such  was  the  decision  -phe  terms  are 
announced  by  Publius  Scipio  in  the  name  of  accepted,  and 
the  whole  Council,  Antiprater  and  Zeuxis  having  missions  seni  to 
expressed  their  consent  to  them,  it  was  agreed 
by  all  to  send  envoys  to  Rome  to  appeal  to  the  Senate  and 
people  to  confirm  the  treaty.  The  ambassadors  of  Antiochus 
departed  with  this  understanding :  and  during  the  following 
days  the  Roman  commanders  divided  their  forces  into  their 
winter  quarters ;  and  when  some  few  days  later  the  hostages 
arrived,  both  Eumenes  and  the  envoys  of  Antiochus  started  on 
their  voyage  to  Rome.  Nor  were  they  alone  in  their  mission  j 
for  Rhodes  also,  and  Smyrna,  and  nearly  all  the  nations  and 
states  on  this  side  Taurus  sent  ambassadors  to  Rome.  .  .  . 

\18.'  At  the  beginning  of  the  summer  following  the  victory 
of  the  Romans  over  Antiochus,  the  ambassadors 
of  that  king,  and  those  from  Rhodes,  as  well  as  ^''^^_  Maniius^ 
from  the  other  states  arrived  in  Rome.      For,  as  I  Vulso,  M.  Fulvius 
e  placed  by  Schwcighaeuscr  and 


274  7'-^^  HJSTOJilES  OF  POL  YBJUS  BOOK 


Nobiiior.  Recep-  said,  nearly  all  the  states  in  Asia  began  sending  en- 
Eumenw  and^the  voystoRome  immediately  after  the  battle,  because 
ambassadors  at  the  hopes  of  all  as  to  their  future  position  rested 
Rome.  at  that  time  on  the  Senate.  All  who  arrived 
were  graciously  received  by  the  Senate ;  but  the  most  imposing 
reception  was  that  accorded  to  king  Eumenes,  both  in  the  com- 
plimentary processions  sent  out  to  meet  him  and  the  arrange- 
ments made  for  his  entertainment ;  and  next  in  cordiality  to 

his  reception  was  that  given  to  the  Rhodians. 

^\^hrsllnaJr  '"  ^^^^"  ^^^  ^^^^  ^^^  '^^  audiences  came,  they  first 

called  in  the  king  and  bade  him  say  freely  what 
„  he  wished  to  obtain  at  the  hands  of  the  Senate. 

But  Eumenes  at  first  evaded  the  task  by  saying  : 
"  If  I  had  been  desirous  of  obtaining  any  favour  from  others, 
I  should  have  looked  to  the  Romans  for  advice,  that  I  might 
neither  desire  anything  that  was  wrong  nor  ask  anything  unfair ; 
but  seeing  that  I  am  here  to  prefer  my  request  to  the  Romans 
themselves,  I  think  it  better  to  leave  the  interests  of  myself  and 
my  brothers  unreservedly  in  their  hands."  And  though  one 
of  the  Senators  rose  and  begged  him  to  have  no  apprehension, 
but  to  speak  his  mind,  he  still  adhered  to  this  view.  And  so 
after  a  certain  time  had  elapsed  the  king  withdrew ;  and  the 
Senate,  remaining  in  the  curia,  debated  what  was  to  be  done. 
Eventually  it  was  decreed  to  call  upon  Eumenes  to  declare 
with  his  own  mouth  the  objects  of  his  visit  without  reserve, 
on  the  ground  that  he  knew  best  what  his  own  kingdom  required, 
and  what  was  the  state  of  things  in  Asia.  He  was  then  called 
in  ;  and,  one  of  the  Senators  having  informed  him  of  the  vote, 
he  was  compelled  to  speak  on  the  business. 

19.  He  said  therefore  that  "He  would  not  say  another 

word  on  his  own  concerns,  but  would  adhere 
Emn^n^       Strictly  to  his  resolution  of  leaving  the  decision 

as  to  them  entirely  in  the  hands  of  the  Romans. 
But  there  was  one  subject  on  which  he  felt  anxiety,  namely, 
the  policy  of  Rhodes ;  and  it  was  this  that  induced  him  to 
address  the  Senate  on  the  present  occasion.  These  Rhodians 
had  come  to  Rome  to  further  the  interests  of  their  own 
country,  and  their  own  prosperity,  quite  as  much  as  he  had 
come  to  promote  those  of  his  own  kingdom  at  that  moment ; 


ixi  KING  EUMENES  IN  THE  SENATE  a7S 

but  their  professions  were  entirely  at  variance  with  their  real 
purpose.  And  it  was  easy  to  satisfy  one's  self  of  this :  for,  when 
they  enter  the  Senate  house,  they  will  say  that  they  come 
neither  to  ask  anything  for  themselves  nor  to  thwart  Eumenes 
in  any  way  whatever ;  but  are  ambassadors  for  the  liberty  of 
the  Greek  inhabitants  of  Asia.  '  To  secure  this,'  they  will  say, 
'is  not  so  much  a  favour  to  themselves  as  an  act  incumbent 
on  the'  Romans,  and  in  consonance  with  their  former  achieve- 
ments.' Such  will  be  their  specious  professions  ;  but  the  real 
truth  of  the  case  will  be  wholly  different.  For  if  these  cities 
are  once  set  free,  the  result  will  be  that  their  dominion  will 
be  many  times  increased,  while  his  own  would  be  in  a  manner 
entirely  broken  up.  For  the  attractive  name  of  liberty  and 
autonomy  would  draw  from  his  rule  not  only  the  cities  to  be 
freed  at  present,  but  those  also  which  had  been  under  his  rule 
from  of  old,  directly  it  is  made  apparent  that  the  Senate  has 
adopted  that  policy,  and  would  add  them  to  the  dominion  of 
Rhodes.  That  was  the  natural  course  for  things  to  take. 
Imagining  that  they  owed  their  freedom  to  Rhodes,  those 
cities  would  become  in  name  its  allies,  but  in  reality  entirely 
subservient,  owing  to  the  heavy  obligation  under  which  they  will 
find  themselves.  He  begged  the  Senators,  therefore,  to  be  on 
their  guard  on  that  point ;  lest  they  should  find  that  they  had 
unwittingly  aggrandised  one  friendly  nation  too  much,  and  dis- 
proportionately weakened  another ;  or  even  that  they  were 
benefiting  men  who  had  once  been  their  foes,  to  the  neglect 
and  contempt  of  their  genuine  friends." 

20.  "  For  myself,"  he  continued,  "  though  in  every  other 
point  I  would  yield,  if  it  were  necessary,  to  my  neighbours, 
yet  in  the  matter  of  your  friendship  and  of  my  goodwill 
towards  you  I  will  never,  if  I  can  help  it,  yield  to  any  one  alive. 
And  I  think  that  my  father,  if  he  had  been  living,  would  have 
said  the  same :  for  as  he  was  the  first  to  become  your  friend 
and  ally,  so  of  all  the  inhabitants  of  Asia  and  Greece  he  was  the 
most  nobly  loyal  to  you  to  the  last  day  of  his  life,  not  only  in 
heart  but  in  deed.  For  he  took  his  part  in  all  your  wars  in 
Greece,  and  furnished  the  largest  contingents  of  men  and 
ships  of  all  your  allies ;  contributed  the  largest  share  of  sup- 
plies ;  and  laced  the  most  serious  dangers :  and  to  sum  up  al' 


276  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  book 

ended  his  life  actually  engaged  in  the  war  with  Philip,  while 
employed  in  urging  the  Boeotians  to  join  your  alliance.  I, 
too,  when  I  succeeded  to  his  kingdom,  while  fully  maintaining 
my  father^s  views,  for  it  was  impossible  to  do  more,  have  yet 
gone  even  beyond  him  in  actual  achievements :  for  the  state 
of  the  times  brought  me  to  a  more  fiery  test  than  they  did 
him.  Antiochus  offered  me  his  daughter  and  a  share  in  his 
whole  kingdom :  offered  me  immediate  restoration  of  all  the 
cities  that  had  been  before  wrested  from  me :  and  finally 
promised  me  any  price  I  chose  if  I  would  join  him  in  his 
war  with  you.  But  so  far  from  accepting  any  one  of  these 
offers,  I  joined  you  in  your  struggle  against  Antiochus  with 
the  largest  military  and  naval  contingents  of  any  of  your  allies ; 
contributed  the  largest  share  of  supplies  at  the  time  of  your 
utmost  need;  and  exposed  myself  unreservedly  to  every 
danger  along  with  your  generals.  Finally,  I  submitted  to 
being  invested  in  Pergamos  itself,  and  risked  my  life  as  well 
as  my  crown  in  my  loyalty  to  your  people. 

21.  "  Therefore,  men  of  Rome,  as  many  of  you  have  been 
eye-witnesses  of  the  truth  of  my  words,  and  all  of  you  know  it, 
it  is  but  just  that  you  should  have  a  corresponding  regard  for 
my  interests.  You  have  made  Massanissa  king  of  the  greater 
part  of  Libya,  though  he  had  once  been  your  enemy  and  at 
last  deserted  to  your  side  accompanied  only  by  a  few  horse- 
men, only  because  he  kept  faith  with  you  in  one  war :  you 
have  raised  Pleuratus  to  the  first  position  among  the  princes 
of  Illyria,  though  he  had  done  absolutely  nothing  for  you 
beyond  keeping  loyal ;  it  would  be  the  height  of  inconsistency 
if  you  should  neglect  me  and  my  family,  who  from  generation  to 
generation  have  co-operated  in  your  most  important  and  glorious 
undertakings.  What  is  it,  then,  that  I  am  asking  you  to  do,  and 
what  do  I  claim  at  your  hands  ?  I  will  tell  you  openly,  since 
you  have  called  upon  me  to  speak  my  mind  to  you.  If  you 
decide,  then,  to  continue  holding  certain  parts  of  Asia  which 
are  on  this  side  Taurus,  and  were  formerly  subject  to  Antiochus, 
that  is  what  I  should  wish  to  see  best  of  all :  for  I  consider 
that  the  security  of  my  realm  would  best  be  secured  by  having 
you  for  neighbours,  and  especially  by  my  sharing  in  your 
prestige.     But  if  you  decide  not  to  do  this,  but  to  evacuate 


XXI  THE  RHODIANS  I77 

Asia  entirely,  there  is  no  one  to  whom  you  may  with  greater 
justice  sunender  the  prizes  you  have  won  in  the  field  than  to 
mc.  But  it  may  be  said,  it  is  a  more  honourable  thing  still 
to  set  the  enslaved  free.  Yes !  if  they  had  rot  ventured  to 
join  Antiochus  in  the  war  against  yoa  But  since  they  had 
the  hardihood  to  do  so,  it  is  a  much  more  honourable  couree 
to  make  a  proper  return  to  your  sincere  friends,  than  to 
benefit  those  who  have  shown  themselves  your  enemies," 

22.  After  the  delivery  of  this  effective  speech  Eumenes 
retired.  The  Senate  received  both  the  king  himself  and  the 
speech  with  every  mark  of  favour,  and  were  enthusiastic  for 
doing  everything  in  their  power  to  gratify  him. 
They  wished  to  call  in  the  Rhodians  next  after '™^^^^'™°' 
him  ;  but  one  of  the  Rhodian  ambassadors  not 
being  there  in  time,  they  called  in  those  from  Smyrna,  who 
delivered  a  long  disquisition  on  the  goodwill  and  zeal  which 
they  had  displayed  towards  Rome  during  the  late  war.  But 
as  there  are  no  two  opinions  about  the  fact  of  their  having 
been,  of  all  the  autonomous  states  in  Asia,  the  most  strenuous 
in  the  cause,  1  do  not  think  it  necessary  to  set  forth  their 
speech  In  detail. 

But  next  to  them  came  in  the  Rhodians :  who,  after  a  short 
preamble  as  to  their  services  to  the  Romans, 
quickly  came  to  the  discussion  of  the  position  RhadianL 
of  their  own  country.  They  said  that  "  It  was 
a  very  great  embarrassment  to  them,  in  the  discharge  of  their 
ambassadorial  duties,  to  find  themselves  placed  by  the  necessities 
of  the  case  in  opposition  to  a  sovereign  with  whom  their 
public  and  private  relations  were  of  the  most  friendly  descrip- 
tion. It  was  the  opinion  of  their  countrymen  that  the  most 
honourable  course,  and  the  one  which  above  all  others  would 
redound  to  the  credit  of  Rome,  was,  that  the  Greeks  in  Asia 
should  be  set  free,  and  should  recover  that  possession  dearest 
to  all  mankind^autonomy  :  but  this  was  the  last  thing  to  suit 
Eumenes  and  his  brothers.  It  was  the  nature  of  monarchy 
to  hate  equality,  and  to  endeavour  to  have  everybody,  or  at 
least  as  many  as  possible,  subject  and  obedient.  But  though 
that  was  the  case  now,  still  they  felt  convinced  that  they  should 
gain  their  object,  not  because  they  had  greater  influetice  will" 


278  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  book 

the  Romans  than  Eumenes,  but  because  they  would  be  shown 
to  be  suggesting  a  course  more  just  in  itself  and  more  in- 
disputably advantageous  to  all  concerned.  If^  indeed,  the 
only  way  the  Romans  could  requite  Eumenes  was  by  handing 
over  to  him  the  autonomous  towns,  they  might  reasonably  be 
at  a  loss  to  determine  what  to  do ;  for  they  would  have  had 
to  decide  between  neglecting  a  sincere  friend  and  disregard- 
ing their  own  honour  and  duty,  and  thus  entirely  obscuring 
and  degrading  the  glory  of  their  great  achievements.  But  if, 
on  the  other  hand,  it  were  possible  adequately  to  consult  for 
both  these  objects  at  the  same  time,  who  could  doubt  about 
the  matter  any  longer  ?  Yet  the  fact  was  that,  as  in  a  costly 
banquet,  there  was  enough  and  to  spare  for  alL  Lycaonia, 
Phrygia  on  the  Hellespont,  and  Pisidia,  the  Chersonese  also 
and  the  districts  bordering  on  it,  were  at  the  disposal  of  the 
Romans  to  give  to  whom  they  chose ;  only  a  few  of  which 
added  to  the  kingdom  of  Eumenes  would  double  its  present 
extent,  while  if  all,  or  even  the  great  part  were  assigned  to  him, 
it  would  become  second  to  that  of  no  other  prince  in  Asia. 

23.  **It  was  therefore  in  the  power  of  the  Romans  to 
strengthen  their  friends  very  materially  without  destroying  the 
glory  of  their  own  policy.  For  the  end  which  they  pro- 
posed to  themselves  in  their  war  was  not  the  same  as  that  of 
other  nations,  but  widely  different.  The  rest  of  the  world  all 
entered  upon  war  with  the  view  of  conquering  and  seizing 
cities,  wealth,  or  ships :  but  heaven  had  ordained  that  they 
should  want  none  of  these  things,  by  having  put  everything 
in  the  whole  world  under  their  rule.  What  was  it,  then,  that 
they  had  still  occasion  to  wish  for,  and  to  take  the  securest 
means  to  obtain  ?  Plainly  praise  and  glory  among  mankind ; 
which  it  was  difficult  indeed  to  gain,  but  most  difficult  of 
all  to  preserve  when  gained.  Their  war  with  Philip  might 
show  them  their  meaning.  That  war  they  had,  as  they 
professed,  undertaken  with  the  sole  object  of  liberating 
Greece ;  and  that  was  in  fact  the  only  prize  they  gained  in  it, 
and  no  other  whatever :  yet  the  glory  they  got  by  it  was 
greater  than  that  which  the  tribute  of  the  Carthaginians  had 
brought  them.  And  justly  so  :  for  money  is  a  possession 
common  to  all  mankind,  but  honour  and  praise  and  glory  are 


XXI  THE  DECISION  OF  THE  SENATE  279 

attributes  of  the  gods  and  of  those  men  who  approach  nearest 
to  them.  Therefore,  the  most  glorious  of  all  their  achieve- 
ments was  the  liberation  of  Greece;  and  if  they  now  com- 
pleted that  work  their  fame  would  receive  its  consummation ; 
but  if  they  neglected  to  do  so,  even  what  they  had  already 
accomplished  would  lose  its  lustre."  They  finally  wound  up 
by  saying,  "  As  for  us,  gentlemen,  having  once  deliberately 
adopted  this  policy  and  joined  with  you  in  the  severest  battles 
and  in  genuine  dangers,  we  do  not  now  propose  to  abandon  the 
part  of  friends  ;  but  have  not  hesitated  to  say  openly  what  we 
believe  to  be  for  your  honour  and  your  interests  alike,  with  no 
ulterior  design  whatever,  and  with  a  single  eye  to  our  duty  as 
the  highest  earthly  object." 

24.  This  speech  of  the  Rhodians  was  universally  regarded 
as    temperate    and    fair.      The    Senate    next     Treaty  with 
caused   Antipater  and    Zeuxis,    the  ambassa-      Antiocbus 
dors    of   Antiochus,  to    be    introduced:    and      «"'>™n'- 
on  their  speaking  in   a  tone  of  entreaty  and  supplication, 
an  approval  of  the  agreement  made  by  him  with  Scipio  in 
Asia  was  voted.     A  few  days   later  the  people  also  ratified  it, 
and  oaths  were  accordingly  interchanged  with  Antipater  and 
his  colleague.     This  done,  the  other  ambassadors  from  Asia 
were  introduced  into  the  Senate :  but  a  very  brief  hearing  was 
given  to  each,  and  the  same  answer  was  returned  to  all ;  namely, 
that  ten  commissioners  would  be  sent  to  decide  on  ail  points 
of  dispute    between    the    cities.      The  Senate     seiilemeni  of 
then   appointed   ten    commissioners,   to  whom  Asia, 

they  gave  the  entire  settlement  of  particulars;  ^'^  '^'^ 
while  as  a  general  principle  they  decided  that  of  Asia 
this  side  Taurus  such  inhabitants  as  had  been  subject  to 
Antiochus  were  to  be  assigned  to  Eumenes,  except  Lycia  and 
Caria  up  to  the  Maeandcr,  which  were  to  belong  to  the 
Rhodians;  while  of  the  Greek  cities,  such  of  them  as  had 
been  accustomed  to  pay  tribute  to  Attalus  were  to  pay  the 
same  to  Eumenes ;  and  only  those  who  had  done  so  to 
Antiochus  were  to  be  relieved  of  tribute  altogether.  Having 
given  the  ten  commissioners  these  outlines  of  the  general 
settlement,  they  sent  them  out  to  join  the  consul,  Cnaeus 
Manlius  Vulso,  in  Asia. 


28o  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  book 

After  these  arrangements  had  been  completed,  the  Rhodian 
c  ,. .   ^.,.  .      envoys  came  to  the  Senate  again  with  a  request 

Soli  in  Cihcia.     .  a   ^      a  v    -      or   •        n      •        *u  ^  *u 

m  regard  to  Soh  m  Cihcia,  allegmg  that  they 
were  called  upon  by  ties  of  kindred  to  think  of  the  interests 
of  that  city ;  for  the  people  of  Soli  were,  like  the  Rhodians, 
colonists  from  Argos.  Having  listened  to  what  they  had  to 
say,  the  Senate  invited  the  attendance  of  the  ambassadors 
from  Antiochus,  and  at  first  were  inclined  to  order  Antiochus 
to  evacuate  the  whole  of  Cilicia ;  but  upon  these  ambassadors 
resisting  this  order,  on  the  ground  of  its  being  contrary  to  the 
treaty,  they  once  more  discussed  the  case  of  Soli  by  itself. 
The  king's  ambassadors  still  vehemently  maintaining  their 
rights,  the  Senate  dismissed  them  and  called  in  the  Rhodians. 
Having  informed  them  of  the  opposition  raised  by  Antipater, 
they  added  that  they  were  ready  to  go  any  length  in  the 
matter,  if  the  Rhodians,  on  a  review  of  the  whole  case,  deter- 
mined to  push  their  claim.  The  Rhodian  envoys,  however, 
were  much  gratified  by  the  spirit  shown  by  the  Senate,  and 
said  that  they  would  ask  nothing  more.  This  question,  there- 
fore, was  left  as  it  was ;  and  just  as  the  ten  commissioners 
and  the  other  ambassadors  were  on  the  point  of  starting,  the 
e  « ^    o   two  Scipios,   and  Lucius  Aemilius,  the  victor 

Summer  RC.  189..         .      ^  /-,  .,a-i  -      ^ 

m  the  sea  fight  with  Antiochus,  amved  at 
Brundisium ;  and  after  certain  days  all  three  entered  Rome  in 
triumph.  .  .  . 

Amynandrus  was  restored  to  the  kingdom  of  Aihamania^ 
which  was  occupied  by  a  garrison  of  Philifs,  by  the  aid  of  the 
AetolianSy   who  tJien  proceeded  to  invade  Amphilochia  and  the 
Dolopes.     Hence  the  Aetolian  7var^  beginning  with  the  siege  of 
Ambracia  by  M,  Fulvius  A^obilior,     Livy^  38,  i-i  i. 

25.  Amynandrus,  king  of  the  Athamanes,  thinking  that  he 

had  now  permanently  recovered  his  kingdom, 

^'^Tgo''^^'^  sent  envoys  to  Rome  and  to  the  Scipios  in 

Asia,  for  they  were  still  in  the  neighbourhood 
of  Ephesus,  partly  to  excuse  himself  for  having,  as  it  appeared, 
secured  his  recall  by  the  help  of  the  Aetolians,  but  chiefly  to 
entreat  that  he  might  be  received  again  into  the  Roman 
alliance.     But  the  Aetolians,  imagining  that  they  had  now  a 


XXI  THE  AETOUAN  WAR  aSi 

good  opportunity  of  once  more  annexing  Atnphilochia  and 
Aperantia,  detennined  on  an  expedition  against  those  coun- 
tries;  and  when  Nicander  their  Strategus  had;  mustered  the 
league  army,  they  invaded  Amphilochia.  Finding  most  of  the 
people  willing  to  join  them,  they  advanced  into  Aperantia; 
and  the  Aperantians  also  willingly  yielding  to  them,  they  con- 
tinued their  expedition  into  Dolopia.  The  Dolopians  for  a 
time  made  a  show  of  resistance,  and  of  keeping  loyal  to 
Philip ;  but  on  considering  what  had  happened  to  the  Atha- 
manes,  and  the  check  which  Philip  had  received  there,  they 
quickly  changed  their  minds  and  gave  in  their  adhesion  to 
the  Aetolians.  After  this  successful  issue  of  his  expedition 
Nicander  led  his  army  home,  believing  that  Aetolia  was 
secured  by  the  subjection  of  these  tribes  and  places,  against 
the  possibility  of  any  one  injuring  its  territory.  But  im- 
mediately after  these  events,  and  when  the  Aetolians  were 
still  in  the  full  elation  of  their  successes,  a 
report  reached  them  of  the  battle  in  Asia,  in  ^r"  i^  ° 
which  they  learnt  that  Antiochus  had  been 
utterly  defeated.  This  caused  a  great  revulsion  of  feeling; 
and  when  presently  Damoteles  came  from  Rome  and  an- 
nounced that  a  continuation  of  the  war  was  decreed  against 
them,  and  that  Marcus  Fulvius  and  an  army  had 
crossed  to  attack  them,  they  were  reduced  to  ''""fgo  ^'^ 
a  state  of  complete  despair ;  and  not  knowing 
how  to  meet  the  danger  which  was  impending  over  them, 
they  resolved  to  send  to  Rhodes  and  Athens,  begging  them  to 
despatch  envoys  to  Rome  10  intercede  in  their  behalf,  and,  by 
softening  the  anger  of  the  Romans,  to  find  some  means  of 
averting  the  evils  that  threatened  Aetolia.  They  also  sent 
ambassadors  of  their  own  to  Rome  once  more,  Alexander, 
Isius,  and  Phaeneas,  accompanied  by  Callippus  of  Ambracia 
and  Lycopus.  .  .  . 

26.  Some  envoys  from  Epirus  having  visited  the  Roman 
Consul,  he  consulted  with  them  as  to  the  best 
way  of  attacking  the  Aetolians.      They  advised  "OT^A^llonb" 
that  he  should  begin  by  attacking  Ambracia, 
which  was  at  that  time  a  member  of  the  Aetolian  league.    They 
gave  as  their  reasons  that,  if  the  Aetolians  ventured  to  give 


282  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  BOOK 

battle,  the  neighbourhood  of  Ambracia  was  very  &vourable  for 
the  legions  to  fight  in ;  and  that  if,  on  the  other  hand,  the 
Aetolians  avoided  an  engagement,  the  town  was  an  excellent  one 
to  besiege :  for  the  district  round  it  would  supply  abundant  timber 
for  the  construction  of  siege  artillery ;  and  the  river  Arachthusi 
which  flowed  right  under  the  walls,  would  be  of  great  use  in  con- 
veying supplies  to  the  army  in  the  summer  season,  and  serve 

as  a  protection  to  their  works.    Fulvius  thought 

uSlmti^iT  ^^^    ^^^^^^    g^>^    "^^^  accordingly  marched 

through  Epirus  to  attack  Ambracia.  On  his 
arrival  there,  as  the  Aetolians  did  not  venture  to  meet  him', 
he  reconnoitred  the  city,  and  set  vigorously  to  work  on  the 

siege.      Meanwhile  the  Aetolian  envoys   that 
S.tnStS>ad  been    sent    to   Rome  were    caught    off 

Cephallenia  by  Sibyrtus,  son  of  Petraeus,  and 
brought  into  Charadrus.  The  Epirotes  first  resolved  to  place 
these  men  at  Buchetus  and  keep  them  under  strict  guard. 
But  a  few  days  afterwards  they  demanded  a  ransom  of  them 
on  the  ground  that  they  were  at  war  with  the  Aetolians.  It 
happened  that  one  of  them,  Alexander,  was  the  richest  man 
in  Greece,  while  the  others  were  badly  off,  and  far  inferior  to 
Alexander  in  the  amount  of  their  property.  At  first  the 
Epirotes  demanded  five  talents  from  each.  The  others  did 
not  absolutely  refuse  this,  but  were  willing  to  pay  if  they 
could,  because  they  cared  above  everything  to  secure  their 
own  safety.  But  Alexander  refused  to  consent,  for  it  seemed 
a  large  sum  of  money,  and  he  lay  awake  at  night  bewailing 
himself  at  the  idea  of  being  obliged  to  pay  five  talents.  The 
Epirotes,  however,  foresaw  what  would  happen,  and  were 
extremely  alarmed  lest  the  Romans  should  hear  that  they  had 
detained  men  who  were  on  a  mission  to  themselves,  and 
should  send  a  despatch  ordering  their  release ;  they,  therefore, 
lowered  their  demand  to  three  talents  a-piece.  The  others 
gladly  accepted  the  offer,  gave  security,  and  departed :  but 
Alexander  said  that  he  would  not  pay  more  than  a  talent,  and 
that  was  too  much  ;  and  at  last,  giving  up  all  thought  of  saving 
himself,  remained  in  custody,  though  he  was  an  old  man,  and 
possessed  property  worth  more  than  two  hundred  talents; 
and  I  think  he  would  have  died  rather  than  pay  the  three 


XXI  SIEGE  OF  A  MB  R ACT  A  aSj 

talents.  So  extraordinarily  strong  in  some  meti  is  the  passion 
for  accumulating  money.  But  On  this  occasion  Fortune  so 
favoured  his  greed,  that  the  result  secured  all  men's  praise  and 
approval  for  his  infatuation.  For,  a  few  days  afterwards,  a 
despatch  arrived  from  Rome  ordering  the  release  of  the 
ambassadors ;  and,  accordingly,  he  was  the  only  one  of  them 
that  was  set  free  without  ransom.  When  the  Aetolians  learnt 
what  had  happened  to  him,  they  elected  Damoteles  as  their 
ambassador  to  Rome ;  who,  however,  when  as  far  as  Leucas 
on  his  voyage,  was  informed  that  Marcus  Fulvius  was  march- 
ing through  Epirus  upon  Ambracia,  and,  therefore,  gave  up 
the  mission  as  useless,  and  returned  back  to  Aetolia.  .  .  . 

27.  The  Aetolians  being  besieged  by  the  consul  Marcus 
Fulvius,  offered  a  gallant  resistance  to  the  assault  of  the  siege 
artillery  and  battering  rams.  Marcus  having  sijge„fAn,brada. 
first  strongly  secured  his  camp  began  the  siege  and  the  gaiuw 
on  an  extensive  scale  ;  he  opened  three  separate  resistance  of  the 
parallel  works  across  the  plain  against  the 
Pyrrheium,  and  a  fourth  opposite  the  temple  of  Asclepius,  and 
a  ^flh  directed  against  the  Acropolis.  And  the  attack  being 
pushed  on  energetically  at  all  these  points  at  once,  the  besieged 
became  terribly  alarmed  at  the  prospect  before  them.  Still,  as 
the  rams  vigorously  battered  the  walls,  and  the  long  poles  with 
their  iron  sickles  tore  oiT  the  battlements,  they  tried  to  invent 
machines  to  bafHe  them,  letting  down  huge  masses  of  lead  and 
stones  and  oak  logs  by  means  of  levers  upon  the  battering 
rams ;  and  putting  iron  hooks  upon  the  sickles  and  hauling 
them  inside  the  walls,  so  that  the  poles  to  which  they  were 
fastened  broke  against  the  battlements,  and  the  sickles  fell  into 
their  hands.  Moreover  they  made  frequent  sallies,  in  which 
they  fought  with  great  courage  :  sometimes  making  a  descent 
by  night  upon  the  pickets  quartered  at  the  works,  and  at  others 
attacking  in  broad  daylight  the  day-parties  of  the  besiegers ; 
and  by  these  means  they  managed  to  protract  the  siege,  .  .  , 

Nicander  was  outside  the  city,  and  sent  five  hundred  horse 
into  it  They  carried  the  intervening  entrenchment  of  the 
enemy  and  forced  their  way  into  the  town.  With  these  he 
had  fixed  on  a  day  on  which  they  were  to  sally  out,  and  he  was 
to  be  ready  to  support  them.    They  accordingly  made  the  sally 


284  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  book 

with  great  courage  and  fought  gallantly ;  but  either  from  fear  of 
the  danger,  or  because  he  conceived  that  what  he  was  engaged 
uix)n  at  the  time  could  not  be  neglected,  Nicander  failed  to 
come  up  to  time,  and  accordingly  the  attempt  failed.  .  .  y 

28.  By  assiduously  working  the  battering  rams  the  Romans 

were  always  breaking  down  this  or  that  part  of 'the  wall.     But 

yet  they  could  not  succeed  in  storming  any  of  these  breaches, 

because  the  besieged  were  energetic  in  raising  counter  walls, 

and   the  Aetolians  fought  with  determined  gallantry  on  the 

debris.     They,  therefore,  in  despair  had  recourse  to  mines  and 

The  Romans    underground   tunnels.     Having  safely  secured 

begin  mining    the  central  one  of  their  three  works,  and  carefully 

operations,      concealed  the   shaft  with  wattle  screens,  they 

erected  in  front  of  it  a  covered  walk  or  stoa  about  two  hundred 

feet  long,  parallel  with  the  wall ;  and  beginning  their  digging 

from  that,  they  carried  it  on  unceasingly  day  and  night,  working 

in  relays.     For  a  considerable  number  of  days  the  besieged 

did  not  discover  them  carrying  the  earth  away  through  the 

shaft ;  but  when  the  heap  of  earth  thus  brought  out  became 

too  high  to  be  concealed  from  those  inside  the 

^Tc'tekgc?i.^'^^^^y»  the  commanders  of  the  besieged  garrison 

set  to  work  vigorously  digging  a  trench  inside, 
parallel  to  the  wall  and  to  the  stoa  which  faced  the  towers. 
When  the  trench  was  made  to  therequired  depth,  they  next  placed 
in  a  row  along  the  side  of  the  trench  nearest  the  wall  a  number 
of  brazen  vessels  made  very  thin ;  and,  as  they  walked  along  the 
bottom  of  the  trench  past  these,  they  listened  for  the  noise  of 
the  digging  outside.  Having  marked  the  spot  indicated  by 
any  of  these  brazen  vessels,  which  were  extraordinarily  .sensitive 
and  vibrated  to  the  sound  outside,  they  began  digging  from 
within,  at  right  angles  to  the  trench,  another  underground 
tunnel  leading  under  the  wall,  so  calculated  as  to  exactly  hit 
the  enemy's  tunnel.  This  was  soon  accomplished,  for  the 
Romans  had  not  only  brought  their  mine  up  to  the  wall,  but 
had  under-pinned  a  considerable  length  of  it  on  either  side  of 
their  mine ;  and  thus  the  two  parties  found  themselves  face  to 
face.  At  first  they  conducted  this  underground  fighting  with 
their  spears :  but  as  neither  side  could  do  much  good,  because 

^  The  text  of  this  fragment  is  much  dislocated. 


ra  SMOKING  OUT  THE  ENEMY  x8s 

both  parties  protected  themselves  with  shidds  and  wattles, 
some  one  suggested  another  plan  to  the  defenders.  Putting  in 
front  of  them  an  earthenware  jar,  made  to  the  width  of  the 
mine,  they  bored  a  hole  in  its  bottom,  and,  in- 
serting an  iron  funnel  of  the  same  length  as  the  "^^f^^ 
depth  of  the  vessel,  they  filled  the  jar  itself  with 
fine  feathers,  and  putting  a  little  fire  in  it  close  to  the  mouth 
of  the  jar,  they  clapped  on  an  iron  lid  pierced  full  of  holes. 
They  carried  this  without  accident  through  the  mine  with  its 
mouth  towards  the  enemy.  When  they  got  near  the  besiegers 
they  stopped  up  the  space  all  round  the  rim  of  the  jar,  leaving 
only  two  holes  on  each  side  through  which  they  thrust  spears 
to  prevent  the  enemy  coming  near  the  jar.  They  then  took  a 
pair  of  bellows  such  as  blacksmiths  use,  and,  having  attached 
them  to  the  orifice  of  the  funnel,  they  vigorously  blew  up  the 
fire  placed  on  the  feathers  near  the  mouth  of  the  jar,  con- 
tinually withdrawing  the  funnel  in  proportion  as  the  feathers 
became  ignited  lower  down.  Tlie  plan  was  successfully  exe- 
cuted ;  the  volume  of  smoke  created  was  very  great,  and,  from 
the  peculiar  nature  of  feathers,  exceedingly  pungent,  and  was 
all  carried  into  the  faces  of  the  enemy.  The  Romans,  there- 
fore, found  themselves  in  a  very  distressing  and  embarrassing 
position,  as  they  could  neither  stop  nor  endure  the  smoke  in 
the  mines.^  The  siege  being  thus  still  further  protracted  the 
Aetolian  commander  determined  to  send  an  envoy  to  the 
Consul.  .  .  . 

29.  About  this  time  the  ambassadors  from  Athens  and 
Rhodes  came  to  the  Roman  camp  for  the  pur-  imetees^on  of 
pose  of  furthering,  if  they  could,  the  conclusion  Athens,  Rhodes, 
of  a  peace.  The  Athamanian  king,  Amynan-  """  ^'"B 
dnis,  also  arrived,  very  eager  to  relieve  the 
Ambraciots  from  their  miserable  position,  and  having  received 
a  safe  conduct  from  Marcus  Fulvius  in  consideration  of  the 
urgent  nature  of  the  business :  For  he  had  a  very  friendly 
feeling  towards  the  Ambraciots,  from  having  passed  most  of  the 

'  Smoking  oul  an  enemy  in  a  mine  wiis  one  of  the  regular  manccuvrcl. 
See  Aen.  Tact.  37.  It  was  perhaps  suggested  by  the  illegal  means  laken  by 
worlunen  in  the  silver  mines  to  annoy  a  rival ;  for  we  find  an  Athenian  law 
directed  against  il.     Sec  Deniostb.  in  PaiilatH.  j  36. 


286  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  book 

time  of  his  exile  in  that  town.^  A  few  days  afterwards  also 
some  Acamanians  arrived,  bringing  Damoteles  and  his  fellow 
envoys.  For  Marcus  Fulvius,  having  been  informed  of  their 
misfortunes,  had  written  to  the  people  of  Thyreum  to  bring  the 
men  to  him.  All  these  various  persons,  therefore,  having 
assembled,  the  negotiations  for  peace  were  pushed  on  energetic- 
ally. For  his  part,  Amynandrus  was  urgent  in  his  advice  to 
the  Ambraciots  to  save  themselves  from  the  destruction  which 
would  not  be  long  in  coming  to  them  unless  they  adopted 
wiser  counsels.  On  his  coming  again  and  again  up  to  the  wall 
and  conversing  with  them  on  this  subject,  the  Ambraciots 
decided  to  invite  him  inside  the  town.  The  consul  having 
given  the  king  leave  to  enter  the  walls,  he  went  in  and  discussed 
the  situation  with  the  inhabitants.  Meanwhile  the  Athenian 
and  Rhodian  envoys  got  hold  of  the  consul  and  tried  by  in- 
genious arguments  to  mollify  his  anger.  Some  one  also  sug- 
gested to  Damoteles  and  Phaeneas  to  apply  to  Caius  Valerius  and 
endeavour  to  win  him  over.  He  was  the  son  of  that  Marcus 
Valerius  Laevinus  who  made  the  first  alliance  with  the  Aetolians ; 
and  half  brother,  by  the  mother's  side,  of  the  consul  Marcus 
Fulvius,  and  being  a  young  man  of  vigorous  character  enjoyed 
the  greatest  confidence  of  the  consul.  Being  appealed  to  by 
Damoteles,  and  thinking  that  in  a  way  he  had  a  family  interest 
in  the  matter,  and  was  bound  to  undertake  the  patronage  of 
the  Aetolians,  he  exerted  himself  with  the  greatest  zeal  and 
enthusiasm  to  rescue  that  people  from  their  perilous  position. 
The  matter  then  being  vigorously  pushed  forward  on  all  sides  at 
once  was  at  length  accomplished.  For  the  Ambraciots,  by  the 
persuasion  of  the  king,  surrendered  to  the  consul  unreservedly 
as  far  as  they  themselves  were  concerned,  and  gave  up  the 
town,  on  the  one  condition  that  the  Aetolian  garrison  should 
march  out  under  truce.  This  primary  exception  they  made 
that  they  might  keep  faith  with  their  allies. 

80.  So  the  consul  agreed  to  grant  the  Aetolians  peace  on 
condition  of  receiving  two  hundred  Euboic  talents  down,  and 

*  Nothing  seems  to  be  known  of  this  exile  of  Fulvius,  who  had  been 
granted  an  ovation  in  B.c.  191  for  his  victories  in  Spain.  He  was,  however, 
in  opposition  to  Cato,  one  of  whose  numerous  prosecutions  may  have  been 
against  him. 


XXI  END  OF  THE  AETOLIAN  WAR  287 

three  hundred  in  six  yearly  instalments  of  fifty :  of  the 
restoration  to  the  Romans  of  all  prisoners  and 
deserters  within  six  months  without  ransom:  ,t^Aarollans '^ 
of  their  retaining  no  city  in  their  league,  nor 
thenceforth  admitting  any  fresh  one,  of  such  as  had  been 
captured  by  the  Romans,  or  had  voluntarily  embraced  their 
friendship  since  Titus  Quinctius  crossed  into  Greece :  the 
Cephallenians  not  to  be  included  in  these  terms. 

Such  was  the  sketch  in  outline  of  the  main  points  of  the  treaty. 
But  it  required  first  the  consent  of  the  Aetolians,  -^^  Aetolian 
and  then  to  be  referred  to  Rome ;  and  meanwhile  people  confirm 
the  Athenian  and  Rhodian  envoys  remained  "'^  'rcaiy, 
where  they  were,  waiting  for  the  decision  of  the  Aetolians.  On 
being  informed  by  Damoteles  and  his  colleagues  on  their 
return  of  the  nature  of  the  terms  that  had  been  granted  them, 
the  Aetolians  consented  to  the  general  principle — for  they 
were  in  fact  much  better  than  they  had  ejtpected, — but  in  regard 
to  the  towns  formerly  included  in  their  league  they  hesitated  for 
some  time ;  finally,  however,  they  acquiesced.  Marcus  Fulvius 
accordingly  took  over  Ambracia,  and  allowed  the  Aetolian 
garrison  to  depart  under  terms ;  but  removed  from  the  town 
the  statues  and  pictures,  of  which  there  was  a  great  number, 
owing  to  the  fact  of  Ambracia  having  been  a  royal  residence 
of  Pyrrhus.  He  was  also  presented  with  a  crown  ^  weighing 
one  hundred  and  fifty  talents.  Ailer  this  settlement  of  affairs 
he  directed  his  march  into  the  interior  of  Aetolia,  feehng 
surprised  at  meeting  with  no  communication  from  the  Aetolians. 
But  on  arriving  at  Amphilochian  Argos,  a  hundred  and  eighty 
stades  from  Ambracia,  he  pitched  his  camp ;  and  being  there 
met  by  Damoteles  and  his  colleagues  with  the  information 
that  the  Aetolians  had  resolved  to  ratify  the  treaty  which  they 
had  concluded,  they  went  their  several  ways,  the  Aetolians  back 
to  their  own  country,  and  Marcus  to  Ambracia,  where  he 
busied  himself  about  getting  his  army  across  to  Cephallenia ; 
while  the  Aetolians  appointed  Phaeneas  and  Nicander  ambassa- 
dors to  go  to  Rome  about  the  peace  :  for  not  a  single  line  of 
the  above  treaty  held  good  until  ratified  by  the  Roman  people. 
I  Or  "a  complimenl."  The  Greek  word  ari^atot  seems  10  be  usa]  for 
any  present  mode  10  a  victor.     So  also  ia  cb.  34,  and  elsewhere. 


288  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  book 

81 .  While  these  envoys,  accompanied  by  those  from  Rhodes 
and  Athens,  were  on  their  voyage  with  this  object,  Marcus 
Fulvius  sent  Caius  Valerius  also,  and  some  others  of  his  friends 
to  Rome  to  secure  the  ratification  of  the  treaty.  But  when 
they  arrived  at  Rome  they  found  that  a  fresh  cause  of  anger 
with  the  Aetolians  had  arisen  by  the  instrumentality  of  king 
Philip ;  who,  looking  upon  himself  as  wronged  by  the  Aetolians 
having  taken  Athamania  and  Dolopia  from  him,  had  sent  to 
some  of  his  friends  at  Rome,  urging  them  to  share  his  dis- 
pleasure and  secure  the  rejection  of  the  pacification.  Accord- 
ingly, on  the  first  arrival  of  the  Aetolians,  the  Senate  would  not 
listen  to  them ;  but  afterwards,  at  the  intercession  of  the 
Rhodians  and  Athenians,  changed  its  mind  and  consented  to 
their  request :  for  Damis,^  besides  other  excellences  dis- 
played in  his  speech,  was  thought  to  have  introduced  a  very 
apt  simile,  extremely  applicable  to  the  case  in  hand.  He  said 
o      u   r  T^     •    "  The  Romans  had  good  cause  for  anger  with 

Speech  of  Damis.    ,        .        ,.  ^       .°         ,^,.  ^  y  ^ 

the  Aetolians ;  for,  mstead  of  bemg  grateful  for 
the  many  kindnesses  received  at  their  hands,  they  had  brought 
the  Roman  Empire  into  great  danger  by  causing  the  war  with 
Antiochus  to  break  out.  But  the  Senate  were  wrong  in  one 
point,  namely  in  directing  their  anger  against  the  masses.  For 
in  states  the  common  people  were  like  the  sea,  which  left  to 
its  own  nature  was  ever  calm  and  unmoved,  and  not  in  the 
least  likely  ever  to  trouble  any  of  those  who  approached  or 
used  it ;  but  directly  violent  winds  blew  upon  and  disturbed 
it,  and  forced  it  against  its  nature  to  become  agitated,  then 
indeed  nothing  could  be  more  dreadful  or  formidable  than  the 
sea.  This  was  just  the  case  with  the  Aetolians.  As  long 
as  they  were  left  to  themselves,  no  people  in  Greece  were 
more  loyal  to  you  or  more  staunch  in  supporting  your  active 
measures.  But  when  Thoas  and  Dicaearchus  brought  a 
storm  from  Asia,  and  Mnestas  and  Damocritus  from  Europ)e, 
and,  disturbing  the  calm  of  the  Aetolian  masses,  compelled 

^  Hultsch's  text,  supported  by  the  MSS.,  has  Ad/xts  6  Kixn<r^<^^>  from  which 
no  sense  scenis  obtainable.  According  to  Suidas,  Damis  was  a  philosopher 
from  Nineveh  who  had  settled  in  Athens.  Livy  (38,  10),  has  Leon  Hicesiac 
Jilius.  He  must  therefore  have  found  the  name  Leon  in  his  copy,  which  could 
hardly  have  lieen  substituted  for  Aofus  by  mistake,  though  *IKE2^ov  may  have 
become  «ctx'70"^«>'. 


XXI  THE  TREATY  WITH  THE  AETOLIANS  289 

them  to  become  reckless  of  what  they  said  or  did, — then 
indeed  their  good  disposition  gave  way  to  bad,  and  while  in- 
tending to  do  mischief  to  you  they  really  inflicted  damage 
upon  themselves.  It  is  against  these  mischief-makers  there- 
fore that  you  should  be  implacable;  while  you  should  take 
pity  on  the  masses  and  make  peace  with  them  :  with  the  assur- 
ance that,  if  once  more  left  to  themselves,  with  the  additional 
feeling  of  having  owed  their  safety  on  the  present  occasion  to 
you,  their  attachment  to  you  will  be  the  warmest  in  Greece." 
'  82.  By  these  arguments  the  Athenian  envoy  persuaded  the 
Senate  to  make  pwace  with  the  Aetolians,  The  Treaty  with 
decree  therefore  having  been  passed  and  con-  Aetolia, 
firmed  by  a  vote  of  the  people,  the  treaty  was  ^^-  '^* 
formally  ratified,  of  which  the  text  was  as  follows:  "The 
people  of  the  Aetolians  shall  in  good  faith  maintain  the 
empire  and  majesty  of  the  people  of  Rome. 

"  They  shall  not  allow  hostile  forces  to  pass  through  their 
territory  or  cities  against  the  Romans,  their  allies  or  friends ; 
nor  grant  them  any  supplies  from  the  public  fiind. 

"They  shall  have  the  same  enemies  as  the  people  of  Rome; 
and  if  the  Roman  people  go  to  war  with  any,  the  Aetolian 
people  shall  do  so  also. 

"  The  Aetolians  shall  surrender  to  the  praefectus  in  Corcyra, 
within  a  hundred  days  from  the  completion  of  the  treaty, 
runaway  slaves,  and  prisoners  of  the  Romans  and  their  allies, 
except  such  as  having  been  taken  during  the  war  have  re- 
turned to  their  own  land  and  been  subsequently  captured; 
and  except  such  as  were  in  arms  against  Rome  during  the 
time  that  the  Aetolians  were  fighting  on  the  side  of  the 
Romans. 

"  If  there  should  be  any  not  found  within  that  time,  they 
shall  hand  them  over  as  soon  as  they  are  forthcoming,  without 
deceit  or  fraud  And  such  persons,  after  the  completion  of 
the  treaty,  shall  not  be  allowed  to  return  to  Aetolia. 

"  The  Aetolians  shall  pay  the  consul  in  Greece  at  once  two 
hundred  Euboic  talents  of  silver,  of  a  standard  not  inferior  to 
the  Attic.  In  place  of  one  third  of  this  silver,  they  may,  if 
they  so  choose,  pay  gold,  at  the  rate  of  a  mina  of  gold  to  ten 
minae  of  silver.  They  shall  pay  the  money  in  the  six  year 
VOL.  11  u 


290  THE  aiSTORIES  OF  FOLYBIUS  book 

next  following  the  completion  of  the  treaty  in  yearly  instal- 
ments of  fifty  talents ;  and  shall  deliver  the  money  in  Rome. 

"  The  Aetolians  shall  give  the  Consul  forty  hostages,  not 
less  than  ten  or  more  than  forty  years  old,  to  remain  for  the 
six  years ;  they  shall  be  selected  by  the  Romans  freely,  except- 
ing only  the  Stiategus,  Hipparch,  public  secretary,  and  such  as 
have  already  been  hostages  at  Rome. 

"The  Aetolians  shall  deliver  such  hostages  in  Rome;  and 
if  any  one  of  them  die,  they  shall  give  another  in  his  place. 

"  Cephallenia  shall  not  be  included  in  this  treaty. 

"Of  such  territories,  cities,   and  men  as  once  belonged 

to  the  Aetolians,  and,  in  the  consulship  of  Titus 

Quinctius  and  CnaeusDomitius,  or  subsequently, 

were  either  captured  by  the  Roman  or  voluntarily  embraced 

their  friendship,  the  Aetolians  shall  not  annex  any,  whether 

city  or  men  therein. 

■   "  The  city  and  territory  of  Oeniadae  shall  belong  to  the 
Acamanians." 

The  treaty  having  been  solemnly  sworn,  peace  was  con- 
cluded, and  the  war  in  Aetolia,  as  is  in  the  rest  of  Greece, 
thus  came  to  an  end.  .  .  . 

THE  WAR  WITH  THE  GAULS  OF  ASIA 

88.  While  the  negotiations  for  peace  with  Antiochus,  and 
for  the  settlement  of  Asia  generally  were  going  on  at  Rome, 
and  the  Aetolian  war  was  being  fought  in  Greece,  it  happened 
that  another  war  in  Asia,  Cliat,  namely,  against  the  Gauls,  was 
brought  to  a  conclusion,  the  account  of  which  I  am  now  about 
to  give  .  .  . 

84.  MoagStes  was  Tyrant  of  Cibyra,  a  cruel  and  crafty  man, 
whose  career  deserves  somewhat  more  than  a  passing  refer- 
ence. .  .  . 

When  Cnaeus  Manlius  was  approaching  Cibyra  and  had 
sent  Helvius  to  find  out  the  intentions  of 
^r«"-v^L."M?"  Moag^tes,  the  latter  begged  him  by  ambassa- 
Fulvius  Nobiiior.  dors  not  to  damage  the  country,  because  he  was 
Rc.  189;  Moa-a  friend  of  Rome,  and  ready  to  do  anything 
^rahl^Mi^  '"  ^'"^  ^^^  required  of  him  ;  and,  at  the  same 
time,  he  offered  Helvius  a  compliment  of  fifteen 


XXI  MOAGETES  OF  CIBYRA  agi 

talents.  In  ansvei  to  this,  Helvius  said  that  he  would  refrain 
from  damaging  the  territory ;  but  that  as  to  the  general  question 
MoagStes  must  communicate  with  the  Consul,  for  he  was 
close  behind  with  his  army.  MoagStes  accordingly  sent  am- 
bassadors to  Cnaeus,  his  own  brother  being  one  of  them. 
When  the  Consul  met  them  in  the  road,  he  addressed  them 
in  threatening  and  reproachful  terms,  asserting  that  "Not  only 
had  Moag^tes  shown  himself  the  most  determined  enemy  of 
Rome,  of  all  the  princes  in  Asia,  but  had  done  his  very  best 
to  overthrow  their  empire,  and  deserved  punishment  rather 
than  friendship." '  Terrified  by  this  display  of  anger,  the  am- 
bassadors abstained  from  delivering  the  rest  of  the  message 
with  which  they  were  charged,  and  merely  begged  him  to  have 
an  interview  with  Moag^tes  :  and  when  Cnaeus  consented  they 
returned  to  Cibyra.  Next  morning  the  Tyrant  came  out  of 
the  town  accompanied  by  his  friends,  displaying  his  humility 
by  a  mean  dress  and  absence  of  all  pomp  ;  and,  in  conducting 
his  defence,  descanted  in  melancholy  terms  on  his  own  helpless- 
ness and  the  poverty  of  the  towns  under  his  rule  (which  con- 
sisted of  Cibyra,  Syleium,  and  the  town  in  the  Marsh),  and 
entreated  Cnaeus  to  accept  the  fifteen  talents.  Astonished  at 
his  assurance,  Cnaeus  made  no  answer,  except  that,  "  If  he  did 
not  pay  five  hundred  talents,  and  be  thankful  that  he  was 
allowed  to  do  so,  he  would  not  loot  the  country,  but  he  would 
storm  and  sack  the  city."  In  abject  terror  Mo^fites  begged 
him  not  to  do  anything  of  the  sort ;  and  kept  adding  to  his 
offer  little  by  little,  until  at  last  he  persuaded  Cnaeus  to  take 
one  hundred  talents,  and  one  thousand  medimni  of  com,  and 
admit  him  to  friendship.^  .  .  . 

86.  When  Cnaeus  Manljus  was  crossing  the  River  Colo- 
batus,  ambassadors  came  to  him  from  the  town 
of  Sinda  (in  Pisidia)  begging  for  help,  because    ^p^^^^j' 
the  people  of  Termessus  had  called  in  the  aid  of 
the  people  of  PhilomeJus,  and  had  depopulated  thetr  territory 
and  5acke,d  their  town ;  and  were  at  that  very  moment  besieg- 

'  The  Gtcck  icxt  is  corrupt.     Tbe  sense  is  given  from  Livy,  38,  14. 
>  The  dynaslf  lasted  until  the  time  of  the  Milhridnlic  wais.     llic  last 
MoagCtcs  being  deposed  b;  Mureena,  when  Cibyra  was  joined  10  Lyda. 


393  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIVS  book 

ing  its  citadel,  into  which  all  the  citizens,  with  wives  and  child- 
ren, had  retreated.  On  hearing  this,  Cnaeus  immediately 
promised  them  aid  with  the  greatest  readiness ;  and  thinking 
the  aflfair  was  a  stroke  of  luck  for  himself,  directed  his  march 
towards  Pamphylia.  On  his  arrival  in  the  neighbourhood  of 
Termessus,  he  admitted  the  Termessians  to  friendship  on  the 
payment  of  fifty  talents.  He  did  the  same  with  the  Aspendians : 
and  having  received  the  ambassadors  of  the  other  towns  in 
Pamphylia,  he  impressed  on  them  in  tliese  interviews  the  con- 
viction mentioned  above,'  and  having  relieved  the  Sindians 
from  their  siege,  he  once  more  directed  his  march  against  the 
Gauls.  .  .  . 

86.  After  taking  the  town  of  Cyrmasa  (in  Pisidia),  and  a 

very  large  booty,  Cnaeus  Manlius  continued  his 
pSiiSi.°      advance.     And  as  he  was  marching  along  the 

marsh,  envoys  came  from  Lysinoe,  offering  an 
unconditional  surrender.  After  accepting  this,  Cnaeus  entered 
the  territory  of  Sagalassus,  and  having  driven  off  a  vast  quantity 
of  spoil  waited  to  see  what  the  SagaJassians  were  prepared 
to  do.  When  their  ambassadors  arrived  he  received  them  ; 
and  accepting  a  compliment  of  fifty  talents,  twenty  thousand 
medinmi  of  barky,  and  twenty  thousand  of  wheat,  admitted 
them  to  friendship  with  Rome.  .  .  . 

87.  Cnaeus  sent  envoys  to  Eposognatus  the  Gaul,  desiring 

him  to  send  embassies  to  the  kings  of  the  Gaula 
"in  Gala^a. ""  Eposognatus  in  his  turn  sent  envoys  to  Cnaeus 

begging  him  not  to  move  his  quarters  or  attack 
the  Tolistobogian  Gauls ;  and  assuring  him  that  he  would  send 
embassies  to  the  kings,  and  propose  peace  to  them,  and  felt 
quite  certain  that  he  would  be  able  to  bring  them  to  a  proper 
view  of  affairs  in  all  respects.  .  .  . 

In  the  course  of  his  march  through  the  country  Cnaeus 
made  a  bridge  over  the  River  Sangorius,  which  was  extremely 
deep  and  difficult  to  cross.  And  having  encamped  on  the  bank 
of  the  river,  he  was  visited  by  some  Galli^  sent  by.Attis  and 
Battacus,  the  priests  of  the  mother  of  the  gods  at  Pesinus, 
wearing  figures  and  images  on  their  breasts,  and  announcing 

'  'rh.it  is   probably  ■■  of  the  necessily  of  submiiiing  to  Rome  ;"  but  Ihe 


Ml  THE  GAULS  OF  ASIA  293 

that  the  goddess  promised  him  victory  and  power ;  to  whom 
Cnaeus  gave  a  courteous  reception.  .  .  . 

When  Cnaeus  was  at  the  small  town  of  Gordieium,  am- 
bassadors came  from  Eposognatus,  announcing  that  he  had 
been  round  and  talked  with  the  kings  of  the  Gauls,  but  that 
they  would  not  consent  to  make  any  overtures  of  friendship 
whatever ;  on  the  contrary,  they  had  collected  their  children 
and  women  on  Mount  Olympus,  and  were  prepared  to  give 
battle.  .  .  . 

The  victory  of  l/ie  Jiomans  ever  the  ToUstoboU  at  Mount 
Olympus  is  described  by  Lhy,  ^%,  19-23;  that  over  the  Tectosages, 
a  feio  miles  from  Ancyra,  in  38,  24-27.  The  second  baHle  took 
place  in  mid-autumn,  n.c.  189;  and  the  result  was  that  the 
Gauls  gave  in  their  submission  at  Ephesus,  and  were  forced  to 
engage  to  leave  off  predatory  excursions,  and  to  confine  themselves 
to  their  07vn  frontiers.     Livy,  38,  27  and  40. 

'38.  It  chanced   that   among   the   prisoners    made  when 

the    Romans   won    the    victory  at    Olympus  _, , 

.  ',  '     *       The  vengeance  of 

over  the  Gauls  of  Asia,  was  Chiomara,  wife  of  chiomara,  wife  of 
Ortiago.      The  centurion  who  had  charge  of  the  Gallic  chief 
her  availed  himself  of  his  chance  in  soldierly    Lf'^ts  ^T 
fashion,  and  violated  her. 

He  was  a  slave  indeed  both  to  lust  and  money:  but 
eventually  his  love  of  money  got  the  upper  hand ;  and,  on 
a  lai^e  sum  of  gold  being  agreed  to  be  paid  for  the  woman, 
he  led  her  off  to  put  her  to  ransom.  There  being  a  river 
between  the  two  camps,  when  the  Gauls  had  crossed  it,  paid 
the  man  the  money,  and  received  the  woman,  she  ordered 
one  of  them  by  a  nod  to  strike  the  Roman  as  he  was  in  the 
act  of  taking  a  polite  and  affectionate  farewell  of  her.  The 
man  obeyed,  and  cut  off  the  centurion's  head,  which  she 
picked  up  and  drove  off  with,  wrapped  in  the  folds  of  her 
dress.  On  reaching  her  husband  she  threw  the  head  at  his 
feet ;  and  when  he  expressed  astonishment  and  said  :  "  Wife  to 
keep  faith  ts  a  good  thing,"  she  replied:  "Yes;  but  it  is  a 
better  thing  that  there  should  be  only  one  man  alive  who  has 
lain  with  me  !  "     [Polybius  says  that  he  conversed  with  the 


394  ^■''■^  HISTVRfES  OF  POLVBIUS  BOOK 

woman  at  Sardis,  and  was  Struck  with  het  digniRed  demeaaour 
and  intelligence.] '     ... 

89.  After  the  victory  over  the  Gauls  at  Olyropus,  when  the 

Romans  were  cncami>ed  at  Ancyra,  and  Cnaeus 

litlwCi^eiL'Man-  **'^^  ""  ^^  point  of  continuing  his  advance, 

lii»  by  n  itniia-  ambassadors  came  from  the  Tectosages  asking 

gom,  init  are    that   Cnaeus  would  leave  his  troops  in  their 

"'  "^  _g  ^  ''*'''■  quarters,  and  advance  himself  in  the  course  of 

the  next  day  into  the  space  between  the  two 
camps ;  and  promising  that  their  kings  would  come  to  meet 
him,  and  discuss  the  terms  of  a  peace.  But  when  Cnaeus 
consented,  and  duly  arrived  at  the  appointed  place  with  five 
hundred  horse,  the  kings  did  not  a]}pear.  After  his  return 
to  the  camp,  however,  the  ambassadors  came  again,  and,  offering 
some  excuses  for  the  kings,  begged  him  to  come  once  more, 
as  they  would  send  some  of  their  chief  men  to  discuss  the 
whole  question.  Cnaeus  consented ;  but,  without  leaving  the 
camp  himself,  sent  Attalus  and  some  tribunes  with  three 
hundred  horse.  'l"he  envoys  of  the  Gauls  duly  appeared  and 
discussed  the  business :  but  finally  said  that  it  was  impossible 
for  them  to  conclude  the  matter  or  ratify  anything  they  agreed 
upon ;  but  they  engaged  that  the  kings  would  come  next  day 
to  agree  on  the  terms,  and  finally  settle  the  treaty,  if  the 
Consul  would  also  come  to  them.  Attalus  promised  that 
Cnaeus  would  come,  and  they  separated  for  that  day.  But 
the  Gauls  were  deliberately  contriving  these  postponements, 
and  amusing  the  Romans,  because  they  wanted  to  get  some 
twrt  of  their  families  and  property  beyond  the  river  Halys ; 
and,  first  of  all,  to  get  the  Roman  Consul  into  their  hands  if 
they  could,  but  if  not,  at  any  rate  to  kill  him.  With  this 
purpose  they  watched  next  day  for  the  coming  of  the  Romans, 
with  a  thousand  horse  ready  to  fall  upon  him.  When  Cnaeus 
heard  the  result  of  Attalus's  interview,  believing  that  the  kings 
would  come,  he  left  the  camp,  attended  as  usual  by  five 
hundred  horse.  Now  it  happened  that,  on  the  days  of  the 
previous    interviews,    the    foraging    parties    which    went    out 

'  This  is  rtally  Plutarch's  version  of  a  story  be  found  in  Polybius,  and,  lo 
judge  from  Livy,  38,  34.  nol  a  very  complete  ont  It  tot*  place  near 
Ancyra.     Plutarch  di  mutierum  virlulitta. 


XXI         ATTEMPTED  TREACHERY  BY  THE  GAULS         295 

from  the  Roman  camp  to  fetch  wood  and  hay  had  gone  in 
the  same  direction,  in  order  to  have  the  protection  of  the 
squadron  which  went  to  the  parley.  A  numerous  foraging  party 
acted  in  the  same  way  on  this  third  occasion,  and  the  tribunes 
ordered  them  to  proceed  in  the  same  direction,  with  the  usual 
number  of  horsemen  to  protect  them  as  they  advanced.  And 
their  being  out  on  this  duty  proved  accidentally  to  be  the 
salvation  of  their  comrades  in  the  danger  which  threatened 
them.  .  .  . 

CEPHALLENIA 

40.  M.  Fulvius  took  the  quarter  of  the  town  y^^  ciiadd  of 
in  which  was  the  ciladel  by  a  night  surprise,  SjH™  iT.' 
and  introduced  the  Romans  into  the  town,^  night  smprUe. 

41.  I'he  good  and  the  expedient  are  seldom  compatible, 
and  rare  indeed  are  those  who  can  combine  and   phiiopoemen"! 
reconcile  them.      For  as  a  general  rule  we  all   policy  lowaids 
know  that  the  good  shuns  the  principles  of  imme-    ^"^'.^k^" 
diate    profit,    and   profit   those   of  the   good.   "    ""'       "'' 
However,  Philopoemen  attempted  this  task,  and  succeeded 
in  his  aim.     For  it  was  a  good  thing  to  restore  the  captive 
exiles  to  Sparta ;  and  it  was  an  expedient  thing  to  humble 
the  Lacedaemonian  state,  and  to  punish  those  who  had  served 
as  bodyguards  to  a  tyrant     But  seeing  clearly  that  money  is 
ever  the  support  on  which  every  dynasty  rests,  and  having  a 
clear  head  and  the  instincts  of  a  ruler,  he  took  measures  to 
prevent  the  introduction  into  the  town  of  money  from  out- 
side. .  .  . 

48.  *  Meanwhile  in  Asia  the  Roman  consul  Cnaeus  Man- 
lius  wintered  at  Ephesus,  in  the  last  year  of  this 
Olympiad,  and  was  there  visited  by  embassies  s^n^,h"tinl^ 
from  the  Greek  cities  in  Asia  and  many  others,  of  iSg-iss  b.c 

•  Sec  Livy,  38,  38,  39,  The  Iragmenl  ht-rc  seems  10  be  Ihat  Imnslaled  by 
Uvy  in  ch.  39,  Romarti  nocte  ptr  arcem,  quam  Cyatidem  vacant  {naiK  urti  in 
mare  daxxa  in  Occidenltat  vergit)  murv  iuperalo  in  forum  ptntncritnt.  'Ilio 
people  of  Some  suddenly  threw  off  Ibe  lerms  under  which  the  rest  of  Cephal- 
lania  had  lubmiltcd  and  stood  a  lour  monlbs'  siege. 

*  A  fragnietil,  arranged  iti  Hullsch's  text  as  ch.  41,  is  too  much  mutilated  t<> 
be  tmulaled  wiih  any  appnneh  to  coirccincss. 


296  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  book 

at  Ephesus,  the  bringing  complimentary  crowns  to  him  for  his 
i^k^oiympkd.  victories  over  the  Gauls.  For  the  entire  inhabi- 
and  arranges  the  tants  of  Asia  this  side  Taurus  were  not  so  much 
settlement  of  Asia,  rejoiced  at  the  prospect  given  them  by  An- 
tiochus's  defeat  of  being  relieved  from  tribute,  garrisons,  or 
other  royal  exactions,  as  at  the  removal  of  all  fear  of  the 
barbarians,  and  at  their  escape  from  their  insolence  and  law- 
lessness. Among  the  rest  Musaeus  came  from  Antiochus, 
and  some  envoys  from  the  Gauls,  desiring  to  ascertain  the  terms 
upon  which  friendship  would  be  granted  them;  and  also  from 
Ariarathes,  the  king  of  Cappadocia.  For  this  latter  prince, 
having  attached  himself  to  the  fortunes  of  Antiochus,  and  having 
taken  part  in  his  battle  with  the  Romans,  had  become  alarmed 
and  dismayed  for  his  own  fate,  and  therefore  was  endeavouring 
by  frequent  embassies  to  ascertain  what  he  would  have  to  pay  or 
do  to  get  pardon  for  his  error.  The  Consul  complimented  the 
ambassadors  from  the  cities,  and  dismissed  them  after  a  very 
favourable  reception  ;  but  he  replied  to  the  Gauls  that  he  would 
not  make  a  treaty  with  them  until  king  Eumenes,  whom  he 
expected,  had  arrived.  To  the  envoys  from  Ariarathes  he  said 
that  they  might  have  peace  on  the  payment  of  six  hundred 
talents.  With  the  ambassador  of  Antiochus  he  arranged  that  he 
would  come  with  his  army  to  the  frontier  of  Pamphylia,  to  receive 
the  two  thousand  five  hundred  talents,  and  the  com  with  which 
the  king  had  undertaken  to  furnish  the  Roman  soldiers  before 
his  treaty  with  Lucius  Scipio.  This  business  being  thus 
settled,  he  solemnly  purified  his  army ;  and,  as  the  season  for 
o   •      f «  ^    oo  military  operations  was  now  beginning,  he  broke 

SpnngofB.c.  i88.         u-  ..  ^     *  i  •         a.*,  i  -.u  u- 

up  his  quarters,  and,  takmg  Attalus  with  him, 
arrived  at  Apamcia  in  eight  days'  march,  and  remained  there 
three  days.  On  the  fourth  he  continued  his  advance ;  and, 
pushing  on  at  great  speed,  arrived  on  the  third  day  at  the 
rendezvous  with  Antiochus,  and  there  pitched  his  camp.  Here 
he  was  visited  by  Musaeus,  who  begged  him  to  wait,  as  the 
carts  and  cattle  that  were  bringing  the  com  and  money  were 
late.  He  consented  to  wait :  and,  when  the  supply  arrived,  he 
distributed  the  corn  among  the  soldiers,  and  handed  over  the 
money  to  one  of  his  tribunes,  with  orders  to  convey  it  to 
Apameia. 


XXI  SETTLEMENT  OF  ASIA  xn 

44k  He  himself  started  in  full  force  for  Perga,  where  he 
heard  that  a  commander  of  a  garrison  placed  in 
that  town  by  Antiochus  had  neither  left  it  him-  ^  ^3''}^^^'^ 
self  nor  withdrawn  his  garrison.  When  he 
came  within  a  short  distance  of  the  place  he  was  met  by 
the  captain  of  the  garrison,  who  begged  Cnaeus  not  to  con- 
demn him  unheard.  "  He  had  received  the  city  from 
Antiochus  in  trust,  and  was  holding  it  until  he  should  be 
instructed  what  to  do  by  the  sovereign  who  had  entrusted  it 
to  him."  And  he  therefore  begged  for  thirty  days'  respite,  to 
enable  him  to  send  and  ask  the  king  for  instructions. 
Observing  that  Antiochus  was  behaving  straightforwardly  in 
other  particulars,  Cnaeus  consented  to  allow  him  to  send  and 
ask  the  king  the  question.  After  some  days  the  ofGcer 
accordingly  received  an  answer,  and  surrendered  the  city. 

About  this  time,  just  at  the  beginning  of  summer,  the  ten 
commissioners  and  king  Eumenes  arrived  tiysiiniiQcr  rc  188 
sea  at  Ephesus;  and,  after  giving  themselves  The  leii  Roman ' 
two  days  to  recover  from  the  voyage,  proceeded 
up  the  country  to  Apameia,  When  their  arrival 
was  known  to  Cnaeus  Manlius,  he  sent  his 
brother  Lucius  with  four  thousand  men  to  Oroanda  (in  Pisidia), 
as  a  forcible  hint  that  they  must  pay  the  money  owing,  in  accord- 
ance with  the  terms  agreed  on ;  while  he  himself  marched  his 
array  at  full  speed  to  meet  Eumenes  and  the  commissioners. 
On  his  arrival  he  found  the  king  and  the  ten  commissioners, 
and  immediately  held  a  consultation  with  them  on  the 
measures  to  be  taken.  The  first  resolution  come  to  was  to 
confirm  the  sworn  agreement  and  treaty  with  Antiochus,  about 
which  I  need  say  no  more,  beyond  giving  the  actual  text  of 
the  treaty,  which  was  as  follows ; — 

45.  "There  shall  be  perpetual  peace  between  Antiochus 
and  the  Romans  if  he  fulfils  the  provisions  of  Ttxt  of  ihe  ircaiy 
the  treaty.  belwcen  Antio- 

"  Neither  Antiochus  nor  any  subject  to  him  =''"'  '"■^  '*°"'*- 
shall  allow  any  to  pass  through  their  territories  to  attack  the 
Romans  or  their  allies,  nor  supply  them  with  aught  Neither 
shall  the  Romans  or  their  allies  do  the  like  for  those  attack- 
ing Antiochus  or  those  subject  to  him. 


298  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  book 

"  Antiochus  shall  not  wage  war  upon  the  Islanders  or  the 
dwellers  in  Europe. 

"He  shall  evacuate  all  cities  and  territory  (this  side  Taurus^). 
His  soldiers  shall  take  nothing  out  with  them  except  the  arms 
they  are  carrying.  If  they  chance  to  have  taken  anything 
away  they  shall  restore  it  to  the  same  cities. 

"  He  shall  receive  neither  soldiers  nor  other  men  from  the 
territory  of  king  Eumenes. 

"  If  there  be  any  men  in  the  army  of  Antiochus  coming 
from  any  of  the  cities  taken  over  by  the  Romans,  he  shall 
deliver  them  up  at  Apameia. 

"If  there  be  any  from  the  kingdom  of  Antiochus  with  the 
Romans  or  their  allies,  they  may  remain  or  depart  as  they 
choose. 

"  Antiochus  and  those  subject  to  him  shall  give  back  the 
slaves,  captives,  and  deserters  of  the  Romans  or  their  allies 
and  any  captive  received  from  any  quarter.  Antiochus  shall 
give  up,  if  it  be  within  his  power  so  to  do,  Hannibal,  son  of 
Hamilcar,  the  Carthaginian,  Mnesilochus  the  Acarnanian, 
Thoas  the  Aetolian,  Euboulidas  and  Philo  the  Chalcidians, 
and  such  of  the  Aetolians  as  have  held  national  offices. 

"  Antiochus  shall  give  up  all  his  elephants,  and  shall  have 
none  henceforth. 

"  Antiochus  shall  surrender  his  ships  of  war,  their  tackle, 
and  fittings,  and  henceforth  have  only  ten  decked  ships.  He 
shall  not  have  a  vessel  rowed  by  thirty  oars,  [or  by  less]  ^  for 
purposes  of  war  begun  by  himself. 

"He  shall  not  sail  west  of  the  river  Calycadnus  and 
the  promontory  of  Sarpedon,  except  to  convey  tribute  or 
ambassadors  or  hostages. 

"  It  shall  not  be  lawful  for  Antiochus  to  enlist  soldiers  or 
receive  exiles  from  the  territory  subject  to  Rome. 

"  Such  houses  as  belonged  to  the  Rhodians  or  their  allies, 
in  the  territory  subject  to  Antiochus,  shall  continue  to  belong 
to  the  Rhodians  as  before  the  war :  any  money  owed  to  them 

^  These  words  are  wanting  in  the  text.  From  Livy  {38,  38)  it  appears 
that  the  territory  was  defined  as  between  the  Taurus  and  the  R.  Halys  as  far 
as  the  borders  of  Lycaonia. 

*  Livy  (/.r.)  has  nrve  monerem  ex  belli  causa  quod  ipse  illaturus  erit. 


K!Ci  TREATY  WITH  ANTIOCHVS  299 

shall  still  be  recoverable :  and  any  properly  left  behind  by 
them,  if  sought  for,  shall  be  restored. 

"The  Rhodians  shall,  as  before  the  war,  be  free  from 
tribute. 

"  If  Antiochus  has  given  any  of  the  towns  to  others  which 
he  is  bound  to  restore,  he  shall  remove  from  them  also  his 
garrisons  and  men.  And  if  any  shall  wish  hereafter  to  desert 
to  him,  he  shall  not  receive  them. 

"  Antiochus  shall  pay  to  the  Romans  ten  thousand  talents, 
in  ten  yearly  instalments,  of  the  best  Attic  silver,  each  talent 
to  weigh  not  less  than  eighty  Roman  pounds,  and  ninety 
thousand  medemni  of  com. 

"  Antiochus  shall  pay  to  king  Eumenes  three  hundred  and 
fifty  talents  in  the  five  years  next  following,  in  yearly  instal- 
ments of  seventy  talents ;  and  in  lieu  of  the  corn,  according 
to  the  valuation  of  Antiochus  himself,  one  hundred  and 
twenty-seven  talents,  two  hundred  and  eight  drachmae,  which 
sum  Eumenes  has  consented  to  accept 'as  satisfying  his  claims.' 

"Antiochus  shall  give  twenty  hostages,  not  less  than 
eighteen  nor  more  than  forty-five  years  old,  and  change  them 
every  three  years. 

"If  there  be  in  any  year  a  deficit  in  the  instalment  paid, 
Antiochus  shall  make  it  good  in  the  next  year. 

"  If  any  of  the  cities  or  nations,  against  whom  it  has  been 
hereby  provided  that  Antiochus  should  not  make  war,  should 
commence  war  against  hin),  it  shall  be  lawful  for  Antiochus  to 
war  with  them ;  but  of  such  nations  and  cities  he  shall  not 
have  sovereignty  nor  attach  them  as  friends  to  himselC 

"Such  complaints  as  arise  between  the  parties  to  this 
treaty  shall  be  referred  to  arbitration. 

"  If  both  parties  agree  in  wishing  anything  to  be  added  to 
or  taken  from  this  treaty,  it  shall  be  lawful  so  to  do." 

46.  Immediately  after  this  treaty  had  been  solemnly  sworn 
to,  the  proconsul  Cnaeus  sent  Quintus  Minucius  Burning  of  Antio- 
Thermus  and  his  brother  Lucius,  who  had  just  chus's  ships  ai 
brought  the  money  from  Oroanda  to  Syria,  with  l'"'^™  ■"  ^yda. 
orders  to  receive  the  oath  from  the  king,  and  confirm  the 
several  clauses  of  the  treaty.  And  to  Quintus  Fabius  Lab*^ 
who  was  in  command  of  the  fleet,  he  sent  a  despatch  oid< 


300  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  book 

him  to  sail  back  to  Patara,  and  take  over  and  bum  the  ships 
there.  .  .  . 

Ariarathcs V.King      47.  The  proconsul  Cnaeus  Manlius  made 
of  Cappadocia.  Ariarathes  a   friend  of  Rome   on   receipt   of 
three  hundred  talents.  .  .  . 

48.  At  Apameia  the  Proconsul  and  the  ten  commissioners, 

Final  settlement  ^^'^'^  listening  to  all  who  appealed  to  them, 

of  the  affairs  of  assigned  in  the  case  of  disputed  claims  to  terri- 

Asia  Minor  by  the  tory,  money.  Or  anything  else,  certain  cities  in 

A*!?.!?rn'n  n"^^«  ^hich  the  paTtics  might  have  their  claims  settled 

Autumn  B.C.  i88. ,         ,  .       f  rr^i  ,1  1  .  1     f 

by  arbitration.  The  general  scheme  which  they 
drew  out  was  as  follows :  Those  of  the  autonomous  cities 
which,  having  formerly  paid  tribute  to  Antiochus,  had  remained 
faithful  to  Rome,  they  relieved  from  tribute  altogether. 
Those  that  had  been  tributary  to  Attalus  they  ordered  to  pay 
the  same  tribute  to  his  successor  Eumenes.  Such  as  had 
abandoned  the  Roman  friendship  and  joined  Antiochus  in  the 
war,  they  ordered  to  pay  Eumenes  the  amount  of  tribute  im- 
ix)sed  on  them  by  Antiochus.  The  people  of  Colophon, 
Notium,  Cymae,  and  Mylae,  they  freed  from  tribute.  To 
the  Clazomenians,  besides  this  relief,  they  gave  the  Island 
Drymussa.  To  the  Ephesians  they  restored  the  sacred  district 
which  they  had  been  obliged  by  the  enemy  to  evacuate.  .  .  } 
To  the  people  of  Chios,  Smyrna,  and  Erythrae,  besides  other 
marks  of  honour,  they  assigned  the  territory  which  they 
severally  expressed  a  wish  to  have  at  the  time,  and  alleged 
was  their  right,  from  regard  for  their  loyalty  and  zeal  which 
they  had  shown  to  Rome  during  the  war.  To  the  Phocaeans 
they  restored  their  ancestral  city  and  the  territory  which  they 
possessed  of  old.  They  next  transacted  business  with  the 
Rhodians,  giving  them  Lycia  and  Caria  up  to  the  river 
Maeander,  except  Telmissus.  As  to  king  Eumenes  and  his 
brothers,  not  content  with  the  liberal  provision  made  for  them 
in  their  treaty  with  Antiochus,  they  now  assigned  him  in 
addition  the  Chersonese,  Lysimacheia,  and  the  castles  on  the 
borders  of  these  districts,  and  such  country  as  had  been  sub- 
ject to  Antiochus  in  Europe;  and  in  Asia,  Phrygia  on  the 

^  See  Livy,  38,  39.     Some  words  are  lost  referring  to  grants  to  the  people 
of  Ilium. 


THE  COMMISSIONERS  IN  ASIA 


30" 


Hellespont,  Great  Fhrygia,  so  much  of  MysJa  as  he  had  before 
subjugated,  Lycaonia,  Milyas,  Lydia,  Tralles,  Ephesus,  and 
Telmissus :  all  these  they  gave  to  Eumenes.  As  to  Fam- 
phylia,  Eumenes  alleged  that  it  was  on  this  side  Taurus,  the 
amijassadors  of  Antiochus  on  the  other ;  and  the  commissioners 
feeling  unable  to  decide,  referred  the  question  to  the  Senate. 
Having  thus  decided  the  largest  number  and  most  important 
of  the  matters  brought  before  them,  they  started  on  the  road 
towards  the  Hellespont,  intending  on  their  journey  to  still 
further  secure  the  settlement  arrived  at  with  the  Gauls.  .  .  . 


BOOK  XXII 

CONTENTS 

In  the  \\%th  Ofympiad  {b,c,  188-184)  embassies  came  from 
Philip  and  the  tribes  bordering  on  Macedonia  to  Rome,  The  decrees 
of  the  Senate  concerning  them.  In  Greece  the  quarrel  of  Philip 
with  the  Thessalians  and  Perrhaebians  about  the  cities  held  by 
Philip  in  their  countries  from  the  time  of  the  war  with  Antiochus, 
TJu  decision  concerning  them  before  Q.  Caecilius  at  Tempe,  Dect- 
sions  of  Caecilius.  A  dijferenct  of  Philip  with  the  ambassadors 
of  Eumenes  and  the  exiles  from  Maroneia  ;  the  pleadings  on 
tliese  points  at  Thessalonica  and  the  decision  of  Caecilius,  The 
massacre  at  Afaroneia  instigated  by  king  Philip,  The  arrival 
of  the  Roman  legates^  and  their  decisions.  The  causes  of  the 
war  betiveen  the  Romans  and  Perseus,  Arrival  of  ambassadors 
from  kings  Ptolemy  and  Eumenes  and  Seleucus  in  the  Pelopon- 
nese.  The  decision  of  the  Achaeans  on  the  alliance  with  Ptolemy ^ 
and  on  the  gifts  offered  them  by  these  kings.  Arrival  of  Q. 
Caecilius  and  his  disapprobation  of  the  measures  taken  in  regard 
to  Sparta,  Embassy  of  A  reus  and  Alcibiades^  t7uo  of  tlie  earlier 
exiles  from  Sparta,  to  Rome,  and  their  accusations  against  Philo- 
poemen  and  the  Achaeans,  The  Roman  envoys  come  to  Cleitor, 
where  there  is  an  Achaean  assembly.  The  speeches  delivered  for 
both  parties,  and  the  Achaean  decrees  in  the  affair  of  Sparta} 

8.  After  the  execution  of  the  men  at  Compasium,^  some  of 
the  Lacedaemonians,  incensed  at  what  had  been  done,  and 

^  This  summary  is  arranged  by  Hultsch  as  chs.  i  and  2  of  book  22. 
It  appears  as  book  23,  chs.  4,  5  in  Schweighacuscr's  text. 

*  In  ac.  191  Philopocmcn  secured  the  adhesion  of  Sparla  to  the  Achaean 
league  :  Init  the  Spartans  were  never  united  in  their  loyalty  to  it,  and  during 
his  year  as  Strategus  (b.c.   189)  he  punished  a  massacre  of  some  Achaean 


BOOK  xjcri  SPARTA  AND  THE  LEAGUE  303 

believing  that  the  power  and  authority  of  the  Romans  had 
been  set  at  naught   by  Philopoemen,  went  to 

Rome  and  accused  Philopoemen  and  his  pro-    „    °'''^"'. 
,,,,,.,,  .11     Komc  against 

ceedmgs;  and  finally  obtaineda  letteraddressed  philopoemen. 
to  the  Achaeans  from  Marcus  I-epidus,  theB-f^'S?,  Cost  M. 
consul  of  the  year,  and  afterwards  Pont'fex'^™'^^'^ 
Maximus,  in  which  he  told  the  Achaeans  that 
they  had  not  acted  equitably  in  the  matters  of  the  I^cedae- 
monians.  At  the  same  time  as  this  mission  from  Sparta, 
Philopoemen  also  appointed  Nicodemus  of  Elis  and  others  to 
go  on  an  embassy  to  Rome. 

Just  at  that  time  Demetrius  of  Athens  came  on  a  mission 
from  Ptolemy,  to  renew   the  existing  alliance    Rene^^of^^le 
between    the   king    and    the  Achaean    league,    treaty  between 
This   was   eagerly   accepted,   and   my   father,     >he  Achaean 
Lycortas,   and  Theodoridas,  and  Rositeles  of     '^„""' 
Sicyon  were  appointed  ambassadors  to  take  the 
oaths  on  behalf  of  the  Achaeans,   and  receive  those  of  the 
king.     And   on   that  occasion  a  circumstance  xhe  accomplish- 
occurred,  which,  though  not  important  perhaps,  mews  of  Ptolemy 
is  still  worth  recording.     After  the  completion      Epipt>anes. 
of  this  renewal  of  alliance  on  behalf  of  the  Achaeans,  Philo- 
poemen entertained  the  ambassador ;  and  in  the  course  of  the 
banquet  the  ambassador  introduced  the  king's  name,  and  said 
a  great  deal  in  his  praise,  quoting  anecdotes  of  his  skill  and 
boldness  in  hunting,  as  well  as  his  excellence  in  riding  and  the 
use  of  arms ;  and  ended  by  quoting,  as  a  proof  of  what  he  said, 
that  the  king  on  horseback  once  transfixed  a  bull    with   a 
javelin.  .  .  . 

4.  In  Bocotia,  after  the  formation  of  the  treaty  between 
Rome  and  Antiochus,  the  hopes  of  the  whole  nie  effect  of  the 
revolutionary  party  were  destroyed.  Politics  coll.tpse  of 
therefore  began  to  assume  a  new  aspect;  and  Antiochus  upon 
whereas  the  administration  of  justice  among 
them  had  been  postponed  for  nearly  the  last  twenty  years, 
voices  began  to  make  themselves  heard  in  the  cities  to  the 

sympathisers  In  Spariaby  an  execution  of  eighty  Spartans  at  Compasium  on  the 
frontier  of  Lnconia.  This  number  Plutarch  gives  on  the  aulhority  of  Poly- 
tnux,  Init  another  account  stated  it  at  three  hundred  and  fifty.    Plut.  Phil,  16. 


304  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  book 

effect  that  "  there  ought  to  be  an  end  and  settlement  of  their 
mutual  disputes."  But  after  considerable  controversy  on  this 
point,  because  the  discontented  were  more  numerous  than  the 
wealthy,  the  following  circumstance  occurred  which  helped 
accidently  to  support  the  party  of  order.  Titus  Flamininus 
had  for  some  time  past  been  zealously  working  in  Rome  to 
Resistance  to  the  sccure  the  restoration  of  Zeuxippus  to  Boeotia, 
recall  of  bccause  he  had  found  him  serviceable  on  many 
Zeuxippus.  occasions  during  the  wars  with  Antiochus  and 
Philip.  And  just  at  this  time  he  had  induced  the  Senate  to 
send  a  despatch  to  the  Boeotians  ordering  them  to  recall 
Zeuxippus  and  his  fellow  exiles.  When  this  despatch  arrived, 
the  Boeotians,  fearing  that,  if  these  men  were  restored,  they 
would  become  detached  from  their  good  understanding  with 
Macedonia,  determined  that  the  legal  sentence  upon 
Zeuxippus  and  the  rest  should  be  publicly  proclaimed,^ 
which  they  had  formerly  drawn  up  against  them.  Thus  they 
condemned  them  on  two  charges,  first,  of  sacrilege  for 
having  stripped  off  the  silver  from  the  plated  table  of  Zeus, 
See  1 8, 43.  Livy,  and,  secondly,  of  murder  for  having  killed 
33.  28.  Brachylles.  Having  made  this  arrangement, 
they  assumed  that  they  need  pay  no  further  attention  to  the 
despatch  of  the  Senate,  but  contented  themselves  with  sending 
Callicritus  and  others  to  Rome  with  the  message  that  they 
were  unable  to  rescind  what  had  been  settled  by  their  laws. 
Zeuxippus  having  sent  an  embassy  to  the  Senate  at  the  same 
time,  the  Romans  wrote  to  the  Aetolians  and  Achaeans  an 
account  of  the  attitude  assumed  by  the  Boeotians,  and  ordered 
them  to  restore  Zeuxippus  to  his  country.  The  Achaeans  re- 
frained from  invading  the  country  with  an  army,  but  selected 
some  ambassadors  to  go  and  persuade  the  Boeotians  to  obey 
the  orders  from  Rome  \  and  also  to  settle  the  legal  disputes 
existing  between  them  and  the  Achaeans,  on  the  same  prin- 
ciples as  they  conducted  the  administration  of  justice  at  home  : 
for  it  happened  that  there  were  some  controversies  between 
the  two  nations  that  had  been  dragging  on  for  a  long  time. 
On  receiving  this  message  the  Boeotians,  whose  Strategus  was 
then  Hippias,  promised  at  the  moment  that  they  would  do 

*  Some  words  arc  lost  from  the  text  describing  their  method  of  procedure. 


xxu  THE  MURDERERS  OF  BRACHYLLES  305 

what  was  demanded  of  them,  but  shortly  afterwards  neglected 
it  at  every  point.  Therefore,  when  Hippias  had  laid  down  his 
office  and  Alcetas  had  succeeded  him,  Philopoemen  gave  all 
who  chose  license  to  make  reprisals  on  the  territories  of  the 
Boeotians ;  which  proved  the  beginning  of  a  serious  quarrel 
between  the  two  nations.  For  on  the  cattle  of  Mymchus  and 
Simon  being  driven  off,'  and  a  struggle  arising  over  this 
transaction,  the  contest  soon  ceased  to  be  political,  and  be- 
came the  beginning  and  prelude  of  open  war.  If  indeed  the 
Senate  had  persisted  in  carrying  out  the  restoration  of 
Zeuxippus,  war  would  quickly  have  been  kindled ;  but  as  it 
maintained  silence  on  the  subject,  the  Megareans  were  induced 
by  an  embassy  proposing  terms  to  stop  the  reprisals.  .  .  ?■ 

6.  A  quarrel  arose  between  the  Lycians  and  Rhodians  from 
the  following  causes.  When  the  ten  commis- 
sioners were  employed  in  the  settlement  of  Asia,  '^^^j;;^  *° 
they  were  visited  by  Theaetetus  and  Philo- 
phron  on  a  mission  from  Rhodes,  demanding  that  Lycia  and 
Caria  should  be  given  to  them  in  return  for  the  goodwill 
and  zeal  displayed  by  them  in  the  war  with  Antiochus.  At 
the  same  time  Hipparchus  and  Satyrus  came  from  Ilium 
begging,  on  the  ground  of  their  kindred  with  the  Lycians,  that 
the  latter  should  receive  pardon  for  their  transgressions.  The 
commissioners  listened  to  these  pleadings,  and  tried  to  do  what 
they  could  to  satisfy  both.  For  the  sake  of  the  people  of 
Ilium,  they  inflicted  no  severity  on  the  Lycians,  but  gratified 
the  Rhodians  by  presenting  them  with  the  sovereignty  over 
that  people.  This  decision  was  the  origin  of  a  serious  division 
and  controversy  between  the  Lycians  and  Rhodians.  For  the 
envoys  of  lUum  visited  the  Lycian  cities,  giving  out  that  they 
had  succeeded  in  pacifying  the  Roman  anger,  and  that  they 
owed  their  liberty  to  them ;  while  Theaetetus  and  his  colleague 
took  back  word  to  their  countrymen  that  Lycia  and  all  Caria 
south  of  the  Maeander  had  been  given  as  a  free  gift  by  the 
Romans  to  Rhodes.  Presently  an  embassy  came  from  Lycia  to 
Rhodes  desiring  an  alliance;  while  the  Rhodians  on  their  part 
had  elected  certain  of  their  citizens  to  go  to  Lycia  and  give 
'  Some  words  ore  toat  in  the  text  which  would  more  lulty  explain  the 


3o6  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  book 

orders  to  the  several  cities  as  to  what  they  were  to  do.  They 
were  thus  entirely  at  cross  purposes,  and  for  some  time  the 
cause  of  the  misunderstanding  was  not  generally  intelligible. 
But  when  the  Lycian  ambassadors  appeared  in  the  assembly 
and  began  talking  about  an  alliance,  and  Pothion  the  Prytanis 
rose  after  them  and  explained  the  different  ideas  which  the  two 
people  entertained  on  the  subject,  and  moreover,  sternly  re- 
buked the  Lycian  envoys,^  the  latter  declared  that  they  would 
endure  anything  rather  than  be  subject  to  the  Rhodians.  .  .   . 

EGYPT    UNDER    PTOLEMY    EPIPHANES    AFTER    THE   DEATH    OF 

ARISTOMENES  (l8,  53,  54) 

6.  All  men  admire  the   magnanimity  of  Philip   towards 

Athens ;  for  though  he  had  been  injured  as  well  as 

condi!^of'phiiip  abused  by  them,  yet  when  he  conquered  them  at 

II.  of  Macedon  to  Chaeroneia,  so  far  from  using  this  opportunity 

Aihcns  in  n.c.  338  for  injuring  his  opponents,  he  caused  the  corpses 

''inoiemy''^     of  the  Athenians  to  be  buried  with  the  proper 

ceremonies ;  while  those  of  them  who  had  been 
taken  prisoners  he  actually  presented  with  clothes,  and 
restored  to  their  friends  without  ransom.  But  though  men 
praise  tliey  do  not  imitate  such  conduct.  They  rather  try  to 
outdo  those  with  whom  they  are  at  war,  in  bitterness  of  passion 
and  severity  of  vengeance.  Ptolemy,  for  instance,  had  men 
tied  naked  to  carts  and  dragged  at  their  tail,  and  then  put  to 
death  with  torture.  .  .  . 

7.  When  this  same  Ptolemy  was  besieging  Lycopolis,  the 
Suppression  of  Egyptian   nobles   surrendered  to  the   king  at 

the  revolt  in     discretion ;  and  his  cruel  treatment  of  them  in- 
lower  F^P^     volved  him  in  manifold  dangers.    The  same  was 
the  result  at  the  time  Polycrates  suppressed  the 
Lycopolis  in  the  revolt.     For  Athinis,  Pausiras,  Chesuphus,  and 
Thcbaid.       Irobastus,  who  still  survived  of  the  rebellious 
nobles,  yielding  to  necessity,  appeared  at  the  city  of  Sais  and 
surrendered  at  discretion  to  the  king.    But  Ptolemy,  regardless 
of  all  pledges,  had  them  tied  naked  to  the  carts  and  dragged 
off,  and  then  put  to  death  with  torture.     He  then  went  to 

^  Something  is  lost  in  the  text. 


XXII        SEEDS  OF  THE  THIRD  MACEDONIAN  WAR         30J 

Naucratis  with  his  army,  where  he  received  the  mercenaries 
enHsted  for  him  by  Aristonicus  from  Greece,  and  thence  sailed 
to  Alexandria,  without  having  taken  any  part  whatever  in  the 
actual  operations  of  the  war,  thanks  to  the  dishonest  advice  of 
Polycratcs,  though  he  was  now  twenty-five  years  old.   .  .  . 

8.  At  this  time  were  sowed  the  seeds  of  fatal  evils  to  the 
royal  house  of  Macedonia.     I  am  aware  that  ^^_  ,35,    1^ 
some  historians  of  the  war  between  Rome  and  origin  of  the  bsi 
Perseus,  when  they  wish  to  set  forth  the  causes  M»<*<ionian  war. 
of  the  quarrel  for  our  information,  assign  as  the  primary  one 
the  expulsion  of  AbrupoUs  from  his  principality,     Abrupolis,  a 
on  the  ground  of  having  made  a  raid  upon  the  Thracian  prmcc 
mines  at  Pangaeum  after  the  death  of  Philip,  ^"^^^f  °'^ 
which  Perseus  repulsed,   finally  expelling  him  ^ivy,  43.  13,  40. 
entirely  out  of  his  own  dominions.     Next  they  Death  of  i-hiiip 
mention  the  invasion  of  Dolopia,  and  the  visit     ^-  ^'^  ''9- 
of  Perseus  Co  Delphi,  the  plot  against  Eumenes  at  Delphi,  and 
the  murder  of  the  ambassadors  in  Boeolia ;  and 
from  these  they  say  sprang  the  war  between 
Perseus  and  the  Romans.     But  my  contention  is  that  it  is  of 
most  decisive  advantage,  both  to  historians  and  their  readers, 
to  know  the  causes  from  which  the  several  events  are  bom  and 
spring.     Most  historians  confound  these,  because  they  do  not 
keep  a  firm  hold  upon  the  distinction  between  a  pretext  and 
a  cause,  or  again  between  a  pretext  and  a  beginning  of  a  war. 
And  since  events  at  the  present  time  recall  this  distinction 
I  feel  compelled  to  renew  my  discussion  of  this  subject     For 
instance,  of  the  events  just  referred  to,  the  first  „„  . ,         ^  , 

,  ,      .  ,         ,  .         Sec  bk,  3,  en.  6. 

three  are  pretexts ;  the  last  two — the  plot  agamst 
Eumenes,  the  murder  of  the  ambassadors,  and  other  similar 
things  that  happened  during  the  same  period — are  clear  Ixgin- 
nings  of  the  war  between  Rome  and  Perseus,  and  of  the  final 
overthrow  of  the  Macedonian  kingdom  ;  but  not  one  of  them 
is  a  cause  of  these  things.  I  will  illustrate  by  examples.  Just 
as  we  say  that  Philip  son  of  Amyntas  contemplated  and 
determined  upon  accomplishing  the  war  with  Persia,  while 
Alexander  put  into  execution  what  he  had  projected,  so  in  the 
present  instance  we  say  that  Philip  son  of  Demetrius  first  pro- 


3o8  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  book 

jected  the  last  war  against  Rome,  and  had  all  his  preparations 
ready  for  the  execution  of  his  design,  but  that  after  his  death 
Perseus  became  the  agent  in  carrying  out  the  undertaking 
itsel£  If  this  be  true,  the  following  also  is  clear :  it  is  im- 
possible that  the  causes  of  the  war  should  have  been  subse- 
quent to  the  death  of  him  who  resolved  upon  and  projected  it ; 
which  would  be  the  case  if  we  accepted  the  account  of  these 
historians ;  for  the  events  alleged  by  them  as  its  causes  were 
subsequent  to  the  death  of  Philip.  .  .  . 

9.  About  the  same  time  ambassadors  came  to  Rome  from 

Complaints      ^^^g   Eumenes,  informing   the  Senate   of  the 

lodged  against   encroachment   of   Philip   upon    the    cities    in 

Philip  at  Rome.  Thrace.      There  came  also  the  exiles  of  the 

Maronitae  denouncing  Philip,  and  charging  him 

with  being  the  cause  of  their  expulsion.     These  were  followed 

by  Athamanians,  Perrhaebians,  and  Thessalians,  demanding  the 

restoration  of  their  cities  which  Philip  had  taken  from  them 

during  the  war  with  Antiochus.     Ambassadors  also  came  from 

Philip  to  make  answer  to  all  accusers.     After  repeated  debates 

between  all  these  envoys  and  the  ambassadors  of  Philip,  the 

A  commission    Senate  decided  to  appoint  a  commission  at  once, 

of  investigation  to  investigate  the  actions  of  Philip,  and  to  pro- 

appomted.      ^^^^  ^  ^y^o  chose  to  State  their  views  and  their 

complaints  of  the  king  to  his  face.    The  legates  thus  appointed 

were    Quintus    Caecilius,     Marcus    Baebius,    and    Tiberius 

Claudius.^  .  .  . 

There  was  again  a  war  of  parties  among  the 
Thrace"       Aenii,  one  side  inclining  to  Eumenes,  the  other 
to  Macedonia.  .  .  . 

Tfu  result  of  these  embassies  was  the  Congress  of  Tenipe^  at 
which  no  definite  settlement  was  made,     Livy\  39,  25-28. 

A  MEETING  OF  THE  ACHAEAN  LEAGUE  PARLIAMENT 

Phiiopoemen  iQ.  I  have  already  stated  that  in  the  Pelo- 

te^^oTtwo^rs  P°"^^^^'  ^^^^^  Philopoemen  was  still  Strategus, 
running,  from    the  Achaean  league  sent  an  embassy  to  Rome 

*  Livy  (39,  24)  gives  the  names  as  Q.   Caecilius   Mctellus,   M.    Baebius 
Tamphilus,  Ti.  Sempronius. 


XXII  A  MEETING  OF  THE  ACHAEAN  LEAGUE  309 

on  the  subject  of  Sparta,  and  another  to  king  "v  "■<=■  '*9  "> 
Ptolemy  to  renew  their  ancient  alliance.  ""*■  ^'^'  '^'■ 

Immediately  after  Philopoemen  had  been  succeeded   by 
Aristaenus   as  Strategus,    the   ambassadors  of  king  Ptolemy 
arrived,  while  the  league  meeting  was  assembled      Arisiaenus. 
at  Megalopolis.     King  Eumenes  also  had  de-Mny,  b,c.  16710 
spatchedanembassyofferingtogivetheAchaeans  ^'^y.  ^.c  186, 
one  hundred  and  twenty  talents,  on  condition  that  it  was  invested 
and  the  interest  used  to  pay  the  council  of  the  league  at  the  time 
of  the  federal  assemblies.     Ambassadors  came  sji^m^  VhWa- 
ateo  from  king  Seieucus,  to  renew  his  friendship  paior  succeeded 
with  them,  and  offering  a  present  of  a  fleet  often       his  father 
ships  of  war.     But  when  the  assembly  got  to  cral^Rc*  I'Si 
business,   the    first  to  come  forward  to  speak 
was  Nicodemus  of  Elis,  who  recounted  to  the    Business  of  ihe 
Achaeans  what  he  and  his  colleagues  had  said       asse^ly 
in  the  Roman  Senate  about  Sparta,  and  read 
the  answer  of  the  Senate;  which  was  to  the  Uuer  from  the 
effect  that  the  Senate  disapproved  of  the  destnic-    ^„bj^<rf 
tion  of  the  walls,  and  of  the  execution  of  the    rhiiopocmen's 
men  put  to  death  at  Compasium,  but  that  it      anions  ai 
did  not  rescind  any  arrangement  made.     No         v^^'^ 
one  saying  a  word  for  or  against  this,  the  subject  was  allowed 
to  pass. 

Next  came  the  ambassadors  from  Eumenes,  who  renewed 
the  ancestral  friendship  of  the  king  with  the 
Achaeans,  and  stated  to  the  assembly  the  offer     ^^'^"^ 
made  by  him.     They  spoke  at  great  length  on 
these  subjects,  and  retired  after  setting  forth  the  greatness  of 
the  king's  kindness  and  affection  to  the  nation. 

1 1.  After  they  had  finished  their  speech,  ApoUonidas  ofSicyon 
rose  and  said  that :  "As  far  as  the  amount  of  the 
money  was  concerned,  it  was  a  present  worthy    ^p^Hon^j^ 
of  the  Achaeans.     But  if  they  looked  to  the 
intention  of  the  donor,  or  the  purpose  to  which  the  gift  was  to 
be  applied,  none  could  well  be  more  insulting  and  more  unconsti- 
tutional.    The  laws  prohibited   any  one,  whether  a   private 
individual  or  magistrate,  from  accepting  presents  from  a  king 
on  any  pretence  whatever ;  but  if  they  took  this  money  they 


3IO  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  BOOK 

would  every  one  of  them  be  plainly  accepting  a  present,  which 
was  at  once  the  gravest  possible  breach  of  the  law,  and  con- 
fessedly the  deepest  possible  personal  disgrace.  For  that  the 
council  should  lake  a  great  wage  from  Eumenes,  and  meet  to 
deliberate  on  the  interests  of  the  league  after  swallowing  such  a 
bait,  was  manifestly  disgraceful  and  injurious.  It  was  Eumenes 
that  offered  money  now ;  presently  it  would  be  Prusias ; 
and  then  Seleucus.  Bat  as  the  interests  of  democracies  and  of 
kings  are  quite  opposite  to  each  other,  and  as  our  most  frequent 
and  most  important  deliberations  concern  the  points  of  contro- 
versy arising  between  us  and  the  kings,  one  of  two  things  must 
necessarily  happen ;  either  the  interests  of  the  king  will  have 
precedence  over  our  own,  or  we  must  incur  tlie  reproach  of 
ingratitude  for  opposing  our  paymasters."  He  therefore  urged 
the  Achaeans  not  only  to  decline  the  offer,  but  to  hold 
Eumenes  in  detestation  for  thinking  of  making  it. 

Next  rose  Cassander  of  Aegina  and  reminded  the  Achaeans 

speech  of  of  "  The  misfortunes  which  the  Aeginetans  had 
Cnssandcr  of  met  With  through  being  members  of  the  Achaean 
Aegina.  league ;  when  Publius  Sulpicius  sailed  against 
them  with  the  Roman  fleet,  and  sold  all  the  unhappy  Aeginetans 
into  slavery."  In  regard  to  this  subject  I  have  already  related 
how  [he  Aetolians,  having  got  possession  of  Aegina  in  virtue  of 
their  treaty  with  Rome,  sold  it  to  Attalus  for  thirty  talents. 
Cassander  therefore  drew  the  attention  of  the  Achaeans  to 
these  facts  ;  and  demanded  that  Eumenes  should  not  seek  to 
gain  the  afTection  of  the  Achaeans  by  offering  them  money,  but 
that  he  should  establish  an  incontestable  claim  to  every  sign  of 
devotion  by  giving  back  Aegina,  He  urged  the  Achaeans  not 
to  accept  presents  which  would  place  them  in  the  position  of 
l>eing  the  destroyers  of  the  hopes  of  Aeginetan  restoration  for 
all  time. 

After  these  speeches  had  been  delivered,  the  people  showed 
The  preseni  of  such  signs  of  enthusiastic  approval  that  no  one 

Eumcnos  is  ventured  to  speak  on  the  side  of  the  king ;  but 
refused.  ([,g  whole  assembly  rejected  the  offer  by  acclama- 
tion, though  its  amount  certainly  made  it  exceedingly  tempting. 

12.  The  next  subject  introduced  for  debate  was  that  of 
king  Ptolemy.    The  ambassadors  who  had  been  on  the  mission 


XXII    OFFERS  OF  SUMENES  &•  SELEUCUS  DECLINED  311 

to  Ptolemy  were  called  forward,  and  Lycortas,  acting  as  spokes- 
man, began  by  stating  how  they  had  interchanged  piolemy.    The 
oaths  of  alliance  with  the  king;  and  next  an-       speech  of 
nounced  that  they  brought  a  present  from  the       Lycortas, 
king  to  the  Achaean  league  of  six  thousand  stands  of  arms  for 
pelcasts,  and  two  thousand  talents  in  bronze  coinage;     He 
added  a  panegyric  on  the  king,  and  finished  his  speech  by  a 
brief  reference  to  the  goodwill  and  active  benevolence  of  the 
king  towards  the  Achaeans.     Upon  this  the  Strategus  of  the 
Achaeans,    Aristaenus,    stood    up    and    asked       a  miMake 
Lycortas  and  his  colleagues  in  the  embassy  to      discovered. 
Ptolemy  "  which  alliance  it  was  that  he  had  thus  renewed  ?  " 

No  one  answering  the  question,  but  all  the  assembly 
beginning  to  converse  with  each  other,  the  Council  chambo' 
was  filled  with  confusion.  The  cause  of  this  absurd  state 
of  things  was  this.  There  had  been  several  treaties  of 
alliance  formed  between  the  Achaeans  and  Ptolemy's 
kingdom,  as  widely  different  in  their  provision  as  in  the 
circumstances  which  gave  rise  to  them  -.  but  neither  had 
Ptolemy's  envoy  made  any  distinction  when  arranging  for  the 
renewal,  merely  speaking  in  general  terms  on  the  matter,  nor  had 
the  ambassadors  sent  from  Achaia;  but  they  had  interchanged 
the  oaths  on  the  assumption  of  there  being  but  one  treaty. 
The  result  was,  that,  on  the  Strategus  quoting  all  the  treaties, 
and  pointing  out  in  detail  the  differences  between  them,  which 
turned  out  to  be  important,  the  assembly  demanded  to  know 
which  it  was  that  it  was  renewing.  And  when  no  one  was  able 
to  explain,  not  even  Philopoemcn  himself,  who  had  been  in  office 
when  the  renewal  was  made,  nor  Lycortas  and  his  colleagues 
who  had  been  on  the  mission  to  Alexandria,  these  men  all 
began  to  be  regarded  as  careless  in  conducting  the  business  of 
the  league ;  while  Aristaenus  acquired  great  reputation  as  being 
the  only  man  who  knew  what  he  was  talking  about  j  and  finally, 
the  assembly  refused  to  allow  the  ratification,  voting  on  account 
of  this  blunder  that  the  business  should  be  postponed. 

Then  the  ambassadors  from  Seleucus  entered  with  their 
proposal.     The  Achaeans,   however,  voted  to        Offer  of 
renew   the   friendship   with    Seleucus,   but   to       Sdcucus. 
decline  for  the  present  the  gifl  of  the  ships. 


312  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  book 

18.  Having  thus  finished  their  deliberations,  the  assembly 
broke  up  and  the  people  separated  to  their 
^cT^iSs*^  several  cities.  But  subsequently,  while  the 
(Nemean)  games  were  in  course  of  celebration, 
Quintus  Caecilius  arrived  from  Macedonia,  on  his  way  back 
from  the  embassy  which  he  had  been  conducting  to  Philip. 
Aristaenus  having  called  a  meeting  of  the  league  magistrates  in 
Argos,  Quintus  attended  and  upbraided  them  for  having  ex- 
ceeded justice  in  the  harshness  and  severity  with  which  they  had 
treated  the  Lacedaemonians,  and  urged  them  strongly  to  repair 
the  error.  Aristaenus  said  not  a  word,  showing  clearly  by  his 
silence  that  he  disapproved  of  what  had  been  done  and  agreed 
with  the  words  of  Caecilius.  But  Diophanes  of  Megalopolis, 
who  was  more  of  a  soldier  than  a  statesman,  stood  up  to  speak, 
and  so  far  from  offering  any  defence  of  the  Achaeans,  suggested 
to  Caecilius,  from  hostility  to  Philopoemen,  another  charge  that 
might  be  brought  against  them.  For  he  said  that  "the  Lacedae- 
monians were  not  the  only  people  who  had  been  badly  treated ; 
the  Messenians  had  been  so  also."  There  were  as  a  fact  some 
controversies  going  on  among  the  Messenians,  in  regard  to  the 
decree  of  FJamininus  concerning  the  exiles,  and  the  execu- 
tion of  it  by  Philopoemen :  and  Caecilius,  thinking  that  he 
now  had  a  party  among  the  Achaeans  themselves  of  the  same 
opinion  as  himself,  expressed  still  greater  anger  at  the  hesita- 
tion on  the  part  of  the  assembled  magistrates  in  obeying  his 
orders.  However,  when  Philopoemen,  Lycortas,  and  Archon 
argued  long  and  elaborately  to  prove  that  what  had  been  done 
at  Sparta  was  right,  and  advantageous  to  the  Lacedaemonians 
themselves  more  than  to  any  one  else,  and  that  it  was  impossible 
to  disturb  any  existing  arrangements  without  violating  justice 
to  man  and  piety  to  the  gods,  they  came  to  the  decision  that 
they  would  maintain  them,  and  give  an  answer  to  that 
effect  to  the  Roman  legate.  Seeing  what  the  disposition  of 
the  magistrates  was,  Caecilius  demanded  that  the  public 
assembly  should  be  summoned,  to  which  the  Achaean  magis- 
trates demanded  to  see  the  instructions  which  he  had  from  the 
Senate  on  these  points :  and  when  he  gave  no  answer  to  this 
demand,  they  said  that  they  would  not  summon  the  assembly 
for  him,  as  their  laws  forbade  them  to  do  so  unless  a  man 


xjtii         CAECFLIUS  m  THE  ACHAEAN  ASSEMBLY  313 

brought  written  instructions  from  the  Senate,  stating  the  subject 
on  which  they  were  to  summon  it.  Caecilius  was  so  angry  at 
this  uncompromising  opposition  to  his  orders,  that  he  refused 
to  receive  his  answer  from  the  magistrates,  and  so  departed 
without  any  answer  at  all  The  Achaeans  laid  the  blame 
both  of  the  former  visit  of  Marcus  Fulvius  and  the  present 
one  of  Caecilius  on  Aristacnus  and  Diophanes,  on  the  ground 
that  they  had  invited  them  on  account  of  their  political  oppo- 
sition to  Fhilopoemen ;  and  accordingly  the  general  public  felt 
a  certain  suspicion  of  these  two  men.  Such  was  the  state  of 
the  Peloponnese.  .  .  . 

14.  Fhilopoemen  had  a  sharp  difference  in  debate  with 
Archon  the  Strategus.  In  course  of  time,  how- 
ever, Fhilopoemen  was  convinced  by  Archon's  '^  ^^^^ 
arguments,  and,  changing  his  mind,  spoke  in 
warm  commendation  of  Archon  as  having  managed  his  business 
with  skill  and  address.  But  when  1  heard  the  speech  at  the 
time  it  did  not  seem  to  me  right'  to  praise  a  man  and  yet  do 
him  an  injury,  nor  do  I  think  so  now  in  my  maturer  years.  For 
I  think  that  there  is  as  wide  a  distinction  in  point  of  morality 
between  practical  ability  and  success  secured  by  absence  of 
scruples,  as  there  is  between  skill  and  mere  cunning.  The  former 
are  in  a  manner  the  highest  attainments  possible,  the  latter  the 
reverse.  But  owing  to  the  lack  of  discernment  so  general  in 
our  day,  these  qualities,  which  have  little  in  common,  excite 
the  same  amount  of  commendation  and  emulation  in  the 
world.  .  .  ■ 

16.  When  Caecilius  returned  from  Greece  and  made  his 
report  to  the  Senate  concerning  Macedonia  and 
the   Peloponnese,   the   ambassadors  who   had  f'^™''^-'*"" . 
come   to  Rome  on   these   matters  were  inCro-    "SiT  Achoran" 
duced  into  the  Senate.     First  came  those  from     heard  on  the 
Philip  and  Eumenes,  as  well  as  the  exiles  from       !?P*'''  °' 
Aenus  and   Maroneia;   and   on    their   saying    ^^^  185-184, 
much  the  same  as  they  had  said  before  Caecilius 
and  his  colleagues  at  Thessalonica,  the  Senate  voted  to  send 
another  deputation  to  Philip,  to  see  first  of  all  whether  he 
had  evacuated  the  cities  in  Perrhaebia  in  conformity  with  the 
answer  he  gave  to  Caecilius :  and  secondly,  to  order  him  to 


314  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  bom 

remove  his  garrison  from  Aenus  and  Maroneia ;  and  in  a  word, 
to  abandon  all  fortresses,  positions,  and  towns  on  the  sea-board 
of  Thrace. 

After  these  the  ambassadors  from  the  Peloponnese  were 

The  Achaean    introduced.     For  the  Achaeans  on  their  part 

aniiiass.Tdors    had  sent  Apollonidas  of  Sicyon,  and  others,  to 

make  thtir     justify  thcmselves  to  Caecilius  for   his  having 

received  no  answer,  and  generally  to  inform  the 

Senate  on  the  question  of  Sparta ;  and  at  the  same  time  Areus 

and  Alcibiades  had  come  from  Sparta  as  ambassadors, — two 

of  the  old  exiles  recently  restored  by  Philopoemen  and  the 

Achaeans.    And  this  was  a  circumstance  that  particularly  roused 

the  anger  of  the  Achaeans ;  because  they  thought  it  the  height  of 

ingratitude  on  the  part  of  the  exiles,  after  receiving  so  important 

and  recent  a  service  at  their  hands,   to  be  now  sending  a 

hostile    embassy,  and  accusing  to  the  sovereign  people  those 

who  had  been  the  authors  of  their  unlooked-for  preservation 

and  restoration  to  their  country, 

16.   Both  parties   were   heard    in    their    defence    in    each 

Other's  presence.     Apollonidas  of  Sicyon  and  his  colleagues 

tried  to  convince  the  Senate  that  the  affairs  of 

'^env^f"     Sparta  could  not   have  been   better  managed 

than    they    were    managed    by    Philopoemen. 

Areus  and  his  colleagues  attempted  to  establish  the  reverse : 

alleging,  first  of  all,  that  the  power  of  the  city  was  entirely 

destroyed  by  the  violent  withdrawal  of  so  large  a  number ; 

and,  in  the  second  place,  that  even  those  that  were  left  were 

so  few  that  their  position  was  insecure,  now  that  the  walls 

were  pulled  down ;   and  that   their  freedom  of  speech  was 

entirely  destroyed  by  the  fact  that  they  were  not  only  amenable 

to  the  general  decrees  of  the  Achaean  league,  but  were  also 

made  specially  subject  to  the  magistrates  set  over  them  from 

time  to  time.     After  hearing  these  envoys  also,  the  Senate 

_,     .    .  .         decided  to  give  the  same  legates  instructions 
The  decision,  ,•         ,  „  ,  ,  . 

regardmg  them  as  well  as  the  others,  and  ap- 
pointed Appius  Claudius  and  his  colleagues  commissioners  for 
Greece, 

But  the  ambassadors  from  the  Achaeans  offered  an  ex- 
planation also  to  Caecilius  in  the  Senate,  on  behalf  of  the 


XTti  ANOTHEk  COMMISSION  FOR  GREECE  315 

magistrates,  asserting  that  "  They  did  not  act  wrongly  or  deserve 
blame  for  refusing  to  summon  the  assembly,  Defence  of  ihe 
unless  it  were  requisite  to  decide  on  an  alliance  refusal  lo  call  ibe 
or  a  war,  or  unless  some  one  brought  a  letter  Achaean  assembly, 
from  the  Senate.  The  magistrates  had  therefore  impartially 
considered  the  subject  of  summoning  the  assembly,  but  were 
prevented  from  doing  so  by  the  laws,  because  he  neither 
brought  a  despatch  from  the  Senate  nor  would  show  them  any 
written  instructions."  At  the  conclusion  of  this  speech 
Caecilius  rose  and  made  an  attack  on  Philopoemen  and 
Lycortas,  and  the  Achaeans  generally,  and  on  the  policy  they 
had  pursued  towards  the  city  of  Sparta.  After  listening  to 
the  arguments,  the  Senate  answered  the  Achaeans  by  saying 
that  they  would  send  commissioners  to  investigate  the  matter 
of  Sparta  ;  and  they  accompanied  this  answer  by  an  admoni- 
tion to  them  to  pay  attention  to  the  ambassadors  sent  by  them 
from  time  to  time,  and  show  them  proper  respect,  as  the 
Romans  did  to  ambassadors  who  came  to  them.  .  .  . 

17.  \Vhen  Philip  learnt,  by  a  message  from  his  own 
ambassadors  at  Rome,  that  he  would  be  obliged  .  , 
to  evacuate  the  cities  in  Thrace,  he  was  ex-  on'lhe^^^ 
tremely  annoyed,  because  he  regarded  his  Maronda.  early 
kingdom  as  being  now  curtailed  on  every  side ;  '?  ■■'^-  '^*- 
and  hevenled  his  wrath  upon  the  unhappy  people  "^'  '''  ^' 
of  Maroneia.  He  sent  for  Onomastus,  his  governor  in  Thrace, 
and  communicated  with  him  on  the  subject  And  Onomastus 
on  his  return  sent  Cassander  to  Maroneia,  who,  from  long 
residence  there,  was  familiar  with  the  inhabitants, — for  Philip's 
practice  had  long  been  to  place  members  of  his  court  in  these 
cities,  and  accustom  the  people  to  their  residence  among 
them.  Some  few  days  after  his  arrival,  the  Thracians  having 
been  prepared  for  what  they  had  to  do,  and  having  obtained 
entrance  to  the  city  by  night  through  the  instrumentality  of 
Cassander,  a  great  massacre  took  place,  and  many  of  the 
Maronites  were  killed.  Having  wreaked  this  vengeance  on 
those  who  opposed  him,  and  satisfied  his  own  anger,  Philip 
waited  for  the  arrival  of  the  Roman  legates,  persuaded  that  no 
one  would  venture  for  fear  of  him  to  denounce  his  crime. 
But  when  Appius  and  his  colleagues  presently  arrived,  they 


3i6  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBWS  book 

were  promptly  informed  of  what  had  happened  at  Maroneia, 
He  attempts  to  ^^^  expostulated  in  severe  terms  with  Philip  for 
evade  responsi-  it.  The  king  attempted  to  defend  himself  by 
bihty  for  it.  asserting  that  he  had  nothing  to  do  with  this  act 
of  violence ;  but  that  the  Maronites,  being  divided  into  two 
hostile  parties,  one  inclined  to  Eumenes  and  the  other  to 
himself,  inflicted  this  misfortune  upon  themselves.  He  more- 
over bade  them  confront  him  with  any  one  who  wished  to 
accuse  him.  He  said  this  from  a  conviction  that  no  one 
would  venture  to  do  so;  because  they  would  consider  that 
Philip's  vengeance  upon  those  w^ho  opposed  him  would  be 
near  at  hand,  while  assistance  from  Rome  would  have  a  long 
way  to  come.  But  when  Appius  and  his  colleagues  said  that 
"  they  required  to  hear  no  defence,  for  they  were  well  aware  of 
what  had  happened,  and  who  was  the  cause  of  it,"  Philip 
became  much  confused. 

1 8.  They  went  no  further  than  this  in  the  first  interview :  but 

The  guilty  agents  during  the  ncxt  day  Appius  ordered  Philip  to 

are  to  be  sent    send  Onomastus   and   Cassander   at   once   to 

to  Rome.       Rome,  that  the  Senate  might  inform  itself  on 

what  had  happened.     The  king  was  disturbed  at  this  to  the 

greatest  possible  degree,  and  for  some  time  did  not  know  what 

to  say ;  but  at  last  he  said  that  he  would  send  Cassander,  who 

was  the  actual  author  of  the  business,  that  the  Senate  might 

learn  the  truth  from  him ;   but  he  tried  to  get  Onomastus 

excused,  both    in  this   and   subsequent   interviews  with  the 

legates,  alleging  as  a  reason  that  not  only  had  Onomastus  not 

been  in  Maroneia  at  the  time  of  the  massacre,  but  not  even 

in  any  part  of  the  country  in  its  neighbourhood.     His  real 

motive,  however,  was  fear  lest,  if  he  got  to  Rome, 

Anoincr  crime.    !•»  i*ii*«  ••« 

havmg  been  engaged  with  him  m  many  similar 
transactions,  he  would  not  only  tell  the  Romans  the  story  of 
Maroneia,   but  all  the  others  also.     Eventually  he  did  get 

Onomastus  excused ;  and  having,  after  the  de- 
^*"lo  Romc."''^  parture  of  the  legates,  sent  off  Cassander,  he 

sent  some  agents  with  him  as  far  as  Epirus, 
and  there  had  him  poisoned.^     But  Appius  and  his  colleagues 

^  Livy  (39,    34)    more  cautiously  says  :  veneno  creditur  sublatus.     Such 
accusations  were  easily  made,  and  not  easily  proved  or  confuted. 


sill      PHILIP  AND  THE  MASSACRE  AT  MARONETA        317 

left  Philip  with  their  minds  fully  made  up  both  as  to  his  guilt 
in  the  matter  of  Maroneia  and  his  alienation  from  Rome. 

The  king,  thus  relieved  of  the  presence  of  the  legates,  after 
consulting  with  his  friends  Apelles  and  Philocles  j^ing  Philip  medi. 
became  clearly  conscious  that  his  quarrel  with  tales  a  breach 
Rome  had  now  become  serious,  and  that  it  ""''  Ro^^- 
could  no  longer  be  concealed,  but  was  become  notorious  to 
most  people  in  the  world.  He  was  therefore  now  wholly  bent 
on  measures  of  self-defence  and  retaliation.  But  as  he  was  as 
yet  unprepared  for  some  of  the  plans  which  he  had  in  his 
mind,  he  cast  about  to  hnd  some  means  of  putting  matters  off, 
and  gaining  time  for  making  his  preparations  for  war.     He 

accordingly  resolved  to  send  his  youngest  son    ___ .  . . 
i>  .  T.  1  I      1  ■     I   1-  Sends  bis  son 

Demetrius  to  Rome  :  partly  to  make  his  defence  Demetrius  ihec^ 
on  the  charges  brought  against  him,  and  partly     in  hopes  of 
also  to   beg   pardon  for  any  error  which  he  ^^^'^f^^^^ 
might  have  committed.      He  felt  certain  that 
everything  he  wished  would  be  obtained  from  the  Senate  by 
means  of  this    young    prince,    because  of  the  extraordinary 
attentions  which  had  been  shown  him  when  he  was  acting  as 
a  hostage.     He  no  sooner  conceived  this  idea  than  he  set 
about  making  preparations  for  sending  the  prince  and  those 
of  his  own  friends  destined  to  accompany  him  on  his  missioiL 
At  the  same  time  he  promised  the  Byzantines  to  give  them 
help :  not  so  much  because  he  cared  for  them,  as  from  a  wish 
under  cover  of  their  name  to  strike  terror  into  the  princes  of 
the  Thracians  living  beyond  the  Propontis,  as  a  step  towards 
the  fulfilment  of  his  main  purpose.  .  .  . 

19.  In  Crete,  while  Cydas  son  of  Antalces  was  Cosmus^ 
the  Gortynians,  who   sought  in  every  way  to  , 

depress  the  Gnossians,  deprived  them  of  a  '*™  "^ '"  ^ 
portion  of  their  territory  called  Lycastium,  and  assigned  it 
to  the  Rhaucii,  and  another  portion  called  Diatonium  to 
the  Lyctii.  But  when  about  this  time  Appius  and  his 
colleagues    arrived    in    the    island    from    Rome,   with    the 

'  For  Ihc  ten  Cosmi  of  Crete,  sec  AriBtol,  Pol.  3,  10 ;  and  MUUer's  Dorians. 
vol.  ii.  p.  133  iq.  Cydas  gives  his  name  to  ibc  year  as  Tpbn-dmr/ioi,  s«e 
C.  I,  G.  1583.  The  same  inscription  contains  the  litle  KotfjiiimXii.  apparenUy 
like  i-oXioCxot,  as  a  name  for  a  guardian  hero  of  the  city.  We  have  already 
had  this  latter  title  01  that  of  a  chief  mai^trale  at  Locri.    See  bk.  la,  cfa.  16. 


3i8  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  booi 

view  of  settling  the  controversies  which  existed  among 
them,  and  addressed  remonstrances  to  the  cities  of  Gnossus 
and  Gortyn  on  these  points,  the  Cretans  gave  in,  and 
submitted  the  settlement  of  their  disputes  to  Appius.  He 
accordingly  ordered  the  restoration  of  their  territory  to  the 
Gnossians ;  and  that  the  Cydoniates  should  receive  back  the 
hostages  which  they  had  formerly  left  in  the  hands  of 
Charmion,  and  should  surrender  Phalasarna,  without  taking 
anything  out  of  it  As  to  sharing  in  the  legal  jurisdiction  of 
the  whole  island,  he  left  it  free  lo  the  several  cities  to  do  so 
or  not  as  they  pleased,  on  condition  that  in  the  latter  case 
they  abstained  from  entering  the  rest  of  Crete,  they  and  the 
exiles  from  Phalasarna  who  murdered  Menochtus  and  his 
friends,  their  most  illustrious  citizens.  .  .  . 

20.  ApoUonias,     the     wife    of    Atlalus,    father    of    king 
The  Queen-     Eumenes,  was  a  native  of  Cyzicus,  and  a  woman 

Dowager,  widow  who  for  many  reasons  deserves  to  be  remem- 
of  AitiJus,  and  bered,  and  with  honour.  Her  claims  upon  a 
favourable  recollection  are  that,  though  bom  of 
a  private  family,  she  became  a  queen,  and  retained  that  exalted 
rank  to  the  end  of  her  life,  not  by  the  use  of  meretricious  fascina- 
tions, but  by  the  virtue  and  integrity  of  her  conduct  in  private 
and  public  life  alike..  Above  all,  she  was  the  mother  of  four 
sons  with  whom  she  kept  on  terms  of  the  most  perfect  affection 
and  motherly  love  to  the  last  day  of  her  life.  And  so  Attalus 
and  his  brother  gained  a  high  character,  while  staying  at 
Cyzicus,  by  showing  their  mother  proper  respect  and  honour. 
For  they  took  each  of  them  one  of  her  hands  and  led  her 
between  them  on  a  visit  to  the  temples  and  on  a  tour  of  the 
town,  accompanied  by  their  suite.  At  this  sight  all  who  saw 
it  received  the  young  princes  with  very  warm  marks  of  approval, 

Hoodotus  I  ai  ^"'^'  '^'^""g  tl^c  story  of  Cleobis  and  Biton, 
'  compared  their  conduct  with  theirs ;  and  re- 
marked that  the  affectionate  zeal  shown  by  the  young  princes, 
though  perhaps  not  going  so  far  as  theirs,  was  rendered  quite 
as  illustrious  by  the  fact  of  their  more  exalted  position. 
This  took  place  in  Cyzicus,  after  the  peace  made  with  king 
Prusias.   .  .  . 

21.  Ostiagon  the  Gaul,   king  of  the  Gauls  of  Asia,  en- 


XXII  THE   WIFE  OF  KING  ATTALVS  319 

deavourcd  to  transfer  to  himself  the  sovereignty  of  all  the 
Gauls  i  and  he  had  many  qualifications  for  such  a  post,  both 
natural  and  acquired.     For  he  was  open-handed    xhe  poiioy  of 
and  generous,  a  man  of  popular  manners  and      Osiiogom  in 
ready  tact ;  and,  what  was  most  important  in        Galana. 
the  eyes  of  the  Gauls,  he  was  a  man  of  courage  and  skill  in 

22.  Aristonicus  was  one  of  the  eunuchs  of  Rolemy,  king 
of  Egypt,  and  had  been  brought  up  from  child-  character  of 
hood  with  the  king.  As  he  grew  up  he  dis-  Arisionkus.  See 
played  more  manly  courage  and  tastes  than  are  "l^™'  ^-  ?■ 
generally  found  in  an  eunuch.  For  he  had  a  natural  predilection 
for  a  military  life,  and  devoted  himself  almost  exclusively  to  that 
and  all  that  it  involved.  He  was  also  skilful  in  dealing  with 
men,  and,  what  is  very  rare,  took  lai^e  and  liberal  views,  and 
was  naturally  inclined  to  bestow  favours  and  kindnesses.  .  .  . 


BOOK  XXIII 

1.  In   the    149th    Olympiad    a    greater    number    of    em- 
bassies came  to  Rome  from  Greece  than  were 
^Tr  f^rrRo"^'  almost  ever  seen  before.      For  as  Philip  was 

compelled  by  treaty  to  submit  disputes  with 
his  neighbours  to  arbitration,  and  as  it  was  known  that  the 
Romans  were  willing  to  receive  accusations  against  Philip, 
Coss.  P.  Claudius  ^nd  would  secure  the  safety  of  those  who  had 
Puicher,  L.  Por-  controversies  with  him,  all  who  lived  near  the 
ciusLicinus,  B.a  frontier  of  Macedonia  came  to  Rome,  some  in 

their  private  capacity,  some  from  cities,  others 
from  whole  tribes,  with  complaints  against  Philip.  At  the 
same  time  also  came  ambassadors  from  Eumenes,  accom- 
panied by  his  brother  Athenaeus,  to  accuse  Philip  in  regard 
to  the  Thracian  cities  and  the  aid  sent  to  Prusias.  Philip's 
son,  Demetrius,  also  came  to  make  answer  to  all  these  various 
envoys,  accompanied  by  Apelles  and  Philocles,  who  were  at 
that  time  considered  the  king's  first  friends.  Ambassadors 
also  came  from  Sparta,  representatives  of  each  faction  of  the 
citizens. 

