BY THE SAME AUTHOR.
Svo. iSs. net each.
HISTORY OP THE BRITISH ARMY
Vols. I. and II. (To the Close of the Seven Years' War).
Vol. III. (To the Second Peace of Paris).
Royal 8vo. 2$s. net.
HISTORY OP THE 17 LANCERS
8vo. 4s. 6d. net.
THE BRITISH ARMY, 1783-18O2
Four Lectures delivered at the Staff College and Cavalry
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LONDON: MACMILLAN AND CO., LIMITED.
'A]
HISTORY OF THE BRITISH ARMY
--<*'.., : ,
50
A History of
he British
1
K?jy.ii
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THE HON. J. W. FORTESCUE
SECOND PART CONTINUED FROM THE FALL OF THE BASTILLE
TO THE PEACE OF AMIENS
VOL. IV PART II
1789-1801
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Printed by R. & R. CLARK, LIMITED, Edinburgh.
CONTENTS
BOOK XII
CHAPTER XXII
THE MEDITERRANEAN
PAGE
Insufficiency of a Naval Force to fulfil the Government's
Policy without an Army ...... coo
Difficulties in obtaining Recruits . .... 60 1
Charles Stuart's Force in Portugal ..... 601
Insubordination of the French Part of it . . . 602
Impracticability of Stuart's Instructions from Dundas . . 603
The first Menace of Trouble in India ..... 605
The Government's new Policy of Raids on Spanish Ports . 605
Lord St. Vincent's Opinion of Charles Stuart . . . 606
Nelson's Cruise in search of Bonaparte .... 607
The Battle of the Nile 607
Nelson returns from the Nile to Naples . ... . 608
Discontent with French Rule in Switzerland and Italy . . 609
Negotiations between Naples and Austria . . . .610
Russia enters the Lists against France . . . . .611
Miserable internal Condition of France . . . . 6ll
Nelson, the Queen of Naples, and Lady Hamilton . .612
Nelson's Eagerness to follow up the Victory of the Nile . 614
Naples takes the Offensive . . . . . . .615
Collapse of the Neapolitans, and Flight of the Court to
Palermo . . . .... . . .615
Stuart's Preparations for Attack on Minorca . . .615
Course of the Expedition . . . . . . .616
VI
HISTORY OF THE ARMY
PAGE
Capture of Minorca . . . . . . . .618
Audacity of Stuart's Campaign . . . . . .619
Dundas's Ideas for future Operations . . . . .620
Stuart's Measures in Minorca . . . . . .621
Nelson begs a Battalion from Stuart for Messina . . .623
Arrival of Stuart in Sicily . . . . . . .623
His masterly Designs for Use and Defence of the Island . 624
Alliance of Russia, Turkey, and England . . . .625
Prussia declines to be included in it . . . . 626
Austria after Hesitation joins the Alliance . . . .627
Weak Points of the new Coalition . . . . .628
The Law of Conscription in France ..... 628
Forces of the French and the Allies ..... 629
Victory of the Archduke Charles at Stockach . . . 629
Thugut's Jealousy of Prussia spoils the Archduke's Campaign 629
Successes of Suvorof in Italy ....... 630
Successes of Nelson and Ruffb in the Neapolitan Dominions. 631
Suvorof 's Victory of the Trebbia . . . . .631
Thugut's Folly thwarts Suvorof 's Plans . . . .632
Suvorof 's Victory of Novi . . . . . . .632
Thugut again spoils his Projects . . . . . .633
Nelson's Jealousy of the Russians in the Mediterranean . 634
His extravagant Scheme for a Campaign in the Roman States 634.
Defeat of Suvorof in Switzerland by Massena . . . 636
Bonaparte's Invasion of Syria . . . . . 637
His Repulse before Acre . . . . . . .637
His Defeat of the Turks at Aboukir . . . . 638
His stealthy Flight from Egypt to France . . . .638
CHAPTER XXIII
THE EXPEDITION TO NORTH HOLLAND
First Act for the Enlistment of Militiamen in the Line . 639
Its Failure. ......... 640
Several Militia and Fencible Regiments volunteer for foreign
Service ......... 640
CONTENTS
Vll
Treaty of England with Russia for Recovery of Holland . 641
Second Act for Enlistment of Militiamen in the Line . . 641
Abercromby called in to advise as to the Operations . . 642
Difficulties of the projected Campaign . .... 643
Abercromby declares against the Expedition. . . . 644
Dundas also adverse to it . . . . . . 645
The Question of Transport ...... 646
First Instructions issued to Abercromby . . . . . 647
Their absolute Futility .... . . . 648
Second Set of Instructions issued to Abercromby . . . 649
Vagueness and Indecision of the Ministry .... 650
Abercromby arrives off the Helder . . . . .651
Description of North Holland and the Coast . . .652
Dispositions of the French and Dutch to repel Abercromby . 653
Action fought by Abercromby to effect his Disembarkation . 654
The Enemy evacuate the Helder ; Capture of the Dutch Fleet 657
The Rendezvous of the Militia at u Barham Downs . . 658
The first Reinforcements sent to Abertromby . . . 659
His Position on the Zype Canal ...... 660
His Inability to move ...... . .661
Brune's Plan of Attack on the Zype Position . . . 662
Brune's Attack on the Position of the Zype. . . . 663
It is everywhere repulsed . . . . . . . 664
Arrival of Reinforcements* British und Russian . . . 665
The Duke of York subjected to a Council of War . . 666
Bad Equipment of his Troops ...... 667
Early Failure of Supplies ....... 667
The Duke's Difficulties with the Followers of the Prince of
Orange ......... 668
CHAPTER XXIV
THE EXPEDITION TO NORTH HOLLAND
Position of the French under General Brune . 670
The Duke of York's Plan for Attack upon it .671
Abercromby's March upon Hoorn
FT. II
Vlll
HISTORY OF THE ARMY
PAGE
The main Attack opened prematurely by the Russians . . 673
Rout of the Russians ........ 676
The British Right compelled to fall back .... 677
Pulteney's Successes on the Left abandoned . . . 679
Evil Consequences of the Failure to the Allied Forces . .681
Arrival of more Russian Troops ; a second Attack deter-
mined on ......... 682
The Duke of York's Plans . . ... . .683
Description of the Sand-Dunes of North Holland . . 684
The Action of Egmont-aan-Zee, 2nd October . . . 687
The Duke of York gains a negative Victory. . . . 693
Dispositions of both Sides after the Battle .... 694
The Action of 6th October . . . . . .695
Heavy Losses of the Allies ....... 697
The Council of War advises a Retreat . . . . 698
The Duke of York retires to the Zype . ... 699
Extreme Danger of his Situation ...... 700
He agrees to evacuate North Holland under a Convention . 701
Reflections on the Expedition ; the Militia . . . .701
The Artillery 702
The Royal Waggon Train . . . . . . .703
The Failure of Supplies . . . . . 703
The Government's Excuses ...... 707
Disingenuous Treatment of Abercromby by Dundas . . 708
Discussion of the Government's Object in the Expedition . 709
CHAPTER XXV
THE EAST INDIES
Incompleteness of Cornwallis's Work after the Capture of
Seringapatam in 1792 ....
Madajee Scindia's Designs upon the Nizam .
Sir John Shore declines to protect the Nizam
Alienation of the Nizam by this Treatment .
Rise of trained Troops under French Leaders
De Boigne and Perron with Scindia
711=
712
712
7*3
713
7H
7H
CONTENTS i x
PAGE
Raymond with the Nizam . . . . . . 715
Menace of these Troops to British Interests . . . . 715
Tippoo Sahib's Overtures to the French Government . .716
The Arrival of Ripaud at Mangalore . . . . .716
Tippoo's Mission to Mauritius . . . . , . 717
Extraordinary Folly of M. Malartic . . . . . 717
Dundas's Measures to reinforce India . . . . . 719
Arrival of Lord Mornington as Governor-general . . . 720
Dangerous Dispersion of the Forces of India . . .721
Mornington resolves to march upon Seringapatam . .721
His successful Negotiations with the Nizam . . . .721
His Transactions with the Mahrattas . . . . .722
Difficulties of Transport for a Campaign in Mysore . .722
The Military Commanders : Harris, Floyd, Wellesley . .723
Mornington trusts Harris with full Powers .... 724
Composition of the Force : the Madras Army . . .725
The Nizam's Contingent and Bombay Army . . . 726
Tippoo's March against the Bombay Army .... 727
His Repulse at Sedaseer ....... 728
March of Harris 728
Enormous Multitude of his Transport Animals . . . 729
His tortuous Movements to obtain Forage .... 730
The Action at Mallavelly 731
The March resumed 734
Arrival of the Army before Seringapatam . . . -735
Wellesley's Mishap at Sultanpettah Tope . -735
The Siege of Seringapatam . ...... 736
The Storm of Seringapatam . . . . . -739
Burial of Tippoo Sahib . 744
His Military Blunders 745
CHAPTER XXVI
THE EAST INDIES
Arrival of a Convoy at Seringapatam . . 746
The Distribution of Prize-money and Partition of Mysore . 747
x HISTORY OF THE ARMY
THE PACIFICATION OF SOUTHERN INDIA
PAGE
Disturbed State of India . . . . ' . . 74 8
Doondia Wao ... . 749
His Force defeated and dispersed . . .75
Occupation of Soonda . . . . . 75 1
Operations against Kistnapah Naik . . .752
Reappearance of Doondia Wao 753
Wellesley is ordered to hunt him down . . . 753
Wellesley opens his Campaign 754
Failure drives him to new Methods . . . . -757
Final Defeat and Death of Doondia . . . . .758
Valuable Experience gained by Wellesley . . . 759
Operations against the Polygars . . . . ; 760
Severe Repulse of the British before Panjslamcoorchy . . 762
Final Storm of Panjalamcoorchy . . . . . .763
Operations against the Murdoos . . . . . 764
Failure of the Operations in the S'he'rewe'le Jungle . . 766
Final Capture of Caliarcoil ...... 767
Operations against the Rajah of Bullam .... 767
Extraordinary Bravery of Lieutenant Parminter . . . 768
CHAPTER XXVII
THE MEDITERRANEAN
Bonaparte becomes First Consul of France . . . . 769
His amazing Energy in repairing the Directory's Blunders . 770
Disruption of the Coalition of 1799 . . . . . 771
Quarrel between Russia and Austria . . . . ,772
Quarrel between Russia and England 772
Thugut's Plans for the Campaign of 1800 . . . -773
Charles Stuart's Plan for Operations in the Mediterranean . 774
The Convention of El Arish . . . . . .774
Neglect of the British Army by Ministers . . . -775
Dundas's Project for a Descent on Brest . . . -775
His further Project of Operations near Bellisle . . . 776
CONTENTS xi
PACE
Charles Stuart quarrels with Ministers and resigns his Com-
mand - 776
Maitland's Expedition to Belleisle . . . 777
It is abandoned by Dundas's Order 770
Successes of the Austrians in the Riviera .... 780
Concentration of British Troops at Minorca . . .781
Abercromby appointed Commander-in-chief in the Mediter-
ranean 7 g t
His first Set of Instructions ...... 782
His second Set of Instructions ...... 783
Bonaparte's Advance over the Alps . . . . 783
Melas entreats for Troops from Minorca .... 784
Battle of Marengo . . . . . . . -785
Abercromby sails to Genoa to arrive too late . . .785
Melas again begs for British Troops 786
Abercromby decides not to co-operate with him . . . 787
Successes of Moreau in Germany ..... 787
Bonaparte's successful Negotiations with Russia and Spain . 788
Third Set of Instructions sent to Abercromby by Dundas . 789
The new Policy of Attacks upon Spanish Ports . . . 789
Pulteney's abortive Attempt^upon Ferrol .... 790
Indignation with Pulteney in England . . . .791
Pulteney not to blame ....... 792
Concentration of the Mediterranean Force at Gibraltar . 793
Abortive Attempt upon Cadiz ...... 793
Surrender of Malta ; Close of the Campaign . . . 794
Gross Misconduct of Military Affairs by the British Ministers 795
The true Reason for it ....... 796
Nelson's Strictures upon the British Generals . . . 797
Nelson's own Failures in Military Operations . . . 798
CHAPTER XXVIII
THE MEDITERRANEAN
French Treaty with Spain, and Attempt to revive the Armed
Neutrality ......... 799
Dundas's fourth Set of Instructions to Abercromby . . 799
Xll
HISTORY OF THE ARMY
THE EXPEDITION TO EGYPT
An Expedition to Egypt ordered ....
The Reasons of the Government for undertaking it
Change in the Situation owing to the Gaining of the Tsar by
Bonaparte ...
A Force from India to co-operate in Egypt .
Abercromby's Difficulties
He concentrates his Force at Malta
Withdrawal of British Troops from Portugal
Increasing Hostility of Russia toward England
Battle of Hohenlinden ; Austria sues for Peace at any Price .
Abercromby arrives in Marmorice Bay
Apparent Hopelessness of the Task assigned, to him
The Training of the Army for Disembarkation .
Increase of Difficulties upon Abercromby .
Bonaparte's Anxiety for Egypt .
Abortive Cruise of Admiral Ganteaume
Quality of the French Army in Egypt .
Assassination of Kleber : Menou succeeds him .
Menou's Blunders ... . . . . .816
Abercromby arrives off Alexandria . . . . .817
Dispositions of Menou . . . .818
The Problem set to Abercromby 8 1 8
His Plan of Attack ..; 819
The Disembarkation on the Peninsula of Ahpujcir . . 820
Storm of the Central Sand-hill by Moore . . . .821
Landing of the Remainder of the .Force. .... 822
Losses of the Army and Navy, m .the Disembarkation . . 823
Position of the Army after the Action . . . . . ,824
Abercromby's Advance on the II th of March . . . 825
Attack of the French on the Ninetieth and Ninety-second . 826
The Action becomes general . . . . . .827
Close of the Action 729
Criticism of Abercromby's Proceedings . . . .830
The British Position of the Roman Camp . . . .831
Rapid Increase of Sickness . ...... 832
FACE
800
801
802
803
804
805
806
807
808
808
809
810
811
812
813
814
815
CONTENTS xiii
PAGE
Menou's Plan of Attack on the British . 833
The Action of the 2 ist of March . 834
Comments upon the Action . . . . . '839
The Losses of the British 840
The Losses of the French ....... 842
The Death of Abercromby . ...... 843
Character of Abercromby 844
CHAPTER XXJX
THE CAMPAIGN IN EGYPT
Bonaparte's diplomatic Successes . . . . . . 848
The Treaty of LuneVille and the Armed Neutrality . . 848
Resignation of Pitt . . . . . .. <. 848
Hutchinson succeeds Abercromby . . . . . 849
His Operations at Rosetta . . .. . . . 849
His Advance up the Nile . .... * 850
Cabal of Officers against Hutchinson . . . . .851
He continues his Advance ....... 852
The Turks successfully engage the French . . . .853
Junction of the Turkish and British Armies . . 854
Surrender of Cairo by the French .... . . . -855
Arrival of Reinforcements from England . . . 856
The Indian Contingent . . . . 857
Its long Delay in reaching Cosseir . . . .858
Baird's March across the Desert from Cosseir . . '859
The March of the Eighty-sixth across the Desert from Suez 860
Hutchinson's Operations against Alexandria .... 801
Capitulation of Menou . 863
Comments on the Egyptian Campaign
Its incompetent Direction by Henry Dundas . 865
The Armed Neutrality ; Capture of the Danish and Swedish
West Indies by the British . ' . . -866
Nelson's Victory at Copenhagen .
Bonaparte's Feints at Invasion of England .
xiv HISTORY OF THE ARMY
PAGE
The Failure of his Diplomacy in Russia and in the Peninsula . 868
Peace of Amiens signed ....... 869
CHAPTER XXX
REVIEW OF THE PROGRESS OF THE ARMY FROM 1793-1802
The Appointment of the Secretary of State for War , .87!
He becomes Secretary of State for War and Colonies . . 872
The Secretary at War ; Yonge ; Windham . . . .872
Effect of a Coalition Ministry on the Military Administra-
tion . . . . . . . . . .873
William Huskisson, the Under-Secretary of State for War . 874
The Appointment of the Secretary of State for War an
Administrative Failure . . . . . 875
The Duke of York as Commander-in-chief . . . . 876
His Position in the Financial Aspect f 877
He assumes alsolute Control of the Military Side of the War
Office . 878
The Adjutant-general, Quartermaster-general, and Military
Secretary ......... 879
Limitations of the Duke's Power in Military Matters . . 879
The Master-general of the Ordnance, Lord Cornwallis . 880
Unsatisfactory State of the Ordnance Office . . .881
Creation of the Staff Corps in consequence . . . .881
The Treasury . . . 88 1
Land Transport and Supply . . . . 882
Sea Transport . . . . . . . . .882
Dangers of Sea Transport in the Eighteenth Century . , 883
The Home Office . .884
Its Friction with the War Office over the Militia. . .885
The Lords-Lieutenant and the Generals of Districts . , 885
The Union with Ireland and Disappearance of the Irish
Establishment . . . . . . . 886
The Regular Army : its Strength and Methods of Recruiting 887
The Militia : English, Scotch, and Irish .... 848
CONTENTS
xv
The Fencibles 8g
Rise of the Ninety-third Highlanders 8o O
Fencibles for Foreign Garrisons goo
West India Regiments : Importance of their Establishment . 891
The Provisional Cavalry . . . . . . .891
The Volunteers : Volunteer or Yeomanry Cavalry . . 892
Volunteer Infantry and Artillery ..... 893
Voluntary Associations for Defence 893
Confusion in the Military Arrangements .... 894
Foreign Troops : Difficulty and Obscurity of the Subject . 895
The Enlistment of Foreign Levies in Principle a Blunder . 896
The Pay of the Army . . . . . . . 897
Change in the Status of Regimental Paymasters . . . 898
Anomalies and Expense of the Change .... 899
The Clothing of the Army ....... 899
Abortive Efforts to change the System ..... 900
Reforms actually executed ....... 902
The Housing of the Army ........ 903
The Establishment of the Barrackmaster-general . . . 903
Shameful Extravagance and Incapacity of the New Officer . 904
The Housing of the Army in Barracks amounted to a Resolu-
tion in the Military System ...... 906
The Branches of the Regular Army : the Cavalry . . 907
Report of the Board of General Officers upon the Mounted
Troops 907
Disappearance of the old War-horse ..... 908
Veterinary Surgeons ........ 909
Defective Training of the Cavalry . . . . .910
General Money's- Criticisms- .- .- .- . .- .911
The Artillery : Growth of the Horse Artillery . . .912
The Field Artillery : the First Corps of Drivers, 1794 . . 913
The Second Corps of Drivers, 1 80 1 . 9H
The Artillery in the Field ... 9H
The Engineers .... 9 J 5
The Royal Military Artificers . . . 9 J 5
The Staff Corps .916
XVI
HISTORY OF THE ARMY
PAGE
The Infantry: Battalions of Flank Companies . . .916
Long Delay in the Creation of true Light Infantry . . 917
The Making of the Rifle Brigade 918
Details of Dress and Drill in the Infantry . . . .921
The Medical Service : its past History . . . . ' 922
The Reforms of 1798 . . . . . . . 9*3
The Chaplains' Department : Reforms. . . . -925
Military Education : the Staff College 926
The Royal Military College 927
Signs of kinder Treatment of the Soldier * ... 927
Good Service of the Duke of York 929
APPENDICES
A. TABLE OF REGULAR REGIMENTS RAISED, 1793-1802. . 930
B. PAY OF THE ARMY 935
C. BRITISH AND IRISH MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS, 1793-1802 938
D. EFFECTIVE STRENGTH OF THE REGULAR ARMY (EXCLUSIVE
OF ARTILLERY), 1793-1801, WITH THE NUMBER OF
RECRUITS RAISED IN EACH YEAR .... 940
E. LIST OF FENCIBLE REGIMENTS FOR THE FORMATION OF
WHICH LETTERS OF SERVICE WERE ISSUED, 1793-1802 942
INDEX
945
MAPS AND PLANS
(In a Packet at the end of Part II. of Vol. IV.}
CAMPAIGN OF THE NETHERLANDS, 1793-1795
1. Position of Famars.
2. Dunkirk.
3. Position of the opposing armies, April 1794.
4. Battle of Turcoing.
5. Villers en Cauchies. 1
_, , T ,. n }- on one sheet.
6. Willems.
CAMPAIGN OF THE MEDITERRANEAN, 1793-1795
7. Toulon.
8. Corsica.
- on one sheet.
9. Bastia.
10. Calvi.
CAMPAIGNS OF THE WEST INDIES,i 1793-1798
LEEWARD SPHERE
11. St. Domingo.
12. Jamaica.
WINDWARD SPHERE
13. Martinique, i on one sheet, with inset of Point-a-Pitre
14. Guadaloupe. JV and the Camp of Berville.
1 For general map of the West Indies see Volume III.
xvii
xviii HISTORY OF THE ARMY
^i 5. St Lucia.
16. Castries.
"-17. St. Vincent. ^i
' *i8. Grenada. j- on one sheet.
49. Dominica. J
CAMPAIGN OF NORTH HOLLAND, 1799
20. General Map of North Holland.
21. North Holland : Helder to Petten.
22. : Petten to Alkmaar.
'"23. Cape of Good Hope.
GENERAL MAPS
24. THE NETHERLANDS, NORTH-EAST FRANCE, and the LOWER
RHINE.
25. FRANCE, AND THE WESTERN MEDITERRANEAN, with five insets
(i) Malta, (2) Valetta, (3) Minorca, (4) Connaught,
1798, (5) Partitions of Poland.
26. EGYPT AND THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN, with three insets
(i) Peninsula of Alexandria, from Aboukir Bay to
Alexandria, (2) The Battle of 2 1st March 1801, (3)
The Valley of the Nile.
27. SOUTHERN INDIA, with two insets (i) Seringapatam, (2)
Ceylon.
ABBREVIATIONS USED IN REFERENCE TO THE ARCHIVES
PRESERVED IN THE RECORD OFFICE
B.G.O. = Minutes of the Board of General Officers.
C.C.L.B. = Commander-in-chief's Letter Books.
H.O.M.E.B. = Home Office Military Entry Books.
S.C,L.B. = The Letter Books of J the Secretary at War known as the
" Secretary's Common Letter Books."
CHAPTER XXII
THE chief interest of our history during the years 1798.
that lie before us, until the Peace of Amiens, centres
wholly in the Mediterranean. We have done with
the false and mistaken offensive operations in the
West Indies ; we have done with seizure of Dutch
Colonies ; we have done, at any rate for the present,
with Irish rebellions and with French projects of
invasion, of which last the battle of Camperdown
and Bonaparte's expedition to Egypt had been made a
final end.
The fleet had been moved from the Irish coast
to the Mediterranean in the full belief that Bonaparte's
armament at Toulon was designed for an attack upon
the British Isles ; and its object was therefore in
strictness defensive. Ireland in 1797 and 1798 might
be regarded as a city besieged by the British land-
forces, and the British fleet as the covering army
which kept the French at a distance while the siege
progressed. As has already been seen in Flanders,
a covering army may take the offensive temporarily
to parry a blow which is designed to interrupt a
siege ; and such counter-attacks, as, for instance, that
of Villers-en-Cauchies, may be brilliantly successful.
None the less, their success must as a rule be limited,
because they cannot be followed up ; a covering army
being, in its essence, a stationary army. But the
British Government contemplated no such limited
offensive mission as this for Nelson's squadron ; for,
as Portland wrote to Camden, the reappearance of
VOL. IV 599 B
600 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1798. the British fleet in the Mediterranean offered the only
chance of rescuing Italy and bringing about a durable
peace. Now, for such an object, it is clear that a
fleet in itself was insufficient. It might meet Bona-
parte's armament at sea and destroy it, or drive it back
to port and hold it blockaded ; or, as actually happened,
it might overtake it after its land-forces had been
disembarked at their appointed destination, destroy
the ships upon which depended their communication
with France, and leave the troops stranded. In either
of these cases the sea would be cleared of the French
fleet, and this, apart from the moral effect of a victory,
would be a great point gained ; but in itself it could
do nothing, though it might pave the way for much,
towards the salvation of Italy and the establishment
of a lasting peace. It is useless for artillery to batter
a breach unless there is infantry ready to rush into it ;
and equally it is useless for a fleet to clear the sea for
an offensive movement unless an army is ready to
follow it.
Now, even if the Ministers had reflected upon this
matter, which I think it certain that they had not,
they possessed no army of their own to second
Nelson's fleet. It was the nemesis for their wasteful
squandering of troops upon secondary objects that,
when a primary object at last commended itself to
them, they could not find a battalion to their hand.
The army had been destroyed by the end of 1794,
and had never been reconstructed. Recruits had
indeed been gathered from all sides, grouped together
under the numbers of the old regiments, and hurried
out to the West Indies to be buried ; but that was
all, and it was worse than nothing. The English
Militia was really the only sound force left.
The gross mismanagement of 1794, and the awful
sacrifice of life in the Caribbean Islands, had dried
up the ordinary sources of recruits. In April 1798
when Camden, at Dublin, was crying out for rein-
forcements, Portland could only answer that none
CH. xxn HISTORY OF THE ARMY 601
could be sent from Great Britain, owing to great 1798.
disappointments in the recruiting service. In Ireland
the case was the same. Eight skeleton regiments
were there kept permanently open, in order to
collect men and draft them into the older corps,
but the whole of the eight did not possess above
sixteen hundred men between them. 1 Voluntary
service, even when propped by levies from parish to
parish, had broken down completely. The Govern-
ment was just able, with great difficulty, to maintain
its garrisons over sea ; but it was absolutely beyond
its power to produce a striking force.
One small body of men, however, which has been
for some time withdrawn from our ken, must now
be recalled to notice. It will be remembered that
it was the declaration of war by Spain against Eng-
land that had caused Pitt to withdraw the fleet
from the Mediterranean, and to evacuate Corsica
in the autumn of 1796. Immediately afterwards
Spain, under the influence of the French Directory,
threatened Portugal with invasion in order to compel
her to close her ports to the British ; and Portugal
appealed to England for help. Thereupon, the Govern-
ment decided to send at once five thousand men to
Lisbon under General Charles Stuart, with instructions
to place himself under the command of the Portuguese
Commander-in-chief, and to act in concert with him
whether for the offensive or the defensive. 2 Dundas's
idea appears to have been to transfer the garrison,
which had lately been removed from Corsica to
Elba, at once to Lisbon ; but it has already been
explained how, through the blunders of the War
Office, the troops were kept at Porto Ferrajo until
April 1797. However, in due time they arrived at
Gibraltar, and after a month's delay reached the 1797.
Tagus on the 2ist of June, where Stuart was waiting June 21,
to receive them. The British regiments, namely,
1 Portland to Camden, 4th April 1798.
2 Dundas to C. Stuart, 3rd December 1796.
602 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK
1797. the second battalion of the Royal Scots, the Fiftieth, and
Fifty -first Foot and the Twelfth Light Dragoons, had
been with him in Corsica, where the three first had served
him brilliantly at Calvi ; but since that time they had
received few recruits from England to fill the gaps made
by active service, and were consequently very weak.
The remainder of the force was made up of foreign
regiments, of which the Duke of Mortemar's, the
Duke of Castries's, the Loyal Emigrants, and some
artillery were composed chiefly of French refugees ;
two battalions of Dillon's regiment, which should have
been Irish, seem also to have been French ; another
regiment, De Roll's, was Swiss, and another detach-
ment of artillery was Maltese. The numbers of the
whole were approximately two thousand British and
four thousand foreigners.
Stuart's first impression of this motley assemblage
was not favourable. " I never in the course of my
service saw two regiments more disgraceful to the
British name than Roll and Dillon," he wrote ; and
they did not improve on acquaintance. The French
regiments had been encouraged by Ministers in the
first enthusiasm of compassion for the Emigrants ;
but in this case, as in so many others, the outcast
French noble showed himself absolutely unworthy
of pity or confidence. The officers seemed to regard
it as an honour to England that they should receive
her money and give her no service for it. They
were to the last degree lazy and insubordinate. They
corresponded secretly with their friends in France to
make their peace with the Directory, no matter at what
prejudice to the British, whom they professed to serve ;
and they corresponded with their friends in England
to gain favours, procure the perpetration of jobs,
and generally to obtain for themselves ease, comfort,
and independence in defiance of the General. Nor
did they lack the support which they craved in Down-
ing Street. The capitulations, upon which the corps
had been raised, being vague, various, and founded
:
CH. xxn HISTORY OF THE ARMY 603
upon no uniform system, gave an excellent oppor- 1797,
tunity for every kind of abuse ; and there seems to
have been no agreement among the British Ministers
as to the department which was in charge of foreign
regiments. The officers, as Stuart complained, were
promoted on one day and reduced on the next.
If he suspended any of them for misconduct, the
next mail brought an intimation from the Duke of
Portland's office that the Government would relieve
them of their punishment ; and this although Dundas
had declared that all matters of discipline were in
the province of the Commander-in-chief. Never-
theless, despite all these impediments, Stuart con-
trived by a mixture of sternness and tact to train these
regiments to efficiency, and to make them live in
harmony with the British. He had no mercy on
the French officers who strove to make the drawing
of their pay their only military function, nor with
certain exalted privates called the Chasseurs Nobles
of Castries' s corps, who refused either to wear their
uniform or do their duty ; and his methodical ad-
ministration, his vigilance in checking malpractices, and
his careful economy of public money were a lesson
to the careless unintelligence of the departments in
England.
In other respects besides discipline Stuart's diffi-
culties were very great. His instructions bade him
place himself under the orders of the Portuguese
Commander-in-chief; but in the chaotic state of
Portugal there were at least three, if not more,
commanders -in -chief, namely, the Prince of Waldeck,
who had been called in from abroad to take up the
appointment ; the Duke de la Foens, a Portuguese
Field-Marshal who refused to yield it up to him,
and the Marquis de la Roziere, a Frenchman, who
worked independently of both. A further com-
plication was that it was doubtful whether the
Portuguese would fight or yield, whether the Spaniards
would attack them or refrain, whether the Court
604 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1797. of Lisbon would give way to the French, and, if
so, upon what terms the French would accept its
submission.
Bewildered by the constant changes in the situation
in Portugal, and being really very far from clear
as to the duty which Stuart's force was actually
expected to fulfil, Dundas wrote instruction after
instruction, until he entangled himself in a maze
of contradictory orders. Stuart, who always addressed
him as if he and not the Minister were master,
lost all patience. " I am determined to be guided
by your instructions so long as they are within the
reach of my comprehension," was the caustic prelude
to one of his letters ; but, in truth, he was very
well able to take care of himself. Without any
instructions whatever, he had from the first made
his dispositions so as to turn his troops into efficient
soldiers, defend Lisbon, command the Tagus, and
keep his communications open for an immediate
embarkation if necessary. At the same time he
carefully cultivated the friendship of the people,
though he was fully determined, if the Portuguese
should turn against him, not to repeat the disastrous
experiment of Toulon. He knew better than to
try to hold a single point in a foreign country against
the armed force of a whole nation ; and he warned
the Government by the examples both of Toulon
and of America not again to embark on so fatal
a policy. Meanwhile, his relations with Lord St.
Vincent were perfectly harmonious, for the great
Admiral recognised a good soldier when he met
one, and was not a little impressed by Stuart's ability.
It would not be too much to say that these two men
possessed the highest strategic talent then to be found
in the British Isles, 1
Thus matters dragged on for a whole year ; and,
notwithstanding frequent alarms of French and Spanish
1 See Stuart's correspondence with Dundas in W.O. Original
Correspondence. Portugal. 2nd July 1797 to I3th June 1798.
CH. xxn HISTORY OF THE ARMY 605
invasion and of the closing of Portuguese ports to 1798.
British ships, this little body of troops still remained
round Lisbon, and the harbour still lay open to the
British Navy. On the I3th of June 1798 Stuart left
Lisbon for England ; and in a letter of the 5th
Dundas ordered his successor, Major-general Fraser,
to maintain his predecessor's arrangements for em-
barkation at a moment's notice, in case the troops
should be required at home (whereby he really meant
in Ireland) or elsewhere. On the 26th Stuart arrived June 26.
in London, bringing with him a return of his force ;
and on the same day Dundas wrote to Fraser to hold
his three British battalions in readiness to embark for
India. News had come from Calcutta that two power-
ful native princes intended to combine with the French
in attacking the British East Indian possessions ; and
the rebellion in Ireland forbade any troops to be spared
for India except those in Portugal. Here therefore
was the main strength of the little force at Lisbon
engaged to service in the East, and lost to the
Mediterranean. 1
This news from India gave something of a clue to
the destination of Bonaparte, which, owing to Grenville's
mistrust of his intelligence, was still a mystery to the
British ; but it is extremely doubtful whether that clue
was grasped in London. Nevertheless, since the danger
of an invasion of Portugal seemed to have passed away,
Dundas at that very moment proposed a supplementary
measure of aggression by inquiring of St. Vincent
whether the British forces in Lisbon and Gibraltar
were adequate for the capture of Minorca and the
destruction of Carthagena. At first sight it might
seem as though the Ministry had begun to com-
prehend the wide opportunities offered by a vigorous
offensive in the Mediterranean ; but this would, I
think, be an erroneous conclusion. The seizure of
Minorca, which meant really the mastery of Port
1 Stuart to Dundas, 26th June ; Dundas to Fraser, 5th and 26th
June 1798.
606 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1798. Mahon, was simply the first indication of a new
policy of raids upon Spanish ports, whereon a vast
deal of useless energy was to be expended during
the next three years ; and Carthagena was designated
as the first of those ports because it was that from
which any expedition for the recapture of Minorca
would certainly be fitted out. But the object of
such raids could only be greater security for the
British isles against invasion, and better assured
supremacy of the British on the sea. In fact they
were purely negative and defensive measures, which
could have no decisive effect towards the conclusion
of the war unless followed up by offensive opera-
tions on land.
St. Vincent answered without hesitation that the
capture of Minorca would be a simple matter, and
added, rather boldly, that the force proposed would be
sufficient for the destruction of Carthagena. More-
over, he opined that the attack upon Minorca might
proceed at once, without waiting for the result of
Nelson's search for the French fleet ; though he warned
Dundas that the island, however easily taken, could
only be maintained by the constant presence of a
squadron. But, above all, he pressed for the return
of Stuart to take command of the troops, with an
earnestness which amounted almost to refusal to under-
take the enterprise on any other terms. " The loss of
General Charles Stuart, whom I believe to be the best
General that you have, is not to be repaired/' he wrote.
. . . "The more I reflect on the services expected
of the troops, the more important I think it for him to
be at their head. No one can manage Frenchmen as
well as him, and the British will go to hell for him."
The great Admiral's grammar was faulty ; but his
meaning was sufficiently plain. Minorca in Stuart's
hands might be turned to great purpose ; in the hands
of any other it would probably be only an encumbrance
to the fleet. We can only marvel that, since Stuart
was actually in London, Dundas should not have con-
.
CH. xxii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 607
suited him, particularly concerning the attack on Cartha- 1798.
gena, before writing to St. Vincent. 1
Meanwhile Nelson's cruise in search of the French
fleet had been strangely unlucky. Bonaparte after
leaving Toulon on the I9th of May had been joined May 19.
at sea on the 26th and 28th by the convoys from
Corsica and Civita Vecchia. On the 9th of June he June 9.
reached Malta, which, after a faint show of resistance,
capitulated on the I2th. Leaving a garrison of four June 12.
thousand men to hold it, he sailed again on the 1 9th June 19.
for Egypt by the circuitous route of the coast of Crete ;
and thus it was that Nelson, who could only guess at
his destination, arrived off Alexandria before him on
the 28th. The impetuous sailor finding, as was June 28.
natural, neither sign nor intelligence of the French,
sailed away somewhat hastily on the 29th to seek them June 29.
elsewhere. Three days later the entire French arma-July i.
ment arrived likewise before Alexandria ; and Bona-
parte, who had already learned that Nelson was in
pursuit of him, began at once to disembark his troops
with all possible haste. With his subsequent opera-
tions we are not concerned. It must suffice to say
that after a brief campaign, similar to many fought by
the British in India, he entered Cairo on the 25th of
July, and left it again on the yth of August to com-
plete the conquest of Lower Egypt. But meanwhile
Nelson had returned to Syracuse on the I9th of July,
and, having satisfied himself that the French were not
to westward, sailed again on the 24th for Alexandria. July 24.
A week later, on the first of August, he surprised Aug. i.
the French fleet at anchor in Aboukir Bay. There is
no need to retell the story of the battle of the Nile,
one of the greatest naval victories of all time. It is
necessary for our purpose only to record that the
French fleet was practically annihilated, eleven out of
1 St. Vincent to Dundas, 3rd and 5th July 1798. Dundas's
letter, to which these are written in reply, I have been unable
to discover, but the sense of it may be gathered from St. Vincent's
answer.
608 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1798. thirteen ships of the line and two out of four frigates
being taken or destroyed. The blow was crushing ;
and Bonaparte, though he met it with a firmness and
constancy which restored the drooping spirits of his
army, realised its severity to the full. He and his
force were prisoners in Egypt ; and there was no
great confidence in the words which he wrote to
Aug. 21. Kleber a few days after receipt of the fatal news :
" If the English relieve this squadron by another,
and continue to flood the Mediterranean, they may
oblige us to do greater things than we wished/' From
such a man there could hardly be franker avowal of
blunder and miscalculation. 1
Here therefore was a great and famous success
achieved by the British fleet. The next question was
how it should be followed up ; though it must be
remembered that the news of the victory did not reach
Naples before the 4th of September nor London until
the 2nd of October. Nelson himself, though severely
wounded in the head, lost no time in repairing his
own and the French ships after the action ; and on
the 1 4th of August six prizes and seven British ships
Aug. 15. of the line sailed for Gibraltar. On the following day
urgent orders reached him from St. Vincent to return
to the westward with his fleet for an attack upon
Minorca. Accordingly, leaving Captain Hood with
three ships of the line and as many frigates to blockade
Alexandria and to interrupt the communications of the
French on the coast of Egypt and Syria, he sailed on
Aug. 19. the 1 9th with his three remaining vessels for Naples.
The attack on Minorca was, however, in spite of St.
Vincent's orders, not to take place for some months ;
for, though Dundas wisely appointed Stuart to command
the expedition, the latter did not receive his instruc-
tions until the 29th of August nor leave England until
some days later. But in any case Nelson's three ships
were so much crippled that they were bound to remain
in Naples for some time to refit, and in the meanwhile
1 Correspondence de Napoleon, iv. 369.
CH. xxii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 609
he could do no more than take measures for the 1798.
blockade of Malta by Portuguese and British ships.
On the 22nd of September he finally arrived at Naples, Sept. 22.
where his influence, subjected to other influences, was
destined to produce such fateful results.
At this point it will be convenient to summarise
the events that had passed in Europe since Bonaparte
had initiated his schemes of aggression on the Continent
at the beginning of the year 1798. Switzerland, in spite
of a gallant resistance on the part of the old Cantons,
had been forced by French bayonets to reconstitute
herself as the Helvetian Republic ; but France still
refused to withdraw her troops or to recognise the
ancient Swiss neutrality. Indeed Talleyrand said
openly that only an offensive alliance would satisfy
the Directory or deliver the country from new
pecuniary exactions. The confiscation of ecclesiastical
property roused the religious feeling alike of the clergy
and of the people ; and a trifling cause brought about
a savage fanatical rising in Schwytz, Unterwalden, and
Niederwalden, which was only suppressed by the French
with difficulty and heavy loss of men.
In Italy the Cisalpine, Roman, and Ligurian Re-
publics were one and all ripe for revolt, owing to the
system of pillage and robbery carried on by the Agents
of the Directory. In Piedmont again the French had
intervened to prevent the Sardinian Government from
repressing an insurrection, and Brune had since the
28th of May taken military possession of Turin. The
next victim was Naples, from which the Directory
extorted by threats a large contribution and an annual
tribute, besides insisting on the dismissal of the chief
minister, the Englishman Acton. By yielding to these
wrongs the miserable King Ferdinand hoped that he
had purchased peace ; but his Queen, Caroline, a sister
of Marie Antoinette, was of a less submissive nature,
and her spirit of resistance was quickened by the
appointment of a regicide as French ambassador at
Naples. Resenting this insult, she caused troops to
6io HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
i798.be raised, and persuaded Austria to conclude on the
1 9th of May a defensive alliance with the kindom of
the Two Sicilies. These measures, however, brought
no relief from the heavy hand of France. Revolu-
tionary agents from the Roman Republic continued
to make mischief in the Neapolitan dominions, and
the Directory took the Court of Naples to task for
allowing Nelson to use the port of Syracuse while on
his search for the French fleet. At last, in August,
King Ferdinand wrote to the Emperor Francis that
the situation had become intolerable, and that the
only chance of successful resistance was to anticipate
the enemy in attack ; to which end he requested the
services of General Mack to command the Neapolitan
troops. In answer, Thugut at once consented to send
Mack, being glad to be rid of him ; and he added that
though the defensive alliance lately concluded was not
binding on Austria if Naples should take the offensive,
still in the circumstances the Emperor would support
King Ferdinand without looking too closely to the
letter of the treaty.
This was a great concession from Thugut, who,
though long since seriously alarmed at the Directory's
proceedings in Italy, had felt constrained to walk
warily. "Without an ally and without money he dared
not break with France ; and England would not hear
of any further dealing with him unless he consented to
sign a treaty, already rejected by him, for repayment of
a former loan. Pitt and Grenville had not forgotten
the occurrences of 1794, and were in no mood to
supply Austria with millions to spend upon her own
aggrandisement without thought of the common cause.
The only alternative ally was Russia ; and the Tsar
Paul was not too friendly to Austria, because he had
failed in an attempt to reconcile her with Prussia. The
poor half-crazy creature had, during Catherine's life,
been kept under so strict restraint that the sudden
change from impotence to omnipotence had turned his
head ; and, when Austria and Prussia had refused to
CH. xxri HISTORY OF THE ARMY 611
become friends at his bidding, his indignation against 1798.
both parties was boundless. Bonaparte's capture of
Malta, however, was an insult which swallowed up all
others, for Paul had set his heart upon obtaining that
island for Russia as a base for future operations against
Turkey. So intense was his animosity towards France
after this occurrence that, on the i6th of July, he July 16,
decided definitely to employ an army of sixty thousand
men against her, to be paid either by Austria or by
England. Moreover, a few days later, he ordered his July 25,
fleet in the Black Sea to proceed to Constantinople and
to offer its services to the Sultan in any operations that
the attack upon Egypt might move him to undertake
against France. The Porte was nothing loth, for
Bonaparte's designs to avert its hostility by diplomatic
means, whatever they may have been, had miscarried ;
and his unprovoked attack upon the Sultan's dominions
was deeply resented. Accordingly, on the ist of
September, the Sultan proclaimed a holy war, in con-
cert with Russia, against France. Thus Russia was
at last definitely drawn into the great contest against
the Revolution.
Next, let us look for a moment at France itself,
where the consequences of six long years of folly,
rascality, and misrule were making themselves felt with
increasing intensity. Since the dissolution of the
Constituent Assembly, practically nothing had been
done towards the re -establishment of internal order
and the restoration of good government. All over
the country roads, bridges, and canals were going or
gone to ruin from want of ordinary repairs, while an
alarming prevalence of highway robbery and brigandage
bore witness to the absence of all internal police. The
people at large were sunk into a dull and apathetic
despair, waiting against hope for the peace that never
came. The plunder of her neighbours had enabled
France, by extraordinary exertions, to struggle on so
far, but even that resource was, by bad husbandry,
nearly exhausted. Moreover, the process of pillage
612 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1798. had been fertile in demoralisation to all concerned,
from the Directors down to the private soldiers,
though, of course, those that were highest in authority
and lowest in merit had gained most profit, while many
of those that had borne the burden and heat of the day
had gone away empty. The finances of the country
were in such appalling disorder that honest men found
themselves powerless to check the frauds of contractors ;
while the rapacity even of able generals, such as
Massena, and the low greed of such ruffians as Brune,
set the worst possible example to all ranks of the army.
Discipline was very seriously relaxed, and the officers
of every grade dangerously insubordinate. The men,
unclothed, unfed, and unpaid, were sick of war.
Desertion had attained to formidable proportions.
Voluntary recruits were not to be obtained. The
twelve hundred thousand men called out under the
decree of 1793 had been exhausted ; and the Directory
was afraid to raise new levies by compulsion. France
had barely one hundred and fifty thousand soldiers at
her disposal, of whom ten thousand were in Holland,
twenty-five thousand in Switzerland, forty thousand on
the Rhine, and seventy thousand in the Cisalpine and
Roman Republics, all of them scattered among strange
nations, whom oppression and plunder had goaded into
formidable discontent.
Such was the situation when Nelson returned to
Naples, and brought to a chafing and oppressed Con-
tinent the news of the battle of the Nile. His reception
in the city itself was enthusiastic beyond description,
for the fleet at Toulon had long been the dread of the
Neapolitans ; and the fame of Bonaparte was swallowed
up in that of the sailor who had wrecked his enterprise
in the East. But this would have been a small matter
had not there been added to the acclamations of the
populace the adulation of two women, Queen Caroline
and the wife of the British Ambassador, the celebrated
Lady Hamilton. It is hardly surprising that Nelson's
head should have been turned by the flattery of this
CH. xxii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 613
pair. He was but a poor parson's son who had 1798.
lived a life of laborious hardship at sea, and was a
stranger to the ways of Courts. He was a man of
strong passions and emotional temperament, with a
very large share of vanity ; and lastly, he was suffering
from the effects of a severe wound in the head, and
from the reaction following upon feverish anxiety during
his long quest of the French fleet. Returning exhausted
in body and mind, he found himself the idol of a
comely, clever, and unprincipled woman, whose early
profession had trained her to the seduction of men,
and whose lust of notoriety could not but stimulate
her to appropriate to herself the hero of the hour. She
had the advantage also of acting as Nelson's nurse,
the position which sets woman at her strongest in
ascendency over man at his weakest ; and to natural
attention and tenderness in this congenial task she
could add an enthusiastic adoration which was unfortu-
nately only too acceptable to the overwrought sailor.
Through her, too, Nelson gained closer access to a
woman of a type unknown to him, to the daughter of
Maria Theresa, with all her pride of race and station,
high and imperious courage, quick insight and head-
strong impetuosity. She had long since taken the
direction of affairs from the hands of the feeble and
incapable Ferdinand into her own ; and this was in
itself sufficient to attract a man of Nelson's energy and
activity, and to blind him to her shallowness and
unwisdom. Nor can the Queen be blamed if she
welcomed this British Admiral, with the scarred face
and mutilated arm, as the man of action long awaited
and arrived at last, who loathed Jacobins upon principle
as fanatically as she hated them for the murder of her
sister, and whose eternal cry was " Down with the
French."
Nelson, though full of ardour to reap the fruits of
his great victory in good time, was painfully aware that
he possessed no resources for the task. An energetic
General with a thoroughly efficient army was needed,
6 1 4 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1 798. and the British Government had no troops ready. There
was, indeed, the Neapolitan army, whatever it might
be worth, and Mack was on his way to Naples to take
command of it ; but there was still a question whether
it was advisable to launch a force, of which so little was
known, against the French veterans, few though they
were, in the Roman Republic. The Queen was
ardently in favour of the movement; but the King,
who shrank from trouble of any kind, hung back in
timidity and hesitation. All turned really upon the
assistance to be given by Austria, and Thugut's last
assurances seemed to promise that this would not be
Oct. wanting. On the 9th of October Mack appeared and
gave Nelson to understand that, if Naples took the
Oct. 15. offensive, Austria would support her ; and a week later
Nelson, apparently satisfied that Mack would open the
campaign within a fortnight, sailed away to supervise
the blockade of Malta.
Nov. 5. Returning to Naples on the 5th of November,
however, he found that the General had not yet
Nov. 13. marched ; and on the I3th a courier arrived from
Vienna with the intimation that Austria would give
no help to Naples unless France were the aggressor.
The truth was that Thugut was jealous of the lead
that England had taken in Europe, irritated that
Naples should presume to act on her own initiative,
and, above all, annoyed that the Neapolitan Court
should have agreed, as lately she had, to make no
peace with France without England's consent. Such
a covenant, he declared, would make Austria de-
pendent on England in any future negotiations ; and,
though Sir Morton Eden and the Neapolitan am-
bassador protested furiously against this renunciation
of his former promise, he declined altogether to give
way. This discouragement threw back the Court of
Naples into agonising doubt ; and only the rude
intervention of Nelson brought it to a decision.
Mack, after inspecting the Neapolitan troops, declared
them to be the finest in Europe, in which estimate
CH. xxii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 615
Nelson, so far as his knowledge went, was disposed to 1798.
agree ; and the Admiral bluntly told King Ferdinand
that the only alternative to a bold advance was to
" stay quiet and be kicked out of his kingdom." Still
Mack hesitated, until on the 23rd came false news that Nov. 23.
the Austrians had come to blows with the French in
the Grisons ; whereupon, on the 24th, he marched upon Nov. 24.
Rome, while Nelson embarked four thousand men and
sent them with three men-of-war to capture Leghorn.
Despite all his eagerness for Mack to advance, the
Admiral recollected what had happened at Toulon, and
mistrusted the issue ; and he proved to be right. 1 Within
a month the thirty thousand finest troops in the world
had been scattered to the winds by fifteen thousand
French under General Championnet, almost without
the firing of a shot. On the 22nd of December the Dec. 22.
Court of Naples fled to Palermo on board Nelson's
squadron ; on the 2jrd of January 1799 the city
surrendered, after a brave but futile resistance by the
lazzaroni ; and the dominion of King Ferdinand incon-
tinently became the Parthenopcean Republic.
Nelson has been much blamed, and not unreason-
ably, for the precipitation with which he hurried Naples
into war ; yet it may be questioned whether, looking
to Mack's eulogy of the Neapolitan army, he was not
justified in taking the risk. It was all important to
follow up the victory of the Nile while its moral effect
was at its highest ; and there was always the chance
that some initial success might encourage Austria to
immediate action. Switzerland was only waiting to be
rallied in a solid phalanx under the Emperor's banners
against the French ; and though Austria might not yet
be fully equipped for war, it was certain that France
was still more unready and in yet sorer need of time
for preparation. The person chiefly to blame was
Thugut, for the jealousy and hesitation which led him
to neglect so favourable an opportunity.
Meanwhile, however, Stuart had arrived at Lisbon Sept. 18.
1 Nelson's Despatches, iii. 170, 184-185.
VOL. IV C
616 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1798. and completed his preparations with all secrecy for the
attack on Minorca. The first instructions as to the
despatch of the troops to India had been altered, and
a single regiment only, the Fifty-first, had been sent
upon that service. He was therefore able to withdraw
the Twenty-eighth, Forty-second, Fifty-eighth and Nine-
tieth regiments from Gibraltar, and finally embarked
Oct. with them at the end of October. A sloop was sent
forward to cruise off Point Mahon for intelligence, but
returned without having made any discovery of im-
portance ; and Stuart then decided at all risks to hazard
Nov. 7. a disembarkation. Accordingly on the yth of November
the fleet made for the north coast of the island; the
line-of-battleships standing in towards the port of
Fornells to make a diversion, while the transports sailed
a little further to the east and dropped anchor in Adaya
Bay. As the armament approached the shore, signals
were seen flying in all directions ; and it was evident
that, though Stuart had most carefully kept his destina-
tion secret, his coming was no surprise to the Spaniards.
Indeed the General subsequently ascertained that the
authorities at Minorca had been warned of his project
quite five weeks before his arrival, doubtless owing to
the usual leakage from Dundas's office.
However, the boats were at once hoisted out, where-
upon the enemy blew up a small battery at the entrance
to the bay and retired. Eight hundred British soldiers
were soon landed, but were almost immediately
threatened by some two thousand Spanish troops
from different directions. Aided, however, by the
fire of a British frigate, they held their own until the
rest of the force had been disembarked, when the
enemy at nightfall retired. Nearly one hundred
deserters had already come in from a Swiss regiment
which formed part of the Spanish garrison, but they
could give no intelligence as to the enemy's move-
ments, though they stated his strength to be four
thousand men. Stuart was at a loss to know how to
proceed. The country was rugged, mountainous, and
CH. xxn HISTORY OF THE ARMY 617
easily defensible, and the roads so bad that any move- 1798.
ment was extremely difficult. But there were at least
two certain facts, namely, that the principal strongholds
of the enemy, Mahon and Ciudadella, were at opposite
extremities of the island, and that by the occupation of
Mercadal, an elevated pass in its centre, the communi-
cation between them could be cut off. The General Nov. 8.
therefore sent Colonel Thomas Graham with six
hundred men to seize this important point, who by
great exertions reached it very shortly after the main
body of the enemy had traversed it on the way to
Ciudadella. Several Spanish officers and soldiers were
taken prisoners and some small magazines captured ;
and on the following day Stuart brought up his main Nov. 9
body to the same spot, two hundred and fifty blue-
jackets helping, with the usual zeal of their service, to
drag the battalion-guns.
Ascertaining that Mahon had been nearly evacuated
by the enemy, Stuart detached Colonel Paget with three
hundred men to the town, where the garrison of one hun-
dred and sixty men at once surrendered. Thereby the
harbour was opened to the British fleet, several Spanish
stragglers were captured, and a good number of animals
obtained for the transport of the army. Intelligence
was then brought in that the enemy's troops were
entrenching themselves at Ciudadella, whereupon Stuart
recalled Paget and two hundred of his men from Mahon
and resolved to carry the entrenched position on the
night of the I3th. The roads leading to Ciudadella
were two, the northern or old Spanish road, and the
southern, known by the name of a former English
Governor as Kane's road. A detachment under Colonel
MoncriefF was at once sent forward to Ferrerias to
secure this latter line ; and the main body, reinforced
by ninety marines and six light guns from the fleet,
was about to march along the northern road when
news came that four Spanish ships of war were in sight
to westward, evidently steering from Majorca to
Minorca. With noble unselfishness Commodore Duck-
6i8 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1798. worth agreed to sail in chase of them without re-embark-
ing the bluejackets and marines which were serving
ashore ; and Stuart, having advanced on the I2th, came
Nov. 1 3 . on the following day before the enemy's entrenchments,
his own and Moncrieff's troops presenting the appear-
ance of two powerful columns. Overawed by their
aspect, the Spaniards evacuated their entrenchments
and retired within the walls of the town. Waiting till
darkness could conceal his movements, Stuart now
pushed out a second detachment to his right or northern
Nov. 14. flank, and on the next morning drew a little nearer,
apparently strengthened by a third powerful column.
Having not a single heavy gun nor the slightest
material for a siege, he now summoned the Spaniards to
surrender. This, however, they hesitated to do, having
very reasonably some doubt whether they were not
superior in number to the British. Accordingly,
during the night Stuart solemnly threw up two batteries
within eight hundred yards of the town and as solemnly
armed them with three light twelve-pounders and as
many light howitzers ; these weapons, which were really
Horse Artillery-guns, being all that he had been able
Nov. 1 5. to bring with him. Then, when the day broke, he
formed the main body of his troops with great parade
before the enemy's batteries, connecting them cunningly
by picquets with the two detachments upon each flank
so as to present an imposing line, partly, as he said,
real and partly imaginary, four miles in length. The
Spanish commander fired a couple of shots from two
of his heavy guns ; but Stuart, without taking the
slightest notice, invited him to another parley, which a
few hours later resulted in a capitulation of the whole
island upon condition that the garrison should be at
once shipped to the nearest Spanish port.
The total number thus embarked was over thirty-
six hundred of all ranks, not counting those captured
at Mahon and nearly a thousand Swiss, who, having
been taken prisoners from the Austrian Army by the
French in Italy and by them sold to the Spaniards at
CH. xxn HISTORY OF THE ARMY 619
two dollars a head, deserted joyfully to the British. 1 1798.
The numbers of Stuart's troops I have been unable
exactly to ascertain, but they were certainly far inferior
to the enemy's, and probably did not amount to more
than three thousand. The General, in fact, simply
cowed his enemy into surrender by rapidity of move-
ment and confidence of bearing ; and though the feat,
being bloodless, has been absolutely forgotten, it forms
one , of the most striking examples in our history of
the powers of impudence in war. Had the Spaniards
really met the British with serious opposition, Stuart's
difficulties might have been considerable, for the
carriages of the six battalion-guns which accompanied
the expedition were so rotten that one and all of them
broke down before they reached Mahon. Stuart was
naturally furious at this neglect of the Office of
Ordnance, as well as at the carelessness or treachery
which had betrayed the secret of the expedition ; but
it is needless to say that he gained no satisfaction for
his complaints. Such shortcomings in the sixth year
of the war were not calculated to inspire Generals with
confidence. 2
However, the solid fact remained that Minorca had
been taken ; and though for the present its garrison was
too weak to dispense with special protection from the
fleet, the immediate question was to what use it could
most profitably be turned. Stuart wished to increase
the force there at once by bringing over de Roll's
Swiss regiment from Lisbon ; for he was already pre-
paring to enlist the thousand deserters from the Swiss
1 Delavoye's Life of Lord Lyneaoch, pp. 158-159.
2 Stuart to Dundas, 26th September, 2Oth October, i8th
November 1798, and I3th April 1799. The Board of Ordnance,
as usual, evaded the true issue, but Stuart asked for a special enquiry
and sent home a damning report of the condition of the guns, with
the characteristic remark that it was forwarded " not in opposition
to the fact of their being apparently good, nor denying that they
were examined, repaired, and painted in England, but in formal
proof of their being unfit for any sort of service when landed in
Minorca."
620 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1798. regiments of the Spanish garrison into a new battalion,
and hoped that the presence of an actual corps of their
compatriots might attract even more to the British
service. But to this the Court of Lisbon raised strong
objections. The attitude of Spain was still threatening ;
and, though the Portuguese were slowly bracing them-
selves to resistance, the feebleness of their rulers was
such that they shrank from any action without the
support of a few hundred British bayonets. Dundas's
original idea, as has been told, was that Stuart, as soon
as he could collect a sufficient force, should attack
Carthagena ; but the General had already ascertained
that the place was well garrisoned and fortified, and
had added a very necessary and significant warning.
" Let no persuasion of the Navy," he wrote, " lead
you to conceive that its reduction could be accomplished
by a handful of men " words which should have been
painted in large letters on the walls of Dundas's office. 1
J 799- Dundas, however, remained wedded to the project,
conceiving meanwhile that, with a very small reinforce-
ment, Stuart might keep the Spanish coast in such
constant alarm as to prevent any attack upon Portugal.
But at the same time he deplored the weakness of
England through the want of an efficient offensive
army, without, apparently, the slightest consciousness
that he was mainly responsible for it. The Portuguese
had lately asked for a British officer to take command
of their forces ; and Dundas was so anxious that Stuart
should accept the appointment that he actually promised
him two whole regiments of British cavalry, if the
negotiations with the Court of Lisbon should come to
a satisfactory conclusion. " Eighteen hundred British
cavalry would doubtless add much to the strength of
any army," he wrote with ludicrous solemnity, though
he was perfectly aware that the Portuguese host was
no army at all. Nor does he seem to have realised
for a moment that France and not Spain was the enemy
to be attacked, that she had already a line of communi-
1 Stuart to Dundas, I3th December 1798.
CH. xxii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 621
cation three hundred miles long down the peninsula 1799.
of Italy, that this would be increased to five hundred
miles if she invaded Naples, and that the whole length
of it was assailable on either flank through the British
command of the sea. Such an opportunity revived in
him no confidence, stimulated him to no exertion. In
vain had Calvert urged again and again in 1794 that
England must depend upon herself; in vain had Stuart
in October dilated upon the need for spirited military
action to turn Nelson's splendid work to account ; in
vain had he added emphatically, "We must fight to
negotiate with effect." Dundas's only answer was that
" it would be extremely desirable if some well-dis-
ciplined European force could be got somewhere on
the Continent to add to the general strength." Never
was there a more miserable confession of helplessness.
These things should have been thought of before
Nelson was sent to the Mediterranean, and the well-
disciplined force should have been under preparation in
England. 1
Happily Stuart was equal to his situation, even
if Dundas were not. Hearing, in the first days of
January 1799, of the dispersion of Mack's forces Jan.
and of the flight of the Court of Naples to Sicily,
he realised that the value of Minorca was thereby
greatly enhanced, and that Spain would spare no
effort to recover it. He lost, therefore, not a
moment in taking his measures for its defence. In
framing the capitulation, he had been careful to do
away with certain political and religious difficulties
which had embarrassed the British Government during
its former possession of the island, so that he was
on good terms with the inhabitants ; and he had
sent an emissary to make friendly overtures to the
Dey of Algiers, from which country the Minorquins
drew their supplies. Throughout the month of
January the Spaniards pushed forward preparations
at Majorca with unusual energy ; but gradually they
1 Dundas to Stuart, 5th and 24th January 1799.
622 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1799. realised that the recapture of Minorca would be a
long and therefore most hazardous operation. British
troops in those days did not love work with the spade,
but for Stuart they would do anything ; and he
wrote with just pride that the industry of the
Twenty - eighth and Ninetieth had rivalled that of
Caesar's legionaries in separating Helvetia from the
Feb. Jura. By the middle of February he was able to
report that the Spaniards had abandoned all idea of
an immediate attack ; and shortly afterwards there
reached him, after undue delay, a reinforcement of
two battalions, long ago promised by Dundas, from
Ireland. These, the Thirtieth and Eighty-ninth, were
in no very satisfactory condition, two hundred of
them being sick, and two hundred and fifty of the
remainder freshly released from the Irish gaols after
conviction of rebellion and still more serious crimes.
But their arrival was timely, for it enabled Stuart
to act on the side where action was really important,
that of Italy. 1
From the moment when he took the Royal family
of Naples on board his flag-ship, Nelson may be said
to have transferred himself and his force to the service
of King Ferdinand. Affairs to eastward he had left
to the Russian and Turkish Navies, which, however,
instead of joining Captain Hood for the blockade
of the Egyptian coast, had employed themselves in
the recapture of the Ionian Islands. Moreover, to
the great and natural indignation of both Nelson and
St. Vincent, Sir Sidney Smith had arrived in the
Mediterranean at the end of 1798, with instructions
from the Admiralty which appeared to place him in
independent command of the ships upon the Egyptian
seaboard. The mistake was speedily set right, but
it added one more to the many worries which the
situation in general, and his own infatuation in par-
ticular, combined to heap upon Nelson. By the
1 Stuart to Dundas, 12th December 1798; 4th January, loth
and 24th February, 1st March 1799.
CH. xxn HISTORY OF THE ARMY 623
middle of February the apparent spread of republican 1799.
principles through Calabria alarmed him seriously for
the safety of Sicily ; and on the 1 6th of February Feb. 1 6.
he wrote a despairing letter to Stuart, lamenting that
a thousand British troops could not be spared to hold
Messina and so to secure the whole island. This
was a very broad hint ; but Nelson knew Stuart
wel r , held his ability in the very highest estimation,
and was perfectly sure that, if he could spare a couple
of battalions, he would not be deterred from sending
them by the fear of a Spanish attack.
The Admiral did not reckon in vain. Stuart at once
embarked the Thirtieth and Eighty-ninth, and arrived
with them in person at Palermo on the loth of March.
Nelson was quite overcome by his promptitude ; and the
King and Queen of Naples being accustomed, as Stuart
said, to the greatest sloth in the transaction of business,
were amazed at his inflexible determination to proceed
to Messina at once. They begged for time ; but
Nelson and Sir William Hamilton seconded the
General ; and within five hours Stuart had started
for Messina, with full powers in his pocket to com-
mand and take his own measures in the east of
Sicily. The troops proceeded thither by sea, but the
General rode on horseback by land to acquaint him-
self with the people and with the country. He found
the inhabitants to be all that he could wish, a hardy,
laborious race of peasants, well affected to their King,
attached to the English, and detesting the French.
At Messina he formed the like favourable judg-
ment of the townsfolk, every soul of whom assembled
to welcome the British transports and to salute the
General as he rode in at the gates. He seized the
moment of enthusiasm to raise his two battalions to
a strength of two thousand men by the enlistment
of Sicilian recruits, and resolved that this should be
the beginning of a firm connection between Sicily
and Great Britain.
The summons of Nelson and Sir William Hamilton
624 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1 799- had not been the only inducement that had drawn
Stuart to Messina. With deeper insight than the
Admiral, he had marked not only the value of the
harbours of Sicily to the British Navy, but also its
internal resources, its bountiful supplies of food,
and its admirable situation as the headquarters of a
military force to act either in Egypt or in Italy. Free
to strike against either coast of Italy, such a force
could by a diversion either aid the advance of Austrian
troops from Tyrol, on the side of the Adriatic, or
menace the French flank and rear on the side of
Genoa. And in order that it might be free, he
sketched for Sir William Hamilton a masterly plan
for the defence of Sicily by its own people. It was
useless, he urged, to try to teach an undisciplined
peasantry stiff military movements ; the people should
be armed and organised in small groups under their
own leaders for the defence of their own little pro-
perties. An extended line from Palermo to Catania
and Messina should be chosen by the most skilful
officer that could be obtained ; and magazines should
be established at different points to feed smaller
depots nearer the coast. Districts should then be
formed upon this line under experienced partisan-
leaders, who would take charge of the various groups
within their sphere of command, and show the people
how to make the best use of their superior knowledge
of the country. Nor must the authorities believe
that the capture of Palermo or Messina might signify
the loss of the island, for, by the proper use of
guerilla -bands, such a capture might be made the
seat of famine rather than a prelude of further success.
If the enemy should advance inland, the mountains,
torrents and ravines made natural defences, and the
peasantry should never cease to harass him in front,
flanks, and rear. But, above all, the officers selected
to command these people must not be the slaves of
frippery or etiquette, but must content themselves
with showing them the simplest and shortest way
CH. xxii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 625
of destroying the enemy and saving themselves. 1798.
" Essential military operations," he wrote, " are too
often avoided, neglected, and misarranged from the
false idea that they can only be effected by disciplined
troops, whereas in many cases, in many countries,
and particularly in Sicily, the joint efforts and exer-
tions of armed peasants are more likely to prove
effectual." After a hurried visit to Malta, where,
while heartily commending the dispositions of Captain
Ball of the Royal Navy, he warned him not to
be too sanguine in expecting an early surrender,
he left Colonel Thomas Graham in command at
Messina, and returned to Minorca. From thence,
with health utterly broken down, he set out for
England, and in June arrived in London. He had
done more in six weeks to shape a good military
policy for England than the whole of Pitt's Cabinet in
six years. 1
Meanwhile, great events had gone forward among Dec. 29.
the monarchies of Europe. The Tsar, stirred up by an
adroit appeal of Lord Whitworth to place himself at
their head, signed at the end of December 1798 a
treaty with England, whereby, in return for 225,000
paid down and a subsidy of 75,000 a month, he
agreed to furnish forty-five thousand men. Paul also
signed formal alliances with Naples and with Turkey, Jan. 3.
promising to help the latter with twelve ships of the
line and eighty thousand soldiers ; and on the 5th of Jan. 5.
January England joined the Russo-Turkish Alliance,
engaging herself to support Turkey by sea while the
Sultan undertook to set on foot one hundred thousand
men against France. A fortnight later Turkey made Jan. 21.
a league also with the Two Sicilies, pledging herself
to supply ten thousand Albanians to assist in the
expulsion of the French from Naples. In a word,
another coalition was fairly set on foot, though, as
1 Stuart to Dundas, 1st and 2yth March ; 1 3th April ; to Sir
William Hamilton, 28th March 1799. Nelson's Despatches, iii.
267, 289.
626 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1 799- yet, neither of the two great German powers had
joined it. Pitt and Grenville were, as usual, rightly
anxious that Prussia should be included. King
Frederick William the Second had died in November
1797, and there was some reason to hope that under
her new king, Frederick William the Third, she
might be more ready than under his feeble pre-
decessor to take part in the great struggle against
the Revolution. Accordingly, Thomas Grenville was
despatched in December 1798 to Berlin to negotiate
a treaty ; the idea being that the allies should devote
part of their energy to the liberation of Holland ; after
which England, with the consent of the other powers,
would be prepared to grant to Prussia a preponderant
influence in that country, or even to make it over to
her altogether. "'
The Prussian Minister, Haugwitz, was inclined to
join the coalition upon these terms, but he had no great
ascendency over the stupid and cautious Frederick
William ; and there were many influences and accidents
adverse to the success of Grenville's mission. In the
first place, all communication between London and Berlin
was severed for many weeks by a very severe frost which
closed the German Ocean to navigation ; and from this
cause Grenville did not reach the Prussian capital, after
shipwreck and infinite hardship and danger, until late
in February. In the second place, Thugut, still in-
sanely jealous of Prussia, was working with might
and main to make mischief between her and Russia,
and to exclude her from the coalition. Thus the
party which upheld Prussia's old policy of selfish
neutrality had not only time but encouragement to
work upon the feelings of a king who, as Grenville said,
was more weak than wicked ; and the British negotia-
tion had failed even before it was opened. By the
end of March the Russian Government was definitely
informed that Prussia declined an offensive alliance ;
and, though Grenville lingered on at Berlin until June
in the vain hope that some accident might yet induce
CH. xxii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 627
the King to change his mind, the miserable monarch 1799,
still persisted in his most fatal decision. 1
The Tsar was so furious at Prussia's refusal to join
him that, as was usual when his wishes were crossed,
he nearly declared war against her on the spot, and
sent a force of sixty thousand men under General
Nummsen to watch the frontier of Prussian Poland.
Nothing could better have pleased the suspicious
mind of Thugut ; but he too, meanwhile, had felt
the hand of the imperious Paul. Through the whole
of December he had abstained so scrupulously from
any act of hostility, in the hope of wheedling France
into the cession of additional Italian territory to
Austria, that he was actually suspected of a secret
agreement with the Directory. He denied the fact
vigorously ; but no one, not even his former friend,
Sir Morton Eden, would believe so notorious a liar.
At last Paul threatened to recall the auxiliary force
which he had promised to Austria, unless she would put
an end to the empty negotiations, which were still pro-
ceeding at the Congress of Rastadt, and declare
definitely for war. Thus pressed, Thugut at last,
on the 24th of January 1799, gave the declaration
required of him. More than this, he very cleverly
turned his concession to good account by offering to
place the Austrian troops in Italy under Russian com-
mand, if Paul would appoint the veteran Suvorof to be
general-in-chief and would add another corps of Russians
to that which he had already engaged himself to pro-
vide. Paul, greatly flattered, joyfully gave his con-
sent, although Suvorof was at the time in disgrace ;
and thus, though England was still firm in refusing
to advance another penny to Austria until the treaty for
repayment of her former loan should be signed, the new
Coalition became formally complete. On the one side
stood Austria, Russia, Turkey and England ; on the
other, France, Italy, Spain, Holland and Switzerland.
The Coalition, by the mouth of Paul, proclaimed the
1 Sybel, v. 396. Courts and Cabinets of George III. 431-441.
628 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1799. war to be one of principle, and the motive of the
powers to be wholly disinterested ; but this was true
rather in word than deed. Austria still hoped for
acquisitions in Italy ; the Tsar, having been elected
Grand Master of the Knights of Malta, was extremely
covetous of the island ; while England expected not
only to keep some of the colonies captured from
France and Holland, but was decidedly jealous of any
extension of Russian influence in the Mediterranean.
Thus, as always, the Coalition carried within itself the
seeds of its own dissolution.
1798. As to France, her financial condition was nearly
desperate, but her military resources had been improved
since 1798 by the passing of a new law of conscription.
This measure, which had been brought forward first by
General Jourdan in the spring but was not finally
Sept. adopted until September, made military service com-
pulsory for all men between the ages of twenty and
twenty-five, dividing them into five classes, of which
the youngest were called up first. The importance of
this enactment to France in the following years was
incalculable. An autocrat, newly risen to power and
unwilling to risk great unpopularity, might have
hesitated to forge such a weapon ; but Bonaparte was
to find it ready to his hand. When the new law was
first put into execution in the autumn and winter of
1798, the numbers called up were two hundred thousand
men, besides eighteen thousand volunteers, so called, from
Switzerland. But the resistance to the levy was most
violent. In Belgium it was impossible to enforce it
without military coercion ; and the authorities resorted
not only to the shooting of all fugitives, but to the
confiscation of the property of themselves and their
families. In France itself there was like difficulty
both with refractory conscripts and deserters ; and in
La Vendee and Brittany the peasants were only awed
into obedience by a considerable military force. This
was an additional reason why Austria should boldly
have drawn the sword in the autumn of 1798, but, as
CH. xxn HISTORY OF THE ARMY 629
has been seen, she did not ; and, while she stood idly 1799.
by, the troops were levied which very soon were to
humble her to the dusk
Nevertheless, the forces of France at the begin-
ning of 1799, though formidable on paper, were in
actual fact small. On the Upper Rhine, Jourdan and
Bernadotte had fewer than fifty thousand men to
meet ninety thousand under the Archduke Charles ;
Massena in Switzerland had but thirty thousand
French and ten thousand Swiss to face over seventy
thousand Austrians in Vorarlberg and Tyrol ; while in
Italy Scherer could collect only fifty thousand men
on the Adige to make head against over one hundred
thousand Austrians and Russians under Suvorof. It
was not until the first week of March that the French
and Austrians came to open hostilities, but from that
moment events marched rapidly. Massena gained at
first brilliant successes in the Grisons ; but on the 25th
of March Jourdan was defeated by the Archduke at March 2 5.
Stockach, whereupon the beaten army retired to the
west of the Rhine, and its two commanders, Jourdan
and Bernadotte, hurried to Paris to visit their wrath on
the Directory. This retreat uncovered Massena's left
flank, and forced him also to retire ; and the Archduke
was preparing to crush him, when Thugut intervened.
The British Government had succeeded in persuading
Paul to consent, if a good understanding with Prussia
were attained, to remove Nummsen's corps of ob-
servation from the Prussian frontier and to send
it to Switzerland. This sufficed to revive once again
Thugut's suspicions of Prussia ; and he kept the Arch-
duke inactive at Stockach, so that his force could watch
Prussia and Bavaria. The Archduke, in bitter vexa-
tion, asked for leave of absence, but Thugut was
obdurate ; and, since the English insisted that
Nummsen's corps should move to Switzerland, the
stubborn Minister resolved that not an Austrian
should enter that country. Meanwhile, Massena,
having received the command of the army of the
630 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1799. Rhine from the Directory, had withdrawn the greater
part of it to Switzerland, and was now in a position
to make a very formidable resistance. The Archduke,
having resumed command, invaded that country in
defiance of Thugut's orders, and, though unsuccessful
June 2. in an attack upon Massena at Zurich, forced him, none
the less, to retreat. Thereby the Archduke secured
his communications with the Imperial Army of Italy ;
whereupon the Swiss flew to arms, and the work in that
side needed only one vigorous push to complete it.
In Italy, matters had gone even better. Scherer,
having been severely defeated by General Kray at
April 5. Magnano on the 5th of April, resigned his command
April 29. to Moreau ; and, on the 29th, Suvorof, having forced
the passage of the Adda with heavy loss to the enemy,
entered Milan in triumph. He now laid his plans for
beating the French armies in Italy in detail, and for
a joint movement with the Archduke Charles to
annihilate Massena ; and, following up his success,
July 26. drove Moreau back upon Genoa, and captured Turin.
On entering Piedmont, however, he had issued a
proclamation calling upon the Piedmontese to rise and
restore their King, who had been driven by the French
from his old capital to Sardinia. This proceeding
was highly offensive to Thugut, who by no means
wanted the King of Sardinia to receive the whole of
his dominions intact, but to yield Novara to Austria.
Upon the fall of Turin, therefore, orders came to
Suvorof from Vienna to halt and devote himself to the
siege of Mantua, since Switzerland was not to be
invaded until Nummsen's corps should have arrived
there. From that moment all cordial relations between
the Russian General and the Imperial Court were at
an end.
While affairs were thus prospering in the north of
Italy, their aspect was no less favourable in the south,
where Nelson was working with fanatical energy to stir
up a counter-revolution in Naples. At the end of
January Cardinal Ruffo was sent to Calabria to rouse
CH. xxn HISTORY OF THE ARMY 631
the people against the French, and met with complete 1799.
success. Apulia followed Calabria in revolt, and the
French troops were everywhere attacked. Championnet
found himself unwillingly obliged to disperse his force,
with the usual demoralising result to its discipline. He
was recalled by the Directory ; and Macdonald, who suc-
ceeded him on the 4th of March, tried, though in vain, March 4.
to restore order by excessive severity. But the news of
the disasters on the Adige and Adda called him away
to northward ; and on the 2yth of May, after leaving May 27.
garrisons in Capua and Gaeta, he hurried with all
speed, through a population everywhere hostile, to
join Moreau. A month later, having been reinforced June 5.
by a few men from the Russian and Turkish fleets,
Ruffo marched upon Naples, entered the city on the
1 3th, and on the 1 5th drove the enemy to take refuge
in the forts. On the I9th the French and their June 19.
followers surrendered, upon a capitulation which
Nelson declined to recognise ; and, by his order,
the leading democrats were arrested, and Admiral
Caracciolo, a principal man among them, was tried by
court-martial and hanged. Thus, within seven weeks
of Macdonald's departure, the republican edifice erected
by the French in Naples had fallen to the ground.
In the north the success of the Allies continued.
Macdonald was beaten by Suvorof on the Trebbia with
the loss of half his force ; and, on the 2oth of June, June 17-20.
the citadel of Turin surrendered. In all Italy there
was now left to the French no more than Civita
Vecchia, Rome, Ancona, Mantua, Coni, Alessandria,
Tortona, and the Riviera of Genoa. It remained only
for Suvorof to drive the French from the Riviera, and
the work of the Allies would practically be done. But
on the 2ist of June arrived a tactless message from
Vienna, which irritated Suvorof into asking for his
recall ; while simultaneously his Imperial Master, also
hurt by a slight which he deemed to have been put on
him by Austria, countermanded for a time the march
of Nummsen's corps upon Switzerland. And now
VOL. IV D
632 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK
HI
1799. once more Thugut stepped in with his old jealousy of
Prussia. He was anxious above all things to keep the
Archduke's army free to put pressure upon that State,
but he wished at the same time to withdraw the Russians
from Italy, where they might interfere with his plans of
territorial aggrandisement. He therefore proposed to
call the whole of the Russians to Switzerland, and to
place Suvorof in sole command there, while the Arch-
duke should move down the Rhine upon Mainz, and,
supported by British operations in Holland, should call
Belgium to revolt. Paul was delighted with the idea,
and Grenville, on England's behalf, approved it, for
he had a sentimental desire for the liberation of Switzer-
land, and judged Suvorof to be the General best fitted
to achieve it. By the end of July all was arranged
upon this footing, and Thugut hastened to communi-
cate the new plan to the Archduke ; but, unfortunately,
he failed to make him understand that the Austrians
were not to be withdrawn from Switzerland until
the Russians had replaced them. It was bad enough
for this jealous, purblind minister to have delayed the
invasion of France till another campaign ; but it was
criminal to add to this the appalling blunder with
regard to Switzerland.
