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THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS
1
STORIES OF POLYBIUS
RANSLATED FROM THE TEXT OF F. HULTSCH
EVELYN S. SHUCKBURGH, M.A.
IN TWO VOLUMES
VOL. II
llonnoi)
MACMILLAN AND CO.
AND NEW YORK
Ry^%
CONTENTS
BOOKS X TO XXXIX
Smaller Fragments
Appendices .
Index
i-S4>
S42-SS9
S60-568
569-61 S
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS
THE HANNIBALIAN WAR — THE RECOVERY OF TARENTUM
1. The distance from the strait and town of Rhegium to
Tarentum is more than two thousand stades; ^^^ ^^^ coss.
and that portion of the shore of Italy is en- Q. Fabiux Maii-
tirely destitute of harbours, except those of "?"" Y- Q- ™"
Tarentum : I mean the coast facing the Sicilian
sea, and verging towards Greece, which contains the most
populous barbarian tribes as well as the most famous of the
Greek cities. For the Bruttii, Lucani, some portions of the
Daunii, the Cabalii, and several others, occupy this quarter
of Italy. So again this coast is lined by the Greek cities of
Rhegium, Caulon, Locri, Croton, Metapontum, and Thurii: so
that voyagers from Sicily or from Greece to any one of these
cities are compelled to drop anchor in the harbours of
Tarentum ; and the exchange and commerce with all who
occupy this coast of Italy take place in this city. One may
judge of the excellence of its situation from the prosperity
attained by the people of Croton ; who, though only possessing
roadsteads suitable for the summer, and enjoying therefore
but a short season of mercantile activity, still have acquired
great wealth, entirely owing, it seems, to the favourable situa-
tion of their town and harbour, which yet cannot be compared
with those of Tarentum. For, even at this day, Tarentum
is in a most convenient position in respect to the harbours of
the Adriatic, and was formerly still more so. Since, from the
VOL. II B
2 THE HISTORIES OE POLYBIUS B(»ok
lapygian promontory as far as Sipontuni, every one coming
from the other side and dropping anchor at Italy always crossed
to Tarentum, and used that city for his mercantile transactions
as an emporium ; for the town of Brundisium had not yet
been founded in these times. ^ Therefore Fabius regarded
the recovery of it as of great importance, and, omitting every-
thing else, turned his whole thoughts to this. . . .
PUBLIUS CORNELIUS SCIPIO AFRICANUS IN SPAIN, B.C. 2IO-2o6
2. Being about to narrate the exploits of Publius Scipio
A common mis- ^^ Iberia, and in fact all the achievements in
take as to Scipio's his life, I think it necessary to direct my
character. readers' attention, to begin with, to his moral
and mental qualities. ^ For as he is perhaps the most illus-
trious man of any born before the present generation, every-
body seeks to know what kind of man he was, and what
advantages from natural ability or experience he enjoyed, to
account for a career so crowded with brilliant achievement ;
and yet is compelled to remain in the dark, or to entertain false
opinions, because those who write about him have not kept to
the truth. The soundness of this assertion will be rendered
evident in the course of my narrative to all who are capable of
estimating the noblest and most gallant of his exploits. Now
all other writers represent him as a man favoured by fortune,
who succeeded in his undertakings contrary to rational ex-
pectatipn, and by the mere force of circumstances. They
consider apparently such men to be, so to speak, more god-
like and worthy of admiration, than those who act in every
case by calculation. They do not seem to be aware of the
distinction between credit for good fortune and credit for
good conduct in the case of such men ; and that the former
may be assigned to any one however commonplace, while the
latter belongs to those alone who act from prudent calculation
and clear intelligence : and it is these last whom we should
look upon as the most god -like and god -beloved.
Now it seems to me that in his character and views
' The port of Brundisium was known long before. See Herod. 4, 99. The
Romans colonised the town in b.c. 244. See Livy, epit. 19.
CHARACTER OF AI-RICANUS
Publius was very bke Lycurgus the legislator of the Lacedae-
monians. For we must not suppose that it scip^a', u^e of
was from superstition that Lycurgus continu- religion compared
ally consulted the Pythian priestess in the wiihihaiof
esUblishment of the Lacedaemonian constitu- y^urp"-
tion; nor that Publius depended on dreams and ominous
words for his success in securing empire for his country. But
as both saw that the majority of mankind cannot be got to
accept contentedly what is new and strange, nor to face dangeis
with course, without some hope of divine favour, — Lycurgus,
by always supporting his own schemes by an oracular response
from the PytW, secured better acceptation and credit for his
ideas ; and Publius, by always in like manner instilling into
the minds of the vulgar an opinion of his acting on some
divine suggestion in the formation of his designs, caused
those under hia command to confront dangerous services with
greater courage and cheerfulness. But that he invariably .
acted on calculation and with foresight, and that the successful
issue of his plans was always in harmony with rational expecta-
tion, will be evident by what I am about to relate.
S. For that he vras beneficent and high-minded is ac-
knowledged ; but that he was acute, sober- scipio's lint
minded, and earnest in pursuit of his aims, exploit.
no one will admit, except those who have "-c. ai8.
lived with him, and contemplated his character, so to speak,
in broad daylight. Of such Gaius Laelius was one. He_^
took part in everything he did or said from boyhood to the
day of his death ; and he it was who convinced me of this
truth : because what he said appeared to me to be likely in
in itself^ and in harmony with the achievements of that great
man. He told me that the first brilliant exploit of Publius
was when his father fought the cavalry engagement with
Hannibal near the Padus. He was then, as it seems, eighteen
years old and on his first campaign. His father had given
him a squadron of picked cavalry for his protection ; but when
in the course of the battle he saw his father surrounded by
the enemy, with only two or three horsemen near him, and
dangerously wounded, he first tried to cheer on his own
squadron to go to his father's assistance, but when he found
4 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS book
them considerably cowed by the numbers of the enemy
surrounding them, he appears to have plunged by himself
with reckless courage into the midst of the enemy : whereupon,
his comrades being forced to charge also, the enemy were
everawed and divided their ranks to let them pass; and
Publius the elder, being thus unexpectedly saved, was the first
to address his son as his preserver in the hearing of the whole
army.^ Having gained an acknowledged reputation for bravery
by this exploit, he ever afterwards freely exposed himself
to every sort of personal danger, whenever his country rested
its hope of safety on him. And this is not the conduct of a
general who trusts to luck, but of one who has a clear head.
4, Subsequently, when his elder brother Lucius was a
candidate for the Aedileship, which is about the most honour-
able office open to a " young " man at Rome : it being the
custom for two patricians to be appointed, and there being
many candidates, for some time he did not venture to stand
for the same office as his brother. But as the
demeanour of the people that his brother would
easily obtain the office, and observing that his own popularity
with the multitude was very great, he made up his mind that the
only hope of his brother's success was that they should combine
their candidatures. He therefore resolved to act as follows :
His mother was going round to the temples and sacrificing
to the gods in behalf of his brother, and was altogether in a
state of eager cxi)ectation as to the result She was the only
parent whose wishes he had to consult; for his father was
then on his voyage to Iberia, having been appointed to command
in the war there. He therefore said to her that he had seen
the same dream twice : for he thought that he was coming home
from the Forum after being elected Aedile with his brother,
and that she met them at the door and threw her arms round
them and kissed them. His mother with true womanly feeling
exclaimed, " Oh, that I might see that day ! " He replied, " Do
you wish us to try ** ? Upon her assenting, under the idea
that he would not venture, but was only jesting on the spur
of the moment (for of course he was quite a young man), he
* Sm.'o on 3, 66.
X HIS ELECTION TO THE AEDILESHIP S
begged her to prepare him at once a white tc^a, such as it Is
the custom for candidates for office to wear.
6. His mother thought no more about it : but Fublius,
having obtained a white toga, went to the Forum before his
mother was awake. His boldness, as well as his previous
popularity, secured him a brilliant reception from the people ;
and when he advanced to the spot assigned for candidates, and
took his place by the side of his brother, the people not only
invested him with the office, but his brother also for his sake ;
and both brothers returned home Aediles designate. The
news having been suddenly brought to their mother, she
rushed in the utmost delight to meet them at the door, and
kissed the young men in an ecstasy of joy. Accordingly
Fublius was believed by all who had heard previously about
his dream to have held commune with the gods, not merely in
his sleep, but rather in a waking vision, and by day. But in
point of fact there was no dream at all : Scipio was kind,
open-handed, and courteous, and by these means had con-
ciliated the favour of the multitude. But by a dexterous use
of the occasion, both with the people and his mother, he
obtained his purpose, and moreover got the reputation of
acting under divine inspiration. For those persons, who, from
dulness or want of experience, or idleness, can never take a
clear view of the occasions or causes or connexion of events,
are apt to give the gods and chance the credit for what is
really effected by sagacity and far-seeing calculation. I have
thought it worth while to say thus much, that my readers may
not be misled by unfounded gossip to pass over this great
man's finest and most splendid qualities, I mean his wealth of
resoiuxre and untiring diligence ; which will become still more
apparent when we come to recount his actual achievements.
6. Such was the man who now assembled the soldiers and
exhorted them not to be dismayed by the„ . ,„ ...
disaster which had befallen them. " For, said Scipio lo the
he, " Romans have never been beaten by Carlha- soldiers in Spain,
g^nians in a trial of valour. It was the result *-^- ""■
of treachery on the part of the Celtiberians, and of rash-
ness, the two commanders getting cut off from each other
owing to their trust in the alliance of these men. But now
6 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS book
these two disadvantages are on the side of the enemy : for they
are encamped at a wide distance from each other; and by
their tyrannical conduct to their allies have alienated them all,
and made them hostile to themselves. The consequence is
that some of them are already sending messages to us ; while
the rest, as soon as they dare, and see that we have crossed
the river, will gladly join us ; not so much because they have
any affection for us, as because they are eager to punish the
outrages of the Carthaginians. Most important of all is
the fact that the enemy are at variance with each other, and
will refuse to fight against us in a body, and by thus engaging
in detail will be more easily dealt with by us.'' Looking to
these facts, therefore, he bade them cross the river with con-
fidence, and undertook that he and the other officers would
see to the next step to be taken. With these words he left
his colleague, Marcus Silanus, with five hundred horse to
« . . . guard the ford, and to protect the allies oo the
Ebro, and swoops north of the river, while he himself began taking
down upon New his army across, without revealing his design
Carthage. ^^ ^^j^y ^^^ ^g ^ matter of fact he had resolved
to do nothing of what he. gave out publicly, and had made
up his mind to make a rapid attack upon the town called
Iberian Carthage. This may be looked upon as the first
and strongest proof of the judgment which I lately passed
upon him. He was now only in his twenty-seventh year : and
yet he, in the first place, undertook to accomplish what the
magnitude of the previous disasters had made the world look
upon as completely hopeless; and, in the second place, having
undertaken it, he left on one side the plain and obvious course,
and conceived and carried out a plan which was a surprise to
the enemy himself. This could only be the result of the
closest calculation.
7. The fact is that he had made minute inquiries, before
leaving Rome, both about the treason of the Celtiberians, and
o . . , , y the separation of the two Roman armies : and
Scipio s careful , , ,^ ^ . . ,./.,.,.
inquiries as to the had mferred that his fathers disaster was
state of things in entirely attributable to these^ He had not there-
Spam. fQj.g shared the popular terror of the Carthagin-
ians, nor allowed himself to be overcome by the general panic.
X HE DETERMINES TO ATTACK CARTHAGENA j
And when he subsequently heard that the allies of Rome
north of the Ebro were remaining loyal, while the Carthaginian
commanders were quarrelling with each other, and maltreating
the natives subject to ihem, he began to feei very cheerful
about his expedition, not from a blind confidence in Fortune,
but from dehberate calculation. Accordingly, when he arrived
in Iberia, he leamt, by questioning everybody and making
inquiries about the enemy from every one, that the forces of
the Carthaginians were divided into three. Mago, he was in-
formed, was lingering west of the pillars of Hercules among
the Conii ; Hasdnibal, the son of Gesco, in Lusitania, near the
mouth of the Tagus ; while the other Hasdnibal was besieging
a certain city of the Caspetani ; and none of the three were less
than ten days' march from the New Town. Now he cal-
culated that, if he decided to give the enemy battle, it would
be risking too much to do so against all three at once, be-
cause his predecessors had been beaten, and because the enemy
would vastly out-number him ; if, on the other hand, he were to
march rapidly to engage one of the three, and should then find
himself surrounded — which might happen by the one attacked
retreating, and the others coming up to his relief,— he dreaded
a disaster like that of his uncle Gnaeus and his father
Publius.
8. He therefore rejected that idea altogether: but being
informed that New Carthage was the most ini- ^e determines
portant source of supplies to the enemy and lo aitenipt
of damage to the Romans in the present war, he ^'* Carthage.
had taken the trouble to make minute inquiries about it during
the winter from those who were well informed. He leamt
that it was nearly the only town in Iberia which possessed a
harbour suitable for a fleet and naval force ; that it lay
very conveniently for the Carthaginians to make the sea
passage from Libya; that they in fact had the bulk of their
money and war material in it, as well as their hostages from
the whole of Iberia; that, most important of all, the num-
ber of fighting men garrisoning the citadei only amounted
to a thousand, — because no one would ever suppose that,
while the Carthaginians commanded nearly the whole of
Iberia, any one would conceive the idea of assaulting this
8 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS book
town ; that the other inhabitants were exceedingly numerous,
but all consisted of craftsmen, mechanics, and fisher-folk, as
far as possible removed from any knowledge of warfare. All
this he regarded as being fatal to the town, in case of the
sudden appearance of an enemy. Nor did he moreover fail
to acquaint himself with the topography of New Carthage, or
the nature of its defences, or the lie of the lagoon : but by
means of certain fishermen who had worked there he had
ascertained that the lagoon was quite shallow and fordable at
most points; and that, generally speaking, the water ebbed
every day towards evening sufficiently to secure this. These
considerations convinced him that, if he could accomplish his
purpose, he would not only damage his opponents, but gain a
considerable advantage for himself; and that, if on the other
hand he failed in effecting it, he would yet be able to secure
the safety of his men owing to his command of the sea, pro-
vided he had once made his camp secure, — and this was easy,
because of the wide dispersion of the enemy's forces. He
had therefore, during his residence in winter quarters, devoted
himself to preparing for this operation to the exclusion of
every other : and in spite of the magnitude of the idea which
he had conceived, and in spite of his youth, he concealed it
from all except Gaius Laelius, until he had himself decided to
reveal it
9. But although historians agree in attributing these cal-
culations to him ; yet, when they come to narrate their issue,
they somehow or another attribute the success obtained not
to the man and his foresight, but to the gods and to Fortune,
and that, in spite of all probability, and the evidence of those
who lived with him ; and in spite of the fact that Publius
himself in a letter addressed to Philip has distinctly set forth
that it was upon the deliberate calculations, which I have just
set forth, that he undertook the Iberian campaign generally,
and the assault upon New Carthage in particular.
However that may be, at the time specified he gave secret
instructions to Gaius Laelius, who was in corn-
Gams Laehus niand of the fleet, and who, as I have said, was
proceeds to ^, , . ^, ^ m i •
New Carthage '"^ ^"'y ^^^^ >" "^^ secret, to sail to this town ;
with the fleet, while he himself marched his army at a rapid
X TOPOGRAPHY OF CARTHAGENA 9
pace io the same direction. His force con- Scipio by land,
sisted of twenty-five thousand infantry and ^^' ^°''
two thousand five hundred cavalry ; and arriving at New
Carthage on the seventh day he pitched his camp on the
north of the town;> defended its rear by a double trench
and rampart stretching from sea to sea,* while on the side
facing the town he made absolutely no defences, for the nature
of the ground made him sufficiently secure.
But as I am now about to describe the assault and capture
of the town, I think I must explain to my readers the lie of
the surrounding country, and the position of the town itself.
10. It stands about halfway down the coast of Iberia in
a gulf which faces south-west, running about ^^ . ,
twenty stades inland, and about ten stades ^^^ c^fcige.
broad at its entrance. The whole gulf is made
a harbour by the fact that an island * lies at its mouth and thus
makes the entrance channels on each side of it exceedingly
narrow. It breaks the force of the waves also, and the whole
gulf has thus smooth water, except when south-west winds
setting down the two channels raise a surf; with all other
winds it is perfectly calm, from being so nearly landlocked.
In the recess of the gulf a mountain juts out in the form of a
Chersonese, and it is on this mountain that the city stands,
surrounded by the sea on the east and south, and on the
west by a lagoon extending so far northward that the
remaining space to the sea on the other side, to connect it
with the continent, is not more than two stades. The
city itself has a deep depression in its centre, presenting
on its south side a level approach from the sea; while the
rest of it is hemmed in by hills, two of them mountainous
and rough, three others much lower, but rocky and difficult of
ascent ; the largest of which lies on the east of the town run-
' Dr. Arnold dKlarcs fl ".itl but an impossibility thai an nrniy should have
marched the distance (not less Ihan 325 Koman miles) in n week," Livy {36.
41) accepts the slalemenl wiihoul question.
* Mr. Slrachan-DnviUson eiplains this to mean [rom the sen to the Inke. as
Scipio's linn would not have extended light round the lake to the other sea,
* Escombreta (Zio^pofila). I mu&t refer my readers 10 Mr. Strachan-
DavidsoD's appendix on TAt Silt 1/ the Spnnish Caiihage for a discussion oT
tbcie delaiU. S«e above a, 13 ; Livy. ab. ^a,
lo THE HISTORIES OF POL VBli/S book
ning out into the sea, on which stands a temple of Asclepius.
Exactly opposite this lies the western mountain in a closely-
corresponding position, on which a palace had been erected at
great cost, which it is said was built by Hasdrubal when he
was aiming at establishing royal power. The remaining three
lesser elevations bound it on the north, of which the western-
most is called the hill of Hephaestus, the next to it that of
Aletes, — who is believed to have attained divine honours from
having been the discoverer of the silver mines, — ^and the third
is called the hill of Cronus. The lagoon has been connected
with the adjoining sea artificially for the sake of the maritime
folk ; and over the channel thus cut between it and the sea a
bridge has been built, for beasts of burden and carts to bring
in provisions from the country.
1 1 . Such is the nature of this city's situation. The side
of the Roman camp which faced the city therefore was
secured, without any artificial means, by the lagoon and the
sea. The neck of land lying between these two, and con-
necting the city with the continent, Scipio did not fence off
with a stockade, although it abutted on the middle of his
camp,— either for the sake of making an impression upon the
enemy, or by way of suiting the arrangement to his own design,
— that he might have nothing to hamper the free egress and
return of his troops to and from the camp. The circuit of
the city wall was not more than twenty stades formerly, —
though I am aware that it has been stated at forty stades ;
but this is false, as I know from personal inspection and not
from mere report, — and in our day it has been still farther
contracted.
The fleet arrived to the hour, and Publius then thought it
o . . ,. , time to summon a meeting of his men and to
kScipio uiscloscs
his intention of encourage them to the undertaking by the use
assaulting of the same arguments by which he had con-
New Carthage, yi^ced himself, and which I have just now
detailed. He pointed out to them that the plan was practi-
cable ; and briefly summing up the blow which their success
would be to their enemies, and the advantage it would be to
themselves, he ended by promising crowns of gold to those
who first mounted the walls, and the usual rewards to those who
I THE ATTACK ON CARTHACENA BEGUN ii
displayed conspicuous gallantry. And finally he declared that
"Poseidon had appeared to him in his sleep, and originally
suggested his' plan to him ; and had promised to give him such
signal aid in the actual hour of battle, that his assistance should
be made manifest to all." The skilful mixture in this speech
of accurate calculation with promises of gold crowns, and a
reference to Divine Providence, created a great impression and
enthusiasm in the minds of the young soldiers.
12. Next morning he stationed ships supplied with missiles
of every sort, all along the seaboard, under the command of
Gaius Laelius ; and having told off two thousand .pj^^ assault
of his strongest men to accompany the ladder-
carriers, he begun the assault about the third hour. The
commandant of the town, Mago, divided his garrison of a
thousand men into two companies \ half he left upon the
citadel, and the rest he stationed upon the eastern hill.
Of the other inhabitants he accoutred about two thousand of
the strongest men with such arms as there were in the city,
and stationed them at the gate leading to the isthmus and
the enemy's camp : the rest he ordered to assist to the best
of their power at all points in the wall. As soon as the
bugles of Publius sounded the moment of the
assault, Mago caused those whom he had '^^fe^den"
armed to sally from the gate, feeling con-
fident that he should create a panic among the assailants
and entirely baffle their design. These men vigorously at-
tacked those of the Koman army who were drawn up opposite
the isthmus, and a sharp engagement took place accompanied
by loud cries of encouragement on both sides : the Romans in
the camp cheering on their men, and the people in the city
theirs. But the contest was an unequal one in the respect of
the facility of bringing up reserves. The Carthaginians had all
to come out by one gate, and had nearly two stades to
march before they got on the ground ; whereas the Romans
had their supports close at hand and able to come out over a
wide area ; for Publius had purposely stationed his men close
to the camp in order to induce the enemy to come out as far
as possible : being quite aware that if he succeeded in destroy-
ing these, who were so to speak the sharp edge of the uri
12 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS BO
population, universal consternation would be the result, an
no more of those in the town would have th
^^ ' courage to come out of the gate. The coi
test however for a certain time was undecided, for it was be
tween picked men on both sides ; but finally the Carthaginian
were overpowered by the superior weight of their opponents
owing to the constant reinforcements from the camp, and
turned to flight A large number of them fell in the actual
engagement, and during the retreat ; but the greater number
were trampled to death by each other as they crowded through
the gate. The city people were thrown into such a panic by
these events, that even those who were guarding the walls
fled. The Romans very nearly succeeded in forcing their
way in through the gates with the fugitives ; and of course
fixed their scaling-ladders against the wall in perfect security.
13. Meanwhile Publius, though throwing himself heartily
into the struggle, yet took all possible precautions to protect
his life. He had three men with him carrying large shields,
which they held in such a position as to completely protect
him from the side of the wall ; and accordingly he went along
the lines, or mounted on elevated ground, and contributed
greatly to the success of the day. For he was enabled to see
all that was going on, and at the same time, by being himself
in view of all, inspired great zeal in the hearts of the combat-
ants. The result was that nothing was omitted which could
contribute to the success of the battle ; but any help he
saw to be at any moment required was rapidly and thoroughly
supplied.
But though the leaders of the escalade had begun mount-
ing the walls with great spirit, they found the
^*®^J^^°^ ^® operation accompanied by some danger: not
so much from the number of the defenders, as
from the height of the wails. The defenders accordingly
plucked up courage considerably when they saw the distress of
the assailants : for some of the ladders were breaking under
the weight of the numbers which, owing to their length, were on
them at the same time ; while on others the first to mount
turned giddy owing to their great height, and without requiring
much resistance from the defenders threw themselves from
X DOUBLE ASSAULT BY THE ROMANS 13
the Udders : and when beams, or anything of that sort, were
hurled upon ihero from the battlements, they were swept olT
en masse and fell to the ground. In spite however of these
difficulties nothing could check the zeal and fury of the
Roman attack ; but as the (irst fell their place was always
taken at once by the next in order. And now, as the day was
far advanced, and the soldiers were worn out with fatigue,
Scipio sounded a recall for the assaulting party.
14. The men in the town were accordingly in high spirits
at having, as they thought, repulsed the assault, xowaris evening
But Scipio, who was conscious that the time Scipio renews ihe
was now approaching for the ebb of the lagoon, ^^sauii on ihe
had five hundred men stationed ready by itSg^J^ijonf^i^is
edge with ladders ; and meanwhile massed some aiiBck by way
fresh soldiers upon the gate and isthmus, and, "' '*'^ lagoon.
after urging them to undertake the work, furnished them with
a larger number of ladders than before : so that the wall was
almost covered with men scaling it. When the signal for
attack was sounded, and the men placed their ladders against
the wall, and b^an ascending at every point, the excitement
and consternation inside the walls was extreme ; for when
they thought themselves released from the threatened danger,
they saw it beginning all over again by another assault Be-
sides, their missiles were beginning to fall short ; and the
number of men they had lost greatly disheartened them. Still,
though they were in great distress, they continued the defence
as well as they could.
Just when the struggle at the ladders was at its hottest the
ebb of the tide began. The water began gradu- .
ally to leave the edges of the lagoon, and the the'fagi^^d
current ran with such violence, and in such a geis his mm
mass through its channel into the adjoining "po" ihe wau.
sea, that to those who were unprepared for the sight it ap-
peared incredible. Being provided with guides, Scipio at
once ordered his men, who had been stationed ready for this
service, to step in and to fear nothing. His was a nature especi-
ally fitted to inspire courage and sympathy with his own
feelings. So now the men at once obeyed him, and when
the army saw them racing each other across the marsh
14 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS boo
could not but suppose that the movement was a kind o
heaven-sent inspiration. This reminded them of the refereno
Scipio had made to Poseidon, and the promises contained it
his harangue : and their enthusiasm rose to such a height that
they locked their shields above their heads, and, charging up
to the gate, they began trying to hew their way through the
panels of the doors with their axes and hatchets.
Meanwhile the party which had crossed the marsh had ap-
proached the wall. They found the battlements unguarded :
and therefore, not only fixed their ladders against the wall,
but actually mounted and took it without striking a blow ; for
the attention of the garrison was distracted to other points,
especially to the isthmus and the gate leading to it, and they
never expected that the enemy were likely to attack on the
side of the lagoon : besides, and above all, there was such
disorderly shouting, and such a scene of confusion within the
wall, that they could neither hear nor see to any purpose.
15. As soon as they found themselves in possession of
The city entered ^^^ ^all, the Romans began making their
and given up to way along the top of it, hurling off such of
the sword, ^j^^ enemy as they met, the nature of
their arms being especially suited for an operation of that
sort But when they arrived at the gate they descended and
began cutting through the bolts, while those without began
forcing their way in, and those who were mounting the walls
in the direction of the isthmus, beginning by this time to get
the better of their opponents, were getting a footing on the
battlements. Thus the walls were finally in possession of the
enemy : and the troops, which entered by the gate, carried the
eastern hill and drove off the garrison occupying it
When Scipio thought that a sufficient number of troops
had entered the town, he gave leave to the larger number of
them to attack those in it, according to the Roman custom,
with directions to kill everything they met, and to spare
nothing; and not to begin looting until they got the order
to do so. The object of this is, I suppose, to strike terror.
Accordingly, one may often see in towns captured by the
Romans, not only human beings who have been put to the
sword, but even dogs cloven down the middle, and the limbs
X CAKTHAGENA CAPTUA'BD AND LOOTED 15
of Other animals hewn off. On this occasion the amount of
such slaughter was exceedingly great, because of the numbers
included in the city,
Scipto himself with about a thousand men now pressed on
towards the citadel. When he arrived there,
Magoat firet thought of resistance; but after- "^heeU^ei"'
wards, when he was satisfied that the city
was completely in the power of the enemy, he sent to
demand a promise of his life, and then surrendered. This
being concluded, the signal was given to stop the slaughter :
whereupon the soldiers left off slaying, and ,. , , .
turned to plunder. When night fell those of ^ ° ^ "^^'
the soldiers to whom this duty had been assigned remained
in the camp, wbile Scipio with his thousand men bivouacked
in the citadel ; and summoning the rest from the dwelling-
houses by means of the 'i'ribunes, he ordered them to collect
all their booty into the market-place by maniples, and to
take up their quarters for the night by these several heaps.
He then summoned the light-armed from the camp, and
stationed them upon the eastern hill.
Thus did the Romans become masters of Carthage in
Iberia.
16. Next morning the baggage of those who had served
in the Carthaginian ranks, as well as the pro-
perty of the city-folk and the craftsmen, having cusioms in ihe
been collected together in the market-place, diiinbiuionof
the Tribunes divided it according to the Roman bowy-
custom among their several legions. Now the Roman
method of procedure in the capture of cities is the follow-
ing : Sometimes certain soldiers taken from each maniple are
told off for this duty, their numbers depending on the size of
the city ; sometimes maniples are told off in turn for it : but
there are never more than half the whole number assigned to
the work. The rest remain in their own ranks in reserve, some-
times outside, at others inside the city, for taking such pre-
cautions as may be from time to time necessary. Sometimes,
though rarely, four legions are massed together ; but generally
speaking the whole force is divided into two legions of
Romans and two of allies. This being settled, all who are
(
/
i6 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS book
told off for plundering carry all they get, each to his own
legion ; and when this booty has been sold, the Tribunes dis-
tribute the proceeds among all equally, including not only
those who were thus held in reserve, but even those who
were guarding the tents, or were invalided, or had been sent
away anywhere on any service. But I have spoken fully
g^g before, when discussing the Roman consti-
tution, on the subject of the distribution of
booty, showing how no one is excluded from a share in
it, in accordance with the oath which all take upon first
joining the camp. I may now add that the arrange-
ment whereby the Roman army is thus divided, half being
engaged in gathering booty and half remaining drawn up in
reserve, precludes all danger of a general catastrophe arising
from personal rivalry in greed. \ox as both parties feel ab-
solute confidence in the fair dealing of each in respect to the
booty, — the reserves no less than the plunderers, — no one
leaves the ranks, which has been the most frequent cause of
disaster in the case of other armies.
1 7. For, as the majority of mankind encounter miseries and
embrace dangers for the sake of gain, it is plain that when
such opportunity is presented to them as this, the men in the re-
serve or in the camp would be with difficulty induced to abstain
from taking advantage of it; because the usual idea is that every-
thing belongs to the man who actually takes it : and though a
general or king may be careful to order all booty to be brought
into the common stock, yet everybody considers that what he
can conceal is his own. The result is that, while the ruck
of the army cannot be prevented from eagerly devoting them-
selves to plunder, they often run the risk of a complete over-
throw : and it has often in fact happened that after a successful
movement, such as the carrying of an entrenched camp or the
capture of a city, the victorious army has, from no other cause
but this, been not only ejected but even utterly defeated.
Therefore there is nothing about which leaders ought to exercise
more care or foresight, than that, on such an occasion, all
may have an absolutely equal prospect of sharing in the booty.
Thus on the present occasion, while the Tribunes were
busied in the distribution of the spoil; the Roman com-
3t SCiPJ&S TREATMENT OF THE P/i/SONEFS 17
mander caused the prisoners, who numbered little short of
ten thousand, to be assembled ; and havine first „ „,
ordered them to be divided mto two groups, of ihe prisoners.
one containing the citizens and their wives and Tlie ciii^ns are
children, the other the craftsmen, he exhorted '"^J^jj'" ^''
the first of these to be loyal to the Romans,
and to remember the favour which they were now receiving,
and allowed them ali to depart to their own houses. With
tears of joy at this unexpected preservation, they bowed in
reverence to Scipio and dispersed. He then -^^^ skilled slaves
told the craftsmen that they were for the present are promised iheir
public slaves of Rome, but that, if they showed f™dom ai the
themselves loyal and zealous in their several
crafts, he promised them their freedom, as soon as the war with
the Carthaginians had been brought to a successful issue. He
then bade them go get their names enrolled in the office of
the Quaestor, and appointed a Roman overseer for every
thirty of them, their whole number being about two thousand.
From the remaining captives he selected the
strongest, those who were in the prime of ^^ JJJ^ ^^'"^
youth and physical vigour, and assigned them
to serve on board ship: and having thus increased the number
of his naval allies by one half, he manned the ships taken from
the enemy as well as his own ; so that the number of men on
board each vessel were now little .short of double what it was
before. For the captured ships numbered eighteen, his
original tleet thirty-five. These men he also promised their
freedom, if they showed themselves loyal and zealous, as soon
as they had conquered the Carthaginians. By this treatment
of the captives he inspired the citizens with warm feelings of
loyalty and fidelity, and the handicraftsmen with great
readiness to serve, from the hope held out to them of recovering
their freedom.
18. He next took Mago and the Carthaginians with him
separately, consisting of one member of the
Council of ancients and fifteen of the Senate.' ' ''^J^e"^'"
These he put under the charge of Gaius I-aelius,
with orders that he should take due care of them. He next
' This seems to be the distinciion between the words ytfinvati. and
1 8 THE HISTORIES OE POLYBWS boo
summoned the hostages, who numbered more than thr©
-m. u . -^ hundred. Such of them as were children hi
1 ne nostages. n i « . « « i • i •
called to him one by one, and strokmg thai
heads told them not to be afraid, for in a few days they woulc
see their parents. The others also he exhorted to be of gooc
cheer, and to write word to their relations in their several cities,
first, that they were safe and well; and, secondly, that the
Romans were minded to restore them all unharmed to their
homes, if only their relations adopted the Roman alliance.
With these words, having already selected from the spoils such
articles as were fitting for his purpose, he presented each with
what was suitable to their sex and age : the girls with ear-rings
and bracelets, the young men with daggers and swords. Among
^ the captive women was the wife of Mandonius,
brother of Andobalus king of the Ilergetes.
Tins woman fell at his feet and besought him with tears to
protect their honour better than the Carthaginians had done.
Touched by her distress Scipio asked her in what respect she
and the other women were left unprovided. She was a lady
of advanced years and of a certain majestic dignity of appear-
ance : and upon her meeting his question by perfect silence,
he summoned the men who had been appointed to take charge
of the women; and when they reported that they had supplied
them with all necessaries in abundance, and when the woman
again clasped his knees and repeated the same request, Scipio
felt still more embarrassed ; and, conceiving the idea that their
guardians had neglected them, and were now making a false
report, he bade the women fear nothing, for that he would
appoint different men to see to their interests, and secure that
they were not left in want of anything. Then after a brief
hesitation the woman said, " You mistake my meaning, General,
if you think that we are asking you for food." Scipio then at
length began to understand what she wished to convey ; and
seeing under his eyes the youthful beauty of the daughters of
Andobalus, and of many of the other nobles, he could not
virfKkrrroi. Cp. 36, 4. The latter is the word used by Polybius for the
Roman Senate : for the nature of the first see Bosworth Smith, Carthage and
he Carthaginians, p. 27. It was usually called " The Hundred." Mommsen
(Hist, tf Rome, vol. ii, p. 15) seems to doubt the existence of the larger coun-
cil : its authority at any rate had been superseded by the oligarchical gerusia.
X SClPKfS TREATMENT OF WOMEN 19
refrain from tears, while the aged lady indicated in a few words
the danger in which they were. He showed at once that he
understood her words : and taking her by the hand, he bade
her and the others also be of good cheer, for that he would
watch over them as he would over his own sisters and
daughters, and would accordingly put men in charge of them
on whom he could rely.
19. His next business was to pay over to the Quaestors
such public money of the Carthaginians as had „ ^ ^^^^
been captured. It amounted to more than
six hundred talents, so that when this was added to the four
hundred which he had brought with him from Rome, he found
himself in possession of more than one thousand talents.
It was on this occasion that some young Romans fell in
with a girl surpassing all the other women in
bloom and beauty ; and seeing that Scipio was continence.
fond of the society of women, they brought her
to him, and, placing her before him, said that they desired to
present the damsel to him. He was struck with admiration
for her beauty, and replied that, if he had been in a private
position, he could have received no present that would have
given him greater pleasure ; hut as general it was the last in the
world which he could receive. He meant to convey, I presume,
by this ambiguous answer that, in hours of rest and idleness,
such things are the most delightful enjoyments and pastimes
for young men ; whereas in times of activity they are hindrances
[diysically and mentally. However that may be, he thanked
the young men ; but called the girl's father, and handing her
over at once to him, told him to bestow her in marriage on
whichever of the citizens he cliose. By this display of con-
tinence and selfcontrol he gained the warm respect of his
mea
Having made these arrangements, and handed over the rest
of the captives to the Tribunes, he despatched Laeiius sem 10
Gatus Laeiius on board a quinquereme to Rome, Rome with the
with the Carthaginian prisoners and the noblest ^^'^^ ^■'^- ^°9-
of the others, to announce at home what had taken place.
For as the prevailing feeling at Rome was one of despair of
success in Iberia, he felt certain that on this news their spirit;
20 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS BOO
would revive, and that they would make much more strenuoui
efforts to support him.
20. Scipio himself stayed a certain time in Nen
Carthage and assiduously practised liis fleet;
^r^dvanL.^"^ and drew up the foUowing scheme for his
military Tribunes for training their men. The
first day he ordered the men to go at the double for thirty
stades in their full arms ; and on the second all of them to rub
down, clean, and thoroughly examine their whole equipments ;
on the third to rest and do nothing ; on the fourth to have a
sham fight, some with wooden swords covered with leather and
with a button at the end, others with javelins also buttoned at
the end ; on the fifth the same march at the double as on the
first That there might be no lack of weapons for the
practises, or for the real fighting, he took the greatest pains with
the handicraftsmen. He had, as I have already stated, appointed
overseers over them in regular divisions to secure that this was
done ; but he also personally inspected them every day, and
saw that they were severally supplied with what was necessary.
Thus while the legions were practising and training in the
vicinity of the town, and the fleet manoeuvring and rowing in
the sea, and the city people sharpening weapons or forging
arms or working in wood, every one in short busily employed
in making armour, the whole place must have presented the
Xen. HeiUn, 3, appearance of what Xenophon called " a work-
4, 17 : AegsiL shopof war.'* When he thought all these works
I, 26. ^gyg sufficiently advanced for the requirements
of the service, he secured the town by posting garrisons and
repairing the walls, and got both his army and navy on the
move, directing his advance upon Tarraco, and taking the
hostages with him. . . .
PHILOPOEMEN OF MEGALOPOLIS
21. Euryleon, the Strategus of the Achaeans, was a man of
Euryieon Achaean timid character, and quite unsuited for service
Strategus, B.C. in the field.
210-209. gy^ 2& my history has now arrived at a point
at which the achievements of Philoi>oemen begin, I think it only
PIIILOPOEMEN
proper that, as I have attempted to describe the habits and
characters of the other men of eminence with whom we have
had to deal, I should do the same for him. It is strangely in-
consistent in historians to record in elaborate detail the founding
of cities, stating when and how and by whom they were estab-
lished, and even the circumstances and difficulties which
accompanied the transaction, and yet to pass over in complete
silence the characteristics and aims of the men by whom the
whole thing was done, though these in fact are the points of
the greatest value. For as one feels more roused to emulation
and imitation by men [hat have life, than by buildings that
have none, it is natural that the history of the former should
have a greater educational value. If I had not therefore already
composed a separate account of him, clearly setting forth who
tie was, his origin, and his policy as a young man, it would
have been necessary to have given an account now of each of
these particulars. But since I have done this in a work in
three books, unconnected with my present history, detailing the
circumstances of his childhood and his most famous achieve-
ments, it is clear that in my present narrative my proper
course will be to remove anything like details from my account
of his youthful characteristics and aims ; while I am careful to
add details to the story of the achievements of his manhood,
which in that treatise were only stated summarily. I shall thus
preserve the proper features of both works. The former being
in the nature of a panegyric demanded an account of his
actions, put briefly and in a style deliberately intended to
enhance their merits ; my present work, which is history, and
therefore absolutely uncommitted to praise or blame, requires
only a true statement, which puts the facts clearly, and traces
the policy which dictated the several actions.
22. Philopoemen, then, to begin with, was of good birth,
descended from one of the noblest families gjnh. parentage,
in Arcadia. He was also educated under that and education of
most distinguished Mantinean, Cleander, who Philopoemen, b.
had been his father's friend before, and happened
at that time to be in exile. When he came to man's estate he
attached himself to Ecdemus and Demophanes, who were by
birth natives of Megalopolis, but who having been exiled by the
22 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS BOOl
tyrant, and having associated with the philosopher Arcesilaus
during their exile, not only set their own country free by
entering into an intrigue against Aristodemus the tyrant, but
also helped in conjunction with Aratus to put down Nicocles,
the tyrant of Sicyon. On another occasion also, on the in*
vitation of the people of Cyrene, they stood forward as their
champions and preserved their freedom for them. Such were
the men with whom he passed his early life; and he at once began
to show a superiority to his contemporaries, by his power of
enduring hardships in hunting, and by his acts of daring in war.
He was moreover careful in his manner of life, and moderate
in the outward show which he maintained ; for he had im-
bibed from these men the conviction, that it was impossible for
a man to take the lead in public business with honour
who neglected his own private affairs; nor again to abstain
from embezzling public money if he lived beyond his private
income.
Being then appointed Hipparch by the Achaean league at
Elected Hipparch, ^^ ^^xiit^ and finding the squadrons in a state
B.C. 2IO. of utter demoralisation, and the men thoroughly
^P* ^^"^- ^^^' 7. dispirited, he not only restored them to a better
aftCT thc^'tUe State than they were, but in a short time made
of Saiiasia, them even superior to the enemy's cavalry, by
B.C. 222. bringing them all to adopt habits of real training
and genuine emulation. The fact is that most of those who
hold this office of Hipparch, either, from being without any
genius themselves for cavalry tactics, do not venture to enforce
necessary orders upon others ; or, because they are aiming at
being elected Strategus, try all through their year of office to
attach the young men to themselves and to secure their favour
in the coming election: and accordingly never administer
necessary reprimands, which are the salvation of the
public interests, but hush up all transgressions, and, for the sake
of gaining an insignificant popularity, do great damage to those
who trust them. Sometimes again, commanders, though neither
feeble nor corrupt, do more damage to the soldiers by intem-
perate zeal than the negligent ones, and this is still oftener the
case with regard to the cavalry. . . .
23. Now the movements which he undertook to teach the
PHILOPOEMEN S REFORMS as
horsemen as being universally applicable to cavalry warfare
The cavalry
were these. In the first place each separate
horse was to be practised in wheeling first to laeilcs S'philo-
the left and then to the right, and also to face poemen, b.c.
right-about; and in the next place they were aio-aog.
to be taught to wheel in squadrons, face-about, and by a
treble movement to face-about right-turn. Next they were to
learn to throw out flying columns of single or double com-
panies at full speed from both wings or from the centre;
and then to pull up and fall in again into troops, or squad-
rons, or regiments : next to deploy into line on both wings,
either by filling up the intervals in the line or by a lateral
movement on the rear. Simply to forni an oblique line,
he said, required no practice, for it was exactly the same
order as that taken up on a march. After this they were to
practice charging the enemy and retreating by every kind of
movement, until they were able to advance at an alarming
pace ; provided only that they kept together, both line and
column, and preserved the proper intervals between the
squadrons : for nothing is more dangerous and unserviceable
than cavalry that have broken up their squadrons, and attempt
to engage in this state.
After giving these instructions both to the people and their
magistrates, he went on a round of inspection through the
towns, and inquired, first, whether the men obeyed the words of
command ; and, secondly, whether the officers in the several
towns knew how to give them clearly and properly : for he held
that the first thing requisite was technical knowledge on the
part of the commanders of each company.
24. When he had thus made the proper preliminary
preparations, he mustered the cavalry from the various cities
into one place, and set about perfecting their evolutions
under his own command, and personally directed the whole
drill. He did not ride in front of the army, as generals now-
adays do, from the notion that this is the proper position for
I This and the following chapter were rormerl]' assigned lo Ihe description
of Scipio's proceedings in Spain and (oUowed. ch. ao. Hultsch, however.
iccms right in placing them thus, and assigning (hem (o the account of the
lactic* of I'hllopocmen.
24 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS book
a commander. For what can be less scientific or more
dangerous than for a commander to be seen by all his men,
and yet not to see one of them? In such manoeuvres a
Hipparch should not make a display not of mere military dignity,
but of the skill and ability of an officer, appearing at one time
in the front, at another on the rear, and at another in the
centre. This is what he did, riding along the lines, and
personally seeing to all the men, giving them directions when
they were at a loss what to do, and correcting at once every
mistake that was being made. Such mistakes, however, were
trifling and rare, owing to the previous care bestowed on every
individual and company. Demetrius of Phalerum has, as far
as words go, given expression to the same idea : " As in the
case of building, if you lay each single brick rightly, and if
proper care is taken in placing each successive course, all will
be well ; so in an army, accuracy in the arrangement of each
soldier and each company makes the whole strong. . . ."
A fragment of a speech of some Macedonian orator as to the
Aetolians making an alliance with Rome,
25. " The case is just like that of the disposition of the
Alliance between various kinds of tfoops on the field of battle.
Aetolians and The light-armed and most active men bear the
Rome ^g^'pst brunt of the danger, are the first to be engaged
byScopas^andDor-^'^^ the first to perish, while the phalanx and
imachus, RC.2II. the heavy-armed generally carry off the glory.
See Livy, 26, 24. g^ ]^ jj^jg csiSty the AetoHans, and such of the
Peloponnesians as are in alliance with them, are put in the post
of danger; while the Romans, like the phalanx, remain in
reserve. And if the former meet with disaster and perish, the
Romans will retire unharmed from the struggle ; while if they
are victorious, which Heaven forbid ! the Romans will get
not only them but the rest of the Greeks also into their
power. . . ."^
* On the margin of one MS, the following is written, which may be a
sentence from the same speech, or a comment of the Epitomator : "A con-
federacy with democratic institutions always stands in need of external sup-
port, owing to the fickleness of the multitude."
PHILIPS INCREASING DETEKI0HAT10N
2S. After iinishlng the celebration of the Ncmean games,
King Philip of Macedon returned to Argos and King Philip's
laid aside his crown and purple robe, with conduci at Argos
the view of making a display of democratic "^*J i^'^'"B "t
,. , P -n I. the Nemean
equahty and good nature. But the more games, b.c. 308.
democratic the dress which he wore, the more See Livy, 3j.
absolute and royal were the privileges which he 3°. 3'-
claimed. He was not now content with seducing unmarried
women, or even with intriguing with married women, but
assumed the right of sending authoritatively for any woman
whose appearance struck him ; and offered violence to those
who did not at once obey, by leading a band of revellers to
their houses; and, summoning their sons or their husbands, he
trumped up iaise pretexts for menacing them. In fact his
conduct was exceedingly outrageous and lawless. But though
this abuse of his privileges as a guest was exceedingly annoying
to many of the Achaeans, and especially to the orderly part of
them, the wars that threatened them on every side compelled
them to show a patience under it uncongenial to their
character. . . .
None of his predecessors had better qualifications for
sovereignty, or more important defects, tlian this same Philip.
And it appears to me that the good qualities were innate,
while the defects grew upon him as he advanced in years, as
happens to some horses as they grow old. Such remarks I
do not, following some other historians, confine to prefaces ;
but when the course of my narrative suggests it, I state my
opinion of kings and eminent men, thinking that most con-
venient for writer and reader alike. . . .
War bettvetn Antiothus the Great {III.) and Arsaces
III., King of the Parthians. B.C. 212-205. ^^ abeve
8, !S-
27. In regard to extent of territory Media is the most
considerable of the kingdoms in Asia, as also in respect o'
26 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS book
the number and excellent qualities of its men, and not less
Description of SO of its horses. For, in fact, it supplies nearly
Media, and of all Asia with these animals, the royal studs being
tiw palace at entrusted to the Medes because of the rich pas-
£cDatana« • < . * rr\ • r i
tures m their country/ To protect it from the
neighbouring barbarians a ring of Greek cities was built round
it by the orders of Alexander. The chief exception to this b
Ecbatana, which stands on the north of Media, in the district
of Asia bordering on the Maeotis and Euxine. It was
originally the royal city of the Medes, and vastly superior to
the other cities in wealth and the splendour of its buildings.
It is situated on the skirts of Mount Orontes, and is without
walls, though containing an artificially formed citadel fortified
to an astonishing strength. Beneath this stands the palace,
which it is in some degree difficult to describe in detail, or to
pass over in complete silence. To those authors whose aim
is to produce astonishment, and who are accustomed to deal in
exaggeration and picturesque writing, this city offers the best
possible subject ; but to those who, like myself, are cautious
when approaching descriptions which go beyond ordinary
notions, it presents much difficulty and embarrassment. How-
ever, as regards size, the palace covers ground the circuit of
which is nearly seven stades; and by the costliness of the
structure in its several parts it testifies to the wealth of its
original builders : for all its woodwork being cedar or cypress
not a single plank was left uncovered ; beams and fretwork
in the ceilings, and columns in the arcades and peristyle, were
overlaid with plates of silver or gold, while all the tiles were of
silver. Most of these had been stripped off during the
invasion of Alexander and the Macedonians, and the rest in the
reigns of Antigonus and Seleucus Nicanor. However, even at
the time of Antiochus's arrival, the temple of Aena^ still had its
columns covered with gold, and a considerable number of
silver tiles had been piled up in it, and some few gold bricks
and a good many silver ones were still remaining. It was
1 See 5, 44.
' This goddess is variously called Anailis (Plut. Artax, 27) and Nanea
(2 Mace. I, 13). And is identified by Plutarch with Artemis, and by others
with Aphrodite.
X ANTIOCHUS THE GREAT m MEDIA a?
from these that the coinage bearing the king's impress was
collected and struck, amounting to little less than four thousand
talents. . . .
28. Arsaces expected that Antiochus would come as far as
this district (of Media), but that he would not .^
^ , " , ,. - - , The nature of the
venture to proceed across the aajoining desert desert between
with so lai^e a force, if for no other reason, yet Media and
from the scarcity of water. For in this tract of Parthia.
country there is no water appearing on the surface, though
there are many subterranean channels which have well-shafts
sunk to them, at spots in the desert unknown to persons un-
acquainted with the district A true account of these channels
has been preserved among the natives to the effect that, during
the Persian ascendency, they granted the enjoyment of the
profits of the land to the inhabitants of some of the waterless
districts for five generations, on condition of their bringing
fresh water in ; and that, there being many large streams flowing
dowti Mount Taurus, these people at infinite toil and expense
constructed these underground channels through a long tract
of country, in such a way, that the very people who now use
the water are ignorant of the sources from which the channels
are originally supplied.
When, however, Arsaces saw that Antiochus was deter-
mined to attempt to cross the desert, he endeav- > ,- ),
oured at once to choke up and spoil the wells, pares to cross it :
But King Antiochus, upon this being reported Arsaces orders
to him, despatched Nicomedes with a thousand ""j**"^" ^
horse ; who found that Arsaces had retired with
his main army, but came upon some of his cavalry in the act
of choking up the shafts which went down into the under-
ground channels. They promptly attacked these men, and,
having routed and forced them to fly, returned back again to
Antiochus. The king, having thus accomplished Antiochus
the journey across the desert, arrived before the arrives at
city Hecatompylos, which is situated in the Hecatompylos.
centre of Parthia, and derives its name from the fact that the
roads which lead to all the surrounding districts convei^e there.
29. Having rested his artny at this place, and having
convinced himself that, had Arsaces been able to give him
2S THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS book
battle, he would not have abandoned his own country, nor have
Antiochus deter- sought a ground more favourable to his own army
mines to follow for fighting him than the district round Hecatom-
Arsaces into pyios ; he concluded that, since he had done so,
^^'^"**' it stood to reason that he had entirely changed
his mind. He therefore decided to advance into Hyrcania*
But having arrived at Tagae, he learnt from the natives that
the country he had to cross, until he reached the ridges of
Mount Labus sloping down into Hyrcania, was exceedingly
rough and difficult, and that large numbers of barbarians were
stationed at the narrowest points. He therefore resolved to
divide his light-armed troops into companies, and distribute
their officers among them, giving them directions as to
the route they were severally to take. He did the same
with the pioneers, whose business it was to make the positions
occupied by the light -armed possible of approach for the
phalanx and beasts of burden. Having made these arrange-
ments, he entrusted the first division to Diogenes, strengthening
him with bowmen and slingers and some mountaineers skilled
in tlirowing javelines and stones, and who, without keeping
any regular order, were always ready to skirmish at a
moment's notice, and in any direction, and rendered the most
effective assistance at the narrow passes. Next to these he
ordered a company of about two thousand Cretans armed with
shields to advance, under the command of Polyxenidas of
Rhodes. The rear was to be brought up by companies armed
with breastplate and shield, and commanded by Nicomedes of
Cos, and Nicolaus the Aetolian.
30. But as they advanced, the ruggedness of the ground
and the narrowness of the passes were found to
Mount*Labus. ^^'" c^c^^d the king's expectations. The length
of the ascent was altogether about three hundred
stades ; and a great part had to be made up the bed of a
winter torrent of great depth, into which numerous rocks and
trees had been hurled by natural causes from the overhanging
precipices, and made a passage up it difficult, to say nothing of
the obstacles which the barbarians had helped to construct
expressly to impede them. These latter had felled a large
number of trees and piled up heaps of huge rocks ; and had
X FIGHTING ON MOUNT LABUS 19
besides occupied all along the gully the high points, which
were at once convenient for attack and capable of covering
themselves ; so that, if it had not been for one glaring error on
their part, Antiochus would have found the attempt beyond
his powers, and would have desisted from it. The error was
this. They assumed that the whole army would be obliged
to march the entire way up the gully, and they accordingly
occupied the points of vantige. But they did not perceive this
fact, that, though the phalanx and the baggage could not possibly
go by any other route than the one they supposed, there was yet
nothing to make it impossible for the light-armed and active
troops to accomplish the ascent of the bare rocks. Conse-
quently, as soon as Diogenes had come upon the first outpost
of the enemy, he and his men began climbing out of the gully,
and the affair at once took a different aspect. For no sooner
bad they come to close quarters, than, acting on the suggestion
of the moment, Diogenes avoided the engagement by ascending
the mountains that flanked the enemy's position, and so got
above him ; and by pouring down volleys of darts and stones he
seriously harassed the barbarians. Their most deadly weapons
however proved to be the slings, which could carry a great
distance ; and when by these means they had dislodged the
first outpost and occupied their ])osition, an opportunity was
secured for the pioneers to clear the way and level it, without
being exposed to danger. Owing to the number of hands the
work went on rapidly ; and meanwhile the slingers, bowmen,
and javelin-men advanced in skirmishing order along the
higher ground, every now and then reforming and seizing on
strong points of vantage ; while the men with. shields formed a
reserve, marching in order and at a regular pace along the side
of the gully itself. The barbarians thereupon abandoned
their positions, and, ascending the mountain, mustered in full
force on the summit
SI. Thus Antiochus effected this ascent without loss, but
slowly and painfully, for it was not until the -j^g i^,^^ „„ ,<^^
eighth day that his army made the summit of summii of Mount
Labus. The barbarians being mustered there, Labus.
and resolved to dispute his passage, a severe engagement took
place, in which the barbarians were eventually dislodged, anf"
30 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS book
by the following manoeuvre. As long as they were engaged
face to face with the phalanx, they kept well together and
fought desperately ; but before daybreak the light-armed troops
had made a wide circuit, and seized some high ground on the
rear of the enemy, and as soon as the barbarians perceived this
they fled in a panic. King Antiochus exerted himself actively
to prevent a pursuit, and caused a recall to be sounded,
because he wished his men to make the descent into Hyrcania,
without scattering, and in close order. He
Ta^t^" accomplished his object : reached Tambrax. an
unwalled city of great size and contammg a
royal palace, and there encamped. Most of the natives fled
from the battle-fleld, and its immediate neigh-
Sh-^.*^ bourhood, into a city called Sirynx, which was
not far from Tambrax, and from its secure and
convenient situation was considered as the capital of Hyrcania.
Antiochus therefore determined to carry this town by assault ;
and having accordingly advanced thither, and pitched his
camp under its walls, he commenced the assault. The
operation consisted chiefly of mining under pent-houses. For
the city was defended by three trenches, thirty cubits broad
and fifteen deep, with a double vallum on the edge of each ;
and behind these there was a strong wall. Frequent struggles
took place at the works, in which neither side were strong
enough to carry off" their killed and wounded : for these hand-
to-hand battles took place, not above ground only, but under-
ground also in the mines. However, owing to the numbers
employed and the activity of the king, it was not long before
the trenches were choked up and the walls were undermined
and fell. Upon this the barbarians, giving up all as lost, put to
death such Greeks as were in the town ; and having plundered
all that was most worth taking, made off" under cover of night.
When the king saw this, he despatched Hyperbasus with the
mercenaries ; upon whose approach the barbarians threw down
their booty and fled back again into the city ; and when they
found the peltasts pouring in energetically through the breach
in the walls they gave up in despair and surrendered.
FALL OF M. CLAUDIUS MARCELLUS
THE HANNIBALIAN WAR
S2. The Consuls, wishing to reconnoitre the slope of the
hill towards the enemy's camp, ordered their ^^ ^^
main force to remain in position ; while they coss. M. Oaudiiw
themselves with two troops of cavalry, their Marcellus, T.
lictors,'and about thirty velites advanced to '^"'"'^"^''7:^
make the reconnaisance. Now some Numidians, consuls were en-
who were accustomed to lie in ambush for those camped within
who came on skirmishes, or any other services 'i"™ ""'== "'
, , „ , , ■ , . each other,
from the Roman camp, happened, as it chanced, between Venusia
to have ensconced themselves at the foot of the and Baniia,
hilL Being informed by their look-out man t^^ "f ^'^i^,
that a body of men was coming over the brow „, Bmiiii, but
of the hill above them, they rose from their had advanced
place of concealment, ascended the hill by ^.'''t*>^Apiiiu.
a side road, and got between the Consuls
and their camp. At the very first charge they kilted
Cbudius and some others, and having wounded Yitsxti of the Con-
the rest, forced them to fly in different directions sui M. Claudius
down the sides of the hill. Though the men WarcEUus-
in camp saw what was happening they were unable to come to
the relief of their endangered comrades ; for while they were
still shouting out to get ready, and before they had recovered
from the first shock of their surprise, while some were putting
the bridles on their horses and others donning their armour,
the affair was all over. The son of Claudius, though wounded,
narrowly escaped with his life.
Thus fell Marcus Marcellus from an act of incautiousness
unworthy of a general. I am continually compelled in the
course of my history to draw the attention of my readers to
occurrences of this sort ; for I perceive that it is this, more
than anything else connected with the science of tactics, that
ruins commanders. And yet the blunder is a very obvious
one. For what is the use of a commander or general, who has
not learnt that the leader ought to keep as far as possible aloof
from those minor operations, in which the whole fortune of the
campaign is not involved ? Or of one who does not know th
32 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS boch
even if circumstances should at times force them to engage in
such subordinate movements, the commanders-in-chief should
not exjx)se themselves to danger until a large number of their
Fiat cxperimen- company have fallen ? For, as the proverb has
turn in corpore it, the experiment should be made " on the
^^*- worthless Carian " ^ not on the general. For to
say " I shouldn't have thought it," — " Who would have
ex|)ected it ? " seems to me the clearest proof of strategical
incompetence and dulness.
83. And so, though HannibaFs claims to be reckoned a
great general are manifold, there is none more conspicuous than
this, that though engaged for a great length of time in an
enemy's country, and though he experienced a great variety of
fortune, he again and again inflicted a disaster on his opponents
in minor encounters, but never suffered one himself in spite of
the number and severity of the contests which he conducted :
and the reason, we may suppose was, that he took great care
of his personal safety. And very properly so : for if the leader
escapes uninjured and safe, though a decisive defeat may
have been sustained, fortune offers many opportunities for
retrieving disasters ; but if he has fallen, the pilot as it were of
the ship, even should fortune give the victory to the army,
no real advantage is gained ; because all the hopes of the
soldiers de[>end upon their leaders. So much for those who
fall into such errors from foolish vanity, childish parade,
ignorance, or contempt For it is ever one or the other of
An incident in these that is at the bottom of such disasters. . . .
iheaiiemptof They suddenly let down the portcullis,
Hannibal to enter ^l^j^l^ they had raised somewhat by pulleys,
balapia, under , . . • « . ri-«i_ ,i
cover of a letter and thus closed up the gateway. 1 nen they
scaie<i by the ring took the men and crucified them before the
of the dead Consul ^^iij,
Marcus. ^^"^ * ' •
Livy, 27, 28.
* This proverb perhaps arose from the frequent employment of tlie non-
Hellenic Carians as mercenaries. Cp. Plato, Laches, 187 B; Euthydemus,
285 B ; Euripides, Cyclops, 654.
THE SUBMISSION OF THE EDETANI
34. In Iberia Publius Scipio took up his winter quarters at
Tarraco, as I have already stated ; and secured
the fidelity and affection of the Iberians, to ^g°ao8°* ^
begin with, by the restoration of the hostages to mpra. ch. so.
their respective families. He found a voluntary The aJhesion of
supporter of his measures in the person of th^'fe^iara "
Edeco, the prince of the Edetani; who no
sooner heard that New Carthage had been taken, and that
Scipio had got his wife and children into his hands, than,
concluding that the Iberians would change sides, he resolved
to take the lead in the movement : conceiving that, by acting
thus, he would best be able to get back his wife and children,
and at the same time have the credit of joining the Romans
by deliberate choice, and not under compulsion. And so it
turned out For as soon as the armies were dismissed to their
winter quarters, he came to Tarraco, accompanied by his
kinsfolk and friends ; and there being admitted to an inter-
view with Scipio, he said that " he thanked the gods heartily
that he was the first of the native princes to come to him \ for
whereas the others were still sending ambassadors to the
Carthaginians and looking to them for support, — even while
stretching out their hands to the Romans, — he was come there
to offer not only himself, but his friends and kinsfolk also, to
the protection of Rome. If therefore he should have the
honour to be regarded by him as a friend and ally, he would
be able to render him important service both in the present
and the future. For as soon as the Iberians saw that he had
been admitted to Scipio's friendship, and had obtained what he
asked, they would all come in with a similar object, hoping to
have their relatives restored, and to enjoy the alliance of Rome.
Their affection being secured for the future by receiving such
a mark of honour and benevolence, he would have in them
sincere and ready coadjutors in all his future undertakings.
He therefore asked to have his wife and children restored to
him, and to be allowed to return home an acknowledged friend
of Rome ; in order that he might have a reasonable pretext
VOL. ri D
34 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS book
for showing, to the best of his power, his own and his friends'
affection for Scipio himself and for the Roman cause."
85, When Edeco had finished his speech, Scipio, who had
Eileco is followed *^en ready to gratify him from the first,
ijy other triixra. and took the same view as to the policy of
iLc. ao9-8. ^hg proceeding, delivered him his wife
and children, and granted the friendship which he asked.
More than this, his subtle intellect made an extraordinary
impression on the Iberian in the course of the interview ; and
having held out splendid hopes to all his companions for the
future, he allowed him to return to his own country. This
afTair having rapidly got wind, all the tribes living north of the
ICbro, such as had not done so before, joined the Romans with
one consent.
Thus so far everything was going well with Scipio. After
the departure of these people, he broke up his naval force,
seeing that there was nothing to resist him at sea ; and select-
ing the Ixist of the crews, he distributed them among the
maniples, and thus augmented his land forces.
liut Andobales and Mandonius, the most powerful princes
AiuIoImIm nnd ^^ ^^ ^Y '" Iberia, and believed to be the
MitiuioniuH nimn. most sincerely devoted to the Carthaginians,
don iluhdruUd. j^^j jQ^g \^^^ secretly discontented and on the
lookout for an op|K>rtunity : ever since Hasdrubal, under a
pretence of liaving a doubt of their loyalty, had demanded a
large sum of money, and their wives and daughters as hostages,
as 1 have already narrated.^ And thinking that a convenient
opportunity had now come, they got together their own forces,
and, (|uitting the C-arthaginian camp under cover of night,
oi'i'upicil a |H)Mition sutlirieutly strong to secure their safety.
Upon this, most of the other Iberians also abandoned
llasilruiviil : having long boon annoyed at the overbearing
ronduct of the ( \irthrtginians, and now seizing the first oppor-
tunity to manilVst their feelings.
86. This has ot\en hapiH*ned to |X}ople before. For though,
as I have many tinies romarkal, success in a campaign and
victory <wor one*H cnenuvs are great things, it requires much
greater skill and caution to xisc such successes well Accord-
* Sw 9. II.
X GENERAL DEFECTION TO THE ROMANS 35
ingly, you will find that those who have gained victories are
many times more numerous than those who have made good
use of them. The Carthaginians at this crisis are an instance
in point. After conquering the Roman armies, and slaying
both the generals, Publius and Gnaeus Scipio, imagining that
Iberia was their own without dispute, they began treating the
natives tyrannically ; and accordingly found enemies in their
subjects instead of allies and friends. And they were quite
rightly served, for imagining that the conduct necessary for
keeping power was something different from that necessary for
obtaining it ; and for failing to understand that they keep
empire best, who best maintain the same principles in virtue of
which they gained it And yet it ts obvious enough, and has
been again and again demonstrated, that men gain power by
beneficent actions, and by holding out hopes of advantage to
those with whom they are dealing ; hut that, as soon as ihey
have got what they wanted, and begin to act wickedly and rule
despotically, it is but natural that, as their rulers have changed,
the feelings of the subjects should change too. So it was with
the Carthaginians.
37. Surrounded by such difficulties Hasdrubal was agitated
by many conflicting emotions and anxieties. He was vexed
by the desertion of Andobales ; vexed by the opposition and
feud between himself and the other commanders ; and greatly
alarmed as to the arrival of Scipio, expecting that he would
immediately bring his forces to attack him. Perceiving there-
fore that he was being abandoned by the Iberians, and that
they were joining the Romans with one accord, he decided
upon the following plan of action. He resolved that he must
collect the best force he could, and give the enemy battle : if
fortune declared in his favour he could then consider his next
step in safety, but if the battle turned out unfavourably for
him, he would retreat with those that survived into Gaul ; and
collecting from that country as many of the natives as he could,
would go to Italy, and take his share in the same fortune as his
brother Hannibal.
While Hasdrubal was arriving at this resolution, Publius
ScipiowasrejoinedbyGaiusLaelius; and,heing Earifinacic"
1 by him of the orders of the Senate, he sdpio mov
36 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS book
southward to collected his forces from their winter quarters
^iiTthe^^y^of ^"^ began his advance : the Iberians joining
the Baetis. him on the march with great promptness and
Livy, 27, 18-19. hearty enthusiasm. Andobales had long been
in communication with Scipio : and, on the latter approaching
the district in which he was entrenched, he left his camp with
his friends and came to Scipio. In this interview he entered
upon a defence of himself in regard to his former friendship
with the Carthaginians, and spoke of the services he had done
them, and the fidelity which he had shown to them.
He then went on to narrate the injustice and tyranny
which he had experienced at their hands ; and demanded that
Scipio himself should be the judge of his pleas. If he were
shown to be making ungrounded complaints against the
Carthaginians, he might justly conclude him incapable of
keeping faith with the Romans either : but if, on a review of
these numerous acts of injustice he were proved to have had no
other course than to desert the Carthaginians, Scipio might
confidently expect that, if he now elected to join the Romans,
he would be firm in his loyalty to them.
38. Andobales added many more arguments before finish-
ing his speech ; and when he had done, Scipio
^^^^^p^J'^^ answered by saying that " he quite believed
what he had said ; and that he had the strongest
reason for knowing about the insolent conduct of the Cartha-
ginians, both from their treatment of the other Iberians, and
conspicuously from their licentious behaviour to their wives
and daughters, whom he had found occupying the position,
not of hostages, but of captives and slaves ; and to whom he
had preserved such inviolable honour as could scarcely have
been equalled by their very fathers themselves." And upon
Andobales and his companions acknowledging that they were
quite aware of this, and falling at his feet and calling him
king, all present expressed approval. Whereupon Scipio with
emotion bade them " fear nothing, for they would experience
nothing but kindness at the hands of the Romans.*' He at
once handed over his daughters to Andobales ; and next day
made the treaty with him, the chief provision of which was
that he should follow the Roman commanders and obey their
X SCIPIO ATTACKS HASDRUBAL 37
commands. This being settled, he returned to his camp;
brought over his army to Scipio; and, having joined camps
with the Romans, advanced with them against Hasdmbal.
Now the Carthaginian general was encamped at Baecula,
in the district of Castulo, not far from the silver j.
mines. But when he learnt the approach of the changes bis pow-
Romans, he shifted his quarters ; and his rear Hon m one of
being secured by a river, and having a stretch ^"P*"'"'*'""^"'-
of tableland in front of his entrenchment of sufficient extent
lot his troops to manceuvre, and bounded by a steep descent
sufficiently deep for security, he stayed quietly in position :
always taking care to post pickets on the brow of the descent.
As soon as he came within distance, Scipio was
eager to give him battle, but was baffled by the Scip.o anive..
strength of the enemy's position. After waiting two days,
however, he became anxious, lest by the arrival of Mago and
Hasdrubal, son of Gesco, he should find himself surrounded
by hostile forces : he therefore determined to venture on an
attack and make trial of the enemy.
S9. His whole army having been got ready for battle, he
confined the main body within his camp, but _ , .
sent out the velites and , some picked men of fuHy assaults
the infantry with orders to assault the brow of Hasdmbai's
the hill and atUck the enemy's pickets. His position.
orders were carried out with great spirit At first the Cartha-
ginian commander watched what was happening without
stirring : but when he saw that, owing to the fuiy of the Roman
attack, his men were being hard pressed, he led out his army
and drew them up along the brow of the hill, trusting to the
strength of the position. Meanwhile Scipio despatched all his
tight-armed troops with orders to support the advanced guard :
and the rest of his army being ready for action, he took half of
them under his own command, and going round the brow of
the hill to the enemy's left, began assaulting the Carthaginians \
while he entrusted the other half to Laetius, with orders to
make a similar attack on the right of the enemy. While this
was going on, Hasdrubal was still engaged in getting his troops
out of camp : for hitherto he had been waiting, because h'
trusted in the strength of the position, and felt confident I
38 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS book
the enemy would never venture to attempt it The attack,
therefore, took him by surprise, before he was able to get his
men on to the ground. As the Romans were now assaulting
the two wings of the position which the enemy had not yet
occupied, they not only mounted the brow of the hill in safety,
but actually advanced to the attack while their opponents were
still in all the confusion and bustle of falling in. Accordingly
they killed some of them on their exposed flank ; while others,
who were actually in the act of falling in, they forced to turn
Hasdrubal re- ^^^ ^^' Seeing his army giving way and re-
treats, and makes treating, Hasdrubal reverted to his preconceived
for the Pyrenees. ^\^^ . ^cnd determining not to stake his all upon
this one desperate hazard, he secured his money and his
elephants, collected as many of his flying soldiers as he could,
and commenced a retreat towards the Tagus, with a view of
reaching the passes of the Pyrenees and the Gauls in that
neighbourhood.
Scipio did not think it advisable to pursue Hasdrubal at
once, for fear of being attacked by the other Carthaginian
generals; but he gave up the enemy's camp to his men to
pillage.
40. Next morning he collected the prisoners, amounting to
ten thousand foot and more than two thousand horse, and
busied himself in making arrangements about them. All the
Iberians of that district, who were in alliance at that time with
the Carthaginians, came in and submitted to the Roman
obedience, and in addressing Scipio called him "king." The
first to do this and to bow the knee before him
^t^m ^^ had been Edeco, and the next Andobales. On
these occasions Scipio had passed the word over
without remark ; but after the battle, when all alike addressed
him by that title, his attention was drawn to it ; and he there-
fore summoned the Iberians to a meeting, and told them that
" he quite wished to be called a man of royal liberality by them
all, and to be so in the truest sense, but that he had no wish
to be a * king,' nor to be called one by any one ; they should
address him as general."
Even at this early period of his career, an observer might
have remarked the loftiness of Scipio's character. He was
X HASDRUBAL RETREATS TO THE PYRENEES 39
Still quite young. His good fortune had been so persistent,
that adl who came under his rule were led naturally to think
and speak of him as a king. Yet he did not lose his self-
control ; but deprecated this popular impulse and this show of
dignity. But this same loftiness of character was still more
admirable in the closing scenes of his life, when, in addition
to his achievements in Iberia, he crushed the Carthaginians ;
reduced the largest and fairest districts of Libya, from the
Altars of Philaenus to the Pillars of Hercules, under the power
of his country ; conquered Asia and the kings of Syria ; made
the best and largest part of the world subject to Rome ; and
in doing so had numerous opportunities of acquiring regal
sway, in whatever parts of the world suited his purpose or
wish. For such achievements were enough to have kindled
pride, not merely in any human breast, but even, if I may say
so without irreverence, in that of a god. But Scipio's great-
ness of soul was so superior to the common standard of man-
kind, that he again and again rejected what Fortune had put
within his grasp, that prize beyond which men's boldest
prayers do not go — ^the power of a king : and he steadily pre-
ferred his country and his duty to that royalty, which men
gaze at with such admiration and envy.
Scipio next proceeded to select from the captives the
native Iberians, and all these he dismissed to .
their homes without ransom ; and bidding Ando- the position
bales select three hundred of the horses, he dis- evacuated by the
tributed the remainder among those who had Carthaginians,
none. For the rest, he at once occupied the entrenchment of
the Carthaginians, owing to its excellent situation ; and there he
remained himself, waiting to see the movements of the other
Carthaginian generals ; while he detached a body of men to
the passes of the Pyrenees to keep a look-out for
HasdrubaL After this, as it was getting late in ^'"og' 207^''''
the season, he retired with his army to Tarraco
being bent on wintering there. . . .
40 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS book
AFFAIRS IN GREECE
41. The Aetolians had recently become greatly encouraged
by the arrival of the Romans and King Attalus :
undCTtekes toxoid ^nd accordingly began menacing every one, and
the Achaean threatening all with an attack by land, while
league and other Attalus and Publius Sulpicius did the same by
against a threat- ^^' Wherefore Achaean legates arrived at the
cned attack of the court of King Philip entreating his help : for it
Aetolians in ^yas not the Aetolians alone of whom they were
Rorne?*B.c 208. Standing in dread, but Machanidas also, as he
Cp. Livy, 27, 30. was encamped with his army on the frontier of
See above Bk. 9, Argos. The Boeotians also, in fear of the
'^^* enemy's fleet, were demanding a leader and
help from the king. Most urgent of all, however, were the
Euboeans in their entreaties to him to take some precaution
against the enemy. A similar appeal was being made by the
Acarnanians ; and there was an embassy even from the
Epirotes. News had arrived that both Scerdilaidas and
Pleuratus were leading out their armies : and, over and above
this, that the Thracian tribes on the frontier of Macedonia,
especially the Maedi, were planning to invade Macedonia, if
the king were induced to slir from his realm however short a
distance. Moreover the Aetolians were already securing the
pass of Thermopylae with trenches and stockades and a
formidable garrison, satisfied that they would thus shut out
Philip, and entirely prevent him from coming to the assistance
of his allies south of the pass. It appears to me that a crisis
of this sort is well worth the observation and attention of my
readers ; for it affords a trial and test of the vigour of the
leader affected. As in the hunting- field the wild animals
never show their full courage and strength until surrounded
and brought to bay, — so it is with leaders. And no more
conspicuous instance could be found than this of Philip. He
dismissed the various embassies, promising each that he would
do his best : and then devoted his attention to the war which
surrounded him on all sides, watching to see in what direction,
and against which enemy, he had best direct his first attack.
X PHILIP V. CALLED /.V AGAINST THE AETOLIANS 41
42. Just then intelligence reached him thai Attalus bad
crossed the sea and, dropping anchor at Peparethos, had
occupied the island. He therefore despatched a body of men
to the islanders to garrison their city ; and at the same time
despatched Polyphonies with an adequate force into Phocis and
Boeolta; and Menippus, with a thousand peltasts and five
hundred Agrianes to Chalets and the rest of Euboea ; while he
himself advanced to Scotusa, and sent word at the same time
to the Macedonians to meet him at that town. But when he
learnt that Attalus had sailed into the port of Nicaea, and that
the leaders of the Aetolians were collecting at Heraclca, with
the purpose of holding a conference together on the immediate
steps to be taken, he started with his army from Scotusa, eager
to hurry thither and break up their meeting. He arrived too
late to interrupt the conference : but he destroyed or carried
off the com belonging to the people along the Aenianian gulf,
and then returned. After this he left his army in Scotusa
once more ; and, with the light-armed troops and the royal
guard, went to Demetrias, and there remained, waiting to see
what the enemy would attempt To secure that he should be
kept perfectly acquainted with all their movements, he sent
messengers to the Peparethii, and to his troops in Phocis and
Euboea, and ordered them to telegraph to him everything
which happened, by means of fire signals directed to Mount
Tisaeum, which is a mountain of Thessaly conveniently situated
for commanding a view of those places.
48. The method of signalling by fire, which is of the
highest utility in the operations of war, has never
before been clearly expounded ; and I think I '™ "^
shall be doing a service if I do not pass it over, but give an
accountof it adequate to its importance. Nowthat opportuneness
is of the utmost moment in all undertakings, and pre-eminently
so in those of war, no one doubts ; and of all the things which
contribute to enable us to hit the proper time nothing is more
efHcacious than fire signals. For they convey intelligence
sometimes of what has just happened, sometimes of what is
actually going on ; and by paying proper attention to them one
can get this information at three or four days' journey off, a
even more : so that it continually happens that the 1
42 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS book
required may be unexpectedly given, thanks to a message
conveyed by fire signals. Now, formerly, as the art of signalling
by fire was confined to a single method, it proved in very
many cases unserviceable to those employing it. For as it
was necessary to employ certain definite signals which had
been agreed upon, and as possible occurrences are unlimited,
the greater number of them were beyond the competence
of the fire signals to convey. To take the present instance:
it was possible by means of the isignals agreed upon to send
the information that a fleet had arrived at Oreus or Peparethos
or Chalcis; but it was impossible to express that "certain
citizens had gone over to the enemy,*' or '* were betraying the
town," or that " a massacre had taken place,'* or any of those
things which often occur, but which cannot be all anticipated.
Yet it is precisely the unexpected occurrences which demand
instant consideration and succour. All such things then were
naturally beyond the competence of fire signalling, inasmuch
as it was impossible to adopt an arbitrary sign for things which
it was impossible to anticipate.
44. Aeneas, therefore, the writer of the treatise on tactics,
The improve- wished to correct this defect, and did in fact
ment introduced make some improvement ; but his invention
by Aeneas gjju f^jj y^^y far short of what was wanted,
Xactitus • •
as the following passage from his treatise will
show.^ " Let those who wish,'* he says, " to communicate any
matter of pressing importance to each other by fire-signals
prepare two earthenware vessels of exactly equal size both as
to diameter and depth. Let the depth be three cubits, the
diameter one. Then prepare corks of a little shorter diameter
than that of the vessels : and in the middle of these corks fix
rods divided into equal portions of three fingers* breadth, and
let each of these portions be marked with a clearly distinguish-
able line : and in each let there be written one of the most
obvious and universal of those events which occur in war ;
for instance in the first * cavalry have entered the country,' in
the second * hoplites,' in the third * light-armed,' in the next
' This passage does not occur in the extant treatise of Aeneas ; but is ap-
parently referred to (ch. 7, § 4) as being contained in a preparatory treatise
(Tapa(ric6i;a4rr(ic^ /9^/3Xof).
X METHODS OF SIGNALLING 43
'inianti; and cavalry,' in another 'ships,' in another 'corn,'
and so on, until all the portions have written on them the
events which may reasonably be expected to occur in the
particular war. Then carefully pierce both the vessels in- such
a way that the taps shall be exactly equal and cany ofT the
same amount of water. Fill the vessels with water and lay the
corks with their rods upon its surface, and set both taps running
together. This being done, it is evident that if there is perfect
equality in every respect between them, both corlts will sink
exactly in proportion as the water runs away, and both rods
will disappear to the same extent into the vessels. When they
have been tested, and the rate of the discharge of water has
been found to be exactly equal in both, then the vessels
should be taken respectively to the two places from which the
two parties intend to watch for fire signals. As soon as any
one of those eventualities which are inscribed upon the rods
takes place, raise a lighted torch, and wait until the signal is
answered by a torch from the others : this being raised, both
parties are to set the taps running together. When the cork
and rod on the signalling side has sunk low enough to bring
the ring containing the words which give (he desired informa-
tion on a level with the nm of the vessel, a torch is to be
raised again. Those on the receiving side are then at once
to stop the tap, and to look at the words in the ring of the rod
which is on a level with the rim of their vessel. This will be
the same as that on the signalling side, assuming everythir^ to
be done at the same speed on both sides."
45. Now this method, though introducing a certain im-
provement in the system of tire signalling, is
still wanting in definitcness : for it is evident ^ih^'^jj^h^*
that it is neither possible to anticipate, or, if you
could anticipate, to write upon the rod every possible thing
that may happen : and therefore, when anything unexpected in
the chapter of accidents does occur, it is plainly impossible
to communicate it by this method. Besides, even such state-
ments as are written on the rods are quite indefinite ; for the
number of cavalry or infantry that have come, or the particular
point in the territory which they have entered, the number of
ships, or the amount of com, cannot be expressed F
44 THE HISTORIES OF POL YEWS book:
what cannot be known before it happens cannot have an
arrangement made for expressing it And this is the import-
ant point. For how is one to take proper measures for relief
without knowing the number or direction of the enemy?
Or how can the party to be relieved feel confidence or the
reverse, or indeed have any conception at all of the situa-
tion, if it does not know how many ships or how much com
have been despatched by the allies ?
But the last method which was hit upon by Cleoxenus and
Democlitus, and further elaborated by myself, is ,p. . ^
above all things definite, and made capable of method of
indicating clearly whatever is needed at the Qeoxenusand
moment; but in its working it requires attention DemocHtus.
and more than ordinarily close observation. It is as follows :
Divide the alphabet into five groups of five letters each (of
course the last group will be one letter short, but this will not
interfere with the working of the system). The parties about
to signal to each other must then prepare five tablets each, on
which the several groups of letters must be written. They
must then agree that the party signalling shall first raise two
torches, and wait until the other raises two also. The object
of this is to let each other know that they are attending.
These torches having been lowered, the signalling party raises
first torches on the left to indicate which of the tablets he
means : for instance, one if he means the first, two if he means
the second, and so on. He next raises torches on the right
showing in a similar manner by their number which of the
letters in the tablet he wishes to indicate to the recipient
46. This matter being agreed upon, the two parties must
go to their respective points of observation ; and each must
have, to begin with, a stenoscope with two funnels, to enable
him to distinguish through one the right, through the other
the left position of the signaller opposite him. Near this
stenoscope the tablets must be fixed, and both points, to the
right and to the left, must be defended by a fence ten feet
long and about the height of a man, in order to make it clear
on which side the torches are raised, and to hide them en-
tirely when they are lowered. These preparations completed
on both sides, when a man wishes, for instance, to send the
nba;"«»*'r3h*-^"-^v» . ==5" — .-*
X IMPROVEMENTS IN SIGNALLING 45
message " Some of our soldiers to the number of a hundred
have deserted to the enemy," — the first thing to do is to select
words that may give the same information with the fewest
letters, for instance, " A hundred Cretans have deserted," for
thus the number of letters is diminished by more than a half
and the same information is given. This sentence having been
written on a tablet will be transmitted by five signals thus :
The first letter is k, this comes in the second group of
letters and therefore on the second tablet; the signaller
therefore must raise two torches on the left to show the
recipient that he must look at the second tablet ; then he will
raise five on the right, because k is the fifth letter in the
group,* which the recipient must thereupon write on his tablet.
Then the signaller must raise four torches on the left, for p is
in that group, and two on the right, because it is the second
in the fourth group, and the recipient will write p on his tablet :
and so on for the other letters.
47. Now everything that happens can be definitely im-
parted by means of this invention ; but the number of torches
employed is large, because each letter has to be indicated by
two series of them : still, if proper preparations are made, the
thing can be adequately carried out But whichever method is
employed, those who use it must practise beforehand, in order that
when the actual occasion for putting it in use arises they may
be able to give each other the information without any hitch.
For there are plenty of instances to show what a wide difference
there is between the way an operation is carried out by men
who hear of it for the first time, and by men who have become
habituated to it Many things which were considered not
only difficult, but impossible at first, are, after an interval of
time and practice, performed with the greatest ease. I could
give many illustrations of the truth of this remark, but the
clearest may be found in the art of reading. Put side by side
* The grouping of these letters will be as follows : —
I
2
3
4
5
I
a
i
X
T
0
2
/»
V
f^
P
X
3
7
e
V
O
^
4
9
I
^
T
(tf
5
€
K
0
U
46 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS book
a man who has never learnt his letters, though otherwise acute,
and a child who has acquired the habit, and give the latter a
book, and bid him read it : the former will clearly not be in-
duced to believe that the reader has first to attend to the look
of each of the letters, secondly to their sound -value, and
thirdly to their combinations with others, each of which
operation requires a certain time. Therefore when he sees
the boy, without a pause for thought, reading off seven or five
lines at a breath, he will not easily be induced to believe
that he has not read the book before ; and certainly not, if he
is able also to obser\'e the appropriate enunciation, the
proper separations of the words, and the correct use of the
rough and smooth breathings. The moral is, not to give up
any useful accomplishment on account of its apparent diffi-
culties, but to persevere till it becomes a matter of habit,
which is the way mankind have obtained all good things. And
especially is this right when the matters in question are
such as are often of decisive importance to our safety.
I was led to say this much in connexion with my former
assertion that *'all the arts had made such progress in our
age that most of them were reduced in a manner to exact
sciences." And therefore this too is a point in which history
properly written is of the highest utility. . . .
ANTIOCHUS IN PARTHIA, B.C. 209-5. See ch. 3 1.
48. The Apasiacae live between the rivers Oxus and Tanais,
The entrance of ^^ former of which falls into the Hyrcanian
the Nomad Sea, the latter into the Palus Maeotis.^ Both
Scythians into ^^ large enough to be navigable; and it
^^^^^ seems surprising how the Nomads managed to
come by land into Hyrcania along with their horses. Two
accounts are given of this affair, one of them probable, the
other very surprising yet not impossible. The Oxus rises in
the Caucasus, and being much augmented by tributaries in
Bactria, it rushes through the level plain with a violent and
turbid stream. When it reaches the desert it dashes its
* Polybius confuses the Tanais (Don) with another Tanais or laxartcs
flowing into the south-east part of the Caspian.
X ANTIOCHVS CROSSES THE ARIUS 4;
stream against some precipitous rocks with a force raised to
such tiemendous proportions by the mass of its wateis, and
thedeclivity down which it has descended, that it leaps from
the rocks to the plain below leaving an interval of more than a
stade between the rock and its falls. It is through this space
that they say the Apasiacae went on foot with their horses
into Hyrcania, under the faJl, and keeping close to the rock.
The other account is more probable on the face of iL It is
said that, as the basin of the, river has extensive flats into
which it descends with violence, the force of the stream makes
hollows in them, and opens chasms into which the water
descends deep below the surface, and so is carried on for a
short way, and then reappears : and that the barbarians, being
well acquainted with the facts, make their way on horseback,
over the space thus left dry, into Hyrcania. . , .
49. News being brought that Euthydemus ' with his force
was at Tapuria, and that a body of ten thou-
, , '^ 1 - J . L Ballle on Ihe
sand horsemen were keeping guard at the nverAriusbe-
passage of the river Anus, he decided to iwem Amiochus
abandon the siege and attack these last The r^"''.""'
river was three days' march away. For two days wians.
therefore he marched at a moderate speed ; but on the third,
after dinner, he gave orders for the rest of his army to start
next day at daybreak ; while he himself, with the cavalry and
light-armed troops and ten thousand peltasts, started in the
night and pushed on at a great rate. For he was informed
that the cavalry of the enemy kept guard by day on the bank
of the river, but at night retired to a city more than twenty
stades off. Having completed therefore the rest of the way
under cover of night, the plains being excellent for riding, he
got the greater part of his array across the river by daybreak,
before the enemy came back. When their scouts told them
what had happened, the horsemen of the BacCrians hastened to
the rescue, and fell in with their opponents while on the march.
Seeing that he must stand the first charge of the enemy, the king
summoned the two thousand horsemen who were accustomed
to fight round his own person; and issuing orders that the rest
were to form their companies and squadrons, and take up the^'
' King of Bactria, sec 11, 34.
48 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS book x
usual order on the ground on which they already were, he
advanced with the two thousand cavalry, and met the charge
of the advanced guard of the Bactrians. In this engagement
Antiochus is reputed to have shown the greatest gallantry of
any of his men. There was heavy loss on both sides : the
king's men conquered the first squadron, but when a second
and a third charged, they began to be hard pressed and to
suffer seriously. At that juncture, most of the cavalry being
by this time on the ground,. Panaetolus ordered a general
advance ; relieved the king and his squadrons ; and, upon the
Bactrians charging in loose order, forced them to turn and
fly in confusion. They never drew rein before the charge of
Panaetolus, until they rejoined Euthydemus, with a loss of more
than half their number. The king's cavalry on the contrary
retired, after killing large numbers and taking a great many
prisoners, and bivouacked by the side of the river. In this
action the king had a horse killed under him, and lost some of
his teeth by a blow on the mouth ; and his whole bearing ob-
tained him a reputation for bravery of the highest description.
After this battle Euthydemus retreated in dismay with his
army to the city of Zariaspa in Bactria. . . .
BOOK XI
t. Mv reason for prefixing a table of contents to each book,
rather than a pre&ce, is not because I do not recognise the
usefulness of a preface in arresting attention and rousing
interest, and also giving facilities for finding any passage t1iat is
wanted, but because I find prefaces viewed, though from many
inadequate reasons, with contempt and neglect. I therefore
had recourse to a table of contents throughout my history,
except the first six books, arranged according to Olympiads,
as being as effective, or even more so, than a preface, and at
the same time as less subject to the objection of being out
of place, for it is closely connected with the subject-matter.
In the first six books I wrote prefaces, because I thought a
mere table of contents less suitable. . . .
Afler the battle at Baecula, Hasdnibal made good his passage
over the Western Pyrenees, and thence through the Cntnnes, B.C.
208. In the sjiring of S.c 207 he eras sed the Alps and descended
into Italy, crossed the Po, and besieged Placenlia. Thence he
sent a letter to his brother Hannibal announcing that he ivould
march southward by Ariminum and meet him in Umbria. The
Utter fell into the hands of the Consul Nero, who was at Venusia,
and who immediately made a forced march northward, joined his
colleague at Sena, and the next day attacked Hasdrubal. Sre
above, 10, 39; Livy, 27, 39-49.
Much easier and shorter was Hasdrubal's journey into
Italy. ...»
Never at any other time had Rome been in a greater state
of excitement and terrified expectation of the result. . . ?
' See Livy, a?, 39. ' Livy, 37, 44.
VOL. II U
•• 4
50 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS BOO»
None of these arrangements satisfied HasdrubaL But
„ , , , circumstances no longer admitted of delay. He
Battle of the ^, j ^ • u ..^.i j
Metaurus, ^^^ ^"^ enemy drawn out m battle array and
B.C. 207. advancing; and he was obHged to get the
Coss. c. Claudius Iberians and the Gauls who were serving with
Sai'inator II. ^^"^ ^'^^^ ^^'^^^ ^^ therefore stationed his ten
elephants on the front, increased the depth of
his lines, and so had his whole army covering a somewhat
small ground. He took up a position himself in the centre of
the line, immediately behind the elephants, and commenced
an advance upon the Roman left, with a full resolution that in
this battle he must either conquer or die. Livius advanced to
meet the enemy with proud confidence, and having come to
close quarters with him was fighting with great gallantry. Mean-
while Claudius, who was stationed on the right wing, found him-
self unable to advance and outflank the enemy, owing to the
rough ground in fronjt of him, relying on which Hasdrubal
had directed his advance upon the Roman left: and being
embarrassed by his inability to strike a blow, he promptly
decided what the circumstances pointed out as the tactics to
pursue. He withdrew his men from the right wing, and
marched them on the rear of the field of battle ; and, after
passing the left of the Roman line, fell upon the flank of the
Carthaginians who were fighting near the elephants. Up to
this point the victory had been doubtful ; for both sides fought
with desperation, the Romans believing that all would be over
with them if they failed, and the Iberians and Carthaginians
holding exactly the same conviction for themselves. Moreover
the elephants were being of disservice to both sides alike ; for
finding themselves between two forces, and exposed to a cross-
fire of javelins, they kept throwing both the Carthaginian and
Roman lines into confusion. But as soon as Claudius fell
upon the rear of the enemy the battle ceased to be equal : for
the Iberians found themselves attacked on front and rear at
once, which resulted in the greater part of them being cut
down on the ground. Six of the elephants were killed with
the men on them, four forced their way through the lines and
were afterwards captured, having been abandoned by their
Indian drivers.
XI DEATH OF HASDRUBAL 51
2. Hasdnibal had behaved on this occasion, as throughout
his whole life, like a brave man, and died
lighting : and he deserves not to be passed over |^ ,j,™bai(te *
without remark. I have already stated that
Hannibal was his brother, and on his departure to Italy
entrusted the command in Iberia to him. I have also described
his many contests with the Romans, and the many embarrassing
difficulties with which he had to struggle, caused by the generals
sent from Carthage to Iberia ; and how in all these matters he
had supported these vicissitudes and reverses in a noble spirit
worthy of a son of Barcas. But I will now speak of his last
contest, and explain why he seems to me pre-eminently to
deserve respectful attention and imitation, Most generals and
kings, when entering upon decisive battles, place before their
eyes the glory and advantages to be obtained from victory, and
frequently consider and contrive what use they will make of
every success ; but they do not go on to review the chances
of failure, nor contemplate the plan to be adopted, or the
action to be taken, in the case of reverse. Vet the former is
obvious, the latter requires foresight. Therefore it is that most
of them, though in many instances their soldiers have fought
nobly, by their own folly and imprudence in this respect have
added dishonour to defeat : have disgraced their previous
achievements, and rendered themselves, during the remainder
of their lives, objects of reproach and contempt. It is easy to
see that many leaders make this fatal mistake, and that the
difference between one man and another in these points is
most signal ; for history is full of such instances. Hasdnibal,
on the contrary, as long as there was reasonable hope of being
able to accomplish anything worthy of his former achievements,
regarded bis personal safety in battle as of the highest conse-
quence ; but when Fortune deprived him of all hopes for the
future, and reduced him to the last extremities, though
neglecting nothing either in his preparations or on the field
that might secure him the victory, nevertheless considered
how, in case of total overthrow, he might face his fate and
suffer nothing unworthy of his past career.
These remarks are meant for those engaged in active
Operations, that they may neither dash the hopes of those whr
52 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS book
rely upon them by a heedless seeking of danger, nor by an
unworthy clinging to life add disgrace and shame to the
catastrophies which befall them.
8. Having won the victory, the Romans began pillaging the
enemy's camp ; and killed a number of the Celts, as they lay
stupefied with drunkenness in their beds, like unresisting
victims. Then they collected the rest of the booty, from
which more than three hundred talents were paid into the
treasury. Taking Carthaginians and Celts together, not less
than ten thousand were killed, and about two thousand
Romans. Some of the principal Carthaginians were taken
prisoners, but the rest were put to the sword. When the
report reached Rome, people at first could not believe it, from
the intensity of their wish that it might be true ; but when still
more men arrived, not only stating the fact, but giving full
details, then indeed the city was filled with overpowering joy ;
every temple -court was decked, and every shrine full of
sacrificial cakes and victims : and, in a word, they were raised
to such a pitch of hopefulness and confidence, that every one
felt sure that Hannibal, formerly the object of their chief
terror, could not after that stay even in Italy. . . .
A speech of iJu legate from Rhodes ^ before an assembly Oj
Aetolians at Heraclea in the autumn of B.C. 207 {see Lii% 28,
7), at the end of the summer campaign,
4. " Facts I imagine, Aetolians, have made it clear to you
that neither King Ptolemy nor the community of Rhodes,
Byzantium, Chios, or Mitylene, regard a composition with you
as unimportant. For this is not the first or the second time
that we have introduced the subject of peace to your assembly ;
but ever since you entered upon the war we have beset you
with entreaties, and have never desisted from warning you on this
subject ; because we saw that its immediate result would be
the destruction of yourselves and of Macedonia, and because
^ There is nothing to show positively that a Rhodian is the speaker : but
Livy mentions envoys from Rhodes and Ptolemy this year. For the special
attempts of the Rhodians to bring about a peace between Philip and the
Aetolians, see 5, 24, 100.
XI A PLEA FOX UNION IN GREECE S3
we foresaw in the future danger to our own countries and to that
of ail other Greeks. For as, when a man has once set a fire
alight, the result is no longer dependent upon his choice, but
it spreads in whatever direction chance may direct, guided for
the most part by the wind and the combustible nature of the
material, and frequently attacks the first author of the conflagra-
tion himself: so too, war, when once it has been kindled by a
nation, sometimes devours the first those who kindled it ; and
soon rushes along destroying everything that falls in its way,
continually gathering fresh strength, and blown into greater
heat by the folly of the people in its neighbourhood, as though
by the wind. Wherefore, men of Aelolia, considering that we,
as representatives of the whole body of the islanders and of the
Greek inhabitants of Asia, are here to beseech you to put an
end to war and to choose peace, because the matter affects
us as well as you, show your wisdom by listening to us and
yielding to our entreaties. For if you were carrying on a war
which, though profitless (and most wars are that), was yet
glorious from the motive which prompted it, and the reputa-
tion Ukely to accrue from it, you might he pardoned perhaps
for a fixed determination to continue it ; but if it is a war
of the most signal, infamy, which can bring you nothing
but discredit and obloquy, — does not such an undertaking
claim considerable hesitation on your part ? We will speak
our opinion frankly ; and you, if you are wise, will give us a
quiet hearing. For it is much better to hear a disagreeable
truth now and thereby be preserved, than to listen to smooth
things now, and soon afterwards to be ruined yourselves, and to
ruin the rest of the Greeks with you.
6. " Put then before your eyes your own folly. You
profess to be at war against Philip on behalf of the Greeks,
that they may escape from servitude to him ; but your war is
really for the enslavement and ruin of Greece. That is the
tale told by your treaty with Rome, which formerly existed
only in written words, but is now seen in full operation.
Heretofore, though mere written words, it was a disgrace to
you : but now your execution of it has made that disgrace
palpable to the eyes of all the world. Moreover, Philip merely
lends his name and serves as a pretext for the war : he is o
54 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS book
exposed to any attack : it is against his allies, — the majority of
the Peloponnesian states, Boeotia, Euboea, Phocis, Locris^
Thessaly, Epirus, — that you have made this treaty, bargaining
^ that their bodies and their goods shall belong to
the Romans, their cities and their territory to
the Aetolians. And though personally, if you took a city, you
would not stoop to violate the freebom, or to bum the build-
ings, because you look upon such conduct as cruel and bar-
barous ; yet you have made a treaty by which you have handed
over all other Greeks to the barbarians, to be exposed to the
most shameful violence and lawlessness. And all this was
hitherto kept a secret But now the fate of the people of
Oreus, and of the miserable Aeginetans, has betrayed you to
every one, — Fortune having, as though of set purpose, suddenly
brought your infatuation before the scenes.
" So much for the origin of the war and its events up to
now. But as to its result, — supposing everything to go to
your wish, — what do you expect that to be ? Will it not be
the beginning of great miseries to all Greece ?
6. " For I presume no one can fail to see that, if once the
Romans get rid of the war in Italy, — ^and this is all but done,
now that Hannibal has been confined to a narrow district in
Bruttii, — they will direct their whole power upon Greece :
professedly, indeed, in aid of the Boeotians against Philip, but
really with the view of reducing it entirely under their own
power. And if they design to treat it well when they have
conquered it, theirs will be the honour and glory; and if
badly, theirs too will be the plunder from the states they destroy,
and the power over those which they allow to survive : while
you will be calling upon the gods to witness your wrongs, when
no god will be any longer willing, nor any man be able to
help you. Now, perhaps, you ought to have foreseen all this
from the first, for that would have been your best course.
But since the future often escapes human foresight, now, at
any rate, that you have seen by actual experience what has
happened, it must be your duty to take better measures for the
future. In any case we have omitted nothing which it becomes
sincere friends to say or do. We have spoken our opinion
about the future with absolute frankness; and you we
..^
XI PHILIP IN AETOLIA AGAIN 55
u^ and entreat not to stand in the way of the freedom and
safety of yourselves or of the rest of Greece."
This speaker having, as it seemed, made a considerable
impression, he was followed by the ambassadors of Philip, who,
without malting a long speech, merely said that they were
commissioned to do one of two things, — if the Aetolians chose
peace, to accept it readily : if not, to call the gods and the
ambassadors from Greece to witness that the Aetolians, and
not Philip, ought to be held responsible for what happened
thereafter, and so to depart. . . ,
7. Philip loudly lamented his ill-fortune in having so
narrowly missed getting Altalus into his Auaius eludes
hands. . . . Philip.
Uvy, aS, 7, 8,
OnhiswaytothelakeTrichonisPhiliparrived ' '°^'
at Thermus, where there was a temple of Apollo ; phiup ai Ther-
and there he once more defaced all the sacred mua. See 5.
buildings which he had spared on his former *■'^■
occupation of the town. In both instances it was an ill-
advised indulgence of temper: for it is a mark of utter un-
reasonabTShess to commit an act of impiety against heaven
in order to gratify one's wrath against man. . . .
PHILOPOEHEN IN THE PELOPONNESE,
B.C 207
8. There are three methods followed by those who wish to
arrive at an intelligent knowledge of tactics.
The f«st iii by the sludy of history, the second ^SIS^S.
by the use of scientific treatises composed by
specblists, the third by actual experience on the field. But
of all three of these methods the Achaean commanders were
equally ignorant. . . .
A very general fault in the men was an unfortunate rivalry,
engendered by the ostentation and bad taste of the others.
They were very particular about their attendants and their
dress ; and there was a show of splendour in this, kept up by
the majority beyond their means. But to their arms they [Kiid
no attention whatever. . . .
■i
56 T^£ II/STOKJES OF POLYBIUS book
Most people, indeed, do not so much as attempt to
imitate the real achievements of those who obtain success, but,
while trying to reproduce their unimportant peculiarities^
succeed only in displaying their own frivolity. . . .
9. " Brightness in the armour," he said, " contributes much
Speech of ^o inspire dismay in the enemy ; and care
Phiiopoemen bestowed on having it made to fit properly is
urging reform, ^f ^^^^ service in actual use. This will best
be secured if you give to your arms the attention which you
now bestow on your dress, and transfer to your dress the
neglect which you now show of your arms. By thus acting,
you will at once save your money, and be undoubtedly able to
maintain the interests of your country. Therefore the man-
who is going to take part in manoeuvres or a campaign ought,
when putting on his greaves, to see that they are bright and
well-fitting, much more than that his shoes and boots are ; and
when he takes up his shield and helmet, to take care that they
are cleaner and more costly than his cloak and shirt: for
when men take greater care of what is for show, than of what
is for use, there can be no doubt of what will happen to them
on the field. I beg you to consider that elaboration in dress
is a woman's weakness, and a woman of no very high character
either ; but costliness and splendour in armour are the charac-
teristics of brave men who are resolved on saving themselves
and their country with glory."
The whole audience were so convinced by this speech and
so much struck with the wisdom of the advice, that, immediately
after leaving the council-chamber, they began pointing with scorn
at the over-dressed dandies, and forced some of them to quit
the market-place ; and what is more, in future manoeuvres and
campaigns they kept a stricter watch on each other in these
points.
10. So true it is that a single word spoken by a man of
credit is often sufficient not only to turn men
^Il!l,°^I!!«?/ ^^om the worst courses, but even to incite
own example. '
them to the noblest But when such a
speaker can appeal to his own life as in harmony with his
words, then indeed his exhortation carries a weight which
nothing can exceed. And this was above all others the case
XI PHILOPOEMEN AND MACHANIDAS yj
' with Philopoemen. For in his dress and eating, as well as in
all that concerned his bodily wants, he was plain and simple ;
in his manners to others without ceremony or pretence ; and
throughout his life he made it his chief aim to be absolutely
sincere. Consequently a few unstudied words from him were
sufficient to raise a firm conviction in the minds of his hearers;
for as he could point to his own life as an example, they
wanted little more to convince them. Thus it happened on
several occasions, that the confidence he inspired, and the
consciousness of his achievements, enabled him in a few words
to overthrow long and, as his opponents thought, skilfully
argued speeches.
So on this occasion, as soon as the council of the league
separated, all returned to their cities deeply impressed both by
the words and the man himself, and convinced that no harm
could happen to them with him at their head. Immediately
afterwards Philopoemen set out on a visitation of the cities,
which he performed with great energy and speed. He then
summoned a levy of citizens and began forming them into
companies and drilling them ; and at last, after ^^^ against
eight months of this preparation and training, he Machanidas.
mustered his forces at Mantinea, prepared to '>'™"' "f ^pana-
fight the tyrant Machanidas in behalf of the ' " '"^'
freedom of all the Peloponnesians.
11. Machanidas had now acquired great confidence, and
looked upon the determination of the Achaeans
._ , , i_i . i_- 1 A Baltic of Mantinea.
as extremely favourable to his plans. As soon ^^ ^
as he heard of their being in force at Mantinea,
he duly harangued his Lacedaemonians at Tegea, and the very
next morning at daybreak advanced upon Mantinea. He led
the right wing of the phalanx himself; his mercenaries marched
in two parallel columns on each side of his front ; and behind
them were carts carrying quantities of field artillery and bolts for
the catapults. Meanwhile Philopoemen too had arranged his
army in three divisions, and was leading them out of Mantinea,
the Illyrians and the men witli body armour by the gale lead-
ing to the temple of Poseidon, and with them -^^ ^^^ ,„
all the rest of the foreign contingent and light- Tegea. Sec Paus.
armed troops ; by the next gate, toward the west, ^' '*" ''■
58 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS book
the phalanx; and by the next the Achaean cavalry. He sent,
his light-armed men forward to occupy the hill, which rises
to a considerable height above the road called Xenis and the
above-mentioned temple : he stationed the men with body
armour next, resting on this hill to the south ; next them the
Illyrians ; next them, in the same straight line, the phalanx,
drawn up in companies, with an interval between each, along
the ditch which runs towards the temple of Poseidon, right
through the middle of the plain of Mantinea, until it touches
the range of mountains that forms the boundary of the
territory of the ElisphasiL Next to them, on the right wing,
he stationed the Achaean cavalry, under the command of
Aristaenetus of Dyme ; while on the left wing he led the whole
of the foreign contingent, drawn up in lines one behind the
other.
12. As soon as the enemy were well in sight, Philopoemen
went down the ranks of the phalanx, and addressed to them an
exhortation which, though short, clearly pointed out to them
the nature of the battle in which they were engaged But
most of what he said was rendered inaudible by the answering
shouts of the troops. The affection and confidence of the
men rose to such a pitch of enthusiasm and zeal that they
seemed to be almost acting under a divine inspiration, as
they cried out to him to lead them on and fear nothing.
However he tried, when he could get the opportunity, to
make this much clear to them, that the battle on the one
side was to establish a shameful and ignominious servitude,
on the other to vindicate an ever- memorable and glorious
liberty.
Machanidas at first looked as though he meant to attack the
enemy's right wing in column ; but when he got
MachsmkiaT^ within moderate distance he deployed into line
by the right, and by this extension movement
made his right wing cover the same amount of ground as the
left wing of the Achaeans, and fixed his catapults in front of
the whole force at intervals. Philopoemen understood that
the enemy's plan was, by pouring volleys from the catapults
into his phalanx, to throw the ranks into confusion : he there-
fore gave him no time or interval of repose, but opened the
XI BATTLE OF MANTJNEA S9
engagement by a vigorous charge of his TarentJnes^ close
to the temple of Poseidon, where the ground
was flat and suitable for cavalry. Whereupon '^'u^"!™'^"
Machanidas was constrained to follow suit by charges.
sending his Tarentines forward also.
IS. At first the struggle was confined to these two forces,
and was maintained with spirit But the light -armed
troops coining gradually to the support of such of them as
were wavering, in a very short time the whole of the mercen-
aries on either side were engaged. They fought sometimes
in close order, sometimes in pairs : and for a long time so en-
tirely without decisive result, that the rest of the two armies,
who were watching in which direction the cloud of dust inclined,
could come to no conclusion, because both sides maintained
for a long while exactly their original ground. Defeat of ihe
But after a time the mercenaries of the tyrant Achaean right
began to get the better of the struggle, from "'"8-
their numbers, and the superiority in skill obtained by long
practice. And this is the natural and usual resulL The
citizens of a democracy no doubt bring more enthusiasm to
their battles than the subjects of a tyrant ; but in the same
proportion the mercenaries of sovereigns are naturally superior
and more efficient than those of a democracy. For in the
former case one side is fighting for liberty, the other for a
condition of servitude ; but in the case of mercenaries, those
of the tyrant are encouraged by the certain prospect of reward,
those of a democracy know that they must lose by victory :
for as soon as a democracy has crushed its assailants, it no
longer employs mercenaries to protect its liberties ; while a
tyranny requires more mercenaries in proportion as its field
of ambition is extended : for as the persons injured by it are
more numerous, those who plot against it are more numerous
also; and the security of despots rests entirely on the
loyalty and power of mercenaries.
14. Thus it came about that the mercenaries in the army
of Machanidas fought with such fury and violence, that even
6o THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS noojt.
the Illyrians and men with body armour, who formed the
reserve supporting the mercenaries of the Achaean army, were
unable to withstand their assault; but were all driven from
their position, and fled in confusion towards the city of
Mantinea, which was about seven stades distant
And now there occurred an undoubted instance of what
some doubt, namely, that the issues in war are for the most p>art
decided by the skill or want of skill of the commanders. For
though perhaps it is a great thing to be able to follow up a
first success properly, it is a greater thing still that, when the
first step has proved a failure, a man should retain his presence
of mind, keep a good look-out for any error of judgment on
the part of the victors, and avail himself of their mistakes.
At any rate one often sees the side, which imagines itself to
have obtained a clear victory, ultimately lose the day ; while
those who seemed at first to have failed recover themselves
by presence of mind, and ultimately win an unexpected victory.
Both happened on this occasion to the respective leaders.
The whole of the Achaean mercenaries having been driven
Machanidas ^o"^ ^^^^ ground, and their left wing having been
pursues the fugi- thoroughly broken up, Machanidas abandoned
lives, and thus jjjg original plan of winning the day by out-
allows tne /vcnaean /^i*.« •.« ^i«^ «
hopUtes to get nankmg the enemy with some of his forces and
between him and charging their front with others, and did neither ;
his quarters, jj^^ quite losing his head, rushed forward heed-
lessly with all his mercenaries in pursuit of the fugitives, as
though the panic was not in itself sufficient to drive those who
had once given way up to the town gates.
15* Meanwhile the Achaean general was doing all he could
to rally the mercenaries, addressing the officers by name, and
urging them to stand ; but when he saw that they were hope-
lessly beaten, he did not run away in a panic nor give up the
battle in despair, but, withdrawing under cover of his phalanx,
waited until the enemy had passed him in their pursuit, and left
the ground on which the fighting had taken place empty, and
then immediately gave the word to the front companies of the
phalanx to wheel to the left, and advance at the double, without
breaking their ranks. He thus swiftly occupied the ground
abandoned by his mercenaries, and at once cut off the pursuers
Xt DEFEAT OF THE LACEDAEMONIANS 6i
from returning, and got on higher groun<l than the enemy's
right wing. He exhorted the men to keep up their courage,
and remain where they were, until he gave the word for a
general advance ; and he ordered Folybius of Megalopohs ' to
collect such of the Illyrians and body armour men and mer-
cenaries as remained behind and had not taken part in the
flight, and form a reserve on the flank of the phalanx, to Iceep
a look-out against the return of the pursuers.
Thereupon the Lacedaemonians, excited by the "^ dyk'c^' ' '
victory gained by the light-armed contingent,
without waiting for the word of command, brought their sarissae
to the charge and rushed upon the enemy. But when in the
course of their advance they reached the edge of the dyke,
beii^ unable at that point to change their purpose and retreat
when at such close quarters with the enemy, and partly because
they did not consider the dyke a serious obstacle, as the slope
down to it was very gradual, and it was entirely without water
or 'underwood growing in it, they continued their advance
through it without stopping to think.
16. The opportunity for attack which Fhilopoemen had
long foreseen had now arrived. He at once ordered the
phalanx to bring their sarissae to the charge and advance. The
men obeyed with enthusiasm, and accompanied their charge
with a ringing cheer. The ranks of the Lacedaemonians had
been disorganised by the passage of the dyke, and as they
ascended the opposite bank they found the enemy above them
They lost courage and tried to fly ; but the greater number
of them were killed in the ditch itself, partly by the Achaeans,
and partly by trampling on each other. Now this result was
not unpremeditated or accidental, but strictly owing to the
acuteness of the general. For Fhilopoemen originally took
ground behind the dyke, not to avoid fighting, as some
supfKJsed, but from a very accurate and scientific calcu-
lation of strategical advantages. He reckoned either that
Machanidas when he arrived would advance without think-
ing of the dyke, and that then his phalanx would get
entangled, just as I have described their actually doing ; or
that if he advanced with a full apprehension of the difficulty
62 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS boom
presented by the dyke, and then changing his mind and
deciding to shrink from the attempt, were to retire in loose
order and a long straggling column, ^ the victory would be his,
without a general engagement, and the defeat his adversary's.
For this has happened to many commanders, who having
drawn up their men for battle, and then concluded that they
were not strong enough to meet their opponents, either from
the nature of the ground, the disparity of their numbers, or for
other reasons, have drawn off in too long a line of march, and
hoped in the course of the retreat to win a victory, or at least get
safe away from the enemy, by means of then: rear guard alone.
17. However, Philopoemen was not deceived in his prog-
nostication of what would happen ; for the Lacedaemonians
were thoroughly routed. Seeing therefore that his phalanx was
victorious and that he had gained a complete and brilliant
success, he set himself vigorously to secure the only thing
wanting to complete it, that is, to prevent the
mumi^' from escape of Machanidas. Seeing therefore that,
the pursuit, is in the course of the pursuit, he was caught
killed while trying between the dyke and the town with his
^ '^ dyke^ ^ ^ mercenaries, he waited for him to attempt a
return. But when Machanidas saw that his army
was in full retreat, with the enemy at their heels, he knew that
he had advanced too far, and had lost his chance of victory :
he therefore rallied the mercenaries that he had with him, and
tried to form close order, and cut his way through the enemy,
while they were still scattered and engaged in the pursuit
Some of his men, understanding his plan and seeing no other
hope of safety, kept by him at first ; but when they came upon
the ground, and saw the Achaeans guarding the bridge over the
dyke, they lost heart ; and the whole company began falling
away from him, each doing the best he could to preserve his
own life. Thereupon the tyrant gave up all hope of making
his way over the bridge ; and rode along the edge of the dyke,
trying with all his might to find a place which he could cross.
^ The text is certainly corrupt here, and it is not clear what the general
sense of the passage is beyond this, — that Philopoemen calculated on defeating
the enemy, as he did, while struggling through the dyke : or on their exposing
themselves to attack if they retreated from the dyke without crossing it.
Xt FALL OF MACHANIDAS 63
18. Fhilopoemen recognised Machanidas by his purple
cloak a.nd the trappings of his horse. He at Death of
once left Anaxidamus, with orders to guard the Machanidas and
bridge with vigilance, and give no quarter to '^^i""'^ "^ ^*8'*'
any of the mercenaries ; because they were the men on whom
the despots of Sparta always depended for supporting their
power. Then taking Polyaenus of Cyprus and Simias, who were
attending on him at the time, he rode along the edge of the
ditch opposite to that in which the tyrant and his attendants
were; for Machanidas had still two men with him, Arexidamus
and one of the mercenaries. As soon as Machanidas had found
a spot in the dyke which could be crossed, he put spurs to his
horse, and tried to force it to go on and get over, I'hen
Philopoemen turned suddenly round upon him and dealt him
a mortal wound with his spear, and a second with a stab from
the spike at the butt end of it, and thus killed the tyrant in a
hand-to-hand encounter. Those who were riding with him
did the same to Arexidamus ; but the third man seeing their
fall gave up the idea of crossing the dyke and escaped, Simias
immediately stripped the bodies of the two who had fallen,
and with their armour carried off also the tyrant's head, and
then hurried off to overtake the pursuing parly; being eager to
give the soldiers ocular evidence of the fall of the enemy's
commander, that they might continue the pursuit of their
opponents with all the more confidence and spirit right up
to Tegea, And this in fact added so greatly to the spirit of
the men that it contributed more than anything else to their
carrying Tegea by assault, and pitching their
camp next day on the Eurotas, undisputed Lac™a '"
masters of all the open country. For many
years past they had been vainly trying to drive the enemy
from their own borders, but now they were themselves de-
vastating Laconia without resistance, without having lost any
great number of their own men in the battle ; while they had
killed not less than four thousand Lacedaemonians, taken even
more prisoners, and possessed themselves of all their baggage
and arms. . . .
19. What profit is it to our re.iders to describe wars and
64 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS book
battles, the storming of cities and the enslavement of their
inhabitants, if they are to know nothing of the causes which
conduce to success and failure ? The results of such operations
merely touch the fancy : it is the tracing of the designs of the
actors in such scenes that is really instructive ; and above all
it is the following in detail of each step that can educate the
ideas of the student . . .
ABILITY OF HANNIBAL. See Livy, 28, 12
Who could refrain from speaking in terms of admiration 01
this great man's strategic skill, courage, and ability, when one
looks to the length of time during which he displayed those
qualities ; and realises to one's self the pitched battles, the
skirmishes and sieges, the revolutions and counter-revolutions
of states, the vicissitudes of fortune, and in fact the course of
his design and its execution in its entirety ? For sixteen con-
o tinuous years Hannibal maintained the war with
Rome in Italy, without once releasing his army
from service in the field, but keeping those vast numbers
under control, like a good pilot, without any sign of disaffection
towards himself or towards each other, though he had troops
in his service who, so far from being of the same tribe, were not
even of the same race. He had Libyans, Iberians, Ligurians,
Celts, Phoenicians, Italians, Greeks, who had naturally nothing
in common with each other, neither laws, nor customs, nor
language. Yet the skill of the commander was such, that
these differences, so manifold and so wide, did not disturb the
obedience to one word of command and to a single will. And yet
circumstances were not by any means unvarying : for though
the breeze of fortune often set strongly in his favour, it as often
also blew in exactly the opposite direction. There is therefore
good ground for admiring Hannibal's display of ability in
campaign ; and there can be no fear in saying that, if he had
reserved his attack upon the Romans until he had first subdued
other parts of the world, there is not one of his projects which
would have eluded his grasp. As it was, he began with those
whom he should have attacked last, and accordingly began
and ended his career with them. . . .
THE HANNIBALIAN WAR CONTINUED
SCIPIO IN SPAIN, AFTER THt BATTLE OF THE METAURUS
20. Hasdnibal having collected his forces from the various
towns in which they had wintered, advanced to
within a short distance of Hipa and there en-^^o^cITpf
camped ; forming his entrenchment at the near iiipa (or
foot of the mountains, with a plain in front of ^'P'^} '" ^^^o*-
him well suited for a contest and battle. His Lj^'^aa'^fa-e
infantry amounted to seventy thousand, his
cavalry to four thousand, and his elephants to thirty-two.
On his part, Scipio sent M. Junius Silanus to
visit Colichas and take over from him the forces "^^1°^^^
that had been prepared by him. These
amounted to three thousand infantry and five hundred horse.
The other allies he received personally in the course of his
march up the country to his destination. When he approached
Castalo and Baecula, and had there been joined by Marcus
Junius and the troops from Colichas, he found himself in a
]>osition of great perplexity. For without their allied the
Roman forces were not strong enough to risk a battle ; yet
to do so, in dependence upon the allies for his hopes of ultimate
success, appeared to him to be dangerous and too venturesome.
In spite however of his perplexity, he was obliged to yield to
the force of circumstances so far as to employ the Iberians ;
but he resolved to do so only to make a show of numbers to
the enemy, while he really fought the action ^^^ encamps
with his own legions. With this purpose in his dose lo the
mind he got his whole army on the march, Carthaginian
forty-five thousand infantry and three thousand ""^^
cavalry ; and when he had come within the view of the
Carthaginians, he pitched his camp on some low bills exactly
opjwsite the enemy.
21. Mago thought that it would be an excellent moment
to attack the Romans while actually engaged
in making their camp; he therefore rode up '"'""jt^g'^''' ^*
to the entrenchment with the greater part of his
own cavalry and Massanissa with the Numidians, persuaded
that he should catch Scipio off his guard. Scipio had how-
VOL. II F
66 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS nooK
ever all along foreseen this, and had placed some cavalry
equal in number to those of the Carthaginians under cover
of some hills. Upon these making an unexpected charge,
many of the enemy's horsemen at once took to flight at the
startling appearance, and l>egan to make off"; while the rest
closed with their opponents and fought with great gallantry.
But the Carthaginians were disconcerted by the agility of some
of the Roman horsemen in dismounting, and after a short
resistance they retreated with considerable loss. The retreat
was at first conducted in good order : but as the Romans
pressed them hard, they broke up their squadrons, and fled for
safety to their own camp. This affiair gave the Romans
better spirits for engaging in a pitched battle, and had the
contrary effect on the Carthaginians. However, during the
next few days they both drew out on the intervening phin ;
skirmished with their cavalry and light-armed troops ; and, after
thus trying each other's mettle, were resolved to bring the matter
to the test of a general engagement.
22. On this occasion Scipio appears to have employed a
two-fold stratagem. Hasdrubal had been accustomed to make
his demonstrations in force somewhat late in the day, with the
Libyans in his centre, and the elephants on either wing ; while
his own practice had been to make his counter-movements some-
what later still, with the Roman soldiers on his centre opposite
the Libyans, and the Iberians on his two wings ; but the day
on which he resolved upon a general engagement,
^on^rgenerar ^\ reversing this arrangement, he greatly con-
engagement, and tributed to secure the victory for his own men, and
alters his dis- succeeded in putting the enemy at a consider-
m'aJie Sir^tilT ^^^^ disadvantage. For directly it was light he
depend upon the sent his aides with orders to the tribunes and
Italians rather men to arm, as soon as they had got their
Spa^niards breakfasts, and parade outside the camp. The
order was obeyed with alacrity because the men
suspected what was going to take place. He then sent the
cavalry and light-armed forward, with orders to advance close
to the enemy's camp, and skirmish boldly up to it ; while he
himself marched out with the infantr}', just as the sun was
appearing above the horizon ; and on reaching the middle of
DEFEAT OF MASDRUBAL SON OF CESCO
(,^
the plain, made his dispositions in the reverse order to his
usual airangement, placing the Iberians in the centre and the
Roman legionaries on the two wings.
The sudden approach of the cavaliy to their camp, and tlie
simultaneous appearance of the rest of the army getting into
order, left the Carthaginians barely time to get under arms.
Hasdrubal was therefore obliged, without waiting for the men
to get breakfast, or making any preparations, to despatcli his
cavalry and light-armed troops at once against tlie enemy's
cavalry on the plain, and to get his infantry into order on
some level ground not far from the skirts of the mountains, as
was theii custom. For a time the Romans remained quiet ;
but when the morning was getting on, and the engagement
between the light-armed troops still continued undecided,
because such of them as were forced from their ground re-
tired on their own heavy infantry and then formed again for
attack, Scipio at length thought that the time was come. He
withdrew his skirmishers through the intervals of the maniples,
and then distributed them equally between the two wings on
rear of his line, first the velites and behind them the cavalry.
He then advanced, at first in line direct ; but when he was
about a stade ' from the enemy, he ordered the Iberians to
continue the advance in the same order, while he commanded
the maniples and squadrons on the right wing to turn out-
wards to the tight, and those on the left wing to the left.
2S. Scipio with the three leading squadrons of cavalry from
the right wing, preceded by the usual number of velites and three
maniples (a combination of troops which the Romans call a
cohort), and Lucius Marcius and Marcus Junius with a similar
force from the left wing, turned the one to the left the other to
the right, and advanced at a great speed in column upon the
enemy, the troops in succession forming up and following in
column as they wheeled. When these troops were within a short
distance of tiie enemy, — the Iberians in the line direct being
still a considerable distance behind, because ihey were advanc-
ing at a deliberate pace, — lliey came into contact with the two
wings of the enemy simultaneously, the Roman forces being in
" live stadvs." \Jv<y, aCl, 14. says qain-
68 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS book
column, according to Scipio's original plan. The move-
ments subsequent to this, which resulted in the troops
on the rear finding themselves in the same line as the
troops in front, and engaged like them with the enemy,
were exactly the converse of each other — taking the right
and left wings in general, and the cavalry and infantry in par-
ticular. For the cavalry and velites on the right wing
came into line on the right and tried to outflank the
enemy, while the heavy infantry came into line on the left ;
but on the left wing the heavy infantry came into line by the
right, the cavalry and velites by the left The result of this
movement was that, as far as the cavalry and light infantry
were concerned, their right became their left. Scipio cared little
for this, but was intent on something more important, namely,
the outflanking of the enemy. For while a general ought
to be quite alive to what is taking place, and rightly so, he
ought to use whatever movements suit the circumstances.
24. When these troops were at close quarters the elephants
„- . , were severely handled, being wounded and
harassed on every side by the velites and
cavalry, and did as much harm to their friends as to their foes ;
for they rushed about promiscuously and killed every one that
fell in their way on either side alike. As to the infantry, —
the Carthaginian wings began to be broken, but the centre
occupied by the Libyans, and which was the best part of the
army, was never engaged at all. It could not quit its ground
to go to the support of the wings for fear of the attack of the
Iberians, nor could it by maintaining its position do any actual
fighting, because the enemy in front of it did not come to close
quarters. However, for a certain time the two wings fought
gallantly, because it was for them, as for the enemy, a struggle
for life and death. But now the midday heat was become in-
tense, and the Carthaginians began to feel faint, because the
unusual time at which they had been forced to come on the
field had prevented them from fortifying themselves with the
proper food ; while the Romans had the advantage in physical
vigour as well as in cheerfulness, which was especially promoted
by the fact that the prudence of their general had secured his
best men being pitted against the weakest troops of the enemy.
II CARTHAGINIANS DRIVEN FROM SPAIN 69
'Ihus hard pressed Hasdrubal's centre began to retreat : at first
step by step; but soon the ranks were broken, and the men
rushed in confusion to the skirts of the mountain ; and on the
Romans pressing in pursuit with still greater violence, they
b^an a headlong flight into their entrenchments. Had not
Providence interfered to save them, they would promptly have
been driven from their camp too ; but a sudden storm
gathered in the air, and a violent and prolonged torrent of
rain descended, under which the Romans with difficulty
elTected a return to their own camp. . . .
Many Romans lost their lives by the fire in 7^,^ Romans in
trying to gel the silver and gold which had been ihcminmgdistrici
melted and fused. . . . ofSpnin.
SCIPIO ON THE EXPULSION OF THE CARTHAGINIANS FROM SPAIN
IN CONSEQUENCE OF THE ABOVE VICTORY
When every one complimented Scipio after he had
driven the Carthaginians from Iberia, and sclpio's idea of
advised him straightway to take some rest and imnsfemn^ ihc
ease, as having put a period to the war, he *^'" '° Africa,
answered that he "congratulated them on their sanguine
hopes ; for himself he was now more than ever revolving in his
mind how to begin the war with Carthage. Up to that time
the Carthaginians had waged war upon the Romans ; but that
now fortune put it in the power of the Romans to make war
upon them. . . ."
SCIPIO S VISIT TO SVPHAX, KING OF MASAESVLIANS,
See Livy, 28, 17, 18
In his conversation with Syphax, Scipio, who was eminently
endowed by nature in this respect, conducted
himself with so much kindness and tact, that ^ovCTsirJuix"
Hasdrubal afterwards remarked to Syphax that
" Scipio appeared more formidable to him in such an interview
than in the field. ..."
70 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS book
A MUTINY IN SPAIN
25i When a mutiny broke out among part of the troops
Scipio appeases a »" the Roman camp, Scipio, though he had
mutiny in the now had a very adequate experience of the
Roman camp, at difficulties of administration, never felt him-
"24! irTihe self more at a loss how to act or in greater
autumn of B.C. embarrassment And naturally so. For as
^°^' in the case of the body, causes of mischief,
such as cold, heat, fatigue, or wounds, may be avoided
by precautions, or easily relieved when they occur ; while those
which arise from within the body itself, such as tumours or
diseases, are difficult to foresee and difficult to relieve when
they do exist, so it is, we must believe, with political and
military administration. Against plots from without, and the
attacks of enemies, the precautions to be taken and the
measures for relief may readily be learned by those who pay
the requisite attention ; but to decide on the right method of
resisting intestine factions, revolutions, and disturbances is
difficult, and requires great tact and extreme acuteness ; and,
moreover, the observation of one maxim suitable in my
opinion to all armies, states, and bodies alike, which is this :
never in such cases to allow any lengthened idleness or repose,
and least of all at a time of success and when provisions are
abundant.
Being, then, as I have all along said, a man eminently
careful, acute, and prompt, Scipio summoned a meeting of the
military tribunes and proposed a solution of the existing
troubles as follows. He said that ** he must promise the
soldiers the settlement of their pay ; and, in order to create a
belief in his promise, he must now take public steps to exact
with all speed the contributions which had been already
imposed upon the cities for the support of the whole army,
with the distinct understanding that the object of that measure
was the settlement of the pay : and these same tribunes
should return to the army and urge and entreat the men
to abandon their rebellious spirit, and come to him to receive
their pay, either singly or, if they preferred it, in a body. And
SCIP/0 SUPPRESSES A MUTINY
when this was done he would consider, as circumstances arose,
what measures it was necessary to take."
26. With this suggestion in their minds these officers
deliberated on the means of raising money ; and having
communicated their decisions to Scipio, he said that he would
now consult them on the next necessary step. They accord-
ingly resolved that they would name a day on which all were
to appear ; and that then they would pardon the general Uocly
of the men, but severely punish the instigators of the mutiny,
who were as many as thirty-five; The day having arrived, and
the mutineers having appeared to make terms and receive their
pay, Scipio gave secret instructions to the tribunes, who had
been sent on the mission to them, to meet them ; and, each
of them selecting five of the ringleaders, to greet them with
politeness and invite them, if possible, to their own tent, or,
if they could not do that, to dinner or some such enter-
tainmcnL But to the troops with him he sent round orders
to have provisions for a considerable period ready in three
days' time, because ihey were to march against the deserter
Andobales under Marcus Silanus. When they heard this
the mutineers were much emboldened, because they im-
agined that they would have everything in their own hands,
as the other troops would be gone by the time they joined
the general.
27. Upon the approach of the mutineers, Scipio gave orders
to his army to march out the next morning at _,
daybreak with their baggage. But he instructed sup prea'^ andihe
the tribunes and praefects that, as soon as they ringleaders eie-
met the mutineers, they should order their men '^"c^ha'^^*
to put down their baggage, and keep them
under arms at the city gate ; and then, placing a detachment at
each of the gates, take good care that none of the mutineers
should leave the city. The officers who had been sent to
meet the men fell in with them on their arrival, and took the
ringleaders with every appearance of civility to their own tents,
in accordance with the arrangement that had been made. At
the same time orders had been given to them to arrest the
thirty-five immediately after dinner, and to keep them in fetters :
without allowing any one in the tent to go out, except the
72 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS book
messenger who was to inform the general from each of them
that this had been accomplished.
The tribunes having done as they were ordered, at day-
break next morning, seeing that the new arrivals were collected
in the market-place, the general gave the signal for the assem-
bly of the army. The signal was as usual promptly obeyed
by all, for they were curious to see how the general would
demean himself in their presence, and what he would say to
them about the business in hand. As soon as they were come
together, Scipio sent word to the tribunes to bring their
soldiers under arms, and station them round the assembled
men. He then came forward himself. His first appearance
caused an immediate change of feeling. The
the^mutinwrs.'^ soldiers Supposed that he was still unwell, and
when they suddenly saw him, contrary to all
expectations, with all the appearance of full health and strength,
they were struck with terror.
28. He began his speech by saying that he wondered what
their grievances were, or what they looked for forward that
induced them to mutiny. For that there were three motives
only on which men usually venture to rebel against their
country and their commanders, — discontent and anger with
their officers ; dissatisfaction with their present position ; or,
lastly, hopes of something better and more glorious. " Now, I
ask you," he continued, " which of these can you allege ? It is
with me, I presume, that you are dissatisfied, because I did not
pay you your wages. But this cannot be laid to my charge ; for
while I was in office your pay was never short. The fault then
may lie with Rome that the accumulated arrears have not been
settled. Which was your proper course then in that case?
To have brought forward your complaint thus, as rebels and
enemies to the country that nurtured you, or to have come
personally to me and stated your case, and to have begged
your friends to support and help you? The latter would
have been the better plan in my opinion. In those who
serve others for pay it is sometimes pardonable to revolt
against their paymasters; but in the case of those who are
fighting for themselves, for their own wives and children, it
can in no circumstances be conceded. It is just as though, on
XI SCiriO HARAHCUES THE MUTINOUS TROOPS 73
the plea of being wronged in money matters by his own father,
a man were to come in arms to slay him from whom he re-
ceived his own life. Or perhaps you may allege that I
imposed greater hardships and dangers on you than on the
others, and gave the rest more than their share of profits and
booty. But you can neither venture to say this, nor, if you
did venture, could you prove it. What then is your grievance
against me at this moment, I should like to ask, that you have
mutinied ? I believe that not one of you will be able to express
or even conceive it
29. " Nor again can it have been any dissatisfaction with
the position of affairs. For when was any prosperity greater?
When has Rome won more victories, when have her arms
had brighter prospects than now ? But perhaps some faint-
heart will say that our enemies have more numerous advan-
tages, fairer and more certain prospects than ourselves.
Which, pray, of these enemies? Is it Andobales and
Mandonius? But which of you is ignorant of the fact that
these men first betrayed the Carthaginians and joined us,
and now once more, in defiance of their oaths and pledges,
have come forward as our opponents? It is a fine thing
surely to become the enemies of your country in reliance on
such men as these I Nor again had you any prospect of becom-
ing masters of Iberia by your own prowess : for you would not
have been strong enough, even in conjunction with Andobales,
to meet us in the field, to say nothing of doing so without
such aid. I should like then to ask, — what was it in which
you trusted ? Surely not in the skill and valour of the leaders
whom you have now elected, or in the fasces and axes which
were borne in front of them, — men of whom I will not deign
to say even another word. All this, my men, is absolutely
futile ; nor will you be able to allege even the smallest just
complaint against me or your country. Wherefore I will
undertake your defence to Rome and myself, by putting for-
ward a plea which all the world will acknowledge to hold good.
And it is that, a crmcd is a'tr easily misled and easily inditced
to any error. Therefore it is that crowds are like the sea,
which in its own nature is safe and quiet; but, when winds fall
violently upon it, assumes the character of the blasts which
74 THE HISTORIES OF POLY BI US book
lash it into fury : thus a multitude also is ever found to be
what its leaders and counsellors are. Acting on this con-
sideration, I and all my fellow-officers hereby offer you pardon
and amnesty for the past : but to the guilty authors of the
mutiny we are resolved to show no mercy, but to punish them
as their misconduct to their country and to ourselves deserves."
80. Just as he said these words, the soldiers, who were
posted under arms round the assembly, clashed their swords
against their shields ; and at the same instant
'ringiKiders! ^ ^^^ ringleaders of the mutiny were brought in,
stripp>ed and in chains. But such terror was
inspired in the men by the threatening aspect of the surround-
ing troops, and by the dreadful spectacle before them, that,
while the ringleaders were being scourged and beheaded, they
neither changed countenance nor uttered a sound, but re-
mained all staring open-mouthed and terrified at what was
going on. So the ringleaders of the mischief were scourged
and dragged off through the crowd dead ; but the rest of the
men accepted with one consent the offer of an amnesty from
the general and officers; and then voluntarily came forward, one
by one, to take an oath to the tribunes that they would obey
the orders of their commanders and remain loyal to Rome.
Having thus crushed what might have been the beginning
of serious danger, Scipio restored his troops to their former
good disposition. ...
Scipio at Nciv Carthage has heard of hostile mm^ements on
the part of Andobales north of tlie Ebro^ B.C. 206. See Liv}\
28, 31-34
81. Scipio at once summoned a meeting of the soldiers in
New Carthage, and addressed them on the sub-
ject of the audacious proceedings of Andobales, ^^jj? ^oi^t^
and his treachery to them ; and by dwelling at
great length on these topics he inspired the men with a very
great eagerness to attack these princes. He then proceeded
to enumerate the battles they had already fought against the
Iberians and Carthaginians combined, the Carthaginians act-
XI SCIPIO DEFEATS ANDQBALES ^l
ing as leaders in the campaigns. " Seeing," lie added, " that
you always beat them, it does not now become you to
fear defeat in a war against Iberians by themselves, and led
by Andobales. I will not therefore even accept any Iberian
of them all as a partner in the struggle, but I will undertake
the campaign by the unassisted services of my Roman soldiers :
in order to make it plain to all that it was not, as some
assert, by the aid of Iberians that we defeated the Cartha-
ginians and drove them from Iberia ; but that it was by Roman
valout and your own gallantry that we have conquered Cartha-
ginian and Celtiberian combined. Let nothing therefore dis-
turb your confidence in each other: but, if you have ever done
it before, approach this undertaking with courage undismayed.
For securing the victory I will with God's help make every
necessary provision." This speech filled the troops with such
zeal and confidence, that they presented all the appearance of
men whose enemies are in full view, and who are on the very
point of closing with them.
32. Scipio then dismissed the assembly, but on the next
day got his troops on the march, and having
reached the Ebro in ten days and crossed it, to'the'EtTO"
on the fourth day after that pitched his cnuses ii, and'in
camp near that of the enemy, with a valley be- fourteen days is
tween his own and the enemy's lines. Next 'onhe'^in^J*
day he turned some cattle that had accom-
panied his army into this valley, after giving Calus Laelius
instructions to have the cavalry ready, and some of the tri-
bunes to prepare the velites. The Iberians having at once
made an onslaught upon the cattle, he despatched some of
the velites against them. These two forces became engaged,
and reinforcements being sent to either party
from time to time, a severe infantry skirmishing '"""
took place in the valley. The proper moment for attack be-
ing now come, Caius Laelius, having the cavalry prepared as
directed, charged the skirmishers of the enemy, getting between
them and the high ground, so that the greater number o{
them were scattered about the valley and killed by the cavalry.
This event roused the barbarians to a furious desire to engage,
that they might not appear to be entirely reduced to desps'-
76 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS book
by tlieir previous defeat ; and accordingly by daybreak next
day they drew out their whole army for battle. Scipio was
quite ready to give them battle ; but when he saw that the
Iberians had come down into the valley in an imprudent
manner, and were stationing, not only their cavalry, but their
infantry also on the level ground, he waited for a time, because
he wished as many of the enemy as possible to take up a
position like that He felt confidence in his cavalry, and still
more in his infantry ; because, in such deliberate and hand-to-
hand battles as this, his men were vastly superior to the Iberians
both in themselves and in their arms.
88. When he thought the right time had come he drew
out [the velites]^ to oppose those of the
^of 's^iSr'^ enemy who occupied the foot of the hills ;
while against those who had descended
into the valley he led his main force from the camp in four
cohorts, and attacked the infantry. Caius Laelius at the
same time made a de'tour with the cavalry by the hills, which
stretched from the camp to the valley, and charged the enemy's
horse on the rear ; and so kept them occupied with fighting
him. The enemy's infantry therefore, being thus deprived ^f
the support of the cavalry, on which they had relied in
descending into the valley, were distressed and overmatched
in the battle ; while their cavalry was in much the same plight :
for, being surprised on ground of insufficient extent, they fell
into confusion, and lost more men by hurting each other than
by the hands of the enemy ; for their own infantry was pressing
upon their flank, and the enemy's infantry on their front, while
his cavalry were attacking on their rear. The battle having
taken this course, the result was that nearly all those who
had descended into the valley lost their lives ; while those who
had been stationed on the foot of the hills managed to escape.
These last were the light-armed troops, and formed about a
third of the whole army : with whom Andobales himself con-
trived to make good his escape to a certain stronghold of great
security. . . .
* The text is imperfect.
SCIF/OS RETUKN TO ROME
By further operations in this year, B. c. ao6, Scipio had
impelled Mago to abandon Spain : and towards the winter the
Roman army went into winter-quarters at Tarraco.
Having (hus put a finishing stroke to his campaigns in
Iberia, Scipio arrived at Tarraco in high spirits, „ .
bringing with him the materials of a brilliant lo Rome in
triumph for himself, and a glorious victory for ihc autumn of
his country. But being anxious to arrive in **^' ^'^-
Rome before the consular elections, he arranged for the govern-
ment of Iberia,' and, having put the army into the hands of
Junius Silanus and L. Marcius, embarked with Caius Laelius
and his other friends for Rome. . . .
ANTIOCHUS IN BACTRIA. See lO, 48, 49
34. Euthydemus was himself a Magnesian, and he an-
swered the envoy by saying that "Antiochus
was acting unjustly in trying to expel him from Euih¥danus''[a
his kingdom. He was not himself a revolted Magnesian), king
subject, but had destroyed the descendant of of Bacina, to
some who had been such, and so had obtained of^i'o^tw™''
the kingdom of Bactria," After adding more
arguments to the same effect, he urged Teleas to act as a
sincere mediator of peace, by urging Antiochus not to grudge
him the royal title and dignity, "for if he did not yield to
this demand, neither of them would be safe : seeing that great
hords of Nomads were close at band, who were a danger to
both ; and that if they admitted them into the country, it
would certainly be utterly barbarised," With these words
he sent Teleas back to Antiochus. The king had long been
looking about for some means of ending the controversy; and
when he was informed by Teleas of what Euthydemus had
said, he readily admitted these picas for a pacification. And
after several journeys of Teleas to and fro between the two,
Euthydemus at last sent his son Demetrius to confirm the
' Handing it over (o L. l^enlulus and I.. Manlius Acidinus, Livy. aS. 3B.
78 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS book xi
terms of the treaty. Antiochus received the young prince; and
judging from his appearance, conversation, and the dignity of
his manners that he was worthy of royal power, he first pro-
mised to give him one of his own daughters, and secondly
conceded the royal title to his father. And having on the other
points caused a written treaty to be drawn up, and the terms
of the treaty to be confirmed on oath, he marched away ; after
liberally provisioning his troops, and accepting the elephants
. , belonging to Euthydemus. He crossed the
tinues his march Caucasus^ and descended into India ; renewed
into the interior his friendship with Sophagasenus the king of
of Asia. jj^g Indians ; received more elephants, until he
had a hundred and fifty altogether; and having once more
provisioned his troops, set out again personally with his army :
leaving Androsthenes of Cyzicus the duty of taking home the
treasure which this king had agreed to hand over to him.
Having traversed Arachosia and crossed the river Enymanthus,
he came through Drangene to Carmania ; and, as it was now
winter, he put his men into winter quarters there. This was
the extreme limit of the march of Antiochus into the interior :
in which he not only reduced the up-country Satraps to
obedience to his authority, but also the coast
B.C. 212-205 cities, and the princes on this side Taurus ; and,
in a word, consolidated his kingdom by over-
awing all his subjects with the exhibition of his boldness and
energy. For this campaign convinced the Europeans as well
as the Asiatics that he was worthy of royal power. . . .
^ That is the Caucasus Indicus or Paropamisus : mod. Hindu Kush.
CRITICISM OF TIMAEUS
1. BvzAciA is near the Syrtes; it has a circumference of two
thousand stades, and is circular in shape. . . .
Hippo, Singa, Tabraca, are cities in Libya. Chalkeia,
however, is not, as E>emosthenes ignorantly stales, the name
of a city, but memis only a " bronze-factory." . . .
2. The lotus is not a large tree ; but it is rough and thorny,
and has a green leaf, tike the rhamnus (black or
white thorn), a little longer and broader. The i^J.'^"'"^ ,^
fruit is like white myrtle-berries when they are
come to perfection; but, as it grows, it becomes purple in colour,
and in size about equal to round olives, and has a very small
stone. When it is ripe they gather it : and some of it they
pound up with groats of spelt, and store in vessels for their
slaves ; and the rest they also preserve for the free inhabitants,
after taking out the stones, and use it for food. It tastes like
a fig or a date, but is superior to them in aroma. A wine is
made of it also by steeping it in water and crushing it, sweet
and pleasant to the taste, like good mead ; and they diink it
without mixing it with water. It will not keep, however, more
than ten days, and they therefore only make It in small
quantities as they want it Vinegar also is made out of it. , . .
S. I'he excellence of the soil of Libya must excite our
8o THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS
admiration. But one would feel inclined to say of Timaeus,
Misstatements of "^t merely that he had never studied the
Timaeus about country, but that he was childish and entirely
Libya, unintelligent in his notions ; completely en-
slaved to those old traditional stories of Libya being wholly
sandy, parched, and barren. The same too holds good about
its animals. The supply of horses, oxen, sheep, and goats
in it is beyond anything to be found in any other part of the
world ; because many of the tribes in Libya do not use culti-
vated crops, but live on and with their flocks and herds.
Again what writer has failed to mention the vast number and
strength of its elephants, lions, and panthers, or the beauty of
its buffalos, or the size of its ostriches ? Of these not one is
to be found in Eurot)e, while Libya is full of them. But
Timaeus, by passing them over without a word, gives, as though
purposely, an impression exactly the reverse of the truth.
And just in the same random way in which he has spoken
, ^ about Libya, he has also done about the island
and Corsica, n j ^ t- i .• . .^ .
called Cyrnus. ror, when mentioning it m
his second book, he says that wild goats, sheep, wild oxen,
stags, hares, wolves, and some other animals are plentiful
in it ; and that the inhabitants employ themselves in hunting
them, and in fact spend most of their time in that pursuit.
Whereas in this island there are not only no wild goats or wild
oxen, but not even hare, wolf, or stag, or any animal of the
sort, except some foxes, rabbits, and wild sheep. The rabbit
indeed at a distance looks like a small. hare; but when taken
in the hand, it is found to be widely different both in appear-
ance and in the taste of its flesh ; and it also lives generally
underground.
4. The idea, however, of all the animals in the island
being wild, has arisen in the following way:
bUmS°^ The caretakers cannot keep up with their
animals, owing to the thick woods and rocky
broken nature of the country; but, whenever they wish to collect
them, they stand on some convenient spots and call the beasts
together by the sound of a trumpet ; and all of them flock
without fail to their own trumpets. Now, when ships arrive at
the coast, and the sailors see goats or cattle grazing without
XII THE ITALIAN SWINEHERDS 8i
any one with them, and thereupon try to catch them, the
animals will not let them come near them, because they are not
used to them, but will scamper off. But as soon as the keeper
sees the men disembarking and sounds his trumpet, they alt
set off running at full speed and collect round the trumpet
This gives the appearance of wildness ; and Timaeus, who
made only careless and |>erfunctory inquiries, committed him-
self to a random statement.
Now this obedience to the sound of a trumpet is
nothing astonishing. For in Italy the swine-
herds manage the feeding of their pigs in the ^^jn^ua^^"^
same way. They do not follow close behind
the beasts, as in Greece, but keep some distance in front of
them, sounding their horn every now and then ; and the ani-
mals follow behind and run together at the sound. Indeed,
the complete familiarity which the animals show with the
particular hom to which they belong seems at first astonishing
and almost incredible. For owing to the populousness and
wealth of the country, the droves of swine in Italy are ex-
ceedingly la^e, esjiecially along the sea' coast of the Tuscans
and Gauls : for one sow will bring up a thousand pigs, or some-
times even more. They therefore drive them out from their
night styes t6 feed, according to their litters and ages. Whence,
if several droves are taken to the same place, they cannot
preserve these distinction of litters ; but they of course get
mixed up with each other, both as they are being driven out,
and as they feed, and as they are being brought home.
Accordingly the device of the hom-btowing has been invented
to separate them, when they have got mixed up together, with-
out labour or trouble. For as they feed, one swineherd goes
in one direction sounding his horn, and another in another :
and thus the animals sort themselves of their own accord, and
follow their own horns with such eagerness that it is impossible
by any means to stop or hinder them. But in Greece, when
the swine get mixed up in the oak forests in their search for
the mast, the swineherd who has most assistants and the best
help at his disposal, when collecting his own animals, drives off
bis neighbour's also. Sometimes too a thief lies in wait, and
drives them ofT without the swineherd knowing how he lost
82 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS BOOK
them ; because the beasts straggle a long way from their driven^
in their eagerness to find acorns, when they are just beginning
to fall . . .
4. (a) It is difficult to pardon such errors in Timaeus,
False criticisms considering how Severe he is in criticising the
of Timaeus on sHps of Others. For instance he finds fault with
Thcopompus and 'j^heopompus for Stating that Dionysius sailed
•p orus. {^Q,^ Sicily to Corinth in a merchant vessel,
whereas he really arrived in a ship of war. And again he falsely
charges Ephorus with contradicting himself, on the ground
that he asserts that Dionysius the Elder ascended the throne
at the age of twenty-three, reigned forty-two years, and died at
sixty-three. Now no one would say, I think, that this was a
blunder of the historian, but clearly one of the transcriber.
For either Ephorus must be more foolish than Coroebus and
Margites, if he were unable to calculate that forty-two added
to twenty-three make sixty-five ; or, if that is incredible in the
case of a man like Ephorus, it must be a mere mistake of the
transcriber, and the carping and malevolent criticism of
Timaeus must be rejected
(b) Again, in his history of Pyrrhus, he says that the Romans
His false account Still keep up the memory of the fall of Troy by
of the October shooting to death with javelins a war-horse on
horse. ^ certain fixed day, because the capture of Troy
was accomplished by means of the " Wooden Horse." This
is quite childish. On this principle, all non-Hellenic nations
must be put down as descendants of the Trojans ; for nearly
all of them, or at any rate the majority, when about to
commence a war or a serious battle with an enemy, first kill
and sacrifice a horse. In making this sort of ill-founded
deduction, Timaeus seems to me to show not only want of
knowledge, but, what is worse, a trick of misapplying knowledge.
For, because the Romans sacrifice a horse, he immediately
concludes that they do it because Troy was taken by means of
a horse.
if) These instances clearly show how worthless his account
of Libya, Sardinia, and, above all, of Italy is ; and that, speak-
XII THE ERRORS OF TIMAEVS 83
ing generally, he has entirely neglected the most important
element in historical investigation, namely, the _.
, . , . ° „ ' .■ . 1 The reason of his
making pereonal iiflTurmii. For as histoncal misiaites a want
events take place in many different localities, and of care in making
as it is impossible for the same man to be in inquiries.
several places at the same time, and also impossible for him
to see with his own eyes all places in the world and observe
their peculiarities, the only resource left is to ask questions
of as many people as possible ; and to believe those who are
worthy of credit ; and to show critical sagacity in judging of
their reports.
(tf) And though Timaeus makes great professions on this
head,heappearstometo be veryferfrom arriving j^^^ .^ he 10 be
atthe truth. Indeed, so far from making accurate misted even in
investigations of the truth through other people, maiiers that fell
he does not tell us anything trustworthy even of T''^'^ ^\^ '™''
events of which he has been an eye-witness, or
of places he has personally visited. This will be made evident,
if we can convict him of being ignorant, even in his account
of Sicily, of the facts which he brings forward. For it will
require very little further proof of his inaccuracy, if he can be
shown to be ill-informed and misled about the localities in
which he was bom and bred, and that too the most famous
of them. Now he asserts that the fountain Arethusa at
Syracuse has its source in the Peloponnese, from .
the river Alpheus, which flows through Arcadia
and Olympia. For that this river sinks into the earth, and,
after being carried for four thousand stades under the Sicilian
Sea, comes to the surface again in Syracuse ; and that this was
proved from the fact that on a certain occasion a storm of
rain having come on during the Olympic festival, and the
river having flooded the sacred enclosure, a quantity of dung
from the animals used for sacrifice at the festival was thrown
up by the fountain Arethusa ; as well as a certain gold cup,
which was pi(!ked up and recognised as being one of the
ornaments used at the festival. . . .
6. I happened to have visited the city of the Ix>crians or
84 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS book
several occasions, and to have been the means of doing them
The traditions of important services. For it was I that secured
the colonisation of their exemption from the service in Iberia and
Locri Epizcphyrii Dalmatia, which, in accordance with the treaty,
a^^ounrSn Ari^s- ^^^ ^'^'"^ bound to supply to the Romans.
totie, rather than And being released thereby from considerable
whh that of hardship, danger, and expense, they rewarded
me with every mark of honour and kind-
ness. I have therefore reason to speak well of the Locrians
rather than the reverse. Still I do not shrink from saying
and writing that the account of their colonisation given by
Aristotle is truer than that of Timaeus. For I know for
certain that the inhabitants themselves acknowledge that the
report of Aristotle, and not of Timaeus, is the one which they
have received from their ancestors. And they give the follow-
ing proofs of this. In the first place, they stated that every
ancestral distinction existing among them is traced by the female
not the male side.^ For instance, those are reckoned noble
among them who belong to "the hundred families"; and these
** hundred families " are those which were marked out by the
Ix)crians, before embarking upon their colonisation, as those
from which they were in accordance with the oracle to select the
virgins to be sent to Ilium. Further, that some of these women
joined the colony : and that it is their descendants who are
now reckoned noble, and called "the men of the hundred
families." Again, the following account of the " cup-bearing "
priestess had been received traditionally by them. When they
ejected the Sicels who occupied this part of Italy, finding that
it was a custom among them for the processions at their sacri-
fices to be led by a boy of the most illustrious and high-bom
family obtainable, and not having any ancestral custom of their
own on the subject, they adopted this one, with no other improve-
ment than that of substituting a girl for one of their boys as cup-
bearer, because nobility with them went by the female line.
6. And as to a treaty, none ever existed, or was said
The trick of the to have existed, between them and the Lo-
Locrians. crians in Greece ; but they all knew by
tradition of one with the Sicels : of which they give the follow-
' Cp. a similar custom of the Lycians, Herod, i, 173.
X?I THE EPIZEPHYRIAN LOCRIANS 85
ing account When they first appeared, and found the Sicels
occupying the district in which they are themselves now
dwelling, these natives were in terror of them, and admitted
them through fear into the country ; and the newcomers made
a sworn agreement with them that " they would be friendly
and share the country with them, as long as they stood upon
the ground they then stood upon, and kept heads upon their
shoulders.'' But, while the oaths were being taken, they say
that the Locrians put earth inside the soles of their shoes,
and heads of garlic concealed on their shoulders, before they
swore ; and that then they shook the earth out of their shoes,
and threw the heads of garlic ofT their shoulders, arid soon
afterwards expelled the Sicels firom the country. This is the
story current at Locri. . . .
By an extraordinary oversight Timaeus of Tauromenium
commits himself to the statement that it was not customary
with the Greeks to possess slaves.' . . .
These considerations would lead us to trust Aristotle rather
than Timaeus. His next statement is still more [^o^n Epiiephyni
strange. For to suppose, with Timaeus, that it colonised by
was unlikely that men, who had been the slaves '^^. b"*^^
of the allies of the Lacedaemonians, would con- ,|,eir btxAonx, and
tinue the kindly feelings and adopt the friendships by some free
of their late masters is foolish. For when they ''"^ women.
have had the good fortune to recover their freedom, and a
certain time has elapsed, men, who have been slaves, not only
endeavour to adopt the friendships of their late masters, but
also their ties of hospitality and blood : in fact, their aim is to
keep them up even more than the ties of nature, for the express
purpose of thereby wiping out the remembrance of their former
degradation and humble position ; because they wish to pose as
the descendants of their masters rather than as their freednien.
And this is what in all probability happened in the case of the
Locrians. They had removed to a great distance from all who
knew their secret ; the lapse of time favoured their pretensions ;
and they were not therefore so foolish as to maintain any
customs likely to revive the memory of their own degradation,
< He mar have been rcrerring to
86 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS book
rather than such as would contribute to conceal it There-
fore they very naturally called their city by the name of that
from which the women came ; and claimed a relationship with
those women : and, moreover, renewed the friendships which
were ancestral to the families of the women.
And this also indicates that there is no sign of Aristotle
Th Loc • being wrong in saying that the Athenians
then w^erenaSy ravaged their territory. For it being quite
friends of Sparta natural, as I have shown, that the men who
"^^^T^^T °^ s^^^^^ ^^^"^ ^^" ^^^ landed in Italy, if they
were slaves ten times over, should adopt friendly
relations with Sparta, it becomes also natural that the
Athenians should be rendered hostile to them, not so much
from regard to their origin as to their policy.
It is not, again, likely that the Lacedaemonians should them-
selves send their young men home from the
I'omenTllSrcamp for the sake of begetting children, and
(in Greece) should refuse to allow the Locrians to do the
leaving their same. Two things in such a statement are not
^''^'"^Jj^l' "^"^ only improbable but untrue. In the first place,
they w^ere not likely to have prevented the
Locrians doing so, when they did the same themselves, for
that would be wholly inconsistent : nor were the Locrians, in
obedience to orders from them, likely to have adopted a
custom like theirs. (For in Sparta it is a traditional law, and a
matter of common custom, for three or four men to have one
wife, and even more if they are brothers ; and when a man
has begotten enough children, it is quite proper and usual for
him to sell his wife to one of his friends.) The fact is, that
though the Locrians, not being bound by the same oath as
the Lacedaemonians, that they would not return home till they
had taken Messene, had a fair pretext for not taking part in
the common expedition ; yet, by returning home only one by
one, and at rare intervals, they gave their wives an opportunity
of becoming familiar with the slaves instead of their original
husbands, and still more so the unmarried women. And this
was the reason of the migration. . . .
7. Timaeus makes many untrue statements ; and he appears
Jttl riMAEUS CRITICISES AKISTOTLE 87
to have done so, not from ignorance, but because his view was
distorted bypanyspirit When once he has made
up his mind to blame or praise, he forgets every- 'Xrisioiie''
thing else and outsteps all bounds of propriety.
So much for the nature of Aristotle's account of Locri, and the
grounds on which it rested. But this naturally leads me to
speak of Timaeus and his work as a whole, and generally of
what is the duty of a man who undertakes to write history.
Now I think that I have made it clear from what I have said,
first, that both of them were writing conjecturally ; and,
secondly, that the balance of probability was on the side of
Aristotle. It is in fact impossible in such matters to be
positive and definite. But let us even admit that Timaeus gives
the more probable account Are the maintainers of the less
probable theory, therefore, to be called by every possible term
of abuse and obloquy, and all but be put on trial for their lives ?
Certainly not. Those who make untrue statements in their ^
books from ignorance ought, I maintain, to be forgiven and 1
corrected in a kindly spirit : it is only those who do so from I
deliberate intention that ought to be attacked without mercy.
8. It must then either be shown that Aristotle's account
of Locri was prompted by partiality, corruption, or personal
enmity ; or, if no one ventures to say that, then it must be
acknowledged that those who dispkiy such personal animosity
and bitterness to others, as Timaeus does to Aristotle, are wrong
and ill advised.
The epithets which he applies to him are "audacious,"
"unprincipled," "rash"j and besides, he says
that he "has audaciously slandered Locri by '"'^■^j^^""
affirming that the colony was formed by runaway
slaves, adulterers, and man-catchers." Further, he asserts that
Aristotle made this statement, " in order that men might believe
him to have been one of Alexander's generals, and to have lately
conquered the Persians at the Cilician Gates in
a pitched battle by his own ability ; and not to
be a mere pedantic sophist, universally unpopular, who had a
short time before shut up that admirable doctor's shop." Again,
he says that he " pushed his way into every palace and tent : "
and that he was " a glutton and a gourmand, who thought
88 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS BOOK
only of gratifying his appetite." Now it seems to me that such
language as this would be intolerable in an impudent vagabond
bandying abuse in a law court ; but an impartial recorder of
public affairs, and a genuine historian, would not think such
things to himself, much less venture to put them in writing.