The  first  summoned  to  the  Senate  was  Athenaeus,  from  whom 
B.C.  183,  Coss.  ^^^  Senate  accepted  the  compliments  of  fifteen 
M.  Claudius     thousand  gold  pieces,  and  passed  a  decree  highly 
Marceiius  Q.     extolling  Eumenes  and  his  brothers  for  their 
answer,  and  exhorting  them  to  continue  in  the 
same  mind.     Next  the  praetors  called  upon  all  the  accusers 
of  Philip,  and  brought  them  forward  by  one  embassy  at  a 
time.     But  as  they  were  numerous,  and  their  entry  occupied 
three  days,  the  Senate  became  embarrassed  as  to  the  settle- 
ment to  be  made  in  each  case.     For  from  Thessaly  there 
were  ambassadors  from  the  whole  nation,  and  also  from  each 


xxm  DEMETRIUS  BEFORE  THE  SENATE  3J1 

city  separately ;  so  also  from  the  Perrhaebians,  Athamanians, 
Epirotes,  and  lUyrians.  And  of  these  some  brought  cases  of 
dispute  as  to  territory,  slaves,  or  cattle ;  and  some  about  con- 
tracts or  injuries  sustained  by  themselves.  Some  alleged  that 
they  could  not  get  their  rights  in  accordance  with  the  treaty, 
because  Philip  prevented  the  administration  of  justice ;  while 
others  impeached  the  justice  of  the  decisions  given,  on  the 
ground  that  Philip  had  corrupted  the  arbitrators.  And,  in 
fact,  there  was  an  inextricable  confusion  and  multiplicity  of 
charges. 

2.  In  such  a  state  of  things  the  Senate  felt  unable  to  come 
to  a  clear  decision  itself,  and  did  not  think  it  Demetrius  in  the 
fair  that  Demetrius  should  have  to  answer  each  Senaie. 
of  the  several  indictments ;  for  it  regarded  him  ^'T'  39.  47- 
with  great  favour,  and  saw  at  the  same  time  that  his  extreme 
youth  unfitted  him  to  cope  with  business  of  such  intricacy  and 
complexity.  Besides,  what  it  desired  most  was  not  to  hear 
speeches  of  Demetrius,  but  to  ascertain  with  certainty  the  dis- 
position of  Philip.  Excusing  him  therefore  from  pleading 
his  cause,  the  Senate  asked  the  young  man  and  his  friends 
whether  they  were  the  bearers  of  any  written  memoir  from 
the  king;  and  upon  Demetrius  answering  that  he  was,  and 
holding  out  a  paper  of  no  great  size,  the  Senate  bade  him 
give  a  summary  of  what  the  paper  contained  in  answer  to 
the  accusations  alleged.  It  amounted  to  this,  that  on  each 
point  Philip  asserted  that  he  had  carried  out  the  injunc- 
tions of  the  Senate,  or,  if  he  had  not  done  so,  laid  the 
blame  upon  his  accusers ;  while  to  the  greater  number  of  his 
declarations  he  had  added  the  words,  "though  the  commis- 
sioners with  Caecihus  were  unfair  to  me  in  this  point,"  or 
again,  "  though  I  am  unjustly  treated  in  this  respect."  Such 
being  Philip's  mind,  as  expressed  in  the  several  clauses  of  the 
paper,  the  Senate,  alter  hearing  the  ambassadors  who  were 
come  to  Rome,  comprehended  them  all  under  one  measure. 
By  the  mouth  of  the  praetor  it  offered  an  honourable  and  cor- 
dial reception  to  Demetrius,  expressed  in  ample  and  emphatic 
language,  and  answered  his  speech  by  saying  that  "  The  Senate 
fully  believe  that  on  all  the  points  mentioned  by  Demetrius,  or 
read  by  him  from  his  paper  of  instructions,  full  justice  was 
VOL.  11  y 


322  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  BOOK 

already  done  or  would  be  done.  But,  in  order  that  Philip 
might  be  made  aware  that  the  Senate  paid  this  honour  to 
Demetrius,  ambassadors  would  be  sent  to  see  that  everything 
was  being  done  in  accordance  with  the  will  of  the  Senate,  and 
at  the  same  time  to  inform  the  king  that  he  owed  this  grace 
to  his  son  Demetrius."  Such  was  the  arrangement  come  to 
on  this  part  of  the  business. 

3.  The  next  to  enter  the  Senate  were  the  ambassadors  ol 

Theamb.     d     ^^"^    Eumenes,    who    denounced    Philip    on 

of  Eumenes  com-  account  of  the  assistance  sent  to  Prusias,  and 

plain  that  Philip  concerning  his  actions  in  Thrace,  alleging  that 

*^  Th^cr^*^  ^^^'^  ^'  ^^^'  moment  he  had  not  withdrawn  his 

garrisons  from  the  cities.  But  upon  Philocles 
showing  his  wish  to  offer  a  defence  on  these  points,  as  having 
been  formerly  charged  with  a  mission  to  Prusias,  and  being 
now  sent  to  the  Senate  to  represent  Philip  on  this  business, 
the  Senate,  without  listening  very  long  to  his  speech,  answered 
that  "  With  regard  to  Thrace,  unless  the  legates  found  every- 
thing there  settled  in  accordance  with  its  will,  and  all  the 
cities  restored  to  the  entire  control  of  Eumenes,  the  Senate 
would  be  unable  any  longer  to  allow  it  to  pass,  or  to  submit  to 
being  continually  disobeyed." 

Though  the  ill-feeling  between  the  Romans  and  Phihp 
The  high  honour  was  becoming  serious,  a  check  was  put  to  it  for 
paid  to  Demetrius  the  time  by  the  presence  of  Demetrius.  And  yet 
at  Rwne,  and  its  jj^jg  young  prince's  mission  to  Rome  proved 

eventually  no  slight  link  in  the  chain  of  events 
which  led  to  the  final  ruin  of  his  house.  For  the  Senate,  by 
thus  making  much  of  Demetrius,  somewhat  turned  the  young 
man's  head,  and  at  the  same  time  gravely  annoyed  Perseus 
and  the  king,  by  making  them  feel  that  the  kindness  they 
received  from  the  Romans  was  not  for  their  own  sakes,  but 
for  that  of  Demetrius.  And  T.  Quintius  Flamininus  con- 
tributed not  a  little  to  the  same  result  by  taking  the  young 
prince  aside  and  communicating  with  him  in  confidence. 
For  he  flattered  him  by  suggesting  that  the  Romans  meant 
before  long  to  invest  him  with  the  kingdom ;  while  he  irritated 
Philip  and  Perseus  by  sending  a  letter  ordering  the  king  to 
send  Demetrius  to  Rome  again,  with  as  many  friends  of  the 


xxiii  PHILIP'S  JEALOUSY  ROUSED  333 

highest  character  as  possible.  It  was,  in  fact,  by  taking  ad- 
vantage of  these  circumstances  that  Perseus  shortly  afterwards 
induced  his  father  to  consent  to  the  death  of  Demetrius. 
But  I  shall  relate  that  event  in  detail  later  on. 

4.  The  next  ambassadors  called  in  were  the  Lacedaemonians. 
Of    these    there    were    four    distinct    factions.  -^^  f^ur  gpanan 
Lysis  and  his  colleagues  represented  the  old     embassies, 
exiles,  and  their  contention  was  that  they  ought  '■  '-^;  ^^l^ 
to  have  back  the  possessions  from  which  they        Nabis. 
had  originally  been  driven.     Areus  and  AIci-    a.  Areusand 
biades,  on  the  contrary,  contended   that   they      Aleibiades. 
should  receive  the  value  of  a  talent  from  their  original  pro- 
perty, and  divide  the  rest  among  deserving  citizens.     Serippus 
pleaded  that  things  should  be  left  in  exactly  the        serinDus 
state  in  which  they  were  when  they  formerly 
belonged  to  the  Achaean  league.     Lastly,  Chaeron  and  his 
colleagues   represented   those  who   had   been 
condemned  to  death  or  exile  by  the  votes  of  ;};^^';°^'^'" 
the  Achaean  league,  and  demanded  their  own 
recall   and    the .  restoration   of  the  constitution.      These   all 
delivered  speeches  against  the  Achaeans  in  conformity  with 
their  several  objects.      The  Senate,  finding  itself  unable  to 
come  to  a  clear  decision  on  these   particular  controversies, 
appointed  a  committee  of  investigation,  consisting  of  the  three 
who  had  already  been  on  a  mission  to  the  Peloponnese  on 
these  matters,  namely  Titus  Flamininus,   Q.  Caecilius,  and 
Appius    Claudius    Pulcher.^      After   long    discussions    before 
this  committee  it  was  unanimously  decided  that 
the  exiles  and  the  condemned  were  to  be  re-  '^'jj^^ri.^ "" 
called,   and   that   the    city   should    remain   a 
member  of  the  Achaean  league.      But  as  to  the  property, 
whether  the  exiles  were  each  to  select  a  talent's  worth  from 
what  had  been  theirs  [or  to  receive  it  all  back],  on  this  point 
they  continued  to  dispute.     That  they  might  not,  however, 
have  to  begin  the  whole  controversy  afresh  [the  committee] 
caused  the  points  agreed  upon  to  be  reduced  to  writing,  to 

I  There  is  some  loss  In  the  leiLl  as  10  these  n; 
on  a  Geeek  embassjr  in  aa,  16.  See  also  tb 
notliiilg  of  thil  commillee  of  Itlc«c 


3»4  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  -aoom. 

which  all  affixed  their  seals.     But  the  committee,  also  wishing 

to  include  the  Achaeans  in  the  agreement,  called  in  Xenarchus 
and  his  colleagues,  who  were  at  that  time  on  a  mission  from 
the  Achaeans,  to  renew  their  alliance  with  Rome,  and  at  the 
same  time  to  give  an  eye  to  their  controversy  with  the  Lace- 
daemonians. These  men,  being  unexpectedly  asked  whether 
they  consented  to  the  terms  contained  in  the  written  docu- 
ment, were  somewhat  at  a  loss  what  to  answer.  For  they  did 
not  approve  of  the  restoration  of  the  exiles  and  the  con- 
demned persons,  as  being  contrary  to  the  decree  of  the  league 
and  the  contents  of  the  tablet  on  which  that  decree  was  en- 
graved ;  and  yet  they  approved  of  the  document  as  a  whole, 
because  it  contained  the  clause  providing  that  Sparta  should 
remain  a  member  of  the  league.  Finally,  however,  partly 
from  this  difficulty,  and  partly  from  awe  of  the  Roman  com- 
missioners, they  affixed  their  seal  The  Senate,  therefore, 
selected  Quintus  Marcius  to  go  as  legate  to  settle  the  afiairs 
of  Macedonia  and  the  Peloponnese.  .  .  . 

5.  When  Deinocrates  of  Messene  arrived  on  a  mission  at 

Rome,  he  was  delighted   to  find   that   Titus 
M^en?  "    Flamininus  had  been  appointed  by  the  Senate 

to  go  as  ambassador  to  Frusias  and  Seleucus. 
For  having  been  very  intimate  with  Titus  during  the  I^cedae- 
monian  war,  he  thought  that  this  friendship,  combined  with 
his  disagreements  with  PhJIopoemen,  would  induce  him  on 
his  arrival  in  Greece  to  settle  the  affairs  of  Messene  in  accord- 
ance with  his  own  views.  He  therefore  gave  up  everything 
else  to  attach  himself  exclusively  to  Titus,  on  whom  he  rested 
all  his  hopes.  .  .  . 

This  same  Deinocrates  was  a  courtier  and  a  soldier  by  nature 
as  well  as  habit,  but  he  assumed  the  air  of  consummate 
statesmanship.  His  parts,  however,  were  showy  rather  than 
solid.  In  war  his  fertility  of  resource  and  boldness  were 
beyond  the  common  run ;  and  he  shone  in  feats  of  personal 
bravery.  Nor  were  these  his  only  accomplishments  ;  he  was 
attractive  and  ready  in  conversation,  versatile  and  courteous 
'in  society.  But  at  the  same  time  he  was  devoted  to  licentious 
intrigue,  and  in  public  affairs  and  questions  of  policy  was  quite 
incapable  of  sustained  attention  or  far-sighted  views,  of  forti- 


XXIII  DETNOCSATES  OF  MESSENE  325 

fying  himself  with  well-considered  arguments,  or  putting  them 
before  the  public  On  this  occasion,  for  instance,  though  he 
had  really  given  the  initiative  to  grave  misfortunes,  he  did  not 
think  that  he  was  doing  anything  of  importance ;  but  followed 
his  usual  manner  of  life,  quite  regardless  of  the  future,  indulg- 
ing day  after  day  in  amours,  wine,  and  song.  Flamininus, 
however,  did  once  force  him  to  catch  a  glimpse  of  the  serious- 
ness of  his  position.  For  seeing  him  on  a  certain  occasion  in 
a  party  of  revellers  dancing  in  Jong  robes,  he  said  nothing  at 
the  time  ;  but  next  morning,  being  visited  by  him  with  some 
request  in  behalf  of  his  country,  he  said :  "  I  will  do  my  best, 
Deinocrates;  but  it  does  astonish  me  that  you  can  drink  and 
dance  after  having  given  the  start  to  such  serious  troubles  for 
Greece."  He  appears,  indeed,  at  that  to  have  a  little  recovered 
his  soberer  senses,  and  to  have  understood  what  an  improper 
display  he  had  been  making  of  his  tastes  and  habits.  However, 
he  arrived  at  this  period  in  Greece  in  company  with  Flamin- 
inus, fully  persuaded  that  the  affairs  of  Messene  would  be 
settled  at  a  blow  in  accordance  with  his  views.  But  Philopoe- 
men  and  his  party  were  fully  aware  that  Flamininus  had  no 
commission  from  the  Senate  in  regard  to  affairs  in  Greece ; 
they  therefore  awaited  his  arrival  without  taking  any  step  of  any 
sort.  Having  landed  at  Naupactus,  Flamininus  addressed  a 
despatch  to  the  Strategus  and  Demiui^i'  bidding  them  summon 
the  Achaeans  to  an  assembly ;  to  which  they  wrote  back  that 
"they  would  do  so,  if  he  would  write  them  word  what  the 
subjects  were  on  which  he  wished  to  confer  with  the  Achaeans; 
for  the  laws  enjoined  that  limitation  on  the  magistrates."  As 
Flamininus  did  not  venture  to  write  this,  the  hopes  of  Deino- 
crates and  the  so-called  "  old  exiles,"  but  who  had  at  that  time 
been  recently  banished  from  Sparta,  came  to  nothing,  as  in  fact 
did  the  visit  of  Flamininus  and  the  plans  which  he  had  formed. . . . 

'  The  ten  Icderal  roagistmles  of  the  league,  who  fonned  a  council  to  act 
with  the  general.  Their  number  probably  arose  from  the  number  of  the 
Achaean  cantons  or  lowni,  after  two  of  the  twelve — Helice  and  Otenus — were 
deslroyed.  Polybius  nowhere  else  gives  them  this  lillc  in  any  part  of  the  history 
we  possess,  but  its  use  by  Livy,  33,  aa,  seems  to  point  to  bis  having  used  it  in 
other  places,  li  also  occurs  in  a  teller  of  Philip  II.  (perhaps  genuine)  tguotcd  in 
DcmosUi.  di  Cor.  157.  Polybius  calls  tbem  aUo  si  Ifixotrtt,  ifxdii  rpomrirtt 
ffurifixo^m,  vvrapjifai.    See  Freeman's  Ftderal  Gov.  p.  aSa. 


326  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  BOOK 


6.  About  the  same  period  some  ambassadors  were  sent  by 
the  exiled  citizens  of  Sparta  to   Rome,  among  whom  was 

g^  Arcesilaus  and  Agesipolis  who,  when  quite  a  boy, 

had  been  made  king  in  Sparta.  These  two 
men  were  fallen  upon  and  killed  by  pirates  on  the  high  seas ; 
but  their  colleagues  arrived  safely  at  Rome.  .  .  . 

7.  On  the  return  of  Demetrius  from  Rome,  bringing  with 

him  the  formal  reply,  in  which  the  Romans  re- 
'^?^^?!fl!V^  ferred  all  the  favour  and  confidence  which  they 

Demetnus  in  ,  ,     .  ,    .-       ^  •  • 

Macedonia.  His  avowed  to  their  regard  for  Demetrius,  saying 
fathers  anger  and  that  all  they  had  done  or  would  do  was  for  his 
**'jealousr^  sake, —  the  Macedonians  gave  Demetrius  a 
cordial  reception,  believing  that  they  were  re- 
lieved from  all  fear  and  danger :  for  they  had  looked  upon 
war  with  Rome  as  all  but  at  their  doors,  owing  to  the  provoca- 
tions given  by  Philip.  But  Philip  and  Perseus  were  far  from 
pleased,  and  were  much  offended  at  the  idea  of  the  Romans 
taking  no  account  of  them,  and  referring  all  their  favour  to 
Demetrius.  Philip  however  concealed  his  displeasure;  but 
Perseus,  who  was  not  only  behind  his  brother  in  good  feelings 
to  Rome,  but  much  his  inferior  in  other  respects,  both  in 
natural  ability  and  acquired  accomplishments,  made  no  secret 
of  his  anger :  and  was  beginning  to  be  thoroughly  alarmed  as 
to  his  succession  to  the  crown,  and  lest,  in  spite  of  being  the 
elder,  he  should  be  excluded.  Therefore  he  commenced  by 
bribing  the  friends  of  Demetrius.  .  .  . 

The  end  of  this  fraternal  jealousy  is  described  in  Liiy^  40, 
5-24.  By  a  forged  letter  purporting  to  come  from  Flamininus^ 
Philip  is  persuaded  that  his  son  played  the  traitor  at  Rome  and 
gives  an  order  or  a  permission  for  his  being  put  to  death  ;  which 
is  accordingly  donCy  partly  by  poison  and  partly  by  violence^  at 
Heracleia,  b.c  181. 

8.  Upon  Quintus  Marcius  arriving  on  his  mission  in 
Philip  feigns  sub-  Macedonia,  Philip  evacuated  the  Greek  cities  in 
mission  to  Rome,  Thrace    entirely  and    withdrew   his    garrisons, 

B.C.  183.  though  in  deep  anger  and  heaviness  of  spirit ; 
and  he  put  on  a  right  footing  everything  else  to  which  the 
Roman  injunctions  referred,  wishing  to  give  them  no  indica- 


KXiii  DEATH  OF  DEMETRIUS  yrt 

tion  of  his  estrangement,  but  to  secure  time  for  malting  his 
preparations  for  war.      In  puisuance  of  this  design  he  led  Out 
an  array  against  the  barbarians,  and   marching  through    the 
centre  of  Thrace  he  invaded  the  Odrysae,  Bessi,  and  Dentheletl 
Coming  to  Phihppopolis,  the  inhabitants  flying  for  safety  to 
the  heights,  he  took  it  without  a  blow.     And  thence,  after 
traversing  the  plain,  and  sacking  some  of  the 
villages,  and  exacting  a  pledge  of  submission      'nebnis 
from  others,  he  returned  home,  leaving  a  garri- 
son in  Fhilippopolis,  which  was  after  a  time  expelled  by  the 
Odrysae  in  defiance  of  their  pledge  of  fidelity  to  Philip.  .  .  . 

9.  In  the  second  year  of  this  Olympiad,  on  the  arrival  of 
ambassadors    from    Eumenes,  Pharnaces,    and      After  mld- 
the  Achaean  league,  and  also  from  the  Lace-  aummer  of  b.c 
daemonians   who    had    been    banished    from  '^3- 

Sparta,^  and  from  those  who  were  in  actual  possession  of  it,  the 
Senate  despatched  their  business.  But  there  came  after  them 
a  mission  from  Rhodes  in  regard  to  the  disaster  at  Sinope; 
to  whom  the  Senate  replied  that  it  would  send  legates  to  in- 
vestigate the  case  of  the  Sinopeans  and  their  grievances  against 
those  kings.  And  Quintus  Marcius  having  recently  arrived 
from  Greece  and  made  his  report  on  the  state  of  affairs  in 
Macedonia  and  the  Peloponnese,  the  Senate  did  not  require 
to  hear  much  more;  but  having  called  in  the  envoys  from 
the  Peloponnese  and  Macedonia  they  listened  indeed  to  what 
they  had  to  say,  but  founded  its  reply,  without 
any  reference  to  their  speeches,  wholly  on  the  ^^bT'  ^^' 
report  of  Marcius,  in  which  he  had  stated,  in 
reference  to  king  Philip,  that  he  had  indeed  done  all  that 
was  enjoined  on  him,  but  with  great  reluctance ;  and  that,  if  he 
got  an  opportunity,  he  would  go  all  lengths  against  the  Romans. 
The  Senate  accordingly  composed  a  reply  to  the  king's  envoys 
in  which,  while  praising  Philip  for  what  he  had  done,  they 
warned  him  for  the  future  to  be  careful  not  to  be  found  acting 
in  opposition  to  the  Romans.  As  to  the  Peloponnese,  Marcius 
had  reported  that,  as  the  Achaeans  were  unwilling  to  refer  any 
matter  whatever  to  the  Senate,  but  were  haughtily  inclined 


328  TFIE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  book 

and  desirous  of  managing  all  their  affairs  themselves,  if  the 
Senate  would  only  reject  their  present  application  and  give 
ever  so  slight  an  indication  of  displeasure,  Sparta  would 
promptly  come  to  an  understanding  with  Messene ;  and  then 
the  Achaeans  would  be  glad  enough  to  appeal  to  the  protec- 
tion of  Rome.  In  consequence  of  this  report  they  answered 
the  Lacedaemonian  Scrippus  and  his  colleagues,  wishing  to 
leave  this  city  in  a  state  of  suspense,  that  they  had  done  their 
best  for  them,  but  that  for  the  present  they  did  not  think  this 
matter  concerned  them.  But  when  the  Achaeans  besought 
for  help  against  the  Messenians^  in  virtue  of  their  alliance  with 
Rome,  or  at  least  that  they  would  take  precautions  to  prevent 
any  arms  or  com  from  being  brought  from  Italy  into  Messene, 
the  Senate  refused  compliance  with  either  request  and 
answered  that  the  Achaeans  ought  not  to  be  surprised  if 
Sparta  or  Corinth  or  Argos  renounced  their  league,  if  they 
would  not  conduct  their  hegemony  in  accordance  with  the 
Senate's  views.  This  answer  the  Senate  made  public,  as 
a  kind  of  proclamation  that  any  people  who  chose  might 
break  off  from  the  Achaeans  for  all  the  Romans  cared ; 
and  they  further  retained  the  ambassadors  in  Rome,  waiting 
to  see  the  issue  of  the  quarrel  between  the  Achaeans  and 
Messenians.  .  .  . 

10.  In  this  period  a  certain  dreadful  foreshadowing  of  mis- 
Thc  conflict  of  fortune  fell  upon  king  Philip  and  the  whole  of 

feelings  in      Macedonia,  of  a  kind  well  worthy  of  close  atten- 
Phiiip's  mind.    ^iQj^   ^^^   record.      As   though   Fortune  had 

resolved  to  exact  from  him  at  once  the  penalties  for  all  the 
impieties  and  crimes  which  he  had  committed  in  the  whole 
course  of  his  life,  she  now  visited  him  with  furies,  those  deities 
of  retribution,  those  powers  that  had  listened  to  the  prayers  of 
the  victims  of  his  cruelties,  who,  haunting  him  day  and  night, 
so  plagued  him  to  the  last  day  of  his  life,  that  all  the  world  was 
forced  to  acknowledge  the  truth  of  the  proverb,  that  "Justice 
has  an  eye  "  which  mere  men  should  never  despise.  The  first 
idea  suggested  to  him  by  this   evil  power  was   that,  as  he 

*  The  Messenians  revolted  from  the  league  B.C.  183,  and  in  the  course  of 
the  fighting  which  ensued  Philopoemen  fell  into  an  ambush,  was  taken 
prisoner,  and  put  to  death  by  them.     See  ch.  12. 


XXIII  PHILIP'S  DESPERATE  MEASURES  3»9 

was  about  to  go  to  war  with  Rome,  he  had  better  remove  from 
the  most  important  cities,  and  those  along  the  sea-coast,  the 
leading  citizens,  with  theii  wives  and  children,  and  place  them 
in  Ennathia,  formerly  called  Paeonia,  and  611  up  the  cities  with 
Thracians  and  other  barbarians,  as  likely  to  be  more  securely 
loyal  to  him  in  the  coming  hour  of  danger.  The  actual 
carrying  out  of  this  measure,  and  the  uprooting  of  these  men 
and  their  families,  caused  such  an  outburst  of  grief,  and  so 
violent  an  outcry,  that  one  might  have  supposed  the  whole  dis- 
trict to  have  been  taken  by  the  sword  Curses  and  appeals  to 
heaven  were  rained  upon  the  head  of  the  king  without  any 
further  attempt  at  concealment  His  next  step,  prompted  by 
the  wish  to  leave  no  element  of  hostility  or  disaffection  in  the 
kingdom,  was  to  write  to  the  governors  of  the  several  cities 
ordering  them  to  search  out  the  sons  and  daughters  of  such 
Macedonians  as  had  been  put  to  death  by  him,  and  place  them 
in  ward ;  in  which  he  referred  especially  to  %—, 
Admetus,  Pyrrhicus,  and  Samus,  and  those  who 
had  perished  with  them  :  but  he  also  included  all  others  who- 
soever that  had  been  put  to  death  by  order  of  the  king,  quoting 
this  verse,  we  are  told : — ' 

"  Oh  fool  1  to  slay  tbe  sire  and  leave  the  soni." 
Most  of  these  men  being  persons  of  distinguished  families,  their 
fate  made  a  great  noise  and  excited  universal  pity.  But  Fortune 
had  a  third  act  in  this  bloody  drama  in  reserve  for  Philip,  in 
which  the  young  princes  plotted  against  each  other;  and  their 
quarrels  being  referred  to  him,  he  was  forced  to  choose  between 
becoming  the  murderer  of  his  sons  and  living  the  rest  of  his 
life  in  dread  of  being  murdered  by  them  in  his  old  age;  and 
to  decide  which  of  the  two  he  had  the  greater  reason  to  fear. 
Tortured  day  and  night  by  these  anxieties,  the  miseries  and 
perturbations  of  his  spirit  lead  to  the  inevitable  reflection  that 
the  wrath  of  heaven  fell  upon  his  old  age  for  the  sins  of  his 
previous  life  :  which  will  be  rendered  still  more  evident  by 
what  remains  to  be  told  .  .  .  Just  when  his  soul  was  stung 
to  madness  by  these  circumstances,  the  quarrel  between  his 
sons  blazed  out :  Fortune,  as  It  were  of  set  purpose,  bringing 
their  misfortunes  upon  the  scene  all  at  one  time.  .  .  . 
'  Suuiniu^. 


330  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  book 

Fragment  referring      The  Macedonians  make  offerings  to  Xanthus 

^shamfight^    ^^  ^  ^^^^»  ^^'^  perform  a  purification  of  the 
which  Perseus    army  with  horses  fully  equipped.  .  .  . 

and  Demetrius 

quarrelled, 

B.C.  182. 

Sec  Livy,  40,  6. 

11.  "One   should   not  merely  read  tragedies,  tales,  and 

histories,  but  should  understand  and  ponder  over 

^Tphliip  to^s*  ^^^'    ^"  ^^  ^^  ^^^  ^^^  ^^y  ^^^^  ^^^  when- 
two  sons  after  the  ever  brothers  fall  out  and  allow  their  quarrel  to 

quarrel  at  the    go  any  great  length,  they  invariably  end  not  only 
^wKEuvrM.  ^   ^y  destroying  themselves  but  in  the  utter  ruin 

of  their  property,  children,  and  cities ;  while 
those  who  keep  their  self-love  within  reasonable  bounds,  and 
put  up  with  each  other's  weaknesses,  are  the  preservers  of 
these,  and  live  in  the  fairest  reputation  and  fame.  I  have 
often  directed  your  attention  to  the  kings  in  Sparta,  telling  you 
that  they  preserved  the  hegemony  in  Greece  for  their  country 
just  so  long  as  they  obeyed  the  ephors,  as  though  they  were 
their  parents,  and  were  content  to  reign  jointly.  But  directly 
they  in  their  folly  tried  to  change  the  government  to  a 
monarchy,  they  caused  Sparta  to  experience  every  misery 
possible.  Finally,  I  have  pointed  out  to  you  as  an  example 
the  case  of  Eumenes  and  Attalus ;  showing  you  that,  though 
they  succeeded  to  but  a  small  and  insignificant  realm,  they 
have  raised  it  to  a  level  with  the  best,  simply  by  the  harmony  and 
unity  of  sentiment,  and  mutual  respect  which  they  maintained 
towards  each  other.  But  so  far  from  taking  my  words  to  heart, 
you  are,  as  it  seems  to  me,  whetting  your  angry  passions  against 
each  other.  ..." 

THE    FALL   OF    PHILOPOEMEN 

12.  Philopoemen  rose^  and  proceeded  on  his  way,  though  he 
Th  d  th  f  ^^^  oppressed  at  once  by  illness  and  the  weight 
Philopoemen,    o^  years,  being  now  in  the  seventieth  year  of 

B.C.  183,       his  age.     Conquering  his  weakness,  however, 
orpCThapseariyinj^y  ^j^^  f^^ce  of  his  previous  habits  he  reached 

Megalopolis,  from  Argos,  in  one  day's  journey 

^  He  was  ill  with  fever.     Plutarch,  Phil.  18. 


XXIII  DEATH  OF  PHILOPOEMEN  331 

He  was  captured,  when  Achaean  Strategus,  by  the  Messenians 
and  poisoned.  Thus,  though  second  to  none  Phiiopoemen  was 
that  ever  hved  before  him  in  excellence,  his  mutdered  by  Uie 
fortune  was  less  happy ;  yet  in  his  previous  life  Messenians,  who 
he  seemed  ever  to  have  enjoyed  her  favour  and  league  and  were 
assistance.  But  it  was,  I  suppose,  a  case  of  the  at  war  wiih  it.  See 
common  proverb,  "a  man  may  have  a  stroke  of  ^"^'  3S'  ■ts-so- 
luck,  but  no  man  can  be  lucky  always."  We  must,  therefore, 
call  our  predecessors  fortunate,  without  pretending  that  they 
were  so  invariably — for  what  need  is  there  to  flatter  Fortune 
by  a  meaningless  and  false  compliment?  It  is  those  who 
have  enjoyed  Fortune's  smiles  in  their  life  for  the  longest 
time,  and  who,  when  she  changes  her  mind,  meet  with  only 
moderate  mishaps,  that  we  must  speak  of  as  fortunate.  .  .  . 

Phiiopoemen  was  succeeded  by  Lycortas,^  .  .  ,  and  though 
he  had  spent  forty  years  of  an  active  career  in    charact 
a  state  at  once  democratic  and  composed  of  phiiopoemen.  He 
many  various  elements,  he  had  entirely  avoided  's  succeeded  by 
giving  rise  to  the  jealousy  of  the  citizens  in  any     ^^^  "* 
direction :   and  yet  he  had  not  flattered  their 
inclinations,  but  for  the  most  part  had  used  great  freedom  of 
speech,  which  is  a  case  of  very  rare  occurrence.  .  .  . 

IS.  An    admirable    feature    in    Hannibal's     character  of 
character,  and  the  strongest  proof  of  his  having   Hannibal,  who 
been  a  born  ruler  of  men,  and  having  possessed  ^,'^"  ^^^  ^ 
statesmanlike  qualities  of  an  unusual  kind,  is  Pmsias,  ».c.i83. 
that,  though  he  was  for  seventeen  years  engaged  See  Livy,  39,  i. 
in  actual  warfare,  and  though  he  had  to  make  his  way  through 
numerous  barbaric  tribes,  and  to  employ  innumerable  men  of 
diflerent  nationalities  in  what  appeared  desperate  and  hazardous 
enterprises,  he  was  never  made  the  object  of  a  conspiracy  by 
any  of  them,  nor  deserted  by  any  of  those  who  had  joined  him 
and  put  themselves  under  his  command.  .  .  . 

14.  Publius  Scipio,  in  the  course  of  an  active  career  in 

'  Liv7  (39,  so)  speaks  of  Lycortas  at  Ihe  time  of  Philopoemen's  dealh  ai 
alttr  imftralor  Achatorum.  If  he  had  been  Ihe  irarrpoTTfyit  we  know  ibat 
he  would  nol  by  law  have  succeeded  on  (he  dcaih  of  Ihe  Stralegiu.  Plutarch, 
Pkit.  31,  seems  to  assert  that  an  election  was  held  at  once,  but  not  ihe 
ordinary  popular  election. 


332  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  book 

an  aristocratic  state,  secured  such  popularity  with  the  multi- 
character of  p.  tude  and  such  credit  with  the  Senate,  that  when 
Cornelius  Scipio  some  one  took  upon  himself  to  bring  him  to 

^^^TpoiX^^  ^"^^  ^^^^'^  ^^  people  in  the  manner  usual  at 

places  in  this  year,  Rome,  and  produced  many  bitter  accusations 

but  according  to  against  him,  he  came  forward  and  said  nothing 

^Sriftorhe*"^"^  ^^^^  "^^  ill-became  the  Roman  people  to 
previous  year  Hsten  to  accusations  against  P.  Cornelius 
(39.  52-)  Scipio,  to  whom  his  accusers  owed  it  that  they 
had  the  power  of  speech  at  all."  At  this  the  populace  dis- 
persed, and  quitting  the  assembly,  left  the  accuser  alone.  .  .  . 
Once  when  there  was  a  sum  of  money  required  in  the  Senate 
for  some  pressing  business,  and  the  quaestor,  on  the  ground 
of  a  legal  difficulty,  refused  to  open  the  treasury  on  that  par- 
ticular day,  Scipio  said  that  '^  he  would  take  the  keys  himself  and 
open  it ;  for  he  was  the  cause  of  the  treasury  being  locked  at  alL" 
And  again,  when  some  one  in  the  Senate  demanded  an  account 
of  the  money  which  he  had  received  from  Antiochus  before  the 
treaty  for  the  pay  of  his  army,  he  said  that  he  had  the  ledger, 
but  that  he  ought  not  to  be  called  to  account  by  any  one.  But 
on  his  questioner  persisting,  and  urging  him  to  produce  it,  he 
bade  his  brother  bring  it  When  the  schedule  was  brought,  he 
held  it  out  in  front  of  him,  and  tearing  it  to  pieces  in  the  sight 
of  everybody  bade  the  man  who  asked  for  it  seek  it  out  of  these 
fragments,  and  he  demanded  of  the  rest  "How  they  could  ask 
for  the  items  of  the  expenditure  of  these  three  thousand  talents, 
and  yet  no  longer  ask  for  an  account  of  how  and  by  whose 
agency  the  fifteen  thousand  talents  which  they  received  from 
Antiochus  came  into  the  treasury,  nor  how  it  is  that  they  have 
become  masters  of  Asia,  Libya,  and  Iberia?"  This  speech 
not  only  made  a  strong  impression  on  the  rest,  but  also  reduced 
the  man  who  demanded  the  account  to  silence. 

These  anecdotes  have  been  related  by  me  for  the  double 
purpose  of  enhancing  the  fame  of  the  departed,  and  of  en- 
couraging future  generations  in  the  paths  of  honour.  .  .  . 

16.  For  my  part,  I  never  concur  with  those  who  indulge 
their  anger  against  men  of  their  own  blood  to  the  length  of 
not  only  depriving  them  of  the  year's  harvest  when  at  war  with 
them,  but  even  of  cutting  down  their  trees  and  destroying 


XXIII  SUBMISSION  OF  THE  AfESSENIANS  333 

their  buildings,  and  of  leaving  them  no  opportunity  for  repent- 
ance. Such  proceedings  seem  to  me  to  be  rank  folly.  For, 
while  they  imagine  that  they  are  dismaying  the  enemy  by  the 
devastation  of  their  territory,  and  the  deprivation  of  their  future 
as  well  as  their  present  means  of  getting  the  necessaries  of  life, 
they  are  all  the  while  exasperating  the  men,  and  converting  an 
isolated  ebullition  of  anger  into  a  lasting  hatred.  .  .  . 

IS.  Lycortas  the  Achaean  Strategus  crushed  the  spirits  of 
the  Messenians  in  the  war.     Up  to  this  time    Lyeortas,  ihe 
the  populace  at  Messene  had  been  afraid  of    successor  of 
their  magistrates  ;  but  now  at  length,  relying  on    Ptiilopocmen, 

,,  °     .  '     ,,  °     '        '     °_         compels  He  Mes- 

tne  protection  of  the  enemy,  some  of  them  seniani  to  sue 
plucked  up  courage  to  break  silence  and  to  say  foi  peace, 
that  the  time  was  come  to  send  an  embassy  "■'^  iSj-iSa. 
to  negotiate  a  peace.  Deinocrates  and  his  colleagues,  being 
no  longer  able  to  face  the  people  under  this  storm  of  popular 
odium,  yielded  to  circumstances  and  retired  to  their  own  houses. 
Thereupon  the  people,  acting  under  the  advice  of  the  older 
men,  and  especially  under  that  of  Epaenetus  and  Apollodorus, 
the  ambassadors  from  Boeotia, — who,  having  arrived  some 
time  before  to  negotiate  a  peace,  happened  fortunately  to  be  at 
that  time  at  Messene, — appointed  and  despatched  envoys, 
beting  forgiveness  for  their  transgressions.  The  Achaean 
Strategus,  having  summoned  his  colleagues '  to  council,  and 
given  the  envoys  a  hearing,  answered  that  "There  was  but 
one  way  in  which  the  Messenians  could  reconcile  themselves  to 
the  league,  and  that  was  by  at  once  surrendering  to  him  the 
authors  of  the  revolt  and  of  the  murder  of  Philopoemen,  leave 
the  rest  to  the  authority  of  the  league  assembly,  and  at  once 
receive  a  garrison  into  their  citadel"  When  this  message  was 
announced  to  the  Messenian  populace,  those  who  had  long 
been  bitterly  opposed  to  the  authors  of  the  war  were  ready 
enough  to  surrender  them  and  to  arrest  them  ;  while  the  rest, 
being  persuaded  that  they  would  not  be  severely  dealt  with  by 
the  Achaeans,  readily  consented  to  submit  the  general  question 
to  the  decision  of  the  assembly.  But  what  chiefly  induced 
them  to  unanimously  accept  the  proposal  was,  that  they  in 
fact  had  no  choice  in  the  matter.  The  Strategus  accordingly 
>  That  is  the 'ten  Demiiirgl. 


334  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  book 

at  once  took  over  the  citadel  and  marched  his  peltasts  into  it ; 
and  then,  taking  some  picked  troops  with  him,  entered  the  city ; 
and  having  summoned  a  meeting  of  the  people,  addressed  them 
in  terms  befitting  the  occasion,  promising  that  '^  they  would 
never  have  reason  to  repent  having  committed  themselves 
to  the  honour  of  the  Achaeans."  The  general  question  ot 
what  was  to  be  done  he  thus  referred  to  the  league, — for  it 
happened  conveniently  that  the  Achaeans  were  just  then  re- 
assembling at  Megalopolis  for  the  second  Congress,^ — but  ot 
o  „  ^    o    those  who  were  guilty  of  the  disturbances,  he 

Summer  B.C.  182.        ,        ,     „         ,  1,     •       !•     .    J    • 

ordered  all  such  as  were  actually  impucated  in 
the  summary  execution  of  Philopoemen  to  put  an  end  to  their 
own  lives.  .  .  . 

17.  The  Messenians  were  reduced  by  their  own  folly  to 
Abia,  Thuria,  and  ^^  brink  of  ruin,  but  were  restored  to  their 
Pharae  make  a  former  position  in  the  league  by  the  magna- 
separate  league,  nimity  of  Lycortas  and  the  Achaeans.  But  the 
towns  of  Abia,  Thuria,  and  Pharae  during  these  transactions 
abandoned  their  connection  with  Messene,  and,  setting  up  a  pillar 
engraved  with  a  treaty  of  alliance  between  themselves,  formed 
a  separate  league.  When  the  Romans  were  informed  that 
the  Messenian  war  had  turned  out  successfully  for  the  Achaeans, 
without  taking  any  account  of  their  previous  declaration  they 
gave  a  different  answer  to  the  same  ambassadors,  asserting 
that  they  had  taken  measures  to  prevent  any  one  from  convey- 
ing arms  or  corn  from  Italy  into  Messene.  By  this  they 
showed  clearly  that,  so  far  from  avoiding  or  disregarding  the 
affairs  of  foreign  nations  not  directly  concerning  themselves, 
they  were,  on  the  contrary,  annoyed  at  everything  not  being 
referred  to  them  and  carried  out  in  accordance  with  their 
opinion. 

When  the  ambassadors  arrived  in  Sparta  with  their  answer, 

the  Achaean  Strategus  as  soon  as  he  had  settled 
Achaean  mcetmg  ^^  Messenian  business,  summoned  a  congress 

at  Sicyon,  and  on  its  assembling,  proposed  a 
resolution  for  the  reception  of  Sparta  into  the  league,  alleging 

*  The  second  congress  of  the  year  seems  to  mean  not  that  held  for  election 
of  the  Strategus  for  the  next  year,  which  met  about  12th  May,  but  the  second 
regular  meeting  in  August. 


Mill  SPARTA  INCLUDED  IN  THE  LEAGUE  335  ■ 

that  "The  Romans  had  declined  the  arbitration  which  had 
previously  been  offered  to  them  in  regard  to  this  city, — for 
they  had  answered  that  they  had  now  no  concern  with  any 
of  the  affairs  of  Sparta.  Those,  however,  at  present  in  power 
at  Sparta  were  desirous  of  being  admitted  to  the  privileges 
of  the  league.  Therefore  he  advised  that  they  should 
admit  the  town ;  for  this  would  be  advantageous  in  two 
ways :  first,  because  they  would  be  thus  admitting  men  who 
had  remained  unshaken  in  their  loyalty  to  the  league  ;  and 
secondly,  because  they  would  not  be  admitting  those  of  the 
old  exiles,  who  had  behaved  with  ingratitude  and  impiety 
towards  them,  to  any  share  of  their  privileges ;  but  by  confirming 
the  measures  of  those  who  had  excluded  them,  would  at  the 
same  time  be  showing,  with  God's  help,  due  gratitude  to  the 
latter."  With  these  words  Lycortas  exhorted  the  Achaeans  to 
receive  the  city  of  Sparta  into  the  league.  But  Diophanes 
and  some  others  attempted  to  put  in  a  word  for  the  exiles,  and 
urged  the  Achaeans  "  Not  to  join  in  pressing  heavily  upon  these 
banished  men;  and  not  to  t>e  influenced  by  a  mere  handful  of 
men  to  strengthen  the  hands  of  those  who  had  impiously  and 
lawlessly  expelled  them  from  their  country." 

18,  Such  were  the  arguments  employed  on    either  side. 
The  Achaeans,  after  listening  to  both,  decided 
to  admit  the  city,  and  accordingly  the  agreement    ^^1^^'^. 
was  engraved  on  a  tablet,  and  Sparta  became 
a  member  of  the  Achaean  league  :  the  existing  citizens  having 
agreed  to  admit  such  of  the  old  exiles  as  were  not  considered 
to  have  acted  in  a  hostile  spirit  against  the  Achaeans.     After 
confirming  this  arrangement    the   Achaeans  sent   Bippus  of 
Argos  and  others  as  ambassadors  to  Rome,  to  explain  to  the 
Senate  what  had  been  done  in  the  matter.     The  Lacedae- 
monians also  sent  Chaeron  and  others ;  while  the  exiles  too 
sent  a  mission  led  by  Oetis  Diactorius^  to  oppose  the  Achaean 
ambassadors  in  the  Senate. 

'  This  looks  like  a  local  name,  bul  no  place  is  known  coiresponding  [0  it. 
A  Diaclorida  of  Sparta  is  mentioned  in  Herodotus,  6,  137  ;  and  perhaps,  as 
Hultscb  suggests,  we  ought  lo  read  ' '  CIctii  and  Diaclorius. " 


BOOK  XXIV 

1.  The  ambassadors  from  the  Spartan  exiles  and  from  the 
.  Achaeans    arrived    in    Rome    simultaneously 

Rome  from  the  ^^^^  those  of  Eumenes,  king  Ariarathes,  and 
Achaeans,  the  Pharnaces  ;  and  the  Senate  attended  to  these 
Spartan  exiles,  latter  first  A  short  time  previously  a  report 
^^^"^arathS"  ^ad  been  made  to  the  Senate  by  Marcus,^  who 
king  of  Cappado-  had  been  despatched  on  a  mission  respecting 
cia,  and  Pharnaces,  ^^g  ^^r  that  had  broken  out  between  Eumenes 
*°B.c.  182.^"*'  ^"^  Pharnaces,  speaking  highly  of  the  modera- 
tion of  Eumenes  in  every  particular,  and  the 
grasping  temper  and  insolence  of  Pharnaces.  The  Senate 
accordingly  did  not  require  any  lengthened  arguments ;  but, 
after  listening  to  the  ambassadors,  answered  that  they  would 
once  more  send  legates  to  examine  more  minutely  into  the 
points  in  dispute  between  the  kings.  Then  came  in  the  am- 
bassadors from  the  Lacedaemonian  exiles,  and  with  them  the 
ambassadors  from  the  citizens  actually  in  the  city ;  and  after 
giving  them  a  long  hearing,  the  Senate  expressed  no  dis- 
approval of  what  had  been  done,  but  promised  the  exiles  to 
write  to  the  Achaeans  on  the  subject  of  their  restoration  to 
their  country.  Some  days  afterwards,  Bippus  of  Argos  and  his 
colleagues,  sent  by  the  Achaeans,  entered  the  Senate  with  a 
statement  as  to  the  restoration  of  order  in  Messene ;  and  the 
Senate,  without  showing  displeasure  at  any  part  of  the  arrange- 
ment, gave  the  ambassadors  a  cordial  reception.  .  .  . 

*  The  mission  to  Eumenes  and  Pharnaces  has  been  already  mentioned  in 
bk.  23,  ch.  9,  but  the  name  of  the  ambassador  was  not  given  ;  nor  is  it  men- 
tioned by  Livy  (40,  20),  who  records  the  mission.  It  is  uncertain  who  is 
meant  by  Marcus,  some  editors  have  altered  it  to  Marcius,  i,e,  Q.  Marcius 
Philippus,  who  had  been  sent  to  Macedonia,  imagining  him  to  have  fulfilled 
both  missions. 


BOOK  XXIV        THE  SPARTAN  EXILES  REFUSED  337 

Z  When  the  ambassadors  of  the  Spartan  exiles  arrived  ia 
the  Peloponnese  from  Rome  with  a  letter  from  xemis  granted 
the  Senate  to  the  Achaeans,  desiring  that  mea-        w  the 
sures  should  be  taken  for  their  recall  and  restora-      Messeniana 
tion  to  their  country,  the  Achaeans  resolved  to  postpone  the 
consideration  of  the  question  until  their  own   ambassadors 
should    return.     After   making  this  answer,  they  caused  the 
agreement    between    themselves  and    the    Messenians  to  be 
engraved  on  a  tablet :  granting  them,  among  other  favours,  a 
three  years'  remission  of  taxes,  in  order  that  the  damage  done 
to  their  territory  should  fall  upon  the  Achaeans  equally  with 
the    Messenians.      But   when   Bippus  and   his    f],,  requtst  of 
colleagues  arrived  from  Rome,  and  reported  that     ihe  Spanan 
the  letter  in  regard  to  the  exiles  was  not  due  to   '="'1**  ^^o'^- 
any  strong  feeling  on    the    part  of  the    Senate,  but  to    the 
importunity  of  the  exiles  themselves,  the  Achaeans  voted  to 
make  no  change  .  .  . 

3.  Mount  Haemus  is  close  to  the  Pontus,  the  most  extensive 
and  loftiest  of  the  ranges  in  Thrace,  which  it     ^  Hacmns. 
divides  Into  two  nearly  equal  parts,  from  which     Livy,  46,  ai. 

a  view  of  both  seas  may  be  obtained.  .  ,  .' 

4,  In  Crete  there  was  the  beginning  of  great  troubles  set 
in  motion,  if  one  should  speak  of  "  a  beginning       creie  in 

of  troubles "  in  Crete :    for  owing  to  the  per-    b.g  18a.    See 
sistency  of  civil  wars  and  the  acts  of  savagery  **■  '^'  '^'^  '* 
practised  against  each  other,  beginning  and  end  are  much  the 
same  in  Crete ;  and  what  appears  to  some  people  to  be  an 
incredible    story    is    a    spectacle    of    everyday    occurrence 
there.  .  .  . 

6.  Having  come  to  terras  with  each  other,  Phamaces, 
Attains,  and  the  rest  returned  home.  While  End  of  the  war 
this  was  going  on,  Eumenes  had  recovered'*"***?^'™™'' 
from  his  illness,  and  was  staying  at  Pergamus ;  ^^^^  ^^  fofmer 
and  when  his  brother  arrived  to  announce  the  had  undertaken 
arrangements  that  had  been  made,  he  approved  '°  support  his 
of  what  had  been  done,  and  resolved  to  send  Ariaraibts.    See 

^  From  Slrabo  {vlL  5,  13},  vrhoadds  :  "  But  this  is  not  (nie,  for  the  distance 
from  the  Adriatic  is  iinroense,  and  there  are  many  obalades  in  the  way  to 
otMCore  the  view." 


338  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS 

Livy,  38,  39,    his  brothers  to  Rome :  partly  because  he  hoped 
B.C.  182-181.    ^Q  py^  ^^  g^^  ^Q  ^YiQ  war  with  Phamaces  by 

means  of  their  mission,  and  partly  because  he  wished  to  intro> 
duce  his  brothers  to  his  own  private  friends  at  Rome,  and 
officially  to  the  Senate.  Attalus  and  his  brother  were  eager 
for  this  tour ;  and  when  they  arrived  in  Rome  the  young  men 
met  with  a  cordial  reception  from  everybody  in  private  society, 
owing  to  the  intimacies  which  they  had  formed  during  the 
Roman  wars  in  Asia,  and  a  still  more  honourable  welcome 
from  the  Senate,  which  made  liberal  provision  for  their  enter- 
tainment and  maintenance,  and  treated  them  with  marked 
respect  in  such  conferences  as  it  had  with  them.  Thus, 
when  the  young  men  came  formally  before  the  Senate,  and, 
after  speaking  at  considerable  length  of  the  renewal  of  their 
ancient  ties  of  friendship  with  Rome  and  inveighing  against 
Pharnaces,  begged  the  Senate  to  adopt  some  active  measures 
to  inflict  on  him  the  punishment  he  deserved,  the  Senate  gave 
them  a  favourable  hearing,  and  promised  in  reply  to  send 
legates  to  use  every  possible  means  of  putting  an  end  to 
the  war.  .  .  . 

6.  About  the  same  time  king  Ptolemy,  wishing  to  make 

Ptolemy       friends  with  the  Achaean  league,  sent  an  am- 

Epiphancs  sends  bassador  to  them  with  an  offer  of  a  fleet  of  ten 

a  present  to     pentccontcrs  fully  equipped ;  and  the  Achaeans, 

^^  Lycort^r^*    ^^linking  the  present  worthy  of  their  thanks,  for 

Poiybius,  and    the  cost  could  not  be  much  less  than  ten  talents, 

Aratus  sent  to   gladly  accepted  the  ofler.     Having  come  to  this 

"^^^  RXJ.^^i!^'    resolution,  they  selected  Lycortas,  Poiybius,  and 

Aratus,  son  of  Aratus  of  Sicyon,  to  go  on  a 

mission  to  the  king,  partly  to  thank  him  for  the  arms  which 

.  he  had  sent  on  a  former  occasion,  and  partly  to 

*  *  receive  the  ships  and  make  arrangements  for 

bringing  them  across.     They  appointed  Lycortas,  because,  as 

Strategus  at  the  time  that  Ptolemy  renewed  the  alliance,  he 

had  worked  energetically  on  the  king's  side;    and  Poiybius, 

though  below  the  legal  age  for  acting  as  ambassador,^  because 

his  father  has  been  ambassador  at  the  renewal  of  the  alliance 

^  Perhaps  thirty,  which^  seems  to  have  been  the  legal  age  for  admission  to 
political  functions.     See  29,  34. 


XXIV  MURDER  OF  APOLLONIDES  AT  SPARTA  339 

with  Ptolemy,  and  had  brought  the  present  of  arms  and  of 
money  to  the  Achaeans;  and  Aratus,  similarly,        ptolemy 
on  account  of  his  former  intercourse  with  the      Epiphanes 
king.     However,  this  mission  never  went  after     poisoned  in 
all,  as  Ptolemy  died  just  at  this  time.  ...  ..11. 

7.  There  was  at  this  time  in  Sparta  a  man  named  Chaeron, 
who  in  the  previous  year  had  been  on  an  chaeron's 
embassy  to  Rome,  a  man  of  ready  wit  and  great  malversations 
ability  in  affairs,  but  still  young,  in  a  humble  at  Sparta, 
position  of  life,  and  without  the  advantages  of  a  liberal  educa- 
tion. By  flattering  the  mob,  and  starting  questions  which  no 
one  else  had  the  assurance  to  move,  he  soon  acquired  a  certain 
notoriety  with  the  people.  The  first  use  he  made  of  his  power 
was  to  confiscate  the  land  granted  by  the  tyrants  to  the  sisters, 
wives,  mothers,  and  children  of  the  exiles,  and  to  distribute  it 
on  his  own  authority  among  the  poor  without  any  fixed  rule  or 
regard  to  equality.  He  next  squandered  the  revenue,  using  the 
public  money  as  though  it  were  his  own,  without  the  authority 
of  law,  public  decree,  or  magistrate.  Annoyed  at  these  pro- 
ceedings, certain  men  managed  to  get  themselves  appointed 
auditors  of  the  treasury  in  accordance  with  the  laws.  Seeing 
this,  and  conscious  of  his  mal-administration  of  the  government, 
Chaeron  sent  some  men  to  attack  Apollonides, 

the  most  illustrious  of  the  auditors,  and  the  most  AroUooito^ 
able  to  expose  his  embezzlements,  who  stabbed 
him  to  death  in  broad  daylight  as  he  was  coming  from  the 
bath.  Upon  this  being  reported  to  the  Achaeans,  and  the 
people  expressing  great  indignation  at  what  had  been  done, 
the  Strategus  at  once  started  for  Sparta ;  and  when  he  arrived 
there  he  brought  Chaeron  to  trial  for  the  murder  of  Apollonides, 
and  having  condemned  him,  threw  him  into  prison;  He  then 
incited  the  remaining  auditors  to  make  a  real  investigation  into 
the  public  funds,  and  to  see  that  the  relations  of  the  exiles  got 
back  the  property  of  which  Chaeron  had  shortly  before  deprived 
them.  .  .  . 

8.  In  Asia  king  Phamaces,  once  more  treating  the  refer- 
ence to  Rome  with  contempt,  sent  Leocritus  in 

the  course  of  the  winter  with  ten  thousand  men  ^^igT-i^So!*^ 
to  ravage  Galatia,  while  he  himself  at  the  begin- 


340  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  book 

ning  of  spring  collected  his  forces  and  invaded  Cappadocia. 

When  Eumenes  heard  of  it,  he  was  much  enraged 

'"^^""fso^  "*^    ^^  Pharnaces  thus  breaking  through  the  terms 

of  the  agreement  to  which  he  was  pledged,  but 

was  compelled  to  retaliate  by  acting  in  the  same  way.     When 

he  had  already  collected  his  forces,  Attalus  and 
^cTp^<^U!"  ^^s  brother  landed  from  their  voyage  from  Rome, 

and  the  three  brothers,  after  meeting  and  inter- 
changing views,  marched  out  at  once  with  the  army.  But  on 
reaching  Galatia  they  found  Leocritus  no  longer  there ;  and 

when  Carsignatus   and  Gaesotorius,  who  had 

^  chicfs^^^"    before  embraced  the  cause  of  Pharnaces,  sent 

them  a  message  desiring  that  their  lives  might 

be  spared,  and  promising  that  they  would  do  anything  that 

might  be  required  of  them,  they  refused  the  request  on  the 

ground  of  the  treachery  of  which  they  had  been  guilty,  and 

advanced  with  their  full  force  against  Pharnaces; 

Gaiaiia  (?).      ^^d  having  performed  the  distance  from  Cal- 

Pamassus,  a     pitus   to  the  river  Halys   in    five   days,  they 

town  on  the     reached  Parnassus  in  six  more,  and  being  there 

joined  by  Ariarathes,  the  king  of  the  Cappa- 

docians,  with  his  own  army,  they  entered  the  territory  of  the 

Mocissians.  Just  as  they  had  pitched  their 
of^'c  Halys  ^"^P»  ^^ws  Came  that  the  ambassadors  from 
Rome  had  arrived  to  effect  a  pacification. 
When  he  heard  this,  Eumenes  sent  his  brother  Attalus  to 
receive  them ;  while  he  devoted  himself  to  doubling  the  number 
of  his  troops,  and  improving  them  to  the  utmost :  partly  with  a 
view  to  prepare  them  for  actual  service,  and  partly  to  impress 
the  Romans  with  the  behef  that  he  was  able  to  defend  himself 
against  Pharnaces,  and  beat  him  in  war. 

9,  When  the  Roman  legates  arrived  and  urged  the  putting 

The  Roman     ^^  ^nd  to  the  war,  Eumenes  and  Ariarathes 

legates  arrive    professed  to  be  ready  to  obey ;  but  begged  the 

and  undertake  Romans  to  bring  them,  if  possible,  to  an  inter- 

o  nego  a  e.     ^^.^^  ^.^j^  Phamaces,  that  they  might  see  fully 

from  what  was  said  in  their  own  presence  how  faithless  and  cruel 

a  man  Pharnaces  was ;  and,  if  this  proved  to  be  impossible, 

to  take   a   fair  and  impartial  view  of  the   controversy   and 


XXIV  EUMENES  AND  PHARNACES  341 

decide  it  themselves.  The  legates  replied  that  they  would 
do  everything  that  was  in  their  power  and  was  consistent 
with  honour;  but  they  required  the  kings  to  remove  their 
army  from  the  country :  for  it  was  inconsistent  that,  when 
they  were  there  with  proposals  for  a  peace,  operations  of  war 
should  be  going  on  and  mutual  acts  of  hostility  be  committed. 
Eumenes  and  his  ally  yielded  to  this  representation,  and  imme- 
diately marched  off  in  the  direction  of  Galatia,  The  Roman 
legates  then  visited  Pharnaces,  and  first  demanded  that  he 
should  meet  Eumenes  and  Ariarathes  in  a  conference,  as  thai 
would  be  the  surest  way  of  settling  the  affair ;  but  when  he 
expressed  repugnance  to  that  measure,  and  absolutely  refused 
to  do  so,  the  Romans  at  once  perceived  that  he  plainly  thought 
himself  in  the  wrong,  and  distrusted  his  own  cause ;  but,  being 
anxious  in  any  and  every  way  to  put  an  end  to  the  war,  they  con- 
tinued to  press  him  until  he  consented  to  send  plenipotentiaries 
to  the  coast,  to  conclude  a  peace  on  such  terms  as  the  legates 
might  command.  When  these  plenipotentiaries, 
the  Roman  legates,  and  Eumenes  and  Aria-  *  "fafi^""" 
rathes  met,  the  latter  showed  themselves  ready 
to  consent  to  any  proposal  for  the  sake  of  concluding  a  peace. 
But  the  envoys  of  Pharnaces  disputed  every  point,  and  did 
not  hold  even  to  what  they,  had  once  accepted,  but  con- 
tinually brought  forward  some  fresh  demand,  and  altered  their 
mind  again  and  again.  The  Roman  legates,  therefore,  quickly 
came  to  the  conclusion  that  they  were  wasting  their  labour,  as 
Pharnaces  could  not  be  induced  to  consent  to  the  pacification. 
The  conference  accordingly  having  come  to  nothing,  and  the 
Roman  legates  having  left  Pergamum,  and  the  envoys  of 
Pharnaces  having  gone  home,  the  war  went  on, 
Eumenes  and  his  allies  proceeding  in  their  eneairedhi" 
preparations  for  it  Meanwhile,  however,  the  putiing  down  a 
Rhodians  earnestly  requested  Eumenes  to  help  "sing  ot  ihe 
them ;  and  he  accordingly  set  out  in  great  haste  ^J'^'ja^'ch^ 
to  carry  on  a  war  against  the  Lycians.  .  .  . 

10.  This  year  the  Achaean  Strategus  Hyperbat us  brought 
before  the  assembly  the  question  of  the  letter 
from  Rome  as  to  the  recall  of  the  Lacedae-    De^,,'n  ^,e 
monian  exiles.     Lycortas  and  his  party  recom- Achaean  assembij' 


342  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  book 

on  the  Roman  mended  that  no  change  should  be  made,  on 
despatch.  ^^  ground  that  "  The  Romans  had  only  acted 
as  they  were  bound  to  do  in  listening  to  the  petition  of  men 
who,  on  the  face  of  it,  were  deprived  of  their  rights,  so  ^  as 
that  petition  seemed  reasonable ;  but  when  they  were  con- 
vinced that  of  a  petition  some  points  were  impossible,  and 
others  such  as  to  inflict  great  disgrace  and  damage  upon  their 
friends,  it  had  never  been  their  custom  to  insist  upon  them 
peremptorily,  or  force  their  adoption.  So  in  this  case  also,  if 
it  were  shown  to  them  that  the  Achaeans  by  obeying  their 
letter  would  be  breaking  their  oaths,  their  laws,  and  the  pro- 
visions engraved  on  the  tablets,  the  very  bonds  of  our  league, 
they  will  retract  their  orders,  and  will  admit  that  we  are  right 
to  hesitate  and  to  ask  to  be  excused  from  carrying  out  its  in- 
junctions." Such  was  the  speech  of  Lycortas.  But  H3rper- 
batus  and  Callicrates  advised  submission  to  the  letter,  and 
that  they  should  hold  its  authority  superior  to  law  or  tablet  or 
anything  else.  Such  being  the  division  of  opinion,  the 
Achaeans  voted  to  send  ambassadors  to  the  Senate,  to  put 
before  it  the  points  contained  in  the  speech  of  Lycortas. 
Callicrates  of  Leontium,  Lydiades  of  Megalopolis,  and  Aratus 
of  Sicyon  were  forthwith  nominated  for  this  mission,  and  were 
despatched  with  instructions  to  this  effect.  But  on  their 
arrival  at  Rome  Callicrates  went  before  the  Senate,  and,  so  far 
from  addressing  it  in  accordance  with  his  instructions,  he  on 
the  contrary  entered  upon  an  elaborate  denunciation  of  his 
political  opponents ;  and,  not  contented  with  that,  he  under- 
took to  rebuke  the  Senate  itself. 

11.  For  he  said  tliat  "The  Romans  were  themselves  re- 

^  „.  sponsible  for  the  Greeks  neglecting  their  letters 

Calhcratcs.  in-  ,         ,         •     ^     j      r     i.      •        ^i.  -r" 

stead  of  obeying  ^^^  Orders  mstead  of  obeymg  them.     For  m 

his  instructions,  all  the  democratic  states  of  the  day  there  were 

denounces  his   ^^q  parties,^-one  recommending  obedience  to 

%^uadS'the    ^^^  Roman  rescripts,  and  holding  neither  law 

Senate  that  their  nor  tablet  nor  anything  else  to  be  superior  to  the 

interference  is    ^ju  Qf  Rome ;  the  Other  always  quoting  oaths  and 

necessary.      tablets,  and  exhorting  the  people  to  be  careful 

about  breaking  them.     Now  the  latter  policy  was  by  far  the 

most  popular  in  Achaia,  and  the  most  influential  with  the 


XXIV  CALUCRATES  TURNS  TRAITOR  343 

multitude;  consequently  the  Romanisers  were  discredited  and 
denounced  among  the  populace — their  opponents  glorified. 
If  then  the  Senate  would  give  some  sign  of  their  interest  in 
the  matter,  the  leaders,  in  the  first  place,  would  quickly  change 
to  the  Romanising  party,  and,  in  the  next  place,  would  be 
followed  by  the  populace  from  fear.  But  if  this  were  neglected 
by  the  Senate,  the  tendency  towards  the  latter  of  the  two 
parties  would  be  universal,  as  the  more  creditable  and  honour- 
able in  the  eyes  of  the  populace.  Thus  it  came  about  that  at 
that  very  time  certain  statesmen,  without  any  other  claims  what- 
ever, had  obtained  the  highest  offices  in  their  own  cities,  merely 
from  coming  forward  to  speak  against  the  rescripts  of  the 
Senate,  with  the  view  of  maintaining  the  validity  of  the  laws 
and  decrees  made  in  the  country.  If  then  the  Senate  was 
indifferent  about  having  their  rescripts  obeyed  by  the  Greeks,  by 
all  means  let  it  go  on  as  it  is  now  doing.  £ut  if  the  Senate 
wished  that  its  orders  should  be  carried  out,  and  its  rescripts 
be  despised  by  no  one,  it  must  give  serious  attention  to  that 
subject.  If  it  did  not  do  so,  he  knew  only  too  well  that  the 
exact  opposite  of  the  Senate's  wishes  would  come  about,  as 
in  fact  had  already  been  the  case.  For  but  lately,  in  the 
Messenian  disturbance,  though  Quintus  Marcius  had  taken 
many  precautions  to  prevent  the  Achaeans  adopting  any 
measures  with  regard  to  the  Messenians  without  the  consent  of 
the  Romans,  they  bad  disobeyed  that  order ;  had  voted  the  war 
on  their  own  authority;  bad  not  only  wasted  the  whole  country 
in  defiance  of  justice,  but  had  in  some  cases  driven  its  noblest 
citizens  into  exile,  and  in  others  put  them  to  death  with  every 
extremity  of  torture,  though  they  had  surrendered,  and  were 
guilty  of  no  crime  but  that  of  appealing  to  Rome  on  the  points 
in  dispute.  Again,  too,  though  the  Senate  had  repeatedly 
written  to  order  the  restoration  of  the  Lacedaemonian  exiles, 
the  Achaeans  were  so  far  from  obeying,  that  they  had  actually 
set  up  an  engraved  tablet,  and  made  a  sworn  agreement  with  the 
men  actually  in  possession  of  the  city  that  these  exiles  should 
never  return.  With  these  instances  before  their  eyes,  the 
Romans  should  take  measures  of  precaution  for  the  future." 

12.  After  delivering  a  speech  in  these  words,  or  to  this 
effect,  Callicrates  left  the  Senate-house.     He  was  followed  by 


344  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  book 

the  envoys  of  the  exiles,  who  retired  after  delivering  a  short 
address,  stating  their  case,  and  containing  some  of  the  ordinary 

appeals  to  pity.    The  Senate  was  persuaded  that 
The  Romans  j^  ^    y^^^  CalHcrates  had  said  touched  the 

adopt  the  pobcy  .  ^  _  ,     ,         .  .1 

of  raising  a  party  interests  of  Rome,  and  that  it  was  incumbent 
in  Greece  against  upon  it  to  exalt  those  who  supported  its  own 
^^^loi^^e*^'*  decrees,  and  to  humble  those  who  resisted  them. 
It  was  with  this  conviction,  therefore,  and  at  this 
time  that  it  first  adopted  the  policy  of  depressing  those  who  in 
their  several  states  took  the  patriotic  and  honourable  side,  and 
promoting  those  who  were  for  appealing  to  its  authority  on 
every  occasion,  right  or  wrong.  The  result  of  which  was  that 
gradually,  as  time  went  on,  the  Senate  had  abundance  of  flatterers, 
but  a  great  scarcity  of  genuine  friends.  How^ever,  on  this 
occasion  the  Senate  did  not  write  about  the  restoration  of  the 
exiles  to  the  Achaeans  only,  but  also  to  the  Aetolians,  Epirotes, 
Athenians,  Boeotians,  and  Acamanians,  calling  them  all  as  it 
were  to  witness,  in  order  to  break  down  the  power  of  the 
Achaeans.  Moreover,  they  added  to  their  answer,  without  say- 
ing a  word  to  his  colleagues,  a  remark  confined  entirely  to  Calli- 
crates  himself,  that  "  everybody  in  the  various  states  should  be 
as  Callicrates."  This  man  accordingly  arrived  in  Greece  with 
his  answer,  in  a  great  state  of  exultation,  little  thinking  that 
he  had  become  the  initiator  of  great  miseries  to  all  the  Greeks, 
but  especially  to  the  Achaeans.  This  nation  had  still  at  that 
time  the  privilege  of  dealing  on  something  like  equal  terms  with 
Rome,  because  it  had  kept  faith  with  her  from  the  time  that  it 
had  elected  to  maintain  the  Roman  cause,  in  the  hour  of  her 
greatest  danger — I  mean  during  the  wars  \s'ith  Philip  and 
Antiochus.  .  .  .  The  league,  too,  had  made  progress  in  material 
strength  and  in  every  direction  from  the  period  from  which  my 
history  commences ;  but  the  audacious  proceeding  of  Callicrates 
proved  the  beginning  of  a  change  for  the  worse.  .  .  . 

The  Romans  having  the  feelings  of  men,  with  a  noble 
spirit  and  generous  principles,  commiserate  all  who  have  met 
with  misfortunes,  and  show  favour  to  all  who  fly  to  them  for 
protection  ;  but  directly  any  one  claims  anything  as  of  right, 
on  the  ground  of  having  been  faithful  to  their  alliance,  they 
at  once  draw  in  and  correct  their  error  to  the  best  of  their 


B.C  i3o-i79- 


XXIV  ROME  AND  THE  ACHAEAN  LEAGUE  345 

ability.  Thus  then  Callicrates,  who  had  been  sent  to  Rome  to 
plead  for  the  rights  of  the  Achaeans,  acted  in  exactly  the 
opposite  spirit ;  and  dragging  in  the  subject  of  the  Messenian 
war,  on  which  the  Romans  themselves  had  made  no  com- 
plaint, returned  to  Achaia  to  overawe  the  people  with  the 
threat  of  the  hostility  of  Rome.  Having  therefore  by  his  official 
report  frightened  and  dismayed  the  spirits  of  the  populace, 
who  were  of  course  ignorant  of  what  he  had  really  said  in  the 
Senate,  he  was  first  of  all  elected  Strategus,  and, 
to  make  matters  worse,  proved  to  be  open  to 
bribery;  and  then,  having  got  the  office,  carried  out  the 
restoration  of  the  Lacedaemonian  and  Messenian  exiles,' .  ,  . 

IS.  Philopoemen  and  Aristaenus,  the  Achaeans,  were  un- 
like both  in  character  and  policy.    Philopoemen  „ 

,  ,  ,  .     ,      1  ■      .     I  ,       T      Comparison  be- 

was  formed  by  nature  in  body  and  mmd  for  the  tween  ihe  char- 
life  of  a  soldier,  Aristaenus  for  a  statesman  and  aders  of  Philo. 
debater.  In  politics  they  differed  in  this,  that  Poemen  and 
whereas  during  the  penods  of  the  wars  with 
Philip  and  Antiochus,  Roman  influence  had  become  supreme 
in  Greece,  Aristaenus  directed  his  policy  with  the  idea  of 
carrying  out  with  alacrity  every  order  from  Rome,  and  some- 
times even  of  anticipating  it  Still  he  endeavoured  to  keep 
up  the  appearance  of  abiding  by  the  laws,  and  did,  in  fact, 
maintain  the  reputation  of  doing  so,  only  giving  way  when  any 
one  of  them  proved  to  plainly  militate  against  the  rescripts 
from  Rome.  But  Philopoemen  accepted,  and  loyally  per- 
formed, alt  Roman  orders  which  were  in  harmony  with  the 
laws  and  the  terms  of  their  alliance ;  but  when  such  orders 
exceeded  these  limits,  he  could  not  make  up  his  mind  to  yield 
a  wilting  obedience,  but  was  wont  first  to  demand  an  arbitra- 
tion, and  to  repeat  the  demand  a  second  time;  and  if  this 
proved  unavailing,  to  give  in  at  length  under  protest,  and  so 
finally  carry  out  the  order.  .  .  . 

14.  Aristaenus  used  to  defendhispolicy  before  the  Achaeans 
by  some  such  arguments  as  these:  "It  wasimpos-TT,^  ^j^^  of  Ans- 
sible  to  maintain  the  Roman  friendship  by  hold-    taenus  on  the 
ing  out  the  spear  and  the  herald's  staff  together.     '*?^'g"^ 
If  we  have  the  resolution  to  withstand  them  face 
>  See  Hidu'a  Gnei  Imcriplians,  p.  330. 


346  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  book 

to  face,  and  can  do  so,  well  and  good.  But  if  Philopoemen 
himself  does  not  venture  to  assert  this,^  .  .  .  why  should  we 
lose  what  is  possible  in  striving  for  the  impossible?  There 
are  but  two  marks  that  every  policy  must  aim  at — honour  and 
expediency.  Those  to  whom  honour  is  a  possible  attainment 
should  stick  to  that,  if  they  have  political  wisdom ;  those  to 
whom  it  is  not  must  take  refuge  in  expediency.  To  miss 
both  is  the  surest  proof  of  unwisdom :  and  the  men  to  do 
that  are  clearly  those  who,  while  ostensibly  consenting  to  obey 
orders,  carry  them  out  with  reluctance  and  hesitation.  There- 
fore we  must  either  show  that  we  are  strong  enough  to  refuse 
obedience,  or,  if  we  dare  not  venture  even  to  suggest  that,  we 
must  give  a  ready  submission  to  orders." 

16.  Philopoemen,  however,  said  that  "People  should  not 

Phiiopoemen's   suppose  him  SO  Stupid  as  not  to  be  able  to 
answer  in  defence  estimate  the  difference  between  the  Achaean 

of  his  policy,  r^^^  Roman  states,  or  the  superiority  of  the 
power  of  the  latter.  But  as  it  is  the  inevitable  tendency  of 
the  stronger  to  oppress  the  weaker,  can  it  be  expedient  to  assist 
the  designs  of  the  superior  power,  and  to  put  no  obstacle  in 
their  way,  so  as  to  experience  as  soon  as  possible  the  utmost 
of  their  tyranny  ?  Is  it  not,  on  the  contrary,  better  to  resist 
and  struggle  to  the  utmost  of  our  power?  .  .  .  And  if  they 
persist  in  forcing  their  *  injunctions  upon  us,^  .  .  .  and  if,  by 
reminding  them  of  the  facts  we  do  something  to  soften  their 
resolution,  we  shall  at  any  rate  mitigate  the  harshness  of  their 
rule  to  a  certain  extent;  especially  as  up  to  this  time  the 
Romans,  as  you  yourself  say,  Aristaenus,  have  always  made  a 
great  point  of  fidelity  to  oaths,  treaties,  and  promises  to  allies. 
But  if  we  at  once  condemn  the  justice  of  our  own  cause,  and, 
like  captives  of  the  spear,  offer  an  unquestioning  submission 
to  every  order,  what  will  be  the  difference  between  the 
Achaeans  and  the  Sicilians  or  Capuans,  who  have  been  notori- 
ously slaves  this  long  time  past  ?  Therefore  it  must  either  be 
admitted  that  the  justice  of  a  cause  has  no  weight  with  the 
Romans,  or,  if  we  do  not  venture  to  say  that,  we  must  stand 
by  our  rights,  and  not  abandon  our  own  cause,  especially  as 
our  position  in  regard  to  Rome  is  exceedingly  strong  and 

^  Something  is  lost  from  the  text. 


XXIV  PfflLOFOEMEN's  POLICY  347 

honourable.  That  the  time  will  come  when  the  Greeks  will 
be  forced  to  give  unlimited  obedience,  I  know  full  well.  But 
would  one  wish  to  see  this  time  as  soon  or  as  late  as  possible  ? 
Surely  as  late  as  possible !  In  this,  then,  my  policy  differs 
from  that  of  Aristaenus.  He  wishes  to  see  the  inevitable 
arrive  as  quickly  as  possible,  and  even  to  help  it  to  come :  I 
wish  to  the  best  of  my  power  to  resist  and  ward  it  off" 

From  these  speeches  it  was  made  clear  that  while  the 
policy  of  the  one  was  honourable,  of  the  other  undignified,  both 
were  founded  on  considerations  of  safety.  Wherefore  while 
both  Romans  and  Greeks  were  at  that  time  threatened  with 
serious  dangers  from  Philip  and  Antiochus,  yet  both  these 
statesmen  maintained  the  rights  of  the  Achaeans  in  regard  to 
the  Romans  undiminished ;  though  a  repott  found  its  way 
about  that  Aristaenus  was  better  affected  to  the  Romans  than 
Philopoemen.  .  .  . 


BOOK  XXV 

1.  Tiberius  Gracchus  destroyed  three  hundred  cities  of  the 

Celtiberes.^  .  .  . 

Q^*  Mviusf  lT*       2*  ^^^  attack  upon  him  being  sudden  and 

Maniius.       formidable,  Pharnaces  was  reduced  to  submit 

The  ex-praetors  to  almost  any  terms ;  and  on  his  sending  an 

SSrit  embassy.  Eumenes  and  Ariarathes  immediately 

Postumius  were  accepted  his  proposals,  and  sent  ambassadors 

still  in  Spain,    to  Pharnaces  in  return.     When  this  had  been 

beerTsinccBc    repeated   several   times,    the    pacification   was 

182.  Livy,  40, 1,  concluded  on  the  following  terms  :  "  Eumenes, 

44-  Prusias,  and  Ariarathes,  shall  maintain  perpetual 

''e'::^^^:'  peace  with  Pharnaces  and  Mithridates. 

Ariarathes  upon        "  Phamaces  shall  not  enter  Galatia  on  any 

Pharnaces.     See  pretence. 

bk.  24.  chs.  8,  9.      «  g^^j^  treaties  as  exist  between  Pharnaces 

and  Gauls  are  hereby  rescinded. 

"Phamaces  shall  likewise  evacuate  Paphlagonia,  after  re- 
storing the  inhabitants  whom  he  had  previously  expelled,  with 
their  shields,  javelins,  and  other  equipment 

"  Pharnaces  shall  restore  to  Ariarathes  all  territory  of  which 
he  has  deprived  him,  with  the  property  thereon  and  the  hos- 
tages. 

"  He  shall  restore  Tium  by  the  Pontus,  which  some  time 
<^  Ki,       »,       before  was  given  freely  and  Hberally  by  Eumenes 

to  Prusias. 

"  Pharnaces  shall  restore,  without  ransom,  all  prisoners  of 
war  and  all  deserters. 

^  From  Strabo  3,  ch.  4,  who  quotes  Poseidonias  as  criticising  this  state- 
ment  by  remaridiig  that  Poljrbitii  must  count  every  tower  as  a  city. 


BOOK  XXV  THE  ACCESSION  OF  PERSEUS  349 

"  He  shall  repay  to  Morzius  and  Ariarathes,  in  lieu  of  all 
money  and  treasure  taken  from  them,  the  sum  of  nine  hun- 
dred talents,  and  shall  add  thereto  three  hundred  talents  for 
Eumenes  towards  the  expenses  of  the  war. 

"  Mithridates,  the  Satrap  of  Armenia,  shall  also  pay  three 
hundred  talents,  because  he  attacked  Ariarathes  in  defiance  of 
the  treaty  with  Eumenes, 

"The  persons  included  under  this  treaty  are,  of  the  princes 
in  Asia,  Artaxias,  lord  of  the  greater  part  of  Armenia,  and 
Acusilochus ;  of  those  in  Europe,  Gatalus  the  Sarmatian :  of 
the  autonomous  peoples,  the  Heracleotes,  the  Mesembrians  in 
the  Chersonese,  and  the  Cyzicenes;" 

The  number  and  quality  of  hostages  to  be  given  by 
Phamaces  was  also  specified.  The  armies  of  the  several 
parties  then  marched  away,  and  thus  was  concluded  the  war 
of  Eumenes  and  Ariarathes  against  Phamaces. 

Philip  V.  died  at  AmphipoUs  towards  the  end  of  B.C.  179. 
His  last  days  were  embittered  by  remorse  for  the  death  of  his  son 
Demetrius,  whose  innocence  had  been  demonstrated  to  him.  He 
wished  to  leave  his  crown  to  Antigonus,  Ih^  son  of  Echecrates  and 
nephew  of  Antigonus  Doson,  in  order  to  punish  his  elder  son 
Perseus  for  his  treachery  in  securing  his  brother's  death.  But 
Philip  died  suddenly  before  this  could  be  secured,  and  Perseus 
succeeded  him  without  opposition.    See  Livy,  40,  55-57. 

3.  Having  renewed  the  alliance  with  Rome,  Perseus  im- 
mediately began  intriguing  in  Greece.  He  TheopeninRof 
invited  back  into  Macedonia  absconding  debtors,  tho  reign  of 
condemned  exiles,  and  those  who  had  been  Peraeua. 
compelled  to  leave  their  country  on  charges  of  treason.  He 
caused  notices  to  be  put  up  to  that  effect  at  Delos,  Delphi, 
and  the  temple  of  Athena  at  Iton,^  offering  not  only  indemnity 

'  The  notices  are  put  up  al  Ihe  three  places  visited  yearly  by  gieat  numbera, 
and  by  many  leparale  pilgrims.  It  is  inleresling  10  nclice  the  persistence  in 
a  custom  common  from  the  earliest  times,  at  any  latc  as  far  as  Delos  and 
Delphi  are  concerned.  Iton  was  in  Thess.ily,  and  the  temple  and  oracle  of 
AtbetiA  tbere  was  celebrated  throughout  Greece,  und  was  the  central  place  of 
wonhip  for  the  Tbessalians.  The  (own  stood  tn  a  rich  plain  on  the  river 
Coarius,  and  hence  its  name — sometimes  urillen  Silon — was  connected  by 
■ome  with  viTi^opof,  "  coni-t>earing"  {Steph.  Byz.)  Homer  calls  it /tiTr/pa 
fd^ittr,  "  motber  of  sheep."     Pynhus  hung  up  in  this  temple  tbe  spoils  of 


3SO  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  book 

to  all  who  returned,  but  also  the  restoration  of  the  property 
lost  by  their  exile.  Such  also  as  still  remained  in  Macedonia 
he  released  from  their  debts  to  the  Royal  exchequer,  and  set 
free  those  who  had  been  confined  in  fortresses  upon  charges  of 
treason.  By  these  measures  he  raised  expectations  in  the 
minds  of  many,  and  was  considered  to  be  holding  out  great 
hopes  to  all  the  Greeks.  Nor  were  other  parts  of  his  life 
and  habits  wanting  in  a  certain  ro)ral  magnificence.  His 
outward  appearance  was  striking,  and  he  was  well  endowed 
with  all  the  physical  advantages  requisite  for  a  statesman.  His 
look  and  mien  were  alike  dignified  and  such  as  became  his 
age.  He  had  moreover  avoided  his  father's  weakness  for  wine 
and  women,  and  not  only  drank  moderately  at  dinner  himself, 
but  was  imitated  in  this  respect  by  his  intimates  and  friends. 
Such  was  the  commencement  of  the  reign  of  Perseus.  .  .  . 

When  king  Philip  had  become  powerful  and  had  obtained 
supremacy  over  the  Greeks,  he  showed  the  most 

misfortune"     "'*^'"  disregard  of  faith  and  principle ;  but  when 

the  breeze  of  fortune  again  set  against  him,  his 

moderation  was  as  conspicuous  in  its  turn.     But  after  his  final 

and  complete  defeat,  he  tried  by  every  possible  expedient  to 

consolidate  the  strength  of  his  kingdom. 

4.  After  despatching  the  consuls  Tiberius  and  Claudius 
B,c.  177.    Coss.  against  the  Istri  and  Agrii,^  the  Senate  towards 

C.  Claudius     the  end  of  summer  transacted   business  with 

Sempronius     ^^    ambassadors    that   had   come   from    the 

Gracchus.       Lycians.     They  had  not  arrived  at  Rome  until 

the  Lycians  had  been  completely  conquered, 

L^dTS^s'T   but  they  had  been  despatched  a  considerable 

Rhodes.  See  bk.  time   before.     For  the  people  of  Xanthus   in 

24,  ch.  9.  Lycia,  when  about  to  embark  upon  the  war,  had 
sent  Nicostratus  and  others  to  Achaia  and  Rome  as  ambassa- 
dors :  who  coming  to  Rome  at  that  time  moved  many  of  the 
Senators  to  pity  them,  by  laying  before  them  the  oppressiveness 
of  the  Rhodians  and  their  own  danger;  and  at  length  induced  the 

Antigonus  and  his  Gallic  soldiers  about  B.C.  273.  [Pausan.  i,  13,  2]. 
' '  Itonian  Athena  "  had  temples  in  other  parts  of  Greece  also,  e,g.  in  Boeotia 
[Paus.  91,  34,  \\ 

^  The  war  in  Istria,  and  the  mutiny  of  the  troops  against  the  consul 
Manlius,  are  described  in  Livy,  41,  8-1 1. 


XXV    CHARACTER  *■  FIRST  MEASURES  OF  PERSEUS   351 

Senate  to  send  envoys  to  Rhodes  to  declare  that  "On  inspecting 
the  record  of  the  arrangements  made  by  the  ten  commissioners 
in  Asia,  when  settling  the  dominions  of  Antiochus,  it  appeared 
that  the  Lycians  had  been  given  to  the  Rhodians,  not  as  a 
gift,  but  rather  as  friends  and  allies."  But  many  were  still  dis- 
satisfied with  this  solution  of  the  matter.  For  the  Romans 
seemed  to  wish,  by  thus  pitting  Rhodes  against  Lycia,  to  exhaust 
the  accumulations  and  treasures  of  the  Rhodians,  because  they 
had  heard  of  the  recent  conveyance  of  the  bride  of  Perseus  by 
the  Rhodians,  and  of  their  grand  naval  review.  For  shortly 
before  this  the  Rhodians  had  been  holding,  with  great  splen- 
dour and  elaboration  of  equipment,  a  review  of  all  vessels  be- 
longing to  them ;  the  fact  being  that  a  vast  quantity  of  timber 
for  ship-building  had  been  presented  to  them  by  Perseus.  More- 
over he  had  presented  a  gold  tiara  to  each  Laodice,  dai^hiei 
of  the  rowers  on  the  upper  bench  in  the  ship  of  Sdeueus  IV. 
that  had  brought  him  his  bride  Laodice.' .  .  .      ^''T'  *'■  "■ 

6.  When  the  envoys  from    Rome   reached   Rhodes   and 
announced  the  decrees  of  the  Senate,  there  was 
a  great  excitement  in  the  island,  and  much  con-  ^''""^■"'"' *' 
-  °   ,    ,.  .  ,       ,      ,.  ,.  •   .  Rhodes;  and  a 

fused  discussion  among  the  leadmg  politicians,  fresh  deietmina- 
They  were  much  annoyed  at  the  allegation  that  ■ion  "f  te 
the  Lycians  had  not  been  given  them  as  a  gift  ^fndewnde^^r' 
but  as  allies ;  for  having  just  satisfied  themselves 
that  the  Lycian  war  was  successfully  concluded,  they  saw  the 
commencement  of  fresh  trouble  for  themselves  growing  up. 
For  no  sooner  had  the  Romans  artived  and  made  this 
announcement  to  the  Rhodians,  than  the  Lycians  began  a 
fresh  revolt,  and  showed  a  determination  of  fighting  to  the  last 
extremity  for  autonomy  and  freedom.  However,  after  hearing 
the  Roman  envoys,  the  Rhodians  made  up  their  minds  that  the 
Romans  had  been  deceived  by  the  Lycians,  and  forthwith 
appointed  Lycophron  to  lead  an  embassy  to  offer  an  explana- 
tion to  the  Senate.  And  the  state  of  affairs  was  such  that 
there  was  momentary  expectation  of  a  fresh  rising  of  the 
Lycians.  .  .  . 

'  Besides  tbii  connexion  with  Sdeueus  of  Syria,  sure  to  be  oflen^ve  10 
Rome,  Peneiu  gave  1  sister  to  Prusbs,  another  enemy  of  Rome  and  Eumenes. 
Li»y.  4a,  in. 


352 


THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBICS 


Rhcxlian  question 
deferred. 


6.  When  the  Rhodian  envoys  arrived  in  Rome  the  Senate^ 
after    listening   to  their  address,   deferred  its 
answer.       Meanwhile   the    Daidanian    envoys 
came  with  reports   as  to  the  number  of  the 
Bastamae,  the  size  of  their  men,  and  their  courage  in  the  field. 

lliey  gave  information  also  of  the  treacherous 
practices  of  Perseus  and  the  Gauls,  and  said 
that  they  were  more  afraid  of  him  than  ci  the 
Bastamae,  and  therefore  begged  the  help  of  the 
Romans.  The  report  of  the  Dardani  being 
supported  by  that  of  the  Thessalian  envoys  who  arrived  at  that 
time,  and  who  also  begged  for  help,  the  Senators  determined 
to  send  some  commissioners  to  see  with  their  own  eyes  the 
truth  of  these  reports;  and  they  accordingly  at  once  appointed 
and  despatched  Aulus  Postumius,  accompanied  by  some 
young  men.  .  . 


Reports  of  the 
intrigues  of 
P<Tseus.     See 
Livy,  41,  19, 
B.C.  176-175. 


BOOK   XXVI 

Selbucus  Philopator,  whom  we  last  heard  of  as  king  of  Syria,  was 
assassioiited  by  one  of  his  nobles — Ueliodorus— in  the  twelfth  year  of  his 
reign.  Anliochua  his  younger  brother  bad  been  a  hostage  at  Kome,  and 
being,  according  to  agreement,  exchanged  in  b,c.  175  for  Philopalor's  son 
Demetrius,  he  was  reluming  to  Syria.  At  Athens,  on  his  journey  home,  he 
beard  of  the  death  of  Seleucus,  and  the  allempt  of  Hcliodorus  to  usurp  the 
kingdom.  By  the  help  of  Eumenes  Heliodorus  was  expelled  and  Aniiochus 
installed,  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  people,  who  gave  him  at  first  the  surname 
of  Epiphanes.  He  is  the  Antiochus  Epiphanes  whose  cruelties  are  recorded 
in  the  books  of  the  Maccabees.  He  died  mad  at  Tabae  in  Persia,  B.C.  164. 
Hee  31,  II.  For  the  following  entracl  preserved  by  Athenaeus,  sec  the 
translation  of  Livy,  4 1,  19. 

1.  Antiochus  EpIphanes,  nicknamed  from  his  actions 
Epitnanes  (the  Madman),  would  sometimes  Antiochus 
steal  from  the  court,  avoiding  his  attendants,  Epiphanes,  b.c. 
and  appear  roaming  wildly  about  in  any  '75->64. 
chance  part  of  the  city  with  one  or  two  companions.  His 
favourite  place  to  be  found  was  the  shops  of  the  silver- 
smiths or  goldsmiths,  chatting  and  discussing  questions  of  art 
with  the  workers  in  relief  and  other  artists ;  at  another  time  he 
would  join  groups  of  the  people  of  the  town  and  converse  with 
any  one  he  came  across,  and  would  drink  with  foreign  visitors 
of  the  humblest  description.  Whenever  he  found  any  young 
men  carousing  together  he  would  come  to  the  place  without 
giving  notice,  with  fife  and  band,  like  a  rout  of  revellers,  and 
oflen  by  his  unexpected  appearance  cause  the  guests  to  rise  and 
run  away.  He  would  often  also  lay  aside  his  royal  robes,  and, 
putting  on  a  tebenna,^  go  round  the  market-place  as  though 
a  candidate  for  office,  shaking  hands  and  embracing  various 

'  This  word,  ot  unknown  origin,  seems  to  be  used  here  for  the  (ogn,  or 
lome  dreu  equivalent  to  i(.     See  ro,  4, 

VOL.  II  3  A 


354  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS         book  xxvi 

people  whom  he  intreated  to  vote  for  him,  sometime  as  aedile, 
and  sometimes  as  tribune.  And  when  he  got  the  office  and 
took  his  seat  on  an  ivory  cunile  chair,  after  the  fashion  of  the 
Romans,  he  heard  law  cases  which  came  on  in  the  agora,  and 
decided  them  with  the  utmost  seriousness  and  attention.  This 
conduct  was  very  embarrassing  to  respectable  people,  some  of 
whom  regarded  him  as  a  good  natured  easy-going  man,  and  others 
as  a  madman.  In  regard  to  making  presents,  too,  his  behaviour 
was  on  a  par  with  this.  Some  he  presented  with  dice  made 
of  gazelle  horn,  some  with  dates,  others  with  gold  There 
were  even  instances  of  his  making  unexpected  presents  to 
men  whom  he  met  casually,  and  whom  he  had  never  seen 
before.  In  regard  to  public  sacrifices  and  the  honours  paid  to 
the  gods,  he  surpassed  all  his  predecessors  on  the  throne ;  as 
witness  the  Olympieium  at  Athens  and  the  statues  placed 
round  the  altar  at  Delos.  He  used  also  to  bathe  in  the 
public  baths,  when  they  were  full  of  the  townspeople,  p>ots  of 
the  most  expensive  unguents  being  brought  in  for  him ;  and  on 
one  occasion  on  some  one  saying,  "  Lucky  fellows  you  kings, 
to  use  such  things  and  smell  so  sweet ! ''  without  saying  a 
word  to  the  man,  he  waited  till  he  was  bathing  the  next  day, 
and  then  coming  into  the  bath  caused  a  pot  of  the  largest 
size  and  of  the  most  costly  kind  of  unguent  called  stact}  to  be 
poured  over  his  head,  so  that  there  was  a  general  rush  of  the 
bathers  to  roll  themselves  in  it ;  and  when  they  all  tumbled 
down,  the  king  himself  among  them,  from  its  stickiness,  there 
was  loud  laughter.  .  .  . 


BOOK    XXVII 

TTie  foenis  of  the  yean  B.C.  174,  173,  172,  tiihifh  gradually  led  up  ta 
the  vtar  vrilh  Perseut,  to  be  described  in  the  taienty-ieveitth  bosk,  viere  briery 
tAeie  :~~ 

Id  B.C.  174  Perseus  Toiced  the  Dolopes,  who  had  appealed  against  him 
to  Rome,  (o  submit  Id  his  authority.  ATler  Ihls  successful  expedllion  he 
inarched  through  Central  and  Northern  Greece,  visiting  Delphi,  where  he 
stayed  three  days,  Phlhiolid  Achaia,  and  Thessaly,  He  carefully  aU- 
slained  from  inRicling  any  dam^e  in  the  districts  through  which  he 
passed,  and  tried  to  gain  the  conRdcnce  of  the  various  slates.  In  the 
same  year  he  made  friendly  advances  to  the  Achaeans,  who  had  forbidden 
any  Lacedaemaniac  ID  enter  their  leriitoiy,  by  oifering  to  restore  their 
fugitive  staves.  But  in  spite  of  the  exertions  of  Xenarchus  the  Strategus, 
the  Achaeans  refuse  to  make  any  change  (Livy,  41,  12-24), 

The  same  year  saw  also  commotions  in  Aelolia,  which  were  settled  by 
five  Rotnan  commissioners  :  and  in  Crete,  on  the  old  score  of  the  status 
of  the  Lycians.      Q,  Mbucius  was  sent  to  settle  this  also  (Livy,  41,  2$). 

In  B.C.  173  Petseus  entered  on  still  more  active  intrigues  in  Greece, 
and  in  spite  of  the  wildest  scandals  that  were  afloat  as  to  his  tyranny,  he 
gained  a  powerful  hold  in  Aetolia,  Thessaly,  and  Perrhaebia.  The  Senate 
accordingly  sent  Marcellus  to  Aetolia  and  Achaia,  and  App.  Claudius  to 
Thessaly,  to  inquire  into  the  facts ;  and  a  commission  of  five  into  Mace- 
donia, with  directions  to  proceed  afterwards  lo  Alexandria  (Livy,  42,  5,  6). 

In  B.C.  173  king  Eumenes  visited  Rome  and  urged  the  Senate  to  lake 
nteasures  in  time  to  counteract  the  attempts  of  Perseus ;  warning  them  thai 
he  had  already  obtained  strong  hold  upon  (he  Boeotians  and  Actolians, 
and  had  an  inexhaustible  recruiting  ground  in  Thrace.  That  everywhere 
he  had  secured  the  death  or  exile  of  the  pailisana  of  Rome,  and  was  over- 
running in  arms  Thessaly  and  Penhoebia  (Livy,  42,  11-13). 

The  Senate,  already  inclined  to  listen  to  these  represenlalions,  was 
still  more  inclined  to  do  so  by  the  defiant  tone  of  Ilarpatus,  the  repre- 
sentative of  king  Perseus ;  by  the  attempted  assassination  of  Eumenes  by 

port  from  Greece  from  C,  Valerius  confirming  the  speech  of  Eumenes  ;  and 
lastly  by  the  confession  of  one  L.  Rammius  of  Brundisium,  that  he  had  been 
leqneiled  to  poison  certain  Roman  envoys  who  were  accustomed  to  slay 
at  bis  house  on  their  journeys  10  and  from  Macedonia  and  Greece  (Livy, 
4a.  li-17J. 


356  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  book 

War  was  now  determined  on  for  the  next  year,  and  the  praetor  ordered 
to  enroll  troops.  And  Eumenes  also,  now  recovered  from  the  wounds  of 
the  assassins,  made  preparations  to  join  in  the  struggle  (Livy,  42,  18-27). 

In  B.C.  171,  fresh  legions  having  been  enrolled,  and  an  army  of  sixteen 
thousand  infantry  and  eight  hundred  cavalry  ordered  to  Macedonia,  envoys 
appeared  from  Perseus  demanding  the  reason.  The  Senate  would  not  allow 
them  to  enter  the  Pomoerium,  but  received  them  in  the  temple  of  Bellona  : 
and  after  listening  to  a  report  from  Sp.  Ca\iUus  that  Perseus  had,  among 
other  acts  of  hostility,  taken  cities  inThessaly  and  entered  Perrhaebia  in  arms, 
the  Senate  answered  the  Macedonian  envoys  that  any  complaint  they  had  to 
make  must  be  made  to  the  consul,  P.  Licinius,  who  would  presently  be  in 
Macedonia,  but  that  they  must  not  come  into  Italy  again  (Livy,  42,  36). 

A  few  da}'s  afterwards  five  commissioners  were  sent  into  Greece,  who 
distributed  the  districts  to  be  visited  among  themselves  :  Servius  and 
Publius  Lentulus  and  Lucius  Dccimius  were  to  go  to  Cephallenia,  the 
Peloponncse,  and  the  west  coast  generally ;  Q.  Marcius  and  Aulus  Atilius 
to  Epirus,  Aetolia,  Thessaly,  and  thence  to  Boeotia  and  Euboea,  where  they 
were  to  meet  the  Lentuli.  Meanwhile  a  letter  from  Perseus,  demanding  the 
cause  of  their  coming  and  of  the  presence  of  troops  in  Macedonia,  was  re- 
ceived and  left  unanswered.  Aflcr  visiting  the  districts  assigned  to  them, 
in  the  course  of  doing  which  Marcius  and  Atilius  had  met  Perseus  on  the 
river  Peneus,  and  granted  him  a  truce  to  enable  him  to  send  envoys  to 
Rome  (Marcius  knowing  well  that  the  Romans  were  not  yet  fully  prepared 
for  war^),  the  commissioners  reached  their  destination  at  Chalcis,  where  the 
earlier  events  narrated  in  the  following  extracts  occurred  (Livy,  42,  36-43). 

THE  WAR  WITH  PERSEUS 

1.  At  this  time  Lases  and   Callias   arrived   at  the  head   of 

B.C.  171.   Coss.  ^^  embassy  from  the  Thespians,  and  Ismenias* 

p.  Licinius  Crassus  from  Neon.     Lases  and  his  colleagues  offered 

c.  Cassius       ^Q  pm  jjjgjj.  ^.jjy  wholly  into  the  hands  of  the 

ngmus.        Romans ;  Ismenias  proposed  to  submit  all  the 

^  Marcius  on  his  reliuii  to  Rome  gloried  in  having  thus  deceived  the  king 
and  gained  time  for  preparations  at  Rome,  but  his  action  was  repudiated  by 
the  Senate.     Livy,  42,  47. 

*  Ismenias  had  just  been  elected  Strategus  of  Boeotia  ;  but  the  parly  who 
had  supported  a  rival  candidate  had  in  revenge  obtained  a  decree  of  the 
league  banishing  the  Boeotarchs  from  all  the  Boeotian  cities.  They  had, 
however  been  received  at  Thcspiae,  whence  they  were  recalled  to  Thebes  and 
reinstated  by  a  reaction  in  popular  feeling.  Then  they  obtained  another  decree 
banisliing  the  twelve  men  who,  though  not  in  office,  had  convened  the  league 
assembly  ;  and  Ismenias  as  Strategus  sentenced  them  to  the  loss  of  all  rights 
in  their  absence.  These  are  the  "exiles"  here  meant  (Livy,  43,  43).  Who 
Neon  was  is  not  certain  ;  but  we  find  in  the  next  chapter  that  he  liad  been 
a  leader  in  the  Macedonising  party  at  Thebes,  i)erhaps  a  son  of  Brachylles, 
whose  father's  name  was  Neon  (sec  20,  5).  He  was  captured  in  B.c.  167 
and  put  to  death  by  the  Romans  (Livy,  45,  31). 


xxvii  AFFAIRS  IN  BOEOTTA  357 

cities  of  fioeotia  as  one  nation  to  the  discretion  of  the  commis- 
sioners. But  this  latter  proposal  was  diametri- 
cally opposed  to  the  policy  of  Marcius  and  his  ^l^i^^^^  ^^ 
colleagues.  What  suited  that  policy  best  was  chaicis :  am- 
to  split  up  Boeotia  into  separate  cities ;  and  bassadors  from 
they  therefore  received  Loses  and  his  party,  as  NmrTo^^ieod 
well  as  the  envoys  from  Chaeronea  and  Lebadea, 
and  all  who  came  from  single  cities,  with  great  favour  and  bvish 
courtesyj  but  treated  Ismenias  with  ostentatious  neglect  and 
coldness.  Some  of  the  exiles^  also  attacked  Ismenias  and  were 
very  near  stoning  him  to  death,  and  would  have  done  so  if  he 
had  not  saved  himself  by  taking  refuge  through  the  door*  of  the 
chamber  where  the  commissioners  were  sitting.  At  the  same 
period  there  were  disturbances  and  party  con-  xhebes, 
tests  at  Thebes.  One  party  were  for  commit- 
ting the  town  unconditionally  to  Rome ;  but  the  Coroneans 
and  Haliartians  flocked  to  Thebes  and  vehemently  maintained 
that  they  ought  to  m^ntain  the  alliance  with  Perseus.  For  a 
time  neither  of  the  two  parties  showed  any  disposition  to  give 
in  to  each  other ;  but  when  Olympichus  of  Coronea  set  the 
example  of  changing  sides  and  asserting  that  they  ought  to 
cleave  to  the  Romans,  a  great  change  and  revolution  came 
over  the  feelings  of  the  populace.  First,  they  compelled 
Dicetas  to  go  on  an  embassy  to  Marcius  and  the  other  com- 
missioners to  excuse  them  for  their  alliance  with  Perseus.  Next, 
they  expelled  Neon  and  Hippias,  crowding  to  their  houses,  and 
bidding  them  go  and  make  their  own  defence  for  the  terms  that 
they  had  made  ;  for  they  were  the  men  who  had  negotiated  the 
alliance.  When  these  men  had  left  the  town,  the  people  imme- 
diately collected  into  the  assembly  and  lirst  voted  honours  and 
gifts  to  the  Romans,  and  then  ordered  the  magistrates  to  push 
on  the  alliance.  Last  of  all  they  appointed  ambassadors  to 
hand  over  the  city  to  the  Romans  and  to  restore  their  exiles. 

'  See  note  3,  page  356. 

*  t4  JHflnpo,  Livy  (41,  44)  says  in  tribunal  legalorum,  and  Cas-mbon  con- 
tents himseir  wilh  the  same  word.  Schweighacuser  Imnslalcs  Afodium.  as 
if  a  "raised  plaifomi  ■'  on  which  the  commissioncra  sat  was  meant.  I  think 
it  ii  used  in  the  natural  sense  of  a  "  door"  leading  into  the  hall  in  which  ihey 
wereiltting.  and  into  which  Ismenias  fled  for  refuge.  Liiy  used  frijunii/  ftom 
the  ideu  <i  his  >£c  as  to  the  constraction  of  such  a  liuilding. 


3S8  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIVS  boox 

2.  Whilst  these  things  were  being  accomplished  at  Thebes, 
The  cause  of  die  '^^  exiles  in  Chalcis  appointed  Pompides  to 
exiles'  iriumph  state  their  grievances  against  Ismenias,  Neon, 

at  Chalcis.  g^^j  Djcetas.  The  bad  policy  of  these  men 
being  manifest,  and  the  Romans  lending  their  support  to  the 
exiles,  Hippias  and  his  party  were  rendered  so  odious  that 
thejr  were  in  danger  of  falling  victims  to  the  fury  of  the  popu- 
lace, until  the  Romans,  by  checking  the  assaults  of  the  roob, 
secured  them  a  certain  degree  of  safely. 

When  the  Theban  envoys  arrived,  bringing  with  them  to 
Dissoiuiion  of   ^^  Commissioners  the  decrees  and  honours  I 

the  Bocoiian  have  mentioned,  a  rapid  change  passed  over 
league,  B.C.  171.  ^^  f^^g  ^f  things  in  each  of  the  towns,  for 
they  were  separated  by  a  very  narrow  interval  from  each  other. 
The  commissioners  with  Marcius  received  the  Theban  en- 
voys, complimented  their  town  and  counselled  them  to  restore 
the  exiles,  and  bade  the  several  towns  send  embassies  to  Rome 
submitting  themselves  individually  and  unreservedly  to  the 
protection  of  the  Romans,  Their  policy,  therefore,  of  splitting 
up  the  league  of  the  Boeotian  towns,  and  of  destroying  the 
popularity  of  the  Macedonian  royal  house  with  the  Boeotian 
populace  having  thus  completely  succeeded,  the  commissioners 
sent  for  Servius  Lcntulus  from  Argos,  and  leaving  him  in 
charge  at  Chalcis  went  themselves  to  the  Peloponnese ;  while 
Neon  a  few  days  afterwards  retired  to  Macedonia ;  and 
Ismenias  and  Dicetas,  being  thrown  at  once  into  prison, 
shortly  afterwards  put  an  end  to  their  lives.  Thus  it  came 
about  that  the  Boeotians,  who  had  for  a  long  period  of 
years,  and  through  many  strange  vicissitudes,  maintained  a 
national  league,  by  now  rashly  and  inconsiderately  adopting 
the  cause  of  Perseus,  and  giving  way  to  an  outburst  of  un- 
reasoning excitement,  were  entirely  disintegrated  and  split  up 
into  separate  cities 

When  Aulus  and  Marcius  arrived  at  Argos,  after  communi- 
Tho  Comniis-    catioti  "ith  the  council  of  the  Achaean  league, 

sioncrs  in  the    they  called  upon  Archon  the  Strategus  to  de- 

Pcloponnese.  jpatch  a  thousand  men  to  Chalcis,  to  garrison 
the  town  until  the  arrival  of  the  Romans ;  an  order  which 
Archon  readily  obeyed.     Having  thus  settled  affairs  in  Greece 


JCrvii    ROMAf/S  Sf  PERSEUS  TRY  TO  SECURE  GREECE   359 

during  the  winter,  and  met  Publius  Lentulus  and  his  two 
colleagues,  the  commissioners  sailed  back  to  Rome.  .  .  . 

S.  Meanwhile   Tiberius    Claudius   and   Aulas  PosCumius 
had  been  engaged  on  a  visitation  of  the  islands    ^1,^  Rhoditms 
and  Greek  cities  in  Asia,  and  had  spent  the      prepare  lo 
lon(;cst  time  in  Rhodes :  though  the  Rhodians      co-operate 
.  S.  .  .■        j-j       .  ■  ■  ■        r  wi"i  Rome, 

at  that  time  did  not  require  any  supervision,  for 

the  prytanis  that  year  was  Agesilochus,  a  man  of  high  rank, 
who  had  once  been  on  an  embassy  to  Rome,  Even  before 
the  legates  came,  as  soon  as  it  became  clear  that  the  Romans 
intended  to  go  to  war  with  Perseus  he  had  urged  his  people 
to  throw  in  their  fortunes  with  those  of  Rome ;  and,  among 
other  things,  had  counselled  them  to  repair  forty  ships,  in  order 
that,  if  any  occasion  for  using  them  should  arise,  it  should  not 
find  them  still  in  the  midst  of  preparations,  but  ready  to 
answer  to  the  call  and  to  carry  out  their  resolve  at  once.  By 
stating  these  fects  to  the  Roman  envoys,  and  showing  them 
the  preparations  visibly  progressing,  he  let  them  return  to 
Rome  in  a  high  state  of  satisfaction  with  Rhodes.  .  .  . 

4.  After  the  conferences  had  been  held  between  the  Roman 
envoys  and   the   Greeks,   Perseus   drew  up  a  Pereeus  sends  a 
despatch  containing  a  statement  of  his  case,  and  circular  despatch 
the  arguments  employed  on  either  side ;  partly     '"  J?"*  Gm-k 
from  an  idea  that  he  would  thus  be  shown  to  ^ 

have  the  superiority  of  right  on  his  side,  and  partly  because  he 
wished  to  test  the  feelings  of  the  several  states.  Copies  of 
this  despatch  he  sent  to  the  other  slates  by  his 
ordinary  letter-carriers  ;  but  to  Rhodes  he  sent  ^R^^'fa^"" 
also  Antenor  and  Philip  as  ambassadors,  who,  on 
their  arrival  in  the  island,  handed  over  the  document  to  the 
magistrates,  and  a  few  days  afterwards  entered  the  Council 
chamber  and  urged  the  Rhodians  "To  remain  neutral  for  the 
present  andwatch  what  happened;  and,  if  the  Romans  attacked 
Perseus  in  violation  of  the  treaty,  to  endeavour  to  mediate. 
For  this  was  the  interest  of  all,  and  pre-eminently  of  the 
Rhodians,  who  more  than  most  peoples  desired  equality  and 
freedom  of  speech,  and  were  ever  the  protectors,  not  only  of 
their  own  liberty,  but  of  that  of  the  rest  of  Greece  also  ;  and 
therefore  ought  to  be  proportionally  careful  to  provide  and 


36o  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  book 

guard  against  a  policy  of  an  opposite  tendency."  These  and 
similar  arguments  of  the  envoys  found  favour  with  the  Rhodian 
people.  But,  as  they  were  already  pledged  to  an  attitude  of 
friendship  to  Rome,  the  influence  of  the  upper  classes  so  far 
prevailed  that,  though  a  friendly  reception  was  given  to  the 
Macedonian  envoys,  they  demanded  in  their  formal  answer 
that  Perseus  should  not  ask  them  to  take  any  measure  which 
would  involve  the  appearance  of  hostility  to  Rome.  Antenor 
and  his  colleagues  would  not  accept  this  reply,  but  with  thanks 
for  the  kindness  of  their  general  reception,  sailed  back  to 
Macedonia.  .  .  . 

6.  Being  informed  that  some  of  the  cities  of  Boeotia  re- 
mained faithful  to  him,  Perseus  sent  Alexander 
^^^^^^^^^"'on   a   mission   to   them.      On   his   arrival   in 

Boeotia,  Alexander  was  obliged  to  abstain  from 

visiting   any   of  the   cities   except   Coronea,    Thisbae,^   and 

Haliartus,  finding  that  they  offered  him  no  facilities  for  securing 

close  relations.     But  he  entered  those  three  towns  and  exhorted 

their  inhabitants  to  cling  to  their  loyalty  to  the  Macedonians. 

They  received  his  words  with  enthusiasm,  and  voted  to  send 

ambassadors  to  Macedonia.     Alexander  accordingly  returned 

to  the  king  and  reported  the  state  of  things  in  Boeotia.     A 

short  time  afterwards  the  ambassadors  arrived,  desiring  the 

king  to  send  aid  to  the  cities  which  favoured  the  Macedonian 

cause ;  for  the  Thebans  were  oppressing  them  severely,  because 

Truce  made  with  ^^1  would  not  agree  with  them  and  side  with 

Q.  Marcius.     Rome.     But  Perseus  replied  that  he  was  pre- 

See  Li\7,  42,  43,  ^^luded  by  the  truce  from  sending  any  aid  to  any 

'  ■  '^  *       one;  but  he  begged  them  to  resist  the  Thebans 

to  the  best  of  their  power,  and  yet  not  to  go  to  war  with  the 

Romans,  but  to  remain  neutral.  .  .  . 

6.  When  the  report  of  the  commissioners  from  Asia  con- 
War  is  decided  cerning  Rhodes  and  the  other  states  had  been 
uponatthecxpira-made  at  Rome,  the  Senate  called  in  theambas- 
tion  of  the  truce,  sadors  of  Perseus,  Solon  and^Hippias  :  who  en- 
deavoured to  argue  the  whole  case  and  to  deprecate  the  anger 

^  The  text  has  GjJ^ay,  which  is  inconsistent  with  what  follows  as  to  the 
Thebans.  An  inscription  found  on  the  site  of  Thisbae  supplies  the  correction 
of  an  error  as  old  as  Livy  (42,  46,  47).     See  Hicks's,  G,  /.  p.  330. 


xxvii  THB  BOEOTIANS  AND  RHODIANS  361 

of  the  Senate  ;  and  particularly  to  defend  their  master  on  the 
subject  of  the  attempt  upon  the  life  of  Eumenes.      When 

they  had  finished  all  they  had  to  ui^e,  '^^S^"^*^' Atiemniedassassi- 
which  had  all  the  while  been  resolved  on  war,  nation  of  Eumenes 
bade  them  depart  forthwith  from  Rome ;  and      ai  Delphi. 
ordered  all  other  Macedonians  also  that  hap-    ^'^J'^^ija*' 
pened  to  be  staying  in  the  country  to  quit  Italy 
within  thirty  days.     The  Senate  then  called  upon  the  Consuls 
to  act  at  once  and  see  that  they  moved  in  good  time,  .  .  . 
7.  Caius  Lucretius '  being  at  anchor  off  Cephallenia,  wiote 

a  letter  to  the  Rhodians,  requesting  them  to„,. .     .„.    ._ 
,  ,  ,  .  ,  J     .      .  Politics  at  Rhodes, 

despatch  some  ships,  and  entrusted  the  letter 
to  a  certain  trainer  named  Socrates.     This  letter  arrived  at 
Rhodes  in  the  second  six  months  of  the  Prytany  of  Stratocles. 
When   the   question   came  on  for  discussion, 
Agathagetus,     Rhodophon,     Astymedes,     and  ""*  ^^""'^"^ 
many  others   were  for  sending  the  ships  and 
taking  part  in  the  war  from  the  first,  without 
any  further  pretence ;  but  Deinon  and  Polyaratus,  "^^  ".^°"'"" 
though  really  displeased  at  the  favour  already 
shown  to  Rome,  now  for  the  present  used  the  case  of  Eumenes 
as  their  pretext,  and  began  by  that  means  to  alienate  the  feelings 
of  the  populace.     There  had  in  fact  been  a  long  standing  feeling 
of  suspicion  and  dislike  in  the  minds  of  the  Rhodians  against 
Eumenes,  dating  from  the  time  of  his  war  with  Fharnaces;  when, 
Upon    king  Eumenes  blockading  the  entrance 
of  the  Hellespont  to  prevent  ships  sailing  into     ^^^^^ 
the  Pontus,  the  Rhodians  had  interfered  with 
his  design  and  thwarted  him.     This  ill-feeling  had  again  been 
recently  exasperated  during  the  Lycian  war  on  the  question  of 
certain  forts,  and  a  strip  of  territory  on  the  frontier  of  the 
Rhodian   Peraea,   which   was    being  damaged   by   some   of 
Eumenes's  subjects.      These  incidents   taken  together  made 
the  Rhodians  ready  to  listen  to  anything  against  the  king. 
Seizing  on  this  pretext,  the  patty  of  Deinon   tried  to  dis- 
credit the  despatch,  asserting  that  it  did  not  come  from  the 

I  Gains  Lucretius  had  seen  naval  service  as  duumvir  navalis  on  the  coast 
of  Ligoria  in  B.C.  181.  Livy,  40,  a6.  He  was  now  (B.C.  171)  Praelor,  his 
fmriiuia  tieiDg  the  fleet,  and  commanded  40  quin<)uerenics.     id,  43.  48. 


362  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  book 

Romans  but  from  Eumenes,  who  wished  to  involve  them 
on  any  possible  pretext  in-  a  war,  and  bring  expense  and 
perfectly  unnecessary  suffering  upon  the  people.  In  support 
of  their  contention  they  put  forward  the  fact  that  the  man  who 
brought  the  letter  was  some  obscure  trainer  or  another ;  and 
asserted  that  the  Romans  were  not  accustomed  to  employ  such 
messengers,  but  were  rather  inclined  to  act  with  unnecessary 
care  and  dignity  in  the  despatch  of  such  missives.  When 
they  said  this  they  were  perfectly  aware  that  the  letter  had 
really  been  written  by  Lucretius  :  their  object  was  to  persuade 
the  Rhodian  people  to  do  nothing  for  the  Romans  readily,  but 
rather  to  perpetually  make  difficulties,  and  thus  give  occasions 
for  offence  and  displeasure  to  crop  up  betw^een  the  two  nations. 
For  their  deliberate  purpose  was  to  alienate  Rhodes  from  the 
Roman  friendship,  and  to  join  it  to  that  of  Perseus,  by  every 
means  in  their  power.  Their  motives  for  thus  clinging  to 
Perseus  were  that  Polyaratus,  who  was  ostentatious  and  vain, 
had  become  heavily  in  debt;  and  that  Deinon,  who  was 
avaricious  and  unscrupulous,  had  from  the  first  relied  on 
increasing  his  wealth  by  getting  presents  from  princes  and 
kings.  These  speeches  having  been  delivered,  the  Prytanis 
Stratocles  rose,  and,  after  inveighing  at  some  length  against 
Perseus,  and  speaking  with  equal  warmth  in  praise  of  the 
Romans,  induced  the  people  to  confirm  the  decree  for  the 
despatch  of  the  ships.  Forthwith  six  quadriremes  were  pre- 
pared, five  of  which  were  sent  to  Chalcis  under  the  command 
of  Timagoras,  and  the  other  under  the  command  of  another 
Timagoras  to  Tenedos.  This  latter  commander  fell  in  at 
Tenedos  with  Diophanes,  who  had  been  despatched  by 
Perseus  to  Antiochus,  and  captured  both  him  and  his  crew. 
All  such  allies  as  arrived  with  offers  of  help  by  sea  Lucretius 
thanked  warmly,  but  excused  from  taking  part  in  this  service, 
observing  that  the  Romans  had  no  need  of  naval  support.  .  .  . 

Perseus  now  collected  a  large  army  at  Citium^  thirty -nine 
thousand  foot  and  four  thousand  horse ^  and  advanced  through  the 
north  of  Thessaly  taking  many  towns ^  and  finally  taking  up 
his  quarters  at  Sicyrium^  at  the  foot  of  Mount  Ossa,  The  Roman 
consul^  P,  Liciniusy  marched  from  the  south-west  through  Gomphiy 


XKVii  IVA/!  WITH  PERSEUS  BEGUN  363 

and  thence  to  Larisa,  where  he  crossed  the  river  Peneus,  After 
some  cavalry  skirmishes,  which  u-ere  generally  favourable  to  the 
king,  Perseus  advanced  nearer  to  the  Roman  camp,  and  a  more 
important  battle  was  fought,  in  which  the  king  again  scored  a  con- 
siderable success  with  his  cavalry  and  light-armed  troops.  The 
Romans  lost  two  hundred  cavalry  killed  and  as  many  prisoners 
and  tivo  thousand  infantry,  while  Perseus  only  had  twenty  cavalry 
and  forty  infantry  killed.  He  did  not,  however,  follow  up  the 
victory  sufficiently  to  inflict  a  crushing  blo^v  upon  tlie  Roman 
army  ;  and  though  the  Consul  withdrew  to  the  south  of  the  Pencus, 
after  some  days'  reflection  the  king  made  proposals  of  peace.  See 
Lhy,  42,  51-62.     B.C  171  {summer). 

8.  After    the    Macedonian    victory    Perseus    summoned 

his   Council,   when   some  of  his   friends   ex- ...     . 

,  '  .   .  ,        ,  ,  ,         After  bealing  Ihe 

pressed  an  Opinion  that  he  ought  to  send  ^n  Roman  cavaiiy  on 
embassy  to  the  Roman  general,  to  signify  his  the  Peneus,  and 
readiness  even  now  to  pay  the   Romans  the  obligmg  Licimus 

r.  ■!_    >  L'    r  .i_       L    J  ,-  1      W  rclira  south  of 

same  amount  of  tribute  as  his  father  had  forraerly  ^he  river,  Perseus 
undertaken  to  pay  when  beaten  in  war,  and  to  endeavours  to 
evacuate  the  same  places.  "For  if,"  they  argued,  ""^'  tmns. 
"  the  Romans  accept  the  terms  the  war  will  be  ended  in  a 
manner  honourable  to  the  king  after  his  victory  in  the  field ; 
and  the  Romans,  after  this  taste  of  Macedonian  valour,  will  be 
much  more  careful  in  the  future  not  to  impose  an  unjust  or 
harsh  burden  upon  the  Macedonians.  And  if,  on  the  other 
hand,  in  spite  of  the  past,  they  prove  obstinate  and  refuse  to 
accept  them,  the  anger  of  heaven  will  with  justice  fall  on  them  ; 
while*  the  king  by  his  moderation  will  gain  the  support  of 
Gods  and  men  alike."  The  majority  of  his  friends  held  this 
view,  and  Perseus  expressing  his  assent  to  il,  Pantauchus,  son 
of  Balacrus,  and  Midon  of  fieroea,  were  forthwith  sent  as 
ambassadors  to  Ltcinius.  On  their  arrival, 
Licinius  summoned  his  Council,  and  the  ambas-  i^,ora™c  "^ 
sadors  having  stated  their  proposals  in  accord- 
ance with  their  instructions,  Pantauchus  and  his  colleague 
were  requested  to  withdraw,  and  they  deliberated  on  the  pro- 
position thus  made  to  them.  They  decided  unanimously  to 
return  as  stern  an  answer  as  possible.     For  this  is  a  peculiarity 


364  77/5  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  book 

of  the  Romans,  which  they  have  inherited  from  their  ancestors, 
and  are  continually  displaying, — to  show  themselves  most 
peremptory  and  imperious  in  the  presence  of  defeat,  and  most 
moderate  when  successful :  a  very  noble  peculiarity,  as  ever)' 
one  will  acknowledge ;  but  whether  it  be  feasible  under  certain 
circumstances  may  be  doubted.  However  that  may  be,  on  the 
present  occasion  they  made  answer  that  Perseus  must  submit 
without  reserve  himself,  and  give  the  Senate  full  power  to  take 
whatever  measures  it  might  think  good  concerning  Macedonia 
and  all  in  it  On  this  being  communicated  to  Pantauchus  and 
Midon,  they  returned  and  informed  Perseus  and  his  friends ; 
some  of  whom  were  roused  to  anger  at  this  astonishing  display 
of  haughtiness,  and  advised  Perseus  to  send  no  more  embassies 
or  messages  about  anything  whatever.  Perseus,  however, 
was  not  the  man  to  take  such  a  line.  He  sent  again  and 
again  to  Licinius,  with  continually  enhanced  offers,  and  promising 
a  larger  and  larger  sum  of  money.  But  as  nothing  that  he 
could  do  had  any  effect,  and  as  his  friends  found  fault  with 
him,  and  told  him  that,  though  he  had  won  a  victory,  he  was 

acting  like  one  who  had  been  defeated  and  lost 

^^Tc^Tum™'^''^"'  ^^  w^  ^^  ^^'^g*^  compelled  to  renounce  the 

sending  of  embassies,  and  remove  his  camp  back 
to  Sicyrium.     Such  was  the  position  of  the  campaign.  .  .  . 

9.  When  the  report  of  the  favourable  result  for  Perseus  of 

The  effect  of  the  ^he  cavalry  engagement,  and  of  the  victory  of 

success  of  Per-  the  Macedonians,  spread  through  Greece,  the 

seus  upon  the    inclination  of  the   populace  to  the  cause  of 

Perseus  blazed  out  like  a  fire,  most  of  them 

having  up  to  that  time  concealed  their  real  feelings.     Their 

conduct,  to  ray  mind,  was  like  what  one  sees  at  gymnastic 

contests.      When  some  obscure  and  far  inferior  combatant 

descends  into  the  arena  with  a  famous  champion  reputed  to 

be  invincible,  the  spectators  immediately  bestow  their  favour 

upon  the  weaker  of  the  two,  and  try  to  keep  up  his  spirits  by 

applause,  and  eagerly  second  his  efforts  by  their  enthusiasm. 

And  if  he  succeeds  so  far  as  even  to  touch  the  face  of  his 

opponent,  and  make  a  mark  to  prove  the  blow,  the  whole  of 

the  spectators  again  show  themselves  on  his  side.     Sometimes 

they  even  jeer  at  his  antagonist :  not  because  they  dislike  or 


xxvn      MORAL  EFFECT  OF  PEXSEUS's  SUCCESSES         365 

UDdervalue  him,  but  because  their  sympathies  are  roused  by  the 
unexpected,  and  they  are  naturally  inclined  to  take  the  weaker 
side.  But  if  any  one  checks  them  at  the  right  moment,  they 
are  quick  to  change  and  see  their  mistake.  And  this  is  what 
Cleitomachus  is  said  to  have  done.  He  had 
the  character  of  being  an  invincible  athlete,  owm^" 
and,  as  his  reputation  was  spread  all  over  the 
world.  King  Ptolemy  is  said  to  have  been  inspired  with  the 
ambition  of  putting  an  end  to  it.  He  therefore  had  Aris- 
tonicus  the  boxer,  who  was  thought  to  have  unusual 
physical  capabilities  for  that  kind  of  thing  trained  with  extra- 
ordinary care,  and  sent  to  Greece.  When  he  appeared  on  the 
arena  at  Olympia  a  great  number  of  the  spectators,  it  seems, 
immediately  showed  their  favour  for  him,  and  cheered  him  on, 
being  rejoiced  that  some  one  should  have  had  the  courage  to 
make  some  sort  of  stand  against  Cleitomachus.  But  when,  as 
the  fight  went  on,  he  showed  that  he  was  a  match  for  his 
antagonist,  and  even  gave  him  a  well-placed  wound,  there  was 
a  general  clapping  of  hands,  and  the  popular  enthusiasm 
showed  itself  loudly  on  his  side,  the  spectators  calling  out  to 
Aristonicus  to  keep  up  his  spirits.  Thereupon  they  say  that 
Cleitomachus  stepped  aside,  and  after  waiting  a  short  time  to 
recover  his  breath,  turned  to  the  crowd  and  asked  them 
"  Why,  they  cheered  Aristonicus,  and  supported  him  all  they 
could  ?  Had  they  detected  him  in  playing  foul  in  the  combat  ? 
Or  were  they  not  aware  that  Cleitomachus  was  at  that  moment 
fighting  for  the  honour  of  Greece,  Aristonicus  for  that  of  king 
Ptolemy  ?  Would  they  prefer  an  Egyptian  to  carry  off  the 
crown  by  beating  Greeks,  or  that  a  Theban  and  Boeotian 
should  be  proclaimed  victor  in  boxing  over  all  comers?" 
Upon  this  speech  of  Cleitomachus,  they  say  that  such  a  revul- 
don  of  feehng  came  over  the  spectators,  that  Aristonicus  in 
his  turn  was  conquered  more  by  the  display  of  popular  feeling 
than  by  Cleitomachus. 

10,  What  happened  in  the  case  of  Perseus  in  regard  to  the 
feeling  of  the  multitude  was  very  similar  to  this.  For  if  any  one 
had  pulled  them  up  and  asked  them  plainly,  in  so  many  words, 
whether  they  wished  such  great  power  to  fall  to  one  man,  and 
were  desirous  of  trying  the  effect  of  an  utterly  irresponsible  des- 


366  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  book 

potism,  I  presume  that  they  would  have  promptly  bethought 
themselves,  recanted  all  they  had  said,  and  gone  to  the  other 
extreme  of  feeling.  Or  if  some  one  had  briefly  recalled  to  their 
recollection  all  the  tyrannical  acts  of  the  royal  house  of  Macedonia 
from  which  the  Greeks  had  suffered,  and  all  the  benefits  they 
had  received  from  the  Romans,  I  imagine  they  would  have  at 
once  and  decisively  changed  their  minds.  However,  for  the 
present,  at  the  first  burst  of  thoughtless  enthusiasm,  the  people 
showed  unmistakable  signs  of  joy  at  the  news,  being  delighted  at 
the  unlooked-for  appearance  of  a  champion  able  to  cope  with 
Rome.  I  say  this  much  to  prevent  anyone,  in  ignorance  of  human 
nature,  from  bringing  a  rash  charge  of  ingratitude  against  the 
Greeks  for  the  feelings  which  they  displayed  at  that  time.  .  .  . 

11.  The  cestros  was  a  novel  invention,  made  during  the  war 
A  new  kind  of  with  Perseus.      This  weapon  consisted  of  an 

missile  used  in  the  iron  bolt  two  palms  long,  half  of  which  was 
army  of  Perseus,  gpjke,  and  half  a  tube  for  the  reception  of  the 
wooden  shaft  which  was  fixed  into  the  tube,  and  measured  a 
span  in  length  and  a  finger- breadth  in  diameter.  At  the 
middle  point  of  the  shaft  three  wooden  "plumes"  were 
morticed  in.  The  sling  had  thongs  of  unequal  length,  and 
on  the  leather  between  them  the  missile  was  loosely  set. 
When  the  sling  was  being  swung  round,  with  the  two  thongs 
taut,  the  missile  kept  its  place;  but  when  the  slinger  let  go  one 
of  the  thongs,  it  flew  from  the  leather  like  a  leaden  bullet,  and 
was  projected  from  the  sling  with  such  force  as  to  inflict  a 
very  grievous  wound  upon  any  one  whom  it  hit.^ 

12.  Cotys  was  a  man  of  distinguished  appearance  and  of 
Character  of     gr^at   ability  in    military  affairs,   and   besides, 

Cotys,  king  of  the  quite  unlike  a  Thracian  in  character.     For  he 
Odrj'sae,  an  ally  ^j^g  of  sober  habits,  and  gave  evidence  of  a 

of  Perseus 

gentleness  of  temper  and  a  steadiness  of  dis- 
position worthy  of  a  man  of  gentle  birth.  .  .  . 

13.  Ptolemy,  the  general  serving  in  Cyprus,  was  by  no 
A  prudent  gover-  "^cans  like  an  Egyptian,  but  was  a  man  of  sense 

nor  of  Cyprus,    and  administrative  ability.      He  received   the 

^^8^^  *^'  ^^'   governorship  of  the  island  when  the  king  of 

Egypt  was  quite  a  child,  and  devoted  himself 

'  Livy,  who  translates  this  passage,  calls  the  missile  a  ctitrosphendona  (43,  65). 


xivii  INDECISIVE  RESULT  OF  THE  FIRST  CAMPAIGN  367 

with  great  zeal  to  the  collection  of  money,  refusing  payments  of 
any  kind  to  any  one,  though  he  was  often  asked  for  them  by 
the  king's  agents,  and  subjected  to  bitter  abuse  for  refusing  to 
part  with  any.  But  when  the  king  came  of  age  he  made  up 
a  lai^e  sum  and  sent  it  to  Alexandria,  so  that  both  king 
Ptolemy  himself  and  his  courtiers  expressed  their  approval  of 
his  previous  parsimony  and  determination  not  to  part  with 
any  money.  .  ,  , 

The  battle  on  the  Peneus  was  followed  by  ot/ur  engagemtnts 
of  no  great  importance ;  and  finally  Peneus  returned  to  Mace- 
donia, and  the  Romans  went  into  winter  quarters  in  various 
towns  in  Tlussaly,  without  a  decisive  blow  having  been  struck  on 
either  side.     Winter  of  R.C  171-170.     Z;?^,  42,  64-67. 