In France, meanwhile, the news of defeat after
June 1 8. defeat had brought about the expulsion of the old
Directory and the appointment of a new one ; where-
upon measures were taken for stricter enforcement of
the conscription. Under the energetic impulse of
Bernadotte, the new Minister of War, thirty thousand
men were hastily collected to form an army of the Alps,
and fifty thousand more to create a new army of the
Rhine ; but, strangely enough, Italy was allowed to
take care of itself, and Massena in Switzerland was
ignored. In Italy, however, the fall of Alessandria and
Mantua on the 25th and 29th of July again released
Suvorof for active operations ; and on the 1 5th of
Aug. 15. August he utterly defeated the army of Italy, now
under General Joubert, at Novi. He was about to
CH. xxii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 633
follow up his victory, which would probably have given 1799.
him peaceable possession of Genoa, when he was again
distracted by the political quarrels of the Allied powers.
Thugut still thirsted for Italian territory ; and, on the
1 6th of August, orders came to Suvorof from Vienna Aug. 16.
for eight thousand Austrian troops to be detached to
Tuscany, for another Austrian corps under General
Klenau to join them there from the Riviera, and for
Suvorof himself to take Tortona. Maddened by this
interference, the Russian General not only suspended
all operations, but allowed Klenau to advance un-
supported against the French in the Riviera, and to
be defeated by their superior numbers. However, the
new plan of campaign gave him full excuse for leaving
Genoa untouched, and taking his whole force to
Switzerland ; though he did not fail to complain bitterly
to his master of the Austrians, and to nurse a bitter
grudge against them himself.
Nor was this the only quarter in which discord
showed itself among the Allies. All Italy had risen
against the French in rear of Suvorof as he advanced ;
but the people were by no means inclined to welcome
the Austrians as their new masters. The Neapolitan
dominions were in such a state of anarchy, owing to
the armed but undisciplined bands that had accom-
plished the counter-revolution, that the restoration of
order and of the old monarchy by some external force
had become urgently necessary. But it was Suvorof
and not an Austrian general who was entreated to
furnish and to lead that force. At the beginning of
August, therefore, the ruling powers at Naples be-
thought them to turn the superfluous energy of their
armed men against Rome and Civita Vecchia, where
the French garrisons were still present and formidable,
in the hope that the occupation of these two places
would exclude the detested Austrians.
For help in this project they turned, of course, to
Nelson, whose infatuation for Lady Hamilton and the
Queen of Naples had by this time sadly blunted his
634 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1799. sense of duty and discipline. The Admiral grasped
eagerly at the project, for he had never forgiven the
Austrians for not acting in support of Mack's advance
in 1798, and was therefore the more zealous to benefit
Naples at their expense. But this line of action
brought him also into direct conflict with the wishes
of Russia. The Tsar was anxious for the force under
Nelson's control to act with greater energy against
Malta ; but the Admiral absolutely forbade the Russian
fleet to take any part in the blockade. He desired
Malta to be surrendered to himself, not from any sense
of its value to England, but because he wished to
deliver it to the King of Naples. He was ready to
employ the Russian fleet to aid in the recapture of
Rome and Civita Vecchia ; but here again he had
no idea of taking those places for any one but King
Ferdinand. In his impatience to anticipate both
Austrians and Russians, he wrote to General Sir James
Erskine at Minorca, adjuring him to spare him a large
part of his garrison for two months. " The Roman
State," he wrote, " with insurrections and daily murders
is still under the French flag, with not more than
fifteen hundred regulars in the whole state, except
Ancona. In Civita Vecchia are about a thousand
regulars, with the whole country against them ; but
such mobs are going about plundering that they (that
alone being their object) are sometimes good Republicans
and sometimes their bitter enemies. ... If you can
spare from the garrison of Minorca twelve hundred
good men for two months for the taking possession of
Civita Vecchia and Rome, with my life I will answer
for the success of the expedition."
To this incoherent effusion Erskine answered with
quiet good sense. After first stating the danger of his
own position at Minorca owing to the absence of a
squadron, he passed to the difficulties of transport and
supply attending such an expedition, and the notorious
unhealthiness of Civita Vecchia at that season of the
year. He then urged the general objection that twelve
CH. xxn HISTORY OF THE ARMY 635
hundred men would be too few for an enterprise which 1799.
was to begin with the reduction of a regular fortress
and end with a march through a country full of armed
mobs. What proportion (he asked) of the twelve
hundred would be left for this last dangerous duty,
when weakened by casualties and by detachments left
in captured places ? Again, assuming the success of the
expedition against Civita Vecchia and Rome, how were
those places to be garrisoned, if the British troops
were wanted for two months only ? To put down the
anarchy in the Roman States was a task beyond the
power of any but a regular armed force ; and a single
brigade would never suffice for the defence of an ex-
tensive district where detachments must be distributed
far and wide. In fact, though Erskine did not put
the matter so crudely, twelve hundred men employed
as the Admiral desired might easily have entered the
Roman States, but would never have returned from them.
To this Nelson made no reply, for indeed there was no
reply to be made. The latest of his biographers makes
it a merit in him that he uttered no word of dissatisfac-
tion with Erskine on account of his refusal to comply
with his request. The truth is that Erskine's firmness
saved him from adding one more to the many follies
which he had already committed. It was already too
much that he had hazarded the safety of Minorca, and
had sacrificed alike obedience to his commanding officer,
the general service of England and her good relations
with her allies, for the sake of a couple of worthless
women. 1
Altogether the relations of the coalesced powers
were becoming everywhere strained, and by the end
of the autumn the tension had reached the breaking
point. The causes that parted Russia from England
1 Erskine to Dundas (enclosing Nelson's and Sir W. Hamilton's
letters of 29th August and his reply of 5th September), $th
September 1799. Mahan, Life of Nelson, 409. See also for
Nelson's jealousy of Russia, ibid. p. 357, and of Austria also,
p. 408. Nelson's Despatches, iii. 452.
636 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1799. shall appear in the chapters next following. Those
that severed her from Austria must now be very
Aug. briefly summarised. At the end of August news
reached the Archduke Charles that the French had
again crossed the Rhine ; whereupon, pursuant to his
orders, he drew all his troops from Switzerland to
meet them. Thugut meanwhile was jubilant. He
opened his mind to Lord Minto, the new ambassador
at Vienna, revealing that Austria designed to take
Piedmont and part of Savoy, and to give Belgium to
the King of Sardinia in exchange ; a project which
Grenville declined to entertain for a moment. Thugut
then assumed a haughty tone to the Tsar, who was
already irritated to the last degree against Austria,
and informed him that, if he would not support her
in her claims to territory in Italy, the Emperor would
reopen the whole question of the partition of Poland.
As usual, he was dividing the spoil before beating the
enemy, or even taking the simplest precautions to beat
him ; and meanwhile he was overtaken by the Nemesis
of his previous blunder. In Switzerland a large pro-
portion of the Austrian force was withdrawn before
the Russians had arrived to replace them ; and in
September, Massena, finding an inferior force before
him, took the offensive with a vigour that wrecked
Suvorof's plans. The Russian General himself, on
crossing the pass of St. Gothard, found himself isolated,
and only by superhuman efforts and very heavy loss
contrived to extricate his army. He then refused to
act further in co-operation with the Austrians ; and
thus the campaign ended with the triumph of the
French, and with discord twenty-fold intensified between
Austria and Russia.
Oct. 9. On the 9th of October, the very day upon which
Suvorof ended his campaign, Napoleon Bonaparte
landed in France, having successfully eluded the British
cruisers on the coast of Egypt. Since the battle of the
Nile he had passed through many troubles. First
there had been a serious insurrection at Cairo on the
CH. xxn HISTORY OF THE ARMY 637
2 ist of October, 1798, which he had repressed with his 1799.
usual ruthless severity ; and in December there had
come the news that a large Turkish force was advancing
through Syria under Djezzar Pasha to attack him by
land, while another expedition was assembling at
Rhodes to descend upon Egypt by sea. He at once
decided to invade Syria, with the double object of
crushing Djezzar and of depriving the British cruisers
of their supplies by occupation of the ports. It seems
also that he contemplated the possibility of still wider
operations, for he wrote at this time to Tippoo Sahib, Jan. 25.
reporting his arrival on the shores of the Red Sea with
an innumerable and invincible army, and requesting
him to send a trustworthy messenger to Suez to
concert measures for the overthrow of the British in
India. 1 His march through Syria was triumphantly
victorious until he reached Acre, the best port and
fortress on the coast, where he met with his old enemy,
the British men-of-war, under the command of Sidney
Smith. On the i8th of March Smith captured the March 1 8.
French siege-train, which was travelling by sea ; and
the guns thus obtained enabled him, by the very
skilful help of Phelippeaux, a French royalist officer
of Engineers, to plan and maintain the defence of Acre.
The siege lasted nine weeks, in the course of which
period Napoleon utterly defeated a Turkish army of April 15.
relief at Mount Tabor ; but his assaults were one and
all beaten off by the garrison of Turks and British
blue -jackets. Finally, on the 2oth he was fain to April 20.
retreat, having lost some five thousand men killed,
wounded, and plague-stricken before Acre.
His failure banished not only his visionary dreams
of Oriental conquest, but even the still dearer hope,
which he had long cherished, of an early return to
France. It is true that a week before his retreat the
British naval commanders had been thrown into con-
sternation by the escape of Admiral Bruix's fleet from
Brest, and by its appearance in the Mediterranean at a
1 Correspondence de Napoleon , v. 278.
638 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1799. moment when the British squadrons were scattered in
all directions. But Bruix made no use of his oppor-
tunity ; and indeed it is doubtful whether his cruise was
designed for the relief of the French force in Egypt
at all. Moreover, it did not better suit Bonaparte
to return to France as one rescued from peril by
others than as a defeated General. Fortune, however,
July 10. was kind to him, for on the loth of July a large body
of Turks from Rhodes landed at Aboukir Bay under
the guns of the British and Turkish fleets, occupied
July 25. the fort and entrenched themselves. On the 25th he
attacked this force and, after a sharp struggle, killed or
captured every man. Such a victory was sufficient to
bring him back to France with honour ; and the latest
news from Europe, which he obtained by adroitly
playing on the vanity and indiscretion of Sidney Smith,
showed him that for his own sake he could not return too
Aug. 22. soon. He embarked, therefore, by stealth on the 22nd
of August, without a word to his army, leaving written
orders to General Kleber to command in his stead.
Nelson had always vowed that not a ship nor a
man of Bonaparte's expedition should ever return to
France, and the probability is that, if his orders had
been obeyed by Sidney Smith, his vow would have
been fulfilled. Whether or not Bonaparte was justified
in quitting his army, after the destruction of one-half
of it in useless enterprises, is a question which does not
concern us here. The fact remains that he did desert
it like a thief in the night, after his victory over the
Turks at Aboukir. But if a British force had been
brought to Sicily, as Charles Stuart had urged, and had
acted in concert with those Turks, there was every
reasonable probability that Bonaparte would have been
defeated, his army and himself made prisoners, and his
reputation so far damaged that France would never have
accepted him for a master. There was a British force
at disposal for the task, had the British Ministry chosen
to employ it ; but, as must now be told, it was diverted
to unprofitable operations in a different quarter.
CHAPTER XXIII
IT has already been related that, by the end of the year 1799.
1797, the ordinary sources for the supply of recruits
had failed. This was owing not a little to mismanage-
ment, but partly also to the rapid development of the
manufacturing industry in England through the removal
of all competition in France and the countries which had
been overrun by the armies of the Revolution. Since
the voluntary system had broken down, it followed
necessarily that a compulsory system must be sub-
stituted for it. The ballot for the Militia provided
a form of compulsion for service at home, and the only
resource was to convert the Militia if possible into a
fountain of recruits for service abroad. The first step
was taken in this direction in January 1798, when an
Act was passed to enable any person duly appointed
by the Commander-in-chief to enlist a certain pro-
portion of militiamen for an appointed number of
regiments of the Line ; the proportion not to exceed
one-fifth of the Supplementary Militia in any county,
and the total number enlisted to be limited to ten
thousand men. This, however, in the circumstances
of the time, was a measure adopted rather for the
reinforcement of garrisons in Ireland and elsewhere
than for any other service. No particular inducements
were offered to attract recruits from the Militia ; no
exemption from the dreaded and detested service in the
West Indies was promised ; and men were shy of
condemning themselves to death by yellow fever.
Only in Norfolk did the Supplementary Militia come
639
640 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1799. forward in numbers to fill the ranks of its county
regiment, the Ninth Foot ; and it was rewarded for
its patriotism by a gratuity which raised the bounty
granted to the men to ten guineas apiece. Elsewhere
the Lords-Lieutenant set their faces against the scheme ;
and it was a total failure. 1
After the suppression of the Irish rebellion and the
victory of the Nile, however, all danger of invasion
disappeared ; and the Ministers, rightly deciding to
reassume the offensive, found themselves crippled by the
want of a striking force. They had no hope of raising
one by the time-honoured methods which had served,
though only indifferently well, for the past century ;
and yet without such a force it was practically hopeless
to attempt to bring the war to a satisfactory close.
There was, however, one encouraging sign. From
the 9th of January 1799 onwards there came from
Ireland a succession of offers from British Fencible
Regiments and Irish Militia to serve abroad ; and it
was not the least satisfactory feature in these offers
that the great majority emanated originally not from
the officers but from the men. In the first six months
of 1799 eleven battalions of Fencible Infantry, two
regiments of Fencible Cavalry and seven battalions
of Irish Militia volunteered for service in any part of
Europe ; seven other battalions of Irish Militia volun-
teered to serve in Great Britain ; and one battalion
of Militia, one of Fencibles and two regiments of
Fencible Cavalry nobly offered to go wherever the
King might choose to send them. The condition,
made by so many corps, that their wanderings should
be confined to Europe, showed plainly that they would
have nothing to do with the West Indies, and gave
Ministers a valuable hint for future guidance. Mean-
while, however, time was passing, and the Govern-
ment's preparations for the united movement of Europe
to crush France had been confined so far entirely to
1 C.C.L.B., A.G. to Sir Charles Grey, 8th June 1798 ; ibid.
22nd and 2$th June.
CH. xxiii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 641
the sphere of diplomacy. As has already been told, 1799.
Thomas Grenville's mission to Berlin had proved
abortive, King Frederick William having signified in
May his definite refusal to join the Coalition. But
early in June the Government received intelligence
that Prussia might at any moment call upon France
to evacuate Holland upon pain of an immediate in-
vasion ; in which case she would certainly summon
the English to co-operate with their fleet and to seize
the island of Walcheren. Sir Ralph Abercromby was
thereupon summoned, by a letter of the 8th of June,
from Edinburgh, to take command of the troops
which were to be held ready for this purpose. More-
over, Lord Grenville's weapons of persuasion were not
yet exhausted ; for in that same month he flattered the
Tsar's vanity by proposing a joint expedition of Russia
and England to recover Holland, hoping that Prussia,
whose prize that country was designed to be, might
thereby be still further tempted to move. Paul
readily accepted the proposal ; and on the 22nd of June 22.
June a treaty was signed whereby England engaged
herself to provide thirty thousand men, and to pay
for eighteen thousand Russians more for the recapture
of Holland.
It is extraordinary that Pitt should so boldly have
promised thirty thousand men for this expedition, when
he knew that he had not more than ten thousand ready
to his hand. The means for supplying them had, how-
ever, been already considered ; and on the I2th of July July 12.
an Act was passed to reduce the numbers of the Militia
in all counties, as could now safely be done, and to
increase the Army by allowing militiamen to enlist in
certain regular regiments. 1 It was stipulated that these
regiments should not serve out of Europe during the
continuance of the war and for six months after, nor in
any case until the lapse of five years ; that the men
1 The regiments named were the 4th, 5th, gth, lyth, 2Oth, 3ist,
35th, 4oth, 42nd, 46th, 52nd, 62nd, 63rd, 82nd. Circular of
Commander-in-chief, I7th July 1799. Grey Papers.
642 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1799. could choose their own corps and not be drafted from
them against their will ; and that they should receive a
bounty of ten pounds. Any man volunteering for
service on these terms was entitled to discharge from
the Militia, provided that the number of such volun-
teers did not exceed one-fourth of the full quota of
each county. The King was further empowered to
disembody the Supplementary Militia or any part of
it, in which case the men so discharged might enlist in
the regulars. If any man did so voluntarily, no ballot
was to be held to fill his place, though if he failed to
do so he might be recalled to the Militia. Such was
the first enactment in the direction of compulsory
service in England, passed, as has been said, on the
1 2th of July in order to make up a force which was to
take the field in September. The Ministers, after all
the bitter experience of the past six years, had not yet
learned the difference between an army and an assembly
of men in red coats.
July. Meanwhile, such few regiments as were in some
degree fit for service were collected together on the
Kentish coast ; and their numbers were made up to
some ten thousand men by volunteers, attracted from
other battalions by a bounty of a guinea and a half. 1
Sir Ralph Abercromby assumed command of this
force ; and upon him devolved the duty of planning
the campaign in concert with the strategists of the
Cabinet, Pitt and Dundas, both of whom took up
their residence for the time at Walmer Castle.
The avowed object of the expedition was clear
enough, namely, the reconquest of Holland north
of the Waal and the restoration of its independ-
ence under the House of Orange ; but how those
objects were to be attained was another question, for
the best of the campaigning season was already far
spent. Abercromby reviewed the situation and quickly
came to a conclusion. The most advantageous point
of attack, in the abstract, was undoubtedly the mouth
1 C.C.L.B. Circular of Commander-in-chief, nth July 1799.
CK. xxiii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 643
of the Meuse, for from thence the British could take 1799.
in rear the lines of the Yssel and of the Vecht, which July-
defended Holland against attack from the south and
east ; and the conquest of that province, thus made
easy, would probably lead to the submission of the
Dutch Netherlands. But the two mouths of the Maas
were barred, the northern channel by the fortress of
Brielle, the southern by the fortress of Helvoetsluys,
both of them situated on the island of Voorne, which
lies between the two channels. If a sufficient force
were provided to attack Voorne and effect a landing
on the mainland simultaneously, then all might be
well ; but, if no disembarkation could be accomplished
without previously gaining possession of Voorne, then
the operation would be hazardous ; for the enemy
could collect his force while the British were engaged
with the sieges of Brielle and Helvoetsluys, and throw
grave difficulties in their way. Finally, Abercromby
expressed a decided opinion that no attempt should
be made upon Holland until the first division of the
Russian contingent was on the spot and ready to co-
operate in the field. 1
This blunt and practical opinion was by no means
to the taste of Pitt, who was eager for action ; and it
was all the less so since the Russians were not expected
until the end of August. A variety of schemes was
now put forward, the first of them being a return to the
original idea of seizing Walcheren. Abercromby freely
conceded that this island would be most valuable, if
the Prussians crossed the Rhine and Meuse and
penetrated into Brabant ; but without Prussia's co-
operation it was useless to Great Britain, would require
a large garrison and a squadron to protect it, and was,
moreover, extremely unhealthy. It was then proposed
that the force should land at Scheveningen, a few miles
to north of the Hague, on an open beach where ships
would be unsafe in a strong west wind, and where the
troops, after disembarkation, would find the whole
i Memo, of Abercromby, 6th July 1799.
644 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1 799. army of Holland upon their left flank and rear. This
J ul y- plan was summarily dismissed by Abercromby. Another
idea was to occupy Walcheren, Goree, an island im-
mediately south of Voorne, and Ameland, a spit of
sand off the north coast of Friesland, to support an
insurrection. Abercromby, suppressing his contempt,
declared quietly that such support would be worthless.
The next suggestion was to land fifteen thousand men
from the Ems on the shore of Groningen. This being
the district where the feeling for the house of Orange
and against the French was strongest, the plan had no
doubt something to commend it. It was very probable
that the force might succeed in recovering Groningen,
Overyssel and part of Friesland and Drenthe ; but,
before it could proceed to attack the Western Provinces,
it must necessarily capture the fortress of Koevorden,
on the Vecht, which could hardly be accomplished
before the winter set in. In that case there would be
a danger not only lest the troops should perish of cold,
but also lest communication with England should be
interrupted by ice, which would be absolutely fatal to
the expedition.
Abercromby therefore pronounced decidedly in
favour of the attack on the Maas as the only really
serviceable plan, whether the Prussians should co-
operate or not. For the success of the invasion in
that quarter, however, the possession of Voorne was
a preliminary that could not be dispensed with ; and
the capture of the island promised to be an extremely
difficult and hazardous operation, for the water on
the western shore was too shallow to admit ships large
enough either to cover a disembarkation or to carry
materials for a siege. Abercromby did not conceal
these difficulties, which he evidently judged to be
insuperable by the force that was to be employed ;
and he did not dissemble his opinion that the object of
the whole expedition was not worth the risk. Pitt,
who had evidently not forgotten the part played by
Abercromby in Ireland, became more and more
CH. xxiii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 645
impatient. " There are some people who have pleasure 1 799.
in opposing whatever is proposed," he remarked upon July-
one occasion; but Abercromby with quiet dignity
suffered this petulant rudeness to pass unnoticed, and
continued to insist upon his opinion.
The root of the whole matter was that Pitt was
about to commit again the old, old blunder of invading
a country with an inadequate force, relying upon an
insurrection of the inhabitants to do the work which
could really be accomplished only by an army. Herein
strangely enough he was abetted by Grenville, usually
the least sanguine of men, who for some reason had
formed extravagant hopes of Prussian assistance and
of an immediate desertion of the Dutch troops from
the French service to the British. "The operation
will be rather a counter-revolution than a conquest,"
he wrote to Dundas. " Make your preparations to
^>reoccupy the Netherlands." Dundas, however, for
once took a wise and sober view of the situation.
" Unless the Dutch co-operate with us cordially and
actively," he answered, " I do not think it possible to
do as much by mere force of arms in this campaign as
we flatter ourselves. I cannot forget the American war
and the disappointment of our hopes." But, in spite
of this belated recollection of past experience, he yielded
to Grenville, whose ideas he knew to be shared by
Pitt, and consented to write to Abercromby that he
was going out, not to conquer a country, but to aid a
counter-revolution ready to burst out in it. More
than this, though he himself had no faith in these
words, he added that they were meant to serve for
Abercromby's justification in case "he should be
led to dash more than military rules and tactics
would warrant." Thus weakly and against his better
judgment did Dundas suffer his colleagues to embark
upon a dangerous enterprise upon the strength
of a mere phrase. Moreover, not content with
choosing one loose corner-stone upon which to build
the conduct of a campaign, Pitt must needs add a
646 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1799. second in the shape of a visionary Prussian Army;
J ul 7- not realising, in his intense ignorance of war and of
the world at large, that an edifice balanced between
two such tottering foundations must inevitably collapse.
Abercromby had not fought through the campaigns
of 1793 and 1794 without learning something both
of the Dutch and of the Prussians ; and in this in-
stance, as formerly in Ireland, his political as well as
his military judgment was far sounder than that of
Ministers. 1
Nor were these Abercromby's only difficulties, for
he was anything but satisfied with the preparations for
his force. His troops, even on the ist of August,
were far short of their estimated strength. The volun-
teers which were arrived or arriving to fill his
battalions needed some days for their equipment, and
three of his regiments were judged unfit for immediate
service. The naval preparations were behindhand ;
the tonnage required for the embarkation had not yet
been obtained ; and the naval force itself eight ships
of sixty -four or fewer guns, and five frigates was
insufficient to carry the number of flat-boats required
for disembarkation. Above all, he was uneasy upon
the question of transport, no sufficient provision of
horses having been made even for the large train of
artillery which he had rightly judged to be essential for
such operations as were enjoined upon him. " The
British troops want the means of conveyance for
artillery, sick, baggage and provisions," he wrote at
the end of July, " and you know we have not a foot
on the Continent till we acquire it. I hope it is not
a crime to state such facts." A return of the Russian
troops, with an enormous train of waggons, gave him
the text for a second discourse upon the same subject
two days later. " The Emperor of Russia may make
a general into a private man by his fiat, but he cannot
1 Grenville to Dundas, 3Oth July ; Dundas to Grenville, 29th
and 3 ist July 1799. Dropmore MSS. Abercromby's Memo., zoth
July 1799. Dunfermline's Life of Abercromby, 140-149.
CH. xxin HISTORY OF THE ARMY 647
make his army march without their baggage. It is 1799.
only in a free country like ours that a Minister has Aug.
absolute power over an army. We are too inconsider-
able to resist. ... It is self-evident that an army is
not a machine that can move of itself ; it must have
the means of moving. ... As our numbers increase
so must our arrangements ; and rest assured that an
army cannot move without horses and waggons." In
his anxiety Abercromby represented the matter to the
Duke of York, who brought it before Pitt and received
from him full powers, that is to say, full powers to
make his requisition to the Treasury and to hope that
it might be timely fulfilled. But Abercromby still
retained his doubts whether the importance of the
question was really understood by the Government ;
and he was right. 1
Dundas was so far impressed by Abercromby's
representations as to the insufficiency of his numbers
that he inclined for a moment to delay the expedition
unless a larger force could be despatched with him.
But political considerations, both domestic and foreign,
prompted him, according to his own account, to urge
the departure of the first division of the army as soon
as possible ; and on the 3rd of August he issued to Aug. 3.
Abercromby his instructions. Herein, ignoring the
General* s strong recommendation that nothing should
be done in Holland until the arrival of the Russians,
he declared it to be expedient and necessary for divers
unspecified reasons, that the expeditionary force should
sail in several divisions, of which Abercromby's ten
thousand men had been appointed to be the first. The
duty assigned to it was to secure on the mainland of
the United Provinces a safe rendezvous and a favourable
position for future operations, which of course should
permit of free communication with England. With this
object the instructions suggested the capture of Goree
and Overflakkee to south of Voorne, of Rosenburg to
1 Abercromby to Huskisson, 29th July and 1st, 3rd, 4th August
1798.
VOL. IV E
648 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1 799. north of it, and of Voorne itself, as a means towards
Au &- obtaining some place on the mainland where reinforce-
ments could land without opposition, and where Aber-
cromby could maintain himself until their arrival.
Maassluis, Schiedam, Rotterdam and Dordrecht were
named as places suitable for the purpose ; and a rein-
forcement of four thousand British troops was promised
to him immediately upon the capture of any one of
them. If, on the other hand, he should secure the
islands above named but fail to establish himself on the
mainland, the reinforcements would be delayed until
the arrival of the Russians should enable them to
proceed in great strength. Dundas further hinted
that the operations might be furthered by naval
diversions both northward towards the Texel and
southward about Zealand ; and to this end he en-
closed a proclamation and an address from the Prince
of Orange, which were to be published as earnest of
England's honourable intentions. But he was careful
to add that Abercromby was at liberty to abandon
these projects altogether if, on arrival in the Meuse, he
should think them impracticable or unduly hazardous
or costly. 1
All this was in the highest degree unsatisfactory,
for there seemed every probability that the expedition
would reduce itself to a voyage to the Meuse and back
again. Goree and Overflakkee had been suggested as
landing-places, apparently, by some Dutch refugees of
the Orange party ; but not one of them could give
the slightest intelligence respecting these islands. In
fact, the only information which Abercromby could
obtain to guide him was that of a Dutch prisoner of
war. On the 6th of August Dundas, Abercromby,
and the Naval Commandant, Vice- Admiral Mitchell,
met in council to talk over the matter, with the help
of Captain Flyn of the Royal Navy and a foreign
officer, both of whom were supposed to be well
acquainted with the navigation of the Meuse. Aber-
1 Dundas to Abercomby, 3rd August 1799.
CH. xxin HISTORY OF THE ARMY 649
cromby was very ill pleased with the result. The 1799.
Admiral talked blindly of the fleet forcing its way Au S-
through every obstacle ; while Flyn was cautious, and
afraid of committing himself. Ultimately, it was
agreed that to gain possession of Voorne the island of
Rosenburg must first be taken, though it was plain
that, from the difficulties of navigation and other
causes, the success of the operation must be most
precarious.
At this stage matters remained until the loth of Aug. 10.
August, when Abercromby again complained of his
want of intelligence, and warned the Government
against building too much on the exertions of the
Orange party. His letter was crossed by a fresh set
of instructions. Dundas, though somewhat infected
by the sanguine hopes of Pitt and Grenville, still mis-
trusted the success of the operations already contem-
plated, and was unwilling to let the General sail without
offering him a further choice of alternative enterprises.
He, therefore, directed him still to make the capture
of Goree his first business, and, after effecting it, to
proceed to the attack of Voorne ; but, if this should
prove to be impracticable, he urged upon him, as
the object next in importance, to obtain possession
of Texel Island and the Helder at the extreme north
of Holland. Should this operation likewise prove
impracticable, he was to enter the Ems, disembark in
the neighbourhood of Delfzyl, and take possession of
Groningen, Friesland and Drenthe. But the capture
of the Helder was set down as far more desirable, if it
could be attained, as securing alike a footing in
Holland, the navigation of the Zuider Zee, and
probably the control of the Dutch fleet at the Texel.
None the less, it was urged as essential that troops
should, if possible, be left at Goree, since it was upon
the presence of such a force that the loyal inhabitants
had "probably" built their plans of co-operation.
Finally, after recounting all these alternatives, the
instructions left it to the discretion of the General
650 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1799. and Admiral to do practically whatever they might
Aug. think best for the King's service. 1
It has been judged necessary to set forth all these
orders at some length, so as to show the extreme
vagueness and indecision of the Ministers' intentions
in despatching this expedition. They professed to
count upon a rising of the Dutch, yet could give the
General no certain intelligence of the designs of the
insurgents. They had, when seeking Abercromby' s
advice, made the co-operation of a Prussian army a
principal factor for the guidance of his calculation ;
yet that factor vanished altogether before the expedi-
tion put to sea. Finally, they hurried the General
and his ten thousand men out of England with no
definite plan of action, but merely with a hazy pur-
pose that he should go to Holland and do something.
Aug. 13. Abercromby sailed accordingly on the I3th of August,
having evidently already made up his mind to go to
Aug. 14. the Helder. On the following day he announced his
intention to Dundas, saying that an attack on the
Maas was absolutely out of the question, and that he
abandoned it the more readily since the persistence of
Prussia in her neutrality had removed the principal
reason for advocating it. Dundas at once approved
cordially of his decision, though he made no effort to
explain why the Government had saddled the General
with a responsibility which it ought to have taken
upon itself. In his usual breezy fashion he assumed
that Abercromby's sphere of attack embraced not only
the Helder itself, but Texel Island and the mainland
south of the Helder as far as Haarlem, or, in other
words, a coast -line of from fifty to sixty miles ;
and already he had visions of an early fall of
Amsterdam. 2
1 Dundas to Abercromby, Abercromby to Huskisson, loth
August 1799 ; Dundas to Grenville, 3rd and nth August. Drop-
more MSS.
2 Abercromby to Dundas, I4th August, three letters ; Dundas to
Abercromby, i6th August 1799.
CH. xxm HISTORY OF THE ARMY 651
Bad luck, however, dogged the expedition from the 1799.
very beginning. The fleet was overtaken by a
westerly gale of unusual violence, which was ominously
noted by Abercromby as certain to delay the arrival
of the Russians. Happily, the transports were able to
keep company, thanks to bright moonlight, and on the
2ist the whole armament approached the coast of the Aug. 21.
Texel. Preparations were made for disembarkation,
but on the next day a second gale forced every sail
again to sea; nor was it till the 26th that the trans- Aug. 26.
ports could be anchored in the stations appointed for
them opposite the shore a little to the south of the
Helder, between Kycksduin and Kallantzoog. Water
and provisions were already so short in the fleet that,
had not the gale moderated on the 26th, Abercromby
and Mitchell had determined to abandon the attempt
on the Helder and to sail for the Ems. However,
at two o'clock on the next morning, the signal was Aug. 27.
made to prepare for disembarkation, though the surf
was still high, and the enemy, having had sight of the
fleet for six days past, could not have failed to make
preparations for defence. Moreover, owing to his
ignorance of the precise duty required of him by the
Government, Abercromby had been unable to arrange
every detail of his attack before sailing, as he had
wished ; and, since the Ministers had failed to provide
the flat-bottomed boats for which he had asked, he
was obliged to rely upon the boats of the men-of-war
only, which could not convey more than three thousand
troops at a time. Lastly, the operation of disembark-
ing a force in presence of an enemy was strange to the
Navy, whose officers hardly understood the importance
of keeping companies and battalions together, and of
landing them in the order which they were to preserve
on shore.
In such discouraging circumstances did Abercromby
approach his adventure. Behind him were the orders
of an ignorant and negligent Cabinet ; before him a
long row of sand-hills concealing he knew not what
652 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK
1799. enemy behind them. North Holland is indeed no
Au - ordinary country. Lying below the level of the sea,
it is preserved, about its northern extremity, only by
a gigantic dyke some five miles in length from inunda-
tion and destruction by the German Ocean. Along
the western coast the part of this dyke is played by a
chain of sand-dunes, varying from half a mile to four
miles in width, which runs, with but a single break,
all the way along the shore from the Helder to the
mouth of the Maas. The break in question occurs
about fifteen miles south of the Helder at Petten, and
extends for some three miles southward to Kamp,
between which points the waves are shut out by
another huge dyke. From Petten for some five
miles northward the dunes are high, and gradually
widen out from a breadth of half a mile to a mile
and a half at Kallantzoog. North of that point they
suddenly contract once more to a breadth of eight
hundred to a thousand yards, and, rapidly decreasing in
height, present, opposite to the village of Groete Keten,
an absolute gap in the barrier of sand. At this point
the beach is wide, and the outer bank of the dunes little
more than ten feet high, so that from the main-top of
a frigate a man could obtain a narrow glimpse of the
reclaimed fen called the plain of North Holland.
The nature of that plain is well known to travellers.
To the eye a perfectly open expanse of meadow land,
it is in reality as strongly enclosed country as there is
in the world. At every hundred yards, or less, it is
intersected by broad ditches or canals, some of them
created to carry of? the water, others to mark boundaries
and do the duty of fences ; for the northern corner of
this strange territory is almost entirely grazing land.
Military movements are practically impossible, except
on the roads, which without exception are carried
along the dykes. With such a description of country
Abercromby had become familiar during the campaign
of 1794 ; but the sand-dunes, which were all that he
could see, were an unknown quantity, and he had
CH. xxni HISTORY OF THE ARMY 653
not the slightest idea what force the enemy might 1799.
keep hidden behind them. Marking, however, the Au S-
gap before Groete Keten and the low dunes to north
of it, he determined, in default of better guidance, to
make that part of the shore his place of landing.
Meanwhile General Brune, who held supreme com-
mand in Holland, had, of course, been apprised of
the approach of the British fleet, and, thanks to the
weather, had found ample time to reinforce the troops
in the north. On the 2jth of August there were at
the disposal of General Daendels, the actual com-
mander about the threatened point, ten thousand
men ; but his was no easy task. Though the gap
at Groete Keten was the obvious place for a dis-
embarkation, and the shore to the north of Petten
for more favourable for the purpose than that to the
south, there was still no natural obstacle to prevent
an enemy from landing at any point between the
Helder and Alkmaar. He therefore decided to
disperse his force along the whole of that line. Apart
from the garrisons in the forts of the Helder, one
brigade lay between Kallantzoog and Petten ; two
battalions, with a third in reserve, were stationed in
the middle of the dunes opposite to the hamlet of
Kleene Keten ; two more were between the village
of Groete Keten and the sea, facing to north, and
three more, with two squadrons of cavalry and four
guns, stood before Huisduinen, a little to the south
of the Helder itself, facing to south-west. Recognis-
ing that the cannon of the fleet could scour the whole
beach with shot, Daendels had decided to refuse his
centre, and to attack the British upon both flanks
when entangled in the dunes. The position of
Kleene Keten was probably chosen for the reserve,
because at that point the plain east of the sand-hills is
dry for a few hundred yards, and gives a little space for
the massing of troops on the open ground.
At five o'clock in the morning the men-of-war, Aug. 27.
at a signal from the flagship, opened a tremendous fire
654 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1799. upon the beach ; and the whole line of boats, carrying
Aug. 27. Coote's brigade and apparently a part of Macdonald's,
under the command of Sir James Pulteney, 1 pushed off
together for the shore about the gap and to north of
it. The landing was effected in much confusion.
Several boats were upset by the surf, and not a few
of the seamen and soldiers were drowned. The men
had to scramble through the waves as best they could ;
companies and battalions were intermixed, and there
was much trouble in dissentangling them. Neverthe-
less, Daendels, doubtless dreading the effect of the
cannonade, kept his men under cover, and made no
attempt, except by distant and dropping fire, to molest
the disordered British soldiers as they hurried to and
fro to find their places in the ranks.
Abercromby had been careful to select for his dis-
embarkation a slight curve in the strand, where the
sand-hills, drawing closer to the sea both to north and
south, gave some protection to his flanks. But it
should seem that, in the general confusion, the right
of the landing force did not extend itself far enough
1 The force was brigaded thus :
1st Brigade. Massed grenadiers of the Guards, 3/1 st Guards
Major-general D'Oyley.
2nd Brigade. I/ Coldstream Guards, i/3rd Guards Major-
general Burrard.
yd Brigade. 2nd, 27th, 2gth, 69th, 85th Major-general
Coote.
4/>5 Brigade. 2/ist, 25th, 49th, 79th, 92nd Major-general
John Moore.
Reserve. 23rd, 55th Colonel Macdonald.
This differs slightly from the brigading as shown by Bunbury
(Great War with France\ but is taken from the return enclosed by
Abercromby to Dundas in his report of the action. The full
strength of the infantry on 4th August was 497 officers and 11,820
non-commissioned officers and men, of whom 753 were sick. There
were also on board :
1 8th Light Dragoons. 13 officers, 208 N.C.O.s and men.
Royal Artillery. 26 officers, 417 N.C.O.s and men, and 157
drivers.
The guns requested by Abercromby (2oth July) were 36 6-prs.
(battalion guns), 20 12-prs., 30 24-prs., 18 5^-inch mortars, 8
8-inch mortars, 19 lo-inch mortars.
CH. xxin HISTORY OF THE ARMY 655
to southward, being possibly blown from its right I 799-
course by the south-west wind ; and for this reason Aug< 2
a number of troops were cramped within an unduly
confined portion of the beach. This increased the con-
fusion ; and the formation of the British was still,
apparently, incomplete when Pulteney, possibly in order
to gain more room for the rear battalions, gave the
order to advance. The forward movement must have
begun a little to north of the gap, for it instantly
brought down a very heavy fire of musketry and light
artillery from the enemy, showing that Daendels had
brought down his detachment from Kleene Keten to
meet them. Thereupon it seems that the British, after
climbing the outer ridge of sand-hills, 1 charged straight
upon the two leading battalions, forced them gradu-
ally back upon the third, which formed their reserve,
and finally drove all three to southward in confusion
upon Groete Keten.
Hotly pursuing them, the British came upon the
gap in the dunes, where there is a curious pan 2 of
flat sunken ground, measuring about five hundred
yards north and south by one hundred east and west,
from which they scrambled up a steep bank some
ten feet high, in no very good order, to debouch
upon the plain beyond. No sooner, however, did
they emerge from the sand upon the grass than they
were met by a withering fire of grape from the guns,
hitherto concealed, of a French detachment on the two
roads which lead inland from this outlet. Thereupon
they fell back hastily into the sand-hills ; and Daendels
at once launched the two battalions, which he held
concealed from view at Groete Keten, upon Pulteney's
right flank, called up more troops from Kallantzoog
to support them, and sent orders to his regiments
1 For some distance north of Groete Keten the dunes consist of
an outer ridge towards the sea, and an inner ridge at the edge of
the plain, with practically open ground between them.
2 This hollow is so sudden and abrupt that a superficial observer
would declare it to be the worked-out clay-bed of an old brickfield.
656 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1799. at Huisduinen to fall forthwith upon the British
Aug. 27. i e f t fl an k. This counter-attack from Groete Keten
was most dangerous and formidable. Pulteney's
troops seem to have been huddled together in the
pan above described, where he tried to change the
front of his right-hand battalion to meet the flanking
attack, but, owing to the narrowness of the space,
could only do so with difficulty, and could form no
second battalion for its support. The British right
was therefore borne back in great disorder ; and the
consequences might have been most serious had not
the enemy forsaken their shelter to pursue them, when,
being enfiladed by the guns of the men-of-war, they
were forced to retire with very heavy loss. 1
Abercromby, however, now landed with D'Oyley's
brigade of Guards to support Pulteney ; while on the
left Moore, who had at first been set ashore with only
three hundred mixed men from every regiment under
his command, was gradually reinforced by the disem-
barkation of the greater part of his brigade. Taking
up his position opposite the Helder, his skirmishers
engaged the enemy's riflemen, and seem to have
checked the attack ordered by Daendels upon the
British left flank. Elsewhere the two armies were
engaged in a long and confused struggle among the
sand-hills, which lasted until five o'clock in the
evening ; the French and Dutch making effort after
effort to force the British back, and the British, though
without artillery, refusing obstinately to give way.
At last the enemy on the centre and right, being fairly
worn down, gave up the contest, and retired in good
order to a position some four miles to the southward.
Thus the landing was won, but there still remained
some two thousand Dutch in the batteries of the Helder,
which needed to be mastered without delay. Aber-
1 The position of the regiments can be fixed only by conjecture,
for the action was extremely confused. From the casualties I guess
that the 23rd and 55th were on the right, and Coote's brigade
immediately to left of them.
CH. xxni HISTORY OF THE ARMY 657
cromby accordingly ordered that they should be attacked 1799.
at daybreak on the following morning by the brigades Au g- 2 7-
of Moore and Burrard. Moore, however, noticed some
movement about the Helder in the evening, and keeping
careful watch, saw the enemy's troops march off at
nightfall by the eastern coast, as if making for the road
to Alkmaar. Pushing forward his patrols, he learned
that the batteries were evacuated and the guns spiked ;
and in the course of the night he took possession both
of the forts and of the town. At daylight the Dutch Aug. 28,
men-of-war, which were lying close under the guns of
the Helder, weighed anchor and retired eastward, with
the exception of seven lying in the Nieuwediep, which
surrendered at once. Admiral Mitchell employed the
two following days in buoying a channel by which to
approach the main body of the Dutch fleet, and, sailing
in on the 3Oth, summoned the Dutch Admiral, Story, Aug. 30.
to hoist the Orange flag and transfer his ships to the
service of the Allies of the British Crown. Story
thereupon yielded up his fleet, alleging that his men
refused to fight ; and twenty- five more men-of-war,
seven of them ships of the line, together with the naval
arsenal of Nieuwediep, with all its stores and ninety-
five guns, passed into possession of the British without
the firing of a shot.
So great and speedy a success exceeded the wildest
expectations alike of those who projected and com-
manded the expedition. Abercromby, in announcing
his intention to hazard a disembarkation, had warned
the Government that to anchor two hundred sail upon
an unsheltered beach, exposed to the prevalent winds,
and then to throw a large force upon a hostile shore,
was an operation beyond the rules of prudence and
common - sense. Six days' warning had given the
enemy ample time to prepare for resistance ; the
means for landing troops were, through no fault of
Abercromby, inadequate ; the disembarkation had con-
sequently been disorderly ; the first advance, whether
through the eagerness of the troops or the fault of
658 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1799- Pulteney, had been too precipitate ; and the action, after
long wearing an ugly aspect, had terminated finally
in no very decided success. Moore, who, it is true,
was always something of a pessimist, looked for a
re - embarkation as almost inevitable if his attack
upon the Helder on the morning of the 28th should
have failed. Yet, by miraculous good luck, all had
gone well, and the first great object of the expedition
had been secured with, in the circumstances, compara-
tively small loss. Three officers and about sixty men
were killed, and twenty men drowned ; twenty -four
officers and three hundred and eighty men were
wounded or missing. The regiments that suffered
most heavily were the Twenty-third and Fifty-fifth,
upon whom fell nearly one half of the total casualties.
Among the wounded officers were Pulteney, 1 Aber-
cromby's second in command, and John Hope and
George Murray, his two principal staff-officers. The
losses of the enemy appear to have been far greater,
though it is not clear why they should have been so ;
but they are set down by French historians at not fewer
than fourteen hundred men an enormous proportion
to the total number engaged.
Meanwhile throughout the month of August the
recruits from the militia had been pouring into the
appointed camp at Barham Downs in the uproarious
condition which, in those days, was inevitably produced
by a large bounty. Such a sight has rarely been seen
in England, even after the paying off of a fleet. The
possession of ten pounds filled the majority of the
men with a pride which forbade them to walk to the
rendezvous. They rolled up to the camp, riotously
drunk, in post-coaches, post-chaises and six, caravans,
and every description of vehicle, leaving the officers to
plod on foot with such few luckless men as had already
lost or spent their money. Even when arrived at their
1 Pulteney was hit in the arm, which afforded him the satis-
faction of having been wounded in both arms and both legs.
Bunbury's Great War with France, p. 47.
CH. xxni HISTORY OF THE ARMY 659
destination they were utterly intractable, for, as gentle- 1799*
men who rode in post-chaises, they thought it beneath
them to attend drill or parade. They knew that they
were to embark almost immediately for active service,
and they were determined to be happy while their
riches lasted. It was only with difficulty that their
names and the regiments from which they came were
ascertained, while all the efforts of the tailors failed to
alter such a multitude of facings in time for embarka-
tion. Upon the news of Abercromby's success, Pitt
and Dundas very injudiciously announced that they
would visit the troops on the following evening, to
witness a march past and the firing of a feu de joie.
The officers spent the next twenty-four hours in a raid
upon Canterbury and the surrounding villages, and by
three o'clock on the appointed afternoon had swept
into camp every man who could stand or walk. Not
more than one man in twenty was sober, and the feu de
joie was, in consequence, so outrageously jubilant that
it was judged prudent to dismiss the troops without
venturing upon a march past. Yet these men, knowing
nothing of their comrades, nothing of their Serjeants
and officers, nothing of their regiments, were in a few
days to stand in face of an enemy in the field. A
month before they had been well - drilled, orderly
militiamen ; with three months' training in their new
corps they would probably have been good, and with
six months' training, excellent troops. Every soldier
knew this, and there were undoubtedly soldiers who
mentioned it to Ministers ; but it was vain to urge
such matters upon Pitt and Dundas.
The first reinforcement of these new levies reached
Abercromby on the 28th of August. It consisted of Aug. 28.
seven battalions organised in two brigades, and count-
ing altogether rather over five thousand of all ranks,
but with only fifty -seven lieutenants and fourteen
ensigns among the whole of them. 1 With them, or
1 Major-gen. Don's Brigade : i/th and 4Otk (each 2 batts.).
Major-gen. Lord Cavan's Brigade : 2Oth (2 batts.), 63rd. 147
660 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
"799- ver 7 soon a f ter > came the Eleventh Light Dragoons.
The arrival of these troops was welcome, for it offered
Abercromby the hope of improving his success. He
was extremely anxious to advance, but an army, as he
had said, cannot move without horses and waggons ;
and he had neither the one nor the other. For four
days the troops bivouacked in their chosen position in
the sand-hills, exposed to constant wind and rain, with-
out any camp-equipment, and, in Abercromby' s words,
labouring under a precarious subsistence from want of
horses to draw their provisions from the Helder. At
length a few horses and waggons were found, and, on
Sept. i. the ist of September, Abercromby moved southward
and took up a strong defensive position, with his right
at Petten on the German Ocean, and his left at Oude
Sluis on the Zuider Zee.
Following the bank of the Zype Canal, the line of
defence ran from Oude Sluis obliquely south-westward
for about twelve miles to the hamlet of Krabbendam,
from which point it turned back sharply north-westward
along the bank of a branch canal which ended at Petten.
Thus the front was covered for its whole length by a
canal ; but a great dyke beyond it was presently made
the first line of defence, additional bridges being con-
structed over the Zype to facilitate the access to it. The
principal approach to the position was at the salient angle
of Zype Sluis, with its adjacent post of Krabbendam ;
for it was at these points that the great northern canal
from Amsterdam and Alkmaar, and the high road
upon the great dyke, entered the lines. Accordingly,
the two hamlets were placed in a state of defence,
strengthened by redoubts, and committed to the charge
of the Twentieth Regiment. To westward of it, along
the branch-canal to Petten, there were transverse dykes
which gave access to the main dyke ; and this space
being the right of the line, was occupied by the two
officers, 4967 N.C.O.s and men, of whom 204. sick. The 2/1 7th
and the 4Oth had not a single ensign. Return, in Dundas to
Abercromby, 22nd August 1799.
CH. xxin HISTORY OF THE ARMY 661
brigades of Guards. North - eastward from Krabben- 1 799,
dam, the next passage of the Zype was by the village Sept.
of St. Maarten, which also was fortified and held by
the Fortieth Regiment under Colonel Spencer ; and
the remainder of Moore's and Don's brigades, less two
battalions left to guard the Helder itself, were stationed
either between Krabbendam and Oude Sluis or as a
reserve in rear of the centre. Every important point
was covered by field-works ; the troops were quartered
under good shelter in Schagen, Harenskarspel, and other
villages in advance of the Zype ; and, thus secured,
Abercromby resolved, until reinforcements should reach
him, to stand on the defensive. 1
For this inaction he has incurred severe censure
from the French historian, General Jomini, yet it is
difficult to see what else he could have done. He
had, it is true, from sixteen to eighteen thousand men
with him, but, with the exception of the Guards and
Ninety-second Highlanders, the regiments that he had
brought with him were imperfect in coherence and dis-
cipline. One and all had been hastily completed by
drafts, and Don's and Cavan's brigades were simply
unformed militia. The force was very ill-equipped in
every respect, and the only transport that had been
shipped to him so far consisted of thirty-five bread
waggons, with four horses apiece, and a single forge-
cart. In the country itself the waggons and teams
were few, and the inhabitants unwilling to part with
them. The Government had counted on water-carriage
to supplement these defects ; but a series of south-
westerly gales made it so difficult for boats to pass from
the Helder through the narrow channel which led to
Oude Sluis and so into the Zype Canal, that it was im-
possible to form magazines even along the length of the
chosen position. Moreover, even if such magazines had
been formed, the boats of the Zype Canal were too large
to enter the great northern canal, and the enemy had
1 Diary of Sir John Moore, i. 345. Bunbury's Great War with
France, pp. 6-7.
662 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1799. been careful to destroy or remove all the smaller craft
as they retreated. Lastly, the country itself presented
every possible difficulty to an advancing force. No
corn was grown on the land, which, being given up
wholly to grazing, produced no supplies beyond a
limited quantity of meat. Again, the maze of dykes
and canals, interspersed at every hundred yards with
wet ditches, rendered the movement of troops im-
possible except by a few roads, which could easily be
obstructed either by breaking down the bridges or, in
some cases, by inundation. Thus every advantage lay
with the defending force, which could with compara-
tively few troops cover a very wide front, extending
practically from sea to sea, and therefore affording no
chance for a turning movement. An invasion of
North Holland from the Helder signified, in fact, a
campaign of frontal attacks along parallel lines of
causeways. 1
General Brune naturally used the respite granted to
him by Abercromby' s halt to summon every man from
the eastern provinces, to call up the National Guard,
and to provide for the defence of Amsterdam by col-
lecting a flotilla of gun-boats in the Zuider Zee, and
by covering with batteries the peninsula of Buiksloot,
Sept. 2. over against the town. On the 2nd of September he
joined Daendels, who had taken up a position from
Alkmaar eastward nearly to Hoorn, with the outposts
on his left pushed forward to within a mile or two of
Sept. 8. those on the British right. On the 8th he was strength-
ened by a reinforcement which raised his total numbers
to twenty-one thousand men, two-thirds Dutch and
one-third French ; whereupon he resolved to attack
Abercromby at once before more troops could reach him
from England. His plan was to turn the British right,
for which purpose seven thousand French under General
Vandamme were to debouch from Schoorl, a village
about five miles north of Alkmaar, and advance
through the dunes by Groet and Kamp upon Petten.
1 Abercromby to Dundas, 4th September 1799.
CH. xxni HISTORY OF THE ARMY 663
On Vandamme's right a second column of six thousand 1799.
Dutch under General Dumonceau were to march by
Schoorldam, a little to eastward of Schoorl, up the
great canal upon Krabbendam, master the bridge and
carry the salient angle of the lines. On Dumonceau's
right a third column of almost the same force under
Daendels was to assemble at St. Pankras, about three
miles north-east of Alkmaar, and thence advance north-
ward upon Eenigenburg.
The attack was fixed for daybreak on the loth, but Sept. 10.
Abercromby had been warned of Brune's intention to
take the offensive. The French movements on the
night of the 9th also were not conducted so silently as
to escape the attention of the British picquets, and
Moore's patrols were ready to move forward as soon
as it was light. Vandamme's column came first into
action while it was still dark, covering its attack, as
usual, with a cloud of skirmishers, while the Grenadiers
rushed forward with the bayonet. Nothing could
exceed the impetuous gallantry of this assault four
companies of the Grenadiers actually gaining the edge
of the small canal at the foot of the dyke which was
lined by the British. But the fire of Burrard's brigade
was cool and steady, the French column was completely
shattered, and the four intrepid companies were killed
or taken to a man. After an hour and a half Van-
damme's column retired, beaten, with very heavy loss.
Further to eastward the attack was delayed by some
mismanagement which brought part of Dumonceau's
column on to the same road with that of Daendels,
and caused much confusion. Fearful of losing pre-
cious time, Dumonceau launched one of his brigades
at Eenigenburg, and, leaving Daendels to turn his
force further northward against St. Maarten, hurried
forward with the rest of his men to the storm of
Krabbendam. Here again the vehemence of the
assault and the gallantry of the assailants were con-
spicuous. The brigade was parted into two columns,
of which the smaller dashed forward along the road,
VOL. IV F
664 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1 799. despite the enfilading fire of two British guns, gained
Sept. 10. the first houses of the village and filled them with
skirmishers, while the main body made a rush to
seize the entrenchments on the dyke. Misled by the
attack on Eenigenburg, Abercromby had detached the
Second battalion of the Twentieth to that quarter ; and
consequently the whole brunt of Dumonceau's on-
slaught fell upon five companies of the First battalion.
For a short space these were borne back, and the
situation wore so serious an aspect that Abercromby
dismounted and placed himself at their head. But,
though hastily composed of militiamen from half-a-
dozen counties besides Devon, to which the regiment
was by title affiliated, the Twentieth had an excellent
Colonel, George Smyth, who had already made it
worthy of its old reputation. The five companies
behaved with the steadiness of veterans, repelling
attack after attack until the Second battalion returned
to their assistance, when Dumonceau's men broke
and fled, and Colonel Macdonald pursuing them with
the Reserve captured a gun, pontoons, and several
prisoners.
At St. Maarten, Daendels was met with equal firm-
ness by the militiamen of the Fortieth under Brent
Spencer, and soon retired. At Eenigenburg the enemy
carried the village but dashed themselves in vain against
the entrenchments. In brief, Brune was repulsed all
along the line, and retreated with a loss of over two
thousand killed, wounded, and prisoners. The casual-
ties among the British barely exceeded two hundred
killed, wounded, and missing of all ranks ; and of
eleven officers wounded six belonged to the First
battalion of the Twentieth. Brune's chances of success,
unless by singular favour of fortune, were in fact
remote ; though the extraordinary advantages promised
by a victory may be held to have justified him in
hazarding the attempt. 1
1 Lieut.-col. Anstruther to Colonel Calvert, nth September
1799. Notes on the expedition in W.Q. Qrig. Corres., 65.
CH. xxin HISTORY OF THE ARMY 665
The prosperous issue of this day greatly strengthened 1799.
the confidence of the British troops in themselves and
in their officers ; and it was with high hopes that they
welcomed the arrival, within the five following days, of Sept. 12-15.
three more brigades of British infantry, a few more
squadrons of British cavalry, and two divisions of
Russians. In all, the reinforcements numbered thirty-
three thousand men, with the Duke of York for Com-
mander-in-chief, David Dundas as a General of Divi-
sion, and Lord Paget, who is better known by his later
titles of Earl of Uxbridge and Marquis of Anglesey,
in command of the Seventh Light Dragoons. 1 As to
the quality of these troops it can only be said that the
British infantry were, like most of the regiments already
on the spot, militiamen of excellent but unshaped
material. The Russians, who numbered twelve
thousand men, were also imperfectly trained and
disciplined ; for, though the Tsar Paul had busied
himself immensely with military improvements, the
results had not been commensurate with his spasmodic
energy, and the Muscovite soldier was not yet such a
man as he proved himself later to be at Eylau. Of
General Hermann, who commanded the two divisions
in Holland, it can only be said that, with a great deal of
boasting and pretension, he was no better than his men.
As regards the Duke of York, his deficiencies in the
field had been sufficiently shown in 1793 and 1794 ;
and his appointment was beyond doubt chiefly due to
the imperative need of a commander-in-chief whose
rank and authority the Russians could not venture to
question. But, though it may well have been essenti-
ally necessary (as in Abercromby's opinion it was), the
choice of the Duke was unfortunate ; and the methods
selected by Ministers for making good his defects were
more unfortunate still. For he was required by his
1 These troops were : Lord Chatham's brigade, 4th (3 batts.),
3 1st; Maj.-gen. Manners's brigade, pth (2 batts.), 56th ; Prince
William of Gloucester's, 5th, 35th (each 2 batts.) ; also the yth Light
Dragoons, a detachment of the i8th Light Dragoons, and Artillery.
666 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xir
1 799. instructions to guide himself upon all important oc-
Sept- casions by the advice of a Council of War, consisting
of Abercromby, David Dundas, Pulteney, the Russian
commander, and Major-general Lord Chatham. 1 The
three first of these were thoroughly competent soldiers,
the fourth might or might not be so ; but the addition
of Lord Chatham, a man of notorious indolence and
incapacity, was nothing short of an insult. Still even
if one and all had been Heaven-born generals, the
arrangement could not but have been utterly vicious ;
and it would have been far better to give the Duke
absolute control, with Abercromby or Moore for the
chief of his staff. As regards the operations to be
undertaken, the Government wisely left to the Duke
a wide discretion, merely prescribing the recovery
of Holland and of Utrecht southward to the Waal, as
the principal object, and hoping that his force would
enable him to send detachments also to the eastern
provinces. 2
The Duke had now some forty-eight thousand men
under his command, of whom three-fourths were British ;
but the first sight of many of them filled him with
dismay. In the haste to despatch the troops from
Deal and the scarcity of tonnage, many necessary
articles had been left behind. Some of the men were
almost naked ; two whole brigades did not possess a
great-coat among them ; and the result, in a season
of incessant wind and rain, was that seventeen hundred
of Abercromby's force were already in hospital. The
arrangements for transport and supply gave him even
more anxiety. In respect of land-transport the full
1 Bunbury, Great War with France, p. 43. I have found no
trace of these instructions as to a Council of War in the papers
(otherwise very perfect) in the Record Office ; but there is con-
firmation of the statement in a letter of Lord Grenville to Lord
Buckingham (Court and Cabinets of George III., ii. 449) : "The
Duke of York has, I really believe, had no other fault than that of
following, perhaps too implicitly, the advice of those whose advice
he was ordered to follow." There is no sign, however, of any
share taken by Lord Chatham.
2 Dundas to York, 5th September 1799.
CH. xxiii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 667
allowance ordered by the Government for a force of 1799.
practically fifty thousand men was one hundred bread-
waggons, as many forage-carts, twenty hospital-waggons
and ten forge-carts an allowance which, on the scale
of the present day, would be wholly insufficient for
a division of infantry and a brigade of cavalry, count-
ing together less than thirteen thousand men. More-
over, these waggons were not yet on the spot, fully
half of them being in England and quite possibly still
in course of construction. In the matter of ammuni-
tion-waggons, again, the Office of Ordnance, from
motives of economy, had sent out a number of the old
pattern which had been so strongly condemned by the
Duke of York himself in 1793. So cumbrous, un-
stable, and unmanageable were they, that the success of
the action of the loth of September was imperilled by
the difficulty of bringing forward ammunition ; and
men and officers rejoiced to see half-a-dozen of these
" vile and ridiculous " vehicles knocked to pieces.
To add to these difficulties, not a single sutler had
joined the army, and there was consequently not a drop
of spirits to be obtained for the men. Fuel was want-
ing and was only supplied, pending the despatch of
coal from England, by breaking up some of the captured
Dutch ships. There were no store-houses for the
housing of the supplies accumulated at the Helder,
and it was necessary to substitute store-ships for them.
Again, the Treasury had contrived to reduce itself to
hopeless confusion over the provision of bread for the
army. On the 9th of September there was but six
days' supply in store, and the Chief Commissary could
think of no better remedy than to write a long and
solemn letter to Abercromby explaining why his forces
must starve. Lastly, the medical arrangements were
absolutely chaotic. The authorities had not taken the
trouble even to form a hospital in England for the
reception of invalids from Holland ; and, when re-
quested to appoint a place for it, they named Deal,
where all the unfortunate wounded must have been
668 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK
1799. landed from small boats on the beach with infinite
torture and risk to broken limbs. Fortunately, a
leading medical authority, Sir Jerome Fitzpatrick,
interposed, and insisted upon the choice of a port
where hospital-ships of large draught could come
alongside a jetty. But it is abundantly evident that
the Ministers and the Public Departments, with the
single exception of the Commander-in-chief's office,
were as hopelessly incompetent for the conduct of war
as in 1793. The Ministers were so busy planning
campaigns, of which they understood nothing, that
they could spare no time for the humble details
whereby an army is kept efficient in the field.
There was yet one more burden laid upon the
Commander-in-chief that, namely, of arming and
organising the Dutch who were to bring about the
counter-revolution in favour of the House of Orange.
High hopes had been built by Pitt and Grenville upon
such a national movement, owing to the representations
of the British Agent in the United Provinces, Mr.
Bentinck, whose name sufficiently explains the reasons
for his appointment. The Greffier Fagel, to whom
Lord Grenville at the end of 1798 had submitted some
of Bentinck' s letters, declared that he had never heard
the names of the persons whom the Agent put forward
as men of influence and leading, and said plainly that
little was to be expected unless the Orange party were
favoured by the principal men in the actual province of
Holland. 1 The British, when they landed, found the
people if not actually hostile, certainly not friendly ;
but, none the less, the Hereditary Prince of Orange,
with the encouragement of the British Government,
attached himself to Abercromby and plagued him with
projects of every description. " I listen," reported the
sagacious old man, " but follow what to me appears to
be our interest. ... I believe the Prince has been
deceived in thinking that he has more friends than
enemies in this country. If we can advance, every one
1 Dropmore Papers, iv. 313.
CH. xxin HISTORY OF THE ARMY 669
will be on our side, but there are few who will risk 1799.
anything." There was the root of the whole matter.
A successful campaign would undoubtedly regain the
people of the United Provinces for the House of
Orange, not because it was the House of Orange, but
because it was the winning side ; and, until the British
arms had reconquered Holland, all negotiations with
the Dutch were premature.
Such, however, in spite of a dozen lessons within
half as many years, was not the belief of the British
Ministers. Emboldened by their promise of pay for
any levies that he could raise, the Prince of Orange
produced a list of nearly three thousand Dutch sailors
and deserters, demanded wages and levy -money for
them, and proposed to attach them to Abercromby's
army with himself at their head. The old General
positively refused to encumber himself with such a
rabble ; but, none the less, the British Government
expressly directed the Duke of York to co-operate
with the Prince in raising such levies, so that the
British troops should be free to go where they were
most wanted. Moreover, Thomas Grenville was sent
Ambassador to the Hague to act as the Prince's political
adviser ; so that the Duke had every prospect of
being hampered not only by the Russian Commanders
and his own Council of War, but also by the Prince of
Orange, and possibly by the brother of the Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs. Not yet had British
Ministers learned, and not yet for ten years were they
to learn, that in war all secondary considerations must
be postponed to the first and greatest object of military
success. 1
1 Abercromby to Dundas, nth September (two letters with
enclosures from the Prince of Orange). York to Dundas, I4th
(three letters), i6th, i8th September; Dundas to York, 5th and
1 5th September 1799, enclosing letter from Sir Jerome Fitzpatrick.
CHAPTER XXIV
*799- OWING to the time consumed in disembarking the
troops, the Duke of York was unable to advance
immediately ; and meanwhile Brune had employed the
respite thus gained since his defeat on the loth of
September in strengthening his position. He now
occupied an oblique line running from the little town
of Bergen, which lies about three miles north-west of
Alkmaar, north-eastward for six miles to Oukarspel.
Bergen itself, nestling close under the highest and
steepest range of the dunes and surrounded by little
woods and copses, was strongly entrenched ; in
advance of it the villages of Schoorl, Groet and
Kamp were fortified ; and commanding positions
were taken up on the sand-dunes, so that every
inch of the ground on his left should be defensible.
To eastward of this, his centre barred the road south-
ward along the Great Northern Canal by the occupation
of the hamlet of Schoorldam and of the village of War-
menhuizen, a little to north-east of it ; and his right,
posted at Oudkarspel, lay astride the great causeway
which leads to Alkmaar from the north. At each and
all of these points he had multiplied the many natural
obstacles of the country by breaking up the roads,
making abatis and palisades, and constructing redoubts
at the heads of the dykes ; but, though outnumbered
by nearly two to one, he omitted as yet to inundate the
country to east of Oudkarspel for the protection of his
right flank.
In a country which was accessible only by a few
670
CH. xxiv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 671
causeways, the Austrian system of attack by isolated 1799.
columns was the only possible one ; and the Council Sept. 19.
of War laid its plans accordingly. It was agreed that
the Russians should take the place of honour on the
right, and that General Hermann, with twelve Russian
battalions, Manners's British brigade and the Seventh
Light Dragoons, should drive the enemy from the
sand-hills at Bergen. 1 This was the First Column. On
its left the Second Column, consisting of the two brigades
of Guards, Prince William's brigade, and two squadrons
of the Eleventh Light Dragoons, under David Dundas,
were to force the positions of Warmenhuizen and
Schoorldam and to co-operate with Hermann. On
Dundas's left the Third Column, composed of Don's
and Coote's brigades, with the two remaining squadrons
of the Eleventh, were to carry Oudkarspel. Finally,
a strong detached column, consisting of Moore's,
Cavan's and Chatham's brigades, the Reserve, two
composite battalions of Grenadiers and Light Infantry,
and two squadrons of the Eighteenth Light Dragoons,
under Abercromby's command, were to move wide to
the left upon Hoorn, some twelve miles south-east of
Oudkarspel, and, proceeding thence southward by forced
1 For the reader's convenience I repeat the list of Brigades :
Cavalry. 7th Light Dragoons, nth Light Dragoons, detachment
of 1 8th Light Dragoons, I troop R.H.A.
First Brigade. Guards grenadier battalion, 3/1 st Guards Major-
general D'Oyley.
Second Brigade. I/ Coldstream, i/3rd Guards Major-general
Burrard.
Third Brigade. 2nd, 27th, 29th, 85th Major-general Coote.
Fourth Brigade. 2/ist, 25th, 49th, 79th, 92nd Major-general
Moore.
Fifth Brigade. i/i7th, 2/1 7th, i/4Oth, 2/4Oth Major-general
Don.
Sixth Brigade. i/zoth, 2/zoth, 63rd Major-general Lord Cavan.
Seventh Brigade. 3 battalions 4th, 3ist Major-general Lord
Chatham.
Eighth Brigade. i/5th, 2/jth, 2/3 5th Prince William.
Ninth Brigade. i/9th, zAjth, 56th Major-general Manners.
Reserve. 23rd, 55th Colonel Macdonald.
In garrison at the Helder, 1/3 5th, 69th.
672 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1799. marches upon Purmerend, to fall on the enemy's right
flank and rear.
It is plain that the nicety of combination required
for the success of this movement was excessive ; and
indeed the whole plan bears the mark of a compromise
or, in other words, of a Council of War. The object
of the Allies was to penetrate as speedily as possible to
Amsterdam, and for that end the first thing requisite
was to clear the passage between Alkmaar and the
North Sea, so as to reach Haarlem and the Y. It may
be affirmed with certainty that Brune could not be
ousted from his position except by forcing one or the
other of his flanks ; and it therefore followed that in
any attack the function of the Allied centre must be
chiefly to contain the enemy, while the bulk of their
strength was concentrated against a flank. Undoubtedly,
the eastern flank, in the direction of Hoorn, was vul-
nerable ; but a turning movement from that side was
so wide as to require a corps of sufficient strength to
act independently. Moreover, such a corps would
need to be concentrated at Hoorn beforehand, so as to
move up on Alkmaar simultaneously with the army on
the Zype ; and to this there was the objection that its
appearance at Hoorn would betray the design, and
cause Brune to check it by inundating the country.
All considerations, therefore, dictated the massing of an
overwhelming force at Petten so as to force Brune's
left or western flank, which would have led the army
straight upon Haarlem and Leiden. Instead of this
the Council of War, apparently halting between two
opinions, concentrated considerable bodies of troops
on both flanks and overwhelming force on neither.
The attack was appointed to begin at dawn of the
Sept. 19. 1 9th ; and accordingly, on the evening of the i8th,
Abercomby marched with his division, about ten
thousand men, for Hoorn. The distance to be
traversed did not exceed thirteen miles as the crow
flies, but was increased to more than twenty by the
deviations of the road, which, moreover, was in an
CH. xxiv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 673
extremely bad condition. Hence his column had a 1799.
long and fatiguing march, but on reaching Hoorn at Se P L !
two in the morning found the commandant and his
petty garrison asleep in their beds, and the sentinels
asleep at the gates. The place was therefore occupied
without difficulty, and one hundred and sixty Dutch
soldiers were captured, which was all to the good.
But the troops were so much jaded by their exertions
during the night, and the roads were so execrable, that
Abercromby did not feel justified in making a forced
march upon Purmerend until he heard how the day was
going on his right. And things on the right, as must
now be told, were going anything but well.
At two o'clock, or still earlier, in the morning of
the 1 9th some Russian light infantry and a battalion
of grenadiers under General SchutorfF crossed the canal
before Petten, for no reason, apparently, except their
own caprice, and advanced along the sea-shore straight
upon the French lines at Kamp. General Hermann
was apprised of the fact by half-past two, but made no
effort to stop or recall them ; and, on the firing of
one or two shots an hour later, he declared that,
since SchutorfF had begun the attack, he must be
supported. Thereupon, he ordered his first line of
Russians to advance from Petten along the Slaeper
dyke, parallel to SchutorfF and about two thousand
yards east of him. At the same time he directed two
squadrons of the Seventh Light Dragoons to support
SchutorfF and two more to act as escort to a troop of
British Horse -Artillery, at the same time moving
Manners' s brigade a little to the eastward from Petten
to wait in reserve. It was still too dark to distinguish
any object when he ordered the gun to be fired as the
signal for attack, being fully aware, as he confessed,
that he was beginning his work too soon, but unable
longer to restrain the impatience of the troops.
The first line of the Russians therefore advanced in
very fair order along the Slaeper dyke till they reached
the first breastwork erected by the French, when they
674 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1799. sent up a savage yell and rushed forward. The enemy
Sept. 19. gave way without firing more than half-a-dozen shots,
but the whole of the Russians, from front to rear of the
column, responded with a tremendous and irregular fire,
destructive to none but themselves. In this tumul-
tuous state they pressed on in the dark, carrying the
second of the breastworks as easily as the first, but
suffering heavily from their own fire. Meanwhile,
SchutorfFs column could be heard advancing as rapidly
on the right through the sand-hills, and Hermann's
men raised a wild cry for artillery. This was brought
forward, and, though the darkness still forbade all dis-
tinction of any definite object, the guns likewise opened
a furious and aimless cannonade. Pressing on to the
end of the dyke the column parted itself into two
divisions, one of which joined SchutorfFs force, and
with it poured from time to time a heavy fire upon the
other division, which followed the road to Groet. This
village also was carried with little difficulty, but it was
evident that the main force of the enemy was on the
east side of this road ; for a heavy though irregular fire
was directed upon the Russians from that quarter,
which was answered both by Hermann's column and,
though far out of range, by SchutorfFs, the latter
firing indiscriminately both upon the enemy and upon
their comrades. Hermann's horse was struck by a
French bullet from the east, and he now ascended
the dunes towards SchutorfFs corps, leaving his own
column without directions of any kind. However,
both divisions still blundered on in the same irregular
fashion. The Russian light infantry had exhausted its
ammunition and was thenceforth useless ; but their
second line of infantry came up, promptly mingled
with the first, and by its impetus carried the whole body
forward. The Russian colonels could not find their
regiments and had lost all control of their men.
From time to time they shouted the order to cease
fire, but no one took the slighest notice. The men
of the French advanced posts had been rallied upon
CH. xxiv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 675
three battalions before Schoorl ; but the Russians in 1799.
the road, though still under the fire of their comrades Sept. ! 9-
on the sand-hills, brushed them aside and floundered
on blindly towards Bergen.
The road now passed through a chain of scattered
houses and narrow copses of very thick underwood, with
occasional openings towards the east, 1 from which a
steadily increasing volume of fire poured upon them
from the French infantry and artillery. For Brune had
already begun to reinforce his left by calling detach-
ments from Dumonceau's troops across the bridge at
Schoorldam. Captain Taylor, the British staff-officer
who had accompanied the Russian column on the road,
now entreated the commanding officers to deploy their
regiments and extend them to eastward ; but they seemed
utterly helpless and incapable of more than a wild ad-
vance along the highway, with indiscriminate firing to
front and flanks. They were now within a mile of
Bergen, and plunged into an avenue with dense under-
wood on each hand, which screened them until they
were within two hundred yards of the town. There the
underwood ceased on the eastern side, and their advance
was checked by a tremendous fire of musketry and
artillery on their front and left flank. Crowded together
in a confused mass, they again yelled for guns, which
were with great difficulty brought up, the horses being
scarcely able to crawl. Then, covered by their fire,
the mob of men again surged forward, still under a
terrible rain of bullets and grape, when General Essen,
Hermann's second in command, at last appeared and
gave the order for the troops to halt and form.
A battalion was then extended to the left, with guns,
to keep down the French fire ; the crowd of men on
the road was re-formed ; and more infantry came up in
the rear under Hermann himself, who apparently had
1 The character of the road, though the houses are far more
numerous than a century ago, is little changed ; and the course of
the action can be well traced by the traveller who traverses it at
this day.
676 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1799. brought them down from the sand-hills. The column
Sept, 19. then advanced again, but was immediately thrown into
confusion by the battalion which had been extended
to the left, and which now fell back in disorder upon
the road. However, though Hermann had now lost
all control of his men, they struggled on to Bergen,
and actually occupied it in a helpless and apathetic
fashion for about twenty minutes, without the slightest
idea as to what they should do next. But by this time
Brune's reserve from Alkmaar had arrived upon the
scene ; whereupon Vandamme, sending forward his
chasseurs to drive back such few Russians as remained
in the sand-hills, attacked the village both from east
and west, and, as the main body fell back along the road,
closed in upon it on all sides. The Russian retreat
now became a rout. Hermann was taken prisoner.
Essen, collecting a few troops, forced his way back
through the avenue under the fire of the French, who
had lined the underwood alongside it, and succeeded in
reaching a small body of men on the sand-hills. Upon
these he rallied his troops, at the same time despatch-
ing Taylor in hot haste to bring up Manners's brigade
to his support.
Meanwhile, Dundas's column, which was accom-
panied by the Duke of York, had advanced as soon as
the light permitted upon Warmenhuizen, throwing out
one battalion towards Schoorldam to cover Hermann's
left flank, and two more to eastward to preserve
communication with Pulteney. His progress was
necessarily slow, owing to the need for throwing flying
bridges over the innumerable waterways that barred his
advance ; but at six o'clock the village was smartly
stormed by the simultaneous attack of three Russian bat-
talions from the east, and of the First Guards from the
west. Supported by three gunboats in the great canal,
Dundas moved next upon Schoorldam ; but, the enemy
having destroyed the roads, he could advance to it
only over a network of canals, and did not reach it
until nine o'clock. He carried that village also, how-
CH. xxiv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 677
ever, taking several hundred prisoners ; soon after 1799.
which an aide-de-camp came galloping up at the top of ^P 1 - 1 9-
his speed to the Duke of York. He brought the news
of the utter defeat of the Russians upon the right.
The Duke at once ordered Manners's brigade to
advance upon Schoorl ; but the French had followed up
their counter-attack with astonishing rapidity, and the
Russians were utterly demoralised. They were scattered
in scores about the villages which they had taken
drunk, insubordinate, and pillaging upon all sides.
Major-general Knox, who entered their camp at nine
o'clock, found it full of stragglers wounded and un-
wounded ; while on the sand-hills Russian riflemen were
in sight, with the French chasseurs in hot pursuit.
Seeing that there was nothing to check these chasseurs,
Knox sent two squadrons of the Seventh Light Dragoons
to rally the Russian riflemen, if possible, and galloped
back to the Helder to fetch the Thirty-fifth, which
formed part of the garrison. Returning to Kamp with
this regiment at about eleven, he met the Russian
General, Essen, who entreated him to stay his drunken,
plundering troops ; whereupon he handed the Thirty-
fifth to him to cover their retreat. A more trying and
difficult duty for a battalion of raw militia, which had
evidently been left in garrison because it was worse
fitted than the rest for the field, it would be difficult to
imagine ; and it is not surprising to find that it suffered
heavily. 1
Thus it was that when Manners's brigade reached
Schoorl it found the village already abandoned by the
Russians and set on fire by their plunderers, and was
1 A militiaman, whom I presume to have been of this corps,
left a journal in which he recorded his impression of our Allies as
he first saw them. " The Russians is people as has not the fear of
God before their eyes, for I saw some of them with cheeses and
butter and all badly wounded, and in particklar one man had an
eit days clock on his back and fiting all the time which made me
to conclude and say all his vanity and vexation of spirit." Recollec-
tions of the British Army, Colburrfs Military Magazine, February
1836.
678 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1799. soon fully occupied, if not overtasked, with the duty
Sept. 19. O f checking the counter-attack of the French. Great
efforts were made to rally the Russians, but without
success. They streamed away into their own lines,
and dispersed, both officers and men, without the
slightest effort to re-form ; and the danger that the
French might force the western extremity of the Allied
line became pressing. Meanwhile, the bridge over
the great canal at Schoorldam had been broken down,
and Dundas was unable to send a man to Schoorl until it
had been repaired, which took a full hour. Battalion
after battalion was then withdrawn from his force to
reinforce Manners, while Dundas himself maintained
his position at Schoorldam under a very heavy fire
with indomitable tenacity. But it was too late. The
British were forced back from Schoorl ; and Dundas
then retired in good order, covered by the gunboats in
the great canal. This seems to have taken place between
four and five o'clock in the afternoon, by which time the
British had been on foot for thirteen or fourteen
hours ; and the retreat, as was natural with weary, half-
trained, and incoherent bodies of men, was anything
but orderly. Many of the brigadiers, as well as the
regimental officers, were without experience, and several
battalions filed through the all - important post of
Krabbendam without an order to any one of them to
take up positions for its defence. In fact, there were
no troops to be trusted except the four battalions of
Guards and the artillery ; and the Guards, having been
heavily engaged all through the day, had lost many
men, had expended nearly all their ammunition, and
were quite worn out with fatigue. These old soldiers,
however, were still unbeaten, and, thanks to their spirit,
the French did not venture on an attack upon the lines. 1
1 According to Bunbury the situation was saved by a Grenadier
of the Guards, who, when his Colonel hesitated to march the weary
battalion back to Krabbendam (through which it had already passed),
said, " Give us some more cartridges, and we will see what can be
done." Thereupon the Colonel gave the order to march. Great
War with France, p. 19.