9. Let us now, then, examine the method of Timaeus, and
^. , compare his account of this colony, that we may
account of his learn which of the two better deserves such
investigations in vituperation. He says in the same book : " I
the history of the ^j^ j^^j ^^^ proceeding on conjecture, but have
colony of Locn. . . , , , • i r i
mvestigated the truth m the course of a personal
visit to the Locrians in Greece. The Locrians first of all showed
me a written treaty which began with the words, * as parents
to children.' There are also existing decrees securing mutual
rights of citizenship to both. In fine, when they were told of
Aristotle's account of the colony, they were astonished at the
audacity of that writer. I then crossed to the Italian Locri
and found that the laws and customs there accorded with the
theory of a colony of free men, not with the licentiousness of
slaves. For among them there are penalties assigned to man-
catchers, adulterers, and run-away slaves. And this would not
have been the case if they were conscious of having been such
themselves."
10, Now the first point one would be inclined to raise is, as
Criticism of the ^^ ^'^^^ Locrians he visited and questioned on
above statement these subjects. If it had been the case that the
of Timaeus. Locrians in Greece all lived in one city, as
those in Italy do, this question would perhaps have been
unnecessary, and everything would have been plain. But as
there are two clans of Locrians, we may ask, Which of the two
did he visit ? What cities of the one or the other ? In whose
hands did he find the treaty? Yet we all know, I suppose,
that this is a speciality of Timaeus's, and that it is in this that
he has surpassed all other historians, and rests his chief claim
to credit, — I mean his parade of accuracy in studying chronology
and ancient monuments, and his care in that department of
research. Therefore we may well wonder how he came to
omit telling us the name of the city in which he found the
treaty, the place in which it w*as inscribed, or the magistrates
XII THE INVESTIGATIONS OF TIMAEUS 89
who showed him the inscription, and with whom he conversed :
to pre\-ent all cavil, and, by defining the place and city, to
enable those who doubted to ascertain the truth. By omitting
these details he shows that he was conscious of having told a
deliberate falsehood. For that 7'imaeus, if he really had
obtained such proofs, would not have let them slip, but would
have fastened upon them with both hands, as (he saying is, is
proved by the following considerations. ^Vould a writer who
tried to establish his credit on that of Echecrates, — he mention-
ing him by name as the person with whom he had conversed,
and from whom he had obtained his facts about the Italian
Locri,^ — -tailing the trouble to add, by way of showing that he
had been told them by no ordinary person, that this man's
father had formerly been entrusted with an embassy by
Dionysius, — would such a writer have remained silent about it
if he had really got hold of a public record or an ancient
ublet ?
11. This is the man forsooth who drew out a comparative
list of the Ephors and the kings of Sparta from _
the earliest times ; as well as one comparing the oi™pk iwisilra
Archons at Athens and priestesses in Argos with
the list of Olympic victors, and thereby convicted those cities
of being in error about those records, because there was a
discrepancy of three months between them ! This again is
the man who discovered the engraved tablets in the inner
shrines, and the records of the guest-friendships on the door-
posts of the temples. And we cannot believe that such a man
could have been ignorant of anything of this sort that existed,
or would have omitted to mention it if he had found it Nor
can he on any ground expect pardon, if he has told an untruth
about it : for, as he has shown himself a bitter and uncompro-
misii^ critic of others, he must naturally look for equally
uncompromising attacks from them.
Being then clearly convicted of falsehood in these points, he
goes to the Italian Locri : and, first of all, says that the two
Locrian peoples had a similar constitution and the same
ties of amity, and that Aristotle and I'heophrastus have
maligned the city. Now I am fully aware that in going into
minute particulars and proofs on this point I shall be forced
90 THE HISTORIES OF POLY B I US book
to digress from the course of my history. It was for that reason
however that I postponed my criticism of Timaeus to a
single section of my work, that I might not be forced again
and again to omit other necessary matter. . . .
12. Timaeus says that the greatest fault in history is want
Timaeus con- ^f truth ; and he accordingly advises all, whom
demned out of he may have convicted of making false state-
his own mouth, p^gnts in their writings, to find some other
name for their books, and to call them anything they like
except history. . . .
For example, in the case of a carpenter's rule, though it
may be too short or too narrow for your purpose, yet if it have
the essential feature of a rule, that of straightness, you may
still call it a rule ; but if it has not this quality, and deviates
from the straight line, you may call it anything you like except
a rule. " On the same principle," says he, ** historical writings
may fail in style or treatment or other details; yet if they hold
fast to truth, such books may claim the title of history, but if
they swerve from that, they ought no longer to be called
history." Well, I quite agree that in such writings truth
should be the first consideration : and, in fact, somewhere
in the course of my work I have said " that as in a living
body, when the eyes are out, the whole is rendered useless, so
e, if you take truth from history what is left is
but an idle tale." I said again, however,
that "there were two sorts of falsehoods, the ignorant and
the intentional ; and the former deserved indulgence, the
latter uncompromising severity." . . . These points being
agreed upon — the wide difference between the ignorant and
intentional lie, and the kindly correction due to the one and
the unbending denunciation to the other — it will be found
that it is to the latter charge that Timaeus more than any one
lays himself open. And the proof of his character in this
respect is clear. . . .
There is a proverbial expression for the breakers of an agree-
Xil TIMAEUS ON DIVINATION 91
ment, " Locrians and a treaty." An explanation given ot this,
equally accepted by historians and the test of xh^ pmverb
the world, is that, at the time of the invasion of AMpol r^
the Heracleidae, the Locrians agreed with the owff^iai.
Peloponnesians that, if the Heracleidae did not enter by way of
the isthmus, but crossed at Rhium, they would raise a war
beacon, that they might have early intelligence and make
provisions to oppose their entrance. The Locrians, however,
did not do this, but, on the contrary, raised a beacon of peace ;
and therefore, when the Heracleidae arrived opposite Rhium,
tiiey crossed without resistance ; while the Peloponnesians,
having taken no precautions, found that they had allowed
their enemies to enter their country, because they had been
betrayed by the Locrians. . . .
Many remarks depreciatory of divination and dream inter-
pretation may be found in his writings.' But Timaeus's
writers who have introduced into their books a aitimde towaFds
good deal of such foolish talk, so far from running '.''? "! "^
down others, should think themselves fortunate
if they escape attack themselves. And this is just the position
in which Timaeus stands. He remarks that „ „. ,
" Callisthenes was a mere sycophant for writmg
stuff of this sort ; and acted in a manner utterly unworthy of
his philosophy in giving heed to ravens and inspired women ;
and that he richly deserved the punishment which he met with
at the hands of Alexander, for having corrupted the mind of
that monarch as far as he could." On the other hand, he
commends Demosthenes, and the other orators who flourished
at that time, and says that " they were worthy of Greece for
speaking against the divine honours given to Alexander ; while
this philosopher, for investing a mere mortal with the aegis and
thunderbolt, justly met the fate which befel him from the hands
ofprovidenca ..."
IS. Timaeus asserts that Demochares was guilty of
unnatural lust, and that his lips therefore were
unfit to blow the sacred fire ; and that in morals
' The leil is veiy imperfect here.
92 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS took
he went beyond any stones told by Botrys and Philaenis
and all other writers of indecent tales. Foul abuse and
shameless accusations of this sort are not only what no man of
cultivation would have uttered, they go beyond what you
might expect from the lowest brothels. It is, however, to get
credit for the foul and shameless accusations, which he is
always bringing, that he has maligned this man : supporting his
charge by dragging in an obscure comic poet. Now on what
grounds do I conjecture the falsity of the accusation ? Well,
first, from the fact of the good birth and education of
Demochares ; for he was a nephew of Demosthenes. And in
the second place, from the fact that he was thought worthy at
Athens, not only of being a general, but of the other offices
also ; which he certainly would not have obtained, if he had
got into such troubles as these. Therefore it seems to me
that Timaeus is accusing the people of Athens more than
Demochares, if it is the fact that they committed the interests
of the country and their own lives to such a man. For if it
had been true, the comic poet Archedicus would not have
been the only one to have made this statement concerning
Demochares, as Timaeus alleges : it would have been repeated
by many of the partisans of Antipater, against whom he has
spoken with great freedom, and said many things calculated to
annoy, not only Antipater himself, but also his successors and
friends. It would have been repeated also by many of his poli-
tical opponents : and among them, by Demetrius of Phalenun,
against whom Demochares has inveighed with extraordinary
bitterness in his History, alleging that "his conduct as a
prince, and the political measures on which he prided himself,
were such as a petty tax-gatherer might be proud of; for he
boasted that in his city things were abundant and cheap, and
every one had plenty to live upon." And he tells another
story of Demetrius, that "He was not ashamed to have a
procession in the theatre led by an artificial snail, worked by
some internal contrivance, and emitting slime as it crawled,
and behind it a string of asses ; meaning by this to indicate
the slowness and stupidity of the Athenians, who had yielded
to others the honour of defending Greece, and were tamely
submissive to Cassander." Still, in spite of these taunts,
XII TIMAEUS ON DEMOCHARES AND AGATHOCLES 93
neither Demetrius nor any one else has ever brought such a
charge agsunst Demochares.
14. Relying therefore on the testimony of his own country-
men, as safer ground than the virulence o( Timaeus, I feel no
hesitation in declaring that the life of Demochares is not
chargeable with such enormities. But even supposing that
Demochares had ever so disgraced himself, what need was
there for Timaeus to insert this passage in his History ? Men
of sense, when resolved to retaliate upon a personal enemy,
think first, not of what he deserves, but of what it is becoming
in them to do. So in the case of abusive language : the first
consideration should be, not what our enemies deserve to be
called, but what our self respect will allow us to call them.
But if men measure everything by their own ill temper and
jealousy, we are forced to be always suspicious of them, and
lo be ever on our guard against their exaggeration. Where-
fore, in the present instance, we may fairly reject the stories to
the discredit of Philochares told by Timaeus ; for he has put
himself out of the pale of indulgence or belief, by so obviously
allowing his native virulence to carry him beyond all bounds
of propriety in his invectives.
Ifi. For my part I cannot feel satisfied with his abuse of
Agathocles either, even admitting him to have
been the worst of men. I refer to the passage d
at the end of his History in which he asserts the aEpersiom oT
that in his youth Agathocles was "a common I'maeus.
stale, extravagantly addicted to every unnatural vice," and
that " when he died, his wife in the course of her lamentations
exclaimed 'Ah, what have I not done for you 1 what have you
not done to me?'" To such language one can only repeat
what has been already said in the case of Demochares, and
express one's astonishment at such extravagant virulence.
For that Agathocles must have had fine natural qualities is
evident from the narrative of Timaeus itself. That a man who
came as a runaway slave to Syracuse, from the potter's wheel
and smolte and clay, at the early age of eighteen, should have
within a short time advanced from that humble beginning to
be master of all Sicily, and after being a terror to the Cartha-
ginians, should have grown old in office and died in enjoyment o'
Agalhoclra
94 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS BOOK
the royal title, — does not this prove that Agathocles had some
great and admirable qualities, and many endowments and talents
for administration ? In view of these the historian ought not
to have recounted to posterity only what served to discredit
and defame this man, but those facts also which were to his
honour. For. that is the proper function of history. Blinded,
however, by personal malignity, he has recorded for us with
bitterness and exaggeration all his defects ; while his eminent
achievements he has passed over in entire silence : seeming
not to be aware that in history such silence is as mendacious
as misstatement The part of his history, therefore, which was
added by him for the gratification of his personal spite I have
passed over, but not what was really germane to his
subject . . .
16. Two young men had a dispute about the ownership of
The laws of ^ slave. This slave had been in the possession
Zaieucus. and an of one of them for a long time ; but two days
incident in their before, as he was going to the farm without his
^^for"wh?ch he" Piaster, the other laid violent hands upon him
legislated, see and dragged him to his house. When the first
Arist. PoL 2, 12). young man heard of this, he came to the house,
seized the slave, and taking him before the magistrate asserted
his ownership and offered sureties. For the law of Zaieucus
ordained that the party from whom the abduction was made
should have possession of the property in dispute, pending the
decision of the suit But the other man in accordance with
the same law, alleged that he was the party from whom the
abduction had been made, for the slave had been brought
before the magistrate from his house. The magistrates who
were trying the case were in doubt, and calling in the Cos-
mopolis ^ referred the point to him. He interpreted the law as
meaning that "the abduction was always from that party in whose
possession the property in dispute had last been for a certain
period unquestioned; but that if another abducted this
property from a holder, and then the original holder repossessed
himself of it from the abductor, this was not abduction in the
^ For this title see on 22, 19. It is found in inscriptions in Thasos, Crete,
and Cibyra. C I. G. 2163, r ; 2583 ; 4380, b*
^ M
XII THE LAfVS OF ZALEUCUS 95
sense of the law." The young man, who thus lost his case,
was not satisfied, and alleged that such was not the intention
of the legislator. Thereupon the Cosmopolis summoned him
to discuss the interpretation in accordance with the law of
Zaleucus ; that is, to argue on the interpretation of the law
with him before the court of the one thousand, and with a
halter round the neck of each : whichever should be shown
to be wrong in his interpretation was to lose his life in the sight
of the thousand. But the young man asserted that the
compact was not a fair one, for the Cosmopolis, who happened
to be nearly ninety, had only two or three years of life left,
while in all reasonable probability he had not yet lived half
his life. By this adroit rejoinder the young man turned off the
affair as a jest : but the magistrates adjudged the question
of abduction in accordance n'ith the interpretation of the
Cosmopolis. . . .
A CRITICISM ON EPHORUS AND CALUSTHENES
17. That I may not be thought to detract wantonly from
the credit of such great writers, I will mention ^ „. ^
one battle, which is at once one of the most and the baiile
famous ever fought, and not too remote in ofluus,
point of time ; and at which, above everything ^'^ 333-
else, CaUisthenes was himself present I mean the battle
between Alexander and Darius in Cilicia. He says that
"Alexander had already got through the pass called the
Cilician Gates : and that Darius, availing himself of that by the
Amanid Gates, made his way with his army into Cilicia; but on
learning from the natives that Alexander was on his way into
Syria, he followed him; and having arrived at the pass leading
to the south, pitched his camp on the bank of the river
Pinarus. The width of the ground from the foot of the
mountain to the sea was not more than fourteen stades,
through which this river ran diagonally. On first issuing from
the mountains its banks were broken, but in its course through
the level down to the sea it ran between precipitous and steep
hills." Starling with this description of the ground, he goes
on to say that "When Alexander's army faced about, and,
96 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS DOOK
retracing its steps, was approaching to attack them, Darius
and his officers determined to draw up their whole phalanx on
the ground occupied by his encampment, as it then was, and to
defend his front by the river, which flowed right along his
camp." But he afterwards says that Darius "stationed his
cavalry close to the sea, his mercenaries next along the river,
and his peltasts next resting on the mountains."
18. Now it is difficult to understand how he could have
drawn up these troops in front of his phalanx, considering that
the river ran immediately under the camp : ^ especially as their
numbers were so great, amounting, on Callisthenes's own
showing, to thirty thousand cavalry and thuty thousand
mercenaries. Now it is easy to calculate how much ground
such a force would require. At the most cavalry in a regular
engagement is drawn up eight deep, and between each
squadron a clear space must be left in the line to enable
them to turn or face about Therefore eight hundred will
cover a stade of front; eight thousand, ten stades;* three
thousand two hundred, four stades ; and so eleven thousand
two hundred would cover the whole of fourteen stades. If
therefore he were to put his whole thirty thousand on the
ground, he would have to mass his cavalry alone nearly three
times the usual depth ; and then what room is left for his
large force of mercenaries? None, indeed, unless on the
rear of the cavalry. But Callisthenes says this was not the
case, but that these latter engaged the Macedonians first.
We must therefore understand half the front, that nearest
the sea, to have been occupied by the cavalry; the other
half, that nearest the mountains, by the mercenaries. We
may by these data easily calculate the depth of the cavalry,
and the distance the river must have been from the camp to
allow of it.
Again, he says that " on the approach of the enemy Darius
himself, who was on the centre, ordered up the mercenaries
from the wing." It is difficult to see what he means by this :
for the point of junction of the mercenaries and the cavalry
* Both Curtius and Arrion seem to have found in their authorities that
Darius crossed the Pinarus. Curt. 3, 8 ; Arrian, 2, 8.
- Reckoning the stade at 600 feet (Greek).
xu THE BATTLE OF ISSUS 9?
must have been at the centre. Where and how then, and to
what point could Darius, who was himself actually among the
mercenaries, be said to " order them up " ?
Lastly, he says that " the cavalry on the right wing charged
Alexander ; and that his men stood the charge gallantly, and,
making a counter charge, kept up an obstinate fight." But he
quite forgets that there was a river between them, a river, too,
of the nature that he had just himself described.^
19. His account of the movements of Alexander are
equally vague. He says that "he crossed into Asia with
forty thousand infantry and four thousand five hundred
cavalry ; but that when he was about lo enter Cilicia he was
joined by a reinforcement of live thousand infantry and eight
hundred cavalry." From these numbers, if one were to make
the liberal allowance of three thousand absentees from the
infantry and three hundred from the cavalry on various
services, there would still remain forty-two thousand infantry
and five thousand cavalry. Starting with these numbers, he
goes on to say "that Alexander heard of the entrance of
Darius into Cilicia when he was a hundred stades away from
him, having already marched through the pass : * that he there-
fore retraced his steps through the pass, his phalanx on
the van, his cavalry next, and his baggage on the rear. But
that as soon as he had debouched upon the open country, he
gave general orders to form up into a phalanx, at first thirty-two
deep ; then sixteen ; and lastly, when they were nearing the
enemy, eight deep." Now this is a worse blunder than the
last. A stade, allowing for the distances which must be
kept on a march, and reckoning the depth at sixteen, admits
of one thousand six hundred men, each man covering six feet
It is plain, therefore, that ten stades will admit of only sixteen
thousand men, and twenty twice that number. Hence, when
Alexander caused his men to form sixteen deep, he would
have wanted a width of ground of twenty stades ; and even
then, the whole of the cavalry and ten thousand infantry
would have been unaccounted for.
20. Again, he says that Alexander was marching in line
98 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS BOOE
when he was about forty stades from the enemy. A greater
blunder it is difficult to conceive. For where could one find
a ground, and especially in Cilicia, twenty stades broad by
forty deep, for a phalanx armed with sarissae to march in line ?
It would not be easy to count all the impossibilities in the
way of such an arrangement and such a movement One
that is mentioned by Callisthenes himself is sufficient to
establish the point For he remarks that the winter torrents
which descend from the hills make so many gullies in the
plain, that, in the course of the flight, the chief part of the
Persians are said to have lost their lives in deep places of
that kind. But, it may be urged, Alexander wished to be ready
for battle as soon as the enemy were in sight But what could
be less ready than a phalanx in a disordered and straggling
line? Is it not much easier to form up a phalanx from a
proper column of route, than to bring a disordered and
straggling line back into the same alignment, and get it into
order of battle on a broken and woody ground? It was,
therefore much better to march twice or four times the
ordinary depth of a phalanx ^ in good order, for which sufficient
ground could possibly be found. And it was easy to deploy his
men quickly into the line of the phalanx, because he was able
by means of scouts to ascertain the presence of the enemy
in plenty of time. But in this case, beside other absurdities,
while bringing his men in line across the level, he did not
even (we are told) put the cavalry in front, but marched with
them in the same alignment
21. But the greatest blunder is still to come. "As soon
as Alexander,*' he says, " was within distance of the enemy
he caused his men to take up order eight deep," which would
have necessitated ground forty stades wide for the length of
the line ; and even had they, to use the poet's expression,
" laid shield to shield and on each other leaned," still ground
twenty stades wide would have been wanted, while he himself
says that it was less than fourteen. [We have also to deduct
from these fourteen stades the space occupied by the two
divisions of the cavalry, one on the left next the sea, the other
on the right] ; ^ and to allow for the fact that the whole force
^ That is, sixteen or thirty -two deep. * The text here is in hopeless confusion.
^ i
XII MISSTATEMENTS OF CALLISTHENES 99
was kept a considerable distance from the hills, to avoid being
exposed to the enemy occupying the skirts of the mountains ;
for ve know that Callisthencs represents the wing to have
been facing these, at an angle with the centre. We are also
leaving out of account the ten thousand foot, whom we showed
to be too many according to his own calculation.
The upshot is that eleven stades at most is left for the whole
length of the phalanx, even taking Calljsthenes's own account,
in which thirty-two thousand men standing shield to shield must
necessarily be drawn up thirty deep ; while he asserts that they
fought eight deep. Such blunders admit of no defence : for
the facts at once demonstrate the impossibility of the assertion.
We have only to compare the space occupied by each man,
the width of the whole ground, and the number of the men,
lo prove its falsity.
22. It would be tedious to mention all his other absurdities
in connexion with this battle. I must be content with a vei; few.
He says, for instance, that " Alexander took care in arranging
his order of battle to be himself personally opposed to Darius;
and that at first Darius was equally anxious to be opposite
Alexander, but afterwards altered his mind" But he does not
vouchsafe to tell us how these kings leamt at what part of their
respective forces they were each posted, or to what point in his
own line Darius re-transferred himself Again, how could a
phalanx mount to the edge of the river bank, when it was pre-
cipitous and covered with brushwood ? Such a piece of bad
generalship must not be attributed to Alexander, because he is
acknowledged by all to have been a skilful strategist and to
have studied the subject from childhood : we must rather
attribute it to the historian's want of ability to descern between
what is or is not practicable in such movements. So much
for Ephorus and Callisthenes. . . .
2S. Timaeus attacks Ephorus with great severity, though he
is himself liable to two grave charges — bitterness Timaeuss
in attacking others for faults of which he is him- over-esiimate or
self guilty, and complete demoralisation, shown Timoieon.
by the opinions which he expresses in his memoirs, and which
he endeavours to implant in the minds of his readers. If we
are to lay it down that Callisthencs deserved his death, what
lOO THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS book
ought to happen to Timaeus? Surely there is much more
reason for Providence to be wroth with him than with Callls-
thenes. The latter wished to deify Alexander ; but Timaeus
exalts Timoleon above the most venerable gods. The hero
of Callisthenes, again, was a man by universal consent of a
superhuman elevation of spirit; while Timoleon, far from
.having accomplished any action of first-rate importance, never
even undertook one. The one expedition which he achieved
in the course of his life took him no farther than from Corinth
to Syracuse; and how paltry is such a distance when compared
with the extent of the world! I presume that Timaeus
believed that if Timoleon, by gaining glory in such a mere
saucer of a place as Sicily, should be thought comparable to
the most illustrious heroes, he too himself, as the historian of
only Italy and Sicily, might properly be considered on a par
i with the writers of universal histor)'. This will be sufficient
' defence of Aristotle, Theophrastus, Callisthenes, Ephorus, and
Demochares against the attacks of Timaeus : and it is addressed
to those who believe that this historian is impartial and
truthful. . . .
24. We may fairly judge Timaeus on the principles which
Tlie incapacity ^^ ^^ himself laid down. According to him,
of Timaeus " pocts and historLms betray their own tastes by
for forming a ^^ incidents which they repeatedly record in
ju gmtn . ^j^^.^ writings. Thus the poet ^ by his fondness
for banqueting scenes shows that he is a glutton ; and in the
same way Aristotle, by frequently describing rich food in his
writings, betrays his love of dainty living and his greediness."
On the same principle he judges Dionysius the tyrant because
he " was always very particular in the ornamentation of his
dining-couches, and had hangings of exquisite make and
variegated colours." If we apply this principle to Timaeus,
we shall have abundant reason to think badly of him. In
attacking others he shows great acuteness and boldness ; when
he comes to independent narrative he is full of dreams,
miracles, incredible myths, — in a word, of miserable supersti-
tion and old wives' tales. The truth is that Timaeus is a proof
^ Homer, who is generally spoken of as " the poet. " We may remember
Horace (Ep, i, 19, 6) Laudibus arguitur vini vinosus Homervs.
TU TIMOLEON. PflALARIS loi
of the fact, that at times, and in the case of many men, want
of skill and want of judgment so completely destroy the value
of their evidence, that though present at and eye-witnesses of
the facts which they record, they might just as well have
been absent or had no eyes. . . .
26. The story of the brazen bull is this. It was made by
Phalaris at ARrigentum ; and he used to force „
. . ° " J ' . , , - , Tbe braien bull
men to get into it, and then by way of punish- ^^ phaiaris.
ment light a fire underneath. The metal becom-
ing thus red hot, the man inside was roasted and scorched to
death ; and when he screamed in his agony, the sound from
the machine was very like the bellowing of a bull When the
Carthaginians conquered Sicily this bull was removed from
Agrigentum to Carthage. The trap door between the shoulders,
through which the victims used to be let down, still remains ;
and no other reason for the construction of such a bull in Car-
thage can be discovered at all ; yet Timaeus has undertaken to
upset the common story, and to refute the declarations of poets
and historians, by alleging that the bull at Carthage did not come
from Agrigentum, and that no such figure ever existed there ;
and he has composed a lengthy treatise to prove this. , . .
GENERAL REMARKS ON TIMAEUS AS AN HISTORIAN
\Vhat epithet ought one to apply to Timaeus, and what word
will properly characterise him? A man of his kind appears to me
to deserve the very bitterest of the terms which he has applied
to others. It has already been sufficiently proved that he is a
carping, false and impudent writer ; and from what remains to
be said he will be shown to be un philosophical, and, in short,
utterly uninstructed. For towards the end of his twenty-first
book, in the course of his " harangue of Timoleon," he remarks
that " the whole sublunary world being divided into three parts
— Asia, Libya, and Europe. . . ."' One could scarcely be-
lieve such a remark to have come, I don't say from Timaeus,
but even from the proverbial Margites. . . .
I02 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS book
25. (a) The proverb tells us that one drop from the largest
vessel is sufficient to show the whole contents. This is
applicable to the present case. When one or two false state-
ments have been discovered in a history, and they have been
shown to be wilful, it is clear that nothing which such an
historian may say can be regarded as certain or trustworthy.
But in order to convince the more careful student, I must
speak on his method and practice in regard to public speeches,
military harangues, ambassador's orations, and all compositions
of that class; which are, as it were, a compendium of events and
an epitome of all history. Now that he has given these in his
writings with entire disregard of truth, and that of set purpose,
can any reader of Timaeus fail to be aware? He has not
written down the words actually used, nor the real drift of
these speeches ; but imagining how they ought to have been
expressed, he enumerates all the arguments used, and makes the
words tally with the circumstances, like a school-boy declaim-
ing on a set theme : as though his object were to display his own
ability, not to give a report of what was in reality said. . . .
(b) The special province of history is, first, to ascertain what
the actual words used were ; and secondly, to learn why it was
that a particular policy or argument failed or succeeded. For
a bare statement of an occurrence is interesting indeed, but not
instructive : but when this is supplemented by a statement of
cause, the study of history becomes fruitful. For it is by
applying analogies to our own circumstances that we get the
means and basis for calculating the future ; and for learning
from the past when to act with caution, and when with greater
boldness, in the present. The historian therefore who omits
the words actually used, as w^ell as all statement of the
determining circumstances, and gives us instead conjectures and
mere fancy compositions, destroys the special use of history.
In this respect Timaeus is an eminent offender, for we all
know that his books are full of such writing.
(c) But perhaps some one may raise the question as to how
it comes about that, being the sort of writer that I am showing
him to be, he has obtained acceptance and credit among
certain people. The reason is that his work abounds with
hostile criticism and invective against others : and he has been
XII INVECTIVE ALWAYS POPULAR 103
judged, not by the positive merits of his own composition and
his independent narrative, but by his skill in refuting his
fellow historians ; to which department he appears to me to
have brought great diligence and an extraordinary natural
aptitude. The case of the physicist Strato is almost precisely
similar. As long as this man is endeavouring to descredit
and refute the opinions of others, he is admirable : directly he
brings forward anything of his own, or expounds any of his
own doctrines, he at once seems to men of science to lose his
£iculties and become stupid and unintelligent And for my
part, I look upon this difference in writers as strictly analogous
to the facts of everyday life. In this too it is easy to criticise
our neighbours, but to be faultless ourselves is hard. One
might almost say that those who are most ready at finding
fault with others are most prone to errors in their own life.
(1/) Besides these I may mention another error of Timaeus.
Having stayed quietly at Athens for about fifty years, during
which he devoted himself to the study of written history, he
imagined that he was in possession of the most important
means of writing it To my mind this was a great mistake.
History and the science of medicine are alike in this respect,
that both may be divided broadly into three departments ; and
therefore those who study either must approach them in three
ways. For instance the three departments of medicine are the
rhetorical, the dietetic, and the surgical and pharmaceutical.
[The second of these though important is discredited by some.]'
The first, which takes its rise from the school of Herophilus
and CalUmachus of Alexandria, does indeed rightly claim a
certain position in medical science; but by its speciousness
and liberal promises acquires so much reputation that those
who are occupied with other branches of the art are supposed to
be completely ignorant. But just bring one of these jirofessors to
an actual invalid : you will find that they are as completely
wanting in the necessary skill as men who have never read a
medical treatise. Nay, it has happened before now that certain
persons, who had really nothing serious the matter with them,
have been persuaded by their powerful arguments to commit
themselves to their treatment, and have thereby endangered
1 Tbe text is again hopeless.
104 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS book
their lives : for they are like men trying to steer a ship out of
a book. Still such men go from city to city with great kclAty
and get the common people together to listen to them. But
if, when this is done, they induce certain people to submit as a
specimen to their practical treatment ; they only succeed in
reducing them to a state of extreme discomfort, and making
them a laughing stock to the audience.^ So completely does
a persuasive address frequently get the advantage over practical
experience. The third branch of the medical science, though
it involves genuine skill in the treatment of the several cases, is
not only rare in itself, but is also frequently cast into the shade,
thanks to the folly of popular judgment, by volubility and
impudence.
26. (e) In the same way the science of genuine history is
threefold : first, the dealing with written documents and the
arrangement of the material thus obtained ; second, topography,
the appearance of cities and localities, the description of rivers
and harbours, and, speaking generally, the peculiar features of
seas and countries and their relative distances ; thirdly, political
affairs. Now, as in the case of medicine, it is the last branch
that many attach themselves to, owing to their preconceived
opinions on the subject. And the majority of writers bring
to the undertaking no spirit of fairness at all : nothing but
dishonesty, impudence and unscrupulousness. Like vendors
of drugs, their aim is to catch popular credit and favour, and
to seize every opportunity of enriching themselves. About such
writers it is not worth while to say more.
(/) But some of those who have the reputation of
approaching history in a reasonable spirit are like the theoretical
physicians. They spend all their time in libraries, and acquire
generally all the learning which can be got from books, and
then persuade themselves that they are adequately equipped
for their task. . . . Yet in my opinion they are only partially
qualified for the production of genuine history. To inspect
ancient records indeed, with the view of ascertaining the notions
entertained by the ancient's of certain places, nations, polities
^ The text is uncertain, and I am not at all sure of the meaning of I-k
dvdfiaTos, cp. 25 k, 27. These public harangues of doctors to attract patients
arc noticed in Xcnophon, Mitnorab. 4, 2, 5.
XII MERE BOOK-LEARNED HISTORIANS 105
and events, and of understanding the several circumstances and
contingencies experienced in former times, is useful ; for the
history of the past directs our attention in a proper spirit to
the future, if a writer can be found to give a stG.tement of facts '
as they really occurred. But to persuade one's self, as Timaeus
does, that such ability in research is sufficient to enable a roan
to describe subsequent transactions with success is quite
foolish. It is as though a man were to imagine that an
inspection of the works of the old masters would enable him
to become a painter and a master of the art himself.
This will be rendered still more evident froro what I have
now to say, particularly from certain passages j^ ^^^^ ^.^
in the history of Ephoms. This writer in his fajriy acquainied
history of war seems to me to have had some with naval, but
idea of naval tactics, but to be quite unacquaint- """ ^aeii""''''^
ed with fighting on shore. Accordingly, if one
turns one's attention to the naval battles at Cyprus and Cnidus,
in which the generals of the king were engaged against Evagoras
of Salamis ' and then against the Lacedaemonians, one will be
struck with admiration of the historian, and will learn many
useful lessons as to what to do in similar circumstances. But
when he tells the story of the battle of
LeucHa between the Thebans and Lacedae- g'^" ^^j'
monians, or again that of Mantinea be-
tween the same combatants, in which Epaminondas lost his
life, if in these one examines attentively and in detail the
arrangements and evolutions in the line of battle, the historian
will appear quite ridiculous, and betray his entire ignorance
and want of personal experience of such matters. The battle
of I.,euctra indeed was simple, and confined to one division of
the forces engaged, and therefore does not make the writer's
lack of knowledge so very glaring : but that of Mantinea was
complicated and technical, and is accordingly unintelligible,
and indeed completely inconceivable, to the historian. This
will be rendered clear by first laying down a correct plan of
the ground, and then measuring the extent of the movements
as described by him. The same is the case with Theopompus,
and above all with Timaeus, the subject of this book. These
' Tyrant of SalBmli in Cyprus, d.c. 404-374, See Isocrates, Oral. x.
io6 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS book
latter writers also can conceal their ignorance, so long as they
deal with generalities ; but directly they attempt minute and
detailed description, they show that they are no better than
Ephorus. . . .
25. (^) It is in fact as impossible to write well on the opera-
tions in a war, if a man has had no experience of actual service,
as it is to write well on politics without having been engaged
in political transactions and vicissitudes. And when history is
written by the book -learned, without technical knowledge, and
without clearness of detail, the work loses all its value. For
if you take from history its element of practical instruction,
, what is left of it has nothing to attract and nothing to teach.
Again, in the topography of cities and localities, when such
men attempt to go into details, being entirely without personal
knowledge, they must in a similar manner necessarily pass
over many points of importance ; while they waste words on
many that are not worth the trouble. And this is what his
failure to make personal inspection brings upon Timaeus. . . .
(K) In his thirty- fourth book Timaeus says that "he
Timaeus's want spent fifty continuous years at Athens as
of practical an alien, and never took part in any mili-
knowiedge. ^^ service, or went to inspect the localities."
Accordingly, when he comes upon any such matters in the
course of his history, he shows much ignorance and makes
many misstatements; and if he ever does come near the
truth, he is like one of those animal -painters who draw from
models of stuffed skins. Such artists sometimes preserve the
correct outline, but the vivid look and life-like portraiture of
the real animal, the chief charm of the painter's art, are quite
wanting. This is just the case with Timaeus, and in fact with
all who start with mere book-learning; there is nothing vivid
in their presentment of events, for that can only come from
the personal experience of the writers. And hence it is, that
those who have gone through no such course of actual ex-
perience produce no genuine enthusiasm in the minds of their
readers. Former historians showed their sense of the necessity
of making professions to this effect in their writings. For when
their subject was political, they were careful to state that the
writer had of course been engaged in politics, and had had
XII /fECESSARV EQUIPMENT OF AN HISTORIAN 107
experience in matters of the son; or if the subject was
military, that he had served a campaign and been actually
engaged ; and again, when the matter was one of everyday life,
that he had brought up children and had been married ; and
so on in every department of life, which we may expect to find
adequately treated by those writers alone who have had per-
son^ experience, and have accordingly made that branch of
history their own. It is difficult perhaps for a man to have
been actually and literally eng^ed in everything : but in the
most important actions and most frequently occurring he must
have been so.
(0 And that this is no impossibility. Homer is a convincing
instance ; for in him you may see this quality of personal
knowledge frequently and conspicuously displayed. The
upshot of all this is that the study of documents is only one of
three elements in the preparation of an historian, and is only
third in importance. And no clearer proof of this could be
given than that furnished by the deliberative speeches, haran-
gues of commanders, and orations of ambassadors as recorded
by Timaeus. For the truth is, that the occasions are rare
which admit of all possible arguments being set forth ; as a
rule, the circumstances of the case confine them to narrow
limits. And of such speeches one sort are regarded with
favour by men of our time, another by those of an earlier age ;
different styles again are popular with Aetolians, Peloponnes-
ians, and Athenians. But to make digressions, in season and
out of season, for the purpose of setting forth every possible
speech that could be made, as Timaeus does by his trick of in-
venting words to suit every sort of occasion, is utterly mislead-
ing, pedantic, and worthy of a schoolboy essayist. And this
practice has brought failure and discredit on many writers.
Of course to select from time to time the proper and appro-
priate language is a necessary part of our art : but as there is
no fixed rule to decide the quantity and quality of the words
to be used on a particular occasion, great care and training is
required if we are to instruct and not mislead our readers.
The exact nature of the situation is difficult to communicate
always; still it may be brought home to the mind by means of
systematic demonstration, founded on personal and habiti>
io8 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS BOOK
experience. The best way of securing that this should be
realised is for historians, first, to state clearly the position, the
aims, and the circumstances of those deliberating ; and then,
recording the real speeches made, to explain to us the causes
which contributed to the success or failure of the several
speakers. Thus we should obtain a true conception of the
situation . and by exercising our judgment upon it, and drawing
analogies from it, should be able to form a thoroughly sound
opinion upon the circumstances of the hour. But I suppose
that tracing causes is difficult, while stringing words together in
books is easy. Few again have the faculty of speaking briefly
to the point, and getting the necessary training for doing so ;
while to produce a long and futile composition is within most
people's capacity and is common enough.
25. {Ji) To confirm the judgment I have expressed of Timaeus,
_. on his wilful misstatements as well as his ignor-
Sicilian history, ^'^ce, I shall now quote certam short passages
from his acknowledged works as specimens. . . .
Of all the men who have exercised sovereignty in Sicily, since
the elder Gelo, tradition tells us that the most able have been
Hermocrates, Timoleon, and Pyrrhus of Epirus, who are the
last persons in the world on whom to father pedantic and
B.C. 413. scholastic speeches. Now Timaeus tells us in
Thucyd.7, 42 Jj^^-his twenty-first book that on his arrival in Sicily
Eurymedon urged the cities there to undertake the war against
Syracuse; that subsequently the people of Gela becoming
tired of the war, sent an embassy to Camarina to make a
truce; that upon the latter gladly welcoming the proposal,
each state sent ambassadors to their respective allies begging
them to despatch men of credit to Gela to deliberate on a
pacification, and to secure the common interests. Upon the
arrival of these deputies in Gela and the opening of the
conference, he represents Hermocrates as speaking to the
following effect : " He praised the people of Gela and Camarina
first, for having made the truce ; secondly, because they were
the cause of the assembling of this peace congress ; and thirdly
because they had taken precautions to prevent the mass of the
citizens from taking part in the discussion, and had secured
that it should be confined to the leading men in the states, who
XII TIMAEUS FALSIFIES SICILTAN HISTOR V 109
knew the difTerence between peace and war." Then after making
two or three practical suggestions, Hennocrates is represented
as expressing an opinion that "if they seriously consider the
matter they will learn the profound difference between peace
and war," — although just before he had said that it was pre-
cisely this which moved his gratitude to the men of Gela, that
" the discussion did not take place in the mass assembly, t)ut in
a congress of men who knew the difference between peace and
war." This is an instance in which Timaeus not only fails to
show the ability of an historian, but sinks below the level of a
school theme. For, I presume, it will be universally admitted
that what an audience requires is a demonstration of that
about which they are in ignorance ot uncertainty ; but to
exhaust one's ingenuity in finding arguments to prove what is
known already is the most futile waste of time. But besides
his cardinal mistake of directing the greater part of the speech
to points which stood in need of no ai^uments at all, Timaeus
also puts into the mouth of Hermocratcs certain ^.c. 405.
sentences of which one could scarcely believe Hermocrates was
that any commonplace youth would have been "oyhete. Xen,
Capable, much less the colleague of the I^cedae- ' "'■■. ■■=7-3>-
monians in the battle of Aegospotami, and the sole conqueror
of the Athenian armies and generals in Sicily.
26. For first he " thinks that he should remind the congress
that in war sleepers are woke at dawn by bugles, in peace by
cocks." ' Then he says that " Hercules established the Olympic
games and the sacred truce during them, as an exemplification
of his own principles ; " and that " he had injured all those
persons against whom he waged war, under compulsion and in
obedience to the order of another, but was never voluntarily
the author of harm to any man." ' Next he quotes the instance
of Zeus in Homer as being displeased with Ares, and saying* —
" Of all the gods Ihat on Olympus dwell
I hold Ihee most detested ; foi thy joy
ts ever stiife and wai and bailie."
And again the wisest of the heroes says* —
' For [his proverb see Pluwrch, Nuias, ch. 9, ^i^iot iufin}iiinH ToC tlw6rTtt
in rait (t tlpiprii KoSciKto'Tat oi aikwiyyft dXV dXcirpviSrEt iipmrtiS^vai.
* n. ch. 35. • Homer, II. s, 890. * Homer, il 9, 63.
no THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS book
*' He is a wretch, insensible and dead
To all the charities of social life,
Whose pleasure is in civil broil and war."
Then he goes on to allege that Euripides agrees with Homer
in the lines ^ —
" O well of infinite riches 1
O fairest of beings divine 1
0 Peace, how alas ! thou delayest ;
My heart for thy coming is fain.
1 tremble lest age overtake me.
Ere thy l)eauty and grace I behold ;
Ere the maidens shall sing in their dancing,
And revels be gladsome with flowers."
Next he remarks that "war is like disease, peace like
health ; for that the latter restores those that are sick, while
in the former even the healthy perish. Moreover, in time of
peace, the old are buried by the young as nature directs, while
in war the case is reversed ; and above all in war there is no
security even as far as the city walls, while in peace it extends
to the frontier of the territory " — and so on. I wonder what
other arguments would have been employed by a youth who
had just devoted himself to scholastic exercises and studies in
history ; and who wished, according to the rules of the art, to
adapt his words to the supposed speakers ? Just these I
think which Timaeus represents Hermocrates as using.
(tf) Again, in the same book, Timoleon is exhorting the
Timoieon's Greeks to engage the Carthaginians;* and
victory over the when they are on the very point of coming
Carthaginians, jq ^lose quarters with the enemy, who are
344. many times superior to them in number,
Timaeus represents him as saying, " Do not look to the
numbers of the foe, but to their cowardice. For though
Libya is fully settled and abounds in inhabitants, yet
when we wish to express complete desolation we say *more
desolate than Libya,' not meaning to refer to its emptiness, but
to the poor spirit of its inhabitants. And after all, who would
be afraid of men who, when nature gives hands as the
distinctive feature of man among all living creatures, carry
^ Euripides, fr. ^ Battle of the Crimcsus. See Plutarch, Timol. ch. 27.
wi SOPHISTICAL COMMONPLACES in
them about all their life inside their tunics idle P ' And more
than all, who wear shirts under their inner tunics, that they
may not even when they fall in battle show their nakedness to
their enemies ? . . . "
(S) When Gelo promised to help the Greeks with twenty
thousand land forces and two hundred decked q^^_
ships, if they would concede to him the chief See Herod,
command either by land or sea, they say that ?■ 'S7-'*s.
the congress of Greeks, sitting at Corinth, gave ' * ''
Gelo's envoys a most spirited answer. They urged Gelo to come
to their aid with his forces, and observed that the logic of facta
would give the command to the bravest. This is not the language
of men depending for succour on the Syracusans, as a last
resource; but of men who felt confidence in themselves, and
challenged all comers to a rivalry of courage and for the crown
of valour. In spite of this, Timaeus spends such a wealth of
rhetoric and earnestness on these points, in his desire to exalt
the importance of Sicily above all the rest of Greece, to
represent its history as the most splendid and glorious of all
the world, its men as the wisest of all who have been great in
philosophy, and the Syracusans as the most consummate and
divine of statesmen, that he could scarcely be surpassed by
the cleverest schoolboy declaimers when undertaking to prove
such paradoxes as that " Thersites was an excellent man," or
" Penelope a bad wife," or other thesis of that description.
(r) However, the only effect of such extravagant exaggera-
tion is to bring ridicule upon the men and the transactions
which it is his intention to champion ; while he himself incurs
the same discredit as ill-trained disputants in the Academy ;
some of whom, in their desire to embarrass their opponents on
all subjects, possible or impossible alike, carry their paradoxical
and sophistical arguments to such a length as to dispute
whether it is possible for people at Athens to smell eggs
cooking at Ephesus : and to offer to maintain that, while they
are discussing these points, they are lying on their couches at
home and carrying on a second discussion on other subjects.
This extravagance of paradox has brought the whole school
112 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS book
into such disrepute, that even reasonable discussions have lost
credit with the world. And apart from their own futility, these
persons have inspired our young men with so depraved a taste,
that they pay no attention whatever to questions of ethics and
politics, which bring benefit to those who study them; but
spend their lives in pursuit of an empty reputation for useless
and paradoxical verbiage.
(//) This is just the case with Tiraaeus and his imitators in
history. Paradoxical and tenacious, he has dazzled the
multitude by skill in words ; and has forced attention to him-
self by a show of veracity, or has conciliated confidence by a
pretence of producing proof of his assertions. The most conspi-
cuous instances of his success in inspiring this confidence are
those parts of his work which treat of colonies, founding of
cities, and the relationships of nations. In these points he
makes such a parade of minute accuracy, and inveighs so
bitterly when refuting others, that people came to imagine that
all other historians have been mere dreamers, and have spoken
at random in describing the world ; and that he is the only
man who has made accurate investigations, and unravelled every
history with intelligence.
{e) As a matter of fact, his books contain much that is sound,
but also much that is false. Those, however, who have spent
much time on his earlier books, in which the passages I have
alluded to occur, when the confidence which they have fully
given to his exaggerated professions is disturbed by some one
pointing out that Timaeus is obnoxious to the same reproaches
which he has brought with such bitterness against others (as,
for instance, in the misstatements as to the Locrians, and other
instances lately mentioned by me), become angry and obstinate
in controversy, and difficult to convince. And that, I might
almost say, is all the benefit which the most diligent students
of his history get from their reading. While those who devote
their attention to his speeches, and generally to the didactic
part of his work, become pedantic, sophistical, and wholly in-
sensible to truth, for reasons which I have already stated.
27. Moreover, when he comes to deal with facts in his
history, we find a combination of all the faults which I have
mentioned. The reason I will now proceed to state. It will
«i AN HISTORIAN NEEDS PRACTICAL EXPERIENCE 1 13
not, perhaps, to most people seem to his credit, and it is in
truth the real source of his enors. For whereas he is thought
to have possessed great and wide knowledge, a faculty for histori-
cal inquiry, and extiaordinary industry in the execution of his
work, in certain cases he appears to have been the most ignorant
and indolent person that ever called himself an historian. And
the following considerations will prove it. Nature has bestowed
on us two instruments of inquiry and research, hearing and sight
Of these sight is, according to Heraclcitus, by far
the truer ; for eyes arc surer witnesses than ears, -^^ ^ p' \^^ '
And of these charmels of learning Timacus has
chosen the pleasanter and the worse; for he entirely refrained
from looking at things with his own eyes, and devoted himself
to learning by hearsay. But even the ear may be instructed in
two ways, reading and answers to personal inquiries : and in
the latter of these he was very indolent, as I have already
shown. The reason of his preference for the other it is easy
to divine. Study of documents involves no danger or fatigue,
if one only takes care to lodge in a city rich in such records,
or to have a library in one's neighbourhood. You may then
investigate any question while reclining on your couch, and
compare the mistakes of former historians without any fatigue
to yourself. But personal investigation demands great exertion
and expense ; though it is exceedingly advantageous, and in
fact is the very corner-stone of history. This is evident from
the writers of history themselves. Ephorus says, " if writers
could only be present at the actual transactions, it would be far
the best of all modes of learning." Theopompus says, " the best
military historian is he who has been present at the greatest
number of battles ; the best speech maker is he who has been
engaged in most political contests." The same might be said
of the art of healing and of steering. Homer has spoken even
more emphatically than these writers on this point. For when
he wishes to describe what the man of light and leading should
be, he introduces Odysseus in these words —
and then goes on—
VOL It
114 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS BOOK
'* And towns of many saw, and learnt their mind.
And suffered much in heart by land and sea.**
and again ^ —
** Passing through wars of men and grieyous waves.*
28. It is such a man that the dignity of history appears to
me to require. Plato says that " human affairs will not go well
Historians must ^^^^ either philosophers become kings or kings
be practical become philosophers." * So I should say that
™*^"- history will never be properly written, until either
men of action undertake to write it (not as they do now, as a
matter of secondary importance; but, with the conviction that
it is their most necessary and honourable employment, shall
devote themselves through life exclusively to it), or historians
become convinced that practical experience is of the first import-
ance for historical composition. Until that time arrives there
will always be abundance of blunders in the writings of historians.
Timaeus, however, quite disregarded all this. He spent his
life in one place, of which he was not even a citizen ; and thus
deliberately renounced all active career either in war or politics,
and all personal exertion in travel and inspection of localities :
and yet, somehow or another, he has managed to obtain the
reputation of a master in the art of history. To prove that
I have not misrepresented him, it is easy to bring the
evidence of Timaeus himself. In the preface
^E™hol!L'!" to his sixth book he says that " some people
suppose that more genius, industry, and
preparation are required for rhetorical than for historical
composition." And that "this opinion had been formerly
advanced against Ephorus." Then because this writer had
been unable to refute those who held it, he undertakes himself
to draw a comparison between history and rhetorical composi-
tions : a most unnecessary proceeding altogethei. In the first
place he misrepresents Ephorus. For in truth, admirable as
Ephorus is throughout his whole work, in style, treatment, and
argumentative acuteness, he is never more brilliant than in his
digressions and statements of his personal views : in fact, when-
ever he is adding anything in the shape of a commentary or a
^ Homer, OJyss. i, 1-4; 8, 183.
* Republic, v. 473 C. vi. 499 B.
xn MERE INQUIRY IS INSUFFICIENT 115
note. And it so happens that his most elegant and convincing
digression is on this very subject of a comparison between
historians and speech-writers. But Timaeus is anxious not
to be thought to follow Ephorus. Therefore, in addition to
misrepresentin;; him and condemning the rest, he enters upon
a long, confused, and in eveiy way inferior, discussion of what
had been already sufficiently handled by others ; and expected
that no one living would detect him.
{a) However, he wished to exalt history ; and, in order to
do so, he says that " history differs from rhetorical composi-
tion as much as real buildings differ from those represented
in scene-paintings." And again, that "to collect the neces-
sary materials for writing history is by itself more laborious
than the whole process of producing rhetorical compositions."
He mentions, for instance, the expense and labour which he
underwent in collecting records from Assyria, and in studying
the customs of the Ligures, Celts, and Iberians. But he ex-
aggerates these so much, that he could not have himself
expected to be believed. One would be glad to asic the
historian which of the two he thinks is the more expensive
and laborious, — to remain quietly at home and collect records
and study the customs of Ligures and Celts, or to obtain
personal experience of all the tribes possible, and see them
with his own eyes ? To ask questions about manceuvres on
the field of battle and the sieges of cities and fights at sea
from those who were present, or to take personal part in the
dangers and vicissitudes of these operations as they occur?
For my part I do not think that real buildings differ so much
from those in stage - scenery, nor history from rhetorical
compositions, as a narrative drawn from actual and personal
experience differs from one derived from hearsay and the
report of others. But Timaeus had no such experience : and
he therefore naturally supposed that the part of an historian's
labour which is the least important and lightest, that namely
of collecting records and making inquiries from those who had
knowledge of the several events, was in reality the most
important and most difficult. And, indeed, in this particular
department of research, men who have had no personal experi-
ence must necessarily fall into grave errors. For how is -
ii6
THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS
BOOK XI£
man, who has no knowledge of such things, to put the right
questions as to manoeuvering of troops, sieges of cities, and
fights at sea? And how can he understand the details of
what is told him ? Indeed, the questioner is as important as
the narrator for getting a clear story. For in the case of men
who have had experience of real action, memory is a sufficient
guide from point to point of a narrative : but a man who has
had no such experience can neither put the right questions,
nor understand what is happening before his eyes. Though he
is on the spot, in fact, he is as good as absent. . . .
TZ2^ "^
BOOK XIII
THE AETOUANS
1. From the unbroken continuity of their wars, and the ex-
travagance of their daily lives, the Aetolians became involved
in debt, not only without others noticing it, but
without being sensible of it thenoselves. Being saa
therefore naturally disposed to a change in loliacausea
their constitution, they elected Dorimachus and reroiu"'"'.
Scopas to draw out a code of laws, because they
saw thai they were not only innovators by disposition, but were
themselves deeply involved in private debt. These men accord-
ingly were admitted to the office and drew up the laws. . . .
When they produced them they were opposed by Alexander
of Aetolia, who tried to show by many instances that innovation
was a dangerous growth which could not be checked, and in-
variably ended by inflicting grave evils upon those who fostered
it He urged them therefore not to look solely to the ex-
igencies of the hour, and the relief from their existing contracts,
but to the future also. For it was a strange inconsistency to
be ready to forfeit their very lives in war to preserve their
children, and yet in their deliberations to be entirely careless
of the future. . . .
2. Having failed to obtain the office, for the sake of which
he had had the boldness to draw up these laws, Scopas
turned his hopes to Alexandria, in the expecta- scopas uroes to
tion of finding means there of restoring his Egypt See i6,
broken fortunes, and satisfying to a fuller extent '*"'' ■ '*■ S3-
his grasping spirit. He little knew that it is impossible to
assuage the ever-rising desires of the soul without correcting
this passion by reason, any more than it is to stay or quench
1 1 8 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS . book
the thirst of the dropsical body by supplying it with drink,
without radically restoring its healthy condition. Scopas,
indeed, is a conspicuous example of this truth ; for though on
his arrival at Alexandria, in addition to his military pay, which
he possessed independently as commander-in-chief, the king
assigned him ten minae a day, and one mina a day to those
next him in rank, still he was not satisfied ; but continued to
demand more, until he disgusted his paymasters by his cupidity,
and lost his life and his gold together.
Philip's treacherous conduci', b.c 204
8. Philip now entered upon a course of treachery which no
one would venture to say was worthy of a king ; but which
some would defend on the ground of its necessity in the con-
duct of public affairs, owing to the prevailing bad faith of the
time. For the ancients, so far from using a fraudulent policy
towards their friends, were scrupulous even as to using it to
conquer their enemies ; because they did not regard a success
as either glorious or secure, which was not obtained by such a
victory in the open field as served to break the confidence of
their enemies. They therefore came to a mutual understand-
ing not to use hidden weapons against each other, nor such as
could be projected from a distance ; and held the opinion that
the only genuine decision was that arrived at by a battle fought
at close quarters, foot to foot with the enemy. It was for this
reason also that it was their custom mutually to proclaim their
wars, and give notice of battles, naming time and place at which
they meant to be in order of battle. But nowadays people
say that it is the mark of an inferior general to perform any
operation of war openly. Some slight trace, indeed, of the
old-fashioned morality still lingers among the Romans; for
they do proclaim their wars, and make sparing use of am-
buscades, and fight their battles hand to hand and foot to foot.
So much for the unnecessary amount of artifice which it is the
fashion for commanders in our days to employ both in politics
and war.
4. Philip gave Heracleides a kind of problem to work out,
— how to circumvent and destroy the Rhodian fleet. At the
Jtrii PHILIP INTRIGUES AGAINST RHODES 119
same time he sent envoys to Crete to excite and provoke them
to go to war with the Rhodians. Heracleides, pj,iiip employs
who was a born traitor, looked upon the com- Heracleides
mission as the very thing to suit his plans ; and "' Tarcmum.
after revolving various methods in his mind, presently started
and sailed to Rhodes, He was by origin a Tarentine, of a
low family of mechanics, and he had many qualities which
fitted him for bold and unscrupulous undertakings. His boy-
hood had been stained by notorious immorality ; he had great
acuteness and a retentive memory ; in the presence of the
vulgar no one could be more bullying and audacious ; to those in
high position no one more insinuating and servile. He had been
originally banished from his native city from a suspicion of
being engaged in an intrigue to hand over Tarentum to the
Romans : not that he had any political influence, but being an
architect, and employed in some repairs of the walls, he got
possession of the keys of the gate on the landward side of the
town. He thereupon fled for his life to the Romans. From
them, being detected in making communications by letters and
messages with Tarentum and Hannibal, he again Bed for fear
of consequences to Philip. With him he obtained so much
credit and influence that he eventually was the most powerful
element in the overthrow of that great monarchy.
6. The Prytanies of Rhodes were now distrustful of Philip,
owing to his treacherous policy in Crete,' and they began to
suspect tliat Heracleides was his agent . . . -^^^ fg^g
But Heracleides came before them and ex- preiences of
plained the reasons which had caused him to Heraciddci ai
f, r T.1 ■!- Rhodes,
fly from Phdip. . . .
Philip was anxious above ever^-thing that the Rhodians
should not discover his purpose in these transactions ; whereby
he succeeded in freeing Heracleides from suspicion. , , .
Nature, as it seems to me, has ordained that Truth should
be a most mighty goddess among men, and has
endowed her with extraordinary power.
least, I notice that though at times everything combines to
' The Rhodians had proclaimed war against Ihe Crelan piialcs. Philip
had secretly commissioned one of his agents, (he Actolian Dicaearchus, 10 aid
Ihe Cretans. Diodor, fr. iivlii.
I20 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS book
crush her, and every kind of specious argument is on the side
of falsehood, she somehow or another insinuates herself by
her own intrinsic virtue into the souls of mea Sometimes
she displays her power at once ; and sometimes, though ob-
scured for a length of time, she at last prevails and overpowers
falsehood. Such was the case with Heracleides when he came
from king Philip to Rhodes.^ . . .
Damocles, who was sent with Pythio as a spy upon the
Romans, was a person of ability, and possessed of many
endowments fitting him for the conduct of affairs. . . .
NABIS, TYRANT OF SPARTA, B.C 207-I92
6. Nabis, tyrant of Sparta, being now in the third year of
his reign, ventured upon no undertaking of importance, owing
to the recent defeat of Machanidas by the
Nabis^^nn? Achaeans; but employed himself in laying the
foundations of a long and grinding tyranny. He
destroyed the last remains of the old Spartan nobles ; drove
into banishment all men eminent for wealth or ancestral glory ;
and distributed their property and wives among the chief men
of those who remained, or among his own mercenary soldiers.
These last were composed of murderers, housebreakers, foot-
pads, and burglars. For this was, generally speaking, the class
of men which he collected out of all parts of the world, whose
own country was closed to them owing to their crimes and
felonies. As he put himself forward as the patron and king of
such wretches, and employed them as attendants and body-
guards, there is evidently no cause for surprise that his impious
character and reign should have been long remembered. For,
besides this, he was not content with driving the citizens into
banishment, but took care no place should be secure, and no
refuge safe for the exiles. Some he caused to be pursued and
killed on the road, while others he dragged from their place of
retreat and murdered. Finally, in the cities where they w^ere
living, he hired the houses next door to these banished men,
1 Heracleides having gained credence at Rhodes by pretending to betray
Philip's intrigue with the Cretans, waited for an opportunity, and, setting fire
to their arsenal, escaped in a boat. Polyacn, 5, 17, 2.
wii THE TYRAfTNY OF NABIS 121
wherever they might be, by means of agents who were not
suspected ; and then sent Cretans into these houses, who made
breaches in the party walls, and through them, or through such
windows as already existed, shot down the exiles as they stood
or lay down in their own houses ; so that there was no place
of retreat, and no moment of security for the unfortunate
Lacedaemonians.
7. When he had by these means put the greater number of
them out of the .way, he next had constructed »■ h- ■ f
a kind of machine, if machine it may be called,
which was the figure of a woman, clothed in costly garments,
and made to resemble with extraordinary fidelity the wife of
Nabis. Whenever then he summoned one of the citizens
with a view of getting some money from him, he used first to
employ a number of arguments politely expressed, pointing
out the danger in which the city stood from the threatening
attitude of the Achaeans, and explaining what a number of
mercenaries he had to support for their security, and the ex-
penses which fell upon him for the maintenance of the national
religion and the needs of the State. If the listeners gave in
he was satisfied ; but if they ever refused to comply with his
demand, he would say, " Perhaps I cannot persuade you, but I
think this lady Ap^ga will succeed in doing so." Ap^ga was
the name of his wife. Immediately on his saying these words,
the figure I have described was brought in. As soon as the
man offered his hand to the supposed lady to raise her from
her seat, the figure threw its arms round him and began draw-
ing him by degrees towards its breasts. Now its arms, hands,
and breasts were full of iron spikes under its clothes. When
the tyrant pressed his hands on the back of the figure, and
then by means of the works dragged the man by degrees
closer and closer to its breasts, he forced him under this
torture to say anything. A good number of men who refused
his demands he destroyed in this way.*
S. The rest of his conduct was on a par with this beginning.
He made common cause with the Cretan pirates. The beginning of
and kept temple-breakers, highway-robbers, and the war iwiween
122 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS book xiii
Nabis and the murderers all over the Peloponnese ; and as he
Achaeans. ghared in the profits of their nefarious trades, he
allowed them to use Sparta as their base of operations. More-
over, about this time some visitors from Boeotia, who happened
to be staying at Lacedaemon, enticed one of his grooms to
make off with them, taking a certain white horse which was
considered the finest in the royal stud They were pursued
by a party sent by Nabis as far as Megalopolis, where the
tyrants found the horse and groom, and took them off with-
out any one interfering. But they then laid hands on the
Boeotians, who at first demanded to be taken before the
magistrate ; but as no attention was paid to the demand, one
of them shouted out " Help ! " Upon a crowd of the people
of the place collecting and protesting that the men should be
taken before the magistrate, Nabis's party were obliged to let
them go and retire. Nabis, however, had been long looking
out for a ground of complaint and a reasonable pretext for a
quarrel, and having seized on this one, he harried the cattle
belonging to Proagoras and some others ; which was a com-
mencement of the war.^ . . .
ANTIOCHUS IN ARABIA, B.C. 205-204
9. Labac, like Sabae, is a city of Chattenia, which is a
territory of the Gerraei. ... In other respects, Chattenia is a
rugged country, but the wealth of the Gerraei who inhabit it
has adorned it with villages and towers. It lies along the
Arabian Sea, and Antiochus gave orders to spare it. . . .
In a letter to Antiochus the Gerraei demanded that he should
not destroy what the gods had given them — perpetual peace
and freedom ; and this letter having been interpreted to him
he granted the request. . . .
Their freedom having been confirmed to the Gerraei, they
presented King Antiochus at once with five hundred talents
of silver, one thousand of frankincense, and two hundred of
oil of cinnamon, called stacte, all of them spices of the country
on the Arabian Sea, He then sailed to the island of Tylos,
and thence to Seleucia. . . .
' These raids on the territory of Megalopolis, however, did not lead to
open war till B.C. 202. Sec 16, 16.
Perhaps a resumk of events in each Olympiad may arrest the
attention of my readers i^oth by their number and importance,
the transactions in every part of the world being
brought under one view. However, I think the ^*f^ al^f^'
events of this Olympiad especially will do so ;
because in it the wars in Italy and Libya came to an end ; and
I cannot imagine any one not caring to inquire what sort of
catastrophe and conclusion they had. For everybody, though
extremely interested in details and particulars, naturally longs
to be told the end of a story. I may add that it was in this
period also that the kings gave the clearest indication of their
character and policy. For what was only rumour in regard to
them before was now become a matter of clear and universal
knowlec^e, even to those who did not care to take part in
public business. Therefore, as I wished to make my narrative
worthy of its subject, I have not, as in former instances, in-
cluded the history of two years in one book. . . .
EletUd Consul for B.C. 205 (see 11, 33) Scipio had Sicily
assigned as his provincia, with leave to cross to Africa if necessary
{Livy, 38, 4S), Ife sent Laelius to Africa in b.C, 205, but re-
mained himself in Sicily. Next spring (b.c. 204) he crossed to
Africa with a year's additional imperium. In tlte course of this
year ke ravaged the Carthaginian territory and besieged Vtica
(Livy, 39, 3S), and at the beginning of u.c. 203 his imperium
was prolonged till he should have finished the war {id. 30, i).
1. While the Consuls were thus engaged,* Scipio in Libya
' Caepio was commanding in Bmllium, Scrvilius in Etniria and Liguria.
Livy, 30, I.
124 THE HISTORIES OF POL YB I US book
learnt during the winter that the Carthaginians were fitting
out a fleet; he therefore devoted himself to
Cn. Serviiius similar preparations as well as to pressing on
Cacpio, c. the siege of Utica. He did not, however, give
ServUius Geminus y ^^ j^^p^g ^f Svphax; but as their forces
Coss. Livy, 30, 1. ^ ^/ .. u 1 *. J-
were not far apart he kept sendmg messages to
him, convinced that he would be able to detach him from the
Carthaginians. He still cherished the belief that Syphax was
getting tired of the girP for whose sake he had joined the
Carthaginians, and of his alliance with the Punic people
generally ; for the Numidians, he knew, were naturally quick
to feel satiety, and constant neither to gods nor men. Scipio's
mind, however, was distracted with various anxieties, and his
prospects were far from seeming secure to him ; for he shrank
from an engagement in the open field on account of the
enemy's great superiority in numbers. He therefore seized an
opportunity which now presented itself. Some of his mes-
sengers to Syphax reported to him that the Carthaginians had
constructed their huts in their winter camp of various kinds of
wood and boughs without any earth ; while the old army of the
Numidians made theirs of reeds, and the reinforcements which
were now coming in from the neighbouring townships constructed
theirs of boughs only, some of them inside the trench arid pali-
sade, but the greater number outside. Scipio therefore made up
his mind that the manner of attacking them, which would be
most unexpected by the enemy and most successful for himself,
would be by fire. He therefore turned his attention to
organising such an attack. Now, in his communications with
Scipio, Syphax was continually harping upon his
SypiMix. ° proposal that the Carthaginians should evacuate
Italy and the Romans Libya ; and that the pos-
sessions held by either between these two countries should
remain in statu quo. Hitherto Scipio had refused to listen to
this suggestion, but he now gave Syphax a hint by the mouth
of his messengers that the course he wished to see followed
was not impossible. Greatly elated at this, Syphax became
much bolder than before in his communications with Scipio ;
^ Sophanisba, the daughter of Hasdrubal son of Gcsco. Livy, 29, 23 ; 30,
12, IS-
XIV SCIPIO PLANS TO ATTACK THE PUNIC CAMP 125
the numbers of the messengers sent backwards and forwards,
and the frequency of their visits, were redoubled ; and they
sometimes even stayed several days in each other's camps
without any thought of precaution. On these occasions
Scipto always took care to send, with the envoys, some men of
tried experience or of military knowledge, dressed up as slaves
in rough and common clothes, that they might examine and
investigate in security the approaches and entrances to both
the entrenchments. For there were two camps, one that of
Hasdrubal, containing thirty thousand infantry and three thou-
sand cavalry; and another about ten stades distant from it of the
Numidians, containing ten thousand cavalry and about fifty thou-
sand infantry. The latter was the easier of approach, and its
huts were well calculated for being set on fire, because, as 1
said before, the Numidians had not made theirs of timber and
earth, but used simply reeds and thatch in their construction.
2. By the beginning of spring Scipio had completed the
reconnaissances necessary for this attempt upon
the enemy ; and he began launching his ships, ^'^°™
and getting the engines on them into working
order, as though with the purpose of assaulting Utica by sea.
With his land forces he once more occupied the high ground
overlooking the town, and carefully fortified it and secured it
by trenches. He wished the enemy to believe that he was
doing this for the sake of carrying on the siege ; but he really
meant it as a cover for his men, who were to be engaged in the
undertaking described above, to prevent the garrison sallying
out, when the legions were separated from their lines,
assaulting the palisade which was so near to them, and attack-
ing the division left in charge of it. Whilst in the midst of
these preparations, he sent to Syphax inquiring whether, " in
case he agreed to his proposab, the Carthaginians would
assent, and not say again that they would deliberate on the
terms }" He ordered these legates at the same time not to
return to him, until they had received an answer on these
points. When the envoys arrived, the Numtdian king was
convinced that Scipio was on the point of concluding the
agreement, partly from the fact that the ambassadors said that
they would not go away until they got his answer, and partly
126 THE HISTORIES OF POL YB I US book
because of the anxiety expressed as to the disposition of the
Carthaginians. He therefore sent immediately to Hasdrubal,
stating the facts and urging him to accept the peace. Mean-
while he neglected all precautions himself, and allowed the
Numidians, who were now joining, to pitch their tents where
they were, outside the lines. Scipio in appearance acted in
the same way, while in reality he was pushing on his prepara-
tions with the utmost care. When a message was returned
from the Carthaginians bidding Syphax complete the treaty of
peace, the Numidian king, in a state of great exaltation, com-
municated the news to the envoys ; who immediately departed
to their own camp to inform Scipio from the king of what
had been clone. As soon as he heard it, the Roman general
at once sent fresh envoys to inform Syphax that Scipio was
quite satisfied and was anxious for the peace; but that the
members of his council differed from him, and held that they
should remain as they were. The ambassadors duly arrived
and informed the Numidians of this. Scipio sent this mission to
avoid the appearance of a breach of truce, if he
^^e^l should perform any act of hostility while negoti-
ations for peace were still going on between
the parties. He considered that, by making this statement, he
would be free to act in whatever way he chose without laying
himself open to blame.
8. Syphax's annoyance at this message was great, in pro-
portion to the hopes he had previously entertained of making
the peace. He had an interview with Hasdrubal, and told
him of the message he had received from the Romans ; but
though they deliberated long and earnestly as to what they
ought to do, they neither had any idea or conjecture as to
what was really going to happen. For they had no anticipa-
tion whatever as to the need of taking precautions, or of any
danger threatening them, but were all eagerness and excite-
ment to strike some blow, and thus provoke the enemy to
descend into the level ground. Meanwhile Scipio allowed his
army generally, by the preparations he was making
^iiisprojecT^ ^^^ ^^^ Orders he was issuing, to imagine that
his aim was the capture of Utica; but sum-
moning the most able and trusty Tribunes at noon, he im-
XiT SYPHAX AND HASDRUBAL ARE DELUDED 127
parted to tbem his design, and ordered them to cause their
men to get their supper early, and then to lead the legions
outside the camp as soon as the buglers gave the usual signal
by a simultaneous blast of their bugles. For it is a custom in
the Roman army for the trumpeters and buglers to sound a
call near the commander's tent at supper time, that the night
pickets may then take up their proper positions. Scipio next
summoned the spies whom he had sent at difierent times to
reconnoitre the enemy's quarters, and carefully compared and
studied the accounts they gave about the roads leading to the
hostile camps and the entrances to them, employing Massanissa
to criticise their words and assist him with his advice, because
he was acquainted with the locality.
4. Everything being prepared for his expedition, Scipio
left a sufficiently strong guard in the camp, and got the rest of
the men on the march towards the end of the first watch, the
enemy being about sixty stades distant Arrived in the neigh-
bourhood of the enemy, about the end of the third watch, he
assigned to Gains Laehus and Massanissa half his Roman
. soldiers and all his Numidians, with orders to attack the camp
of Syphax, urging them to quit themselves like brave men and
do nothing carelessly; with the clear understanding that, as the
darkness hindered and prevented the use of the eyes, a night
attack required all the more the assistance of a cool head and
a firm heart The rest of the army he took the command of
in person, and led against HasdrubaL Ke had calculated on
not beginning his assault until Laelius's division had set fire to
the enemy's huts; he therefore proceeded slowly, Destmction of the
The latter meanwhile advanced in two divisions, camp of Sypbax
which attacked the enemy simultaneously. The byCLaeiius
construction of the huts being as though pur- ^ ^''^
posely contrived to be susceptible of a conHagmtion, as I have
already explained, as soon as the front rank men began to set
light to them, the fire caught all the first row of huts fiercely,
and soon got beyond all control, from the closeness of the huts
to each other, and the amount of combustible material which
they contained. Laelius remained in the rear as a reserve ;
but Massanissa, knowing the localities through which those
who fled from the fire would be sure to retreat, stationed his
128 THE HISTORIES OF POL YB I US book
own soldiers at those spots. Not a single Numidian had any
suspicion of the true state of the case, not even Syphax
himself; but thinking that it was a mere accidental confla-
gration of the rampart, some of them started unsuspiciously
out of bed, others sprang out of their tents in the midst of a
carouse and with the cup actually at their lips. The result
was that numbers of them got trampled to death by their own
friends at the exits from the camp ; many were caught by the
flames and burnt to death ; while all those who escaped the
flame fell into the hands of the enemy, and were killed,
without knowing what was happening to them or what they
were doing.
5. At the same time the Carthaginians, observing the
proportions of the conflagration and the huge-
and ofHasdru- ^^^^ ^^ ^^^ ^^^^ ^^^ ^^ ^.j^j^^^^ imagined that
the Numidian camp had been accidentally
set on fire. Some of them therefore started at once to
render assistance, and all the rest hurried outside their own
camp unarmed, and stood there gazing in astonishment at
the spectacle. Everything having thus succeeded to his best
wishes, Scipio fell upon these men outside their camp, and
either put them to the sword, or, driving them back into
the camp, set fire to their huts. The disaster of the Punic
army was thus very like that which had just befallen the
Numidians, fire and sword in both cases combining to destroy
them. Hasdrubal immediately gave up all idea of combating
the fire, for he knew from the coincidence of the two that the
fire in the Numidian camp was not accidental, as he had
supposed, but had originated from some desperate design of
the enemy. He therefore turned his attention to saving his
own life, although there was now little hope left of doing so.
For the fire was spreading rapidly and was catching every-
where ; while the camp gangways were full of horses, beasts of
burden, and men, some of them half dead and devoured by
the fire, and others in a state of such frantic terror and mad
excitement that they prevented any attempts at making a
defence, and by the utter tumult and confusion which they
created rendered all chance of escape hopeless. The case of
Syphax was the same as that of Hasdrubal, as it was also that
XIT DREADFUL SCENE IN THE BURNING CAMPS 129
of the other officers. The two former, however, did manage
to escape, accompanied by a few horsemen : but all those
myriads of men, horses, and beasts of burden, either met a
miserable and pitiable death from the fire, or, if they escaped
the violence of that, some of the men perished ignominiously
at the hands of the enemy, cut down naked and defenceless, not
only without their aims, but without so much as their clothes
to cover them. The whole place was filled with yells of pain,
confused cries, terror, and unspeakable din, mingled with a
conflagration which spread rapidly and blazed with the utmost
fierceness. It was the combination and suddenness of these
horrors that made them so awful, any one of which by itself
would have been sufficient to strike terror into the hearts of
men. It is accordingly impossible for the imagination to
exa^erate the dreadful scene, so completely did it surpass
in horror everything hitherto recorded Of all the brilliant
achievements of Scipio this appears to me to have been the
most brilliant and the most daring. . . .
6. When day broke, and he found the enemy either killed
or in headlong flight, Scipio exhorted his Hasdnjl>al at
Tribunes to activity, and at once started in pur- Anda, see Appian,
suit. At first the Carthaginian general seemed ^' "*
inclined to stand his ground, though told of Scipio's approach,
trusting in the strength of the town [of Anda] ; but when he
saw that the inhabitants were in a mutinous state, he shrank
from meeting the attack of Scipio, and fled with the relics of his
army, which consisted of as many as five hundred cavalry and
about two thousand infantry. The inhabitants of the town
thereupon submitted unconditionally to the Romans, and were
spared by Scipio, who, however, gave up two neighbouring towns
to the legions to plunder. This being done he returned to his
original entrenchment. Baffled in the hopes which they had
entertained of the course which the campaign
would take, the Carthaginians were deeply de- cmi^gc.
pressed. They had expected to shut up the
Romans on the promontory near Utica, which had been
the site of their winter quarters, and besiege them there
with their army and fleet both by sea and land. With this
view all their preparations had been made ; and when they
VOt. II K
I30 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS book
saw, quite contrary to their calculations, that they were not
only driven from the open country by the enemy, but were
in hourly expectation of an attack upon themselves and their
city, they became completely disheartened and panic-stricken.
Their circumstances, however, admitted of no delay. They
were compelled at once to take precautions and adopt some
measures for the future. But the senate was filled with doubt
and varied and confused suggestions. Some said that they
ought to send for Hannibal and recall him from Italy, their
one hope of safety being now centred in that general and his
forces. Others were for an embassy to Scipio to obtain a truce
and discuss with him the terms of a pacification and treaty.
The Senate, how- Others again were for keeping up their courage
ever, resolves to and Collecting their forces, and sending a mes-
continue their gage to Syphax; who, they said, was at the neigh-
bouring town of Abba, engaged in collecting
the remnants of his army. This last suggestion was the one
which ultimately prevailed. The Government of Carthage
accordingly set about collecting troops, and sent a despatch to
Syphax begging him to support them and abide by his original
policy, as a general with an army would presently join him.
7. Meanwhile the Roman commander was pressing on the
seige of Utica. But when he heard that Syphax was still in
position, and that the Carthaginians were once more collecting
an army, he led out his forces and pitched his camp close
under the walls of Utica. At the same time he divided the
booty among the soldiers. . . } The merchants who pur-
chased them from the soldiers went away with very profitable
bargains; for the recent victory inspired the soldiers with
high hopes of a successful conclusion of the campaign, and
they therefore thought little of the spoils already obtained,
and made no difficulties in selling them to the merchants.
Q„,.K«^ ;e «^ The Numidian king and his friends were at
oypnax is per- • j ^ • «
suaded by Sophan- "fst mmdcd to contmue their retreat to their own
isba to stand by land. But while deliberating on this, certain
^^^ ^"^^^^^"^ Celtiberes, over four thousand in number, who
had been hired as soldiers by the Carthaginians,
arrived in the vicinity of Abba. Encouraged by this addi-
^ Some words are lost from the text.
XIT CARTBAGINIANS REINFORCED AND RESOLUTE 131
tiooal strength the Numidians stopped on their retreat. And
when the young lady, who was daughter of Hasdrubal and
wife of Syphax, added her earnest entreaties that he would
remain and not abandon the Carthaginians at such a crisis, the
Numidian king gave way and consented to her prayer. The
approach of these Celtiberes did a great deal also to encourage
the hopes of the Carthaginians : for instead of four thousand,
it was reported at Carthage that they were ten thousand, and
that their bravery and the excellency of their arms made them
irresistible in the field. Excited by this rumour, and by the
boastful talk which was current among the common people,
the Carthaginians felt their resolution to once xhe Canhaginians
more take the field redoubled. And finally, again take the
within thirty days, they pitched a camp in con- ''^'''■
junction with the Numidians and Celtiberes on what are
called the Great Plains, with an army amounting to no less
than thirty thousand.
8. Wiien news of these proceedings reached the Roman
camp Scipio immediately determined to attack. Leaving
orders, therefore, to the army and navy, which were besieg-
ing Utica, as to what they were to do, he started with all his
army in light marching order. On the fifth day he reached
the Great Plains, and during the first day after his arrival
encamped on a piece of rising ground about thirty stades from
the enemy. Next day he descended into the plain and drew up
his army ^ at a distance of seven stades from the enemy, with
his cavalry forming an advanced guard. After skirmishing
attacks carried on by both sides during the next two days, on
the fourth both armies were deliberately brought out into
position and drawn up in order of battle, xhc baiiie on the
Scipio followed exactly the Roman system. Great Plains.
stationing the maniples of hastati in the front,''^"'J"""i°''~""3-
behind them the principes, and lastly the Iriarii in the rear.
Of his cavalry he stationed the Italians on the right wing, the
Numidians and Massanissa on the left. Syphax and Hasdmbal
' irap«F/|9oXX«, whioh Schweig. tmnslatra castra locavil .- but though the
word does sometimes bear that meaning, I cannot think that it does so here.
Scipio Hxms to hat-c retained his camp on the hill, only (wo and a half miles'
distant, and to have come down into the plain to offer bailie each of the
three days. Hence Ibc imperial.
132 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS book
stationed the Celtiberes in the centre opposite the Roman
cohorts, the Numidians on the left, and the Carthaginians on
the right At the very first chaige the Numidians reeled
The Roman before the Italian cavalry, and the Carthaginians
wings arc both before those under Massanissa ; for their many
victorious. previous defeats had completely demoralised
them. But the Celtiberes fought gallantly, for they had no
hope of saving themselves by flight, being entirely unacquainted
with the country ; nor any expectation of being spared if they
were taken prisoners on account of their perfidy to Scipio : for
they were regarded as having acted in defiance of justice and
of their treaty in coming to aid the Carthaginians against the
Romans, though they had never suffered any act of hostility at
The Celtiberes, on Scipio's hands during the campaigns in Iberia.
the centre, are cut When, however, the two wings gave way these
to pieces after a jj^gj^ ^.gj^ surrounded by the principes and
gallant resistance, ^^.^j^ ^^^ ^^^ ^^ p.^^^^ ^^ ^^ ^^j^ ^^^^^ ^^
a man. Thus perished the Celtiberes, who yet did very
effective service to the Carthaginians, not only during the
whole battle, but during the retreat also; for, if it had not
been for the hindrance caused by them, the Romans would
have pressed the fugitives closely, and very few of the enemy
would have escaped. As it was, owing to the delay caused
by these men, Syphax and his cavalry effected
Hasdmb^ie. ^^^^^ ^^^^^^^ ^^ ^^^ o^'^ kingdom in safety ;
while Hasdrubal with the survivors of his army
did the same to Carthage.
9. After making the necessary arrangements as to the booty
J, . . . .u and prisoners, Scipio summoned a council of
ocipio receives ine . _ _
submission of the war to consult as to what to do next It was
country, while resolved that Scipio himself and one part of the
Laciius goes in ^^^^ g^ould Stay in the country and visit the
pursuit of Syphax. / i.'i t v j •»* •
various towns; while Laelius and Massanissa,
with the Numidians and the rest of the Roman legions,
should pursue Syphax and give him no time to deliberate or
make any preparations. This being settled the commanders
separated ; the two latter going with their division in pursuit
of Syphax, Scipio on a round of the townships. Some of
these were terrified into a voluntary submission to the Romans,
XIV SCIPrds VICTORY ON THE GREAT PLAINS 133
Others he jwompdy took by assault The whole country was
ripe for a change, owing to the constant series of miseries and
contributions, under which it had been groaning from the pro-
tracted wars in Iberia.
In Carthage meanwhile, where the panic had been great
enough before, a still wilder state of excitement
prevailed, after this second disaster, and the dis- c^thaee'
appointment of the hopes of success which they
had entertained. However, those of the counsellors who
claimed the highest character for courage urged that they
should go on board their ships and attack the besiegers of
Utica, try to raise the blockade, and engage the enemy at sea,
who were not in a forward state of preparation in that depart-
ment; that they should recall Hannibal, and without delay
test to the utmost this one more chance : for both these
measures offered great and reasonable opportunities of secur-
ing their safety. Others declared that their circumstances no
longer admitted of these measures : what they had to do was
to fortify their town and prepare to stand a siege ; for chance
would give them many occasions of striking a successful blow
if they only held together. At the same time they advised
that they should deliberate on coming to terms and making a
treaty, and see on what conditions and by what means they
might extricate themselves from the danger. After a long
debate, all these proposals were adopted together.
10. Upon this decision being come to, those who were to
sail to Italy went straight from the council chamber to the sea,
while the Navarch went to prepare the ships. The rest began
to take measures for securing the city, and remained in con-
stant consultation on the measures necessary for the purpose.
Meanwhile Scipio's camp was getting gorged with booty ;
for he found no one to resist him, and everybody yielded to
bis attacks. He therefore determined to despatch the greater
part of the booty to his original camp; while he advanced with
his army in light marching order to seize the entrenchment
near Tunes, and pitched his camp within the view of the in-
habitants of Carthage, thinking that this would do more than
anything else to strike terror into their hearts and lower their
courage.
134 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS book
The Carthaginians had in a few days manned and pro-
visioned their ships, and were engaged in getting under
sail and carrying out their plan of operations, when Scipio
arrived at Tunes, and, the garrison flying at his approach,
occupied the town, which is about a hundred stades from Car-
thage, of remarkable strength both natural and artificial, and
visible from nearly every point of Carthage.
Just as the Romans pitched their camp there, the Cartha-
Scipio rccaUed to ginians were putting out to sea on board thieir
utica by the fear ships to sail to Utica. Seeing the enemy thus
of an attack putting out, and fearing some misfortune to his
upon Ills tleet. <i.r^** jj j*i
own fleet, Scipio was rendered exceedingly
anxious, because no one there was prepared for such an attack,
or had anything in readiness to meet the danger. He there-
fore broke up his camp and marched back in haste to support
his men. There he found his decked ships thoroughly well
fitted out for raising siege-engines and applying them to walls,
and generally for all purposes of an assault upon a town, but
not in the least in the trim for a sea-fight ; while the enemy's
fleet had been under process of rigging for this purpose tiie
whole winter. He therefore gave up all idea of putting to sea
to meet the enemy and accepting battle there ; but anchoring
his decked ships side by side he moored the transports round
them, three or four deep ; and then, taking down the masts and
yard-arms, he lashed the vessels together firmly by means of
these, keeping a space between each sufficient to enable the
light craft to sail in and out . . .
PTOLEMY PHILOPATOR, B.C 2 2 2-205
1 1. Philo was a parasite of Agathocles, the son of Oenanthe,
and the friend of king Philopator. . . .
Many statues of Cleino, the girl who acted as cupbearer
The extra- ^^ Ptolemy Philadelphus, were set up at Alex-
ordinary influence andria, draped in a single tunic and holding a
of women of low cup in the hands. And are not the most splen-
Ai^andri^ ^^^ bouses there those which go by the names
of Murtium, Mnesis, and Pothine ? And yet
Mnesis was a flute -girl, as was Pothine, and Murtium was a
XiT PTOLEMY PHir.OPATOR I3S
public prostitute. And was not Agathocleia, the mistress of
kir^ Ptolemy Fhilopator, an influential personage, — she who
was the niin of the whole kingdom ? . . .
12. The question may be asked, perhaps, why I have
chosen to give a sketch of Egyptian history The feeble char-
here, going back a considerable period ; whereas, acta- of Ptolemy
in the case of the rest of my history, I havQ Phi'opaior.
recorded the events of each year in the several countries side
by side ? I have done so for the following reasons : Ptolemy
Philopator, of whom I am now speaking, after the conclusion
of the war for the possession of Coele-Syria,^ abandoned all
noble pursuits and gave himself up to the hfe of debauchery
which I have just described. But late in life he was com-
pelled by circumstances to engage in the war 1 have men-
tioned,* which, over and above the mutual cruelty and lawless-
ness with which it was conducted, witnessed neither pitched
battle, sea fight, siege, or anything else worth recording. I
thought, therefore, that it would be easier for me as a writer,
and more intelligible to my readers, if I did not touch upon
everything year by year as it occurred, or give a full account
of transactions which were insignificant and undeserving of
serious attention ; but should once for all sum up and describe
the character and policy of this king.
' The war with Antiochus, B.C. aiB-ai7. See s, 40, 58-71, 79-87.
* A civil vk'ar, apparently in a rebellion caused by bis own feeble and vicious
character. It seems lo be that referred to in 5, 107,
BOOK XV
A slight success on the part of the Carthaginian fleet at
Utica (14, 10) had been more than outweighed by the capture
of Syphax by Laelius \Livy^ 39, 11} Negotiations for peace
followed^ and an armistice^ in tlie course of which occurred the
incident referred to in the first extract of this book,
1. The Carthaginians having seized the transports as prizes
Some transports ^f war, and with them an extraordinary quantity
under Cn. Octa- of provisions, Scipio was extremely enraged,
h"^ i^*^^^r ^" "^^^ ^° much at the loss of the provisions, as by
thage, and tak^n the fact that the enemy had thereby obtained
possession of by a vast supply of necessaries ; and still more at
the Carthaginians ^l^g Carthaginians having violated the sworn
m spite of the . , r * ^ t
truce. Autumn articles of truce, and commenced the war
of B.C. 203. afresh. He therefore at once selected Lucius
^^' ^"*^» 30. 24. Sergius, Lucius Baebius, and Lucius Fabius to
go to Carthage, to remonstrate on what had taken place, and
at the same time to announce that the Roman people had
ratified the treaty ; for he had lately received a despatch from
home to that effect Upon their arrival in Carthage these
envoys first had an audience of the Senate, and then were
introduced to a meeting of the people. On both occasions
they spoke with great freedom on the situation
Roi^nc'liVoys. °^ ^^^^^^' reminding their hearers that "Their
ambassadors who had come to the Roman
camp at Tunes, on being admitted to the council of officers,
had not been content with appealing to the gods and
kissing the ground, as other people do, but had thrown
themselves upon the earth, and in abject humiliation
had kissed the feet of the assembled officers ; and then, rising
BOOK XV SPEECH OF ROMAN ENVOYS AT CARTHAGE 137
from the ground, had reproached themselves for breaking the
existing treaty between the Romans and Carthaginians, and
acknowledged that they deserved every severity at the hands
of the Romans ; but intreated to be spared the last severities,
from a regard to the vicissitudes of hupian fortune, for their
folly would be the means of displaying the generosity of the
Romans. Remembering all this, the general and the officers
then present in the council were at a loss to understand what
had encouraged them to forget what they then said, and to
venture to break their sworn articles of agreement. Plainly it
was this — they trusted in Hannibal and the Hannibal leaves
forces that had arrived with him. But they iraiy, aadjune,
were very ill advised All the world knew ^■'^- *°3-
that he and his army had been driven these two years past
from every port of Italy, and had retreated into the neighbour-
hood of the Lacinian promontory, where they had been so
closely shut up and almost besieged, that they had barely
been able to get safe away home, Not that, even if they '
had come fiack," he added, " as conquerors, and were minded
to engage us who have already defeated you in two con-
secutive battles, ought you to entertain any doubt as to the
result, or to speculate on the chance of victory. The certainty
of defeat were a better subject for your reflections : and when
that takes place, what are the gods that you will summon to
your aid? And what arguments will you use to move the pity
of the victors for your misfortunes ? You must needs expect
to be debarred from all hope of mercy from gods and men
alike by your perfidy and folly."
2. After delivering this speech the envoys retired. Some
few of the citizens were against breaking the Treacherous
treaty j but the majority, both of the poli- aitempi on ihc
ticians and the Senate, Ti'ere much annoyed "''esodhe
by its terms, and irritated by the plain speak-
ing of the envoys ; and, moreover, could not make up their
minds to surrender the captured transports and the provisions
which were on board them. But their main motive was a con-
fident hope that they might yet conquer by means of Hannibal
The people therefore voted to dismiss the envoys without an
answer. Moreover, the political party, whose aim it was to
138 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS book
bring on the war at all hazards, held a meeting and arranged
the following act of treachery. They gave out that it was neces-
sary to make provision for conducting the envo]^ back to their
camp in safety. They therefore at once caused two triremes
to be got ready to convoy them ; but at the same time sent a
message to the Navarch Hasdrubal to have some vessels ready
at no great distance from the Roman camp, in order that, as
soon as the convoys had taken leave of the Roman envoj^ he
might bear down upon their ships and sink them; for the
Carthaginian fleet was stationed at the time close under
Utica. Having made this arrangement with Hasdrubal, they
despatched the envoys, with instructions to the officers of the
convoys to leave them and return, as soon as they had passed
the mouth of the River Macara ; for it was from this point that
the enemy's camp came into sight Therefore, according to their
instructions, as soon as they had passed this point, the officers
of the convoys made signs of farewell to the Roman envoys
and returned. Lucius and his colleagues suspected no danger,
and felt no other annoyance at this proceeding than as re-
garding it as a mark of disrespect But no sooner were they
left thus alone, than three Carthaginian vessels suddenly started
out to attack them, and came up with the Roman quinquereme.
They failed, indeed, to stave her in, because she evaded them ;
nor did they succeed in boarding her, because the men resisted
them with great spirit But they ran up alongside of the
vessel, and kept attacking her at various points, and managed
to wound the marines with their darts and kill a considerable
number of them ; until at last the Romans, observing that their
forage parties along the shore were rushing down to the beach
to their assistance, ran their ships upon land. Most of the
marines were killed, but the envoys had the unexpected good
fortune to escape with their lives.
8. This was the signal for the recommencement of the war
in a fiercer and more angry spirit than before.
hc«uutie^ ^^^ Romans on their part, looking upon them-
selves as having been treated with perfidy, were
possessed with a furious determination to conquer the Car-
thaginians ; while the latter, conscious of the consequences of
what they had done, were ready to go all lengths to avoid
XV LAST YEAR OF THE SECOND FUNIC WAR 139
Calling under the power of the enemy. With such feelings
animating both sides, it was quite evident that the result
would have to be decided on the field of battle Conse-
quently everybody, not only in Italy and Libya, but in Iberia,
Sicily, and Sardinia, was in a state of excited expectation,
watching with conflicting feelings to see what would happen.
But meanwhile Hannibal, finding himself too Hannibal's
weak in cavalry, sent to a certain Numidian cavalry reinforced
named Tychaeus, who was a friend of Syphax, *''' Tychaeus.
and was reputed to possess the most warlike cavalry in Libya,
urging him "to lend his aid, and not let the present opportunity
slip ; as he must be well aware that, if the Carthaginians won
the day, he would be able to maintain his rule; but if the Romans
proved victorious, his very life would be in danger, owing to the
ambition of Massanissa." This prince was convinced by these
arguments, and joined Hannibal with two thousand horsemen.
4. Having secured his fieet, Scipio left Baebius in
command of it in his place, while he him-
self went a round of the cities. This time scjpi^,^'^iji.sjj
he did not admit to mercy those who volun- the CartiiBginian
tarily surrendered, but carried all the towns by temiory, and
force, and enslaved the inhabitants, to show his j^^J^'^yj^j
anger at the treachery of the Carthaginians. To
Massanissa he sent message after message, explaining to him
how the Punic government had broken the terms, and urging
him to collect the largest army he was able and join him with
all speed. For as soon as the treaty had been made, Massan-
issa, as I have said, had immediately departed with his own
army and ten Roman cohorts, infantry and cavalry, accom-
panied by some commissioners from Scipio, that he might not
only recover his own kingdom, but secure the addition of that
of Syphax also, by the assistance of the Romans. And this
purpose was eventually effected.
It happened that just at this time the envoys from Rome
arrived at the naval camp. Those of them scipio orders
who had been sent by the Roman government, ihe Carthaginian
Baebius at once caused to be escorted to e"™ysiob«
Scipio, while he retained those who were Car-
thaginians. The latter were much cast down, and regarded
I40 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBWS book
their position as one of great danger; for when they were
informed of the impious outrage committed by their countr3rmen
on the persons of the Roman envoys, they thought there could
be no doubt that the vengeance for it would be wreaked upon
themselves. But when Scipio learnt from the recently-arrived
commissioners that the senate and people accepted with en-
thusiasm the treaty which he had made with the Carthaginians,
and were ready to grant everything he asked, he was highly
delighted, and ordered Baebius to send the envoys home with
all imaginable courtesy. And he was very well advised to do
so, in my opinion. For as he knew that his countrymen
made a great point of respecting the rights of ambassadors, he
considered in his own mind, not what the Carthaginians de-
served to have done to them, but what it was becoming in
Romans to inflict Therefore, though he did not relax his
own indignation and anger at what they had done, he yet
endeavoured, in the words of the proverb, "to maintain the
good traditions of his sires." The result was that, by this
superiority in his conduct, a very decided impression was
made upon the spirits of the Carthaginians and of Hannibal
himself.
6. When the people of Carthage saw the cities in their
• '. -territory being sacked, they sent a message to Hannibal beg-
ging him to act without delay, to come to close quarters with
the enemy, and bring the matter to the decision of battle.
He bade the messengers in answer "to confine their attention
to other matters, and to leave such things to him, for he
would choose the time for fighting himself." Some days
afterwards he broke up his quarters at Adrumetum, and
pitched his camp near Zama, a town about five
"''to'^mT''^ days' march to the west of Carthage. From
that place he sent spies to ascertain the place,
nature, and strength of the Roman general's encampment
These spies were caught and brought to Scipio, who, so far
from inflicting upon them the usual punishment of spies,
appointed a tribune to show them everything in the camp
thoroughly and without reserve ; and when this had been done,
he asked the men whether the appointed officer had been care-
ful to point out everything to them. Upon their replying that
XT BOTH SIDES PREPARE FOR BATTLE 141
he had, be gave them provisions and an escort, and despatched
them with injunctions to be careful to tell Hannibal every-
thing they had seen. On their return to his camp, Hannibal
was so much struck with the magnanimity and high courage '
of Scipio, that he conceived a lively desire for a personal in-
terview with him. With this purpose he sent a herald to say
that he was desirous of a parley to discuss the matters at issue.
When the herald had delivered his message, Scipio at once
expressed his consent, and said that he would himself send
him a message when it suited him to meet, naming the time
and place. The herald returned to Hannibal with this answer.
Next day Massanissa arrived with six thousand
infantry and about four thousand cavalry. Scipio M^^tmi^
received him with cordiality, and congratulated
him on having added to his sway all those who had previously
been subject to Syphax. Thus reinforced, he removed bis
camp to Naragara : selecting it as a place which, among
other advantages, enabled him to get water within a javelin's
6. From this place he sent to the Carthaginian general,
informing him that he was ready to meet him, and discuss
matters with him. On hearing this, Hannibal moved his quar-
ters to within thirty stades of Scipio, and pitched his camp on
a hill, which seemed a favourable position for his present pur-
pose, except that water had to be fetched from a considerable
distance which caused his soldiers great fatigue.
Next day both commanders advanced from their camps
attended by a few horsemen. Presently they
left these escorts and met in the intervening *^d HaS,"
space by themselves, each accompanied by an
interpreter. Hannibal was the 6rst to speak, after the usual
salutation. He said that " He wished that the
Romans had never coveted any possession ^^[j '
outside Italy, nor the Carthaginians outside
Libya ; for these were both noble empires, and were, so to
speak, marked out by nature. But since," he continued, " our
rival claims to Sicily first made us enemies, and then those
for Iberia; and since, finally, unwarned by the lessons of mis-
fortune, we have gone so far that the one nation has eo-
142 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS book
dangered the very soil of its native land, and the other is
now actually doing so, all that there remains for us to do is
to try our best to deprecate the wrath of the gods, and to put
an end, as far as in us lies, to these feelings of obstinate hos-
tility. I personally am ready to do this, because I have learnt
by actual experience that Fortune is the most fickle thing in
the world, and inclines with decisive favour now to one side
and now to the other on the slightest pretext, treating man-
kind like young children.
7. " But it is about you that I am anxious, Scipia For
you are still a young man, and everything has succeeded to
your wishes both in Iberia and Libya, and you have as yet
never experienced the ebb tide of Fortune ; I fear, therefore,
that my words, true as they are, will not influence you. But
do look at the facts in the light of one story, and that not
connected with a former generation, but our owa Look at
me ! I am that Hannibal who, after the battle of Cannae,
became master of nearly all Italy ; and presently advancing to
Rome itself, and pitching my camp within forty stades of it,
deliberated as to what I should do with you and your country ;
but now I am in Libya debating with you, a Roman, as to the
bare existence of myself and my countrymen. With such
a reverse as that before your eyes, I beg you not to entertain
high thoughts, but to deliberate with a due sense of human
weakness on the situation ; and the way to do that is among
good things to choose the greatest, among evils the least.
What man of sense, then, would deliberately choose to incur
the risk which is now before you. If you conquer, you will
add nothing of importance to your glory or to that of your
country ; while, if you are worsted, you will have been your-
self the means of entirely cancelling all the honours and
glories you have already won. What then is the point that I
am seeking to establish by these arguments ? It is that the
Romans should retain all the countries for which we have
hitherto contended — I mean Sicily, Sardinia, and Iberia ; and
that the Carthaginians should engage never to go to war with
Rome for these ; and also that all the islands lying between
Italy and Libya should belong to Rome. For I am per-
suaded that such a treaty will be at once safest for the
IV MEETING OF HANNIBAL AND SCIPIO 143
Carthaginians, and most glorious for you and the entire people
of Rome."
8. In reply to this speech of Hannibal, Scipio said "That
neither in the Sicilian nor Iberian war were the ,.■■._,
_ , , - 1 . Scipio s reply,
Romans the aggressors, but notoriously the
Carthaginians, which no one knew better than Hannibal him-
self. That the gods themselves had confirmed this by giving
the victory, not to those who struck the first and unprovoked
blow, but to those who only acted in self defence. That he
was as ready as any one to keep before his eyes the uncertainty
of Fortune, and tried his best to confine his efforts within the
range of human infirmity. But if," he continued, "you had
yourself quitted Italy before the Romans crossed to Libya
with the offer of these terms in your hands, I do not think
that you would have been disappointed in your expectation.
But now that your departure from Italy has been involuntary,
and we have crossed into Libya and conquered the country,
it is clear that matters stand on a very different footing. But
above all, consider the point which affairs have reached now.
Your countrymen have been beaten, and at their earnest
prayer we arranged a written treaty, in which, besides the
offer now made by you, it was provided that the Carthaginians
should restore prisoners without ransom, should surrender all
their decked vessels, pay five thousand talents, and give
hostages for their performance of these articles. These were
the terms which I and they mutually agreed upon ; we both
despatched envoys to our respective Senates and people, — we
consenting to grant these terms, the Carthaginians begging to
have them granted. The Senate agreed : the people ratified
the treaty. But though they had got what they asked, the
Carthaginians annulled the compact by an act of perfidy
towards us. What course is left to me ? Put yourself in my
place and say. To withdraw the severest clauses of the treaty ?
Are we to do this, say you, not in order that by reaping the
reward of treachery they may learn in future to outrage their
benefactors, but in order that by getting what they ask for
they may be grateful to us ? Why, only the other day, after
obtaining what they begged for as suppliants, because your
presence gave them a slender hope of success, they at once
144 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS BOOE
treated us as hated foes and public enemies. In these circum-
stances, if a still severer clause were added to the conditioni
imposed, it might be possible to refer the treaty back to the
people ; but, if I were to withdraw any of these conditions, such
a reference does not admit even of discussion. What then is
the conclusion of my discourse ? It is, that you must sub-
mit yourselves and your country to us unconditionally, or
conquer us in the field"
9. After these speeches Hannibal and Scipio parted without
The momentous coming to any terms ; and next morning by
issues depending daybreak both generals drew out their forces
onthe battle of ^^d engaged To the Carthaginians it was a
' * ^°** struggle for their own lives and the sovereignty
of Libya; to the Romans for universal dominion and supremacy.
And could any one who grasped the situation fail to be moved
at the story? Armies more fitted for war than these, or
generals who had been more successful or more thoroughly
trained in all the operations of war, it would be impossible to
find, or any other occasion on which the prizes proposed by
destiny to the combatants were more momentous. For it was
not merely of Libya or Europe that the victors in this battle
were destined to become masters, but of all other parts of the
world known to history, — a destiny which had not to wait
long for its fulfilment.
Scipio placed his men on the field in the following order :
the hastati first, with an interval between their
^ofbatU^^ maniples; behind them the principeSy their
maniples not arranged to cover the intervals
between those of the hastati as the Roman custom is, but
immediately behind them at some distance, because the enemy
was so strong in elephants. In the rear of these he stationed
the triarii. On his left wing he stationed Gaius Laelius with
the Italian cavalry, on the right Massanissa with all his
Numidians. The intervals between the front maniples he
filled up with maniples of velitesy who were ordered to begin
the battle ; but if they found themselves unable to stand the
charge of the elephants, to retire quickly either to the rear of
the whole army by the intervals between the maniples, which
went straight through the ranks, or, if they got entangled with
XV DISPOSITIONS FOR THE BATTLE OF ZAMA 145
the elephants, to step aside into the lateral spaces between the
maniples.
10. These dispositions made, he went along the ranks
delivering an exhortation to the men, which,
though short, was much to the point in the ^ohj^*^^^
circumstances in which they were placed. He
called upon them, "Remembering their former victories, to
show themselves to be men of mettle and worthy their repu-
tation and their country. To put before their eyes that the
effect of their victory would be not only to make them complete
masters of Libya, but to give them and their country the
supremacy and undisputed lordship of the world. But if the
result of the battle were unfavourable, those who fell fighting
gallantly would have the record of having died for their
country, while those that saved themselves by flight would
spend the rest of their days as objects of pitying contempt
and scorn. For there was no place in Libya which could
secure their safety if they fled; while, if they fell into the hands
of the Carthaginians, no one who looked facts in the face
could doubt what would happen to them. May none of you,"
he added, "learn that by experience! Since, then, Fortune
puts before us the most glorious of rewards, in whichever way
the batde is decided, should we not be at once the most
mean-spirited and foolish of mankind if we abandon the most
glorious alternative, and from a paltry clinging to life deli-
berately choose the worst of misfortunes ? Charge the enemy
then with the steady resolve to do one of two things, to
conquer or to die ! For it is men thus minded who invariably
conquer their opponents, since they enter the field with no
other hope of life."
11. Such was Scipio's address to his men. Meanwhile
Hannibal had put his men also into position. His
elephants, which numbered more than eighty, he ""^'^X"^"
placed in the van of the whole army. Next his
mercenaries, amounting to twelve thousand, and consisting of
Ltgurians, Celts, Baliarians, and Mauretani; behind them
the native Libyans and Carthaginians ; and on the rear of the
whole the men whom he had brought from Italy, at a distance
of somewhat more than a stade. His wings he strengthened
VOL. II L
146 THE HISTORIES OF POL YB I US book
with cavalry, stationing the Numidian allies on the left wing;
and the Carthaginian horsemen on the right He ordered
each officer to address his own men, bidding them rest their
hopes of victory on him and the army he had brought with
him; while he bade their officers remind the Carthaginians
in plain terms what would happen to their wives and children
if the battle should be lost While these orders were carried
out by the officers, Hannibal himself went along the lines of
his Italian army and urged them " to remember the seventeen
Hannibal's years during which they had been brothers-in-
speech to the arms, and the number of battles they had fought
•army of Italy." ^^^j^ ^j^^ Romans, in which they had never been
beaten or given the Romans even a hope of victory. Above
all, putting aside minor engagements and their countless suc-
cesses, let them place before their eyes the battle of the River
Trebia against the father of the present Roman commander ;
and again the battle in Etruria against Flaminius; and
lastly that at Cannae against Aemilius, with none of which
was the present struggle to be compared, whether in regard
to the number or excellence of the enemy's men. Let
them only raise their eyes and look at the ranks of the
enemy ; they would see that they were not merely fewer, but
many times fewer than those with whom they had fought
before, while, as to their soldierly qualities, there was no com-
parison. The former Roman armies had come to the struggle
with them untainted by memories of past defeats : while these
men were the sons or the remnants of those who had been
beaten in Italy, and fled before him again and again. They
ought not therefore," he said, " to undo the glory and fame
of their previous achievements, but to struggle with a firm and
brave resolve to maintain their reputation of invincibility."
Such were the addresses of the two commanders.
12. All arrangements for the battle being complete, and
the two opposing forces of Numidian cavalry
fhe'eSntsf ^^^ing been for some time engaged in skirmish-
ing attacks upon each other, Hannibal gave the
word to the men on the elephants to charge the enemy. But
as they heard the horns and trumpets braying all round them,
some of the elephants became unmanageable and rushed back
XV THE BATTLE OF ZAMA M7
upon the Numidian contingents of the Carthaginian army;
and this enabled Massanissa with great speed to deprive the
Carthaginian left wing of its cavalry support The rest of the
elephants charged the Roman veUtes in the spaces between the
maniples of the line, and while inflicting much damage on the
enemy suffered severely themselves ; until, becoming frightened,
some of them ran away down the vacant spaces, the Romans
letting them pass harmlessly along, according to Scipio's
orders, while others ran away to the right under a shower of
darts from the cavalry, until they were finally driven clear off
the field. It was just at the moment of this might of ibe
stampede of the elephants, that Laelius forced Canhaginian
the Carthaginian cavalry into headlong flight, ca™lry.
and along with Massanissa pressed them with a vigorous
pursuit While this was going on, the opposing lines of heavy
infantry were advancing to meet others with deliberate step and
proud confidence, except Hannibal's "army of Italy," which
remained in its or^nal position. When they came within
distance the Roman soldiers charged the enemy, shouting as
usual their war-cry, and clashing their swords against their
shields : while the Carthaginian mercenaries uttered a strange
confusion of cries, the effect of which was indescribable, for, in
the words of the poet,' the " voice of all was not one " —
18. The whole affair being now a trial of strength between
man and man at close quarters, as the combat-
ants used their swords and not their spears, the ^^^f^tj*
superiority was at first on the side of the dexterity
and daring of the mercenaries, which enabled them to wound
a considerable number of the Romans. The latter, however,
trusting to the steadiness of their ranks and the excellence of
their arms, still kept gaining ground, their rear ranks keeping
close up with them and encouraging them to advance ; while
the Carthaginians did not keep up with their mercenaries nor
support them, but showed a thoroughly cowardly spirit. The
result was that the foreign soldiers gave way : and, believing that
they had been shamelessly abandoned by their own side, ff"
' Homer, Iliad, 4, 437.
148 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS book
upon the men on their rear as they were retreating, and began
killing them ; whereby many of the Carthaginians were com-
pelled to meet a gallant death in spite of themselves. For as
they were being cut down by their mercenaries they had, much
against their inclination, to fight with their own men and the
Romans at the same time ; and as they now fought with
desperation and fury they killed a good many both of their
own men and of the enemy also. Thus it came about that their
charge threw the maniples of the hastati into confusion ; where-
upon the officers of the principes caused their lines to advance
to oppose them. However, the greater part of the mercenaries
and Carthaginians had fallen either by mutual slaughter or by the
sword of the hastati. Those who survived and fled Hannibal
would not allow to enter the ranks of his army, but ordered
his men to lower their spears and keep them back as they
approached ; and they were therefore compelled to take refuge
on the wings or make for the open country.
14. The space between the two armies that still remained
Final struggle in position was full of blood, wounded men, and
between dead corpses ; and thus the rout of the enemy
Hannibal s proved an impediment of a perplexing nature to
reserves his * r o
•' army of Italy," the Roman general. Everything was calculated
and the whole to make an advance in order difficult, — the
Roman infantry, ground slippery with gore, the corpses lying
piled up in bloody heaps, and with the corpses arms flung
about in every direction. However Scipio caused the wounded
to be carried to the rear, and the hastati to be recalled from
the pursuit by the sound of a bugle, and drew them up where
they were in advance of the ground on which the fighting had
taken place, opposite the enemy's centre. He then ordered
the principes and triarii to take close order, and, threading their
way through the corpses, to deploy into line with the hastati on
either flank. When they had surmounted the obstacles and
got into line with the hastatiy the two lines charged each other
with the greatest fire and fury. Being nearly equal in numbers,
spirit, courage, and arms, the battle was for a long time un-
decided, the men in their obstinate valour falling dead without
The battle is S^^ing way a step ; until at last the divisions of
decided by the Massanissa and Laelius, returning from the
XT VICTORY OF SCIPIO AND FUGHT OF HANNIBAL 149
pursuit, arrived providentially in the very nick reiumorihe
of time. Upon their charging Hannibal's rear, Roman and
the greater part of his men were cut down in ra™i™"
their ranks ; while of those who attempted to fly
very few escaped with their life, because the horsemen were
close at their heels and the ground was quite level. On the
Roman side there fell over fifteen hundred, on the Cartha-
ginian over twenty thousand, while the prisoners taken were
almost as numerous.
16. Such was the end of this battle, fought under these
famous commanders : a battle on which everything depended,
and which assigned universal dominion to Rome, After it had
come to an end, Scipio pushed on in pursuit as far as the
Carthaginian camp, and, a(ler plundering that,
returned to his own, Hannibal, escaping with to^drum^m^
a few horsemen, did not draw rein until he
arrived safely at Adrumetum. He had done in the battle all
that was to be expected of a good and experienced general
First, he had tried by an interview with his opponent to see
what he could do to procure a pacification ; and that was the
right course for a man, who, while fully conscious of his former
victories, yet mistrusts Fortune, and has an eye to all the possible
and unexpected contingencies of war. Next, having accepted
battle, the excellence of his dispositions for a contest with
the Romans, considering the identity of the arms on each side,
could not have been surpassed. For though the Roman line ~
is hard to break, yet each individual soldier and each company,
owing to the uniform tactic employed, can fight in any direction,
those companies, which happen to be in nearest contact with
the danger, wheeling round to the point required. Again, the
nature of their arms gives at once protection and confidence, for
their shield is large and their sword will not bend : the Romans
therefore are formidable on the field and hard to conquer,
16. Still Hannibal took his measures against each of these
difficulties in a manner that could not be surpassed. He pro-
vided himself with those numerous elephants, and put them in
the van, for the express purpose of throwing the enemy's ranks
into confusion and breaking their order. Again he stationed
the mercenaries in firont and the Carthaginians behind them, in
ISO THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS book
order to wear out the bodies of the enemy with &tigue before-
hand, and to blunt the edge of their swords by the numbers
that would be killed by them ; and moreover to compel the
Carthaginians, by being in the middle of the army, to stay
where they were and fight, as the poet says^ —
** That howsoe'er unwilling fight he must.**
But the most warlike and steady part of his army he held in
reserve at some distance, in order that they might not see
what was happening too closely, but, with strength and spirit
unimpaired, might use their courage to the best advantage
when the moment arrived. And, if in spite of having done
everything that could be done, he who had never been beaten
before failed to secure the victory now, we must excuse him.
For there are times when chance thwarts the plans of the
brave ; and there are others again, when a man
** Though great and brave has met a greater stilL**'
And this we might say was the case with Hannibal on this
occasion. . . .
17. Manifestations of emotion which go beyond what is
customary among a particular people, if they
^'^ht'eTvo'J^' a^e ^ho"g^^ ^o t)e the result of genuine feeling
from Carthage evoked by extraordinary disasters, excite pity
after Zama, who in the minds of those who see or hear them ;
!;i^nH^''n?3!l? and we are all in a manner moved by the
displays of sorrow. , - , , -r^ i i i •
novelty of the spectacle. But when such thmgs
appear to be assumed for the purpose of taking in the spec-
tators and producing a dramatic effect, they do not provoke
pity, but anger and dislike. And this was the case in regard
to the Carthaginian envoys. Scipio deigned to give a very
brief answer to their prayers, saying that " They, at any rate,
deserved no kindness at the hands of the Romans, since
they had themselves confessed that they were the aggres-
sors in the war, by having, contrary to their treaty obliga-
tions, taken Saguntum and enslaved its inhabitants, and had
recently been guilty of treachery and breaking the terms of a
treaty to which they had subscribed and sworn. It was from
^ Homer, Iliad, 4, 300.
'^ A line of which the author is unknown ; perhaps it was Theognis.
XT TERMS M^DE AFTER TflE BATTLE OF ZAMA 151
a regard to their own dignity, to the vicissitudes of Fortune, and
to the dictates of humanity that the Romans had determined
to treat them with lenity and behave with magnanimity. And
of this they would be convinced if they would take a right
view of the case. For they ought not to consider it a hard-
ship if they found themselves charged to submit to any punish-
ment, to follow a particular line of conduct, or to give up
this or that ; they ought rather to regard it as an unexpected
favour that any kindness was conceded to them at all ; since
Fortune, after depriving them of all right to pity and considera-
tion, owing to their own unrighteous conduct, had put them in
the power of their enemies." After this preamble he men-
tioned the concessions to be made to them, and the penalties
to which they were to submit
18. The following are the heads of the terms offered
them: — The Carthaginians to retain tite towns Terms imposed
in Libya, of which they were possessed be/ore fhpf on Canhage after
commenced the last war against Rome, and /A*'''^*""'^'''^'™''
territory which they also heretofore held, with
its cattle, slaves, and olher stock : and from that day should not
be subject to ads of hostility, should enjoy their own laws and
customs, and not have a Roman garrison in their city. These
were the concessions favourable to them. The clauses of an
opposite character were as follows : — The Carthaginians to pay
an indemnify to the Romans for all wrongs committed during
the truee ; to restore all captives and runaway slaves without
limit of time ; to hand aver all their ships of war except ten
triremes, and all elephants ; to go to war with no people outside
Libya at all, and with none in Libya without consent from
Rome ; to restore to Massanissa all houses, territory, and cities
belonging to him or his ancestors within the frontiers assigned to
that king ; to supply the Roman army with proiisions for three
months, and with pay, until such time as an answer shall be
returned from Rome on the subject of the treaty ; to pay ten
thousand talents of silver in fifty years, two hundred Euboic
talents every year ; to give a hundred hostages of thar good faith,
— such hostages to be selected from the young men of the country
fy the Roman general, and to be not younger than fourteen or
older than thirty years.
152 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS book
19. This was the nature of Scipio*s answer to the envoys,
who hastened home and communicated its
(^rtt^iglnki^;^-. ^^™^ ^^ *^^*^ countrymen. It was then that
sembiy. Hannibal the story goes that, upon a certain Senator
persuades them intending to speak against accepting the terms
^""t^w^^ and actually beginning to do so, Hannibal
^* came forward and pulled the man down from
the tribune ; and when the other senators showed anger at
this breach of custom, Hannibal rose again and " owned that
he was ignorant of such things ; but said that they must pardon
him if he acted in any way contrary to their customs, remem-
bering that he had left the country when he was but fourteen,
and had only returned when now past forty-five. Therefore
he begged them not to consider whether he had committed
a breach of custom, but much rather whether he were genuinely
feeling for his country's misfortunes ; for that was the real
reason for his having been guilty ^of this breach of manners.
For it appeared to him to be astonishing, and, indeed, quite
unaccountable, that any one calling himself a Carthaginian,
and being fully aware of the policy which they had individually
and collectively adopted against the Romans, should do other-
wise than adore the kindness of Fortune for obtaining such
favourable terms, when in their power, as a few days ago no
one — considering the extraordinary provocation they had
given — would have ventured to mention, if they had been
asked what they expected would happen to their country, in
case of the Romans proving victorious. Therefore he called
upon them now not to debate, but unanimously to accept the
terms offered, and with sacrifices to the gods to pray with one
accord that the Roman people might confirm the treaty." His
advice being regarded as both sensible and timely, they resolved
to sign the treaty on the conditions specified ; and the senate
at once despatched envoys to notify their consent. . . .
The intrigues of Philip V, and Antiochus the Great to di-
vide the dominions of the infant king of Egypty Ptolemy Epi-
phanes, B.C. 204.
20. Is it not astonishing that while Ptolemy Philopator
was alive and did not need such assistance, these two kings
XT LEAGUE AGAINST PTOLEMY EPIPHANES 153
were ready with offers of aid, but that as soon as he was dead,
leaving his heir a mere child, whose kingdom shameless
they were bound by the ties of nature to have ambition of Philip
defended, they then egged each other on to and Antiocbus.
adopt the policy of partitioning the boy's kingdom between
themselves, and getting rid entirely of the heir ; and that too
without putting forward any decent pretext to cover their
iniquity, but acting so shamelessly, and so like beasts of prey,*
that one can only compare their habits to those ascribed to
fishes, among which, though they may be of the same species,
the destruction of the smaller is the food and sustenance of
the larger. This treaty of theirs shows, as though in a mirror,
the impiety to heaven and cruelty to man of these two
kings, as well as their unbounded ambition. However, If a
man were disposed to find fault with Fortune for her adminis-
tration of human affairs, he might fairly become reconciled to
her in this case ; for she brought upon those monarchs the
punishment they so well deserved, and by the signal example
she made of them taught posterity a lesson in righteousness,
For while they were engaged in acts of treachery against each
Other, and in dismembering the child's kingdom in their own
interests, she brought the Romans upon them, and the very
measures which they had lawlessly designed against another,
she justly and properly carried out against them. For both of
them, being promptly beaten in the field, were
not only prevented from gratifying their desire ^^' J^^'
for the dominions of another, but were them-
selves made tributary and forced to obey orders from Rome.
Finally, within a very short time Fortune restored the kingdom
of Ptolemy to prosperity ; while as to the dynasties and suc-
cessors of these two monarchs, she either utterly abolished and
destroyed them, or involved them in misfortunes which were
little short of that . , .
21. There was a certain man at Cius named Molpagoras,
a ready speaker and of considerable ability in The imrigues and
affairs, but at heart a mere demagogue and tyranny of Mol-
selfish intriguer. By flattering the mob, and P«Boras at Cius,
., ° . , '... . ° . ' , in Bithynia,
putting the richer citizens mto its power, he
either got them put to death right out, or drove them into exile
154 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS book
and distributed their confiscated goods among the common
people, and thus rapidly secured for himself a position of
despotic power. . . .
The miseries which befel the Cians were not so much
owing to Fortune or the aggressions of their
'^^,!^^?^*^ neighbours, as to their own folly and perverse
policy. For by steadily promoting their worst
men, and punishing all who were opposed to these, that they
might divide their property among themselves, they seemed as
it were to court the disasters into which they fell. These are
disasters into which, somehow or another, though all men &ll,they
yet not only cannot learn wisdom, but seem not even to acquire
the cautious distrust of brute beasts. The latter, if they have
once been hurt by bait or trap, or even if they have seen another
in danger of being caught, you would find it difficult to induce
to approach anything of the sort again : they are shy of the
place, and suspicious of everything they see. But as for men,
though they have been told of cities utterly ruined by their
policy, and sec others actually doing so before their eyes, yet
directly any one flatters their wishes by holding out to them
the prospect of recruiting their fortunes at the cost of others,
they rush thoughtlessly to the bait : although they know quite
well that no one, who has ever swallowed such baits, has ever
survived ; and that such political conduct has notoriously been
the ruin of all who have adopted it.
22. Philip was delighted at taking the city, as though
Capture of Cius ^^ ^^^ performed a glorious and honourable
by Philip V. achievement ; for while displaying great zeal in
B.C. 202.1 behalf of his brother-in-law (Prusias), and over-
awing all who opposed his policy, he had secured for himself in
fair warfare a large supply of slaves and money. But the reverse
of this picture he did not see in the least, although it was quite
plain. In the first place, that he was assisting his brother-in-
law, who, without receiving any provocation, was treacherously
assailing his neighbours. In the second place, that by involving
a Greek city without just cause in the most dreadful misfortunes,
he was sure to confirm the report, which had been widely
spread, of his severity to his friends ; and by both of these
* See Livy, 31, 31 ; Strabo, 12, c. 4. Philip handed over Cius to Prusias.
■ sv PHILIP ROUSES TflE ENMITY OF THE GREEKS 155
actions would justly gain throughout Greece the reputation of a
man reckless of the dictates of piety. In the third place, that
he had outraged the envoys from the above-mentioned states,'
who had come with the hope of saving the Cians from the
danger which threatened them, and who, after being day after
day mocked by his professions, had been at length compelled
to witness what they most abhorred. And lastly, that he had so
infuriated the Rhodians, that they would never henceforth
listen to a word in his favour: a circumstance for which
Philip had to thank Fortune as well as himself
2S. For it happened that just when his ambassador was
defending his master before the Rhodians in The anger of the
the theatre, — enlarging on " the magnanimity of Rhodians ai the
Philip," and announcing that " though already in f^' °^ ^"^
a manner master of Cius, he conceded its safety to the wishes
of the Rhodian people ; and did so because he desired to
refute the calumnies of his enemies, and to establish the
honesty of his intentions in the eyes of Rhodes," — ^just then a'
man entered the Prytaneum who had newly arrived in the
island, and brought the news of the enslavement of the Cians
and the cruelty which Philip had exercised upon them. The
Prytanis coming into the theatre to announce this news, while
the ambassador was absolutely in the middle of his speech,
the Rhodians could scarcely make up their minds to believe
a report which involved such monstrous treachery.
He had then betrayed himself quite as grossly as the
Cians ; and so blind or misguided had he become as to the
principles of right and wrong, that he boasted of actions of
which he ought to have been most heartily ashamed, and
plumed himself upon them as though they were to his credit
But the people of Rhodes from that day forth regarded
Philip as their enemy, and made their preparations with that
view. And no less by this course had he gained i, causes a.
the hatred of the Aetolians. He had but breach with the
lately made terms with,' and held out the hand Aeiolians.
of friendship to that nation : no excuse for a breach had
arisen ; and the Lysimachians, Calchedonians, and Cianians
were friends and allies of the Aetolians, Nevertheless only
' Thai is, (rom Rhodes antl other stales.
1 56 THE HISTORIES OF FOLYBWS doox •
short time before he had separated LysimachJa from the
Aetolian alliance, and induced it to submit to him : then he
had done the same to Cakhedon : and lastly he had enslaved
the Cians, though there was an Aetolian officer actually in Cius
and conducting the government. Prusias, however, in so far
as his policy was accomplished, was delighted ; but inasmuch
as another was in possession of the prizes of the operations,
while he himself got as his share nothing but the bare site
of a city, was extremely annoyed, but was yet unable to do
anything. . . .
24. During his return voyage Philip engaged in one act of
treachery after another, and among others put in
^'Jf a'o^^^' "•^"^ mid-day at the town of Thasos, and
though it was on good terms with him, took it
and enslaved its inhabitants. . . .
The Thasians answered Philip's general Metrodorus, that
they would surrender their city, on condition that he would
guarantee them freedom from a garrison, tribute, or billeting
of soldiers, and the enjoyment of their own laws. Metrodorus
having declared the king's consent to this, the whole assembly
signified their approval of the words by a loud shout, where-
upon they admitted Philip into the town. . . .
All kings perhaps at the beginning of their reign dangle the
name of liberty before their subjects' eyes, and address as
friends and allies those who combine in pursuing the same
objects as themselves ; but when they come to actual
administration of affairs they at once cease to treat these
as allies, and assume the airs of a master. Such persons
accordingly find themselves deceived as to the honourable
position they expected to occupy, though as a rule not as
to the immediate advantage which they sought. But if a
king is meditating undertakings of the greatest importance,
and only bounding his hopes by the limits of the world, and
has as yet had nothing to cast a damp upon his projects,
would it not seem the height of folly and madness to proclaim
his own fickleness and untrust worthiness in matters which are
of the smallest consequence, and lie at the very threshold of
his enterprise ? . . .
XV PTOLEMY EPIPHANES SUCCEEDS TO THE CROWN 157
24 {a). My plan being to narrate under each year all the
events in the several parts of the world which were contem-
porary, it is clear that In some cases it will be necessary to
mention the end before the beginning ; when, that is to say,
that particular part of the subject calls for mention, first as
being in place in the general course of my narrative, and the
events which embrace the end of an episode fit in sooner than
those which belong to its beginning and first conceptioa . . .
26, Sosibius, the unfaithful guardian of Ptolemy Epiphanes,
was a creature of extraordinary cunning, who
long retained his power, and was the instrument ^^^^^J^^^^i^
of many crimes at court : he contrived first the
murder of Lysimachus, son of Arsinoe, daughter of Ptolemy
and Berenice ; secondly, that of Maga, son of Ptolemy and
Berenice the daughter of Maga ; thirdly, that of Berenice the
mother of Ptolemy Pbilopator ; fourthly, that of Cleomenes of
Sparta'; and fifthly, that of Arsinoe the daughter of Berenice; . . .
Three or four days after the death of Ptolemy Philopatot,
having caused a platform to be erected in the
largest court of the palace Agathocles and ■j^'j^^'of
Sosibius summoned a meeting of the foot- pioiemy Phiio-
guards and the household, as well as the P^tor announced,
officers Of the infantry and cavalry. The '^^^^^^
assembly being formed, they mounted the plat-
form, and first of all announced the deaths of the king and
queen, and proclaimed the customary period of mourning for
the people. After that they placed a diadem upon the head
of the child, Ptolemy Epiphanes, proclaimed him king,
and read a forged will, in which the late king nominated
Agathocles and Sosibius guardians of his son. They ended by
an exhortation to the ofBcers to be loyal to the boy and maintain
his sovereignty. They next brought in two silver urns, one of
which they declared contained the ashes of the king, the other
those of Arsinoe. Andin fact one of them did really contain
the king's ashes, the other was filled with spices. Having done
this they proceeded to complete the funeral ceremonies. It
was then that all the world at last learnt the truth about the
158 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS book
death of Arsinoe. For now that her death was clearly
established, the manner of it began to be a matter of specu-
lation. Though rumours which turned out to be true hmi
found their way among the people, they had up to this time
been disputed; now there was no possibility of hiding the
truth, and it became deeply impressed in the minds of alU
Indeed there was great excitement among the populace : no one
thought about the king ; it was the fate of Arsinoe that
moved them. Some recalled her orphanhood; others the
tyranny and insult she had endured from her earliest days ;
and when her miserable death was added to these misfortunes,
it excited such a passion of pity and sorrow that the city was
filled with sighs, tears, and irrepressible lamentation. Yet it was
clear to the thoughtful observer that these were not so much
signs of affection for Arsinoe as of hatred towards Agathodes.
The first measure of this minister, after depositing the urns
Agaihociet pro- '" ^^^ royal mortuary, and giving orders for the
pitiaies tbe army laying aside of mourning, was to gratify the
and gets rid of army with two months' pay ; for he was con-
vinced that the way to deaden the resentment
of the common soldiers was to appeal to their interests. He
then caused them to take the oath customary at the pro-
clamation of a new king ; and next took measures to get all
who were likely to be formidable out of the country.
Philammon, who had been employed in the murder of Arsinoe,
he sent out as governor of Cyrene, while he committed the
young king to the chaise of Oenanthe and Agathocleia.
Next, Pelops the son of Pelops he despatched to the court of
Antiochus in Asia, to urge him to maintain his friendly
relations with the court of Alexandria, and not to violate the
treaty he had made with the young king's father. Ptolemy,
son of Sosibius, he sent to Philip to arrange for a treaty of
intermarriage between the two countries, and to ask for assist-
ance in case Antiochus should make a serious attempt to play
them false in any matter of importance.
He also selected Ptolemy, son ■ of Agesarchus, as am-
bassador to Rome : not with a view of his seriously prosecuting
the embassy, but because he thought that, if he once entered
Greece, he would find himself among friends and kinsfolk,
XV MISCONDUCT OF AGATHOCLES 159
and would stay there ; which would suit his policy of getting
rid of eminent men. Scopas the Aelolian also he sent to
Greece to recruit foreign mercenaries, giving him a large
sum in gold for bounties. He had two objects in view
in this measure : one was to use the soldiers so recruited
in the war with Antiochus ; another was to get rid of the
mercenary troops already existing, by sending them on garrison
duty in the various farts and settlements about the country ;
while he used tbe new recruits to fill up the numbers of the
household regiments with new men, as well as the pickets
immediately round the palace, and in other parts of the city.
For he believed that men who had been hired by himself, and
were taking his pay, would have no feehngs in common with
the old soldiers, with whom they would be totally unacquainted ;
but that, having all their hopes of safety and profit in him, he
would find them ready to co-operate with him and carry out
his orders.
Now all this took place before the intrigue of Philip, though
it was necessary for the sake of clearness to speak of that first,
and to describe the transactions which took place, both at the
audience and the dispatch of the ambassadors.
To return to Agathocles : when he had thus got rid of the
most eminent men, and had to a great degree
way of hfe. Drawing round him a body of friends, whom he
selected from the most frivolous and shameless of his personal
attendants or servants, he devoted the chief part of the day
and night to drunkenness and all the excesseswhich accompany
drunkenness, sparing neither matron, nor bride, nor virgin, and
doing all this with tbe most offensive ostentation. The result
was a widespread outburst of discontent; and when there
appeared no prospect of reforming this state of things, or of
obtaining protection against the violence, insolence and
debauchery of the court, which on the contrary grew daily
more outrageous, their old hatred blazed up once more in the
hearts of the common people, and all began again to recall the
misfortunes which the kingdom already owed to these very
men. But the absence of any one fit to take the lead, and
l6o THE HISTORIES OF POLYhWS bom
by whose means they coutd vent their wrath upon Agathocles
and Agathocleia, kept them quiet. Their one remaining hope
rested upon Tlepolemus, and on this they fixed their con-
fidence.
As long as the late king was alive Tlepolemus remained in
„ retirement ; but upon his death he quickly pro-
govemor of Peiu- pitiated the common soldiers, and became once
sium.tltiermincsiomore governor of Pelusium. At first he directed
depose Agaiho- ^ ^is actions With a view to the interest of the
cles, B.C, aoj-ioi. , . . .- . , . i , ■
king, believing that there would be some
council of regency to take charge of the boy and administer
the government But when he saw that all those who were
fit for this charge were got out of the way, and that Agathocles
was boldly monopolising the supreme power, he quickly
changed his purpose ; because he suspected the danger that
threatened him from the hatred which they mutually enter-
tained. He therefore began to draw his troops together, and
bestir himself to collect money, that he might not be an easy
prey to any one of his enemies. At the same time he was not
without hope that the guardianship of the young king, and
the chief power in the state might devolve upon him ; both
because, in his own private opinion, he was much more fit for
it in every respect than Agathocles, and because he was
informed that his own troops and those in Alexandria were
looking to him to put an end to the minister's outrageous
conduct. When such ideas were entertained by Tlepolemus,
it did not take long to make the quarrel grow, especially as the
partisans of both helped to inflame it. Being eager to secure
the adhesion of the generals of divisions and the captains of
companies, he frequently invited them to banquets; and at
these assemblies, instigated partly by the flattery of his guests
and partly by his own impulse (for he was a young man
and the conversation was over the wine), he used to throw
out sarcastic remarks against the family of Agathocles. At
first they were covert and enigmatic, then merely ambiguous,
and finally undisguised, and containing the bitterest reflections.
He proposed the health of the scribbler of pasquinades, the
sackbut-gtrl and waiting-woman ; and spoke of his shameful
boyhood, when as cupbearer of the king he had submitted
XV INTERVENTION OF TLEPOLEMUS i6i
to the foulest treatment. His guests were always leady to
laugh at his words and add theiT quota to the sum of vitupera-
tion. Il was not long before this reached the ears of
Agalhocles : and the breach between the two
thus becoming an open one, Agathocles im- ^'f^^hi^"
mediately began bringing charges against
Tlepolemus, declaring that he was a traitor to the king, and
was inviting Antiochus to come and seize the government.
And he brought many plausible proofs of this forward, some of
which he got by distorting facts that actually occurred, while
others were pure invention. His object in so doing was to
excite the wrath of the common people against Tlepolemus.
But the result was the reverse ; for the populace had long fixed
their hopes on Tlepolemus, and were only too delighted to see
the quarrel growing hot between them. The actual popular
outbreak which did occur began from the following circum-
stances. Nlcon, a relation of Agathocles, was in the lifetime of
the late king commander of the navy. . . .
26 (n). Another, murder committed by Agathocles was that
of Deinon, son of Deinon. But this, as the pro- a fragmeni from
verb has it, was the fairest of his foul deeds, the earlier hiaiory
For the letter ordering the murder of Arsiroe of AgaUiodcs.
had fallen into this man's hands, and he might have given
information about the plot and saved the Queen ; but at the
time he chose rather to help Philammon, and so became the
cause of all the misfortunes which followed ; while, after the
murder was committed, he was always recalling the circum-
stances, commiserating the unhappy woman, and expressing
repentance at having let such an opportunity slip : and this he
repeated in the hearing of many, so that Agathocles heard of
it, and he met with his just punishment In losing his life. . . .
THE DEATH OF AGATHOCLES AND HIS FAMILY
26. (^) The first step of Agathocles was to summon a meet-
ing of the Macedonian guards. He entered the Agaihocies pre-
assembly accompanied by the young king andtendsaploiofTle-
his own sister Agathocleia. At first he feigned po'emus against
not to be able to say what he wished for tears ; "^ '"^'
but after again and again wiping his eyes with his chlamys he
VOL. II H
i6i THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS «»»
at length mastered his emotion, and, taking the young king in
his arms, spoke as follows : " Take this boy, whom his father
on his death-bed placed in this lady's arms " (pointing to his
sister) " and confided lo your loyalty, men of Macedonia ! That
lady's affection has but little influence in securing the child's
safety : it is on you that that safety now depends ; his fortunes
are in your hands. It has long been evident to those who
had eyes to see, that Tlepolemus was aiming at something
higher than his natural rank ; but now he has named the day
and hour on which he intends to assume the crown. Do not
let your belief of this depend upon my words ; refer to those
who know the real truth and have but just come from the
very scene of his treason." With these words he brought
forward Critolaus, who deposed that he had seen with his own
eyes the allars being decked, and the victims being got ready
by the common soldiers for the ceremony of a coronation.
When the Macedonian guards had heard all this, far from
Anger of the being moved by his appeal, they showed their
pojiuiace and contempt by hooting and loud murmurs, and
^J^"'" "fj""^' drove him away under such a fire of derision
that he got out of the assembly without being
conscious how he did it. And similar scenes occurred among
other corps of the army at their meetings. Meanwhile great
crowds kept pouring into Alexandria from the up-country
stations, calling upon kinsmen or friends to help the move-
ment, and not to submit to the unbridled tyranny of such
unworthy men. But what inflamed the populace against the
government more than anything else was the knowledge that,
as Tlepolemus had the absolute command of all the imports
into Alexandria, delay would be a cause of suffering to Uiem-
selves.
27. Moreover, an action of Agathocles himself served to
heighten the anger of the multitude and of Tlepolemus. For
he took Danae, the latter's mother-in-law, from the temple of
Demeler, dragged her through the middle of the city unveiled,
and cast her into prison. His object in doing this was to
manifest his hostility to Tlepolemus ; but its effect was to
loosen the tongues of the people. In their anger they no
longer confined themselves to secret murmurs : but some of
XV GROWING HATRED OF AGATHOCLBS 163
them in the night covered the walls in every part of the city
with pasquinades ; while others in the day time collected in
groups and openly expressed their loathing for the government
Seeing what was taking place, and beginning to fear the
worst, Agathocles at one time meditated making
his escape by secret flight; but as he had '^'^^^^'
nothing ready for such a measure, thanks to his
own imprudence, he had to give up that idea. At another
time he set himself to drawing out lists of men likely to assist
him in a bold coup d'etat, by which he should put to death
or arrest his enemies, and then possess himself of absolute
power. While still meditating these plans he received in-
formation that Moeragenes, one of the body-guard, was
betraying all the secrets of the palace to Tlepolemus, and was
co-operating with him on account of his relationship with
Adaeus, at that time the commander of Bubastus. Agathocles
immediately ordered his secretary Nicostratus
tp arrest Moeragenes, and extract the truth ■'^™^°J^°^'
from him by every possible kind of torture.
Being promptly arrested by Nicostratus, and taken to a retired
part of the palace, he was at first examined directly as to the
facts alleged ; but, refusing to confess anything, he was stripped.
And now some of the torturers were preparing their instru-
ments, and others with scourges in their bands were just
taking off their outer garments, when just at that very moment
a servant ran in, and, whispering something in the ear of
Nicostratus, hurried out again. Nicostratus followed close
behind him, without a word, frequently slapping his thigh with
his hand.
28. The predicament of Moeragenes was now indescrib-
ably strange. There stood the executioners
by his side on the point of raising their "^^^f^^^"^
scourges, while others close to him were
getting ready their instruments of torture : but when Nicos-
tratus withdrew they all stood silently staring at each other's
faces, expecting him every moment to return; but as time
went on they one by one slipped away, until Moeragenes was
left alone. Having made his way through the palace, after
this unhoped-for escape, he rushed in his half-clothed state
■64 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIVS book
into a tent of the Macedonian guards whjdi was situated
close to the palace. They chanced to be at breaUast, and
therefore a good many were collected together j and to them
he narrated the story of his wonderful escape. At first they
would not believe it, but ultimately were convinced by his
appearing without his clothes. Taking advantage of this
extraordinary occurrence, Moeragenes besought the Macedonian
guards with tears not only to help him to secure his own
safety, but the king's also, and above all their own, "For
certain destruction stared them in the face," he said, "unless
they seized the moment when the hatred of the populace iras
at its height, and every one was ready to wreak vengeance on
Agathocles. That moment was now, and all that was wanted
was some one to begin."
29. The passions of the Macedonians were roused by these
words, and they finally agreed to do as Moeragenes advised.
They at once went round to the tents, first those of their own
corps, and then those of the other soldiers ; which were all
close together, facing the same quarter of the city. The wish
was one which had for a long time been formed in the minds
of the soldiery, wanting nothing but some one to call it forth,
and with courage to begin. No sooner, therefore, had a com-
mencement been made than it blazed out like a fire : and
before four hours had elapsed every class, whether military or
civil, had agreed to make the attempt
At this crisis, too, chance contributed a great deal to the
final catastrophe. For a letter addressed by
^^^^ Tlepolemus to the army as well as some of
his spies, had fallen into the hands of
Agathocles. The letter announced that he would be at
Alexandria shortly, and the spies informed Agathocles that
he was already there. This news so distracted Agathocles
that he gave up taking any measures at all or even thinking
about the dangers which surrounded him, but departed at his
usual hour to his wine, and kept up the carouse to the end
Ocnamho in the '" his usual licentious fashioa But his
temple of mother Oenanthe went in great distress to the
^**°'^"^'- temple of Demeter and Persephone, which was
open on account of a certain annual sacrifice ; and there first
XV A REVOLT DECIDED UPON BY THE ARMY 165
of all she besought the aid of those goddesses with bend-
ings of the knee and strange incantations, and then sat down
close to the altar and remained motionless. Most of
the women present, delighted to witness her dejection and
distress, kept silence : but the ladies of the family of Poly-
crates, and certain others of the nobility, being as yet unaware
of what was going on around thetn, approached Oenanthe and
tried to comfort her. But she cried out in a loud voice :
" Do not come near me, you monsters ! I know you well !
Vour hearts are always against us ; and you pray the goddess
for all imaginable evil upon us. Still I trust and believe that,
God willing, you shall one day taste the flesh of your own
children." With these words she ordered her female
attendants to drive them away, and strike them with their
staves if they refused to go. The ladies availed thereiselves of
this excuse for quitting the temple in a body, raising their
hands and praying that she might herself have experience of
those very miseries with which she had threatened her
neighbours.
SO. The men having by this time decided upon a re-
volution, now that in every house the anger of the women was
added to the general resentment, the popular
hatred blazed out with redoubled violence. As
soon as night fell the whole city was filled with tumult, torches,
and hurrying feet. Some were assembling with shouts in the
stadium ; some were calling upon others to join them ; some
were running backwards and forwards seeking to conceal them-
selves in houses and places least likely to be suspected. And
now the open spaces round the palace, the stadium, and the
street were filled with a motley crowd, as well as the area in
front of the Dionysian Theatre. Being informed of this,
Agathocles roused himself from a drunken lethargy, — for he had
just dismissed his drinking party, — and, accompanied by all his
family, with the exception of Fhilo, went to the king. After
a few words of lamentation over his misfortunes addressed to
the child, he took him by the hand, and proceeded to the
covered walk which runs between the Maeander garden and the
Palaestra, and leads to the entrance of the theatre. Having
securely fastened the two first doors through which be passe
lU THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS book
he entered the third with two or three bodyguards, his own
family, and the king. The doors, however, which were secured
by double bars, were only of lattice work and could therefore
be seen through.
By this time the mob had collected frona every part of the
city in such numbers, that, not only was every foot of ground
occupied, but the doorsteps and roofs also were crammed with
human beings ; and such a mingled storm of shouts and cries
arose, as might be expected from a crowd in which women and
children were mixed with men : for in Alexandria, as in Car-
thage, the children perform as conspicuous a part in such
commotions as the men.
81. Day now began to break and the uproar was still a
confused hibet of voices ; but one cry made itself heard con-
Cries for the liine SP'^^^^^'X *bove the rest, it was a call for THE
' King. The first thing actually done was by the
Macedonian guard : they le(^ their quarters and seized the
vestibule which served as the audience hall of the palace ; then,
after a brief pause, having ascertained whereabouts in the
palace the king was, they went round to the covered walk,
burst open the first doors, and, when they came to the next,
demanded with loud shouts that the young king should be
surrendered to them. Agathocles, recognising his danger,
begged his bodyguards to go in his name to the Macedonians,
to inform them that "he resigned the guardianship of the
king, and all offices, honours, or emoluments which he
possessed, and only asked that his life should be granted him
with a bare maintenance ; that by sinking to his original situa-
tion in life he would be rendered incapable, even if he wished
it, of being henceforth oppressive to any one." All the body-
guards refused except Aristomenes, who afterwards obtained the
chief power in the state.
This man was an Acamanian, and, though far advanced in
^ life when he obtained supreme power, he is
thought to have made a most excellent and
blameless guardian of the king and kingdom. And as he was
distinguished in that capacity, so had he been remarkable
before for his adulation of Agathocles in the time of his pros-
perity. He was the first, when entertaining Agathocles at his
iwox III SUMMARY OF THE WORK 167
braced events of such magnitude and importance. In describing
them I shall start from the 1 40th Olympiad and ,
shall arrange myexpositionin thefoUowing order:
2. First I shall indicate the causes of the Punic or
Hannibalian war : and shall have to describe ,_ xi,e cause and
how the Carthaginians entered Italy; broke up course of the
the Roman power there ; made the Romans Hannibalian war.
tremble for their safety and the very soil of their country;
and contrary to all calculation acquired a good prospect of
surprising Rome itself
I shall next try to make it clear how in the same period
Philip of Macedon, after finishing his war with 3 Macedonian
the Aetolians, and subsequently settling the ireaiy with Cai-
affairs of Greece, entered upon a design of *W*. ^.c. 316.
forming an offensive and defensive alliance with Carthage.
Then I shall tell how Antiochus and Ptolemy Phitopator
first quarrelled and finally went to war with 3. Syrian war,
each other for ihe possession of Coele-Syria. b-c. aia
Next how the Rhodians and Frusias went to war with the
Byzantines, and compelled them to desist from 4. Byiantine srar.
exacting dues from ships sailing into the Pontus. ^c. aao.
At this point I shall pause in my narrative to introduce a
disquisition upon the Roman Constitution, in f^^ digression
which I shall show that its peculiar character on the Rtman
contributed largely to their success, not only in ConsUtuiion,
reducing all Italy to their authority, and in acquiring a
supremacy over the Iberians and Gauls besides, but also at
last, after their conquest of Carthage, to their conceiving the
idea of universal dominion.
Along with this I shall introduce another second on Hiero .
digression on tiie fall of Hiero of Syracuse. of Syracuse.
After these digressions will come the disturbances in
Egypt ; how, after the death of King Ptolemy,
Antiochus and Philip entered into a compact ^*^|^jono7ilie
for the partition of the dominions of thatdominionsofPioi-
monarch's infant son. I shall describe their ■^"'J' Epiphanes,
treacherous dealings, Philip laying hands upon ^^ ^°^'
the islands of the Aegean, and Caria and Samos, Antiochus
upon Coele-Syria and Phoenicia.
i68 TJJE ff/STOKIES OF POLYBWS book
3. Next, after a summarj- cecapitulalion of the proceedings of
6. War H'iih ''^'^ Carthaginians and Komatis in Iberia, Libya,
Philip, acaoi- and Sicily, I shall, following the changes of
'9'* events, sliift the scene of my story entirely to
Greece. Here I shall first descrilie the naval battles of Attalus
and the Rhodiatis against Philip ; and the war between Philip
and Rome, the persons engaged, its circumstances, ^fid result
Next to this I shall have to record the wrath of the Actolians,
, in consequence of which they invited the aid of
kc^'ioa-igi ' Antiochus, and tliereby gave rise to what is
called the Asiatic war against Rome and the
Achaean league. Having stated the causes of this war, and
described the crossing of Antiochus into Europe, I shall Have
to show first in what manner he was driven from Greece;
secondly, how, being defeated in the war, he was forced to
cede all his territory west of Taurus; and thirdly, how the
Romans, after crushing the insolence of the Gauls, secured
undisputed possession of Asia, and freed all the nations on
the west of Taurus from the fear of barbarian inroads and
the lawless violence of the Gauls.
Next, after reviewing the disasters of the Aetolians and
8. Gallic wari of Cephalic nians, I shall pass to the wars waged
Eumenes and by Eumcnes against Prusias and the Gauls; as
Prasias. „g][ ^ (hat carried on in alliance with Ariarathes
against Ph a maces.
Pinally, after speaking of the unity and settlement of the
Union erf ih P^'op**"'*^''^! ^^^ ^f t^e gTowth of the common-
Pcloponnese. wealth of Rhodes, I shall add a summary of
Aniiochus my whole work, concluding by an account
E^t"""^!! of °'' ^^^ expedition of Antiochus Epiphanes
the Macedonian against Egypt ; of the war against Perseus ;
monnrehy, and the destruction of the Macedonian
B.C. 1B8-168. jnonarchy. Throughout the whole narrative it
Iwill be shown how the policy adopted by the Romans in one
iafler another of these cases, as they arose, led to their eventual
ponquest of the whole world.
4. And if our judgment of individuals and constitutions,
for praise or blame, could be adequately formed from a simple
consideration of their successesior defeats, I must necessarily
Ill EXTENSIO!^ OF THE FIRST PLAN OF THE WORK 169
have stopped at this point, and have concluded my history as
soon as I reached these last events in accordance with my
original plan. For at this point the fifty-three years were
coming to an end, and the progress of the Roman power bad
arrived at its consummation. And, besides, by this time
the acknowledgment had been extorted from all that the v"
supremacy of Rome must be accepted, and her commands
obeyed. But in truth, judgments of either side -^^ ^^^ g^.
founded on the bare facts of success or failure tended loembrace
in the field are by no means final. It has "" P*""^ f™™
often happened that what seemed the most ^''^' ' '* '
signal successes have, from ill management, brought the
most crushing disasters in their train ; while not unfre-
quentjy the most terrible calamities, sustained with spirit,
have been turned to actual advantage, I am bound, there-
fore, to add to my statement of facts a discussion on the
subsequent policy of the conquerors, and their admini- '
stfaHon of "tlTelr universal dominion: and again on the
various feelings and opinions entertained by other nations
towards their rulers. And I must also describe the tastes
and aims of the several nations, whether in their private
lives or public policy. The present generation will learn)
from this whether they should shun or seek the rule
of Rome; and future generations "will fie taught whether tol
praise and imitate, or to decry it. The useftjloess of my
history, whether for the present or the future, will mainly lie
in this. For the end of a policy should not be, in the"^yea
either of the actors or their historians, simply to conquer other^ '
and bring all into subjection. Nor does any man of sense
go to war with his neighbours for the mere purpose of
mastering his opponents ; nor go to sea for the mere sake of
the voyage ; nor engage in professions and trades for the sole
purpose of learning them. In all these cases the objects are
invariably the pleasure, honour, or jirijfit which are the results
of the several employments. Accordingly the object of this
work shall be to ascertain exactly what the position of the several
states was, after the universal conquest by which they fell under
the power of Rome, until the commotions and disturbances
which broke out at a later period. These I designed
i;o THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS book
make the . starting-point of what may almost be called a new
work, partly because of the greatness and suqirising nature of
the events themselves, but chiefly because, in the case of most
of them, I was not only an eye-witness, but in some cases one
of the actors, and in others the chief director.
6. The events I refei to are the wars of Rome against the
A new departure : '-^'''^^"•'"5 and Vaccaei J those of Carthage
ilie breaking-up against Massinissa, king of Libya ; and those
oftheairang^ of Attalus and Prusias in Asia. Then also
the faJi of Ariarathes, King of Cappadocia, having been
Macedonia, ejected from his throne by Orophemes through
^*". ""^"'^Ee the agency of King Demetrius, recovered his
^sa! and^'f ancestral power by the help of Attalus ; while
Rome against Demetrius, son of Seleucus, after twelve years'
ilie CelUberians, possession of the throne of Syria, was deprived
and a^insl^Car- ^^ ''■ ^^^ °^ ^'^ ''^^ ^' ^^^ ^'*'"^ ^™^' ''J' ^ ^°™"
tkigc (3d Panic bination of the other kings against him. Then
war, B.C. 149. i( -^f^s, too, that the Romans restored to their
'■* '■ country those Greeks who had been charged
with guih in the matter of the war with Perseus, after formally
acquitting them of the crimes alleged against them. Not
long afterwards the same people turned their hands against
Carthage : at first with the intention of forcing its removal to
some other spot, but finally, for reasons to be afterwards
stated, with the resolution of utterly destroying it Con-
temporaneous with this came the renunciation by the Mace-
donians of their friendship to Rome, and by the Lacedae-
monians of their membership of the Achaean league, to
which the disaster that befel all Greece alike owed its be-
ginning and end.
This is my purpose : but its fulfilment must depend upon
whether Fortune protracts my life to the necessary length. I am
persuaded, however, that, even if the common human destiny
does overtake me, this theme will not be allowed to lie idle
for want of competent men to handle it ; for there are many
besides myself who will readily undertake its completion.
But having given the heads of the most remarkable events,
with the object of enabling the reader to grasp the general
scope of my history as well as the arrangement of its several
XV THE KING SURRENDERED TO THE SOLDIERS 167
house, to distinguish him among his guests by the present of a
gold diadem, an honour reserved by custom to the kings alone ;
he was the first too who ventured to wear his likeness on his
ring ; and when a daughter was bora to him he named her
Agathocleia.
But to return to my story. Aristomenes undertook the
mission, received his message, and made his xhe guanis insist
way through a certain wicket-gate to the on the summder
Macedonians, He stated his business in few of the king.
words : the first impulse of the Macedonians was to stab
him to death on the spot ; but some of them held up their
hands to protect him, and successfully be^ed his life.
He accordingly returned with orders to bring the king or to
come no more himself. Having dismissed Aristomenes with
these words, the Macedonians proceeded to burst open the
second door also. When convinced by their proceedings, no
less than by the answers they had returned, of the fierce pur-
pose of the Macedonians, the first idea of Agathocles was to
thrust his hand through the latticed door, — while Agathocleia
did the same with her breasts which she said had suckled the
king, — and by every kind of entreaty to beg that the
Macedonians would grant him bare life.
32. But finding that his long and piteous appeals produced
no effect, at last he sent out the young king with the body-
guards. As soon as they had got the king, xhe ]^[„^ j^^.
the Macedonians placed him on a horse and ducted to the
conducted him to the stadium. His appear- siadium.
ance being greeted with loud shouts and clapping of
hands, they stopped the horse, and dismounting the child,
ushered him to the royal stall and seated him there. But
the feelings of the crowd were divided ; they were de-
lighted that the young king had been brought, but they
were dissatisfied that the guilty persons had not been arrested
and met with the punishment they deserved. Accordingly,
they continued with loud cries to demand that the authors of all
the mischief should be brought out and made an example. The
day was wearing away, and yet the crowd had found no one
on whom^to wreak their vengeance, when Sosibius, who, though
a son of the elder Sosibius, was at that time a member of the
168 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS book
bodyguard, and as such had a special eye to the safety of the
king and the State, — seeing that the furious desire of the
multitude was implacable, and that the child was frightened at
the unaccustomed faces that surrounded him and the uproar
of the crowd, asked the king whether he would " surrender to
the populace those who had injured him or his mother." The
boy having nodded assent, Sosibius bade some of the body-
guard announce the lung's decision, while he raised the young
child from his seat and took him to his own house which
was close by to receive proper attention and refreshment.
When the message from the king was declared, the whole
place broke out into a storm of cheering and clapping of
hands. But meanwhile Agathoclcs and Agathocleia had
separated and gone each to their own lodgings. Without loss
of time soldiers, some voluntarily and others under pressure
from the crowd, started in search of them.
83. The beginning of actual bloodshed, however, was
this. One of the servants and flatterers of Agathocles, whose
name was Philo, came out to the stadium still flustered with
wine. Seeing the fury of the multitude, he said to some by-
standers that they would have cause to repent it again, as they
had only the other day, if Agathocles were to come there. Of
those who heard him some began to abuse him, while others
pushed him about ; and on his attempting to defend himself,
some tore his cloak off his back, while others thrust their
spears into him and wounded him mortally. He was dragged
into the middle of the crowd breathing his last gasp ; and, having
thus tasted biood, the multitude began to look impatiently for
Death of ^^ coming of the other victims. They had not
Agathocles. to wait long. First appeared Agathocles dragged
hissister, and along bound hand and foot. No sooner had
he entered than some soldiers rushed at him
and struck him dead. And in doing so they were his friends
rather than enemies, for they saved him from the horrible
death which he deserved. Nicon was brought next, and after
him Agathocleia stripped naked, with her two sisters; and
following them the whole family. Last of all some men came
bringing Oenanthe, whom they had torn from the temple of
Demeter and Persephone, riding stripped naked upon a horse.
XV THE MASSACRE OF AGATHOCLES AND FAMILY 169
They were all given up to the populace, who bit, and stabbed
them, and knocked out their eyes, and, as soon as any one
of them fell, tore him limb from limb, until they had utterly
annihilated them all : for the savagery of the Egyptians when
their passions are roused is indeed terrible. At the same
time some young girls who had been brought up with Arsinoe,
having learnt that Philammon, the chief agent in the murder of
that Queen, had arrived three days before from Cyrene, rushed
to his house ; forced their way in ; killed Philammon with
stones and sticks ; strangled his infant son ; and, not content
with this, dragged his wife naked into the street and put her
to death.
Such was the end of Agathocles and Agathocleia and their
kinsfolk.
84. I am quite aware of the miraculous occurrences and
embellishments which the chroniclers of this 71,^ („n,en,pu-(je
event have added to their narrative with a view chaiacier of
of producing a striking effect upon their hearers, Aeaihode*.
making more of their comments on the story than of the story
itself and the main incidents. Some ascribe it entirely to
Fortune, and take the opportunity, of expatiating on her fickle-
ness and the difficulty of being on one's guard against her.
Others dwell upon the unexpectedness of the event, and
try to assign its causes and probabilities. It was not my pur-
pose, however, to treat this episode in this way, because Aga-
thocles was not a man of conspicuous courage or ability as a
soldier; nor particularly successful or worth imitating as a
Statesman ; nor, lastly, eminent for his acuteness as a courtier
or cunning as an intriguer, by which latter accomplishments
Sosibius and many others have managed to keep one king
after another under their influence to the last day of their
lives. The very opposite of all this may be said of this man.
For though he obtained high promotion owing to Philopator's
feebleness as a king ; and though after his death he had the
most favourable opportunity of consolidating his power, he yet
soon fell into contempt, and lost his position and his life at
once, thanks to his own want of courage and vigour.
SG. To such a story then no such dissertation is required, as
was in place, for instance, in the case of the Sicilian monarchs.
tro THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS book
Agathocles and Dionysius, and certain others who have ad-
g^ j^ ministered govemnients with repuUlion. Forthe
former of these, starting from a plebeian and
humble position — having been, as TJmacus sneeringly remarks,
a potter — came from the wheel, clay, and smoke, quite a young
man to Syracuse. And, to begin with, both these men in their re-
spective generations became tyrants of Syracuse, a city that had
obtained at that time the greatest reputation and the greatest
wealth of any in the world ; and afterwards were regarded
as suzerains of all Sicily, and lords of certain districts in Italy.