14,  Just  about  the  time  when  Perseus  retired  for  the 
winter  from  the  Roman  war,  Antenor  arrived   ^. 

at  Rhodes  from  him,  to  negotiate  for  the  ransom  i^i.i^o.  Dis- 
of  Diophares  and  those  who  were  on  board  pute  at  Rhodes  as 
with  him.     Thereupon  there  arose  a  great  dis-  w  tiie  f eiease  of 

,         .'  .  .  °  Diophanes,  Ihe 

pute  among  the  statesmen  as  to  what  course  envo)-  of  Perseus, 
they  ought  to  take.  Philophron,  Thcaetetus,cap(iiredai  Tene- 
and  their  party  were  against  entering  into  such  **■"■  ^**'  *■  ?■ 
an  arrangement  on  any  terms;  Deinon  and  Polyaratus  and 
their  party  were  for  doing  so.  Finally  they  did  enter  upon  an 
arrangement  with  Perseus  for  their  redemptioa  .  .  . 

15.  Cephalus  came  [to  Pella]  from  Epinis.     He  had  long 
been  connected  by  friendship  with    the  royal  what  induced  the 
house  of  Macedonia,  but  was  now  compelled  I'^ding  men  in 
by  the  force  of  circumstances  to  embrace  the    Epin"  w  join 
side   of  Perseus,  the  cause   of   which   was  as 

follows :  There  was  a  certain  Epirote  named  Charops,  a  man 
of  high  character,  and  well  disposed  to  Rome,  who,  when 
Philip  was  holding  the  passes  into  Epirus,  was  the  cause  of 
his  being  driven  from  the  country,  and  of  Titus  Flamininus 
conquering  Epirus  and  Macedonia.  Charops  had  a  son 
named  Machatus,  who  had  a  son  also  named  Charops. 
Machatus  having  died  when  this  son  was  quite  a  youth,  the 
elder  Charops  sent  his  grandson  with  a  suitable  retinue  to 
Rome  to  learn  to  speak  and  read  Latin.     In  the  course  of 


368  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  book 

time  the  young  man  returned  home,  having  made  many  inti- 
^.  mate  friendships  at  Rome.     The  elder  Charops 

then  died,  and  the  young  man,  bemg  of  a  restless 
and  designing  character,  began  giving  himself  airs  and  attack- 
ing the  distinguished  men  in  the  country.  At  first  he  was  not 
much  noticed,  Antinous  and  Cephalus,  his  superiors  in  age  and 
reputation,  managing  public  affairs  as  they  thought  right  But 
when  the  war  with  Perseus  broke  out,  the  young  man  at  once 
began  laying  information  against  these  statesmen  at  Rome, 
grounding  his  accusations  on  their  former  intimacy  with  the 
Macedonian  royal  family;  and  by  watching  everything  they  said 
or  did,  and  putting  the  worst  construction  on  it,  suppressing 
some  facts  and  adding  others,  he  succeeded  in  getting  his  accusa- 
tions against  them  believed.  Now  Cephalus  had  always  shown 
good  sense  and  consistency,  and  at  the  present  crisis  had 
adhered  to  a  course  of  the  highest  wisdom.  He  had  begun 
by  praying  heaven  that  the  war  might  not  take  place,  or  the 
question  come  to  the  arbitrament  of  arms ;  but  when  the  war 
was  actually  begun,  he  was  for  performing  all  treaty  obligations 
towards  Rome,  but  for  not  going  a  step  beyond  this,  or  show- 
ing any  unbecoming  subservience  or  officiousness.  When 
Charops  then  vehemently  accused  Cephalus  at  Rome,  and  repre- 
sented everything  that  happened  contrary  to  the  wishes  of  the 
Romans  as  malice  prepense  on  his  part,  at  first  he  and  others 
like  him  thought  little  of  the  matter,  being  not  conscious  of 
entertaining  any  designs  hostile  to  Rome.     But  when  they  saw 

Hippolochus,  Nicander,  and  Lochagus  arrested 
"^^^ti^^JSf^  without  cause,  and  conveyed   to  Rome  after 

the  cavalry  battle,  and  that  the  accusations 
made  against  them  by  Lyciscus  were  believed, — Lyciscus 
being  a  leader  of  the  same  party  in  Aetolia  as  Charops  was 
in  Epirus, — they  at  length  began  to  be  anxious  about  what 
would  happen,  and  to  consider  their  position.  They  resolved 
therefore  to  try  every  possible  means  to  prevent  themselves 
from  being  similarly  arrested  without  trial  and  carried  to 
Rome,  owing  to  the  slanders  of  Charops.  It  was  thus  that 
Cephalus  and  his  friends  were  compelled,  contrary  to  their 
original  policy,  to  embrace  the  cause  of  Perseus.  .  .  . 

16.  Theodotus    and   Philostratus    committed   an   act    of 


xxrii  CHAROPS  OF  EPIRVS  3S9 

fiagrant  impiety  and  treachery.  They  learnt  that  the  Roman 
consul  Aulus  Hostilius  was  on  his  way  to  coss.A,HostUius, 
Thessaly  to  join  the  army ;  and  thinking  that,  Mancinus.  A. 
if  they  could  deliver  Aulus  to  Perseus,  they  would  ■*'■''"=  Semnus, 
have  given  the  latter  the  strongest  possible 
proof  of  their  devotion,  and  have  done  the  Attempt  of  two 
greatest  possible  damage  to  the  Romans  at  this  Moiossian  leaden 
crisis,  they  wrote  urgently  to  Perseus  to  make '°*''"''^'°'""'- 
haste.  The  king  was  desirous  of  advancing  at  once  and  join- 
ing them  ;  but  he  was  hindered  by  the  fact  that  the  Molossians 
had  seized  the  bridge  over  the  Aous,  and  was  obliged  to  give 
them  battle  first  Now  it  chanced  that  Aulus  had  arrived  at 
Fhanota,^  and  put  up  at  the  house  of  Nestor  the  Ctopian,* 
and  thus  gave  his  enemies  an  excellent  opportunity ;  and  had 
not  fortune  interfered  00  his  behalf,  I  do  not  think  that  he 
would  have  escaped.  But,  in  fact,  Nestor  providentially 
suspected  what  was  brewing,  and  compelled  him  to  change 
his  quarters  for  the  night  to  the  house  of  a  neighbour. 
Accordingly  he  gave  up  the  idea  of  going  by  land  through 
Epirus,  and,  having  sailed  to  Anticyra,*  thence  made  his  way 
into  Thessaly.  .  .  . 

"  17.  Pharnaces  was  the  worst  of  all  his  pre-  Ptamace^  king 
decessors  on  the  throne.  .  .  .  of  Pontus. 

18.  While  Attains  was  spending  the  winter  in  Elateia  (in 
Phocis),  knowing  that  his  brother  Eumenes  was 
annoyed  in  the  highest  possible  degree  at  the  ^^^^^  ^'t^ 
splendid  honours  which  had  been  awarded  tohim  Eumenes  should 
having  been  annulled  by  a  public  decree  of  the    •*  nsiored  to 
Peloponnesians,  though  he  concealed  his  annoy-     p^™n"£j(f 
ance  from  every  one, — he  took  upon  himself  to 
send  messages  to  certain  of  the  Achaeans,  urging  that  not 
only  the  statues  of  honour,  but  the  complimentary  inscriptions 

'  In  Pbocjs.  The  name  was  variously  given  as  Phanoteis.  Phanole, 
Pbanota  (Sleph.  By%J) 

'  Schwdghaeuser  seems  to  regard  this  as  a  second  name.  But  the  Greeks 
seldom  had  such,  and  it  is  more  likely  the  designation  of  some  unknown 
localily.  There  was  an  Attic  deme  named  Cropia,  and  tbcrefore  the  name  is 
a  recognised  one  {Steph.  B/i.)    Gronovius  conjeclural  'npwirfy  "of  Oropns." 

'  Appwendy  the  Anticyra  on  the  Sperchius.  on  (he  boiilers  of  Achaia 
Pbthiotii. 

VOL.  II  3  B 


370  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBWS        book  xxvii 

also,  which  had  been  placed  in  his  brother's  honour,  should  be 
restored.  His  motive  in  acting  thus  was  the  belief  that  he 
could  give  his  brother  no  greater  gratification,  and  at  the  same 
time  would  display  to  the  Greeks  by  this  act  his  own  brotherly 
affection  and  generosity.^ .  .  . 

19.  When  Antiochus  saw  that  the  government  of  Alexan- 

dria was  openly  making  preparations  for  a  war 
the  attack  upon  ^^  annexation  in  Coele-Syria,  he  sent  Meleager 
Code-Syria  by  at  the  head  of  an  embassy  to  Rome,  with  in- 
thc  ministers  of  structions  to  inform  the  Senate  of  the  fact,  and 
Phiiometor.     ^°  protest  that  Ptolemy  was  attackmg  him  with- 
out the  least  justification.   .  .  . 

20.  In  all  human  affairs  perhaps  one  ought  to  regulate 

every  undertaking  by  considerations  of  time; 

JLpl^e^!     but  this  is  especially  tme  in  war,  in  which  a 

moment  makes  all  the  dinerence  between  success 

and  failure,  and  to  miss  this  is  the  most  fatal  of  errors.  .  .  . 

Many  men   desire   honour,  but  it  is  only  the  few  who 

venture  to  attempt  it ;  and  of  those  who  do  so, 

^^  aicj^*^*^'    ^^  ^^  ^^^  *^  ^"^  ^"y  ^^^  ^^^^  *^^  resolution  to 
persevere  to  the  end.   .  .  . 

^  Hence  Attalus  obtained  the  name  of  Philadelphns.  The  origin  ot 
Eumencs's  loss  of  popularity  in  the  Peloponncse  is  referred  to  in  28,  7,  but  no 
adequate  cause  is  alleged.  A  reference  to  Achaia  in  his  speech  at  Rome  was 
not  perhaps  altogether  friendly  (Livy,  42,  12),  and  we  shall  see  that  he  was 
afterwards  suspected  of  intriguing  with  Perseus  ;  but  if  this  extract  is  rightly 
placed,  it  can  hardly  be  on  this  latter  ground  that  the  Achaeans  had  renoimccd 
him. 


BOOK  XXVIII 

1.  When  the  war  between  the  kings  Antiochus  and  Ptolemy^ 
for  the  possession  of  Coele-Syria  had  just  g^.  ^^  .  ,,_ 
begun,  Meleager,  Sosiphanes,  and  Heracletdes  cbus  and  Ptolemy 
came  as  ambassadors  from  Antiochus,  and  both  appeal  to 
Timotheos  and  Damon  from  Ptolemy.  The  .'*°"'t°" '''*/||J'- 
one  actually  in  possession  of  Coele-Syna  and 
Phoenicia  was  Antiochus;  for  ever  since  his  father's  victory 
over  the  generals  of  Ptolemy  at  Panium  *  all  those  districts  had 
been  subject  to  the  Syrian  kings.  Antiochus,  accordingly, 
regarding  the  right  of  conquest  as  the  strongest  and  most 
honourable  of  all  claims,  was  now  eager  to  defend  these  places 
as  unquestionably  belonging  to  himself :  while  Ptolemy,  con- 
ceiving that  the  late  king  Antiochus  had  unjustly  taken 
advantage  of  his  father's  orphan  condition  to  wrest  the  cities  in 
Coele-Syria  from  him,  was  resolved  not  to  acquiesce  in  his 
possession  of  them.  Therefore  Meleager  and  his  colleagues 
came  to  Rome  with  instructions  to  protest  before  the  Senate 
that  Ptolemy  had,  in  breach  of  all  equity,  attacked  him  first ; 
while  Timotheos  and  Damon  came  to  renew  their  master's 
friendship  with  the  Romans,  and  to  offer  their  mediation  for 
putting  an  end  to  the  war  with  Perseus;  but,  above  all,  to 
watch  the  communications  made  by  Meleagcr's  embassy.  As 
to  putting  an  end  to  the  war,  by  the  advice  of  Marcus 
Aeinilius  they  did  not  venture  to  speak  of  it ;  but  afrei  form- 
ally renewing  the  friendly  relations  between  Ptolemy  and  Rome, 
and  receiving  a  favourable  answer,  they  returned  to  Alexan- 
dria. To  Meleager  and  his  colleagues  the  Senate  answered 
that  Quintus  Marcius  should  be  commissioned  to  write  to 
175-164;    Plolemy  VI.    Philomelor, 


372  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  book 

Rolemy  on  the  subject,  as  he  should  think  it  most  to  the 
interest  of  Rome  and  his  own  honour.  Thus  was  the  business 
settled  for  the  time.  .  .  . 

2.  About  this  time  there  came  also  ambassadors  from  the 

TheRhodiansask^^odians  towards  the  end  of  summer,  Agesilo- 

for  license  to     chus,  Nicagoras,  and  Nicander.     The  objects 

import  com.     Qf  ^^y^  mission  were  to  renew  the  friendship 

of  Rhodes   and  Rome;    to   obtain  a  license   for  importing 

com   from    the   Roman    dominions;    and  to    defend    their 

state   from   certain  charges  that  had   been  brought  against 

it.     For  there  were  most  violent  party  contests  going  on  in 

Rhodes :  Agathagetus,  Philophron,  Rhodophon,  and  Theaete- 

tus  resting  all  their  hopes  on  the  Romans,  and  Deinon  and 

Polyaratus  on  Perseus  and  the  Macedonians;  and  as  these 

divisions  gave  rise  to  frequent  debates  in  the  course  of  their 

public   business,  and   many  contradictory   expressions   were 

used   in   their    deliberations,    plenty   of    opportunities   were 

afforded  to  those  who  wished  to  make  up  stories  against  the 

state.     On  this  occasion,  however,  the  Senate  affected  to  be 

ignorant  of  all  this,  though  perfectly  acquainted  with  what 

went  on  in  the  island,  and  granted  them  a  license  to  import 

one  hundred  thousand  medimini  of  com  from  Sicily.     This 

answer  was  given  by  the  Senate  to  the  Rhodians  separately. 

Audience  was  then  given  collectively  to  all  the  envoys  from 

the  rest  of  Greece  that  were  united  in  the  same  policy.  .  .  . 

8.  Aulus  being  thus  Proconsul,  and  wintering  in  Thessaly 

with  the  army,  sent  Gains  Popilius  and  Gnaeus 

Auius^HosUiius,  Octavius   to   visit    certain    places   in   Greece. 

in  Greece  with'  They  first  Came  to  Thebes,  where,  after  speaking 

proconsular     in  complimentary  terms  of  the  Thebans,  they  ex- 

^  Popm^  and^'  ^o^^^  t^^"^  to  maintain  their  good  disposition 
Octavius  to  visit  towards  Rome.  They  then  went  a  round  of 
the  Greek  towns  the  cities  in  the  Peloponnese,  and  endeavoured 
c^J?^e^s^nltc.to  convince  the  people  of  the  clemency  and 

humanity  of  the  Senate  by  producing  the^  de- 

*  The  decree  referred  to  is  given  in  Livy,  43,  17.  "No  one  shall 
supply  any  war  material  to  the  Roman  magistrates  other  than  that  which  the 
Senate  has  decreed."  This  had  been  extracted  from  the  Senate  by  vehement 
complaints  reaching  Rome  of  the  cruel  extortions  of  the  Roman  officers  in  the 
previous  two  years. 


irviii   PRESSURE  PUT  ON  ACHAIA  AND  AETOLIA         373 

cree  which  I  recently  mentioned.      At   the  same  time  they 
made  it  clearly  understood  that  the  Senate  was    They  visii  the 
aware  who  in  the  several  stales  were  hanging  Peloponncse,  and 
back  and  trying  to  evade  their  obligations,  and  x^^^-^^^tA 
who  were  forward  and  zealous  ;  and  they  let  it  be    .ihe  backward 
seen  that  they  were  as  much  displeased  with  those  policy  of  certain 
who  thus  hung  back  as  with  those  who  openly     ^chaeans, 
took  the  opposite  side.     This  brought  hesitation  and  doubt  to 
the  minds  of  the  people  at  large,  as  to  how  to  frame  their 
words  and  actions  so  as  to  exactly  suit  the  necessities  of  the 
tiroes.     Gaius  and  Gnaeus  were  reported  to  have  resolved,  as 
soon  as  the  Achaean  congress  was  assembled,  to  accuse  Lycor- 

tas,  Archon,  and  Folybius,  and  to  point  out,  ,_, 

that  they  were  opposed  to  the  policy  of  Rome ;  smU  Poiybius  are 
and  were  at  the  present  moment  refraining  from  supposed  lo  be 
active   measures,  not  because  that   was   their     '™^'!^'^''' 
genuine  inclination,  but  because  they  were  watch- 
ing the  turn  of  events,  and  waiting  their  opportunity.    They  did 
not,  however,  venture  to  do  this,  because  they  had  no  well- 
founded  pretext  for  attacking  these  men.     Accordingly,  when 
the  counol^  met  at  Aegium,  after  delivering  a  speech  of  mingled 
compliments  and  exhortation,  they  took  ship  for  Aetolia. 

4.  The  Aetolian  congress  being  summoned  to  meet  them 
at  Thermum,  they  came  before  the  assembled 
people,  and  again  delivered  a  speech  in  which        "f^sa   '" 
expressions  of  benevolence  were    mixed    with 
exhortations.     But  the  real  cause  of  summoning  the  congress 
was  to  announce  that  the  Aetolians  must  give 
hosUges.     On  their  leaving  the  speakers'  plat- ^^;;j^'^'^'°|h^ 
form,   Proandrus    stood    forward    and    desired 
leave  to  mention  certain  services  performed  by  himself  to  the 

Romans,  and  to  denounce  those  who  accused      ^ . 

him.  Gams  thereupon  rose;  and,  though  he  well 
knew  that  Proandrus  was  opposed  to  Rome,  he  paid  him  some 
compliments,  and  acknowledged  the  truth  of  everything  he 
had  said.     After  this,  Lyciscus  stood  forward,       ,    . 
and,  without  accusing  any  one  person  by  name, 


374  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  book 

yet  cast  suspicion  on  a  great  many.  For  he  said  that  "  The 
Romans  had  been  quite  right  to  arrest  the  ringleaders  and 
take  them  to  Rome  "  (whereby  he  meant  Eupolemus,  Nican- 
der,  and  the  rest) :  "  but  members  of  their  party  still  remained 
in  Aetolia,  all  of  whom  ought  to  meet  with  the  same  correction, 
unless  they  gave  up  their  children  as  hostages  to  the  Romans." 
In  these  words  he  meant  to  point  especially  to  Archedamus 
and  Pantaloon ;  and,  accordingly,  when  he  retired,  Pantaleon 
p    ^  J  stood  up,  and,  after  a  brief  denunciation  of 

Lyciscus  for  his  shameless  and  despicable  flattery 
of  the  stronger  side,  turned  to  Thoas,  conceiving  him  to  be  the 
man  whose  accusations  of  himself  obtained  the  greater  credit 
from  the  fact  that  he  had  never  been  supposed  to  be  at  en- 
mity with  him.  He  reminded  Thoas  first  of  the  events  in 
the  time  of  Antiochus ;  and  then  reproached  him  for  ingrati- 
tude to  himself,  because,  when  he  had  been  surrendered  to 
Rome,  he  obtained  an  unexpected  release  at  the  intercession 
of  Nicander  and  himself  He  ended  by  calling  upon  the 
Aetolians,  not  only  to  hoot  Thoas  down  if  he  tried  to  speak, 
but  to  join  with  one  accord  in  stoning  him.  This  was  done ; 
,j-  t  cd  ^^^  Gaius,  after  administering  a  brief  reproof 
to  the  Aetolians  for  stoning  Thoas,  departed 
with  his  colleague  to  Acarnania,  without  any  more  being  said 
about  hostages.  Aetolia,  however,  was  filled  with  mutual 
suspicions  and  violent  factions. 

6.  In  Acarnania  the  assembly  was  held  at  Thurium,  at 
which  Aeschrion,  Glaucus,  and  Chremes,  who  were  all  parti- 
sans of  Rome,  begged  Gaius  and  Gnaeus  to 
place  a  garrison  in  Acarnania;  for  they  had 
among  them  certain  persons  who  were  for  putting  the 
country  in  the  hands  of  Perseus  and  the  Macedonians.  The 
advice  of  Diogenes  was  the  opposite.  "A  garrison,"  he 
said,  "ought  not  to  be  put  into  any  of  their  cities,  for  that 
was  what  was  done  to  those  who  had  been  at  war  with 
Rome  and  had  been  beaten;  whereas  the  Acarnanians  had 
done  no  wrong,  and  did  not  deserve  in  any  respect  to  have 
a  garrison  thrust  upon  them.  Chremes  and  Glaucus  and 
their  partisans  were  slandering  their  political  opponents,  and 
desired  to  bring  in  a  garrison  which  would  support  their  self- 


xxviii  LYCORTAS  ADVISES  NEUTRALITY  37s 

seeking  policy,  in  order  to  establish  their  own  tyrannical 
power."  After  these  speeches,  Gaius  and  his  colleague,  seeing 
that  the  populace  disliked  the  idea  of  having  garrisons,  and 
wishing  to  follow  the  line  of  policy  marked  out  by  the  Senate, 
expressed  their  adherence  to  the  view  of  Diogenes ;  and  de- 
parted to  join  the  Proconsul  at  Larisa,  after  paying  some 
compliments  to  the  Acamanians.  .  .  . 

6.  The  Greeks  made  up  their  minds  that  this  embassy 
required   much   consideration    on    their   part      Meeting  of 
They  therefore  called  to  council  such  men  as  Achaean  states. 
were  of  one  mind  in  other  political  questions, —  '"^^JJ  ^?  consider 
Arcesilaus  and  Ariston  of  Megalopolis,  Stratius        B.c.^9.^' 
of  Tritaea,  Xenon  of  Patrae  and  Apollonides  of 
Sicyon.     But  Lycortas  stood  firm  to  his  original    Lyconas  is  for 
view :  which  was  that  they  should  send  no  help    complete  neu- 
to  either  Perseus  or  Rome  in  any  way,  nor,  on        traiity. 
the  other  hand,  take  part  against  either.     For  he  held  that 
co-operation  with  either  would   be   disadvantageous  to  the 
Greeks  at  large,  because  he  foresaw  the  overwhelming  power 
which   the   successful    nation   would    possess;    while   active 
hostility,  he  thought,  would  be  dangerous,  because  they  had 
already  in  former  times  been  in  opposition  to  many  of  the 
most  illustrious  Romans  in  their  state  policy.     Apollonides 
and   Stratius   did   not   recommend   open  and  Apollonides  and 
avowed    hostility  to  Rome,  but  thought  that  stratius  for  sup- 
"  Those  who  were  for  plunging  headlong  into  ^"^^j^^^  ^  ^^' 
the    contest,  and    wished   to    use   the   action  Rome,  and  yet 
of  the  nation   to   secure   their   own   personal  not  openly  oppos- 
favour  at  Rome,  ought  to  be  put  down  and        »ngher. 
boldly  resisted."     Archon   said   that   "They  must   yield   to 
circumstances,   and    not   give    their    personal    ,-^  «.   . 

'  4.-  11  ^^  Strategus 

enemies  a  handle  for  accusations;   nor  allow    Archon  is  for 
themselves  to  fall  into  the  same  misfortune  as   bending  to  the 
Nicander,  who,  before  he  had  learnt  what  the^/°™;^"^^*^^'"K 

1^  „  ,      ,  -11      frankly  for  Rome. 

power  of  Rome  really  was,  had  met  with  the 
gravest  calamities."     With  this  last  view,  Polyaenus,  Arcesi- 
laus, Ariston,  and  Xenon  agreed.     It  was  thereupon  decided 
that  Archon  should  go  without  delay  to  his  duties       poiybius 
as  Strategus,  and  Poiybius  to  those  of  Hipparch.      Hipparch. 


376  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  book 


7.  Very  soon  after  these  events,  and  when  Archon  had  made 

hass  fr       ^P  ^^^  mind  that  the  Achaeans  must  take  active 

Atiaius^to  the    P^"^  with  Rome  and  her  allies,  it  happened  most 

Achaeans  desiring  conveniently  that  Attains  made  his  proposal  to 

^he'S^nJ^lTfor-^  him  and  found  him  ready  to  accept  it  Archon 
maiiy  decreed  to  his  at  once  eagerly  promised  his  support  to  Attalus's 
brother  Eumencs,  request:  and  when  thereupon  that  prince's  en  voys 
See  27.  18.  appeared  at  the  next  congress,  and  addressed 
the  Achaeans  about  the  restoration  of  king  Eumenes's  honours, 
begging  them  to  do  this  for  the  sake  of  Attains,  the  people  did 
not  show  clearly  what  their  feeling  was,  but  a  good  many  rose 
to  s[^ak  against  the  proposal  from  many  various  motives. 
Those  who  were  originally  the  advisers  of  the  honours  being 
paid  to  the  king  were  now  desirous  to  confirm  the  wisdom  of 
their  own  policy ;  while  those  who  had  private  reasons  for 
animosity  against  the  king  thought  this  a  good  opportunity 
for  revenging  themselves  upon  him  ;  while  others  again,  from 
spite  against  those  who  supported  him,  were  determined  that 
Attains  should  not  obtain  his  request.  Archon,  however,  the 
Strategus,  rose  to  support  the  envoys, — for  it  was  a  matter 
that  called  for  an  expression  of  opinion  from  the  Strategus, — 
but  after  a  few  words  he  stood  down,  afraid  of  being  thought 
to  be  giving  his  advice  from  interested  motives  and  the  hope 
of  making  money,  because  he  had  spent  a  large  sum  on  his 
office.  Amidst  a  general  feeling  of  doubt  and  hesitation, 
Polybius  rose  and  delivered  a  long  speech.  But  that  part  of  it 
which  best  fell  in  with  the  feelings  of  the  populace  was  that  in 

which  he  showed  that  "The  original  decree  of  the 
Pdybius*       Achaeans  in  regard  to  these  honours  enacted  that 

such  honours  as  were  improper  and  contrary  to  latv 
were  to  be  abolished,  but  not  all  honours  by  any  means.  That 
Sosigenes  and  Diopeithes  and  their  colleagues,  however,  who 
were  at  the  time  judges,  and  for  private  reasons  personally  hostile 
to  Eumenes,  seized  the  opportunity  of  overturning  all  the  erec- 
tions put  up  in  honour  of  the  king ;  and  in  doing  so  had  gone 
beyond  the  meaning  of  the  decree  of  the  Achaeans,  and  beyond 
the  powers  entrusted  to  them,  and,  what  was  worst  of  all,  be- 
yond the  demands  of  justice  and  right.  For  the  Achaeans 
had   not   resolved   upon   doing   away   with   the  honours  of 


xrviii  A  SPEECH  OF  POL  YBIUS  ■  377 

Eumenes  on  the  ground  of  having  received  any  injury  at  his 
hands ;  but  had  taken  ofTence  at  his  making  demands  beyond 
what  his  services  warranted,  and  had  accordingly  voted  to 
remove  everything  that  seemed  excessive.  As  then  these 
judges  had  overthrown  these  honours,  because  they  had  a  greater 
regard  for  the  gratification  of  their  private  enmity  than  for  the 
honour  of  the  Achaeans,  so  the  Achaeans,  from  the  conviction 
that  duty  and  honour  must  be  their  highest  consideration,  were 
bound  to  correct  the  error  of  the  judges,  and  the  unjustiliable 
insult  inflicted  upon  Eumenes :  especially  as,  in  doing  so,  they 
would  not  be  bestowing  this  favour  on  Eumenes  only,  but  on 
his  brother  Attalus  also."  The  assembly  having  expressed  their 
agreement  with  this  speech,  a  decree  was  written  out  ordering 
the  magistrates  to  restore  all  the  honours  of  king  Eumenes, 
except  such  as  were  dishonourable  to  the  Achaean  league  or 
contrary  to  their  law.  It  was  thus,  and  at  this  time,  that 
Attalus  secured  the  reversal  of  the  insult  to  his  brother 
Eumenes  in  regard  to  the  honours  once  given  him  in  the 
Peloponnese.  .  ,  . 

8.   Perseus  sent  Pleuratus  the  Illyrian,  an  exile  living  at  his 
court,  and  Adaeus  of  Beroea  on  a  mission  to 
king  Genthius,  with  instructions  to  inform  him  after  taking  Hy- 
of  what  he  had  achieved  in  his  war  with  the    scana  in  liiy- 
Romans,  Dardani,  Epirotes,  and  Illyrians  up  to  "^'  ^"^f^' 
the  present  time;  and  to  urge  him  to  make  a ^d'^ence senS 
friendship  and  alliance  with  him  in  Macedonix    envoys  to  king 
These  envoys  journeyed  beyond  Mount  Scardus,'^*"','"'''"""'"'"' 
through  lUyria  Deserta,  as  It  is  called, — a  region       '*'''  *^' ''' 
a  short  time  back  depopulated  by  the  Macedonians,  in  order 
to  make  an  invasion  of  Illyria  and  Macedonia  dilHcult  for  the 
Dardani.    Their  journey  through  this  region  was  accompanied 
by  much  suffering  ;  but  they  reached  Scodra,  and  being  there 
informed  that  Genthius  was  at  Lissus,  they  sent  a  message  to 
him.    He  promptly  responded  :  and  having  been  admitted  to  an 
interview  with  him,  they  discussed  the  business 
to  which  their  instructions  referred.     Genthius        '""' 


378  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  book 

but  he  alleged  want  of  means  as  an  excuse  for  not  complying 
with  the  request  at  once,  and  his  inability  to  undertake  a  war 
with  Rome  without  money.  With  this  answer,  Adaeus  and  his 
colleagues  returned  home.  Meanwhile  Perseus  arrived  at 
Stubera,  and  sold  the  booty  and  gave  his  army  a  rest  while 
waiting  for  the  return  of  Pleuratus  and  Adaeus.     On  their 

arrival  with  the  answer  from  Genthius,  he  inmie- 
iTG^nihiS^"  diately  sent  another  mission, consisting  again  of 
Adaeus,  Glaucias,  one  of  his  body-guards,  and 
the  lUyrian  (Pleuratus)  also,  because  he  knew  the  Illyrian  lan- 
guage, with  the  same  instructions  as  before :  on  the  ground  that 
Perseus  goes    Genthius   had   not   stated   distinctly   what  he 
back  to  Hyscana  wanted,  and  what  would  enable  him  to  consent 
in  iiiyria.       ^q   ^|^g   proposals.     When   these   envoys    had 
started  the  king  himself  removed  with  his  army  to  Hyscana.^  . . . 
9.  The   ambassador  sent   to  Genthius   returned   without 
Genthius  being  having  accomplished  anything  more  than  the 
unpersuaded  by  previous  envoys,  and  without  any  fresh  answer; 
the  second  mis-  for  Gcnthius  remained  of  the   same  mind, — 

sion,  Perseus         .,!•        *     •    •         •*.!_  -n  •     i.*  u    -. 

sends  a  third,  but  wiUmg  to  jom  With  Perseus  m  his  war,  but  pro- 
stiii  without  offer,  fessing  to  be  in  want  of  money.  Perseus  dis- 
ing  money,  regarded  the  hint,  and  sent  another  mission 
under  Hippias  to  conclude  the  treaty,  without  taking  any  notice 
of  the  main  point,  while  professing  a  wish  to  do  whatever 
Genthius  wished.  It  is  not  easy  to  decide  whether  to  ascribe 
such  conduct  to  mere  folly,  or  to  a  spiritual  delusion.  For  my 
part,  I  am  inclined  to  regard  it  as  a  sheer  spiritual  delusion  when 
men  aim  at  bold  enterprises,  and  risk  their  life,  and  yet  ne- 
glect the  most  important  point  in  their  plans,  though  they  see  it 
T-u  -111     t   all  the  time  and  have  the  power  to  execute  it. 

The  dishke  of     _        _     ,  ,  •    i     •         .,,1         ,      .    ,    1 

Perseus  to  give   ^ox  I  do  not  think  it  Will  be  denied  by  any 
money  turned  out  man  of  reflection  that,  had  Perseus  at  that  time 
^^Gre©ce°^      been  willing  to  make  grants  of  money  either  to 
states  as  such,   or  individually   to  kings  and 
statesmen,  I  do  not  say  on  a  great  scale,  but  even  to  a  mode- 
rate extent,  they  would  all — Greeks  and  kings  alike — have 
yielded  to  the  temptation.     As  it  was,  he  happily  did  not  take 
that  course,  which  would  have  given  him,  if  successful,  an 

*  Hyscana,  or  Uscana,  a  town  of  the  lUyrian  tribe  Penestae. 


MTiii  VmVISE  PARSIMONY  OF  PERSEUS  379 

overweening  supremacy ;  or,  if  unsuccessful,  would  have  in- 
volved many  others  in  his  disaster.  But  he  took  the  opposite 
course :  which  resulted  in  confining  the  numbers  of  the  Greeks 
who  adopted  the  unwise  policy  at  this  crisis  to  very  narrow 
limits.  .  .  . 

[Peiseus  now  returned  from  Stubera.  to  Hyscana,  and  after  a  vain 
ollempt  upoD  Stratus  in  Aetolia,  retired  into  Macedonia  for  (he  rest  of  the 
winter.  In  the  early  spring  of  B.C.  169  Q.  Marciu3  Phitippus  began  his 
advance  upon  Macedonia  from  his  permanent  camp  in  Perrliaebia.  Per- 
seus stationed  Asclepiodotus  and  Hippias  (o  defend  two  passes  of  the  Cam- 
banian  mountains,  white  he  himself  held  Dium,  which  commanded  the 
coast  Toad  from  Thessaly  into  Macedonia.  Marcius  however,  after  only  a 
rather  severe  skirmish  with  the  light-armed  troops  of  Hippias,  effected  the 
passage  of  the  mountains  and  descended  upon  Dium.  The  king  was  taken 
by  suiprise ;  he  had  not  secured  the  pass  of  Tempe,  which  would  have  cut 
olf  ihe  Romans  from  retreat ;  and  he  now  hastily  retired  to  Pydna.  Q. 
Marcius  occupied  Dium,  but  after  a  short  stay  there  retired  upon  Phila,  10 
get  provisions  and  secure  the  coast  road.  Whereupon  Perseus  reoccupled 
Dium,  and  contemplated  staying  there  to  the  end  of  the  summer.  Q. 
Marcius  took  Ileracleum,  which  was  l>etween  I'hila  and  Dium,  and  made 
preparations  for  a  second  advance  on  Dium.  But  the  winter  (B.C.  1G9- 
16S)  was  now  approaching,  and  he  contented  himself  with  seeing  (hal  the 
roads  through  Thessaly  were  put  in  a  proper  slate  for  (he  conveyance  of 
provisions.     Livy,  43,  19-23;  44,  1-9.] 

10.  Having  been  completely  worsted  on  the  entrance  of  the 

Romans  into  Macedonia,  Perseus  found  fault  „         ,      .. 

.  ,    „.      .  „      ■  ■   -        .     .  Perseus  lays  the 

with  Hippias.      But  m  my  opinion  it  is  easy  to     t>lameofhis 
find  feult  with  others  and  to  see  their  mistakes,    failure  on  his 
but  it  is  the  hardest  thing  in  the  world  10  do     ^"""^'^ 
everything  that  can  be  done  one's  self,  and  to 
be  thoroughly  acquainted  with  one's  own  affairs.     And  Perseus 
was  now  an  instance  in  point.  .  .  . 

11.  The  capture  of  Heracleum  was  effected  in  a  very 
peculiar  manner.  The  city  wall  at  one  part  The  tesiudo. 
and  for  a  short  distance  was  low.  The  Romans  ^ivy,  44,  q. 
attacked  with  three  picked  maniples:  and  the  first  made  a 
protection  for  their  heads  by  locking  their  shields  together 
over  them  so  closely,  that  they  presented  the  appearance  of  a 
sloping  tiled  roof.  .  -  . 

This  manceuvre  the  Romans  used  also  in  mock  lights.  .  .  . 

While   C.  Marcius  Fibulas,  the  praetor,   was  engaged  in 


38o  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  book 

Chalddice,  Q.  Marcius  sent  M,  Popilius  to  besiege  Meliboea  in 
Magnesia,  Perseus  sent  Euphranor  to  relieve  ity  andy  if  he 
succeeded,  to  enter  Demetrias,  This  he  did,  and  was  not 
attacked  at  the  latter  place  by  Popilius  or  Eumenes — scandcU 
saying  that  the  latter  was  in  secret  communication  with  Perseus, 
Livy,  44,  10-13,  b.c.  169. 

12.  Upon  Perseus  designing  to  come  into  Thessaly  and 

Th  A  h  there  decide  the  war  by  a  general  engagement, 

decide  to  co-    ^s  he  probably  would  have  done,  Archon  and  his 

operate  actively  colleagues  resolved  to  defend  themselves  against 

^*^^^^^^^the   suspicions   and   slanders    that    had   been 

thrown  upon  them,  by  taking  some  practical 
steps.  They  therefore  brought  a  decree  before  the  Achaean 
congress,  ordering  an  advance  into  Thessaly,  with  the  full  force 
of  the  league,  to  co-operate  energetically  with  the  Romans.  The 
decree  being  confirmed,  the  Achaeans  also  voted  that  Archon 
should  superintend  the  collection  of  the  army  and  the  necessary 
preparations  for  the  expedition,  and  should  also  send  envoys  to 
the  Consul  in  Thessaly,  to  communicate  to  him  the  decree  of 

the  Achaeans,  and  to  ask  when  and  where  their 

^*°i^c  Consul.  ^°  ^^^y  ^^^  ^^  J^^"  ^^"^-      Polybius  and  others 

were  forthwith  appointed,  and  strictly  instructed 
that,  if  the  Consul  approved  of  the  army  joining  him,  they 
should  at  once  send  some  messengers  to  communicate  the  fact, 
that  they  might  not  be  too  late  on  the  field ;  and  meanwhile, 
that  Polybius  himself  should  see  that  the  whole  army  found 
provisions  in  the  various  cities  through  which  it  was  to  pass, 
and  that  the  soldiers  should  have  no  lack  of  any  necessaries. 
With  these  instructions  the  envoys  started.  The  Achaeans 
also  appointed  Telocritus  to  conduct  an  embassy  to  Attains, 
bearing  the  decree  concerning  the  restoration  of  the  honours 
Ptolemy  Physcon  ^^  Eumenes.  And  as  news  arrived  about  the 
celebrates  his  same  time  that  king  Ptolemy  had  just  celebrated 
anacietena.  j^jg  anacleteria,  the  usual  ceremony  when  the 
kings  come  of  age,  they  voted  to  send  some  ambassadors  to 
confirm  the  friendly  relations  existing  between  the  league  and 
the  kingdom  of  Egypt,  and  thereupon  appointed  Alcithus  and 
Pasiadas  for  this  duty. 


xxvm  ACHAEAN  AID  TO  ROME  DECLINED  381 

18.  Polybius  and  his  colleagues  found  the  Romans  moved 
from  Thessaly,  and  encamped  in  Perrhaebia, 
between  Azorium and  Dolicha  They  therefore  """"J"  ^'^ 
postponed  communication  with  the  Consul, 
owing  to  the  critical  nature  of  the  occasion,  but  shared  in  the 
dangers  of  the  invasion  of  Macedonia.  When  the  Roman  army 
at  length  reached  the  district  of  Hcracleum,  it 
seemed  the  right  moment  for  their  interview  ^^60" 
with  Q.  Marcius,  because  he  considered  that  the 
most  serious  part  of  his  undertaking  was  accomplished.  The 
Achaean  envoys  therefore  took  the  opportunity  of  presenting 
the  decree  to  Marcius,  and  declaring  the  intention  of  the 
Achaeahs,  to  the  effect  that  they  wished  with  their  full  force  to 
take  part  in  his  contests  and  dangers.  In  addition  to  this  they 
demonstrated  to  him  that  every  command  of  q^  Marcioide- 
the  Romans,  whether  sent  by  letter  or  messenger,  dines  the  offered 
had  been  during  the  present  war  accepted  by  "^yf  ^^ii^^^^ 
the  Achaeans  without  dispute.  Marcius  acknowledged  with 
great  warmth  the  good  feeling  of  the  Achaeans,  but  excused 
them  from  taking  part  in  his  labours  and  expenses,  as  there 
was  no  longer  any  need  for  the  assistance  of  allies.  The  other 
ambassadors  accordingly  returned  home ;  but  Polybius  stayed 
there  and  took  part  in  the  campaign,  until  ^ppLus  Claudius 
Marcius,  hearing  that  Appi us  Cento  asked  for  five  Cemo  defeated  at 
thousand  Achaean  soldiers  to  be  sent  to  Epirus,  Hystana  m  b.c. 
despatched  Polybius  with  orders  to  prevent  the ''°'  '^'  *^'  '"■ 
soldiers  being  granted,  or  such  a  heavy  expense  being  cause- 
lessly imposed  on  the  Achaeans ;  for  Appius  had  no  reason 
whatever  for  asking  for  these  soldiers.  Whether  he  did  this 
from  consideration  for  the  Achaeans,  or  from  a  desire  to  prevent 
Appius  from  obtaining  any  success,  it  is  difficult  to  say.  Poly- 
bius, however,  returned  to  the  Peloponnese  and  found  that  the 
letter  from  Epirus  had  arrived,  and  that  the  Achaean  congress 
had  been  soon  afterwards  assembled  at  Sicyon.  He  was 
therefore  in  a  situation  of  great  embarrassment  When  Cento's 
demand  of  soldiers  was  brought  before  the  Congress  he  did 
not  think  it  by  any  means  proper  to  reveal  the  charge  which 
Q.  Marcius  had  given  him  privately :  and  on  the  other  hand  to 
oppose  the  demand,  without  some  clear  pretext,  was  exceedingly 


3»a  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  book 


dangerous.     In  this  difficult  and  delicate  position  he  called  to 

his  aid  the  decree  of  the  Roman  Senate,  for- 

^iT  ^^jtT^*      bidding  compliance  with  the  written  demands  of 

commanders  unless  made  in  accordance  with  its 

own  dci  rec.    Now,  no  mention  of  such  a  decree  occurred  in  the 

dcsiKitch  from  Appius.    By  this  argument  he  prevailed  with  the 

|H\>plc  to  refer  the  matter  to  the  Consul,  and  by  his  means  to 

^el  the  nation  relieved  of  an  expense  which  would  amount  to 

OUT  a  hundred  and  twenty  talents.      Still  he  gave  a  great 

hanille  to  those  who  wished  to  denounce  him  to  Appius,  as 

havin^v:  thwarted  his  design  of  obtaining  a  reinforcement  .  .  . 

14*  The  |HX>ple  of  Cydon  at  this  time  committed  a  shock- 

i^vu\     l-he    ^^^   ^^^  ^^  indisputable   treachery.      Though 

i>M»wn*  attack  niany  such  have  occurred  in   Crete,  yet  this 

Aiui  tAkf?       appeared  to  go  beyond  them  alL     For  though 

'^^  CiKvvsur ''  ^^^7  ^'^"^  ^""^  ^^  Apollonia,  not  only  by  the  ties 
of  friendship,  but  by  those  of  common  institutions 
ftlsi\  and  \\\  fill  I  l>y  everything  which  mankind  regard  as  sacred, 
anvl  though  these  obligations  were  confirmed  by  a  sworn  treaty 
engraved  and  presented  in  the  temple  of  Idaean  Zeus,  yet  they 
treacherously  seized  Ajwllonia,  put  the  men  to  the  sword, 
plundered  the  proj^erty,  and  divided  among  themselves  the 
women,  children,  city,  and  territory.  .  .  . 

16.  Afraid  of  the  Gortynians,  because  they  had  narrowly 
The  Cydonians  escaped  losing  their  city  in  the  previous  year 
ask  help  from    by  an  attack  led  by  Nothocrates,  the  Cydonians 
Eumencs,       g^j^j  envoys  to  Eumenes  demanding  his  assist- 
ance in  virtue  of  their  alliance  with  him.     The  king  selected 
Leon  and  some  soldiers,  and  sent  them  in  haste  to  Crete ;  and 
on  their  arrival  the  Cydonians  delivered  the  keys  of  their  city 
to  Leon,  and  put  the  town  entirely  in  his  hands.  .  .  . 

16.  The  factions  in  Rhodes   kept   continually  becoming 
The  Rhodians    "lo^e  and  more  violent.     For  when  the  decree 
determine  to  send  of  the  Senate,  directing  that  they  should   no 
a  mission  to     longer  conform  to  the  demands  of  the  military 
omc,    .  .  170.  magistrates  but  only  to  those  contained  in  the 
Senate's  decrees,  was  communicated  to  them,  and  the  people  at 
large  expressed  satisfaction  at  the  care  of  the  Senate  for  their  in- 
terests ;  Philophron  and  Theaetetus  seized  the  occasion  to  carry 


xiTiii         DISSENSIONS  IN  CRETE  AND  RHODES  383 

out  their  policy  further,  declaring  that  they  ought  to  send  envoys 
to  the  Senate,  and  to  Q.  Marcius  Philippus  the  Consul,  and 
Gains  Maicius  Figulus,  the  commander  of  the  fleet  For  it 
was  by  that  time  known  to  everybody  which  of  the  magistrates 
designate  in  Rome  were  to  come  to  Greece.  The  proposal 
was  loudly  applauded,  though  some  dissent  was  ^^ 
expressed :  and  at  the  beginning  of  the  summer 
Agesilochus,  son  of  Hegesias,  and  Nicagoras,  son  of  Nicander, 
were  sent  to  Rome ;  Agepolis,  Ariston,  and  Pancrates  to  the 
Consul  and  commander  of  the  fleet,  with  instructions  to  renew 
the  friendship  of  the  Cretans  with  Rome,  and  to  make  their 
defence  against  the  accusations  that  were  being  uttered  against 
their  state  ;  while  Agesilochus  and  his  colleagues  were  at  the 
same  time  to  make  a  proposal  about  a  license  to  export  com 
from  the  Roman  dominions.  The  speech  made  by  these 
envoys  to  the  Senate,  and  the  reply  made  by  the  Senate,  and 

the   successful  termination  of  their  mission,  I  „„     ^ t 

-  ,        ,  -         ,  .       ,  -         ,  ,   ^™?  supra,  CD.  9. 

have  aheady  mentioned  m  the  section  devoted 
to  Italian  afTairs.  But  it  is  useful  to  repeat  such  points,  as  I 
am  careful  to  do,  because  I  am  obliged  frequently  to  record 
the  actual  negotiations  of  ambassadors  before  mentioning  the 
circumstances  attending  their  appointment  and  despatch. 
For  since  I  am  recording  under  each  year  the  contemporary 
events  in  several  countries,  and  endeavouring  to  take  a  sum- 
mary review  of  them  all  together  at  the  end,  this  must  of  neces- 
sity form  a  feature  in  my  history. 

17.  Agepolis  and  his  colleagues  found  Q.  Marcius  himself 
encamped  near  Heracleum  in  Macedonia,  and  ^^^  envoys  visit 
delivered  their  commission  to  him  there.     In     Q.  Marcius 
answer,  he  said  that  "  He  himself  paid  no  atten-     [^^jJ^Pij^^"' 
tioQ  to  those  calumnies,  and  advised  them  not 
to  pay  any  to  those  who  ventured  to  speak  against  Rome." 
He  added  many  other  expressions  of  kindness,  and  even  wrote 
them  in  a  despatch  to  the  people  of  Rhodes.     Agepolis  was 
much  charmed  by  his  whole  reception ;  and  observing  this,  the 
Consul  took  him  aside  and  said  to  him  privately  that  "  He 
wondered  at  the  Rhodians  not  trying  to  put  an  ^^   ^^  ji^^,  ^^^^ 
end  to  the  war,'  which  it  would  be  eminently  in   Rhodians  stop 
'  That  ii,  ibe  war  twtweoi  Anliochtu  and  Plo)eni]i. 


384  THE  HISTORIES  OF  FOLYBIUS  book 

the  war  between  their   interests   to  da"      Did  the  Consul  act 

^"inoiX^?""^  thus  because  he  was  suspicious  of  Antiochus, 
and  was  afraid,  if  he  conquered  Alexandria,  that 
he  would  prove  a  formidable  second  enemy  to  themselves,  seeing 
that  the  war  with  Perseus  was  becoming  protracted,  and  the  war 
for  Coele-Syria  had  already  broken  out  ?  Or  was  it  because  he 
saw  that  the  war  with  Perseus  was  all  but  decided,  now  that 
the  Roman  legions  had  entered  Macedonia,  and  because  he 
had  confident  hopes  of  its  result ;  and  therefore  wished,  by 
instigating  the  Rhodians  to  interfere  between  the  kings,  to  give 
the  Romans  a  pretext  for  taking  any  measures  they  might 
think  good  concerning  them  ?  It  would  not  be  easy  to  say 
for  certain ;  but  I  am  inclined  to  believe  that  it  was  the  latter, 
judging  from  what  shortly  afterwards  happened  to  the  Rhodians. 
However,  Agepolis  and  his  colleagues  immediately  afterwards 
proceeded  to  visit  Gaius  Marcius  Figulus  :  and,  ha\ing  received 
from  him  still  more  extraordinary  marks  of  favour  than  from 
Quintus  Marcius,  returned  with  all  speed  to  Rhodes.  When 
they  received  the  report  of  the  embassy,  and  knew  that  the 
rffrct  of  the     ^^^  commanders  had  vied  with  each  other  in 

warni  reception  warmth,  both  by  word  of  mouth  and  in  their 
of  their        formal  answers,  the  Rhodians  were  universally 

ami^ssadors  on    j  ^^  ^^^  ^^^  ^j^j^  pleasing  expectation.    But 

the  Rhodians.  ...         ,  .11  ..i, 

not  all  m  the  same  spirit:  the  sober-minded 
were  delighted  at  the  good  feeling  of  the  Romans  towards 
them ;  but  the  restless  and  fractious  calculated  in  their  own 
minds  that  this  excessive  complaisance  was  a  sign  that  the 
Romans  were  alarmed  at  the  dangers  in  which  they  found 
themselves,  and  at  their  success  not  having  answered  to  their 
expectations.     But  when  Agepolis  communicated  to  his  friends 

that  he  had  a  private  message  from  Q.  Marcius 

TS  m^e^^^cc'  ^^  ^^^  ^^^^^"  Council  about  putting  an  end  to 

between        the  war  (in  Syria),  then  Deinon  and  his  friends 

Antiochus  Epi-  felt  fully  convinced  that  the  Romans  were  in  a 

Vio^myVhytcoxi.  ^^^^^  ^^^"^^^ '  ^^"^  ^^^^  accordingly  sent  envoys 

also  to  Alexandria  to  put  an  end  to  the  war 
then  existing  between  Antiochus  and  Ptolemy.  .  .  . 


xxviti  ANTIOCHVS  INVADES  EGYPT  385 

Ptolemy  Epiphana,who  diedB.c.  \%i,left  two  sons,  Ptolemy 
Pkilometor  and  Ptolemy  Physcon,  and  a  daughter,  Cleopatra,  by 
his  wife  Cleopatra,  sister  of  Antioekus  Epiphanes.  After  the 
death  of  Ptolemy s  mother  Cleopatra,  his  ministers,  Eulaeus  and 
Lenaeiis,  engaged  in  a  war  with  Antiochus  for  the  recovery  of 
Code-Syria  and  Phoenicia,  which  had  been  taken  by  Aniiochus 
the  Great,  and  which  they  alleged  had  been  assigned  as  a  dower 
to  the  late  Cleopatra.  Their  war  was  singularly  unsuccessful. 
Antieehus  Epiphanes  defeated  their  troops  at  Pelusium,  took 
young  Ptolemy  Philometor  captive,  and  advanced  as  far  as 
Memphis.  Thereupon  Ptolemy  Physcon  assumed  the  royal  title 
at  Alexandria  as  Euergetes  II.,  and  sent  envoys  to  Antiochus  at 
Memphis.  Antiochus,  however,  treated  Ptolemy  Philometor  with 
kindness,  established  him  as  king  at  Memphis,  and  advanced  to 
Naucratis,  and  thence  to  Alexandria,  which  he  besieged  on  the 
pretext  of  re-estahlishing  Philometor.  b.c  171.  See  infra, 
bk.  ag.  ch.  23. 

18.  King  Antiochus  was  a  man  of  ability  in  the  field  and 
daring  in  design,  and  showed  himself  worthy     characier  of 
of  the   royal    name,  except    in   regard   to  his    Antiochus  IV. 
manceuvres  at  Peiusium.  .  .  .  (Epiphanes). 

19.  ^Vhen  Antiochus  was  actually  in  occupation  of  Egypt, 
Comanus  and   Cineas,  after  consultation  with    comanus  and 
king  Ptolemy  Physcon,  determined  upon  sum- Cineas.  Physcon  s 
moning  a  conference  of  the  most  distinguished  ""ni^wrap  tieip- 
Egyptian  nobles  to  consult  about  the  danger     embassies  \o 
which   threatened  them.     The   first  resolution      Aniiochus, 
the  conference  came  to  was  to  send  the  Greek       ^'^  '*'■ 
envoys  who  were  then  at  Alexandria  as  envoys  to  Antiochus 
to  conclude  a  pacification.     There  were  at  that  time  in  the 
country  two  embassies  from  the  Achaean  league,  one  which 
had  been  sent  to  renew  the  alliance  between  the  league  and 
Egypt,  and  which  was  composed  of  Alcithus  of  Aegium,  son  of 
Xenephon,  and  Pasiodes,  and  another  sent  to  give  notice  of 
the  festival  of  the  Antigoneia.'     There  was  also  an  embassy 

'  The  Anligoneia  was  a  festival  established  in  honour  of  Antigonus  Doson, 
who  had  been  a  benefactor  of  Ihc  Achaeans.  In  30,  33,  il  is  mentioned  as 
being  celebrated  in  Sicyon.  The  benefaclions  of  this  Macedonian  king  lo  the 
Achaeans  are  mentioned  by  Pnusnnias  (B,  8,  la), 

VOL.  11  3  C 


386  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  book 

from  Athens  led  by  Demaratus  on  the  subject  of  some 
present,  and  two  sacred  embassies,  one  in  connexion  with  the 
Panathenaea  under  the  presidency  of  Callias  the  pancratiast, 
and  the  other  on  the  subject  of  the  mysteries,  of  which 
Cleostratus  was  the  active  member  and  spokesman.  There 
were  also  there  Eudemus  and  Hicesius  from  Miletus,  and 
Apollonides  and  Apollonius  from  Clazomenae.  The  king 
also  sent  with  them  Tlepolemus  and  Ptolemy  the  rhetorician 
as  envoys.  These  men  accordingly  sailed  up  the  river  to  meet 
Antiochus.  .  .  . 

20,  While  Antiochus  was  occupying  Egypt,^  he  was  visited 
Th  G    ic      ^y  ^^  Greek  envoys  sent  to  conclude  terms  of 
envoys  visit     pcace.     He  received  them  courteously,  devoted 
Antiochus  and   the  first  day  to  giving  them  a  splendid  enter- 
cndcavourto    t^inment,  and  on  the  next  granted  them  an 
interview,  and  bade  them  deliver  their  instruc- 
tions.    The  first  to  speak  were  the  Achaeans,  the  next  the 
Athenian  Demaratus,  and  after  him  Eudemus  of  Miletus.    And 
as  the  occasion  and  subject  of  their  speeches  were  the  same, 
the  substance  of  them  was  also  nearly  identical.     They  all  laid 
^.  .  the  blame  of  what  had  occurred  on  Eulaeus,  and 

'  referring  to  Ptolemy's  youth  and  his  relationship 
to  himself,  they  intreated  the  king  to  lay  aside  his  anger. 
Tlicreupon  Antiochus,  after  acknowledging  the  general  truth 

of  their  remarks,  and  even  supporting  them  by 
Antiochus  additional  arguments  of  his  own,  entered  upon 
a  defence  of  the  justice  of  his  original  demands. 
He  attempted  to  establish  the  claim  of  the  king  of  Syria  on 
Coele- Syria,  "  Insisting  upon  the  fact  that  Antigonus,  the 
founder  of  the  Syrian  kingdom,  exercised  authority  in  that 
country ;  and  referring  to  the  formal  cession  of  it  to  Seleucus,- 
after  the  death  of  Antigonus,  by  the  sovereigns  of  Macedonia. 
Next  he  dwelt  on  the  last  conquest  of  it  by  his  father 
Antiochus ;  and  finally  he  denied  that  any  such  agreement 
was  made  between  the  late  king  Ptolemy  and  his  father  as 
the  Alexandrian  ministers  asserted,  to  the  effect  that  Ptolemy 
was  to  take  Coele-Syria  as  a  dowry  when  he  married  Cleopatra, 

*  Sec  27,  19  ;  18,  I,  17. 
^  Selcucus  Nicanor,  B.C.  306-280. 


XiviTi  ANTIOCHUS  EPIPHANES  IN  EGYPT  387 

the  mother  of  the  present  king."     Having  by  these  ai^uments 

not  only  persuaded  himself,  but  the  envoys  also,        . 

of  the  justice  of  his  claim,  he  sailed  down  the    pi^s  Naucraiis" 

river  to  Naucraiis.    There  he  treated  the  inhabi-      and  ihence 

tants  with  humanity,  and  gave  each  of  the  Greeks      nflvances  to 

living  there  a  gold  piece,  and  then  advanced 

towards  Alexandria,     He  told  the  envoys  that  he  would  give 

them  an  answer  on  the  return  of  Aristeides  and  Thesis,  whom 

he  had  sent  on  a  mission  to  Ptolemy ;  and  he  wished,  he  said, 

that  the  Greek  envoys  should  all  be  cognisant  and  witnesses  of 

their  report,  ,  .  . 

21.  The  eunuch  Eulaeus  persuaded  Rolemy  to  collect  his 
money,  Give  up  liis  kingdom  to  his  enemies,  _.      ., .  . 
and  retire  to  Samothrace.     This  will  be  to  any  of  Eulaeus  upon 
one  who  reflects  upon  it  a  convincing  proof  of        Piolcmy 
the  supreme  mischief  done  by  evil  companions  ^o™**?^.   He 

, ,       f        ,        ^,  ;  .      "^  ,    advises  hira  10 

of  boyhood.     That  a  monarch  so  entirely  out  of       yidd  10 
reach  of  personal  danger  and  so  far  removed    Antiochus  and 
from  his  enemies,  should  not  make  one  effort  to     u^^''^ '" 
save  his  honour,  while  in  possession  too  of  such 
abundant  resources,  and  master  over  such  wide  territory  and 
such  numerous  subjects,  but  should  at  once  without  a  blow 
surrender  a  most  splendid  and  wealthy  kingdom,^is  not  this 
the  sign  of  a  spirit  utterly  effeminate  and  corrupted?     And  if 
this  had  been  Ptolemy's  natural  character,  we  must  have  laid 
the  blame  upon  nature  and  not  upon  any  external  influence. 
But  since  by  his  subsequent  achievements  his  natural  character 
has   vindicated   itself,  by  proving  Ptolemy  to  be  sufficiently 
resolute  and  courageous  in  the  hour  of  danger,  we  may  clearly, 
without  any  improbability,  attribute  to  this  eunuch,  and  his  com- 
panionship with  the  king  in  his  boyhood,  the  ignoble  spirit 
displayed  by  him  on  that  occasion,  and  his  idea  of  going  to 
Samothrace.  .  .  . 

22.  After  raising  the  siege  of  Alexandria,  Antiochus  sent 
envoys  to  Rome,  whose  names  were  Meleager,  Amioehus  leax-cs 
Sosiphanes,  and  Heracleides,  agreeing  to  pay  one  Alexandria 
hundred  and  fifty  talents,  fifty  as  a  compliment-  ^'"  =  '™^'  '*'"B 
ary  present  to  the  Romans,  and  the  rest  as  a  gift  ^^^^^^^ 
to  be  divided  among  certain  cities  in  Greece.  ...     See  29,  35. 


_,  .^^.iiigs  10  Dom  Kingao 
existini;  hetwcen  the  two  kings  the 
wliii  h  a  peace  would  be  to  both, 
the  ervoy  in  the  middle  of  his  s\ 
was  no  need  of  much  talking,  for  ll: 
elder  Ptolemy,  and  with  him  he  hac 
they  were  friends,  and  if  the  peo 
him  Antiochus  would  not  prevent 
word,  .  .  . 


BOOK   XXIX 

1.   "Their  one  idea,  expressed  at  parties  or  conversations  in 
the  street,  was,  that  they  should  manage  the  war 
in  Macedonia  while  remaining  quietly  at  homec^j^^'j^e^iUuj 
in  Rome,  sometimes  by  criticising  what  the      PauUus,  c. 
generals  were  doing,  at  others  what  they  were  H^'?'""  ^"''"'=|?- 
leaving  undone.     From  this  the  public  interests  ,[,g  j^l^hof  l. 
never  got  any  good,  and  often  a  great  deal  of  Aemiiius  before 
harm.     The  generals  themselves  were  at  times  ^'^'"e  for '^<»- 
greatly  hampered  by  this  ill-timed   loquacity.     lJ^"^,  33. 
For  as  it  is  the  invariable  nature  of  slander  to 
spread  rapidly  and  slop  at  nothing,  the  people  got  thoroughly 
infected  by  this  idle  talk,  and  the  generals  were  consequently 
rendered  contemptible  in  the  eyes  of  the  enemy."  .  .  . 

2.  The  Senate  being  informed  that  Antiochus    ,   ^  ^^ 

had  become  master  of  Egypt,  and  all  but  taken     embassy  from 
Alexandria,  and  conceiving  that  the  aggrandise-  Piolcmy  Physcon 
ment  of  that  king  was  a  matter  affectins  them-      "I"'  **"  ^"'" 
■  -        1    .-.   ■        T.      ■•■  ,        ■  Cleopatra,  the 

selves,  appomted  Gaius  Popilms  and  others  Senate  sunds  Gaius 
to  go  as  ambassadors  to  put  an  end  to  the    Popilius  Laetias 
war,   and   generally   to   inspect  the  state   of    '^  Alexandria, 
affairs.  .  .  .  '"''■ "'  '"■ 

S.  Hippias,  and  the  other  ambassadors  sent  by  Perseus,  to 
Genthius  to  make  an  alliance  with  him,  returned  cemhius  joins 
before  the  winter,  and  reported  that  Genthius  Perseus  on  being 
would  undertake  to  join  in  the  war  with  Rome  if  ™ppii«i  with  300 
he  was  paid  three  hundred  talents  and  received 
proper  securities.  Thereupon  Perseus  sent  Pantauchus,  one 
of  his  chief  friends,  with  the  following  instructions  :  He  was 
to  agree  to  pay  Genthius  the  money ;  to  interchange  oaths  of 
alliance ;  to  take  from  Genthius  such  hostages  as  he  himself 


...^  jMOjccisoi  I'crseus.      i 
to  and  reducx'd  U)  writing',  (icnlhii 
whose  names  Pantaucluis   had   cai 
text  of  the  treaty  ;  and  with  them 
receive  the  oaths  and  hostages  froi 
were  to  have  charge  of  the  mone 

and  also  consents  ^im  to  send  also  sor 
to  join  in  a     a  mission  to  Rhodes ' 

"RhJS^  ^°      ^"  ^^^^^  ^^  negotiate ; 
the  three  states.     Foi 

the  Rodians  consented  to  embark  upc 
they  would  be  easily  able  to  conquer 
listened  to  the  suggestion,  and  appoint 
to  undertake  the  mission ;  with  instr 
they  had  received  the  oaths  and  host 
the  question  of  the  money  had   beei 
proceed  on  the  embassy  to  Rhodes. 
4i.  So    these   various    ambassador 
Perseus  meets    Macedonia.     ButPanU 
Uie  envoys  from  of  the  young  king,  and 
Genihms  ;      ^^g  necessity  of  makii 
and   urging   him   not   to   be  too  lat< 
especially  urgent  that  he  should  prepc 
for,  as  the  Romans  were  quite  unprep 
on  the  coasts  both  of  Epirus  and  Illyr 
form  would  be  easilv  '* — 


XXIX  GENTHIUS  JOINS  PERSEUS  39 1 

in  the  presence  of  the  whole  body  of  cavalry ;  for  he  was  very 
anxious  that  the  Macedonians  should  know  of  the  adhesion  of 
Genthius,  hoping  that  this  additional  advantage  would  have 
the  effect  of  raising  their  courage :  and  next  he  received  the 
hostages  and  handed  over  his  own  to  Olympion  and  his 
colleagues,  the  noblest  of  whom  were  Limnaeus,  the  son  of 
Polemocrates,  and  Balacrus,  son  of  Pantauchus.  Lastly,  he 
sent  the  agents  who  had  come  for  the  money  to  Pella,  assuring 
them  that  they  would  receive  it  there  :  and  appointed  the  am- 
bassadors for  Rhodes  to  join  Metrodorus  at  Thessalonica,  and 
hold  themselves  in  readiness  to  embark. 

This  embassy  succeeded  in  persuading  the  Rhodians   to 
join  in  the  war.    And,  having  accomplished  this,  ^^^  sends  others 
Perseus    next  sent  Herophon,   who  had  been  to  Eumenes  and 
similarly   employed   before,   on   a  mission    to      Amiochus. 
Eumenes;  and  Telemnastos  of  Crete  to  Antiochus  to   urge 
him  "  Not  to  let  the  opportunity  escape ;  nor  to  imagine  that 
Perseus  was  the  only  person  affected  by  the  overbearing  and 
oppressive  conduct  of  Rome :  but  to  be  quite  sure  that,  if  he 
did  not  now  assist  Perseus,  if  possible  by  putting  an  end  to 
the  war,  or,  if  not,  by  supporting  him  in  it,  he  would  quickly 
meet  with  the  same  fate  himself."  .  .  . 

6.  In  venturing  upon  a  narrative  of  the  intrigues  of  Perseus 
and  Eumenes,  I  have  felt  myself  in  a  position  The  intrigues  of 
of  great  embarrassment.     For  to  give  full  and     Perseus  and 
accurate  details  of  the  negotiations,  which  these       Eumenes. 
two  kings  conducted  in  secret  between  themselves,  appeared 
to  me  to  be  an  attempt  open  to  many  obvious  criticisms  and 
exceedingly  liable  to  error :  and  yet  to  pass  over  in  complete 
silence  what  seemed  to  have  exercised  the  most  decisive  in- 
fluence in  the  war,  and  which  alone  can  explain  many  of  the 
subsequent  events,  seemed  to  me  to  wear  the  appearance  of 
a  certain  sluggishness  and  entire  want  of  enterprise.     On  the 
whole,  I  decided  to  state  briefly  what  I  believed  to  be  truth, 
and  the  probabilities  and  surmises  on  which  I  founded  that 
opinion ;  for  I  was,  in  fact,  during  this  period  more  struck 
than  most  people  at  what  happened. 

6.  I  have  already  stated^  that  Cydas  of  Crete,  while,  serving 

*  In  a  previous  part  of  the  book  now  lost.     See  Livy,  44,  25. 


X  cibcus  to  EumenL'S,  and  that  the 
began    to   have   reasonable   suspiei 
rendered  clear  from  what    hapjjen* 
allowed  this  prince  to  come  to  Ro 
I  to  transact  the  business  he  had  on  t 

a  favourable  answer  and  dismissed 
kindness,  although  he  had  done  th( 
portance  in  the  war  with  Perseus ;  i 
rendered  them  the  most  important  st 
them   again   and   again   in   their  wa 
Perseus,  they  not  only  prevented  fron 
bade  him  leave  Italy  within  a  certain  \ 
it  was  mid-winter.     Therefore  it  is  qu 
triguing  had  been  taking  place  between 
to  account  for  the  alienation  of  the  R 
What  this  was,  and  how  far  it  went,  is 
inquiry. 

7.  We  can  easily  satisfy  ourselves 
_       .  .     ,  ,    have  wished  Perseus  to  1 

The  ongin  of  the        ,   , 

intrigue  between  ^"^  become  supreme  ir 
Eumenesand    nothing  of  the  traditioi 
Perseus  was  the  existing  between  these 

idea  of  the  former, ,    • 

that,  both  sides  theu:  respective  powers  ^ 
being  tired  of  the  distrust,  jealousy,  and,  ii 
war,  he  might    mosity  between  t^***^ 

intervene  with    ^,. 


xxiK  EUMENES  INTRIGUES  WITH  PERSEUS  393 

result,  because  they  made  no  real  progress  in  the  war  until 
Paul  us  took  the  coiumand,  and  because 
Aetolia  was  in  a  dangerous  state  of  excite- 
ment, he  conceived  that  it  would  not  be  impossible  that  the 
Romans  would  consent  to  some  means  of  ending  the  war  and 
making  terms  :  and  he  looked  upon  himself  as  the  most  proper 
person  to  act  as  mediator  and  elfcct  the  reconciliation.  With 
these  secret  ideas  in  his  mind,  he  began  sounding  Perseus  by 
means  of  Cydas  of  Crete,  the  year  before,  to  find  out  how 
much  he  would  be  inclined  to  pay  for  such  a  chance.  This 
appear  to  me  to  be  the  origin  of  their  connexion  with  each 
other. 

8.  Two  kings,  one  of  whom  was  the  most  unprincipled 
and  the  other  the  most  avaricious  in  the  world,  TheU-irgain 
being  now  pitted  against  each  other,  theiraiicmpiedbctwecn 
mutual  stru^les  presented  a  spectacle  truly  liumenesand 
ridiculous.  Eumenes  held  out  every  kind  of 
hope,  and  threw  out  every  species  of  bait,  believing  that  he 
would  catch  Perseus  by  such  promises,  Perseus,  without 
waiting  to  be  approached,  rushed  to  the  bait  held  out  to  him, 
and  made  for  it  greedily ;  yet  he  could  not  make  up  his  mind 
to  swallow  it,  to  such  an  extent  as  to  give  up  any  money. 
The  sort  of  huckstering  contest  that  went  on  between  them 
was  as  follows.  Eumenes  demanded  five  hundred  talents  as 
the  price  of  his  abstention  from  co-operating  with  the  Romans 
by  land  and  sea  during  the  fourth  year  of  the  war,  and  fifteen 
hundred  for  putting  an  end  to  the  war  altogether,  and  pro- 
mised to  give  hostages  and  securities  for  his  promise  at  once. 
Perseus  accepted  the  proposal  of  hostages,  named  the 
number,  the  time  at  which  they  were  to  be  sent,  and  the 
manner  of  their  safe  custody  at  Cnosus.  But  as  to  the  money, 
he  said  that  it  would  be  disgraceful  to  the  one  who  paid,  and 
still  more  to  the  one  who  received  it,  to  be  supposed  to  remain 
neutral  for  hire ;  but  the  fifteen  hundred  talents  he  would 
send  in  charge  of  Folemocrates  and  others  to  Samothrace, 
to  be  held  as  a  deposit  there.  Now  Perseus  was  master  of 
Samothrace ;  but  as  Eumenes,  like  a  poor  physician,  preferred 
a  retatning-fee  to  a  payment  after  work,  he  finally  gave  U|) 
the  attempt,  when  he  found  that  his  own  craftiness  was  no 


394  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  book 


match  for  the  meanness  of  Perseus.  They  thus  parted  on 
equal  terms,  leaving,  like  good  athletes,  the  battle  of  avarice 
a  drawn  one.  Some  of  these  details  leaked  out  at  the  time, 
and  others  were  communicated  subsequently  to  Perseus's 
intimate  friends ;  and  he  has  taught  us  by  them  that  every 
vice  is  clinched,  so  to  speak,  by  avarice. 

9.  I  add  the  further  question  from  my  own  reflexions, 
Reflexions  on  the  whether  avarice  is  not  also  short-sighted  ?  For 
blindness  of  the  who  could  fail  to  remark  the  folly  of  both  the 
avancious  kings,  kings  ?  How  could  Eumenes  on  the  one  hand 
expect  to  be  trusted  by  a  man  with  whom  he  was  on  such  bad 
terms;  and  to  get  so  large  a  sum  of  money,  when  he  was 
able  to  give  Perseus  absolutely  no  security  for  recovering 
it,  in  case  of  his  not  carrying  out  his  promises?  And 
how  could  he  expect  not  to  be  detected  by  the  Romans  in 
taking  so  large  a  sum  ?  If  he  had  concealed  it  at  the  time  he 
certainly  would  not  have  done  so  long.  Moreover,  he  would 
have  been  bound  at  any  rate,  in  return  for  it,  to  have  adopted 
the  quarrel  with  Rome ;  in  which  he  would  have  been  certain 
to  have  lost  the  money  and  his  kingdom  together,  and  very 
probably  his  life  also,  by  coming  forward  as  an  enemy  of  the 
Romans.  For  if,  even  as  it  was,  when  he  accomplished 
nothing,  but  only  imagined  it,  he  fell  into  the  gravest  dangers, 
what  would  have  happened  to  him  if  this  design  had  been 
brought  to  perfection  ?  And  again,  as  to  Perseus — who  could 
fail  to  be  surprised  at  his  thinking  anything  of  higher  import- 
ance, or  more  to  his  advantage,  than  to  give  the  money  and 
allow  Eumenes  to  swallow  the  bait  ?  For  if,  on  the  one  hand, 
Eumenes  had  performed  any  part  of  his  promises,  and  had 
put  an  end  to  the  war,  the  gift  would  have  been  well  bestowed ; 
and  if,  on  the  other  hand,  he  had  been  deceived  of  that 
hope,  he  could  at  least  have  involved  him  in  the  certain 
enmity  of  Rome;  for  he  would  have  had  it  entirely  in  his 
own  power  to  make  these  transactions  public.  And  one  may 
easily  calculate  how  valuable  this  w^ould  have  been  to  Perseus, 
whether  he  succeeded  or  failed  in  the  war :  for  he  would 
have  regarded  Eumenes  as  the  guilty  cause  of  all  his  mis- 
fortunes, and  could  in  no  way  have  retaliated  upon  him  more 
effectually  than  by  making  him  an  enemy  of  Rome.     What 


ixix  THE  AVARICE  OF  PERSEUS  395 

then  was   the   root   of  all   this   blind   folly?     Nothing  but 

avarice.    It  could  have  been  nothing  else  ;  for,  to  save  himself 

from  giving  money,  Perseus  was  content  to  suffer 

anything,   and   neglect  every  other  considera- ^cmiiiui"^  la 

tion.     On  a  par  too  with  this  was  his  conduct 

to  the  Gauls  and  Genthius.  .  .  . 

10.  The  question  being  put  to  the  vote  at  Rhodes,  it  was 
carried  to  send  envoys  to  negotiate  a  peace ; 

and  this  decree  thus  decided  the  relative  mXe^afu^^jJ^ 
strength  of  the  opposite  political  parties  at  to  (onn  a  con- 
Rhodes  [as  has  been  stated  in  my  essay  on  fedoraiion  againsi 
public  speaking],  showing  that  the  party  for  '["™^„|,",'o^^;' 
siding  with  Perseus  was  stronger  than  that 
which  was  for  preserving  their  country  and  its  laws.  The 
Prytanies  immediately  appointed  ambassadors  to  negotiate 
the  cessation  of  the  war :  Agepolis,  Diodes,  and  Cleombrotus 
were  sent  to  Rome ;  Damon,  Nicostratus,  Agesilochus,  and 
Telephus  to  Perseus  and  the  consul.  The  Rhodians  went  on 
in  the  same  spirit  to  take  farther  steps,  so  that  they  eventually 
committed  themselves  past  all  excuse.  For  they  at  once 
sent  ambassadors  to  Crete,  to  renew  their  friendly  relations 
with  the  entire  Cretan  people,  and  to  urge  that,  in  view  of  the 
dangers  that  threatened  them,  they  should  throw  in  their  lot  with 
the  people  of  Rhodes,  and  hold  the  same  people  to  be  friends 
and  enemies  as  they  did,  and  also  to  address  the  separate  cities 
to  the  same  effect.  .  .  . 

11.  When   the   embassy   led   by  Parmenio   and  Morcus 
from  Genthius,  accompanied  by  those  led  by   The  manner  in 
Metrodorus,   arrived   in  Rhodes,  the  assembly  which  this  vote  of 
summoned  to  meet  them  proved  very  turbulent,  ""^  >j°^'^'fia^* 
the  party  of  Deinon  venturing  openly  to  plead  '  '  ' 

the  cause  of  Perseus,  whilst  that  of  Theaetetus  was  quite  over- 
powered and  dismayed.  For  the  presence  of  the  Illyrian 
galleys,  the  nunilier  of  the  Roman  cavalry  that  had  been 
killed,  and  the  fact  of  Genthius  having  changed  sides,  quite 
crushed  them.  Thus  it  was  that  the  result  of  the  meeting  of 
the  assembly  was  as  I  have  described  it.  For  the  Rhodians 
voted  to  return  a  favourable  answer  to  both  kings,  to  state 
that  they  had  resolved  to  put  an  end  to  the  war,  and  to 


396  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  book 

exhort  the  kings  themselves  to  make  no  difficulty  about  the 
terms.  They  also  received  the  ambassadors  of  Genthius 
at  the  common  altar- hearth  or  Prytaneum  of  the  city  with 
every  mark  of  friendship.  .  .  . 

1 2.  Other  historians  [have  spoken  in  exaggerated  terms]  * 

of  the  Syrian  war.      And  the  reason  is  one 

P^y&mcth^  which  I  have  Often  mentioned.     Though  their 

in  writing  history,  subjccts  are  simple  and  without  complications, 

and  his  avoidance  they  seek  the  name  and  reputation  of  historians 

^^'d^t^iSr^     not  from  the  truth  of  their  facts,  but  the  number 

of  their  books ;  and  accordingly  they  are  obligod 
to  give  petty  affairs  an  air  of  importance,  and  fill  out  and  give 
rhetorical  flourishes  to  what  was  originally  expressed  briefly; 
dress  up  actions  and  achievements  which  were  originally  quite 
secondary;  expatiate  on  struggles;  and  describe  pitched  battles, 
in  which  sometimes  ten  or  a  few  more  infantry  fell,  and  still 
fewer  cavalry.  As  for  sieges,  local  descriptions,  and  the  like, 
one  cannot  say  that  their  treatment  is  adequate,  because  they 
have  no  facts  to  give.  But  a  writer  of  universal  history  must 
pursue  a  different  plan ;  and  therefore  I  ought  not  to  be  con- 
demned for  minimising  the  importance  of  events,  if  I  some- 
times pass  over  affairs  that  have  met  with  wicie  fame  and 
laboured  description,  or  for  mentioning  them  with  brevity  ;  but 
I  ought  to  be  trusted  to  give  to  each  subject  the  amount  of  dis- 
cussion which  it  deserves.  Such  historians  as  I  refer  to,  when 
they  are  describing  in  the  course  of  their  work  the  siege,  say 
of  Phanoteia,  or  Coroneia,  or  [Haliartus],  are  forced  to  dis- 
play all  the  contrivances,  bold  strokes,  and  other  features  of  a 
siege ;  and  when  they  come  to  the  capture  of  Tarentum,  the 
sieges  of  Corinth,  Sardis,  Gaza,  Bactra,  and,  above  all,  of 
Carthage,  they  must  draw  on  their  own  resources  to  prolong 
the  agony  and  heighten  the  picture,  and  are  not  at  ail  satisfied 
with  me  for  giving  a  more  truthful  relation  of  such  events  as  they 
really  occurred.  Let  this  statement  hold  good  also  as  to  my 
description  of  pitched  battles  and  public  harangues,  as  well  as 
other  departments  of  history ;  in  all  of  which  I  might  fairly 
claim  considerable  indulgence,  as  also  in  what  is  now  about  to 

*  The  extract  begins  in  the  middle  of  a  sentence  at  the  top  of  a  page.      I 
have  supplied  these  words  at  a  guess,  giving  what  seems  the  sense. 


XXIX  OF  PROPOKTION  IN  HISTORY  397 

be  narrated,  if  I  am  detected  in  some  inconsistency  in  the 
substance  of  my  story,  the  treatment  of  my  facts,  or  the  style 
of  language ;  and  also  if  1  make  some  mistakes  in  the  names 
of  mountains  or  rivers,  or  the  special  features  of  localities :  for 
indeed  the  magnitude  of  my  work  is  a  sufficient  excuse  in  all 
these  points,  unless,  indeed,  I  am  ever  detected  in  deliberate 
or  interested  misstatements  in  my  writings :  for  such  I  ask  no 
indulgence,  as  I  have  repeatedly  and  explicitly  remarked  in 
the  course  of  my  history.  .  .  . 

IS.  Genthius,  king  of  the  lllyrians,  disgraced  himself  by 
many  abominable  actions  in  the  course  of  his  intemperance 
life  from  his  addiction  to  drink,  in  which  he  in-  and  bruiaiiiy  of 
dulged  continually  day  and  night.  Among  other  Genthius. 
things  he  killed  his  brother  Plastor,  who  was  about  to  marry 
the  daughter  of  Monunius,  and  married  the  girl  himsel£  He 
also  behaved  with  great  cruelty  to  his  subjects.  .  .  . 

In  the  spring  of  B.C.  1 68  Genthius  was  forced  to  surrender  to 
the  praetor  L.  Anidus  Gallus  {Livy,  44,  30-31).  The  consul 
L.  Aemilius  Paulus  found  Perseus  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Mace- 
donian river  Enipeus  in  a  very  strong  position,  which  was  how- 
ever turned  by  a  gallant  exploit  of  JVasica  and  Q.  J^abius 
Maximus,  who  made  their  way  with  a  considerable  force  oi^erthe 
mountains,  thus  getting  on  the  rear  of  Perseus.  Liiy,  44, 
30-35.     Plutarch,  Aemil.  15. 

14h  The  first  man  to  volunteer  to  make  the  outflanking 
movement  was    Scipio    Nasica,    son-in-law  of 

Scipio  Africanus,  who   afterwards  became  the  '^ri!^lZ'''''i'"' 
^  ^         ,  ,  II,     ^^^  others  volun- 

most  mnuential  man  m  the  Senate,'  and  who  iccr  to  cross  the 
now  undertook  to  lead  the  party.     The  second    mouniaina  into 
was  Fabius  Maximus,  the  eldest  of  the  sons  of      q„|^JJIJ^  ^ 
the  consul  Aemilius  Paulus,*  still  quite  a  young 
man,    who   stood    forward    and    offered    to   join    with    great 

■  P.  Corncliiu  Scipio  Nasica  Corculum  was  afterwards  Ponlifex  Maximus 
(rc  150).     See  Cic  de  Sen.  3.  ja 

'  Of  the  two  eldest  sons  o[  Aemilius.  the  elder  was  adopted  by  Quinlus 
Fabius  Maximus.  Ihc  second  by  P.  Cornelius  Scipio,  son  of  the  elder  Af  ' 
his  malemal  uncle. 


398  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  book 

enthusiasm.     Aemilius  was  therefore  delighted  and  assigned 
them  a  body  of  soldiers.  ^  .  .  . 

Struggle  in  the        1^*  The   Romans  offered  a  gallant  resist- 
bedoftheEnipeus.ance  by  aid  of  their  strong  targets  or  Ligurian 

Livy.  44.  35-     shields.    .    .    . 

Perseus  saw  that  Aemilius  had  not  moved,  and  did  not 

The  Romans    ^ckon  on  what  was  taking  place,  when  suddenly 

force  the  heights  a  Cretan,  who  had  deserted  from  the  Roman 

by  way  of  army  on  its  march,  came  to  him  with  the  in- 
y  eum.  formation  that  the  Romans  were  getting  on  his 
rear.  Though  thrown  into  the  utmost  panic  he  did  not  strike 
his  camp,  but  despatched  ten  thousand  mercenaries  and  two 
thousand  Macedonians  under  Milo,  with  orders  to  advance  with 
speed  and  seize  the  heights.  The  Romans  fell  upon  these  as 
they  were  lying  asleep.*  .  .  . 

16.  An  eclipse  of  the  moon  occurring,  the  report  went 
abroad,  and  was  believed  by  many,  that  it  signified  an  eclipse 
of  the  king.  And  this  circumstance  raised  the  spirits  of  the 
Romans  and  depressed  those  of  the  Macedonians.  So  true  is  the 
common  saying  that  "war  has  many  a  groundless  scare. "^  .  .  . 

Perseus  finding  himself  thus  on  the  point  of  being  outflanked 
retired  on  Pydna^  near  which  toivn  Aemilius  Paulus,  after 
considerable  delay ,  about  midsummer  inflicted  a  crushing  defeat 
upon  him.  Perseus  fled  to  Amphipolis,  and  thence  to  Samothrace^ 
7vliere  lie  was  captured  by  Paulus  and  taken  to  Rome  to  adorn 
his  triumph  J  and  afterwards  alloived  to  live  as  a  private  person 
at  Alba,  This  was  the  end  of  tlie  Mcuedonian  kingdom,  {Livy, 
44,  36-43;  45,  1-8.     Plutarch,  Aemil.  16-23.) 

^  From  Plutarch,  Aemilius,  15,  who  adds  that  Polybius  made  a  mistake  as 
to  the  number  of  soldiers  told  off  for  this  service,  which  to- judge  from  Livy, 
44,  35,  Polybius  probably  stated  at  5000.    Plutarch  got  his  correction  from  an 
extant  letter  of  Nasica  (8000  Roman  infantry,   with  120  horse,   and   200 
Thracians  and  Cretans). 

"^  From  Plutarch,  who  again  contradicts  this  last  statement,  on  the  authority 
of  Nasica,  who  said  that  there  was  a  sharp  engagement  on  the  heights. 

'  The  Roman  was  saved  from  a  scare  by  the  eclipse  being  foretold  by  Gaius 
Sulpicius  Gallus,  famous  for  his  knowledge  of  Greek  literature  and  astronomy. 
He  is  represented  by  Cicero  as  explaining  the  celestial  globe  {spkaera)  which 
Marcellus  brought  from  Syracuse.  He  was  consul  in  B.C.  166.  Livy,  44,  37  ; 
Cicero,  Brut,  §  78 ;  <^  Repub,  i,  §  21. 


xiix  BATTLE  OF  PYDN^A  399 

17.  The  consul  Lucius  Aemilius  had  never  seen  a  phalanx 
until  he  saw  it  in  the  army  of  Perseus  on  this  1^  phalani  at 
occasion ;  and  he  often  confessed  to  some  of  his     the  hatiie  of 
friends  at  Rome  subsequently,  that  he  had  never         ^'''S 
beheld  anything  more  alanning  and  terrible  than 

the  Macedonian  phalanx:  and  yet  he  had  been,  if  any  one  ever  . 
had,  not  only  a  spectator  but  an  actor  in  many  battles.  .  .  . 

Many  plans  which  look  plausible  and  feasible,  when 
brought  to  the  test  of  actual  experience,  tike  base  coins 
when  brought  to  the  furnace,  cease  to  answer  in  any  way  to 
their  original  conceptions.  .  .  . 

When  Perseus  came  to  the  hour  of  trial  his  courage  all  left 
him,  like  that  of  an  athlete  in  bad  training.  For  when  the 
danger  was  approaching,  and  it  became  necessary  to  fight  a 
decisive  battle,  his  resolution  gave  way.  ,  .  . 

As  soon  as  the  battle  began,  the  Macedonian  king  played 
the  coward  and  rode  off  to  the  town,  under  the  pretext  of 
sacrificing  to  Hercules, — who  certainly  does  not  accept  craven 
gifts  from  cravens,  nor  fulfil  unworthy  prayers.  .  ,  . 

18.  He  was  then  very  young,  and  it  was  his  first  experience 
of  actual  service  in  the  field,  and  having  but  scipo  Afncinus 
recently  begun  to  taste  the  sweets  of  promotion,  the  younger,  cf. 
he  was  keen,  ambitious,  and  eager  to  be  first.  .  . ,  ^"t-  *''•  <*  ''' 

19.  Just  when  Perseus  had  been  beaten  and  was  trying  to 
save  himself  by  flight,  the  Senate  determined  to    xh^  Rhodbn 
admit  the  ambassadors,  who  had  come   from   mission  deliver 
Rhodes  to  negotiate  a  peace,  to  an  audience :  '^"^'^  i^ssage  too 
Fortune  thus  appearing  designedly  to   parade 

the  folly  of  the  Rhodians  on  the  stage, — if  we  may  say  "  of  the 
Rhodians,"  and  not  rather  "  of  the  individuals  who  were  then 
in  the  ascendant  at  Rhodes."  VVhen  Agesipolis  and  his 
colleagues  entered  the  Senate,  they  said  that  "  They  had  come 
to  arrange  an  end  to  the  war ;  for  the  people  of  Rhodes, — see- 
ing that  the  war  was  become  protracted  to  a  considerable  length 
of  time,  and  seeing  that  it  was  disadvantageous  to  all  the  Greeks, 
as  well  as  to  the  Romans  themselves,  on  account  of  its  enormous 
expenses, — had  come  to  that  conclusion.  Hut  as  the  war  was 
already  ended,  and  the  wish  of  the  Rhodians  was  thus  fulfilled, 
they  had  only  to  congratulate  the  Romans."     Such  was  the 


400  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  book 

brief  speech  of  Agesipolis.  But  the  Senate  seized  the  oppor- 
tunity of  making  an  example  of  the  Rhodians,  and  produced  an 
answer  of  which  the  upshot  was  that  "They  did  not  regard  this 
Uncompromising  embassy  as  having  been  sent  by  the  Rhodians 
answer  of  the  in  the  interests  either  of  the  Greeks  or  them- 
Senate.  selves,  but  in  those  of  Perseus.  For  if  they  had 
meant  to  send  an  embassy  in  behalf  of  the  Greeks,  the  proper 
time  for  doing  so  was  when  Perseus  was  plundering  the  territory 
and  cities  of  Greece,  while  encamped  for  nearly  two  years  in 
Thessaly.  But  to  let  that  time  pass  without  notice,  and  to 
come  now  desiring  to  put  an  end  to  the  war,  at  a  time  when 
the  Roman  legions  had  entered  Macedonia,  and  Perseus  was 
closely  beleagured  and  almost  at  the  end  of  his  hopes,  was  a 
clear  proof  to  any  one  of  observation  that  the  Rhodians  had 
sent  their  embassy,  not  with  the  desire  of  ending  the  war,  but 
to  rescue  and  save  Perseus  to  the  best  of  their  ability.  There- 
fore they  deserved  no  indulgence  at  the  hands  of  the  Romans 
at  this  time,  nor  any  favourable  reply."  Such  was  the  Senate's 
answer  to  the  Rhodians.  .  .  . 

20.  Then  Aemilius  Paulus  speaking  once  more  in  Latin  bade 
Perseus,  being  ^^  members  of  his  council,  "  With  such  a  sight 

brought  a      before  their  eyes,'* — pointing  to  Perseus, — "  not 
prisoner  before  ^q  ^g  ^^^  boastful  in  thc  hour  of  success,  nor  to 

and  his  council,  ^^^  ^"X  extreme  or  inhuman  measures  against 

refuses  to  reply  any  one,  nor  in  fact  ever  to  feel  confidence  in 

to  his  questions,  ^^  permanence  of  their  present  good  fortune. 

the  king  in  Greek  ^^t^er  it  was  precisely  at  the  time  of  greatest 

and  then  his     success,  either  private  or  public,   that   a  man 

council  in  Latin,  should  be  most  alive  to  the   possibility  of  a 

»vy,  45.    •     reverse.     Even  so  it  was  difficult  for  a  man  to 

exhibit   moderation   in   good   fortune.      But   the   distinction 

between  fools  and  wise  was  that  the  former  only  learnt  by  their 

own  misfortunes,  the  latter  by  those  of  others."  .  .  . 

21.  One  is  often  reminded  of  the  words  of  Demetrius  of 
Demetrius  of  Phalerum.  In  his  treatise  on  Fortune,  wishing 
Phaierum  on    to  give  the  world  a  distinct  view  of  her  mutability, 

mutability,  j^^  fixed  upon  the  period  of  Alexander,  when 
that  monarch  destroyed  the  Persian  dynasty,  and  thus  expresses 
himself:  "If  you  will  take,  I  don't  say  unlimited  time  or  many 


ixix  UNCERTAINTIES  OF  FORTUNE  401 

generations,  but  only  these  last  fifty  years  immediately  preceding 
our  generation,  you  will  be  able  to  understand  the  cruelty  of 
Fortune.  For  can  you  suppose,  If  some  god  had  warned 
the  Persians  or  their  king,  or  the  Macedonians  or  their  king, 
that  in  fifty  years  the  very  name  of  the  Persians,  who  once 
were  masters  of  the  world,  would  have  been  lost,  and  that  the 
Macedonians,  whose  name  was  before  scarcely  known,  would 
become  masters  of  it  ail,  that  they  would  have  believed  it? 
Nevertheless  it  is  true  that  Fortune,  whose  influence  on  our  life 
is  incalculable,  who  displays  her  power  by  surprises,  is  even 
now  I  think,  showing  all  mankind,  by  her  elevation  of  the 
Macedonians  into  the  high  prosperity  once  enjoyed  by  the 
Persians,  that  she  has  merely  lent  them  these  advantages  until 
she  may  otherwise  determine  concerning  them."  And  this  has 
now  come  to  pass  in  the  person  of  Perseus ;  and  indeed 
Demetrius  has  spoken  prophetically  of  the  future  as  though  he 
were  inspired.  And  as  the  course  of  my  history  brought  me  to 
the  period  which  witnessed  theruinofthe  Macedonian  kingdom, 
I  judged  it  to  be  right  not  to  pass  it  over  without  proper 
remark,  especially  as  I  was  an  eye-witness  of  the  transaction. 
It  was  a  case  I  thought  both  for  enlarging  on  the  theme 
myself,  and  for  recalling  the  words  of  Demetrius,  who  appeared 
to  me  to  have  shown  something  more  than  mere  human 
sagacity  in  his  remarks ;  for  he  made  a  true  forecast  of  the 
future  almost  a  hundred  and  fifty  years  before  the  event.  .  .  . 
2Z  After  the  conclusion  of  the  battle  between  Perseus  and 
the  Romans,  king  Eumenes  found  himself  in 
what  people  call  an  unexpected  and  extraordin-  ai„^ys"b^^!^ 
ary  trouble,  but  what,  if  we  regard  the  natural 
course  of  human  concerns,  was  quite  an  everyday  affair.  For 
it  is  quite  the  way  of  Fortune  to  confound  human  calculations 
by  surprises ;  and  when  she  has  helped  a  man  for  a  time,  and 
caused  her  balance  to  incline  in  his  favour,  to  turn  round 
upon  him  as  though  she  repented,  throw  her  weight  into  the 
opposite  scaJe,  and  mar  all  his  successes.  And  i;umencs  disnp. 
this  was  the  case  now  with  Eumenes.  He  im-  poinicd  ot  his 
agined  that  at  last  his  own  kingdom  was  safe,  """l"  "^  l"'"'  ^1 
and  that  he  might  look  forward  to  a  tmie  of 
ease,  now  that  Perseus  and  the  whole  kingdom  of  Macedonia 


iS. 

23.    In  ihc  Peloponnesu 
of  the  winter . 

This  gave  rist 
sions.     The  party  of  Callicr 
granting  the  help ;  while  Arc 
for  sending  it  to  the  kings  in . 
alliance.     For  by  this  time  it  1 
Ptolemy  had  been  proclaimed  I 
owing  to  the  danger  which  t. 
elder  had  subsequently  retume< 
ing  jointly  with  his  sister.     A 

tkind  of  assistance,  they  sent  J 
the  Achaeans,  asking  a  thousar 
with  Lycortas  to  command  th< 
^  They  sent  a  message  also  to  ' 

him  to  hire  them  a  thousand 

chanced  to  have  become  intims 

ticular  men,  owing  to  the  tran 

The  ambassadors  arrived  whei 

session  in  Corinth.     They  the 

'  recalling  the   many  evidences 

j  Achaeans  to  the  kingdom  of  ] 

!  the  danger  in  tri>!-»- 


xxiK       THE  PTOLEMIES  ASK  HELP  FROM  ACHAIA         403 

forces  for  the  service  of  Rome.  For  there  was  a  general 
expectation  just  then  of  a  decisive  battle  being  fought,  as  Q. 
Philippus  was  wintering  in  Macedonia. 

24.  The  people  were  alarmed  lest  they  should  be  thought 
to  (ail  the  Romans  in  any  way  :  and  accordingly  pdybius  advo- 
LycoTtas  and  Polybius  rose  in  their  turn,  and,  cates  the  cause  of 
among  other  advice  which  they  impressed  upon  ""^  ftolenues. 
them,  argued  that  "  ^Vhen  in  the  previous  year  the  Achaeans 
had  voted  to  join  the  Roman  army  with  their  full  levy,  and 
sent  Polybius  to  announce  that  resolution,  Quintus  Marcius, 
while  accepting  the  kindness  of  their  intention,  had  yet  stated 
that  the  assistance  was  not  needed,  since  he  had  won  the  pass 
into  Macedonia.  Their  opponents  therefore  were  manifestly 
using  the  need  of  helping  the  Romans  merely  as  a  pretext  for 
preventing  this  aid  being  sent  to  Alexandria.  They  entreated 
the  Achaeans,  in  view  of  the  greatness  ofthe  danger  surrounding 
the  king  of  Egypt,  not  to  neglect  the  right  moment  for  acting; 
but  keeping  in  mind  their  mutual  agreement  and  good  services, 
and  above  all  their  oaths,  to  fulfil  the  terms  of  their  agree- 
ment." 

The  people  were  once  more  inclined  to  grant  the  aid  when 
ihey  hear4  this  :  but  Callicrates  and  his  party 
managed  to  prevent  the  decree  being  passed,  by  *''^  j^^^^^'^'* 
staggering  the  magistrates  with  the  assertion 
that  it  was  unconstitutional  to  discuss  the  question  of  sending 
help  abroad  in  public  assembly.^  But  a  short  time  afterwards 
a  meeting  was  summoned  at  Sicyon,  which  was  ^^^  ^^  ^  smaller 
attended  not  only  by  the  members  of  the  coun-  meeting  ai  Sicyon 
cil,  but  by  all  citizens  over  thirty  years  of  age ;  ^°^i^"^  prevails, 
and  after  a  lengthened  debate,  Polybius  especially  dwelling  on 
the  fact  that  the  Romansdid  not  require  assistance, — inwhich  he 
was  believed  not  to  be  speaking  without  good  reason,  as  he  had 
spent  the  previous  summer  in  Macedonia  at  the  headquarters 

'  ir  irft^.  The  objection,  though  it  served  to  divert  the  magistrates  Irom 
going  on  with  the  proposilion  Bl  Ihc  lime,  seems  10  have  been  got  over  bcCore 
the  meeting  at  Sicyon ;  unless,  indeed,  the  laller  was  considered  to  be  of  a 
diflcrenl  nature  in  regard  to  the  nge  of  those  nttcnding.  But  we  have  no  in- 
fonnalion  as  to  Ihisrcstdclion  of  thiny  years  of  .-ige, — wheihei  it  was  universal. 
or  confined  to  particular  occasions.  This  passage  would  seem  to  point  to  the 
)Ut«r  alternative; 


404  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBWS  book 

of  Marcius  Philippus, — and  also  alleging  that,  even  supposing 
the  Romans  did  turn  out  to  require  their  active  support,  the 
Achaeans  would  not  be  rendered  incapable  of  furnishing  it  by 
the  two  hundred  horse  and  one  thousand  foot  which  were  to 
be  despatched  to  Alexandria, — for  they  could,  without  any  in- 
convenience, put  thirty  or  forty  thousand  men  into  the  field, — 
the  majority  of  the  meeting  were  convinced,  and  were  inclined 
to  the  idea  of  sending  the  aid  Accordingly,  on  the  second  of 
the  two  days  on  which,  according  to  the  laws,  those  who 
wished  to  do  so  were  bound  to  bring  forward  their  motions, 
Lycortas  and  Polybius  proposed  that  the  aid  should  be  sent 
Callicrates,  on  the  other  hand,  proposed  to  send  ambassadors 
to  reconcile  the  two  Eg>'ptian  kings  with  Antiochus.  So  once 
more,  on  these  two  motions  being  put,  there  was  an  animated 
contest ;  in  which,  however,  Lycortas  and  Polybius  got  a  con- 
siderable majority  on  their  side.  For  there  was  a  very  wide 
distinction  between  the  claims  of  the  two  kingdoms.  There 
were  very  few  instances  to  be  found  in  past  times  of  any  act 
of  friendship  on  the  part  of  Syria  to  the  Greeks, — though  the 
liberality  of  the  present  king  was  well  known  in  Greece, — but 
from  Egypt  the  acts  of  kindness  in  past  times  to  the  Achaeans 
had  been  as  numerous  and  important  as  any  one  could  possibly 
expect.  By  dwelling  on  this  point  Lycortas  made  a  great 
impression,  because  the  distinction  between  the  two  kingdoms 
in  this  respect  was  shown  to  be  immense.  For  it  was  as  diffi- 
cult to  count  up  all  the  benefactions  of  the  Alexandrine  kings, 
as  it  was  impossible  to  find  a  single  act  of  friendship  done  by 
the  dynasty  of  Antiochus  to  the  Achaeans.  .  .  . 

25.  For  a  time  Andronidas  and  Callicrates  kept  on  arguing 

The  measure  is  ^^  support  of  the  plan  of  putting  an  end  to 
again  defeated  by  the   war  :   but  as  no  One  was  persuaded  by 

a  trick  of  Caiii-  them,  they  employed  a  stratagem.  A  letter- 
carrier  came  into  the  theatre  (where  the  meet- 
ing was  being  held),  who  had  just  arrived  with  a  despatch  from 
Quintus  Marcius,  urging  those  Achaeans  who  were  of  the  pro- 
Roman  party  to  reconcile  the  kings ;  for  it  was  a  fact  that  the 
Senate  had  sent  a  mission  under  T.  Numisius  to  do  so.  But 
this  really  made  against  their  argument :  for  Titus  Numisius 
and  his  colleagues  had  been  unable  to  effect  the  pacification,  and 


Mil  ANTIOCHVS  FORCED  TO  LEAVE  EGYPT  405 

had  returned  to  Rome  completely  unsuccessful  in  the  object 
of  their  mission.  However,  as  Polybius  and  his  party  did 
not  wish  to  speak  against  the  despatch,  from  consideration  for 
Marcius,  they  retired  from  the  discussion  :  and  it  was  thus 
that  the  proposal  to  send  an  aid  to  the  kings  fell  througL  The 
Achaeans  voted  to  send  ambassadors  to  effect  The  ^ngj  ^\^ 
the  pacification  :  and  Archon  of  Aegeira,  and  for  Lyconas  and 
Arcesilaus  and  Ariston  of  Megalopolis  were  Polybius. 
appointed  to  the  duty.  Whereupon  the  envoys  of  Ptolemy, 
being  disappointed  of  obtaining  the  help,  handed  over  to  the 
magistrate  the  despatch  from  the  kings,  in  which  they  asked 
that  they  would  send  Lycortas  and  Polybius  to  take  part  in 
the  war.  .   .  . 

26.  Forgetful  of  all  he  had  written  and  said  Anliochus 
began   preparing   for   a   renewal    of   the   war 

against  Rolemy.  So  true  are  the  words  of  '^^'^."^rM^i™'^' 
Simonides, — "  'Tis  hard  to  be  good."  For  to  ihus  joining  each 
have  certain  impulses  towards  virtue,  and  even  oiher,  Amiochus 
to  hold  to  it  up  to  a  certain  point,  is  easy ;  but  ^'^™^^  'ils""' 
to  be  uniformly  consistent,  and  to  allow  no 
circumstances  of  danger  to  shake  a  resolute  integrity,  which 
regards  honour  and  justice  as  the  highest  considerations,  is 
indeed  difficult.   ... 

27.  WhenAntiochus  had  advanced  to  attack  Ptolemy  inorder 
to  possess  himself  of  Pelusium,  he  was  met  by  *„,.,[,„_  j  „ 
the  Roman  commander  Gaius  Popilius  Laenas.  near  Alexandria 
Upon  the  king  greeting  him  from  some  distance,  (Li'7.  4S.,f»)by 
and  holding  out  his  right  hand  to  him,  Popilius  \^fr^^^\,o 
answered  by  holding  out  the  tablets  which  con-  forces  him  to  ab- 
tained  the  decree  of  the  Senate,  and  bade  s'ain  from  the 
Antiochus  read  that  first :  not  thinking  it  right,  '^"" 

I  suppose,  to  give  the  usual  sign  of  friendship  until  he  knew 
the  mind  of  the  recipient,  whether  he  were  to  be  regarded  as  a 
friend  or  foe.  On  the  king,  after  reading  the  despatch,  saying 
that  he  desired  to  consult  with  his  friends  on  the  situation, 
Popilius  did  a  thing  which  was  looked  upon  as  exceedingly 
overbearing  and  insolent  Happening  to  have  a  vine  stick  in 
hb  hand,  he  drew  a  circle  round  Antiochus  with  it,  and  ordered 
him  to  give  his  answer  to  the  letter  before  he  stepped  out  of 


406  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS         book  xxix 

* 

that  circumference.  The  king  was  taken  aback  by  this  haughty 
proceeding.  After  a  brief  interval  of  embarrassed  silence,  he 
replied  that  he  would  do  whatever  the  Romans  demanded. 
Then  Popilius  and  his  colleagues  shook  him  by  the  hand,  and 
one  and  all  greeted  him  with  warmth.  The  contents  of  the 
despatch  was  an  order  to  put  an  end  to  the  war  with  Ptolemy 
at  once.  Accordingly  a  stated  number  of  days  was  allowed 
him,  within  which  he  withdrew  his  army  into  Syria,  in  high 
dudgeon  indeed,  and  groaning  in  spirit,  but  yielding  to  the 
necessities  of  the  time. 

Popilius    and    his    colleagues    then    restored    order    in 

Popilius  goes  on  Alexandria;  and  after  exhorting  the  two  kings  to 

to  Cyprus  and    maintain  peaceful  relations  with  each  other,  and 

forces  the  anny  charging  them  at  the  same  time  to  send  Poly- 

ofAntiochusto  ^^^^yg   ^Q   Rome,  they  took   ship   and   sailed 

evacuate  it  >  j  ^ 

towards  Cyprus,  with  the  intention  of  promptly 
ejecting  from  the  island  the  forces  that  were  also  gathered 
there.  When  they  arrived,  they  found  that  Ptolemy's  generals 
had  already  sustained  a  defeat,  and  that  the  whole  island  was 
in  a  state  of  excitement  They  promptly  caused  the  invading 
army  to  evacuate  the  country,  and  remained  there  to  keep 
watch  until  the  forces  had  sailed  away  for  Syria.  Thus  did 
the  Romans  save  the  kingdom  of  Ptolemy,  when  it  was  all  but 
The  previous  sinking  under  its  disasters.  Fortune  indeed  so 
defeat  of  Perseus  disposed  of  the  fate  of  Perseus  and  the  Mace- 
I^vlui^of^  ^^t  ^^"^^'^s,  that  the  restoration  of  Alexandria  and 
gyp .  ^^  ^^Qie  Qf  Egypt  was  decided  by  it ;  that  is 
to  say,  by  the  fate  of  Perseus  being  decided  previously :  for  if 
that  had  not  taken  place,  or  had  not  been  certain,  I  do  not 
think  that  Antiochus  would  have  obeyed  these  orders. 


BOOK  XXX 

1.  Attalus,  brother  of  king  Eumenes,  came  to  Rome  this 
year,  pretending  that,  even  if  the  disaster  of  the  b.c.  167.  Coss.Q. 
Gallic  rising  had  not  happened  to  the  kingdom,  Aciius  Pactus.  M. 
he  should  have  come  to  Rome,  to  congratulate  J^^^  Pennus. 
the  Senate,  and  to  receive  some  mark  of  its  ^    , 

,    -       ,       .        ,  .     ,  ,  Attains  at  Rome, 

approval  for  having  been  actively  engaged  on  is  persuaded  to 
their  side  and  loyally  shared  in  all  their  dangers ;  try  by  the  Roman 
but,  as  it  happened,  he  had  been  forced  to  come  *^®^P  ^Z  ^"PP^***^ 

.    ,         '  ^  .  ,       ,  c  »iis  brother. 

at  that  time  to  Rome  owing  to  the  danger  from 
the  Gauls.  Upon  finding  a  general  welcome  from  everybody, 
owing  to  the  acquaintance  formed  with  him  on  the  campaign, 
and  the  belief  that  he  was  well  disposed  to  them,  and  meeting 
with  a  reception  that  surpassed  his  expectation,  the  young 
man's  hopes  were  extraordinarily  raised,  because  he  did  not 
know  the  true  reason  of  this  friendly  warmth.  The  result  was 
that  he  narrowly  escaped  ruining  his  own  and  his  brother's 
fortunes,  and  indeed  the  entire  kingdom.  The  majority  at  Rome 
were  thoroughly  angry  with  king  Eumenes,  and  believed  that 
he  had  been  playing  a  double  game  during  the  war,  keeping  up 
communications  with  Perseus,  and  watching  his  opportunity 
against  them :  and  accordingly  some  men  of  high  rank  got 
Attalus  under  their  influence,  and  urged  him  to  lay  aside  the 
character  of  ambassador  for  his  brother,  and  to  speak  in  his 
own  behalf;  as  the  Senate  was  minded  to  secure  a  separate 
kingdom  and  royal  government  for  him,  because  of  their  dis- 
pleasure with  his  brother.  This  excited  the  ambition  of 
Attalus  still  more,  and  in  private  conversation  he  signified  his 
assent  to  those  who  advised  this  course.  Finally,  he  arranged 
with  some  men  of  position  that  he  would  actually  appear 
before  the  Senate  and  deliver  a  speech  on  the  subject. 


4o8  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  book 


2.  ^Vhile  Attalus  was  engaged  on  this  intrigue,  Eumenes, 

Stratius  is  sent  to  faring  what  w^ould  happen,  sent  his  physician 

dissuade  Attalus  Stratius  to  Rome,  putting  him  in  possession  of 

from  his  meditated  ^j^^  facts,  and  charging  him  to  employ  every  means 

to  prevent  Attalus  from  following  the  advice 
of  those  who  wished  to  ruin  their  kingdom.  On  arriving  at 
Rome  and  getting  Attalus  by  himself,  he  used  a  great  variety 
of  arguments  to  him  (and  he  was  a  man  of  great  sense 
and  powers  of  persuasion),  and  at  length,  with  much  trouble, 
succeeded  in  his  object,  and  in  recalling  him  from  his 
mad  project  He  represented  to  him  that  "he  was  already 
practically  joint-king  with  his  brother,  and  only  differed  from 
him  in  the  fact  that  he  wore  no  diadem,  and  was  not  called 
king,  though  in  everything  else  he  possessed  an  equal  and 
identical  authority :  that  in  the  future  he  was  the  acknowledged 
heir  to  the  crown,  and  with  no  very  distant  prospect  of  posses- 
sion ;  as  the  king,  from  tlie  weak  state  of  his  health,  was  in  con- 
stant expectation  of  his  departure,  and  being  childless  could 
not,  even  if  he  wished  it,  leave  the  crown  to  any  one  else." 
(For  in  fact  that  natural  son  of  his,  who  afterwards  succeeded 
to  the  crown,  had  not  as  yet  been  acknowledged.)  "  Above  all, 
he  was  surprised  at  the  hindrance  Attalus  was  thus  interposing 
to  the  measures  necessary  at  that  particular  crisis.  For  they 
ought  to  thank  heaven  exceedingly  if  they  proved  able,  even 
with  hearty  co-operation  and  unanimity,  to  repel  the  threatened 
attack  of  the  Gauls ;  but  if  he  should  at  such  a  time  quarrel 
with  and  oppose  his  brother,  it  was  quite  clear  that  he  would 
ruin  the  kingdom,  and  deprive  himself  both  of  his  present 
power  and  his  future  expectations,  and  his  other  brothers  also 
of  the  kingdom  and  the  power  they  possessed  in  it,"  By  these 
and  similar  arguments  Stratius  dissuaded  Attalus  from  taking 
any  revolutionary  steps. 

8.  Accordingly,  when  Attalus  appeared  before  the  Senate, 
he  congratulated  it  on  what  had  happened ;  expatiated  on  the 
loyalty  and  zeal  shown  by  himself  in  the  war  with  Perseus ;  and 
urged  at  some  length  that  the  Senate  should  send  envoys  to 
restrain  the  audacity  of  the  (iauls,  and  compel  them  to  confine 
themselves  once  more  to  their  original  boundaries.  He  also 
said  something  about  the  cities  of  Aeneus  and  Maronea,  desiring 


ixx  ATTALUS  AT  ROME  409 

that  they  might  be  given  as  a  free  gift  to  himself  But  he  said 
not  a  single  word  against  the  Icing,  or  about  the  partition  of  the 
kingdom.  The  senators,  supposing  that  he  would  interview 
them  privately  on  a  future  occasion  upon  these  points,  pro- 
mised to  send  the  envoys,  and  loaded  him  lavishly  with  the 
customary  presents,  and,  moreover,  promised  him  these  cities. 
But  when,  after  receiving  these  marks  of  favour,  he  at  once 
left  Rome  without  fulfilling  any  of  its  expectations,  the 
Senate,  though  foiled  in  its  hopes,  had  nothing  else  which  it 
could  do ;  but  before  he  had  got  out  of  Italy  it  declared 
Acneus  and  Maronea  free  cities, — thus  rescind- 
ing its  promise, — and  sent  Publius  Licinius  at  oaLiUa '° 
the  head  of  a  mission  to  the  Gauls.  And  what 
instructions  these  ambassadors  had  given  to  them  it  is  not  easy 
to  say,  but  it  may  be  guessed  without  difficulty  from  what  sub- 
sequently happened.  And  this  will  be  rendered  clear  from  the 
transactions  themselves. 

4,  There  also  came  embassies  from  Rhodes,  the  first  headed 
by    Philocrates,     the     second    by    Philophron 
and  Astymrfo.      For  when  the  Rhodans  re-  ",^'^^ 
ceived   the  answer  given   to   the  embassy  of      b.c.  167. 
Agesipolis  immediately  after  the  battle  of  Pydna,     g^  ^    ^ 
they    understood    the    anger    and    threatening 
attitude  of  the  Senate  towards  them,  and  promptly  despatched 
these   embassies.     Aslymedes  and   Philophron,    observing  in 
the  course  of  public  and  private  conversations  the  suspicions 
and  anger  entertained  towards  them  at  Rome,  were  reduced  to 
a  stale  of  great  discouragement  and   distress.     Terror  of  ihe 
But  when  one   of  the  praetors    mounted    the  Rhodian  envoys  ai 
Rostra  and  urged  the  people  to  declare  war""'"'"^' °'"^''- 
a;;ainst  Rhodes,  then  indeed  they  were  beside  themselves  with 
terror  at   the  danger  that   threatened   their  country.     They 
assumed  mourning  garments,  and  in  their  various  interviews 
with  their  friends  dropped  the  tone  of  persuasion  or  demand, 
and  pleaded  instead,  with  tears  and  prayers,  that  they  would  not 
adopt  any  measure  of  supreme  severity  towards  them.     A  few 
days  afterwards  Antony,  one  of  the  tribimes,  introduced  them 
to  the  Senate,  and  dragged  the  praetor  who  advised  the  war 
down    from   the    Rostra.     Philophron  spoke   first,  and    was 


4IO  THE  nrSTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  BOOK 

followed  by  Astymedcs ;  and,  having  thus  uttered  the 
proverbial  "  swan's  song,**  they  received  an  answer  which,  while 
freeing  them  from  actual  fear  of  war,  conveyed  a  bitter  and 
stern  rebuke  from  the  Senate  for  their  conduct.  Now  Asty- 
medes  considered  himself  to  have  made  a  good  speech  on 
A  criticism  on  the  behalf  of  his  country,  but  did  not  at  all  satisfy 

speech  of  the  the  Greeks  visiting  or  residing  at  Rome.  For 
Rhodian  jjg  aftcrwards  published  the  speech  contain- 
s  >mtc  cs.  .^^  j^.^  argument  in  defence,  which,  to  all  those 
into  whose  hands  it  fell,  appeared  absurd  and  quite  uncon- 
vincing. For  he  rested  his  plea  not  alone  on  the  merits  of  his 
country,  but  still  more  on  an  accusation  of  others.  Comparing 
the  good  services  done  and  the  co-operation  undertaken  by 
the  others,  he  endeavoured  to  deny  or  minimise  them ;  while 
he  exaggerated  those  of  Rhodes  as  far  above  their  actual 
amount  as  he  could.  The  errors  of  others,  on  the  contrary, 
he  inveighed  against  in  bitter  and  hostile  terms,  while  those  of 
the  Rhodians  he  attempted  to  cloak  and  conceal,  in  order 
that,  by  this  comparison,  those  of  his  own  country  might  appear 
insignificant  and  pardonable,  those  of  others  grave  and  beyond 
excuse,  "all  of  whom,"  he  added,  **  had  already  been  pardoned 
before."  But  this  sort  of  pleading  can  in  no  circumstances  be 
considered  becoming  to  a  statesman.  Take  the  case  of  the 
betrayal  of  secrets.  It  is  not  those  who,  for  fear  or  gain,  turn 
informers  that  we  commend ;  but  those  who  endure  any  torture 
and  punishment  rather  than  involve  an  accomplice  in  the  same 
misfortune.  These  are  the  men  whom  we  approve  and  con- 
sider noble.  But  a  man  who,  from  some  undefined  alarm, 
exposes  to  the  view  of  the  party  in  power  all  the  errors  of 
others,  and  who  recalls  what  time  had  obliterated  from  the 
minds  of  the  ruling  people,  cannot  fail  to  be  an  object  of  dis- 
like to  all  who  hear  of  it. 

5.     After  receiving  the  above  answer  Philocrates  and  his 

colleagues  immediately  started  home ;  but  Asty- 

^^'^ansvv^r  ihc^  "^  medes  and  his  fellows  stayed  where  they  were  and 

Rhodians  endea-  kept  on  the  watch,  that  no  report  or  observation 

vour  to  propitiate  against  thcir  country  might  be  made  unknown 

1  k^'^^^rorr      to  them.     But  when  this  answer  of  the  Senate 
was  reported  at  Rhodes,  the  people,  considering 


XXX    THE  RHODIANS  TRY  TO  EXCUSE  THEMSELVES  ^\\ 

themselves  relieved  of  the  worst  fear — that,  namely,  of  war — 
made  light  of  the  rest,  though  extremely  unfavourable.  So  true 
it  ever  is  that  a  dread  of  worse  makes  men  forget  lighter  mis- 
fortunes. They  immediately  voted  a  complimentary  crown 
worth  ten  thousand  gold  pieces^  to  Rome,  and  appointed 
Theaetetus  at  once  envoy  and  navarch  to  convey  it  at  the  be- 
ginning of  summer,  accompanied  by  an  embassy  under  Rhodo- 
phon,  to  attempt  in  every  possible  way  to  make  an  alliance 
with  the  Romans.  They  acted  thus  because  they  wished  that, 
if  the  embassy  failed  by  an  adverse  answer  at  Rome,  the  failure 
might  take  place  without  the  people  having  passed  a  formal 
decree,  the  attempt  being  made  solely  on  the  initiative  of  the 
navarch,  and  the  navarch  having  by  the  law  power  to  act  in 
such  a  case.  For  the  fact  was  that  the  republic  xhe  astuteness  of 
of  Rhodes  had  been  administered  with  such  the  Rhodian 
consummate  statesmanship,  that,  though  it  had  po^cy. 
for  nearly  a  hundred  and  forty  years  been  engaged  in  con- 
junction with  Rome  in  actions  of  the  greatest  importance  and 
glory,  it  had  never  yet  made  an  alliance  with  her.  Nor 
ought  I  to  omit  stating  the  reason  of  this  policy  of  the 
Rhodians.  They  wished  that  no  ruler  or  prince  should  be 
entirely  without  hope  of  gaining  their  support  or  alliance ;  and 
they  therefore  did  not  choose  to  bind  or  hamper  themselves 
beforehand  with  oaths  and  treaties ;  but,  by  remaining  uncom- 
mitted, to  be  able  to  avail  themselves  of  all  advantages  as  they 
arose.  But  on  this  occasion  they  were  much  bent  upon 
securing  this  mark  of  honour  from  Rome,  not  because  they 
were  anxious  for  the  alliance,  or  because  they  were  afraid  of 
any  one  else  at  the  time  except  the  Romans,  but  because  they 
wished,  by  giving  an  air  of  special  importance  to  their  design, 
to  remove  the  suspicions  of  such  as  were  inclined  to  entertain 
unfavourable  thoughts  of  their  state.  For  immediately  after 
the  return  of  the  ambassadors  under  Theaetetus,  caunus.in  Peraca, 
the  Caunians  revolted  and  the  Mylassians  seized  and  Myiassa.  in 
on  the  cities  in  Euromus.  And  about  the  same  ^''^^'  ''*^^°^^* 
time  the  Roman  Senate   published   a   decree  declaring   all 

*  Livy  says  viginii  millia.  By  "xpwTov^  Polybius  appears  to  mean 
"staters,"  worth  about  20  drachmae  (20  francs).  This  would  give  a  rough 
value  of  the  present  as  ;f  8000,  or  on  Livy's  computation  twice  that  amount. 


4 1 2  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  BOOK 


Carians  and  Lycians  free  who  had  been  assigned  to  the  Rhodians 
The  Senate  de-  ^^^^^  ^^^  war  with  Antiochus.  The  Caunian  and 
Clare  Caria  and  Mylassian  revolts  were  speedily  put  down  by 
Lycia  free.    See  jj^g  Rhodians ;  for  they  compelled  the  Caunians, 

by  sending  Lycus  with  a  body  of  soldiers,  to 
return  to  their  allegiance,  though  the  people  of  Cib)rra  had 
come  to  their  assistance ;  and  in  an  expedition  into  Euromus 
they  conquered  the  Mylassians  and  Alabandians  in  the  field, 
these  two  peoples  having  combined  their  forces  to  attack 
Orthosia.  But  when  the  decree  concerning  the  Lycians  and 
Carians  was  announced  they  were  once  more  in  a  state  of 
dismay,  fearing  that  their  gift  of  the  crown  had  proved  in 
vain,  as  well  as  their  hopes  of  an  alliance.  .  .  . 

6.  I  have  already  directed  my  readers'  attention  to  the 
The  three  classes  poHcy  of  Deinon  and  Polyaratus.  For  Rhodes 
of  men  who  in  the  was  not  the  only  place  which  experienced  grave 
various  states  got  (jancrer  and  important  changes.     Nearly  all  the 

into  trouble  for  «•       j  •       i  -r        -n     i 

their  conduct  States  sufTcred  m  the  same  way.  It  will  there- 
during  the  Mace-  fore  be  instructive  to  take  a  review  of  the 
donian  war.  policy  adopted  by  the  statesmen  in  the  several 
countries,  and  to  ascertain  which  of  them  will  be  proved  to 
have  acted  with  wisdom,  and  which  to  have  done  otherwise  : 
in  order  that  posterity  in  similar  circumstances  of  danger  may, 
with  these  examples  as  models,  so  to  speak,  before  their  eyes, 
be  able  to  choose  the  good  and  avoid  the  bad  with  a  genuine 
insight ;  and  may  not  in  the  last  hour  of  their  lives  dishonour 
their  previous  character  and  achievements,  from  failing  to  per- 
ceive where  the  path  of  honour  lies.  There  were,  then, 
three  different  classes  of  persons  who  incurred  blame  for  their 
conduct  in  the  war  with  Perseus.  One  consisted  of  those 
who,  while  displeased  at  seeing  the  controversy  brought  to  a 
decisive  end,  and  the  control  of  the  world  fall  into  the  power  of 
one  government,  nevertheless  took  absolutely  no  active  steps  for 
or  against  the  Romans,  but  left  the  decision  entirely  to  Fortune. 
A  second  consisted  of  those  who  were  glad  to  see  the 
question  settled,  and  wished  Perseus  to  win,  but  were  unable  to 
convert  the  citizens  of  their  own  states  or  the  members  of 
their  race  to  their  sentiments.  And  a  third  class  consisted  of 
those  who  actually  succeeded  in  inducing  their  several  states 


XXX  GREEK  STATES  AND  THE  WAR  WITH  PERSEUS  ^\^ 

to  change  round  and  join  the  alliance  of  Perseus.  Our 
present  task  is  to  examine  how  each  of  these  conducted  their 
respective  policies, 

7.  In  the  last  class  were  Antinous,  Theodotus,  and  Cephalus, 
who  induced  the  Molossians  to  join  Perseus.       . 

These  men,  when  the  results  of  the  campaign  ^j^J^^^^j^^^^  (-^.p^, 
went  completely  against  them,  and  they  found  lus  of  the  Moiossi 
themselves  in  imminent  danger  of  the  worst  ^"^  instances  of 

X    yy    e  '^       J         ^    the  third  class. 

consequences,  put  a  bold  face  upon  it  and  met 
an  honourable  death  in  the  field.     These  men  deserve  our 
commendation  for  their  self-respect,  in  refusing  to  allow  them- 
selves to  lapse  into  a  position  unworthy  of  their  previous  life. 

Again,   in  Achaia   and  Thessaly  and  Perrhaebia   several 
persons  incurred  blame  by  remaining  neutral,  ^ 

^1  J    .»    ^    ^v  ^  r^«         ^u    •     Several  instances 

on  the  ground  that  they  were  watching  their  ^f  j^e  first  class 
opportunity,  and  were  in  heart  on  the  side  of      in  Achaia 
Perseus  :  and  yet  they  never  let  a  word  to  that  P^^io^Js,  Thessaly, 

rt-  «t  1  !•     iincl  Perrhaebia, 

effect  get  abroad,  nor  were  ever  detected  m 
sending  letter  or  message  to  Perseus  on  any  subject  whatever, 
but  conducted  themselves  with  unexceptionable  discretion. 
Such  men  as  these  therefore  very  properly  determined  to  face 
judicial  inquiry  and  stand  their  judgment,  and  to  make  every 
effort  to  save  themselves.  For  it  is  quite  as  great  a  sign  of 
cowardice  to  abandon  life  voluntarily  when  a  man  is  conscious 
of  no  crime,  from  fear  of  the  threats  of  political  opponents  or 
of  the  power  of  the  conquerors,  as  it  is  to  cling  to  life  to  the 
loss  of  honour. 

Again,  in  Rhodes  and  Cos,  and  several  other  cities,  there 
were  men  who  favoured  the  cause  of  Perseus,  instances  of  the 
and  who  were  bold  enough  to  speak  in  behalf  second  class  in 
of  the  Macedonians  in  their  own  cities,  and  to  ^*^ojJ«S'  ^os,  and 
inveigh  against  the  Romans,  and  to  actually    °  er paces, 
advise  active  steps  in  alliance  with  Perseus,  but  who  were  not 
able  to  induce  their  states  to  transfer  themselves  to  alliance 
with  the  king.     The  most  conspicuous  of  such  men  were  in 
Cos  the  two  ^brothers  Hippias  and  Diomedon,  and  in  Rhodes 
Deinon  and  Polyaratus. 

8,  And  it  is  impossible  not  to  view  the  policy  of  these 
men    with    disapproval.      To    begin    with,    all   their   fellow- 


414  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  BOOK 

citizens  were  aware  of  everything  they  had  done  or  said ; 
in  the  next  place,  the  letters  were  intercepted  and  made 
public  which  were  coming  from  Perseus  to  them,  and 
from  themselves  to  Perseus,  as  well  as  the  messengers  from 
both  sides :  yet  they  could  not  make  up  their  minds  to 
yield  and  put  themselves  out  of  the  way,  but  still  disputed 
the  point.  The  result  of  this  persistence  and  dinging 
to  life,  in  the  face  of  a  desperate  position,  was  that  they 
quite  ruined  their  character  for  courage  and  resolution, 
and  left  not  the  least  ground  for  pity  or  sympathy  in  the 
minds  of  posterity.  For  being  confronted  with  their  own 
letters  and  agents,  they  were  regarded  as  not  merely  un- 
fortunate, but  rather  as  shameless.  One  of  those  who  went 
on  these  voyages  was  a  man  named  Thoas.  He  had  frequently 
sailed  to  Macedonia  on  a  mission  from  these  men,  and  when 
the  decisive  change  in  the  state  of  affairs  took  place,  conscious 
of  what  he  had  done,  and  fearing  the  consequences,  he  retired 
to  Cnidos.  But  the  Cnidians  having  thrown  him  into  prison, 
he  was  demanded  by  the  Rhodians,  and  on  coming  to  Rhodes 
and  being  put  to  the  torture,  confessed  his  crime ;  and  his 
story  was  found  to  agree  with  everything  in  the  cipher  of 
the  intercepted  letters,  and  with  the  despatches  from  Perseus 
to  Deinon,  and  from  Deinon  and  Polyaratus  to  him.  There- 
fore it  was  a  matter  of  surprise  that  Deinon  persuaded  himself 
to  cling  to  life  and  submit  to  so  signal  an  exposure. 

9.  But  in  respect  to  folly  and  baseness  of  spirit,  Polyaratus 
The  vain  attempts  surpassed  Deinon.     P'or  when  PopUius  Laenas 
of  Polyaratus  to  charged   king  Ptolemy  to  send  Polyaratus  to 
escape,        Rome,  the  king,  from  a  regard  both  to  Poly- 
aratus himself  and  his  country,  determined  not  to  send  him 
to  Rome  but  to  Rhodes,  this  being  also  what  Polyaratus  him- 
self asked  him  to  do.     Having  therefore  caused  a  galley  to 
be  prepared,  the  king  handed  him  over  to  Demetrius,  one  of 
his  own  friends,  and  despatched  him,  and  wrote  a  despatch  to 
the  Rhodians  notifying  the  fact     But  touching  at  Phaselis  in 
Ph     r        ^^  course  of  the  voyage,  Polyaratq^,  from  some 
notion  or  another  which  he   had   conceived, 
took  suppliant  branches  in  his  hand,  and  fled  for  safety  to  the 
city  altar.     If  any  one  had  asked  him  his  intention  in  thus 


XXX  POLYARATUS  OF  RHODES  415 

acting,  I  am  persuaded  that  he  could  not  have  told  it.  For  If 
he  wanted  to  go  to  his  own  country,  where  was  the  need  of  sup- 
pliant branches  ?  For  his  conductors  were  charged _to  take  him 
there.  But  if  he  wished  to  go  to  Rome,  that  was  sure  to  take 
place  whether  he  wished  it  or  no.  What  other  alternative  was 
there?  Other  place  that  could  receive  him  with  safety  to  himself 
there  was  none.  However,  on  the  people  of  Phasclis  sending 
to  Rhodes  to  beg  that  they  would  receive  Polyaratus,  and  take 
him  away,  the  Rhodians  came  to  the  pradent  resolution  of 
sending  an  open  vessel  to  convoy  him ;  but  forbade  the  captain 
of  it  to  actually  take  him  on  board,  on  the  ground  that  the 
officers  from  Alexandria  had  it  in  charge  to  deliver  the  man 
in  Rhodes.  When  the  vessel  arrived  at  Phaselis,  and  its  cap- 
tain, Epichares,  refused  to  take  the  man  on  board,  and 
Demetrius,  who  had  been  deputed  by  the  king  for  that  busi- 
ness, urged  him  to  leave  the  altar  and  resume  his  voyage ;  and 
when  the  people  of  Phaselis  supported  his  command,  because 
they  were  afraid  they  would  incur  some  blame  from  Rome  on 
that  account,  Polyaratus  could  no  longer  resist  the  pressure  of 
circumstances,  but  once  more  went  on  board  Demetrius's  galley. 
But  in  the  course  of  the  voyage  he  seized  an  opportunity  0/ 
doing  the  same  again  at  Caunus,  flying  for 
safety  there  in  the  same  way,  and  begging  the 
Caunians  to  save  him.  Upon  the  Caunians  rejecting  him,  on 
the  grounds  of  their  being  leagued  with  Rhodes,  he  sent 
messages  to  Cibyra,  begging  them  to  receive  him  in  their 
city,  and  to  send  him  an  escort.  He  had  some  claim  upon 
this  city,  because  the  sons  of  its  tyrant,  Pancrales,  had  been 
educated  at  his  house ;  accordingly,  they  listened  to  his  re- 
quest, and  did  what  he  asked.     But  when  he       .     „ . 