CH. xxiv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 679
Meanwhile, Pulteney, after struggling with infinite 1799.
difficulties before Oudkarspel, had at last contrived to Se P t - *9-
carry the redoubt which barred his progress along the
great causeway. Coote's brigade, which he had detached
to turn the French position, had found it absolutely
impossible to make its way over the obstacles pre-
sented by the marshy meadows. In front, he himself
could advance no further than to a cross-dyke, from
behind which he engaged in a savage duel of musketry
and artillery with the Dutch, hoping that time might
yet give him a favourable opening. At length, after
the lapse of many hours, the enemy imprudently
attempted a counter-attack, which was heavily repulsed ;
and the British, pursuing, entered the redoubt upon
the backs of the fugitives, and drove them from it, with
the loss of sixteen guns and seven hundred prisoners.
The Dutch retreated in confusion south-westward
to Koedyck, and Pulteney, after advancing for a short
distance in that direction with the hope of renewing
the attack on the morrow, bivouacked for the night.
At eleven o'clock he received an order from the Duke
of York to retreat without delay to the lines of the
Zype, which he did, after first destroying the captured
guns ; and thus the whole of the advantage which he
had gained was thrown away.
Abercromby's division never moved nor fired a shot
throughout the day. The first message which he
received from the Duke of York came at noon and
announced Dundas's success at Warmenhuizen, but
added that nothing was known of Pulteney. The
General thereupon took steps to ascertain whether he
could march across country to the westward, but found
that such a step was impracticable owing to the breadth
of the canals that barred the way. At four o'clock in
the afternoon a second messenger arrived with the
news that Pulteney had captured Oudkarspel, but that
the Russians had been beaten, and that the division
was to return to its original station immediately.
Leaving the Fifty -fifth to occupy Hoorn, where the
VOL. IV G
680 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1799. inhabitants had been very friendly, he started at dusk
Sept. 1 9. along the road by which he had come. The rain
began to fall in torrents directly afterwards ; the road
became one mass of mud, and the march was terribly
arduous. The two battalions of flank-companies from
the Line, being composed entirely of militiamen, left
an enormous number of stragglers on the road, one
company returning to quarters with only twenty men
out of one hundred and ten. 1 At every point was
proved the danger of throwing half -trained men
suddenly into active service.
The casualties of the British were six officers and
one hundred and twenty-seven men killed ; forty-four
officers and three hundred and ninety -seven men
wounded, and four hundred and ninety men missing,
exclusive of three hundred and fifty men of the First
battalion of the Thirty-fifth, whose fate was stated to
be unknown, but who were certainly taken. This was
the unfortunate battalion that had been hurried forward
from the Helder, when the retreating Russians first
began to stream into Petten. The total of casualties
was therefore rather over fourteen hundred of all
ranks, of whom five hundred belonged to Manners's
brigade ; from which it is evident that the covering of
the Russian retreat cost far more men than the attacks
of Dundas and Pulteney. Against this the Duke of
York could show three thousand prisoners captured,
the bulk of them by Dundas in his capture of Schoorl-
dam, and sixteen French guns destroyed. The loss
of the Russians was set down at between two and
three thousand men, the latter figure being the more
probable ; and they left twenty-six guns in the hands
of the enemy. The loss of the French and Dutch can
have been little if at all smaller than that of the Allies ;
and, altogether, neither side had very much to boast of.
1 Of these twenty, fourteen were old soldiers, of which there
were only fifteen in the company. The remaining six were rebels
captured at Vinegar Hill. Colburn' s Military Magazine, Feb.
1836.
CH. xxiv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 68 1
None the less, the moral advantage gained by the 1799.
French was immense. The British had lost all con-
fidence in the Russians ; and the Russians, though their
misfortunes were entirely of their own making, of course
attributed them to the backwardness of the British in
giving them support. Since the Duke of York had
sacrificed nearly a thousand men to save them, their com-
plaints did not render the British feeling towards them
more cordial. Beyond all doubt, the Russians were
responsible for the day's failure, for, if they had but
gone through their antics two hours later, as had been
arranged, the Duke's plan, faulty though it was, might
have proved successful. Even so, however, their
plunder and destruction of the Dutch villages would
have done, as it actually did, untold mischief by
alienating the inhabitants ; for, in this respect, the
behaviour of the British had so far been exemplary.
Lastly, the British had lost confidence in their Com-
mander-in-chief, and the Commander-in-chief had lost
confidence in his troops in neither case without good
reason. The Duke's hasty recall of both Abercromby
and Pulteney, instead of holding on to Oudkarspel, and
using a part of Abercromby's force to support it,
showed that he had lost his head for the moment ;
and this was not calculated to encourage the troops.
On the other hand, the disorder of the retreat on
the right and the helplessness of the brigadiers
in that difficult duty were enough to discourage any
General.
Two days later Admiral Mitchell took a flotilla of Sept. 21
gunboats into the Zuider Zee, and paid visits to
Medemblick and Enckhuisen, where the inhabitants
hoisted the Orange standard ; while another detach-
ment of the like craft sailed across and made a raid
upon Lemmer, on the west coast of Friesland. There
was, however, little profit in these operations, and,
indeed, the Admiral seems to have been no very
enterprising officer, or he would long before have
prepared his gunboats, as Abercromby had urged,
682 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1799. and have threatened Amsterdam. 1 However, on the
Sept. 24. 2 ^th of September a new corps of from three to four
thousand Russians from Kronstadt was disembarked,
and at about the same time there arrived also three
troops of the Fifteenth Light Dragoons, and a com-
pany or two of riflemen from the Sixth battalion of
the Sixtieth a battalion not yet two months old,
and, of course, composed of foreigners. The Duke
of York, therefore, lost no time in making prepara-
tions for a second attack. The plans which he sub-
mitted to Abercromby and Dundas were three. The
first was to detach a strong corps to eastward to
threaten the French right, and in co-operation with
the fleet to alarm Amsterdam. This Abercromby
rejected on the ground that this detachment, if raised
to a proper strength, would leave too few men to
hold the lines of the Zype. A second proposal, to
hold the present position, and send seven thousand
men to hearten the Orange party in Friesland and
Groningen was rejected both by David Dundas and
Abercromby, as promising no certain result and
giving the enemy time to gather reinforcements.
It was, therefore, decided to adopt the third plan,
namely, to make a second general attack upon the
enemy's position, directing an overwhelming force
upon his left, and entrusting the hardest of the work,
namely, the advance along the sea-shore from Petten,
to the best of the British troops with Abercromby in
command.
The attack was fixed for the 29th of September,
and the columns were actually formed up at day-
break ; but a heavy south - westerly gale made the
march of troops along the beach impossible, and drove
the sand so furiously before it in the dunes that
no troops could have fought against it with success.
Further operations were therefore unavoidably delayed
for three days, which Brune did not fail to turn to
account by perfecting his defences. Warmenhuizen
1 Abercromby to Dundas, 4th September 1799.
CH. xxiv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 683
was indeed abandoned, but Oudkarspel was further 1799.
strengthened by inundations. Koedyck, a village on
the great canal about three miles to south-east of
Schoorl, and Schoorl itself were fortified by additional
entrenchments ; and the reclaimed fens called the
Schermer, Beemster and Purmer, to east and south-
east of Alkmaar, were flooded, thus effectually cover-
ing his right flank and rear. Finally, a reinforcement
of four French squadrons, four French and several
Dutch battalions made good to him his losses in
the last action, and raised his force to about twenty-
five thousand men.
The Duke of York laid his plans for the attack
in four principal columns.
The First or Right Column consisted of D'Oyley's,
Moore's, and Cavan's brigades, and Macdonald's
Reserve, in all about eight thousand bayonets ;
together with one troop of Horse Artillery and
nine squadrons of the Seventh, Eleventh, and
Fifteenth Light Dragoons, making seven hundred
and fifty sabres, under Lord Paget. It was ordered
to march along the beach against Egmont-aan-Zee 1
and to turn the enemy's left flank.
The Second Column was composed wholly ot
Russian troops, eight thousand of them infantry,
and two hundred Cossacks, under their own General
Essen. It was directed to follow the road under the
eastern face of the sand-dunes, which Hermann had
traversed on the I9th of September, through Groet
and Schoorl upon Bergen, keeping a detachment
under General Sedmoratzky on its eastern side so
as to cover its left flank and maintain communica-
tion with the next column.
This, the Third Column, under command of David
Dundas, was formed of Chatham's, Coote's and
Burrard's brigades, with one squadron of the Eleventh
Light Dragoons ; in all about forty - five hundred
1 The form most familiar to Englishmen is Egmont-op-Zee, bu
I adhere to the name as given on modern Dutch maps.
684 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1799. bayonets and one hundred sabres. Of these, Coote's
Sept. brigade was to follow the advanced guard of Aber-
cromby's column to Kamp, and there turning east-
ward to take in reverse the defences which barred
the advance of the Russians, and to cover Essen's
right flank. Chatham's brigade was to follow in
support of Essen's corps for the attack on Bergen,
and in conjunction with Coote's to endeavour to
maintain communication with Abercromby. Burrard's
brigade was to move on the eastern side of the Great
Northern Canal and combine with Sedmoratzky's
corps in the attack on Schoorldam, being assisted by
seven gunboats, specially prepared and protected for
the purpose, upon the canal itself.
The Fourth Column, under Pulteney, consisted
of Prince William's, Don's, and Manners's brigades,
two battalions of Russians, and two squadrons of
the Eighteenth Light Dragoons. It was posted so as
to cover the left of the British position to the
Zuider Zee, threaten the enemy's right, and take
advantage of any favourable opportunity that might
offer itself. It numbered forty-eight hundred bayonets
and one hundred and fifty sabres, and was stationed
chiefly at Schagen. 1
The attacking army, excluding the Fourth Column,
was reckoned at twenty -two thousand bayonets and
sabres, or, making allowance for officers and sergeants,
about twenty-five thousand of all ranks.
It will be observed that the greater part of this force
was to act in the sand-dunes, the one space unbroken
by dykes, ditches, and canals in Brune's line of defence ;
and it is therefore necessary to describe them some-
what minutely. From Kamp southward to Bergen,
a distance of about four miles, the dunes rise to a
larger scale than at any other point on the coast.
Beginning with a breadth of two or three hundred
1 I have taken the numbers from the plan enclosed in the Duke
of York's letter to Dundas of 25th September, corrected by the
slight alterations that are shown in his despatch of 6th October.
CH. xxiv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 685
yards at Kamp itself, they widen rapidly to more 1799.
than a mile opposite Groet, to about three miles Sept.
opposite Schoorl, and to close upon four miles mid-
way between Schoorl and Bergen. In this last space
they attain to the dignity of true hills, with a height
of fully one hundred and fifty feet, and with un-
broken ridges, four or five hundred yards in length,
covered with heather and stunted coppice. On
the seaward side they rise abruptly, like cliffs, for
some eighty feet sheer above a broad beach. To
landward they descend, for the most part, as abruptly
to the level plain of the fen, covered with long strips
of dense scrub and coppice, chiefly birch, which,
where fully sheltered from the westerly wind, grows
to a respectable height. Between the two outer ridges
to seaward and to landward lies a chaos of lower
sand-hills, for the most part bare or held together
by coarse grasses, but frequently presenting narrow
valleys of nearly level ground, dotted with heather
and low creeping shrubs, and broken by occasional
patches of dense stunted birch from a quarter to
a half of an acre in extent. These little valleys are
in places fully half a mile long, and from fifty to
one hundred yards broad ; and it is important to
note that they are to be found, for the most part,
immediately within the two outermost ridges. Hence,
if a force were advancing in line through the dunes,
the two flanks, unless constantly checked, would
inevitably soon outstrip the centre.
It must be remarked also that, once within this con-
fusion of sand-hills, a man is practically shut off from
the world without. A company advancing just within
the seaward ridge, and another company advancing
along the beach within three hundred yards of it would
be out of sight, and, from the roar of wind and sea,
out of hearing of each other. The only means for
preserving communication between them would be
for one man, or a few men, to follow the comb of
the outermost ridge itself, ascending and descending
686 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1 799. knee-deep in loose sand, along a surface where hardly
Sept. three consecutive steps would be upon the same level.
Troops summoned from the beach to the dunes
would equally have to climb up a sheer ascent of
eighty or a hundred feet knee-deep in sand, no very
easy matter to men burdened with a heavy musket
and a pack. Finally, within the dunes themselves,
an officer could rarely see to any distance either to
front or flank without a laborious scramble to the
summit of some ridge or hummock, where his figure
would stand clear against the sky-line, an easy mark
for sharp-shooters, who even within a few yards of
him could find ample means of concealment. It
will, therefore, be gathered that it was difficult to
move infantry, and quite impossible to move -artillery
through the dunes. Hence, Abercromby could take
no guns with him except a single troop of horse-
artillery and two six -pounders, which were practi-
cally tied to the beach ; and freedom of movement
even on the beach, owing to quicksands and
other obvious causes, was dependent on the state of
the tide.
So much for the difficulties of the advance and
the maintenance of communication between the beach
and the dunes. Scarcely less formidable were those
that beset the communication between the dunes and
the reclaimed fen to landward. The road from Kamp
to Bergen runs at first about five hundred yards
distant from the foot of the sand-hills, draws closer
to them at the village of Groet for a few hundred
yards, recedes again for a short distance, and finally
returning to them at the village of Schoorl hugs
them closely all the way to Bergen. At Groet there
begins on the eastern slope of the sand-hills a chain
of rough coppice, which continues almost unbroken
to Bergen ; while that slope itself from Schoorl south-
ward is often for many hundred yards so steep that
a man could hardly ride, and could only with difficulty
lead, a horse from the road to the summit. A blinder
CH. xxiv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 687
country, and one more difficult for scouts, it would 1799.
be difficult to find. But this is not all. Immediately
to south of Bergen the width of the dunes suddenly
contracts from four miles to two, and continues to
shrink steadily to southward, until at Egmont-aan-
Zee it hardly exceeds a mile. The hills themselves
also become easier and lower, while the plain immedi-
ately to east of Egmont itself, though perfectly level,
is for nearly a mile in width sound, firm ground,
enclosed by banks and free from the ditches that
make the plain of North Holland impassable. It
is, in fact, ground where troops can deploy, where
artillery can move, and where cavalry can act.
There is also a gap in the dunes at Egmont-aan-
Zee, and a road running eastward from it to Egmont-
aan-den-Hoef whereby guns could be easily moved to
or from either flank of the sand-hills. To south of
Egmont-aan-Zee the dunes, though low and scattered,
broaden out once more, while a great number of
little copses on each side of the road afford addi-
tional facilities for a force retiring southward to cover
its retreat. A reserve of French troops about Egmont-
aan-Zee and Egmont -aan- den -Hoef could either
prevent an exhausted enemy from debouching from
the dunes on to the plain, and cut them off from
water, or, if forced back, could effectually harass, if
not actually prevent, their further advance. 1
The morning of the 2nd of October broke fine Oct. 2.
and warm, though the wind still blew too strongly
from the south-west to permit the flotilla on the
Zuider Zee to make a demonstration, as had been
intended, on the right flank of the French. About
six o'clock the tide was at ebb, and Abercromby's
column moved out of Petten, the advanced guard
being formed by a squadron of the Seventh Light
Dragoons with two guns of the Horse Artillery.
1 I feel constrained to apologise for so lengthy a description of
this little strip of country ; but without it any conception of the
difficulty of the Duke of York's task is impossible.
688 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1799. The French picquet at Kamperduin retired without
Oct. 2. resistance, merely firing a signal -gun as it went ;
and Abercromby's column, with the other brigades
that followed it, passed on to the sand-hills and
deployed. Coote's brigade, pursuant to its orders,
turned sharply to eastward, making for the road to
Schoorldam. Macdonald's Reserve, strengthened by
two composite battalions of the Grenadiers and Light
Infantry of the Line, and by three hundred Russian
Light Infantry, also turned to the east, its duty being
to cover the left flank of Abercromby's main column.
Moore's brigade, which formed the advanced guard,
likewise entered the sand-dunes, keeping its right flank
on the hills that rise immediately from the beach,
while the rest of the column followed the beach
itself, 1 the right flank of the cavalry being constantly
in the water. The enemy was visible in small bodies
both on the shore and among the dunes ; and a
few skirmishers presently engaged and annoyed the
Reserve. Thereupon Macdonald, who has been
described by one of his contemporaries as a " very
wild warrior," strayed away to eastward in pursuit
of them, leaving the flank of Abercromby's column
uncovered. Unable to discover what had become of
the Reserve, and finding his flank galled by the
French light troops, Abercromby was obliged to
delay and weaken his advance by throwing out a
flank-guard. Moore accordingly detached the Twenty-
fifth and Seventy-ninth for this duty, taking command
of them in person.
He had scarcely formed them before the French
attacked them in earnest, but were driven back by a
charge with the bayonet, though not before Moore had
been struck in the thigh by a bullet. He continued
1 The British Military Library, ii. 1 1 1, says that Cavan's brigade
(which was commanded by General Hutchinson) followed Coote's
brigade and advanced along the heights overlooking the road to
Schoorl. All other authorities point to its having been on the
beach, but I can find no trace of the part that it took in the action,
and its casualties were slight.
CH. xxiv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 689
however, to command his brigade, and the advance was 1799.
resumed, the French light troops retreating before him, Oct - 2 -
but skilfully using all the innumerable advantages of
the ground to harass and oppose him. Gradually more
battalions were thrown out to bear back the pressure on
Moore's left flank and rear, first the Royals and Forty-
ninth, and later the Grenadier battalion of Guards
from the beach ; and thus it came about that, the
difficulties both of the ground and of the enemy's
attacks being greatest upon his left, Moore's whole
brigade was drawn out into a long irregular echelon, the
Twenty-fifth leading it on the right at a considerable
distance in advance of the other battalions. However,
after five hours' march in these trying circumstances,
Abercromby's column arrived within about a mile of
Egmont, where the enemy stood in force in a strong
position. 1
Their officers quickly noticed Moore's disordered
battalions, and forthwith launched upon them their
own fresh and unwearied troops. The Twenty-fifth
was struck heavily in front and flank, and three com-
panies of the Ninety-second, coming to their assist-
ance, were clumsily led straight through the hottest of
the fire. The whole began to give way, and at this
critical moment Moore was struck down by a bullet
behind the ear, and fell to the ground stunned and
helpless. The rest of the Ninety- second, however,
backed by the First Guards, came up on the right of
the Twenty-fifth ; the Royals, Forty-ninth, and Grena-
diers of the Guards hastened to close up to their left ;
and the fight was renewed. A confused struggle
followed, which lasted the best part of an hour ; small
bodies of men on both sides closing with each other,
and, unable to use their weapons in the unstable sand,
1 After close examination of the ground I and my companion
came to the conclusion that this position was exactly opposite the
village of Wimmenum, where a transverse ridge of very steep sand-
hills, with a multitude of little copses, cuts across the dunes from
east to west. But, in truth, the whole of the dunes form one con-
tinuous defensive position.
690 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1799. betaking themselves to their fists. At length, wearied
Oct. 2. ou t ? the French retired to their first position,
the British halted over against them, and, as if by
tacit agreement, the contest ceased in this part of the
field. 1
In this situation Abercromby found himself as the
sun began to decline. Moore's brigade, the only one
except the Guards which was composed of trained
soldiers, was utterly exhausted by fighting, and
weakened by the loss of nearly seven hundred men
and of forty-four officers, among whom was Moore
himself, the best officer of all. To renew his attack
he had no trained soldiers except the two battalions
of Guards, of which the first had lost nearly seventy
officers and men in the struggle to rescue the Twenty-
fifth, while the Grenadiers, though they had suffered
far less, had shared in the distressing march through
the sand-hills. To support them he had only three
battalions of Militia, numbering fewer than eighteen
hundred men. The enemy in his front was in great
force ; reinforcements were visible marching to join
them ; and their artillery, far surpassing his own in
weight and number of guns, had already made itself
felt among the troops on the beach. Of the rest of
the British army he could see nothing and hear
nothing. From Macdonald he had received not a
word except one note written some hours before, to
say that he was at Groet, which was at least three
miles from where he ought to have been. Weary in
body, for two horses had been killed under him,
perplexed and harassed in spirit, Abercromby was fain
to halt, and, while making a show of a bold front, to
look for a position against the coming of night.
Nor had the other columns fared much better.
Coote's brigade duly scoured the sand-hills on the
right of Essen's column, while Sedmoratzky and
Burrard cleared the plain on their left ; but though
the French retired without much resistance from
1 Narrative of a Private Soldier in the gznd Eoot, pp. 46-48.
CH. xxiv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 691
Groet and Schoorl, they stood for some time at 1799.
Schoorldam, until driven out at about eleven o'clock ^ ct - 2 -
by Sedmoratzky and Burrard. At this point, however,
Essen halted the whole of the Russians and declined to
budge further, thus preventing Burrard from moving
forward against Koedyck, and leaving only Coote's
and Chatham's brigades to Dundas for the capture of
Bergen. Coote's battalions were at the time above
Schoorl, extended at wide intervals into the sand-hills
and making little progress. Dundas therefore passed
Chatham's brigade to the right of Coote's, and moved
it forward so as to threaten the left flank of the French,
who retired to the heights above Bergen itself, from
whence they opened a heavy cannonade upon Dundas's
line. The British, easily finding shelter among the
dunes, suffered little ; and an attempt at a counter-
attack from the French along the avenue that led into
Bergen was repulsed with heavy loss by the Eighty-
fifth. Dundas now passed three battalions of Coote's
brigade to the right of Chatham's ; and these unex-
pectedly found their right in contact with Macdonald's
Reserve, which had been floundering aimlessly among
the sand-hills all day. The whole were therefore
formed in line, Coote's and Chatham's brigades to east
of the road from Bergen to Egmont, and Macdonald's
battalions to west of it. A general advance swept the
enemy from the sand-hills on the right front ; and the
eleven battalions established themselves astride of the
road, thus cutting the direct communication between the
French on the beach and their comrades in Bergen.
Meanwhile Abercromby, though remaining halted,
had pushed his troop of Horse Artillery well in advance,
its escort of dragoons standing dismounted a little in
rear of it and hidden from the enemy's view by a
sand-hill. General Vandamme, who had just brought
up two battalions and a squadron of hussars from
Alkmaar, perceiving the guns to be unprotected, sent
forward the hussars to make a swoop upon them ; and
so swiftly and cunningly did these French horsemen
692 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1799. advance that they were actually in the midst of the
Oct. 2. battery before they were discovered. But a dozen
English sergeants and officers, among whom were
Paget, Robert Wilson, and Colonel Erskine of the
Fifteenth, had remained in the saddle ; and this hand-
ful of horsemen galloping straight at the hussars
engaged them so vigorously as to gain time for the
escort to mount. The British Light Dragoons speedily
came up to their assistance and every man of the
French squadron was cut down or captured.
This closed the action on the western flank. Far
away to eastward Pulteney had played his part in
threatening Oudkarspel and the French right with
sufficient skill and prudence ; and at nightfall the
divisions of Dundas and Abercromby bivouacked on
the ground that they had won, Macdonald bringing
his weary and jaded men into Abercromby 's lines at
dusk. The action had lasted for over twelve hours,
and the men were terribly fatigued. They had by
the Duke's order left their packs behind, and carried
only a blanket or a great-coat and three days' provisions ;
but, parched by the wind and by the salt and sand with
which it was loaded, the men had emptied their water-
bottles by noon, and there was no water in the bivouac.
Suffering agonies from thirst, they were unable to touch
their salted rations, and lay down in misery until, as
had already happened in every twenty-four hours of
this campaign, the rain presently came down in torrents
and gave them relief. Wringing their dripping clothes
into their hats they drank the water greedily ; and
when the morning came, it was found that Brune
had withdrawn his army from its position between
Oudkarspel and Egmont and retreated. He retired,
however, at his leisure and in perfect order, only to
take up a shorter and more formidable line from Wyk-
aan-Zee on the west through Beverwyk to Purmerend.
The action had not accomplished much towards the
conquest of Holland.
However, the Duke of York could justly claim a
CH. xxiv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 693
victory, and the name of Egmont-op-Zee is still borne 1799.
on the colours of the regiments engaged. But it was Oct - 2
the kind of victory which ruins an army. The loss of
the British amounted to over fifteen hundred officers
and men, 1 and of the Russians to over six hundred
officers and men killed, wounded, and missing, making
over two thousand casualties altogether. Considerably
more than half of this loss fell, as has been said, upon
Abercromby's Division, and chiefly upon Moore's
brigade, wherein the Ninety-second Highlanders alone
counted fourteen officers and two hundred men fallen,
besides forty more missing. Macdonald also had con-
trived in the course of his foolish wanderings to throw
away nearly three hundred men of the Reserve ; his
raw troops having suffered heavily from the French
riflemen. 2 The loss of the French was at least as
great ; and they left seven guns, besides a few hundred
prisoners, as trophies to the Duke. But there can be
no doubt that the British in the sand-hills were out-
fought throughout the day by the enemy, for the simple
reason that the French had an active and well-trained
light infantry, whereas the British had none. Moore
himself was obliged to drive off the French skirmishers
with the bayonet, having no skirmishers of his own
with which to meet them ; and the huge militiamen
of the massed grenadier-companies exhausted them-
selves in rushing up sand-hills after the nimble little
Frenchmen, who indeed always retired, but were seldom
if ever overtaken. This was one cause of the general
failure of the attack. Others, which chiefly contributed
to it, were the sulky refusal of the Russians to advance,
and the powerlessness of Abercromby upon his arrival
1 1 1 officers and 226 men killed ; 74 officers, 1033 men wounded;
5 officers and 218 men missing; 125 horses killed, wounded, and
missing.
" 2 Surtees, Twenty-jive Tears in the Rifle Brigade,^. 16-20. The
author at the time was in the light company of the Fifty-sixth.
From his account it is plain that the Reserve became broken up,
and that there were companies of it scattered along the whole line
from Bergen to the sea.
694 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1799. before Egmont owing to the vagaries of Macdonald.
But, in truth, even the most highly -trained troops
under the best of officers might easily have come to
misfortune over a plan of operations which was neces-
sarily complicated owing to the enormous difficulties of
the country.
On the days following the action Abercromby moved
forward to the south of Egmont-aan-Zee, the Russians
to Egmont Binnen on Abercromby's left, Dundas to
Alkmaar and to Heiloo on the road to Haarlem, and
Pulteney to the space between Alkmaar and Schermer-
horn, with Prince William's brigade detached to Hoorn.
But these dispositions were made in the most careless
and slovenly fashion, and for two days Abercromby
remained isolated at Egmont without a man between
him and Alkmaar. 1 Meanwhile Brune, having been
reinforced by six French battalions from Belgium, had
fortified a triple line of posts, the foremost running
from South Bakkum through Limmen to Akersloot
and the Lange Meer, the next from Heemskerk to
Uitgeest, and the third from Wyk-aan-Zee to Bever-
wyk ; while Daendels held the passes through the
inundations to eastward at Knollendam and Purmerend,
with a reserve in rear of the latter at Monnikendam.
The Duke of York, somewhat elated by his victory
and in difficulties over supplies for his army, was
anxious to force the position of Beverwyk before
Brune could fortify it effectually ; and, ignorant of
his true dispositions, ordered the advanced posts on his
Oct. 6 right to move forward on the morning of the 6th and
to occupy the villages in their front. Accordingly, so
far as can be gathered, a part of Abercromby's division
advanced through the sand-hills on the coast, Essen's
Russians moved upon South Bakkum, and Coote's and
Burrard's brigades upon Limmen and Akersloot re-
spectively. All three of the villages were captured
with little difficulty, five companies of the Coldstream
1 Diary of Sir John Moore, i. 358. Bunbury, Great War with
France, p. 31.
CH. xxiv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 695
and Third Guards making a brilliant charge at Akers- 1799.
loot and capturing two hundred prisoners. But Essen, Oct -
not content with this, insisted upon wandering still
further south, unaware that Brune had been concen-
trating upon his second line of defence ; and upon
reaching Kastrikum, on the road a little to southward
of South Bakkum, the Russian General found his easy
progress arrested by a sharp resistance from three
French battalions. Instantly he sent for reinforce-
ments. Battalion after battalion of his own troops
hurried forward to join him ; Abercromby also came
forward on the west ; and the French commander,
rinding that Abercromby was gaining way and likely
to outflank him, evacuated the village and fell back
to a position in the sand-hills. From Egmont Binnen
southward to Kastrikum and beyond it, the dunes again
widen out to a breadth of fully three miles, no longer
separated by a hard line from the cultivated plain, but
gradually merged in it, in a tangle of little hills,
enclosures, and copses. Here, therefore, the French
held their own till Brune came to their support with
the greater part of a division ; and then for three
hours a stubborn conflict was' maintained with little
advantage to either side, until Brune observed British
troops, presumably Burrard's brigade, moving from
the east to the help of Essen. Thereupon he detached
three battalions to hold Burrard in check, and, massing
the remainder in close columns, fell upon the Russians
with the bayonet, and drove them headlong back to
Kastrikum.
Here Essen rallied his broken battalions, calling
urgently to Abercromby for help ; but hardly had he
succeeded in forming about four thousand men and
posting his guns to command the approaches to the
village, when the French division came upon him in
pursuit. A sharp struggle followed ; but Brune's
men, pressing on with the impetuosity of success,
speedily captured his guns and again drove him back
along the two roads to South Bakkum and Limmen.
VOL. IV H
696 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1799. The French cavalry followed them up keenly on the
Oct. 6. western road, until a small party of British horse,
apparently of the Seventh Light Dragoons under Lord
Paget, crashed in upon their left flank from an ambush
in the dunes and sent them galloping back in wild
confusion upon the French infantry. 1 The effect of
this unexpected charge of a few score of resolute men
was astonishing. The panic of the French horsemen
communicated itself to the French foot, and the whole,
some two or three thousand strong, gave way and ran
back to Kastrikum. It was but just in time, for an
unbridged stream lay in the rear of the Russians, and
their destruction was almost inevitable. The attack of
the dragoons, however, gave them breathing-time and
recovered for them their guns. Abercromby appeared
in person with one brigade from the west, and two of
Dundas's battalions from the east. The bridge was
repaired ; the stream was passed ; and the fight ended
at the villages of Bakkum and Limmen, whence both
sides retired in the darkness to their first positions.
It is difficult to know what to make of this strange
scramble of an action. It seems certain that the Duke
of York had intended only to drive in the French out-
posts on the 6th, and to advance in force on the following
day ; and the British blamed Essen for carrying his
troops too far forward in contempt of the Duke's
orders. Since Essen, by all accounts, refused to have
any dealing with the Duke and made a point of dis-
obeying his commands, this may well have been the
case ; but the fact remains that the Duke allowed the
whole of his force to drift into a general action for no
particular object, without the slightest idea how to
control it. He was, in fact, in Alkmaar, with one of
1 This charge of the Seventh Light Dragoons (for, putting the
various accounts together, I think it certain that the credit of the
action belongs to them) must have taken place where the road
passes actually through a belt of the dunes a little to the north of
South Bakkum. There is a small open space, just large enough
for a couple of squadrons, adjoining the road but invisible until
actually entered, where they were probably formed.
CH. xxiv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 697
his staff perched on the top of the church-spire and 1799.
with aides-de-camp flying in all directions to discover Oct -
what had become of his army. The country, as has
been told, was extremely difficult and intricate ; the
rain was falling in torrents ; the smoke hung thickly
among the trees ; and in all directions were bodies of
troops engaging whatever enemy came first to hand,
and advancing or retiring, sometimes in great disorder, 1
according as they were the weaker or the stronger
party. Yet it seems that the Duke had notice of the
first serious encounter of the Russians with the French
from Abercromby, with a warning that the enemy
seemed to intend a general attack. No notice, how-
ever, was taken of this ; and the Duke being at
dinner, only invited the messenger, a certain Major
James Kempt, to join him at table. Fortunately Brune
did not meditate a general attack ; but the engage-
ment was sufficiently costly. The Russians returned
a loss of over eleven hundred of all ranks, and the
British casualties amounted to over eight hundred
killed and wounded, and over six hundred prisoners. 2
The brigade that suffered most severely was Chatham's,
in which the three battalions of the Fourth lost nearly
one hundred and fifty officers and men killed and
wounded, and over five hundred, including thirteen
officers, prisoners ; while the Thirty-first lost over
one hundred killed and wounded and thirty-three
prisoners. In what part of the field these battalions
were engaged I have been unable to discover, but under
so incompetent a brigadier they were likely to come to
misfortune in any position. According to one authority
Chatham himself was wounded, but not, apparently,
in time to save him from wrecking his unfortunate
troops. Far heavier work fell upon Hutchinson with
the Twentieth and Sixty-third, who was left to hold
1 See the account of the rout of the grenadier-companies before
Egmont Binnen in Surtees, pp. 24-25.
2 4 officers, 91 men killed ; 36 officers, 696 men wounded ;
19 officers, 593 men missing.
698 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1799. his own against superior forces in the dunes while
Oct. 6. Abercromby was extricating Essen's disordered battal-
ions. Hutchinson himself was struck in the thigh
by a bullet ; the Sixty-third lost nearly two hundred
of all ranks, one-fourth of them missing, and the two
battalions of the Twentieth over one hundred and
eighty more ; but the brigade did its difficult duty
well. The loss of the French was probably somewhat
smaller than that of the Allies, though they too left
five hundred prisoners in the hands of the British.
But there could be no question that with them lay the
advantage of the day. 1
On that night Abercromby, David Dundas, Pul-
teney, and Hulse, the four Lieutenant-generals with
the army, went to the Duke of York, and told him
that he must retreat ; and both they and he wrote to
Henry Dundas their reasons for the necessity. The
army since landing had fought five considerable actions,
costing altogether nine to ten thousand men, but had
made little or no progress. The country was singu-
larly difficult ; the sand-hills afforded neither fuel nor
cover ; the plain of North Holland, always low and
marshy, was so soaked by continuous rain that troops
could not be encamped, even if there had been means of
transporting tents ; and all movements were confined to
dykes and roads, of which the latter had been much
damaged by the enemy. So far the army's supplies
had been carried on the canals ; but even so it had been
impossible ever to keep more than two days' victuals
in hand, and seldom even so much. The canals had
now come to an end, and, owing to the want of wheeled
carriage, every step in advance increased the difficulties
of transport and supply. Moreover, it was well known
1 Few modern actions are so obscure as this last, not a single
English person present, apparently, having left any account of it.
The above account is drawn chiefly from Jomini, iv. 67. Moore
was not present. Bunbury's narrative is as vague as the Duke of
York's despatch of yth October, wherein he reported the action.
Maule, the Military Library, and Colburn's Military Magazine give
few or no particulars.
CH. xxiv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 699
that, owing to the state of the roads and the lowness 1799.
of the land, military operations generally became im- Oct. 6.
possible in Holland in November. The Russians were
disheartened, and there was no friendly feeling between
them and the British. A renewal of the attack would be
hazardous in the extreme, for the French had been re-
inforced ; and even if they were beaten it would be
impossible to follow them owing to the state of the
roads, the lack of waggons, and the presence of the
Dutch on the eastern flank. Defeat, on the other
hand, would mean utter disaster. " Were we to sus-
tain a severe check," wrote Abercromby privately, " I
much doubt if the discipline of the troops would be
sufficient to prevent a total dissolution of the army.
This is melancholy, and is the natural consequence of
young soldiers and inexperienced officers all-powerful
if attacked, but without resource if beaten." x
Accordingly the Duke retreated on the following day, Oct. 7.
leaving his wounded behind him for want of means of
conveyance, and on the morrow re-entered the lines of Oct. 8.
the Zype. So terrible was the state of the roads after
weeks of rain that his few waggons took two days to
cover nine miles ; but, though the French followed him
closely, the army suffered little loss. An attack was
indeed made by Daendels upon Prince William's
brigade on its retreat from Hoorn, but this was re-
pulsed with little trouble. Even within the lines,
however, the difficulties of supplies recurred, there
being but nine days' provisions in store. The Com-
missary had sent ships to Hamburg and Bremen for
flour more than a month before, but, owing to foul
winds or other causes, not one had yet returned.
Abercromby thereupon wrote to Henry Dundas that
the sooner the army re-embarked the better, though
even with the best management it could not hope
to evacuate Holland without loss of horses and
1 The Lieutenant-generals to Dundas, 6th October; Aber-
cromby to same, 8th October ; York to same, 7th and 8th October
1799.
700 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1799. artillery. The Helder by itself was untenable, and
Oct - could not by any means be made secure for the winter.
The Zype position, though strong, was so extensive as
to throw much labour on the troops, who were already
sickening fast ; and it was out of the question for the
army to winter there, if only for the reason that the
navigation to it was generally closed by the middle of
November. The re-embarkation itself promised to be
a most difficult matter, for the Zype was the only
position that really covered the port, and as the troops
were gradually withdrawn from it, the enemy would
have the better chance of attacking it with success.
Moreover, the Helder could not be strengthened so
as to hold out above three or four days against siege-
artillery ; and, if it were captured, every ship in the
Mars Diep would be captured with it. In fact, the
situation was as awkward and as dangerous as could
well be conceived ; and, to distress the Commanders
still further, there came at this time the news of
Massena's victory at Zurich on the nth of September,
and of the defeat of the Allies in Switzerland. 1
Fortunately Brune's officers threw out a hint of an
armistice and a convention, which was eagerly caught
up by the Duke's staff. Negotiations were accordingly
opened on the I4th, Major-general Knox acting very
Oct. 1 8. ably on behalf of the British, and by the i8th a capitu-
lation was agreed upon. The conditions were that hostili-
ties should cease and that the British should evacuate the
country by the 3Oth of November, yielding up eight
thousand French and Dutch prisoners from England,
though without prejudice to the cartel already fixed for
exchange of prisoners during the past campaign. The
Dutch fleet was to remain in the hands of its captors.
Though Brune did not know it, the British had but
Oct. 20. three days' bread left on the 2oth ; and indeed Aber-
cromby looked upon the loss of half of the army as so
certain that he could not conceive why the French
1 Abercromby to Dundas, izth October; York to Dundas,
1 2th, 1 4th, and i8th October 1799.
CH. xxiv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 701
agreed to such easy terms. However, fortunately for 1799.
Pitt and Dundas, they did, thanks not a little to the Oct -
astuteness of Knox. Further supplies of flour arrived
shortly after the signing of the capitulation ; and with
some difficulty, owing to continual storms, the whole
of the troops were embarked by the appointed day.
By that time sickness had reduced the British to
twenty -four thousand and the Russians to nine
thousand effective men. Bad luck continued to dog the
expedition to the last, for three ships of war were
wrecked on the Dutch coast, two of them with all
hands, and a transport with over two hundred and
fifty of the Twenty-third on board was also cast away,
and only twenty of the soldiers saved. However, the
remainder of the troops seem to have reached England
in safety, including the Russians, who, after astounding
the good people of Yarmouth by drinking the oil from
the street-lamps, were finally quartered in the Channel
Islands. So ended the expedition to the Helder. 1
The enterprise is of interest in many respects as
being, in spite of its failure, the first undertaken by
the renovated, or rather of the new, British Army.
The force was of course raw, unformed, hastily as-
sembled, and therefore utterly unfit to be plunged, as
it was, immediately into active service ; but, none the
less, considered as material, it was the best that
England had put into the field since Cromwell's regi-
ments were disbanded. There was singularly little
crime among the soldiers, in spite of the demoralising
company of the poor underpaid Russians ; and Aber-
cromby declared the Militiamen to be, in his judg-
ment, a superior class of men and a great acquisition
to the Army. Mingled with them were a certain
number of Irish, hot from the late insurrection ; and
an officer recorded many years later that the best
soldiers during the campaign in his own very strong
1 York to Dundas, 2Oth and zist October; Abercromby to
Dundas, I9th October 1799. Dunfermline's Life of Abercromby,
pp. 197-203 ; Colburn's Military Magazine, February 1836.
702 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1 799. company were six rebels captured at Vinegar Hill. 1 Un-
fortunately the officers were not only deficient in num-
bers, but many were very young and inexperienced men
who had been lifted, by the sudden augmentation of the
regiments, prematurely to superior rank. In fact, the
hurrying of this crude force into the field at a moment's
notice was a shameful injustice alike to Generals, regi-
mental officers, sergeants, and men ; and it was credit-
able to them to have got through the campaign, with
all their faults, as well as they did. It was, however,
a great point that this new material had been found.
" In the spring," wrote Abercromby to Dundas, "you
will have a fine army, if the brigades are put under
Major-generals who are capable of instructing young
officers and training young soldiers. They must
remain stationary, and not be allowed to dance all
over Great Britain." Here, therefore, was a promise of
a future camp at Shorncliffe, though not yet of a Light
Division. 2 Nevertheless, as has been seen, there were
a few riflemen, actual members of the British Army,
who took a share in this campaign ; and this marked a
step in advance, which, as shall be seen, was soon to
be carried still further.
Another innovation was the appointment for the
first time in our history of an officer in supreme
command of the Artillery, at whose recommendation
Abercromby withdrew the battalion - guns from the
infantry and massed them into four brigades or, as
we should now call them, batteries, each of four six-
pounders. 3 But the campaign was altogether an
important one in the history of the Artillery, for it
not only brought that arm into the field for the first
time with its own drivers, but launched the Horse
Artillery likewise into active service, and gave its
baptism of fire to the famous Chestnut Battery. 4
1 Col burn's Military Magazine, ut supra.
2 Abercromby to Dundas, nth September 1797. Military
Magazine, ut supra ; Life of Abercromby, p. 202.
3 Lieut.-col. Whitworth to Abercromby, 5th July 1799.
4 Duncan, History of the Royal Artillery, ii. 88 sq.
CH. xxiv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 703
Still more interesting was the appearance of a 1799.
new corps called the Royal Waggon Train, which,
though only formed for the first time on the i2th
of August, was at once carried across the North Sea.
It consisted of five troops, which on the 2ist of Sep-
tember were increased to eight, each of four officers
and seventy-one men, of whom sixty were drivers ;
and a Waggon-Master-General was placed in command
of the whole. The pay of the Waggon-Train was the
same as of the Cavalry, the men being in fact such
troopers of the Cavalry as were nearly worn out or
" did not match their regiments." l Considering that
Abercromby sailed on the day after the order for the
formation of this corps was issued, it may readily be
conceived that no part of it was ready to accompany
him. But it appears that fragments of it soon reached
the Duke of York, and that, by the time when he had
decided to re-embark, he had for the first time a sufficient,
or nearly sufficient, number of officers and men to deal
with the transport of his army. It seems, in fact, that
the Government in this expedition to the Helder de-
spatched the troops first, then the supplies, and lastly
the transport ; and, since the difficulties of transport
and supply were among the chief reasons urged for
the retreat and re-embarkation of the army, it is neces-
sary to enter rather more minutely into this dry and
difficult question. 2
An inquiry was held as to the causes why the main
depot of supplies at the Helder had so often been on
the verge of exhaustion ; when both the Treasury and
1 S.C.L.B., 1 2th August, 2 ist September; C.C.L.B., 8th
August 1799.
2 A return of I4th October 1799 shows the strength of the
Waggon-Train at that date in Holland to have been 25 officers,
275 officers and men, and 514 horses. The Duke of York wrote
to Dundas on 24th October that "the Waggon-Train has been
till now inadequate to the service of the Army." I may add that
at the present time the number of four-horse vehicles assigned to
an Army Corps of 36,000 men, excluding all pair-horse carriages,
six-horse carriages, and pack-animals, is 514, the precise figure of
the horses at the Duke of York's command.
yo 4 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1799. the Commissary-general were able to produce vouchers
showing that between the I3th of August and the 2oth
of October there had arrived in Holland from England
ninety-seven days' supplies for forty thousand men.
Aug. 13. The largest shipment was that which left England with
Abercromby, amounting to thirty-five days' subsistence
for forty thousand men ; and yet, though Abercromby
had no more than at first twelve thousand and, after
the 28th of August, seventeen thousand men, his
supplies had already run dangerously short by the 9th
of September ; that is to say, after twenty-eight days
only. This the Commissary-general professed himself
unable to explain at the time ; though he was able to
account for it triumphantly some months later, when it
was discovered that many of the transports on their
return to England contained provisions enough to
victual the men on board for several weeks. It seems
extraordinary that the Commissaries themselves should
have been unaware of this fact ; and indeed their
ignorance reveals extreme incapacity and want of
organisation in this department of the Treasury. But,
apart from this, the Commissariat appears never to
have calculated for the necessity of retaining at least a
month's supplies for the troops upon all the transports,
for it was not safe to allow less even for so short a
voyage as the passage of the German Ocean. Aber-
cromby' s division had been fourteen days on board
ship before it could land at the Helder ; and, with the
dangerous and intricate navigation of the Mars Diep
to be encountered in the face of prevailing westerly
winds, it might well have been delayed even longer in
its return to England. The only retreat of the British,
in case of defeat, lay across the sea, and a General who
failed to keep his ships victualled against such an event,
to say nothing of possible movements of troops by
water in the course of the operations, would have been
a madman.
But, even if Abercromby 's division were adequately
provided for, the same is not true of the Duke of
CH. xxiv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 705
York's army. Its strength was reckoned at forty 1799.
thousand men : it numbered actually from forty-eight
to fifty-four thousand ; and the Russians required a
ration of bread half as large again as the British, 1 so
that the number of bread-rations required must be
taken as at least fifty thousand. 2 At the time when the
Duke of York's army disembarked there had reached Sept. 14.
Holland forty- seven days' bread for forty thousand
men, or say forty days' allowance for fifty thousand.
Of this Abercromby's division had already consumed
the equivalent of at least twelve days' supply, leaving
twenty-eight days' supply only, or about the quantity
that should have been kept on board the ships in case
of re-embarkation. During the remaining sixteen days
of September there arrived, or were purchased with
great difficulty from the fleet and in the country, small
quantities amounting to a further supply for twenty-
eight days, leaving twelve days' allowance on the ist
of October. Between the ist and i9th of October
arrived twelve days' further supply, in two consign-
ments ; but meanwhile, owing to the accumulation of
three thousand Dutch deserters and other adherents of
the Prince of Orange, the number of mouths had
increased. Hence on the I3th of October there was,
both on the transports and ashore, bread for only
twenty- three days for the forty thousand men that
remained of the force. This amount being less than
ought to have been reserved upon the transports against
the event of a disembarkation, it was not untrue that,
when the capitulation was signed, the army was prac-
tically at the end of its supplies.
Sheer misfortune was in great measure responsible
for this, for four months' bread-stuffs for forty thou-
sand men had been purchased in the Elbe just before
1 ij lb. against I Ib.
2 I give the figures of Commissary-general Motz, being uncertain
whether he does or does not make allowance for the extra half-
ration required by the Russians. I am very nearly certain that he
does not ; and if I am right the case against the Treasury is very
much stronger than is here expressed.
yo6 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1 799- Abercromby sailed ; but the ships that carried them
were wind-bound for five weeks and did not reach the
Helder until the 2oth of October. But even if they
had been delayed for one week only, which should
fairly have been taken into calculation, they would
not have reached their destination until a week after
the army had disembarked ; and the season was so
far advanced that time was valuable beyond all price.
This, therefore, cannot excuse the failure to furnish
the Duke with a very large reserve of supplies in
the first instance ; for want of which he was unable to
fill his advanced magazines and to provide adequately
for movements upon a large scale. The truth is that
the Cabinet came to its decision in a hurry, and left
this and many other matters to chance. 1
When even the comparatively simple business of
filling the principal magazine was mismanaged, it is not
surprising that the far more difficult task of distributing
provisions from that magazine was found insuperable.
Abercromby, as has been seen, asked again and again
for horses and waggons, but without result. The
figures as to the waggons and so forth have already
been given and need not be repeated ; but it is beyond
all question that the Ministers deliberately burked the
whole subject of land-carriage, and determined to trust
to water-carriage and to luck. They trusted in vain ;
for the French, as has been told, on learning of Aber-
cromby's approach, removed every boat and waggon
that they could ; but this was a contingency that should
have been reckoned with. Henry Dundas blamed the
weather for everything that went amiss in the matter
of transport and supply ; but, even if his expectations
as to water-carriage had been realised, canals no more
dispense with the need for wheeled -transport than
railways.
In fact it is difficult to decide whether the reckless-
ness of the Government was more conspicuous in the
1 See the voluminous correspondence on this subject in W.O.
Orig. Carres., 64, 65.
CH. xxiv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 707
preparation or in the design of this expedition. The 1799.
dissatisfaction of the public in England over its mis-
carriage was very great ; and the Ministers were there-
fore driven to find new excuses for it. Their first line
of defence was the weather, which beyond question
was cold, rainy and stormy beyond all human experi-
ence, considering the season, and greatly impeded the
progress of the campaign. But rain and tempest
furnished no explanation for putting a raw force into
the field without any transport ; wherefore it was
roundly asserted that all the maritime resources of
England would not then have sufficed to disembark an
army at once complete with the necessary train of
carriages and waggons. This was probably true ; but
the obvious reply was that, in that case, North Holland,
which was known to possess few horses and waggons,
was a very unfortunate field of action to select.
As to the imperfect training and organisation of
the troops, Ministers pleaded that, until the initial
successes of the Allies in Italy and the sailing of the
Brest fleet, they did not feel justified in diminishing the
number of the Militia. But considering that the suc-
cesses of the Allies were well advanced in April, that
the French fleet left Brest on the 25th of that month,
and that the Act for reducing the Militia was not passed
until July, this plea was merely childish. Moreover,
the Militia could, with a little care, have been made
more effective for home defence when converted into
regular regiments than before. The next step, there-
fore, was to prove that the expedition was valuable as a
diversion in favour of the Allies, and that it played a
part in weakening the French numbers at Novi and in
Switzerland. Upon this it is sufficient to remark that
the battle of Novi was fought two days after Aber-
cromby sailed, and that Massena's great victory over
Suvorof in Switzerland was won a week after the Duke
of York had begun to move forward in force.
These pretexts being miserably thin, it was necessary
to back them by some military opinion, which was the
708 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOKXII
1799. more difficult since Abercromby had condemned the
whole enterprise from the first. So far, Dundas in his
correspondence with the Generals in this campaign had
behaved with a candour that did him honour. He had
acknowledged to Abercromby after his embarkation
that he had required of him an unduly hazardous ser-
vice ; and he had acquitted the Duke of York in
generous terms of responsibility for the misfortunes
that compelled him to retreat. But in the House of
Commons his courage failed him ; and he or one of his
colleagues, prompted by him, quoted a single sentence
apart from its context from one of Abercromby 's letters,
to show that the veteran General had looked forward to
a successful campaign. Abercromby strongly remon-
strated against such unfair treatment, but in vain. The
Ministers wrote him many compliments and offered
him a peerage ; but they would not imperil themselves
by telling the truth, and allowed the public to believe that
they had acted in accordance with the General's advice
instead of directly contrary to it. A century has
wrought little change in this respect among British
Ministers of War. 1
The Ministers, therefore, escaped payment of the
penalty for this as for so many previous military
failures ; but meanwhile it is still difficult to discover
what was their real design in sending this large force
to Holland. It is, I think, absolutely certain that they
had no idea of entering upon a regular Continental war
and of making Holland the sphere of operations ;
otherwise the fleet could have been used to transport
the army to the coast of Friesland, thence to strike on
Arnheim and to invade the province by line of the
Waal. Ministers hoped, no doubt, that at the first
appearance of British troops the Dutch would rise,
1 Dundas to York (private), October 1799. Life of Abercromby
pp. 211-215 ; and see four draft memoranda, evidently prepared to
defend the action of Government in W.O. Orig. Corres., 64, 65.
Whole passages from these occur in the speeches of Ministers in
Parliament.
CH. xxiv HISTORY OF THE ARMY
709
expel the French and restore the Stadtholder ; but this 1799.
was a matter that could very well have waited until
France was brought to her knees by the Allied Armies
and the British fleet, when it would have followed as a
matter of course. What, then, was the need to hasten
British troops over the North Sea with orders (for such
was the purport of Abercromby's instructions) to land
somewhere and do something ? The explanation
appears to lie in the intense distrust which the British
Cabinet not unjustly entertained towards the Court of
Vienna ; and in its desire to hold a pledge which should
bind that Court to some approach to honest dealing. 1
It should seem as though Pitt dreaded lest France should
be crushed and Europe parcelled out by Austria and
Russia without reference to England. Holland there-
fore being the country with which British interests
were chiefly concerned, he determined to intervene
there in concert with Russia by military operations, so
as to secure a decisive voice in the ultimate fate of the
United Provinces, and to bring Austria to reason by
threatening to hand them to Prussia. But, be this
as it may, the fact remains that he did send a powerful
force to the H elder for no sound military object, and
that it was forced to withdraw with disgrace. That
there were grave military blunders committed by the
Commanders-in-chief both of the British and of the
Russians is unquestionable ; but, in the opinion of the
best judges, the difficulties of the country were so
enormous that a successful invasion of Holland from
the Helder was practically impossible. The brunt of
1 " The only right suggestion is that which the King made to
me on Wednesday that we should make our force sufficient to be
quite certain (at least as much as the thing will admit) of occupying
the whole country ourselves before the winter. It is only in that
way that we can put ourselves in a situation to talk to Vienna in
the only style which ever succeeds in making them hear reason.
... If we decide to return the provinces to Austria, it should, I
think, be only in consideration of her co-operation in the attack on
France. If we return them to Austria during the war we lose our
only tie on them." Grenville to Dundas, 2/th July 1799. Drop-
more MSS.
HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xi
1799. e blame for the mishap, therefore, must lie with the
Ministers who persisted in pursuing their own designs
despite the emphatic and repeated protests of their best
military adviser.
AUTHORITIES. The authorities for the Helder Expedition are
W.Q. Orig. Corres., 61-65, Walsh's Campaign in Holland, Life oj
Sir R. Abercromhy, Surtees's Twenty-Jive Tears in the Rifle Brigade,
Narrative of a Private Soldier in the Ninety-second, Bunbury's Great
War with France, Diary of Sir "John Moore, Major F. Maule's
Memoir of Events in the Campaigns of North Holland and Egypt,
Colburn's Military Magazine, February 1836. I know of no
French account besides that of Jomini, which is rather unusually
full.
CHAPTER XXV
BY the failure of the attempt upon North Holland, the 1792.
attention of the British Government was perforce
brought back once more to the Mediterranean. But
before proceeding to follow the narrative of events in
that quarter it is necessary first to trace the progress of
affairs in the East Indies, the influence of which has
already been seen in the hasty despatch of British troops
from Portugal to India. The story of the capture of
Pondicherry, of Ceylon and of the Dutch East India
settlements has already been told, as a part of Pitt's
policy in seizing every foreign settlement that could be
appropriated beyond the sea. It is now time to enter
into the dealings of the British not only with European
but with native powers in India.
Our last review of this subject ended with the con-
clusion of the Treaty between Cornwallis and Tippoo
Sahib after the capture of Seringapatam in 1792. The
Sultan of Mysore had, it will be remembered, been
brought to submission by a triple alliance of the Nizam,
the Mahrattas and the British. In other words, the
two powers which aimed, consciously or unconsciously,
at supremacy over the whole of India had leagued
themselves against their most dangerous rival in the
south, and had drawn into the quarrel a third power,
which, being too weak to stand by itself, was bound to
submit itself to one of the three others. Cornwallis,
after the fall of Seringapatam, had endeavoured to
develop the treaty of alliance into a treaty of guarantee,
whereby the Nizam should be assured of protection if
VOL. IV 711 I
712 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK
1792. attacked by the Mahrattas or Tippoo, either singly or
in combination. Such a treaty was naturally much
desired by the sovereign of Hyderabad, but the
Mahrattas threw every obstacle into the way of it, and
Cornwallis departed from India leaving the matter,
which was of vital importance, still unsettled.
The motives of the Mahrattas in obstructing Corn-
wallis's negotiations are easily explained. The basis of
all Mahratta policy was plunder ; and, though the
Mahratta Confederacy was at this time dangerously
divided, there was within it one great and able chief,
Madajee Scindia, who, despite the jealousies of his
peers, aspired to unite it and ultimately all other native
powers in one great effort to drive the foreigners from
India. Up to 1782 he had been thwarted by the
British ; but the urgent danger from Hyder Ali had
then compelled Warren Hastings to buy him off by
the Treaty of Salbye, and he had used his freedom to
1793. good purpose. By 1793 he was not only master of
Central India and of North- Western India as far as
Aligarh, but also ruler of the Mogul Empire, having
military possession of all the strong places from Ujjein
to Delhi and Agra. With all this he still professed
subjection to the Peishwa, the pageant head of all the
Mahrattas, at Poona, and acted ostensibly only as his
deputy in directing affairs at Delhi ; but in council his
voice was all powerful. Having every intention of
plundering the Nizam's dominions, he remonstrated
strongly against any further connection with the
British ; and he gave a significant clue to his policy
when he represented that the weakening of Tippoo
Sahib had been a mistake. He soon found a pretext
for a quarrel with the Nizam by making a claim upon
him for tribute. Sir John Shore, Lord Cornwallis's
successor, thinking any evil preferable to war, excused
himself by Jesuitical arguments from giving assistance
to the threatened potentate, even though Tippoo was
prepared to assist the Mahrattas in their aggression ;
and they were accordingly left free to work their will.
:xn
CH. xxv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 713
Madajee Scindia died before the actual outbreak of 1794.
hostilities, but his successor, Dowlut Rao Scindia, pur- Feb - I2
sued his policy, and in March 1795 a single battle 1795.
brought the Nizam to a disgraceful treaty. Thereby he March
not only conceded extensive territory to the Mahrattas
but gave up to them his Minister, Azim-ul-Omra, who
had always favoured alliance with the British, and aban-
doned himself to what seemed to be political extinction.
Much incensed against the Governor -General for
his neutrality, which he interpreted not quite unjustly
as a renunciation of promised friendship, the Nizam
dismissed the two auxiliary battalions furnished to him
by the British Government, and seemed disposed to
break with it for ever. The rebellion of his son, Ali June 28.
Jah, however, induced him presently to beg that these
troops might be restored to him ; and their prompt
return prepared the way for a reconciliation, which was
presently forwarded by the release of Azim-ul-Omra
by the Mahrattas, and his reinstatement as Minister at
Hyderabad. For the present, however, the Nizam
decided to strengthen his forces by measures which,
as shall presently be shown, were wholly antagonistic
to British interests.
Tippoo, meanwhile, had watched the proceedings
with the keenest attention, and had engaged himself, m
return for a large extent of territory, to help Ali Jah to-
wards the dethronement of his father. But the rapid
suppression of the rebellion put an end to these designs,
and he resolved to bide his time until he could obtain
a French armament to assist him. A few months later, Oct. 25.
the young Peishwa, Madoo Rao Narrain, destroyed
himself, and the Mahrattas were distracted from further
immediate mischief by quarrels over the succession to
his throne. The British also were intent upon the
conquest of Ceylon and other Dutch possessions ; and
thus all parties were for the time sufficiently occupied
with their own affairs.
But, during the past few years, there had grown up
a new power within the armies of several of the native
7 14 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOKXII
1795-96. princes. Having learned by experience the value of
infantry trained after the European model, they had
sought out officers to form and command regular
regiments for them ; and the greater number of these
officers were French. Madajee Scindia had taken to
himself M. de Boigne, a Savoyard, who, after serving
both in the French and Russian armies in Europe, had
drifted out to India, where he was successively an
officer in the Madras Native Infantry of the British
Service, in the army of the Mogul Emperor, and
finally, in 1784, in the forces of Scindia, for whom he
raised two native battalions. These two were gradually
increased to twenty-four battalions, to each of which
was attached a battery of five guns ; and the whole
were organised into three brigades, which, with one
regiment of horse attached to each of them, made up a
force of twenty thousand trained men. The officers,
so long as De Boigne retained command, were of all
European nations, British not excluded ; and many
of them men of good character and education. De
Boigne resigned about 1796, giving to Scindia the
parting advice never to excite the jealousy of the
British Government by increasing his battalions, and
rather to discharge them than to risk a war. 1 His
successor, M. Perron, however, was not of this mind.
He not only advocated increase of the force, but would
accept none but French officers ; and he discouraged
such Englishmen as remained in Scindia's army so
systematically as to convert it practically into a French
force under French commanders. Moreover, taking
advantage of Scindia's title as Deputy of the Peishwa
in the vicegerency of the Mogul Empire, Perron
called his army the Imperial Army ; from which it is
not difficult to see that any treaty, real or fictitious,
between the French Republic and the puppet Emperor
of Delhi would have given him a sufficient pretext for
invasion of British territory. 2
1 Grant Duff, History of the Makrattas, ii. 339 ; Hi. 24-5, 175.
2 Wilks, ifi. 352.
CH. xxv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 7 1 5
Another force, similar in kind though inferior in 1796.
efficiency, was that of the Nizam, under the French
officer, M. Raymond. Originally it had consisted of
two battalions only, which had fought with the British
against Tippoo Sahib in 1792 ; but, after Sir John
Shore had left the Nizam to fight with the Mahrattas
unaided, it was increased to twenty -three battalions
which their commander laboured incessantly to bring
to perfection. Nor was he unsuccessful, for they were
reckoned superior to all native infantry except the
Sepoys in the British Service. But this was not all.
Raymond was deeply infected with the doctrines of
the Revolution. His battalions carried the colours of
the French Republic, and wore buttons engraved with
the cap of liberty. He had been detected in a corre-
spondence with the French officers who had been
taken prisoners at the capture of Pondicherry, with
the object of obtaining their services ; and lastly, he
had opened communications with Tippoo himself. On
every side was evidence that Raymond and his sub-
ordinates cherished a determined hostility to the
British.
Among all these potential enemies of the British
rule in India, Tippoo seems to have steered his course
so unskilfully as to have secured none for his allies.
Early in 1796, however, he sent an embassy to Cabul
to invite the Sovereign of the Afghans, Zeman Shah,
to come with his army into the plains, conquer Delhi,
and expel the Mahrattas first from Hindostan and then
from the Deccan ; after which it would, as he urged,
be easy to sweep the rest of the infidels into the sea.
Zeman Shah, as a matter of fact, had already moved
his forces for an invasion, and, though he was recalled
by intestine troubles to Afghanistan, the menace kept
the Government of Bengal in constant apprehension.
Nor can it be doubted that his march into Hindostan
would have served as an important diversion in Tippoo's
favour by preventing the resources of Bengal from
being employed in the south. But Tippoo's chief
716 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1796. reliance was still on France, as the power that would
help him to drive the British out of India. The
Frenchmen in his service were careful to point out the
superiority of their country's arms over England's, as
displayed in the victories of the Revolutionary
armies ; and they were able to transmit for him any
letters which he wished to send to Paris. He
remembered the favourable reception given to his
embassy by the French Court in 1788 ; and it appears
certain that he invited French help and made formal
propositions of alliance to the Republican Govern-
ment.
Such was Tippoo's state of mind when, early in
1797. 1797, a privateer from Mauritius arrived at Mangalore,
dismasted, to beg permission to refit. It so happened
that the Sultan's chief officer at the port had been one
of his ambassadors to Paris, and had learned enough
of the French language to converse with the master of
the vessel. This person, Francois Ripaud by name,
wishing apparently to add to his own importance, gave
out that he was second in command at Mauritius, that
an expedition was waiting there in readiness to expel
the British from India, and that he had been specially
instructed to touch at Mangalore in order to ascertain
Tippoo's wishes regarding French co-operation with
him for that object. The Sultan's officers quickly
discovered that Ripaud was an impostor, and strongly
recommended that no faith should be reposed in him,
representing at the same time the danger that would
arise from premature revelation of their sovereign's
designs against the British. Tippoo, however, had
already made up his mind to make use of the man ;
wherefore, purchasing his ship for his own service,
April . he despatched it in April to Mauritius with four
ambassadors on board, one of whom was to remain
on that island, and the remainder to proceed to
Paris. Ripaud himself was retained as French envoy
in Mysore.
The voyage, however, was delayed by the abscond-
CH.XXV HISTORY OF THE ARMY 717
ing of one of the Frenchmen with the money which 1797.
the Sultan had paid for the vessel ; and ultimately the
mission did not start until October, with the envoys Oct.
reduced to two, and Ripaud himself in command of
the ship. According to Tippoo's instructions, the
ambassadors were to conceal their quality and their
object, and to pose only as merchants ; but upon
their arrival at Mauritius, on the I9th of January
1798, the Governor, M. Malartic, sent officers of high 1798.
rank to wait upon them, and received them himself
upon their landing with a guard of honour and a
salute. They then presented their despatches, con-
taining the Sultan's proposals for a treaty with the
Government of Mauritius, which were to the following
effect. The French were to provide for five to ten
thousand European troops, and from twenty -five to
thirty thousand Africans, who were to be met at an
appointed rendezvous by sixty thousand Mysoreans ;
after which the whole would proceed to the conquest
first of Goa, which would be retained by Tippoo, then
of Bombay, which would pass to the French, then of
Madras, then of Nizam Ali and the Mahrattas, and
finally of Bengal.
The ambassadors speedily discovered that Ripaud
had lied, and that no armament for an expedition to
India was either ready or expected at Port Louis ; but
the Sultan's letters were at once forwarded to Paris,
and, in the meanwhile, Malartic bethought himself to
satisfy them by raising a corps of volunteers in
Mauritius and Bourbon. The Mysorean envoys
protested in vain that their instructions were to bring
a large force and not a small one, and that they had no
money for the raising of a new levy. Whether from
arrogance or from vanity, Malartic insisted upon foisting
a band of adventurers upon them. Further, not content
with this, he issued on the 3Oth of January a public Jan. 30.
proclamation, wherein he set forth at length the arrival
and objects of the Mysorean mission, and the Sultan's
intention, when strengthened by a French force, of
71 8 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1798. driving the British from India. Finally, after recounting
his own inability, owing to want of regular troops,
to furnish the succours which the Sultan needed,
he invited citizens to enter his service with the assur-
ance of advantageous rates of pay. The reasons
which induced Malartic to this most fatuous proceed-
ing, violating as it did Tippoo's injunctions as to
secrecy and proclaiming his designs to the whole
world, have never yet been fathomed ; but the
Revolution produced so many men who were alike
arrogant and incompetent that the simplest explanation
is probably the truest. The unfortunate envoys
weakly gave way to the blustering Frenchman ; and,
March 7. on the yth of March, they re-embarked for India with
their volunteers, exactly one hundred in number,
including one General of the land forces, twenty-nine
officers and sergeants, thirty -six European soldiers,
and twenty -two half-castes ; one General and six
officers of the marine, four shipwrights, and a watch-
maker.
April 26. On the 26th of April they arrived at Mangalore,
when Tippoo, instead of sending them straight back to
Mauritius, welcomed them to Seringapatam. There
this precious band organised a Jacobin Club, under
the worthy presidency of that approved swindler and
pirate. Citizen Francois Ripaud. They formed a
council of discipline to subvert that of their own
commanders, brought the national colours to be
blessed by Citizen Tippoo on the public parade,
planted a tree of liberty, and swore an oath of hatred
to all kings except "Tippoo Sultan the victorious" ; all
of which harmless eccentricities were countenanced
with benign amusement by the potentate in question.
The officers, or at any rate the two Generals, Chapuis
and Dubuc, appear to have taken no part in these
antics, having prepared for themselves credentials as
June. envoys to the Sultan's court ; and, in June, Dubuc
was selected to sail in company with two Mohammedan
envoys from Tranquebar on a special mission to the
CH. xxv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 719
Directory in Paris. It is difficult to say which showed 1798.
the greater folly during these months : Tippoo himself J une -
or the gang of ruffians who, with matchless impudence,
had intruded themselves into his capital.
Meanwhile the news of Malartic's proclamation,
carried by an American vessel, had reached the Cape of
Good Hope. From thence it was forwarded east and
west on the 28th of March by the Governor, Lord
Macartney, reaching England on the I4th, and India
on the 1 8th of June. Dundas had already received
intelligence which led him to suspect an attack by
Tippoo upon the British dominions ; and he was by this
time satisfied that the destination of Bonaparte's fleet,
which, as will be remembered, had sailed from Toulon
on the 1 9th of May, was Egypt. No difficulties, as
he wrote, were likely to deter the "unprincipled
desperate Government of France nor its adventurous
speculative leader " from making an attempt upon
India ; and he had therefore determined to send five
thousand seasoned troops to India as soon as possible.
But since, at the height of the Irish rebellion, not a
regiment could be spared from England, the reinforce-
ment was to be composed of two battalions from
Gibraltar, three more from Portugal, and two from the
Cape.
The three from Portugal were, as has already been
seen, reduced ultimately to the Fifty-first only, which
sailed from Lisbon in the first days of October. The Oct.
two from the Cape were consequently increased to
three, of which the Eighty -fourth and the Scotch
Brigade were, with the exception of a few companies,
embarked in September, together with two hundred
dragoons. The whole of these were under the command
of Major-general David Baird, who had stopped at
Cape Town with the skeleton of his own regiment, the
Seventy-first, on his way to England. The remainder
of these two corps, together with the Eighty -sixth,
sailed from the Cape in the middle of February 1799 ;
and, meanwhile, the Tenth from England and the
720 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOKXI
i79 8 - Fifty-first from the Mediterranean reached the Cape at
the end of December 1798, and proceeded immediately
upon their voyage to India. Considering the delays to
which navigation was subject in those days, the difficulty
of obtaining tonnage at the Cape, and the numerous
embarrassments which crowded upon England in the
summer of 1798, the despatch of these reinforce-
ments appears to me to be the best work recorded
of Dundas during his direction of the war. It was
not accomplished without reducing the garrison at
the Cape to dangerous weakness, and that at a time
when the Boers at Graf Reinet were still giving
trouble ; but the occasion was worth the hazard ; and
Dundas should receive credit for his courage and his
zeal for India. 1
The situation in India meanwhile was in many
respects disquieting for the British ; but, fortunately,
there had arrived in April, 1798, a new Governor-
general, Lord Mornington, who was great enough to
cope with it. He found Perron's troops, as we have
seen, tacitly menacing the British frontier on the north,
and a further invasion threatened by Zeman Shah ;
while in the south there were Tippoo, evidently pre-
pared to open hostilities, and Raymond's corps under
the Nizam, little less hostile in spirit than Tippoo.
The British forces had been weakened by the garrisons
required for Ceylon and other less valuable Dutch
dependencies, and only by great good fortune had
escaped still more dangerous reduction. In August
1797 a small army of about three thousand British
and four thousand native soldiers had been collected
at Madras for an expedition to Manilla, under com-
mand of Sir James Craig. One division of it had
already sailed to Penang, when, in consequence of
1 Brigadier Fraser (Lisbon) to Henry Dundas, yth October
1798 ; Lord Macartney (Cape) to Henry Dundas, 28th March
and 1 8th September 1798 ; General Francis Dundas (Cape) to
Henry Dundas, 23rd January and 6th April 1799 ; Henry Dundas
to Macartney, i8th June, 22nd August, i$th December 1798.
CH.XXV HISTORY OF THE ARMY 721
Bonaparte's victories in Italy, and of apprehensions
that Tippoo might seize the opportunity to invade
the Carnatic, orders came from England for it to
be recalled. It will be observed that Pitt and Dundas,
not content with exhausting the army of England,
wished to exhaust that of India also by their absurd
methods of making war.
But though this peril of Manilla had been averted,
the army of Madras was dispersed in all directions, not
only among the possessions captured from the Dutch,
but also, owing to the maladministration of the Nabob
of the Carnatic, within the Madras Presidency itself.
It was impossible to concentrate it without the delay of
several weeks, during which Tippoo might have taken
the offensive with every chance of success ; while, even
supposing the concentration to have been accom-
plished, motives of economy, as is usual with the
British, had forbidden the maintenance of any efficient
organisation for transport and supply. None the
less, two days after the receipt of Malar tic's procla-
mation, Mornington ordered the army to be assembled June 20,
on the coast, and instructed General Harris to select
a station as a starting-point for a march upon Ser-
ingapatam.
His next immediate care was to regain, so far as
possible, the former members of the triple Alliance.
On the 8th of July instructions were issued to the July 8.
Resident at Hyderabad to negotiate a treaty for the
increase of the British subsidiary force in the Nizam's
Army from two to six battalions, and for the dismissal
of Raymond's troops, now under the command of
M. Piron. This was duly accomplished, and the
treaty, which stipulated for the mutual defence of
the members of the Triple Alliance, and for a mutual
guarantee between them, was signed on the ist of Sept. i.
September. Immediately upon the conclusion of the
negotiations, the four additional subsidiary battalions,
which had been stationed near the frontier, marched
to Hyderabad to enforce the disarmament of Piron's
722 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1798. troops. The Nizam, a weak and foolish old man,
hesitated to give the necessary orders ; but the British
Oct. 21. Resident was peremptory, and on the 2ist of October
the six British battalions, with their artillery, took up
a position commanding the French lines. The pro-
clamation for the dismissal was then circulated among
the French, and two days later, after some little
trouble, the whole of them were disarmed and dis-
banded without bloodshed. Thus a body of fourteen
thousand hostile soldiers was removed, and the
Nizam's assistance gained for the coming campaign
against Tippoo.
At Poona no such success was to be expected.
Scindia was quite prepared to throw in his lot with
Tippoo for the prosecution of his own designs of
plunder in the south of India ; and the treaty of
Hyderabad, whereby the British engaged themselves
to mediate in case of any differences between the
Mahrattas and the Nizam, could not be agreeable
to him. He therefore used all his influence, and
with success, to prevent the Peishwa from taking
part in the coming struggle as a member of the
Triple Alliance ; but at the same time he saw that
it would be prudent for him to maintain neutrality.
This was as much as Lord Mornington had expected,
and was for the present sufficient.
Meanwhile the news that the Governor - general
projected a campaign against Tippoo had at first
thrown the Council of Madras into dismay. Not
only was the army unready, but the transport was
reckoned to require twenty thousand bullocks, to
purchase which the Government could show only
an empty treasury and bankrupt credit. From the
earliest days of the British in Madras it had been
the practice in every campaign to buy at any price
the wild and undersized cattle of the Carnatic, and
to attach them to the guns and waggons without
previous training or experienced drivers. Commander
after commander had complained of this, from Eyre
CH. xxv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 723
Coote downward, but no effort had been made to 1798,
apply any remedy. It was very soon ascertained
beyond all doubt that an immediate advance upon
Mysore, such as had been at first contemplated by
the Viceroy, was absolutely out of the question, and
that the necessary force could not be equipped and
concentrated before February I799. 1
But, apart from this, Mornington was confronted
with a further difficulty. There were many men, in-
cluding some of excellent judgment, who viewed his
plans with dread and did their utmost to dissuade him
from executing them. Against these Mornington found
the staunchest of allies in General Harris, who was
not only Commander-in-chief, but senior member ot
Council in the Presidency. It was he who had in-
sisted on sparing four thousand men to enforce the
Viceroy's policy at Hyderabad, and had overborne
all objections by offering to pledge his private funds
for the necessary expense. The success of this stroke
caused a revulsion of feeling in Mornington's favour,
which was intensified as the campaigning season con-
tinued to pass away without any attack from Tippoo.
And meanwhile the British troops were silently but
steadily concentrating at Vellore and Wallajahbad,
from forty to fifty miles west and south-west of
Madras, the latter under the superintendence of
Major-general Floyd, the former under the Viceroy's
younger brother, Colonel Arthur Wellesley of the
Thirty-Third. This latter officer was still only in
his twenty-eighth year, and had arrived in India in
1797, having seen no active service since he fought
under the Duke of York in Holland in 1794.
Harris, who was to command the expedition to
Mysore, we saw first at Bunker's Hill, where he
was severely wounded. He had since taken part in
the brilliant action at St. Lucia in 1778, and ten
years later had accompanied Sir William Medows to
India, where he had learned under Cornwallis in
1 Lushington, Life of Lord Harris, pp. 150, 156, 204.
724 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1798. 1791 and 1792 the difficulties of an advance upon
Seringapatam.
On the 3ist of October the news of the victory
of the Nile reached India ; and, the British prepara-
tions being now well advanced, Mornington seized
Nov. 8. the opportunity to open negotiations with Tippoo
Dec. 10. for a specific settlement. A month later he him-
self embarked for Madras, so as to be at hand to
pursue them in person. A few letters passed,
wherein Tippoo seemed to be intent rather on gain-
ing time than on serious entertainment of Morning-
1799. ton's overtures. But the new Governor-general was
not a man to brook any trifling. All intelligence
from Egypt pointed to the fact that the French were
in possession of a considerable force ; and at last
came the news that, after many delays, Dubuc and
Tippoo's envoys had sailed on the 7th of February
from Tranquebar on their mission to the Directory
in Paris.
After incredible difficulties, due chiefly to the
cumbrous forms of the military administration in
Madras and the encroachments of the civilians upon
the powers of the Commander-in-chief, the prepara-
tions were completed, and the " ponderous machine,"
as Arthur Wellesley called the army, was ready to
Feb. be set in motion. 1 Early in February, therefore,
Harris received his orders to invade Mysore, and
therewith the fullest possible authority that could
be delegated to him by the Governor - general.
Mornington had been strongly pressed by the Council
in Madras to accompany the army in person ; but,
feeling little inclination thereto, he wisely consulted his
brother Arthur, who told him bluntly that if he
himself were in Harris's situation and the Governor-
general were to join the army, he would quit it.
Harris therefore entered upon his task with a free hand
and plenary powers.
The army at Vellore numbered close upon twenty-
1 Wellington, SuppL Desp. i. 191-2, 199.
CH.XXV HISTORY OF THE ARMY 725
one thousand non-commissioned officers and men, 1799.
of which the European cavalry counted just nine
hundred, and the European infantry rather fewer
than forty-four hundred ; and it was reckoned to
be the best equipped force ever seen in India. 1
Marching westward from Vellore on the nth of Feb. u,
February, it was joined near Amboor on the 2oth by
the troops from Hyderabad. These included the six
subsidiary battalions which had disarmed Raymond's
force, with the artillery attached to them, six thou-
sand of the Nizam's Cavalry, and thirty-six hundred
of his old French contingent, in all sixteen thousand
1 Cavalry. Major-general Floyd, igth Light Dragoons.
ist Brigade. igth Light Dragoons, 1st and 4th Madras
Native Cavalry Colonel Steerman, Madras Army.
2nd Brigade. 25th Light Dragoons, 2nd and 3rd Madras
Native Cavalry Colonel Pater, Madras Army.
884 Europeans, 1751 Natives Total, 2635 non-commissioned
officers and men.
Artillery :
Two companies Bengal, 1st and 2nd battalions Madras
Artillery.
Total, 608 non-commissioned officers and men. Also 1433 Gun
Lascars.
Infantry :
Right Wing. Major-general Bridges, Madras Army.
ist Brigade. His Majesty's lath, 74th, Scotch Brigade
Major-general Baird.
T,rd Brigade. i/ist, i/6th, i/i2th Madras Native Infantry
Colonel Gowdie, Madras Army.
'yh Brigade. i/8th, 2/3rd, 2/1 2th Madras Native Infantry-
Colonel Roberts, Madras Army.
Left Wing. Major-general Popham, Bengal Army.
2nd Brigade. His Majesty's 73rd, De Meuron's, His
Majesty's 33rd Colonel Sherbrooke.
Afth Brigade. 3 battalions Bengal Native Infantry Lieuten-
ant-colonel Gardiner, Bengal Army.
6th Brigade. 2/5th, 2/9th Madras Native Infantry Lieuten-
ant-colonel Scott, Scotch Brigade.
1000 Madras Pioneers.
Total, 4381 European, 10,695 Native non-commissioned officers
and men.
The native regiments are designated not by their present but
their contemporary numbers.