While, for his part, Agathocles not only made an attempt
upon Africa, but eventually died in possession of the greatness
he had acquired. It is on this account that the story is told
of Publius Scipio, the first conqueror of the Carthaginians,
that being asked whom he considered to have been the most
skilful administrators and most distinguished for boldness com-
bined with prudence, he replied, "the Sicilians Agathocles
and Dionysius." Now, in the case of such men as these, it is
certainly right to try to arrest the attention of our readers, and,
I suppose, to speak of Fortune and the mutability of human
affairs, and in fact to point a moral : but in the case of such
men as we have been speaking of, it is quite out of place to
do so.
38. For these reasons I have rejected all idea of making
too much of tKe story of Agathocles. But another and the
strongest reason was that all such wonderful and striking
catastrophes are only worth listening to once ; not only are
subsequent exhibitions of them unprofitable to ear and eye, but
elaborate harping upon soon becomes simply troublesome.
For those who are engaged on representing anything either to
eye or ear can have only two objects to aim at, — pleasure and
profit ; and in history, more than in anything else, excessive
prolixity on events of tragic interest fails of both these objects.
For, in the first place, who would wish to emulate extraordinary
catastrophes? And next, no one likes to be continually seeing
and hearing things that are unnatural and beyond the ordinary
conceptions of mankind. We arc, indeed, eager to see and
hear such things once and for the first time, because we want
to know that a thing is possible which was supposed to be im-
XV AG ATHOCLES WAS NOT AN IMPORTANT PERSON 171
possible : but when once convinced on that point no one is
pleased at lingering on the Unnatural ; but in fact would
rather not come across it at all oftener than need be. In fact,
the dwelling upon misfortunes which exceed the ordinary
limits is more suitable to tragedy than to history. But per-
haps we ought to make allowances for men who have studied
neither nature nor universal history. They think, I presume,
that the most important and astonishing events in all history are
those which they happen to have come across themselves or to
have heard from others, and they therefore give their attention
exclusively to those. They accordingly do not perceive that
they are making a mistake in expatiating on events which are
neither novel, — for they have been narrated by others before, —
nor capable of giving instruction or pleasure. So much on
this point. . . .
87. King Antiochus, at the beginning of his reign, was
thought to be a man of great enterprise and Msappoinimenu
courage, and great vigour in the execution of as to the cbanio
his purposes ; but as he grew older his character '" of Anii™*™
evidently deteriorated in itself, and disappointed
the expectation of the world. ...
BOOK XVI
PHILIP V. WAGES WAR WITH ATTALUS, KING OF ]
AND THii RHODIAHS. Sce supra 15, 20-24; Livy, 31,
17. *??•
1. King Philip having arrived at Pergamum, and believing
Philip's impious ^^^ ^^ ^^^ ^ good as made an end of Attalus,
conduci in Asia, gavc the reiti to every kind of outrage ; and
B.C. aoi. ijy „ay of gratifying his almost insane fury he
vented his wrath even more against the gods than against
man. For his skirmishing attacks being easily repelled by the
garrison of Pcrgamum, owing to the strength of the place, and
being prevented by the precautions taken by Attalus from
getting booty from the country, he directed his anger against
the seats of the gods and the sacred enclosures ; in which, as
it appears to me, he did not wrong Attalus so much as himself.
He threw down the temples and the altars, and even had their
stones broken to pieces that none of the buildings he had
destroyed might be rebuilt After spoiling the Nicephorium,
cutting down its grove, and demolishing its ring wall, and
levelling with the ground many costly fanes, he first directed
his attack upon Thyalira, and thence matched into the plain
of Thebe, thinking that this district would supply him with the
Zciuria, Satrap richest spoll. But finding himself again disap-
of Aniiochus, fails pointed in this respect, on arriving at the
to help Philip " Holy Village " he sent a message to Zeuxis,
substantially. , ,■..?, u r ■ , , ■ - l
demanding that he would furnish him with com,
and render the other services stipulated for in the treaty.^
Zeuxis, however, though feigning to fulfil the obligations of
the treaty, was not minded to give Philip real and substantial
help, . . .
' That is the treaty between Philip and Anlioctius.
THE SEA-FIGHT OFF CHIOS
GREAT SEA-FIGHT OFF CHIOS BETWEEN PHILIP AND THE
ALLIED FLEETS OF ATTALUS AND RHODES, EC 20I
2. As the siege was not going on favourably for him, and
the enemy were blockading him with an in- phiup failing to
creasing number of decked vessels, he felt take Chios sails
uncenain and uneasy as to the result But "" '" s^™"*-
as the state of affairs left him no choice, he suddenly put to
sea quite unexpectedly to the enemy ; for Attalus expected that
he would persist in pushing on the mines he had commenced.
But Philip was especially keen to make his putting to sea a
surprise, because he thought that he would thus be able to out-
strip the enemy, and complete the rest of his passage along
the coast to Samos in security. But he was much aiihIus and
disappointed in his calculations ; for Attalus and Theophiiiscus
Theophiliscus (of Rhodes), directly they saw him foUowhim.
putting to sea, lost no time in taking action. And although,
from their previous conviction that Philip meant to stay where
he was, they were not in a position to put to sea quite simul-
taneously, still__by a vigorous use of their oars they managed to
overtake him, and attacked, — Attalus the enemy's right wing,
which was his leading squadron, and Theophiliscus his left. Thus
intercepted and surrounded, Philip gave the signal to the ships
of his right wing, ordering them to turn their prows towards
the enemy and engage them boldly; while he himself retreated
under cover of the smaller islands, which lay in the way, with
some light galleys, and thence watched the result of the battle.
The whole number of ships engaged were, on Philip's side, fifty-
three decked, accompanied by some undecked vessels, and galleys
and beaked ships to the number of one hundred and fifty ; for
he had not been able to fit out all his ships in Samos. On
the side of the enemy there were sixty-five decked vessels,
besides those which came from Byzantium, and along with
them nine triemioliae (light-decked vessels), and three triremes.
S, The fight having been begun on the ship on which King
Attalus was sailing, all the others near began
charging each otiier without waiting for orders, '""^"^^^i^" ""*
Attalus ran into an eight-banked ship, and
having struck it a well-directed blow below the water-line, after
174 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS BOOK
a proloi^ed stiu^le between the combatants on the decks, at
Loss of PhUip's length succeeded in sinking it. Philip's ten-
Bagsbipand banked ship, which, moreover, was the ad-
admirai, miral's, was captured by the enemy in an
extraordinary manner. For one of the trietnieliae, having run
close under her, she struck against her violently amidships, just
beneath the thole of the topmost bank of oars, and got fast
jammed on to her, the steersman being unable to check the way
of his ship. The result was that, by this craft hanging sus-
pended to her, she became unmanageable and unable to turn
one way or another. While in this plight, two quinqueremes
charged her on both sides at once, and destroyed the vessel it-
self and the fighting men on her deck, among whom fell Demo-
ciates, Philip's admiral At the same time Dionysodorus and
Deinocrates, who were brothers and joint-admirals of the fleet of
Attains, charged, the one upon a seven-banked, the other upon an
e^ht-banked ship of the enemy, and had a most extraordinary
T. . adventure in the battle. Deinocrates, in the
first place, came into collision with an eight-
banked ship, and had his ship struck above the water-line ; for
the enemy's ship had its prow built high ; but he struck the
enemy's ship below the water-line,^ and at first could not get
himself clear, though he tried again and again to back water ;
and, accordingly, when the Macedonian boarded him and fought
with great gallantry, he was brought into the most imminent
danger. Presently, upon Attains coming to his aid, and by a
vigorous charge separating the two ships, Deinocrates unex-
pectedly found himself free, and the enemy's boarders were all
killed after a gallant resistance, while their own vessel being
Donvsodorus. '^*^ without men was captured by Attalus. In
the next place, Dionysodorus, making a furious
chaise, missed his blow; but running up alongside of the enemy
lost all the oars on his right side, and had the timbers sup-
porting his towers smashed to pieces, and was thereupon imme-
diately surrounded by the enemy. In the midst of loud shouts
and great confusion, all the rest of his marines perished along
with the ship, but he himself with two others managed to
XYI INCIDENTS OF THE SEA-FIGHT 175
escape by swimming lo the triemiolia which was coming up to
the rescue.
4. The fight between the rest of the fleet, however, was an
undecided one ; for the superiority in the num-
bers of Philip's galleys was compensated for by ^^^"^-i^
Attalus's superiority in the number of his decked
ships. Thus on the right wing of Philip's fleet the state of
things was that the ultimate result was doubtful, but that, of
the two, Attalus had the better hope of victory. As for the
Rhodians, they were, at first starting, as I have said, far behind
the enemy, but beingmuch their superiors inspeed they managed
to come up with the rear of the Macedonians. At first they
charged the vessels on the stem as they were retiring, and broke
off their oars ; but upon Philip's ships swinging round and
beginning to bring help to those in danger, while those of the
Rhodians who had started later than the rest reached the
squadron of Theophiliscus, both parties turned their ships in line
prow to prow and charged gallantly, inciting each other to fresh
exertions by the sound of trumpets and loud cheers. Had
not the Macedonians placed their galleys between the opposing
lines of decked ships, the battle would have been quickly de-
cided ; but, as it was, these proved a hindrance to the Rhodians
in various ways. For as soon as the first charge had disturbed
the original order of the ships, they became all mixed up with
each other in complete confusion, which made it difficult to
sail through the enemy's line or to avail themselves of the
points in which they were superior, because the galleys kept
running sometimes against the blades of their oars so as to
hinder the rowing, and sometimes upon their prows, or again
upon their stems, thus hampering the service of steerers and
rowers alike. In the direct charges, however, the Rhodians
employed a particular manoeuvre. By depressing their bows
they received the blows of the enemy above the water-line,
while by staving in the enemy's ships below the water-line they
rendered the blows fatal. Still it was rarely that they succeeded
in doing this, for, as a rule, they avoided collisions, because the
Macedonians fouglit gallantly from their decks when they came
to close quarters. Their most frequent manoeuvre was to row
through the Macedonian line, and disable the enemy's ships by
i
176 r/fE HrSTORIES OF POLYBIUS book
breaking off their oars, and then, rowing round into position,
again charge the enemy on the stem, or catch them broadside
as they were in the act of turning ; and thus they either stove
them in or broke away some necessary part of their ri^ng.
By this manner of fighting they destroyed a great number of
the enemy's ships.
6. But the most brilliant and hazardous exploits were those
Further incidenis °^ three quinqueremes : the flagship on which
in ihe fight on Theophiliscus sailed, then that commanded by
^■^'u*!"^" Philostratus, and lastly the one steered Iw
The Rhodian . , , 1 , , , - , ■.,-
adini[«i Theo- Autolycus, and on board of which was Nicos-
phiiiscus mortally tratus. This last charged an enemy's ship,
wounded. ^^^j [gj^ j^^ ^^^^ sticking in it. The ship thus
struck sank with all hands ; but Autolycus and his comrades,
as the sea poured into his vessel through the prow, was sur-
rounded by the enemy. For a time they defended themselves
gallantly, but at last Autolycus himself was wounded, and fell
overboard in his armour, while the rest of the marines were
killed fighting bravely. While this was going on, Theophiliscus
came to the rescue with three quinqueremes, and though he
could not save the ship, because it was now full of water, he
yet stove in three hostile vessels, and forced their marines
overboard. Being quickly surrounded by a number of galleys
and decked ships, he lost the greater number of his marines
after a gallant struggle on their part ; and after receiving three
wounds himself, and performing prodigies of valour, just
managed to get his own ship safely off with the assistance
of Philostratus, who came to his aid and bravely took his share
of the danger. Having thus rejoined his own squadron, he
darted out once more and ran in upon the enemy, utterly
prostrated in body by his wounds, but more dashing and
vehement in spirit than before.
So that there were really two sea-fights going on at a con-
siderable distance from each other. For the right wing of
Philip's fleet, continually making for land in accordance with
his original plan, was not far from the Asiatic coast ; while
the left wing, having to veer round to support the ships on
the rear, were engaged with the Rhodians at no great distance
from Chios.
ivi AT^ALUS BARELY ESCAPES CAPTURE \TJ
6. As the fleet of Attalus, however, was rapidly overpower-
ing the right wing of Philip, and was now ap- Aiialus inter-
proaching the small islands, under cover of ccpied by Philip,
which Philip was moored watching the result ,='"! ^°''l^ !°
r ,,_ ■ , . , t ^ ■ abaniion bis ship,
oi the battle, Attalus saw one of his quin-
queremes staved in and in the act of being sunk by an
enemy's ship. He therefore hurried to its assistance with two
quadriremes. The enemy's ship turning to flight, and making
for the shore, he pursued it somewhat too eagerly in his
ardent desire to effect its capture. Thereupon Philip, observ-
ing that Attalus had become detached a considerable distance
from his own fleet, took four quinqueremes and three hemioliae,
as well as all the galleys within reach, and darting out got be-
tween Attalus and his ships, and forced him in the utmost
terror to run his three ships ashore. After this mishap the
king himself and his crew made their way to Erythrae, while
Philip captured his vessels and the royal equipage on board
them. For in this emergency Attalus had employed an arti-
fice. He caused the most splendid articles of the royal
equipage to be spread out on the deck of his ship ; the conse-
quence of which was that the first Macedonians who arrived on
the galleys, seeing a quantity of flagons and purple robes and
such like things, abandoned the pursuit, and turned their atten-
tion to plundering these. Thus it came about that Atulus
got safe away to Erythrae ; while Philip, though he had dis-
tinctly got the worst of it in the general engagement, was so
elated at the unexpected reverse which had befallen Attalus,
that he put to sea again and exerted himself strenuously in
collecting his ships and restoring the spirits of his men by
assuring them that they were the victors. For when they
saw Philip put to sea towing off the royal ship, they very
naturally thought that Attalus had perished. But Dionyso-
dorus, conjecturing what had really happened to the king, set
about collecting his own ships by raising a signal ; and this
being speedily done, he sailed away unmolested
to their station in Asia. Meanwhile those RhSlians.
Macedonians who were engaged with the
Rhodians, having been for some time past in evil case, were
gradually extricating themselves from the battle, one after the
VOL. II N
178 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS BOOK
Other retiring on the pretence of being anxious to support their
comrades. So the Rhodians, taking in tow some of their
vessels, and having destroyed others by charging them, sailed
away to Chios.
7. In the battle with Attalus Philip had had destroyed a
D.C. aoi. ten-banked, a nine-banked, a seven-banked, and
The losses in a six-banked ship, ten other decked vessels, three
ihe battle. iriemtoUae, twenty-five galleys and their crews.
In the battle with the Rhodians ten decked vessels and
about forty galleys. While two quadriremes and seven
galleys with their crews were captured. In the fleet of Attalus
one triemiolia and two quinqueremes were sunk, while two
quadriremes besides that of the king were captured. Of the
Rhodian fleet two quinqueremes and a trireme were destroyed,
but no ship was taken. Of men the Rhodians lost sixty,
Attalus seventy ; while Philip lost three thousand Mace-
donians and six thousand rowers. And of the Macedonians
and their allies two thousand were taken prisoners, and of
their opponents six hundred.
8. Such was the end of the battle of Chios ; in which
Philip vainly pre- Philip claimed the victory on two pretexts.
lends that he FJrst, because he had driven Attalus ashore and
won the baiUe. j,^^ captured his ship ; and secondly, because,
as he had anchored at the promontory of Argennum, he had
the credit of having taken up his anchorage where the wrecks
were floating. He acted in accordance with this assertion
next day by collecting the wrecks, and causing the corpses
which could be recognised to be picked up for burial, all for
the sake of strengthening this pretence. For that he did not
himself believe that he had won was shortly afterwards proved
by the Rhodians and Dionysodorus. For on that very next
day, while he was actually engaged on these operations, after
communication with each other they sailed out to attack him,
but, on nobody putting out to meet them, they returned to
Chios. Philip indeed had never before lost so many men
either by land or sea at one time, and was extremely mortified
at what had happened and had lost much of his spirit for the
enterprise. To the outside world, however, he tried to con-
ceal his real sentiments : though this was forbidden by facts.
2jri PHILIP VAINLY CLAIMS THE VICTORY AT CHIOS 179
Besides everything else, what happened after the battle im-
pressed all who saw it too strongly. For the slaughter and
destruction was so great that, on the day of battle itself the
whole striit was filled with corpses, blood, arms, and
wrecks ; while on the subsequent days the strands might be
seen piled up with all these together in wild confusion.
Hence the extreme consternation of the king could not be
confined to himself, but was shared by all his Macedonians.
9. Theophiliscus survived for one day; and then having
written a despatch home with an account of the
battle, and appointed Cleonaeus to succeed him xheophiiiscus
in his command, died from his wounds. He had
shown great valour in the engagement, and his far-sighted policy
deserves to be remembered. If it had not been for bis bold-
ness in attacking Philip in time, all the allies would have let
the opportunity pass, in terror at Philip's audacity. But by
beginning the war as he did he forced his countrymen to seize
the opportunity, and compelled Attains not to lose time in
mere preparatory measures for war, but to go to war ener-
getically and grapple with the danger. The Rhodians, there-
fore, were quite right to pay him, even after his death, such
honours as were incentives, not only to men living at the time^
but to future generations also, to prompt service in their
country's cause. . . .
THE INDECISIVE BATTLE OF CHIOS WAS FOLLOWED BY ANOTHER
OFF LADE, IN WHICH PHILIP WAS PARTLY SUCCESSFUL'
10. After the battle of Lade, the Rhodians being out of
his way, and Attalus not having yet appeared on the scene, it
is clear that Philip might have accomplished his voyage to
Alexandria. And here we have evidence stronger than any
other of Philip's infatuation in acting as he did. What, then,
prevented his design ? Nothing in the world but what always
occurs in the natural course of affairs. For at a distance
many men at times desire the impossible from the extravagant
prospects it holds out, their ambition over-mastering their reason;
' Jam cum Shodiii et Allah navaiiius artaminiius. ntutre felidlir, vim
txftriui. Livy, 31, 14.
l8o THE HISTORIES OF POLYBI US hook
but when they appToach the moment of action they quite
as irrationally abandon their purpose, because their calcula-
tions are obscured and confused by the embarrassments and
difficulties which meet them. . . .
PHILIP'S OPERATIONS IN CARIA, B.C. SOI
11. Having made some assaults which proved abortive
The siraiiigem by owing to the Strength of the place, Philip went
which Philip lookaway again, plundering the forts and villages in
Prinassus. ti,^ country. Thence he marched to Prinassus
and pitched his camp under its wall Having promptly got ready
his pent-houses and other siege artillery, he began to attempt the
town by mines. This plan proving impracticable, owing to
the rocky nature of the soil, he contrived the following strata-
gem. During the day he caused a noise to be made under
ground, as though the mines were being worked at; while
during the night he caused earth to be brought and piled up
at the mouth of the mine, in order that the men in the city,
by calculating the quantity of earth thrown up, might become
alarmed. At first the Prinassians held out bravely : but when
Philip sent them a message informing them that he had under-
pinned two plethra of their walls, and asking them whether
they preferred to march out with their lives, or one and all
to perish with their town when he set fire to the props, then
at last, believing that what he said was true, they surrendered
the city.
12. The town of lassus is situated in Asia on the gulf
Leeends of between the temple of Poseidmen, the territory
lassus and of Miletus, and the city of Myndus, called the
BftTgylLa. gulf [of lassus by some], but by most the gulf of
Bargylia, from the names of the cities built upon its inner coast
The lassians boast of being originally colonists from Ai^os,
and more recently from Miletus, their ancestors having invited
to their town (he son of Neleus, the founder of Miletus, owing
to their losses in the war with the Carians. The size of the
town is ten stades. Among the people of Bargylia it is a
common report widely believed that the statue of the Kindyan
Artemis, though in the open air, is never touched by snow or
XVI PHILIP IN CARJA iSl
rain ; and the same belief is held among the lassians as to
the Artemis Astias.' All these stories have been repeated by
certain historians. But, for my part, I have in the whole
course of my work set myself against such statements of our
historiographers and have had no toleration for them. For it
appears to me that such tales are only fit to amuse children,
when they transgress not only the limits of probability but even
those of possibility. For instance, to say that certain bodies
when placed in full light cast no shadow argues a state of quite
deplorable folly. But Theopompus has done this; for he
says that those who enter the holy precinct of Zeus in Arcadia
cast no shadow, which is on a par with the statements to
which I have just referred. Now, in so £ir as such tales tend
to preserve the reverence of the vulgar for religion, a certain
allowance may be made for some historians when they record
these miraculous legends. But they must not be allowed to go
too far. Perhaps it is difficult to assign a limit in such a
matter ; still it is not impossible. Therefore, in my judgment,
such displays of ignorance and delusion should be pardoned
if they do not go very for, but anything like extravagance in
them should be rejected. . . .
AFFAIRS IN GREECE
IS. I have already described the deliberate policy of Nabis,
tyrant of the Lacedaemonians ; how he drove xhe tyranny of
the citizens into exile, freed the slaves, and gave Nobis. See 13,
them the wives and daughters of their masters. *"'■
How also, by opening his kingdom as a kind of inviolable
sanctuary for all who fled from their own countries, he col-
lected a number of bad characters in Sparta. I will now
proceed to tell how in the same period, being in alliance with
Aelolians, Eleans, and Messenians, and being bound by oaths
and treaties to support one and all of those ^ aoa-aoi
peoples in case of any one attacking them, he ' '
yet in utter contempt of these obligations determined to make
a treacherous attack on Messene. . . .
' An inscriplion found at lassus [C.I.G. 36S3] has conlinned this name
which u found in one MS. instead of Hesliai. Whether the meaning of the
dtle ti Aitemis of the Cily, or some local desigDatiOD, i
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIVS
DIGRESSION ON THE MERITS OF THE HISTORIANS
ZENO AND ANTISTHENES OF RHODES
14t As some episodical historians have written on the
period which embraces the affair at Messene and the sea-fights
already described, it is my intention to discuss them briefly.
I will not however speak of them all, but only those whom I
suppose to be worthy of commemoration and full discussion.
The necessity of These are the Rhodian writers Zeno and Antls-
discussing ihe thenes, whom I judge to deserve this distinction,
hinones of zcno f^^ xaox^ than one reason. They were contem-
and Antislhenes. . , , i j ■
porary with the events, and were engaged in
practical politics ; and, lastly, they composed their histories
with no view to gain, but for the sake of fame, and as part of
the business of politicians. Since then they write of the same
events as myself, I cannot omit mentioning them ; lest, from
the reputation of their country, and the idea that naval affairs
are peculiarly the province of Khodians, some students may
prefer their authority to mine where I differ from them.
Now both these writers, to begin with, describe the battle of
TTieir description I-ade as not less severe than that of Chios, but
of the battle of more fiercely and daringly contested, both in
Lade. Seech. lo. ^^.^^ ^nd as a whole, and finally assert that the
victory was with the Rhodians. For my part I should be
inclined to allow that historians must show some partiality to
their own countries ; not however that they should state what
is exactly opposite to the facts regarding them. There are
quite enough mistakes which writers make from ignorance,
and which it is difficult for poor human nature to avoid : but
if we deliberately write what is false for the sake of country,
friends, or favour, how do we differ from those who do the
same to get a living? For as the latter, by measiiring every-
thing by the standard of private gain, ruin the credit of their
works, so your politicians often fall into the same discredit by
yielding to the influence of hatred or affection. Therefore
readers ought to be jealously watchful on this head; while
writers ought to be on their guard for their own sakes.
16. The present matter is an exampla When coming to de-
XVI ZENO AtfD ANTJSTHENES \%\
tails of the battle of L^de, these writers confess that in it " two
quinqueremes of Rhodes were captured by the enemy ; and that
upon one ship raising its studding-sail to escape from the conflict,
owing to its having being staved in and shipping sea, many of
the vessels near it did the same and made for the open sea ; and
that at last the admiral, being left with only a few vessels, was
forced to follow their example. That for the present they were
forced by unfavourable winds to drop anchor on the territory of
Myndus, but next day put to sea and crossed to Cos ; while the
enemy, having secured the quinqueremes, landed at Lade and
took up their quarters in the Rhodian camp : that, moreover,
the Milesians, deeply impressed by what had taken place, pre-
sented not only Philip, but Heracleides also, with a garland
of victory on his entrance to their territory," And yet, though
they give all these particulars, which all evidently indicate the
losing side, they still declare the Rhodians to have been vic-
torious both in particular combats and in the whole battle ; and
that too in spite of the fact that the original despatch from the
admiral concerning the battle, sent to the Senate and Prytanies,
still exists in their Prytaneium, which testifies to the truth, not
of the statements of Antisthenes and Zeno, but of mine.
16. Next as to their account of the treacherous attempt
upon Messene. Zeno says that " Nabis started , . . .
^^ f^ . , „ , -. Zeno s account of
from Sparta, crossed the Eurotas near the tnbu- [he atiack of
tary called the Hoplites, and advanced along Nabis upon
the narrow road past Poliasium until he arrived ijlf^'*',
at Sallasia, thence past Pharae to Thalamae, and
so to the river Pamisus." About which I do not know what to
say. It is just as if one were to say that a man started from
Corinth and marched through the Isthmus and arrived at the
Scironean way, and then came straight to the Contoporian road,
and journeyed past Mycenae to Argos. For such a statement
would not be merely slightly wrong but wholly contradictory.
For the Isthmus and the Scironian rocks are east of Corinth,
while the Contoporian road and Mycenae are nearly due
south-west ; so that it is completely impossible to go by way
of the former to the latter. The same may be said about
Lacedaemon ; for the Eurotas and Sallasia are to the north-
east of Sparta, while Thalamae, Pharae, and the Pamisus are
l84 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS book
to the south-west Therefore it is not possible to go to
Sallasiii, nor necessary to cross the Eurotas, if a man means to
go to Messenia by way of Thalamae,
17. Besides these mistakes, he says that Nabis statted on
his return from Messenia by the gate on the road to Tegea.
This is another absurdity ; for Megalopolis is between Tegea
and Messene, so that it is impossible that a gate at Messene
should be called the " Gate to Tegea." The fact is that there
is a gate there called the "Tegean Gate," by which Nabis
commenced his return ; and this led Zeno into the mistake of
supposing that Tegea was near Messene, which is not the
fact : for the Laconian territory, as well as that of Megalopolis,
lies between that of Messene and Tegea. Lastly, he says
that the Alpheus flows undeiground from its source for a
considerable distance, and comes up near Lycoa, in Arcadia.
The truth is that this river does go down underground not far
from its source, and, after remaining hidden for about ten
stades, comes up again, and then flows through the territory
of Megalopolis, at first with a gentle stream, and then gaining
volume, and watering that whole district in a splendid manner
for two hundred stades, at length reaches Lycoa, swollen by
the tributary stream of the Lusius, and become unfordable
and deep. . . .
However, I think that the points I have mentioned,
though all of them blunders, admit of some palliation and
excuse ; for the latter arose from mere ignorance, those con-
nected with the sea-fight from patriotic affection. But is it
.not then a fault in Zeno, that he does not bestow as much
pains on investigating the truth and thoroughly mastering his
subject, as upon the ornaments of style ; and shows on many
occasions that he particularly plumes himself on this, as many
other famous writers do ? To my mind it is quite right to take
great care and pay great attention to the presentation of one's
fiicts in correct and adequate language, for this contributes in
no small degree to the effectiveness of history ; still I do not
think that serious writers should regard it as their primary
and most important object. Far from it. Quite other are the
parts of his history on which a practical politician should
rather pride himself.
XVI ZENdS ACCOUNT OF THE BATTLE OF PANIUM 185
IS. The best illustration of what I mean will be the
following. This same writer, in his account of [he siege of
Gaza and Antiochus's pitched battle with Scopas
in Coele-Syria, at Mount Panium,' showed such [he tai^eof
extreme anxiety about ornaments of style, that panium between
he made it quite impossible even for professional Aniiochus the
rhetoricians or mob-orators to outstrip him ;„ G'^a^^'J^Scopas.
theatrical effect ; while he showed such a con-
tempt of facts, as once more amounted to unsurpassable care-
lessness and inaccuracy. For, intending to describe the first
position in the field taken up by Scopas, he says that
" the right extremity of his line, together with a few cavalry,
rested on the slope of the mountain ; while its left with
all the cavalry belonging to this wing, was in the plains
below. That Antiochus, just before the morning watch,
despatched his elder son Antiochus with a division of his army
to occupy the high ground which commanded the enemy;
and that at daybreak he led the rest of his army across the
river which flowed between the two camps, and drew them up
on the plain : arranging his heavy-armed infantry in one line,
facing the enemy's centre, and his cavalry, some on the right
and the rest on the left wing of the phalanx, among which
were the heavy-armed horsemen, under the sole command of
the younger of the king's sons Antiochus. That in advance
of this line he stationed the elephants at certain intervals, and
the Tarentines^ commanded by Antipater; while he filled up
the spaces between the elephants with archers and slingers.
And finally, that he took up his own station on the rear of the
elephants with a squadron of household cavalry and body-
guards." After this preliminary description he continues : " The
younger Antiochus " — whom he had described as being on the
level ground with the heavy-armed cavalry — " charged down
from the high ground and put to flight and pursued the cavalry
under Ptolemy, son of Aeropus, who was in command of the
Aelolians in the plain on the left wing ; but the two lines,
' Called Panion or Pandoiu See Joscphus D. Jud. 3, 10, 7, Iix>Jd*oii nfyi)
rh nirtwr. The town near it was called Pnneas, and afterwards Paneaj
Caesarea, and laler still Caesarea Philippi. Scopas, tbe Aelolian, was now
serving Ptolemy Epiphanes ; see 13, a ; 18, 53.
■86 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBWS book
when they met, maintained a stubborn fight" But he fails to
observe that, as the elephants, cavalry, and light-armed infantty
were in front, the two hnes could not possibly meet at all.
19. Next he says that "the phalanx, outmatched in
agiiity and forced backwards by the Aetolians, retired step
by step, while the elephants received the retreating line, and
did great service in chaining the enemy." But how the
elephants got on the rear of the phalanx it is not easy to
understand, or how, if they had got there, they could have
done good service. For as soon as the two lines were once
at close quarters, the animals would no longer have been able
to distinguish friend from foe among those that came in their
way. Again, he says that " the Aetolian cavalry were thrown
into a panic during the engagement, because they were un-
accustomed to the look of the elephants," But, by his own
account, the cavalry which was originally stationed on the
light wing remained unbroken ; while the other division of
the cavalry, that on the right wing, had all fled before the
successful attack of Antiochus. What portion of the cavalry
was it, then, that was on the centre of the phalanx, and was
terrified by the elephants? And where was the king, or what
part did he take in the batde, seeing that he had with him
the very flower of the infantry and cavalry ? For not a word
has been told us about these. And where was the elder
of the young Antlochi, who, with a division of the troops, occu-
pied the high ground 7 For this prince Is not represented even
as returning to his quarters after the battle. And very natur-
ally so. For Zeno started by assuming two sons of the king
named Antiochus, whereas there was only one in the army
on that occasion. How comes it, again, that according to
him, Scopas returned fiist and also last from the field ? For
he says : " when he saw the younger Antiochus, after return-
ing from the pursuit, on the rear of his phalanx, and accord-
ingly gave up all hopes of victory, he retired." But afterwards
he says that " he sustained the most imminent peril when his
phalanx got surrounded by the elephants and cavalry, and
was the last man to retire from the field."
20. These and similar blunders appear to me to reflect
very great discredit upon writers. It is necessary, therefore.
XVI ZENO ACKNOWLEDGES HIS ERROU 187
to endeavour to make one's self master of all departments of
history alike. That is the ideal ; but if that is impossible, one
ought at least to be excessively careful on the most essential
and important points in it I have been induced to say this
because I have observed that in history, as in other arts and
sciences, there is a tendency to neglect the true and essential,
while the ostentatious and the showy secure praise and emula-
tion as something great and admirable. The fact being that
in history, as in other departments of literature, these latter
qualities require less trouble and gain a cheaper reputation.
As to his ignorance of the topography of Pdybiuswroie
Laconia, considering that his error was an im- lo Zeno on his
iwrtant one, I did not hesitate to write to Zeno ^™??fi^'^
personally. For I thought it a point of honour
not to look upon the mistakes of others as personal triumphs,
as is the way with some writers \ but to do the best I could to
secure correctness, not only of my own historical writings, but
of those of others also, for the benefit of the world at Large.
When Zeno received my letter and found that it was impossible
to make the correction, because his history was already published,
he was much vexed, but could do nothing. He, however, put the
most friendly interpretation on my proceeding ; and, in regard
to this point, I would beg my own readers, whether of my
own or future generations, if I am ever detected in making a
deliberate misstatement, and disregarding truth in any part of
my history, to criticise me unmercifully ; but if I do so from
lack of information, to make allowances : and I ask it for
myself more than others, owing to the size of my history and
the extent of ground covered by its transactions. . . .
EGYPT
21. Tlepolemus,' the chief minister in the kingdom of
Egypt, was a young man, but one who had characicrand
spent all his life in the camp, and with reputa- extravagance of
tion. By nature^ aspiring and ambitious, he had Tiepolemuj.
done much that was glorious in the service of his country,
but much that was evil also. As a general in a campaign, and
as an administrator of military expeditions, he was a man of
' See 15, as.
i88 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBWS ik)ok
great ability, high natural courage, and extremely well fitted to
deal personally with soldiers. But on the other hand, for the
management of complicated affairs, he was delicient in diligence
and sobriety, and had the least faculty in the world for the
keeping of money or the economical administration of finance.
And it was this that before long not only caused his own fall,
but seriously damaged the kingdom as well. For though he
had complete control of the exchequer, he spent the greater
part of the day in playing- ball and in matches in martial
exercises with the young men ; and directly he left these
sports he collected drinking parties, and spent the greater part
of his life in these amusements and with these associates.
But that part of his day which he devoted to business, he
employed in distributing, or, I might rather say, in throwing
away the royal treasures among the envoys from Greece
and the Dionysian actors, and, more than all, among
the officers and soldiers of the palace guard. He was utterly
incapable of saying no, and bestowed anything there was at
hand on any one who said anything to please him. The evil
which he himself thus began continually increased. For
every one who had received a favour expressed his gratitude
in extravagant language, both for the sake of what he had got
and of what he hoped to get in the future. And thus being
informed of the universal praise which was bestowed on him,
of the toasts proposed in his honour at banquets, of com-
plimentary inscriptions, and songs sung in his praise by the
public singers all through the town, he became entirely be-
fooled, and grew daily more and more pufTed up with conceit,
and more reckless in squandering favours upon foreigners and
soldiers.
22. These proceedings were very offensive to the other
Tiepoiemus sup- members of the court ; and, therefore, they
presses & coun watched everything he did with a jealous eye,
intriEue against gjjj] conceived a detestation for his insolence,
which they began to compare unfavourably with
the character of Sosibius. For the latter was considered to
show more wisdom in his guardianship of the king than his age
gave reason to expect ; and, in his dealings with other persons,
to maintain the dignity proper to his high trust, which was the
XVI INTRIGUES AT ALEXANDRIA 189
royal seal and person. Just at thb time, Ptolemy, the son of
Sc^ibius, returned from his mission to Philip. Before he left
Alexandria on his voyage, he had been full of foolish pride,
partly from his own natural disposition and partly from his
father's success. But upon landing in Macedonia, and mix-
ing with the young men at court, he conceived the notion
that the virtue of the Macedonians consisted in the better
fashion of their boots and clothes ; he therefore came home
got up in imitation of all these peculiarities, and fully per-
suaded that his foreign tour and association with Macedonians
had made a man of him. He therefore immediately began
showing jealousy of Tlepolemus, and inveighing against him ;
and as all the courtiers joined him, on the ground that
Tlepolemus was treating the business and revenue of the
state as though he were its heir and not its guardian, the
quarrel quickly grew. Meanwhile llepolemus, being in-
formed of certain unfriendly speeches, originating in the
jealous observation and malignity of the courtiers, at first
turned a deaf ear to them and affected to despise them ; but
when at length they ventured to hold a meeting and openly
express their disapproval of him in his absence, on the ground
of his maladministration of the government of the kingdom,
he grew angry ; and, summoning the council, came forward
and said that " they brought their accusations against him
secretly and in private, but he judged it right to accuse them
in public and face to face." ...
After making his public speech, Tlepolemus deprived
Sosibius of the custody of the seal also, and having got that
into his hands, thenceforth conducted the administration ex-
actly as he chose, . . ■
THE WAR IN COELE-SYRIA
22 (a). It seems to me to be at once just and proper to
pve the people of Gaza' the praise which bc. 301.
they deserve. For though they do not differ Vaioui of the
as to bravery in war from the rest of the peop'e of Gaia.
inhabitants of Coele-Syria, yet as parties to an intemadonal
190 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIVS book
agreement, and in their fidelity to their promises, they
far surpass them, and show altogether a courage in such
matters that is irresistible. In the first place, when all the
other people were terrified at the invasion of the Persians,^ in
view of the greatness of their power, and one and all submitted
themselves and their countries to the Medes, they alone faced the
danger and stood a siege. Again, on the invasion
of Alexander, when not only did the other cities
surrender, but even Tyre was stormed and its inhabitants sold
into slavery ; and when it seemed all but hopeless for any to
escape destruction, who resisted the fierce and violent attack
of Alexander, they alone of all the Syrians withstood him,
and tested their powers of defence to the uttermost. Follow-
ing the same line of conduct on the present occasion, they
omitted nothing within their power in their determination to
keep faith with Ptolemy, Therefore, just as we distinguish by
special mention in our history individuals of eminent virtue,
so ought we, in regard to states as such, to mention with
commendation those which act nobly in any point from tra-
ditional principles and deliberate policy. . , ,
ITALY {LIVV, 30, 4S)
23. Publius Scipio returned from Libya soon after the
Scipio's reiurn evcnts I have narrated. The expectation of the
to Rome and people concerning him was proportionable to
iriumph, B.C. aoi. ti^g magnitude of his achievements: and the
=P- IS. 19- splendour of his reception, and the signs of
popular favour which greeted him were extraordinary. Nor
was this otherwise than reasonable and proper. For after
despairing of ever driving Hannibal from Italy, or of averting
that danger from themselves and their kinsfolk, they now
looked on themselves as not only securely removed from every
fear and every menace of attack, but as having conquered their
enemies. Their joy therefore knew no bounds ; and when
Scipio came into the city in triumph, and the actual sight of
' Syria was conquered by the Assyrian king Tiglalh-Pileicr about B.C. 747,
and was afterwards a part of the Babylonian and Persian empires. It does
nM seem certain to what invasion Polybius is here refeiring.
xvi SCJPIOS TRIUMPH igt
the prisoners who formed the procession brought stitl more
clearly to their memories the dangers of the past, they became
almost wild in the expression of their thanks to the gods, and
their affection for the author of such a signal change. For
among the prisoners who were led in the triumphal procession
was Syphax, the Iting of the Masaesylii, who shortly afterwards
died in prison. The triumph concluded, the citizens cele-
brated games and festivals for several days running with great
Splendour, Scipio, in his magnificent liberality, supplying the
cost. . . .
WAR BETWEEN ROME AND PHILIP V.
24^ At the beginning of the winter in which Publius Sul-
picius was elected consul at Rome, king Philip, wiotcr of
who was staying at Bargylia, was rendered ex- rc aoi-aoo.
ceedingly uneasy and filled with many con- ^'^- '^- ^P'''"*'
flicting anxieties for the future, when he Maiimus'll.,
observed that the Rhodlans and Attalus, far C. AureUus.
from dismissing their navy, were actually man- '-°*'" 't?'
ning additional ships and paying more earnest
attention than ever to guarding the coasts. He had a double
cause, indeed, for uneasiness : he was afraid of p^n ■. anneiies
sailing from Bargylia, and foresaw that he would
have to encounter danger at sea ; and at the same time he
was not satisfied with the state of things in Macedonia, and
therefore was unwilling on any consideration to spend the
winter in Asia, being afraid both of the Aetolians and the
Romans; for he was fully aware of the embassies sent to
Rome to denounce him [as soon as it was known] that the
war in Libya was ended. These considerations caused him
overwhelming perplexity; but he was compelled for the
present to remain where he was, leading the life of a wolf, to
use the common expression : for he robbed and stole from
some, and used force to others, while he did
violence to his nature by fawning on others, be- ^^^ ^^^^^ ^J^
cause his army was suffering from famine ; and
by these means managed sometimes to get meat to eat, some-
times figs, and sometimes nothing but a very short allowance
of com. Some of these provisions were supplied to him by
192 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS book
Zeuxis, and some by the people of Mylae, Alabanda, and
Magnesia, whom he flattered whenever they gave him any-
thing, and barked at and plotted against when they did not
Finally, he made a plot to seize Mylae by the agency of
Philocles, but failed from the clumsiness with which the
scheme was contrived. The territory of Alabanda he harried
as though it were an enemy's, alleging that it was imperatively
necessary to get food for his troops. . . .
When this Philip, father of Perseus, was thus ovemmning
Asia, being unable to get provisions for his army, he accepted
a present of figs from the Magnesians, as they had no com.
For which reason, when he conquered Myus, he granted its
territory to the Magnesians in return for their figs. . . .
25. The Athenian people sent envoys to king Attalus, both
The visit of to thank him for the past, and to urge him to
Attalus to Athens, come to Athens to consult with them on the
B.C. 200. dangers that still threatened them.^ The king
was informed a few days afterwards that Roman ambassadors
had arrived at the Peiraeus ; and, believing that it was neces-
sary to have an interview with them, he put to sea in haste.
The Athenian people, being informed of his coming, passed very
liberal votes as to the reception and general entertainment of the
king. Arrived at the Peiraeus, Attalus spent the first day in
transacting business with the Roman ambassadors, and was ex-
tremely delighted to find that they were fully mindful of their
ancient alliance with him, and quite prepared for the war with
Philip. Next morning, in company with the Romans and the
Athenian magistrates, he began his progress to the city in
great state. For he was met, not only by all the magistrates
and the knights, but by all the citizens with their children and
wives. And when the two processions met, the warmth of the
welcome given by the populace to the Romans, and still more
to Attalus, could not have been exceeded. At his entrance
into the city by the gate Dipylum the priests and priestesses
lined the street on both sides : all the temples were then
thrown open ; victims were placed ready at all the altars ; and
the king was requested to offer sacrifice. Finally they voted
* That is from the wars undertaken by them against Philip. Livy, 31,
14, 24.
XVI KING ATTALUS AT ATHENS 193
him such high honours as they had never without great hesita-
tion voted to any of their former benefactors : for, in addition
to other compliments, they turned a tribe after Attalus, and
classed him among their eponymous heroes.
26. They next summoned an ecclesia and invited the king
to address them. But upon his excusing him- xhe Athenians
self, on the plea that il would be ill-bred for him vote for war
to appear before the people and recount his '«*'"*' Philip.
own good services in the presence of those on whom they had
been bestowed, they gave up asking for his personal appear-
ance ; but begged him to give them a written statement as to
what he thought was the best thing to do in view of the exist-
ing circumstances. On his consenting to do this, and writing
the document, the m^istrates produced the despatch to the
ecclesia. The cantents of this written communication were
briefly these : he recalled the good services he had done the
people in the past; enumerated the things he had accom-
plished in ihe existing war against Philip ; and lastly exhorted
them to activity in this war, and protested that, if they did not
determine resolutely to adopt this policy of hostility to Philip
in common with the Rhodians, Romans, and himself, and yet
afterwards wished to share in the benefits which had been
secured by others, they would miss securing the true interests
of their country. As soon as this despatch had been read, the
people, influenced both by its contents and by their warm
feeling towards Attalus, were prepared to vote the war : and
when the Rhodians also entered and argued at great length
to the same efl'ect, the Athenians at once decreed the
war against Philip. They gave the Rhodians also a mag-
nificent reception, honoured their state with a crown of
valour, and voted all Rhodians equal rights of citizenship at
Athens, on the ground of their having, besides other things,
restored the Athenian ships which had been captured with
the men on board them. After concluding this arrangement,
the Rhodian ambassadors sailed to Ceos with their fleet to
visit the islands. . . .
27. While the Roman ambassadors were still at Athens,
Nicanor, by the command of Philip, made a ^j, ^^^^^^
raid upon Attica, and came as far as the Aca- wam rhiiip to
vol. II o
194 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBWS book
atrttnin from at- dcmy. Thereupon the Romans sent a herald
amuo do'ji^ucc *^ ^^™» ^"^ ^^^ *^*™ announcc to his master
* to AtMhis. on Philip that '* The Romans admonished him to
i*;iiii of war. make HO war upon any Greek State, and to
sul)mit to an arbitration l>efore a fair tribunal as to the injuries
he had inflicted upon Attalus : that, if he did this, he might
have iK*acc with Rome, but, if he refused to obey, the opposite
would immediately follow." On the receipt of this message
Nicanor retired. Then the Romans sailed along the coast of
Ispinis and delivered a similar announcement in regard to
Pliilii) in the town of Phoenice ; also to Amynandrus in the
district of Athamania ; also to the Aetolians in Naupactusy and
the Achaeans in Aegiuni. And having thus by the mouth of
Nicanor j^iven Philip this clear warning, the Roman envoys
thfinselves sailed away to visit Antiochus and Ptolemy with a
view to settle their controversies. . . .
28. It api>ears to me that to make a good beginning, and
riic finiiiKss even to maintain enthusiasm long enough to
niiii vi);ijur of securc a Considerable measure of success, is an
''''•'''• '" "»'yt'»n: ac-hievemcnt of which many have been found
< .mK< r. capable ; but to carr>' a purpose through to its
end, and, even though fortune be adverse, to make up by cool
reason for the deficiency of enthusiasm is within the power of
few. r>om this i)oint of view one cannot but disparage the
inactivity of Attalus and the Rhodians, while regarding with
admiration the royal and lofty spirit displayed by Philip, and
his constancy to his purpose, — not meaning to speak in praise
of his character as a whole, but simply commending the
vigour with which he acted on this occasion. I make this
distinction to prevent any one supposmg that I contradict
myself, because I recently praised Attalus and the Rhodians
and found fault with Philip, whereas I am now doing
the reverse. This is just such a case as I
referred to at the beginning of my history, when
I said that it was necessary sometimes to praise, and some-
times to blame the same persons, since it frequently happens
that changes of circumstances for the worse and calamities alter
men*s original dispositions, and frequently also changes for the
better ; and sometimes too it is the case that from natural
XTi ACTIVITY AND ENERGY OF PHILIP 195
temperament men are at one time inclined to what is right, at
another to the reverse. And it is a variation of this sort that
I think occurred to Philip in this instance. For, irritated by
his defeats, and influenced in a great degree by anger and
passion, he addressed himself with a kind of insane or inspired
eagerness to meet the dangers of the hour ; and it was in this
spirit that he rose to the attack upon the Rhodians and king
Attalus, and gained the successes which followed. I was induced
to make these remarks, because I observe that some men, like
bad runners in the stadium, abandon their purposes when close
to the goal ; while it is at that particular point, more than at any
other, that others secure the victory over their rivals. . . .
29. Philip was anxious to anticipate the Romans in
seizing bases of operation and landing-places
in this country (Asia). ...
In order that, if it should be his purpose again to cross to
Asia, he might have a landing-place at Abydos. . . .
The position of Abydos and Sestos, and the advant^es of
the situation of those towns it would, I think, __ _ . „
i_ . r .- t . . . ■ . J . -1 ^^ Dardanelles
be waste of time for me to state m great detail, compared wiih
liecause the singularity of those sites has made the Suaiu of
them familiar to all persons of intelligence. Still G'brali"-
I imagine that It will not be otherwise than useful to remind
my readers briefly of the facts, by way of attracting their atten-
tion. A man would best realise the advantages of these cities,
not by regarding their sites by themselves, but by comparing
and contrasting them with those about to be mentioned. For
just as it is impossible to sail from the Ocean, — or as some
call it the Atlantic, — into our sea, except by passing between
the Pillars of Heracles, so is it impossible to sail from our sea
into the Propontis and the Pontus except through the channel
separating Sestos and Abydos. But as though Fortune had
designed these two straits to counterbalance each other, the
passage between the Pillars of Heracles is many times as broad
as that of the Hellespont, — the former being sixty, the latter two
stades; the reason being, as far as one may conjecture, the
great superiority in size of the external Ocean to our sea : while
the channel at Abydos is more convenient than that at the
Pillars of Heracles. For the former being lined on both sides
196 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS book
by human habitations is of the nature of a gate admitting
mutual intercourse, sometimes being bridged over by those
who determine to cross on foot, and at all times admitting a
passage by sea. But the channel at the Pillars of Heracles is
seldom used, and by very few persons, owing to the lack of
intercourse between the tribes inhabiting those remote parts of
Libya and Europe, and owing to the scantiness of our know-
ledge of the external Ocean. The city of Abydos itself is
enclosed on both sides by two European promontories, and
possesses a harbour capable of sheltering ships anchoring in it
from every wind ; while there is no possibility of anchoring at
any point near the city outside the harbour mouth, owing to the
rapidity and violence of the current setting through the strait.
80. Having then invested Abydos partly by a palisade and
Siege of Abydos. P^^^^^ ^^ ^^ earthwork, Philip began blockading
it by land and sea together. This siege was not
at all remarkable for the extent of the machinery employed,
or the ingenuity displayed in those works on which besiegers
and besieged are wont to exhaust all their invention and skill
against each other ; but still it deserves, if any ever did, to be
remembered and recorded for the noble spirit and extraordinary
gallantry exhibited by the besieged. At first, feeling full
confidence in themselves, the inhabitants of Abydos maintained
a courageous resistance to the attempts of Philip ; struck and
dislodged some of his engines, which he brought against their
walls by sea, with stones from their catapults, and destroyed
others by fire, and with such fierceness, that the enemy were
barely able to drag their ships out of danger. Against the
siege operations on land, too, up to a certain point they offered
an undaunted resistance, not at all despairing of ultimately
overpowering the enemy. But when their outer wall was
undermined and fell, and when moreover the Macedonians by
means of these same mines were approaching the inner wall,
which had been erected by the besieged to cover the breach :
then at length they send Iphiades and Pantacnotus as am-
bassadors, with an offer to Philip that he should take over the
city, on condition of letting the soldiers from Rhodes and
Attains depart under a truce ; and of permitting all free persons
to depart as they could, and wherever each might choose, with
XVI THE SIEGE OF ABYDOS 197
the clothes that each was wearing. But on Fhiltp bidding
them " surrender at discretion or fight like men," the ambassa-
dors returned to the town.
31. On being informedof the message the people of Abydos
met in public assembly, and with feelings of 3jspe„,e f^joiy.
Utter despair deliberated upon their position, ton of ihe people
They thereupon resolved, first to liberate the of Abydos.
slaves, that they might secure their sincere interest and
loyalty ; next, to collect all the women into the temple
of Artemis, and the children with their nurses into the
gymnasium ; and finally to bring together their silver and
gold into the market-place, as well as collect their clothes
which were of any value into the quadrireme of the
Rhodians and the trireme of the Cyzicenes. Having formed
these resolutions and acted on the decree with unanimity, they
again assembled in public meeting, and elected fifty of the
older and most trusted men, who at the same time were pos-
sessed of sufficient bodily vigour to enable them to carry out
what had been determined upon ; and these they bound on
oath in the presence of the whole of the citizens, that " when-
ever they saw the inner wall being captured by the enemy, they
would kill the children and women, and would bum the above-
mentioned ships, and, in accordance with the curses that had
been invoked, would throw the silver and gold into the sea."
After this they brought the priests forward, and all the citizens
swore that they would conquer the enemy or die fighting for
their country. To crown all, they slew victims and compelled
the priests and priestesses to dictate the words of this impre-
cation over the burnt offerings. Having bound themselves
by this solemn agreement, they left off attempting to counter-
mine the enemy, and resolved that, directly the interior wall fell,
they would fight to the last in the breach with the enemy's
storming party and there die.
32. This would justify us in saying that the gallantry of the
Abydenians outdid the proverbial Phocian
recklessness and Acamanian courage.^ For the ^i^^lj^l^on^of
Phocians have the repuUtion of having adopted the Abydenians
' For Ihe Pbocians see Pausan. 10, i. 6. For (he A<
198 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS book
with similar ones a similar resolution as to their families, but not
aSdA^a^SS. because they despaired of victory, for they
were about to fight a pitched battle with the
Thessalians in the open field. So too the Acamanians, upon
the mere prospect of an Aetolian invasion, adopted a like
resolution ; the details of which I have already narrated. But
the Abydenians, at a time when they were closely invested and
in all but complete despair of being saved, elected by a
unanimous resolution to meet their fate along with their child-
ren and wives, rather than to live any longer with the knowledge
that their children and wives would fall into the power of the
enemy. Therefore one might justly complain of Fortune for
having, in the former cases, given victory and safety to those
who despaired of them, while she adopted the opposite decision
in regard to the Abydenians. For the men were killed, and the
city was taken, but the children with their mothers fell into
the hands of the enemy.
33. As soon as the interior wall had fallen, the men,
H th t according to their oaths, sprang upon the ruins
surrendered and and fought the enemy with such desperate
the women and courage, that Philip, though he had kept sending
^'^'^er^'X^ the Macedonians to the front in relays till
nightfall, at last abandoned the contest in de-
spair of accomplishing the capture at all. For not only did
the Abydenian forlorn hope take their stand upon the dead ,
bodies of the fallen enemies, and maintain the battle with
fury; nor was it only that they fought gallantly with mere
swords and spears ; but when any of these weapons had been
rendered useless, or had been knocked out of their hands, they
grappled with the Macedonians, and either hurled them to the
ground arms and all, or broke their sarissae, and stabbing their
faces and exposed parts of their bodies with the broken ends,
threw them into a complete panic But the fight being inter-
rupted by nightfall, most of the citizens having now fallen in
the breach, and the rest being utterly exhausted by fatigue and
wounds, Glaucides and Theognetus collected a few of the
older men together, and, instigated by hopes of personal safety,
lowered the special eminence and unique glory which their
fellow-citizens had acquired. For they resolved to save the
XVI THE FALL OF ABYDOS 199
chtldien and women alive, and at daybreak to send the priests
and priestesses with garlands to Philip, to entreat his mercy
and surrender the city to him.
34. While this was going on, king Attatus, having heard
that Abydos was being besieged, sailed through a Roman envoy
the Aegean to Tenedos ; and similarly the arrives 10 warn
youngest of the Roman ambassadors, Marcus ^'"''P '" '*=*'**■
Aemilius, arrived on board ship at Abydos itself. For
the Roman ambassadors, having learnt at Rhodes the fact
of the siege of Abydos, and wishing in accordance with their
commission to deliver their message to Philip personally, put
off their purpose of visiting the two kings, and despatched
this man to him. Having found the king outside Abydos, he
explained to him that "The Senate had resolved to order him
not to wage war with any Greek state ; nor to interfere in the
dominions of Ptolemy ; and to submit the injuries inflicted on
Attalus and the Rhodians to arbitration ; and that if he did
so he might have peace, but if he refused to obey he would
promptly have war with Rome." Upon Philip endeavouring
to show that the Rhodians had been the first to lay hands on
him, Marcus interrupted him by saying : " But what about the
Athenians ? And what about the Cianians ? And what
about the Abydenians at this moment ? Did any one of them
also lay hands on you first ? " The king, at a loss for a reply,
said : " I pardon the offensive haughtiness of your manners for
three reasons : first, because you are a young man and inex-
perienced in affairs ; secondly, because you are the handsomest
man of your time " (this was true) ; " and thirdly, because you
are a Roman. But for my part, my first demand to the
Romans is that they should not break their treaties or go to
war with me; but if they do, I shall defend myself as
courageously as I can, appealing to the gods to defend my
cause." With these words they separated. On becoming
master of Abydos, Philip found all the property -n,e voluntary
of the citizens collected by themselves ready to death of ihe
his hand. But when he saw the numbers and Abydenians.
fury of those who were stabbing, burning, hanging, throwing into
wells, or precipitating themselves from housetops, and their
children and wives, he was overpowered with surprise; an''
200 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS »00k
resenting these proceedings he published a proclamation^
announcing, that "he gave three days' grace to those who
wished to hang or stab themselves.'* The Abydenians, already
bent on executing their original decree, and looking upon
themselves as traitors to those who had fought and died for
their country, could not endure remaining alive on any terms ;
and, accordingly, with the exception of those who had previously
been put in chains or some similar restraint, they all without
delay hastened to their death, each family by itself. . . .
85. After the capture of Abydos, envoys came from the
The Rhodians Achaean nation to Rhodes urging the Rhodians
resolve to side to make terms with Philip. But upon these
with Rome, being followed by the arrival of the ambassadors
from Rome, who argued that they should make no terms with
Philip without consulting the Romans, the Rhodian people
voted to listen to the latter and to hold to their friendship
with them. . . .
THE PELOPONNESE — WAR WITH NABIS
86. Philopoemcn calculated the distances of all the cities
of the Achaean league, and from which of
afwcc f^ToHcct- ^^^^ ^^^ ^^"^^ ^"""^^ ^^ Tegea along the same
ingaii the Achaean roads. He then wrote despatches to each of
levies at Tegea them, and sent them to the most distant cities,
''Tc 2^"^^^' so dividing them that each city that was
farthest on a particular road should get, not
only the one addressed to itself, but those also of the other
cities on the same road. The contents of these first despatches
addressed to the chief magistrate were as follows : " As soon
as ye receive this despatch, forthwith cause all the men of
military age, with arms, and provisions, and money for five
days, to assemble immediately in the market-place. And as
soon as they are thus collected, march them out and lead them
to the next city. As soon as ye have arrived there, deliver the
despatch addressed to its chief magistrate and follow the in-
structions therein contained." Now, this second despatch
contained exactly the same words as the former, except of
course that the name of the next town was changed to which
XVI A MUSTER OF ACHAEANS AGAINST HABIS »I
they were to march. By this arrangement being repeated
right along the road, in the first place no one knew for what
purpose or undertaking the expedition was directed ; and in
the next place, every one was absolutely ignorant where he was
going, beyond the name of the next town, but all marched
forward in a state of complete mystification, taking on the suc-
cessive contingents as they went. But as of course the most
remote towns were not equally distant from Tegea, the letters
were not delivered to them all at the same time, but to each
in proportion to its distance. By which arrangement, without
either the Tegeans or the new arrivals knowing what was going
to happen, all the Achaeans marched into Tcgea under amis
by all the gates simultaneously.
87. What suggested to Philopoemen this stratagem was the
great number of the tyrant's eavesdroppers and
spies. On the day then on which the main body L^nia?"
of the Achaeans were to arrive at Tegea, he de-
spatched a band of picked men, so timing their start, that they
might pass the night near Sellasia and at daybreak begin a raid
on Laconia. They had orders that, in case the mercenaries of
Nabis left their quarters and attacked them, they were to retire
on Scotita, and in other respects follow the directions of
Didascalondas of Crete ; for Philopoemen had given his confi-
dence to this officer, and full directions as to the whole ex-
pedition. These men therefore set out in good spirits to the
task assigned to them. Philopoemen himself having issued
orders to the Achaeans to sup early, led out his army from
Tegea, and after a rapid night's march halted it about the time
of the morning watch in the neighbourhood of Scotita, wlitch
is between Tegea and Lacedaemon. When day broke the
mercenaries in Pellene, being informed by their scouts of the
raid which the enemy were making, started at once to the
rescue, as was their custom, and bore down upon them ; and
when the Achaeans, in accordance with their instructions, re-
tired, they followed, harassing them with bold and daring
assaults. But as soon as they came to the place where
PhDopoemen lay in ambush, the Achaeans sprang up and cut
some of them to pieces, and took others prisoners. . . .
88. Philip seeing that the Achaeans were disposed to '
202
THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS
BOOK XYI
tate about undertaking the war with Rome, tried earnestly by
every means to rouse their feeling of hostility. . . .
COELE-SYRIA
89. Ptolemy's general Scopas marched into the upper region
during the winter and subdued the Jewish nation. . . .
The siege having been conducted in a desultory msuiner,
Scopas fell into bad repute and was attacked with all the
petulance of youth. . . .
Having conquered Scopas, Antiochus took Batanaea,
B.C 200. Samaria, Abila, and Gadara ; and after a while
Antiochus con- those of the Jews who inhabit the sacred town
'^''^d^h!^ je^'^ ^^^^^ Jerusalem submitted to him also. On
after beating Sco- the subject of this town I have a good deal
pas at Panium. more to say, and especially on account of the
^^ supra, ch. 18. splendour of its temple, but I shall put it off to
another opportunity.
BOOK xvmi .
THE WAR WITH PHILIP
1. When the time appointed arrived, Philip put to sea rrom
Demetrias and came into the Mehan Gulf, with
five galleys and one beaked war-ship (pristis), Nicaea1nL<xais,
on the latter of which he himself was sailing, wimerolB.c. ige-
There met him the Macedonian secretaries '97- Cms- Titus
ApoUodorus and Demosthenes, Brachylles from ^ininusrsext
Bocotia, and the Achaean Cycliadas, who had Aeiius Paeios
been driven from the Peloponnese for the Caius.
reasons I have already described. With Fla- Cydiadas expelled
mininus came king Amynandras, and Diony- f™ favouring
sodonis, legate of king Attalus. The com-™"^^^^/-''''
missioners from cities and nations were
Aristaenus and Xenophon from the Achaeans ; Acesimbrotus
the navarch from the Rhodians; Phaeneas their Strategtis
from the Actolians, and several others of their statesmen with
him. Approaching the sea near Nicaea, Flamininus and those
with him took their stand upon the very edge of the beach,
while Philip, bringing his ship close to shore, remained afloat.
Upon Flamininus bidding him disembark, he stood up on
board and refused to leave his ship, Flamininus again asked
him what he feared, he said that he feared no one but the
gods, but he distrusted most of those who were there, especially
the Aetolians. Upon the Roman expressing his surprise, and
remarking that the danger was the same to all and the risk
common, Philip retorted that " He was mistaken in saying that :
' According to Hullseh no fragments or extracts ol book 17 are preserved.
In it would have lieen contained the campaign of B.C. 199. in the war bclsveen
Rome and Philip, (or ubich sec Livy. 31, 34-43. And Ihe operations of
Flamininus in (he season of B.C. 198. Livy, 31, 9-18. The (iial seventeen
chapters of this book arc generally classed in book 17.
204 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS book
for that, if anything happened to Phaeneas, there were many
who would act as Strategi for the Aetolians ; but if Philip were
to perish at the present juncture, there was no one to be king of
the Macedonians." Though all thought this an unconciliatory
way of opening the discussion, Flamininus nevertheless bade
him speak on the matters he had come to consider. Philip
however said that " The word was not with himself but with
Flamininus; and therefore begged that he would
^emand^" State clearly what he was to do in order to have
peace." The Roman consul replied that " What
he had to say was simple and obvious : it was to bid him
evacuate Greece entirely ; restore the prisoners and deserters
in his hands to their several states ; hand over to the Romans
those parts of Illyricum of which he had become possessed since
Peace of Epirus, ^^^ peace of Epirus ; and, similarly, to restore to
B.C. 205. Ptolemy all the cities which he had taken from
^^ supra II, 5-7. j^i^ sjnce the death of Ptolemy Philopator.
2. Having said this Flamininus refrained from any further
speech of his own ; but turning to the others he bade them deliver
what they had been severally charged to say by those who sent
them. And first Dionysodorus, the envoy of
^ Auaius °^ Attalus, took up the discourse by declaring that
" Philip ought to restore the king's ships which
had been captured in the battle at Chios and their crews with
them ; and to restore also the temple of Aphrodite to its
original state, as well as the Nicephorium, bo£h of which he had
r.u Du ,• destroyed." He was followed by the Rhodian
of the Rhodians, •; . . , , , , i ,, rr^,
navarch Acesimbrotus, who demanded "That
Philip should evacuate Peraea, which he had taken from them ;
withdraw his garrisons from lasus, Bargylia, and Euromus;
restore the Perinthians to their political union with Byzantium ;
and evacuate Sestos, Abydos, and all commercial ports and
r .u A u harbours in Asia." Following the Rhodians the
' Achaeans demanded "The restoration of Corinth
and Argos uninjuired." Then came the Aetolians, who first de-
manded, like the Romans, that " Philip should
Acto^fans! entirely evacuate Greece; and, secondly, that
he should restore to them uninjured all cities
formerly members of the Aetolian league."
xTiii CONGRESS OF NICAEA aos
S. When Phaeneas the Aetolian strategus had delivered this
demand, a man called Alexander Isius, who
had the reputation of being an able politician Aieii^ndCT isi™.
and good speaker, said that " Philip was neither
sincere at the present moment in proposing teims, nor bold in
his manner of making war, when he had to do that. In con-
ferences and colloquies he was always setting ambushes and
lying in wait, and using all the practices of war, but in actual
war itself took up a position at once unjust and ignoble : for
he avoided meeting his enemies face to face, and, as he fled
before them, employed himself in burning and plundering the
cities ; and by this policy, though himself beaten, he spoilt the
value of the victor's reward. Yet former kings of Macedonia
had not adopted this plan, but one exactly the reverse : for
they were continually fighting with each other in the open
field, but rarely destroyed and ruined cities. This was shown
clearly by Alexander's war in Asia against king Darius;
and again in the contentions between his successors, when
they combined to fight Antlgonus for the possession of Asia.
So too had the successors of these kings followed the same policy
down to the time of Pyrrhus ; they had been prompt to war
against each other in the open field, and to do everything they
could to conquer each other in arms, but had spared the cities,
that they might rule them if they conquered, and be honoured
by their subjects. But that a nsan should abandon war, and
yet destroy that for which the war was undertaken, seemed an
act of madness, and madness of a very violent sort. And this
was just what Philip was doing at that moment ; for he had
destroyed more cities in Thessaly, on his rapid march from the
pass of Epirus, though he was a friend and ally of that country,
than any one who had ever been at war with the Thessalians."
After a good deal more to the same effect he ended by
asking Philip, " On what grounds he was holding the town of
Lysimacheia with a garrison, having expelled the strategus sent
by the Aetolian league, of which it was a member? Also
on what grounds he had enslaved the Ciani who were also in
alliance with the Aetolians ? T,astly, on what plea he was in
actual occupation of Echinus, Phthioiid Thebes, Pharsalus,
and Larisa?"
2o6 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS book
4, When Alexander had concluded his speech, Philip came
somewhat nearer to the shore than he was
The JfJ^j^"*^^^ ° before, and, rising on board his ship, said that
"Alexander had composed and delivered a
speech in the true AetoHan and theatrical style. For every one
knew quite well that nobody willingly destroys his own allies,
but that, at times of special danger, military commanders are
compelled to do many things contrary to their natural feelings."
While the king was still speaking, Phaeneas, who was very
short-sighted, interrupted him by saying, " You are trifling with
us ; you must either fight and conquer, or obey the commands
of the stronger." Philip, in spite of the unfortunate position of
his affairs, could not refrain from his habitual humour:
turning towards Phaeneas he said, " Even a blind man could
see that" Such a knack had he of cutting repartee. Then he
turned to Alexander again and said, " You ask me, Alexander,
why I took possession of Lysimacheia. I reply, in order that it
might not by your neglect be devastated by Thracians, as it has
now actually been ; because I was compelled by this war to re-
move my soldiers, who indeed were no hostile garrison, as you
say, but were there for its protection. As for the Ciani, I did
not go to war with them, but only assisted Prusias to take them
who was at war with them. And of this you yourselves were the
cause. For though I sent envoy after envoy to you desiring
that you would repeal the law which allows you the privilege of
taking * spoil from spoil,* you replied that rather than abolish
this law you would remove Aetolia from Aetolia."
5. When Flamininus expressed some wonder at what he
Philip explains meant by this, the king tried to explain it to him
the peculiar law by saying that " The Aetolian custom was this.
of the Aeioiians. ^^^ey not Only plundered those with whom
they were at war, and harried their country ; but, if certain
other nations were at war with each other, even though both
were friends and allies of the Aetolians, none the less the
Aetolians might, without a formal decree of the people, take
part with both combatants and plunder the territory of both.
The result was that in the eyes of the Aetolians there were no
defined limits of friendship or enmity, but they were ready to
be the enemies and assailers of all who had a dispute on any-
XTIII PHILIP RETORTS ON HIS ACCUSERS 207
thing. " How then," he added, " have they any right to blame
me if^ while on temis of friendship with the Aetolians, I did
anything against the Ciani in support of my own allies ? But -
the most outrageous part of their conduct is that they try to
rival Rome, and bid me entirely evacuate Greece ! The
demand in itself is sufHcientty haughty and dictatorial : still, in
the mouths of Romans, it is tolerable, but in that of Aetolians
quite intolerable. What is this Greece, pray, from which ye
bid me depart ? How do you define it ? Why, most of the
Aetolians themselves are not Greeks ; for neither the Agrai,
nor the Apodoti, nor the Amphilochi are counted as Greek.
Do you then give up those tribes to me ? "
6. Upon Flamininus laughing at these words, Philip pro-
ceeded : " Well, enough said to the Aetolians ! phiijp-s answer
But to the Rhodians and Attalus I have to say to the Rbodians
that, in the eyes of a fair judge. It would be held "'"' '^"^"*-
more just that they should restore to me the ships captured,
than I to them. For I did not begin the attack upon Attalus
and the Rhodians, but they upon me, as everybody acknow-
ledges. However, at your instance, Titus, I restore Peraea to
the Rhodians, and to Attalus his ships and as many of the
men as are still alive. As for the destruction of the Nice-
phorium and the grove of Aphrodite, I am not able to do
anything else towards their restoration, but I will send plants
and gardeners to attend to the place and the growth of the
trees that have been cut down." Flamininus once more
lauehine at the king's sarcastic tone, Philip , . . .
" ,° , , , ° ,, , r and ihe Aehaeans.
turned to the Achaeans, and first went through
the list of benefactions received by them from Antigonus and
himself; then quoted the extraordinary honours Antigonus and
he had received from them ; and concluded by reading their
decree for abandoning him and joining Rome. Taking this for
his text, he expatiated at great length on the fickleness and in-
gratitude of the Achaeans. Still he said he would restore Argos
to them, and as to Corinth would consult with Flamininus.
7. Having thus concluded his conversation with the other
envoys, he asked Flamininus, observing that
the discussion was really confined to himself na^n^^
and the Romans, " Whether he considered that
2o8 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS book
he was bound to evacuate only those places in Greece which
he had himself acquired, or those also which he had inherited
from his ancestors?" On Flamininus making no answer
Aristaenus for the Achaeans, and Phaeneas for the Aetolians!
were on the point of replying. But as the day was closing in
time prevented them from doing so ; and Philip demanded
that they should all hand into him a written statement of the
terms on which peace was to be granted : for being there
alone he had no one with whom to consult ; and therefore
wished to turn their demands over in his own mind. Now
Flamininus was much amused at Philip's sarcastic banter ; but
not wishing the others to think so, he retaliated on him by a
sarcasm also, saying : " Of course you are alone, Philip : for
you have killed all the friends likely to give you the best
advice !" The king smiled sardonically, but said nothing.
And for the present, all having handed in the written state-
ments of their demands as aforesaid, the conference broke up,
after appointing to meet again next day at Nicaea. But next
morning, though Flamininus came to the appointed place and
found the others there, Philip did not arrive.
8. When the day, however, had nearly come to an end,
Second days and Titus and the others had almost given him
conference, Philip up, Philip appeared accompanied as before,
comes Lite. ^^^ excused himself by saying that he had
spent the whole day in perplexit)' and doubt, caused by the
severity of the demands made upon him. But every one else
thought that he had acted thus from a wish to prevent, by the
lateness of the hour, the delivery of invectives by the Achaeans
and Aetolians : for he saw, as he was going away on the previous
evening, that both were ready to attack him and state grievances.
Therefore, as soon as he approached the meeting this time,
he demanded that " The Roman Consul should discuss the
matter with him in private ; that they might not have a mere
war of words on both sides, but that a definite settlement
should be come to on the points in dispute." On his several
times repeating this request and pressing it strongly, Flamini-
nus asked those present what he ought to do. On their
bidding him meet the king and hear what he had to say, he
took with him Appius Claudius, at that time a military Tribune,
xvm THE DISPUTE REFERRED TO THE SENATE 209
and telling the others to retire a short way from the sea and
remain there, he himself bade Philip disembark. Accordingly
the king, attended by Apollodorus and Demosthenes, left his
ship, and, joining Flamininus, conversed with him for a con-
siderable time. What was said by the one and the other on
that occasion it is not easy to state. However,
when Philip and he had parted, Flamininus, ^'■"'S^^^"^
in explaining the king's views to the others,
said that he consented to restore Pharsalus and Larisa to the
Aetolians, but not Thebes : and that to the Rhodians he
surrendered Peraea, but not lasus and Bargylia: to the
Achaeans he gave up Corinth and Argos : to the Romans he
promised that he would surrender Itlyricum and all prisoners :
and to Attalus the ships, and as many of the men captured in
the sea-fights as survived.
9. All present expressed their dissatisfaction at these terms,
and alleged that it was necessary before all that
he should perform the general injunction, that, ^coneraa
namely, of evacuating all Greece : otherwise
these particular concessions were vain and useless. Observing
that there was an animated discussion going on among them,
and fearing at the same time that they would indulge in
accusations against himself, Philip requested Flamininus to
adjourn the conference till next day, as the evening was
closing in ; and promised that he would then either persuade
them to accept his terms or submit to theirs. Flamininus
consenting, they separated, after appointing to meet next day
on the beach near Thronium,
Next day al! came to the appointed place in good time.
Philip in a short speech called on all, and ybird day's con-
especially on Flamininus, " Not to break off the ference. A refer-
negotiation for peace now that by far the ™™iJL'|jf Senate
greater number were inclined to come to some
arrangement ; but, if possible, to come to an understanding by
themselves on the points in dispute ; or, if that could not be,
to send envoys to the Senate, and either convince it as to this
controversy, or submit to whatever it enjoined."
On this proposition of the king, all the others declared that
they preferred war to such a demand. But the Roman Coi^' ' '
2IO THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS book
said that " He was quite aware that it was improbable that
Philip would submit to any of their demands, yet, as it did
not in the least stand in the way of such action as they
chose to lake to grant the favour demanded by the king, he
would concede it. For not one of the proposals actually made at
present could be confirmed without the authority of the Senate ;
and besides the season now coming on was a favourable one
for ascertaining its opinion ; for, even as things were, the
armies could do nothing owing to the winter : it was therefore
against no one's interests, but, on the contrary, very convenient
for them all, to devote this time to a reference to the Senate
on the present state of affairs."
10. Seeing that Flamininus was not averse to referring the
matter to the Senate, all the others presently
'^loTo^'^ consented, and voted to allow Philip to send
envoys to Rome, and that they too should
severally send envoys of their own to plead their cause before
the Senate, and stale their grievances against Philip.
The business of the conference having thus been concluded
in accordance with his views and the opinions he had origin-
ally expressed, Flamininus at once set about carefully securing
his own position, and preventing Philip from taking any
undue advantage. For though he granted him three months*
suspension of hostilities, he stipulated that he should complete
his embassy to Rome within that time, and insisted on his
immediately removing his garrisons from Phocis and Locris.
He was also very careful to insist on behalf of the Roman
allies, that no act of hostility should be committed against
them during this period by the Macedonians. Having made
these terms in writing with Philip, he immediately took the
necessary steps himself to carry out his own policy. First, he
sent Amynandrus to Rome at once, knowing that he was a
man of pliable character, and would be easily persuaded by
his own friends in the city to take any course they might
propose ; and at the same lime would carry with him a certain
prestige, and rouse men's curiosity and interest by his title of
royalty. Next to him he sent as personal envoys his wife's
nephew Quintus Fabius, Quintus Fulvius, and Appius Claudius
Nero. From the Aetolians went Alexander Isius, Damocritus
XVIII PLEADINGS BEFORE THE SENATE an
of Calydon, Dicaearchus of Trichonium, Polemarchus of
Arsinoe, Lamius of Ambracia, Nicomachus of Acamania, —
one of those who had fled from Thurium and settled in
Ambracia, — and Theodgtus of Pherae, an exile from Thessaly
who settled in Stratus : from the Achaeans Xenophon of
Aegium : from King Attalus only Alexander : and from the
Athenian people Cephisodorus and his colleagues.
11. Now these envoys arrived in Rome before the Senate
had settled the provinces of the Consuls ap- xhg speeches of
pointed for this year, and whether it would be the Greek envoys
necessary to send both to Gaul, or one of them '^ "■* Senate,
against Philip, But the friends of Fiamininus having as-
sured themselves that both Consuls would remain in Italy
owing to the threat of an attack from the Celts, all the
ambassadors appeared and bluntly stated their grievances
against Philip. The bulk of their accusations was to the
same effect as what they had before stated to the king himself;
but they also endeavoured carefully to instil this idea in the
minds of the Senators, "That so long as Chalcis, Corinth, and
Demetrias were subject to Macedonia, it was impossible for the
Greeks to think of liberty ; for Philip himself had spoken the
exact truth when he called these places the ' fetters of Greece.'
For neither could the Peloponnese breathe while a royal gar-
rison was stationed in Comith, nor the Locrians, Boeotians,
and Phocians feel any confidence while Philip was In occupa-
tion of Chalcis and the rest of Euboea ; nor indeed could the
Thessalians or Magnesians raise a spark of liberty^ while
Philip and the Macedonians held Demetrias. That, therefore,
Philip's offer to evacuate the other places was a mere pretence
in order to escape the immediate danger; and that on the
very first day he chose he would with ease reduce the Greeks
again under his power, if he were in possession of these places."
They accordingly urged the Senate "either to force Philip to
evacuate the cities they had named, or to stand by the policy
they had begun, and vigorously prosecute the war against
him. For in truth the most difficult part of the war was
already accomplished, the Macedonians having already been
) represent, Is doubtful
212 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS book
twice defeated, and most of their resources on land already
expended"
They concluded by beseeching the Senate " not to beguile
the Greeks of their hopes of liberty, nor deprive themselves
of the most glorious renown." Such, or nearly so, were the
arguments advanced by the Greek envoys. Philip's envoys
were prepared to make a long speech in reply : but they were
stopped at the threshold. P or being asked whether they were
prepared to evacuate Chalcis, Corinth, and Demetrias, they
declared that they had not any instructions as to those towns.
They were accordingly rebuked by the Senate and obliged to
discontinue their speech.
12. The Senate then, as I have said before, assigned Gaul
B.C. 197 Coss. *o \>o\S\ the consuls as their province, and
G. Cornelius ordered that the war against Philip should go
Caihagiw, Q. q^^ assigning to Titus Flamininus the entire
uus. ^qj^jj.qJ Qf Greek aflfairs. These decrees
having been quickly made known in Greece, Flamininus
found everything settled to his mind, partly no doubt by the
assistance of chance, but for the most part by his own fore-
sight in the management of the whole business. For he
was exceedingly acute, if ever Roman was. The skill and
good sense with which he conducted public business and
private negotiations could not be surpassed, and yet he was
quite a young man, not yet more than thirty, and the first
Roman who had crossed to Greece with an araiy. ...
18. It has often and in many cases occurred to me to
Was Aristaenus wonder at the mistakes men make ; but none
a traitor or a wise seems to me SO surprising as that of traitors.
Opportunist? j ^jgj^^ therefore, to say a word in season on
the subject I know very well that it is one which does not
admit of easy treatment or definition. For it is not at all
easy to say whom we ought to regard as a real traitor. Plainly
all those, who at a time of tranquillity make compacts with
kings or princes, cannot be reckoned such off hand ; nor, again,
those who in the midst of dangers transfer their country from
existing friendships and alliances to others. Far from it.
For such men have again and again been the authors of mani-
fold advantages to their own countries. But not to go any
XTiii W/SE PATRIOTS OR TRAITORS t 213
further foi example, my meaning can be made clear by the
circumstances of the present case. For, if Aristaenus had not
at this time opportunely caused the Achaeans to leave their
alliance with Philip and join that of Rome, it is clear that the
whole league would have been utterly ruined. But as it was,
this man and this policy were confessedly the sources, not only
of security to individual Achaeans at the time, but of the
aggrandisement of the whole league. Therefore he was not
looked upon as a traitor, but universally honoured as a bene-
factor and saviour of the country. The same principle will
hold good in the case of all others who regulate their policy
and measures by the necessities of the hour.
14. From this point of view fault might be found
with Demosthenes, admirable as he is in . ,
, . ■ ,, J - J' Compansoa of
many respects, for havmg rashly and mdis- the pdicy of ihe
criminately launched an exceedingly bitter Achaeans and
charge at the most illustrious Greeks. For he °'^" Peiopon-
asserted that in Arcadia, Cercidas, Hieronymus, phiiipv.wiihthat
and Eucampidas were traitors to Greece for recommended
making an alliance with Philip ; in Messene ''i' P^pjjj^
the sons of Philiades, Neon and Thraylochus ; '^
in Argos, Mystis, Teledamus, one Mnaseas ; in Thessaly,
Daochus and Cineas ; in Boeotia, Theogeiton and Timolas :
and many more besides he has included in the same category,
naming them city by city ; and yet all these men have a
weighty and obvious plea to urge in defence of their conduct,
and above all those of Arcadia and Messene.^ For it was by
their bringing Philip into the Peloponnese,' and humbling the
Lacedaemonians, that these men in the first place enabled atl
its inhabitants to breathe again, and conceive the idea of
liberty ; and in the next place, by recovering the territory and
cities which the Lacedaemonians in the hour of prosperity had
taken from the Messenians, Megalopolitans, Tegeans, and
Argives, notoriously raised the fortunes of their own coun-
tries.' In return for this they were bound not to make war
' Demosthenes, de Corona. g§ 43, 48. 395.
* B.C. 338 aRerUio baltte of Chaeranea. See Thirlvrall, 6, 77 1 Grote, 11,
3IS (ch. 9c) ; Kennedy's translation o( ihe de Corona, Appendix vl, The
arsmneat of Polytdui is of course an ix foil facte one. It is open still to
214 T'^^ HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS book
on Philip and the Macedonians, but to do all they could to
promote his reputation and honour. Now, if they had been
doing all this, or if they had admitted a garrison from Philip
into their native cities, or had abolished their constitutions
and deprived their fellow-citizens of liberty and freedom of
speech, for the sake of their own private advantage or power,
they would have deserved this name of traitor. But if, while
carefully maintaining their duty to their countries, they yet
diflfered in their judgment of politics, and did not consider
that their interests were the same as those of the Athenians,
it is not, I think, fair that they should have been called traitors
on that account by Demosthenes. The man who measures
everything by the interests of his own particular state, and
imagines that all the Greeks ought to have their eyes fixed
upon Athens, on the pain of being styled traitors, seems to me
to be ill-informed and to be labouring under a strange delu-
sion, especially as the course which events in Greece took at
that time has borne witness to the wisdom, not of Demosthenes,
but of Eucampidas, Hieronymus, Cercidas, and the sons of
Philiades. For what did the Athenians eventually get by their
8 opposition to Philip? Why, the crowning dis-
aster of the defeat at Chaeronea. And had it not
been for the king's magnanimity and regard for his own repu-
tation, their misfortunes would have gone even further, thanks
to the policy of Demosthenes. WTiereas, owing to the men I
have mentioned, security and relief from attacks of the Lace-
daemonians were obtained for Arcadia and Messenia generally,
and many advantages accrued to their states separately.
1 6. It is not easy then to define to whom one may properly
Xh t It ^PP^y ^^^^ name. The nearest approach to truth
is the man who would be to assign it to those who in times of
actswith personal public danger, either for the sake of personal
objects or from security or advantage, or to retaliate upon poli-
tical opponents, put their cities into the hands
of the enemy : or indeed to those who, by admitting a foreign
garrison, and employing external assistance to carry out private
maintain that, had the advice of Demosthenes been followed, these states might
have been freed from the tyranny of Si>arta without becoming subject to
another master in the king of Macedonia.
XTiii THE FATE OF TRAITORS 215
aims and views, bring their country under the direction of a
superior power. All such men as these one might include in
the category of traitors with perfect reasonableness. Such men,
indeed, gain neither profit nor honour, but the reverse, as
every one acknowledges. And this brings me
back to my original observation, that it is difficult '^,.^„"* "^
to understand with what object, and supported
by what reasoning, men rush upon such a disastrous position.
For no one ever yet betrayed his cily or camp or fort without
being detected ; but even if a man here and there managed
to conceal it at the moment of his crime, yet all have been
detected in the course of time. Nor when known has any
such ever had a happy life ; but, as a rule, they meet with the
punishment they deserve from the very persons in whose
favour they act. For, indeed, though generals and princes
constantly employ traitors for their own purposes ; yet when
they have got all they can out of them, they
treat them thenceforth as traitors, as Demos- ,-„.„„ . „
, .1-1.1 Lonma. % 47.
thenes says ; very naturally considering that
those, who have put their country and original friends into the
hands of their enemies, are never likely to be really loyal or
to keep faith with themselves. Nay, even though they escape
violence at the hands of these, yet they do not easily avoid
the vengeance of those whom they betrayed. Or if, finally,
they manage to evade the designs of both the one and the
other, yet all over the world fame dogs their footsteps with
vengeance to their lives' end, suggesting to their imaginations
night and day numberless terrors, false and true ; helping and
hounding on all who design any evil against them; and, finally,
refusing to allow them even in sleep to forget their crimes, but
forcing them to dream of every kind of plot and disaster,
because they are aware of the universal loathing and hatred
which attend them. Yet, though all this is true, nobody who
wanted one was ever at a loss for a traitor, except in the rarest
cases. From which one might say with some plausibility that
man, reputed the most cunning of animals, gives considerable
grounds for being regarded as the stupidest For the other
animals, which obey their bodily appetites alone, can be
decdved by these alone ; while man, though he has reason
2i6 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS BOOK
to guide him, is led into error by the failure of that reason no
less than by his physical appetites. . . .
16. King Attalus had for some time past been held in
extraordinary honour by the Sicyonians, ever
^^^^^c'^i?''"' since the time that he ransomed the sacred
land of Apollo for them at the cost of a large
sum of money ; in return for which they set up the colossal
statue of him, ten cubits high, near the temple of Apollo in
the market-place. But on this occasion, on his presenting
them with ten talents and ten thousand medimni of wheat,
their devotion to him was immensely increased; and they
accordingly voted him a statue of gold, and passed a law to
offer sacrifice in his honour every year. With these honours,
then, Attalus departed to Cenchreae.^ . . .
17. The tyrant Nabis, leaving Timocrates of Pellene at
The cruelty of Argos, — because he trusted him more than any
Apcga, wife of one else and employed him in his most im-
Nabis. portant undertakings, — returned to Sparta : and
thence, after some few days, despatched his wife with instruc-
tions to go to Argos and raise money. On her arrival she far
surpassed Nabis himself in cruelty. For she summoned women
to her presence either privately or in families, and inflicted
every kind of torture and violence upon them, until she had
extorted from almost all of them, not only their gold ornaments,
but also the most valuable parts of their clothing. . . .
B.C. 197. In a speech of considerable length Attalus
beforefhc^Ssem- reminded them of the ancient valour of their
bled Boeotians, ancestors. . . .
See Livy, 33, a.
THE END OF THE FIRST MACEDONIAN WAR
18. Flamininus being unable to ascertain where the enemy
B.C. 197, at the were encamped, but yet being clearly informed
beginning of that they had entered Thessaly, gave orders
spring. ^Q ^ jjjg j^gj^ jQ ^y^ stakes to carry with them,
ready for use at any moment. This seems im-
' Attalus spent the winter of B.c. 198-197 at Aegina, in the course of which
he seems to have visited Sicyon.
xvm ROMAN AND GREEK PALISADING 117
possible to Greek habits, but to those of Rome it is easy. For
the Greeks find it difficult to hold even their 1^^ meihods of
sarissae on the march, and can scarcely bear forming palisades
the fatigue of them; but the Romans strap """'"E'''*'^'*''"
their shields to their shoulders with leathern
thongs, and, having nothing but their javelins in their hands,
can stand the additional burden of a stake. There is also
a great difference between the slakes employed by the two
peoples. The Greeks hold that the best slake is that which
has the largest and most numerous shoots growing round the
stem ; but the Roman stakes have only two or three side shoots,
or at most four ; and those are selected which have these
shoots on one side only. The result is that their porterage is
very easy (for each man carries three or four packed together),
and they make an exceedingly secure palisade when put
into use. For the Greek palisading, when set in the front of
the camp, in the first place can easily be pulled down; for
since the part that is firm and tightly fixed in the ground IS
single, while the projecting arms of it are many and large, two
or three men can get hold of the same stake by its projecting
arms, and easily pull it up ; and directly that is done, its
breadth is so great that a regular gateway is made ; and because
in such a palisade the stakes are not closely interlaced or
interwoven with each other, when one is pulled up the part
next to it is made insecure. With the Romans it is quite
different. For as soon as they fix their stakes, they interlace
them in such a manner that it is not easy to know to which of
the stems fixed in the ground the branches belong nor on
which of these branches the smaller shoots are growing.
Moreover, it is impossible to insert the hand and grasp them,
owing to the closeness of the interlacing of the branches and
the way they lie one upon another, and because the main
branches are also carefully cut so as to have sharp ends. Nor,
if one is got hold of, is it easy to pull up : because, in the first
place, all the stakes are sufficiently tightly secured in the
ground to be self-supporting; and, in the second place, because
the man who pulls away one branch must, owing to the close
interlacing, be able to move several others in its train ; and it is
quite unlikely that two or three men should happen to get hold
2i8 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS book
of the same stake. But even if, by the exertion of enormous
force, a man has succeeded in pulling one or another up, the
gap is scarcely perceptible. Considering, therefore, the vast
superiority of this method, both in the readiness with which
such stakes are found, the ease with which they are carried,
and the security and durability of the palisade made with
them, it is plain, in my opinion, that if any military operation
of the Romans deserves to be admired and imitated, it is this.
19. After providing for contingencies by these preparations,
Flamininus advanced with his whole force at a moderate pace,
and, having arrived at about fifty stades from Pherae, pitched
Flamininus ^ camp there; and next morning, just before
marches to Pherae the moming watch, sent out some reconnoitring
in Thessaiy. parties to see whether they could get any oppor-
tunity of discovering the position and movements of the
enemy. Philip, at the same time, being informed that the
Romans were encamped near Thebes, started
'^"'udeT^*''''' with his whole force from Larisa in the direc-
tion of Pherae. When about thirty stades from
that town, he pitched his camp there, and gave orders for all
his men to make their preparations early next morning, and
about the moming watch got his troops on the march. The
division whose usual duty it was to form the advance guard he
sent forward first, with instructions to cross the heights above
Pherae, while he personally superintended the main army's
advance from the camp as the day was breaking. The
advanced guards of the two armies were within a very little of
The advanced Coming into collision in the pass ; for the dark-
guards of the two ness prevented their seeing each other until they
armies meet, ^g^g quite a short distance apart Both sides
halted, and sent speedy intelligence to their respective leaders
of what had happened, and asking for instructions. . . .
[The generals decided] to remain in their intrenchments,
and recall these advanced guards. Next morning both sent
out about three hundred cavalry and light infantry to recon-
noitre, among which Flamininus also sent two squadrons of
Aetolians, because they were acquainted with the country.
These opposing reconnoitring parties fell in with each other
on the road between Pherae and Larisa, and joined battle
XVIII FLAMimNVS &■ PHILIP NBARING EACH OTHER J19
with great fuiy. The men under Eupolemus the Aetolian
fighting gallantly, and urging the Italian troops to do the
same, the Macedonians were repulsed; and, after skirmish-
ing for a long while, both parties retired to their respective
camps.
20. Dissatisfied with the country near Pherae, as being
thickly wooded and full of walls and gardens, Auiumnof
both parties broke up their camps next day. b.c 197.
Philip directed his march towards Scotusa, be- ''°^!''l'P °"*^
cause he desired to supply himself with pro- advance towards
visions from that town, and thus, with all his Scotusa, on
preparations complete, to find a district more opposite sides of
suitable to his army: while Flamininus, ^""B*"
divining his intention, got his army on the march at the
same time as Philip, in great haste to anticipate him in
securing the corn in the territory of Scotusa. A range
of hills intervening between their two lines of march, the
Romans could not see in what direction the Macedonians were
marching, nor the Macedonians the Romans. Both armies,
however, continued their march during this day, Flamininus to
Eretria in Phthiotis, and Philip to the river Onchestus ; and
there they respectively pitched their camps. Next day they
advanced again, and again encamped : Philip at Melambium
in the territory of Scotusa, and Flamininus at the temple of
Thetis in that of Pharsalus, being still ignorant of each other's
whereabouts. A violent stonn of rain and thunder coming
on next day, the whole atmosphere descended from the clouds
to the earth about the time of the morning watch, so that the
darkness was too dense to see even those who were quite
close. In spite of this, Philip was so eager to accomplish his
object, that he started with his whole army ; but finding him-
self much embarrassed on the march by the mist, after accom-
plishing a very small distance he again encamped ; but he sent
his reserve back, with instructions to halt upon the summit of
the intervening hills.'
21. Flamininus, in his camp near the temple of Thetis,
I Thai is of Cynoscephalae. Supergrnsi tttaittlos qui Cyiuattfhalat
vocaiUur, nlicia iH stationi firma ptdilum equitumqur. pemerunt cattra.
Uvjr, 33. 7-
220 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS book
Another skirmish being Uncertain as to the position of the enemy,
between detached sent out ten troops of cavalry and a thousand
parties. M^i infantry in advance, with instructions to
keep a careful look-out as they traversed the country. As
these men were approaching the ridge of the hills they came
upon the Macedonian reserve without expecting it, owing to
the dimness of the light After a short interval of mutual
alarm, both sides began irregular attacks on each other, and
both despatched messengers to their respective chiefs to give
information of what had occurred; and when the Romans
began to get the worst of it in the encounter, and to suffer
heavily at the hands of the Macedonian reserve, they sent to
their camp begging for supports. Flamininus accordingly
despatched the Aetolians under Archedamus and Eupolemus,
as well as two of his own tribunes, with a force altogether of
five hundred cavalry and two thousand infantry, after properly
exhorting them to do their duty. On their arrival to the
support of the skirmishing party already engaged, the aspect of
affairs was promptly changed. For the Romans, inspired by
the hope which this reinforcement gave, renewed the contest
with redoubled spirit ; while the Macedonians, though offering
a gallant defence, were now in their turn hard pressed, and
being forced to make a general retreat, retired to the highest
points in the hills, and despatched messengers to the king for
help.
22. But Philip, who had not expected, for reasons indi-
cated above, that a general engagement would
suppoS^^ take place on that day, happened to have sent
a considerable part of his troops out of camp
foraging. But when informed of what was taking place by
these messengers, the mist at the same time beginning to lift,
he despatched, with due exhortation, Heracleides of Gyrton,
the commander of his Thessalian cavalry ; Leon, the general
of his Macedonian horse ; and Athenagoras, with all the mer-
cenaries except those from Thrace. The reserve being joined
by these troops, and the Macedonian force having thus become
a formidable one, they advanced against the enemy, and in
their turn drove the Romans back from the heights. But what
prevented them, more than anything else, from entirely routing
XVIII SKIRAflSHES BEFORE THE MAIN BATTLE 321
the enemy was the gallantry of the Aetolian cavaliy, which
fought wilh desperate fury and reckless valour.
For the Aetolians are as superior to the rest of Aeioli*^ Lvaliy.
the Greeks in cavalry for fighting in skirmishing
order, troop to troop, or man to man, as they are inferior
to them both in the arms and tactics of their infantry for the
purpose of a general engagement The enemy being held in
check therefore by these troops, the Romans were not forced
back again quite on to the level ground, but, after retiring to a
short distance, faced round and halted. But Cynascephalae.
when Flamininus saw that not only had the FiHminmus offen
cavalry and light infantry retire ' '
owing to them, his whole force v
uneasy, he drew out his entire army a
them into order of battle close to the hills. Meanwhile one
man after another of the Macedonian reserve ran towards
Philip shouting out, " King, the enemy are flying : do not let
slip the opportunity. The barbarians cannot stand before us :
now is the day for you to strike : now is your opportunity ! "
The result was that he was induced to fight in spite of his dis-
satisfaction with the ground. For these hills, which are
called Cynoscephalae, are rough, precipitous, and of con-
siderable height ; and it was because he foresaw the disadvan-
tages of such a ground, that he was originally disinclined to
accept battle there; but, being excited now by the extrava-
gantly sanguine reports of these messengers, he gave the order
for his army to be drawn out of camp.
23. Having got his main body into order, Flamininus gave
his attention at the same time to relieving his Flaroininus
advanced guard, and to going along the ranks addresses his men,
to encourage his men. His exhortation was and advance
short, but cleat and intelligible to the hearers :
for, pointing to the enemy with his hand, he said to his sol-
diers : " Are not these the Macedonians, my men, whom, when
occupying in their own country the pass to Eordaea, you routed
in open battle, under the command of Sulpicius, and drove to
take refuge on the hills with the loss of many of their com-
rades? Are not these the Macedonians whom, when defended
by what seemed an impassable country in Epirus, you dis-
222 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS BOOK
lodged by sheer valour, and forced to throw away their shields
and fly right into Macedonia ? Why then should you feel any
hesitation when you are to fight the same men on equal
ground ? Why look anxiously to the past, rather than let that
past minister courage to you for the present ? Therefore, my
men, rouse each other by mutual exhortations, and hasten in
your might to the struggle ! For, with God's will, I am per-
suaded that this battle will quickly have the same issue as the
contests in the past'* With these words he ordered his right
wing to remain where they were, and the elephants in front of
The advanced them; while with his left, supported by the
guard are light infantry, he advanced in gallant style to
encouraged, attack the enemy. And the Roman troops
already on the field, finding themselves thus reinforced by
the legions on their rear, once more faced round and charged
their opponents.
24. Meanwhile, when he had seen the main part of his
Philip ako army in position outside the camp, Philip him-
advances and self advanced with his peltasts and the right
occupies the hills, ^jj^g ^f j^jg phalanx, commencing the ascent of
the hills with great rapidity, and having left instructions with
Nicanor, surnamed the Elephant, to see that the rest of the
army followed at once. As soon as his first files reached the
summit, he deployed his men into line by the left, and occupied
the range of high ground : for the Macedonians who had
been sent in advance had forced the Romans a considerable
distance down the other side of the hills, and therefore he
found the ridges unoccupied by the enemy. But while he
was still engaged in getting the right wing of his army into line,
his mercenaries came on the ground, having been decisively
repulsed by the enemy. For when the Roman light infantry
found themselves supported by the heavy, as I said just now,
with their assistance, which they regarded as turning the scale
in their favour, they made a furious charge on the enemy, and
killed a large number of them. When the king first came on
the ground, and saw that the fighting between
^I^^def^t^!^ ^^^ ^*g^' ^^"^^^ w^ g^i"g o*^ "^^ t^e enemy's
camp, he was delighted: but when, on the
other hand, he saw his own men giving ground and requiring
XVIII THE BATTLE OF CYNOSCEPHALAE 1*3
support, he was compelled to give it, and allow the necessities
of the moment to decide the fortunes of the whole day, in
spite of the fact that the greater part of his phalanx was still
on the march and engaged in mounting the hills. Receiving
therefore the men who had been already engaged, he massed
them all upon his right wing, both infantry and cavalry;
while he ordered the peltasts and heavy armed to double their
depth and close up to the right By the time this was effected
the enemy were close at hand ; and, accordingly, the word was
given to the phalanx to lower spears and charge ; to the l^hl
infantry to cover their flank. At the same time Flamininus
also, having received his advanced party into the intervals be-
tween his maniples, charged the enemy.
26. The charge was made with great violence and loud
shouting on both sides : for both advancing .^^^ . .
parties raised their war cry, while those who
were not actually engaged shouted encouragement to those
that were ; and the result was a scene of the wildest excite-
ment, terrible in the last degree. Philip's right pbiup's right wing
wing came off brilliantly in the encounter, for repulse the
they were charging down hill and were superior "0"™° Icf-
in weight, and their arms were far more suited for the actual
conditions of the struggle ; but as for the rest of the army, that
part of it which was in the rear of the actual tighters did not get
into contact with the enemy; while the left wing, which had
but just made the ascent, was only beginning to show on the
ridge. Seeing that his men were unable to stand the charge
of the phalanx, and that his left wing was losing ground, some
having already fallen and the rest slowly retiring, but that
hopes of saving himself still remained on the successful advance
right, Flamininus hastily transferred himself to ofthf Roman
the latter wing; and when he perceived that '"'s'"'
the enemy's force was not well together — part being in contact
with the actual fighters, part just in the act of mounting the
ridge, and part halting on it and not yet beginning to descend,* —
' I have given the meaning which I concdi'e this sentence to have ; but the
editors generally suspect the loss of a word lilte drjMrra or dTpaYOJrfm
after rk pit vvnyji roit Jia')'Ui-tfD^4^r<Ni. This is unnecessary if we regard
o-tnx^ " predicative, and I think this way of taking it gives sufficient sense.
PolyUu ii thinking of the Macedonian army as being so dislocated by the
224 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS book
keeping the elephants in front he led the maniples of his right
against the enemy. The Macedonians having no one to give
them orders, and unable to form a proper phalanx, owing to
the inequalities of the ground and to the fact that, being
engaged in trying to come up with the actual combatants, they
were still in column of march, did not even wait for the Romans
to come to close quarters : but, thrown into confusion by the
mere charge of the elephants, their ranks were disordered and
they broke into flight
26. The main body of the Roman right followed and
The Macedonian slaughtered the flying Macedonians, But one
phalanx of the tribunes, with about twenty maniples,
outflanked, having made up his mind on his own account
what ought to be done next, contributed by his action very
greatly to the general victory. He saw that the division
which was personally commanded by Philip was much farther
forward than the rest of the enemy, and was pressing hard
upon the Roman left by its superior weight ; he therefore left
the right, which was by this time clearly victorious, and direct-
ing his march towards the part of the field where a struggle
was still going on, he managed to get behind the Macedonians
and charge them on the rear. The nature of the phalanx is
such that the men cannot face round singly and defend them-
selves : this tribune, therefore, charged them and killed all he
could get at; until, being unable to defend themselves, they
were forced to throw down their shields and fly ; whereupon
the Romans in their front, who had begun to yield, faced round
again and charged them too. At first, as I have said, Philip,
judging from the success of his own division, felt certain of a
complete victory ; but when he saw his Macedonians all on a
sudden throwing away their shields, and the enemy close upon
their rear, he withdrew with a small body of foot
.^,^^i'"^^^fl•oc and horse a short distance from the field and
the field and flies. /. i , , i ,
took a general survey of the whole battle : and
when he observed that the Romans in their pursuit of his left
wing were already approaching the tops of the hills, he rallied as
many Thracians and Macedonians as he could at the moment,
nature of the ground, that, while some parts were in contact with the enemy,
the rest had not arrived on the scene of the fighting.
XViii PHILIP'S DEFEAT AND FLIGHT aas
and Red. As Flamininus w^ pursuing the fugitives he came
upon the lines of the Macedonian \^i, just as they were scaling
the ridge in their attempt to cross the hills, and at first halted
in some surprise because the enemy held their spears straight
up, as is the custom of the Macedonians when surrendering
themselves or intending to pass over to the enemy. Presently,
having had the reason of this movement explained to him, he
held his men back, thinking it best to spare the lives of those
whom fear had induced to surrender. But whilst he was still
reflecting on this matter, some of the advanced guard rushed
upon these men from some higher ground and put most of
them to the sword, whiie the few survivors threw away their
shields and escaped by fiight,
27. The battle was now at an end in every part of the
field ; the Romans everywhere victorious ; and Philip in full
retreat towards Tempe. The first night he
passed at what is called Alexander's tower ; the Tramt" "*
next day he got as far as Gonni, on the pass
into Tempe, and there remained, with a view of collecting the
survivors of the battle.
fiut the Romans, after following the fiigitives for a certain
distance, returned ; and some employed themselves in stripping
the dead; others in collectine the captives ;,„ _
, ., """f ;., .,,, i*^,, 'The Romans soon
while the majonty hurried to the plunder of the abandon pursuit
enemy's camp. But there they found that the and devote them-
Aetolians had been beforehand with them ; and "'^^ V" ""^
thinking, therefore, that they were deprived of
their fair share of the booty, they began grumbling at the
Aetolians and protesting to their general that " he imposed the
dangers upon them, but yielded the spoil to others." For the
present, however, they returned to their own camp, and passed
the night in their old quarters : but next morning they em-
ployed themselves in collecting the prisoners and the remainder
of the spoils, and then started on the march towards Larisa.
In the battle the Romans lost seven hundred
men ; the Macedonians eight thousand killed, both^de^"
and not less than five thousand taken prisoners.
Such was the result of the battle at Cynoscephalae in
Thessaly between the Romans and Philip.
VOL. II Q
226 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS BOOK
28. In my sixth book I made a promise, still unfulfilled, of
taking a fitting opportunity of drawing a comparison between
the arms of the Romans and Macedonians, and their re-
spective system of tactics, and pointing out how they differ
for better or worse from each other. I will now endeavour by
a reference to actual facts to fulfil that promise. For since in
former times the Macedonian tactics proved themselves by
experience capable of conquering those of Asia and Greece ;
while the Roman tactics sufficed to conquer the nations of
Africa and all those of Western Europe ; and since in our
own day there have been numerous opportunities of com-
paring the men as well as their tactics, — it will be, I think, a
useful and worthy task to investigate their differences, and dis-
cover why it is that the Romans conquer and carry off the
palm from their enemies in the operations of war : that we may
not put it all down to Fortune, and congratulate them on their
good luck, as the thoughtless of mankind do; but, from a
knowledge of the true causes, may give their leaders the tribute
of praise and admiration which they deserve.
Now as to the battles which the Romans fought with Hanni-
bal, and the defeats which they sustained in them, I need say no
The Roman de- niore. It was not Owing to their anus or their
feats in the Punic tactics, but to the skill and genius of Hannibal
'fr^^nfcrkT/ ^^^^ ^^^ "^^^ ^^^^ ^^°^^ defeats : and that I made
tactics, but owing quite clear in my account of the battles them-
to the genius of selves. And my contention is supported by
Hannibal. ^^^ facts. First, by the conclusion of the war :
for as soon as the Romans got a general of ability compar-
able with that of Hannibal, victory was not long in following
their banners. Secondly, Hannibal himself, being dissatisfied
with the original arms of his men, and having immediately after
his first victory furnished his troops with the arms of the
Romans, continued to employ them thenceforth to the end.^
Pyrrhus, again, availed himself not only of the arms, but also
of the troops of Italy, placing a maniple of Italians and a
company of his own phalanx alternately, in his battles against
the Romans. Yet even this did not enable him to win ; the
battles were somehow or another always indecisive.
* See 3, 87.
xviti THE MACEDONIAN PHALANX tXJ
It was necessary to speak first on these points, to anticipate
any instances which might seem to make against my theory.
1 will now return to my comparison.
29. Many considerations may easily convince us that, if
only the phalanx has its proper foimation and strength, nothing
can resist it face to face or withstand its charge. For as a mas
in close order of battle occupies a space of three feet ; and as
the length of the sarlssae is sixteen cubits according to the
original design, which has been reduced in practice to fourteen ;
and as of these fourteen four must be deducted, to allow for
the distance between the two hands holding it, and to balance
the weight in front; it follows clearly that each hopIitewiU have
ten cubits of his sarissa projecting beyond his body, when he
lowers it with both hands, as he advances against the enemy :
hence, too, though the men of the second, third, and fourth
rank will have their sarissac projecting farther beyond the front
rank than the men of the fifth, yet even these last will have two
cubits of their sarissae beyond the front rank ; if only the
phalanx is properly formed and the men close up properly both
flank and rear, like the description in Homer' —
" So buckler pre&sed on buckler ; helm on helm ;
And man on man: and waving hoise-hair plumes
In polished head-piece mingled, as Ihey swayed
In order : b such serried rank they stood."
And if my description is true and exact, it is clear that in front
of each man of the front rank there will be five sarissae projecting
to distances varying by a descending scale of two cubits.
SO. With this point in our minds, it will not be difficult to
imagine what the appearance and strength of the whole phalanx
is hkely to be, when, with lowered sarissae, it advances to the
charge sixteen deep. Of these sixteen ranks, all above the fifth
are unable to reach with their sarissae far enough to take actual
part in the lighting. They, therefore, do not lower them, but
hold them with the points inclined upwards over the shouldeis
of the ranks in front of thera, to shield the heads of the whole
phalanx ; for the sarissae are so closely serried, that they repel
missiles which have carried over the front ranks and might fall
upon the heads of those in the rear. These rear ranks, how-
' Iliad, 13, 131.
228 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS BOOK
ever, during an advance, press forward those in front by the
weight of their bodies ; and thus make the chaige very fordblei
and at the same time render it impossible for the front ranks
to face about
Such is the arrangement, general and detailed, of the
The Roman more phalanx. It remains now to compare with it
open order com- the peculiarities and distinctive features of the
^^^ai^*^^*^ Roman arms and tactics. Now, a Roman
^ *' soldier in full armour also requires a space of
three square feet But as their method of fighting admits of
individual motion for each man — because he defends his body
with a shield, which he moves about to any point from which
a blow is coming, and because he uses his sword both for
cutting and stabbing, — it is evident that each man must have
a clear space, and an interval of at least three feet both on
flank and rear, if he is to do his duty with any effect The
result of this will be that each Roman soldier will face two of
the front rank of a phalanx, so that he has to encounter and
fight against ten spears, which one man cannot find time even
to cut away, when once the two lines are engaged, nor force
his way through easily — seeing that the Roman front ranks are
not supported by the rear ranks, either by way of adding weight
to their charge, or vigour to the use of their swords. Therefore
it may readily be understood that, as I said before, it is im-
possible to confront a charge of the phalanx, so long as it
retains its proper formation and strength.
81. Why is it then that the Romans conquer ? And what is
it that brings disaster on those who employ the
"^^^ V^lj;^^"^ phalanx ? Why, just because war is full of un-
certainties both as to time and place ; whereas
there is but one time and one kind of ground in which a
phalanx can fully work. If, then, there were anything to com-
pel the enemy to accommodate himself to the time and place
of the phalanx, when about to fight a general engagement, it
would be but natural to expect that those who employed the
phalanx would always carry off the victory. But if the enemy
finds it possible, and even easy, to avoid its attack, what
becomes of its formidable character? Again, no one denies
that for its employment it is indispensable to have a country
xviil CUMBROUS NATURE OF THE PHALANX 329
flat, bare, and without such impediments as ditches, cavities,
depressions, steep banks, or beds of rivers : foi all such
ol^tacles are sufficient to hinder and dislocate this particular
formation. And that it is, I may say, impossible, or at any rate
exceedingly rare to find a piece of country of twenty stades, or
sometimes of even greater extent, without any such obstacles,
every one will also admit However, let us suppose that such
a district has been found. If Che enemy decline to coroe
down into it, but traverse the country sacking the towns and
territories of the allies, what use will the phalanx be ? For if
it remains on the ground suited to itself, it will not only fait
to benefit its friends, but wiil be incapable even of preserving
itself; for the carriage of provisions will be easily stopped by
the enemy, seeing that they are in undisputed possession of
the country : while if it quits its proper ground, from the wish
to strike a blow, it will be an easy prey to the enemy. Nay,
if a general does descend into the plain, and yet does not risk
his whole army upon one charge of the phalanx or upon
. one chance, but manoeuvres for a time to avoid coming to
close quarters tn the engagement, it is easy to learn what will
be the result from what the Romans are now actually doing.
S2. For no speculation is any longer required to test the
accuracy of what I am now saying : that can be done by re-
ferring to accomplished facts.
The Romans do not, then, attempt to extend their front to
equal that, of a phalanx, and thep charge directly upon it with
their whole force : but some of their divisions are kept in re-
serve, while others join battle with the enemy at close quarters.
Now, whether the phalanx in its charge drives its opponents
from their ground, or is itself driven back, in either case its
peculiar order is dislocated; for whether in following the
retiring, or flying from the advancing enemy, they quit the
rest of their forces : and when this takes place, the enemy's
reserves can occupy the space thus left, and the ground which
the phalanx had just before been holding, and so no longer
charge them face to face, but fall upon them on their flank
and rear. If, then, it is easy to take precautions against the
opportunities and peculiar advantages of the phalanx, but im-
possible to do so in the case of its disadvant^es, must it not
230 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS book
follow that in practice the difference between these two systems is
enormous ? Of course those generals who employ the phalanx
must march over ground of every description, must pitch
camps, occupy points of advantage, besiege, and be besieged,
and meet with unexpected appearances of the enemy : for all
these are part and parcel of war, and have an important and
sometimes decisive influence on the ultimate victory. And
in all these cases the Macedonian phalanx is difficult, and
sometimes impossible to handle, because the men cannot act
either in squads or separately. The Roman order on the
other hand is flexible : for every Roman, once
Romanonia'.^ armed and on the field, is equally well equipped
for every place, time, or appearance of the
enemy. He is, moreover, quite ready and needs to make no
change, whether he is required to fight in the main body, or
in a detachment, or in a single maniple, or even by himself.
Therefore, as the individual members of the Roman force are
so much more serviceable, their plans are also much more
often attended by success than those of others.
I thought it necessary to discuss this subject at some
length, because at the actual time of the occurrence many
Greeks supposed when the Macedonians were beaten that it
was incredible; and many will afterwards be at a loss to
account for the inferiority of the phalanx to the Roman
system of arming.
88. Philip having thus done all he could in the battle,
but having been decisively beaten, after taking
of Phmp "^^ ^P ^^ roany of the survivors as he could, pro-
ceeded through Tempe into Macedonia. On
the night previous to his start he sent one of his guard to
Larisa, with orders to destroy and burn the king's correspond-
ence. And it was an act worthy of a king to retain, even in
the midst of disaster, a recollection of a necessary duty. For
he knew well enough that, if these papers came into the pos-
session of the Romans, they would give many handles to the
enemy both against himself and his friends. It has, perhaps,
been the case with others that in prosperity they could not use
power with the moderation which becomes mortal men, while in
disaster they displayed caution and good sense ; but certainly
JCVIil PHTLIP^S CONDUCT AFTER THE BATTLE 131
this was the case with PhJUp. And this will be made manifest
by what I shall subsequently relate. For as I showed without
reserve the justice of his measures at the beginning of his
reign, and the change for the worse which they subsequently
underwent ; and showed when and why and how this took
place, with a detailed description of the actions in this part of
his career;* in the same way am I bound to set forth his
repentance, and the dexterity with which he changed with his
change of fortune, and may be said to have shown the highest
prudence in meeting this crisis in his affairs.
As for Flamininus, having after the battle taken the
necessary measures as to the captives and the rest of the
spoils, he proceeded to Larisa, . . ,
34. Flamininus was much annoyed at the selfishness dis-
played by the Aetolians in regard to the spoils ;
and had no idea of leaving them to be masters ^'^^„^"^ *^
of Greece after he had deprived Philip of his
supremacy there. He was irritated also by their braggadocio,
when he saw that they claimed all the credit of the victory,
and were filling Greece with the report of their valour.
Wherefore, wherever he met them he behaved with hauteur,
and never said a word on public business, but carried out all
his measures independently or by the agency of his own
friends. While the relations between these two were in this
strained state, some few days after the battle Flamininus grants
Demosthenes, Cycliadas, and Limnaeus came fifteen days' imce
on a mission from Philip ; and, after consider- '" Philip,
able discussion with them, Flamininus granted an immediate
armistice of fifteen days, and agreed to have a personal inter-
view also with Philip in the course of them to discuss the state of
affairs. And this interview being conducted in a courteous and
friendly manner, the suspicions entertained of Flamininus by tbe
Aetolians blazed forth with double fury. For as corruption, and
thehabitofnever doing anything without a bribe, had long been
a common feature in Greek politics, and as this was the acknow-
ledged characteristic of the Aetolians, they could not believe
that Flamininus could so change in his relations with Philip
vrithout a bribe They did not know the habits and principles
' See 4, 77 ; 7. la ; 10, a6.
232 * THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS BOOK
of the Romans on this subject ; but judging from themselves
they concluded that there was every probability of Philip in
his present position offering a large sum of money, and of
Flamininus being unable to resist the temptation.
85. If I had been speaking of an earlier period, and expres-
The disinterested-Sing what was generally true, I should have had
ness of the Ro- no hesitation in asserting of the Romans as a
mans generaUy nation that they would not be likely to do such
as o money. ^ thing, — I mean in the period before they en-
gaged in wars beyond the sea, and while they retained their
own habits and principles uncontaminated.^ But in the pre-
sent times I should not venture to say this of them all ; still,
as individuals, I should be bold to say of the majority of the
men of Rome that they are capable of preserving their honesty
in this particular : and as evidence that I am making no im-
possible assertion, I would quote two names which will command
general assent, — I mean first, Lucius Aemilius
^"^ Pauiur*""^ ^^^ conquered Perseus, and won the kingdom of
Macedonia. In that kingdom, besides all the
other splendour and wealth, there was found in the treasury
more than six thousand talents of gold and silver : yet he was
so far from coveting any of this, that he even refused to see it,
and administered it by the hands of others ; though he was far
from being superfluously wealthy himself, but, on the contrary,
was very badly off. At least, I know that on his death, which
occurred shortly after the war, when his own sons Publius
Scipio and Quintus Maximus wished to pay his wife her dowry,
amounting to twenty-five talents, they were reduced to such
straits that they would have been quite unable to do so if they
had not sold the household furniture and slaves, and some of
the landed property besides. And if what I say shall appear
incredible to any one, he may easily convince himself on the
subject : for though there are many controversies at Rome,
and especially on this particular point, arising from the an-
Publius Cornelius, tagonistic parties among them, yet he will find
Scipio Africanus that what I have just said about Aemilius is
Minor. acknowledged by every one. Again, Publius
Scipio, son by blood of this Aemilius, and son by adoption
1 See 6. 56 ; 32, 11.
XVIII COMPARATIVE INCORRUPTIBILITY OF ROMANS 333
of Fublius called tlie Great, when he got possession of Car-
thage, reckoned the wealthiest city in the world, took abso-
lutely nothing from it for his own private use, either by pur-
chase or by any other manner of acquisition whatever, although
he was by no means a very rich man, but very moderately so
for a Roman. But he not only abstained from the wealth of
Carthage itself, but refused to allow anything from Airica at
all to be mixed up with his private property. Therefore, in
regard to this man once more, any one who chooses to inquire
will find that his reputation in this particular is absolutely
undisputed at Rome. I shall, however, take a more suitable
opportunity of treating this subject at greater length.
86. Titus then having appointed Philip a day for the con-
gress, immediately wrote to the allies announc- Tbe codbtcu of
ing when they were to appear ; and a few days Tcmpe, b.c 197.
afterwards came himself to the pass of Tempe at the appointed
time. When the allies had assembled, and the congress met,
the Roman imperator rose and bade each say on what terms
they ought to make peace with Philip. King Amynandros
then delivered a short and moderate speech,
merely asking that " they would all have some ^A^^nd!^
consideration for him, to prevent Philip, as soon
as the Romans left Greece, from turning the whole weight of his
anger upon him ; for the Athamanes were always an easy prey
to the Macedonians, because of their weakness and the close
contiguity of their territory." When he had finished, Alexan-
der the Aetolian rose and complimented Flami-
ninus for " having assembled the allies in that '^'^^'*'*
congress to discuss the terms of peace ; and,
above all, for having on the present occasion called on each
to express his opinion. But he was deluded and mistaken,"
he added, " if he believed that by making terms with Philip
he would secure the Romans peace or the Greeks freedom. For
neither of these was possible. But if he desired to accom-
plish both the design of his own government and his own
promises, which he had given to all the Greeks, there was one
way, and one only, of making terms with Macedonia, and that
was to eject Philip from his throne; and this could easily be
done if he did not let slip the present opportunity."
234 T'^-E HTSTOJilES OF POLYBIUS book
After some further ai^mcnls in support of this view he sat
down.
87. tlamintnus here took up the ai^ument, and said that
"Alexander was mistaken not onlyas to the pohcy
FianUn^nus. '^'^ Rome, but also 3s to the object which he pro-
posed to himself, and above all as to the true
interests of Greece. For it was not the Roman way to utterly
destroy those with whom they had been at open war.- A proof of
his assertion might be found in the war with Hannibal and the
Carthaginians ; for though the Romans had received the sever-
est provocation at their hands, and afterwards had it in their
power to do absolutely what they pleased to them, yet they
had adopted no extreme measures against the Carthaginians.
For his part, moreover, he had never entertained the idea that
it was necessary to wage an inexpiable war with Philip ; but on
the contrary had been prepared before the battle to come to
terms with him, if he would have submitted to the Roman
demands. He was surprised, therefore, that those who had
taken part in the former peace conference should now adopt a
tone of such irreconcilable hostility. Have we not conquered ?
(say they). Yes, but this is the niDst senseless of arguments. For
brave men, when actually at war, should be terrible and full of
fire ; when beaten, undaunted and courageous ; when victori-
ous, on the other hand, moderate, placable, and humane. But
your present advice is the reverse of all this. Yet, in truth, to
the Greeks themselves it is greatly to their interest that Mace-
donia should be humbled, but not at all so that she should
be destroyed. For it might chance thereby that they would
experience the barbarity of Thracians and Gauls, as has been
the case more than once already." He then added that " the
final decision of himself and Roman colleagues was, that, if
Philip would consent to fulfil all the conditions formerly en-
joined by the allies, they would grant him peace, subject, of
course, to the 'approval of the Senate : and that the Aetolians
were free to take what measures they chose for themselves"
Upon Phaeneas attempting to reply that " Everything done
hitherto went for nothing ; for if Philip managed to ex-
tricate himself from his present difficulties, he would at once
find some other occasion for hostilities," — Flamininus sprang
xviii DEBATE IN THE CONGRESS AT TBMPE 235
at once from his seat, and said, wilh some heat, " Cease this
trifling, Phaeneas ! For I will so settle the terms of the peace
that Phihp will be unable, even if he wished it, to molest the
Greeks."
38. After this they separated for that day. On the next the
king arrived : and on the third, when all the on the third day
delegates were met for discussion, Philip en- of the conference
tered, and with great skill and tact diverted ^'"P "PPe=^
the anger which they all entertained against him. For he
said that " He conceded the demands made on the former
occasion by the Romans and the allies, and remitted the de-
cision on the remaining points to the Senate." But Phaeneas,
one of the Aetolians present, said : " Why then, Philip, do
not you restore to us Larisa Cremaste, Pharsalus, Fhtfaiotid
Thebes, and Echinus ? " Whereupon Philip bade them take
them over. But Flamininus here interposed, The Aetolians
and forbade the Aetolians to take over any of checkmated by
the towns except Phthiotid Thebes ; " for upon fTanuninui.
his approaching this town with his army, and summoning it to
submit to the Roman protection, the Thebans had refused ;
and, as it had now come into his hands in the course of war,
he had the right of taking any measures he chose regarding it."
Phaeneas and his colleagues indignantly protested at this, and
asserted that it was their clear right to recover the towns pre-
viously members of their league, " first on the ground that
they had taken part in the recent war ; and secondly in virtue
of their original treaty of alliance, according to which the mov-
able property of the conquered belonged to the Romans, the
towns to the Aetolians." To which Flamininus answered that
" they were mistaken in both points ; for their treaty with
Rome had been annulled when they abandoned the Romans,
and made terms with Philip : and, even supposing that treaty
to be still in force, they had no right to recover or take over
such cities as had voluntarily put themselves under the protec-
tion of Kome, as the whole of the cities in Thessaly had done,
but only such as were taken by force,'
* Livy (33, 13) has mistaken the ineitning of Polybius in this passage, re-
pnsenling the quarrel of the Aetolians and Flaminiaus as being for the
poMCSsion of Thebes,— the only town, in (acl, on which there was no dispnt-
236 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS BOOK
39. The other members of the congress were delighted
iho tornis of t!»e ^' ^^^ spccch of Flamininus. But the Aetoli-
pcacc settled, ans listened with indignation ; and what proved
Winter of ^q \^ ^^ beginning of serious evils was
'^^' engendered. For this quarrel was the spark
from which, not long afterwards, both the war with the Aetol-
ians and that with Antiochus flamed out The principal
motive of Flamininus in being thus forward in' coming to
terms was the information he had received that Antiochus
had started from Syria with an army, with the intention of
crossing over into Europe. Therefore he was anxious lest
Philip, catching at this chance, should determine to defend
the towns and protract the war ; and lest meanwhile he should
himself be superseded by another commander from home, on
whom the honour of all that he had achieved would be
diverted. Therefore the terms which the king asked were
granted : namely, that he should have four months* suspension
of hostilities, paying Flamininus at once the two hundred
talents ; delivering his son Demetrius and some others of his
friends as hostages; and sending to Rome to submit the
decision on the whole pacification to the Senate. Flamininus
and Philip then separated, after interchanging mutual pledges
of fidelity, on the understanding that, if thfe treaty were not
confirmed, Flamininus was to restore to Philip the two hundred
talents and the hostages. All the parties then sent ambas-
sadors to Rome, some to support and others to oppose the
settlement. . . .
40. Why is it that, though deceived again and again by the
same things and persons, we are unable to aban- Foolish credulity,
don our blind folly ? For this particular kind see ch. 13 ; and
of fraud has often been committed before now, 3i» «!•
and by many. That other men should allow themselves to
be taken in is perhaps not astonishing ; but it is wonderful
that those should do so who are the authors and origin of the
same kind of malpractice. But I suppose the cause is the
absence of that rule so happily expressed by Epicharmus :
*' Cool head and wise mistrust are wisdom's sinews." . . .
KING ATTALUS I
41. [They endeavoured] to prevent Antiochus from sail-
ing along their coast, not from enmity to him, but from a
suspicion that by giving support to Philip he would become
an obstacle in the way of Greek liberty. , , .
King Antiochus was very desirous of possessing Ephesus,
owing to its extremely convenient position ; for it appeared to
occupy the position of an Acropolis for expeditions by land
and sea against Ionia and the cities of the Hellespont, and to
be always a most convenient base of operations for the kings
of Asia against Europe. . . .
Of King Attalus, who now died, I think I ought to
speak a suitable word, as I have done in the ueaih of King
case of others. Originally he had no other Atuiiu, who had
externa] qualification for royalty except money _'^^™ '" "'
, L- 1 ■ J J T L J. J -.t i Tliebes, before
alone, which, mdeed, if handled with good ^^ baitie of Cy-
sense and boldness, is of very great assistance noscephaiae. nnd
in every undertaking, but without these qualities ^^ *>■*" brought
. . . ... - -1 J . r . home 10 die u
IS m Its nature the origin of evil, and, m fact, Pergamum,
of utter ruin to very many. For tn the firstautumn, s.a 177.
place it engenders envy and malicious plots, '-"T' 33. ai.
and contributes lately to the destruction of body and soul.
For few indeed are the souls that are able by the aid of
wealth to repel dangers of this description. This king's great-
ness of mind therefore deserves our admiration, because he
never attempted to use his wealth for anything else but the
acquisition of royal power, — an object than which none greater
can be mentioned. Moreover he made the first step in this
design, not only by doing services to his friends and gaining
their affection, but also by achievements in war. For it was
afrer conquering the Gauls, the most formidable and warlike
nation at that time in Asia, that he assumed this rank and
first puts himself forward as king And though he obtained
this honour, and lived seventy-two years, of which he reigned
forty-four, he passed a life of the utmost virtue and goodness
towards his wife and children ; kept faith with all allies and
friends ; and died in the midst of a most glorious campaign,
fighting for the liberty of the Greeks i and what is more
238 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS book
remarkable than all, though he left four grown-up sons, he so well
settled the question of succession, that the crown was handed
down to his children's children without a single dispute. . . .
ITALY
42. After Marcus Marcellus had entered upon the consul-
ship the ambassadors from Philip, and from
L^^F^Ilis^?- Flamininus and the allies, arrived at Rome to
pureo, M. Claudius discuss the treaty with Philip ; and after a
MarceUus. The lengthened hearing the confirmation of the
^Tcon^™'^ terms was decreed in the Senate. But on the
matter being brought before the people, Marcus
Claudius, who was ambitious of being himself sent to Greece,
spoke against the treaty, and did his best to get it rejected.
The people however ratified the terms, in accordance with the
wish of Flamininus ; and, upon this being settled, the Senate
immediately despatched a commission of ten men of high
rank to arrange the settlement of Greece in conjunction with
Flamininus, and to confirm the freedom of the Greeks.
Among others Damoxenus of Aegium and his colleagues,
envoys from the Achaean league, made a proposal in the
Senate for an alliance with Rome; but as some opposition
was raised to this at the time, on account of a counter-claim of
the Eleians upon Triphylia, and of the Messenians, who were
at the time actually in alliance with Rome, upon Asine and
Pylus, and of the Aetolians upon Heraea, — the decision was
referred to the commission of ten. Such were the proceedings
in the Senate. ...
GREECE '
48. After the battle of Cynoscephalae, as Flamininus was
Philip allows his wintering at Elateia, the Boeotians, being anxious
Boeotian followers' to recover their citizens who had served in
to return home, philip^s army, sent an embassy to Flamininus
to try and secure their safety. Wishing to encourage the loyalty
of the Boeotians to himself, because he was already anxious
as to the action of Antiochus, he readily assented to their
petition. These men were promptly restored from Macedonia,
and one of them named Brachylles the Boeotians at once
elected Boeotarch ; and in a similar spirit honoured and pro-
xv»i MURDER OF BRACHYLLES 839
moted, as much as before, such of the others as were thought
to be well disposed to the rpyal house of Macedonia. They
also sent an embassy to Philip to thank him for the return
of the young men, thus derogating from the favour done them
by Flamininus, — a measure highly disquieting' zeuxippus and
to Zeuxippus and Peisistratus, and all who were Peisisiraius, heads
regarded as partisans of Rome; because they of the Romanising
foresaw what would happen to themselves and lo^'gei'^nd of
their families, knowing quite well that if the Brachyiies,
Romans quitted Greece, and Philip remained ^^' ''*■
closely supporting the political party opposed to themselves, it
would be unsafe for them to remain citizens of Boeotia. They
therefore agreed among themselves to send an embassy to
Flamininus in Elateia : and having obtained an interview
with him, they made a lengthy and elaborate statement on
this subject, describing the state of popular feeling which nas
now adverse to themselves, and discanting on the untrusl-
worthiness of democratic assemblies. And finally, they
ventured to say that " Unless they could overawe the common
people by getting rid of Brachyiies, there could be no security
for the party in favour of Rome as soon as the legions departed,"
After listening to these arguments Flamininus replied that
" He would not personally take any part in such a measure,
but he would not hinder those who wished to do so." Finally,
he bade them speak to Alexamenus the Strategus of the
Aetolians. Zeuxippus and his colleagues accepted the suggest-
ion, and communicated with Alexamenus, who at once con-
sented; and agreeing to carry out their proposal sent three
Aetolians and three Italians, all young men, to assassinate
Brachyiies. ... ,
There is no more terrible witness, or '"ore.demi^^y^
formidable accuser, than the conscience which own conscience,
resides in each man's breast. ... See LLvy, 33, aS.
44. About this same time the ten commissioners arrived
from Rome who were to effect the settlement
of Greece, bringing with them the decree of consuitum'
the Senate on the peace with Philip. The
main points of the decree were these : " All other Greeks,
whether in Asia or Europe, to be free and enjoy their own
240 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS BOOK
laws ; but that Philip should hand over to the Romans those
at present under his authority, and all towns in which he had
a garrison, before the Isthmian games ; and restore Euromus,
Pedasa, Bargylia, lasus, Abydos, Thasus, Marinus, and Perin-
thus to freedom, and remove his garrisons from them. That
Flamininus should write to Prusias commanding him to
liberate Cius, in accordance with the decree of the Senate.
That Philip should restore to the Romans within the same
period all captives and deserters; and likewise all decked
ships, except three and his one sixteen-banked vessel; and
should pay a thousand talents, half at once, and half by
instalments spread over ten years."
45. Upon this decree being published in Greece, it created
a feeling of confidence and gratification in all
^'^^^^oi^i^ ^ ^ ^^ communities except the Aetolians, These
last were annoyed at not getting all they ex-
pected, and attempted to run down the decree by saying that
it was mere words, without anything practical in it ; and they
based upon the clauses of the decree itself some such argu-
ments as follow, by way of disquieting those who would listen
to them. They said " That there were two distinct clauses in
the decree relating to the cities garrisoned by Philip: one
ordering him to remove those garrisons and to hand over the
cities to the Romans; the other bidding him withdraw his
garrisons and set the cities free. Those that were to be set
free were definitely named, and they were towns in Asia ; and
it was plain, therefore, that those which were to be handed
over to the Romans were those in Europe, namely, Oreus,
Eretria, Chalcis, Demetrias, and Corinth. Hence it was
plain that the Romans were receiving the * fetters of Greece '
from the hand;5 of Philip, and that the Greeks were getting,
not freedom, but a change of masters."
These arguments of the Aetolians were repeated ad
nauseatn. But, meanwhile, Flamininus left Elateia with the
ten commissioners, and having crossed to Anticyra, sailed
straight to Corinth, and there sat in council with the com-
missioners, and considered the whole settlement to be made.
The commis- "^"^ ^^ ^^ adverse comments of the Aetolians
sioners sit at obtained wide currency, and were accepted by
xvm THE FREEDOM OF GREECE 241
some, Flamininus was forced to enter upon Corinth, and de-
many elaborate arcuments in the meetings of ciare ail Greek
. ' ° . . . . " cities free, except
the commission, trymg to convince the com-theAcrocoriaihus.
missioners that if they wished to acquire un- Demeinas, and
alloyed praise from the Greeks, and to establish Chalds,
firmly in the minds of all that they had originally come into
the country not to gain any advantage for Rome, but simply
to secure the freedom of Greece, they must abandon every
district and free all the cities now garrisoned by Philip. But
this was just the point in dispute among the commissioners ;
for, as lo all other cities, a decision had been definitely arrived
at in Rome, and the ten commissioners had express instruc-
tions; but about Chalcis, Corinth, and Demetrias they had
been allowed a discretion on account of Antiochus, in order
that they might take such measures as they thought best from
a view of actual events. For it was notorious that this king
had for some time past been meditating an interference in
Europe. However, as far as Corinth was concerned, Flamini-
nus prevailed on the commissioners to free it at once and
restore it to the Achaean league, from respect to the terms of
the original agreement; but he retained the Acrocorinthus,
Demetrias, and Chalcis.
46. When these decisions had been come to, the time for
the celebration of the Isthmian games arrived, xbe isthmian
The expectation of what would happen there eames, July b.c.
drew the men of highest rank from nearly every '9*-
quarter of the world ; and there was a great deal of talk on the
subject from one end of the assembled multitude to the
other, and expressed in varied language. Some said that
from certain of the places and towns it was impossible that
the Romans could withdraw ; while others asserted that they
would withdraw from those considered most important, but
would retain others that were less prominent, though capable
of being quite as serviceable. And such persons even took
upon themselves in their ingenuity to designate the precise
places which would be thus treated. While people were still
in this state of uncertainty, all the world being assembled on
the stadium to watch the games, the herald came forward,
and having proclaimed silence by the sound of a trumpet.
242 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS book
delivered the following proclamation : '* The senate of Rome
ProciamaUon of ^^^ Titus Quintus, procoHsul and imperator,
the freedom of having conquered King Philip and the Mace-
the Greek cities, donians in war, declare the following peoples
free, without garrison, or tribute, in full enjoyment of the laws
of their respective countries : namely, Corinthians, Phociansy
Locrians, Euboeans, Achaeans of Phiotis, Magnesians, Thes-
salians, Perrhaebians."
Now as the first words of the proclamation were the signal
for a tremendous outburst of clappintr, some of
An exciting scene. , , ,, , . ,, ,
the people could not hear it at all, and some
wanted to hear it again ; but the majority feeling incredulous,
and thinking that they heard the words in a kind of dream, so
utterly unexpected was it, another impulse induced every one
to shout to the herald and trumpeter to come into the middle
of the stadium and repeat the words : I suppose because the
people wished not only to hear but to see the speaker, in their
inability to credit the announcement. But when the herald,
having advanced into the middle of the crowd, once more, by
his trumpeter, hushed the clamour, and repeated exactly the
same proclamation as before, there was such an outbreak of clap-
ping as is difficult to convey to the imagination of my readers
at this time. When at length the clapping ceased, no one paid
any attention whatever to the athletes, but all were talking to
themselves or each other, and seemed like people bereft of
their senses. Nay, after the games were over, in the extrava-
gance of their joy, they nearly killed Flamininus by the ex-
hibition of their gratitude. Some wanted to look him in
the face and call him their preserver; others were eager
to touch his hand ; most threw garlands and fillets upon him ;
until between them they nearly crushed him to death. But
though this expression of popular gratitude was thought to
have been extravagant, one might say with confidence that it fell
short of the importance of the actual event. For that the Romans
and their leader Flamininus should have deliberately incurred
unlimited expense and danger, for the sole purpose of freeing
Greece, deserved their admiration ; and it was also a great thing
that their power was equal to their intention. But the greatest
thing of all is that Fortune foiled their attempt by none of her
xvm PROCLAMATION AT THE ISTHMIAN GAMES 243
usgal caprices, but that every single thing came to a success-
Tul issue at the same time ; so that all Greeks, Asiatic and
European alike, were by a single proclamation become "free,
without garrison or tribute, and enjoying their own laws."
47. The Isthmian festival having come to an end, the
first persons with whom the commissioners Answer of com-
dealt were the ambassadors from Antiochus. misslonersto
They instructed them that "Their master must '^'"8 Awiochai.
abstain from attacking those cities in Asia which were autono-
mous, and go to war with none of them ; and must evacuate
those that had been subject to Ptolemy or Philip. In addi-
tion to this they forbade him to cross over into Europe with
an army ; for no Greek henceforth was to be attacked in war
or to be enslaved to any one. Finally, they said that some of
their own number would go to visit Antiochus." With this
answer Hegesianax and Lysias returned to Antiochus. They
next summoned the representatives of all the
nations and cities, and declared to them the ^'"^i^J^**"
decisions of the commissioners. The Mace-
donian tribe of the Orestae, on the ground of their having
joined Rome during the war, they declared autonomous ; the
Penhaebians, Dotopes, and Magnesians they declared to be free.
To the Thessalians, in addition to their freedom, they assigned
the Phiotid Achaeans, with the exception, however, of Phthiotid
Thebes and Pharsalus : for the Aetolians made such a point
of their claim to Pharsalus, as also to Leucas, on the ground
of the rights secured them by the original treaty, that the
commissioners referred the consideration of their demand in
regard to these places back again to the Senate, but allowed
them to retain Phocis and Locris as members of their league
as they had been before. Corinth, Triphylia, and Heraea
they handed over to the Achaeans. Oreus and Eretria the
majority wished to give to King Eumenes, but on the instance
of Flamininus this design was not confirmed ; and, accordingly,
a short time afterwards these towns, with Caiystus, were de-
clared free by the Senate. To Pleuratus they assigned Lychnis
and Parthus in Illyria, towns which had been subject to
Philip; and Amynandros they allowed to retain all such strong-
holds as he had taken firom Philip during the war.
244 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS book
48. This business completed, the commissioners separated
in various directions: Publius Lentulus sailed
sioners^semrate to Bargylia and announced its freedom; Leucius
and go to various Stertinius did the same to Hephaestia, Thasus,
parts of Greece, and the cities in Thrace ; while Publius Ven-
Twogoto tilius and Lucius Terentius started to visit
Antiochusand Antiochus ; and Gnaeus Cornelius with his
o ers o 11. ^Qjjgagues went to king Philip. They met him
near Tempe, and after speaking with him on the other
matters about which they had instructions, they advised him to
send an embassy to Rome, to ask for an alliance, in order to
obviate all suspicion of being on the watch for an oppot^
tunity in expectation of the arrival of Antiochus. The king
Gnaeus Cornelius ^g^^^^^S ^^ follow this advice, Comelius left
at the congress of him and went to the league congress at Thermus;
the Aetoiian ^nd Coming into the public assembly urged the
eague. Aetolians in a lengthy speech to abide by the
policy they had adopted, from the first, and maintain their good
disposition towards the Romans. Many rose to answer : of
whom some expressed dissatisfaction with the Romans in
moderate and decorous language, for not having used their good
fortune with sufficient regard to their joint interests, and for
not observing the original compact; while others delivered
violent invectives, asserting that the Romans would never have
set foot on Greece or conquered Philip if it had not been for
them. Cornelius disdained to answer these speeches in detail,
but he advised them to send ambassadors to Rome, for they
would get full justice in the Senate : which they accordingly
did Such was the conclusion of the war with Philip. . . .
ASIA
49. A\Tienever they are reduced to the last extremity, as the
phrase goes, they will fly to the Romans for protection and
commit themselves and their city to them.^ . . .
* Referring apparently to the conduct of the Hellenic cities in Asia in pre-
sence of Antiochus, who, having wintered in Ephesus (B.C. 197-196), was
endeavouring in 196 by force or stratagem to consolidate his power in Asia
Minor. Livy, 33, 38.
xviii ROMAN ENVOYS TO ANTIOCHVS 845
60. Just when the designs of Antiochus in Thrace were suc-
ceeding to his heart's desire, Lucius Cornelius Amiochus in the
and his party sailed into Selybria, These were Chereonesus and
the envoys sent by the Senate to conclude a ''"'™™' s-c- 196-
peace between Antiochus and Ptolemy. And at the same
time there arrived Puhlius Lentulus from Bargylia, Lucius
Terentius and Publius Villius from Thasus, three of the ten
commissioners for Greece, Their arrival having been promptly
announced to Antiochus, they all assembled within the next
few days at Lysimacheia ; and it so happened that Hegesianax
and Lysias, who had been on the mission to Flamininus,
arrived about the same time. The private intercourse between
the king and the Romans was informal and friendly ; but when
presently they met in conference to discuss public affairs,
things took quite another aspect. Lucius Cor-
nelius demanded that Antiochus should ^P^^^^""
evacuate all the cities subject to Ptolemy which
he had taken in Asia ; while he warned him in solemn and
emphatic language that he must do so also to the cities subject
to Philip, " for it was ridiculous that Antiochus should come in
and take the prizes of the war which Rotne had waged with
Philip," He also admonished him to abstain from attacking
autonomous cities, and added that " He was at a loss to con-
jecture with what view Antiochus had crossed over to Europe
with such a powerful army and fleet ; for if it were not with
the intention of attacking the Romans, there was no ex-
planation left that any reasonable person could accept"
With these words the Romans ceased speaking.
61. The king began his reply by saying that " He did not
understand by what right the Romans raised a
controversy with him in regard to the cities in Anii^hus"
Asia, They were the last people in the world
who had any claim to do so." Next he chimed that " They
should refrain entirely from interfering in the affairs of Asia,
seeing that he never in the least degree interposed in those of
Italy. He had crossed into Europe with his army to recover
his possessions in the Chersonese and the cities in Thrace ;
his right to the government of these places being superior to
that of any one in the world. For this was originally the
V
246 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS book
principality of Lysimachus ; and as Seleucus waged war with
Lysimachus ^^^ conquered that prince, the whole domain
conquered by of Lysimachus passed to Seleucus:^ then
s^«^ Ni<»nor, o^ng to the multifarious interests which dis-
tracted the attention of his predecessors, fir$t
Ptolemy and then Philip had managed to wrest this country
from them and secure it for themselves. He had not then
availed himself of Philip's difficulties to take it, but had re-
cai'ered possession of it in the exercise of his undoubted rights.
It was no injury to the Romans that he should now be
restoring to their homes, and settling again in their city, the
people of Lysimacheia who had been expelled by an unexpected
raid of the Thracians. He was doing this, not from any in-
tention of attacking the Romans, but to prepare a place of
residence for his son Seleucus. As for the autonomous cities
of Asia, they must acquire their freedom by his free grace, not
by an injunction from Rome.. As for Ptolemy, he was about
to settle matters amicably with him : for it was his intention
to confirm their friendship by a matrimonial alliance."
52. But upon Lucius expressing an opinion that they ought
Antiochus refuses ^^ ^^ i" ^^^ representatives of Lampsacus and
to acknowledge Smyrna and give them a hearing, this was done.
the Romans as 'pj^g envoys from Lampsacus were Parmenio
and Pythodorus, and from Smyrna Coeranus.
These men expressing themselves with much openness, Philip
was irritated at the idea of defending himself against accusers
before a tribunal of Romans, and interrupting Parmenio, said :
" A truce to your long speeches : I do not choose to have my
controversies with you decided before a Roman but before a
Rhodian court." Thereupon they broke up the conference
very far from pleased with each other. . . .
EGYPT
58. Many people have a yearning for bold and glorious
Death of Scopas. Undertakings, but few dare actually attempt them.
See supra, Yet Scopas had much fairer opportunities for a
> Justin. 17, 1-2 ; Appian Syr. 62. The battle was in the plain of Corns
in Phiygia,
iviii FALL OF SCOPAS 247
hazardous and bold career than Cleomenes. i3< " ; '^i '8,
For the latter, though circumvented by his "'^ '' "
enemies, and reduced to depend upon such forces as his
servants and friends could supply, yet left no chance untried,
and tested every one to the best of his ability, valuing an
honourable death more highly than a life of disgrace. But
Scopas, with all the advantages of a formidable body of
soldiers and of the excellent opportunity afforded by the youth
of the king, by bis own delays and halting counsels allowed
himself to be circumvented. For having ascertained that he
was holding a meeting of his partisans at his own house, and
was consulting with them, Aristomenes sent some of the royal
bodyguards and summoned him to the king's council.
\Vhereupon Scopas was so infatuated that he was neither bold
enough to cany out his designs, nor able to make up his mind
to obey the king's summons, — which is in itself the most
extreme step, — until Aristomenes, understanding the blunder
he had made, caused soldiers and elephants to surround his
house, and sent Ptolemy son of Eumenes in with some young
men, with orders to bring him quietly if he would come, but, if
not, by force. When Ptolemy entered the house and in-
formed Scopas that the king summoned him, he refused at
first to obey, but remained looking fixedly at Ptolemy, and for
a long while preserved a threatening attitude as though he
wondered at his audacity; and when Ptolemy came boldly
up to him and took hold of his cblamys, he called on the by-
standers to help him. But seeing that the number of young
men who had accompanied Ptolemy into the house was large,
and being informed by some one of the military array surround-
ing it outside, be yielded to circumstances, and went, accom-
panied by his friends, in obedience to the summons.
54. On his entering the council chamber the kingwas the first
to state the accusation against him, which he did
briefly. He was followed by Polycrates lately ^°^^°^ ^
arrived from Cyprus ; and he again by Aristo-
menes. The charges made by them all were much to the
same effect as what I have just stated ; but there was now
added to them the seditious meeting with his friends, and his
refusal to obey the summons of the king. On these charges
248 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS book
he was unanimously condemned, not only by the members of
the council, but also by the envoys of foreign nations who
were present. And when Aristomenes was about to commence
his accusation he brought in a large number of other Greeks
of rank also to support him, as well as the Aetolian am-
bassadors who had come to negotiate a peace, among whom
was Dorimachus son of Nicostratus. When these speeches
had been delivered, Scopas endeavoured to put forward certain
pleas in his defence : but gaining no attention from any one,
owing to the senseless nature of his proceedings, he was taken
along with his friends to prison. There after nightfall Aristo-
menes caused Scopas and his family to be put to death by poison;
but did not allow Dicacarchus to die until he had had him
racked and scourged, thus inflicting on him a punishment which
he thoroughly descr\'ed in the name of all Greece. For this was
the Dicaearchus whom Philip, when he resolved
i)kncarciius "pon his trcachcrous attack on the Cyclades
and the cities of the Hellespont, appointed
leader of the whole fleet and the entire enterprise : who being
thus sent out to perform an act of flagrant wickedness, not
only thought that he was doing nothing wrong, but in the
extravagance of his infatuation imagined that he would strike
terror into the gods as well as man. For wherever he
anchored he used to build two altars, to Impiety and Lawless-
ness, and, ofl"ering sacrifice upon these altars, worshipped them
as his gods. Therefore in my opinion he met with a just
retribution both from gods and men : for as his hfe had been
spent in defiance to the laws of nature, his end was properly
also one of unnatural horror. All the other Aetolians who
wished to depart were allowed by the king to go in possession
of their property.
56. As in the lifetime of Scopas his love of money had
Enormous wealth been notorious, for his avarice did in fact surpass
coiiccieci by that of any man in the world, so after his death
Scopas. ^j^g i^ made still more conspicuous by the
enormous amount of gold and other property found in his
house; for by the assistance of the coarse manners and
drunken habits of Charimortus he had absolutely pillaged the
kingdom.
xviii AyACLBTERIA OF PTOLEMY EP/PffANES 249
Having thus settled the AetoUan business to their likings
the courtiers turned their attention to the cere- The anacieieria
mony of instituting the king into the manage- of PtolEin)'
ment of his office, called the Anadeteria. His EpiphaMs.
age was not indeed yet so far advanced as to ' '' ' ' ■ '*"
make this necessary ; but they thought that the kingdom
would gain a certain degree of lirmness and a fresh impulse
towards prosperity, if it were known that the king had assumed
the independent direction of the government They then made
the preparations for the ceremony with great splendour, and
carried it out in a manner worthy of the greatness of the
kingdom, Polycrates being considered to have contributed very
largely to the accomplishment of their efforts. For this man
had enjoyed even during his youth, in the reign of the late
king, a reputation second to no one in the court for fidelity
and practical ability; and this reputation he bad maintained
during the present reign also. For having been entrusted with
the management of Cyprus and its revenues, when its affairs
were in a critical and complicate stale, he not only preserved
the island for the young king, but collected a very considerable
sum of money, with which hehad just arrived and had paid to the
king, after handing over the government of Cyprus to Ptolemy
of Megalopolis. But though he obtained great applause by
this, and a large fortune immediately afterwards, yet, as he
grew older, he drifted into extravagant debauchery and
scandalous Indulgence. Nor was the reputation of Ptolemy,
son of Agesarchus very different in the later part of his life.
But in regard to these men, when we come to the proper time,
I shall not shrink from stating the circumstances which dis-
graced their official life. . . .
BOOK XIX
The only fragment we possess of the nineteenth book of Polyixus is a
statement quoted by Plutarch as to M. Porcius Cato, to the eflfect that by
his orders the walls of all the numerous Spanish cities north of the Baetis
were dismantled on the same day. Cato was in Spain B.C. 195. The
means taken by him to secure this simultaneous destruction of fortifications
are told by Frontinus, Strategy I, I, I.
We thus lose the history of the years B.C. 195, 194, 193 ; as well as
the greater part of that of B.C. 192, 191, contained in the early part of
book 20, of which only a few fragments remain. Livy, however, has
evidently translated from Polybius in his history of these years, and a
brief al^tract of events in Greece may help the reader in following the
fragmentary book which follows with more interest.
B.C. 195.
Lucius Valerius Flaccus, 1 ^
M. Porcius Cato, /
Flamininus's imperium is extended for this year, because of the danger
from Antiochus and Nabis. The Aetolians, still discontented, push their
demand for Pharsalus and Leucas, and are referred by the Senate back to
Flamininus. The latter summons a conference of Greek states at Corinth,
and a war is decreed against Nabis, the Aetolians still expressing their dis-
like of Roman interference. The levies are collected ; Argos is freed
from Nabis ; Sparta all but taken ; and Nabis forced to submit to most
humiliating terms : the Aetolians again objecting to his being allowed to
remain at Sparta on any terms at all. In this year also legates from
Antiochus visit Flamininus, but are referred to the Senate.
B.C. 194.
Publius Cornelius Scipio II., \p
Tiberius Sempronius Longus, j
Flamininus leaves Greece after a speech at Corinth to the assembled
league advising internal peace and loyalty to Rome, and enters Rome in
triumph. There is a time of comparative tranquillity in Greece.
B.C. 193.
L. Cornelius Mcrula,
Q. Minucius Thermus,
The legates from Antiochus are sent back with the final answer that,
unless the king abstains from entering Europe in arms, the Romans will
' l-Coss.
us, j
BOOK SIX ABSTRACT OF EVENTS 251
fiee ihe Asiatic Greek cities fiam him. Roman legates, P. Sulpicius, P.
Villius, P. Aelius, are sent to him. Hannibal arrives at the court of
Antiochas, and nrges him to resist ; and the Aetolians urge the same
course, trying also to stir up Nabis and Philip of Macedon. Antiochus
accordingly will give the Roman envoys no satisfactory answer.
B.C. 192.
L. Quintius Flamininus, \coss.
Cn. Domitiua Aheoobarbus, J
The Romans therefore prepare for war. A fleet under the praetor
Atilius is sent against Nabis : commissioneis are sent into Greece — T.
Quintius Flamininius, C. Octavius, Cn. Servilins, P. Villins — early in
the year : M . Baebius is ordered to hold his army in readiness at Brun-
disium. Then news is brought to Rome by Altalus of Pergamum
(brother of king Eumeoes] thai Antiochus has crossed the Hellespont,
and the Aetolians on the point of joioing him. Therefore Uaebitu ii
ordered to transport bis army to Apollonia.
Meanwhile Nabis lakes advantage of the alarm caused by Anliocbas
to move. He besieges Gylhium, and ravages the Achaean territory.
The league, under Philopoemen, proclaim war against him, and, after
losing an unimportant naval battle, decisively defeat him on land and ihal
him up in Sparta.
The Aelolians now formally vole to call in Antiochus, " to liberale
Greece and arbitrate between them and Rome." They occupy Demetrias ;
and kill Nabis by a stratagem. Whereupon Philopoemen annexes Sparta
to the Achaean league. Later in the year Antiochus meets the assembly
of the Aetolians at Lamia in Thessoly, is proclaimed " Stiategus"; and
after a vain attempt to conciliate (he Acbaeans seizes Chalcis, where he
winters, and marries a young wife.
B.C. 191.
The Romans declare war with Antiochus. Manius Acilius is selected
10 go to Greece, where he takes over the army of Baebius, and aAei taking
many towns in Thessaly meets and defeats Antiochas at Thermopylae ;
where the Aetolian league did after all little service lo the king, who
retires to Ephesus.
See Livy, 34, 43 36, 21. See also Plulaicli, I'Ulafoemeii, and
Flamimma; Applan, Syriacae, 6 — 31.
BOOK XX
GREECE
1. The Aetolians chose thirty of the Apocleti^ to confer
Antiochus the with King Antiochus. . . .
Great at a meet- He accordingly summoned a meeting of the
ing of Aetolians Apocleti and consulted them on the state of
ai j-«aiTiiai -^ .
autumn of affairs. . . .
B.C. 192. Livy,
. 35. 43-46.
2. When Antiochus sent an embassy to the Boeotians,
they answered that they would not consider his proposals
until the king came in person. . . .
8. As Antiochus was staying at Chalcis, just as the winter
was beginning, two ambassadors came to visit
"^"thrwrmeT^r ^i'"' Charops from Epirus, and Callistiatus
B.C. 192191 at from Elis. The prayer of the Epirotes was
Chalcis. Visit of that " The king would not involve them in the
Ep^^and^Elis. ^^^ ^^^^ ^^"^^' ^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^^ ^" ^^^ ^ide of
" Greece immediately opposite Italy ; but that, if
he could, he would secure their safety by defending the frontier
of Epirus : in that case he should be admitted into all their
towns and harbours : but if he decided not to do so at present,
they asked his indulgence if they shrank from a war with Rome."
The Eleans, in their turn, begged him " To send a reinforce-
ment to their town ; for as the Achaeans had voted war against
them, they were in terror of an attack from the troops of the
league." The king answered the Epirotes by saying that he
would send envoys to confer with them on their mutual*
' The AfX)clcti, of the numbers of whom we have no information, acted as
a consultative senate to prepare measures for the Aetolian Assembly. See
Freeman, History of Federal Government » p. 335. Livy, 35, 34.
BOOK XX DEGENERACY OF THE BOEOTIANS 253
interests ; but to Elis he despatched a thousand foot soldiers
under the command of Euphanes of Crete. . . .
4. The Boeotians had long been in a very depressed slate,
which offered a strong contrast to the former
prosperity and reputation of their country. Bii™tia^°
They had acquired great glory as well as great
material prosperity at the time of the battle of LeucCra ; but
by some means or another from that time fo'-fro^Bc *
ward they steadily diminished both the one
and the other under the leadership of Amaeocritus ; and sub-
sequently not only diminished them, but underwent a complete
change of character, and did all that was possible to wipe out
their previous reputation. For having been incited by the
Achaeans to go to war with the Aetolians, they adopted the
policy of the former and made an alliance with them, and
thenceforth maintained a steady war with the ^x.. 345.
Aetolians. But on the Aetolians invading See Plutarch.
Boeotia, they marched out with their full '*'""• '^
available force, and without waiting for the arrival of the
Achaeans, who had mustered their men and were on the
point of marching to their assistance, they attacked the
Aetolians ; and being worsted in the battle were so completely
demoralised, that, from the time of that campaign, they never
plucked up spirit to claim any position of honour whatever,
and never shared in any enterprise or contest undertaken by
the common consent of the Greeks. They devoted them-
selves entirely to eating and drinking, and thus became effemi-
nate in their souls as well as in their bodies,
6. Such were, briefiy, the steps in the degeneracy of
Boeotia. Immediately after the battle Just mentioned they
abandoned the Achaeans and joined the Aetolians.^ But on
the latter presently going to war with Philip's
father Demetrius, they once more abandoned
the Aetolians; and upon Demetrius entering ""
Boeotia with an army, without attempting resistance they
submitted completely to the Macedonians. But as a spark of
' tpailTtifiar AlnjiXat rh (9rin, cp, a, 43. Some have Ihoughl thai a
regular pc^lka] union with the Aetolian League is meant. But the spirit of
the aarnthe teerot to point rather to an alliance.
254 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS book
their ancestral glory still survived, there were found some
who disliked the existing settlement and the complete
subservience to Macedonia : and they accordingly main-
tained a violent opposition to the policy of Ascondas and
Neon, the ancestors of Brachylles, who were the
hoi^"of Neon! "^^^' prominent in the party which favoured
Macedonia. However, the party of Ascondas
eventually prevailed, owing to the following circumstance. Anti-
gonus (Doson), who, after the death of Demetrius, was PhUip's
guardian, happened to be sailing on some business along the
coast of Boeotia ; when off Larymna he was surprised by a
sudden ebb of the tide, and his ships were left high and dry.
Now just at that time a rumour had been spread that Anti-
gonus meant to make a raid upon the country ; and therefore
Neon, who was Hipparch at the time, was patrolling the
country at the head of all the Boeotian cavalry to protect it,
and came upon Antigonus in this helpless and embarrassed posi-
tion : and having it thus in his power to inflict a serious blow
upon the Macedonians, much to their surprise he resolved to
spare them. His conduct in so doing was approved by the other
Boeotians, but was not at all pleasing to the Thebans. An-
tigonus, however, when the tide flowed again and his ships
floated, proceeded to complete the voyage to Asia on which
he was bound, with deep gratitude to Neon for having
abstained from attacking him in his awkward position.