^-.  ■  ■        ■    .  -        ,,  .1       and  "l  Cibym. 

got   to   Cibyra,   he   placed   himself   and    the 

Cibyratae  into  a  still  greater  difficulty  than  that  which  he 
caused  before  when  at  Phaselis.  For  they  neither  dared  to 
retain  him  in  their  town  for  fear  of  Rome,  nor  had  the 
power  of  sending  him  to  Rome,  because  of  their  ignor- 
ance of  thf  sea,  being  an  entirely  inland  folk.  Eventu- 
ally they  were  reduced  to  send  envoys  to  Rhodes  and  the 
Roman  proconsul  in  Macedonia,  begging  them  to  take  over 
the  man.     Lucius  Aemilius  wrote  to  the  Cibyratae,  ordering 


4i6  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  book 

them  to  keep  Polyaratus  in  safe  custody;  and  to  the  Rhodians 
to  make  provision  for  his  conveyance  by  sea  and  his  safe 
delivery  upon  Roman  territory.  Both  peoples  obeyed  the 
despatch :  and  thus  Polyaratus  eventually  came  to  Rome,  after 
making  a  spectacle  of  his  folly  and  cowardice  to  the  best  of 
his  ability ;  and  after  having  been,  thanks  to  his  own  folly, 
four  times  surrendered — by  king  Ptolemy,  the  people  of 
Phaselis,  the  Cibyratae,  and  the  Rhodians. 

The  reason  of  my  having  dwelt  at  some  length  on  the 
Story  of  Polyaratus  and  Deinon  is  not  that  I  have  any  desire 
to  trample  upon  their  misfortunes,  for  that  would  be  ungener- 
ous in  the  last  degree ;  but  in  order  that,  by  clearly  showing 
their  folly,  I  might  instruct  those  who  fall  into  similar  difficulties 
and  dangers  how  to  take  a  better  and  wiser  course.  .  .  . 

10.  The  most  striking  illustration  of  the  mutability  and 
The  columns  con-  capriciousness  of  Fortune  is  when  a  man,  within 
structed  ai  Delphi  a  brief  period,  turns  out  to  have  been  preparing 
for  statucsof  Per- |q,.  ^^  ygg  q£  jjjg  enemies  the  very  things  which 

*Aemiiius.^    he  imagined  that  he  was  elaborating  in  his  own 

Autumn  of  B.C.  honour.   Thus  Perseus  was  having  some  columns 

167.  Livy,  45,  27- made,  which  Lucius  Aemilius,  finding  unfinished, 

caused  to  be  completed,  and  placed  statues  of  himself  on 

them.  .  .  . 

He  admired   the  situation  of  the  city,  and  the  excellent 
....      .     position  of  the  acropolis  for  commanding  the 
Corinih.        districts  on  both  sides  of  the  Isthmus.  .  .  . 
.   _,  Having  been  long  anxious  to  see  Olympia, 

AtOlympia.      1  ^        f^u«.u  /     r     > 

^  he  set  out  thither.  .  . 
Aemilius  entered  the  sacred  enclosure  at  Olympia,  and 
was  struck  with  admiration  at  the  statue  of  the  god,  remark- 
ing that,  to  his  mind,  Pheidias  was  the  only  artist  who  had 
represented  the  Zeus  of  Homer ;  and  that,  though  he  had  had 
great  expectations  of  Olympia,  he  found  the  reality  far  sur- 
passed them.  .  .  . 

11.  The  Aetolians  had  been  accustomed  to  get  their  live- 

lihood from  plundering  and  such  like  lawless 
st^e  ©rActoi^   occupations ;  and  as  long  as  they  were  permitted 

to  plunder  and  loot  the  Greeks,  they  got  all 
they  required  from  them,  regarding  every  country  as  that  of 


XXX  THE  GREEK  PRISONERS  IN  ITAL  Y  417 

an  enemy.  But  subsequently,  when  the  Romans  obtained  the 
supremacy,  they  were  prevented  from  this  means  of  support, 
and  accordingly  turned  upon  each  other.  Even  before  this, 
in  their  civil  war,  there  was  no  horror  which  they  did  not  com- 
mit ;  and  a  little  earlier  still  they  had  had  a  taste  of  mutual 
slaughter  in  the  massacres  at  Arsinoe ;  ^  they  were,  therefore, 
ready  for  anything,  and  their  minds  were  so  infuriated  that 
they  would  not  allow  their  magistrates  to  have  even  a  voice  in 
their  business.  Aetolia,  accordingly,  was  a  scene  of  turbu- 
lence, lawlessness,  and  blood :  nothing  they  undertook  was 
done  on  any  calculation  or  fixed  plan ;  everything  was  con- 
ducted at  haphazard  and  in  confusion,  as  though  a  hurricane 
had  burst  upon  them.  .  .  . 

12.  The  state  of  Epirus  was  much  the  same.     For  in  pro- 
portion as  the  majority  of  its  people  are  more 
law-abiding  than  those  of  Aetolia,  so  their  chief  ^^"^y^^^™"' 
magistrate  surpassed  every  one  else  in  wicked- 
ness and  contempt  for  law.     For,  I  think,  there  never  was 
and  never  will  be  a  character  more  ferocious  and  brutal  than 
that  of  Charops.  .  .  . 

18.  After  the  destruction  of  Perseus,  immediately  after  the 
decisive  battle,  embassies  were  sent  on  all  sides 
to  congratulate  the  Roman  commanders  on  the^^^^^^^^^ 
event.     And  as  now  all  power  tended  towards      especially 
Rome,  in  every  city  those  who  were  regarded  Achaeans.  to  be 
as    of  the   Romanising   party    were    in    the     ^rV^^A^?'^' 

-  ,  ^      ^  .      ■'    .  ,  .  B«C.   107. 

ascendant,  and  were   appointed  to  embassies 
and   other   services.      Accordingly   they  flocked  into  Mace- 
donia— from  Achaia,  Callicrates,  Aristodamus,  Agesias,  and 
Philippus;  from  Boeotia,  Mnasippos;  from  Acarnania,  Chre- 
mas ;  from  Epirus,  Charops  and  Nicias ;  from  Aetolia,  Lyciscus 

*  Called  by  Polybius  in  previous  books  Conope,  4,  64 ;  5,  6.  Its  name 
was  changed  to  Arsinoe,  from  its  having  been  rebuilt  and  enlarged  by  Arsinoe, 
sister  and  wife  of  Ptolemy  Philadelphus  (Strabo,  10,  2,  22).  It  was  on  the 
east  bank  of  the  Achelous.  Its  modem  name  is  Angelokastro.  The  civil  war 
in  Aetolia  alluded  to  here  is  mentioned  in  Li\y.  41,  25  (b.c.  174).  This  parti- 
cular massacre  appears  to  have  taken  place  in  B.C.  168-167.  Li\'y  (45,  28) 
narrates  that  Acmilius  was  met  during  his  Greek  tour  in  B.C.  167  by  a  crowd 
of  Aetolians,  in  a  miserable  state  of  destitution,  who  informed  him  that  five 
hundred  and  fifty  Aetolian  nobles  had  been  massacred  by  Lyciscus  and  Tisippus, 
besides  many  driven  into  exile,  and  that  the  goods  of  both  had  been  confiscated. 

VOL.  II  2  E 


4i8  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  book 


and  Tisippus.  These  all  having  met,  and  eagerly  vieing  with 
each  other  in  attaining  a  common  object ;  and  there  being  no 
one  to  oppose  them,  since  their  political  opponents  had  all 
yielded  to  the  times  and  completely  retired,  they  accomplished 
their  purpose  without  trouble.  So  the  ten  commissioners 
issued  orders  to  the  other  cities  and  leagues  through  the 
mouths  of  the  strategi  themselves  as  to  what  citizens  were  to  go 
to  Rome.  And  these  turned  out  to  be,  for  the  most  part,  those 
whom  the  men  I  have  named  had  made  a  list  of  on  party  grounds, 
except  a  very  few  of  such  as  had  done  something  conspicuous. 
But  to  the  Achaean  league  they  sent  two  men  of  the  high- 
est rank  of  their  own  number,  Gaius  Claudius  and  Gnaeus 
Domitius.  They  had  two  reasons  for  doing  so  :  the  first  was 
that  they  were  uneasy  lest  the  Achaeans  should  refuse  to  obey 
the  written  order,  and  lest  Callicrates  and  his  colleagues  should 
be  in  absolute  danger  from  being  reputed  to  be  the  authors 
of  tlic  accusations  against  all  the  Greeks, — which  was  about 
true ;  and  in  the  second  place,  because  in  the  intercepted 
despatches  nothing  distinct  had  been  discovered  against  any 
Achaean.  Accordingly,  after  a  while,  the  proconsul  sent  the 
letter  and  envoys  with  reference  to  these  men,  although  in  his 
private  opinion  he  did  not  agree  with  the  charges  brought  by 
Lyciscus  and  Callicrates,  as  was  afterwards  made  clear  by 
what  took  place.  .  .  . 

14.  Lucius  Anicius,  who  had  been  praetor,  after  his  vic- 
tory over  the  Illyrians,  and  on  bringing  Genthius 
aS*^^^^^^       prisoner    to    Rome    with    his    children,    while 
over  the  Illyrians  celebrating  his  triumph,  did  a  very  ridiculous 
at  the  Quirinalia,  thing.     He  sent  for  the  most  famous  artists 

^uc^^i67^^'  ^'"^"^  Greece,  and  having  constructed  an  im- 
mense theatre  in  the  circus,  he  brought  all  the 
flute  players  on  the  stage  together  first.  Their  names  were 
Theodorus  the  Boeotian,  Theopompus  and  Hermippus  of 
Lysimacheia,  the  most  celebrated  of  the  day.  He  placed  them 
on  the  proscenium  with  the  chorus,  and  bid  them  all  play  at 

once.      But    on   their  beginning   to    play  the 

A  scene  in  a.  -ju  -^  . 

Roman  theatre.  ^""^»  accompanied  by  appropnate  movements, 

he  sent  to  them  to  say  that  they  were  not  play- 
ing well,  and  must  put  more  excitement  into  it.     At  first  they 


XXX  NOISY  SCEJVE  IN  A  ROMAN  THEATRE  419 

did  not  know  what  to  make  of  this,  until  one  of  the  lictors 
showed  them  that  they  must  form  themselves  into  two  com- 
panies, and  facing  round,  advance  against  each  other  as 
though  in  a  battle.  The  fluteplayers  caught  the  idea  at 
once,  and,  adopting  a  motion  suitable  to  their  own  wild  strains, 
produced  a  scene  of  great  confusion.  They  made  the  middle 
group  of  the  chorus  face  round  upon  the  two  extreme  groups, 
and  the  fluteplayers,  blowing  with  inconceivable  violence  and 
discordance,  led  these  groups  against  each  other.  The  mem- 
bers of  the  chorus  meanwhile  rushed,  with  a  violent  stamp- 
ing which  shook  the  stage,  against  those  opposite  them,  and 
then  faced  round  and  retired.  But  when  one  of  the  chorus, 
whose  dress  was  closely  girt  up,  turned  round  on  the  spur  of 
the  moment  and  raised  his  hands,  like  a  boxer,  in  the  face  of 
the  fluteplayer  who  was  approaching  him,  then  the  spectators 
clapped  their  hands  and  cheered  loudly.  Whilst  this  sort  of 
sham  tight  was  going  on,  two  dancers  were  brought  into  the 
orchestra  to  the  sound  of  music  ;  and  four  boxers  mounted 
upon  the  stage,  accompanied  by  trumpeters  and  clarion 
players.  The  effect  of  these  various  contests  all  going  on 
together  was  indescribable.  But  if  I  were  to  speak  about 
their  tragic  actors,  I  should  be  thought  by  some  to  be 
jesting.'  ... 

16.  It  requires  the  same  sort  of  spirit  to  arrange  public 
games  well,  and  to  set  out  great  banquets  and  wine  with  fitting 
splendour,  as  it  does  to  draw  up  an  army  in  presence  of  the 
enemy  with  strategic  skill.  .  .  . 

16.  Aemilius  Paulus  took  seventy  cities  in  Epirus  after  the 
conquest   of  the    Macedonians   and    Perseus, 

most    of  which  were    in    the    country    of   the      '^"l^'^'" 
Molossi ;  and  enslaved  one  hundred  and  fifty 
thousand  men.  .  .  . 

17,  Id    Egypt  the  first  thing  the    kings    did    after  being 

'  From  Atfaeniieus.  xiv.  4,  p.  615.  It  seems  10  be  pnrt  of  some  strictures 
of  Polybios  on  the  coarseness  of  Ihe  amustmcnls  of  the  Romans.  This  noLsy 
■nd  riotous  scene  in  n  thcaire  would  strike  a  Greek  as  barbarous  .md  rci'oll- 
ine :  and  may  remind  us  of  the  complaints  of  the  noise  and  interruption  to 
their  actors  so  often  found  in  the  prologues  to  the  plays  of  Plaulus  and  Ter- 
ence. Though  the  substance  of  Ibis  extract  is  doubtless  froio  Polybhis, 
Athenaens  has  evidently  told  the  anecdote  in  his  own  langimge. 


420  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  book 

relieved  from  the  war  with  Antiochus  was  to  send  Numenius, 

one  of  their  friends,  as  an  envoy  to  Rome  to 

Mai^^as      return  thanks  for  the  favours  received ;   and 

they  next  released  the  Lacedaemonian  Menal- 

cidas,  who  had  made  active  use  of  the  occasion  against  the 

kingdom  for  his  own  advantage  ;  Gains  Popilius  Laenas  asked 

the  king  for  his  release  as  a  favour  to  himself.^ .  .  . 

18.  At  this  period  Cotys,  king  of  the  Odrysae,  sent  am- 
Cotys,  king  of    bassadors  to  Rome,  asking  for  the  restoration 

the  Odrysae.  cp.  of  his  son,  and  pleading  his  defence  for  having 
bk.  27,  ch.  12.  acted  on  the  side  of  Perseus.  The  Romans, 
considering  that  they  had  effected  their  purpose  by  the  suc- 
cessful issue  of  the  war  against  Perseus,  and  that  they  had  no 
need  to  press  their  quarrel  with  Cotys  any  further,  allowed 
him  to  take  his  son  back — who,  having  been  sent  as  a  hostage 
to  Macedonia,  had  been  captured  with  the  children  of  Perseus, 
— wishing  to  display  their  clemency  and  magnanimity,  and  with 
the  idea  at  the  same  time  of  binding  Cotys  to  themselves  by 
so  great  a  favour.  .  .  . 

1 9.  About  the  same  time  king  Prusias  also  came  to  Rome 
The  abject  con-  ^^  Congratulate  the  Senate  and  the  generals  on 

duct  of  king  their  success.  This  Prusias  was  in  no  sense 
Frusuxs.  worthy  of  the  royal  title,  as  we  may  judge  from 
the  following  facts :  When  the  Roman  envoys  first  appeared 
at  his  court,  he  met  them  with  shorn  head  and  wearing  a  cap, 
toga,  and  shoes,  and  in  fact  exactly  in  the  garb  worn  by  those 
recently  manumitted  at  Rome,  whom  they  call  liberti:  and 
greeting  the  envoys  respectfully,  he  exclaimed,  "  Behold  your 
freedman,  who  is  willing  to  obey  you  in  all  things  and  to 
imitate  your  fashions ! "  than  which  a  more  contemptible 
speech  it  would  be  difficult  to  imagine.  And  now,  again, 
when  he  reached  the  entrance  of  the  Senate-house  he  stopped 
at  the  door  facing  the  senators,  and,  dropping  both  his  hands 
he  paid  reverence  to  the  threshold  and  the  seated  Fathers, 
exclaiming,  "  Hail,  ye  gods  my  preservers ! "  seeming  bent 
on  surpassing  all  who  might  come  after  him  in  meanness  of 

*  Menalcidas  was  one  of  the  Romanising  party,  who  appears  to  have  l^ecn 
Strategus  of  the  league  in  B.C.  153  [Pausan.  7,  11,  7],  and  to  have  committtKi 
suicide  in  B.C.  148-147,  in  despair  at  his  failure  to  wrest  Sparta  from  the  league. 


XXX  PSUSIAS  AND  EUMENES  421 

spirit,  unmanliness,  and  servility.  And  his  behaviour  in  the 
conference  which  he  held  when  he  had  entered  the  Senate- 
house  was  on  a  par  with  this;  and  was  such  as  might  make 
one  blush  even  to  write.  However  this  contemptible  display 
served  in  itself  to  secure  him  a  favourable  answer. 

20.  Just  as  he  had  got  his  answer,  news  came  that 
Eumenes  was  on  his  way.  This  caused  the 
Senators  much  embarrassment  They  were  ,°  STt-^ll"!!*" 
thoroughly  incensed  with  him,  and  were  en-  the  Senate  pass  a 
tirely  fixed  in  their  sentiments  towards  him  ;  dec™  fbtbidding 
and  yet  they  did  not  wish  to  betray  themselves.  ^"  ^^^^^  ™" 
For  having  proclaimed  to  all  the  world  that 
this  king  was  their  foremost  and  most  esteemed  friend,  if  they 
now  admitted  him  to  an  interview  and  allowed  him  to  plead 
his  cause,  they  must  either,  by  answering  as  they  really  thought 
and  in  harmony  with  their  sentiments,  signalise  their  own 
folly  in  having  marked  out  such  a  man  in  past  times  for 
special  honour  ;  or  i^  in  deference  to  appearances,  they  gave 
him  a  friendly  answer,  they  must  disregard  truth  and  the 
interests  of  their  country.  Therefore,  as  both  these  methods  of 
proceeding  could  have  consequences  of  a  disagreeable  nature, 
they  hit  upon  the  following  solution  of  the  difficulty.  On  the 
ground  of  a  general  dislike  of  the  visits  of  kings,  they  published 
a  decree  that  "no  king  was  to  visit  Rome."  Having  been 
informed  subsequently  that  Eumenes  had  landed  Eumenea 
at  Bnindisium  in  Italy,  they  sent  the  quaestor  to  stopped  ai 
convey  the  decree  to  him,  and  to  bid  him  to  Bmnditium. 
communicate  with  himself  if  he  wanted  anything  from  the 
Senate ;  or,  if  he  did  not  want  anything,  to  bid  him  depart  at 
the  earliest  possible  opportunity  from  Italy.  When  the 
quaestor  met  the  king  and  informed  him  of  the  decree,  the 
latter,  thoroughly  understanding  the  intention  of  the  Senate, 
said  not  a  single  word,  except  that  "  he  wanted  nothing." 

This  is  the  way  in  which  Eumenes  was  prevented  from 
coming  to  Rome.  And  it  was  not  the  only  important 
result  of  this  decree.  For  the  Gauls  were  at  that  time  threat- 
ening the  kingdom  of  Eumenes ;  and  it  was  soon  made 
apparent  that  by  this  repulse  the  king's  allies  were  all  greatly 
depressed,  while  the  Gauls  were  doubly  encouraged  to  press 


422  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  BOOK 

on  the  war.     And  it  was  in  fact  their  desire  to  humiliate  him 
in  every  possible  way  that  induced  the  Senate  to  adopt  this 

resolution.     These  things  were  going  on  at  the 

B.^  *i67-i66     bcgi'^i^ii^g  o^  the  winter :  but  to  all  other  am- 
bassadors who  arrived — and  there  was  no  city 
or  prince  or  king  who  had  not  at  that  time  sent  an  embassy 
of  congratulation — the  Senate  returned  a  gracious  and  friendly 
answer,  except  to  the  Rhodians;  and  these  they  dismissed 
with  displeasure,  and  with  ambiguous  declarations  as  to  the 
future.     As  to  the  Athenians  again  the  Senate  hesitated.  .  .  . 
21.  The  first  object  of  the  Athenian   embassy  was  the 
,_,...        restoration  of  Haliartus  :  ^  but  when  they  met 

The  Athenians       .  ,  _       ,  ,       '       .  ,  ,  '         . 

ask  for  the     With   a  refusal   on  that   point,   they   changed 

restoration  of   the  subject  of  their  appeal  and  put  forward 

Haliartus;  faihng  ^j^^jj.  ^^^  claim  to  the  possession  of  Delos, 

territory,  with    Lemnos,  and  the  territory  of  Haliartus.     No 

Delos  and      one  could  properly  find  fault  with  them  for  this, 

Lemnos  them-   ^^  ^r^j  ^s  Delos  and  Lemnos  were  concerned,  for 

selves. 

they  had  of  old  laid  claim  to  them ;  but  there 
is  good  reason  for  reproaching  them  in  respect  to  the  territory 
of  Haliartus.     Haliartus  was  nearly  the  most  ancient  city  in 
Boeotia;  had  met  wnth  a  heavy  misfortune:  instead  of  en- 
deavouring in  every  possible  way  to  restore  it, — to  contribute 
to  its  utter  annihilation,  and  to  deprive  its  dispossessed  in- 
habitants of  even  their  hopes  for  the  future,  was  an  act  which 
would  be  thought  worthy  of  no  Greek  nation,  and  least  of 
all  of  the  Athenians.     They  open  their  own  territory  to  all 
comers ;  and  to  take  away  that  of  others  can  never  appear 
consonant  with  the  spirit  of  their  State.     However,  the  Senate 
granted  them  Delos  and  Lemnos.     Such  was  the  decision  in 
the  Athenian  business.  .  .  . 
The  possession        As  to  Lemnos  and  Delos  they  had,  accord- 
°  ml'sfortune^  ^  ^"^  ^°  ^^  proverb,  "  got  the  wolf  by  the  ears  : " 
Athens.        ^^^  ^^^Y  suffered  much  ill   fortune  from  their 
See  32,  17.      quarrels    with    the    Delians ;    and    from    the 

'  Haliartus  had  been  taken  by  the  praetor  L.  Lucretius  Gallus  in  b.c. 
171,  its  inhabitants  sold  into  slavery,  and  its  houses  and  walls  entirely  de- 
stroyed. Its  crime  was  siding  with  Perseus.  Livy,  42,  63.  Supra  bk.  27, 
ch.  5  ;  29,  12. 


XXX  THE  ATHENIANS  AND  RHODIANS  423 


territory    of    Haliartus     they    reaped    shame    rather    than 
profit.  .  .  . 

22.  At   this   time   Theaetetus    being  admitted   into   the 
Senate  spoke  on  the   subject  of  the  alliance.       Death  of 
The  Senate,  however,  postponed  the  considera-    Theaetetus  of 
tion   of  the  proposal,  and   in   the   meantime        Rhodes. 
Theaetetus  died  in  the  course  of  nature,  for  he  was  more  than 
eighty  years  old.     But  on  the  arrival  in  Rome     caunus  and 
of  exiles  from  Caunus  and   Stratoniceia,   and  Stratoniceia  in 
their  admission  to  the  Senate,  a  decree  was         Caria. 
passed  orderihg  the   Rhodians   to  withdraw  their   garrisons 
from  Caunus  and  Stratoniceia.     And  the  embassy  of  Philo- 
phron  and  Astymedes  having  received  this  answer  sailed  with 
all  speed  home,  alarmed  lest  the  Rhodians  should  disregard 
the  order  for  withdrawing  the  garrisons,  and  so  give  a  fresh 
ground  for  complaints.  .  .  . 

23.  In  the  Peloponnese,  when  the  ambassa-  The  effect  of  the 
dors  arrived  and  announced  the  answers  from    |"^i*ff®  ^^ 

_  -  ,  -  ,  the  Romans  in 

Rome,  there  was  no  longer  mere  clamour,  but     the  Achaean 
downright  rage  and  hatred  against  Callicrates  league.    Supra 
and  his  party.  ...  ^^'  '3' 

An  instance  of  the  hatred  entertained  for  Callicrates  and 
Adronidas,    and  the   others  who  agreed  with  ,.         ,   .      - 

1  \\  '         rr.1      r      •     1     /•   1       A      •  •      Unpopulantv  of 

them,  was  this.     The  festival  of  the  Antigoneia      callicrates, 
was  being  held  at  Sicyon, — the  baths  being  all  Adronidas,  and 
supplied  with  large  public  bathing  tubs,  and     ^^^^^  party, 
smaller  ones  placed  by  them  used  by  bathers  of  the  better 
sort, — if  Adronidas  or  Callicrates  entered  one  of  these,  not  a 
single  one  of  the  bystanders  would  get  into  it  any  more,  until 
the  bathman  had  let  every  drop  of  water  run  out  and  filled  it 
with  fresh.     They  did  this  from  the  idea  that  they  would  be 
polluted  by  entering  the   same  water  as   these   men.     Nor 
would  it   be  easy  to  describe  the  hissing  and  hooting  that 
took  place  at  the  public  games  in  Greece  when  any  one 
attempted  to  proclaim  one  of  them  victor.     The  very  children 
in  the  streets  as  they  returned  from  school  ventured  to  call 
them  traitors  to  their  faces.     To  such  height  did  the  anger 
and  hatred  of  these  men  go.  .  .  . 

24.  The  inhabitants  of  Peraea  were  like  slaves  unexpectedlv 


424 


THE  HISTORIES  OF  FOLYBIUS 


BOOK  XXX 


released  from  chains,  who.  are  scarcely  able  to  believe  their 

present  good   fortune,   thinking   it  a  change 

^Sf^pirla ^^e  ^^"^^st  too  great  to  be  natural;  and  cannot 

Roman  decree   believe  that  those  they  meet  can  understand 

emancipating    or   fully   see    that    they    are    really   released, 

unless  they  do  something  strange  and  out  of  the 

ordinary  course.  .  .  . 


them  from 
Rhodes. 


BOOK   XXXI 

1.  At  this  time  the  Cnosians,  in  alliance  with  the  Bc.  165.  Warin 
Gortynians,  made  war  upon  the  Rhaucians,  and  Ctcieorcnouu 
swore  a  mutual  oath  that  they  would  not  end     '-'ji^^'"' 
the  war  until  they  had  Uken  Rhaucus,  "^  """' 

But  when  the  Rhodians  received  the  decree  regarding 
Caunus,  and  saw  that  the  anger  of  the  Romans  j]^  Rhodians  are 
was  not  abating,  after  having  scrupulously  carried  again  refused  an 
out  the  orders  contained  in  the  Senate's  replies,  alliance. 
they  forthwith  sent  Aristotle  at  the  head  of  an  embassy  to 
Rome,  with  instructions  to  make  another  attempt  to  secure  the 
alUance.  They  arrived  in  Rome  at  the  height  of  summer,  and, 
having  been  admitted  to  the  Senate,  at  once  declared  how 
their  people  had  obeyed  the  Senate's  orders,  and  pleaded  for 
the  alliance,  using  a  great  variety  of  arguments  in  a  speech  of 
considerable  length.  But  the  Senate  returned  them  a  reply  in 
which,  without  a  wcrd  about  their  friendship,  they  said  that,  as 
to  the  alliance,  it  was  not  proper  for  them  to  grant  the  Rhodians 
this  favour  at  present  .  .  . 

2.  To  the  ambassadors  of  the  Gauls  in  Asia  they  granted 
autonomy,    on    condition    that   they    remained    Autonomy  10 
within  their  dwellings,  and  went  on  no  warlike      Gaiaiia  on 
expeditions  beyond  their  own  frontiers.  .  ,  .  conditions. 

S.  When  this  same  king  (Antiochus  Epiphanes)  heard  of  the 
games  in  Macedonia  held  by  the  Roman  proconsul  Aemiltus 
Paulus,  wishing  to  out-do  Paulus  by  the  splendour  of  his 
liberality,  he  sent  envoys  to  the  several  cities  The  grand  fesiival 
announcing  games  to  be  held  by  him  at  bdd  t>]>  Antiochus 
Daphne ;  and  it  became  the  rage  in  Greece  ^piph"""  ai 
to  attend  them.  The  public  ceremonies  began  ofAnt^och.  wctwI 
with  a  procession  composed  as  follows :  first      10  Apoiio. 


426  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  book 

came  some  men  armed  in  the  Roman  fashion,  with  their 
coats  made  of  chain  armour,  five  thousand  in  the  prime  of 
Ufe.  Next  came  five  thousand  Mysians,  who  were  followed 
by  three  thousand  Cilicians  armed  like  light  infantry,  and 
wearing  gold  crowns.  Next  to  them  came  three  thousand 
Thracians  and  five  thousand  Gauls.  They  were  followed  by 
twenty-thousand  Macedonians,  and  five  thousand  armed  with 
brass  shields,  and  others  with  silver  shields,  who  were  followed 
by  two  hundred  and  forty  pairs  of  gladiators.  Behind  these 
were  a  thousand  Nisaean  cavalry  and  three  thousand  native 
horsemen,  most  of  whom  had  gold  plumes  and  gold  crowns, 
the  rest  having  them  of  silver.  Next  to  them  came  what  are 
called  "companion  cavalry,"  to  the  number  of  a  thousand, 
closely  followed  by  the  corps  of  king's  "  friends  "  of  about  the 
same  number,  who  were  again  followed  by  a  thousand  picked 
men ;  next  to  whom  came  the  Agetna  or  guard,  which  was 
considered  the  flower  of  the  cavalry,  and  numbered  about  a 
thousand.  Next  came  the  "cataphract"  cavalry,  both  men 
and  horses  acquiring  that  name  from  the  nature  of  their 
panoply ;  they  numbered  fifteen  hundred.  All  the  above  men 
had  purple  surcoats,  in  many  cases  embroidered  with  gold  and 
heraldic  designs.  And  behind  them  came  a  hundred  six-horsed, 
and  forty  four-horsed  chariots;  a  chariot  drawn  by  four  elephants 
and  another  by  two ;  and  then  thirty-six  elephants  in  single  file 
with  all  their  furniture  on. 

The  rest  of  the  procession  was  almost  beyond  description, 
but  I  must  give  a  summary  account  of  it.  It  consisted  of 
eight  hundred  young  men  wearing  gold  crowns,  about  a  thousand 
fine  oxen,  foreign  delegates  to  the  number  of  nearly  three 
hundred,  and  eight  hundred  ivory  tusks.  The  number  of 
images  of  the  gods  it  is  impossible  to  tell  completely:  for  repre- 
sentations of  every  god  or  demigod  or  hero  accepted  by  man- 
kind were  carried  there,  some  gilded  and  others  adorned  with 
gold-embroidered  robes;  and  the  myths,  belonging  to  each, 
according  to  accepted  tradition,  were  represented  by  the  most 
costly  symbols.  Behind  them  were  carried  representations  of 
Night  and  Day,  Earth,  Heaven,  Morning  and  Noon.  The  best 
idea  that  I  can  give  of  the  amount  of  gold  and  silver  plate  is  this  : 
One  of  the  king's  friends,  Dionysius  his  secretary,  had  a  thousand 


XXXI  GRAND  FESTIVAL  AT  DAPHNE  ^27 

boys  in  the  procession  carrying  stiver  vessels,  none  of  which 
weighed  less  than  a  thousand  drachmae;^  and  by  their  side 
walked  six  hundred  young  slaves  of  the  king  holding  gold 
vessels.  There  were  also  two  hundred  women  sprinkling  un- 
guents from  gold  boxes ;  and  after  them  came  eighty  women 
sitting  in  litters  with  gold  feet,  and  five  hundred  in  litters  with 
silver  feet,  aJl  adorned  with  great  costliness.  These  were  the 
most  remarkable  features  of  the  procession. 

4.  The  festival,  including  the  gladiatorial  shows  and  hunting, 
lasted  thirty  days,  in  the  course  of  which  there  was  continual 
round  of  spectacles.  During  the  first  five  of  these  everybody 
in  the  gymnasium  anointed  himself  with  oil  scented  with 
saflVon  in  gold  vessels,  of  which  there  were  fifteen,  and  the 
same  number  scented  with  cinnamon  and  nard.  On  the 
following  days  other  vessels  were  brought  in  scented  with 
fenugreeic,  marjoram,  and  lily,  all  of  extraordinary  fragiancy. 
Public  banquets  were  also  given,  at  which  couches  were  pre- 
pared, sometimes  for  a  thousand  and  sometimes  for  (ifiecn 
hundred,  with  the  utmost  splendour  and  costliness. 

The  whole  of  the  arrangements  were  made  personally  by  the  " 
king.  He  rode  on  an  inferior  horse  by  the  side  of  the  proces- 
sion, ordering  one  part  to  advance,  and  another  to  halt,  as 
occasion  required ;  so  that,  if  his  diadem  had  been  removed, 
no  one  would  have  believed  that  he  was  the  king  and  the  master 
of  all ;  for  his  appearance  was  not  equal  to  that  of  a  moderately 
good  servant  At  the  feasts  also  he  stood  himself  at  the 
entrance,  and  admitted  some  and  assigned  others  their  places ; 
he  personally  ushered  in  the  servants  bringing  the  dishes  ;  and 
walking  about  among  the  company  sometimes  sat  down  and 
sometimes  lay  down  on  the  couches.  Sometimes  he  would 
jump  up,  lay  down  the  morsel  of  food  or  the  cup  that  he  was 
raising  to  his  lips,  and  go  to  another  part  of  the  hall ;  and 
walking  among  the  guests  acknowledge  the  compliment,  as 
now  one  and  now  another  pledged  him  in  wine,  or  jest  at  any 
recitations  that  might  be  going  on.  And  when  the  festivity 
had  gone  on  for  a  long  time,  and  a  good  many  of  the  guests  had 
departed,  the  king  was  carried  in  by  the  mummers,  completely 
shrouded  in  a  robe,  and  laid  upon  the  ground,  as  though  he 
'  A  drachma  rray  be  laken  as  between  a  sixtb  and  a  seventh  of  an  ounce. 


428  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  book 

were  one  of  the  actors ;  then,  at  the  signal  given  by  the  music, 
he  leapt  up,  stripped,  and  began  to  dance  with  the  jesters ;  so 
that  all  the  guests  were  scandalised  and  retired.  In  fact  every 
one  who  attended  the  festival,  when  they  saw  the  extraordinary 
wealth  which  was  displayed  at  it,  the  arrangements  made  in  the 
processions  and  games,  and  the  scale  of  the  splendour  on  which 
the  whole  was  managed,  were  struck  with  amazement  and 
wonder  both  at  the  king  and  the  greatness  of  his  kingdom : 
but  when  they  fixed  their  eyes  on  the  man  himself,  and  the 
contemptible  conduct  to  which  he  condescended,  they  could 
scarcely  believe  that  so  much  excellence  and  baseness  could 
exist  in  one  and  the  same  breast.^  .  .  . 

5.  After  the  completion  of  the  festival,  the  envoys  with 
Roman  envoys  Tiberius  Gracchus  arrived,  who  had  been  sent 

at  Antioch.      from  Rome  to  investigate  the  state  of  affairs  in 
Antiochus  affects  gyna.     Antiochus  received  them  with  such  tact 

extreme  cordiality.       ,.,  .  ri*j  .1. 

and  with  so  many  expressions  of  kindness,  that 
Tiberius  not  only  had  no  suspicion  that  he  was  meditating  any 
active  step,  or  cherishing  any  sinister  feeling  on  account  of  what 
had  happened  at  Alexandria,  but  was  even  induced  by  the  extra- 
ordinary kindness  of  his  reception  to  discredit  those  who  made 
any  such  suggestion.  For,  besides  other  courtesies,  the  king 
gave  up  his  own  hall  for  the  use  of  the  envoys,  and  almost  his 
crown  in  appearance ;  although  his  true  sentiments  were  not  at 
all  of  this  kind,  and  he  was  on  the  contrary  profoundly  incensed 
with  the  Romans.  .  .  . 

6.  A  large  number  of  ambassadors  from  various  quarters  hav- 
B.C.  164.    Com-  i^g  arrived  at  Rome,  the  most  important  of  which 

plaints  against   were  those  with  Astymedes  from  Rhodes,  Eureus 
Eumencs  at  Rome  ^jj^j^j^jjjjj^yg  ^^^   Satyrus  from  the  Achaeans, 

from  1  nisi'TS  01 

Bithynia,  and    ^^^  those  with  Pytho  from  Prusias, — the  Senate 

other  parts  of   gave  audience  to  these  last.     The  ambassadors 

Asia.  ixoxd    Prusias  complained   of  king    Eumenes, 

alleging  that  he  had  taken  certain  places  belonging  to  their 

country,  and  had  not  in  any  sense  evacuated  Galatia,  or  obeyed 

the  decrees  of  the  Senate ;  but  had  been  supporting  all  who 

1  Hultsch  prints  in  parallel  columns  the  text  of  this  fragment  as  it  appears 
in  Athenaeus  and  Diodorus.  The  English  translation  attempts  to  combine 
them. 


XJtKi  COMPLAmTS  AGAINST  EUMBNF.S  419 

fitvoured  himself,  and  depressing  in  every  possible  way  those 
who  wished  to  shape  their   policy  in  accordance  with  the 
Senate's  decrees.     There  were  also  some  ambassadors  from 
certain  towns  in  Asia,  who  accused  the  kir^  on  the  grounds  of 
his  intimate  association  with  Antiochus,     The  Senate  listened 
to  the  accusers,   and  neither  rejected  their  accusations  noi 
openly  expressed  its  own  opinion  ;  but  acted  with  close  reserve, 
thoroughly  distrusting  both  Eumenes  and  Antio- 
chus :  and  meanwhile  contented  itself  by  con-  p^'^i^^^a. 
tinually  supporting  Galatia  and  contriving  some 
fresh  security  for  its  freedom.     But  the  envoys  under  Tiberius 
Gracchus,  on  their  return  from  their  mission,  had     Failure  of  the 
no  clearer  idea  themselves  in  regard  to  Eumenes       mi&sion  ot 
and  Antiochus  than  before  they  left  Rome,  nor       Gracchus. 
could  they  give  the  Senate  one  either.     So  completely  had  the 
kings  hoodwinked  them  by  the  cordiality  of  their  reception. 

7.  The  Senate  next  called  In  the  Khodians  and  heard 
what  they  had  to  say.  When  Astymedes  entered,  phodiona  appeal 
he  adopted  a  more  moderate  and  more  effective  againsi  the  injury 
line  ofargument  than  on  his  formerembassy.  He '*°""°'*™"™'*' 
omitted  the  invectives  against  others,  and  took 
the  humble  tone  of  men  who  are  being  fledged,  begging  to  be  for- 
given, and  declaring  that  his  country  had  suffered  sufficient 
punishment, and  a  more  severe  one  than  its  crime  deserved.  And 
thenhewentbrieflythroughthelistoftheKhodian 
losses.  "  First,  they  have  lost  Lycia  and  Caria,  /^^^^^ 
which  had  already  cost  them  a  large  sum  of 
money,  having  been  forced  to  support  three  wars  against  them  ; 
while  at  the  present  moment  they  have  been  deprived  of  a  con- 
siderable revenue  which  they  used  to  draw  from  those  countries. 
But  perhaps,"  he  added,  "  this  is  as  it  should  be :  you  gave 
them  to  our  people  as  a  free  gift,  because  you  regarded  us 
with  favour ;  and  in  now  recalling  your  gift,  because  you  suspect 
and  are  at  variance  with  us,  you  may  seem  only  to  be  acting 
reasonably.  But  Caunus,  at  any  rate,  we  purchased  from 
Ptolemy's  officers  for  two  hundred  talents  j  and  Stratoniceia  we 
received  as  a  great  favour  from  Antiochus,  son  of  Seleucus ; 
and  from  those  two  towns  our  people  had  a  revenue  of  a 
hundred  and  twenty  talents  a  year.    All  these  sources  of  revenue 


430  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  book 

we  have  surrendered,  in  our  submission  to  your  injunctions. 
From  which  it  appears  that  you  have  imposed  a  heavier 
penalty  on  the  Rhodians  for  one  act  of  folly,  than  on  the 
Macedonians  that  have  been  continually  at  war  with  you.  But 
the  greatest  disaster  of  all  to  our  State  is  that  the  revenue 
from  its  harbour  has  been  abolished  by  your  making  Delos  a 
free  port ;  and  by  your  depriving  our  people  of  that  independ- 
ence by  which  the  harbour,  as  well  as  other  interests  of  the 
States,  were  maintained  in  suitable  dignity.^  And  it  is  easy 
to  satisfy  yourselves  of  the  truth  of  my  words.  Our  revenue 
from  harbour  dues  amounted  in  past  years  to  one  million 
drachmae,  from  which  you  have  now  taken  one  hundred 
and  fifty  thousand;  so  that  it  is  only  too  true,  gentle- 
men of  Rome,  that  your  anger  has  affected  the  resources 
of  the  country.  Now,  if  the  mistake  committed,  and  the 
alienation  from  Rome,  had  been  shared  in  by  the  entire 
people,  you  might  perhaps  have  seemed  to  be  acting  rightly 
in  maintaining  a  lasting  and  irreconcilable  anger  against 
us ;  but  if  the  fact  is  made  clear  to  you  that  it  was  an  exceed- 
ingly small  number  who  shared  in  this  foolish  policy,  and  that 
these  have  all  been  put  to  death  by  this  very  people  itself, 
why  still  be  irreconcilable  to  those  who  are  in  no  respect 
guilty  ?  Especially  when  to  every  one  else  you  are  reputed 
to  exhibit  the  highest  possible  clemency  and  magnanimity. 
Wherefore,  gentlemen,  our  people  having  lost  their  revenues, 
their  freedom  of  debate,  and  their  position  of  independence,  in 
defence  of  which  in  time  past  they  have  been  ever  willing  to 
make  any  sacrifices,  now  beg  and  beseech  you  all,  as  having 
been  smitten  sufficiently,  to  relax  your  anger,  and  to  be  recon- 
ciled and  make  this  alliance  with  them  :  that  it  may  be  made 
manifest  to  all  the  world  that  you  have  put  away  your  anger 
against  Rhodes,  and  have  returned  to  your  old  feelings  and 
friendship   towards    them."      Such    among   others   were    the 

words  of  Astymedes.     He  was  thought  to  have 

moii?fied"by  this  ^poken  much  to  the  point  in  the  circumstances  ; 

speech  and  by   but  what  helped  the  Rhodians  to  the  alliance 

*  lie  means  that,  they  being  no  longer  able  to  decide  in  mercantile  affairs 
independently  of  Rome,  the  prestige  {rpwrra/rla),  and  consequently  the  popu- 
larity, of  this  harbour  is  destroyed. 


xixi  THE  ACHAEAN  PRISONERS  DETAWED  431 

more  than  anything  else  was  the  recent  return  'he  report  of 
of  the  embassy  under  Tiberius  Gracchus.  For  *^^^^,\,e"^ 
he  gave  evidence,  in  the  first  place,  that  the  alliance. 
Rhodians  had  obeyed  all  the  decrees  of  the  Senate ;  and  in 
the  next  place,  that  the  men  who  were  the  authors  of  their 
hostile  policy  had  all  been  condemned  to  death ;  and  by  this 
testimony  overcame  all  opposition,  and  secured  the  alliance 
between  Rome  and  Rhodes.  .  .  . 

8.  After  an  interval  the  envoys  of  the  Achaeans  were 
admitted  with  instructions  conformable  to  the  g  c.  165. 
last  reply  received,  which  was  to  ihe  effect  that  Embassy  from 
"The  Senate  were  surprised  that  they  should '^'^''^'.'■""'''"Bfor 
applyto  them  for  a  decision  on  matters  which  they  g[  ^  Aci^ean 
had  already  decided  for  themselves."  Accord-  diunus.  who  10 
inglyanother  embassy  under  Eureas  nowappeared  '*"  i"inii«r  of 
to  explain  that  "  The  league  had  neither  heard  teen  Bummoned 
the  defence  of  the  accused  persons,  nor  given  10  Italy  in  b.c. 
any  decision  whatever  concerning  them;  but '^?-  ^^030.  13. 
wished  the  Senate  to  take  measures  in  regard  "'^^'  '' '"'  "' 
to  these  men,  that  they  might  have  a  trial  and  not  perish 
uncondemned.  They  begged  thai,  if  possible,  the  Senate 
should  itself  conduct  the  investigation,  and  declare  who  are  the 
persons  guilty  of  those  charges ;  but,  if  its  variety  of  business 
made  it  impossible  to  do  this  itself,  that  it  should  intrust  the 
business  to  the  Achaeans,  who  would  show  by  their  treatment 
of  the  guilty  their  detestation  of  their  crime."  The  Senate 
reci^nised  that  the  tone  of  the  embassy  was  in  conformity 
with  its  own  injunctions,  but  still  felt  embarrassed  how  to  acL 
Both  courses  were  open  to  objection.  To  judge  the  case  of 
the  men  was,  it  thought,  not  a  task  it  ought  to  undertake  ;  and 
to  release  them  without  any  trial  at  all  evidently  involved  ruin 
to  the  friends  of  Rome.  In  this  strait  the  Senate,  wishing 
to  take  all  hope  from  the  Achaean  people  of  the  restitution  of 
the  men  who  were  detained,  in  order  that  they  might  obey 
without  a  murmur  Callicrates  in  Achaia,  and  in  the  other 
states  those  who  sided  with  Rome,  wrote  the  following  answer  : 
"We  do  not  consider  it  advisable  either  for  ourselves  or 
for  your  nationalities  that  these  men  should  return  home." 
The  publication  of  this  answer  not  only  reduced  the  men  who 


432  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  book 


had  been  summoned  to  Italy  to  complete  despair  and  dejec- 
tion, but  was  regarded  by  all  Greeks  as  a  common  sorrow,  for 
it  seemed  to  take  away  all  hope  of  restoration  from  these 
unfortunate  men.  When  it  was  announced  in  Greece  the 
people  were  (juite  crushed,  and  a  kind  of  desperation  in- 
vaded the  minds  of  all;  but  Charops  and  Callicrates,  and 
all  who  shared  their  policy,  were  once  more  in  high 
spirits.  .  .  . 

9.  Tiberius  Gracchus,  partly  by  force  and  partly  by  per- 
Rcduction  of  tijc  suasion,  reduced  the  Cammani  to  obedience  to 

Cammani  in      Rome.    .    .    . 

CapiKidocia.  ^  \;sx%Q,  number  of  embassies  having  come  to 

Rome,  the  Senate  gave  a  reply  to  Attalus  and  Athenaeus.  For 
Prusias,  not  content  with  earnestly  pressing  his  accusations  him- 
self against  Eumenes  and  Attalus,  had  also  instigated  the  Gauls 
and  Sclgians  (in  Pisidia),  and  many  others  in  Asia,  to  adopt 
the  same  policy;  consequently  king  Eumenes  had  sent  his 
brothers  to  defend  him  against  the  accusations  thus  brought. 
On  their  admission  to  the  Senate  they  were  thought  to  have 
made  a  satisfactory  defence  against  all  accusers;  and  finally 
returned  to  Asia,  after  not  only  rebutting  the  accusations, 
but  with  marks  of  special  honour.  The  Senate,  however,  did 
not  altogether  cease  to  be  suspicious  of  Eumenes  and  Antiochus. 
They  sent  (Jaius  Sulpicius  and  Manias  Sergius  as  envoys  to 
investigate  the  state  of  Greece ;  to  decide  the  question  of 
territory  that  had  arisen  between  Megalopolis  and  the  Lacedae- 
monians ;  but,  above  all,  to  give  attention  to  the  proceedings 
of  Antiochus  and  li^umenes,  and  to  discover  whether  any 
warlike  preparations  were  being  made  by  either  of  them,  or  any 
combination  being  formed  between  them  against  Rome.  .  .  . 

10.  Besides  his  other  follies,  (iaius  Sulpicius  Gallus,  on 
^    .   .        arriving  in  Asia,  put   up  notices  in  the  most 

Sulpicius  ciaiiiis  im|K)rtant  cities,  ordering  any  one  who  wished 
in  Asia;  he  to  bring  any  accusation  against  king  Eumenes 
collects  facts     ^^  ^^^^  Y{\xi\  at  Sardis  within  a  specified  time. 

ac^amsi  i_<unien(.Sa  •«.  f\      y  ii*i'  • 

He  then  went  to  Sardis,  and,  takmg  his  seat  in 
the  Gymnasium,  gave  audience  for  ten  days  to  those  who  had 
such  accusations  to  make :  admitting  every  kind  of  foul  and 
abusive  language  against  the  king,  and,  generally,  making  the 


XXXI  DEATH  OF  ANTJOCHUS  EPIPHANES  433 

most  of  every  fact  and  every  accusation ;  for  he  was  frantic 
and  inveterate  in  his  hatred  of  Eumenes.  .  .  . 

But  the  harder  the  Romans  appeared  to  bear  upon  Eumenes, 
the  more  popular  did  he  become  in  Greece,  from  the  natural 
tendency  of  mankind  to  feel  for  the  side  that  is  oppressed. . . . 

11.  In  Syria  king  Antiochus,  wishing  to  enrich  himself, 
determined  on  an  armed  attack  upon  the  temple  , 

of  Artemis,  in  Elymais.     But  having  arrived  in  Death  of  Antiochus 
this  country  and  failed  in  his  purpose,  because  Epiphanes  on  his 
the  native  barbarians  resisted  his  lawless  attempt,  ^  'l®^*^™ J"^*^"^ 

,        ,.    ,  .  ,.  ^  rT>  u       \ 'Susiana.  See26,i. 

he  died  m  the  course  of  his  return  at  Tabae,  in 
Persia,  driven  mad,  as  some  say,  by  some  manifestations  of 
divine  wrath  in  the  course  of  his  wicked  attempt  upon  this 
temple.  .  .  . 

Antiochus  Epiphanes  left  a  son  and  daughter ;  tht  former^ 
nine  years  oldy  was  called  Antiochus  Eupator^  and  succeeded  to  the 
kingdom^  Lysias  acting  as  his  guardian,  Demetrius^  his  cousin^ 
son  of  Seleucus  Philopator,  being  at  Rome  as  a  hostage  in  place  of 
the  late  Antiochus  Epiphanes^  endeavoured  to  persuade  the  Senate 
to  make  him  king  of  Syria  instead  of  the  boy, 

12.  Demetrius,    son  of  Seleucus,    who    had    been    long 
detained  at  Rome  as  an  hostage,  had  been  for  Demetrius,  son  of 
some  time  past  of  opinion  that  his  detention    Seleucus,  and 
was  unjust.     He  had  been  given  by  his  father  &»\"dson  of  Anti- 

->  ,         •'  ,     ,  /.   ,  •  1    /.  .  1        1  ochus  the  Great, 

Seleucus  as  a  pledge  of  his  good  faith ;  but,  wishes  to  be  re- 
when  Antiochus  (Epiphanes)  succeeded  to  the  stored  to  the  king- 
throne,  he  considered  that  he  ought  not  to  be  a  ^°"^  °^  ^^"^ 
hostage  in  behalf  of  that  monarch's  children.  However,  up  to 
this  time  he  kept  quiet,  especially  as  he  was  unable,  being  still 
a  mere  boy,  to  do  anything.  But  now,  being  in  the  very  prime 
of  youthful  manhood,  he  entered  the  Senate  and  made  a  speech  : 
demanding  that  the  Romans  should  restore  him  to  his  king- 
dom, which  belonged  to  him  by  a  far  better  right  than  to  the 
children  of  Antiochus.  He  entered  at  great  length  upon 
arguments  to  the  same  effect,  affirming  that  Rome  was  his 
country  and  the  nurse  of  his  youth;  that  the  sons  of  the 
Senators  were  all  to  him  as  brothers,  and  the  Senators  as 
fathers,  because  he  had  come  to  Rome  a  child,  and  was  then 

VOL.  II  2  F 


434  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  book 

twenty-three  years  old.^  All  who  heard  him  were  disposed  in 
their  hearts  to  take  his  part :  the  Senate  however,  as  a  body 
voted  to  detain  Demetrius,  and  to  assist  in  securing  the  crown 
for  the  boy  left  by  the  late  king.  Their  motive  in  thus  acting 
was,  it  seems  to  me,  a  mistrust  inspired  by  the  vigorous  time 
of  life  to  which  Demetrius  had  attained,  and  an  opinion  that 
the  youth  and  weakness  of  the  boy  who  had  succeeded  to  the 
kingdom  were  more  to  their  interest     And  this  was  presently 

made  manifest.  For  they  appointed  Gnaeus 
^^A^Z^^^'^'  Octavius,  Spurius  Lucretius,  and  Lucius  Aurel- 

sion  appointed.    .  »      r  ,  .1         ir  •  r 

ms  as  commissioners  to  arrange  the  anairs  of 
the  kingdom  in  accordance  with  the  will  of  the  Senate,  on  the 
ground  that  no  one  would  resist  their  injunctions,  the  king 
being  a  mere  child,  and  the  nobles  being  quite  satisfied  at  the 
government  not  being  given  to  Demetrius,  for  that  was  what 
they  had  been  most  expecting.    Gnaeus  and  his  colleagues  there- 
fore started  with  instructions,  first  of  all  to  burn  the  decked  ships, 
next  to  hamstring  the  elephants,  and  generally  to  weaken  the 
.      forces  of  the  kingdom.    They  were  also  charged 
sioncrs  arc  also  with  the  additional  task  of  making  an  inspec- 
to  visit  Gaiatia,  tion  of  Macedonia ;  for  the  Macedonians,  un- 
Cappaciocia.  and  accustomed   to  democracy  and  a  government 

^Xlcxandria. 

by  popular  assembly,  were  splitting  up  into 
hostile  factions.^  Gnaeus  and  his  colleagues  were  also  to 
inspect  the  state  of  Gaiatia  and  of  the  kingdom  of  Ariarathes. 
After  a  time  the  further  task  was  imposed  on  them,  by  despatch 
from  the  Senate,  of  reconciling  as  well  as  they  could  the  two 
kings  in  Alexandria.  .  .  . 

18.  While  this  was  going  on  at  Rome,  envoys  from  the 

Missions  to  Aria- ^^^y*    ""^^^    Marcus   Junius,    had    arrived    to 
rathes,  king  of  arbitrate   on  the  disputes   between  the  Gauls 

*  Demetrius  had  been  exchanged  for  his  uncle  Antiochus  Epiphanes  in  B.C. 
175,  just  eleven  years  before.     * 

'^  The  Senatus  Consultum  de  Macedonibus  (Livy,  45,  29)  had  declared  all 
Macedonians  free ;  each  city  to  enjoy  its  own  laws,  create  its  own  annual 
magistrates,  and  pay  a  tribute  to  Rome — half  the  amount  that  it  had  paid  to  the 
king.  Macedonia  was  divided  into  four  regions,  at  the  respective  capitals  of 
which— Amphipolis,  Thessalonica,  Pella,  and  PeLigonia — the  district  assem- 
blies (concilia)  were  to  be  held,  the  revenue  of  the  district  was  to  be  collected, 
and  the  district  magistrates  elected  ;  and  there  was  to  be  no  inter-marriage 
or  mutual  rights  of  owning  property  between  the  regions. 


XXXI  ARIARATHES  OF  CAPPA DOC/A  435 

and  king  Ariarathes.     For  the  Trocmi,  having  Cappadocia,  in 
found  themselves  unable  to  annex  any  portion  regard  to  the  en- 
of  Cappadocia  by  their  unaided   efforts,  and  *^^^heGadte.  ° 
having  been  promptly  foiled  in  their  audacious 
attempts,^  sought  refuge  with  the  Romans,  and  endeavoured 
to  bring  Ariarathes  into  discredit  there.     On  this  account  an 
embassy  under  M.  Junius  was   sent   to  Cappadocia.      The 
king  gave  them  a  satisfactory  account  of  the  affair,  treated 
them  with  great  courtesy,  and  sent  them  away  loud  in  his 
praises.      And    when    subsequently    Gnaeus    Octavius    and 
Spurius  Lucretius  arrived,  and  again  addressed  the  king  on 
the  subject  of  his  controversies  with  the  Gauls,  after  a  brief 
conversation    on    that   subject,   and   saying   that   he   would 
acquiesce  in  their  decision  without  difficulty,  he  Ariarathes  warns 
directed  the  rest  of  his  remarks  to  the  state  of  Octavius  of  the 
Syria,   being    aware    that    Octavius    and    his  dangerousjtate 
colleagues  were  going   thither.      He   pointed       °    ^^ 
out  to  them  the  unsettled  state  of  the  kingdom  and  the  un- 
principled character  of  the  men  at  the  head  of  affairs  there ; 
and  added  that  he  would  escort  them  with  an  army,  and 
remain  on  the  watch  for  all  emergencies,  until  they  returned 
from  Syria  in  safety.      Gnaeus  and  his  colleagues  acknowleged 
the  king's  kindness  and  zeal,  but  said  that  for  the  present 
they  did  not  need  the  escort :  on  a  future  occasion,  however, 
if  need  should  arise,  they  would  let  him  know  without  delay; 
for  they  considered  him  as  one  of  the  true  friends  of  Rome.  .  .  . 
Ariarathes  died  soon  after  this  embassy^  and  was  succeeded  by 
his  son  Ariarathes  Philopator,     B.C.  164.     Z/V^,  Ep.  46. 

14.  About  this  time  ambassadors  arrived  from  Ariarathes, 
who  had  recently  succeeded  to  the  kingdom  of 
Cappadocia,   to  renew  the  existing  friendship  .xri.^ra^hcs  Phiio- 
and   alliance  with    Rome,    and  in  general  to  pator  continues 
exhort  the  Senate  to  accept  the  king's  affection *^>s  fathers  policy 
and  goodwill,  which  he  entertained,  both  in  their  °   "*Rome!'  ^* 
private  and  public  capacity,  for  all  the  Romans. 
The  Senate,  on  hearing  this,  acceded  to  the  request  for  the 
renewal  of  the  friendship  and  alliance,  and  graciously  acknow- 

^  The  Greek  of  this  sentence  is  certainly  corrupt,  and  no  satisfactory  sense 
can  be  elicited  from  it. 


436  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  book 

ledged  the  general  amity  of  the  king.  The  chief  reason  for 
this  warmth  on  the  part  of  the  Senate  was  the  report  of  the 
envoys  under  Tiberius,  who,  when  sent  to  inspect  the  state  of 
Cappadocia,  had  returned  full  of  the  praises  of  the  late  king 
and  of  his  kingdom  generally.  It  was  on  the  credit  of  this 
report  that  the  Senate  received  the  ambassadors  of  Ariarathes 
graciously,  and  acknowledged  the  goodwill  of  the  king.  .  .  . 

15.  Having    somewhat    recovered    from    their    previous 

disaster,    the    Rhodians    sent   Cleagoras   with 

'^^^^^j^^^'^*' ambassadors   to   Rome   to   ask   that   Calynda 

Caria,  and  for  should  be  Ceded  to  them,  and  to  petition  the 

the  retention  of  Senate  that  those  of  their  citizens  who  had  pro- 

^C^a  ^nd^yci^  P^'"^*^^  '^^  ^^^^^  ^^  ^^^  "^^S^t  be  allowed  to 

retain  them  as  before.     They  had  also  voted 

to  raise  a  colossal  statue  of  the  Roman  people, 

^  ''of'^Jnf  ^''*'  thirty  cubits  high,  to  be  set  up  in  the  temple 

of  Athene.  .  .  . 

16.  The  Calyndians  having  broken  off  from  Caunus,  and 
The  Rhodians   ^^^  Caunians  being  about  to  besiege  Calynda, 

undertake  the  pro-  the  Calyndians  first  called  in  the  aid  of  the 
tection  of  Calynda.  Cnidians ;  and,  on  their  sending  the  required 
support,  they  held  out  against  their  enemies  for  a  time :  but 
becoming  alarmed  as  to  what  would  happen,  they  sent  an 
embassy  to  Rhodes,  putting  themselves  and  their  city  in  its 
hands.  Thereupon  the  Rhodians  sent  a  naval  and  military 
force  to  their  relief,  forced  the  Caunians  to  raise  the  siege, 
and  took  over  the  city.  .  .  . 

17.  When  Ariarathes,  king  of  Cappadocia,  had  received  his 
Ariarathes's  joy  at  ambassadors  on  their  return  from  Rome,  judg- 

the  favourable     ing  from  the  answers  they  brought  that  his 
answer  from  Rome,  kingdom  was  secured,  because  he  had  gained 
the  goodwill  of  Rome,  he  offered  a  thank-offering  to  the  gods 
for  what  had  happened,  and  entertained  his  nobles  at  a  feast 
He  then  sent  ambassadors  to  Lysias  in  Antioch,  desiring  to 
He  recovers  the  ^^  allowed  to  bring  away  the  bones  of  his  sister 
ashes  of  his     and  mother.     He  determined  not  to  say  a  word 
mother  and  sister  of  blame  as  to  the  Crime  that  had  been  com- 
mitted, lest  he  should  irritate  Lysias,  and  so 
fail  to  effect  his  present  object,  though  he  was  in  fact  greatly 


XXXI  THE  TWO  PTOLEMIES  437 

incensed  at  it.  He  gave  his  envoys  therefore  instructions 
couched  in  terms  of  courteous  request  Lysias  and  his  friends 
acceded  to  his  wishes ;  and  the  bones  having  been  conveyed 
to  Cappadocia,  the  king  received  them  in  great  state,  and 
buried  them  next  the  tomb  of  his  father  with  affectionate 
reverence.  .  .  } 

Artaxias  wished  to  kill  a  man,  but  on  the  remonstrances  of 
Ariarathes  did  not  do  so,  and  held  him  on  the  t,.    .  ^  r 

.     ...  '     ,  o.       ,     •    The  influence  of 

contrary  m  higher  respect  than  ever.     So  deci-      good  men, 
sive  is   the   influence   of  justice,  and   of  the     Artaxias  of 
opinions  and  advice  of  good  men,  that  they       Armenia. 
often  prove  the  salvation  of  foes  as  well  as  of 
friends,  and  change  their  whole  characters  for  the  better.  .  .  . 

Good  looks  are  a  better  introduction  than  any  letter.  .  .  . 

The  quarrels  of  the  two  kings  of  Egypt^  Ptolemy  VI, 
Philometor  and  Euergetes  IL  {or  Ptolemy  VIL)  Physcon,  The 
former  had  been  expelled  by  the  latter ^  and  had  taken  refuge  in 
Cyprus^  but  had  been  restored  by  a  popular  outbreak  in  his 
favour^  and  under  the  authority  of  Commissioners  sent  from 
Rome,  B.C  164.  (Z/7{y,  Ep.  46.  Diod,  Sic.  fr,  xi.)  Fresh 
quarrels  however  broke  out,  in  the  course  of  which  Physcon  was 
much  worsted  by  his  brother,  {Diod,  Sic  fr.  of^i),  and  at  length  it 
was  arranged  that  one  should  reign  in  Egypt  the  other  in  Cyrene, 
B.C  162.     {Livy,  Ep.  47.) 

18.  After  the  Ptolemies  had  made  their  partition  of  the 
kingdom,  the  younger  brother  arrived  in  Rome 
desiring  to  set  aside  the  division  made  between     E^rcetes^ii 
himself  and  his  brother,  on  the  ground  that  he  had  ( Ptoiemy  Phys- 
not  acceded  to  the  arrangement  voluntarily,  but    co").  who  had 
under  compulsion,  and  yielding  to  the  force  oi^^^^^^^^^ 
circumstances.     He  therefore  begged  the  Senate 
to  assign  Cyprus  to  his  portion  ;  for,  even  if  that  were  done,  he 
should  still  have  a  much  poorer  share  than  his  -^he  members  of 
brother.      Canuleius   and   Quintus    supported  the  Commission 

*  Ariarathes.  the  elder,  had  been  in  alliance  with  Antiochus  the  Great, 
and  had  apparently  given  him  one  of  his  daughters  in  marriage,  who  had 
been  accompanied  by  her  mother  to  Antioch,  where  both  had  now  fallen 
victims  to  the  jealousy  of  Eupator's  minister,  Lysias.     Sec  21.  43. 


.J..V,  lo  nim  '  ;  anci  inai,  ace 

^t^lad  to   rorcivc    the    L^^ovornmL 

not   hoj)c(l  for  or  expected  ;  a 

his  brother  with  the  customary 

^  \  gave  a  positive  denial :  and  the 

•'  was  clearly  an  unequal  one,  an 

that,  as  the  brothers   themselvt 
division  being  made  at  all,  it  sho\ 

The  Senate  decide  advantageous  tO   I 

in  favour  of     the  younger  Ptolen 
f  Physcon.       interest    Measures 

among  the  Romans,  by  which  the> 
found   policy   of  the   mistakes   ol 
strengthen  their  own  empire,  unc 
favours  and  benefiting  those  who  cc 
{  The  object  of  the  principle  they  acted  i 

t  Senate  is  to  divide  the  power  of  the   Eg 

an^^^en      fearing  lest,  if  it  ever 
^^  petent  head,  he-  wouk 

pointed  Titus  Torquatus  and  Gnj 
Ptolemy  Physcon  in  Cyprus,  and  th 
policy  while  satisfying  his.  These 
cordingly  at  once  despatched  with  ii 
brothers  to  each  other,  and  to  secure 

When  the  Roman  comtnissionen^ 
Syria^  and  began  carrying  out  their  / 
and  killing  the  elef*^""-  '' 


I 


i 


(i 


XXXI  THE  MURDER  OF  OCTA  VIUS  439 

burial^  and  by  sending  an   embassy   to   Rome  to  protest  his 
innocence,     Appian,  Syr.  46. 

19.  News  having  come  to  Rome  of  the  disaster  by  which 
Gnaeus  Octavius  lost  his  life,  ambassadors  also       g^c.  162. 
arrived  from  king  Antiochus,  sent  by  Lysias,  The  Senate  pay 
who    vehemently    protested    that    the    king's  l»"^^  attention  to 

r  '      ji-juj  _^'xi-         •  Tt   ^  X.     Lysias  s  excuses. 

friends  had  had  no  part  m  the  cnme.     But  the 
Senate  showed  scant  attention  to  the  envoys,  not  wishing  to 
make  any  open  declaration  on  the  subject  or  to  allow  their 
opinion  to  become  public  in  any  way. 

But  Demetrius  was  much  excited  by  the  news,  and  imme- 
diately summoned  Polybius  to  an  interview,  and  Demetrius  thinks 
consulted  him  as  to  whether  he  should  once  there  is  again  a 
more  bring  his  claims  before  the  Senate.     Poly-  chance  for  him. 
bius  advised  him  "  not  to  stumble  twice  on  the 
same  stone,"  but  to  depend  upon  himself  and  .^act^fo^yotr^f." 
venture  something  worthy  of  a  king;   and  he 
pointed  out  to  him  that  the  present  state  of  affairs  offered  him 
many  opportunities.     Demetrius  understood  the  hint,  but  said 
nothing  at  the  time ;  but  a  short  while  afterwards  consulted 
Apollonius  one  of  his  intimate  friends,  on  the  same  subject. 
This  man,  being  simple  minded  and  very  young,  hc  however  again 
advised    him   to   make   another   trial   of  the    appeals  to  the 
Senate.     "  He  was  convinced,"  he  said,  "  that.        Senate, 
since  it  had  deprived  him  of  his  kingdom  without  any  just 
expuse,  it  would  at  least  release  him  from  his  position  of 
hostage  ;  for  it  was  absurd  that,  when  the  boy  Antiochus  had 
succeeded  to  the  kingdom  in  Syria,  Demetrius  should  be  a 
hostage   for  him."     Persuaded  by  these  arguments  he  once 
more  obtained  a  hearing  of  the  Senate,  and  claimed  to  be 
relieved  of  his  obligations  as  a  hostage,  since  they  had  decided 
to  secure   the   kingdom  to  Antiochus.      But, 
though  he  pleaded  his  cause  wnth  many  argu-     ""refused^*" 
ments,  the  Senate  remained  fixed  in  the  same 
resolve  as  before.     And  that  was  only  what  was  to  be  ex- 
pected.    For  they  had  not,  on  the  former  occasion,  adjudged 
the  continuance  of  the  kingdom  to  the  child  on  the  ground 
that  the  claim  of  Demetrius  was  not  just,  but  because  it  was 


440  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBTVS  ■OOK 

advantageous  to  Rome  that  it  should  be  so ;  and  as  the  cir- 
cumstances remained  precisely  the  same,  it  was  only  natural 
that  the  policy  of  the  Senate  should  remain  unchanged  also. 

20.  Demetrius  having  thus  delivered  himself  in  vain  of  his 
swan's  song,  his  last  appea],  and  becoming  convinced  that 
Polybius  had  given  hin)  good  advice,  repented  of  what  he  had 
done.  But  he  was  naturally  of  a  lofty  spirit,  and  possessed 
sufficient  daring  to  carry  out  his  resolutions.  He  promptly 
called  Diodorus,  who  had  recently  arrived  from  Syria,  to  his 
aid,  and  confided  his  secret  purpose  to  him.  Diodorus  had 
had  the  chaige  of  Demetrius  as  a  child,  and  was  a  man  of 
considerable  adroitness,  who  had  besides  made  a  careful 
inspection  of  the  state  of  affairs  in  Syria.  He  now  pointed  out 
to  Demetrius  that  "The  confusion  caused  by  the  murder  of 
Octavius, — the  people  mistrusting  Lysias,  and  Lysias  mis- 
trusting the  people,  while  the  Senate  was  convinced  that  the 
lawless  murder  of  their  envoy  really  originated  with  the 
king's  friends, — presented  a  most  excellent  opportunity  for 
his  appearing  on  the  scene :  for  the  people  there  would 
promptly  transfer  the  crown  to  him,  even  though  he  were  to 
arrive  attended  by  but  one  slave ;  while  the  Senate  would 
not  venture  to  give  any  further  assistance  or  support  to  Lysias 
after  such  an  abominable  crime.  Finally,  it  was  quite  possible 
Demetrius  resoii-M  f*""  'hem  to  leave  Rome  undetected,  without  any 
to  escape  from  onehaving  anyidea  of  hisintention."  Thiscourse 
Rome,  ar^a^in  being  resolved  upon,  Demetrius  sent  for  Poly- 
^  '  '  bius,  and  telling  him  what  he  was  going  to  dt^ 
begged  him  to  lend  his  assistance,  and  to  join  him  in  contriving 
to  manage  his  escape. 

There  happened  to  be  at    Rome    a   certain  Menyllus  of 
Mcnyiius  of     Alabanda,  on  a  mission  from  the  elder  Ptolemy 
Aiabanda  [in    to  cotifront  and  answer  the  younger  before  the 
Caria)  helps  him  Senate.     Between  this  man  and  Polybius  there 
^  '  was  a  strong  friendship    and    confidence,  and 

Polybius  therefore  thought  him  just  the  man  for  the  purpose 
in  hand.  He  accordingly  introduced  him  with  all  speed  to 
Demetrius,  and  with  warm  expressions  of  regard.  Being 
trusted  with  the  secret,  Menyllus  undertook  to  have  the  necessary 
ship  in  readiness,  and  to  see  that  everything  required  for  the 


XXXI  DEMETRIUS  PLANS  TO  LEAVE  ROME  441 

voyage  was  prepared  Having  found  a  Carthaginian  vessel 
anchored  at  the  mouth  of  the  Tiber,  which  had  been  on  sacred 
service,  he  chartered  it  (These  vessels  are  carefully  selected 
at  Carthage,  to  convey  the  offerings  sent  by  the  Carthaginians 
to  their  ancestral  gods  at  Tyre.)  He  made  no  secret  about 
it,  but  chartered  the  vessel  for  his  own  return  voyage ;  and 
therefore  was  able  to  make  his  arrangements  for  provisions  also 
without  exciting  suspicion,  talking  openly  with  the  sailors  and 
making  an  appointment  with  them. 

21 .  When  the  shipmaster  had  everything  ready,  and  nothing 
remained  except  for  Demetrius  to  do  his  part,  he 
sent  Diodorus  to  Syria  to  gather  information,  and  ^^th^^gM   °^ 
to  watch  the  disposition  of  the  people  there. 
His  foster-brother  Apollonius  took  part  in  this  expedition; 
and  Demetrius  also  confided  his  secret  to  the  two  brothers 
of  Apollonius,  Meleager  and  Menestheus,  but  to  no  one  else 
of  all  his  suite,  though   that   was  numerous.      These  three 
brothers  were  the  sons  of  the  Apollonius  who  occupied  so 
important  a  position  at  the  court  of  Seleucus,  but  who  had 
removed  to  Miletus  at  the  accession  of  Antiochus  Epiphanes. 
As  the  day  agreed  upon  with  the  sailors  approached,  it  was 
arranged  that  one  of  his  friends  should  give  an  entertainment 
to  serve  as  an  excuse  for  Demetrius  going  out     For  it  was 
impossible  that  he  should  sup  at  home  ;  as  it  was  his  constant 
habit,  when  he  did  so,  to  invite  all  his  suite.    Those  who  were  in 
the  secret  were  to  leave  the  house  after  supper  and  go  to  the 
ship,  taking  one  slave  each  with  them  ;  the  rest  they  had  sent 
on  to  Anagnia,  saying  that  they  would  follow  next  Poiybius  sends  a 
day.     It  happened  that  at  this  time  Poiybius  was     warning  to 
ill  and  confined  to  his  bed ;  but  he  was  kept  ac-     Demetnus. 
quainted  with  all  that  was  going  on  by  constant  communications 
from  Menyllus.     He  was  therefore  exceedingly  anxious,  know- 
ing Demetrius  to  be  fond  of  conviviality  and  full  of  youthful 
wilfulness,  lest,  by  the  entertainment  being  unduly  prolonged, 
some  difficulty  should  arise  from  over-indulgence  in  wine  to 
prevent  his  getting  away.     He  therefore  wrote  and  sealed  a 
small  tablet ;  and  just  as  it  was  getting  dusk  sent  a  servant  of 
his  own,  with  orders  to  ask  for  Demetrius^s  cupbearer  and  give 
him  the  tablet,  without  saying  who  he  was  or  from  whom  he 


442  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  book 


came,  and  to  bid  the  cupbearer  to  give  it  to  Demetrius  to  read 
at  once.  His  orders  were  carried  out,  and  Demetrius  read 
the  tablet,  which  contained  the  following  apophthegms  ^ : — 

"  The  ready  hand  bears  off  the  sluggard's  prize." 

**  Night  favours  all,  but  more  the  daring  heart." 

"  Be  bold  :  front  danger  :  strike  !  then  lose  or  win, 
Care  not,  so  you  be  true  unto  yourself." 

"Cool  head  and  wise  distrust  are  wisdom's  sinews." 

22.  As  soon  as  Demetrius  had  read  these  lines,  he  under- 
Demetrius  takes  stood  their  purport,  and  from  whom  they  came  ; 
the  hint,  and  the  and  at  once  pretending  that  he  felt  sick,  he  left 
voyage  is  safely  ^^  banquet  escorted  by  his  friends.     Arrived 

at  his  lodging,  he  sent  away  those  of  his  servants 
who  were  not  suited  to  his  purpose  to  Anagnia,  ordering  them 
to  take  the  hunting  nets  and  hounds  and  meet  him  at  Cerceii, 
where  it  had  been  his  constant  custom  to  go  boar  hunting, 
which,  in  fact,  was  the  origin  of  his  intimacy  with  Poly  bins. 
He  then  imparted  his  plan  to  Nicanor  and  his  immediate 
friends,  and  urged  them  to  share  his  prospects.  They  all  con- 
sented with  enthusiasm  ;  whereupon  he  bade  them  return  to 
their  own  lodgings,  and  arrange  with  their  servants  to  go  before 
daybreak  to  Anagnia  and  meet  them  at  Cerceii,  while  they  got 
travelling  clothes  and  returned  to  him,  telling  their  domestics 
that  they  would  join  them,  accompanied  by  Demetrius,  in  the 
course  of  the  next  day  at  Cerceii.  Everything  having  been 
done  in  accordance  with  this  order,  he  and  his  friends  went  to 
Ostia,  at  the  mouth  of  the  Tiber,  by  night.  Menyllus  preceded 
them  and  had  a  Conversation  with  the  sailors  ;  telling  them 
that  orders  had  arrived  from  the  king  which  made  it  necessary 
for  him  to  remain  at  Rome  for  the  present,  and  to  send  some 
of  the  most  trustworthy  of  his  young  men  to  his  Majesty,  to 
inform  him  of  what  had  been  done  about  his  brother.  He 
should  not,  therefore,  he  said,  go  on  board  himself;  but  the 
young  men  who  were  to  sail  would  come  about  midnight.  The 
shipmasters  made  no  difficulty  about  it,  as  the  passage  money 
for  which  they  had  originally  bargained  was  in  their  hands; 

*  The  first  line  is  of  unknown  authorship.  The  second  is  from  Euripides, 
Phoeniss.  633.  The  third  apophthegm  is  again  unknown.  The  last  is  from 
Kpichamius,  see  18,  40. 


TXXI  DEMETRIUS  ESCAPES  443 

and  they  had  long  made  all  their  preparations  for  sailing,  when 
Demetrius  and  his  friends  arrived  about  the  third  watch. 
There  were  altogether  eight  of  them,  besides  five  slaves  and 
three  boys.  Menyllus  entered  into  conversation  with  them, 
showed  them  the  provisions  in  store  for  the  voyage,  and  com- 
mended them  earnestly  to  the  care  of  the  shipmaster  and 
crew.  They  then  went  on  board,  and  the  pilot  weighed  anchor 
and  started  just  as  day  was  breaking,  having  absolutely  no 
idea  of  the  real  state  of  the  case,  but  believing  that  he  was 
conveying  some  soldiers  from  Menyllus  to  Ptolemy. 

23.  At  Rome,  during  the  whole  of  the  following  day,  no  one 
was  likely  to  make  any  inquiry  for  Demetrius   — .      . 

..  '  ,        .     ,  ■  u    u-  I-        ...  The  nbsence  of 

or  those  who  had  gone  with  him.  For  those  Demetrius  is  not 
of  his  household  who  stayed  in  the  city  sup-    ascertained  in 

posed  him  to  have  Rone  to  Cerceii :  and  those  **?""*  ™"'  ''^ 
■^  ,  ,  °      .        ,  .  '  ,  fourth  day. 

at  An^nia  were  expectmg  hira  to  come  there 
toa    The  flight  from  Rome,  therefore,  was  entirely  unremarked ; 
until  one  of  his  slaves,  having  been  flogged  at  Anagnia,  ran  ofT 
to  Cerceii,  expecting  to  find  Demetrius  there ;  and  not  finding 
him,  ran   back   again   to   Rome,   hoping   10  meet   him   on 
the  road.    But  as  he  failed  to  meet  him  anywhere,  he  went  and 
informed  his  friends  in  Rome  and  the  members  of  his  house- 
hold who  had  been  left  behind  in  his  house.      But  it  was  not 
until  the  fourth  day  after  his  start  that,  Demetrius  being  looked 
for  in  vain,  the  truth  was  suspected.     On  the    ^hc  Senate  is 
fifth  the  Senate  was  hastily  summoned  to  con-  summoned,  bui 
sider  the  matter,  when  Demetrius  had  already    d*^''***  "°'  'o 
cleared    the  Straits  of  Messina.      The  Senate  '^  ""'^  pursui . 
gave  up  all  idea  of  pursuit :  both  because  they  imagined  that 
he  had  got  a  long  start  on  the  voyage  (for  the  wind  was  in  his 
favour),  and  because  they  foresaw  that,  though  they  might  wish 
to  hinder  him,  they  would  be  unable  to  do  so.   commissioner 
But  some  few  days  afterwards  they  apiwinted    appointed  for 
Tiberius  Gracchus,  Lucius  Untulus,  and  Ser-*^"^^"^^  Asia, 
vilius  GLiucia  as  commissioners  :  first  to  inspect 
the  state  of  Greece ;  and,  next,  to  cross  to  Asia  and  watch  the 
result  of  Demetrius's  attempt,  and  examine  the  policy  adopted 
by  the  other  kings,  and  arbitrate  on  their  controversies  with 
the  Gauls,      Such  were  the  events  in  Italy  this  year.  .  ,  . 


444  I^HE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  book 

Demetrius  expecting  the  arrival  of  the  commissioner  who 
was  to  be  sent  to  him.  .  .  . 

24.  The  dissoluteness  of  the  young  men  in  Rome  had 

grown  to  such  a  height,  and  broke  out  in  such 
CTOM^^onuxwy  extravagances,  that  there  were  many  instances  of 

men  purchasinga  jar  of  Pontic  salt-fish  for  three 
hundred  drachmae.^  In  reference  to  which  Marcus  Porcius 
Cato  once  said  to  the  people  in  indignation,  that  no  better 
proof  could  be  shown  of  the  degeneracy  of  the  state  than  that 
good-looking  slaves  ^  should  fetch  more  than  a  farm,  and  a  jar 
of  salt-fish  more  than  a  carter.  .  .  . 

25.  The  Rhodians,  though  in  other  respects  maintaining 
The  Rhodians    ^he  dignity  of  their  state,  made  in  my  opinion  a 

accept  money  to  slight  lapse  at  this  period.  They  had  received  two 
pay  their  school-  hundred  and  eighty  thousand  medimni  of  com 
mas  crs,    .  from  Eumenes,  that  its  value  might  be  invested 

and  the  interest  devoted  to  pay  the  fees  of  the  tutors  and  school- 
masters of  their  sons.  One  might  accept  this  from  friends  in  a  case 
of  financial  embarrassment,  as  one  might  in  private  life,  rather 
than  allow  children  to  remain  uneducated  for  want  of  means ; 
but  where  means  are  abundant  a  man  would  rather  do  any- 
thing than  allow  the  schoolmaster's  fee  to  be  supplied  by  a 
joint  contribution  from  his  friends.  And  in  proportion  as  a 
state  should  hold  higher  notions  than  an  individual,  so  ought 
governments  to  be  more  jealous  of  their  dignity  than  private 
men,  and  above  all  a  Rhodian  government,  considering  the 
wealth  of  the  country  and  its  high  pretensions.  .  .  . 

26.  After  this  the  younger  Ptolemy  arrived  in  Greece  with 
Ptolemy  Physcon  ^^^  Roman  commissioners,  and  began  collecting 
returning  with  the  a  formidable  army  of  mercenaries,  among  whom 

commissioners,   he  enlisted  Damasippus  the  Macedonian,  who, 

^l^^'ln  Gr^e'  ^^^^^  murdering  the  members  of  the  council  at 

but  is  persuaded  Phacus,  fled  with  his  wife  and  children  from 

to  disband  them,  Macedonia,  and  after  reaching  Peraea,  opposite 

B.C.  162.       Rhodes,  and  being  entertained  by  the  people 

there,  determined  to  sail  to  Cyprus.   But  when  Torquatus  and  his 

*    AlK>Ut  j^I2. 

*  In  his  Censorship  (b.c  184)  Cato  imposed  a  tax  on  slaves  under  twenty 
sold  for  more  than  ten  sestertia  (about  £70.)     Livy,  39,  44. 


XXTi  THE  TWO  PTOLEMIES  445 

colleagues  saw  that  Ptolemy  had  collected  a  Tonnidable  corps  of 
mercenaries,  they  reminded  him  of  their  commission,  which 
was  to  restore  him  "  without  a  war,"  and  at  last  persuaded  him 
to  go  as  far  as  Side  (in  Pamphylia),  and  there  disband  his 
mercenaries,  give  up  his  idea  of  invading  Cyprus,  and  meet 
them  on  the  frontiers  of  Cyrene.  Meanwhile,  they  said  that 
they  would  sail  to  Alexandria,  and  induce  the  king  to  consent 
to  their  demands,  and  would  meet  him  on  the  He. howL-vcr, takes 
frontiers,  bringing  the  other  king  with  thera.  The  about  100  Cretans 
younger  Ptolemy  was  persuaded  by  these  argu-'^"^''*''^  *"■"  ■" 
ments,  gave  up  the  attack  upon  Cyprus,  dis- 
missed the  mercenaries,  and  first  sailed  to  Crete,  accompanied 
by  Damasippus  and  Gnaeus  Merula,  one  of  ,^ 
the  commissioners ;  and,  after  enlisting  about  a 
thousand  soldiers  in  Crete,  put  to  sea  and  crossed  Co  Libya, 
landing  at  Apis. 

27.  Meanwhile  Torquatus  had  crossed  to  Alexandria  and 
was  trying  to  induce  the  elder  Ptolemy  to  be  pioicmy  physcon 
reconciled  to  his  brother,  and  yield  Cyprus  to  invades  the 
him.  But  Ptolemy,  by  alternate  promises  and  lioni'iionsofhis 
refusals  and  the  like,  managed  to  waste  the 
time,  while  the  younger  king  lay  encamped  with  his  thousand 
Cretans  at  Apis  in  Libya,  according  to  his  j^reement.  Be- 
coming thoroughly  irritated  at  receiving  no  intelligence,  he  first 
sent  Gnaeus  Merula  to  Alexandria,  hoping  by  this  means  to 
bring  Torquatus  and  those  with  him  to  the  place  of  meeting. 
But  Merula  was  like  the  others  in  protracting  the  business : 
forty  days  passed  without  a  word  of  intelligence,  and  the  king 
was  in  despair.  The  fact  was  that  the  elder  king,  by  using 
every  kind  of  flattery,  had  won  the  commissioners  over,  and 
was  keeping  them  by  him,  rather  against  their  will  than  with  it. 
Moreover,  at  this  lime  the  younger  Ptolemy  was  informed  that 
the  people  of  Cyrene  had  revolted,  that  the  cities  were 
conspiring  with  them,  and  that  Ptolemy  Sympetesis  had  also 
taken  their  side.  This  man  was  an  Egyptian  by  birth,  and 
had  been  left  by  the  king  in  charge  of  his  whole  kingdom  when 
he  was  going  on  his  journey  to  Rome.  When  the  king  was 
informed  of  this,  and  learned  presently  that  the  Cyreneans  were 
encamped  in  the  open  country,  afraid  lest,  in  his  desire  to  add 


446  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS         book  xxxi 


Cyprus  to  his  dominions,  he  might  lose  Cyrene  also,  he  threw 
everything  else  aside  and  marched  towards  Cyrene.  When  he 
came  to  what  is  called  the  Great  Slope,  he  found  the  Libyans 
and  Cyreneans  occupying  the  pass.  Ptolemy  was  alarmed  at 
this:  but,  putting  half  his  forces  on  board  boats,  he  ordered 
them  to  sail  beyond  the  difficult  ground,  and  show  themselves 
on  the  rear  of  the  enemy;  while  with  the  other  half  he  marched 
up  in  their  front  and  tried  to  carry  the  pass.  The  Libyans  being 
panic-stricken  at  this  double  attack  on  front  and  rear,  and 
abandoning  their  position,  Ptolemy  not  only  got  possession  of 
the  pass,  but  also  of  Tetrapyrgia,  which  lay  immediately  below 
it,  in  which  there  was  an  abundant  supply  of  water.  Thence 
he  crossed  the  desert  in  seven  days,  the  forces  under 
Mochyrinus  coasting  along  parallel  to  his  line  of  march.  The 
Cyreneans  were  encamped  eight  thousand  five  hundred  strong, 
eight  thousand  infantry  and  five  hundred  cavalry :  for  having 
satisfied  themselves  as  to  the  character  of  Ptolemy  from  his 
conduct  at  Alexandria,  and  seeing  that  his  government  and 
policy  generally  were  those  of  a  tyrant  rather  than  a  king,  they 
could  not  endure  the  idea  of  becoming  bis  subjects,  but  were 
determined  to  venture  everything  in  their  desire  for  fi-eedom. 
And  at  last  he  was  beaten.  .  .  . 

28.  At  this  time  Gnaeus  Merula  also  came  from  Alexandria, 

The  Roman  com-  ^'^^"^^^^'^6  ^^  ^^"g  (Physcon)  that  bis  brother 

mission  fails  to  would  consent  to  none  of  the   proposals,  but 

secure  peace     maintained  that  they  ought  to  abide  by  the 

^brothers^*^     original  agreements.     On  hearing  this,  Physcon 

selected  the  brothers  Comanus  and  Ptolemy^ 

to  go  as  ambassadors  to  Rome  with  Gnaeus,  and  inform  the 

Senate  of  his  brother's  selfish  and  haughty  behaviour.     At  the 

same  time  the  elder  Ptolemy  sent  away  Titus  Torquatus  also 

without  having  attained  the  object  of  his  mission.     Such  was 

the  state  of  things  in  Alexandria  and  Cyrene.  .  .  . 

^  Called  Ptolemy  the  Orator  in  28,  19. 


BOOK   XXXII 

1.  This  year  Comanus  and  his  brother  arrived  at  Rome  on 
their  mission  from  the  younger  Ptolemy,  and  ,       ,j« 

Menyllus  of  Alabanda  from  the  elder.     Their    senate  break 
interview  with  the  Senate  was  the  occasion  of     off  relations 
many  mutual  recriminations  expressed  with  great  phn^inet^r^^nd 
bitterness ;   and   when    Titifs    Torquatus    and      encourage 
Gnaeus  Merula  gave  evidence  in  favour  of  the  Ptolemy  Physcon 
younger  king,  and   supported  him  with  great   *"  **i?  *^^*"*  ^^ 
earnestness,   the  Senate  voted   that    Menyllus 
and  his  colleagues  should  leave  Rome  within  five  days,  and 
that  the  treaty  of  alliance  with  the  elder  Ptolemy  should  be 
annulled ;  but  that  they  should  send  envoys  to  the  younger 
to  inform  him  of  the  decree  of  the  Senate.     Publius  Apustius 
and    Gaius   Lentulus  were   appointed   to   this   service,  who 
immediately  sailed  to  Gyrene,  and  with  great  despatch  an- 
nounced  to  Physcon   the   decree   of   the   Senate.      Greatly 
elated  by  this,   Ptolemy  began  collecting   mercenaries,  and 
devoted  his  whole  attention  and  energies  to  the  acquisition  of 
Cyprus.     This  was  what  was  going  on  in  Italy.  .  .  . 

2.  Not  long  before  this  period  Massanissa  resolved  to  try 
his  strength  with  the  Carthaginians.     He  saw 
how  numerous  the  cities  built  along  the  lesser  second  arid^Uiird 
Syrtis  were,  and  noticed  the  excellence  of  the      Punic  wars 
district  which  they  call  Emporia,  and  he  had      Massanissa 
long   been  casting  an  envious  eye  upon   the    ^^ach^^oT' 
revenues  which  those    places   produced.     He    Carthaginian 
quickly  possessed  himself  of  the  open  part  of  territory.    Both 
the  country,   because  the  Carthaginians  were    '^tomV 
always  averse  from  service  in  the  field,  and  were 
at  that  time  completely  enervated  by  the  long  peace.     But  he 


448  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  book 

was  unable  to  get  possession  of  the  towns,  because  they  were 
carefully  guarded  by  the  Carthaginians.     Both  parties  then  re- 
ferring their  case  to  the  Roman  Senate,  and  frequent  embassies 
coming  to  Rome  from  both  sides,  it  always  happened  that 
and  the  Romans  ^^  Carthaginians  got  the  worst  of  it  in  the 
invariably  sup-  judgment  of  the  Romans,  not  on  the  merits 
port  Massanissa.  ^f  ^^  c2iS>^^  but  because  the  judges  were  con- 
vinced that  such  a  decision  was  in  their  interests.    For  instance, 

not  many  years  before  this  Massanissa  was  him- 
Livy  ^?4  6a  self  at  the  head  of  an  anny  in  pursuit  of  Aphther, 
who  had  revolted  from  him,  and  asked  per- 
mission of  the  Carthaginians  to  go  through  this  territory,  which 
they  refused  on  the  ground  that  it  had  nothing  to  do  with  him. 
Owing,  however,  to  the  decisions  given  at  Rome  during  this 
period,  the  Carthaginians  were  put  into  such  difficulties  that 
they  not  only  lost  the  cities  and  territory,  but  had  to  pay 
besides  five  hundred  talents  as  mesne  profits  from  the  district 
And  this  was  the  origin  of  the  present  controversy.^  .  .  . 

3.  Prusias  sent  envoys  to  Rome  with  some  Gauls  to  accuse 
Further  com-    Eumenes ;  and  Eumenes  in  his  turn  sent  his 

plaints  against    brother  Attalus  to  rebut  the  accusations.    Aria- 
Eumenes  by     ^athes   Sent  a   present  of  ten   thousand  gold 

JrTusias  and  tnc 

Gauls.    See     picccs,  and  envoys  to  inform  the  Senate  of  the 
31.  4.         reception    given    to   Tiberius   Gracchus ;   and 
B.C.  161.       generally  to  ask  for  their  commands,  and  to 
assure  them  that  he  would  do  anything  they  told  him.  .  .  . 

4.  When  Menochares  arrived  in  Antioch  to  visit  Demetrius, 
T^      ...      and  informed  the  king  ^  of  the  conversation  he 

Demctnus  in- 

duces  Tiberius   had  had  with  the  commission  under  Tiberius 

Gracchus  to     Gracchus  in  Cappadocia,  the  king,  thinking  it  a 

salute  him  as    j^^tter  of  the  most  urgent  necessity  to  get  these 

men  on  his  side  as  much  as  he  could,  devoted 

himself,  to  the  exclusion  of  every  other  business,  to  sending 

^  A  more  detailed  statement  of  the  controversies  between  Carthage  and 
Massanissa,  fostered  and  encouraged  by  the  Romans,  is  found  in  Appian, 
Res  Punicae,  67  sq. 

'  Demetrius  was  now  king.  On  his  escape  from  Rome,  described  in  bk.  31, 
chs.  20-23,  ^^  li'^d  met  with  a  ready  reception  in  Syria,  had  seized  the  sovereign 
power,  and  put  the  young  Antiochus  and  his  minister  Lysias  to  death  ;  this  was 
in  B.C.  162.     Appian,  Syriac,  ch.  47, 


XXXII  DEMETRIUS  AND  ARIARATHES  449 


messages  to  them,  first  to  Pamphylia,  and  then  to  Rhodes, 
undertaking  to  do  everything  the  Romans  wished ;  till  at  last 
he  extracted  their  acknowledgment  of  him  as  king.     The  fact 
was  that  Tiberius  was  very  favourably  disposed  to  him ;  and, 
accordingly,   materially   contributed    to    the    success   of  his 
attempt,  and   to  his  acquisition  of  the  royal  surrenders  the 
power.     Demetrius  took  advantage  of  this  to     murderer  of 
send   envoys   to  Rome,    taking   with   them  a       Octavius. 
complimentary  crown,  the  murderer  of  Gnaeus  Octavius,  and 
with  them  Isocrates  the  critic.  .  .  . 

6.  At  this  time  came  ambassadors  from  Ariarathes,  bringing 
a  complimentary  present  of  ten  thousand  gold 
pieces,  and  announcing  the  king's  faithful  attach-  f^  ^^^^^^^ 
ment  to  Rome ;  and  of  this  they  appealed  to 
Tiberius  and  his  colleagues  as  witnesses.     Tiberius  and  his 
colleagues  confirmed  their  statements :  whereupon  the  Senate 
accepted   the    present   with    warm   thanks,    and   sent   back 
in  return  presents,  which  with  them  are  the  most  honour- 
able  they   can   give — a   sceptre    and    ivory   chair.      These 
ambassadors  were  dismissed  at  once  by  the  Senate  before  the 
winter.    But  after  them  arrived  Attalus  when  the 
new  Consuls  had  already  entered  on  their  office ;  ^^^  ^yV'* 
as  well  as  the  Gauls  who  had  accusations  against  b.c.  160.    Coss. 
him,  and  whom  Prusias  had  sent,  with  as  many  L.  Aniciiis  Gaiius, 
more  from  Asia.     After  giving  all  a  hearing,     ^^he'^'" 
the  Senate  not  only  acquitted  Attalus  of  all 
blame,  but  dismissed  him  with  additional  marks  of  their  favour 
and  kindness :  for  their  friendship  for  and  active  support  of 
Attalus  was  in  the  same  proportion  as  their   hostility  and 
opposition  to  king  Eumenes.  .  .  . 

6.  The  ambassadors  with  Menochares  arrived  in  Rome  from 
Demetrius,  bringing  the  present  of  ten  thousand  Reception  of  the 
gold  pieces,  as  well  as  the  man  who  had  assassin-  ambassadors  of 
ated  Gnaeus  Octavius.  The  Senate  was  for  a  long      Demetnus. 
time  doubtful  what  to  do  about  these  matters.    Finally  they  re- 
ceived the  ambassadors  and  accepted  the  present,  but  declined 
to  receive  the  men  who  were  thus  brought  prisoners.     Yet 
Demetrius  had  sent  not  only  Leptines,  the  actual  assassin  of 
Octavius,  but  Isocrates  as  well.     The  latter  was  a  grammarian 

VOL.  II  '20 


450  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  book 


and  public  lecturer ;  but  being  by  nature  garrulous,  boastful, 

and  conceited,  he  gave  offence   even  to  the 
^'l^r^^  Greeks,  Alcaeus  and  his  friends  being  accus- 

tomed  to  direct  their  wit  against  him  and  hold 
him  up  to  ridicule  in  their  scholastic  discussions.^     When  he 

arrived  in  Syria,  he  displayed  contempt  for  the 
"*^  s'tr^ ^"  people  of  the  country ;  and  not  content  with 

lecturing  on  his  own  subjects,  he  took  to  speak- 
ing on  politics,  and  maintained  that  "Gnaeus  Octavius  had 
been  rightly  served ;  and  that  the  other  ambassadors  ought  to 
be  put  to  death  also,  that  there  might  be  no  one  left  to  report 
the  matter  to  the  Romans ;  and  so  they  might  be  taught  to 
give  up  sending  haughty  injunctions  and  exercising  unlimited 
power.''  By  such  random  talk  he  got  into  this  trouble. 
7.  And  there  is  a  circumstance  connected  with  both   these 

men  that  is  worth  recording.    After  assassinating 
^^^  L^lhTcr  ""^  ^naeus,  I^ptines  immediately  went  openly  about 

Laodicea,  asserting  that  what  he  had  done  was 
just,  and  that  it  had  been  effected  in  accordance  with  the  will 
of  the  gods.  And  when  Demetrius  took  possession  of  the 
government,  he  went  to  the  king  exhorting  him  to  have  no 
fear  about  the  murder  of  Gnaeus,  nor  to  adopt  any  measures 
of  severity  against  the  Laodiceans ;  for  that  he  would  himself 
go  to  Rome  and  convince  the  Senate  that  he  had  done  this 
deed  in  accordance  with  the  will  of  the  gods.  And  finally, 
thanks  to  his  entire  readiness  and  even  eagerness  to  go,  he 
was  taken  without  chains  or  a  guard.  But  directly  Isocrates 
Extraordinary  found  himself  included  under  this  charge,  he 
conduct  of  went  entirely  beside  himself  with  terror ;  and, 
Isocrates.  ^Sitx  the  collar  and  chain  were  put  on  his  neck, 
he  would  rarely  touch  food,  and  completely  neglected  all 
care  of  his  body.  He  accordingly  arrived  at  Rome  a  truly 
astonishing  spectacle,  sufficient  to  convince  us  that  nothing 
can  be  more  frightful  than  a  man,  in  body  and  soul  alike, 
when    once   divested    of    his   humanity.      His    aspect   was 

*  tV  rah  ffvyKpifftffip.  But  it  is  very  doubtful  what  the  exact  meaning  of  this 
word  is.  Alcaeus  seems  to  be  the  Epicurean  philosopher  who,  among  others, 
was  expelled  from  Rome  in  b.c.  171.  See  Athenae\is,  xii.  547,  who  however 
calls  him  Alcios.     .See  also  Aelian,  T.  I/isf,  9,  la. 


XXXII  /SOCRATES  THE  GRAMMARIAN  451 

beyond  all  measure  terrifying  and  savage,  as  might  be  ex* 
pected  in  a  man  who  had  neither  washed  the  dirt  from 
his  body,  nor  pared  his  nails,  nor  cut  his  hair,  for  a  year. 
The  wild  glare  and  rolling  of  his  eyes  also  showed  such  inward 
horror,  that  any  one  who  saw  him  would  have  rather  approached 
any  animal  in  the  world  than  him.  Leptines,  on  the  contrary, 
maintained  his  original  view :  was  ready  to  appear  before  the 
Senate ;  owned  plainly  to  all  who  conversed  with  him  what  he 
had  done ;  and  asserted  that  he  would  meet  with  no  severity 
at  the  hands  of  the  Romans.  And  eventually  his  expecta- 
tion was  fully  justified.  For  the  Senate,  from  The  senate 
the  idea,  I  believe,  that,  if  it  received  and  decide  to  keep  the 
punished  the  guilty  men,  the  populace  would  quesUon  of  the 
consider  that  full  satisfaction  had  been  taken  ™"  eropen. 
for  the  murder,  refused  almost  outright  to  receive  them ;  and 
thus  kept  the  charge  in  reserve,  that  they  might  have  the  power 
of  using  the  accusation  whenever  they  chose.  They  therefore 
confined  their  answer  to  Demetrius  to  these  words :  "  He  shall 
find  all  favour  at  our  hands,  if  he  satisfy  the  Senate  in  accord- 
ance with  the  obedience  which  he  owed  to  it  before."  .  .  . 

There  came  also  ambassadors  from  the  Achaeans,  headed 
by  Xenon  and  Telecles,  in  behalf  of  their  accused 
compatriots,  and  especially  in  behalf  of  Polybius  ^"^"^^^^ 
and  Stratius  ;  for  lapse  of  time  had  now  brought  behalf  of  Polybius 
an  end  to  the  majority,  or  at  any  rate  to  those    and  the  other 
of  any   note.      The   ambassadors   came   with  ^^^^"  f^^°^' 
instructions  couched  in  a  tone  of  simple  en- 
treaty, in  order  to  avoid  anything  like  a  contest  with  the  Senate. 
But  when  they  had  been  admitted  and  delivered  their  commis- 
sion in  proper  terms,  even  this  humble  tone  failed  to  gain  their 
end,  and  the  Senate  voted  to  abide  by  their  resolve.  .  .  . 

8.  The  strongest  and  most  honourable  proof  of  the  integrity 
of  Lucius  Aemilius  Paulus  was  made  public 
after  his  death.     For  the  character  which  he'^^^^^^^^P^^^^ 
enjoyed  while  alive  was  found  to  be  justified  at    Pauius  at  his 
his  death,  than  which  there  can  be  no  clearer  death  is  a  proof  of 
proof  of  virtue.     No  one  of  his  contemporaries  ^'^  ^'n^"^^^' 
brought  home  more  gold  from  Iberia  than  he ;  no 
one  captured  such  enormous  treasures  as  he  did  in  Macedonia ; 


452  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBJUS  BpOK 


and  yet,  though  in  both  these  countries  he  had  the  most  un- 
limited authority,  he  left  so  small  a  private  fortune,  that  his 
sons  could  not  pay  his  wife's  jointure  wholly  from  the  sale  of 
his  personalty,  and  were  obliged  to  sell  some  of  his  real  estate 
^  also  to  do  so,  a  fact  of  which  I  have  already 

spoken  in  some  detail  This  forces  us  to  ac- 
knowledge that  the  fame  of  the  men  who  have  been  admired 
in  Greece  in  this  respect  suffers  by  a  comparison.  For  if  to 
abstain  from  appropriating  money,  entrusted  to  a  man  for  the 
benefit  of  the  depositor,  deserves  our  admiration, — as  is  said 
to  have  happened  in  the  case  of  the  Athenian  Aristeides  and 
the  Theban  Epaminondas, — how  much  more  admirable  is  it 
for  a  man  to  have  been  master  of  a  whole  kingdom,  with 
absolute  authority  to  do  with  it  as  he  chose,  and  yet  to  have 
coveted  nothing  in  it !     And  if  what  I  say  appears  incredible 

Poiybius  has  the  ^^  ^^1  ^^  "^X  readers,  let  them  consider  that  the 
fear  of  Roman    present  writer  was  fully  aware  that  Romans,  more 

critics  before  his  ji^^n  any  Other  people,  would  take  his  books  into 
^^    *  their  hands, — because  the  most  splendid  and 

numerous  achievements  recorded  therein  belong  to  them ;  and 
that  with  them  the  truth  about  the  facts  could  not  p>os- 
sibly  be  unknown,  nor  the  author  of  a  falsehood  expect  any 
indulgence.  No  one  then  would  voluntarily  expose  himself  to 
certain  disbelief  and  contempt.  And  let  this  be  kept  in  mind 
throughout  the  whole  course  of  my  work,  when  I  seem  to  be 
making  a  startling  assertion  about  the  Romans. 

9.  As  the  course  of  my  narrative  and  the  events  of  the 

The  origin  of  the  ^^^^  ^^^^  drawn  our  attention  to  this  family,  I 
friendship  between  wish  to  carry  out  fully,  for  the  sake  of  students, 
Scipio  Aemiiianus  yf\^^\  was  left  as  a  mere  promise  in  my  previous 
oy  lus.  i^qJ^  J  promised  then  that  I  would  relate 
the  origin  and  manner  of  the  rise  and  unusually  early  glory  of 
Scipio's  reputation  in  Rome ;  and  also  how  it  camfe  about  that 
Poiybius  became  so  attached  to  and  intimate  with  him,  that  the 
fame  of  their  friendship  and  constant  companionship  was  not 
merely  confined  to  Italy  and  Greece,  but  became  known  to 
more  remote  nations  also.  We  have  already  shown  that  the 
acquaintance  began  in  a  loan  of  some  books  and  the  conversa- 
tion about  them.    But  as  the  intimacy  went  on,  and  the  Achaean 


XXXII  SCIPIO  THE  YOUNGER  AND  POL  YB I  US  453 

detenus  were  being  distributed  among  the  various  cities,  Fabius 
and  Scipio,  the  sons  of  Lucius  Aemilius  Paulus,^  exerted  all 
their  influence  with  the  praetor  that  Polybius  might  be  allowed 
to  remain  in  Rome.  This  was  granted :  and  the  intimacy  was 
becoming  more  and  more  close,  when  the  Young  Scipio 
following  incident  occurred.  One  day,  when  opens  his  heart  to 
they  were  all  three  coming  out  of  the  house  of  Polybius. 
Fabius,  it  happened  that  Fabius  left  them  to  go  to  the  Forum, 
and  that  Polybius  went  in  another  direction  with  Scipio.  As 
they  were  walking  along,  in  a  quiet  and  subdued  voice,  and 
with  the  blood  mounting  to  his  cheeks,  Scipio  said,  "  Why  is 
it,  Polybius,  that  though  I  and  my  brother  eat  at  the  same 
table,  you  address  all  your  conversation  and  all  your  questions 
and  explanations  to  him,  and  pass  me  over  altogether?  Of 
course  you  too  have  the  same  opinion  of  me  as  I  hear  the  rest 
of  the  city  has.  For  I  am  considered  by  everybody,  I  hear, 
to  be  a  mild  effete  person,  and  far  removed  from  the  true 
Roman  character  and  ways,  because  I  don't  care  for  pleading  in 
the  law  courts.  And  they  say  that  the  family  I  come  of  requires 
a  different  kind  of  representative,  and  not  the  sort  that  I  am. 
That  is  what  annoys  me  most." 

10.  Polybius  was  taken  aback  by  the  opening  words  of 
the  young  man's  speech  (for  he  was  only 
just  eighteen),  and  said,  "In  heaven's  name,  ^*P;°3^^™*^"^' 
Scipio,  don't  say  such  things,  or  take  into 
your  head  such  an  idea.  It  is  not  from  any  want  of  apprecia- 
tion of  you,  or  any  intention  of  slighting  you,  that  I  have  acted 
as  I  have  done  :  far  from  it !  It  is  merely  that,  your  brother 
being  the  elder,  I  begin  and  end  my  remarks  with  him,  and 
address  my  explanations  and  counsels  to  him,  in  the  belief 
that  you  share  the  same  opinions.  However,  I  am  delighted 
to  hear  you  say  now  that  you  appear  to  yourself  to  be  some- 
what less  spirited  than  is  becoming  to  members  of  your  family  : 
for  you  show  by  this  that  you  have  a  really  high  spirit,  and  I 
should  gladly  devote  myself  to  helping  you  to  speak  or  act  in 
any  way  worthy  of  your  ancestors.  As  for  learning,  to  which 
I  see  you  and  your  brother  devoting  yourselves  at  present  with 
so  much  earnestness  and  zeal,  you  will  find  plenty  of  people 

^  See  note  on  p.  456. 


454  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  book 


to  help  you  both ;  for  I  see  that  a  large  number  of  such 
learned  men  from  Greece  are  finding  their  way  into  Rome  at 
the  present  time.     But  as  to  the  points  which  you  say  are  just 
now  vexing  you,  I  think  you  will  not  fmd  any  one  more  fitted 
to  support  and  assist  you  than  myself"     While  Polybius  was 
still  speaking  the  young  man  seized  his  right  hand  with  both  of 
his,  and  pressing  it  warmly,  said,  "  Oh  that  I  might  see  the  day 
on  which  you  would  devote  your  first  attention  to  me,  and  join 
your  life  with  mine.     From  that  moment  I  shall  think  myself 
Polybius  is  some- worthy  both  of  my  family  and  my  ancestors." 
what  alarmed  at  Polybius  was  partly  delighted  at  the  sight  of 
the  responsibility.  ^^  young  man's  enthusiasm  and  affection,  and 
partly  embarrassed  by  the  thought  of  the  high  position  of  his 
family  and  the  wealth  of  its  members.    However,  from  the  hour 
of  this  mutual  confidence  the  young  man  never  lefl  the  side  of 
Polybius,  but  regarded  his  society  as  his  first  and  dearest  object 
11.  From  that  time  forward  they  continually  gave  each 
Scipio's  high     Other  practical  proof  of  an  affection  which  re- 
character  for     called  the  relationship  of  father  and  son,  or  of 
continence  as  a  kinsmen  of  the  same  blood.     The  first  impulse 
young  nian.     ^^^  ambition  of  a  noble  kind  with  which  he  was 
inspired  was  the  desire  to  maintain  a  character  for  chastity, 
and  to  be  superior  to  the  standard  observed  in  that  respect 
among  his  contemporaries.     This  was  a  glory  which,  great  and 
The  deterioration  difficult  as  it  generally  is,  was  not  hard  to  gain 
in  Roman  morals  at  that  period  in  Romc,  owing  to  the  general 
and  its  causes,    deterioration    of  morals.      Some    had   wasted 
their  energies  on  favourite  youths ;  others  on  mistresses ;  and 
a  great  many  on  banquets  enlivened  with  poetry  and  wine,  and 
all  the  extravagant  expenditure  which  they  entailed,  having 
quickly  caught  during  the  war  with  Perseus  the  dissoluteness 
of  Greek  manners  in  this  respect.     And  to  such  monstrous 
lengths  had  this  debauchery  gone  among  the  youtig  men,  that 
many  of  them  had  given  a  talent  for  a  young  favourite.     This 
dissoluteness  ha,d  as  it  were  burst  into  flame  at  this  period  :  in 
the  first  place,  from  the  prevalent  idea  that,  owing  to  the 
destruction  of  the  Macedonian  monarchy,  universal  dominion 
was  now  secured  to  them  beyond  dispute  ;  and  in  the  second 
place,  from  the  immense  difference  made,  both  in  public  and 


XXXII  CHARACTER  OF  THE  YOUNGER  SCIPIO  455 

private  wealth  and  splendour,  by  the  importation  of  the  riches 
of  Macedonia  into  Rome.  Scipio,  however,  set  his  heart  on  a 
different  path  in  life ;  and  by  a  steady  resistance  to  his 
appetites,  and  by  conforming  his  whole  conduct  to  a  consistent 
and  undeviating  standard,  in  about  the  first  five  years  after 
this  secured  a  general  recognition  of  his  character  for  goodness 
and  purity. 

12.  His  next  object  was  to  cultivate  lofly  sentiments  in 
regard  to  money,  and  to  maintain  a  higher  standard  of  disin- 
terestedness than  other  people.  In  this  respect  he  had  an 
excellent  start  in  his  association  with  his  natural  father  (L. 
Aemilius) :  but  he  also  had  good  natural  impulses  towards  the 
right;  and  chance  contributed  much  to  his  success  in  this 
particular  aim.  For  he  first  lost  the  mother  of  his  adoptive 
father,  who  was  the  sister  of  his  natural  father  Lucius,  and 
wife  of  his  adoptive  grandfather,  Scipio  the  Great  She  left  a 
large  fortune,  to  which  he  was  heir,  and  which  gave  him  the 
first  opportunity  of  giving  a  proof  of  his  principles.  Aemilia, 
for  that  was  this  lady's  name,  was  accustomed  to  attend  the 
women's  processions  in  great  state,  as  sharing  the  life  and 
high  fortune  of  Scipio.  For  besides  the  magnificence  of  her 
dress  and  carriage,  the  baskets,  cups,  and  such  implements  for 
the  sacrifice,  which  were  carried  in  her  train,  were  all  of  silver 
or  gold  on  great  occasions ;  and  the  number  of 
maid-servants  and  other  domestics  that  made  ^jfh^^mSSw!^^ 
up  her  train  was  in  proportion  to  this  splendour. 
All  this  establishment,  immediately  after  Aemilia's  funeral, 
Scipio  presented  to  his  own  mother,  who  had  long  before  been 
divorced  by  his  father  Lucius,  and  was  badly  off  considering 
the  splendour  of  her  birth.^  She  had  therefore  in  previous 
years  refrained  from  taking  part  in  grand  public  processions ; 
but  now,  as  there  chanced  to  be  an  important  state  sacrifice, 
she  appeared  surrounded  with  all  the  splendour  and  wealth 
which  had  once  been  Aemilia's,  using  among  other  things  the 
same  muleteers,  pair  of  mules,  and  carriage.  The  ladies,  there- 
fore, who  saw  it  were  much  impressed  by  the  kindness  and 
liberality  of  Scipio,  and  all  raised  their  hands  to  heaven  and 
prayed  for  blessings  upon  him.     This  act,  indeed,  would  be 

^  She  was  the  daughter  of  C.  Papirius  Carbo.  Coss.  ac.  231. 


456 


THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS 


BOOK 


thought  honourable  anywhere,  but  at  Rome  it  was  quite  aston- 
ishing: for  there  no  one  ever  thinks  of  giving  any  of  his 
private  property  to  any  one  if  he  can  help  it.  This  was  the 
beginning  of  Scipio's  reputation  for  nobility  of  character, 
and  it  spread  very  widely, — for  women  are  talkative  and  prone 
to  exaggeration  whenever  they  feel  warmly. 

18.  The  next  instance  was  his  conduct  to  the  daughters 

Scipio's  liberality  ^^  ^^^  Great   Scipio,  sisters   to   his   adoptive 

to  his  cousins,   father.^     When  he  took  the  inheritance  he  was 

sisters  to  his    bound  to  pay  them  their  portion.     For  their 

adoptive  father.    .    .  ^    ■»    ^         •  i_       ri_»^ 

father  covenanted  to  give  each  of  his  two 
daughters  a  marriage  portion  of  fifty  talents.  Half  of  this  their 
mother  paid  down  at  once  to  their  husbands,  but  left  the 
other  half  undischarged  when  she  died.  Now,  the  Roman 
law  enjoins  the  payment  of  money  due  to  women  as  dowry 
in  three  annual  instalments,  the  personal  outfit  having  been 
first  paid  within  ten  months  according  to  custom.*  But 
Scipio  instructed  his  banker  at  once  to  pay  the  twenty-five 
talents  to  each  within  the  ten  months.  \Vhen,  therefore, 
Tiberius  Gracchus  and  Scipio  Nasica,  for  they  were  the 
husbands  of  these  ladies,  called  on  the  banker  at  the  expira- 


^  The  following  pedigree  will  show  the  various  family  connexions  liere 
alluded  to : — 

Publius  Cornelius  Scipio 
ob.  in  Spain  d.c.  212. 

P.  Cornelius  Scipio  AfricanusrrAemllia,  sister  of  Lucius  Aemilius  Paulus  =  Papina 


ob.  B.C.  187. 


ob.  B.C.  1 6a. 


ob.  B.C.  160. 


Quintus  Fabius 


Scipio 


i^uimus  ramus  bcipio  two 

Maximus  adopted  by        Aeminanus  daughters. 

Q.  F.  M.  b.  B.C.  185. 


P.  Scipio  Nasica  =  Cornelia  (i). 


Cornelia  (2)  =  Tib.  Sempronius 
Gracchus. 


Publius  Cornelius 
Scipio  Africanus 

ob.  s.  p. 

adopted  his  cousin 

who  became 

Publius  Cornelius  Scipio 

Acmilianus  Africanus 

ob.  B.C.  129. 

^  tS>v  iirlxXuv,  the  omatncnta  of  a  bride,  consisting  of  clothes,  jewels, 
slaves,  and  other  things,  in  accordance  with  her  station.  See  Horace,  Sat.  2, 
3,  214.  For  the  three  instalments  in  which  it  was  necessary  to  pay  dowries,  sec 
Cicero  ad  Aft.  ii.  23  ;  2  Phil.  §  113. 


xrxii  SCIPICfS  LIBBRAUTV  457 

tion  of  the  ten  months,  and  asked  whether  Scipio  had  given 
him  any  instructions  as  to  the  money,  he  told  them  they 
might  have  it  at  once,  and  proceeded  to  enter  the  transfer  of 
twenty-five  talents  to  each.^  They  then  said  that  he  had  made 
a  mistake,  for  they  had  no  claim  for  the  whole  as  yet,  but  only 
took  a  third  according  to  the  law ;  and  upon  the  banker  answer- 
ing that  such  were  his  instructions  from  Scipio,  they  could  not 
believe  him,  and  went  to  call  on  the  young  man,  supposing 
him  to  have  made  a  mistake.  And,  indeed,  their  feelings 
were  natural :  for  at  Rome,  so  far  from  paying  fifty  talents 
three  years  in  advance,  no  one  will  pay  a  single  talent  before 
the  appointed  day ;  so  excessively  particular  are  they  about 
money,  and  so  profitable  do  they  consider  time.  However, 
when  they  reached  Scipio  and  asked  him  what  instructions  he 
had  given  his  banker,  on  his  replying,  "  To  pay  both  sisters  the 
whole  sum  due  to  them,"  they  told  him  he  had  made  a  mistake ; 
and  with  a  show  of  friendly  regard  pointed  out  to  him  that, 
according  to  the  laws,  he  had  the  use  of  the  money  for  a  con- 
siderable time  longer.  But  Scipio  replied  that  he  was  quite  aware 
of  all  that ;  but  that  close  reckoning  and  legal  exactness  were 
for  strangers ;  with  relations  and  friends  he  would  do  his  best 
to  behave  straightforwardly  and  liberally.  He  therefore  bade 
them  draw  on  the  banker  for  the  whole  sum.  When  Tiberius 
and  Nasica  heard  this  they  returned  home  in  silence,  quite 
confounded  at  the  magnanimity  of  Scipio,  and  condemning 
themselves  for  meanness,  though  they  were  men  of  as  high  a 
character  as  any  at  Rome. 

14.  Two  years  afterwards,  when  his  natural  father,  Lucius 
Aemilius,  died,  and  left  him  and  his  brother  -^^  liberality  of 
Fabius  joint  heirs  to  his  property,  he  did  an  act     Scipio  lo  his 
honourable  to   himself  and  worthy  to   be  re-  .  ''foiherand 
corded.     Lucius  died  without  children  in  the  ' 

eyes  of  the  law,  for  the  two  elder  had  been  adopted  into  other 
families,  and  the  other  sons,  whom  he  was  bringing  up  to  be 
the  successors  to  himself  and  to  continue  his  family,  all  died ;' 

'  TOtoGrrsi  7-j)r  iia.fpiu^\*  seemB  a  banker's  (erni  Tor  "paying."  i.e.  by 
striking  off  or  eanccUing  a  debt  enlcrcd  against  a  man.  Tlie  only  other  in- 
stance of  such  a  use  seems  to  be  Dionys.  Hal.  5,  a8. 

*  Of  his  two  younger  sons'onc  died  ^ve  days  before  his  Macedonian  triumph, 
the  other  three  dayt  al^er  il.     Svc  Livy,  45,  40. 


458  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  book 


he  therefore  left  his  property  to  these  two.  But  Scipio,  per- 
ceiving that  his  brother  was  worse  off  than  himself,  renounced 
the  whole  of  his  share  of  the  inheritance,  though  the  property 
was  valued  altogether  at  over  sixty  talents,  with  a  view  of  thus 
putting  Fabius  on  an  equality  with  himself  in  p>oint  of  wealth. 
This  was  much  talked  about ;  but  he  afterwards  gave  a  still 
dearer  proof  of  his  liberality.  For  when  his  brother  wished 
to  give  some  gladiatorial  games  in  honour  of  his  father,  but 
was  unable  to  support  the  expense,  because  of  the  enormous 
costliness  of  such  things,  Scipio  contributed  half  of  this  also 
from  his  own  pocket.  Now  the  cost  of  such  an  exhibition, 
if  it  is  done  on  a  large  scale,  does  not  amount  in  all  to  less 
than  thirty  talents.  While  the  fame  of  his  liberality  to  his 
mother  was  still  fresh,  she  died ;  and  so  far  from  taking  back 
any  part  of  the  wealth  he  had  recently  bestowed  on  her,  of 
which  I  have  just  spoken,  Scipio  gave  it  and  the  entire 
residue  of  his  mother's  property  to  his  sisters,^  though  they 
had  no  legal  claim  at  all  upon  it.  Accordingly  his  sisters 
again  adopted  the  splendour  and  retinue  which  Aemilia  had 
employed  in  the  public  processions;  and  once  more  the 
liberality  and  family  affection  of  Scipio  were  recalled  to  the 
minds  of  the  people. 

With  such  recommendations  dating  from  his  earliest  years, 
Publius  Scipio  sustained  the  reputation  for  high  morality  and 
good  principles,  which  he  had  won  by  the  expenditure  of 
perhaps  sixty  talents,  for  that  was  the  sum  which  he  bestowed 
from  his  own  property.  And  this  reputation  for  goodness  did 
not  depend  so  much  on  the  amount  of  the  money,  as  on 
the  seasonableness  of  the  gift  and  the  graciousness  with  which 

^  The  two  sisters  were  both  named  Aemilia  ;  the  elder  >**as  married  to  Q. 
Aelius  Tulxiro,  the  younger  to  M.'-.Porcius  Cato.  elder  son  of  the  Censor.  The 
daughters  were  prevented  from  taking  the  inheritance  of  their  mother's  pro- 
perty by  the  lex  Voconia  (b.c.  174),  in  virtue  of  which  a  woman  could  not  be 
a  haercs,  nor  take  a  legacy  greater  than  that  of  the  haeres,  or  of  all  the 
hacredes  together.  Tlie  object  of  the  law  was  to  prevent  the  transference  of 
the  property  of  one  gens  to  another  on  a  large  scale.  It  was  evaded  (1)  by 
trusteeships,  Gaius,  2,  274  ;  Plutarch,  Cic,  41  :  (2)  by  the  assent  of  the 
haeres,  Cic.  de  Off.  2,  §  55.  And  it  was  relaxed  by  Augustus  in  favour  of 
mothers  of  three  children,  Dio  Cass.  56,  10.  See  also  Cicero  de  Sen.  §  14  ; 
de  Ugg,  2,  20;  de  Rep.  3,  10  ;  Verr.  2,  i,  42  ;  Pliny,  Panegyr.  42  ;  Livy, 
E4.  41. 


J 


XXXII  SCIPIOS  MANLINESS  459 


it  was  bestowed.  By  his  strict  chastity,  also,  he  not  only 
saved  his  purse,  but  by  refraining  from  many  irregular  pleasures 
he  gained  sound  bodily  health  and  a  vigorous  constitution, 
which  accompanied  him  through  the  whole  of  his  life  and 
repaid  him  with  many  pleasures,  and  noble  compensations  for 
the  immediate  pleasures  from  which  he  had  formerly  abstained. 
16.  Courage,  however,  is  the  most  important  element  of 
character  for  public  life  in  every  country,  but  scipio's  physical 
especially  in  Rome :  and  he  therefore  was  bound  strength  and 
to  give  all  his  most  serious  attention  to  it  In  this    c^J^s^  were 

u  n  jjuT-i.  1  T"  confirmed  by  the 

he  was  well  seconded  by  Fortune  also.     For  as      exercise  of 
the    Macedonian    kings  were   especially  eager      hunting  in 
about  hunting,  and  the  Macedonians  devoted     Macedonia, 
the   most  suitable   districts   to    the    preservation   of    game, 
these  places  were  carefully  guarded  during  all  the  war  time, 
as  they  had  been  before,  and  yet  had  not  been  hunted  the 
whole  of  the  four  years  owing  to  the  public  disturbances  :  the 
consequence  was  that  they  were  full  of  every  kind  of  animal. 
But  when  the  war  was  decided,  Lucius  Aemilius,  thinking  that 
hunting  was  the  best  training  for  body  and  courage  his  young 
soldiers  could  have,  put  the  royal  huntsmen  under  the  charge 
of  Scipio,  and  gave  him  entire  authority  over  all  matters  con- 
nected with  the  hunting.     Scipio  accepted  the  duty,  and,  look- 
ing upon  himself  as  in  a  quasi-royal  position,  devoted  his  whole 
time   to   this   business,  as   long   as   the   army  remained   in 
Macedonia  after  the  battle  of  Pydna.^Having  then  ample 
opportunity  for  following  this  kind  of^ursuit, 
and  being  in  the  very  prime  of  his  youth  and  eontin^ued'^L 
naturally  disposed   to    it,  the  taste   for  hunt-     his  return  to 
ing    which    he    acquired   became   permanent.  Rome,  and  was 
Accordingly  when  he  returned  to  Rome,  and   ^"p^iy^^^^ 
found  his  taste  supported  by  a  corresponding 
enthusiasm  on  the  part  of  Polybius,  the  time  that  other  young 
men  spent  in  law  courts  and  formal  visits,^  haunting  the  Forum 
and  endeavouring  thereby  to  ingratiate  themselves  with  the 
people,  Scipio  devoted  to  hunting ;  and,  by  continually  display- 
ing brilliant  and  memorable  acts  of  prowess,  won  a  greater 

^  That  is,  the  morning  from  daybreak  till  about  ten  or  eleven.    The  saluta- 
tiones  came  first,  and  the  law  business  in  the  third  hour. 


46o  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  book 


reputation  than  others,  whose  only  chance  of  gaining  credit  was 
by  inflicting  some  damage  on  one  of  their  fellow-citizens, — for 
that  was  the  usual  result  of  these  law  proceedings.  Scipio,  on 
the  other  hand,  without  inflicting  annoyance  on  any  one, 
gained  a  popular  reputation  for  manly  courage,  rivalling 
eloquence  by  action.  The  result  was  that  in  a  short  time  he 
obtained  a  more  decided  superiority  of  position  over  his  con- 
temporaries, than  any  Roman  is  remembered  to  have  done ; 
although  he  struck  out  a  path  for  his  ambition  which,  with  a 
view  to  Roman  customs  and  ideas,  was  quite  different  from 
that  of  others. 

16.  I  have  spoken  somewhat  at  length  on  the  character  of 
Scipio's  subse-  Scipio,  because  I  thought  that  such  a  stor>' 
quent  success,    would  be  agreeable  to  the  older,  and  useful  to 

therefore,  was  the  ^^  younger  among  my  readers.     But  especially 

his  early  conduct,  because  I  wished  to  make  what  I  have  to  tell 

and  not  the  off-  in  my  following  books  appear  credible ;   that 

spnng  of  chance,  j^q  ^^^  jj^j^y  f^^i  j^^jy  difficulty  because  of  the 

apparent  strangeness  of  what  happened  to  this  man ;  nor 
deprive  him  of  the  credit  of  achievements  which  were  the 
natural  consequences  of  his  prudence,  and  attribute  them  to 
Fortune  and  chance.  I  must  now  return  from  this  digression 
to  the  regular  course  of  my  history.  .  .  . 

17.  Thearidas  and  Stephanus  conducted  a  mission  from 
_^   -^  ,.      -      Athens  and  the  Achaeans  on  the  matter  of  the 

The  Dehans  hav.  •     ,        t^         x.       ^\.     x^  v  j        j   • 

ing  been  allowed  reprisals.  For  when  the  Delians  were  ordered,  m 
to  leave  their    answer  to  an  embassy  to  Rome  after  Delos  had 

island  with  '  •  all  y^^^^i  granted  to  Athens,  to  depart  from  the  island, 
found  many  occa-  t>ut  to  take  all  their  goods  with  them,  they  re- 
sions  of  legal  dis-  moved  to  Achaia ;  and  having  been  enrolled  as 

putes  with  the   citizens  of  the  league,  wished  to  have  their  claims 

Athenians,  to  »        .   i        •  j      •  •!     »  ,•  i 

whom  the  island  upon  the  Athenians  decided,  according  to  the 
was  granted,  convention  existing  between  the  Achaeans  and 
See  30,  21.      Athens.     But,  on  the  Athenians  denying  that 

They  remove  to  ^     o 

Achaia.  and  sue  they  had  any  right  to  plead  under  that  agree- 

the  Athenians    ment,  the  Delians  demanded  from  the  Achaeans 

under  the  Achaean  J  j^gj^gg  j^  make    reprisals  on   the  Athenians. 

convention.       r*^,      ,  ,         ^  1  ^     t^ 

Roman  decision  The  latter,  therefore,  sent  an  embassy  to  Rome 
against  Athens,  on  these  points,  and  were  answered  that  decisions 


XXXII     ATHENS,  DELOS,  DALMATIA,  AND  AETOLIA       461 


made  by  the  Achaeans  according  to  their  laws  concerning  the 
Delians  were  to  be  binding.  .  .  . 

18.  The  people  of  Issa  having  often  sent  embassies  to 
Rome,  complaining  that  the  Dalmatians  damaged    piracies  of  the 
their  territory  and  the  cities  subject  to  them, —   Dalmatians  on 
meaning  thereby  Epetium  and  Tragyrium, — and  ^^^  **^^^  °^  ^^^^ 
the  Daorsi  also  bringing  similar  complaints,  the       ^*^'  *^  * 
Senate  sent  a  commission  under  Gaius  Fannius  to  inspect 
the  state  of  Illyria,  with  special  reference  to  the  Dalmatians. 
This  people  had  been  subject  to  Pleuratus  as  long  as  he  was 
alive ;  but  when  he  died,  and  was  succeeded  on  the  throne 
by  Genthius,  they  revolted,  overran  the  bordering  territories, 
and  reduced  the  neighbouring  cities,  some  of  which  even  paid 
them  a  tribute  of  cattle  and  corn.     So  Fannius  and  his  col- 
league started  on  their  mission.  .  .  . 

19.  Lyciscus  the  Aetolian  was  a  factious  turbulent  agita- 
tor, and  direcdy  he  was  killed  the  Aetolians 

from  that  hour  lived  harmoniously  and  at  peace  lvc^sci^ 
with  each  other,  simply  from  the  removal  of 
one  man.  Such  decisive  influence  has  character  in  human 
affairs,  that  we  find  not  only  armies  and  cities,  but  also 
national  leagues  and  whole  divisions  of  the  world,  experiencing 
the  greatest  miseries  and  the  greatest  blessings  through  the 
vice  or  virtue  of  one  man.  .  .  . 

Though  he  was  a  man  of  the  worst  character,  Lyciscus 
ended  his  life  by  an  honourable  death ;  and  accordingly,  most 
people  with  some  reason  reproach  Fortune  for  sometimes 
giving  to  the  worst  of  men  what  is  the  prize  of  the  good — an 
easy  death.  .  .  . 