726 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1799. men. 1 This last corps, before the territory ot Mysore
was actually entered, was placed under the command
of Colonel Wellesley, much to the discontent of
Baird ; and the Thirty-third regiment was added to
it. Thus the forces on the side of Madras amounted
in all to thirty-one thousand fighting men, exclusive
of the Nizam's cavalry. Besides these, a force of
six thousand men from Bombay had been organised
under command of Lieutenant-general James Stuart, 2
and assembled at Cannanore with orders to ascend
the ghauts into the province of Coorg. It marched
accordingly from Cannanore on the 2ist February,
March 2. and encamped on the 2nd of March about seven
miles west of Peripatam, on the high road to
Seringapatam, and not above fifty miles distant
from it.
Tippoo, meanwhile, after long wavering between
resistance and submission, had finally decided to defy
the British, principally, it seems, upon the persuasion
of the French officers who had come to him from
Mauritius. His forces, including the garrison of
Seringapatam, were reckoned at about thirty -three
1 Hyderabad Contingent :
I and 2/ioth Bengal Native Infantry, 2/2nd, 2//th,
I and 2/nth Madras Native Infantry; I
Company of Artillery, I Company of Bengal
Artillery .....
Nizam's Cavalry 6000, Old French Contingent
3621 .....
16,157
2 Bombay Army :
Right Brigade. l/2nd, i/4th, i/3rd Bombay Native In-
fantry Lieutenant-colonel Montresor.
Centre Brigade. His Majesty's 75th, 77th, iO3rd (Bombay
Europeans) Lieutenant-colonel Dunlop.
Left Brigade. 2/3rd, I /5th, 2/2nd Bombay Native Infantry
Lieutenant-colonel Wiseman.
European Infantry and Artillery, 1617 non-commissioned
officers and men.
Native Infantry, Artillery, and Pioneers, 4803 non-com-
missioned officers and men.
Total, 6420 non-commissioned officers and men.
CH. xxv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 727
thousand infantry and fifteen thousand cavalry and 1799.
rocket-men, making a total, with artillery, of fifty
thousand fighting men ; and, on learning that the
British were closing in upon him from both east and
west, he decided, while there was still time, to strike
a decisive blow. Leaving, therefore, a small force to
watch the progress of Harris, and giving out that
he meant to attack him on that side, he led twelve
thousand men of the flower of his troops secretly
and by forced marches upon Peripatam, in the hope
of crushing Stuart while he was still isolated from the
main army. Stuart, for his part, had endeavoured in
compliance with his instructions to find a defensive
position for his force, but this was impossible in a
country almost covered by thick and nearly impene-
trable forest ; and he found himself compelled to
distribute his troops into three divisions. Of these
the foremost, Montresor's brigade, was at Sedaseer, on
the frontier of Mysore, near a high hill which com-
mands a view of the country almost to Seringapatam ;
while the six remaining battalions were at two different
points twelve and eight miles distant from it. Stuart
was a good officer, who had marched to Seringapatam
with Cornwallis in 1792 ; wherefore it would be un-
reasonable to suppose that his dispositions were not,
under the circumstances, the best that he could make,
though in themselves they wear the appearance of
being both unsafe and unsound.
On the morning of the 5th of March a recon- March 5.
noitring party on the hill of Sedaseer remarked the
formation of a large encampment a little to westward
of Peripatam, with a green tent which seemed to
signify the presence of the Sultan himself. Intelli-
gence from Seringapatam reported that Tippoo had
marched with all his forces to meet Harris ; but Stuart
none the less judged it prudent to reinforce Montresor's
brigade by an additional battalion of Sepoys. At dawn
of the following morning Major-general Hartley, who March 6.
held a command in the Bombay Army, discovered that
VOL. IV K
728 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1799. the enemy's force was in motion, but, owing to the
March 6. forest and the haziness of the atmosphere, could divine
neither their direction nor their object. Indeed, so
swiftly and quietly did Tippoo's columns make their
way through the jungle that between nine and ten
o'clock they fell almost by surprise simultaneously on
the front and rear of Montresor's brigade ; interposing
five thousand men so as to isolate it completely from
its fourth battalion, which was stationed over two
miles from the main body. Fortunately, Hartley was
able to send intelligence of the attack to Stuart, and
meanwhile Montresor's battalions took up the best
position that they could. There, though surrounded
on all sides by greatly superior numbers, they fought
stoutly and held their own.
They were, however, well nigh exhausted by nearly
six hours' struggle, when at length Stuart came up at
half-past two with the Seventy-seventh and the flank-
companies of the Seventy-fifth, and after half an hour's
sharp firing routed the division of the enemy that
encompassed Montresor's rear. The enemy then lost
heart, and before three o'clock retreated in all directions,
with a loss of fifteen hundred killed and wounded ; the
casualties of Stuart's force little exceeding one hundred
and forty killed, wounded and missing. The action
was most creditable to the steadiness of the Bombay
Sepoys ; but it must be confessed that, alike for his
design to crush Stuart and for his dispositions in the
attack, Tippoo deserved better success. But for his
revelation of his presence by pitching his tent at
Peripatam, he would almost certainly have surprised
and annihilated Montresor's brigade, and possibly also
the greater part of the Bombay army. 1
By this time Harris likewise had crossed the border
of Mysore. From Amboor the main army moved
very slowly west and southward to Baramahal, reach-
March 4. ing Rayacotta on the 4th of March. From thence
detachments were sent out to capture a couple of hill-
1 Life of Sir T. Munro, i. 217.
CH. xxv HISTORY OF THE ARMY
729
forts, which being accomplished, the entire force 1799.
moved north-westward to Kelamungalum, and thence
on the roth by Anicul and Jigginy toward Bangalore,
within sight of which the army encamped on the
1 4th. The works of Bangalore and Oossoor had March 14.
been destroyed by Tippoo in order that they might
not serve again as advanced bases or depots to the
British ; but Harris's movement in this direction was
no more than a feint, though a successful one, for the
Sultan's light horse could be seen destroying forage
on all sides to northward. As in 1791 and 1792,
transport and supply were to be the great difficulties
of the campaign, but in 1799 tne situation of the
British was far more favourable, for they possessed the
districts of Baramahal and Coimbatore, in the former
of which a force of over five thousand native troops
was employed in collecting and forwarding provisions.
Had Tippoo taken the initiative by using his cavalry
to devastate Baramahal, he might have delayed the
whole expedition for a year.
Nevertheless, even as matters were, owing to the
necessity for transporting a train of forty-seven heavy
siege-pieces and from thirty to forty days' supplies,
Harris's anxieties were terrible. The advance was
made always in two parallel columns, the British force
on the left and the Nizam's contingent on the right,
with the cavalry thrown out in front and rear, which
gave the army the formation practically of a parallelo-
gram with two sides of seven miles and two of about
three miles. Within the space thus enclosed was
crowded an incredible number of beasts of burden.
In Harris's army the baggage and commissariat alone
required sixty thousand bullocks, three - fourths of
them pack-animals, to which the grain - merchants
added twenty thousand more. In the Nizam's con-
tingent the grain-merchants and military departments
employed thirty-six thousand bullocks, making nearly
one hundred and twenty thousand bullocks in all.
Besides these, there were more bullocks, elephants,
730 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1799. camels, coolies, and a rabble of followers belonging
March. to p r i va t e individuals, according to the luxurious
fashion of Indian campaigns. The bazaar of Harris's
army, according to an officer who accompanied it,
equalled that of a populous city in extent and variety
of articles exposed for sale ; and the followers out-
numbered the fighting men by five to one. 1 " I have
no scruple in declaring," wrote Wellesley at the time,
" that the number of cattle and people in the employ-
ment of individuals was double that in the employ-
ment of the public." The whole of this gigantic
multitude of animals, of course, required forage ;
and in the first few days after entering Mysore it
seemed as if the task of providing for them would
break the whole expedition down. The bullocks in
the department of the Commissary of Stores began to
fail very early, although there was abundance of forage
in the country ; great quantities of ammunition were
lost, and on the I4th of March the outlook was so
serious that an investigation was held into the cause.
It was then discovered that, as so often happens, these
unfortunate bullocks had been starved in accordance
with certain absurd regulations of the department con-
cerned. These rules were summarily abolished ; a
number of superfluous stores were destroyed ; and
from that moment matters slightly, but only slightly,
improved. 2
During the I5th the army halted in its position
Mar. 15-16. close to Bangalore, and on the i6th turned westward
until it struck the road from Bangalore to Cancan-
hilly at Talgautporam, at which point it wheeled
abruptly to the south upon Cancanhilly itself. The
Mysorean horse, not expecting this new movement,
had omitted to destroy the forage along this road, and
1 MS. Journal of Lieutenant George Rowley of the Madras
Engineers. lam indebted to the kindness of the Honourable N.
Darnell Davis of British Guiana for the loan of a copy of this
journal.
2 Lushington, Life of Lord Harris, p. 267 ; Wellington,
Desp. i. 203-206.
CH.XXV HISTORY OF THE ARMY 731
the army in consequence found abundance of it and of 1799.
water also. But still the loss of ammunition from the
siege-train continued, and on the i8th the whole force March 18.
was again halted to find further remedy for this evil.
At last, on the 2ist, Harris reached Cancanhilly, having March 21.
taken five days to march five and twenty miles ; and
there he learned that Tippoo and his army, having
retreated from Peripatam, were now little more than a
day's march in his front. Nevertheless, though the
enemy's cavalry were busy in laying waste the country,
forage was still procurable ; and the force, now in
three divisions, turned westward and continued its
slow progress, till, on the 24th, the cavalry and right March 24.
wing, which were in advance, reached the river Mad-
door and encamped on the eastern bank. Tippoo,
however, made no attempt to dispute the passage,
though the ground offered him every advantage ; and
Harris was further encouraged on this same day by the
receipt of a letter from Stuart reporting his success at
Sedaseer. After passing the river, the advanced divi-
sions halted on the 25th for the rear to come up, and Mar. 25-26,
on the 26th the whole force encamped five miles east
of Mallavelly. From the site of the camp the enemy's
advanced parties, with a few elephants among them,
could be seen upon a distant ridge ; and the sight of
fourteen or fifteen guns in motion pointed to the like-
lihood of a general action on the morrow.
At daybreak on the 2yth the army marched forward March 27.
along the high road towards Mallavelly, Wellesley's
division and the Nizam's contingent moving parallel
to it and somewhat wide on its left flank, so as to
protect the baggage, while Floyd with his two brigades
of cavalry as usual covered the advance. Within a
mile of Mallavelly the enemy's cavalry was discovered
in force upon the British right, while his infantry
appeared in position on the heights beyond the village,
and his guns were seen to be in motion towards his
southern flank as if with the design of enfilading the
British during their advance. Wellesley's division,
732 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOKXII
1799. supported by Floyd's cavalry, was thereupon directed
March 27. to attack the enemy's right flank, while the right wing
under Harris in person advanced upon his centre at
the village of Mallavelly, and the left wing was in-
structed to cover the baggage.
The enemy on perceiving these dispositions at once
retired for some distance to a line of heights, whereupon
Harris ordered the camp to be marked out beyond the
village. The picquets of the army under Colonel Sher-
brooke, together with the Twenty-fifth Light Dragoons
and a regiment of Native Cavalry under Colonel
Stapleton Cotton, thereupon advanced to cover the
Quartermaster -general's parties; but the camp had
hardly been marked out before two of Tippoo's heavy
guns opened fire at extreme range. Cotton cleared
some parties of Mysorean horse and rocket-men out of
two neighbouring villages, but the main body of the
enemy's cavalry on the British right now became so
menacing that he was obliged to station himself so as
to check them, while Sherbrooke drew the picquets
together on Cotton's left, resting their right flank upon
a village. The enemy's cannonade increasing, Harris
ordered guns to the front to answer it, and bringing
forward in succession Roberts's, Baird's, and Gowdie's
brigades of infantry formed them upon the left of the
picquets ; while Wellesley's division, supported by
Floyd's First Brigade, came up on the left of Gowdie in
echelon of battalions, with the left refused. The whole
line then advanced slowly over a low ridge, and descended
into low, uneven ground, broken by patches of jungle.
The enemy thereupon with great spirit delivered
two nearly simultaneous attacks upon the British
left and centre. Ten thousand infantry, supported by
cavalry, advanced boldly upon the Thirty-third, at the
head of Wellesley's echelon, received its fire at sixty
yards' distance, and did not give way until the British
bayonets were almost upon them. Then, however,
Floyd's First Brigade of Cavalry crashed into them, arid
cut them down with frightful execution. A body of
CH. xxv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 733
Tippoo's infantry also bore down upon the left of Baird's 1799.
brigade, whereupon Baird advanced three companies March 27.
of the Seventy-fourth with orders to fire and fall back
immediately. The Mysorean foot swerving from the
volley, the whole of the Seventy -fourth fired and
rushed forward just as a compact body of three
hundred cavalry, breaking out of a patch of jungle,
charged furiously down upon the right of the brigade.
Galloping forward, Baird with great difficulty suc-
ceeded in checking the Seventy-fourth ; and meanwhile
the steadiness of the Twelfth and Scotch brigade com-
pletely shattered this second attack. One Mysorean
trooper, however, fell by the bayonets, while another
actually broke through them close to Harris, who for
the moment took personal command of the Scotch
brigade ; but the rest turned and galloped along the
right of the British line, receiving the fire of five
Sepoy battalions without losing a man or a horse.
Had Tippoo supported these attacks, the action might
have been serious ; but he had only sacrificed these
brave men to gain time to withdraw his artillery, for
he fully shared his father's superstition as to the con-
servation of his guns. His whole force now retired
to a second line of heights where it formed a new
front ; the British infantry following it for about two
miles, while Sherbrooke and Cotton worked round its
left flank to be ready for attack in case he should make
a second stand. But the Sultan was bent upon nothing
but retreat, and Harris halted his army and returned
to his former encampment, being unable to find water
elsewhere. The British loss was trifling, being less
than seventy killed, wounded, and missing, of whom
forty-three were Europeans. The enemy's loss was
later ascertained to have been a thousand killed and
wounded. The action was typical of the feebleness
which now characterised Tippoo's military operations. 1
1 Beatson, War with Tippoo Sultan, pp. 78 sq. ; Life of Sir
David Baird, i. 182-183 ; Life of Lord Harris, pp. 277 sq. ; Wel-
lington, Suppl. Desp. i. 208.
734 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1799. On the following day Harris moved forward about
March 28. f our miles north-west of Mallavelly, where he could
find water, as if still intending to follow the main
road westward to Seringapatam ; but he had already
made up his mind to cross the Cavery, if possible,
at Sosily, about fifteen miles south-west of Mallavelly,
and to attack the city from the westward. One
advantage of this plan was that it would facilitate
the junction with Stuart's force ; a second, that it
would assist the forwarding of supplies from Bara-
mahal by the pass of Caveriporam ; but the great
advantage of all was that an advance by this route
would be unsuspected by Tippoo, and the forage
in that quarter consequently undestroyed. For, it
must be repeated, the whole campaign turned upon
the question of forage. If the beasts could not be
fed, they could not transport supplies and stores ;
and, if they could not transport supplies and stores,
the army could not be fed, nor could the batteries
necessary for the siege of Seringapatam be furnished
with ammunition. Keeping his intentions absolutely
secret, Harris on the same morning sent a small
party to reconnoitre the ford of the Cavery at Sosily,
and, having received a satisfactory report, marched
March 29. thither at daybreak of the following morning. The
result exceeded his utmost expectations. The vil-
lages on the way were all deserted, but forage in
abundance was found in them and in the fields, and
the fort of Sosily was discovered to contain a large stock
of grain. Moreover its environs were crowded with
the fugitive inhabitants and their property, including
several thousand head of cattle and a great number
of sheep and goats. In the exhausted condition of
the gun-bullocks such a supply was valuable beyond
estimation.
Two days were consumed in the passage of the
April i. river, and on the ist of April Harris marched westward
along the Cavery, the enemy's horsemen appearing in his
front, but showing themselves less activity than usual in
CH. xxv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 735
devastation. Nevertheless the progress of the army, 1799.
though unopposed, was still miserably slow, and it was
not until the 5th that it at last took up its position about April 5,
two miles from the western face of the fort of Seringa-
patam, having spent five days in traversing twenty-eight
miles. However, the force had reached its destination
with its siege-train and abundance of food and am-
munition, and the main difficulty of the campaign was
overcome.
The position occupied by the army was extremely
strong. The right of the camp was on high command-
ing ground ; its rear was covered by deep ravines, and
its left secured not only by the Cavery, but by an
aqueduct which in its winding course protected much
of the front. There were, however, beyond it several
ruined villages and rocky eminences which gave shelter
to the enemy's rocket -men and sharpshooters, and
which therefore required to be taken at once. Accord-
ingly, on the evening of the 5th, two parties were sent
out one, consisting of the Twelfth and two native
battalions, under Colonel Shawe, to attack the enemy's
post at the aqueduct ; the other, made up of a Bengal
battalion and the Twenty-third under Wellesley, to
clear a grove of trees, known as the Sultanpettah Tope,
on the right front of the British camp. Both marched
at sunset, and the night fell with an intense darkness
which proved fatal to the enterprise. Shawe seized a
ruined village which sheltered his men from the fire of
the enemy on the aqueduct, but could do no more.
Wellesley entered the grove at the head of the flank-
companies of the Thirty - third, and was at once
received by the enemy with a hot fire in front and
flank, which killed an officer and struck down several
men. The two companies gave way, and the remainder
of the battalion, having lost its bearings, was led by its
commander to the shelter of an embankment for the
night ; while Wellesley found his way back alone to
camp at midnight to report, with much agitation, his
misfortunes to Harris. The young Colonel was deeply
736 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1799. mortified by his failure, 1 but on renewing the attack
on the following morning with the Scotch Brigade,
two native battalions, and four guns, he carried the
grove with little difficulty. Shawe at the same time
made a rush upon the enemy who had foiled him in
the night, and drove them out ; and thus the line of
the aqueduct was secured for the British advanced
posts.
At dawn of the same day Floyd marched with four
regiments of cavalry and nearly the whole of the left
wing of infantry, to open communication with Stuart
April 14. at Peripatam. On the I4th he returned in company
with Stuart's whole army, which had suffered little
from the enemy on its march, but was short of supplies
and, through some disease among the cattle, had lost
four thousand bullocks. Still more alarming was the
discovery made on the next day that Harris's store
of rice, which had been reckoned on the 5th at thirty-
three days' supply for the army on full allowance, had
April 15. through some rascality been reduced by the I5th to
eighteen days' supply on half allowance. This decided
the General more than ever to hasten the attack ; and,
in compliance with the advice of the engineers, the
north-western angle of the fort was selected as the
April 1 6. point to be assailed. On the i6th Stuart's force
crossed to the northern side of the Cavery and took
up a position with its right to the river, and its left on
the ruins of the Eadgah or Mosque redoubt, which
had delayed Medows for so long in the assault of the
April 17. 6th of February 1792. On the following day at sun-
set he sent out the Seventy-fifth and two battalions of
Bombay Sepoys under Colonel Hart, supported by the
Seventy-fourth and a native battalion from Harris's
force, to attack the village of Agrar, over against the
north-west angle of the fort, from which the enemy
was driven with little difficulty or loss. On the same
1 "Wellesley is mad with this ill success," Lieut. Rowley's
Journal. The true account of the mishap is in Lushington's
Life of Lord Harris, pp. 292 sqq.
CH. xxv HISTORY OF THE ARMY
737
night a battery of six cannon and two howitzers was 1899.
constructed to enfilade the angle above named, and was
christened by the name of Hart's post ; while, on the
south bank of the river a first step was taken by
driving the enemy from a watercourse, called the
Little Cavery, running parallel to the western front
of the fortress. A post was here established, which
received the name of Macdonald's post. A trench
was dug to connect this last with a ruined village on
the aqueduct in rear : of it, called Shawe's post, and
therewith, though the town had not been invested, the
siege of Seringapatam was fairly begun.
None the less, Harris's anxiety on account of failing
supplies was extreme. On the I9th, the anniversary April 19.
of the disastrous fight at Lexington in 1775, Stuart
had but two days' provisions in store for his Euro-
peans ; and though, by various means, rice had been
collected sufficient to victual the fighting men for a
month, the General on that day sent Floyd eastward
towards the pass of Caveriporam with the whole of the
cavalry and a brigade of infantry to hasten the arrival
of the convoys expected from Baramahal. The work
of the siege, however, progressed. The enemy had
thrown up a line of entrenchments on the western
bank of the river parallel to the western face of the
fort, from which position it was essential to drive them
in order to obtain a site for breaching batteries. A
battery was therefore erected a little to the north of
Sultanpettah to enfilade such portion of it as was not
raked by Stuart's guns, and on the evening of the
2oth the enemy were driven from one of their posts
at a powder-mill in advance of this entrenchment, with
a loss of two hundred and fifty killed and wounded.
A first parallel was then dug from the Cavery to the
Little Cavery, and a battery, known as the eight-gun
battery, built a little in front of it ; while at the same
time a new battery was marked out on the north bank
of the river. This last measure stimulated the enemy
to a determined attack upon Stuart's position on the
738 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1799. 22nd, which, however, was beaten off with a loss to
April 22. them of six or seven hundred men. The new battery
was then constructed, and with the assistance of addi-
tional batteries on the southern bank the enemy's guns
April 24. on the western face of the fortress were by the 24th
entirely silenced.
On that night a first zigzag was carried forward from
the eight-gun battery, and a new battery was raised,
which in a short time forced the enemy to withdraw
the guns from two towers which flanked the site
of the intended breach. This zigzag brought the
besiegers within little more than two hundred yards
of the enemy's entrenchments on the west bank of
the Cavery. These occupied a length of about eight
hundred yards on a narrow slip of ground between the
river and the watercourse, the front being covered by
the bank of the watercourse, and the southern flank
closed by a small circular work. At sunset of the
April 26. 26th, under direction of Colonel Wellesley, an attack
was made upon this entrenchment by two columns
simultaneously, the first consisting of four companies
of the Scotch Brigade, the second of as many of the
Seventy -third, each of them supported by four com-
panies of Bengal Sepoys. Both parties entered the
enemy's lines at or near their northern extremity, and
carried them at the first rush ; but, finding themselves
under heavy fire from the circular work at the southern
end, suffered some loss. A party of the Seventy-
fourth and Scotch Brigade, however, presently joined
them under Lieutenant-colonel Campbell, who with-
out further ado stormed the obnoxious work, and,
following hard upon the flying enemy, actually crossed
the bridge in rear of it into the island of Seringapatam.
There they bayoneted some of Tippoo's troops in their
tents and spiked two guns, after which Campbell, con-
tent with having filled the entire garrison with alarm of
a general assault, very wisely retreated.
April 27. By ten o'clock of the next morning the British had
established themselves firmly on the ground thus
CH.XXV HISTORY OF THE ARMY 739
gained, their losses in the action having slightly 1799.
exceeded three hundred of all ranks, killed, wounded,
and missing, the brunt of which fell on the Seventy-
fourth. The watercourse being found to furnish an
excellent third parallel, ready made, the construction
of breaching batteries against the western face of the
north-west angle was at once begun ; and, on the 2nd May ^.
of May, fire was opened from twenty-nine cannon and
six howitzers. Early in the course of the cannonade,
a magazine of rockets was exploded within the fort,
and by the evening of the 3rd the breach was reported
practicable. Harris thereupon decided to assault at
once. Indeed, he had no choice, for his supplies had
fallen so low that the army was on the verge of
starvation. So desperate was the situation that the
General had fully resolved, if necessary, to throw his
entire army into the breach, since success was positively
necessary to its existence. 1
The command of the assaulting column was May 4.
entrusted to Baird, who had volunteered his services
upon this, his third visit to Seringapatam. The troops
were told off into two parties, which were to enter the
breach together and turn, the one to the left and the
other to the right, upon mounting the rampart. The
left attack under Lieutenant -colonel Dunlop of the
Seventy -seventh, consisted of the flank- companies of
that regiment, the Seventy-fifth, and the Hundred and
Third, besides the complete battalions of Twelfth and
Thirty-third Foot, ten flank-companies of the Bengal
Native Infantry, and a small body of artillerymen.
The right attack, under Colonel Sherbrooke, was
formed of the flank-companies of the Scotch Brigade
and of de Meuron's Regiment, the Seventy-third and
Seventy-fourth Highlanders, and fourteen flank-com-
panies of Bombay and Coast Sepoys, with also a
handful of gunners. The whole numbered close upon
five thousand men, of whom nearly three-fifths were
1 Life of Sir D. Baird, i. 200; Lushington, Life of Lord Harris,
p. 332; Lieutenant Rowley's Journal.
740 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1799. Europeans. 1 Each column was led by a sergeant and
May 4. twelve volunteers, followed immediately by twenty-
five men under a subaltern, the chosen officers being
Lieutenant Hill of the Seventy-fourth in Sherbrooke's
party, and Lieutenant Lawrence of the Seventy-seventh
in Dunlop's. The troops were all in the trenches by
daybreak, having been marched thither in small bodies
in order to disarm suspicion ; and Harris had directed
that the assault should take place at one o'clock in the
afternoon, judging that the enemy would least expect it
on the hottest hour of the day. The men were not in
high spirits, possibly because they were half starved, but
there was every likelihood that they would prove to be
savage, for the murder and torture of prisoners by
Hyder Ali and Tippoo in former days had not been
forgotten. All through the forenoon the batteries
played upon the breach incessantly, and at one o'clock,
Baird, in the advanced trench, drew his sword, with
the words, " Men, are you all ready " ? " Yes," was
the answer. " Then forward, my lads " ; and both
storming parties instantly rushed forward to the
breach. 2
From the trench to the bank of the river was but
one hundred yards. The river itself, rocky and vary-
ing in depth from ankle-deep to waist-deep, measured
two hundred and eighty yards more ; beyond that
again was a low stone wall, then a ditch some sixty
yards wide, and finally the breach. A very heavy fire
of grape, musketry, and rockets was poured upon the
columns as they advanced, causing some of the men to
swerve from the ford, which had been marked out for
them, into deeper water. But Baird led the way across
1 2494 Europeans and 1882 natives are the official figures ; but
these do not include sergeants nor havildars, nor, of course, officers.
The numbers of all ranks, excluding staft officers, were Europeans,
2862 ; natives, 2003.
2 These details are from Lieutenant Rowley's Journal. He was
one of the assaulting party, and records Baird's terse words (which
are less theatrical than those ascribed to him by Hook or Beatson)
with the comment that they were not in the style of Livy.
CH.XXV HISTORY OF THE ARMY 741
the appointed passage, crossing the ditch, which was 1799.
almost filled with the ruins fallen from the breach, Ma 7 4-
among the foremost ; and, within six minutes, the
British flag was waving on the ramparts. The sup-
porting companies quickly came up, and the two
columns separated, Sherbrooke's to the right or south,
and Dunlop's to the left. On reaching the summit of
the breach, a formidable ditch was found within, which
divided the outer from the inner rampart ; but a small
party of the Twelfth under Captain Goodall found
a means of crossing it, and, by following the inner
rampart in a parallel course with Dunlop's column,
did excellent service. Dunlop himself was disabled by
a sword-cut on the wrist, but his men on the outer
rampart quickly cleared the north-west bastion and the
faussebraye beneath it, from which had come the dead-
liest of the fire in the breach. This task accomplished,
they turned eastward along the northern rampart, for
the still grimmer work that lay before them.
Before they had proceeded three hundred yards they
were checked by a traverse, from behind which a large
body of the enemy, commanded by the Sultan in person,
maintained so steady a fire that the Europeans were
staggered. Most of their leading officers had fallen in
the Cavery or in the breach, and the Grenadiers com-
plained that their ammunition had been spoiled in pass-
ing the river. With some difficulty, they were rallied
by Lieutenant Farquhar of the Seventy-fourth, an ex-
cellent and most gallant officer, who, among many other
dangerous services, had sounded and marked the ford
before the breach, and guided the storming party to the
breach itself. He now led the Grenadiers forward, but
was instantly shot dead ; and the men were again
wavering when fortunately more troops came up.
Then with the help of Goodall's party, which flanked
the traverses on the outer rampart, the column quickly
swept everything before it. The unhappy fugitives were
pent in between the outer and inner ditches, both of
them broad and deep, and the slaughter now became
742 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOKXII
1799- terrible. The blood of the British was up, and no
4- quarter was given. The Sultan was borne back undis-
tinguished amid the press of the flying, though, being
still mounted, he was able to make for the gate on the
northern face of the works, which led to the interior for-
tress. But here the terrified Mysoreans from without
were met by an equally strong current of the panic-
stricken from within ; and the two parties of British on
the outer and inner ramparts, forming up in order,
poured in a regular fire by platoons upon the swaying
masses on each side of the archway. The Sultan, twice
wounded before he reached the gateway, contrived to
pass within it ; but he received a third wound and his
horse was killed under him, as he emerged on the
interior side. His attendants tried to remove him in
his palanquin, but were unable to do so owing to the
confused throng and the heaps of dead and dying
that choked the way. Some English soldiers now
entered the gateway, and one of them seized the
Sultan by the belt. Half fainting with loss of
blood, Tippoo seized a sword and aimed a wild
cut at his assailant, who, unable to distinguish
him from his fellows, instantly shot him through
the temple. The Sultan fell dead, unknown and
unrecognised. His body was presently covered by
many others through the slaughter at the gate, and the
left column of the British pressed on along the northern
ramparts to complete the victory.
Presently a mighty shout of triumph proclaimed
that the two attacking columns had caught sight of
each other, and were about to meet. Sherbrooke's
troops, indeed, had encountered little resistance, though
there were strongholds which, in the hands of a few
resolute men, could have wrought great havoc among
them. Many of the Mysorean troops who were
encamped outside the southern and eastern sides of
the fort fled by a ford towards Carighaut Hill, pursued
by the shot which the British directed upon them from
their own guns. But a great crowd ran in abject
CH. xxv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 743
terror eastward, and, meeting the other stream of 1799.
fugitives, which was flying before the British of the Ma 7 4-
left attack, surged in upon it with all the hideous
pressure of panic. A few had contrived to escape by
the eastern or Bangalore Gateway ; but the leaves of
the gate opened inward, and there was no unfolding
them against the mass of struggling men who threw all
their weight, in vain despair, upon them. The heat of
the day was unusually oppressive, but the troops, and
particularly the sepoys, were savage and did not weary
of killing. In the midst of the carnage, the gateway
from some unknown cause caught fire, and the dense
multitude beneath the archway swayed to and fro in
wild agony between the flames and the bayonets, find-
ing mercy from neither. After two hours, all resistance
had ceased, but the number of Mysoreans that perished
in the storm was reckoned at ten thousand. 1
Meanwhile, Baird, ignorant of Tippoo's fate, after
making his dispositions for securing the southern
rampart, sent a flag of truce to the palace to summon
him to surrender. The flag was very reluctantly
admitted, and two of the Sultan's sons, who were
within, were afraid at first to take the responsibility of
throwing open the gates. When after long hesitation
they at last assented, Baird with the Twelfth and Thirty-
third regiments was found to be waiting outside, both
General and soldiers roused to the highest pitch of
indignation by the discovery that all the British
prisoners taken during the siege had been murdered
in cold blood. In such circumstances it was hardly
safe to admit the British troops within the palace,
wherefore Baird entered with a small party only,
disarmed the Mysoreans within, and sent away the
two princes under an escort suited to their rank.
1 Beatson, who accompanied the right attack, bears witness to
the good discipline and humanity of the troops and, in particular,
of their officers. Lieutenant Rowley's Journal, however, gives a
different picture of the left attack, where the foremost troops, as
commonly happens when an assault meets with serious resistance,
passed for a time out of all control.
VOL. IV L
744 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK XH
1799- After searching the palace in vain for the Sultan, he
May 4. wen f- t the northern gateway, where among a vast
heap of the dead a single man was found alive. He
was one of the Sultan's faithful attendants, who had
saved himself from suffocation by creeping beneath his
palanquin, and now crawled out, faint and wounded, to
show where his dead master lay. Corpse after corpse
was lifted and passed out for examination under
the ghastly torch -light until at last the body was
found of a man, short-necked, broad-shouldered, and
corpulent, with tiny hands and feet, which the attend-
ants recognised to be that of Tippoo Sultan. On the
following day it was buried by that of his father, under
the fire of minute guns and under the escort of British
Grenadiers ; and at the close of the ceremony a
thunderstorm of a violence unusual even in those
regions burst over Seringapatam, killing two officers
and several men of the Bombay Army, and marking
with terror the end of the dynasty of Hyder Ali.
So closed the last siege of Seringapatam, which,
from beginning to end, cost the British just under nine
hundred Europeans and six hundred and forty natives,
killed, wounded, and missing, 1 the Seventy - fourth
being the corps that suffered most heavily. It was no
very heavy price to pay for the breaking of the most
formidable power in the south of India ; and, indeed,
had Tippoo been such a soldier as his father, it may
well be doubted whether the siege could have been
undertaken before the breaking of the monsoon
rendered the Cavery impassable. The Sultan had
pursued a wrong policy for the defence of his
dominions by devoting most of his energy to the
fortification of his capital. He had, it is true, made
some improvements in his artillery and infantry, though
1 Officers : killed 22, 45 wounded. Europeans : killed 181,
missing 22, wounded 622. Natives: killed 119, missing 100,
wounded 420. The casualties in the assault were 69 Europeans
and 12 sepoys killed, 248 Europeans and 32 sepoys wounded, 4
Europeans and 2 sepoys missing.
CH. xxv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 745
he had marred them by constant changes, and by 1799.
the promotion of undeserving officers. But he had
suffered his cavalry to decay the famous cavalry
which was a better protection to Seringapatam than
fifty ramparts and ditches. With judicious handling
even of the troops which he possessed, the British force
ought, in Colonel Wellesley's judgment, to have been
still entangled among the jungles of Bangalore on the
day when it reached Seringapatam. 1 That Tippoo was
by no means wholly lacking in military talent is proved
by his attack upon Stuart as well as by incidents in
previous campaigns ; but he failed to see that his
true advantage against the British lay in his superior
mobility. Against Cornwallis he had fought first what
may be called a campaign of forage, and had won it,
then a campaign of walls and ditches, and had lost
it. Nevertheless, he had repeated a like campaign
of improved walls and ditches against Harris, and had
lost everything. Hyder had made every campaign
against the British a campaign of bullocks, and thus
had gained many great successes, while sustaining no
decisive defeat. The cattle of Mysore were, and are,
to other cattle in India what the Arab horse is to other
horses, superior in blood, strength, energy, quickness
of step, staying power, and endurance of privation ;
and Hyder knew how to use them for swift marches.
Tippoo also had turned them to account on occasion,
but he knew not their true value ; and it is not too
much to say that the transfer of his faith from bullocks
to bastions was the principal reason for his fall.
AUTHORITIES. Wilks' Historical Sketches of the South of India,
Beatson's View of the Origin and Conduct of the War with Tippoo
Sultan (the official history written by Mornington's order), Wilson's
History of the Madras Army, Biddulph's The Nineteenth and their Times,
Wellesley's Despatches, Despatches and Supplementary Despatches of
the Duke of Wellington, Hook's Life of Sir David Eaird, Lushington's
Life of Lord Harris, Grant Duff's History of the Mahrattas.
1 Wellington's Suppl. Desp., i. 208.
CHAPTER XXVI
1799. ON the night of the storm the troops broke loose and
gave themselves up to the plunder of Seringapatam as.
their lawful right. Scarcely a house was left unpillaged,
and bars of gold, jewels, and trinkets of great value
were brought into camp for sale by private soldiers and
sepoys. The treasure at the palace was saved, except
one casket of jewels, said to have been worth 300,000,
whereof it appears that at least one officer took his
May 5. share with the men. On the morning of the 5th,
however, Wellesley took over the command of the
city, and, by a few severe examples of hanging and
flogging, restored order among the troops and confidence
among the despoiled people. Within ten days all the
subordinate officers of Tippoo surrendered, and on the
May 13. 1 3th General Floyd arrived with a gigantic convoy of
nearly forty thousand cattle, chiefly draught and pack
bullocks, and twenty-one thousand sheep, guarded by
his own troops and two detachments under Lieutenant-
colonels Read and Brown. Read's duty had been to
cover the collection of supplies in Baramahal, for which
purpose he had received a force of more than five
thousand men, including only a handful of Europeans.
After capturing one or two hill -forts to north of
Rayacotta, he moved down to assemble the grain
merchants at Caveriporam, whither he was followed on
the ist of May by Brown. This officer had marched
from Trichinopoly on the 29th of March with over
three thousand men, including eleven hundred of the
Nineteenth and Hundred-and-second Regiments, and
746
CH. xxvi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 747
had reduced Caroor, Erode, and Avaracoorchy, pre- 1799.
paratory to operations in the district of Coimbatore,
when he was summoned to assist Read. Leaving
Caver iporam on the 23rd of April, Read was unable
to clear the pass until the 27th, when he met Floyd at
its head, while the convoy, accompanied by Brown's
force, took nine whole days to move from the plain to
the tableland. Its arrival at Seringapatam set Harris's
mind at ease for the victualling of his army.
The next matter to be settled was the distribution
of the prize-property, of which the Governor-General
assigned the treasure and jewels, valued at over eleven
hundred thousand pounds, to the army, reserving the
destination of the captured ordnance, amounting to
nine hundred and twenty- nine pieces, besides other
military stores, for the decision of the Company.
Tippoo's own sword was made over by the Prize
Committee to Baird, and the gilded tiger's head from
the Sultan's throne has long adorned the treasures of
Windsor Castle. This distribution of the prize-money,
however, gave rise to a long and acrimonious dispute,
which had serious consequences for Harris and, indeed,
for all the General Officers. Harris had been recom-
mended by Mornington for a peerage and a red riband.
Owing to the opposition of the East India Company,
he received nothing until 1815. On the contrary, the
Company persecuted him with litigation over his share
of the prize-money for six years, until the Privy
Council, as the final Court of Appeal, confirmed it to
him. Baird's claims to the Knighthood of the Bath
were most strongly urged by Mornington, and likewise
ignored. We shall see that Floyd, Arthur Wellesley,
and Mornington himself, at a time when they had
doubled and tripled their services rendered in 1799, all
alike found cause to complain that the East India
Company was the worst of masters.
On the 22nd of June was signed the treaty for the June 22,
partition of Mysore itself. Hereby the province of
Canara and the districts of Coimbatore and Wynaad
748 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1799. passed to the East India Company ; Gooty and Gur-
rumconda were made over to the Nizam ; the small
district of Soonda and Harponhilly, on the north-west
was assigned to the Mahrattas ; and the remainder was
restored to the representative of the old Hindoo
dynasty of Mysore, which was now re-established.
Tippoo's army was disbanded ; and a treaty was made
with the new Maharaja for the defence of his country
by the Company's troops in return for an annual
subsidy. Harris, however, was particularly careful to
take over for the Madras Army Tippoo's establishment
of draft bullocks, which he had so often coveted during
his weary march upon Seringapatam. Meanwhile the
May 13. expeditionary force was broken up. On the ijth of
May Stuart and the troops from Bombay marched to
the west coast to occupy the province of Canara ; on
May 17. the iyth Read's force was detached to take possession
of Savandroog, Nundydroog, and Bangalore ; on the
May 22. 22nd Brown, leaving the Hundred -and -Second and
a native battalion behind him, retraced his steps to take
May 25. over the district of Coimbatore ; and on the 25th two
subsidiary battalions of the Nizam's force were sent to
enforce the change of government in Gooty and Gur-
rumconda. The Thirty-third, the Scotch Brigade, and
three native battalions formed the garrison of Seringa-
patam itself, with Arthur Wellesley for commandant ;
while Harris, with the remainder of the force, encamped
outside the town.
We enter now upon a long series of petty operations
which, though they may be tedious to the general reader,
must none the less be briefly chronicled as an essential
part of the history of the British Army and of British
India. The crushing of the Mohammedan dynasty
in Mysore signified something more than the mere
partition of Tippoo's territory ; it was the first and
principal step towards the establishment of British
influence and authority as paramount in Southern India.
One great power, that of the Mahrattas, still remained
to be overcome ; but the Nizam's dominions were
CH. xxvi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 749
virtually dependent on the Company since Morning- 1799.
ton's last treaty. Tanjore, to anticipate matters by
a few months, was made over to the administration
of the British upon the condition that a fixed subsidy
and one-fifth of the revenue of the province should be
paid to its native suzerain. It remained to reduce to
order the lawless elements that might still linger in
Mysore itself, and the unruly tribes, independent and
semi -independent, that surrounded it on every side
the Polygars on the east and south, the proud military
caste of the Nairs in Malabar, and the tribes of Arab
descent, bearing the name of Moplahs, that also claimed
independence on the western coast. The period, as has
been well said, was the golden age of adventurers.
Only forty years had passed since Hyder Ali, a soldier
of fortune, had founded the dynasty just overthrown
by Harris. In the far north Runjeet Singh, the
founder of the Sikh State in the Punjab, was rising to
eminence. Between the Ganges and the Jumna Perron,
nominally in Scindia's service, was endeavouring to form
a province under French protection, only to find him-
self crossed by an Irish sailor, George Thomas, who in
his turn tried to set up an independent principality of
his own. All these, to say nothing of lesser predatory
chiefs, were taking advantage of the anarchy which
prevailed everywhere without the sphere of British
authority. Owing to the dissensions among the
Mahratta chiefs, any leader who could offer booty for
reward could assemble a band of brigands, which success
would quickly increase into an army, and a touch of
genius could convert into the conquerors of a kingdom.
The first trouble arose from the disbandment of
Tippoo's army, which threw a number of active and
discontented men upon the world without means of
subsistence. These found a leader in one Doondia
Wao, who had once been in Hyder Ali's service but
had deserted during Cornwallis's campaigns, and, upon
conclusion of peace, had collected a gang of freebooters
which lived by depredation in the district of Darwar.
750 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOKXII
1799. Being driven out from thence by the Peishwa's troops,
he in 1794 tried to make his peace with Tippoo, who,
however, kept him in close confinement at Seringapatam.
Escaping from prison upon the day of the storm, he at
once gathered round him a number of the dismissed
soldiers and made for the district of Bednore, where
the general confusion enabled him to gain possession
of many of the principal forts in the country. New
adherents rapidly swarmed to him. He ravaged and
plundered with merciless greed and cruelty, and having
thus acquired artillery, arms, ammunition, and money,
he claimed the province of Bednore as his own and
proclaimed himself to be King of the Two Worlds.
By the beginning of July Doondia was recognised to
be so formidable that two flying columns, each of two
native battalions and one regiment of Native Cavalry
were sent to suppress him, while the headquarters of
the army also moved northward to their support.
One of these columns under Lieutenant-colonel James
July 6. Dalrymple at once seized the hill-fort at Chitteldroog,
July 15. and on the I5th of July, after a forced march of forty
miles in twenty-four hours, caught up a body of over
six hundred of Doondia's followers and, attacking with
cavalry only, destroyed the whole of them. Two days
July 17. later Dalrymple surprised another small detachment of
the brigands ; and after further successes he presently
turned westward towards the upper waters of the Toom-
budra to co-operate with the second column under Colonel
Stevenson. The headquarters of the army had mean-
July 24. while reached Chitteldroog on the 24th, from whence it
moved early in August to Hurryhur on the Toombudra,
about forty miles west and north. The flank-companies
of the Seventy-third and Seventy-fourth and a native
battalion were then pushed northward for twenty-five
Aug. 1 6. miles to the fort of Hollal, which was carried by storm
and its garrison destroyed. On the following day
Dalrymple and Stevenson, having captured the strong-
holds of Shimooga and Honelly, came up with twelve
hundred horse and three hundred foot of Doondia's
CH.XXVI HISTORY OF THE ARMY 751
force under the walls of Shikarpoor, stormed the fort 1799.
with their infantry, charged the troops in the open with
their cavalry and routed them with great slaughter.
Doondia fled to the Mahratta country, but was instantly
attacked by the Mahratta chief, Doonda Punt Gokla,
whereby the remainder of his following was dispersed.
The province of Bednore was then occupied by the
British without further opposition ; and it was fondly
supposed that there was an end of Doondia.
A few days later Harris returned to Madras, leaving Aug. 24.
Arthur Wellesley in command of all the troops above
the Ghauts, or, in other words, in full military and civil
charge of Mysore. The new commander at once set
out for the north of the province ; but almost immedi-
ately his plans for establishing the new ruler's authority
were upset by new orders from the Governor-General.
Mornington's treaty of 1798 with the Nizam had
caused great jealousy among the Mahrattas at Poona ;
but their plans for an alliance with Tippoo had been
disconcerted by the rapidity of the Governor-General's
action, and they were therefore the less disposed to
acquiesce in the Treaty of Partition, and to accept
Soonda as their share of the plunder. Mornington,
therefore, instructed his brother to take over Soonda for
the Maharaja of Mysore, and, since it was already
occupied by the Mahrattas under Doonda Punt Gokla,
Wellesley wrote a friendly letter to that chief, request-
ing him to evacuate it. At the same time he directed
a small force of native infantry under Major St. Leger
to move into the country from the south, while Sept. 10.
Stevenson crossed the river Wurda and entered it from
the east. St. Leger alone met with some opposition, Sept. 29.
being compelled to storm at some cost of life a fortified
village held by Mahrattas which barred his advance ;
but by the end of September the district was in British
possession. Wellesley, however, found in it so many
disadvantages through its proximity to Mahratta terri-
tory, its heavy jungles, and its unhealthiness that he
was by no means eager to retain it. " There is little
752 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1799. in it to govern," he wrote, " but trees and wild beasts " ;
and the forest, being a harbour for freebooters, made
heavy demands upon his troops. 1
Nov. Wellesley returned to Seringapatam towards the
end of November, but there were still two troublesome
marauders on the Malabar Coast who defied all autho-
rity. The first was Kistnapah Naik, Rajah of Bullam,
who had taken possession of the Soobramy Pass, 2 lead-
ing from Mysore to Canara, and thus interrupted
communication with Mangalore. The second was an
individual known as the Pychy Rajah, who had seized
the district of Wynaad and other territory between the
Ghauts and the coast, at the south-western corner of
Mysore. Already in August a force had been sent
to seize Munserabad, a principal stronghold of Kistna-
pah Naik, and the place had surrendered without
1800. resistance ; but this lesson proved to be insufficient,
March, and on the 23rd of March 1800 Lieutenant-colonel
Tolfrey was detached with thirteen companies of Sepoys
and a body of Mysore troops to inflict severer punish-
April 2. ment. On the 2nd of April he attacked the Rajah at
Arrakeera, a stockaded position in dense forest about
three miles south-east of Munserabad, and was beaten
off with a loss of nearly fifty killed and wounded.
Thereupon, the flank-companies of the Seventy-third and
April 30. Seventy-seventh together with four more companies of
Sepoys were added to his force, and on the 3Oth, in
spite of a stubborn resistance protracted by the enemy
along a mile and a half of obstacles, the position was
carried, at a loss to the assailants of one hundred and
forty killed and wounded. This defeat and the
destruction of several villages brought the refractory
chief to reason. Every preparation had been made
to mete out the like measure to his brother freebooter
in Wynaad, but circumstances gave him respite for a
year, when he too was compelled to cry for mercy.
1 Wellington, Suppl. Desp., i. 318-319, 341, 347-348, 355. ^
2 Apparently the pass which was also known as the Bissly
Ghaut.
CH. xxvr HISTORY OF THE ARMY 753
But, meanwhile, a far more troublesome enemy had 1800,
reappeared, with a following that threatened to become
really formidable.
This was Doondia Wao, to whom the intestine
quarrels of the Mahrattas had given the opportunity
of recruiting his bands to considerable strength. After
his defeat by Dairy mple he had for a time taken
service with the Rajah of Kolapore, who was at open
war with his suzerain the Peishwa. Then separating
from him he made a raid on the Carnatic, where he
plundered the territory both of the Company and the
Peishwa. He then returned to the neighbourhood of
Darwar, threatening the province of Soonda, but
thirsting above all for the blood of his old enemy
Doonda Punt Gokla. In the middle of April Wellesley
became anxious for the safety of his garrisons in the
north ; and on the 25th he ordered three regiments of
cavalry and a battalion of infantry to be concentrated
at Hurryhur for the protection of Bednore. 1 In the
first week in May came the news that Doondia had
completely defeated five thousand Mahratta horse,
which had been sent out against him ; and on the
2nd the Governor-General, having obtained from the
Mahrattas permission to enter their territory, gave
Wellesley orders to hunt down Doondia Wao and
to hang him on the first tree.
Accordingly, the Colonel marched on the 2ist of May zi,
May from Seringapatam, and by the beginning of June
had concentrated at Chitteldroog the Seventy -third,
Seventy-seventh, and five battalions of Native Infantry,
the Nineteenth and Twenty-fifth Light Dragoons and
three regiments of Native Cavalry, besides pioneers and
artillery. Three more native battalions, a regiment of
Native Cavalry, and a thousand of the Nizam's horse
under Colonel Bowser were also ordered to co-operate
with him. The campaign was a peculiar one, having for
its object not the capture of territory nor the infliction
of the British will upon an enemy who declined to submit
1 Wellington, Suppl. Desp., i. 523, 539.
754 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1800. to it, but the extirpation of a band of robbers, said to
June, number forty thousand men, which, in Wellesley's words,
increased as it advanced, like a snowball. Doondia,
as the Colonel admitted, was a despicable enemy ; but
great preparations were needed to cope with him, for
it was certain that the operations would take the form
of a long and weary chase. Transport, therefore, was
of the first importance, and the subject was one to which
Wellesley had given much study. "In the wars which
we may expect in India in future," he had written on
the 1 6th of January 1800, "we must look to light and
quick movements ; and we ought always to be in that
state to be able to strike a blow as soon as a war might
become evidently necessary." With this object he
urged the importance of keeping a sufficient number
of bullocks for fifty field-guns always ready ; but above
all things he insisted on the need of maintaining a corps
of bullock-drivers, even at the sacrifice of a regiment of
sepoys, since without trained drivers the bullocks were
no sooner collected than they perished from neglect.
More than once he expatiated at some length on this
theme, pleading in excuse that these bullocks were great
favourites with him ; but it does not appear from the
sequel that any immediate notice was taken of his
representations. 1
June 1 6. On the i6th of June Wellesley arrived at Hurryhur
from Chitteldroog, hoping to cross the Toombudra,
while it was still low ; but he arrived one day too late.
The monsoon burst, the river rose rapidly, and ten
whole days were lost while the troops were passed over
the river in boats. By the 24th all had crossed, and on
June 7. the 2yth he marched north-westward upon Ranee
Bednore, from which fire was opened upon his advanced
guard. Thereupon, the fort was at once stormed, and
Doondia' s garrison was put to the sword ; for their
atrocious cruelties forbade the granting of quarter to
these robbers. Want of grain, due to the ten days lost
at Hurryhur, now compelled Wellesley to halt for a
1 Wellington, Suppl. Desp., i. 432, 438.
CH. xxvi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 755
week, when the bad news reached him that the force 1800,
of Doonda Punt Gokla had been caught in an ambus-
cade by Doondia, its leader killed, the whole of his
guns taken, and his levies utterly dispersed. Moving
still north - westward Wellesley arrived at Deogeri on
the 6th of July, and crossing the Wurda reached July 6.
Savanore on the I2th, where Doondia advanced to meet July 12.
him, but not daring to face a battle retired to Koondgul.
Wellesley at once followed him up, and reaching the
fort after a march of twenty-two miles, carried it there July 14,
and then by escalade, but found to his disappointment
that the place contained nothing but a garrison, Doondia
having continued his retreat with the bulk of his force.
On the following day the British force marched south- July 1 5,
eastward for seventeen miles to Lukmaisir, which was
found to be evacuated by the enemy, thence twelve July 1 6.
miles north-east to relieve Sirhitty, which was blockaded July 17,
by one of Doondia's adherents, and thence back to
Savanore to pick up baggage and stores. 1
A halt of two days in that place cost him the loss of
half of his cattle. There was forage in abundance all
around, and such of the bullocks as possessed proper
drivers throve well enough ; but the men in charge of
the hired cattle refused to take their beasts out for two
or three miles to graze. Hence the unfortunate animals
were almost starved, and two days of very severe
weather sufficed to kill hundreds and thousands of them.
With great difficulty Wellesley crawled northward July 22.
again to Lukmaisir, a district full of cattle whereby
he was able to made good his losses. Advancing then
to Sirhitty he turned thence eastward upon Dummul, a
strong stone fort occupied by one thousand of Doondia's
men, which was at once attacked and carried by escalade. July 26*
Following up his success he turned next north-west-
ward upon Gudduck, which was evacuated by the
enemy upon his approach. Thus the last of Doondia's
strongholds in the districts of Savanore and Darwar
was taken.
1 Wellington, Desp., i. 169, 181 ; Suppl. Desp. ii. 59.
756 HISTORY THE ARMY BOOK xn
1800. Wellesley was now ih ned to awa i t t h e arrival of
July- Bowser for the execution- his fina i p i an} namely,
to drive Doondia into the n gj e f orm ed by the
Toombudra and Kistna, both 01- ^ m un fordable dur-
ing the monsoon, and so to reh r ^{ s escape im-
possible. Bowser, however, was stm wo days* march
in rear ; and, since Doondia was kno\ to be anxious
to cross the Malpurba, which being i. heavy flood
barred his retreat to the north, Wellesley e t e rmined
to allow him no rest. He had since the ^th been
joined by two thousand Mahratta cavalry oir> onda
Punt Gokla's force, and he hoped that these,hough
much frightened by their late defeat, might takeeart
when supported by the British. He therefore marked
with all speed north-westward upon Soondooty, wh-e
Doondia was then encamped, but on arriving withi
fifteen miles of it heard that the robber-chief had parU
his force into three divisions, sending one of ther.
southward, another eastward, and a third northwarc
to Manoli on the Malpurba. Making a rapid march
of twenty-six miles, Wellesley surprised this last party,
which was about five thousand strong, on the afternoon
July 30. of the 3Oth, destroyed or drove into the river every
soul in the camp, and captured the whole of the
baggage and cattle besides six guns. After this severe
blow Doondia' s followers began to desert him, and
Wellesley to think that his work was nearly done. 1
On the ist of August Wellesley fell back to Soon-
Aug. 5. dooty, and thence, after three days' halt, moved south-
westward by Bedkaira to Kitoor in order to prepare
boats for the passage of the Malpurba. Doondia
meanwhile had doubled back to westward along the
river, crossed it by an extraordinary march through the
jungle at its source, and again turned northward. But
when he reached the river Ghatpurba all the native
chiefs took arms and headed him back, and he was
fain to turn eastward towards Cowdelghee. Wellesley
therefore detached Colonel Stevenson and Bowser's
1 Wellington, /)<?#., i. 188, 191 ; Suppl. Desp., ii. 61, 70.
CH. xxvi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 757
column to cross the Upper Malpurba at Konapoor and 1800.
to follow in his track, while he himself passed the river
opposite Hoobly between the i6th and i8th and pur- Aug. 1 6- 1 8.
sued a parallel course along the north bank. At the
same time a detachment under Major Capper was
ordered to march likewise parallel with him on the
south bank, through Soondooty, Hooly, and Jellahal ;
and Colonel Bowser was detached by Stevenson to
Shapoor, about fifteen miles north-west of Konapoor,
apparently to check any attempt of Doondia to cross
the upper waters of the Ghatpurba and gain Kolapore.
The British columns now moved together eastward,
driving Doondia steadily towards the junction of the
Ghatpurba and Malpurba rivers. There was but one
outlet to which he could possibly escape, namely, a ford
across the Malpurba a little above its junction with the
Kistna, and even this seemed likely to be closed by the
floods ; but Wellesley directed Capper to push on with
the Mahratta cavalry and hold the ford, in order to seal
up the passage beyond all doubt. The Mahrattas,
however, had not forgotten their recent defeat, and
refused to move ; and Capper's main body had advanced
no further eastward than Jellahal when, on the 24th, the Aug. 24-25.
Malpurba suddenly fell. Thus Doondia, by great good
luck, was able to cross the river twenty miles below him,
though at the sacrifice of five guns, a quantity of arms
and ammunition, and ten thousand draught-bullocks,
which fell into Wellesley's hands. 1
Now Wellesley perceived his error. He had
attempted to reduce by a stern chase an enemy who
lived on the country, whereas his own troops were
obliged constantly to wait for supplies, and who could
without distress march for a greater distance in twelve
hours than his own army with the utmost effort could
traverse in two days. Such a method was hopeless,
and he resolved in future so to place his columns that
one should always be waiting to head the enemy while
1 Wellington, Suppl. Desp. ii. 93, 95, 97, 102, 107 ; Desp.
i. 2CK.
758 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK
QI
1800. the rest pursued. For the present, however, he was
Au S- obliged to halt the whole of his troops in order to
replenish his supplies ; and meanwhile it was necessary
to guard against the danger of Doondia's doubling back
to destroy the British magazines at Savanore, or of his
crossing the Toombudra, with the help of some native
chiefs, and entering Mysore. Wellesley therefore, on
Aug. 29. the 29th, crossed to the south bank of the Malpurba
by a very deep ford at Jellahal, turned eastward upon
Sept. 6. Hummunsagur, and thence marched on the 6th of
September south-eastward upon Khanagerry so as to
check any attempt of Doondia to escape to the south.
Meanwhile Stevenson, continuing his march eastward,
Sept. 5. reached Hoonagoonda on the 5th, and pressed on
towards Deodroog, rather ahead of the other columns ;
while to south of him the contingents of the Nizam
and the Mahrattas moved in a parallel course between
Sept. 8. him and Wellesley. On the 8th Wellesley left Kanag-
herry with his cavalry only, the infantry following in
rear, and turning north-eastward by Buswapore and
Chinoor reached Yepalparri on the following day. On
Sept. 9. that same day Doondia left his camp at Mudgheri,
some twenty miles to the north-east of Yepalparri,
heading northward for the Kistna ; but seeing Steven-
son's camp he at once turned south again and encamped
about nine miles to north-east of Yepalparri, within
three miles of Conagul. Intelligence of this movement
came early to Wellesley, but the weather was so bad
and his horses were so weary that he could not move
Sept. 10. on that night. On the following morning he advanced,
and after a march of six miles came upon Doondia at
Conagul. The robber-chief was actually moving west-
ward in the hope of slipping between Wellesley and
the Mahrattas. Perceiving the British, Doondia halted
and drew up his five thousand men in a strong position,
whereupon Wellesley, forming his four regiments of
cavalry into a single line, led them to the charge and
dispersed the brigands in all directions. Doondia was
killed and his camp captured ; another division of his
CH. xxvi HISTO IY OF THE ARMY 759
force was routed by * Stevenson ; his followers were 1 800.
hunted down by the Mahratta and Hyderabad Horse, Se P c -
and his reign as King of the Two Worlds was ended
for ever. 1
Thus brilliantly closed the first campaign fought by
Arthur Wellesley in independent command. In the
matter of mere fighting it furnished him with little
experience of any value ; the simple rule being that the
cavalry should charge the enemy whenever they appeared
in the open, and that the infantry should storm the
strongest forts without hesitation. There was little
danger in either service, and the casualties in the cam-
paign were absurdly few. But in the matter of making
rapid movements over execrable roads at the height of
the rainy season, and of overcoming the difficulties of
transport and supply, the experience to him was worth
very much. A great part of these difficulties arose
from the extremely cumbrous organisation for transport
which at the time prevailed in the Madras Army. It
appears that the draft bullocks were distributed among
the artillery -department, the grain -department, the
provision-department, and the camp-equipage-depart-
ment, besides which each regiment of cavalry possessed
a grain-department of its own, making from eight to
ten different departments for the transport of a force of
five thousand men. 2 He had, as has been told, fore-
seen the inconvenience of the system, and was in some
measure prepared for the disastrous loss of cattle which
overtook him at Savanore ; but it was not in his power
greatly to amend matters, and hence it was really no
small feat that he should have continued to make from
time to time so many rapid marches and yet to keep
his troops supplied.
Shortly afterwards a part of Wellesley's force was
1 Wellington, Desp. i. 214, 218, 223 ; Suppl. Desp. ii. 130.
There is a brief account of the campaign in Wilson's History of the
Madras Army, iii. 14 sq., and Colonel Biddulph has told the story
clearly, fully, and tersely, as is his wont, in The Nineteenth and their
Times, pp. 1 1 6 sqq.
- Wellington, Suppl. Desp. ii. 89.
VOL. IV M
j6o HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1800. placed under command of General Dugald Campbell to
occupy the ceded districts of Bellary and Gooty, a duty
which caused serious disturbances and kept the troops
actively employed until September 1801, when the
country was reported to be quiet. In November,
however, the Polygar of Ternakul, a fort about seven-
teen miles east of Adoni, broke out into rebellion, and
the Twenty-fifth Light Dragoons, with two regiments
of Native Cavalry and three battalions of Native
Infantry, were placed under command of Major
1 80 1. Strachan to subdue him. Strachan attacked the fort
Dec. 14. on the I4th of December, and was repulsed with the
loss of sixty killed and wounded. General Campbell
then joined him with the Seventy- third, and a second
Dec. 20. attack was delivered on the 2oth, which was again
repulsed with the loss of over one hundred and seventy
killed and wounded. The General then did what he
ought to have done at first, and brought up siege-guns,
after which the fort was carried by storm with the loss
of four men wounded only.
Very similar were the difficulties that beset another
campaign, which followed shortly afterwards in the
extreme south of India. The Polygar s of Madura and
Tinnevelly had long given trouble by their refusal to
pay their tribute, and by their predatory attacks not
only upon each other but upon the territory of the
Company. In 1792 an expedition under Colonel
Maxwell had taught them a severe lesson, but this had
been forgotten. In August 1799, therefore, a force of
four hundred men of the Nineteenth Foot and thirteen
companies of Native Infantry under Major John
Banner man was sent to reduce the fort of Panjalam-
coorchy, which lies from twenty-five to thirty miles
north-east of Tinnevelly and of Palamcottah, with
orders further to capture the chief and disarm the
whole of the southern Polygars. At the beginning of
September Bannerman advanced from Palamcottah, and
Sept. 5. arriving before the fort on the fth attempted to storm
it immediately with his native troops only, the Nine-
CH. xxvi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 761
teenth having not yet come up. He was repulsed, 1799.
owing to the misbehaviour of his troops, with the loss
of four European officers killed and two wounded and
of ninety-three Sepoys killed and wounded. However,
on the arrival of the Nineteenth on the following day Sept. 6
the enemy evacuated the fort, and within six weeks the
Polygar was caught and executed, forty-four forts were
destroyed, several chiefs were imprisoned at Palamcottah,
and Bannerman's mission was declared to have been
accomplished.
In February 1801, however, the imprisoned Poly- 1801.
gars escaped from Palamcottah, and being joined near Feb -
Panjalamcoorchy by four thousand armed men broke
out again into rebellion. The moment was well chosen,
for at that very time operations were in progress against
the Pychy Rajah on the Malabar Coast, and against the
Polygars of Dindigul sixty miles south-west of Trich-
inopoly. Major Macaulay, who commanded in the
province, could collect no more than a battalion of
Native Infantry and two hundred irregulars, with which
he marched on the 6th of February against Panjalam- Feb. 6.
coorchy. After repelling several attacks of the enemy
on the march, he arrived before it on the 9th, when he Feb. 9.
found, to his great astonishment, that the fort which
had been destroyed in 1799 had been completely rebuilt
and was now much stronger than before. He therefore Feb. 10.
retreated, without further molestation than a single
attack on his rearguard, to Palamcottah, where he
remained, too weak for any but the pettiest operations,
until the end of March. Meanwhile the insurgents
captured the fort of Tuticorin, which was disgrace- March 2.
fully yielded up by its garrison of Sepoys in defiance
of their officer who, being a subaltern just arrived
from England, had no control over them. Altogether
there was every prospect of increasing trouble in the
south.
At length, after una'/oidable delay, reinforcements of
nearly three thousand men, including two companies
of the Seventy-fourth and odd companies from six
762 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1801. different native battalions, together with a few cavalry
and heavy guns, were gathered together at Kytar, about
March 29. nineteen miles north of Palamcottah ; and on the 29th
of March the whole advanced upon Panjalamcoorchy.
On the march sixty troopers of the bodyguard charged
and cut to pieces a body of two hundred Polygar pike-
March 3 1 . men ; and on the 3 1 st the entire force came before the
fort. This was an irregular oblong structure, about
five hundred feet long and three hundred broad, built
of mud, with walls twelve feet high and a multitude of
small square bastions, the whole being surrounded by
a thick hedge of thorn. Macaulay, having two heavy
guns and two howitzers, prepared to batter a breach in
the walls ; but after a few hours of futile cannonading
with bad ammunition and shells that would not burst,
he decided to storm without further delay.
The assault was led by two companies of the Seventy-
fourth backed by the grenadier-companies of the Sepoys
and one complete native battalion. The men dashed
forward gallantly under the heaviest possible fire, burst
through the hedge, and made desperate efforts to sur-
mount the breach, but in vain. The bastions had been
hollowed out by the enemy, so as to present no footing
at the top ; and ingress was barred by a hedge of pikes,
from eighteen to twenty feet long, held by invisible de-
fenders below the level of the broken parapet ; while
from an elevated spot behind them and from the bastions
on each flank an incessant fire was poured upon the
assailants. Astonishing gallantry was shown by the
officers, both native and European, but to no purpose.
The assault was beaten back with heavy loss ; and the
sounding of the retreat, as so often happens on such
occasions, was the signal for a backward rush which
greatly resembled a flight. Instantly the enemy sprang
to the breach in pursuit, some pausing to pierce with
their pikes the bodies of the dying and the dead, others
throwing themselves upon a howitzer, which was only
rescued by the exertions of six officers and fifty Sepoys
who had rallied on them. The total number of casualties
CH. xxvi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 763
amounted to fourteen officers and three hundred and 1801.
three men killed and wounded, but this figure only March 31,
faintly represents the havoc wrought among the
Europeans. Of the two companies of the Seventy-
fourth, two officers and eighteen men were killed, three
officers and fifty-three men wounded ; and of one
hundred and twenty British who formed the storming
party only forty-six escaped unhurt. In short, on its
own small scale, this was as murderous a fight as is
recorded in the history of any British regiment.
After the action Macaulay entrenched himself within
fifteen hundred yards of the fort and awaited reinforce-
ments. For three weeks he was little troubled except
by occasional skirmishes, but on the 22nd of April the April 22.
Polygars took advantage of a heavy thunderstorm to
attack the camp, and actually carried off a gun. The
Sepoys being unable to fire their muskets owing to the
rain found a bayonet little defence against a long pike
with a razor's edge. The gun was, however, rescued, and
there was no further serious engagement until the 2ist May 21.
of May, when Colonel Agnew arrived with the Seventy-
seventh Foot, seven companies of Sepoys, a regiment
of Native Cavalry, a small party of Malays, and six
pieces of heavy artillery. Regular batteries were then
erected, which opened fire at dawn on the 23rd of May, May 23.
and by noon had battered a practicable breach ; but at
Macaulay's entreaty Agnew continued the cannonade
for another twenty hours. Then a storming party,
formed of the two shattered companies of the Seventy-
fourth, two more of the Seventy -seventh, and five
companies of Sepoy grenadiers, made a rush for the
breach. So stoutly did the enemy stand that it was
half an hour before the British could obtain any footing
upon the summit ; but at length the defenders at the
breach were all killed by hand-grenades, whereupon the
whole body of the enemy gave way. The cavalry, with
four galloping guns, was waiting to intercept them at
the egress at the other end of the fort, but the Polygars
formed themselves into two solid columns and presented
764 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1 80 1. a formidable phalanx against the charging horse. About
Ma 7 2 3- six hundred of them were cut off and over four hundred
more were found dead in the fort ; but the main body,
about two thousand strong, made good its retreat.
Nor was this the only evidence of the enemy's patient
and enduring bravery. Thickly crowded into a miser-
ably narrow space, they had dug burrows underground
for shelter from shot and shell, which when seen by
the British officers presented horrors beyond descrip-
tion. The casualties in the assault numbered one
hundred and eighty-six killed and wounded, of whom
eight were officers. The Seventy -fourth again lost
two officers, and the two companies of the Seventy-
seventh two officers and fifty-one men. The sense of
their superiority to the native troops seems to have
inspired the British regiments with a spirit which
triumphed over the severest losses.
After the capture of the fort the rebel Polygars
betook themselves about seventy miles northward to
Shevagunga, then ruled by two chiefs named Vella
Murdoo and Chinna Murdoo, who, having once been
the principal officers of the Zemindar, had usurped his
authority and now exercised supreme control over the
district. Agnew called upon the Murdoos to give up
their principal leaders, and, on their refusal to comply,
began active operations against them. Accordingly,
after leaving detachments to destroy the captured
fort and to occupy Tuticorin, which had been evacu-
ated by the rebels, Agnew, with the rest of the force,
May 26. marched on the 26th north-eastward in order to
relieve the garrison of Comery, over thirty miles
west of Ramnad. From Comery he turned north-
June 2. westward to Trippawannum, where he halted and sent
his siege -artillery under escort to Madura. The
escorting party was attacked on its way back to Trip-
pawannum, but escaped with slight loss ; and on the
June 7. yth of June the army turned south-eastward towards
Ramnad, where Agnew hoped to find a friendly district
in his rear while penetrating the jungles of Shevagunga
CH. xxvi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 765
from the east. The march was of the most harassing 1801.
description, particularly after the third day, when the
road passed through a network of high banks, water-
courses, and jungle ; for the enemy never ceased to
deliver petty attacks from every point of vantage, the
repulse of which on one day cost nearly one hundred
killed and wounded.
Arriving at Ramnad on the i4th, Agnew discovered June 14.
that the northern part of the district was in revolt and
could not be counted on to furnish him with pro-
visions ; and he was fain to march back to Madura,
which he reached on the 4th of July. Leaving it again July 4.
on the 22nd, he moved eastward to Trivatoor, where July 22.
he was joined on the 26th by a reinforcement of one
battalion and some detached companies of Native
Infanty, a detachment of the Twelfth Foot, the flank
companies of De Meuron's regiment, and apparently
a part of the Scotch Brigade under Colonel Innes.
The country was close and difficult ; and Innes, inces-
santly attacked on all sides, made but slow progress
until Agnew sent out a detachment to help his advance,
when the junction was at last effected, after the two
divisions had lost nearly seventy killed and wounded.
The united force on the 28th moved south-eastward July 28.
to Ookoor, and on the following day eastward upon July 29.
Sherewele or Serruvial, a large village where stood the
palace of the Murdoos. The route on this day lay
through a maze of banks flanked by jungle, at every
one of which the enemy made a stand ; and the march
in consequence consisted of a series of manoeuvres for
turning the flanks of these obstacles. On the morrow, July 30.
as the force drew nearer to Sherewele, it was obstructed
by a battery of four guns in addition to the usual
obstacles, and six hours were needed to traverse a
distance of less than three miles. The enemy, how-
ever, made no effort to hold the village itself, which,
though eminently defensible, was occupied by Agnew
without opposition.
Now came the most difficult part of the work. Due
766 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xu
1 80 1. south of Sherewele lay the fort of Caliarcoil, 1 the prin-
cipal stronghold of the rebels, only five miles distant,
but separated from it by some of the thickest and
most impenetrable jungle in the Carnatic. Over two
thousand pioneers and woodcutters had been collected
to cut a road through the forest ; and morning after
Aug. morning from the 3ist of July to the 3ist of August
working parties were sent out for this purpose, covered
by detachments of troops for their protection. At
first the work went forward rapidly, but as the road
drew nearer to Caliarcoil the jungle grew denser, and
the enemy's harassing opposition more vigorous. Half
Aug. 9. of the distance had been penetrated by the 9th of
August, when it was necessary to throw up a redoubt,
close to a tree which was too gigantic to be felled, in
order to cover further progress. Constantly repulsed,
sometimes with heavy loss, the enemy persisted in
their attacks, occasionally throwing up breastworks
with cannon to fire down the road, more often plying
the working parties and their escort with musketry
from the forest. After a month of hard work only
four out of the five miles of forest had been cut
through, and the woodcutters were weary of their
work. Dysentery also was playing havoc with the
* J A * O
troops ; and the communications of the force were so
effectually cut that it was practically impossible to pass
even the smallest message through the circle of the
Sept. 2. enemy. On the 2nd of September, therefore, Agnew
abandoned the enterprise, and returned to Ookoor.
No roll of his casualties exists, but it seems certain
that the losses of the force by sickness were very
heavy.
At the end of the month, however, Agnew received
information which gave him hope of surprising the
rebels at Caliarcoil, and accordingly made arrange-
ments to move upon it by three converging columns.
The Seventy-seventh and a battalion of Sepoys under
Lieutenant-colonel Spry marched from Ookoor on the
1 In modern maps Kauliar Kovil.
CH. xxvi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 767
night of the 3Oth to follow the road which had been 1801.
cut from Sherewele for some distance, and then to Se P t - 3-
leave it for a path, hitherto unknown to the British,
through the jungle. Agnew himself, starting at dawn
of the ist of October, took the main road leading to Oct. i.
Caliarcoil through Mootoor, and Colonel Innes, start-
ing at the same time from Sholapooram, moved by
way of Kerranoor and Calangoody. The operation
was completely successful. By eight o'clock on the
ist of October Spry was in possession of Caliarcoil, and
Innes's column alone met with serious resistance, the
enemy leaving at one of their barriers one hundred
dead. This success broke the back of the insurrection.
The rebels dispersed in every direction, and the leaders
were in a few weeks taken and executed or deported to
Penang. By the end of March 1 802 the population March,
had been disarmed, the forts destroyed, and the rebel-
lion completely suppressed.
At about the same time, January 1802, Colonel 1802.
Wellesley undertook his first forest-campaign against the J an -
Rajah of Bullum, advancing upon his principal strong-
hold in three converging columns, and forcing him to
abject submission in little more than a fortnight. In
these operations the Seventh-seventh, only lately re-
leased from hard work about Caliarcoil, took a prin-
cipal part, so heavy was the call upon British troops
for dangerous duty in India.
The operations above narrated may seem to many
not worth the chronicling ; and yet such petty cam-
paigns, of which no army has fought so many as the
British, tax the nerve and ability of officers and the
courage and endurance of their men as heavily as the
high-sounding wars of which alone history takes notice.
To ignore them would be to ignore some of the finest
work ever done by British soldiers, and some of the
grandest acts of individual heroism in the British or
any other army. To give but one instance, in a skir-
mish on the march from Comery to Ramnad, Lieutenant
Parminter of the Madras Native Infantry with a small
768 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1 802. flanking party of Sepoys was overpowered by a large body
of rebels in a patch of jungle. His men gave way, leav-
ing him to fight his battle alone with a paltry regimental
sword. Yet did he successfully hold the enemy at bay
until by chance he stumbled, when he was instantly
pierced in five places by pikes, one of which pinned
him by the shoulder to the ground. A Polygar came
up with musket and bayonet to despatch him, when
Parminter with a desperate effort wrenched the
weapon out of the ground, and rising to his feet with
the blade still fast in his arm, renewed the fight and
despatched his opponent. His men then ran up to
rescue him, and the enemy, utterly amazed, turned
and fled. 1 Such deeds of valour were common in
those forgotten expeditions, when commanders relied
upon fifty or one hundred British soldiers to make
good the defects of two or three thousand Madras
Sepoys, and never found them to fail.
Nor was the pacification of Southern India in itself
a small thing, when such an adversary was in the field
as Napoleon Bonaparte ; for these insurrections could
easily have been turned into weighty and important
diversions when some greater military enterprise was
afoot. So far Bonaparte's plans and threats from
Egypt had produced no effect in India, except the
destruction of one of England's most dangerous
enemies and the consolidation of her power on the
Continent. It is now time to return to Europe, to take
up again the thread of Bonaparte's career, and to trace
to the end the history of his army in Egypt.
AUTHORITIES. Wilson, Biddulph, Wellington's despatches, as at
the end of preceding chapter ; Welsh, Reminiscences in the East
Indies.
1 Welsh, Reminiscences in the East Indies, i. 83.
CHAPTER XXVII
WHEN Bonaparte landed in France on his return 1799.
from Egypt, the glamour of his enterprise in the East Oct. 9.
covered all his failures and gained for him an enthu-
siastic welcome. He found the country crying out
for a man who would put an end to the uncertainties
and disorders that had harried her almost to death for
ten long years. A group of malcontents soon rallied
round him, and within a month the Directorial Constitu-
tion was swept out of existence by an armed conspiracy,
which is commemorated in history by the date of the
1 8th Brumaire. Five weeks more sufficed to produce a Nov. 9.
new Constitution, whereby three Consuls were nominally
charged with the executive power, while an elaborate
and extremely complex machinery of Senate, Tribunate,
and Legislative Assembly dealt with the business of
legislation. All this, however, was a mere matter of
form, for, under the title of First Consul, Bonaparte
became sole ruler of France, with autocratic powers far
exceeding those enjoyed by Lewis the Fourteenth.
He began to reign on Christmas Day, and the task Dec. 25,
that lay before him was one of appalling difficulty.
The local no less than the general government
required to be reorganised ; the arrears caused by ten
years of neglect in every department needed to be made
good ; the Treasury was empty, and the financial
situation more than ever confounded. Lastly, not
only was France beset by enemies on every side, but
the old sore of rebellion, inflamed by Royalist leaders,
had broken out afresh in La Vendee.
769
770
HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1799. Finance was the first object that occupied Bonaparte's
attention ; and he was driven unavoidably to very
strange shifts to raise the funds that were so urgently
necessary. The armies of Holland and Switzerland
supplied their needs by levying large contributions in
those countries, and the army of the Rhine had done
the like by exacting large sums from Swabia ; but the
army of Italy was absolutely destitute. As a first step,
he sent Moreau to take command on the Rhine and in
Switzerland, despatched Massena to save, if possible,
the defeated and disheartened troops in Italy, and
appointed Brune, the Jacobin, to restore order in La
Vendee. The army of Brune on the western coast
was styled the army of England, as if still designed for
an invasion of the British Isles ; though Bonaparte on
taking office had not omitted to write specious letters
to King George and the Emperor Francis, setting forth
his desire to put an end to the war. Pitt, reckoning
that the total exhaustion of France's military resources,
so long expected, was come at last, rejected the over-
ture with exaggerated energy ; and in Austria also
every one, with the solitary exception of Thugut,
thought it impossible that the Republic could again
take the offensive. Nothing could better have suited
Bonaparte's designs than this undervaluing of his
strength, for he awaited only the favourable moment
for dealing his enemies an unlocked for and fatal blow.
1800. Meanwhile his wisdom, his energy, and his amazing
power of work were framing and forwarding measure
after measure for the reorganisation and restoration
Feb. of France. By the beginning of February a complete
new scheme of local administration had been formu-
lated which, being in essence no more than a revival
of the intendants and sub-intendants of the monarchy,
was calculated no less surely to turn the utmost powers
of the country to account than to strengthen his
authority as sole ruler. Nor were his efforts to con-
ciliate internal enemies in St. Domingo less remarkable,
for on the day of his accession to power he wrote a
CH. xxvn HISTORY OF THE ARMY 771
letter to the negroes there, insidiously promising to 1799.
them liberty and equality of rights with white men,
and urging them to be true to France. A few days
later he took the first step towards making peace
between the French people and the Church ; and im-
mediately afterwards he threw open his arms to receive
also the Emigrants and the Royalists. By the end of
February, through a judicious blending of severity and
clemency, he had reduced La Vendee again to order ;
and the great work of uniting all France under one
banner had been well begun. Never, perhaps, in his
whole career did Bonaparte show greater political
sagacity or higher statesmanship than in the first three
months of his rule.