Bc 222 Accordingly, when at a subsequent period
he conquered the Spartan Cleomenes and
became master of Lacedaemon, he left Brachylles in
charge of the town, by way of paying him for the kindness
done him by his father Neon. This proved to be the begin-
ning of a great rise in importance of the family of Brachylles,
But this was not all that Antigonus did for him : from that
time forward either he personally, or king Philip, continually
supported him with money and influence ; so that before long
this family entirely overpowered the political party opposed to
them in Thebes, and forced all the citizens, with very few ex-
ceptions, to join the party of Macedonia. Such was the origin
of the political adherence to Macedonia of the family of Neon,
and of its rise to prosperity.
XX CONTINUED DECLINE OF BOEOTIA 355
6. But Boeotia as a nation had come to such a low pitch,
that for nearly twenty-five years the administra-
tion of justice liad been suspended in private jiai^i^oeoiia.
and public suits alike. Their magistrates were
engaged in despatching bodies of men to guard the country
or in proclaiming national expeditions, and thus continually
postponed their attendance at courts of law. Some of the
Strat^ also dispensed allowances to the needy from the public
treasuiy ; whereby the common people learnt to support and
invest with office those who would help them to escape the
penalties of their crimes and undischarged liabilities, and to
be enriched from time to time with some portion of the public
property obtained by official favour. No one contributed to
this lamentable state of things more than Ophelias, who was
always inventing some plan calculated to benefit the masses for
the moment, while perfectly certain to ruin them in the future.
To these evils was added another unfortunate fashion. It
became the practice for those who died childless not to leave
their property to the members of their family, as had been
the custom of the country formerly, but to assign it for the
maintenance of feasts and convivial entertainments to be shared
in by the testator's friends in common ; and even many who
did possess children left the larger part of their property to the
members of their own club. The result was that there were
many Boeotians who had more feasts to attend in the month
than there were days in it. The people of Megara therefore,
disliking this habit, and remembering their old connexion with
the Achaean league, were inclined once more to renew their
political alliance with it. For the Megarians had been
members of the Achaean league since the time AntLgonus
of Antigonus Gonatas ; but upon Cleomenes Gonaias. 0*.
blockading the Isthmus, finding themselves cut '-^ "3*
off from the Achaeans they joined the Boeotians, with the
consent of the former. But a little before the
time of which we are now speaking, becoming ^^^^I'i^^
dissatisfied with the Boeotian constitution, they
again joined the Achaeans. Tlie Boeotians, incensed at what
they considered acts of contempt, sallied out in fuU force to
attack Megata ; and on the Megarians declining to listen to
as6 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS book
them, they determined in tlieir anger to besiege and assault
their city. £ut being attacked by a panic, on a report spread-
ing that Philopoemen was at hand at the head of a force of
Achacaiis, they left their scaling ladders against the walls
and fled back precipitately to their own country,
7. Such being the state of Boeotian politics, it was only by
extraordinary good fortune that they evaded destruction in the
dangerous periods of the wars of Philip and Antiochus. But
in the succeeding period they did not escape in the same way.
Fortune, on the contrary, seemed determined to make them
pay for their former good luck by a specialty severe retribution,
as I shall relate hereafter. . . .
Many of the Boeotians defended their alienation from
Aniiochus re- ''■^ Romans by alleging the assassination of
ceived in Thebes, Brachylles,^ and the expedition made by Flamini-
B.C. 19a. j,us upon Coronea owing to the murders of
Romans on the roads.^ But the real reason was their moral
degeneracy, brought about by the causes I have mentioned.
For as soon as the king approached, the Boeotian magistrates
went out to meet him, and after holding a friendly conversa-
tion with him conducted him into Thebes. . . .
8. Antiochus the Great came to Chalcis in Euboea, and there
Aniiochus completed his marriage, when he was fifty years
wintering in old, and had already undertaken his two most
Chalcis, B.C. important labours, the liberation of Greece — as
"'"''''■ he called it — and the war with Rome. How-
ever, having fallen in love with a young lady of Chalcis, he was
bent on marrying her, though the war was still going on ; for
he was much addicted to wine and delighted in excesses. The
lady was a daughter of Cleoptolemus, a man of rank, and was pos-
sessed of extraordinary beauty. He remained in Chalcis all the
winter occupied in marriage festivities, utterly regardless of the
pressing business of the time. He gave the giri the name of
Euboea, and after his defeat' fled with his bride to Ephesus. . , .
' Drachytlcs, whrn a Boeoiarch in B.C. 196, Has assassinaled by a band of
sin nitn. of whom three wore Italians and three Aetohans, on his way home
from a banquet. Livy. 33, 28. ' Livy, 33, 29.
' Al Thermopylae, in which Ualtlc Uvy (36, 19) stales on the outbority
of Polj'bius that only 500 men out of 10,000 brought by Antiochus into Greece
XK SUBSflSSION OF THE AETOUAN OFFICERS 3S7
9, When the Romans took Heracleia, Phaeneas the
Aetolian Strategus, in view of the danger
threatening Aetolia, and seeing what would ^ ^^ uto,
happen to the other towns, determined to send by Adiiui after
an embassy to Manius Acilius to demand a ''^^ ^im^ of
truce and treaty of peace. With this purpose ^^^g^*™'
he despatched Archidamus, Pantaleon and
Chalesus, who on meeting the Roman consul were intending
to enter upon a long argument, but were interrupted in the
middle of their speech and prevented from finishing it. For
Acilius remarked that " For the present he had
no leisure to attend to them, being much engaged "AetoiUni.
with the distribution of the spoils of Heracleia :
he would, however, grant a ten days' truce and send Lucius
Valerius Flaccus with them, with instructions as to what he
was to say." The truce being thus made, and Valerius having
come to Hypaia, a lengthened discussion took place on the
state of aflairs. The Aetolians sought to estabhsh their case
by referring to their previous services to Rome. But Valerius
cut this line of argument short by saying that " Such justifica-
tion did not apply to the present circumstances; for as these
old friendly relations had been broken ofT by them, and the
existing hostility was owing entirely to the Aetolians themselves,
the services of the past could be of no assistance to them in
the present. They must therefore abandon a!! idea of justifica-
tion, and adopt a tone of supplication, and beseech the consul's
pardon for their transgressions." After a long discussion on
various details, the Aetolians eventually decided to leave the
whole matter to Acilius, and commit themselves without reserve
to the good lajth of the Romans. They had no comprehension
of what this really involved ; but they were misled by the
word " faith " into supposing that the Romans would thereby
be more inclined to grant them terms. But with the Romans
for a man " to commit himself to their good faith " is held to
be equivalent to " surrendering unconditionally."
10. Having come to this resolution, Phaeneas despatched
legates with Valerius to announce the decision
of the AetolUns to Acilius. On being admitted '^"'^XZ!^''
to the presence of the Consul, these legates, after
2S8 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS BOOK
once more entering upon a plea of self-justification, ended by
announcing that the Aetolians had decided to commit them-
selves to the good faith of the Romans. Hereupon Acillus
interrupted them by saying, ** Is this really the case, men of
Aetolia ? " And upon their answering in the affirmative, he
o . said : " Well then, the first condition is that
Koman terms. . • j^ • i ,i n .. i
none of you, mdividually or collectively, must
cross to Asia ; the second is that you must surrender Mene-
stratus the Epirote" (who happened at that time to be at
Naupactus, where he had come to the assistance of the
Aetolians), "and also King Amynander, with such of the
Athamanians as accompanied him in his desertion to your side."
Here Phaeneas interrupted him by saying : " But it is neither
just nor consonant with Greek customs, O Consul, to do what
you order/' To which Acilius replied, — not so much because
he was angry, as because he wished to show him the dangerous
position in which he stood, and to thoroughly frighten him, —
" Do you still presume to talk to me about Greek customs,
and about honour and duty, after having committed your-
selves to my good faith? Why, I might if I chose put
you all in chains and commit you to prison ! *' With these
words he ordered his men to bring a chain and an iron
collar and put it on the neck of each of them. Thereupon
Phaeneas and his companions stood in speechless amaze-
ment, as though bereft of all power of thought or motion, at
this unexpected turn of affairs. But Valerius and some
others who were present besought Acilius not to inflict any
severity upon the Aetolians then before him, as they were in
the position of ambassadors. And on his yielding to these
representations, Phaeneas broke silence by saying that " He and
the Apocleti were ready to obey the injunctions, but they must
consult the general assembly if they were to be confirmed."
Upon Acilius agreeing to this, he demanded a truce often days
to be granted. This also having been conceded, they departed
with these terms, and on arrival at Hypata told the Apocleti
what had been done and the speeches that had been made.
This report was the first thing which made their error, and the
compulsion under which they were placed, clear to the Aetolians.
It was therefore decided to write round to the various cities
XK THE AETOLIANS DO NOT CONFIRM THE TERMS 2S9
and call the Aetolians together, to consult on the injunctions
imposed upon them. When the news of the The Aetoiiana toil
reception Phaeneas had met with was noised lo ratify ibe
abroad, the Aetolian people were so infuriated peace,
that no one would even attend the meeting to discuss the matter
at all. It was thus Impossible to hold the discussion, lliey
were further encouraged by the arrival of Nicandcr, who just
at that time sailed into Phalara, on the Malian gulf, from
Asia, bringing news of the warm reception given him by
Antiochus, and the promises for the future which the king had
made \ they therefore became quite indifferent as to the non-
completion of the peac& Thus when the days of the truce had
elapsed the Aetolians found themselves still at war with Rome.
1 1, But I ought not to omit to describe the subsequent career
and fate of Nlcander. He arrived back at Phalara
on the twelfth day after leaving Ephesus, and ^i^'^^^'^
found the Romans still engaged in Heracleia, and
the Macedonians having already evacuated Lamia, but encamped
at no great distance from the town : he thereupon conveyed
his money unexpectedly into Lamia, and attempted himself to
make his way between the two camps into Hypata. But,
falling into the hands of the Macedonian pickets, he was
taken to Philip, while his evening party was still at the midst
of their entertainment, greatly alarmed lest he should meet
with rough treatment from having incurred Philip's resent-
ment, or should be handed over to the Romans. But when
the matter was reported to the king, he at once gave orders
that the proper officers should offer Nicander refreshments, and
show him every politeness and attention. After a time he got
up from table and went personally to visit him; and after
enlarging at great length on "the folly of the Aetolians, for
having first brought the Romans into Greece, and afterwards
Antiochus," he still, even at this hour, urged that " they should
forget their past, adhere to their loyalty to himself, and not
show a disposition to take advantage of each other's difficulties."
He bade Nicander convey this message to the leaders of the
Aetolians, and exhorting him personally to remember the favours
which he had received at his hands, he despatched him with
a sufGdent escort, which he ordered to see him safe into Hypi
26o THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS BOOK
This result was far beyond Nicander's hopes or expectations.
He was restored in due course to his friends, and from the
moment of this adventure remained devoted to the royal
family of Macedonia. Thus, in the subsequent period of the
war with Perseus, the obligations which this favour had imposed
upon him caused him to offer such an unwilling and luke-
warm opposition to the designs of Perseus, that he exposed
himself to suspicion and denunciation, and at last was sum-
moned to Rome and died there. . . .
12. The Spartans could not find one of their own citizens
^, willing to address Philopoemen on this subject
wish to oflfer '^ o ^^^ who for the most part undertake work for
Philopoemen the what they can get by it there are plenty of people
palace of Nabis, ^.q q^^^j. g^^j^ rewards, and to regard them as the
as a ren-ard. and ^- ,. ' i-j .. r- ■« i .
as an inducement means of founding and consolidating fnendship :
to defend their but in the case of Philipoemen no one could be
^^^^y.J*^"^^"^*^' found willing to convey this offer to him at all.
Finally, being completely at a loss, they elected
Timolaus to do it, as being his ancestral guest-friend and very
intimate with him. Timolaus twice journeyed to Megalopolis
for this express purpose, without daring to say a word to
Philopoemen about it But having goaded himself to making
a third attempt, he at length plucked up courage to mention
the proposed gifts. Much to his surprise Philopoemen
received the suggestion with courtesy ; and Timolaus was
overjoyed by the belief that he had attained his object.
Philopoemen, however, remarked that he would come to
Si)arta himself in the course of the next few days; for he
wished to offer all the magistrates his thanks for this favour.
He accordingly came, and, being invited to attend the Senate, he
said : " He had long been aware of the kindness with which the
Lacedaemonians regarded him ; but was more convinced than
ever by the compliments and extraordinary mark of honour
they now offered him. But while gratefully accepting their
intention, he disliked the particular manner of its exhibition.
They should not bestow such honour and rewards on their
friends, the poison of which would indelibly infect the receiver,
but rather upon their enemies ; that the former might retain
their freedom of si)eech and the confidence of the Achaeans
SI PHlLOPOEAfEN's DISINTERESTEDNESS a6i
when proposing to offer assistance to Sparta ; while the latter,
by swallowing the bait, might be compelled either to support
their cause, or at any rate to keep silence and do them no
harm. ..."
T/u remaining events of the war against Antiochus in this
year are related by Livy, 36, 41-45. Acilius was engaged /or
two months in the siege of Naupactus : white the Roman jUet
under Gaius Livius defeated that of Aniioehus, under his admiral
Polyxenidas, off Phocaea.
To see an operation with one's own eyes is not like merely
hearing a description of it. It is, indeed, quite another thing ;
and the confidence which such vivid experience gives is always
greatly advantageous. . . .
t
BOOK XXI
1. At this time also it happened that the embassy, which the
Lacedaemonians had sent to Rome, returned
Embassy from disappointed. The subject of their mission
Sparta, and the was the hostages and the villages. As to the
i^ma^^nate ^^^^^8^^ ^^^ Senate answered that they would give
instructions to envoys sent by themselves ; and
as to the hostages they desired to consider further. But as to
the exiles of past times, they said that they wondered why they
were not recalled, now that Sparta had been freed from her
tyrants. . . .
2. At the same period the Senate dealt with the ambassadors
from Philip. They had come to set forth the loyalty and zeal
of the king, which he had shown to the Romans in the war
against Antiochus. On hearing what the envoys had to say,
the Senate released the king's son Demetrius from his position
as hostage at once, and promised that they would also remit
part of the yearly indemnity, if he kept faith with Rome in
future. The Senate likewise released the Lacedaemonian
hostages, except Armenas, son of Nabis; who subsequently
fell ill and died. . . .
'^ 3. Directly the news of the victory at sea reached Rome,
Suppiicatio ^^^ Senate first decreed a public suppUcatio for
for the victory nine days, — which means a public and universal
off" Phocaea. holiday, accompanied by the sacrifice of thank-
offerings to the gods for the happy success, — and next gave
audience to the envoys from Aetolia and Manius Acilius.
Answer to the When both parties had pleaded their cause
Aetoiian Envoys at some length, the Senate decreed to offer the
intercession of AetoUans the alternative of committing their
FUimininus, when cause Unconditionally to the arbitration of the
BOOK XXI THE SCfPIOS fN GKEECE 263
Senate, or of paying a thousand talents down and Acilius was about
making an offensive and defensive alliance with '°.t*'« NaupKtus.
Rome. But on the Aetolians desiring the "^'Ijl^*'^^'
Senate to state definitely on what points they
were to submit to such arbitration, the Senate refused to
define them. Accordingly the war with the Aetolians went
oa . . ,
^ 4. While Amphissa was still being besieged by Manius
Acilius, the Athenians, hearing at that timegpnngofB.c. 100.
both of the distress of the Amphissians and ofcoss. L. Coroeiius
the arrival of Publius Scipio, despatched Eche-^'P'°' '^- Laei'os.
demus and others on an embassy to him, with instructions to
pay their respects to both Lucius and Publius „ „
' ; . , *^ , , . , ?■ Cornelius
ijcipio, and at the same time to try what could scipio Africanus
be done to get peace for the Aetolians, On in Greece as lega-
their arrival Publius welcomed them gladly and ,'"* ."' *"* ''™'J'=y
, , - , . . Luciua, (March.)
treated them with great courtesy ; because he
saw that they would be of assistance to him in carrying out
his plans. For he was very desirous of effecting a settlement
in Aetolia on good tenns ; but had resolved that, if the Aetoli-
ans refused to comply, he would at all hazards relinquish that
business for the present, and cross to Asia : for he was well
aware that the ultimate object of the war and of the entire
expedition was not to reduce the Aetolian nation to obedience,
but to conquer Antiochus and take possession of Asia,
Therefore, directly the Athenians mentioned the pacification,
he accepted their suggestion with eagerness, and bade them
sound the Aetolians also. Accordingly, Echedemus and his
colleagues, having sent a preliminary deputation to Hypata,
presently followed in person, and entered into a discussion
with the Aetolian magistrates on the subject of
a pacification. They, too, readily acquiesced ^^f^^e^^^.
in the suggestion, and certain envoys were ap- '
pointed to meet the Romans. They found Publius and the army
encamped sixty stades from Amphissa, and there discoursed
at great length on their previous services to Rome. Publius
Scipio adopted in reply a still milder and more conciliatory
style, quoting his own conduct in Iberia and Libya, and
explaining how he had treated all who in those countries had
264 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS BOOK
confided to his honour : and finally expressing an opinion that
they had better put themselves in his hands. At first, all who
were present felt very sanguine that the pacification was about
to be accomplished. But when, in answer to the Aetolian
demand to know on what terms they were to make the peace,
Lucius Scipio explained that they had two alternatives — to
submit their entire case unconditionally to the arbitrament of
Rome, or to pay a thousand talents down and to make an
offensive and defensive alliance with her — the Aetolians
present were thrown into the state of the most painful per-
plexity at the inconsistency of this announcement with the
previous talk : but finally they said that they would consult
the Aetolians on the terms imposed.
5. On the return of the Aetolian envoys for the purpose of
consulting their countrymen, Echedemus and his colleagues
joined the council of the apocleti in their deliberations on
this subject. One of the alternatives was impossible owing to
the amount of money demanded, and the other was rendered
alarming in their eyes by the deception they had experienced
See%k 20 ch 10 ^^^°''^j when, after submitting to the surrender,
they had narrowly escaped being thrown into
chains. Being then much perplexed and quite unable to
decide, they sent the same envoys back to beg the Scipios that
they would either abate part of the money, so as to be within
their power to pay, or except from the surrender the persons
of citizens, men and women. But upon their arrival in the
Roman camp and delivering their message, Lucius Scipio merely
replied that " The only terms on which he was commissioned
by the Senate to treat were those which he had recently
stated." They therefore returned once more, and were followed
by Echedemus and his colleagues to Hypata, who advised the
Aetolians that "Since there was at present a hitch in the
negotiations *for peace, they should ask for a truce ; and,
having thus at least delayed the evils threatening them, should
send an embassy to the Senate. If they obtained their
request, all would be well ; but, if they did not, they must trust
to the chapter of accidents : for their position could not be
worse than it was now, but for many reasons might not im-
possibly be better." The advice of Echedemus was thought
XXI TRUCE WITH THE AETOLIANS 265
sound, and the Aetolians accordingly voted to send envoys
to obtain a truce ; who, upon reaching Lucius ^ six monihi'
Scipio, begged that for the present a truce trace with the
of six months might be granted them, that Aeiolian*.
they might send an embassy to the Senate. Publius Scipio,
who had for some time past been anxious to begin the
campaign in Asia, quickly persuaded his brother to grant
their request. The agreement therefore was reduced to
writing, and thereupon Manius Acilius handed over his army
to Lucius Scipio, and returned with his military tribunes to
Rome. . . .
ASIA
6. Factions became rife at Phocaea,^ partly because they
suffered from the Romans left with the ships a party at Pho-
being quartered on them, and partly because caea wish to join
they were annoyed at the tribute imposed on Antiochus,
them. ... ''"'
Then the Phocaean magistrates, alarmed at the state of
popular excitement caused by the dearth of com, and the
agitation kept up by the partisans of Antiochus, sent envoys
to Seleucus,^ who was on Iheir frontiers, ordering him not to
approach the town, as they were resolved to remain neutral
and await the final decision of the quarrel, and then obey
orders. Of these ambassadors the partisans of Seleucus and
his faction were Aristarchus, Cassander, and Rhodon ; those,
on the contrary, who inclined to Rome were Hegias and Gelias.
On their arrival Seleucus at once showed every attention to
Aristarchus and his partisans, but treated Hegias and Gelias
with complete neglect. But when he was informed of the
state of popular feeling, and the shortness of provisions in
Phocaea, he threw aside all negotiation or discussion with the
envoys, and marched towards the town. . . .
Two Galli, with sacred images and figures The Roman fleet
on their breasts, advanced from the town, and be- "^J^o/l'hf "
sought them not to adopt any extreme measures caiii or priests
against the city,* ... of Cybele.
L'T. 37. 9-
' Lh7.37.9.
266 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS book
7. The fire-carrier used by Pausistratus, the navarch of
the Rhodians, was a scoop or baskets On
firing apparatus. ^^^^^^ ^^^^ ^^ ^^^ P^°^ ^^^ Staples were fixed
into the inner part of the two sides of the ship,
into which poles were fitted with their extremities extending
out to sea. To the end of these the scoop filled with fire
was attached by an iron chain, in such a way that in charging
the enemy's ship, whether on the prow or the broadside, fire
was thrown upon it, while it was kept a long way off from his
own ship by the slope of the poles. . . .
The Rhodian admiral Pamphilidas was thought to be
Pa i t better capable than Pausistratus of adapting
beaten by Poiyx- himself to all possible contingencies, because
enidas. the ad- his character was more remarkable for its
mirai of the king. ^^ ^j^ ^^^ solidity than for its boldness. For
LiVy -ay jQ II, * '
' most men judge not from any fixed principle
but by results. Thus, though they had recently elected
Pausistratus to the command, on the ground of his possessing
these very (jualities of energy and boldness, their opinions at
once underwent a complete revolution when he met with his
disaster. . . .
8. At this time a letter arrived at Samos for Lucius
The Actolian truce Acmilius and Eumcncs from the consul Lucius
announced to Scipio, announcing the agreement made with
Eunienes and jj^^ Aetolians for the truce, and the approach-
ing advance of the land forces to the Helles-
pont. Another to the same effect was sent to Antiochus and
Seleucus from the Aetolians. . . .
9. An embassy from King Eumenes having arrived in
Achaean con- Achaia proposing an alliance, the Achaeans
tingent sent to met in public assembly and ratified it, and
the war.^ ^^^^ ^^ some soldiers, a thousand foot and a
hundred horse, under the command of Dio-
phanes of Megalopolis. . . .
Diophanes was a man of great experience in war; for
during the i)rotracted hostilities with Nabis in the neigh-
bourhood of Megalopolis, he had served throughout under
a brilHant emendation of Toupe, who reads €fcX^<irrft ftJkp FdXXoi for the
meaningless i^€\Qb¥T€t luyiiKok. Livy calls them /anatici Galli,
xxr ANTIOCHUS AT PERGAMUM afi;
Philopoemen, and accordingly had gained a real familiarity
with the operations of actual warfare. And besides this
advantage, his appearance and physical prowess were im-
pressive ; and, most important of all, he was a man of per-
sonal courage and exceedingly expert in the use of arms. . . .
10. King Antiochus had already penetrated into the terri-
tory of Pergamum; but when he heard that Antiochus pro-
king Eumenes was close at hand, and saw that poses peace with
the land forces as well as the fleet were ready '*'""^'^'™«"'''
to attack him, he began to consider the prt>-
pricty of proposing a pacification with the Romans, Eumenes,
and the Rhodians at once. He therefore removed with his
whole army to Elaea, and having seized a hill facing that
town, he encamped his infantry upon it, while he entrenched
his cavalry, amounting to over six thousand, close under the
walls of the town. He took up his own position between these
two, and proceeded to send messengers to Lucius Aemilius
in the town, proposing a peace. The Roman imperator
thereupon called Eumenes and the Rhodians to a meeting,
and desired them to give their opinions on the proposal.
Eudemus and Pamphilidas were not averse to making terms ;
but the king said that "To make peace at the present
moment was neither honourable nor possible. „
How could it be an honourable conclusion of poses the peace,
the war that they should make terms while on the grounds
confined within the walls of a town ? And "' honour and
how was it possible to give validity to those
terms without waiting for the Consul and obtaining his
consent ? Besides, even if they did give any indication of
coming to an agreement with Antiochus, neither the naval nor
military forces could of course return home until the Senate
and people had ratified the terms of it. All that would be
left for them to do would be to spend the winter where they
were, waiting idly for the decision from home, doing nothing,
and exhausting the wealth and resources of their allies. And
then, if the Senate withheld its approval of the terms, they
would have to begin the war all over again, having lei the
opportunity pass, which, with God's help, would have enabled
them to put a period to the whole war." Such was the speech
268 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS book
of king Eumenes. Lucius Aemilius accepted the advice, and
answered the envoys of Antiochus that the peace could not
ix)ssibly be made until the Proconsul arrived. On hearing
this Antiochus immediately began devastating the territory of
Elaea ; and subsequently, while Seleucus remained in occupa-
tion of that district, Antiochus continued his march through
the country as far as the plain of Thebe, and having there
entered upon an exceedingly fertile and wealthy district, he
gorged his army with spoil of every description. . . .
1 1. On his arrival at Sardis after this expedition, Antiochus
at once sent to Prusias to urge him to an alliance.
B^ynia.^ ° Now in former times Prusias had by no means
been disinclined to join Antiochus, because he
was much alarmed lest the Romans should cross over to Asia
for the purpose of putting down all crowned heads. But the
perusal of a letter received from Lucius and PubHus Scipio
had served to a great extent to relieve his anxiety, and give
him a tolerably correct forecast of the result of the war. For
Letter of the ^^^ Scipios had put the case with great clearness
Scipios to in their letter, and had supported their assertions
Prusias. i^y numerous proofs. They entered not only
upon a defence of the policy adopted by themselves, but of that
also of the Roman people generally ; by which they showed
that, so far from depriving any of the existing kings of their
sovereignties, they had themselves been the authors in some
\ cases of their establishment, in others of the extension of their
. powers and the large increase of their dominions. To prove this
they quoted the instances of Andobales and Colichas in Iberia,
of Massanissa in Libya, and of Pleuratus in Illyria, all of whom
they said they had raised from petty and insignificant princes
to the position of undisputed royalty. They further mentioned
the cases of Philip and Nabis in Greece. As to Philip, they had
conquered him in war and reduced him to the necessity of
giving hostages and paying tribute : yet, after receiving a slight
proof of his good disposition, they had restored his son and
the young men who were hostages with him, had remitted the
tribute, and given him back several of the towns that had been
taken in the course of war. While as for Nabis, though they
might have utterly destroyed him, they had not done so, but
XXI PRUSIAS REFUSES TO HELP ANTIOCHUS a69
had spared him, tyrant as he was, on receiving the usual
security for his good faith. With these facts before his eyes
they urged Prusias in their letter not to be in any fear for his
kingdom, but to adopt the Roman alliance without misgiving,
for he would never have reason to regret his choice. This
letter worked an entire change in the feelings of Frusias ; and
when, besides, Caius Livius and the other legates arrived at his
court, after conversation with them, he entirely relinquished
all ideas of looking for support from Antiochus. Foiled,
therefore, of hope in this quarter, Antiochus retired to Ephesus :
and being convinced on reflection that the only way of pre-
venting the transport of the enemy's army, and in fact of
repelling an invasion of Asia at all, was to keep
a firm mastery of the sea, he determined to f^m'sMnos^io
fight a naval battle and leave the issue of the t«>s the Roman
struggle to be decided by his success in that. . , . fleei sight some
12. When the pirates saw that the Roman ?iS^'^^
fleet was coming they turned and fled. ...
The baUle between the fleets of Rome and Antiochus took
place betiveen the promontories Myonnesus and Corycum, which
form the bay of Teos, Atttiochus was beaten with a loss of forty-
two ships early in b.c. 190. Livy, 37, 30.
IS. After sustaining this defeat at sea, Andochus remained
in Sardis, neglecting to avail himself of such
opportunities as he had left, and taking no
steps whatever to prosecute the war ; and when :
he learnt that the enemy had crossed into seniu an envoy
Asia he lost all heart, and determined in despair '°^^ ^'^^
to send an envoy to Lucius and Pubhus Scipio
to treat of peace. He selected Heracleides of Byzantium for
this purpose, and despatched him with instructions to offer to
surrender the territories of lampsacus and Smyrna as well as
Alexandria (Troas), which were the original cause of the war,
and any other cities in Aeolis and Ionia of which they might
wish to deprive him, as having embraced their side in the
war ; and in addition to this to promise an indemnity of half
the expenses they had incurred in their quarrel with him. Such
were the offers which the envoy was instructed to make in his
270 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS book
public audience ; but, besides these, there were others to be
committed to Publius Scipio's private ear, of which I will speak
in detail later on. On his arrival at the Hellespont the envoy
found the Romans still occupying the camp which they had
constructed immediately after crossing. At first he was much
cheered by this fact, for he thought it would materially aid his
negotiation that the enemy were exactly where they were at
first, and had not as yet taken any further action. But when
he learnt that Publius Scipio was still on the other side of the
water he was much disturbed, because the turn which his
negotiations were to take depended principally on Scipio's view
of the matter. The reason of the army being still in their
The laws relating first camp, and of Publius Scipio's absence
to the Saiii or from the army, was that he was one of the Salii.
priests of Mars, 'py^ggg ^re, as I have before stated, one of the
three colleges of priests by whom the most important sacrifices
to the gods are offered at Rome. And it is the law that, at
the time of these sacrifices, they must not quit the spot for
thirty days in which it happens to find them.^ This was the
case at the present time with Publius Scipio ; for just as the
army was on the point of crossing this season arrived, and
prevented him from changing his place of abode. Thus it
came about that he was separated from the legions and re-
mained in Europe, while, though the army crossed, it remained
encamped, and could take no further step, because they were
waiting for him.
14. However, Publius arrived a few days afterwards, and
Heracleides being summoned to attend the
Heradeides Council, delivered the message with which
he was charged, announcing that Antiochus
abandoned Lampsacus, Smyrna, and Alexandria ; and also all
such towns in Aeolis and Ionia as had sided with Rome ; and
that he oflered, further, an indemnity of half their expenses in
the present war. He added many arguments besides, urging
the Romans " Not to tempt fortune too far, as they were but
* Dies forte, quibus ANiilia mcu'entur, religiosi ad iter inciderant. Livy,
37t 33' The festival of Mars, during which the ancilia were carried about,
was on the ist of March and following days. If this incident, therefore, took
place in the late spring or summer of B.C. 190, the Roman Calendar must have
been very far out.
xiti ANTIOCHUS TRIES TO NEGOTIATE 271
men ; nor to extend their empire indefinitely, but rather to keep
it within limits, if possible those of Europe, — for even then
they would have an tnormous and unprecedented dominion,
such as no nation before them had attained ; — but if they were
determined at all hazards to grasp parts of Asia also, let thetn
say definitely what parts those were, for the king would go to
the utmost stretch of his power to meet their wishes," After
the delivery of this speech the council decided that the
Consul should answer that " It was only fair
that Antiochus should pay, not the half, but '^^^'^''
the whole expense of the war, seeing that he,
and not they, had originally begun it ; and as to the cities, he
must not only liberate those in Aeolis and Ionia, but must
surrender his whole dominion on this side of Mount Taurus."
On receiving this answer from the council, conveying de-
mands which went far beyond his instructions, the envoy,
without answering a word, abstained from a public audience
thenceforth, but exerted himself to conciliate Publius Scipio.
15. Having at length got a suitable opportunity, he disclosed
to him the offers with which he was charged, xhe secrei offers.
These were that the king would first restore his of Amiochua to
son without ransom, who had been taken '^•"'"^ Scipi"-
prisoner in the early part of the war ; and was prepared, secondly,
to pay him any sum of money he might name, and thenceforth
share with him the wealth of his kingdom, if he would
only support the acceptance of the terms offered by the king.
Publius replied that the promise as to his son g^. . .
he accepted, and would feel under an obligation
to the king if he fulfilled it ; but as to the rest he assured him
that the king, among his other delusions, was under a complete
mistake as to the course demanded by his own interests.
" For if he had made these offers while still master of Lysima-
cheia and the entrance into the Chersonese, he would at once
have got what he asked : and so too, even after evacuating
these places, if he had appeared with his army at the Helles-
pont and shown that he meant to prevent our crossing, and
then had sent his envoys, he might even thus have obtained
his demands. But when he comes with his proposals of
equitable terms, after allowing our troops to set foot in Asia,
272 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS book
and having so not only submitted to the bridle, but allowed
the rider to mount, he must expect to fail and be disappointed
of his hopes. Therefore, I advise him to adopt wiser measure^
and look at the facts in their true light In return for his
promise in regard to my son, I will give him a hint which is well
worth the favour he olfers me : make any concession, do any-
thing, rather than fight with the Romans." With this answer
Heracleides returned and told the king everything. And
Antiochus, considering that no severer terms could be imposed
on him if he were beaten in the lield, abandoned all idea of
negotiation, and began making preparations of all sorts and in
every direction for the battle, . . .
Antiochus sent Scipie^s son ba{k. The decisive battle took
place in the neighbourhood of Thyatira, and proved a decisive
victory for the Romans. This was in the late autumn of ac
190. See Uvy, 37, 38-44.
1 8. After the victory the Romans took Sardis and its Acro-
polis, and there they were visited by Musaeus bringing a
message from Antiochus. Being politely received by the
Scipios, he announced that Antiochus wished to send envoys
to treat on the terms of peace, and therefore desired that a
safe conduct should be given them. This was granted and the*
herald returned ; and some days after, Zeuxis, formerly Satrap
of Lydia, and Antipater, his nephew, came as ambassadors
from king Antiochus. Their first anxiety was to meet lung
Eumenes, because they feared that his old quarrel would cause
him to be only too ready to do them a bad turn. But when
they found liim, contrary to their expectation, disposed to
moderate and gentle methods, they at once addressed them-
selves to meeting the council Being summoned to attend it
they made a lengthy speech, among other things exhorting the
Romans to use their victory with mildness and generosity;
and alleging that such a course was still more to the interest
of the Romans than of Antiochus, since Fortune had com-
mitted to them the empire and lordship of the world. Finally,
they asked " What they were to do to obtain peace and the
friendship of Rome ? " The members of the council had
already in a previous sitting discussed and agreed upon this
Jtxi THE ROMAN TERMS TO ANTIOCHUS 273
point, and now bade Publius Scipio deliver their de-
cision.
17. Scipio began by saying that victory never made the
Romans more severe than before, and accord- xhe Roman tenns
ingly the envoys would receive the same imposed on
answer as they had previously received when they Aniiochus.
came to the Hellespont before the battle. " They must
evacuate Europe and all Asia this side Taurus : must pay the
Romans iiftcen thousand Euboic talents as an indemnity for
the expenses of the war, five hundred at once, two thousand
five hundred on the ratification of the treaty by the people,
and the rest in twelve yearly instalments of a thousand talents.
Further, Antiochus must pay Eumenes the four hundred
talents owing to him, and the balance of the corn due In
accordance with the treaty made with his father Attalus. He
must at the same time deliver Hannibal the Carthaginian,
Thoas the Aetolian, Mnasilochus the Acarnanian, and Philo
and Eubulides the Chalcidians. As security for the fulfilment
of these terms, Antiochus must at once give twenty hostages
named in the treaty." Such was the decision -phe terms are
announced by Publius Scipio in the name of accepted, and
the whole Council, Antiprater and Zeuxis having missions seni to
expressed their consent to them, it was agreed
by all to send envoys to Rome to appeal to the Senate and
people to confirm the treaty. The ambassadors of Antiochus
departed with this understanding : and during the following
days the Roman commanders divided their forces into their
winter quarters ; and when some few days later the hostages
arrived, both Eumenes and the envoys of Antiochus started on
their voyage to Rome. Nor were they alone in their mission j
for Rhodes also, and Smyrna, and nearly all the nations and
states on this side Taurus sent ambassadors to Rome. . . .
\18.' At the beginning of the summer following the victory
of the Romans over Antiochus, the ambassadors
of that king, and those from Rhodes, as well as ^''^^_ Maniius^
from the other states arrived in Rome. For, as I Vulso, M. Fulvius
e placed by Schwcighaeuscr and
274 7'-^^ HJSTOJilES OF POL YBJUS BOOK
Nobiiior. Recep- said, nearly all the states in Asia began sending en-
Eumenw and^the voystoRome immediately after the battle, because
ambassadors at the hopes of all as to their future position rested
Rome. at that time on the Senate. All who arrived
were graciously received by the Senate ; but the most imposing
reception was that accorded to king Eumenes, both in the com-
plimentary processions sent out to meet him and the arrange-
ments made for his entertainment ; and next in cordiality to
his reception was that given to the Rhodians.
^\^hrsllnaJr '" ^^^^" ^^^ ^^^^ ^^^ '^^ audiences came, they first
called in the king and bade him say freely what
„ he wished to obtain at the hands of the Senate.
But Eumenes at first evaded the task by saying :
" If I had been desirous of obtaining any favour from others,
I should have looked to the Romans for advice, that I might
neither desire anything that was wrong nor ask anything unfair ;
but seeing that I am here to prefer my request to the Romans
themselves, I think it better to leave the interests of myself and
my brothers unreservedly in their hands." And though one
of the Senators rose and begged him to have no apprehension,
but to speak his mind, he still adhered to this view. And so
after a certain time had elapsed the king withdrew ; and the
Senate, remaining in the curia, debated what was to be done.
Eventually it was decreed to call upon Eumenes to declare
with his own mouth the objects of his visit without reserve,
on the ground that he knew best what his own kingdom required,
and what was the state of things in Asia. He was then called
in ; and, one of the Senators having informed him of the vote,
he was compelled to speak on the business.
19. He said therefore that "He would not say another
word on his own concerns, but would adhere
Emn^n^ Strictly to his resolution of leaving the decision
as to them entirely in the hands of the Romans.
But there was one subject on which he felt anxiety, namely,
the policy of Rhodes ; and it was this that induced him to
address the Senate on the present occasion. These Rhodians
had come to Rome to further the interests of their own
country, and their own prosperity, quite as much as he had
come to promote those of his own kingdom at that moment ;
ixi KING EUMENES IN THE SENATE a7S
but their professions were entirely at variance with their real
purpose. And it was easy to satisfy one's self of this : for, when
they enter the Senate house, they will say that they come
neither to ask anything for themselves nor to thwart Eumenes
in any way whatever ; but are ambassadors for the liberty of
the Greek inhabitants of Asia. ' To secure this,' they will say,
'is not so much a favour to themselves as an act incumbent
on the' Romans, and in consonance with their former achieve-
ments.' Such will be their specious professions ; but the real
truth of the case will be wholly different. For if these cities
are once set free, the result will be that their dominion will
be many times increased, while his own would be in a manner
entirely broken up. For the attractive name of liberty and
autonomy would draw from his rule not only the cities to be
freed at present, but those also which had been under his rule
from of old, directly it is made apparent that the Senate has
adopted that policy, and would add them to the dominion of
Rhodes. That was the natural course for things to take.
Imagining that they owed their freedom to Rhodes, those
cities would become in name its allies, but in reality entirely
subservient, owing to the heavy obligation under which they will
find themselves. He begged the Senators, therefore, to be on
their guard on that point ; lest they should find that they had
unwittingly aggrandised one friendly nation too much, and dis-
proportionately weakened another ; or even that they were
benefiting men who had once been their foes, to the neglect
and contempt of their genuine friends."
20. " For myself," he continued, " though in every other
point I would yield, if it were necessary, to my neighbours,
yet in the matter of your friendship and of my goodwill
towards you I will never, if I can help it, yield to any one alive.
And I think that my father, if he had been living, would have
said the same : for as he was the first to become your friend
and ally, so of all the inhabitants of Asia and Greece he was the
most nobly loyal to you to the last day of his life, not only in
heart but in deed. For he took his part in all your wars in
Greece, and furnished the largest contingents of men and
ships of all your allies ; contributed the largest share of sup-
plies ; and laced the most serious dangers : and to sum up al'
276 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS book
ended his life actually engaged in the war with Philip, while
employed in urging the Boeotians to join your alliance. I,
too, when I succeeded to his kingdom, while fully maintaining
my father^s views, for it was impossible to do more, have yet
gone even beyond him in actual achievements : for the state
of the times brought me to a more fiery test than they did
him. Antiochus offered me his daughter and a share in his
whole kingdom : offered me immediate restoration of all the
cities that had been before wrested from me : and finally
promised me any price I chose if I would join him in his
war with you. But so far from accepting any one of these
offers, I joined you in your struggle against Antiochus with
the largest military and naval contingents of any of your allies ;
contributed the largest share of supplies at the time of your
utmost need; and exposed myself unreservedly to every
danger along with your generals. Finally, I submitted to
being invested in Pergamos itself, and risked my life as well
as my crown in my loyalty to your people.
21. " Therefore, men of Rome, as many of you have been
eye-witnesses of the truth of my words, and all of you know it,
it is but just that you should have a corresponding regard for
my interests. You have made Massanissa king of the greater
part of Libya, though he had once been your enemy and at
last deserted to your side accompanied only by a few horse-
men, only because he kept faith with you in one war : you
have raised Pleuratus to the first position among the princes
of Illyria, though he had done absolutely nothing for you
beyond keeping loyal ; it would be the height of inconsistency
if you should neglect me and my family, who from generation to
generation have co-operated in your most important and glorious
undertakings. What is it, then, that I am asking you to do, and
what do I claim at your hands ? I will tell you openly, since
you have called upon me to speak my mind to you. If you
decide, then, to continue holding certain parts of Asia which
are on this side Taurus, and were formerly subject to Antiochus,
that is what I should wish to see best of all : for I consider
that the security of my realm would best be secured by having
you for neighbours, and especially by my sharing in your
prestige. But if you decide not to do this, but to evacuate
XXI THE RHODIANS I77
Asia entirely, there is no one to whom you may with greater
justice sunender the prizes you have won in the field than to
mc. But it may be said, it is a more honourable thing still
to set the enslaved free. Yes ! if they had rot ventured to
join Antiochus in the war against yoa But since they had
the hardihood to do so, it is a much more honourable couree
to make a proper return to your sincere friends, than to
benefit those who have shown themselves your enemies,"
22. After the delivery of this effective speech Eumenes
retired. The Senate received both the king himself and the
speech with every mark of favour, and were enthusiastic for
doing everything in their power to gratify him.
They wished to call in the Rhodians next after '™^^^^'™°'
him ; but one of the Rhodian ambassadors not
being there in time, they called in those from Smyrna, who
delivered a long disquisition on the goodwill and zeal which
they had displayed towards Rome during the late war. But
as there are no two opinions about the fact of their having
been, of all the autonomous states in Asia, the most strenuous
in the cause, 1 do not think it necessary to set forth their
speech In detail.
But next to them came in the Rhodians : who, after a short
preamble as to their services to the Romans,
quickly came to the discussion of the position RhadianL
of their own country. They said that " It was
a very great embarrassment to them, in the discharge of their
ambassadorial duties, to find themselves placed by the necessities
of the case in opposition to a sovereign with whom their
public and private relations were of the most friendly descrip-
tion. It was the opinion of their countrymen that the most
honourable course, and the one which above all others would
redound to the credit of Rome, was, that the Greeks in Asia
should be set free, and should recover that possession dearest
to all mankind^autonomy : but this was the last thing to suit
Eumenes and his brothers. It was the nature of monarchy
to hate equality, and to endeavour to have everybody, or at
least as many as possible, subject and obedient. But though
that was the case now, still they felt convinced that they should
gain their object, not because they had greater influetice will"
278 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS book
the Romans than Eumenes, but because they would be shown
to be suggesting a course more just in itself and more in-
disputably advantageous to all concerned. If^ indeed, the
only way the Romans could requite Eumenes was by handing
over to him the autonomous towns, they might reasonably be
at a loss to determine what to do ; for they would have had
to decide between neglecting a sincere friend and disregard-
ing their own honour and duty, and thus entirely obscuring
and degrading the glory of their great achievements. But if,
on the other hand, it were possible adequately to consult for
both these objects at the same time, who could doubt about
the matter any longer ? Yet the fact was that, as in a costly
banquet, there was enough and to spare for alL Lycaonia,
Phrygia on the Hellespont, and Pisidia, the Chersonese also
and the districts bordering on it, were at the disposal of the
Romans to give to whom they chose ; only a few of which
added to the kingdom of Eumenes would double its present
extent, while if all, or even the great part were assigned to him,
it would become second to that of no other prince in Asia.
23. **It was therefore in the power of the Romans to
strengthen their friends very materially without destroying the
glory of their own policy. For the end which they pro-
posed to themselves in their war was not the same as that of
other nations, but widely different. The rest of the world all
entered upon war with the view of conquering and seizing
cities, wealth, or ships : but heaven had ordained that they
should want none of these things, by having put everything
in the whole world under their rule. What was it, then, that
they had still occasion to wish for, and to take the securest
means to obtain ? Plainly praise and glory among mankind ;
which it was difficult indeed to gain, but most difficult of
all to preserve when gained. Their war with Philip might
show them their meaning. That war they had, as they
professed, undertaken with the sole object of liberating
Greece ; and that was in fact the only prize they gained in it,
and no other whatever : yet the glory they got by it was
greater than that which the tribute of the Carthaginians had
brought them. And justly so : for money is a possession
common to all mankind, but honour and praise and glory are
XXI THE DECISION OF THE SENATE 279
attributes of the gods and of those men who approach nearest
to them. Therefore, the most glorious of all their achieve-
ments was the liberation of Greece; and if they now com-
pleted that work their fame would receive its consummation ;
but if they neglected to do so, even what they had already
accomplished would lose its lustre." They finally wound up
by saying, " As for us, gentlemen, having once deliberately
adopted this policy and joined with you in the severest battles
and in genuine dangers, we do not now propose to abandon the
part of friends ; but have not hesitated to say openly what we
believe to be for your honour and your interests alike, with no
ulterior design whatever, and with a single eye to our duty as
the highest earthly object."
24. This speech of the Rhodians was universally regarded
as temperate and fair. The Senate next Treaty with
caused Antipater and Zeuxis, the ambassa- Antiocbus
dors of Antiochus, to be introduced: and «"'>™n'-
on their speaking in a tone of entreaty and supplication,
an approval of the agreement made by him with Scipio in
Asia was voted. A few days later the people also ratified it,
and oaths were accordingly interchanged with Antipater and
his colleague. This done, the other ambassadors from Asia
were introduced into the Senate : but a very brief hearing was
given to each, and the same answer was returned to all ; namely,
that ten commissioners would be sent to decide on ail points
of dispute between the cities. The Senate seiilemeni of
then appointed ten commissioners, to whom Asia,
they gave the entire settlement of particulars; ^'^ '^'^
while as a general principle they decided that of Asia
this side Taurus such inhabitants as had been subject to
Antiochus were to be assigned to Eumenes, except Lycia and
Caria up to the Maeandcr, which were to belong to the
Rhodians; while of the Greek cities, such of them as had
been accustomed to pay tribute to Attalus were to pay the
same to Eumenes ; and only those who had done so to
Antiochus were to be relieved of tribute altogether. Having
given the ten commissioners these outlines of the general
settlement, they sent them out to join the consul, Cnaeus
Manlius Vulso, in Asia.
28o THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS book
After these arrangements had been completed, the Rhodian
c ,. . ^.,. . envoys came to the Senate again with a request
Soli in Cihcia. . a ^ a v - or • n • *u ^ *u
m regard to Soh m Cihcia, allegmg that they
were called upon by ties of kindred to think of the interests
of that city ; for the people of Soli were, like the Rhodians,
colonists from Argos. Having listened to what they had to
say, the Senate invited the attendance of the ambassadors
from Antiochus, and at first were inclined to order Antiochus
to evacuate the whole of Cilicia ; but upon these ambassadors
resisting this order, on the ground of its being contrary to the
treaty, they once more discussed the case of Soli by itself.
The king's ambassadors still vehemently maintaining their
rights, the Senate dismissed them and called in the Rhodians.
Having informed them of the opposition raised by Antipater,
they added that they were ready to go any length in the
matter, if the Rhodians, on a review of the whole case, deter-
mined to push their claim. The Rhodian envoys, however,
were much gratified by the spirit shown by the Senate, and
said that they would ask nothing more. This question, there-
fore, was left as it was ; and just as the ten commissioners
and the other ambassadors were on the point of starting, the
e « ^ o two Scipios, and Lucius Aemilius, the victor
Summer RC. 189.. . ^ /-, .,a-i - ^
m the sea fight with Antiochus, amved at
Brundisium ; and after certain days all three entered Rome in
triumph. . . .
Amynandrus was restored to the kingdom of Aihamania^
which was occupied by a garrison of Philifs, by the aid of the
AetolianSy who tJien proceeded to invade Amphilochia and the
Dolopes. Hence the Aetolian 7var^ beginning with the siege of
Ambracia by M, Fulvius A^obilior, Livy^ 38, i-i i.
25. Amynandrus, king of the Athamanes, thinking that he
had now permanently recovered his kingdom,
^'^Tgo''^^'^ sent envoys to Rome and to the Scipios in
Asia, for they were still in the neighbourhood
of Ephesus, partly to excuse himself for having, as it appeared,
secured his recall by the help of the Aetolians, but chiefly to
entreat that he might be received again into the Roman
alliance. But the Aetolians, imagining that they had now a
XXI THE AETOUAN WAR aSi
good opportunity of once more annexing Atnphilochia and
Aperantia, detennined on an expedition against those coun-
tries; and when Nicander their Strategus had; mustered the
league army, they invaded Amphilochia. Finding most of the
people willing to join them, they advanced into Aperantia;
and the Aperantians also willingly yielding to them, they con-
tinued their expedition into Dolopia. The Dolopians for a
time made a show of resistance, and of keeping loyal to
Philip ; but on considering what had happened to the Atha-
manes, and the check which Philip had received there, they
quickly changed their minds and gave in their adhesion to
the Aetolians. After this successful issue of his expedition
Nicander led his army home, believing that Aetolia was
secured by the subjection of these tribes and places, against
the possibility of any one injuring its territory. But im-
mediately after these events, and when the Aetolians were
still in the full elation of their successes, a
report reached them of the battle in Asia, in ^r" i^ °
which they learnt that Antiochus had been
utterly defeated. This caused a great revulsion of feeling;
and when presently Damoteles came from Rome and an-
nounced that a continuation of the war was decreed against
them, and that Marcus Fulvius and an army had
crossed to attack them, they were reduced to ''""fgo ^'^
a state of complete despair ; and not knowing
how to meet the danger which was impending over them,
they resolved to send to Rhodes and Athens, begging them to
despatch envoys to Rome 10 intercede in their behalf, and, by
softening the anger of the Romans, to find some means of
averting the evils that threatened Aetolia. They also sent
ambassadors of their own to Rome once more, Alexander,
Isius, and Phaeneas, accompanied by Callippus of Ambracia
and Lycopus. . . .
26. Some envoys from Epirus having visited the Roman
Consul, he consulted with them as to the best
way of attacking the Aetolians. They advised "OT^A^llonb"
that he should begin by attacking Ambracia,
which was at that time a member of the Aetolian league. They
gave as their reasons that, if the Aetolians ventured to give
282 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS BOOK
battle, the neighbourhood of Ambracia was very &vourable for
the legions to fight in ; and that if, on the other hand, the
Aetolians avoided an engagement, the town was an excellent one
to besiege : for the district round it would supply abundant timber
for the construction of siege artillery ; and the river Arachthusi
which flowed right under the walls, would be of great use in con-
veying supplies to the army in the summer season, and serve
as a protection to their works. Fulvius thought
uSlmti^iT ^^^ ^^^^^^ g^>^ "^^^ accordingly marched
through Epirus to attack Ambracia. On his
arrival there, as the Aetolians did not venture to meet him',
he reconnoitred the city, and set vigorously to work on the
siege. Meanwhile the Aetolian envoys that
S.tnStS>ad been sent to Rome were caught off
Cephallenia by Sibyrtus, son of Petraeus, and
brought into Charadrus. The Epirotes first resolved to place
these men at Buchetus and keep them under strict guard.
But a few days afterwards they demanded a ransom of them
on the ground that they were at war with the Aetolians. It
happened that one of them, Alexander, was the richest man
in Greece, while the others were badly off, and far inferior to
Alexander in the amount of their property. At first the
Epirotes demanded five talents from each. The others did
not absolutely refuse this, but were willing to pay if they
could, because they cared above everything to secure their
own safety. But Alexander refused to consent, for it seemed
a large sum of money, and he lay awake at night bewailing
himself at the idea of being obliged to pay five talents. The
Epirotes, however, foresaw what would happen, and were
extremely alarmed lest the Romans should hear that they had
detained men who were on a mission to themselves, and
should send a despatch ordering their release ; they, therefore,
lowered their demand to three talents a-piece. The others
gladly accepted the offer, gave security, and departed : but
Alexander said that he would not pay more than a talent, and
that was too much ; and at last, giving up all thought of saving
himself, remained in custody, though he was an old man, and
possessed property worth more than two hundred talents;
and I think he would have died rather than pay the three
XXI SIEGE OF A MB R ACT A aSj
talents. So extraordinarily strong in some meti is the passion
for accumulating money. But On this occasion Fortune so
favoured his greed, that the result secured all men's praise and
approval for his infatuation. For, a few days afterwards, a
despatch arrived from Rome ordering the release of the
ambassadors ; and, accordingly, he was the only one of them
that was set free without ransom. When the Aetolians learnt
what had happened to him, they elected Damoteles as their
ambassador to Rome ; who, however, when as far as Leucas
on his voyage, was informed that Marcus Fulvius was march-
ing through Epirus upon Ambracia, and, therefore, gave up
the mission as useless, and returned back to Aetolia. . . .
27. The Aetolians being besieged by the consul Marcus
Fulvius, offered a gallant resistance to the assault of the siege
artillery and battering rams. Marcus having sijge„fAn,brada.
first strongly secured his camp began the siege and the gaiuw
on an extensive scale ; he opened three separate resistance of the
parallel works across the plain against the
Pyrrheium, and a fourth opposite the temple of Asclepius, and
a ^flh directed against the Acropolis. And the attack being
pushed on energetically at all these points at once, the besieged
became terribly alarmed at the prospect before them. Still, as
the rams vigorously battered the walls, and the long poles with
their iron sickles tore oiT the battlements, they tried to invent
machines to bafHe them, letting down huge masses of lead and
stones and oak logs by means of levers upon the battering
rams ; and putting iron hooks upon the sickles and hauling
them inside the walls, so that the poles to which they were
fastened broke against the battlements, and the sickles fell into
their hands. Moreover they made frequent sallies, in which
they fought with great courage : sometimes making a descent
by night upon the pickets quartered at the works, and at others
attacking in broad daylight the day-parties of the besiegers ;
and by these means they managed to protract the siege, . . ,
Nicander was outside the city, and sent five hundred horse
into it They carried the intervening entrenchment of the
enemy and forced their way into the town. With these he
had fixed on a day on which they were to sally out, and he was
to be ready to support them. They accordingly made the sally
284 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS book
with great courage and fought gallantly ; but either from fear of
the danger, or because he conceived that what he was engaged
uix)n at the time could not be neglected, Nicander failed to
come up to time, and accordingly the attempt failed. . . y
28. By assiduously working the battering rams the Romans
were always breaking down this or that part of 'the wall. But
yet they could not succeed in storming any of these breaches,
because the besieged were energetic in raising counter walls,
and the Aetolians fought with determined gallantry on the
debris. They, therefore, in despair had recourse to mines and
The Romans underground tunnels. Having safely secured
begin mining the central one of their three works, and carefully
operations, concealed the shaft with wattle screens, they
erected in front of it a covered walk or stoa about two hundred
feet long, parallel with the wall ; and beginning their digging
from that, they carried it on unceasingly day and night, working
in relays. For a considerable number of days the besieged
did not discover them carrying the earth away through the
shaft ; but when the heap of earth thus brought out became
too high to be concealed from those inside the
^Tc'tekgc?i.^'^^^^y» the commanders of the besieged garrison
set to work vigorously digging a trench inside,
parallel to the wall and to the stoa which faced the towers.
When the trench was made to therequired depth, they next placed
in a row along the side of the trench nearest the wall a number
of brazen vessels made very thin ; and, as they walked along the
bottom of the trench past these, they listened for the noise of
the digging outside. Having marked the spot indicated by
any of these brazen vessels, which were extraordinarily .sensitive
and vibrated to the sound outside, they began digging from
within, at right angles to the trench, another underground
tunnel leading under the wall, so calculated as to exactly hit
the enemy's tunnel. This was soon accomplished, for the
Romans had not only brought their mine up to the wall, but
had under-pinned a considerable length of it on either side of
their mine ; and thus the two parties found themselves face to
face. At first they conducted this underground fighting with
their spears : but as neither side could do much good, because
^ The text of this fragment is much dislocated.
ra SMOKING OUT THE ENEMY x8s
both parties protected themselves with shidds and wattles,
some one suggested another plan to the defenders. Putting in
front of them an earthenware jar, made to the width of the
mine, they bored a hole in its bottom, and, in-
serting an iron funnel of the same length as the "^^f^^
depth of the vessel, they filled the jar itself with
fine feathers, and putting a little fire in it close to the mouth
of the jar, they clapped on an iron lid pierced full of holes.
They carried this without accident through the mine with its
mouth towards the enemy. When they got near the besiegers
they stopped up the space all round the rim of the jar, leaving
only two holes on each side through which they thrust spears
to prevent the enemy coming near the jar. They then took a
pair of bellows such as blacksmiths use, and, having attached
them to the orifice of the funnel, they vigorously blew up the
fire placed on the feathers near the mouth of the jar, con-
tinually withdrawing the funnel in proportion as the feathers
became ignited lower down. Tlie plan was successfully exe-
cuted ; the volume of smoke created was very great, and, from
the peculiar nature of feathers, exceedingly pungent, and was
all carried into the faces of the enemy. The Romans, there-
fore, found themselves in a very distressing and embarrassing
position, as they could neither stop nor endure the smoke in
the mines.^ The siege being thus still further protracted the
Aetolian commander determined to send an envoy to the
Consul. . . .
29. About this time the ambassadors from Athens and
Rhodes came to the Roman camp for the pur- imetees^on of
pose of furthering, if they could, the conclusion Athens, Rhodes,
of a peace. The Athamanian king, Amynan- """ ^'"B
dnis, also arrived, very eager to relieve the
Ambraciots from their miserable position, and having received
a safe conduct from Marcus Fulvius in consideration of the
urgent nature of the business : For he had a very friendly
feeling towards the Ambraciots, from having passed most of the
' Smoking oul an enemy in a mine wiis one of the regular manccuvrcl.
See Aen. Tact. 37. It was perhaps suggested by the illegal means laken by
worlunen in the silver mines to annoy a rival ; for we find an Athenian law
directed against il. Sec Deniostb. in PaiilatH. j 36.
286 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS book
time of his exile in that town.^ A few days afterwards also
some Acamanians arrived, bringing Damoteles and his fellow
envoys. For Marcus Fulvius, having been informed of their
misfortunes, had written to the people of Thyreum to bring the
men to him. All these various persons, therefore, having
assembled, the negotiations for peace were pushed on energetic-
ally. For his part, Amynandrus was urgent in his advice to
the Ambraciots to save themselves from the destruction which
would not be long in coming to them unless they adopted
wiser counsels. On his coming again and again up to the wall
and conversing with them on this subject, the Ambraciots
decided to invite him inside the town. The consul having
given the king leave to enter the walls, he went in and discussed
the situation with the inhabitants. Meanwhile the Athenian
and Rhodian envoys got hold of the consul and tried by in-
genious arguments to mollify his anger. Some one also sug-
gested to Damoteles and Phaeneas to apply to Caius Valerius and
endeavour to win him over. He was the son of that Marcus
Valerius Laevinus who made the first alliance with the Aetolians ;
and half brother, by the mother's side, of the consul Marcus
Fulvius, and being a young man of vigorous character enjoyed
the greatest confidence of the consul. Being appealed to by
Damoteles, and thinking that in a way he had a family interest
in the matter, and was bound to undertake the patronage of
the Aetolians, he exerted himself with the greatest zeal and
enthusiasm to rescue that people from their perilous position.
The matter then being vigorously pushed forward on all sides at
once was at length accomplished. For the Ambraciots, by the
persuasion of the king, surrendered to the consul unreservedly
as far as they themselves were concerned, and gave up the
town, on the one condition that the Aetolian garrison should
march out under truce. This primary exception they made
that they might keep faith with their allies.
80. So the consul agreed to grant the Aetolians peace on
condition of receiving two hundred Euboic talents down, and
* Nothing seems to be known of this exile of Fulvius, who had been
granted an ovation in B.c. 191 for his victories in Spain. He was, however,
in opposition to Cato, one of whose numerous prosecutions may have been
against him.
XXI END OF THE AETOLIAN WAR 287
three hundred in six yearly instalments of fifty : of the
restoration to the Romans of all prisoners and
deserters within six months without ransom: ,t^Aarollans '^
of their retaining no city in their league, nor
thenceforth admitting any fresh one, of such as had been
captured by the Romans, or had voluntarily embraced their
friendship since Titus Quinctius crossed into Greece : the
Cephallenians not to be included in these terms.
Such was the sketch in outline of the main points of the treaty.
But it required first the consent of the Aetolians, -^^ Aetolian
and then to be referred to Rome ; and meanwhile people confirm
the Athenian and Rhodian envoys remained "'^ 'rcaiy,
where they were, waiting for the decision of the Aetolians. On
being informed by Damoteles and his colleagues on their
return of the nature of the terms that had been granted them,
the Aetolians consented to the general principle — for they
were in fact much better than they had ejtpected, — but in regard
to the towns formerly included in their league they hesitated for
some time ; finally, however, they acquiesced. Marcus Fulvius
accordingly took over Ambracia, and allowed the Aetolian
garrison to depart under terms ; but removed from the town
the statues and pictures, of which there was a great number,
owing to the fact of Ambracia having been a royal residence
of Pyrrhus. He was also presented with a crown ^ weighing
one hundred and fifty talents. Ailer this settlement of affairs
he directed his march into the interior of Aetolia, feehng
surprised at meeting with no communication from the Aetolians.
But on arriving at Amphilochian Argos, a hundred and eighty
stades from Ambracia, he pitched his camp ; and being there
met by Damoteles and his colleagues with the information
that the Aetolians had resolved to ratify the treaty which they
had concluded, they went their several ways, the Aetolians back
to their own country, and Marcus to Ambracia, where he
busied himself about getting his army across to Cephallenia ;
while the Aetolians appointed Phaeneas and Nicander ambassa-
dors to go to Rome about the peace : for not a single line of
the above treaty held good until ratified by the Roman people.
I Or "a complimenl." The Greek word ari^atot seems 10 be usa] for
any present mode 10 a victor. So also ia cb. 34, and elsewhere.
288 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS book
81 . While these envoys, accompanied by those from Rhodes
and Athens, were on their voyage with this object, Marcus
Fulvius sent Caius Valerius also, and some others of his friends
to Rome to secure the ratification of the treaty. But when
they arrived at Rome they found that a fresh cause of anger
with the Aetolians had arisen by the instrumentality of king
Philip ; who, looking upon himself as wronged by the Aetolians
having taken Athamania and Dolopia from him, had sent to
some of his friends at Rome, urging them to share his dis-
pleasure and secure the rejection of the pacification. Accord-
ingly, on the first arrival of the Aetolians, the Senate would not
listen to them ; but afterwards, at the intercession of the
Rhodians and Athenians, changed its mind and consented to
their request : for Damis,^ besides other excellences dis-
played in his speech, was thought to have introduced a very
apt simile, extremely applicable to the case in hand. He said
o u r T^ • " The Romans had good cause for anger with
Speech of Damis. , . ,. ^ .° ,^,. ^ y ^
the Aetolians ; for, mstead of bemg grateful for
the many kindnesses received at their hands, they had brought
the Roman Empire into great danger by causing the war with
Antiochus to break out. But the Senate were wrong in one
point, namely in directing their anger against the masses. For
in states the common people were like the sea, which left to
its own nature was ever calm and unmoved, and not in the
least likely ever to trouble any of those who approached or
used it ; but directly violent winds blew upon and disturbed
it, and forced it against its nature to become agitated, then
indeed nothing could be more dreadful or formidable than the
sea. This was just the case with the Aetolians. As long
as they were left to themselves, no people in Greece were
more loyal to you or more staunch in supporting your active
measures. But when Thoas and Dicaearchus brought a
storm from Asia, and Mnestas and Damocritus from Europ)e,
and, disturbing the calm of the Aetolian masses, compelled
^ Hultsch's text, supported by the MSS., has Ad/xts 6 Kixn<r^<^^> from which
no sense scenis obtainable. According to Suidas, Damis was a philosopher
from Nineveh who had settled in Athens. Livy (38, 10), has Leon Hicesiac
Jilius. He must therefore have found the name Leon in his copy, which could
hardly have lieen substituted for Aofus by mistake, though *IKE2^ov may have
become «ctx'70"^«>'.
XXI THE TREATY WITH THE AETOLIANS 289
them to become reckless of what they said or did, — then
indeed their good disposition gave way to bad, and while in-
tending to do mischief to you they really inflicted damage
upon themselves. It is against these mischief-makers there-
fore that you should be implacable; while you should take
pity on the masses and make peace with them : with the assur-
ance that, if once more left to themselves, with the additional
feeling of having owed their safety on the present occasion to
you, their attachment to you will be the warmest in Greece."
' 82. By these arguments the Athenian envoy persuaded the
Senate to make pwace with the Aetolians, The Treaty with
decree therefore having been passed and con- Aetolia,
firmed by a vote of the people, the treaty was ^^- '^*
formally ratified, of which the text was as follows: "The
people of the Aetolians shall in good faith maintain the
empire and majesty of the people of Rome.
" They shall not allow hostile forces to pass through their
territory or cities against the Romans, their allies or friends ;
nor grant them any supplies from the public fiind.
"They shall have the same enemies as the people of Rome;
and if the Roman people go to war with any, the Aetolian
people shall do so also.
" The Aetolians shall surrender to the praefectus in Corcyra,
within a hundred days from the completion of the treaty,
runaway slaves, and prisoners of the Romans and their allies,
except such as having been taken during the war have re-
turned to their own land and been subsequently captured;
and except such as were in arms against Rome during the
time that the Aetolians were fighting on the side of the
Romans.
" If there should be any not found within that time, they
shall hand them over as soon as they are forthcoming, without
deceit or fraud And such persons, after the completion of
the treaty, shall not be allowed to return to Aetolia.
" The Aetolians shall pay the consul in Greece at once two
hundred Euboic talents of silver, of a standard not inferior to
the Attic. In place of one third of this silver, they may, if
they so choose, pay gold, at the rate of a mina of gold to ten
minae of silver. They shall pay the money in the six year
VOL. 11 u
290 THE aiSTORIES OF FOLYBIUS book
next following the completion of the treaty in yearly instal-
ments of fifty talents ; and shall deliver the money in Rome.
" The Aetolians shall give the Consul forty hostages, not
less than ten or more than forty years old, to remain for the
six years ; they shall be selected by the Romans freely, except-
ing only the Stiategus, Hipparch, public secretary, and such as
have already been hostages at Rome.
"The Aetolians shall deliver such hostages in Rome; and
if any one of them die, they shall give another in his place.
" Cephallenia shall not be included in this treaty.
"Of such territories, cities, and men as once belonged
to the Aetolians, and, in the consulship of Titus
Quinctius and CnaeusDomitius, or subsequently,
were either captured by the Roman or voluntarily embraced
their friendship, the Aetolians shall not annex any, whether
city or men therein.
■ " The city and territory of Oeniadae shall belong to the
Acamanians."
The treaty having been solemnly sworn, peace was con-
cluded, and the war in Aetolia, as is in the rest of Greece,
thus came to an end. . . .
THE WAR WITH THE GAULS OF ASIA
88. While the negotiations for peace with Antiochus, and
for the settlement of Asia generally were going on at Rome,
and the Aetolian war was being fought in Greece, it happened
that another war in Asia, Cliat, namely, against the Gauls, was
brought to a conclusion, the account of which I am now about
to give . . .
84. MoagStes was Tyrant of Cibyra, a cruel and crafty man,
whose career deserves somewhat more than a passing refer-
ence. . . .
When Cnaeus Manlius was approaching Cibyra and had
sent Helvius to find out the intentions of
^r«"-v^L."M?" Moag^tes, the latter begged him by ambassa-
Fulvius Nobiiior. dors not to damage the country, because he was
Rc. 189; Moa-a friend of Rome, and ready to do anything
^rahl^Mi^ '" ^'"^ ^^^ required of him ; and, at the same
time, he offered Helvius a compliment of fifteen
XXI MOAGETES OF CIBYRA agi
talents. In ansvei to this, Helvius said that he would refrain
from damaging the territory ; but that as to the general question
MoagStes must communicate with the Consul, for he was
close behind with his army. MoagStes accordingly sent am-
bassadors to Cnaeus, his own brother being one of them.
When the Consul met them in the road, he addressed them
in threatening and reproachful terms, asserting that "Not only
had Moag^tes shown himself the most determined enemy of
Rome, of all the princes in Asia, but had done his very best
to overthrow their empire, and deserved punishment rather
than friendship." ' Terrified by this display of anger, the am-
bassadors abstained from delivering the rest of the message
with which they were charged, and merely begged him to have
an interview with Moag^tes : and when Cnaeus consented they
returned to Cibyra. Next morning the Tyrant came out of
the town accompanied by his friends, displaying his humility
by a mean dress and absence of all pomp ; and, in conducting
his defence, descanted in melancholy terms on his own helpless-
ness and the poverty of the towns under his rule (which con-
sisted of Cibyra, Syleium, and the town in the Marsh), and
entreated Cnaeus to accept the fifteen talents. Astonished at
his assurance, Cnaeus made no answer, except that, " If he did
not pay five hundred talents, and be thankful that he was
allowed to do so, he would not loot the country, but he would
storm and sack the city." In abject terror Mo^fites begged
him not to do anything of the sort ; and kept adding to his
offer little by little, until at last he persuaded Cnaeus to take
one hundred talents, and one thousand medimni of com, and
admit him to friendship.^ . . .
86. When Cnaeus Manljus was crossing the River Colo-
batus, ambassadors came to him from the town
of Sinda (in Pisidia) begging for help, because ^p^^^^j'
the people of Termessus had called in the aid of
the people of PhilomeJus, and had depopulated thetr territory
and 5acke,d their town ; and were at that very moment besieg-
' The Gtcck icxt is corrupt. Tbe sense is given from Livy, 38, 14.
> The dynaslf lasted until the time of the Milhridnlic wais. llic last
MoagCtcs being deposed b; Mureena, when Cibyra was joined 10 Lyda.
393 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIVS book
ing its citadel, into which all the citizens, with wives and child-
ren, had retreated. On hearing this, Cnaeus immediately
promised them aid with the greatest readiness ; and thinking
the aflfair was a stroke of luck for himself, directed his march
towards Pamphylia. On his arrival in the neighbourhood of
Termessus, he admitted the Termessians to friendship on the
payment of fifty talents. He did the same with the Aspendians :
and having received the ambassadors of the other towns in
Pamphylia, he impressed on them in tliese interviews the con-
viction mentioned above,' and having relieved the Sindians
from their siege, he once more directed his march against the
Gauls. . . .
86. After taking the town of Cyrmasa (in Pisidia), and a
very large booty, Cnaeus Manlius continued his
pSiiSi.° advance. And as he was marching along the
marsh, envoys came from Lysinoe, offering an
unconditional surrender. After accepting this, Cnaeus entered
the territory of Sagalassus, and having driven off a vast quantity
of spoil waited to see what the SagaJassians were prepared
to do. When their ambassadors arrived he received them ;
and accepting a compliment of fifty talents, twenty thousand
medinmi of barky, and twenty thousand of wheat, admitted
them to friendship with Rome. . . .
87. Cnaeus sent envoys to Eposognatus the Gaul, desiring
him to send embassies to the kings of the Gaula
"in Gala^a. "" Eposognatus in his turn sent envoys to Cnaeus
begging him not to move his quarters or attack
the Tolistobogian Gauls ; and assuring him that he would send
embassies to the kings, and propose peace to them, and felt
quite certain that he would be able to bring them to a proper
view of affairs in all respects. . . .
In the course of his march through the country Cnaeus
made a bridge over the River Sangorius, which was extremely
deep and difficult to cross. And having encamped on the bank
of the river, he was visited by some Galli^ sent by.Attis and
Battacus, the priests of the mother of the gods at Pesinus,
wearing figures and images on their breasts, and announcing
' 'rh.it is probably ■■ of the necessily of submiiiing to Rome ;" but Ihe
Ml THE GAULS OF ASIA 293
that the goddess promised him victory and power ; to whom
Cnaeus gave a courteous reception. . . .
When Cnaeus was at the small town of Gordieium, am-
bassadors came from Eposognatus, announcing that he had
been round and talked with the kings of the Gauls, but that
they would not consent to make any overtures of friendship
whatever ; on the contrary, they had collected their children
and women on Mount Olympus, and were prepared to give
battle. . . .
The victory of l/ie Jiomans ever the ToUstoboU at Mount
Olympus is described by Lhy, ^%, 19-23; that over the Tectosages,
a feio miles from Ancyra, in 38, 24-27. The second baHle took
place in mid-autumn, n.c. 189; and the result was that the
Gauls gave in their submission at Ephesus, and were forced to
engage to leave off predatory excursions, and to confine themselves
to their 07vn frontiers. Livy, 38, 27 and 40.
'38. It chanced that among the prisoners made when
the Romans won the victory at Olympus _, ,
. ', ' * The vengeance of
over the Gauls of Asia, was Chiomara, wife of chiomara, wife of
Ortiago. The centurion who had charge of the Gallic chief
her availed himself of his chance in soldierly Lf'^ts ^T
fashion, and violated her.
He was a slave indeed both to lust and money: but
eventually his love of money got the upper hand ; and, on
a lai^e sum of gold being agreed to be paid for the woman,
he led her off to put her to ransom. There being a river
between the two camps, when the Gauls had crossed it, paid
the man the money, and received the woman, she ordered
one of them by a nod to strike the Roman as he was in the
act of taking a polite and affectionate farewell of her. The
man obeyed, and cut off the centurion's head, which she
picked up and drove off with, wrapped in the folds of her
dress. On reaching her husband she threw the head at his
feet ; and when he expressed astonishment and said : " Wife to
keep faith ts a good thing," she replied: "Yes; but it is a
better thing that there should be only one man alive who has
lain with me ! " [Polybius says that he conversed with the
394 ^■''■^ HISTVRfES OF POLVBIUS BOOK
woman at Sardis, and was Struck with het digniRed demeaaour
and intelligence.] ' ...
89. After the victory over the Gauls at Olyropus, when the
Romans were cncami>ed at Ancyra, and Cnaeus
litlwCi^eiL'Man- **'^^ "" ^^ point of continuing his advance,
lii» by n itniia- ambassadors came from the Tectosages asking
gom, init are that Cnaeus would leave his troops in their
"' "^ _g ^ ''*'''■ quarters, and advance himself in the course of
the next day into the space between the two
camps ; and promising that their kings would come to meet
him, and discuss the terms of a peace. But when Cnaeus
consented, and duly arrived at the appointed place with five
hundred horse, the kings did not a]}pear. After his return
to the camp, however, the ambassadors came again, and, offering
some excuses for the kings, begged him to come once more,
as they would send some of their chief men to discuss the
whole question. Cnaeus consented ; but, without leaving the
camp himself, sent Attalus and some tribunes with three
hundred horse. 'l"he envoys of the Gauls duly appeared and
discussed the business : but finally said that it was impossible
for them to conclude the matter or ratify anything they agreed
upon ; but they engaged that the kings would come next day
to agree on the terms, and finally settle the treaty, if the
Consul would also come to them. Attalus promised that
Cnaeus would come, and they separated for that day. But
the Gauls were deliberately contriving these postponements,
and amusing the Romans, because they wanted to get some
twrt of their families and property beyond the river Halys ;
and, first of all, to get the Roman Consul into their hands if
they could, but if not, at any rate to kill him. With this
purpose they watched next day for the coming of the Romans,
with a thousand horse ready to fall upon him. When Cnaeus
heard the result of Attalus's interview, believing that the kings
would come, he left the camp, attended as usual by five
hundred horse. Now it happened that, on the days of the
previous interviews, the foraging parties which went out
' This is rtally Plutarch's version of a story be found in Polybius, and, lo
judge from Livy, 38, 34. nol a very complete ont It tot* place near
Ancyra. Plutarch di mutierum virlulitta.
XXI ATTEMPTED TREACHERY BY THE GAULS 295
from the Roman camp to fetch wood and hay had gone in
the same direction, in order to have the protection of the
squadron which went to the parley. A numerous foraging party
acted in the same way on this third occasion, and the tribunes
ordered them to proceed in the same direction, with the usual
number of horsemen to protect them as they advanced. And
their being out on this duty proved accidentally to be the
salvation of their comrades in the danger which threatened
them. . . .
CEPHALLENIA
40. M. Fulvius took the quarter of the town y^^ ciiadd of
in which was the ciladel by a night surprise, SjH™ iT.'
and introduced the Romans into the town,^ night smprUe.
41. I'he good and the expedient are seldom compatible,
and rare indeed are those who can combine and phiiopoemen"!
reconcile them. For as a general rule we all policy lowaids
know that the good shuns the principles of imme- ^"^'.^k^"
diate profit, and profit those of the good. " ""' "''
However, Philopoemen attempted this task, and succeeded
in his aim. For it was a good thing to restore the captive
exiles to Sparta ; and it was an expedient thing to humble
the Lacedaemonian state, and to punish those who had served
as bodyguards to a tyrant But seeing clearly that money is
ever the support on which every dynasty rests, and having a
clear head and the instincts of a ruler, he took measures to
prevent the introduction into the town of money from out-
side. . . .
48. * Meanwhile in Asia the Roman consul Cnaeus Man-
lius wintered at Ephesus, in the last year of this
Olympiad, and was there visited by embassies s^n^,h"tinl^
from the Greek cities in Asia and many others, of iSg-iss b.c
• Sec Livy, 38, 38, 39, The Iragmenl ht-rc seems 10 be Ihat Imnslaled by
Uvy in ch. 39, Romarti nocte ptr arcem, quam Cyatidem vacant {naiK urti in
mare daxxa in Occidenltat vergit) murv iuperalo in forum ptntncritnt. 'Ilio
people of Some suddenly threw off Ibe lerms under which the rest of Cephal-
lania had lubmiltcd and stood a lour monlbs' siege.
* A fragnietil, arranged iti Hullsch's text as ch. 41, is too much mutilated t<>
be tmulaled wiih any appnneh to coirccincss.
296 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS book
at Ephesus, the bringing complimentary crowns to him for his
i^k^oiympkd. victories over the Gauls. For the entire inhabi-
and arranges the tants of Asia this side Taurus were not so much
settlement of Asia, rejoiced at the prospect given them by An-
tiochus's defeat of being relieved from tribute, garrisons, or
other royal exactions, as at the removal of all fear of the
barbarians, and at their escape from their insolence and law-
lessness. Among the rest Musaeus came from Antiochus,
and some envoys from the Gauls, desiring to ascertain the terms
upon which friendship would be granted them; and also from
Ariarathes, the king of Cappadocia. For this latter prince,
having attached himself to the fortunes of Antiochus, and having
taken part in his battle with the Romans, had become alarmed
and dismayed for his own fate, and therefore was endeavouring
by frequent embassies to ascertain what he would have to pay or
do to get pardon for his error. The Consul complimented the
ambassadors from the cities, and dismissed them after a very
favourable reception ; but he replied to the Gauls that he would
not make a treaty with them until king Eumenes, whom he
expected, had arrived. To the envoys from Ariarathes he said
that they might have peace on the payment of six hundred
talents. With the ambassador of Antiochus he arranged that he
would come with his army to the frontier of Pamphylia, to receive
the two thousand five hundred talents, and the com with which
the king had undertaken to furnish the Roman soldiers before
his treaty with Lucius Scipio. This business being thus
settled, he solemnly purified his army ; and, as the season for
o • f « ^ oo military operations was now beginning, he broke
SpnngofB.c. i88. u- .. ^ * i • a.*, i -.u u-
up his quarters, and, takmg Attalus with him,
arrived at Apamcia in eight days' march, and remained there
three days. On the fourth he continued his advance ; and,
pushing on at great speed, arrived on the third day at the
rendezvous with Antiochus, and there pitched his camp. Here
he was visited by Musaeus, who begged him to wait, as the
carts and cattle that were bringing the com and money were
late. He consented to wait : and, when the supply arrived, he
distributed the corn among the soldiers, and handed over the
money to one of his tribunes, with orders to convey it to
Apameia.
XXI SETTLEMENT OF ASIA xn
44k He himself started in full force for Perga, where he
heard that a commander of a garrison placed in
that town by Antiochus had neither left it him- ^ ^3''}^^^'^
self nor withdrawn his garrison. When he
came within a short distance of the place he was met by
the captain of the garrison, who begged Cnaeus not to con-
demn him unheard. " He had received the city from
Antiochus in trust, and was holding it until he should be
instructed what to do by the sovereign who had entrusted it
to him." And he therefore begged for thirty days' respite, to
enable him to send and ask the king for instructions.
Observing that Antiochus was behaving straightforwardly in
other particulars, Cnaeus consented to allow him to send and
ask the king the question. After some days the ofGcer
accordingly received an answer, and surrendered the city.
About this time, just at the beginning of summer, the ten
commissioners and king Eumenes arrived tiysiiniiQcr rc 188
sea at Ephesus; and, after giving themselves The leii Roman '
two days to recover from the voyage, proceeded
up the country to Apameia, When their arrival
was known to Cnaeus Manlius, he sent his
brother Lucius with four thousand men to Oroanda (in Pisidia),
as a forcible hint that they must pay the money owing, in accord-
ance with the terms agreed on ; while he himself marched his
array at full speed to meet Eumenes and the commissioners.
On his arrival he found the king and the ten commissioners,
and immediately held a consultation with them on the
measures to be taken. The first resolution come to was to
confirm the sworn agreement and treaty with Antiochus, about
which I need say no more, beyond giving the actual text of
the treaty, which was as follows ; —
45. "There shall be perpetual peace between Antiochus
and the Romans if he fulfils the provisions of Ttxt of ihe ircaiy
the treaty. belwcen Antio-
" Neither Antiochus nor any subject to him =''"' '"■^ '*°"'*-
shall allow any to pass through their territories to attack the
Romans or their allies, nor supply them with aught Neither
shall the Romans or their allies do the like for those attack-
ing Antiochus or those subject to him.
298 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS book
" Antiochus shall not wage war upon the Islanders or the
dwellers in Europe.
"He shall evacuate all cities and territory (this side Taurus^).
His soldiers shall take nothing out with them except the arms
they are carrying. If they chance to have taken anything
away they shall restore it to the same cities.
" He shall receive neither soldiers nor other men from the
territory of king Eumenes.
" If there be any men in the army of Antiochus coming
from any of the cities taken over by the Romans, he shall
deliver them up at Apameia.
"If there be any from the kingdom of Antiochus with the
Romans or their allies, they may remain or depart as they
choose.
" Antiochus and those subject to him shall give back the
slaves, captives, and deserters of the Romans or their allies
and any captive received from any quarter. Antiochus shall
give up, if it be within his power so to do, Hannibal, son of
Hamilcar, the Carthaginian, Mnesilochus the Acarnanian,
Thoas the Aetolian, Euboulidas and Philo the Chalcidians,
and such of the Aetolians as have held national offices.
" Antiochus shall give up all his elephants, and shall have
none henceforth.
" Antiochus shall surrender his ships of war, their tackle,
and fittings, and henceforth have only ten decked ships. He
shall not have a vessel rowed by thirty oars, [or by less] ^ for
purposes of war begun by himself.
"He shall not sail west of the river Calycadnus and
the promontory of Sarpedon, except to convey tribute or
ambassadors or hostages.
" It shall not be lawful for Antiochus to enlist soldiers or
receive exiles from the territory subject to Rome.
" Such houses as belonged to the Rhodians or their allies,
in the territory subject to Antiochus, shall continue to belong
to the Rhodians as before the war : any money owed to them
^ These words are wanting in the text. From Livy {38, 38) it appears
that the territory was defined as between the Taurus and the R. Halys as far
as the borders of Lycaonia.
* Livy (/.r.) has nrve monerem ex belli causa quod ipse illaturus erit.
K!Ci TREATY WITH ANTIOCHVS 299
shall still be recoverable : and any properly left behind by
them, if sought for, shall be restored.
"The Rhodians shall, as before the war, be free from
tribute.
" If Antiochus has given any of the towns to others which
he is bound to restore, he shall remove from them also his
garrisons and men. And if any shall wish hereafter to desert
to him, he shall not receive them.
" Antiochus shall pay to the Romans ten thousand talents,
in ten yearly instalments, of the best Attic silver, each talent
to weigh not less than eighty Roman pounds, and ninety
thousand medemni of com.
" Antiochus shall pay to king Eumenes three hundred and
fifty talents in the five years next following, in yearly instal-
ments of seventy talents ; and in lieu of the corn, according
to the valuation of Antiochus himself, one hundred and
twenty-seven talents, two hundred and eight drachmae, which
sum Eumenes has consented to accept 'as satisfying his claims.'
"Antiochus shall give twenty hostages, not less than
eighteen nor more than forty-five years old, and change them
every three years.
"If there be in any year a deficit in the instalment paid,
Antiochus shall make it good in the next year.
" If any of the cities or nations, against whom it has been
hereby provided that Antiochus should not make war, should
commence war against hin), it shall be lawful for Antiochus to
war with them ; but of such nations and cities he shall not
have sovereignty nor attach them as friends to himselC
"Such complaints as arise between the parties to this
treaty shall be referred to arbitration.
" If both parties agree in wishing anything to be added to
or taken from this treaty, it shall be lawful so to do."
46. Immediately after this treaty had been solemnly sworn
to, the proconsul Cnaeus sent Quintus Minucius Burning of Antio-
Thermus and his brother Lucius, who had just chus's ships ai
brought the money from Oroanda to Syria, with l'"'^™ ■" ^yda.
orders to receive the oath from the king, and confirm the
several clauses of the treaty. And to Quintus Fabius Lab*^
who was in command of the fleet, he sent a despatch oid<
300 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS book
him to sail back to Patara, and take over and bum the ships
there. . . .
Ariarathcs V.King 47. The proconsul Cnaeus Manlius made
of Cappadocia. Ariarathes a friend of Rome on receipt of
three hundred talents. . . .
48. At Apameia the Proconsul and the ten commissioners,
Final settlement ^^'^'^ listening to all who appealed to them,
of the affairs of assigned in the case of disputed claims to terri-
Asia Minor by the tory, money. Or anything else, certain cities in
A*!?.!?rn'n n"^^« ^hich the paTtics might have their claims settled
Autumn B.C. i88. , , . f rr^i ,1 1 . 1 f
by arbitration. The general scheme which they
drew out was as follows : Those of the autonomous cities
which, having formerly paid tribute to Antiochus, had remained
faithful to Rome, they relieved from tribute altogether.
Those that had been tributary to Attalus they ordered to pay
the same tribute to his successor Eumenes. Such as had
abandoned the Roman friendship and joined Antiochus in the
war, they ordered to pay Eumenes the amount of tribute im-
ix)sed on them by Antiochus. The people of Colophon,
Notium, Cymae, and Mylae, they freed from tribute. To
the Clazomenians, besides this relief, they gave the Island
Drymussa. To the Ephesians they restored the sacred district
which they had been obliged by the enemy to evacuate. . . }
To the people of Chios, Smyrna, and Erythrae, besides other
marks of honour, they assigned the territory which they
severally expressed a wish to have at the time, and alleged
was their right, from regard for their loyalty and zeal which
they had shown to Rome during the war. To the Phocaeans
they restored their ancestral city and the territory which they
possessed of old. They next transacted business with the
Rhodians, giving them Lycia and Caria up to the river
Maeander, except Telmissus. As to king Eumenes and his
brothers, not content with the liberal provision made for them
in their treaty with Antiochus, they now assigned him in
addition the Chersonese, Lysimacheia, and the castles on the
borders of these districts, and such country as had been sub-
ject to Antiochus in Europe; and in Asia, Phrygia on the
^ See Livy, 38, 39. Some words are lost referring to grants to the people
of Ilium.
THE COMMISSIONERS IN ASIA
30"
Hellespont, Great Fhrygia, so much of MysJa as he had before
subjugated, Lycaonia, Milyas, Lydia, Tralles, Ephesus, and
Telmissus : all these they gave to Eumenes. As to Fam-
phylia, Eumenes alleged that it was on this side Taurus, the
amijassadors of Antiochus on the other ; and the commissioners
feeling unable to decide, referred the question to the Senate.
Having thus decided the largest number and most important
of the matters brought before them, they started on the road
towards the Hellespont, intending on their journey to still
further secure the settlement arrived at with the Gauls. . . .
BOOK XXII
CONTENTS
In the \\%th Ofympiad {b,c, 188-184) embassies came from
Philip and the tribes bordering on Macedonia to Rome, The decrees
of the Senate concerning them. In Greece the quarrel of Philip
with the Thessalians and Perrhaebians about the cities held by
Philip in their countries from the time of the war with Antiochus,
TJu decision concerning them before Q. Caecilius at Tempe, Dect-
sions of Caecilius. A dijferenct of Philip with the ambassadors
of Eumenes and the exiles from Maroneia ; the pleadings on
tliese points at Thessalonica and the decision of Caecilius, The
massacre at Afaroneia instigated by king Philip, The arrival
of the Roman legates^ and their decisions. The causes of the
war betiveen the Romans and Perseus, Arrival of ambassadors
from kings Ptolemy and Eumenes and Seleucus in the Pelopon-
nese. The decision of the Achaeans on the alliance with Ptolemy ^
and on the gifts offered them by these kings. Arrival of Q.
Caecilius and his disapprobation of the measures taken in regard
to Sparta, Embassy of A reus and Alcibiades^ t7uo of tlie earlier
exiles from Sparta, to Rome, and their accusations against Philo-
poemen and the Achaeans, The Roman envoys come to Cleitor,
where there is an Achaean assembly. The speeches delivered for
both parties, and the Achaean decrees in the affair of Sparta}
8. After the execution of the men at Compasium,^ some of
the Lacedaemonians, incensed at what had been done, and
^ This summary is arranged by Hultsch as chs. i and 2 of book 22.
It appears as book 23, chs. 4, 5 in Schweighacuscr's text.
* In ac. 191 Philopocmcn secured the adhesion of Sparla to the Achaean
league : Init the Spartans were never united in their loyalty to it, and during
his year as Strategus (b.c. 189) he punished a massacre of some Achaean
BOOK xjcri SPARTA AND THE LEAGUE 303
believing that the power and authority of the Romans had
been set at naught by Philopoemen, went to
Rome and accused Philopoemen and his pro- „ °'''^"'.
,,,,,.,, .11 Komc against
ceedmgs; and finally obtaineda letteraddressed philopoemen.
to the Achaeans from Marcus I-epidus, theB-f^'S?, Cost M.
consul of the year, and afterwards Pont'fex'^™'^^'^
Maximus, in which he told the Achaeans that
they had not acted equitably in the matters of the I^cedae-
monians. At the same time as this mission from Sparta,
Philopoemen also appointed Nicodemus of Elis and others to
go on an embassy to Rome.
Just at that time Demetrius of Athens came on a mission
from Ptolemy, to renew the existing alliance Rene^^of^^le
between the king and the Achaean league, treaty between
This was eagerly accepted, and my father, >he Achaean
Lycortas, and Theodoridas, and Rositeles of '^„""'
Sicyon were appointed ambassadors to take the
oaths on behalf of the Achaeans, and receive those of the
king. And on that occasion a circumstance xhe accomplish-
occurred, which, though not important perhaps, mews of Ptolemy
is still worth recording. After the completion Epipt>anes.
of this renewal of alliance on behalf of the Achaeans, Philo-
poemen entertained the ambassador ; and in the course of the
banquet the ambassador introduced the king's name, and said
a great deal in his praise, quoting anecdotes of his skill and
boldness in hunting, as well as his excellence in riding and the
use of arms ; and ended by quoting, as a proof of what he said,
that the king on horseback once transfixed a bull with a
javelin. . . .
4. In Bocotia, after the formation of the treaty between
Rome and Antiochus, the hopes of the whole nie effect of the
revolutionary party were destroyed. Politics coll.tpse of
therefore began to assume a new aspect; and Antiochus upon
whereas the administration of justice among
them had been postponed for nearly the last twenty years,
voices began to make themselves heard in the cities to the
sympathisers In Spariaby an execution of eighty Spartans at Compasium on the
frontier of Lnconia. This number Plutarch gives on the aulhority of Poly-
tnux, Init another account stated it at three hundred and fifty. Plut. Phil, 16.
304 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS book
effect that " there ought to be an end and settlement of their
mutual disputes." But after considerable controversy on this
point, because the discontented were more numerous than the
wealthy, the following circumstance occurred which helped
accidently to support the party of order. Titus Flamininus
had for some time past been zealously working in Rome to
Resistance to the sccure the restoration of Zeuxippus to Boeotia,
recall of bccause he had found him serviceable on many
Zeuxippus. occasions during the wars with Antiochus and
Philip. And just at this time he had induced the Senate to
send a despatch to the Boeotians ordering them to recall
Zeuxippus and his fellow exiles. When this despatch arrived,
the Boeotians, fearing that, if these men were restored, they
would become detached from their good understanding with
Macedonia, determined that the legal sentence upon
Zeuxippus and the rest should be publicly proclaimed,^
which they had formerly drawn up against them. Thus they
condemned them on two charges, first, of sacrilege for
having stripped off the silver from the plated table of Zeus,
See 1 8, 43. Livy, and, secondly, of murder for having killed
33. 28. Brachylles. Having made this arrangement,
they assumed that they need pay no further attention to the
despatch of the Senate, but contented themselves with sending
Callicritus and others to Rome with the message that they
were unable to rescind what had been settled by their laws.
Zeuxippus having sent an embassy to the Senate at the same
time, the Romans wrote to the Aetolians and Achaeans an
account of the attitude assumed by the Boeotians, and ordered
them to restore Zeuxippus to his country. The Achaeans re-
frained from invading the country with an army, but selected
some ambassadors to go and persuade the Boeotians to obey
the orders from Rome \ and also to settle the legal disputes
existing between them and the Achaeans, on the same prin-
ciples as they conducted the administration of justice at home :
for it happened that there were some controversies between
the two nations that had been dragging on for a long time.
On receiving this message the Boeotians, whose Strategus was
then Hippias, promised at the moment that they would do
* Some words arc lost from the text describing their method of procedure.
xxu THE MURDERERS OF BRACHYLLES 305
what was demanded of them, but shortly afterwards neglected
it at every point. Therefore, when Hippias had laid down his
office and Alcetas had succeeded him, Philopoemen gave all
who chose license to make reprisals on the territories of the
Boeotians ; which proved the beginning of a serious quarrel
between the two nations. For on the cattle of Mymchus and
Simon being driven off,' and a struggle arising over this
transaction, the contest soon ceased to be political, and be-
came the beginning and prelude of open war. If indeed the
Senate had persisted in carrying out the restoration of
Zeuxippus, war would quickly have been kindled ; but as it
maintained silence on the subject, the Megareans were induced
by an embassy proposing terms to stop the reprisals. . . ?■
6. A quarrel arose between the Lycians and Rhodians from
the following causes. When the ten commis-
sioners were employed in the settlement of Asia, '^^^j;;^ *°
they were visited by Theaetetus and Philo-
phron on a mission from Rhodes, demanding that Lycia and
Caria should be given to them in return for the goodwill
and zeal displayed by them in the war with Antiochus. At
the same time Hipparchus and Satyrus came from Ilium
begging, on the ground of their kindred with the Lycians, that
the latter should receive pardon for their transgressions. The
commissioners listened to these pleadings, and tried to do what
they could to satisfy both. For the sake of the people of
Ilium, they inflicted no severity on the Lycians, but gratified
the Rhodians by presenting them with the sovereignty over
that people. This decision was the origin of a serious division
and controversy between the Lycians and Rhodians. For the
envoys of lUum visited the Lycian cities, giving out that they
had succeeded in pacifying the Roman anger, and that they
owed their liberty to them ; while Theaetetus and his colleague
took back word to their countrymen that Lycia and all Caria
south of the Maeander had been given as a free gift by the
Romans to Rhodes. Presently an embassy came from Lycia to
Rhodes desiring an alliance; while the Rhodians on their part
had elected certain of their citizens to go to Lycia and give
' Some words ore toat in the text which would more lulty explain the
3o6 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS book
orders to the several cities as to what they were to do. They
were thus entirely at cross purposes, and for some time the
cause of the misunderstanding was not generally intelligible.
But when the Lycian ambassadors appeared in the assembly
and began talking about an alliance, and Pothion the Prytanis
rose after them and explained the different ideas which the two
people entertained on the subject, and moreover, sternly re-
buked the Lycian envoys,^ the latter declared that they would
endure anything rather than be subject to the Rhodians. . . .
EGYPT UNDER PTOLEMY EPIPHANES AFTER THE DEATH OF
ARISTOMENES (l8, 53, 54)
6. All men admire the magnanimity of Philip towards
Athens ; for though he had been injured as well as
condi!^of'phiiip abused by them, yet when he conquered them at
II. of Macedon to Chaeroneia, so far from using this opportunity
Aihcns in n.c. 338 for injuring his opponents, he caused the corpses
''inoiemy''^ of the Athenians to be buried with the proper
ceremonies ; while those of them who had been
taken prisoners he actually presented with clothes, and
restored to their friends without ransom. But though men
praise tliey do not imitate such conduct. They rather try to
outdo those with whom they are at war, in bitterness of passion
and severity of vengeance. Ptolemy, for instance, had men
tied naked to carts and dragged at their tail, and then put to
death with torture. . . .
7. When this same Ptolemy was besieging Lycopolis, the
Suppression of Egyptian nobles surrendered to the king at
the revolt in discretion ; and his cruel treatment of them in-
lower F^P^ volved him in manifold dangers. The same was
the result at the time Polycrates suppressed the
Lycopolis in the revolt. For Athinis, Pausiras, Chesuphus, and
Thcbaid. Irobastus, who still survived of the rebellious
nobles, yielding to necessity, appeared at the city of Sais and
surrendered at discretion to the king. But Ptolemy, regardless
of all pledges, had them tied naked to the carts and dragged
off, and then put to death with torture. He then went to
^ Something is lost in the text.
XXII SEEDS OF THE THIRD MACEDONIAN WAR 30J
Naucratis with his army, where he received the mercenaries
enHsted for him by Aristonicus from Greece, and thence sailed
to Alexandria, without having taken any part whatever in the
actual operations of the war, thanks to the dishonest advice of
Polycratcs, though he was now twenty-five years old. . . .
8. At this time were sowed the seeds of fatal evils to the
royal house of Macedonia. I am aware that ^^_ ,35, 1^
some historians of the war between Rome and origin of the bsi
Perseus, when they wish to set forth the causes M»<*<ionian war.
of the quarrel for our information, assign as the primary one
the expulsion of AbrupoUs from his principality, Abrupolis, a
on the ground of having made a raid upon the Thracian prmcc
mines at Pangaeum after the death of Philip, ^"^^^f °'^
which Perseus repulsed, finally expelling him ^ivy, 43. 13, 40.
entirely out of his own dominions. Next they Death of i-hiiip
mention the invasion of Dolopia, and the visit ^- ^'^ ''9-
of Perseus Co Delphi, the plot against Eumenes at Delphi, and
the murder of the ambassadors in Boeolia ; and
from these they say sprang the war between
Perseus and the Romans. But my contention is that it is of
most decisive advantage, both to historians and their readers,
to know the causes from which the several events are bom and
spring. Most historians confound these, because they do not
keep a firm hold upon the distinction between a pretext and
a cause, or again between a pretext and a beginning of a war.
And since events at the present time recall this distinction
I feel compelled to renew my discussion of this subject For
instance, of the events just referred to, the first „„ . , ^ ,
, , . , , . Sec bk, 3, en. 6.
three are pretexts ; the last two — the plot agamst
Eumenes, the murder of the ambassadors, and other similar
things that happened during the same period — are clear Ixgin-
nings of the war between Rome and Perseus, and of the final
overthrow of the Macedonian kingdom ; but not one of them
is a cause of these things. I will illustrate by examples. Just
as we say that Philip son of Amyntas contemplated and
determined upon accomplishing the war with Persia, while
Alexander put into execution what he had projected, so in the
present instance we say that Philip son of Demetrius first pro-
3o8 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS book
jected the last war against Rome, and had all his preparations
ready for the execution of his design, but that after his death
Perseus became the agent in carrying out the undertaking
itsel£ If this be true, the following also is clear : it is im-
possible that the causes of the war should have been subse-
quent to the death of him who resolved upon and projected it ;
which would be the case if we accepted the account of these
historians ; for the events alleged by them as its causes were
subsequent to the death of Philip. . . .
9. About the same time ambassadors came to Rome from
Complaints ^^^g Eumenes, informing the Senate of the
lodged against encroachment of Philip upon the cities in
Philip at Rome. Thrace. There came also the exiles of the
Maronitae denouncing Philip, and charging him
with being the cause of their expulsion. These were followed
by Athamanians, Perrhaebians, and Thessalians, demanding the
restoration of their cities which Philip had taken from them
during the war with Antiochus. Ambassadors also came from
Philip to make answer to all accusers. After repeated debates
between all these envoys and the ambassadors of Philip, the
A commission Senate decided to appoint a commission at once,
of investigation to investigate the actions of Philip, and to pro-
appomted. ^^^^ ^ ^y^o chose to State their views and their
complaints of the king to his face. The legates thus appointed
were Quintus Caecilius, Marcus Baebius, and Tiberius
Claudius.^ . . .
There was again a war of parties among the
Thrace" Aenii, one side inclining to Eumenes, the other
to Macedonia. . . .
Tfu result of these embassies was the Congress of Tenipe^ at
which no definite settlement was made, Livy\ 39, 25-28.
A MEETING OF THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE PARLIAMENT
Phiiopoemen iQ. I have already stated that in the Pelo-
te^^oTtwo^rs P°"^^^^' ^^^^^ Philopoemen was still Strategus,
running, from the Achaean league sent an embassy to Rome
* Livy (39, 24) gives the names as Q. Caecilius Mctellus, M. Baebius
Tamphilus, Ti. Sempronius.
XXII A MEETING OF THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE 309
on the subject of Sparta, and another to king "v "■<=■ '*9 ">
Ptolemy to renew their ancient alliance. ""*■ ^'^' '^'■
Immediately after Philopoemen had been succeeded by
Aristaenus as Strategus, the ambassadors of king Ptolemy
arrived, while the league meeting was assembled Arisiaenus.
at Megalopolis. King Eumenes also had de-Mny, b,c. 16710
spatchedanembassyofferingtogivetheAchaeans ^'^y. ^.c 186,
one hundred and twenty talents, on condition that it was invested
and the interest used to pay the council of the league at the time
of the federal assemblies. Ambassadors came sji^m^ VhWa-
ateo from king Seieucus, to renew his friendship paior succeeded
with them, and offering a present of a fleet often his father
ships of war. But when the assembly got to cral^Rc* I'Si
business, the first to come forward to speak
was Nicodemus of Elis, who recounted to the Business of ihe
Achaeans what he and his colleagues had said asse^ly
in the Roman Senate about Sparta, and read
the answer of the Senate; which was to the Uuer from the
effect that the Senate disapproved of the destnic- ^„bj^<rf
tion of the walls, and of the execution of the rhiiopocmen's
men put to death at Compasium, but that it anions ai
did not rescind any arrangement made. No v^^'^
one saying a word for or against this, the subject was allowed
to pass.
Next came the ambassadors from Eumenes, who renewed
the ancestral friendship of the king with the
Achaeans, and stated to the assembly the offer ^^'^"^
made by him. They spoke at great length on
these subjects, and retired after setting forth the greatness of
the king's kindness and affection to the nation.
1 1. After they had finished their speech, ApoUonidas ofSicyon
rose and said that : "As far as the amount of the
money was concerned, it was a present worthy ^p^Hon^j^
of the Achaeans. But if they looked to the
intention of the donor, or the purpose to which the gift was to
be applied, none could well be more insulting and more unconsti-
tutional. The laws prohibited any one, whether a private
individual or magistrate, from accepting presents from a king
on any pretence whatever ; but if they took this money they
3IO THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS BOOK
would every one of them be plainly accepting a present, which
was at once the gravest possible breach of the law, and con-
fessedly the deepest possible personal disgrace. For that the
council should lake a great wage from Eumenes, and meet to
deliberate on the interests of the league after swallowing such a
bait, was manifestly disgraceful and injurious. It was Eumenes
that offered money now ; presently it would be Prusias ;
and then Seleucus. Bat as the interests of democracies and of
kings are quite opposite to each other, and as our most frequent
and most important deliberations concern the points of contro-
versy arising between us and the kings, one of two things must
necessarily happen ; either the interests of the king will have
precedence over our own, or we must incur tlie reproach of
ingratitude for opposing our paymasters." He therefore urged
the Achaeans not only to decline the offer, but to hold
Eumenes in detestation for thinking of making it.
Next rose Cassander of Aegina and reminded the Achaeans
speech of of " The misfortunes which the Aeginetans had
Cnssandcr of met With through being members of the Achaean
Aegina. league ; when Publius Sulpicius sailed against
them with the Roman fleet, and sold all the unhappy Aeginetans
into slavery." In regard to this subject I have already related
how [he Aetolians, having got possession of Aegina in virtue of
their treaty with Rome, sold it to Attalus for thirty talents.
Cassander therefore drew the attention of the Achaeans to
these facts ; and demanded that Eumenes should not seek to
gain the afTection of the Achaeans by offering them money, but
that he should establish an incontestable claim to every sign of
devotion by giving back Aegina, He urged the Achaeans not
to accept presents which would place them in the position of
l>eing the destroyers of the hopes of Aeginetan restoration for
all time.
After these speeches had been delivered, the people showed
The preseni of such signs of enthusiastic approval that no one
Eumcnos is ventured to speak on the side of the king ; but
refused. ([,g whole assembly rejected the offer by acclama-
tion, though its amount certainly made it exceedingly tempting.
12. The next subject introduced for debate was that of
king Ptolemy. The ambassadors who had been on the mission
XXII OFFERS OF SUMENES &• SELEUCUS DECLINED 311
to Ptolemy were called forward, and Lycortas, acting as spokes-
man, began by stating how they had interchanged piolemy. The
oaths of alliance with the king; and next an- speech of
nounced that they brought a present from the Lycortas,
king to the Achaean league of six thousand stands of arms for
pelcasts, and two thousand talents in bronze coinage; He
added a panegyric on the king, and finished his speech by a
brief reference to the goodwill and active benevolence of the
king towards the Achaeans. Upon this the Strategus of the
Achaeans, Aristaenus, stood up and asked a miMake
Lycortas and his colleagues in the embassy to discovered.
Ptolemy " which alliance it was that he had thus renewed ? "
No one answering the question, but all the assembly
beginning to converse with each other, the Council chambo'
was filled with confusion. The cause of this absurd state
of things was this. There had been several treaties of
alliance formed between the Achaeans and Ptolemy's
kingdom, as widely different in their provision as in the
circumstances which gave rise to them -. but neither had
Ptolemy's envoy made any distinction when arranging for the
renewal, merely speaking in general terms on the matter, nor had
the ambassadors sent from Achaia; but they had interchanged
the oaths on the assumption of there being but one treaty.
The result was, that, on the Strategus quoting all the treaties,
and pointing out in detail the differences between them, which
turned out to be important, the assembly demanded to know
which it was that it was renewing. And when no one was able
to explain, not even Philopoemcn himself, who had been in office
when the renewal was made, nor Lycortas and his colleagues
who had been on the mission to Alexandria, these men all
began to be regarded as careless in conducting the business of
the league ; while Aristaenus acquired great reputation as being
the only man who knew what he was talking about j and finally,
the assembly refused to allow the ratification, voting on account
of this blunder that the business should be postponed.
Then the ambassadors from Seleucus entered with their
proposal. The Achaeans, however, voted to Offer of
renew the friendship with Seleucus, but to Sdcucus.
decline for the present the gifl of the ships.
312 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS book
18. Having thus finished their deliberations, the assembly
broke up and the people separated to their
^cT^iSs*^ several cities. But subsequently, while the
(Nemean) games were in course of celebration,
Quintus Caecilius arrived from Macedonia, on his way back
from the embassy which he had been conducting to Philip.
Aristaenus having called a meeting of the league magistrates in
Argos, Quintus attended and upbraided them for having ex-
ceeded justice in the harshness and severity with which they had
treated the Lacedaemonians, and urged them strongly to repair
the error. Aristaenus said not a word, showing clearly by his
silence that he disapproved of what had been done and agreed
with the words of Caecilius. But Diophanes of Megalopolis,
who was more of a soldier than a statesman, stood up to speak,
and so far from offering any defence of the Achaeans, suggested
to Caecilius, from hostility to Philopoemen, another charge that
might be brought against them. For he said that "the Lacedae-
monians were not the only people who had been badly treated ;
the Messenians had been so also." There were as a fact some
controversies going on among the Messenians, in regard to the
decree of FJamininus concerning the exiles, and the execu-
tion of it by Philopoemen : and Caecilius, thinking that he
now had a party among the Achaeans themselves of the same
opinion as himself, expressed still greater anger at the hesita-
tion on the part of the assembled magistrates in obeying his
orders. However, when Philopoemen, Lycortas, and Archon
argued long and elaborately to prove that what had been done
at Sparta was right, and advantageous to the Lacedaemonians
themselves more than to any one else, and that it was impossible
to disturb any existing arrangements without violating justice
to man and piety to the gods, they came to the decision that
they would maintain them, and give an answer to that
effect to the Roman legate. Seeing what the disposition of
the magistrates was, Caecilius demanded that the public
assembly should be summoned, to which the Achaean magis-
trates demanded to see the instructions which he had from the
Senate on these points : and when he gave no answer to this
demand, they said that they would not summon the assembly
for him, as their laws forbade them to do so unless a man
xjtii CAECFLIUS m THE ACHAEAN ASSEMBLY 313
brought written instructions from the Senate, stating the subject
on which they were to summon it. Caecilius was so angry at
this uncompromising opposition to his orders, that he refused
to receive his answer from the magistrates, and so departed
without any answer at all The Achaeans laid the blame
both of the former visit of Marcus Fulvius and the present
one of Caecilius on Aristacnus and Diophanes, on the ground
that they had invited them on account of their political oppo-
sition to Fhilopoemen ; and accordingly the general public felt
a certain suspicion of these two men. Such was the state of
the Peloponnese. . . .
14. Fhilopoemen had a sharp difference in debate with
Archon the Strategus. In course of time, how-
ever, Fhilopoemen was convinced by Archon's '^ ^^^^
arguments, and, changing his mind, spoke in
warm commendation of Archon as having managed his business
with skill and address. But when 1 heard the speech at the
time it did not seem to me right' to praise a man and yet do
him an injury, nor do I think so now in my maturer years. For
I think that there is as wide a distinction in point of morality
between practical ability and success secured by absence of
scruples, as there is between skill and mere cunning. The former
are in a manner the highest attainments possible, the latter the
reverse. But owing to the lack of discernment so general in
our day, these qualities, which have little in common, excite
the same amount of commendation and emulation in the
world. . . ■
16. When Caecilius returned from Greece and made his
report to the Senate concerning Macedonia and
the Peloponnese, the ambassadors who had f'^™''^-'*"" .
come to Rome on these matters were inCro- "SiT Achoran"
duced into the Senate. First came those from heard on the
Philip and Eumenes, as well as the exiles from !?P*''' °'
Aenus and Maroneia; and on their saying ^^^ 185-184,
much the same as they had said before Caecilius
and his colleagues at Thessalonica, the Senate voted to send
another deputation to Philip, to see first of all whether he
had evacuated the cities in Perrhaebia in conformity with the
answer he gave to Caecilius : and secondly, to order him to
314 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS bom
remove his garrison from Aenus and Maroneia ; and in a word,
to abandon all fortresses, positions, and towns on the sea-board
of Thrace.
After these the ambassadors from the Peloponnese were
The Achaean introduced. For the Achaeans on their part
aniiiass.Tdors had sent Apollonidas of Sicyon, and others, to
make thtir justify thcmselves to Caecilius for his having
received no answer, and generally to inform the
Senate on the question of Sparta ; and at the same time Areus
and Alcibiades had come from Sparta as ambassadors, — two
of the old exiles recently restored by Philopoemen and the
Achaeans. And this was a circumstance that particularly roused
the anger of the Achaeans ; because they thought it the height of
ingratitude on the part of the exiles, after receiving so important
and recent a service at their hands, to be now sending a
hostile embassy, and accusing to the sovereign people those
who had been the authors of their unlooked-for preservation
and restoration to their country,
16. Both parties were heard in their defence in each
Other's presence. Apollonidas of Sicyon and his colleagues
tried to convince the Senate that the affairs of
'^env^f" Sparta could not have been better managed
than they were managed by Philopoemen.
Areus and his colleagues attempted to establish the reverse :
alleging, first of all, that the power of the city was entirely
destroyed by the violent withdrawal of so large a number ;
and, in the second place, that even those that were left were
so few that their position was insecure, now that the walls
were pulled down ; and that their freedom of speech was
entirely destroyed by the fact that they were not only amenable
to the general decrees of the Achaean league, but were also
made specially subject to the magistrates set over them from
time to time. After hearing these envoys also, the Senate
_, . . . decided to give the same legates instructions
The decision, ,• , „ , , .
regardmg them as well as the others, and ap-
pointed Appius Claudius and his colleagues commissioners for
Greece,
But the ambassadors from the Achaeans offered an ex-
planation also to Caecilius in the Senate, on behalf of the
XTti ANOTHEk COMMISSION FOR GREECE 315
magistrates, asserting that " They did not act wrongly or deserve
blame for refusing to summon the assembly, Defence of ihe
unless it were requisite to decide on an alliance refusal lo call ibe
or a war, or unless some one brought a letter Achaean assembly,
from the Senate. The magistrates had therefore impartially
considered the subject of summoning the assembly, but were
prevented from doing so by the laws, because he neither
brought a despatch from the Senate nor would show them any
written instructions." At the conclusion of this speech
Caecilius rose and made an attack on Philopoemen and
Lycortas, and the Achaeans generally, and on the policy they
had pursued towards the city of Sparta. After listening to
the arguments, the Senate answered the Achaeans by saying
that they would send commissioners to investigate the matter
of Sparta ; and they accompanied this answer by an admoni-
tion to them to pay attention to the ambassadors sent by them
from time to time, and show them proper respect, as the
Romans did to ambassadors who came to them. . . .
17. \Vhen Philip learnt, by a message from his own
ambassadors at Rome, that he would be obliged . ,
to evacuate the cities in Thrace, he was ex- on'lhe^^^
tremely annoyed, because he regarded his Maronda. early
kingdom as being now curtailed on every side ; '? ■■'^- '^*-
and hevenled his wrath upon the unhappy people "^' ''' ^'
of Maroneia. He sent for Onomastus, his governor in Thrace,
and communicated with him on the subject And Onomastus
on his return sent Cassander to Maroneia, who, from long
residence there, was familiar with the inhabitants, — for Philip's
practice had long been to place members of his court in these
cities, and accustom the people to their residence among
them. Some few days after his arrival, the Thracians having
been prepared for what they had to do, and having obtained
entrance to the city by night through the instrumentality of
Cassander, a great massacre took place, and many of the
Maronites were killed. Having wreaked this vengeance on
those who opposed him, and satisfied his own anger, Philip
waited for the arrival of the Roman legates, persuaded that no
one would venture for fear of him to denounce his crime.
But when Appius and his colleagues presently arrived, they
3i6 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBWS book
were promptly informed of what had happened at Maroneia,
He attempts to ^^^ expostulated in severe terms with Philip for
evade responsi- it. The king attempted to defend himself by
bihty for it. asserting that he had nothing to do with this act
of violence ; but that the Maronites, being divided into two
hostile parties, one inclined to Eumenes and the other to
himself, inflicted this misfortune upon themselves. He more-
over bade them confront him with any one who wished to
accuse him. He said this from a conviction that no one
would venture to do so; because they would consider that
Philip's vengeance upon those w^ho opposed him would be
near at hand, while assistance from Rome would have a long
way to come. But when Appius and his colleagues said that
" they required to hear no defence, for they were well aware of
what had happened, and who was the cause of it," Philip
became much confused.
1 8. They went no further than this in the first interview : but
The guilty agents during the ncxt day Appius ordered Philip to
are to be sent send Onomastus and Cassander at once to
to Rome. Rome, that the Senate might inform itself on
what had happened. The king was disturbed at this to the
greatest possible degree, and for some time did not know what
to say ; but at last he said that he would send Cassander, who
was the actual author of the business, that the Senate might
learn the truth from him ; but he tried to get Onomastus
excused, both in this and subsequent interviews with the
legates, alleging as a reason that not only had Onomastus not
been in Maroneia at the time of the massacre, but not even
in any part of the country in its neighbourhood. His real
motive, however, was fear lest, if he got to Rome,
Anoincr crime. !•» i*ii*« ••«
havmg been engaged with him m many similar
transactions, he would not only tell the Romans the story of
Maroneia, but all the others also. Eventually he did get
Onomastus excused ; and having, after the de-
^*"lo Romc."''^ parture of the legates, sent off Cassander, he
sent some agents with him as far as Epirus,
and there had him poisoned.^ But Appius and his colleagues
^ Livy (39, 34) more cautiously says : veneno creditur sublatus. Such
accusations were easily made, and not easily proved or confuted.
sill PHILIP AND THE MASSACRE AT MARONETA 317
left Philip with their minds fully made up both as to his guilt
in the matter of Maroneia and his alienation from Rome.
The king, thus relieved of the presence of the legates, after
consulting with his friends Apelles and Philocles j^ing Philip medi.
became clearly conscious that his quarrel with tales a breach
Rome had now become serious, and that it ""'' Ro^^-
could no longer be concealed, but was become notorious to
most people in the world. He was therefore now wholly bent
on measures of self-defence and retaliation. But as he was as
yet unprepared for some of the plans which he had in his
mind, he cast about to hnd some means of putting matters off,
and gaining time for making his preparations for war. He
accordingly resolved to send his youngest son ___ . . .
i> . T. 1 I 1 ■ I 1- Sends bis son
Demetrius to Rome : partly to make his defence Demetrius ihec^
on the charges brought against him, and partly in hopes of
also to beg pardon for any error which he ^^^'^f^^^^
might have committed. He felt certain that
everything he wished would be obtained from the Senate by
means of this young prince, because of the extraordinary
attentions which had been shown him when he was acting as
a hostage. He no sooner conceived this idea than he set
about making preparations for sending the prince and those
of his own friends destined to accompany him on his missioiL
At the same time he promised the Byzantines to give them
help : not so much because he cared for them, as from a wish
under cover of their name to strike terror into the princes of
the Thracians living beyond the Propontis, as a step towards
the fulfilment of his main purpose. . . .
19. In Crete, while Cydas son of Antalces was Cosmus^
the Gortynians, who sought in every way to ,
depress the Gnossians, deprived them of a '*™ "^ '" ^
portion of their territory called Lycastium, and assigned it
to the Rhaucii, and another portion called Diatonium to
the Lyctii. But when about this time Appius and his
colleagues arrived in the island from Rome, with the
' For Ihc ten Cosmi of Crete, sec AriBtol, Pol. 3, 10 ; and MUUer's Dorians.
vol. ii. p. 133 iq. Cydas gives his name to ibc year as Tpbn-dmr/ioi, s«e
C. I, G. 1583. The same inscription contains the litle KotfjiiimXii. apparenUy
like i-oXioCxot, as a name for a guardian hero of the city. We have already
had this latter title 01 that of a chief mai^trale at Locri. See bk. la, cfa. 16.
3i8 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS booi
view of settling the controversies which existed among
them, and addressed remonstrances to the cities of Gnossus
and Gortyn on these points, the Cretans gave in, and
submitted the settlement of their disputes to Appius. He
accordingly ordered the restoration of their territory to the
Gnossians ; and that the Cydoniates should receive back the
hostages which they had formerly left in the hands of
Charmion, and should surrender Phalasarna, without taking
anything out of it As to sharing in the legal jurisdiction of
the whole island, he left it free lo the several cities to do so
or not as they pleased, on condition that in the latter case
they abstained from entering the rest of Crete, they and the
exiles from Phalasarna who murdered Menochtus and his
friends, their most illustrious citizens. . . .
20. ApoUonias, the wife of Atlalus, father of king
The Queen- Eumenes, was a native of Cyzicus, and a woman
Dowager, widow who for many reasons deserves to be remem-
of AitiJus, and bered, and with honour. Her claims upon a
favourable recollection are that, though bom of
a private family, she became a queen, and retained that exalted
rank to the end of her life, not by the use of meretricious fascina-
tions, but by the virtue and integrity of her conduct in private
and public life alike.. Above all, she was the mother of four
sons with whom she kept on terms of the most perfect affection
and motherly love to the last day of her life. And so Attalus
and his brother gained a high character, while staying at
Cyzicus, by showing their mother proper respect and honour.
For they took each of them one of her hands and led her
between them on a visit to the temples and on a tour of the
town, accompanied by their suite. At this sight all who saw
it received the young princes with very warm marks of approval,
Hoodotus I ai ^"'^' '^'^""g tl^c story of Cleobis and Biton,
' compared their conduct with theirs ; and re-
marked that the affectionate zeal shown by the young princes,
though perhaps not going so far as theirs, was rendered quite
as illustrious by the fact of their more exalted position.
This took place in Cyzicus, after the peace made with king
Prusias. . . .
21. Ostiagon the Gaul, king of the Gauls of Asia, en-
XXII THE WIFE OF KING ATTALVS 319
deavourcd to transfer to himself the sovereignty of all the
Gauls i and he had many qualifications for such a post, both
natural and acquired. For he was open-handed xhe poiioy of
and generous, a man of popular manners and Osiiogom in
ready tact ; and, what was most important in Galana.
the eyes of the Gauls, he was a man of courage and skill in
22. Aristonicus was one of the eunuchs of Rolemy, king
of Egypt, and had been brought up from child- character of
hood with the king. As he grew up he dis- Arisionkus. See
played more manly courage and tastes than are "l^™' ^- ?■
generally found in an eunuch. For he had a natural predilection
for a military life, and devoted himself almost exclusively to that
and all that it involved. He was also skilful in dealing with
men, and, what is very rare, took lai^e and liberal views, and
was naturally inclined to bestow favours and kindnesses. . . .
BOOK XXIII
1. In the 149th Olympiad a greater number of em-
bassies came to Rome from Greece than were
^Tr f^rrRo"^' almost ever seen before. For as Philip was
compelled by treaty to submit disputes with
his neighbours to arbitration, and as it was known that the
Romans were willing to receive accusations against Philip,
Coss. P. Claudius ^nd would secure the safety of those who had
Puicher, L. Por- controversies with him, all who lived near the
ciusLicinus, B.a frontier of Macedonia came to Rome, some in
their private capacity, some from cities, others
from whole tribes, with complaints against Philip. At the
same time also came ambassadors from Eumenes, accom-
panied by his brother Athenaeus, to accuse Philip in regard
to the Thracian cities and the aid sent to Prusias. Philip's
son, Demetrius, also came to make answer to all these various
envoys, accompanied by Apelles and Philocles, who were at
that time considered the king's first friends. Ambassadors
also came from Sparta, representatives of each faction of the
citizens.
The first summoned to the Senate was Athenaeus, from whom
B.C. 183, Coss. ^^^ Senate accepted the compliments of fifteen
M. Claudius thousand gold pieces, and passed a decree highly
Marceiius Q. extolling Eumenes and his brothers for their
answer, and exhorting them to continue in the
same mind. Next the praetors called upon all the accusers
of Philip, and brought them forward by one embassy at a
time. But as they were numerous, and their entry occupied
three days, the Senate became embarrassed as to the settle-
ment to be made in each case. For from Thessaly there
were ambassadors from the whole nation, and also from each
xxm DEMETRIUS BEFORE THE SENATE 3J1
city separately ; so also from the Perrhaebians, Athamanians,
Epirotes, and lUyrians. And of these some brought cases of
dispute as to territory, slaves, or cattle ; and some about con-
tracts or injuries sustained by themselves. Some alleged that
they could not get their rights in accordance with the treaty,
because Philip prevented the administration of justice ; while
others impeached the justice of the decisions given, on the
ground that Philip had corrupted the arbitrators. And, in
fact, there was an inextricable confusion and multiplicity of
charges.
2. In such a state of things the Senate felt unable to come
to a clear decision itself, and did not think it Demetrius in the
fair that Demetrius should have to answer each Senaie.
of the several indictments ; for it regarded him ^'T' 39. 47-
with great favour, and saw at the same time that his extreme
youth unfitted him to cope with business of such intricacy and
complexity. Besides, what it desired most was not to hear
speeches of Demetrius, but to ascertain with certainty the dis-
position of Philip. Excusing him therefore from pleading
his cause, the Senate asked the young man and his friends
whether they were the bearers of any written memoir from
the king; and upon Demetrius answering that he was, and
holding out a paper of no great size, the Senate bade him
give a summary of what the paper contained in answer to
the accusations alleged. It amounted to this, that on each
point Philip asserted that he had carried out the injunc-
tions of the Senate, or, if he had not done so, laid the
blame upon his accusers ; while to the greater number of his
declarations he had added the words, "though the commis-
sioners with Caecihus were unfair to me in this point," or
again, " though I am unjustly treated in this respect." Such
being Philip's mind, as expressed in the several clauses of the
paper, the Senate, alter hearing the ambassadors who were
come to Rome, comprehended them all under one measure.
By the mouth of the praetor it offered an honourable and cor-
dial reception to Demetrius, expressed in ample and emphatic
language, and answered his speech by saying that " The Senate
fully believe that on all the points mentioned by Demetrius, or
read by him from his paper of instructions, full justice was
VOL. 11 y
322 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS BOOK
already done or would be done. But, in order that Philip
might be made aware that the Senate paid this honour to
Demetrius, ambassadors would be sent to see that everything
was being done in accordance with the will of the Senate, and
at the same time to inform the king that he owed this grace
to his son Demetrius." Such was the arrangement come to
on this part of the business.
3. The next to enter the Senate were the ambassadors ol
Theamb. d ^^"^ Eumenes, who denounced Philip on
of Eumenes com- account of the assistance sent to Prusias, and
plain that Philip concerning his actions in Thrace, alleging that
*^ Th^cr^*^ ^^^'^ ^' ^^^' moment he had not withdrawn his
garrisons from the cities. But upon Philocles
showing his wish to offer a defence on these points, as having
been formerly charged with a mission to Prusias, and being
now sent to the Senate to represent Philip on this business,
the Senate, without listening very long to his speech, answered
that " With regard to Thrace, unless the legates found every-
thing there settled in accordance with its will, and all the
cities restored to the entire control of Eumenes, the Senate
would be unable any longer to allow it to pass, or to submit to
being continually disobeyed."
Though the ill-feeling between the Romans and Phihp
The high honour was becoming serious, a check was put to it for
paid to Demetrius the time by the presence of Demetrius. And yet
at Rwne, and its jj^jg young prince's mission to Rome proved
eventually no slight link in the chain of events
which led to the final ruin of his house. For the Senate, by
thus making much of Demetrius, somewhat turned the young
man's head, and at the same time gravely annoyed Perseus
and the king, by making them feel that the kindness they
received from the Romans was not for their own sakes, but
for that of Demetrius. And T. Quintius Flamininus con-
tributed not a little to the same result by taking the young
prince aside and communicating with him in confidence.
For he flattered him by suggesting that the Romans meant
before long to invest him with the kingdom ; while he irritated
Philip and Perseus by sending a letter ordering the king to
send Demetrius to Rome again, with as many friends of the
xxiii PHILIP'S JEALOUSY ROUSED 333
highest character as possible. It was, in fact, by taking ad-
vantage of these circumstances that Perseus shortly afterwards
induced his father to consent to the death of Demetrius.
But I shall relate that event in detail later on.
4. The next ambassadors called in were the Lacedaemonians.
Of these there were four distinct factions. -^^ f^ur gpanan
Lysis and his colleagues represented the old embassies,
exiles, and their contention was that they ought '■ '-^; ^^l^
to have back the possessions from which they Nabis.
had originally been driven. Areus and AIci- a. Areusand
biades, on the contrary, contended that they Aleibiades.
should receive the value of a talent from their original pro-
perty, and divide the rest among deserving citizens. Serippus
pleaded that things should be left in exactly the serinDus
state in which they were when they formerly
belonged to the Achaean league. Lastly, Chaeron and his
colleagues represented those who had been
condemned to death or exile by the votes of ;};^^';°^'^'"
the Achaean league, and demanded their own
recall and the . restoration of the constitution. These all
delivered speeches against the Achaeans in conformity with
their several objects. The Senate, finding itself unable to
come to a clear decision on these particular controversies,
appointed a committee of investigation, consisting of the three
who had already been on a mission to the Peloponnese on
these matters, namely Titus Flamininus, Q. Caecilius, and
Appius Claudius Pulcher.^ After long discussions before
this committee it was unanimously decided that
the exiles and the condemned were to be re- '^'jj^^ri.^ ""
called, and that the city should remain a
member of the Achaean league. But as to the property,
whether the exiles were each to select a talent's worth from
what had been theirs [or to receive it all back], on this point
they continued to dispute. That they might not, however,
have to begin the whole controversy afresh [the committee]
caused the points agreed upon to be reduced to writing, to
I There is some loss In the leiLl as 10 these n;
on a Geeek embassjr in aa, 16. See also tb
notliiilg of thil commillee of Itlc«c
3»4 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS -aoom.
which all affixed their seals. But the committee, also wishing
to include the Achaeans in the agreement, called in Xenarchus
and his colleagues, who were at that time on a mission from
the Achaeans, to renew their alliance with Rome, and at the
same time to give an eye to their controversy with the Lace-
daemonians. These men, being unexpectedly asked whether
they consented to the terms contained in the written docu-
ment, were somewhat at a loss what to answer. For they did
not approve of the restoration of the exiles and the con-
demned persons, as being contrary to the decree of the league
and the contents of the tablet on which that decree was en-
graved ; and yet they approved of the document as a whole,
because it contained the clause providing that Sparta should
remain a member of the league. Finally, however, partly
from this difficulty, and partly from awe of the Roman com-
missioners, they affixed their seal The Senate, therefore,
selected Quintus Marcius to go as legate to settle the afiairs
of Macedonia and the Peloponnese. . . .
5. When Deinocrates of Messene arrived on a mission at
Rome, he was delighted to find that Titus
M^en? " Flamininus had been appointed by the Senate
to go as ambassador to Frusias and Seleucus.
For having been very intimate with Titus during the I^cedae-
monian war, he thought that this friendship, combined with
his disagreements with PhJIopoemen, would induce him on
his arrival in Greece to settle the affairs of Messene in accord-
ance with his own views. He therefore gave up everything
else to attach himself exclusively to Titus, on whom he rested
all his hopes. . . .
This same Deinocrates was a courtier and a soldier by nature
as well as habit, but he assumed the air of consummate
statesmanship. His parts, however, were showy rather than
solid. In war his fertility of resource and boldness were
beyond the common run ; and he shone in feats of personal
bravery. Nor were these his only accomplishments ; he was
attractive and ready in conversation, versatile and courteous
'in society. But at the same time he was devoted to licentious
intrigue, and in public affairs and questions of policy was quite
incapable of sustained attention or far-sighted views, of forti-
XXIII DETNOCSATES OF MESSENE 325
fying himself with well-considered arguments, or putting them
before the public On this occasion, for instance, though he
had really given the initiative to grave misfortunes, he did not
think that he was doing anything of importance ; but followed
his usual manner of life, quite regardless of the future, indulg-
ing day after day in amours, wine, and song. Flamininus,
however, did once force him to catch a glimpse of the serious-
ness of his position. For seeing him on a certain occasion in
a party of revellers dancing in Jong robes, he said nothing at
the time ; but next morning, being visited by him with some
request in behalf of his country, he said : " I will do my best,
Deinocrates; but it does astonish me that you can drink and
dance after having given the start to such serious troubles for
Greece." He appears, indeed, at that to have a little recovered
his soberer senses, and to have understood what an improper
display he had been making of his tastes and habits. However,
he arrived at this period in Greece in company with Flamin-
inus, fully persuaded that the affairs of Messene would be
settled at a blow in accordance with his views. But Philopoe-
men and his party were fully aware that Flamininus had no
commission from the Senate in regard to affairs in Greece ;
they therefore awaited his arrival without taking any step of any
sort. Having landed at Naupactus, Flamininus addressed a
despatch to the Strategus and Demiui^i' bidding them summon
the Achaeans to an assembly ; to which they wrote back that
"they would do so, if he would write them word what the
subjects were on which he wished to confer with the Achaeans;
for the laws enjoined that limitation on the magistrates." As
Flamininus did not venture to write this, the hopes of Deino-
crates and the so-called " old exiles," but who had at that time
been recently banished from Sparta, came to nothing, as in fact
did the visit of Flamininus and the plans which he had formed. . . .
' The ten Icderal roagistmles of the league, who fonned a council to act
with the general. Their number probably arose from the number of the
Achaean cantons or lowni, after two of the twelve — Helice and Otenus — were
deslroyed. Polybius nowhere else gives them this lillc in any part of the history
we possess, but its use by Livy, 33, aa, seems to point to bis having used it in
other places, li also occurs in a teller of Philip II. (perhaps genuine) tguotcd in
DcmosUi. di Cor. 157. Polybius calls tbem aUo si Ifixotrtt, ifxdii rpomrirtt
ffurifixo^m, vvrapjifai. See Freeman's Ftderal Gov. p. aSa.
326 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS BOOK
6. About the same period some ambassadors were sent by
the exiled citizens of Sparta to Rome, among whom was
g^ Arcesilaus and Agesipolis who, when quite a boy,
had been made king in Sparta. These two
men were fallen upon and killed by pirates on the high seas ;
but their colleagues arrived safely at Rome. . . .
7. On the return of Demetrius from Rome, bringing with
him the formal reply, in which the Romans re-
'^?^^?!fl!V^ ferred all the favour and confidence which they
Demetnus in , , . , .- ^ • •
Macedonia. His avowed to their regard for Demetrius, saying
fathers anger and that all they had done or would do was for his
**'jealousr^ sake, — the Macedonians gave Demetrius a
cordial reception, believing that they were re-
lieved from all fear and danger : for they had looked upon
war with Rome as all but at their doors, owing to the provoca-
tions given by Philip. But Philip and Perseus were far from
pleased, and were much offended at the idea of the Romans
taking no account of them, and referring all their favour to
Demetrius. Philip however concealed his displeasure; but
Perseus, who was not only behind his brother in good feelings
to Rome, but much his inferior in other respects, both in
natural ability and acquired accomplishments, made no secret
of his anger : and was beginning to be thoroughly alarmed as
to his succession to the crown, and lest, in spite of being the
elder, he should be excluded. Therefore he commenced by
bribing the friends of Demetrius. . . .
The end of this fraternal jealousy is described in Liiy^ 40,
5-24. By a forged letter purporting to come from Flamininus^
Philip is persuaded that his son played the traitor at Rome and
gives an order or a permission for his being put to death ; which
is accordingly donCy partly by poison and partly by violence^ at
Heracleia, b.c 181.
8. Upon Quintus Marcius arriving on his mission in
Philip feigns sub- Macedonia, Philip evacuated the Greek cities in
mission to Rome, Thrace entirely and withdrew his garrisons,
B.C. 183. though in deep anger and heaviness of spirit ;
and he put on a right footing everything else to which the
Roman injunctions referred, wishing to give them no indica-
KXiii DEATH OF DEMETRIUS yrt
tion of his estrangement, but to secure time for malting his
preparations for war. In puisuance of this design he led Out
an array against the barbarians, and marching through the
centre of Thrace he invaded the Odrysae, Bessi, and Dentheletl
Coming to Phihppopolis, the inhabitants flying for safety to
the heights, he took it without a blow. And thence, after
traversing the plain, and sacking some of the
villages, and exacting a pledge of submission 'nebnis
from others, he returned home, leaving a garri-
son in Fhilippopolis, which was after a time expelled by the
Odrysae in defiance of their pledge of fidelity to Philip. . . .
9. In the second year of this Olympiad, on the arrival of
ambassadors from Eumenes, Pharnaces, and After mld-
the Achaean league, and also from the Lace- aummer of b.c
daemonians who had been banished from '^3-
Sparta,^ and from those who were in actual possession of it, the
Senate despatched their business. But there came after them
a mission from Rhodes in regard to the disaster at Sinope;
to whom the Senate replied that it would send legates to in-
vestigate the case of the Sinopeans and their grievances against
those kings. And Quintus Marcius having recently arrived
from Greece and made his report on the state of affairs in
Macedonia and the Peloponnese, the Senate did not require
to hear much more; but having called in the envoys from
the Peloponnese and Macedonia they listened indeed to what
they had to say, but founded its reply, without
any reference to their speeches, wholly on the ^^bT' ^^'
report of Marcius, in which he had stated, in
reference to king Philip, that he had indeed done all that
was enjoined on him, but with great reluctance ; and that, if he
got an opportunity, he would go all lengths against the Romans.
The Senate accordingly composed a reply to the king's envoys
in which, while praising Philip for what he had done, they
warned him for the future to be careful not to be found acting
in opposition to the Romans. As to the Peloponnese, Marcius
had reported that, as the Achaeans were unwilling to refer any
matter whatever to the Senate, but were haughtily inclined
328 TFIE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS book
and desirous of managing all their affairs themselves, if the
Senate would only reject their present application and give
ever so slight an indication of displeasure, Sparta would
promptly come to an understanding with Messene ; and then
the Achaeans would be glad enough to appeal to the protec-
tion of Rome. In consequence of this report they answered
the Lacedaemonian Scrippus and his colleagues, wishing to
leave this city in a state of suspense, that they had done their
best for them, but that for the present they did not think this
matter concerned them. But when the Achaeans besought
for help against the Messenians^ in virtue of their alliance with
Rome, or at least that they would take precautions to prevent
any arms or com from being brought from Italy into Messene,
the Senate refused compliance with either request and
answered that the Achaeans ought not to be surprised if
Sparta or Corinth or Argos renounced their league, if they
would not conduct their hegemony in accordance with the
Senate's views. This answer the Senate made public, as
a kind of proclamation that any people who chose might
break off from the Achaeans for all the Romans cared ;
and they further retained the ambassadors in Rome, waiting
to see the issue of the quarrel between the Achaeans and
Messenians. . . .
10. In this period a certain dreadful foreshadowing of mis-
Thc conflict of fortune fell upon king Philip and the whole of
feelings in Macedonia, of a kind well worthy of close atten-
Phiiip's mind. ^iQj^ ^^^ record. As though Fortune had
resolved to exact from him at once the penalties for all the
impieties and crimes which he had committed in the whole
course of his life, she now visited him with furies, those deities
of retribution, those powers that had listened to the prayers of
the victims of his cruelties, who, haunting him day and night,
so plagued him to the last day of his life, that all the world was
forced to acknowledge the truth of the proverb, that "Justice
has an eye " which mere men should never despise. The first
idea suggested to him by this evil power was that, as he
* The Messenians revolted from the league B.C. 183, and in the course of
the fighting which ensued Philopoemen fell into an ambush, was taken
prisoner, and put to death by them. See ch. 12.
XXIII PHILIP'S DESPERATE MEASURES 3»9
was about to go to war with Rome, he had better remove from
the most important cities, and those along the sea-coast, the
leading citizens, with theii wives and children, and place them
in Ennathia, formerly called Paeonia, and 611 up the cities with
Thracians and other barbarians, as likely to be more securely
loyal to him in the coming hour of danger. The actual
carrying out of this measure, and the uprooting of these men
and their families, caused such an outburst of grief, and so
violent an outcry, that one might have supposed the whole dis-
trict to have been taken by the sword Curses and appeals to
heaven were rained upon the head of the king without any
further attempt at concealment His next step, prompted by
the wish to leave no element of hostility or disaffection in the
kingdom, was to write to the governors of the several cities
ordering them to search out the sons and daughters of such
Macedonians as had been put to death by him, and place them
in ward ; in which he referred especially to %—,
Admetus, Pyrrhicus, and Samus, and those who
had perished with them : but he also included all others who-
soever that had been put to death by order of the king, quoting
this verse, we are told : — '
" Oh fool 1 to slay tbe sire and leave the soni."
Most of these men being persons of distinguished families, their
fate made a great noise and excited universal pity. But Fortune
had a third act in this bloody drama in reserve for Philip, in
which the young princes plotted against each other; and their
quarrels being referred to him, he was forced to choose between
becoming the murderer of his sons and living the rest of his
life in dread of being murdered by them in his old age; and
to decide which of the two he had the greater reason to fear.
Tortured day and night by these anxieties, the miseries and
perturbations of his spirit lead to the inevitable reflection that
the wrath of heaven fell upon his old age for the sins of his
previous life : which will be rendered still more evident by
what remains to be told . . . Just when his soul was stung
to madness by these circumstances, the quarrel between his
sons blazed out : Fortune, as It were of set purpose, bringing
their misfortunes upon the scene all at one time. . . .
' Suuiniu^.
330 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS book
Fragment referring The Macedonians make offerings to Xanthus
^shamfight^ ^^ ^ ^^^^» ^^'^ perform a purification of the
which Perseus army with horses fully equipped. . . .
and Demetrius
quarrelled,
B.C. 182.
Sec Livy, 40, 6.
11. "One should not merely read tragedies, tales, and
histories, but should understand and ponder over
^Tphliip to^s* ^^^' ^" ^^ ^^ ^^^ ^^^ ^^y ^^^^ ^^^ when-
two sons after the ever brothers fall out and allow their quarrel to
quarrel at the go any great length, they invariably end not only
^wKEuvrM. ^ ^y destroying themselves but in the utter ruin
of their property, children, and cities ; while
those who keep their self-love within reasonable bounds, and
put up with each other's weaknesses, are the preservers of
these, and live in the fairest reputation and fame. I have
often directed your attention to the kings in Sparta, telling you
that they preserved the hegemony in Greece for their country
just so long as they obeyed the ephors, as though they were
their parents, and were content to reign jointly. But directly
they in their folly tried to change the government to a
monarchy, they caused Sparta to experience every misery
possible. Finally, I have pointed out to you as an example
the case of Eumenes and Attalus ; showing you that, though
they succeeded to but a small and insignificant realm, they
have raised it to a level with the best, simply by the harmony and
unity of sentiment, and mutual respect which they maintained
towards each other. But so far from taking my words to heart,
you are, as it seems to me, whetting your angry passions against
each other. ..."
THE FALL OF PHILOPOEMEN
12. Philopoemen rose^ and proceeded on his way, though he
Th d th f ^^^ oppressed at once by illness and the weight
Philopoemen, o^ years, being now in the seventieth year of
B.C. 183, his age. Conquering his weakness, however,
orpCThapseariyinj^y ^j^^ f^^ce of his previous habits he reached
Megalopolis, from Argos, in one day's journey
^ He was ill with fever. Plutarch, Phil. 18.
XXIII DEATH OF PHILOPOEMEN 331
He was captured, when Achaean Strategus, by the Messenians
and poisoned. Thus, though second to none Phiiopoemen was
that ever hved before him in excellence, his mutdered by Uie
fortune was less happy ; yet in his previous life Messenians, who
he seemed ever to have enjoyed her favour and league and were
assistance. But it was, I suppose, a case of the at war wiih it. See
common proverb, "a man may have a stroke of ^"^' 3S' ■ts-so-
luck, but no man can be lucky always." We must, therefore,
call our predecessors fortunate, without pretending that they
were so invariably — for what need is there to flatter Fortune
by a meaningless and false compliment? It is those who
have enjoyed Fortune's smiles in their life for the longest
time, and who, when she changes her mind, meet with only
moderate mishaps, that we must speak of as fortunate. . . .
Phiiopoemen was succeeded by Lycortas,^ . . , and though
he had spent forty years of an active career in charact
a state at once democratic and composed of phiiopoemen. He
many various elements, he had entirely avoided 's succeeded by
giving rise to the jealousy of the citizens in any ^^^ "*
direction : and yet he had not flattered their
inclinations, but for the most part had used great freedom of
speech, which is a case of very rare occurrence. . . .
IS. An admirable feature in Hannibal's character of
character, and the strongest proof of his having Hannibal, who
been a born ruler of men, and having possessed ^,'^" ^^^ ^
statesmanlike qualities of an unusual kind, is Pmsias, ».c.i83.
that, though he was for seventeen years engaged See Livy, 39, i.
in actual warfare, and though he had to make his way through
numerous barbaric tribes, and to employ innumerable men of
diflerent nationalities in what appeared desperate and hazardous
enterprises, he was never made the object of a conspiracy by
any of them, nor deserted by any of those who had joined him
and put themselves under his command. . . .
14. Publius Scipio, in the course of an active career in
' Liv7 (39, so) speaks of Lycortas at Ihe time of Philopoemen's dealh ai
alttr imftralor Achatorum. If he had been Ihe irarrpoTTfyit we know ibat
he would nol by law have succeeded on (he dcaih of Ihe Stralegiu. Plutarch,
Pkit. 31, seems to assert that an election was held at once, but not ihe
ordinary popular election.
332 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS book
an aristocratic state, secured such popularity with the multi-
character of p. tude and such credit with the Senate, that when
Cornelius Scipio some one took upon himself to bring him to
^^^TpoiX^^ ^"^^ ^^^^'^ ^^ people in the manner usual at
places in this year, Rome, and produced many bitter accusations
but according to against him, he came forward and said nothing
^Sriftorhe*"^"^ ^^^^ "^^ ill-became the Roman people to
previous year Hsten to accusations against P. Cornelius
(39. 52-) Scipio, to whom his accusers owed it that they
had the power of speech at all." At this the populace dis-
persed, and quitting the assembly, left the accuser alone. . . .
Once when there was a sum of money required in the Senate
for some pressing business, and the quaestor, on the ground
of a legal difficulty, refused to open the treasury on that par-
ticular day, Scipio said that '^ he would take the keys himself and
open it ; for he was the cause of the treasury being locked at alL"
And again, when some one in the Senate demanded an account
of the money which he had received from Antiochus before the
treaty for the pay of his army, he said that he had the ledger,
but that he ought not to be called to account by any one. But
on his questioner persisting, and urging him to produce it, he
bade his brother bring it When the schedule was brought, he
held it out in front of him, and tearing it to pieces in the sight
of everybody bade the man who asked for it seek it out of these
fragments, and he demanded of the rest "How they could ask
for the items of the expenditure of these three thousand talents,
and yet no longer ask for an account of how and by whose
agency the fifteen thousand talents which they received from
Antiochus came into the treasury, nor how it is that they have
become masters of Asia, Libya, and Iberia?" This speech
not only made a strong impression on the rest, but also reduced
the man who demanded the account to silence.
These anecdotes have been related by me for the double
purpose of enhancing the fame of the departed, and of en-
couraging future generations in the paths of honour. . . .
16. For my part, I never concur with those who indulge
their anger against men of their own blood to the length of
not only depriving them of the year's harvest when at war with
them, but even of cutting down their trees and destroying
XXIII SUBMISSION OF THE AfESSENIANS 333
their buildings, and of leaving them no opportunity for repent-
ance. Such proceedings seem to me to be rank folly. For,
while they imagine that they are dismaying the enemy by the
devastation of their territory, and the deprivation of their future
as well as their present means of getting the necessaries of life,
they are all the while exasperating the men, and converting an
isolated ebullition of anger into a lasting hatred. . . .
IS. Lycortas the Achaean Strategus crushed the spirits of
the Messenians in the war. Up to this time Lyeortas, ihe
the populace at Messene had been afraid of successor of
their magistrates ; but now at length, relying on Ptiilopocmen,
,, ° . ' ,, ° ' ' °_ compels He Mes-
tne protection of the enemy, some of them seniani to sue
plucked up courage to break silence and to say foi peace,
that the time was come to send an embassy "■'^ iSj-iSa.
to negotiate a peace. Deinocrates and his colleagues, being
no longer able to face the people under this storm of popular
odium, yielded to circumstances and retired to their own houses.
Thereupon the people, acting under the advice of the older
men, and especially under that of Epaenetus and Apollodorus,
the ambassadors from Boeotia, — who, having arrived some
time before to negotiate a peace, happened fortunately to be at
that time at Messene, — appointed and despatched envoys,
beting forgiveness for their transgressions. The Achaean
Strategus, having summoned his colleagues ' to council, and
given the envoys a hearing, answered that "There was but
one way in which the Messenians could reconcile themselves to
the league, and that was by at once surrendering to him the
authors of the revolt and of the murder of Philopoemen, leave
the rest to the authority of the league assembly, and at once
receive a garrison into their citadel" When this message was
announced to the Messenian populace, those who had long
been bitterly opposed to the authors of the war were ready
enough to surrender them and to arrest them ; while the rest,
being persuaded that they would not be severely dealt with by
the Achaeans, readily consented to submit the general question
to the decision of the assembly. But what chiefly induced
them to unanimously accept the proposal was, that they in
fact had no choice in the matter. The Strategus accordingly
> That is the 'ten Demiiirgl.
334 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS book
at once took over the citadel and marched his peltasts into it ;
and then, taking some picked troops with him, entered the city ;
and having summoned a meeting of the people, addressed them
in terms befitting the occasion, promising that '^ they would
never have reason to repent having committed themselves
to the honour of the Achaeans." The general question ot
what was to be done he thus referred to the league, — for it
happened conveniently that the Achaeans were just then re-
assembling at Megalopolis for the second Congress,^ — but ot
o „ ^ o those who were guilty of the disturbances, he
Summer B.C. 182. , , „ , 1, • !• . J •
ordered all such as were actually impucated in
the summary execution of Philopoemen to put an end to their
own lives. . . .
17. The Messenians were reduced by their own folly to
Abia, Thuria, and ^^ brink of ruin, but were restored to their
Pharae make a former position in the league by the magna-
separate league, nimity of Lycortas and the Achaeans. But the
towns of Abia, Thuria, and Pharae during these transactions
abandoned their connection with Messene, and, setting up a pillar
engraved with a treaty of alliance between themselves, formed
a separate league. When the Romans were informed that
the Messenian war had turned out successfully for the Achaeans,
without taking any account of their previous declaration they
gave a different answer to the same ambassadors, asserting
that they had taken measures to prevent any one from convey-
ing arms or corn from Italy into Messene. By this they
showed clearly that, so far from avoiding or disregarding the
affairs of foreign nations not directly concerning themselves,
they were, on the contrary, annoyed at everything not being
referred to them and carried out in accordance with their
opinion.
When the ambassadors arrived in Sparta with their answer,
the Achaean Strategus as soon as he had settled
Achaean mcetmg ^^ Messenian business, summoned a congress
at Sicyon, and on its assembling, proposed a
resolution for the reception of Sparta into the league, alleging
* The second congress of the year seems to mean not that held for election
of the Strategus for the next year, which met about 12th May, but the second
regular meeting in August.
Mill SPARTA INCLUDED IN THE LEAGUE 335 ■
that "The Romans had declined the arbitration which had
previously been offered to them in regard to this city, — for
they had answered that they had now no concern with any
of the affairs of Sparta. Those, however, at present in power
at Sparta were desirous of being admitted to the privileges
of the league. Therefore he advised that they should
admit the town ; for this would be advantageous in two
ways : first, because they would be thus admitting men who
had remained unshaken in their loyalty to the league ; and
secondly, because they would not be admitting those of the
old exiles, who had behaved with ingratitude and impiety
towards them, to any share of their privileges ; but by confirming
the measures of those who had excluded them, would at the
same time be showing, with God's help, due gratitude to the
latter." With these words Lycortas exhorted the Achaeans to
receive the city of Sparta into the league. But Diophanes
and some others attempted to put in a word for the exiles, and
urged the Achaeans " Not to join in pressing heavily upon these
banished men; and not to t>e influenced by a mere handful of
men to strengthen the hands of those who had impiously and
lawlessly expelled them from their country."
18, Such were the arguments employed on either side.
The Achaeans, after listening to both, decided
to admit the city, and accordingly the agreement ^^1^^'^.
was engraved on a tablet, and Sparta became
a member of the Achaean league : the existing citizens having
agreed to admit such of the old exiles as were not considered
to have acted in a hostile spirit against the Achaeans. After
confirming this arrangement the Achaeans sent Bippus of
Argos and others as ambassadors to Rome, to explain to the
Senate what had been done in the matter. The Lacedae-
monians also sent Chaeron and others ; while the exiles too
sent a mission led by Oetis Diactorius^ to oppose the Achaean
ambassadors in the Senate.
' This looks like a local name, bul no place is known coiresponding [0 it.
A Diaclorida of Sparta is mentioned in Herodotus, 6, 137 ; and perhaps, as
Hultscb suggests, we ought lo read ' ' CIctii and Diaclorius. "
BOOK XXIV
1. The ambassadors from the Spartan exiles and from the
. Achaeans arrived in Rome simultaneously
Rome from the ^^^^ those of Eumenes, king Ariarathes, and
Achaeans, the Pharnaces ; and the Senate attended to these
Spartan exiles, latter first A short time previously a report
^^^"^arathS" ^ad been made to the Senate by Marcus,^ who
king of Cappado- had been despatched on a mission respecting
cia, and Pharnaces, ^^g ^^r that had broken out between Eumenes
*°B.c. 182.^"*' ^"^ Pharnaces, speaking highly of the modera-
tion of Eumenes in every particular, and the
grasping temper and insolence of Pharnaces. The Senate
accordingly did not require any lengthened arguments ; but,
after listening to the ambassadors, answered that they would
once more send legates to examine more minutely into the
points in dispute between the kings. Then came in the am-
bassadors from the Lacedaemonian exiles, and with them the
ambassadors from the citizens actually in the city ; and after
giving them a long hearing, the Senate expressed no dis-
approval of what had been done, but promised the exiles to
write to the Achaeans on the subject of their restoration to
their country. Some days afterwards, Bippus of Argos and his
colleagues, sent by the Achaeans, entered the Senate with a
statement as to the restoration of order in Messene ; and the
Senate, without showing displeasure at any part of the arrange-
ment, gave the ambassadors a cordial reception. . . .
* The mission to Eumenes and Pharnaces has been already mentioned in
bk. 23, ch. 9, but the name of the ambassador was not given ; nor is it men-
tioned by Livy (40, 20), who records the mission. It is uncertain who is
meant by Marcus, some editors have altered it to Marcius, i,e, Q. Marcius
Philippus, who had been sent to Macedonia, imagining him to have fulfilled
both missions.
BOOK XXIV THE SPARTAN EXILES REFUSED 337
Z When the ambassadors of the Spartan exiles arrived ia
the Peloponnese from Rome with a letter from xemis granted
the Senate to the Achaeans, desiring that mea- w the
sures should be taken for their recall and restora- Messeniana
tion to their country, the Achaeans resolved to postpone the
consideration of the question until their own ambassadors
should return. After making this answer, they caused the
agreement between themselves and the Messenians to be
engraved on a tablet : granting them, among other favours, a
three years' remission of taxes, in order that the damage done
to their territory should fall upon the Achaeans equally with
the Messenians. But when Bippus and his f],, requtst of
colleagues arrived from Rome, and reported that ihe Spanan
the letter in regard to the exiles was not due to '="'1** ^^o'^-
any strong feeling on the part of the Senate, but to the
importunity of the exiles themselves, the Achaeans voted to
make no change . . .
3. Mount Haemus is close to the Pontus, the most extensive
and loftiest of the ranges in Thrace, which it ^ Hacmns.
divides Into two nearly equal parts, from which Livy, 46, ai.
a view of both seas may be obtained. . , .'
4, In Crete there was the beginning of great troubles set
in motion, if one should speak of " a beginning creie in
of troubles " in Crete : for owing to the per- b.g 18a. See
sistency of civil wars and the acts of savagery **■ '^' '^'^ '*
practised against each other, beginning and end are much the
same in Crete ; and what appears to some people to be an
incredible story is a spectacle of everyday occurrence
there. . . .
6. Having come to terras with each other, Phamaces,
Attains, and the rest returned home. While End of the war
this was going on, Eumenes had recovered'*"***?^'™™''
from his illness, and was staying at Pergamus ; ^^^^ ^^ fofmer
and when his brother arrived to announce the had undertaken
arrangements that had been made, he approved '° support his
of what had been done, and resolved to send Ariaraibts. See
^ From Slrabo {vlL 5, 13}, vrhoadds : " But this is not (nie, for the distance
from the Adriatic is iinroense, and there are many obalades in the way to
otMCore the view."
338 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS
Livy, 38, 39, his brothers to Rome : partly because he hoped
B.C. 182-181. ^Q py^ ^^ g^^ ^Q ^YiQ war with Phamaces by
means of their mission, and partly because he wished to intro>
duce his brothers to his own private friends at Rome, and
officially to the Senate. Attalus and his brother were eager
for this tour ; and when they arrived in Rome the young men
met with a cordial reception from everybody in private society,
owing to the intimacies which they had formed during the
Roman wars in Asia, and a still more honourable welcome
from the Senate, which made liberal provision for their enter-
tainment and maintenance, and treated them with marked
respect in such conferences as it had with them. Thus,
when the young men came formally before the Senate, and,
after speaking at considerable length of the renewal of their
ancient ties of friendship with Rome and inveighing against
Pharnaces, begged the Senate to adopt some active measures
to inflict on him the punishment he deserved, the Senate gave
them a favourable hearing, and promised in reply to send
legates to use every possible means of putting an end to
the war. . . .
6. About the same time king Ptolemy, wishing to make
Ptolemy friends with the Achaean league, sent an am-
Epiphancs sends bassador to them with an offer of a fleet of ten
a present to pentccontcrs fully equipped ; and the Achaeans,
^^ Lycort^r^* ^^linking the present worthy of their thanks, for
Poiybius, and the cost could not be much less than ten talents,
Aratus sent to gladly accepted the ofler. Having come to this
"^^^ RXJ.^^i!^' resolution, they selected Lycortas, Poiybius, and
Aratus, son of Aratus of Sicyon, to go on a
mission to the king, partly to thank him for the arms which
. he had sent on a former occasion, and partly to
* * receive the ships and make arrangements for
bringing them across. They appointed Lycortas, because, as
Strategus at the time that Ptolemy renewed the alliance, he
had worked energetically on the king's side; and Poiybius,
though below the legal age for acting as ambassador,^ because
his father has been ambassador at the renewal of the alliance
^ Perhaps thirty, which^ seems to have been the legal age for admission to
political functions. See 29, 34.