20.  There  was  a  great  change  for  the  better  in  Aetolia 
when  the  civil  war  was  stopped  after  the  death  of  Lyciscus ; 
and  in  Boeotia  when  Mnasippus  of  Coronea  died ;  and  similarly 
in  Acarnania  when  Chremas  was  got  out  of  the  way.  Greece 
was  as  though  purified  by  the  removal  from 

life  of  those  accursed  pests   of  the   country.  ^^b^c.Ts7."'^'' 
For   in   the   same    year    Charops   of    Epirus 
chanced  to  die  at  Brundisium.     Affairs  in  Epirus  had  been 
still  in  disorder  and  confusion  as  before,  owing  T^g  tyranny  of 
to  the  cruelty  and  tyranny  of  Charops,  ever  Charops  in  Epirus 


462  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  book 

after  the  battle  of  Since  the  end  of  the  war  with  Perseus.     For 
p>diia,  B.C.  i68-  Lucius  Anicius  having  condemned  some  of  the 
'^^*  leading  men  in  the  country  to  death,  and  trans- 

ported all  others  to  Rome  against  whom  there  was  the  slightest 
suspicion,  Charops  at  once  got  complete  power  to  do  what  he 
chose ;  and  thereupon  committed  every  possible  act  of  cruelty, 
sometimes  personally,  at  others  by  the  agency  of  his  friends : 
for  he  was  quite  a  young  man  himself,  and  was  quickly  joined 
by  a  crowd  of  the  worst  and  most  unprincipled  persons,  who 
gathered  round  him  for  the  sake  of  plunder  from  other  people. 
But  what  protected  him  and  inclined  people  to  believe  that  he 
was  acting  on  a  fixed  design,  and  in  accordance  with  the  will 
of  the  Romans,  was  his  former  intimacy  with  them,  and  the  sup- 
port of  the  old  man  Myrton  and  his  son  Nicanor.  These  two 
had  the  character  of  being  men  of  moderation  and  on  good 
terms  with  the  Romans ;  but  though  up  to  that  time  they  had 
been  widely  removed  from  all  suspicion  of  injustice,  they  now 
gave  themselves  up  wholly  to  support  and  share  in  the  lawless 
acts  of  Charops.  This  man,  after  murdering  some  openly  in 
the  market-place,  others  in  their  own  houses,  others  by  send- 
ing secret  assassins  to  waylay  them  in  the  fields  or  on  the 
roads,  and  selling  the  property  of  all  whom  he  had  thus 
He  extorts  money  ^il^^d,  thought  of  another  device.  He  put  up 
from  the  rich  lists  of  such  men  and  women  as  were  rich,  con- 
under  threat  of  demning  them  to  exile ;  and  having  held  out 
this  threat,  he  extracted  money  out  of  them, 
making  the  bargain  himself  with  the  men,  and  by  the 
agency  of  his  mother  Philotis  with  the  women ;  for  this  lady 
was  well  suited  to  the  task,  and  for  any  act  of  violence  was 
even  more  helpful  than  could  have  been  expected  in  a 
woman. 

2 1 .  When  he  and  his  mother  had  thus  got  all  the  money 

The  people  of   ^^^7  could  out  of  these  persons,  they  none  the 

Phoenice  terrified  less  caused  all  the  proscribed  to  be  impeached 

or  cajoled  into   before  the  people ;  and  the  majority  in  Phoe- 

uppor  1  g   1   .  ^.^^^  partly  from  fear  and   partly  induced  by 

the  baits  held  out  by  Charops  and  his  friends,  condemned 

all  thus  impeached,  for  being  ill-disposed  to  Rome,  to  death 

instead    of  banishment.      These   men,   however,   fled    while 


XXXII  CHAROPS  OF  EPIRUS  463 

Charops  visited  Rome,   whither  he  went   with   money,  and 
accompanied  by  Myrton  and  Nicanor,  wishing  to  get  a  seal  of 
approval  put  to  his  wickedness  by  means  of  the  Senate.     On 
that  occasion  a  very  honourable  proof  was  given  ^.^3^^    ^^  ,0 
of  Roman  principles  ;  and  a  spectacle  was  dis-  Rome,  but  is  for- 
played    exceedingly   gratifying    to    the    Greeks    bidden  by  ihe 
residing    in    Rome,    especially    the    detenus.  J^'|^B^!'°^^ 
Marcus  Aemilius  I^pidus,  who  was  Fontifex 
Maximus   and   Princeps   Senatus,  and  Lucius  Aemilius,  the 
conqueror  of  Perseus,  a  man  of  the  highest  credit  and  in- 
fluence, learning  what  had  been  done  by  Charops  in  Epirus, 
refused   to  admit  him   into  their  houses.      This   becoming 
much  talked  about,  the  foreign  residents  in  Rome  were  ex- 
ceedingly  rejoiced,   and    observed   with    pleasure    that    the 
Romans  discountenanced  evil.    And  on  Charops 
being  afterwards  admitted  to  the  Senate-house,    X^Zt^^ 
the  Senate  refused  to  consent  to  his  demands, 
but  answered  that  "  They  would  give  instructions  to  commis- 
sioners to  examine  into  what  had  taken  place."     But  when 
Charops  returned  home  he  entirely  suppressed    He  suppresses 
this  reply  ;  and  having  written  one  to  suit  his  the  reply  of  the 
own  ideas,  gave  out  that  the  Romans  approved        Senate. 
of  what  had  been  done  by  him.  .  .  . 

22.  King  Eumenes  was  entirely  broken  in  bodily  strength, 
but  still  maintained  his  brilliancy  of  mind.     He  Death  and  char- 
was  a  man  who  in  most  things  was  the  equal  of  acier  of  Eumenes, 
any  king  of  his  time;  and  in  those  which  were       ^-^^  'S9- 
the  most  important  and  honourable,  was  greater  and  more 
illustrious    than    them    all.       First,    he    sue-     He  raised  his 
ceeded  his  father  in  a  kingdom  reduced  to  a  kingdom  to  ihe 
very  few  insignificant  cities ;  and  he  raised  it  to      '''"  ""'' ' 
the  level  of  the  largest  dynasties  of  his  day.     And  it  was  not 
chance  which   contributed  to  this,  or  a  mere  sudden  cata- 
,  strophe,  it  was  his  own  acuteness,  indefatigable  industry,  and 
personal  labour.      Again,   he  was   exceedingly 
ambitious  of  establishing  a  good   reputation,  ***touniif^f '' 
and  showed  it  by  doing  good  services  to  a  very 
large  number  of  cities,  and  enriching  privately  a  great  many 
men.     And  in  the  third  place,  he  had  three  brothers  grown 


464  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  BOor 

up  and  active,  and  he  kept  all  four  of  them  loyal  to  himself, 
and  was  loyally  ^^^  acting  as  guards  of  his  person  and  preservers 
sencd  by  four   of  the  kingdom  :  and  that  is  a  thing  of  which 
brothers.       there  are  very  rare  instances  in  history.  .  .  . 
On  succeeding  his  brother  Eumenes  on  the  throne,  Attalus 
Attaius  restores  at  once  gave  a  specimen  of  his  principles  and  ac- 
Ariarathes.      tivity  by  restoring  Ariarathes  to  his  kingdom.  ^ . . . 
28.  When  the  envoys  under  Fannius  returned  from  Illyria, 
Fannius  and  hi    ^^^  reported  that,  SO  far  from  the  Dalmatians 
colleagues  roughly  making  any  restitution  to  those  who  asserted 
treated  by  the    that  they  were  being  continually  wronged  by 
Dalmatians,  B.C.  ^^^^  they  refused  even  to  listen  to  the  com- 
missioners at  all,  saying  that  they  had  nothing 
to  do  with   the  Romans.      Besides,  they  reported  that  no 
lodging  or  entertainment  of  any  sort  had  been  supplied  to 
them  ;  but  that  the  very  horses,  which  they  had  procured  from 
another  city,  the  Dalmatians  had  forcibly  taken  from  them; 
and  would  have  laid  violent  hands  upon  themselves,  if  they 
had  not  yielded  to  necessity  and  retired  as  quietly  as  they 
The  Senate  decide    could.    The  Senate  listened  attentively  to  the 
on  declaring  war    report  j  they  were  exceedingly  angry  at  the 
with  the  Dalmatians,  disobedience  and  rudeness  of  the  Dalmatians, 
but  their  prevailing  feeling  was  that  the  present  time  was  a 
suitable  one  for  declaring  war  against  this  people  for  more 
reasons  than  one.     For,  in  the  first  place,  the  coasts  of  Illyria 
towards  Italy  had  been  entirely  neglected  by  them  ever  since 
they  had  expelled  Demetrius  of  Pharos;    and,  in  the  next 
place,  they  did  not  wish  their  own  citizens  to  become  ener- 
vated by  a  long-continued  peace ;  for  it  was  now  the  twelfth 

year  since  the  war  with  Perseus  and  the  cam- 
paigns in  Macedonia.  They  therefore  planned 
that,  by  declaring  war  against  the  Dalmatians,  they  would  at 
once  renew  as  it  were  the  warlike  spirit  and  enterprise  of  their 
own  people,  and  terrify  the  Illyrians  into  obedience  to  their 
injunctions.     Such  were  the  motives  of  the  Romans  for  going 

^  Ariarathes  V.  had  been  expelled  his  kingdom  by  Demetrius,  who,  in 
consideration  of  one  thousand  talents,  had  assisted  his  reputed  brother  Oro- 
phemes,  who  had  been  palmed  off  on  Ariarathes  IV.  by  his  wife,  to  displace 
him.  The  Senate,  when  eventually  appealed  to,  decided  that  the  two  brothers 
should  share  the  kingdom.     Livy,  Ep,  47  ;  Appian,  Syr,  47. 


XXXII  H^A/l  IVITH  THE  DALMATIANS  465 

to  war  with  the  Dalmatians.  But  to  the  world  at  large  they 
gave  out  that  they  had  determined  on  war  owing  to  the  insults 
offered  to  their  legates.  .  .  . 

24.  King  Ariarathes  arrived  in  Rome  in  the  course  of  the 
summer.^     And  when  Sextus  Julius  Caesar  and  g^c.  157.    Coss. 
his  colleague  had  entered  on  their  consulship,  Sext.  Julius  Caesar, 
the  king  visited  them  privately,  presenting  in  his     L.  Aureiius 
personal  appearance  a  striking  picture  of  the 

dangers  with  which  he  was  surrounded. 

Ambassadors  also  arrived  from  Demetrius,  headed  by 
Miltiades,  prepared  to  act  in  two  capacities — to  defend  the 
conduct  of  Demetrius  in  regard  to  Ariarathes,  and  to  accuse 
that  king  with  the  utmost  bitterness.  Orophemes  also  had 
sent  Timotheus  and  Diogenes  to  represent  him,  conveying  a 
crown  for  Rome,  and  charged  to  renew  the  friendship  and 
alliance  of  Cappadocia  with  the  Romans ;  but,  above  all,  to 
confront  Ariarathes,  and  both  to  answer  his  accusations  and 
bring  their  own  against  him.  In  these  private  interviews 
Diogenes  and  Miltiades  and  their  colleagues  made  a  better 
show,  because  they  were  many  to  one  in  the  controversy; 
besides  their  personal  appearance  was  better  than  that  of 
Ariarathes,  for  they  were  at  present  on  the  winning  side 
and  he  had  failed.  They  had  also  the  advantage  of  him,  in 
making  their  statement  of  the  case,  that  they  were  entirely 
unscrupulous,  and  cared  nothing  whatever  about  the  truth  of 
their  words;  and  what  they  said  could  not  be  confuted, 
because  there  was  no  one  to  take  the  other  side.  So  their 
lying  statements  easily  prevailed,  and  they  thought  everything 
was  going  as  they  wished.  .  .  . 

25,  After  reigning  for  a  short  time  in  Cappa- 
docia in  utter  contempt  of  the  customs  of  his  ^orophernes° 
country;  Orophemes  introduced  the  organised 
debaucheries  of  Ionia.*  .  .  . 

'  Ariarathes  arrived  in  the  summer  of  B.C.  158. 

'  rV  'leufV  KoX  rex^'Tt'cV  dffurrlay.  The  translation  given  above  is  in 
accordance  with  the  explanation  of  Casaubon,  who  quoted  Horace  {Odes  3,  6, 
21),  Afotus  doceri  gaudet  lonicos  matura  virgo.  Orophemes  had  been  sent  to 
Ionia,  when  Antiochis  had  a  real  son  (Ariarathes  V.),  that  he  might  not  set 
up  a  claim  to  the  throne.  He  had  been  imposed  by  Antiochis  on  her  husband 
.Ariarathes  IV.  before  she  had  a  real  son. 

VOL.  II  2  U 


466  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  book 

It  has  happened  to  not  a  few,  from  the  desire  for  increas- 
ing their  wealth,  to  lose  their  life  along  with  their  money.  It 
was  from  being  captivated  by  such  passions  that  Orophemes, 
king  of  Cappadocia,  perished  and  was  expelled  fi:x>m  his  king- 
dom. But  having  briefly  narrated  the  restoration  of  this  king 
(Ariarathes),  I  will  now  bring  back  my  narrative  to  its  regular 
course;  for  at  present  I  have,  to  the  exclusion  of  Greek 
affairs,  selected  from  those  of  Asia  the  events  connected  with 
Cappadocia  out  of  their  proper  order,  because  it  was  im- 
possible to  separate  the  voyage  of  Ariarathes  from  Italy  from 
his  restoration  to  his  kingdom.^  I  will  therefore  now  go  back 
to  the  history  of  Greece  during  this  period,  in  which  a  peculiar 
and  extraordinary  affair  took  place  in  regard  to  the  city  of 
Oropus,  of  which  I  will  give  the  whole  story  from  beginning 
to  end,  going  both  backward  and  forward  in  point  of  time, 
that  I  may  not  render  the  history  of  an  episode  which  was 
made  up  of  separate  events,  and  was  not  on  the  whole  im- 
portant, still  more  insignificant  and  indistinct  by  relating  it 
under  different  years.  For  when  an  event  as  a  whole  does 
not  appear  to  readers  to  be  worth  attention,  I  cannot  certainly 
expect  a  student  to  follow  its  details  scattered  at  intervals 
through  my  history.^  .  .  . 

For  the  most  part  when  things  go  well  men  generally  get 
on  together ;  but  in  times  of  failure,  in  their  annoyance  at 
events,  they  become  sore  and  irritable  with  their  friends.  And 
this  is  what  happened  to  Orophemes,  when  his  affairs  began 

^  Orophemes  was  soon  deposed,  and  Ariarathes  V.  restored,  but  we  have 
no  certain  indication  when  this  happened.     See  3,  5. 

-  The  episode  of  Oropus  here  referred  to,  Polybius's  account  of  which 
is  lost,  was  made  remarkable  by  the  \isit  of  the  three  philosophers  to  Rome 
as  ambassadors  from  Athens.  The  story,  as  far  as  Athens  was  concerned, 
is  told  by  Pausanias,  7,  11,  4-7.  The  Athenians  had  been  much  impoverished 
by  the  events  of  the  war  with  Perseus  (b.c.  172-168),  and  had  made  a  raid  or 
raids  of  some  sort  ujxjn  Oropus.  The  Oropians  appealed  to  Rome.  The 
Romans  referred  the  assessment  of  damages  to  an  Achaean  court  at  Sicyon. 
The  Athenians  failed  to  appear  before  the  court  at  Sicyon,  and  were  con- 
demned by  default  to  a  fine  of  five  hundred  talents.  Thereupon  Cameades  the 
Academician,  Diogenes  the  Stoic,  and  Critol.ius  the  Peripatetic  were  sent  to 
plead  for  a  remission  of  a  fine  which  the  Athenians  were  wholly  unable  to  pay. 
They  made  a  great  impression  on  the  Roman  youth  by  their  lectures,  and 
Calo  urged  that  they  should  get  their  answer  and  be  sent  away  as  soon  as 
possible.  The  Senate  reduced  the  fine  to  one  hundred  talents  :  but  even  that 
the  Athenians  could  not  collect ;  and  they  seem  to  have  managed  to  induce  the 


xxxii        OROPHERNES,  ATTALUS,  AND  PRUSIAS  467 

to  take  a  wrong  turn  in  his  relations  with  Theotimus, — both 
indulging  in  mutual  recriminations.  .  .  . 

26.  Ambassadors  having  arrived  from  Epirus  about  this 
time,  sent  both  from  those  who  were  in  actual 

B.C    I  Co 

possession  of  Phoenice  and  from  those  who  coss.  L.  Corne- 
had  been  banished  from  it ;  and  both  parties  Uus  Lentuius,  c. 
having  made   their  statement  in   presence  of  ^^^*"j  j^**^"^ 
each  other,  the  Senate  answered  that  they  would 
give  instructions  on  this  point  to  the  commissioners  that  were 
about  to  be  sent  into  Illyria  with  Gains  Marcius  the  Consul.^ . . . 

27.  After  defeating  Attains,  and  advancing  to  Pergamum, 
Prusias  prepared  a   magnificent  sacrifice   and  pmsias,  king  of 
brought  it  to  the  sacred  enclosure  of  Asclepius,  Bithynia,  attacks 
and   after    offering    the  victims,   and    having      Attaiusof 
obtained  favourable  omens,  went  back  into  his       ergamum. 
camp  for  that  day;  but  on  the  next  he  directed  his  forces 
against  the  Nicephorium,  and  destroyed  all  the  temples  and 
sacred  enclosures,  and  plundered  all  the  statues  of  men  and 
the  marble  images  of  the  gods.     Finally  he  carried  off  the 
statue   of  Asclepius   also,   an   admirably   executed   work   of 
Ph)rromachus,  and  transferred  it  to  his  own  country, — the 
very   image   before   which   the   day  before   he   had   poured 
libations  and  offered  sacrifice ;  desiring,  it  would  seem,  that 
the  god  might  in  every  way  be  propitious  and 

favourable  to   him.     I   have  spoken  of  such 

proceedings   before,   when   discoursing   on   Philip,    as   sheer 

Oropians  to  allow  an  Athenian  garrison  to  hold  Oropus,  and  to  give  hostages 
for  their  fidelity  to  the  Athenian  government.  This  led  to  fresh  quarrels  and 
an  appeal  to  the  Achaean  government.  The  Achaean  Strategus,  Menalcidas 
of  Sparta,  was  bribed  by  a  present  of  ten  talents  to  induce  an  interference  in 
behalf  of  Oropus.  Thereupon  the  Athenians  withdrew  their  garrison  from 
Oropus,  after  pillaging  the  town,  and  henceforth  took  no  part  in  the  quarrels 
which  ensued,  arising  from  the  demands  of  Menalcidas  for  his  ten  talents ; 
which  the  Oropians  refused  to  pay,  on  the  ground  that  he  had  not  helped  them 
as  he  promised ;  quarrels  which  presently  centred  round  the  question  of  the 
continuance  of  Sparta  in  the  Achaean  league.  The  date  of  the  original  quarrel 
between  Athens  and  Oropus  is  not  fixed,  but  the  mission  of  the  philosophers 
was  in  B.c.  155.  See  Plutarch,  Cato,  2a  ;  Pliny,  N,  H,  7,  112-113  ;  Aulus 
Gellius.  6,  14  ;  Cic.  ad  Ait.  12,  2^  ;  Tusc.  4,  §  5. 

*  C.  Marcitis  consul  adversus  Dalmatas  parum  prospcre  primumt  postea 
feiiciier pugnai'it.    The  war  was  continued  in  the  next  year  (B.C.  155),  and  the 
Dalmatians  subdued  for  the  time  by  the  consul  P.  Cornelius  Scipio  Nasica. 
Livy,  Ep,  47. 


468 


THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS 


insanity.  For  at  one  time  to  offer  sacrifice,  and  endeavou 
propitiate  heaven  by  their  means,  worshipping  and  uttering 
most  earnest  prayers  before  holy  tables  and  altars,  as  Pm 
was  wont  to  do,  with  bendings  of  the  knee  and  effemii 
prostrations,  and  at  the  same  time  to  violate  these  sac 
objects  and  to  flout  heaven  by  their  destruction, — can  we  ascj 
such  conduct  to  anything  but  a  mind  disordered  and  a  spirit 
to  sober  reason  ?  I  am  sure  this  was  the  case  with  Pnisi 
for  he  led  his  army  off  to  Elaea,  without  having  perfoime 
single  act  of  manly  courage  in  the  course  of  his  attempts 
Pergamum,  and  after  treating  everything  human  and  dii 
with  petty  and  effeminate  spite.  He  attempted  to  take  Eli 
Elaea  on  the  ^"^^  made  some  assaults  upon  it ;  but  bt 
Casius,  ihe  port  unable  to  effect  anything,  owing  to  Sosani 
of  Pergamuni.  jjje  king's  foster-brother,  having  thrown  him 
into  the  town  with  an  army  and  repelling  his  assaults, 
marched  off  towards  Tliyateira.  In  the  course  of  his  mai 
he  plundered  the  temple  of  Artemis  in  the  Holy  village  ;  j 
the  sacred  enclosure  of  Apollo  Cynneius  at  Temnus'  like^ 
he  not  only  plundered  but  destroyed  by  fire.  After  tJ 
achievements  he  returned  home,  having  waged  war  aga 
the  gods  as  well  as  against  men.  But  Prusias's  infantry  t 
suffered  severely  from  famine  and  dysentery  on  their  ret 
march,  so  that  the  wrath  of  heaven  appears  to  have  qui< 
visited  him  for  these  crimes.-  .   .   . 

28.  After  his   defeat   by  Prusias   Attalus   appointed 
brother  Athenaeus  to  accompany  Publius  1 

U<Ii^"rloRome''"'"S    '°    ^"""^    '«    '"'°^'"    ^"^^   Senate    Of  » 

had  happened.  At  Rome  they  had  not  \ 
much  attention  when  a  previous  messenger  named  Androni 
had  come  from  Attalus,  with  news  of  the  original  invasi 


Apollo  s. 
according  to  Suidas 


1  Mysia,  s.  of  llie  river  Hcrmus.  Cynneius  or  Cyi 
1  ApoUo  guardian  of  the  shepherd  dogs.  There 
s.v.  liwjfuoi),  a  lemplc  lo  Apollo  at  Athens  with 
n  the  work  of  Cynnis,  a  son  of  Apollo  and  a  ay 

I'arnelhiR. 

'  The  batlte,  in  which  Prusias  is  here 

treacherous  attack  upon  Attalus  who  was  waiting, 

arrangemetx  made  by  Roman  envoys  Horlcnsius  and  Arunculeius,  lo 

I'rusins  on  his  frontier,  accompanied  by  only  one  thousand  cavalry. 

Roman  envo;*  eren  had  to  fly  for  thdr  llvet.    Appian,  MitAridaiei,  3. 


■e  conquered  Allalus,  v 


PRUSIAS  AND  ATT  ALUS 


469 


because  they  suspected  that  Attalus  wished  to  attack  Pnisias 
himself,  and  was  therefore  getting  up  a  case  against  him  before- 
hand, and  trying  to  prejudice  him  in  their  eyes  by  these 
accusations:   and  when  Nicomedes  and  some  «_  .    ,  ^ 

xTusi&s  o&Q  sent 

ambassadors   from   Pnisias,    headed   by   Anti- his  son  Nicomedes 
philus,  arrived  and  protested  that  there  was  not  and  some  ambas- 
a  word  of  truth  in  the  statement,  the  Senate  ^^^'^^^^^^ 
was  still  more  incredulous  of  what  had  been 
said  about  Pnisias.     But  when  after  a  time  the  real  truth  was 
made  known,  the  Senate   still   felt  uncertain,  The  Senate  send 
and  sent  Lucius  Apuleius  and  Gaius  Petronius    fresh  oommis- 
to  investigate  what  was  the  state  of  the  case  in     .  sioners  to 
regard  to  these  two  kings.  investigate. 


BOOK  XXXIII 

1.  Before  spring  this  year  the  Senate,  after  hearing  the  report 

B.C.  155.       o^  Publius  Lentulus  and  his  colleagues,  who  had 

The  Roman  legate  just  reached  Rome  from  Asia,  in  the  business 

^andlth^^l!^' ^^    king    Prusias,    called    in   Athenaeus   also, 

brother  of  Attaius,  brother  of  king  Attalus.     The  matter,  however, 

reach  Rome  and  did  not  need  many  words :  the  Senate  promptly 

declare  the  truth,  appointed  Gaius  Claudius  Cento,  Lucius  Hor- 

tensius,   and   Gaius   Arunculeius,    to   accompany   Athenaeus 

home,  with  instructions  to  prevent  Prusias  from  waging  war 

against  Attalus. 

Also  Xeno  of  Aegium  and  Telecles  of  Tegea  arrived  as 
Another  embassy  ambassadors  from  the  Achaeans  in  behalf  of  the 

in  behalf  of  the  Achaean  detenus.  After  the  delivery  of  their 
Achaean  detenus,  speech,  on  the  question  being  put  to  the  vote, 
the  Senators  only  refused  the  release  of  the  accused  persons 

It  fails  by  the     by   a  very  narrow  majority.      The   man   who 

action  of  the     really  prevented  the  release  from  being  carried 

S'iftT^^^'tvl^^!,^^  was  Aulus  Postumius,  who  was  praetor,  and  as 

puttmg  the  ques-  •  j    j  •      *u      c        *  \.u   *. 

tionsimply  "yes"  such  presided  m  the  Senate  on  that  occasion. 

or  "  no  "  for  re-  Three   alternatives  were   proposed  —  one   for 

^^y  whr^ire  ^^  absolute  release,  another  for  an  absolute 

for  postponing  it  refusal,  and  a  third  for  a  postponement  of  the 

to  vote  "no."    release  for  the  present.     The  largest  numbers 

were  for  the  first  of  these  three ;  but  Postumius  left  out  the 

third,  and  put  the  two  first  to  the  vote  together,  release  or  no 

release ;  the  result  was  that  those  who  were  originally  for  the 

postponement  transferred  their  votes  to  the  party  that  were 

against  the  release,  and  thus  gave  a  majority  against  release. . . . 

8.^  When  the  ambassadors  returned  to  Achaia  with  the  news 

^  Hultsch  places  an  extract  from  Aulus  Gellius  (6,  14,  8)- relating  to  the 


BOOK  XXXIII    RELEASE  OF  ACHAEANS  REFUSED  471 

that  the  restoration  of  all  the  detenus  had  been  only  lost  in 

the  Senate  by  a  narrow  majority,  the  people  The  Achaeans  are 
becoming  hopeful  and  elated  sent  Telecles  of  encouraged  to 
Megalopolis  and  Anaxidamus  on  a  fresh  mission      ^  ^s^**- 
at  once.     That  was  the  state  of  things  in  the  Peloponnese.  .  .  . 

4.  Aristocrates,  the  general  of  the  Rhodians,  was  in  appear- 
ance a  man  of  mark  and  striking  ability ;  and     Aristocrates 
the  Rhodians,  judging  from  this,  believed  that  proves  a  failure  in 
they  had  in  him  a  thoroughly  adequate  leader     ^e  war  with 
and  guide  in  the  war.^     But  they  were  disap- 
pointed in  their  expectations  :  for  when  he  came  to  the  test  of 
experience,  like  spurious  coin  when  brought  to  the  furnace,  he 
was  shown  to  be  a  man  of  quite  a  different  sort     And  this 
was  proved  by  actual  facts.  .  .  . 

5.  [Demetrius]  offered  him  five  hundred  talents  if  he  would 
surrender  Cyprus  to  him,  with  other  similar  advantages  and 
honours  from  himself  if  he  would  do  him  this  service.  .  .  . 

Archias,  therefore,  wishing  to  betray  Cyprus  to  Demetrius, 
and  being  caught  in  the  act  and  led  off  to  stand  his  trial, 
hanged  himself  with  one  of  the  ropes  of  the  awnings  in  the 
court.  For  it  is  a  true  proverb  that  led  by  their  desires  "  the 
reckonings  of  the  vain  are  vain."  This  man,  for  instance, 
imagining  that  he  was  going  to  get  five  hundred  talents,  lost 
what  he  had  already,  and  his  life  into  the  bargain.  .  .  . 

6.  About  this  time  an  unexpected  misfortune  befell  the 
people  of  Priene.     They  had  received  a  deposit 

of  four  hundred  talents  from  Orophemes  when  he  pe^pj^^of  Priene 
got  possession  of  the  kingdom;  and  subsequently  (in  Caria)  in  pre- 
when   Ariarathes   recovered   his   dominion  he  serving  the  money 
demanded  the  money  of  them.     But  they  acted     orophemes^ 
like  honest  men,  in  my  opinion,  in  declaring 
that  they  would  deliver  it  to  no  one  as    long  as  Orophernes 
was  alive,  except  to  the  person  who  deposited  it  with  them  ; 
while  Ariarathes  was  thought  by  many  to  be  committing  a 
breach  of  equity  in  demanding  a  deposit  made  by  another. 

mission  of  the  three  philosophers  as  ch.  2  of  this  book.  The  substance  is  given 
in  the  note  on  p.  466.  It  is  more  in  place  there,  as  Polybius  expressly  said 
that  he  would  give  the  whole  story  together  (32,  25). 

'  This  war  appears  to  have  arisen  from  a  treacherous  attack  of  the  Cretans 
upon  the  island  of  Siphnos.     Exc,  dt  Virt.  ei  Vit.  p.  588. 


47a  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  book 

However,  up  to  this  point,  one  might  perhaps  pardon  his 
making  the  attempt,  because  he  looked  upon  the  money  as 
belonging  to  his  own  kingdom;  but  to  push  his  anger  and 
imperious  determination  as  much  farther  as  he  did  seems 
utterly  unjustifiable.  At  the  period  I  refer  to,  then,  he  sent 
troops  to  pillage  the  territory  of  Priene,  Attains  assisting  and 
urging  him  on  from  the  private '  grudge  which  he  entertained 
towards  the  Prienians.  After  losing  many  slaves  and  cattle, 
some  of  them  being  slaughtered  close  to  the  city  itself,  the 
Prienians,  unable  to  defend  themselves,  first  sent  an  embassy 
to  the  Rhodians,  and  eventually  appealed  for  protection  to 
Rome.  .  .  . 

But  he  would  not  listen  to  the  proposal  So  it  came  about 
that  the  Prienians,  who  had  great  hopes  from  the  possession  of 
so  large  a  sum  of  money,  found  themselves  entirely  dis- 
appointed. For  they  repaid  Orophemes  his  deposit,  and, 
thanks  to  this  same  deposit,  were  unjustly  exposed  to  severe 
damage  at  the  hands  of  Ariarathes.  .  .  . 

7.  This  year  there  came  ambassadors  also  from  the  people  of 
P  Marseilles,  who  had  long  been  suffering  from  the 

The  Ligurians   Ligurians,  and  at  that  time  were  being  closely 

harass  Marseilles  invested  by  them,  while  their  cities  of  Antipolis 

and  besiege     ^^^   Nicaea  were  also   subjected   to   a  siege. 

Antibes  and  Nice,  r^.,  ,         ^  .       "^   ,  ^  ° 

They,  therefore,  sent  ambassadors  to  Rome  to 
represent  the  state  of  things  and  beg  for  help.  On  their 
being  admitted,  the  Senate  decided  to  send  legates  to  see 
personally  what  was  going  on,  and  to  endeavour  by  persuasion 
to  correct  the  injurious  proceedings  of  the  barbarians.  .  .  . 

The  peaceful  mission  failed^  and  the  consul  Opimius  subdued 
the  Oxybiiy  a  Ligurian  trihe^  in  arms^  B.C.  154.     Livy^  Ep.  47. 

8.  At  the  same  time  as  the  Senate  despatched  Opimius  to 
B.C  154.       the  war  with  the  Oxybii,  Ptolemy  the  younger 

Coss.  Q.  Opimius,  arrived  at  Rome ;  and  being  admitted  to  the 

Aiblmis."^    Senate  brought  an  accusation  against  his  brother, 

Ptolemy  Physcon  laying  on  him  the  blame  of  the  attack  against 

charges  his      his  life.     He  showed  the  scars  of  his  wounds, 

citing  a  plot""  ^^^   speaking   with   all    the    bitterness   which 

against  his  life,  they  seemed    to  suggest,   moved    his    hearers 


xxxiii    THE  UGURIANS,  PTOLEMIES,  AND  PRUSIAS     473 

to     pity     him;    and     when    Neolaidas    and  The  Senate  refiies 
Andromachus  also  came  on  behalf  of  the  elder  ^°  ^^^  ^^«  *^- 
Ptolemy,  to  answer  the  charges  brought  by  his    ^^lemy^^ 
brother,  the  Senate  refused  even  to  listen  to     Phiiometor, 
their  pleas,  having  been  entirely  prepossessed  by 
the  accusations  of  the  younger.     They  commanded  them  to 
leave  Rome  at  once ;  while  they  assigned  five   ^nd  send  com- 
commissioners    to    the    younger,    headed    by    missionersto 
Gnaeus  Merula  and  Lucius  Thermus,  with  a  restore  Physcon 
quinquereme     for     each    commissioner,    and       ^   yp™s- 
ordered  them  to  restore  Ptolemy  (Physcon)  to  Cyprus ;  and 
at  the  same  time  sent  a  circular  to  their  allies  in  Greece  and 
Asia,  granting  permission  to  them  to  assist  in  the  restoration 
of  Ptolemy.  .  .  . 

9.  When    the     commissioners    under     Hortensius     and 
Arunculeius  returned  from  Pergamum,  and  re-         . 
ported  Prusias's  disregard  of  the  orders  of  the  refuscd^ob^ence 
Senate ;  and  how  by  an  act  of  treachery  he  had    to  the  former 
besieged  them  and  Attalus  in  Pergamum,^  and  commission  (see 
had  given  rein  to  every  kind  of  violence  and  ne^Simmission 
lawlessness :  the  Senate,  enraged  and  offended   is  sent  out  with 
at  what  had  happened,  immediately  appointed     peremptory 
ten  commissioners,  headed  by  Lucius  Anicius, 

Gaius  Fannius,  and  Quintus  Fabius  Maximus,  and  sent  them 
out  with  instructions  to  put  an  end  to  the  war,  and  compel 
Pnisias  to  indemnify  Attalus  for  the  injuries  received  by  him 
during  the  war.  .  .  . 

10.  On  the  complaint  of  the  ambassadors  of  Marseilles  as 
to  their  injuries  sustained  at  the  hands  of  the  ,„.  t  •     • 

X  .        .  ,        ^  .        ,  The  Ligunans 

Ligurians,  the  Senate  at  once  appomted  a  prevent  the  com- 
commission,  consisting  of  Flaminius,  Popilius  missioners  from 
Laenas,  and  Lucius  Pupius,  who  sailed  with  the     *^j*"f  ^^. 

r  xjF         -11  J  1      J    J  •     .u     *       '.        wound  Flammius 

envoys  of  Marseilles,  and  landed  m  the  territory  ^ho  had  already 
of  the  Oxybii  at  the  town  of  Aegitna.     The  landed,  and  drive 
Ligurians,  hearing  that  they  were  come  to  bid  ^"^  '°  *^'^  ^^*P- 
them  raise  the  siege,  descended  upon  them  as  they  lay  at  anchor, 
and  prevented  the  rest  from  disembarking;  but  finding  Flaminius 
already  disembarked  and  his  baggage  landed,  they  began  by 

'  See  32.  27,  note. 


474  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  book 


ordering  him  to  leave  the  country,  and  on  his  refusal  they  began 
to  plunder  his  baggage.  His  slaves  and  freedmen  resisting  this, 
and  trying  to  prevent  them,  they  began  to  use  violence  and 
attacked  them  with  their  weapons.  When  Flaminius  came  to 
the  rescue  of  his  men  they  wounded  him,  and  killed  two  of 
his  servants,  and  chased  the  rest  down  to  their  ship,  so  that 
Flaminius  only  escaped  with'his  life  by  cutting  away  the  hawsers 
and  anchors.  He  was  conveyed  to  Marseilles  and  his  wound 
War  ordered  with  attended  to  with  all  possible  care ;  but  when  the 
the  Oxybii  and  Senate  was  informed  of  the  transaction,  it  imme- 
Deaatae,B.c.i54.  ^jj^jgjy  Ordered  one  of  the  consuls,  Quintus 

Opimius,  to  lead  an  army  against  the  Oxybii  and  Deciatae.  ^ 
11.  Having   collected    his    army   at    Placentia,    Quintus 

Opimius  orders  Opimius   marched   over    the   Apennines    and 
his  soldiers  to  join  arrived  in  the  territory  of  the  Oxybii ;  and,  pitch- 

at  Piaccntia,  and  \^„  jjjg  camp  on  the  river  Apro,  awaited  the 

marches  in  to  Gaul,      °  \     -        '   r  j^i^^i  ..• 

enemy,  bemg  mformed  that  they  were  mustenng 
their  forces  and  were  eager  to  give  him  battle.     Meanwhile, 

talc    A    *t        ^^  advanced  to  Aegitna,  where  the  ambassadors 

had  been  outraged,  took  the  city  by  assault,  and 
sold  its  inhabitants  as  slaves,  sending  the  ringleaders  in  the 
outrage  to  Rome  in  chains.  Having  done  this,  he  went  to 
meet  the  enemy.  The  Oxybii,  convinced  that  their  violence 
to  the  ambassadors  admitted  of  no  terms  being  granted  them, 
with  all  the  courage  of  desperation,  and  excited  to  the  highest 
pitch  of  furious  enthusiasm,  did  not  wait  to  be  joined 
by  the  Deciatae,  but,  having  collected  to  the  number  of  about 

and  defeats  the  ^^^^  thousand,  rushed  to  the  attack  upon  their 
Oxybii  and  enemy.  Quintus  was  somewhat  dismayed  at 
Deciatae,  ^^  boldness  of  their  attack,  and  at  the 
desperate  fury  of  the  barbarians ;  but  was  encouraged  by 
observing  that  the  enemy  were  advancing  in  complete 
disorder,  for  he  was  an  experienced  soldier  and  a  man 
of  great  natural  sagacity.  He  therefore  drew  out  his  men, 
and,  after  a  suitable  harangue,  advanced  at  a  slow  pace 
towards  the  enemy.  His  charge  was  delivered  with  great 
vigour  :  he  quickly  repulsed  the  enemy,  killed  a  great  many  of 
them,  and  forced  the  rest  into  headlong  flight.     Meanwhile, 

Ligurian  inhcs  between  Nice  and  Marseilles.     Pliny,  A^  H.  3,  §  47. 


XXXIII  LIGURIAN  WAR  475 

the  Deciatae  had  mustered  their  forces,  and  appeared  on  die 
ground  intending  to  fight  side  by  side  with  the  Oxybii ;  but 
finding  themselves  too  late  for  the  battle,  they  received  the 
fugitives  in  their  ranks,  and  after  a  short  time  charged  the 
Romans  with  great  fury  and  enthusiasm ;  but  being  worsted  in 
the  engagement,  they  immediately  all  surrendered  themselves 
and  their  city  at  discretion  to  the  Romans.    Having  thus  become 
masters  of  these  tribes,  Opimius  delivered  over  their  territory 
on  the  spot  to  the  people  of  Marseilles,  and  for  the  future  forced 
the  Ligurians  to  give  hostages  at  certain  fixed  intervals  to  the 
Marsilians.     He  then  deprived  the  tribes  that  had  fought  with 
them  of  their  arms,  and  divided  his  army  among  opimius  winters 
the  cities  there  for  the  winter,  and  himself  took       in  Gaul, 
up  his  winter  quarters  in  the  country.     Thus    ^^*  ^S4-i53- 
the  war  had  a  conclusion  as  rapid  as  its  commencement.  .  .  . 

12.  All  the  previous  winter  Attalus  had  been  busy  collecting 
a  large  army,  Ariarathes  and  Mithridates  having    ,^ 
sent  him  a  force  of  cavalry  and  infantry,  in      sioners  visit 
accordance  with  the  terms  of  their  alliance  with     Attalus  and 
him.     While  he  was  still  engaged  in  these  pre-  ^"^*^  ^^^y  *° 
parations  the  ten  commissioners  arrived  from  ^' 

Rome :  who,  after  meeting  and  conferring  with  him  at  Cadi 
about  the  business,  started  to  visit  Prusias,  to  whom  on  meet- 
ing him  they  explained  the  orders  of  the  Senate  in  terms  of 
serious  warning.  Prusias  at  once  yielded  to  some  of  the 
injunctions,  but  refused  to  submit  to  the  greater  part.  The 
Romans  grew  angry,  renounced  his  friendship 
and  alliance,  and  one  and  all  started  to  return  X^l^i  TJi^  w^ 

'  .  ,      ^  ,   yield  till  too  late. 

to  Attains.     Thereupon  Prusias  repented ;  fol- 
lowed them  a  certain  distance  with  vehement  entreaties ;  but, 
failing  to  gain  any  concession,  left  them  in  a  state  of  great 
doubt  and  embarrassment     The  Romans,  on  their  return  to 
Attains,  bade  him  station  himself  with  his  army    xhe  Romans 
on  his  own  frontier,  and  not  to  begin  the  war  promote  a  com- 
himself,  but  to  provide  for  the  security  of  the  i^»nation  against 
towns  and  villages  in  his  territory :  while  they 
divided  themselves,  one  party  sailing  home  with  all  speed  to 
announce  to  the  Senate  the  disobedience  of  Prusias ;  another 


476  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  book 

departing  for  Ionia;  and  a  third  to  the  Hellespont  and  the 
ports  about  Byzantium,  all  with  one  and  the  same  purpose, 
namely,  to  detach  the  inhabitants  from  friendship  and  alliance 
with  Prusias,  and  to  persuade  them  to  adhere  to  Attains  and 
assist  him  to  the  best  of  their  power.  .  .  . 

18.  At  the   same   time   Athenaeus    set    sail   with  eighty 

Summer  of  B.C.  decked  ships,  of  which  five  were  quadriremes 

154.    Attaiuss  sent  by  the  Rhodians  for  the  Cretan  war,  twenty 

brother        {xoxti  Cyzicus,  twenty-seven  Attalus's  own,  and 

harasses  the     ^^  ^est  contributed  by  the  other  allies.    Having 

coast  of  Prusias's  sailed  to  the  Hellespont,  and  reached  the  cities 

kmgdom.       subject  to  Prusias,  he  made  frequent  descents 

upon  the  coast,  and  greatly  harassed  the  country.     But  when 

the  Senate  heard  the  report  of  the  commissioners  who  had 

returned  from    Prusias,  they  immediately  despatched   three 

new  ones,  Appius  Claudius,  Lucius  Oppius,  and  Aulus  Pos- 

tumius :  who,  on  arriving  in  Asia,  put  an  end  to  the  war  by 

bringing  the  two  kings  to  make  peace,  on  condition  of  Prusias 

at  once  handing  over  to  Attalus  twenty  decked  ships,  and 

paying  him  five  hundred  talents  in  twenty  years,  both  retaining 

the  territory  which  they  had  at  the  commencement  of  the 

war.     Farther,  that  Prusias  should  make  good  the  damage 

done  to  the  inhabitants  of  Methymna,  Aegae,  Cymae,  Her- 

acleia,  by  a  payment  of  a  hundred  talents  to  those  towns. 

The  treaty  having  been  drawn  out  in  writing  on  those  terms, 

Attalus  withdrew  his  army  and  navy  to  his  own  country.    Such 

are  the  particulars  of  the  events  which  took  place  in  the 

quarrel  between  Attalus  and  Prusias.  .  .  . 

B.C.  153.  ^*'  ^^  embassy  again  coming  to  Rome  from 

Another  fruitless  Achaia  in  behalf  of  the  detenus,  the  Senate 
embassy  from    ^qx.^^  to  make  no  change.  .  .  . 

Achaia. 

Hcracieides  ^5»  Heracleides    came    to    Rome   in    the 

brings  to  Rome  middle  of  summer,  bringing  Laodice  and  Alex- 

i-aod^e.  daughter  j^j^^jgj.^  r^^^  Stayed  there  a  long  time,  employing 

Epiphanes.  and  ^  ^^^  arts  of  cunning  and  corruption  to  win 
his  supposed  son  the  support  of  the  Senate.  .  .  . 

Alexander  Balas. 

Astymedes  of  Rhodes  being  appointed  ambassador  and 


xxxiii  fVAJ^  BETIVEEN  RHODES  AND  CRETE  477 

navarch  at  the  same  time,   came  forward  immediately  and 
addressed  the  Senate  on  the  war  with  Crete.   The  quarrel  of 
The  Senate  listened  with  attention,  and  imme-     Rhodes  and 
diately  appointed  Quintus   at   the  head  of  a         ^'^^®' 
commission  to  put  an  end  to  the  war.  .  .  . 

16.  This  year  the  Cretans  sent  Antiphatas,  son  of  Telam- 
nestus  of  Gortyn,  with  envoys  to  the  Achaeans  ask-  'j^^  Achaeans 
ing  for  help,  and  the  Rhodians  sent  Theophanes    decline  to  help 
with  a  similar  mission.     The  Congress  of  the  either^Rhodes  or 
Achaeans  was  that  year  at  Corinth :  and  on  each  ' 
body  of  ambassadors  pleading  their  respective   causes,   the 
assembled  people  were  more  inclined  towards  although  inclined 
the  Rhodians,  from  respect  to  the  reputation  of      to  support 
their  state,  and  the  general  character  of  their        Rhodes. 
policy  and  statesmen.     When  Antiphatas  saw  this,  he  wished 
to  come  forward  to  make  another  speech ;  and,  having  obtained 
permission  from  the  Strategus  to  do  so,  he  spoke  in  weightier 
and  more  exalted  terms  than  might  be  expected  from  a  Cretan ; 
for,  in  fact,  the  young  man  was  in  no  way  of  the  ordinary 
Cretan  type,  but  had  shunned  the  characteristic  principles  of 
his  countrymen.     Accordingly  the  Achaeans  received  his  plain 
speaking  with  favour ;  and  still  more  for  the  sake  of  his  father 
Telamnestus,  who  had  taken  a  spirited  part  with  them  at  the 
head  of  five  hundred  Cretans  in  their  war  against  Nabis. 
However,  none  the  less  for  that,  after  listening  to  him  they 
were   still   inclined   to   aid   the    Rhodians,    until   Callicrates 
of  Leontium  stood  up  and  said  that  they  ought  not  to  go  to 
war  in  favour  of  either,  or  to  send  aid  to  either  of  the  two 
peoples  without  the  consent  of  the  Romans.     This  argument 
decided  them  in  favour  of  non-intervention.  .  .  . 

17.  Dispirited  with  the  course  things  were  taking,  the 
Rhodians  entered  upon  some  measures  and  designs  which  were 
strange  and  unreasonable.  In  fact,  they  were  much  in  the 
same  state  as  men  suffering  from  chronic  diseases.  It 
frequently  happens  that  such  men,  when,  in  spite  of  following 
all  the  rules  of  medicine  and  obeying  the  prescriptions  of  the 
doctors,  they  are  unable  to  make  any  advance  towards  improve- 
ment, give  up  all  such  efforts  in  despair,  and  either  listen 
wholly  to  priests  and  seers,  or  try  every  sort  of  charm  or 


478  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  book 

amulet.  So  it  was  with  the  Rhodians.  When  their  hopes 
were  baffled  in  every  direction,  they  were  reduced  to  listen  to 
every  kind  of  suggestion,  and  to  magnify  and  accept  every 
kind  of  chance.  Nor  was  this  unnatural.  For  when  nothing 
dictated  by  reason  proves  successful,  and  yet  some  action  or 
another  must  necessarily  be  pushed  on,  there  is  no  alternative 
but  to  try  something  which  does  not  depend  on  reason.  The 
Rhodians,  having  come  to  this  dilemma,  acted  accordingly ; 
and,  among  other  things  that  were  in  defiance  of  reason,  re- 
elected as  their  archon  a  man  of  whom  they  disapproved.  .  .  . 

18.  Many  different   embassies    having    come    to   Rome, 

B  c  I  2     Visit  ^^^    Senate    admitted   Attains,^   son    of    king 

of  the  young    Eumenes  I.     For  he  had  arrived  at  Rome  at 

Attaius,  son  of  this  time,  still  quite  a  young  boy,  to  be  intro- 

the  late  king     ^^^^ed   to   the   Senate,   and   to  renew   in   his 

person  the  ancestral  friendship  and  connexion 

with  the  Romans.     After  a  kindly  reception  by  the  Senate  and 

his  father^s  friends,  and  after  receiving  the  answer  which  he 

desired,  and  such  honours  as  suited  his  time  of  life,  he  returned 

to  his  native  land,  meeting  with  a  warm  and  liberal  reception 

in  all  the  Greek  cities  through  which  he  passed  on  his  return 

journey.  Demetrius  also  came  at  this  time,  and, 
^Trtarathc^VL^  ^^^^  receiving  a  fairly  good  reception  for  a  boy, 

returned  home. 

Then  Heracleides  entered  the  Senate,  bringing  Laodice  and 

Laodice  and  Alexander  with  him.  The  youthful  Alexander 
Alexander  Baias.  first   addressed   the   Senate,  and   begged   the 

Seech.  15.  Romans  "to  remember  their  friendship  and 
alliance  with  his  father  Antiochus,  and  if  possible  to  assist 
him  to  recover  his  kingdom ;  or  if  they  could  not  do  that,  at 
least  to  give  him  leave  to  return  home,  and  not  to  hinder 
those  who  wished  to  assist  him  in  recovering  his  ancestral 
crown."  Heracleides  then  took  up  the  word,  and,  after 
delivering  a  lengthy  encomium  on  Antiochus,  came  to  the 
same  point,  namely,  that  they  ought  in  justice  to  grant  the 
young  prince  and  Laodice  leave  to  return  and  claim  their  own, 
as  they  were  the  true-born  children  of  Antiochus.     Sober- 

*  Surnamed  Philometor.     He  succeeded  his  uncle  Attaius  Philadelphus  in 
B.C.  138,  and  at  his  death  in  B.c.  133  left  his  dominions  to  Rome. 


xxxiii  ALEXANDER  BALAS  479 

minded  people  were  not  all  attracted  by  any  of  these  argu- 
ments.     They  understood   the   meaning   of   this    theatrical 
exhibition,  and  made  no  secret  of  their  distaste  for  Heracleides. 
But  the  majority  had  fallen  under  the  spell  of  Heracleides*s 
cunning,   and    were    induced  to   pass  the  following  decree : 
"Alexander  and  Laodice,  children  of  a  king.     The  Senate's 
our  friend  and  ally,  appeared  before  the  Senate  decree  in  favour 
and  stated  their  case  :  and  the  Senate  gave  them  ^^  Alexander  and 
authority  to  return  to  the  kingdom  of  their  fore- 
fathers ;  and  help,  in  accordance  with  their  request,  is  hereby 
decreed  to  them."     Seizing  on  this  pretext,  Heracleides  imme- 
diately began  hiring  mercenaries,  and  calling  on  some  men  of 
high  position  to  assist  him.     He  accordingly  went  to  Ephesus 
and  devoted  himself  to  the  preparations  for  his  attempt.^  .  .  . 

19,  Demetrius,  who,  when  residing  as  a  hostage  at  Rome, 
had  fled  and  become  king  in  Syria,  was  a  man 

so  much  addicted  to  drunkenness  that  he  spent    jn^ranperance. 
the  greater  part  of  the  day  in  drinking.  ... 

20.  When  once  the  multitude  feel  the  impulse  to  violent 
love  or  hatred  of  any  one,  any  pretext  is  good  enough  for 
indulging  their  feelings.  .  .  . 

However,  I  am  afraid  I  may  fall  under  the  common 
dilemma,  "  Which  is  the  greater  fool,  the  man  who  milks  a 
he-goat,  or  the  man  who  holds  a  sieve  to  catch  the  milk  ? " 
For  I  seem  to  be  doing  something  of  this  sort  in  arguing  and 
writing  an  essay  on  what  every  one  acknowledges  to  be  false. 
It  is,  then,  waste  time  to  speak  of  such  things,  unless  one  cares 
to  write  down  dreams,  or  look  at  dreams  with  one's  eyes 
open. 


I.  .  . 


'  Alexander  Balas  was  an  impostor  of  low  origin  set  up  by  Heracleides  as 
a  son  of  Antiochus  Epiphanes.  He  entered  Syria  in  B.C.  152,  defeated  and 
killed  Demetrius  in  B.C.  150,  and  was  himself  defeated  in  B.c.  146  by  Ptolemy 
Philometor  (who  also  fell)  in  favour  of  a  son  of  Demetrius,  and  was  shortly 
afterwards  murdered.    Livy,  Ep,  52.    Appian,  Syr.  67  ;  Joseph.  Antiq.  13,  2, 4. 


BOOK   XXXIV 

GEOGRAPHICAL  FRAGMENTS 

Poly  bins  devoted  one  book  of  his  history  to  a  separate  treatise 
on  the  geography  of  the  continents,     Strabo^  9,  i,  i. 

1.  In  their  Greek  histories  Eudoxus  gave  a  good,  but  Ephorus 
the  best,  account  of  the  foundations,  blood  connexions, 
migrations,  and  founders  of  states;  but  I  shall  now  give 
some  information  on  the  position  of  countries  and  their  dis- 
tances, which  are  the  subjects  most  properly  belonging  to  the 
science  of  Geography.  .  .  . 

2.  It  is  not  Homer's  manner  to  indulge  in  mere  mythological 
Homer  true  to   stories  founded  on  no  substratum  of  truth.    For 
nature.        there  is  no  surer  way  of  giving  an  air  of  verisimili- 
tude to  fiction  than  to  mix  with  it  some  particles  of  truth.    And 

this  is  the  case  with  the  tale  of  the  wanderings  of  Odysseus 

For  instance,  Aeolus,  who  taught  the  way  of  getting  through 
the  straits,  where  there  are  currents  setting  both  ways,  and  the 
passage  is  rendered  difficult  by  the  indraught  of  the  sea,  came 
to  be  called  and  regarded  as  the  dispenser  and  king  of  the  winds ; 
just  as  Danaus,  again,  who  discovered  the  storages  of  water  in 
Argos,and  Atreus,  who  discovered  the  fact  of  the  sun's  revolution 
being  in  the  opposite  direction  to  that  of  the  heaven,  were 
called  seers  and  priest-kings.  So  the  priests  of  the  Egyptians, 
the  Chaldeans,  and  the  Magi,  being  superior  to  the  rest  of  the 
world  in  wisdom,  obtained  rule  and  honour  in  former  genera- 
tions. And  on  this  principle,  too,  each  one  of  the  gods  is 
honoured  as  the  inventor  of  something  useful  to  man.  I  do 
not  allow  therefore  that  Aeolus  is  wholly  mythical,  nor  the 
wanderings  of  Odysseus  generally.  Some  mythical  elements 
have  been  undoubtedly  added,  as  they  have  in  the  War  01 


BOOK  XXXIV  FISHING  NEAR  SCYLLA  481 

Ilium;  but  the  general  account  of  Sicily  given  by  the  poet 
agrees  with  that  of  other  historians  who'  have  given  topo- 
graphical details  of  Italy  and  Sicily.  I  cannot  agree  therefore 
with  the  remark  of  Eratosthenes  that  ''we  shall  discover 
where  Odysseus  wandered,  when  we  find  the  cobbler  who 
sewed  up  the  leather  bag  of  the  winds."  See  for  instance  how 
Homer's  description  of  Scylla  agrees  with  what  really  happens 
at  the  Scyllaean  rock,  and  the  taking  of  the  sword  fish  :  ^ 

"  And  there  she  fishes,  roaming  round  the  rock, 
For  dog-fish  and  for  dolphins,  or  what  else 
Of  huger  she  may  take  that  swims  the  sea." 

For  the  fact  is  that  tunnies  swimming  in  great  shoals  along  the 
Italian  coast,  if  they  are  drifted  from  their  course  and  are  pre- 
vented from  reaching  Sicily,  fall  a  prey  to  the  larger  fish,  such 
as  dolphins,  dog-fish,  or  other  marine  monsters ;  and  from 
hunting  these  the  sword-fish  (called  also  xiphiae,  or  sometimes 
sea-dogs)  are  fattened.  The  same  thing  happens  at  a  rise  of 
the  Nile,  and  other  rivers,  as  in  the  case  of  a  fire  or  a  burning 
forest ;  the  animals  crowd  together,  and,  in  their  effort  to  escape 
the  fire  or  the  water,  fall  a  prey  to  stronger  animals. 

8.  Fishing  for  sword-fish  at  the  Scyllaean  rock  is  carried  on 
in  this  way.     A  number  of  men  lie  in  wait,  two 
each  in  small  two-oared  boats,  and  one  man  is      I^J^^ck'^ 

11  /.        1  11        »       1      1  sword-fish. 

set  to  look  out  for  them  all  In  the  boat  one 
man  rows,  while  the  other  stands  on  the  prow  holding  a  spear. 
When  the  look-out  man  signals  the  appearance  of  a  sword-fish 
(for  the  animal  swims  with  one-third  of  its  body  above  water), 
the  boat  rows  up  to  it,  and  the  man  with  the  spear  strikes  it  at 
close  quarters,  and  then  pulls  the  spear-shaft  away  leaving  the 
harpoon  in  the  fish's  body ;  for  it  is  barbed  and  loosely  fastened 
to  the  shaft  on  purpose,  and  has  a  long  rope  attached  to  it. 
They  then  slacken  the  rope  for  the  wounded  fish,  until  it  is 
wearied  out  with  its  convulsive  struggles  and  attempts  to 
escape,  and  then  they  haul  it  on  to  land,  or,  if  its  size  is  not  too 
great,  into  the  boat  And  if  the  spearshaft  falls  into  the  sea  it 
is  not  lost ;  for  being  made  of  two  pieces,  one  oak  and  the 
other  pine,  the  oak  end  as  the  heavier  dips  under  water,  the 

*  Odyss.  12,  95. 
VOL.  U  2  I 


482  THE  HISTORIES  OF-POLYBIUS  book 

Other  end  rises  above  it  and  is  easily  got  hold  of.  But  some- 
times it  happens  that  the  man  rowing  is  wounded,  right  through 
the  boat,  by  the  immense  size  of  the  animal's  sword ;  for  it 
charges  like  a  boar,  and  hunting  the  one  is  very  like  hunting 
the  other. 

This  would  lead  us  to  conjecture  that  the  wandering 
described  by  Homer  was  near  Sicily,  because  he  has  assigned 
to  Scylla  the  kind  of  fishing  which  is  indigenous  to  the 
Scyllaean  rock;  and  because  what  he  says  of  Charybdis 
correctly  describes  what  does  happen  in  the  Straits.     But  the 

**  Thrice  sends  she  up  the  darksome  tide," 

Island  of  Meninx.instead  of  twice  "a  day,"  is  an  error  to   be 

off  the  lesser    ascribed  to  the  copyist  or  the  geographer.^     So 

Syrtis.  Seei,39.  j^igQ  Meninx  answers  to  his  description  of  the 

Lotophagi. 

4.  Or  if  there  are  some  points  which  do  not  answer,  we 
must  lay  the  blame  on  ignorance  or  poetic  licence,  which  uses 
real  history,  picturesque  detaD,  and  mythological  allusion.  The 
object  of  history  is  truth,  as  when  in  the  catalogue  of  ships  the 
poet  describes  the  features  of  the  several  localities,  calling  one 
city  "  rocky,"  another  "  frontier-placed,"  another  "  with  wealth 
of  doves,"  or  "  hard  by  the  sea."  But  the  object  of  picturesque 
detail  is  vividness,  as  when  he  introduces  men  fighting ;  and 
that  of  mythological  allusion  is  to  give  pleasure  or  rouse  wonder. 
But  a  narrative  wholly  fictitious  creates  no  illusion  and  is  not 
Homeric.  For  all  look  upon  his  poetry  as  a  philosophical 
work  ;  and  Eratosthenes  is  wrong  in  bidding  us  not  judge  his 
poems  with  a  view  to  having  any  serious  meaning,  or  to  seek 
for  history  in  them. 

It  is  better,  again,  to  take  the  line  ^ 

**  Thence  for  nine  days  the  foul  winds  drave  us  on," 

to  mean  that  he  made  but  a  short  distance — for  foul  winds  do 
not  favour  a  straight  course — than  to  imagine  him  to  have  got 
into  the  open  ocean  as  running  before  favouring  winds.  The 
distance  from  Malea  to  the  Pillars  is  twenty-two  thousand  five 
hundred  stades.     If  we  suppose  this  to  have  been  accomplished 

^  Odyss,  12,  105.  *  Odyss.  9,  8a, 


XXXIV  PYTHEAS  483 

at  an  even  speed  in  the  nine  days,  he  would  make  two 
thousand  five  hundred  stades  a  day.  Now,  who  has  ever 
asserted  that  any  one  made  the  voyage  from  Lycia  or  Rhodes 
to  Alexandria  in  four  days,  a  distance  of  four  thousand 
stades  ? 

To  those  who  ask  how  it  was  that  Odysseus,  though  he 
came  to  Sicily  three  times,  never  once  went  through  the  straits, 
I  answer  that  all  subsequent  sailors  avoided  that  passage 
also.  .  .  . 

6.  In  treating  of  the  geography  of  Europe  I  shall  say 
nothing  of  the  ancient  geographers,  but  shall  confine  my 
attention  to  their  modern  critics,  Dicaearchus,  Eratosthenes, 
who  is  the  most  recent  writer  on  geography,  and  Pytheas,  who 
has  misled  many  readers  by  professing  to  have  traversed  on 
foot  the  whole  of  Britain,  the  coastline  of  which  island,  he 
says,  is  more  than  forty  thousand  stades.  And  again  by  his 
stories  of  Thule  and  the  countries  in  its  neighbourhood,  "in 
which,"  he  says,  "  there  is  neither  unmixed  land  or  sea  or  air, 
but  a  kind  of  compound  of  all  three  (like  the  jelly-fish  or  Pulmo 
Marinus),  in  which  earth  and  sea  and  everything  else  are  held 
in  suspense,  and  which  forms  a  kind  of  connecting  link  to  the 
whole,  through  which  one  can  neither  walk  nor  sail."  This 
substance,  which  he  says  is  like  the  Pulmo  Marinus,  he  saw 
with  his  own  eyes,  the  rest  he  learnt  by  report.  Such 
is  Pytheas's  story,  and  he  adds  that,  on  his  return  thence, 
he  traversed  the  whole  of  the  coast  of  Europe  ^  ..  .   ..    T^ 

-  -,     ,  1        r^        •         ^  Cadiz  to  the  Don. 

from  Gades  to  the  Tanais.  But  we  cannot 
believe  that  a  private  person,  who  was  also  a  poor  man,  should 
have  made  such  immense  journeys  by  land  and  sea.  Even 
Eratosthenes  doubted  this  part  of  his  story,  though  he  believed 
what  he  said  about  Britain,  and  Gades,  and  Iberia.  I  would 
much  rather  believe  the  Messenian  (Euhemerus)  than  him. 
The  latter  is  content  with  saying  that  he  sailed  to  one  country 
which  he  calls  Panchaia;^  while  the  former  asserts  that  he  has 
actually  seen  the  whole  northern  coast  of  Europe  up  to  the 

^  Panchaia  or  PanchSa,  the  fabulous  island  or  country  in  the  Red  Sea  or 
Arabian  gulf,  in  which  Euhemerus  asserted  that  he  had  discovered  the  inscrip- 
tions which  proved  the  reputed  gods  to  have  been  famous  generals  or  kings. 
Plutarch,  Is.  et  Osir.  23,  Diodor.  fr.  6,  i.  The  Roman  poets  used  the  word 
as  equivalent  to  "  Arabian."     See  Vcrg.  Georg.  a,  139. 


484  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  book 


very  verge  of  the  world,  which  one  would  hardly  believe  of 
Hermes  himself  if  he  said  it  Eratosthenes  calls  Euhemerus 
a  Bergaean,^  yet  believes  Pytheas,  though  Dicaearchus  himself 
did  not.^  .  .  .  Eratosthenes  and  Dicaearchus  give  mere 
popular  guesses  as  to  distances. 

6.  For  instance,  Dicaearchus  says  that  the  distance  from 
the  Peloponnese  to  the  Pillars  is  ten  thousand  stades 
and  still  further  to  the  head  of  the  Adriatic ;«  and  from 
the  Peloponnesus  to  the  Sicilian  straits  three  thousand; 
and  therefore  the  remainder,  from  the  Straits  to  the  Pillars, 
is  seven  thousand  stades.  I  say  nothing  about  the  three 
thousand  stades,  whether  they  are  right  or  wrong;  but 
the  seven  thousand  cannot  be  made  out,  whether  you  measure 
along  the  coast  or  straight  across  the  sea.  The  coast  route  is 
a  kind  of  obtuse  angle,  contained  by  two  lines  resting  on  the 
straits  and  the  pillars  respectively ;  so  that  we  have  a  triangle, 
of  which  the  apex  is  Narbo,  and  the  base  the  straight  line 
representing  the  course  by  the  open  sea ;  of  the  two  sides  of 
the  triangle  which  contain  the  obtuse  angle,  that  which  extends 
from  the  straits  to  Narbo  is  more  than  eleven  thousand  two 
hundred  stades,  the  other  from  Narbo  to  the  Pillars  is  a  little 
under  eight  thousand.  The  longest  distance  from  Europe  to 
Libya  across  the  Tuscan  sea  is  allowed  to  be  not  more  than 
three  thousand  stades,  that  by  the  Sardinian  sea  is  some- 
what less;  but  let  us  call  it  three  thousand  stades.  Now 
suppose  a  perpendicular  let  down  through  the  gulf  of  Narbo 
to  the  base  of  the  triangle,  that  is  to  the  straight  sea- 
course,  measuring  two  thousand  stades;  it  requires  only  a 
schoolboy's  geometry  to  prove  that  the  coasting  voyage  is 
longer  than  the  direct  sea  voyage  by  nearly  five  hundred 
stades.*      And   when   the   three   thousand    stades   from  the 

^  That  is  "  as  great  a  liar  as  Antiphanes  of  Berga."  See  below.  Strabo 
classes  Antiphanes  with  Pytheas  and  Euhemerus  more  than  once  (see  2,  3,  5). 
Hence  came  the  verb  ficfiydl^eip,  "to  tell  travellers'  tales"  (Steph.  Byz.).  But 
there  is  considerable  doubt  as  to  the  identification  of  the  traveller  Antiphanes, 
some  confounding  him  with  a  comic  poet  of  the  same  name,  and  others  with 
the  author  of  an  essay  ircpl  h-aipwy,     Berga  was  in  the  valley  of  the  Strymon. 

'  Strabo  here  protests  against  Dicaearchus  being  treated  as  a  standard  of 
geographical  truth.      For  Pytheas  see  Appendix. 

^  Polybius  proves  his  point  by  the  demonstration  of  the  proposition  ' '  The 


-. — . — ■■»■ 


XXXIV 


DISTANCES  IN  THE  MEDITERRANEAN 


485 


Peloponnese  to  the  straits  are  added,  the  whole  number  of 
the  stades  even  of  the  straight  sea  course  will  be  more  than 
double  Dicaearchus's  reckoning.  And  if  we  measure  to  the 
head  of  the  Adriatic  we  must  add  still  more  by  his  own 
admission ;  that  is  to  say,  from  the  Peloponnese  to  Leucas  is 
seven  hundred  stades,  from  Leucas  to  Corcyra  seven  hundred, 
from  Corcyra  to  Ceraunia  seven  hundred,  and  from  Ceraunia 
along  the  Illyrian  coast  six  thousand  one  hundred  and  fifty. ^ 

In  talking  such  nonsense  he  might  well  be  regarded  as 
having  gone  beyond  even  Antiphanes  of  Berga,  and,  in  fact, 
to  have  left  no  folly  for  his  successors  to  commit.  .  .  . 

7.  From  Ithaca  to  Corcyra  is  more  than  nine  hundred 
stades;  from  Epidamnus  to  Thessalonica  more  than  two 
thousand.  From  Marseilles  to  the  Pillars  is  more  than  nine 
thousand ;  from  the  Pyrenees,  rather  less  than  eight  thousand. 
.  .  .  The  Pagus  from  source  to  mouth  is  eight  thousand, 
not  following  its  windings,  but  taking  a  direct  line.  .  .  . 
Eratosthenes  is  quite  ignorant  of  the  geography  of  Iberia, 
and  sometimes  makes  statements  about  it  entirely  con- 
tradictory. He  says,  for  instance,  that  its  western  coast  as 
far  as  Gades  is  inhabited  by  Gauls,  since  the  whole  western 
side  of  Europe,  as  far  south  as  Gades,  is  occupied  by  that 

square  of  the  hypotenuse  of  a  right-anglcd-triangle  is  equal  to  the  squares  of  the 
sides  containing  the  right  angle. " 

BNarbo 


Pillars. 


Straits. 


By  applying  this  principle  AD =7745. 9  .  .  and  00=11019.9  .  .,  and  the 
whole  AC  =18765.8  ;  whereas  AB  +  BC  («>.  the  coasting  voyage)  =  19200 
stades  (a  difference  of  434.2  stades,  not  500).  Add  to  this  the  3000  from  the 
Peloponnese  to  the  Straits,  the  total  coast  voyage  is  23,200  stades,  as  against 
Dicaearchus's  10.000. 

*  Strabo  quotes  this  reckoning  of  the  distance  from  the  Peloponnese  to  the 
head  of  the  Adriatic  to  prove  that  Polybius,  on  his  own  showing,  is  wrong  in 
admitting  that  this  distance  (8250  stades)  is  greater  than  that  from  the  Pelo- 
ponnese to  the  Pillars,  which  Dicaearchus  said  was  10,000  stades,  and  which 
Polybius  showed  to  be  18,765  stades  by  the  shortest  route. 


486  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  book 

people :  and  then,  quite  forgetting  he  has  said  this,  when 
taking  a  survey  of  the  whole  of  Spain,  he  nowhere  mentions 
the  Gauls.  .  .  .  The  length  of  Europe  is  less  than  that  of 
Libya  and  Asia  put  together  by  the  distance  between  the  sun- 
rise in  summer  and  at  the  point  of  the  equinox ;  for  the  source  of 
the  Tanais  is  at  the  former,  and  the  Pillars  are  at  the  western 
equinox,  and  between  them  lies  Europe,  while  Asia  occupies 
the  northern  semicircle  between  the  Tanais  and  equinoctial 
sunrise.  .  .  . 

Southern  Europe  is  divided  into  five  peninsulas — Iberia; 

Polybiuss  fivefold  Italy ;  a  third  ending  in  the  Capes  Malea  and 

division  of  the   Sunium,   in  which   are  included  Greece  and 

s^*!!r^o^^^^^y"^  ^"^  ^  P^  °^  Thrace;  a  fourth  called 

^to^he^threefoid  ^he   Thracian   Chersonese,    bounded    by    the 

dixision  of  Era-  strait  between  Sestos  and  Abydos ;  and  a  fifth 

tosihenes.  along  the  Cimmerian  Bosphorus  and  the  en- 
trance to  the  Maeotis.  .  .  . 

8.  In  the  sea  off  Lusitania  acorn-bearing  oaks  grow,  upon 
which  the  tunnies  feed  and  fatten  themselves,  which  may,  there- 
fore, well  be  called  sea-hogs,  as  they  feed  like  hogs  on  acorns. . . . 

These  acorns  are  sometimes  carried  by  the  tide  as  far  as 
the  coast  of  Latium,  unless  they  may  be  thought  to  be  the 
produce  of  Sardinia  or  neighbouring  islands.  .  .  . 

In  Lusitania  both  animals  and  man  are  extraordinarily 
productive,  owing  to  the  excellent  temperature  of  the  air ;  the 
fruits  never  wither ;  there  is  not  more  than  three  months  in 
the  year  in  which  roses,  white  violets  (or  gilly-fiowers),  and 
asparagus  do  not  grow;  while  the  fish  caught  in  its  sea  is 
far  superior  to  what  is  found  in  our  waters  for  quantity,  quality, 
and  beauty.  There,  too,  a  Sicilian  medimnus  of  barley  is 
sold  for  a  drachma,  and  one  of  wheat  for  nine  Alexandrine 
obols.  A  metreta  of  wine  costs  a  drachma,  and  a  good  kid 
or  hare  an  obol,  and  a  lamb  from  three  to  four  obols ;  a  fat 
pig  weighing  a  hundred  minae  costs  five  drachmae,  and  a 
sheep  two.  A  talent  of  figs  is  sold  for  three  obols,  a  calf 
for  five  drachmae,  a  draught -ox  for  ten.  The  flesh  of  wild 
animals  is  not  thought  worth  fixing  a  price  upon  at  all,  but  the 
people  give  it  to  each  other  for  nothing  and  as  a  present.^ .  .  . 

*  To  enable  the  reader  to  follow  this  list  of  prices,  a  short  table  is  here  sub- 


XXXI V  PORTUGAL  AND  SPAIN  487 

9.  The  Turduli  live  on  the  immediate  north  Tribes  in  Boetica. 
of  the  Turdetani.  .  .  . 

The  fertility  of  their  country  has  had  a  civilising  influence 
on  the  Turditani  and  on  their  Celtic  kinsfolk,  and  taught 
them  the  art  of  social  life.  .  .  . 

The  Pillars  are  at  either  side  of  the  straits.  .  .  . 

There  is  a  fountain  in  the  Heracleum  at  Gades,  the  water 
of  which    is  sweet  and  is  reached  by  steps. 
This  fountain  has  a  tide  which  rises  and  falls  ^  ^^^l^^  ^^ 
exactly  in  the  reverse  order  of  the  sea  tide. 
When  it  is  high  tide  at  sea  it  is  low  tide  in  the  fountain,  and 
high  in  the  fountain  when  it  is  low  at  sea.     The  explanation 
of  this  is  that  the  wind,  which  rises  from  the  bowels  of  the 
earth  to  the  surface,  is  prevented  from   finding   its   natural 
egress  when  the  earth  is  covered  with  water  at  the  rise  of  the 
tide,  and  being  thus  turned  back  into  the  interior  of  the  earth, 
it  stops  up  the  underground  channels  of  the  fountain  and 
produces  a  deficiency  of  water ;  but  when  the  earth  is  again 
uncovered,  the  wind  having  once  more  found  an  easy  egress, 
sets  the  veins  of  the  fountain  free  again,  and  the  water  spurts 
up  freely.  .  .  . 

There   are   very  large   silver  mines   about  twenty  stades 
from  New  Carthage,  extending  to  a  circuit  of  The  process  of 
four  hundred  stades,  in  which  forty  thousand  producing  silver 
men   are  continually  employed,  who  produce  ^"  ^®  "?'"^  ^^^ 
for  the  benefit  of  the  Roman  people  twenty-     ^^  ^  ' 

five  thousand  drachmae  a  day.  It  would  take  too  long  to 
describe  the  whole  process  of  working  them,  but  I  may  men- 
tion that  the  alluvial  soil  containing  the  silver  ore  is  first 
broken  up,  and  sifted  in  sieves  held  in  w^ater ;  that  then  the 
deposit  is  again  broken,  and  being  again  filtered  with  running 

joined  of  Greek  weights  and  money, — though  he  must  be  warned  that  values 
varied  at  different  times  and  pUices, — with  approximate  values  in  English 
weights  and  money. 

I  obol  =  j\j  oz.  =        I  shilling. 

6  obols         =    I  drachma  =     VV  o^«     •     •     •     9^' 
IOC  drachmae  =    x  mina        =15^02.     .  .     ;^3:i8:6. 

60  minae       =    i  talent       =     57  lbs.    .     .     .     L'^Zh- 
A  medimnus  =11  gals.  4  pts.  (dry  measure). 
A  metreta     =   8  gals.  5  pU.  (liquid  measimi). 


488  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  book 

water,  is  broken  a  third  time.     This  is  done  five  times ;  the 

fifth  deposit  is  smelted,  and,  the  lead  having  been  run  off, 

pure  silver  remains.  .  .  . 

The  Guadiana         '^^^  ^nas  and  Boetis  both  flow  from  Celti- 

and  Guadai-     beria,  their  streams  being  about  nine  hundred 

quivir.        stades  apart  .  .  . 
Among  other  cities  of  the  Vaccaei  and  Celtiberians  are 
Segesama  and  Intercatia.  .  .  . 

One  of  the  Iberian  kings  had  such  a  magnificent  and 

richly  furnished   palace,  that  he  rivalled   the 

^^^\^^"'    luxury  of  the  Phaeacians,  except  that  the  vessels 

standing  in  the  interior  of  the  house,  though 

made  of  gold  and  silver,  were  full  of  barley-wine.  .  .  . 

10.  From  the  Pyrenees  to  the  river  Narbo  the  country  is 

River  Aude.     ^^^  i  *^^  through  it  flow  the  Illeberis  and  Rus- 

The  Tech  and    cinus,  past  some  cities  of  the  same  name  in- 

the  Ruscino  or  habited  by  Celts.    In  this  plain  there  are  found 

what  are  called  underground  fish.  The  soil  is 
light,  and  produces  a  quantity  of  grass  called  agrosHs\  and  below 
this  soil  the  earth  is  sandy  for  a  depth  of  two  or  three  cubits, 
through  which  the  overflow  of  the  river  percolates ;  and  with 
this  water,  as  it  makes  its  way,  the  fish  also  get  below  the  soil 
to  feed,  for  they  are  exceedingly  fond  of  the  root  of  the 
agrostis^  and  have  thus  made  the  whole  plain  full  of  sub- 
A  mistake  of    terranean    fish,    which     people    dig    up    and 

Timaeus  as  to    take.    .    .    . 

the  Rhone.  'pj^g  Rhone  has  not  five,  but  two  mouths 

The  Liger  discharges  itself  between  the  Pictones  and  Nam- 

The  Loire  be-    ^itae.    There  was  in  ancient  times  an  emporium 

twcen  Poitou  and  on  this  river  called  Corbilo,  but  none  of  its  in- 

Nantes.    Coiron.  habitants,  nor  those  of  Massalia  or  Narbo,  could 

give  Scipio  ^  any  information  worth  mentioning  on  the  subject 

Britain  is  quite  ^^  Britain  when   questioned   by  him,  though 

unknown  to  the  they  were  the  most  important  cities  in  that  part 

southern  Gauls,  q^  ^he  country ;  and  yet  Pytheas  has  ventured 

on  all  those  stories  about  it.  .  .  . 

*  WTiich  member  of  the  Cornelian  gens  this  was  is  unknown.  He  appears 
to  have  been  at  Marseilles  in  the  4th  century  B.C.  inquiring  as  to  centres  of 
trade  open  to  Rome  in  rivalry  with  Carthage. 


XXXIV  THE  ALPS  489 

An  animal  is  produced  on  the  Alps  of  a  peculiar  form ;  its 
shape  is  that  of  a  stag  except  its  neck  and  coat,       ,p,    „„ 
which  resemble  that  of  a  he-goat.     Beneath  its 
chin  it  has  an  excrescence  about  a  span  long,  hairy  at  the  end, 
about  as  thick  as  a  colt's  tail.  .  .  . 

Near  Aquileia,  in  the  territory  of  the  Noric  Taurisci,  in  my 
own  time  a  gold  mine  was  discovered,  so  easy  to 
work,  that  by  scraping  away  the  surface  soil  for  ^  ^AqiSdl''^ 
two  feet,  gold  could  be  found  immediately.  The 
seam  of  gold  was  not  more  than  fifteen  feet ;  some  of  it  was 
found  unmixed  with  alloy  in  nuggets  of  the  size  of  a  bean  or 
lupine,  only  an  eig&th  of  it  disappearing  in  the  furnace ;  and 
some  wanted  more  elaborate  smelting,  but  would  still  pay 
thoroughly  welL  Accordingly,  on  the  Italians  joining  the 
barbarians  in  working  this  mine,  in  two  months  the  price  of 
gold  went  down  a  third  throughout  Italy :  and  when  the 
Taurisci  found  out  that,  they  expelled  their  Italian  fellow- 
workers  and  kept  the  monopoly  themselves.  .  .  . 

If    we    compare    the    mountains    in   Greece — Taygetus, 
Lycaeus,  Parnassus,  Olympus,   Pelion,   Ossa,   and   those   in 
Thrace — Haemus,    Rhodope,    Dunax,    with    the    Alps,    we 
may  state  the  case  thus.     Each  one  of  the  former  may  be 
ascended  or  skirted  by  an  active  traveller  in  a  single  day  ;  but 
no  one  could  ascend  the  Alps  even  in  five  days,  the  distance 
from  the  plain  being  two  thousand  two  hundred  r^^^  ^^^ 
stades.    There  are  but  four  passes,  one  through  of  the  Alps,— the 
Liguria,  nearest  the  T)nThenian  Sea ;  the  next  Cornice,  Argen- 
through  the  Taurini,  which  was  the  one  used  ^fl^  Genivre(yai 

.       ^x  L   1         t         I-   J     .  1     .1       ^  T       •     d  Aosta),  Cenis. 

by  Hannibal;    the  third  through  the  Salassi; 

and  the  last  by  the  Rhaeti,^  all  of  them  excessively  precipitous. 

There  are  several  lakes  in  the  mountains,  three 

of  great  size,  the  Benacus,  five  hundred  by  one  l^|°  ^|  coma 

hundred  and  thirty  stades,  out  of  which  the 

Mincius  flows;    the   Larius,   four  hundred  stades  long,  and 

somewhat  narrower  than  the  Benacus,  discharging  the  Addua ; 

and  thirdly,  the  Verbanus,  about  three  hundred  -^  . . 

stades   by   thirty,  from   which    comes   a  con- 

*  Varro  [Serv,  ad  y£n,  10,  13)  adds  a  fifth  by  the  Graian  Alps,  i.g.  Little 
St.  Bernard. 


»>  inc. 


I 


The  length  of 
straits   is  tlircc  thousand  stadcs 
the   Sic  i Han   sea.      Sailing,  howc 
five  hundred  stades.  .  .  . 

The  largest  distance  of  the  Et 
Ostia,  a  distance  of  one  thousan 
stades.^.  .  . 

The  island  Lemnos  is  called  A> 
The  bay  between  the  two  pro 
Minerva    is    called 
■^"aST'     Above  this  coast  lit 
the  most  fertile  plaii 
the  Bowl  live  the  Opici  and  the  Aui 

Eastern  coast.  '^^^    north    road 

road  from  s.  to  marked  out  with  mil 
N.  of  Italy.     jQ  Sena,  and  one  hui 
to  Aquileia.  .  .  . 

Then  comes  Lacinium  .  .  .  fron 
is  a  distance  of  one 
stades,  and  thence  to 


The  Lacinian 
promontory. 


seven  hundred  .  .  . 
Of  the  three  craters  one  has  pan 
_.       ....   remain  perfect.      Tl 

The  craters  m  the      .^         f, 

volcanic  Holy    onfice  With  a  circumi 

Island  one  of  the  it  gradual ^^  o^-* 
Lipari  sroitr* 


XXXIV  THE  VIA  EGNATIA  491 

difference  in  the  sound  of  the  rumbling,  and  by  observing  from 
what  point  the  eruptions  and  flames  and  smoke  begin,  the 
wind  which  is  to  blow  on  the  third  day  from  that  time  can  be 
foretold  At  least,  some  men  in  the  Lipari  Islands  when 
weather-bound  have  foretold  what  wind,  was  coming  and  have 
not  been  deceived.  Therefore,  it  appears  that  Homer  did  not 
speak  without  meaning,  but  was  stating  a  truth  allegorically 
when  he  called  Aeolus  ^  *'  steward  of  the  winds."  .  .  . 

12.  The  road  from  ApoUonia  to  Macedonia  is  called  the 
Via  Egnaiia,  which  has  been  measiired  in  miles 
and  marked   out   with   milestones    as   far  as     ®    *^  ^ 
Cypselus  and  the  River  Hebrus,  a  distance  of  five  hundred 
and  thirty- five  miles.     Reckoning  eight  and  one- third  stades 
to   a    mile,  the    number    of  stades   will  be   four  thousand 
four   hundred    and   fifty -eight^      The   distance    is   exactly 
the  same  whether  you  start  from  Apollonia  or  Epidamnus. 
The   whole   road   is   called   the  Egnatia,    but   its  first   part 
has  got  a  name  from  Candavia,  a  mountain  of  lUyria,  and 
leads  through   the  town  of  Lycnidus,   and   through  Pylon, 
which  is  the  point  on  the  road  where  lUyria  and  Macedonia 
join.     Thence   it   leads   over   Mount  Bamus,     ,-^      .    . 
through  Heracleia,  Lyncestia,  and  Eordea,  to  half-way  to  the 
Edessa  and  Pella,  and  finally  to  Thessalonica ;     Hebrus  from 
and   the   number   of  miles  is   altogether  two      Apoiioma. 
hundred  and  sixty-seven.  .  .  .  And  the  whole  distance  from 
the  Ionian  Gulf  at  Apollonia  to  Byzantium  is  seven  thousand 
^vt  hundred  stades.  .  .  . 

The  circumference  of  the  Peloponnesus,  if 
you  do   not   follow  the   indentations,  is    four        ^n^iST-" 
thousand  stades.  .  .  . 

The  distance  from  Cape  Malea  to  the  Ister  Fro"^  c.  Maiea 
is  ten  thousand  stades.^ ...  '"""^^  ^^^^- 

• 

^  The  islands  were  called  also  Vulcaniae  and  Aeoliae, 

'  Strabo  reckons  8  stades  to  a  mile,  thus  making  the  number  of  stades 
4280.  The  exact  calculation  by  Polybius's  reckoning  is  4458^  stades.  The 
miles  are  Roman  miles  of  5000  feet ;  therefore,  by  Strabo* s  calculation,  the 
stade  is  625  feet,  by  Polybius's  600  feet. 

'  Strabo,  however,  supports  the  measurement  of  Artemidorus — 6500,  ex- 
plaining that  Polybius  is  taking  some  practical  measurement  of  a  voyage,  not 
the  shortest. 


492  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YB I  US      book  xxxiv 

18.  On  matters  concerning  the  country  between  the 
Euphrates  and  India,  Eratosthenes  is  a  better  authority  than 
Artemidorus.  ... 

14.  A  personal  visit  to  Alexandria  filled  me  with  disgust 
at  the  state  of  the  city.     It  is  inhabited  by  three 

Alexandria,  distinct  races, — native  Egyptians,  an  acute  and 
civilised  race ;  secondly,  mercenary  soldiers  (for 
the  custom  of  hiring  and  supporting  men-at-arms  is  an  ancient 
one),  who  have  learnt  to  rule  rather  than  obey  owing  to  the 
feeble  character  of  the  kings ;  and  a  third  class,  consisting  of 
native  Alexandrians,  who  have  never  from  the  same  cause 
become  properly  accustomed  to  civil  life,  but  who  are  yet 
better  than  the  second  class;  for  though  they  are  now  a 
mongrel  race,  yet  they  were  originally  Greek,  and  have  retained 
some  recollection  of  Greek  principles.  But  this  last  class  has 
become  almost  extinct,  thanks  to  Euergetes  Physcon,  in  whose 
reign  I  visited  Alexandria ;  for  that  king  being  troubled  with 
seditions,  frequently  exposed  the  common  people  to  the  fury 
of  the  soldiery  and  caused  their  destruction.  So  that  in  this 
state  of  the  city  the  poet's  words  only  expressed  the  truth — '^ 

**To  Egypt  *tis  a  long  and  toilsome  road." 
*  Homer,  Odyss.  4,  485. 


BOOK   XXXV 

Spain,  the  eastern  and  southern  parts  of  which  were,  since  the  2d  Punic 
war,  governed  by  the  Romans  under  a  kind  of  military  occupation  without 
being  reduced  to  the  form  of  regular  provinces,  was  always  in  a  disturbed 
state,  partly  from  sudden  uprisings  of  various  tribes  against  the  Roman 
authority,  and  partly  from  numerous  bodies  of  banditti,  who  seized  strong- 
holds or  fortified  towns  and  carried  on  their  depredations  from  these 
centres.  Hence  it  had  been  the  policy  of  the  Roman  praetors  and  consuls 
to  insist  on  the  demolition  of  fortresses  and  city  walls,  as  we  learn  from 
the  accounts  of  Cato  in  B.C.  195  and  others.  In  B.C.  177  Tiberius 
■  Sempronius  Gracchus  had  inflicted  a  severe  defeat  upon  the  Celtiberians,  and 
had  made  a  settlement  of  the  country,  which  for  a  few  years  produced 
comparative  quiet  and  content.  But  in  B.C.  154  an  outbreak  of  the 
Lusitani  led  to  a  considerable  disaster  to  the  Roman  army  under  Lucius 
Mummius ;  and  when  the  consul  Q.  Fulvius  Nobilior  arrived  in  B.C.  1 53,  be 
found  that  the  war  had  accordingly  spread  to  the  Celtiberian  tribes,  the 
Belli  and  Titthi,  who  attempted  to  build  the  walls  of  Segeda.  On 
Nobilior  ordering  them  to  desist,  in  accordance  with  Gracchan  settlement, 
most  of  them  obeyed  after  some  resistance,  but  some  of  them  fled  to  the 
Arevacae  (near  the  sources  of  the  Douro  and  Tagus) ;  and  this  powerful 
tribe,  after  defeating  the  Roman  army,  entrenched  themselves  in  Numantia, 
under  the  walls  of  which  Nobilior  sustained  further  losses.  He  was  super> 
seded  in  B.C.  152  by  Marcus  Claudius  Marcellus,  who,  partly  by  strategy, 
and  partly  by  administrative  skill  and  conciliation,  restored  the  Roman 
fortunes  to  a  better  position.  The  Belli  and  Titthi  became  allies  of 
Rome,  and  the  Arevacae  at  least  thought  it  worth  while  to  ask  for  a  truce 
to  enable  them  to  send  envoys  to  Rome  to  arrange  peace. — Appian, 
Hispan.  44-50. 

1.  The  war  between  the  Romans  and  Celtiberians  was 
called  the  "  fiery  war ; "  for  it  was  of  a  pecu- 
liarly fierce  kind  and  remarkable  for  the  fre-    ?;5-  *53->5\- 

•  Tiie  war  with 

quency  of  its  battles.     The  wars  m  Greece  and  t^g  ccitiberian 
Asia  were  as  a  rule  settled  by  one  battle,  or  in   Arevacae  con- 
rare  cases  by  two ;  and  the  battles  themselves  p^i"^*^J^$* 
were  decided  by  the  result  of  the  first  charge  and  M.  Claudius 
and  shock  of  the  two  armies.     But  in  this  war      Marcellus. 


494  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  book 

things  were  quite  different  As  a  rule  the  battles  were 
only  stopped  by  the  fall  of  night ;  the  men  neither  lost  heart 
nor  would  yield  to  bodily  fatigue;  but  returned  again  and 
again  with  fresh  resolution  to  renew  the  combat  The  whole 
war,  and  its  series  of  pitched  battles,  was  at  length  interrupted 
for  a  time  by  the  winter.  One  therefore  could  hardly  con- 
ceive a  war  more  nearly  answering  to  our  notion  of  a  "  fiery 
war "  than  this.  .  .  . 

2.  The  Celtiberians,  after  making  a  truce  with  the  consul 

.        M.    Claudius    Marcellus,   had    sent    ambassa- 

Marceiius  winters  ^ors   to   Rome   who   remained    there   quietly 

at  Cordova,     waiting  for  the  answer  of  the  Senate.     Mean- 

B.C  152-151.    while   M.    Claudius   went    on    an   expedition 

against  the  Lusitani,  took  Nercobrica  by  assault,  and  then 

went  into  winter  quarters  at  Corduba.     Of  the  ambassadors 

who  came  to  Rome  the  Senate  admitted  those 

of  Rome,  to  enter  the  city ;  but  ordered  those 
from  the  Arevacae  to  lodge  on  the  other  side  of  the  Tiber,  as 
being  at  war  with  Rome,  until  such  time  as  the  Senate  should 
have  decided  the  whole  question.  When  the  time  for  the 
interview  was  come,^  the  praetor  introduced  the  envoys  from 

their  allies  first     Barbarians  as  they  were,  they 

BeiiTand  Tiithi   ^^^^  ^  ^et  speech,  and  endeavoured  to  explain 

clearly  the  causes  of  all  the  dissension  prevail- 
ing in  their  country:  pointing  out  that  "  Unless  those  who  had 
broken  out  into  war  were  reduced  to  tranquillity  and  punished 
as  they  deser\'ed,  the  very  moment  the  Roman  legions  left 
Iberia,  they  would  inflict  punishment  upon  the  Belli  and 
Titthi  as  traitors  ;  and  that  if  they  escaped  unpunished  for  their 
first  act  of  hostility,  they  would  make  all  the  tribes  in  Iberia 
ripe  for  an  outbreak  from  the  belief  that  they  were  capable  of 
coping  with  Rome.  They  begged,  therefore,  that  the  legions 
should  remain  in  Iberia,  and  that  each  year  a  consul  should 
come  thither  2  to  protect  the  allies  of  Rome  and  punish  the 

*  Probably  in  February,  the  month  usually  devoted  by  the  Senate  to  lega- 
Hones. 

^  Since  B.C.  195  up  to  B.C.  154  the  two  divisions  of  Spain  had  been  en- 
trusted to  Praetors. 


XXXV  THE  CELTIBERIAN  WARS  495 

depredations  of  the  Arevacae ;  or,  if  they  wished  to  withdraw 
the  legions,  they  should  first  take  signal  vengeance  for  the  out- 
break of  this  tribe,  that  no  one  might  venture  to  do  the  like 
again."  Such,  or  to  this  effect,  was  the  speech  of  the  envoys 
of  the  Belli  and  Titthi  who  were  in  alliance  with  Rome.  The 
envoys  of  the  hostile  tribe  were  then  introduced  On  coming 
forward  the  Arevacae  assumed  a  feigned  tone  ^^^  Arevacae 
of  submission  and  humility  in  the  language  of 
their  answer,  without  being,  as  was  evident,  at  all  yielding  in  their 
hearts  or  acknowledging  themselves  beaten.  On  the  contrary, 
they  continually  hinted  at  the  uncertainty  of  fortune;  and 
speaking  of  the  battles  that  had  taken  place  as  undecided,  they 
conveyed  the  impression  that  they  had  had  the  best  of  the 
contest  in  them  all.  The  upshot  of  their  speech  was  this : 
"  If  they  must  submit  to  some  definite  mulct  for      ,        ,  . 

-     .        •'        ,  ,  ,  .  ,  demand  the 

their  error,  they  were  ready  to  do  so  :  but,  when    settlement  of 
that  was  completed,  they  demanded  that  things        Tiberius 
should  revert  to   the   position   fixed  by  their      Gracdius. 
treaty  made  with  the  Senate  in  the  time  of 
Tiberius  Gracchus." 

8.  The  Senators  having  thus  heard  both  sides  called 
in  the  legates  from  Marcellus ;  and  when  xhe  Senate  refer 
they  saw  that  they  also  were  inclined  to  a  both  the  deputa- 
pacification,  and  that  Marcellus  was  more  ^^^'^^  *°  ^^^^"*' 
inclined  to  favour  the  enemy  than  the  allied  tribes,  they 
answered  the  Arevacae  that  Marcellus  would  declare  in  Iberia 
to  both  parties  the  decision  of  the  Senate.  However,  they 
were  convinced  in  their  own  minds  that  their  true  interests 
were  such  as  the  envoys  of  the  allied  tribes  suggested,  and 
that  .the  Arevacae  were  still  inclined  to  haughty  independ- 
ence, and  that  their  own  commander  was  afraid  of  them : 
they  therefore  gave  secret  instructions  to  the   .  ,    . 

.        but  secretly  de- 

legates  of  Marcellus  to  carry  on  the  war  with  termine  to  go  on 
spirit,  and  as  the  honour  of  the  country  de-  with  the  war  and 
manded.     But  when  they  had  thus  determined     to  supersede 

ivlarccllus 

on  a  continuance  of  the  war,  feeling  no  con- 
fidence in  Marcellus,  they  determined  first  of  all  to  send  a 
commander  to  relieve  him  in  Iberia,  as  the       g  ^  151. 
new    consuls   Aulus    Postumius    and    Lucius     Coss.  Lucius 


496  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS  book 

Licinius  Lucuiius,  Licinius    Lucullus   had    just   taken   up    their 
Auius  Postumius   ^^^     jj^       ^j^^j^   entered   with    spirit  and 

Vigour  on  then:  preparations,  because  they 
believed  that  the  Iberian  question  would  be  decided  by  the 
result  of  this  campaign :  if  these  enemies  were  beaten,  they 
assumed  that  all  others  would  accept  the  orders  of  Rome; 
but  that,  if  the  Ar^vacae  proved  able  to  ward  off  the  punish- 
ment that  threatened  them,  not  only  would  their  spirits  be 
again  raised,  but  those  of  all  the  other  Iberian  tribes  besides. 
4.  The  more  determined  however  the  Senate  was  to  carry  on 
the  war,  the  greater  became  their  embarrassment. 

Rome  made  men  Nobilior,  the  commander  in  Iberia  in  the  pre- 
use  every  pretext  vious  year  (b.c.  1 5  3),  and  those  who  had  served 
i^l^rihiTfr^""  under  him,  of  the  perpetual  recurrence  of  the 

vice  m  the  army.     .     ,      ,   ,       ,  ,  .  ..    ,       i-  ,1  ^ 

pitched  battles,  the  number  of  the  fallen,  and 
the  valour  of  the  Celtiberians,  combined  with  the  notorious 
fact  that  Marcellus  shrank  in  terror  from  the  war,  caused  such 
a  panic  in  the  minds  of  the  new  levies  as  the  old  men  declared 
had  never  happened  before.  To  such  an  extent  did  the  panic 
go,  that  sufficient  men  were  not  found  to  come  forward  for  the 
office  of  military  tribune,  and  these  posts  were  consequently 
not  entirely  filled  up;  whereas  heretofore  a  larger  number 
than  were  wanted  had  been  wont  to  volunteer  for  the  duty : 
nor  would  the  men  nominated  by  the  Consuls  as  Ugati  to 
accompany  the  commanders  consent  to  serve ;  and,  worst  of 
all,  the  young  men  tried  to  avoid  the  levies,  and  put  forward 
such  excuses  as  were  disgraceful  for  them  to  allege,  and 
beneath  the  investigation  of  the  Consuls,  and  yet  impossible 
to  refute.  But  at  length,  in  this  embarrassment  of  the  Senate 
and  magistrates,  when  they  were  wondering  what  was  to  be 
Scipio  volunteers  the  end  of  this  shameless  conduct  of  the  young 
to  act  as  legatus  men,  for  they  could  call  it  nothing  else,  Publius 
or  tribune.  Cornelius  Scipio  Africanus,  who,  though  still  a 
young  man,  had  been  one  of  those  to  advise  the  war,  and 
who,  though  he  had  already  acquired  a  reputation  for  high 
principle  and  pure  morality,  had  not  been  known  for  his 
personal  courage,  seeing  the  Senate  was  in  a  difficulty,  stood 
up  and   bade  them  send  him  to   Iberia,  either  as  military 


XXXV  SCIPIO   VOLUNTEERS  FOR  SPAIN  497 

tribune  or  legatus,  for  he  was  ready  to  serve  in  either  capacity. 
"  Though,  as  far  as  I  am  concerned,"  he  said,  "  my  mission 
to  Macedonia  would  be  safer  and  more  appropriate  " — for  it 
happened  that  at  that  time  Scipio  was  personally  and  by  name  in- 
vited by  the  Macedonians  to  come  and  settle  the  disputes  which 
were  raging  among  them — "  yet  the  needs  of  my  own  country 
are  the  more  pressing  of  the  two,  and  imperatively  summon 
to  Iberia  all  who  have  a  genuine  love  of  honour."  This  offer 
was  unexpected  by  all,  both  from  the  youth  of  xhis  offer  shames 
Scipio  and  his  general  character  for  caution,  others  into  doing 
and  consequently  he  became  exceedingly  popu-  *^®  ^^"*®- 
lar  on  the  spot,  and  still  more  so  on  subsequent  days.  For 
those  who  had  before  shrunk  from  the  danger  of  the  service, 
now,  from  dislike  of  the  sorry  figure  they  made  in  comparison 
with  him,  began  volunteering  to  serve.  Some  offered  to  go  as 
Ugati  to  the  generals,  and  others  in  groups  and  clubs  entered 
their  names  on  the  muster  rolls.  .  .  . 

Lucius  Lucinius  Lucullus,  consul  for  b.c.  151,  is  sent  to 
Spain,  Scipio  Aemilianus  acting  as  his  legatus,  Tluy  found  that 
the  Arevacae  had  already  submitted  to  Marcellus  ;  but  being  in 
want  of  money  Lucullus  was  determined  not  to  be  deprived  of  a 
campaign.  He  therefore  attacked  the  next  tribe,  the  Vaccaei, 
who  lived  on  the  other  side  of  the  Tagus,  nominally  on  the  pre- 
text of  their  having  injured  the  Carpetani,  The  war  which 
followed  was  marked  by  signal  acts  of  cruelty  and  treachery  on 
the  part  of  Lucullus,  as  on  that  of  the  praetor  Sennus  Sulpicius 
Galba  among  the  Lusitani.     Appian,  Hisp.  49-55. 

5.  In  Scipio's  mind  there  rose  a  contest  of  feelings,  and 
a  hesitation  as  to  whether  he  ought   to  meet     incidents  in 
the   barbarian   and   fight  him  in  single  com-  Scipio's  Spanish 

bat.^  .  campaign. 

Scipio's  horse  was  much  distressed  by  the  blow,  but 
did  not  come  down  entirely,  and  accordingly  Scipio  managed 
to  light  on  his  feet  .  .  . 

6.  Cato  was  consulted  by  Scipio,  at  the  request  of  Polybius, 
on  behalf  of  the  Achaeans;  and  when  the  debate  in  the 
Senate,  between  the  party  who  wished  to  grant  it  and  the 

*  Livy,  Ep.  48.     PravoccUorem  barbarum  tribunus  militutn  occidit. 
VOL.   II  2  K 


498 


THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS 


BOOK  XXXY 


party  that  opposed  it,  was  protracted  to  a  considerable  length, 
Restoration  of  the  Cato  stood  up  and  Said :  "  As  though  we  had 
Achaean  detenus,  nothing  else  to  do,  we  Sit  here  the  whole  day 
B.C.  151.  debating  whether  some  old  Greek  dotards  should 
be  buried  by  Italian  or  Achaean  undertakers ! "  Their  resto- 
ration being  voted,  Polybius  and  his  friends,  after  a  few  days' 
interval,  were  for  appearing  before  the  Senate  again,  with  a 
petition  that  the  exiles  should  enjoy  the  same  honours  in 
Achaia  as  they  had  before.  Cato,  however,  remarked  with  a 
smile  that  Polybius,  like  another  Odysseus,  wanted  to  go  a 
second  time  into  the  cave  of  the  Cyclops,  because  he  had 
forgotten  his  cap  and  belt  .  .  . 


BOOK  XXXVI 

THE   THIRD    PUNIC   WAR 

1.  It  may  occur  to  some  to  ask  why  I  have  not  given  a 
dramatic  turn  to  my  narrative,  now  that  I  have  ,^    . 

..  .  .  ^       ,  i_.     .     /.         t_  •       The  dramatic  re- 

so  Striking  a  theme  and  a  subject  of  such  im-  presentation  of 
portance,  by  recording  the  actual  speeches  debates  though 
deUvered;  a  thing  which  the  majority  of  ^°"^^°^^^*  **  °°* 
historians  have  done,  by  giving  the  appropriate 
arguments  used  on  either  side.  That  I  do  not  reject  this 
method  altogether  I  have  shown  in  several  parts  of  my  work, 
in  which  I  have  recorded  popular  harangues  and  expositions 
delivered  by  statesmen ;  but  that  I  am  not  inclined  to  employ 
it  on  every  occasion  alike  will  now  be  made  clear;  for  it 
would  not  be  easy  to  find  a  subject  more  remarkable  than 
this,  nor  material  more  ample  for  instituting  a  comparison  of 
such  a  character.  Nor  indeed  could  any  form  of  composition 
be  more  convenient  to  me.  Still,  as  I  do  not  think  it  becom- 
ing in  statesmen  to  be  ready  with  argument  and  exposition  on 
every  subject  of  debate  without  distinction,  but  rather  to  adapt 
their  speeches  to  the  nature  of  the  particular  occasion,  so  neither 
do  I  think  it  right  for  historians  to  practise  their  skill  or 
show  off  their  ability  upon  their  readers :  they  ought  on  the 
contrary  to  devote  their  whole  energies  to  discover  and  record 
what  was  really  and  truly  said,  and  even  of  such  words  only 
those  that  are  the  most  opportune  and  essential.  .  .  . 

2.  This  idea  having  been  firmly  fixed  in  the  minds  of  all, 
they  looked  out  for  a  suitable  opportunity  and 
a  decent  pretext  to  justify  them  in  the  eyes  of  '^^  Romans  were 
the   world.       For    indeed   the   Romans   ^^re '^J'^^l^^^}^^^ 
quite  rightly  very  careful  on  this  point.     For         war. 


500  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  book 

instance,   the  general  impression  that  they  were  justified  in 
entering  upon  the  war  with  Demetrius  enhances  the  value  of 
their  victories,  and  diminishes  the  risks  incurred  by  their  de- 
feats ;  but  if  the  pretext  for  doing  so  is  lame  and 
'  poor  the  contrary  effects  are  produced.    Accord- 

ingly, as  they  differed  as  to  the  sentiments  of  the  outer  world 
on  the  subject,  they  were  very  nearly  abandoning  the  war.  .  .  . 

The  policy  of  Rome  in  Africa  of  constantly  supporting  Mas- 
sanissa  against  Carthage  was  mentioned  in  32,  2.  Frequent 
complaints  came  to  Rome  from  the  Numidian  king^  and  the 
Carthaginians  were  said  to  be  collecting  an  army  contrary  to 
treaty.  Commissioners  were  sent  over  in  154  B.C.  on  the  advice 
of  CatOy  7vho  were  roughly  treated  at  Carthage ;  and  when^  in 
B.C.  151,  Massanissa  sent  his  son  Gulussa  with  similar  com- 
plaints to  Rofne,  Cato  urged  immediate  war.  The  Senate^  how- 
ei'er^  again  sent  commissioners ^  among  whom  was  Cato  himself 
to  cxamitu  into  the  matter.  They  reported  that  the  Cartha- 
ginians had  an  army  and  nervy.  An  ultimatum  was  therefore 
sent,  that  the  army  and  navy  were  to  be  broken  up  within  the 
year,  or  that  the  next  consuls  should  bring  the  question  of  war 
before  the  Senate  (b.c.  150).  Just  at  this  crisis  Utica^  in 
enmity  with  Carthage,  placed  itself  under  the  protection  of 
Rome,     Livy,  Ep.  48;  Appian,  Pun.  75. 

8.  When  the  Carthaginians  had  been  some  time  deliberating 

B.C.  149.       ^^^  *^^y  should  meet  the  message  from  Rome 

Utica  puts  itself  they  were  reduced  to   a  state  of  the  utmost 

under  the  pro-    embarrassment  by  the  people  of  Utica  anticipatini; 

tection  of  Rome.  -i.   •    j     •       u       ^4.-       *.u  i  j      ^iT 

their  design  by  putting  themselves  under  the  pro- 
tection of  Rome.     This  seemed  their  only  hope  of  safety  left : 
and  they  imagined  that  such  a  step  must  win  them  favour  at 
Rome :  for  to  submit  to  put   themselves  and  their  country 
under  control  was  a  thing  which  they  had  never  done  even  in 
their  darkest  hour  of  danger  and  defeat,  with  the  enemy  at 
their  very  walls.     And  now  they  had  lost  all  the  fruit  of  this 
Carthaginian    rcsolve  by  being  anticipated  by  the  people  of 
plenipotentiaries  Utica ;  for  it  would  appear  nothing  novel  or 
at  Rome.       strange  to  the  Romans  if  they  only  did  the  same 
as  that  people.     Accordingly,  with  a  choice  of  two  evils  only 


XXXVI     IVAR  WITH  CARTHAGE  RESOLVED  UPON  501 

left,  to  accept  war  with  courage  or  to  surrender  their  independ- 
ence, after  a  long  and  anxious  discussion  held  secretly  in  the 
Senate-house,  they  appointed  two  ambassadors  with  plenary 
powers,  and  instructed  them,  that,  in  view  of  the  existing  state 
of  things,  they  should  do  what  seemed  for  the  advantage  of 
their  country.  The  names  of  these  envoys  were  Cisco 
Strytanus,  Hamilcar,  Misdes,  Gillimas,  and  Mago.  When 
they  reached  Rome  from  Carthage,  they  found  war  already 
decreed  and  the  generals  actually  started  with  their  forces. 
Circumstances,  therefore,  no  longer  giving  them  any  power  of 
deliberating,  they  offered  an  unconditional  surrender. 

4.  I  have  spoken  before  about  what  this  implies,  but  I 
must  in  this  place  also  briefly  remind  my  readers  ^hat  is  implied 
of  its  import.     Those  who  thus  surrender  them- by  their  surrender. 
selves  to  the  Roman  authority,  surrender  all    ^^  ^°'  ^'^^' 
territory  and  the  cities  in  it,  together  with  all  men  and  women 
in  all  such  territory  or  cities,  likewise  rivers,  harbours,  temples, 
and  tombs,  so  that  the  Romans  should  become  actual  lords  of 
all  these,  and  those  who  surrender  should  remain  lords  of 
nothing  whatever.     On  the  Carthaginians  making  a  surrender 
to  this  eflect,  they  were  summoned  into  the  Senate-house  and 
the  Praetor  delivered  the  Senate's  decision,  which  was  to  this 
effect :    "  They  had   been   well   advised,    and   -Yh^  senate  re- 
therefore  the  Senate  granted  them  freedom  and  gram  their  liberty 
the  enjoyment  of  their  laws ;  and  moreover,  all  ^-^^  territory  to 
their  territory  and  the  possession  of  their  other  *  ^         agimans. 
property,  public  or  private."     The  Carthaginian  envoys  were 
much  relieved  when  they  heard  this ;  thinking  that,  where  the 
alternatives   were   both   miserable,    the   Senate   had    treated 
them  well  in  conceding  their  most  necessary  and  important 
requirements.     But  presently  the  Praetor  went  but  on  condition 
on  to  state  that  they  would  enjoy  these  con-    ^^  pv»"S  300 
cessions  on  condition  of  sending  three  hundred  oteykig^crtain 
hostages  to  Lilybaeum  within  thirty  days,  sons    orders  not  yet 
of  members  of  the  Hundred  ^  or  the  Senate,  and      expressed, 
obeying  such  commands  as  should  be  imposed  on  them  by  the 

^  rwv  ix  ffvyKk-fyrov  koX  -nyj  y€f>o\Hrlai,  The  same  distinction  occurs  in 
lo,  18,  and  seems  to  refer  to  the  two  bodies  known  as  the  Hundred  and 
the  Gerusia.     See  Bosworth  Smith's  Carthage  and  the  Carthaginians,  p.  27. 


va  THE  m STORIES  OF  POLYBiUS  ■«« 

cocscls.  Tnis  dished  thdr  qfwfiftion  for  a  tnne,  because 
they  had  no  means  of  knowing  vhat  onias  were  to  be  ghren 
them  throogh  the  coosck;  however,  thej  started  at  once, 
bein^  anxiocs  to  report  what  had  occmied  to  their  coantrymen 
wid)  ail  speed,  ^^lien  they  armed  in  Cardiage  and  stated  the 
iacts,  the  citizens  considered  that  the  envoys  had  in  aD  respects 
acted  with  pcx>per  camion ;  but  they  were  greatly  alarmed  and 
distressed  bv  the  (act  that  in  the  answer  no  mention  was  made 
of  the  city  itself. 

6.  At  this  juncture  they  say  that  Mago  Brettius  delirered  a 

manly  and   statesmanlike  speech.      He  said: 
^P^'JI^*^  "The  Carthaginians  had  two  qf^rtunities  of 

taking  counsel  in  regard  to  themselves  and  their 
country,  one  of  which  they  had  let  pass ;  for  in  good  truth  it 
was  no  use  now  to  question  what  was  goit^  to  be  en- 
joined on  them  by  the  consuls,  and  why  it  was  that  the 
Senate  had  made  no  mention  of  the  city :  they  shotild  have 
done  that  when  they  made  the  surrender.  Having  once  made 
that,  they  must  clearly  make  up  their  mind  to  the  necessity  of 
submitting  to  every  possible  injunction,  unless  it  should  prove 
to  be  something  unbearably  oppressive  or  beyond  what  they 
could  possibly  expect  If  they  would  not  do  this,  they  must 
now  consider  whether  they  preferred  to  stand  an  invasion  and 
all  its  possible  consequences,  or,  in  terror  of  the  attack  of  the 
enemy,  accept  without  resistance  every  order  they  might  impose 

upon  them."  But  as  the  imminence  of  war  knd 
Jnuo^!ily^um!  f^^  uncertainty  of  the  future  made  every  one 

inclined  to  submit  to  these  injunctions,  it 
was  decided  to  send  the  hostages  to  Lilybaeum.  Three 
hundred  young  men  were  forthwith  selected  and  sent  to  Lily- 
baeum amidst  loud  expressions  of  sorrow  and  tears,  each  of 
them  being  escorted  by  his  nearest  friends  and  relations,  the 
whole  scene  being  made  especially  moving  by  the  lamentations 
of  the  women.  On  landing  at  Lilybaeum  the  hostages  were 
at  once  handed  over  by  the  consuls  to  Quintus  Fabius 
Maximus,  who  had  been  appointed  to  the  command  in  Sicily 
at  that  time.  By  him  they  were  safely  conveyed  to  Rome  and 
confined  in  the  dockyard  of  the  six-benched  ships. 

6.  I'hc    hostages    being    thus    disposed   of,    the    consuls 


XXXVI  THE  ROMAN  ARMY  IN  AFRICA  503 

brought  their  fleet  to  the  citadel  of  Utica.     When  news  of  this 
reached  Carthage,  the  city  was  in  the  utmost  ex-  ^ 
citement  and  panic,  not  knowing  what  to  expect  Marcius  Censori- 
next     However,  it  was  decided  to  send  envoys  nus.  M*.  ManiUus, 
to  ask  the  consuls  what  they  were  to  do,  and  to  ^^^  *"  Afnca. 
state  that  they  were  all  prepared  to  obey  orders. 
The  envoys  arrived  at  the  Roman  camp:  the  general's  council  was 
summoned :  and  they  delivered  their  commission.    The  senior 
Consul  thereupon,  after  complimenting  them  on  xhey  demand  the 
their  policy  and  readiness  to  obey,  bade  them  total  disarming  of 
hand  over  all  arms  and  missiles  in  their  posses- ^^^^^^^fi:*'**^'^^* 
sion  without  subterfuge  or  concealment     The  envoys  answered 
that  they  would  carry  out  the  directions,  but  begged  the  Consul 
to  consider  what  would  happen  if  the  Carthaginians  surrendered 
all  their  arms,  and  the  Romans  took  them  and  sailed  away  from 
the  country.     However,  they  gave  them  up.  .  .  . 

It  was  clearly  shown  that  the  resources  of  the  city  were 
enormous,  for  they  surrendered  to  the  Romans  more  than 
two  hundred  thousand  stands  of  arms  and  two  thousand 
catapults.  .  .  . 

This  was  followed  by  a  second  injunction  of  the  consuls  that 
the  whole  people  of  Carthage  should  remove  to  some  other  spot,  to 
be  not  less  than  ten  miles  from  the  sea,  and  there  build  a  new 
city,     Livy,  Ep.  49. 

7.  The  people  had  no  idea  what  the  announce-    Return  of  the 
ment  was  going  to  be,  but  suspecting  it  from  envoys  with  the 
the  expression  of  the  envoys'  countenances,  they  '^^  orders  from 
immediately  burst  into  a  storm  of  cries  and 
lamentations.  .  .  . 

Then  all  the  Senators,^  uttering  a  cry  of  horror,  re- 
mained as  though  paralysed  by  the  shock.     But  ,-^  ,    , 

,  .       •  •  1  I  J  *     The  popular  fury. 

the  report  havmg  quickly  spread  among  the 
people,  the  general  indignation  at  once  found  expression. 
Some  made  an  attack  on  the  envoys,  as  the  guilty  authors  of 
their  misfortunes,  while  others  wreaked  their  wrath  upon  all 
Italians  caught  within  the  city,  and  others  rushed  to  the  town 
gates.  .  .  . 

'  The  envoys  first  report  to  the  Gerusia     Appian,  Pun,  91. 


504  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS       book  xxxvi 

The  Carthaginians  determine  to  resist,  and  the  consuls,  who 
had  not  hurried  tfumselves,  because  they  believed  that  resistance 
from  an  unarmed  populace  was  impossible,  found,  when  they 
approcuhed  Carthage,  that  it  was  prepared  to  offer  a  vigorous 
resistance.  The  scene  which  followed  the  announcement  of  the 
Consufs  orders,  and  the  incidents  of  the  siege,  are  chiefly  known 
to  us  from  Appian,  Pun.  91  sq.  Livy,  Ep.  49.  Scipio  was 
serving  as  military  Tribune,  b.c.  149-148;  consul,  B.C.  147. 

„     .,     ou  8.  HamilcarPhameas^  was  the  general  of  the 

HamilcarPhameas,  ^     ^,       .    .  •      .v  .  e  yr 

the  commander  Carthaginians,  a  man  m  the  very  prime  of  life 

of  the  Punic      and  of  great  physical  strength.     What  is  of  the 

cavainr.    Appian.  upmost  importance  too  for  service  in  the  field, 

he  was  an  excellent  and  bold  horseman.  .  .  . 
When  he  saw  the  advanced  guard,  Phameas,  though  not  at 
all  deficient  in  courage,  avoided  coming  to  close  quarters  with 
Scipio :  and  on  one  occasion  when  he  had  come  near  his 
reserves,  he  got  behind  the  cover  of  the  brow  of  a  hill  and 
halted  there  a  considerable  time.  .  .  . 

The  Roman  maniples  fled  to  the  top  of  a  hill ;  and  when 
all  had  given  their  opinions,  Scipio  said,  "  When  men  are  con- 
sulting what  measures  to  take  at  first,  their  object  should  be  to 
avoid  disaster  rather  than  to  inflict  it"  ^  .  .  . 
Polybius's  personal  It  ought  not  to  excite  surprise  that  I  am 
knowledge  of  more  minute  than  usual  in  my  account  of  Scipio 
Scipio.         ^jj^  ^^^  J  gjyg  'y^  detail  everything  which  he 

said.  .  .  . 

When  Marcius  Porcius  Cato  heard  in  Rome  of  the  glorious 
achievements  of  Scipio  he  uttered  a  palinode  to  his  criticisms 
of  him  :  "  What  have  you  heard  ?  He  alone  has  the  breath 
of  wisdom  in  him  :  the  rest  are  but  flitting  phantoms."  ^ 

^  Phameas  was  afterwards  persuaded  by  Massanissa  to  join  the  Romans. 
Livy,  Ep.  50. 

2  The  incident  referred  to  is  narrated  in  Appian.  Punica,  103.  Scipio  re- 
lieved this  body  of  men,  who  were  beleaguered  on  the  top  of  a  hill,  by  a  rapid 
and  bold  movement  of  his  cavalry. 

'  Odyssey,  20,  495.  Cato  had  always  been  opposed  to  the  Scipios,  but  Livy 
seems  to  attribute  his  former  criticisms  of  the  yoimger  Africanus  to  his  general 
habit  of  caustic  disparagement  {vir promptioris  ad  vituperandum  linguae),  and 
we  know  that  his  elder  son  had  married  a  daughter  of  Paulus,  sister  to  the 
younger  Africanus. 


BOOK   XXXVII 

1.  There  was  a  great  deal  of  talk  of  all  sorts  in  Greece,  first 
as  to  the  Carthaginians  when  the  Romans  con-  The  various  views 
quered  them,  and  subsequently  as  to  the  question  hdd  in  Greece 
of  the  pseudo-Philip.  The  opinions  expressed  in  ^  *°  ^^^  Roman 
regard  to  the  Carthaginians  were  widely  divided,  ^  ^^^' 
and  indicated  entirely  opposite  views.  Some  commended  the 
Romans  for  their  wise  and  statesmanlike  policy  in  regard  to 
that  kingdom.  For  the  removal  of  a  perpetual  menace,  and  the 
utter  destruction  of  a  city  which  had  disputed  the  supremacy 
with  them,  and  could  even  then  if  it  got  an  opportunity  have 
still  been  disputing  it, — thus  securing  the  supremacy  for  their 
own  country, — were  the  actions  of  sensible  and  far-sighted  men. 
Others  contradicted  this,  and  asserted  that  the  Romans  had  no 
such  policy  in  view  when  they  obtained  their  supremacy ;  and 
that  they  had  gradually  and  insensibly  become  perverted  to 
the  same  ambition  for  power,  which  had  once  characterised 
the  Athenians  and  Lacedaemonians;  and  though  they  had 
advanced  more  slowly  than  these  last,  that  they  would  from 
all  appearances  yet  arrive  at  the  same  consummation.  For 
in  old  times  they  had  only  carried  on  war  until  their  opponents 
were  beaten,  and  induced  to  acknowledge  the  obligation  of 
obedience  and  acceptance  of  their  orders ;  but  that  nowadays 
they  had  given  a  foretaste  of  their  policy  by  their  conduct  to 
Perseus,  in  utterly  destroying  the  Macedonian  dynasty  root  and 
branch,  and  had  given  the  finishing  stroke  to  that  policy  by  the 
course  adopted  in  regard  to  the  Carthaginians ;  for  though  this 
latter  people  had  committed  no  act  of  irretrievable  outrage, 
they  had  taken  measures  of  irretrievable  severity  against  them, 
in  spite  of  their  offering  to  accept  any  terms,  and  submitting  to 
any  injunctions  that  might  be  placed  upon  them.     Others 


5o6  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  book 

again  said  that  the  Romans  were  generally  a  truly  civilised 
people;  and  that  they  had  this  peculiarity,  on  which  they 
prided  themselves,  that  they  conducted  their  wars  openly  and 
generously,  not  employing  night  surprises  or  ambuscades,  but 
scorning  every  advantage  to  be  gained  by  stratagem  and 
deceit,  and  regarding  open  and  face -to -face  combats  as 
alone  becoming  to  their  character:  but  that  in  the  present 
instance  their  whole  campaign  against  the  Carthaginians  had 
been  conducted  by  means  of  stratagem  and  deceit  Little  by 
little, — by  holding  out  inducements  here,  and  practising  con- 
cealment there, — they  had  deprived  them  of  all  hopes  of 
assistance  from  their  allies.  This  was  a  line  of  conduct  more 
appropriate  by  rights  to  the  intriguing  chicanery  of  a  monarchy, 
than  to  a  republican  and  Roman  policy,  ^ain,  there  were 
some  who  took  the  opposite  line  to  these.  They  said  that  if 
it  were  really  true  that,  before  the  Carthaginians  had  made 
the  surrender,  the  Romans  had  behaved  as  alleged,  holding 
out  inducements  here,  and  making  half  revelations  there,  they 
would  be  justly  liable  to  such  charges;  but  ifi  on  the  con- 
trary, it  was  only  after  the  Carthaginians  had  themselves  made 
the  surrender, — ackowledging  the  right  of  the  Romans  to  take 
what  measures  they  chose  concerning  them, — that  the  latter  in 
the  exercise  of  their  undoubted  right  had  imposed  and  enjoined 
what  they  determined  upon,  then  this  action  must  cease  to  be 
looked  on  as  partaking  of  the  nature  of  impiety  or  treachery. 
And  some  denied  that  it  was  an  impiety  at  all :  for  there 
were  three  ways  in  which  such  a  thing  could  be  defined,  none 
of  which  applied  to  the  conduct  of  the  Romans.  An  impiety 
was  something  done  against  the  gods,  or  one's  parents,  or  the 
dead ;  treachery  was  something  done  in  violation  of  oaths  or 
written  agreements ;  an  injustice  something  done  in  violation 
of  law  and  custom.  But  the  Romans  could  not  be  charged  on 
any  one  of  these  counts :  they  had  offended  neither  the  gods, 
their  parents,  nor  the  dead;  nor  had  they  broken  oaths  or 
treaties,  but  on  the  contrary  charged  the  Carthaginians 
with  breaking  them.  Nor  again  had  they  violated  laws,  cus- 
toms, or  their  own  good  faith ;  for  having  received  a  volun- 
tary surrender,  with  the  full  power  of  doing  what  they  pleased 
in  the  event  of  the  submitting  party  not  obeying  their  injunc- 


XXXVII         VIEWS  IN  GREECE  OF  ROMAN  POLICY  507 

tions,  they  had,  in  view  of  that  eventuality  having  arisen,  ap- 
plied force  to  them. 

2.  Such  were  the  criticisms  commonly  made  on  the  dealings 
of  the  Romans  with  the  Carthaginians,  But  as  xhe  pretended 
to  the  Pseudo-Philip,  the  report  at  first  appeared  Philip,  son  of 
quite  beneath  consideration.  A  Philip  sud-  P^^^us,  b.c.  149. 
denly  appears  in  Macedonia,  as  though  he  had  dropped  from 
the  skies,  in  contempt  of  Macedonians  and  Romans  alike, 
without  having  the  least  reasonable  pretext  for  his  claim,  as 
eveiy  one  knew  that  the  real  Philip  had  died  in  Alba  in  Italy 
two  years  after  Perseus  himself.  But  when,  three  or  four 
months  afterwards,  a  report  arrived  that  he  had  conquered  the 
Macedonians  in  a  battle  in  the  territory  of  the  Odomanti 
beyond  the  Strymon,  some  believed  it,  but  the  majority  were 
still  incredulous.  But  presently,  when  news  came  that  he  had 
conquered  the  Macedonians  in  a  battle  on  this  side  of  the 
Strymon,  and  was  master  of  all  Macedonia ;  and  when  letters 
and  envoys  came  from  the  Thessalians  to  the  Achaeans 
imploring  help,  as  though  the  danger  were  now  affecting 
Thessaly,  it  seemed  an  astonishing  and  inexplicable  event ;  for 
there  was  nothing  to  give  it  the  air  of  probability,  or  to  supply 
a  rational  explanation  of  it. 

Such  was  the  view  taken  of  these  things  in  Greece.  .  .  . 

8.  A  despatch  from  Manius  Manilius   to  the  Achaeans 
having  reached  the  Peloponnese,   saying  that  Poiybius  sent  for 
they  would  oblige  him  by  sending  Poiybius  of  to  negotiate  with 
Megalopohs  with  all  speed  to  Lilybaeum,  as      Carthage, 
he  was  wanted  on  account  of  certain  public  *    ^^' 

affairs,  the  Achaeans  decided  to  send  him  in  accordance  with 
the  letter  of  the  consul  And  as  I  felt  bound  to  obey  the 
Romans,  I  put  everything  else  aside,  and  sailed  at  the  begin- 
ning of  summer.  But  when  we  arrived  at  Corcyra,  we  found 
another  despatch  from  the  consul  to  the  Corcyreans  had 
come,  announcing  that  the  Carthaginians  had  already  sur- 
rendered all  the  hostages  to  them,  and  were  prepared  to  obey 
them.i  Thinking,  therefore,  that  the  war  was  at  an  end,  and 
that  there  was  no  more  occasion  for  our  services,  we  sailed 
back  to  the  Peloponnese.  .  .  . 

*  Livy,  Ep.  49. 


5o8  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  book 

4.  It  should  not  excite  surprise  that  I  sometimes  designate 
myself  by  my  proper  name,  and  at  other  times  by  the  common 
forms  of  expression — for  instance,  "when  /had  said  this,"  or 
"we  had  agreed  to  this."  For  as  I  was  much  personally 
involved  in  the  transactions  about  to  be  related,  it  becomes 
necessary  to  vary  the  methods  of  indicating  myself;  that  I  may 
not  weary  by  continual  repetition  of  my  own  name,  nor  again 
by  introducing  the  words  "  of  me,"  or  "  through  me,"  at  every 
turn,  fall  insensibly  into  an  appearance  of  egotism.  I  wished, 
on  the  contrary,  by  an  interchangeable  use  of  these  terms,  and 
by  selecting  from  time  to  time  the  one  which  seemed  most 
in  place,  to  avoid,  as  far  as  could  be,  the  ofTensiveness  of  talk 
about  one's  self;  for  such  talk,  though  naturally  unacceptable, 
is  frequently  inevitable,  when  one  cannot  in  any  other  way 
give  a  clear  exposition  of  the  subjects.  I  am  somewhat  assisted 
in  this  point  by  the  accident  that,  as  far  as  I  know,  no  one  up 
to  our  own  time  has  ever  had  the  same  name  as  myself.^  .  .  . 

6.  The  statues  of  Callicrates  2  were  carried  in  under  the 
cover  of  darkness,  while  those  of  Lycortas  were  brought  out 
again  by  broad  daylight,  to  occupy  their  original  position  :  and 
this  coincidence  drew  the  remark  from  every  one,  that  we 
ought  never  to  use  our  opportunities  against  others  in  a  spirit 
of  presumption,  knowing  that  it  is  extremely  characteristic  of 
Fortune  to  subject  those  who  set  a  precedent  to  the  operation 
of  their  own  ideas  and  principles  in  their  turn.  .  .  . 

The  mere  love  of  novelty  inherent  in  mankind  is  a  sufficient 
incentive  to  any  kind  of  change.  .  .  . 

6.  The  Romans  sent  envoys  to  restrain  the  impetuosity  of 

Mission  to  Bithy-  Nicomedes  and  to  prevent  Attalus  from  going 

nia  to  investigate  to  war  with  Prusias.     The  men  appointed  were 

t^n^NicoJn^'es  Marcus  Licinius,  who  was  suffering  from  gout, 

(II.)  and  his    and  was  quite  lamed  by  it,  and  with  him  Aulus 

*  He  seems  to  have  forgotten  his  namesake  mentioned  in  11,  15. 

2  For  Callicrates,  the  author  of  the  Romanising  policy,  see  26,  1-3.  One 
of  the  statues  raised  to  him  by  the  Spartan  exiles  was  at  Olympia,  the  base  of 
which  has  been  discovered.  See  Hicks' s  Greek  Inscriptions ^  p.  330.  To  what 
the  fragment  refers  is  not  clear,  but  evidently  to  something  connected  with  the 
popular  movement  against  Sparta,  and  a  recurrence  to  the  policy  of  Philopoe- 
men  as  represented  by  Lycortas,  which  eventually  brought  down  the  vengeance 
of  Rome. 


XXXVII        ATTALUS,  NICOMEDES,  AND  PRUSIAS  509 

Mancinus,  who,  from  a  tile  falling  on  his  head,  father  Prusias  II. 
had  so   many   and    such    great   scars    on   it,  See  j»/ra,  32, 28, 
that  it  was  a  matter  of  wonder  that  he  escaped        •  •  ^4  . 
¥rith   his  life,  and   Lucius  Malleolus  who  was  reputed  the 
stupidest  man  in  Rome.     As   the   business  required   speed 
and  boldness,  these  men  seemed  the  least  suitable  possible 
for  the  purpose  that  could  be  conceived;   and  accordingly 
they  say  that  Marcus  Porcius  Cato  remarked  in  the  Senate 
that  "  Not  only  would  Prusias  perish  before  they  got  there, 
but  that  Nicomedes  would  grow  old  in  his  kingdom.     For 
how  could  a  mission  make  haste,  or  if  it  did,  how  could  it 
accomplish  anything,  when  it  had  neither  feet,  head,  nor  in- 
telligence?" .  .  . 

7.  King  Prusias  was  exceedingly  repulsive  in  personal  appear- 
ance, though*  his  reasoning  powers  were  some- 
what superior :  but  externally  he  seemed  only      p^^^ii° 
half  a  man,  and  was  cowardly  and  effeminate  in 

all  matters  pertaining  to  war.  For  not  only  was  he  timid,  but 
he  was  averse  to  all  hardships,  and  in  a  word  was  utterly  un- 
manned in  mind  and  body  throughout  his  whole  life ;  qualities 
which  all  the  world  object  to  in  kings,  but  the  Bithynians 
above  all  people.  Moreover,  he  was  also  exceedingly  dis- 
solute in  regard  to  sensual  pleasures ;  was  completely  without 
education  or  philosophy,  or  any  of  the  knowledge  which  they 
embrace;  and  had  not  the  remotest  idea  of  what  virtue  is. 
He  lived  the  barbaric  life  of  a  Sardanapallus  day  and  night 
Accordingly,  directly  his  subjects  got  the  least  hope  of  being 
able  to  do  so,  they  conceived  an  implacable  resolution  not 
only  to  throw  off  allegiance  to  the  king,  but  to  press  for  ven- 
geance upon  him.^  .  .  . 