Not so far-seeing were his adversaries, the Allies.
The campaign of 1799 had in fact ended with the
disruption of the Coalition. The disasters in Switzer-
land had wholly alienated Russia from Austria ; and
the Tzar, in his first outburst of rage over Suvorof's
complaints, not only renounced all further co-operation
with the Emperor Francis, but called Prussia's attention
to the rapacity of Austria and proposed an alliance of
the Northern Powers to curb it. Prussia, however,
clung fast to her neutrality ; and Grenville, when
sounded upon the subject, strove to reconcile the
injured Tsar with the Emperor. His efforts were
seconded by a visit paid by Mr. Wickham, the British
Agent in Switzerland, to Suvorof in his temporary
winter - quarters at Augsburg ; when the veteran
General, always eager for action, proposed that during
the next campaign eighty thousand Russians should
act in concert with the Austrian forces in Switzer-
land and Italy. Grenville approved this plan uncon-
ditionally, engaging that England would bear the cost
of augmenting the Russian Army ; and Paul was so far
mollified that he ordered Suvorof for the present to
suspend his retreating movement.
But Grenville' s success was only momentary. Falsely
conceiving that Austria was abashed by his august dis-
772 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1799. favour, Paul demanded the dismissal of Thugut from the
Emperor's councils. This request Francis contemptu-
ously ignored ; and Thugut, now elated to insolence, not
only insisted upon Austria's most extravagant claims to
territory in Italy, but rejected SuvoroFs plan of cam-
paign, and requested the immediate withdrawal of all
Russian troops from within the bounds of the Empire.
This in itself was sufficient to irritate the Tsar ; but
presently there came news from Italy which kindled his
indignation against Austria to furious heat. Thanks
to the energy of Nelson, Rome and Civita Vecchia had
been yielded by their French garrisons, the former to
the Neapolitan forces, the latter to the British ; and
Sept. 20. some weeks later Ancona also was surrendered in like
manner to the Russian Admiral. The Austrian troops
had arrived too late to intervene in the fate of Rome ;
but they marched without hesitation into Ancona, ex-
pelled the Russian garrison, and hauled down the
Russian colours. Paul, greatly exasperated, thereupon
definitely recalled his troops to their own country, and
pending reparation for the insult to his flag, broke off
all diplomatic relations with Austria.
Thugut at first cared little for this, which was the
more strange inasmuch as he had divined more truly
than other men the danger which underlay Bonaparte's
accession to power in France. He had, however, at
last come to a satisfactory agreement with England,
having signed, after two years' delay, the treaty for
repayment of an English loan and thereby gained a
fresh subsidy. He had also rid himself of Suvorof,
who shortly afterwards died of a broken heart, and of
the Archduke Charles, who in December had resigned
his command on account of ill health ; and, having
thus driven the two ablest generals at his disposal from
the field, he felt himself thoroughly at ease over the
coming campaign. Meanwhile, the good understand-
ing between Grenville and Thugut had decided Paul
to break with England also. He had taken deep
offence over the fancied ill treatment of his troops
CH. xxvn HISTORY OF THE ARMY 773
during the campaign of the Helder ; and his injured 1799.
feelings were not soothed either by Nelson's proceed-
ings at Malta nor by a dispute with Grenville, wherein
he himself was in the wrong, over the payment of the
British subsidies. Russia, therefore, retired from the
contest, to the great contentment of Thugut, who
reckoned that the money thereby saved to England
would be bestowed upon the Emperor.
For the coming campaign the Austrian Minister 1800.
calculated that, by means of increased contingents
from Bavaria, Wiirtemberg, and Mainz, which were
to be paid for by England, he could put into the field
two hundred and thirty thousand men. Of these, one
hundred and four thousand were placed under the
command of General Kray, eighty thousand of them
being stationed along the Rhine from SchafFhausen to
Heildelberg, while twenty-four thousand, owing to a
superstitious solicitude for the hereditary dominions
of the Hapsburgs, were kept in the Grisons and Tyrol.
The ultimate task assigned to Kray was the conquest of
Switzerland, for which, however, he demanded at least
twenty -five thousand men from the army of Italy.
This latter force numbered rather over one hundred
thousand men under General Melas, of which about
thirty thousand men were required for garrisons and
seventy thousand were available for the field. To
oppose them the French could for the present show
but thirty thousand men, holding a line of about a
hundred miles from the banks of the Var to Genoa ;
and it was therefore vital to press them hard before
they could be reinforced. The British Mediterranean
fleet under Lord Keith was at hand to cut off the
French communications by sea, and to hang upon
their westward flank along the whole length of the
coast. On the 24th of February, therefore, orders Feb. 24.
were despatched to Melas to drive the French from
the Riviera and Genoa, which having been accomplished,
he was to send to Kray the detachment required by him
for the invasion of Switzerland from the north.
774 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1799. To a nation which, practically speaking, held un-
challenged the command of the sea, which possessed
one military base at Minorca and a second in Sicily,
this plan undoubtedly offered an opportunity of effec-
tive co-operation. Moreover, England possessed a
striking force in the army which had lately returned
Ocu from Holland, and which a new Act of Parliament
had enabled Ministers to increase by drawing an un-
limited number of recruits from the Militia. Nor
was sound military advice wanting for the employment
Dec. of this force. Charles Stuart in December 1799 ^ a ^
before Ministers a project for the concentration of
twenty thousand men at Minorca, from whence they
could move against the French at any point on the
coast between Toulon and Genoa. It appears, further,
that some arrangements had been concerted for the
kindling of an insurrection at Marseilles by the
Emigrant General de Willot, who is described as
having possessed both talent and energy. But, setting
all questions of insurrection aside, the fact that a
British force from Minorca could strike at the flank
and rear of the French in Italy while the Austrians
operated against their front, was sufficient to commend
the plan. There was no other object in the Mediter-
ranean to distract the troops from this service. No
great number was needed for the blockade of Malta,
and the French army in Egypt was still imprisoned
1800. beyond hope of escape. It is true that in January
Jan. 1800 Sidney Smith, who fondly conceived himself to
be a diplomatist, had, contrary to all his instructions,
concluded with Kleber the Convention of El Arish
for the evacuation of the country by the French,
and the safe conveyance of the army to French ports.
But the British Government had no idea of rati-
fying such a treaty ; and consequently the situation
remained unchanged. From all of these considera-
tions Stuart's plan seems at first to have found favour
with Dundas ; and the General thought the matter
Feb. so far settled, that in February he invited, and ob-
CH. xxvii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 775
tained, the services of John Moore for the projected 1800.
operations.
With two such officers at its head this chosen corps
would probably have effected much, and quite possibly
might have altered the whole course of European history.
But it was not to be. Abercromby, as we have seen,
had entreated Huskisson that the army of the Helder
might be kept together, trained and disciplined on its
return to England; and Dundas had answered with
big words. " Bring me back as many good troops as
you can, and before next spring I will show you an
army the country never saw before." * Nevertheless,
no pains were taken to improve, nor even to preserve,
the efficiency of this force. The regiments, to use
Abercromby's expressive phrase, were allowed to
" dance about " all over Great Britain. Officers were
permitted to be absent as in time of peace ; and when
the various corps were finally collected, they were
found to be deficient not only in discipline but in
the equipment necessary for taking the field. More-
over, despite the new Recruiting Act, their number
was found to be but ten thousand instead of fifteen
thousand men, proving for the hundredth time the
utter incapacity of the Minister for all military ad-
ministration. 2
Even ten thousand men, with five thousand more
from the Mediterranean garrisons, might have turned
the scale in the critical operations which were presently
to go forward in Italy ; but by the middle of March March,
the Government had already another project in hand.
During the winter of 1799 Dundas had become
suddenly enamoured of an invasion of France upon a
grand scale, and had urged a descent upon Brest with
seventy thousand men. The enterprise was abandoned
upon the discovery that the maritime resources of
England were unequal to the transport of so large
1 Dunfermline, Life of Abercromby, p. 208.
2 Bunbury, Great War with France, pp. 57-66 ; Diary of Sir
John Moore, i. 363-4.
VOL. IV N
776 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1800. a body of men. He therefore reverted with increased
ardour to projects for a series of petty, useless raids
upon the French coast. " It shall not be my fault,"
he had written in May 1798, "if, with one expedition
after another, the coast of France is allowed to sleep
sound any one week during the summer." l Windham
also was convinced that no European coalition could
succeed except by allying itself with the Royalists, in
which term he included all that were opposed to
Jacobin Government in France ; and the recrudes-
cence of the Chouan insurrection in Brittany and La
Vendee seemed to offer a favourable opportunity.
The operation determined upon was the capture of
Belleisle, less for its importance as a naval station than
as a means for affording assistance to the insurgents.
Four to five thousand troops were therefore detailed
for this service ; a certain number more seem to
have been destined for Portugal, owing to an alarm
of a Spanish invasion ; 2 and the reinforcement for
the Mediterranean was accordingly cut down to five
thousand men, which were offered to Stuart in lieu
of the fifteen thousand for which he had asked. It
does not appear, however, that the Ministers definitely
came to this decision, or at all events communicated
it to Stuart, until the middle of April so dilatory were
they in making up their minds at a time when every
hour was precious.
Then, most unfortunately, a bitter quarrel deprived
them of his services. It has been written by one
of his contemporaries that Stuart, a proud and
hot-tempered man, on learning of the wreck of his
wise and far-reaching plans, threw up the command
in the Mediterranean in disgust and refused to have
1 Dropmore Papers, iv. 224, 275. The project for an attack on
Brest is mentioned in several letters from Dundas to Grenville
during the autumn of 1799, the last of these being of 2nd Decem-
ber. Dropmore MSS. It appears from the Grey MSS. that Sir
Charles Grey was designated to command the expedition.
2 Life of Abercrombj, p. 219 ; Bunbury, Great War with France^
p. 66.
CH. xxvii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 777
more to do with it. But this seems to be incorrect. 1800,
Stuart's real difference with Dundas arose from his
refusal to accept instructions to restore the Knights
of Malta and to subject the island to the despotism
of Russia, which King George had bound himself by
treaty to do. Events proved Stuart to be perfectly
correct in regarding such instructions as ridiculous and
impossible ; but the question was a political one and
for the Cabinet, not for the General, to decide. " If
our officers are to control our councils," wrote Dundas
with perfect justice at this time, "there is an end of
all Government." Stuart therefore resigned ; and
this, lamentably enough, is our last sight of this
exceedingly able officer. He died in May 1801 ; and
if he be now remembered, it is as the subject of a fine
portrait by Romney, who has handed down to us his
noble features and dignified carriage, and as the father
of the distinguished diplomatist who later became Lord
Stuart de Rothsay. Nevertheless, he seems to me
to have been the greatest of all the British officers
of this period great enough, indeed, both as a man and
a soldier to have done the work which afterwards fell
to Wellington in the Peninsula.
Since, therefore, according to the usual wisdom of
Pitt's Cabinet, the small British striking force was
broken up into fragments too small to accomplish any
but trifling service, it will be convenient first to follow
the detachment which was sent to Belleisle. This ex-
pedition was entrusted to Colonel Thomas Maitland,
and may possibly have been suggested by him ; but
there is no evidence, so far as 1 can discover, which
gives any clue to its inception, though no doubt Wind-
ham was its chief advocate. The Government's know-
ledge concerning Belleisle was extremely vague ; and
Maitland therefore began operations by sending
Lieutenant-colonel Nightingale to Quiberon Bay to gain
intelligence. Nightingale's orders were first to make a
1 Bunbury, Great War with France, p. 66 ; Dundas to Grenville,
25th April, 1800. Dropmore MSB.
778 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1800. few prisoners, and then to sail to the islands of Houat
and Hedic, where he was to mark out large encamp-
ments, talk loudly about the disembarkation of a con-
siderable force on the mainland, and meanwhile gather
all possible information from all sources respecting
Belleisle. He started accordingly in the first week of
May with five hundred men of the Thirty-sixth foot ;
May 1 8. and Maitland, following him on the i8th, cruised off
Ushant until the 3Oth, when St. Vincent's fleet joined
him and sailed with him to Quiberon Bay. There
he learned from Georges, the Chouan leader, that the
garrison of Belleisle was much stronger than had been
supposed, amounting at the lowest estimate to four
thousand men, and, according to the highest, to double
that number. Maitland's own force, of which only a
part had yet reached him, was to leave England in two
divisions, the first nominally of four thousand men,
which was supposed to effect a landing, and the second
of two thousand more which was to reinforce him as
soon as a footing on the island had been secured. He
therefore sent Nightingale home to explain the situa-
tion, and meanwhile decided to attempt nothing until
the whole of his six thousand men should have reached
him. 1 His decision was the more easily taken since
the want of flat-bottomed boats absolutely forbade him
to essay a disembarkation.
Sir Edward Pellew, who was in charge of the
squadron detached by St. Vincent to cover the opera-
tions, now instituted, without appearing to do so, a
strict blockade of Belleisle ; and Maitland, establishing
his headquarters at Houat, made constant and careful
reconnaissance of the island. He was almost convinced
that the enemy's strength was exaggerated by the
Chouans, though unable absolutely to satisfy himself ;
June 17. and having by the I7th of June received the whole of
1 Maitland to Huskisson, 28th March, 1st, I3th, i^-th, i8th
May; to Nightingale (instructions), 22nd April; to Dundas,
3<Dth May, 6th June ; Dundas to Maitland (instructions), 8th May
1800.
CH. xxvii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 779
the first division of his troops 1 he completed all his 1800.
dispositions for an attack on the night of the I9th. June 19.
Bad weather caused him to defer the attempt for
twenty-four hours, when a confidential messenger came
to him from Georges to warn him that the enemy
were certainly seven thousand strong. Though still
sceptical as to the truth of this statement, Maitland,
knowing that defeat would mean disaster, decided to
await the coming of his second division ; when, to his
surprise, there arrived on the next day instructions June 21.
from Dundas, dated on the i6th of June, to send the
whole of his troops at once to Minorca to join the
force in the Mediterranean.
Within twenty -eight hours of the receipt of the
despatch the six battalions were embarked, and the June 2 3
transports at sea ; and within forty -eight hours
afterwards came a second letter from Dundas to
say that, if a landing on Belleisle had been effected,
the troops were not to be sent away. A few days
later arrived the second division of the troops,
numbering not two thousand men, as Dundas had
promised, but seventeen hundred only ; 2 and on the
4th of July Dundas instructed Maitland to leave these July 4.
at Quiberon Bay under command of the senior officer,
and to return home. So ended the expedition to
Belleisle, eminently foolish, eminently mischievous,
eminently characteristic of Pitt's Government. It is
difficult to see what good could have come of it even
if, according to the fond hope of Ministers, Lewis the
Eighteenth or some scion of his most unprofitable
house had hoisted the white standard at Palais. In
1793 or 1794 the seizure of the island might have
produced great results. Even in the winter of 1799,
when the Chouan insurrection was in full vigour, the
despatch of troops thither, though a mistake in military
policy, might have found some kind of justification.
1 These were the 2nd Queens, i/2Oth, 2/2Oth, 36th, 82nd,
92nd, 2 companies R.A.
2 23rd, 3 1st, 63rd Foot ; 1696 of all ranks.
780 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1800. But the expedition, as it was conducted, can only be
termed a wanton and wicked waste of six thousand
valuable soldiers during three most critical months. 1
Meanwhile the Austrians had begun their advance
upon the Riviera, not at the end of February, as had
April 5. been ordained, but on the 5th of April. For the loss
of these six precious weeks, which carried with it also
the loss of Italy, a heavy fall of snow on the I3th of
February was in part responsible ; but the chief reason
is to be found in the fact that Melas was old and slow.
He moved forward, however, in overwhelming strength,
and by the middle of April succeeded in cutting the
French forces in twain ; throwing back Massena him-
self with some ten or twelve thousand soldiers into
Genoa, and driving his left wing under General Suchet
in isolation to the Var. Leaving General Ott to
blockade Genoa in concert with the British fleet under
April 27. Lord Keith, Melas set out on the 27th of April for
the Var with the object of mastering the bridge and
bridge-head over that river, in order, if possible,
to paralyse Suchet's corps completely. For, until this
was done, he could not consider his situation in the
Maritime Alps to be secure, nor devote his whole
attention to the reduction of Genoa and to the opera-
tions that were to follow upon it. Twenty thousand
British soldiers would have been invaluable at this time to
assist either in the attack on the Var or in the blockade
of Genoa ; and the British Ministers in February had
actually given the Court of Vienna to understand that
such a force would be ready. But, for reasons which
have already in part been explained, it was not forth-
coming ; and it is now necessary to see what the British
Government was actually doing in the Mediterranean.
Towards the end of August 1799, tne garrison
of Minorca was made up to more than six thou-
1 Maitland to Huskisson, I3th, 2ist, z^th June, 2nd, 6th July;
to Dundas, 2ist, 24th June, 2nd, 6th July; Dundas to Maitland,
1 6th June, 4th July 1800. The documents relating to the expedi-
tion are in W.Q. Orig. Corres., 28.
CH. xxvn HISTORY OF THE ARMY 781
sand 1 men, a number sufficient not only to render 1800.
the island absolutely safe against attack, but even to
furnish a battalion or two for service elsewhere if re-
quired. In November General Fox, whom we last saw as
a brigadier under the Duke of York in the Netherlands,
arrived to take over the command, but with no instruc-
tions empowering him to furnish any troops to the
fleet either for the blockade of Malta or for any other
service. In January 1800 there arrived a reinforce-
ment in the shape of the Ancient Irish Fencible In-
fantry, under Colonel Thomas Judkin Fitzgerald, an
Irish magistrate, who by extreme severity had kept
Tipperary from rebellion in 1798, and apparently had
been permitted to raise this corps for his reward.
Since the men were undisciplined and the Government
had not provided more than half of them with arms,
this regiment could not be regarded immediately as an
accession of strength ; though after a few months' train-
ing it might become sufficiently serviceable to release
some other regiment for work elsewhere. But at the
beginning of May Fox received advice that five thou- May.
sand men were sailing from England to Minorca under
Major-general Pigot, that Sir Charles Stuart, who had
been nominated as Commander-in-chief, had been
" prevented by recent circumstances " from accompany-
ing them, and that pending the appointment of his
successor the troops must be encamped. The first
division of Pigot' s troops arrived on the I2th, and the May 12, 17.
remainder on the 1 7th of May, 2 by which latter date
there were in Minorca just under twelve thousand
men of all ranks fit for duty. 8
1 It amounted actually to 7000 men ; but the 28th Foot was
almost immediately withdrawn from it to Gibraltar.
2 1st division, 1st and 2nd battalions of the I7th, 35th and 4Oth ;
-ind division^ i8th and 48th; 5548 of all ranks fit for duty; 242
sick. The two regiments last named were from Gibraltar, where
two battalions from England had been dropped to relieve them.
3 Erskine to Dundas, 22nd August 1799; Fox to Dundas, 3rd
November 1799, 2Oth January, 27th May 1800; Dundas to Fox,
25th April 1800.
782 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1800. Meanwhile, Sir Ralph Abercromby had been chosen
to take Stuart's place in the Mediterranean. The
Portuguese had asked for him to command their own
army, but the old General declined to enter the service
of another sovereign ; l and the idea of operations in
Portugal appears to have been abandoned within a week
in favour of wider schemes of aggression. On the 5th
May 5. of May Abercromby received his instructions as Com-
mander-in-chief of all the forces (including the troops
at Gibraltar) in the Mediterranean. These prescribed
to him four objects in succession. The first was to
strengthen the British troops at Malta by two or
three battalions, so as to hasten its surrender and
liberate the blockading squadron ; and to this was sub-
joined the clause to which Stuart had objected, namely,
that the island, after capture, should be garrisoned
jointly by the forces of England, Naples and Russia,
pending its restoration to the Knights of St. John.
Secondly, after allowing three or four thousand men
as the garrison of Minorca, he was to give every
assistance to the Austrians which a light moveable
force and a superior fleet could afford. Thirdly, he
was to co-operate by the same means with any rising
in the southern provinces of France, but to avoid
pledging England to any further support to the
Royalists ; and fourthly, in the improbable event of
the Austrians being reduced to the defensive in Pied-
mont, he was to give assistance to Naples and Portugal,
should their territory be threatened or invaded by the
enemy.
This was an extensive programme for a force
which, after providing for Malta and Minorca, could
not have spared about five thousand men for other
operations ; but Dundas, wishing to provide for every
1 It was characteristic of Dundas that he none the less reported
to the Cabinet that Abercromby was ready to accept the command
of the Portuguese army. Life of Abercromby^ p. 220. Aber-
cromby's biographer uniformly describes Dundas as " sanguine'* on
such occasions. No doubt he was sanguine, but he was also
consciously or unconsciously dishonest.
CH. xxvii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 783
contingency, favoured Abercromby with a second set 1800.
of instructions. The purport of these was that, if the
position of the Austrians and the Royalists rendered
the former plans ineffectual or impracticable and if the
needs of Portugal were not pressing, Abercromby
should attack Teneriffe, " an acquisition not immaterial
in point of commerce and, by its position, of the
greatest importance to our navigation and the security
of our valuable distant possessions." For the capture
of this island, Dundas considered from three to five
thousand men sufficient, though he freely confessed
that he had no knowledge whatever of its means of
defence nor of the numbers of its garrison. However,
assistance to the Austrians and the Royalists was to
take precedence of this enterprise ; and only when his
presence in the Mediterranean was no longer desirable
nor likely to be needed, was Abercromby required to
sail for two thousand miles from Mahon into the
Atlantic against an island which, for aught he knew,
might be impregnable. 1
The General left England in the King's ship Seahorse May 12.
on the 1 2th of May, in convoy of a few troop-ships and
store-ships; but he was driven back by a gale ; and on
the 1 9th he wrote that, with such heavy sailers as the
transports in company, it would be impossible for the
frigate to reach Minorca within any reasonable time.
Ultimately, he sailed again and arrived! at Gibraltar
on the 6th of June ; but, meanwhile, the genius of June 6.
Bonaparte was rapidly altering the complexion of affairs
in Italy. Massena, after a series of most skilful and
valiant sorties from Genoa, had been reduced after the
1 3th of May to a purely defensive attitude ; but still he
held out, though terribly pressed by famine, and delayed
any decisive movement on the part of Melas by keep-
ing Ott's corps tied to the blockade. And Melas's
time was running short, for by the 2ist of May the May 21.
head of Bonaparte's main army of forty thousand men
had crossed the Alps by the pass of the Great St.
1 Dundas to Abercromby, 5th May 1800.
784 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1800. Bernard, and was debouching on to the plain of Lom-
bardy. On his left fifteen thousand men under
General Moncey were advancing southward by the
pass of St. Gothard ; on his right five thousand more
were climbing Mont Cenis. On the 2ist Melas heard
of Bonaparte's advance, and leaving eighteen thousand
men under General Elsnitz on the Var, where all his
efforts had failed to capture the bridge, hurried with
May 31. the remainder to Turin. On the 3ist he learned that
Moncey was coming down upon Milan, across his line
of communication ; whereupon he hastily summoned
all his troops to Alessandria, in order to fight his way
back to Mantua. He recalled even Ott's detachment
from before Genoa ; but negotiations had already been
opened with Massena for the surrender of the city,
and Keith insisted that the siege should be pressed.
June 4. Finally, on the 4th of June, the French garrison marched
out with the honours of war.
But, meanwhile, Suchet had been reinforced on the
Var, and, pursuing Elsnitz on his retreat from that river,
not only inflicted upon him enormous loss, but forced
him to take a circuitous route which greatly delayed his
junction with his Commander-in-chief. Bonaparte also
had entered Milan on the 2nd of June ; and, in these
June 5. circumstances, Melas wrote on the 5th to Keith that,
in consequence of Elsnitz's mishap, he must withdraw
the whole of Ott's corps, excepting a feeble garrison,
from Genoa. He therefore entreated him, if possible,
to reinforce both Genoa and Savona with troops from
Minorca. Keith at once forwarded this letter to Fox
with a quotation from Abercromby's instructions, which
had been communicated to him, as to the detachment
of a force to the assistance of the Austrians. He sub-
joined an expression of his own opinion that an English
garrison thrown into Italy would be the saving of all
Italy ; and he added the intelligence that the French from
the Var were in full march upon Genoa, and that Ott
on his own responsibility had left five thousand men in
that city. Keith's letter seems to have reached Fox
CH. xxvn HISTORY OF THE ARMY 785
very speedily and to have caused him much anxiety ; 1800.
but the General could only answer that his instructions
were to encamp his force at Minorca until Aber-
cromby's arrival, and that he had but one transport
ready to embark troops. On the I2th Keith again June 12.
wrote to him more urgently, giving still worse news
of the French successes in Italy, and announcing the
despatch of transports to Minorca ; whereupon Fox,
though in mortal dread of deranging Abercromby's
plans, made all preparations to embark the troops if
Keith should repeat his request. But on the I4th of June 14.
June Melas was completely defeated at Marengo ; and
the favourable moment had passed away for ever. 1
On the 22nd Abercromby arrived at Mahon, June 22.
where he found letters both from Keith and Melas
pressing him to hasten to Genoa with every man that
he could spare. He decided to sail thither at once ;
and so perfect were Fox's arrangements that five
thousand men were embarked within twenty -four
hours. The whole put to sea on the 23rd, but only June 23.
to learn a few days later that the Austrians had
evacuated Genoa, and that Keith had sailed to Leghorn.
Pursuing the Admiral thither, Abercromby learned
from him on the ist of July that Melas, after his July i.
crushing reverse at Marengo, had concluded with
Bonaparte the convention of Alessandria, under which
all the Imperial troops, except the garrisons of
Peschiera and Mantua, were to retire to the east of
the Mincio. All chance of co-operation with the
Austrians being thus at an end, the greater number of
the transports was ordered back to Mahon before they
were arrived at Leghorn, and the remainder returned
on the evening of the 5th. This, however, was not July 5.
accomplished without a struggle ; for Nelson, the
Queen of Naples, and Sir William and Lady Hamilton
were all at Leghorn, uniting to put pressure on
Abercromby to land his troops for the defence of
1 Fox to Dundas, I5th and 2 ist June, enclosing correspondence
with Keith.
786 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xir
1 800. Naples. But Keith and Abercromby were obdurate
- alike against the royal tears and the royal reproaches.
The General therefore sailed for Malta, and the Queen
with her retinue, including Nelson, made her way to
Vienna.
Upon his arrival at Malta, to which he had previously
detached General Pigot with two battalions of the
Thirty - fifth, Abercromby found another letter from
Melas, written from Villafranca on the 5th of July,
wherein the Austrian commander begged that the
British might be disembarked at Leghorn to undertake
the defence of Tuscany and Naples. He replied that,
in circumstances so changed, he felt himself no longer
authorised to act in Italy, and that five thousand men
were too few for the task required of him. Consider-
ing that the French had already spread as far south as
Modena and Bologna, is it not easy to see what other
answer he could have given. Since there was nothing
further to be done at Malta, which was amply provided
with troops, Abercromby left it at the end of the
month for Mahon. 1
On arriving there on the 2nd of August, he was
surprised to learn that now six new battalions were
lying in the harbour under the command of Lord
Dalhousie. They were those which had been so sud-
denly removed from Maitland's command in June.
Also he found a fresh letter of instructions from
Dundas, dated the i6th of June, recommending him
to employ the whole of his troops in the defence of the
coast of the Riviera, so as to liberate the entire force of
Melas for service in the field. Three months earlier
such instructions would have gone near to fulfil the
wishes of Stuart, and would probably have saved Italy ;
but written, as they were, two days after the battle of
Marengo, they were a cruel mockery. Abercromby,
however, at once sent Brigadier John Hope to Melas
with a message that he would hold his troops ready
to sail at the shortest notice, and was prepared to
1 Abercromby to Dundas, 5th and 2 3rd July 1800.
CH. xxvii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 787
co-operate with him in any specific plan which might be 1 800.
profitable to the common cause.
The project suggested by Melas was, that the British
should occupy the port and fortress of Leghorn, and
countenance a rising of the Tuscan peasantry against
the French. The Neapolitans at this time occupied
Rome in force ; the Austrians held Ancona ; and bands
of armed peasants, under the direction of an Austrian
officer, were swarming in the Apennines along a line of
some fifty miles from the borders of Lucca to the borders
of Ancona. These last were thoroughly in earnest, and,
indeed, later in the year those about Arezzo offered
a determined resistance to the advance of the French ;
but at this moment the French troops were fully
occupied with an equal force of Austrians on the
Mincio, and could have spared not a man for Tuscany.
Moreover, Bonaparte had quitted Italy for Paris on
the 25th of June, leaving the command first to
Massena and later to Brune, so that the master's hand
had actually been withdrawn. Abercromby, however,
appears to have regarded Melas's plan as neither feasible
nor valuable; and he spoke of Hope's mission as a
failure which no efforts of his own could have con-
verted into success. At the root of his unwillingness,
possibly, were a sense of the impotence of so small a
body as ten thousand men, a recollection of Austrian
trickery in 1794, and a just conviction of the utter
incompetence of the British Cabinet. 1
Meanwhile, Bonaparte, upon reaching Paris on the
3rd of July, had, with his usual activity, thrown him-
self into the work of reaping, by diplomatic means, the
fruits of his great victory. It was not only in Italy
that the French arms had triumphed. In Germany
also, Moreau, after a series of successes, had forced
Kray back first to Ulm, and thence behind the Inn ; July 7.
and on the I5th of July the truce concluded at July 15,
1 Dundas to Abercromby, i6th June ; Abercromby to Dundas,
4th and i6th August 1800; Bunbury's Great War with France,
pp. 69-70, note.
788 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1800. Alessandria was extended to Germany under the name
of the Armistice of Parsdorf. Immediately after
Marengo, Bonaparte had renewed his appeals to the
Emperor Francis to conclude peace ; but, since the
treaty between England and Austria, signed so recently
as on the 2oth of June, bound the Emperor not to
come to terms with France before February 1801, his
overtures could only be answered vaguely so as to
gain time. Russia the astute First Consul gained by
undertaking to make over Malta to the Tsar, as
Grand Master of the Order of St. John, and by
releasing, clothing, and equipping seven thousand
Russian prisoners to form its garrison. It was true
that Malta was then closely blockaded by the British,
and almost at the last gasp from famine ; but Paul in
his simplicity overlooked this ; and thus Bonaparte
gained his point of turning him into an enemy of
July 22. England. Lastly, the First Consul set on foot a
negotiation * with Spain, offering to grant a small
kingdom in Italy to the Duke of Parma, who was a
brother of the Spanish Queen, in return for the
cession of Louisiana and six ships of war to France ;
his principal object being to force Spain at once into
war with Portugal, and so to drive the British fleet
from Lisbon. Under the influence of Godoy, who
was eager to be on good terms with the victor of
Marengo, the Court of Madrid was inclined to go
more than half way to meet him, and made little secret
of its willingness to bend itself to his service.
In these circumstances, Dundas, judging that there
was no longer employment for the British troops in
Aug. i. Italy, on the ist of August issued to Abercromby two
new sets of instructions. The first of these reversed
his previous orders that Russian troops should share
in the occupation of Malta after its surrender, bidding
the General do his best, without coming to actual
hostilities, to dissuade her commanders " for their own
safety and comfort" from attempting to land their
1 Corres. de Napoleon, vi. 415.
CH. xxvii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 789
troops in the island. At the same time Abercromby was 1 800.
to encourage and complete the native regiments raising
in Malta, and to impress upon the inhabitants the
advantage of the British connection. It is difficult to
see how the Russians could be alarmed for their safety
and comfort without the menace of hostilities, though,
as usual, Dundas tried to shroud this characteristic
evasion of responsibility in a mist of words. It is
easy to read between the lines of these instructions
that the Government wished the Russians to be
excluded from Malta at any cost, but had not the
courage to give the General definite commands to do
so. This, however, was, comparatively speaking, a
subordinate matter. The second batch of instructions
set forth a new military policy to be executed by
Abercromby's troops, namely, the destruction of the
Spanish naval forces and arsenals by attacks upon
Ferrol, Vigo, and Cadiz.- For this purpose the General
was to sail immediately with his striking force from
Minorca to Gibraltar, where it would be joined by
reinforcements sufficient to raise its strength to twenty
thousand men. 1
The reinforcements in question consisted of about
eleven thousand men, namely, five companies of ar-
tillery and fifteen battalions of infantry, four of which
last had for a month past been unprofitably kept at
the island of Houat. 2 They were to be assembled
first at Quiberon Bay, there to be met by a detachment
of Lord St. Vincent's fleet, after which they were to
1 Dundas to Abercromby, ist August 1800.
5 The four battalions at Houat were the 23rd, 3ist, 1/5 2nd,
63rd. The remainder of the force consisted of I/ Coldstream
Guards, i/3rd Guards, 2/ist, 3 batts. 9th, 1 3th, 2 batts. 2/th,
2/5 2nd, 2 batts. 54th, 79th, 3 companies of the Rifle Brigade.
A brigade from Ireland, 2500 strong, was to have made the
numbers of the force up to 13,663, but I cannot discover that
any part of this brigade was forthcoming, and the two battalions
of Guards (which are not in the list first sent to Pulteney) appear
to have been substituted for it. They certainly came from
Ireland. Pulteney in the House of Commons called his force
13,000 men.
790 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1 800. proceed to Ferrol, to disembark there, and, if possible,
to destroy the arsenal, dockyards, and fortifications.
This service effected, they were to proceed to Vigo, in
order to work the like destruction in that place also.
The command was entrusted to Sir James Pulteney,
who had retrieved and enhanced his reputation by the
skill and resource which he had displayed in the cam-
paign of the Helder. He made his way accordingly to
Quiberon Bay, whither St. Vincent had detached for him
Aug. 25. a squadron under Sir John Warren; and on the 25th of
August the entire armament appeared before Ferrol.
On the same night the disembarkation began in
a neighbouring bay, and by five o'clock on the follow-
Aug. 26. ing morning the whole army was ashore, when after
a brisk skirmish the enemy were driven from the
heights that overlook the town and harbour. Pul-
teney then examined the works with his brigadiers,
and came to the conclusion that to carry the place
by coup-de-main or escalade was out of the question.
It was surrounded on three sides by the sea, and
the landward side was regularly defended along its
whole length of two thousand yards by formid-
able fortifications of masonry, including a high wall
upon the curtain, with seven bastions of consider-
able elevation and other flank-defences. The garrison
numbered seven thousand men, or over two thousand
more than were necessary to man the works ; cannon
could be seen mounted on the ramparts ; and every-
thing (as was afterwards ascertained by accounts from
Madrid) was ready to meet an attack. A siege also
was out of the question. It must have been lengthy ;
and meanwhile the fleet was lying insecure in an open
roadstead. But, even if the works covering the harbour
had been taken and the fleet admitted to a safe anchor-
age, no more than eight thousand men could have been
spared from the protection of the communications for
the double duty of conducting the siege and shielding
the besiegers against any army that the united forces of
all Spain could despatch for relief of the town. The
CH. xxvii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 791
operation would in fact have been not only foolhardy 1800.
but foolish ; and with the full assent of his brigadiers
Pulteney ordered the army to be re-embarked. He
had lost in the skirmish of the morning eighty-four
killed and wounded : the Spaniards had lost as many,
besides thirty or forty prisoners. The chief military
interest of the action was that it brought under fire for
the first time three companies of a regiment whose
origin has yet to be described, and whose ranks were
still not wholly filled the Ninety-fifth, now better
known as the Rifle Brigade. 1
Upon the order to re-embark there arose a howl
from the Navy, which was taken up by the Army and
reverberated a few months later from within the walls
of Parliament. Pulteney seems to have entered upon
his task with high hopes of success, and very impru-
dently to have communicated them to Dundas. The
Minister confessed to a sense of severe disappointment ;
but it was the naval officers above all who clamoured
loud against the General, and talked of the storming
of Ferrol as though it were child's play ; the most
powerful cause of their discontent being that they had
counted upon large prize-money and gained none.
The malcontents of both services found a spokesman
in a Mr. Sturt, who, on the I9th of February 1800,
brought forward in the House of Commons a motion
for inquiry into the expedition to Ferrol, and as a
matter of course censured the General. Pulteney then
rose and adduced the facts above enumerated as to the
fortifications of the place ; adding that only one naval
officer had ever seen Ferrol, or even approached it,
from the side of the land, and that junior military
officers were not universally judges either of the
management of a large body of troops, or of the
nature of the attack or defence of fortified places. Nor
did he fail to insist upon the undoubted fact that such
enterprises were of greater difficulty and hazard than
1 Dundas to Pulteney, 3ist July; Pulteney to Dundas, 2yth
August 1800.
VOL. IV O
792 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1800. ordinary military operations, and that it was for the
commander to decide whether the object to be attained
were worth the risk to be run.
This of course brought Dundas and Pitt to their
feet, both of whom urged that the destruction of a
naval arsenal and of eleven Spanish ships of the
line, the consequent weakening of the confederacy
which Bonaparte was forming against England, and
the distraction of Spain from the invasion of Portugal,
constituted very sufficient objects. Neither of them,
however, said a word about the risk, nor attempted to
meet Pulteney's arguments concerning it. Pitt indeed
announced that Lord St. Vincent had approved the
plan ; but St. Vincent, great man though he was, had
never seen the place from the shore. Moreover he
had equally approved a similar attempt upon Cartha-
gena, against which Charles Stuart, his favourite general,
had given the Government a most emphatic warning.
Thomas Maitland, who was with Pulteney, was entirely
of his opinion as to the impracticability of an assault ;
and John Moore, who reconnoitred Ferrol by stealth in
1 804, came to the same conclusion. 1 The end of the
whole matter, therefore, seems to be that Pulteney was
right, and that the Ministers alone were to blame for
selecting, upon imperfect information, an impossible
enterprise for their forces. 2
After re-embarking his troops Pulteney proceeded
to Vigo, whence, rinding that there was no object worth
gaining by an attack, he proceeded after some delay
Sept. 19. to Gibraltar, where he arrived on the I9th of September.
Meanwhile, Abercromby, having received Dundas' s new
instructions on the 24th of August, had sailed with ten
1 Diary of Sir John Moore, i. 373. Bunbury, Great War with
France, p. 73.
2 The original papers respecting Ferrol I have unfortunately
been unable to discover beyond the letters already quoted from
Dundas to Pulteney of 3 1st July, and a second of 3Oth October,
in W.Q. Sec. of State's Letter Books, 19. Pulteney's despatch of 27th
August is taken from the Gazette : his speech in the Commons
from Par/. Hist., xxxv. pp. 973 sqq.
CH. xxvn HISTORY OF THE ARMY 793
thousand men from Minorca on the 3ist, and reached 1800.
Gibraltar on the 1 1 th of September. Upon the advent Sept. i
of Pulteney, Lord Keith was called into consultation
for the attack on Cadiz ; and upon the 3rd of October
the entire armament passed through the Straits, anchor-
ing within sight of the city on the next day. Aber- Oct. 4.
cromby had little intelligence as to the condition of the
enemy at Cadiz, being able to discover for certain only
that the Spaniards had been expecting a descent for
some time, and that the plague was raging with peculiar
malignity. He had therefore been for abandoning the
enterprise, but Keith had given him to understand that
he considered his orders to attack to be peremptory.
The plan preconcerted before sailing had been to land
a force a little to the north of the northern shore of the
Bay of Cadiz, capture the batteries and a strong fort
which commanded the haven from that side, and so
gain a secure anchorage for the fleet. Keith, however,
on consulting some of his officers who were better
acquainted with the coast than himself, became doubt-
ful whether this anchorage would be safe in all condi-
tions of weather ; but though pressed by Abercromby
to give an opinion on one side or the other he for long
hesitated to do so. On the yth three thousand soldiers Oct. 7.
were actually embarked in the flat-boats to be landed ;
but Abercromby, on learning that these men must be
left ashore unsupported for several hours before the
boats could return and land another division, summarily
cancelled all orders and decided to abandon the expedi-
tion altogether.
In his report to Dundas he enclosed a letter from
Keith, dated the 6th of October, wherein the Admiral
at last advised him definitely not to land the troops,
since he could not undertake that the fleet would not
be blown off the coast and might possibly be unable to
return for weeks. Official reports therefore very rightly
gave no sign of the friction between the General and
the Admiral, though Abercromby appears to have
resented not a little Keith's attempt to evade his re-
794 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1800. sponsibility. As to the wisdom and propriety ot
Abercromby's decision there can be no question what-
ever. The naval arrangements for the dis-embarkation
seem to have been of the crudest. To have landed
twenty thousand men on a hostile shore without the
certainty of being in constant communication with the
fleet would have been madness : to have done so when
the plague was raging in their appointed destination
would have been criminal madness. Here, therefore,
was another of the Government's great schemes gone
to wreck, because no trouble had been taken to ascer-
tain first if it were feasible at all, and secondly whether,
if it were feasible, the season of the equinoctial gales
was not likely to be most unfavourable to it. In a
word, the project was thoroughly characteristic of Pitt's
military administration. 1
Sept. 5. Meanwhile, on the 5th of September Malta had
fallen, after a blockade of nearly twelve months ; and
this was the sole fruit of the British campaign in the
Mediterranean during the year 1800. It is difficult
to speak with patience of the conduct of the British
Ministers during this year. Already in 1799 they had
been guilty of the egregious blunder of sending their
troops to a most hazardous campaign at the Helder,
though Stuart had pointed out to them that Sicily was
the true point of concentration for operations either
in Italy or in Egypt. On the evacuation of Holland
Abercromby had pressed them to train and equip the
army carefully so that it should be ready for service in
the spring ; but they had taken no pains to do so. In
December 1799 Stuart in person had urged upon them
for the second time the vital importance of sending
twenty thousand to Minorca, from whence it could
strike at any point in Italy ; but, though apparently
they had accepted the suggestion for a time, they had
presently abandoned it. Had twenty thousand men
1 Abercromby to Dundas, 7th October 1800. Diary of Sir
John Moore, i. 373-379. Bunbury, Great War with France, pp.
74-78.
CH. xxvn HISTORY OF THE ARMY 795
been collected at Minorca, as Stuart had urged, by the 1 800.
end of March, they might have landed at Nice or
Ventimiglia, and, falling on the flank and rear of Suchet's
corps while the Austrians assailed it in front, could have
utterly destroyed it.
Far from this, the Government actually kept a
force of nearly ten thousand men inactive for nearly
two months before it could make up its mind to do
anything at all. Pigot's troops were detained for
weeks on board their transports before they were
finally despatched to Minorca ; and the first divi-
sion of Maitland's detachment did not sail upon its
idiotic errand against Belleisle until the third week in
May. Had even these seven or eight thousand men
reached Minorca by the end of April or the beginning
of May, they might have shortened the blockade of
Genoa or at all events have liberated that number of
Austrians to capture the bridge-head at the Var, so as
to have thrust Suchet altogether out of the field of
action. Had they been landed at Savona even in the
first week of June, they must have checked Suchet's
pursuit of Elsnitz, and, by enabling that general to join
Melas by the shortest route and with numbers little
diminished, might have given the Austrians a decisive
superiority at Marengo. And Melas, it must be re-
membered, had beaten Bonaparte himself at Marengo,
and was only deprived of his victory by the arrival of
Desaix at five o'clock in the evening. In fact on a
dozen occasions a very little must have turned the
scale against the French, and that little it had been
in the power of the British Ministers to bestow. Yet,
even after a most capable and far-seeing soldier had for
months striven to show them how to wield their tiny
force to the best purpose, they had not the sense to
take his advice.
Even more futile were the enterprises prescribed
to the Generals after the belated arrival of Abercromby
at Minorca. Had every possible man been sent out
with him, he would have been in a position to hearten
796 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1800. Melas to future efforts, to countenance the insurrection
of the peasants in Tuscany, and by an advance from
the south to bring serious pressure to bear against
the right flank of Brune, who was a very incompetent
commander. This would have marred the effect of
Bonaparte's victory, would have weakened his diplomacy
and might well have recalled him from Paris to Italy
once more. As things were, a renewal of the suspen-
sion of arms in September enabled Brune to detach
a force which suppressed the rising of the peasantry
and occupied Tuscany. Meanwhile, the British army
was divided in order to make useless displays of
weakness around the Spanish ports, nominally for
the object of distracting the Spaniards from the in-
vasion of Portugal, but in reality to save the Navy
from the trouble of blockading them, though in truth
there was nothing but this tedious duty left for the
Navy to do.
This was the true secret of these foolish expeditions
against Ferrol and Cadiz, and probably also for the
ridiculous project, which appears to have been tacitly
ignored, of an attack upon Teneriffe. One and all
had their origin in the counsels of naval officers, which
were not wholly uninfluenced by the question of prize-
money. No doubt the destruction of the Spanish
fleets and naval arsenals was, on general grounds,
desirable ; but, if the object were worth the employ-
ment of ten thousand troops, it was also worth some
effort to obtain intelligence and information. On the
other hand, it must be remembered, in justice to the
Navy, that the work of a blockading squadron was
weary, harassing, and thankless in the extreme both
to officers and men. The life at sea, at a time when
ships sometimes did not drop anchor for months and
even years together, was one of such continual hard-
ship and peril as to claim great rewards. Bitter feelings
were excited during this war among the crews of the
line-of-battle-ships, which cruised before the enemy's
ports, towards the frigates which roamed at large over
CH. xxvii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 797
the seas, picking up prizes in all directions. It was 1800.
not easy for an Admiral to keep his officers and crews
in good humour in such circumstances ; and hence we
find St. Vincent detaching Nelson and his squadron to
TenerifFe in July 1797, to give him and his men, as it
were, a holiday. On that occasion both of these great
Admirals tried hard to persuade first General de Burgh
at Elba and afterwards General O'Hara at Gibraltar,
to spare them a thousand or fifteen hundred men for
their raid ; but the two soldiers shook their heads, and
Nelson thereupon proceeded to pass sweeping judg-
ment upon the whole of their service. " Soldiers," he
wrote, " have not the same boldness in undertaking a
political measure that we have ; we look to the benefit
of our country, and risk our own fame every day to save
her : a soldier obeys his orders and no more." l
The political measure in question was the anticipated
capture of six millions sterling of Spanish treasure, the
circulation of which would doubtless have given untold
relief to England at that moment, when cash-payments
had recently been suspended. But the Navy's share
of prize-money would also have been enormous ; and,
though we may freely grant that this was very far
from being the first consideration to Nelson, it would
be absurd to suppose that it did not count in his own
mind for something, 2 and in the minds of his officers
and men for a great deal. It may be remarked, more-
over, that though his reproach against the soldiers
generally of unwillingness to take responsibility was
not altogether without justice, the Commander-in-
chief of the Mediterranean fleet was in a very different
position to a humble Major-general in charge of three
or four thousand men and wholly under the orders of
ignorant Ministers. It may be noted further that
Colonel Maitland's convention upon the evacuation
1 Mahan, Life of Nelson, pp. 254. sqq.
2 Hood gained ^50,000 as his share of prize-money by the
capture of a single ship laden with bullion and specie in 1793.
Brenton's Naval History, i. 100.
798 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1 800. of St. Domingo was a far bolder, greater, and more
successful political measure than any of Nelson's.
But, to return from this digression, Nelson, as is
well known, sailed to Teneriffe, knowing nothing what-
ever about the defences of the place, and was completely
and disastrously defeated. His landing-party numbered
a thousand men : had O'Hara complied with his
requisition it might have been twenty -five hundred
men. The Spaniards had eight thousand men in
strongly fortified positions, and were quite prepared to
meet them. Here was a warning, and it was not the
first. Hood had utterly misconceived the position both
at Toulon and at Bastia, in the former case with dis-
astrous results ; and the fall of Calvi had been due
solely to the soldier, Stuart. St. Vincent, again on
insufficient information, had given his sanction to an
attempt on Carthagena, which had only been averted
by Stuart's adjuration to Dundas not to trust the light-
hearted advice of naval officers upon such operations.
Nevertheless, the raids upon Ferrol, Vigo, and Cadiz
were deliberately ordered by the Government ; and
this although there were in Egypt a French force wait-
ing to be captured and a British squadron pining to
be relieved from a blockade. The conclusion of the
whole matter cannot be better summed up than in the
words of Cornwallis. " What a disgraceful and what
an expensive campaign have we made ! Twenty-two
thousand men, a large proportion not soldiers, floating
round the greater part of Europe, the scorn and
laughing-stock of friends and foes ! The infatuation
of Ministers is so great that I have no hopes of
amendment ; and if the means of forming another
army should fall as unexpectedly again into their
hands, they would in a few months and in like manner
bring it to ruin and disgrace."
1 Cornwallis Carres., iii. 300-301.
CHAPTER XXVIII
UPON his return to Gibraltar Abercromby received on 1800.
the 24th of October yet another batch of instructions. Oct -
Bonaparte's diplomacy had begun to bear fruit. On
the ist of October the Court of Madrid concluded
with the First Consul the preliminary Treaty of San
Ildefonso. Hereby Spain yielded to France six ships
of war and Louisiana in return for the cession of a
kingdom in Italy for the Duke of Parma ; though for
the present she continued to evade an express stipula-
tion that she should declare war upon Portugal. On
the 3Oth of September France also agreed upon a
treaty with the United States -whereby both parties
renounced the right of search, and the rupture created
by the folly of the Directory was healed. Finally the
Tsar Paul had been definitely alienated from England
by his exclusion from Malta and was working with
France towards a revival of the Armed Neutrality of
1780, with good hope of persuading Sweden, Denmark,
and Prussia to accede to it. In fact, though France
and Austria were still held apart by a suspension of
arms only, there seemed to be every prospect that
England would shortly be left to deal with Bonaparte
single-handed.
The first of Dundas's new instructions related to
Portugal, which, rightly anticipating a Spanish invasion,
had begged that the British auxiliary force should be
raised to fifteen thousand men with Pulteney in
command. Abercromby was therefore directed to
send eight thousand men under Pulteney to Lisbon,
799 '
fit
- ;.
8oo HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1800. where five thousand Dutch troops were to join them
from England. The next orders concerned Malta,
from which the commandant was now directed ab-
solutely to exclude Russian troops by every measure
short of actual hostilities, and upon no account to
admit them to any of the principal fortresses or works.
This last sentence was meaningless unless it signified
that, in case of need, the Russians should be debarred
from access to the works by force ; but the Ministry,
as usual, had not the courage to speak its mind out-
right.
Finally a third batch ot instructions ordered Aber-
cromby to embark fifteen thousand infantry, take them
to some suitable port at Cyprus, Crete, Rhodes, or
the coast of Asia Minor for the purchase of supplies,
and there to concert operations with the Sultan's
officers for a landing in Egypt and the reduction of
Alexandria. The French force in Egypt Dundas
calculated at thirteen thousand men, of which three
thousand men formed the garrison of Alexandria, while
most of the remainder were tied (as he conceived) to
different posts in Upper Egypt and Syria. The
defences of Alexandria itself were, as he had been
correctly informed, so incomplete that the place would
be easily reducible ; nor was it possible, in his opinion,
that the enemy could oppose to the British such a
force as could disturb them in the prosecution of a
siege. The French army was known to be very
anxious to return home ; wherefore Abercromby was
authorised to offer to transport the troops in Alex-
andria, and later on those in the other posts also,
direct to France. If this offer were rejected by the
French Commander-in-chief, he was to take care that
it should become known to the French rank and file.
Any advance up the country after the capture of
Alexandria and the sea-ports, though not absolutely
forbidden, was to be deprecated except with the object
of facilitating a passage to the Turkish army ; and
Dundas added that, in order to straiten the resources
CH. xxvin HISTORY OF THE ARMY 801
of the enemy to the utmost, five thousand troops had 1800.
been ordered to sail from India for the capture of all
posts occupied by the French army on the Red Sea.
Finally the Minister gave Abercromby to understand
that he had been so urgent in pressing this expedition
upon the Cabinet that he held himself solely respon-
sible for it ; that he had long been deterred from
insisting upon it by reports of the difficulties of
navigation in the Levant, but that his misgivings upon
this head had been set at rest by a report from Sir
Thomas Troubridge, which was the chief authority
upon which he had acted in advising the expedition.
This report, which was so brief, vague, and meagre as
to be practically worthless, he carefully enclosed. For
the rest he left Abercromby full discretion to act
contrary to these instructions, if on further enquiry
he should think fit ; and he concluded by a series of
compliments which, reading between the lines, I can
interpret only to mean that he threw himself upon the
General's mercy to deliver him from his troubles by a
great success. Considering how many and how shame-
ful had been Dundas's failures in the conduct of the
war, it is not surprising that he should have trembled
over the issue of this, his last adventure. 1
The explanation of this sudden attention to Egypt
is explained by a variety of causes. In the first place a
number of letters from French officers, both before and
after the departure of Bonaparte from Alexandria, had
been intercepted and published in England, all of
which, including one in particular from Kleber, painted
the condition and prospects of the French army in the
gloomiest colours. These accounts the Government
accepted without further enquiry, being always content
with the baldest intelligence. Next, though Colonel
Koehler and a small party of officers and non-commis-
sioned officers had for some months been attached to
the Turkish army at Jaffa in order to improve its
1 Dundas to Abercromby and Pulteney, 6th October (4 letters),
to Abercromby, i$th October 1800.
802 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1 800. training and discipline, the Grand Vizier had asked for
five thousand British troops to join them. Indeed both
Koehler and Sidney Smith declared that, without such
support, the Turks could never drive the French from
Egypt. Moreover, it was plain that Bonaparte was
excessively anxious about his troops in Egypt and
longed to rescue them if he could. He had tried to
do so by inviting England to accede to the suspension
of arms which had been initiated by Austria ; but Gren-
ville insisted upon excepting Malta and Egypt from
such a truce, and the negotiations in consequence had
fallen to the ground.
Most important of all was the fact that the con-
version of the Tsar to friendship with France had
altered the entire situation. If the First Consul
should succeed in forming a hostile confederacy of
the Northern powers against England, then it might
be necessary to withdraw part of the British fleet
from the Mediterranean ; and Bonaparte was not
likely to miss such an opportunity of reinforcing the
troops in Egypt. Nor was it possible to foresee what
arrangement the autocrats of France and Russia, the
one absolutely unprincipled and the other insane, might
not concert for the partition of Turkey and possibly
for attack upon the eastern possessions of Britain.
Some of these contingencies might have been con-
sidered by the Government before the Convention of
El Arish was annulled. It is true that at the begin-
ning of 1800 it was most undesirable to restore a body
of French veteran troops to France ; and this indeed
had been the principal ground for the repudiation of
that treaty. But Sidney Smith, according to his own
account, had provided against that difficulty. He had
stipulated not to transport the French army from
Egypt in a mass to any particular port, but to take
every man to his home clear of the army ; and he had
intended to scatter the transports among all the ports of
France, where they would have been kept in quarantine
owing to the plague, so that the troops could not
CH. xxviir HISTORY OF THE ARMY 803
easily have been collected nor trained to good con- 1800.
dition for a campaign. However, it was now too late
to think of such matters ; and the only remedy
was to hurry Abercromby to Alexandria as quickly as
possible. 1
The design of bringing troops from India to Egypt
seems to have occurred to several people, but to
Dundas himself first of all, very soon aftf he had
heard the news of the battle of the Nile. Sidney
Smith had also thought of it ; and Lord Elgin, the
Ambassador at Constantinople, either took the idea from
him or conceived it independently. Both of them
wrote to consult Lord Wellesley in India as to the
feasibility of the plan, and Sidney Smith at any rate
received an answer that lack of troops rather than of
good-will prevented the Governor-general from enter-
taining it. 2 However, Dundas lost no time in writing
to Wellesley for a thousand European troops and two
thousand Sepoys, boldly predicting that Abercromby
would arrive in Egypt by December, and the Indian
contingent by the following April. We shall presently
see how utterly false these and all other of Dundas's
calculations proved to be. But in truth the man
looked upon the coming Egyptian campaign as a very
trifling affair. On the 1 3th of October, a week after
the date of his first instructions, he wrote to Aber-
cromby that he need give Pulteney only five thousand
instead of eight thousand men for Portugal. He was
sanguine, he said, that, with such an addition to the
force for Egypt, the General would perform the whole
service expected of him without serious resistance
or loss, and would be able to send home the whole
1 Letters from General Bonaparte's army in Egypt. London,
1798-99. Koehler to Grenville, 2nd August, enclosing a letter
from Sidney Smith of zyth July; Abercromby to Dundas, nth
September (with enclosures from Koehler) ; Sidney Smith to
Keith, 27th September 1800.
2 Dropmore Papers, iv. 423. Elgin to Mornington (undated),
1799 ; Sidney Smith to Keith (enclosing letter from Wellesley of
26th April), 29th September 1800.
804 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOKXII
1 800. of his troops, excepting the garrison of Alexandria, in
the course of the ensuing summer. 1
Abercromby, when these letters reached him, was
not in the happiest temper. Anticipating some distant
expedition, he had been engaged in sorting out the
regiments enlisted for general service from those
enlisted for service in Europe only, and embarking the
former on the old half-armed two-deckers which in those
days were termed troop-ships. 2 For some days, how-
ever, the wind had blown hard from the east, which
made all repairs impossible, prevented the ships from
lying in Gibraltar, and, worse still, forbade them to
proceed to Tetuan, where alone they could obtain the
water necessary for their voyage to Minorca. More-
over, Dundas had, as usual, utterly miscalculated the
number of men at his disposal. Instead of eight
thousand men, as originally ordered, Abercromby could
only spare to Pulteney fewer than five thousand men " of
the worst species," and even then he reserved to him-
self something less than the prescribed force of fifteen
thousand infantry. In addition to this difficulty, the
troops were growing sickly from long confinement on
board ship, more particularly such regiments as had
drawn recruits from the Irish Militia, whose men paid
as little attention to cleanliness as their officers to
duty. Matters were not improved by the enormous
price of fresh meat at Gibraltar, though fortunately
vegetables were procurable in sufficient quantity to
check the scurvy which had already made its appear-
ance. 3 Clothing and necessaries again were so deficient
and so urgently required, there being no means of
procuring either at Gibraltar, that Abercromby was
obliged to ask that these articles might be provided at
once by special convoy. Lastly, many of the trans-
ports were in great need of repairs, which could not be
effected in those days at Gibraltar ; and it was therefore
1 Dundas to Abercromby, I3th October 1800.
2 Bunbury, p. 93.
3 Anderson's 'Journal of the Forces, etc., pp. 62, 97.
CH. xxvni HISTORY OF THE ARMY 805
imperative that they should be overhauled at Malta 1800.
or Minorca before they could proceed to the final
rendezvous on the coast of Asia Minor. All these
little things Dundas had of course left out of calcula-
tion ; and the casual fashion in which he spoke already
of the return of the troops to England after the com-
pletion of their work in Egypt irritated even the
gentle Abercromby into something greatly resembling
sarcasm. 1
The first division of the troops weighed anchor for
Minorca in the last week of October ; but the second, Oct.
which was much the larger, was so long prevented by
inclement weather from taking in water that it did not
sail for Malta until the second week in November. Nov.
Both the divisions united at Malta at the end of that
month ; and several regiments were stationed per-
manently ashore while the transports were under
survey and repair. At least one of the vessels, which
had carried John Moore among other passengers, was
condemned as unfit for sea, and many of the troop-
ships were in little better plight. From this and from
various other causes it was the lyth of December
before the troops could be re-embarked, and the 2oth Dec. 20.
before the wind enabled them to put to sea. The
entire force on the 1 5th of December numbered sixteen
thousand non-commissioned officers and men fit for
duty, and twelve hundred and seventy sick. Of this
total the cavalry and artillery claimed from seven to
eight hundred men, the whole of the remainder being
infantry ; but it must be remarked that among the
infantry of the line were two battalions of the Fifty-
fourth and four flank-companies of the Fortieth, both
of which regiments were composed of militiamen,
engaged for service in Europe only. The men of
these two battalions and four companies numbered
fifteen hundred ; and, had not they volunteered for
service beyond the limits fixed by their agreement,
Abercromby could not have collected the fifteen
1 Abercrombv to Dundas, z8th October 1800.
806 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xir
1800. thousand infantry ordained by Dundas for the ex-
pedition. Hence it was only through the public spirit
of the British soldier that the armament was able to
start at all from Malta for the appointed rendezvous on
the coast of Asia Minor ; and even then at a date when
the sanguine ignorance of Dundas had reckoned that
they would already have reached the coast of Egypt. 1
Meanwhile, under the pressure of the French
armies and of Bonaparte's diplomacy, events had
moved rapidly upon the Continent of Europe ; and
the difficulties of the British Government were in-
creased by the failure of the harvest for the second
year in succession, and consequently by general distress
and discontent at home. On the iyth of November
Dundas informed Pulteney not only that no reinforce-
ments could be spared to him, but that nearly all of
his troops were imperatively needed to preserve order
in England and Ireland. He was therefore directed to
send one of his six battalions to Minorca, to embark
the remaining five for England immediately, and to
despatch five hundred men of the Twelfth and Twenty-
sixth Light Dragoons to join Abercromby. Thus all
British troops were withdrawn from Portugal, and the
three foreign regiments of Mortemar, Castries, and
Le Chastre alone remained ; the British Government
having now made up its mind, erroneously, that the
country was no longer in any danger from the menaces
of France and Spain. To Pulteney himself Dundas
gave the option either to join Abercromby or to return
home, a proceeding which was nothing short of mon-
strous. Pulteney was the officer next in seniority to
Abercromby in the Mediterranean, and was therefore
bound to succeed him in the chief command in the
event of that General's death. For this position he
was either fit or unfit ; and, in fairness to himself and
to Abercomby, he should have received definite instruc-
tions either to assume it or to return to England.
1 Abercromby to Dundas, loth December 1800, enclosing return
of troops of I 5th December.
CH. xxvni HISTORY OF THE ARMY 807
Being probably aware that Abercromby had selected 1800
Hutchinson for his second in command, Pulteney, with
great tact and good taste, elected not to join the army ;
but the whole incident affords another proof of
Dundas's incurable negligence even of the most
elementary military arrangements. 1
But the affairs of Portugal were those of least
moment in the great change which Bonaparte had
brought about in Europe. The hostility of Russia
towards Britain was becoming more strongly marked ;
and Dundas's letter to Pulteney was accompanied by
another of the same date to General Pigot, repeating Nov. 17
his former instructions to exclude Russian troops and
officers from Malta. He ordered him, moreover, to
increase the militia of the island and to assure the in-
habitants that they should not be allowed to fall into
the hands of Russia nor of the Knights of St. John
the very measure that Charles Stuart had pressed for
in vain six months before. A few days later the Tsar,
without any declaration of war, laid an embargo on all
British shipping in Russian ports. Thereupon Dundas,
on the 2nd of December, wrote to warn Abercromby Dec. ^.
that he and Keith must be prepared to repel an attack
by Russia from the side of the Dardanelles, though
they were to confine themselves to observation only of
the Russian forces until war should be actually declared
or some hostile act committed. The Minister, how-
ever, added that these new duties called for increased
diligence in the campaign against Egypt, so as to liber-
ate a large portion of the fleet for service in the Baltic.
This comment proves how ludicrous was his mis-
conception of the true state of affairs in the Medi-
terranean. His anticipation of the need of a fleet in
the Baltic was, however, only too just. After fruitless
negotiation at Paris the Austrians decided to try the
fortune of war once more, and on the ist December
they reopened the campaign in Germany by an attack
upon General Moreau. Two days later they sustained Dec. 3.
1 Dundas to Pulteney, I7th November 1800.
VOL. IV P
8o8 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1800. a crushing defeat at Hohenlinden, and from that
moment they abandoned all hope. Thugut, who had
threatened to resign from the moment when the
Emperor had favoured a pacific policy, now finally
withdrew from office ; and Austria sued for peace at
Dec. 1 6. any price. Finally, on the i6th of December, the re-
vival of the Armed Neutrality became an accomplished
fact, and England was left alone with many enemies
but without a friend in Europe.
Ignorant of all these matters but with sufficient
anxiety for his own task, Abercromby sailed eastward
Dec. 29. from Malta ; and on the 29th and 3Oth of December
the fleet and transports anchored in Marmaras or
Marmorice Bay, on the coast of Asia Minor, about
forty miles north of Rhodes. Immediately upon
receiving his orders for the Egyptian expedition the
General had sent his Quartermaster-general and two
more officers to Rhodes, in order to obtain supplies
and to concert operations with the army of the Grand
Vizir at Jaffa ; but in spite of these precautions and of
the British Government's instructions to the Ambas-
sador at Constantinople, there was no sign of the
slightest preparation on the part of the Turks. No
small craft had been collected ; the Turkish gunboats
at Rhodes were not manned ; no provisions had been
procured ; no horses had been sent from Constanti-
nople, and no supplies, except a little barley, had been
amassed. It was not that either Lord Elgin or the
British officers had failed in their duty. The Porte
had been lavish of promises and decrees, but it had
done nothing, and, whether from natural apathy or
from fear of Russia, showed every sign of persistence
in doing nothing. The Turkish army at Jaffa was
without magazines or the means of advancing. The
Capitan Pasha, who had taken the Turkish fleet to
Constantinople with solemn assurances of an immediate
return, now declared that he could not come back for
forty days. It was very evident that the British must
trust to their own exertions alone.
CH. xxvin HISTORY OF THE ARMY 809
Abercromby did not shrink from the prospect, but 1801
there was little to reassure him. He had been unable
anywhere to obtain any trustworthy information as to
the numbers of the French in Egypt, and could learn
only that they had twelve thousand regular troops
besides auxiliaries. Accepting this figure, which as a
matter of fact underestimated the strength of the enemy
by one half, he could at best hope to meet them only
with equal numbers. His officers and men had been
patient in the extreme of the long confinement on
board ship, and of the insolence of the officers, natur-
ally not the choicest in the King's Navy, of the troop-
ships ; but the upper works of those vessels were in
such disrepair that the men were often wet for days
together ; and, from this cause added to deficient cloth-
ing, the number of the sick had been greatly increased.
The army, in fact, notwithstanding the addition of five
hundred Maltese pioneers, had already shrunk from
seventeen thousand to fifteen thousand five hundred
effective men. 1 Moreover, from intelligence supplied
by the intercepted letters from the French army intelli-
gence which had lain before Dundas long before it was
forwarded to Abercromby it appeared that, until
Alexandria should be captured, every drop of water
for the British force must be landed from the ships.
Troubridge had hinted at this difficulty by stating that
both troopships and men-of-war " must be filled chock
full of water " ; but it never struck Dundas that
it was anything unusual to launch fifteen thousand
men into a semi-tropical campaign against a force of
unknown strength, with no more water than they
could draw from the fleet, and with no prospect of a
regular supply until they should have carried a fortified
city by siege or assault. It never occurred to him that
if the fleet should be forced to sea by a gale the army
would die of thirst. Nevertheless Abercromby knew
1 Exclusive of officers, the actual number was 15,526 N.C.O.s
and men : 932 sick present, 800 sick left at Minorca, Malta, and
Gibraltar. Return of nth January 1801.
8 io HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1801. British Ministers of War too well to be surprised.
He was too loyal a servant to be deterred even by-
such difficulties as these ; and his hidden indignation
revealed itself only in one stinging sentence : " There
are risks in a British warfare unknown in any other
service." l
To ascertain the truth about the Turkish army,
Moore was sent to Jaffa to inspect it ; but his report
only confirmed those already received as to its in-
efficiency and unreadiness. Unfortunately, too, Koehler
had died just when his influence with the Grand Vizir
would have been most valuable. There was no re-
source, therefore, but to wait and hope that in due
time the Turks would fulfil their promises, and mean-
time to train the army most carefully for the coming
disembarkation. Abercromby remembered the con-
fusion of the landing at the Helder, and was deter-
mined to have no more of it. Full instructions were
issued for the officers of both Army and Navy, pre-
senting a curious but most effective combination of
naval and military tactics. The advance of the flotilla
was to be made in three lines : the first line consisting
exclusively of flat-boats at intervals of fifty feet, the
second line of cutters, to stand by the flat-boats and
render any assistance that might be required, the third
line of cutters to tow the launches which carried the
artillery. The flat-boats in which each grenadier-com-
pany was embarked were to hoist the camp-colours ot
their regiment for distinction, and the boats with the
remaining companies were to fall in upon their left
according to the order in which the troops were to
stand when landed. The dressing of the line of flat-
boats was to be carefully kept, and the intervals most
accurately preserved, so as to allow the cutters and
launches from the second and third lines to reach the
shore between them. The men were positively for-
bidden to speak, stand up, or load their muskets in the
1 Abercromby to Dundas, nthand i$th January 1801. Life
of Abercromby, pp. 265-66.
CH. xxvin HISTORY OF THE ARMY 811
boats ; they were to sit absolutely still and silent until 1801,
they reached the shore, and then form up in line
opposite to the point at which they had landed.
These manoeuvres were practised again and again by
the troops appointed to lead the disembarkation, and
simultaneously the whole army was trained ashore
continually in the tactics best suited to foil the French
in Egypt.
Nevertheless the long delay was intolerably irk-
some and disappointing to the Commander-in-chief.
The arrival of the Twelfth and Twenty- sixth Light
Dragoons from Portugal had raised his force of cavalry
to eleven hundred men, but he had not the means of
mounting them. A few horses were indeed furnished
by Lord Elgin, but they were so poor that most of
them were given to the artillery ; and indeed the whole
number supplied did not exceed five hundred and
fifty. Transport - ships for these animals had been
hired from Smyrna, but did not arrive before the
middle of February ; and without them it was im-
possible to move. The news from Egypt also was
not reassuring. Sidney Smith, who had joined the ex-
pedition from before Toulon, gave the numbers of the
French and their auxiliaries at thirty thousand effective
men. This figure, though it proved to be not far from
correct, Abercromby thought an exaggeration, reckoning
that the enemy could not bring more than at most ten
thousand men to oppose him in the field. But, even
so, the number of his boats did not permit him to land
more than six thousand men together ; and, even if
the disembarkation were successfully accomplished, he
had neither waggons nor draft-animals for purposes of
transport. Everything therefore, even water, would
require to be dragged by the seamen and soldiers
under a burning sun from the ships to the camp. It
was, therefore, practically certain that many men would
be driven to hospital, and that friction would arise
with the fleet from the natural, and indeed laudable,
solicitude of the naval officers for the health of their
812 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1 80 1. ships' companies. However, it was idle to think of
waiting until these defects should be made good. His
army at least was in good order and good spirits,
though sickness had reduced its numbers to little more
than sixteen thousand effective men. 1 He decided
therefore to sail on the i8th of February, but being
delayed by foul winds did not finally put to sea until
Feb. 22. the 22nd. "We are now on the point of sailing for
Egypt," he wrote to the Military Secretary on the
1 6th, "with very slender means for executing the
orders we have received. I never went on any service
entertaining greater doubts of success, at the same time
with more determination to conquer difficulties." 2
Meanwhile Bonaparte's anxiety and activity on be-
half of his army in Egypt had long been extreme. He
was eager above all to prove to the French nation that,
under its new ruler, victory signified peace ; 3 and he
saw that, in the negotiations which he was pressing for-
ward for a general cessation of arms, the nation that
occupied Egypt would possess an enormous advantage
in the driving of a bargain. The British Ministers
were fully alive to this fact ; and Dundas was prepared
to maintain, for diplomatic purposes, that the possession
of Egypt was in dispute from the moment when Aber-
cromby's force was assembled at its final rendezvous.
As far back as in February 1800 Bonaparte had issued
orders for a French fleet to raise the blockade of Malta
and send relief to Egypt ; while constant references to
these places occur in his correspondence until he left
Paris to lead his army over the Alps, and reappear
1 Infantry, 14,555; cavalry, 1125, of whom 400 mounted;
artillery (including drivers), 667. Total, 16,347 N.C.O.s and
men fit for duty ; 1098 sick present ; 794 sick at Malta, Minorca,
etc. Return of I4th February 1801. The increase in numbers over
the last return was due to the arrival of the I2th and 26th Light
Dragoons and of recovered invalids from Malta and Minorca.
2 Abercromby to Dundas, I5th and 2ist January ; i6th February
1801. Life of Abercromby, p. 267.
* For a curious instance of his methods for the propagation or
this idea, see Carres, de Napoleon, vi. 160, letter to Lucien Bona-
parte of 3rd March 1800.
CH. xxvni HISTORY OF THE ARMY 813
within a week after the battle of Marengo. 1 In October 1801.
he again issued orders for the despatch of a fleet to
Egypt, but it was not until the 23rd of January 1801 Jan. 23.
that a heavy gale drove the British blockading squadron
from before Brest and enabled Admiral Ganteaume to
slip out with seven ships of war, carrying on board them
four thousand troops.
Ganteaume passed the Straits of Gibraltar in safety,
but, being followed by four British ships under Admiral
Warren, took fright and put back into Toulon. Of March 2 5.
four frigates, however, that started from Toulon and
Rochefort at about the same time, three successfully
evaded the blockading squadron before Alexandria,
bringing to the garrison ordnance stores and from six to
eight hundred troops. The fourth was taken off Ceuta
by the British frigate Phcebe on the I9th of February.
This vessel, the Africaine^ a frigate of forty-four guns,
carried four hundred troops besides her ship's company
of three hundred sailors ; and when, after a most gallant
fight of two hours, she at last hauled down her colours,
the number of her dead was two hundred, and of her
wounded one hundred and fifty. The Phoebe^ of about
the same weight of metal but with a crew of only two
hundred and thirty, lost but one killed and twelve
wounded. From this example we may gather what
would have happened if Nelson's squadron had met
that of Bonaparte on its way out to Egypt. 2
Thus by means of single frigates Bonaparte con-
trived to add a few men to his army in Egypt ; but
there were perhaps there always had been influences
at work which had tended to undermine its efficiency.
The troops had formed part, it is true, of Bonaparte's
army of Italy in 1796 ; but though under the magic of
his leadership they had done great things, yet they
were not in the first instance particularly good material,
nor had they ever been properly disciplined. They
1 Corres.de Napoleon, vi. 142, 146, etc. ; Letter to Carnot, 2Oth
June 1800, ibid. 379.
2 Corres. de Napoleon, vi. 529 ; James, Naval History, iii. 239.
8 1 4 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1 80 1 had beaten the Austrians again and again ; but the com-
position and spirit of the Austrian armies opposed to
them had been lamentable beyond description. Four
hundred of their officers had at one time been found
skulking in a single town, having deserted their regi-
ments ; and they had been led by Generals always
of incapacity and sometimes of downright stupidity. 1
Triumph over such adversaries was not very difficult ;
and hence, though the training of the French troops in
Italy had made them terrible in attack and even more
terrible in victory, the plunder of Lombardy had taught
them bad lessons in self-indulgence and insubordination.
The hardships of heat and thirst in Egypt had found
out their weak points very early ; and though Bonaparte
had compelled them to obedience he had failed to con-
strain them to content. " They are the most intrepid
troops in the world," wrote one of their officers from
Egypt in July 1798, "but they are not formed for
distant expeditions. A word dropped at random will
dishearten them. They are lazy, capricious, and a law
unto themselves. They have been heard to say, c Here
come our butchers,' 2 with a thousand like expressions,
when their generals pass by."
This quotation has been selected from the most
moderate and thoughtful of the letters intercepted
from the French army in Egypt. There are many
others, which have been very freely quoted by every
description of writer, depicting the soldiers as com-
mitting suicide in Bonaparte's presence, with other
details, which give the impression of an army in
open mutiny. 8 These documents, however, are in
1 Delavoye, Life of Lord Lynedoch, p. 117; and see the whole ot
Graham's letters from Italy, pp. 111-152.
2 " VoiU les bourreaux des Frar^ais," Intercepted Letters, i. 161.
3 Count Yorck von Wartenburg has collected a large assortment
of these quotations in Napoleon as a General, and from that source
General Maurice has borrowed specimens (apparently without recol-
lection that the originals were first published in England) in Diary of
Sir John Moore, ii. 37-39. Even Sybel quotes the passages about
the suicide of the men, which, judging from the general tone of the
CH. xxvm HISTORY OF THE ARMY 815
many cases evidently the work of confirmed grumblers, 1801,
and full of exaggeration ; and I believe it to be
quite a mistake to rate the military value of these
troops so low. The men were beyond doubt miserably
homesick, not only because Frenchmen abroad always
are homesick, but because they were wholly cut off
from the food, the wine, and the brandy to which they
were accustomed. But they had become acclimatised
to a hot sun, mosquitoes, fleas, flies, and other plagues,
over which, upon first landing, they had howled like
children ; and they had settled down, though not with
the best grace, to make the best of things in the hope
of deliverance. They had suffered severe trials, first
when Nelson won the battle of the Nile, and later when
Bonaparte deserted them ; but though they had never
been really well-disciplined troops, they were kept well
in hand by Kleber, and under his leadership were quite
ready to give a good account of themselves. Granted
success, they were as formidable as ever ; but they were
not, nor ever had been, well fitted to struggle with
failure or adversity.
Kleber, however, was assassinated by a fanatic in
May 1 800, and the command devolved upon General
Menou. French writers have conspired to write this
man down as utterly incapable either for civil or military
purposes ; and it seems certain that, whatever his
capacity, he was vain, flighty, short-sighted, and self-
seeking. Thinking, apparently, that Egypt was safe
from an invasion, he boldly proclaimed it a French
colony, upset the existing civil administration to make
way for a new scheme of his own, and, having already
two letters which mention it (Intercepted Letters, ii. 50, 220), are
gross exaggerations. That one or two men, probably confirmed
drinkers, mad with thirst or through the approach of sunstroke, may
have used violent language to the General and even have blown
out their brains, is quite possible. But discontented officers, per-
haps deservedly under their General's displeasure, do not inquire
strictly into these matters before reporting them in the hope of
injuring him with the public, particularly under such a government
as the Directory.
816 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1 80 1. embraced Mohammedanism, showed particular partiality
to those who were of his new faith. This quickly
brought him into conflict with his divisional Generals,
and in particular with Reynier, who, though he had
indeed seen more service than his chief, possessed no
less vanity and no greater military talent. 1 One and
all of these divisional Generals were intensely jealous of
their chief, and Menou, finding that they would not
work with him, ignored them and corresponded direct
with the brigadiers. This injuriously affected discipline,
and the army became full of feuds and parties, thoroughly
unhappy, and as a natural consequence discontented
and quarrelsome. Its numbers in March 1801 were
slightly over twenty-five thousand, or, excluding auxili-
aries, twenty-four thousand of all ranks. Of these,
from six to seven thousand were either unfit for active
service or fixed permanently in garrison, so that the
force at disposal for the field amounted to about seven-
teen thousand of all ranks, of which about seventeen
hundred were excellent cavalry. 2 With this force, which
was certainly superior to Abercromby's, Menou judged
himself so secure that, though amply warned of the
danger that threatened him, he took no precautions to
throw up additional defences nor even to victual the
fortresses which he actually possessed. In fact he despised
his enemy, as very reasonably he might ; for the English
military enterprises since the beginning of the war had
almost invariably failed with ignominy ; and, judging
them to have been projected by military men, he had
naturally formed a low opinion of the English military
1 I judge this by the fact that the British beat him in fair fight
with inferior numbers both at Maida and at Sabugal.