XXIV MURDER OF APOLLONIDES AT SPARTA 339
with Ptolemy, and had brought the present of arms and of
money to the Achaeans; and Aratus, similarly, ptolemy
on account of his former intercourse with the Epiphanes
king. However, this mission never went after poisoned in
all, as Ptolemy died just at this time. ... ..11.
7. There was at this time in Sparta a man named Chaeron,
who in the previous year had been on an chaeron's
embassy to Rome, a man of ready wit and great malversations
ability in affairs, but still young, in a humble at Sparta,
position of life, and without the advantages of a liberal educa-
tion. By flattering the mob, and starting questions which no
one else had the assurance to move, he soon acquired a certain
notoriety with the people. The first use he made of his power
was to confiscate the land granted by the tyrants to the sisters,
wives, mothers, and children of the exiles, and to distribute it
on his own authority among the poor without any fixed rule or
regard to equality. He next squandered the revenue, using the
public money as though it were his own, without the authority
of law, public decree, or magistrate. Annoyed at these pro-
ceedings, certain men managed to get themselves appointed
auditors of the treasury in accordance with the laws. Seeing
this, and conscious of his mal-administration of the government,
Chaeron sent some men to attack Apollonides,
the most illustrious of the auditors, and the most AroUooito^
able to expose his embezzlements, who stabbed
him to death in broad daylight as he was coming from the
bath. Upon this being reported to the Achaeans, and the
people expressing great indignation at what had been done,
the Strategus at once started for Sparta ; and when he arrived
there he brought Chaeron to trial for the murder of Apollonides,
and having condemned him, threw him into prison; He then
incited the remaining auditors to make a real investigation into
the public funds, and to see that the relations of the exiles got
back the property of which Chaeron had shortly before deprived
them. . . .
8. In Asia king Phamaces, once more treating the refer-
ence to Rome with contempt, sent Leocritus in
the course of the winter with ten thousand men ^^igT-i^So!*^
to ravage Galatia, while he himself at the begin-
340 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS book
ning of spring collected his forces and invaded Cappadocia.
When Eumenes heard of it, he was much enraged
'"^^""fso^ "*^ ^^ Pharnaces thus breaking through the terms
of the agreement to which he was pledged, but
was compelled to retaliate by acting in the same way. When
he had already collected his forces, Attalus and
^cTp^<^U!" ^^s brother landed from their voyage from Rome,
and the three brothers, after meeting and inter-
changing views, marched out at once with the army. But on
reaching Galatia they found Leocritus no longer there ; and
when Carsignatus and Gaesotorius, who had
^ chicfs^^^" before embraced the cause of Pharnaces, sent
them a message desiring that their lives might
be spared, and promising that they would do anything that
might be required of them, they refused the request on the
ground of the treachery of which they had been guilty, and
advanced with their full force against Pharnaces;
Gaiaiia (?). ^^d having performed the distance from Cal-
Pamassus, a pitus to the river Halys in five days, they
town on the reached Parnassus in six more, and being there
joined by Ariarathes, the king of the Cappa-
docians, with his own army, they entered the territory of the
Mocissians. Just as they had pitched their
of^'c Halys ^"^P» ^^ws Came that the ambassadors from
Rome had arrived to effect a pacification.
When he heard this, Eumenes sent his brother Attalus to
receive them ; while he devoted himself to doubling the number
of his troops, and improving them to the utmost : partly with a
view to prepare them for actual service, and partly to impress
the Romans with the behef that he was able to defend himself
against Pharnaces, and beat him in war.
9, When the Roman legates arrived and urged the putting
The Roman ^^ ^nd to the war, Eumenes and Ariarathes
legates arrive professed to be ready to obey ; but begged the
and undertake Romans to bring them, if possible, to an inter-
o nego a e. ^^.^^ ^.^j^ Phamaces, that they might see fully
from what was said in their own presence how faithless and cruel
a man Pharnaces was ; and, if this proved to be impossible,
to take a fair and impartial view of the controversy and
XXIV EUMENES AND PHARNACES 341
decide it themselves. The legates replied that they would
do everything that was in their power and was consistent
with honour; but they required the kings to remove their
army from the country : for it was inconsistent that, when
they were there with proposals for a peace, operations of war
should be going on and mutual acts of hostility be committed.
Eumenes and his ally yielded to this representation, and imme-
diately marched off in the direction of Galatia, The Roman
legates then visited Pharnaces, and first demanded that he
should meet Eumenes and Ariarathes in a conference, as thai
would be the surest way of settling the affair ; but when he
expressed repugnance to that measure, and absolutely refused
to do so, the Romans at once perceived that he plainly thought
himself in the wrong, and distrusted his own cause ; but, being
anxious in any and every way to put an end to the war, they con-
tinued to press him until he consented to send plenipotentiaries
to the coast, to conclude a peace on such terms as the legates
might command. When these plenipotentiaries,
the Roman legates, and Eumenes and Aria- * "fafi^"""
rathes met, the latter showed themselves ready
to consent to any proposal for the sake of concluding a peace.
But the envoys of Pharnaces disputed every point, and did
not hold even to what they, had once accepted, but con-
tinually brought forward some fresh demand, and altered their
mind again and again. The Roman legates, therefore, quickly
came to the conclusion that they were wasting their labour, as
Pharnaces could not be induced to consent to the pacification.
The conference accordingly having come to nothing, and the
Roman legates having left Pergamum, and the envoys of
Pharnaces having gone home, the war went on,
Eumenes and his allies proceeding in their eneairedhi"
preparations for it Meanwhile, however, the putiing down a
Rhodians earnestly requested Eumenes to help "sing ot ihe
them ; and he accordingly set out in great haste ^J'^'ja^'ch^
to carry on a war against the Lycians. . . .
10. This year the Achaean Strategus Hyperbat us brought
before the assembly the question of the letter
from Rome as to the recall of the Lacedae- De^,,'n ^,e
monian exiles. Lycortas and his party recom- Achaean assembij'
342 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS book
on the Roman mended that no change should be made, on
despatch. ^^ ground that " The Romans had only acted
as they were bound to do in listening to the petition of men
who, on the face of it, were deprived of their rights, so ^ as
that petition seemed reasonable ; but when they were con-
vinced that of a petition some points were impossible, and
others such as to inflict great disgrace and damage upon their
friends, it had never been their custom to insist upon them
peremptorily, or force their adoption. So in this case also, if
it were shown to them that the Achaeans by obeying their
letter would be breaking their oaths, their laws, and the pro-
visions engraved on the tablets, the very bonds of our league,
they will retract their orders, and will admit that we are right
to hesitate and to ask to be excused from carrying out its in-
junctions." Such was the speech of Lycortas. But H3rper-
batus and Callicrates advised submission to the letter, and
that they should hold its authority superior to law or tablet or
anything else. Such being the division of opinion, the
Achaeans voted to send ambassadors to the Senate, to put
before it the points contained in the speech of Lycortas.
Callicrates of Leontium, Lydiades of Megalopolis, and Aratus
of Sicyon were forthwith nominated for this mission, and were
despatched with instructions to this effect. But on their
arrival at Rome Callicrates went before the Senate, and, so far
from addressing it in accordance with his instructions, he on
the contrary entered upon an elaborate denunciation of his
political opponents ; and, not contented with that, he under-
took to rebuke the Senate itself.
11. For he said tliat "The Romans were themselves re-
^ „. sponsible for the Greeks neglecting their letters
Calhcratcs. in- , , • ^ j r i. • ^i. -r"
stead of obeying ^^^ Orders mstead of obeymg them. For m
his instructions, all the democratic states of the day there were
denounces his ^^q parties,^-one recommending obedience to
%^uadS'the ^^^ Roman rescripts, and holding neither law
Senate that their nor tablet nor anything else to be superior to the
interference is ^ju Qf Rome ; the Other always quoting oaths and
necessary. tablets, and exhorting the people to be careful
about breaking them. Now the latter policy was by far the
most popular in Achaia, and the most influential with the
XXIV CALUCRATES TURNS TRAITOR 343
multitude; consequently the Romanisers were discredited and
denounced among the populace — their opponents glorified.
If then the Senate would give some sign of their interest in
the matter, the leaders, in the first place, would quickly change
to the Romanising party, and, in the next place, would be
followed by the populace from fear. But if this were neglected
by the Senate, the tendency towards the latter of the two
parties would be universal, as the more creditable and honour-
able in the eyes of the populace. Thus it came about that at
that very time certain statesmen, without any other claims what-
ever, had obtained the highest offices in their own cities, merely
from coming forward to speak against the rescripts of the
Senate, with the view of maintaining the validity of the laws
and decrees made in the country. If then the Senate was
indifferent about having their rescripts obeyed by the Greeks, by
all means let it go on as it is now doing. £ut if the Senate
wished that its orders should be carried out, and its rescripts
be despised by no one, it must give serious attention to that
subject. If it did not do so, he knew only too well that the
exact opposite of the Senate's wishes would come about, as
in fact had already been the case. For but lately, in the
Messenian disturbance, though Quintus Marcius had taken
many precautions to prevent the Achaeans adopting any
measures with regard to the Messenians without the consent of
the Romans, they bad disobeyed that order ; had voted the war
on their own authority; bad not only wasted the whole country
in defiance of justice, but had in some cases driven its noblest
citizens into exile, and in others put them to death with every
extremity of torture, though they had surrendered, and were
guilty of no crime but that of appealing to Rome on the points
in dispute. Again, too, though the Senate had repeatedly
written to order the restoration of the Lacedaemonian exiles,
the Achaeans were so far from obeying, that they had actually
set up an engraved tablet, and made a sworn agreement with the
men actually in possession of the city that these exiles should
never return. With these instances before their eyes, the
Romans should take measures of precaution for the future."
12. After delivering a speech in these words, or to this
effect, Callicrates left the Senate-house. He was followed by
344 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS book
the envoys of the exiles, who retired after delivering a short
address, stating their case, and containing some of the ordinary
appeals to pity. The Senate was persuaded that
The Romans j^ ^ y^^^ CalHcrates had said touched the
adopt the pobcy . ^ _ , , . .1
of raising a party interests of Rome, and that it was incumbent
in Greece against upon it to exalt those who supported its own
^^^loi^^e*^'* decrees, and to humble those who resisted them.
It was with this conviction, therefore, and at this
time that it first adopted the policy of depressing those who in
their several states took the patriotic and honourable side, and
promoting those who were for appealing to its authority on
every occasion, right or wrong. The result of which was that
gradually, as time went on, the Senate had abundance of flatterers,
but a great scarcity of genuine friends. How^ever, on this
occasion the Senate did not write about the restoration of the
exiles to the Achaeans only, but also to the Aetolians, Epirotes,
Athenians, Boeotians, and Acamanians, calling them all as it
were to witness, in order to break down the power of the
Achaeans. Moreover, they added to their answer, without say-
ing a word to his colleagues, a remark confined entirely to Calli-
crates himself, that " everybody in the various states should be
as Callicrates." This man accordingly arrived in Greece with
his answer, in a great state of exultation, little thinking that
he had become the initiator of great miseries to all the Greeks,
but especially to the Achaeans. This nation had still at that
time the privilege of dealing on something like equal terms with
Rome, because it had kept faith with her from the time that it
had elected to maintain the Roman cause, in the hour of her
greatest danger — I mean during the wars \s'ith Philip and
Antiochus. . . . The league, too, had made progress in material
strength and in every direction from the period from which my
history commences ; but the audacious proceeding of Callicrates
proved the beginning of a change for the worse. . . .
The Romans having the feelings of men, with a noble
spirit and generous principles, commiserate all who have met
with misfortunes, and show favour to all who fly to them for
protection ; but directly any one claims anything as of right,
on the ground of having been faithful to their alliance, they
at once draw in and correct their error to the best of their
B.C i3o-i79-
XXIV ROME AND THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE 345
ability. Thus then Callicrates, who had been sent to Rome to
plead for the rights of the Achaeans, acted in exactly the
opposite spirit ; and dragging in the subject of the Messenian
war, on which the Romans themselves had made no com-
plaint, returned to Achaia to overawe the people with the
threat of the hostility of Rome. Having therefore by his official
report frightened and dismayed the spirits of the populace,
who were of course ignorant of what he had really said in the
Senate, he was first of all elected Strategus, and,
to make matters worse, proved to be open to
bribery; and then, having got the office, carried out the
restoration of the Lacedaemonian and Messenian exiles,' . , .
IS. Philopoemen and Aristaenus, the Achaeans, were un-
like both in character and policy. Philopoemen „
, , , . , 1 ■ . I , T Comparison be-
was formed by nature in body and mmd for the tween ihe char-
life of a soldier, Aristaenus for a statesman and aders of Philo.
debater. In politics they differed in this, that Poemen and
whereas during the penods of the wars with
Philip and Antiochus, Roman influence had become supreme
in Greece, Aristaenus directed his policy with the idea of
carrying out with alacrity every order from Rome, and some-
times even of anticipating it Still he endeavoured to keep
up the appearance of abiding by the laws, and did, in fact,
maintain the reputation of doing so, only giving way when any
one of them proved to plainly militate against the rescripts
from Rome. But Philopoemen accepted, and loyally per-
formed, alt Roman orders which were in harmony with the
laws and the terms of their alliance ; but when such orders
exceeded these limits, he could not make up his mind to yield
a wilting obedience, but was wont first to demand an arbitra-
tion, and to repeat the demand a second time; and if this
proved unavailing, to give in at length under protest, and so
finally carry out the order. . . .
14. Aristaenus used to defendhispolicy before the Achaeans
by some such arguments as these: "It wasimpos-TT,^ ^j^^ of Ans-
sible to maintain the Roman friendship by hold- taenus on the
ing out the spear and the herald's staff together. '*?^'g"^
If we have the resolution to withstand them face
> See Hidu'a Gnei Imcriplians, p. 330.
346 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS book
to face, and can do so, well and good. But if Philopoemen
himself does not venture to assert this,^ . . . why should we
lose what is possible in striving for the impossible? There
are but two marks that every policy must aim at — honour and
expediency. Those to whom honour is a possible attainment
should stick to that, if they have political wisdom ; those to
whom it is not must take refuge in expediency. To miss
both is the surest proof of unwisdom : and the men to do
that are clearly those who, while ostensibly consenting to obey
orders, carry them out with reluctance and hesitation. There-
fore we must either show that we are strong enough to refuse
obedience, or, if we dare not venture even to suggest that, we
must give a ready submission to orders."
16. Philopoemen, however, said that "People should not
Phiiopoemen's suppose him SO Stupid as not to be able to
answer in defence estimate the difference between the Achaean
of his policy, r^^^ Roman states, or the superiority of the
power of the latter. But as it is the inevitable tendency of
the stronger to oppress the weaker, can it be expedient to assist
the designs of the superior power, and to put no obstacle in
their way, so as to experience as soon as possible the utmost
of their tyranny ? Is it not, on the contrary, better to resist
and struggle to the utmost of our power? . . . And if they
persist in forcing their * injunctions upon us,^ . . . and if, by
reminding them of the facts we do something to soften their
resolution, we shall at any rate mitigate the harshness of their
rule to a certain extent; especially as up to this time the
Romans, as you yourself say, Aristaenus, have always made a
great point of fidelity to oaths, treaties, and promises to allies.
But if we at once condemn the justice of our own cause, and,
like captives of the spear, offer an unquestioning submission
to every order, what will be the difference between the
Achaeans and the Sicilians or Capuans, who have been notori-
ously slaves this long time past ? Therefore it must either be
admitted that the justice of a cause has no weight with the
Romans, or, if we do not venture to say that, we must stand
by our rights, and not abandon our own cause, especially as
our position in regard to Rome is exceedingly strong and
^ Something is lost from the text.
XXIV PfflLOFOEMEN's POLICY 347
honourable. That the time will come when the Greeks will
be forced to give unlimited obedience, I know full well. But
would one wish to see this time as soon or as late as possible ?
Surely as late as possible ! In this, then, my policy differs
from that of Aristaenus. He wishes to see the inevitable
arrive as quickly as possible, and even to help it to come : I
wish to the best of my power to resist and ward it off"
From these speeches it was made clear that while the
policy of the one was honourable, of the other undignified, both
were founded on considerations of safety. Wherefore while
both Romans and Greeks were at that time threatened with
serious dangers from Philip and Antiochus, yet both these
statesmen maintained the rights of the Achaeans in regard to
the Romans undiminished ; though a repott found its way
about that Aristaenus was better affected to the Romans than
Philopoemen. . . .
BOOK XXV
1. Tiberius Gracchus destroyed three hundred cities of the
Celtiberes.^ . . .
Q^* Mviusf lT* 2* ^^^ attack upon him being sudden and
Maniius. formidable, Pharnaces was reduced to submit
The ex-praetors to almost any terms ; and on his sending an
SSrit embassy. Eumenes and Ariarathes immediately
Postumius were accepted his proposals, and sent ambassadors
still in Spain, to Pharnaces in return. When this had been
beerTsinccBc repeated several times, the pacification was
182. Livy, 40, 1, concluded on the following terms : " Eumenes,
44- Prusias, and Ariarathes, shall maintain perpetual
''e'::^^^:' peace with Pharnaces and Mithridates.
Ariarathes upon " Phamaces shall not enter Galatia on any
Pharnaces. See pretence.
bk. 24. chs. 8, 9. « g^^j^ treaties as exist between Pharnaces
and Gauls are hereby rescinded.
"Phamaces shall likewise evacuate Paphlagonia, after re-
storing the inhabitants whom he had previously expelled, with
their shields, javelins, and other equipment
" Pharnaces shall restore to Ariarathes all territory of which
he has deprived him, with the property thereon and the hos-
tages.
" He shall restore Tium by the Pontus, which some time
<^ Ki, », before was given freely and Hberally by Eumenes
to Prusias.
" Pharnaces shall restore, without ransom, all prisoners of
war and all deserters.
^ From Strabo 3, ch. 4, who quotes Poseidonias as criticising this state-
ment by remaridiig that Poljrbitii must count every tower as a city.
BOOK XXV THE ACCESSION OF PERSEUS 349
" He shall repay to Morzius and Ariarathes, in lieu of all
money and treasure taken from them, the sum of nine hun-
dred talents, and shall add thereto three hundred talents for
Eumenes towards the expenses of the war.
" Mithridates, the Satrap of Armenia, shall also pay three
hundred talents, because he attacked Ariarathes in defiance of
the treaty with Eumenes,
"The persons included under this treaty are, of the princes
in Asia, Artaxias, lord of the greater part of Armenia, and
Acusilochus ; of those in Europe, Gatalus the Sarmatian : of
the autonomous peoples, the Heracleotes, the Mesembrians in
the Chersonese, and the Cyzicenes;"
The number and quality of hostages to be given by
Phamaces was also specified. The armies of the several
parties then marched away, and thus was concluded the war
of Eumenes and Ariarathes against Phamaces.
Philip V. died at AmphipoUs towards the end of B.C. 179.
His last days were embittered by remorse for the death of his son
Demetrius, whose innocence had been demonstrated to him. He
wished to leave his crown to Antigonus, Ih^ son of Echecrates and
nephew of Antigonus Doson, in order to punish his elder son
Perseus for his treachery in securing his brother's death. But
Philip died suddenly before this could be secured, and Perseus
succeeded him without opposition. See Livy, 40, 55-57.
3. Having renewed the alliance with Rome, Perseus im-
mediately began intriguing in Greece. He TheopeninRof
invited back into Macedonia absconding debtors, tho reign of
condemned exiles, and those who had been Peraeua.
compelled to leave their country on charges of treason. He
caused notices to be put up to that effect at Delos, Delphi,
and the temple of Athena at Iton,^ offering not only indemnity
' The notices are put up al Ihe three places visited yearly by gieat numbera,
and by many leparale pilgrims. It is inleresling 10 nclice the persistence in
a custom common from the earliest times, at any latc as far as Delos and
Delphi are concerned. Iton was in Thess.ily, and the temple and oracle of
AtbetiA tbere was celebrated throughout Greece, und was the central place of
wonhip for the Tbessalians. The (own stood tn a rich plain on the river
Coarius, and hence its name — sometimes urillen Silon — was connected by
■ome with viTi^opof, " coni-t>earing" {Steph. Byz.) Homer calls it /tiTr/pa
fd^ittr, " motber of sheep." Pynhus hung up in this temple tbe spoils of
3SO THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS book
to all who returned, but also the restoration of the property
lost by their exile. Such also as still remained in Macedonia
he released from their debts to the Royal exchequer, and set
free those who had been confined in fortresses upon charges of
treason. By these measures he raised expectations in the
minds of many, and was considered to be holding out great
hopes to all the Greeks. Nor were other parts of his life
and habits wanting in a certain ro)ral magnificence. His
outward appearance was striking, and he was well endowed
with all the physical advantages requisite for a statesman. His
look and mien were alike dignified and such as became his
age. He had moreover avoided his father's weakness for wine
and women, and not only drank moderately at dinner himself,
but was imitated in this respect by his intimates and friends.
Such was the commencement of the reign of Perseus. . . .
When king Philip had become powerful and had obtained
supremacy over the Greeks, he showed the most
misfortune" "'*^'" disregard of faith and principle ; but when
the breeze of fortune again set against him, his
moderation was as conspicuous in its turn. But after his final
and complete defeat, he tried by every possible expedient to
consolidate the strength of his kingdom.
4. After despatching the consuls Tiberius and Claudius
B,c. 177. Coss. against the Istri and Agrii,^ the Senate towards
C. Claudius the end of summer transacted business with
Sempronius ^^ ambassadors that had come from the
Gracchus. Lycians. They had not arrived at Rome until
the Lycians had been completely conquered,
L^dTS^s'T but they had been despatched a considerable
Rhodes. See bk. time before. For the people of Xanthus in
24, ch. 9. Lycia, when about to embark upon the war, had
sent Nicostratus and others to Achaia and Rome as ambassa-
dors : who coming to Rome at that time moved many of the
Senators to pity them, by laying before them the oppressiveness
of the Rhodians and their own danger; and at length induced the
Antigonus and his Gallic soldiers about B.C. 273. [Pausan. i, 13, 2].
' ' Itonian Athena " had temples in other parts of Greece also, e,g. in Boeotia
[Paus. 91, 34, \\
^ The war in Istria, and the mutiny of the troops against the consul
Manlius, are described in Livy, 41, 8-1 1.
XXV CHARACTER *■ FIRST MEASURES OF PERSEUS 351
Senate to send envoys to Rhodes to declare that "On inspecting
the record of the arrangements made by the ten commissioners
in Asia, when settling the dominions of Antiochus, it appeared
that the Lycians had been given to the Rhodians, not as a
gift, but rather as friends and allies." But many were still dis-
satisfied with this solution of the matter. For the Romans
seemed to wish, by thus pitting Rhodes against Lycia, to exhaust
the accumulations and treasures of the Rhodians, because they
had heard of the recent conveyance of the bride of Perseus by
the Rhodians, and of their grand naval review. For shortly
before this the Rhodians had been holding, with great splen-
dour and elaboration of equipment, a review of all vessels be-
longing to them ; the fact being that a vast quantity of timber
for ship-building had been presented to them by Perseus. More-
over he had presented a gold tiara to each Laodice, dai^hiei
of the rowers on the upper bench in the ship of Sdeueus IV.
that had brought him his bride Laodice.' . . . ^''T' *'■ "■
6. When the envoys from Rome reached Rhodes and
announced the decrees of the Senate, there was
a great excitement in the island, and much con- ^''""^■"'"' *'
- ° , ,. . , , ,. ,. • . Rhodes; and a
fused discussion among the leadmg politicians, fresh deietmina-
They were much annoyed at the allegation that ■ion "f te
the Lycians had not been given them as a gift ^fndewnde^^r'
but as allies ; for having just satisfied themselves
that the Lycian war was successfully concluded, they saw the
commencement of fresh trouble for themselves growing up.
For no sooner had the Romans artived and made this
announcement to the Rhodians, than the Lycians began a
fresh revolt, and showed a determination of fighting to the last
extremity for autonomy and freedom. However, after hearing
the Roman envoys, the Rhodians made up their minds that the
Romans had been deceived by the Lycians, and forthwith
appointed Lycophron to lead an embassy to offer an explana-
tion to the Senate. And the state of affairs was such that
there was momentary expectation of a fresh rising of the
Lycians. . . .
' Besides tbii connexion with Sdeueus of Syria, sure to be oflen^ve 10
Rome, Peneiu gave 1 sister to Prusbs, another enemy of Rome and Eumenes.
Li»y. 4a, in.
352
THE HISTORIES OF POL YBICS
Rhcxlian question
deferred.
6. When the Rhodian envoys arrived in Rome the Senate^
after listening to their address, deferred its
answer. Meanwhile the Daidanian envoys
came with reports as to the number of the
Bastamae, the size of their men, and their courage in the field.
lliey gave information also of the treacherous
practices of Perseus and the Gauls, and said
that they were more afraid of him than ci the
Bastamae, and therefore begged the help of the
Romans. The report of the Dardani being
supported by that of the Thessalian envoys who arrived at that
time, and who also begged for help, the Senators determined
to send some commissioners to see with their own eyes the
truth of these reports; and they accordingly at once appointed
and despatched Aulus Postumius, accompanied by some
young men. . .
Reports of the
intrigues of
P<Tseus. See
Livy, 41, 19,
B.C. 176-175.
BOOK XXVI
Selbucus Philopator, whom we last heard of as king of Syria, was
assassioiited by one of his nobles — Ueliodorus— in the twelfth year of his
reign. Anliochua his younger brother bad been a hostage at Kome, and
being, according to agreement, exchanged in b,c. 175 for Philopalor's son
Demetrius, he was reluming to Syria. At Athens, on his journey home, he
beard of the death of Seleucus, and the allempt of Hcliodorus to usurp the
kingdom. By the help of Eumenes Heliodorus was expelled and Aniiochus
installed, to the satisfaction of the people, who gave him at first the surname
of Epiphanes. He is the Antiochus Epiphanes whose cruelties are recorded
in the books of the Maccabees. He died mad at Tabae in Persia, B.C. 164.
Hee 31, II. For the following entracl preserved by Athenaeus, sec the
translation of Livy, 4 1, 19.
1. Antiochus EpIphanes, nicknamed from his actions
Epitnanes (the Madman), would sometimes Antiochus
steal from the court, avoiding his attendants, Epiphanes, b.c.
and appear roaming wildly about in any '75->64.
chance part of the city with one or two companions. His
favourite place to be found was the shops of the silver-
smiths or goldsmiths, chatting and discussing questions of art
with the workers in relief and other artists ; at another time he
would join groups of the people of the town and converse with
any one he came across, and would drink with foreign visitors
of the humblest description. Whenever he found any young
men carousing together he would come to the place without
giving notice, with fife and band, like a rout of revellers, and
oflen by his unexpected appearance cause the guests to rise and
run away. He would often also lay aside his royal robes, and,
putting on a tebenna,^ go round the market-place as though
a candidate for office, shaking hands and embracing various
' This word, ot unknown origin, seems to be used here for the (ogn, or
lome dreu equivalent to i(. See ro, 4,
VOL. II 3 A
354 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS book xxvi
people whom he intreated to vote for him, sometime as aedile,
and sometimes as tribune. And when he got the office and
took his seat on an ivory cunile chair, after the fashion of the
Romans, he heard law cases which came on in the agora, and
decided them with the utmost seriousness and attention. This
conduct was very embarrassing to respectable people, some of
whom regarded him as a good natured easy-going man, and others
as a madman. In regard to making presents, too, his behaviour
was on a par with this. Some he presented with dice made
of gazelle horn, some with dates, others with gold There
were even instances of his making unexpected presents to
men whom he met casually, and whom he had never seen
before. In regard to public sacrifices and the honours paid to
the gods, he surpassed all his predecessors on the throne ; as
witness the Olympieium at Athens and the statues placed
round the altar at Delos. He used also to bathe in the
public baths, when they were full of the townspeople, p>ots of
the most expensive unguents being brought in for him ; and on
one occasion on some one saying, " Lucky fellows you kings,
to use such things and smell so sweet ! '' without saying a
word to the man, he waited till he was bathing the next day,
and then coming into the bath caused a pot of the largest
size and of the most costly kind of unguent called stact} to be
poured over his head, so that there was a general rush of the
bathers to roll themselves in it ; and when they all tumbled
down, the king himself among them, from its stickiness, there
was loud laughter. . . .
BOOK XXVII
TTie foenis of the yean B.C. 174, 173, 172, tiihifh gradually led up ta
the vtar vrilh Perseut, to be described in the taienty-ieveitth bosk, viere briery
tAeie :~~
Id B.C. 174 Perseus Toiced the Dolopes, who had appealed against him
to Rome, (o submit Id his authority. ATler Ihls successful expedllion he
inarched through Central and Northern Greece, visiting Delphi, where he
stayed three days, Phlhiolid Achaia, and Thessaly, He carefully aU-
slained from inRicling any dam^e in the districts through which he
passed, and tried to gain the conRdcnce of the various slates. In the
same year he made friendly advances to the Achaeans, who had forbidden
any Lacedaemaniac ID enter their leriitoiy, by oifering to restore their
fugitive staves. But in spite of the exertions of Xenarchus the Strategus,
the Achaeans refuse to make any change (Livy, 41, 12-24),
The same year saw also commotions in Aelolia, which were settled by
five Rotnan commissioners : and in Crete, on the old score of the status
of the Lycians. Q, Mbucius was sent to settle this also (Livy, 41, 2$).
In B.C. 173 Petseus entered on still more active intrigues in Greece,
and in spite of the wildest scandals that were afloat as to his tyranny, he
gained a powerful hold in Aetolia, Thessaly, and Perrhaebia. The Senate
accordingly sent Marcellus to Aetolia and Achaia, and App. Claudius to
Thessaly, to inquire into the facts ; and a commission of five into Mace-
donia, with directions to proceed afterwards lo Alexandria (Livy, 42, 5, 6).
In B.C. 173 king Eumenes visited Rome and urged the Senate to lake
nteasures in time to counteract the attempts of Perseus ; warning them thai
he had already obtained strong hold upon (he Boeotians and Actolians,
and had an inexhaustible recruiting ground in Thrace. That everywhere
he had secured the death or exile of the pailisana of Rome, and was over-
running in arms Thessaly and Penhoebia (Livy, 42, 11-13).
The Senate, already inclined to listen to these represenlalions, was
still more inclined to do so by the defiant tone of Ilarpatus, the repre-
sentative of king Perseus ; by the attempted assassination of Eumenes by
port from Greece from C, Valerius confirming the speech of Eumenes ; and
lastly by the confession of one L. Rammius of Brundisium, that he had been
leqneiled to poison certain Roman envoys who were accustomed to slay
at bis house on their journeys 10 and from Macedonia and Greece (Livy,
4a. li-17J.
356 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS book
War was now determined on for the next year, and the praetor ordered
to enroll troops. And Eumenes also, now recovered from the wounds of
the assassins, made preparations to join in the struggle (Livy, 42, 18-27).
In B.C. 171, fresh legions having been enrolled, and an army of sixteen
thousand infantry and eight hundred cavalry ordered to Macedonia, envoys
appeared from Perseus demanding the reason. The Senate would not allow
them to enter the Pomoerium, but received them in the temple of Bellona :
and after listening to a report from Sp. Ca\iUus that Perseus had, among
other acts of hostility, taken cities inThessaly and entered Perrhaebia in arms,
the Senate answered the Macedonian envoys that any complaint they had to
make must be made to the consul, P. Licinius, who would presently be in
Macedonia, but that they must not come into Italy again (Livy, 42, 36).
A few da}'s afterwards five commissioners were sent into Greece, who
distributed the districts to be visited among themselves : Servius and
Publius Lentulus and Lucius Dccimius were to go to Cephallenia, the
Peloponncse, and the west coast generally ; Q. Marcius and Aulus Atilius
to Epirus, Aetolia, Thessaly, and thence to Boeotia and Euboea, where they
were to meet the Lentuli. Meanwhile a letter from Perseus, demanding the
cause of their coming and of the presence of troops in Macedonia, was re-
ceived and left unanswered. Aflcr visiting the districts assigned to them,
in the course of doing which Marcius and Atilius had met Perseus on the
river Peneus, and granted him a truce to enable him to send envoys to
Rome (Marcius knowing well that the Romans were not yet fully prepared
for war^), the commissioners reached their destination at Chalcis, where the
earlier events narrated in the following extracts occurred (Livy, 42, 36-43).
THE WAR WITH PERSEUS
1. At this time Lases and Callias arrived at the head of
B.C. 171. Coss. ^^ embassy from the Thespians, and Ismenias*
p. Licinius Crassus from Neon. Lases and his colleagues offered
c. Cassius ^Q pm jjjgjj. ^.jjy wholly into the hands of the
ngmus. Romans ; Ismenias proposed to submit all the
^ Marcius on his reliuii to Rome gloried in having thus deceived the king
and gained time for preparations at Rome, but his action was repudiated by
the Senate. Livy, 42, 47.
* Ismenias had just been elected Strategus of Boeotia ; but the parly who
had supported a rival candidate had in revenge obtained a decree of the
league banishing the Boeotarchs from all the Boeotian cities. They had,
however been received at Thcspiae, whence they were recalled to Thebes and
reinstated by a reaction in popular feeling. Then they obtained another decree
banisliing the twelve men who, though not in office, had convened the league
assembly ; and Ismenias as Strategus sentenced them to the loss of all rights
in their absence. These are the "exiles" here meant (Livy, 43, 43). Who
Neon was is not certain ; but we find in the next chapter that he liad been
a leader in the Macedonising party at Thebes, i)erhaps a son of Brachylles,
whose father's name was Neon (sec 20, 5). He was captured in B.c. 167
and put to death by the Romans (Livy, 45, 31).
xxvii AFFAIRS IN BOEOTTA 357
cities of fioeotia as one nation to the discretion of the commis-
sioners. But this latter proposal was diametri-
cally opposed to the policy of Marcius and his ^l^i^^^^ ^^
colleagues. What suited that policy best was chaicis : am-
to split up Boeotia into separate cities ; and bassadors from
they therefore received Loses and his party, as NmrTo^^ieod
well as the envoys from Chaeronea and Lebadea,
and all who came from single cities, with great favour and bvish
courtesyj but treated Ismenias with ostentatious neglect and
coldness. Some of the exiles^ also attacked Ismenias and were
very near stoning him to death, and would have done so if he
had not saved himself by taking refuge through the door* of the
chamber where the commissioners were sitting. At the same
period there were disturbances and party con- xhebes,
tests at Thebes. One party were for commit-
ting the town unconditionally to Rome ; but the Coroneans
and Haliartians flocked to Thebes and vehemently maintained
that they ought to m^ntain the alliance with Perseus. For a
time neither of the two parties showed any disposition to give
in to each other ; but when Olympichus of Coronea set the
example of changing sides and asserting that they ought to
cleave to the Romans, a great change and revolution came
over the feelings of the populace. First, they compelled
Dicetas to go on an embassy to Marcius and the other com-
missioners to excuse them for their alliance with Perseus. Next,
they expelled Neon and Hippias, crowding to their houses, and
bidding them go and make their own defence for the terms that
they had made ; for they were the men who had negotiated the
alliance. When these men had left the town, the people imme-
diately collected into the assembly and lirst voted honours and
gifts to the Romans, and then ordered the magistrates to push
on the alliance. Last of all they appointed ambassadors to
hand over the city to the Romans and to restore their exiles.
' See note 3, page 356.
* t4 JHflnpo, Livy (41, 44) says in tribunal legalorum, and Cas-mbon con-
tents himseir wilh the same word. Schweighacuser Imnslalcs Afodium. as
if a "raised plaifomi ■' on which the commissioncra sat was meant. I think
it ii used in the natural sense of a " door" leading into the hall in which ihey
wereiltting. and into which Ismenias fled for refuge. Liiy used frijunii/ ftom
the ideu <i his >£c as to the constraction of such a liuilding.
3S8 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIVS boox
2. Whilst these things were being accomplished at Thebes,
The cause of die '^^ exiles in Chalcis appointed Pompides to
exiles' iriumph state their grievances against Ismenias, Neon,
at Chalcis. g^^j Djcetas. The bad policy of these men
being manifest, and the Romans lending their support to the
exiles, Hippias and his party were rendered so odious that
thejr were in danger of falling victims to the fury of the popu-
lace, until the Romans, by checking the assaults of the roob,
secured them a certain degree of safely.
When the Theban envoys arrived, bringing with them to
Dissoiuiion of ^^ Commissioners the decrees and honours I
the Bocoiian have mentioned, a rapid change passed over
league, B.C. 171. ^^ f^^g ^f things in each of the towns, for
they were separated by a very narrow interval from each other.
The commissioners with Marcius received the Theban en-
voys, complimented their town and counselled them to restore
the exiles, and bade the several towns send embassies to Rome
submitting themselves individually and unreservedly to the
protection of the Romans, Their policy, therefore, of splitting
up the league of the Boeotian towns, and of destroying the
popularity of the Macedonian royal house with the Boeotian
populace having thus completely succeeded, the commissioners
sent for Servius Lcntulus from Argos, and leaving him in
charge at Chalcis went themselves to the Peloponnese ; while
Neon a few days afterwards retired to Macedonia ; and
Ismenias and Dicetas, being thrown at once into prison,
shortly afterwards put an end to their lives. Thus it came
about that the Boeotians, who had for a long period of
years, and through many strange vicissitudes, maintained a
national league, by now rashly and inconsiderately adopting
the cause of Perseus, and giving way to an outburst of un-
reasoning excitement, were entirely disintegrated and split up
into separate cities
When Aulus and Marcius arrived at Argos, after communi-
Tho Comniis- catioti "ith the council of the Achaean league,
sioncrs in the they called upon Archon the Strategus to de-
Pcloponnese. jpatch a thousand men to Chalcis, to garrison
the town until the arrival of the Romans ; an order which
Archon readily obeyed. Having thus settled affairs in Greece
JCrvii ROMAf/S Sf PERSEUS TRY TO SECURE GREECE 359
during the winter, and met Publius Lentulus and his two
colleagues, the commissioners sailed back to Rome. . . .
S. Meanwhile Tiberius Claudius and Aulas PosCumius
had been engaged on a visitation of the islands ^1,^ Rhoditms
and Greek cities in Asia, and had spent the prepare lo
lon(;cst time in Rhodes : though the Rhodians co-operate
. S. . .■ j-j . ■ ■ ■ r wi"i Rome,
at that time did not require any supervision, for
the prytanis that year was Agesilochus, a man of high rank,
who had once been on an embassy to Rome, Even before
the legates came, as soon as it became clear that the Romans
intended to go to war with Perseus he had urged his people
to throw in their fortunes with those of Rome ; and, among
other things, had counselled them to repair forty ships, in order
that, if any occasion for using them should arise, it should not
find them still in the midst of preparations, but ready to
answer to the call and to carry out their resolve at once. By
stating these fects to the Roman envoys, and showing them
the preparations visibly progressing, he let them return to
Rome in a high state of satisfaction with Rhodes. . . .
4. After the conferences had been held between the Roman
envoys and the Greeks, Perseus drew up a Pereeus sends a
despatch containing a statement of his case, and circular despatch
the arguments employed on either side ; partly '" J?"* Gm-k
from an idea that he would thus be shown to ^
have the superiority of right on his side, and partly because he
wished to test the feelings of the several states. Copies of
this despatch he sent to the other slates by his
ordinary letter-carriers ; but to Rhodes he sent ^R^^'fa^""
also Antenor and Philip as ambassadors, who, on
their arrival in the island, handed over the document to the
magistrates, and a few days afterwards entered the Council
chamber and urged the Rhodians "To remain neutral for the
present andwatch what happened; and, if the Romans attacked
Perseus in violation of the treaty, to endeavour to mediate.
For this was the interest of all, and pre-eminently of the
Rhodians, who more than most peoples desired equality and
freedom of speech, and were ever the protectors, not only of
their own liberty, but of that of the rest of Greece also ; and
therefore ought to be proportionally careful to provide and
36o THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS book
guard against a policy of an opposite tendency." These and
similar arguments of the envoys found favour with the Rhodian
people. But, as they were already pledged to an attitude of
friendship to Rome, the influence of the upper classes so far
prevailed that, though a friendly reception was given to the
Macedonian envoys, they demanded in their formal answer
that Perseus should not ask them to take any measure which
would involve the appearance of hostility to Rome. Antenor
and his colleagues would not accept this reply, but with thanks
for the kindness of their general reception, sailed back to
Macedonia. . . .
6. Being informed that some of the cities of Boeotia re-
mained faithful to him, Perseus sent Alexander
^^^^^^^^^"'on a mission to them. On his arrival in
Boeotia, Alexander was obliged to abstain from
visiting any of the cities except Coronea, Thisbae,^ and
Haliartus, finding that they offered him no facilities for securing
close relations. But he entered those three towns and exhorted
their inhabitants to cling to their loyalty to the Macedonians.
They received his words with enthusiasm, and voted to send
ambassadors to Macedonia. Alexander accordingly returned
to the king and reported the state of things in Boeotia. A
short time afterwards the ambassadors arrived, desiring the
king to send aid to the cities which favoured the Macedonian
cause ; for the Thebans were oppressing them severely, because
Truce made with ^^1 would not agree with them and side with
Q. Marcius. Rome. But Perseus replied that he was pre-
See Li\7, 42, 43, ^^luded by the truce from sending any aid to any
' ■ '^ * one; but he begged them to resist the Thebans
to the best of their power, and yet not to go to war with the
Romans, but to remain neutral. . . .
6. When the report of the commissioners from Asia con-
War is decided cerning Rhodes and the other states had been
uponatthecxpira-made at Rome, the Senate called in theambas-
tion of the truce, sadors of Perseus, Solon and^Hippias : who en-
deavoured to argue the whole case and to deprecate the anger
^ The text has GjJ^ay, which is inconsistent with what follows as to the
Thebans. An inscription found on the site of Thisbae supplies the correction
of an error as old as Livy (42, 46, 47). See Hicks's, G, /. p. 330.
xxvii THB BOEOTIANS AND RHODIANS 361
of the Senate ; and particularly to defend their master on the
subject of the attempt upon the life of Eumenes. When
they had finished all they had to ui^e, '^^S^"^*^' Atiemniedassassi-
which had all the while been resolved on war, nation of Eumenes
bade them depart forthwith from Rome ; and ai Delphi.
ordered all other Macedonians also that hap- ^'^J'^^ija*'
pened to be staying in the country to quit Italy
within thirty days. The Senate then called upon the Consuls
to act at once and see that they moved in good time, . . .
7. Caius Lucretius ' being at anchor off Cephallenia, wiote
a letter to the Rhodians, requesting them to„,. . .„. ._
, , , . , J . . Politics at Rhodes,
despatch some ships, and entrusted the letter
to a certain trainer named Socrates. This letter arrived at
Rhodes in the second six months of the Prytany of Stratocles.
When the question came on for discussion,
Agathagetus, Rhodophon, Astymedes, and ""* ^^""'^"^
many others were for sending the ships and
taking part in the war from the first, without
any further pretence ; but Deinon and Polyaratus, "^^ ".^°"'""
though really displeased at the favour already
shown to Rome, now for the present used the case of Eumenes
as their pretext, and began by that means to alienate the feelings
of the populace. There had in fact been a long standing feeling
of suspicion and dislike in the minds of the Rhodians against
Eumenes, dating from the time of his war with Fharnaces; when,
Upon king Eumenes blockading the entrance
of the Hellespont to prevent ships sailing into ^^^^^
the Pontus, the Rhodians had interfered with
his design and thwarted him. This ill-feeling had again been
recently exasperated during the Lycian war on the question of
certain forts, and a strip of territory on the frontier of the
Rhodian Peraea, which was being damaged by some of
Eumenes's subjects. These incidents taken together made
the Rhodians ready to listen to anything against the king.
Seizing on this pretext, the patty of Deinon tried to dis-
credit the despatch, asserting that it did not come from the
I Gains Lucretius had seen naval service as duumvir navalis on the coast
of Ligoria in B.C. 181. Livy, 40, a6. He was now (B.C. 171) Praelor, his
fmriiuia tieiDg the fleet, and commanded 40 quin<)uerenics. id, 43. 48.
362 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS book
Romans but from Eumenes, who wished to involve them
on any possible pretext in- a war, and bring expense and
perfectly unnecessary suffering upon the people. In support
of their contention they put forward the fact that the man who
brought the letter was some obscure trainer or another ; and
asserted that the Romans were not accustomed to employ such
messengers, but were rather inclined to act with unnecessary
care and dignity in the despatch of such missives. When
they said this they were perfectly aware that the letter had
really been written by Lucretius : their object was to persuade
the Rhodian people to do nothing for the Romans readily, but
rather to perpetually make difficulties, and thus give occasions
for offence and displeasure to crop up betw^een the two nations.
For their deliberate purpose was to alienate Rhodes from the
Roman friendship, and to join it to that of Perseus, by every
means in their power. Their motives for thus clinging to
Perseus were that Polyaratus, who was ostentatious and vain,
had become heavily in debt; and that Deinon, who was
avaricious and unscrupulous, had from the first relied on
increasing his wealth by getting presents from princes and
kings. These speeches having been delivered, the Prytanis
Stratocles rose, and, after inveighing at some length against
Perseus, and speaking with equal warmth in praise of the
Romans, induced the people to confirm the decree for the
despatch of the ships. Forthwith six quadriremes were pre-
pared, five of which were sent to Chalcis under the command
of Timagoras, and the other under the command of another
Timagoras to Tenedos. This latter commander fell in at
Tenedos with Diophanes, who had been despatched by
Perseus to Antiochus, and captured both him and his crew.
All such allies as arrived with offers of help by sea Lucretius
thanked warmly, but excused from taking part in this service,
observing that the Romans had no need of naval support. . . .
Perseus now collected a large army at Citium^ thirty -nine
thousand foot and four thousand horse ^ and advanced through the
north of Thessaly taking many towns ^ and finally taking up
his quarters at Sicyrium^ at the foot of Mount Ossa, The Roman
consul^ P, Liciniusy marched from the south-west through Gomphiy
XKVii IVA/! WITH PERSEUS BEGUN 363
and thence to Larisa, where he crossed the river Peneus, After
some cavalry skirmishes, which u-ere generally favourable to the
king, Perseus advanced nearer to the Roman camp, and a more
important battle was fought, in which the king again scored a con-
siderable success with his cavalry and light-armed troops. The
Romans lost two hundred cavalry killed and as many prisoners
and tivo thousand infantry, while Perseus only had twenty cavalry
and forty infantry killed. He did not, however, follow up the
victory sufficiently to inflict a crushing blo^v upon tlie Roman
army ; and though the Consul withdrew to the south of the Pencus,
after some days' reflection the king made proposals of peace. See
Lhy, 42, 51-62. B.C 171 {summer).
8. After the Macedonian victory Perseus summoned
his Council, when some of his friends ex- ... .
, ' . . , , , , After bealing Ihe
pressed an Opinion that he ought to send ^n Roman cavaiiy on
embassy to the Roman general, to signify his the Peneus, and
readiness even now to pay the Romans the obligmg Licimus
r. ■!_ > L' r .i_ L J ,- 1 W rclira south of
same amount of tribute as his father had forraerly ^he river, Perseus
undertaken to pay when beaten in war, and to endeavours to
evacuate the same places. "For if," they argued, ""^' tmns.
" the Romans accept the terms the war will be ended in a
manner honourable to the king after his victory in the field ;
and the Romans, after this taste of Macedonian valour, will be
much more careful in the future not to impose an unjust or
harsh burden upon the Macedonians. And if, on the other
hand, in spite of the past, they prove obstinate and refuse to
accept them, the anger of heaven will with justice fall on them ;
while* the king by his moderation will gain the support of
Gods and men alike." The majority of his friends held this
view, and Perseus expressing his assent to il, Pantauchus, son
of Balacrus, and Midon of fieroea, were forthwith sent as
ambassadors to Ltcinius. On their arrival,
Licinius summoned his Council, and the ambas- i^,ora™c "^
sadors having stated their proposals in accord-
ance with their instructions, Pantauchus and his colleague
were requested to withdraw, and they deliberated on the pro-
position thus made to them. They decided unanimously to
return as stern an answer as possible. For this is a peculiarity
364 77/5 HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS book
of the Romans, which they have inherited from their ancestors,
and are continually displaying, — to show themselves most
peremptory and imperious in the presence of defeat, and most
moderate when successful : a very noble peculiarity, as ever)'
one will acknowledge ; but whether it be feasible under certain
circumstances may be doubted. However that may be, on the
present occasion they made answer that Perseus must submit
without reserve himself, and give the Senate full power to take
whatever measures it might think good concerning Macedonia
and all in it On this being communicated to Pantauchus and
Midon, they returned and informed Perseus and his friends ;
some of whom were roused to anger at this astonishing display
of haughtiness, and advised Perseus to send no more embassies
or messages about anything whatever. Perseus, however,
was not the man to take such a line. He sent again and
again to Licinius, with continually enhanced offers, and promising
a larger and larger sum of money. But as nothing that he
could do had any effect, and as his friends found fault with
him, and told him that, though he had won a victory, he was
acting like one who had been defeated and lost
^^Tc^Tum™'^''^"' ^^ w^ ^^ ^^'^g*^ compelled to renounce the
sending of embassies, and remove his camp back
to Sicyrium. Such was the position of the campaign. . . .
9. When the report of the favourable result for Perseus of
The effect of the ^he cavalry engagement, and of the victory of
success of Per- the Macedonians, spread through Greece, the
seus upon the inclination of the populace to the cause of
Perseus blazed out like a fire, most of them
having up to that time concealed their real feelings. Their
conduct, to ray mind, was like what one sees at gymnastic
contests. When some obscure and far inferior combatant
descends into the arena with a famous champion reputed to
be invincible, the spectators immediately bestow their favour
upon the weaker of the two, and try to keep up his spirits by
applause, and eagerly second his efforts by their enthusiasm.
And if he succeeds so far as even to touch the face of his
opponent, and make a mark to prove the blow, the whole of
the spectators again show themselves on his side. Sometimes
they even jeer at his antagonist : not because they dislike or
xxvn MORAL EFFECT OF PEXSEUS's SUCCESSES 365
UDdervalue him, but because their sympathies are roused by the
unexpected, and they are naturally inclined to take the weaker
side. But if any one checks them at the right moment, they
are quick to change and see their mistake. And this is what
Cleitomachus is said to have done. He had
the character of being an invincible athlete, owm^"
and, as his reputation was spread all over the
world. King Ptolemy is said to have been inspired with the
ambition of putting an end to it. He therefore had Aris-
tonicus the boxer, who was thought to have unusual
physical capabilities for that kind of thing trained with extra-
ordinary care, and sent to Greece. When he appeared on the
arena at Olympia a great number of the spectators, it seems,
immediately showed their favour for him, and cheered him on,
being rejoiced that some one should have had the courage to
make some sort of stand against Cleitomachus. But when, as
the fight went on, he showed that he was a match for his
antagonist, and even gave him a well-placed wound, there was
a general clapping of hands, and the popular enthusiasm
showed itself loudly on his side, the spectators calling out to
Aristonicus to keep up his spirits. Thereupon they say that
Cleitomachus stepped aside, and after waiting a short time to
recover his breath, turned to the crowd and asked them
" Why, they cheered Aristonicus, and supported him all they
could ? Had they detected him in playing foul in the combat ?
Or were they not aware that Cleitomachus was at that moment
fighting for the honour of Greece, Aristonicus for that of king
Ptolemy ? Would they prefer an Egyptian to carry off the
crown by beating Greeks, or that a Theban and Boeotian
should be proclaimed victor in boxing over all comers?"
Upon this speech of Cleitomachus, they say that such a revul-
don of feehng came over the spectators, that Aristonicus in
his turn was conquered more by the display of popular feeling
than by Cleitomachus.
10, What happened in the case of Perseus in regard to the
feeling of the multitude was very similar to this. For if any one
had pulled them up and asked them plainly, in so many words,
whether they wished such great power to fall to one man, and
were desirous of trying the effect of an utterly irresponsible des-
366 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS book
potism, I presume that they would have promptly bethought
themselves, recanted all they had said, and gone to the other
extreme of feeling. Or if some one had briefly recalled to their
recollection all the tyrannical acts of the royal house of Macedonia
from which the Greeks had suffered, and all the benefits they
had received from the Romans, I imagine they would have at
once and decisively changed their minds. However, for the
present, at the first burst of thoughtless enthusiasm, the people
showed unmistakable signs of joy at the news, being delighted at
the unlooked-for appearance of a champion able to cope with
Rome. I say this much to prevent anyone, in ignorance of human
nature, from bringing a rash charge of ingratitude against the
Greeks for the feelings which they displayed at that time. . . .
11. The cestros was a novel invention, made during the war
A new kind of with Perseus. This weapon consisted of an
missile used in the iron bolt two palms long, half of which was
army of Perseus, gpjke, and half a tube for the reception of the
wooden shaft which was fixed into the tube, and measured a
span in length and a finger- breadth in diameter. At the
middle point of the shaft three wooden "plumes" were
morticed in. The sling had thongs of unequal length, and
on the leather between them the missile was loosely set.
When the sling was being swung round, with the two thongs
taut, the missile kept its place; but when the slinger let go one
of the thongs, it flew from the leather like a leaden bullet, and
was projected from the sling with such force as to inflict a
very grievous wound upon any one whom it hit.^
12. Cotys was a man of distinguished appearance and of
Character of gr^at ability in military affairs, and besides,
Cotys, king of the quite unlike a Thracian in character. For he
Odrj'sae, an ally ^j^g of sober habits, and gave evidence of a
of Perseus
gentleness of temper and a steadiness of dis-
position worthy of a man of gentle birth. . . .
13. Ptolemy, the general serving in Cyprus, was by no
A prudent gover- "^cans like an Egyptian, but was a man of sense
nor of Cyprus, and administrative ability. He received the
^^8^^ *^' ^^' governorship of the island when the king of
Egypt was quite a child, and devoted himself
' Livy, who translates this passage, calls the missile a ctitrosphendona (43, 65).
xivii INDECISIVE RESULT OF THE FIRST CAMPAIGN 367
with great zeal to the collection of money, refusing payments of
any kind to any one, though he was often asked for them by
the king's agents, and subjected to bitter abuse for refusing to
part with any. But when the king came of age he made up
a lai^e sum and sent it to Alexandria, so that both king
Ptolemy himself and his courtiers expressed their approval of
his previous parsimony and determination not to part with
any money. . , ,
The battle on the Peneus was followed by ot/ur engagemtnts
of no great importance ; and finally Peneus returned to Mace-
donia, and the Romans went into winter quarters in various
towns in Tlussaly, without a decisive blow having been struck on
either side. Winter of R.C 171-170. Z;?^, 42, 64-67.
14, Just about the time when Perseus retired for the
winter from the Roman war, Antenor arrived ^.
at Rhodes from him, to negotiate for the ransom i^i.i^o. Dis-
of Diophares and those who were on board pute at Rhodes as
with him. Thereupon there arose a great dis- w tiie f eiease of
, .' . . ° Diophanes, Ihe
pute among the statesmen as to what course envo)- of Perseus,
they ought to take. Philophron, Thcaetetus,cap(iiredai Tene-
and their party were against entering into such **■"■ ^**' *■ ?■
an arrangement on any terms; Deinon and Polyaratus and
their party were for doing so. Finally they did enter upon an
arrangement with Perseus for their redemptioa . . .
15. Cephalus came [to Pella] from Epinis. He had long
been connected by friendship with the royal what induced the
house of Macedonia, but was now compelled I'^ding men in
by the force of circumstances to embrace the Epin" w join
side of Perseus, the cause of which was as
follows : There was a certain Epirote named Charops, a man
of high character, and well disposed to Rome, who, when
Philip was holding the passes into Epirus, was the cause of
his being driven from the country, and of Titus Flamininus
conquering Epirus and Macedonia. Charops had a son
named Machatus, who had a son also named Charops.
Machatus having died when this son was quite a youth, the
elder Charops sent his grandson with a suitable retinue to
Rome to learn to speak and read Latin. In the course of
368 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS book
time the young man returned home, having made many inti-
^. mate friendships at Rome. The elder Charops
then died, and the young man, bemg of a restless
and designing character, began giving himself airs and attack-
ing the distinguished men in the country. At first he was not
much noticed, Antinous and Cephalus, his superiors in age and
reputation, managing public affairs as they thought right But
when the war with Perseus broke out, the young man at once
began laying information against these statesmen at Rome,
grounding his accusations on their former intimacy with the
Macedonian royal family; and by watching everything they said
or did, and putting the worst construction on it, suppressing
some facts and adding others, he succeeded in getting his accusa-
tions against them believed. Now Cephalus had always shown
good sense and consistency, and at the present crisis had
adhered to a course of the highest wisdom. He had begun
by praying heaven that the war might not take place, or the
question come to the arbitrament of arms ; but when the war
was actually begun, he was for performing all treaty obligations
towards Rome, but for not going a step beyond this, or show-
ing any unbecoming subservience or officiousness. When
Charops then vehemently accused Cephalus at Rome, and repre-
sented everything that happened contrary to the wishes of the
Romans as malice prepense on his part, at first he and others
like him thought little of the matter, being not conscious of
entertaining any designs hostile to Rome. But when they saw
Hippolochus, Nicander, and Lochagus arrested
"^^^ti^^JSf^ without cause, and conveyed to Rome after
the cavalry battle, and that the accusations
made against them by Lyciscus were believed, — Lyciscus
being a leader of the same party in Aetolia as Charops was
in Epirus, — they at length began to be anxious about what
would happen, and to consider their position. They resolved
therefore to try every possible means to prevent themselves
from being similarly arrested without trial and carried to
Rome, owing to the slanders of Charops. It was thus that
Cephalus and his friends were compelled, contrary to their
original policy, to embrace the cause of Perseus. . . .
16. Theodotus and Philostratus committed an act of
xxrii CHAROPS OF EPIRVS 3S9
fiagrant impiety and treachery. They learnt that the Roman
consul Aulus Hostilius was on his way to coss.A,HostUius,
Thessaly to join the army ; and thinking that, Mancinus. A.
if they could deliver Aulus to Perseus, they would ■*'■''"= Semnus,
have given the latter the strongest possible
proof of their devotion, and have done the Attempt of two
greatest possible damage to the Romans at this Moiossian leaden
crisis, they wrote urgently to Perseus to make '°*''"''^'°'""'-
haste. The king was desirous of advancing at once and join-
ing them ; but he was hindered by the fact that the Molossians
had seized the bridge over the Aous, and was obliged to give
them battle first Now it chanced that Aulus had arrived at
Fhanota,^ and put up at the house of Nestor the Ctopian,*
and thus gave his enemies an excellent opportunity ; and had
not fortune interfered 00 his behalf, I do not think that he
would have escaped. But, in fact, Nestor providentially
suspected what was brewing, and compelled him to change
his quarters for the night to the house of a neighbour.
Accordingly he gave up the idea of going by land through
Epirus, and, having sailed to Anticyra,* thence made his way
into Thessaly. . . .
" 17. Pharnaces was the worst of all his pre- Ptamace^ king
decessors on the throne. . . . of Pontus.
18. While Attains was spending the winter in Elateia (in
Phocis), knowing that his brother Eumenes was
annoyed in the highest possible degree at the ^^^^^ ^'t^
splendid honours which had been awarded tohim Eumenes should
having been annulled by a public decree of the •* nsiored to
Peloponnesians, though he concealed his annoy- p^™n"£j(f
ance from every one, — he took upon himself to
send messages to certain of the Achaeans, urging that not
only the statues of honour, but the complimentary inscriptions
' In Pbocjs. The name was variously given as Phanoteis. Phanole,
Pbanota (Sleph. By%J)
' Schwdghaeuser seems to regard this as a second name. But the Greeks
seldom had such, and it is more likely the designation of some unknown
localily. There was an Attic deme named Cropia, and tbcrefore the name is
a recognised one {Steph. B/i.) Gronovius conjeclural 'npwirfy "of Oropns."
' Appwendy the Anticyra on the Sperchius. on (he boiilers of Achaia
Pbthiotii.
VOL. II 3 B
370 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBWS book xxvii
also, which had been placed in his brother's honour, should be
restored. His motive in acting thus was the belief that he
could give his brother no greater gratification, and at the same
time would display to the Greeks by this act his own brotherly
affection and generosity.^ . . .
19. When Antiochus saw that the government of Alexan-
dria was openly making preparations for a war
the attack upon ^^ annexation in Coele-Syria, he sent Meleager
Code-Syria by at the head of an embassy to Rome, with in-
thc ministers of structions to inform the Senate of the fact, and
Phiiometor. ^° protest that Ptolemy was attackmg him with-
out the least justification. . . .
20. In all human affairs perhaps one ought to regulate
every undertaking by considerations of time;
JLpl^e^! but this is especially tme in war, in which a
moment makes all the dinerence between success
and failure, and to miss this is the most fatal of errors. . . .
Many men desire honour, but it is only the few who
venture to attempt it ; and of those who do so,
^^ aicj^*^*^' ^^ ^^ ^^^ *^ ^"^ ^"y ^^^ ^^^^ *^^ resolution to
persevere to the end. . . .
^ Hence Attalus obtained the name of Philadelphns. The origin ot
Eumencs's loss of popularity in the Peloponncse is referred to in 28, 7, but no
adequate cause is alleged. A reference to Achaia in his speech at Rome was
not perhaps altogether friendly (Livy, 42, 12), and we shall see that he was
afterwards suspected of intriguing with Perseus ; but if this extract is rightly
placed, it can hardly be on this latter ground that the Achaeans had renoimccd
him.
BOOK XXVIII
1. When the war between the kings Antiochus and Ptolemy^
for the possession of Coele-Syria had just g^. ^^ . ,,_
begun, Meleager, Sosiphanes, and Heracletdes cbus and Ptolemy
came as ambassadors from Antiochus, and both appeal to
Timotheos and Damon from Ptolemy. The .'*°"'t°" '''*/||J'-
one actually in possession of Coele-Syna and
Phoenicia was Antiochus; for ever since his father's victory
over the generals of Ptolemy at Panium * all those districts had
been subject to the Syrian kings. Antiochus, accordingly,
regarding the right of conquest as the strongest and most
honourable of all claims, was now eager to defend these places
as unquestionably belonging to himself : while Ptolemy, con-
ceiving that the late king Antiochus had unjustly taken
advantage of his father's orphan condition to wrest the cities in
Coele-Syria from him, was resolved not to acquiesce in his
possession of them. Therefore Meleager and his colleagues
came to Rome with instructions to protest before the Senate
that Ptolemy had, in breach of all equity, attacked him first ;
while Timotheos and Damon came to renew their master's
friendship with the Romans, and to offer their mediation for
putting an end to the war with Perseus; but, above all, to
watch the communications made by Meleagcr's embassy. As
to putting an end to the war, by the advice of Marcus
Aeinilius they did not venture to speak of it ; but afrei form-
ally renewing the friendly relations between Ptolemy and Rome,
and receiving a favourable answer, they returned to Alexan-
dria. To Meleager and his colleagues the Senate answered
that Quintus Marcius should be commissioned to write to
175-164; Plolemy VI. Philomelor,
372 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS book
Rolemy on the subject, as he should think it most to the
interest of Rome and his own honour. Thus was the business
settled for the time. . . .
2. About this time there came also ambassadors from the
TheRhodiansask^^odians towards the end of summer, Agesilo-
for license to chus, Nicagoras, and Nicander. The objects
import com. Qf ^^y^ mission were to renew the friendship
of Rhodes and Rome; to obtain a license for importing
com from the Roman dominions; and to defend their
state from certain charges that had been brought against
it. For there were most violent party contests going on in
Rhodes : Agathagetus, Philophron, Rhodophon, and Theaete-
tus resting all their hopes on the Romans, and Deinon and
Polyaratus on Perseus and the Macedonians; and as these
divisions gave rise to frequent debates in the course of their
public business, and many contradictory expressions were
used in their deliberations, plenty of opportunities were
afforded to those who wished to make up stories against the
state. On this occasion, however, the Senate affected to be
ignorant of all this, though perfectly acquainted with what
went on in the island, and granted them a license to import
one hundred thousand medimini of com from Sicily. This
answer was given by the Senate to the Rhodians separately.
Audience was then given collectively to all the envoys from
the rest of Greece that were united in the same policy. . . .
8. Aulus being thus Proconsul, and wintering in Thessaly
with the army, sent Gains Popilius and Gnaeus
Auius^HosUiius, Octavius to visit certain places in Greece.
in Greece with' They first Came to Thebes, where, after speaking
proconsular in complimentary terms of the Thebans, they ex-
^ Popm^ and^' ^o^^^ t^^"^ to maintain their good disposition
Octavius to visit towards Rome. They then went a round of
the Greek towns the cities in the Peloponnese, and endeavoured
c^J?^e^s^nltc.to convince the people of the clemency and
humanity of the Senate by producing the^ de-
* The decree referred to is given in Livy, 43, 17. "No one shall
supply any war material to the Roman magistrates other than that which the
Senate has decreed." This had been extracted from the Senate by vehement
complaints reaching Rome of the cruel extortions of the Roman officers in the
previous two years.
irviii PRESSURE PUT ON ACHAIA AND AETOLIA 373
cree which I recently mentioned. At the same time they
made it clearly understood that the Senate was They visii the
aware who in the several stales were hanging Peloponncse, and
back and trying to evade their obligations, and x^^^-^^^tA
who were forward and zealous ; and they let it be .ihe backward
seen that they were as much displeased with those policy of certain
who thus hung back as with those who openly ^chaeans,
took the opposite side. This brought hesitation and doubt to
the minds of the people at large, as to how to frame their
words and actions so as to exactly suit the necessities of the
tiroes. Gaius and Gnaeus were reported to have resolved, as
soon as the Achaean congress was assembled, to accuse Lycor-
tas, Archon, and Folybius, and to point out, ,_,
that they were opposed to the policy of Rome ; smU Poiybius are
and were at the present moment refraining from supposed lo be
active measures, not because that was their '™^'!^'^'''
genuine inclination, but because they were watch-
ing the turn of events, and waiting their opportunity. They did
not, however, venture to do this, because they had no well-
founded pretext for attacking these men. Accordingly, when
the counol^ met at Aegium, after delivering a speech of mingled
compliments and exhortation, they took ship for Aetolia.
4. The Aetolian congress being summoned to meet them
at Thermum, they came before the assembled
people, and again delivered a speech in which "f^sa '"
expressions of benevolence were mixed with
exhortations. But the real cause of summoning the congress
was to announce that the Aetolians must give
hosUges. On their leaving the speakers' plat- ^^;;j^'^'^'°|h^
form, Proandrus stood forward and desired
leave to mention certain services performed by himself to the
Romans, and to denounce those who accused ^ .
him. Gams thereupon rose; and, though he well
knew that Proandrus was opposed to Rome, he paid him some
compliments, and acknowledged the truth of everything he
had said. After this, Lyciscus stood forward, , .
and, without accusing any one person by name,
374 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS book
yet cast suspicion on a great many. For he said that " The
Romans had been quite right to arrest the ringleaders and
take them to Rome " (whereby he meant Eupolemus, Nican-
der, and the rest) : " but members of their party still remained
in Aetolia, all of whom ought to meet with the same correction,
unless they gave up their children as hostages to the Romans."
In these words he meant to point especially to Archedamus
and Pantaloon ; and, accordingly, when he retired, Pantaleon
p ^ J stood up, and, after a brief denunciation of
Lyciscus for his shameless and despicable flattery
of the stronger side, turned to Thoas, conceiving him to be the
man whose accusations of himself obtained the greater credit
from the fact that he had never been supposed to be at en-
mity with him. He reminded Thoas first of the events in
the time of Antiochus ; and then reproached him for ingrati-
tude to himself, because, when he had been surrendered to
Rome, he obtained an unexpected release at the intercession
of Nicander and himself He ended by calling upon the
Aetolians, not only to hoot Thoas down if he tried to speak,
but to join with one accord in stoning him. This was done ;
,j- t cd ^^^ Gaius, after administering a brief reproof
to the Aetolians for stoning Thoas, departed
with his colleague to Acarnania, without any more being said
about hostages. Aetolia, however, was filled with mutual
suspicions and violent factions.
6. In Acarnania the assembly was held at Thurium, at
which Aeschrion, Glaucus, and Chremes, who were all parti-
sans of Rome, begged Gaius and Gnaeus to
place a garrison in Acarnania; for they had
among them certain persons who were for putting the
country in the hands of Perseus and the Macedonians. The
advice of Diogenes was the opposite. "A garrison," he
said, "ought not to be put into any of their cities, for that
was what was done to those who had been at war with
Rome and had been beaten; whereas the Acarnanians had
done no wrong, and did not deserve in any respect to have
a garrison thrust upon them. Chremes and Glaucus and
their partisans were slandering their political opponents, and
desired to bring in a garrison which would support their self-
xxviii LYCORTAS ADVISES NEUTRALITY 37s
seeking policy, in order to establish their own tyrannical
power." After these speeches, Gaius and his colleague, seeing
that the populace disliked the idea of having garrisons, and
wishing to follow the line of policy marked out by the Senate,
expressed their adherence to the view of Diogenes ; and de-
parted to join the Proconsul at Larisa, after paying some
compliments to the Acamanians. . . .
6. The Greeks made up their minds that this embassy
required much consideration on their part Meeting of
They therefore called to council such men as Achaean states.
were of one mind in other political questions, — '"^^JJ ^? consider
Arcesilaus and Ariston of Megalopolis, Stratius B.c.^9.^'
of Tritaea, Xenon of Patrae and Apollonides of
Sicyon. But Lycortas stood firm to his original Lyconas is for
view : which was that they should send no help complete neu-
to either Perseus or Rome in any way, nor, on traiity.
the other hand, take part against either. For he held that
co-operation with either would be disadvantageous to the
Greeks at large, because he foresaw the overwhelming power
which the successful nation would possess; while active
hostility, he thought, would be dangerous, because they had
already in former times been in opposition to many of the
most illustrious Romans in their state policy. Apollonides
and Stratius did not recommend open and Apollonides and
avowed hostility to Rome, but thought that stratius for sup-
" Those who were for plunging headlong into ^"^^j^^^ ^ ^^'
the contest, and wished to use the action Rome, and yet
of the nation to secure their own personal not openly oppos-
favour at Rome, ought to be put down and »ngher.
boldly resisted." Archon said that "They must yield to
circumstances, and not give their personal ,-^ «. .
' 4.- 11 ^^ Strategus
enemies a handle for accusations; nor allow Archon is for
themselves to fall into the same misfortune as bending to the
Nicander, who, before he had learnt what the^/°™;^"^^*^^'"K
1^ „ , , -11 frankly for Rome.
power of Rome really was, had met with the
gravest calamities." With this last view, Polyaenus, Arcesi-
laus, Ariston, and Xenon agreed. It was thereupon decided
that Archon should go without delay to his duties poiybius
as Strategus, and Poiybius to those of Hipparch. Hipparch.
376 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS book
7. Very soon after these events, and when Archon had made
hass fr ^P ^^^ mind that the Achaeans must take active
Atiaius^to the P^"^ with Rome and her allies, it happened most
Achaeans desiring conveniently that Attains made his proposal to
^he'S^nJ^lTfor-^ him and found him ready to accept it Archon
maiiy decreed to his at once eagerly promised his support to Attalus's
brother Eumencs, request: and when thereupon that prince's en voys
See 27. 18. appeared at the next congress, and addressed
the Achaeans about the restoration of king Eumenes's honours,
begging them to do this for the sake of Attains, the people did
not show clearly what their feeling was, but a good many rose
to s[^ak against the proposal from many various motives.
Those who were originally the advisers of the honours being
paid to the king were now desirous to confirm the wisdom of
their own policy ; while those who had private reasons for
animosity against the king thought this a good opportunity
for revenging themselves upon him ; while others again, from
spite against those who supported him, were determined that
Attains should not obtain his request. Archon, however, the
Strategus, rose to support the envoys, — for it was a matter
that called for an expression of opinion from the Strategus, —
but after a few words he stood down, afraid of being thought
to be giving his advice from interested motives and the hope
of making money, because he had spent a large sum on his
office. Amidst a general feeling of doubt and hesitation,
Polybius rose and delivered a long speech. But that part of it
which best fell in with the feelings of the populace was that in
which he showed that "The original decree of the
Pdybius* Achaeans in regard to these honours enacted that
such honours as were improper and contrary to latv
were to be abolished, but not all honours by any means. That
Sosigenes and Diopeithes and their colleagues, however, who
were at the time judges, and for private reasons personally hostile
to Eumenes, seized the opportunity of overturning all the erec-
tions put up in honour of the king ; and in doing so had gone
beyond the meaning of the decree of the Achaeans, and beyond
the powers entrusted to them, and, what was worst of all, be-
yond the demands of justice and right. For the Achaeans
had not resolved upon doing away with the honours of
xrviii A SPEECH OF POL YBIUS ■ 377
Eumenes on the ground of having received any injury at his
hands ; but had taken ofTence at his making demands beyond
what his services warranted, and had accordingly voted to
remove everything that seemed excessive. As then these
judges had overthrown these honours, because they had a greater
regard for the gratification of their private enmity than for the
honour of the Achaeans, so the Achaeans, from the conviction
that duty and honour must be their highest consideration, were
bound to correct the error of the judges, and the unjustiliable
insult inflicted upon Eumenes : especially as, in doing so, they
would not be bestowing this favour on Eumenes only, but on
his brother Attalus also." The assembly having expressed their
agreement with this speech, a decree was written out ordering
the magistrates to restore all the honours of king Eumenes,
except such as were dishonourable to the Achaean league or
contrary to their law. It was thus, and at this time, that
Attalus secured the reversal of the insult to his brother
Eumenes in regard to the honours once given him in the
Peloponnese. . , .
8. Perseus sent Pleuratus the Illyrian, an exile living at his
court, and Adaeus of Beroea on a mission to
king Genthius, with instructions to inform him after taking Hy-
of what he had achieved in his war with the scana in liiy-
Romans, Dardani, Epirotes, and Illyrians up to "^' ^"^f^'
the present time; and to urge him to make a ^d'^ence senS
friendship and alliance with him in Macedonix envoys to king
These envoys journeyed beyond Mount Scardus,'^*"','"'''"""'"'"'
through lUyria Deserta, as It is called, — a region '*''' *^' '''
a short time back depopulated by the Macedonians, in order
to make an invasion of Illyria and Macedonia dilHcult for the
Dardani. Their journey through this region was accompanied
by much suffering ; but they reached Scodra, and being there
informed that Genthius was at Lissus, they sent a message to
him. He promptly responded : and having been admitted to an
interview with him, they discussed the business
to which their instructions referred. Genthius '""'
378 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS book
but he alleged want of means as an excuse for not complying
with the request at once, and his inability to undertake a war
with Rome without money. With this answer, Adaeus and his
colleagues returned home. Meanwhile Perseus arrived at
Stubera, and sold the booty and gave his army a rest while
waiting for the return of Pleuratus and Adaeus. On their
arrival with the answer from Genthius, he inmie-
iTG^nihiS^" diately sent another mission, consisting again of
Adaeus, Glaucias, one of his body-guards, and
the lUyrian (Pleuratus) also, because he knew the Illyrian lan-
guage, with the same instructions as before : on the ground that
Perseus goes Genthius had not stated distinctly what he
back to Hyscana wanted, and what would enable him to consent
in iiiyria. ^q ^|^g proposals. When these envoys had
started the king himself removed with his army to Hyscana.^ . . .
9. The ambassador sent to Genthius returned without
Genthius being having accomplished anything more than the
unpersuaded by previous envoys, and without any fresh answer;
the second mis- for Gcnthius remained of the same mind, —
sion, Perseus .,!• * • • •*.!_ -n • i.* u -.
sends a third, but wiUmg to jom With Perseus m his war, but pro-
stiii without offer, fessing to be in want of money. Perseus dis-
ing money, regarded the hint, and sent another mission
under Hippias to conclude the treaty, without taking any notice
of the main point, while professing a wish to do whatever
Genthius wished. It is not easy to decide whether to ascribe
such conduct to mere folly, or to a spiritual delusion. For my
part, I am inclined to regard it as a sheer spiritual delusion when
men aim at bold enterprises, and risk their life, and yet ne-
glect the most important point in their plans, though they see it
T-u -111 t all the time and have the power to execute it.
The dishke of _ _ , , • i • .,,1 , . , 1
Perseus to give ^ox I do not think it Will be denied by any
money turned out man of reflection that, had Perseus at that time
^^Gre©ce°^ been willing to make grants of money either to
states as such, or individually to kings and
statesmen, I do not say on a great scale, but even to a mode-
rate extent, they would all — Greeks and kings alike — have
yielded to the temptation. As it was, he happily did not take
that course, which would have given him, if successful, an
* Hyscana, or Uscana, a town of the lUyrian tribe Penestae.
MTiii VmVISE PARSIMONY OF PERSEUS 379
overweening supremacy ; or, if unsuccessful, would have in-
volved many others in his disaster. But he took the opposite
course : which resulted in confining the numbers of the Greeks
who adopted the unwise policy at this crisis to very narrow
limits. . . .
[Peiseus now returned from Stubera. to Hyscana, and after a vain
ollempt upoD Stratus in Aetolia, retired into Macedonia for (he rest of the
winter. In the early spring of B.C. 169 Q. Marciu3 Phitippus began his
advance upon Macedonia from his permanent camp in Perrliaebia. Per-
seus stationed Asclepiodotus and Hippias (o defend two passes of the Cam-
banian mountains, white he himself held Dium, which commanded the
coast Toad from Thessaly into Macedonia. Marcius however, after only a
rather severe skirmish with the light-armed troops of Hippias, effected the
passage of the mountains and descended upon Dium. The king was taken
by suiprise ; he had not secured the pass of Tempe, which would have cut
olf ihe Romans from retreat ; and he now hastily retired to Pydna. Q.
Marcius occupied Dium, but after a short stay there retired upon Phila, 10
get provisions and secure the coast road. Whereupon Perseus reoccupled
Dium, and contemplated staying there to the end of the summer. Q.
Marcius took Ileracleum, which was l>etween I'hila and Dium, and made
preparations for a second advance on Dium. But the winter (B.C. 1G9-
16S) was now approaching, and he contented himself with seeing (hal the
roads through Thessaly were put in a proper slate for (he conveyance of
provisions. Livy, 43, 19-23; 44, 1-9.]
10. Having been completely worsted on the entrance of the
Romans into Macedonia, Perseus found fault „ , ..
. , „. . „ ■ ■ - . . Perseus lays the
with Hippias. But m my opinion it is easy to t>lameofhis
find feult with others and to see their mistakes, failure on his
but it is the hardest thing in the world 10 do ^"""^'^
everything that can be done one's self, and to
be thoroughly acquainted with one's own affairs. And Perseus
was now an instance in point. . . .
11. The capture of Heracleum was effected in a very
peculiar manner. The city wall at one part The tesiudo.
and for a short distance was low. The Romans ^ivy, 44, q.
attacked with three picked maniples: and the first made a
protection for their heads by locking their shields together
over them so closely, that they presented the appearance of a
sloping tiled roof. . - .
This manceuvre the Romans used also in mock lights. . . .
While C. Marcius Fibulas, the praetor, was engaged in
38o THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS book
Chalddice, Q. Marcius sent M, Popilius to besiege Meliboea in
Magnesia, Perseus sent Euphranor to relieve ity andy if he
succeeded, to enter Demetrias, This he did, and was not
attacked at the latter place by Popilius or Eumenes — scandcU
saying that the latter was in secret communication with Perseus,
Livy, 44, 10-13, b.c. 169.
12. Upon Perseus designing to come into Thessaly and
Th A h there decide the war by a general engagement,
decide to co- ^s he probably would have done, Archon and his
operate actively colleagues resolved to defend themselves against
^*^^^^^^^the suspicions and slanders that had been
thrown upon them, by taking some practical
steps. They therefore brought a decree before the Achaean
congress, ordering an advance into Thessaly, with the full force
of the league, to co-operate energetically with the Romans. The
decree being confirmed, the Achaeans also voted that Archon
should superintend the collection of the army and the necessary
preparations for the expedition, and should also send envoys to
the Consul in Thessaly, to communicate to him the decree of
the Achaeans, and to ask when and where their
^*°i^c Consul. ^° ^^^y ^^^ ^^ J^^" ^^"^- Polybius and others
were forthwith appointed, and strictly instructed
that, if the Consul approved of the army joining him, they
should at once send some messengers to communicate the fact,
that they might not be too late on the field ; and meanwhile,
that Polybius himself should see that the whole army found
provisions in the various cities through which it was to pass,
and that the soldiers should have no lack of any necessaries.
With these instructions the envoys started. The Achaeans
also appointed Telocritus to conduct an embassy to Attains,
bearing the decree concerning the restoration of the honours
Ptolemy Physcon ^^ Eumenes. And as news arrived about the
celebrates his same time that king Ptolemy had just celebrated
anacietena. j^jg anacleteria, the usual ceremony when the
kings come of age, they voted to send some ambassadors to
confirm the friendly relations existing between the league and
the kingdom of Egypt, and thereupon appointed Alcithus and
Pasiadas for this duty.
xxvm ACHAEAN AID TO ROME DECLINED 381
18. Polybius and his colleagues found the Romans moved
from Thessaly, and encamped in Perrhaebia,
between Azorium and Dolicha They therefore """"J" ^'^
postponed communication with the Consul,
owing to the critical nature of the occasion, but shared in the
dangers of the invasion of Macedonia. When the Roman army
at length reached the district of Hcracleum, it
seemed the right moment for their interview ^^60"
with Q. Marcius, because he considered that the
most serious part of his undertaking was accomplished. The
Achaean envoys therefore took the opportunity of presenting
the decree to Marcius, and declaring the intention of the
Achaeahs, to the effect that they wished with their full force to
take part in his contests and dangers. In addition to this they
demonstrated to him that every command of q^ Marcioide-
the Romans, whether sent by letter or messenger, dines the offered
had been during the present war accepted by "^yf ^^ii^^^^
the Achaeans without dispute. Marcius acknowledged with
great warmth the good feeling of the Achaeans, but excused
them from taking part in his labours and expenses, as there
was no longer any need for the assistance of allies. The other
ambassadors accordingly returned home ; but Polybius stayed
there and took part in the campaign, until ^ppLus Claudius
Marcius, hearing that Appi us Cento asked for five Cemo defeated at
thousand Achaean soldiers to be sent to Epirus, Hystana m b.c.
despatched Polybius with orders to prevent the ''°' '^' *^' '"■
soldiers being granted, or such a heavy expense being cause-
lessly imposed on the Achaeans ; for Appius had no reason
whatever for asking for these soldiers. Whether he did this
from consideration for the Achaeans, or from a desire to prevent
Appius from obtaining any success, it is difficult to say. Poly-
bius, however, returned to the Peloponnese and found that the
letter from Epirus had arrived, and that the Achaean congress
had been soon afterwards assembled at Sicyon. He was
therefore in a situation of great embarrassment When Cento's
demand of soldiers was brought before the Congress he did
not think it by any means proper to reveal the charge which
Q. Marcius had given him privately : and on the other hand to
oppose the demand, without some clear pretext, was exceedingly
3»a THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS book
dangerous. In this difficult and delicate position he called to
his aid the decree of the Roman Senate, for-
^iT ^^jtT^* bidding compliance with the written demands of
commanders unless made in accordance with its
own dci rec. Now, no mention of such a decree occurred in the
dcsiKitch from Appius. By this argument he prevailed with the
|H\>plc to refer the matter to the Consul, and by his means to
^el the nation relieved of an expense which would amount to
OUT a hundred and twenty talents. Still he gave a great
hanille to those who wished to denounce him to Appius, as
havin^v: thwarted his design of obtaining a reinforcement . . .
14* The |HX>ple of Cydon at this time committed a shock-
i^vu\ l-he ^^^ ^^^ ^^ indisputable treachery. Though
i>M»wn* attack niany such have occurred in Crete, yet this
Aiui tAkf? appeared to go beyond them alL For though
'^^ CiKvvsur '' ^^^7 ^'^"^ ^""^ ^^ Apollonia, not only by the ties
of friendship, but by those of common institutions
ftlsi\ and \\\ fill I l>y everything which mankind regard as sacred,
anvl though these obligations were confirmed by a sworn treaty
engraved and presented in the temple of Idaean Zeus, yet they
treacherously seized Ajwllonia, put the men to the sword,
plundered the proj^erty, and divided among themselves the
women, children, city, and territory. . . .
16. Afraid of the Gortynians, because they had narrowly
The Cydonians escaped losing their city in the previous year
ask help from by an attack led by Nothocrates, the Cydonians
Eumencs, g^j^j envoys to Eumenes demanding his assist-
ance in virtue of their alliance with him. The king selected
Leon and some soldiers, and sent them in haste to Crete ; and
on their arrival the Cydonians delivered the keys of their city
to Leon, and put the town entirely in his hands. . . .
16. The factions in Rhodes kept continually becoming
The Rhodians "lo^e and more violent. For when the decree
determine to send of the Senate, directing that they should no
a mission to longer conform to the demands of the military
omc, . . 170. magistrates but only to those contained in the
Senate's decrees, was communicated to them, and the people at
large expressed satisfaction at the care of the Senate for their in-
terests ; Philophron and Theaetetus seized the occasion to carry
xiTiii DISSENSIONS IN CRETE AND RHODES 383
out their policy further, declaring that they ought to send envoys
to the Senate, and to Q. Marcius Philippus the Consul, and
Gains Maicius Figulus, the commander of the fleet For it
was by that time known to everybody which of the magistrates
designate in Rome were to come to Greece. The proposal
was loudly applauded, though some dissent was ^^
expressed : and at the beginning of the summer
Agesilochus, son of Hegesias, and Nicagoras, son of Nicander,
were sent to Rome ; Agepolis, Ariston, and Pancrates to the
Consul and commander of the fleet, with instructions to renew
the friendship of the Cretans with Rome, and to make their
defence against the accusations that were being uttered against
their state ; while Agesilochus and his colleagues were at the
same time to make a proposal about a license to export com
from the Roman dominions. The speech made by these
envoys to the Senate, and the reply made by the Senate, and
the successful termination of their mission, I „„ ^ t
- , , - , . , - , , ^™? supra, CD. 9.
have aheady mentioned m the section devoted
to Italian afTairs. But it is useful to repeat such points, as I
am careful to do, because I am obliged frequently to record
the actual negotiations of ambassadors before mentioning the
circumstances attending their appointment and despatch.
For since I am recording under each year the contemporary
events in several countries, and endeavouring to take a sum-
mary review of them all together at the end, this must of neces-
sity form a feature in my history.
17. Agepolis and his colleagues found Q. Marcius himself
encamped near Heracleum in Macedonia, and ^^^ envoys visit
delivered their commission to him there. In Q. Marcius
answer, he said that " He himself paid no atten- [^^jJ^Pij^^"'
tioQ to those calumnies, and advised them not
to pay any to those who ventured to speak against Rome."
He added many other expressions of kindness, and even wrote
them in a despatch to the people of Rhodes. Agepolis was
much charmed by his whole reception ; and observing this, the
Consul took him aside and said to him privately that " He
wondered at the Rhodians not trying to put an ^^ ^^ ji^^, ^^^^
end to the war,' which it would be eminently in Rhodians stop
' That ii, ibe war twtweoi Anliochtu and Plo)eni]i.
384 THE HISTORIES OF FOLYBIUS book
the war between their interests to da" Did the Consul act
^"inoiX^?""^ thus because he was suspicious of Antiochus,
and was afraid, if he conquered Alexandria, that
he would prove a formidable second enemy to themselves, seeing
that the war with Perseus was becoming protracted, and the war
for Coele-Syria had already broken out ? Or was it because he
saw that the war with Perseus was all but decided, now that
the Roman legions had entered Macedonia, and because he
had confident hopes of its result ; and therefore wished, by
instigating the Rhodians to interfere between the kings, to give
the Romans a pretext for taking any measures they might
think good concerning them ? It would not be easy to say
for certain ; but I am inclined to believe that it was the latter,
judging from what shortly afterwards happened to the Rhodians.
However, Agepolis and his colleagues immediately afterwards
proceeded to visit Gaius Marcius Figulus : and, ha\ing received
from him still more extraordinary marks of favour than from
Quintus Marcius, returned with all speed to Rhodes. When
they received the report of the embassy, and knew that the
rffrct of the ^^^ commanders had vied with each other in
warni reception warmth, both by word of mouth and in their
of their formal answers, the Rhodians were universally
ami^ssadors on j ^^ ^^^ ^^^ ^j^j^ pleasing expectation. But
the Rhodians. ... , .11 ..i,
not all m the same spirit: the sober-minded
were delighted at the good feeling of the Romans towards
them ; but the restless and fractious calculated in their own
minds that this excessive complaisance was a sign that the
Romans were alarmed at the dangers in which they found
themselves, and at their success not having answered to their
expectations. But when Agepolis communicated to his friends
that he had a private message from Q. Marcius
TS m^e^^^cc' ^^ ^^^ ^^^^^" Council about putting an end to
between the war (in Syria), then Deinon and his friends
Antiochus Epi- felt fully convinced that the Romans were in a
Vio^myVhytcoxi. ^^^^^ ^^^"^^^ ' ^^"^ ^^^^ accordingly sent envoys
also to Alexandria to put an end to the war
then existing between Antiochus and Ptolemy. . . .
xxviti ANTIOCHVS INVADES EGYPT 385
Ptolemy Epiphana,who diedB.c. \%i,left two sons, Ptolemy
Pkilometor and Ptolemy Physcon, and a daughter, Cleopatra, by
his wife Cleopatra, sister of Antioekus Epiphanes. After the
death of Ptolemy s mother Cleopatra, his ministers, Eulaeus and
Lenaeiis, engaged in a war with Antiochus for the recovery of
Code-Syria and Phoenicia, which had been taken by Aniiochus
the Great, and which they alleged had been assigned as a dower
to the late Cleopatra. Their war was singularly unsuccessful.
Antieehus Epiphanes defeated their troops at Pelusium, took
young Ptolemy Philometor captive, and advanced as far as
Memphis. Thereupon Ptolemy Physcon assumed the royal title
at Alexandria as Euergetes II., and sent envoys to Antiochus at
Memphis. Antiochus, however, treated Ptolemy Philometor with
kindness, established him as king at Memphis, and advanced to
Naucratis, and thence to Alexandria, which he besieged on the
pretext of re-estahlishing Philometor. b.c 171. See infra,
bk. ag. ch. 23.
18. King Antiochus was a man of ability in the field and
daring in design, and showed himself worthy characier of
of the royal name, except in regard to his Antiochus IV.
manceuvres at Peiusium. . . . (Epiphanes).
19. ^Vhen Antiochus was actually in occupation of Egypt,
Comanus and Cineas, after consultation with comanus and
king Ptolemy Physcon, determined upon sum- Cineas. Physcon s
moning a conference of the most distinguished ""ni^wrap tieip-
Egyptian nobles to consult about the danger embassies \o
which threatened them. The first resolution Aniiochus,
the conference came to was to send the Greek ^'^ '*'■
envoys who were then at Alexandria as envoys to Antiochus
to conclude a pacification. There were at that time in the
country two embassies from the Achaean league, one which
had been sent to renew the alliance between the league and
Egypt, and which was composed of Alcithus of Aegium, son of
Xenephon, and Pasiodes, and another sent to give notice of
the festival of the Antigoneia.' There was also an embassy
' The Anligoneia was a festival established in honour of Antigonus Doson,
who had been a benefactor of Ihc Achaeans. In 30, 33, il is mentioned as
being celebrated in Sicyon. The benefaclions of this Macedonian king lo the
Achaeans are mentioned by Pnusnnias (B, 8, la),
VOL. 11 3 C
386 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS book
from Athens led by Demaratus on the subject of some
present, and two sacred embassies, one in connexion with the
Panathenaea under the presidency of Callias the pancratiast,
and the other on the subject of the mysteries, of which
Cleostratus was the active member and spokesman. There
were also there Eudemus and Hicesius from Miletus, and
Apollonides and Apollonius from Clazomenae. The king
also sent with them Tlepolemus and Ptolemy the rhetorician
as envoys. These men accordingly sailed up the river to meet
Antiochus. . . .
20, While Antiochus was occupying Egypt,^ he was visited
Th G ic ^y ^^ Greek envoys sent to conclude terms of
envoys visit pcace. He received them courteously, devoted
Antiochus and the first day to giving them a splendid enter-
cndcavourto t^inment, and on the next granted them an
interview, and bade them deliver their instruc-
tions. The first to speak were the Achaeans, the next the
Athenian Demaratus, and after him Eudemus of Miletus. And
as the occasion and subject of their speeches were the same,
the substance of them was also nearly identical. They all laid
^. . the blame of what had occurred on Eulaeus, and
' referring to Ptolemy's youth and his relationship
to himself, they intreated the king to lay aside his anger.
Tlicreupon Antiochus, after acknowledging the general truth
of their remarks, and even supporting them by
Antiochus additional arguments of his own, entered upon
a defence of the justice of his original demands.
He attempted to establish the claim of the king of Syria on
Coele- Syria, " Insisting upon the fact that Antigonus, the
founder of the Syrian kingdom, exercised authority in that
country ; and referring to the formal cession of it to Seleucus,-
after the death of Antigonus, by the sovereigns of Macedonia.
Next he dwelt on the last conquest of it by his father
Antiochus ; and finally he denied that any such agreement
was made between the late king Ptolemy and his father as
the Alexandrian ministers asserted, to the effect that Ptolemy
was to take Coele-Syria as a dowry when he married Cleopatra,
* Sec 27, 19 ; 18, I, 17.
^ Selcucus Nicanor, B.C. 306-280.
XiviTi ANTIOCHUS EPIPHANES IN EGYPT 387
the mother of the present king." Having by these ai^uments
not only persuaded himself, but the envoys also, .
of the justice of his claim, he sailed down the pi^s Naucraiis"
river to Naucraiis. There he treated the inhabi- and ihence
tants with humanity, and gave each of the Greeks nflvances to
living there a gold piece, and then advanced
towards Alexandria, He told the envoys that he would give
them an answer on the return of Aristeides and Thesis, whom
he had sent on a mission to Ptolemy ; and he wished, he said,
that the Greek envoys should all be cognisant and witnesses of
their report, , . .
21. The eunuch Eulaeus persuaded Rolemy to collect his
money, Give up liis kingdom to his enemies, _. ., . .
and retire to Samothrace. This will be to any of Eulaeus upon
one who reflects upon it a convincing proof of Piolcmy
the supreme mischief done by evil companions ^o™**?^. He
, , f , ^, ; . "^ , advises hira 10
of boyhood. That a monarch so entirely out of yidd 10
reach of personal danger and so far removed Antiochus and
from his enemies, should not make one effort to u^^''^ '"
save his honour, while in possession too of such
abundant resources, and master over such wide territory and
such numerous subjects, but should at once without a blow
surrender a most splendid and wealthy kingdom,^is not this
the sign of a spirit utterly effeminate and corrupted? And if
this had been Ptolemy's natural character, we must have laid
the blame upon nature and not upon any external influence.
But since by his subsequent achievements his natural character
has vindicated itself, by proving Ptolemy to be sufficiently
resolute and courageous in the hour of danger, we may clearly,
without any improbability, attribute to this eunuch, and his com-
panionship with the king in his boyhood, the ignoble spirit
displayed by him on that occasion, and his idea of going to
Samothrace. . . .
22. After raising the siege of Alexandria, Antiochus sent
envoys to Rome, whose names were Meleager, Amioehus leax-cs
Sosiphanes, and Heracleides, agreeing to pay one Alexandria
hundred and fifty talents, fifty as a compliment- ^'" = '™^' '*'"B
ary present to the Romans, and the rest as a gift ^^^^^^^
to be divided among certain cities in Greece. ... See 29, 35.
_, .^^.iiigs 10 Dom Kingao
existini; hetwcen the two kings the
wliii h a peace would be to both,
the ervoy in the middle of his s\
was no need of much talking, for ll:
elder Ptolemy, and with him he hac
they were friends, and if the peo
him Antiochus would not prevent
word, . . .
BOOK XXIX
1. "Their one idea, expressed at parties or conversations in
the street, was, that they should manage the war
in Macedonia while remaining quietly at homec^j^^'j^e^iUuj
in Rome, sometimes by criticising what the PauUus, c.
generals were doing, at others what they were H^'?'"" ^"''"'=|?-
leaving undone. From this the public interests ,[,g j^l^hof l.
never got any good, and often a great deal of Aemiiius before
harm. The generals themselves were at times ^'^'"e for '^<»-
greatly hampered by this ill-timed loquacity. lJ^"^, 33.
For as it is the invariable nature of slander to
spread rapidly and slop at nothing, the people got thoroughly
infected by this idle talk, and the generals were consequently
rendered contemptible in the eyes of the enemy." . . .
2. The Senate being informed that Antiochus , ^ ^^
had become master of Egypt, and all but taken embassy from
Alexandria, and conceiving that the aggrandise- Piolcmy Physcon
ment of that king was a matter affectins them- "I"' **" ^"'"
■ - 1 .-. ■ T. ■•■ , ■ Cleopatra, the
selves, appomted Gaius Popilms and others Senate sunds Gaius
to go as ambassadors to put an end to the Popilius Laetias
war, and generally to inspect the state of '^ Alexandria,
affairs. . . . '"''■ "' '"■
S. Hippias, and the other ambassadors sent by Perseus, to
Genthius to make an alliance with him, returned cemhius joins
before the winter, and reported that Genthius Perseus on being
would undertake to join in the war with Rome if ™ppii«i with 300
he was paid three hundred talents and received
proper securities. Thereupon Perseus sent Pantauchus, one
of his chief friends, with the following instructions : He was
to agree to pay Genthius the money ; to interchange oaths of
alliance ; to take from Genthius such hostages as he himself
...^ jMOjccisoi I'crseus. i
to and reducx'd U) writing', (icnlhii
whose names Pantaucluis had cai
text of the treaty ; and with them
receive the oaths and hostages froi
were to have charge of the mone
and also consents ^im to send also sor
to join in a a mission to Rhodes '
"RhJS^ ^° ^" ^^^^^ ^^ negotiate ;
the three states. Foi
the Rodians consented to embark upc
they would be easily able to conquer
listened to the suggestion, and appoint
to undertake the mission ; with instr
they had received the oaths and host
the question of the money had beei
proceed on the embassy to Rhodes.
4i. So these various ambassador
Perseus meets Macedonia. ButPanU
Uie envoys from of the young king, and
Genihms ; ^^g necessity of makii
and urging him not to be too lat<
especially urgent that he should prepc
for, as the Romans were quite unprep
on the coasts both of Epirus and Illyr
form would be easilv '* —
XXIX GENTHIUS JOINS PERSEUS 39 1
in the presence of the whole body of cavalry ; for he was very
anxious that the Macedonians should know of the adhesion of
Genthius, hoping that this additional advantage would have
the effect of raising their courage : and next he received the
hostages and handed over his own to Olympion and his
colleagues, the noblest of whom were Limnaeus, the son of
Polemocrates, and Balacrus, son of Pantauchus. Lastly, he
sent the agents who had come for the money to Pella, assuring
them that they would receive it there : and appointed the am-
bassadors for Rhodes to join Metrodorus at Thessalonica, and
hold themselves in readiness to embark.
This embassy succeeded in persuading the Rhodians to
join in the war. And, having accomplished this, ^^^ sends others
Perseus next sent Herophon, who had been to Eumenes and
similarly employed before, on a mission to Amiochus.
Eumenes; and Telemnastos of Crete to Antiochus to urge
him " Not to let the opportunity escape ; nor to imagine that
Perseus was the only person affected by the overbearing and
oppressive conduct of Rome : but to be quite sure that, if he
did not now assist Perseus, if possible by putting an end to
the war, or, if not, by supporting him in it, he would quickly
meet with the same fate himself." . . .
6. In venturing upon a narrative of the intrigues of Perseus
and Eumenes, I have felt myself in a position The intrigues of
of great embarrassment. For to give full and Perseus and
accurate details of the negotiations, which these Eumenes.
two kings conducted in secret between themselves, appeared
to me to be an attempt open to many obvious criticisms and
exceedingly liable to error : and yet to pass over in complete
silence what seemed to have exercised the most decisive in-
fluence in the war, and which alone can explain many of the
subsequent events, seemed to me to wear the appearance of
a certain sluggishness and entire want of enterprise. On the
whole, I decided to state briefly what I believed to be truth,
and the probabilities and surmises on which I founded that
opinion ; for I was, in fact, during this period more struck
than most people at what happened.
6. I have already stated^ that Cydas of Crete, while, serving
* In a previous part of the book now lost. See Livy, 44, 25.
X cibcus to EumenL'S, and that the
began to have reasonable suspiei
rendered clear from what hapjjen*
allowed this prince to come to Ro
I to transact the business he had on t
a favourable answer and dismissed
kindness, although he had done th(
portance in the war with Perseus ; i
rendered them the most important st
them again and again in their wa
Perseus, they not only prevented fron
bade him leave Italy within a certain \
it was mid-winter. Therefore it is qu
triguing had been taking place between
to account for the alienation of the R
What this was, and how far it went, is
inquiry.
7. We can easily satisfy ourselves
_ . . , , have wished Perseus to 1
The ongin of the , ,
intrigue between ^"^ become supreme ir
Eumenesand nothing of the traditioi
Perseus was the existing between these
idea of the former, , •
that, both sides theu: respective powers ^
being tired of the distrust, jealousy, and, ii
war, he might mosity between t^***^
intervene with ^,.
xxiK EUMENES INTRIGUES WITH PERSEUS 393
result, because they made no real progress in the war until
Paul us took the coiumand, and because
Aetolia was in a dangerous state of excite-
ment, he conceived that it would not be impossible that the
Romans would consent to some means of ending the war and
making terms : and he looked upon himself as the most proper
person to act as mediator and elfcct the reconciliation. With
these secret ideas in his mind, he began sounding Perseus by
means of Cydas of Crete, the year before, to find out how
much he would be inclined to pay for such a chance. This
appear to me to be the origin of their connexion with each
other.
8. Two kings, one of whom was the most unprincipled
and the other the most avaricious in the world, TheU-irgain
being now pitted against each other, theiraiicmpiedbctwecn
mutual stru^les presented a spectacle truly liumenesand
ridiculous. Eumenes held out every kind of
hope, and threw out every species of bait, believing that he
would catch Perseus by such promises, Perseus, without
waiting to be approached, rushed to the bait held out to him,
and made for it greedily ; yet he could not make up his mind
to swallow it, to such an extent as to give up any money.
The sort of huckstering contest that went on between them
was as follows. Eumenes demanded five hundred talents as
the price of his abstention from co-operating with the Romans
by land and sea during the fourth year of the war, and fifteen
hundred for putting an end to the war altogether, and pro-
mised to give hostages and securities for his promise at once.
Perseus accepted the proposal of hostages, named the
number, the time at which they were to be sent, and the
manner of their safe custody at Cnosus. But as to the money,
he said that it would be disgraceful to the one who paid, and
still more to the one who received it, to be supposed to remain
neutral for hire ; but the fifteen hundred talents he would
send in charge of Folemocrates and others to Samothrace,
to be held as a deposit there. Now Perseus was master of
Samothrace ; but as Eumenes, like a poor physician, preferred
a retatning-fee to a payment after work, he finally gave U|)
the attempt, when he found that his own craftiness was no
394 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS book
match for the meanness of Perseus. They thus parted on
equal terms, leaving, like good athletes, the battle of avarice
a drawn one. Some of these details leaked out at the time,
and others were communicated subsequently to Perseus's
intimate friends ; and he has taught us by them that every
vice is clinched, so to speak, by avarice.
9. I add the further question from my own reflexions,
Reflexions on the whether avarice is not also short-sighted ? For
blindness of the who could fail to remark the folly of both the
avancious kings, kings ? How could Eumenes on the one hand
expect to be trusted by a man with whom he was on such bad
terms; and to get so large a sum of money, when he was
able to give Perseus absolutely no security for recovering
it, in case of his not carrying out his promises? And
how could he expect not to be detected by the Romans in
taking so large a sum ? If he had concealed it at the time he
certainly would not have done so long. Moreover, he would
have been bound at any rate, in return for it, to have adopted
the quarrel with Rome ; in which he would have been certain
to have lost the money and his kingdom together, and very
probably his life also, by coming forward as an enemy of the
Romans. For if, even as it was, when he accomplished
nothing, but only imagined it, he fell into the gravest dangers,
what would have happened to him if this design had been
brought to perfection ? And again, as to Perseus — who could
fail to be surprised at his thinking anything of higher import-
ance, or more to his advantage, than to give the money and
allow Eumenes to swallow the bait ? For if, on the one hand,
Eumenes had performed any part of his promises, and had
put an end to the war, the gift would have been well bestowed ;
and if, on the other hand, he had been deceived of that
hope, he could at least have involved him in the certain
enmity of Rome; for he would have had it entirely in his
own power to make these transactions public. And one may
easily calculate how valuable this w^ould have been to Perseus,
whether he succeeded or failed in the war : for he would
have regarded Eumenes as the guilty cause of all his mis-
fortunes, and could in no way have retaliated upon him more
effectually than by making him an enemy of Rome. What
ixix THE AVARICE OF PERSEUS 395
then was the root of all this blind folly? Nothing but
avarice. It could have been nothing else ; for, to save himself
from giving money, Perseus was content to suffer
anything, and neglect every other considera- ^cmiiiui"^ la
tion. On a par too with this was his conduct
to the Gauls and Genthius. . . .
10. The question being put to the vote at Rhodes, it was
carried to send envoys to negotiate a peace ;
and this decree thus decided the relative mXe^afu^^jJ^
strength of the opposite political parties at to (onn a con-
Rhodes [as has been stated in my essay on fedoraiion againsi
public speaking], showing that the party for '["™^„|,",'o^^;'
siding with Perseus was stronger than that
which was for preserving their country and its laws. The
Prytanies immediately appointed ambassadors to negotiate
the cessation of the war : Agepolis, Diodes, and Cleombrotus
were sent to Rome ; Damon, Nicostratus, Agesilochus, and
Telephus to Perseus and the consul. The Rhodians went on
in the same spirit to take farther steps, so that they eventually
committed themselves past all excuse. For they at once
sent ambassadors to Crete, to renew their friendly relations
with the entire Cretan people, and to urge that, in view of the
dangers that threatened them, they should throw in their lot with
the people of Rhodes, and hold the same people to be friends
and enemies as they did, and also to address the separate cities
to the same effect. . . .
11. When the embassy led by Parmenio and Morcus
from Genthius, accompanied by those led by The manner in
Metrodorus, arrived in Rhodes, the assembly which this vote of
summoned to meet them proved very turbulent, ""^ >j°^'^'fia^*
the party of Deinon venturing openly to plead ' ' '
the cause of Perseus, whilst that of Theaetetus was quite over-
powered and dismayed. For the presence of the Illyrian
galleys, the nunilier of the Roman cavalry that had been
killed, and the fact of Genthius having changed sides, quite
crushed them. Thus it was that the result of the meeting of
the assembly was as I have described it. For the Rhodians
voted to return a favourable answer to both kings, to state
that they had resolved to put an end to the war, and to
396 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS book
exhort the kings themselves to make no difficulty about the
terms. They also received the ambassadors of Genthius
at the common altar- hearth or Prytaneum of the city with
every mark of friendship. . . .
1 2. Other historians [have spoken in exaggerated terms] *
of the Syrian war. And the reason is one
P^y&mcth^ which I have Often mentioned. Though their
in writing history, subjccts are simple and without complications,
and his avoidance they seek the name and reputation of historians
^^'d^t^iSr^ not from the truth of their facts, but the number
of their books ; and accordingly they are obligod
to give petty affairs an air of importance, and fill out and give
rhetorical flourishes to what was originally expressed briefly;
dress up actions and achievements which were originally quite
secondary; expatiate on struggles; and describe pitched battles,
in which sometimes ten or a few more infantry fell, and still
fewer cavalry. As for sieges, local descriptions, and the like,
one cannot say that their treatment is adequate, because they
have no facts to give. But a writer of universal history must
pursue a different plan ; and therefore I ought not to be con-
demned for minimising the importance of events, if I some-
times pass over affairs that have met with wicie fame and
laboured description, or for mentioning them with brevity ; but
I ought to be trusted to give to each subject the amount of dis-
cussion which it deserves. Such historians as I refer to, when
they are describing in the course of their work the siege, say
of Phanoteia, or Coroneia, or [Haliartus], are forced to dis-
play all the contrivances, bold strokes, and other features of a
siege ; and when they come to the capture of Tarentum, the
sieges of Corinth, Sardis, Gaza, Bactra, and, above all, of
Carthage, they must draw on their own resources to prolong
the agony and heighten the picture, and are not at ail satisfied
with me for giving a more truthful relation of such events as they
really occurred. Let this statement hold good also as to my
description of pitched battles and public harangues, as well as
other departments of history ; in all of which I might fairly
claim considerable indulgence, as also in what is now about to
* The extract begins in the middle of a sentence at the top of a page. I
have supplied these words at a guess, giving what seems the sense.
XXIX OF PROPOKTION IN HISTORY 397
be narrated, if I am detected in some inconsistency in the
substance of my story, the treatment of my facts, or the style
of language ; and also if 1 make some mistakes in the names
of mountains or rivers, or the special features of localities : for
indeed the magnitude of my work is a sufficient excuse in all
these points, unless, indeed, I am ever detected in deliberate
or interested misstatements in my writings : for such I ask no
indulgence, as I have repeatedly and explicitly remarked in
the course of my history. . . .
IS. Genthius, king of the lllyrians, disgraced himself by
many abominable actions in the course of his intemperance
life from his addiction to drink, in which he in- and bruiaiiiy of
dulged continually day and night. Among other Genthius.
things he killed his brother Plastor, who was about to marry
the daughter of Monunius, and married the girl himsel£ He
also behaved with great cruelty to his subjects. . . .
In the spring of B.C. 1 68 Genthius was forced to surrender to
the praetor L. Anidus Gallus {Livy, 44, 30-31). The consul
L. Aemilius Paulus found Perseus on the left bank of the Mace-
donian river Enipeus in a very strong position, which was how-
ever turned by a gallant exploit of JVasica and Q. J^abius
Maximus, who made their way with a considerable force oi^erthe
mountains, thus getting on the rear of Perseus. Liiy, 44,
30-35. Plutarch, Aemil. 15.
14h The first man to volunteer to make the outflanking
movement was Scipio Nasica, son-in-law of
Scipio Africanus, who afterwards became the '^ri!^lZ'''''i'"'
^ ^ , , II, ^^^ others volun-
most mnuential man m the Senate,' and who iccr to cross the
now undertook to lead the party. The second mouniaina into
was Fabius Maximus, the eldest of the sons of q„|^JJIJ^ ^
the consul Aemilius Paulus,* still quite a young
man, who stood forward and offered to join with great
■ P. Corncliiu Scipio Nasica Corculum was afterwards Ponlifex Maximus
(rc 150). See Cic de Sen. 3. ja
' Of the two eldest sons o[ Aemilius. the elder was adopted by Quinlus
Fabius Maximus. Ihc second by P. Cornelius Scipio, son of the elder Af '
his malemal uncle.
398 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS book
enthusiasm. Aemilius was therefore delighted and assigned
them a body of soldiers. ^ . . .
Struggle in the 1^* The Romans offered a gallant resist-
bedoftheEnipeus.ance by aid of their strong targets or Ligurian
Livy. 44. 35- shields. . . .
Perseus saw that Aemilius had not moved, and did not
The Romans ^ckon on what was taking place, when suddenly
force the heights a Cretan, who had deserted from the Roman
by way of army on its march, came to him with the in-
y eum. formation that the Romans were getting on his
rear. Though thrown into the utmost panic he did not strike
his camp, but despatched ten thousand mercenaries and two
thousand Macedonians under Milo, with orders to advance with
speed and seize the heights. The Romans fell upon these as
they were lying asleep.* . . .
16. An eclipse of the moon occurring, the report went
abroad, and was believed by many, that it signified an eclipse
of the king. And this circumstance raised the spirits of the
Romans and depressed those of the Macedonians. So true is the
common saying that "war has many a groundless scare. "^ . . .
Perseus finding himself thus on the point of being outflanked
retired on Pydna^ near which toivn Aemilius Paulus, after
considerable delay , about midsummer inflicted a crushing defeat
upon him. Perseus fled to Amphipolis, and thence to Samothrace^
7vliere lie was captured by Paulus and taken to Rome to adorn
his triumph J and afterwards alloived to live as a private person
at Alba, This was the end of tlie Mcuedonian kingdom, {Livy,
44, 36-43; 45, 1-8. Plutarch, Aemil. 16-23.)
^ From Plutarch, Aemilius, 15, who adds that Polybius made a mistake as
to the number of soldiers told off for this service, which to- judge from Livy,
44, 35, Polybius probably stated at 5000. Plutarch got his correction from an
extant letter of Nasica (8000 Roman infantry, with 120 horse, and 200
Thracians and Cretans).
"^ From Plutarch, who again contradicts this last statement, on the authority
of Nasica, who said that there was a sharp engagement on the heights.
' The Roman was saved from a scare by the eclipse being foretold by Gaius
Sulpicius Gallus, famous for his knowledge of Greek literature and astronomy.
He is represented by Cicero as explaining the celestial globe {spkaera) which
Marcellus brought from Syracuse. He was consul in B.C. 166. Livy, 44, 37 ;
Cicero, Brut, § 78 ; <^ Repub, i, § 21.
xiix BATTLE OF PYDN^A 399
17. The consul Lucius Aemilius had never seen a phalanx
until he saw it in the army of Perseus on this 1^ phalani at
occasion ; and he often confessed to some of his the hatiie of
friends at Rome subsequently, that he had never ^'''S
beheld anything more alanning and terrible than
the Macedonian phalanx: and yet he had been, if any one ever .
had, not only a spectator but an actor in many battles. . . .
Many plans which look plausible and feasible, when
brought to the test of actual experience, tike base coins
when brought to the furnace, cease to answer in any way to
their original conceptions. . . .
When Perseus came to the hour of trial his courage all left
him, like that of an athlete in bad training. For when the
danger was approaching, and it became necessary to fight a
decisive battle, his resolution gave way. , . .
As soon as the battle began, the Macedonian king played
the coward and rode off to the town, under the pretext of
sacrificing to Hercules, — who certainly does not accept craven
gifts from cravens, nor fulfil unworthy prayers. . , .
18. He was then very young, and it was his first experience
of actual service in the field, and having but scipo Afncinus
recently begun to taste the sweets of promotion, the younger, cf.
he was keen, ambitious, and eager to be first. . . , ^"t- *''• <* '''
19. Just when Perseus had been beaten and was trying to
save himself by flight, the Senate determined to xh^ Rhodbn
admit the ambassadors, who had come from mission deliver
Rhodes to negotiate a peace, to an audience : '^"^'^ i^ssage too
Fortune thus appearing designedly to parade
the folly of the Rhodians on the stage, — if we may say " of the
Rhodians," and not rather " of the individuals who were then
in the ascendant at Rhodes." VVhen Agesipolis and his
colleagues entered the Senate, they said that " They had come
to arrange an end to the war ; for the people of Rhodes, — see-
ing that the war was become protracted to a considerable length
of time, and seeing that it was disadvantageous to all the Greeks,
as well as to the Romans themselves, on account of its enormous
expenses, — had come to that conclusion. Hut as the war was
already ended, and the wish of the Rhodians was thus fulfilled,
they had only to congratulate the Romans." Such was the
400 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS book
brief speech of Agesipolis. But the Senate seized the oppor-
tunity of making an example of the Rhodians, and produced an
answer of which the upshot was that "They did not regard this
Uncompromising embassy as having been sent by the Rhodians
answer of the in the interests either of the Greeks or them-
Senate. selves, but in those of Perseus. For if they had
meant to send an embassy in behalf of the Greeks, the proper
time for doing so was when Perseus was plundering the territory
and cities of Greece, while encamped for nearly two years in
Thessaly. But to let that time pass without notice, and to
come now desiring to put an end to the war, at a time when
the Roman legions had entered Macedonia, and Perseus was
closely beleagured and almost at the end of his hopes, was a
clear proof to any one of observation that the Rhodians had
sent their embassy, not with the desire of ending the war, but
to rescue and save Perseus to the best of their ability. There-
fore they deserved no indulgence at the hands of the Romans
at this time, nor any favourable reply." Such was the Senate's
answer to the Rhodians. . . .
20. Then Aemilius Paulus speaking once more in Latin bade
Perseus, being ^^ members of his council, " With such a sight
brought a before their eyes,'* — pointing to Perseus, — " not
prisoner before ^q ^g ^^^ boastful in thc hour of success, nor to
and his council, ^^^ ^"X extreme or inhuman measures against
refuses to reply any one, nor in fact ever to feel confidence in
to his questions, ^^ permanence of their present good fortune.
the king in Greek ^^t^er it was precisely at the time of greatest
and then his success, either private or public, that a man
council in Latin, should be most alive to the possibility of a
»vy, 45. • reverse. Even so it was difficult for a man to
exhibit moderation in good fortune. But the distinction
between fools and wise was that the former only learnt by their
own misfortunes, the latter by those of others." . . .
21. One is often reminded of the words of Demetrius of
Demetrius of Phalerum. In his treatise on Fortune, wishing
Phaierum on to give the world a distinct view of her mutability,
mutability, j^^ fixed upon the period of Alexander, when
that monarch destroyed the Persian dynasty, and thus expresses
himself: "If you will take, I don't say unlimited time or many
ixix UNCERTAINTIES OF FORTUNE 401
generations, but only these last fifty years immediately preceding
our generation, you will be able to understand the cruelty of
Fortune. For can you suppose, If some god had warned
the Persians or their king, or the Macedonians or their king,
that in fifty years the very name of the Persians, who once
were masters of the world, would have been lost, and that the
Macedonians, whose name was before scarcely known, would
become masters of it ail, that they would have believed it?
Nevertheless it is true that Fortune, whose influence on our life
is incalculable, who displays her power by surprises, is even
now I think, showing all mankind, by her elevation of the
Macedonians into the high prosperity once enjoyed by the
Persians, that she has merely lent them these advantages until
she may otherwise determine concerning them." And this has
now come to pass in the person of Perseus ; and indeed
Demetrius has spoken prophetically of the future as though he
were inspired. And as the course of my history brought me to
the period which witnessed theruinofthe Macedonian kingdom,
I judged it to be right not to pass it over without proper
remark, especially as I was an eye-witness of the transaction.
It was a case I thought both for enlarging on the theme
myself, and for recalling the words of Demetrius, who appeared
to me to have shown something more than mere human
sagacity in his remarks ; for he made a true forecast of the
future almost a hundred and fifty years before the event. . . .
2Z After the conclusion of the battle between Perseus and
the Romans, king Eumenes found himself in
what people call an unexpected and extraordin- ai„^ys"b^^!^
ary trouble, but what, if we regard the natural
course of human concerns, was quite an everyday affair. For
it is quite the way of Fortune to confound human calculations
by surprises ; and when she has helped a man for a time, and
caused her balance to incline in his favour, to turn round
upon him as though she repented, throw her weight into the
opposite scaJe, and mar all his successes. And i;umencs disnp.
this was the case now with Eumenes. He im- poinicd ot his
agined that at last his own kingdom was safe, """l" "^ l"'"' ^1
and that he might look forward to a tmie of
ease, now that Perseus and the whole kingdom of Macedonia
iS.
23. In ihc Peloponnesu
of the winter .
This gave rist
sions. The party of Callicr
granting the help ; while Arc
for sending it to the kings in .
alliance. For by this time it 1
Ptolemy had been proclaimed I
owing to the danger which t.
elder had subsequently retume<
ing jointly with his sister. A
tkind of assistance, they sent J
the Achaeans, asking a thousar
with Lycortas to command th<
^ They sent a message also to '
him to hire them a thousand
chanced to have become intims
ticular men, owing to the tran
The ambassadors arrived whei
session in Corinth. They the
' recalling the many evidences
j Achaeans to the kingdom of ]
! the danger in tri>!-»-
xxiK THE PTOLEMIES ASK HELP FROM ACHAIA 403
forces for the service of Rome. For there was a general
expectation just then of a decisive battle being fought, as Q.
Philippus was wintering in Macedonia.
24. The people were alarmed lest they should be thought
to (ail the Romans in any way : and accordingly pdybius advo-
LycoTtas and Polybius rose in their turn, and, cates the cause of
among other advice which they impressed upon ""^ ftolenues.
them, argued that " ^Vhen in the previous year the Achaeans
had voted to join the Roman army with their full levy, and
sent Polybius to announce that resolution, Quintus Marcius,
while accepting the kindness of their intention, had yet stated
that the assistance was not needed, since he had won the pass
into Macedonia. Their opponents therefore were manifestly
using the need of helping the Romans merely as a pretext for
preventing this aid being sent to Alexandria. They entreated
the Achaeans, in view of the greatness ofthe danger surrounding
the king of Egypt, not to neglect the right moment for acting;
but keeping in mind their mutual agreement and good services,
and above all their oaths, to fulfil the terms of their agree-
ment."
The people were once more inclined to grant the aid when
ihey hear4 this : but Callicrates and his party
managed to prevent the decree being passed, by *''^ j^^^^^'^'*
staggering the magistrates with the assertion
that it was unconstitutional to discuss the question of sending
help abroad in public assembly.^ But a short time afterwards
a meeting was summoned at Sicyon, which was ^^^ ^^ ^ smaller
attended not only by the members of the coun- meeting ai Sicyon
cil, but by all citizens over thirty years of age ; ^°^i^"^ prevails,
and after a lengthened debate, Polybius especially dwelling on
the fact that the Romansdid not require assistance, — inwhich he
was believed not to be speaking without good reason, as he had
spent the previous summer in Macedonia at the headquarters
' ir irft^. The objection, though it served to divert the magistrates Irom
going on with the proposilion Bl Ihc lime, seems 10 have been got over bcCore
the meeting at Sicyon ; unless, indeed, the laller was considered to be of a
diflcrenl nature in regard to the nge of those nttcnding. But we have no in-
fonnalion as to Ihisrcstdclion of thiny years of .-ige, — wheihei it was universal.
or confined to particular occasions. This passage would seem to point to the
)Ut«r alternative;
404 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBWS book
of Marcius Philippus, — and also alleging that, even supposing
the Romans did turn out to require their active support, the
Achaeans would not be rendered incapable of furnishing it by
the two hundred horse and one thousand foot which were to
be despatched to Alexandria, — for they could, without any in-
convenience, put thirty or forty thousand men into the field, —
the majority of the meeting were convinced, and were inclined
to the idea of sending the aid Accordingly, on the second of
the two days on which, according to the laws, those who
wished to do so were bound to bring forward their motions,
Lycortas and Polybius proposed that the aid should be sent
Callicrates, on the other hand, proposed to send ambassadors
to reconcile the two Eg>'ptian kings with Antiochus. So once
more, on these two motions being put, there was an animated
contest ; in which, however, Lycortas and Polybius got a con-
siderable majority on their side. For there was a very wide
distinction between the claims of the two kingdoms. There
were very few instances to be found in past times of any act
of friendship on the part of Syria to the Greeks, — though the
liberality of the present king was well known in Greece, — but
from Egypt the acts of kindness in past times to the Achaeans
had been as numerous and important as any one could possibly
expect. By dwelling on this point Lycortas made a great
impression, because the distinction between the two kingdoms
in this respect was shown to be immense. For it was as diffi-
cult to count up all the benefactions of the Alexandrine kings,
as it was impossible to find a single act of friendship done by
the dynasty of Antiochus to the Achaeans. . . .
25. For a time Andronidas and Callicrates kept on arguing
The measure is ^^ support of the plan of putting an end to
again defeated by the war : but as no One was persuaded by
a trick of Caiii- them, they employed a stratagem. A letter-
carrier came into the theatre (where the meet-
ing was being held), who had just arrived with a despatch from
Quintus Marcius, urging those Achaeans who were of the pro-
Roman party to reconcile the kings ; for it was a fact that the
Senate had sent a mission under T. Numisius to do so. But
this really made against their argument : for Titus Numisius
and his colleagues had been unable to effect the pacification, and
Mil ANTIOCHVS FORCED TO LEAVE EGYPT 405
had returned to Rome completely unsuccessful in the object
of their mission. However, as Polybius and his party did
not wish to speak against the despatch, from consideration for
Marcius, they retired from the discussion : and it was thus
that the proposal to send an aid to the kings fell througL The
Achaeans voted to send ambassadors to effect The ^ngj ^\^
the pacification : and Archon of Aegeira, and for Lyconas and
Arcesilaus and Ariston of Megalopolis were Polybius.
appointed to the duty. Whereupon the envoys of Ptolemy,
being disappointed of obtaining the help, handed over to the
magistrate the despatch from the kings, in which they asked
that they would send Lycortas and Polybius to take part in
the war. . . .
26. Forgetful of all he had written and said Anliochus
began preparing for a renewal of the war
against Rolemy. So true are the words of '^^'^."^rM^i™'^'
Simonides, — " 'Tis hard to be good." For to ihus joining each
have certain impulses towards virtue, and even oiher, Amiochus
to hold to it up to a certain point, is easy ; but ^'^™^^ 'ils""'
to be uniformly consistent, and to allow no
circumstances of danger to shake a resolute integrity, which
regards honour and justice as the highest considerations, is
indeed difficult. ...
27. WhenAntiochus had advanced to attack Ptolemy inorder
to possess himself of Pelusium, he was met by *„,.,[,„_ j „
the Roman commander Gaius Popilius Laenas. near Alexandria
Upon the king greeting him from some distance, (Li'7. 4S.,f»)by
and holding out his right hand to him, Popilius \^fr^^^\,o
answered by holding out the tablets which con- forces him to ab-
tained the decree of the Senate, and bade s'ain from the
Antiochus read that first : not thinking it right, '^""
I suppose, to give the usual sign of friendship until he knew
the mind of the recipient, whether he were to be regarded as a
friend or foe. On the king, after reading the despatch, saying
that he desired to consult with his friends on the situation,
Popilius did a thing which was looked upon as exceedingly
overbearing and insolent Happening to have a vine stick in
hb hand, he drew a circle round Antiochus with it, and ordered
him to give his answer to the letter before he stepped out of
406 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS book xxix
*
that circumference. The king was taken aback by this haughty
proceeding. After a brief interval of embarrassed silence, he
replied that he would do whatever the Romans demanded.
Then Popilius and his colleagues shook him by the hand, and
one and all greeted him with warmth. The contents of the
despatch was an order to put an end to the war with Ptolemy
at once. Accordingly a stated number of days was allowed
him, within which he withdrew his army into Syria, in high
dudgeon indeed, and groaning in spirit, but yielding to the
necessities of the time.
Popilius and his colleagues then restored order in
Popilius goes on Alexandria; and after exhorting the two kings to
to Cyprus and maintain peaceful relations with each other, and
forces the anny charging them at the same time to send Poly-
ofAntiochusto ^^^^yg ^Q Rome, they took ship and sailed
evacuate it > j ^
towards Cyprus, with the intention of promptly
ejecting from the island the forces that were also gathered
there. When they arrived, they found that Ptolemy's generals
had already sustained a defeat, and that the whole island was
in a state of excitement They promptly caused the invading
army to evacuate the country, and remained there to keep
watch until the forces had sailed away for Syria. Thus did
the Romans save the kingdom of Ptolemy, when it was all but
The previous sinking under its disasters. Fortune indeed so
defeat of Perseus disposed of the fate of Perseus and the Mace-
I^vlui^of^ ^^t ^^"^^'^s, that the restoration of Alexandria and
gyp . ^^ ^^Qie Qf Egypt was decided by it ; that is
to say, by the fate of Perseus being decided previously : for if
that had not taken place, or had not been certain, I do not
think that Antiochus would have obeyed these orders.
BOOK XXX
1. Attalus, brother of king Eumenes, came to Rome this
year, pretending that, even if the disaster of the b.c. 167. Coss.Q.
Gallic rising had not happened to the kingdom, Aciius Pactus. M.
he should have come to Rome, to congratulate J^^^ Pennus.
the Senate, and to receive some mark of its ^ ,
, - , . , . , , Attains at Rome,
approval for having been actively engaged on is persuaded to
their side and loyally shared in all their dangers ; try by the Roman
but, as it happened, he had been forced to come *^®^P ^Z ^"PP^***^
. , ' ^ . , , c »iis brother.
at that time to Rome owing to the danger from
the Gauls. Upon finding a general welcome from everybody,
owing to the acquaintance formed with him on the campaign,
and the belief that he was well disposed to them, and meeting
with a reception that surpassed his expectation, the young
man's hopes were extraordinarily raised, because he did not
know the true reason of this friendly warmth. The result was
that he narrowly escaped ruining his own and his brother's
fortunes, and indeed the entire kingdom. The majority at Rome
were thoroughly angry with king Eumenes, and believed that
he had been playing a double game during the war, keeping up
communications with Perseus, and watching his opportunity
against them : and accordingly some men of high rank got
Attalus under their influence, and urged him to lay aside the
character of ambassador for his brother, and to speak in his
own behalf; as the Senate was minded to secure a separate
kingdom and royal government for him, because of their dis-
pleasure with his brother. This excited the ambition of
Attalus still more, and in private conversation he signified his
assent to those who advised this course. Finally, he arranged
with some men of position that he would actually appear
before the Senate and deliver a speech on the subject.
4o8 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS book
2. ^Vhile Attalus was engaged on this intrigue, Eumenes,
Stratius is sent to faring what w^ould happen, sent his physician
dissuade Attalus Stratius to Rome, putting him in possession of
from his meditated ^j^^ facts, and charging him to employ every means
to prevent Attalus from following the advice
of those who wished to ruin their kingdom. On arriving at
Rome and getting Attalus by himself, he used a great variety
of arguments to him (and he was a man of great sense
and powers of persuasion), and at length, with much trouble,
succeeded in his object, and in recalling him from his
mad project He represented to him that "he was already
practically joint-king with his brother, and only differed from
him in the fact that he wore no diadem, and was not called
king, though in everything else he possessed an equal and
identical authority : that in the future he was the acknowledged
heir to the crown, and with no very distant prospect of posses-
sion ; as the king, from tlie weak state of his health, was in con-
stant expectation of his departure, and being childless could
not, even if he wished it, leave the crown to any one else."
(For in fact that natural son of his, who afterwards succeeded
to the crown, had not as yet been acknowledged.) " Above all,
he was surprised at the hindrance Attalus was thus interposing
to the measures necessary at that particular crisis. For they
ought to thank heaven exceedingly if they proved able, even
with hearty co-operation and unanimity, to repel the threatened
attack of the Gauls ; but if he should at such a time quarrel
with and oppose his brother, it was quite clear that he would
ruin the kingdom, and deprive himself both of his present
power and his future expectations, and his other brothers also
of the kingdom and the power they possessed in it," By these
and similar arguments Stratius dissuaded Attalus from taking
any revolutionary steps.
8. Accordingly, when Attalus appeared before the Senate,
he congratulated it on what had happened ; expatiated on the
loyalty and zeal shown by himself in the war with Perseus ; and
urged at some length that the Senate should send envoys to
restrain the audacity of the (iauls, and compel them to confine
themselves once more to their original boundaries. He also
said something about the cities of Aeneus and Maronea, desiring
ixx ATTALUS AT ROME 409
that they might be given as a free gift to himself But he said
not a single word against the Icing, or about the partition of the
kingdom. The senators, supposing that he would interview
them privately on a future occasion upon these points, pro-
mised to send the envoys, and loaded him lavishly with the
customary presents, and, moreover, promised him these cities.
But when, after receiving these marks of favour, he at once
left Rome without fulfilling any of its expectations, the
Senate, though foiled in its hopes, had nothing else which it
could do ; but before he had got out of Italy it declared
Acneus and Maronea free cities, — thus rescind-
ing its promise, — and sent Publius Licinius at oaLiUa '°
the head of a mission to the Gauls. And what
instructions these ambassadors had given to them it is not easy
to say, but it may be guessed without difficulty from what sub-
sequently happened. And this will be rendered clear from the
transactions themselves.
4, There also came embassies from Rhodes, the first headed
by Philocrates, the second by Philophron
and Astymrfo. For when the Rhodans re- ",^'^^
ceived the answer given to the embassy of b.c. 167.
Agesipolis immediately after the battle of Pydna, g^ ^ ^
they understood the anger and threatening
attitude of the Senate towards them, and promptly despatched
these embassies. Aslymedes and Philophron, observing in
the course of public and private conversations the suspicions
and anger entertained towards them at Rome, were reduced to
a stale of great discouragement and distress. Terror of ihe
But when one of the praetors mounted the Rhodian envoys ai
Rostra and urged the people to declare war""'"'"^' °'"^''-
a;;ainst Rhodes, then indeed they were beside themselves with
terror at the danger that threatened their country. They
assumed mourning garments, and in their various interviews
with their friends dropped the tone of persuasion or demand,
and pleaded instead, with tears and prayers, that they would not
adopt any measure of supreme severity towards them. A few
days afterwards Antony, one of the tribimes, introduced them
to the Senate, and dragged the praetor who advised the war
down from the Rostra. Philophron spoke first, and was
4IO THE nrSTORIES OF POLYBIUS BOOK
followed by Astymedcs ; and, having thus uttered the
proverbial " swan's song,** they received an answer which, while
freeing them from actual fear of war, conveyed a bitter and
stern rebuke from the Senate for their conduct. Now Asty-
medes considered himself to have made a good speech on
A criticism on the behalf of his country, but did not at all satisfy
speech of the the Greeks visiting or residing at Rome. For
Rhodian jjg aftcrwards published the speech contain-
s >mtc cs. .^^ j^.^ argument in defence, which, to all those
into whose hands it fell, appeared absurd and quite uncon-
vincing. For he rested his plea not alone on the merits of his
country, but still more on an accusation of others. Comparing
the good services done and the co-operation undertaken by
the others, he endeavoured to deny or minimise them ; while
he exaggerated those of Rhodes as far above their actual
amount as he could. The errors of others, on the contrary,
he inveighed against in bitter and hostile terms, while those of
the Rhodians he attempted to cloak and conceal, in order
that, by this comparison, those of his own country might appear
insignificant and pardonable, those of others grave and beyond
excuse, "all of whom," he added, ** had already been pardoned
before." But this sort of pleading can in no circumstances be
considered becoming to a statesman. Take the case of the
betrayal of secrets. It is not those who, for fear or gain, turn
informers that we commend ; but those who endure any torture
and punishment rather than involve an accomplice in the same
misfortune. These are the men whom we approve and con-
sider noble. But a man who, from some undefined alarm,
exposes to the view of the party in power all the errors of
others, and who recalls what time had obliterated from the
minds of the ruling people, cannot fail to be an object of dis-
like to all who hear of it.
5. After receiving the above answer Philocrates and his
colleagues immediately started home ; but Asty-
^^'^ansvv^r ihc^ "^ medes and his fellows stayed where they were and
Rhodians endea- kept on the watch, that no report or observation
vour to propitiate against thcir country might be made unknown
1 k^'^^^rorr to them. But when this answer of the Senate
was reported at Rhodes, the people, considering
XXX THE RHODIANS TRY TO EXCUSE THEMSELVES ^\\
themselves relieved of the worst fear — that, namely, of war —
made light of the rest, though extremely unfavourable. So true
it ever is that a dread of worse makes men forget lighter mis-
fortunes. They immediately voted a complimentary crown
worth ten thousand gold pieces^ to Rome, and appointed
Theaetetus at once envoy and navarch to convey it at the be-
ginning of summer, accompanied by an embassy under Rhodo-
phon, to attempt in every possible way to make an alliance
with the Romans. They acted thus because they wished that,
if the embassy failed by an adverse answer at Rome, the failure
might take place without the people having passed a formal
decree, the attempt being made solely on the initiative of the
navarch, and the navarch having by the law power to act in
such a case. For the fact was that the republic xhe astuteness of
of Rhodes had been administered with such the Rhodian
consummate statesmanship, that, though it had po^cy.
for nearly a hundred and forty years been engaged in con-
junction with Rome in actions of the greatest importance and
glory, it had never yet made an alliance with her. Nor
ought I to omit stating the reason of this policy of the
Rhodians. They wished that no ruler or prince should be
entirely without hope of gaining their support or alliance ; and
they therefore did not choose to bind or hamper themselves
beforehand with oaths and treaties ; but, by remaining uncom-
mitted, to be able to avail themselves of all advantages as they
arose. But on this occasion they were much bent upon
securing this mark of honour from Rome, not because they
were anxious for the alliance, or because they were afraid of
any one else at the time except the Romans, but because they
wished, by giving an air of special importance to their design,
to remove the suspicions of such as were inclined to entertain
unfavourable thoughts of their state. For immediately after
the return of the ambassadors under Theaetetus, caunus.in Peraca,
the Caunians revolted and the Mylassians seized and Myiassa. in
on the cities in Euromus. And about the same ^''^^' ''*^^°^^*
time the Roman Senate published a decree declaring all
* Livy says viginii millia. By "xpwTov^ Polybius appears to mean
"staters," worth about 20 drachmae (20 francs). This would give a rough
value of the present as ;f 8000, or on Livy's computation twice that amount.
4 1 2 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS BOOK
Carians and Lycians free who had been assigned to the Rhodians
The Senate de- ^^^^^ ^^^ war with Antiochus. The Caunian and
Clare Caria and Mylassian revolts were speedily put down by
Lycia free. See jj^g Rhodians ; for they compelled the Caunians,
by sending Lycus with a body of soldiers, to
return to their allegiance, though the people of Cib)rra had
come to their assistance ; and in an expedition into Euromus
they conquered the Mylassians and Alabandians in the field,
these two peoples having combined their forces to attack
Orthosia. But when the decree concerning the Lycians and
Carians was announced they were once more in a state of
dismay, fearing that their gift of the crown had proved in
vain, as well as their hopes of an alliance. . . .
6. I have already directed my readers' attention to the
The three classes poHcy of Deinon and Polyaratus. For Rhodes
of men who in the was not the only place which experienced grave
various states got (jancrer and important changes. Nearly all the
into trouble for «• j • i -r -n i
their conduct States sufTcred m the same way. It will there-
during the Mace- fore be instructive to take a review of the
donian war. policy adopted by the statesmen in the several
countries, and to ascertain which of them will be proved to
have acted with wisdom, and which to have done otherwise :
in order that posterity in similar circumstances of danger may,
with these examples as models, so to speak, before their eyes,
be able to choose the good and avoid the bad with a genuine
insight ; and may not in the last hour of their lives dishonour
their previous character and achievements, from failing to per-
ceive where the path of honour lies. There were, then,
three different classes of persons who incurred blame for their
conduct in the war with Perseus. One consisted of those
who, while displeased at seeing the controversy brought to a
decisive end, and the control of the world fall into the power of
one government, nevertheless took absolutely no active steps for
or against the Romans, but left the decision entirely to Fortune.
A second consisted of those who were glad to see the
question settled, and wished Perseus to win, but were unable to
convert the citizens of their own states or the members of
their race to their sentiments. And a third class consisted of
those who actually succeeded in inducing their several states
XXX GREEK STATES AND THE WAR WITH PERSEUS ^\^
to change round and join the alliance of Perseus. Our
present task is to examine how each of these conducted their
respective policies,
7. In the last class were Antinous, Theodotus, and Cephalus,
who induced the Molossians to join Perseus. .
These men, when the results of the campaign ^j^J^^^^j^^^^ (-^.p^,
went completely against them, and they found lus of the Moiossi
themselves in imminent danger of the worst ^"^ instances of
X yy e '^ J ^ the third class.
consequences, put a bold face upon it and met
an honourable death in the field. These men deserve our
commendation for their self-respect, in refusing to allow them-
selves to lapse into a position unworthy of their previous life.
Again, in Achaia and Thessaly and Perrhaebia several
persons incurred blame by remaining neutral, ^
^1 J .» ^ ^v ^ r^« ^u • Several instances
on the ground that they were watching their ^f j^e first class
opportunity, and were in heart on the side of in Achaia
Perseus : and yet they never let a word to that P^^io^Js, Thessaly,
rt- «t 1 !• iincl Perrhaebia,
effect get abroad, nor were ever detected m
sending letter or message to Perseus on any subject whatever,
but conducted themselves with unexceptionable discretion.
Such men as these therefore very properly determined to face
judicial inquiry and stand their judgment, and to make every
effort to save themselves. For it is quite as great a sign of
cowardice to abandon life voluntarily when a man is conscious
of no crime, from fear of the threats of political opponents or
of the power of the conquerors, as it is to cling to life to the
loss of honour.
Again, in Rhodes and Cos, and several other cities, there
were men who favoured the cause of Perseus, instances of the
and who were bold enough to speak in behalf second class in
of the Macedonians in their own cities, and to ^*^ojJ«S' ^os, and
inveigh against the Romans, and to actually ° er paces,
advise active steps in alliance with Perseus, but who were not
able to induce their states to transfer themselves to alliance
with the king. The most conspicuous of such men were in
Cos the two ^brothers Hippias and Diomedon, and in Rhodes
Deinon and Polyaratus.
8, And it is impossible not to view the policy of these
men with disapproval. To begin with, all their fellow-
414 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS BOOK
citizens were aware of everything they had done or said ;
in the next place, the letters were intercepted and made
public which were coming from Perseus to them, and
from themselves to Perseus, as well as the messengers from
both sides : yet they could not make up their minds to
yield and put themselves out of the way, but still disputed
the point. The result of this persistence and dinging
to life, in the face of a desperate position, was that they
quite ruined their character for courage and resolution,
and left not the least ground for pity or sympathy in the
minds of posterity. For being confronted with their own
letters and agents, they were regarded as not merely un-
fortunate, but rather as shameless. One of those who went
on these voyages was a man named Thoas. He had frequently
sailed to Macedonia on a mission from these men, and when
the decisive change in the state of affairs took place, conscious
of what he had done, and fearing the consequences, he retired
to Cnidos. But the Cnidians having thrown him into prison,
he was demanded by the Rhodians, and on coming to Rhodes
and being put to the torture, confessed his crime ; and his
story was found to agree with everything in the cipher of
the intercepted letters, and with the despatches from Perseus
to Deinon, and from Deinon and Polyaratus to him. There-
fore it was a matter of surprise that Deinon persuaded himself
to cling to life and submit to so signal an exposure.
9. But in respect to folly and baseness of spirit, Polyaratus
The vain attempts surpassed Deinon. P'or when PopUius Laenas
of Polyaratus to charged king Ptolemy to send Polyaratus to
escape, Rome, the king, from a regard both to Poly-
aratus himself and his country, determined not to send him
to Rome but to Rhodes, this being also what Polyaratus him-
self asked him to do. Having therefore caused a galley to
be prepared, the king handed him over to Demetrius, one of
his own friends, and despatched him, and wrote a despatch to
the Rhodians notifying the fact But touching at Phaselis in
Ph r ^^ course of the voyage, Polyaratq^, from some
notion or another which he had conceived,
took suppliant branches in his hand, and fled for safety to the
city altar. If any one had asked him his intention in thus
XXX POLYARATUS OF RHODES 415
acting, I am persuaded that he could not have told it. For If
he wanted to go to his own country, where was the need of sup-
pliant branches ? For his conductors were charged _to take him
there. But if he wished to go to Rome, that was sure to take
place whether he wished it or no. What other alternative was
there? Other place that could receive him with safety to himself
there was none. However, on the people of Phasclis sending
to Rhodes to beg that they would receive Polyaratus, and take
him away, the Rhodians came to the pradent resolution of
sending an open vessel to convoy him ; but forbade the captain
of it to actually take him on board, on the ground that the
officers from Alexandria had it in charge to deliver the man
in Rhodes. When the vessel arrived at Phaselis, and its cap-
tain, Epichares, refused to take the man on board, and
Demetrius, who had been deputed by the king for that busi-
ness, urged him to leave the altar and resume his voyage ; and
when the people of Phaselis supported his command, because
they were afraid they would incur some blame from Rome on
that account, Polyaratus could no longer resist the pressure of
circumstances, but once more went on board Demetrius's galley.
But in the course of the voyage he seized an opportunity 0/
doing the same again at Caunus, flying for
safety there in the same way, and begging the
Caunians to save him. Upon the Caunians rejecting him, on
the grounds of their being leagued with Rhodes, he sent
messages to Cibyra, begging them to receive him in their
city, and to send him an escort. He had some claim upon
this city, because the sons of its tyrant, Pancrales, had been
educated at his house ; accordingly, they listened to his re-
quest, and did what he asked. But when he . „ .
^-. ■ ■ ■ . - ,, .1 and "l Cibym.
got to Cibyra, he placed himself and the
Cibyratae into a still greater difficulty than that which he
caused before when at Phaselis. For they neither dared to
retain him in their town for fear of Rome, nor had the
power of sending him to Rome, because of their ignor-
ance of thf sea, being an entirely inland folk. Eventu-
ally they were reduced to send envoys to Rhodes and the
Roman proconsul in Macedonia, begging them to take over
the man. Lucius Aemilius wrote to the Cibyratae, ordering
4i6 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS book
them to keep Polyaratus in safe custody; and to the Rhodians
to make provision for his conveyance by sea and his safe
delivery upon Roman territory. Both peoples obeyed the
despatch : and thus Polyaratus eventually came to Rome, after
making a spectacle of his folly and cowardice to the best of
his ability ; and after having been, thanks to his own folly,
four times surrendered — by king Ptolemy, the people of
Phaselis, the Cibyratae, and the Rhodians.
The reason of my having dwelt at some length on the
Story of Polyaratus and Deinon is not that I have any desire
to trample upon their misfortunes, for that would be ungener-
ous in the last degree ; but in order that, by clearly showing
their folly, I might instruct those who fall into similar difficulties
and dangers how to take a better and wiser course. . . .
10. The most striking illustration of the mutability and
The columns con- capriciousness of Fortune is when a man, within
structed ai Delphi a brief period, turns out to have been preparing
for statucsof Per- |q,. ^^ ygg q£ jjjg enemies the very things which
*Aemiiius.^ he imagined that he was elaborating in his own
Autumn of B.C. honour. Thus Perseus was having some columns
167. Livy, 45, 27- made, which Lucius Aemilius, finding unfinished,
caused to be completed, and placed statues of himself on
them. . . .
He admired the situation of the city, and the excellent
.... . position of the acropolis for commanding the
Corinih. districts on both sides of the Isthmus. . . .
. _, Having been long anxious to see Olympia,
AtOlympia. 1 ^ f^u«.u / r >
^ he set out thither. . .
Aemilius entered the sacred enclosure at Olympia, and
was struck with admiration at the statue of the god, remark-
ing that, to his mind, Pheidias was the only artist who had
represented the Zeus of Homer ; and that, though he had had
great expectations of Olympia, he found the reality far sur-
passed them. . . .
11. The Aetolians had been accustomed to get their live-
lihood from plundering and such like lawless
st^e ©rActoi^ occupations ; and as long as they were permitted
to plunder and loot the Greeks, they got all
they required from them, regarding every country as that of
XXX THE GREEK PRISONERS IN ITAL Y 417
an enemy. But subsequently, when the Romans obtained the
supremacy, they were prevented from this means of support,
and accordingly turned upon each other. Even before this,
in their civil war, there was no horror which they did not com-
mit ; and a little earlier still they had had a taste of mutual
slaughter in the massacres at Arsinoe ; ^ they were, therefore,
ready for anything, and their minds were so infuriated that
they would not allow their magistrates to have even a voice in
their business. Aetolia, accordingly, was a scene of turbu-
lence, lawlessness, and blood : nothing they undertook was
done on any calculation or fixed plan ; everything was con-
ducted at haphazard and in confusion, as though a hurricane
had burst upon them. . . .
12. The state of Epirus was much the same. For in pro-
portion as the majority of its people are more
law-abiding than those of Aetolia, so their chief ^^"^y^^^™"'
magistrate surpassed every one else in wicked-
ness and contempt for law. For, I think, there never was
and never will be a character more ferocious and brutal than
that of Charops. . . .
18. After the destruction of Perseus, immediately after the
decisive battle, embassies were sent on all sides
to congratulate the Roman commanders on the^^^^^^^^^
event. And as now all power tended towards especially
Rome, in every city those who were regarded Achaeans. to be
as of the Romanising party were in the ^rV^^A^?'^'
- , ^ ^ . ■' . , . B«C. 107.
ascendant, and were appointed to embassies
and other services. Accordingly they flocked into Mace-
donia— from Achaia, Callicrates, Aristodamus, Agesias, and
Philippus; from Boeotia, Mnasippos; from Acarnania, Chre-
mas ; from Epirus, Charops and Nicias ; from Aetolia, Lyciscus
* Called by Polybius in previous books Conope, 4, 64 ; 5, 6. Its name
was changed to Arsinoe, from its having been rebuilt and enlarged by Arsinoe,
sister and wife of Ptolemy Philadelphus (Strabo, 10, 2, 22). It was on the
east bank of the Achelous. Its modem name is Angelokastro. The civil war
in Aetolia alluded to here is mentioned in Li\y. 41, 25 (b.c. 174). This parti-
cular massacre appears to have taken place in B.C. 168-167. Li\'y (45, 28)
narrates that Acmilius was met during his Greek tour in B.C. 167 by a crowd
of Aetolians, in a miserable state of destitution, who informed him that five
hundred and fifty Aetolian nobles had been massacred by Lyciscus and Tisippus,
besides many driven into exile, and that the goods of both had been confiscated.
VOL. II 2 E
4i8 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS book
and Tisippus. These all having met, and eagerly vieing with
each other in attaining a common object ; and there being no
one to oppose them, since their political opponents had all
yielded to the times and completely retired, they accomplished
their purpose without trouble. So the ten commissioners
issued orders to the other cities and leagues through the
mouths of the strategi themselves as to what citizens were to go
to Rome. And these turned out to be, for the most part, those
whom the men I have named had made a list of on party grounds,
except a very few of such as had done something conspicuous.
But to the Achaean league they sent two men of the high-
est rank of their own number, Gaius Claudius and Gnaeus
Domitius. They had two reasons for doing so : the first was
that they were uneasy lest the Achaeans should refuse to obey
the written order, and lest Callicrates and his colleagues should
be in absolute danger from being reputed to be the authors
of tlic accusations against all the Greeks, — which was about
true ; and in the second place, because in the intercepted
despatches nothing distinct had been discovered against any
Achaean. Accordingly, after a while, the proconsul sent the
letter and envoys with reference to these men, although in his
private opinion he did not agree with the charges brought by
Lyciscus and Callicrates, as was afterwards made clear by
what took place. . . .
14. Lucius Anicius, who had been praetor, after his vic-
tory over the Illyrians, and on bringing Genthius
aS*^^^^^^ prisoner to Rome with his children, while
over the Illyrians celebrating his triumph, did a very ridiculous
at the Quirinalia, thing. He sent for the most famous artists
^uc^^i67^^' ^'"^"^ Greece, and having constructed an im-
mense theatre in the circus, he brought all the
flute players on the stage together first. Their names were
Theodorus the Boeotian, Theopompus and Hermippus of
Lysimacheia, the most celebrated of the day. He placed them
on the proscenium with the chorus, and bid them all play at
once. But on their beginning to play the
A scene in a. -ju -^ .
Roman theatre. ^""^» accompanied by appropnate movements,
he sent to them to say that they were not play-
ing well, and must put more excitement into it. At first they
XXX NOISY SCEJVE IN A ROMAN THEATRE 419
did not know what to make of this, until one of the lictors
showed them that they must form themselves into two com-
panies, and facing round, advance against each other as
though in a battle. The fluteplayers caught the idea at
once, and, adopting a motion suitable to their own wild strains,
produced a scene of great confusion. They made the middle
group of the chorus face round upon the two extreme groups,
and the fluteplayers, blowing with inconceivable violence and
discordance, led these groups against each other. The mem-
bers of the chorus meanwhile rushed, with a violent stamp-
ing which shook the stage, against those opposite them, and
then faced round and retired. But when one of the chorus,
whose dress was closely girt up, turned round on the spur of
the moment and raised his hands, like a boxer, in the face of
the fluteplayer who was approaching him, then the spectators
clapped their hands and cheered loudly. Whilst this sort of
sham tight was going on, two dancers were brought into the
orchestra to the sound of music ; and four boxers mounted
upon the stage, accompanied by trumpeters and clarion
players. The effect of these various contests all going on
together was indescribable. But if I were to speak about
their tragic actors, I should be thought by some to be
jesting.' ...
16. It requires the same sort of spirit to arrange public
games well, and to set out great banquets and wine with fitting
splendour, as it does to draw up an army in presence of the
enemy with strategic skill. . . .
16. Aemilius Paulus took seventy cities in Epirus after the
conquest of the Macedonians and Perseus,
most of which were in the country of the '^"l^'^'"
Molossi ; and enslaved one hundred and fifty
thousand men. . . .
17, Id Egypt the first thing the kings did after being
' From Atfaeniieus. xiv. 4, p. 615. It seems 10 be pnrt of some strictures
of Polybios on the coarseness of Ihe amustmcnls of the Romans. This noLsy
■nd riotous scene in n thcaire would strike a Greek as barbarous .md rci'oll-
ine : and may remind us of the complaints of the noise and interruption to
their actors so often found in the prologues to the plays of Plaulus and Ter-
ence. Though the substance of Ibis extract is doubtless froio Polybhis,
Athenaens has evidently told the anecdote in his own langimge.
420 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS book
relieved from the war with Antiochus was to send Numenius,
one of their friends, as an envoy to Rome to
Mai^^as return thanks for the favours received ; and
they next released the Lacedaemonian Menal-
cidas, who had made active use of the occasion against the
kingdom for his own advantage ; Gains Popilius Laenas asked
the king for his release as a favour to himself.^ . . .
18. At this period Cotys, king of the Odrysae, sent am-
Cotys, king of bassadors to Rome, asking for the restoration
the Odrysae. cp. of his son, and pleading his defence for having
bk. 27, ch. 12. acted on the side of Perseus. The Romans,
considering that they had effected their purpose by the suc-
cessful issue of the war against Perseus, and that they had no
need to press their quarrel with Cotys any further, allowed
him to take his son back — who, having been sent as a hostage
to Macedonia, had been captured with the children of Perseus,
— wishing to display their clemency and magnanimity, and with
the idea at the same time of binding Cotys to themselves by
so great a favour. . . .
1 9. About the same time king Prusias also came to Rome
The abject con- ^^ Congratulate the Senate and the generals on
duct of king their success. This Prusias was in no sense
Frusuxs. worthy of the royal title, as we may judge from
the following facts : When the Roman envoys first appeared
at his court, he met them with shorn head and wearing a cap,
toga, and shoes, and in fact exactly in the garb worn by those
recently manumitted at Rome, whom they call liberti: and
greeting the envoys respectfully, he exclaimed, " Behold your
freedman, who is willing to obey you in all things and to
imitate your fashions ! " than which a more contemptible
speech it would be difficult to imagine. And now, again,
when he reached the entrance of the Senate-house he stopped
at the door facing the senators, and, dropping both his hands
he paid reverence to the threshold and the seated Fathers,
exclaiming, " Hail, ye gods my preservers ! " seeming bent
on surpassing all who might come after him in meanness of
* Menalcidas was one of the Romanising party, who appears to have l^ecn
Strategus of the league in B.C. 153 [Pausan. 7, 11, 7], and to have committtKi
suicide in B.C. 148-147, in despair at his failure to wrest Sparta from the league.
XXX PSUSIAS AND EUMENES 421
spirit, unmanliness, and servility. And his behaviour in the
conference which he held when he had entered the Senate-
house was on a par with this; and was such as might make
one blush even to write. However this contemptible display
served in itself to secure him a favourable answer.
20. Just as he had got his answer, news came that
Eumenes was on his way. This caused the
Senators much embarrassment They were ,° STt-^ll"!!*"
thoroughly incensed with him, and were en- the Senate pass a
tirely fixed in their sentiments towards him ; dec™ fbtbidding
and yet they did not wish to betray themselves. ^" ^^^^^ ™"
For having proclaimed to all the world that
this king was their foremost and most esteemed friend, if they
now admitted him to an interview and allowed him to plead
his cause, they must either, by answering as they really thought
and in harmony with their sentiments, signalise their own
folly in having marked out such a man in past times for
special honour ; or i^ in deference to appearances, they gave
him a friendly answer, they must disregard truth and the
interests of their country. Therefore, as both these methods of
proceeding could have consequences of a disagreeable nature,
they hit upon the following solution of the difficulty. On the
ground of a general dislike of the visits of kings, they published
a decree that "no king was to visit Rome." Having been
informed subsequently that Eumenes had landed Eumenea
at Bnindisium in Italy, they sent the quaestor to stopped ai
convey the decree to him, and to bid him to Bmnditium.
communicate with himself if he wanted anything from the
Senate ; or, if he did not want anything, to bid him depart at
the earliest possible opportunity from Italy. When the
quaestor met the king and informed him of the decree, the
latter, thoroughly understanding the intention of the Senate,
said not a single word, except that " he wanted nothing."
This is the way in which Eumenes was prevented from
coming to Rome. And it was not the only important
result of this decree. For the Gauls were at that time threat-
ening the kingdom of Eumenes ; and it was soon made
apparent that by this repulse the king's allies were all greatly
depressed, while the Gauls were doubly encouraged to press
422 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS BOOK
on the war. And it was in fact their desire to humiliate him
in every possible way that induced the Senate to adopt this
resolution. These things were going on at the
B.^ *i67-i66 bcgi'^i^ii^g o^ the winter : but to all other am-
bassadors who arrived — and there was no city
or prince or king who had not at that time sent an embassy
of congratulation — the Senate returned a gracious and friendly
answer, except to the Rhodians; and these they dismissed
with displeasure, and with ambiguous declarations as to the
future. As to the Athenians again the Senate hesitated. . . .
21. The first object of the Athenian embassy was the
,_,... restoration of Haliartus : ^ but when they met
The Athenians . , _ , , ' . , , ' .
ask for the With a refusal on that point, they changed
restoration of the subject of their appeal and put forward
Haliartus; faihng ^j^^jj. ^^^ claim to the possession of Delos,
territory, with Lemnos, and the territory of Haliartus. No
Delos and one could properly find fault with them for this,
Lemnos them- ^^ ^r^j ^s Delos and Lemnos were concerned, for
selves.
they had of old laid claim to them ; but there
is good reason for reproaching them in respect to the territory
of Haliartus. Haliartus was nearly the most ancient city in
Boeotia; had met wnth a heavy misfortune: instead of en-
deavouring in every possible way to restore it, — to contribute
to its utter annihilation, and to deprive its dispossessed in-
habitants of even their hopes for the future, was an act which
would be thought worthy of no Greek nation, and least of
all of the Athenians. They open their own territory to all
comers ; and to take away that of others can never appear
consonant with the spirit of their State. However, the Senate
granted them Delos and Lemnos. Such was the decision in
the Athenian business. . . .