8.  Museium  is  a  place  near  Olympus  in  Macedonia,  .  .  . 
^    9.  As  I  blame  those  who  assign  fortune  and  destiny  as  the 
moving   causes  in  common  events   and  ^^^' um^^xoHt^^he^x^^i 
strophes,  I  wish  now  to  enter  as  minutely  on  of  the  direct  imer- 
the  discussion  of  this  subject  as  the  nature  of  ference  of  Provi- 
an  historical  work  will  admit     Those  things  of  ^'''''^^^^^ 
which  it  is  impossible  or  difficult  for  a  mere 

'  Prusias  was  killed  at  Pergamum  by  his  son  Nicomedes  with  the  conniv- 
ance of  Attains  (Livy,  Ep,  50). 


5IO  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  book 

man  to  ascertain  the  causes,  such  as  a  continuous  fall  of  rains 
and  unseasonable  wet,  or,  on  the  contrary,  droughts  and  frosts, 
one  may  reasonably  impute  to  God  and  Fortune,  in  default  of 
any  other  explanation;  and  from  them  come  destruction  of 
fruits,  as  well  as  long-continued  epidemics,  and  other  similar 
things,  of  which  it  is  not  easy  to  find  the  cause.  On  such 
matters  then,  we,  in  default  of  a  better,  follow  the  prevailing 
opinions  of  the  multitude,  attempting  by  supplications  and 
sacrifices  to  appease  the  wrath  of  heaven,  and  sending  to 
ask  the  gods  by  what  words  or  actions  on  our  part  a  change 
for.  the  better  may  be  brought  about,  and  a  respite  be  ob- 
tained for  the  evils  which  are  afHicting  us.  But  those  things, 
of  which  it  is  possible  to  find  the  origin  and  cause  of  their 
occurrence,  I  do  not  think  we  should  refer  to  the  gods.  I 
mean  such  a  thing  as  the  following.  In  our  time  all  Greece 
was  visited  by  a  dearth  of  children  and  generally  a  decay  of 
population,  owing  to  which  the  cities  were  denuded  of  in- 
habitants, and  a  failure  of  productiveness  resulted,  though 
there  were  no  long- continued  wars  or  serious  pestilences 
among  us.  If,  then,  any  one  had  advised  our  sending  to  ask  the 
gods  in  regard  to  this,  what  we  were  to  do  or  say  in  order  to 
become  more  numerous  and  better  fill  our  cities, — would  he 
not  have  seemed  a  futile  person,  when  the  cause  was  manifest 
and  the  cure  in  our  own  hands  ?  For  this  evil  grew  upon  us 
rapidly,  and  without  attracting  attention,  by  our  men  becoming 
perverted  to  a  passion  for  show  and  money  and  the  pleasures 
of  an  idle  life,  and  accordingly  either  not  marrying  at  all,  or,  if 
they  did  marry,  refusing  to  rear  the  children  that  were  born,  or 
at  most  one  or  two  out  of  a  great  number,  for  the  sake  of 
leaving  them  well  off  or  bringing  them  up  in  extravagant 
luxury.  For  when  there  are  only  one  or  two  sons,  it  is  evi- 
dent that,  if  war  or  pestilence  carries  off  one,  the  houses  must 
be  left  heirless :  and,  like  swarms  of  bees,  little  by  little  the 
cities  become  sparsely  inhabited  and^  weak.  On  this  subject 
there  is  no  need  to  ask  the  gods  how  we  are  to  be  relieved 
from  such  a  curse :  for  any  one  in  the  world  will  tell  you  that 
it  is  by  the  men  themselves  if  possible  changing  their  objects 
of  ambition ;  or,  if  that  cannot  be  done,  by  passing  laws  for  the 
preservation  of  infants.     On  this  subject  there  is  no  need  of 


xrroi  DEPOPULATION  OF  GREECE  511 

seers  or  prodigies.  And  the  same  holds  good  of  all  similar 
things.  But  in  regard  to  events  of  which  the  causes  are  im- 
possible or  difficult  to  discover,  it  is  reasonable  to  feel  a 
difficulty.  And  in  this  class  may  be  reckoned  the  course  of 
Macedonian  history.  For  the  Macedonians  had  enjoyed 
many  important  fevours  at  the  hands  of  the  Romans,  having 
been  as  a  nation  liberated  from  arbitrary  government  and 
imports,  and  having  obtained  undisputed  freedom  in  the  place 
of  slavery ;  and  having  been  individually  relieved  to  a  great 
extent  from  intestine  factions  and  civil  bloodshed.^  .  .  .  They 
had  been  worsted  by  the  Romans  formerly  The  inexplicable 
when  fighting  on  the  side  of  Demetrius*  and  conduct  of  the 
again  on  that  of  Perseus ;  yet  when  engaged  on  Macedonians, 
the  side,  of  a  man  of  odious  character,^  and  in  support  of  his 
claims  to  the  throne,  they  displayed  great  courage  and  con- 
quered a  Roman  army.  These  facts  may  well  seem  a  puzzle 
to  us,  for  it  is  difficult  to  discover  their  cause.  And  accord- 
ingly one  would  be  inclined  to  say  in  such  matters  that  what 
had  happened  was  a  heaven-sent  infatuation,  and  that  the 
wrath  of  God  had  fallen  upon  the  Macedonians.  And  this 
will  be  rendered  evident  from  what  remains  to  be  told.  .  .  . 

10.  Massanissa,  king  of  the  Numidians  in  Africa,  was  the 
best  man  of  all  the  kings  of  our  time,  and  the  ^   '     -  ., 

.       y    r  r     y  •         t  Death  of  Massa- 

most  completely  fortunate ;  for  he  reigned  more  nissa  rc.  148. 
than  sixty  years  in  the  soundest  health  and  His  fortunate 
to  extreme  old  age, — for  he  was  ninety  when  *^^^^^  ^^  P^^^*' 

1       J'    J        TT  \      •  -i         t  /-  1        cal  vigour. 

he  died.  He  was,  besides,  the  most  powerful 
man  physically  of  all  his  contemporaries :  for  instance,  when 
it  was  necessary  to  stand,  he  would  do  so  without  moving  a 
foot  all  day  long ;  and  again,  when  he  had  once  sat  down  to 
business  he  remained  there  the  whole  day;  nor  did  it 
distress  him  the  least  to  remain  in  the  saddle  day  and  night 
continuously ;  and  at  ninety  years  old,  at  which  age  he  died, 
he  left  a  son  only  four  years  old,  called  Sthembanus,  who  was 

^  A  considerable  passage  is  here  lost,  with  the  exception  of  a  few  words, 
insufficient  to  ground  a  conjectural  translation  upon. 

*  Demetrius  II.,  son  of  Antigonus  Gonatas. 

•  Pseudophilippus,  after  cutting  to  pieces  a  Roman  legion  under  the 
praetor  Juventius,  was  conquered  and  captured  by  Q.  Caecilius  Metcllus  in 
B.c  148  (Livy,  £p.  50;  Eutrop.  4,  6). 


512  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS     book  xxmi 

afterwards  adopted  by  Micipses,  and  four  sons  besides. 
Owing,  again,  to  the  affection  existing  between  these  sons, 
he  kept  his  whole  life  free  from  any  treasonable  plot  and  his 
kingdom  unpolluted  by  any  family  tragedy.  But  his  greatest 
and  most  divine  achievement  was  this :  Numidia  had  been 
before  his  time  universally  unproductive,  and  was  looked 
upon  as  incapable  of  producing  any  cultivated  fruits.  He  was 
the  first  and  only  man  who  showed  that  it  could  produce 
cultivated  fruits  just  as  well  as  any  other  country  whatever,  by 
cultivating  farms  to  the  extent  of  ten  thousand  plethra  for  each 
of  his  sons  in  different  parts  of  it.  On  this  man's  death, 
then,  so  much  may  reasonably  and  justly  be  said.  Scipio 
arrived  at  Cirta  on  the  third  day  after  his  departure,  and 
settled  everything  properly  and  fairly.^  .  .  . 

A  little  while  before  his  death  he  was  seen,  on  the  day 
following  a  great  victory  over  the  Carthaginians,  sitting  outside 
his  tent  eating  a  piece  of  dirty  bread,  and  on  those  who  saw 
it  expressing  surprise  at  his  doing  so,  he  said.*  .  .  . 

^  Massanissa,  feeling  himself  to  be  dying,  had  asked  Scipio  to  come  to  him. 
He  left  his  sons  strict  injunctions  to  submit  the  arrangements  of  the  succession 
and  division  of  his  kingdom  to  Scipio.  Appian,  Punica,  105  ;  Livy,  Ep.  50. 
Livy  has  adopted  the  statement  of  Polybius  as  to  the  age  of  Massanissa  at  his 
death  ;  and  Cicero  {dt  Sen,  §  34)  has  made  Cato  take  the  same  reckoning, 
perhaps  from  Polybius  also.  But  it  does  not  agree  with  another  statement  of 
Livy  himself,  who  (24,  49)  speaks  of  him  as  being  seventeen  in  B.C.  213,  in 
which  case  he  would  be  in  his  eighty-second  year  in  B.C.  148.  It  is,  however, 
proposed  to  read  xxvii.  for  xvii.  in  this  passage  of  Livy. 

*  Livy  [Ep.  48)  in  speaking  of  this  victory  says  that  Massanissa  was 
ninety-two,  and  ate  and  enjoyed  his  bread  without  anything  to  flavour  it  (sine 
pulpamine). 


BOOK  XXXVIII 

1.  Hasdrubal,  the  general  of  the  Carthaginians,  was  a  vain 

ostentatious  person,  very  far  from   possessing 

real   strategic    ability.      There   are   numerous 'jJ^ViTr''^?/' 

/■       i-  1  •  ^r  .     1  T        t        /-        thage,  B.C.  147. 

proofs  of  his  want  of  judgment.     In  the  first  coss.  p.  Cornelius 
place  he  appeared  in  foil  armour  in  his  inter-  Scipio  Africanus 
view  with  Gulussa,  king  of  the  Numidians,  with  i^^^^'^'^'u^' 
a  purple  dyed  robe  over  his  armour  fastened  by 
a  brooch,  and  attended  by  ten  bodyguards  armed  with  swords; 
and  in  the  next  place,   having  advanced  in  front  of  these 
armed  attendants  to  a  distance  of  about  twenty  feet,  he  stood 
behind  the  trench  and  palisade  and  beckoned  the  king  to 
come  to  him,  whereas  it  ought  to  have  been  quite  the  other  way. 
However,  Gulussa,   after  the  Numidian   fashion,    being  not 

inclined  to  stand  on  ceremony,  advanced  interview  between 
towards  him  unattended,  and  when  he  got  near  Hasdmbai  and 
him  asked  him  "  Whom  he  was  afraid  of  that  he  ^^"S  Gulussa. 
had  come  in  full  armour?"  And  on  his  answering,  "The 
Romans,"  Gulussa  remarked :  "  Then  you  should  not  have 
trusted  yourself  to  the  city,  when  there  was  no  necessity  for 
your  doing  so.  However,  what  do  you  want,  and  what  do 
you  ask  me  to  do  ?  "  To  which  Hasdrubal  replied  :  "  I  want 
you  to  go  as  our  ambassador  to  the  Roman  commander,  and 
to  undertake  for  us  that  we  will  obey  every  injunction ;  only 
I  beg  of  you  both  to  abstain  from  harming  this  wretched  city." 
Then  said  Gulussa :  "  Your  demand  appears  to  me  to  be  quite 
childish  I  Why,  my  good  sir,  what  you  failed  to  get  by  your 
embassies  from  the  Romans,  who  were  then  quietly  encamped 
at  Utica,  and  before  a  blow  had  been  struck, — how  can  you 
expect  to  have  granted  you  now,  when  you  have  been  completely 
invested  by  sea  and  land,  and  have  almost  given  up  every  hope 

VOL.  II  2  L 


514  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBWS  BOOK 

of  safety  ?  "  To  which  Hasdrubal  replied  that "  Gulussa  was 
ill  informed ;  for  they  still  had  good  hopes  of  their  outside 
allies/' — for  he  had  not  yet  heard  about  the  Mauretani,  and 
thought  that  the  forces  in  the  country  were  still  unconquered,^ 
— "  nor  were  they  in  despair  as  to  their  own  ultimate  safety. 
And  above  all,  they  trusted  in  the  support  of  the  gods,  and  in 
what  they  might  expect  from  them;  for  they  believed  that 
they  would  not  disregard  the  flagrant  violation  of  treaty  from 
which  they  were  suffering,  but  would  give  them  many  oppor- 
tunities of  securing  their  safety.  Therefore  he  called  on  the 
Roman  commander  in  the  name  of  the  gods  and  of  Fortune  to 
spare  the  city;  with  the  distinct  understanding  that,  if  its 
inhabitants  failed  to  obtain  this  grace,  they  would  be  cut  to 
pieces  to  the  last  man  sooner  than  evacuate  it."  After  some 
more  conversation  of  the  same  sort,  these  men  separated  for 
the  present,  having  made  an  appointment  to  meet  again  on 
the  third  day  from  that  time. 

2.  On  Gulussa  communicating  to  him  what  had  been  said, 

Scipios  scorn  of  Scipio  remarked  with  a  laugh  :  " Oh,  then,  it 
the  proposal,  was  because  you  intended  to  make  this  demand 
B.C.  147.  ^j^j^^  yQy  displayed  that  abominable  cruelty  to 
our  prisoners !  ^  And  you  trust  in  the  gods,  do  you,  after 
violating  even  the  laws  of  men?"  The  king  went  on  to 
remind  Scipio  that  above  all  things  it  was  necessary  to  finish 
the  business  speedily;  for,  apart  from  unforeseen  contingencies, 
the  consular  elections  were  now  close  at  hand,  and  it  was  only 
right  to  have  regard  to  that,  lest,  if  the  winter  found  them  just 
where  they  were,  another  Consul  would  come  to  supersede 
him,  and  without  any  trouble  get  all  the  credit  of  his  labours. 

He  offers  Hasdni-  ^'hese  words  induced  Scipio  to  give  directions 
hai  personal  secu-  to  offer  Hasdrubal  safety  for  himself,  his  wife 
"'y  ^J'he'^tow^"^  ^"^  children,  and  ten  families  of  his  friends  and 
^  °^^       relations,  and  permission  to  take  ten  talents  of 

*  The  task  of  subduing  the  country  in  B.C.  147  was  entrusted  to  the  pro- 
consul Culpumius  Piso,  while  Scipio  was  engaged  in  completing  the  invest- 
ment of  Carthage.     Appian,  Pun.  113-126. 

2  After  the  capture  of  Megara,  the  suburban  district  of  Carthage,  by 
Scipio,  Hasdrubal  withdrew  into  the  B>Tsa,  got  made  commander-in-chief, 
and  bringing  all  Roman  prisoners  to  the  battlements,  put  them  to  death  with 
the  most  ghastly  tortures.     Appian,  /*w«.  118, 


XXX VIII  MISER  Y  IN  CAR  THA  GE  5x5 


his  private  property  and  to  bring  out  with  him  whichever  of  his 
slaves  he  chose.  With  these  concessions  therefore  Gulussa 
went  to  his  meeting  with  Hasdrubal  on  the  third  day,  who 
again  came  forward  with  great  pomp  and  at  a  dignified  step, 
clothed  in  his  purple  robe  and  fuU  suit  of  armour,  so  as  to 
cast  the  tyrants  of  tragedy  far  into  the  shade.  He  was 
naturally  fat,  but  at  that  time  he  had  grown  extremely  cor- 
pulent, and  had  become  more  than  usually  red  from  exposure 
to  the  sun,  so  that  he  seemed  to  be  living  like  fat  oxen  at  a  fair ; 
and  not  at  all  like  a  man  to  be  in  command  at  a  time  of  such 
terrible  miseries  as  cannot  easily  be  described  in  words. 
When  he  met  the  king,  and  heard  the  offer  of  the  Consul,  he 
slapp>ed  his  thigh  again  and  again,  and  appealing  to  the  gods  and 
Fortune  declared  that  "  The  day  would  never  come  on  which 
Hasdrubal  would  behold  the  sun  and  his  native  city  in  flames ; 
for  to  the  nobly-minded  one's  country  and  its  burning  houses 
were  a  glorious  funeral  pile."  These  expressions  force  us  to  feel 
some  admiration  for  the  man  and  the  nobility  The  selfish  and 
of  his  language;  but  when  we  come  to  view  tyrannical  conduct 
his  administration  of  affairs,  we  cannot  fail  to  be  °^  Hasdrubal 
struck  by  his  want  of  spirit  and  courage ;  for  at  a  time  when 
his  fellow-citizens  were  absolutely  perishing  with  famine,  he 
gave  banquets  and  had  second  courses  put  on  of  a  costly  kind, 
and  by  his  own  excellent  physical  condition  made  their  misery 
more  conspicuous.  For  the  number  of  the  dying  surpassed 
belief,  as  well  as  the  number  who  deserted  every  day  from 
hunger.  However,  by  fiercely  rebuking  some,  and  by  execut- 
ing as  well  as  abusing  others,  he  cowed  the  common  people  : 
and  by  this  means  retained,  in  a  country  reduced  to  the 
lowest  depths  of  misfortune,  an  authority  which  a  tyrant  would 
scarcely  enjoy  in  a  prosperous  city.  Therefore  I  think  I  was 
justified  in  saying  that  two  leaders  more  like  comparison  be- 
each  other  than  those  who  at  that  time  directed  tween  Hasdrubal 
the  affairs  of  Greece  and  Carthage  it  would  not  ^^  ^^^^• 
be  easy  to  find.  And  this  will  be  rendered  manifest  when  we 
come  to  a  formal  comparison  of  them.  .  .  . 

8.  My  thirty-eighth  book  embraces  the  con- 
summation  of  the  misfortunes  of  Greece.     For  ^';^:^''^^^ 
though  Greece  as  a  whole,  as  well  as  separate    fall  of  Greece. 


s"ilrremdy'm,t,ri„naic,"At',™yrn 
C;inliaL,'o    is    looked 
H.is  even  more:    kind,  yct  One  cannot 
lamentable  than  as  not  Icss,  and  in  SOT. 
tbai  of  Quthage.  ^^  (he  Carthaginians 
for  posterity  to  say  on  their  behalf; 
Greeks  were  so  glaring  that  they  mad 
who  wished  to  support  them  to  do  s 
tion  of  the  Carthaginians  was  trame 
they  had  no  feeling  afterwards  of  t^ 
Greeks,  with  their  misfortunes  ever  b 
down  to  their  children's  children  the  I 
theirs.     And  in  proportion  as  we  regan 
as  more  pitiable  than  those  who  lose  th 
of  their  misfortunes,  in  that  ptoportio: 
the  Greeks  be  regarded  as  more  piti 
Carthaginians, — unless  a  man  thinks 
honour,  and  gives  bis  opinion  from  a 
advantage.     To  prove  the  truth  of  w 
to  remember  and  compare  the  misfort 
to  be  the  heaviest  with  what  I  have  jus 
4.  Now,  the  greatest  alarm  that  fori 
Computeon  be  '*>e  Greeks  was  when  X 


XXXVIII  THE  MISFORTUNES  OF  GREECE  517 

glory  in  the  eyes  of  all  the  world  for  having  regarded  every- 
thing as  of  less  importance,  in  comparison  with  taking  their 
share  in  the  same  fortune  as  the  other  Greeks.     Accordingly, 
in  consequence  of  their  exalted  conduct,  they  not  only  im- 
mediately recovered  their  own  city  and  territory,  but  soon 
afterwards  disputed  the  supremacy  in  Greece  with  the  Lacedae- 
monians.     Subsequently,   indeed,    they    were    th  ^  f  t  f 
beaten  by  the  Spartans  in  war,  and  forced  to  the  Athenians  at 
submit  to   the   destruction  of  their  own   city    Aegospotami, 
walls  :  but  even  this  one  might  assert  to  be  a       ^•^*  ^^^* 
reproach  to  the  Lacedaemonians,  for  having  used  the  power 
put  into  their  hands  with  excessive  severity,  rather  than  to  the 
Athenians.    Then  the  Spartans  once  more,  being  of  the  Spanans 
beaten  by  the  Thebans,  lost  the  supremacy  in      at  Leuctra, 
Greece,  and  after  that  defeat  were  deprived  of      b-c  371. 
their  outside  rule  and  reduced  to  the  frontiers  of  Laconia. 
But  what  disgrace  was  there  in  having  retired,  while  disputing 
for  the  most  honourable  objects,  to  the  limits  of  their  ancestral 
dominion?     Therefore,   these   events   we   may  speak  of  as 
failures,  but  not  as  misfortunes  in  any  sense.     The  Mantlneans 
again  were  forced   to   leave  their   city,  being  The  destruction 
divided  out  and  scattered  into  separate  villages     of  Mantinea, 
by  the   Lacedaemonians ;  but  for  this  all  the       ^-^  ^^a, 
world  blamed  the  folly,  not  of  the  Mantineans,  but  of  the 
Lacedaemonians.      The  Thebans,  indeed,  be- 
sides the  loss  of  their  army,  saw  their  country  de-  ^'^  Vc.^s^' 
populated  at  the  time  when  Alexander,  having 
resolved  on  the  invasion  of  Asia,  conceived  that  by  making  an 
example  of  Thebes  he  should  establish  a  terror  that  would  act 
as  a  check  upon  the  Greeks,  while  his  attention  was  distracted 
upon  other  affairs :  but  at  that  time  all  the  world  pitied  the 
Thebans  as  having  been  treated  with  injustice  and  harshness, 
and  no  one  was  found  to  justify  this  proceeding  of  Alexander. 
;  6.  Accordingly  after  a  short  time  they  obtained  assistance, 
and   once   more    inhabited   their   country  in   security.     For 
the  compassion  of  foreigners  is  no   small  benefit  to  those 
who    are    unjustly    dispossessed;    since  we   often  see   that, 
with  the  change  of  feeling  among  the  many.  Fortune  also 
changes ;  and  even  the  conquerors  themselves  repent,  and  make 


5i8  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  boot 

good  the  disasters  of  those  who  have  fallen  under  undeserved 

misfortunes.     Once  more,  at  certain  periods  the  Chalcidians 

The  tyranny  of  ^^^  Corinthians  and  some  other  cities,  owing  to 

the  later  kings  the  advantages  of  their  situation,  were  attacked 

of  Macedonia,   ^y  jj^g  kings  of  Macedonia,  and  had  garrisons 

imposed  on  them :    but  when   they  were  thus  enslaved  all 

the  world  were  eager  to  do  their  best  to  liberate  them,  and 

loathed    their  enslavers   and   regarded   them   continually  as 

their  enemies.     But  above  all,  up  to  this  time  it  was  generally 

single   states   that  were   depopulated,   and   in   single   states 

that  reverses  were  met  with,  in  some  cases  while  disputing  for 

supremacy  and  empire,  and  in  others  from  the  treacherous 

attacks  of  despots  and  kings :  so  that,  so  far  from  their  losses 

bringing  them  any  reproach,  they  escaped  even  the  name  of 

misfortune.     For  we  must  look  on  all  those  who  meet  with 

But  the  last  fall  incalculable  disasters  whether  private  or  public 

of  Greece  was    as  the  victims  of  losses,  and  those  only  to  be 

embittered  by  the  "unfortunate,"  to  whom  events  through  their 

fact  that  It  came  /■  n     i    •         j*  i  t     ^  i-    .i- 

from  the  folly  of  o^'^  ^^^v  bnng  dishonour.     Instances  of  this 
(the  Greeks      last     are     the      Peloponnesians,     Boeotians, 
themselves      phocians,  .  .  .  and    Locrians,    some    of   the 
dwellers   on  the  Ionian  gulf,  and  next  to  these   the    Mace- 
donians, .  .  .  who  all  as  a  rule  did  not  merely  suffer  loss, 
but  were  "  unfortunate,"  with  a  misfortune  of  the  gravest  kind 

and  for  which  they  were  themselves  open  to 
Thci^icadere.^  reproach :  for  they  displayed  at  once  want  of 
good  faith  and  want  of  courage,  brought  upon 
themselves  a  series  of  disgraces,  lost  all  that  could  bring  them 
honour,  .  .  .  and  voluntarily  admitted  into  their  towns  the 
Roman  fasces  and  axes.  They  were  in  the  utmost  panic,  in  fact, 
owing  to  the  extravagance  of  their  own  wrongful  acts,  if  one 
ought  to  call  them  their  own ;  for  I  should  rather  say  that  the 
peoples  as  such  were  entirely  ignorant,  and  were  beguiled  from 
the  path  of  right :  but  that  the  men  who  acted  wrongly  were 
the  authors  of  this  delusion. 

6.  In  regard  to  these  men,  it  should  not  be  a  matter 
of  surprise  if  we  leave  for  a  while  the  ordinary  method  and 
spirit  of  our  narrative  to  give  a  clearer  and  more  elaborate 
exposition  of  their  character.     I  am  aware  that  some  may 


XXXVIII     THE  GREEKS  HAD  THEMSELVES  TO  BLAME    519 

be  found,  regarding  it  as  their  first  duty  to  cast  a  veil  over 
the  errors  of  the  Greeks,  to  accuse  us  of  writing  in  a  spirit  of 
malevolence.  But  for  myself,  I  conceive  that  with  right-minded 
persons  a  man  will  never  be  regarded  as  a  true  friend  who 
shrinks  from  and  is  afraid  of  plain  speech,  nor  indeed  as  a  good 
citizen  who  abandons  the  truth  because  of  the  offence  he  will 
give  to  certain  persons  at  the  time.  But  a  writer  of  public 
history  above  all  deserves  no  indulgence  whatever,  who  regards 
anything  of  superior  importance  to  truth.  For  in  proportion 
as  written  history  reaches  larger  numbers,  and  survives  for 
longer  time,  than  words  spoken  to  suit  an  occasion,  both  the 
writer  ought  to  be  still  more  particular  about  truth,  and  his 
readers  ought  to  admit  his  authority  only  so  far  as  he 
adheres  to  this  principle.  At  the  actual  hour  of  danger  it  is 
only  right  that  Greeks  should  help  Greeks  in  every  possible 
way,  by  protecting  them,  veiling  their  errors  or  deprecating 
the  wrath  of  the  sovereign  people, — and  this  I  genuinely  did 
for  my  part  at  the  actual  time :  but  it  is  also  right,  in  regard 
to  the  record  of  events  to  be  transmitted  to  posterity,  to  leave 
them  unmixed  with  any  falsehood :  so  that  readers  should  not 
be  merely  gratified  for  the  moment  by  a  pleasant  tale,  but 
should  receive  in  their  souls  a  lesson  which  will  prevent  a 
repetition  of  similar  errors  in  the  future.  Enough,  however, 
on  this  subject.  .  .  . 

In  the  autumn  of  rc  1^0  the  corrupt  Menalchidas  of  Sparta 
was  succeeded  as  AcJiaean  Strategus  by  Diaeus,  who,  to  cover  his 
share  in  the  corruption  of  Menalchidas,  induced  the  league  to  act 
in  the  matter  of  some  disputed  claim  of  Sparta  in  a  manner 
contrary  to  the  decisions  of  t/ie  Roman  Senate,  The  Spartans 
wished  to  appeal  again  to  Rome;  whereupon  the  Achaeans 
passed  a  law  forbidding  separate  cities  to  make  such  appeals, 
which  were  to  be  only  made  by  the  league.  The  Lacedaemonians 
took  up  arms :  and  Diaeus  professing  that  the  league  was  not 
at  war  with  Sparta,  but  with  certain  factious  citizens  of  that 
city,  named  four  of  its  chief  men  who  were  to  be  banished.  They 
fled  to  Rome,  where  t/ie  Senate  ordered  their  restoration.  Em- 
bassies went  from  Achaia  and  from  Sparta  to  Rome  to  state  their 
respective  cases  ;  and  on  their  return  gave  false  reports, — Diaeus 


5*0  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  IKWK 

assuring  the  Achaeans  that  the  Senate  had  ordered  the  Spartans 
to  obey  the  league;  Menalchidas  telling  the  Spartans  that  the 
Romans  had  released  theni  from  all  connexion  with  the  league. 
War  then  again  broke  out  (b.c.  148).  Metellus^  who  was  in 
Macedonia  on  the  business  of  the  Pseudo-Philip^  sent  legates  to 
the  Achaeans  forbidding  them  to  bear  arms  against  Sparta^  and 
announcing  the  speedy  arrival  of  commissioners  from  Rome  to 
settle  the  dispute.  But  the  Achaean  levies  were  already  mustered 
under  the  Stratcgus  Damocritus^  and  the  Lacedaemonians  seem 
to  have  almost  compelled  them  to  fight.  The  Spartans  were 
beaten  with  considerable  loss :  and  on  Damocritus  preventing  a 
pursuit  and  a  capture  of  Sparta^  the  Achaeans  regarded  him  as 
traitor  and  fined  him  fifty  talents.  He  was  succeeded  in  his 
office  of  Stratcgus  by  Diaeus  {autumn  B.C.  148- b.c  147)  who 
promised  Metellus  to  await  the  arrival  of  the  commissioners 
from  Rome,  But  the  Spartans  no7u  assumed  their  freedom  from 
the  league  and  elected  a  Stratcgus  of  their  oivn,  Menalchidas ; 
wlw  provoked  a  rencival  of  the  war  by  taking  the  town  of  lasos 
on  the  Laconian  frontier.  In  despair  of  resisting  the  attack  of 
the  Achaeans^  and  disowned  by  his  felloiu-citizenSy  he  took  poison. 
The  Roman  commissioners  arrived^  led  by  L,  Aurelius  Orestes^  in 
B.C.  147,  a  fid  summoning  the  magistrates  of  the  Achaean  towns 
and  the  Stratcgus  Diaeus  before  them  at  Corinth^  announced  the 
decision  of  the  Senate — separating  Lacedaemon^  Corinth^  Argos^ 
Heraclea  near  Aete^  and  Orchomcfws  in  Arcadia  from  the 
Achaean  league^  as  not  being  united  by  blood,  and  only  being 
subsequent  additions.  The  magistrates^  without  anstveringy 
hastily  summoned  the  league  congress.  The  people,  on  hearing 
the  Roman  decision,  pillaged  the  houses  of  the  Lacedaemonian 
residents  in  Corinth,  and  savagely  attacked  all  who  were  or  who 
looked  like  Spartans,  The  Roman  envoys  endeavoured  to  re- 
strain the  popular  fury.  But  tluy  were  someivhat  roughly 
handled  themselves ;  and  the  people  could  not  be  persuaded  to 
release  the  Spartans  whom  tluy  had  arrested:  though  they  let 
all  others  go,  and  sent  an  embassy  to  Rome,  which,  hoivet^r, 
meeting  the  former  embassy  on  its  return,  and  learning  the 
hopelessness  of  support  in  Rome,  returned  home.  It  is  this  out- 
break which  is  referred  to  in  the  next  fragment.  See  Pausanias, 
vii,  12-14;  Livy,  Ep.  51. 


XXXVIII        ROME  AND  THE  ACHAEAN  LEAGUE  521 


7,  When   the   commissioners   with    L.    Aurelius   Orestes 
arrived  in  Rome  from  the  Peloponnese,  they  On  the  report  of 
reported  what  had  taken  place,  and  declared  ^  ^^^^"^P,"^" 

^1.^.1-       I.    J  r      ^     11     1     •       tes  of  the  disturb- 

that  they  had  a  narrow  escape  of  actually  losing  ance  at  Corinth, 

their  lives.  They  made  the  most  of  the  occur-  b.c.  147. 
rence  and  put  the  worst  interpretation  upon  it ;  for  they  re- 
presented the  violence  which  had  been  offered  them  as  not 
the  result  of  a  sudden  outbreak,  but  of  a  deliberate  intention 
on  the  part  of  the  Achaeans  to  inflict  a  signal  insult  upon  them. 
The  Senate  was  therefore  more  angry  than  it  had  ever  been, 
and  at  once  appointed  Sextus  Julius  Caesar  the  Senate  send 
and  other  envoys^with  instructions  to  rebuke  and  a  fresh  commis- 
upbraid  the  Achaeans  for  what  had  occurred,  ^'°'\  ^?  ^'^"^  ^® 
yet  in  terms  of  moderation,  but  to  exhort  them 
"  not  to  listen  to  evil  councillors,  not  to  allow  themselves  to 
be  betrayed  into  hostility  with  Rome,  but  even  yet  to  make 
amends  for  their  acts  of  folly  by  inflicting  punishment  on  the 
authors  of  the  crime."  This  was  a  clear  proof  that  the  Senate 
gave  its  instructions  to  Aurelius  and  his  colleagues,  not  with 
the  view  of  dismembering  the  league,  but  with  the  object  of 
restraining  the  obstinacy  and  hostility  of  the  Achaeans  by 
terrifying  and  overawing  them.  Some  people  accordingly 
imagined  that  the  Romans  were  acting  hypocritically,  be- 
cause the  Carthaginian  war  was  still  unfinished ;  but  this  was 
not  the  case.  The  fact  is,  that  they  had  long  regarded  the 
Achaean  league  with  favour,  believing  it  to  be  the  most  trust- 
worthy of  all  the  Greek  governments ;  and  though  now  they 
were  resolved  to  give  it  an  alarm,  because  it  had  become  too 
lofty  in  its  pretensions,  yet  they  were  by  no  means  minded  to 
go  to  war  or  to  have  a  serious  quarrel  with  the  Achaeans.  .  .  . 

8.  As  Sextus  Julius  Caesar  and  bis  colleagues  were  on  their 
way  from  Rome  to  the  Peloponnese,  they  were  Arrival  of  Sextus 
met  by  Thearidas  and  the  other  envoys,  sent  by   Julius  and  the 
the  Achaeans  to  make  their  excuse  and  give  conimissioners  m 
the  Senate  an  explanation  of  the  intemperate  acts 
committed  in  regard  to  Aurelius  Orestes.     But  Sextus  Julius 
persuaded  them  to  turn  back  to  Achaia,  on  the  ground  that 
he  and  his  colleagues  were  coming  with  full  instructions  to 
communicate  with  the  Achaeans  on  all  these  points.     When 


522  THE  HISTORIES  OF  P0LYB2US  book 

Sextus  arrived  in  the  Peloponnese,  and  in  a  conference  with 

Conference  at    ^^^  Achaeans  in  Aegium  spoke  with  great  kind- 

Acgium.    The  ness,  he  made  no  mention  of  the  injurious  treat- 

envoys  are  con-  ment  of  the  legates,  and  scarcely   demanded 

ciliatorv  %j        '  * 

any  defence  at  all,  but  took  a  more  lenient 
view  of  what  had  happened  than  even  the  Achaeans  them- 
selves; and  dwelt  chiefly  on  the  subject  of  exhorting  them 
not  to  carry  their  error  any  further,  in  regard  either  to 
the  Romans  or  the  Lacedaemonians.  Thereupon  the  more 
sober-minded  party  received  the  speech  with  satisfaction,  and 
were  strongly  moved  to  obey  the  suggestions,  because  they 
were  conscious  of  the  gravity  of  what  they  had  been  doing, 
and  had  before  their  eyes  what  happened  to  opponents  of 
Rome ;  but  the  majority,  though  they  had  not  a  word  to  say 
against  the  justice  of  the  injunctions  of  Sextus  Julius,  and  were 
quite  silent,  yet  remained  deeply  tainted  with  disaffection.  And 
Action  of  Diaeus  Diaeus  and  Critolaus,  and  all  who  shared  their 
and  Critolaus  and  sentiments, — and  they  consisted  of  all  the  great- 
their  party,  ^g^  rascals  in  every  city,  men  at  war  with  the  gods, 
and  pests  of  the  community,  carefully  selected, — took,  as  the 
proverb  has  it,  with  the  left  hand  what  the  Romans  gave  with 
the  right,  and  went  utterly  and  entirely  wrong  in  their  calcu- 
lations. For  they  supposed  that  the  Romans,  owing  to  the 
troubles  in  Libya  and  Iberia,  feared  a  war  with  the  Achaeans 
and  would  submit  to  anything  and  say  anything.  Thinking, 
therefore,  that  the  hour  was  their  own,  they  answered  the 
Roman  envoys  politely  that  "  They  would,  nevertheless,  send 
Thearidas  and  his  colleagues  to  the  Senate ;  while  they  would 
themselves  accompany  the  legates  to  Tegea,  and  there  in  con- 
sultation with  the  I^cedaemonians  would  provide  for  some 
settlement  of  the  war  that  would  meet  the  views  of  both  parties." 
With  this  answer  they  subsequently  induced  the  unhappy 
nation  to  follow  the  senseless  course  to  which  they  had  long 
before  made  up  their  mind.  And  this  result  was  only  what 
might  have  been  expected  from  the  inexperience  and  corrup- 
tion of  the  prevailing  party. 

9.  But  the  finishing  stroke  to  this  ruinous  policy  was  given 

Conference  at    i"  ^^  following  manner.     Wlien  Sextus  and 

Tcgca.  Critolaus  his  colleagues  arrived  at  Tegea,  and  invited  the 


XXXVIII  FOOLISH  FOLIC  Y  IN  A  CHAIA  5  23 

attendance  of  the  Lacedaemonians,  in  order  to  contrives  to  avoid 
arrange  terms  between  them  and  the  Achaeans,  "  ^'''«"''"- 
both  as  to  the  satisfaction  to  be  given  for  previous  complaints 
and  for  putting  a  stop  to  the  war,  until  the  Romans  should  send 
commissioners  to  review  the  whole  question,  Critolaus  and  his 
party,  having  held  a  conference,  decided  that  all  the  rest  should 
avoid  the  meeting,  and  that  Critolaus  should  go  alone  to  Tegea. 
When  Sextus  and  his  fellow- commissioners  therefore  had 
almost  given  them  up,  Critolaus  arrived ;  and  when  the  meet- 
ing with  the  Lacedaemonians  took  place,  he  would  settle 
nothing, — alleging  that  he  had  no  authority  to  make  any  arrange- 
ment without  the  consent  of  the  people  at  large ;  but  that  he 
would  bring  the  matter  before  the  Achaeans  at  their  next  con- 
gress, which  must  be  held  six  months  from  that  time.  Sextus 
and  his  fellow-commissioners,  therefore,  convinced  of  the  ill 
disposition  of  Critolaus,  and  much  annoyed  at  his  conduct, 
dismissed  the  Lacedaemonians  to  their  own  country,  and 
themselves  returned  to  Italy  with  strong  views  as  to  the  folly 
and  infatuation  of  Critolaus. 

After  their  departure  Critolaus  spent  the  winter  in  visiting 
the  cities  and  holding  assemblies  in  them,  on^interofB.c.i47. 
the  pretext  that  he  wished  to  inform  them  of  146.  Critolaus  pro- 
what  he  had  said  to  the  Lacedaemonians  at  ^^^^^^^1*" 
Tegea,  but  in  reality  to  denounce  the  Romans  •' 

and  to  put  an  evil  interpretation  on  everything  they  said  ;  by 
which  means  he  inspired  the  common  people  in  the  various 
cities  with  feelings  of  hostility  and  hatred  for  them.  At 
the  same  time  he  sent  round  orders  to  the  magis- 
trates not  to  exact  money  from  debtors,  nor  to  ^^^mems.*^*^ 
receive  prisoners  arrested  for  debt,  and  to  cause 
loans  on  pledge  to  be  held  over  until  the  war  was  decided. 
By  this  kind  of  appeal  to  the  interests  of  the  vulgar  everything 
he  said  was  received  with  confidence;  and  the  common  people 
were  ready  to  obey  any  order  he  gave,  being  incapable  of 
taking  thought  for  the  future,  but  caught  by  the  bait  of  im- 
mediate indulgence  and  relief. 

10.  When  Quintus  Caecilius  Metellus  heard  in  Macedonia 
of  the  commotion  and  disturbance  going  on  in  ^^^^  legates  are 
the  Peloponnese,  he  despatched  thither  his  le-  sent  from  Mace- 


524  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBWS  book 


donia  to  Achaia  gates  Gneaus  Papirius  and  the  younger  Popilius 
*  rc.%77.m6!^  Laenas,  along  with  Aulus  Gabinius  and  Gains 

Fannius;  who,  happening  to  arrive  when  the 
congress  was  assembled  at  Corinth,  were  introduced  to  the 
assembly,  and  delivered  a  long  and  conciliatory  speech,  much 
in  the  spirit  of  that  of  Sextus  Julius,  exerting  themselves  with 
great  zeal  to  prevent  the  Achaeans  from  proceeding  to  an 
open  breach  with  Rome,  either  on  the  pretext  of  their  grievance 
against  the  Lacedaemonians,  or  from  any  feeling  of  anger 
against  the  Romans  themselves.     But  the  assembled  people 

would  not  hear  them ;  insulting  words  were 
lu'corin^^  loudly  uttered  against  the  envoys,  and  in  the 
midst  of  a  storm  of  yells  and  tumult  they  were 
driven  from  the  assembly.  The  fact  was  that  such  a  crowd 
of  workmen  and  artisans  had  been  got  together  as  had  never 
been  collected  before ;  for  all  the  cities  were  in  a  state  of 
drivelling  folly,  and  above  all  the  Corinthians  en  masse;  and 
there  were  only  a  very  few  who  heartily  approved  of  the  words 
of  the  envoys. 

Critolaus,  conceiving  that  he  had  attained  his  purpose,  in 
the  midst  of  an  audience  as  excited  and  mad  as  himself  began 
attacking  the  magistrates,  abusing  all  who  were  opposed  to 
him,  and  openly  defying  the  Roman  envoys,  saying  that  he 
was  desirous  of  being  a  friend  of  the  Romans,  but  had  no 
Critolaus  makes  '^iste  for  them  as  his  masters.  And,  finally,  he 
no  secret  of  his  tried  to  incite  the  people  by  saying  that,  if  they 
hostility  to  Rome,  quitted  themselves  like  men,  they  would  have 
no  lack  of  allies ;  but,  if  they  betrayed  womanish  fears,  they 
would  not  want  for  masters.  By  many  other  such  words  to 
the  same  effect,  conceived  in  the  spirit  of  a  charlatan  and 
huckster,  he  roused  and  excited  the  populace.  He  attempted 
also  to  make  it  plain  that  he  was  not  acting  at  random  in 
these  proceedings,  but  that  some  of  the  kings  and  republics 
were  engaged  in  the  same  policy  as  himself. 

11.  And  when  some  of  the  Gerusia  wished  to  check  him, 

and  restrain  him  from  the  use  of  such  expres- 

Critoiaus  cames  gions,  hc  ordered  the  soldiers  surrounding  him 

his  point,  and  '.  ,  ^  ^         •         i  • 

induces  the     to  retire,  and  stood  up  fronting  his  opponents, 
Achaeans  to  pro-  and  bade  any  one  of  them  come  up  to  him. 


XXXVIII  VIOLENT  POLICY  OF  CRITOLAUS  525 

come  near  him,  or  venture  to  touch  his  chlamys.  claim  war  against 
And,  finally,  he  said  that  **  He  had  restrained    ^^  Lacedae- 

monians 

himself  now  for  a  long  time ;  but  would  endure 
it  no  longer,  and  must  speak  his  mind.  The  people  to  fear 
were  not  Lacedaemonians  or  Romans,  but  the  traitors  among 
themselves  who  co-operated  with  their  foes:  for  there  were 
some  who  cared  more  for  Romans  and  Lacedaemonians  than 
for  their  own  country."  He  added,  as  a  confirmation  of  his 
words,  that  Evagoras  of  Aegium  and  Stratius  of  Tritaea 
betrayed  to  Gnaeus  Papirius  and  his  fellow-commissioners  all 
the  secret  proceedings  in  the  meetings  of  the  magistrates. 
And  when  Stratius  acknowledged  that  he  had  had  interviews 
with  those  men,  and  should  do  so  again,  as  they  were  friends 
and  allies,  but  asserted  that  he  had  told  them  nothing  of  what 
was  said  in  the  meetings  of  the  magistrates,  sofne  few  believed 
him,  but  the  majority  accepted  the  accusation  as  true.  And 
so  Critolaus,  having  inflamed  the  people  by  his  accusations 
against  these  men,  induced  the  Achaeans  once  more'to  decree  a 
war  which  was  nominally  against  the  Lacedaemonians,  but  in 
effect  was  against  the  Romans ;  and  he  got  another  decree 
added,  which  was  a  violation  of  the  constitution,  namely,  that 
whomsoever  they  should  elect  as  Strategi  should  have  absolute 
power  in  carrying  on  the  war.  He  thus  got  for  himself  some- 
thing like  a  despotism. 

Having  carried  these  measures,  he   began  intriguing  to 
bring  on  an  outbreak  and  cause  an  attack  upon  xhe  Roman  en- 
the  Roman  envoys.     He  had  no  pretext  for  voys  retire  from 
doing  this ;  but  adopted  a  course  which,  of  all        Connth. 
possible  courses,  offends  most  flagrantly  against  the  laws  of 
gods  and   man.     The   envoys,  however,   separated;  Gnaeus 
Papirius  went  to  Athens  and  thence  to  Sparta  to  watch  the 
turn  of  events  ;  Aulus  Gabinius  went  to  Naupactus ;  and  the 
other  two  remained  at  Athens,  waiting  for  the  arrival  of  Cae- 
cilius    Metellus.     This  was  the  state  of  things  in  the  Pelo- 
ponnese.  .  .  . 


BOOK  XXXIX 

^Including  Book  XL.  of  Dindorfs  Text,] 

1.  I  AM  fully  aware  that  some  will  be  found  to  criticise  my 

work,  on  the  ground  that  my  narrative  of  events 

hutori^^rmeth^  ^^  incomplete  and  disconnected  ;  beginning,  for 

ofparaiiei  histories  instance,  the  story  of  the  siege  of  Carthage,  and 

of  several  coun-  then  leaving  it  half  told,  and  interrupting  the 

'"^'^^^^{J^J'^^P'"^  stream  of  my  history,   I  pass  over  to  Greek 

affairs,  and  from  them  to  Macedonian  or 
Syrian,  or  some  other  history ;  whereas  students  require  con- 
tinuity, and  desire  to  hear  the  end  of  a  subject ;  for  the  com- 
bination of  pleasure  and  profit  is  thus  more  completely  secured. 
But  I  do  not  think  this  :  I  hold  exactly  the  reverse.  And  as 
a  witness  to  the  correctness  of  my  opinion  I  might  appeal  to 
nature  herself,  who  is  never  satisfied  with  the  same  things 
continuously  in  any  of  the  senses,  but  is  ever  inclined  to 
change;  and,  even  if  she  is  satisfied  with  the  same  things, 
wishes  to  have  them  at  intervals  and  in  diversity  of  circum- 
stance. This  may  be  illustrated  first  by  the  sense  of  hearing, 
which  is  never  gratified  either  in  music  or  recitations  by  a  con- 
tinuance of  the  same  strains  or  subjects ;  it  is  the  varied  style, 
and,  in  a  word,  whatever  is  broken  up  into  intervals  and  has  the 
most  marked  and  frequent  changes,  that  gives  it  pleasurable 
excitement.  Similarly  one  may  notice  that  the  palate  can 
never  remain  gratified  by  the  same  meats,  however  costly,  but 
grows  to  feel  a  loathing  for  them,  and  delights  in  changes  of 
diet,  and  often  prefers  plain  to  rich  food  merely  for  the  sake  of 
variety.  The  same  may  be  noticed  as  to  the  sight :  it  is  quite 
incapable  of  remaining  fixed  on  the  same  object,  but  it  is  a 
variety  and  change  of  objects  that  excites  it.    And  this  is  more 


BOOK  XXXIX  VARIETY  IS  PLEASING  527 

than  all  the  case  with  the  mind ;  for  changes  in  the  objects  of 
attention  and  study  act  as  rests  to  laborious  men. 

2.  Accordingly  the  most  learned  of  the  ancient  historians 
have,  as  it  seems  to  me,  taken  intervals  of  rest  in  this  way : 
some  by  digressions  on  myths  and  tales,  and  others  by 
digressions  on  historical  facts, — not  confining  themselves  to 
Greek  history,  but  introducing  disquisitions  on  points  of  foreign 
history  as  well.  As,  for  instance,  when,  in  the  course  of  a  history 
of  Thessaly  and  the  campaigns  of  Alexander  of  Pherae,  they 
introduce  an  account  of  the  attempts  of  the  Lacedaemonians 
in  the  Peloponnese;  or  those  made  by  the  Athenians;  or  actions 
which  took  place  in  Macedonia  or  Illyria :  and  then  break  off 
into  an  account  of  the  expedition  of  Iphicrates  into  Egypt,  and 
the  iniquitous  deeds  of  Clearchus  in  the  Pontus.  This  will 
show  you  that  these  historians  all  employ  this  method ;  but, 
whereas  they  employ  it  without  any  system,  I  do  so  on  a 
regular  system.  For  these  men,  after  mentioning,  for  instance, 
that  Bardylis,  king  of  the  Illyrians,  and  Cersobleptes,  king 
of  the  Thracians,  established  their  dynasties,  neither  go  on 
continuously  with  the  stories  nor  return  to  them  after  an 
interval  to  take  them  up  where  they  left  off,  but,  treating  them 
like  an  episode  in  a  poem,  they  go  back  to  their  original  subject. 
But  I  made  a  careful  division  of  all  the  most  important  countries 
in  the  world  and  the  course  of  their  several  histories;  pursued 
exactly  the  same  plan  in  regard  to  the  order  of  taking  the  several 
divisions ;  and,  moreover,  arranged  the  history  of  each  year  in 
the  respective  countries,  carefully  keeping  to  the  Urn  its  of  the 
time :  and  the  result  is  that  I  have  made  the  transition  back- 
wards and  forwards  between  my  continuous  narrative  and  the 
continually  recurring  interruptions  easy  and  obvious  to  students, 
so  that  an  attentive  reader  need  never  miss  anything.  .  .  . 

After  various  operations  during  the  autumn  of^,c,  147,  M^ 
upshot  of  which  was  to  put  the  whole  of  the  open  country  in 
Roman  hands^  in  the  beginning  of  spring  b.c.  146,  Scipio  delivered 
his  final  attack  on  CartJuxge^  taking  first  the  quarter  of  the  mer- 
chants^ harbour  J  then  the  war  harbour^  atid  then  the  market-place. 
There  only  remained  the  streets  leading  to  the  Byrsa  and  the 
Byrsa  itself     Appian,  Pun.  123-126.     Z/V7,  Ep.  51. 


528  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  book 


8.  Having  got  within  the  walls,  while  the  Carthaginians 

The  faU  of      Still  held  out  on  the  citadel,  Scipio  found  that 

Carthage,      the  arm  of  the  sea  which  intervened  was  not 

B.C.  146  (spring).  ^^  r^  ^ggp  .  ^^  yx^n  Polybius  advising  him  to 

set  it  with  iron  spikes  or  drive  sharp  wooden  stakes  into  it,  to 

prevent  the  enemy  crossing  it  and  attacking  the 
^^of'S^>ol^'  ^^  said   that,   having  taken   the  walls 

and  got  inside  the  city,  it  would  be  ridiculous 
to  take  measures  to  avoid  fighting  the  enemy.  .  .  . 

4,  The  pompous  Hasdrubal  threw  himself  on  his  knees 
before  the  Roman  commander,  quite  forgetful  of  his  proud 
language.  .  .  . 

When  the  Carthaginian  commander  thus  threw  himself  as  a 
suppliant  at  Scipio's  knees,  the  proconsul  with  a  glance  at  those 
present  said :  "  See  what  Fortune  is,  gentlemen !  What  an 
example  she  makes  of  irrational  men !  This  is  the  Hasdrubal 
who  but  the  other  day  disdained  the  large  favours  which  I  offered 
him,  and  said  that  the  most  glorious  funeral  pyre  was  one's 
country  and  its  burning  ruins.  Now  he  comes  with  suppliant 
wreaths,  beseeching  us  for  bare  life  and  resting  all  his  hopes  on 
us.  Who  would  not  learn  from  such  a  spectacle  that  a  mere 
man  should  never  say  or  do  anything  presumptuous?"  Then 
some  of  the  deserters  came  to  the  edge  of  the  roof  and  begged 
the  front  ranks  of  the  assailants  to  hold  their  hands  for  a 
little ;  and,  on  Scipio  ordering  a  halt,  they  began  abusing 
Hasdrubal,  some  for  his  perjury,  declaring  that  he  had  sworn 
again  and  again  on  the  altars  that  he  would  never  abandon 
them,  and  others  for  his  cowardice  and  utter  baseness :  and 
they  did  this  in  the  most  unsparing  language,  and  with  the 
bitterest  terms  of  abuse.  And  just  at  this  moment  Hasdrubal's 
wife,  seeing  him  seated  in  front  of  the  enemy  with  Scipio, 
advanced  in  front  of  the  deserters,  dressed  in  noble  and  dignified 
attire  herself,  but  holding  in  her  hands,  on  either  side,  her  two 
boys  dressed  only  in  short  tunics  and  shielded  under  her  own 
robes.^     First  she  addressed  Hasdrubal  by  his  name,  and  when 

^  r6.  x^y^Ta^  that  is,  apparently,  the  mole  of  huge  stones  constructed  by  the 
Romans  to  block  up  the  mouth  of  the  harbour. 

*  fcerA  Tiov  IdLuiv  ip^vfidruy.  The  German  translator  Kraz  gives  up  these 
words  in  despair.  Kampe  translated  them  in  ikrer gewdhrtlUher  Tracht,  Mr. 
Strachan- Davidson  says,  "  ir/HxreiXi/^uca,  etc,  '  folding  them  in  her  own  robe 


FALL  OF  CARTHAGE  529 

i  nothing  but  remained  with  his  head  bowed  to  the  ground, 
;gan  by  calling  on  the  name  of  the  gods,  and  next  thanked 
'  warmly  because,  as  far  as  he  could  secure  it,  both  she 
er  children  were  saved. ^  And  then,  pausing  for  a  short 
she  asked  Hasdrubal  how  he  had  had  the  heart  to  secure 
Lvour  from  the  Roman  general  for  himself  alone,  .  .  . 
eaving  his  fellow-citizens  who  trusted  in  him  in  the  most 
ible  plight,  had  gone  over  secretly  to  the  enemy  ?  And 
le  had  the  assurance  to  be  sitting  there  holding  suppliant 
s,  in  the  face  of  the  very  men  to  whom  he  had  frequently 
[lat  the  day  would  never  come  in  which  the  sun  would  see 
•ubal  alive  and  his  native  city  in  flames.  .  .  . 

jsdrubaTs  wife  finally  threw  herself  and  children  from  the 
^  into  the  burning  streets,     Livy^  Ep.  51. 

ter  an  interview  with  [Scipio],  in  which  he  was  kindly 
i,  Hasdrubal  desired  leave  to  go  away  from  the  towa  . . . 
At  the  sight  of  the  city  utterly  perishing  amidst  the 
J  Scipio  burst  into  tears,  and  stood  long  reflecting  on  the 
ible  change  which  awaits  cities,  nations,  and  dynasties, 
md  all,  as  it  does  every  one  of  us  men.  This,  he 
ht,  had  befallen  Ilium,  once  a  powerful  city,  and  the 
mighty  empires  of  the  Assyrians,  Medes,  Persians,  and 
f  Macedonia  lately  so  splendid.  And  unintentionally  or 
sely  he  quoted, — the  words  perhaps  escaping  him  uncon- 

**  The  day  shall  be  when  holy  Troy  shall  fall 
And  Priam,  lord  of  spears,  and  Priam*s  folk." 

)n  my  asking  him  boldly  (for  I  had  been  his  tutor)  what 
eant  by  these  words,  he  did  not  name  Rome  distinctly, 
ras  evidently  fearing  for  her,  from  this  sight  of  the 
>ility  of  human  aflairs.  .  .  . 

lother  still  more  remarkable  saying  of  his  I  may  record. . . 
1  he  had  given  the  order  for  firing  the  town]  he  imme- 

r  hands,'  "  which  seems  straining  the  meaning  of  irpoirecXi^^uca.     The 
translator  says,  deux  enfans  susfendus  d  ses  vitemens. 
:cording  to  Livy  {Ep,  51)  she  had  tried  to  induce  her  husband  to  accept 
r  described  in  38,  2. 
omer,  //.  6,  448. 

..II  2  M 


530  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  *« 

diately  turned  round  and  grasped  me  by  the  hand  and  said: 
"  O  Polybius,  it  is  a  grand  thing,  but,  I  know  not  how,  I  fed 
a  terror  and  dread,  lest  some  one  should  one  day  give  the  same 
order  about  my  own  native  city."  .  .  .  Any  observation  more 
practical  or  sensible  it  is  not  easy  to  make.  For  in  the  midst 
of  supreme  success  for  one's  self  and  of  disaster  for  the  enemji 
to  take  thought  of  one's  own  position  and  of  the  possible  reveise 
which  may  come,  and  in  a  word  to  keep  well  in  mind  in  the 
midst  of  prosperity  the  mutability  of  Fortune,  is  the  charac- 
teristic of  a  great  man,  a  man  free  from  weaknesses  and  worthy 
to  be  remembered.  .  .  . 

After  the  rejection  of  the  orders  conveyed  by  the  legates  of 
Me  tell  us  (38,    11),   Critolaus   collected  the  Achaean  levies  at 
Corinth  y  under  the  pretext  of  going  to  war  with  Sparta  ;  but  hi 
soon  induced  tlie  league  to  declare  themselves  openly  at  war  with 
Rome.     He  was  encouraged  by  the  adhesion  of  the  Boeotarch 
Pytheas^  and  of  the  Chalcidians,     The  Thebans  were  the  readier 
to  join  him  because  they  had  lately  been  ordered  by  Metellus^  as 
arbiter  in  the  disputes^  to  pay  fines  to  the  Phocians^  Euboeans^ 
and  Amphissians.       When   ncivs  of  t/use  proceedings   reached 
Pome  in  the  spring  of  h.c.  146,  the  consul  Alummius  ivas  ordered 
to  lead  a  fleet  and  artny  against  Achaia,     But  Metellus  in 
Macedonia  wished  to  have  the  credit  of  settling  the  matter  him- 
self;  he  therefore  sent  envoys  to  the  Achaeans  ordering  them  to 
release  from  the  league  the  totcns  already  named  by  the  ^nate 
viz.   Sparta y   Connth^   Argos,   Heracleia^   and  Orchotnenus  in 
Arcadia^  and  advanced  with  his  army  from  Macedonia  through 
Thessaly   by   the   coast  road^    skirting    tlie    Sinus   Maliacus. 
Critolaus  was  already  engaged  in  besieging  Heraclea  Oetea^  to 
compel  it  to  return  to  its  obedience  to  the  league^  and  7vhen  his 
scouts  informed  him  of  the  approach  of  Metellus^  he  retreated  to 
Scar  plica  on  the  coast  of  LocriSy  some  miles  south  of  the  pass  of 
Thermopylae,     But  before  he  could  get  into  Scarphea  Metellus 
caught  him  w/,  killed  a  large  number  of  his  men^  and  took  one 
thousand  prisoners,     Critolaus  himself  disappeared ;  Pausanias 
seems  to  imagine  that  he  was  drojvned  in  the  salt  marshes  of 
the  coast y  but  Livy  says  that  he  poisoned  himself     Pausanias^  7, 
14,  15.     Livy,  Ep.  52.      Orosius,  5,  3. 


DIAEUS  SUCCEEDS  CRITOLAUS  531 


7.  Pytheas  was  a  brother  of  Acatidas  the  runner,  and  son 
of  Cleomenes.     He  had  led  an  evil  life,  and  character  of  the 
was  reported  to  have  wasted  the  flower  of  his      Boeotarch 
youth  in  unnatural  debauchery.     In  political  life        Pytheas. 
also  he  was  audacious  and  grasping,  and  had  been  supported 
by  Eumenes  and  Philataerus  for  these  very  reasons.  .  .  . 

8.  Critolaus  the  Achaean  Strategus  being  dead,  and  the  law 
providing  that,  in  case  of  such  an  event  befall-  o  th  d   th  f 
ing  the  existing  Strategus,  the  Strategus  of  the  critolaus  (spring 
previous  year  should  succeed  to  the  office  until  of  b.c.  i46)Diaeus 
the  regular  congress  of  the  league  should  meet,     succeeds  as 

it  fell  to  Diaeus  to  conduct  the  business  of  the 
league  and  take  the  head  of  affairs.    Accordingly,  after  sending 
forward  some  troops  to  Megara,^  he  went  himself  to  Argos ; 
and  from  that  place  sent  a  circular  letter  to  all    He  orders  the 
the  towns  ordering  them  to  set  free  their  slaves  arming  of  10,000 
who  were  of  military  age,  and  who  had  been        slaves, 
bom  and  brought  up  in  their  houses,  and  send  them  furnished 
with  arms  to  Corinth.    He  assigned  the  numbers  to  be  furnished 
by  the  several  towns  quite  at  random  and  without  any  regard 
to  equality,  just  as  he  did  everything  else.     Those  who  had 
not  the  requisite  number  of  home-bred  slaves  were  to  fill  up 
the  quota  imposed  on  each  town  from  other   slaves.      But 
seeing  that  the  public  poverty  was  very  great, 
owing  to  the  war  with  the  Lacedaemonians,  he  i;'J^fP;^^''^  ^J'^^^ 
compelled  the  richer  classes,  men  and  women 
alike,  to  make  promises  of  money  and  furnish  separate  contri- 
butions.    At  the  same  time  he  ordered  a  levy  en    ^^^  ^  general 
masse  at  Corinth  of  all  men  of  military  age.    The  levy  of  the  free- 
result  of  these  measures  was  that  every  city  was  ™^'"  ^^  military 
full  of  confusion,  commotion,  and  despair :  they  ^^'^' 

deemed  those  fortunate  who  had  already  perished  in  the  war, 
and  pitied  those  who  were  now  starting  to  take  part  in  it ;  and 
everybody  was  in  tears  as  though  they  foresaw  only  too  well 
what  was  going  to  happen.  They  were  especially  annoyed  at 
the  insolent  demeanour  and  neglect  of  their  duties  on  the  part 
of  the  slaves, — airs  which  they  assumed  as  having  been  recently 
liberated,  or,  in  the  case  of  others,  because  they  were  excited 

^  4000  under  Alcamcnes,  Pausan.  7,  15,  8. 


532  1HE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIVS  book 

by  the  prospect  of  freedom.  Moreover  the  men  were  compelled 
to  make  their  contribution  contrary  to  their  own  views,  aoccnd- 
ing  to  the  property  they  were  reputed  to  possess ;  while  the 
women  had  to  do  so,  by  taking  the  ornaments  of  their  own 
persons  or  of  their  children,  to  what  seemed  deliberately  meant 
for  their  destruction. 

9.  As  these  measures  came  all  at  once,  the  dismay  caused 
by  the  hardship  of  each  individually  prevented  people  from 
attending  to  or  grasping  the  general  question ;  or  they  must 
have  foreseen  that  they  were  all  being  led  on  to  secure  the 
certain  destruction  of  their  wives  and  children.  But,  as  though 
caught  in  the  rush  of  some  winter  torrent  and  carried  on  by 
its  irresistible  violence,  they  followed  the  infatuation  and 
The  Eieians  and  niadness  of  their  leader.  The  Eleians  and 
Messenians  do  not  Messenians  indeed  did  not  stir,  in  terror  of  the 
™°^'^  Roman  fleet;  for  nothing  could  have  saved  them 
if  the  storm  had  burst  when  it  was  originally  intended  The 
T^.  .  „  .       people  of  Patrae,  and  of  the  towns  which  were 

Dismay  at  Patrae.  r*^,.,.,,         ,  .         ,-  «.       - 

leagued  with  it,  had  a  short  time  before  sunered 
disasters  in  Phocis  ;^  and  their  case  was  much  the  most  pitiable 
one  of  all  the  Peloponnesian  cities  :  for  some  of  them  sought 
a  voluntary  death ;  others  fled  from  their  towns  through  deserted 
parts  of  the  country,  with  no  definite  aim  in  their  wanderings,  from 
the  panic  prevailing  in  the  towns.  Some  arrested  and  delivered 
each  other  to  the  enemy,  as  having  been  hostile  to  Rome;  others 
hurried  to  give  information  and  bring  accusations,  although  no 
one  asked  for  any  such  service  as  yet ;  while  others  went  to 
meet  the  Romans  with  suppliant  branches,  confessing  their 
treason,  and  asking  what  penance  they  were  to  pay,  although  as 
yet  no  one  was  asking  for  any  account  of  such  things.     The 

whole  country  seemed  to  be  under  an  evil  spell : 
suueoro^e    everywhere  people   were   throwing  themselves 

down  wells  or  over  precipices ;  and  so  dreadful 
was  the  state  of  things,  that  as  the  proverb  has  it  "  even  an 
enemy  would  have  pitied"  the  disaster  of  Greece.  For  in 
times  past  the  Greeks  had  met  with  reverses  or  indeed  complete 
disaster,  either  from  internal  dissensions  or  from  treacherous 
attacks  of  despots;  but  in  the  present  instance  it  was  from 

^  In  the  battle  with  Metellus  at  Scarphca. 


XXXIX         CONFUSION  AND  TERROR  IN  GREECE  533 

the  folly  of  their  leaders  and  their  own  unwisdom  that  they 

experienced  the  grievous  misfortunes  which  befell  them.     The 

Thebans  also,  abandoning  their  city  en  tnasse^ 

left   it   entirely   empty;   and  among  the   rest    ^^wi^^" 

Pytheas  retired  to  the   Peloponnese,  with  his 

wife  and  children,  and  there  wandered  about  the  country.^  .  .  . 

He  came  upon  the  enemy  much  to  his  surprise.  But  to  my 
mind  the  proverb,  "  the  reckonings  of  the  foolish  are  foolishness" 
applies  to  him.  And  naturally  to  such  men  things  clear  as 
diay  come  as  a  surprise.  .  .  . 

He  was  even  forming  plans  for  getting  back  home,  acting 
very  like  a  man  who,  not  having  learnt  to  swim  and  being 
about  to  plunge  into  the  sea,  should  not  consider  the  question 
of  taking  the  plunge;  but,  having  taken  it,  should  begin  to 
consider  how  he  is  to  swim  to  land.  .  .  . 

Having  secured  Boeotta,  Meiellus  advanced  to  Megara^  where 
the  Achaean  Alcamenes  had  been  posted  by  Diaeus  with  five 
thousand  men,     Alcamenes  hastily  evacuated  Megara  and  re- 
joined Diaeus  at  Corinth^  the  latter  having  meanwhile  been  re- 
elected Strategus,     PausaniaSf  7,  15,  10. 

10.  Diaeus  having  recently  come  to  Corinth  after  being 
appointed  Strategus  by  the  vote  of  the  people,  oiaeus  at  Corinth 
Andronidas  and  others  came   from  Caecilius  rejects  all  offers 
Metellus.     Against  these  men  he  spread  a  report  ^"'  ^y  Meieiius, 
that  they  were  in  alliance  with  the  enemy,  and    ^^^  1  b-c.  14  . 
gave  them  up  to  the  mob,  who  seized  on  them  with  great  violence 
and  threw  them  into  chains.     Philo  of  Thessaly  also  came 
bringing  many  liberal  offers  to  the  Achaeans.    And  on  hearing 
them,  certain  of  the  men  of  the  country  attempted  to  secure 
their  acceptance ;  among  whom  was  Stratius,  now  a  very  old 
man,  who  clung  to  Diaeus's  knees  and  entreated  him  to  yield  to 
the  offers  of  Metellus.     But  he  and  his  party  would  not  listen 
to  Philo's  proposals.     For  the  fact  was  that  they  did  not  believe 
that  the  amnesty  would  embrace  them  with  the  rest ;  and,  as 
they  regarded  their  own  advantage  and  personal  security  as  of 

*  Pausanias  on  the  contrary  says  that  Pytheas  was  caught  in  Boeotia  and 
condemned  by  Metellus  (7,  15,  10). 


534  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBWS  BOOl 

the  highest  importance,  they  spoke  as  they  did,  and  directed 

all  their  measures  on  the  existing  state  of  a&irs 
hT^^y^dJ'not  *^  t^^s  end :  although,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  they 
believe  that  they  failed  entirely  to  secure  these  objects.  For  as  they 
will  ever  be  am-  understood  quite  clearly  the  gravity  of  what  they 

tain  any  mercy  from  Rome ;  and  as  to  enduring 
nobly  whatever  should  befall  on  behalf  of  their  country  and  the 
safety  of  the  people,  that  they  never  once  took  into  considera- 
tion ;  yet  that  was  the  course  becoming  men  who  cared  for 
glory,  and  professed  to  be  the  leaders  of  Greece.  But  indeed 
how  or  whence  was  it  likely  that  such  a  lofty  idea  should  occur 
to  these  men  ?  The  members  of  this  conclave  were  Diaeus 
and  Damocritus,  who  had  but  recently  been  recalled  from  exile 
owing  to  the  disturbed  state  of  the  times,  and  with  them 
Alcamenes,  Theodectes  and  Archicrates ;  and  of  these  last  I 
have  already  stated  at  length  who  they  were,  and  have  de- 
scribed their  character,  policy,  and  manner  of  life. 

11.  Such  being  the  men  w^ith  whom  the  decision  rested, 

the  determination  arrived  at  was  what  was  to 
^  SlficlSes.''^  be  expected.    They  not  only  imprisoned  Andro- 

nidas  and  Lagius  and  their  friends,  but  even 
the  sub-Strategus  Sosicrates,  on  the  charge  of  his  having 
presided  at  a  council  and  given  his  voting  for  sending  an 
embassy  to  Caecilius  Metellus,  and  in  fact  of  having  been  the 
cause  of  all  their  misfortunes.  Next  day  they  empanelled 
judges  to  try  them ;  condemned  Sosicrates  to  death ;  and 
having  bound  him  racked  him  till  he  died,  without  however 
inducing  him  to  say  anything  that  they  expected  :  but  they 
acquitted  Lagius,  Andronidas  and  Archippus,  partly  because 
the  people  were  scared  at  the  lawless  proceeding  against 
Sosicrates,  and  partly  because  Diaeus  got  a  talent  from 
Andronidas  and  forty  minae  from  Archippus;  for  this  man 
could  not  relax  his  usual  shameless  and  abandoned  principles 
in  this  particular  even  "  in  the  very  pit,"  ^  as  the  saying  is.  He 
had  acted  with  similar  cruelty  a  short  time  before  also  in 

^  The  pit  is  the  place  dug  out  ((r<cdfc/xa)  and  prepared  in  the  gymnasium 
for  leapcrs.  To  be  in  the  pit  is  to  be  on  Ihe  very  ground  of  the  struggle, 
without  possibility  of  escaping  it. 


XXXIX  SAFETY  IN  SWIFT  RUIN  535 

regard  to  Philinus  of  Corinth.  For  on  a  charge  of  his  holding 
communication  with  Menalcidas^  and  favouring  the  Roman 
cause,  he  caused  Philinus  and  his  sons  to  be  flogged  and 
racked  in  each  other's  sight,  and  did  not  desist  until  the  boys 
and  Philinus  were  all  dead  When  such  madness  and  ferocity 
was  infecting  everybody,  as  it  would  not  be  easy  to  parallel  even 
among  barbarians,  it  would  be  clearly  very  natural  to  ask  why 
the  whole  nation  did  not  utterly  perish.  For  my  Greece  is  saved 
part,  I  think  that  Fortune  displayed  her  resources  by  the  rapidity  of 
and  skill  in  resisting  the  folly  and  madness  of  ^^  """• 
the  leaders ;  and,  being  determined  at  all  hazards  to  save  the 
Achaeans,  like  a  good  wrestler,  she  had  recourse  to  the  only 
trick  left ;  and  that  was  to  bring  down  and  conquer  the  Greeks 
quickly,  as  in  fact  she  did.  For  it  was  owing  to  this  that  the 
wrath  and  fury  of  the  Romans  did  not  blaze  out  farther ;  that 
the  army  of  Libya  did  not  come  to  Greece ;  and  that  these 
leaders,  being  such  men  as  I  have  described,  did  not  have  an 
opportunity,  by  gaining  a  victory,  of  displaying  their  wickedness 
upon  their  countrymen.  For  what  it  was  likely  that  they 
would  have  done  to  their  own  people,  if  they  had  got  any 
ground  of  vantage  or  obtained  any  success,  may  be  reason- 
able inferred  from  what  has  already  been  said.  And  indeed 
everybody  at  the  time  had  the  proverb  on  his  lips,  "  had  we 
not  perished  quickly  we  had  not  been  saved  "^  .  .  . 

12.  Aulus  Postumius  deserves  some  special  notice  from  us 
here.     He  was  a  member  of  a  family  and  gens     character  of 
of  the  first  rank,  but  in   himself  was   garru-  Aulus  Postumius 
lous  and  wordy,  and  exceedingly  ostentatious.        Aibmus. 
From  his  boyhood  he  had  a  great  leaning  to  Greek  studies 
and  literature :  but  he  was  so  immoderate  and  affected  in 
this   pursuit,  that   owing   to   him   the    Greek   style   became 
offensive  to  the  elder  and  most  respectable  men  at  Rome. 
Finally  he  attempted  to  write  a  poem  and  a  formal  history 
in   Greek,  in  the  preface  to  which  he  desired  his  readers 
to  excuse  him  if,  being  [a  Roman,  he  could  not  completely 
command    the   Greek    idiom   or   method    in   the   handling 
of  the  subject     To  whom   M.   Porcius  Cato  made  a  very 

^  See  note  on  30,  17. 
*  For  this  proverb  see  Plutarch,  Thcmist,  29  ;  dc  Alex,  llrf,  5  ;  de  Exih  7. 


536  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  booe 

pertinent  answer.  "  I  wonder,"  said  he,  "  on  what  grounds 
you  make  such  a  demand  If  the  Amphictyonic  council  had 
charged  you  to  write  the  history,  you  might  p>erhaps  have  been 
forced  to  allege  this  excuse  and  ask  for  this  consideratioa 
But  to  write  it  of  your  own  accord,  when  there  was  no  com- 
pulsion to  do  so,  and  then  to  demand  consideration,  if  you 
should  happen  to  write  bad  Greek,  is  quite  unreasonable.  It 
is  something  like  a  man  entering  for  the  boxing  match  or 
pancratium  in  the  pubHc  games,  and,  when  he  comes  into  the 
stadium,  and  it  is  his  turn  to  fight,  begging  the  spectators  to 
pardon  him  *if  he  is  unable  to  stand  the  fatigue  or  the  blows.' 
Such  a  man  of  course  would  be  laughed  at  and  condemned  at 
once."  ^  And  this  is  what  such  historiographers  should  experi- 
ence, to  prevent  them  spoiling  a  good  thing  by  their  rash  pre- 
sumption. Similarly,  in  the  rest  of  his  life,  he  had  imitated  all  the 
worst  points  in  Greek  fashions ;  for  he  was  fond  of  pleasure  and 
averse  from  toil.  And  this  may  be  illustrated  from  his  conduct 
in  the  present  campaign :  for  being  among  the  first  to  enter 
(}reece  at  the  time  that  the  battle  in  Phocis  took  place,  he  retired 
to  Thebes  on  the  pretence  of  illness,  in  order  to  avoid  taking 
part  in  the  engagement ;  but,  when  the  battle  was  ended,  he 
was  the  first  to  write  to  the  Senate  announcing  the  victory, 
entering  into  every  detail  as  though  he  had  himself  been 
present  at  the  conflict  .  .  . 

On  the  atrival  of  the  Consul  MummiuSy  Metellus  was  sent 

Rc.  146.       ^^^^   '''^^    Macedonia,     Mummius   was  accom- 

Coss.  Cn.  Cor-  panted  by  L,  Aurelius  Orestes^  who  had  been 

nelius  Lentulus,  ,,^^^A.  fnurdcred  in  the  riot  at  Corinth  (38,  7), 

and^  pitching  his  camp  in  the  Isthmus^  7vas  joined 
by  allies  who  raised  his  artny  to  three  thousand  five 
hundred  cavalry  and  tiventy-six  thousand  infantry.  The 
Achaeans  made  a  sudden  attack  upon  them  and  gained  a 
slight  success^  which  was  a  feio  days  aftenvards  revenged 
by   a   signal  defeat,-     Instead  of  retiring  into    Corinth^  and 

*  Plutarch  reports  the  same  anecdote  much  more  briefly  in  Caio  Maj.  12, 
as  do  others.  Professor  Freeman  [History  of  Federal  Goirmment,  p.  142) 
seems  to  regard  it  as  a  serious  indication  that  the  Amphictyonic  council  had 
Injcome  a  body  exercising  some  literary  authority,  in  default  of  any  other.  I 
think  that  Calo  had  no  such  meaning.  He  mentioned  any  body  of  men, 
however  unlikely  to  exercise  such  an  influence,  which  at  any  rate  was  Greek. 


XXXIX  FALL  OF  CORINTH  537 

from  that  stronghold  making  some  terms  with  Mummius, 
Diaeusfled  to  Megalopolis^  where  he  poisoned  himself  ^  after  first 
killing  his  wife.  The  rest  of  the  beaten  Achaean  army  took 
refuge  in  Corinth^  which  Mummius  took  and  fired  on  the  third 
day  after  the  battle  with  Diams,  Then  the  commissioners  were 
sent  from  Rome  to  settle  the  whole  of  Greece,  Pausanias^  7, 
16-17 ;  Livy^  Ep.  52. 

13.  The  incidents  of  the  capture  of  Corinth  were  melan- 
choly.     The   soldiers   cared  nothing   for   the  The  destruction  of 
works  of  art  and  the  consecrated  statues.     I  the  works  of  art 
saw  with  my  own  eyes  pictures  thrown  on  the  '"  Corinth,  Sep- 
ground  and  soldiers  playing  dice  on  them ;  among  .   •  •   ^  . 
them  was  a  picture  of  Dionysus  by  Aristeides — in  reference 
to  which  they  say  that  the  proverbial  saying  arose,  "  Nothing 
to  the  Dionysus," — and  the  Hercules  tortured  by  the  shirt  of 
Deianeira.  .  .  . 

14.  Owing  to  the  popular  reverence  for  the  memory  of 
Philopoemen,  they  did  not  take  down  the  statues  of  him  in 
the  various  cities.  So  true  is  it,  as  it  seems  to  me,  that  every 
genuine  act  of  virtue  produces  in  the  mind  of  those  who 
benefit  by  it  an  affection  which  it  is  difficult  to  efface.  .  .  . 

One  might  fairly,  therefore,  use  the  common  saying  :  "  He 
has  been  foiled  not  at  the  door,  but  in  the  road."  .  .  .^ 

There   were   many   statues   of   Philopoemen,   and   many 
erections  in  his  honour,  voted  by  the  several 
cities ;  and  a  Roman  at  the  time  of  the  disaster    phiSIJJSi^n 
which  befell  Greece  at  Corinth,  wished  to  abolish 
them  all  and  to  formally  indict  him,  laying  an  information 
against  him,  as  though  he  were  still  alive,  as  an  enemy  and  ill- 
wisher  to  Rome.     But  after  a  discussion,  in  which  Polybius 
spoke  against  this  sycophant,  neither  Mummius  nor  the  com- 
missioners would  consent  to  abolish  the  honours  of  an  illus- 
trious man.  .  .  . 

Polybius,  in  an  elaborate  speech,  conceived  in  the  spirit  of 
what  has  just  been  said,  maintained  the  cause  of  speech  of  Polybius 
Philopoemen.     His  arguments  were  that  "This    defending  the 

^  Seems  to  mean  "he  lost  before  he  began,"  before  he  got  even  at  the 
threshold  of  his  enterprise.  There  is  nothing  to  show  to  what  the  fragment 
refers. 


538  THE  HISTORTFS  OF  POL  VBIUS  book 

memory  of  man  had  indeed  been  frequently  at  variance  with 
Phiiopoemen.  ^^e  Romans  on  the  matter  of  their  injunctions, 
but  he  only  maintained  his  opposition  so  far  as  to  inform  and 
persuade  them  on  the  points  in  dispute ;  and  even  that  he  did 
not  do  without  serious  cause.  He  gave  a  genuine  proof  of  his 
loyal  policy  and  gratitude,  by  a  test  as  it  were  of  fire,  in  the 
periods  of  the  wars  with  Philip  and  Antiochus.  For,  possessing 
at  those  times  the  greatest  influence  of  any  one  in  Greece,  from 
his  personal  power  as  well  as  that  of  the  Achaeans,  he  preserved 
his  friendship  for  Rome  with  the  most  absolute  fidelity,  having 
joined  in  the  vote  of  the  Achaeans  in  virtue  of  which,  four 
months  before  the  Romans  crossed  from  Italy,  they  levied 
a  war  from  their  own  territory  upon  Antiochus  and  the 
Aetolians,  when  nearly  all  the  other  Greeks  had  become 
estranged  from  the  Roman  friendship."  Having  listened  to 
this  speech  and  approved  of  the  speaker's  view,  the  ten  com- 
missioners granted  that  the  complimentary  erections  to  Phiio- 
poemen in  the  several  cities  should  be  allowed  to  remain. 
Acting  on  this  pretext,  Polybius  begged  of  the  Consul  the 
statues  of  Achaeus,  Aratus,  and  Phiiopoemen,  though  they 
had  already  been  transported  to  Acamania  from  the  Pelo- 
ponnesc :  in  gratitude  for  which  action  people  set  up  a  marble 
statue  of  Polybius  himself.^  .  .  . 

16.  After  the  settlement  made  by  the  ten  commissioners 
Polybius  will  have  i*^  Achala,  they  directed  the  Quaestor,  who  was 
no  confiscated  to  superintend  the  selling  of  Diaeus's  property,  to 
goods.  allow  Polybius  to  select  anything  he  chose 
from  the  goods  and  present  it  to  him  as  a  free  gift,  and  to 
sell  the  rest  to  the  highest  bidders.  But,  so  far  from  accept- 
ing any  such  present,  Polybius  urged  his  friends  not  to  covet 
anything  whatever  of  the  goods  sold  by  the  Quaestor  any- 
where : — for  he  was  going  a  round  of  the  cities  and  selling  the 
property  of  all  those  who  had  been  partisans  of  Diaeus,  as 
well  of  such  as  had  been  condemned,  except  those  who  left 
children  or  parents.     Some  of  these  friends  did  not  take  his 

1  The  base  of  a  statue  of  Polybius  has  l)ecn  discovered  at  01>'mpia  with 
the  inscription  y\  ir6X((  ^  rwv  'HXefwi'  IIoXi//3toi'  Ai'/c6pra  Mc7aXoToX£/rT7»'.  But 
the  statue  mentioned  in  the  text  seems  to  be  one  set  up  by  the  Achaeans. 
For  the  statues  of  Polybius,  see  Introduction,  pp.  xxxi.  xxxii. 


xxxix  ROMAN  SETTLEMENT  OF  GREECE  539 

advice ;  but  those  who  did  follow  it  earned  a  most  excellent 
reputation  among  their  fellow-citizens. 

16.  After  completing  these  arrangements  in  six  months, 
the  ten  commissioners  sailed  for  Italy,  at  the       g^c.  145. 
beginning  of  spring,  having  left  a  noble  monu-  The  commission- 
ment  of  Roman  policy  for  the  contemplation  of  ^^  "[^'"^  ^'^.^^^^ 
all  Greece.     They  also  charged  Polybius,  as  instractioS'^'itfi 
they  were  departing,  to  visit  all  the  cities  and  to  Polybius  to  ex- 
decide  all  questions  that  might  arise,  until  such    P^^^°  the  new 

,  -It*       constitutions. 

time  as  they  were  grown  accustomed  to  their 
constitution  and  laws.  Which  he  did :  arid  after  a  while 
caused  the  inhabitants  to  be  contented  with  the  constitution 
given  them  by  the  commissioners,  and  left  no  difficulty  con- 
nected with  the  laws  on  any  point,  private  or  public,  un- 
settled 

[Wherefore  the  people,  who  always  admired  and  honoured 
this  man,  being  in  every  way  satisfied  with  the  ^  .  ^     {'    a 
conduct  of  his  last  years  and  his  management  of  Polybius  as  to 
of  the  business  just  described,  honoured  him  the  effect  of  his 
with  the  most  ample  marks  of  their  respect  both  ^f^^"^  ftiifiiment 

,     .        ,  .     ,.-       *^ ,      -        ,  .     ,       1  A     ,    t  •   of  his  commission. 

during  his  hfe  and  after  his  death.  And  this 
universal  verdict  was  fully  justified.  For  if  he  had  not 
elaborated  and  reduced  to  writing  the  laws  relating  to  the 
administration  of  justice,  everything  would  have  been  in  a 
state  of  uncertainty  and  confusion.  Therefore  we  must  look 
upon  this  as  the  most  glorious  of  the  actions  of  Polybius.]  .  .  . 

17.  The    Roman    Proconsul,    after    the    commissioners 
had    left    Achaia,    having    restored    the   holy  Mummius  acted 
places   in   the   Isthmus   and   ornamented   the    in  Greece  with 
temples  in  Olympia  and  Delphi,  proceeded  to  ^^^^  ^^^^  ^^ 

,  /.    1         •  •  ^    .   \  ,         -  great  moderation. 

make  a  tour  of  the  cities,  receivmg  marks  of 
honour  and  proper  gratitude  in  each.  And  indeed  he 
deserved  honour  both  public  and  private,  for  he  conducted 
himself  with  self-restraint  and  disinterestedness,  and  ad- 
ministered his  office  with  mildness,  although  he  had  great 
opportunities  of  enriching  himself,  and  immense  authority  in 
Greece.  And  in  fact  in  the  points  in  which  he  was  thought  to 
have  at  all  overlooked  justice,  he  appears  not  to  have  done  it 
for  his  own  sake,  but  for  that  of  his  friends.     And  the  most 


S40  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS  book 

conspicuous  instance  of  this  was  in  the  case  of  the  Chalddian 
horsemen  whom  he  put  to  death.  ^  .  .  . 

18.  Ptolemy,  king  of  Syria,'  died  from  a  wound  received 

Death  of  Ptolemy*"  ^^^  J^ '  a  man  who,  according  to  some. 

iniiiometor  in  a  deserved   great    praise    and    abiding   remem- 

war  in  Syria  in  brance,  and  according  to  others  the  reverse.     If 

Dcmori"  *ihe    ^"^  ^*"^  before  him  ever  was,  he  was  mild  and 

younger  against  benevolent ;  a  very  strong  proof  of  which  is  that 

Alexander  Baias.  he  never  put  any  of  his  own  friends  to  death  on 

See  above,      ^^^  charge  whatever ;  and  I  believe  that  not  a 

single  man  at  Alexandria  either  owed  his  death 

to  him.     Again,  though  he  was  notoriously  ejected  from  his 

throne  by  his  brother,  in  the  first  place,  when  he  got  a  clear 

opportunity  against   him   in   Alexandria,   he   granted  him  a 

complete   amnesty;  and  afterwards,  when   his   brother  once 

more  made  a  plot  against  him  to  seize  Cyprus,  though  he  got 

him  body  and  soul  into  his  hands  at  Lapethus,  he  was  so  far 

from  punishing  him  as  an  enemy,  that  he  even  made  him  grants 

in  addition  to  those  which  formerly  belonged  to  him  in  virtue 

of  the  treaty  made  between  them,  and  moreover  promised  him 

his  daughter.     However,  in  the  course  of  a  series  of  successes 

and  prosperity,  his  mind  became  corrupted ;  and  he  fell  a  prey  to 

the  dissoluteness  and  effeminacy  characteristic  of  the  Egyptians: 

and  these  vices  brought  him  into  serious  disasters.  .  .  . 


CONCLUSION    OF   THE   HISTORY 

19.  Having  accomplished  these  objects,  I  returned  home 
from  Rome,  having  put,  as  it  werp,  the  finishing-stroke  to  my 
whole  previous  political  actions,  and  obtained  a  worthy  return 
for  my  constant  loyalty  to  the  Romans.     Wherefore  I  make  my 

*  Thebac  quoquc  ct  Chalcis,  quae  auxilio  fucrant,  dirutae.  Ipse  L.  Mum- 
mius  abstinentissimum  virum  egit ;  ncc  quidqiiam  ex  iis  opibus  omamentisque, 
quae  praedives  Corinthus  habuit,  in  domuni  ejus  pervenit.     Lixy,  Ep.  52. 

*  Ptolemy  Philometor,  king  of  Egypt,  is  called,  by  way  of  distinction,  "King 
of  Syria,"  because  that  title  was  l)estowed  on  him  by  the  people  of  Antioch 
during  his  last  expedition  in  Syria.  This  was  undertaken  in  support  of 
Alexander  Bnlas,  who  repaid  him  by  conniving  at  an  attempt  upon  his  life. 
Whereupon  Ptolemy  joined  Demetrius,  the  son  of  £)cmetrius  Soter,  and  sup- 
ported his  claim  against  Alexander  Balas.  Joseph.  Ant.  13,  3  ;  1  Maccabees 
II,  1-13. 


XXXIX  SUMMARY  OF  THE  WORK  541 

prayers  to  all  the  gods  that  the  rest  of  my  life  may  continue  in 
the  same  course  and  in  the  same  prosperity ;  for  I  see  only 
too  well  that  Fortune  is  envious  of  mortals,  and  is  most  apt  to 
show  her  power  in  those  points  in  which  a  man  fancies  that  he 
is  most  blest  and  most  successful  in  life. 

Such  was  the  result  of  my  exertions.  But  having  now 
arrived  at  the  end  of  my  whole  work,  1  wish 
to  recall  to  the  minds  of  my  readers  the  See  1^3^  and 
point  from  which  I  started,  and  the  plan  which 
I  laid  down  at  the  commencement  of  my  history,  and  then 
to  give  a  summary  of  the  entire  subject.  I  announced  then  at 
starting  that  I  should  begin  my  narrative  at  the  point  where 
Timaeus  left  off,  and  that  going  cursorily  over  the  events  in 
Italy,  Sicily,  and  Libya — since  that  writer  has  only  composed  a 
history  of  those  places, — when  I  came  to  the  time  when  Han- 
nibal took  over  the  command  of  the  Carthaginian  army;  Philip 
son  of  Demetrius  the  kingdom  of  Macedonia ;  Cleomenes  of 
Sparta  was  banished  from  Greece ;  Antiochus  succeeded  to  the 
kingdom  in  Syria,  and  Ptolemy  Philopator  to  that  in  Egypt, — I 
promised  that  starting  once  more  from  that  period,  namely  the 
139th  Olympiad,  I  would  give  a  general  history  of  the  world : 
marking  out  the  periods  of  the  Olympiads,  separating  the 
events  of  each  year,  and  comparing  the  histories  of  the  several 
countries  by  parallel  narratives  of  each,  up  to  the  capture  of 
Carthage,  and  the  battle  of  the  Achaeans  and  Romans  in  the 
Isthmus,  and  the  consequent  political  settlement  imposed  on 
the  Greeks.  From  all  of  which  I  said  that  students  would 
learn  a  lesson  of  supreme  interest  and  instructiveness.  This 
was  to  ascertain  how,  and  under  what  kind  of  polity,  almost 
the  whole  inhabited  world  came  under  the  single  authority  of 
Rome,  a  fact  quite  unparalleled  in  the  past.  These  promises 
then  having  all  been  fulfilled,  it  only  remains  for  me  to  state 
the  periods  embraced  in  my  history,  the  number  of  my  books, 
and  how  many  go  to  make  up  my  whole  work.  .  .  . 


I.— SHORTER  FRAGMENTS 

The  first  eight  of  these  fragments  belong  to  book  6,  but  as 
they  do  not  fall  in  7vith  what  remains  of  the  text,  I  have  placed 
them  here,  I  have  divided  these  fragtnents  into  tu^o  classes  : 
(A)  those  which  seem  to  have  some  distinct  reference  which  can 
be  recognised  or  guessed :  {B)  those  which  though  fairly  complete 
in  themselves  cannot  be  so  classed,  A  good  many  more,  generally 
quoted  by  Suidas  for  the  sake  of  some  one  7Vordy  did  not  seem 
worth  /cutting  in  an  English  dress.  The  numbers  in  brackets 
are  those  of  Hultsclis  text. 


I  (6,  2) 

I  believe  Rome  to  have  been  founded  in  the 
second  year  of  the  7th  Olympiad.^ 


B.C.  751. 


^  Dionysius  Hal.  (1,  74)  (]uotcs  this  statement  of  Polybius  with  the  remark 
that  it  is  founded  on  a  single  tablet  in  the  custody  of  the  Pontifices,  Various 
calculations  as  to  the  dale  were  : — 

I">aloslhones 


follow  oil  l>y 
AfK)llodorus 
Nojx^s 
Dionysius 
Lulalius 

(J.  Fabius  Picl<»r 
Tiniaeus 

L.  Cincius  Alimantus 
M.  Pore i us  Calo 
\'arro  ) 

Vellcius  Palcrculus     \ 
Pomi>onius  Allicus   . 


Olymp.  7,  I 


K.C.  752. 


Olymp.  8,  I  .         .         .  B.C.  748. 

38th  year  liefore  Olymp.  i     .  B.C.  813. 

Olymp.  12,  4       .         .         .  B.C.  729. 

432  years  after  the  Trojan  war.  B.C.  752. 

Olymp.  6,  2         .         .  RC.  755. 

Olymp.  6,  3         .         .         .      RC.  754. 

Hut  even  grantinjj  a  definite  act  of  foundation  (on  which  see  Mommscn,  //.  of 
A\  vol.  i.  p.  4),  the  01ymj)ic  register  before  672  B.C.  is  a  very  uncertain  founda- 
tion on  which  to  build,     ^s^aa  Journal  of  Hellenic  ^Studies,  vol.  ii.  p.  164  sq. 


SHORTER  FRAGMENTS  543 

II  (6,  2) 

Polybius,  like  Aristodemus  of  Elis,  informs  us  that  the 
register  of  the  athletic  victors  at  the  Olympic 
games    began    to    be    kept    from    the    27  th 
Olympiad,  at  which  Coroebus  of  Elis  was  first  registered  as 
conqueror  in  the  stadium ;  and  this  Olympiad  was  regarded 
as  an  era  by  the  Greeks  from  which  to  calculate  dates.^ 

III  (6,  2) 

The  Palatine  was  named  after  Pallas,  who  died  there.  He 
was  the  son  of  Heracles  and  Lavina,  daughter  of  Evander. 
His  maternal  grandfather  raised  a  barrow  as  his  tomb  on  this 
hill,  and  called  the  place  after  him  the  Pallantium. 

IV  (6,  2) 

Among  the  Romans  women  are  forbidden  to  drink  wine ; 
and  they  drink  what  is  called  passutfiy  which  is  made  from 
raisins,  and  tastes  very  like  the  sweet  wine  of  Aegosthena  or 
Crete.  This  is  what  they  drink  to  quench  their  thirst.  But 
it  is  almost  impossible  for  them  to  drink  wine  without 
being  found  out.  For,  to  begin  with,  the  woman  has  not 
got  the  charge  of  wine ;  and,  in  the  next  place,  she  is  bound 
to  kiss  all  her  male  relatives  and  those  of  her  husband,  down 
to  his  cousins,  every  day  on  seeing  them  for  the  first  time ; 
and  as  she  cannot  tell  which  of  them  she  will  meet,  she  has 
to  be  on  her  guard  For  if  she  has  but  tasted  wine,  there  is 
no  occasion  for  any  formal  accusation.^ 

V  (6,  2) 

He  also  founded  Ostia  at  the  mouth  of  the  Ancus  Marcius, 
Tiber.  Livy,  i,  33. 

^  From  Eusebius.  It  may  be  noted  that  this  statement  of  Polybius  is  an 
earlier  evidence  than  any  other  for  the  existence  of  an  Olympian  register  prior 
to  B.C.  600.  Pausanias  also  dates  the  register  from  the  year  of  Coroebus's 
victory  (5,  8,  6). 

^  I  have  translated  this  passage  as  it  stands  in  the  various  editions  of 
Polybius.  But  I  feel  convinced  that  none  of  it  belongs  to  him  except  the  first 
sentence.     It  comes  from  Athenaeus,  440  E, 


544  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS 


VI  (6,  2) 

Lucius,  the  son  of  Demaratus  of  Corinth,  came  to  Rome 
Lucius  Tarquinius  relying  on  his  own  ability  and  wealth,  and  con- 
Priscus  comes  to  vinced  that  the  advantages  he  possessed  would 
Rome.  place  him  in  the  front  rank  in  the  state :  for 
he  had  a  wife  who,  among  other  useful  qualities,  was  admir- 
ably suited  by  nature  to  assist  in  any  political  enterprise. 
Arrived  at  Rome,  and  admitted  to  citizenship,  he  devoted 
himself  to  flattering  the  king ;  and  before  very  long  his  wealth, 
his  natural  dexterity,  and,  more  than  all,  his  early  training, 
enabled  him  so  to  please  the  king's  taste  that  he  gained  his 
cordial  liking  and  confidence.  As  time  went  on  his  intimacy 
became  so  close  that  he  lived  with  [Ancus]  Marcius,  and 
assisted  him  in  managing  his  kingdom.  While  so  engaged, 
he  contrived  to  make  himself  useful  to  every  one.  All  who 
were  suitors  for  anything  found  in  him  an  active  supporter 
and  friend :  his  wealth  was  spent  with  noble  liberality  and 
judgment  on  various  objects  of  national  importance  ;  and  thus 
he  secured  for  himself  the  gratitude  of  many,  and  the  goodwill 
and  good  word  of  all,  and  finally  obtained  the  throne.  .  .  .^ 

Every  branch  of  virtue  should  be  practised  by  those  who 
aim  at  good  training,  from  childhood,  but,  above  all, 
courage.  .  . 

(6,  I) 
An  impossible  lie  admits  of  no  defence  even. 

(6,1) 

It  is  the  act  of  a  wise  and  sensible  man  to  recognise — as 
Hesiod  puts  it — "how  much  greater  the  half  is  than  the 
whole."  2 

VII  (6,  i) 

To  learn  sincerity  towards  the  Gods  is  a  kind  of  image  of 
truthfulness  towards  each  other. 

^  Sec  Li^y,  i,  34.     Dionys.  Halic.  3,  46. 

^  Hesiod,   Works  and  Days,   40,    yijirtoi*  oihk   (<raat¥   6(T(fi   rX^oy   iifutru 
Travrbi, 


SHORTER  FRAGMENTS  545 


VIII  (6,  i) 

It  generally  happens  in  the  world  that  men  who  acquire 
have  a  natural  turn  for  keeping ;  while  those  who  succeed  to 
wealth,  without  any  trouble  to  themselves,  are  apt  to  squander  it. 

IX  (10) 

The  strongest  fortifications  are  in  general  dangerous  to 
both  sides ;  which  may  be  illustrated  from  what  occurs  in  the 
case  of  citadels.  These  last  are  regarded  as  contributing 
greatly  to  the  security  of  the  cities  in  which  they  stand,  and  to 
the  protection  of  their  freedom ;  but  they  often  turn  out  to  be 
the  origin  of  slavery  and  indisputable  misfortunes.^ 

X(i3) 

Some  few  approved  of  his  doing  so,  but  the  majority  ob- 
jected, saying,  some  that  it  was  folly,  and  others  that  it  was 
madness  for  a  man  thus  to  risk  and  hazard  his  life,  who  was 
quite  unacquainted  with  the  kind  of  fighting  in  use  among 
these  barbarians.  2 

XI  (16) 

**  Secure  retreat  in  case  disaster  fall." 

One  ought  always  to  keep  this  line  in  mind.  From  failing 
to  do  so  Lucius  the  Roman  ^  met  with  a  grave  disaster.  So 
narrow  is  the  risk  of  destruction  to  the  most  powerful  forces 
when  the  leaders  are  unwise.  A  sufficient  illustration  to 
thoughtful  men  is  furnished  by  the  headstrong  invasion  of 
Argos  by  Pyrrhus  king  of  the  Epirotes,*  and  the  expedition 
through  Thrace  of  king  Lysimachus  against  Dorimichaites, 
king  of  Odrysae ;  ^  and  indeed  many  other  similar  cases. 

^  Polybius  is  perhaps  referring  to  the  Acrocorinthus  especially.  But  we 
must  remember  that  many  of  the  citadels  in  the  third  century  B.C.  were  in  the 
hands  of  Macedonian  garrisons. 

*  This  has  been  referred  by  some  to  the  account  of  Scipio  Aemilianus's 
single  combat  with  the  Spaniard.     See  35,  5. 

'  Perhaps  L.  Postumius,  Livy,  23,  24  (Hultsch). 

*  B.C.  272.     Plutarch,  Pyrrh.  31-34. 

*  .*<ee  Pausan.  i.  9,  6.  His  disaster  compelled  him  to  give  up  his  domi- 
nions Ix^yond  the  Danube.  Another  and  more  successful  war  in  Tliracc  secm« 
referred  to  in  Diod.  Sic.  18,  14. 

VOU  II  2  N 


546  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIVS 

XII  (23) 

Marcellus  never  once  conquered  Hannibal,  who  in  fact 
remained  unbeaten  until  Scipio's  victory.^ 

XIII  (25) 

No  darkness,  no  storm  however  violent,  turned  him  from 
his  purpose.  He  forced  his  way  through  all  such  obstacles ; 
he  overcame  even  disease  by  resolute  labour,  and  never  once 
failed  in  an  object  or  experienced  a  variation  in  his  uniform 
good  fortune. 

XIV  (29) 

In  old  times  single  combats  among  the  Romans  were  con- 
ducted with  good  faith  [but  in  our  days  many  contrivances 
have  been  hit  upon]. 

XV  (31) 

The  horse,  from  the  agony  of  the  wound,  first  fell  forward, 
and  then  galloped  furiously  through  the  middle  of  the  camp. 

XVI  (42) 

Seeing  that  the  superstitious  feelings  of  the  soldiers  were 
roused  by  these  portents,  he  exerted  himself  to  remove  the 
scruples  of  the  men  by  means  of  his  own  intelligence  and 
strategic  skill. 

XVII  (63) 

SHIPS   WITH    SIX    BANKS   OF   OARS 

These  vessels  appear  to  be  as  swift  sailers  as  penteconters, 
but  to  be  much  inferior  to  triremes  ;  and  their  construction  has 
been  abandoned  for  many  years  past.  Polybius,  however,  is 
supposed  to  lay  down  the  measurements  of  such  vessels,  which 
the  Romans  and  Carthaginians  appear  to  have  often  employed 
in  their  wars  with  each  other.- 

^  Livy,  however,  records  more  than  one  success   of   Marcellus    against 
Hannibal,  see  23,  16,  46  ;  27,  14.     Scipio's  victory  of  course  is  at  Zama. 
3  From  Zosimus,  5,  20,  7.     Sec  i,  26. 


SHORTER  FRAGMENTS  547 

XVIir  (64) 

Getting  completely  drunk,  and  all  flung  on  the  ground  in 
the  various  tents,  they  neither  heard  any  word  of  command 
nor  took  any  thought  of  the  future  whatever.^ 

XIX  (66) 

In  consultations  of  war,  as  in  those  relating  to  bodily  sick- 
ness, one  ought  to  take  as  much  account  of  the  symptoms 
that  have  since  arisen  as  of  those  originally  existing. 

XX  (90) 

Cappadocia  extends  from  Mount  Taurus  and  Lycaonia  up 
to  the  Pontic  Sea.  The  name  is  Persian  and  arose  thus.  A 
certain  Persian  [named  Cappadocus  ?]  was  present  at  a  hunt 
with  Artaxerxes,  or  some  other  king,  when  a  lion  sprang  upon 
the  king*s  horse.  This  Persian  happened  to  be  in  that  part  of 
the  hunting  company,  and  drawing  his  sword  rescued  the  king 
from  his  imminent  danger  and  killed  the  lion.  This  Persian 
therefore  ascending  the  highest  mountain  in  the  neighbourhood 
received  as  a  gift  from  the  king  as  much  territory  as  the 
human  eye  could  take  in,  looking  east,  west,  north,  and  south.^ 

XXI  (95) 

The  Celtiberians  have  a  peculiar  manoeuvre  in  war. 
When  they  see  their  infantry  hard  pressed,  they  dismount  and 
leave  their  horses  standing  in  their  places.  They  have  small 
pegs  attached  to  their  leading  reins,  and  having  fixed  them 
carefully  into  the  ground,  they  train  their  horses  to  keep  their 
places  obediently  in  line  until  they  come  back  and  pull  up  the 
pegs. 

XXII  (96) 

The  Celtiberians  excel  the  rest  of  the  world  in  the  con- 
struction of  their  swords ;  for  their  point  is  strong  and  service- 

^  Some  refer  this  to  a  circumstance  narrated  in  Livy,  41,  2.  But  Hultsch 
points  out  that  Livy  is  not  using  Polybius  in  that  period. 

'  From  Constantitu  Prophyrogenneta  de  thematis,  p.  18,  ed.  Bonnensis 
(Hultsch).  He  says  that  there  are  two  Cappadocias,  great  and  little.  Great 
Cappadocia  extending  from  Caesarea  (Nco-Caesarea),  and  Mount  Taurus  to  the 
Pontus,  bounded  on  the  south-west  by  the  Halys  and  on  the  east  by  V 


548  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS 

able,  and  they  can  deliver  a  cut  with  both  edges.  Wherefore 
the  Romans  abandoned  their  ancestral  swords  after  the 
Hannibalian  war  and  adopted  those  of  the  Iberians.  They 
adopted,  I  say,  the  construction  of  the  swords,  but  they  can 
by  no  means  imitate  the  excellence  of  the  steel  or  the  other 
points  in  which  they  are  so  elaborately  finished.^ 

XXIII  (102) 

The  Roman  praetor  Marcus  *  wished  to  get  rid  of  the  war 
against  the  Lusitani,  and  laying  aside  war  altogether,  to  shirk — 
as  the  saying  is — "the  men's  hall  for  the  women's  bower," 
because  of  the  recent  defeat  of  the  praetor  by  the  Lusitani. 

(103) 
But  those  of  the  Ligurians  who  fought  against  Mago  were 
unable  to  do  anything  important  or  great 

XXIV  (113) 

A  mora  consisted  of  nine  hundred  men.^ 

XXV  (117) 

A  general  needs  good  sense  and  boldness;  they  are  the 
most  necessary  qualities  for  dangerous  and  venturesome  under- 
takings. 

XXVI  (154) 

The  second  king  of  Egypt,  called  Philadelphus,  when 
giving  his  daughter  Berenice  in  marriage  to  Antiochus  king  of 
Syria,  was  careful  to  send  her  some  Nile  water,  that  the  young 
bride  might  drink  no  other  water. 

XXVII  (156) 

I  say  this  to  point  out  the  wisdom  of  the  Romans,  and  the 
folly  of  those  who  despise  the  practice  of  making  comparisons 
with  the  habits  of  foreign  nations,  and  believe  themselves  com- 
petent to  reform  their  own  armies  without  reference  to  others.* 

^  See  6,  23.  The  excellence  of  Spanish  steel  has  never  perhaps  been  sur- 
passed even  to  our  day.  '  See  35,  2-4. 

8  Plutarch,  Pelop.  17,  who  says  that  other  authorities  reckoned  it  at  500 
and  700  men.  There  were  originally  six  morae  in  the  Spartan  army.  See 
Xenophon,  Rep,  Lac,  11,  4  ;  Hell,  6,  4,  ia-17.  "*  See  6,  25. 


SHORTER  FRAGMENTS  549 

XXVIII  (157) 

The  Romans  were  wont  to  take  great  care  not  to  appear  to 
be  the  aggressors,  or  to  attack  their  neighbours  without  provoca- 
tion ;  but  to  be  considered  always  to  be  acting  in  self-defence, 
and  only  to  enter  upon  war  under  compulsion.^ 

XXIX  (166) 

When  Scipio  Africanus,  the  younger,  was  commissioned  by 
the  Senate  to  settle  the  kingdoms  throughout  the  world,  and  see 
that  they  were  put  in  proper  hands,  he  only  took  ^yt  slaves 
with  him ;  and,  on  one  of  these  dying  during  the  journey,  he 
wrote  home  to  his  relations  to  buy  another  and  send  him  to 
take  the  place  of  the  dead  one.* 

XXX  (184) 

If  one  ought  to  speak  of  Fortune  in  regard  to  such  things ; 
for  I  fear  she  often  gets  credit  of  that  sort  without  good  reason ; 
while  the  real  fault  lies  with  the  men  who  administer  public 
business,  who  sometimes  act  with  seriousness  and  sometimes 
the  reverse. 


XXXI  (i) 

But  not  making  at  all  a  good  guess  at  the  king's  mind,  he 
acted  in  a  most  inconsiderate  manner. 

XXXII  (2) 

Want  of  civilisation  appears  to  have  an  extraordinary  in- 
fluence on  mankind  in  this  direction. 

XXXIII  (3) 

But  the  general  being  unable  to  endure  the  unfairness  of 
those  who  made  these  assertions  ... 

*  This  is  referred  by  Nissen  to  the  account  of  the  origin  of  the  third  Punic 
war.     See  36,  3-5. 

'  This  moderation  in  the  number  of  slaves  was  perhaps  imitated  from  Cato. 
See  Cato,  Orationum  frgm.  3.     Ed.  Jordan. 


550  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS 


XXXIV  (5) 

But  he  determined  to  hold  out  to  the  last,  trusting  to  the 
supplies  from  Egypt. 

XXXV  (6) 

But  having  fallen  in  with  him  he  gained  an  extremely 
fortunate  victory. 

XXXVI  (7) 

In  all  these  things  the  Aetolians  had  been  deceived. 

XXXVII  (8) 

And  some  he  honoured  with  gold  cloths  and  spears, 
because  he  wished  that  his  promises  should  agree  with  his 
performances. 

XXXVIII  (11) 

He  wrote  in  bitter  and  frantic  terms,  calling  them  fiends 
and  murderers  in  his  letter,  if  they  abandoned  the  positions 
thus  disgracefully,  before  they  had  suffered  or  witnessed  any 
hardship. 

XXXIX  (12) 

There  is  a  courage  in  words  too  which  can  despise  death. 

XXXIX  (14) 

Before  he  had  been  rejoined  by  the  stragglers  of  the 
skirmishing  parties. 

XL  (27) 

Being  utterly  at  a  loss,  at  last  he  rested  his  chance  of 
escape  from  the  difficulty  which  was  upon  him  on  some  such 
hope  as  this. 

XLI  (30) 

None  of  the  citizens  being  aware  of  what  was  taking  place 
owing  to  the  distance,  for  the  city  was  a  large  one. 

XLIl  (32) 

But  trusting  to  them  he  undertook  the  war  against 
Ariarathes. 


SHORTER  FRAGMENTS  551 

XLIII   (34) 

Harpyia  is  a  city  in  lUyria  near  Encheleae,  to  which 
Baton,  charioteer  of  Amphiaraus,  removed  after  the  latter's 
disappearance. 

XLIV  (35) 

And  he  waited  for  the  coming  of  Hasdrubal. 

XLV  (36) 
Hearing  all  this  through  the  curtain  the  king  laughed. 

XLVI  (39) 

Foreseeing  and  fearing  the  fierce  temper  and  obstinacy  of 
the  men. 

XLVI  I  (40) 

At  that  time,  persuaded  that  he  was  enduring  a  fiery  test, 
he  was  released  from  the  suspicion. 

XLVIII  (43) 

He  thought  therefore  that  it  was  dangerous  to  have  shared 
in  their  enterprise  when  their  plan  had  failed  and  come  to  an 
end. 

XLIX  (44) 

Having  urged  the  soldiers  to  make  haste,  and  exhorted  the 
tribunes  to  engage. 

L  (46) 

Thinking  it  better  and  safer  not  to  be  present  at  the  hour 
of  the  enemy's  opportunity,  nor  when  they  were  under  the 
influence  of  popular  excitement  and  fury. 

LI  (47) 

Whenever  it  is  possible  to  obtain  satisfaction  from  those 
who  have  wronged  us  either  by  law  or  by  any  other  settled 
forms  of  justice. 

LII  (54) 
Having  drawn  his  army  from  the  pass  he  encamped. 


552  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIVS 

L"  (55) 

And  then  they  took  up  some  sort  of  order,  as  though  by 
mutual  consent,  and  fought  the  battle  in  regular  formation. 

LIII  (56) 

That  which  causes  the  most  pain  at  the  time  involves  also 
the  most  signal  revulsion  of  joy. 

LIV  (57) 

Having  ordered  the  pilots  to  steer  the  ships  as  fast  as  they 
could  to  Elaea. 

\N  (61) 

They  not  only  drove  themselves  off  the  stage,  but  ruined 
also  all  Greece. 

LV  (62) 

But  he,  from  his  long  experience  of  war,  did  not  all  lose 
his  presence  of  mind. 

LVI  (67) 

He  persuades  them  by  reckoning  all  the  wealth  he  con- 
sidered they  would  gain  in  the  battle. 

LVII  (68) 

The  Romans  had  been  inspired  by  some  divine  influence, 
and  having  fortified  their  courage  with  irresistible  might  .   .  . 

LVII  (69) 

To  signalise  some  by  favours,  and  others  by  punishments, 
that  they  might  be  a  warning  to  the  rest. 

LVIII  (72) 

And  they,  being  persuaded,  and  throwing  themselves  in  the 
way  of  the  enemy^s  charge,  died  gallantly. 

ux  (73) 

He    tried  to    take    the    city  by  an    intrigue,  having  long 
secured  a  party  of  traitors  within  it. 


SHORTER  FRAGMENTS  553 

LX  (74) 

He  brought  up  the  transports,  by  lading  which  with  rocks 
and  sinking  them  at  the  mouth  of  the  harbour  he  planned  to 
shut  out  the  enemy  entirely  from  the  sea. 

LXI  (80) 

Though  I  have  much  more  to  say,  I  fear  lest  some  of  you 
may  think  that  I  am  unnecessarily  diffuse. 

LXII  (81) 

'I'hey  are  reserving  themselves  for  an  opportunity,  and  are 
quite  ready  to  meet  them  again. 

LXIII  (85) 

To  be  eager  for  life  and  to  cling  to  it  is  a  sign  of  the 
greatest  baseness  and  weakness. 

LXIV  (86) 

He  was  feeling  something  like  starters  in  horse  races,  which 
are  started  by  the  raising  of  torches. 

LXV  (88) 

Their  boldness  transgresses  the  bounds  of  propriety,  and 
their  actions  are  a  violation  of  duty. 

LXV  (91) 

Seeing  that  the  Carthaginians  had  obeyed  all  injunctions 
in  the  most  honourable  spirit. 

LXVI  (92) 

To  have  fifty  ships  built  entirely  new,  and  to  launch  fifty 
of  those  already  existing  from  the  docks. 

LXVI  I  (100) 

Lucius  being  appointed  to  go  on  a  mission  to  the  Lapateni 
and  speak  to  them  in  favour  of  an  unconditional  surrender, 
was  unprepared  for  the  task  before  him. 


554  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS 

LXVIII  (loi) 

Of  all  the  determining  forces  in  war  the  most  decisive  of 
failure  or  success  is  the  spirit  of  the  combatants. 

LXIX  (104) 

Having  mentioned  summarily  the  defeats  they  had  sus- 
tained, and  putting  before  them  the  successes  of  the  Mace- 
donians. 

LXX  (105) 

For  he  perceived  that  the  Macedonian  kingdom  would 
become  contemptible,  if  the  rebels  succeeded  in  their  first 
attempt 

LXXI  (109) 

Therefore  it  was  intolerable  that  the  Romans  even  then 
should  make  their  way  into  Macedonia  unobserved. 

LXXII  (no) 

He,  if  any  one  of  our  time  has  done  so,  has  examined  all 
that  has  been  said  scientifically  on  tactics. 

LXXin  (in) 

Metrodorus  and  his  colleagues,  frightened  at  the  threaten- 
ing aspect  of  Philip,  departed. 

LXXIV  (112) 

The  Romans  made  no  show  of  bearing  a  grudge  for  what 
had  taken  place. 

LXXV  (113) 

But  putting  both  spurs  to  his  horse  he  rode  on  as  hard  as 
he  could. 

LXX VI  (114) 

Being  annoyed  at  the  treaty,  Nabis  paid  no  attention  to  its 
provisions. 

LXXVn  (120) 

It  was  neither  possible  to  examine  the  man  closely  in  his 
state  of  physical  weakness,  nor  to  put  a  question  to  him  for 
fear  of  worrying  him. 


SHORTER  FRAGMENTS  555 

LXXVIII  (122) 

The  Pannonians  having  seized  the  fort  at  the  beginning  of 
the  war,  had  taken  it  as  a  base  of  operations,  and  had  fitted  it 
up  for  the  reception  of  booty. 

LXXIX  (124) 

But  wishing  to  point  the  contrast  between  his  policy  to 
those  who  trusted  and  those  who  disobeyed  him,  he  com- 
menced the  siege. 

LXXX  (126) 

So  that  those  in  the  assembly  were  thunderstruck  and  un- 
able to  collect  their  thoughts,  sympathising  with  the  poignant 
sorrow  of  those  thus  dispossessed  of  their  all. 

LXXXI  (131) 

They  immediately  sent  a  courier  to  Perseus  to  tell  him  what 
had  happened.  (132)  It  was  Perseus's  design  to  keep  it  close, 
but  he  could  not  hide  the  truth. 

LXXXII  (133) 

In  other  respects  he  was  well  equipped  for  service,  but 
his  spear  was  limp. 

LXXXI II  (134) 

Publius  was  anxious  to  engage  and  avail  himself  of  the 
enthusiasm  of  the  barbarians.  (135)  He  put  in  at  Naupactus 
in  Aetolia.  (136)  He  escorted  Publius  out  with  great  respect. 
(137)  Having  received  Publius  and  Gaius  with  kindness  and 
honour. 

LXXXI  V  (140) 

It  was  the  deliberate  intention  of  the  Romans  to  fight  at 
sea. 

LXXXV  (141) 

While  they  were  still  together  and  were  fighting  at  close 
quarters  with  their  swords,  taking  his  stand  behind  them  he 
stabbed  him  under  the  armpit. 


556  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS 

LXXXVI  (151) 

This  man  presented  Prusias  with  many  silver  and  gold  cups 
during  the  banquet. 

LXXXVII  (153) 

Taking  a  wise  view  of  the  future,  he  came  to  the  conclusion 
to  get  rid  of  the  garrison  sent  by  Ptolemy. 

LXXXVIII  (158) 

On  that  occasion  both  Romans  and  Carthaginians  bivouacked 
on  the  embankment. 

LXXXIX  (159) 

Not  being  able  to  persuade  him  again,  owing  to  that  king's 
cautious  and  inactive  character,  he  was  forced  to  offer  five 
hundred  talents.     And  so  Seleucus  agreed  to  give  the  aid. 

XC  (161) 

Chance  and  Fortune,  so  to  speak,  enhanced  the  achieve- 
ments of  Scipio,  so  that  they  always  appeared  more  illustrious 
than  was  expected. 

XCI  (162) 

One  must  not  pass  over  even  a  minor  work  of  his,  as  in 
the  case  of  a  famous  artist. 

XCII  (163) 

Scipio  counselled  him  either  not  to  try,  or  to  do  so  in  such 
a  manner  as  to  succeed  at  all  risks.  For  to  make  an  attempt 
on  the  same  man  twice  was  dangerous  in  itself,  and  was  apt  to 
make  a  man  altogether  contemptible. 

XCIII  (164) 

But  being  jealous  of  Scipio  they  tried  to  decry  his  achieve- 
ments. 

XCIV  (168) 

Fixing  the  stocks  upright  in  the  ground  in  a  semicircle 
touching  each  other. 


SHORTER  FRAGMENTS  557 

XCV  (170) 

The  important  point  of  their  resolution  was  that  they  would 
not  admit  a  garrison  or  governor,  and  would  not  give  up  their 
constitution  as  established  by  law. 

XCV  (177-179) 

He  said  that  we  should  not  let  the  enemy  escape,  or  en- 
courage their  boldness  by  shirking  a  battle.  .  .  , 

Conceiving  a  slight  hope  from  the  besieged  garrison,  he 
made  the  most  of  it.  .  .  . 

Pretending  warm  friendship,  he  tried  every  manoeuvre 
whereby  he  might  promote  the  enemy's  interests,  and  surround 
us  by  the  gravest  perils.  .  .  . 

XCVI  (182) 

As  the  rock  caused  them  difficulty  because  they  were  obliged 
to  bore  a  hole  in  it,  they  completed  the  mine  which  they  were 
making  by  using  wooden  bolts. 

XCVII  (183) 

He  did  not  think  it  right  to  leave  the  war  in  Etruria,  and 
give  his  attention  to  the  cities  in  that  part  of  the  country.  He 
feared  that  he  should  waste  all  the  time,  which  was  not  very 
long  to  begin  with,  in  less  important  details. 

XCVni  (185) 

And  having  got  his  boats  and  hemioliae  dragged  across  the 
Isthmus  he  put  to  sea,  being  anxious  to  be  in  time  for  the 
Achaean  congress. 

XCIX  (191) 
Philip  was  annoyed  at  the  request  of  the  Corcyreans. 

C  (192) 

Since  circumstances  debar  Philip,  the  king  wishes  to  give 
that  man  the  credit  of  the  achievement,  making  the  proposal 
to  him  in  the  light  of  a  favour. 


5S8  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIVS 

CI  (193) 

Philip,  having  given  out  that  he  was  about  to  serve  out 
rations,  made  a  proclamation  that  a  return  should  be  made  to 
him  of  all  who  had  not  provisions  for  more  than  thirty  days. 

CII  (19s) 

After  two  days  from  starting  for  the  seat  of  war  Philip  passed 
the  order  to  make  two  rations  three,  whenever  he  wanted  an 
additional  day,  and  sometimes  to  make  two  four.  (?  Cp.  Livy, 
35,  28.) 

cm  (195) 

A  swipe  (</>p€aTOT07ravov)  is  one  of  the  implements  mentioned 
by  Polybius.     (See  9,  43,  Hultsch.) 

CIV  (199) 

It  was  impossible  to  convey  the  equipments  and  provisions 
for  the  legions  by  sea  or  upon  beasts  of  burden ;  they  must 
carry  ten  days'  provisions  in  their  wallets. 


II.— GEOGRAPHICAL  NAMES 

QUOTED    BY   STEPHANUS    AND    OTHERS 

AS  HAVING  BEEN  USED  BY  POLYBIUS 

Achriane,  a  town  in  Hyrcania. 

Adrane,  a  town  in  Thrace. 

Aegosthena,  a  town  in  Megaris. 

Allaria,  a  town  in  Crete. 

Ancara,  a  town  in  Italy. 

Aperanteia,  a  city  and  district  in  Thessaly. 

Apsyrtus,  an  island  off  Illyricum. 

Ares,  plain  of,  "  A  desolate  plain  in  Thrace  with  low  trees." 

Arsinoe,  a  town  in  Aetolia  and  in  Libya. 


GEOGRAPHICAL  NAMES  559 

Atella,  a  town  of  the  Opici,  in  Campania.     "The  Atellani 

surrendered." 
Badiza,  a  town  in  Bruttium. 
Babrantium,  a  place  near  Chios. 
Cabyle,  a  town  in  Thrace. 
Calliope,  a  town  in  Parthia. 
Candasa,  a  fort  in  Caria. 
Carthaea,  one  of  the  four  cities  of  Ceos. 
Corax,  a  mountain  between  Callipolis  and  Naupactus. 
Cyathus,  a  river  in  Aetolia,  near  Arsinoe  (a  tributary  of  the 

Achelous). 
Dassaretae,  an  lUyrian  tribe. 
Digeri,  a  Thracian  tribe. 
EUopium,  a  town  in  Aetolia. 
Gitta,  a  town  in  Palestine  (Gath). 
Hella,  in  Asia,  a  port  belonging  to  Attalus. 
Hippo  (Regius),  a  town  in  Libya. 
Hyrtacus,  a  town  in  Crete. 
Hyscana,  a  town  in  Illyria. 
Ilattia,  a  town  in  Crete. 
Lampeteia,  a  town  in  Bruttium. 
Mantua,  in  N.  Italy. 
Massyleis,  a  Libyan  tribe. 
MeHtusa,  a  town  in  Illyria. 
Oricus  (m.),  a  town  in  Epirus,  "The  first  town  on  the  right  as 

one  sails  into  the  Adriatic" 
Parthus,  a  town  in  Illyria, 
Philippi,  a  town  in  Macedonia. 
Phorynna,  a  town  in  Thrace. 
Phytaeum,  a  town  in  Aetolia. 
Rhyncus,  in  Aetolia. 
Sibyrtus,  a  town  in  Crete. 
Singa,  a  town  in  Libya. 
Tabraca,  a  town  in  Libya. 
Temesia,  a  town  in  Bruttium. 
Volci,  a  town  in  Etruria. 
Xynia,  a  town  in  Thessaly. 


THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBWS 


5^      ,M] 


iwu.ul                   i!"'J  ' 

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APPENDIX  III  563 


APPENDIX    III 

I,  21.  The  capture  of  Cornelius  Asina  is  ascribed  by  Livy 
{Ep.  17)  to  an  act  of  treachery,  per  fraudem  velut  in,  colloquium 
evocatus  captus  est  He  is  copied  by  Florus  (2,  2)  and  Eutropius 
(2,  10).  See  also  Valerius  Max.  6,  6,  2.  This  is  perhaps  not 
incompatible  with  the  narrative  of  Polybius,  which,  however,  does 
not  suggest  it.  He  must  have  been  released  at  the  time  of  the 
entrance  of  Regulus  into  Africa,  for  being  captured  in  B.C.  260, 
we  find  him  Consul  for  B.C.  254,  without  any  account  of  his 
release  being  preserved. 

I,  32-36. — XANTHIPPUS   THE   LACEDAEMONIAN 

The  fate  of  Xanthippus  has  been  variously  reported.  Polybius 
represents  him  as  going  away  voluntarily,  and  Mommsen  sup- 
poses him  to  have  taken  service  in  the  Egyptian  army.  Appian, 
however,  asserts  that  he  and  his  men  were  drowned  on  their  way 
home  to  Sparta  by  the  Carthaginian  captains  who  were  conveying 
them,  and  who  were  acting  on  secret  orders  frorfi  home  (8,  4). 
Mommsen  also  regards  the  account  of  Polybius  of  the  reforms 
introduced  in  the  Carthaginian  tactics  by  Xanthippus  as  exag- 
gerated :  "  The  officers  of  Carthage  can  hardly  have  waited  for 
foreigners  to  teach  them  that  the  light  African  cavalry  can  be 
more  appropriately  employed  on  the  plain  than  among  hills  and 
forests."  The  doubt  had  apparently  occurred  to  others  [Diodor. 
Sic.  fr.  bk.  23.]  The  mistake,  however,  was  not  an  unnatural  one. 
For  other  references  to  Xanthippus  see  Cicero  de  Off,  3,  26,  7  ; 
Valerius  Max.  i,  i,  14  ;  Dio  Cassius,  fr.  43,  24. 

I,  34. — M.    ATILIUS    REGULUS 

No  more  is  told  us  of  the  fate  of  Regulus,  and  Mommsen  says 
**  nothing  more  is  known  with  certainty."  Arnold,  following 
Niebuhr,  declared  the  story  of  his  cruel  death  to  be  a  fabrication. 
The  tradition,  however,  of  his  mission  home  to  propose  peace,  his 
subsequent  return  after  advising  against  it,  and  his  death  under 
torture,  was  received  undoubtingly  by  the  Roman  writers  of  the 
time  of  Cicero  and  afterwards.  See  Cicero,  Off.  3,  §  99  ;  ad  Att, 
16,  II;  de  Sen,  §  74 ;  Paradox,  2,  16  ;  Tusc.  5,  §  14.     Horace, 


5^4  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBJUS 


Od,  3,  5  ;  Livy,  Ep.  i8  ;  Valerius  Max.  i,  i,  14 ;  Dio  Cassius, 
fr.  43,  28.  To  Appian  (8,  4)  is  due  the  additional  particular  of  the 
barrel  full  of  nails,  icai  avrov  01  Kapvi^vioi  Ka^c^a^vrcs  cv 
yaAeayp^  K€VTpa  vdvroStv  €\ov(rQ  Su<f>0€if>av,  Against  this 
uniformity  of  tradition  is  to  be  set  the  silence  of  Polybius.  But 
on  the  other  hand,  in  this  introductory  part  of  his  history,  Polybius 
does  not  profess  to  give  full  particulars  (see  note  to  i,  21) ;  and 
in  the  case  of  Regulus,  he  has  not  stated  what  we  learn  from  Livy 
(Ep.  18)  and  Valerius  Max.  4,  4,  6,  that  his  stay  in  Africa  for 
the  second  year  was  against  his  own  express  wish,  his  private 
business  requiring,  as  he  thought,  his  presence  in  Italy. 

I,  60. — LUTATIUS 

Lutatius  is  represented  by  Polybius  as  directing  the  oper- 
ations at  the  battle  of  Aegusa ;  but  it  appears  that  he  had 
received  some  hurt  a  few  days  before,  and  was  confined  to  his 
lectica  during  the  action  (lectica  claudum  jucutsse).  The  chief 
direction  therefore  devolved  upon  the  praetor,  Q.  Valerius  Falto, 
who  accordingly  claimed  to  share  his  triumph,  but  was  refused 
on  the  technical  ground  that  the  victory  had  not  been  won  under 
his  auspicia,     Valerius  Max.  2,  8,  2. 

I,  76. — HAMILCAR 

(Vol.  i.  p.  85.)  Dr.  Warre  writes  on  the  manoeuvre  of 
Hamilcar  as  follows :  "  Hamilcar's  army  is  in  column  of  route ; 
elephants  leading,  then  cavalry,  then  light-armed  infantry,  and 
heavy-armed  infantry  in  the  rear.  He  observes  the  enemy  bearing 
down  hastily ;  gives  orders  to  his  whole  force  to  turn  about,  and 
then  forms  line  (c^croo-t?)  by  successive  wheels  of  his  heavy-armed 
troops.  He  would  thus  have  changed  his  heavy-armed  from 
column  of  route  into  line  by  wheeling  them  while  retiring  to  the 
right  (or  left)  about.  The  light-armed  apparently  passed  through 
the  intervals ;  the  cavalry  halted  when  they  came  to  the  line  now 
formed  up,  and  at  once  turned  to  their  front  and  faced  the  enemy, 
and  the  remainder  marched  forward  to  meet  them.  Polybius 
does  not  tell  us  with  what  front  Hamilcar  was  marching ;  but  I 
think  it  is  clear  that  he  was  in  column  of  route  and  not  in  battle 
array  {Ik  TrapaTo^coi?).  Thus  the  deployment  of  his  columns, 
while  retiring^  by  right  {or  left)  about  wheel  into  line  by  successive 
(TvvTay/iaTa,  or  battalions,  would  be  a  very  pretty  manoeuvre,  and 
only  such  as  an  able  tactician  would  resort  to." 