2 The returns given by Jomini and Reynier do not exactly agree,
Jomini giving the cavalry at 1250 and Reynier at 1661, exclusive
of officers. I have preferred Reynier's figures for this detail. For
the force at large the two returns are in substantial accord. Bunbury
gives the numbers of the French at from 27,000 to 28,000 veterans,
and Wilson, apparently from authentic returns, puts the figures, in-
clusive of auxiliaries, at 32,000. Expedition to Egypt, p. 255. To
avoid all semblance of favour to the English side, I accept the
French figures throughout.
CH. xxvm HISTORY OF THE ARMY 817
service. Better testimony could not be found to the 1801.
contempt into which Pitt's Ministry had brought the
British Army.
On the afternoon of the ist of March the British March i
fleet arrived off Alexandria, when Keith, for some reason,
stood in close enough to distinguish the signals of the
vessels in the harbour, but stood off again in consequence
of boisterous weather, finally coming to anchor at nine
o'clock on the following morning in the Bay of Aboukir. March t.
Abercromby had sent forward from Asia Minor two
officers of the Engineers to reconnoitre the shore ; but
he now found that they had ventured in too close, and
that one of them had been killed and the other taken.
The General therefore rowed off in a cutter with Moore
to look for himself, the men-of-war being moored from
five to seven miles from the beach owing to the shallow-
ness of the water. They duly selected the point for
disembarkation ; but, as they returned, a French armed
vessel ran through the lines of the fleet and anchored
under the Castle of Aboukir in a position to rake the
appointed extent of beach from end to end. Lord
Keith, however, declared that he could not spare a
vessel to look after her, and the matter proved to be of
small importance ; for, though Abercromby gave orders
to land upon the following morning, the wind freshened
into a regular gale which blew persistently for four
days, raising a heavy sea and rendering disembarkation
absolutely impossible.
Menou at this time was at Cairo, in and about
which city there were eight thousand of his troops.
He had heard of the arrival of the British on the
4th, so that by undeserved good fortune he had still March 4.
time to move a formidable body to Alexandria by
the 9th. His Generals urged him to concentrate
his troops to oppose the British landing, but he never-
theless remained at Cairo, merely sending Reynier
with about fifteen hundred men about thirty miles
northward to Belbeis, detaching five hundred more to
Damietta, and ordering General Lanusse at Ramanieh
8i8 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOKXII
1801. to reinforce Alexandria with a bare six hundred men.
General Friant, who commanded at the port last named,
had with him about two thousand effective soldiers, and
about the same number of seamen and invalids. Of
these he stationed one small detachment at Rosetta
and another about ten miles to south-west of it,
while he himself with sixteen hundred infantry, 1 two
hundred cavalry and fifteen guns, took up a position
at Aboukir.
March 7. On the yth of March the gale abated, and in the
afternoon Abercromby gave orders for the landing to
be attempted on the morrow. The anxiety of the
veteran must have been trying almost beyond endurance^
for he had not the slightest information as to the enemy's
strength or movements. The place selected for the
disembarkation was the eastern front of the peninsula
of Aboukir, in a bay measuring about two miles from
north to south. Upon the northern horn of this bay
stood the Castle of Aboukir, mounting, besides smaller
guns, eight twenty-four pounders and two twelve-inch
mortars, which enfiladed the beach to southward up to
a range of eighteen hundred yards. Upon the southern
horn stood a block-house with at least one heavy gun.
At about the centre of the bay rose a high sand-hill, of
which the seaward face was partially flanked by the
guns of the Castle ; and to the south of it the ground
was simply a confusion of lower sand-hills, rising in tiers
one behind the other, and dotted with patches of scrub.
The French General thus possessed every means of con-
cealing his troops ; but Moore, after reconnoitring the
ground carefully, could perceive no entrenchments
whatever, though the visible presence of picquets along
the whole length of the line showed that the enemy
was there in unknown force. The guns of the fort of
Aboukir forbade any attempt at a landing to north of
the high central sand-hill ; and Moore resolved that
1 Two battalions of the 6ist and 75th demibrigades, half a bat-
talion of the 5 ist and a detachment of the 25th demibrigades,
1 8th Dragoons, detachment of 2Oth Dragoons.
CH. xxvin HISTORY OF THE ARMY 819
this hill should be the objective of the right of the 1801.
British attack. From its situation it could not but form March 7.
either the left or the centre of the French position, and
in either case the possession of ground so commanding
was important. The attack was therefore to be limited
to a front of about a mile along the beach from this
sand-hill southward ; and the troops appointed for the
service were, counting from right to left, the Reserve
under Moore, the Guards, and the Royals and Fifty-
fourth from Cavan's brigade. 1
On the evening of the jth two boats were moored
in advance to mark the points upon which the line of
flat-boats was to be formed. The naval officers
received and issued their orders ; the troops of the
second disembarkation were transferred to vessels of
light draught so as to be closer to the shore ; and all
was ready for the morrow.
At two o'clock on the morning of the 8th of March March 8.
the darkness was broken for a moment by a rocket
which flew aloft from the flagship ; and upon this signal
all the boats of the fleet repaired to their appointed
1 The Army was brigaded as follows :
Guards' Brigade. Major-general Ludlow I/ Coldstream,
i /3rd Guards.
1st Brigade. Major-general Coote 2/ist, 54th (2 batts.),
92nd.
2ff^ Brigade. Major-general Craddock 8th, I3th, i8th,
9<Dth.
$rd Brigade. Major-general Lord Cavan 5Oth, 79th.
^th Brigade. Brigadier -general Doyle 2nd, 3Oth, 44th,
89th.
yh Brigade. Brigadier-general John Stuart Minorca Regi-
ment, De Roll's, Dillon's.
Reserve Major-general Moore, Brigadier-general Oakes
23rd, 28th, 42nd, 58th, 4 companies /4Oth, Corsican
Rangers.
Cavalry Brigade. Brigadier-general Finch I troop nth
L.D., 1 2th, 26th, and Hompesch's L.D.
Artillery. About 700 of all ranks.
Field-pieces. 24 light 6-prs., 4 light 12-prs., 12 medium 12-
prs., 6 5j-inch howitzers.
Sifge-pieces. 4 iron 12-prs., 20 24-prs., 2 lo-inch, 10 8-inch
howitzers, 18 5j-inch, 10 8-inch, 12 lo-inch mortars.
820
HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1 80 1. ships. By half-past three the whole of them were rilled
8. an j moving in dead silence, broken only by the mono-
tonous plash of oars, over the five miles that separated
them from the rendezvous. By daylight most of them
had reached the appointed alignment, but much time
was consumed before Captain Cochrane, 1 who was in
charge of the naval arrangements, and Moore could
draw them up in their proper order. The first line
consisted of fifty-eight flat-boats, each packed to its
utmost capacity with about fifty soldiers, who, burdened
with three days' provisions and sixty rounds of ammu-
nition, sat patiently with their firelocks between their
knees, blinking at the fierce glare of the low morning
sun. In rear of them, ready to slip into the intervals,
came the cutters, eighty-four in number, also packed
with men. Then in third line were thirty -seven
launches, and in rear of all fourteen launches, contain-
ing nearly five hundred seamen and gunners with
fourteen field-guns, these last being under the orders
of Sidney Smith. On each flank of the flotilla were
three armed vessels two gunboats and a bomb ship
and three more ships of light draught were moored as
close in as possible with their broadsides to the shore.
At last the regiments were sorted out into their several
stations. The place of honour on the right was held
by the militiamen of the flank - companies of the
Fortieth, and then in succession from right to left
came the Twenty-third, Twenty-eighth, Forty-second,
Fifty -eighth, Corsican Rangers, Coldstream Guards,
Third Guards, Royals, and Fifty -fourth. A little
before nine o'clock all was ready. The gunboats and
bomb ships opened fire, and Cochrane gave the signal
to advance.
The boats then pulled slowly and steadily forward ;
and the enemy, who had for some hours been visible
watching the preparations, disappeared from view.
Closer and closer the flotilla crept in, until it passed
1 This was not Lord Cochrane, more famous in later days as
Lord Dundonald, as has been represented by some writers.
CH. xxvin HISTORY OF THE ARMY 821
within range of the French cannon ; and then from the 1801.
Castle of Aboukir, from the central sand-hill, from March 8 -
four different points to right and left of it, and from
the blockhouse there rained upon it a furious cross-fire
of shot and shell. The water seethed under the tem-
pest of iron, and the men were drenched to the skin,
but little damage was done. The boats moved implac-
ably on till they drew near to the shore, and then
instead of round-shot there poured upon them a stream
of grape and langridge which churned up the water
like hail and struck down seamen and soldiers right
and left. The fiercest of the fire naturally fell about
the centre, where one shell burst in the midst of a
flat-boat which carried some of the Coldstream Guards,
killing and wounding many men and sending the rest
to the bottom. This part of the line appears in con-
sequence to have swerved somewhat to its left, 1 but
still the bluejackets rowed coolly and steadily on, the
soldiers joining them in an occasional cheer. Grape
and langridge were now supplemented by musketry,
but still the boats advanced ; and on the right of the
line, where the order had never been broken, Moore's
eyes were fixed steadily upon the great sand-hill. At
last the boats touched bottom, and during their last
moments of immunity the enemy poured in a savage fire
and even thrust down the soldiers as they landed, with
the bayonet. But the British quickly sprang ashore and
formed ; and Moore, drawing up the Fortieth, Twenty-
third and Twenty - eighth in line, led them straight
upon the central sand-hill. It was so steep as to
seem inaccessible ; but the men, without a thought of
loading their muskets, scrambled after him, some in
perfect order as if on parade, some on their hands and
knees, but all close upon their leader. On the summit
stood the Sixty-first French demibrigade, but did not
stand there long. Suddenly and unexpectedly the red-
coats appeared at the head of the steep ascent, as though
they had sprung out of the ground, swept them head-
1 Wilson, Expedition to Egypt, p. 14.
822 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1801. long down with the bayonet, captured their four guns,
March 8. anc j hunted them from the sand-hills into the plain
beyond. There Moore halted them, to see how the
army was faring elsewhere.
On Moore's left Oakes with the remainder of the
Reserve had been not less successful. Landing a few
minutes later than his commander, he had found the
French prepared to meet him not only with infantry
but with cavalry ; but the Forty-second, which was the
first to land, formed under heavy fire as if on parade
and repulsed the horsemen by their volleys. The
Highlanders then advanced, with the Fifty-eighth in
support, drove the infantry opposed to them also out
of the sand-hills, and captured three guns. On the
left of Oakes the brigade of Guards, having been
thrown into confusion by the sinking of two of their
boats, reached the shoal water in disorder, some part
of it in rear of Oakes's brigade. The men were there-
fore thrown ashore intermingled and in small parties,
which prevented them from forming readily ; and the
French cavalry, observing their plight, seized the
moment to deliver a second attack. With the help of
the Fifty-eighth, however, the horsemen were again
hurled back ; and Ludlow, quickly setting his two
battalions in order, advanced to his appointed place in
the line. The Fifty-fourth and Royals landed shortly
afterwards upon the left of the Guards, just in time to
drive away a battalion of French infantry which was
marching along a hollow upon Ludlow's left flank.
Coote by this time had formed the whole of the troops
which had landed on the left of the Reserve ; and, after
another hour and a half of petty work against the
French sharpshooters in the inner sand-hills, the
enemy's entire force was thrust back into the plain,
with a total loss of eight guns. From the moment
when the British first set foot ashore to the carrying
of the high sand-hill by Moore, the time did not
exceed twenty minutes ; and the action was practically
won by the twenty-five hundred men of the Reserve.
CH. xxvin HISTORY OF THE ARMY 823
Thus was gained the landing in Egypt, perhaps the 1801,
most skilful and daring operation of its kind that was
ever attempted. Tactically, the advance of the flotilla
into the concave of the beach was equivalent to an as-
sault upon a re-entrant angle of a fortress, in which the
hands of the assailants were tied until they reached the
counterscarp ; and the patient endurance of the troops
as they sat, powerless for resistance, between the peril
of a furious fire above and the peril of drowning below,
was beyond all praise. Undoubtedly the storming of
the high sand-hill was the most brilliant as it was the
decisive movement of the day ; for the French, who
held that ground, seem to have given way instantly
before Moore's battalions, as if panic-stricken by their
mere appearance on the summit. At the last moment
before the advance Abercromby had sent a message to
ask Moore if he would not direct his boats a little to
the south of it instead of straight upon it ; but Moore
answered that the steepness of the hill was in favour of
his men rather than the contrary, and events proved
him to be right. Nevertheless the finest performance
of the day was that of the Forty-second Highlanders,
who, after suffering heavily in the boats, were so
steady and so perfectly formed upon landing that they
beat off the attack of the French cavalry. Their losses
amounted to twenty-one men killed, and one hundred
and fifty-six, including eight officers, wounded. Next
to them the heaviest sufferers were the Coldstream
Guards, with six officers and ninety-one men killed,
wounded, and missing. Altogether the casualties of the
Army in this action amounted to thirty-one officers and
six hundred and twenty-one men killed, wounded, and
missing, of whom a Corsican officer and twelve men
were prisoners. The losses of the Navy, which had
played a most noble though thankless part in the advance
without the satisfaction of a fight ashore, were seven
officers and ninety men killed and wounded, raising the
total of casualties to over seven hundred. The loss of
the French was from three to four hundred men.
VOL. IV Q
824 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1801. While the fight was still proceeding the boats
March 8. returned to bring off the rest of the troops, and before
evening the entire force had been disembarked, when
Abercromby advanced for a couple of miles and halted
for the night. The army stood now upon a narrow
strip of land which stretches for some forty miles from
Aboukir in the east to the Arab Tower on the west,
and divides Lake Mareotis from the sea. Aber-
cromby's front faced to westward, his right flank rest-
ing on the open sea, his left upon the salt lake of
Maadieh or Aboukir ; and the average width of the
peninsula for the eleven miles that separated his posi-
tion from the city of Alexandria was between three and
four thousand yards. The ground consisted merely
of sand of irregular surface dotted with palm trees ; and
by digging near these trees, in obedience to Sidney
Smith, the men found water, to the intense relief of
Abercromby, upon whom the thought of dependence
upon the fleet for water had lain inexpressibly heavy.
In theory it seems strange that he did not follow up
his beaten enemy, but in practice his halt is easily
explained. The men had been afoot since two o'clock
in the morning ; they had been mewed up on board
ship for many months before ; the sand made marching
very laborious even for soldiers in the best of condition,
and finally no stores and but few horses had yet been
landed. Friant meanwhile drew in all his detachments
except a small party at Rosetta and the garrison at the
Castle of Aboukir, which last had been blockaded by
two British brigades, and stationed himself in advance
of Alexandria so as to cover the city. There on the
following morning he was joined by General Lanusse,
who had hastened with his division towards the sound
of the cannon. This raised his force to about five
thousand of all ranks with twenty-one guns.
March 9. On the 9th and loth the wind blew too hard to
permit the landing of supplies and stores, and the
main body of the British army remained stationary.
The Reserve, however, was moved forward for a short
CH. xxvin HISTORY OF THE ARMY 825
distance to a point where the width of the peninsula 1801
shrank to less than a mile ; and the Second Queen's,
with four hundred dragoons, liberated the two brigades
from the blockade of the Castle ot Aboukir. On the
nth calmer weather allowed the horses and supplies March n.
to be disembarked, and fortunately Lake Maadieh
furnished a means of transport by water ; otherwise,
for want of animals, it would have been impossible
for the army to advance. The British gunboats had
already entered the lake, where by a strange over-
sight the French had no gunboats to oppose them, and
thus both the left flank and the line of supply were
secured. On the I2th the force moved forward about March iz.
four miles through deep sand, the French cavalry retir-
ing before it and gradually revealing the main body of
their army, which seemed to be advancing for a general
action. Presently, however, the French halted and
took up a position upon some heights a little beyond
the western end of Lake Maadieh. Friant, in anxiety
lest his communications with Lower Egypt should be
severed, had determined to guard the dyke which
divided Lake Mareotis from Lake Maadieh, and which
adjoined the canal that bore the waters of the Nile to
Alexandria. For, though Lake Mareotis was dry,
the French General conceived that at that season it
would be impassable, and that consequently the dyke
was the only route by which Menou could lead his main
body to the city. Abercromby upon the first sight of
the march of the French had deployed his troops, but
he halted on perceiving their true object, and resolved
to attack on the morrow. The French position, which
was known as the Roman Camp, was commanding.
The heights occupied by Friant afforded a perfect
glacis for the play of his numerous artillery, and his
line was extended obliquely across the peninsula, the
right being in advance, and the left thrown back to
some old ruined buildings that abutted upon the sea.
Bivouacking therefore for the night at a distance of
about a mile and a half from the enemy, Abercromby
826
HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xii
1 80 1 gave his orders to march at five o'clock on the morrow
morning, and laid his plans to turn Friant's right flank.
March 13. From some untoward circumstances it was half-past
six before the British army was able to move forward,
as ordained, in three parallel columns. The Reserve
under Moore formed the right column, next to the
sea ; Craddock's, Coote's, and the Guards brigades the
central column ; Cavan's brigade, strengthened by a
battalion of Marines, Stuart's foreign brigade and
Doyle's brigade, the left column. The paltry little
body of mounted dragoons was disposed between the
right and central columns ; the guns, apparently about
sixteen pieces in all, were painfully dragged by the
seamen at the heads of the several brigades ; and the
advanced guard was formed by the Ninetieth Foot and
the Ninety-second Highlanders, the former before the
central, the latter, with a field gun and a light howitzer,
before the left column. In this order the army, now
about fourteen thousand strong, struggled slowly and
painfully through the heavy sand, halting frequently
to enable the guns to keep their place and enduring
heavy loss through the fire of the French artillery.
The result was that the Ninetieth and Ninety-second
pressed on too far in advance, and appeared in full
view of the French at a point where, by chance, the
central column was invisible owing to some rising
ground. Supposing them to be unsupported, Friant,
upon Lanusse's suggestion, left about eighteen hundred
men with a few guns to contain Moore's column by
the sea, and brought forward the rest of his force to
crush not only the two advanced battalions, but also,
as he imagined, the isolated left column of the British.
The French cavalry were the first to come into
action, the Twenty-second Mounted Chasseurs swoop-
ing suddenly down with the greatest impetuosity upon
the Ninetieth. The latter regiment was in the act of
deployment from column into line, and the rear sec-
tions, having no time to complete the movement,
massed themselves six or eight deep upon the left.
CH. xxvm HISTORY OF THE ARMY 827
In this order the Ninetieth awaited the shock, reserving 1801.
its fire until the sabres were close to the bayonets, when March 13.
it poured in a crushing volley which shattered the
French horsemen to pieces. Immediately afterwards
the French infantry and artillery came up, and for a
short time the Ninetieth and Ninety-second bore their
attack single-handed, suffering very heavily both from
musketry and artillery, but standing with a steadfast-
ness beyond all praise. 1 But now Abercromby's central
and left columns began to deploy, pursuant to their
orders, in two lines, under a heavy fire from the French
guns ; and the action became general, though the
Reserve on the right and the Fourth Brigade on the
extreme left still retained their formation in column.
The pressure upon the Ninetieth and Ninety-second
was relieved ; the French began to fall back all along
the line ; and the Highlanders, pressing forward against
the French position, captured three guns. The general
advance of the British was, however, very slow ; and
the French horse -artillery took advantage of Aber-
cromby's weakness in cavalry and gun-teams to make
a running fight for every yard of ground, unlimbering
at every opportunity to pour in a destructive fire, and
galloping off to take up a new position before the
British guns could come forward to silence them.
None the less the British moved steadily onward in
most perfect order ; the Reserve and Craddock's
brigade, on the right, being somewhat in advance of
the rest of the line, since the weakening of the French
in their front enabled them to make sure of turning
the enemy's left. As the Reserve gained the heights
of the Roman Camp the French abandoned the posi-
tion ; and Moore and Craddock halted their men until
the rest of the army should come up. Meanwhile on
1 The Ninety-second was extremely well handled, being dis-
posed in echelon of half-battalions, with the left half-battalion
refused and well sheltered among a patch of scrub, so as to meet
any attempt to outflank it upon that side. Narrative of a private
soldier of the
828 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1801 the extreme left Dillon's regiment most gallantly
March 13. stormed a French field-work, in which two guns were
mounted, upon the Alexandria canal ; and, delivered
from this menace on its flank, the left of the British
came level with the right, and the whole again moved
forward for about half a mile into the plain on the west
of the Roman Camp. There Abercromby suddenly
ordered the entire line to halt, and summoned Hutch-
inson and Moore to him for consultation.
The French had now fallen back to their main
position on a chain of fortified heights, known as the
heights of Nicopolis, about thirteen hundred yards east
of Alexandria ; and Abercromby, who was extremely
short-sighted, had apparently failed to realise immedi-
ately how formidable it was. He now decided to turn
it by both flanks, to which end Hutchinson with the
Third, Fourth, and Fifth brigades was ordered to attack
upon the left, while Moore, conforming his move-
ments with Hutchinson's, was simultaneously to assault
from the right, the rest of the troops lying down where
they had been halted on the plain. Hutchinson accord-
ingly made for a bridge close to the southern end ot
the French position, by which to cross the canal on to
Lake Mareotis ; hoping to march round the right of the
French position upon the dried mud at its edge, and from
thence to storm. The bridge, though defended by a
strong party of French with a howitzer, was gallantly
carried by the Forty-fourth ; but the main column was
saluted by a tremendous fire from the artillery on the
heights of Nicopolis. Thereupon Hutchinson, per-
ceiving that this position was very strong, and moreover
commanded by the guns of Alexandria, hesitated to com-
mit his troops further without orders. Meanwhile the
French, finding themselves untroubled, brought forward
the guns along their front and opened a murderous can-
nonade upon the British troops in the plain, which, since
it could not be silenced, was passively endured. In due
course Hutchinson's messenger reached Abercromby ;
and the General despatched John Hope from his staff
CH. xxvni HISTORY OF THE ARMY 829
to examine the French right and report to him. But 1801.
all these matters took time, and the rain of shot from March 13
the French guns never ceased to pour upon the un-
lucky British infantry. The day was now wearing
towards evening. Abercromby resolved to abandon
the projected attack, and drew back his troops to the
position from which he had driven the French in the
morning.
The loss of the French in this action was about five
hundred ; that of the British, including the casualties
of the seamen in the gunboats, was just over thirteen
hundred killed and wounded, of whom seventy-nine
were officers. 1 Of these over two hundred and forty
belonged to the Ninetieth and one hundred and forty
to the Ninety -second ; and, as a reward for their
gallant behaviour, these two corps still enjoy the
exclusive privilege of carrying the name Mandora
upon their colours and appointments, the engage-
ment having taken place near the Mandora redoubt.
But the action was both costly and unsatisfactory,
and does not show Abercromby at his best. Either
he should have halted the army after carrying the
first position of the French, until he had made up
his mind whether or not to assault their second
position upon the heights of Nicopolis ; or, having
brought his troops into the plain within range of the
French cannon, he should have made his attack upon
the second position forthwith. As matters were con-
ducted, a great many of his battalions were exposed
for hours to a destructive cannonade, and suffered very
heavy loss for no object whatever. It seems too that,
if Hutchinson had continued his flanking movement
further to the west, he might have attacked the
southern front of Alexandria itself with every prospect
of success. But Hutchinson's eyesight, like Aber-
cromby's, was extremely defective ; he had no informa-
1 Army, 6 officers, 150 men killed; 66 officers, 1016 men
wounded. Navy and Marines, 3 officers and 27 men killed, 4
officers and 50 men wounded.
830 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1 80 1. tion as to the safety of the bed of Lake Mareotis for
March 13. the passage of infantry and artillery; and it is ex-
tremely probable that both he, and indeed all the
officers of the army, were misled by mirage. The
country was new to every man in the force except
Sidney Smith and a few naval officers ; and it is well
known that, in an atmosphere so clear as that of Egypt,
some time is needed for strangers to train their eyes to
the judgment of distances and elevations. In fact, the
advance of Abercromby beyond the Roman Camp rather
suggests the error of a man who, having begun by
mistaking a mile of distance for half a mile, has run to
the opposite extreme of misjudging half a mile to be a
mile.
Apart from this, Abercromby appears to have been
precipitate in not endeavouring to make some recon-
naissance of the heights of Nicropolis before moving
his men within the range of the French cannon.
That he could have carried the position, there can, I
think, be no doubt ; but he does not seem to have
asked himself until too late whether he could hold it
as well as capture it. He had forced the enemy back
from the Roman Camp practically without artillery and
without cavalry, indeed if he had possessed either he
could have destroyed Friant's force, but his losses for
this very reason had been extremely heavy ; and he
might well have doubted whether, without entrenching
tools and with at best a very few barely mobile guns,
he could maintain himself within cannon-shot of the
forts of Alexandria. Again, after passing the head of
Lake Maadieh he possessed no longer the means of
water-transport ; and, since he had no land-transport, he
must have been reduced to his own men's backs to
bring up supplies and stores from the waterside.
Chilly bivouacs, foul camping-grounds, and bad water
had already caused much sickness among his troops,
and the additional fatigue of acting as beasts of burden
must inevitably have broken many of them down.
Yet, after seeing his soldiers maltreated, through no
CH. xxvin HISTORY OF THE ARMY 831
fault of his or their own, in the most exasperating 1801.
fashion by the French horse -artillery, it is hardly March-
surprising that he should have been loth to stop
them when the enemy was in full retreat, and that he
should have thought of all the objections to an advance
just an hour too late. The only satisfaction, therefore,
to be found in the day's work lay in the admirable
behaviour of the troops under a very severe trial, and
in the five captured guns which bore witness to their
valour.
Still in complete ignorance of the enemy's numbers,
Abercromby now set himself to assure his position
upon the peninsula. Heavy guns were landed for the
siege of the Castle of Aboukir, and the men were
busily employed in entrenching the new position. It
was by nature strong. The peninsula at this point is
about a mile and a half wide, of which distance five
hundred yards on the southern extremity adjoining the
Alexandria canal is level plain. To this level margin
succeeds a ridge, which runs from north to south for
three-quarters of a mile, and is bounded on the north
by another six hundred yards of level ground, beyond
which rises a second ridge of considerable height run-
ning parallel to the sea and descending in gradual slopes
from east to west. The summit of this ridge was
crowned by the ruins of a large building, dating from
the days of Roman rule, which gave to the hill its
name of the Roman Camp. The position thus pre-
sented the features of a central ridge with a level space
on each flank, that on the left hand being unprotected,
but that on the right covered by the natural bastion of
the Roman Camp. This bastion or salient angle was
the key of the whole, and was accordingly strengthened
first by a small redan on the lowest slopes, next by an
unclosed redoubt on one of the intermediate acclivities,
and finally by the ruined building on the summit. Its
defence was entrusted to the Reserve under Moore,
who quickly arranged every detail so that each man
should know his duty in case of attack. Fleches and
it ' <; i-i
,
832 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1 80 1. field-works were thrown up also on the central ridge,
Marcn. more particularly at the southern end, so as to com-
mand the margin of plain to the south. Two twenty-
four pounders and thirty-four field-guns in all were
mounted along the whole length of the position ; and
on the left of Moore the Guards' and Coote's brigades
carried the first line of defence to the southern end of
the central ridge, from which Craddock's brigade was
thrown back to the head of Lake Maadieh. The
general formation of the British was therefore an
echelon with the right advanced. In second line stood
in succession from right to left the brigades of Stuart,
Doyle, Finch, and Cavan, the last being now made up to
three battalions by the arrival of the second battalion
of the Twenty-seventh from Minorca. 1
The duties of entrenching, of dragging up guns, and
above all of bringing forward supplies and stores from the
magazines now fell very heavily on the men ; and the
sick-list increased rapidly. 2 Fuel also was scarce, there
being none except the trunks of date-palms, which were
only to be found at a distance and burned ill with an
exceedingly pungent smoke. On the 1 8th of March the
sick-list had reached the figure of twenty-four hundred
on the spot and eleven hundred shipped away to the
Mediterranean stations. Horses were still unobtain-
able, and the few already in the hands of the cavalry
March 1 8. had been diminished by an unlucky affair with a small
French party of hussars and chasseurs, in which the
Twenty -sixth Light Dragoons, from too rash an
advance, lost five officers, twenty-five men and forty-
two horses killed, wounded, and taken. However, on
the same day Abercromby was somewhat compensated
by the surrender of the Castle of Aboukir with its
garrison of two hundred men. But he was still most
1 I have been unable to discover when this battalion joined the
army. Abercromby sent most of it to Pulteney in November as
unfit for active service ; but seven companies arrived at Minorca
early in February. Abercromby to Dundas, 2nd November 1800 ;
Fox to Dundas, I9th February 1801.
2 Wilson, p. 25.
CH. xxvin HISTORY OF THE ARMY 833
uneasy about his situation, for he was now aware of his 1801.
inferiority in numbers to the French. He thought it March.
his duty to bring up some heavy cannon and attempt
by a night attack to drive the French from the heights
of Nicopolis ; but, even if he succeeded, he did not
know how far his success would forward the siege of
Alexandria, while, if he failed, he could see no alterna-
tive but to re-embark. It went to his heart that so
fine an army as his own should be thrown away ; but,
since the Government persisted in despatching inade-
quate forces upon imperfect information, no other
result was to be expected. 1
Meanwhile Friant worked indefatigably to strengthen
the fortifications of Alexandria, and Menou began to
concentrate a part of his troops, though still only a
part instead of the whole, at Ramanieh. A way
practicable for artillery was found across Lake Mareotis,
and on the I9th the French Commander - in - chief March 19.
arrived at Alexandria with his reinforcements, raising
the strength of his army to ten thousand men, includ-
ing fourteen hundred cavalry, with forty -six guns.
Being aware that both the Turkish Army and Baird's
force from India were shortly expected, he determined
to take the initiative ; and to this end he adopted a
plan suggested by Lanusse for an attack upon the
British. According to this scheme Lanusse's division
of infantry, twenty-seven hundred strong, was to storm
the redoubts and the Roman ruins on the British right.
Rampon's division of two thousand men, with Rey-
nier's in support, was to fall upon the British centre
as soon as Lanusse had made good his footing ; and
to Reynier likewise, whose division was thirty -five
hundred strong, was assigned the duty of holding the
British left in check and of sending a detachment,
strengthened by three hundred cavalry, between Lakes
Maadieh and Mareotis to close the road to Alexandria.
Finally, the rest of the cavalry, about nine hundred
sabres, under General Roize, was to remain in reserve
1 Diary of Sir John Moore, ii. 12.
834 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1 80 1 in rear of the centre. The general idea was to force
the right and centre of the British in succession under
cover of a feint upon their left, and by a final charge of
cavalry to sweep them into Lake Maadieh. It was
arranged that the first attack should be delivered before
daylight, so that the advancing columns should not be
exposed to the fire of the cannon in the redoubts nor
of the gunboats which guarded the British right flank ;
and it was reasonably reckoned that the assault might
come as a surprise, since Abercromby had no intelli-
March 20. gence of Menou's arrival at Alexandria. On the 2oth
of March, however, Abercromby in a general order
warned the troops of the possibility of a night-attack ;
giving directions that they should sleep fully accoutred
in their appointed positions, and that the entire force
should be always under arms half an hour before
daylight.
On the 2oth it happened that Moore was Major-
general of the day, and consequently charged with the
duty of visiting the picquets during the night. The
first hours of darkness had passed quietly enough ; and
in going his rounds from right to left of the line he
had reached the left-hand picquet of the Guards, when,
March 2 1. at a little after five o'clock, he heard a dropping fire
from the picquets of the extreme left. He trotted
forward in that direction ; and Brigadier Stuart, whose
brigade formed the reserve far away in the rear, was
actually setting his battalions in motion towards it when
suddenly a sound of heavy firing was heard on the
extreme right. " This is the real attack," exclaimed
Moore, and striking spurs into his horse he galloped
instantly to the Roman Camp. There he found all
the picquets falling back. The light had not yet
broken, and the darkness was increased by the smoke
of guns and small arms. Shot and bullets were flying
in all directions ; and in front there was a confused
hubbub of drums beating the charge, and hoarse voices
shouting " Vive la France ! Vive la Republique ! "
but it was as yet impossible to discover what the
CH. xxvin HISTORY OF THE ARMY 835
enemy was actually doing. Nevertheless Moore's 1801.
battalions were already taking up their assigned March 21,
positions quietly and in order. Edward Paget was
manning the redoubt with his men of the Twenty-
eighth, throwing back two companies on his left to
guard against an attack from the rear. The Fifty-
eighth was lining the ruins in rear of the redoubt.
Brigadier Oakes had already brought up the left wing
of the Forty-second to the left of the redoubt, and
Moore at once sent his aide-de-camp to summon the
right wing also, and to bring the Twenty-third and
Fortieth to reinforce the Fifty -eighth in the ruins.
Moore's horse was shot under him in the redoubt
itself, and Paget, who was talking to him, was knocked
out of his saddle by a bullet in the neck. He fell,
crying out that he was killed, but presently recovered
and remounted his horse ; for it had been ordained
that he was yet to be Moore's right hand on the retreat
to Coruna. And so the two men waited, watching for
the moment when they should see clearly enough to
enable them to act.
They did not wait long. The French advance upon
the extreme left had been, as Moore had divined, a
feint. A small party on that side had successfully
surprised an advanced redan, capturing the gun and the
twenty men that were in it, but had been immediately
driven out by the fire from a fleche immediately in
rear of it, and had retired carrying off their prisoners
and wounded. Meanwhile Lanusse's division had
advanced upon the Roman camp in two columns,
Valentin's brigade following the sea-shore, and Silly's
moving straight upon the redoubt. Silly's leading
battalion carried the fleche in advance of the redoubt,
but was unable to pass the ditch of the redoubt itself
under the fire of the Twenty-eighth, and swerved to
its left. Meanwhile Valentin's brigade was attempting
to ascend the height from the sea, its right battalion
towards the north-western face of the redoubt, its left
battalion in the re-entrant angle between the redoubt
836 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1801. and the buildings. The former encountering a terrible
March 21. fi re of grape began to waver, and Lanusse, galloping to
its head to rally it, was presently struck down with
a mortal wound. This completed its discomfiture ;
and the left battalion also gave way, being unable to
stand against the cross-fire of the Twenty-eighth and
Fifty-eighth.
Meanwhile Rampon's division likewise came into
action, but his left brigade in the darkness moved
too far to its left, and thus, becoming entangled
with Silly's brigade about the salient angle of the
redoubt, interposed itself between its leading and rear
battalions. Rampon's right brigade meanwhile ad-
vanced towards the hollow between the Roman camp
and the central ridge, where its leading battalion
ascended the hill, apparently unnoticed in the tumult
and the darkness, and came up between the rear of the
redoubt and the ruins just as the right wing of the
Forty-second appeared in answer to Moore's summons.
Moore instantly ordered the Forty-second and some
of the Twenty-eighth to face about, and drove this
hapless battalion into the building, where the Twenty-
third and Fifty-eighth gave it such a welcome that
every man was killed, wounded, or taken. Without
delay Moore then re-formed the Forty-second and led
them back to the left flank of the redoubt, just in time
to meet Silly's rear battalion, which had extricated itself
and was now advancing. He instantly attacked and
repulsed it, receiving a wound in the leg in the course
of the fight ; and some of the Forty - second and
Twenty - eighth followed them for some distance in
pursuit. Whether for this or for some other reason,
Menou now ordered the first line of his cavalry to
charge. The horsemen, galloping impetuously past
the flank of the redoubt, quickly overthrew the rash
pursuers, but presently were floundering in all directions
among a number of holes, which the Twenty-eighth
had dug for shelter before the arrival of their tents.
The Highlanders rallied immediately, and the two
CH. xxvm HISTORY OF THE ARMY 837
gallant French regiments were driven back with very 1801.
heavy loss.
The light was now improving; and the various March 21
corps that encircled the redoubt made a second attack
upon it in front and both flanks, Silly's leading battalion
having apparently moved round to the northern face
in order to hearten the shattered remnants of Valentin's
brigade. These brave men fared no better than their
comrades. The British gunboats off the northern
coast now came into action with great gallantry ; and
the Fifty-eighth, holding their fire till their assailants
were within sixty yards of them, gave them a volley
which sent them staggering back. At about the same
time Rampon, having recalled what was left of his
division, 1 advanced against the front of the Guards'
brigade, but, being driven back by steady and
destructive volleys, changed his tactics and sought to
turn its left flank. This manoeuvre Ludlow met by
throwing back some companies of the Third Guards,
which for a time appear to have been very severely
engaged, until the Royals from Coote's brigade came
forward to take the pressure from them. Then, com-
pletely baffled and disheartened by failure and heavy
losses, Rampon drew oflF his division and gave up the
attack.
Meanwhile Menou had shot his last bolt. Undis-
mayed by the rout of his first line of cavalry, he now
ordered General Roize to lead his second line also to the
charge, while Reynier set a part of his division in motion
to support them. With a desperation that heightened
their natural gallantry, Roize's three regiments, barely
five hundred sabres, galloped furiously up the southern
slope of the Roman camp and towards the central ridge.
Some of the squadrons of their left broke through the
Highlanders on the flank of the redoubt and came in
upon its rear, where Moore had to gallop hard to keep
1 English accounts appear to indicate that a battalion or two of
Reynier's division took part in this attack, and I hardly see how the
Guards could otherwise have been so hardly pressed as they were.
838 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1801. clear of them. Abercromby, who also stood in this
March 2 1 . p art O f tne fielc^ was actually taken prisoner, but was
immediately delivered by a soldier of the Forty-second,
though not before he had received a severe contusion
in the breast. But, though broken and disordered as
a regiment, the Highlanders stood fast as individuals,
each man fighting desperately for himself. The
Twenty - eighth faced about and killed such of the
dragoons as were in rear of the redoubt ; and the mass
of horsemen mingled with the Highlanders then
surged along the side of the ruins, from which the
Fortieth poured upon them two volleys which crushed
them out of existence. Simultaneously the right-hand
squadrons of Roize's brigade dashed headlong into
the valley between the Roman camp and the central
ridge, where Stuart's Minorca Regiment, opening out
to let them pass, poured a shattering fire upon
them as they galloped by, and, intercepting them as
readily when they tried to return, practically destroyed
them.
This was the last effort of the French. Every one
of their attacks had been repulsed with heavy loss.
The divisions of Lanusse and Rampon were dispersed
among the sand-hills at the foot of the slope, some of
them keeping up a scattered fire ; some, whose ammuni-
tion was spent, engaging the Twenty-eighth with volleys
of stones, one of which killed a sergeant dead on the
spot. The Twenty-eighth returned these missiles with
.all possible vigour, for the ammunition both for the
muskets and the guns of the Reserve was completely
exhausted. This was the result of sending troops to
active service without land-transport. Reynier, how-
ever, though his division was still intact, thought it
hopeless to attempt to renew the engagement ; and
there was a long lull, during which the French, training
their guns at great elevation, poured in a heavy fire
which wrought some havoc on the British second line
in rear of the two ridges. Abercromby, meanwhile,
rode to a field-work at the north end of the central
CH. xxviii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 839
ridge from which he could see the whole field, and 1801.
there paced up and down amid a storm of cannon-shot, March 21,
complaining of the pain from the contusion on his
breast, but betraying neither by word, manner, nor
gesture that he had been struck by a bullet in his
thigh. At length fresh ammunition was brought up,
and the British guns again opened fire with great
effect upon the French on the plain ; but still Menou
hesitated to retire, until a couple of his ammunition-
waggons had been exploded by the British shells,
when, at about nine o'clock, he drew off his maltreated
army in good order and unpursued.
This was a hard and well - fought battle. The
numbers on both sides seem to have been as nearly as
may be equal, though it is impossible to arrive at any
certainty upon this point ; for General Reynier, whose
returns furnish the authority for the strength of the
French, was not a man of scrupulous veracity in details.
But in any case it was only a part of each army that
was engaged. On the French side Reynier's division
hardly came into action ; and on the British side the
brigades of Cavan, Doyle, Craddock, and (excepting
one battalion) of Coote took as little share in the
fight as Reynier's men. It is probable therefore that,
in the numbers actually engaged, the French had the
superiority, though the British on the other hand
enjoyed a decided advantage of position. Menou's plan
of attack was not without the merit of audacity and
even of a certain skill ; but considering that he staked
so much upon the capture of the Roman camp, which
he knew to be the key of the position, it is surprising
that he did not stake his all, and throw half of Reynier's
division in addition to those of Lanusse and Rampon
against the British right. It is, however, unlikely
even so that he would have succeeded. The darkness
enabled Lanusse to approach close to Moore's position
with very little loss, but the French infantry never
really obtained any footing upon it. The one battalion
that contrived to penetrate to the rear of the redoubt
VOL. iv R
840
HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1 80 1. was annihilated, and the remainder were beaten back
March 2 1 . with comparatively little difficulty.
Nor was the loss of Moore's regiments, the Forty-
second excepted, very heavy ; for Moore was careful to
keep them as far as possible under the shelter of the
redoubt and the ruins, with the result that the Twenty-
eighth escaped with only four officers and seventy men
killed and wounded, while the Twenty-third, Fifty-
eighth, and Fortieth had not fifty casualties between them.
But, on the other hand, the battalions that were exposed
to the attack of the French cavalry suffered terribly.
Among these the Forty-second stands pre-eminent for
a gallantry and steadfastness which would be difficult to
match in the history of any army. The battalion had
embarked about eight hundred strong. It lost eight
officers and one hundred and sixty-nine men in the
disembarkation of the 8th of March ; three officers and
thirteen men on the I3th ; and four officers and forty-
eight men killed, eight officers and two hundred and
fifty-three men wounded on the 2ist. And these
losses were not those of rout and demoralisation, but
of persistent and victorious fighting ; for the regiment
repulsed two attacks of infantry and, though broken by
two furious charges of Roize's cavalry, took a principal
part in the annihilation of those rash and daring horse-
men. John Stuart's Minorca Regiment, which was
chiefly concerned in the repulse of Roize's second
charge, lost thirteen officers and just over two hundred
men killed, wounded, and missing ; and the casualties
of the two remaining regiments of the foreign brigade
amounted to over one hundred and forty. In fact this
little band of Minorquins, Germans, French, and
Swiss, which Charles Stuart had taken over in the
worst possible condition, behaved themselves, thanks
to his training, most admirably. When such was the
spirit that animated even the poorest troops on the
British right, not even Napoleon's veterans of the
Army of Italy could have hoped for success. Even
the failure of ammunition found Moore undaunted and
CH. xxvui HISTORY OF THE ARMY 84 i
confident. " We were for an hour without a cartridge," 1 801.
he wrote ; " the enemy during this time were pounding March 21,
us with shot and shell and distant musketry. Our
artillery could not return a shot, and had their infantry
advanced again we must have repelled them with the
bayonet. Our fellows would have done it ; I never
saw men more determined to do their duty." *
Next to the Reserve the brigade of Guards, which
lay immediately to its left, endured a trial little less
severe. Few details or none are to be found respecting
Rampon's advance upon this part of the field, except
that the Third Guards were thrown back to meet an
attempt at a flanking attack, and that it cost them
nearly two hundred officers and men to repel it. The
Royals, who were detached from the right of Coote's
brigade to their assistance, lost over eighty officers and
men ; the Coldstream, who to a great extent were
covered by redans, lost more than sixty ; but the
havoc wrought among the Third Guards, who were
not cut up by cavalry like the Forty-second and
Minorquins, points to a very arduous struggle in
the centre as well as on the right. The casualties of
the remainder of Coote's brigade were about one
hundred, and of Cavan's brigade about seventy,
numbers which would be unworthy of comment but
for the fact that these battalions hardly fired a shot.
It should seem indeed that the hour of passive en-
durance, during which Abercromby's guns were silent
for want of ammunition, added some hundreds to the
list of British killed and disabled ; and it is impossible
to banish a suspicion that the brigadiers of the second
line took less care than Moore to keep their men
under shelter. But still more significant is it that the
French infantry, when broken up by their defeat, kept
up an incessant fire as skirmishers at long range, and
that the British made no attempt to silence them by
similar tactics. Hence the British casualties were
more numerous than they should have been, reaching
1 Diary of Sir "John Moore, ii. 16.
842 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1 80 1. a total of seventy-three officers and fourteen hundred
March 21. men k m e( } an( } wounded. 1
But the carnage among the British was as nothing
compared to that among the French, who actually left
on the field over one thousand dead and over six
hundred wounded, besides about two hundred un-
wounded prisoners. Allowing for the usual proportion
of wounded to dead, their loss can have fallen little
below four thousand men ; and it is therefore small
wonder that Reynier could not rally a man of Lanusse's
and Rampon's divisions upon his own to renew the
attack. The French prisoners, with whom was captured
a colour bearing the name (among others) of the Bridge
of Lodi, declared that their work in Italy had been
child* s play compared to the three actions of the 8th,
1 3th, and 2ist of March, and that they had never yet
known what it was to fight. Probably this was true ;
and, if Abercromby's troops in Egypt had been similar
to those which he took to the West Indies, they would
probably have succumbed to the veterans of Italy as
readily as the Austrians. But these battalions of 1801
were the new British Army, and their fire, as the
French now learned for the first time, was the most
deadly in the world. Nevertheless the enemy might
have suffered less had Menou withdrawn his men
before the ammunition of the British had been re-
plenished. But with a false pride he kept them still
within range, though all possibility of a successful
attack had vanished ; and his unfortunate soldiers
suffered cruelly in consequence when the British guns
reopened fire. This, as it seems to me, was his most
culpable blunder during the day, though it is possible
that all movements on his side were paralysed for a
time by the want of superior officers. Of Lanusse's
division Lanusse himself was killed, and of his two
brigadiers, Silly was very severely wounded ; in Ram-
pon's division both brigadiers, Eppler and d'Estin, were
1 10 officers, 233 men killed; 60 officers, 1193 men wounded;
3 officers, 29 men missing.
CH. xxvni HISTORY OF THE ARMY 843
wounded ; in Reynier's division Brigadier Baudot was 1801.
killed by a cannon shot ; in the cavalry brigade General March 21
Roize was killed and his second in command severely
wounded. The British generals suffered less, though
the tale of wounded included the name not only of the
unlucky Moore, who never came out of an action
unhurt, but of his brigadier, Oakes, of Lawson, who
commanded the Artillery, of John Hope the Adjutant-
general, and not least of the Commander-in-chief.
Half an hour before the French retired Abercromby
stopped short in his pacing to and fro within the
Guards' redan, and sank fainting to the ground.
Refusing to leave the field he was propped against the
parapet ; but at length, when Menou had fairly drawn
off his troops, he consented that his wound should be
examined by a surgeon of the Guards, who advised
that he should be carried on board ship without delay.
He was therefore lifted on to a litter, where Lieutenant
John Macdonald of the Queen's laid a folded blanket
under his head for a pillow. " What is that you are
placing under my head ? " asked Abercromby. " Only
a soldier's blanket," answered Macdonald. " Only a
soldier's blanket ! " retorted the other, " a soldier's
blanket is of great consequence, and you must send me
the name of the soldier to whom it belongs, that it
may be returned to him." This was the last order
ever given by Ralph Abercromby ; and it was
punctually obeyed. He was borne from the field
through the midst of his men, who greeted him with
cries of " God bless your honour," and with those rude
expressions of sympathy and attachment which to a
good officer are a reward more precious than Sovereign
or Parliament can bestow. He allowed his son, who
was on his staff, to accompany him to the beach, and
then dismissed him to attend to his duty under
Hutchinson, who now succeeded to the command.
For a few days sanguine hopes were cherished of his
recovery ; but the bullet, being embedded in the bone
of his thigh, could not be extracted. Symptoms of
844 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1 8 01. gangrene appeared on the 26th, and on the 28th of
March 28. March, without pain or suffering, he expired.
His body was carried to Malta, where its resting-
place is marked by a long Latin inscription. In Eng-
land a peerage and a pension were granted to his
widow ; a monument was erected to his memory in St.
Paul's Cathedral ; and in a General Order of the Duke
of York, his example was held up, in no unworthy
language, to the respect and the imitation of the
British Army. Yet it may be doubted whether by
any of these tributes full justice was done to the
character of this noble old soldier. Though delighting
to the end in Livy and Cicero, in Caesar and Tacitus,
and though familiar with all that was best in con-
temporary literature, Abercromby was essentially a
thinker rather than a reader. His opinions were based
rather on reflection than on study ; and the quality
admired above all others by the able men who served
under him was his sagacity. Politically he was a Liberal,
for he believed neither in war upon opinion nor in the
possibility of coercing a nation ; and for this reason he de-
clined to go upon active service to America. Moreover
though the aggression of the French Republic banished
his scruples as to taking up arms against France, he
had no faith in the policy of restoring the monarchy of
the Bourbons. Having, however, accepted service in
the field he laid all political considerations aside ; and
from that moment he resigned himself absolutely to
obey any orders that the Government might impose
upon him, without question and without complaint.
He was already fifty-nine years of age when he went
to Flanders in 1793 as a brigadier under the Duke
of York ; and, when he returned after the disastrous
retreat through Holland in 1795, he became the com-
mander to whom the Government resorted in all its
difficulties.
It was not that he stood alone and unapproached
in military or intellectual ability ; for Moira and
Charles Stuart were at least equal if not superior
CH. xxvin HISTORY OF THE ARMY 845
to him. It was not that Ministers set any great 1801
store by his counsel ; for his advice was sought only
for the execution, not for the choice, of enterprises,
and even then was invariably unheeded. It was
simply that, no matter what impossibilities Ministers
might require of him, no matter how distasteful
their projects to his feelings or how repugnant to his
judgment, he was always ready to take their orders
and to do his best. He did not lack the courage
to point out the fatuity of their plans, nor to protest
against them, undismayed even by positive rudeness
from Pitt ; but, when once the decision of the Cabinet
was taken, he accepted it with unswerving loyalty as
the will of the country, communicated through its
chosen rulers. Thenceforward it remained for him
only to wrest, if he could, from their folly both welfare
to the nation and credit to the Army. Hence, though
with deep inward disgust and misgiving, he led his
rabble of raw recruits to the Windward Islands and
Porto Rico, accepted the command in Ireland, threw
his unformed militia ashore at the Helder, devised a
serious plan for the ridiculous attack upon Cadiz, and
finally, in the face of risks which no General should
have been called upon to encounter, invaded Egypt
with an inferior force.
There is something very touching in the patient
submission of this wise, upright, and sagacious soldier
to a master so blind, ignorant, and disingenuous as
Dundas. The struggle was often difficult, for Aber-
cromby loved his men as well as his country, and
it must have gone to his heart to lead them again
and again to destruction and failure. The trial was
indeed too hard for high-spirited men like Moira and
Charles Stuart. Moira, who addressed himself almost
exclusively to Huskisson, revealed his feelings by
occasional irony, of which dry humour only sharpened
the sting. Stuart, hot-tempered, imperious, and
tingling with nervous energy, treated Dundas in
public correspondence with scarcely disguised con-
846 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1 80 1. tempt. It must be added also, to the eternal dis-
honour of Dundas, that he succeeded in exhausting
the patience even of Abercromby. The old General
never forgot how the Government had treated him in
Ireland ; he could not overlook its neglect of his
counsel respecting North Holland ; he was deeply
distressed over Stuart's resignation of the command in
the Mediterranean ; and the vague and haphazard
instructions for the expedition to Egypt were the last
straw that made his burden intolerable. Like a
desperate gambler Dundas had staked all the reputa-
tipn that remained to him upon the success of the
enterprise. Its failure would have meant his ruin ;
and he threw it upon the General to succeed, no
matter by what shift, and to save him.
The cowardice and unfairness of this proceeding
appear to have affected Abercromby deeply. In
previous expeditions he had pointed out negligence
and shortcomings in the matter of preparation with
plainness enough ; but in his last campaign there
runs through his letters an under -current of in-
dignation and even bitterness which occasionally
comes to the surface. He was as determined as
ever to do his best, but he thought ill of the whole
adventure, and was tormented by anxiety and appre-
hension to the end. Moore noticed that the General,
who was always inclined to expose himself overmuch
in action, never courted personal danger so persistently
as in Egypt ; and it is difficult to believe that death,
which followed so quickly upon his wound, was
unwelcome to him. He did not know that Menou's
blunders had crowned Dundas's last campaign with
unexpected success. He did not know that his own
last battle was really decisive, that it had irremediably
disheartened the French for further resistance, and
that his work was practically done. It was not given
to him to say like Wolfe, " Now God be praised, I
can die in peace," for to the very end he had no
certain intelligence of the numbers of the French
CH. xxvm HISTORY OF THE ARMY 847
except that they were superior. He could not reckon 1801
that the British would receive reinforcements, and that
Menou would not. He could form no plans that
were not haunted by visions of an army reduced to
impotence by plague, fatigue, and sickness, of a
difficult retreat, and of a humiliating re-embarkation.
He could find no comfort except in the cheerful
courage which had borne him through so many diffi-
culties, in the devotion which, not less through his care
and gentleness than through his bravery and his skill,
he had won from his soldiers, and above all in the
consciousness that he had done his best. The Duke
of York did right to hold him up as a pattern to the
Army. Ministers come and Ministers go ; politicians
of Dundas's type are always among us, and from time
to time still find their way to the War Office ; but
Ralph Abercromby stands forth as an example to
British Generals that by serving even a Dundas faith-
fully they may serve their country well.
CHAPTER XXIX
1801. THROUGHOUT the first months of 1801 Bonaparte had
pressed foward his diplomatic schemes with astonishing
Feb. 9. success. By the Treaty of Luneville Austria had
accepted the line of the Adige for her boundary in
Italy, and had guaranteed the independence of the
Cisalpine, Ligurian, Helvetian, and Batavian Republics.
In Germany France had gained the left bank of the
Rhine, and practical control of such interior redistribu-
tion as should be necessary. Naples abjectly accepted
peace on condition that she should evacuate the States
of the Church, close her ports to the British, and pay
for the maintenance, at Taranto, of a French corps
which was designed for the reinforcement of Egypt.
Spain signed a new treaty, whereby she engaged herself
to declare war upon Portugal, unless the Portuguese
Government should place territory in her hand in
pledge for the evacuation of Malta, Minorca, and
Trinidad by the British. The Armed Neutrality was
assembling its forces ; and the Tsar was, in addition,
preparing an expedition to march upon India by way
of Khiva and Herat. England was isolated in Europe ;
and even there Pitt, the protagonist so greatly dreaded
Feb. 10. by France, had resigned office on account or a differ-
ence with the King concerning the removal of the
disabilities of Catholics. His successor was William
Addington, Speaker of the House of Commons, who
possessed the sober mediocrity which qualifies men for
that office. All in fact was going prosperously for
Bonaparte when the luck suddenly changed. On the
8 4 8
CH. xxix HISTORY OF THE ARMY 849
2 ist of March Abercromby won his decisive action ; on 1801,
the 23rd the Tsar Paul was assassinated, and on the ist
of April Nelson's naval victory at Copenhagen dealt a
heavy blow at the Armed Neutrality. By the time, there-
fore, when the news of the third engagement at Aboukir
reached London, the British Government had every
encouragement to continue the struggle against France.
In Egypt, however, there presented itself an unfore-
seen difficulty. Hutchinson, who succeeded to the
command upon Abercromby's death, was little known
to the army, and outwardly had little to commend
himself to it. His features were harsh and jaundiced
by ill-health ; his eyesight was extremely defective, his
figure awkward and stooping, his dress slovenly, his
manners ungracious, and his temper violent. Withal
he was well read and well informed ; he had closely
studied his profession, and his bravery was unques-
tioned ; but the troops knew him only by his appear-
ance, which was by no means to their taste. During
the first days of his command he busied himself in
fortifying his position to great strength, so as to
blockade Alexandria with a part of his force and with
the rest to deal with the enemy's detachments in
detail ; and he did not fail at the same time to write to
Minorca for reinforcements. On the 25th, to his great March 25,
relief, the Capitan Pasha arrived with six ships of the
line, a few frigates, and some four thousand Turkish
troops, twelve hundred of which had been partly
trained and in appearance were agreeably superior to
the British expectations. Hutchinson therefore resolved
first to possess himself of Rosetta, and, by opening that
branch of the Nile to the British gunboats, to master
the navigation of the river. Accordingly on the 6th of
April Colonel Brent Spencer with the Queen's, the flank- April 6.
companies of the Fortieth, the Fifty -eighth and some
Turkish troops marched upon the town of Rosetta,
which the French evacuated upon his approach, leaving
three hundred men to hold Fort St. Julien at the mouth
of the Nile. Batteries were erected against this strong-
850 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1801. hold, which after three days* firing surrendered ; and
April 19. 1^3 {kg entrance to the Nile was secured.
April. 13. Meanwhile after much hesitation Hutchinson had
taken the momentous step of cutting through the dyke
of the Alexandra canal and admitting the sea to inun-
date Lake Mareotis, thereby isolating Alexandria more
completely than before and opening a communication
by water with the Arabs to westward. The measure
had been much dreaded by the French for many
reasons, and not least because it destroyed the regular
channel which carried fresh water to Alexandria ; but
there were still wells and cisterns in the city which
furnished a sufficient supply. The fortifications of his
position being now improved and its flanks secured by
the inundation, Hutchinson was able to detach in
succession ten more battalions to Spencer, who had
taken up a strong position at El Hamed, five or six
miles south of Rosetta. The reinforcement was
necessary, for a few miles up the stream, at El Aft,
was a force of about five thousand men under General
Lagrange, which had been gradually detached by
April 26. Menou from Alexandria. On the 26th Hutchinson
left Coote with six thousand men in the position before
Alexandria, and himself took personal command of the
troops which had been assembled at El Hamed. These
amounted to about five thousand British l besides the
Turks, whose indiscipline made them rather an encum-
brance than a help. It was Hutchinson's object if
possible to capture Rahmanieh, the main French posi-
tion about eight miles south of El Aft, for this was the
point from which both the road from Cairo and the canal
from the river branched off to Alexandria, and through
which the French carried on all their communication
between the Delta, Cairo, and Upper Egypt. He did
not doubt that Lagrange would fall back from El Aft
as soon as he himself moved forward, but he looked
with reason for a sharp action at Rahmanieh.
1 nth L.D., I2th L.D. ist, 2nd, 8th, i8th, 3oth, 4Oth, 58th,
79th, 89th, 9oth, Corsican Rangers.
CH. xxix HISTORY OF THE ARMY 851
After a week of further delay, due apparently to the 1801;
deficiency in land-transport for guns and ammunition,
the British moved forward from El Hamed on the 5th May 5.
of May, the main body being upon the western bank,
and about twelve hundred men (half of the Eighty-
ninth regiment and half irregulars) upon the eastern
bank. A flotilla of gunboats and transport-boats moved
up the river between these two divisions. The advance
was exceedingly slow ; but on the morning of the yth May 7.
it was discovered that the French had evacuated El
Aft, and on the morning of the 9th the British came May 9,
up to the enemy's position at Rahmanieh. A desul-
tory action followed, which lasted till nightfall, when
the French retired southward, after a very feeble resist-
ance, leaving a few prisoners behind them. Thus the
communication between the French forces at Alexandria
and at Cairo was severed ; and Hutchinson prepared to
march upon the capital. The day of the occupation of
Rahmanieh was one of good fortune on every side, for
it brought not only the first reinforcements from Malta
to Aboukir, 1 but the news of the advance of the main
Turkish army under the Grand Vizir over the eastern
desert, and a vague report of the arrival of the East
Indian contingent in the Red Sea.
No sooner, however, did Hutchinson announce to his
principal officers his intention to move straight upon Cairo
than they broke out into protests which were almost muti-
nous in their violence. They urged the risk to the troops
of a campaign during the hot season, the want of maga-
zines and hospitals, the prevalence of plague, the superior
force that must be encountered at Cairo, and the im-
possibility of besieging the citadel ; all of which was
little more than a cloak to disguise their personal dis-
like and distrust of the General. In their infatuation
these officers actually invited the concurrence of Coote
1 i/2yth and recovered invalids of other regiments, in all about
1 200 men. Bunbury (p. 124) says that they came from England,
but this is incorrect. Pigot to Fox, i6th April (enclosed in Fox to
Dundas of 22nd April) 1801.
852 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1801. and Moore in a plan to deprive Hutchinson of his
command, with the only result of calling down from
Moore, who was still at Rosetta disabled by his wound,
a rebuke so stern as effectually to silence them. This
conspiracy was the more wicked since it was precisely
such a cabal, headed by Reynier against Menou, that
was paralysing the energy of the French army.
This trouble being ended, Hutchinson summoned two
more battalions from Aboukir, and continued his advance
May 1 1 . up the river on the 1 1 th. On the 1 2 th arrived intelligence
that General Belliard was about to march from Cairo to
crush the Grand Vizir ; upon which Hutchinson sent
urgent messages to the latter not upon any account to
risk an engagement with the French, feeling assured
that his own movements would speedily compel them
to return to Cairo. At the same time came definite
but disheartening news that only one man-of-war and
two companies of infantry had yet arrived at Suez from
India. None the less Hutchinson pushed on, though
slowly, for the bar at Rosetta had fallen so low that
boats with provisions from the fleet could only with
the greatest difficulty pass over it. The hot wind also
blew fiercely from the sun-baked desert of the south,
choking the men, retarding the boats on the river, and
forbidding any but short marches. The French at
Cairo were nine thousand strong, or nearly half as
numerous again as the British ; but Hutchinson knew
that they were demoralised by internal divisions and by
Abercromby's victories, and was determined to pursue
his advantage.
May 14. On the I4th a large convoy of supplies and stores
was captured in the canal of Menouf, together with
May 17. its escort; and, on the lyth, a small party of one
hundred and fifty British dragoons, wide upon
Hutchinson's western flank, came upon a French
convoy with five hundred camels, which had been sent
out from Alexandria to collect supplies. The French
force numbered five hundred and seventy men com-
posed of cavalry, infantry, and a dromedary corps, with
CH.XXIX HISTORY OF THE ARMY 853
one gun ; and the nearest support to the British dragoons 1 801 .
was Doyle's brigade, which was still toiling over the Ma 7 l 7-
sand three miles away. With great readiness Major
Robert Wilson, of Hompesch's dragoons, galloped
forward waving a white handkerchief, and summoned
the French to surrender ; loudly offering the condition
that, on laying down their arms, they should be sent
back to France. Colonel Cavalier, who was in com-
mand of the convoy, indignantly refused ; but his
troops had caught the word France, and showed signs
of unsteadiness. Before Wilson could return to his
own men, a French aide-de-camp came galloping up to
recall him, when, after a short parley, the terms were
accepted. Cavalier's detachment marched to Hutchin-
son's headquarters and laid down its arms ; and thus
the number of French prisoners taken in various petty
affairs since the 2ist of March was raised to fifteen
hundred. Home -sickness had become irresistibly
strong in Bonaparte's veterans since their three defeats
on the peninsula of Aboukir.
On the same day came news which testified more
than ever to the demoralisation of the French. Despite
Hutchinson's recommendations, the Vizir had been
unable to restrain his army from advancing upon Cairo ;
and on the i6th its advanced guard encountered some May 16.
five or six thousand men under Belliard, about twenty
miles north of the city. The Turkish commander,
however, while declining to come to close action, man-
oeuvred his cavalry so skilfully against Belliard's flanks
and communications that, after a prolonged and desul-
tory skirmish, the French General retired to Cairo.
The true reason of his retreat was that Hutchinson
was preparing to cross the river and fall upon his rear,
but it was of course given out that the redoubtable
rench had been beaten by the Turks. 1 Thus Hutch-
inson's communications with the Grand Vizir were
assured ; and he now halted for several days at Algam,
>ome forty miles north of Cairo, to permit the two
1 Hutchinson to Hobart, 9th January 1802.
854 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1801. armies to form their junction, and to allow transport to
May. be collected for the Indian contingent. This last was
now reported to have arrived at Cosseir on the 1 4th ;
but further intelligence showed that the ships had been
dispersed, and that many of them were still missing.
At the same time there came from the Mediterranean
disquieting intelligence that Admiral Ganteaume's
squadron with a large force of troops was off the
African coast to westward of Alexandria, and that one
of his corvettes had actually entered the port. More-
over, ophthalmia, dysentery, and other diseases had
reduced Coote's force to four thousand men, while
Hutchinson himself had sent nearly a thousand invalids
down the Nile from his own column. The party of
mutiny and discontent again raised its head, and un-
fortunately Moore had not yet rejoined the army from
Rosetta to crush it.
The advance, however, was none the less resumed
June i. on the ist of June, and the junction of twelve hundred
Mamelukes on the 3rd supplied one of Hutchinson's
chief wants in the field a large and efficient body of
horsemen. The united force now moved southward
in three columns : the Turks on the left, the British
in the centre, and the Mamelukes, who loathed and
distrusted the Turks, wide on the right. In a few
days came the news that Ganteaume's squadron had
disappeared. The unfortunate Admiral had, in fact,
tried to execute a mad scheme of Bonaparte to land his
troops at Derna on the north coast of Africa, that they
might march thence over four hundred miles of desert
upon Alexandria ; but being frightened by the appearance
of strange sails in the offing he had returned to Toulon. 1
This was an immense relief to Hutchinson, who, on the
1 5th, sent a summons to General Belliard to capitulate.
1 Egypt by this time stank in the nostrils of the French soldier.
Hutchinson reported (letter to Hobart, i6th August 1801) that
even the Generals on board Ganteaume's squadron believed them-
selves to be bound to St. Domingo, otherwise it would have been
impossible to embark the troops.
CH. xxix HISTORY OF THE ARMY 855
The message was defiantly rejected; but on the 2ist 1801.
the British army came before Gizeh and the Turkish J uae 2I -
before the walls of Cairo, on both banks of the Nile,
and on the 22nd Belliard sent a flag of truce to open June 22.
negotiations. The parleying lasted for some days, but
on the 2 yth a convention was signed for the surrender June 27.
of all places occupied by the French in Egypt, and for
the shipping of the troops themselves, with their arms
and artillery, to France. The numbers of the French
in Cairo were nearly thirteen thousand, of which eight
thousand men were fit for duty ; whereas Hutchin-
son's British were, by this time, reduced to four thou-
sand. In ordinary circumstances any officer trained by
Bonaparte would have scattered the rabble of the Turks
first, and overwhelmed the British afterwards ; but now
the red coats came as deliverers, for only on their ships,
which commanded the sea, could the exiled French-
men return home. It was a curious comment upon
Bonaparte's dream of an Oriental empire.
Shortly afterwards Hutchinson and Craddock fell so
sick that the command of the army devolved upon
Moore, who, with Hope, had returned to the front on
the 29th of June. To Moore, therefore, fell the delicate June 29.
duty of escorting eight thousand French, besides their
arms, artillery, and ammunition, some two hundred
miles to Rosetta, with a division of undisciplined Turks,
a few hundred Mamelukes, and but thirty-five hundred
British ; but his arrangements were so skilful, and the
French so delighted at the prospect of returning to
France, that no difficulty of any kind occurred during
a fortnight's march. The whole body, French and
English, marched on the I5th of July, leaving five July 15.
hundred British soldiers to guard the sick French
officers, but otherwise making over the occupation of
Cairo wholly to the Turks. On the joth they reached July 50
Rosetta, and within another fortnight the French were
embarked and on their way to France.
There now remained to be driven from Egypt only
the four or five thousand men in Alexandria under
VOL. iv s
856 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1 80 1. Menou, who had rejected the capitulation accepted by
Belliard ; and their chance was the worse since large
reinforcements had recently reached Hutchinson from
various quarters. At Minorca General Fox had been
much embarrassed by Hutchinson's appeal for troops,
since nearly all of his battalions were enlisted from the
militia for service in Europe only a point which Dun-
das, with his usual carelessness, had overlooked in the
planning of the campaign. However, one and all ot
the regiments volunteered to serve in Egypt, whereby
Fox was enabled to spare not only the Ancient Irish
Fencibles, whose sphere of service was unlimited, but
also the two battalions of the Twentieth. In addition
to these there arrived from England, besides drafts,
the Twenty-fourth, Twenty-fifth, and Twenty-sixth,
and from different quarters the three foreign regiments
known as Watteville's, the Chasseurs Britanniques, and
Lowenstein's Rifle Corps. 1 Hereby the losses of the
campaign were nearly, if not quite, made good ; and
the only difficulty which remained was that of money,
the pay of the troops being five months in arrear.
Abercromby had begged for 250,000 in October 1 800 :
it was now July 1801, and no money had been sent,
nor even an answer to his letter. 2 The new adminis-
tration in England was evidently as ignorant as the old
of the nature of war.
Meanwhile the Indian contingent, after long delay,
also appeared upon the scene ; and it is now necessary
briefly to trace its fortunes. When Dundas's letter,
ordering the shipment of a force from India to Egypt,
arrived at Calcutta, Lord Wellesley had already pre-
1 Watteville's was composed of Swiss, who had enlisted from
the disbanded men of the old Swiss regiments in the French
service, and had served in British pay with the Austrian army.
The Chasseurs Britanniques were formed from the remains of the
Prince of Conde's Royalist army, which had at different times been
in the pay of England, Austria, and Russia. It was dissolved at
the peace of Luneville, and such individuals as cared to re-enlist
were embodied into this new corps.
2 Hutchinson to Hobart, zgth June 1801.
CH. xxix HISTORY OF THE ARMY 857
pared a force of four British battalions 1 and a few 1801.
native troops for the capture first of Java, and after- ^ cb - 6.
wards of Mauritius. In the former enterprise Major-
general David Baird was to hold the chief command,
with Arthur Wellesley for his second ; of the latter,
as a minor expedition, the supreme direction was to be
entrusted to Wellesley. This force was assembled at
Trincomalee, where Wellesley held temporary com-
mand of it ; and Baird was on the point of sailing to
join it from Calcutta, when the Governor - general
intimated to him the change in its destination, re-
appointing, however, both officers to their former posts
as chief and second in command. But the new in-
structions had already been communicated to Arthur
Wellesley also, who, taking note of the lateness of the
season, sailed at once with the troops to Bombay, with-
out waiting for his Commander-in-chief, in order that
provisions might be taken in and the transports de-
spatched to the Red Sea without further delay. Baird
followed him, but Wellesley would have started in
advance of his chief had he not been prevented by a
severe attack of fever. On the 3ist of March Baird March 31
arrived at Bombay ; the last of his troops sailed a day
or two later ; and he himself followed on the 6th of April 6.
April, leaving his second in command behind. Wel-
lesley was then recalled to his government of Mysore,
not unwillingly, for, though his illness was genuine,
and at the last moment his regret at not accompanying
the expedition was sincere, yet his reluctance to serve
as second to Baird was unquestionable. 2
Then came a long train of mishaps. On reaching
1 loth, 1 9th, Both Regiments, with detachments of the 86th
and 88th.
2 Wellington. Despatches, i. 287, 289, 299, 306, 309 ; Suppl.
Desp. 11. 324-6, 333, 345, 347-8. The nominal strength of the
force despatched was 31/0 Europeans (loth, I9th, 8oth, 86th,
detachment of 36th), besides which the 6ist was expected from
the Cape. The native troops were I battalion of Bengal and 2
battalions of Bombay Native Infantry. The Artillery num-
bered 230.
858 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1 80 1. Mocha on the 2fth of April, Baird learned that two
April 25. divisions of his army had left the place not many days
earlier, the one for Jeddah, the other for he knew not
whither ; whereas the rendezvous which he had fixed
April 28. upon was Cosseir. On the 28th the third division
of the army came in to Mocha ; and, after some days
spent in taking in water, the General sailed with it to
Jeddah on his way to Cosseir. On arriving at Jeddah
May 1 8. on the i8th of May, he found that the two advanced
divisions, not having received the orders which he had
endeavoured to convey to them, had proceeded up the
Gulf for Suez. Meanwhile Rear-admiral Blankett,
who had no concern v/ith the expedition, had arrived
at that port already with a detachment of the Eightieth
on board his flagship, thus inspiring Hutchinson with
false hopes that the Indian contingent would shortly be
able to co-operate with him. A few days later Sir
Home Popham came into Jeddah with two ships of
war, having sailed from the Cape with the Sixty-first,
some of the Eighth Light Dragoons, and a company
of field artillery in convoy. He reported that he had
called at Mocha, but had heard nothing there of the
fourth division of the army nor of the provision ships
which were expected from India. However, on the 26th
May 26. of May, Baird sailed with Popham for Cosseir, which
June 8. he reached on the 8th of June, and there found that two
divisions of troops had been waiting for him for six
weeks, and by the care of the Quartermaster-general,
Colonel John Murray, had already been provided with
Jun: 15. a certain number of camels. A week later Blankett
arrived, bearing a letter dated the I3th of May from
Hutchinson, to welcome him and to assure him that
he would not leave the vicinity of Cairo until the
Indian contingent had passed safely across the desert.
Learning from the Admiral that it was hopeless to
think at that season of sailing to Suez, Baird prepared
to conduct his column across one hundred long
miles of arid sand to the Nile at Keneh. Colonel
Murray went forward to Keneh itself to forward
CH. xxix HISTORY OF THE ARMY
859
supplies of water and provisions from thence to 1801.
different stations on the route ; and parties of Sepoys J une -
were employed from the side of Cosseir in searching
for springs and digging wells at different points. The
whole journey was thus cut up into seven stages, at
the first, third, and fifth of which water was to be
obtained, while the seventh ended at the Nile itself. 1
Baird's plan was to pass his army over the whole
distance in small divisions, of which the first, on reach-
ing Keneh, was to send back its camels and water-bags
to the fifth stage ; the second, on reaching the fifth
stage, was likewise to send its camels back to the third
stage ; and the third division, on reaching the third
stage, was to send back its camels to the first stage,
enabling the remaining divisions to come forward in
succession after the same principle.
The first division, consisting of the Eighty-eighth
under Lieutenant-colonel Beresford, later better known
as Marshal Beresford, marched accordingly on the 1 9th of
June, accompanied for the first stage by Baird himself.
The skins or mussucks containing the water, however,
almost emptied themselves from leakage, so that when the
first division reached the third stage, Baird was obliged
to forward to them the water and camels of the second
division. It seemed, indeed, as if the passage of the
desert must have been abandoned as impracticable, had
not additional water fortunately been found by digging
midway between the third and fourth stages ; but by
the 8th of July Baird had brought the Tenth, Eighty- Juiy 8.
eighth, and a few companies of Sepoys to Keneh, where
1 The stages from Cosseir were :
1. To the New Wells .
2. Half-way to Moilah
3. Moilah .
4. Advanced Wells
5. Half-way to Segeta
6. Baromba .
7. Keneh .
1 1 miles. Water.
17 miles. No water.
17 miles. Water and provisions,
9 miles. Water.
19 miles. No water.
18 miles. Water.
10 miles. The Nile.
101 miles.
860 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
iSoi.he halted to await orders from Hutchinson. For
J ul 7- several days he could obtain no news of him whatever,
and remained in painful doubt whether to advance or
to retreat ; but at length he learned through a circuit-
ous channel of the fall of Cairo, and later he received
a letter from Hutchinson himself. From this it
appears that nothing but the very vaguest information
had been furnished to the Commander-in-chief as to
the strength of the Indian contingent or the time and
place of its disembarkation, and that Abercromby had
never believed in its existence. However, Hutchinson
was now able to give Baird definite instructions to
move down to Gizeh ; and the latter therefore sum-
moned the rest of his force to join him from Cosseir.
Additional troops had arrived there since his departure,
raising the whole force disembarked from India to
six thousand men ; but several transports and store-
ships were yet wanting, and more than one vessel had
been lost or compelled to return owing to the perils
which, in those days of imperfect charts and surveys,
beset the navigation of the Red Sea. Ultimately the
whole force from Cosseir arrived at Keneh with the
loss of only three men. 1
Far more terrible was the march of the three com-
panies of the Eighty-sixth, which had been carried to
Suez on Admiral Blankett's flagship, over seventy
miles of desert to El Hanka. They started at six
June 6. o'clock in the evening of the 6th of June with an
allowance of three pints of water for each man, and
after traversing twenty-six miles, halted at seven
June 7. o'clock on the morning of the yth. But at ten o'clock,
the thermometer then standing at one hundred and
nine degrees, they were urged forward by the guides,
who declared that the camels would require water
if they rested longer in the sun. They resumed the
march accordingly, but the men began to fall down
fast ; and after three hours the officers, at the
Colonel's example, cut their baggage from the backs
1 Hook's Life of Sir David Baird, i. 289-386.
CH. xxix HISTORY OF THE ARMY 861
of the camels, and set the men upon them in its place. 1801.
An hour later the hot south wind began to blow ; the June 7.
temperature rose to one hundred and sixteen degrees ;
and at four o'clock in the afternoon the Colonel was
obliged to call a halt. The water-skins had been
cracked by the sun and the water had become thick,
but the officers divided their little stock of Madeira
with the men, and so refreshed them. At seven in
the evening the wind and extreme heat abated, and
the column pushed on, leaving behind it seventeen
men, who were unable to travel, with camels to carry
them. At eleven o'clock at night the detachment
again halted in pitchy darkness, and instantly every
officer and man dropped asleep from exhaustion. At
four o'clock in the morning of the 8th they fell into June 8.
their ranks, drenched with dew and benumbed with
cold, and struggled on. At two o'clock in the after-
noon the hot wind again blew fiercely, but the men
found it less trying than before, and between four and five
o'clock they reached the springs of El Hanka, having
traversed the seventy miles in less than forty-eight
hours. Not a man had tasted food since leaving Suez,
lest he should aggravate his thirst. In the course of
the next three hours the stragglers all came in, and
on the next day eight of the seventeen men who had June 9.
been left behind rode in on their camels, the remaining
nine having died. Such a feat of courage and endur-
ance is not unworthy of record. 1
Meanwhile, after the embarkation of Belliard's army,
Hutchinson assembled his whole force, about sixteen
thousand strong, at the old position occupied by Coote
on the peninsula of Aboukir ; and on the 1 5th of August Aug. 1 5.
he arrived there in person to direct the siege of Alex-
andria. Lake Mareotis having by this time assumed
the dimensions of an inland sea, the Guards', Ludlow's,
and Finch's Brigades, nearly five thousand strong, were
embarked under the command of Major-general Coote
on the evening of the 1 6th, so as to effect a landing to the Aug. 16.
1 Cannon's Records of the Eighty-sixth Foot.
862 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1 80 1 . west of Alexandria, and to invest the city from both sides. 1
Aug. 1 7. On the following morning a small detachment of the
enemy, which had been brought to the shore to hinder
a disembarkation, was held in check by a feint of
Finch's Brigade, while the remainder of the force
landed about seven miles to the westward of the city ;
Hutchinson favouring the whole movement by a false
attack from the east. Coote's first business was the
reduction of Fort Marabout, on an island off the
north shore over against his landing-place. With
great difficulty heavy guns were dragged up within
Aug. 2 1. range of the fort, which surrendered on the 2ist.
While this operation was going forward his main body
had advanced two miles nearer to Alexandria, and
within three thousand yards of a French detachment
which had been thrown out by Menou upon that side.
The enemy's force was well posted on advantageous
ground with batteries and gunboats upon each flank ;
but with the help of the cannon of the fleet on the sea,
Aug. 22. and of the gunboats on the lake, Coote drove the
French from this position with little difficulty or loss
on the 22nd, capturing seven of their guns.
Aug. 23. On the following day Hutchinson reinforced Coote
1 The force was on the 9th of August newly brigaded as
follows :
Guards' Brigade. Coldstream and Third Guards Major-
general Lord Cavan.
ist Brigade. 25th, 44th, i/27th, 2/2yth Major-general
Ludlow.