The possession As to Lemnos and Delos they had, accord-
° ml'sfortune^ ^ ^"^ ^° ^^ proverb, " got the wolf by the ears : "
Athens. ^^^ ^^^Y suffered much ill fortune from their
See 32, 17. quarrels with the Delians ; and from the
' Haliartus had been taken by the praetor L. Lucretius Gallus in b.c.
171, its inhabitants sold into slavery, and its houses and walls entirely de-
stroyed. Its crime was siding with Perseus. Livy, 42, 63. Supra bk. 27,
ch. 5 ; 29, 12.
XXX THE ATHENIANS AND RHODIANS 423
territory of Haliartus they reaped shame rather than
profit. . . .
22. At this time Theaetetus being admitted into the
Senate spoke on the subject of the alliance. Death of
The Senate, however, postponed the considera- Theaetetus of
tion of the proposal, and in the meantime Rhodes.
Theaetetus died in the course of nature, for he was more than
eighty years old. But on the arrival in Rome caunus and
of exiles from Caunus and Stratoniceia, and Stratoniceia in
their admission to the Senate, a decree was Caria.
passed orderihg the Rhodians to withdraw their garrisons
from Caunus and Stratoniceia. And the embassy of Philo-
phron and Astymedes having received this answer sailed with
all speed home, alarmed lest the Rhodians should disregard
the order for withdrawing the garrisons, and so give a fresh
ground for complaints. . . .
23. In the Peloponnese, when the ambassa- The effect of the
dors arrived and announced the answers from |"^i*ff® ^^
_ - , - , the Romans in
Rome, there was no longer mere clamour, but the Achaean
downright rage and hatred against Callicrates league. Supra
and his party. ... ^^' '3'
An instance of the hatred entertained for Callicrates and
Adronidas, and the others who agreed with ,. , . -
1 \\ ' rr.1 r • 1 /• 1 A • • Unpopulantv of
them, was this. The festival of the Antigoneia callicrates,
was being held at Sicyon, — the baths being all Adronidas, and
supplied with large public bathing tubs, and ^^^^^ party,
smaller ones placed by them used by bathers of the better
sort, — if Adronidas or Callicrates entered one of these, not a
single one of the bystanders would get into it any more, until
the bathman had let every drop of water run out and filled it
with fresh. They did this from the idea that they would be
polluted by entering the same water as these men. Nor
would it be easy to describe the hissing and hooting that
took place at the public games in Greece when any one
attempted to proclaim one of them victor. The very children
in the streets as they returned from school ventured to call
them traitors to their faces. To such height did the anger
and hatred of these men go. . . .
24. The inhabitants of Peraea were like slaves unexpectedlv
424
THE HISTORIES OF FOLYBIUS
BOOK XXX
released from chains, who. are scarcely able to believe their
present good fortune, thinking it a change
^Sf^pirla ^^e ^^"^^st too great to be natural; and cannot
Roman decree believe that those they meet can understand
emancipating or fully see that they are really released,
unless they do something strange and out of the
ordinary course. . . .
them from
Rhodes.
BOOK XXXI
1. At this time the Cnosians, in alliance with the Bc. 165. Warin
Gortynians, made war upon the Rhaucians, and Ctcieorcnouu
swore a mutual oath that they would not end '-'ji^^'"'
the war until they had Uken Rhaucus, "^ """'
But when the Rhodians received the decree regarding
Caunus, and saw that the anger of the Romans j]^ Rhodians are
was not abating, after having scrupulously carried again refused an
out the orders contained in the Senate's replies, alliance.
they forthwith sent Aristotle at the head of an embassy to
Rome, with instructions to make another attempt to secure the
alUance. They arrived in Rome at the height of summer, and,
having been admitted to the Senate, at once declared how
their people had obeyed the Senate's orders, and pleaded for
the alliance, using a great variety of arguments in a speech of
considerable length. But the Senate returned them a reply in
which, without a wcrd about their friendship, they said that, as
to the alliance, it was not proper for them to grant the Rhodians
this favour at present . . .
2. To the ambassadors of the Gauls in Asia they granted
autonomy, on condition that they remained Autonomy 10
within their dwellings, and went on no warlike Gaiaiia on
expeditions beyond their own frontiers. . , . conditions.
S. When this same king (Antiochus Epiphanes) heard of the
games in Macedonia held by the Roman proconsul Aemiltus
Paulus, wishing to out-do Paulus by the splendour of his
liberality, he sent envoys to the several cities The grand fesiival
announcing games to be held by him at bdd t>]> Antiochus
Daphne ; and it became the rage in Greece ^piph""" ai
to attend them. The public ceremonies began ofAnt^och. wctwI
with a procession composed as follows : first 10 Apoiio.
426 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS book
came some men armed in the Roman fashion, with their
coats made of chain armour, five thousand in the prime of
Ufe. Next came five thousand Mysians, who were followed
by three thousand Cilicians armed like light infantry, and
wearing gold crowns. Next to them came three thousand
Thracians and five thousand Gauls. They were followed by
twenty-thousand Macedonians, and five thousand armed with
brass shields, and others with silver shields, who were followed
by two hundred and forty pairs of gladiators. Behind these
were a thousand Nisaean cavalry and three thousand native
horsemen, most of whom had gold plumes and gold crowns,
the rest having them of silver. Next to them came what are
called "companion cavalry," to the number of a thousand,
closely followed by the corps of king's " friends " of about the
same number, who were again followed by a thousand picked
men ; next to whom came the Agetna or guard, which was
considered the flower of the cavalry, and numbered about a
thousand. Next came the "cataphract" cavalry, both men
and horses acquiring that name from the nature of their
panoply ; they numbered fifteen hundred. All the above men
had purple surcoats, in many cases embroidered with gold and
heraldic designs. And behind them came a hundred six-horsed,
and forty four-horsed chariots; a chariot drawn by four elephants
and another by two ; and then thirty-six elephants in single file
with all their furniture on.
The rest of the procession was almost beyond description,
but I must give a summary account of it. It consisted of
eight hundred young men wearing gold crowns, about a thousand
fine oxen, foreign delegates to the number of nearly three
hundred, and eight hundred ivory tusks. The number of
images of the gods it is impossible to tell completely: for repre-
sentations of every god or demigod or hero accepted by man-
kind were carried there, some gilded and others adorned with
gold-embroidered robes; and the myths, belonging to each,
according to accepted tradition, were represented by the most
costly symbols. Behind them were carried representations of
Night and Day, Earth, Heaven, Morning and Noon. The best
idea that I can give of the amount of gold and silver plate is this :
One of the king's friends, Dionysius his secretary, had a thousand
XXXI GRAND FESTIVAL AT DAPHNE ^27
boys in the procession carrying stiver vessels, none of which
weighed less than a thousand drachmae;^ and by their side
walked six hundred young slaves of the king holding gold
vessels. There were also two hundred women sprinkling un-
guents from gold boxes ; and after them came eighty women
sitting in litters with gold feet, and five hundred in litters with
silver feet, aJl adorned with great costliness. These were the
most remarkable features of the procession.
4. The festival, including the gladiatorial shows and hunting,
lasted thirty days, in the course of which there was continual
round of spectacles. During the first five of these everybody
in the gymnasium anointed himself with oil scented with
saflVon in gold vessels, of which there were fifteen, and the
same number scented with cinnamon and nard. On the
following days other vessels were brought in scented with
fenugreeic, marjoram, and lily, all of extraordinary fragiancy.
Public banquets were also given, at which couches were pre-
pared, sometimes for a thousand and sometimes for (ifiecn
hundred, with the utmost splendour and costliness.
The whole of the arrangements were made personally by the "
king. He rode on an inferior horse by the side of the proces-
sion, ordering one part to advance, and another to halt, as
occasion required ; so that, if his diadem had been removed,
no one would have believed that he was the king and the master
of all ; for his appearance was not equal to that of a moderately
good servant At the feasts also he stood himself at the
entrance, and admitted some and assigned others their places ;
he personally ushered in the servants bringing the dishes ; and
walking about among the company sometimes sat down and
sometimes lay down on the couches. Sometimes he would
jump up, lay down the morsel of food or the cup that he was
raising to his lips, and go to another part of the hall ; and
walking among the guests acknowledge the compliment, as
now one and now another pledged him in wine, or jest at any
recitations that might be going on. And when the festivity
had gone on for a long time, and a good many of the guests had
departed, the king was carried in by the mummers, completely
shrouded in a robe, and laid upon the ground, as though he
' A drachma rray be laken as between a sixtb and a seventh of an ounce.
428 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS book
were one of the actors ; then, at the signal given by the music,
he leapt up, stripped, and began to dance with the jesters ; so
that all the guests were scandalised and retired. In fact every
one who attended the festival, when they saw the extraordinary
wealth which was displayed at it, the arrangements made in the
processions and games, and the scale of the splendour on which
the whole was managed, were struck with amazement and
wonder both at the king and the greatness of his kingdom :
but when they fixed their eyes on the man himself, and the
contemptible conduct to which he condescended, they could
scarcely believe that so much excellence and baseness could
exist in one and the same breast.^ . . .
5. After the completion of the festival, the envoys with
Roman envoys Tiberius Gracchus arrived, who had been sent
at Antioch. from Rome to investigate the state of affairs in
Antiochus affects gyna. Antiochus received them with such tact
extreme cordiality. ,., . ri*j .1.
and with so many expressions of kindness, that
Tiberius not only had no suspicion that he was meditating any
active step, or cherishing any sinister feeling on account of what
had happened at Alexandria, but was even induced by the extra-
ordinary kindness of his reception to discredit those who made
any such suggestion. For, besides other courtesies, the king
gave up his own hall for the use of the envoys, and almost his
crown in appearance ; although his true sentiments were not at
all of this kind, and he was on the contrary profoundly incensed
with the Romans. . . .
6. A large number of ambassadors from various quarters hav-
B.C. 164. Com- i^g arrived at Rome, the most important of which
plaints against were those with Astymedes from Rhodes, Eureus
Eumencs at Rome ^jj^j^j^jjjjj^yg ^^^ Satyrus from the Achaeans,
from 1 nisi'TS 01
Bithynia, and ^^^ those with Pytho from Prusias, — the Senate
other parts of gave audience to these last. The ambassadors
Asia. ixoxd Prusias complained of king Eumenes,
alleging that he had taken certain places belonging to their
country, and had not in any sense evacuated Galatia, or obeyed
the decrees of the Senate ; but had been supporting all who
1 Hultsch prints in parallel columns the text of this fragment as it appears
in Athenaeus and Diodorus. The English translation attempts to combine
them.
XJtKi COMPLAmTS AGAINST EUMBNF.S 419
fitvoured himself, and depressing in every possible way those
who wished to shape their policy in accordance with the
Senate's decrees. There were also some ambassadors from
certain towns in Asia, who accused the kir^ on the grounds of
his intimate association with Antiochus, The Senate listened
to the accusers, and neither rejected their accusations noi
openly expressed its own opinion ; but acted with close reserve,
thoroughly distrusting both Eumenes and Antio-
chus : and meanwhile contented itself by con- p^'^i^^^a.
tinually supporting Galatia and contriving some
fresh security for its freedom. But the envoys under Tiberius
Gracchus, on their return from their mission, had Failure of the
no clearer idea themselves in regard to Eumenes mi&sion ot
and Antiochus than before they left Rome, nor Gracchus.
could they give the Senate one either. So completely had the
kings hoodwinked them by the cordiality of their reception.
7. The Senate next called In the Khodians and heard
what they had to say. When Astymedes entered, phodiona appeal
he adopted a more moderate and more effective againsi the injury
line ofargument than on his formerembassy. He '*°""°'*™"™'*'
omitted the invectives against others, and took
the humble tone of men who are being fledged, begging to be for-
given, and declaring that his country had suffered sufficient
punishment, and a more severe one than its crime deserved. And
thenhewentbrieflythroughthelistoftheKhodian
losses. " First, they have lost Lycia and Caria, /^^^^^
which had already cost them a large sum of
money, having been forced to support three wars against them ;
while at the present moment they have been deprived of a con-
siderable revenue which they used to draw from those countries.
But perhaps," he added, " this is as it should be : you gave
them to our people as a free gift, because you regarded us
with favour ; and in now recalling your gift, because you suspect
and are at variance with us, you may seem only to be acting
reasonably. But Caunus, at any rate, we purchased from
Ptolemy's officers for two hundred talents j and Stratoniceia we
received as a great favour from Antiochus, son of Seleucus ;
and from those two towns our people had a revenue of a
hundred and twenty talents a year. All these sources of revenue
430 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS book
we have surrendered, in our submission to your injunctions.
From which it appears that you have imposed a heavier
penalty on the Rhodians for one act of folly, than on the
Macedonians that have been continually at war with you. But
the greatest disaster of all to our State is that the revenue
from its harbour has been abolished by your making Delos a
free port ; and by your depriving our people of that independ-
ence by which the harbour, as well as other interests of the
States, were maintained in suitable dignity.^ And it is easy
to satisfy yourselves of the truth of my words. Our revenue
from harbour dues amounted in past years to one million
drachmae, from which you have now taken one hundred
and fifty thousand; so that it is only too true, gentle-
men of Rome, that your anger has affected the resources
of the country. Now, if the mistake committed, and the
alienation from Rome, had been shared in by the entire
people, you might perhaps have seemed to be acting rightly
in maintaining a lasting and irreconcilable anger against
us ; but if the fact is made clear to you that it was an exceed-
ingly small number who shared in this foolish policy, and that
these have all been put to death by this very people itself,
why still be irreconcilable to those who are in no respect
guilty ? Especially when to every one else you are reputed
to exhibit the highest possible clemency and magnanimity.
Wherefore, gentlemen, our people having lost their revenues,
their freedom of debate, and their position of independence, in
defence of which in time past they have been ever willing to
make any sacrifices, now beg and beseech you all, as having
been smitten sufficiently, to relax your anger, and to be recon-
ciled and make this alliance with them : that it may be made
manifest to all the world that you have put away your anger
against Rhodes, and have returned to your old feelings and
friendship towards them." Such among others were the
words of Astymedes. He was thought to have
moii?fied"by this ^poken much to the point in the circumstances ;
speech and by but what helped the Rhodians to the alliance
* lie means that, they being no longer able to decide in mercantile affairs
independently of Rome, the prestige {rpwrra/rla), and consequently the popu-
larity, of this harbour is destroyed.
xixi THE ACHAEAN PRISONERS DETAWED 431
more than anything else was the recent return 'he report of
of the embassy under Tiberius Gracchus. For *^^^^,\,e"^
he gave evidence, in the first place, that the alliance.
Rhodians had obeyed all the decrees of the Senate ; and in
the next place, that the men who were the authors of their
hostile policy had all been condemned to death ; and by this
testimony overcame all opposition, and secured the alliance
between Rome and Rhodes. . . .
8. After an interval the envoys of the Achaeans were
admitted with instructions conformable to the g c. 165.
last reply received, which was to ihe effect that Embassy from
"The Senate were surprised that they should '^'^''^'.'■""'''"Bfor
applyto them for a decision on matters which they g[ ^ Aci^ean
had already decided for themselves." Accord- diunus. who 10
inglyanother embassy under Eureas nowappeared '*" i"inii«r of
to explain that " The league had neither heard teen Bummoned
the defence of the accused persons, nor given 10 Italy in b.c.
any decision whatever concerning them; but '^?- ^^030. 13.
wished the Senate to take measures in regard "'^^' '' '"' "'
to these men, that they might have a trial and not perish
uncondemned. They begged thai, if possible, the Senate
should itself conduct the investigation, and declare who are the
persons guilty of those charges ; but, if its variety of business
made it impossible to do this itself, that it should intrust the
business to the Achaeans, who would show by their treatment
of the guilty their detestation of their crime." The Senate
reci^nised that the tone of the embassy was in conformity
with its own injunctions, but still felt embarrassed how to acL
Both courses were open to objection. To judge the case of
the men was, it thought, not a task it ought to undertake ; and
to release them without any trial at all evidently involved ruin
to the friends of Rome. In this strait the Senate, wishing
to take all hope from the Achaean people of the restitution of
the men who were detained, in order that they might obey
without a murmur Callicrates in Achaia, and in the other
states those who sided with Rome, wrote the following answer :
"We do not consider it advisable either for ourselves or
for your nationalities that these men should return home."
The publication of this answer not only reduced the men who
432 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS book
had been summoned to Italy to complete despair and dejec-
tion, but was regarded by all Greeks as a common sorrow, for
it seemed to take away all hope of restoration from these
unfortunate men. When it was announced in Greece the
people were (juite crushed, and a kind of desperation in-
vaded the minds of all; but Charops and Callicrates, and
all who shared their policy, were once more in high
spirits. . . .
9. Tiberius Gracchus, partly by force and partly by per-
Rcduction of tijc suasion, reduced the Cammani to obedience to
Cammani in Rome. . . .
CapiKidocia. ^ \;sx%Q, number of embassies having come to
Rome, the Senate gave a reply to Attalus and Athenaeus. For
Prusias, not content with earnestly pressing his accusations him-
self against Eumenes and Attalus, had also instigated the Gauls
and Sclgians (in Pisidia), and many others in Asia, to adopt
the same policy; consequently king Eumenes had sent his
brothers to defend him against the accusations thus brought.
On their admission to the Senate they were thought to have
made a satisfactory defence against all accusers; and finally
returned to Asia, after not only rebutting the accusations,
but with marks of special honour. The Senate, however, did
not altogether cease to be suspicious of Eumenes and Antiochus.
They sent (Jaius Sulpicius and Manias Sergius as envoys to
investigate the state of Greece ; to decide the question of
territory that had arisen between Megalopolis and the Lacedae-
monians ; but, above all, to give attention to the proceedings
of Antiochus and li^umenes, and to discover whether any
warlike preparations were being made by either of them, or any
combination being formed between them against Rome. . . .
10. Besides his other follies, (iaius Sulpicius Gallus, on
^ . . arriving in Asia, put up notices in the most
Sulpicius ciaiiiis im|K)rtant cities, ordering any one who wished
in Asia; he to bring any accusation against king Eumenes
collects facts ^^ ^^^^ Y{\xi\ at Sardis within a specified time.
ac^amsi i_<unien(.Sa •«. f\ y ii*i' •
He then went to Sardis, and, takmg his seat in
the Gymnasium, gave audience for ten days to those who had
such accusations to make : admitting every kind of foul and
abusive language against the king, and, generally, making the
XXXI DEATH OF ANTJOCHUS EPIPHANES 433
most of every fact and every accusation ; for he was frantic
and inveterate in his hatred of Eumenes. . . .
But the harder the Romans appeared to bear upon Eumenes,
the more popular did he become in Greece, from the natural
tendency of mankind to feel for the side that is oppressed. . . .
11. In Syria king Antiochus, wishing to enrich himself,
determined on an armed attack upon the temple ,
of Artemis, in Elymais. But having arrived in Death of Antiochus
this country and failed in his purpose, because Epiphanes on his
the native barbarians resisted his lawless attempt, ^ 'l®^*^™ J"^*^"^
, ,. , . ,. ^ rT> u \ 'Susiana. See26,i.
he died m the course of his return at Tabae, in
Persia, driven mad, as some say, by some manifestations of
divine wrath in the course of his wicked attempt upon this
temple. . . .
Antiochus Epiphanes left a son and daughter ; tht former^
nine years oldy was called Antiochus Eupator^ and succeeded to the
kingdom^ Lysias acting as his guardian, Demetrius^ his cousin^
son of Seleucus Philopator, being at Rome as a hostage in place of
the late Antiochus Epiphanes^ endeavoured to persuade the Senate
to make him king of Syria instead of the boy,
12. Demetrius, son of Seleucus, who had been long
detained at Rome as an hostage, had been for Demetrius, son of
some time past of opinion that his detention Seleucus, and
was unjust. He had been given by his father &»\"dson of Anti-
-> , •' , , /. , • 1 /. . 1 1 ochus the Great,
Seleucus as a pledge of his good faith ; but, wishes to be re-
when Antiochus (Epiphanes) succeeded to the stored to the king-
throne, he considered that he ought not to be a ^°"^ °^ ^^"^
hostage in behalf of that monarch's children. However, up to
this time he kept quiet, especially as he was unable, being still
a mere boy, to do anything. But now, being in the very prime
of youthful manhood, he entered the Senate and made a speech :
demanding that the Romans should restore him to his king-
dom, which belonged to him by a far better right than to the
children of Antiochus. He entered at great length upon
arguments to the same effect, affirming that Rome was his
country and the nurse of his youth; that the sons of the
Senators were all to him as brothers, and the Senators as
fathers, because he had come to Rome a child, and was then
VOL. II 2 F
434 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS book
twenty-three years old.^ All who heard him were disposed in
their hearts to take his part : the Senate however, as a body
voted to detain Demetrius, and to assist in securing the crown
for the boy left by the late king. Their motive in thus acting
was, it seems to me, a mistrust inspired by the vigorous time
of life to which Demetrius had attained, and an opinion that
the youth and weakness of the boy who had succeeded to the
kingdom were more to their interest And this was presently
made manifest. For they appointed Gnaeus
^^A^Z^^^'^' Octavius, Spurius Lucretius, and Lucius Aurel-
sion appointed. . » r , .1 ir • r
ms as commissioners to arrange the anairs of
the kingdom in accordance with the will of the Senate, on the
ground that no one would resist their injunctions, the king
being a mere child, and the nobles being quite satisfied at the
government not being given to Demetrius, for that was what
they had been most expecting. Gnaeus and his colleagues there-
fore started with instructions, first of all to burn the decked ships,
next to hamstring the elephants, and generally to weaken the
. forces of the kingdom. They were also charged
sioncrs arc also with the additional task of making an inspec-
to visit Gaiatia, tion of Macedonia ; for the Macedonians, un-
Cappaciocia. and accustomed to democracy and a government
^Xlcxandria.
by popular assembly, were splitting up into
hostile factions.^ Gnaeus and his colleagues were also to
inspect the state of Gaiatia and of the kingdom of Ariarathes.
After a time the further task was imposed on them, by despatch
from the Senate, of reconciling as well as they could the two
kings in Alexandria. . . .
18. While this was going on at Rome, envoys from the
Missions to Aria- ^^^y* ""^^^ Marcus Junius, had arrived to
rathes, king of arbitrate on the disputes between the Gauls
* Demetrius had been exchanged for his uncle Antiochus Epiphanes in B.C.
175, just eleven years before. *
'^ The Senatus Consultum de Macedonibus (Livy, 45, 29) had declared all
Macedonians free ; each city to enjoy its own laws, create its own annual
magistrates, and pay a tribute to Rome — half the amount that it had paid to the
king. Macedonia was divided into four regions, at the respective capitals of
which— Amphipolis, Thessalonica, Pella, and PeLigonia — the district assem-
blies (concilia) were to be held, the revenue of the district was to be collected,
and the district magistrates elected ; and there was to be no inter-marriage
or mutual rights of owning property between the regions.
XXXI ARIARATHES OF CAPPA DOC/A 435
and king Ariarathes. For the Trocmi, having Cappadocia, in
found themselves unable to annex any portion regard to the en-
of Cappadocia by their unaided efforts, and *^^^heGadte. °
having been promptly foiled in their audacious
attempts,^ sought refuge with the Romans, and endeavoured
to bring Ariarathes into discredit there. On this account an
embassy under M. Junius was sent to Cappadocia. The
king gave them a satisfactory account of the affair, treated
them with great courtesy, and sent them away loud in his
praises. And when subsequently Gnaeus Octavius and
Spurius Lucretius arrived, and again addressed the king on
the subject of his controversies with the Gauls, after a brief
conversation on that subject, and saying that he would
acquiesce in their decision without difficulty, he Ariarathes warns
directed the rest of his remarks to the state of Octavius of the
Syria, being aware that Octavius and his dangerousjtate
colleagues were going thither. He pointed ° ^^
out to them the unsettled state of the kingdom and the un-
principled character of the men at the head of affairs there ;
and added that he would escort them with an army, and
remain on the watch for all emergencies, until they returned
from Syria in safety. Gnaeus and his colleagues acknowleged
the king's kindness and zeal, but said that for the present
they did not need the escort : on a future occasion, however,
if need should arise, they would let him know without delay;
for they considered him as one of the true friends of Rome. . . .
Ariarathes died soon after this embassy^ and was succeeded by
his son Ariarathes Philopator, B.C. 164. Z/V^, Ep. 46.
14. About this time ambassadors arrived from Ariarathes,
who had recently succeeded to the kingdom of
Cappadocia, to renew the existing friendship .xri.^ra^hcs Phiio-
and alliance with Rome, and in general to pator continues
exhort the Senate to accept the king's affection *^>s fathers policy
and goodwill, which he entertained, both in their ° "*Rome!' ^*
private and public capacity, for all the Romans.
The Senate, on hearing this, acceded to the request for the
renewal of the friendship and alliance, and graciously acknow-
^ The Greek of this sentence is certainly corrupt, and no satisfactory sense
can be elicited from it.
436 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS book
ledged the general amity of the king. The chief reason for
this warmth on the part of the Senate was the report of the
envoys under Tiberius, who, when sent to inspect the state of
Cappadocia, had returned full of the praises of the late king
and of his kingdom generally. It was on the credit of this
report that the Senate received the ambassadors of Ariarathes
graciously, and acknowledged the goodwill of the king. . . .
15. Having somewhat recovered from their previous
disaster, the Rhodians sent Cleagoras with
'^^^^^j^^^'^*' ambassadors to Rome to ask that Calynda
Caria, and for should be Ceded to them, and to petition the
the retention of Senate that those of their citizens who had pro-
^C^a ^nd^yci^ P^'"^*^^ '^^ ^^^^^ ^^ ^^^ "^^S^t be allowed to
retain them as before. They had also voted
to raise a colossal statue of the Roman people,
^ ''of'^Jnf ^''*' thirty cubits high, to be set up in the temple
of Athene. . . .
16. The Calyndians having broken off from Caunus, and
The Rhodians ^^^ Caunians being about to besiege Calynda,
undertake the pro- the Calyndians first called in the aid of the
tection of Calynda. Cnidians ; and, on their sending the required
support, they held out against their enemies for a time : but
becoming alarmed as to what would happen, they sent an
embassy to Rhodes, putting themselves and their city in its
hands. Thereupon the Rhodians sent a naval and military
force to their relief, forced the Caunians to raise the siege,
and took over the city. . . .
17. When Ariarathes, king of Cappadocia, had received his
Ariarathes's joy at ambassadors on their return from Rome, judg-
the favourable ing from the answers they brought that his
answer from Rome, kingdom was secured, because he had gained
the goodwill of Rome, he offered a thank-offering to the gods
for what had happened, and entertained his nobles at a feast
He then sent ambassadors to Lysias in Antioch, desiring to
He recovers the ^^ allowed to bring away the bones of his sister
ashes of his and mother. He determined not to say a word
mother and sister of blame as to the Crime that had been com-
mitted, lest he should irritate Lysias, and so
fail to effect his present object, though he was in fact greatly
XXXI THE TWO PTOLEMIES 437
incensed at it. He gave his envoys therefore instructions
couched in terms of courteous request Lysias and his friends
acceded to his wishes ; and the bones having been conveyed
to Cappadocia, the king received them in great state, and
buried them next the tomb of his father with affectionate
reverence. . . }
Artaxias wished to kill a man, but on the remonstrances of
Ariarathes did not do so, and held him on the t,. . ^ r
. ... ' , o. , • The influence of
contrary m higher respect than ever. So deci- good men,
sive is the influence of justice, and of the Artaxias of
opinions and advice of good men, that they Armenia.
often prove the salvation of foes as well as of
friends, and change their whole characters for the better. . . .
Good looks are a better introduction than any letter. . . .
The quarrels of the two kings of Egypt^ Ptolemy VI,
Philometor and Euergetes IL {or Ptolemy VIL) Physcon, The
former had been expelled by the latter ^ and had taken refuge in
Cyprus^ but had been restored by a popular outbreak in his
favour^ and under the authority of Commissioners sent from
Rome, B.C 164. (Z/7{y, Ep. 46. Diod, Sic. fr, xi.) Fresh
quarrels however broke out, in the course of which Physcon was
much worsted by his brother, {Diod, Sic fr. of^i), and at length it
was arranged that one should reign in Egypt the other in Cyrene,
B.C 162. {Livy, Ep. 47.)
18. After the Ptolemies had made their partition of the
kingdom, the younger brother arrived in Rome
desiring to set aside the division made between E^rcetes^ii
himself and his brother, on the ground that he had ( Ptoiemy Phys-
not acceded to the arrangement voluntarily, but co"). who had
under compulsion, and yielding to the force oi^^^^^^^^^
circumstances. He therefore begged the Senate
to assign Cyprus to his portion ; for, even if that were done, he
should still have a much poorer share than his -^he members of
brother. Canuleius and Quintus supported the Commission
* Ariarathes. the elder, had been in alliance with Antiochus the Great,
and had apparently given him one of his daughters in marriage, who had
been accompanied by her mother to Antioch, where both had now fallen
victims to the jealousy of Eupator's minister, Lysias. Sec 21. 43.
.J..V, lo nim ' ; anci inai, ace
^t^lad to rorcivc the L^^ovornmL
not hoj)c(l for or expected ; a
his brother with the customary
^ \ gave a positive denial : and the
•' was clearly an unequal one, an
that, as the brothers themselvt
division being made at all, it sho\
The Senate decide advantageous tO I
in favour of the younger Ptolen
f Physcon. interest Measures
among the Romans, by which the>
found policy of the mistakes ol
strengthen their own empire, unc
favours and benefiting those who cc
{ The object of the principle they acted i
t Senate is to divide the power of the Eg
an^^^en fearing lest, if it ever
^^ petent head, he- wouk
pointed Titus Torquatus and Gnj
Ptolemy Physcon in Cyprus, and th
policy while satisfying his. These
cordingly at once despatched with ii
brothers to each other, and to secure
When the Roman comtnissionen^
Syria^ and began carrying out their /
and killing the elef*^""- ''
I
i
(i
XXXI THE MURDER OF OCTA VIUS 439
burial^ and by sending an embassy to Rome to protest his
innocence, Appian, Syr. 46.
19. News having come to Rome of the disaster by which
Gnaeus Octavius lost his life, ambassadors also g^c. 162.
arrived from king Antiochus, sent by Lysias, The Senate pay
who vehemently protested that the king's l»"^^ attention to
r ' ji-juj _^'xi- • Tt ^ X. Lysias s excuses.
friends had had no part m the cnme. But the
Senate showed scant attention to the envoys, not wishing to
make any open declaration on the subject or to allow their
opinion to become public in any way.
But Demetrius was much excited by the news, and imme-
diately summoned Polybius to an interview, and Demetrius thinks
consulted him as to whether he should once there is again a
more bring his claims before the Senate. Poly- chance for him.
bius advised him " not to stumble twice on the
same stone," but to depend upon himself and .^act^fo^yotr^f."
venture something worthy of a king; and he
pointed out to him that the present state of affairs offered him
many opportunities. Demetrius understood the hint, but said
nothing at the time ; but a short while afterwards consulted
Apollonius one of his intimate friends, on the same subject.
This man, being simple minded and very young, hc however again
advised him to make another trial of the appeals to the
Senate. " He was convinced," he said, " that. Senate,
since it had deprived him of his kingdom without any just
expuse, it would at least release him from his position of
hostage ; for it was absurd that, when the boy Antiochus had
succeeded to the kingdom in Syria, Demetrius should be a
hostage for him." Persuaded by these arguments he once
more obtained a hearing of the Senate, and claimed to be
relieved of his obligations as a hostage, since they had decided
to secure the kingdom to Antiochus. But,
though he pleaded his cause wnth many argu- ""refused^*"
ments, the Senate remained fixed in the same
resolve as before. And that was only what was to be ex-
pected. For they had not, on the former occasion, adjudged
the continuance of the kingdom to the child on the ground
that the claim of Demetrius was not just, but because it was
440 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBTVS ■OOK
advantageous to Rome that it should be so ; and as the cir-
cumstances remained precisely the same, it was only natural
that the policy of the Senate should remain unchanged also.
20. Demetrius having thus delivered himself in vain of his
swan's song, his last appea], and becoming convinced that
Polybius had given hin) good advice, repented of what he had
done. But he was naturally of a lofty spirit, and possessed
sufficient daring to carry out his resolutions. He promptly
called Diodorus, who had recently arrived from Syria, to his
aid, and confided his secret purpose to him. Diodorus had
had the chaige of Demetrius as a child, and was a man of
considerable adroitness, who had besides made a careful
inspection of the state of affairs in Syria. He now pointed out
to Demetrius that "The confusion caused by the murder of
Octavius, — the people mistrusting Lysias, and Lysias mis-
trusting the people, while the Senate was convinced that the
lawless murder of their envoy really originated with the
king's friends, — presented a most excellent opportunity for
his appearing on the scene : for the people there would
promptly transfer the crown to him, even though he were to
arrive attended by but one slave ; while the Senate would
not venture to give any further assistance or support to Lysias
after such an abominable crime. Finally, it was quite possible
Demetrius resoii-M f*"" 'hem to leave Rome undetected, without any
to escape from onehaving anyidea of hisintention." Thiscourse
Rome, ar^a^in being resolved upon, Demetrius sent for Poly-
^ ' ' bius, and telling him what he was going to dt^
begged him to lend his assistance, and to join him in contriving
to manage his escape.
There happened to be at Rome a certain Menyllus of
Mcnyiius of Alabanda, on a mission from the elder Ptolemy
Aiabanda [in to cotifront and answer the younger before the
Caria) helps him Senate. Between this man and Polybius there
^ ' was a strong friendship and confidence, and
Polybius therefore thought him just the man for the purpose
in hand. He accordingly introduced him with all speed to
Demetrius, and with warm expressions of regard. Being
trusted with the secret, Menyllus undertook to have the necessary
ship in readiness, and to see that everything required for the
XXXI DEMETRIUS PLANS TO LEAVE ROME 441
voyage was prepared Having found a Carthaginian vessel
anchored at the mouth of the Tiber, which had been on sacred
service, he chartered it (These vessels are carefully selected
at Carthage, to convey the offerings sent by the Carthaginians
to their ancestral gods at Tyre.) He made no secret about
it, but chartered the vessel for his own return voyage ; and
therefore was able to make his arrangements for provisions also
without exciting suspicion, talking openly with the sailors and
making an appointment with them.
21 . When the shipmaster had everything ready, and nothing
remained except for Demetrius to do his part, he
sent Diodorus to Syria to gather information, and ^^th^^gM °^
to watch the disposition of the people there.
His foster-brother Apollonius took part in this expedition;
and Demetrius also confided his secret to the two brothers
of Apollonius, Meleager and Menestheus, but to no one else
of all his suite, though that was numerous. These three
brothers were the sons of the Apollonius who occupied so
important a position at the court of Seleucus, but who had
removed to Miletus at the accession of Antiochus Epiphanes.
As the day agreed upon with the sailors approached, it was
arranged that one of his friends should give an entertainment
to serve as an excuse for Demetrius going out For it was
impossible that he should sup at home ; as it was his constant
habit, when he did so, to invite all his suite. Those who were in
the secret were to leave the house after supper and go to the
ship, taking one slave each with them ; the rest they had sent
on to Anagnia, saying that they would follow next Poiybius sends a
day. It happened that at this time Poiybius was warning to
ill and confined to his bed ; but he was kept ac- Demetnus.
quainted with all that was going on by constant communications
from Menyllus. He was therefore exceedingly anxious, know-
ing Demetrius to be fond of conviviality and full of youthful
wilfulness, lest, by the entertainment being unduly prolonged,
some difficulty should arise from over-indulgence in wine to
prevent his getting away. He therefore wrote and sealed a
small tablet ; and just as it was getting dusk sent a servant of
his own, with orders to ask for Demetrius^s cupbearer and give
him the tablet, without saying who he was or from whom he
442 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS book
came, and to bid the cupbearer to give it to Demetrius to read
at once. His orders were carried out, and Demetrius read
the tablet, which contained the following apophthegms ^ : —
" The ready hand bears off the sluggard's prize."
** Night favours all, but more the daring heart."
" Be bold : front danger : strike ! then lose or win,
Care not, so you be true unto yourself."
"Cool head and wise distrust are wisdom's sinews."
22. As soon as Demetrius had read these lines, he under-
Demetrius takes stood their purport, and from whom they came ;
the hint, and the and at once pretending that he felt sick, he left
voyage is safely ^^ banquet escorted by his friends. Arrived
at his lodging, he sent away those of his servants
who were not suited to his purpose to Anagnia, ordering them
to take the hunting nets and hounds and meet him at Cerceii,
where it had been his constant custom to go boar hunting,
which, in fact, was the origin of his intimacy with Poly bins.
He then imparted his plan to Nicanor and his immediate
friends, and urged them to share his prospects. They all con-
sented with enthusiasm ; whereupon he bade them return to
their own lodgings, and arrange with their servants to go before
daybreak to Anagnia and meet them at Cerceii, while they got
travelling clothes and returned to him, telling their domestics
that they would join them, accompanied by Demetrius, in the
course of the next day at Cerceii. Everything having been
done in accordance with this order, he and his friends went to
Ostia, at the mouth of the Tiber, by night. Menyllus preceded
them and had a Conversation with the sailors ; telling them
that orders had arrived from the king which made it necessary
for him to remain at Rome for the present, and to send some
of the most trustworthy of his young men to his Majesty, to
inform him of what had been done about his brother. He
should not, therefore, he said, go on board himself; but the
young men who were to sail would come about midnight. The
shipmasters made no difficulty about it, as the passage money
for which they had originally bargained was in their hands;
* The first line is of unknown authorship. The second is from Euripides,
Phoeniss. 633. The third apophthegm is again unknown. The last is from
Kpichamius, see 18, 40.
TXXI DEMETRIUS ESCAPES 443
and they had long made all their preparations for sailing, when
Demetrius and his friends arrived about the third watch.
There were altogether eight of them, besides five slaves and
three boys. Menyllus entered into conversation with them,
showed them the provisions in store for the voyage, and com-
mended them earnestly to the care of the shipmaster and
crew. They then went on board, and the pilot weighed anchor
and started just as day was breaking, having absolutely no
idea of the real state of the case, but believing that he was
conveying some soldiers from Menyllus to Ptolemy.
23. At Rome, during the whole of the following day, no one
was likely to make any inquiry for Demetrius — . .
.. ' , . , ■ u u- I- ... The nbsence of
or those who had gone with him. For those Demetrius is not
of his household who stayed in the city sup- ascertained in
posed him to have Rone to Cerceii : and those **?""* ™"' ''^
■^ , , ° . , . ' , fourth day.
at An^nia were expectmg hira to come there
toa The flight from Rome, therefore, was entirely unremarked ;
until one of his slaves, having been flogged at Anagnia, ran ofT
to Cerceii, expecting to find Demetrius there ; and not finding
him, ran back again to Rome, hoping 10 meet him on
the road. But as he failed to meet him anywhere, he went and
informed his friends in Rome and the members of his house-
hold who had been left behind in his house. But it was not
until the fourth day after his start that, Demetrius being looked
for in vain, the truth was suspected. On the ^hc Senate is
fifth the Senate was hastily summoned to con- summoned, bui
sider the matter, when Demetrius had already d*^''*** "°' 'o
cleared the Straits of Messina. The Senate '^ ""'^ pursui .
gave up all idea of pursuit : both because they imagined that
he had got a long start on the voyage (for the wind was in his
favour), and because they foresaw that, though they might wish
to hinder him, they would be unable to do so. commissioner
But some few days afterwards they apiwinted appointed for
Tiberius Gracchus, Lucius Untulus, and Ser-*^"^^"^^ Asia,
vilius GLiucia as commissioners : first to inspect
the state of Greece ; and, next, to cross to Asia and watch the
result of Demetrius's attempt, and examine the policy adopted
by the other kings, and arbitrate on their controversies with
the Gauls, Such were the events in Italy this year. . , .
444 I^HE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS book
Demetrius expecting the arrival of the commissioner who
was to be sent to him. . . .
24. The dissoluteness of the young men in Rome had
grown to such a height, and broke out in such
CTOM^^onuxwy extravagances, that there were many instances of
men purchasinga jar of Pontic salt-fish for three
hundred drachmae.^ In reference to which Marcus Porcius
Cato once said to the people in indignation, that no better
proof could be shown of the degeneracy of the state than that
good-looking slaves ^ should fetch more than a farm, and a jar
of salt-fish more than a carter. . . .
25. The Rhodians, though in other respects maintaining
The Rhodians ^he dignity of their state, made in my opinion a
accept money to slight lapse at this period. They had received two
pay their school- hundred and eighty thousand medimni of com
mas crs, . from Eumenes, that its value might be invested
and the interest devoted to pay the fees of the tutors and school-
masters of their sons. One might accept this from friends in a case
of financial embarrassment, as one might in private life, rather
than allow children to remain uneducated for want of means ;
but where means are abundant a man would rather do any-
thing than allow the schoolmaster's fee to be supplied by a
joint contribution from his friends. And in proportion as a
state should hold higher notions than an individual, so ought
governments to be more jealous of their dignity than private
men, and above all a Rhodian government, considering the
wealth of the country and its high pretensions. . . .
26. After this the younger Ptolemy arrived in Greece with
Ptolemy Physcon ^^^ Roman commissioners, and began collecting
returning with the a formidable army of mercenaries, among whom
commissioners, he enlisted Damasippus the Macedonian, who,
^l^^'ln Gr^e' ^^^^^ murdering the members of the council at
but is persuaded Phacus, fled with his wife and children from
to disband them, Macedonia, and after reaching Peraea, opposite
B.C. 162. Rhodes, and being entertained by the people
there, determined to sail to Cyprus. But when Torquatus and his
* AlK>Ut j^I2.
* In his Censorship (b.c 184) Cato imposed a tax on slaves under twenty
sold for more than ten sestertia (about £70.) Livy, 39, 44.
XXTi THE TWO PTOLEMIES 445
colleagues saw that Ptolemy had collected a Tonnidable corps of
mercenaries, they reminded him of their commission, which
was to restore him " without a war," and at last persuaded him
to go as far as Side (in Pamphylia), and there disband his
mercenaries, give up his idea of invading Cyprus, and meet
them on the frontiers of Cyrene. Meanwhile, they said that
they would sail to Alexandria, and induce the king to consent
to their demands, and would meet him on the He. howL-vcr, takes
frontiers, bringing the other king with thera. The about 100 Cretans
younger Ptolemy was persuaded by these argu-'^"^''*''^ *"■" ■"
ments, gave up the attack upon Cyprus, dis-
missed the mercenaries, and first sailed to Crete, accompanied
by Damasippus and Gnaeus Merula, one of ,^
the commissioners ; and, after enlisting about a
thousand soldiers in Crete, put to sea and crossed Co Libya,
landing at Apis.
27. Meanwhile Torquatus had crossed to Alexandria and
was trying to induce the elder Ptolemy to be pioicmy physcon
reconciled to his brother, and yield Cyprus to invades the
him. But Ptolemy, by alternate promises and lioni'iionsofhis
refusals and the like, managed to waste the
time, while the younger king lay encamped with his thousand
Cretans at Apis in Libya, according to his j^reement. Be-
coming thoroughly irritated at receiving no intelligence, he first
sent Gnaeus Merula to Alexandria, hoping by this means to
bring Torquatus and those with him to the place of meeting.
But Merula was like the others in protracting the business :
forty days passed without a word of intelligence, and the king
was in despair. The fact was that the elder king, by using
every kind of flattery, had won the commissioners over, and
was keeping them by him, rather against their will than with it.
Moreover, at this lime the younger Ptolemy was informed that
the people of Cyrene had revolted, that the cities were
conspiring with them, and that Ptolemy Sympetesis had also
taken their side. This man was an Egyptian by birth, and
had been left by the king in charge of his whole kingdom when
he was going on his journey to Rome. When the king was
informed of this, and learned presently that the Cyreneans were
encamped in the open country, afraid lest, in his desire to add
446 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS book xxxi
Cyprus to his dominions, he might lose Cyrene also, he threw
everything else aside and marched towards Cyrene. When he
came to what is called the Great Slope, he found the Libyans
and Cyreneans occupying the pass. Ptolemy was alarmed at
this: but, putting half his forces on board boats, he ordered
them to sail beyond the difficult ground, and show themselves
on the rear of the enemy; while with the other half he marched
up in their front and tried to carry the pass. The Libyans being
panic-stricken at this double attack on front and rear, and
abandoning their position, Ptolemy not only got possession of
the pass, but also of Tetrapyrgia, which lay immediately below
it, in which there was an abundant supply of water. Thence
he crossed the desert in seven days, the forces under
Mochyrinus coasting along parallel to his line of march. The
Cyreneans were encamped eight thousand five hundred strong,
eight thousand infantry and five hundred cavalry : for having
satisfied themselves as to the character of Ptolemy from his
conduct at Alexandria, and seeing that his government and
policy generally were those of a tyrant rather than a king, they
could not endure the idea of becoming bis subjects, but were
determined to venture everything in their desire for fi-eedom.
And at last he was beaten. . . .
28. At this time Gnaeus Merula also came from Alexandria,
The Roman com- ^'^^"^^^^'^6 ^^ ^^"g (Physcon) that bis brother
mission fails to would consent to none of the proposals, but
secure peace maintained that they ought to abide by the
^brothers^*^ original agreements. On hearing this, Physcon
selected the brothers Comanus and Ptolemy^
to go as ambassadors to Rome with Gnaeus, and inform the
Senate of his brother's selfish and haughty behaviour. At the
same time the elder Ptolemy sent away Titus Torquatus also
without having attained the object of his mission. Such was
the state of things in Alexandria and Cyrene. . . .
^ Called Ptolemy the Orator in 28, 19.
BOOK XXXII
1. This year Comanus and his brother arrived at Rome on
their mission from the younger Ptolemy, and , ,j«
Menyllus of Alabanda from the elder. Their senate break
interview with the Senate was the occasion of off relations
many mutual recriminations expressed with great phn^inet^r^^nd
bitterness ; and when Titifs Torquatus and encourage
Gnaeus Merula gave evidence in favour of the Ptolemy Physcon
younger king, and supported him with great *" **i? *^^*"* ^^
earnestness, the Senate voted that Menyllus
and his colleagues should leave Rome within five days, and
that the treaty of alliance with the elder Ptolemy should be
annulled ; but that they should send envoys to the younger
to inform him of the decree of the Senate. Publius Apustius
and Gaius Lentulus were appointed to this service, who
immediately sailed to Gyrene, and with great despatch an-
nounced to Physcon the decree of the Senate. Greatly
elated by this, Ptolemy began collecting mercenaries, and
devoted his whole attention and energies to the acquisition of
Cyprus. This was what was going on in Italy. . . .
2. Not long before this period Massanissa resolved to try
his strength with the Carthaginians. He saw
how numerous the cities built along the lesser second arid^Uiird
Syrtis were, and noticed the excellence of the Punic wars
district which they call Emporia, and he had Massanissa
long been casting an envious eye upon the ^^ach^^oT'
revenues which those places produced. He Carthaginian
quickly possessed himself of the open part of territory. Both
the country, because the Carthaginians were '^tomV
always averse from service in the field, and were
at that time completely enervated by the long peace. But he
448 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS book
was unable to get possession of the towns, because they were
carefully guarded by the Carthaginians. Both parties then re-
ferring their case to the Roman Senate, and frequent embassies
coming to Rome from both sides, it always happened that
and the Romans ^^ Carthaginians got the worst of it in the
invariably sup- judgment of the Romans, not on the merits
port Massanissa. ^f ^^ c2iS>^^ but because the judges were con-
vinced that such a decision was in their interests. For instance,
not many years before this Massanissa was him-
Livy ^?4 6a self at the head of an anny in pursuit of Aphther,
who had revolted from him, and asked per-
mission of the Carthaginians to go through this territory, which
they refused on the ground that it had nothing to do with him.
Owing, however, to the decisions given at Rome during this
period, the Carthaginians were put into such difficulties that
they not only lost the cities and territory, but had to pay
besides five hundred talents as mesne profits from the district
And this was the origin of the present controversy.^ . . .
3. Prusias sent envoys to Rome with some Gauls to accuse
Further com- Eumenes ; and Eumenes in his turn sent his
plaints against brother Attalus to rebut the accusations. Aria-
Eumenes by ^athes Sent a present of ten thousand gold
JrTusias and tnc
Gauls. See picccs, and envoys to inform the Senate of the
31. 4. reception given to Tiberius Gracchus ; and
B.C. 161. generally to ask for their commands, and to
assure them that he would do anything they told him. . . .
4. When Menochares arrived in Antioch to visit Demetrius,
T^ ... and informed the king ^ of the conversation he
Demctnus in-
duces Tiberius had had with the commission under Tiberius
Gracchus to Gracchus in Cappadocia, the king, thinking it a
salute him as j^^tter of the most urgent necessity to get these
men on his side as much as he could, devoted
himself, to the exclusion of every other business, to sending
^ A more detailed statement of the controversies between Carthage and
Massanissa, fostered and encouraged by the Romans, is found in Appian,
Res Punicae, 67 sq.
' Demetrius was now king. On his escape from Rome, described in bk. 31,
chs. 20-23, ^^ li'^d met with a ready reception in Syria, had seized the sovereign
power, and put the young Antiochus and his minister Lysias to death ; this was
in B.C. 162. Appian, Syriac, ch. 47,
XXXII DEMETRIUS AND ARIARATHES 449
messages to them, first to Pamphylia, and then to Rhodes,
undertaking to do everything the Romans wished ; till at last
he extracted their acknowledgment of him as king. The fact
was that Tiberius was very favourably disposed to him ; and,
accordingly, materially contributed to the success of his
attempt, and to his acquisition of the royal surrenders the
power. Demetrius took advantage of this to murderer of
send envoys to Rome, taking with them a Octavius.
complimentary crown, the murderer of Gnaeus Octavius, and
with them Isocrates the critic. . . .
6. At this time came ambassadors from Ariarathes, bringing
a complimentary present of ten thousand gold
pieces, and announcing the king's faithful attach- f^ ^^^^^^^
ment to Rome ; and of this they appealed to
Tiberius and his colleagues as witnesses. Tiberius and his
colleagues confirmed their statements : whereupon the Senate
accepted the present with warm thanks, and sent back
in return presents, which with them are the most honour-
able they can give — a sceptre and ivory chair. These
ambassadors were dismissed at once by the Senate before the
winter. But after them arrived Attalus when the
new Consuls had already entered on their office ; ^^^ ^yV'*
as well as the Gauls who had accusations against b.c. 160. Coss.
him, and whom Prusias had sent, with as many L. Aniciiis Gaiius,
more from Asia. After giving all a hearing, ^^he'^'"
the Senate not only acquitted Attalus of all
blame, but dismissed him with additional marks of their favour
and kindness : for their friendship for and active support of
Attalus was in the same proportion as their hostility and
opposition to king Eumenes. . . .
6. The ambassadors with Menochares arrived in Rome from
Demetrius, bringing the present of ten thousand Reception of the
gold pieces, as well as the man who had assassin- ambassadors of
ated Gnaeus Octavius. The Senate was for a long Demetnus.
time doubtful what to do about these matters. Finally they re-
ceived the ambassadors and accepted the present, but declined
to receive the men who were thus brought prisoners. Yet
Demetrius had sent not only Leptines, the actual assassin of
Octavius, but Isocrates as well. The latter was a grammarian
VOL. II '20
450 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS book
and public lecturer ; but being by nature garrulous, boastful,
and conceited, he gave offence even to the
^'l^r^^ Greeks, Alcaeus and his friends being accus-
tomed to direct their wit against him and hold
him up to ridicule in their scholastic discussions.^ When he
arrived in Syria, he displayed contempt for the
"*^ s'tr^ ^" people of the country ; and not content with
lecturing on his own subjects, he took to speak-
ing on politics, and maintained that "Gnaeus Octavius had
been rightly served ; and that the other ambassadors ought to
be put to death also, that there might be no one left to report
the matter to the Romans ; and so they might be taught to
give up sending haughty injunctions and exercising unlimited
power.'' By such random talk he got into this trouble.
7. And there is a circumstance connected with both these
men that is worth recording. After assassinating
^^^ L^lhTcr ""^ ^naeus, I^ptines immediately went openly about
Laodicea, asserting that what he had done was
just, and that it had been effected in accordance with the will
of the gods. And when Demetrius took possession of the
government, he went to the king exhorting him to have no
fear about the murder of Gnaeus, nor to adopt any measures
of severity against the Laodiceans ; for that he would himself
go to Rome and convince the Senate that he had done this
deed in accordance with the will of the gods. And finally,
thanks to his entire readiness and even eagerness to go, he
was taken without chains or a guard. But directly Isocrates
Extraordinary found himself included under this charge, he
conduct of went entirely beside himself with terror ; and,
Isocrates. ^Sitx the collar and chain were put on his neck,
he would rarely touch food, and completely neglected all
care of his body. He accordingly arrived at Rome a truly
astonishing spectacle, sufficient to convince us that nothing
can be more frightful than a man, in body and soul alike,
when once divested of his humanity. His aspect was
* tV rah ffvyKpifftffip. But it is very doubtful what the exact meaning of this
word is. Alcaeus seems to be the Epicurean philosopher who, among others,
was expelled from Rome in b.c. 171. See Athenae\is, xii. 547, who however
calls him Alcios. .See also Aelian, T. I/isf, 9, la.
XXXII /SOCRATES THE GRAMMARIAN 451
beyond all measure terrifying and savage, as might be ex*
pected in a man who had neither washed the dirt from
his body, nor pared his nails, nor cut his hair, for a year.
The wild glare and rolling of his eyes also showed such inward
horror, that any one who saw him would have rather approached
any animal in the world than him. Leptines, on the contrary,
maintained his original view : was ready to appear before the
Senate ; owned plainly to all who conversed with him what he
had done ; and asserted that he would meet with no severity
at the hands of the Romans. And eventually his expecta-
tion was fully justified. For the Senate, from The senate
the idea, I believe, that, if it received and decide to keep the
punished the guilty men, the populace would quesUon of the
consider that full satisfaction had been taken ™" eropen.
for the murder, refused almost outright to receive them ; and
thus kept the charge in reserve, that they might have the power
of using the accusation whenever they chose. They therefore
confined their answer to Demetrius to these words : " He shall
find all favour at our hands, if he satisfy the Senate in accord-
ance with the obedience which he owed to it before." . . .
There came also ambassadors from the Achaeans, headed
by Xenon and Telecles, in behalf of their accused
compatriots, and especially in behalf of Polybius ^"^"^^^^
and Stratius ; for lapse of time had now brought behalf of Polybius
an end to the majority, or at any rate to those and the other
of any note. The ambassadors came with ^^^^" f^^°^'
instructions couched in a tone of simple en-
treaty, in order to avoid anything like a contest with the Senate.
But when they had been admitted and delivered their commis-
sion in proper terms, even this humble tone failed to gain their
end, and the Senate voted to abide by their resolve. . . .
8. The strongest and most honourable proof of the integrity
of Lucius Aemilius Paulus was made public
after his death. For the character which he'^^^^^^^^P^^^^
enjoyed while alive was found to be justified at Pauius at his
his death, than which there can be no clearer death is a proof of
proof of virtue. No one of his contemporaries ^'^ ^'n^"^^^'
brought home more gold from Iberia than he ; no
one captured such enormous treasures as he did in Macedonia ;
452 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBJUS BpOK
and yet, though in both these countries he had the most un-
limited authority, he left so small a private fortune, that his
sons could not pay his wife's jointure wholly from the sale of
his personalty, and were obliged to sell some of his real estate
^ also to do so, a fact of which I have already
spoken in some detail This forces us to ac-
knowledge that the fame of the men who have been admired
in Greece in this respect suffers by a comparison. For if to
abstain from appropriating money, entrusted to a man for the
benefit of the depositor, deserves our admiration, — as is said
to have happened in the case of the Athenian Aristeides and
the Theban Epaminondas, — how much more admirable is it
for a man to have been master of a whole kingdom, with
absolute authority to do with it as he chose, and yet to have
coveted nothing in it ! And if what I say appears incredible
Poiybius has the ^^ ^^1 ^^ "^X readers, let them consider that the
fear of Roman present writer was fully aware that Romans, more
critics before his ji^^n any Other people, would take his books into
^^ * their hands, — because the most splendid and
numerous achievements recorded therein belong to them ; and
that with them the truth about the facts could not p>os-
sibly be unknown, nor the author of a falsehood expect any
indulgence. No one then would voluntarily expose himself to
certain disbelief and contempt. And let this be kept in mind
throughout the whole course of my work, when I seem to be
making a startling assertion about the Romans.
9. As the course of my narrative and the events of the
The origin of the ^^^^ ^^^^ drawn our attention to this family, I
friendship between wish to carry out fully, for the sake of students,
Scipio Aemiiianus yf\^^\ was left as a mere promise in my previous
oy lus. i^qJ^ J promised then that I would relate
the origin and manner of the rise and unusually early glory of
Scipio's reputation in Rome ; and also how it camfe about that
Poiybius became so attached to and intimate with him, that the
fame of their friendship and constant companionship was not
merely confined to Italy and Greece, but became known to
more remote nations also. We have already shown that the
acquaintance began in a loan of some books and the conversa-
tion about them. But as the intimacy went on, and the Achaean
XXXII SCIPIO THE YOUNGER AND POL YB I US 453
detenus were being distributed among the various cities, Fabius
and Scipio, the sons of Lucius Aemilius Paulus,^ exerted all
their influence with the praetor that Polybius might be allowed
to remain in Rome. This was granted : and the intimacy was
becoming more and more close, when the Young Scipio
following incident occurred. One day, when opens his heart to
they were all three coming out of the house of Polybius.
Fabius, it happened that Fabius left them to go to the Forum,
and that Polybius went in another direction with Scipio. As
they were walking along, in a quiet and subdued voice, and
with the blood mounting to his cheeks, Scipio said, " Why is
it, Polybius, that though I and my brother eat at the same
table, you address all your conversation and all your questions
and explanations to him, and pass me over altogether? Of
course you too have the same opinion of me as I hear the rest
of the city has. For I am considered by everybody, I hear,
to be a mild effete person, and far removed from the true
Roman character and ways, because I don't care for pleading in
the law courts. And they say that the family I come of requires
a different kind of representative, and not the sort that I am.
That is what annoys me most."
10. Polybius was taken aback by the opening words of
the young man's speech (for he was only
just eighteen), and said, "In heaven's name, ^*P;°3^^™*^"^'
Scipio, don't say such things, or take into
your head such an idea. It is not from any want of apprecia-
tion of you, or any intention of slighting you, that I have acted
as I have done : far from it ! It is merely that, your brother
being the elder, I begin and end my remarks with him, and
address my explanations and counsels to him, in the belief
that you share the same opinions. However, I am delighted
to hear you say now that you appear to yourself to be some-
what less spirited than is becoming to members of your family :
for you show by this that you have a really high spirit, and I
should gladly devote myself to helping you to speak or act in
any way worthy of your ancestors. As for learning, to which
I see you and your brother devoting yourselves at present with
so much earnestness and zeal, you will find plenty of people
^ See note on p. 456.
454 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS book
to help you both ; for I see that a large number of such
learned men from Greece are finding their way into Rome at
the present time. But as to the points which you say are just
now vexing you, I think you will not fmd any one more fitted
to support and assist you than myself" While Polybius was
still speaking the young man seized his right hand with both of
his, and pressing it warmly, said, " Oh that I might see the day
on which you would devote your first attention to me, and join
your life with mine. From that moment I shall think myself
Polybius is some- worthy both of my family and my ancestors."
what alarmed at Polybius was partly delighted at the sight of
the responsibility. ^^ young man's enthusiasm and affection, and
partly embarrassed by the thought of the high position of his
family and the wealth of its members. However, from the hour
of this mutual confidence the young man never lefl the side of
Polybius, but regarded his society as his first and dearest object
11. From that time forward they continually gave each
Scipio's high Other practical proof of an affection which re-
character for called the relationship of father and son, or of
continence as a kinsmen of the same blood. The first impulse
young nian. ^^^ ambition of a noble kind with which he was
inspired was the desire to maintain a character for chastity,
and to be superior to the standard observed in that respect
among his contemporaries. This was a glory which, great and
The deterioration difficult as it generally is, was not hard to gain
in Roman morals at that period in Romc, owing to the general
and its causes, deterioration of morals. Some had wasted
their energies on favourite youths ; others on mistresses ; and
a great many on banquets enlivened with poetry and wine, and
all the extravagant expenditure which they entailed, having
quickly caught during the war with Perseus the dissoluteness
of Greek manners in this respect. And to such monstrous
lengths had this debauchery gone among the youtig men, that
many of them had given a talent for a young favourite. This
dissoluteness ha,d as it were burst into flame at this period : in
the first place, from the prevalent idea that, owing to the
destruction of the Macedonian monarchy, universal dominion
was now secured to them beyond dispute ; and in the second
place, from the immense difference made, both in public and
XXXII CHARACTER OF THE YOUNGER SCIPIO 455
private wealth and splendour, by the importation of the riches
of Macedonia into Rome. Scipio, however, set his heart on a
different path in life ; and by a steady resistance to his
appetites, and by conforming his whole conduct to a consistent
and undeviating standard, in about the first five years after
this secured a general recognition of his character for goodness
and purity.
12. His next object was to cultivate lofly sentiments in
regard to money, and to maintain a higher standard of disin-
terestedness than other people. In this respect he had an
excellent start in his association with his natural father (L.
Aemilius) : but he also had good natural impulses towards the
right; and chance contributed much to his success in this
particular aim. For he first lost the mother of his adoptive
father, who was the sister of his natural father Lucius, and
wife of his adoptive grandfather, Scipio the Great She left a
large fortune, to which he was heir, and which gave him the
first opportunity of giving a proof of his principles. Aemilia,
for that was this lady's name, was accustomed to attend the
women's processions in great state, as sharing the life and
high fortune of Scipio. For besides the magnificence of her
dress and carriage, the baskets, cups, and such implements for
the sacrifice, which were carried in her train, were all of silver
or gold on great occasions ; and the number of
maid-servants and other domestics that made ^jfh^^mSSw!^^
up her train was in proportion to this splendour.
All this establishment, immediately after Aemilia's funeral,
Scipio presented to his own mother, who had long before been
divorced by his father Lucius, and was badly off considering
the splendour of her birth.^ She had therefore in previous
years refrained from taking part in grand public processions ;
but now, as there chanced to be an important state sacrifice,
she appeared surrounded with all the splendour and wealth
which had once been Aemilia's, using among other things the
same muleteers, pair of mules, and carriage. The ladies, there-
fore, who saw it were much impressed by the kindness and
liberality of Scipio, and all raised their hands to heaven and
prayed for blessings upon him. This act, indeed, would be
^ She was the daughter of C. Papirius Carbo. Coss. ac. 231.
456
THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS
BOOK
thought honourable anywhere, but at Rome it was quite aston-
ishing: for there no one ever thinks of giving any of his
private property to any one if he can help it. This was the
beginning of Scipio's reputation for nobility of character,
and it spread very widely, — for women are talkative and prone
to exaggeration whenever they feel warmly.
18. The next instance was his conduct to the daughters
Scipio's liberality ^^ ^^^ Great Scipio, sisters to his adoptive
to his cousins, father.^ When he took the inheritance he was
sisters to his bound to pay them their portion. For their
adoptive father. . . ^ ■» ^ • i_ ri_»^
father covenanted to give each of his two
daughters a marriage portion of fifty talents. Half of this their
mother paid down at once to their husbands, but left the
other half undischarged when she died. Now, the Roman
law enjoins the payment of money due to women as dowry
in three annual instalments, the personal outfit having been
first paid within ten months according to custom.* But
Scipio instructed his banker at once to pay the twenty-five
talents to each within the ten months. \Vhen, therefore,
Tiberius Gracchus and Scipio Nasica, for they were the
husbands of these ladies, called on the banker at the expira-
^ The following pedigree will show the various family connexions liere
alluded to : —
Publius Cornelius Scipio
ob. in Spain d.c. 212.
P. Cornelius Scipio AfricanusrrAemllia, sister of Lucius Aemilius Paulus = Papina
ob. B.C. 187.
ob. B.C. 1 6a.
ob. B.C. 160.
Quintus Fabius
Scipio
i^uimus ramus bcipio two
Maximus adopted by Aeminanus daughters.
Q. F. M. b. B.C. 185.
P. Scipio Nasica = Cornelia (i).
Cornelia (2) = Tib. Sempronius
Gracchus.
Publius Cornelius
Scipio Africanus
ob. s. p.
adopted his cousin
who became
Publius Cornelius Scipio
Acmilianus Africanus
ob. B.C. 129.
^ tS>v iirlxXuv, the omatncnta of a bride, consisting of clothes, jewels,
slaves, and other things, in accordance with her station. See Horace, Sat. 2,
3, 214. For the three instalments in which it was necessary to pay dowries, sec
Cicero ad Aft. ii. 23 ; 2 Phil. § 113.
xrxii SCIPICfS LIBBRAUTV 457
tion of the ten months, and asked whether Scipio had given
him any instructions as to the money, he told them they
might have it at once, and proceeded to enter the transfer of
twenty-five talents to each.^ They then said that he had made
a mistake, for they had no claim for the whole as yet, but only
took a third according to the law ; and upon the banker answer-
ing that such were his instructions from Scipio, they could not
believe him, and went to call on the young man, supposing
him to have made a mistake. And, indeed, their feelings
were natural : for at Rome, so far from paying fifty talents
three years in advance, no one will pay a single talent before
the appointed day ; so excessively particular are they about
money, and so profitable do they consider time. However,
when they reached Scipio and asked him what instructions he
had given his banker, on his replying, " To pay both sisters the
whole sum due to them," they told him he had made a mistake ;
and with a show of friendly regard pointed out to him that,
according to the laws, he had the use of the money for a con-
siderable time longer. But Scipio replied that he was quite aware
of all that ; but that close reckoning and legal exactness were
for strangers ; with relations and friends he would do his best
to behave straightforwardly and liberally. He therefore bade
them draw on the banker for the whole sum. When Tiberius
and Nasica heard this they returned home in silence, quite
confounded at the magnanimity of Scipio, and condemning
themselves for meanness, though they were men of as high a
character as any at Rome.
14. Two years afterwards, when his natural father, Lucius
Aemilius, died, and left him and his brother -^^ liberality of
Fabius joint heirs to his property, he did an act Scipio lo his
honourable to himself and worthy to be re- . ''foiherand
corded. Lucius died without children in the '
eyes of the law, for the two elder had been adopted into other
families, and the other sons, whom he was bringing up to be
the successors to himself and to continue his family, all died ;'
' TOtoGrrsi 7-j)r iia.fpiu^\* seemB a banker's (erni Tor "paying." i.e. by
striking off or eanccUing a debt enlcrcd against a man. Tlie only other in-
stance of such a use seems to be Dionys. Hal. 5, a8.
* Of his two younger sons'onc died ^ve days before his Macedonian triumph,
the other three dayt al^er il. Svc Livy, 45, 40.
458 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS book
he therefore left his property to these two. But Scipio, per-
ceiving that his brother was worse off than himself, renounced
the whole of his share of the inheritance, though the property
was valued altogether at over sixty talents, with a view of thus
putting Fabius on an equality with himself in p>oint of wealth.
This was much talked about ; but he afterwards gave a still
dearer proof of his liberality. For when his brother wished
to give some gladiatorial games in honour of his father, but
was unable to support the expense, because of the enormous
costliness of such things, Scipio contributed half of this also
from his own pocket. Now the cost of such an exhibition,
if it is done on a large scale, does not amount in all to less
than thirty talents. While the fame of his liberality to his
mother was still fresh, she died ; and so far from taking back
any part of the wealth he had recently bestowed on her, of
which I have just spoken, Scipio gave it and the entire
residue of his mother's property to his sisters,^ though they
had no legal claim at all upon it. Accordingly his sisters
again adopted the splendour and retinue which Aemilia had
employed in the public processions; and once more the
liberality and family affection of Scipio were recalled to the
minds of the people.
With such recommendations dating from his earliest years,
Publius Scipio sustained the reputation for high morality and
good principles, which he had won by the expenditure of
perhaps sixty talents, for that was the sum which he bestowed
from his own property. And this reputation for goodness did
not depend so much on the amount of the money, as on
the seasonableness of the gift and the graciousness with which
^ The two sisters were both named Aemilia ; the elder >**as married to Q.
Aelius Tulxiro, the younger to M.'-.Porcius Cato. elder son of the Censor. The
daughters were prevented from taking the inheritance of their mother's pro-
perty by the lex Voconia (b.c. 174), in virtue of which a woman could not be
a haercs, nor take a legacy greater than that of the haeres, or of all the
hacredes together. Tlie object of the law was to prevent the transference of
the property of one gens to another on a large scale. It was evaded (1) by
trusteeships, Gaius, 2, 274 ; Plutarch, Cic, 41 : (2) by the assent of the
haeres, Cic. de Off. 2, § 55. And it was relaxed by Augustus in favour of
mothers of three children, Dio Cass. 56, 10. See also Cicero de Sen. § 14 ;
de Ugg, 2, 20; de Rep. 3, 10 ; Verr. 2, i, 42 ; Pliny, Panegyr. 42 ; Livy,
E4. 41.
J
XXXII SCIPIOS MANLINESS 459
it was bestowed. By his strict chastity, also, he not only
saved his purse, but by refraining from many irregular pleasures
he gained sound bodily health and a vigorous constitution,
which accompanied him through the whole of his life and
repaid him with many pleasures, and noble compensations for
the immediate pleasures from which he had formerly abstained.
16. Courage, however, is the most important element of
character for public life in every country, but scipio's physical
especially in Rome : and he therefore was bound strength and
to give all his most serious attention to it In this c^J^s^ were
u n jjuT-i. 1 T" confirmed by the
he was well seconded by Fortune also. For as exercise of
the Macedonian kings were especially eager hunting in
about hunting, and the Macedonians devoted Macedonia,
the most suitable districts to the preservation of game,
these places were carefully guarded during all the war time,
as they had been before, and yet had not been hunted the
whole of the four years owing to the public disturbances : the
consequence was that they were full of every kind of animal.
But when the war was decided, Lucius Aemilius, thinking that
hunting was the best training for body and courage his young
soldiers could have, put the royal huntsmen under the charge
of Scipio, and gave him entire authority over all matters con-
nected with the hunting. Scipio accepted the duty, and, look-
ing upon himself as in a quasi-royal position, devoted his whole
time to this business, as long as the army remained in
Macedonia after the battle of Pydna.^Having then ample
opportunity for following this kind of^ursuit,
and being in the very prime of his youth and eontin^ued'^L
naturally disposed to it, the taste for hunt- his return to
ing which he acquired became permanent. Rome, and was
Accordingly when he returned to Rome, and ^"p^iy^^^^
found his taste supported by a corresponding
enthusiasm on the part of Polybius, the time that other young
men spent in law courts and formal visits,^ haunting the Forum
and endeavouring thereby to ingratiate themselves with the
people, Scipio devoted to hunting ; and, by continually display-
ing brilliant and memorable acts of prowess, won a greater
^ That is, the morning from daybreak till about ten or eleven. The saluta-
tiones came first, and the law business in the third hour.
46o THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS book
reputation than others, whose only chance of gaining credit was
by inflicting some damage on one of their fellow-citizens, — for
that was the usual result of these law proceedings. Scipio, on
the other hand, without inflicting annoyance on any one,
gained a popular reputation for manly courage, rivalling
eloquence by action. The result was that in a short time he
obtained a more decided superiority of position over his con-
temporaries, than any Roman is remembered to have done ;
although he struck out a path for his ambition which, with a
view to Roman customs and ideas, was quite different from
that of others.
16. I have spoken somewhat at length on the character of
Scipio's subse- Scipio, because I thought that such a stor>'
quent success, would be agreeable to the older, and useful to
therefore, was the ^^ younger among my readers. But especially
his early conduct, because I wished to make what I have to tell
and not the off- in my following books appear credible ; that
spnng of chance, j^q ^^^ jj^j^y f^^i j^^jy difficulty because of the
apparent strangeness of what happened to this man ; nor
deprive him of the credit of achievements which were the
natural consequences of his prudence, and attribute them to
Fortune and chance. I must now return from this digression
to the regular course of my history. . . .
17. Thearidas and Stephanus conducted a mission from
_^ -^ ,. - Athens and the Achaeans on the matter of the
The Dehans hav. • , t^ x. ^\. x^ v j j •
ing been allowed reprisals. For when the Delians were ordered, m
to leave their answer to an embassy to Rome after Delos had
island with ' • all y^^^^i granted to Athens, to depart from the island,
found many occa- t>ut to take all their goods with them, they re-
sions of legal dis- moved to Achaia ; and having been enrolled as
putes with the citizens of the league, wished to have their claims
Athenians, to » . i • j • •! » ,• i
whom the island upon the Athenians decided, according to the
was granted, convention existing between the Achaeans and
See 30, 21. Athens. But, on the Athenians denying that
They remove to ^ o
Achaia. and sue they had any right to plead under that agree-
the Athenians ment, the Delians demanded from the Achaeans
under the Achaean J j^gj^gg j^ make reprisals on the Athenians.
convention. r*^, , , ^ 1 ^ t^
Roman decision The latter, therefore, sent an embassy to Rome
against Athens, on these points, and were answered that decisions
XXXII ATHENS, DELOS, DALMATIA, AND AETOLIA 461
made by the Achaeans according to their laws concerning the
Delians were to be binding. . . .
18. The people of Issa having often sent embassies to
Rome, complaining that the Dalmatians damaged piracies of the
their territory and the cities subject to them, — Dalmatians on
meaning thereby Epetium and Tragyrium, — and ^^^ **^^^ °^ ^^^^
the Daorsi also bringing similar complaints, the ^*^' *^ *
Senate sent a commission under Gaius Fannius to inspect
the state of Illyria, with special reference to the Dalmatians.
This people had been subject to Pleuratus as long as he was
alive ; but when he died, and was succeeded on the throne
by Genthius, they revolted, overran the bordering territories,
and reduced the neighbouring cities, some of which even paid
them a tribute of cattle and corn. So Fannius and his col-
league started on their mission. . . .
19. Lyciscus the Aetolian was a factious turbulent agita-
tor, and direcdy he was killed the Aetolians
from that hour lived harmoniously and at peace lvc^sci^
with each other, simply from the removal of
one man. Such decisive influence has character in human
affairs, that we find not only armies and cities, but also
national leagues and whole divisions of the world, experiencing
the greatest miseries and the greatest blessings through the
vice or virtue of one man. . . .
Though he was a man of the worst character, Lyciscus
ended his life by an honourable death ; and accordingly, most
people with some reason reproach Fortune for sometimes
giving to the worst of men what is the prize of the good — an
easy death. . . .
20. There was a great change for the better in Aetolia
when the civil war was stopped after the death of Lyciscus ;
and in Boeotia when Mnasippus of Coronea died ; and similarly
in Acarnania when Chremas was got out of the way. Greece
was as though purified by the removal from
life of those accursed pests of the country. ^^b^c.Ts7."'^''
For in the same year Charops of Epirus
chanced to die at Brundisium. Affairs in Epirus had been
still in disorder and confusion as before, owing T^g tyranny of
to the cruelty and tyranny of Charops, ever Charops in Epirus
462 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS book
after the battle of Since the end of the war with Perseus. For
p>diia, B.C. i68- Lucius Anicius having condemned some of the
'^^* leading men in the country to death, and trans-
ported all others to Rome against whom there was the slightest
suspicion, Charops at once got complete power to do what he
chose ; and thereupon committed every possible act of cruelty,
sometimes personally, at others by the agency of his friends :
for he was quite a young man himself, and was quickly joined
by a crowd of the worst and most unprincipled persons, who
gathered round him for the sake of plunder from other people.
But what protected him and inclined people to believe that he
was acting on a fixed design, and in accordance with the will
of the Romans, was his former intimacy with them, and the sup-
port of the old man Myrton and his son Nicanor. These two
had the character of being men of moderation and on good
terms with the Romans ; but though up to that time they had
been widely removed from all suspicion of injustice, they now
gave themselves up wholly to support and share in the lawless
acts of Charops. This man, after murdering some openly in
the market-place, others in their own houses, others by send-
ing secret assassins to waylay them in the fields or on the
roads, and selling the property of all whom he had thus
He extorts money ^il^^d, thought of another device. He put up
from the rich lists of such men and women as were rich, con-
under threat of demning them to exile ; and having held out
this threat, he extracted money out of them,
making the bargain himself with the men, and by the
agency of his mother Philotis with the women ; for this lady
was well suited to the task, and for any act of violence was
even more helpful than could have been expected in a
woman.
2 1 . When he and his mother had thus got all the money
The people of ^^^7 could out of these persons, they none the
Phoenice terrified less caused all the proscribed to be impeached
or cajoled into before the people ; and the majority in Phoe-
uppor 1 g 1 . ^.^^^ partly from fear and partly induced by
the baits held out by Charops and his friends, condemned
all thus impeached, for being ill-disposed to Rome, to death
instead of banishment. These men, however, fled while
XXXII CHAROPS OF EPIRUS 463
Charops visited Rome, whither he went with money, and
accompanied by Myrton and Nicanor, wishing to get a seal of
approval put to his wickedness by means of the Senate. On
that occasion a very honourable proof was given ^.^3^^ ^^ ,0
of Roman principles ; and a spectacle was dis- Rome, but is for-
played exceedingly gratifying to the Greeks bidden by ihe
residing in Rome, especially the detenus. J^'|^B^!'°^^
Marcus Aemilius I^pidus, who was Fontifex
Maximus and Princeps Senatus, and Lucius Aemilius, the
conqueror of Perseus, a man of the highest credit and in-
fluence, learning what had been done by Charops in Epirus,
refused to admit him into their houses. This becoming
much talked about, the foreign residents in Rome were ex-
ceedingly rejoiced, and observed with pleasure that the
Romans discountenanced evil. And on Charops
being afterwards admitted to the Senate-house, X^Zt^^
the Senate refused to consent to his demands,
but answered that " They would give instructions to commis-
sioners to examine into what had taken place." But when
Charops returned home he entirely suppressed He suppresses
this reply ; and having written one to suit his the reply of the
own ideas, gave out that the Romans approved Senate.
of what had been done by him. . . .
22. King Eumenes was entirely broken in bodily strength,
but still maintained his brilliancy of mind. He Death and char-
was a man who in most things was the equal of acier of Eumenes,
any king of his time; and in those which were ^-^^ 'S9-
the most important and honourable, was greater and more
illustrious than them all. First, he sue- He raised his
ceeded his father in a kingdom reduced to a kingdom to ihe
very few insignificant cities ; and he raised it to '''" ""'' '
the level of the largest dynasties of his day. And it was not
chance which contributed to this, or a mere sudden cata-
, strophe, it was his own acuteness, indefatigable industry, and
personal labour. Again, he was exceedingly
ambitious of establishing a good reputation, ***touniif^f ''
and showed it by doing good services to a very
large number of cities, and enriching privately a great many
men. And in the third place, he had three brothers grown
464 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS BOor
up and active, and he kept all four of them loyal to himself,
and was loyally ^^^ acting as guards of his person and preservers
sencd by four of the kingdom : and that is a thing of which
brothers. there are very rare instances in history. . . .
On succeeding his brother Eumenes on the throne, Attalus
Attaius restores at once gave a specimen of his principles and ac-
Ariarathes. tivity by restoring Ariarathes to his kingdom. ^ . . .
28. When the envoys under Fannius returned from Illyria,
Fannius and hi ^^^ reported that, SO far from the Dalmatians
colleagues roughly making any restitution to those who asserted
treated by the that they were being continually wronged by
Dalmatians, B.C. ^^^^ they refused even to listen to the com-
missioners at all, saying that they had nothing
to do with the Romans. Besides, they reported that no
lodging or entertainment of any sort had been supplied to
them ; but that the very horses, which they had procured from
another city, the Dalmatians had forcibly taken from them;
and would have laid violent hands upon themselves, if they
had not yielded to necessity and retired as quietly as they
The Senate decide could. The Senate listened attentively to the
on declaring war report j they were exceedingly angry at the
with the Dalmatians, disobedience and rudeness of the Dalmatians,
but their prevailing feeling was that the present time was a
suitable one for declaring war against this people for more
reasons than one. For, in the first place, the coasts of Illyria
towards Italy had been entirely neglected by them ever since
they had expelled Demetrius of Pharos; and, in the next
place, they did not wish their own citizens to become ener-
vated by a long-continued peace ; for it was now the twelfth
year since the war with Perseus and the cam-
paigns in Macedonia. They therefore planned
that, by declaring war against the Dalmatians, they would at
once renew as it were the warlike spirit and enterprise of their
own people, and terrify the Illyrians into obedience to their
injunctions. Such were the motives of the Romans for going
^ Ariarathes V. had been expelled his kingdom by Demetrius, who, in
consideration of one thousand talents, had assisted his reputed brother Oro-
phemes, who had been palmed off on Ariarathes IV. by his wife, to displace
him. The Senate, when eventually appealed to, decided that the two brothers
should share the kingdom. Livy, Ep, 47 ; Appian, Syr, 47.
XXXII H^A/l IVITH THE DALMATIANS 465
to war with the Dalmatians. But to the world at large they
gave out that they had determined on war owing to the insults
offered to their legates. . . .
24. King Ariarathes arrived in Rome in the course of the
summer.^ And when Sextus Julius Caesar and g^c. 157. Coss.
his colleague had entered on their consulship, Sext. Julius Caesar,
the king visited them privately, presenting in his L. Aureiius
personal appearance a striking picture of the
dangers with which he was surrounded.
Ambassadors also arrived from Demetrius, headed by
Miltiades, prepared to act in two capacities — to defend the
conduct of Demetrius in regard to Ariarathes, and to accuse
that king with the utmost bitterness. Orophemes also had
sent Timotheus and Diogenes to represent him, conveying a
crown for Rome, and charged to renew the friendship and
alliance of Cappadocia with the Romans ; but, above all, to
confront Ariarathes, and both to answer his accusations and
bring their own against him. In these private interviews
Diogenes and Miltiades and their colleagues made a better
show, because they were many to one in the controversy;
besides their personal appearance was better than that of
Ariarathes, for they were at present on the winning side
and he had failed. They had also the advantage of him, in
making their statement of the case, that they were entirely
unscrupulous, and cared nothing whatever about the truth of
their words; and what they said could not be confuted,
because there was no one to take the other side. So their
lying statements easily prevailed, and they thought everything
was going as they wished. . . .
25, After reigning for a short time in Cappa-
docia in utter contempt of the customs of his ^orophernes°
country; Orophemes introduced the organised
debaucheries of Ionia.* . . .
' Ariarathes arrived in the summer of B.C. 158.
' rV 'leufV KoX rex^'Tt'cV dffurrlay. The translation given above is in
accordance with the explanation of Casaubon, who quoted Horace {Odes 3, 6,
21), Afotus doceri gaudet lonicos matura virgo. Orophemes had been sent to
Ionia, when Antiochis had a real son (Ariarathes V.), that he might not set
up a claim to the throne. He had been imposed by Antiochis on her husband
.Ariarathes IV. before she had a real son.
VOL. II 2 U
466 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS book
It has happened to not a few, from the desire for increas-
ing their wealth, to lose their life along with their money. It
was from being captivated by such passions that Orophemes,
king of Cappadocia, perished and was expelled fi:x>m his king-
dom. But having briefly narrated the restoration of this king
(Ariarathes), I will now bring back my narrative to its regular
course; for at present I have, to the exclusion of Greek
affairs, selected from those of Asia the events connected with
Cappadocia out of their proper order, because it was im-
possible to separate the voyage of Ariarathes from Italy from
his restoration to his kingdom.^ I will therefore now go back
to the history of Greece during this period, in which a peculiar
and extraordinary affair took place in regard to the city of
Oropus, of which I will give the whole story from beginning
to end, going both backward and forward in point of time,
that I may not render the history of an episode which was
made up of separate events, and was not on the whole im-
portant, still more insignificant and indistinct by relating it
under different years. For when an event as a whole does
not appear to readers to be worth attention, I cannot certainly
expect a student to follow its details scattered at intervals
through my history.^ . . .
For the most part when things go well men generally get
on together ; but in times of failure, in their annoyance at
events, they become sore and irritable with their friends. And
this is what happened to Orophemes, when his affairs began
^ Orophemes was soon deposed, and Ariarathes V. restored, but we have
no certain indication when this happened. See 3, 5.
- The episode of Oropus here referred to, Polybius's account of which
is lost, was made remarkable by the \isit of the three philosophers to Rome
as ambassadors from Athens. The story, as far as Athens was concerned,
is told by Pausanias, 7, 11, 4-7. The Athenians had been much impoverished
by the events of the war with Perseus (b.c. 172-168), and had made a raid or
raids of some sort ujxjn Oropus. The Oropians appealed to Rome. The
Romans referred the assessment of damages to an Achaean court at Sicyon.
The Athenians failed to appear before the court at Sicyon, and were con-
demned by default to a fine of five hundred talents. Thereupon Cameades the
Academician, Diogenes the Stoic, and Critol.ius the Peripatetic were sent to
plead for a remission of a fine which the Athenians were wholly unable to pay.
They made a great impression on the Roman youth by their lectures, and
Calo urged that they should get their answer and be sent away as soon as
possible. The Senate reduced the fine to one hundred talents : but even that
the Athenians could not collect ; and they seem to have managed to induce the
xxxii OROPHERNES, ATTALUS, AND PRUSIAS 467
to take a wrong turn in his relations with Theotimus, — both
indulging in mutual recriminations. . . .
26. Ambassadors having arrived from Epirus about this
time, sent both from those who were in actual
B.C I Co
possession of Phoenice and from those who coss. L. Corne-
had been banished from it ; and both parties Uus Lentuius, c.
having made their statement in presence of ^^^*"j j^**^"^
each other, the Senate answered that they would
give instructions on this point to the commissioners that were
about to be sent into Illyria with Gains Marcius the Consul.^ . . .
27. After defeating Attains, and advancing to Pergamum,
Prusias prepared a magnificent sacrifice and pmsias, king of
brought it to the sacred enclosure of Asclepius, Bithynia, attacks
and after offering the victims, and having Attaiusof
obtained favourable omens, went back into his ergamum.
camp for that day; but on the next he directed his forces
against the Nicephorium, and destroyed all the temples and
sacred enclosures, and plundered all the statues of men and
the marble images of the gods. Finally he carried off the
statue of Asclepius also, an admirably executed work of
Ph)rromachus, and transferred it to his own country, — the
very image before which the day before he had poured
libations and offered sacrifice ; desiring, it would seem, that
the god might in every way be propitious and
favourable to him. I have spoken of such
proceedings before, when discoursing on Philip, as sheer
Oropians to allow an Athenian garrison to hold Oropus, and to give hostages
for their fidelity to the Athenian government. This led to fresh quarrels and
an appeal to the Achaean government. The Achaean Strategus, Menalcidas
of Sparta, was bribed by a present of ten talents to induce an interference in
behalf of Oropus. Thereupon the Athenians withdrew their garrison from
Oropus, after pillaging the town, and henceforth took no part in the quarrels
which ensued, arising from the demands of Menalcidas for his ten talents ;
which the Oropians refused to pay, on the ground that he had not helped them
as he promised ; quarrels which presently centred round the question of the
continuance of Sparta in the Achaean league. The date of the original quarrel
between Athens and Oropus is not fixed, but the mission of the philosophers
was in B.c. 155. See Plutarch, Cato, 2a ; Pliny, N, H, 7, 112-113 ; Aulus
Gellius. 6, 14 ; Cic. ad Ait. 12, 2^ ; Tusc. 4, § 5.
* C. Marcitis consul adversus Dalmatas parum prospcre primumt postea
feiiciier pugnai'it. The war was continued in the next year (B.C. 155), and the
Dalmatians subdued for the time by the consul P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica.
Livy, Ep, 47.
468
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS
insanity. For at one time to offer sacrifice, and endeavou
propitiate heaven by their means, worshipping and uttering
most earnest prayers before holy tables and altars, as Pm
was wont to do, with bendings of the knee and effemii
prostrations, and at the same time to violate these sac
objects and to flout heaven by their destruction, — can we ascj
such conduct to anything but a mind disordered and a spirit
to sober reason ? I am sure this was the case with Pnisi
for he led his army off to Elaea, without having perfoime
single act of manly courage in the course of his attempts
Pergamum, and after treating everything human and dii
with petty and effeminate spite. He attempted to take Eli
Elaea on the ^"^^ made some assaults upon it ; but bt
Casius, ihe port unable to effect anything, owing to Sosani
of Pergamuni. jjje king's foster-brother, having thrown him
into the town with an army and repelling his assaults,
marched off towards Tliyateira. In the course of his mai
he plundered the temple of Artemis in the Holy village ; j
the sacred enclosure of Apollo Cynneius at Temnus' like^
he not only plundered but destroyed by fire. After tJ
achievements he returned home, having waged war aga
the gods as well as against men. But Prusias's infantry t
suffered severely from famine and dysentery on their ret
march, so that the wrath of heaven appears to have qui<
visited him for these crimes.- . . .
28. After his defeat by Prusias Attalus appointed
brother Athenaeus to accompany Publius 1
U<Ii^"rloRome''"'"S '° ^"""^ '« '"'°^'" ^"^^ Senate Of »
had happened. At Rome they had not \
much attention when a previous messenger named Androni
had come from Attalus, with news of the original invasi
Apollo s.
according to Suidas
1 Mysia, s. of llie river Hcrmus. Cynneius or Cyi
1 ApoUo guardian of the shepherd dogs. There
s.v. liwjfuoi), a lemplc lo Apollo at Athens with
n the work of Cynnis, a son of Apollo and a ay
I'arnelhiR.
' The batlte, in which Prusias is here
treacherous attack upon Attalus who was waiting,
arrangemetx made by Roman envoys Horlcnsius and Arunculeius, lo
I'rusins on his frontier, accompanied by only one thousand cavalry.
Roman envo;* eren had to fly for thdr llvet. Appian, MitAridaiei, 3.
■e conquered Allalus, v
PRUSIAS AND ATT ALUS
469
because they suspected that Attalus wished to attack Pnisias
himself, and was therefore getting up a case against him before-
hand, and trying to prejudice him in their eyes by these
accusations: and when Nicomedes and some «_ . , ^
xTusi&s o&Q sent
ambassadors from Pnisias, headed by Anti- his son Nicomedes
philus, arrived and protested that there was not and some ambas-
a word of truth in the statement, the Senate ^^^'^^^^^^
was still more incredulous of what had been
said about Pnisias. But when after a time the real truth was
made known, the Senate still felt uncertain, The Senate send
and sent Lucius Apuleius and Gaius Petronius fresh oommis-
to investigate what was the state of the case in . sioners to
regard to these two kings. investigate.
BOOK XXXIII
1. Before spring this year the Senate, after hearing the report
B.C. 155. o^ Publius Lentulus and his colleagues, who had
The Roman legate just reached Rome from Asia, in the business
^andlth^^l!^' ^^ king Prusias, called in Athenaeus also,
brother of Attaius, brother of king Attalus. The matter, however,
reach Rome and did not need many words : the Senate promptly
declare the truth, appointed Gaius Claudius Cento, Lucius Hor-
tensius, and Gaius Arunculeius, to accompany Athenaeus
home, with instructions to prevent Prusias from waging war
against Attalus.
Also Xeno of Aegium and Telecles of Tegea arrived as
Another embassy ambassadors from the Achaeans in behalf of the
in behalf of the Achaean detenus. After the delivery of their
Achaean detenus, speech, on the question being put to the vote,
the Senators only refused the release of the accused persons
It fails by the by a very narrow majority. The man who
action of the really prevented the release from being carried
S'iftT^^^'tvl^^!,^^ was Aulus Postumius, who was praetor, and as
puttmg the ques- • j j • *u c * \.u *.
tionsimply "yes" such presided m the Senate on that occasion.
or " no " for re- Three alternatives were proposed — one for
^^y whr^ire ^^ absolute release, another for an absolute
for postponing it refusal, and a third for a postponement of the
to vote "no." release for the present. The largest numbers
were for the first of these three ; but Postumius left out the
third, and put the two first to the vote together, release or no
release ; the result was that those who were originally for the
postponement transferred their votes to the party that were
against the release, and thus gave a majority against release. . . .
8.^ When the ambassadors returned to Achaia with the news
^ Hultsch places an extract from Aulus Gellius (6, 14, 8)- relating to the
BOOK XXXIII RELEASE OF ACHAEANS REFUSED 471
that the restoration of all the detenus had been only lost in
the Senate by a narrow majority, the people The Achaeans are
becoming hopeful and elated sent Telecles of encouraged to
Megalopolis and Anaxidamus on a fresh mission ^ ^s^**-
at once. That was the state of things in the Peloponnese. . . .
4. Aristocrates, the general of the Rhodians, was in appear-
ance a man of mark and striking ability ; and Aristocrates
the Rhodians, judging from this, believed that proves a failure in
they had in him a thoroughly adequate leader ^e war with
and guide in the war.^ But they were disap-
pointed in their expectations : for when he came to the test of
experience, like spurious coin when brought to the furnace, he
was shown to be a man of quite a different sort And this
was proved by actual facts. . . .
5. [Demetrius] offered him five hundred talents if he would
surrender Cyprus to him, with other similar advantages and
honours from himself if he would do him this service. . . .
Archias, therefore, wishing to betray Cyprus to Demetrius,
and being caught in the act and led off to stand his trial,
hanged himself with one of the ropes of the awnings in the
court. For it is a true proverb that led by their desires " the
reckonings of the vain are vain." This man, for instance,
imagining that he was going to get five hundred talents, lost
what he had already, and his life into the bargain. . . .
6. About this time an unexpected misfortune befell the
people of Priene. They had received a deposit
of four hundred talents from Orophemes when he pe^pj^^of Priene
got possession of the kingdom; and subsequently (in Caria) in pre-
when Ariarathes recovered his dominion he serving the money
demanded the money of them. But they acted orophemes^
like honest men, in my opinion, in declaring
that they would deliver it to no one as long as Orophernes
was alive, except to the person who deposited it with them ;
while Ariarathes was thought by many to be committing a
breach of equity in demanding a deposit made by another.
mission of the three philosophers as ch. 2 of this book. The substance is given
in the note on p. 466. It is more in place there, as Polybius expressly said
that he would give the whole story together (32, 25).
' This war appears to have arisen from a treacherous attack of the Cretans
upon the island of Siphnos. Exc, dt Virt. ei Vit. p. 588.
47a THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS book
However, up to this point, one might perhaps pardon his
making the attempt, because he looked upon the money as
belonging to his own kingdom; but to push his anger and
imperious determination as much farther as he did seems
utterly unjustifiable. At the period I refer to, then, he sent
troops to pillage the territory of Priene, Attains assisting and
urging him on from the private ' grudge which he entertained
towards the Prienians. After losing many slaves and cattle,
some of them being slaughtered close to the city itself, the
Prienians, unable to defend themselves, first sent an embassy
to the Rhodians, and eventually appealed for protection to
Rome. . . .
But he would not listen to the proposal So it came about
that the Prienians, who had great hopes from the possession of
so large a sum of money, found themselves entirely dis-
appointed. For they repaid Orophemes his deposit, and,
thanks to this same deposit, were unjustly exposed to severe
damage at the hands of Ariarathes. . . .
7. This year there came ambassadors also from the people of
P Marseilles, who had long been suffering from the
The Ligurians Ligurians, and at that time were being closely
harass Marseilles invested by them, while their cities of Antipolis
and besiege ^^^ Nicaea were also subjected to a siege.
Antibes and Nice, r^., , ^ . "^ , ^ °
They, therefore, sent ambassadors to Rome to
represent the state of things and beg for help. On their
being admitted, the Senate decided to send legates to see
personally what was going on, and to endeavour by persuasion
to correct the injurious proceedings of the barbarians. . . .
The peaceful mission failed^ and the consul Opimius subdued
the Oxybiiy a Ligurian trihe^ in arms^ B.C. 154. Livy^ Ep. 47.
8. At the same time as the Senate despatched Opimius to
B.C 154. the war with the Oxybii, Ptolemy the younger
Coss. Q. Opimius, arrived at Rome ; and being admitted to the
Aiblmis."^ Senate brought an accusation against his brother,
Ptolemy Physcon laying on him the blame of the attack against
charges his his life. He showed the scars of his wounds,
citing a plot"" ^^^ speaking with all the bitterness which
against his life, they seemed to suggest, moved his hearers
xxxiii THE UGURIANS, PTOLEMIES, AND PRUSIAS 473
to pity him; and when Neolaidas and The Senate refiies
Andromachus also came on behalf of the elder ^° ^^^ ^^« *^-
Ptolemy, to answer the charges brought by his ^^lemy^^
brother, the Senate refused even to listen to Phiiometor,
their pleas, having been entirely prepossessed by
the accusations of the younger. They commanded them to
leave Rome at once ; while they assigned five ^nd send com-
commissioners to the younger, headed by missionersto
Gnaeus Merula and Lucius Thermus, with a restore Physcon
quinquereme for each commissioner, and ^ yp™s-
ordered them to restore Ptolemy (Physcon) to Cyprus ; and
at the same time sent a circular to their allies in Greece and
Asia, granting permission to them to assist in the restoration
of Ptolemy. . . .
9. When the commissioners under Hortensius and
Arunculeius returned from Pergamum, and re- .
ported Prusias's disregard of the orders of the refuscd^ob^ence
Senate ; and how by an act of treachery he had to the former
besieged them and Attalus in Pergamum,^ and commission (see
had given rein to every kind of violence and ne^Simmission
lawlessness : the Senate, enraged and offended is sent out with
at what had happened, immediately appointed peremptory
ten commissioners, headed by Lucius Anicius,
Gaius Fannius, and Quintus Fabius Maximus, and sent them
out with instructions to put an end to the war, and compel
Pnisias to indemnify Attalus for the injuries received by him
during the war. . . .
10. On the complaint of the ambassadors of Marseilles as
to their injuries sustained at the hands of the ,„. t • •
X . . , ^ . , The Ligunans
Ligurians, the Senate at once appomted a prevent the com-
commission, consisting of Flaminius, Popilius missioners from
Laenas, and Lucius Pupius, who sailed with the *^j*"f ^^.
r xjF -11 J 1 J J • .u * '. wound Flammius
envoys of Marseilles, and landed m the territory ^ho had already
of the Oxybii at the town of Aegitna. The landed, and drive
Ligurians, hearing that they were come to bid ^"^ '° *^'^ ^^*P-
them raise the siege, descended upon them as they lay at anchor,
and prevented the rest from disembarking; but finding Flaminius
already disembarked and his baggage landed, they began by
' See 32. 27, note.
474 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS book
ordering him to leave the country, and on his refusal they began
to plunder his baggage. His slaves and freedmen resisting this,
and trying to prevent them, they began to use violence and
attacked them with their weapons. When Flaminius came to
the rescue of his men they wounded him, and killed two of
his servants, and chased the rest down to their ship, so that
Flaminius only escaped with'his life by cutting away the hawsers
and anchors. He was conveyed to Marseilles and his wound
War ordered with attended to with all possible care ; but when the
the Oxybii and Senate was informed of the transaction, it imme-
Deaatae,B.c.i54. ^jj^jgjy Ordered one of the consuls, Quintus
Opimius, to lead an army against the Oxybii and Deciatae. ^
11. Having collected his army at Placentia, Quintus
Opimius orders Opimius marched over the Apennines and
his soldiers to join arrived in the territory of the Oxybii ; and, pitch-
at Piaccntia, and \^„ jjjg camp on the river Apro, awaited the
marches in to Gaul, ° \ - ' r j^i^^i ..•
enemy, bemg mformed that they were mustenng
their forces and were eager to give him battle. Meanwhile,
talc A *t ^^ advanced to Aegitna, where the ambassadors
had been outraged, took the city by assault, and
sold its inhabitants as slaves, sending the ringleaders in the
outrage to Rome in chains. Having done this, he went to
meet the enemy. The Oxybii, convinced that their violence
to the ambassadors admitted of no terms being granted them,
with all the courage of desperation, and excited to the highest
pitch of furious enthusiasm, did not wait to be joined
by the Deciatae, but, having collected to the number of about
and defeats the ^^^^ thousand, rushed to the attack upon their
Oxybii and enemy. Quintus was somewhat dismayed at
Deciatae, ^^ boldness of their attack, and at the
desperate fury of the barbarians ; but was encouraged by
observing that the enemy were advancing in complete
disorder, for he was an experienced soldier and a man
of great natural sagacity. He therefore drew out his men,
and, after a suitable harangue, advanced at a slow pace
towards the enemy. His charge was delivered with great
vigour : he quickly repulsed the enemy, killed a great many of
them, and forced the rest into headlong flight. Meanwhile,
Ligurian inhcs between Nice and Marseilles. Pliny, A^ H. 3, § 47.
XXXIII LIGURIAN WAR 475
the Deciatae had mustered their forces, and appeared on die
ground intending to fight side by side with the Oxybii ; but
finding themselves too late for the battle, they received the
fugitives in their ranks, and after a short time charged the
Romans with great fury and enthusiasm ; but being worsted in
the engagement, they immediately all surrendered themselves
and their city at discretion to the Romans. Having thus become
masters of these tribes, Opimius delivered over their territory
on the spot to the people of Marseilles, and for the future forced
the Ligurians to give hostages at certain fixed intervals to the
Marsilians. He then deprived the tribes that had fought with
them of their arms, and divided his army among opimius winters
the cities there for the winter, and himself took in Gaul,
up his winter quarters in the country. Thus ^^* ^S4-i53-
the war had a conclusion as rapid as its commencement. . . .
12. All the previous winter Attalus had been busy collecting
a large army, Ariarathes and Mithridates having ,^
sent him a force of cavalry and infantry, in sioners visit
accordance with the terms of their alliance with Attalus and
him. While he was still engaged in these pre- ^"^*^ ^^^y *°
parations the ten commissioners arrived from ^'
Rome : who, after meeting and conferring with him at Cadi
about the business, started to visit Prusias, to whom on meet-
ing him they explained the orders of the Senate in terms of
serious warning. Prusias at once yielded to some of the
injunctions, but refused to submit to the greater part. The
Romans grew angry, renounced his friendship
and alliance, and one and all started to return X^l^i TJi^ w^
' . , ^ , yield till too late.
to Attains. Thereupon Prusias repented ; fol-
lowed them a certain distance with vehement entreaties ; but,
failing to gain any concession, left them in a state of great
doubt and embarrassment The Romans, on their return to
Attains, bade him station himself with his army xhe Romans
on his own frontier, and not to begin the war promote a com-
himself, but to provide for the security of the i^»nation against
towns and villages in his territory : while they
divided themselves, one party sailing home with all speed to
announce to the Senate the disobedience of Prusias ; another
476 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS book
departing for Ionia; and a third to the Hellespont and the
ports about Byzantium, all with one and the same purpose,
namely, to detach the inhabitants from friendship and alliance
with Prusias, and to persuade them to adhere to Attains and
assist him to the best of their power. . . .
18. At the same time Athenaeus set sail with eighty
Summer of B.C. decked ships, of which five were quadriremes
154. Attaiuss sent by the Rhodians for the Cretan war, twenty
brother {xoxti Cyzicus, twenty-seven Attalus's own, and
harasses the ^^ ^est contributed by the other allies. Having
coast of Prusias's sailed to the Hellespont, and reached the cities
kmgdom. subject to Prusias, he made frequent descents
upon the coast, and greatly harassed the country. But when
the Senate heard the report of the commissioners who had
returned from Prusias, they immediately despatched three
new ones, Appius Claudius, Lucius Oppius, and Aulus Pos-
tumius : who, on arriving in Asia, put an end to the war by
bringing the two kings to make peace, on condition of Prusias
at once handing over to Attalus twenty decked ships, and
paying him five hundred talents in twenty years, both retaining
the territory which they had at the commencement of the
war. Farther, that Prusias should make good the damage
done to the inhabitants of Methymna, Aegae, Cymae, Her-
acleia, by a payment of a hundred talents to those towns.
The treaty having been drawn out in writing on those terms,
Attalus withdrew his army and navy to his own country. Such
are the particulars of the events which took place in the
quarrel between Attalus and Prusias. . . .
B.C. 153. ^*' ^^ embassy again coming to Rome from
Another fruitless Achaia in behalf of the detenus, the Senate
embassy from ^qx.^^ to make no change. . . .
Achaia.
Hcracieides ^5» Heracleides came to Rome in the
brings to Rome middle of summer, bringing Laodice and Alex-
i-aod^e. daughter j^j^^jgj.^ r^^^ Stayed there a long time, employing
Epiphanes. and ^ ^^^ arts of cunning and corruption to win
his supposed son the support of the Senate. . . .
Alexander Balas.
Astymedes of Rhodes being appointed ambassador and
xxxiii fVAJ^ BETIVEEN RHODES AND CRETE 477
navarch at the same time, came forward immediately and
addressed the Senate on the war with Crete. The quarrel of
The Senate listened with attention, and imme- Rhodes and
diately appointed Quintus at the head of a ^'^^®'
commission to put an end to the war. . . .
16. This year the Cretans sent Antiphatas, son of Telam-
nestus of Gortyn, with envoys to the Achaeans ask- 'j^^ Achaeans
ing for help, and the Rhodians sent Theophanes decline to help
with a similar mission. The Congress of the either^Rhodes or
Achaeans was that year at Corinth : and on each '
body of ambassadors pleading their respective causes, the
assembled people were more inclined towards although inclined
the Rhodians, from respect to the reputation of to support
their state, and the general character of their Rhodes.
policy and statesmen. When Antiphatas saw this, he wished
to come forward to make another speech ; and, having obtained
permission from the Strategus to do so, he spoke in weightier
and more exalted terms than might be expected from a Cretan ;
for, in fact, the young man was in no way of the ordinary
Cretan type, but had shunned the characteristic principles of
his countrymen. Accordingly the Achaeans received his plain
speaking with favour ; and still more for the sake of his father
Telamnestus, who had taken a spirited part with them at the
head of five hundred Cretans in their war against Nabis.
However, none the less for that, after listening to him they
were still inclined to aid the Rhodians, until Callicrates
of Leontium stood up and said that they ought not to go to
war in favour of either, or to send aid to either of the two
peoples without the consent of the Romans. This argument
decided them in favour of non-intervention. . . .
17. Dispirited with the course things were taking, the
Rhodians entered upon some measures and designs which were
strange and unreasonable. In fact, they were much in the
same state as men suffering from chronic diseases. It
frequently happens that such men, when, in spite of following
all the rules of medicine and obeying the prescriptions of the
doctors, they are unable to make any advance towards improve-
ment, give up all such efforts in despair, and either listen
wholly to priests and seers, or try every sort of charm or
478 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS book
amulet. So it was with the Rhodians. When their hopes
were baffled in every direction, they were reduced to listen to
every kind of suggestion, and to magnify and accept every
kind of chance. Nor was this unnatural. For when nothing
dictated by reason proves successful, and yet some action or
another must necessarily be pushed on, there is no alternative
but to try something which does not depend on reason. The
Rhodians, having come to this dilemma, acted accordingly ;
and, among other things that were in defiance of reason, re-
elected as their archon a man of whom they disapproved. . . .
18. Many different embassies having come to Rome,
B c I 2 Visit ^^^ Senate admitted Attains,^ son of king
of the young Eumenes I. For he had arrived at Rome at
Attaius, son of this time, still quite a young boy, to be intro-
the late king ^^^^ed to the Senate, and to renew in his
person the ancestral friendship and connexion
with the Romans. After a kindly reception by the Senate and
his father^s friends, and after receiving the answer which he
desired, and such honours as suited his time of life, he returned
to his native land, meeting with a warm and liberal reception
in all the Greek cities through which he passed on his return
journey. Demetrius also came at this time, and,
^Trtarathc^VL^ ^^^^ receiving a fairly good reception for a boy,
returned home.
Then Heracleides entered the Senate, bringing Laodice and
Laodice and Alexander with him. The youthful Alexander
Alexander Baias. first addressed the Senate, and begged the
Seech. 15. Romans "to remember their friendship and
alliance with his father Antiochus, and if possible to assist
him to recover his kingdom ; or if they could not do that, at
least to give him leave to return home, and not to hinder
those who wished to assist him in recovering his ancestral
crown." Heracleides then took up the word, and, after
delivering a lengthy encomium on Antiochus, came to the
same point, namely, that they ought in justice to grant the
young prince and Laodice leave to return and claim their own,
as they were the true-born children of Antiochus. Sober-
* Surnamed Philometor. He succeeded his uncle Attaius Philadelphus in
B.C. 138, and at his death in B.c. 133 left his dominions to Rome.
xxxiii ALEXANDER BALAS 479
minded people were not all attracted by any of these argu-
ments. They understood the meaning of this theatrical
exhibition, and made no secret of their distaste for Heracleides.
But the majority had fallen under the spell of Heracleides*s
cunning, and were induced to pass the following decree :
"Alexander and Laodice, children of a king. The Senate's
our friend and ally, appeared before the Senate decree in favour
and stated their case : and the Senate gave them ^^ Alexander and
authority to return to the kingdom of their fore-
fathers ; and help, in accordance with their request, is hereby
decreed to them." Seizing on this pretext, Heracleides imme-
diately began hiring mercenaries, and calling on some men of
high position to assist him. He accordingly went to Ephesus
and devoted himself to the preparations for his attempt.^ . . .
19, Demetrius, who, when residing as a hostage at Rome,
had fled and become king in Syria, was a man
so much addicted to drunkenness that he spent jn^ranperance.
the greater part of the day in drinking. ...
20. When once the multitude feel the impulse to violent
love or hatred of any one, any pretext is good enough for
indulging their feelings. . . .
However, I am afraid I may fall under the common
dilemma, " Which is the greater fool, the man who milks a
he-goat, or the man who holds a sieve to catch the milk ? "
For I seem to be doing something of this sort in arguing and
writing an essay on what every one acknowledges to be false.
It is, then, waste time to speak of such things, unless one cares
to write down dreams, or look at dreams with one's eyes
open.
I. . .
' Alexander Balas was an impostor of low origin set up by Heracleides as
a son of Antiochus Epiphanes. He entered Syria in B.C. 152, defeated and
killed Demetrius in B.C. 150, and was himself defeated in B.c. 146 by Ptolemy
Philometor (who also fell) in favour of a son of Demetrius, and was shortly
afterwards murdered. Livy, Ep, 52. Appian, Syr. 67 ; Joseph. Antiq. 13, 2, 4.
BOOK XXXIV
GEOGRAPHICAL FRAGMENTS
Poly bins devoted one book of his history to a separate treatise
on the geography of the continents, Strabo^ 9, i, i.
1. In their Greek histories Eudoxus gave a good, but Ephorus
the best, account of the foundations, blood connexions,
migrations, and founders of states; but I shall now give
some information on the position of countries and their dis-
tances, which are the subjects most properly belonging to the
science of Geography. . . .
2. It is not Homer's manner to indulge in mere mythological
Homer true to stories founded on no substratum of truth. For
nature. there is no surer way of giving an air of verisimili-
tude to fiction than to mix with it some particles of truth. And
this is the case with the tale of the wanderings of Odysseus
For instance, Aeolus, who taught the way of getting through
the straits, where there are currents setting both ways, and the
passage is rendered difficult by the indraught of the sea, came
to be called and regarded as the dispenser and king of the winds ;
just as Danaus, again, who discovered the storages of water in
Argos,and Atreus, who discovered the fact of the sun's revolution
being in the opposite direction to that of the heaven, were
called seers and priest-kings. So the priests of the Egyptians,
the Chaldeans, and the Magi, being superior to the rest of the
world in wisdom, obtained rule and honour in former genera-
tions. And on this principle, too, each one of the gods is
honoured as the inventor of something useful to man. I do
not allow therefore that Aeolus is wholly mythical, nor the
wanderings of Odysseus generally. Some mythical elements
have been undoubtedly added, as they have in the War 01
BOOK XXXIV FISHING NEAR SCYLLA 481
Ilium; but the general account of Sicily given by the poet
agrees with that of other historians who' have given topo-
graphical details of Italy and Sicily. I cannot agree therefore
with the remark of Eratosthenes that ''we shall discover
where Odysseus wandered, when we find the cobbler who
sewed up the leather bag of the winds." See for instance how
Homer's description of Scylla agrees with what really happens
at the Scyllaean rock, and the taking of the sword fish : ^
" And there she fishes, roaming round the rock,
For dog-fish and for dolphins, or what else
Of huger she may take that swims the sea."
For the fact is that tunnies swimming in great shoals along the
Italian coast, if they are drifted from their course and are pre-
vented from reaching Sicily, fall a prey to the larger fish, such
as dolphins, dog-fish, or other marine monsters ; and from
hunting these the sword-fish (called also xiphiae, or sometimes
sea-dogs) are fattened. The same thing happens at a rise of
the Nile, and other rivers, as in the case of a fire or a burning
forest ; the animals crowd together, and, in their effort to escape
the fire or the water, fall a prey to stronger animals.
8. Fishing for sword-fish at the Scyllaean rock is carried on
in this way. A number of men lie in wait, two
each in small two-oared boats, and one man is I^J^^ck'^
11 /. 1 11 » 1 1 sword-fish.
set to look out for them all In the boat one
man rows, while the other stands on the prow holding a spear.
When the look-out man signals the appearance of a sword-fish
(for the animal swims with one-third of its body above water),
the boat rows up to it, and the man with the spear strikes it at
close quarters, and then pulls the spear-shaft away leaving the
harpoon in the fish's body ; for it is barbed and loosely fastened
to the shaft on purpose, and has a long rope attached to it.
They then slacken the rope for the wounded fish, until it is
wearied out with its convulsive struggles and attempts to
escape, and then they haul it on to land, or, if its size is not too
great, into the boat And if the spearshaft falls into the sea it
is not lost ; for being made of two pieces, one oak and the
other pine, the oak end as the heavier dips under water, the
* Odyss. 12, 95.
VOL. U 2 I
482 THE HISTORIES OF-POLYBIUS book
Other end rises above it and is easily got hold of. But some-
times it happens that the man rowing is wounded, right through
the boat, by the immense size of the animal's sword ; for it
charges like a boar, and hunting the one is very like hunting
the other.
This would lead us to conjecture that the wandering
described by Homer was near Sicily, because he has assigned
to Scylla the kind of fishing which is indigenous to the
Scyllaean rock; and because what he says of Charybdis
correctly describes what does happen in the Straits. But the
** Thrice sends she up the darksome tide,"
Island of Meninx.instead of twice "a day," is an error to be
off the lesser ascribed to the copyist or the geographer.^ So
Syrtis. Seei,39. j^igQ Meninx answers to his description of the
Lotophagi.
4. Or if there are some points which do not answer, we
must lay the blame on ignorance or poetic licence, which uses
real history, picturesque detaD, and mythological allusion. The
object of history is truth, as when in the catalogue of ships the
poet describes the features of the several localities, calling one
city " rocky," another " frontier-placed," another " with wealth
of doves," or " hard by the sea." But the object of picturesque
detail is vividness, as when he introduces men fighting ; and
that of mythological allusion is to give pleasure or rouse wonder.
But a narrative wholly fictitious creates no illusion and is not
Homeric. For all look upon his poetry as a philosophical
work ; and Eratosthenes is wrong in bidding us not judge his
poems with a view to having any serious meaning, or to seek
for history in them.
It is better, again, to take the line ^
** Thence for nine days the foul winds drave us on,"
to mean that he made but a short distance — for foul winds do
not favour a straight course — than to imagine him to have got
into the open ocean as running before favouring winds. The
distance from Malea to the Pillars is twenty-two thousand five
hundred stades. If we suppose this to have been accomplished
^ Odyss, 12, 105. * Odyss. 9, 8a,
XXXIV PYTHEAS 483
at an even speed in the nine days, he would make two
thousand five hundred stades a day. Now, who has ever
asserted that any one made the voyage from Lycia or Rhodes
to Alexandria in four days, a distance of four thousand
stades ?
To those who ask how it was that Odysseus, though he
came to Sicily three times, never once went through the straits,
I answer that all subsequent sailors avoided that passage
also. . . .
6. In treating of the geography of Europe I shall say
nothing of the ancient geographers, but shall confine my
attention to their modern critics, Dicaearchus, Eratosthenes,
who is the most recent writer on geography, and Pytheas, who
has misled many readers by professing to have traversed on
foot the whole of Britain, the coastline of which island, he
says, is more than forty thousand stades. And again by his
stories of Thule and the countries in its neighbourhood, "in
which," he says, " there is neither unmixed land or sea or air,
but a kind of compound of all three (like the jelly-fish or Pulmo
Marinus), in which earth and sea and everything else are held
in suspense, and which forms a kind of connecting link to the
whole, through which one can neither walk nor sail." This
substance, which he says is like the Pulmo Marinus, he saw
with his own eyes, the rest he learnt by report. Such
is Pytheas's story, and he adds that, on his return thence,
he traversed the whole of the coast of Europe ^ .. . .. T^
- -, , 1 r^ • ^ Cadiz to the Don.
from Gades to the Tanais. But we cannot
believe that a private person, who was also a poor man, should
have made such immense journeys by land and sea. Even
Eratosthenes doubted this part of his story, though he believed
what he said about Britain, and Gades, and Iberia. I would
much rather believe the Messenian (Euhemerus) than him.
The latter is content with saying that he sailed to one country
which he calls Panchaia;^ while the former asserts that he has
actually seen the whole northern coast of Europe up to the
^ Panchaia or PanchSa, the fabulous island or country in the Red Sea or
Arabian gulf, in which Euhemerus asserted that he had discovered the inscrip-
tions which proved the reputed gods to have been famous generals or kings.
Plutarch, Is. et Osir. 23, Diodor. fr. 6, i. The Roman poets used the word
as equivalent to " Arabian." See Vcrg. Georg. a, 139.
484 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS book
very verge of the world, which one would hardly believe of
Hermes himself if he said it Eratosthenes calls Euhemerus
a Bergaean,^ yet believes Pytheas, though Dicaearchus himself
did not.^ . . . Eratosthenes and Dicaearchus give mere
popular guesses as to distances.
6. For instance, Dicaearchus says that the distance from
the Peloponnese to the Pillars is ten thousand stades
and still further to the head of the Adriatic ;« and from
the Peloponnesus to the Sicilian straits three thousand;
and therefore the remainder, from the Straits to the Pillars,
is seven thousand stades. I say nothing about the three
thousand stades, whether they are right or wrong; but
the seven thousand cannot be made out, whether you measure
along the coast or straight across the sea. The coast route is
a kind of obtuse angle, contained by two lines resting on the
straits and the pillars respectively ; so that we have a triangle,
of which the apex is Narbo, and the base the straight line
representing the course by the open sea ; of the two sides of
the triangle which contain the obtuse angle, that which extends
from the straits to Narbo is more than eleven thousand two
hundred stades, the other from Narbo to the Pillars is a little
under eight thousand. The longest distance from Europe to
Libya across the Tuscan sea is allowed to be not more than
three thousand stades, that by the Sardinian sea is some-
what less; but let us call it three thousand stades. Now
suppose a perpendicular let down through the gulf of Narbo
to the base of the triangle, that is to the straight sea-
course, measuring two thousand stades; it requires only a
schoolboy's geometry to prove that the coasting voyage is
longer than the direct sea voyage by nearly five hundred
stades.* And when the three thousand stades from the
^ That is " as great a liar as Antiphanes of Berga." See below. Strabo
classes Antiphanes with Pytheas and Euhemerus more than once (see 2, 3, 5).
Hence came the verb ficfiydl^eip, "to tell travellers' tales" (Steph. Byz.). But
there is considerable doubt as to the identification of the traveller Antiphanes,
some confounding him with a comic poet of the same name, and others with
the author of an essay ircpl h-aipwy, Berga was in the valley of the Strymon.
' Strabo here protests against Dicaearchus being treated as a standard of
geographical truth. For Pytheas see Appendix.
^ Polybius proves his point by the demonstration of the proposition ' ' The
-. — . — ■■»■
XXXIV
DISTANCES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN
485
Peloponnese to the straits are added, the whole number of
the stades even of the straight sea course will be more than
double Dicaearchus's reckoning. And if we measure to the
head of the Adriatic we must add still more by his own
admission ; that is to say, from the Peloponnese to Leucas is
seven hundred stades, from Leucas to Corcyra seven hundred,
from Corcyra to Ceraunia seven hundred, and from Ceraunia
along the Illyrian coast six thousand one hundred and fifty. ^
In talking such nonsense he might well be regarded as
having gone beyond even Antiphanes of Berga, and, in fact,
to have left no folly for his successors to commit. . . .
7. From Ithaca to Corcyra is more than nine hundred
stades; from Epidamnus to Thessalonica more than two
thousand. From Marseilles to the Pillars is more than nine
thousand ; from the Pyrenees, rather less than eight thousand.
. . . The Pagus from source to mouth is eight thousand,
not following its windings, but taking a direct line. . . .
Eratosthenes is quite ignorant of the geography of Iberia,
and sometimes makes statements about it entirely con-
tradictory. He says, for instance, that its western coast as
far as Gades is inhabited by Gauls, since the whole western
side of Europe, as far south as Gades, is occupied by that
square of the hypotenuse of a right-anglcd-triangle is equal to the squares of the
sides containing the right angle. "
BNarbo
Pillars.
Straits.
By applying this principle AD =7745. 9 . . and 00=11019.9 . ., and the
whole AC =18765.8 ; whereas AB + BC («>. the coasting voyage) = 19200
stades (a difference of 434.2 stades, not 500). Add to this the 3000 from the
Peloponnese to the Straits, the total coast voyage is 23,200 stades, as against
Dicaearchus's 10.000.
* Strabo quotes this reckoning of the distance from the Peloponnese to the
head of the Adriatic to prove that Polybius, on his own showing, is wrong in
admitting that this distance (8250 stades) is greater than that from the Pelo-
ponnese to the Pillars, which Dicaearchus said was 10,000 stades, and which
Polybius showed to be 18,765 stades by the shortest route.
486 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS book
people : and then, quite forgetting he has said this, when
taking a survey of the whole of Spain, he nowhere mentions
the Gauls. . . . The length of Europe is less than that of
Libya and Asia put together by the distance between the sun-
rise in summer and at the point of the equinox ; for the source of
the Tanais is at the former, and the Pillars are at the western
equinox, and between them lies Europe, while Asia occupies
the northern semicircle between the Tanais and equinoctial
sunrise. . . .
Southern Europe is divided into five peninsulas — Iberia;
Polybiuss fivefold Italy ; a third ending in the Capes Malea and
division of the Sunium, in which are included Greece and
s^*!!r^o^^^^^y"^ ^"^ ^ P^ °^ Thrace; a fourth called
^to^he^threefoid ^he Thracian Chersonese, bounded by the
dixision of Era- strait between Sestos and Abydos ; and a fifth
tosihenes. along the Cimmerian Bosphorus and the en-
trance to the Maeotis. . . .
8. In the sea off Lusitania acorn-bearing oaks grow, upon
which the tunnies feed and fatten themselves, which may, there-
fore, well be called sea-hogs, as they feed like hogs on acorns. . . .
These acorns are sometimes carried by the tide as far as
the coast of Latium, unless they may be thought to be the
produce of Sardinia or neighbouring islands. . . .
In Lusitania both animals and man are extraordinarily
productive, owing to the excellent temperature of the air ; the
fruits never wither ; there is not more than three months in
the year in which roses, white violets (or gilly-fiowers), and
asparagus do not grow; while the fish caught in its sea is
far superior to what is found in our waters for quantity, quality,
and beauty. There, too, a Sicilian medimnus of barley is
sold for a drachma, and one of wheat for nine Alexandrine
obols. A metreta of wine costs a drachma, and a good kid
or hare an obol, and a lamb from three to four obols ; a fat
pig weighing a hundred minae costs five drachmae, and a
sheep two. A talent of figs is sold for three obols, a calf
for five drachmae, a draught -ox for ten. The flesh of wild
animals is not thought worth fixing a price upon at all, but the
people give it to each other for nothing and as a present.^ . . .
* To enable the reader to follow this list of prices, a short table is here sub-
XXXI V PORTUGAL AND SPAIN 487
9. The Turduli live on the immediate north Tribes in Boetica.
of the Turdetani. . . .
The fertility of their country has had a civilising influence
on the Turditani and on their Celtic kinsfolk, and taught
them the art of social life. . . .
The Pillars are at either side of the straits. . . .
There is a fountain in the Heracleum at Gades, the water
of which is sweet and is reached by steps.
This fountain has a tide which rises and falls ^ ^^^l^^ ^^
exactly in the reverse order of the sea tide.
When it is high tide at sea it is low tide in the fountain, and
high in the fountain when it is low at sea. The explanation
of this is that the wind, which rises from the bowels of the
earth to the surface, is prevented from finding its natural
egress when the earth is covered with water at the rise of the
tide, and being thus turned back into the interior of the earth,
it stops up the underground channels of the fountain and
produces a deficiency of water ; but when the earth is again
uncovered, the wind having once more found an easy egress,
sets the veins of the fountain free again, and the water spurts
up freely. . . .
There are very large silver mines about twenty stades
from New Carthage, extending to a circuit of The process of
four hundred stades, in which forty thousand producing silver
men are continually employed, who produce ^" ^® "?'"^ ^^^
for the benefit of the Roman people twenty- ^^ ^ '
five thousand drachmae a day. It would take too long to
describe the whole process of working them, but I may men-
tion that the alluvial soil containing the silver ore is first
broken up, and sifted in sieves held in w^ater ; that then the
deposit is again broken, and being again filtered with running
joined of Greek weights and money, — though he must be warned that values
varied at different times and pUices, — with approximate values in English
weights and money.
I obol = j\j oz. = I shilling.
6 obols = I drachma = VV o^« • • • 9^'
IOC drachmae = x mina =15^02. . . ;^3:i8:6.
60 minae = i talent = 57 lbs. . . . L'^Zh-
A medimnus =11 gals. 4 pts. (dry measure).
A metreta = 8 gals. 5 pU. (liquid measimi).
488 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS book
water, is broken a third time. This is done five times ; the
fifth deposit is smelted, and, the lead having been run off,
pure silver remains. . . .
The Guadiana '^^^ ^nas and Boetis both flow from Celti-
and Guadai- beria, their streams being about nine hundred
quivir. stades apart . . .
Among other cities of the Vaccaei and Celtiberians are
Segesama and Intercatia. . . .
One of the Iberian kings had such a magnificent and
richly furnished palace, that he rivalled the
^^^\^^"' luxury of the Phaeacians, except that the vessels
standing in the interior of the house, though
made of gold and silver, were full of barley-wine. . . .
10. From the Pyrenees to the river Narbo the country is
River Aude. ^^^ i *^^ through it flow the Illeberis and Rus-
The Tech and cinus, past some cities of the same name in-
the Ruscino or habited by Celts. In this plain there are found
what are called underground fish. The soil is
light, and produces a quantity of grass called agrosHs\ and below
this soil the earth is sandy for a depth of two or three cubits,
through which the overflow of the river percolates ; and with
this water, as it makes its way, the fish also get below the soil
to feed, for they are exceedingly fond of the root of the
agrostis^ and have thus made the whole plain full of sub-
A mistake of terranean fish, which people dig up and
Timaeus as to take. . . .
the Rhone. 'pj^g Rhone has not five, but two mouths
The Liger discharges itself between the Pictones and Nam-
The Loire be- ^itae. There was in ancient times an emporium
twcen Poitou and on this river called Corbilo, but none of its in-
Nantes. Coiron. habitants, nor those of Massalia or Narbo, could
give Scipio ^ any information worth mentioning on the subject
Britain is quite ^^ Britain when questioned by him, though
unknown to the they were the most important cities in that part
southern Gauls, q^ ^he country ; and yet Pytheas has ventured
on all those stories about it. . . .
* WTiich member of the Cornelian gens this was is unknown. He appears
to have been at Marseilles in the 4th century B.C. inquiring as to centres of
trade open to Rome in rivalry with Carthage.
XXXIV THE ALPS 489
An animal is produced on the Alps of a peculiar form ; its
shape is that of a stag except its neck and coat, ,p, „„
which resemble that of a he-goat. Beneath its
chin it has an excrescence about a span long, hairy at the end,
about as thick as a colt's tail. . . .
Near Aquileia, in the territory of the Noric Taurisci, in my
own time a gold mine was discovered, so easy to
work, that by scraping away the surface soil for ^ ^AqiSdl''^
two feet, gold could be found immediately. The
seam of gold was not more than fifteen feet ; some of it was
found unmixed with alloy in nuggets of the size of a bean or
lupine, only an eig&th of it disappearing in the furnace ; and
some wanted more elaborate smelting, but would still pay
thoroughly welL Accordingly, on the Italians joining the
barbarians in working this mine, in two months the price of
gold went down a third throughout Italy : and when the
Taurisci found out that, they expelled their Italian fellow-
workers and kept the monopoly themselves. . . .
If we compare the mountains in Greece — Taygetus,
Lycaeus, Parnassus, Olympus, Pelion, Ossa, and those in
Thrace — Haemus, Rhodope, Dunax, with the Alps, we
may state the case thus. Each one of the former may be
ascended or skirted by an active traveller in a single day ; but
no one could ascend the Alps even in five days, the distance
from the plain being two thousand two hundred r^^^ ^^^
stades. There are but four passes, one through of the Alps,— the
Liguria, nearest the T)nThenian Sea ; the next Cornice, Argen-
through the Taurini, which was the one used ^fl^ Genivre(yai
. ^x L 1 t I- J . 1 .1 ^ T • d Aosta), Cenis.
by Hannibal; the third through the Salassi;
and the last by the Rhaeti,^ all of them excessively precipitous.
There are several lakes in the mountains, three
of great size, the Benacus, five hundred by one l^|° ^| coma
hundred and thirty stades, out of which the
Mincius flows; the Larius, four hundred stades long, and
somewhat narrower than the Benacus, discharging the Addua ;
and thirdly, the Verbanus, about three hundred -^ . .
stades by thirty, from which comes a con-
* Varro [Serv, ad y£n, 10, 13) adds a fifth by the Graian Alps, i.g. Little
St. Bernard.
»> inc.
I
The length of
straits is tlircc thousand stadcs
the Sic i Han sea. Sailing, howc
five hundred stades. . . .
The largest distance of the Et
Ostia, a distance of one thousan
stades.^. . .
The island Lemnos is called A>
The bay between the two pro
Minerva is called
■^"aST' Above this coast lit
the most fertile plaii
the Bowl live the Opici and the Aui
Eastern coast. '^^^ north road
road from s. to marked out with mil
N. of Italy. jQ Sena, and one hui
to Aquileia. . . .
Then comes Lacinium . . . fron
is a distance of one
stades, and thence to
The Lacinian
promontory.
seven hundred . . .
Of the three craters one has pan
_. .... remain perfect. Tl
The craters m the .^ f,
volcanic Holy onfice With a circumi
Island one of the it gradual ^^ o^-*
Lipari sroitr*
XXXIV THE VIA EGNATIA 491
difference in the sound of the rumbling, and by observing from
what point the eruptions and flames and smoke begin, the
wind which is to blow on the third day from that time can be
foretold At least, some men in the Lipari Islands when
weather-bound have foretold what wind, was coming and have
not been deceived. Therefore, it appears that Homer did not
speak without meaning, but was stating a truth allegorically
when he called Aeolus ^ *' steward of the winds." . . .
12. The road from ApoUonia to Macedonia is called the
Via Egnaiia, which has been measiired in miles
and marked out with milestones as far as ® *^ ^
Cypselus and the River Hebrus, a distance of five hundred
and thirty- five miles. Reckoning eight and one- third stades
to a mile, the number of stades will be four thousand
four hundred and fifty -eight^ The distance is exactly
the same whether you start from Apollonia or Epidamnus.
The whole road is called the Egnatia, but its first part
has got a name from Candavia, a mountain of lUyria, and
leads through the town of Lycnidus, and through Pylon,
which is the point on the road where lUyria and Macedonia
join. Thence it leads over Mount Bamus, ,-^ . .
through Heracleia, Lyncestia, and Eordea, to half-way to the
Edessa and Pella, and finally to Thessalonica ; Hebrus from
and the number of miles is altogether two Apoiioma.
hundred and sixty-seven. . . . And the whole distance from
the Ionian Gulf at Apollonia to Byzantium is seven thousand
^vt hundred stades. . . .
The circumference of the Peloponnesus, if
you do not follow the indentations, is four ^n^iST-"
thousand stades. . . .
The distance from Cape Malea to the Ister Fro"^ c. Maiea
is ten thousand stades.^ ... '"""^^ ^^^^-
•
^ The islands were called also Vulcaniae and Aeoliae,
' Strabo reckons 8 stades to a mile, thus making the number of stades
4280. The exact calculation by Polybius's reckoning is 4458^ stades. The
miles are Roman miles of 5000 feet ; therefore, by Strabo* s calculation, the
stade is 625 feet, by Polybius's 600 feet.
' Strabo, however, supports the measurement of Artemidorus — 6500, ex-
plaining that Polybius is taking some practical measurement of a voyage, not
the shortest.
492 THE HISTORIES OF POL YB I US book xxxiv
18. On matters concerning the country between the
Euphrates and India, Eratosthenes is a better authority than
Artemidorus. ...
14. A personal visit to Alexandria filled me with disgust
at the state of the city. It is inhabited by three
Alexandria, distinct races, — native Egyptians, an acute and
civilised race ; secondly, mercenary soldiers (for
the custom of hiring and supporting men-at-arms is an ancient
one), who have learnt to rule rather than obey owing to the
feeble character of the kings ; and a third class, consisting of
native Alexandrians, who have never from the same cause
become properly accustomed to civil life, but who are yet
better than the second class; for though they are now a
mongrel race, yet they were originally Greek, and have retained
some recollection of Greek principles. But this last class has
become almost extinct, thanks to Euergetes Physcon, in whose
reign I visited Alexandria ; for that king being troubled with
seditions, frequently exposed the common people to the fury
of the soldiery and caused their destruction. So that in this
state of the city the poet's words only expressed the truth — '^
**To Egypt *tis a long and toilsome road."
* Homer, Odyss. 4, 485.
BOOK XXXV
Spain, the eastern and southern parts of which were, since the 2d Punic
war, governed by the Romans under a kind of military occupation without
being reduced to the form of regular provinces, was always in a disturbed
state, partly from sudden uprisings of various tribes against the Roman
authority, and partly from numerous bodies of banditti, who seized strong-
holds or fortified towns and carried on their depredations from these
centres. Hence it had been the policy of the Roman praetors and consuls
to insist on the demolition of fortresses and city walls, as we learn from
the accounts of Cato in B.C. 195 and others. In B.C. 177 Tiberius
■ Sempronius Gracchus had inflicted a severe defeat upon the Celtiberians, and
had made a settlement of the country, which for a few years produced
comparative quiet and content. But in B.C. 154 an outbreak of the
Lusitani led to a considerable disaster to the Roman army under Lucius
Mummius ; and when the consul Q. Fulvius Nobilior arrived in B.C. 1 53, be
found that the war had accordingly spread to the Celtiberian tribes, the
Belli and Titthi, who attempted to build the walls of Segeda. On
Nobilior ordering them to desist, in accordance with Gracchan settlement,
most of them obeyed after some resistance, but some of them fled to the
Arevacae (near the sources of the Douro and Tagus) ; and this powerful
tribe, after defeating the Roman army, entrenched themselves in Numantia,
under the walls of which Nobilior sustained further losses. He was super>
seded in B.C. 152 by Marcus Claudius Marcellus, who, partly by strategy,
and partly by administrative skill and conciliation, restored the Roman
fortunes to a better position. The Belli and Titthi became allies of
Rome, and the Arevacae at least thought it worth while to ask for a truce
to enable them to send envoys to Rome to arrange peace. — Appian,
Hispan. 44-50.
1. The war between the Romans and Celtiberians was
called the " fiery war ; " for it was of a pecu-
liarly fierce kind and remarkable for the fre- ?;5- *53->5\-
• Tiie war with
quency of its battles. The wars m Greece and t^g ccitiberian
Asia were as a rule settled by one battle, or in Arevacae con-
rare cases by two ; and the battles themselves p^i"^*^J^$*
were decided by the result of the first charge and M. Claudius
and shock of the two armies. But in this war Marcellus.
494 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS book
things were quite different As a rule the battles were
only stopped by the fall of night ; the men neither lost heart
nor would yield to bodily fatigue; but returned again and
again with fresh resolution to renew the combat The whole
war, and its series of pitched battles, was at length interrupted
for a time by the winter. One therefore could hardly con-
ceive a war more nearly answering to our notion of a " fiery
war " than this. . . .
2. The Celtiberians, after making a truce with the consul
. M. Claudius Marcellus, had sent ambassa-
Marceiius winters ^ors to Rome who remained there quietly
at Cordova, waiting for the answer of the Senate. Mean-
B.C 152-151. while M. Claudius went on an expedition
against the Lusitani, took Nercobrica by assault, and then
went into winter quarters at Corduba. Of the ambassadors
who came to Rome the Senate admitted those
of Rome, to enter the city ; but ordered those
from the Arevacae to lodge on the other side of the Tiber, as
being at war with Rome, until such time as the Senate should
have decided the whole question. When the time for the
interview was come,^ the praetor introduced the envoys from
their allies first Barbarians as they were, they
BeiiTand Tiithi ^^^^ ^ ^et speech, and endeavoured to explain
clearly the causes of all the dissension prevail-
ing in their country: pointing out that " Unless those who had
broken out into war were reduced to tranquillity and punished
as they deser\'ed, the very moment the Roman legions left
Iberia, they would inflict punishment upon the Belli and
Titthi as traitors ; and that if they escaped unpunished for their
first act of hostility, they would make all the tribes in Iberia
ripe for an outbreak from the belief that they were capable of
coping with Rome. They begged, therefore, that the legions
should remain in Iberia, and that each year a consul should
come thither 2 to protect the allies of Rome and punish the
* Probably in February, the month usually devoted by the Senate to lega-
Hones.
^ Since B.C. 195 up to B.C. 154 the two divisions of Spain had been en-
trusted to Praetors.
XXXV THE CELTIBERIAN WARS 495
depredations of the Arevacae ; or, if they wished to withdraw
the legions, they should first take signal vengeance for the out-
break of this tribe, that no one might venture to do the like
again." Such, or to this effect, was the speech of the envoys
of the Belli and Titthi who were in alliance with Rome. The
envoys of the hostile tribe were then introduced On coming
forward the Arevacae assumed a feigned tone ^^^ Arevacae
of submission and humility in the language of
their answer, without being, as was evident, at all yielding in their
hearts or acknowledging themselves beaten. On the contrary,
they continually hinted at the uncertainty of fortune; and
speaking of the battles that had taken place as undecided, they
conveyed the impression that they had had the best of the
contest in them all. The upshot of their speech was this :
" If they must submit to some definite mulct for , , .
- . •' , , , . , demand the
their error, they were ready to do so : but, when settlement of
that was completed, they demanded that things Tiberius
should revert to the position fixed by their Gracdius.
treaty made with the Senate in the time of
Tiberius Gracchus."
8. The Senators having thus heard both sides called
in the legates from Marcellus ; and when xhe Senate refer
they saw that they also were inclined to a both the deputa-
pacification, and that Marcellus was more ^^^'^^ *° ^^^^"*'
inclined to favour the enemy than the allied tribes, they
answered the Arevacae that Marcellus would declare in Iberia
to both parties the decision of the Senate. However, they
were convinced in their own minds that their true interests
were such as the envoys of the allied tribes suggested, and
that .the Arevacae were still inclined to haughty independ-
ence, and that their own commander was afraid of them :
they therefore gave secret instructions to the . , .
. but secretly de-
legates of Marcellus to carry on the war with termine to go on
spirit, and as the honour of the country de- with the war and
manded. But when they had thus determined to supersede
ivlarccllus
on a continuance of the war, feeling no con-
fidence in Marcellus, they determined first of all to send a
commander to relieve him in Iberia, as the g ^ 151.
new consuls Aulus Postumius and Lucius Coss. Lucius
496 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS book
Licinius Lucuiius, Licinius Lucullus had just taken up their
Auius Postumius ^^^ jj^ ^j^^j^ entered with spirit and
Vigour on then: preparations, because they
believed that the Iberian question would be decided by the
result of this campaign : if these enemies were beaten, they
assumed that all others would accept the orders of Rome;
but that, if the Ar^vacae proved able to ward off the punish-
ment that threatened them, not only would their spirits be
again raised, but those of all the other Iberian tribes besides.
4. The more determined however the Senate was to carry on
the war, the greater became their embarrassment.
Rome made men Nobilior, the commander in Iberia in the pre-
use every pretext vious year (b.c. 1 5 3), and those who had served
i^l^rihiTfr^"" under him, of the perpetual recurrence of the
vice m the army. . , , , , , . .. , i- ,1 ^
pitched battles, the number of the fallen, and
the valour of the Celtiberians, combined with the notorious
fact that Marcellus shrank in terror from the war, caused such
a panic in the minds of the new levies as the old men declared
had never happened before. To such an extent did the panic
go, that sufficient men were not found to come forward for the
office of military tribune, and these posts were consequently
not entirely filled up; whereas heretofore a larger number
than were wanted had been wont to volunteer for the duty :
nor would the men nominated by the Consuls as Ugati to
accompany the commanders consent to serve ; and, worst of
all, the young men tried to avoid the levies, and put forward
such excuses as were disgraceful for them to allege, and
beneath the investigation of the Consuls, and yet impossible
to refute. But at length, in this embarrassment of the Senate
and magistrates, when they were wondering what was to be
Scipio volunteers the end of this shameless conduct of the young
to act as legatus men, for they could call it nothing else, Publius
or tribune. Cornelius Scipio Africanus, who, though still a
young man, had been one of those to advise the war, and
who, though he had already acquired a reputation for high
principle and pure morality, had not been known for his
personal courage, seeing the Senate was in a difficulty, stood
up and bade them send him to Iberia, either as military
XXXV SCIPIO VOLUNTEERS FOR SPAIN 497
tribune or legatus, for he was ready to serve in either capacity.
" Though, as far as I am concerned," he said, " my mission
to Macedonia would be safer and more appropriate " — for it
happened that at that time Scipio was personally and by name in-
vited by the Macedonians to come and settle the disputes which
were raging among them — " yet the needs of my own country
are the more pressing of the two, and imperatively summon
to Iberia all who have a genuine love of honour." This offer
was unexpected by all, both from the youth of xhis offer shames
Scipio and his general character for caution, others into doing
and consequently he became exceedingly popu- *^® ^^"*®-
lar on the spot, and still more so on subsequent days. For
those who had before shrunk from the danger of the service,
now, from dislike of the sorry figure they made in comparison
with him, began volunteering to serve. Some offered to go as
Ugati to the generals, and others in groups and clubs entered
their names on the muster rolls. . . .
Lucius Lucinius Lucullus, consul for b.c. 151, is sent to
Spain, Scipio Aemilianus acting as his legatus, Tluy found that
the Arevacae had already submitted to Marcellus ; but being in
want of money Lucullus was determined not to be deprived of a
campaign. He therefore attacked the next tribe, the Vaccaei,
who lived on the other side of the Tagus, nominally on the pre-
text of their having injured the Carpetani, The war which
followed was marked by signal acts of cruelty and treachery on
the part of Lucullus, as on that of the praetor Sennus Sulpicius
Galba among the Lusitani. Appian, Hisp. 49-55.
5. In Scipio's mind there rose a contest of feelings, and
a hesitation as to whether he ought to meet incidents in
the barbarian and fight him in single com- Scipio's Spanish
bat.^ . campaign.
Scipio's horse was much distressed by the blow, but
did not come down entirely, and accordingly Scipio managed
to light on his feet . . .
6. Cato was consulted by Scipio, at the request of Polybius,
on behalf of the Achaeans; and when the debate in the
Senate, between the party who wished to grant it and the
* Livy, Ep. 48. PravoccUorem barbarum tribunus militutn occidit.
VOL. II 2 K
498
THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS
BOOK XXXY
party that opposed it, was protracted to a considerable length,
Restoration of the Cato stood up and Said : " As though we had
Achaean detenus, nothing else to do, we Sit here the whole day
B.C. 151. debating whether some old Greek dotards should
be buried by Italian or Achaean undertakers ! " Their resto-
ration being voted, Polybius and his friends, after a few days'
interval, were for appearing before the Senate again, with a
petition that the exiles should enjoy the same honours in
Achaia as they had before. Cato, however, remarked with a
smile that Polybius, like another Odysseus, wanted to go a
second time into the cave of the Cyclops, because he had
forgotten his cap and belt . . .
BOOK XXXVI
THE THIRD PUNIC WAR
1. It may occur to some to ask why I have not given a
dramatic turn to my narrative, now that I have ,^ .
.. . . ^ , i_. . /. t_ • The dramatic re-
so Striking a theme and a subject of such im- presentation of
portance, by recording the actual speeches debates though
deUvered; a thing which the majority of ^°"^^°^^^* ** °°*
historians have done, by giving the appropriate
arguments used on either side. That I do not reject this
method altogether I have shown in several parts of my work,
in which I have recorded popular harangues and expositions
delivered by statesmen ; but that I am not inclined to employ
it on every occasion alike will now be made clear; for it
would not be easy to find a subject more remarkable than
this, nor material more ample for instituting a comparison of
such a character. Nor indeed could any form of composition
be more convenient to me. Still, as I do not think it becom-
ing in statesmen to be ready with argument and exposition on
every subject of debate without distinction, but rather to adapt
their speeches to the nature of the particular occasion, so neither
do I think it right for historians to practise their skill or
show off their ability upon their readers : they ought on the
contrary to devote their whole energies to discover and record
what was really and truly said, and even of such words only
those that are the most opportune and essential. . . .
2. This idea having been firmly fixed in the minds of all,
they looked out for a suitable opportunity and
a decent pretext to justify them in the eyes of '^^ Romans were
the world. For indeed the Romans ^^re '^J'^^l^^^}^^^
quite rightly very careful on this point. For war.
500 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS book
instance, the general impression that they were justified in
entering upon the war with Demetrius enhances the value of
their victories, and diminishes the risks incurred by their de-
feats ; but if the pretext for doing so is lame and
' poor the contrary effects are produced. Accord-
ingly, as they differed as to the sentiments of the outer world
on the subject, they were very nearly abandoning the war. . . .
The policy of Rome in Africa of constantly supporting Mas-
sanissa against Carthage was mentioned in 32, 2. Frequent
complaints came to Rome from the Numidian king^ and the
Carthaginians were said to be collecting an army contrary to
treaty. Commissioners were sent over in 154 B.C. on the advice
of CatOy 7vho were roughly treated at Carthage ; and when^ in
B.C. 151, Massanissa sent his son Gulussa with similar com-
plaints to Rofne, Cato urged immediate war. The Senate^ how-
ei'er^ again sent commissioners ^ among whom was Cato himself
to cxamitu into the matter. They reported that the Cartha-
ginians had an army and nervy. An ultimatum was therefore
sent, that the army and navy were to be broken up within the
year, or that the next consuls should bring the question of war
before the Senate (b.c. 150). Just at this crisis Utica^ in
enmity with Carthage, placed itself under the protection of
Rome, Livy, Ep. 48; Appian, Pun. 75.
8. When the Carthaginians had been some time deliberating
B.C. 149. ^^^ *^^y should meet the message from Rome
Utica puts itself they were reduced to a state of the utmost
under the pro- embarrassment by the people of Utica anticipatini;
tection of Rome. -i. • j • u ^4.- *.u i j ^iT
their design by putting themselves under the pro-
tection of Rome. This seemed their only hope of safety left :
and they imagined that such a step must win them favour at
Rome : for to submit to put themselves and their country
under control was a thing which they had never done even in
their darkest hour of danger and defeat, with the enemy at
their very walls. And now they had lost all the fruit of this
Carthaginian rcsolve by being anticipated by the people of
plenipotentiaries Utica ; for it would appear nothing novel or
at Rome. strange to the Romans if they only did the same
as that people. Accordingly, with a choice of two evils only
XXXVI IVAR WITH CARTHAGE RESOLVED UPON 501
left, to accept war with courage or to surrender their independ-
ence, after a long and anxious discussion held secretly in the
Senate-house, they appointed two ambassadors with plenary
powers, and instructed them, that, in view of the existing state
of things, they should do what seemed for the advantage of
their country. The names of these envoys were Cisco
Strytanus, Hamilcar, Misdes, Gillimas, and Mago. When
they reached Rome from Carthage, they found war already
decreed and the generals actually started with their forces.
Circumstances, therefore, no longer giving them any power of
deliberating, they offered an unconditional surrender.
4. I have spoken before about what this implies, but I
must in this place also briefly remind my readers ^hat is implied
of its import. Those who thus surrender them- by their surrender.
selves to the Roman authority, surrender all ^^ ^°' ^'^^'
territory and the cities in it, together with all men and women
in all such territory or cities, likewise rivers, harbours, temples,
and tombs, so that the Romans should become actual lords of
all these, and those who surrender should remain lords of
nothing whatever. On the Carthaginians making a surrender
to this eflect, they were summoned into the Senate-house and
the Praetor delivered the Senate's decision, which was to this
effect : " They had been well advised, and -Yh^ senate re-
therefore the Senate granted them freedom and gram their liberty
the enjoyment of their laws ; and moreover, all ^-^^ territory to
their territory and the possession of their other * ^ agimans.
property, public or private." The Carthaginian envoys were
much relieved when they heard this ; thinking that, where the
alternatives were both miserable, the Senate had treated
them well in conceding their most necessary and important
requirements. But presently the Praetor went but on condition
on to state that they would enjoy these con- ^^ pv»"S 300
cessions on condition of sending three hundred oteykig^crtain
hostages to Lilybaeum within thirty days, sons orders not yet
of members of the Hundred ^ or the Senate, and expressed,
obeying such commands as should be imposed on them by the
^ rwv ix ffvyKk-fyrov koX -nyj y€f>o\Hrlai, The same distinction occurs in
lo, 18, and seems to refer to the two bodies known as the Hundred and
the Gerusia. See Bosworth Smith's Carthage and the Carthaginians, p. 27.
va THE m STORIES OF POLYBiUS ■««
cocscls. Tnis dished thdr qfwfiftion for a tnne, because
they had no means of knowing vhat onias were to be ghren
them throogh the coosck; however, thej started at once,
bein^ anxiocs to report what had occmied to their coantrymen
wid) ail speed, ^^lien they armed in Cardiage and stated the
iacts, the citizens considered that the envoys had in aD respects
acted with pcx>per camion ; but they were greatly alarmed and
distressed bv the (act that in the answer no mention was made
of the city itself.
6. At this juncture they say that Mago Brettius delirered a
manly and statesmanlike speech. He said:
^P^'JI^*^ "The Carthaginians had two qf^rtunities of
taking counsel in regard to themselves and their
country, one of which they had let pass ; for in good truth it
was no use now to question what was goit^ to be en-
joined on them by the consuls, and why it was that the
Senate had made no mention of the city : they shotild have
done that when they made the surrender. Having once made
that, they must clearly make up their mind to the necessity of
submitting to every possible injunction, unless it should prove
to be something unbearably oppressive or beyond what they
could possibly expect If they would not do this, they must
now consider whether they preferred to stand an invasion and
all its possible consequences, or, in terror of the attack of the
enemy, accept without resistance every order they might impose
upon them." But as the imminence of war knd
Jnuo^!ily^um! f^^ uncertainty of the future made every one
inclined to submit to these injunctions, it
was decided to send the hostages to Lilybaeum. Three
hundred young men were forthwith selected and sent to Lily-
baeum amidst loud expressions of sorrow and tears, each of
them being escorted by his nearest friends and relations, the
whole scene being made especially moving by the lamentations
of the women. On landing at Lilybaeum the hostages were
at once handed over by the consuls to Quintus Fabius
Maximus, who had been appointed to the command in Sicily
at that time. By him they were safely conveyed to Rome and
confined in the dockyard of the six-benched ships.
6. I'hc hostages being thus disposed of, the consuls
XXXVI THE ROMAN ARMY IN AFRICA 503
brought their fleet to the citadel of Utica. When news of this
reached Carthage, the city was in the utmost ex- ^
citement and panic, not knowing what to expect Marcius Censori-
next However, it was decided to send envoys nus. M*. ManiUus,
to ask the consuls what they were to do, and to ^^^ *" Afnca.
state that they were all prepared to obey orders.
The envoys arrived at the Roman camp: the general's council was
summoned : and they delivered their commission. The senior
Consul thereupon, after complimenting them on xhey demand the
their policy and readiness to obey, bade them total disarming of
hand over all arms and missiles in their posses- ^^^^^^^fi:*'**^'^^*
sion without subterfuge or concealment The envoys answered
that they would carry out the directions, but begged the Consul
to consider what would happen if the Carthaginians surrendered
all their arms, and the Romans took them and sailed away from
the country. However, they gave them up. . . .
It was clearly shown that the resources of the city were
enormous, for they surrendered to the Romans more than
two hundred thousand stands of arms and two thousand
catapults. . . .
This was followed by a second injunction of the consuls that
the whole people of Carthage should remove to some other spot, to
be not less than ten miles from the sea, and there build a new
city, Livy, Ep. 49.
7. The people had no idea what the announce- Return of the
ment was going to be, but suspecting it from envoys with the
the expression of the envoys' countenances, they '^^ orders from
immediately burst into a storm of cries and
lamentations. . . .
Then all the Senators,^ uttering a cry of horror, re-
mained as though paralysed by the shock. But ,-^ , ,
, . • • 1 I J * The popular fury.
the report havmg quickly spread among the
people, the general indignation at once found expression.
Some made an attack on the envoys, as the guilty authors of
their misfortunes, while others wreaked their wrath upon all
Italians caught within the city, and others rushed to the town
gates. . . .
' The envoys first report to the Gerusia Appian, Pun, 91.
504 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS book xxxvi
The Carthaginians determine to resist, and the consuls, who
had not hurried tfumselves, because they believed that resistance
from an unarmed populace was impossible, found, when they
approcuhed Carthage, that it was prepared to offer a vigorous
resistance. The scene which followed the announcement of the
Consufs orders, and the incidents of the siege, are chiefly known
to us from Appian, Pun. 91 sq. Livy, Ep. 49. Scipio was
serving as military Tribune, b.c. 149-148; consul, B.C. 147.
„ ., ou 8. HamilcarPhameas^ was the general of the
HamilcarPhameas, ^ ^, . . • .v . e yr
the commander Carthaginians, a man m the very prime of life
of the Punic and of great physical strength. What is of the
cavainr. Appian. upmost importance too for service in the field,
he was an excellent and bold horseman. . . .
When he saw the advanced guard, Phameas, though not at
all deficient in courage, avoided coming to close quarters with
Scipio : and on one occasion when he had come near his
reserves, he got behind the cover of the brow of a hill and
halted there a considerable time. . . .
The Roman maniples fled to the top of a hill ; and when
all had given their opinions, Scipio said, " When men are con-
sulting what measures to take at first, their object should be to
avoid disaster rather than to inflict it" ^ . . .
Polybius's personal It ought not to excite surprise that I am
knowledge of more minute than usual in my account of Scipio
Scipio. ^jj^ ^^^ J gjyg 'y^ detail everything which he
said. . . .
When Marcius Porcius Cato heard in Rome of the glorious
achievements of Scipio he uttered a palinode to his criticisms
of him : " What have you heard ? He alone has the breath
of wisdom in him : the rest are but flitting phantoms." ^
^ Phameas was afterwards persuaded by Massanissa to join the Romans.
Livy, Ep. 50.
2 The incident referred to is narrated in Appian. Punica, 103. Scipio re-
lieved this body of men, who were beleaguered on the top of a hill, by a rapid
and bold movement of his cavalry.
' Odyssey, 20, 495. Cato had always been opposed to the Scipios, but Livy
seems to attribute his former criticisms of the yoimger Africanus to his general
habit of caustic disparagement {vir promptioris ad vituperandum linguae), and
we know that his elder son had married a daughter of Paulus, sister to the
younger Africanus.
BOOK XXXVII
1. There was a great deal of talk of all sorts in Greece, first
as to the Carthaginians when the Romans con- The various views
quered them, and subsequently as to the question hdd in Greece
of the pseudo-Philip. The opinions expressed in ^ *° ^^^ Roman
regard to the Carthaginians were widely divided, ^ ^^^'
and indicated entirely opposite views. Some commended the
Romans for their wise and statesmanlike policy in regard to
that kingdom. For the removal of a perpetual menace, and the
utter destruction of a city which had disputed the supremacy
with them, and could even then if it got an opportunity have
still been disputing it, — thus securing the supremacy for their
own country, — were the actions of sensible and far-sighted men.
Others contradicted this, and asserted that the Romans had no
such policy in view when they obtained their supremacy ; and
that they had gradually and insensibly become perverted to
the same ambition for power, which had once characterised
the Athenians and Lacedaemonians; and though they had
advanced more slowly than these last, that they would from
all appearances yet arrive at the same consummation. For
in old times they had only carried on war until their opponents
were beaten, and induced to acknowledge the obligation of
obedience and acceptance of their orders ; but that nowadays
they had given a foretaste of their policy by their conduct to
Perseus, in utterly destroying the Macedonian dynasty root and
branch, and had given the finishing stroke to that policy by the
course adopted in regard to the Carthaginians ; for though this
latter people had committed no act of irretrievable outrage,
they had taken measures of irretrievable severity against them,
in spite of their offering to accept any terms, and submitting to
any injunctions that might be placed upon them. Others
5o6 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS book
again said that the Romans were generally a truly civilised
people; and that they had this peculiarity, on which they
prided themselves, that they conducted their wars openly and
generously, not employing night surprises or ambuscades, but
scorning every advantage to be gained by stratagem and
deceit, and regarding open and face -to -face combats as
alone becoming to their character: but that in the present
instance their whole campaign against the Carthaginians had
been conducted by means of stratagem and deceit Little by
little, — by holding out inducements here, and practising con-
cealment there, — they had deprived them of all hopes of
assistance from their allies. This was a line of conduct more
appropriate by rights to the intriguing chicanery of a monarchy,
than to a republican and Roman policy, ^ain, there were
some who took the opposite line to these. They said that if
it were really true that, before the Carthaginians had made
the surrender, the Romans had behaved as alleged, holding
out inducements here, and making half revelations there, they
would be justly liable to such charges; but ifi on the con-
trary, it was only after the Carthaginians had themselves made
the surrender, — ackowledging the right of the Romans to take
what measures they chose concerning them, — that the latter in
the exercise of their undoubted right had imposed and enjoined
what they determined upon, then this action must cease to be
looked on as partaking of the nature of impiety or treachery.