APPENDIX  III 


565 


II,  22-23. — SCIPIO  AND  HASDRUBAL  SON  OF  GESCO 

(Vol.  ii.  p.  67.)  Of  this  passage  Dr.  Warre  has  again  favoured 
me  with  a  note  and  a  translation  which  I  append :  "  The  passage  in 
Polybius  is  very  interesting.  It  is  a  good  tactical  example  of  an 
attack  on  both  flanks,  refusing  the  centre,  the  effect  being  to  keep 
the  enemy  from  moving  the  troops  in  his  centre  to  the  assistance 
of  his  wings.  The  inversion  of  order,  by  which  the  right  became 
the  left  in  the  case  of  those  troops  who  had  first  orders  *  right 
turn,  left  wheel  from  line  into  column,'  and  then  *  left  wheel  into 
line,'  is  an  ordinary  instance  of  doing  what  might  be  called 
•  clubbing '  a  battalion  or  brigade.  It  is  of  course  on  parade  a 
clumsy  mistake  to  make ;  but  Scipio  rightly  took  no  notice  of  it 
in  battle,  as  Polybius,  who  sees  the  matter  with  a  soldier's  eye, 
observes.  Scipio's  army  was  inferior  in  numbers,  and  so  he  first 
moved  his  Romans  outwards  while  still  in  line,  and  then  formed 
for  attack  with  the  cavalry,  light  infantry,  and  three  battalions 
(cohorts)  on  each  flank.'* 

C  Rtaht 

Original  Right 


now  become  Left .  1 


HigMja 


t 


I 

/ 


^0 


Left^ U«J 

'Right  leading 


Left 


Right 


B 


As  In  line.  Then  Right  turn-  left  wheel. 
A 


The  following  is  Dr.  Warre*s  translation  : — 
"Polybius   II,   22. — On  this  occasion  Scipio  seems  to  have 
employed  two  stratagems.     He  observed  that  Hasdrubal  was  in 


566  THE  HISTORIES  OF  POL  YBIUS 

the  habit  of  marching  out  late  in  the  day,  of  keeping  his  Libyan 
troops  in  the  centre,  and  of  posting  his  elephants  in  front  of  each 
wing.     His  own  custom  was  to  march   out  at  the  said  hour  to 
oppose  him,  and  to  set  the  Romans  in  his  centre  opposite  to  the 
Libyans,  while  he  posted  his  Spanish  troops  upon  his  wings.     On 
the  day  upon  which  he  determined  to  decide  matters  he  did  the 
reverse  of  this,  and  thereby  greatly  assisted  his  forces  towards 
gaining  a  victory,  and  placed  the  enemy  at  no  small  disadvantage. 
At  daybreak  he  sent  his  aides  and  gave  orders  to  all  the  tribunes 
and  to  the  soldiers  that  they  were  first  to  get  their  breakfast, 
and  then  to  arm  and  to  parade  in  front  of  the  ramparts.     This 
was  done.     The  soldiers  obeyed  eagerly,  having  an  idea  of  his 
intention.     He  sent  forward  the  cavalry  and  light  infantry,  gfiving 
them  joint  orders  to  approach  the  camp  of  the  enemy,  and  to 
skirmish  up  to  it  boldly ;  but  he  himself  took  the  heavy  infantry, 
and  at  sunrise  advanced,  and  when  he  had  reached  the  middle  of 
the  plain  formed  line  in  just  the  opposite  order  to  his  previous 
formation.      For  he   proceeded  to  deploy  the    Iberians  on   the 
centre  and  the  Romans  on  the  flanks." 

•  ••••••• 

"  For  a   while    the    Romans    remained  as    usual    silent,   but 
after  the  day  had  worn,  and  the  light  infantry  engagement  was 
indecisive    and    on    equal    terms,    since    those    who    were    hard 
pressed  retired  on  their  own  heavy  infantry  and  (ck  fura^okrj^ 
Ka'5i'i'€V€a'),  after    retreating  formed   again    for   attack,   then    it 
was    that    Scipio    withdrew   his    skinnishers    through    the   inter- 
vals  of  the  troops   under  the   standards,   and   divided  them  on 
either   wing  in    rear  of  his    line,   first  the  velites,  and    in    suc- 
cession  to  them  his  cavalr>^,  and  at  first  made  his  advance  in 
line  direct.     But  when  distant  (?  five)  furlongs  from  the  enemy  he 
directed  the  Iberians  to  advance  in  the  same  formation,  but  gave 
orders  to  the  wings  to  turn  outwards  (to  the  right  wing  for  the 
infantry  to  turn  to  their  right,  and  to  their  left  to  the  left).     Then 
he  himself  took  from  the  right  and  Lucius  Marcius  and  Marcus 
Junius  from  the  left  the  three  leading  squadrons  of  cavalry,  and 
in  front  of  these  the  usual  number  of  velites,  and  three  cohorts 
(for  this  is  the  Roman  term),  but  the  one  body  wheeled  to  the  left 
and  the  other  to  the  right,  were  led  in  column  against  the  enemy, 
advancing  at   full  speed,   the  troops  in   succession  forming  and 
following  as  they  wheeled.  .  .  . 

(They  were  in  line,  and  the  cavalry  and  velites  got  the  word 
turn,  left  wheel,  and  the  infantry  right  wheel  and  forward,  />.  the 


APPENDIX  III  567 


light  troops  and  cavalry  wheeled  from  their  outer  flank,  and  the 
heavy  infantry  from  their  inner  flank.) 

**  And  when  these  troops  were  not  far  oflf  the  enemy,  and  the 
Iberians  in  the  line  direct  were  still  a  considerable  distance 
behind,  as  they  were  advancing  slowly,  they  came  in  contact  with 
either  wing  of  the  enemy,  the  Roman  forces  being  in  column 
according  to  his  original  intention. 

"  The  subsequent  movements  by  which  the  troops  in  rear  of 
these  columns  came  into  line  with  those  leading  were  exactly  the 
reverse,  generally,  in  the  case  of  the  right  and  the  left  wings,  and 
particularly,  in  case  of  the  light  troops  and  cavalry  and  the  heavy 
infantry.  For  the  cavalry  and  velites  on  the  right  wing  forming 
to  the  right  into  line  were  trying  to  outflank  the  enemy,  but  the 
infantry  formed  on  the  contrary  to  the  left.  On  the  left  wing  the 
cavalry  and  light  infantry  left  formed  into  line,  and  the  heavy 
infantry  right  formed  into  line.  And  so  it  came  to  pass  that  on 
both  wings  the  cavalry  and  light  troops  were  in  inverted  order,  />. 
their  proper  right  had  become  their  left.  The  general  took  little 
heed  of  this,  but  cared  only  for  that  which  was  of  greater  im- 
portance, the  outflanking  of  the  enemy  ;  and  rightly  so,  for  while 
a  general  ought  to  know  what  has  happened,  he  should  use  the 
movements  that  are  suitable  to  the  circumstances." 

34,  5,   10. — PYTHEAS 

The  date  of  these  voyages  of  Pytheas  is  uncertain  beyond  the 
fact  that  they  were  somewhere  in  the  4th  century  B.C.  His 
Periplus,  or  notes  of  his  voyage,  was  extant  until  the  5th 
century  A.D.  The  fragments  remaining  have  been  published  by 
Arvesdson,  Upsala,  1824.  The  objection  raised  by  Polybius  to 
the  impossibility  of  a  poor  man  making  such  voyages  is  sometimes 
answered  by  the  supposition  that  he  was  sent  officially  by  the 
Massilian  merchants  to  survey  the  north  of  Europe  and  look  out 
for  places  suitable  for  commerce.  The  northern  sea,  which  he 
describes  as  "  like  a  jellyfish  through  which  one  can  neither  walk 
nor  sail,"  is  referred  "  to  the  rotten  and  spongy  ice  which  some- 
times fills  those  waters."  This  is  assuming  Thule  to  be  Iceland. 
Tacitus  supposed  it  to  be  Shetland  (Agr.  10),  and  described  the 
waters  there  as  sluggish,  and  not  subject  to  the  influence  of  the 
wind.  See  Elton  (Origins  of  English  History^  pp.  73-74).  Elton 
quotes  Wallace  {Concerning  Thule^  3 1 ),  who  comments  on  Tacitus 
by  saying,  **  This  agrees  with  the  sea  in  the  north-east  of  Scotland. 


568 


THE  HISTORIES  OF  POLYBIUS 


not  for  the  reason  given  by  Tacitus,  but  because  of  the  contrary 
tides,  which  drive  several  ways,  and  stop  not  only  boats  with  oars 
but  ships  under  sail." 


34,   lO. — THE  SUBTERRANEAN  FISH 

Schweighaeuser  in  his  note  on  this  passage  quotes  Aristotle  (U 
Anim,  6,  15,  who  states  that  gudgeon  thus  hide  themselves  in  the 
earth ;  and  Seneca,  Nat,  g.,  3i  1 7  and  1 9,  who  refers  to  the  fact 
piscem  posse  vivere  sub  terra  et  effodiy  and  quotes  an  instance  as 
occurring  in  Caria.  See  also  Livy,  42,  2,  who,  among  other 
prodigies  occurring  in  B.C.  173,  says,  in  Gallico  agro  qua  inducere- 
tus  aratrum  sub  exsistentibus  glebis  pisces  emersisse  dicebantur. 
Eels  and  other  fish  have  been  found  in  the  mud  of  ponds  long 
after  the  ponds  have  been  dried  up.  The  truer  account  is  given 
in  Strabo  (4,  1,6):  "  There  was  a  lake  near  Ruscino,  and  a 
swampy  place  a  little  above  the  sea,  full  of  salt,  and  containing 
mullets  (KC(rr/?€ts),  which  are  dug  out ;  for  if  a  man  dig  down 
two  or  three  feet,  and  drive  a  trident  into  the  muddy  water,  he 
may  spear  fish  which  is  of  considerable  size,  and  which  feeds  on 
the  mud  like  the  eels." 


INDEX 


The  references  are  to  Books  and  Chapters^  except  where  the  volume  and 
page  of  this  translation  are  indicated  by  vol. —  /, — /  Fr.  indicates  the  minor 
fragments  at  the  end  of  vol.  ii. 


Abba,  town  in  Africa,  14,  6,  7 
Abia,  town  in  Messenia,  23,  17 
Abila,  town  in  Palestine,  5.  71  ;  16, 

39 
Abilyx,  a  Spaniard,  3,  98,  99 

Abrupolis,  a  Thracian  prince,  22,  8 

Abydus,  town  in  Asia  Minor,  on  the 

Hellespont,  4,  44  ;  5,  m  ;  16,  29- 

35  ;  its  situation  and  fall,   18,   a. 

44  ;  34.  7 
Academy,  the,  12,  26c  ;  16.  27 

Acamania,  4, 6, 30, 63, 65, 66  ;  5, 3-5 ; 
9,  34  ;  28,  4,  5  ;  30,  13  ;  32,  20  ; 
89,  14 
Acarnanians,  2,  6,  10,  45,  65,  66  ;  4, 
5,  9,  IS,  25,  30,  63  ;  5,  3-6,   13. 
96  :    9,   32,   38-40 ;    10,   41  ;  16, 
32  ;  21,  29,  32  ;  24,  12  ;  28,  5 
Acatides,  a  Theban  runner,  39,  7 
Acerrae,  a  town  of  the  Insubres,  2,  34 
Acesimbrotus  of  Rhodes,  18,  1,2 
Achaeans,  the,  1,  3,  passim ;  appealed 
to  by  the  Epirotes,  2,  6,  9,  10,  12  ; 
the  rise  of  their  league  in  the  Pelo- 
|x>nnese,    2,    37-70 ;     assist   Mes- 
senians  against  the  Aetolians,  and 
call  in  Philip  v.,  4,  1-19,  22  ;  pro- 
claim war  with  Aetolians,  4.  25-27. 
See  also  36,  59-85  ;  agree  to  fuirnish 
Philip  with  subvention.  5,   i  ;   join 
Philip  in  his  invasion  of  Laconia,  5, 
18-24  f  harassed  by  Aetolians,  5,  30, 
35  ;    elect  Aratus  after  the  incap- 
able Strategus  Epcratus,  5,  91-95  ; 


make  peace  with  the  Aetolians,  5, 
101-105  ;  instructed  in  military 
exercises  by  Philopoemen,  10,  23  ; 
at  war  with  Machanidas  of  Sparta, 
11,  11-18  ;  Philopoemen  summons 
a  levy  at  Tegea  to  invade  Laconia, 
16,  36,  37  ;  incUne  to  Philip's  part 
against  Rome,  16,  38  ;  send  envoys 
to  the  congress  at  Nicaea,  18,  1-8  ; 
receive  back  Corinth  by  the  advice 
of  Flamininus,  18,  45  fin. ;  and 
Triphylia  and  Heraea,  18,  47  ; 
offer  to  help  the  Boeotians,  who 
however  abandon  their  alliance, 
20,  4, 5;  Megara  leaves  their  league, 

20,  6  ;  make  alliance  with  Eumenes, 

21,  9  ;  Roman  legates  at  the  con- 
gress at  Cleitor,  22,  2  ;  Eumenes 
offers  120  talents  to  the  congress  at 
Megalopolis,  Seleucus  10  ships  of 
war,  22,  10-12  ;  difficulty  as  to  the 
renewal  of  a  treaty  with  Ptolemy, 

22,  12 ;  Q.  Caecilius  before  the 
congress  at  Argos  remonstrates  on 
the  subject  of  Sparta,  22,  13; 
their  deading  with  Messene  after  the 
murder  of  Philopoemen,  23,  16-18  ; 
send  an  embassy  to  Rome  in  re- 
gard to  Messene,  24,  i  ;  Ptolemy 
presents  the  league  with  10  ships 
of  war,  24.  6  ;  the  league  officers 
condemn  Chaeron  of  Sparta  for  the 
murder  of  A|x>llonides,  24,  7 ;  de- 
bate  in   the  assembly  as    to    the 


570 


INDEX 


orders  from  Rome  about  the  Spartan 
exiles,  24.  io-i2;  attitude  to- 
wards Rome,  24,  13-15;  ordered  to 
guard  Chalcis  for  Rome,  27,  2  fin. ; 
Gaius  Popilius  and  Gnaeus  Oc- 
tavius  address  the  congress,  28. 
3 ;  decide  to  take  the  side  of 
Rome  against  Perseus  openly,  28. 
12, 13;  two  embassies  at  Alexandria, 
28,  19.  20 ;  the  two  Ptolemies  ask 
their  help  against  Antiochus,  29. 
23-25;  Romanising  party  in  Achaia. 
80.  13  ;  embassy  to  Rome,  81,  6, 
8 ;  32.  7,  17 ;  88.  i,  3 ;  Cretans 
ask  the  Achaeans  for  help,  88. 
16 ;     Achaean     detenus    released, 

86.  6 ;  Thessalians  ask  for  help 
against  the  pseudo  -  Philip,  87,  2  ; 
asked  to  send  Polybius  to  Lily- 
baeum.  37,  3  ;  dissolution  of  the 
league  by  the  Romans,  88,  3-1 1  ; 
89,  7-17 ;  Achaean  assembly  or 
congress,  at  Aegium,  2,  54  ;  4,  7, 
26.  82  ;  6,  I  ;  16,  27  ;  28,  3  ;  at 
CUiior,  22,  2  ;  at  Corinth,  29,  23  ; 
33,  16 ;  88,  10  ;  at  Megalopolis, 
23,  10,  16  ;  at  Sicyon^  6,  i  ;  23. 
17  ;  28,  13  ;  29,  24  ;  election  of 
magistrates,  4,  37,  82  ;  6,  i  ;  80, 
7  ;  soldiers,  29,  24 ;  arms,  11,  9  ; 
cavalry,  10,  23  ;  ships,  2.  10 

Achaeus,  son  of  Xuthus,  the  mythical 
ancestor  of  the  Achaeans,  39.  14 

Achaeus,  son  of  Androniachus, 
nephew  of  Laodice,  mother  of  An- 
tiochus the  Great,  4,  2,  48-91,  51  ; 
6,  40-42,  57,  58,61,  66,  67,  72,  78, 

87,  107,    III  ;   7,    17 ;    8,  2 ;  his 
capture  and  death,  8,  17-23 

Achaia  Phthiotis,  18,  46  ;  47,  7 
Achelous,  river,  4,  63  ;  6,  6-7,  13 
Achradina,  a  part  of  Syracuse,  8,  5,  6 
Acilius  Glabrio,  M',,  consul  B.C.  191, 

20.  9.  10  ;  21,  3-5 
Acilus,  Gaius,  33,  2 
Acrae,  a  town  iaAetolia,  5,  13 
Acriac,  a  town  in  Laconia,  6.  19 
Acrocorinthus,  the  citadel  of  Corinth, 

1900  feet  high,  2,  43,  45-  50-  S^- 

52,  54;  4,  8;  7,  II  ;  18,  45 
Acrolissus,  citadel  of  the  Illyrican  city 

of  Lissus.  8.  15.  16 


Acte,  the,  east  coast  of  Laconia,  6, 

Actium,  temple  and  town  in  Acar- 
nania,  on  the  narrowest  point 
of  the  Ambracian  gulf,  4,  63 

Acusilochus,  an  Asiatic  ruler,  25,  2 

Adaeus,  governor  of  the  town  of 
Bubastus  in  Egypt,  16,  27 

Adaeus  of  Beroea,  legate  of  Perseus 
to  Genthius,  28,  8 

Adeiganes,  a  magistrate  at  Seleucus  on 
the  Tigris,  6,  54 

Adeimantus  of  Sparta,  4,  2a,  23 

Adherbal,  a  Carthaginian  general  in 
the  first  Punic  war,  1,  44,  46,  49, 

50.  52.  53 
Admetus,  put  to  death  by  Philip  V. , 

28,  10 
Adriatic   Sea,  the,  1,  2  ;  2,   14,    16, 

17,   26;  8.    47.   61,    86-88,   zio  ; 

10,  1  ;  24,  3 ;  82.  23 ;  84,  6,  7 
Adrumetum,  a  city  in  Africa,  15,  5. 

15 
Adua  or  Addua,  the  river  Adda,   a 

tributary  of  the   Po,    2.    32 ;    84. 

10 
Adys,  a  town  in  Afiica,  1,  30 
Aeacidae,     descendants     of    Aeacus 

(Peleus,  Achilles,   Telamon,  Ajax), 

5,  2 

Aecae,  a  town  in  Apulia,  8,  88 
Aegae,  a  town  in  Aeolis,  6,  77  ;  88, 

13 
Aegean  Sea.  8,  2  ;  16,  34 

Aegina,  island,  9,  42  ;  11,  5  ;  22,  11 

Aegira,  a  town  in  Achaea,  2,  41  ;  4, 

57.  58 

Aegitna,  a  town  of  the  Oxybii,  a 
Ligurian  tribe,  38,  10,  1 1 

Aegium,  chief  town  of  the  Achaean 
league,  2,  41,  55  ;  4,  57  ;  5,  30, 
loi,  102  ;  16.  38  ;  meetings  of  the 
congress  at,   2,   54  ;  4,  7.  26,  82  ; 

6,  I  ;  16,   27,  28  ;  territory  of,  5, 

94 
Aegosagae,   a  tril>e  of  Gauls  invited 

into   Asia   by  Attains,    6,   77,   78, 

III 
Aegospotami,  the  Goat's  river,  on  the 

Hellespont,  1,  6  ;  12,  25)^ 
Aegusa,   one   of  the  Aegates   (Fari- 
I      gnano),  1,  60 


INDEX 


571 


Aegusae  (the  Aegates),  1,  44 
Aegys,  a  town  in  Laconia,  2.  54 
Aemilia,  wife  of  Scipio  Africanus  the 

elder,  and  sister  of  Aerailius  PauUus, 

82,  12-14 
Aemilius   Lepidus,    M.,    consul   &c. 

232,  2,  21,  22 
Aemilius   Lepidus,    M. ,    consul   B.c 

187.   16,   34  ;  22.   3  ;  28,    i  ;  82. 

21 
Aemilius  Papus.  L.,  consul  B.C  225. 

2.  23,  26.31 
Aemilius  Paullus.  M.,  consul  B.C.  255, 

I.  36,  37 

Aemilius  Paullus,  L.,  consul  &C  219 
and  215.  8,  16,  18,  19,  106,  107, 
116,  117  ;  4,  37,  66 ;  6,  108  ;  15, 
II 

Aemilius  Paulus  Macedonicus,  L., 
consul  B.C.    182  and  168,  18,  35; 

29,  I,  7.  10.  14.  15.  17.  20  ;  80, 

9,  10,   13,    16,    19;  81.  3;  32.  8, 

II.  12.  14.  15.  21  ;  his  wives.  82,  8 
Aemilius    Regillus,   L.,   praetor  B.c. 

190,  21.  8.  10,  24 
Aena,  a  temple  at  Ecbatana,  10.  27 
Aeneas  Tacticus  (middle  of  4th  cent 

B.C.),  10.  44 
Aenianian  Giilf(= Sinus  Maliacus),  so 

called  from  the  Aenianes.  10,  42 
Aenus,  a  town  in  Thrace,  mod.  Enos, 

G,  34  ;  32,  9,  15  ;  80,  3 
Aeolian  Islands.     See  Liparae 
Aeolis,   a  district  of  Mysia  between 

the  rivers  Carius  and  Hermus,  6, 

77 ;  ai.  13.  14 

Aeolus,  king  of  the  Winds,  84,  2,11 
Aerenosii,  a  Spanish  tribe,  3,  35 
Aeschrion,  a  Romanising  Acamanian, 

28.  5 

Aethaleia,     name    of    the    island  of 

Lemnus,  84,  11 

Aethiopia,  8.  38  ;  84,  16 

Aetna,  Mt.,  1,  55 

Aetolians,  the,  1,  3,  etc.;  attack 
Medion,  2,  2*4  ;  help  the  Epirotes 
against  the  Illyrians,  2,  6-12  ;  en- 
gage in  the  Social  war,  2,  37 ; 
make  peace  with  the  Achaeans,  2, 
44 ;  make  alliance  with  Antigonus 
Doson,  and  Cleomenes  of  Sparta, 
2, 45-49  ;  refuse  Antigonus  passage. 


2,  52  ;  joined  by  Mantinea.  2,  57, 
58  ;  intrigue  with  Antiochus,  3,  6, 
7  ;  invade  Messenia,  4,  9-19,  22-27, 

29-31.  34-37.  53-59.  61-67,  77-8o, 
84  ;  attacked  by  Philip  V.,  5,  2- 
14 ;  attempt  to  invade  Thessaly,  6. 
17 ;  evade  peace  with  Philip,  6, 
29.  See  also  30,  35,  63,  91,  92, 
95.  96.  99.  100-103,  105,  107; 
attend  a  conference  at  Sparta,  9, 
28-39  !  attack  Acarnania.  9,  40  ; 
in  alliance  with  Rome  against 
Philip,  10,  25,  26,  41,  42  ;  receive 
a  legation  from  Rhodes  on  the  sub- 
ject of  peace,  11,  4-7  ;  distress  and 
revolutionary  measures,  18,  1,  2  ; 
fresh  offence  with  Philip,  15,  23 ; 
in  alliance  with  Nabis,  16.  13 ;  at 
the  battle  of  Panium,  16,  18  ;  ad- 
dressed by  Roman  envoys  in  Nau- 
pactus,  16,  27  ;  attend  a  conference 
at  Nicaea,  18.  i-io  ;  fight  on  the 
Roman  side  in  Thessaly,  18,  19 ; 
their  superiority  in  cavalry,  18,  22  ; 
discontented  with  their  share  of 
spoil  after  Cynoscephalae,  18,  27, 
34.  38,  39 ;  claim  Heraea,  18,  42  ; 
discontented  with  the  Roman  settle- 
ment of  B.C.  196,  18.  45  ;  claim 
Pharsalus,  18,  47 ;  addressed  by 
Roman  legates,  18.  48 ;  once  in 
league  with  Achaeans  against 
Boeotia,  20.  4  ;  submit  uncondition- 
ally to  Rome  after  the  battle  of 
Thermopylae,  20,  9-11  ;  the  Roman 
terms  with,  21,  3-4  ;  six  months' 
truce  allowed  them  in  which  to  ap- 
peal to  the  Senate,  21,  5,  8  ;  the 
Romans  proclaim  war  with   them, 

21,  25-32  ;  sell  Aegina  to  Attains, 

22,  II  ;  Gaius  Popilius  andOnaeus 
Octavius  order  them  to  give  hostages, 
28.  4  ;  their  violence  and  habits  of 
pillage,  80,  11  ;  improvement  after 
the  death  of  Lyciscus,  82,  19  ;  their 
principle  of  "spoil  from  spoil,"  18. 
4  ;  their  character  and  habits.  2.  3. 
4,  45,  46,  49  ;  4,  67  ;  9,  38  ;  18, 
4,  34  ;  their  officers.  21,  32 

Agathagetus  of  Rhodes.  27,  7  ;  28.  2 
Agatharchus,    a    Syracusan    sent    as 
I      ambassador  to  Carthage,  7,  4 


572 


INDEX 


Agatharchus,  son  of  Agathocles*  king 

of  Syracuse,  7.  2 
Agathinus  of  Corinth,  6,  95 
Agathoclea,  daughter  of  Aristomenes, 

15,  39 
Agathoclea,     mistress      of     Ptolemy 

Philopator,  14,  11  ;  16.  25.  31-33 
Agathocles,  king  of  Syracuse,  1,  7, 

82  ;  8,    12  ;    9,   23  ;  12,   15  ;  15, 

35 
Agathocles,   son    of   Oenanthe    and 

guardian  of  Ptolemy  Epii^ianes,  6. 

63  ;  14,  II  ;  15,  25-36 
Agathyma,  a  city  on  the  north  coast 

of  Sicily,  9,  27 
Agelaus  of  Naupactus,  4,  16 ;  6,  3, 

103-105,  107 
Agema,  or  guard,  in  the  Macedonian 

army,    5,    25 ;     in    the    army    of 

Ptolemy  Philopator,   6,  65,  84 ;  in 

the  army  of  Aiitiochus  Epiphanes, 

81,  3 
Agepolis  of  Rhodes,  28,  16,  17 ;  29. 

10,  19  ;  80.  4 
Agesarchus  of  Megalopolis,  father  of 

Ptolemy,  governor  of  Cyprus,  15, 

25 ;  18,  55 
Agesias,  an  Achaean,  80.  13 
Agesilaus  II.,  king  of  Sparta.   8,  6  ; 

9,  8,  23  (B.C.  398-361) 
Agesilaus,  son  of  Eudamidas,  4.  53 
Agesilochus  of  Rhodes,  27,  3  ;  28,  2, 

16  ;  29,  10 
Agesipolis,   son  of  Cleombrotus  XL, 

king  of  Sparta,  4,  35 
Agesipolis  III.,  king  of  Sparta,  son  of 

the  last,  4.  35  ;  23,  6  (b.c.  221) 
Agesipolis  of  Dyme,  5,  17 
Agetas,  Aetolian  Strategus,  5,  91,  96 
Agones,  a  tribe  of  Cisalpine  Gauls,  2, 

15 
Agrai,  a  tribe  in  Aetolia,  18,  5 

Agrianes,  a  Thracian  tribe,  2,  65  ;  5, 

79  ;  10,  42 

A^^igentum,  in  Sicily,  1,  17-20,   27, 

43  ;  a.  7 ;  9.  27;  la,  25 

Agrigentus,    a    river,    9.    27 ;    mod. 

Fiume  di  S,   Biagio,   which  joins 

the  Hypsas  (mod,  Drago) 
Agrii,  25,  4 
Agrinium,  a  city  of  Aetolia,  near  the 

Achclous,  5,  7 


Agron,  king  of  the  Illjrrians.  2,  2,  4 
Alabanda,  dty  in  Caria,  6,  79  ;  16. 

24;  30,  S 
Alba,  in  Latium,  2,  18 ;  87,  a 
Alcaeus  of  Messene,  82,  6 
Alcamenes  of  Sparta,  4.  22 
Alcamenes  of  Achaea,  friend  of  Diaeos, 

89,  10 
Alcetas.  Boeotian  Strategus,  22,  4 
Alcibiades,  son  of  Clinias  of  Athens, 

4.  44 
Alcibiades,  a  Spartan  exile,  22,  i,  15  : 

28,4 

Alcithus  of  Aegium,  28,  12,  19 

Aletas,  discoverer  of  the  silver  mines 

in  Spain,  10,  10 
Alexamenus,  an  Aetolian  Strategus, 

18,  43 
Alexander  the  Great,  2,  41.  71  ;  8, 

6,  59 ;  *.  23  ;  5,  JO,   55  ;  8.   12  ; 

9,   28,  34;    10,  27;  12.   12^.   17, 

18,  19,  22  ;  18,  3 ;  22,  8  ;  29.  21  ; 

88,  4 
Alexander,  son  of  Acmetus,  officer  01 

Antigonus  Doson,  2,  66 
Alexander,  commander  of  cavalry  to 

Antigonus  Doson  and  a  minister  of 

Philip  v.,  2,   66,  68;    4,   87:  6. 

28 ;  7,  12 
Alexander  of  Aetolia,  friend  of  Dori- 

machus,  4,  57,  58 
Alexander,   father  of  Antigonus,   the 

legate  from  Perseus  to  Boeotia,  27, 

5 
Alexander,  ambassador  to  Rome  from 

Attains,  18,  10 

Alexander  Balas,  38,  15  ;  18,  6 

Alexander,  king  of  Epirus,  2,  45  *,  9, 

34 
Alexander  Isius,  an  Aetolian,  13,  i  ; 

18,  3.  4.  10.  36 ;  21,  25.  26 
Alexander,    brother   of    Molo,    com- 
mander of  Persis  under  Antiochus 
the  Great,  5,  40,  41,  43,  54 
Alexander,  tyrant  of  Pherae  in  Thes- 

saly,  8,  I  ;  89,  2 
Alexander,  made  governor  of  Phocis 

by  Philip  v.,  5,  96 
Alexander  of  Trichonium,  5,  13 
Alexander,  tower  of,  in  Thessaly,  18, 

27 
Alexandria,  capital  town  of  Egypt,  2, 


INDEX 


573 


69 :  4,  51 ;  5,  35,  37.  40.  63,  66, 
67,  79,  86,  87  ;  7,  a  ;  12,  25^/;  18, 
3;  14.  XI  ;  15,  25,  26,  30;  16, 
10,  22  ;  23.  7,  12  ;  27.  19  ;  28,  i, 

17,  20,  22,  23  ;  29.  2,  24,  27;  80. 
9;  81,  5,  12,  26-28  ;  84.  4.  14  : 
89.  18 ;  obols  of  Alexandria.  84, 
8 

Alexandria  Troas,  6.   78,    xii  ;   21. 

13.  14 
Alexis,  captain  of  Apamea.  6,  50 

Alexo.  an  Achaean,  1,  43 

Alipheira,  a  city  of  Arcadia,  4,  77,  78 

Allaria.  a  city  of  Crete,  6,  63,  65 

Allobroges.  8.  49-51 

Alpheus,  river  in  the  Peloponnese,  4. 

77,  78  ;  12,  4^/ ;  16.  17 

Alps.  2,    14.   15.  16,   18.  21,  22,  28, 

32,  34.  35  ;  8.  34.  39.  47.  48,  50- 
56,  60-62,  64,  65  ;  34,  10,  15 
Altars,  the.     See  Philaenns 
Althaea,  a  town  in  Spain.  8,  18 
Amaeocritus,  Boeotian  Strategus.  20, 

4 
Amanides  Pylae,  pass  between  Cilicia 

and   S3rria.   N.N.E.   of  Issus.  12, 

17 

Ambradan  Gulf,  the,  4,  63,  66 ;  6, 

5.  18 
Ambracus,  or  Ambracia,   4,  61,  63  ; 

18.  10  ;  21,  26  -  30.  Sometimes 
Ambracia  means  the  territory.  4, 
61 

Ambrysus.  a  city  of  Phocis,  4,  25 
Ammonius   Barcaeus,    an    officer    of 

Ptolemy  Philopator,  6.  65 
Amphaxitis.    a    maritime    district  of 

Macedonia  on  the  left  bank  of  the 

Axius,  6,  97 
Amphiaraus,  fr.  xliii. 
Amphictyonic  league,  4,  25  ;  89.  12 
Amphidamus,    Strategus   of  Elis.   4, 

75.  84,  86 
Amphilochians.    an    Aetolian    tribe, 

18.  5  :  21.  25 
Amphipolis,  a  city  of  Macedonia,  29. 

6 
Amphissa.  a  city  of  Locris,  21,  4 
Amyce.  plain  of,  near  Antioch,  6,  59 
Amyclae,  a  town  in  Laconia,  6.  18- 

20,  23 
Amynander.  king  of  the  Athamanes, 


4,  16 ;  16,  27  ;  18,  i,  10,  36,  47  ; 

20,  10  ;  21,  25,  29 
Amyntas,  father  of  Philip  II.,  2,  48  ; 

22,  8 
Amyrus,  plain  of,  in  Thessaly,  6,  99 
Anacleteria   of    Ptolemy   Epiphanes, 

18,  55  ;  of  Philometor,  28,  12 
Anadendritis,  a  vine,  84,  1 1 
Anamares,  or  Ananes,  or  Andres,  or 

Anares,  a  Cisalpine  Gallic  tribe.  2, 

17.  32.  34 
Anas,  a  river  in  Spain  [Guadiana), 

84,  9,  15 
Anaxidamus,   an  Achaean   officer  of 

Philopoemen,  11,  18 
Anaxidamus,  an  Achaean  ambassador 

to  Rome,  31,  6 ;  83,  3 
Ancus  Marcius,  king  of  Rome,  fr.  v. 
Ancyra,  a  city  of  Galatia,  21,  39 
Anda,  a  city  in  Libya,  14,  6 
Andania,  a  city  in  Messenia,  6,  92 
Andobales  (or  Indibilis),  king  of  the 

Ilergetes,  8,  76;  9,  11 ;  10,  18,  35, 

37,  40  ;  11,  26,  29,  31,  33  ;  21,  II 
Andosini,  a  Spanish  tribe,  3,  35 
Andranodorus  of  Syracuse,  7.  2,  5 
Andreas,  physician  of  Philopator.  6, 

81 
Androlochus  of  Elis,  6,  94 
Andromachus,   father  of  Achaeus,  4, 

51  ;  8,  22 
Andromachus  of  Aspendus,  an  officer 

of  Ptolemy  Philopator.  6,  64,  65, 

83,  85,  87 
Andromachus,       ambassador       from 

Philopator  to  Rome,  88,  8 
Andronicus,  ambassador  of  Attains, 

82.  28 
Andronidas,  a  Romanising  Achaean, 

29,  25  ;  80,  23;  89,  10,  11 
Androsthenes  of  Cyzicus,  11,  34 
Aneroestes,  king  of  the  Gaesatac,  2. 

22,  26,  31 
Aniaracae,  a  tribe  in  Media,  6,  44 
Anicius  Gallus,  L.,  praetor  B.c.  168, 

80,  14  ;  82,  20  ;  83,  9 
Anio,  river  in  Latium,  9,  5,  7 
Antalces  of  Gortyn  in  Crete,  22,  19 
Antalcidas,  1,  6  ;  4.  27  ;  6,  49 
Antanor  of  Elis.  6,  94 
Antenor.  ambassador  of  Perseus  to 

Rhodes,  27,  4,  14 


574 


INDEX 


Anticyra,  in  Locris.  9,  39 ;  in  Phods, 

18.  45  :  27,  16 
Anligoneia,  a  city  of  Epinis,  2,  5,  6 
Antigoneta,  games  at  Sicyon  in  honour 

of  Antigonus  Doson,  38,  19 ;  80, 

Antigonus  the  One-eyed,  successor  of 
Alexander  the  Great  in  Syria,  B.C 
323-301.1,63;  5,67;  10,27;  18, 
3;  28,  20 

Antigonus  Gonatas,  king  of  Mace- 
donia, son  of  Demetrius  Poliorcetes, 
B.C  283-239,  8,  41,  43-45;  9. 
29,  31,  32,  34,  38  ;  18,  6  ;  20,  6 

Antigonus  Doson,  grandson  of 
Demetrius  PoUorcetes,  guardian  of 
Philip  v.,  and  really  king  of 
Macedonia,  B.C  229-220,  2,  45, 
47-70 ;  8,  16  ;  4,  I,  3,  6,  9,  16, 
22,  34,  69,  76,  82,  87  ;  6,  9,  16, 
24.  34.  35.  63,  89,  93  ;  7,  II :  9, 
29,  36  ;  20.  5 

Antigonus,  son  of  Alexander,  an  am- 
bassador from  Perseus  to  Boeotia, 
27,  5 

Antilibanus,  a  mountain  in  Coele- 
Syria,  the  eastern  range  of  Lebanon, 

B.  45.  59 
Antimachus,  a  friend  of  Perseus,  29.  6 

Antinous    of     Epirus,    a     friend    of 

Perseus,  27,  15  ;  30,  7 
Antioch  in  Mygdonia,  6,  51 
Antioch   on  the  Orontes,   capital   of 

S>Tia,   6,  43,   59,  60,  87  ;  81,  17  ; 

32.  4 
Antiochis,    sister    of    Antiochus    the 

Great,  8.  25 
Antiochus  I.,  Soter,  king  of  Syria  B.C. 

280-261,  81,  7 
Antiochus  II.,  Theos,  king  of  Syria 

B.C.  261-246 
Antiochus  Hierax,   son  of  Antiochus 

II..  ob.  B.C.  227,  6,  74 
Antiochus    III.,   the   Great,    king   of 

Syria  B.C.   223-187,  1,  3 ;  2,   71; 

3,  2,  3,  6,  7,  II,  12,  32  ;  4,  2,  37, 

48.  51  ;  6,  I,  29,  31,  34,40-71,  73, 

79-87,  89.  105,  109  ;  7,  15-18  ;  8. 

18-23,  25  ;  10,  27-31,  49  ;  11,  34; 

13.  9 ;  16,  20.  25,  37  ;  16,  18,  19, 

22,  27,  39  ;  18,  39,  41,  43.  45.  47- 

52  ;  20,   1-3,   7-11  ;   21,  2,  4,  6, 


8-ai,  24.  25,  33,  43-48  ;  2S.  4.  5 ; 
28,  14 ;  24.  13.  15  :  80,  4  ;  88.  i. 
4,  20 ;  89.  6 ;  89,  14.  19 ;  his 
treaty  with  Rome,  81,  45 

Antiochus  IV. ,  Epiphanes.  second  son 
of  Antiochus  the  Great,  king  of 
Syria  B.C.  175-164,  8,  3  ;  16,  18, 
19  ;  26,  I  ;  27.  7,  19 ;  28.  i,  17- 
23  ;  29,  2,  4,  24,  26.  27  ;  80,  17  ; 
81,  3-6.  9,  II,  12,  21  ;  88,  18 

Antiochus  V.,  Eupator,  son  of  Epi- 
phanes, king  of  Syria  B.C  164-162. 

81,  12.  19 

Antiochus,  another  son  of  Antiochus 
the  Gieat  according  to  the  historian 
Zeno,  16,  18,  19 

Antipater,  guardian  of  Alexander  the 
Great's  son  Philip  III.,  and  practi- 
cally king  in  Macedonia  B.C  323- 
319,  6,  10  :  9,  29.  30 ;  18,  13 

Antipater,  nephew  of  Antiochus  the 
Great,  6,  79.  82,  87 ;  16,  18  ;  21, 
16,  17,  24 

Antipatria,  a  town  of  the  Illyrian 
Dassaretae,  on  the  River  Apsus,  6, 
108 

Antiphanes  of  Berga.  a  proverbial 
liar  (whence  ^pyat^cuf),  34,  6 

Antiphatas,  of  Gortyn  in  Crete,  33, 
16 

Antiphilus,  an  ambassador  of  Pmsias, 

82,  28 

Antipolis,    a  colony  from   Marseilles 

{An/ ides),  33,  7 
Antisthcnes  of  Rhodes,  16.  14-15 
Antium,  in  Latium,  8,  22,  24 
Antonius,  M.,  Trib.  PI.  B.C.  167,  80, 

4 
Aous,  a  river  in    IU3rria  (^iVja),   6, 

no ;  27,  16 

Apameia,  a  town  in  Syria  (Kulak-el- 

Mudik),  6,  45,  50,  56,  58,  59 
Apameia,  a  town  in  Phrygia  (Denair)^ 

21.  43-45.  48 
Apasiacae,  a  Nomad  tribe  between  the 
Oxus  and  the  Asiatic  Tanais,  10, 

48 
Apaturius      Gallus,       assassin        of 

Seleucus  III..  4,  48 
Apega,  wife  of  Nabis,  13,  7  ;  18,  17 
Apclaurum,  a  mountain  in  Arcadia,  4. 

69 


INDEX 


575 


Apelles,  guardian  and  friend  of  Philip 
v.,  4.  76,  82,  84.87  :  5,  I  ;  he 
conspires  against  the  king,  6,  2,  4, 
14,  16.  26-29 

Apelles,  another  friend  of  Philip  V. , 

22.  z8  :  28.  I 

Apennines,  the.  2.  14.  16,  17.  24  ;  8, 

90,  no  ;  83.  II 
Aperantia,    a    district    and    city    of 

Thessaly,  20.  13  ;  21.  25 
Aphrodite   of    Eryx,    1,    55 ;    2,    7  ; 

temple  of,    at    Pergamum,  18,  2, 

6  ;  near  Saguntum,  3.  97 
Aphther,  a  Libyan,  32,  2 
Apia,  plain  of,  a  city  of  Phrygia,  6, 

77 
Apis,  a  harbour  in  Egypt,  81.  26.  27 
ApocUti,  magistrates  of  the  Aetolians, 

4,  5  ;  20.  I  ;  cp.  21,  4 
Apodoti.  an  Aetolian  tribe,  18,  5 
Apollo  of  the  Greeks  and  Cartha- 
ginians, 7.  9 ;  temples  of  Apollo 
at  Amyclae,  6,  19 ;  at  Delphi.  39, 
17  ;  at  Thermus,  11.  7  ;  near  Tera- 
nus.  82,  27  ;  statue  of,  at  Sicyon, 
18.  16  ;  sacred  land  of,  in  Sicyonia, 
ih\^  ;  mound   of,  at  Tarentum,  8. 

Apollodorus,  governor  of  Susiana,  6, 

54 
Apollodorus,  tyrant  of  Cassandreia,  7, 

7 
Apollodorus,  secretary  of  Philip  V., 

18.  I.  8 

Apollodorus,    Boeotian    ambassador, 

23.  16 

Apollonia,  town  in  Illyria,  2,  9.  11  ; 

6.  109.  no  ;  7,  9  ;  84.  12 
Apollonia.  a  city  of  Assyria.  6.  43,  44, 

51.52 
Apollonia.  a  city  of  Crete.  28.  14 
Apollonias,  wife  of  Attains  I. .  22.  20 
Apollonidas  of  Sicyon,  22,  11,  15.  16; 

28.  6 
Apollonides  of  Sparta,  24.  7 
ApoUonides  of  Clazomenae,  28.  19 
ApoUonius  of  Clazomenae,  28.  19 
ApoUonius,  a  friend  of  Seleucus  IV. . 

31.  21  ;  and   his    son  ApoUonius, 

81,  19.  21 
Apollophanes  of  Sdeucia,  a  physician, 

5,  56,  58 


Apro,  a  river  in  Liguria  (some  would 
read  O0a/>o$  Varus   the   Var),  33. 
II 
Aptera,  a  town  in  Crete,  4,  55 
Apuleius  Saturninus.  L. ,  82,  28 
Apustius.  P.,  82,  I 
Aquileia,  on  the  Adriatic.  34.  10,  11 
Arabia,  6.  71  ;  Arabians,  6,  71,  79, 

82.  85  ;  18,  9 
Arachosia,  district  in  Asia,  11,  34 
Aradus,  an  island    off  the    coast   of 

Phoenicia  {Ruad),  6,  68 
Aratthus,  a  river  in  Eplhis,  21,  26 
Aratus  of  Sicyon,  son  of  Clinias.  his 
history,  1,  3  ;    2.  40 ;    4.  2  ;    his 
policy  and  character,  2.  40.  43-52, 
56-60  ;  4,  6-12,  14,  19,  24,  37.  67, 
76,  82,  84-87  :  5,   I,  5.  7.  12.  15' 
16.  23,  26-28,  30.  91-103  ;  7.  II  ; 
his  death.  8.  14.     See  also  9.  17. 
23  ;  10,  22  ;  24.  6  ;  34.  14.     Vol 
i.  p.  283,  note. 
Aratus.  the  yoimger,  son  of  the  last, 
a.  51 ;  *.  37.  60,  67.  70,  72,  82  ; 
6,  I  ;  7.  II  ;  24.  6.  10 
Araxus.  promontory  of  Achaia,  4,  59, 

65 
Arbo.  a  city  in  Illyria.  2.  11 

Arbucala.  a   city  of   the  Vaccaei    in 

.   Spain,  8.  14 

Arcades,  a  city  in  Crete.  4.  53 

Arcadia  and  the  Arcadians.  2,  38,  54, 
56,  62  ;  4.  17,  20,  21,  33,  70-77 ; 
6.  2  ;  12.  4  ;  18.  14  ;  39.  7  ;  prac- 
tice of  music  in,  4.  20,  21 

Areas,  the  ancestor  of  the  Arcadians, 

*.  77 

Arcesilas  of  Pitane,  academical  philo- 
sopher, 10,  22 

Arcesilaus,  ambassador  of  the  Lace- 
daemonian exiles,  23,  6 

Arcesilaus  of  Megalopolis,  28,  6  ;  29, 

25 
Archedamus,  an  Aetolian,  18,  21 ;  20, 

9 :  SB.  4 
Archedicus.  a  comedy  writer,  12.  13 
Archias,  governor  of  Cyprus,  88.  5 
Archicrates,  an  Achaean,  89.  10 
Archidamus  V.,  king  of  Sparta,   ob. 

B.C.  236-235.  4,  35-37  ;  8,  I 
Archidamus.    son    of    Pantaleon,    an 

Aetolian.  4.  57-58 


576 


INDEX 


Archimedes  of  Syracuse,  8.  5,  7-9 
Archippus,  an  Achaean,  89.  11 
Archon  of  Aegira,  an  Achaean  Stratc- 
gus  in  B.C.  189,  171,  169,  22,  13, 
14  ;  27.  2  ;  28,  3,  6,  7,    12  ;  29. 

23.  25 

Ardaxanus,  a  river  in  Illyria,  8,  15 
Ardca.  in  Latium,  8,  22,  24 
Ardiaei,  an  Illyrian  tribe,  2.  11.  12 
Ardyes,  a  Gallic  tribe  on  the  Rhone, 

8.  47 

Ardys,  an    officer   of   Antiochus   the 

Great.  6.  53,  60 
Ares.  7,   9  ;    12.    26 ;    plain    of,    in 

Thrace,  18,  10 
Arethusa,  a  spring  in  Sicily,  12.  4 
Areus  of  Sparta,  22,  i.  15.  16  ;  28,  4 
Arevaci,  a  Celtiberian  tribe.  86.  2,  3 
Arexidamus.  a  soldier  of  Machanidas, 

11,  18 
Argennum,  promontory  in  Ionia,  16,  8 
Argolis,  2,  64  ;  4,  36  ;  6,  20,  95 
Argos,  Argives,  2,  44,  52-54,   59,  64, 

70 ;  4,  36,  82,  87  ;  6,    16-18,  20, 

24,  91,  92,  loi  ;  9,  28,  34;  10,  26, 
41  ;  16,  12.  16 ;  18,  2,  6,  8,  14, 
17;  21,  24  ;  22.  13  ;  23.  9,  12,  13; 
27,  2  ;  30.  10 ;  34.  2  ;  39,  8 ; 
priestesses  at,  12.  11 

Argos,  Amphilochian,  21,  30 
Arianus.  of  Crete,  8,  18-22 
Ariarathes    V.,  king    of   Cappadocia 

B.C.  220-163,  3,  3  ;  4,  2  ;  21,  47  ; 

24.  I,  8,  9  ;  26,  2  ;  81.  12-14 
Ariarathes  VI.,  king  of   Cappadocia 

B.C.   163-130,  8.5;    31,  14,    17; 

32.   3.   5,  22,  24  ;  32.  25  ;  33,  6, 

12 
Aribazus,     commandant    of    Sardis, 

7.  17.  18  ;  8,  23 
Aricia,  in  Latium,  3,  22 
Aridices,  a  Rhodian    ambassador,  4. 

52 
Ariminum,  on  the  coast    of   Umbria 

(Rimini),  2.  21,  23;  3,  61,  68,75, 

77f  86,  88 
Ariobazus  of  Sardis,  8.  23 
Arisba,  towTi  in  the  Troad,  6.  iii 
Aristaenetus  of  Dyme,  11,  11 
Aristaenus,    Achaean    Strategus    B.C. 

198,   195,   187,  185.  18.  I.  7,  13; 

22,  10,  12,  13  ;  24,  13-15 


Aristarchus,  a  Phocaean  ambassador, 

21,6 
.Aristeides  of  Athens,  9,  33  ;  88.  8 
.\risteides,  an  ambassador  of  Ptolemy 

Epiphanes,  28,  20 
Aristeides,  a  Theban  painter QC^r.  circ. 

B.C  350),  89,  13 
Aristocrates,  king  of  Arcadia,  4,  33 
Aristocrates,  of  Rhodes,  88,  4 
Aristocracy,  6,  3-8 
Aristodamus,  an  Achaean  ambassador, 

30,  13 
Aristodemus,  t>Tant   of    M^;aIopolis, 

10,  22 
Aristodemus.  of  Elis.  fr.  iL 
Aristogciton.  of  Elis,  6,  94 
Aristomachus,  tyrant  of  Argos.  2,  44, 

59 
Aristomachus,  of  Corinth,  7,  5 

Aristomenes,    guardian    of    Ptolemy 

Epiphanes,  16,  31  ;  18,  53,  54 

Aristomenes,  king  of  Messenia,  4,  33 

Ariston,  Aetolian  Strategus  B.C.  221, 

4.  5,  9.  17 
Ariston  of  Megalopolis,  28,  6  ;    29,  25 
Ariston  of  Rhodes,  28.  16 
Aristonicus,  a  eunuch  in  the  Court  of 

Ptolemy  Epiphanes,  22.  7,  22 
Aristonicus,  a  boxer.  27,  9 
Aristophantus  of  Acarnania,  6.  6 
Aristotle,  the  philosopher,  12,  5-8,  11, 

23.f24 
Aristotle  of  Argos,  2,  53 
Aristotle,  Rhodian  ambassador.  81,  i 
Arius,  a  river  in  Asia  {Hcri  Rud\  10, 

49 
Armenas,  son  of  Nabis,  21,  2 

Armenia,  9.  43  ;  26.  2 

Armies,  necessary  accomplishment  for 

commanding,  4,  12-20 
Armosata,  a  city  of  Armenia.  8.  25 
Arpani,  people  of  Arpi,  in  Apulia,  8, 

88,  118 
Arretium,  a  city  of  Etruria  (Arexzo), 

2,  16,  19  ;  3,  77,  80 
Arsaces  III.,   king  of   the  Parthians, 

10.  28 
.\rsinoc,    wife  of   Ptolemy    Philadel- 

phus,  16,  25 
Arsinoe,  sister   and  wife  of   Ptolemy 

Philopator,  6.  83.  84,  87  ;  16,  25, 

32.  33 


INDEX 


577 


Arsinoe.  a  city  of  Aetolia,  80,  1 1 
Artabazanes,  an  Asian  prince,  6, 55,  57 
Artaxerxes    II.,  Mnemon,     king    of 
Persia,  1,  6 ;  12,  25/,  B.C.  405-362 
Artaxias,  a  prince  in  Armenia,  25,  2  ; 

81.  17 
Artemidonis  of  Syracuse,  1,  8 
Artemis,  temples  of,  near  Lusi,  4,  18, 
19.  25  ;  9,  34  ;  at  Abydos,  16,  31 ; 
near   Pergamum,     32,    27 ;     near 
Elyma,    81,    xi  ;    worship    of,  at 
Syracuse,  8,  37  ;  image  of,  at  Bar- 
gylia,  16,  12 
Artemisium  in  Elis,  4,  73 
Arunculeius,  Gains,  83,  i,  9 
As,  Roman  coin,  2.  15  ;  6,  39 
Asclepius    (Aesculapius),  temples   of, 
at    Agrigentum,    1,     18 ;  at   New 
Carthage,    10,    xo ;  at    Ambracia, 
21,  27  ;  at  Pergamum,  82,  27 
Ascondas  of  Boeotia,  20,  5 
Asia,  one  of  the  three  divisions  of  the 
world,  2.  37  ;  8,  37.  38.  59  ;  84,  7- 
This  side  Taurus,  =  Asia  Minor,  3. 
3  ;    4,  2,  48  ;  21,   14.  45  ;  cp.  6, 

34.  90. 
Asine,  a  city  in  Laconia,  5,  19 

Asine,  a  city  in  Messenia,  18,  42 
Aspasiacae,  a  Nomad  tribe  in  Asia, 

10.  48 
Aspasianus,  a  Mede,  5,  79 
Aspasius  of  Elis,  5,  94 
Aspendus,  in  Pamphylia,  6,  73 ;  21,  35 
Aspis,  a  city  in  Africa  (Clupea),  1,  29, 

34.  36 
Ass's  Back  {OnH  Monies),  2,  52 
Assyrians,  12.  28  ;  89,  6 
Astapa,  a  city  in  Spain,  11,  24 
Asti,  a  Thracian  tribe,  13,  zo 
Astias  (Artemis),  16,  Z2 
Astymedes,  of  Rhodes,  27,  7  ;  30,  4, 

5,  22  ;  81,  6,  7  :  88,  15 
Atabyrium,    mountain    and    town   in 

Galilee,  6.  70 
Athamanes,  a  tribe  in  Epirus,  4.  16  ; 

16,  27 ;  18.   36  ;  20,   10  ;  21.  25. 

31 ;  22.  9  ;  23,  I 
Athen^,  temples   of,  at  Rhodes.  81, 

15 ;  at    Agrigentum,    9,    27 ;     at 

Sparta  (of  the  Brazenhouse),  4,  22, 

35  ;    at    Itone,    4.     25 ;    26,     3  ; 

among  the  Insubres,  2.  32  ;  statue 

VOI«  II 


of,  at  Alipheira,  4,  78  ;  games  of, 

4,  49 
Athens,  5,  27  ;  12,  13,  25.  26  ;  16, 

25,  27  ;  38,  4,  II  ;  Olympieium  at, 

26,  X.  Athenians,  the,  their  triremes, 
1,  63;. assessment  of,  2,  62;  capture 
of  Chrysopolis,  4,  44 ;  conquered  by 
Philip  II.,  6,  10;  their  adulation  of 
Ptolemy  IV. ,  6,  10  ;  relieve  Man- 
tinea,  9,  8 ;  their  colonies  in  Thrace, 
9,  28 ;  suffer  under  Antipater,  9, 
29 ;  hostility  to  Sparta,  12,  6 ;  at 
Aegospotami,  12  ;  25^^ ;  their  re- 
ception of  king  Attains,  16,  25,  26 ; 
attacked  by  Philip  V.,  16,  34  ; 
intercede  for  the  Aetolians,  21,  4, 
25,  29-31  ;  beaten  at  Chaeroneia, 
22,  6 ;  addressed  by  Roman  Senate, 
24,  12  ;  send  ambassadors  to  Alex- 
andria, 28, 19, 20;  petition  the  Senate 
for  Delos  and  Lemnos,  30,  21  ; 
82,  17  :  their  quarrel  with  Oropus, 
82,  25  ;  their  resistance  to  Xerxes, 
88,  4  ;  their  republican  constitution, 
6,  43»  44.  cp.  9,  23 ;  their  list  of 
Archons,  12,  11 

Athenaeum,  a  fortress  near  Megalo- 
polis, 2.  46,  54 ;  4,  37,  60,  8 1 

Athenaeum,  a  promontory  of  Cam- 
pania {Promontorium  Alinervae, 
Punta  dtlla  Campanella),  34,  xi 

Athenaeus,  son  of  Attalus  I.,  28,  i  ; 
81,  9  ;  32,  28  ;  88.  i.  13 

Athenagoras.  a  mercenary  officer  of 
Philip  v.,  18,  22 

Athinis,  an  Egyptian  prince,  22,  7 

Athymus.     See  Vultumus 

Atilius,  Aulus,  27.  2 

Atilius  Calatinus.  A.,  consul  B.C.  258, 
254,  1,  24,  38 

Atilius  Regulus,  M.,  consul  B.C.  267, 
256,  1.  26.  28-31.  33-35 

Atilius  Regulus.  C,  consul  B.C.  257, 
250,  1,  25.  39,  41-48 

Atilius  Regulus,  M. .  consul  B.C.  227, 

217,  8.  106,  114.  116 

Atilius   Regulus.    Gaius,   consul  B.C. 

225,  2,  23.  27,  28 
Atilius  Serranus,  Gaius,  praetor  B.C. 

218,  3,  40 

Atintanes,  a  tribe  in  Epirus,  % 

T.  9 


578 


INDEX 


Atis,  a  Boian  chief,  2,  21 

Atlantic  Ocean,  the,  8.  37.  57.  59  I 

16.  29 
Atreus,  son  of  Pdops,  84,  2 
Atropatei,  a  tribe  in  Asia,  6,  44 
Attains  I.,  king  of  Perganyim   B.a 

241-197,  8,  3 ;  4,  48,  49.  65 ;  5, 

^^,  78,  X05,  X07,  III :  9,  30  ;  10. 

41,  42  ;  11,  7 ;  16,  1-9.  24.28,  30, 
34,  40  ;  18,  I,  2,  6,  8,  10,  16,  17, 
41  ;  21.  20,  48  ;  22,  11,  20;  82, 
22  ;  the  Athenians  name  a  tribe 
Attalica  after  him,  16,  25 

Attains  II.,  succeeds  his  brother 
Eumenes  II.  B.c.  159-138,  8.  5 ; 
81'  39*  43;  88.  20;  28,  11;  24, 
5,  8  ;  27,  18 ;  28,  7.  12  ;  29,  6  ; 
80.  1-3  :  81,  9 ;  82,  3,  5,  22,  27, 
28  ;  88,  I,  6.  9,  12  ;  87.  6 

Attains  III.,  son  of  Eumenes  II.,  suc- 
ceeded his  tmcle  B.C.  138-133,  80, 
2  ;  38,  18 

Attica,  valuation  of,  2,  72  ;  6,  29  ; 
excellence  of  its  silver,  21,  32,  45 

Attis,  priest  of  Cybele,  21.  37 

Aufidus,  river,  in  Apulia  (O/anio),  8. 
no  ;  4,  I 

Aurelius  Orestes,  L,,  consul  B.C.  157, 
31.  12  ;  38.  7.  8 

Ausones.  in  Italy,  34,  11 

Autaritus,  a  leader  of  Gallic  mercen- 
aries, 1,  77-80,  85,  86 

Autolychus,  of  Rhodes,  16.  5 

Autonous.  a  Thessalian,  7,  5 

Azanis,  a  district  in  Arcadia  contain- 
ing 17  towns  {St.  Byt.),  4,  70 

Azorium,  a  town  of  Perrhaebia  in 
Thessaly,  28,  13 

Babylon,  6,  48,  51,  52  ;  9.  43 
Babyrtas,  a  Messenian,  4,  4 
Bactra,  capital  of  Bactriana,  29,  12 
Bactriana,  10,  48,  49  ;  11,  34 
Baebius,  L.,  praetor  B.C.  189,  16,  x. 

4 
Baebius  Tamphilus,  M.,  consul  B.c. 

181,  22,  9 
Baecula.  a  town  in  Spain,   10,   38  ; 

11,  20  ;  battle  of,  10,  39 
Bactis.  river  in  Spain  (Guadalquivir). 

84.  9 
Balacer,  father  of  Pnntauchus,  27,  8 


Balacer,  son  of  Pantaachus.  29,  4 
Balearic  slingers,  1,   67  ;  8,  33,  72, 

83.  113;  15,  II 
Ballistae,  9,  41 
Bantia,  town  in  IIl3rria,  6,  108 
Barathra,  in  Egypt,  6.  80 
Barca.  a  city  in  Gyrene,  5.  65 
Barcas.     See  Hamilcar 
Bardylis,  an  Illyrian  prince,  89,  2 
Bargusii,  a  Spanish  tribe,  8.  35 
Bargylia.  a  town  in  Garia,  16,  12,  24; 

18,  2,  8  ;  18.  44,  48,  50  :  gulf  of, 

16.  12 
Barmocarus,  a  Garthaginian,  7,  9 
Bamus,  in  Macedonia,  84,  12 
Bastarnae,  tribe  on  the  Danube,  26.  6 
Batanaea,  in  Palestine,  16,  39 
Bato,  fr.  xliii. 

Battacus,  priest  of  Gybele,  21,  37 
Beacons.     See  Signals 
Belli,  a  Geltiberian  tribe,  85,  2 
Belmina,  in  Arcadia,  2,  54 
Benacus,  lake,  84,  10 
Beneventum,  in  Samnium,  8,  90 
Berenice,  daughter  of  Ptolemy  Phila- 

delphus,  wife  of  Antiochus  II.,  6, 

58  ;  fr.  xxvi. 
Berenice,  wife  of  Ptolemy  Euergetes, 

5.  36  ;  15,  25 
Berga.  in  Macedonia,  84,  5,  6 
Beroea.  in  Macedonia,  27,  8  ;  28,  8 
Berytus,  in  Phoenicia  (BeinU),  6,  61, 

68 
Bessi,  a  Thracian  tribe,  23,  8 
Bionidas,  of  Sparta,  4.  22 
Bippus,  an  Argive,  23,  18  ;  24,  i,  2 
Bithynians,  4.  50,  52  ;  8,  24 ;  87,  7 
Bito,  of  Argos,  22,  20 
Bodencus,  Gallic  name  of  the  Po,  2. 

16 
Boeae,  town  in  Laconia,  6.  19 
Boei.  an  Illyrican  tribe,  6.  108 
Boeotarch,  18.  43 
Boeotia.   Boeotians.  2,  49,  65  ;  4,  9, 

15.  25.  67 ;  9,  38  :  10, 41 ;  11.  5 ; 

18,  8  :  18,  II,  14,  43  ;  20.  2  ;  21, 
20  ;  22.  4  ;  23,  16  ;  24,  12  ;  27, 
I.  2,  5.  38  ;  82,  20  ;  the  decline  of 
Boeotia,  20,  4-7 ;  Panboeotian  con- 
gress. 4,  3  ;  9.  34 
Boii,  Gisalpine  Gauls.  2.  17,  20-24, 
28,  30,  31  ;  8,  40,  56,  67 


INDEX 


579 


Bolax,  a  city  of  Triphylia  in  Elis,  4, 

77,  8o 
Bolis,  of  Crete,  8.  17-22 
Bomilcar,    a  Carthaginian   suifes,  8. 

33.  42 
Bomilcar,  a  Carthaginian  admiral.  9.  9 

Boodcs,  of  Carthage,  1,  21 

Bosporus,  Cimmerian  (Straits  af  Yeni 

Kali),  4.  39 
Bosporus,  Thracian  (Channel  of  Con- 

stantinopU),  4.  39,  43 
Bostarus,  Carthaginian  general,  1,  30, 

79 
Bostor,  Carthaginian  general,  3,  98,  99 

Botrys,  city  of  Phoenicia,  6,  68 

Botrys,  a  Messenian  writer,  12,  13 

Bottia,  in  Macedonia,  5.  97 

Brachylles,  a  Boeotian,  18,  i.  43  ;  SO, 

S.  7  :  M.  4 
Braun    shields,    men    with,    Mace- 
donians, 2,  66,  67  ;  Megalopolitans, 

&•  65  ;  4,  69  ;  in  Syrian  army,  31.  3 
Breasts,  the,  sandbanks  at  the  mouth 

of  Danube,  4,  41 
Brennus,  leader  of  the  Gallic  invaders, 

4,  46  ;  9,  30.  35 
Britain,  3,  57  ;  34,  5,  10 
Brochi,  in  Coele-Syria,  6.  46,  61 
Brundisium,  in  Calabria,  2.  ix  ;  10. 

X  ;  21.    24  ;    29,    6 ;  30,  20 ;  38, 

20 ;  a  Bnmdisian,  3.  69 
Bruttii,  or  Bruttium,  1,  56 ;  9,  7,  25, 

27  ;  11,  6  ;  13.  10 
Bubali,  in  Africa,  12,  3 
Bubastus,  in  Egypt,  16.  27 
Buchetus,  in  Epinis,  21.  26 
Bura,  town  in  Achaia,  2.  41 
Bylazora,  town  in  Paeonia,  6,  97 
Byttachus,  a  Macedonian,  5,  79    82 
Byzachium,  district  in  Africa,  3   23  ; 

12.  I 
Byzantium  and  Byzantines,  3,  2  ;  its 

site  and  war  with  Rhodians,  4,  38. 

39,  42-52  ;  6,  63,  100.     See  also  8. 

24  ;  11,  4  ;  16,  2  ;  18,  2  ;  22,  18  ; 

84,  12 

Cadi,  a  to\%-n  in  Maeonia,  33.  12 
Cadmea,  the,  citadel  of  Thel)es,  4,  27 
Cadusii,  a  tribe  in  Asia,  6,  44.  79 
Caecilius  Metellus  Denter,  L.,  consul 
B.C.  284,  2,  19 


Caecilius  Metellus,  L. ,  consul  B.c.  251, 

1.  39 
Caecilius   Metellus,   Q.,    consul    ac. 

206,  22,  I,  6.  9,  13,  15,  16;  23.  2,4 
Caecilius  Metellus  Macedonicus,  Q., 

38,  10,  II  ;  39.  7.  10,  II 
Caesarea,  in  Cappadocia,  fr.  xx. 
Calabrians,  the,  10,  i 
Calamae,  fort  in  Messenia,  6,  92 
Calamus,  a  town  in  Phoenicia,  6,  68 
Calchedon,  on  the  Propontis  (Chalhe- 

don  or  Kadi-Kivi),  4,  39,  43,  44 ; 

15,  23 
Calena,  or  Calela,a  fort  near  Larinum, 

3,  loi 
Cales,  in  Campania  (Calvi),  3,  91 
Calicoeni,  an  Illyrian  tribe,  6,  xo8 
Calleas,  of  Thespiae,  27,  x 
Callias,  a  pancratiast  of  Athens,  28, 

19 
Callicrates,  of   Lcontium  in  Achaia, 

24,  10-12  ;  29,  23.25  ;  30.  13.  23; 

31,  8  ;  83,  16  ;  37.  5 
Callicritus,  a  Boeotian,  22.  4 
Calligito,  of  Byzantium,  4,  52 
Callimachus,  school  of,  12.  25^/. 
Calliope,  a  city  of  the  Parthians,  10, 

31 
Callipolis.  a  city  of  Aetolia,  20.  13 

Callippus,  of  Ambracia,  21.  25,  26 
Callisthenes,  of  Olynthus,  historian,  4, 

33  :  6,  45  ;  12.  II,  26 
Callistratus,  of  Ellis,  20.  3 
Callonitis,  district  in  Mesopotamia,  6. 

54 
Calpitus,  a  city  in  Galatia,  24,  8 
Calycadnus,    promontory    in    Cilicin, 

21.  45 
Calydonia,  district  of  Aetolia,  4,  65, 

95 
Calynda,  a  city  of  Caria,  31,  15.  16 
Camarina,  a  city  in  Sicily,  1,  24,  37  ; 

12,  25*. 
Cambylus,  a  Cretan,  8.  17-20 
Camerinum,  a  city  in  Umbria,  2,  19 
Cammani,  a  tribe  in  Asia,  31.  9 
Campania,  3,    90,  91  ;    34,   11  ;  the 

Campanian    Mamertines,    1,  7,  8. 

See  also  2.  24  ;  3.  118  ;  7,  i  ;  24, 

15 
Campus  Martins,  the,  12,  4^. 

Camus,  town  in  Palestine,  6,  70 


58o 


INDEX 


Candavia,  mountain  in  Illyria,  84,  1 2 

Cannae,  in  Apulia,  8,  107 ;  battle  of, 

8,    113- "7  ;    4,   I  ;  5,   105,   no, 

III  ;  6,  II,  58  ;  15,  7,  II 

Canobus.  or  Canopus.  town  in  Egypt, 

5.  39 
Canuleius,  ambassador  to  Egypt,  81. 

18 
Canusium,  town  in  Apulia,  8.  107 
Caphyae,  town  in  Arcadia,  3.  52  ;  4. 

II,  12,  68,  70  ;  plain  of,  4,  ii,  13 
Capitolium,  1,  6  ;  2.  18,  31  ;  6,  19 
Cappadocians,   8.   5  ;    4.   2  ;  5,  43  ; 

21,  43  ;  **»  8  ;    81,   13,   14.   17  ; 

32,  25  ;  Cappadocia,  extent  of,  fr. 

XX. 

Capros,  river  in  Assyria,  5,  51 
Capua,  2,    17  ;  8.  90,  91  ;    9,  3-5  ; 

26.  2  ;  84,  II 
Carchi.  a  tribe  in  Asia,  6,  44 
Cardaces,     Asiatic      mercenaries     of 

Antiochus  the  Great,  6,  79,  82 
Caria,  8.  2  ;  6,  36,  41  ;  16.  40  ;  21. 
24,  48  ;  22,  5  ;  31.  7.  15  I  Carian 
war,  16,  12 ;  freed  from  the 
Khodians.  30.  5  ;  as  worthless  as  a 
Carian,  10,  32 
Carmania,  district  in  Asia,  6,  79.  82  ; 

11.  34 
Carneades,     Academic     philosopher, 

vol.  ii.  p.  466 
Cameium,    in    Laconia,    sacred     to 

Apollo,  6,  19 
Carpetani,  a  tribe  in  Spain,  3,  14  ;  10, 

7 
Carseae  (or  Carcsus),  a  town  in  the 

Troad,  6,  77 

Carsignatus,  a  Gallic  chief  in  Galatia, 
24,  8 

Carthaea,  a  town  in  Ceos,  16,  40 

Carthage,  its  position,  1,  73,  75  ;  its 
religion,  3,  25 ;  7,  9  ;  31.  20 ;  its 
government,  1,  3 ;  6,  43,  47.  5i.  5^ ; 
its  magistrates,  3.  33.  42,  51  ;  its 
senate,  1,  21,  68;  6,  51  ;  10.  18; 
36.  4  ;  the  Hundred,  36.  4  ;  its  do- 
minion, 5.  39 ;  9.  II ;  its  navy,  6, 52 ; 
its  cavalry,  3,  no,  117;  its  oppress- 
ive rule,  1,  72.  See  also  1,  19  ;  6, 
52;  11,  19;  14.  I.  5:  15,4-  Punic 
cunning,  3.  78  ;  l)oys,  15,  30 

Carthage,   New,   in  Spain,  2,  13  ;  3. 


13-17.  33.  39.  76,  9s;  •.  i;  «te 

situation,  10,  10 ;  its  capture,  10. 
11-16.     See  also  10.  6,  8  ;  11,  31 ; 
34,  9 ;  89.  19 
Carthalo,  a  Carthaginian  general.  1. 

53.54 
Caryneia,  a  city  of  Achaia.  2,  41 

Carystus,  a  dty  of  Euboea,  18.  47 

Casius,  a  mountain   on  the  borders 

of  Egypt  and  Arabia  Petraea  {Ei 

Katteh),  6.  80 

Caspian,  the.     See  Hyrcanian  Sea 

Caspian  pass,  the,  in  Media.  6.  44 

Cassander,  son  of  Antipater,  successor 

of  Alexander  the  Great   in  Maise- 

donia  and  Greece  B.C  306-296.  2, 

41  ;  5,  67  ;  9.  29  ;  12.  13 

Cassander,  of  Aegina.  22,  11 

Cassander,  of  Corinth,  6,  95 

Cassander,  minister  of  Philip  V.,  82, 

17.  18 
Cassander,     an      ambassador     from 

Phocaea,  21,  6 
CassiusLonginus,  C.  consul  B.C.  171, 

27,  6 
Castulo,  a  town  in  Spain  (Ceulona), 

10,  38  ;  11,  20 
Catapults,  1,  74  ;  11,  II 
Caucasus   {Hindoo  Koosh),    10.    48 ; 

11.  34 

Caulonia,   a  Greek  dty  on   the  east 

coast  of  Bruttium,  2.  39 ;  10,  x 
Caunus,  a  city  in  Caria,  80,  5,  9,  22 ; 

31,  I.  7.  x6 
Cavarus,  king  of  the  Gauls  in  Thrace. 

4,  46,  52  ;  8,  24 
Celtiberians.  in  Spain.  3,  5.  17 ;  11. 
I      31  ;  14,  7,  8 ;  26.  I ;  84.  I ;  their 
I      horses  and  swords,  fr.  xxi. .  xxit 
Celtici,  a  tribe  in  Baetica,  34,  9 
Celts  (Polybius  seems  to  use  the  words 

KcXrof  and  FoXdrcu  indifferently). 

See  Gauls 
Cenchreae,  the  eastern  port  of  Corinth, 

a.  59,  60  ;  4.  19 ;  5,  29,  loi ;  18. 

16 
Ccnomani,  a  tribe  of  Cisalpine  Gauls, 

2,  17.  23,  24,  32 
Censors,  the,  6.  13,  17 
Centaurs,  the,  8,  11 
Ccntenius,   Gaius,    pro -praetor    B.C. 

217,  3.  86 


INDEX 


S8i 


Centurions,  6,  24.  30,  36,  41 

Ceos,  island  in  the  Aegean,  16.  a6.  40 

Cephallenia,  the  largest  island  in  the 

Ionian  Sea  [Cephaloni<i\,  8,  3 ;  4. 

6;  5,  3-5.   109,  no;  21,   26,  30, 

3a ;  ST,  7 
Cephalo.  a  servant  of  Aratus.  8,  14 
Cephalus,  a  Molossian,  27,   15  ;  80, 

7.8 
Cephisodorus,       ambassador      from 

Athens.  18,  xo 
Ceraeas,  an  officer  of  Ptolemy  Philo- 

pator,  6,  70.  71 
Ceraunian  Mountains,  in  Epirus,  84. 

6 
Cerax,  a  town  in  Illyria.  6,  108  — 
Cercidas,  of  Megalopolis,   2,  48,  50. 

65 
Cercidas,  an  Arcadian.  18,  14 

Cerdna,  an  island  off  the  lesser  Syrtis 

(Karkenah),  3.  96 
Ceretae,  a  town  in  Crete,  4,  53 
Cersobleptes,  king  of  the  Thracians. 

89.  2 
Cesbediimi,    a    temple    of    Zeus    in 

Pisidia.  5,  76 
Cestros,  the,  27.  11 
Chaereas,  an  historian,  8,  20 
Chaeron,  of  Sparta,  28.  4,  18  ;  24,  7 
Chaeroneia.   in   Boeotia,   5,    xo ;  18, 

14  ;  22,  6  ;  27,  i 
Chalceia,  a  town  in  Aetolia,  5,  94 
Chalcidian  Mount,  in  Sicily,  1,  1 1 
ChalciSy  in  Euboea,  5,  2,  26 ;  9,  28  ; 

10.  42.  43 ;  18,   IX,  45  ;  20.  3,  8  ; 

27.  2,  7 ;  88,  5  ;  89,  17 
Chaldeans,  the,  84,  2 
Chalesus,   an    Aetolian    ambassador, 

29.  9 
Chalkeia,  bronu  works  in  Africa,  12,  i 
Charadra,  or  -drus,  a  town  in  Epirus, 

4,  63  ;  21,  26 
Chares,  an  Athenian,  9,  23 
Charimortus,  a  friend  of  Scopas,  18, 

55 
Charixenus,  an  Aetolian,  4,  34 

Charmion,  of  Crete.  22,  19 

Charops,  of  Epirus,  father  of  Machatas, 

20,  3 ;  27,  IS 

Charops,  of  Epirus,  son  of  Machatas. 
27.  IS  ;  80,  12,  13 ;  81,  8 ;  82, 
20,  21 


Charybdis,  34,  3 

Chattenia,  district  in  Arabia,  13,  9 
Chersonese,  Tauric.  25,  2 
Chersonese,   Thracian,    18,   $1  ',    21. 

15,  22.  48 

Chesuphus.  an  Egyptian.  22,  7 
Chilon,  of  Sparta,  4,  81 
Chimarus,  of  Crete,  29,  6 
Chiomara,  wife  of  Ortiago  the  Gaul, 

21,  38 
Chiron's  villa,  near  Messene,  4,  4 
Chius,  island  of,  6,  24,  28,  100 ;  11, 

4 ;  16,  S.  6,   8,   14,  40  ;   18,  22  ; 

21.  48  ;  battle  at,  16,  2-14 
Chlaeneas,  an  Aetolian    ambassador, 

•.  31.  32,  37 ;  speech  of,  9,  28-31 
Chreraas.  an  Acamanian,  28,  s  !  80, 

13 ;  32,  20 
jCbryseis,  wife  of  Antigonus  Doson,  6, 

89 
Chrysogonus,  an  officer  of  Philip  V. , 

5,  9.  17.  97 ;  7.  12  ;  9.  23 
Chrysondyon,  a   city  of  the    Illyrian 

Dassaretae,  6,  108 
Chrysopolis,    on     the     Bosporus    in 

Bithynia,  4,  44 
Cibyra,  a  town  in  Phrygia  (Horxoom), 

21,  34 ;  80,  S>  9 
Cilicia,  6,  S9.  79.  82 ;  12,  7.  17-ao ; 

21,  24 ;  31,  3 
Cilician  Gates,  the,  12,  8,  17 
Cineas,  of  Thessaly,  18.  14 
Cineas.  a  minister  of  Ptolemy  Physcon, 

28.  19 
Circeii,  in  Latium,  3,  22,  24  ;  31,  22, 

23 
Circus  maximus,  the.  30,  14 
Cirrha,  in  Phocis,  harbour  of  Delphi, 

6,  27 

Cirta,  a  town  in  Numidia,  37,  10 
Cissa,  a  town  in  Spain,  3,  76 
Cissii,  a  tribe  in  Susiana,  6.  79,  82 
Citadels,  dangers  of,  fr.  ix. 
Cius,  a  town  of  Bithynia,  15,  21,  23  ; 

16,  34 ;  18.  3-5,  44 

Clarium,  a  fort  near  Megalopolis,  4. 

6,  25 
Clastidium,  a  town  in  Cisalpine  Gaul 

{Casteggio),  2,  34 ;  3,  69 
Claudius  Caudex,  App.,  consul   B.C. 

212,    t^es    Messene    and    relieves 

the  Mamertines,  1,  11,  12,  16 


582 


INDEX 


Claudius  Pulcher,  App.,  consul  B.C. 
185,  as  Trib.  Mil.  B.C.  197  under 
Flamininus  meets  Philip  V.  at 
Nicaea,  18.  8,  10 ;  sent  as  com- 
missioner to  Greece  B.c.  185,  22. 
16-19;  28.  4 

Claudius  Cento,  App.,  legatus  of  the 
consul  Q.  Marcius  in  Achaia.  28. 
13  ;  sent  to  Pnisias  B.C.  154,  83. 
13  (this  may  be  a  different  man) 

Claudius  Nero,  C,  consul  B.C.  207, 
at  the  battle  of  the  Metaunis.  11,  i 

Claudius  Pulcher,  C,  consul  B.C  177, 
sent  to  Istria,  26,  4  ;  B.C.  167  sent 
as  legatus  to  Greece,  80.  13 

Claudius  Cento,  C,  sent  to  Prusias, 
88.  I 

Claudius   Marcellus,    M.,    five  times 

consul    B.C.     322,    215    (Suff.),   2x4, 

210,  208,  2,  34  ;  besieges  Syractise, 
8*  3'9>  37  •  engaged  against  Han- 
nibal in  Bruttium,  10,  32  ;  fr.  xii. 
Claudius  Marcellus,  M.,  son  of  the 
last,  consul  B.C.  196,  wounded,  10, 
32  ;  opposes  treaty  with  Philip  V. , 

18,  4a 

Claudius  Marcellus,  M.,  three  times 
consul  B.C  166,  155,  152  ;  engaged 
in  the  Celtibcrian  war,  86,  2-4  (?  fr. 
xxiii. ) 

Claudius  l*ulcher.  P.,  consul  B.C.  249, 
beaten  in  naval  battle  off  Drepanum, 

1.  49-52 
Claudius,    Tib.,   a    commissioner  to 

Macedonia,  22,  9 
Claudius  Pulcher,  Tib.,  praetor  B.C. 

X78,  commissioner  to  Asia  and  the 

islands,  27,  3 
Clazomenae,     Ionian     city    in     Asia 

Minor,  21,  48 ;  28,  19 
Cleagoras,  of  Rhodes,  81,  15 
Cleander,  of  Mantinea,  tutor  of  Philo- 

poemen,  10.  22 
Clcarchus,  of  £lis,  6,  94 
Clearchus,  tyrant  of  Heracleia,  89,  2 
Cleino,     servant     and     mistress     of 

Ptolemy  Philadelphus.  14,  11 
Cleitor,  a  city  of  Arcadia,  2,   55 ;  4, 

10,  II,  18,  19,  25,  70 ;  9,  38;  22,  2 
Cleitomachus,  an  athlete,  27,  9 
Clcobis,  of  Argos,  22,  20 
Cleomachus,  of  Athens,  7,  9 


Qeombrotus  L,  kin^  of  Sparta  B.C 
380-371.  9.  23 

Qeombrotus  II.,  kin^  of  Sparta  B.C 
243-240,  4.  35 

Cleombrotus,  of  Rhodes,  89.  xo 

Cleomenes  III.,  son  of  Lconidas  II., 
king  of  Sparta  ac.  236 -22x, 
alliance  with  the  Aetolians.  8,  45 ; 
at  war  with  the  Achaeans  and 
Antigonus,  2,  46-70;  S.  x6,  32; 
^}  I'  7>  35  :  resolute  resistance  to 
by  the  Achaeans,  4,  76 ;  his  resi- 
dence at  Alexandria  and  death.  6. 
34-39  ;  his  destruction  of  M^;alo- 
polis,  6.  93  ;  9,  18  ;  his  dealings 
with  Archidamus,  8.  x.  See  also  1, 
13  ;  2,  46,  56 ;  4.  5,  6,  37.  60,  69, 
81  ;  6,  9,  24;  8,  X  ;  9.  23,  29; 
16.  25  ;  18,  53 ;  20.  5,  6 ;  89.  X9 

Cleomenes,  son  of  Cleombrotus  II., 

*.  35 
Cleomenes,  of  Thebes,  89.  7 
Cleon,  of  Athens.  9.  23 
Clconae,    a  city  on  the    road    from 

Argos  to  Corinth,  2,  52 
Cleonaeus,  a  Rhodian  admiral,  16,  9 
Cleonicus,  of  Naupactus,  6.  95,  102; 

9,  37  (?  the  same) 
Cleonymus,  tyrant  of  Phlius,  8,  44 
Cleopatra,  wife  of  Ptolemy  Epiphanes, 

28.  20 

Clcoptolemus,  of  Chalcis,  20.  8 
Cleostratus,  Athenian  ambassador,  28. 

19 
Cleoxenus,  author  of  a  code  of  five 

signals,  10,  45 
Cletis,     ambassador     from     Spartan 

exiles,  23,  18 
Clupea,     See  Aspis 
Clusium,  town  in  Etruria,  2,  25 
Clusius,  a  river  in  Gallia  Transpadana 

{Chiese),  2,  32 
Cnidus,  a  city  of  Doris  in  Asia  Minor, 

12.  25/-;  80,  8;  81.  16 
Cnopias,  of  Allaria  in  Crete,  an  officer 

of  Ptolemy  Philopator,  6,  63,  65 
Cnossus,  in  Crete,  4.  53-55  ;  22.  19  ; 

29.  8  ;  31,  I 

Cocynthus,  a  promontory  in  Bruttium 
(Punta  di  Stilo),  erroneously  stated 
by  Polybius  to  be  the  southcrmost 
point  in  Italy,  2,  14 


INDEX 


583 


Coele-Syria,  Hollow  Syria,  properly 
denotes  only  the  plain  between 
Libanus  and  Antilibanus.  but  in 
Polybius  includes  all  Palestine  and 
Phoenicia  to  the  frontier  of  £^gypt. 
Antiochus  the  Great  contends  with 
Ptolemy  Philopator  for  the  posses- 
sion of  it,  5.  40,  58-87,  105.  See 
also  1,  3  ;  2,  71  I  8,  i,  2  ;  4.  2, 
37 ;  5,  I,  29,  31,  34.  42,  48,  49 ; 
14,   12 ;  16,  18,  22  ;  37,   19  ;  38, 

1.  17.  ao 

Coeranus,  ambassador  from  Smyrna, 

18,  52 
Colaeus,  in  Megalopolis,  2,  55 
Colchians,  the,  4,  39 
Colichas,  a  Spanish  chief,  11,  ao  ;  31, 

II 
Colobatus  (or  Cobulatus),  a  river  in 

Asia  Minor,  21,  35 
Coloneia,  in  Cappadocia,  fr.  xx. 
Colophon,  a  town  of  Ionia,   6,  77 ; 

21.48 
Colossus  of  Rhodes,  the,  6,  88,  89  ; 

another  in  honour  of  Rome,  31,  15  ; 

at  Sicyon,  18,  16 
Comanus,  minister  of  Ptolemy  Physcon, 

28.19;  81,  28;  83,  I 
Comontorins.  king  of  the  Gauls  near 

Byzantium,  4,  45,  46 
Compasium,  in  Aircadia,  32,  3,  10 
Concolitanus,  king  of  the  Gaesatae,  2, 

22,  31 
Conii,  a  Spanish  tribe,  10,  7 
Conope,  a  town  in  Aetolia,  4,  64 ;  6, 

6,  7.  13 
Consul,  power  of,   8,  87 ;  6,   12,  13, 

15  ;    army  of,   1,    16 ;    2,   24  ;   3, 

107  ;  6,  19.  20,  26 ;  10.  16  ;  two 

consular  armies  combined,   3.  72, 

no;  6,  32;  10,  16 
Contoporia,    road    from    Corinth    to 

Cleonae,  16.  16 
Corbilo,  a  town  in  Gaul  on  the  Loire 

(Coiron),  84,  10 
Corbrenae,  a  tribe  in  Asia,  6.  44 
Corcyra  (Cotfu),  2,  9-12  ;    7,  9  I    21, 

32 ;  84.  6.  7  ;  87.  3 
Corduba,  in  Spain  (Cordova),  36.  2 
Corinth,  2,  12,  43,  51,  52,  54 ;  4.  6, 

13,  19,  22,  24,  25,  66-69,  72;  5. 

2,  17,    18,    24,    26-29,    102  ;    13, 


26^;  16,  16;  18.  2,  6,  8,  II,  45- 
47  ;  33.  9  ;  29.  12,  23  ;  80.  10 ; 
83.  16 ;  38,    5,  10 ;  39.  8,  10.  13, 

Cornelius  Cethegus,  C,  consul  B.C. 
197,  sent  to  Gaul,  18,  12 

Cornelius  Lentulus  Caudinus,  P., 
praetor  B.c.  203,  sent  B.c.  196  as 
one  of  the  ten  commissioners  to 
Macedonia,  18.  48,  50 

Cornelius  Lentulus,  Ser.,  praetor  B.C. 
169,  placed  in  command  of  Chalcis 
(b.C.  171),  27,  2 

Cornelius  Lentulus,  P.,  brother  of  the 
last,  I^^tus  in  Greece,  37,  2  ;  to 
Attains,  32,  28  ;  83.  i 

Cornelius  Lentulus,  L.,  a  commis- 
sioner for  Greece  and  Asia,  31,  23 

Cornelius  Lentulus,  C,  ambassador 
to  Ptolemy  Physcon,  83.  i 

Cornelius  Merula,  Cn.,  twice  sent  to 
Egypt  to  compose  matters  between 
the  Ptolemies  (B.C  161,  154),  81. 
18,  26-28;  82.  I  ;  83.  8 

(Cornelius)  Scipio.  in  the  middle  of 
4th  cent.  B.C.  sent  to  Marseilles  to 
inquire  about  trading  ports  in 
Britain,  34.  10 

Cornelius  Scipio  Asina.  Cn.,  consul 
B.C.  260,  254,  made  prisoner  at 
Lipara,  1,  21,  22  ;  8,  i ;  takes 
Panormus,  1,  38 

Cornelius  Scipio,  P.,  the  father  of 
Africanus,  consul  B.C.  218,  sent  to 
Spain  to  oppose  Hannibal,  3,  40  ; 
has  to  enroll  a  second  army,  ib, ;  ar- 
rives at  the  mouth  of  the  Rhone,  8. 
41  ;  learning  that  Hannibal  was  on 
the  Rhone,  he  starts  in  pursuit,  3, 
45  ;  finding  himself  outstripped,  he 
goes  to  Italy  and  sends  his  brother 
to  Spain,  8,  49  ;  lands  at  Pisae  and 
marches  to  the  Po,  3.  56,  61,  62  ; 
wounded  at  the  battle  of  the  Ticinus, 
3,  164-168 ;  his  life  saved  by  his 
son,  10.  3  ;  dissuades  his  colleague 
from  giving  the  enemy  battle,  8,  70; 
sent  (b.c.  217)  to  join  his  brother 
in  Spain,  8,  97  ;  restores  the  Span- 
ish hostages.  8.  99  ;  commands  the 
Socii  navales,  8,  3  ;  his  fall  referred 
to,  10,  3,  7,  36 


584 


INDEX 


Cornelius  Scipio  Calvus,  Cn.,  brother 
of  the  last,  consul  B.C.  222,  2,  34 ; 
sent  as  legatus  by  Publius  to  Spain. 
8>  49>  56  •  lands  at  Emporium  and 
conquers  Hanno  and  Andobales  at 
Cissa,  8.  76 ;  winters  at  Tarraco, 
ib.  \  defeats  Hasdrubal  at  the 
mouth  of  the  £bro,  8,  95.  96 ; 
joined  by  his  brother,  8.  97-99.  Se4 
also  8.  3,  38  ;  10,  7.  3^ 

Cornelius  Scipio  Africanus  (major), 
P.,  his  first  campaign  in  B.C.  218, 
10,  3  ;  his  campaigns  in  Spain, 
10,  2-20,  34-40;  11.  20-33;  >n 
Africa,  14,  i-io ;  ^6,  x-19 ;  his 
reception  at  Rome  after  the  battle 
of  Zama,  16.  23 ;  in  Greece  as 
legatus  of  his  brother,  31,  4,  5,  8  ; 
in  the  war  with  Antiochus,  21.  11- 
17,  24,  25  ;  his  position  at  Rome, 
23,  14.  See  also  18,  35  ;  29,  14 ; 
82,  12.  13 

Cornelius  Scipio  Asiaticus,  L. ,  brother 
of  Africanus,  consul  B.C.  190, 
elected  Aedile,  10,  4  ;  commcinds  in 
the  war  against  Antiochus,  18,  49- 
52  ;  21.  4.  5,  8-13,  25,  30,  43 ; 
returns  to  Italy  and  triumphs,  21, 
24 ;  his  accounts  of  the  booty  in 
the  Asiatic  war  demanded,  23,  14 

Cornelius  Scipio,  P.,  son  of  Africanus, 
21.  15  ;  32,  12,  13 

Cornel iae,  two  daughters  of  Africanus, 

32.  13 

Cornelius  Scipio  Aemilianus  Africanus 
(minor),  son  of  L.  Aemilius  Paullus 
Maccdonicus.  adopted  by  the  son 
of  Africanus  major,  consul  B.C. 
147.  134,  his  liberality,  18,  35  ;  his 
friendship  with  Polybius  and  char- 
acter. 82,  9-16  ;  86,  8 ;  volunteers 
for  the  Celtiberian  war,  86,  4.  5  ; 
arranges  the  succession  of  Massa- 
nissa,  37,  10 ;  besieges  Carthage, 
88.  1.2;  destroys  Carthage,  39,  3- 
6  ;  his  simplicity  of  habits,  fr.  xxix. 

Cornelius  Scipio  Nasica,  son-in-law  of 
Africanus,    consul    B.C.    162,    155, 

29.  14.  IS  ;  82,  13 

Cornelius,  Gnaeus.  a  commissioner  in 
Greece  B.c.  196.  18.  48  (?  Gn. 
Cornelius  Lentulus,  consul  B.C.  201) 


Coroebus    (of  Mygdon    in    Phrygia, 

Paus.  10,  27,  i),  a  synonym  for  a 

fool,  12.  4/2.  Set  Lucian,  Am,  §  53, 

Suidas,  S.V.,  BovraXfcMr 
Coroebus,  of  Elis,  a  stadium  nmner, 

fr.  ii. 
Coronea,  in  Boeotia,  20.  7 ;  27,  i,  5; 

29.  12 
Corsica,  12,  3,  4 
Cortona,  in  Etruria,  8,  82 
Coruncanius,  Graius  and  Lucius,  sent 

to  Queen  Teuta,  2,  8 
Coryphaeus,     a    motmtain    between 

Cilicia  and  Phoenicia,  5,  59 
Cos,  island.  16,  15  ;  80,  7 
Cosmcpolis,    a    magistrate    at    Locri 

Epizephyrii,  12,  x6 
Cosmus,  a  magistrate  in  Crete,  82,  19 
Cossaei,  a  hill  tribe  on  the  borders  of 

Susiana,  6,  44 
Cossyrus,  an  island  between  Sicily  and 

Africa  [Pantellaria) ,  3,  96 
Cothon,  of  Byzantium.  4,  52 
Cotys,  king  of  the  Thracian  Odrysae, 

27.  12  ;  80,  18 

Cow,  the,  a  spot  on  the  Asiatic  side 
of  the  Thracian   Bosporus.   4,   43, 

44 
Cremona,  a  Roman  colony  in  Gallia 

Cisalpina,  8,  40 

Creonium,  a  town  of  the  Illyrian 
Dassaretae,  6.  108 

Creta,  Island,  character  of  the  people, 
4.  53  ;  6,  46,  47 ;  8,  18,  21  ;  24. 
4 ;  its  government,  6,  43.  45-47  ; 
22,  19 ;  its  pirates,  13.  8  ;  the 
Cretans  as  mercenaries,  2.  66 ;  8, 
75  :  8.  3,  7.  14.  36.  53.  65.  79.  82  ; 
10.  46  ;  13,  6  ;  81,  27  ;  33,  16 ; 
war  with  Rhodes,  33.  4,  13.  15,  16  ; 
to  outwit  a  Cretan,  8,  21.  See 
also  4.  8,  20,  54,  55,  61,  67,  71, 
80  ;  7,  12,  14  ;  13.  4,  5  ;  22.  19  ; 

28.  15  ;  29,  10 ;  81.   26  ;  83.   15. 
16 

Cretan  sea,  the,  5,  19 

Cretan  wine,  6,  2 

Cretopolis.  in  Mylias,  part  of  Pam- 

phylia.  6,  72 
Crinon.  a  Macedonian.  6,  15,  16 
Critolaus.  a  follower  of  Agathocles  of 

Alexandria,  16,  26 


INDEX 


S8S 


Criiolaiis,    Achaean     Strategus    B.C. 

146,  38.  8-1 1  ;  39.  7.  8 
Critolaus,  a  Peripatetic   philosopher. 

goes  on  a  mission  to  Rome,  vol.  ii. 

p.  466 
Cronus,  tumulus  of.  10.  10 
Cropius  (Nestor),  27,  16 
Croton,  a  city  in  Magna  Graecia,  2. 

39 ;  7,  I  ;  10.  I 
Craw^  the,  a  machine  for  grappling 

ships,  1,  23,  ay,  a8 
Crown,  mural,  6,  39  ;  10,   11  ;  civic, 

6,  39 
Ctesiphon,    a    city  in    the   south   of 

Assyria,  5,  45 

Cumae,  a  city  in  Campania,  1,  56  ; 

3,  91 

Curius  Denatus,  M.,  consul  B.C.  290, 

275.  2.  19 
Cyamosorus,  a  river  in  Sicily,  1,  9 
Cyaneae,  islands  at  the  mouth  of  the 

Thracian  Bosporus,  34,  12 
Cybele,  21,  37 

Cyclades,  the,  3.  16 ;  4.  16  ;  18,  54 
Cycliadas,  an  Achaean,  18,  i,  34 
Cyclops,  the,  36,  6 
Cydas,  of  Gortyn  in  Crete,  22,   19  ; 

29.  6,  7 
Cydonia,  town  in  Crete,  4,  55 ;  22, 

19;  28,  14,  15 
Cyllene,  seaport  town  of  EUis,  4,  9  ; 

5.  3 
Cyme,  a  city  in  Aeolis,  6,  ^^  ;  21,  48  ; 

88,  13 

Cynaetha,  a  town  in  Arcadia,  4,  16- 

21,  25.  29  ;  9.  17,  38 
C)mneus.     See  Apollo 
Cynos,     seaport     of    the    Opuntian 

Locrians,  4,  67 
Cynoscephalae,     hills     in     Thessaly, 

battle  of,  18,  20-27 
Cyparissia,   a  town  in    Messenia,  6, 

92;  11,  18 
Cyphanta,  seaport  town  of  Laconia, 

4.  36 

Cyprus,  island  of,  5,  34,  59;  12,  25/; 

18.   54.  55  ;  29,  27  ;  31,   18,   26, 

27;  32,  I  ;  83,  5.  8  ;  34,  15;  39. 

18 
Cypsela,  a  Thracian    town    on    the 

Hebnis  {Ipsala),  84.  12 
Cyrene,    a   Dorian   colony   in   Africa 


from  the  island  of  Thera,  founded 
B.C.  631,  and  capital  of  Cyrenaica  ; 
freed  by  Ecdemus  and  Demophanes, 
10,  22  ;    subject  to  the  Ptolemies, 
16.  25.  33  ;  81.  18,  26-28  ;  32,  i 
Cyrmasa,  a  town  in  Pisidia,  21,  36 
Cyrrhestae,  a  tribe  in  Syria,  6,  50,  57 
Cyrtii.  slingers  of,  a  robber  tribe  of 

Media,  6.  52 
Cythera,  island  of,  4.  6^ 
Cyzicus,  a  town  in  Mysia  on  the  Pro- 
pontis  [Dal  Kiz),  4.  44  ;  6,  63  ;  16, 
31  ;  22,  20  ;  26.  2  ;  33,  13 

Daae,  a  Scythian  tribe,  6,  79 
Dalmatians,  12.  5  ;  32,  18.  23 
Damasippus,  a  Macedonian,  81,  26 
Damippus,  a  Lacedaemonian,  7.  5 
Damis,  an  Athenian  ambassador,  21, 

31 
Damon,    ambassador    from    Ptolemy 

Philometor,  28,  x 
Damon,  a  Rhodian  ambassador,  29, 

18 
Damocles,   a   spy  in    the   ser\'ice  of 

Philip  v.,  18,  5 
Damocritus  of  Calydon,   an  Aetolian 

ambassador,  18.  10 ;  21,  31 
Damocritus,  an  Achaean.  39,  10 
Damoteles,  an  Aetolian  ambassador, 

21,  25,  26,  29 
Damoxenus,  of  Aegium,  an  Achaean 

ambassador,  18.  42 
Damuras,  a  river  in  Phoenicia,  6,  68 
Danae,  of  Alexandria,  mother-in-law 

of  Tlepolemus,  16,  27 
Danaus,  of  Argos,  84,  2 
Daochus,  of  Thessaly,  18.  14 
Daorsi.  a  tribe  in  Illyria,  82,  18 
Daphne,  near  Antioch  in  Syria,  sacred 

to  Apollo  and  Artemis,  31,  3 
Dardani,  an    Illyrian  tribe,  2,  6  ;  4, 

66  :  6.  97 ;  26,  6  ;  28.  8 
Darius,  son  of  Hystaspes,  4.  43 ;  6. 

43 
Darius  (Codomanus),  12.   17-19.  22  ; 

18,  3 
Dassaretae,  an  Illyrian  tribe,  6.  108 
Dauliuni,  a  town  in  Phocis,  4,  25 
I^unia,  part  of  Apulia,  3,  88,  91  ;  6, 

108  ;  9,  7 
Decietae,  a  Ligurian  tribe,  38.  11 


586 


INDEX 


E>ecius.  a  Campanian,  1,  7 

Dtcuriones,  6.  25 

Deep  Road,  the,  at  Tarentum,  8,  31. 

35 
Deianira,  wife  of  Henniles,  89,  13 

Deigma,  the  mart  at  Rhodes,  6,  88 

Deinocrates,  an  officer  of  Attalus,  16, 

3 
Deinocrates,  of  Messene,  23.  5,  16 

Deinon.  of  Alexandria,  16.  26£C 

Deinon,  of  Rhodes,  27.  7,  14  ;  28.  2, 

17  ;  29.  II  ;  80,  6-9 

Delos,  island  of,  26,  3 ;  26,  i ;  30,  21 ; 

32,  17  ;  made  a  free  port.  81,  7 
Delphi,  1,  6 ;  2,  20,  35  ;  4,  46 ;  9, 

33.  35 ;  22,  8 ;  26,  3 ;  39.  17 
Delta,  the,  of  the  Nile,  3.  49 
Demaratus,  of  Corinth  (6.  2),  fr.  vi. 
Demaratus,  an  Athenian  ambassador, 

28,  19,  20 
Demeter,    temple    of,    at   Alexandria 

(Thesmophorium),  16,  27,  29,  33 
Demctrias,    a    city   of    Magnesia    in 

Thessaly,  3,  6,  7  ;  6.   29,  99  ;  10. 

42  ;  18,  I,  II,  45;  29,  6 
Demetrius    I.,     Poliorcetes,    king    of 

Macedonia  B.C.  294-283,  1,  63  ;  2, 

41  ;  9.  29.  34 
Demetrius   II.,    king    of    Macedonia 

B.C.  239-229,   1,  3  ;  2,   2,  44,  46, 

60 ;  4.  25.  63  ;  20.  5  ;  87.  9 ;  39. 

Demetrius,  son  of  Philip  V.,  brother 
of   Perseus,    18,    39 ;    21,    2 ;    22. 

18  ;  23,  1-3.  7 

Demetrius  I.,  Soter,  king  of  Syria  B.C. 

162-150.   3.   5;  31,   12;   19-23; 

32,  4.  6,  7,  24;  33,  5,  18,  19 
Demetrius,  of  Pharos,  2.    10.   11.  65. 

66  ;  3,  16,  18  ;  4,  16,  19,  37,  66  ; 

6.  12,   loi,   102,    105,   108;  7,  9. 

II,  13,  14:  9.  23;  32.  23 
Demetrius,  of  Phalerum,  10,  24  ;  12, 

13  :  29.  21  ;  86,  2 
Demetrius,  son  of  Ariarathes  VI.  of 

Cappadocia.  33,  12,  18 
Demetrius,  an  Athenian,  22,  3 
Demetrius,  son  of  Euthydemus,  king 

of  Bactria,  11,  34 
Demetrius,  friend  of    I*tolcmy  Philo- 

metor,  30.  9 
Demiurgi,  the,  23,  5 


Demochares,  an  historiaD,  12,  13,  15, 

23 
Democleittis,  inventor  of  a  system  of 

fire  signals.  10.  45 
Democracy,  6,  3,  4 ;  its  origin,  6,  9  ; 

its  degeneracy.  6.  4,  10  ;  in  Achaia. 

2.  38  ;  in  Messene,  7,  10 
Democratcs,  a   Macedonian  admiral, 

16.  3 
Demodocus,  an  Achaean,  6.  95 
Demophanes,  of  Megalopolis,  10,  2a 
Demosthenes,  the  famous  orator.  12, 

12^,  13;  18,  14 
Demosthenes, of  Bithynia,  an  historian, 

12,  I 
Demosthenes,  secretary  of  Philip  V. , 

18.  1,  8,  34 
Dentheleti,  a  Thracian  tribe,  23,  8 
Diaeus,  Achaean  Strategus  B.C.  151, 

149,  147,  38,  8  ;  39,  7.  8,  10,  11, 

15 
Diatonium,  a  city  in  Crete,  22,  19 

Dicaearchus,     of     Trichonium,  an 

Aetolian  ambassador,  18.  10  ;  20. 
10  ;  21,  31 

Dicaearchus,  an  officer  of  Philip  V., 

18.  54 
Dicaearchus,  of  Messene  in  Sicily,  a 

Peripjatetic  philosopher,  84,  5,  6 
Dicgtas,  a  Boeotian  ambassador,  27. 

I,  2 
Dictator,  power  of,  8.  87,  103 
Didascolondas,  of  Crete,  16,  37 
Dimale,  a  city  in  Ulyria,  8,   18  ;  7, 

9 
Diodes,  of  Dyme,  6,  17 

Diocles,  governor  of  Parapotamia  in 

Assyria,  6.  69 
Diocles,  a  Rhodian  ambassador,  29, 

10 
Diodorus,  tutor  of  Demetrius  Soter  at 

Rome.  81,  20.  21 
Diogenes,   Stoic  Philosopher,  vol.  ii. 

p.  466 
Diogenes,  of  Acamania,  28,  5 
Diogenes,  an  officer  of  Antiochus  the 

Great,  6,  46,  48,  54  ;  10,  29,  30 
Diogenes,     ambassador     from     Oro- 

phcrncs.  32.  24 
Diognetus,   an    officer   of   Antiochus 

the  Great,  6,  43,   59.  60,  62,  68- 

70 


INDEX 


S87 


Diomedon,  governor  of  Seleucia,  6,  48 

DiomedoD,  of  Cos,  80,  7 

Dionysius,  theatre  of,  at  Alexandria, 

16.  30;    artists  in   theatre  of,  16. 

21 ;  pipers  in  festival  of,  in  Arcadia. 

4,  20 ;    picture    of,   by  Aristeides, 

13,  a 

Dionysius,    tyrant    of   Syracuse   B.C. 

405-367.  1»  6 ;  2,  39 ;  12,  4^,  10, 

24 ;  W.  35 
Dionysius,  son  of  the  preceding,  also 

tyrant  of  Syracuse    B.C.  367-343, 

12.  4ix 
Dionysius,  an  officer  of  Antiochus  the 

Great,  7,  16-18 
Dionysius,     secretary    of    Antiochus 

Epiphanes,  31,  3 
Dionysius,  a  Thracian,  6,  65 
Dionysodorus,  an  officer  of  Attains, 

16,  3,  6.  8  ;  18.  I.  2 
Dionysodorus,  ambassador  from  the 

Ptolemies,  29.  23 
Diopeithes,  of  Rhodes,  28.  7 
Diophanes,    of  Megalopolis,    21,    9  ; 

22.  13 ;  23.  17 :  29.  23 
Diofrfianes,     an     ambassador     from 

Perseus,  27,  7,  14 
Dioryctus,      the     channel      between 

Leucas  and  Acamania,  6,  5 
Dioscurium,    temple  and    hamlet    of 

Phlios,  4,  67,  68.  73 
Dipylum,  gate  at  Athens,  16,  25 
Dium,  a  town  in  Macedonia,  4,  62  ; 

5,  9.  II  ;  9,  35;  29,  4 
Dodona,  in  Epirus,  4,  67  note ;  6,  9, 

II  ;  9,  35 
Dog-star,  the,  1,  37 ;  2,  16  ;  9,  43 
Doliche,  a  city  in  Perrhaebia,  28.  13 
Dolopes,  the,  in   Thessaly,    18,  47 ; 

21.  25,  31 ;  22.  8 
Domitius  Ahenobarbus,  Gnaeus,  consul 

B.C,  192,  21,  32 ;  30.  13 
Dorimachus.  of  Trichonium.  Aetolian 

Strategus  B.C.  219.  4,  3-6,  9,  10, 

14,  16,  17,  19,  57,  58,  67,  77 ;  5. 

I.  3.  Si  6,  11,  17,  61  ;  9,  42  ;  13, 
I  ;  18,  54 

Dorymenes,  an  Aetolian,  6.  61 
Drangene,  a  district  in  Asia  [Sejestan), 

II.  34 

Drepana,  a  city  in  Sicily  (Trapani), 

1,  41,  46,  49.  55.  56,  59.  61 


Dromichaetes,  king  of  the  Odrysae,  fr. 

xi. 
Drymussa,  one  of  the  islands  in  front 

of  Clazomenae,  21,  48 
Duilius,  C,  consul  B.c.  260,  1,  22. 

23 
Dunax.  a  mountain  in  Thrace,  34,  10 
Dura,  a  town  in  Phoenicia,  5,  66 
Dura,  a  town  on  the    Euphrates  in 

Mesopotamia,  6,  48 
Dura,  a  town  on  the  Tigris  in  Assyria 

[Lhlr),  5.  52 
Dyme,  an  Achaean  town,  2,  41,  51  ; 

4,  59,  60,  65,  83,  86 ;  5,  3,  17,  30, 
91.  95 

EcBATANA,  capital  of  Media.  10.  27 
Ecdemus,  of  Megalopolis,  10,  22 
Echecrates,  of  Thessaly,  5,  63,  65,  82, 

85 
Echecrates,  of  Phlius,  philosopher  and 

historian.  12,  10 

Echedemus,    Athenian    ambassador, 

21.  4.  5 
Echetla,  a  city  in  Sicily,  1,  15 

Echinus,  a  city  in  Thessaly,  9,  41,  42 ; 
18,  3,  38 

Ecnomus,  a  hill  on  the  south  coast  of 
Sicily  between  Agrigentum  and  Gela 
{Monte  di  Licata),  1,  25 

Edecon,  chief  of  the  Edetani  in 
Spain,  10,  34,  35,  40 

Edessa,  a  town  in  Macedonia  origin- 
ally the  capital,  on  the  via  Egnatia, 

5,  97  ;  84.  12 

Edetani,  a  Spanish  tribe,  10,  34 
Egnatia  via,  from   Apollonia  to   the 

Hellespont.  84,  12 
Egypt,  its  peaceful  and  prosperous 
state,  2,  37  ;  9,  44  ;  the  conspiracy 
of  Antiochus  the  Great  and  Philip 
against,  3,  2;  succession  of  Ptolemy 
Philopator.  4.  2  ;  6.  34  ;  its  king 
in  possession  of  Seleucia,  6,  58  ; 
the  savagery  of  the  Egyptians,  15, 
33  ;  revolt  of  the  nobles.  22,  7  ; 
invasion  of  Antiochus  Epiphanes,  3. 
3  ;  28,  19,  26  ;  29,  2,  27  ;  30,  17  ; 
31,  4  ;  jealousy  in  Rome  of,  81,  18  ; 
visitof  Polybius  to,  84,  14;  invasion 
by  Iphicrates,  89,  2.  See  also  6,  69, 
80.  82,  107  ;  14,  12 ;  39,  18.    Idle 


588 


INDEX 


character  of  the  Egyptians,  S9.  i8 ; 

priests  of.  84,  a 
EUaea,  a  city  of  Aeolis,  81,    lo  ;  38, 

27  ;  fr.  liv. 
Elateia,  a  city  of  Phocis,  6,  a6  ;  18. 

43.  45  ;  27,  18 
Elaus,  a  fort  in  the  territory  of  Caly- 

don,  4.  65 
Elephants,  used  by  the  Carthaginians, 

1,  18.   19,  30,  32-34.   38.  39.  40. 

41,  74,  78,  84,  85  ;  3,   13,  42,  45, 

46.  53.  55.  74.  79 ;  11.  I  ;  12,  2 ; 

Roman  terror   of,  1,  39 ;    African 

elephants  afraid  of  Indian,  6.   84. 

See  also  31,  3 
Elephas.     See  Nicanor 
Eleuthema,  a  town  in  Crete,  4,  53, 

55 
Elis,  the  city,  4.  84  ;  86  ;  80,  3  ;  the 

country  and  people,  4,  5,  9,  19,  36, 

59.  68,   69.86,  91-95.   102;    6.  2, 

3.  5.  17.  30.  91.  92,  94.  95  ;  9. 

30  ;  16.  13;  18,  42  ;  20,  3  ;  89,  9  ; 

its  wealth  and  peacefulness,  4,  73 
Elisphasii,  in  the  Peloponnese,  11,  11 ; 

Elks,  84.  10 
Elleporus  (Helorus,  Diodor.  Sic.   14, 

104),  a   river    in    the    territory    of 

CaiUon  in  South  Italy,  1,  6 
Elpeius,  a  river  in  Macedonia,  89,  4 
Elymaei,  a  tribe  living  to  the  north  of 

Mount  Zagrus,  6.  44;  81,  xi 
Emathia,  a  region  in  Macedonia,  83, 

10 
Emporia,  a  district  in  Africa  near  the 

Lesser  Syrtis,  1,  82  ;  8,  23  ;  88,  a 
Emporium,  a  city  in  north  Spain,  8, 

39.  76 
Enchelanae,  a  tribe  in  Illyria,  6,  108  ; 

fr.  xliii. 
Enip)eus,  a  river  in  Thessaly,  6.  99 
Eordi,  a  Macedonian  tribe,   18,  23  ; 

84,  12 
Epaenetus,  a    Bqeotian  ambassador, 

88,  16 
Epaminondas,  of  Thebes,  4,  32,  33  ; 

6,  43  ;  8.   I  ;  9,  8;  18.  25/;  38, 

8 
Eperalus,  of  Pharae,  Achaean  Strate- 

gus  B.C.  218,  4,  82;  5,    I,   5.    30, 

91 
Epetium,  a  town  of  Illyria,  38.  18 


Ephesus,  a  city  of  Ionia.  6,  35 ;  8, 
17 :  18.  a6r ;  18,  41 ;  80,  xi  ;  81, 
zi,  17,  35,  43.  44,  48 ;  83.  18 

Ephorst  the  Spartan,  4.  22,  23,  34. 
35,  81 ;  18.  IX  ;  S3,  iz  ;  of  the 
Messenian,  4.  4,  31 

Ephorus.  of  Cyme,  an  historian.  4. 

20  ;  5.  33  ;  6.  45  :  9,  4  ;  M.  4^ . 

aa,  a3,  a5/,  27,  a8 ;  34.  i 
Epichares.  a  Rhodian,  SO.  9 
Epicharmus,  of  Cos,  18,  40  ;  cp.  vol. 

ii.  p.  44a 
Epicydes,  of  Syracuse,  7.  a ;    8.  5. 

37 
Epidamnus,  a  city  of  Illyria,  8,  9-11  ; 

34,  7.  12 
Epidaurus,  in  Argolis,  8,  5a  ;  SO,  10 
Epigenes.  a  friend  of  Antiochus  the 

Great,  6,  41,  4a,  49.51 
Epipolae,  a  part  of  Syracuse.  8.  37 
Epirus,  8,  5-8,  65;  4,  5.  6,  9.   xs, 

16.  a5,  30.  36,  57,  61.  63,  66.  67  ; 

5.  3-6  ;  9.  38,  40 ;  10,  41  ;  11.  5  ; 

16,  37  ;  18.  I,  3,  a3 ;  80.  3 ;  81. 

a6 ;    88,   18  ;    88.  x  ;  84,   la ;  87. 

15,  16 ;  88.  8,  13  ;  89,  4  ;  80,  la, 

13,  16 ;  38,  20,  21,  26 
Epistratus,  of  Acamania,  4.  11 
Epitalium,  a    town    of   Triphylia    in 

Elis,  4.  80 
Eposognatus,  a  chief  in  Galatia,  81. 

37 
Eratosthenes,  of  Cyrene,  34,  2,  4,  5, 

7.  13 
Eretria,  a  town  in    Euboea,  18,  45, 

47 
Eretria,  a  town  of  Phthiotis  in  Thes- 
saly, 18,  20 
Eribianus,  a  mountain  pass  between 

Samnium  and  Campania,  3,  92 
Eridanus,  a  name  of  the  Po,  8,  16 
Erymanthus,  a  river   of  Arcadia,  4, 

70,  71 
Erymanthus,  a  river  of  Arachosia  in 

Persia,  11,  34 
Erythrae,  a  city  in  Ionia,  16,  6 ;  81. 

48 
Eryx,  a  mountain  and  city  in  Sicily, 

I.  55-60,  66,  77 ;  8,  7  :  8,  9.     See 

also  Aphrodite 
Etcnnians,  a  tribe  in.Pisidia,  6,  73 
Etesian  winds,  4,  44  ;  6,  5 


INDEX 


589 


Etruria,  1,  6  ;  2,  16,  17,  19,  20,  23- 
27 ;  8,  49,  56,  61,  75,  77,  78,  80, 
82,  84,  86,  108  ;  6,  loi,  105 ;  12, 
4  ;  16,  II ;  84,  IX 
Etruscan  sea,  the.  See  Tyrrhenian  sea 
Euboea,  island  of,  2,  52  ;  4,  67 ;  10, 
41.  42;  11,  5;  18.  II,  46;  20. 
8 ;  Euboic  talent,  1,  62  ;  16,   18 ; 

ai.  17.  30.  3a 
Euboea,   daughter   of  Cleoptolemus, 

wife  of  Antiochus  the  Great,  20,  8 
Eubulidas,  of  Chalcis.  21,  17,  45 
Eucampidas,  of  Arcadia,  18.  14 
Euclidas.  brother  of  Cleonienes  III., 

2,  65,  67.  68 
Eudamidas,  of  Sparta,  4,  35 
Eudemus,  of  Rhodes,  21,  10 
Eudemus,  an  ambassador  of  Miletus, 

28,  19.  20 

Eudoxus,  a  Greek  historian,  34,  i 
Euemerus,  of  Messene,  a  writer   on 

religion,  84,  5,  6 
Eulaeus.    an    Egyptian    eunuch,   28. 

20,  21 
Eumenes  II.,  king  of  Pergamum  B.C. 

197-159,  son  of  Attalus  I.,  3,  3  ; 

18.  47;  21,  8-11,   16-22,  24,  43- 

45,48;  22,   I,  8-11,  15,   17,  20; 

23.   I,  3.  9.   II ;   24.  I,  5>  8>  9  ; 

26,  2 ;    27,  6,  7.   18  ;   28,  7.  12. 

15  ;  29,  4,  6.  22  ;  30,   I,  2,  20 ; 

31,  6,  9,   10,  25  ;    32,  3.  5,   22  ; 

33.  18  ;  39.  7 
Eumenes,  an  Egyptian,  ambassador, 

29,  23 

Euphanes,  of  Crete,  20,  3 
Euphrates,  the,  6,  51  ;  8,  25  ;  9,  43 
Eupolemus,  an  Aetolian,  18,  19 ;  28, 

4 
Eureas,  an  Achaean  ambassador,  31, 

6.  8 
Euripidas,    an  Aetolian,   4.    19,   59. 

60,  68-72.  83 ;  6,  94,  95 
Euripides,   quoted,    1,   35  ;    6.   106 ; 

12,  26  ;  31.  21 
Euripus.  the,  6,  29,  loi,  109 
Euromus,  a  city  in  Caria,  18,  2,  44  ; 

30,  5 

Europe,  position  and  size  of,  3,  37 ; 

«*.  5-7.  15 
Europus,  a  city  in    Parapotamia,  6. 

48 


Eurotas,  river  in  Laconia,  6,  21-23  ! 

8,  35  ;  9,  8  ;  11.  18  ;  16,  16 
Eurotas,  another  name  of  the  Galaeslis, 

(q-v.)  8,  35 
Eurycleidas,  of  Athens.  6.  106 
Euryleon.  Achaean  Strategus  B.C.  210, 

10,  21 
Eurylochus,  a  Cretan,  6,  79 
Eurylochus,  a  Magncsian,  6,  63,  65 
Eurymedon,  of  Athens,  12,  25V& 
Euthydemus,   of  Magnesia,    king   of 

Bactria,  10,  49  ;  11,  34 
Euxine,  the,  3,  2  ;  4.  38-44,  46,  47, 

50,  52,  56 ;  6,  43.  44.  55  ;  10,  27  ; 

16,  29 ;  24.  3  ;  26.  2  ;  27.  7  ;  31. 

24  ;  84,  7  ;  39.  2 
Evagoras,  king  of  Salamis  in  Cyprus, 

12.  25/^ 
Evagoras,  of  Aegium,  38,  11 
Evander,  fr.  iii. 
Evanoridas,  of  Elis,  6,  94 
Evas,  a  hill  in  Laconia,  2,  65,  66 ; 

6.  24 
Exile,  voluntary,  16,  14 

Fabius  Maximus  Cunctator,  Q., 

3,  87-94,  loi,  103,  105,  106;  10,  I 
Fabius,  L..  16.  i 
Fabius.  Q. .  18.  10 
Fabius  Labeo,  Q.,  praetor  B.C  189, 

21,  46 
Fabius  Maximus  Aemilianus,  Q. ,  elder 

brother  of  the  younger  Africanus, 

son  of  Aemilius  Paullus,  consul  B.C. 

145.  18»  35  :    29,   14 ;  32,  9,   10, 

14  ;  33.  9  :  36.  5 
Fabius  Pictor.  Q..  annalist.  1.  14,  15, 

58  ;  3,  8,  9 
Faesulae,  in  Etruria,  2,  25  ;  3.  82 
Fair  Plain,  the,  in  Armenia,  8,  25 
Fair  Promontory,  the,  near  Carthage, 

3,  22-24 
Falemian  district,  the,  in  Campania, 

8.  90f  92,  94 
Faliscans.  the,  1.  65 
Fannius.  Gaius,  ambassador  to  Illyria, 

32.   18.  23  ;  to  Prusias,  33,  9 ;  to 

the  Achaeans,  38.  10 
Flamininus.     See  Quinctius 
Flaminius.   C.  consul    B.c     223.  2. 

21  ;  conquers  the  Insubres.  2,   32, 

33;   consul    II.,    B.C.  217,  enrolls 


S90 


INDEX 


an  army,  3.  75,  77,  78  ;  encamped 

at  Arretium.  3,   80 ;  falls   at    the 

battle   of   Thrasymene,    3,   82-84. 

See  also  3,  86,  106  ;  16,  xi 
Flaminius,  commissioner  in  B.C.  153 

to  the  Ligurians,  83,  10 
Fortune,  mutability  of.  29.  21 
Frentani,   a  people  of  Samnium,  2, 

24 ;  3.  88 
Fulvius  Centumalus,  Gn.  consul  B.C. 

229;  2,  II.  12 
Fulvius  Centumalus,  Gn.,  consul  ac. 

211,  9.  6,  7 
Fulvius  Flaccus,  Qu.,  consul  B.c.  224, 

2.  31 
Fulvius  Flaccus.  Qu.,  a  legatus  under 

Flamininus,  18.  10 
Fulvius  Nobilior,  Ser.,  consul  B.c.  255, 

1,  36,  37 
Fulvius  Nobilior,  M.,  consul  B.C  189, 

21,  25-31,  40;  22.  13 

Furius  Pacilus,  Gains,  consul  b.c.  251. 

1.  39.  40 

Furius  Philus,  P.,  consul  B.c.  223,  2, 

31 

Gabinius.     Aulus,     legate     to     the 

Achaeans,  38.  10,  11 
Gadara,  a  town  in  Palestine,  6.  71  ; 

16,  39 
Gadcs.  a  town  in  Spain  (Cadiz),  34, 

5.  7.  9.  15  ;  strait  of.  34.  15 
Gaesatae,   a    tribe    of   Gauls  in  the 

valley  of  the  Rhone,  2,  22,  23,  28. 

30,  34 
Gaezoloris,  a  chief  in  Galatia,  24,  8 
Galadrae,  a  town  in  Macedonia.  23. 18 
Galaesus.  a  river  of  Calabria  flowing 

into  the  Gulf  of  Tarentum  8,  35 
Galatia.  a  district  in  Asia  Minor  oc- 
cupied by  Gauls  (FaXdrat),  24,  8, 
9 ;  26,  2  ;  81.  6 
Galatis,  a  district  of  Palestine,  6,  71 
Galatus,  a  chief  of  the  Boii.  2,  21 
Galli,  priests  of  Cybele,  21,  6,  37 
Garsyeris.  an   oflScer  of  Achaeus.  6. 

57.  1^-7^ 
Gatalus.  a  Sarmatian  prince.  26.  2 

Gaul,  8,  59  ;  7.  9  ;  Cisalpine  Gaul, 

2,  19,  21,  22,  24,  32  ;  3,  40.  JT, 
87,  106,  118  ;  18,  12  ;  plains  of,  8, 
86 


Gauls  (or  Celts,  q.v.) 

Take  Rome  under  Brennus,  1,  6; 
2,  18 

Cisalpine  Gauls,  thdr  countiy  and 
their  wars  with  Rome,  2,  x3-35« 
See  oho  S.  2.  16,  34,  41,  44,  54, 
60,  66-75,  78,  79,  83-85,  118; 
12,  4;  18.  II.  See  Agones, 
Anares,  Boii,  Cenomania.  In- 
subres,  Lai,  Lebecii.  Ligures,  Lin- 
gones,  Senones,  Veneti 

Gauls  of  the  Alps,  2,  18,  21  ;  3. 
34.  Su  Allol^-oges,  Taurini, 
Taurisci,  Salassi 

Transalpine  Gauls,  2,   15.  22  ;   S, 

37.  39-41.  43,  45,  47,  49.  50 ; 

84,  7,  10.  See  AUobroges, 
Ardiges,  Decietae,  Ligures, 
Oxybii 

Gauls  invading  Greece  and  con- 
quered at  Delphi,  1,  6  ;  2,  20, 
35  ;  *.  46 ;  9,  34.  35 :  settled 
near  Macedonia,  18,  37  ;  26.  6  ; 
29.  9  ;  near  Byzantium,  4,  38, 
45,  46,  52.     Su  Aegosagae 

Gauls  in  Asia  (Gallograeci),  6.  5 ;  8, 

3;  6,  hi;  18.  41;  21.  33-39.  43. 
48  ;  22.  21  ;  26,  2  ;  29.  22 ;  30. 
1-3.  20 ;  81.  2.  6.  9.  12,  13,  23  ; 
32.  3.     See  Galatia,  Tectosages, 
Tolistobogii,  Trocmi 
Gallic  cavalry  in  the  Roman  army, 
3>  65-67  ;  character  of  the  Gaub, 
2,  7,  19,  32,  33,  35 ;  8,  70,  79 ; 
their  arms  and  mode  of  fighting, 
2.  33 ;  3.  62  ;  the  Gallic  sword, 
2.  30,  33;  3.  114 
Gallic  mercenaries  in  the  service  of 
Carthage,  1,  43,  67,  77  \  2.  7  ; 
8,  72,  74,  79,  84.  85,  106.  113- 
115.   117;    11.   I.   19 ;    16.   II. 
In  the  service  of  Macedonia,  2, 
65  ;  3,  2,  17.     In  the  service  of 
Ptolemy  Philopator,  6.  65,  82 
Gaza,  a  city  in  Palestine,  6,  68,  80, 

86 ;  16,  18.  22  ;  29.  12 
Gela,  a  town  in  Sicily,  12.  25/^ 
Gelias,  an  ambassador  from  Phocaea, 

21.  6 
Gelo.  tyrant  of  Gela  and  afterwards  of 
Syracuse   B.C.   485-478,    12,    25^- 
26^ 


INDEX 


591 


Gelo,  son  of  Hiero  II.  of  Syracuse,  6, 

88  ;  7,  7.  8 
Genesara,  a  lake  in  Palestine,  6.  70 
Genthius,  son  of  Pleuratus,  king  of 

lUyria,   28.   8;  89,   3,  9,   11,   13; 

SO,  14 ;  82.  18 
Gephnis,  a  city  in  Palestine,  6.  70 
Gerrha,  a  fort  in  Coele-Syria,  6,  46, 

61 
Gertus,  a  city  of  the  Dassaretae  in 

lUyria,  6,  108 
Gerunium,   a  town    in   Apulia    near 

Larinum,  3,  xoo-ioa,  107,  108 
Gems,   a  town  of  the  Dassaretae  in 

Illyria,  6.  xo8 
Gesco,  a  Carthaginian  general,  1,  66, 

68-70,  79-81 
Gesco  Strytanus,  a  Carthaginian  am- 
bassador, 86,  3 
Gillimas,  a  Carthaginian  ambassador, 

36.  3 
Gladiators^  32,  14 

Glaucias.  ambassador  of  Perseus,  28.  8 
Glaucides,  of  Abydus,  16,  33 
Glaucus,  of  Acarnania.  28,  5 
Glympes,   a  fort  on  the  frontiers  of 

Argos  and  Laconia,  4,  36  ;  6.  20 
Gonni,  a  town  in  Thessaly.  18.  27 
Gordium,  a  town  in  Phrygia.  21,  37 
Gorgus,  of  Messene.  6,  5  ;  7,  10 
Gortyn,  a  city  in  Crete,  4,   53.   55  ; 

22.  19 ;  28,  15 ;  31,  i 
Gortyna.  a  town  in  Arcadia,  4,  60 
Gorza,  a  town  in  Africa,  1,  74 
Greeks,   history  of,   1,   3 ;  2,  37 ;  3, 

118;    4,    I,   28;    6,   31,  51,   105, 

106,    III  ;    34,    I  ;    39,    i  ;    their 

fickleness,   6,    56 ;    amenability   to 

bribes,  18,  34 ;  decreased  numbers, 

87.  9  ;  military  customs,  6,  25,  42 ; 
18.  18.     See  also  36.  6  ;  89,  12 

Greeks  in  Thrace,  9,  28  ;  in  Asia,  21, 
43;  in  Italy,  1,  6;  2,  39^10,  1 

Greek  mercenaries,  1.  32,  48 ;  6,  79, 
82;  22,  7;  half-bred  Greeks 
(Au^AXip'Cj),  1,  67 

Gtdussa,  a  son  of  Massanissa,  84.  16 ; 

88,  I.  2 

Gyridas,  of  Sparta,  4,  35 
Gyrton,  a  town  in  Thessaly,  18,  22 
Gythium,  the  seaport  town  of  Sparta, 
2,  69  ;  5,  19 


Hadrian  A,  district  of  Hadria,  a  town 

in  Picenum,  8,  88 
Haemus,     a    mountain     in     Thrace 

{Balkan),  24,  3  ;  34,  10 
Haliartus,  a  town  in  Boeotia,  27,  i, 

5  ;  29,  12  ;  30,  21 
Halys,  a  river  in  Asia  Minor  {ICisil 

/rmai),  21,  39  ;  24,  8 
Hamilcar,  the   elder,  general   in  the 

first  Punic  war,  1,  24,  27,  28,  30, 

44 

Hamilcar  Barcas,  son  of  Hannibal, 
in  the  first  Punic  war,  1,  13,  56- 
58,  60,  62,  64,  66  ;  in  the  mer- 
cenary war,  1,  75-88  ;  in  Spain,  2. 
I  ;  8.  9-14.     See  also  11,  2 

Hamilcar,  a  Carthaginian  admiral  in 
the  second  Punic  war,  8,  95  ;  8.  3 

Hamilcar.  a  legate  in  the  third  Punic 
war,  86.  3 

Hamilcar  Phaneas.  a  Carthaginian 
officer  in  the  third  Punic  war,  36, 
8 

Hannibal,  commandant  of  Agrigentum 
in  the  first  Punic  war,  1.  18,  19,  21, 
23.  24,  43 

Hannibal,  son  of  the  last,  1,  43 

Hannibal,  son  of  Hamilcar  the  elder, 
1,  44,  46,  82,  86 

Hannibal  Rhodius,  1,  46,  47 

Hannibal,  son  of  Hamilcar  Barcas,  1, 
64,  65  ;  2,  1,  14.  24,  36 ;  3.  6,  8, 
9;  his  oath.  3,  11,  12  ;  succeeds 
Hasdrubal,  8,  13  ;  his  expeditions 
in  Spain,  3, 14-16;  takes  Saguntum, 
8,  17  ;  his  surrender  demanded  by 
Rome,  3.  20  ;  winters  (b.c.  219- 
218)  at  New  Carthage,  3,  33,  34  ; 
starts  for  Italy,  8.  35  ;  crosses  the 
Pyrenees.  3.  40 ;  crosses  the 
Rhone,  3,  42-47 ;  the  Alps,  8,  48- 
56 ;  in  Gallia  Cisalpina,  3,  60-75  ! 
in  Etruria,  8,  79-85  ;  in  Umbria, 
Picenum,  and  the  south,  3,  86-90  ; 
invades  Campania,  3,  90-94 ;  in 
Bruttium,  3.  100-118.  See  also  ^, 
I.  2,  28,  37,  66  ;  6,  I,  29,  loi, 
108,  no;  6,  58;  7.  I,  2,  4,  9. 
Takes  Tarentum,  8.*  26-36;  at 
Capua  and  in  the  neighbourhood  of 
Rome,  9,  3-9  ;  his  character.  9, 
21-26;  10,   32,  33;  23,   13;  cof 


592 


INDEX 


fined  to  Bnittium,  11,  6 ;  his  i6 
years  in  Italy,  11,  19 ;  recalled  to 
Africa,  14,  6,  9;  16,  1-16;  his 
interview  with  Scipio,  15,  5-8  ;  per- 
suades the  Carthaginians  to  accept 
Scipio's  terms,  15,  19  ;  at  the  court 
of  Antiochus,  21,  17,  45.  See  also 
11,  2,  3  ;  13,  4 ;  16,  23.  28,  37  ; 
84.  10 ;  89,  19  ;    his  death,  23>  13 

Hannibal,  sent  by  the  great  Hannibal 
to  Hieronymus,  7,  2 

Hannibal  Monomachus,  9.  24 

Hanno,  Carthaginian  commander  at 
Agrigentum  and  Ecnomus,  1,  18, 
27,  28  ;  conquered  by  Lutatius,  1, 
60,  61 

Hanno,  crucified  by  the  mercenaries 
in  Sardinia,  1,  79 

Hanno  (Magnus),  commander  in  the 
mercenary  war,  1,  67,  72-74,  81, 
82.  87,  88 

Hanno,  left  by  Hannibal  in  command 
of  Northern  Spain,  3,  35,  76 

Hanno,  son  of  Bomilcar,  an  officer 
under  Hannibal,  3.  42,  114 

HarmostSt  Spartan,  4,  27 

Harpyia,  a  town  in  Illyria,  fr.  xliii. 