2nd Brigade. 24th, 26th, i/54th, 2/54th Major-general
Finch.
$rd Brigade. Stuart, de Roll, Dillon, Watte ville Brigadier-
general John Stuart.
^th Brigade. 8th, l8th, 79th, goth Brigadier-general Hope.
$th Brigade. 3Oth, 5Oth, 89th, 92nd Brigadier - general
Doyle.
6tb Brigade. ist, i/2Oth, 2/2Oth, Irish Fencibles Brigadier-
general Blake.
Reserve. 2nd, 23rd, 28th, 4Oth, 42nd, Grenadier Companies,
and 4 Light Companies, LOwenstein's Rifles, Chasseurs
Britanniques, Corsican Rangers Major-general Moore,
Brigadier-general Oakes.
CH.XXIX HISTORY OF THE ARMY 863
with Blake's Brigade, having decided to carry out his 1801.
principal attack upon Alexandria from that side. Menou,
indeed, while making his works on the eastern front
most formidable, had entirely neglected those on the west.
Accordingly, on the 25th, Coote opened fire from two Aug. 25.
batteries against an advanced redoubt of the French,
and on the same night drove back their picquets with
the loss of a hundred men, capturing a position suitable
for the erection of a second battery within close range.
On the 26th four batteries opened upon the enemy's Aug. 26.
entrenched camp on the eastern front, and on the
same evening Menou asked for a suspension of arms
with a view to capitulation. His first demands were
inadmissible, but on the 2nd of September an agree- Sept. 2.
ment was signed under which he and his men, like
the rest of the French army, were to be shipped
in English transports to the havens of France. Two
days earlier Baird arrived at Rosetta, having dragged Aug. 31.
his unfortunate troops through the desert and hurried
them down the valley of the Nile, only to arrive,
through no fault of his own, too late.
Thus the Egyptian campaign ended with brilliant
and unexpected success to the British arms, owing
principally to the incredible mismanagement of the
French Commander-in-chief. The numbers of the
French are variously stated, by themselves at twenty-
five thousand men, by moderate Englishmen at
twenty-seven thousand, by others at over thirty
thousand. Yet the whole of these were beaten in
detail by a force which never exceeded seventeen
thousand British, simply because Menou played the
Austrian and dispersed his force. Five thousand
men and a dozen more guns at Aboukir would have
prevented the disembarkation, and Menou could
perfectly well have spared ten or fifteen thousand.
Again, even after the British had landed, he could
still have met them with superior forces before
Alexandria and forced them to fight an action on
disadvantageous terms, which, whether won or lost,
86 4 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1 80 1. would probably have weakened the British army so
much as to compel them to re-embark. With such
divisions and quarrels as existed in the French army,
any General worth the name would have seen that a
serious reverse must be fatal, whereas an initial success
would banish all evil. The French, in spite of all
drawbacks and disadvantages, fought most gallantly
until after the 2ist of March. They were old and
skilful soldiers ; they had superiority in cavalry and
artillery ; and they might hope that a great victory
would hasten their release from the country which
they had learned to abominate. But when they found
that the British were not easily beaten, they would try
no more ; and hence the very discreditable capitulation
of Belliard's greatly superior force at Cairo.
The whole story is a bitter commentary upon
Bonaparte's original expedition, which cost France a
far greater price than is usually admitted. Apart from
the fleet destroyed by Nelson at the battle of the Nile,
several transports and small vessels of war were
captured on their way to Alexandria, and a final effort
of the joint squadrons of France and Spain to effect
the relief of the Egyptian army was defeated by Sir
James Saumarez on the I2th of July 1801 with the
loss of two Spanish ships blown up and one French
ship taken. Add to this the constant strain which the
bare thought of this unhappy force must have thrown
upon the naval and military administration of France,
the spasmodic and hazardous efforts to relieve it by
such abortive cruises as those of Ganteaume, and
finally the waste of French soldiers who fell, died, or
deserted in Egypt, and it is easy to see that Bona-
parte's venture, despite his triumphs over undisciplined
Mamelukes and Turks, was most disastrous to his
country. He was already projecting another as insane
expedition which shall be noticed in due time ; but
this of Egypt was a sufficient indication of the
gambling spirit which was to be his ruin.
Equally culpable with Bonaparte's proceedings in
CH. xxix HISTORY OF THE ARMY 865
Egypt were those of Henry Dundas. It may truly be 1801,
said that without the help of Menou even gallant old
Abercromby would have failed to save him. The more
the matter is examined, the more shameful appears the
careless neglect with which the two forces from the
Mediterranean and from India were hurried to Egypt.
The Minister had taken as little pains to ascertain the
strength of the French force as to instruct himself con-
cerning the navigation of the Red Sea ; and he had
actually set the armies in motion with a vague idea that
the one was to kindle insurrection in Upper Egypt and
the other to take Alexandria. Baird, after a most
dangerous and protracted voyage against the prevailing
winds, found himself at anchor in an insecure and un-
healthy port of the Red Sea, with orders to cross the
desert, but without a word of information as to what re-
sistance he was likely to meet with or what he was to do
when he reached the Nile. An able man in Menou's
place would have forced the armies both from India
and from the Mediterranean to retire with precipitation
and possibly with disaster ; and indeed but for Hut-
chinson's bold advance to Cairo, a small detachment
might well have destroyed the fragments of Baird's
army in succession as fast as they reached Keneh. The
nerve shown by both of these commanders in their
extremely difficult situations does high honour to them
both ; but their success was due to themselves and not
in any sense to the Secretary of State for War. Dundas,
true to his nature, ordered the troops upon an errand
which, according to all human calculation, should have
ended certainly in failure and possibly in disgrace. Let
not, therefore, the Egyptian expedition be taken as in
the slightest degree atoning for his previous faults, for
it was dictated by precisely the same ignorance, folly,
and presumption as had inspired all his previous enter-
prises. Its success probably saved him at the time
from impeachment, but cannot redeem him now from
condemnation.
Though the terms granted to Menou's army were
866 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1 80 1. practically the same as those conceded twenty months
before to Kleber at El Arish, yet the effect of the
victorious campaign was great in Europe, still greater
in England, and greatest of all in the British Army.
The three actions at Aboukir had proved that in fair
fight British soldiers could still beat even French
veterans of the army of Italy. Unfortunately the new
Ministry had not the wisdom nor the courage to take
due advantage of this revival of strength and hope.
Hawkesbury, Addington's Foreign Secretary, made
secret overtures for peace to Bonaparte in March,
before anything had been heard of the success or
failure of the Egyptian expedition, and before time
had been allowed for the execution of the measures
prepared against the Armed Neutrality. Within a
fortnight the whole situation was changed. The action
of the 2 ist of March decided the fate of Egypt ; be-
tween the 22nd and the 29th General Trigge, with a
small force from Antigua, captured with little trouble
or loss the Danish and Swedish Islands of St. Bartholo-
mew, St. Martin, St. John, St. Thomas, and St. Croix,
in the West Indies ; J and on the ist of April Nelson
won the battle of Copenhagen. A little less precipita-
tion it would be juster to say a little more common
sense would have saved the Cabinet from betraying
to Bonaparte its want of confidence in itself and in its
armed forces ; but there can be little doubt that in
thus grasping eagerly at peace it felt assured of the
support of Pitt. The late Prime Minister was ex-
tremely alarmed at the financial condition of the
country. Though beyond doubt of great ability in
fiscal matters, he had not, strangely enough, grasped
the fact that a loan of a hundred pounds at three per
cent, floated at seventy-five, was practically an incon-
vertible loan raised at four and a half per cent. A
man who had raised scores of millions upon such terms
and had squandered them upon useless allies and foolish
1 The troops engaged were i/ist, Buffs, I ith, 64th, and the 2nd
and 8th W.I.R.
CH. xxix HISTORY OF THE ARMY 867
and unprofitable expeditions, might well have felt mis- 1801
givings. Flattering adorers might call him the pilot
who weathered the storm, but the title cannot abolish
the fact that war was to him an unknown sea, and that
he was too arrogant to take counsel of those that
had learned to navigate it.
Bonaparte of course preyed upon the fears of Ad-
dington's ministry by ostentatious preparations for an
invasion of Britain from Boulogne and other ports
upon the French coast. These were but a feint, 1 but
they sufficed to cause anxiety at the Admiralty and in
the country at large. The Ministry, however, threw
the whole burden of defence upon the Navy, and with
a hardihood which is still the astonishment of French
officers, 2 stripped the three kingdoms of almost every
trained man in order to pursue their success in Egypt.
Had Bonaparte converted his feint into a real attack
with no more than fifty thousand or, in Ireland, even
twenty thousand men, he could hardly have failed of
success. " God send that we may have no occasion to
decide the matter on shore," wrote Cornwallis, who at
this time held the Eastern command, " where I have
too much reason to apprehend that the contest must
terminate in the disgrace of the General and the de-
struction of the country." 3 Events, however, proved
that the Ministers were justified in their action ; and
though probably they were prompted less by real
audacity than by a blind reliance on Volunteers, which,
for the most part existed only on paper, they are
entitled to praise for their spirit and courage. Strangely
enough the French Admiral Latouche Treville was far
more ardent for an attempt upon England, particularly
after the failure of Nelson's attack upon the flotilla at
Boulogne, than Bonaparte himself. The man who
1 Conclusive evidence of this appears in Projets et Tentative* de
Debar quement aux lies Britanniques (published by the Historical
Section of the French General Staff), ii. 291-418, and in particular
pp. 295, 302, 305, 314, 321.
2 Projets et Tentative;, ii. 400.
3 Cornwall:! Corres. iii. 381.
868 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
1801. really shrank from the struggle was the dreaded First
Consul.
In truth matters had not gone well for Bonaparte in
1 80 1, and in great measure through his own fault.
By too overbearing a tone he alienated the new Tsar
Alexander, and the British Government did not neglect
the opportunity of seeking reconciliation with Russia.
Alexander's renunciation of the Grand Mastership of
the Knights of Malta made the way easy ; and in July
England and Russia concluded a treaty which put an
end to all differences between them as to the maritime
rights of neutral powers. In the Iberian Peninsula
also Bonaparte's design had failed. Pursuant to treaty,
the Spanish army, with an auxiliary force of French
May. troops, invaded Portugal in May, and by the end of
the month was in possession of the province of Alem-
tejo. The First Consul counted greatly upon this
stroke to compel the British Government to renounce
all of England's conquests ; but it proved to be a mere
flourish in the air. Portugal agreed to purchase the
evacuation of her -territory by engaging to close her
ports to British vessels, to cede Olivenza to Spain, and
to pay an indemnity to France. The King of Spain,
anxious to remove French troops as soon as possible
from Spanish soil, ratified the treaty at once ; and
Lucien Bonaparte likewise accepted it on his brother's
behalf. Napoleon, furious with rage, talked loudly of
a fresh invasion of Portugal ; and, since negotiations
June, for peace had been reopened, he instructed his emissary
to make exorbitant demands upon England. But the
moment for bluster was past, for every week brought
news of further successes of the British on the Nile ;
and it was very evident that, in the game of diplomacy,
Egypt was a card which would shortly pass from Bona-
parte's to Hawkesbury's hand. Finally, the news of
the fall of Alexandria caused the First Consul to hasten
the presentation of his final terms before the news
should reach England ; and the preliminaries of peace,
drawn up on the assumption that Menou still held his
CH. xxix HISTORY OF THE ARMY 869
own, were signed in London on the ist of October. 1801
On the very next day arrived Hutchinson's despatch Oc t-
reporting the total expulsion of the French from
Egypt.
It is really impossible to imagine why the Ministry
should have been so hasty in concluding this treaty.
In July they had prematurely reckoned that Egypt
was actually theirs ; and in August Hutchinson had
written that the fall of Alexandria was certain and its
garrison in the worst possible condition. 1 Yet, without
waiting to hear again from him, they set their hands to
these preliminaries, and actually congratulated them-
selves that all should have been settled before the fate
of Egypt was known. They yielded all of England's
conquests except Trinidad and Ceylon, and evacuated
Porto Ferrajo in the island of Elba, where a British
officer, Colonel Airey, with a small body of foreign
troops had for five months defied all the strength of
France. In return they obtained the integrity of
Portugal, Naples, and the Ottoman Empire, leaving
France in actual or disguised possession of Holland,
Switzerland, the left bank of the Rhine, and Northern
Italy.
In such a peace wise and far-seeing men, like
Grenville and Windham, could see nothing but the
prospect of military establishments maintained per-
petually upon a footing for war without the satisfaction
of hostilities. The enormous preponderance of power
gained by France could not but be a perpetual menace,
and for this reason they wished to fight on until some
better terms could be won. Beyond all doubt they
were right. England was indeed weary of the war,
but France was wearier still, and Napoleon had pledged
himself to give her peace and honourable peace. More-
over, despite the enormous increase of her debt, the
military and economic condition of England had im-
proved since 1793, whereas there had yet been no time
1 Hobart to Hutchinson, 22nd July ; Hutchinson to Hobart,
1 6th and 191)1 August 1801.
870
HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOKXII
1 80 1. to restore financial equilibrium in France. But the
Ministers, for the sake of a little cheap popularity,
chose to try the experiment whether the French nation
would be content, on obtaining peace, to devote itself
to internal improvement. They forgot that they had
to do not with the nation but with Bonaparte, who had
already a score of schemes of ambition and aggrandise-
ment seething in his brain, and who never allowed
even the most solemn engagements to interfere with
his good pleasure. Moreover, with touching simplicity
they left several most important positions unsettled in
the preliminary treaty, and then, with singular infelicity
of choice, selected Cornwallis as their diplomatic agent
to conduct the final negotiations. He was hopelessly
outwitted by Napoleon Bonaparte and his brother
Joseph ; and, long before his business was concluded,
the Government realised that its experiment was already
a failure. The peace of Amiens was signed on the 25th
of March 1802, but it would be of no profit to specify
its conditions. It was no more than a suspension of
arms ; and on the next occasion when England was to
conclude a treaty with France it was to be on terms of
her own dictation.
AUTHORITIES. For the Egyptian campaign the printed author-
ities are numerous and good Walsh's Campaign in Egypt, Wilson's
Expedition to Egypt, Anderson's Journal of the Forces under Sir Ralph
Abercromby, Bunbury's Great War with France, Life of Sir Ralph
Abercromby, Diary of Sir John Moore, Narrative of a Private Soldier
in the Ninety-second Foot, Reynier's State of Egypt after the Battle
of Heliopolis. The French official account, edited by M. de
Jonquiere, has not yet reached the period of the British invasion of
Egypt. The official despatches are in W.Q. Orig. Carres., 190-196.
CHAPTER XXX
IT now remains for me to review, according to the
practice pursued throughout this work, the changes
and improvements in administration, training, and
equipment, which were introduced into the Army
during the first period of the war of the French Re-
volution. It has already been necessary for the right
understanding of the narrative to dwell at some length
upon many of them ; but it will, I think, be both con-
venient and instructive briefly to recapitulate every one
of them in order, and to weave them, together with
new matter, into a single coherent summary. For
this decade of 1793 to 1803 was more fruitful in
reform than any equal term of years in the history of
the Army.
In the highest branches of administration the most
important changes were the appointment of a Secretary
of State for War, the reconstitution of the Commander-
in-chief's office, and the abolition of the Irish Estab-
lishment upon the union of the three Kingdoms in
1800. To each of these three matters a few words
must be devoted in succession.
At the opening of the war the arrangements at the
War Office and Horse Guards were much the same as
they had been in 1756. There was no Commander-in-
chief, and Lord Amherst was appointed to perform
the duties of that post with the title of General on the
Staff. But Pitt, instead of allowing Grenville to direct
the campaign in Flanders, and Dundas to control the
operations in the West Indies, according to precedent,
VOL. iv 871 T
872 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOKXII
threw the conduct of the war in every quarter into the
hands of a single Minister ; and set the seal upon this
novelty in 1794 by making this Minister Secretary of
State for War. In principle the measure was right
and sound, and should be remembered to Pitt's
honour. In 1798 the administration of the Colonies
was added to this office, and from that time for more
than fifty years the Minister who held it was known
as the Secretary for War and Colonies. Nor was
the blending of the two departments at the time
either unwise or unreasonable. Our Colonies at the
time were reduced practically to the West Indies only,
many of them recently conquered from the enemy, and
all of them, with one or two exceptions, recently the
scene of active military operations. To place Army and
Colonies under a single head was therefore in principle
wise, and in practice a means of easing much friction
in the Cabinet.
The creation of a Secretary of State for War did
not in theory affect the position of that rather mysterious
functionary the Secretary at War. Sir George Yonge,
who occupied the latter post in 1793, was not a man
who was likely greatly to trouble himself with administra-
tive niceties. He went Governor to the Cape in 1799,
and was recalled in 1801 for having granted to certain
men of ascertained bad character the monopoly of
supplying meat to the garrison, contrary to the Com-
missary -general's advice, and for having shared in
their profits himself. 1 It may therefore be assumed
that he was content to limit himself at the War Office
to such duties as afforded opportunity for jobbery and
pilfering, without aspiration to any higher sphere of
usefulness. But the case was very different with his
successor, William Windham, a man of original ideas
and very great ability. He stood, between the new
Secretary of State on the one side and the new Com-
mander-in-chief on the other, nominally charged with
1 R.O. Col. Corres., Cape of Good Hope, Hobart to Gen. Dundas,
2nd May 1801.
CH. xxx HISTORY OF THE ARMY 873
financial responsibility for the expenditure of both, and
yet vested with little or no control over the actions of
either. His predecessors in years of peace had been
practically commanders -in -chief ; he found himself
theoretically reduced to the status of a financial clerk.
Moreover, since there was a Parliamentary Under-
secretary of State for War, there was encroachment
even upon these humble functions. In fact he was a
superfluity, though by no means inclined to consider
himself as such ; and in consequence the archives of the
War Office at this period reveal some curious features,
well worthy of notice, in our military administration.
After the junction of the Duke of Portland's follow-
ing with Pitt in 1794, the ministry was of course
formed out of a coalition, a name which is synonymous
in our history with weak government. Windham
represented Portland's party in the military councils of
the nation ; Dundas represented Pitt's ; and Huskisson,
the Under-Secretary of State, appears to have been the
mouthpiece of all parties, not excluding the Opposition.
Windham, as has been seen, was a very warm advocate
for making the French Royalists in general, and those
upon the Atlantic coast in particular, the centre of the
British attack upon the Revolution ; or, in other words,
he would fain from the first have turned Brittany and
La Vendee into the principal spheres of operations
against France. Herein, no doubt, he showed sagacity
and wisdom. Dundas, on the contrary, while quite
ready to ally himself with the worthless self-seekers
who dishonoured the name of Royalist in the West
Indies, shrank from giving to the Vendean chiefs the
whole-hearted support which would have carried them
to Paris. But Windham, with all the influence of
Portland at his back, was not lightly to be ignored ;
wherefore Dundas, in order to silence his importunity,
dealt him out occasional doles of men and money, which
were sufficient to encourage Charette and his brave
companions to commit themselves irrevocably, but in-
adequate to afford them the support which would have
874 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOKXII
ensured their success. No Englishman can recall with-
out shame the fate of these gallant Frenchmen, the only
band of united Royalists who fought for their cause with
unselfish devotion ; but the secret of the tragedy lies in
the inherent vices of a coalition-ministry. Dundas was
unwilling heartily to help them ; Windham was as
unwilling to desert them ; and Pitt fell back upon a
compromise which ruined them completely, and very
seriously injured his own country. His position was
undoubtedly difficult, and yet a way was to be found
for escape from it. A council of skilled military men,
judging the question upon purely military grounds,
could have decided it aright ; and where political
opinions were evenly balanced upon a matter of military
policy, it would have been reasonable to have allowed
the weight of the sword to turn the scale. But un-
fortunately this was the very last thing that would ever
have occurred to Pitt.
The position of Huskisson appears to have been
even stranger than Windham's. Officers like Charles
Grey, who had quarrelled with Dundas, or like Moira,
who would have nothing to do with him, addressed
Huskisson with perfect freedom and confidence, and
used him as the instrument for impressing their views
upon Dundas, and so upon the Cabinet. The expedi-
tion for the destruction of the sluices at Ostend was
managed from beginning to end by Huskisson, just as
the disastrous embarkation of the Royalists at Quiberon
was wholly the work of Windham. Home Popham
contrived to gain Charles Grey to the raid upon Ostend ;
Grey in turn (mistakenly, as I think) commended it to
Huskisson ; and thereupon the matter was set in train,
despite the strenuous opposition of the Admiralty. In
fact Dundas's "turn for facilitating business," which
Pitt so greatly admired, appears to have consisted in
allowing eager subordinates to carry out their own
designs from time to time, upon condition that they
should leave him free in turn to pursue his own devices.
Thus it came about that there were three several civilians
CH. xxx HISTORY OF THE ARMY 875
at the War Office, nominally working together to pro-
mote a common military policy, yet each at the same
time contending for particular attention to some ex-
traneous operation which exclusively interested himself.
Practically, therefore, there were three Ministers of
War, instead of one, and there would have been a
fourth but for Grenville's firm refusal to be saddled
with the military direction of the Royalists in France,
which Dundas endeavoured by stealth to foist upon
him.
It may be urged that this lamentable state of things
arose accidentally, from the peculiar circumstances of the
time and the peculiar characters of the men concerned,
and from no inherent defect in administrative principle.
There is some truth in this ; and yet it must be recorded
that the appointment of the first Secretary of State for
War was a great administrative failure. There was not
the unity of command which Pitt had a right to expect
from the creation of the office ; and the chief reason
was that the true functions of the new Minister had
never been properly considered. Pitt doubtless counted
upon Dundas for the efficient organisation of the new
department, and the fact is a grave reproach to his
judgment of men ; but it is probable that he was quite
unconscious, when the warrant was drafted for the third
Secretary of State, that he was initiating a new departure
in administration. Had Dundas been as capable as
Pitt conceived him to be, he could have established
new traditions for the conduct of war which would have
earned for him the enduring gratitude of posterity. He
missed a great opportunity, and it must be confessed
that Pitt missed it also. A man so deeply versed in
the history of English parties must have known that
the admission of Windham to the War Office would
raise up a rival to Dundas. He might have guessed
that, by attaching to his confidant a council of military
advisers and thus arming him with the weapon of
expert military opinion, he would have enabled him to
bear down all opposition. But he did nothing of the
876 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOKXII
kind ; and the result was that Windham and Huskisson
could claim, with perfectly good reason, that they were
as well qualified to direct military operations as Dundas
himself.
Thus Pitt gave full play to all the defects of a
coalition-ministry, an evil against which a great states-
man would have been upon his guard. It is only
natural that the conduct of our great wars should
commonly fall upon coalitions. In times of great
national peril the spirit of patriotism leads men to sink
minor differences and to league themselves with former
political opponents for their country's sake ; yet, owing
to the peculiar properties of government by party, this
apparent unity gives no corresponding increase of
strength. It is written in our history beyond all denial
that in the absence of a strong and efficient Opposition
the ablest ministry must rapidly deteriorate, and that a
weak and insignificant opposition declines rapidly into
disreputability, and even into sedition. And thus is
reached the paradoxical but distressing conclusion that
the efficiency of the Government varies inversely as
the unanimity of the nation. The absolute exclusion
of military men from the councils of the Ministry
intensified these evils under the rule of Pitt ; and
hence it was not even a well-ordered but a distracted
imbecility which governed the conduct of the war in all
its branches.
The new Commander-in-chief, 1 on the other hand,
proved himself to be far more capable in the organisa-
tion of his department. The scope of his duties was
totally undefined ; and with invasions impending and
practically no real army in existence, the Duke of York
naturally imagined at first that the complete and absolute
control over every part of the military service was vested
1 The Duke of York was appointed Field-Marshal on the Staff,
loth February 1795 ; Commander-in-chief in Great Britain, 3rd
April 1798 ; Captain-general of the forces in Great Britain and
all forces employed in the Continent of Europe, 4th September
1799; Commander-in-chief of the forces in Great Britain and
Ireland, 9th June 1801.
CH. xxx HISTORY OF THE ARMY 877
in him. This not unreasonably was resented by the
Secretary at War, who by statute of 1783 was responsible
to Parliament for all military expenditure. The exist-
ence of this statute was unfortunate, since it closed the
way to an important reform. It is too generally
forgotten that commanders, whether of detachments or
large armies in the field, are charged as much with
administrative as purely military functions, and are
answerable for the expenditure of considerable it may
be enormous sums of money. To master the difficult
duties thus thrust upon them in time of war, they re-
quire training in time of peace ; and no training can be
better than to entrust them with the outlay of the
funds voted for their departments at all times. A strict
audit should of course be enforced, and every security
provided for the protection of the civil Minister, who
under the Constitution is responsible to Parliament for
the moneys allocated to the military service at large. But
the essential thing is that officers should be familiarised
with the handling of large sums and with the expenditure
of the same to the best advantage, that they may the
better be able to fulfil those duties when on active
service. Fraud and misconduct are perhaps even less
to be apprehended from military than from civil officers,
since the former are amenable not only to civil penalties
but to the summary process of military law. Sir George
Yonge, convicted as Governor of the Cape of a con-
spiracy to swindle the King's troops, escaped with a
recall and the loss of his appointment. An officer
guilty of the same crime would have been liable to
trial by court-martial and to dismissal from the service,
with public record of his disgrace in the Gazette.
But though the Duke failed to obtain the control
over expenditure which he had desired, the importance
of the Secretary at War began none the less to dwindle
from the day of his appointment as Commander-in-chief.
Later on, as shall be told in a future volume, the Duke
was anxious that his Military Secretary should have a
seat in the House of Commons to assist the civilian
878 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOKXII
Secretary in the exposition of military matters ; but
before 1802 there was apparently no thought of this.
It remained for him therefore only to confine the powers
of the Secretary at War within due limits, which was
not finally accomplished until 1799, when it was laid
down that all correspondence relating to discipline and
military regulations should pass through the Adjutant-
general, all concerning quarters and marches through
the Quartermaster-general, and purely financial matters
only through the Secretary at War. The mere re-
modelling of the administration upon the principle that
military authority should be supreme in military affairs
sufficed to extend the Duke's powers enormously ; and it
was high time, for discipline had fallen utterly to decay
owing to the encroachments of the civil head of the War
Office upon the province of the Commander-in-chief.
Before 1795 tne Adjutant -general's correspond-
ence had been confined to the discipline of the
army in Great Britain and of the forces in the field.
That officer now became the centre of information
and authority upon all matters affecting numbers and
efficiency. The Duke initiated a system of returns,
as also of confidential reports concerning every officer
in the service, all of which came up to the Adjutant-
general and gave him the power that springs from
knowledge. More significant still was the appoint-
ment of a Military Secretary as the channel of com-
munication between all ranks of the army and the
Commander-in-chief. This was an absolute novelty in
the service and exceedingly valuable, since, by removing
all shadow of excuse for correspondence between officers
and the Secretary at War, it put an end to the inter-
ference of politicians and other civilians with matters of
discipline. By appropriating also to his office all pro-
motions and all appointments excepting the very highest,
which necessarily remained in the hands of the Cabinet,
the Duke drew the army still closer to its military head ;
and by establishing a regular chain of communication
downwards from the Commander-in-chief through
CH. xxx HISTORY OF THE ARMY 879
Generals commanding districts and Colonels command-
ing regiments, he preserved his touch with all ranks
of the army, and held them from highest to lowest in
subordination.
Nevertheless, his powers continued to be in many
respects greatly circumscribed. In the first place,
neither he nor his staff were consulted upon any
military enterprise that was under consideration of
the Cabinet. He was simply asked whether he could
furnish so many men at such a time, to fulfil the plans
of the Ministry ; and with his aye or no his part in
the matter was ended. In other words, his functions
were purely executive. So far as regarded the actual
operations of war, the Cabinet was right in making
them so, for no one man could have found time at
once to plan campaigns and to train an army. The
real blemish was that Ministers assigned to them-
selves no military advisers, in thorough co-operation
and sympathy with the Commander-in-chief, to guide
them in the conduct of war. Nor does it appear that
his advice was sought or taken upon the disposal of the
troops at home, otherwise the army that returned from
the Helder might have been kept together for exercise
and instruction, as Abercromby had recommended.
One probable reason for this was that the Government
possessed no police except the armed forces of the
Crown, and, mistaught by long tradition, thought it
more important to disperse them as constables than to
concentrate them as soldiers. In such matters the
Commander-in-chief was absolutely powerless, for he
could not legally order a corporal's guard to march
from London to Windsor without a route from
the Secretary at War. Abroad, the transfer of troops
from country to country appears to have lain in the
province of the Secretary of State for War, who gave
general orders for the purpose but left all further
detail to the direction of the Commander-in-chief. In
fact the limits in the jurisdiction of the various
functionaries who aspired to command the army were
88o HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOKXII
often exceedingly obscure, the Secretary for War, as
has been already told, frequently competing in a most
bewildering fashion with the Secretary for the Colonies,
until the two offices were amalgamated. However, the
absolute removal from the civilians of all authority
concerning promotion and discipline was a gain of
unspeakable value ; and it shall presently be seen that
the Duke's reforms in the Army at large bore worthy
comparison with those effected at the Horse Guards.
Less satisfactory at this period was the condition of
the Board of Ordnance, though Cornwallis became
Master-general at about the same time when the
Duke of York became Commander-in-chief. What
was amiss in the office it is not quite easy to say ; but
it is certain that it was in constant disrepute for
dilatoriness and inefficiency, and that the Regiment of
Artillery was never in so bad a state as between 1783
and 1803. Moore in Egypt declared that it had
failed both there and at the Helder from want of
intelligence and military spirit in the officers. " There
is certainly something wrong about our artillery," he
wrote ; " it was formerly our best corps, it is now far
from it." Adding to this testimony the Duke of
York's complaints of his waggons and harness in 1793,
the delay in providing the siege-train for Dunkirk, the
detention of Abercromby's expedition in 1795, * ne
rotten gun-carriages furnished to Stuart for Minorca in
1798, and the miserable character of the ammunition-
waggons despatched to the Helder in 1799, I am forced
to the conclusion not only that the Ordnance was in a
thoroughly unsatisfactory state, but that Cornwallis
did nothing to improve it. It may well be that the
multiplicity of duties thrust upon him allowed him no
time to attend to his duties as Master-general ; but in
this case he should have been careful to enjoin the
greater zeal upon his subordinates. The truth seems
to be that there was considerable friction between the
Ordnance and the War Office ; and Cornwallis wrote
so sneeringly of the Duke of York's appointment as
CH.XXX HISTORY OF THE ARMY 881
Commander-in-chief that, quite possibly, he sympathised
unconsciously with his own department in thwarting
the Duke's attempts at reform.
Be that as it may, it is certain that the Ordnance
Office showed itself so disobliging to the War Office
and Horse Guards in the matter of providing detach-
ments of Military Artificers for active service, that the
Duke formed a corps of the same kind, called the Staff
Corps, which should stand on the same footing as the
cavalry and infantry towards the Commander-in-chief.
Beginning with an establishment of one company of
Pioneers, this Staff Corps was in 1800 augmented to
five companies, which did useful service under
Abercromby in Egypt ; but this does not disguise the
fact that it was set up by the War Office in rivalry with
a similar body already subject to the Ordnance Office,
and that consequently the country was put to the
expense of two corps when one should have sufficed.
It is noteworthy also that the Ordnance made no effort
to place their Artificers under the command of the
officers of the Engineers, a reform obviously desirable
at once for economy and efficiency. Altogether, it
seems to me that Cornwallis and his subordinates were
found wanting at this time. It would indeed have
been a great advantage if the Duke of York had been
appointed Master-general of the Ordnance as well as
Captain -general of the Army after the precedent of
Marlborough ; but Ministers should not be blamed
because he was not. They could not know by instinct
how successful the Duke was to approve himself as an
administrator. 1
I pass now to the Treasury, the third office con-
cerned with the general administration of the Army,
through its control not only of the business of pay but
of the services of transport and supply. Upon this
department the War Office and Horse Guards made
an encroachment by the formation, first of the Royal
1 S.C.L.B. 3ist July 1799; 14-th January 1800. Conolly,
History of the Royal Sappers and Miners, i. 119.
882 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOKXII
Waggoners in 1794 and secondly of the Royal
Waggon Train in 1799, whereby transport was trans-
ferred in part from civil to military hands and organised
upon a military system. Since, however, the train
possessed few vehicles or animals of its own, the
necessary consequence followed that its officers, if sent
forward to purchase or hire transport for a projected
campaign, were still subjected to the Commissaries of
the Treasury. The department of the Commissariat
consisted of a Commissary - general of Stores, six
Deputy-commissaries, and seven assistants ; but it was
still inefficient, generally speaking, for work in the
field, though there were one or two of its officers who
received high commendation both from Abercromby
and Charles Stuart. In fact, though this particular
branch of the service had advanced somewhat, it was
still backward ; nor was it destined to improve until
Arthur Wellesley, taught by much experience with the
bullocks of Mysore, finally brought it to real efficiency
in the Peninsula.
Regarding transport by sea, which was in the hands
of a Board consisting of five naval captains and a
secretary, no very flattering account can be given. There
can be no doubt that, through the enormous increase of
Britain's commerce during the war and her practical
monopoly of the carrying trade by sea, tonnage was
often most difficult to procure ; but in embarkation
after embarkation there were just complaints of in-
sufficient accommodation and unseaworthy vessels.
Worst of all were the arrangements for transferring
recruits from Ireland to the depot at Chatham, when
men suffering from infectious fevers were hurried
aboard bad and crowded vessels to carry disease and
death to their unfortunate comrades. The mortality
on these short passages was consequently appalling.
The men, only just enlisted, were subject to no
discipline ; they were provided neither with medical
officers nor medical stores ; and since they refused
from superstitious scruples to commit the corpses of
CH. xxx HISTORY OF THE ARMY 883
their comrades to the sea, they came into port, the
living with the dead, in unspeakable filth and
corruption. 1 It is true that the blame for this state of
things by no means rested wholly, perhaps not even
chiefly, with the Board of Transport ; but that body
seems to have been out of touch with all other depart-
ments, and to have treated ships merely as ships and
not as floating abodes for soldiers. Consequently
healthy men were often embarked for long voyages
upon infected vessels, wherein they perished by the
score and even by the hundred.
In truth it is difficult in these days to realise
the perils and discomforts patiently endured by officers
and men in leaky transports, when frequently they
could not sleep dry for weeks together. Not the
least of the dangers was the drunkenness and incom-
petence of the masters and mates, which on at least
one occasion compelled a captain of infantry to take
command and navigate a ship from the West Indies to
England. Marvellous to say, he brought her safely into
Cork, though his observations had led him to believe
that he was in the Downs when in reality he was off the
mouth of the Mersey ; but it was to his credit that his
error was no greater. 2 Towards the end of the war,
as has been mentioned, old ships of fifty-four and sixty
guns were used for troopships, with the cannon removed
from the lower-decks ; but this, being an ill-organised
service, resulted in constant friction between Army and
Navy. In fact the only ships on which the troops were
healthy and comfortable were those of the East India
1 S. P. Ireland^ Sir Jerome Fitzpatrick to Major-gen. Fox, 1st
April 1798.
2 Autobiography of Sir J. M^Grigor, p. 78. My old chief, the
late Lieutenant-general Sir William Jervois, told me that in 1841,
being then a subaltern of Engineers, he sailed to the Cape in a
hired transport. The master and mate came to blows a few days
out, and the only sextant on the ship went overboard in the struggle.
Fortunately, he himself happened to possess a quadrant, by the
help of which the navigation of the vessel was carried on. The
voyage to Capetown lasted 140 days.
88 4 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOKXII
Company, which, as is testified by the reports from
the General at the Cape during 1798 and 1799, were
beyond reproach. Nor must it be supposed that the
troops were under different regulations on board the
East Indiamen, for the rules for the entire service were
made uniform in 1795, and were remarkably good and
sound. The difference was due simply and solely to
the size, quality, and internal fittings of the ships them-
selves. So far, therefore, as the Admiralty and Treasury
were concerned with the Army, it cannot be said that
they covered themselves with credit ; and it is no
extreme statement to assert that their duties would
have been better performed if transferred to the
military authorities.
The fourth department concerned with the adminis-
tration of the armed forces was the Home Office,
which reigned supreme over the Fencibles, Militia, and
Volunteers, including Yeomanry Cavalry. Here,
however, once again circumstances compelled the War
Office and Horse Guards to trespass upon a province
which had hitherto been closed to them. The reduction
of Fencible regiments in order to drive their men into
the Regular Army first brought the Home Office and War
Office into closer contact. This contact was turned into
collision by the first Act for the enlistment of recruits
from the Militia into the Line, for the Lords-Lieutenant
discountenanced the measure and made its execution a
failure. 1 Finally, the arrangements for the defence of
the Kingdom against invasion turned collision for a
time into friction. The Militia occupied at that time
a peculiar position in the country. It was supported
from the proceeds of the land-tax, which, being the
principal contribution of the land-owners to the general
revenue, led the country gentlemen to claim a kind of
proprietary interest in the force. For this reason they
felt a pride in furnishing it with officers ; and indeed
the Militia lists of that period are simply a catalogue of
the names of the leading county-families, the greater
1 Dropmore Papers, iv. 224.
CH.XXX HISTORY OF THE ARMY 885
magnates holding the higher, and the lesser the lower
ranks. Over all presided the Lord-Lieutenant, who
not only as a rule was actually a colonel of Militia, but
was charged with the distribution of commissions and
with the more serious duty of keeping the peace within
his county. Hence his office was of the greatest
importance and, if he were really competent to execute
it, of singular weight and authority.
Many of the Lords-Lieutenant were gentlemen of the
highest character, great ability, and strong public spirit,
with a standard of conduct, a courtesy to high and low,
and a simple though noble dignity of bearing which
gained for their every word and deed an unquestioning
obedience and respect within their jurisdiction. Others,
though unendowed with great personal qualities,
possessed none the less great weight and influence
through their wealth, their rank, their ownership
of pocket -boroughs and their powers of patronage
generally. In fact they were great magnates whose
path in life was hung with blue and red ribands, and
led at the very least to a gorgeous funeral in the
ancestral vault. But all alike were to some extent
petty Sovereigns, with the Militia for their army.
They were attached to the force, frequently spent very
large sums upon it, and easily grew to regard it as their
own. Their officers shared their views, and hence in
many cases a regiment of Militia became a very
exclusive county-club, with a just pride in itself which
was of not a little value.
It was therefore a rude shock to many corps
when in 1798 the Generals of their districts demanded
of them their flank - companies to be formed into
distinct battalions under officers of the regular Army.
Some of the more pompous Colonels denounced
the entire proposal as unconstitutional, and threatened
to carry the matter before the courts of law. The
Militia, they urged, was not the Army ; it was not
subject to the Commander-in-chief; it had nothing
to do with War Office or Horse Guards ; and no part
886 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOKXII
of it could legally be torn away from its own officers
to be trained according to a false German system.
Foremost among the champions of this opinion
was Lord Buckingham, a self-important busybody of
conceit so amazing as to make even his very genuine
and generous patriotism seem ridiculous. Puffed
up with his dignity as Lord-Lieutenant and Colonel,
he plagued the whole Cabinet with arguments upon
the constitutional aspect of the question, and was
hardly to be silenced even by the adverse opinion of
the legal officers of the Crown. As a matter of common
sense it was difficult to meet the contention of the
Generals that, if they were responsible for the defence
of the country, they must be permitted to handle their
troops in their own way. The controversy was there-
fore decided in favour of the Commander-in-chief, and
this was the first step towards the uniting of all the
land-forces of the Crown under a single department ;
though many years were still to pass before the country
was to perceive the folly of dividing them between a
Minister of Offence and a Minister of Defence. 1
The Union of Ireland with Great Britain contributed
enormously towards the simplification of our military
affairs at large. Until 1800, all the cumbrous machin-
ery which hampered the progress of the Army at home
had been duplicated in the sister kingdom. Ireland had
her own sovereign, the Lord- Lieutenant, her own
Commander-in-chief, her own War Office, her own
Paymaster-general, her own Board of Ordnance, her
own artillery, her own establishment for the strength of
regiments and her own rates of pay. For years this
arrangement had been the distraction of administrators,
as it still is of historians, giving rise to endless jobbery
and incredible financial confusion. The transfer even
of a single officer from the British to the Irish
Establishment signified a troublesome adjustment of
differences of pay ; and the transfer of a regiment
meant not only change of emoluments and position
1 Dropmore Papers, iv. 169, 177, 179, 207. Grey MSS.
CH.XXX HISTORY OF THE ARMY 887
but the choice of a new Agent and subjection to
new and extremely capricious patronage. Every
Lord -Lieutenant was bound to submit to the King
his periodical lists of promotions and vacancies, on
which George the Third would write minutes in his
own hand, occasionally exposing and checking some
flagrant job. Nothing is more remarkable, amid the
many evidences of the old King's indefatigable industry,
than the care with which he perused all military papers
from Ireland.
From the administrative departments I turn now to
the Regular Army itself. Its nominal strength, accord-
ing to the annual establishments in these years, may be
found upon another page, 1 but its effective numbers in
rank and file, that is to say exclusive of officers and
sergeants, did not reach one hundred thousand men
until 1795, varied from that figure to one hundred and
twenty thousand from 1795 to 1799, and only in 1800
attained to one hundred and forty thousand. Since the
foreign troops enlisted in the British service are included
in these totals, the figures may be taken to represent,
roughly speaking, the effective strength of all ranks of
the truly British forces. The number of recruits
enlisted in the three kingdoms from 1793 to 1800 was
almost exactly two hundred and ten thousand, of which
over forty thousand were obtained in 1795 and about
the same number in 1799. The various experiments
in recruiting have already been enumerated in the
course of my narrative, but may now be briefly
recapitulated. In 1793 the ordinary methods were
followed, the bounty offered being ten guineas, but was
shortly superseded by General Cunyngham's ingenious
scheme for making new levies pay for themselves. Then
in 1794 was adopted the scandalous and extravagant
resource of allowing an unlimited number of officers to
raise men for rank, which was followed at the close of the
same year by the infamous system of contracting with
certain individuals to supply recruits at twenty guineas
1 Appendices C, D.
VOL. IV U
888 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOKXII
a head. In 1796 an Act was passed for the levying of
recruits from parish to parish for both Army and Navy,
which proved to be an absolute failure. By the end of
1797 the whole of these expedients had been found
wanting, and in November six regiments were ordered
to enlist boys under eighteen years of age with a
bounty of a guinea and a half. 1 Finally, in January
1798, was passed the first Act for tempting ten thousand
militiamen to join the Army by a bounty of ten pounds,
which failed, as has been told, owing to the opposition
of the Lords-Lieutenant. The same principle was suc-
cessfully extended by a second Act of July 1799 ; and
in October of the same year a second Act empowered
the King to enlist an unlimited number of militiamen
in whole companies and battalions. It must, however,
be borne in mind that the men thus drawn from the
old constitutional force were engaged for service in
Europe only, and that they fought in Egypt simply as
a favour to their country. The difficulty in procuring
men for general service was still great ; and even in July
1800 a certain Ensign Nugent accepted a contract to
furnish fifteen hundred men and five hundred boys at
prices varying from fifteen guineas to twenty-four
pounds a head. 2
As to the Militia itself, its average strength in
England from 1794 to 1798 was about forty-two
thousand men, but in the latter year it was increased by
the establishment of the Supplementary Militia to a
nominal total of one hundred thousand. This, however,
lasted for but one year, for the withdrawal of recruits
1 The regiments were the 9th, i6th, 22nd, 34-th, 55th, and 65th.
The 32nd and 45th were also ordered to recruit boys in 1800.
S.C.L.B., 2nd Dec. 1797 ; loth Feb., 6th July 1800. The three
regiments which first tried this experiment were the 22nd, 34th, and
55th. Memoirs of John Shipp, p. 14.
2 S.C.L.B., 1st July 1800. The amount paid for each man
enlisted in Ireland was 24, in England 21 ; for each boy enlisted
in Ireland 18 : 155., in England 15 : 155. ; this seems to have
covered all expenses, including the provisions of the men with
necessaries.
CH. xxx HISTORY OF THE ARMY
for the Regular Army soon lowered the figures very
greatly ; and in 1801 the united strength of the Militia
and Fencibles in the three kingdoms was set down as
only one hundred and four thousand men. The most
interesting points in the history of the force during this
period are the formation in 1793 of the Irish Militia, at
first sixteen thousand and later twenty -one thousand
men, and of the Scottish Militia, six thousand men, in
1797 ; the draining of the Militia of England to supply
seamen and gunners in 1795, and of the Militia of all
three kingdoms to furnish recruits after 1798 ; and
finally the passage of the British and the Irish Militia in
opposite directions over St. George's Channel, to do
duty in each other's kingdoms.
I pass next to the Fencibles, though by right they
should have taken the precedence of the Militia, which
was assigned to them by lot in 1795.* These, to
repeat my former definition, were regular troops enlisted
for service at home and for the duration of the war
only, and were designed to liberate the Regular Army
from the United Kingdom for service abroad. It is
extremely difficult to arrive at their actual strength, for
their establishment was frequently reduced (in the hope
of forcing the discharged men to enter the regiments of
the Line) and as frequently reaugmented. Most of the
Fencible corps were created either in 1794 or 1798, and
to judge by the old Monthly Army Lists 2 of 1799, the
greatest number of them in existence at one time in
Great Britain was thirty-one regiments of cavalry and
forty-five battalions of infantry. But by March 1 800 the
greater part 'of the cavalry had been disembodied, so
1 C.C.L.B., 6th April 1795.
2 I cannot say when these unofficial monthly Army Lists came
into being, nor, indeed, have I ever seen more than two or three
specimens, which I bought at a second-hand bookstall for a few
pence. They are minute quartos of sixty pages, in very small type,
and I do not know where any complete collection of them is to be
found. The official list of Auxiliary Forces in 1800 shows thirteen
regiments of Fencible Cavalry, and forty-six battalions of Fencible
Infantry.
890 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOKXII
that it would not be wise to reckon the Fencibles as
exceeding, at their highest figure, twenty to twenty-five
thousand men. It has already been mentioned that
several of the Fencible regiments volunteered for service
abroad and that the Ancient Irish found their way to
Egypt. Most, if not all, of the Fencible Infantry was
disbanded in May 1801, before the signature of the
preliminaries of peace ; x but one relic of these forgotten
corps still lives a distinguished life among us. In
April 1799 Colonel Wemyss of the Sutherland Fencibles
received a letter of service to raise a regular regiment
from that corps and county, the bounty being
ten guineas for fencible men and fifteen for new
recruits ; and so came into being the Ninety-third
Highlanders. 2
But this principle of creating corps for duty in
garrison only for such was the true nature of the
Fencibles was not confined to the United Kingdom.
In 1795 Skinner's regiment of Fencible Infantry was
recruited for service in Newfoundland and North
America only. In the same year such soldiers of the
Line as were fit for light work but unequal to a campaign
were drafted into a Garrison Regiment, which, though
intended for Gibraltar, was employed chiefly in England.
Again, in August 1800, Fraser's corps of two companies,
apparently augmented from a single company which
had been enlisted for African service in 1794, was
created for duty at Goree. 3 These were of course
only imitations of the small bodies of trained men
which had been organised by Simcoe for Canada and
Grose for New South Wales shortly after the close of
the American War. What their value may have been
1 S.C.L.B., 3rd to I3th May 1801.
2 S.C.L.B., i6th April 1799. Stewart (Highland Claris, ii. 280)
says that the Sutherland Fencibles were disbanded in 1798 (a most
unlikely date), and the Ninety-third formed in May 1800. I have
not found the order for disbandment, while the letter of service
bears the date that I have assigned to it.
8 S.C.L.B., 25th April, 1st September 1795; 25th June 1794;
27th to 29th August 1800.
CH.XXX HISTORY OF THE ARMY 891
it is extremely difficult to say, but it is tolerably safe to
conjecture that the Garrison Regiment consisted of all
the useless old soldiers (with their wives and children)
of whom the colonels of the Line desired to be rid, and
that Eraser's was composed of convicts and incorrigible
offenders who preferred even the West Coast of Africa
to the misery of the hulks. In the same category of
local troops, but of far greater value, must be reckoned
the West India Regiments, which in November 1798
had reached their full number of twelve battalions.
The formation of these native levies for the garrison of
our tropical possessions is one of the most important
facts in the military history of this period. The prin-
ciple has since been indefinitely extended, though it is
still subject to temporary limitations owing to the re-
luctance of white settlers to put arms in the hands of
the coloured races.
Next after the Fencibles, the Provisional Cavalry
and Volunteers demand consideration. The Pro-
visional Cavalry, as the reader will remember, was
called into existence when the alarm of invasion was at
its greatest, in November 1796. A part of it, for the
counties of Berkshire, Kent, Somerset, Suffolk, North-
umberland and Worcester, was embodied in 1797,
and disembodied at the same time with the Fencible
Cavalry in the spring of 1800. I have been unable to
discover what degree of efficiency it may have originally
possessed, or with what description of officer it was
provided ; but if there was any merit either in the
higher or the lower ranks, this force after three years'
training should have been of considerable value. It must,
however, be remarked that the Government shrank from
the unpopularity of using its powers of compulsion in
respect of the Provisional Cavalry, readily abdicating
them in favour of doubtful promises of voluntary
service. Before the Act for its creation had been for
many weeks in force, an amending enactment was passed,
providing that if any town or county should raise
volunteers equal to three-fourths of the number required
892 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOKXII
under the original Act, then the Lord-Lieutenant should
have power to dispense with Provisional Cavalry and to
raise Yeomanry, or, in other words, Volunteer Cavalry.
This was of a piece with Pitt's military policy at large.
He never passed an Act for National Defence without
an amendment to substitute " You may serve " for
" You must serve." No doubt he could have adduced
many arguments in favour of this course, based ulti-
mately upon the proposition, which he regarded as an
axiom, that his withdrawal from office would mean
the ruin of England. None the less the principle was
surely unsound. An Act to compel men to voluntary
service, which (absurd as it may seem) was the purport
of this and other of his measures, is an Act to enable
men to evade service.
Meanwhile it is significant of the inefficiency of the
civil administration of the War Office that informa-
tion concerning the Volunteers in these years is
both scanty and untrustworthy. By the time when
hostilities were renewed in 1803 the orderly and
methodical rule of the Duke of York had established
a system of returns and statistics full of minute informa-
tion ; but being fully occupied with the task of remodel-
ling the discipline of the Army amid all the pressure and
distraction of the war, he had not succeeded in reducing
this particular district of chaos to order by 1801.
From such information as I can glean from the records
of the War Office, the Yeomanry Cavalry in Great
Britain in 1798 counted a total of one hundred and
sixty-three troops ; l but the entries are certainly in-
complete, for the official list for 1800 shows a total of
two hundred and one corps, with an aggregate of four
hundred troops, for Great Britain alone. According to
1 Raised in 1794 . . . . 81 troops.
1795
I79 6
1798
H
46 r,
18
163 troops.
CH. xxx HISTORY OF THE ARMY 893
a return of January 1801 l the nominal strength of the
Yeomanry or Volunteer Cavalry in the three kingdoms
was close upon twenty-four thousand men, exclusive of
officers ; but it is added that at least one-third should
be deducted from this total, which would reduce it to
sixteen thousand, and it may be doubted whether in
actual practice the force could have produced above
twelve thousand fit for service. Besides these there were
local Associations of Cavalry numbering sixty-nine corps
in all, of which the great majority consisted of a single
troop only.
Of the Volunteer Infantry and Artillery (for in some
of the towns on the coast the companies were formed,
one-third of infantry and two-thirds of artillery) it is
equally difficult to speak with certainty. From all that
I can gather there were from fourteen hundred to
fourteen hundred and fifty companies of Volunteers in
Great Britain and about seventy- five in Ireland, the
greatest part of them having been formed in 1794,
1797, and I798. 2 The return above referred to gives
their nominal strength at just below one hundred
and twenty-three thousand non-commissioned officers
and men, or, after deduction of one-third, perhaps eighty
thousand effective. But over and above these there
were the Voluntary Associations for Defence, counting
in all seventy- eight distinct corps with over five
1 Printed in Projets et Tentative; de Debarquement aux lies
Britanniques, ii. 396.
2 In a lecture delivered at the Staff College, before I had dis-
covered this return, I gave the number of the volunteers as 26,000
only. The companies actually enumerated in the books of the
Secretary at War do not exceed 450, and hence my miscalculation.
The official list of 1800 shows 619 Volunteer Infantry corps,
numbering apparently 1432 companies ; but it is not always easy to
reckon the number of companies in a corps. Nothing can exceed
the disorder and want of system in the records of that department of
the War Office. In collecting material for this chapter, I have
frequently found subjects of exactly similar nature recorded indiffer-
ently in one or other of three series of entry-books, with occasional
excursions into a fourth and a fifth. On the other hand, I have
found important orders printed in contemporary handbooks, but
not recorded in the entry books at all.
894 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xn
hundred companies. The military authorities seem to
have taken no account of these, probably with perfect
justice ; and it is extremely doubtful whether all the
Volunteers could have put above sixty thousand men
into the field.
It should be mentioned that the Yeomanry supplied
their own belts and swords, receiving an allowance for
the same, and that both they and the Volunteers were
subject to the same rules in respect of pay. The
Government supplied both alike with clothing, and
paid regular wages to one sergeant in each troop and
company, in order to make good as far as possible its
inability to furnish non-commissioned officers from the
regular Army. The officers received two days' pay,
according to their rank, and the men two shillings weekly,
on attending exercise for two days in the seven ; the
principle being that until called out for permanent duty
they should be paid for each day upon which they were
present at drill. 1 The blot upon the organisation of the
Volunteer Infantry, as I have remarked elsewhere, was
the departure from the old principle of affiliating it to
the Militia, a blunder which has been fruitful in waste
and extravagance. But it is only necessary to glance
at this confusion of regular regiments for general service,
regular regiments for European service, regular regi-
ments for home service, invalid companies and other
corps for garrisons at home and abroad, Militia, pro-
visional Cavalry, Yeomanry, Volunteers, Associations of
Cavalry, and Associations of Infantry, to be satisfied
that the Ministry had never really grappled with the
problem of national defence. Such a multiplicity of
denominations might be construed to indicate activity,
but its true significance is poverty of thought and of
power in organisation. Setting aside coloured levies, I
1 S.C.L.B., 1 7th May 1794, I9th February 1796. The North
Devon Yeomanry refused the assistance of Government in the
matter of clothing and appointments. Ibid, I5th May 1798. I
cannot suppose this to be an unique case of patriotism among the
Yeomanry and Volunteers.
CH. xxx HISTORY OF THE ARMY 895
think it extremely doubtful whether in any one year
from 1793 to 1802 the effective strength of the Regular
Army and Auxiliary forces exceeded, even if it attained,
the figure of two hundred thousand men.
A word must now be given to foreign troops, by
which is meant not those merely hired from foreign
countries, like the Hanoverians, but those regularly
enlisted into the British service. The confusion in the
records makes this subject also exceedingly obscure.
Letters of service to foreigners, chiefly Emigrants, to
raise regiments of all kinds are to be found in abundance,
but whether many of these corps ever existed except
on paper it is difficult to say. Sometimes it may be
confidently asserted that they were still-born ; some-
times, as for instance Stuart's foreign regiments at
Lisbon, they appear suddenly after years of silence as
full grown ; occasionally, as in the case of the Chasseurs
Britanniques, they drop as though from the skies into
the middle of a British army in the field, and it is
fortunate if by chance some unofficial record of their
origin is preserved. The one thing certain is that from
the moment when a letter of service for a foreign corps
was issued, the Secretary of State for War treated the
levy as ready to his hand, and laid his plans accordingly.
Thus in July 1800 the Prince of Orange engaged him-
self to raise a large body of Dutch soldiers. Dundas
promptly wrote to Abercromby that these were five
thousand strong, and should be employed in Portugal ;
a month later he announced that they would be required
for service in Ireland ; and finally it appeared that they
were not forthcoming at all. 1 This makes one great
difficulty in tracing the history of foreign corps. Another
is that the majority of them were called by their Colonel's
names, which were sometimes changed, sometimes dupli-
cated, and occasionally abolished altogether in favour of
some florid title more or less connected with the Royal
Family of England. The death of these corps is often
1 S.C.L.B., nth July 1800. W.O. Orig. Carres., Dundas to
Abercromby, I3th October; to Pulteney, iyth November 1800.
896 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOKXII
as mysterious as their birth. To all appearances they
have been buried in the West Indies or swallowed up
by the Sixtieth, when the historian is startled by their
sudden appearance, either through resurrection or re-
generation, in the heart of Europe. On the other hand,
some which seemed to be full of vigorous life vanish
abruptly into space, leaving not a wrack behind. As
to the regiments formed or ordained for St. Domingo,
any attempt to fathom the secret of their being or their
failure to be is hopeless. There is but one safe guide,
the name of Charmilli, for it may be regarded as
synonymous with fraud ; but unfortunately it is not
easy to determine how many of his colleagues were of
like guile with himself, nor even whether their legions,
real or imaginary, were composed of black men or of
white.
The truth would appear to be that every Agent of
the British Government on the Continent of Europe
was on the watch to gather in recruits of any nation.
Thus it came about that there were in the direct pay of
Britain isolated regiments of French, Germans, Dutch,
Swiss, Corsicans, Minorquins, and Maltese, with an
occasional infusion of Austrians, Italians, and Greeks.
There was even an attempt to raise two battalions of
Albanians, which, however, was only partially successful. 1
Some few of the foreign corps, easily to be distinguished
in the course of my narrative, were good and valuable
troops ; others would desert even in such inhospitable
localities as St. Lucia and Marmorice Bay ; others
again were absolutely worthless. For how many such
corps Pitt may have paid is a question which he would
most probably have been unable and certainly have
been unwilling to answer ; but it may be doubted
whether, taking one year with another, they supplied
him at any one time with more than five thousand or at
most seven thousand effective men. In fact the system
of competing with foreign crimps for the refuse of the
1 S.C.L.B., 25th May 1799, 2^th June 1801 ; Abercromby to
Dundas, 5th May 1800.
CH. xxx HISTORY OF THE ARMY 897
recruits of the Continent was a blunder, and a very
costly and ignoble blunder ; yet it was of a piece with
Pitt's former policy of paying a retaining fee to the
Landgrave of Hesse for the first claim to his mercenaries,
instead of spending the money upon the amelioration of
the British Army. Never was ostensible economy so
false, so short-sighted, so unworthy of a great statesman.
From the numbers and organisation of our armed
forces I pass to their pay, clothing, and lodging. In
respect of pay it must be mentioned first that the
scarcity of food compelled the Ministers in 1795 to
grant a temporary increase to the men, which was
effected by consolidating several allowances into a lump
sum, with an addition proportionate to the enhanced
price of bread. This favour was conceded by Royal
Warrant without previous consultation of Parliament,
whereupon the Opposition at once raised the cry that
it was calculated to teach the Army to rely upon the
generosity of the King rather than of Parliament, and to
attach it to the Crown rather than to the nation. This,
of course, was mere factious mischief, for the question
at issue was not whether constitutional niceties should
be respected, but whether the Army should be converted
by starvation into a dangerous mob. As a matter of
fact there was, as has been mentioned, a formidable riot
near Seaford in Sussex, when the Oxfordshire Militia
broke out of barracks, seized all the wheat and flour in
the town, impressed waggons to carry it off, and sold it
at fifteen shillings the sack. The outbreak was quelled,
and three of the ringleaders, after trial, were shot. In
the face of this rising the only wonder is that Pitt did
not earlier yield to the soldiers this most necessary
relief. But he was generally slow to regard the wants
both of Army and Navy. 1 The real and solid increase
of wages to the men was made, it will be remembered,
1 C.C.L.B., ist September 1795 ; Clode, i. 99. Clode's habit
of taking all Parliamentary speeches seriously, without regard to
circumstances or the character of the speakers, is a blot upon an
otherwise valuable book.
898 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOKXII
in 1797, in consequence of the mutiny in the Fleet. 1 It
was accompanied, marvellous to say, by an augmenta-
tion of pay to the subaltern officers. The deductions
for poundage, hospitals, and agency were remitted, an
additional shilling a day was granted, and it was ordained
that they should receive their pay in full as it fell due,
without subjection to vexatious delays and belated re-
funding of arrears, as had been the rule in the past. 2
This was a great concession. It is true that the
subalterns were starving, and that the fact had been
represented to Ministers some years before both by
the Adjutant-general from the Horse Guards, and by
the Duke of York from Flanders ; but this was a trifle
to which the Cabinet paid no attention, until the sea-
men of the Royal Navy showed that starving men were
dangerous.
There remains to be considered an important ad-
ministrative change in the matter of pay. Hitherto the
only intermediary between the public and the regiments
which composed the Army had been the regimental
Agent, holding the Colonel's power of attorney. The
Paymaster -general made over all issues of money to
this Agent ; he in turn transferred them to the
regimental paymaster, who was simply one of the
officers selected by the Colonel to perform this in
addition to his ordinary duties ; and finally, the
regimental paymaster made his issues to the captains
for their troops and companies. Each captain then
accounted with the regimental paymaster, the paymaster
with the Agent and the Agent with the Secretary at
War, on whose certificate the final account between the
Paymaster-general and the Agent was closed. In 1797,
however, an additional officer was allotted to each
regiment as paymaster, who was still appointed by the
Colonel on the old theory of the latter's pecuniary
responsibility for all regimental matters. But the
Secretary at War then proceeded to open direct
1 For the details of the increase see Appendix B.
2 S.C.L.B., 27th June 1797.
CH. xxx HISTORY OF THE ARMY 899
correspondence with the regimental paymasters on all
financial business, thereby initiating an extraordinary
complication of anomalies which remained unaltered
until the abolition of purchase. In theory the pay-
master, as the Colonel's nominee and subordinate, was
bound to obey him at his peril, according to the terms
of the Mutiny Act ; but in practice he was accountable
also to a civil court as a civil servant ; so that it was
open to him to plead the Colonel's commands in
evasion of those of the Secretary at War, and those of
the Secretary at War in defiance of his Colonel. The
actual result was that the financial position of the
Colonel and the Agent towards the regiment and the
Treasury became entirely fictitious, which indeed would
have been no evil if the clothing of the men had been
taken out of the Colonel's hands and the principle of
purchase abolished. But the retention of these two
ancient institutions made the maintenance of agency
imperative, and consequently forbade the reduction of
its cost to the public. Hitherto the Agents, in return
for that cost, had done most of the detailed work of
accountance for the Army ; but now that it had pleased
the Secretary at War to take that duty upon himself, it
inevitably followed that the country was saddled with
the charge of providing him with a large staff of clerks.
The Agents were, of course, well content to see their
work diminished while their emoluments remained
unchanged ; but to the nation the only result of in-
creased expenditure was the establishment of a system
alike vicious and unsound. But indeed the ignorance
of the civil heads of departments respecting the ad-
ministrative machinery of their own offices seems to
have been deplorable. 1
From the foregoing the reader will have gathered
that the old methods of clothing the soldier remained
unaltered, notwithstanding that in almost every cam-
paign there had been complaints of its wastefulness and
inefficiency. Thousands of men must have perished
1 Clode, i. 298-301.
900 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOKXII
in Flanders and Holland in 1793, I794> and 1799 fr m
insufficient protection against the cold ; while equally in
the West Indies the nakedness of the men, particularly
in respect of shoes, 1 exposed them to the attacks of
insects and so to malignant ulcers, which disabled
hundreds from service. The helplessness of the
authorities in face of these evils was amazing. In 1793
subscriptions were collected in several towns to provide
the troops in Flanders with flannel shirts, and a depot
was formed in Soho Square for the storing of these and
similar comforts ; but the Secretary at War appealed to
the public rather to expend its money on shoes, of
which, as he gravely stated, "the consumption often
exceeds the present funds providing them." 2 It seems
never to have occurred to him that the " present funds "
might have been increased. A very short step towards
amendment of the existing practice was taken in 1795,
when the expenses of horse-clothing in the cavalry and
of alterations to raiment in the infantry were transferred
from regimental to public funds, the annual allowance
being fixed for the former at twenty pence and for the
latter at thirty pence a man. 3 But the motive for this
measure was rather the deliverance of starving soldiers
from a stoppage of pay than any wish for an advance
on the road to true reform.
In 1798, however, serious criticisms were passed
by the Finance Committee of the House of Commons
upon the whole system of clothing the Army. While
admitting that Colonelcies were bestowed upon de-
serving officers, this Committee with good reason
disapproved the principle that officers should make
profit from the clothing of their men, and recom-
mended that for the future a Board of General
1 Readers who have lived in the tropics hardly need to be reminded
of chigoes, vulgarly called "jiggers." These insects burrow under
the toe-nails to lay their eggs, which in course of incubation set up
dangerous inflammation. Tens of thousands of men have lost one
or more joints of their toes in this way.
2 S.C.L.B., I4th November 1793.
3 C.C.L.B., ist September 1795.
CH. xxx HISTORY OF THE ARMY 901
Officers should make contracts for the clothing of the
whole of the forces, whether Regulars, Fencibles, or
Militia, the loss to the Colonels of the Regulars being
made good to them by compensation. Beyond all doubt
there was very much to be said in favour of some plan
of this kind ; and the Colonels themselves would have
welcomed the exchange of a certain for an uncertain
reward. But the cost interposed a fatal objection. It
must be remembered that at this period General
Officers received no pay as such except when employed
in some definite position on active service, when a
special allowance was voted for them by Parliament.
At other times unless they held command of a district,
the Governorship of a fortress or a Colony, or the
Colonelcy of a regiment they received nothing beyond
the pay, or half-pay, of their regimental rank. Practi-
cally, therefore, a Colonelcy, through the emolument
derived from clothing, was the only recompense that
could be given to a General in time of peace, no matter
how long or distinguished his service. 1 This practice
was of course in accordance with the principle upon
which the Army had been built up, namely, that it
should pay for itself ; and any attempt to tamper with
that principle might bring the whole structure to the
ground. The cost of indemnifying all Colonels of
regiments, added to that of the newly-suggested system
of clothing, would have caused a storm in Parliament.
It was urged also, not without force, that a contract on
so gigantic a scale as for the clothing of the whole
army would be a dangerous experiment, and that
Colonels and Quartermasters, having no longer a
personal interest in the matter, would be less zealous
for economy than heretofore, while their love of
1 Thus when Major-general Irving succeeded Lieutenant-
general Vaughan on the death of the latter in the West Indies he
could draw none of his allowances, and received in fact nothing but
his pay as Lieutenant-colonel. The result was that in a few weeks
he found himself jiooo in debt owing to the expenses of his new
position. W.O. Orig. Corres., Irving to Dundas, loth August
1795-
902 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOKXII
smartness at the same time would not tend to keep
down expense to the public. Finally it was pointed
out that the gains of Colonels were really extremely
hazardous, since an augmentation of their regiments
might bring them either large profits or heavy losses
according as it was ordered immediately before or
immediately after the annual assignment of off-
reckonings. While, therefore, they asked for deliver-
ance from conditions so inequitable, they would
naturally expect no trifling compensation.
In the face of these considerations the Finance
Committee was unable to persist in its proposals for
reform ; and accordingly the amended regulations for
clothing, dated the 23rd of April 1801, accepted the
old system with some few changes of detail only. New
rules were made to reduce the fluctuations in the
Colonel's emoluments as far as possible ; and then the
far more important question of the soldier's raiment
was cautiously approached. The difficulty as to shoes
was overcome by the issue to every private of two pair
of shoes, in lieu of his half-mounting, 1 and to every
sergeant of three shillings in addition. Great-coats also
were supplied for the first time to the whole of the
troops, the nation generously providing the first batch
of them and leaving it to the Colonels to maintain
them out of the allowance granted for watch-coats.
This allowance amounted to one shilling for every man
annually, but was increased after 1798 by the abolition
of lapels, whereby twenty pence was saved on the price
of a soldier's coat and liberated for application to the
purpose aforesaid. The extreme cunning of the
Treasury in shielding the nation from additional
expense on account of shoes and great-coats is very
characteristic. Every soldier enlisted since 1793 had
cost the country at least twenty pounds before he
embarked on active service, but in tens of thousands of
cases this money to say nothing of a man's life was
1 Half-mounting consisted of" a neck cloth (changed in 1795 to
a black stock), shirt, one pair of shoes and stockings.
CH. xxx HISTORY OF THE ARMY 903
sacrificed through the miserable grudging of the few
shillings that would have saved him from death by
exposure. It has needed many years to drive from the
heads of British statesmen the idea that it is not sound
economy to pay a heavy price for a man on one day
and to kill him within a month in order to save a few
shillings. 1
I come now to the matter of lodging, wherein at
this time was accomplished not only a change but a
revolution. The old system, which provided for the
quartering of troops in ale-houses upon the terms laid
down in the Mutiny Act, had always been deficient and
had at last become ridiculous. 2 There were indeed
barracks in forty-three different garrisons and fortresses,
with nominal accommodation for twenty-one thousand
infantry and artillery ; but, even if the space had sufficed
for twice the number, the troops could not, owing to
the demand for their services as police, have been
distributed into so few centres. Moreover, the need
for small bodies of soldiers in many towns had been
increased by the rapid growth of manufacturing
industries and by the activity of revolutionary agitators
among the artisans. In fact it may be said outright
that it was the want of an efficient constabulary that
drove Pitt to cover the country with new barracks.
To this end he in June 1792 summoned Colonel Oliver
Delancey, then a Deputy -adjutant -general at head-
quarters, and asked him to undertake the duty of
constructing buildings to house the troops, with the
title of Barrackmaster-general. After first stipulating
that he should not become a public accountant,
Delancey accepted the appointment ; and his office
was established by warrant in the following year. Pitt
took no vote from Parliament for the proposed work,
1 Misc. Orders, gth April 1800, 23rd April, 2Oth May 1801.
Entry Books, Board of General Officers, zoth February 1798.
Treatise on Military Finance, 1795.
2 It must be remembered that this applied to Great Britain only.
There had long been barracks in Ireland.
VOL. IV X
9 o 4 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOKXII
allowing the cost to be defrayed out of the vague
charge which went by the name of " Extraordinaries of
the Army." The advantage of this arrangement was
that nothing concerning it came before the House of
Commons until a considerable sum of money had been
spent on account. Fox in 1793 and General Smith in
1796 spoke in condemnation of the general policy of
the measure, but Windham pledged himself for the
economy and good management of the new department ;
and there could be no question, to any reasonable man,
that the need for barracks was urgent. The matter there-
fore was allowed to go quietly forward ; and through
the peculiar nature of his appointment Delancey was
empowered to purchase or hire plots of land, to contract
for the erection of buildings, the supply of bedding,
and so forth, and in fact to conduct financial operations
on an enormous scale without the slightest supervision
or control. His duties demanded a man of exceptional
training, experience and ability in business, with a
staff of assistants expert in surveying and building.
Military advice was required only for the settlement of
general principles in the construction of barracks and
the selection of sites, though the choice even of these
latter was dictated by considerations of police rather
than of strategy. Beyond this the functions of the
Barrackmaster-general were purely commercial. He
was simply a large trader in the particular markets with
which military men were least conversant because least
concerned.
No doubt there were a few officers in the Army who
possessed the qualifications to wield the powers thus en-
trusted to the newly-created department. Delancey was
not one of them. He made the most extravagant
bargains both for land and buildings, and actually
entrusted the contract for the fittings of barracks to a
single individual, upon the easiest and most insecure of
agreements. The Secretary at War, after a slight
struggle to exert some kind of control over the ex-
penditure, seems to have abandoned the attempt with
CH. xxx HISTORY OF THE ARMY 905
perfect equanimity and to have connived with ready
helplessness at all irregularities. The Commissioners of
Audit were ignored and the authority of the Treasury
set aside on the most ridiculous pretexts ; and when
enquiry was at last made in 1804, it was found that
over nine million pounds of public money had been
issued to the Barrackmaster-generars department, and
that no accurate account could be produced either of the
public or private expenditure of the same. The part
played by Delancey himself appears to have been most
disgraceful. He not only appropriated large sums to
himself under the guise of personal expenses, but
appointed a vast number of subordinate barrack-
masters, even in places where there were no barracks,
all of whom, of course, were paid with public money.
Indeed it should seem that officers commanding regi-
ments were likewise appointed agents to superintend
the construction of barracks, with power to incur debts
to the amount of thousands of pounds and with little or
no financial responsibility. Thus not only facility but
absolute temptation towards extravagance, if not towards
corrupt dealing, was thrown in the way of the entire
military service.
Yet it is humiliating to record that Delancey not only
escaped unscathed but received a pension of six pounds
a day on retiring from his office in 1804, which reward
he enjoyed, together with the Colonelcy of the Seven-
teenth Light Dragoons, until his death in 1822. No
doubt he owed his immunity from disgrace to the fact
that the Ministers were obliged to shield him. The
constitution of his office was absolutely indefensible ;
and indeed it is impossible to understand how any
public servant, military or civil, could have been per-
mitted to dispose of millions of public treasure without
the slightest financial check. Yet the Ministers alone
appear to have been responsible for this carelessness,
for the principal persons present, when the establishment
of the Barrackmastership was broached to Delancey,
were Pitt, Dundas, and Sir George Yonge. When
906 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOKXII
Delancey was ultimately called to account, his defiance
of the Commissioners of Audit was excused on the
flimsy plea that his accounts were exempt from examina-
tion, by special agreement between himself and the King ;
but it was never pretended that his appointment was
a royal job. Nor is it possible to contend that the
whole transaction originated in some corrupt design of
the military authorities, for, in the first place, barracks
had lain in the province of the Ordnance before the
creation of the new department, and, in the second
place, the supreme military control was vested in 1792
in Sir George Yonge, the Secretary at War. Most
astonishing of all is the fact that Windham, though
apprised in 1795 of the laxity of the Barrackmaster-
general's methods, took no step whatever to scrutinise
or correct them. That he should knowingly have in-
volved himself in any nefarious practice is absolutely
incredible ; yet, since his particular function was to
watch all expenditure of the nation's money on
military objects, it is difficult to acquit him of neglect
of duty. There can be no doubt that Delancey was
guilty of a shameful breach of trust towards the
Ministers, and they as guilty of a breach of trust
towards the nation.
The explanation of the whole matter seems to be
that Pitt, in despair of obtaining the assent of Parlia-
ment to a great scheme for constructing barracks, or,
in other words, to a great revolution in the military
system of Great Britain, resolved to compass his ends
by stealth no matter at what cost. It is impossible not
to admire his courage, for patriotism can have been his
only motive ; and it is perhaps hardly too much to say
that, if he had fallen in 1797, this transaction of the
barracks might have cost him his life. But he who
does evil that good may come should be careful that
the least possible harm shall ensue on the evil and the
greatest possible benefit proceed from the good ; and
herein Pitt failed, apparently not a little from that
unhappy ignorance of the world which made him so
CH. xxx HISTORY OF THE ARMY 907
poor a judge of men. Delancey should never have
been selected as Barrackmaster-general, nor Yonge as
Secretary at War, nor Dundas as Secretary of State for
War. However, over two hundred barracks were
ultimately built for one hundred and forty-six thousand
infantry and seventeen thousand cavalry ; and it is signi-
ficant that of forty-eight constructed for the cavalry, two
only were calculated to contain as many as six troops.
In fact they were not military barracks, but police-
stations for the maintenance of internal order ; and
from this cause they were far less beneficial than they
should have been to the Army. Their original cost
was extravagantly wasteful, and after a century they are
almost worse than valueless ; but for this last Pitt
cannot be blamed, since in his time a true constabulary
was still undreamed of. However, the fact remains
that in a few short years the British Army was imper-
ceptibly transferred from quarters in ale-houses to
quarters in barracks. 1
The different arms of the service now claim our
attention, and first of all the Cavalry. Its history
during this period combines a strange mixture of glory
and disgrace, with the brilliant actions of Villiers-en-
Cauchies, Beaumont, and Willems on one side, and on
the other the mutiny of the Fifth Dragoons and the
race of Castlebar. Speaking generally, the condition of
the Cavalry at the opening of the war seems to have
been bad, partly owing to the extreme dispersion of
regiments and the under-payment of subalterns, which
were causes beyond its control, partly from general
idleness and neglect. The Duke of York therefore
took the mounted troops early in hand ; and having first
circulated Dundas' s book of drill to commanding
officers and enjoined its use for all regiments, he in
March 1796 appointed a board of General Officers to
enquire as to the clothing, saddlery, and equipment of
the men. On the 1 8th of May these Generals produced
their report. As to clothing they recommended the
1 Clode, i. 240, sq.; S.C.L.B., 25th Feb. 1796.
908
HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOKXII
abolition of the old long coat in favour of one with
short skirts, the substitution for epaulettes of wings
strong enough to turn a sword cut, breeches of plush
with woollen lining instead of leather, and boots well
hollowed at the back to be the more easily drawn on
and off. In the matter of saddlery they produced a
new pattern of saddle, and recommended the abolition
of housings, the showy and ponderous drapery which
served for an ornament to the horse and for a coverlet
to the man. The arms and equipment they left un-
altered, desiring only that the bayonet should be issued
to light as well as to heavy dragoons ; which suggestion
was rejected. As to horses they pointed out that the
breed of black horses formerly ridden by all heavy
cavalry was either extinct or completely transformed,
the animals in the market being suitable only for
draught and unfit to carry a soldier. But at the same
time they reported that a new type of horse, bred
chiefly for gentlemen's carriages, had been introduced,
which was well adapted to take the place of the blacks
for work in the ranks. Finally, they urged that
a veterinary surgeon, a saddler, and an armourer
should be attached to every regiment of cavalry in the
service. 1
Practically the whole of these recommendations were
adopted, and some of the new regulations probably
afforded great relief to the officers. The price of
chargers had risen, as was natural, considering the in-
crease of Regular, Fencible, and Yeomanry Cavalry ;
and the fact had apparently been made by some officers
an excuse for not providing themselves with an animal
of any kind. To remedy this an order was issued,
shortly before the signing of the report above named
that if any officer neglected to buy himself a charger,
his Colonel should buy one for him at a cost not ex-
ceeding fifty pounds, and stop the amount from his
pay. But at the same time permission was granted for
officers to ride nag-tailed horses, not under fifteen
1 C.C.L.B., loth July 1795, 3rd March, i8th May 1796.
CH. xxx HISTORY OF THE ARMY 909
hands in height, from which it is to be inferred that
the price of black chargers with tails undocked had
become prohibitive. A month later the Third, Fifth,
and Sixth Dragoon Guards, and the Fourth and Sixth
Dragoons were named in orders as allowed to ride
brown, bay, or chestnut horses ; and this was a greater
reform than at first sight appears, for display had been
so highly valued in the Cavalry that any change which
might depreciate it was welcome.
The introduction of veterinary surgeons also antici-
pated the issue of the report, the order for appointing one
to each regiment bearing date the I5th of April 1796.