And some denied that it was an impiety at all : for there
were three ways in which such a thing could be defined, none
of which applied to the conduct of the Romans. An impiety
was something done against the gods, or one's parents, or the
dead ; treachery was something done in violation of oaths or
written agreements ; an injustice something done in violation
of law and custom. But the Romans could not be charged on
any one of these counts : they had offended neither the gods,
their parents, nor the dead; nor had they broken oaths or
treaties, but on the contrary charged the Carthaginians
with breaking them. Nor again had they violated laws, cus-
toms, or their own good faith ; for having received a volun-
tary surrender, with the full power of doing what they pleased
in the event of the submitting party not obeying their injunc-
XXXVII VIEWS IN GREECE OF ROMAN POLICY 507
tions, they had, in view of that eventuality having arisen, ap-
plied force to them.
2. Such were the criticisms commonly made on the dealings
of the Romans with the Carthaginians, But as xhe pretended
to the Pseudo-Philip, the report at first appeared Philip, son of
quite beneath consideration. A Philip sud- P^^^us, b.c. 149.
denly appears in Macedonia, as though he had dropped from
the skies, in contempt of Macedonians and Romans alike,
without having the least reasonable pretext for his claim, as
eveiy one knew that the real Philip had died in Alba in Italy
two years after Perseus himself. But when, three or four
months afterwards, a report arrived that he had conquered the
Macedonians in a battle in the territory of the Odomanti
beyond the Strymon, some believed it, but the majority were
still incredulous. But presently, when news came that he had
conquered the Macedonians in a battle on this side of the
Strymon, and was master of all Macedonia ; and when letters
and envoys came from the Thessalians to the Achaeans
imploring help, as though the danger were now affecting
Thessaly, it seemed an astonishing and inexplicable event ; for
there was nothing to give it the air of probability, or to supply
a rational explanation of it.
Such was the view taken of these things in Greece. . . .
8. A despatch from Manius Manilius to the Achaeans
having reached the Peloponnese, saying that Poiybius sent for
they would oblige him by sending Poiybius of to negotiate with
Megalopohs with all speed to Lilybaeum, as Carthage,
he was wanted on account of certain public * ^^'
affairs, the Achaeans decided to send him in accordance with
the letter of the consul And as I felt bound to obey the
Romans, I put everything else aside, and sailed at the begin-
ning of summer. But when we arrived at Corcyra, we found
another despatch from the consul to the Corcyreans had
come, announcing that the Carthaginians had already sur-
rendered all the hostages to them, and were prepared to obey
them.i Thinking, therefore, that the war was at an end, and
that there was no more occasion for our services, we sailed
back to the Peloponnese. . . .
* Livy, Ep. 49.
5o8 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS book
4. It should not excite surprise that I sometimes designate
myself by my proper name, and at other times by the common
forms of expression — for instance, "when /had said this," or
"we had agreed to this." For as I was much personally
involved in the transactions about to be related, it becomes
necessary to vary the methods of indicating myself; that I may
not weary by continual repetition of my own name, nor again
by introducing the words " of me," or " through me," at every
turn, fall insensibly into an appearance of egotism. I wished,
on the contrary, by an interchangeable use of these terms, and
by selecting from time to time the one which seemed most
in place, to avoid, as far as could be, the ofTensiveness of talk
about one's self; for such talk, though naturally unacceptable,
is frequently inevitable, when one cannot in any other way
give a clear exposition of the subjects. I am somewhat assisted
in this point by the accident that, as far as I know, no one up
to our own time has ever had the same name as myself.^ . . .
6. The statues of Callicrates 2 were carried in under the
cover of darkness, while those of Lycortas were brought out
again by broad daylight, to occupy their original position : and
this coincidence drew the remark from every one, that we
ought never to use our opportunities against others in a spirit
of presumption, knowing that it is extremely characteristic of
Fortune to subject those who set a precedent to the operation
of their own ideas and principles in their turn. . . .
The mere love of novelty inherent in mankind is a sufficient
incentive to any kind of change. . . .
6. The Romans sent envoys to restrain the impetuosity of
Mission to Bithy- Nicomedes and to prevent Attalus from going
nia to investigate to war with Prusias. The men appointed were
t^n^NicoJn^'es Marcus Licinius, who was suffering from gout,
(II.) and his and was quite lamed by it, and with him Aulus
* He seems to have forgotten his namesake mentioned in 11, 15.
2 For Callicrates, the author of the Romanising policy, see 26, 1-3. One
of the statues raised to him by the Spartan exiles was at Olympia, the base of
which has been discovered. See Hicks' s Greek Inscriptions ^ p. 330. To what
the fragment refers is not clear, but evidently to something connected with the
popular movement against Sparta, and a recurrence to the policy of Philopoe-
men as represented by Lycortas, which eventually brought down the vengeance
of Rome.
XXXVII ATTALUS, NICOMEDES, AND PRUSIAS 509
Mancinus, who, from a tile falling on his head, father Prusias II.
had so many and such great scars on it, See j»/ra, 32, 28,
that it was a matter of wonder that he escaped • • ^4 .
¥rith his life, and Lucius Malleolus who was reputed the
stupidest man in Rome. As the business required speed
and boldness, these men seemed the least suitable possible
for the purpose that could be conceived; and accordingly
they say that Marcus Porcius Cato remarked in the Senate
that " Not only would Prusias perish before they got there,
but that Nicomedes would grow old in his kingdom. For
how could a mission make haste, or if it did, how could it
accomplish anything, when it had neither feet, head, nor in-
telligence?" . . .
7. King Prusias was exceedingly repulsive in personal appear-
ance, though* his reasoning powers were some-
what superior : but externally he seemed only p^^^ii°
half a man, and was cowardly and effeminate in
all matters pertaining to war. For not only was he timid, but
he was averse to all hardships, and in a word was utterly un-
manned in mind and body throughout his whole life ; qualities
which all the world object to in kings, but the Bithynians
above all people. Moreover, he was also exceedingly dis-
solute in regard to sensual pleasures ; was completely without
education or philosophy, or any of the knowledge which they
embrace; and had not the remotest idea of what virtue is.
He lived the barbaric life of a Sardanapallus day and night
Accordingly, directly his subjects got the least hope of being
able to do so, they conceived an implacable resolution not
only to throw off allegiance to the king, but to press for ven-
geance upon him.^ . . .
8. Museium is a place near Olympus in Macedonia, . . .
^ 9. As I blame those who assign fortune and destiny as the
moving causes in common events and ^^^' um^^xoHt^^he^x^^i
strophes, I wish now to enter as minutely on of the direct imer-
the discussion of this subject as the nature of ference of Provi-
an historical work will admit Those things of ^'''''^^^^^
which it is impossible or difficult for a mere
' Prusias was killed at Pergamum by his son Nicomedes with the conniv-
ance of Attains (Livy, Ep, 50).
5IO THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS book
man to ascertain the causes, such as a continuous fall of rains
and unseasonable wet, or, on the contrary, droughts and frosts,
one may reasonably impute to God and Fortune, in default of
any other explanation; and from them come destruction of
fruits, as well as long-continued epidemics, and other similar
things, of which it is not easy to find the cause. On such
matters then, we, in default of a better, follow the prevailing
opinions of the multitude, attempting by supplications and
sacrifices to appease the wrath of heaven, and sending to
ask the gods by what words or actions on our part a change
for. the better may be brought about, and a respite be ob-
tained for the evils which are afHicting us. But those things,
of which it is possible to find the origin and cause of their
occurrence, I do not think we should refer to the gods. I
mean such a thing as the following. In our time all Greece
was visited by a dearth of children and generally a decay of
population, owing to which the cities were denuded of in-
habitants, and a failure of productiveness resulted, though
there were no long- continued wars or serious pestilences
among us. If, then, any one had advised our sending to ask the
gods in regard to this, what we were to do or say in order to
become more numerous and better fill our cities, — would he
not have seemed a futile person, when the cause was manifest
and the cure in our own hands ? For this evil grew upon us
rapidly, and without attracting attention, by our men becoming
perverted to a passion for show and money and the pleasures
of an idle life, and accordingly either not marrying at all, or, if
they did marry, refusing to rear the children that were born, or
at most one or two out of a great number, for the sake of
leaving them well off or bringing them up in extravagant
luxury. For when there are only one or two sons, it is evi-
dent that, if war or pestilence carries off one, the houses must
be left heirless : and, like swarms of bees, little by little the
cities become sparsely inhabited and^ weak. On this subject
there is no need to ask the gods how we are to be relieved
from such a curse : for any one in the world will tell you that
it is by the men themselves if possible changing their objects
of ambition ; or, if that cannot be done, by passing laws for the
preservation of infants. On this subject there is no need of
xrroi DEPOPULATION OF GREECE 511
seers or prodigies. And the same holds good of all similar
things. But in regard to events of which the causes are im-
possible or difficult to discover, it is reasonable to feel a
difficulty. And in this class may be reckoned the course of
Macedonian history. For the Macedonians had enjoyed
many important fevours at the hands of the Romans, having
been as a nation liberated from arbitrary government and
imports, and having obtained undisputed freedom in the place
of slavery ; and having been individually relieved to a great
extent from intestine factions and civil bloodshed.^ . . . They
had been worsted by the Romans formerly The inexplicable
when fighting on the side of Demetrius* and conduct of the
again on that of Perseus ; yet when engaged on Macedonians,
the side, of a man of odious character,^ and in support of his
claims to the throne, they displayed great courage and con-
quered a Roman army. These facts may well seem a puzzle
to us, for it is difficult to discover their cause. And accord-
ingly one would be inclined to say in such matters that what
had happened was a heaven-sent infatuation, and that the
wrath of God had fallen upon the Macedonians. And this
will be rendered evident from what remains to be told. . . .
10. Massanissa, king of the Numidians in Africa, was the
best man of all the kings of our time, and the ^ ' - .,
. y r r y • t Death of Massa-
most completely fortunate ; for he reigned more nissa rc. 148.
than sixty years in the soundest health and His fortunate
to extreme old age, — for he was ninety when *^^^^^ ^^ P^^^*'
1 J' J TT \ • -i t /- 1 cal vigour.
he died. He was, besides, the most powerful
man physically of all his contemporaries : for instance, when
it was necessary to stand, he would do so without moving a
foot all day long ; and again, when he had once sat down to
business he remained there the whole day; nor did it
distress him the least to remain in the saddle day and night
continuously ; and at ninety years old, at which age he died,
he left a son only four years old, called Sthembanus, who was
^ A considerable passage is here lost, with the exception of a few words,
insufficient to ground a conjectural translation upon.
* Demetrius II., son of Antigonus Gonatas.
• Pseudophilippus, after cutting to pieces a Roman legion under the
praetor Juventius, was conquered and captured by Q. Caecilius Metcllus in
B.c 148 (Livy, £p. 50; Eutrop. 4, 6).
512 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS book xxmi
afterwards adopted by Micipses, and four sons besides.
Owing, again, to the affection existing between these sons,
he kept his whole life free from any treasonable plot and his
kingdom unpolluted by any family tragedy. But his greatest
and most divine achievement was this : Numidia had been
before his time universally unproductive, and was looked
upon as incapable of producing any cultivated fruits. He was
the first and only man who showed that it could produce
cultivated fruits just as well as any other country whatever, by
cultivating farms to the extent of ten thousand plethra for each
of his sons in different parts of it. On this man's death,
then, so much may reasonably and justly be said. Scipio
arrived at Cirta on the third day after his departure, and
settled everything properly and fairly.^ . . .
A little while before his death he was seen, on the day
following a great victory over the Carthaginians, sitting outside
his tent eating a piece of dirty bread, and on those who saw
it expressing surprise at his doing so, he said.* . . .
^ Massanissa, feeling himself to be dying, had asked Scipio to come to him.
He left his sons strict injunctions to submit the arrangements of the succession
and division of his kingdom to Scipio. Appian, Punica, 105 ; Livy, Ep. 50.
Livy has adopted the statement of Polybius as to the age of Massanissa at his
death ; and Cicero {dt Sen, § 34) has made Cato take the same reckoning,
perhaps from Polybius also. But it does not agree with another statement of
Livy himself, who (24, 49) speaks of him as being seventeen in B.C. 213, in
which case he would be in his eighty-second year in B.C. 148. It is, however,
proposed to read xxvii. for xvii. in this passage of Livy.
* Livy [Ep. 48) in speaking of this victory says that Massanissa was
ninety-two, and ate and enjoyed his bread without anything to flavour it (sine
pulpamine).
BOOK XXXVIII
1. Hasdrubal, the general of the Carthaginians, was a vain
ostentatious person, very far from possessing
real strategic ability. There are numerous 'jJ^ViTr''^?/'
/■ i- 1 • ^r . 1 T t /- thage, B.C. 147.
proofs of his want of judgment. In the first coss. p. Cornelius
place he appeared in foil armour in his inter- Scipio Africanus
view with Gulussa, king of the Numidians, with i^^^^'^'^'u^'
a purple dyed robe over his armour fastened by
a brooch, and attended by ten bodyguards armed with swords;
and in the next place, having advanced in front of these
armed attendants to a distance of about twenty feet, he stood
behind the trench and palisade and beckoned the king to
come to him, whereas it ought to have been quite the other way.
However, Gulussa, after the Numidian fashion, being not
inclined to stand on ceremony, advanced interview between
towards him unattended, and when he got near Hasdmbai and
him asked him " Whom he was afraid of that he ^^"S Gulussa.
had come in full armour?" And on his answering, "The
Romans," Gulussa remarked : " Then you should not have
trusted yourself to the city, when there was no necessity for
your doing so. However, what do you want, and what do
you ask me to do ? " To which Hasdrubal replied : " I want
you to go as our ambassador to the Roman commander, and
to undertake for us that we will obey every injunction ; only
I beg of you both to abstain from harming this wretched city."
Then said Gulussa : " Your demand appears to me to be quite
childish I Why, my good sir, what you failed to get by your
embassies from the Romans, who were then quietly encamped
at Utica, and before a blow had been struck, — how can you
expect to have granted you now, when you have been completely
invested by sea and land, and have almost given up every hope
VOL. II 2 L
514 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBWS BOOK
of safety ? " To which Hasdrubal replied that " Gulussa was
ill informed ; for they still had good hopes of their outside
allies/' — for he had not yet heard about the Mauretani, and
thought that the forces in the country were still unconquered,^
— " nor were they in despair as to their own ultimate safety.
And above all, they trusted in the support of the gods, and in
what they might expect from them; for they believed that
they would not disregard the flagrant violation of treaty from
which they were suffering, but would give them many oppor-
tunities of securing their safety. Therefore he called on the
Roman commander in the name of the gods and of Fortune to
spare the city; with the distinct understanding that, if its
inhabitants failed to obtain this grace, they would be cut to
pieces to the last man sooner than evacuate it." After some
more conversation of the same sort, these men separated for
the present, having made an appointment to meet again on
the third day from that time.
2. On Gulussa communicating to him what had been said,
Scipios scorn of Scipio remarked with a laugh : " Oh, then, it
the proposal, was because you intended to make this demand
B.C. 147. ^j^j^^ yQy displayed that abominable cruelty to
our prisoners ! ^ And you trust in the gods, do you, after
violating even the laws of men?" The king went on to
remind Scipio that above all things it was necessary to finish
the business speedily; for, apart from unforeseen contingencies,
the consular elections were now close at hand, and it was only
right to have regard to that, lest, if the winter found them just
where they were, another Consul would come to supersede
him, and without any trouble get all the credit of his labours.
He offers Hasdni- ^'hese words induced Scipio to give directions
hai personal secu- to offer Hasdrubal safety for himself, his wife
"'y ^J'he'^tow^"^ ^"^ children, and ten families of his friends and
^ °^^ relations, and permission to take ten talents of
* The task of subduing the country in B.C. 147 was entrusted to the pro-
consul Culpumius Piso, while Scipio was engaged in completing the invest-
ment of Carthage. Appian, Pun. 113-126.
2 After the capture of Megara, the suburban district of Carthage, by
Scipio, Hasdrubal withdrew into the B>Tsa, got made commander-in-chief,
and bringing all Roman prisoners to the battlements, put them to death with
the most ghastly tortures. Appian, /*w«. 118,
XXX VIII MISER Y IN CAR THA GE 5x5
his private property and to bring out with him whichever of his
slaves he chose. With these concessions therefore Gulussa
went to his meeting with Hasdrubal on the third day, who
again came forward with great pomp and at a dignified step,
clothed in his purple robe and fuU suit of armour, so as to
cast the tyrants of tragedy far into the shade. He was
naturally fat, but at that time he had grown extremely cor-
pulent, and had become more than usually red from exposure
to the sun, so that he seemed to be living like fat oxen at a fair ;
and not at all like a man to be in command at a time of such
terrible miseries as cannot easily be described in words.
When he met the king, and heard the offer of the Consul, he
slapp>ed his thigh again and again, and appealing to the gods and
Fortune declared that " The day would never come on which
Hasdrubal would behold the sun and his native city in flames ;
for to the nobly-minded one's country and its burning houses
were a glorious funeral pile." These expressions force us to feel
some admiration for the man and the nobility The selfish and
of his language; but when we come to view tyrannical conduct
his administration of affairs, we cannot fail to be °^ Hasdrubal
struck by his want of spirit and courage ; for at a time when
his fellow-citizens were absolutely perishing with famine, he
gave banquets and had second courses put on of a costly kind,
and by his own excellent physical condition made their misery
more conspicuous. For the number of the dying surpassed
belief, as well as the number who deserted every day from
hunger. However, by fiercely rebuking some, and by execut-
ing as well as abusing others, he cowed the common people :
and by this means retained, in a country reduced to the
lowest depths of misfortune, an authority which a tyrant would
scarcely enjoy in a prosperous city. Therefore I think I was
justified in saying that two leaders more like comparison be-
each other than those who at that time directed tween Hasdrubal
the affairs of Greece and Carthage it would not ^^ ^^^^•
be easy to find. And this will be rendered manifest when we
come to a formal comparison of them. . . .
8. My thirty-eighth book embraces the con-
summation of the misfortunes of Greece. For ^';^:^''^^^
though Greece as a whole, as well as separate fall of Greece.
s"ilrremdy'm,t,ri„naic,"At',™yrn
C;inliaL,'o is looked
H.is even more: kind, yct One cannot
lamentable than as not Icss, and in SOT.
tbai of Quthage. ^^ (he Carthaginians
for posterity to say on their behalf;
Greeks were so glaring that they mad
who wished to support them to do s
tion of the Carthaginians was trame
they had no feeling afterwards of t^
Greeks, with their misfortunes ever b
down to their children's children the I
theirs. And in proportion as we regan
as more pitiable than those who lose th
of their misfortunes, in that ptoportio:
the Greeks be regarded as more piti
Carthaginians, — unless a man thinks
honour, and gives bis opinion from a
advantage. To prove the truth of w
to remember and compare the misfort
to be the heaviest with what I have jus
4. Now, the greatest alarm that fori
Computeon be '*>e Greeks was when X
XXXVIII THE MISFORTUNES OF GREECE 517
glory in the eyes of all the world for having regarded every-
thing as of less importance, in comparison with taking their
share in the same fortune as the other Greeks. Accordingly,
in consequence of their exalted conduct, they not only im-
mediately recovered their own city and territory, but soon
afterwards disputed the supremacy in Greece with the Lacedae-
monians. Subsequently, indeed, they were th ^ f t f
beaten by the Spartans in war, and forced to the Athenians at
submit to the destruction of their own city Aegospotami,
walls : but even this one might assert to be a ^•^* ^^^*
reproach to the Lacedaemonians, for having used the power
put into their hands with excessive severity, rather than to the
Athenians. Then the Spartans once more, being of the Spanans
beaten by the Thebans, lost the supremacy in at Leuctra,
Greece, and after that defeat were deprived of b-c 371.
their outside rule and reduced to the frontiers of Laconia.
But what disgrace was there in having retired, while disputing
for the most honourable objects, to the limits of their ancestral
dominion? Therefore, these events we may speak of as
failures, but not as misfortunes in any sense. The Mantlneans
again were forced to leave their city, being The destruction
divided out and scattered into separate villages of Mantinea,
by the Lacedaemonians ; but for this all the ^-^ ^^a,
world blamed the folly, not of the Mantineans, but of the
Lacedaemonians. The Thebans, indeed, be-
sides the loss of their army, saw their country de- ^'^ Vc.^s^'
populated at the time when Alexander, having
resolved on the invasion of Asia, conceived that by making an
example of Thebes he should establish a terror that would act
as a check upon the Greeks, while his attention was distracted
upon other affairs : but at that time all the world pitied the
Thebans as having been treated with injustice and harshness,
and no one was found to justify this proceeding of Alexander.
; 6. Accordingly after a short time they obtained assistance,
and once more inhabited their country in security. For
the compassion of foreigners is no small benefit to those
who are unjustly dispossessed; since we often see that,
with the change of feeling among the many. Fortune also
changes ; and even the conquerors themselves repent, and make
5i8 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS boot
good the disasters of those who have fallen under undeserved
misfortunes. Once more, at certain periods the Chalcidians
The tyranny of ^^^ Corinthians and some other cities, owing to
the later kings the advantages of their situation, were attacked
of Macedonia, ^y jj^g kings of Macedonia, and had garrisons
imposed on them : but when they were thus enslaved all
the world were eager to do their best to liberate them, and
loathed their enslavers and regarded them continually as
their enemies. But above all, up to this time it was generally
single states that were depopulated, and in single states
that reverses were met with, in some cases while disputing for
supremacy and empire, and in others from the treacherous
attacks of despots and kings : so that, so far from their losses
bringing them any reproach, they escaped even the name of
misfortune. For we must look on all those who meet with
But the last fall incalculable disasters whether private or public
of Greece was as the victims of losses, and those only to be
embittered by the "unfortunate," to whom events through their
fact that It came /■ n i • j* i t ^ i- .i-
from the folly of o^'^ ^^^v bnng dishonour. Instances of this
(the Greeks last are the Peloponnesians, Boeotians,
themselves phocians, . . . and Locrians, some of the
dwellers on the Ionian gulf, and next to these the Mace-
donians, . . . who all as a rule did not merely suffer loss,
but were " unfortunate," with a misfortune of the gravest kind
and for which they were themselves open to
Thci^icadere.^ reproach : for they displayed at once want of
good faith and want of courage, brought upon
themselves a series of disgraces, lost all that could bring them
honour, . . . and voluntarily admitted into their towns the
Roman fasces and axes. They were in the utmost panic, in fact,
owing to the extravagance of their own wrongful acts, if one
ought to call them their own ; for I should rather say that the
peoples as such were entirely ignorant, and were beguiled from
the path of right : but that the men who acted wrongly were
the authors of this delusion.
6. In regard to these men, it should not be a matter
of surprise if we leave for a while the ordinary method and
spirit of our narrative to give a clearer and more elaborate
exposition of their character. I am aware that some may
XXXVIII THE GREEKS HAD THEMSELVES TO BLAME 519
be found, regarding it as their first duty to cast a veil over
the errors of the Greeks, to accuse us of writing in a spirit of
malevolence. But for myself, I conceive that with right-minded
persons a man will never be regarded as a true friend who
shrinks from and is afraid of plain speech, nor indeed as a good
citizen who abandons the truth because of the offence he will
give to certain persons at the time. But a writer of public
history above all deserves no indulgence whatever, who regards
anything of superior importance to truth. For in proportion
as written history reaches larger numbers, and survives for
longer time, than words spoken to suit an occasion, both the
writer ought to be still more particular about truth, and his
readers ought to admit his authority only so far as he
adheres to this principle. At the actual hour of danger it is
only right that Greeks should help Greeks in every possible
way, by protecting them, veiling their errors or deprecating
the wrath of the sovereign people, — and this I genuinely did
for my part at the actual time : but it is also right, in regard
to the record of events to be transmitted to posterity, to leave
them unmixed with any falsehood : so that readers should not
be merely gratified for the moment by a pleasant tale, but
should receive in their souls a lesson which will prevent a
repetition of similar errors in the future. Enough, however,
on this subject. . . .
In the autumn of rc 1^0 the corrupt Menalchidas of Sparta
was succeeded as AcJiaean Strategus by Diaeus, who, to cover his
share in the corruption of Menalchidas, induced the league to act
in the matter of some disputed claim of Sparta in a manner
contrary to the decisions of t/ie Roman Senate, The Spartans
wished to appeal again to Rome; whereupon the Achaeans
passed a law forbidding separate cities to make such appeals,
which were to be only made by the league. The Lacedaemonians
took up arms : and Diaeus professing that the league was not
at war with Sparta, but with certain factious citizens of that
city, named four of its chief men who were to be banished. They
fled to Rome, where t/ie Senate ordered their restoration. Em-
bassies went from Achaia and from Sparta to Rome to state their
respective cases ; and on their return gave false reports, — Diaeus
5*0 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS IKWK
assuring the Achaeans that the Senate had ordered the Spartans
to obey the league; Menalchidas telling the Spartans that the
Romans had released theni from all connexion with the league.
War then again broke out (b.c. 148). Metellus^ who was in
Macedonia on the business of the Pseudo-Philip^ sent legates to
the Achaeans forbidding them to bear arms against Sparta^ and
announcing the speedy arrival of commissioners from Rome to
settle the dispute. But the Achaean levies were already mustered
under the Stratcgus Damocritus^ and the Lacedaemonians seem
to have almost compelled them to fight. The Spartans were
beaten with considerable loss : and on Damocritus preventing a
pursuit and a capture of Sparta^ the Achaeans regarded him as
traitor and fined him fifty talents. He was succeeded in his
office of Stratcgus by Diaeus {autumn B.C. 148- b.c 147) who
promised Metellus to await the arrival of the commissioners
from Rome, But the Spartans no7u assumed their freedom from
the league and elected a Stratcgus of their oivn, Menalchidas ;
wlw provoked a rencival of the war by taking the town of lasos
on the Laconian frontier. In despair of resisting the attack of
the Achaeans^ and disowned by his felloiu-citizenSy he took poison.
The Roman commissioners arrived^ led by L, Aurelius Orestes^ in
B.C. 147, a fid summoning the magistrates of the Achaean towns
and the Stratcgus Diaeus before them at Corinth^ announced the
decision of the Senate — separating Lacedaemon^ Corinth^ Argos^
Heraclea near Aete^ and Orchomcfws in Arcadia from the
Achaean league^ as not being united by blood, and only being
subsequent additions. The magistrates^ without anstveringy
hastily summoned the league congress. The people, on hearing
the Roman decision, pillaged the houses of the Lacedaemonian
residents in Corinth, and savagely attacked all who were or who
looked like Spartans, The Roman envoys endeavoured to re-
strain the popular fury. But tluy were someivhat roughly
handled themselves ; and the people could not be persuaded to
release the Spartans whom tluy had arrested: though they let
all others go, and sent an embassy to Rome, which, hoivet^r,
meeting the former embassy on its return, and learning the
hopelessness of support in Rome, returned home. It is this out-
break which is referred to in the next fragment. See Pausanias,
vii, 12-14; Livy, Ep. 51.
XXXVIII ROME AND THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE 521
7, When the commissioners with L. Aurelius Orestes
arrived in Rome from the Peloponnese, they On the report of
reported what had taken place, and declared ^ ^^^^"^P,"^"
^1.^.1- I. J r ^ 11 1 • tes of the disturb-
that they had a narrow escape of actually losing ance at Corinth,
their lives. They made the most of the occur- b.c. 147.
rence and put the worst interpretation upon it ; for they re-
presented the violence which had been offered them as not
the result of a sudden outbreak, but of a deliberate intention
on the part of the Achaeans to inflict a signal insult upon them.
The Senate was therefore more angry than it had ever been,
and at once appointed Sextus Julius Caesar the Senate send
and other envoys^with instructions to rebuke and a fresh commis-
upbraid the Achaeans for what had occurred, ^'°'\ ^? ^'^"^ ^®
yet in terms of moderation, but to exhort them
" not to listen to evil councillors, not to allow themselves to
be betrayed into hostility with Rome, but even yet to make
amends for their acts of folly by inflicting punishment on the
authors of the crime." This was a clear proof that the Senate
gave its instructions to Aurelius and his colleagues, not with
the view of dismembering the league, but with the object of
restraining the obstinacy and hostility of the Achaeans by
terrifying and overawing them. Some people accordingly
imagined that the Romans were acting hypocritically, be-
cause the Carthaginian war was still unfinished ; but this was
not the case. The fact is, that they had long regarded the
Achaean league with favour, believing it to be the most trust-
worthy of all the Greek governments ; and though now they
were resolved to give it an alarm, because it had become too
lofty in its pretensions, yet they were by no means minded to
go to war or to have a serious quarrel with the Achaeans. . . .
8. As Sextus Julius Caesar and bis colleagues were on their
way from Rome to the Peloponnese, they were Arrival of Sextus
met by Thearidas and the other envoys, sent by Julius and the
the Achaeans to make their excuse and give conimissioners m
the Senate an explanation of the intemperate acts
committed in regard to Aurelius Orestes. But Sextus Julius
persuaded them to turn back to Achaia, on the ground that
he and his colleagues were coming with full instructions to
communicate with the Achaeans on all these points. When
522 THE HISTORIES OF P0LYB2US book
Sextus arrived in the Peloponnese, and in a conference with
Conference at ^^^ Achaeans in Aegium spoke with great kind-
Acgium. The ness, he made no mention of the injurious treat-
envoys are con- ment of the legates, and scarcely demanded
ciliatorv %j ' *
any defence at all, but took a more lenient
view of what had happened than even the Achaeans them-
selves; and dwelt chiefly on the subject of exhorting them
not to carry their error any further, in regard either to
the Romans or the Lacedaemonians. Thereupon the more
sober-minded party received the speech with satisfaction, and
were strongly moved to obey the suggestions, because they
were conscious of the gravity of what they had been doing,
and had before their eyes what happened to opponents of
Rome ; but the majority, though they had not a word to say
against the justice of the injunctions of Sextus Julius, and were
quite silent, yet remained deeply tainted with disaffection. And
Action of Diaeus Diaeus and Critolaus, and all who shared their
and Critolaus and sentiments, — and they consisted of all the great-
their party, ^g^ rascals in every city, men at war with the gods,
and pests of the community, carefully selected, — took, as the
proverb has it, with the left hand what the Romans gave with
the right, and went utterly and entirely wrong in their calcu-
lations. For they supposed that the Romans, owing to the
troubles in Libya and Iberia, feared a war with the Achaeans
and would submit to anything and say anything. Thinking,
therefore, that the hour was their own, they answered the
Roman envoys politely that " They would, nevertheless, send
Thearidas and his colleagues to the Senate ; while they would
themselves accompany the legates to Tegea, and there in con-
sultation with the I^cedaemonians would provide for some
settlement of the war that would meet the views of both parties."
With this answer they subsequently induced the unhappy
nation to follow the senseless course to which they had long
before made up their mind. And this result was only what
might have been expected from the inexperience and corrup-
tion of the prevailing party.
9. But the finishing stroke to this ruinous policy was given
Conference at i" ^^ following manner. Wlien Sextus and
Tcgca. Critolaus his colleagues arrived at Tegea, and invited the
XXXVIII FOOLISH FOLIC Y IN A CHAIA 5 23
attendance of the Lacedaemonians, in order to contrives to avoid
arrange terms between them and the Achaeans, " ^'''«"''"-
both as to the satisfaction to be given for previous complaints
and for putting a stop to the war, until the Romans should send
commissioners to review the whole question, Critolaus and his
party, having held a conference, decided that all the rest should
avoid the meeting, and that Critolaus should go alone to Tegea.
When Sextus and his fellow- commissioners therefore had
almost given them up, Critolaus arrived ; and when the meet-
ing with the Lacedaemonians took place, he would settle
nothing, — alleging that he had no authority to make any arrange-
ment without the consent of the people at large ; but that he
would bring the matter before the Achaeans at their next con-
gress, which must be held six months from that time. Sextus
and his fellow-commissioners, therefore, convinced of the ill
disposition of Critolaus, and much annoyed at his conduct,
dismissed the Lacedaemonians to their own country, and
themselves returned to Italy with strong views as to the folly
and infatuation of Critolaus.
After their departure Critolaus spent the winter in visiting
the cities and holding assemblies in them, on^interofB.c.i47.
the pretext that he wished to inform them of 146. Critolaus pro-
what he had said to the Lacedaemonians at ^^^^^^^1*"
Tegea, but in reality to denounce the Romans •'
and to put an evil interpretation on everything they said ; by
which means he inspired the common people in the various
cities with feelings of hostility and hatred for them. At
the same time he sent round orders to the magis-
trates not to exact money from debtors, nor to ^^^mems.*^*^
receive prisoners arrested for debt, and to cause
loans on pledge to be held over until the war was decided.
By this kind of appeal to the interests of the vulgar everything
he said was received with confidence; and the common people
were ready to obey any order he gave, being incapable of
taking thought for the future, but caught by the bait of im-
mediate indulgence and relief.
10. When Quintus Caecilius Metellus heard in Macedonia
of the commotion and disturbance going on in ^^^^ legates are
the Peloponnese, he despatched thither his le- sent from Mace-
524 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBWS book
donia to Achaia gates Gneaus Papirius and the younger Popilius
* rc.%77.m6!^ Laenas, along with Aulus Gabinius and Gains
Fannius; who, happening to arrive when the
congress was assembled at Corinth, were introduced to the
assembly, and delivered a long and conciliatory speech, much
in the spirit of that of Sextus Julius, exerting themselves with
great zeal to prevent the Achaeans from proceeding to an
open breach with Rome, either on the pretext of their grievance
against the Lacedaemonians, or from any feeling of anger
against the Romans themselves. But the assembled people
would not hear them ; insulting words were
lu'corin^^ loudly uttered against the envoys, and in the
midst of a storm of yells and tumult they were
driven from the assembly. The fact was that such a crowd
of workmen and artisans had been got together as had never
been collected before ; for all the cities were in a state of
drivelling folly, and above all the Corinthians en masse; and
there were only a very few who heartily approved of the words
of the envoys.
Critolaus, conceiving that he had attained his purpose, in
the midst of an audience as excited and mad as himself began
attacking the magistrates, abusing all who were opposed to
him, and openly defying the Roman envoys, saying that he
was desirous of being a friend of the Romans, but had no
Critolaus makes '^iste for them as his masters. And, finally, he
no secret of his tried to incite the people by saying that, if they
hostility to Rome, quitted themselves like men, they would have
no lack of allies ; but, if they betrayed womanish fears, they
would not want for masters. By many other such words to
the same effect, conceived in the spirit of a charlatan and
huckster, he roused and excited the populace. He attempted
also to make it plain that he was not acting at random in
these proceedings, but that some of the kings and republics
were engaged in the same policy as himself.
11. And when some of the Gerusia wished to check him,
and restrain him from the use of such expres-
Critoiaus cames gions, hc ordered the soldiers surrounding him
his point, and '. , ^ ^ • i •
induces the to retire, and stood up fronting his opponents,
Achaeans to pro- and bade any one of them come up to him.
XXXVIII VIOLENT POLICY OF CRITOLAUS 525
come near him, or venture to touch his chlamys. claim war against
And, finally, he said that ** He had restrained ^^ Lacedae-
monians
himself now for a long time ; but would endure
it no longer, and must speak his mind. The people to fear
were not Lacedaemonians or Romans, but the traitors among
themselves who co-operated with their foes: for there were
some who cared more for Romans and Lacedaemonians than
for their own country." He added, as a confirmation of his
words, that Evagoras of Aegium and Stratius of Tritaea
betrayed to Gnaeus Papirius and his fellow-commissioners all
the secret proceedings in the meetings of the magistrates.
And when Stratius acknowledged that he had had interviews
with those men, and should do so again, as they were friends
and allies, but asserted that he had told them nothing of what
was said in the meetings of the magistrates, sofne few believed
him, but the majority accepted the accusation as true. And
so Critolaus, having inflamed the people by his accusations
against these men, induced the Achaeans once more'to decree a
war which was nominally against the Lacedaemonians, but in
effect was against the Romans ; and he got another decree
added, which was a violation of the constitution, namely, that
whomsoever they should elect as Strategi should have absolute
power in carrying on the war. He thus got for himself some-
thing like a despotism.
Having carried these measures, he began intriguing to
bring on an outbreak and cause an attack upon xhe Roman en-
the Roman envoys. He had no pretext for voys retire from
doing this ; but adopted a course which, of all Connth.
possible courses, offends most flagrantly against the laws of
gods and man. The envoys, however, separated; Gnaeus
Papirius went to Athens and thence to Sparta to watch the
turn of events ; Aulus Gabinius went to Naupactus ; and the
other two remained at Athens, waiting for the arrival of Cae-
cilius Metellus. This was the state of things in the Pelo-
ponnese. . . .
BOOK XXXIX
^Including Book XL. of Dindorfs Text,]
1. I AM fully aware that some will be found to criticise my
work, on the ground that my narrative of events
hutori^^rmeth^ ^^ incomplete and disconnected ; beginning, for
ofparaiiei histories instance, the story of the siege of Carthage, and
of several coun- then leaving it half told, and interrupting the
'"^'^^^^{J^J'^^P'"^ stream of my history, I pass over to Greek
affairs, and from them to Macedonian or
Syrian, or some other history ; whereas students require con-
tinuity, and desire to hear the end of a subject ; for the com-
bination of pleasure and profit is thus more completely secured.
But I do not think this : I hold exactly the reverse. And as
a witness to the correctness of my opinion I might appeal to
nature herself, who is never satisfied with the same things
continuously in any of the senses, but is ever inclined to
change; and, even if she is satisfied with the same things,
wishes to have them at intervals and in diversity of circum-
stance. This may be illustrated first by the sense of hearing,
which is never gratified either in music or recitations by a con-
tinuance of the same strains or subjects ; it is the varied style,
and, in a word, whatever is broken up into intervals and has the
most marked and frequent changes, that gives it pleasurable
excitement. Similarly one may notice that the palate can
never remain gratified by the same meats, however costly, but
grows to feel a loathing for them, and delights in changes of
diet, and often prefers plain to rich food merely for the sake of
variety. The same may be noticed as to the sight : it is quite
incapable of remaining fixed on the same object, but it is a
variety and change of objects that excites it. And this is more
BOOK XXXIX VARIETY IS PLEASING 527
than all the case with the mind ; for changes in the objects of
attention and study act as rests to laborious men.
2. Accordingly the most learned of the ancient historians
have, as it seems to me, taken intervals of rest in this way :
some by digressions on myths and tales, and others by
digressions on historical facts, — not confining themselves to
Greek history, but introducing disquisitions on points of foreign
history as well. As, for instance, when, in the course of a history
of Thessaly and the campaigns of Alexander of Pherae, they
introduce an account of the attempts of the Lacedaemonians
in the Peloponnese; or those made by the Athenians; or actions
which took place in Macedonia or Illyria : and then break off
into an account of the expedition of Iphicrates into Egypt, and
the iniquitous deeds of Clearchus in the Pontus. This will
show you that these historians all employ this method ; but,
whereas they employ it without any system, I do so on a
regular system. For these men, after mentioning, for instance,
that Bardylis, king of the Illyrians, and Cersobleptes, king
of the Thracians, established their dynasties, neither go on
continuously with the stories nor return to them after an
interval to take them up where they left off, but, treating them
like an episode in a poem, they go back to their original subject.
But I made a careful division of all the most important countries
in the world and the course of their several histories; pursued
exactly the same plan in regard to the order of taking the several
divisions ; and, moreover, arranged the history of each year in
the respective countries, carefully keeping to the Urn its of the
time : and the result is that I have made the transition back-
wards and forwards between my continuous narrative and the
continually recurring interruptions easy and obvious to students,
so that an attentive reader need never miss anything. . . .
After various operations during the autumn of^,c, 147, M^
upshot of which was to put the whole of the open country in
Roman hands^ in the beginning of spring b.c. 146, Scipio delivered
his final attack on CartJuxge^ taking first the quarter of the mer-
chants^ harbour J then the war harbour^ atid then the market-place.
There only remained the streets leading to the Byrsa and the
Byrsa itself Appian, Pun. 123-126. Z/V7, Ep. 51.
528 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS book
8. Having got within the walls, while the Carthaginians
The faU of Still held out on the citadel, Scipio found that
Carthage, the arm of the sea which intervened was not
B.C. 146 (spring). ^^ r^ ^ggp . ^^ yx^n Polybius advising him to
set it with iron spikes or drive sharp wooden stakes into it, to
prevent the enemy crossing it and attacking the
^^of'S^>ol^' ^^ said that, having taken the walls
and got inside the city, it would be ridiculous
to take measures to avoid fighting the enemy. . . .
4, The pompous Hasdrubal threw himself on his knees
before the Roman commander, quite forgetful of his proud
language. . . .
When the Carthaginian commander thus threw himself as a
suppliant at Scipio's knees, the proconsul with a glance at those
present said : " See what Fortune is, gentlemen ! What an
example she makes of irrational men ! This is the Hasdrubal
who but the other day disdained the large favours which I offered
him, and said that the most glorious funeral pyre was one's
country and its burning ruins. Now he comes with suppliant
wreaths, beseeching us for bare life and resting all his hopes on
us. Who would not learn from such a spectacle that a mere
man should never say or do anything presumptuous?" Then
some of the deserters came to the edge of the roof and begged
the front ranks of the assailants to hold their hands for a
little ; and, on Scipio ordering a halt, they began abusing
Hasdrubal, some for his perjury, declaring that he had sworn
again and again on the altars that he would never abandon
them, and others for his cowardice and utter baseness : and
they did this in the most unsparing language, and with the
bitterest terms of abuse. And just at this moment Hasdrubal's
wife, seeing him seated in front of the enemy with Scipio,
advanced in front of the deserters, dressed in noble and dignified
attire herself, but holding in her hands, on either side, her two
boys dressed only in short tunics and shielded under her own
robes.^ First she addressed Hasdrubal by his name, and when
^ r6. x^y^Ta^ that is, apparently, the mole of huge stones constructed by the
Romans to block up the mouth of the harbour.
* fcerA Tiov IdLuiv ip^vfidruy. The German translator Kraz gives up these
words in despair. Kampe translated them in ikrer gewdhrtlUher Tracht, Mr.
Strachan- Davidson says, " ir/HxreiXi/^uca, etc, ' folding them in her own robe
FALL OF CARTHAGE 529
i nothing but remained with his head bowed to the ground,
;gan by calling on the name of the gods, and next thanked
' warmly because, as far as he could secure it, both she
er children were saved. ^ And then, pausing for a short
she asked Hasdrubal how he had had the heart to secure
Lvour from the Roman general for himself alone, . . .
eaving his fellow-citizens who trusted in him in the most
ible plight, had gone over secretly to the enemy ? And
le had the assurance to be sitting there holding suppliant
s, in the face of the very men to whom he had frequently
[lat the day would never come in which the sun would see
•ubal alive and his native city in flames. . . .
jsdrubaTs wife finally threw herself and children from the
^ into the burning streets, Livy^ Ep. 51.
ter an interview with [Scipio], in which he was kindly
i, Hasdrubal desired leave to go away from the towa . . .
At the sight of the city utterly perishing amidst the
J Scipio burst into tears, and stood long reflecting on the
ible change which awaits cities, nations, and dynasties,
md all, as it does every one of us men. This, he
ht, had befallen Ilium, once a powerful city, and the
mighty empires of the Assyrians, Medes, Persians, and
f Macedonia lately so splendid. And unintentionally or
sely he quoted, — the words perhaps escaping him uncon-
** The day shall be when holy Troy shall fall
And Priam, lord of spears, and Priam*s folk."
)n my asking him boldly (for I had been his tutor) what
eant by these words, he did not name Rome distinctly,
ras evidently fearing for her, from this sight of the
>ility of human aflairs. . . .
lother still more remarkable saying of his I may record. . .
1 he had given the order for firing the town] he imme-
r hands,' " which seems straining the meaning of irpoirecXi^^uca. The
translator says, deux enfans susfendus d ses vitemens.
:cording to Livy {Ep, 51) she had tried to induce her husband to accept
r described in 38, 2.
omer, //. 6, 448.
..II 2 M
530 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS *«
diately turned round and grasped me by the hand and said:
" O Polybius, it is a grand thing, but, I know not how, I fed
a terror and dread, lest some one should one day give the same
order about my own native city." . . . Any observation more
practical or sensible it is not easy to make. For in the midst
of supreme success for one's self and of disaster for the enemji
to take thought of one's own position and of the possible reveise
which may come, and in a word to keep well in mind in the
midst of prosperity the mutability of Fortune, is the charac-
teristic of a great man, a man free from weaknesses and worthy
to be remembered. . . .
After the rejection of the orders conveyed by the legates of
Me tell us (38, 11), Critolaus collected the Achaean levies at
Corinth y under the pretext of going to war with Sparta ; but hi
soon induced tlie league to declare themselves openly at war with
Rome. He was encouraged by the adhesion of the Boeotarch
Pytheas^ and of the Chalcidians, The Thebans were the readier
to join him because they had lately been ordered by Metellus^ as
arbiter in the disputes^ to pay fines to the Phocians^ Euboeans^
and Amphissians. When ncivs of t/use proceedings reached
Pome in the spring of h.c. 146, the consul Alummius ivas ordered
to lead a fleet and artny against Achaia, But Metellus in
Macedonia wished to have the credit of settling the matter him-
self; he therefore sent envoys to the Achaeans ordering them to
release from the league the totcns already named by the ^nate
viz. Sparta y Connth^ Argos, Heracleia^ and Orchotnenus in
Arcadia^ and advanced with his army from Macedonia through
Thessaly by the coast road^ skirting tlie Sinus Maliacus.
Critolaus was already engaged in besieging Heraclea Oetea^ to
compel it to return to its obedience to the league^ and 7vhen his
scouts informed him of the approach of Metellus^ he retreated to
Scar plica on the coast of LocriSy some miles south of the pass of
Thermopylae, But before he could get into Scarphea Metellus
caught him w/, killed a large number of his men^ and took one
thousand prisoners, Critolaus himself disappeared ; Pausanias
seems to imagine that he was drojvned in the salt marshes of
the coast y but Livy says that he poisoned himself Pausanias^ 7,
14, 15. Livy, Ep. 52. Orosius, 5, 3.
DIAEUS SUCCEEDS CRITOLAUS 531
7. Pytheas was a brother of Acatidas the runner, and son
of Cleomenes. He had led an evil life, and character of the
was reported to have wasted the flower of his Boeotarch
youth in unnatural debauchery. In political life Pytheas.
also he was audacious and grasping, and had been supported
by Eumenes and Philataerus for these very reasons. . . .
8. Critolaus the Achaean Strategus being dead, and the law
providing that, in case of such an event befall- o th d th f
ing the existing Strategus, the Strategus of the critolaus (spring
previous year should succeed to the office until of b.c. i46)Diaeus
the regular congress of the league should meet, succeeds as
it fell to Diaeus to conduct the business of the
league and take the head of affairs. Accordingly, after sending
forward some troops to Megara,^ he went himself to Argos ;
and from that place sent a circular letter to all He orders the
the towns ordering them to set free their slaves arming of 10,000
who were of military age, and who had been slaves,
bom and brought up in their houses, and send them furnished
with arms to Corinth. He assigned the numbers to be furnished
by the several towns quite at random and without any regard
to equality, just as he did everything else. Those who had
not the requisite number of home-bred slaves were to fill up
the quota imposed on each town from other slaves. But
seeing that the public poverty was very great,
owing to the war with the Lacedaemonians, he i;'J^fP;^^''^ ^J'^^^
compelled the richer classes, men and women
alike, to make promises of money and furnish separate contri-
butions. At the same time he ordered a levy en ^^^ ^ general
masse at Corinth of all men of military age. The levy of the free-
result of these measures was that every city was ™^'" ^^ military
full of confusion, commotion, and despair : they ^^'^'
deemed those fortunate who had already perished in the war,
and pitied those who were now starting to take part in it ; and
everybody was in tears as though they foresaw only too well
what was going to happen. They were especially annoyed at
the insolent demeanour and neglect of their duties on the part
of the slaves, — airs which they assumed as having been recently
liberated, or, in the case of others, because they were excited
^ 4000 under Alcamcnes, Pausan. 7, 15, 8.
532 1HE HISTORIES OF POLYBIVS book
by the prospect of freedom. Moreover the men were compelled
to make their contribution contrary to their own views, aoccnd-
ing to the property they were reputed to possess ; while the
women had to do so, by taking the ornaments of their own
persons or of their children, to what seemed deliberately meant
for their destruction.
9. As these measures came all at once, the dismay caused
by the hardship of each individually prevented people from
attending to or grasping the general question ; or they must
have foreseen that they were all being led on to secure the
certain destruction of their wives and children. But, as though
caught in the rush of some winter torrent and carried on by
its irresistible violence, they followed the infatuation and
The Eieians and niadness of their leader. The Eleians and
Messenians do not Messenians indeed did not stir, in terror of the
™°^'^ Roman fleet; for nothing could have saved them
if the storm had burst when it was originally intended The
T^. . „ . people of Patrae, and of the towns which were
Dismay at Patrae. r*^,.,.,, , . ,- «. -
leagued with it, had a short time before sunered
disasters in Phocis ;^ and their case was much the most pitiable
one of all the Peloponnesian cities : for some of them sought
a voluntary death ; others fled from their towns through deserted
parts of the country, with no definite aim in their wanderings, from
the panic prevailing in the towns. Some arrested and delivered
each other to the enemy, as having been hostile to Rome; others
hurried to give information and bring accusations, although no
one asked for any such service as yet ; while others went to
meet the Romans with suppliant branches, confessing their
treason, and asking what penance they were to pay, although as
yet no one was asking for any account of such things. The
whole country seemed to be under an evil spell :
suueoro^e everywhere people were throwing themselves
down wells or over precipices ; and so dreadful
was the state of things, that as the proverb has it " even an
enemy would have pitied" the disaster of Greece. For in
times past the Greeks had met with reverses or indeed complete
disaster, either from internal dissensions or from treacherous
attacks of despots; but in the present instance it was from
^ In the battle with Metellus at Scarphca.
XXXIX CONFUSION AND TERROR IN GREECE 533
the folly of their leaders and their own unwisdom that they
experienced the grievous misfortunes which befell them. The
Thebans also, abandoning their city en tnasse^
left it entirely empty; and among the rest ^^wi^^"
Pytheas retired to the Peloponnese, with his
wife and children, and there wandered about the country.^ . . .
He came upon the enemy much to his surprise. But to my
mind the proverb, " the reckonings of the foolish are foolishness"
applies to him. And naturally to such men things clear as
diay come as a surprise. . . .
He was even forming plans for getting back home, acting
very like a man who, not having learnt to swim and being
about to plunge into the sea, should not consider the question
of taking the plunge; but, having taken it, should begin to
consider how he is to swim to land. . . .
Having secured Boeotta, Meiellus advanced to Megara^ where
the Achaean Alcamenes had been posted by Diaeus with five
thousand men, Alcamenes hastily evacuated Megara and re-
joined Diaeus at Corinth^ the latter having meanwhile been re-
elected Strategus, PausaniaSf 7, 15, 10.
10. Diaeus having recently come to Corinth after being
appointed Strategus by the vote of the people, oiaeus at Corinth
Andronidas and others came from Caecilius rejects all offers
Metellus. Against these men he spread a report ^"' ^y Meieiius,
that they were in alliance with the enemy, and ^^^ 1 b-c. 14 .
gave them up to the mob, who seized on them with great violence
and threw them into chains. Philo of Thessaly also came
bringing many liberal offers to the Achaeans. And on hearing
them, certain of the men of the country attempted to secure
their acceptance ; among whom was Stratius, now a very old
man, who clung to Diaeus's knees and entreated him to yield to
the offers of Metellus. But he and his party would not listen
to Philo's proposals. For the fact was that they did not believe
that the amnesty would embrace them with the rest ; and, as
they regarded their own advantage and personal security as of
* Pausanias on the contrary says that Pytheas was caught in Boeotia and
condemned by Metellus (7, 15, 10).
534 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBWS BOOl
the highest importance, they spoke as they did, and directed
all their measures on the existing state of a&irs
hT^^y^dJ'not *^ t^^s end : although, as a matter of fact, they
believe that they failed entirely to secure these objects. For as they
will ever be am- understood quite clearly the gravity of what they
tain any mercy from Rome ; and as to enduring
nobly whatever should befall on behalf of their country and the
safety of the people, that they never once took into considera-
tion ; yet that was the course becoming men who cared for
glory, and professed to be the leaders of Greece. But indeed
how or whence was it likely that such a lofty idea should occur
to these men ? The members of this conclave were Diaeus
and Damocritus, who had but recently been recalled from exile
owing to the disturbed state of the times, and with them
Alcamenes, Theodectes and Archicrates ; and of these last I
have already stated at length who they were, and have de-
scribed their character, policy, and manner of life.
11. Such being the men w^ith whom the decision rested,
the determination arrived at was what was to
^ SlficlSes.''^ be expected. They not only imprisoned Andro-
nidas and Lagius and their friends, but even
the sub-Strategus Sosicrates, on the charge of his having
presided at a council and given his voting for sending an
embassy to Caecilius Metellus, and in fact of having been the
cause of all their misfortunes. Next day they empanelled
judges to try them ; condemned Sosicrates to death ; and
having bound him racked him till he died, without however
inducing him to say anything that they expected : but they
acquitted Lagius, Andronidas and Archippus, partly because
the people were scared at the lawless proceeding against
Sosicrates, and partly because Diaeus got a talent from
Andronidas and forty minae from Archippus; for this man
could not relax his usual shameless and abandoned principles
in this particular even " in the very pit," ^ as the saying is. He
had acted with similar cruelty a short time before also in
^ The pit is the place dug out ((r<cdfc/xa) and prepared in the gymnasium
for leapcrs. To be in the pit is to be on Ihe very ground of the struggle,
without possibility of escaping it.
XXXIX SAFETY IN SWIFT RUIN 535
regard to Philinus of Corinth. For on a charge of his holding
communication with Menalcidas^ and favouring the Roman
cause, he caused Philinus and his sons to be flogged and
racked in each other's sight, and did not desist until the boys
and Philinus were all dead When such madness and ferocity
was infecting everybody, as it would not be easy to parallel even
among barbarians, it would be clearly very natural to ask why
the whole nation did not utterly perish. For my Greece is saved
part, I think that Fortune displayed her resources by the rapidity of
and skill in resisting the folly and madness of ^^ """•
the leaders ; and, being determined at all hazards to save the
Achaeans, like a good wrestler, she had recourse to the only
trick left ; and that was to bring down and conquer the Greeks
quickly, as in fact she did. For it was owing to this that the
wrath and fury of the Romans did not blaze out farther ; that
the army of Libya did not come to Greece ; and that these
leaders, being such men as I have described, did not have an
opportunity, by gaining a victory, of displaying their wickedness
upon their countrymen. For what it was likely that they
would have done to their own people, if they had got any
ground of vantage or obtained any success, may be reason-
able inferred from what has already been said. And indeed
everybody at the time had the proverb on his lips, " had we
not perished quickly we had not been saved "^ . . .
12. Aulus Postumius deserves some special notice from us
here. He was a member of a family and gens character of
of the first rank, but in himself was garru- Aulus Postumius
lous and wordy, and exceedingly ostentatious. Aibmus.
From his boyhood he had a great leaning to Greek studies
and literature : but he was so immoderate and affected in
this pursuit, that owing to him the Greek style became
offensive to the elder and most respectable men at Rome.
Finally he attempted to write a poem and a formal history
in Greek, in the preface to which he desired his readers
to excuse him if, being [a Roman, he could not completely
command the Greek idiom or method in the handling
of the subject To whom M. Porcius Cato made a very
^ See note on 30, 17.
* For this proverb see Plutarch, Thcmist, 29 ; dc Alex, llrf, 5 ; de Exih 7.
536 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS booe
pertinent answer. " I wonder," said he, " on what grounds
you make such a demand If the Amphictyonic council had
charged you to write the history, you might p>erhaps have been
forced to allege this excuse and ask for this consideratioa
But to write it of your own accord, when there was no com-
pulsion to do so, and then to demand consideration, if you
should happen to write bad Greek, is quite unreasonable. It
is something like a man entering for the boxing match or
pancratium in the pubHc games, and, when he comes into the
stadium, and it is his turn to fight, begging the spectators to
pardon him *if he is unable to stand the fatigue or the blows.'
Such a man of course would be laughed at and condemned at
once." ^ And this is what such historiographers should experi-
ence, to prevent them spoiling a good thing by their rash pre-
sumption. Similarly, in the rest of his life, he had imitated all the
worst points in Greek fashions ; for he was fond of pleasure and
averse from toil. And this may be illustrated from his conduct
in the present campaign : for being among the first to enter
(}reece at the time that the battle in Phocis took place, he retired
to Thebes on the pretence of illness, in order to avoid taking
part in the engagement ; but, when the battle was ended, he
was the first to write to the Senate announcing the victory,
entering into every detail as though he had himself been
present at the conflict . . .
On the atrival of the Consul MummiuSy Metellus was sent
Rc. 146. ^^^^ '''^^ Macedonia, Mummius was accom-
Coss. Cn. Cor- panted by L, Aurelius Orestes^ who had been
nelius Lentulus, ,,^^^A. fnurdcred in the riot at Corinth (38, 7),
and^ pitching his camp in the Isthmus^ 7vas joined
by allies who raised his artny to three thousand five
hundred cavalry and tiventy-six thousand infantry. The
Achaeans made a sudden attack upon them and gained a
slight success^ which was a feio days aftenvards revenged
by a signal defeat,- Instead of retiring into Corinth^ and
* Plutarch reports the same anecdote much more briefly in Caio Maj. 12,
as do others. Professor Freeman [History of Federal Goirmment, p. 142)
seems to regard it as a serious indication that the Amphictyonic council had
Injcome a body exercising some literary authority, in default of any other. I
think that Calo had no such meaning. He mentioned any body of men,
however unlikely to exercise such an influence, which at any rate was Greek.
XXXIX FALL OF CORINTH 537
from that stronghold making some terms with Mummius,
Diaeusfled to Megalopolis^ where he poisoned himself ^ after first
killing his wife. The rest of the beaten Achaean army took
refuge in Corinth^ which Mummius took and fired on the third
day after the battle with Diams, Then the commissioners were
sent from Rome to settle the whole of Greece, Pausanias^ 7,
16-17 ; Livy^ Ep. 52.
13. The incidents of the capture of Corinth were melan-
choly. The soldiers cared nothing for the The destruction of
works of art and the consecrated statues. I the works of art
saw with my own eyes pictures thrown on the '" Corinth, Sep-
ground and soldiers playing dice on them ; among . • • ^ .
them was a picture of Dionysus by Aristeides — in reference
to which they say that the proverbial saying arose, " Nothing
to the Dionysus," — and the Hercules tortured by the shirt of
Deianeira. . . .
14. Owing to the popular reverence for the memory of
Philopoemen, they did not take down the statues of him in
the various cities. So true is it, as it seems to me, that every
genuine act of virtue produces in the mind of those who
benefit by it an affection which it is difficult to efface. . . .
One might fairly, therefore, use the common saying : " He
has been foiled not at the door, but in the road." . . .^
There were many statues of Philopoemen, and many
erections in his honour, voted by the several
cities ; and a Roman at the time of the disaster phiSIJJSi^n
which befell Greece at Corinth, wished to abolish
them all and to formally indict him, laying an information
against him, as though he were still alive, as an enemy and ill-
wisher to Rome. But after a discussion, in which Polybius
spoke against this sycophant, neither Mummius nor the com-
missioners would consent to abolish the honours of an illus-
trious man. . . .
Polybius, in an elaborate speech, conceived in the spirit of
what has just been said, maintained the cause of speech of Polybius
Philopoemen. His arguments were that "This defending the
^ Seems to mean "he lost before he began," before he got even at the
threshold of his enterprise. There is nothing to show to what the fragment
refers.
538 THE HISTORTFS OF POL VBIUS book
memory of man had indeed been frequently at variance with
Phiiopoemen. ^^e Romans on the matter of their injunctions,
but he only maintained his opposition so far as to inform and
persuade them on the points in dispute ; and even that he did
not do without serious cause. He gave a genuine proof of his
loyal policy and gratitude, by a test as it were of fire, in the
periods of the wars with Philip and Antiochus. For, possessing
at those times the greatest influence of any one in Greece, from
his personal power as well as that of the Achaeans, he preserved
his friendship for Rome with the most absolute fidelity, having
joined in the vote of the Achaeans in virtue of which, four
months before the Romans crossed from Italy, they levied
a war from their own territory upon Antiochus and the
Aetolians, when nearly all the other Greeks had become
estranged from the Roman friendship." Having listened to
this speech and approved of the speaker's view, the ten com-
missioners granted that the complimentary erections to Phiio-
poemen in the several cities should be allowed to remain.
Acting on this pretext, Polybius begged of the Consul the
statues of Achaeus, Aratus, and Phiiopoemen, though they
had already been transported to Acamania from the Pelo-
ponnesc : in gratitude for which action people set up a marble
statue of Polybius himself.^ . . .
16. After the settlement made by the ten commissioners
Polybius will have i*^ Achala, they directed the Quaestor, who was
no confiscated to superintend the selling of Diaeus's property, to
goods. allow Polybius to select anything he chose
from the goods and present it to him as a free gift, and to
sell the rest to the highest bidders. But, so far from accept-
ing any such present, Polybius urged his friends not to covet
anything whatever of the goods sold by the Quaestor any-
where : — for he was going a round of the cities and selling the
property of all those who had been partisans of Diaeus, as
well of such as had been condemned, except those who left
children or parents. Some of these friends did not take his
1 The base of a statue of Polybius has l)ecn discovered at 01>'mpia with
the inscription y\ ir6X(( ^ rwv 'HXefwi' IIoXi//3toi' Ai'/c6pra Mc7aXoToX£/rT7»'. But
the statue mentioned in the text seems to be one set up by the Achaeans.
For the statues of Polybius, see Introduction, pp. xxxi. xxxii.
xxxix ROMAN SETTLEMENT OF GREECE 539
advice ; but those who did follow it earned a most excellent
reputation among their fellow-citizens.
16. After completing these arrangements in six months,
the ten commissioners sailed for Italy, at the g^c. 145.
beginning of spring, having left a noble monu- The commission-
ment of Roman policy for the contemplation of ^^ "[^'"^ ^'^.^^^^
all Greece. They also charged Polybius, as instractioS'^'itfi
they were departing, to visit all the cities and to Polybius to ex-
decide all questions that might arise, until such P^^^° the new
, -It* constitutions.
time as they were grown accustomed to their
constitution and laws. Which he did : arid after a while
caused the inhabitants to be contented with the constitution
given them by the commissioners, and left no difficulty con-
nected with the laws on any point, private or public, un-
settled
[Wherefore the people, who always admired and honoured
this man, being in every way satisfied with the ^ . ^ {' a
conduct of his last years and his management of Polybius as to
of the business just described, honoured him the effect of his
with the most ample marks of their respect both ^f^^"^ ftiifiiment
, . , . ,.- *^ , - , . , 1 A , t • of his commission.
during his hfe and after his death. And this
universal verdict was fully justified. For if he had not
elaborated and reduced to writing the laws relating to the
administration of justice, everything would have been in a
state of uncertainty and confusion. Therefore we must look
upon this as the most glorious of the actions of Polybius.] . . .
17. The Roman Proconsul, after the commissioners
had left Achaia, having restored the holy Mummius acted
places in the Isthmus and ornamented the in Greece with
temples in Olympia and Delphi, proceeded to ^^^^ ^^^^ ^^
, /. 1 • • ^ . \ , - great moderation.
make a tour of the cities, receivmg marks of
honour and proper gratitude in each. And indeed he
deserved honour both public and private, for he conducted
himself with self-restraint and disinterestedness, and ad-
ministered his office with mildness, although he had great
opportunities of enriching himself, and immense authority in
Greece. And in fact in the points in which he was thought to
have at all overlooked justice, he appears not to have done it
for his own sake, but for that of his friends. And the most
S40 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS book
conspicuous instance of this was in the case of the Chalddian
horsemen whom he put to death. ^ . . .
18. Ptolemy, king of Syria,' died from a wound received
Death of Ptolemy*" ^^^ J^ ' a man who, according to some.
iniiiometor in a deserved great praise and abiding remem-
war in Syria in brance, and according to others the reverse. If
Dcmori" *ihe ^"^ ^*"^ before him ever was, he was mild and
younger against benevolent ; a very strong proof of which is that
Alexander Baias. he never put any of his own friends to death on
See above, ^^^ charge whatever ; and I believe that not a
single man at Alexandria either owed his death
to him. Again, though he was notoriously ejected from his
throne by his brother, in the first place, when he got a clear
opportunity against him in Alexandria, he granted him a
complete amnesty; and afterwards, when his brother once
more made a plot against him to seize Cyprus, though he got
him body and soul into his hands at Lapethus, he was so far
from punishing him as an enemy, that he even made him grants
in addition to those which formerly belonged to him in virtue
of the treaty made between them, and moreover promised him
his daughter. However, in the course of a series of successes
and prosperity, his mind became corrupted ; and he fell a prey to
the dissoluteness and effeminacy characteristic of the Egyptians:
and these vices brought him into serious disasters. . . .
CONCLUSION OF THE HISTORY
19. Having accomplished these objects, I returned home
from Rome, having put, as it werp, the finishing-stroke to my
whole previous political actions, and obtained a worthy return
for my constant loyalty to the Romans. Wherefore I make my
* Thebac quoquc ct Chalcis, quae auxilio fucrant, dirutae. Ipse L. Mum-
mius abstinentissimum virum egit ; ncc quidqiiam ex iis opibus omamentisque,
quae praedives Corinthus habuit, in domuni ejus pervenit. Lixy, Ep. 52.
* Ptolemy Philometor, king of Egypt, is called, by way of distinction, "King
of Syria," because that title was l)estowed on him by the people of Antioch
during his last expedition in Syria. This was undertaken in support of
Alexander Bnlas, who repaid him by conniving at an attempt upon his life.
Whereupon Ptolemy joined Demetrius, the son of £)cmetrius Soter, and sup-
ported his claim against Alexander Balas. Joseph. Ant. 13, 3 ; 1 Maccabees
II, 1-13.
XXXIX SUMMARY OF THE WORK 541
prayers to all the gods that the rest of my life may continue in
the same course and in the same prosperity ; for I see only
too well that Fortune is envious of mortals, and is most apt to
show her power in those points in which a man fancies that he
is most blest and most successful in life.
Such was the result of my exertions. But having now
arrived at the end of my whole work, 1 wish
to recall to the minds of my readers the See 1^3^ and
point from which I started, and the plan which
I laid down at the commencement of my history, and then
to give a summary of the entire subject. I announced then at
starting that I should begin my narrative at the point where
Timaeus left off, and that going cursorily over the events in
Italy, Sicily, and Libya — since that writer has only composed a
history of those places, — when I came to the time when Han-
nibal took over the command of the Carthaginian army; Philip
son of Demetrius the kingdom of Macedonia ; Cleomenes of
Sparta was banished from Greece ; Antiochus succeeded to the
kingdom in Syria, and Ptolemy Philopator to that in Egypt, — I
promised that starting once more from that period, namely the
139th Olympiad, I would give a general history of the world :
marking out the periods of the Olympiads, separating the
events of each year, and comparing the histories of the several
countries by parallel narratives of each, up to the capture of
Carthage, and the battle of the Achaeans and Romans in the
Isthmus, and the consequent political settlement imposed on
the Greeks. From all of which I said that students would
learn a lesson of supreme interest and instructiveness. This
was to ascertain how, and under what kind of polity, almost
the whole inhabited world came under the single authority of
Rome, a fact quite unparalleled in the past. These promises
then having all been fulfilled, it only remains for me to state
the periods embraced in my history, the number of my books,
and how many go to make up my whole work. . . .
I.— SHORTER FRAGMENTS
The first eight of these fragments belong to book 6, but as
they do not fall in 7vith what remains of the text, I have placed
them here, I have divided these fragtnents into tu^o classes :
(A) those which seem to have some distinct reference which can
be recognised or guessed : {B) those which though fairly complete
in themselves cannot be so classed, A good many more, generally
quoted by Suidas for the sake of some one 7Vordy did not seem
worth /cutting in an English dress. The numbers in brackets
are those of Hultsclis text.
I (6, 2)
I believe Rome to have been founded in the
second year of the 7th Olympiad.^
B.C. 751.
^ Dionysius Hal. (1, 74) (]uotcs this statement of Polybius with the remark
that it is founded on a single tablet in the custody of the Pontifices, Various
calculations as to the dale were : —
I">aloslhones
follow oil l>y
AfK)llodorus
Nojx^s
Dionysius
Lulalius
(J. Fabius Picl<»r
Tiniaeus
L. Cincius Alimantus
M. Pore i us Calo
\'arro )
Vellcius Palcrculus \
Pomi>onius Allicus .
Olymp. 7, I
K.C. 752.
Olymp. 8, I . . . B.C. 748.
38th year liefore Olymp. i . B.C. 813.
Olymp. 12, 4 . . . B.C. 729.
432 years after the Trojan war. B.C. 752.
Olymp. 6, 2 . . RC. 755.
Olymp. 6, 3 . . . RC. 754.
Hut even grantinjj a definite act of foundation (on which see Mommscn, //. of
A\ vol. i. p. 4), the 01ymj)ic register before 672 B.C. is a very uncertain founda-
tion on which to build, ^s^aa Journal of Hellenic ^Studies, vol. ii. p. 164 sq.
SHORTER FRAGMENTS 543
II (6, 2)
Polybius, like Aristodemus of Elis, informs us that the
register of the athletic victors at the Olympic
games began to be kept from the 27 th
Olympiad, at which Coroebus of Elis was first registered as
conqueror in the stadium ; and this Olympiad was regarded
as an era by the Greeks from which to calculate dates.^
III (6, 2)
The Palatine was named after Pallas, who died there. He
was the son of Heracles and Lavina, daughter of Evander.
His maternal grandfather raised a barrow as his tomb on this
hill, and called the place after him the Pallantium.
IV (6, 2)
Among the Romans women are forbidden to drink wine ;
and they drink what is called passutfiy which is made from
raisins, and tastes very like the sweet wine of Aegosthena or
Crete. This is what they drink to quench their thirst. But
it is almost impossible for them to drink wine without
being found out. For, to begin with, the woman has not
got the charge of wine ; and, in the next place, she is bound
to kiss all her male relatives and those of her husband, down
to his cousins, every day on seeing them for the first time ;
and as she cannot tell which of them she will meet, she has
to be on her guard For if she has but tasted wine, there is
no occasion for any formal accusation.^
V (6, 2)
He also founded Ostia at the mouth of the Ancus Marcius,
Tiber. Livy, i, 33.
^ From Eusebius. It may be noted that this statement of Polybius is an
earlier evidence than any other for the existence of an Olympian register prior
to B.C. 600. Pausanias also dates the register from the year of Coroebus's
victory (5, 8, 6).
^ I have translated this passage as it stands in the various editions of
Polybius. But I feel convinced that none of it belongs to him except the first
sentence. It comes from Athenaeus, 440 E,
544 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS
VI (6, 2)
Lucius, the son of Demaratus of Corinth, came to Rome
Lucius Tarquinius relying on his own ability and wealth, and con-
Priscus comes to vinced that the advantages he possessed would
Rome. place him in the front rank in the state : for
he had a wife who, among other useful qualities, was admir-
ably suited by nature to assist in any political enterprise.
Arrived at Rome, and admitted to citizenship, he devoted
himself to flattering the king ; and before very long his wealth,
his natural dexterity, and, more than all, his early training,
enabled him so to please the king's taste that he gained his
cordial liking and confidence. As time went on his intimacy
became so close that he lived with [Ancus] Marcius, and
assisted him in managing his kingdom. While so engaged,
he contrived to make himself useful to every one. All who
were suitors for anything found in him an active supporter
and friend : his wealth was spent with noble liberality and
judgment on various objects of national importance ; and thus
he secured for himself the gratitude of many, and the goodwill
and good word of all, and finally obtained the throne. . . .^
Every branch of virtue should be practised by those who
aim at good training, from childhood, but, above all,
courage. . .
(6, I)
An impossible lie admits of no defence even.
(6,1)
It is the act of a wise and sensible man to recognise — as
Hesiod puts it — "how much greater the half is than the
whole." 2
VII (6, i)
To learn sincerity towards the Gods is a kind of image of
truthfulness towards each other.
^ Sec Li^y, i, 34. Dionys. Halic. 3, 46.
^ Hesiod, Works and Days, 40, yijirtoi* oihk (<raat¥ 6(T(fi rX^oy iifutru
Travrbi,
SHORTER FRAGMENTS 545
VIII (6, i)
It generally happens in the world that men who acquire
have a natural turn for keeping ; while those who succeed to
wealth, without any trouble to themselves, are apt to squander it.
IX (10)
The strongest fortifications are in general dangerous to
both sides ; which may be illustrated from what occurs in the
case of citadels. These last are regarded as contributing
greatly to the security of the cities in which they stand, and to
the protection of their freedom ; but they often turn out to be
the origin of slavery and indisputable misfortunes.^
X(i3)
Some few approved of his doing so, but the majority ob-
jected, saying, some that it was folly, and others that it was
madness for a man thus to risk and hazard his life, who was
quite unacquainted with the kind of fighting in use among
these barbarians. 2
XI (16)
** Secure retreat in case disaster fall."
One ought always to keep this line in mind. From failing
to do so Lucius the Roman ^ met with a grave disaster. So
narrow is the risk of destruction to the most powerful forces
when the leaders are unwise. A sufficient illustration to
thoughtful men is furnished by the headstrong invasion of
Argos by Pyrrhus king of the Epirotes,* and the expedition
through Thrace of king Lysimachus against Dorimichaites,
king of Odrysae ; ^ and indeed many other similar cases.
^ Polybius is perhaps referring to the Acrocorinthus especially. But we
must remember that many of the citadels in the third century B.C. were in the
hands of Macedonian garrisons.
* This has been referred by some to the account of Scipio Aemilianus's
single combat with the Spaniard. See 35, 5.
' Perhaps L. Postumius, Livy, 23, 24 (Hultsch).
* B.C. 272. Plutarch, Pyrrh. 31-34.
* .*<ee Pausan. i. 9, 6. His disaster compelled him to give up his domi-
nions Ix^yond the Danube. Another and more successful war in Tliracc secm«
referred to in Diod. Sic. 18, 14.
VOU II 2 N
546 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIVS
XII (23)
Marcellus never once conquered Hannibal, who in fact
remained unbeaten until Scipio's victory.^
XIII (25)
No darkness, no storm however violent, turned him from
his purpose. He forced his way through all such obstacles ;
he overcame even disease by resolute labour, and never once
failed in an object or experienced a variation in his uniform
good fortune.
XIV (29)
In old times single combats among the Romans were con-
ducted with good faith [but in our days many contrivances
have been hit upon].
XV (31)
The horse, from the agony of the wound, first fell forward,
and then galloped furiously through the middle of the camp.
XVI (42)
Seeing that the superstitious feelings of the soldiers were
roused by these portents, he exerted himself to remove the
scruples of the men by means of his own intelligence and
strategic skill.
XVII (63)
SHIPS WITH SIX BANKS OF OARS
These vessels appear to be as swift sailers as penteconters,
but to be much inferior to triremes ; and their construction has
been abandoned for many years past. Polybius, however, is
supposed to lay down the measurements of such vessels, which
the Romans and Carthaginians appear to have often employed
in their wars with each other.-
^ Livy, however, records more than one success of Marcellus against
Hannibal, see 23, 16, 46 ; 27, 14. Scipio's victory of course is at Zama.
3 From Zosimus, 5, 20, 7. Sec i, 26.
SHORTER FRAGMENTS 547
XVIir (64)
Getting completely drunk, and all flung on the ground in
the various tents, they neither heard any word of command
nor took any thought of the future whatever.^
XIX (66)
In consultations of war, as in those relating to bodily sick-
ness, one ought to take as much account of the symptoms
that have since arisen as of those originally existing.
XX (90)
Cappadocia extends from Mount Taurus and Lycaonia up
to the Pontic Sea. The name is Persian and arose thus. A
certain Persian [named Cappadocus ?] was present at a hunt
with Artaxerxes, or some other king, when a lion sprang upon
the king*s horse. This Persian happened to be in that part of
the hunting company, and drawing his sword rescued the king
from his imminent danger and killed the lion. This Persian
therefore ascending the highest mountain in the neighbourhood
received as a gift from the king as much territory as the
human eye could take in, looking east, west, north, and south.^
XXI (95)
The Celtiberians have a peculiar manoeuvre in war.
When they see their infantry hard pressed, they dismount and
leave their horses standing in their places. They have small
pegs attached to their leading reins, and having fixed them
carefully into the ground, they train their horses to keep their
places obediently in line until they come back and pull up the
pegs.
XXII (96)
The Celtiberians excel the rest of the world in the con-
struction of their swords ; for their point is strong and service-
^ Some refer this to a circumstance narrated in Livy, 41, 2. But Hultsch
points out that Livy is not using Polybius in that period.
' From Constantitu Prophyrogenneta de thematis, p. 18, ed. Bonnensis
(Hultsch). He says that there are two Cappadocias, great and little. Great
Cappadocia extending from Caesarea (Nco-Caesarea), and Mount Taurus to the
Pontus, bounded on the south-west by the Halys and on the east by V
548 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS
able, and they can deliver a cut with both edges. Wherefore
the Romans abandoned their ancestral swords after the
Hannibalian war and adopted those of the Iberians. They
adopted, I say, the construction of the swords, but they can
by no means imitate the excellence of the steel or the other
points in which they are so elaborately finished.^
XXIII (102)
The Roman praetor Marcus * wished to get rid of the war
against the Lusitani, and laying aside war altogether, to shirk —
as the saying is — "the men's hall for the women's bower,"
because of the recent defeat of the praetor by the Lusitani.
(103)
But those of the Ligurians who fought against Mago were
unable to do anything important or great
XXIV (113)
A mora consisted of nine hundred men.^
XXV (117)
A general needs good sense and boldness; they are the
most necessary qualities for dangerous and venturesome under-
takings.
XXVI (154)
The second king of Egypt, called Philadelphus, when
giving his daughter Berenice in marriage to Antiochus king of
Syria, was careful to send her some Nile water, that the young
bride might drink no other water.
XXVII (156)
I say this to point out the wisdom of the Romans, and the
folly of those who despise the practice of making comparisons
with the habits of foreign nations, and believe themselves com-
petent to reform their own armies without reference to others.*
^ See 6, 23. The excellence of Spanish steel has never perhaps been sur-
passed even to our day. ' See 35, 2-4.
8 Plutarch, Pelop. 17, who says that other authorities reckoned it at 500
and 700 men. There were originally six morae in the Spartan army. See
Xenophon, Rep, Lac, 11, 4 ; Hell, 6, 4, ia-17. "* See 6, 25.
SHORTER FRAGMENTS 549
XXVIII (157)
The Romans were wont to take great care not to appear to
be the aggressors, or to attack their neighbours without provoca-
tion ; but to be considered always to be acting in self-defence,
and only to enter upon war under compulsion.^
XXIX (166)
When Scipio Africanus, the younger, was commissioned by
the Senate to settle the kingdoms throughout the world, and see
that they were put in proper hands, he only took ^yt slaves
with him ; and, on one of these dying during the journey, he
wrote home to his relations to buy another and send him to
take the place of the dead one.*
XXX (184)
If one ought to speak of Fortune in regard to such things ;
for I fear she often gets credit of that sort without good reason ;
while the real fault lies with the men who administer public
business, who sometimes act with seriousness and sometimes
the reverse.
XXXI (i)
But not making at all a good guess at the king's mind, he
acted in a most inconsiderate manner.
XXXII (2)
Want of civilisation appears to have an extraordinary in-
fluence on mankind in this direction.
XXXIII (3)
But the general being unable to endure the unfairness of
those who made these assertions ...
* This is referred by Nissen to the account of the origin of the third Punic
war. See 36, 3-5.
' This moderation in the number of slaves was perhaps imitated from Cato.
See Cato, Orationum frgm. 3. Ed. Jordan.
550 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS
XXXIV (5)
But he determined to hold out to the last, trusting to the
supplies from Egypt.
XXXV (6)
But having fallen in with him he gained an extremely
fortunate victory.
XXXVI (7)
In all these things the Aetolians had been deceived.
XXXVII (8)
And some he honoured with gold cloths and spears,
because he wished that his promises should agree with his
performances.
XXXVIII (11)
He wrote in bitter and frantic terms, calling them fiends
and murderers in his letter, if they abandoned the positions
thus disgracefully, before they had suffered or witnessed any
hardship.
XXXIX (12)
There is a courage in words too which can despise death.
XXXIX (14)
Before he had been rejoined by the stragglers of the
skirmishing parties.
XL (27)
Being utterly at a loss, at last he rested his chance of
escape from the difficulty which was upon him on some such
hope as this.
XLI (30)
None of the citizens being aware of what was taking place
owing to the distance, for the city was a large one.
XLIl (32)
But trusting to them he undertook the war against
Ariarathes.
SHORTER FRAGMENTS 551
XLIII (34)
Harpyia is a city in lUyria near Encheleae, to which
Baton, charioteer of Amphiaraus, removed after the latter's
disappearance.
XLIV (35)
And he waited for the coming of Hasdrubal.
XLV (36)
Hearing all this through the curtain the king laughed.
XLVI (39)
Foreseeing and fearing the fierce temper and obstinacy of
the men.
XLVI I (40)
At that time, persuaded that he was enduring a fiery test,
he was released from the suspicion.
XLVIII (43)
He thought therefore that it was dangerous to have shared
in their enterprise when their plan had failed and come to an
end.
XLIX (44)
Having urged the soldiers to make haste, and exhorted the
tribunes to engage.
L (46)
Thinking it better and safer not to be present at the hour
of the enemy's opportunity, nor when they were under the
influence of popular excitement and fury.
LI (47)
Whenever it is possible to obtain satisfaction from those
who have wronged us either by law or by any other settled
forms of justice.
LII (54)
Having drawn his army from the pass he encamped.
552 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIVS
L" (55)
And then they took up some sort of order, as though by
mutual consent, and fought the battle in regular formation.
LIII (56)
That which causes the most pain at the time involves also
the most signal revulsion of joy.
LIV (57)
Having ordered the pilots to steer the ships as fast as they
could to Elaea.
\N (61)
They not only drove themselves off the stage, but ruined
also all Greece.
LV (62)
But he, from his long experience of war, did not all lose
his presence of mind.
LVI (67)
He persuades them by reckoning all the wealth he con-
sidered they would gain in the battle.
LVII (68)
The Romans had been inspired by some divine influence,
and having fortified their courage with irresistible might . . .
LVII (69)
To signalise some by favours, and others by punishments,
that they might be a warning to the rest.
LVIII (72)
And they, being persuaded, and throwing themselves in the
way of the enemy^s charge, died gallantly.
ux (73)
He tried to take the city by an intrigue, having long
secured a party of traitors within it.
SHORTER FRAGMENTS 553
LX (74)
He brought up the transports, by lading which with rocks
and sinking them at the mouth of the harbour he planned to
shut out the enemy entirely from the sea.
LXI (80)
Though I have much more to say, I fear lest some of you
may think that I am unnecessarily diffuse.
LXII (81)
'I'hey are reserving themselves for an opportunity, and are
quite ready to meet them again.
LXIII (85)
To be eager for life and to cling to it is a sign of the
greatest baseness and weakness.
LXIV (86)
He was feeling something like starters in horse races, which
are started by the raising of torches.
LXV (88)
Their boldness transgresses the bounds of propriety, and
their actions are a violation of duty.
LXV (91)
Seeing that the Carthaginians had obeyed all injunctions
in the most honourable spirit.
LXVI (92)
To have fifty ships built entirely new, and to launch fifty
of those already existing from the docks.
LXVI I (100)
Lucius being appointed to go on a mission to the Lapateni
and speak to them in favour of an unconditional surrender,
was unprepared for the task before him.
554 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS
LXVIII (loi)
Of all the determining forces in war the most decisive of
failure or success is the spirit of the combatants.
LXIX (104)
Having mentioned summarily the defeats they had sus-
tained, and putting before them the successes of the Mace-
donians.
LXX (105)
For he perceived that the Macedonian kingdom would
become contemptible, if the rebels succeeded in their first
attempt
LXXI (109)
Therefore it was intolerable that the Romans even then
should make their way into Macedonia unobserved.
LXXII (no)
He, if any one of our time has done so, has examined all
that has been said scientifically on tactics.
LXXin (in)
Metrodorus and his colleagues, frightened at the threaten-
ing aspect of Philip, departed.
LXXIV (112)
The Romans made no show of bearing a grudge for what
had taken place.
LXXV (113)
But putting both spurs to his horse he rode on as hard as
he could.
LXX VI (114)
Being annoyed at the treaty, Nabis paid no attention to its
provisions.
LXXVn (120)
It was neither possible to examine the man closely in his
state of physical weakness, nor to put a question to him for
fear of worrying him.
SHORTER FRAGMENTS 555
LXXVIII (122)
The Pannonians having seized the fort at the beginning of
the war, had taken it as a base of operations, and had fitted it
up for the reception of booty.
LXXIX (124)
But wishing to point the contrast between his policy to
those who trusted and those who disobeyed him, he com-
menced the siege.
LXXX (126)
So that those in the assembly were thunderstruck and un-
able to collect their thoughts, sympathising with the poignant
sorrow of those thus dispossessed of their all.
LXXXI (131)
They immediately sent a courier to Perseus to tell him what
had happened. (132) It was Perseus's design to keep it close,
but he could not hide the truth.
LXXXII (133)
In other respects he was well equipped for service, but
his spear was limp.
LXXXI II (134)
Publius was anxious to engage and avail himself of the
enthusiasm of the barbarians. (135) He put in at Naupactus
in Aetolia. (136) He escorted Publius out with great respect.
(137) Having received Publius and Gaius with kindness and
honour.
LXXXI V (140)
It was the deliberate intention of the Romans to fight at
sea.
LXXXV (141)
While they were still together and were fighting at close
quarters with their swords, taking his stand behind them he
stabbed him under the armpit.
556 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS
LXXXVI (151)
This man presented Prusias with many silver and gold cups
during the banquet.
LXXXVII (153)
Taking a wise view of the future, he came to the conclusion
to get rid of the garrison sent by Ptolemy.
LXXXVIII (158)
On that occasion both Romans and Carthaginians bivouacked
on the embankment.
LXXXIX (159)
Not being able to persuade him again, owing to that king's
cautious and inactive character, he was forced to offer five
hundred talents. And so Seleucus agreed to give the aid.
XC (161)
Chance and Fortune, so to speak, enhanced the achieve-
ments of Scipio, so that they always appeared more illustrious
than was expected.
XCI (162)
One must not pass over even a minor work of his, as in
the case of a famous artist.
XCII (163)
Scipio counselled him either not to try, or to do so in such
a manner as to succeed at all risks. For to make an attempt
on the same man twice was dangerous in itself, and was apt to
make a man altogether contemptible.
XCIII (164)
But being jealous of Scipio they tried to decry his achieve-
ments.
XCIV (168)
Fixing the stocks upright in the ground in a semicircle
touching each other.
SHORTER FRAGMENTS 557
XCV (170)
The important point of their resolution was that they would
not admit a garrison or governor, and would not give up their
constitution as established by law.
XCV (177-179)
He said that we should not let the enemy escape, or en-
courage their boldness by shirking a battle. . . ,
Conceiving a slight hope from the besieged garrison, he
made the most of it. . . .
Pretending warm friendship, he tried every manoeuvre
whereby he might promote the enemy's interests, and surround
us by the gravest perils. . . .
XCVI (182)
As the rock caused them difficulty because they were obliged
to bore a hole in it, they completed the mine which they were
making by using wooden bolts.
XCVII (183)
He did not think it right to leave the war in Etruria, and
give his attention to the cities in that part of the country. He
feared that he should waste all the time, which was not very
long to begin with, in less important details.
XCVni (185)
And having got his boats and hemioliae dragged across the
Isthmus he put to sea, being anxious to be in time for the
Achaean congress.
XCIX (191)
Philip was annoyed at the request of the Corcyreans.
C (192)
Since circumstances debar Philip, the king wishes to give
that man the credit of the achievement, making the proposal
to him in the light of a favour.
5S8 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIVS
CI (193)
Philip, having given out that he was about to serve out
rations, made a proclamation that a return should be made to
him of all who had not provisions for more than thirty days.
CII (19s)
After two days from starting for the seat of war Philip passed
the order to make two rations three, whenever he wanted an
additional day, and sometimes to make two four. (? Cp. Livy,
35, 28.)
cm (195)
A swipe (</>p€aTOT07ravov) is one of the implements mentioned
by Polybius. (See 9, 43, Hultsch.)
CIV (199)
It was impossible to convey the equipments and provisions
for the legions by sea or upon beasts of burden ; they must
carry ten days' provisions in their wallets.
II.— GEOGRAPHICAL NAMES
QUOTED BY STEPHANUS AND OTHERS
AS HAVING BEEN USED BY POLYBIUS
Achriane, a town in Hyrcania.
Adrane, a town in Thrace.
Aegosthena, a town in Megaris.
Allaria, a town in Crete.
Ancara, a town in Italy.
Aperanteia, a city and district in Thessaly.
Apsyrtus, an island off Illyricum.
Ares, plain of, " A desolate plain in Thrace with low trees."
Arsinoe, a town in Aetolia and in Libya.
GEOGRAPHICAL NAMES 559
Atella, a town of the Opici, in Campania. "The Atellani
surrendered."
Badiza, a town in Bruttium.
Babrantium, a place near Chios.
Cabyle, a town in Thrace.
Calliope, a town in Parthia.
Candasa, a fort in Caria.
Carthaea, one of the four cities of Ceos.
Corax, a mountain between Callipolis and Naupactus.
Cyathus, a river in Aetolia, near Arsinoe (a tributary of the
Achelous).
Dassaretae, an lUyrian tribe.
Digeri, a Thracian tribe.
EUopium, a town in Aetolia.
Gitta, a town in Palestine (Gath).
Hella, in Asia, a port belonging to Attalus.
Hippo (Regius), a town in Libya.
Hyrtacus, a town in Crete.
Hyscana, a town in Illyria.
Ilattia, a town in Crete.
Lampeteia, a town in Bruttium.
Mantua, in N. Italy.
Massyleis, a Libyan tribe.
MeHtusa, a town in Illyria.
Oricus (m.), a town in Epirus, "The first town on the right as
one sails into the Adriatic"
Parthus, a town in Illyria,
Philippi, a town in Macedonia.
Phorynna, a town in Thrace.
Phytaeum, a town in Aetolia.
Rhyncus, in Aetolia.
Sibyrtus, a town in Crete.
Singa, a town in Libya.
Tabraca, a town in Libya.
Temesia, a town in Bruttium.
Volci, a town in Etruria.
Xynia, a town in Thessaly.
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBWS
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APPENDIX III 563
APPENDIX III
I, 21. The capture of Cornelius Asina is ascribed by Livy
{Ep. 17) to an act of treachery, per fraudem velut in, colloquium
evocatus captus est He is copied by Florus (2, 2) and Eutropius
(2, 10). See also Valerius Max. 6, 6, 2. This is perhaps not
incompatible with the narrative of Polybius, which, however, does
not suggest it. He must have been released at the time of the
entrance of Regulus into Africa, for being captured in B.C. 260,
we find him Consul for B.C. 254, without any account of his
release being preserved.
I, 32-36. — XANTHIPPUS THE LACEDAEMONIAN
The fate of Xanthippus has been variously reported. Polybius
represents him as going away voluntarily, and Mommsen sup-
poses him to have taken service in the Egyptian army. Appian,
however, asserts that he and his men were drowned on their way
home to Sparta by the Carthaginian captains who were conveying
them, and who were acting on secret orders frorfi home (8, 4).
Mommsen also regards the account of Polybius of the reforms
introduced in the Carthaginian tactics by Xanthippus as exag-
gerated : " The officers of Carthage can hardly have waited for
foreigners to teach them that the light African cavalry can be
more appropriately employed on the plain than among hills and
forests." The doubt had apparently occurred to others [Diodor.
Sic. fr. bk. 23.] The mistake, however, was not an unnatural one.
For other references to Xanthippus see Cicero de Off, 3, 26, 7 ;
Valerius Max. i, i, 14 ; Dio Cassius, fr. 43, 24.
I, 34. — M. ATILIUS REGULUS
No more is told us of the fate of Regulus, and Mommsen says
** nothing more is known with certainty." Arnold, following
Niebuhr, declared the story of his cruel death to be a fabrication.
The tradition, however, of his mission home to propose peace, his
subsequent return after advising against it, and his death under
torture, was received undoubtingly by the Roman writers of the
time of Cicero and afterwards. See Cicero, Off. 3, § 99 ; ad Att,
16, II; de Sen, § 74 ; Paradox, 2, 16 ; Tusc. 5, § 14. Horace,
5^4 THE HISTORIES OF POLYBJUS
Od, 3, 5 ; Livy, Ep. i8 ; Valerius Max. i, i, 14 ; Dio Cassius,
fr. 43, 28. To Appian (8, 4) is due the additional particular of the
barrel full of nails, icai avrov 01 Kapvi^vioi Ka^c^a^vrcs cv
yaAeayp^ K€VTpa vdvroStv €\ov(rQ Su<f>0€if>av, Against this
uniformity of tradition is to be set the silence of Polybius. But
on the other hand, in this introductory part of his history, Polybius
does not profess to give full particulars (see note to i, 21) ; and
in the case of Regulus, he has not stated what we learn from Livy
(Ep. 18) and Valerius Max. 4, 4, 6, that his stay in Africa for
the second year was against his own express wish, his private
business requiring, as he thought, his presence in Italy.
I, 60. — LUTATIUS
Lutatius is represented by Polybius as directing the oper-
ations at the battle of Aegusa ; but it appears that he had
received some hurt a few days before, and was confined to his
lectica during the action (lectica claudum jucutsse). The chief
direction therefore devolved upon the praetor, Q. Valerius Falto,
who accordingly claimed to share his triumph, but was refused
on the technical ground that the victory had not been won under
his auspicia, Valerius Max. 2, 8, 2.
I, 76. — HAMILCAR
(Vol. i. p. 85.) Dr. Warre writes on the manoeuvre of
Hamilcar as follows : " Hamilcar's army is in column of route ;
elephants leading, then cavalry, then light-armed infantry, and
heavy-armed infantry in the rear. He observes the enemy bearing
down hastily ; gives orders to his whole force to turn about, and
then forms line (c^croo-t?) by successive wheels of his heavy-armed
troops. He would thus have changed his heavy-armed from
column of route into line by wheeling them while retiring to the
right (or left) about. The light-armed apparently passed through
the intervals ; the cavalry halted when they came to the line now
formed up, and at once turned to their front and faced the enemy,
and the remainder marched forward to meet them. Polybius
does not tell us with what front Hamilcar was marching ; but I
think it is clear that he was in column of route and not in battle
array {Ik TrapaTo^coi?). Thus the deployment of his columns,
while retiring^ by right {or left) about wheel into line by successive
(TvvTay/iaTa, or battalions, would be a very pretty manoeuvre, and
only such as an able tactician would resort to."
APPENDIX III
565
II, 22-23. — SCIPIO AND HASDRUBAL SON OF GESCO
(Vol. ii. p. 67.) Of this passage Dr. Warre has again favoured
me with a note and a translation which I append : " The passage in
Polybius is very interesting. It is a good tactical example of an
attack on both flanks, refusing the centre, the effect being to keep
the enemy from moving the troops in his centre to the assistance
of his wings. The inversion of order, by which the right became
the left in the case of those troops who had first orders * right
turn, left wheel from line into column,' and then * left wheel into
line,' is an ordinary instance of doing what might be called
• clubbing ' a battalion or brigade. It is of course on parade a
clumsy mistake to make ; but Scipio rightly took no notice of it
in battle, as Polybius, who sees the matter with a soldier's eye,
observes. Scipio's army was inferior in numbers, and so he first
moved his Romans outwards while still in line, and then formed
for attack with the cavalry, light infantry, and three battalions
(cohorts) on each flank.'*
C Rtaht
Original Right
now become Left . 1
HigMja
t
I
/
^0
Left^ U«J
'Right leading
Left
Right
B
As In line. Then Right turn- left wheel.
A
The following is Dr. Warre*s translation : —
"Polybius II, 22. — On this occasion Scipio seems to have
employed two stratagems. He observed that Hasdrubal was in
566 THE HISTORIES OF POL YBIUS
the habit of marching out late in the day, of keeping his Libyan
troops in the centre, and of posting his elephants in front of each
wing. His own custom was to march out at the said hour to
oppose him, and to set the Romans in his centre opposite to the
Libyans, while he posted his Spanish troops upon his wings. On
the day upon which he determined to decide matters he did the
reverse of this, and thereby greatly assisted his forces towards
gaining a victory, and placed the enemy at no small disadvantage.
At daybreak he sent his aides and gave orders to all the tribunes
and to the soldiers that they were first to get their breakfast,
and then to arm and to parade in front of the ramparts. This
was done. The soldiers obeyed eagerly, having an idea of his
intention. He sent forward the cavalry and light infantry, gfiving
them joint orders to approach the camp of the enemy, and to
skirmish up to it boldly ; but he himself took the heavy infantry,
and at sunrise advanced, and when he had reached the middle of
the plain formed line in just the opposite order to his previous
formation. For he proceeded to deploy the Iberians on the
centre and the Romans on the flanks."
• •••••••
" For a while the Romans remained as usual silent, but
after the day had worn, and the light infantry engagement was
indecisive and on equal terms, since those who were hard
pressed retired on their own heavy infantry and (ck fura^okrj^
Ka'5i'i'€V€a'), after retreating formed again for attack, then it
was that Scipio withdrew his skinnishers through the inter-
vals of the troops under the standards, and divided them on
either wing in rear of his line, first the velites, and in suc-
cession to them his cavalr>^, and at first made his advance in
line direct. But when distant (? five) furlongs from the enemy he
directed the Iberians to advance in the same formation, but gave
orders to the wings to turn outwards (to the right wing for the
infantry to turn to their right, and to their left to the left). Then
he himself took from the right and Lucius Marcius and Marcus
Junius from the left the three leading squadrons of cavalry, and
in front of these the usual number of velites, and three cohorts
(for this is the Roman term), but the one body wheeled to the left
and the other to the right, were led in column against the enemy,
advancing at full speed, the troops in succession forming and
following as they wheeled. . . .
(They were in line, and the cavalry and velites got the word
turn, left wheel, and the infantry right wheel and forward, />. the
APPENDIX III 567
light troops and cavalry wheeled from their outer flank, and the
heavy infantry from their inner flank.)
** And when these troops were not far oflf the enemy, and the
Iberians in the line direct were still a considerable distance
behind, as they were advancing slowly, they came in contact with
either wing of the enemy, the Roman forces being in column
according to his original intention.
" The subsequent movements by which the troops in rear of
these columns came into line with those leading were exactly the
reverse, generally, in the case of the right and the left wings, and
particularly, in case of the light troops and cavalry and the heavy
infantry. For the cavalry and velites on the right wing forming
to the right into line were trying to outflank the enemy, but the
infantry formed on the contrary to the left. On the left wing the
cavalry and light infantry left formed into line, and the heavy
infantry right formed into line. And so it came to pass that on
both wings the cavalry and light troops were in inverted order, />.
their proper right had become their left. The general took little
heed of this, but cared only for that which was of greater im-
portance, the outflanking of the enemy ; and rightly so, for while
a general ought to know what has happened, he should use the
movements that are suitable to the circumstances."
34, 5, 10. — PYTHEAS
The date of these voyages of Pytheas is uncertain beyond the
fact that they were somewhere in the 4th century B.C. His
Periplus, or notes of his voyage, was extant until the 5th
century A.D. The fragments remaining have been published by
Arvesdson, Upsala, 1824. The objection raised by Polybius to
the impossibility of a poor man making such voyages is sometimes
answered by the supposition that he was sent officially by the
Massilian merchants to survey the north of Europe and look out
for places suitable for commerce. The northern sea, which he
describes as " like a jellyfish through which one can neither walk
nor sail," is referred " to the rotten and spongy ice which some-
times fills those waters." This is assuming Thule to be Iceland.
Tacitus supposed it to be Shetland (Agr. 10), and described the
waters there as sluggish, and not subject to the influence of the
wind. See Elton (Origins of English History^ pp. 73-74). Elton
quotes Wallace {Concerning Thule^ 3 1 ), who comments on Tacitus
by saying, ** This agrees with the sea in the north-east of Scotland.
568
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS
not for the reason given by Tacitus, but because of the contrary
tides, which drive several ways, and stop not only boats with oars
but ships under sail."
34, lO. — THE SUBTERRANEAN FISH
Schweighaeuser in his note on this passage quotes Aristotle (U
Anim, 6, 15, who states that gudgeon thus hide themselves in the
earth ; and Seneca, Nat, g., 3i 1 7 and 1 9, who refers to the fact
piscem posse vivere sub terra et effodiy and quotes an instance as
occurring in Caria. See also Livy, 42, 2, who, among other
prodigies occurring in B.C. 173, says, in Gallico agro qua inducere-
tus aratrum sub exsistentibus glebis pisces emersisse dicebantur.
Eels and other fish have been found in the mud of ponds long
after the ponds have been dried up. The truer account is given
in Strabo (4, 1,6): " There was a lake near Ruscino, and a
swampy place a little above the sea, full of salt, and containing
mullets (KC(rr/?€ts), which are dug out ; for if a man dig down
two or three feet, and drive a trident into the muddy water, he
may spear fish which is of considerable size, and which feeds on
the mud like the eels."
INDEX
The references are to Books and Chapters^ except where the volume and
page of this translation are indicated by vol. — /, — / Fr. indicates the minor
fragments at the end of vol. ii.
Abba, town in Africa, 14, 6, 7
Abia, town in Messenia, 23, 17
Abila, town in Palestine, 5. 71 ; 16,
39
Abilyx, a Spaniard, 3, 98, 99
Abrupolis, a Thracian prince, 22, 8
Abydus, town in Asia Minor, on the
Hellespont, 4, 44 ; 5, m ; 16, 29-
35 ; its situation and fall, 18, a.
44 ; 34. 7
Academy, the, 12, 26c ; 16. 27
Acamania, 4, 6, 30, 63, 65, 66 ; 5, 3-5 ;
9, 34 ; 28, 4, 5 ; 30, 13 ; 32, 20 ;
89, 14
Acarnanians, 2, 6, 10, 45, 65, 66 ; 4,
5, 9, IS, 25, 30, 63 ; 5, 3-6, 13.
96 : 9, 32, 38-40 ; 10, 41 ; 16,
32 ; 21, 29, 32 ; 24, 12 ; 28, 5
Acatides, a Theban runner, 39, 7
Acerrae, a town of the Insubres, 2, 34
Acesimbrotus of Rhodes, 18, 1,2
Achaeans, the, 1, 3, passim ; appealed
to by the Epirotes, 2, 6, 9, 10, 12 ;
the rise of their league in the Pelo-
|x>nnese, 2, 37-70 ; assist Mes-
senians against the Aetolians, and
call in Philip v., 4, 1-19, 22 ; pro-
claim war with Aetolians, 4. 25-27.
See also 36, 59-85 ; agree to fuirnish
Philip with subvention. 5, i ; join
Philip in his invasion of Laconia, 5,
18-24 f harassed by Aetolians, 5, 30,
35 ; elect Aratus after the incap-
able Strategus Epcratus, 5, 91-95 ;
make peace with the Aetolians, 5,
101-105 ; instructed in military
exercises by Philopoemen, 10, 23 ;
at war with Machanidas of Sparta,
11, 11-18 ; Philopoemen summons
a levy at Tegea to invade Laconia,
16, 36, 37 ; incUne to Philip's part
against Rome, 16, 38 ; send envoys
to the congress at Nicaea, 18, 1-8 ;
receive back Corinth by the advice
of Flamininus, 18, 45 fin. ; and
Triphylia and Heraea, 18, 47 ;
offer to help the Boeotians, who
however abandon their alliance,
20, 4, 5; Megara leaves their league,
20, 6 ; make alliance with Eumenes,
21, 9 ; Roman legates at the con-
gress at Cleitor, 22, 2 ; Eumenes
offers 120 talents to the congress at
Megalopolis, Seleucus 10 ships of
war, 22, 10-12 ; difficulty as to the
renewal of a treaty with Ptolemy,
22, 12 ; Q. Caecilius before the
congress at Argos remonstrates on
the subject of Sparta, 22, 13;
their deading with Messene after the
murder of Philopoemen, 23, 16-18 ;
send an embassy to Rome in re-
gard to Messene, 24, i ; Ptolemy
presents the league with 10 ships
of war, 24. 6 ; the league officers
condemn Chaeron of Sparta for the
murder of A|x>llonides, 24, 7 ; de-
bate in the assembly as to the
570
INDEX
orders from Rome about the Spartan
exiles, 24. io-i2; attitude to-
wards Rome, 24, 13-15; ordered to
guard Chalcis for Rome, 27, 2 fin. ;
Gaius Popilius and Gnaeus Oc-
tavius address the congress, 28.
3 ; decide to take the side of
Rome against Perseus openly, 28.
12, 13; two embassies at Alexandria,
28, 19. 20 ; the two Ptolemies ask
their help against Antiochus, 29.
23-25; Romanising party in Achaia.
80. 13 ; embassy to Rome, 81, 6,
8 ; 32. 7, 17 ; 88. i, 3 ; Cretans
ask the Achaeans for help, 88.
16 ; Achaean detenus released,
86. 6 ; Thessalians ask for help
against the pseudo - Philip, 87, 2 ;
asked to send Polybius to Lily-
baeum. 37, 3 ; dissolution of the
league by the Romans, 88, 3-1 1 ;
89, 7-17 ; Achaean assembly or
congress, at Aegium, 2, 54 ; 4, 7,
26. 82 ; 6, I ; 16, 27 ; 28, 3 ; at
CUiior, 22, 2 ; at Corinth, 29, 23 ;
33, 16 ; 88, 10 ; at Megalopolis,
23, 10, 16 ; at Sicyon^ 6, i ; 23.
17 ; 28, 13 ; 29, 24 ; election of
magistrates, 4, 37, 82 ; 6, i ; 80,
7 ; soldiers, 29, 24 ; arms, 11, 9 ;
cavalry, 10, 23 ; ships, 2. 10
Achaeus, son of Xuthus, the mythical
ancestor of the Achaeans, 39. 14
Achaeus, son of Androniachus,
nephew of Laodice, mother of An-
tiochus the Great, 4, 2, 48-91, 51 ;
6, 40-42, 57, 58,61, 66, 67, 72, 78,
87, 107, III ; 7, 17 ; 8, 2 ; his
capture and death, 8, 17-23
Achaia Phthiotis, 18, 46 ; 47, 7
Achelous, river, 4, 63 ; 6, 6-7, 13
Achradina, a part of Syracuse, 8, 5, 6
Acilius Glabrio, M',, consul B.C. 191,
20. 9. 10 ; 21, 3-5
Acilus, Gaius, 33, 2
Acrae, a town iaAetolia, 5, 13
Acriac, a town in Laconia, 6. 19
Acrocorinthus, the citadel of Corinth,
1900 feet high, 2, 43, 45- 50- S^-
52, 54; 4, 8; 7, II ; 18, 45
Acrolissus, citadel of the Illyrican city
of Lissus. 8. 15. 16
Acte, the, east coast of Laconia, 6,
Actium, temple and town in Acar-
nania, on the narrowest point
of the Ambracian gulf, 4, 63
Acusilochus, an Asiatic ruler, 25, 2
Adaeus, governor of the town of
Bubastus in Egypt, 16, 27
Adaeus of Beroea, legate of Perseus
to Genthius, 28, 8
Adeiganes, a magistrate at Seleucus on
the Tigris, 6, 54
Adeimantus of Sparta, 4, 2a, 23
Adherbal, a Carthaginian general in
the first Punic war, 1, 44, 46, 49,
50. 52. 53
Admetus, put to death by Philip V. ,
28, 10
Adriatic Sea, the, 1, 2 ; 2, 14, 16,
17, 26; 8. 47. 61, 86-88, zio ;
10, 1 ; 24, 3 ; 82. 23 ; 84, 6, 7
Adrumetum, a city in Africa, 15, 5.
15
Adua or Addua, the river Adda, a
tributary of the Po, 2. 32 ; 84.
10
Adys, a town in Afiica, 1, 30
Aeacidae, descendants of Aeacus
(Peleus, Achilles, Telamon, Ajax),
5, 2
Aecae, a town in Apulia, 8, 88
Aegae, a town in Aeolis, 6, 77 ; 88,
13
Aegean Sea. 8, 2 ; 16, 34
Aegina, island, 9, 42 ; 11, 5 ; 22, 11
Aegira, a town in Achaea, 2, 41 ; 4,
57. 58
Aegitna, a town of the Oxybii, a
Ligurian tribe, 38, 10, 1 1
Aegium, chief town of the Achaean
league, 2, 41, 55 ; 4, 57 ; 5, 30,
loi, 102 ; 16. 38 ; meetings of the
congress at, 2, 54 ; 4, 7. 26, 82 ;
6, I ; 16, 27, 28 ; territory of, 5,
94
Aegosagae, a tril>e of Gauls invited
into Asia by Attains, 6, 77, 78,
III
Aegospotami, the Goat's river, on the
Hellespont, 1, 6 ; 12, 25)^
Aegusa, one of the Aegates (Fari-
I gnano), 1, 60
INDEX
571
Aegusae (the Aegates), 1, 44
Aegys, a town in Laconia, 2. 54
Aemilia, wife of Scipio Africanus the
elder, and sister of Aerailius PauUus,
82, 12-14
Aemilius Lepidus, M., consul &c.
232, 2, 21, 22
Aemilius Lepidus, M. , consul B.c
187. 16, 34 ; 22. 3 ; 28, i ; 82.
21
Aemilius Papus. L., consul B.C 225.
2. 23, 26.31
Aemilius Paullus. M., consul B.C. 255,
I. 36, 37
Aemilius Paullus, L., consul &C 219
and 215. 8, 16, 18, 19, 106, 107,
116, 117 ; 4, 37, 66 ; 6, 108 ; 15,
II
Aemilius Paulus Macedonicus, L.,
consul B.C. 182 and 168, 18, 35;
29, I, 7. 10. 14. 15. 17. 20 ; 80,
9, 10, 13, 16, 19; 81. 3; 32. 8,
II. 12. 14. 15. 21 ; his wives. 82, 8
Aemilius Regillus, L., praetor B.c.
190, 21. 8. 10, 24
Aena, a temple at Ecbatana, 10. 27
Aeneas Tacticus (middle of 4th cent
B.C.), 10. 44
Aenianian Giilf(= Sinus Maliacus), so
called from the Aenianes. 10, 42
Aenus, a town in Thrace, mod. Enos,
G, 34 ; 32, 9, 15 ; 80, 3
Aeolian Islands. See Liparae
Aeolis, a district of Mysia between
the rivers Carius and Hermus, 6,
77 ; ai. 13. 14
Aeolus, king of the Winds, 84, 2,11
Aerenosii, a Spanish tribe, 3, 35
Aeschrion, a Romanising Acamanian,
28. 5
Aethaleia, name of the island of
Lemnus, 84, 11
Aethiopia, 8. 38 ; 84, 16
Aetna, Mt., 1, 55
Aetolians, the, 1, 3, etc.; attack
Medion, 2, 2*4 ; help the Epirotes
against the Illyrians, 2, 6-12 ; en-
gage in the Social war, 2, 37 ;
make peace with the Achaeans, 2,
44 ; make alliance with Antigonus
Doson, and Cleomenes of Sparta,
2, 45-49 ; refuse Antigonus passage.
2, 52 ; joined by Mantinea. 2, 57,
58 ; intrigue with Antiochus, 3, 6,
7 ; invade Messenia, 4, 9-19, 22-27,
29-31. 34-37. 53-59. 61-67, 77-8o,
84 ; attacked by Philip V., 5, 2-
14 ; attempt to invade Thessaly, 6.
17 ; evade peace with Philip, 6,
29. See also 30, 35, 63, 91, 92,
95. 96. 99. 100-103, 105, 107;
attend a conference at Sparta, 9,
28-39 ! attack Acarnania. 9, 40 ;
in alliance with Rome against
Philip, 10, 25, 26, 41, 42 ; receive
a legation from Rhodes on the sub-
ject of peace, 11, 4-7 ; distress and
revolutionary measures, 18, 1, 2 ;
fresh offence with Philip, 15, 23 ;
in alliance with Nabis, 16. 13 ; at
the battle of Panium, 16, 18 ; ad-
dressed by Roman envoys in Nau-
pactus, 16, 27 ; attend a conference
at Nicaea, 18. i-io ; fight on the
Roman side in Thessaly, 18, 19 ;
their superiority in cavalry, 18, 22 ;
discontented with their share of
spoil after Cynoscephalae, 18, 27,
34. 38, 39 ; claim Heraea, 18, 42 ;
discontented with the Roman settle-
ment of B.C. 196, 18. 45 ; claim
Pharsalus, 18, 47 ; addressed by
Roman legates, 18. 48 ; once in
league with Achaeans against
Boeotia, 20. 4 ; submit uncondition-
ally to Rome after the battle of
Thermopylae, 20, 9-11 ; the Roman
terms with, 21, 3-4 ; six months'
truce allowed them in which to ap-
peal to the Senate, 21, 5, 8 ; the
Romans proclaim war with them,
21, 25-32 ; sell Aegina to Attains,
22, II ; Gaius Popilius andOnaeus
Octavius order them to give hostages,
28. 4 ; their violence and habits of
pillage, 80, 11 ; improvement after
the death of Lyciscus, 82, 19 ; their
principle of "spoil from spoil," 18.
4 ; their character and habits. 2. 3.
4, 45, 46, 49 ; 4, 67 ; 9, 38 ; 18,
4, 34 ; their officers. 21, 32
Agathagetus of Rhodes. 27, 7 ; 28. 2
Agatharchus, a Syracusan sent as
I ambassador to Carthage, 7, 4
572
INDEX
Agatharchus, son of Agathocles* king
of Syracuse, 7. 2
Agathinus of Corinth, 6, 95
Agathoclea, daughter of Aristomenes,
15, 39
Agathoclea, mistress of Ptolemy
Philopator, 14, 11 ; 16. 25. 31-33
Agathocles, king of Syracuse, 1, 7,
82 ; 8, 12 ; 9, 23 ; 12, 15 ; 15,
35
Agathocles, son of Oenanthe and
guardian of Ptolemy Epii^ianes, 6.
63 ; 14, II ; 15, 25-36
Agathyma, a city on the north coast
of Sicily, 9, 27
Agelaus of Naupactus, 4, 16 ; 6, 3,
103-105, 107
Agema, or guard, in the Macedonian
army, 5, 25 ; in the army of
Ptolemy Philopator, 6, 65, 84 ; in
the army of Aiitiochus Epiphanes,
81, 3
Agepolis of Rhodes, 28, 16, 17 ; 29.
10, 19 ; 80. 4
Agesarchus of Megalopolis, father of
Ptolemy, governor of Cyprus, 15,
25 ; 18, 55
Agesias, an Achaean, 80. 13
Agesilaus II., king of Sparta. 8, 6 ;
9, 8, 23 (B.C. 398-361)
Agesilaus, son of Eudamidas, 4. 53
Agesilochus of Rhodes, 27, 3 ; 28, 2,
16 ; 29, 10
Agesipolis, son of Cleombrotus XL,
king of Sparta, 4, 35
Agesipolis III., king of Sparta, son of
the last, 4. 35 ; 23, 6 (b.c. 221)
Agesipolis of Dyme, 5, 17
Agetas, Aetolian Strategus, 5, 91, 96
Agones, a tribe of Cisalpine Gauls, 2,
15
Agrai, a tribe in Aetolia, 18, 5
Agrianes, a Thracian tribe, 2, 65 ; 5,
79 ; 10, 42
A^^igentum, in Sicily, 1, 17-20, 27,
43 ; a. 7 ; 9. 27; la, 25
Agrigentus, a river, 9. 27 ; mod.
Fiume di S, Biagio, which joins
the Hypsas (mod, Drago)
Agrii, 25, 4
Agrinium, a city of Aetolia, near the
Achclous, 5, 7
Agron, king of the Illjrrians. 2, 2, 4
Alabanda, dty in Caria, 6, 79 ; 16.
24; 30, S
Alba, in Latium, 2, 18 ; 87, a
Alcaeus of Messene, 82, 6
Alcamenes of Sparta, 4. 22
Alcamenes of Achaea, friend of Diaeos,
89, 10
Alcetas. Boeotian Strategus, 22, 4
Alcibiades, son of Clinias of Athens,
4. 44
Alcibiades, a Spartan exile, 22, i, 15 :
28,4
Alcithus of Aegium, 28, 12, 19
Aletas, discoverer of the silver mines
in Spain, 10, 10
Alexamenus, an Aetolian Strategus,
18, 43
Alexander the Great, 2, 41. 71 ; 8,
6, 59 ; *. 23 ; 5, JO, 55 ; 8. 12 ;
9, 28, 34; 10, 27; 12. 12^. 17,
18, 19, 22 ; 18, 3 ; 22, 8 ; 29. 21 ;
88, 4
Alexander, son of Acmetus, officer 01
Antigonus Doson, 2, 66
Alexander, commander of cavalry to
Antigonus Doson and a minister of
Philip v., 2, 66, 68; 4, 87: 6.
28 ; 7, 12
Alexander of Aetolia, friend of Dori-
machus, 4, 57, 58
Alexander, father of Antigonus, the
legate from Perseus to Boeotia, 27,
5
Alexander, ambassador to Rome from
Attains, 18, 10
Alexander Balas, 38, 15 ; 18, 6
Alexander, king of Epirus, 2, 45 *, 9,
34
Alexander Isius, an Aetolian, 13, i ;
18, 3. 4. 10. 36 ; 21, 25. 26
Alexander, brother of Molo, com-
mander of Persis under Antiochus
the Great, 5, 40, 41, 43, 54
Alexander, tyrant of Pherae in Thes-
saly, 8, I ; 89, 2
Alexander, made governor of Phocis
by Philip v., 5, 96
Alexander of Trichonium, 5, 13
Alexander, tower of, in Thessaly, 18,
27
Alexandria, capital town of Egypt, 2,
INDEX
573
69 : 4, 51 ; 5, 35, 37. 40. 63, 66,
67, 79, 86, 87 ; 7, a ; 12, 25^/; 18,
3; 14. XI ; 15, 25, 26, 30; 16,
10, 22 ; 23. 7, 12 ; 27. 19 ; 28, i,
17, 20, 22, 23 ; 29. 2, 24, 27; 80.
9; 81, 5, 12, 26-28 ; 84. 4. 14 :
89. 18 ; obols of Alexandria. 84,
8
Alexandria Troas, 6. 78, xii ; 21.
13. 14
Alexis, captain of Apamea. 6, 50
Alexo. an Achaean, 1, 43
Alipheira, a city of Arcadia, 4, 77, 78
Allaria. a city of Crete, 6, 63, 65
Allobroges. 8. 49-51
Alpheus, river in the Peloponnese, 4.
77, 78 ; 12, 4^/ ; 16. 17
Alps. 2, 14. 15. 16, 18. 21, 22, 28,
32, 34. 35 ; 8. 34. 39. 47. 48, 50-
56, 60-62, 64, 65 ; 34, 10, 15
Altars, the. See Philaenns
Althaea, a town in Spain. 8, 18
Amaeocritus, Boeotian Strategus. 20,
4
Amanides Pylae, pass between Cilicia
and S3rria. N.N.E. of Issus. 12,
17
Ambradan Gulf, the, 4, 63, 66 ; 6,
5. 18
Ambracus, or Ambracia, 4, 61, 63 ;
18. 10 ; 21, 26 - 30. Sometimes
Ambracia means the territory. 4,
61
Ambrysus. a city of Phocis, 4, 25
Ammonius Barcaeus, an officer of
Ptolemy Philopator, 6. 65
Amphaxitis. a maritime district of
Macedonia on the left bank of the
Axius, 6, 97
Amphiaraus, fr. xliii.
Amphictyonic league, 4, 25 ; 89. 12
Amphidamus, Strategus of Elis. 4,
75. 84, 86
Amphilochians. an Aetolian tribe,
18. 5 : 21. 25
Amphipolis, a city of Macedonia, 29.
6
Amphissa. a city of Locris, 21, 4
Amyce. plain of, near Antioch, 6, 59
Amyclae, a town in Laconia, 6. 18-
20, 23
Amynander. king of the Athamanes,
4, 16 ; 16, 27 ; 18, i, 10, 36, 47 ;
20, 10 ; 21, 25, 29
Amyntas, father of Philip II., 2, 48 ;
22, 8
Amyrus, plain of, in Thessaly, 6, 99
Anacleteria of Ptolemy Epiphanes,
18, 55 ; of Philometor, 28, 12
Anadendritis, a vine, 84, 1 1
Anamares, or Ananes, or Andres, or
Anares, a Cisalpine Gallic tribe. 2,
17. 32. 34
Anas, a river in Spain [Guadiana),
84, 9, 15
Anaxidamus, an Achaean officer of
Philopoemen, 11, 18
Anaxidamus, an Achaean ambassador
to Rome, 31, 6 ; 83, 3
Ancus Marcius, king of Rome, fr. v.
Ancyra, a city of Galatia, 21, 39
Anda, a city in Libya, 14, 6
Andania, a city in Messenia, 6, 92
Andobales (or Indibilis), king of the
Ilergetes, 8, 76; 9, 11 ; 10, 18, 35,
37, 40 ; 11, 26, 29, 31, 33 ; 21, II
Andosini, a Spanish tribe, 3, 35
Andranodorus of Syracuse, 7. 2, 5
Andreas, physician of Philopator. 6,
81
Androlochus of Elis, 6, 94
Andromachus, father of Achaeus, 4,
51 ; 8, 22
Andromachus of Aspendus, an officer
of Ptolemy Philopator. 6, 64, 65,
83, 85, 87
Andromachus, ambassador from
Philopator to Rome, 88, 8
Andronicus, ambassador of Attains,
82. 28
Andronidas, a Romanising Achaean,
29, 25 ; 80, 23; 89, 10, 11
Androsthenes of Cyzicus, 11, 34
Aneroestes, king of the Gaesatac, 2.
22, 26, 31
Aniaracae, a tribe in Media, 6, 44
Anicius Gallus, L., praetor B.c. 168,
80, 14 ; 82, 20 ; 83, 9
Anio, river in Latium, 9, 5, 7
Antalces of Gortyn in Crete, 22, 19
Antalcidas, 1, 6 ; 4. 27 ; 6, 49
Antanor of Elis. 6, 94
Antenor. ambassador of Perseus to
Rhodes, 27, 4, 14
574
INDEX
Anticyra, in Locris. 9, 39 ; in Phods,
18. 45 : 27, 16
Anligoneia, a city of Epinis, 2, 5, 6
Antigoneta, games at Sicyon in honour
of Antigonus Doson, 38, 19 ; 80,
Antigonus the One-eyed, successor of
Alexander the Great in Syria, B.C
323-301.1,63; 5,67; 10,27; 18,
3; 28, 20
Antigonus Gonatas, king of Mace-
donia, son of Demetrius Poliorcetes,
B.C 283-239, 8, 41, 43-45; 9.
29, 31, 32, 34, 38 ; 18, 6 ; 20, 6
Antigonus Doson, grandson of
Demetrius PoUorcetes, guardian of
Philip v., and really king of
Macedonia, B.C 229-220, 2, 45,
47-70 ; 8, 16 ; 4, I, 3, 6, 9, 16,
22, 34, 69, 76, 82, 87 ; 6, 9, 16,
24. 34. 35. 63, 89, 93 ; 7, II : 9,
29, 36 ; 20. 5
Antigonus, son of Alexander, an am-
bassador from Perseus to Boeotia,
27, 5
Antilibanus, a mountain in Coele-
Syria, the eastern range of Lebanon,
B. 45. 59
Antimachus, a friend of Perseus, 29. 6
Antinous of Epirus, a friend of
Perseus, 27, 15 ; 30, 7
Antioch in Mygdonia, 6, 51
Antioch on the Orontes, capital of
S>Tia, 6, 43, 59, 60, 87 ; 81, 17 ;
32. 4
Antiochis, sister of Antiochus the
Great, 8. 25
Antiochus I., Soter, king of Syria B.C.
280-261, 81, 7
Antiochus II., Theos, king of Syria
B.C. 261-246
Antiochus Hierax, son of Antiochus
II.. ob. B.C. 227, 6, 74
Antiochus III., the Great, king of
Syria B.C. 223-187, 1, 3 ; 2, 71;
3, 2, 3, 6, 7, II, 12, 32 ; 4, 2, 37,
48. 51 ; 6, I, 29, 31, 34,40-71, 73,
79-87, 89. 105, 109 ; 7, 15-18 ; 8.
18-23, 25 ; 10, 27-31, 49 ; 11, 34;
13. 9 ; 16, 20. 25, 37 ; 16, 18, 19,
22, 27, 39 ; 18, 39, 41, 43. 45. 47-
52 ; 20, 1-3, 7-11 ; 21, 2, 4, 6,
8-ai, 24. 25, 33, 43-48 ; 2S. 4. 5 ;
28, 14 ; 24. 13. 15 : 80, 4 ; 88. i.
4, 20 ; 89. 6 ; 89, 14. 19 ; his
treaty with Rome, 81, 45
Antiochus IV. , Epiphanes. second son
of Antiochus the Great, king of
Syria B.C. 175-164, 8, 3 ; 16, 18,
19 ; 26, I ; 27. 7, 19 ; 28. i, 17-
23 ; 29, 2, 4, 24, 26. 27 ; 80, 17 ;
81, 3-6. 9, II, 12, 21 ; 88, 18
Antiochus V., Eupator, son of Epi-
phanes, king of Syria B.C 164-162.
81, 12. 19
Antiochus, another son of Antiochus
the Gieat according to the historian
Zeno, 16, 18, 19
Antipater, guardian of Alexander the
Great's son Philip III., and practi-
cally king in Macedonia B.C 323-
319, 6, 10 : 9, 29. 30 ; 18, 13
Antipater, nephew of Antiochus the
Great, 6, 79. 82, 87 ; 16, 18 ; 21,
16, 17, 24
Antipatria, a town of the Illyrian
Dassaretae, on the River Apsus, 6,
108
Antiphanes of Berga. a proverbial
liar (whence ^pyat^cuf), 34, 6
Antiphatas, of Gortyn in Crete, 33,
16
Antiphilus, an ambassador of Pmsias,
82, 28
Antipolis, a colony from Marseilles
{An/ ides), 33, 7
Antisthcnes of Rhodes, 16. 14-15
Antium, in Latium, 8, 22, 24
Antonius, M., Trib. PI. B.C. 167, 80,
4
Aous, a river in IU3rria (^iVja), 6,
no ; 27, 16
Apameia, a town in Syria (Kulak-el-
Mudik), 6, 45, 50, 56, 58, 59
Apameia, a town in Phrygia (Denair)^
21. 43-45. 48
Apasiacae, a Nomad tribe between the
Oxus and the Asiatic Tanais, 10,
48
Apaturius Gallus, assassin of
Seleucus III.. 4, 48
Apega, wife of Nabis, 13, 7 ; 18, 17
Apclaurum, a mountain in Arcadia, 4.
69
INDEX
575
Apelles, guardian and friend of Philip
v., 4. 76, 82, 84.87 : 5, I ; he
conspires against the king, 6, 2, 4,
14, 16. 26-29
Apelles, another friend of Philip V. ,
22. z8 : 28. I
Apennines, the. 2. 14. 16, 17. 24 ; 8,
90, no ; 83. II
Aperantia, a district and city of
Thessaly, 20. 13 ; 21. 25
Aphrodite of Eryx, 1, 55 ; 2, 7 ;
temple of, at Pergamum, 18, 2,
6 ; near Saguntum, 3. 97
Aphther, a Libyan, 32, 2
Apia, plain of, a city of Phrygia, 6,
77
Apis, a harbour in Egypt, 81. 26. 27
ApocUti, magistrates of the Aetolians,
4, 5 ; 20. I ; cp. 21, 4
Apodoti. an Aetolian tribe, 18, 5
Apollo of the Greeks and Cartha-
ginians, 7. 9 ; temples of Apollo
at Amyclae, 6, 19 ; at Delphi. 39,
17 ; at Thermus, 11. 7 ; near Tera-
nus. 82, 27 ; statue of, at Sicyon,
18. 16 ; sacred land of, in Sicyonia,
ih\^ ; mound of, at Tarentum, 8.
Apollodorus, governor of Susiana, 6,
54
Apollodorus, tyrant of Cassandreia, 7,
7
Apollodorus, secretary of Philip V.,
18. I. 8
Apollodorus, Boeotian ambassador,
23. 16
Apollonia, town in Illyria, 2, 9. 11 ;
6. 109. no ; 7, 9 ; 84. 12
Apollonia. a city of Assyria. 6. 43, 44,
51.52
Apollonia. a city of Crete. 28. 14
Apollonias, wife of Attains I. . 22. 20
Apollonidas of Sicyon, 22, 11, 15. 16;
28. 6
Apollonides of Sparta, 24. 7
ApoUonides of Clazomenae, 28. 19
ApoUonius of Clazomenae, 28. 19
ApoUonius, a friend of Seleucus IV. .
31. 21 ; and his son ApoUonius,
81, 19. 21
Apollophanes of Sdeucia, a physician,
5, 56, 58
Apro, a river in Liguria (some would
read O0a/>o$ Varus the Var), 33.
II
Aptera, a town in Crete, 4, 55
Apuleius Saturninus. L. , 82, 28
Apustius. P., 82, I
Aquileia, on the Adriatic. 34. 10, 11
Arabia, 6. 71 ; Arabians, 6, 71, 79,
82. 85 ; 18, 9
Arachosia, district in Asia, 11, 34
Aradus, an island off the coast of
Phoenicia {Ruad), 6, 68
Aratthus, a river in Eplhis, 21, 26
Aratus of Sicyon, son of Clinias. his
history, 1, 3 ; 2. 40 ; 4. 2 ; his
policy and character, 2. 40. 43-52,
56-60 ; 4, 6-12, 14, 19, 24, 37. 67,
76, 82, 84-87 : 5, I, 5. 7. 12. 15'
16. 23, 26-28, 30. 91-103 ; 7. II ;
his death. 8. 14. See also 9. 17.
23 ; 10, 22 ; 24. 6 ; 34. 14. Vol
i. p. 283, note.
Aratus. the yoimger, son of the last,
a. 51 ; *. 37. 60, 67. 70, 72, 82 ;
6, I ; 7. II ; 24. 6. 10
Araxus. promontory of Achaia, 4, 59,
65
Arbo. a city in Illyria. 2. 11
Arbucala. a city of the Vaccaei in
. Spain, 8. 14
Arcades, a city in Crete. 4. 53
Arcadia and the Arcadians. 2, 38, 54,
56, 62 ; 4. 17, 20, 21, 33, 70-77 ;
6. 2 ; 12. 4 ; 18. 14 ; 39. 7 ; prac-
tice of music in, 4. 20, 21
Areas, the ancestor of the Arcadians,
*. 77
Arcesilas of Pitane, academical philo-
sopher, 10, 22
Arcesilaus, ambassador of the Lace-
daemonian exiles, 23, 6
Arcesilaus of Megalopolis, 28, 6 ; 29,
25
Archedamus, an Aetolian, 18, 21 ; 20,
9 : SB. 4
Archedicus. a comedy writer, 12. 13
Archias, governor of Cyprus, 88. 5
Archicrates, an Achaean, 89. 10
Archidamus V., king of Sparta, ob.
B.C. 236-235. 4, 35-37 ; 8, I
Archidamus. son of Pantaleon, an
Aetolian. 4. 57-58
576
INDEX
Archimedes of Syracuse, 8. 5, 7-9
Archippus, an Achaean, 89. 11
Archon of Aegira, an Achaean Stratc-
gus in B.C. 189, 171, 169, 22, 13,
14 ; 27. 2 ; 28, 3, 6, 7, 12 ; 29.
23. 25
Ardaxanus, a river in Illyria, 8, 15
Ardca. in Latium, 8, 22, 24
Ardiaei, an Illyrian tribe, 2. 11. 12
Ardyes, a Gallic tribe on the Rhone,
8. 47
Ardys, an officer of Antiochus the
Great. 6. 53, 60
Ares. 7, 9 ; 12. 26 ; plain of, in
Thrace, 18, 10
Arethusa, a spring in Sicily, 12. 4
Areus of Sparta, 22, i. 15. 16 ; 28, 4
Arevaci, a Celtiberian tribe. 86. 2, 3
Arexidamus. a soldier of Machanidas,
11, 18
Argennum, promontory in Ionia, 16, 8
Argolis, 2, 64 ; 4, 36 ; 6, 20, 95
Argos, Argives, 2, 44, 52-54, 59, 64,
70 ; 4, 36, 82, 87 ; 6, 16-18, 20,
24, 91, 92, loi ; 9, 28, 34; 10, 26,
41 ; 16, 12. 16 ; 18, 2, 6, 8, 14,
17; 21, 24 ; 22. 13 ; 23. 9, 12, 13;
27, 2 ; 30. 10 ; 34. 2 ; 39, 8 ;
priestesses at, 12. 11
Argos, Amphilochian, 21, 30
Arianus. of Crete, 8, 18-22
Ariarathes V., king of Cappadocia
B.C. 220-163, 3, 3 ; 4, 2 ; 21, 47 ;
24. I, 8, 9 ; 26, 2 ; 81. 12-14
Ariarathes VI., king of Cappadocia
B.C. 163-130, 8.5; 31, 14, 17;
32. 3. 5, 22, 24 ; 32. 25 ; 33, 6,
12
Aribazus, commandant of Sardis,
7. 17. 18 ; 8, 23
Aricia, in Latium, 3, 22
Aridices, a Rhodian ambassador, 4.
52
Ariminum, on the coast of Umbria
(Rimini), 2. 21, 23; 3, 61, 68,75,
77f 86, 88
Ariobazus of Sardis, 8. 23
Arisba, towTi in the Troad, 6. iii
Aristaenetus of Dyme, 11, 11
Aristaenus, Achaean Strategus B.C.
198, 195, 187, 185. 18. I. 7, 13;
22, 10, 12, 13 ; 24, 13-15
Aristarchus, a Phocaean ambassador,
21,6
.Aristeides of Athens, 9, 33 ; 88. 8
.\risteides, an ambassador of Ptolemy
Epiphanes, 28, 20
Aristeides, a Theban painter QC^r. circ.
B.C 350), 89, 13
Aristocrates, king of Arcadia, 4, 33
Aristocrates, of Rhodes, 88, 4
Aristocracy, 6, 3-8
Aristodamus, an Achaean ambassador,
30, 13
Aristodemus, t>Tant of M^;aIopolis,
10, 22
Aristodemus. of Elis. fr. iL
Aristogciton. of Elis, 6, 94
Aristomachus, tyrant of Argos. 2, 44,
59
Aristomachus, of Corinth, 7, 5
Aristomenes, guardian of Ptolemy
Epiphanes, 16, 31 ; 18, 53, 54
Aristomenes, king of Messenia, 4, 33
Ariston, Aetolian Strategus B.C. 221,
4. 5, 9. 17
Ariston of Megalopolis, 28, 6 ; 29, 25
Ariston of Rhodes, 28. 16
Aristonicus, a eunuch in the Court of
Ptolemy Epiphanes, 22. 7, 22
Aristonicus, a boxer. 27, 9
Aristophantus of Acarnania, 6. 6
Aristotle, the philosopher, 12, 5-8, 11,
23.f24
Aristotle of Argos, 2, 53
Aristotle, Rhodian ambassador. 81, i
Arius, a river in Asia {Hcri Rud\ 10,
49
Armenas, son of Nabis, 21, 2
Armenia, 9. 43 ; 26. 2
Armies, necessary accomplishment for
commanding, 4, 12-20
Armosata, a city of Armenia. 8. 25
Arpani, people of Arpi, in Apulia, 8,
88, 118
Arretium, a city of Etruria (Arexzo),
2, 16, 19 ; 3, 77, 80
Arsaces III., king of the Parthians,
10. 28
.\rsinoc, wife of Ptolemy Philadel-
phus, 16, 25
Arsinoe, sister and wife of Ptolemy
Philopator, 6. 83. 84, 87 ; 16, 25,
32. 33
INDEX
577
Arsinoe. a city of Aetolia, 80, 1 1
Artabazanes, an Asian prince, 6, 55, 57
Artaxerxes II., Mnemon, king of
Persia, 1, 6 ; 12, 25/, B.C. 405-362
Artaxias, a prince in Armenia, 25, 2 ;
81. 17
Artemidonis of Syracuse, 1, 8
Artemis, temples of, near Lusi, 4, 18,
19. 25 ; 9, 34 ; at Abydos, 16, 31 ;
near Pergamum, 32, 27 ; near
Elyma, 81, xi ; worship of, at
Syracuse, 8, 37 ; image of, at Bar-
gylia, 16, 12
Artemisium in Elis, 4, 73
Arunculeius, Gains, 83, i, 9
As, Roman coin, 2. 15 ; 6, 39
Asclepius (Aesculapius), temples of,
at Agrigentum, 1, 18 ; at New
Carthage, 10, xo ; at Ambracia,
21, 27 ; at Pergamum, 82, 27
Ascondas of Boeotia, 20, 5
Asia, one of the three divisions of the
world, 2. 37 ; 8, 37. 38. 59 ; 84, 7-
This side Taurus, = Asia Minor, 3.
3 ; 4, 2, 48 ; 21, 14. 45 ; cp. 6,
34. 90.
Asine, a city in Laconia, 5, 19
Asine, a city in Messenia, 18, 42
Aspasiacae, a Nomad tribe in Asia,
10. 48
Aspasianus, a Mede, 5, 79
Aspasius of Elis, 5, 94
Aspendus, in Pamphylia, 6, 73 ; 21, 35
Aspis, a city in Africa (Clupea), 1, 29,
34. 36
Ass's Back {OnH Monies), 2, 52
Assyrians, 12. 28 ; 89, 6
Astapa, a city in Spain, 11, 24
Asti, a Thracian tribe, 13, zo
Astias (Artemis), 16, Z2
Astymedes, of Rhodes, 27, 7 ; 30, 4,
5, 22 ; 81, 6, 7 : 88, 15
Atabyrium, mountain and town in
Galilee, 6. 70
Athamanes, a tribe in Epirus, 4. 16 ;
16, 27 ; 18. 36 ; 20, 10 ; 21. 25.
31 ; 22. 9 ; 23, I
Athen^, temples of, at Rhodes. 81,
15 ; at Agrigentum, 9, 27 ; at
Sparta (of the Brazenhouse), 4, 22,
35 ; at Itone, 4. 25 ; 26, 3 ;
among the Insubres, 2. 32 ; statue
VOI« II
of, at Alipheira, 4, 78 ; games of,
4, 49
Athens, 5, 27 ; 12, 13, 25. 26 ; 16,
25, 27 ; 38, 4, II ; Olympieium at,
26, X. Athenians, the, their triremes,
1, 63;. assessment of, 2, 62; capture
of Chrysopolis, 4, 44 ; conquered by
Philip II., 6, 10; their adulation of
Ptolemy IV. , 6, 10 ; relieve Man-
tinea, 9, 8 ; their colonies in Thrace,
9, 28 ; suffer under Antipater, 9,
29 ; hostility to Sparta, 12, 6 ; at
Aegospotami, 12 ; 25^^ ; their re-
ception of king Attains, 16, 25, 26 ;
attacked by Philip V., 16, 34 ;
intercede for the Aetolians, 21, 4,
25, 29-31 ; beaten at Chaeroneia,
22, 6 ; addressed by Roman Senate,
24, 12 ; send ambassadors to Alex-
andria, 28, 19, 20; petition the Senate
for Delos and Lemnos, 30, 21 ;
82, 17 : their quarrel with Oropus,
82, 25 ; their resistance to Xerxes,
88, 4 ; their republican constitution,
6, 43» 44. cp. 9, 23 ; their list of
Archons, 12, 11
Athenaeum, a fortress near Megalo-
polis, 2. 46, 54 ; 4, 37, 60, 8 1
Athenaeum, a promontory of Cam-
pania {Promontorium Alinervae,
Punta dtlla Campanella), 34, xi
Athenaeus, son of Attalus I., 28, i ;
81, 9 ; 32, 28 ; 88. i. 13
Athenagoras. a mercenary officer of
Philip v., 18, 22
Athinis, an Egyptian prince, 22, 7
Athymus. See Vultumus
Atilius, Aulus, 27. 2
Atilius Calatinus. A., consul B.C. 258,
254, 1, 24, 38
Atilius Regulus, M., consul B.C. 267,
256, 1. 26. 28-31. 33-35
Atilius Regulus. C, consul B.C. 257,
250, 1, 25. 39, 41-48
Atilius Regulus, M. . consul B.C. 227,
217, 8. 106, 114. 116
Atilius Regulus. Gaius, consul B.C.
225, 2, 23. 27, 28
Atilius Serranus, Gaius, praetor B.C.
218, 3, 40
Atintanes, a tribe in Epirus, %
T. 9
578
INDEX
Atis, a Boian chief, 2, 21
Atlantic Ocean, the, 8. 37. 57. 59 I
16. 29
Atreus, son of Pdops, 84, 2
Atropatei, a tribe in Asia, 6, 44
Attains I., king of Perganyim B.a
241-197, 8, 3 ; 4, 48, 49. 65 ; 5,
^^, 78, X05, X07, III : 9, 30 ; 10.
41, 42 ; 11, 7 ; 16, 1-9. 24.28, 30,
34, 40 ; 18, I, 2, 6, 8, 10, 16, 17,
41 ; 21. 20, 48 ; 22, 11, 20; 82,
22 ; the Athenians name a tribe
Attalica after him, 16, 25
Attains II., succeeds his brother
Eumenes II. B.c. 159-138, 8. 5 ;
81' 39* 43; 88. 20; 28, 11; 24,
5, 8 ; 27, 18 ; 28, 7. 12 ; 29, 6 ;
80. 1-3 : 81, 9 ; 82, 3, 5, 22, 27,
28 ; 88, I, 6. 9, 12 ; 87. 6
Attains III., son of Eumenes II., suc-
ceeded his tmcle B.C. 138-133, 80,
2 ; 38, 18
Attica, valuation of, 2, 72 ; 6, 29 ;
excellence of its silver, 21, 32, 45
Attis, priest of Cybele, 21. 37
Aufidus, river, in Apulia (O/anio), 8.
no ; 4, I
Aurelius Orestes, L,, consul B.C. 157,
31. 12 ; 38. 7. 8
Ausones. in Italy, 34, 11
Autaritus, a leader of Gallic mercen-
aries, 1, 77-80, 85, 86
Autolychus, of Rhodes, 16. 5
Autonous. a Thessalian, 7, 5
Azanis, a district in Arcadia contain-
ing 17 towns {St. Byt.), 4, 70
Azorium, a town of Perrhaebia in
Thessaly, 28, 13
Babylon, 6, 48, 51, 52 ; 9. 43
Babyrtas, a Messenian, 4, 4
Bactra, capital of Bactriana, 29, 12
Bactriana, 10, 48, 49 ; 11, 34
Baebius, L., praetor B.C. 189, 16, x.
4
Baebius Tamphilus, M., consul B.c.
181, 22, 9
Baecula. a town in Spain, 10, 38 ;
11, 20 ; battle of, 10, 39
Bactis. river in Spain (Guadalquivir).
84. 9
Balacer, father of Pnntauchus, 27, 8
Balacer, son of Pantaachus. 29, 4
Balearic slingers, 1, 67 ; 8, 33, 72,
83. 113; 15, II
Ballistae, 9, 41
Bantia, town in IIl3rria, 6, 108
Barathra, in Egypt, 6. 80
Barca. a city in Gyrene, 5. 65
Barcas. See Hamilcar
Bardylis, an Illyrian prince, 89, 2
Bargusii, a Spanish tribe, 8. 35
Bargylia. a town in Garia, 16, 12, 24;
18, 2, 8 ; 18. 44, 48, 50 : gulf of,
16. 12
Barmocarus, a Garthaginian, 7, 9
Bamus, in Macedonia, 84, 12
Bastarnae, tribe on the Danube, 26. 6
Batanaea, in Palestine, 16, 39
Bato, fr. xliii.
Battacus, priest of Gybele, 21, 37
Beacons. See Signals
Belli, a Geltiberian tribe, 85, 2
Belmina, in Arcadia, 2, 54
Benacus, lake, 84, 10
Beneventum, in Samnium, 8, 90
Berenice, daughter of Ptolemy Phila-
delphus, wife of Antiochus II., 6,
58 ; fr. xxvi.
Berenice, wife of Ptolemy Euergetes,
5. 36 ; 15, 25
Berga. in Macedonia, 84, 5, 6
Beroea. in Macedonia, 27, 8 ; 28, 8
Berytus, in Phoenicia (BeinU), 6, 61,
68
Bessi, a Thracian tribe, 23, 8
Bionidas, of Sparta, 4. 22
Bippus, an Argive, 23, 18 ; 24, i, 2
Bithynians, 4. 50, 52 ; 8, 24 ; 87, 7
Bito, of Argos, 22, 20
Bodencus, Gallic name of the Po, 2.
16
Boeae, town in Laconia, 6. 19
Boei. an Illyrican tribe, 6. 108
Boeotarch, 18. 43
Boeotia. Boeotians. 2, 49, 65 ; 4, 9,
15. 25. 67 ; 9, 38 : 10, 41 ; 11. 5 ;
18, 8 : 18, II, 14, 43 ; 20. 2 ; 21,
20 ; 22. 4 ; 23, 16 ; 24, 12 ; 27,
I. 2, 5. 38 ; 82, 20 ; the decline of
Boeotia, 20, 4-7 ; Panboeotian con-
gress. 4, 3 ; 9. 34
Boii, Gisalpine Gauls. 2. 17, 20-24,
28, 30, 31 ; 8, 40, 56, 67
INDEX
579
Bolax, a city of Triphylia in Elis, 4,
77, 8o
Bolis, of Crete, 8. 17-22
Bomilcar, a Carthaginian suifes, 8.
33. 42
Bomilcar, a Carthaginian admiral. 9. 9
Boodcs, of Carthage, 1, 21
Bosporus, Cimmerian (Straits af Yeni
Kali), 4. 39
Bosporus, Thracian (Channel of Con-
stantinopU), 4. 39, 43
Bostarus, Carthaginian general, 1, 30,
79
Bostor, Carthaginian general, 3, 98, 99
Botrys, city of Phoenicia, 6, 68
Botrys, a Messenian writer, 12, 13
Bottia, in Macedonia, 5. 97
Brachylles, a Boeotian, 18, i. 43 ; SO,
S. 7 : M. 4
Braun shields, men with, Mace-
donians, 2, 66, 67 ; Megalopolitans,
&• 65 ; 4, 69 ; in Syrian army, 31. 3
Breasts, the, sandbanks at the mouth
of Danube, 4, 41
Brennus, leader of the Gallic invaders,
4, 46 ; 9, 30. 35
Britain, 3, 57 ; 34, 5, 10
Brochi, in Coele-Syria, 6. 46, 61
Brundisium, in Calabria, 2. ix ; 10.
X ; 21. 24 ; 29, 6 ; 30, 20 ; 38,
20 ; a Bnmdisian, 3. 69
Bruttii, or Bruttium, 1, 56 ; 9, 7, 25,
27 ; 11, 6 ; 13. 10
Bubali, in Africa, 12, 3
Bubastus, in Egypt, 16. 27
Buchetus, in Epinis, 21. 26
Bura, town in Achaia, 2. 41
Bylazora, town in Paeonia, 6, 97
Byttachus, a Macedonian, 5, 79 82
Byzachium, district in Africa, 3 23 ;
12. I
Byzantium and Byzantines, 3, 2 ; its
site and war with Rhodians, 4, 38.
39, 42-52 ; 6, 63, 100. See also 8.
24 ; 11, 4 ; 16, 2 ; 18, 2 ; 22, 18 ;
84, 12
Cadi, a to\%-n in Maeonia, 33. 12
Cadmea, the, citadel of Thel)es, 4, 27
Cadusii, a tribe in Asia, 6, 44. 79
Caecilius Metellus Denter, L., consul
B.C. 284, 2, 19
Caecilius Metellus, L. , consul B.c. 251,
1. 39
Caecilius Metellus, Q., consul ac.
206, 22, I, 6. 9, 13, 15, 16; 23. 2,4
Caecilius Metellus Macedonicus, Q.,
38, 10, II ; 39. 7. 10, II
Caesarea, in Cappadocia, fr. xx.
Calabrians, the, 10, i
Calamae, fort in Messenia, 6, 92
Calamus, a town in Phoenicia, 6, 68
Calchedon, on the Propontis (Chalhe-
don or Kadi-Kivi), 4, 39, 43, 44 ;
15, 23
Calena, or Calela,a fort near Larinum,
3, loi
Cales, in Campania (Calvi), 3, 91
Calicoeni, an Illyrian tribe, 6, xo8
Calleas, of Thespiae, 27, x
Callias, a pancratiast of Athens, 28,
19
Callicrates, of Lcontium in Achaia,
24, 10-12 ; 29, 23.25 ; 30. 13. 23;
31, 8 ; 83, 16 ; 37. 5
Callicritus, a Boeotian, 22. 4
Calligito, of Byzantium, 4, 52
Callimachus, school of, 12. 25^/.
Calliope, a city of the Parthians, 10,
31
Callipolis. a city of Aetolia, 20. 13
Callippus, of Ambracia, 21. 25, 26
Callisthenes, of Olynthus, historian, 4,
33 : 6, 45 ; 12. II, 26
Callistratus, of Ellis, 20. 3
Callonitis, district in Mesopotamia, 6.
54
Calpitus, a city in Galatia, 24, 8
Calycadnus, promontory in Cilicin,
21. 45
Calydonia, district of Aetolia, 4, 65,
95
Calynda, a city of Caria, 31, 15. 16
Camarina, a city in Sicily, 1, 24, 37 ;
12, 25*.
Cambylus, a Cretan, 8. 17-20
Camerinum, a city in Umbria, 2, 19
Cammani, a tribe in Asia, 31. 9
Campania, 3, 90, 91 ; 34, 11 ; the
Campanian Mamertines, 1, 7, 8.
See also 2. 24 ; 3. 118 ; 7, i ; 24,
15
Campus Martins, the, 12, 4^.
Camus, town in Palestine, 6, 70
58o
INDEX
Candavia, mountain in Illyria, 84, 1 2
Cannae, in Apulia, 8, 107 ; battle of,
8, 113- "7 ; 4, I ; 5, 105, no,
III ; 6, II, 58 ; 15, 7, II
Canobus. or Canopus. town in Egypt,
5. 39
Canuleius, ambassador to Egypt, 81.
18
Canusium, town in Apulia, 8. 107
Caphyae, town in Arcadia, 3. 52 ; 4.
II, 12, 68, 70 ; plain of, 4, ii, 13
Capitolium, 1, 6 ; 2. 18, 31 ; 6, 19
Cappadocians, 8. 5 ; 4. 2 ; 5, 43 ;
21, 43 ; **» 8 ; 81, 13, 14. 17 ;
32, 25 ; Cappadocia, extent of, fr.
XX.
Capros, river in Assyria, 5, 51
Capua, 2, 17 ; 8. 90, 91 ; 9, 3-5 ;
26. 2 ; 84, II
Carchi. a tribe in Asia, 6, 44
Cardaces, Asiatic mercenaries of
Antiochus the Great, 6, 79, 82
Caria, 8. 2 ; 6, 36, 41 ; 16. 40 ; 21.
24, 48 ; 22, 5 ; 31. 7. 15 I Carian
war, 16, 12 ; freed from the
Khodians. 30. 5 ; as worthless as a
Carian, 10, 32
Carmania, district in Asia, 6, 79. 82 ;
11. 34
Carneades, Academic philosopher,
vol. ii. p. 466
Cameium, in Laconia, sacred to
Apollo, 6, 19
Carpetani, a tribe in Spain, 3, 14 ; 10,
7
Carseae (or Carcsus), a town in the
Troad, 6, 77
Carsignatus, a Gallic chief in Galatia,
24, 8
Carthaea, a town in Ceos, 16, 40
Carthage, its position, 1, 73, 75 ; its
religion, 3, 25 ; 7, 9 ; 31. 20 ; its
government, 1, 3 ; 6, 43, 47. 5i. 5^ ;
its magistrates, 3. 33. 42, 51 ; its
senate, 1, 21, 68; 6, 51 ; 10. 18;
36. 4 ; the Hundred, 36. 4 ; its do-
minion, 5. 39 ; 9. II ; its navy, 6, 52 ;
its cavalry, 3, no, 117; its oppress-
ive rule, 1, 72. See also 1, 19 ; 6,
52; 11, 19; 14. I. 5: 15,4- Punic
cunning, 3. 78 ; l)oys, 15, 30
Carthage, New, in Spain, 2, 13 ; 3.
13-17. 33. 39. 76, 9s; •. i; «te
situation, 10, 10 ; its capture, 10.
11-16. See also 10. 6, 8 ; 11, 31 ;
34, 9 ; 89. 19
Carthalo, a Carthaginian general. 1.
53.54
Caryneia, a city of Achaia. 2, 41
Carystus, a dty of Euboea, 18. 47
Casius, a mountain on the borders
of Egypt and Arabia Petraea {Ei
Katteh), 6. 80
Caspian, the. See Hyrcanian Sea
Caspian pass, the, in Media. 6. 44
Cassander, son of Antipater, successor
of Alexander the Great in Maise-
donia and Greece B.C 306-296. 2,
41 ; 5, 67 ; 9. 29 ; 12. 13
Cassander, of Aegina. 22, 11
Cassander, of Corinth, 6, 95
Cassander, minister of Philip V., 82,
17. 18
Cassander, an ambassador from
Phocaea, 21, 6
CassiusLonginus, C. consul B.C. 171,
27, 6
Castulo, a town in Spain (Ceulona),
10, 38 ; 11, 20
Catapults, 1, 74 ; 11, II
Caucasus {Hindoo Koosh), 10. 48 ;
11. 34
Caulonia, a Greek dty on the east
coast of Bruttium, 2. 39 ; 10, x
Caunus, a city in Caria, 80, 5, 9, 22 ;
31, I. 7. x6
Cavarus, king of the Gauls in Thrace.
4, 46, 52 ; 8, 24
Celtiberians. in Spain. 3, 5. 17 ; 11.
I 31 ; 14, 7, 8 ; 26. I ; 84. I ; their
I horses and swords, fr. xxi. . xxit
Celtici, a tribe in Baetica, 34, 9
Celts (Polybius seems to use the words
KcXrof and FoXdrcu indifferently).
See Gauls
Cenchreae, the eastern port of Corinth,
a. 59, 60 ; 4. 19 ; 5, 29, loi ; 18.
16
Ccnomani, a tribe of Cisalpine Gauls,
2, 17. 23, 24, 32
Censors, the, 6. 13, 17
Centaurs, the, 8, 11
Ccntenius, Gaius, pro -praetor B.C.
217, 3. 86
INDEX
S8i
Centurions, 6, 24. 30, 36, 41
Ceos, island in the Aegean, 16. a6. 40
Cephallenia, the largest island in the
Ionian Sea [Cephaloni<i\, 8, 3 ; 4.
6; 5, 3-5. 109, no; 21, 26, 30,
3a ; ST, 7
Cephalo. a servant of Aratus. 8, 14
Cephalus, a Molossian, 27, 15 ; 80,
7.8
Cephisodorus, ambassador from
Athens. 18, xo
Ceraeas, an officer of Ptolemy Philo-
pator, 6, 70. 71
Ceraunian Mountains, in Epirus, 84.
6
Cerax, a town in Illyria. 6, 108 —
Cercidas, of Megalopolis, 2, 48, 50.
65
Cercidas, an Arcadian. 18, 14
Cerdna, an island off the lesser Syrtis
(Karkenah), 3. 96
Ceretae, a town in Crete, 4, 53
Cersobleptes, king of the Thracians.
89. 2
Cesbediimi, a temple of Zeus in
Pisidia. 5, 76
Cestros, the, 27. 11
Chaereas, an historian, 8, 20
Chaeron, of Sparta, 28. 4, 18 ; 24, 7
Chaeroneia. in Boeotia, 5, xo ; 18,
14 ; 22, 6 ; 27, i
Chalceia, a town in Aetolia, 5, 94
Chalcidian Mount, in Sicily, 1, 1 1
ChalciSy in Euboea, 5, 2, 26 ; 9, 28 ;
10. 42. 43 ; 18, IX, 45 ; 20. 3, 8 ;
27. 2, 7 ; 88, 5 ; 89, 17
Chaldeans, the, 84, 2
Chalesus, an Aetolian ambassador,
29. 9
Chalkeia, bronu works in Africa, 12, i
Charadra, or -drus, a town in Epirus,
4, 63 ; 21, 26
Chares, an Athenian, 9, 23
Charimortus, a friend of Scopas, 18,
55
Charixenus, an Aetolian, 4, 34
Charmion, of Crete. 22, 19
Charops, of Epirus, father of Machatas,
20, 3 ; 27, IS
Charops, of Epirus, son of Machatas.
27. IS ; 80, 12, 13 ; 81, 8 ; 82,
20, 21
Charybdis, 34, 3
Chattenia, district in Arabia, 13, 9
Chersonese, Tauric. 25, 2
Chersonese, Thracian, 18, $1 ', 21.
15, 22. 48
Chesuphus. an Egyptian. 22, 7
Chilon, of Sparta, 4, 81
Chimarus, of Crete, 29, 6
Chiomara, wife of Ortiago the Gaul,
21, 38
Chiron's villa, near Messene, 4, 4
Chius, island of, 6, 24, 28, 100 ; 11,
4 ; 16, S. 6, 8, 14, 40 ; 18, 22 ;
21. 48 ; battle at, 16, 2-14
Chlaeneas, an Aetolian ambassador,
•. 31. 32, 37 ; speech of, 9, 28-31
Chreraas. an Acamanian, 28, s ! 80,
13 ; 32, 20
jCbryseis, wife of Antigonus Doson, 6,
89
Chrysogonus, an officer of Philip V. ,
5, 9. 17. 97 ; 7. 12 ; 9. 23
Chrysondyon, a city of the Illyrian
Dassaretae, 6, 108
Chrysopolis, on the Bosporus in
Bithynia, 4, 44
Cibyra, a town in Phrygia (Horxoom),
21, 34 ; 80, S> 9
Cilicia, 6, S9. 79. 82 ; 12, 7. 17-ao ;
21, 24 ; 31, 3
Cilician Gates, the, 12, 8, 17
Cineas, of Thessaly, 18. 14
Cineas. a minister of Ptolemy Physcon,
28. 19
Circeii, in Latium, 3, 22, 24 ; 31, 22,
23
Circus maximus, the. 30, 14
Cirrha, in Phocis, harbour of Delphi,
6, 27
Cirta, a town in Numidia, 37, 10
Cissa, a town in Spain, 3, 76
Cissii, a tribe in Susiana, 6. 79, 82
Citadels, dangers of, fr. ix.