Hasdrubal,  son  of  Hanno,  1,  30,  38, 
40 

Hasdrubal,  son-in-law  of  Hamilcar 
Barcas,  1,  13  ;  2,  i,  13,  22,  36 ; 
8,  8,  12,  13,  15,  21,  27,  29;  10, 
10 

Hasdrubal,   brother  of  Hannibal,  8. 

33.  56,  76,  95.  96.  98  ;  9,  22 ;  10, 

7.  37-40 
Hasdrubal,  an  officer  of  Hannibal's 

army,  3,  66,  102,  114,  iz6 

Hasdrubal,  head  of  Hannibal's  com- 
missariat, 3,  93 

Hasdrubal,  son  of  Gesco,  9,  11,  22; 
10,  7.  35.  38  ;  11.  20-24 ;  14,  x-6, 
8 

Hasdrubal,  a  naval  commander  at 
Utica,  15,  2 

Hasdrubal,  a  Carthaginian  officer  in 
the  third  Punic  war,  38,  i  ;  39,  4 

Hiistati,  6.  21,  23,  29,  33  ;  15,  9 

Hearths,  the,  on  the  Thracian  Bos- 
porus, 4,  43 

Hebrus,  a  river  in  Thrace  (Afarit»a), 

34,  12 


Hecatodorus,  of  Byzantium.  4,  47 
Hecatodorus,  an  artist,  4,  78 
Hecatombaeum,  a  place  in  the  territory 

of  Dyme,  2,  51 
Hecatompylus,  a  city  in  Parthia,  10, 

28,  29 
Hecatompylus,  a  city  in  Africa,  1,  73 
Hegesianax,  ambassador  from  Anti- 
ochus the  Great,  18,  47  ;  50,  3 
Hegesias,  of  Rhodes,  28.  16 
Hegias,  an  ambassador  from  Phocaea, 

21,  6 
Heleia,  a  district  in  I^conia,  5.   19. 

20 
Helice,  a  town  in  Achaia,  2,  41 
Helicranum,  a  fort  in  Epinis,  2,  6 
Heliotropium,  a  place  near  Thebes  in 

Phthiotis,  6,  99 
Hellespont,  the,  4,  44,  46,  50 ;  6,  34. 

78,  III  ;  16,   29  ;  18,  41,  54;  21. 

8,  13,  15,  17,  48  ;  27,  7  ;   83.  12, 

13 
Helmantica,  a  city  of  the  Vaccaei  in 

Spain,  3,  14 
Hclvius,    Gains,    legatus   of  Manlius 

Vulso  B.C.  189,  21.  34 
Hephaeslia,   a   city   in    Lemnus.   18, 

48 
Hephaestus,       tumulus       of,        near 

Carthage,    10,    10 ;    island  of,   34, 

XI 

Hcracleia,  a  city  in  Thcssaly,  10,  42  ; 

20,  9,  II 
Hcracleia  Lyncestis,  a  town  in  upper 

Macedonia,  84,  12 
Heracleium.    See  Hcracleia  Lyncestis, 

28,  II,  13,  17 
Heracleidae,   the,  2,   41  ;  4,  34,  35  ; 

12,  12a 
Hcracleides,      an      ambassador      of 

Antiochus   Epiphanes,  28,   i,   22 ; 

88.  15,  18 
Hcracleides,  of  Byzantium,  21,  13-15 
Heracleides,  of  Gyrton,  18,  22 
Hcracleides,  of  Tarentum,  13,  4  ;  16, 

IS 
Heracles,  4,  35,  59 ;  6,  2  ;  7,  9 ;  12, 

26 ;    29.   17  ;  picture  of,   39.    13  ; 

Temple  of,  at  Gades,  34,  9 

Heracles,   columns  of,  2,  i  ;  3,   37, 

39,  57 ;  10,  7.  40 ;  16.  29 ;  84.  4. 

6.  7.  9 


IXDEX 


593 


Hcraclitus,    of  Ephesus,    4,    40  ;   12, 

27 
Heraea,  a  city  in  Arcadia,  2,  54 ;  4. 

77,  78,  80 ;  18,  42,  47 
Herbesus,  a  town  in  Sicily,  1,  18 
Hercte,    a    mountain    between    Mt. 

Elryx  and  Panormus  (Monte  PelU- 

grino),  1,  56 
Here,  7,  9 ;  temple  and  priests  of,  at 

Argos,  9.  43  ;  12,  1 1 ;  at  Lacinium, 

34,  II 
Hermaeum,  on  the  Thracian  Bosporus, 

4,  43 
Hermaeum,      a      promontory     near 

Carthage,  1,  29,  36 
Hermeias,  a  Carian,  6,  41.  45,  49-56 
Hermes,  84,  5 

Hermione,  a  city  in  Argolis,  2,  42,  52 
Hermippus,  of  Lysimachia,  30,  14 
Hermocrates,    of  Syracuse,  12,  25^. 

26 
Hennogenes,  an  officer  of  Antiochus 

the  Great,  6,  60 
Heroes,  4,  20 

Herophilus,  followers  of,  12,  25^/ 
Herophon,     an     ambassador     from 

Perseus,  29,  4,  6 
Hesiod.  the  poet,  6,  2,  32  ;  fr.  vi. 
Hexapyla,  a  gate  at  Sjrracuse,  8,  5,  37 
Hicesias,  vol  ii.  p.  288,  note 
Hicesius.  of  Miletus,  28,  19 
Hiero  II.,  king  of  Syracuse  B.C.  272- 

2i6,  1,  8,  9,  11-18,  62,  83  ;  2,  I ; 

3,  2,  75 ;  5,  88  ;  7,  3,  4,  5f  7.  8 
Hieromnemon,  at  Byzantium,  4.  52 
Hicron,  a  fort  on  the  Thracian  Bos- 
porus, 4,  39.  43,  50,  52 
Hieronymus,  son  of  Gelo  II.,  king  of 

Syracuse  B.C.  216-215,  7,  2-7 ;  8, 

5 
Hieronymus,  of  Arcadia,  13,  14 

Himeras,  a  river  in  Sicily,  7,  4,  5 
Himerean  Thermae,  in  Sicily,  1,  24 
Himilco,  commandant  of  Lilybaeum, 

1,  42,  43,  45 
Hippana,  a  city  in  Sicily 'near  Panor- 
mus. 1,  24 
Hipparchus,    an     ambassador    from 

Ilium,  22,  5 
Hippias,   strategus  of  the  Boeotians, 
22,  4 ;  27,  I,  2,  6 ;  23.  9.  10 ;  29. 
3 
VOL.  II 


Hippitas,  a  friend  of  Clcoiiiencs  111., 

3,  37 
Hippocrates,  of  Cos,  30,  7 

Hippo  Regius,  in  Numidia,  X2,  i 

Hippo  Zarytos  (Diarrhytus),  a  town  in 

Libya,  1,  70,  73,  77,  82,  88 
Hippocrates,  of  Syracuse,  7,  2,  4,  5  ; 

8,  5  ;  9,  22 
Hippodrome,    near  Seleucia,    6,    59  ; 

near  Sardis,  7,  17 
Hippolochus,  of  Aetolia,  27,  15 
Hippolochus,  of  Thessaly,  6.  70,  71, 

79 
Hippomedon,  a  Spartan,  4,  35 
Hipposthenes,  of  Syracuse.  7.  4 
Hirpini,  a  people  of  Central  Italy,  3. 

91 
History,  value  of,  1,  i,  35  ;  2,  35  ;  3. 

31  ;  3,  75  ;  truth  the  eye  of,  1,  14  ; 

12,  7  ;  connected  with  geography, 

8.  36  ;  and  natural  science,  3,  57  ; 

compared  with  tragedy,  2,  56  ;  16, 

36 
Hollows,  the,  near  Naupactus,  6,  103 
Holy  Isle,  one  of  the  Aegates,  1,  60, 

61  (Maritima)  \  an  Aeolian  island 

sacred  to  Hephaestus,  84,  11 
Holy  Town,  in  Lydia,  16,  i  ;  32,  27 
Homarium,  the,    at  Megalopolis,   6, 

93.     See  Zeus 
Homer,  9,  16  ;  12,  24,  26,  27  ;  30, 

10  ;  34,  2-4 ;  39,  5 ;  quoted,  3, 
94 ;  3,  38 ;  12.  9>  a6,  27 ;  16.  12, 
16  ;  18,  29  ;  84, 2-4  ;  86,  8  ;  39.  6 

Hoplites,  a  river  in  Laconia,  16,  16 
Horatius  Pulvillus,  M.,  consul  (sufT.) 

B.C.  509.  3.  22 
Horatius  Cocles,  P.,  6,  55 
Horii,  a  state  in  Crete,  4,  53 
Horn,  the,  gulf  at  Byzantium,  4,  43 
Horse,  sacrifice  of,  12,  4^ 
Hortensius,  L.,  83,  i.  9 
Hostilius  Mancinus,   A.,  consul  B.C. 

170.  27.  16  ;  28.  3 
Hostilius  Mancinus,  A.,  commissioner 

in  Asia,  37.  6 
Hyacinthus,  tomb  of,  near  Tarentum, 

8.  30 
Hypana,  a  town  of  Triphylia,  4,  77, 

79 
Hypata.  a  town  in  Thessaly,  20,  9- 

11  ;  21.  4,  5 

2Q 


594 


INDEX 


Hyperbasas,  an  officer  of  Antiochus 

the  Great,  10,  31 
Hypcrbatiis,  Achaean  Strategy  B.C. 

179,  24.  10 ;  29,  23 
Hypsas,  a  river  near  Agrigentum,  9, 

27 
Hyrcania,  a  region   in  Asia  on  the 

south  of  the  Caspian.  10,  29,  31,  48 
Hyrcanian  sea,  5,  44,  55  ;  10,  48 
Hyscana,  a  city  in  Illyria,  2B,  8 

lAPYGiA  (Appulia).  2.  24  ;  3.  88 
lapygian    promontory,    in     Calabria 

{Capa  Sta,  Maria  di  Leuca),  10,  i; 

84,  6,  II 
lasus,  a  city  in  Caria,  16,  12 ;  18.  2, 

8.  44 

Iberia  (Spain),  1,  10  ;  2,  13,  36  ;  3. 
3.  8-17,  21,  27,  30,  33-35.  37,  39, 
49.  56.  57.  59.  61,  64.  87,  89,  95, 
96,  98,  106 ;  5.  I,  33  ;  11.  24,  29, 
31.  33  ;  12.  5  ;  82.  8  ;  34.  5,  7-9; 
36.  1-5  ;  38,  8  ;  events  in,  see  Cor- 
nelius Scipio 

Iberians,  arms  of,  3.  114  ;  character 
of,  3,  98  ;  mercenaries,  1,  17,  67  ; 

3.  72.  74.  79.  83.  93.  94.  » 13-1 15. 
117  ;  11,  I,  19 

Ibcrus,  river  in  Spain  (mod.  Ebro),  2, 
13  ;  3,  6.  14,  15.  27,  29,  30,  35, 
39,  40.  76,  95.  97  ;  4,  28  ;  5,  I  ; 
10.  35  ;  11.  32 

Ida,  Mt.     See  Zeus 

Uergetes,  a  tribe  of  north  Spain,    3. 

35;  10,  18 
Ilipa,  a  town  in  Spain,  12,  20 
Ilium,  a  city  in  the  Troad,  5,  78,  iii ; 

12,  5  ;  22,  5  :  84.  2  :  89.  6 
Illeberis,   a  town  and  river  of  Aqui- 

tania,  34.  lo 
Illyria,    1,    13;  2.    2,    8,    11,  44;  3, 

16,  18,  19 ;  4,    16,   29,  37,  66 ;  5, 

4,  loi.  108,  no;  18.  I.  8;  21. 
21  ;  28,  8  ;  29.  4 ;  82,  18,  23.  26 ; 
34,  6,  7.  12  ;  39.  2 

lUyrians,  their  tactics,  2.  3 ;  their 
language,  28.  8.  See  also  2,  2-12, 
65-68.  70  ;  3,  16,  18,  107 ;  4,  16, 
25.  55  ;  6.  7,  13.  M.  22,  23,  loi, 
109;  8.  16 ;  9,  38 ;  11.  11,  14, 
15  ;  23.  I  ;  28,  8  ;  SO,  14 ;  32. 
23 :  39.  2 


Ilurgia,  a  city  in  Spain,  11,  24 
Impiety  and  Injustice^  altar  of,  18.  54 
India,  11,  34 ;  84,  13 
Indian  drivers  of  elephants,  1,  40  ;  3. 

46;  11,  I 
Insubres,  a  tribe  of  Cisalpine  Gauls. 

2,  17,  22,  23.   28,  30,  32,  34  ;  3. 

40.  56,  60  ;  16,  40 
Intercatia.  a  town  in  Spain,  34,  9 
lo,  daughter  of  Inachus.  4.  43 
lolaus.  comrade  of  Hercules,  7.  9 
Ionia.  18,  41a ;  21.  13,  14 ,  33.  12 
Ionian  sea,  2,   14;  6,   no;  34.  12; 

38.  5 
Iphiades,  of  Abydus,  16,  30 
Iphicrates,  of  Athens.  39.  2 
Irobastus,  an  Egyptian,  22,  7 
Isara,  a  river  in  Gaul  (Isere),  3,  49 
Iseas,  tyrant  of  Car3meia,  2, 41 
Isius.     See  Alexander. 
Island,  the,  between  the  Rhine  and 

Isara,  3,  49 
Ismenias,  of  Boeotia,  27,  1.2 
Isocrates,  a  grammarian,  32,  4,  6,  7 
Issa,  an  island  in  the  Adriatic  on  the 

coast  of  Illyria  (Lissa),  2.   8,   11  ; 

32.  18 
Issus,  in  Cilicia,  battle  of,  12,  17,  18 
Ister.     See  Danube. 
Isthmian  games,  the,  2. 12 ;  18. 44,  46 
Isthmus  of  Corinth,  the,   2,   52  ;    3. 

32  ;  4.  13  ;  12.  12  ;  16.  16  ;  20.  6; 

30,  10 ;  39.  17.  19  ;  ships  dragged 

across,  4,  19  ;  fr.  xcviii. 
Istri,  the,  inhabitants  of  Istria,  26,  4 
Italy,  geography  and  inhabitants  of, 

2,  14-24;  34,  15;  Italians,  2,  31  ; 

8,  2,  77,  85,  118 ;  5.  104  ;  11,  19  ; 

18.  19;  34.  10.     See  also  1.  3  ;  3. 

118;  6,  105  ;  28,  16  ;  39,  19 
Ithaca,  island  of,  34,  7 
Ithomates.  citadel  of  Messene,  7.  1 1 
Ithoria.  a  fort  in  Aetolia,  4.  64 
Itonian  Artemis,  4,  25  ;  26,  3 

Jason.  4.  39 

Jews,  the.  16.  39 

Jordan,  the,  6.  70 

Julius  Caesar,  Sex.,  consul  B.C.    157, 

32.  24;  38,  7-10 
Junius  Brutus,  L.,  consul  B.C  509,  3, 

22 


INDEX 


595 


Junius  Pullus,    L.,  consul  B.C.   249, 

1.  5a.  54.  55 
Junius  Silanus,   M.,  serves   in    Spain 

under  Scipio,  10.  6  ;  11,  20,  23.  26, 

33 
Junius,      Marcus,      ambassador      to 

Ariarathes,  31.  13 

Jupiter,  Capitolinus,  3.  23,  26  ;  Lapis. 

«,as 

King's  Dyke,  the.  6.  51 

Labab,  a  dty  in  Arabia,  18,  9 
Labeatis,  a  district  in  lUyria,  29,  3 
Labus,  a  mountain  between  Parthia 

and  Hyrcania,  10,  29,  31 
Lacedaemon  (or  Sparta),  its  position 
and  extent,  6,  22  ;  9,  21.     See  also 
%,  41,  53,  65,*  69,  70  ;  4,  23,  34-36  ; 

5,  9,  17,  19,  20,  23,  24,  37.  92  ;  6. 
48;  9.  8,9,  18;  13,  6,8;  16,  13. 
16,  37  ;  18,  17 ;  20,  5.  12  ;  21,  1, 
41  ;  22.  1, 3.  10,  13,  15,  16  ;  28,  5, 

6,  9,  II,  17,  18  ;  24.  I,  2,  7,  10-12 
Lacedaemonians  (Spartans) .  their  num  - 

bers  and  territoiy.  2.  38  ;  their  con- 
stitution, 2,  62  ;  4,  81  ;  6,  3.  10, 

43.  45-51;  W.  6.  »i.  23;  their 
iron  money,  6,  49  ;  their  use  of  the 
tibia  in  war,  4.  20  ;  admitted  to  the 
Achaean  league,  23. 17. 18.   See  also 

1, 6,  63 ;  2. 39,  45-47. 49.  SO.  5a.  57. 
58,  62,  65,  69,  70  ;  3,  5  ;  4,  2,   5, 

7,  9,  10,  IS,  16,  1,5:24,  27,  32  34, 
36,  54,  80,  81  ;  6,  2,  9,  19-23,  35, 
76,  92,  28,  39  ;  11,  II,  15-18  ;  12, 
6,  25  :  13,  6  ;  18,  14;  20,  12  ;  21. 
I,  2.  41  ;  22,  3.  13.  16  ;  23.  i.  4. 
9,  18  ;  81,  9 ;  37,  I  ;  38,  4.  8  : 
39,  2,  8 

Lacinium,  a  promontory  of  Bruttium. 

3,  33.  56  ;  16,  I ;  84,  11 
Laconia,  2,  54.  65;  6,  19,  20,  24. 

92 ;  16,  17.  ao,  37 ;  88,  4 
Lade,  an  island  off  Miletus,  16,   10, 

14.  IS 
Ladictts,  an  Acamanian,  4,  80 

Ladoceia,  in  the  territory  of  Megalo- 
polis, 2.  51,  55 
Laelius,  Gaius,  10.  3.  9.   12,   18.  19, 

37.  39  ;  11.  3«.  33 :  1*.  4. 9 ;  16. 

9.  ",  14 


Laenas.     See  Popilius 
Laestrygones,  the,  8,  11 
Lagius.  an  Achaean,  89.  11 
Lagoras.  of  Crete,  an  oflScer  of  Ptolemy 

Philopator,  6.  61 ;  7.  15-18 
Lagus,  father  of  Ptolemy  I.,  2,  41  ;  6, 

67 
Lai,  a  tribe  of  Cisalpine  Gauls.  2,  17 
Lamia,  a  city  in  Thessaly,  9,  29  ;  20, 

II 
Lamius,  of  Ambracia,  18,  10 
Lampsacus.  a  city  in  Mysia,  6,  78  ; 

18,  52  ;  21,  13.  14 
Laodice,  wife  of  Seleucus  Callinicus, 

4,  51  ;  8.  22 

Laodice,  daughter  of  Mithridates  IV. , 
wife  of  Antiochus  the  Great,  6,  43, 

55 

Laodice.  another  daughter  of  Mithri- 
dates IV. ,  wife  of  Achaeus,  5.  74  ; 
8.  21,  22,  23 

Laodicea,  a  city  in  Phrygia.  6,  57 

Laodicea  by-the-Sea,  a  city  in  Syria, 
32,  7 

Laodicea,  at  Libanus,  a  city  in  Syria, 

5.  45 
Lapateni,  fr.  xvii 

Lapethus,  a  city  in  Cyprus,  39,  18 

Lappa,  a  city  in  Crete,  4,  53-55 

Larinum,  a  city  in  North  Apulia,  3. 101 

Larisa,  a  city  in  Thessaly,  4,  66.  67  ; 

*.  97.  99 ;  9,  18  ;  18.  19,  27,  33  ; 

28.  5 
Larisa     Cremaste,      in     Thessalian 

PhthioUs,  18,  3,  8  ;  18,  38 
Larius  (Lake  of  Como),  84,  10 
Larymna,  a  town  in  Boeotia,  20.  5 
Lases,  an  ambassador  from  Thespiae, 

27,  I 
Lasio,  a  town  in  Elis,  4,  72-74  ;  6, 

102 
Latin,  old,  8,  22 

Latins,  the,  1,  6  ;  2,  18.  24 ;  3,  22 
Latium,  3.  22-24  !  34.  8 
Lattabus,  an  Aetolian,  9,  34 
Lavina,  daughter  of  Evander,  fr.  iii. 
Laurentines,  the,  8.  22 
Lebadeia,  a  town  in  Boeotia,  27.  i 
Lebecii,  a  tribe  of  Cisalpine  Gauls,  2, 

17 
Lechaeuro,  the  harbour  of  Con** 

2,  17,  18,  24,  25-28,  lO' 


596 


INDEX 


Legion,  the  Roman.    See  Roman  Army 
Lemnus.  island  of,  SO.  ai  ;  84,  ii 
Leo,  a  Macedonian  officer,  18,  23 
Leo.  an  officer  of  Eumenes  I.,  28,  15 
Leonidas   I.,   son   of  Anazandridas, 

king  of  Sparta  B.C  491-480,  9,  38 
Leonidas  II.,    king  of   Sparta  B.C. 

257-242,  4.  35 
Leontini,  a  city  in  Sicily,  7.  6  ;  8,  xi 
Leontium,  a  city  in  Achaia,  2, 41  ;  6. 

94  ;  24.  10 
Leontius,  conspirator  against  Philip  V., 

4.  87  ;  6.  1.  2.  4,  5,  7,  14-16,  25- 

27.  29,  100 
Leontius,  governor  of  Pieria,  6,  60 
Lepreum,  a  city  of  Triphylia,  4,  77-80 
Leptines,  of  Syracuse,  1,  9 
Leptines.  assassin  of  Gn.  Octa\ius,  32, 

4.6.  7 
Leptis.  a  city  of  Africa,  1,  87 
Lergetae,  an  African  tribe,  3,  33 
Leucas  island,   6.  5,   16-18,  95,  101, 

108,  109  ;  18.  47 ;  21.  26  ;  84.  6 
Leuctra  (in  Bocolia).  battle  of,  1,  6  ; 
2,  39.  41  ;  4,  81  ;  8,  13  :  12,  25/; 

20.4 
Libanus,  Mt.    (Lebanon),  6.   45,  59. 

69 
Libba,  a  city  in  Mesopotamia  on  the 

Tigris,  6.  51 
Libumus.  Mt  in  Apulia,  8.  100 
Libya,  1.  3.  26,  29,  70,  72  ;  3,  3.  33. 

37-39  ;  ».    1.  33.   65.   105  ;  12,  4. 

26a  ;  34,  6,  7,  15,  16  ;  88,  8  ;  39. 

11,  19 
Libyans,  their  war  with  Carthage,  1, 

19.  65.  67.  73.  74.  76.  77*  79.  82, 
84-87.  See  also  3.  33,  56,  72,  74, 
79'  83,  87,  113-117 ;  5.  65.  82  ;  6. 
52  ;  11, 19.  22.  24 ;  31,  27.  Philam- 
mon  governor  of.  16,  25 

Libyan  sea,  1,  37.  42  ;  4,  77 

.Libyophoenicians,  3,  33 

Licinius  Crassus.  P.,  consul  B.C.  171, 
27.  6,  8  ;  30,  3 

Licinius,  Marcus,  37,  6 

Licinius  Lucullus,  L.,  37,  6 

Liger,  a  river  in  Gaul  (Loire),  84.  10 

Ligures,  a  large  tribe  of  Cisalpine 
Gauls,  2,  16  ;  12.  28  ;  33.  7.  10- 
12  ;  84.  10.  Serve  the  Cartha- 
ginians as  mercenaries,   1,  17,  67  ; 


3.    33;    11.    19;     16,    II  :    their 

shields,  29,  14 
Liguria,  2,  31  ;  8.  41 ;  7,  9 
Lilybaeum,  in   SicOy,  1,    25,  38-48, 

52-56,  59-61,  66 ;  3.  41.  61.  68,  96, 

106.  109.  no;  7,  3  ;    86.  4*  5 ; 

87.  3 
Limnaea,  a  town  of  Acamania.  6,  5, 

6,  14 

Limnaeus,  a  prince  in  Asia  Minor,  6, 

90 
Limnasus,  a  Macedonian.  89.  4 
Lingones,  a  tribe  of  Cisalpine  Gauls. 

2,  17 
Lipara,  a  city  and  island,  1,  21,  24, 

39 
Liparae  Islands,  the,  1.  25  ;  84.  11 
Lissus,  a  city  of  Illyria,  2,    12  ;    3. 

16  ;  4,  16  ;  8,  15  ;  28,  8 
Lissus,  a  river  in  Sicily  (FiumeRttina), 

7,  6 

Livius  Macatus,  Gains,  8.  27,  29,  32 
Livius  Salinator,  Marcus,  consul  B.C. 

219,  207,  11.  I,  3 
Livius  Salinator,   Gains,   consul  B.C; 

188,  21,  3,  11 
Lochagus,  an  Aetolian,  27,  15 
Locri,  in  Greece,  the,  11,  5  ;   12.  6.  9- 

II  ;   18,  II,  46,   47  ;    38.    5,    10  ; 

Locris,  18.  10 
Locri  Epizcphyrii,  in  Magna  Graecia. 

1,  20;  10,  I  ;  12,  5-12;   Locris.  1, 

56 
Logbasis,  of  Selge,  6.  74-76 
Longanus,  a  river  in  Sicily,  1.  9 
Lotophagi,  the,  1,  39  ;  34.  3 
Lucani.  the,  2,  24;  10.  i 
Luceria.  in  Daunia,  3,  88,  100 
Lucius,  fr.  xi.,  1.,  xvii. 
Lucretius  Gallus,  Gaius,  27,  7 
Lucretius,  Spurius,  81,  12.  13 
Lugdunum,  a  town  in  Gaul.  84,  15 
Luna,  a  town  in  Etruria,  34,  11 
Lusi,  a  town  in  Arcadia,  4,  i8,  25  ; 

9.  34 
Lusitani,  the,  10,  17 ;  84.  8  ;  86.  2 
Lusius,   a  stream  in  the  territory  of 

Megalopolis.  16.  17 
Lutatius  Catulus,  Gaius,  consul  B.C. 

242.  1,  59-62  ;  8.  21  ;  29.  3 
Lutatius  Catulus,  Gaius,  consul  b.c. 

220,  8.  40 


INDEX 


597 


Lycaeum,  a  town  in  the  territory  of 

Megalopolis,  2.  51,  55 
Lycaeus,  a  mountain  in  Arcadia,  34, 

10 
Lycaonia,  a  district  of  Asia  Minor,  6, 

57 ;  31,  22,  48 
Lycastium,  a  district  of  Crete,  22,  19 
Lychnidius,  a  lake  in  Illyria,  6.  xo8 
Lychnis,  a  town  in  Illyria,  18,  47  ;  34. 

12 

Lycia,  21,  24,  48  ;  22,  S,  24 ;  24,  9  ; 

25.  4  :  30.  5  ;  31,  7.  15  ;  34,  4 
Lyciscus,  an  Acamanian,  9,  32-39 
Lyciscus,  an  Aetolian,  27.  15 ;  28,  4  ; 

30.  13  ;'  32,  19.  20 
Lycoa,  a  town  in  Arcadia,  16,  17 
Lycon,  a  Rhodian,  30.  5 
Lycophron,  a  Rhodian,  26.  5 
Lycopolis,  a  city  in  Egypt,  22.  7 
Lycopus,  an  Aetolian,  21,  25.  26 
Lycortas,    of    Megalopolis,    Achaean 

Strategus,  B.C.  184,  182,  father  of 

Polybius,  2,  40  ;  22,  3,  10,  12,  13. 

16 ;   23.   12.    z6,   17 ;  24,    6,    10 ; 

28,  3,  6  ;  29,  23-25  ;  87,  5 
Lyctians,  22,  18.  Su  Lyttus 
Lycurgus,   the  Spartan  legislator,   4, 

81  ;  6,  3,  10-12,  46,  48-50  ;  10,  2 
Lycurgus,   king  of  Sparta,  ac.  220- 

210,  4,  2,  35-37.  60,  81  ;  5,  S,  17. 

18,  20-23,  29,  91,  92 
Lycus,  of  Pharae,  6.  94,  95 
Lycus,  a  river  in  Mysia,  6.  77 
Lycus,  a  river  of  Phoenicia,  6,  68 
Lycus,  a  river  of  Assyria,  6,  51 
Lydia,  5,  57,  79,  82  ;  21,  16,  48 
Lydiadas,  tyrant  of  Megalopolis,   2. 

44.  51  ;  *.  77 
Lydiackis.  a  citizen  of  Megalopolis. 

24.  10 
Lyncestae,  a  tribe  in  Macedonia,  84, 

12 
Lysanias,  a  prince  in  Asia  Minor,  6. 

90 
Lysias,  an  ambassador  of  Antiochus 

the  Great.  18.  47.  50 
Lysias,  guardian  of  Antiochus  V.,  31, 

17,  19,  20 
Lysimacheia,  a  city  of  Aetolia,  6,  7 
Lysimacheia,  a  city  of  the  Thracian 

Chersonese,  5,  34 ;  16,  23  ;  18,  3, 

4.  50.  51  *.  21,  15,  48  I 


Lysimachus,   successor  of  Alexander 
the  Great  in  Thrace,  2,  41,  71  ;  6, 
67 ;  16,  25  ;  18,  51  ;  Fr.  xi. 
Lysimachus,   son   of  Ptolemy   Phila- 

delphus,  16,  25 
Lysimachus,  a  Gaul,  6,  79 
Lysinoe,  a  town  in  Pisidia,  21,  36 
Lysis,    ambassador    from    Lacedae- 
monian exiles,  23,  4 
Lyttus,   a  town  in  Crete,  4,  53,  54 ; 
22,  19 

M  AGAR  AS,    a    river    near    Carthage 

(Bagrtxlas),  1,  75,  86 ;  16,  2 
Maccoei,  a  tribe  in  Libya,  3,  33 
Macedonia,  2,  70  ;  3,  3  ;  4,  i,  50,  51, 
57,  62,  63,  66,  69.  85,  87  ;  6,  5, 

26.  30,  34,  97,  101,  106,  108-110  ; 

27,  4.  S.  8  ;  28,  8,  10,  13,  17,  20 ; 
29,  I,  4,  22,  24 ;  80,  8,  9,  13,  16, 
18;  81,  3,  12;  82.  8,  II,  15,  23  ; 
84,  12  ;  86,  4 ;  87,  i,  2,  8  ;  88,  5. 
10  ;  89,  2,  19  ;  Roman  settlement 
of,  vol.  ii.  p.  434 

Macedonian   soldiers   at   Alexandria ; 

16,  26,  28,  29,  31 
Macedonians,  the,  their  empire,  1,  2  ; 

their  government,  4,    76 ;   6,    27 ; 

their   freedom   of  speech,    6.    27 ; 

their  supremacy  in  Greece,  9,  28- 

36,  39 ;  their  army,  2,  65 ;  3,  6  ; 
4,  8  ;  6,  2,  65,  79,  82 ;  18,  28-32. 
See  Phalanx  ;  serving  in  Egypt,  16, 
26,  28,  31,  32.  See  also  2.  37,  39, 
43,  48-51.  54.  56,  65-71  ;  8.  5,  6, 
16;  4,  2.  3,  5,  8,  9,  II,  16,  22-24, 
34.  35.  37.  61,  64,  68-73,  76.  78. 
80,  84,  87 ;  6.  2-8.  13,  17,  18,  25, 
29.  35.  97.  100,  109 ;  22,  4  ;  27, 
2-10,  15;  28,  2,  5,  8;  29,  4.  21, 
37  ;  31.  3.  7.  la :  32,  14 ;  36,  4, 

37,  2,  9 ;  38,  5  ;  39,  6 
Macedonians,  the  Upper,  6.  97 
Macella.  a  city  in  Sicily,  1,  24 
Machanidas,  tyrant  of  Sparta,  10,  41  ; 

11.  11-18;  13,  6 
Machatas,  an  Aetolian,  4,  34,  36 
Machatas.  son  of  Charops.  27.  15 
Maeander.  the  river,  21.  24,  48  ;  22,  5 
Maeander,  of  Alexandria,  16,  30 
Maedi,  a  Thracian  tribe,  10.  41 
Maeotis  Palus  (Sea  of  Azov),  4,  39, 


598 


INDEX 


40,  4a  ;  5,  44  ;  10,  27,  48  ;  84.  7, 

15 
Magas,  father  of  Berenice,  16,  26 

Magas,  son  of  Ptolemy  Euergetes  and 

Berenice,  6,  34,  36 ;  15,  25 

Magi,  the,  84,  2 

Magilus,  a  Gallic  chief,  S,  44 

Magister  equitum,  3,  87 

Magistrates  at  Rome,  3,  87;  6.   12, 

19 
Magnesia,   a  district  in  Thessaly,  6. 

99,  100;  18,  II,  46,  47 
Magnesia,    a  city  of   Ionia    on    the 

Maeander,  6,  65  ;  16.  24 
Mago,  brother  of  Hannibal,  3.  71.  79. 

85,  114;   9.  22;   10,  7.    38;  11. 
21 

Mago  Samnis,  a  friend  of  Hannibal, 

9,  25 

Mago.  commandant  of  New  Carthage, 

10.  12,  15,  18,  19 

Mago,  an  ambassador  from  Carthage, 

36.  3 
Mago  Bruttius,  86,  5 
Magonus,  of  Carthage.  7.  9 
Magus,  the  (false  Smerdis).  6,  43 
Mahabal,  an  officer  under  Hannibal. 

3,  84.  85,  86 
Malea,  promontory  of  Laconia  (Malid)^ 

5.  95.  101,  109 ;  84.  4.  7,  la 
Malian  Gulf.  9.  41  ;  18.  i  ;  20.  10 
Mamertines.  the.  1,  7-12,  20 ;  3.  26 
Mamilius  Vitulus,  Q.,  consul  B.C.  262 ; 

1.  17-19 
Mandonius,  a  Spanish  chief,  10,  18, 

35  ;  11,  29 
ManiUus.    Manius,    consul  B.C.    145. 

86.  6 ;  37,  3 

Manlius,   Lucius,   praetor   B.C.    218, 

3.  40 

Manlius  Torquatus,  T.,  consul   B.C. 

224,  2.  31 
Manlius  Torquatus.  T..  consul    B.C. 

165,  sent  to  support  Ptolemy  Phys- 

con,  81.  18,  26-28  ;  82.  i 
Manlius  Vulso  Longus,  L. ,  consul  B.C. 

256,  250,  1.  26,  28,  29,  39,  41-48 
Manlius  Vulso.  Gnaeus.   consul  B.C. 

189.  21,  24,  34.39,  43.  44.  47,  48 
Manlius  Vulso,  Lucius,  brother  of  the 

preceding,  21,  44.  46 
Mantinea,  a  city  of  Arcadia,  2.  46,  53, 


54.  56.  58.  61  ;  4,  8,  21,  27.  33 ; 

9.  8,  9,   34;  6,   43;  11,   II,  14; 

12.  25/;  88,  4 
Mantua,  in  Cisalpine  Gaul  (Mantua), 

16,  10 
Marathus,  a  city  in  Phoenicia,  6.  68 
Marcius,  Ancus,  fr.  v.,  vi. 
Marcius,  Lucius,  legatus  of  Scipio,  11, 

23 
Marcius    Philippus,    Quintus,    consul 

B.C.  186,  169,  S3,  4,  8,  9 :  24,  II  ; 

27  ;  28,  1,  13,  16,  17  ;  29,  23-25 
Marcius  Figulus,  Gains,  praetor  B.C. 

169,  consul  B.C.   162,  156,  28,  14, 

17 ;  82.  26 
Marcius   Censorinus,    Lucius,  consul 

B.a  149,  36.  6 
Margites,  12,  4^1,  25 
Margus,     of     Caryneia,     first     sole 

Achaean  Strategus,  ac.  255,  2,  10, 

41.  43 
Maroneia,  a  city  of  Thrace,  6,  34  ; 

22,   I,  15.    17;  18,   3  ;  22.  9,  17, 

18  ;  30.  3 
Mamicini,  a  tribe  in  Central  Italy,  2, 

24  :  3,  88 
Mars  Quirinus,  3.  25 
Marseilles,  2,   14,  16 ;  3.  37.  41 1  47i 

61.  95  ;  83.  7.  10,  II  ;  84,  7,  10 
Marsh,  the  town  in  the,  21,  34 
Marshes,  the  (Barathra)^  near  Pelu- 

sium.  6.  80 
Marsi,  a  nation  in  Italy,  2,  24 
Marsyas,  plain   of,  between  Libanus 

and  Antilibanus,  6,  45.  46,  61 
Masaesylii,  a  tribe  in  Africa,  8,  33  ; 

16,  23 
Massanissa,  king  of  Numidia,  8,  5  ; 

9,  25  ;  11,  21  ;  14,  3.  4,  8,  9 ;  16, 

3-5,  9,  II,  12,  14,  18  ;  21,  II,  21 ; 

32,  2  ;  character  of,  37,  10 
Massolii,  a  Numidian  tribe,  3,  33 
Mastia,  a  town  of  Africa,  8,  24 
Mastiani,  a  Spanish  tribe,  3,  33 
Magna  Mater,  21,  37 
Maihos,  a  Libyan  leader  of  mercen- 
aries, 1,  69-73,  75.  77.  79.  82,  84, 

86-88 
Matiani,  a  tribe  in  Media,  6,  44 
Maurctania,  84,  15 
Mauretanians,   the,   8.   33 ;    16.    11; 

88.  I 


INDEX 


599 


Medes,  the,  6,  44,  79.  82,  85  ;  16, 
22a ;  89,  6 

Media.  5,  40,  44,  45,  47,  51,  52,  54, 
55  ;  10.  27 

Medicine,  Schools  of,  12,  25^/ 

MedimnuSt  an  Attic,  6,  39  ;  Sicilian^ 
2.  15  ;  9.  44 

Mediolanum  (Afilan),  2,  34 

Medion,  a  city  of  Acamania,  2,  2-4  ; 
18,  40 

Mediterranean,  the,  8,  37,  39  ;  16, 
29 

Megaleas,  secretary  of  Philip  V.,  4, 
87;  6,  2,  14-16,  25-28 

Megalopolis,  a  city  in  Arcadia,  2.  44. 
46,  48,  so,  51,  54,  55,  61,  62,  64- 
66  ;  4,  6,  7,  9,  10,  13,  25,  32,  33, 
37,  60,  69,  77,  80-82 ;  6.  91-93  ; 
9,  18.  21,  28  ;  13,  8 ;  16,  17 ;  18, 
14 ;  20,  12 ;  21,  9 ;  22,  xo ;  28, 
12,  16;  31.  9;  taken  by  Cleomenes, 

a.  55 
Megara,  2,  43  ;  4,  67 ;  20,  6 ;  39.  8 

Megistus,  a  river  of  Mysia,  5,  77 

Melambium,  a  township  in    Pelasgic 

Thessaly,  18,  20 
Melancomas,  of  Ephesus,  8,  17-20 
Meleager,  ambassador  from  Antiochus 

Epiphanes,  27,  19  ;  2B,  i,  22  ;  31, 

21 
Melitaea,  a  city  of  Phthiotis,  6,  97 ; 

9.  18 
Memphis,  a  city  in  Egypt,  6,  62,  63. 

66 ;  29,  23 
Menalddas,  of   Sparta,  80,  17 ;   89, 

IX 

Menecrates,  a  Macedonian,  29,  6 
Menedemus,  of  Alabanda,  6,  69,  79, 

82 
Menelaium.    a    hill     and    shrine    in 

Laconia,  6,  z8,  22 
Menesiheus.  brother  of  Meleager  and 

Apollonius,  81,  21 
Menestratus,  of  Epirus,  20,   10 ;  21. 

Meninx.  island  of  the  Lotophagp.  1, 

39 ;  84,  3 

Menippus.  a  Macedonian.  10,  42 

Menneas,  6,  71 

Menochares,  ambassador  from  Deme- 
trius Soter,  32.  4.  6 

Menoetius,  of  Crete,  22,  19 


Mcnyllus,  of  Alabanda,  31,  18, 20,  22; 

32.  I 

Merganfe,  a  town  of  Sicily,  1.  8 
Mesembriani,  a  Thracian  people,  26, 

2 
Mesopotamia,  6,  44,  48 
Messapii,  a  tribe  in  Apulia,  2,  24  ;  8, 

88 
Messene,  in  Sicily,  1.  7-11,  15,  20,  21, 

25.  38.  52 ;  3,  26 
Messene,  in   the   Peloponnese,  2,  5, 

55,  61,   62,  79,  80;  3,   X9;  4,  4, 

33.  49.  77 ;  5.  5.  17.  37.  91.  9a  ; 

7,  10,  II  ;  8,  10,  14;  12,  6^;  16, 
13.  16,  17 ;  18,  14.  4a ;  22,  13  ; 
23,  5,  9,  12,  16,  17  ;  24,  2,  11-13, 
IS ;  89,  9 

Messenians,  wars  with  the  Aetolians, 
*.  3-7.  9.  15  ;  their  old  wars  with 
Sparta,  4,  33  ;  6,  49  ;  endeavour 
to  join  Philip  V.  in  his  attacks  on 
Sparta,  6,  20 ;  Lycurgus  prepares 
an  invasion  of  them,  6,  91,  92  ; 
democracy  among,  7,  10 ;  obtain 
some  Spartan  territory,  9,  28,  30 ; 
in  alliance  with  Nabis,  16,  13 ; 
quarrel  with  the  Achaeans,  23,  9  ; 
poison  Philopoemen,  23,  12  ;  sub- 
dued by  Lycortas.  23.  16  ;  24,  2. 
II  ;  their  attitude  in  B.C.  146,  89,  9 
Metagonia,  a  district  in  Africa,  3,  33 
Metapa.  a  town  in  Aetolia,  6,  7,  13 
Metapontium.  a  city  in  Magna  Graecia, 

8.  36;  10.  I 

Meteon,  a  city  of  Labeatis  in  lUyria, 

29.  3 
Methydrium.  a  town   in  Arcadia,  4, 

10,  II,  13 
Methymna,  a  city  in  Lesbos,  88.  13 
Metretes,  a,  2.  15 
Metrodorus,  an  officer  of  Philip  V., 

16.  24 ;  fr.  Ixxii. 
Metrodorus.     an     ambassador     from 

Perseus.  29,  4,  11 
Metropolis,  a  city  of  Acamania,  4.  64 
Miccus,  of  Dyme,    sub-Stratcgus   of 

the  Achaeans,  4,  59 
Micio,  of  Athens.  6.  106 
Micipsa,  son  of  Massanissa,  87.  10 
Midon.  of  Bcroea,  27,  8 
Milestones  on  Roman  roads,  3,  39 ; 

84,  II 


6oo 


INDEX 


Miletus,  16,  12,  15 ;  21.  48 ;  28,  19; 
81,  a  I 

Milo,  an  officer  of  Perseus,  29,  15 

Miltiades,  ambassador  from  Deme- 
trius Soter,  82.  24 

Milyas,  a  district  in  Asia  Minor,  6. 
72.  17 ;  21,  48 

Mincius,  a  river  in  Cisalpine  Gaul 
{Mincio),  84,  10 

Minervae  promontorium,  84,  11 

Minoa  Heracleia,  a  city  in  Sicily.  1, 

Minucius  Rufus,  M.,  8,  87,  90,  92, 

94,  X01-106 
Minucius  Rufus,  Q.,  consul  B.C.  T94, 

18,    12 

Minucius   Thermus,  Q.,  consul   B.C. 

183.  21,  46 
Minucius    lliermus,     L.,    legate    in 

Egypt.  88.  8 
Misdes,  a  Carthaginian  ambassador, 

86.  3 

Miscnum,  a  promontory  in  Campania, 
84,  II 

Mithridates  IV.,  king  of  Cappadocia 
on  the  Pontus  from  about  B.C.  242 
to  about  B.C.  190  ;  4.  56  ;  6,  43. 
90 ;  8.  22 

Mithridates  V.,  son  of  Phamaces  I., 
king  of  Cappadocia  circ,  B.C.  154- 
120,  26,  2  ;  88.  12 

Mithridates,  nephew  of  Antiochus  the 
Great,  and  grandfather  of  the  pre- 
ceding, 8.  25 

Mithridates,  Satrap  of  Armenia,  26.  2 

Mitylene,  a  city  in  Lesbos.  11,  4 

Mnascas,  of  Argos,  18,  14 

Mnasiadcs,  of  Argos,  an   athlete,   6, 

64 
Mnasilochus,  of   Acamania,    21.   17. 

45 
Mnasippus,  of  Coronea,  80,  13  ;  82, 

20 
Mncsis.  a  flute  girl,  14.  11 
Moagetes,  tyrant  of  Cibyra,  21,  34 
Mob-rule,  6,  4  ;  9.  5 
Mochyrinus,  81,  27 
Mocissus,  a  town  in  Cappadocia,  24. 

8 
Moeragenes,     guardian    of     Ptolemy 

Epiphanes,  16,  27-29 
Molon,  Satrap  of  Media,  6,  40-43,  61 


Molossi.  a  people  of  Epirus,  27.  x6 ; 

80,  7*  16 
Molpagoras.  tyrant  of  the  Ciani.  16. 

21 

Molycria,  a  town  in  Aetolia.  6.  94 
Monarchy^  6.  3-6,  8.  9 
Monunius.  an  lllyrian  chief.  29.  13 
Mora,  a  Spartan,  Er.  xxiv. 
Morcus,  an  ambassador  fromGenthius. 

29,  3.  II 
Morini,  a  Gallic  tribe,  84.  15 
Morzias.  a  prince  in  Paphlagonia.  26, 

2 
Mummius,  Lucius,  consul  B.C.   146. 

89,  14,  17 
Musaeum,  in  Macedonia,  87,  8 
Musaeum.  at  Tarentum.  8,  27,  29 
Musaeus,  an  ambassador  from  Anti- 
ochus the  Great,  21,  x6,  43 
Music  in  Arcadia,  4,  20,  21 
Mutina,  in  Cisalpine  Gaul  [Jidodena), 

8.  40 
Mycenae,  in  Argolis,  16,  16 
Mygdonia,  a  district  in  Mesopotamia. 

6,  51 
Myiscus,  an  officer  of  Antiochus  the 

Great,  6,  82 
Mylae,  a  city  in  Sicily,  1,  9,  23 
Mylasa,  a  city  in  Caria,   16,  24 ;  21. 

48 ;  80.  5 
Myndus,  a  city  in  Caria,  16,  12,  15 
I  Myrcanus,  a  Carthaginian,  7,  9 
Myrina,  a  city  in  Aeolis,  18,  44 
Myrrhicus,  a  Boeotian,  22.  4 
Myrtis,  of  Argos,  18,  14 
Myrtium,  a  courtesan  of  Alescandria, 

14.  II 
Myrton,  a  friend  of  Charops,  82,  20, 

21 
Mysia,  4.  50,  52  ;  6,  76,  77  ;  21.  48 
Mysteries,  the,  28,  19 
Myttistratum,  a  town  in  Sicily.  1,  24 
Myttonus,  a  Libyan,  9.  22 
Myus,  a  town  of  Ionia,  16,  24 

Nabis.  tyrant  of  Sparta,  4,  81  ;  18. 
6-8  ;  16.  13.  16,  17  ;  18,  17 ;  21, 
2,  9,  11;  88.  16.     5<"^  Apega 

Namnitae,  a  tribe  of  Transalpine  Gaul. 
84.  10 

Naragara,  a  tON^m  in  Africa,  16,  5 

Nardvas,  a  Numidian,  1,  78,  82,  84.  86 


INDEX 


6oi 


Narbo  (or  Atax),  a  river  in  Transal- 
pine Gaul  (the  Aude),  6,  37,  38  ; 
S4,  10 

Narbo  (Narbonne),  84.  6,  10 

Naucratis,  a  city  in  Egypt,  22,  7  ;  28, 
20 

Naupactus,  a  city  of  the  Aetolians 
(Lepanto),  4.  16 ;  6,  95.  102,  103; 
16,  27;  20,  xo,  13;  28,  5;  88, 
1 1 ;  fr.  Ixxxiii.  ;  the  Hollows  of,  6, 
103 

Neapolis  (Naples),  1,  20  ;  8,  91  ;  6, 

Neleus.  16,  12 

Nemean  games,  2,  70 ;  6,  loi  ;  10, 

26 ;  22,  13 
Neocaesareia,  fr.  xx. 
Neocretans,  6,  3,  65,  79 
Neolaidas,     an      ambassador     from 

Ptolemy  Philometor,  88,  8 
Neolaus,  brother  of  Molon,  6,  53,  54 
Neon,  a  Messenian,  18,  14 
Neon,  a  Boeotian,  father  of  Brachylles, 

20,  5 
Neon,  a  relation  of  the  preceding,  27, 

X.  2,  6 
Neptime,  10.  ix,  14.     See  Poseidon 
Nercobrica,  a  city  in  Spain,  86,  2 
Nereis,  daughter  of  Pyrrhus,  7,  4 
Nestor  Cropius,  27,  16 
Nesus,  a  town  in  Acamania,  9,  39 
Nicaea,  a  town  in  Locris,  10,  42  ;  18, 

I.  7 
Nicagoras,  of  Messene,  6,  37,  38 
Nicagoras,  of  Rhodes.  28,  2,  16 
Nicander,  Aetolian  Strategus  B.C.  190, 

20,  10  ;  21,    25,    27,   30 ;  27,  X5  ; 

28.  4,  6 
Nicander,  of  Rhodes,  18,  2,  x6 
Nicanor,  assassin  of  Seleucus  III.,  4, 

48 
Nicanor,  an  officer  of  Philip  V.,  16, 

27 
Nicanor  Elephantus,  18.  24 
Nicanor,  friend  of  Demetrius  Soter, 

81,  22 
Nicanor,  son  of  Myrton,  32,  20,  21 
Nicarchus.    officer  of  Antiochus   the 

Great.  6.  68,  71,  79,  83,  85 
Nicasippus,  of  Elis,  6,  94 
Nicephorium,  a  temple  at  Pergamum, 

16,  I  ;  18.  2,  6;  82,  27 


Nicias,  of  Athens,  9,  19 

Nicias,  an  officer  of  Ptolemy  Philo- 

pator,  6.  71 
Nicias,  of  Epirus,  80.  13 
Nicippus,  of  Messene,  4,  3X 
Nicodemus.  of  Elis,  22.  3,  5 
Nicodes,  tyrant  of  Sicyon,  10,  22 
Nicolaus,  an  Aetolian,  6,  61,  66,  68, 

70 ;  10,  29 
Nicomachus,  of  Acamania,  18,  10 
Nicomachus,  of  Rhodes,  8,  17-19 
Nicomedes,  of  Cos,  10,  28 
Nicomedes,  son  of  king  Pnisias,  82, 

28 ;  87.  6 
Nicon,  of  Tarentum,  8,  26,  29,  30 
Nicon,  connexion  of  Agathocles,  16, 

25.  33 
Nicophanes,   of  Megalopolis,  2,  48, 

50 
Nicostratus,   an    Aetolian,    father  of 

Dorimachus,  4.  3 ;  9,  34  ;  18,  54 
Nicostratus,  a  secretary  of  Agathocles, 

16,  27,  28 
Nicostratus,   of  Rhodes,   16,   5  ;  29, 

10 
Nicostratus,  of  Xanthus,  26,  4 
Nile,  the,    8,   37  ;  84.  2,  X5  ;  canals 

of,  6.  62  ;  drinking  from.  fr.  xxvi 
Nisaean  cavalry,  82,  3.     See  Herod.  9, 

20 
Nola,  a  city  in  Campania  (Nola),  2, 

17 ;  8,  9X 
Nomads,   the,   a  Scythian  tribe,   11, 

34.     See  also  Apasiacae 
Noricum  (Neumark  in  Styria),  84,  10 
Nothocrates.  of  Gortyn,  28.  15 
Notium,  harboiu*  of  Colophon.  21.  48 
Numenius,  ambassador  of  the  Ptole- 
mies, 30,  17 
Numidians,   the,    1,    19,   31,  65.   74, 

77,  78:  8,  33.  44.  45.  65-73.  1X2, 

1x6,    1x7;  11,    2X  ;  14,   1-9;    16, 

9,  II,  12.     See  also  Zl,  xo  ;  88.  i 
Numisius.    Titus,    commissioner    to 

Egypt,  29,  S 
Nutria,  a  town  in  Illyria,  2,  11 

Obols,  value  of,  2,  15  ;  6,  39 
Ocean,  the,  8,.  33  ;  16^29  ;  84,  15 
Octavius,  Gnaeus,  praetor  B.C.    166, 
28.  3-5;  30.  19;  consul  B.C.   165, 
81,  12,  13,  19,  20 ;  82.  4,  6,  7 


602 


INDEX 


Odomantica,  a  district  in  Thrace,  87.  2 
Odrysae,  a  tribe  in   Thrace,  28.   8  ; 

80.  x8  ;  fr.  xi. 
Oeanthia.  acityof  theOzolianLocrians, 

*.  57  ;  «.  17 
Oenanthe,  mother  of  Agathodes,  14, 

11  ;  16.  25.  29,  33 
Oeniadae.  a  town  in  Acamania,  4.  65 ; 

9.  39  :  31.  32 
Oenis,  of  Messene.  4.  31 
Oenus,  a  river  of  Laconia.  2,  65.  66 
Ogygus,  an  ancient  king  of  Achaia,  2, 

Olana.  a  mouth  of  the  Po.  2,  16 
Olenus,  a  town  of  Achaia,  2,  41 
Oligarchy,  6,  3,  4,  8 
Olygyrtus,  a  mountain  in  Arcadia.  4, 

II,  70 
Olympia,  4,    10.   73,  75,  ^^,  84,  86 ; 

Olympic  games,  4,  73  ;  12.  4^/,  26; 

29.  9  ;  30,  10  ;  89,  17 
Olympiad,  an,  7th,  fr.  i  ;  27th,  €,  2 ; 

X24th,   2,    41,    71  ;    X29th,    1,   5 ; 

X39th,  2.  71  ;  140th.   1,   3  ;  8,   i  ; 

4.  26,  66  ;  6,  30,  105 ;  141st,  9, 
X  ;  147th,  21.  43 ;  148th,  22,  i  ; 
X49lh,  23,  X.  9 

Olympichus,  a  prince  in  Asia  Minor, 

5,  90 

Olympichus,  of  Coronea,  27,  i 
Olympieion,  at  Athens,  26,  i 
Olympiodoms,  of  Byznntium,  4.  47 
Olympion,  an  ambassador  from  Gen- 

thius,  29.  3,  4 
Olympus,     Mt,     in     Laconia     near 

Sallasia,  2,  65,  66,  69  ;  6,  24 
Olympus,  Mt. ,  in  Thessaly,  12,  26 ; 

84.  10 
Olympus,  Mt.,  in  Galatia  {Ala  Dagh), 

21.  37 

Olynthus,  a  city  in  Macedonia,  9.  28, 

33 
Omias,  of  Sparta,  4,  23  ;  24,  8 

Oncheslus,  a  river  in  Thessaly,  18,  20 

Onesi genes  of  Syracuse,  7,  4 

Onomarchus,  a  Phocian,  9,  33 

Onomastus,  governor  of  Thrace,  22, 

17,  18 
Opheltas,  of  Boeotia,  20,  6 
Opici,  a  tribe  in  Campania,  84,  11 
Opimius,    Quintus,  consul    B.C.    154, 

38,  8,  10,  13 


Oppius,  Lucius,  88,  13 
Orchomenus,  a  city  of  Arcadia,  2,  46, 

54,  55  ;  *.  6,  II,  12 
Oreium,  a  mountain  in  Ass3ma,  6,  52 
Orestae,  a  tribe  in  Macedonia,  18,  47 
Orestes.     See  Aurelius 
Orestes,  father  of  Tisamenus,  2,  41 ; 

4,  I 
Oretes,  a  Spanish  tribe,  8,  33 

Oreus,  a  city  in  Euboea,  10.  43  ;  11, 

5  ;  18.  45,  47 
Orgyssus,  a  town  in  lUjrria,  6,  108 

Orion,  the  rise  of,  1,  37 

Oroanda,  a  town  in  Pisidia,  21,  44,  46 

Orontes,  a  river  in  Syria,  6,  59 

Orontes,  a  mountain  in  Media,  10.  27 

Orophemes,  usurper  of  Cappadocia, 

8,  5  :  82.  84,  25  ;  88,  6 
Oropus,  in  Boeotia,  32,  25  ;  88,  2 
Onhosia,  a  town  in  Caria.  SO.  5 
Ortiago.  a  Gallic  chief.  21.  38  ;  22. 

21 
Ossa,  Mt.,  in  Thessaly,  84.  xo 
Ostia,  harbour  of  Rome,  fr.  v.  (6,  '2) ; 

81,  22  ;  34,  II 
Otacilius  Crassus,  Manius,  consul  B.c. 

261,  1,  20 
Oxus.  a  river  in  Asia,  10,  48 
Oxybii,  a  tribe  of  Transalpine  Gauls, 

38,  8,  10,  II 

Pachynus,    a    promontory  of  Sicily 
{Capo  Passaro),  1,  25.  42,  54  ;  7,  3 
Padoa.  a  mouth  of  the  Po.  2.  16 
Padus  (the  Po),  2.  16,  17,  23,  28,  32, 
34.  35  *.  8.  40.  61,  64,  66,  69,  75, 
86  ;  6,    29  ;  10,    3  ;   34,  10  ;    the 
valley  or  plain  of.  2,  19,  35  ;  8,  39, 
44,  47.  48,  54,  56,  61 
Paeanium,  a  town  in  Aetolia,  4,  65 
Paeonia,  a  district  near  Macedonia,  6, 

97 ;  28,  10 
Palatine,  the,  fr.  iii. 
Pale,  a  town  in  Cephallenia,  6.  3,  5. 

16,  17,  100 
Pallas,  son  of  Hercules  and   Pallan- 

tium,  fr.  iii. 
Pamisus,  a  river  in  Messenia,  16,  16 
Pamphia,  a  hamlet  in  Aetolia,  6.  8,  13 
Pamphilidas,  of  Rhodes,  21.  7,  10 
Pamphylia,  6,  34.  72.  77  >  21,  35.  43, 
48  ;  82, 4 


INDEX 


603 


Panachaicum,  a  mountain  in  Achaia, 

5,  30 
Panaetolus,  an  officer  of  Antiochus  the 

Great,  6,  30 
Panathenaea,  the,  28,  19 
Pan-boeotii,  4,  3 ;  9,  34 
Panchaea,  a  fobulous  island  of  Arabia 

Felix,  84,  5 
Pancrates,  of  Rhodes,  28,  16 
Pancrates,  tyrant  of  Cibyra,  80.  9 
Pangaeum,  a  mountain  in  Thrace,  22, 

8 
Panic,  a,  6,  96,  100 
Panium,  a  mount n in   in   Coele-Syria 

(part  of  Lebanon),  16,  x8  ;  28,  i 
Panormus,  a  town  in  Sicily,  1,  ax,  24, 

38-40,  55,  56 
Pantacnotus,  of  Abydus,  16,  30 
Pantaleon,    an    Aetolian,    father    of 

Archidamus,  4,  57 
Pantaleon,  an  Aetolian  ambassador, 

20,  9 :  a«,  4 

Pantauchus,  son  of  Balacrus,  27,  8  ; 

ao,  3,  4 

Panteus,  of  Sparta,  6,  37 

Paphlagonia,  26,  a 

Papiria,  wife  of  Macedonicus,  mother 

of  the  younger  Africanus,  82,  la,  14 
Papirius,  Gnaeus,  88,  10,  11 
Parapotamia,  a  district  in  Assyria,  6, 

48,  69 
Parmenio,  of  Lampsacus,  18,  5a 
Parmenio,  ambassador  fix>m  Genthius, 

M,  3,  " 

Parnassus,  a  mountain  in  Phocis,  4, 

57  ;  84,  10 
Parnassus,  a  city  in  Cappadocia,  24,  8 
Paropus,  a  town  in  Sicily,  1,  24 
Parthenius,  a  mountain  in  the  Pelo- 

ponnese,  4.  23 
Parthians,  the,  6,  44  ;  10.  28,  31 
Parthus,  a  city  in  Illyria,  2,  11 ;  7,  9  ; 

18.  47 
Pasiadas,  an  Achaean,  28,  12,  19 
Possum,  raisin  wine,  fr.  iv. 
Patara,  a  city  in  Lycia,  21,  46 
Patrae,  a  city  of  Achaia,  2,  41 ;  4,  6,  7, 

10,  25,  83  ;  6,  2,  3, 30,  91,  95, 101 ; 

28.  6  ;  89,  9 
Pausiras,  an  Egyptian  prince,  22,  7 
Pausistratus,  of  Rhodes,  21,  7 
Paxi,  islands,  near  Corcyra,  2.  xo 


Pedasa,  a  town  in  Caria,  18,  44 
Pednclissus,  a  city  in  Pisidia,  6,  72, 

73.  76 
Pelagonia,  a  district  in  Macedonia,  6, 

X08 
Pelecas,  a  mountain  in  Mysia,  6,  7j 
Pelion,  a  moimtain  in  Thessaly,  8,  11 ; 

84,  10 
Pella,  a  city  in  Macedonia,  4,  66  ;  29. 

4;  3*.  12 
Pella,  a  town  in  Palestine,  6,  70 
Pellene,  a  city  in  Achaia,  2,  4X,  52  ;  4, 

8,  13.  72 
Pellene,  a  town  in  Laconia,  4,  81  ;  16. 

37 
Pelopidas.  of  Thebes,  6,  43  ;  8,  i 
Peloponnese,  the,  1,  42  ;  2,  37.  43, 
44.49.  5a.  54.  60,  62  ;  4.  3.  5.  6, 8, 
9, 13,  14.  22,  32,  57.  6x,  62,  65,  66, 
70.  73.  77*  84,  87  ;  6,  I,  3,  X7,  36, 
102,  106,  no;  12.  4//;  22,  I,  10, 
13.  15  :  28,  4.  9  ;  24.  2  ;  27,  2, 
18  ;  28.  3,  7,  13  ;  29.  23  ;  80,  23 ; 

88.  3  ;  84.  6.   12  ;  87.  3  ;  88,  7  ; 

89.  2,  9,  14 

Peloponnesians,  the,  2.  37.  38.  40,  42, 
43.  49.  52,  62 ;  8.  3  ;  4,  I.  7,  32, 
67.  69,  77,  82  ;  6.  92,  106 ;  6.  49  ; 

10.  25  ;  11,   5  ;  12,  I2iz,  251  ;  18, 

11.  14  ;  88.  5 

Pelops.  of  Alexandria,  16.  25 
Pelorias,  a  promontory  of  Sicily,  1,  11, 

42 
Pelusium,  a  city  of  Egypt,  6.  62,  80  ; 

16.  25 ;  28.  18  ;  29.  27 
Penelope,  12.  26^ 
Peparethus,  island  of,  10,  42 
Peraea  Rhodionim,  a  part  of  Caria, 

18.  2,  6,  8  ;  27.  7  \  80,  24  ;  81.  26 
Pergamum  (or  Pergamos,  21.  20).  in 

Mysia,  chief  city  of  Attalus,  4,  48  ; 

6.  78 ;  16,   X  ;  21,  xo.  20 ;  24,  5. 

9  ;  82.  27  ;  88.  9 
Perge,  in  Pamphylia,  6.  72  ;  21,  44 
Pericles,  of  Athens,  9.  23 
Perigenes,  an  officer  of  Ptolemy  Philo- 

pator,  6.  68.  69 
Perinthus,    a   city   in  Thrace  on  the 

Propontis.  18.  2,  44  ;  84.  X2 
Perioeci  of  Sparta,  the,  2,  65  ;  4.  34 
Perippia  (or-ii),  6.  xoa 
Perrhaebi,  a  tribe  in  Thessaly,  f 


6o4 


INDEX 


18.  46,  47 ;  22,  I,  9,  15 ;  28,  i  ; 
28.  13  ;  80.  7 

Perseus,  son  of  Philip  V. ,  king  of  Mace- 
donia B.C.  179-168.  1,  3  ;  18,  35  ; 

22,  8  ;  intrigues  against  his  brother, 

23.  3.  7,  xo ;  beginning  of  his 
reign,  26,  3,  4,  6  ;  war  with  Rome, 
27,  i-ii,  14-16  ;  28.  I,  2,  5,  12. 
17  ;  defeated  at  Pydna,  29,  3-22, 
27  ;  80,  I,  3.  6-8,  xo,  13,  16,  18  ; 
32,  20,  21,  23  ;  in  Alba,  87,  1-3,  9. 
See  alsoZ,  3,  5,  32  ;  20,  11 ;  82, 11. 
fr.  Ixxxi. 

Persian  Gulf,  the,  6,  46,  48,  54  ;  9, 

43  ;   13,  9  {'EpvOp^L  BdXoffaa,  cp. 

Herod.  6.  20) 
Persian  Gates,  the,  at  Sardis,  7,  17, 

18 
Persians,  the,  1,  2,  6,  63  ;  2,  35  ;  3, 

6  ;  4,  31  :  6,   10,  43,  55  ;  6,  49  ; 

•.  34.  39  ;  10,  28  ;  12,  8,  20,  25/; 

16,  22  ;  22,  8  ;  29,  21  ;  39,  6 
Persis,  6,  40,  44.  54  ;  31,  11 
Pessinus,  a  city  of  Galatia,  21,  37 
Petelia,  a  town  of  Bruttium  {Strongoli), 

7,  I 
Petraeus,  of  Epinis,  4,  24  ;  6,  17  ;  21, 

26 
Petronius,  Gaius,  32,  28 
Phacus,  a  town  in  Macedonia,  31,  26 
Phaeacians,  the,  34,  9 
Phaeneas,  Aetolian  Strategus  B.C.  198, 

192,  18,  I,  3.  4.  7.  37.  38  ;  20,  9, 

10  ;  21,  25,  26,  29,  30 
Phaestus,  a  city  of  Crete,  4,  55 
Phaethon,  fall  of,  2,  16 
Phalanx,  the  Macedonian,  2,  65  ;  12, 

20,  21  ;  18,  26-28  ;  29,  17  ;  double, 

2,     66 ;     quadruple,     12,     20 ;    of 

Pyrrhus,  18,  28  ;  of  Achaeans,  11, 

11.  IS 

Phalara,  a  city  of  Thessaly,  20,  10,  11 
Phalaris,  tyrant  of  Agrigentum,  7,  7  ; 

12,  25 

Phalasama,  a  town  in  Crete,  22,  19 
Phanoteia,   a  town  in  Phocis,  6,  96  ; 

27,  16  ;  29.  12 

Pharae  (or  Pharaea),  a  city  of  Achaia, 
2,  41  ;  4.  6,  7,  25,  59,  60,  77 ;  6, 

30.  94.  95 
Pharae,  a  town  of  Messenia,  16,  x6 ; 

28,  17 


Phamaces  I. ,  son  of  Mithridates  IV. , 
king  of  Cappadocia  circ.  ac.  190- 
170.  3,  3 ;  28,  9 ;  24,  i.  5.  8,  9 ; 
26,  2  ;  27,  7,  17 

Pharsalus,  a  city  of  Thessaly,  6,  99 ; 

18,  3,  8 ;  18,  20,  38,  47 
Phanis,  island  and  town  of,  2.  11;  8, 

t8,  19  ;  6,  108  ;  7,  9.     See  Deme- 
trius 
Pharycus,  an  Aetolian.  9,  34 
Phaselis,  a  city  of  Lycia,  30,  9 
Phasis,  a  river  in  Colchis,  4.  56 
Phayllus,  an  officer  of  Achaeus,  6,  72, 

73 
Pheias,  harbour  town  in  Elis,  4,  9 

Pheidias,  the  Athenian  artist,  30,  10 

Pheneus,  a  town  in  Arcadia,  2,  52  ;  4, 

68 

Pherae,  a  city  of  Thessaly,  6,  99  ;  18, 

19,  20 

Phibotides,  a  city  of  Illyria,  6,  108 
Phigaleia,  a  city  in  Arcadia,  4,  3,   6, 

31,  79,  80  ;  6,  4 
Philaenus,   altars    of,   in  the  Greater 

Syrtis,  3,  39;  10,  40 
Philaenis,  12.  13 
Philammon,  governor  of  Libya,  under 

Ptolemy  Epiphanes,  16,  25,  26a,  33 
Philemenus,  of  Tarentum,  8,  26,  27, 

31.  3a 
Philetaerus,  son  of  Attalus  I.,  39,  7 

Philiades,  of  Messene,  18,  14 

Philinus,  historian,  1,  14,  15  ;  3,  26 

Philinus,  of  Corinth,  39,  1 1 

Philip  II.,  king  of  Macedonia,  B.C. 
360-336,  2,  41,  48;  3,  6;  6,  10; 
8.  X1-13;  9,  28,  33;  18,  14  ;  22, 
6,  8 

Philip  v.,  son  of  Demetrius  II.,  king 
of  Macedonia  B.C.  229-X79,  1,  3  ; 
his  youth  and  succession,  2,  2,  37, 
45.  70;  engages  in  the  social  war, 
4,  2,  3.  5,  9,  13,  15,  x6,  19,  22-27, 
29.  30,  34,  36,  37  ;  invades  Aetolia, 
4,  55,  57,  61-87 ;  renews  the  war 
by  sea,  attack  on  Thermus,  6,  1-30, 
34,  95.97-105.  108-xxo;  makes  a 
treaty  with  Hannibal,  7,  9,  cp.  3, 
2;  conduct  at  Messene,  7,  11; 
gets  rid  of  Aratus,  8,  3,  10- 
x6 ;  fails  in  an  attack  on  M^alo- 
polis,  9,  18  ;  his  lawless  conduct  in 


INDEX 


60s 


Greece,  9,  23,  30-32,  35-37.  4X|  42 ; 
supports  Achaeans  against  Rome, 
and  Attains,  and  Aetolians,  10,  9. 
26,  27,  41  ;  second  attack  on 
Thermus,  11,  5-7 ;  18,  3-5 ;  his 
designs  against  Ptolemy  Epiphanes, 
16,  20-25  !  defeated  at  Chius,  16, 
i-xi,  15,  22;  his  energy,  16, 
28,  29 ;  war  with  Rome,  16, 
34'35i  38  >  attends  conference  at 
Nicaea,  18,  1-12  ;  battle  of  Cyno- 
scephalae,  18,  27,  33,  36-39,  41-48, 
50,  51,  54 ;  supports  the  Romans 
against  Antiochus,  20,  5,  7,  11.  See 
also  21,  2,  n,  23,  25,  31  ;  22,  i, 
8.  9.  13.  '5.  17  ;  M,  1-3,  7-10 ; 
24.  12;  26,  3;  27,  15;  82,  27; 
87,  9  ;  fr.  xcviii.  -cii.  For  his 
change  of  character  see  4,  7jt  81  ; 
7.  12,  14  ;  9,  23 

Philip,  adopted  son  of  Perseus,  87,  2 

Philip,  an  Achaean,  80,  13 

Philip,  an  ambassador  of  Perseus,  27, 

4 
Philip,  a  companion  of  Antiochus  the 

Great,  6,  82 
Philippopolis,  a  city  in  Thessaly,  6, 

100 
Phillidas,  an  Aetolian,  4,  77-80 
Philodes,  friend  of  Philip  V. ,  16,  24  ; 

22,  18 ;  28,  I,  3 
Philocrates,  of  Rhodes,  80,  4 
Philodemus,  of  Argos,  7,  2 
Philomdum,  a  city  in  Phrygia,  21,  35 
Philomehis,  of  Phocis,  9,  32 
Philon,  of  Cnossus,  6,  65 
Philon,  friend  of  Agathocles,  14,  11  ; 

1*.  30.  33 
Philon,  of  Chalcis,  21,  17,  45  ;  28.  28, 

2,  16  ;  80.  4.  22 
Philon,  of  Thessaly,  89,  10 
Philophron,  of  Rhodes,  22,  5 ;  27.  14 
Philopoemen,  of  Megalopolis,  Achaean 
Strategus  ac   206,  204,  201,   192, 
189-188,183;  completes  the  work  of 
Aratus,  2,  40  ;  at  Uie  battle  of  Sal- 
lasia,  2, 67-69 ;  his  education  and  re- 
forms, 10, 21-24  ;  13L.  9-18  ;  invades 
Laconia,  16,  36,  37  ;  goes  to  defend 
Megara,  20,  6 ;    refuses  a  present 
from  the  Spartans,  20,  12  ;  restores 
some  Spartan  exiles,   21,  41  ;  22, 


15 ;     accused    at    Rome,    22,    3 ; 
hostile  steps  against  Boeotia,  22,  4  ; 
his    error    about    the   treaty    with 
Ptolemy,     22.     12 ;     his  policy  in 
Sparta  blamed  by  Caecilius,  22,  13  ; 
his  conduct  to  Archon,  22,  14  ;  his 
Spartan    policy    discussed    in    the 
Roman  Senate,  22,   16  ;  enmity  of 
Flamininus  to,  28,  5;  joins  in  re- 
fusing to  summon  a  meeting  of  the 
league,  ib,  ;  captured  by  the  Mes- 
senians  and  put  to  death,  28,  12, 
16 ;   his  character,  24,   13-15  ;  his 
statues  spared  by  Mummius,  89,  14 
Philostratus,  of  Rhodes,  16,  5 
Philostratus,  of  Epirus,  27,  t6 
Philoteria,  a  town  in  Palestine,  8,  70 
Philotis,  mother  of  Charops,  82.  20 
Philoxenus,  a  poet  and  musician,  4, 

20 
Phlegraean  plains,  the,  2,  17 ;  8,  91 
Phlius,  a  city  in  the  Peloponnese,  2, 

44,  52,  67  ;  4.  67 
Pbocaea,  a  city  in  Ionia,  8,  77  ;  21,  6, 

48 
Phocis,  4,  9,  15,  25,  55  ;  8,  24,   26, 
28,  96  ;   16.  32  ;  18,   10,  46,  47 ; 
88,  5  ;  89.  9 
Phoebidas,  of  Sparta,  4,  27 
Phoenice,  a  town  in  Epirus,  2,  5,  6, 

8  ;  16,  27  ;  82,  2T,  26 
Phoenicia,  a  district  in  Asia,  8,  2  ;  8, 

59,  66,  67,  87  ;  8,  19 
Phoetiae,  a  town  in  Acamania,  4.  63 
Pholeus,  in  MegalopoUs,  9,  18 
Phoxidas,  of  Melitaea,  6,  63,  65,  82, 

85 
Phrixa,  a  town  in  Triphylia,  4,  77, 

80 
Phrygia,   6.   57  ;  on  the  Hellespont. 

21,  22,  48  ;  the  greater,  21,  48 
Phthiotid  Thebes.     See  Thebes 
Phthiotis,  Achaeans  of,  in  Thessaly, 

18,  46,  47.     See  also  18,  20 
Phylarchus,  the  historian,  2,  56-63 
Phyromachus,  a  statuary,  82,  27 
Physsias,  of  Elis,  6,  94 
Phytaeum,  a  town  in  Aetolia,  8,  7 
Phyxium.  a  place  in  Elis,  6,  95 
Picenus  ager,  2,  21  ;  8,  86 
Pictones,  a  tribe  of  Transalpine  Gauls, 

84,  10 


6o6 


INDEX 


Pieria,  a  region  in  Macedonia,  4,  6a 

Pieria,  a  r^on  in  Syria,  84.  15 

Pinarus,  a  river  in  Cilicia,  12,  17,  x 8 

Pindar,  quoted.  4,  31 

Piraeus,  the,  16,  25 

Pisae,  in  Etruria  {Pisa),  2,  16,  27,  28; 

8,  41.  56.  96 
Pisantini,  an  Illyrian  tribe,  6,  108 
Pisatis.  a  district  in  the  Pelopoanese, 

4,74 
Pisidia,  6,  57,  72,  73  ;  21,  22 
Pisistratus,  of  Boeotia,  18,  43 
Pissaeum,  a  town  in   Macedonia,  5, 

108 
Plains,  the  Great  (near  Carthage),  14, 

7,  8  ;  the  Fair,  in  Armenia,  8,  25 
Placentia  {Placenta),  8,  40,  66,  74  ; 

83.  II 
Platanus,  a  fortress  in  Phoenicia,  5, 

68 
Plato,  6,  5,  45,  47 ;  7,  13  ;  12,  28 
Plator,  an  officer  of  Philip  V. ,  4,  55 
Plator,  brother  of  Genthius,  29,  13 
Pleiads,  the,  3,  54  ;  4.   37  I  *.  i  I  •» 

18 
Pleuratus.  an  Illyrian,  father  of  Agron 

and  Sccrdilaidas,  2,  2 
Pleuratus,  son  of  Scerdilaidas,  father 
of  Genthius,  10,  41  ;  18,  47  ;  21, 
II.  21  ;  82.  18 
Pleuratus,  an  Illyrian  exile,  28,  8 
PoUmarch,  the,  in  the  Peloponnese,  4, 
18 ;  9.  17  ;  at  Cynaetha,  4,  18  ;  at 
Phigaleia,  4,  79 
Polemarchus,  of  Arsinoe,  18,  10 
Polemocles,  of  Rhodes,  4,  52,  53 
Polcmocrates,  a  courtier  of  Perseus, 

29,  4,  8 
Poliasium,  in  Laconia,  16,  16 
Polichna,  a  town  in  Laconia,  4,  36 
Polyaenus,  of  Cyprus,  11,  18 
Polyaenus,  an  Achaean,  28,  6 
Polyaratus,  of  Rhodes,  27,  7,  14  ;  28, 

2  ;  29,  27  ;  30,  6,  7,  9 
Polybius,  of  M^[alopolis  (not  the  his- 
torian), 11,  15 
Polybius,  of  Megalopolis,  son  of 
Lycortas,  the  historian :  writes  to 
instruct  the  Greeks  and  of  contem- 
])orary  events  or  those  immediately 
preceding  him,  1.  3,  4 ;  4,  2 ;  ex- 
tent and  scope  of  his  history,  3,  32  ; 


his  authorities  for  the  Hannibalian 
war,  8,  48  ;  his  travels,  8,  59  ;  in- 
terviews with  Massanissa,  9.  25  ; 
his  code  of  signals,  10,  45  ;  his 
visits  to  Locri  E^izephyrii,  18,  5 ;  to 
Sardis,  81,  38 ;  writes  to  Zeno  of 
Rhodes,  16.  20 ;  ambassador  to 
Ptolemy  Epiphanes  B.C.  181.  24, 
6 ;  accused  of  hostility  to  Rome, 
28,  3 ;  hipparch,  28,  6 ;  speech  on 
the  honours  of  Eumenes,  28,  7 ; 
ambassador  to  Marcius  Philippus, 
28.  13,  14 ;  invited  to  Alexandria, 
89,  23-26 ;  advice  to  Demetrius 
Soter  in  Rome  (b.c  i6a),  81.  19- 
21  ;  his  intimacy  with  Scipio 
Aemilianus,  82,  8-16 ;  visits  Alex- 
andria, 84,  14  ;  tries  to  influence 
Cato,  85,  5  ;  pleads  in  the  Senate, 
86,  6 ;  sent  for  by  the  Consul 
Manius  Manilius,  87,  3 ;  the  only 
man  so  called,  87,  4,  but  see  11, 
15  ;  his  view  of  Providence,  87,  9  ; 
at  the  siege  and  capture  of  Carthage, 
39,3 ;  at  the  burning  of  Corinth,  39. 
13  ;  saves  the  statues  of  Philopoe- 
men,  89,  14 ;  refuses  confiscated 
goods,  39,  15  ;  employed  in  settle- 
ment of  Achaia,  89.  x6 ;  his  fond- 
ness for  hunting.  31.  22  ;  82.  15 

Polycletus,  of  Cyrene,  7,  2 

Polycrates,  of  Argos,  5,  64,  65,  82, 
84  ;  15,  29  ;  18,  54,  55 ;  22,  7 

Polycritus,  an  Aetolian,  9,  34 

Polymedes.  of  A^um,  5,  17 

Polyphontes,  an  officer  of  Philip  V. , 
10,  42 

Polyphontes,  of  Sparta,  4,  22 

Polyrrhenii,  a  city  in  Crete,  4,  53,  55, 
61 

Polyxenidas,  of  Rhodes,  10,  29 

Pompides,  a  Theban,  27.  a 

Pontus,  the.    See  Euxine ;  Pontic  fish, 
81.  24  ;  Cap[)adocia  on  the  Pontus, 

».  43 

Popilius  Laenas,  Gaius,   consul  B.C. 

172,  158,  28,  3-5  ;  29,  2,  27 ;  80, 

9.  17 
Popilius    Laenas,    Marcus   (?  consul 

B.C.  139).  88,  10 
Popilius  I^aenas,  the  younger  (?  con- 
sul B.C.  132),  88,  19 


INDEX 


607 


Porcius  Cato,  M..  31.  24  ;  86,  6 ; 
86.  8  ;  37.  6 ;  39.  la 

Porphyrion,  a  town  in  Phoenicia,  6, 
68 

Poseidon,  7. 9;  temple  of.  at  Mantinea. 
9,  8,  34 ;  at  Taenanun,  9,  34 ; 
near  Miletus,  16,  12 

Postumius  Albinus  Megellus,  L. ,  con- 
sul B.C.  262,  1,  17-19 

Postumius  Albinus,  L.,  consul  B.C. 
229,  2,  XI,  12;  8,  106,  118 
(wrongly  called  Aulus  in  2,  ix) 

Postumius  Albinus,  Aulus,  consul  B.  c. 
180,  25,  6  ;  27,  3 

Postumius  Albinus,  Aulus,  consul  B.C. 
151,  83.  I.  13 ;  86.  3 ;  89,  12 

Pothine,  a  flute  girl,  14.  x  i 

Pothion,  of  Rhodes,  22,  5 

Pound,  weight  of  a  Roman,  21,  45 

Praeneste,  in  Latium  {PaUstrinaY  6, 

Praetorium,  6.  27,  33,  35,  41 
Praetutianus  ager,  in  Picenum,  8.  88 
Prasiae,  a  town  in  Laconia,  4,  36 
Pration,  a  Rhodian,  28.  23 
Priene,  a  city  of  Ionia,  38,  6 
Prinassus,  a  city  of  Caria,  16,  11 
Prion.     See  Saw 

Proagoras,  of  Megalopolis,  18.  8 
Proander,  an  Aetolian,  26,  4 
Prolans,  of  Sicyon,  4,  72 
Pronni,  harbour  of  Cephallenia,  6,  3 
Propontis,  the  (Sea  of  Marmora),  4. 

39'  43>  44 ;  16,  29  ;  22,  18 
Propus,  a  place  in  Arcadia,  4,  1 1 
Prusias  I.,  king  of  Bithjrnia  ctrc,  B.C. 
220-z8o.   8,    2  ;  4,   47-5^  I  *.   77> 
90,  III 
Prusias  II.,  son  of  preceding,  king  of 
Bithynia  B.C.  179-149,  3,  3,  5 ;  16, 
23  ;  W,  4,  s.  44 ;  21,  II ;  22.  11, 
20 ;  28.  1,3;  26.  2  ;  30,  19 ;  31, 
6,  9;  82,  3,  5,  27,  28;  88,  1.  9,  12, 
13  :  87,  6 
Prytanis,  a  Peripatetic  philosopher,  6, 

93 
Prytanis^  a  magistrate  at  Rhodes,  22, 

5 
Pseudo-Philip,  87,  i,  2,  9 

Psophis,  a  city  in  Arcadia,  4,  68-73 

Ptolemais,  a  city  in  Phoenicia,  4,  37  ; 

6,  61,  62,  71 


Ptolemy  Ceraunus,  king  of  Thrace 
and  Macedonia  B.c.  281-280,  son 
of  Ptolemy  I.  of  Egypt,  2,  41  ;  9, 

35 
Ptolemy   I.,  son   of  I..agus.  king  of 

Egypt  B.C.  323-285,  1,  63  ;  2.  41, 

71,  67 
Ptolemy   II.,    Philadelphus,    king  of 

Egypt  B.C.  286-247,  14,   XI ;   16, 

25  ;  81.  17 ;  fr.  xxvi. 
Ptolemy    III.,    Euergetes,     king    of 

Egypt  B.C.  247-222,  2.  47,  51,  63. 

71  ;  4,  I  ;  6.  34,  35,  58  ;  16,  25 ; 

29,  24 
Ptolemy    IV.,     Philopator,    king    of 

Egypt  RC.  222-205,  1.  3  ;  2,  71  ; 

3.  2  ;  4,  2,  30.   37,   51  ;  6.  1.  31, 

34.  36.  38-40.  42.  45.  55.  57.  58, 
61-68,  70,  79-87.  89,  100,  105- 
X07  ;  8.  17  ;  9,  44 ;  11.  4 »  1*. 
II,   12  ;  16,  20.  25,  34  ;    18,   i  ; 

27,  9  ;  39,  19 

Ptolemy  V. .  Epiphanes,  king  of  Egypt 
B.C.  205-181.  8.  2  ;  16,  20,  25-32; 
16.  22.  27,  34,  39  ;  18.  1,  47,  49- 
5^.  54.  55  ;  22,  1.  3.  6,  7,  10,  12, 
22 ;  24,  6  ;  28.  i,  20 

Ptolemy  VI.,  Philometor,  king  of 
Egypt  B.C.   X81-146,  27.    13,    19  ; 

28,  I,  12,  17,  23  ;  29.  23-27  ;  80, 
9.  17  ;  81.  4.  18,  20,  22,  27,  28  ; 
82.  X  ;  33,  8  ;  89.  18 

Ptolemy  VII.,  Physcon,  brother  of 
preceding,  joint  king  B.c.  170-154, 
king  of  Cyrene  B.C.  154-146,  sole 
king  B.C.  146-117.  28.  19.  20.  21  ; 

29,  23-25,  27 ;  80,  17  ;  81,  18,  26- 
28  ;  82.  X  ;  88.  8  ;  34.  14 

Ptolemy,  son  of  Aeropus,  an  Aetolian, 
16.  x8 

Ptolemy,  son  of  Agesarchus  of  Mega- 
lopolis, 16,  25  ;  18,  55  ;  27,  13 

Ptolemy,  son  of  Eumenes.  18,  53 

Ptolemy,  a  courtier  of  Philip  V.,  6, 
25,  26 

Ptolemy,  commandant  of  Alexandria, 

6.  39 
Ptolemy,  a  rhetorician.  28.   19  ;   81, 

28 
Ptolemy,  son  of  Sosibius,  16,  25  ;  16, 

22 
Ptolemy  Sympetesis,  81,  27 


6o8 


INDEX 


Ptolemy,  son  of  Thraseas,  5,  6x 
Publicius  Malleolus,  Lucius,  37,  6 
Punic  army.  1,  19;  11,  19;  strength 

and  courage  compared  with  Italian, 

6,  52  ;  stratagem,  8,  78 
Pupius,  Lucius,  88,  10 
Puteoli  (Dicaearchia\  a  city  in  Cam- 
pania (Possuoli),  8.  91 
I^lon,  on  the  Via  Egnatia,  84,  12 
Pylus,  a  town  in  Messenia,  4,  16,  25; 

9,  38  ;  18.  42 
I^yrenees,  the,  8.  35,  37,  39-41 ;  10. 

39,  40  ;  84,  7.  xo 
Pyrgus,  a  town  of  Triphylia,  4,  77,  80 
Pyrrhias,  an  Aetolian,  5.  30,  91,  92 
I^rrhicus,  put  to  death  by  Philip  V. , 

23.  10 
Pyrrhus,  palace  of,  at  Ambracia,  21. 

27  ;    camp  of,  in  Laconia,  5,   19. 

Sff  also  1,  6,  7,  23  ;  2,  20,  41  ;  8. 

25  ;  32,  2  ;  7.  4 ;   8.  26 ;    12,  4. 

25*  ;  18.  3.  28  ;  fr.  xi. 
Pythagoreans,  the,  2,  39 
Pytheas,  a  traveller  and  writer,  84,  5, 

10 
I*ytheas,  of  Thebes,  89,  7,  9 
Pyihia,  the,  10,  2 
Pythiades,  an  officer  of  Antiochus  the 

Great,  6.  46 
Pythias,  of  Pellene,  4,  72 
Pythion,  a  spy,  18,  5 
Pyihionicus,  tomb  of,  at  Tarentum. 

8,  30 
Pytho,  an  ambassador  from  Prusias, 

81,  6 
Pythodorus,  of  Lampsacus,  18,  52 

Quaestor,  the,  6,  13,  31,  32,  35 
Quinctius  Crispinus,  Titus,  consul  B.C. 

208,  10,  32 
Quinctius  Flamininus,  T.,  consul  B.C. 

198,  18.    1-12,    18-27,    33,  34,  36- 

39,  42-47,  50 ;  20,  7 ;  21,  30 ;  22, 

4.   13  ;  28.  3-5  ;  27,   15 ;  declares 

Greece  free,  18,  46 
Quinctius  Flamininus,  Lucius,  consul 

B.C.  192.  21,  32 
Quinctius  Flamininus,   Titus  (son  of 

Titus  above),  consul  B.C.  150,  88,  10 
Quintus,  commissioner  to  Egypt,  81. 

18  ;  and  to  Rhodes,  83,  15 
Quirinus,  8.  25 


Rabbatamana      (Philadelphia),      a 

town  in  Palestine,  6,  71 
Rhaeti,  an  Alpine  tribe,  84,  10 
Rhaphia,  a  town  in  Palestine.  0,  80, 

85.  86,  107 
Rhaucus,  a  town  in  Crete,  22.  19 ; 

81.  I 
Rhegium,  a  city  of  Bruttium  [Ifeggic), 

1,  6-8,  10;  8,  26  ;  6.   no  ;  9,   7, 

9.  27  ;  10,  I 
Rhigosages,  mercenary  Gauls.  6.  53 
Rhinocolura,  a  town  of  Egypt,  6.  80 
Rhium,    promontory  and  harbour  of 

Achaia,  4.   10,   19.  26 ;  5.   28-30 ; 

12,   12a ;  Aetolian  Rhium   (AtUir- 

rhium),  6,  94 
Rhium,  the  strait  between  Rhium  and 

Antirrhium,  4,  64 
Rhizon,  a  city  in  Illyria,  2,  iz 
Rhodes,  island  of,  4,  50 ;  18,  5 ;  16, 

34,   35  ;  22.    5  ;  26,    4-6  :    28,    2, 

16,  17,  23;  29.   3,  4,  II.  19;  80, 

5,  7-9  ;    32,    4 ;     earthquake    at. 

6,  88  -  90 ;     Rhodians,    8,    2,    3  ; 

4.  19.  37.  47-53.  56;  5,  24,  28. 
63,  88-90,  100  ;  9.  27  ;  11.  4  ;  IS. 
4,   5  ;    15,   22,   23 :    16,  4-10,   14. 

15,  24.  26.  28,  30.  31,  34.  35  ;  18. 

1,  2,  6.  8,  52  ;  21,  7,  10,   17,    18. 

22,  24,  25,  29-31,  45,  48 ;  22,  s  ; 

23,  9  ;  26,  4.  5  ;  27,   3.  4.  7  ;  28, 

2,  16,  23;  29,  3.  4,  10,  II,  19; 
30,  4-9,  20,  22  ;  31,  2,  3,  6.  7,  15, 

16,  25,  26  ;  38,  4,  6,  13,  15,  16. 
17  ;  Rhodian  magistrates,  navarch, 
30,  5  ;  prytanies,  13.  5  ;  16.  23  ; 
22,  5  ;  27,  7  ;  29.  10 ;  their  at- 
tempts to  end  the  Social  War,  5, 

24,  100 ;  11,  4  ;  accept  money  for 
the  cost  of  education,  31,  25 

Rhodon,  of  Phocaea,  21.  6 
Rhodope,  mountain.  Thrace.  34.  10 
Rhodophon,   of  Rhodes,   27.   7  ;  28, 

2  ;  80,  5 
Rhone,  the,  2,  15,  22.  34 ;  3,  35.  37, 

39,  41-49,  60,  61,  64,  76  ;  34,  10 
Rhositeles,  of  Sicyon,  22.  3 
Rhyncus,  in  Aetolia,  6,  59 
Romans,  their  language,  29.^  20 ;  their 

character,  1,  20.  55,  59,  64  ;  8,  3  ; 

28.  8  ;  82.  9  ;  their  treatment  of  the 

conquered.  18.  37  ;  their  ceremonies 


INDEX 


609 


in  proclaiming  war,  13.  3  ;  their 
Jidts,  20,  9  ;  36,  4  ;  their  desire 
for  wealth,  32,  za,  13  ;  Roman 
constitution,  6.  xi-42;  compared 
with  others,  €.  43-56.  See  also  1, 
3,  64  ;  3,  2,  118  ;  5,  iii  ;  6,  47, 
50.  51-58  ;  8,  3  ;  10,  16 ;  21,  13. 
Their  readiness  in  adopting  improve- 
ments, 6,  25  ;  fr.  xxvii.  ;  their  in- 
corruptibility, 6,  56 ;  decline  in  their 
character,  18,  35  ;  32,  1 1  ;  cp.  37, 
I ;  Magistrates,  see  dictator,  consul, 
tribune,  aedile 
Roman  Empire,  extent  of,  1,  2 ; 
how  acquired,  1,  3,  64 ;  18,  28  ; 
the  first  step  out  of  Italy,  1,  5, 
1 1 ;  effect  of  their  eastern  conquests, 

18,35 

Roman  Army,  €,   19-42  ;  the  legion, 

I,  16,  26  ;  2,  24  ;  3,  72,  107;  6, 
19-21,  26,  30;  10,  16;  28,  17; 
enrolment  of,  6,  19,  26  ;  officers  of, 
military  tribunes,  6,  19-21,  27,  33, 
37  ;  centurions,  6,  24,  30,  36,  41  ; 
equites  in,  3,   107  ;  6,  19,  20,  25, 

II,  21  ;  pedites  in,  3,  107  ;  €,  19. 
21  ;  velites,  6,  21,  22,  24,  33,  35  ; 
11,  22-24,  3a  :  15,  9  ;  hastati,  6. 
21,  23,  29,  33  ;  15,  9  ;  principes, 
6,  21,  23,  29,  33 ;  triarii,  6, 
ai,   23,    29,  33,  cp.   1,  26  ;  socii, 

I,  24  ;  3,  72,  107  ;  6.  13, 
3Z,  26.  30 ;  10,  16  ;  extraordi- 
narii,  6,  26,  31  ;  maniples.  6,  24 ; 

II,  23  ;  arms  of,  galea,  6,  22,  23  ; 
gladius,  2,  30,  33  ;  6,  23  ;  lorica, 
6,  23,  25  ;  pilum,  1,  40  ;  6,  23  ; 
scutum,  2,  30  ;  6,  23-51  ;  compared 
with  those  of  the  Macedonians,  18, 
38-32.  5^tfa/j^2,  33  ;  13,  3.  Line 
of  battle  compared  with  the  Mace- 
donian, ib. ;  camp,  formation  of,  €, 

27-37,  41,  42  / 

Roman  fleet,  the  first,  1,'*^20 ;  its  in- 
crease, 1/  25  ;  rapid  building  of,  1, 
38,  f52  ;  its  destruction,  1,'  52  ; 
another  built,  1,^59  ;  losses  of,  in  the 
first  Punic  war,  1,^63 

Rome,  foundation  of,  fr.  i ;  captured 
by  the  Gauls.  1,  6  ;  2,  x8  ;  crowns 
in  honour  of,  32.  3.  24  ;  colossal 
statue  to,  at  Rhodes,  31,  15 

VOL.  II 


Ruscinus.  (or  -o),  a  river  in  Gaul  (TV/), 
34,  10 

Sabines,  the,  2,  24 

Sagalassus,  a  city  in  Pisidia,  21.  36 

Saguntum,  a  city  in  Spain,  8,  6,  8,  14- 

17,  20,  ai,   29,  30,  61,  97-99 ;  4, 

28,  37,  66  ;  15,  17 
Sais,  a  city  in  Egypt,  22.  7 
Salassi,  an  Alpine  tribe  {Val d^ Aosia), 

34,  xo 
Salii,  the,  21,  13 

Sallentini,  a  tribe  in  Calabria,  34,  15 
Salutis  via,  at  Tarentum,  8.  35 
Samaria,  city  and  district  in  Palestine, 

5.  71  ;   16,  39 
Sambucae,  siege  engines,  8,  6-8 
Samicum,  a  town  in  Triphylia,  4,  77, 

80 
Samnites,  the,  1,  6  ;   2,  19  ;  3,  90-92 ; 

8.  5 

Samos,  island  of,  3,  a  ;   6,  35  ;   16, 

2;  21,8 
Samothrace,  an  island  in  the  Aegean, 

28,  2X  ;   29,  8 
Samus,  a  poet.  5,  9  ;  23,  10 
Sangarius,    a    river    of   Asia    Minor 

(Sakari),  21,  37 
Saperda,  in  Pisidia,  5,  72 
Sarapieium,  in  Thrace,  4,  39 
Sardanapalus,  king  of  Assyria,  8,  12; 

37.  7 
Sardinia,  1,  2,  10,  24,  43.  79,  82,  83, 

88  ;   2,  23,  27  ;   3,  10,  13,  15,  22- 

24.27,28,  30.  75.  96;  12.  4r:  34,8 
Sardinian  sea,  the.  1,  10,  42 ;  2,  14 ; 

3,  37.  41,  47;  34,  6 
Sardis,  in  Lydia,  5,  77  ;  7,  15-18  ;  8, 

17,  23  ;  21,    II,   13,   16,  38  ;   29, 
12  ;  31.  10 

Sarissae,  Macedonian  spears,  12,  20  ; 

18,  26.  29 

Sarsina,  a  town  in  Umbria  {Sarsina), 

2,  24 
Sason,  an  island  off  lUyria.  5,  xio 
Saspiri,  an  Asian  tribe.  6,  44 
Saticn,  a  town  in  Illyria,  6,  108 
Satrapeii.  an  Asian  tribe,  5.  44 
Satyrus,  of  Ilium,  22,  5 
Satyrus,  an  Achaean,  31,  6 
Saw,  the.  a  place  in   Sardis,  1,   15  ; 

another  in  Libya,  1,  85 


6io 


INDEX 


Scardus,  a  mountain  in  lUyria,  28,  8 
Scerdilaidas,  an  Illyrian  general,  2,  5. 

6  ;  4,  16,  29  ;  5,  3,  4.  95,  loi,  108,  \ 

no  ;  10.  41 
Science,  progress  of,  10,  12 
Scipio.     See  Cornelius.     Cp.  34,  10  ; 

pedigree  of,  vol.  ii.   p.  456.      See 

also  fr.  xc-xciii. 
Scironian  rocks,  the,  16,  16 
Scodra,  a  town  in  Illyria,  28,  8 
Scopas,  an  Aetolian,  4,   5,  6,  9,  14, 

16,  19,  27,  37,  62  ;\5,  3,   II  ;  18, 

I,  2  ;  15,  25  ;  16,  18,  19,  39  ;  18, 

53-55 
Scopium,  near  Phthiotid  Thebes,  6,  99 

Scorpions,  name  for  cross-bows,  8,  7 

Scotitas,  a  forest  in  Laconia,  16,  37 

Scotusa,  a  town  in  Thessaly,  10,  42  ; 

18,  20 
Scurvy,  the,  3,  87 
Scylla,    34,    2,     3  ;     promontory    of 

{Scilla),  84,  2,  3 
Scyron,  of  Messenia,  4,  4 
Scythian  colonnade  at  Syracuse,  8,  5 
Scythians,  the,  4,  43  ;  9,  34 
Scythopolis,  a  city  in  Palestine,  6,  70 
Segesama,  a  town  in  Si>ain,  34,  9 
Segesta,  a  city  in  Sicily,  1,  24 
Seleucia  Pieria  (Seleucia  on  the  sea), 

a  town  in  Syria,  6,  58-61,  66,  67  ; 

84,  IS 
Seleucia,  on  the  Tigris,  6,  45,  46,  48, 

54  :  13.'  9 
Seleucia,  in  Mesopotamia,  6,  43 
Seleucus  I.,   Nicanor,   king   of  Syria 

B.C.   306-280,  2.  41,  71;    6.    67; 

10.  27  ;  18,  51  ;  28,  20  ;  31,  7 
Seleucus  II.,  Callinicus,  sonof  Antiochus 

I.,  king  of  Syria  B.C.  246-226,  2, 

71  ;  4,  48,  51  ;  5,  40,  89  ;  8,  22 
Seleucus   III.,  Ceraunus,  son  of  the 

preceding,  king  of  Syria  b.c.  226- 

223,  2,  71 ;  4»  I.  2.  48  ;  8. 34. 40. 

41 
Seleuciis  IV.,  Philopator,  son  of  Anti- 
ochus the  Great,  king  of  Syria  B.C. 
188-175, 18,  51  ;  21,  6,  8,  10  :  22, 
I,  10-13  ;  28.  5  ;  31.  12 
Selge,  a  city  in  Pisidia,  6,  72-77  ;  31, 9 
Selinus,  a  city  in  Sicily,  1,  39 
Sellasia,  a  town  in  Laconia,  2,  65  ;  4, 
69  ;  16,  16,  37 


Selybria.  a  city  in  Thrace,  18,  49 
Sempronius   Blaesus,    Gaius,    consul 

B.C.  253,  1,  39 
Sempronius,  Longus,  Ti.,  consul  B.C. 

218,  8.  40.  41.  61,  68-75  ;  *'  66 ; 

6,  I 
Sempronius,  Gracchus,  Ti.,  consul B.c. 

215,  213,  8,  I 
Sempronius,    Gracchus,    Ti.,    consul 

B.C.   177,  son-in-law  of  Africanus, 

22,    9,  note  \    26,   i,    4  ;   31,   5-7, 

9,  14,  23  ;  32,  3-5.  13  ;  35,  a 
Sena,  a  Roman  colony  in  Cisalpine 

Gaul  (Sinigaglia),  2,  14,   16,   19  ; 

34,  II 
Senate,  the  Roman,  3,  20  ;  6,  13,  16, 

17  ;  the  Spartan,  4.  35  ;  6.  45 
Senones,  a  tribe  of  Cisalpine  Gauls, 

2,  17,  19,  20 
Sentinum,  a  town  in  Umbria  (Sentino), 

2,  19 
Serapis,  4,  39 
Sergius,  Lucius,  15,  i,  2 
Sergius,  Manius,  31,  9 

Serippus.  a  Lacedaemonian,  23,  4,  9 
Servilius  Caepio,  Gnacus,  consul  B.C. 

253.  1.  39 
Servilius  Caepio,  Gnaeus,  consul  B.c. 

203.  14   I 
Servilius     Geminus,    Gnaeus.    consul 

B.C.  217,  3,  75,  77,  86,  88,96,97, 

106,  107,  114,  116  • 
Servilius     Geminus,    Gnaeus,    consul 

B.C.  203,  14,  I 
ServiUus  Glaucid,  31.  23 
Sestus,  a  city  in  Thrace,  4,  44,   50 ; 

16.  29  ;  18,  2 ;  34.  7 
Sibyrtus,  of  Epirus,  21,  26 
Sicca,  a  town  near  Carthage,  1,  66,  67 
Sicily,  the  war  for,  1,   13,  63,  83  ;  3, 

3,  9,  21,  22,  25.  27,  32.  37  ;  5,  33  ; 
39.  19 ;  its  position,  1,  42.  See 
also  1,  2,  5,  8.  10,  II,  16-74,  83; 
2,  I,  24.  36,  37,  43  :  3,  3,  13,  21- 
29.  32,  75.  96,  108 ;  5.  33  ;  12,  4, 
25^,  26^;  28,  2;  84,  2-4,  II,  15  ; 
36.  5  ;  89,  19 

Sicilian  Strait,  the,  1,   7,  11.  20,  21, 

38,  49  ;  10,  i;  5,  no  ;  84,  6 
Sicilian  medimnus,  2, 15 ;  9,  44 ;  34,  8 
Sicilian  Sea,  the,  1,  42  ;  2,  14,  16  ;  4, 
63 ;  5,  3,  5  ;  10.  1  :  12,  4  ;  34,  11 


INDEX 


6ii 


Sicilians,  the,  1,  i6 ;  2,  20  ;  8,  2  ;  6, 

104  ;  12,  5,  6  ;  24,  xs 
Sicyon.  a  city  in  Achaia,  2,  43,  52, 

54  ;  *.  8,  13,  57,  67,  68  ;  5,  i,  27  ; 

10.  22  ;  18,  16  ;  28,   17  ;  28,   13  ; 

29.  24  ;  80.  10.  23 
Sida,  a  city  of  Pisidia,  5.  73 ;  31,  26 
Sidon,  a  city  in  Phoenicia,  6,  69,  70 
Signals  by  fire,  10,  43-47  ;  cp.  1,  19  ; 

8,  30 
Silver,  value  of,  compared  with  gold, 

21.  32.    Attic,  21.  32,  45 ;  mines  of, 

in  Spain,  3.  57  ;  10,  10  ;  24,  9 
Simias,  an  Achaean,  11,  18 
Simon,  a  Boeotian,  22,  4 
Simonidcs,  of  Ceos,  29,  26 
Sinda,  a  town  of  Pisidia,  21,  35 
Sinope,  a  city  of  Paphlagonia,  4,  56, 

57  ;  28,  9 
Sinuessa,  acity  in  'LBX\Mm(Mondragone), 

8.  91 
Sipontum,    a  city  in   Apulia,  on  the 

Adriatic  (Sta.   Maria  di  Siponto), 

10.  I 
Sirynx,  a  city  in  Hyrcania,  10,  31 
Six-banked  ships,  1,  26  ;  fr.  xvii. 
Smyrna,  a  city  in  Ionia,  5,  77  ;  18, 

52  ;  21,  13,  14.  17,  22,  48 
Socrates,  a  Boeotian,  6,  63,  65,  82 
Socrates,  a  trainer,  27,  7 
Soli,  a  city  in  Cilicia,  21,  24 
Solon,  a  Macedonian,  27.  6 
Sophagascnus,  an  Indian  king,  11,  34 
Sosander,  friend  of  Attalus  II.,    82. 

27 
Sosibius,  a  friend   of  Ptolemy  Philo- 

pator,  5.  35-38.  63,  65-67,   83,  85. 

87  ;  8,  17-19  ;  W.  25,  32,  34 
Sosibius,  son  of  the  preceding,  15,  32  ; 

16,  22 
Sosicrates,  Achaean  sul>>Strategus,  89, 

II 
Sosigenes,  of  Rhodes,  28,  7 
Sosiphancs,   ambassador   from    Anti- 

ochus  Epiphanes,  28,  i,  22 
Sostratus,  a  statuary,  4.  78 
Sostratus,  of  Calchcdon,  8,  24 
Sosylus,  an  historian,  3.  20 
Sparta.    See  Lacedaemon 
Spendius,  a  leader  in  the  mercenary 

war,  1,  69,  70,  76-80.  82,  84,  86 
Stade,  a,  8.  39  ;  34.  12  note 


Stair,  the,  a  pass  near  Selge  in  Pisidia, 

6,  72 
Stasinus,  a  poet,  28,  10 
Stephanus,  of  Athens,  32,  17 
Stertinius,  Lucius,  18,  48I 
Sthembanus,  son  of  Massanissa,    87, 

10 
Sthenclaus,  of  Sparta.  4,  22 
Stratius,  of  Tritaea,  28,  6  ;  82,  7 ;  88, 

II  ;  39,  10 
Stratius,  a  physician,  80,  2 
Strato,  of  Lampsacus,  12,  25^ 
Stratocles,  prytanis  of  Rhodes,  27,  7 
Stratonicca,  a  city  in  Caria,  80,  22 ; 

31,  7 
Stratus,  a  city  in  Acarnania,  4,  63,  64  ; 

5,  6,  7,  13,  14,  96  ;  6,  59;  18,  10 
Stratus,  a  town  in  ^\rcadia,  4,  73 
Strymon,  the,  river  in  Thrace,  37,  2 
Stubera,  a  town  in  Macedonia,  28,  8 
Stylangium,  a  town  in  Triphylia,  4, 

77,  80 
Stymphalus,  a  city  in  Arcadia,  2,  55  ; 

4,  68,  69 
Sub-strategus^  the  Achaean,  6,  94 
Suffete,  a  Carthaginian  magistrate,  3, 

33.  42  :  6.  51 
Sulpicius    Patcrculus,    Gaius,    consul 

B.C.  258,  1,  24 
Sulpicius  Galba,  Publius,  consul  ac. 

211,  200,   8,  3  ;  9,  6,  7,  42  ;  10, 

41  ;  16,  24;  18,  23  ;  22,  11 
Sulpicius  Gallus,  Gciius,  81,  9,  10 
Sunium,  promontory  of  Attica,  34,  7 
Susa,  capital  of  Susiana,  6, 48 ;  Susiana, 

5»  46.  52.  54 
Sybaris,  a  city  of  Magna  Graecia,  2, 

39  ;  7,  I 
Sycurium,  a  town  in  Thessaly,  27,  8 
Syleium,  a  city  in  Phrygia,  21,  34 
Synes,  near  Messene  in  Sicily,  1,  11 
Syphax,  king  of  Numidia,  11,  24  ;  14, 

1-9  ;    15,  3-5  ;   16,   23.     His  wife 

Sophanisba,  14.  i,  7 
Syracuse,  1,  8-12,  15,  16,  43,  52-54, 

62  ;  5.  88  ;  8,  5-9.  37  ;  9.  10,  19  ; 

12,  4^/,  15,  23,  25,  26 ;  15,  35 
Syria,  2,  71;  3,   5;  4,  2,  48;  5,  36; 

43.  57.  58.  85.  87  ;  9.  43  ;  12,  17  : 
21.  46  ;  28,  I,  20  ;  29.  27  ;  31.  11, 

13.  19-21  ;  32,  6  ;  33.  19  ;  84.  i""  • 
39,  18.  19 


6l2 


INDEX 


Sjrrinx,  a  covered  w-ay  at  Alexandria, 

16.  30,  31 
Syrinx,  a  to^^'n  in  Hyrcania,  10,  3X 
Syrtes,  the,  12,  i  ;  the  greater  Syrtis, 

8.   39  ;  the  lesser,  1,   39  ;    8,  23  ; 

82,  2  ;  84.  15 

Tabae,  a  city  in  Persia,  81,  11 
Taenanim,  a  promontory  of  Laconia 

(C  Matapan),  5,  19  ;  9,  34 
Tagae,  a  city  in  Parthia,  10.  29 
Tagus.  river  in  Spain,   8,  14  ;  10.  7, 

39  ;  84,  7 
Talent  (weight),  4,  56  ;  5,  89  ;  9,  41  ; 

See  84.  8  note 
Talent  (money),  5,  89  ;  22,  12.    See 

Euboic,  Attic 
Tambrax,  a  town  in  Hyrcania,  10,  31 
Tanais  (the  Don),  8,  37.  38  ;  S4,  5, 

7  ;  confused  with  the  Jaxartes,  10. 

48 
Tannetus,  a  hamlet  in  Cisalpine  Gaul, 

3,  40 

Tantalus,  4,  45 

Tapuri,a  Median  tribe,  5, 44 ;  Tapuria, 

10,  49 

Tarentincs,  i.e.  mercenary  cavalry,  4, 

77  ;  11.  12  ;  16,  18 
Tarentum,  a  city  in  Italy  ( Taranto\  1, 

6,  20;  2,  24;  8,  75.    118;  8.   26- 

36  ;  9.  9;  10.  I  :  18.  4  ;  29.  12 
Tarquinius  Priscus  (6.  2).  fr.  vi. 
Tarracina,  a  city  in  Latium  ( Terra- 

cina),  8.  22,  24 
Tarrjico.  a  city  in  Spain  ( Tarragona), 

3,  76.  95  :  10,  20.  34.  40  ;  11,  33 
Tarseium,  a  town  in  Spain  (  Tartessus), 

3,  24,  33 
Taurini,  a  Gallic  tribe  in  the  valley  of 

the  Po.  3,  60  ;  34.  10 
Taurion.  minister  of  Philip  V.,  4.  6, 

10.  19,  80,  87  ;  5.  27.  92,  95,  103; 

8.  14  :  9,  23 
Taurisci,  an  Alpine  tribe,  2.  1$,  28,  30 
Taurisci  Norici,  a  tribe  near  Aquilcia, 

34,  10 
Taurus,   mountain  in  Asia  Minor.  4. 

48;  6.  40.  41.  107.  109*.  10,  28  ; 
as  a  boundary  of  Asia  from  Syria 
and  other  kingdoms,  3.  3  ;  4.  2. 
48  :  5.  40.  77 ;  8,  22  ;  11,  34  ;  21, 
14.  17.  21,  24,  43,  48 


Taygetus,  mountain  in  the  Pelopon- 

nese,  84.  10 
Teanum   Sidicinuro,  a   city  in  Cam- 
pania {Teano),  3,  91 
Tectosages,   a  Gallic    tribe    in  Asia 

Minor,  21,  39 
Tegea,  a  city  in  Arcadia,  2.  46,  54, 
58,  70  ;  4,  22,  23,   82  ;  6,   17,  18, 
20,  24.  92  ;  9.  28  ;  11.  II,  18;  16, 
17.  36,  37  ;  18,  14 ;  38,  8,  9 
Tegean  gate  at  Messene,  16.  17 
Telamon,   on   the  coast    of    Etniria 

( Telamone),  2,  27 
Teleas,     an     ambassador    of    King 

Euthydemus,  11,  34 
Telecles,  of  Aegium,  82,  7  ;  88,  i 
Telecles,  of  Megalopolis,  38,  3 
Teledamus,  of  Argos,  18,  14 
Tclemnastus,  of  Crete,  29,  4 ;  88,  16 
Telephus,  of  Rhodes,  29,  10 
Telmissus,  a  city  of  Lycia,  21.  48 
Telocritus.  an  Achaean,  28,  12 
Telphusa,  a  city  in  Arcadia.   2.   54  ; 

4.  60.  77 
Temenid  gates  at  Tarentum,  8.  27. 

30 
Temnus,  a  city  in  Aeolis,  5,  77  ;  82, 

27 
Tempe,  in  Thessaly,  18.  27,   33,  36, 

48  ;  22.  I 
Tenedos,  island  of,  16.  34  ;  27,  7 
Teos,  a  city  in  Ionia,  6,  77 
Terentius  Varro,  Gaius,   consul    ac 

216,  3.  106,  110-117  ;  6,  108 
Terentius.  Lucius,  18.  48,  50 
Termcssus,  a  city  in  IMsidia,  21,  35 
Tetrapyrgia.  in  C>Tene,  31.  27 
Teuta.  queen  of  Illyria.  2,  4.  6,  8,  9, 

II.    12 

Thalamac.  a  town  in  Laconia.  16,  16 
Thalamae.  a  fort  in  Elis.  4,  75,  84 
Thasos.  island    of.  16,  24  ;    18.  44, 

48.  50 
Theactctus,  of   Rhodes.    22,  5  ;    27, 

14  ;  28.  2,  16  ;  29,  11  ;  30.  5.  22 
Thearches,  of  Cleitor,  2.  55 
Thearidas.  an  Achaean,  82.  17  ;  38, 

8 
Thebc.  a  city  in  Mysia,  16,  1  ;  21,  10 
Thebes,  in  Boeotia,  2,  39.  62  ;  4.  23. 

27,  31  ;  6.   10.   27,  28  ;  9,   8.   28, 

34,  39  ;  12,  25 ;  20,  5.   7 ;  27,  i. 


INDEX 


613 


a.   5;  38,  3;    38,  4;    39,  9,   12; 

constitution  of,  6,  43 
Thebes,  Phthiotid,  in  Thessaly,  5,  99- 

loi  ;  18,  3,  8,  19,  38,  47 
Themison,  an  officer  of  Antiochus  the 

Great,  6,  79,  82 
Themistes,  of  Alexandria  Troas,  5, 

III 
Themistocles,  of  Athens,  6,  44 
Themistocles,  an  officer  of  Achaeus, 

8.  77 
Theodectes,  an  Achaean,  39,  10 

Theodoridas,  of  Sicyon,  22,  3  ;    29, 

23 
Theodonis,  a  Boeotian  flute  -  player, 

80.  14 
Theodotus.  an  Aetolian,  4,  37 ;  5,  40, 

46,  61,  62,  66,  67,  79,  81  ;  7,  16, 

18 
Theodotus  Hemiolius,  5,  42,  43,  45, 

59,  68,  69,  71,  79,  83,  87 
Theodotus,  of  Epirus,  27,  16  ;  30,  7 
Theodotus,  of  Pherae,  18,  10 
Theogeiton,  a  Boeotian,  18,  14 
Theognetus,  of  Abydus,  16.  33 
Theophanes,  of  Rhodes,  33.  16 
Theophiliscus,  of  Rhodes,  16,  2,  4,  5, 

9 

Theophrastus,  a  Peripatetic  philoso- 
pher, 12,  II,  23 

Theopompus,  of  Chios,  historian,  8, 
11-13  ;  12,  4«,  25,  27 ;  16,  12 

Theopompus,  a  flute-player,  80,  14 

Theoprosopon,  a  promontory  in 
Phoenicia,  6,  68 

Theotimus,  a  friend  of  Orophemes,  82, 

as 
Theris,    ambassador  from  Antiochus 

Epiphanes.  28.  20 
Thermae    (or    Therma),  a    town    in 

Sicily,  1,  24,  39 
Thermopylae,  2,  52  ;  10,  41 
Thermus,    capital    of    the    Aetolian 

League,  6,   6-9,    13,   18 ;    7.    13 ; 

9,  30 ;  11,  7  ;  28,  3  ;    assembUes 

at.  6.  8  ;  18.  48  ;  28,  4 
Thersitae,  a  tribe  in  Spain,  3,  33 
Thersites.  12,  26^ 
Thesmophoreium,  temple  of  Demeter, 

15,  29,  33 
Thespiae,  a  city  in  Boeotia,  27,  i 

Thcssalians,  4,  9,  76  ;  9,  28,  33,  38  ; 


11,  5  ;  16,  32  ;  18,  3.  11.  46,  47  5 
22,  I,   9  ;  23,  I  ;  26,  6  ;    SO,  7  '. 
87,   2  ;    ThessaUan  cavalry,  4,  8  ; 
18,  22 
Thessalonica,    a   city  in    Macedonia, 

22,  I.  15  ;  29,  4  ;  34,  7.  xa 
Thessaly,  2,  49,   52  ;  4,  57,  61,  62, 

66.  67 ;  6.  5,  17,  26,  29,  99,  100  ; 
18,  3,  14,  27,  38  ;  20.  13  ;  22,  i  ; 

27.  16  ;    28,  3,   12,   13 ;   29,   19 ; 
39,  2 

Thestia    (or    Thestieis),    a    town    in 

Aetolia,  5,  7 
Thetis,  temple  of,  at  Pharsalus,  18, 

20,  21 
Thoas,  an  Aetolian,  21,   17,  31,  45 ; 

28,  4 

Thoas,  an  agent  between  Perseus  and 

Rhodes,  80,  8 
Thrace,  4,  39,  44,  45  ;    5,  34.  74  *. 

18,  49  ;  22,  15,  17  ;  23,  8  ;  24,  3; 

34,  7,  10  ;  Greek  cities  in,  9,  28  ; 

18,  48,  51 ;  22,  I,  9.  17 ;  28.  8 
Thracians,    the,    mercenaries,   5,  65. 

79,  82  ;  31,  3.     See  also  4.  38,  45, 

46,  51,  66  ;  6,  7  ;  8.  24 ;  10,  41  ; 

18,  4,  22,  37  ;  21,  49  ;  22,  17.  18; 

23,  10  ;  34,  7  ;  39,  2 
Thraseas,  an  Alexandrian,  5,  65 
Thrason,  of  Syracuse,  7,  2 
Thrasycrates,  of  Rhodes,  11,  4 
Thrasylochus  of  Messene,  18,  14 
Thrasymene   Lake,    the,    8,    82,  84, 

108  ;  6,  loi  ;  16,  11 
Thronium,  a  city  of  the  Epicnemidian 

Locrians,  9,  41  ;  18,  9 
Thucydides,  the  historian,  8,  13 
Thule,  island  of.  34.  5 
Thuria,  a  town  in  Messenia,  23,  17 
Thurii,  in  Magna  Graecia,  8,  26  ;  10, 

I 
Thyateira,  a  town  in  Lydia,  16,   1  ; 

32.  27 
Thyestes,  of  Sparta,  4,  22 
Thyreum,  a  \owti   in  Arcadia,  4,  6, 

25  ;  18,  10  ;  21,  29  ;  28,  5 
Tiber,   the,   6,   2,    55  ;   81,   20,    22  ; 

36,  2 
Tiboetes,  uncle  of  Prusias  I. ,  4,  50-52 
Tibur  {Tivcli),  6.  14 
Ticinus.  a  river  in  Cisalpine  Gaul,  8, 

64  ;  34,  10 


6 14 


INDEX 


Tigris,  the,  6,  45,  46,  48,  51,  52 
Timaeus,  of  Tauromenium  in  Sicily, 

the  historian,  1,  5  ;  2.  16  ;  8,  12  ; 

criticism  of,  12,  3-15,  23-28  ;   84, 

10 ;  89,  19 
Timaeus.  an  Aetolian,  4,  34  ;  9,  34 
Timagoras,  a  Rhodian  admiral,  27 1  7 
Timagoras,  another  Rhodian,  a  cap- 
tain of  a  vessel,  27,  7 
Timarchus,  a  Cretan,  4,  53 
Timocrates,  of  Pellene,  18,  17 
Timolas,  of  Boeotia,  18.  14 
Timolaus,  of  Sparta,  20,  12 
Timoleon,    of  Corinth,    12,    23,   25, 

25*.  26 
Timotheus,  ambassador  from  Ptolemy 

Philometor,  28,  i 
Timotheus,    ambassador    from    Oro- 

phemes,  82,  24 
Timotheus,  of  Miletus,  4,  20 
Timoxenus,  Achaean   Stratcgus  B.c. 

ai6,  2,  S3  ;  4,  6,  7,  82  ;  6,  xo6 
Tisaeus,  Mt.,  in  Thcssaly,  10,  42 
Tisamenus,  king  of  Achaia,  2,41  ;  4,  i 
Tisippus,  an  Aetolian,  80,  13 
Titti,  a  Spanish  tribe,  86,  2 
Tium,  a  city  in  Bithynia,  26.  2 
Tlepolcmus,  commandant  of  Pelusium, 

16,  25-27,  29;  16.  21,  22 
Tlepolemus,  ambassador  from  Ptolemy 

Physcon,  28,  19 
Tolistobogii,  a  tribe  in    Galatia,  21, 

37 
Tbrches,      See    Signals ;     used    for 

starting  horse  races,  fr.  Ixiv. 
Torus,  a  hill  near  Agrigentum,  1,  19 
Tower,  the,  6,  102.     See  Perippia. 
Tragiscus,  of  Tarcntum*  8.  29,  30 
Tragyrium,  a  city  in  Illyria,  82,  18 
Tralles,  a  city  in  Caria,  21,  48 
Trebia,  a  river  in  Cisalpine  Gaul.  8. 

67-69,  72  ;  battle  of,  8,  72-74,  108; 

16.  II 
Trench,  the,  in  Messenia,  4.  33 
Triarii.     See  Roman  Army 
Tribuni  militura.     See  Roman  Army  ; 

Tribuni  plebi,  8,  87 ;    6,  12,   16  ; 

30.  4 
Trichonium,  a  town  in  Aetolia,  5,  7 
Trichonian  lake,  the.  in  Aetolia,  6,  7; 

11.  7 

Trieres,  a  to^^^l  in  Phoenicia,  5,  68 


Trigaboli,  at  the  head  of  the  delta  of 

the  Po,  2,  16 
Triphylia,  a  district  in  the  Pelopon- 

nese,  4.  77 1 79-8 1 ;  5, 27 ;  18, 42, 47 
Triphylus,  son  of  Areas,  4,  77 
Tripolis,  a  district  of  Laconia,  4,  81 
Tritaea,  a  city  of  Achaia,  2,  41 ;  4, 

6.  59 ;  5,  95 
Triton,  7,  9 
-Triumph,    a,    6.     15.       5^    3,     19 

(PauUus)  ;  4,  66 ;  11,  33  (Scipio)  ; 

21,   24  (L.  and  P.  Scipio  and  L. 

Aemilius)  ;  80,  14  (L.  Anicius) 
Troas,  5,  ixi.     5^  Alexandria 
Trocmi.  a  tribe  of  Galatia,  81,  13 
Troezen,  a  city  of  Argolis,  2,  52 
Trojan  war,  the,  84,  2 ;  Trojans,  the, 

12,  4^ 
Tunes,  a  city  in  Africa  ( Tunis),  1,  30, 

67.  69,  73,  76,  77,  79,  84-86 ;  14, 

10 ;  16,  I 
Turdetani,  a  Spanish  tribe,  84,  9 
Turduli,  a  Spanish  tribe,  34,  9 
Tychaeus,  a  Numidian,  16,  3 
Tychon,   officer     of    Antiochus    the 

Great,  8,  54 
Tylis,  a  town  in  Thrace,  4,  46 
Tylus,  an  island  in  the  Arabian  Gulf. 

18,  9 
Tyndaris,  a  city  in  Sicily,  1,  25,  27 
Typaneae,  a  town  in  Triphylia,  4,  77- 

79 
Tyranny,  6,  1 1 ;  6,  3,  7.  8 
Tyrrhenian  Sea,  1,  10  ;  2,  14,  16;  8, 

61,  no ;  84.  6,  10 
Tyre,  3.  24  ;  4,  37  ;  6,  61,  62,  70 ; 

16.  22  ;  31,  20 

Ulysses,   9,    16 ;   12.  27  ;  34,   2-4  ; 

86.  6 
Umbrians,  the,  2,  16,  24 ;  3,  86 
Utica,  a  city  of  Africa,  i,  70,   73-76. 

82,  83,  88  ;  14.  1-3,  6-10  ;  16.  2  ; 

86,  3,  6  ;  38.  X 

Vaccaei,  a  Spanish  tribe,  3,  5,  14  ; 

34.  9 
Vadinioniim  Lake,  the.  in  Etruria,  2, 20 
Valerius  Haccus,  L.,  consul  b.c.  261. 

1,  20 
Valerius  Flaccus,  L. ,  consul  B.C.  195, 

20.  9,  10 


INDEX 


6is 


Valerius  Laevinus,  M. ,  consul  B.C. 
2IO,  8,  3  ;  9,  27  ;  21,  29 

Valerius  Laevinus,  C. ,  son  of  the  pre- 
ceding,  consul  suff.   B.C.   176,  21, 

29.  31 
Valerius   Maximus  Messala,   Manius, 

consul  B.C  263,  1,  16,  17 

Velia,  a  city  in  Lucania,  1,  20 

Vclites.     See  Roman  Army 

Veneti,  a  tribe  of  Cisalpine  Gauls,  2. 

17,  18,  23,  24 

Venusia,  a  city  of  Apulia,  3,  90,  116, 

117 
Verbanus  lacus  (La^  Magi^ore)^^,  10 
Vesta,  6,  93 

Vestini,  a  people  of  central  Italy,  2,  24 
Vibo,  a  town  in  Bnittium  (Hipponium, 

Bivona),  8,  88 
Villius  Tapulus,  P.,  consul  B.C.  199, 

18,  48,  50 

Vultumus,  a  river  in  Samnium,  8,  92 

Wall,  the,  a  fort  near  Dyme,  4,  59, 

Walls,  the  Two,  a  fort  in  Mysia,  6|  77 

Walls,  scribbling  on,  6,  33 
White  Rock,  the,  8,  53  ;  cp.  10,  30 

World,  divisions  of,  8,  37  ;  12,  25 

Xanthippus,  of  Sparta,  1,  32-36 
Xanthus,  Macedonian  hero,  28.  10 
Xanthus,  a  city  in  Lycia.  26,  4 
Xenarchus,  an  Achaean,  28,  4 
Xenis,  a  road  near  Mantinea,  11,  ix 
Xeno,  of  Aegium,  82,  7  ;  88,  i 
Xeno,  tyrant  of  Hermione,  2,  44 
Xeno,  of  Patrae,  28,  6 
Xeno,    an   officer    of    Antiochus   the 

Great,  6,  42,  43,  45 
Xenoetas,  an  Achaean,  6,  45-48 


Xenophanes,  of  Athens,  7,  9 
Xenophantus,  of  Rhodes,  4,  50 
Xenophon,  the  Athenian  historian,  8, 

6  ;  6,  45  ;  10,  20 
Xenophon,  of  Aegium,  18,  i,  10  ;  28, 

19 
Xerxes,  king  of  Persia,  8,  22  ;  6,  1 1 ; 

9.  38  ;  88,  4 

Xerxes,  a  prince  of  Armosata.  8,  25 

Zabdidelus,  an  Arabian,  6,  79 
Zacynthus,  island  of  (Zante),  6.  4,  102 
Zagnis,  a  mountain  in  Media,  6,  44, 

54.  55 
Zaleucus,  legislator  of  the   Locrians, 

12,  16 

Zama,  battle  of,  16,  5-16 

Zarax,  a  town  in  Laconia,  4,  36 

2^iaspa,  a  town  of  Bactriana,  10,  49 

Zarzas,  a  Libyan,  1,  84,  85 

Zelys,  of  Gortyn  in  Crete,  6,  79 

Zeno,  of  Rhodes,  an  historian,  16,  14- 

17,  20 

Zeugma,  a  bridge  of  boats  across  the 

Euphrates,  6,  43 

Zeus,  Homarius,  2,  39  ;  6,  93  ;  Idaeus, 

28,  14  ;  Lycaeus,  4,  33  ;  Olympius, 

9,  27  ;  26,   I  ;  89,  17  ;  Atabyrius, 

9,  27 ;   temple  of,  at  Selge   (Ccs- 

bedium),    6.    76 ;    precinct    of,    in 

Arcadia,    16,    12 ;    statue    of,    by 

Pheidias,  80,  10 ;  worshipped  by  the 

Carthaginians,  8,  ix  ;  7,  9.  See  also 

*.  33 ;  7,  9,  XI  ;  12,  26 ;  80,  xo 

Zeuxippus,  of  Boeotia,  18,  43  ;  22,  4 

Zeuxis,    an  officer  of  Antiochus   the 

Great,  6,   45-48,   51-54,    60.     See 

also  16,  I,  24  ;  21,  16,  X7,  24 

Zodiac,  signs  of  the,  9,  15 

Zoippus,  of  Syracuse,  7,  2 


THE   END 


Printtdby'^'  &  R.  Clark,  Edinbufgh 


ii.k. 


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Stanford,  California 


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