Cius, a town of Bithynia, 15, 21, 23 ;
16, 34 ; 18. 3-5, 44
Clarium, a fort near Megalopolis, 4.
6, 25
Clastidium, a town in Cisalpine Gaul
{Casteggio), 2, 34 ; 3, 69
Claudius Caudex, App., consul B.C.
212, t^es Messene and relieves
the Mamertines, 1, 11, 12, 16
582
INDEX
Claudius Pulcher, App., consul B.C.
185, as Trib. Mil. B.C. 197 under
Flamininus meets Philip V. at
Nicaea, 18. 8, 10 ; sent as com-
missioner to Greece B.c. 185, 22.
16-19; 28. 4
Claudius Cento, App., legatus of the
consul Q. Marcius in Achaia. 28.
13 ; sent to Pnisias B.C. 154, 83.
13 (this may be a different man)
Claudius Nero, C, consul B.C. 207,
at the battle of the Metaunis. 11, i
Claudius Pulcher, C, consul B.C 177,
sent to Istria, 26, 4 ; B.C. 167 sent
as legatus to Greece, 80. 13
Claudius Cento, C, sent to Prusias,
88. I
Claudius Marcellus, M., five times
consul B.C. 322, 215 (Suff.), 2x4,
210, 208, 2, 34 ; besieges Syractise,
8* 3'9> 37 • engaged against Han-
nibal in Bruttium, 10, 32 ; fr. xii.
Claudius Marcellus, M., son of the
last, consul B.C. 196, wounded, 10,
32 ; opposes treaty with Philip V. ,
18, 4a
Claudius Marcellus, M., three times
consul B.C 166, 155, 152 ; engaged
in the Celtibcrian war, 86, 2-4 (? fr.
xxiii. )
Claudius l*ulcher. P., consul B.C. 249,
beaten in naval battle off Drepanum,
1. 49-52
Claudius, Tib., a commissioner to
Macedonia, 22, 9
Claudius Pulcher, Tib., praetor B.C.
X78, commissioner to Asia and the
islands, 27, 3
Clazomenae, Ionian city in Asia
Minor, 21, 48 ; 28, 19
Cleagoras, of Rhodes, 81, 15
Cleander, of Mantinea, tutor of Philo-
poemen, 10. 22
Clcarchus, of £lis, 6, 94
Clearchus, tyrant of Heracleia, 89, 2
Cleino, servant and mistress of
Ptolemy Philadelphus. 14, 11
Cleitor, a city of Arcadia, 2, 55 ; 4,
10, II, 18, 19, 25, 70 ; 9, 38; 22, 2
Cleitomachus, an athlete, 27, 9
Clcobis, of Argos, 22, 20
Cleomachus, of Athens, 7, 9
Qeombrotus L, kin^ of Sparta B.C
380-371. 9. 23
Qeombrotus II., kin^ of Sparta B.C
243-240, 4. 35
Cleombrotus, of Rhodes, 89. xo
Cleomenes III., son of Lconidas II.,
king of Sparta ac. 236 -22x,
alliance with the Aetolians. 8, 45 ;
at war with the Achaeans and
Antigonus, 2, 46-70; S. x6, 32;
^} I' 7> 35 : resolute resistance to
by the Achaeans, 4, 76 ; his resi-
dence at Alexandria and death. 6.
34-39 ; his destruction of M^;alo-
polis, 6. 93 ; 9, 18 ; his dealings
with Archidamus, 8. x. See also 1,
13 ; 2, 46, 56 ; 4. 5, 6, 37. 60, 69,
81 ; 6, 9, 24; 8, X ; 9. 23, 29;
16. 25 ; 18, 53 ; 20. 5, 6 ; 89. X9
Cleomenes, son of Cleombrotus II.,
*. 35
Cleomenes, of Thebes, 89. 7
Cleon, of Athens. 9. 23
Clconae, a city on the road from
Argos to Corinth, 2, 52
Cleonaeus, a Rhodian admiral, 16, 9
Cleonicus, of Naupactus, 6. 95, 102;
9, 37 (? the same)
Cleonymus, tyrant of Phlius, 8, 44
Cleopatra, wife of Ptolemy Epiphanes,
28. 20
Clcoptolemus, of Chalcis, 20. 8
Cleostratus, Athenian ambassador, 28.
19
Cleoxenus, author of a code of five
signals, 10, 45
Cletis, ambassador from Spartan
exiles, 23, 18
Clupea, See Aspis
Clusium, town in Etruria, 2, 25
Clusius, a river in Gallia Transpadana
{Chiese), 2, 32
Cnidus, a city of Doris in Asia Minor,
12. 25/-; 80, 8; 81. 16
Cnopias, of Allaria in Crete, an officer
of Ptolemy Philopator, 6, 63, 65
Cnossus, in Crete, 4. 53-55 ; 22. 19 ;
29. 8 ; 31, I
Cocynthus, a promontory in Bruttium
(Punta di Stilo), erroneously stated
by Polybius to be the southcrmost
point in Italy, 2, 14
INDEX
583
Coele-Syria, Hollow Syria, properly
denotes only the plain between
Libanus and Antilibanus. but in
Polybius includes all Palestine and
Phoenicia to the frontier of £^gypt.
Antiochus the Great contends with
Ptolemy Philopator for the posses-
sion of it, 5. 40, 58-87, 105. See
also 1, 3 ; 2, 71 I 8, i, 2 ; 4. 2,
37 ; 5, I, 29, 31, 34. 42, 48, 49 ;
14, 12 ; 16, 18, 22 ; 37, 19 ; 38,
1. 17. ao
Coeranus, ambassador from Smyrna,
18, 52
Colaeus, in Megalopolis, 2, 55
Colchians, the, 4, 39
Colichas, a Spanish chief, 11, ao ; 31,
II
Colobatus (or Cobulatus), a river in
Asia Minor, 21, 35
Coloneia, in Cappadocia, fr. xx.
Colophon, a town of Ionia, 6, 77 ;
21.48
Colossus of Rhodes, the, 6, 88, 89 ;
another in honour of Rome, 31, 15 ;
at Sicyon, 18, 16
Comanus, minister of Ptolemy Physcon,
28.19; 81, 28; 83, I
Comontorins. king of the Gauls near
Byzantium, 4, 45, 46
Compasium, in Aircadia, 32, 3, 10
Concolitanus, king of the Gaesatae, 2,
22, 31
Conii, a Spanish tribe, 10, 7
Conope, a town in Aetolia, 4, 64 ; 6,
6, 7. 13
Consul, power of, 8, 87 ; 6, 12, 13,
15 ; army of, 1, 16 ; 2, 24 ; 3,
107 ; 6, 19. 20, 26 ; 10. 16 ; two
consular armies combined, 3. 72,
no; 6, 32; 10, 16
Contoporia, road from Corinth to
Cleonae, 16. 16
Corbilo, a town in Gaul on the Loire
(Coiron), 84, 10
Corbrenae, a tribe in Asia, 6. 44
Corcyra (Cotfu), 2, 9-12 ; 7, 9 I 21,
32 ; 84. 6. 7 ; 87. 3
Corduba, in Spain (Cordova), 36. 2
Corinth, 2, 12, 43, 51, 52, 54 ; 4. 6,
13, 19, 22, 24, 25, 66-69, 72; 5.
2, 17, 18, 24, 26-29, 102 ; 13,
26^; 16, 16; 18. 2, 6, 8, II, 45-
47 ; 33. 9 ; 29. 12, 23 ; 80. 10 ;
83. 16 ; 38, 5, 10 ; 39. 8, 10. 13,
Cornelius Cethegus, C, consul B.C.
197, sent to Gaul, 18, 12
Cornelius Lentulus Caudinus, P.,
praetor B.c. 203, sent B.c. 196 as
one of the ten commissioners to
Macedonia, 18. 48, 50
Cornelius Lentulus, Ser., praetor B.C.
169, placed in command of Chalcis
(b.C. 171), 27, 2
Cornelius Lentulus, P., brother of the
last, I^^tus in Greece, 37, 2 ; to
Attains, 32, 28 ; 83. i
Cornelius Lentulus, L., a commis-
sioner for Greece and Asia, 31, 23
Cornelius Lentulus, C, ambassador
to Ptolemy Physcon, 83. i
Cornelius Merula, Cn., twice sent to
Egypt to compose matters between
the Ptolemies (B.C 161, 154), 81.
18, 26-28; 82. I ; 83. 8
(Cornelius) Scipio. in the middle of
4th cent. B.C. sent to Marseilles to
inquire about trading ports in
Britain, 34. 10
Cornelius Scipio Asina. Cn., consul
B.C. 260, 254, made prisoner at
Lipara, 1, 21, 22 ; 8, i ; takes
Panormus, 1, 38
Cornelius Scipio, P., the father of
Africanus, consul B.C. 218, sent to
Spain to oppose Hannibal, 3, 40 ;
has to enroll a second army, ib, ; ar-
rives at the mouth of the Rhone, 8.
41 ; learning that Hannibal was on
the Rhone, he starts in pursuit, 3,
45 ; finding himself outstripped, he
goes to Italy and sends his brother
to Spain, 8, 49 ; lands at Pisae and
marches to the Po, 3. 56, 61, 62 ;
wounded at the battle of the Ticinus,
3, 164-168 ; his life saved by his
son, 10. 3 ; dissuades his colleague
from giving the enemy battle, 8, 70;
sent (b.c. 217) to join his brother
in Spain, 8, 97 ; restores the Span-
ish hostages. 8. 99 ; commands the
Socii navales, 8, 3 ; his fall referred
to, 10, 3, 7, 36
584
INDEX
Cornelius Scipio Calvus, Cn., brother
of the last, consul B.C. 222, 2, 34 ;
sent as legatus by Publius to Spain.
8> 49> 56 • lands at Emporium and
conquers Hanno and Andobales at
Cissa, 8. 76 ; winters at Tarraco,
ib. \ defeats Hasdrubal at the
mouth of the £bro, 8, 95. 96 ;
joined by his brother, 8. 97-99. Se4
also 8. 3, 38 ; 10, 7. 3^
Cornelius Scipio Africanus (major),
P., his first campaign in B.C. 218,
10, 3 ; his campaigns in Spain,
10, 2-20, 34-40; 11. 20-33; >n
Africa, 14, i-io ; ^6, x-19 ; his
reception at Rome after the battle
of Zama, 16. 23 ; in Greece as
legatus of his brother, 31, 4, 5, 8 ;
in the war with Antiochus, 21. 11-
17, 24, 25 ; his position at Rome,
23, 14. See also 18, 35 ; 29, 14 ;
82, 12. 13
Cornelius Scipio Asiaticus, L. , brother
of Africanus, consul B.C. 190,
elected Aedile, 10, 4 ; commcinds in
the war against Antiochus, 18, 49-
52 ; 21. 4. 5, 8-13, 25, 30, 43 ;
returns to Italy and triumphs, 21,
24 ; his accounts of the booty in
the Asiatic war demanded, 23, 14
Cornelius Scipio, P., son of Africanus,
21. 15 ; 32, 12, 13
Cornel iae, two daughters of Africanus,
32. 13
Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus Africanus
(minor), son of L. Aemilius Paullus
Maccdonicus. adopted by the son
of Africanus major, consul B.C.
147. 134, his liberality, 18, 35 ; his
friendship with Polybius and char-
acter. 82, 9-16 ; 86, 8 ; volunteers
for the Celtiberian war, 86, 4. 5 ;
arranges the succession of Massa-
nissa, 37, 10 ; besieges Carthage,
88. 1.2; destroys Carthage, 39, 3-
6 ; his simplicity of habits, fr. xxix.
Cornelius Scipio Nasica, son-in-law of
Africanus, consul B.C. 162, 155,
29. 14. IS ; 82, 13
Cornelius, Gnaeus. a commissioner in
Greece B.c. 196. 18. 48 (? Gn.
Cornelius Lentulus, consul B.C. 201)
Coroebus (of Mygdon in Phrygia,
Paus. 10, 27, i), a synonym for a
fool, 12. 4/2. Set Lucian, Am, § 53,
Suidas, S.V., BovraXfcMr
Coroebus, of Elis, a stadium nmner,
fr. ii.
Coronea, in Boeotia, 20. 7 ; 27, i, 5;
29. 12
Corsica, 12, 3, 4
Cortona, in Etruria, 8, 82
Coruncanius, Graius and Lucius, sent
to Queen Teuta, 2, 8
Coryphaeus, a motmtain between
Cilicia and Phoenicia, 5, 59
Cos, island. 16, 15 ; 80, 7
Cosmcpolis, a magistrate at Locri
Epizephyrii, 12, x6
Cosmus, a magistrate in Crete, 82, 19
Cossaei, a hill tribe on the borders of
Susiana, 6, 44
Cossyrus, an island between Sicily and
Africa [Pantellaria) , 3, 96
Cothon, of Byzantium. 4, 52
Cotys, king of the Thracian Odrysae,
27. 12 ; 80, 18
Cow, the, a spot on the Asiatic side
of the Thracian Bosporus. 4, 43,
44
Cremona, a Roman colony in Gallia
Cisalpina, 8, 40
Creonium, a town of the Illyrian
Dassaretae, 6. 108
Creta, Island, character of the people,
4. 53 ; 6, 46, 47 ; 8, 18, 21 ; 24.
4 ; its government, 6, 43. 45-47 ;
22, 19 ; its pirates, 13. 8 ; the
Cretans as mercenaries, 2. 66 ; 8,
75 : 8. 3, 7. 14. 36. 53. 65. 79. 82 ;
10. 46 ; 13, 6 ; 81, 27 ; 33, 16 ;
war with Rhodes, 33. 4, 13. 15, 16 ;
to outwit a Cretan, 8, 21. See
also 4. 8, 20, 54, 55, 61, 67, 71,
80 ; 7, 12, 14 ; 13. 4, 5 ; 22. 19 ;
28. 15 ; 29, 10 ; 81. 26 ; 83. 15.
16
Cretan sea, the, 5, 19
Cretan wine, 6, 2
Cretopolis. in Mylias, part of Pam-
phylia. 6, 72
Crinon. a Macedonian. 6, 15, 16
Critolaus. a follower of Agathocles of
Alexandria, 16, 26
INDEX
S8S
Criiolaiis, Achaean Strategus B.C.
146, 38. 8-1 1 ; 39. 7. 8
Critolaus, a Peripatetic philosopher.
goes on a mission to Rome, vol. ii.
p. 466
Cronus, tumulus of. 10. 10
Cropius (Nestor), 27, 16
Croton, a city in Magna Graecia, 2.
39 ; 7, I ; 10. I
Craw^ the, a machine for grappling
ships, 1, 23, ay, a8
Crown, mural, 6, 39 ; 10, 11 ; civic,
6, 39
Ctesiphon, a city in the south of
Assyria, 5, 45
Cumae, a city in Campania, 1, 56 ;
3, 91
Curius Denatus, M., consul B.C. 290,
275. 2. 19
Cyamosorus, a river in Sicily, 1, 9
Cyaneae, islands at the mouth of the
Thracian Bosporus, 34, 12
Cybele, 21, 37
Cyclades, the, 3. 16 ; 4. 16 ; 18, 54
Cycliadas, an Achaean, 18, i, 34
Cyclops, the, 36, 6
Cydas, of Gortyn in Crete, 22, 19 ;
29. 6, 7
Cydonia, town in Crete, 4, 55 ; 22,
19; 28, 14, 15
Cyllene, seaport town of EUis, 4, 9 ;
5. 3
Cyme, a city in Aeolis, 6, ^^ ; 21, 48 ;
88, 13
Cynaetha, a town in Arcadia, 4, 16-
21, 25. 29 ; 9. 17, 38
C)mneus. See Apollo
Cynos, seaport of the Opuntian
Locrians, 4, 67
Cynoscephalae, hills in Thessaly,
battle of, 18, 20-27
Cyparissia, a town in Messenia, 6,
92; 11, 18
Cyphanta, seaport town of Laconia,
4. 36
Cyprus, island of, 5, 34, 59; 12, 25/;
18. 54. 55 ; 29, 27 ; 31, 18, 26,
27; 32, I ; 83, 5. 8 ; 34, 15; 39.
18
Cypsela, a Thracian town on the
Hebnis {Ipsala), 84. 12
Cyrene, a Dorian colony in Africa
from the island of Thera, founded
B.C. 631, and capital of Cyrenaica ;
freed by Ecdemus and Demophanes,
10, 22 ; subject to the Ptolemies,
16. 25. 33 ; 81. 18, 26-28 ; 32, i
Cyrmasa, a town in Pisidia, 21, 36
Cyrrhestae, a tribe in Syria, 6, 50, 57
Cyrtii. slingers of, a robber tribe of
Media, 6. 52
Cythera, island of, 4. 6^
Cyzicus, a town in Mysia on the Pro-
pontis [Dal Kiz), 4. 44 ; 6, 63 ; 16,
31 ; 22, 20 ; 26. 2 ; 33, 13
Daae, a Scythian tribe, 6, 79
Dalmatians, 12. 5 ; 32, 18. 23
Damasippus, a Macedonian, 81, 26
Damippus, a Lacedaemonian, 7. 5
Damis, an Athenian ambassador, 21,
31
Damon, ambassador from Ptolemy
Philometor, 28, x
Damon, a Rhodian ambassador, 29,
18
Damocles, a spy in the ser\'ice of
Philip v., 18, 5
Damocritus of Calydon, an Aetolian
ambassador, 18. 10 ; 21, 31
Damocritus, an Achaean. 39, 10
Damoteles, an Aetolian ambassador,
21, 25, 26, 29
Damoxenus, of Aegium, an Achaean
ambassador, 18. 42
Damuras, a river in Phoenicia, 6, 68
Danae, of Alexandria, mother-in-law
of Tlepolemus, 16, 27
Danaus, of Argos, 84, 2
Daochus, of Thessaly, 18. 14
Daorsi. a tribe in Illyria, 82, 18
Daphne, near Antioch in Syria, sacred
to Apollo and Artemis, 31, 3
Dardani, an Illyrian tribe, 2, 6 ; 4,
66 : 6. 97 ; 26, 6 ; 28. 8
Darius, son of Hystaspes, 4. 43 ; 6.
43
Darius (Codomanus), 12. 17-19. 22 ;
18, 3
Dassaretae, an Illyrian tribe, 6. 108
Dauliuni, a town in Phocis, 4, 25
I^unia, part of Apulia, 3, 88, 91 ; 6,
108 ; 9, 7
Decietae, a Ligurian tribe, 38. 11
586
INDEX
E>ecius. a Campanian, 1, 7
Dtcuriones, 6. 25
Deep Road, the, at Tarentum, 8, 31.
35
Deianira, wife of Henniles, 89, 13
Deigma, the mart at Rhodes, 6, 88
Deinocrates, an officer of Attalus, 16,
3
Deinocrates, of Messene, 23. 5, 16
Deinon. of Alexandria, 16. 26£C
Deinon, of Rhodes, 27. 7, 14 ; 28. 2,
17 ; 29. II ; 80, 6-9
Delos, island of, 26, 3 ; 26, i ; 30, 21 ;
32, 17 ; made a free port. 81, 7
Delphi, 1, 6 ; 2, 20, 35 ; 4, 46 ; 9,
33. 35 ; 22, 8 ; 26, 3 ; 39. 17
Delta, the, of the Nile, 3. 49
Demaratus, of Corinth (6. 2), fr. vi.
Demaratus, an Athenian ambassador,
28, 19, 20
Demeter, temple of, at Alexandria
(Thesmophorium), 16, 27, 29, 33
Demctrias, a city of Magnesia in
Thessaly, 3, 6, 7 ; 6. 29, 99 ; 10.
42 ; 18, I, II, 45; 29, 6
Demetrius I., Poliorcetes, king of
Macedonia B.C. 294-283, 1, 63 ; 2,
41 ; 9. 29. 34
Demetrius II., king of Macedonia
B.C. 239-229, 1, 3 ; 2, 2, 44, 46,
60 ; 4. 25. 63 ; 20. 5 ; 87. 9 ; 39.
Demetrius, son of Philip V., brother
of Perseus, 18, 39 ; 21, 2 ; 22.
18 ; 23, 1-3. 7
Demetrius I., Soter, king of Syria B.C.
162-150. 3. 5; 31, 12; 19-23;
32, 4. 6, 7, 24; 33, 5, 18, 19
Demetrius, of Pharos, 2. 10. 11. 65.
66 ; 3, 16, 18 ; 4, 16, 19, 37, 66 ;
6. 12, loi, 102, 105, 108; 7, 9.
II, 13, 14: 9. 23; 32. 23
Demetrius, of Phalerum, 10, 24 ; 12,
13 : 29. 21 ; 86, 2
Demetrius, son of Ariarathes VI. of
Cappadocia. 33, 12, 18
Demetrius, an Athenian, 22, 3
Demetrius, son of Euthydemus, king
of Bactria, 11, 34
Demetrius, friend of I*tolcmy Philo-
metor, 30. 9
Demiurgi, the, 23, 5
Demochares, an historiaD, 12, 13, 15,
23
Democleittis, inventor of a system of
fire signals. 10. 45
Democracy, 6, 3, 4 ; its origin, 6, 9 ;
its degeneracy. 6. 4, 10 ; in Achaia.
2. 38 ; in Messene, 7, 10
Democratcs, a Macedonian admiral,
16. 3
Demodocus, an Achaean, 6. 95
Demophanes, of Megalopolis, 10, 2a
Demosthenes, the famous orator. 12,
12^, 13; 18, 14
Demosthenes, of Bithynia, an historian,
12, I
Demosthenes, secretary of Philip V. ,
18. 1, 8, 34
Dentheleti, a Thracian tribe, 23, 8
Diaeus, Achaean Strategus B.C. 151,
149, 147, 38, 8 ; 39, 7. 8, 10, 11,
15
Diatonium, a city in Crete, 22, 19
Dicaearchus, of Trichonium, an
Aetolian ambassador, 18. 10 ; 20.
10 ; 21, 31
Dicaearchus, an officer of Philip V.,
18. 54
Dicaearchus, of Messene in Sicily, a
Peripjatetic philosopher, 84, 5, 6
Dicgtas, a Boeotian ambassador, 27.
I, 2
Dictator, power of, 8. 87, 103
Didascolondas, of Crete, 16, 37
Dimale, a city in Ulyria, 8, 18 ; 7,
9
Diodes, of Dyme, 6, 17
Diocles, governor of Parapotamia in
Assyria, 6. 69
Diocles, a Rhodian ambassador, 29,
10
Diodorus, tutor of Demetrius Soter at
Rome. 81, 20. 21
Diogenes, Stoic Philosopher, vol. ii.
p. 466
Diogenes, of Acamania, 28, 5
Diogenes, an officer of Antiochus the
Great, 6, 46, 48, 54 ; 10, 29, 30
Diogenes, ambassador from Oro-
phcrncs. 32. 24
Diognetus, an officer of Antiochus
the Great, 6, 43, 59. 60, 62, 68-
70
INDEX
S87
Diomedon, governor of Seleucia, 6, 48
DiomedoD, of Cos, 80, 7
Dionysius, theatre of, at Alexandria,
16. 30; artists in theatre of, 16.
21 ; pipers in festival of, in Arcadia.
4, 20 ; picture of, by Aristeides,
13, a
Dionysius, tyrant of Syracuse B.C.
405-367. 1» 6 ; 2, 39 ; 12, 4^, 10,
24 ; W. 35
Dionysius, son of the preceding, also
tyrant of Syracuse B.C. 367-343,
12. 4ix
Dionysius, an officer of Antiochus the
Great, 7, 16-18
Dionysius, secretary of Antiochus
Epiphanes, 31, 3
Dionysius, a Thracian, 6, 65
Dionysodorus, an officer of Attains,
16, 3, 6. 8 ; 18. I. 2
Dionysodorus, ambassador from the
Ptolemies, 29. 23
Diopeithes, of Rhodes, 28. 7
Diophanes, of Megalopolis, 21, 9 ;
22. 13 ; 23. 17 : 29. 23
Diofrfianes, an ambassador from
Perseus, 27, 7, 14
Dioryctus, the channel between
Leucas and Acamania, 6, 5
Dioscurium, temple and hamlet of
Phlios, 4, 67, 68. 73
Dipylum, gate at Athens, 16, 25
Dium, a town in Macedonia, 4, 62 ;
5, 9. II ; 9, 35; 29, 4
Dodona, in Epirus, 4, 67 note ; 6, 9,
II ; 9, 35
Dog-star, the, 1, 37 ; 2, 16 ; 9, 43
Doliche, a city in Perrhaebia, 28. 13
Dolopes, the, in Thessaly, 18, 47 ;
21. 25, 31 ; 22. 8
Domitius Ahenobarbus, Gnaeus, consul
B.C, 192, 21, 32 ; 30. 13
Dorimachus. of Trichonium. Aetolian
Strategus B.C. 219. 4, 3-6, 9, 10,
14, 16, 17, 19, 57, 58, 67, 77 ; 5.
I. 3. Si 6, 11, 17, 61 ; 9, 42 ; 13,
I ; 18, 54
Dorymenes, an Aetolian, 6. 61
Drangene, a district in Asia [Sejestan),
II. 34
Drepana, a city in Sicily (Trapani),
1, 41, 46, 49. 55. 56, 59. 61
Dromichaetes, king of the Odrysae, fr.
xi.
Drymussa, one of the islands in front
of Clazomenae, 21, 48
Duilius, C, consul B.c. 260, 1, 22.
23
Dunax. a mountain in Thrace, 34, 10
Dura, a town in Phoenicia, 5, 66
Dura, a town on the Euphrates in
Mesopotamia, 6, 48
Dura, a town on the Tigris in Assyria
[Lhlr), 5. 52
Dyme, an Achaean town, 2, 41, 51 ;
4, 59, 60, 65, 83, 86 ; 5, 3, 17, 30,
91. 95
EcBATANA, capital of Media. 10. 27
Ecdemus, of Megalopolis, 10, 22
Echecrates, of Thessaly, 5, 63, 65, 82,
85
Echecrates, of Phlius, philosopher and
historian. 12, 10
Echedemus, Athenian ambassador,
21. 4. 5
Echetla, a city in Sicily, 1, 15
Echinus, a city in Thessaly, 9, 41, 42 ;
18, 3, 38
Ecnomus, a hill on the south coast of
Sicily between Agrigentum and Gela
{Monte di Licata), 1, 25
Edecon, chief of the Edetani in
Spain, 10, 34, 35, 40
Edessa, a town in Macedonia origin-
ally the capital, on the via Egnatia,
5, 97 ; 84. 12
Edetani, a Spanish tribe, 10, 34
Egnatia via, from Apollonia to the
Hellespont. 84, 12
Egypt, its peaceful and prosperous
state, 2, 37 ; 9, 44 ; the conspiracy
of Antiochus the Great and Philip
against, 3, 2; succession of Ptolemy
Philopator. 4. 2 ; 6. 34 ; its king
in possession of Seleucia, 6, 58 ;
the savagery of the Egyptians, 15,
33 ; revolt of the nobles. 22, 7 ;
invasion of Antiochus Epiphanes, 3.
3 ; 28, 19, 26 ; 29, 2, 27 ; 30, 17 ;
31, 4 ; jealousy in Rome of, 81, 18 ;
visitof Polybius to, 84, 14; invasion
by Iphicrates, 89, 2. See also 6, 69,
80. 82, 107 ; 14, 12 ; 39, 18. Idle
588
INDEX
character of the Egyptians, S9. i8 ;
priests of. 84, a
EUaea, a city of Aeolis, 81, lo ; 38,
27 ; fr. liv.
Elateia, a city of Phocis, 6, a6 ; 18.
43. 45 ; 27, 18
Elaus, a fort in the territory of Caly-
don, 4. 65
Elephants, used by the Carthaginians,
1, 18. 19, 30, 32-34. 38. 39. 40.
41, 74, 78, 84, 85 ; 3, 13, 42, 45,
46. 53. 55. 74. 79 ; 11. I ; 12, 2 ;
Roman terror of, 1, 39 ; African
elephants afraid of Indian, 6. 84.
See also 31, 3
Elephas. See Nicanor
Eleuthema, a town in Crete, 4, 53,
55
Elis, the city, 4. 84 ; 86 ; 80, 3 ; the
country and people, 4, 5, 9, 19, 36,
59. 68, 69.86, 91-95. 102; 6. 2,
3. 5. 17. 30. 91. 92, 94. 95 ; 9.
30 ; 16. 13; 18, 42 ; 20, 3 ; 89, 9 ;
its wealth and peacefulness, 4, 73
Elisphasii, in the Peloponnese, 11, 11 ;
Elks, 84. 10
Elleporus (Helorus, Diodor. Sic. 14,
104), a river in the territory of
CaiUon in South Italy, 1, 6
Elpeius, a river in Macedonia, 89, 4
Elymaei, a tribe living to the north of
Mount Zagrus, 6. 44; 81, xi
Emathia, a region in Macedonia, 83,
10
Emporia, a district in Africa near the
Lesser Syrtis, 1, 82 ; 8, 23 ; 88, a
Emporium, a city in north Spain, 8,
39. 76
Enchelanae, a tribe in Illyria, 6, 108 ;
fr. xliii.
Enip)eus, a river in Thessaly, 6. 99
Eordi, a Macedonian tribe, 18, 23 ;
84, 12
Epaenetus, a Bqeotian ambassador,
88, 16
Epaminondas, of Thebes, 4, 32, 33 ;
6, 43 ; 8. I ; 9, 8; 18. 25/; 38,
8
Eperalus, of Pharae, Achaean Strate-
gus B.C. 218, 4, 82; 5, I, 5. 30,
91
Epetium, a town of Illyria, 38. 18
Ephesus, a city of Ionia. 6, 35 ; 8,
17 : 18. a6r ; 18, 41 ; 80, xi ; 81,
zi, 17, 35, 43. 44, 48 ; 83. 18
Ephorst the Spartan, 4. 22, 23, 34.
35, 81 ; 18. IX ; S3, iz ; of the
Messenian, 4. 4, 31
Ephorus. of Cyme, an historian. 4.
20 ; 5. 33 ; 6. 45 : 9, 4 ; M. 4^ .
aa, a3, a5/, 27, a8 ; 34. i
Epichares. a Rhodian, SO. 9
Epicharmus, of Cos, 18, 40 ; cp. vol.
ii. p. 44a
Epicydes, of Syracuse, 7. a ; 8. 5.
37
Epidamnus, a city of Illyria, 8, 9-11 ;
34, 7. 12
Epidaurus, in Argolis, 8, 5a ; SO, 10
Epigenes. a friend of Antiochus the
Great, 6, 41, 4a, 49.51
Epipolae, a part of Syracuse. 8. 37
Epirus, 8, 5-8, 65; 4, 5. 6, 9. xs,
16. a5, 30. 36, 57, 61. 63, 66. 67 ;
5. 3-6 ; 9. 38, 40 ; 10, 41 ; 11. 5 ;
16, 37 ; 18. I, 3, a3 ; 80. 3 ; 81.
a6 ; 88, 18 ; 88. x ; 84, la ; 87.
15, 16 ; 88. 8, 13 ; 89, 4 ; 80, la,
13, 16 ; 38, 20, 21, 26
Epistratus, of Acamania, 4. 11
Epitalium, a town of Triphylia in
Elis, 4. 80
Eposognatus, a chief in Galatia, 81.
37
Eratosthenes, of Cyrene, 34, 2, 4, 5,
7. 13
Eretria, a town in Euboea, 18, 45,
47
Eretria, a town of Phthiotis in Thes-
saly, 18, 20
Eribianus, a mountain pass between
Samnium and Campania, 3, 92
Eridanus, a name of the Po, 8, 16
Erymanthus, a river of Arcadia, 4,
70, 71
Erymanthus, a river of Arachosia in
Persia, 11, 34
Erythrae, a city in Ionia, 16, 6 ; 81.
48
Eryx, a mountain and city in Sicily,
I. 55-60, 66, 77 ; 8, 7 : 8, 9. See
also Aphrodite
Etcnnians, a tribe in.Pisidia, 6, 73
Etesian winds, 4, 44 ; 6, 5
INDEX
589
Etruria, 1, 6 ; 2, 16, 17, 19, 20, 23-
27 ; 8, 49, 56, 61, 75, 77, 78, 80,
82, 84, 86, 108 ; 6, loi, 105 ; 12,
4 ; 16, II ; 84, IX
Etruscan sea, the. See Tyrrhenian sea
Euboea, island of, 2, 52 ; 4, 67 ; 10,
41. 42; 11, 5; 18. II, 46; 20.
8 ; Euboic talent, 1, 62 ; 16, 18 ;
ai. 17. 30. 3a
Euboea, daughter of Cleoptolemus,
wife of Antiochus the Great, 20, 8
Eubulidas, of Chalcis. 21, 17, 45
Eucampidas, of Arcadia, 18. 14
Euclidas. brother of Cleonienes III.,
2, 65, 67. 68
Eudamidas, of Sparta, 4, 35
Eudemus, of Rhodes, 21, 10
Eudemus, an ambassador of Miletus,
28, 19. 20
Eudoxus, a Greek historian, 34, i
Euemerus, of Messene, a writer on
religion, 84, 5, 6
Eulaeus. an Egyptian eunuch, 28.
20, 21
Eumenes II., king of Pergamum B.C.
197-159, son of Attalus I., 3, 3 ;
18. 47; 21, 8-11, 16-22, 24, 43-
45,48; 22, I, 8-11, 15, 17, 20;
23. I, 3. 9. II ; 24. I, 5> 8> 9 ;
26, 2 ; 27, 6, 7. 18 ; 28, 7. 12.
15 ; 29, 4, 6. 22 ; 30, I, 2, 20 ;
31, 6, 9, 10, 25 ; 32, 3. 5, 22 ;
33. 18 ; 39. 7
Eumenes, an Egyptian, ambassador,
29, 23
Euphanes, of Crete, 20, 3
Euphrates, the, 6, 51 ; 8, 25 ; 9, 43
Eupolemus, an Aetolian, 18, 19 ; 28,
4
Eureas, an Achaean ambassador, 31,
6. 8
Euripidas, an Aetolian, 4. 19, 59.
60, 68-72. 83 ; 6, 94, 95
Euripides, quoted, 1, 35 ; 6. 106 ;
12, 26 ; 31. 21
Euripus. the, 6, 29, loi, 109
Euromus, a city in Caria, 18, 2, 44 ;
30, 5
Europe, position and size of, 3, 37 ;
«*. 5-7. 15
Europus, a city in Parapotamia, 6.
48
Eurotas, river in Laconia, 6, 21-23 !
8, 35 ; 9, 8 ; 11. 18 ; 16, 16
Eurotas, another name of the Galaeslis,
(q-v.) 8, 35
Eurycleidas, of Athens. 6. 106
Euryleon. Achaean Strategus B.C. 210,
10, 21
Eurylochus, a Cretan, 6, 79
Eurylochus, a Magncsian, 6, 63, 65
Eurymedon, of Athens, 12, 25V&
Euthydemus, of Magnesia, king of
Bactria, 10, 49 ; 11, 34
Euxine, the, 3, 2 ; 4. 38-44, 46, 47,
50, 52, 56 ; 6, 43. 44. 55 ; 10, 27 ;
16, 29 ; 24. 3 ; 26. 2 ; 27. 7 ; 31.
24 ; 84, 7 ; 39. 2
Evagoras, king of Salamis in Cyprus,
12. 25/^
Evagoras, of Aegium, 38, 11
Evander, fr. iii.
Evanoridas, of Elis, 6, 94
Evas, a hill in Laconia, 2, 65, 66 ;
6. 24
Exile, voluntary, 16, 14
Fabius Maximus Cunctator, Q.,
3, 87-94, loi, 103, 105, 106; 10, I
Fabius, L.. 16. i
Fabius. Q. . 18. 10
Fabius Labeo, Q., praetor B.C 189,
21, 46
Fabius Maximus Aemilianus, Q. , elder
brother of the younger Africanus,
son of Aemilius Paullus, consul B.C.
145. 18» 35 : 29, 14 ; 32, 9, 10,
14 ; 33. 9 : 36. 5
Fabius Pictor. Q.. annalist. 1. 14, 15,
58 ; 3, 8, 9
Faesulae, in Etruria, 2, 25 ; 3. 82
Fair Plain, the, in Armenia, 8, 25
Fair Promontory, the, near Carthage,
3, 22-24
Falemian district, the, in Campania,
8. 90f 92, 94
Faliscans. the, 1. 65
Fannius. Gaius, ambassador to Illyria,
32. 18. 23 ; to Prusias, 33, 9 ; to
the Achaeans, 38. 10
Flamininus. See Quinctius
Flaminius. C. consul B.c 223. 2.
21 ; conquers the Insubres. 2, 32,
33; consul II., B.C. 217, enrolls
S90
INDEX
an army, 3. 75, 77, 78 ; encamped
at Arretium. 3, 80 ; falls at the
battle of Thrasymene, 3, 82-84.
See also 3, 86, 106 ; 16, xi
Flaminius, commissioner in B.C. 153
to the Ligurians, 83, 10
Fortune, mutability of. 29. 21
Frentani, a people of Samnium, 2,
24 ; 3. 88
Fulvius Centumalus, Gn. consul B.C.
229; 2, II. 12
Fulvius Centumalus, Gn., consul ac.
211, 9. 6, 7
Fulvius Flaccus, Qu., consul B.c. 224,
2. 31
Fulvius Flaccus. Qu., a legatus under
Flamininus, 18. 10
Fulvius Nobilior, Ser., consul B.c. 255,
1, 36, 37
Fulvius Nobilior, M., consul B.C 189,
21, 25-31, 40; 22. 13
Furius Pacilus, Gains, consul b.c. 251.
1. 39. 40
Furius Philus, P., consul B.c. 223, 2,
31
Gabinius. Aulus, legate to the
Achaeans, 38. 10, 11
Gadara, a town in Palestine, 6. 71 ;
16, 39
Gadcs. a town in Spain (Cadiz), 34,
5. 7. 9. 15 ; strait of. 34. 15
Gaesatae, a tribe of Gauls in the
valley of the Rhone, 2, 22, 23, 28.
30, 34
Gaezoloris, a chief in Galatia, 24, 8
Galadrae, a town in Macedonia. 23. 18
Galaesus. a river of Calabria flowing
into the Gulf of Tarentum 8, 35
Galatia. a district in Asia Minor oc-
cupied by Gauls (FaXdrat), 24, 8,
9 ; 26, 2 ; 81. 6
Galatis, a district of Palestine, 6, 71
Galatus, a chief of the Boii. 2, 21
Galli, priests of Cybele, 21, 6, 37
Garsyeris. an oflScer of Achaeus. 6.
57. 1^-7^
Gatalus. a Sarmatian prince. 26. 2
Gaul, 8, 59 ; 7. 9 ; Cisalpine Gaul,
2, 19, 21, 22, 24, 32 ; 3, 40. JT,
87, 106, 118 ; 18, 12 ; plains of, 8,
86
Gauls (or Celts, q.v.)
Take Rome under Brennus, 1, 6;
2, 18
Cisalpine Gauls, thdr countiy and
their wars with Rome, 2, x3-35«
See oho S. 2. 16, 34, 41, 44, 54,
60, 66-75, 78, 79, 83-85, 118;
12, 4; 18. II. See Agones,
Anares, Boii, Cenomania. In-
subres, Lai, Lebecii. Ligures, Lin-
gones, Senones, Veneti
Gauls of the Alps, 2, 18, 21 ; 3.
34. Su Allol^-oges, Taurini,
Taurisci, Salassi
Transalpine Gauls, 2, 15. 22 ; S,
37. 39-41. 43, 45, 47, 49. 50 ;
84, 7, 10. See AUobroges,
Ardiges, Decietae, Ligures,
Oxybii
Gauls invading Greece and con-
quered at Delphi, 1, 6 ; 2, 20,
35 ; *. 46 ; 9, 34. 35 : settled
near Macedonia, 18, 37 ; 26. 6 ;
29. 9 ; near Byzantium, 4, 38,
45, 46, 52. Su Aegosagae
Gauls in Asia (Gallograeci), 6. 5 ; 8,
3; 6, hi; 18. 41; 21. 33-39. 43.
48 ; 22. 21 ; 26, 2 ; 29. 22 ; 30.
1-3. 20 ; 81. 2. 6. 9. 12, 13, 23 ;
32. 3. See Galatia, Tectosages,
Tolistobogii, Trocmi
Gallic cavalry in the Roman army,
3> 65-67 ; character of the Gaub,
2, 7, 19, 32, 33, 35 ; 8, 70, 79 ;
their arms and mode of fighting,
2. 33 ; 3. 62 ; the Gallic sword,
2. 30, 33; 3. 114
Gallic mercenaries in the service of
Carthage, 1, 43, 67, 77 \ 2. 7 ;
8, 72, 74, 79, 84. 85, 106. 113-
115. 117; 11. I. 19 ; 16. II.
In the service of Macedonia, 2,
65 ; 3, 2, 17. In the service of
Ptolemy Philopator, 6. 65, 82
Gaza, a city in Palestine, 6, 68, 80,
86 ; 16, 18. 22 ; 29. 12
Gela, a town in Sicily, 12. 25/^
Gelias, an ambassador from Phocaea,
21. 6
Gelo. tyrant of Gela and afterwards of
Syracuse B.C. 485-478, 12, 25^-
26^
INDEX
591
Gelo, son of Hiero II. of Syracuse, 6,
88 ; 7, 7. 8
Genesara, a lake in Palestine, 6. 70
Genthius, son of Pleuratus, king of
lUyria, 28. 8; 89, 3, 9, 11, 13;
SO, 14 ; 82. 18
Gephnis, a city in Palestine, 6. 70
Gerrha, a fort in Coele-Syria, 6, 46,
61
Gertus, a city of the Dassaretae in
lUyria, 6, 108
Gerunium, a town in Apulia near
Larinum, 3, xoo-ioa, 107, 108
Gems, a town of the Dassaretae in
Illyria, 6. xo8
Gesco, a Carthaginian general, 1, 66,
68-70, 79-81
Gesco Strytanus, a Carthaginian am-
bassador, 86, 3
Gillimas, a Carthaginian ambassador,
36. 3
Gladiators^ 32, 14
Glaucias. ambassador of Perseus, 28. 8
Glaucides, of Abydus, 16, 33
Glaucus, of Acarnania. 28, 5
Glympes, a fort on the frontiers of
Argos and Laconia, 4, 36 ; 6. 20
Gonni, a town in Thessaly. 18. 27
Gordium, a town in Phrygia. 21, 37
Gorgus, of Messene. 6, 5 ; 7, 10
Gortyn, a city in Crete, 4, 53. 55 ;
22. 19 ; 28, 15 ; 31, i
Gortyna. a town in Arcadia, 4, 60
Gorza, a town in Africa, 1, 74
Greeks, history of, 1, 3 ; 2, 37 ; 3,
118; 4, I, 28; 6, 31, 51, 105,
106, III ; 34, I ; 39, i ; their
fickleness, 6, 56 ; amenability to
bribes, 18, 34 ; decreased numbers,
87. 9 ; military customs, 6, 25, 42 ;
18. 18. See also 36. 6 ; 89, 12
Greeks in Thrace, 9, 28 ; in Asia, 21,
43; in Italy, 1, 6; 2, 39^10, 1
Greek mercenaries, 1. 32, 48 ; 6, 79,
82; 22, 7; half-bred Greeks
(Au^AXip'Cj), 1, 67
Gtdussa, a son of Massanissa, 84. 16 ;
88, I. 2
Gyridas, of Sparta, 4, 35
Gyrton, a town in Thessaly, 18, 22
Gythium, the seaport town of Sparta,
2, 69 ; 5, 19
Hadrian A, district of Hadria, a town
in Picenum, 8, 88
Haemus, a mountain in Thrace
{Balkan), 24, 3 ; 34, 10
Haliartus, a town in Boeotia, 27, i,
5 ; 29, 12 ; 30, 21
Halys, a river in Asia Minor {ICisil
/rmai), 21, 39 ; 24, 8
Hamilcar, the elder, general in the
first Punic war, 1, 24, 27, 28, 30,
44
Hamilcar Barcas, son of Hannibal,
in the first Punic war, 1, 13, 56-
58, 60, 62, 64, 66 ; in the mer-
cenary war, 1, 75-88 ; in Spain, 2.
I ; 8. 9-14. See also 11, 2
Hamilcar, a Carthaginian admiral in
the second Punic war, 8, 95 ; 8. 3
Hamilcar. a legate in the third Punic
war, 86. 3
Hamilcar Phaneas. a Carthaginian
officer in the third Punic war, 36,
8
Hannibal, commandant of Agrigentum
in the first Punic war, 1. 18, 19, 21,
23. 24, 43
Hannibal, son of the last, 1, 43
Hannibal, son of Hamilcar the elder,
1, 44, 46, 82, 86
Hannibal Rhodius, 1, 46, 47
Hannibal, son of Hamilcar Barcas, 1,
64, 65 ; 2, 1, 14. 24, 36 ; 3. 6, 8,
9; his oath. 3, 11, 12 ; succeeds
Hasdrubal, 8, 13 ; his expeditions
in Spain, 3, 14-16; takes Saguntum,
8, 17 ; his surrender demanded by
Rome, 3. 20 ; winters (b.c. 219-
218) at New Carthage, 3, 33, 34 ;
starts for Italy, 8. 35 ; crosses the
Pyrenees. 3. 40 ; crosses the
Rhone, 3, 42-47 ; the Alps, 8, 48-
56 ; in Gallia Cisalpina, 3, 60-75 !
in Etruria, 8, 79-85 ; in Umbria,
Picenum, and the south, 3, 86-90 ;
invades Campania, 3, 90-94 ; in
Bruttium, 3. 100-118. See also ^,
I. 2, 28, 37, 66 ; 6, I, 29, loi,
108, no; 6, 58; 7. I, 2, 4, 9.
Takes Tarentum, 8.* 26-36; at
Capua and in the neighbourhood of
Rome, 9, 3-9 ; his character. 9,
21-26; 10, 32, 33; 23, 13; cof
592
INDEX
fined to Bnittium, 11, 6 ; his i6
years in Italy, 11, 19 ; recalled to
Africa, 14, 6, 9; 16, 1-16; his
interview with Scipio, 15, 5-8 ; per-
suades the Carthaginians to accept
Scipio's terms, 15, 19 ; at the court
of Antiochus, 21, 17, 45. See also
11, 2, 3 ; 13, 4 ; 16, 23. 28, 37 ;
84. 10 ; 89, 19 ; his death, 23> 13
Hannibal, sent by the great Hannibal
to Hieronymus, 7, 2
Hannibal Monomachus, 9. 24
Hanno, Carthaginian commander at
Agrigentum and Ecnomus, 1, 18,
27, 28 ; conquered by Lutatius, 1,
60, 61
Hanno, crucified by the mercenaries
in Sardinia, 1, 79
Hanno (Magnus), commander in the
mercenary war, 1, 67, 72-74, 81,
82. 87, 88
Hanno, left by Hannibal in command
of Northern Spain, 3, 35, 76
Hanno, son of Bomilcar, an officer
under Hannibal, 3. 42, 114
HarmostSt Spartan, 4, 27
Harpyia, a town in Illyria, fr. xliii.
Hasdrubal, son of Hanno, 1, 30, 38,
40
Hasdrubal, son-in-law of Hamilcar
Barcas, 1, 13 ; 2, i, 13, 22, 36 ;
8, 8, 12, 13, 15, 21, 27, 29; 10,
10
Hasdrubal, brother of Hannibal, 8.
33. 56, 76, 95. 96. 98 ; 9, 22 ; 10,
7. 37-40
Hasdrubal, an officer of Hannibal's
army, 3, 66, 102, 114, iz6
Hasdrubal, head of Hannibal's com-
missariat, 3, 93
Hasdrubal, son of Gesco, 9, 11, 22;
10, 7. 35. 38 ; 11. 20-24 ; 14, x-6,
8
Hasdrubal, a naval commander at
Utica, 15, 2
Hasdrubal, a Carthaginian officer in
the third Punic war, 38, i ; 39, 4
Hiistati, 6. 21, 23, 29, 33 ; 15, 9
Hearths, the, on the Thracian Bos-
porus, 4, 43
Hebrus, a river in Thrace (Afarit»a),
34, 12
Hecatodorus, of Byzantium. 4, 47
Hecatodorus, an artist, 4, 78
Hecatombaeum, a place in the territory
of Dyme, 2, 51
Hecatompylus, a city in Parthia, 10,
28, 29
Hecatompylus, a city in Africa, 1, 73
Hegesianax, ambassador from Anti-
ochus the Great, 18, 47 ; 50, 3
Hegesias, of Rhodes, 28. 16
Hegias, an ambassador from Phocaea,
21, 6
Heleia, a district in I^conia, 5. 19.
20
Helice, a town in Achaia, 2, 41
Helicranum, a fort in Epinis, 2, 6
Heliotropium, a place near Thebes in
Phthiotis, 6, 99
Hellespont, the, 4, 44, 46, 50 ; 6, 34.
78, III ; 16, 29 ; 18, 41, 54; 21.
8, 13, 15, 17, 48 ; 27, 7 ; 83. 12,
13
Helmantica, a city of the Vaccaei in
Spain, 3, 14
Hclvius, Gains, legatus of Manlius
Vulso B.C. 189, 21. 34
Hephaeslia, a city in Lemnus. 18,
48
Hephaestus, tumulus of, near
Carthage, 10, 10 ; island of, 34,
XI
Hcracleia, a city in Thcssaly, 10, 42 ;
20, 9, II
Hcracleia Lyncestis, a town in upper
Macedonia, 84, 12
Heracleium. See Hcracleia Lyncestis,
28, II, 13, 17
Heracleidae, the, 2, 41 ; 4, 34, 35 ;
12, 12a
Hcracleides, an ambassador of
Antiochus Epiphanes, 28, i, 22 ;
88. 15, 18
Hcracleides, of Byzantium, 21, 13-15
Heracleides, of Gyrton, 18, 22
Hcracleides, of Tarentum, 13, 4 ; 16,
IS
Heracles, 4, 35, 59 ; 6, 2 ; 7, 9 ; 12,
26 ; 29. 17 ; picture of, 39. 13 ;
Temple of, at Gades, 34, 9
Heracles, columns of, 2, i ; 3, 37,
39, 57 ; 10, 7. 40 ; 16. 29 ; 84. 4.
6. 7. 9
IXDEX
593
Hcraclitus, of Ephesus, 4, 40 ; 12,
27
Heraea, a city in Arcadia, 2, 54 ; 4.
77, 78, 80 ; 18, 42, 47
Herbesus, a town in Sicily, 1, 18
Hercte, a mountain between Mt.
Elryx and Panormus (Monte PelU-
grino), 1, 56
Here, 7, 9 ; temple and priests of, at
Argos, 9. 43 ; 12, 1 1 ; at Lacinium,
34, II
Hermaeum, on the Thracian Bosporus,
4, 43
Hermaeum, a promontory near
Carthage, 1, 29, 36
Hermeias, a Carian, 6, 41. 45, 49-56
Hermes, 84, 5
Hermione, a city in Argolis, 2, 42, 52
Hermippus, of Lysimachia, 30, 14
Hermocrates, of Syracuse, 12, 25^.
26
Hennogenes, an officer of Antiochus
the Great, 6, 60
Heroes, 4, 20
Herophilus, followers of, 12, 25^/
Herophon, an ambassador from
Perseus, 29, 4, 6
Hesiod. the poet, 6, 2, 32 ; fr. vi.
Hexapyla, a gate at Sjrracuse, 8, 5, 37
Hicesias, vol ii. p. 288, note
Hicesius. of Miletus, 28, 19
Hiero II., king of Syracuse B.C. 272-
2i6, 1, 8, 9, 11-18, 62, 83 ; 2, I ;
3, 2, 75 ; 5, 88 ; 7, 3, 4, 5f 7. 8
Hieromnemon, at Byzantium, 4. 52
Hicron, a fort on the Thracian Bos-
porus, 4, 39. 43, 50, 52
Hieronymus, son of Gelo II., king of
Syracuse B.C. 216-215, 7, 2-7 ; 8,
5
Hieronymus, of Arcadia, 13, 14
Himeras, a river in Sicily, 7, 4, 5
Himerean Thermae, in Sicily, 1, 24
Himilco, commandant of Lilybaeum,
1, 42, 43, 45
Hippana, a city in Sicily 'near Panor-
mus. 1, 24
Hipparchus, an ambassador from
Ilium, 22, 5
Hippias, strategus of the Boeotians,
22, 4 ; 27, I, 2, 6 ; 23. 9. 10 ; 29.
3
VOL. II
Hippitas, a friend of Clcoiiiencs 111.,
3, 37
Hippocrates, of Cos, 30, 7
Hippo Regius, in Numidia, X2, i
Hippo Zarytos (Diarrhytus), a town in
Libya, 1, 70, 73, 77, 82, 88
Hippocrates, of Syracuse, 7, 2, 4, 5 ;
8, 5 ; 9, 22
Hippodrome, near Seleucia, 6, 59 ;
near Sardis, 7, 17
Hippolochus, of Aetolia, 27, 15
Hippolochus, of Thessaly, 6. 70, 71,
79
Hippomedon, a Spartan, 4, 35
Hipposthenes, of Syracuse. 7. 4
Hirpini, a people of Central Italy, 3.
91
History, value of, 1, i, 35 ; 2, 35 ; 3.
31 ; 3, 75 ; truth the eye of, 1, 14 ;
12, 7 ; connected with geography,
8. 36 ; and natural science, 3, 57 ;
compared with tragedy, 2, 56 ; 16,
36
Hollows, the, near Naupactus, 6, 103
Holy Isle, one of the Aegates, 1, 60,
61 (Maritima) \ an Aeolian island
sacred to Hephaestus, 84, 11
Holy Town, in Lydia, 16, i ; 32, 27
Homarium, the, at Megalopolis, 6,
93. See Zeus
Homer, 9, 16 ; 12, 24, 26, 27 ; 30,
10 ; 34, 2-4 ; 39, 5 ; quoted, 3,
94 ; 3, 38 ; 12. 9> a6, 27 ; 16. 12,
16 ; 18, 29 ; 84, 2-4 ; 86, 8 ; 39. 6
Hoplites, a river in Laconia, 16, 16
Horatius Pulvillus, M., consul (sufT.)
B.C. 509. 3. 22
Horatius Cocles, P., 6, 55
Horii, a state in Crete, 4, 53
Horn, the, gulf at Byzantium, 4, 43
Horse, sacrifice of, 12, 4^
Hortensius, L., 83, i. 9
Hostilius Mancinus, A., consul B.C.
170. 27. 16 ; 28. 3
Hostilius Mancinus, A., commissioner
in Asia, 37. 6
Hyacinthus, tomb of, near Tarentum,
8. 30
Hypana, a town of Triphylia, 4, 77,
79
Hypata. a town in Thessaly, 20, 9-
11 ; 21. 4, 5
2Q
594
INDEX
Hyperbasas, an officer of Antiochus
the Great, 10, 31
Hypcrbatiis, Achaean Strategy B.C.
179, 24. 10 ; 29, 23
Hypsas, a river near Agrigentum, 9,
27
Hyrcania, a region in Asia on the
south of the Caspian. 10, 29, 31, 48
Hyrcanian sea, 5, 44, 55 ; 10, 48
Hyscana, a city in Illyria, 2B, 8
lAPYGiA (Appulia). 2. 24 ; 3. 88
lapygian promontory, in Calabria
{Capa Sta, Maria di Leuca), 10, i;
84, 6, II
lasus, a city in Caria, 16, 12 ; 18. 2,
8. 44
Iberia (Spain), 1, 10 ; 2, 13, 36 ; 3.
3. 8-17, 21, 27, 30, 33-35. 37, 39,
49. 56. 57. 59. 61, 64. 87, 89, 95,
96, 98, 106 ; 5. I, 33 ; 11. 24, 29,
31. 33 ; 12. 5 ; 82. 8 ; 34. 5, 7-9;
36. 1-5 ; 38, 8 ; events in, see Cor-
nelius Scipio
Iberians, arms of, 3. 114 ; character
of, 3, 98 ; mercenaries, 1, 17, 67 ;
3. 72. 74. 79. 83. 93. 94. » 13-1 15.
117 ; 11, I, 19
Ibcrus, river in Spain (mod. Ebro), 2,
13 ; 3, 6. 14, 15. 27, 29, 30, 35,
39, 40. 76, 95. 97 ; 4, 28 ; 5, I ;
10. 35 ; 11. 32
Ida, Mt. See Zeus
Uergetes, a tribe of north Spain, 3.
35; 10, 18
Ilipa, a town in Spain, 12, 20
Ilium, a city in the Troad, 5, 78, iii ;
12, 5 ; 22, 5 : 84. 2 : 89. 6
Illeberis, a town and river of Aqui-
tania, 34. lo
Illyria, 1, 13; 2. 2, 8, 11, 44; 3,
16, 18, 19 ; 4, 16, 29, 37, 66 ; 5,
4, loi. 108, no; 18. I. 8; 21.
21 ; 28, 8 ; 29. 4 ; 82, 18, 23. 26 ;
34, 6, 7. 12 ; 39. 2
lUyrians, their tactics, 2. 3 ; their
language, 28. 8. See also 2, 2-12,
65-68. 70 ; 3, 16, 18, 107 ; 4, 16,
25. 55 ; 6. 7, 13. M. 22, 23, loi,
109; 8. 16 ; 9, 38 ; 11. 11, 14,
15 ; 23. I ; 28, 8 ; SO, 14 ; 32.
23 : 39. 2
Ilurgia, a city in Spain, 11, 24
Impiety and Injustice^ altar of, 18. 54
India, 11, 34 ; 84, 13
Indian drivers of elephants, 1, 40 ; 3.
46; 11, I
Insubres, a tribe of Cisalpine Gauls.
2, 17, 22, 23. 28, 30, 32, 34 ; 3.
40. 56, 60 ; 16, 40
Intercatia. a town in Spain, 34, 9
lo, daughter of Inachus. 4. 43
lolaus. comrade of Hercules, 7. 9
Ionia. 18, 41a ; 21. 13, 14 , 33. 12
Ionian sea, 2, 14; 6, no; 34. 12;
38. 5
Iphiades, of Abydus, 16, 30
Iphicrates, of Athens. 39. 2
Irobastus, an Egyptian, 22, 7
Isara, a river in Gaul (Isere), 3, 49
Iseas, tyrant of Car3meia, 2, 41
Isius. See Alexander.
Island, the, between the Rhine and
Isara, 3, 49
Ismenias, of Boeotia, 27, 1.2
Isocrates, a grammarian, 32, 4, 6, 7
Issa, an island in the Adriatic on the
coast of Illyria (Lissa), 2. 8, 11 ;
32. 18
Issus, in Cilicia, battle of, 12, 17, 18
Ister. See Danube.
Isthmian games, the, 2. 12 ; 18. 44, 46
Isthmus of Corinth, the, 2, 52 ; 3.
32 ; 4. 13 ; 12. 12 ; 16. 16 ; 20. 6;
30, 10 ; 39. 17. 19 ; ships dragged
across, 4, 19 ; fr. xcviii.
Istri, the, inhabitants of Istria, 26, 4
Italy, geography and inhabitants of,
2, 14-24; 34, 15; Italians, 2, 31 ;
8, 2, 77, 85, 118 ; 5. 104 ; 11, 19 ;
18. 19; 34. 10. See also 1. 3 ; 3.
118; 6, 105 ; 28, 16 ; 39, 19
Ithaca, island of, 34, 7
Ithomates. citadel of Messene, 7. 1 1
Ithoria. a fort in Aetolia, 4. 64
Itonian Artemis, 4, 25 ; 26, 3
Jason. 4. 39
Jews, the. 16. 39
Jordan, the, 6. 70
Julius Caesar, Sex., consul B.C. 157,
32. 24; 38, 7-10
Junius Brutus, L., consul B.C 509, 3,
22
INDEX
595
Junius Pullus, L., consul B.C. 249,
1. 5a. 54. 55
Junius Silanus, M., serves in Spain
under Scipio, 10. 6 ; 11, 20, 23. 26,
33
Junius, Marcus, ambassador to
Ariarathes, 31. 13
Jupiter, Capitolinus, 3. 23, 26 ; Lapis.
«,as
King's Dyke, the. 6. 51
Labab, a dty in Arabia, 18, 9
Labeatis, a district in lUyria, 29, 3
Labus, a mountain between Parthia
and Hyrcania, 10, 29, 31
Lacedaemon (or Sparta), its position
and extent, 6, 22 ; 9, 21. See also
%, 41, 53, 65,* 69, 70 ; 4, 23, 34-36 ;
5, 9, 17, 19, 20, 23, 24, 37. 92 ; 6.
48; 9. 8,9, 18; 13, 6,8; 16, 13.
16, 37 ; 18, 17 ; 20, 5. 12 ; 21, 1,
41 ; 22. 1, 3. 10, 13, 15, 16 ; 28, 5,
6, 9, II, 17, 18 ; 24. I, 2, 7, 10-12
Lacedaemonians (Spartans) . their num -
bers and territoiy. 2. 38 ; their con-
stitution, 2, 62 ; 4, 81 ; 6, 3. 10,
43. 45-51; W. 6. »i. 23; their
iron money, 6, 49 ; their use of the
tibia in war, 4. 20 ; admitted to the
Achaean league, 23. 17. 18. See also
1, 6, 63 ; 2. 39, 45-47. 49. SO. 5a. 57.
58, 62, 65, 69, 70 ; 3, 5 ; 4, 2, 5,
7, 9, 10, IS, 16, 1,5:24, 27, 32 34,
36, 54, 80, 81 ; 6, 2, 9, 19-23, 35,
76, 92, 28, 39 ; 11, II, 15-18 ; 12,
6, 25 : 13, 6 ; 18, 14; 20, 12 ; 21.
I, 2. 41 ; 22, 3. 13. 16 ; 23. i. 4.
9, 18 ; 81, 9 ; 37, I ; 38, 4. 8 :
39, 2, 8
Lacinium, a promontory of Bruttium.
3, 33. 56 ; 16, I ; 84, 11
Laconia, 2, 54. 65; 6, 19, 20, 24.
92 ; 16, 17. ao, 37 ; 88, 4
Lade, an island off Miletus, 16, 10,
14. IS
Ladictts, an Acamanian, 4, 80
Ladoceia, in the territory of Megalo-
polis, 2. 51, 55
Laelius, Gaius, 10. 3. 9. 12, 18. 19,
37. 39 ; 11. 3«. 33 : 1*. 4. 9 ; 16.
9. ", 14
Laenas. See Popilius
Laestrygones, the, 8, 11
Lagius. an Achaean, 89. 11
Lagoras. of Crete, an oflScer of Ptolemy
Philopator, 6. 61 ; 7. 15-18
Lagus, father of Ptolemy I., 2, 41 ; 6,
67
Lai, a tribe of Cisalpine Gauls. 2, 17
Lamia, a city in Thessaly, 9, 29 ; 20,
II
Lamius, of Ambracia, 18, 10
Lampsacus. a city in Mysia, 6, 78 ;
18, 52 ; 21, 13. 14
Laodice, wife of Seleucus Callinicus,
4, 51 ; 8. 22
Laodice, daughter of Mithridates IV. ,
wife of Antiochus the Great, 6, 43,
55
Laodice. another daughter of Mithri-
dates IV. , wife of Achaeus, 5. 74 ;
8. 21, 22, 23
Laodicea, a city in Phrygia. 6, 57
Laodicea by-the-Sea, a city in Syria,
32, 7
Laodicea, at Libanus, a city in Syria,
5. 45
Lapateni, fr. xvii
Lapethus, a city in Cyprus, 39, 18
Lappa, a city in Crete, 4, 53-55
Larinum, a city in North Apulia, 3. 101
Larisa, a city in Thessaly, 4, 66. 67 ;
*. 97. 99 ; 9, 18 ; 18. 19, 27, 33 ;
28. 5
Larisa Cremaste, in Thessalian
PhthioUs, 18, 3, 8 ; 18, 38
Larius (Lake of Como), 84, 10
Larymna, a town in Boeotia, 20. 5
Lases, an ambassador from Thespiae,
27, I
Lasio, a town in Elis, 4, 72-74 ; 6,
102
Latin, old, 8, 22
Latins, the, 1, 6 ; 2, 18. 24 ; 3, 22
Latium, 3. 22-24 ! 34. 8
Lattabus, an Aetolian, 9, 34
Lavina, daughter of Evander, fr. iii.
Laurentines, the, 8. 22
Lebadeia, a town in Boeotia, 27. i
Lebecii, a tribe of Cisalpine Gauls, 2,
17
Lechaeuro, the harbour of Con**
2, 17, 18, 24, 25-28, lO'
596
INDEX
Legion, the Roman. See Roman Army
Lemnus. island of, SO. ai ; 84, ii
Leo, a Macedonian officer, 18, 23
Leo. an officer of Eumenes I., 28, 15
Leonidas I., son of Anazandridas,
king of Sparta B.C 491-480, 9, 38
Leonidas II., king of Sparta B.C.
257-242, 4. 35
Leontini, a city in Sicily, 7. 6 ; 8, xi
Leontium, a city in Achaia, 2, 41 ; 6.
94 ; 24. 10
Leontius, conspirator against Philip V.,
4. 87 ; 6. 1. 2. 4, 5, 7, 14-16, 25-
27. 29, 100
Leontius, governor of Pieria, 6, 60
Lepreum, a city of Triphylia, 4, 77-80
Leptines, of Syracuse, 1, 9
Leptines. assassin of Gn. Octa\ius, 32,
4.6. 7
Leptis. a city of Africa, 1, 87
Lergetae, an African tribe, 3, 33
Leucas island, 6. 5, 16-18, 95, 101,
108, 109 ; 18. 47 ; 21. 26 ; 84. 6
Leuctra (in Bocolia). battle of, 1, 6 ;
2, 39. 41 ; 4, 81 ; 8, 13 : 12, 25/;
20.4
Libanus, Mt. (Lebanon), 6. 45, 59.
69
Libba, a city in Mesopotamia on the
Tigris, 6. 51
Libumus. Mt in Apulia, 8. 100
Libya, 1. 3. 26, 29, 70, 72 ; 3, 3. 33.
37-39 ; ». 1. 33. 65. 105 ; 12, 4.
26a ; 34, 6, 7, 15, 16 ; 88, 8 ; 39.
11, 19
Libyans, their war with Carthage, 1,
19. 65. 67. 73. 74. 76. 77* 79. 82,
84-87. See also 3. 33, 56, 72, 74,
79' 83, 87, 113-117 ; 5. 65. 82 ; 6.
52 ; 11, 19. 22. 24 ; 31, 27. Philam-
mon governor of. 16, 25
Libyan sea, 1, 37. 42 ; 4, 77
.Libyophoenicians, 3, 33
Licinius Crassus. P., consul B.C. 171,
27. 6, 8 ; 30, 3
Licinius, Marcus, 37, 6
Licinius Lucullus, L., 37, 6
Liger, a river in Gaul (Loire), 84. 10
Ligures, a large tribe of Cisalpine
Gauls, 2, 16 ; 12. 28 ; 33. 7. 10-
12 ; 84. 10. Serve the Cartha-
ginians as mercenaries, 1, 17, 67 ;
3. 33; 11. 19; 16, II : their
shields, 29, 14
Liguria, 2, 31 ; 8. 41 ; 7, 9
Lilybaeum, in SicOy, 1, 25, 38-48,
52-56, 59-61, 66 ; 3. 41. 61. 68, 96,
106. 109. no; 7, 3 ; 86. 4* 5 ;
87. 3
Limnaea, a town of Acamania. 6, 5,
6, 14
Limnaeus, a prince in Asia Minor, 6,
90
Limnasus, a Macedonian. 89. 4
Lingones, a tribe of Cisalpine Gauls.
2, 17
Lipara, a city and island, 1, 21, 24,
39
Liparae Islands, the, 1. 25 ; 84. 11
Lissus, a city of Illyria, 2, 12 ; 3.
16 ; 4, 16 ; 8, 15 ; 28, 8
Lissus, a river in Sicily (FiumeRttina),
7, 6
Livius Macatus, Gains, 8. 27, 29, 32
Livius Salinator, Marcus, consul B.C.
219, 207, 11. I, 3
Livius Salinator, Gains, consul B.C;
188, 21, 3, 11
Lochagus, an Aetolian, 27, 15
Locri, in Greece, the, 11, 5 ; 12. 6. 9-
II ; 18, II, 46, 47 ; 38. 5, 10 ;
Locris, 18. 10
Locri Epizcphyrii, in Magna Graecia.
1, 20; 10, I ; 12, 5-12; Locris. 1,
56
Logbasis, of Selge, 6. 74-76
Longanus, a river in Sicily, 1. 9
Lotophagi, the, 1, 39 ; 34. 3
Lucani. the, 2, 24; 10. i
Luceria. in Daunia, 3, 88, 100
Lucius, fr. xi., 1., xvii.
Lucretius Gallus, Gaius, 27, 7
Lucretius, Spurius, 81, 12. 13
Lugdunum, a town in Gaul. 84, 15
Luna, a town in Etruria, 34, 11
Lusi, a town in Arcadia, 4, i8, 25 ;
9. 34
Lusitani, the, 10, 17 ; 84. 8 ; 86. 2
Lusius, a stream in the territory of
Megalopolis. 16. 17
Lutatius Catulus, Gaius, consul B.C.
242. 1, 59-62 ; 8. 21 ; 29. 3
Lutatius Catulus, Gaius, consul b.c.
220, 8. 40
INDEX
597
Lycaeum, a town in the territory of
Megalopolis, 2. 51, 55
Lycaeus, a mountain in Arcadia, 34,
10
Lycaonia, a district of Asia Minor, 6,
57 ; 31, 22, 48
Lycastium, a district of Crete, 22, 19
Lychnidius, a lake in Illyria, 6. xo8
Lychnis, a town in Illyria, 18, 47 ; 34.
12
Lycia, 21, 24, 48 ; 22, S, 24 ; 24, 9 ;
25. 4 : 30. 5 ; 31, 7. 15 ; 34, 4
Lyciscus, an Acamanian, 9, 32-39
Lyciscus, an Aetolian, 27. 15 ; 28, 4 ;
30. 13 ;' 32, 19. 20
Lycoa, a town in Arcadia, 16, 17
Lycon, a Rhodian, 30. 5
Lycophron, a Rhodian, 26. 5
Lycopolis, a city in Egypt, 22. 7
Lycopus, an Aetolian, 21, 25. 26
Lycortas, of Megalopolis, Achaean
Strategus, B.C. 184, 182, father of
Polybius, 2, 40 ; 22, 3, 10, 12, 13.
16 ; 23. 12. z6, 17 ; 24, 6, 10 ;
28, 3, 6 ; 29, 23-25 ; 87, 5
Lyctians, 22, 18. Su Lyttus
Lycurgus, the Spartan legislator, 4,
81 ; 6, 3, 10-12, 46, 48-50 ; 10, 2
Lycurgus, king of Sparta, ac. 220-
210, 4, 2, 35-37. 60, 81 ; 5, S, 17.
18, 20-23, 29, 91, 92
Lycus, of Pharae, 6. 94, 95
Lycus, a river in Mysia, 6. 77
Lycus, a river of Phoenicia, 6, 68
Lycus, a river of Assyria, 6, 51
Lydia, 5, 57, 79, 82 ; 21, 16, 48
Lydiadas, tyrant of Megalopolis, 2.
44. 51 ; *. 77
Lydiackis. a citizen of Megalopolis.
24. 10
Lyncestae, a tribe in Macedonia, 84,
12
Lysanias, a prince in Asia Minor, 6.
90
Lysias, an ambassador of Antiochus
the Great. 18. 47. 50
Lysias, guardian of Antiochus V., 31,
17, 19, 20
Lysimacheia, a city of Aetolia, 6, 7
Lysimacheia, a city of the Thracian
Chersonese, 5, 34 ; 16, 23 ; 18, 3,
4. 50. 51 *. 21, 15, 48 I
Lysimachus, successor of Alexander
the Great in Thrace, 2, 41, 71 ; 6,
67 ; 16, 25 ; 18, 51 ; Fr. xi.
Lysimachus, son of Ptolemy Phila-
delphus, 16, 25
Lysimachus, a Gaul, 6, 79
Lysinoe, a town in Pisidia, 21, 36
Lysis, ambassador from Lacedae-
monian exiles, 23, 4
Lyttus, a town in Crete, 4, 53, 54 ;
22, 19
M AGAR AS, a river near Carthage
(Bagrtxlas), 1, 75, 86 ; 16, 2
Maccoei, a tribe in Libya, 3, 33
Macedonia, 2, 70 ; 3, 3 ; 4, i, 50, 51,
57, 62, 63, 66, 69. 85, 87 ; 6, 5,
26. 30, 34, 97, 101, 106, 108-110 ;
27, 4. S. 8 ; 28, 8, 10, 13, 17, 20 ;
29, I, 4, 22, 24 ; 80, 8, 9, 13, 16,
18; 81, 3, 12; 82. 8, II, 15, 23 ;
84, 12 ; 86, 4 ; 87, i, 2, 8 ; 88, 5.
10 ; 89, 2, 19 ; Roman settlement
of, vol. ii. p. 434
Macedonian soldiers at Alexandria ;
16, 26, 28, 29, 31
Macedonians, the, their empire, 1, 2 ;
their government, 4, 76 ; 6, 27 ;
their freedom of speech, 6. 27 ;
their supremacy in Greece, 9, 28-
36, 39 ; their army, 2, 65 ; 3, 6 ;
4, 8 ; 6, 2, 65, 79, 82 ; 18, 28-32.
See Phalanx ; serving in Egypt, 16,
26, 28, 31, 32. See also 2. 37, 39,
43, 48-51. 54. 56, 65-71 ; 8. 5, 6,
16; 4, 2. 3, 5, 8, 9, II, 16, 22-24,
34. 35. 37. 61, 64, 68-73, 76. 78.
80, 84, 87 ; 6. 2-8. 13, 17, 18, 25,
29. 35. 97. 100, 109 ; 22, 4 ; 27,
2-10, 15; 28, 2, 5, 8; 29, 4. 21,
37 ; 31. 3. 7. la : 32, 14 ; 36, 4,
37, 2, 9 ; 38, 5 ; 39, 6
Macedonians, the Upper, 6. 97
Macella. a city in Sicily, 1, 24
Machanidas, tyrant of Sparta, 10, 41 ;
11. 11-18; 13, 6
Machatas, an Aetolian, 4, 34, 36
Machatas. son of Charops. 27. 15
Maeander. the river, 21. 24, 48 ; 22, 5
Maeander, of Alexandria, 16, 30
Maedi, a Thracian tribe, 10. 41
Maeotis Palus (Sea of Azov), 4, 39,
598
INDEX
40, 4a ; 5, 44 ; 10, 27, 48 ; 84. 7,
15
Magas, father of Berenice, 16, 26
Magas, son of Ptolemy Euergetes and
Berenice, 6, 34, 36 ; 15, 25
Magi, the, 84, 2
Magilus, a Gallic chief, S, 44
Magister equitum, 3, 87
Magistrates at Rome, 3, 87; 6. 12,
19
Magnesia, a district in Thessaly, 6.
99, 100; 18, II, 46, 47
Magnesia, a city of Ionia on the
Maeander, 6, 65 ; 16. 24
Mago, brother of Hannibal, 3. 71. 79.
85, 114; 9. 22; 10, 7. 38; 11.
21
Mago Samnis, a friend of Hannibal,
9, 25
Mago. commandant of New Carthage,
10. 12, 15, 18, 19
Mago, an ambassador from Carthage,
36. 3
Mago Bruttius, 86, 5
Magonus, of Carthage. 7. 9
Magus, the (false Smerdis). 6, 43
Mahabal, an officer under Hannibal.
3, 84. 85, 86
Malea, promontory of Laconia (Malid)^
5. 95. 101, 109 ; 84. 4. 7, la
Malian Gulf. 9. 41 ; 18. i ; 20. 10
Mamertines. the. 1, 7-12, 20 ; 3. 26
Mamilius Vitulus, Q., consul B.C. 262 ;
1. 17-19
Mandonius, a Spanish chief, 10, 18,
35 ; 11, 29
ManiUus. Manius, consul B.C. 145.
86. 6 ; 37, 3
Manlius, Lucius, praetor B.C. 218,
3. 40
Manlius Torquatus, T., consul B.C.
224, 2. 31
Manlius Torquatus. T.. consul B.C.
165, sent to support Ptolemy Phys-
con, 81. 18, 26-28 ; 82. i
Manlius Vulso Longus, L. , consul B.C.
256, 250, 1. 26, 28, 29, 39, 41-48
Manlius Vulso. Gnaeus. consul B.C.
189. 21, 24, 34.39, 43. 44. 47, 48
Manlius Vulso, Lucius, brother of the
preceding, 21, 44. 46
Mantinea, a city of Arcadia, 2. 46, 53,
54. 56. 58. 61 ; 4, 8, 21, 27. 33 ;
9. 8, 9, 34; 6, 43; 11, II, 14;
12. 25/; 88, 4
Mantua, in Cisalpine Gaul (Mantua),
16, 10
Marathus, a city in Phoenicia, 6. 68
Marcius, Ancus, fr. v., vi.
Marcius, Lucius, legatus of Scipio, 11,
23
Marcius Philippus, Quintus, consul
B.C. 186, 169, S3, 4, 8, 9 : 24, II ;
27 ; 28, 1, 13, 16, 17 ; 29, 23-25
Marcius Figulus, Gains, praetor B.C.
169, consul B.C. 162, 156, 28, 14,
17 ; 82. 26
Marcius Censorinus, Lucius, consul
B.a 149, 36. 6
Margites, 12, 4^1, 25
Margus, of Caryneia, first sole
Achaean Strategus, ac. 255, 2, 10,
41. 43
Maroneia, a city of Thrace, 6, 34 ;
22, I, 15. 17; 18, 3 ; 22. 9, 17,
18 ; 30. 3
Mamicini, a tribe in Central Italy, 2,
24 : 3, 88
Mars Quirinus, 3. 25
Marseilles, 2, 14, 16 ; 3. 37. 41 1 47i
61. 95 ; 83. 7. 10, II ; 84, 7, 10
Marsh, the town in the, 21, 34
Marshes, the (Barathra)^ near Pelu-
sium. 6. 80
Marsi, a nation in Italy, 2, 24
Marsyas, plain of, between Libanus
and Antilibanus, 6, 45. 46, 61
Masaesylii, a tribe in Africa, 8, 33 ;
16, 23
Massanissa, king of Numidia, 8, 5 ;
9, 25 ; 11, 21 ; 14, 3. 4, 8, 9 ; 16,
3-5, 9, II, 12, 14, 18 ; 21, II, 21 ;
32, 2 ; character of, 37, 10
Massolii, a Numidian tribe, 3, 33
Mastia, a town of Africa, 8, 24
Mastiani, a Spanish tribe, 3, 33
Magna Mater, 21, 37
Maihos, a Libyan leader of mercen-
aries, 1, 69-73, 75. 77. 79. 82, 84,
86-88
Matiani, a tribe in Media, 6, 44
Maurctania, 84, 15
Mauretanians, the, 8. 33 ; 16. 11;
88. I
INDEX
599
Medes, the, 6, 44, 79. 82, 85 ; 16,
22a ; 89, 6
Media. 5, 40, 44, 45, 47, 51, 52, 54,
55 ; 10. 27
Medicine, Schools of, 12, 25^/
MedimnuSt an Attic, 6, 39 ; Sicilian^
2. 15 ; 9. 44
Mediolanum (Afilan), 2, 34
Medion, a city of Acamania, 2, 2-4 ;
18, 40
Mediterranean, the, 8, 37, 39 ; 16,
29
Megaleas, secretary of Philip V., 4,
87; 6, 2, 14-16, 25-28
Megalopolis, a city in Arcadia, 2. 44.
46, 48, so, 51, 54, 55, 61, 62, 64-
66 ; 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 13, 25, 32, 33,
37, 60, 69, 77, 80-82 ; 6. 91-93 ;
9, 18. 21, 28 ; 13, 8 ; 16, 17 ; 18,
14 ; 20, 12 ; 21, 9 ; 22, xo ; 28,
12, 16; 31. 9; taken by Cleomenes,
a. 55
Megara, 2, 43 ; 4, 67 ; 20, 6 ; 39. 8
Megistus, a river of Mysia, 5, 77
Melambium, a township in Pelasgic
Thessaly, 18, 20
Melancomas, of Ephesus, 8, 17-20
Meleager, ambassador from Antiochus
Epiphanes, 27, 19 ; 2B, i, 22 ; 31,
21
Melitaea, a city of Phthiotis, 6, 97 ;
9. 18
Memphis, a city in Egypt, 6, 62, 63.
66 ; 29, 23
Menalddas, of Sparta, 80, 17 ; 89,
IX
Menecrates, a Macedonian, 29, 6
Menedemus, of Alabanda, 6, 69, 79,
82
Menelaium. a hill and shrine in
Laconia, 6, z8, 22
Menesiheus. brother of Meleager and
Apollonius, 81, 21
Menestratus, of Epirus, 20, 10 ; 21.
Meninx. island of the Lotophagp. 1,
39 ; 84, 3
Menippus. a Macedonian. 10, 42
Menneas, 6, 71
Menochares, ambassador from Deme-
trius Soter, 32. 4. 6
Menoetius, of Crete, 22, 19
Mcnyllus, of Alabanda, 31, 18, 20, 22;
32. I
Merganfe, a town of Sicily, 1. 8
Mesembriani, a Thracian people, 26,
2
Mesopotamia, 6, 44, 48
Messapii, a tribe in Apulia, 2, 24 ; 8,
88
Messene, in Sicily, 1. 7-11, 15, 20, 21,
25. 38. 52 ; 3, 26
Messene, in the Peloponnese, 2, 5,
55, 61, 62, 79, 80; 3, X9; 4, 4,
33. 49. 77 ; 5. 5. 17. 37. 91. 9a ;
7, 10, II ; 8, 10, 14; 12, 6^; 16,
13. 16, 17 ; 18, 14. 4a ; 22, 13 ;
23, 5, 9, 12, 16, 17 ; 24, 2, 11-13,
IS ; 89, 9
Messenians, wars with the Aetolians,
*. 3-7. 9. 15 ; their old wars with
Sparta, 4, 33 ; 6, 49 ; endeavour
to join Philip V. in his attacks on
Sparta, 6, 20 ; Lycurgus prepares
an invasion of them, 6, 91, 92 ;
democracy among, 7, 10 ; obtain
some Spartan territory, 9, 28, 30 ;
in alliance with Nabis, 16, 13 ;
quarrel with the Achaeans, 23, 9 ;
poison Philopoemen, 23, 12 ; sub-
dued by Lycortas. 23. 16 ; 24, 2.
II ; their attitude in B.C. 146, 89, 9
Metagonia, a district in Africa, 3, 33
Metapa. a town in Aetolia, 6, 7, 13
Metapontium. a city in Magna Graecia,
8. 36; 10. I
Meteon, a city of Labeatis in lUyria,
29. 3
Methydrium. a town in Arcadia, 4,
10, II, 13
Methymna, a city in Lesbos, 88. 13
Metretes, a, 2. 15
Metrodorus, an officer of Philip V.,
16. 24 ; fr. Ixxii.
Metrodorus. an ambassador from
Perseus. 29, 4, 11
Metropolis, a city of Acamania, 4. 64
Miccus, of Dyme, sub-Stratcgus of
the Achaeans, 4, 59
Micio, of Athens. 6. 106
Micipsa, son of Massanissa, 87. 10
Midon. of Bcroea, 27, 8
Milestones on Roman roads, 3, 39 ;
84, II
6oo
INDEX
Miletus, 16, 12, 15 ; 21. 48 ; 28, 19;
81, a I
Milo, an officer of Perseus, 29, 15
Miltiades, ambassador from Deme-
trius Soter, 82. 24
Milyas, a district in Asia Minor, 6.
72. 17 ; 21, 48
Mincius, a river in Cisalpine Gaul
{Mincio), 84, 10
Minervae promontorium, 84, 11
Minoa Heracleia, a city in Sicily. 1,
Minucius Rufus, M., 8, 87, 90, 92,
94, X01-106
Minucius Rufus, Q., consul B.C. T94,
18, 12
Minucius Thermus, Q., consul B.C.
183. 21, 46
Minucius lliermus, L., legate in
Egypt. 88. 8
Misdes, a Carthaginian ambassador,
86. 3
Miscnum, a promontory in Campania,
84, II
Mithridates IV., king of Cappadocia
on the Pontus from about B.C. 242
to about B.C. 190 ; 4. 56 ; 6, 43.
90 ; 8. 22
Mithridates V., son of Phamaces I.,
king of Cappadocia circ, B.C. 154-
120, 26, 2 ; 88. 12
Mithridates, nephew of Antiochus the
Great, and grandfather of the pre-
ceding, 8. 25
Mithridates, Satrap of Armenia, 26. 2
Mitylene, a city in Lesbos. 11, 4
Mnascas, of Argos, 18, 14
Mnasiadcs, of Argos, an athlete, 6,
64
Mnasilochus, of Acamania, 21. 17.
45
Mnasippus, of Coronea, 80, 13 ; 82,
20
Mncsis. a flute girl, 14. 11
Moagetes, tyrant of Cibyra, 21, 34
Mob-rule, 6, 4 ; 9. 5
Mochyrinus, 81, 27
Mocissus, a town in Cappadocia, 24.
8
Moeragenes, guardian of Ptolemy
Epiphanes, 16, 27-29
Molon, Satrap of Media, 6, 40-43, 61
Molossi. a people of Epirus, 27. x6 ;
80, 7* 16
Molpagoras. tyrant of the Ciani. 16.
21
Molycria, a town in Aetolia. 6. 94
Monarchy^ 6. 3-6, 8. 9
Monunius. an lllyrian chief. 29. 13
Mora, a Spartan, Er. xxiv.
Morcus, an ambassador fromGenthius.
29, 3. II
Morini, a Gallic tribe, 84. 15
Morzias. a prince in Paphlagonia. 26,
2
Mummius, Lucius, consul B.C. 146.
89, 14, 17
Musaeum, in Macedonia, 87, 8
Musaeum. at Tarentum. 8, 27, 29
Musaeus, an ambassador from Anti-
ochus the Great, 21, x6, 43
Music in Arcadia, 4, 20, 21
Mutina, in Cisalpine Gaul [Jidodena),
8. 40
Mycenae, in Argolis, 16, 16
Mygdonia, a district in Mesopotamia.
6, 51
Myiscus, an officer of Antiochus the
Great, 6, 82
Mylae, a city in Sicily, 1, 9, 23
Mylasa, a city in Caria, 16, 24 ; 21.
48 ; 80. 5
Myndus, a city in Caria, 16, 12, 15
I Myrcanus, a Carthaginian, 7, 9
Myrina, a city in Aeolis, 18, 44
Myrrhicus, a Boeotian, 22. 4
Myrtis, of Argos, 18, 14
Myrtium, a courtesan of Alescandria,
14. II
Myrton, a friend of Charops, 82, 20,
21
Mysia, 4. 50, 52 ; 6, 76, 77 ; 21. 48
Mysteries, the, 28, 19
Myttistratum, a town in Sicily. 1, 24
Myttonus, a Libyan, 9. 22
Myus, a town of Ionia, 16, 24
Nabis. tyrant of Sparta, 4, 81 ; 18.
6-8 ; 16. 13. 16, 17 ; 18, 17 ; 21,
2, 9, 11; 88. 16. 5<"^ Apega
Namnitae, a tribe of Transalpine Gaul.
84. 10
Naragara, a tON^m in Africa, 16, 5
Nardvas, a Numidian, 1, 78, 82, 84. 86
INDEX
6oi
Narbo (or Atax), a river in Transal-
pine Gaul (the Aude), 6, 37, 38 ;
S4, 10
Narbo (Narbonne), 84. 6, 10
Naucratis, a city in Egypt, 22, 7 ; 28,
20
Naupactus, a city of the Aetolians
(Lepanto), 4. 16 ; 6, 95. 102, 103;
16, 27; 20, xo, 13; 28, 5; 88,
1 1 ; fr. Ixxxiii. ; the Hollows of, 6,
103
Neapolis (Naples), 1, 20 ; 8, 91 ; 6,
Neleus. 16, 12
Nemean games, 2, 70 ; 6, loi ; 10,
26 ; 22, 13
Neocaesareia, fr. xx.
Neocretans, 6, 3, 65, 79
Neolaidas, an ambassador from
Ptolemy Philometor, 88, 8
Neolaus, brother of Molon, 6, 53, 54
Neon, a Messenian, 18, 14
Neon, a Boeotian, father of Brachylles,
20, 5
Neon, a relation of the preceding, 27,
X. 2, 6
Neptime, 10. ix, 14. See Poseidon
Nercobrica, a city in Spain, 86, 2
Nereis, daughter of Pyrrhus, 7, 4
Nestor Cropius, 27, 16
Nesus, a town in Acamania, 9, 39
Nicaea, a town in Locris, 10, 42 ; 18,
I. 7
Nicagoras, of Messene, 6, 37, 38
Nicagoras, of Rhodes. 28, 2, 16
Nicander, Aetolian Strategus B.C. 190,
20, 10 ; 21, 25, 27, 30 ; 27, X5 ;
28. 4, 6
Nicander, of Rhodes, 18, 2, x6
Nicanor, assassin of Seleucus III., 4,
48
Nicanor, an officer of Philip V., 16,
27
Nicanor Elephantus, 18. 24
Nicanor, friend of Demetrius Soter,
81, 22
Nicanor, son of Myrton, 32, 20, 21
Nicarchus. officer of Antiochus the
Great. 6. 68, 71, 79, 83, 85
Nicasippus, of Elis, 6, 94
Nicephorium, a temple at Pergamum,
16, I ; 18. 2, 6; 82, 27
Nicias, of Athens, 9, 19
Nicias, an officer of Ptolemy Philo-
pator, 6. 71
Nicias, of Epirus, 80. 13
Nicippus, of Messene, 4, 3X
Nicodemus. of Elis, 22. 3, 5
Nicodes, tyrant of Sicyon, 10, 22
Nicolaus, an Aetolian, 6, 61, 66, 68,
70 ; 10, 29
Nicomachus, of Acamania, 18, 10
Nicomachus, of Rhodes, 8, 17-19
Nicomedes, of Cos, 10, 28
Nicomedes, son of king Pnisias, 82,
28 ; 87. 6
Nicon, of Tarentum, 8, 26, 29, 30
Nicon, connexion of Agathocles, 16,
25. 33
Nicophanes, of Megalopolis, 2, 48,
50
Nicostratus, an Aetolian, father of
Dorimachus, 4. 3 ; 9, 34 ; 18, 54
Nicostratus, a secretary of Agathocles,
16, 27, 28
Nicostratus, of Rhodes, 16, 5 ; 29,
10
Nicostratus, of Xanthus, 26, 4
Nile, the, 8, 37 ; 84. 2, X5 ; canals
of, 6. 62 ; drinking from. fr. xxvi
Nisaean cavalry, 82, 3. See Herod. 9,
20
Nola, a city in Campania (Nola), 2,
17 ; 8, 9X
Nomads, the, a Scythian tribe, 11,
34. See also Apasiacae
Noricum (Neumark in Styria), 84, 10
Nothocrates. of Gortyn, 28. 15
Notium, harboiu* of Colophon. 21. 48
Numenius, ambassador of the Ptole-
mies, 30, 17
Numidians, the, 1, 19, 31, 65. 74,
77, 78: 8, 33. 44. 45. 65-73. 1X2,
1x6, 1x7; 11, 2X ; 14, 1-9; 16,
9, II, 12. See also Zl, xo ; 88. i
Numisius. Titus, commissioner to
Egypt, 29, S
Nutria, a town in Illyria, 2, 11
Obols, value of, 2, 15 ; 6, 39
Ocean, the, 8,. 33 ; 16^29 ; 84, 15
Octavius, Gnaeus, praetor B.C. 166,
28. 3-5; 30. 19; consul B.C. 165,
81, 12, 13, 19, 20 ; 82. 4, 6, 7
602
INDEX
Odomantica, a district in Thrace, 87. 2
Odrysae, a tribe in Thrace, 28. 8 ;
80. x8 ; fr. xi.
Oeanthia. acityof theOzolianLocrians,
*. 57 ; «. 17
Oenanthe, mother of Agathodes, 14,
11 ; 16. 25. 29, 33
Oeniadae. a town in Acamania, 4. 65 ;
9. 39 : 31. 32
Oenis, of Messene. 4. 31
Oenus, a river of Laconia. 2, 65. 66
Ogygus, an ancient king of Achaia, 2,
Olana. a mouth of the Po. 2, 16
Olenus, a town of Achaia, 2, 41
Oligarchy, 6, 3, 4, 8
Olygyrtus, a mountain in Arcadia. 4,
II, 70
Olympia, 4, 10. 73, 75, ^^, 84, 86 ;
Olympic games, 4, 73 ; 12. 4^/, 26;
29. 9 ; 30, 10 ; 89, 17
Olympiad, an, 7th, fr. i ; 27th, €, 2 ;
X24th, 2, 41, 71 ; X29th, 1, 5 ;
X39th, 2. 71 ; 140th. 1, 3 ; 8, i ;
4. 26, 66 ; 6, 30, 105 ; 141st, 9,
X ; 147th, 21. 43 ; 148th, 22, i ;
X49lh, 23, X. 9
Olympichus, a prince in Asia Minor,
5, 90
Olympichus, of Coronea, 27, i
Olympieion, at Athens, 26, i
Olympiodoms, of Byznntium, 4. 47
Olympion, an ambassador from Gen-
thius, 29. 3, 4
Olympus, Mt, in Laconia near
Sallasia, 2, 65, 66, 69 ; 6, 24
Olympus, Mt. , in Thessaly, 12, 26 ;
84. 10
Olympus, Mt., in Galatia {Ala Dagh),
21. 37
Olynthus, a city in Macedonia, 9. 28,
33
Omias, of Sparta, 4, 23 ; 24, 8
Oncheslus, a river in Thessaly, 18, 20
Onesi genes of Syracuse, 7, 4
Onomarchus, a Phocian, 9, 33
Onomastus, governor of Thrace, 22,
17, 18
Opheltas, of Boeotia, 20, 6
Opici, a tribe in Campania, 84, 11
Opimius, Quintus, consul B.C. 154,
38, 8, 10, 13
Oppius, Lucius, 88, 13
Orchomenus, a city of Arcadia, 2, 46,
54, 55 ; *. 6, II, 12
Oreium, a mountain in Ass3ma, 6, 52
Orestae, a tribe in Macedonia, 18, 47
Orestes. See Aurelius
Orestes, father of Tisamenus, 2, 41 ;
4, I
Oretes, a Spanish tribe, 8, 33
Oreus, a city in Euboea, 10. 43 ; 11,
5 ; 18. 45, 47
Orgyssus, a town in lUjrria, 6, 108
Orion, the rise of, 1, 37
Oroanda, a town in Pisidia, 21, 44, 46
Orontes, a river in Syria, 6, 59
Orontes, a mountain in Media, 10. 27
Orophemes, usurper of Cappadocia,
8, 5 : 82. 84, 25 ; 88, 6
Oropus, in Boeotia, 32, 25 ; 88, 2
Onhosia, a town in Caria. SO. 5
Ortiago. a Gallic chief. 21. 38 ; 22.
21
Ossa, Mt., in Thessaly, 84. xo
Ostia, harbour of Rome, fr. v. (6, '2) ;
81, 22 ; 34, II
Otacilius Crassus, Manius, consul B.c.
261, 1, 20
Oxus. a river in Asia, 10, 48
Oxybii, a tribe of Transalpine Gauls,
38, 8, 10, II
Pachynus, a promontory of Sicily
{Capo Passaro), 1, 25. 42, 54 ; 7, 3
Padoa. a mouth of the Po. 2. 16
Padus (the Po), 2. 16, 17, 23, 28, 32,
34. 35 *. 8. 40. 61, 64, 66, 69, 75,
86 ; 6, 29 ; 10, 3 ; 34, 10 ; the
valley or plain of. 2, 19, 35 ; 8, 39,
44, 47. 48, 54, 56, 61
Paeanium, a town in Aetolia, 4, 65
Paeonia, a district near Macedonia, 6,
97 ; 28, 10
Palatine, the, fr. iii.
Pale, a town in Cephallenia, 6. 3, 5.
16, 17, 100
Pallas, son of Hercules and Pallan-
tium, fr. iii.
Pamisus, a river in Messenia, 16, 16
Pamphia, a hamlet in Aetolia, 6. 8, 13
Pamphilidas, of Rhodes, 21. 7, 10
Pamphylia, 6, 34. 72. 77 > 21, 35. 43,
48 ; 82, 4
INDEX
603
Panachaicum, a mountain in Achaia,
5, 30
Panaetolus, an officer of Antiochus the
Great, 6, 30
Panathenaea, the, 28, 19
Pan-boeotii, 4, 3 ; 9, 34
Panchaea, a fobulous island of Arabia
Felix, 84, 5
Pancrates, of Rhodes, 28, 16
Pancrates, tyrant of Cibyra, 80. 9
Pangaeum, a mountain in Thrace, 22,
8
Panic, a, 6, 96, 100
Panium, a mount n in in Coele-Syria
(part of Lebanon), 16, x8 ; 28, i
Panormus, a town in Sicily, 1, ax, 24,
38-40, 55, 56
Pantacnotus, of Abydus, 16, 30
Pantaleon, an Aetolian, father of
Archidamus, 4, 57
Pantaleon, an Aetolian ambassador,
20, 9 : a«, 4
Pantauchus, son of Balacrus, 27, 8 ;
ao, 3, 4
Panteus, of Sparta, 6, 37
Paphlagonia, 26, a
Papiria, wife of Macedonicus, mother
of the younger Africanus, 82, la, 14
Papirius, Gnaeus, 88, 10, 11
Parapotamia, a district in Assyria, 6,
48, 69
Parmenio, of Lampsacus, 18, 5a
Parmenio, ambassador fix>m Genthius,
M, 3, "
Parnassus, a mountain in Phocis, 4,
57 ; 84, 10
Parnassus, a city in Cappadocia, 24, 8
Paropus, a town in Sicily, 1, 24
Parthenius, a mountain in the Pelo-
ponnese, 4. 23
Parthians, the, 6, 44 ; 10. 28, 31
Parthus, a city in Illyria, 2, 11 ; 7, 9 ;
18. 47
Pasiadas, an Achaean, 28, 12, 19
Possum, raisin wine, fr. iv.
Patara, a city in Lycia, 21, 46
Patrae, a city of Achaia, 2, 41 ; 4, 6, 7,
10, 25, 83 ; 6, 2, 3, 30, 91, 95, 101 ;
28. 6 ; 89, 9
Pausiras, an Egyptian prince, 22, 7
Pausistratus, of Rhodes, 21, 7
Paxi, islands, near Corcyra, 2. xo
Pedasa, a town in Caria, 18, 44
Pednclissus, a city in Pisidia, 6, 72,
73. 76
Pelagonia, a district in Macedonia, 6,
X08
Pelecas, a mountain in Mysia, 6, 7j
Pelion, a moimtain in Thessaly, 8, 11 ;
84, 10
Pella, a city in Macedonia, 4, 66 ; 29.
4; 3*. 12
Pella, a town in Palestine, 6, 70
Pellene, a city in Achaia, 2, 4X, 52 ; 4,
8, 13. 72
Pellene, a town in Laconia, 4, 81 ; 16.
37
Pelopidas. of Thebes, 6, 43 ; 8, i
Peloponnese, the, 1, 42 ; 2, 37. 43,
44.49. 5a. 54. 60, 62 ; 4. 3. 5. 6, 8,
9, 13, 14. 22, 32, 57. 6x, 62, 65, 66,
70. 73. 77* 84, 87 ; 6, I, 3, X7, 36,
102, 106, no; 12. 4//; 22, I, 10,
13. 15 : 28, 4. 9 ; 24. 2 ; 27, 2,
18 ; 28. 3, 7, 13 ; 29. 23 ; 80, 23 ;
88. 3 ; 84. 6. 12 ; 87. 3 ; 88, 7 ;
89. 2, 9, 14
Peloponnesians, the, 2. 37. 38. 40, 42,
43. 49. 52, 62 ; 8. 3 ; 4, I. 7, 32,
67. 69, 77, 82 ; 6. 92, 106 ; 6. 49 ;
10. 25 ; 11, 5 ; 12, I2iz, 251 ; 18,
11. 14 ; 88. 5
Pelops. of Alexandria, 16. 25
Pelorias, a promontory of Sicily, 1, 11,
42
Pelusium, a city of Egypt, 6. 62, 80 ;
16. 25 ; 28. 18 ; 29. 27
Penelope, 12. 26^
Peparethus, island of, 10, 42
Peraea Rhodionim, a part of Caria,
18. 2, 6, 8 ; 27. 7 \ 80, 24 ; 81. 26
Pergamum (or Pergamos, 21. 20). in
Mysia, chief city of Attalus, 4, 48 ;
6. 78 ; 16, X ; 21, xo. 20 ; 24, 5.
9 ; 82. 27 ; 88. 9
Perge, in Pamphylia, 6. 72 ; 21, 44
Pericles, of Athens, 9. 23
Perigenes, an officer of Ptolemy Philo-
pator, 6. 68. 69
Perinthus, a city in Thrace on the
Propontis. 18. 2, 44 ; 84. X2
Perioeci of Sparta, the, 2, 65 ; 4. 34
Perippia (or-ii), 6. xoa
Perrhaebi, a tribe in Thessaly, f
6o4
INDEX
18. 46, 47 ; 22, I, 9, 15 ; 28, i ;
28. 13 ; 80. 7
Perseus, son of Philip V. , king of Mace-
donia B.C. 179-168. 1, 3 ; 18, 35 ;
22, 8 ; intrigues against his brother,
23. 3. 7, xo ; beginning of his
reign, 26, 3, 4, 6 ; war with Rome,
27, i-ii, 14-16 ; 28. I, 2, 5, 12.
17 ; defeated at Pydna, 29, 3-22,
27 ; 80, I, 3. 6-8, xo, 13, 16, 18 ;
32, 20, 21, 23 ; in Alba, 87, 1-3, 9.
See alsoZ, 3, 5, 32 ; 20, 11 ; 82, 11.
fr. Ixxxi.
Persian Gulf, the, 6, 46, 48, 54 ; 9,
43 ; 13, 9 {'EpvOp^L BdXoffaa, cp.
Herod. 6. 20)
Persian Gates, the, at Sardis, 7, 17,
18
Persians, the, 1, 2, 6, 63 ; 2, 35 ; 3,
6 ; 4, 31 : 6, 10, 43, 55 ; 6, 49 ;
•. 34. 39 ; 10, 28 ; 12, 8, 20, 25/;
16, 22 ; 22, 8 ; 29, 21 ; 39, 6
Persis, 6, 40, 44. 54 ; 31, 11
Pessinus, a city of Galatia, 21, 37
Petelia, a town of Bruttium {Strongoli),
7, I
Petraeus, of Epinis, 4, 24 ; 6, 17 ; 21,
26
Petronius, Gaius, 32, 28
Phacus, a town in Macedonia, 31, 26
Phaeacians, the, 34, 9
Phaeneas, Aetolian Strategus B.C. 198,
192, 18, I, 3. 4. 7. 37. 38 ; 20, 9,
10 ; 21, 25, 26, 29, 30
Phaestus, a city of Crete, 4, 55
Phaethon, fall of, 2, 16
Phalanx, the Macedonian, 2, 65 ; 12,
20, 21 ; 18, 26-28 ; 29, 17 ; double,
2, 66 ; quadruple, 12, 20 ; of
Pyrrhus, 18, 28 ; of Achaeans, 11,
11. IS
Phalara, a city of Thessaly, 20, 10, 11
Phalaris, tyrant of Agrigentum, 7, 7 ;
12, 25
Phalasama, a town in Crete, 22, 19
Phanoteia, a town in Phocis, 6, 96 ;
27, 16 ; 29. 12
Pharae (or Pharaea), a city of Achaia,
2, 41 ; 4. 6, 7, 25, 59, 60, 77 ; 6,
30. 94. 95
Pharae, a town of Messenia, 16, x6 ;
28, 17
Phamaces I. , son of Mithridates IV. ,
king of Cappadocia circ. ac. 190-
170. 3, 3 ; 28, 9 ; 24, i. 5. 8, 9 ;
26, 2 ; 27, 7, 17
Pharsalus, a city of Thessaly, 6, 99 ;
18, 3, 8 ; 18, 20, 38, 47
Phanis, island and town of, 2. 11; 8,
t8, 19 ; 6, 108 ; 7, 9. See Deme-
trius
Pharycus, an Aetolian. 9, 34
Phaselis, a city of Lycia, 30, 9
Phasis, a river in Colchis, 4. 56
Phayllus, an officer of Achaeus, 6, 72,
73
Pheias, harbour town in Elis, 4, 9
Pheidias, the Athenian artist, 30, 10
Pheneus, a town in Arcadia, 2, 52 ; 4,
68
Pherae, a city of Thessaly, 6, 99 ; 18,
19, 20
Phibotides, a city of Illyria, 6, 108
Phigaleia, a city in Arcadia, 4, 3, 6,
31, 79, 80 ; 6, 4
Philaenus, altars of, in the Greater
Syrtis, 3, 39; 10, 40
Philaenis, 12. 13
Philammon, governor of Libya, under
Ptolemy Epiphanes, 16, 25, 26a, 33
Philemenus, of Tarentum, 8, 26, 27,
31. 3a
Philetaerus, son of Attalus I., 39, 7
Philiades, of Messene, 18, 14
Philinus, historian, 1, 14, 15 ; 3, 26
Philinus, of Corinth, 39, 1 1
Philip II., king of Macedonia, B.C.
360-336, 2, 41, 48; 3, 6; 6, 10;
8. X1-13; 9, 28, 33; 18, 14 ; 22,
6, 8
Philip v., son of Demetrius II., king
of Macedonia B.C. 229-X79, 1, 3 ;
his youth and succession, 2, 2, 37,
45. 70; engages in the social war,
4, 2, 3. 5, 9, 13, 15, x6, 19, 22-27,
29. 30, 34, 36, 37 ; invades Aetolia,
4, 55, 57, 61-87 ; renews the war
by sea, attack on Thermus, 6, 1-30,
34, 95.97-105. 108-xxo; makes a
treaty with Hannibal, 7, 9, cp. 3,
2; conduct at Messene, 7, 11;
gets rid of Aratus, 8, 3, 10-
x6 ; fails in an attack on M^alo-
polis, 9, 18 ; his lawless conduct in
INDEX
60s
Greece, 9, 23, 30-32, 35-37. 4X| 42 ;
supports Achaeans against Rome,
and Attains, and Aetolians, 10, 9.
26, 27, 41 ; second attack on
Thermus, 11, 5-7 ; 18, 3-5 ; his
designs against Ptolemy Epiphanes,
16, 20-25 ! defeated at Chius, 16,
i-xi, 15, 22; his energy, 16,
28, 29 ; war with Rome, 16,
34'35i 38 > attends conference at
Nicaea, 18, 1-12 ; battle of Cyno-
scephalae, 18, 27, 33, 36-39, 41-48,
50, 51, 54 ; supports the Romans
against Antiochus, 20, 5, 7, 11. See
also 21, 2, n, 23, 25, 31 ; 22, i,
8. 9. 13. '5. 17 ; M, 1-3, 7-10 ;
24. 12; 26, 3; 27, 15; 82, 27;
87, 9 ; fr. xcviii. -cii. For his
change of character see 4, 7jt 81 ;
7. 12, 14 ; 9, 23
Philip, adopted son of Perseus, 87, 2
Philip, an Achaean, 80, 13
Philip, an ambassador of Perseus, 27,
4
Philip, a companion of Antiochus the
Great, 6, 82
Philippopolis, a city in Thessaly, 6,
100
Phillidas, an Aetolian, 4, 77-80
Philodes, friend of Philip V. , 16, 24 ;
22, 18 ; 28, I, 3
Philocrates, of Rhodes, 80, 4
Philodemus, of Argos, 7, 2
Philomdum, a city in Phrygia, 21, 35
Philomehis, of Phocis, 9, 32
Philon, of Cnossus, 6, 65
Philon, friend of Agathocles, 14, 11 ;
1*. 30. 33
Philon, of Chalcis, 21, 17, 45 ; 28. 28,
2, 16 ; 80. 4. 22
Philon, of Thessaly, 89, 10
Philophron, of Rhodes, 22, 5 ; 27. 14
Philopoemen, of Megalopolis, Achaean
Strategus ac 206, 204, 201, 192,
189-188,183; completes the work of
Aratus, 2, 40 ; at Uie battle of Sal-
lasia, 2, 67-69 ; his education and re-
forms, 10, 21-24 ; 13L. 9-18 ; invades
Laconia, 16, 36, 37 ; goes to defend
Megara, 20, 6 ; refuses a present
from the Spartans, 20, 12 ; restores
some Spartan exiles, 21, 41 ; 22,
15 ; accused at Rome, 22, 3 ;
hostile steps against Boeotia, 22, 4 ;
his error about the treaty with
Ptolemy, 22. 12 ; his policy in
Sparta blamed by Caecilius, 22, 13 ;
his conduct to Archon, 22, 14 ; his
Spartan policy discussed in the
Roman Senate, 22, 16 ; enmity of
Flamininus to, 28, 5; joins in re-
fusing to summon a meeting of the
league, ib, ; captured by the Mes-
senians and put to death, 28, 12,
16 ; his character, 24, 13-15 ; his
statues spared by Mummius, 89, 14
Philostratus, of Rhodes, 16, 5
Philostratus, of Epirus, 27, t6
Philoteria, a town in Palestine, 8, 70
Philotis, mother of Charops, 82. 20
Philoxenus, a poet and musician, 4,
20
Phlegraean plains, the, 2, 17 ; 8, 91
Phlius, a city in the Peloponnese, 2,
44, 52, 67 ; 4. 67
Pbocaea, a city in Ionia, 8, 77 ; 21, 6,
48
Phocis, 4, 9, 15, 25, 55 ; 8, 24, 26,
28, 96 ; 16. 32 ; 18, 10, 46, 47 ;
88, 5 ; 89. 9
Phoebidas, of Sparta, 4, 27
Phoenice, a town in Epirus, 2, 5, 6,
8 ; 16, 27 ; 82, 2T, 26
Phoenicia, a district in Asia, 8, 2 ; 8,
59, 66, 67, 87 ; 8, 19
Phoetiae, a town in Acamania, 4. 63
Pholeus, in MegalopoUs, 9, 18
Phoxidas, of Melitaea, 6, 63, 65, 82,
85
Phrixa, a town in Triphylia, 4, 77,
80
Phrygia, 6. 57 ; on the Hellespont.
21, 22, 48 ; the greater, 21, 48
Phthiotid Thebes. See Thebes
Phthiotis, Achaeans of, in Thessaly,
18, 46, 47. See also 18, 20
Phylarchus, the historian, 2, 56-63
Phyromachus, a statuary, 82, 27
Physsias, of Elis, 6, 94
Phytaeum, a town in Aetolia, 8, 7
Phyxium. a place in Elis, 6, 95
Picenus ager, 2, 21 ; 8, 86
Pictones, a tribe of Transalpine Gauls,
84, 10
6o6
INDEX
Pieria, a region in Macedonia, 4, 6a
Pieria, a r^on in Syria, 84. 15
Pinarus, a river in Cilicia, 12, 17, x 8
Pindar, quoted. 4, 31
Piraeus, the, 16, 25
Pisae, in Etruria {Pisa), 2, 16, 27, 28;
8, 41. 56. 96
Pisantini, an Illyrian tribe, 6, 108
Pisatis. a district in the Pelopoanese,
4,74
Pisidia, 6, 57, 72, 73 ; 21, 22
Pisistratus, of Boeotia, 18, 43
Pissaeum, a town in Macedonia, 5,
108
Plains, the Great (near Carthage), 14,
7, 8 ; the Fair, in Armenia, 8, 25
Placentia {Placenta), 8, 40, 66, 74 ;
83. II
Platanus, a fortress in Phoenicia, 5,
68
Plato, 6, 5, 45, 47 ; 7, 13 ; 12, 28
Plator, an officer of Philip V. , 4, 55
Plator, brother of Genthius, 29, 13
Pleiads, the, 3, 54 ; 4. 37 I *. i I •»
18
Pleuratus. an Illyrian, father of Agron
and Sccrdilaidas, 2, 2
Pleuratus, son of Scerdilaidas, father
of Genthius, 10, 41 ; 18, 47 ; 21,
II. 21 ; 82. 18
Pleuratus, an Illyrian exile, 28, 8
PoUmarch, the, in the Peloponnese, 4,
18 ; 9. 17 ; at Cynaetha, 4, 18 ; at
Phigaleia, 4, 79
Polemarchus, of Arsinoe, 18, 10
Polemocles, of Rhodes, 4, 52, 53
Polcmocrates, a courtier of Perseus,
29, 4, 8
Poliasium, in Laconia, 16, 16
Polichna, a town in Laconia, 4, 36
Polyaenus, of Cyprus, 11, 18
Polyaenus, an Achaean, 28, 6
Polyaratus, of Rhodes, 27, 7, 14 ; 28,
2 ; 29, 27 ; 30, 6, 7, 9
Polybius, of M^[alopolis (not the his-
torian), 11, 15
Polybius, of Megalopolis, son of
Lycortas, the historian : writes to
instruct the Greeks and of contem-
])orary events or those immediately
preceding him, 1. 3, 4 ; 4, 2 ; ex-
tent and scope of his history, 3, 32 ;
his authorities for the Hannibalian
war, 8, 48 ; his travels, 8, 59 ; in-
terviews with Massanissa, 9. 25 ;
his code of signals, 10, 45 ; his
visits to Locri E^izephyrii, 18, 5 ; to
Sardis, 81, 38 ; writes to Zeno of
Rhodes, 16. 20 ; ambassador to
Ptolemy Epiphanes B.C. 181. 24,
6 ; accused of hostility to Rome,
28, 3 ; hipparch, 28, 6 ; speech on
the honours of Eumenes, 28, 7 ;
ambassador to Marcius Philippus,
28. 13, 14 ; invited to Alexandria,
89, 23-26 ; advice to Demetrius
Soter in Rome (b.c i6a), 81. 19-
21 ; his intimacy with Scipio
Aemilianus, 82, 8-16 ; visits Alex-
andria, 84, 14 ; tries to influence
Cato, 85, 5 ; pleads in the Senate,
86, 6 ; sent for by the Consul
Manius Manilius, 87, 3 ; the only
man so called, 87, 4, but see 11,
15 ; his view of Providence, 87, 9 ;
at the siege and capture of Carthage,
39,3 ; at the burning of Corinth, 39.
13 ; saves the statues of Philopoe-
men, 89, 14 ; refuses confiscated
goods, 39, 15 ; employed in settle-
ment of Achaia, 89. x6 ; his fond-
ness for hunting. 31. 22 ; 82. 15
Polycletus, of Cyrene, 7, 2
Polycrates, of Argos, 5, 64, 65, 82,
84 ; 15, 29 ; 18, 54, 55 ; 22, 7
Polycritus, an Aetolian, 9, 34
Polymedes. of A^um, 5, 17
Polyphontes, an officer of Philip V. ,
10, 42
Polyphontes, of Sparta, 4, 22
Polyrrhenii, a city in Crete, 4, 53, 55,
61
Polyxenidas, of Rhodes, 10, 29
Pompides, a Theban, 27. a
Pontus, the. See Euxine ; Pontic fish,
81. 24 ; Cap[)adocia on the Pontus,
». 43
Popilius Laenas, Gaius, consul B.C.
172, 158, 28, 3-5 ; 29, 2, 27 ; 80,
9. 17
Popilius Laenas, Marcus (? consul
B.C. 139). 88, 10
Popilius I^aenas, the younger (? con-
sul B.C. 132), 88, 19
INDEX
607
Porcius Cato, M.. 31. 24 ; 86, 6 ;
86. 8 ; 37. 6 ; 39. la
Porphyrion, a town in Phoenicia, 6,
68
Poseidon, 7. 9; temple of. at Mantinea.
9, 8, 34 ; at Taenanun, 9, 34 ;
near Miletus, 16, 12
Postumius Albinus Megellus, L. , con-
sul B.C. 262, 1, 17-19
Postumius Albinus, L., consul B.C.
229, 2, XI, 12; 8, 106, 118
(wrongly called Aulus in 2, ix)
Postumius Albinus, Aulus, consul B. c.
180, 25, 6 ; 27, 3
Postumius Albinus, Aulus, consul B.C.
151, 83. I. 13 ; 86. 3 ; 89, 12
Pothine, a flute girl, 14. x i
Pothion, of Rhodes, 22, 5
Pound, weight of a Roman, 21, 45
Praeneste, in Latium {PaUstrinaY 6,
Praetorium, 6. 27, 33, 35, 41
Praetutianus ager, in Picenum, 8. 88
Prasiae, a town in Laconia, 4, 36
Pration, a Rhodian, 28. 23
Priene, a city of Ionia, 38, 6
Prinassus, a city of Caria, 16, 11
Prion. See Saw
Proagoras, of Megalopolis, 18. 8
Proander, an Aetolian, 26, 4
Prolans, of Sicyon, 4, 72
Pronni, harbour of Cephallenia, 6, 3
Propontis, the (Sea of Marmora), 4.
39' 43> 44 ; 16, 29 ; 22, 18
Propus, a place in Arcadia, 4, 1 1
Prusias I., king of Bithjrnia ctrc, B.C.
220-z8o. 8, 2 ; 4, 47-5^ I *. 77>
90, III
Prusias II., son of preceding, king of
Bithynia B.C. 179-149, 3, 3, 5 ; 16,
23 ; W, 4, s. 44 ; 21, II ; 22. 11,
20 ; 28. 1,3; 26. 2 ; 30, 19 ; 31,
6, 9; 82, 3, 5, 27, 28; 88, 1. 9, 12,
13 : 87, 6
Prytanis, a Peripatetic philosopher, 6,
93
Prytanis^ a magistrate at Rhodes, 22,
5
Pseudo-Philip, 87, i, 2, 9
Psophis, a city in Arcadia, 4, 68-73
Ptolemais, a city in Phoenicia, 4, 37 ;
6, 61, 62, 71
Ptolemy Ceraunus, king of Thrace
and Macedonia B.c. 281-280, son
of Ptolemy I. of Egypt, 2, 41 ; 9,
35
Ptolemy I., son of I..agus. king of
Egypt B.C. 323-285, 1, 63 ; 2. 41,
71, 67
Ptolemy II., Philadelphus, king of
Egypt B.C. 286-247, 14, XI ; 16,
25 ; 81. 17 ; fr. xxvi.
Ptolemy III., Euergetes, king of
Egypt B.C. 247-222, 2. 47, 51, 63.
71 ; 4, I ; 6. 34, 35, 58 ; 16, 25 ;
29, 24
Ptolemy IV., Philopator, king of
Egypt RC. 222-205, 1. 3 ; 2, 71 ;
3. 2 ; 4, 2, 30. 37, 51 ; 6. 1. 31,
34. 36. 38-40. 42. 45. 55. 57. 58,
61-68, 70, 79-87. 89, 100, 105-
X07 ; 8. 17 ; 9, 44 ; 11. 4 » 1*.
II, 12 ; 16, 20. 25, 34 ; 18, i ;
27, 9 ; 39, 19
Ptolemy V. . Epiphanes, king of Egypt
B.C. 205-181. 8. 2 ; 16, 20, 25-32;
16. 22. 27, 34, 39 ; 18. 1, 47, 49-
5^. 54. 55 ; 22, 1. 3. 6, 7, 10, 12,
22 ; 24, 6 ; 28. i, 20
Ptolemy VI., Philometor, king of
Egypt B.C. X81-146, 27. 13, 19 ;
28, I, 12, 17, 23 ; 29. 23-27 ; 80,
9. 17 ; 81. 4. 18, 20, 22, 27, 28 ;
82. X ; 33, 8 ; 89. 18
Ptolemy VII., Physcon, brother of
preceding, joint king B.c. 170-154,
king of Cyrene B.C. 154-146, sole
king B.C. 146-117. 28. 19. 20. 21 ;
29, 23-25, 27 ; 80, 17 ; 81, 18, 26-
28 ; 82. X ; 88. 8 ; 34. 14
Ptolemy, son of Aeropus, an Aetolian,
16. x8
Ptolemy, son of Agesarchus of Mega-
lopolis, 16, 25 ; 18, 55 ; 27, 13
Ptolemy, son of Eumenes. 18, 53
Ptolemy, a courtier of Philip V., 6,
25, 26
Ptolemy, commandant of Alexandria,
6. 39
Ptolemy, a rhetorician. 28. 19 ; 81,
28
Ptolemy, son of Sosibius, 16, 25 ; 16,
22
Ptolemy Sympetesis, 81, 27
6o8
INDEX
Ptolemy, son of Thraseas, 5, 6x
Publicius Malleolus, Lucius, 37, 6
Punic army. 1, 19; 11, 19; strength
and courage compared with Italian,
6, 52 ; stratagem, 8, 78
Pupius, Lucius, 88, 10
Puteoli (Dicaearchia\ a city in Cam-
pania (Possuoli), 8. 91
I^lon, on the Via Egnatia, 84, 12
Pylus, a town in Messenia, 4, 16, 25;
9, 38 ; 18. 42
I^yrenees, the, 8. 35, 37, 39-41 ; 10.
39, 40 ; 84, 7. xo
Pyrgus, a town of Triphylia, 4, 77, 80
Pyrrhias, an Aetolian, 5. 30, 91, 92
I^rrhicus, put to death by Philip V. ,
23. 10
Pyrrhus, palace of, at Ambracia, 21.
27 ; camp of, in Laconia, 5, 19.
Sff also 1, 6, 7, 23 ; 2, 20, 41 ; 8.
25 ; 32, 2 ; 7. 4 ; 8. 26 ; 12, 4.
25* ; 18. 3. 28 ; fr. xi.
Pythagoreans, the, 2, 39
Pytheas, a traveller and writer, 84, 5,
10
I*ytheas, of Thebes, 89, 7, 9
Pyihia, the, 10, 2
Pythiades, an officer of Antiochus the
Great, 6. 46
Pythias, of Pellene, 4, 72
Pythion, a spy, 18, 5
Pyihionicus, tomb of, at Tarentum.
8, 30
Pytho, an ambassador from Prusias,
81, 6
Pythodorus, of Lampsacus, 18, 52
Quaestor, the, 6, 13, 31, 32, 35
Quinctius Crispinus, Titus, consul B.C.
208, 10, 32
Quinctius Flamininus, T., consul B.C.
198, 18. 1-12, 18-27, 33, 34, 36-
39, 42-47, 50 ; 20, 7 ; 21, 30 ; 22,
4. 13 ; 28. 3-5 ; 27, 15 ; declares
Greece free, 18, 46
Quinctius Flamininus, Lucius, consul
B.C. 192. 21, 32
Quinctius Flamininus, Titus (son of
Titus above), consul B.C. 150, 88, 10
Quintus, commissioner to Egypt, 81.
18 ; and to Rhodes, 83, 15
Quirinus, 8. 25
Rabbatamana (Philadelphia), a
town in Palestine, 6, 71
Rhaeti, an Alpine tribe, 84, 10
Rhaphia, a town in Palestine. 0, 80,
85. 86, 107
Rhaucus, a town in Crete, 22. 19 ;
81. I
Rhegium, a city of Bruttium [Ifeggic),
1, 6-8, 10; 8, 26 ; 6. no ; 9, 7,
9. 27 ; 10, I
Rhigosages, mercenary Gauls. 6. 53
Rhinocolura, a town of Egypt, 6. 80
Rhium, promontory and harbour of
Achaia, 4. 10, 19. 26 ; 5. 28-30 ;
12, 12a ; Aetolian Rhium (AtUir-
rhium), 6, 94
Rhium, the strait between Rhium and
Antirrhium, 4, 64
Rhizon, a city in Illyria, 2, iz
Rhodes, island of, 4, 50 ; 18, 5 ; 16,
34, 35 ; 22. 5 ; 26, 4-6 : 28, 2,
16, 17, 23; 29. 3, 4, II. 19; 80,
5, 7-9 ; 32, 4 ; earthquake at.
6, 88 - 90 ; Rhodians, 8, 2, 3 ;
4. 19. 37. 47-53. 56; 5, 24, 28.
63, 88-90, 100 ; 9. 27 ; 11. 4 ; IS.
4, 5 ; 15, 22, 23 : 16, 4-10, 14.
15, 24. 26. 28, 30. 31, 34. 35 ; 18.
1, 2, 6. 8, 52 ; 21, 7, 10, 17, 18.
22, 24, 25, 29-31, 45, 48 ; 22, s ;
23, 9 ; 26, 4. 5 ; 27, 3. 4. 7 ; 28,
2, 16, 23; 29, 3. 4, 10, II, 19;
30, 4-9, 20, 22 ; 31, 2, 3, 6. 7, 15,
16, 25, 26 ; 38, 4, 6, 13, 15, 16.
17 ; Rhodian magistrates, navarch,
30, 5 ; prytanies, 13. 5 ; 16. 23 ;
22, 5 ; 27, 7 ; 29. 10 ; their at-
tempts to end the Social War, 5,
24, 100 ; 11, 4 ; accept money for
the cost of education, 31, 25
Rhodon, of Phocaea, 21. 6
Rhodope, mountain. Thrace. 34. 10
Rhodophon, of Rhodes, 27. 7 ; 28,
2 ; 80, 5
Rhone, the, 2, 15, 22. 34 ; 3, 35. 37,
39, 41-49, 60, 61, 64, 76 ; 34, 10
Rhositeles, of Sicyon, 22. 3
Rhyncus, in Aetolia, 6, 59
Romans, their language, 29.^ 20 ; their
character, 1, 20. 55, 59, 64 ; 8, 3 ;
28. 8 ; 82. 9 ; their treatment of the
conquered. 18. 37 ; their ceremonies
INDEX
609
in proclaiming war, 13. 3 ; their
Jidts, 20, 9 ; 36, 4 ; their desire
for wealth, 32, za, 13 ; Roman
constitution, 6. xi-42; compared
with others, €. 43-56. See also 1,
3, 64 ; 3, 2, 118 ; 5, iii ; 6, 47,
50. 51-58 ; 8, 3 ; 10, 16 ; 21, 13.
Their readiness in adopting improve-
ments, 6, 25 ; fr. xxvii. ; their in-
corruptibility, 6, 56 ; decline in their
character, 18, 35 ; 32, 1 1 ; cp. 37,
I ; Magistrates, see dictator, consul,
tribune, aedile
Roman Empire, extent of, 1, 2 ;
how acquired, 1, 3, 64 ; 18, 28 ;
the first step out of Italy, 1, 5,
1 1 ; effect of their eastern conquests,
18,35
Roman Army, €, 19-42 ; the legion,
I, 16, 26 ; 2, 24 ; 3, 72, 107; 6,
19-21, 26, 30; 10, 16; 28, 17;
enrolment of, 6, 19, 26 ; officers of,
military tribunes, 6, 19-21, 27, 33,
37 ; centurions, 6, 24, 30, 36, 41 ;
equites in, 3, 107 ; 6, 19, 20, 25,
II, 21 ; pedites in, 3, 107 ; €, 19.
21 ; velites, 6, 21, 22, 24, 33, 35 ;
11, 22-24, 3a : 15, 9 ; hastati, 6.
21, 23, 29, 33 ; 15, 9 ; principes,
6, 21, 23, 29, 33 ; triarii, 6,
ai, 23, 29, 33, cp. 1, 26 ; socii,
I, 24 ; 3, 72, 107 ; 6. 13,
3Z, 26. 30 ; 10, 16 ; extraordi-
narii, 6, 26, 31 ; maniples. 6, 24 ;
II, 23 ; arms of, galea, 6, 22, 23 ;
gladius, 2, 30, 33 ; 6, 23 ; lorica,
6, 23, 25 ; pilum, 1, 40 ; 6, 23 ;
scutum, 2, 30 ; 6, 23-51 ; compared
with those of the Macedonians, 18,
38-32. 5^tfa/j^2, 33 ; 13, 3. Line
of battle compared with the Mace-
donian, ib. ; camp, formation of, €,
27-37, 41, 42 /
Roman fleet, the first, 1,'*^20 ; its in-
crease, 1/ 25 ; rapid building of, 1,
38, f52 ; its destruction, 1,' 52 ;
another built, 1,^59 ; losses of, in the
first Punic war, 1,^63
Rome, foundation of, fr. i ; captured
by the Gauls. 1, 6 ; 2, x8 ; crowns
in honour of, 32. 3. 24 ; colossal
statue to, at Rhodes, 31, 15
VOL. II
Ruscinus. (or -o), a river in Gaul (TV/),
34, 10
Sabines, the, 2, 24
Sagalassus, a city in Pisidia, 21. 36
Saguntum, a city in Spain, 8, 6, 8, 14-
17, 20, ai, 29, 30, 61, 97-99 ; 4,
28, 37, 66 ; 15, 17
Sais, a city in Egypt, 22. 7
Salassi, an Alpine tribe {Val d^ Aosia),
34, xo
Salii, the, 21, 13
Sallentini, a tribe in Calabria, 34, 15
Salutis via, at Tarentum, 8. 35
Samaria, city and district in Palestine,
5. 71 ; 16, 39
Sambucae, siege engines, 8, 6-8
Samicum, a town in Triphylia, 4, 77,
80
Samnites, the, 1, 6 ; 2, 19 ; 3, 90-92 ;
8. 5
Samos, island of, 3, a ; 6, 35 ; 16,
2; 21,8
Samothrace, an island in the Aegean,
28, 2X ; 29, 8
Samus, a poet. 5, 9 ; 23, 10
Sangarius, a river of Asia Minor
(Sakari), 21, 37
Saperda, in Pisidia, 5, 72
Sarapieium, in Thrace, 4, 39
Sardanapalus, king of Assyria, 8, 12;
37. 7
Sardinia, 1, 2, 10, 24, 43. 79, 82, 83,
88 ; 2, 23, 27 ; 3, 10, 13, 15, 22-
24.27,28, 30. 75. 96; 12. 4r: 34,8
Sardinian sea, the. 1, 10, 42 ; 2, 14 ;
3, 37. 41, 47; 34, 6
Sardis, in Lydia, 5, 77 ; 7, 15-18 ; 8,
17, 23 ; 21, II, 13, 16, 38 ; 29,
12 ; 31. 10
Sarissae, Macedonian spears, 12, 20 ;
18, 26. 29
Sarsina, a town in Umbria {Sarsina),
2, 24
Sason, an island off lUyria. 5, xio
Saspiri, an Asian tribe. 6, 44
Saticn, a town in Illyria, 6, 108
Satrapeii. an Asian tribe, 5. 44
Satyrus, of Ilium, 22, 5
Satyrus, an Achaean, 31, 6
Saw, the. a place in Sardis, 1, 15 ;
another in Libya, 1, 85
6io
INDEX
Scardus, a mountain in lUyria, 28, 8
Scerdilaidas, an Illyrian general, 2, 5.
6 ; 4, 16, 29 ; 5, 3, 4. 95, loi, 108, \
no ; 10. 41
Science, progress of, 10, 12
Scipio. See Cornelius. Cp. 34, 10 ;
pedigree of, vol. ii. p. 456. See
also fr. xc-xciii.
Scironian rocks, the, 16, 16
Scodra, a town in Illyria, 28, 8
Scopas, an Aetolian, 4, 5, 6, 9, 14,
16, 19, 27, 37, 62 ;\5, 3, II ; 18,
I, 2 ; 15, 25 ; 16, 18, 19, 39 ; 18,
53-55
Scopium, near Phthiotid Thebes, 6, 99
Scorpions, name for cross-bows, 8, 7
Scotitas, a forest in Laconia, 16, 37
Scotusa, a town in Thessaly, 10, 42 ;
18, 20
Scurvy, the, 3, 87
Scylla, 34, 2, 3 ; promontory of
{Scilla), 84, 2, 3
Scyron, of Messenia, 4, 4
Scythian colonnade at Syracuse, 8, 5
Scythians, the, 4, 43 ; 9, 34
Scythopolis, a city in Palestine, 6, 70
Segesama, a town in Si>ain, 34, 9
Segesta, a city in Sicily, 1, 24
Seleucia Pieria (Seleucia on the sea),
a town in Syria, 6, 58-61, 66, 67 ;
84, IS
Seleucia, on the Tigris, 6, 45, 46, 48,
54 : 13.' 9
Seleucia, in Mesopotamia, 6, 43
Seleucus I., Nicanor, king of Syria
B.C. 306-280, 2. 41, 71; 6. 67;
10. 27 ; 18, 51 ; 28, 20 ; 31, 7
Seleucus II., Callinicus, sonof Antiochus
I., king of Syria B.C. 246-226, 2,
71 ; 4, 48, 51 ; 5, 40, 89 ; 8, 22
Seleucus III., Ceraunus, son of the
preceding, king of Syria b.c. 226-
223, 2, 71 ; 4» I. 2. 48 ; 8. 34. 40.
41
Seleuciis IV., Philopator, son of Anti-
ochus the Great, king of Syria B.C.
188-175, 18, 51 ; 21, 6, 8, 10 : 22,
I, 10-13 ; 28. 5 ; 31. 12
Selge, a city in Pisidia, 6, 72-77 ; 31, 9
Selinus, a city in Sicily, 1, 39
Sellasia, a town in Laconia, 2, 65 ; 4,
69 ; 16, 16, 37
Selybria. a city in Thrace, 18, 49
Sempronius Blaesus, Gaius, consul
B.C. 253, 1, 39
Sempronius, Longus, Ti., consul B.C.
218, 8. 40. 41. 61, 68-75 ; *' 66 ;
6, I
Sempronius, Gracchus, Ti., consul B.c.
215, 213, 8, I
Sempronius, Gracchus, Ti., consul
B.C. 177, son-in-law of Africanus,
22, 9, note \ 26, i, 4 ; 31, 5-7,
9, 14, 23 ; 32, 3-5. 13 ; 35, a
Sena, a Roman colony in Cisalpine
Gaul (Sinigaglia), 2, 14, 16, 19 ;
34, II
Senate, the Roman, 3, 20 ; 6, 13, 16,
17 ; the Spartan, 4. 35 ; 6. 45
Senones, a tribe of Cisalpine Gauls,
2, 17, 19, 20
Sentinum, a town in Umbria (Sentino),
2, 19
Serapis, 4, 39
Sergius, Lucius, 15, i, 2
Sergius, Manius, 31, 9
Serippus. a Lacedaemonian, 23, 4, 9
Servilius Caepio, Gnacus, consul B.C.
253. 1. 39
Servilius Caepio, Gnaeus, consul B.c.
203. 14 I
Servilius Geminus, Gnaeus. consul
B.C. 217, 3, 75, 77, 86, 88,96,97,
106, 107, 114, 116 •
Servilius Geminus, Gnaeus, consul
B.C. 203, 14, I
ServiUus Glaucid, 31. 23
Sestus, a city in Thrace, 4, 44, 50 ;
16. 29 ; 18, 2 ; 34. 7
Sibyrtus, of Epirus, 21, 26
Sicca, a town near Carthage, 1, 66, 67
Sicily, the war for, 1, 13, 63, 83 ; 3,
3, 9, 21, 22, 25. 27, 32. 37 ; 5, 33 ;
39. 19 ; its position, 1, 42. See
also 1, 2, 5, 8. 10, II, 16-74, 83;
2, I, 24. 36, 37, 43 : 3, 3, 13, 21-
29. 32, 75. 96, 108 ; 5. 33 ; 12, 4,
25^, 26^; 28, 2; 84, 2-4, II, 15 ;
36. 5 ; 89, 19
Sicilian Strait, the, 1, 7, 11. 20, 21,
38, 49 ; 10, i; 5, no ; 84, 6
Sicilian medimnus, 2, 15 ; 9, 44 ; 34, 8
Sicilian Sea, the, 1, 42 ; 2, 14, 16 ; 4,
63 ; 5, 3, 5 ; 10. 1 : 12, 4 ; 34, 11
INDEX
6ii
Sicilians, the, 1, i6 ; 2, 20 ; 8, 2 ; 6,
104 ; 12, 5, 6 ; 24, xs
Sicyon. a city in Achaia, 2, 43, 52,
54 ; *. 8, 13, 57, 67, 68 ; 5, i, 27 ;
10. 22 ; 18, 16 ; 28, 17 ; 28, 13 ;
29. 24 ; 80. 10. 23
Sida, a city of Pisidia, 5. 73 ; 31, 26
Sidon, a city in Phoenicia, 6, 69, 70
Signals by fire, 10, 43-47 ; cp. 1, 19 ;
8, 30
Silver, value of, compared with gold,
21. 32. Attic, 21. 32, 45 ; mines of,
in Spain, 3. 57 ; 10, 10 ; 24, 9
Simias, an Achaean, 11, 18
Simon, a Boeotian, 22, 4
Simonidcs, of Ceos, 29, 26
Sinda, a town of Pisidia, 21, 35
Sinope, a city of Paphlagonia, 4, 56,
57 ; 28, 9
Sinuessa, acity in 'LBX\Mm(Mondragone),
8. 91
Sipontum, a city in Apulia, on the
Adriatic (Sta. Maria di Siponto),
10. I
Sirynx, a city in Hyrcania, 10, 31
Six-banked ships, 1, 26 ; fr. xvii.
Smyrna, a city in Ionia, 5, 77 ; 18,
52 ; 21, 13, 14. 17, 22, 48
Socrates, a Boeotian, 6, 63, 65, 82
Socrates, a trainer, 27, 7
Soli, a city in Cilicia, 21, 24
Solon, a Macedonian, 27. 6
Sophagascnus, an Indian king, 11, 34
Sosander, friend of Attalus II., 82.
27
Sosibius, a friend of Ptolemy Philo-
pator, 5. 35-38. 63, 65-67, 83, 85.
87 ; 8, 17-19 ; W. 25, 32, 34
Sosibius, son of the preceding, 15, 32 ;
16, 22
Sosicrates, Achaean sul>>Strategus, 89,
II
Sosigenes, of Rhodes, 28, 7
Sosiphancs, ambassador from Anti-
ochus Epiphanes, 28, i, 22
Sostratus, a statuary, 4. 78
Sostratus, of Calchcdon, 8, 24
Sosylus, an historian, 3. 20
Sparta. See Lacedaemon
Spendius, a leader in the mercenary
war, 1, 69, 70, 76-80. 82, 84, 86
Stade, a, 8. 39 ; 34. 12 note
Stair, the, a pass near Selge in Pisidia,
6, 72
Stasinus, a poet, 28, 10
Stephanus, of Athens, 32, 17
Stertinius, Lucius, 18, 48I
Sthembanus, son of Massanissa, 87,
10
Sthenclaus, of Sparta. 4, 22
Stratius, of Tritaea, 28, 6 ; 82, 7 ; 88,
II ; 39, 10
Stratius, a physician, 80, 2
Strato, of Lampsacus, 12, 25^
Stratocles, prytanis of Rhodes, 27, 7
Stratonicca, a city in Caria, 80, 22 ;
31, 7
Stratus, a city in Acarnania, 4, 63, 64 ;
5, 6, 7, 13, 14, 96 ; 6, 59; 18, 10
Stratus, a town in ^\rcadia, 4, 73
Strymon, the, river in Thrace, 37, 2
Stubera, a town in Macedonia, 28, 8
Stylangium, a town in Triphylia, 4,
77, 80
Stymphalus, a city in Arcadia, 2, 55 ;
4, 68, 69
Sub-strategus^ the Achaean, 6, 94
Suffete, a Carthaginian magistrate, 3,
33. 42 : 6. 51
Sulpicius Patcrculus, Gaius, consul
B.C. 258, 1, 24
Sulpicius Galba, Publius, consul ac.
211, 200, 8, 3 ; 9, 6, 7, 42 ; 10,
41 ; 16, 24; 18, 23 ; 22, 11
Sulpicius Gallus, Gciius, 81, 9, 10
Sunium, promontory of Attica, 34, 7
Susa, capital of Susiana, 6, 48 ; Susiana,
5» 46. 52. 54
Sybaris, a city of Magna Graecia, 2,
39 ; 7, I
Sycurium, a town in Thessaly, 27, 8
Syleium, a city in Phrygia, 21, 34
Synes, near Messene in Sicily, 1, 11
Syphax, king of Numidia, 11, 24 ; 14,
1-9 ; 15, 3-5 ; 16, 23. His wife
Sophanisba, 14. i, 7
Syracuse, 1, 8-12, 15, 16, 43, 52-54,
62 ; 5. 88 ; 8, 5-9. 37 ; 9. 10, 19 ;
12, 4^/, 15, 23, 25, 26 ; 15, 35
Syria, 2, 71; 3, 5; 4, 2, 48; 5, 36;
43. 57. 58. 85. 87 ; 9. 43 ; 12, 17 :
21. 46 ; 28, I, 20 ; 29. 27 ; 31. 11,
13. 19-21 ; 32, 6 ; 33. 19 ; 84. i"" •
39, 18. 19
6l2
INDEX
Sjrrinx, a covered w-ay at Alexandria,
16. 30, 31
Syrinx, a to^^'n in Hyrcania, 10, 3X
Syrtes, the, 12, i ; the greater Syrtis,
8. 39 ; the lesser, 1, 39 ; 8, 23 ;
82, 2 ; 84. 15
Tabae, a city in Persia, 81, 11
Taenanim, a promontory of Laconia
(C Matapan), 5, 19 ; 9, 34
Tagae, a city in Parthia, 10. 29
Tagus. river in Spain, 8, 14 ; 10. 7,
39 ; 84, 7
Talent (weight), 4, 56 ; 5, 89 ; 9, 41 ;
See 84. 8 note
Talent (money), 5, 89 ; 22, 12. See
Euboic, Attic
Tambrax, a town in Hyrcania, 10, 31
Tanais (the Don), 8, 37. 38 ; S4, 5,
7 ; confused with the Jaxartes, 10.
48
Tannetus, a hamlet in Cisalpine Gaul,
3, 40
Tantalus, 4, 45
Tapuri,a Median tribe, 5, 44 ; Tapuria,
10, 49
Tarentincs, i.e. mercenary cavalry, 4,
77 ; 11. 12 ; 16, 18
Tarentum, a city in Italy ( Taranto\ 1,
6, 20; 2, 24; 8, 75. 118; 8. 26-
36 ; 9. 9; 10. I : 18. 4 ; 29. 12
Tarquinius Priscus (6. 2). fr. vi.
Tarracina, a city in Latium ( Terra-
cina), 8. 22, 24
Tarrjico. a city in Spain ( Tarragona),
3, 76. 95 : 10, 20. 34. 40 ; 11, 33
Tarseium, a town in Spain ( Tartessus),
3, 24, 33
Taurini, a Gallic tribe in the valley of
the Po. 3, 60 ; 34. 10
Taurion. minister of Philip V., 4. 6,
10. 19, 80, 87 ; 5. 27. 92, 95, 103;
8. 14 : 9, 23
Taurisci, an Alpine tribe, 2. 1$, 28, 30
Taurisci Norici, a tribe near Aquilcia,
34, 10
Taurus, mountain in Asia Minor. 4.
48; 6. 40. 41. 107. 109*. 10, 28 ;
as a boundary of Asia from Syria
and other kingdoms, 3. 3 ; 4. 2.
48 : 5. 40. 77 ; 8, 22 ; 11, 34 ; 21,
14. 17. 21, 24, 43, 48
Taygetus, mountain in the Pelopon-
nese, 84. 10
Teanum Sidicinuro, a city in Cam-
pania {Teano), 3, 91
Tectosages, a Gallic tribe in Asia
Minor, 21, 39
Tegea, a city in Arcadia, 2. 46, 54,
58, 70 ; 4, 22, 23, 82 ; 6, 17, 18,
20, 24. 92 ; 9. 28 ; 11. II, 18; 16,
17. 36, 37 ; 18, 14 ; 38, 8, 9
Tegean gate at Messene, 16. 17
Telamon, on the coast of Etniria
( Telamone), 2, 27
Teleas, an ambassador of King
Euthydemus, 11, 34
Telecles, of Aegium, 82, 7 ; 88, i
Telecles, of Megalopolis, 38, 3
Teledamus, of Argos, 18, 14
Tclemnastus, of Crete, 29, 4 ; 88, 16
Telephus, of Rhodes, 29, 10
Telmissus, a city of Lycia, 21. 48
Telocritus. an Achaean, 28, 12
Telphusa, a city in Arcadia. 2. 54 ;
4. 60. 77
Temenid gates at Tarentum, 8. 27.
30
Temnus, a city in Aeolis, 5, 77 ; 82,
27
Tempe, in Thessaly, 18. 27, 33, 36,
48 ; 22. I
Tenedos, island of, 16. 34 ; 27, 7
Teos, a city in Ionia, 6, 77
Terentius Varro, Gaius, consul ac
216, 3. 106, 110-117 ; 6, 108
Terentius. Lucius, 18. 48, 50
Termcssus, a city in IMsidia, 21, 35
Tetrapyrgia. in C>Tene, 31. 27
Teuta. queen of Illyria. 2, 4. 6, 8, 9,
II. 12
Thalamac. a town in Laconia. 16, 16
Thalamae. a fort in Elis. 4, 75, 84
Thasos. island of. 16, 24 ; 18. 44,
48. 50
Theactctus, of Rhodes. 22, 5 ; 27,
14 ; 28. 2, 16 ; 29, 11 ; 30. 5. 22
Thearches, of Cleitor, 2. 55
Thearidas. an Achaean, 82. 17 ; 38,
8
Thebc. a city in Mysia, 16, 1 ; 21, 10
Thebes, in Boeotia, 2, 39. 62 ; 4. 23.
27, 31 ; 6. 10. 27, 28 ; 9, 8. 28,
34, 39 ; 12, 25 ; 20, 5. 7 ; 27, i.
INDEX
613
a. 5; 38, 3; 38, 4; 39, 9, 12;
constitution of, 6, 43
Thebes, Phthiotid, in Thessaly, 5, 99-
loi ; 18, 3, 8, 19, 38, 47
Themison, an officer of Antiochus the
Great, 6, 79, 82
Themistes, of Alexandria Troas, 5,
III
Themistocles, of Athens, 6, 44
Themistocles, an officer of Achaeus,
8. 77
Theodectes, an Achaean, 39, 10
Theodoridas, of Sicyon, 22, 3 ; 29,
23
Theodonis, a Boeotian flute - player,
80. 14
Theodotus. an Aetolian, 4, 37 ; 5, 40,
46, 61, 62, 66, 67, 79, 81 ; 7, 16,
18
Theodotus Hemiolius, 5, 42, 43, 45,
59, 68, 69, 71, 79, 83, 87
Theodotus, of Epirus, 27, 16 ; 30, 7
Theodotus, of Pherae, 18, 10
Theogeiton, a Boeotian, 18, 14
Theognetus, of Abydus, 16. 33
Theophanes, of Rhodes, 33. 16
Theophiliscus, of Rhodes, 16, 2, 4, 5,
9
Theophrastus, a Peripatetic philoso-
pher, 12, II, 23
Theopompus, of Chios, historian, 8,
11-13 ; 12, 4«, 25, 27 ; 16, 12
Theopompus, a flute-player, 80, 14
Theoprosopon, a promontory in
Phoenicia, 6, 68
Theotimus, a friend of Orophemes, 82,
as
Theris, ambassador from Antiochus
Epiphanes. 28. 20
Thermae (or Therma), a town in
Sicily, 1, 24, 39
Thermopylae, 2, 52 ; 10, 41
Thermus, capital of the Aetolian
League, 6, 6-9, 13, 18 ; 7. 13 ;
9, 30 ; 11, 7 ; 28, 3 ; assembUes
at. 6. 8 ; 18. 48 ; 28, 4
Thersitae, a tribe in Spain, 3, 33
Thersites. 12, 26^
Thesmophoreium, temple of Demeter,
15, 29, 33
Thespiae, a city in Boeotia, 27, i
Thcssalians, 4, 9, 76 ; 9, 28, 33, 38 ;
11, 5 ; 16, 32 ; 18, 3. 11. 46, 47 5
22, I, 9 ; 23, I ; 26, 6 ; SO, 7 '.
87, 2 ; ThessaUan cavalry, 4, 8 ;
18, 22
Thessalonica, a city in Macedonia,
22, I. 15 ; 29, 4 ; 34, 7. xa
Thessaly, 2, 49, 52 ; 4, 57, 61, 62,
66. 67 ; 6. 5, 17, 26, 29, 99, 100 ;
18, 3, 14, 27, 38 ; 20. 13 ; 22, i ;
27. 16 ; 28, 3, 12, 13 ; 29, 19 ;
39, 2
Thestia (or Thestieis), a town in
Aetolia, 5, 7
Thetis, temple of, at Pharsalus, 18,
20, 21
Thoas, an Aetolian, 21, 17, 31, 45 ;
28, 4
Thoas, an agent between Perseus and
Rhodes, 80, 8
Thrace, 4, 39, 44, 45 ; 5, 34. 74 *.
18, 49 ; 22, 15, 17 ; 23, 8 ; 24, 3;
34, 7, 10 ; Greek cities in, 9, 28 ;
18, 48, 51 ; 22, I, 9. 17 ; 28. 8
Thracians, the, mercenaries, 5, 65.
79, 82 ; 31, 3. See also 4. 38, 45,
46, 51, 66 ; 6, 7 ; 8. 24 ; 10, 41 ;
18, 4, 22, 37 ; 21, 49 ; 22, 17. 18;
23, 10 ; 34, 7 ; 39, 2
Thraseas, an Alexandrian, 5, 65
Thrason, of Syracuse, 7, 2
Thrasycrates, of Rhodes, 11, 4
Thrasylochus of Messene, 18, 14
Thrasymene Lake, the, 8, 82, 84,
108 ; 6, loi ; 16, 11
Thronium, a city of the Epicnemidian
Locrians, 9, 41 ; 18, 9
Thucydides, the historian, 8, 13
Thule, island of. 34. 5
Thuria, a town in Messenia, 23, 17
Thurii, in Magna Graecia, 8, 26 ; 10,
I
Thyateira, a town in Lydia, 16, 1 ;
32. 27
Thyestes, of Sparta, 4, 22
Thyreum, a \owti in Arcadia, 4, 6,
25 ; 18, 10 ; 21, 29 ; 28, 5
Tiber, the, 6, 2, 55 ; 81, 20, 22 ;
36, 2
Tiboetes, uncle of Prusias I. , 4, 50-52
Tibur {Tivcli), 6. 14
Ticinus. a river in Cisalpine Gaul, 8,
64 ; 34, 10
6 14
INDEX
Tigris, the, 6, 45, 46, 48, 51, 52
Timaeus, of Tauromenium in Sicily,
the historian, 1, 5 ; 2. 16 ; 8, 12 ;
criticism of, 12, 3-15, 23-28 ; 84,
10 ; 89, 19
Timaeus. an Aetolian, 4, 34 ; 9, 34
Timagoras, a Rhodian admiral, 27 1 7
Timagoras, another Rhodian, a cap-
tain of a vessel, 27, 7
Timarchus, a Cretan, 4, 53
Timocrates, of Pellene, 18, 17
Timolas, of Boeotia, 18. 14
Timolaus, of Sparta, 20, 12
Timoleon, of Corinth, 12, 23, 25,
25*. 26
Timotheus, ambassador from Ptolemy
Philometor, 28, i
Timotheus, ambassador from Oro-
phemes, 82, 24
Timotheus, of Miletus, 4, 20
Timoxenus, Achaean Stratcgus B.c.
ai6, 2, S3 ; 4, 6, 7, 82 ; 6, xo6
Tisaeus, Mt., in Thcssaly, 10, 42
Tisamenus, king of Achaia, 2,41 ; 4, i
Tisippus, an Aetolian, 80, 13
Titti, a Spanish tribe, 86, 2
Tium, a city in Bithynia, 26. 2
Tlepolcmus, commandant of Pelusium,
16, 25-27, 29; 16. 21, 22
Tlepolemus, ambassador from Ptolemy
Physcon, 28, 19
Tolistobogii, a tribe in Galatia, 21,
37
Tbrches, See Signals ; used for
starting horse races, fr. Ixiv.
Torus, a hill near Agrigentum, 1, 19
Tower, the, 6, 102. See Perippia.
Tragiscus, of Tarcntum* 8. 29, 30
Tragyrium, a city in Illyria, 82, 18
Tralles, a city in Caria, 21, 48
Trebia, a river in Cisalpine Gaul. 8.
67-69, 72 ; battle of, 8, 72-74, 108;
16. II
Trench, the, in Messenia, 4. 33
Triarii. See Roman Army
Tribuni militura. See Roman Army ;
Tribuni plebi, 8, 87 ; 6, 12, 16 ;
30. 4
Trichonium, a town in Aetolia, 5, 7
Trichonian lake, the. in Aetolia, 6, 7;
11. 7
Trieres, a to^^^l in Phoenicia, 5, 68
Trigaboli, at the head of the delta of
the Po, 2, 16
Triphylia, a district in the Pelopon-
nese, 4. 77 1 79-8 1 ; 5, 27 ; 18, 42, 47
Triphylus, son of Areas, 4, 77
Tripolis, a district of Laconia, 4, 81
Tritaea, a city of Achaia, 2, 41 ; 4,
6. 59 ; 5, 95
Triton, 7, 9
-Triumph, a, 6. 15. 5^ 3, 19
(PauUus) ; 4, 66 ; 11, 33 (Scipio) ;
21, 24 (L. and P. Scipio and L.
Aemilius) ; 80, 14 (L. Anicius)
Troas, 5, ixi. 5^ Alexandria
Trocmi. a tribe of Galatia, 81, 13
Troezen, a city of Argolis, 2, 52
Trojan war, the, 84, 2 ; Trojans, the,
12, 4^
Tunes, a city in Africa ( Tunis), 1, 30,
67. 69, 73, 76, 77, 79, 84-86 ; 14,
10 ; 16, I
Turdetani, a Spanish tribe, 84, 9
Turduli, a Spanish tribe, 34, 9
Tychaeus, a Numidian, 16, 3
Tychon, officer of Antiochus the
Great, 8, 54
Tylis, a town in Thrace, 4, 46
Tylus, an island in the Arabian Gulf.
18, 9
Tyndaris, a city in Sicily, 1, 25, 27
Typaneae, a town in Triphylia, 4, 77-
79
Tyranny, 6, 1 1 ; 6, 3, 7. 8
Tyrrhenian Sea, 1, 10 ; 2, 14, 16; 8,
61, no ; 84. 6, 10
Tyre, 3. 24 ; 4, 37 ; 6, 61, 62, 70 ;
16. 22 ; 31, 20
Ulysses, 9, 16 ; 12. 27 ; 34, 2-4 ;
86. 6
Umbrians, the, 2, 16, 24 ; 3, 86
Utica, a city of Africa, i, 70, 73-76.
82, 83, 88 ; 14. 1-3, 6-10 ; 16. 2 ;
86, 3, 6 ; 38. X
Vaccaei, a Spanish tribe, 3, 5, 14 ;
34. 9
Vadinioniim Lake, the. in Etruria, 2, 20
Valerius Haccus, L., consul b.c. 261.
1, 20
Valerius Flaccus, L. , consul B.C. 195,
20. 9, 10
INDEX
6is
Valerius Laevinus, M. , consul B.C.
2IO, 8, 3 ; 9, 27 ; 21, 29
Valerius Laevinus, C. , son of the pre-
ceding, consul suff. B.C. 176, 21,
29. 31
Valerius Maximus Messala, Manius,
consul B.C 263, 1, 16, 17
Velia, a city in Lucania, 1, 20
Vclites. See Roman Army
Veneti, a tribe of Cisalpine Gauls, 2.
17, 18, 23, 24
Venusia, a city of Apulia, 3, 90, 116,
117
Verbanus lacus (La^ Magi^ore)^^, 10
Vesta, 6, 93
Vestini, a people of central Italy, 2, 24
Vibo, a town in Bnittium (Hipponium,
Bivona), 8, 88
Villius Tapulus, P., consul B.C. 199,
18, 48, 50
Vultumus, a river in Samnium, 8, 92
Wall, the, a fort near Dyme, 4, 59,
Walls, the Two, a fort in Mysia, 6| 77
Walls, scribbling on, 6, 33
White Rock, the, 8, 53 ; cp. 10, 30
World, divisions of, 8, 37 ; 12, 25
Xanthippus, of Sparta, 1, 32-36
Xanthus, Macedonian hero, 28. 10
Xanthus, a city in Lycia. 26, 4
Xenarchus, an Achaean, 28, 4
Xenis, a road near Mantinea, 11, ix
Xeno, of Aegium, 82, 7 ; 88, i
Xeno, tyrant of Hermione, 2, 44
Xeno, of Patrae, 28, 6
Xeno, an officer of Antiochus the
Great, 6, 42, 43, 45
Xenoetas, an Achaean, 6, 45-48
Xenophanes, of Athens, 7, 9
Xenophantus, of Rhodes, 4, 50
Xenophon, the Athenian historian, 8,
6 ; 6, 45 ; 10, 20
Xenophon, of Aegium, 18, i, 10 ; 28,
19
Xerxes, king of Persia, 8, 22 ; 6, 1 1 ;
9. 38 ; 88, 4
Xerxes, a prince of Armosata. 8, 25
Zabdidelus, an Arabian, 6, 79
Zacynthus, island of (Zante), 6. 4, 102
Zagnis, a mountain in Media, 6, 44,
54. 55
Zaleucus, legislator of the Locrians,
12, 16
Zama, battle of, 16, 5-16
Zarax, a town in Laconia, 4, 36
2^iaspa, a town of Bactriana, 10, 49
Zarzas, a Libyan, 1, 84, 85
Zelys, of Gortyn in Crete, 6, 79
Zeno, of Rhodes, an historian, 16, 14-
17, 20
Zeugma, a bridge of boats across the
Euphrates, 6, 43
Zeus, Homarius, 2, 39 ; 6, 93 ; Idaeus,
28, 14 ; Lycaeus, 4, 33 ; Olympius,
9, 27 ; 26, I ; 89, 17 ; Atabyrius,
9, 27 ; temple of, at Selge (Ccs-
bedium), 6. 76 ; precinct of, in
Arcadia, 16, 12 ; statue of, by
Pheidias, 80, 10 ; worshipped by the
Carthaginians, 8, ix ; 7, 9. See also
*. 33 ; 7, 9, XI ; 12, 26 ; 80, xo
Zeuxippus, of Boeotia, 18, 43 ; 22, 4
Zeuxis, an officer of Antiochus the
Great, 6, 45-48, 51-54, 60. See
also 16, I, 24 ; 21, 16, X7, 24
Zodiac, signs of the, 9, 15
Zoippus, of Syracuse, 7, 2
THE END
Printtdby'^' & R. Clark, Edinbufgh
ii.k.
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