The pay assigned to them was ninety-five pounds a year ;
and since apparently the supply of veterinary surgeons
was unequal to the demand, it was arranged that regi-
ments which were unable to obtain one should receive
one-half of that sum towards the support of a student
at the Veterinary College. It should seem that the
intention had been for commanding officers to send
some of their farriers (to whom hitherto the medical
charge of troop-horses had been entrusted) to receive
instruction at the College ; but this scheme proved to
be impracticable. In September 1796, therefore, it
was laid down that Veterinary Surgeons should receive
the King's commission ; their pay was raised to seven
shillings a day ; and a Principal Veterinary Surgeon
to the Army was appointed with salary of ten shillings
a day. Thus the new department was finally estab-
lished, and with trained horse - doctors, saddlers,
armourers, and armourer -sergeants, which last were
added in 1802, the efficiency of the Cavalry bade fair
to show substantial improvement. 1
Nevertheless the training of the mounted troops
still remained very imperfect. The new drill, with its
novelty of executing manoeuvres by threes, was indeed
made obligatory in 1795, an ^ a code of signals for the
trumpet was drawn up and made uniform for all regi-
1 C.C.L.B., 3rd June 1796, ist July 1802 ; S.C.L.B.,
April, 2 ist September 1796.
9 io HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOKXII
ments in 1798. In 1796 also regulations for sword-
exercise, drawn up by the fencing-master, Angelo, were
published by authority, and schools of instruction therein
were opened at several centres both for the Regular
and the Auxiliary Cavalry. But still nothing was
officially required of the dragoons, light or heavy, be-
yond excellence in performing showy evolutions ; the
more difficult duties of scouting, reconnaissance, and
dismounted work being entirely neglected. Of the
many new regiments raised, both regular and auxiliary,
nearly all were nominally light dragoons, yet not one
had the slightest knowledge of the special functions of
that arm.
A certain General Money, who had entered the
French service as volunteer in 1792 and had held high
command in the field until the entry of England into
the war compelled him to resign it, protested strongly
in published pamphlets against this false and mistaken
system. He pointed out that in England, the most
strongly enclosed country in the world, there were
forty thousand cavalry, of which not a single troop was
properly armed or trained for dismounted duty ; and
it is a positive fact that only twelve carbines were issued
to each troop of Fencibles. 1 " Is there," asked Money,
" between London and Ipswich any ground on which
three squadrons of horse can form without being in
reach or musketeers from the hedgerows in their front
and flank ? Of what use then, in God's name, is cavalry
when they cannot form to charge ? for if they cannot
form they cannot charge." He quoted the success and
efficiency of the French mounted chasseurs in Italy
and in other campaigns, and pleaded with great
eloquence and force for the introduction of similar
corps in England ; but he was not sanguine of success.
"Till this new system of horse-chasseurs be adopted
by Austria and Prussia, whom we copy in most things,
and have copied for a century past, nothing will be
done." Such was his prediction, and it was perfectly
1 S.C.L.B., 25th June 1974.
CH.XXX HISTORY OF THE ARMY 911
correct. Although the corps of Simcoe and Tarleton
had furnished perfect models of light horse as much
at home in the saddle as heavy dragoons, as much at
home on foot as riflemen not the slightest effort was
made to imitate them. Yet the very difficult and try-
ing campaign against the Maroons had shown how
easily a good regiment of light dragoons could be con-
verted on occasion into the best of light infantry. In
fact the omission to form and to instruct corps of dis-
mountable dragoons can only be regarded as a grave
reproach upon the officers who were responsible for
the efficiency of the British Cavalry ; and it must be
ascribed, in Money's pungent phrase, chiefly to mere
"jack-boot prejudice." l
At the same time it must be said, in defence of the
Board of Generals who reported on the Cavalry, that
they refrained from offering recommendations respect-
ing the Light Dragoons owing to the expense lately
thrown upon the Colonels by the alteration of the
uniform in 1784. It should seem, therefore, that
reform was in some measure checked by the original
sin of the clothing system ; but even so the delinquen-
cies of regimental officers are not wholly excused, for
they did not prepare their men well even for work
in the saddle. The swords, it is true, were of an
abominable pattern, long and straight for the heavy
dragoons, shorter and much curved for their lighter
brothers, but in neither case possessing any guard
except a single bar ; and for this they were not respon-
sible. But it was greatly to their discredit that their
regiments, though taught to charge, were never taught
to rally. In short, apart from the addition of the few
expert officers already named, and the introduction of
uniformity in drill, the attempt to improve the cavalry
appears to have ended in the substitution of grey
for blue in the uniform of Light Dragoons in India,
and the dressing of the hair of all ranks in a queue
measuring ten inches in length below the collar. Such
1 Money, Letter to the Right Hon. W. Windhnm^ 1799.
9 i2 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOKXII
trivialities have too often been preferred to solid and
well-considered reform. 1
The Artillery, as has been already hinted, was not
at its best at this period, owing partly to the disorder
in the office of Ordnance, partly to the growth, for
some reason, of a bad spirit in the corps. Neverthe-
less it made progress in several directions towards the
efficiency which it ultimately attained in the Peninsula.
The first brigade of Horse Artillery, it will be re-
membered, came into existence in January 1793 with
two companies, each counting one hundred men of all
ranks and two hundred and eighteen horses. In
September of the same year the establishment of these
companies was raised to three hundred of all ranks with
four hundred horses. In July 1794 the brigade was
transformed into four troops, with nearly eight hundred
of all ranks and over a thousand horses ; in September
of the same year it rose to nearly twelve hundred of
all ranks with close upon sixteen hundred horses ;
and finally in September and October 1801 it was
augmented first to seven and then to ten troops, each
counting one hundred and eighty of all ranks with
nearly six hundred horses. We have seen the Horse
Artillery on active service at the Helder in 1799 ; but
General John Moore saw one troop at drill two years
earlier in 1797, and pronounced that he could conceive
of nothing in higher order. The armament of each
troop consisted of four six - pounders, two twelve-
pounders, and two light howitzers. 2
The Field Artillery (if I may use a term which did
not then exist) likewise underwent a rapid series of
augmentations, the existing supply of gunners having
been exhausted in the first year of the war. In the spring
of 1793 the corps consisted of four battalions with a
total establishment of thirty-seven hundred men ; in
1 C.C.L.B., 2 ist June and 4th July 1796.
2 Warrant Books, i ith September 1793; izth July and September
1794 ; ist September and I2th October 1801. Diary of Sir John
Moore, i. 263.
CH.XXX HISTORY OF THE ARMY 913
September there were added to it five hundred gunners
and four hundred drivers, of which the latter appear
to have existed chiefly on paper, for the Duke of York
was always complaining of the dearth of them in
Flanders. However in 1794 there was formed a new
corps of Captains-commissaries and Drivers for the
parks of Artillery serving in England, which was
organised in divisions, each consisting of thirty drivers
and nine non - commissioned officers and artificers.
Twenty -eight of these divisions were assigned to
the four parks in England and eighteen to those
in the Netherlands, with a Captain-commissary and
Lieutenant-commissary in charge of each park. The
full strength of the corps was rather over two thousand
of all ranks, with three thousand five hundred horses ;
and apparently there was affiliated to it an establish-
ment of bat-horses for eighty-four regiments, numbering
in all three hundred and thirty -six men and over
seventeen hundred horses. This last was presumably
formed to carry the reserve of ammunition for the
infantry, otherwise it could hardly have been under
the control of the Board of Ordnance. It is easy to
understand that when military organisation had been
given to the drivers of artillery, there should have
been eagerness in all other branches of the service to
take advantage of the precedent.
Meanwhile in August 1794 a fifth battalion was
added to the British gunners ; in November four
companies of French Emigrant Artillery, complete with
drivers, was taken into British pay ; in July 1799
followed a sixth battalion ; and in February 1801 a
seventh was formed by the incorporation of the
Irish Artillery. Moreover in 1793 a company of
invalid gunners had been formed for Bermuda, and by
1 80 1 there was a whole battalion of these veterans,
nearly one thousand strong. Altogether, when the
preliminaries of peace were signed, the Artillery had
risen to the strength of between nine and ten thousand
men, exclusive of all drivers but those of the Horse
9H HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOKXII
Artillery. It was the peculiar distinction of the Horse
Artillery that its drivers formed part and parcel of each
troop ; and it is difficult to say why the like organisation
was not adopted for the Field Artillery. However, some
approach to it was made in September 1801 by re-
placing the corps of Captains-commissaries with a corps
of gunner-drivers, distributed into seven companies,
evidently to meet the wants of the seven battalions.
Each or these new companies included three officers
and three hundred and fifty non-commissioned officers,
artificers, and drivers, making a total of nearly thirty-
two hundred men with five thousand eight hundred
horses. It is difficult for us to realise, at this distance
of time, what an enormous advance in efficiency is
indicated by these apparently primitive arrangements. 1
Turning to the work of the Artillery in the field, one
notable point is the constant employment of heavy
ordnance in the general actions during the campaigns
of the Netherlands in 1793 and 1794, when twenty-
four pounders were as freely used as field-pieces. The
explanation seems to lie in the practice of fortifying
very extensive positions to enormous strength, which
was employed first by the French in order to shield
their raw levies, and later by the Allies to make good
their inferiority of numbers. In the days of Saxe
when two armies sat down opposite each other en-
trenched to the teeth, it was invariably dearth of forage
or supplies that compelled one or other of them to
move away ; but through the improvement of roads it
seems to have become the habit, for a time, of armies
to keep heavy guns always at hand so as to confront
positions which were practically fortresses with ordnance
suitable for a siege. Like causes produce like effects,
and after a long period of disuse the custom has been
revived for campaigns of entrenched positions (if the
expression may be allowed) in the twentieth century.
1 Warrant Books, nth September 1793; 4th August, 9th
September, 1st November 1794; 27th February 1796; i6th July
1799 ; 1 6th February and 1st September 1801.
CH.XXX HISTORY OF THE ARMY 915
Another important matter was the gradual tendency to
take from the infantry their battalion-guns and to use
cannon in larger tactical units, so as to turn to full
advantage their long range for missile action, instead of
employing them simply to eke our musketry with
grape-shot. Abercromby, it will be remembered, in-
troduced this novelty in Holland in 1799, when f r tne
first time a British army took the field with a special
officer in command of the whole of its artillery. There
was still to be a slight reaction in favour of the older
system, but it is noteworthy that in 1798 and 1801
orders were issued for an officer and eighteen men of
each regiment of cavalry and thirty-four men of each
regiment of infantry to be trained to serve the gallop-
ing-guns and battalion-guns, evidently with the idea
of liberating all true artillerymen for their own
cannon. It will be seen in due time that the galloping-
guns of the light dragoons, though now forgotten,
played a considerable part in more than one great action
in India. 1
Of the Engineers there is comparatively little to be
said except that their officers were constantly employed
in the highest and most difficult duties of the Staff in
the field. After the evacuation of the Low Countries
there was little scope for their talent in the siege of
regular fortifications, and Abercromby complained that
those who conducted the operations against Morne
Fortune were ignorant of their business. In 1801
their establishment was raised to two battalions, each
of fifty-six officers ; and in April 1 802 the appointment
of an Inspector-general of Fortifications showed that
the defences of the United Kingdom were to receive
greater attention. The private soldiers of this branch of
the service were not under the direct command of the
officers of Engineers, and still bore the name of Royal
Military Artificers. Of these four new companies
were formed in 1793, two for Flanders, one for Canada,
and one for the West Indies ; and by the end of that
1 C.C.L.B., 1 9th April 1798, 23rd September 1801.
916
HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOKXII
year their establishment appears to have included
altogether ten companies, numbering in all a thousand
men. In small detachments these Artificers bore their
part in every campaign of the war, though their
services became less conspicuous after the creation,
which has been already recorded, of the Staff Corps by
the Commander-in-chief.
I come now to the principal arm of all, the Infantry,
the actual progress of which during the war must be
described on the whole as somewhat disappointing.
Nevertheless it was on the eve of two great improve-
ments, the one of abolition, the other of creation, which
demand particular notice. In the first place, the
practice of massing together the companies of Light
Infantry and Grenadiers, though we shall meet with it
to the eve of the Peninsular War, began to show signs
of dying out ; and indeed there can be no doubt that
in the British Army it was extremely pernicious. The
flank-companies were always the choicest of a battalion,
and the detachment of them for formation into a
separate corps signified practically that the remaining
companies were ruined for their benefit. A very
flagrant instance was that of the twenty-eight flank-
companies sent with Sir Charles Grey to the West
Indies, which indeed made up between them a superb
little body of troops, but practically destroyed for some
years the efficiency of the battalions from which they
had been drawn. Generals, of course, favoured the
system because it gave them a body of picked men ;
and it was particularly dear to officers of the old school,
such as Amherst, Howe, and Grey. Dundas, indeed,
complained that Amherst had done irreparable mischief
in this way during his short tenure of the chief com-
mand ; and the reproach was not wholly unmerited,
though the consequences would have been far less
serious if the battalions had not been reduced to such
miserable weakness before the outbreak of the war. 1
1 Dundas to Grenville, 2ist July 1798.
263-264.
Dropmore Papers, \v.
CH. xxx HISTORY OF THE ARMY 917
But another grave objection to the practice was that
it concealed the real point at issue, namely, the need
for Light Infantry properly armed, trained, and equipped
as such ; which the massed Light Companies of the
Army failed utterly to satisfy. Lord Howe had created
such infantry in 1757 ; Tarleton and Simcoe had copied
him in the American War of Independence ; besides
which, as has already been told, every battalion had
organised for itself a company of riflemen. Grey, with
American reminiscences strong upon him, had given
his light-companies a special course of instruction at
Barbados in 1794 ; but Murray and Craig had been
obliged to resort to foreign levies under the different
denominations of rangers, chasseurs, and jager. In
fact the only soldier untaught in the work of light
infantry was the British. In 1795 a beginning was
indeed made by forming two companies of marksmen
in the North Riding Militia of York, which were the
first regular British riflemen ever seen in the country ;
but though they were dressed in green they were
neither selected, trained, nor properly accoutred for
their work. In fact they were a mere parody on true
light infantry and might just as well have been dressed
in scarlet and armed with a musket. 1 It seems, indeed,
that the authorities were positively afraid to enjoin
novel and peculiar instruction upon any but a new
corps. In vain General Money urged that one-fifth of
the British Infantry of the Line and half of the Supple-
mentary Militia should be at once converted into
genuine riflemen : no heed was paid to him. In
campaign after campaign the French tactics threw the
need for such soldiers into stronger relief; but, as the
foreign corps in the British service gradually perished
from want of recruits, the British Generals found them-
selves more and more at a loss to supply the want.
The fragments of some of these corps were indeed
swept together in 1798 to form a Fifth battalion of the
1 Militia Letter Books, 24th July 1795. James's Regimental Com-
panion, ii. 393-394-
9 i 8 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOKXII
Sixtieth, which was at once constituted into a rifle-
battalion with a peculiar dress of green jacket, white
waistcoat and blue pantaloons ; but though this intro-
duced the thin end of the wedge into the British Army
it did not affect soldiers of British nationality. 1 Then
came the campaign of the Helder, wherein a few com-
panies of riflemen might more than once have turned
the scale, especially during the advance of Moore's
brigade upon Egmont op Zee ; but none were to hand,
and for want of them England failed of success and
very nearly lost the best officer in her Army.
At last, however, in January 1800, the Duke of
York ordered a detachment of three officers and thirty-
four men to be furnished by each of fifteen regiments
of the Line 2 to Colonel Coote Manningham, for in-
struction in the use of the rifle and in the exercise of
true light infantry. Manningham had commanded
several light companies under Grey in the West Indies,
and was therefore well qualified for the work ; but the
response to the Duke of York's order was not very
cordial. Six of the selected regiments seized the
opportunity to send to him all their unserviceable
men, and one in particular supplied no fewer than
twenty-two out of thirty who were of this description.
None the less these detachments were assembled in
March at Horsham, from which they marched to
Windsor Forest, there to be trained by Lieutenant-
colonel William Stewart, an excellent officer of broad
ideas. It had never been intended that the men should
1 S.C.L.B. I2th January; C.C.L.B. I9th January 1798.
2 The 2/ist, 2ist, 23rd, 25th, 2yth, 29th, 49th, 55th, 69th,
7 1st, 72nd, 79th, 85th, 92nd. Cope's History of the Rifle Brigade,
pp. 1-2. I may add that the first letters of the Adj. -gen. to
Manningham mention only six of these regiments (C.C.L.B. yth
January, 8th February 1800), while Cope gives a list of fourteen
on his first page and fifteen on his second. It appears that the
Duke of York consulted Cornwallis as to the formation of this
corps, and that Cornwallis, while advising that all the men should
be trained as light infantry, would have armed only one-tenth of
them with rifles, quoting the experience of a Colonel of Hessian
Jager in America. Cornwallis Corres. iii. 177.
CH.XXX HISTORY OF THE ARMY 919
be permanently kept together, the design being
presently to send them back to their own battalions
to diffuse knowledge of the rifle in the Army ; for,
according to the official view, it was impossible from
the nature of the case that Manningham's corps should
be a permanent one. However, at Stewart's request,
the whole of it was embarked in July for the expedition
to Ferrol, and was not broken up until some weeks
later at Malta. What then happened to it is something
of a mystery ; but the corps appears to have been
recreated in the course of the autumn with a new
establishment of ten companies under its former
officers, but with men chiefly drawn from the dis-
embodied Irish Fencibles. The patterns of its clothing
and accoutrements were settled in December, and on
the 3ist of March 1801 a letter of service was granted,
apparently as an afterthought, for the formation of
Manningham's Rifle Corps. Possibly there was some
doubt even to the last whether the companies should
be kept together or again dispersed to preach the
gospel of the rifle in the Army ; but the wiser counsel
prevailed, and thus was born the regiment which still
marches to the tune of Ninety-five, but is not less
famous under its later name of the Rifle Brigade. 1
The zeal for the multiplication of riflemen did not
at once exhaust itself, for in September 1801 a rifle
company was added to the Second Battalion of the
Sixtieth ; and in July it was decreed that all descriptions
of riflemen should be dressed alike, without distinction
except of buttons and facings. 2 The uniform consisted
of a short green jacket and close-fitting pantaloons,
1 British Military Library, ii. 564 sq. S.C.L.B., 1st December
1800, 1 2th March 1801 ; C.C.L.B., 29th September, 1 8th Decem-
ber 1800. Cope's History of the Rifle Brigade. The B.M. Library
above quoted speaks of a letter of service of 25th August 1800.
This, the date of the landing at Ferrol, was taken for the commis-
sions of the officers, but I can find no record of the letter. The
regiment received the number Ninety-five on i8th January 1803.
S.C.L.B. sub. dat.
2 S.C.L.B., 24th September 1801 ; C.C.L.B., I3th July 1802.
VOL. IV Y
920 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOKXII
with a plain leather cap for the men and a light
dragoon's helmet for the officers. The sergeants carried
a whistle, which alone marked their difference from
the privates. The officers wore a black shoulder-belt
with silver ornaments and a whistle, besides the crimson
sash which was worn round the waist by all who held
the King's commission ; while a curved sword, together
with heavy black lace on the jacket, helped to assimilate
their dress to that of light dragoons. The weapon of
the men was a rifle, called the Baker rifle, which
though a clumsy weapon was reputed to be extremely
accurate up to three hundred yards' range ; their side-
arm was a sword which could be fixed as a bayonet.
Cartridges were not used as a rule, but every man
carried a powder-horn and bag of bullets to enable
him to load his rifle with what was called "running
ball," which was the method preferred for this particular
arm. The buttons of the dress were dull ; all orna-
ments of bright metal were discarded ; and the barrel
of the rifle was brown, so as to make the men as little
conspicuous as possible. Finally, all movements were
carried out by signal of bugle-horn, the calls for which
had been lately revised ; and a treatise upon light troops
by M. de Jarry was recommended for general guidance
and instruction.
Manningham and Stewart needed little teaching, for
they were men who could think for themselves. In the
year 1801 the Standing Orders of the regiment were
drawn up, containing novelties positively startling to the
old school of martinets. Therein provision was made
not only for bestowing on the soldiers medals for good
conduct and for bravery in the field, but also for careful
and systematic training in musketry, for classifying
men according to their skill at the target, for dis-
tinction of the best as marksmen, for the formation of a
regimental school with periodic examinations, for the
delivery of lectures upon military subjects, and even
for the encouragement of athletic exercises. It needed
only the finishing touches of Moore in the camp at
CH.XXX HISTORY OF THE ARMY 921
Shorncliffe for the new Rifle Corps to begin life with
a regimental system that would defy the wear of a
century. It is no exaggeration to say that the founda-
tion of the Rifle Brigade marks a new era in the history
of the British infantry.
A few small details must be mentioned before the
infantry is finally dismissed. Its clothing and equip-
ment remained unaltered except for the abolition of
lapels and the introduction of a felt or leathern cap,
seemingly the forerunner of the chaco, in place of the
cocked hat. 1 Officers also were required to wear when
on duty a red and gold band round their hats, with
a rosette of the same material, and a gorget tied with
ribbons of the colour of the regimental facings. 2 The
plumes of officers were also definitely appointed to be
white for grenadier -companies, green for light -com-
panies, and red and white for battalion -companies. 3
Hair powder was generally abolished in the Army in
1795, b ut the order required to be repeated before
Colonels would obey it. 4 The queue, however, was
still retained, except in the case of Grenadiers and
Light Infantry, who were required to turn their hair
up under their hats. 5 The drill, being new, remained
unchanged ; but inspecting officers had liberty to permit
regiments to be drawn up in two instead of three ranks
even for review. 6 The Duke of York raised the whole
standard of manoeuvre in the field by the orders which
he issued in 1795 for the exercise of the troops in
camp. Mondays and Fridays were given up to bat-
talion-drill, Tuesdays and Saturdays to brigade -drill,
Wednesdays to a field-day of all the troops, and
1 S.C.L. ., 28th January 1796, nth December 1799. To judge
from contemporary pictures the new cap, in some of its forms,
greatly resembled a chimney-pot hat.
~ C.C.L.J3., 3rd May 1796. Possibly the gold band passed away
with the cocked hat.
" Ibid. 1 3th September 1797.
4 Ibid. 1 9th July 1795, 8th September 1797.
5 Ibid. 6th June 1799.
6 Ibid. 24th September 1801.
922 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOKXII
Thursdays, as in the Navy, were a day of rest. 1 Regi-
ments of Militia were also formed into brigades for the
first time in 1797, no doubt with good results. 2 Disci-
pline in general was greatly improved by the Duke's
very proper severity towards officers who were remiss in
joining their regiments or in the performance of their
duty ; but there was still much room for improvement
in this respect. As regards the men, flogging was as
frequent as ever, though a soldier could generally
commute a very heavy sentence by consenting to serve
in the Sixtieth or in the East and West Indies ; and
the instances of men who accepted this alternative are
innumerable. Taking the general condition of the
infantry, however, in 1802, there can be no doubt that
it was immensely improved since 1793.
Having already spoken of Transport and Supply
under the head of the Treasury, I pass now to the
Medical Service. After the scandalous revelations of
the hospitals in Holland in 1793 and 1794 some
reform in this branch of the Army was imperative ;
but for the better understanding of the subject, which
is exceedingly obscure, a brief sketch must be given
of the early constitution of the Medical Department.
The Surgeon and his assistant were essentially regi-
mental officers, being by origin servants of the Colonel
according to the old regimental system. As such they
purchased their situations and received an allowance,
which had originally been levied by stoppage from the
men's pay, but was later made good by the Captains
from the funds of their companies. In the matter of
medicines they were nominally subject to a royal
warrant of 1747, whereby a certain individual was
appointed Apothecary-general with the monopoly, for
himself and his heirs, of providing drugs for the
Army ; but in 1793 the surgeon received a sum pro-
portioned to the strength of his corps on the under-
standing that he should furnish all necessary medicines.
1 C.C.L.B., i6th May 1795.
2 Ibid. 1 7th February 1797.
CH. xxx HISTORY OF THE ARMY 923
As to general administration, there was an Apothecary-
general, and there had been a Physician-general and
a Surgeon-general ever since the days of Charles the
Second. There had also been Inspectors of Hospitals
since 1758, but their supervision appears to have been
of the most perfunctory. In 1794 a Medical Board
was appointed to direct the Medical service of the
Army, and in I796 1 it was ordained that surgeons
were to be regularly paid, that all their perquisites were
to be abolished, that medicines and hospitals were to
be paid for by Government, and that they themselves
were to rank with captains when choosing quarters and
to be entitled to a retiring allowance. At the same
time surgeons' mates were promoted to the dignity of
commissioned officers.
In 1798, however, the Medical Board was abolished
and its duties divided between the Physician -general,
Surgeon -general, and Inspector of Hospitals, in so
injudicious a fashion as to set these three depart-
ments fighting desperately for patronage and im-
portance. However, some compensation for this
blunder was found in the new regulations that every
physician must possess a medical diploma or degree,
and that surgeons' mates were to pass a medical
examination before receiving a commission. But at
the same time the new organisation was so imperfect
that regimental surgeons, though their pay had been
increased, were once more so far entrusted with
their former powers that they became at once medical
officers, contractors for supplies, and directors of
expenditure, whereby they were exposed to tempta-
tions very difficult for a poor man to resist. It is
amusing to note that three years later the office of
Ordnance set up a Medical Department of its own,
since apparently its jealousy of the War Office forbade
it to save the country the expense of forming two
separate establishments. For the rest the improved
position of the doctors was assured by assigning to
1 S.C.L.8., i6th April 1796
924 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOKXII
them a uniform of plain scarlet in the Army at large,
and of blue in the Light Dragoons. It was a pity that
other difficulties could not have been as easily settled
as this. 1
Nevertheless the appalling losses in the West Indies
did awake the authorities very seriously to the im-
portance of preserving the health of the soldiers ; and
the result was a decided improvement in the condition
of the four great military hospitals at Deal, Portsmouth,
Plymouth, and Gosport, and of the York Hospital at
Chelsea. It is interesting to remark that the Cold-
stream Guards and the Eighty -fifth were inoculated
against smallpox " in the mode adopted by Dr. Jenner "
in the course of 1799, and that the War Office did not
grudge one hundred guineas to Jenner for his trouble. 2
Much thought was given also to the care of men in
the tropics, and a table of very sound and sensible
regulations was produced which, if faithfully observed,
would have saved many lives. But the enforcement of
these rules depended necessarily on the zeal not of
doctors only, but of each and every officer ; and this,
owing to laziness and ignorance, was too rarely to be
depended on. Even so elementary a principle as that
the men should not, if possible, be exposed to the
tropical sun, was often neglected ; and it is probable
that hundreds of men were sacrificed by being compelled
to stand as guards, or for other useless purposes, in the
full blaze of noon. Unpardonable though this was, the
officers must not be too hardly judged. They have
seldom been encouraged in the British service to think
for themselves, and they may well have shrunk from
the responsibility of breaking all English rules, and from
the difficulty of adjusting military duty to strange
climatic conditions without injury to discipline. To
this day all young Englishmen need severe though
1 C.C.L.B., 20th September 1797, 2ist July 1798; Warrant
Books, ist September 1801. Autobiography of Sir j. M'Grigor,
pp. xvii.-xxi.
2 Ibid. I 5th and 2 2nd April 1799, 27th August 1 800.
CH. xxx HISTORY OF THE ARMY 925
sympathetic restraint to prevent them from taking
liberties with a tropical climate ; and j in those days
sanitary science was still in its infancy.
Finally I come to the department of the Chaplain-
general. Hitherto chaplains, like surgeons, had been
purely regimental officers, holding commissions from the
King but being none the less appointed by the Colonels,
who in the early days of the Army frequently made
arrangements for dispensing the reverend gentlemen
from their duty and putting their pay into their own
pockets. 1 By royal warrant of 1 796 regimental chaplains
were abolished, and it was arranged that general chaplains,
with pay of ten shillings a day, should be appointed for
troops in foreign garrisons and in the field ; while the
clergy in the neighbourhood of the barracks should
perform divine service at home, receiving an allowance
of twenty-five pounds a year. A retiring allowance of
four shillings a day was offered to all regimental chaplains
who chose to resign ; but it was made clear to them that
if they remained in the Army they must be subject to
a Chaplain-general, who was appointed to control them
and their brethren. It is remarkable that the considera-
tion accorded to the clergy by the Army under William
the Third and Anne should have vanished so com-
pletely by the end of the eighteenth century. Auvergne,
Story, and Hare, all of them chaplains, were the principal
chroniclers of the campaigns between 1689 and 1714 ;
but after their disappearance no such men seem to
have come forward to take their place, though a Naval
Chaplain on H.M.S. Boyne did indeed write the history
of Grey's and Jervis's expedition to the West Indies.
In my own researches I have found little or nothing
to indicate that chaplains even existed in the Army ;
and no man, except John Wesley, gave the slightest
pastoral care to the soldier. 2 No doubt this was
1 Walton, History of the British Standing Army, p. 760.
2 For a brief but excellent account of Wesley's relations with
British soldiers see Sir George Trevelyan's American Revolution,
vol. ii. part ii. 296-304.
926 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOKXII
due to the torpor in which at that time the Church
of England was sunk ; yet it is strange that in
these ten years of war the name of not a single
chaplain should have come down to us. In no respect
do modern days present a greater contrast to ancient
than in the attitude of the Church towards the British
soldier.
Altogether therefore the Army was on the road to
amendment, for though its standards might not always
be high they were none the less rising in every depart-
ment. The praise of this steady improvement belongs
chiefly to the Duke of York ; but all his efforts would
have been of little avail but for his strenuous pursuit of
one principal object, the restoration of discipline among
the officers. And herein perhaps the most powerful
influence of all was the Duke's own sense of justice.
He made himself easily accessible to every officer in
the Army ; and though there might well be some who
nursed just grievances, there was not one who could
complain that he had been turned away unheard by the
Commander-in-chief. Apart from all rules and regula-
tions for correspondence and so forth, he forwarded
his general scheme of keeping officers in subordination
by certain distinctions of dress for General and Staff*
Officers 1 a small matter which is mentioned only to
show how thorough was his work in this matter ; for
side by side with it he was working at a far greater
project for the instruction of officers in their profession.
This took shape in March 1799 in the opening of a
school at High Wycombe by M. de Jarry, who having
been a professor at the Military School of Berlin was
well qualified to found such an institution. The
number of pupils was limited to thirty, each of whom
was nominated by the Commander-in-chief, and was
required to bring to his studies a certain knowledge of
his profession, of French, and of geometry. This
school a few years later came to be known as the Staff
College.
1 C.C.L.B., 3rd May 1796, 3ist January 1799.
CH.XXX HISTORY OF THE ARMY 927
But the Duke in 1800 went a step further, and
summoned a Board of Generals to advise as to the
establishment of a second College for the education of
aspirants to the military calling ; and thus came into
being the Royal Military College, first opened in 1802
in a hired house at Great Marlow. Its members were
at first limited to one hundred gentlemen cadets, divided
into three classes. Of these thirty, being sons of officers
who had perished on active service, were entitled to free
education, board, and clothing ; twenty more, being
sons of officers still in the service, were entitled to the
like privilege for forty pounds a year ; and fifty more,
sons of civilians, paid the full fee of ninety pounds a
year. Students were allowed to enter the College at
thirteen and to remain there four years, after which, on
passing a satisfactory examination, they received a
commission. Such was the origin of the institution
now identified with the name of Sandhurst ; and its
establishment signified very much, for it imperceptibly
introduced education as a rival to hard cash for the key
to entrance and advancement in the Army. If the
foundation of these two Colleges had been the only
service done by the Duke for his country, he would
have deserved well of the nation.
But he by no means confined his measures to the
improvement ot officers only. From the time of his
accession to command there are signs of a movement
through the service towards a different treatment of the
soldier, and towards the ruling of him by appeal to his
higher nature and his self-respect as well as to his fears.
I do not say that this was general in the Army any
more than in the Navy, for the cat-o'-nine-tails was far
too busy ; but at least it existed. There is no military
officer, so far as I know, who can be held up as an
exact parallel to Collingwood, who was charged with the
taming of all the most dangerous seamen at a most
dangerous time, and accomplished it practically without
the use of the lash a marvellous achievement which is
partially explained by the fact that, under his rules of
928 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOKXII
discipline, officers were obliged to address the men with
civility. Probably Charles Stuart and Abercromby were
the soldiers who approached most nearly to him in this
respect, Stuart being also the man who drew closest to
Nelson in the adoration which he commanded from his
men. One of the most noble features in our great
naval commanders at that greatest period of our naval
history was the anxious care with which they looked to
the health of their men. St. Vincent, the iron disciplin-
arian; Nelson, the inspired and inspiring leader; Colling-
wood, the unselfish and patriotic gentleman, all alike were
nearly as proud of an empty sick-bay as of a victory.
Herein, it can happily be recorded, they found worthy
rivals in the Army. Charles Grey, Ralph Abercromby,
Charles Stuart, John Moore, and Thomas .Maitland,
stern disciplinarians one and all, possessed that peculiar
thoughtfulness for the soldier's comfort which loses
no opportunity of staving off from him avoidable
hardship and privation. It is not by fair words or
affable condescension, but by ever watchful attention
to their health and their wants that the hearts of men
are won by a commander in the field. 1 It is a reproach
to us that the story of Ralph Abercromby and the
soldier's blanket in Egypt is not as familiar to every
schoolboy as that of Philip Sidney and the cup of water
at Zutphen.
From such leaders as these regimental officers could
not but take their example ; and, to judge by a few
small indications, the spirit of kindness and respect
towards the men was nowhere stronger than at head-
quarters. Hitherto soldiers in the field had been treated
in the War Office as mere ciphers. After an action a
return of killed and wounded was indeed sent in, but it
1 "His steady observance of discipline, his ever-watchful attention
to the health and wants of his troops, the persevering and uncon-
querable spirit which marked his military career, the splendour of
his actions in the field and the heroism of his death are worth the
imitation of all who desire, like him, a life of honour and a death of
glory." G.O. of the Duke of York on the death of Sir Ralph
Abercromby.
CH.XXX HISTORY OF THE ARMY 929
contained only the number, not the names, of the fallen.
In 1799, however, four Colonels who had ventured to
furnish so bald a statement were sharply rebuked by
the Commander-in-chief for their neglect ; and the
names of the dead were required of them for the sake
of the widows and orphans. 1 Three months later an
order was issued that all inquiries as to the death or
existence of private soldiers and non-commissioned
officers could be made free of charge ; and at about the
same time the postage of all letters addressed to any
men, then serving in Holland, below the rank of com-
missioned officer was reduced to one penny. 2 In short
it was recognised that soldiers were not machines but
men, to whom their countrymen owed encouragement,
sympathy, and help, alike for themselves and for those
whom their death might leave destitute behind them.
And the soldiers had established their claim to such
recognition. At least nine regiments of the Line and
one of the Militia contributed regularly a voluntary
subscription to the funds for prosecuting the war, and
only ceased in 1799 when, in consequence of the im-
position of the income-tax, the Ministers with many
expressions of gratitude declined any longer to receive
it. 3 We have not yet seen the last of the benefits
which the Duke of York was yet to confer upon the
soldier, and which was to complete the good work which
he had so well begun. For the present it must suffice
that in 1795 ne to k over a number of undisciplined
and disorganised regiments, filled for the most part with
the worst stamp of man and officer, and that in less than
seven years he converted these unpromising elements
into an Army.
1 C.C.L.B., 1st March 1799.
2 James, Regimental Companion, ii. 386.
3 Circular to ist L.G., ist D.G., i4th L.D., I5th, i6th, 24th,
z6th, 33rd Foot, and Leicester Militia. C.C.L.B., 2Oth August
1799.
APPENDIX A
TABLE OF REGULAR REGIMENTS RAISED, 1793-1802
Note. The numbers in brackets are those by which the regiments were
designated upon formation. The regiments marked ? appear never to
have been formed. Those marked R were recruiting regiments, formed
only to be drafted into existing regiments.
CAVALRY
Date
2Oth January 1793
loth March 1794
loth
loth
loth
2Oth
30th
3oth
3Oth
3Oth
27th June
27th
27th
27th
'795
Gardner's Light Dragoons
Beaumont's Light Dragoons (zist)
Fielding's Light Dragoons (22nd)
Fullarton's Light Dragoons (23rd)
Gwyn's Light Dragoons (25th).
Loftus's Light Dragoons (24th) .
Manners's Light Dragoons (26th)
Blathwayt's Light Dragoons (27th) .
Lawrie's Light Dragoons (28th)
Heathfield's Light Dragoons (29th) .
Garden's 1 Light Dragoons (3Oth)
St. Leger's Light Dragoons (3 ist)
Blake's Light Dragoons (32nd)
Blackwood's Light Dragoons (33rd) .
FOOT
SEVENTY-EIGHTH Highlanders (Humberstone
Mackenzie's) .....
SEVENTY-NINTH (Alan Cameron's)
EIGHTIETH (Lord Paget's) ....
EIGHTY-SEVENTH (Doyle's).
EIGHTY-FIRST (Bertie's) ....
EIGHTY-EIGHTH (De Burgh's) .
Scots Brigade (94th) Cunningham's,
Halkett's, Ferrier's ....
EIGHTY-SECOND (Leigh's) ....
1 These four regiments (joth to 33rd) were drafted out and reduced 26th February
1796.
931
Date
7th March 1793
1 7th August 1793
1 2th September 1793
1 8th
25 th
26th
27 th
932
HISTORY OF THE ARMY
John Murray's (96th) ....
EIGHTY-FOURTH (Bernard's)
Fletcher Campbell's (9ist)
EIGHTY-SIXTH (Cuyler's) ....
Edmeston's (95th) . . . . .
Balfour's (93rd) . . .
EIGHTY-FIFTH (Nugent's) ....
EIGHTY-THIRD (Fitch's) ....
Trench's (loznd) .....
Argyll's ?
NINETIETH (Thomas Graham's)
Staart Douglas's ? .
NINETY-FIRST (gSth), Duncan Campbell's
or Breadalbane's ....
EIGHTY-NINTH (Crosbie's) ....
NINETY-SECOND ( I ooth), Marquis of Huntly's
James Grant's (97th) . .
2nd Batt. SEVENTY-EIGHTH
Fullarton's (loist)
2nd Batts. to EIGHTY-FIRST, EIGHTY-SECOND,
and NINETIETH ....
L'Hoste's (iO4th), raised by town of Man-
chester ......
Alex. Hay's (logth), raised by city of
Aberdeen .....
Bulwer's (io6th), raised by city of Norwich
Somerset's (iO3rd), raised by city of Bristol
Forbes's (ic>5th) (Borough of Leeds).
Roberts's (nth) (Town of Birmingham) .
Macdonnell's (ii3th) ....
Pigot's (i30th)
Prince William's (n5th) .
2nd Batt. EIGHTY-FOURTH
Sutherland's (City of Lincoln) ?
St. John's (iiyth) ....
Simon Fraser's (i33rd) ....
Williams's (izoth)
D. J. Cameron's (Loyal Sheffield) .
Podmore's (City of Chester)
Pringle's (Jedburgh Burghs)
Stribling's (City of Exeter) ?
Montgomerie's (Glasgow)
Treen's (Stamford) (i2$th)
Troughton (Gentlemen of Coventry)
(I2 9 th) ....
D. Cameron's (Wakefield) (l32nd) .
Howe's .
Date
ist November 1793
2nd
1 2th
1 2th
1 2th
1 2th
1 8th
1 8th December
1 8th
loth February 1794
loth
loth
loth
loth
loth
loth
loth March
1 2th
ist April
1st
ist
ist
1 8th
1 8th
1 8th
1 8th
2nd May
29th July
22nd August
22nd
22nd
27th
27th
28th
28th
28th
28th
28th
28th
i ith September
25th
APPENDIX A
933
The following twenty-two regiments were also raised in 1794,
though the dates of the letters of service are not recorded. The
dates here given are from the Army List :
Stratford's (i22nd) .
Lewis's ( 1 34th)
Hewitt's (gznd)
Hutchinson's (94th)
A. Campbell's (i 1 6th)
Donoughmore's ( 1 1 2th)
Macnamara's (12 1st)
Leatherband's (i23rd)
Beresford's
Trigge's (99th)
Keating's (loyth)
Ward's .
LlandafFs (ii4th) .
Granard's (io8th) .
O'Donnell's (noth)
Talbot's (i 1 8th) .
Rochford's (ngth) .
Mountnorris's (i26th)
Cradock's (i2jth) .
Ogle's (i 28th)
Conningham's .
C. Macdonnell's
Blair's (Liverpool) .
2nd Batt. EIGHTY-THIRD .
2nd Batt. SEVENTH .
Robert Wood's. R
Pennington's (13151)
Macdonald's
Lewis's Garrison Battalion
Grant's Highlanders. R .
Vere Hunt's (13 5th). R
Steele's. R . " .
French's. R .
Plunkett's. R
Macdonald's. R
James Campbell's. R
Macdonnell's. R .
Shaw's. R
O'Connor's. R
James Murray's. R
Hauger's. R .
Bradshaw's. R
5th Batt. of SIXTIETH
Date
2 5th July 1794
2nd November
ist October
toth February
2 ist July
2Oth June
22nd August
nth
loth February
8th April
7th August
9th April
1 7th May
6th June
22nd July
29th May
26th April
1 6th
4th October
25th August
27th November
2Oth February 1795
1 6th March
8th April
8th May
23rd June
23rd July
ist September
33rd
4th February 1796
1 2th
9th March
2nd May
6th
i 2th
28th
nth June
3 ist August
5th October
6th
i 7th May 1797
1 2th January 1798
934
HISTORY OF THE ARMY
Date
Bissett's. R i6th March 1798
Ogle's. R 28th April
Armstrong's. R loth July
Kingstone's. R ..... 2nd August
Nugent's. R 1 7th October
NINETY-THIRD HIGHLANDERS (Wemyss's) . i6th April 1799
6th Batt. of SIXTIETH .... 3Oth July
RIFLE BRIGADE (95th, Manningham's) . 2 1st February 1800
Nugent's. R 1st July
CORPS FOR COLONIAL GARRISONS
Skinner's Fencibles (Newfoundland).
Eraser's two Companies for Goree
29th April 1795
27th August 1800
TRANSPORT AND ARTIFICERS' CORPS
Poole's Corps of Waggoners
Hamilton's Corps of Waggoners
Corps of Pioneers (Staff Corps)
7th March 1794
1 2th August and 2 1st
September 1799
3 ist July 1799, I4th
January 1800
ARTILLERY DRIVERS
Corps of Captains-commissaries and Drivers
(35 divisions) . . . . .
Corps of Gunner Drivers (7 companies,
3180 men, 5676 horses) .
9th September 1794
1st 1801
APPENDIX B
PAY OF THE ARMY
THE proclamation for raising the pay of the Army is dated 25th
May 1797, and runs to the following effect :
Over and above all other allowances the private has hitherto
received 6d. a day pay, and lately z|d. more in commutation of
certain abolished allowances. From this day his pay shall be is.
daily, from which he is to pay the extra price of bread and meat,
amounting to i|d. a day, so that the net increase is 2d. a day.
From this is. a day a sum not exceeding 43. a week shall be
applied to his messing ; a sum not exceeding is. 6d. a week shall
be stopped for necessaries, and the remainder, is. 6d. a week, shall
be paid to the soldier subject to the usual deduction for washing
and articles for cleaning his appointments.
Thus, pay of a private
Infantry. Dragoons.
75. od. a week 8s. 9d. a week
Stoppages as above 53. 6d. 73. i^d.
Remains is. 6d. a week is. 7^d. a week
In camp he shall receive 5jd. per week, being the difference
between bread and beer allowance in camp and in quarters.
If meat exceed 6d. per Ib. and bread ,i^d. per lb., such extra
price shall be paid by the public to the amount of f lb. of meat
and i lb. of bread daily.
The daily pay of the foot and invalids now stands as follows l :
Foot.
Invalids.
Private ....
is. od.
os. n|d.
Drummer ....
is. ifd.
is. i^d.
Corporal ....
Sergeant ....
is. 2|d.
is. 6|d.
is. i|d.
is. 6|d.
[The pay of subalterns of cavalry was augmented by an order of
27th June 1797 to the following effect.]
The pay of subalterns of cavalry will in future be issued in full,
without delay for arrears, and without deduction for poundage,
hospital, and agency. Also an allowance of is. a day additional
shall be made to them, which, however, shall bring with it no
increase of half-pay. 2
1 C.C.L.B., 25th May 1797. 2 S.C.L.B., 2/th June 1797.
VOL. IV 935 Z
936
HISTORY OF THE ARMY
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APPENDIX C
BRITISH AND IRISH MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS, 1793-1802
(From the Estimates in the Journals of the British and Irish
Houses of Commons.)
Britiah Establishment.
I793-
1794.
'795-
1796.
1797.
Home
Plantations
India ....
Artillery .
Embodied Militia (and
Fencibles)
Foreign troops .
Total .
Irish Establishment.
Army (including Regu-
lars and Fencibles)
Militia
Total .
Total British and Irish
Establishments
17,344
18,194
10,700
3,730
17,602
60,244
41,490
IO,7OO
6,415
42,803
33,754
119,380
40,261
10,700
7,084
62,791
35,820
49,219
82,182
10,718
7,664
65,662
20,288
60,765
64,227
12,390
7,664
66,096
12,000
67,570
195,406
276,036
235,733
223,000
12,000*
17,500?
12,000
i7,5
20,246
21,369
19,012
22,698
37,667
22,698 2
29,500
29,500
41,615
41,710
60,365
97,070
124,906
317,651
277,443
283,365
1 The Irish Establishment, as fixed by Act of Parliament, was 15,000 men, but
of these 3000 were quartered abroad, and are here included in the British Establish-
ment, though their cost was borne by the Irish Exchequer.
2 A vote was taken also for Yeomanry, both horse and foot.
938
APPENDIX C
939
APPENDIX C Continued
British Establishment.
1798.
1799.
1800.
1801.
1802.
Home
Plantations
48,609
34,320
52,051
3!,445
80,275
41,719
75, 6l 9
72,829
70,299
25,494
India.
Artillery .
Embodied Militia and
22,174
7,664
62,202
24,972
7,358
134,786
23,752
9,126
56,522
26,219
9,500
104,619
26,219
10,296
Fencibles
Embodied Militia and
75,000
additional
Foreign troops .
4,807
4,323
J 4,754 j
...
Total .
254,776
257,137
226,148
288,786
132,308 1
Irish Establishment.
Merged
in the
Army
39,620
32,268
45,831 ! British
Militia
26,634
26,890
27,112 Estab-
(Yeomanry)
(37,539)
lishment
Total .
103,793
59*58
72,943
the
Union.
Total British and Irish
291,030
316,295
299,09!
288,786
132,308
Establishments
Peace estimates.
APPENDIX D
EFFECTIVE STRENGTH OF THE REGULAR ARMY (EXCLUSIVE
OF ARTILLERY), 1793-1801, WITH THE NUMBER OF
RECRUITS RAISED IN EACH YEAR
Year.
Number of
Recruits
raised.
Cavalry.
Foot Guards.
Infantry.
Total.
1793
17,033
4,681
2,885
3',379
38,945
1794
38,563
i4,5 2 7
6,103
64,467
85,097
*795
40,463
28,810
6,08 1
94,37!
124,262
1796
16,336
19,899
5,39
86,707
111,996
1797
16,096
21,601
5,480
77,78i
104,862
1798
2i,457
23,236
5,797
73,530
102,563
1799
4i, 3 l6
26,135
8,307
80,810
115,252
1800
17,829
29,5 8 3
7,927
103,288
140,798
1801
No return
23,178
8,734
n7,953
149,865
Note. The numbers include foreign troops, but privates and corporals only of all
regiments. To arrive at the full strength, including sergeants and commissioned
officers, add .
940
APPENDIX E
LIST OF FENCIBLE REGIMENTS FOR THE FORMATION OF
WHICH LETTERS OF SERVICE WERE ISSUED, 1793-1802
CAVALRY
Date.
No. of
Troops.
Colonel or
Commander.
Description.
1794
March 14
6
J. C. Villiers
First Regiment
?>
6
Sir Watkin Wynn
Ancient British
>
6
Tho. Peter Legh
Lancashire
2 5
6
G. N. Edwards
Rutland
3i
i
Sir G. Thomas
Sussex
V
2
Cholmely Dering
New Romney (Duke of
York's Own)
J> ?>
I
R. J. Adeane
Cambridgeshire
*?
6
St. Leger
? Never formed
?5 ?>
6
Earl of Poulett
Somersetshire
6
Montague Burgoyne
Loyal Essex
April 4
4
Lord Falmouth
Cornwall (increased to
6 troops, 1 4th April
1795).
>5 >5
2
Lord Ancrum
Midlothian
7
2
Duke of Buccleuch
? Amalgamated with
Ancrum's
10
6
Hon. W. A. Harbord
Norfolk
12
2
Sir Alex. Don
Berwickshire (increased
to 4 troops, iyth
April 1795)
19
4
Earl of Darlington
Princess of Wales's
30
6
Lord Onslow
Surrey
?> 7
6
Jenkinson
Cinque Ports
(Lord Hawkesbury)
>5
6
Charles Rooke
Windsor Foresters
May i
2
T. C. Everitt
Hampshire
12
2
Sir J. Scott
Roxburgh and Selkirk
(increased to 4 troops,
2ist April 1795)
941
942 HISTORY OF THE ARMY
CAVALRY continued
Date.
No. of
Troops.
Colonel or
Commander.
Description.
May 12
2
Dunlop
Ayr (increased to 6
troops, 1 2th Jan.
1796)
2
Maxwell
Dumfries (increased to 4
I
C. Hamilton
troops, 20th June 1 794)
Dumbarton (increased
to 2 troops, 2Oth June
1794 ; amalgamated
with Lanark)
2
John Anstruther
Fife (increased to 4
Thompson
troops, 3rd August
J 795)
2
J. Hamilton
East and West Lothian
>
2
W. Hamilton
Lanark (increased to
4 troops, 7th July
1794 ; amalgamated
with Dumbarton)
5> 5>
I
Sir A. Levingston
Linlithgow
V J>
2
Sir J. Scott
Roxburgh
3
Charles Moray
Perth (increased to 6
troops, 28th May
J 795)
i
H. Davis
Pembrokeshire (in-
creased to 3 troops,
1 7th April 1795)
2
Hon. T. Parker
Oxfordshire
20
6
Earl of Warwick
Warwickshire
J 795
May i
4
Andrew M'Dowall
Princess Royal's Own
The Regiments that survived until 1799 were :
Ayr
Berwickshire
Ancient British
Cambridgeshire
Cinque Ports
Cornwall
Dumfriesshire
Loyal Essex
Fireshire
First Regiment
Hampshire
Lanark and Dumbarton
Lancashire
Lothian (E. and W.)
Lothian Mid
Norfolk
Oxfordshire
Pembrokeshire
Perthshire
Princess of Wales's
Princess Royal's Own
New Romney
Roxburgh and Selkirk
Rutland
Somersetshire
Surrey, Sussex
Warwickshire
Windsor Foresters
Irish Fencible Cavalry
Lord Roden's, i8th July 1795 | Lord Stentworth's, i8th July 1795
APPENDIX E
943
INFANTRY
Date.
No. of
Coys.
Colonel or
Commander.
Description.
Feb. 20
3
Duke of Athol *
Royal Manx
March 2
8 Earl of Breadalbane
Breadalbane (ist Batt.)
8 j Marquis of Lome
Argyllshire
8
Earl of Eglinton
Lowland (West)
8
Earl of Hopetoun
Southern
8
Earl Gower (William
Sutherland
Wemyss)
8
Sir James Grant
Strathspey
8
Duke of Gordon Northern
8
8
Earl of Breadalbane
Breadalbane (2nd Batt.)
April 20
3
Thomas Balfour
Orkney
March 7
8
Thomas Sinclair *
Rothesay and Caithness
(ist Batt.)
August 14
IO
Alex. M'Donnell* I Glengarry
10 Colin Campbell*
Dumbartonshire
Sept. 27
2 John Fraser
Angus Volunteers
Oct. 1 6
10 j Lord Grey de Wilton*
Royal Lancashire Vol-
unteers
20
IO
James Durham *
Fifeshire
IO
Archibald Douglas*
Angusshire
}
10
William Robertson
Perthshire
IO
James Leith *
Princess of Wales (Aber-
deen Highlanders)
IO
H. M. Clavering*
Argyllshire (2nd Batt.)
J>
10
M. H. Baillie*
Reay
>
10
Lieut.-Col. Morison
? Never formed
IO
John Manners Ker *
Northampton
IO
J. E. Urquhart*
Loyal Essex
IO
James O'Connor*
Loyal Nottingham
)>
IO
Sir Robert Stewart
Loyal British
5?
IO
John Robinson *
Suffolk
10
Alex. Mall*
? Robert Anstruther's
(Loyal Tay)
IO
W. F. Forster*
Loyal Somerset
5
IO
Hon. G. A. C.
York
Stapylton *
Nov. 1 5
10
Robert Hall *
Devon and Cornwall
10
Thomas Balfour * j Lowland North
IO
Sir Ben. Dunbar
Caithness Legion
?>
IO
David Hunter
? Never formed
p
Major Parkyns*
Prince of Wales's
Leicester
Handcock
Loyal Irish
" I7
C. Courtenay*
Cheshire
* The Regiments marked thus endured until 1801.
944 HISTORY OF THE ARMY
INFANTRY continued
Date.
No. of
Coys.
Colonel or
Commander.
Description.
1794-
Nov. 19
10
Sinclair
Rothesay and Caithness
(2nd Batt.)
20
2
Mackenzie
Ross-shire
21
John Baillie *
Loyal Inverness
28
Earl of Elgin *
Lord Elgin's
99 29
2
James Fraser *
Fraser Regiment
Dec. i
?
Robert Wood
?A false entry, Wood
having raised a regu-
lar regiment
99 9
Earl of Breadalbane *
Breadalbane (3rd Batt.)
99 J 5
10
Handcock
Loyal Irish
J 795
Feb. 26
IO
Barrington Price*
Loyal Durham
28
IO
Francis Blake *
Northumberland
April 7
IO
Duke of Athol*
Royal Manx (2nd Batt.)
25
IO
Skinner *
Newfoundland
1796
April 19
I
Gudgeon *
Scilly
1798
Feb. 8
2
Malcolmson
Shetland
May 29
IO
Lord Macdonald*
None
June 15
IO
Cameron *
Lochaber
J) 5J
IO
Macleod*
Princess Charlotte of
Wales's (Loyal
Macleod)
?9 99
IO
Dunbar
? Never formed
99 99
IO
Sir W. Johnstone *
Prince of Wales's Own
99 99
10
Arch. M'Neill*
3rd Argyll
99 99
IO
Sir Vere Hunt
Loyal Limerick
July 20
IO
Dunlop
? Never formed
26
IO
Hay*
Duke of York's Own
Banffshire
99 27
10
Sir E. Leslie*
Loyal Tarbert
99 3 1
10
Alex. M'Grigor
? Never formed
Aug. 8
IO
Louis Mackenzie*
Ross and Cromarty
?> jj
10
Edwards*
Cambrian Rangers
99 10
IO
Tyndale
? Never formed
Sept. 21
IO
M'Gregor Murray*
Clanalpine
Nov. 26
IO
Pollen
None
Dec. i
IO
James Kann
? Never formed
1799
June 4
10
T. J. Fitzgerald *
Ancient Irish
* The Regiments marked thus endured until 1801.
INDEX
Aa (river), 301, 305
Aachen, 63
Abercromby, Ralph, Major-general and
Lieutenant-general, sent with a
brigade to Holland (1793), So,
109, no; Dundas's extraordinary
letter to, 146 ; his action at Lannoy
(1793), 148 ; engaged in the Nether-
lands campaign (1794), 231 ; at the
battle of Turcoing, 261, 264;
appointed to the command of the
West Indian expedition, 477 ; his
departure delayed, 478-482 ; his
arrival in the West Indies and sub-
sequent operations, 482 sqq. ; his
return to England, 537 ; his subse-
quent operations at Trinidad and
Porto Rico, 537-542 ; his appoint-
ment to the chief command in
Ireland, 571 ; his action in Ireland,
571 tq. ; his famous General Order,
573 ; his resignation, 578 ; his
appointment to be Commander-in-
chief in Scotland, 578 ; selected to
command the expedition to North
Holland, 641 ; he disapproves the
project, 643-645 ; he forces his
disembarkation, 653 ; his successful
action in the Zype position, 663 sq.;
his part in the actions of igth Sep-
tember 1799, 672, 679 ; 2nd
October 1799, 687-692; 6th
October 1799, 695 ; his reasons for
urging a retreat from North Holland,
698-699 ; appointed Commander-
in-chief in the Mediterranean, 782 ;
his action in the Mediterranean,
785 57. ; appointed to command
the expedition to Egypt, 80 1 ; his
preparations and subsequent opera-
tions, 80 1 sqq. ; his last order, 843 ;
his death and character, 844
Aboukir, Bonaparte's victory over the
Turks at, 638 j Abercromby's dis-
embarkation at, 819 sqq.
Acre, Bonaparte's repulse at, 637
Acul (St. Domingo), 337
Agnew, Colonel, 763-767
Ainslie, General, 113
Akersloot, 695
Alfen, 307, 311
Alost, 285, 287
Alsace, 27, 87
Alvintzy, General (Austrian), 314
Amboyna, 404
Amerongen, 319
Amiens, Peace of, signed 25th March
1802, 870
Anselme, General (French), 50
Antwerp, 67, 88, 104, 281, 285, 287,
288, 289, 290, 304 ; Conference of
the Powers at, 88
Anzin, 103, 105, 109-111
Apeltern, 311
Aresnes, 169, 170
Argonne, 48, 49
Arms, armour and accoutrements, fusils
issued to the light companies of the
Guards, 95 ; the equipment of Man-
ningham's Rifles (Rifle Brigade),
919-920 j the Baker rifle, 920
Arnheim, 309, 311, 314, 316
Arnold, Benedict, 376
Artois, Charles, Count of (afterwards
Charles X.) (and see Emigrants,
French), his flight from France, 13 ;
offers to cede Lorraine to Austria,
29 ; his base treatment of Charette,
420-421
Artres, 109, no
Assche, 287
Aubry, 109
Auckland, Lord, Ambassador at the
Hague (1792), his negotiations
with Dumouriez, 62 (and see French
Revolution) ; begs British troops
for defence of Holland, 65 ; com-
pels Stadtholder to issue orders for
defence of his country, 66; an-
nounces that England would expect
945
946
HISTORY OF THE ARMY
an indemnity for her share in the
war, 88
Austria. See Joseph, Emperor j Leopold,
Emperor j Francis II., Emperor j
Thugut, Baron
Austrian Army, its condition in 1793,
91-94; and in 1794, 223-224
Austrian Netherlands. See Belgic Nether-
lands
Aux Cayes (St. Domingo), 329, 335,
347, 35 8
Avesnes-le-Sec, 236 ; cavalry combat at,
142
Aylett, Captain, at Villers-en-Cauchies,
236-237
Bacchus Point, Guadeloupe, 380
Baird, Major-general David, 719, 725
., 726, 733, 747 j commands the
assault of Seringapatam, 739 sqq. ;
commands the Indian contingent in
Egypt, 857-860, 863
Balcarres, Major-general Lord, Governor
of Jamaica, his mismanagement of
the Maroon War, 462 sqq., 467 ;
and the evacuation of St. Domingo,
560, 563-564
Bale, Treaty of, 388
Banda, 404
Bannerman, Major John, his repulse
at Panjalamcoorchy, 760
Barbados, 79, 351-352, 477-481
Barrackmaster-general appointed, 903
Barracks, great construction of, 903-
907
Barrere, of the Committee of Public
Safety, 126
Baskerville, Lieutenant, 347
Basseterre (Gaudeloupe), 365, 370
Bastia, 179 ; attack and capture of, 184-
190
Batticaloa, 403
Battles, Combats, Sieges, etc. :
Alessandria, 632
Aresnes, 169, 170
Bacchus Point, 380
Bastia, 190
Beaumont, 240
Berville, 380
Bois-le-duc, 310
Bombarde, 338
Buurmalsen, 319
Calvi, 195
Camperdown, 570
Ckollet, 98
Conde, 114
Copenhagen, 866
Cor on, 153
Courtrai, 244
Dunkirk, 102, 123-132
Battles, Combats, Sieges, etc. :
Famars, 108
Fleur d'Epee, 364
Fleurus, 283
Fornali, 184
Fort Matilda, 382
Furnes, 147
Geldermalsen, 319
Genoa, 784
Guadeloupe, 382
Hohenlinden, 808
Jemappe, 53
Landau, 201
Landrecies, 247
Laval. 153
Le Catcau, 153
Lendelede, 250
Linselles, 121
Lyons, 165
Mainx, 114
Malta, 794
Mantua, 526, 632
Marchiennes, 147
Marengo, 785
Marseilles, 157
Martinique, 361
Maubeuge, 147
Menin, 143
Mons, 285
Mont Far on, 163
Morne Fortune, 363, 489-492
Mortella Tower, 183
Mozzello, Fort, 193, 194
Nantes, 153
Neerivinden, 68
Nieuport, 147, 286
Nouvion, 234
Panjalamcoorchy, 762
Pirmasens, 143
Pointe St. Jean, 371
Porto Ferrajo, 510
Rexpoede, 130
Rosetta, 849
Savenay, 156
Seringapatam, 739
Sluys, 303
St. Pierre, 134
Tiburon, 335, 557
Tobago, 134
Toulon, 133
Trincomalee, 403
Trinidad, 540
Tuil, 318
Turcoing, 256
Turin, 631
Valenciennes, 1 1 2-1 14
Valmy, 48
Villers-en-Cauchies, 236
Warsaw, 252
Wattrelos, 263
INDEX
947
Battles, Combats, Sieges, etc. :
Willems, 240
Ypres, 280
Bavai, 103, no, 226
Bavaria, proposed exchange of, for the
Belgic Provinces by Austria, 44, 60,
86, 87
Beaulieu, General (Austrian), 227
Beaumont, advanced posts of the Allies
driven from (April 1794), 240
Belgic Netherlands, 34 j invasion of by
Dumouriez, 37 ; discontent with
French rule in, 57, 58 5 expulsion
of the French from, 84 ; British
interest in, as a barrier state, 73 j
abandoned by the Austrians, 275 ;
becomes a French province, 567
Bellegarde, General (Austrian), defeats the
French, 240
Bellegarde, General (French), abandons
Gros Morne, 357
Bentheim, 321
Beresford, Lieutenant -colonel William,
859
Bergen-op-Zoom, 65, 300
Bernard, General, 210
Bertie, Colonel Albemarle, 209
Bertry, 240
Bethune, 37
Bettignies, 103, 120
Beurnonville, General, driven from the
French War Office, 99
Blandain, Allies driven from, by the
French, 272
Blankett, Captain, R.N., 392, 394, 858,
860
Blaton, 120
Bois-le-Duc, 67, 68, 301, 304, 308, 310,
315
Bokstel, Arthur Wellesley's baptism of
fire at, 305
Bombarde (St. Domingo), 332, 338,472-
473
Bommeler-Waert, the, 306, 307, 309,
3 IO 3 J 3
Bonaparte, Lucien, 868
Bonaparte, Napoleon. See Napoleon
Bonchamp, Marquis of, 152; killed at
Chollet, 153
Bonn, 310, 312
Bonnaud, General, 247
Bouchain, in, 237, 238
Bouchotte, Mons., French Minister o
War, 99, 115
Bouille, Marquis of, 19, 21 ; suppresses
the mutiny at Nanci, 19 j suggests
a descent upon Havre, 85 j in Bar
bados (1796), 486
Bowyer, Major-general, his services in
the West Indies, 470, 474
Bradford, Lieutenant, 347
Braine L'Alleud, 283, 285
3raine-le-Comte, 287
Sreda, 65, 67, 301, 305
Brisbane, Captain Thomas, 333, 344,
345 ; his death, 458
Brissot, Jean Pierre, 30, 32, 34, 75
Brittany alienated from the Republic by
the attack on the Church, 21 j the
expedition to Quiberon, 413-417
Bruay, 103
Bruce, General, his abortive attack on
Martinique, 135
Bruges, 279, 282, 284
Brune, General, in Piedmont, 609, 612 j
in command of the troops in North
Holland, 653-701 ; in Italy (i8oo) y
796 j in Switzerland, 580
Brunswick, Ferdinand, Duke of, opposes
Austrian alliance with Prussia, 42 j
esteemed first General in Europe,
42 ; objects to French War, 42 j
furnishes plan of campaign for in-
vasion of France (1792), 42 j his
operations (1792), 47-49 ; his con-
ference with the Austrian Com-
mander-in-chief, 63 ; his operations
in 1793, 87, 88 j defeats the French
at Pirmasens, 143 5 checks Hoche's
pursuit of Wurmser, 201
Brunswick-Oels, Duke of, 67, 68
Brussels, 37, 68, 281, 283, 285, 286, 287
Buckingham, Marquis of, 85, 478, 886
Buren, 319
Burke, Edmund, 62
Burrard, Colonel and Major - general
Harry, his service at the Bruges
Canal, 5885 his service in North
Holland, 654 n., 671 ., 683, 690,
695
Byron, Lieutenant William, death of,.
194
Caldwell, Admiral, 383
Calpentyn, 404
Calvi, 179 ; siege and capture of, 192-
195
Cambrai, 120, 235, 237, 240
Cameron, Alan, of Erracht, raises Seventy-
ninth Highlanders, 209
Campbell, Lieutenant -colonel Archibald
(Twenty-ninth Foot), his operations
in Grenada, 437-438, 494
Campbell, Captain (Forty-sixth Foot), his
operations in St. Vincent, 429
Campbell, General Dugald, 760
Campbell, Colonel Duncan, raises Ninety-
first Highlanders, 210
Camphin, 148
Cape of Good Hope, its condition and
HISTORY OF THE ARMY
past history (1795), 396 ; British
expedition to, 393-401 $ surrender
of, 401 j defeat of the Dutch expedi-
tion to, 506-509
Carnot, Lazare, 100, 101 (and see French
Army) ; antecedents and character,
100 5 placed in charge of the army,
100; his reforms, 101; his operations
(1793), 101, 112, 113; joins Com-
mittee of Public Safety, 126 ; assumes
control of the armies, 126 j known
as a Worker, 127 ; schemes of
aggression, 206 ; his plan of invasion
of England, 206 ; his plan of cam-
paign for 1794, 228 j his differences
with Robespierre and St. Just, 274 ;
his reinforcement of the army of
the Rhine, 294 ; driven from
office, 388 ; returns to the War
Office, 501 ; driven from France,
535
Cassel (France), 103, 143
" Castlebar, Race of," 592
Cathcart, Major-general Lord, 317,
3 J 9> 3 2I 3 2 3
Cathelineau (Vendean leader), 153
Catherine, Empress of Russia, her pro-
fessed zeal for the French monarchy,
29 ; her intrigues to embroil
Austria and Prussia, 43 j her
military occupation of Poland, 44 ;
her secret treaty with Prussia as to
Poland, 59 - 60 j her treaty with
Austria for partition of Poland,
386 ; death of, 524
Cavan, Major-general Lord, 819 .
Ceylon, capture of, 403-404
Championnet, General, 615
Chappuis, General, 240, 241
Charbonnier, General, 240
Charette, Mons. (Vendean leader), 153,
203, 414, 416-421
Charleroi, 280, 283
Charles, Archduke of Austria, in the
Netherlands campaign of 1793, 67 ;
of 1794, 229, 255, 256, 287 ; his
share in the battle of Turcoing,
259-262, 269, 270 ; his service on
the Rhine (1795), 503 ; his victory
at Wurzburg, 5115 his retreat be-
fore Bonaparte in Carinthia, 533 j
prepares the army for war (1798),
585 ; his victory at Stockach, 629 ;
his operations hampered by Thugut,
629-632 ; he resigns further military
command, 772
Clothing of the British Army, breakdown
of the old system, 298 j the new
regulations, 899-902 ; green clothing
introduced for Riflemen, 917-918 j
distinctions of dress for General and
Staff Officers, 926
Clunes, Lieutenant, 346
Coblentz, the rallying - point of the
Emigrants, 28
Coburg-Saalfeld, Prince Josias of, Com-
mander-in-chief of the Allied Army
in the Netherlands, his character,
92 j his plan of operations for the
campaign of 1793, 89-91 ; the cam-
paign of 1793, Io2 s yi- 5 his apathy
at the beginning of it, 105 ; he
forces the hand of the British
Government by besieging Maubeuge,
144 ; his difficulties at the opening
of 1794, 223-224 ; the campaign of
1794, 225-3035 his resignation,
33
Cockburn, Sir William, 547
Colland, General (French), 129
Colloredo, Count, no, 119
Collot, General, 365
Collot d'Herbois, 126, 202
Cologne, 51, 310
Colombo, surrender of, 404
Committee of Public Safety, 100, 115,
201, 202, 204
Commune of Paris, 41, 47, 201, 202,
205
Conde, Prince of, his flight from France,
14
Cond6, blockaded by the Austrians, 89 ;
surrenders, 114 ; recapture of, by the
French, 288, 304
Connolly, Captain, 170-171
Contich, 287
Cooke, Chief Secretary for Ireland, 81
Coote, Eyre, Colonel and Major-general,
in the West Indian campaign of
J 793> 3 6 3 j in the Netherlands
campaign of 1794, 319 j in command
of the expedition to the Bruges
Canal, 587 5 in the North Holland
expedition of 1799, 654, 671 .,
679, 683-684, 690-691 j in the
Egyptian campaign, 819 ., 822,
839, 841, 850, 854, 862-863
Copenhagen, battle of, 866
Cork, Ireland, danger of, in 1796, 525
Cornwallis, Charles, Marquis, his mission
to the Prussian headquarters (1794),
275, 295 ; appointed Master-general
of the Ordnance, 406 ; his errors
of omission in India, 711-7125 his
condemnation of the Ministers after
the campaign of 1800, 798 ; refuses
Command-in-chief in Ireland, 579 j
Lord - lieutenant and Commander-
in - chief in Ireland during the
rebellion, 591-598
INDEX
949
Corsica rises against Convention, under
Paoli, 1165 her readiness to place
herself under British protection,
117 j operations in, 1793-1794,
179 - 199 ; King George accepts
the crown of, 199 j Bonaparte
stirs the Corsicans to insurrection,
509-5 10 j evacuation of the island
512
Coruna, 835
Cotton, Stapleton (Captain and Colonel),
his service in the Netherlands, 232,
250 5 his service in the Seringapatam
campaign, 732-733
Couthon, a member of the Committee of
Public Safety, 126
Craddock, John (Lieutenant-colonel and
Major-general), 357 j his service in
Egypt, 819 ., 826-827, 832, 839,
855
Craig, James (Colonel and Major-general),
appointed Chief of the Duke of
York's Staff, 225 ; his distrust of
the cordon-system, 225 ; his service
in the Netherlands, 238, 296, 231-
291, 295-315 j his adverse criticism
of the Austrians, 271, 278, 279 ;
his service at the Cape of Good
Hope, 392-402, 507-509
Crevecoeur, 306, 308
Crosbie, Colonel, raises the Eighty-ninth
Foot, 2ioj in the Netherlands as
Major-general, 295
Cul-de-Sac Plain (St. Domingo), 328
Cunninghame, Colonel, 209
Curgies, 109
Custine, General, his invasion of the
German Bishoprics, 51 j driven
back to west bank of the Rhine,
57 j driven from Mainz, 87 j suc-
ceeds Dampierre with the Northern
Army, 115 5 executed, 116
Cuyler, Major-general, raises the Eighty-
sixth Foot, 210 5 his service in the
West Indies, 134, 543, 554
Daendels, General (in French service),
his part in the North Holland cam-
paign, 1799, 653-656, 663-664
Dalwigk, General (Hessian in British
service), 317
Dampierre, General, succeeds Dumouriez
in command on the Belgic frontier,
99 5 killed in action, 106
Danton, Jacques, 39, 48 ; executed, 205
Dantzig, 27
D'Aubant, Colonel, his service in Corsica,
188-191
De Boigne, Mons., officer in Scindia's
service, 714
De Burgh, Colonel Thomas, 209, 5 1 2, 7 97
Delancey, Colonel Oliver, the first
Barrackmaster - general, 903 5 his
misconduct, 903-907
Demer (river), 289
Denain, 120, 281
Dendre (river), 280
De Vins, General (Austrian), 117
Deynse, 279, 282, 283
Diest, 289
Dillon, General (French), massacred by
his troops, 37
Dillon's regiment (French) passes into
English pay, 331; defeat of rebels
in, 449
Dominica, 76, 139
Doonda Punt Gokla, 751, 753, 755
Doondia Wao, robber chief, 749-751,
753-759
Dort, 66
Doyle, Colonel John, raises the Eighty-
seventh Foot, 209 ; sent on an
expedition to the coast of France,
418-423 j sent on an expedition to
the Texel, 521
Drummond, Colonel, his service in the
West Indies, 368-369, 380
Duckworth, Commodore, at Minorca,
617
Duffel, 289
Dumouriez, Lieutenant-general, 34 j his
scheme for isolation of Prussia from
Austria, 48 j ordered to the Ar-
gonne, 48 j invades Belgium, 52 ;
successfully attacks the Austrians
on Jemappe, 53 5 directed to abstain
from invasion of Holland, 57 j his
negotiations with Lord Auckland,
62 j ordered to invade Holland, 62 ;
his plan of campaign, 63 j defeated
at Neerwinden, 68 ; opens negotia-
tions with Coburg, 68 j driven from
his army, 68 ; takes refuge with the
Austrians, 69 ; defection of, 99
Duncan, Admiral, 521, 568-5695 his
victory at Camperdown, 570
Dundas, David (Major - general and
Lieutenant-general), his service at
Toulon and Corsica, 167-176, 179-
187 } his service in the Netherlands,
296, 317-319 ; declines to go to
Ireland, 570, 576 ; his service in
Holland (1799), 671, 676-678,
680, 683, 691-692, 698
Dundas, Colonel Francis, 370, 371
Dundas, Henry, Secretary of State for
War, his antecedents, 70, 71 ;
charged with the Colonies and con-
duct of the war, 71 ; Pitt's closest
friend, 71 j his military policy, 73-
950
HISTORY OF THE ARMY
74 } agrees to give British protection
to St. Domingo, 79 ; sends orders to
Barbados for the capture of Tobago,
79 ; commits himself to the protec-
tion of the French West Indies, 79 ;
sends emissary to Jamaica, 82 ; his
plans for future campaign in the
Mediterranean, 1794, 117; ap-
pointed first Secretary for War,
208 ; the creation of the office an
administrative failure, 875 ; his con-
duct of the campaigns in the Nether-
lands, 113, 125-126, 141, 145-146,
149-150, 301-303; his conduct of the
operations at Toulon, 141, 168, 175-
178 ; his conduct of the war in the
Leeward West Indies, 331, 343, 347,
469, 472, 475, 550-551 ; Windward
West Indies, 351, 367-368, 375-378,
426-427, 43-433> 45!-45 2 > 459>
477-482, 537, 543-544 ; against the
Dutch Colonies, 393, 401-405, 507 ;
raids on the French coast, 153-156,
412 sq., 416-423, 775-779 ; raids on
the Dutch coast, 520, 587 ; his
design for an expedition to South
America, 527 ; his conduct of the
war in the Mediterranean, 604-606,
620-621, 775-780, 782, 786, 788,
795-796, 798 ; his conduct of the ex-
pedition to North Holland, 645-650,
708 ; his conduct of the war in the
East Indies, 720 ; his conduct of the
expedition to Egypt, 800-807, 809,
845-847, 865 ; his measures for re-
cruiting the army, 211-215, 407,
522, 639-642
Dundas, Ralph, General, 107
Dundas, Thomas, General, 354, 368 ;
his service in the West Indies, 352,
354-359> 364-367 } his death, 367
Dunkirk, to be claimed as Great Britain's
indemnity for war, 85 ; siege of, 102,
103, 112, Il8, 120, 122, 124-127,
129, 131, 132 ; cost to the allies of
the siege of, 132
Dutch Netherlands, or United Provinces,
England's treaty obligations to, 56 ;
apathy of the people in national
defence, 64 ; Dumouriez's invasion
of, 62-65 ; British troops sent for
protection of, 65 ; expulsion of the
French forces, 69 ; the army of,
95 j misbehaviour of its troops in
1794, 308, 310, 313 ; the provinces
occupied by the French, 323 ; the
Stadtholder driven to take refuge
in England, 387 ; Dutch Republic
formed in alliance with France, 391 ;
British attacks on the Dutch
Colonies, 394-404 j effort of the
Dutch to recapture the Cape of Good
Hope, 506 sq. j British raids on the
Dutch coast, 520 j Dutch expedition
for the invasion of Ireland, 569 ;
persecution of the Dutch Republic
by Bonaparte, 581 ; British expedi-
tion to North Holland, 1799, 641
sqq.
Duval, Mons., 331
Dyle (river), 287-288
East Indies, the capture of Pondicherry,
402 j the first menace of trouble in,
605 j the conquest of Mysore, 711-
745 ; pacification of Southern India,
746-748 ; dangers from French
officers in, 714-715
Eden, Sir Morton, British Ambassador at
Vienna, 87, 523 ; suggests that
Austria should be bribed to retain
Belgium, 84 j completely deceived
by Thugut, 137
Eenigenburg, 663
Egmont-aan-Zee, 69 1-692 ; battle of, 68 3
sq.
Egmont Binnen, 695
Egypt, Bonaparte's expedition to, 582-585,
607, 637-638 j British expedition to,
800-863
Einhoven, 304
El Aft (Egypt), 850
El Arish, Convention of, 774, 802
Elba, captured by the British, 510-512
El Hamed, 851
Elliot, Sir Gilbert (afterwards Earl of
Minto), sent Commissioner to
Toulon, 1 68; at Corsica, 180-181,
188, 199, 575
Elphinstone, Captain (R.N., later Ad-
miral Lord Keith), his service at
Toulon, 158 j his service in the
expedition to the Cape, 394-402 ;
compels the Dutch fleet in Saldanha
Bay to surrender, 507-509 ; his
service in the Mediterranean, 773,
780, 784-786 j his difference with
Abercromby at Cadiz, 793-794 ; in
the Egyptian expedition, 817
Emigrants, French, at Coblentz, 28, 31 ;
responsible for Brunswick's mani-
festo, 45-46 ; Emigrant regiments in
the Netherlands campaign, 311,
322 ; Emigrant regiments in West
Indies, 341-342
Emmerick, 309
Erskine, General Sir James, his difference
with Nelson, 634-635
Essen, General (Russian), 675, 677, 683,
690, 691, 694, 695
INDEX
95 1
Famars, action of, 108 sq.
Fencible Regiments, 83, 889 ; Ninety-
third Highlanders, 890 j Ancient
Irish, 781
Ferrand, General (French), 114
Ferrier, Colonel, 209
Finch, Brigadier-General, 819 n.
Fishguard, French raid on, 527
Fitch, Colonel, raises Eighty-third Foot,
210 j killed in action, 463
Fitzgerald, Colonel Thomas Judkin, of
the Ancient Irish Fencibles, 781
Fitzgerald, Lord Edward, dismissed the
Army, 57 ; military chief of the
Irish Rebellion, 589
Fitzwilliam, Earl, Lord -Lieutenant of
Ireland, 207, 517
Flers, 260
Flers, General, Dumouriez's successor in
Holland, 67
Fleurus, 283, 284
Flushing, Lord Mulgrave's detachment
sent to, 302
Forbes, Major-General, his service in the
West Indies, 466, 468-575
Ford, Commodore, R.N., his service in
the West Indies, 330-333
Fornali (Corsica), 182-184
Fort Artigues, 161
Fort Bourbon (Martinique), 353, 355,
357, 359, 3 6
Fort Charlotte (St. Lucia), 363
Fort Crevecoeur, 308
Fort de la Croix (Bastia), 185
Fort Croix de Faron (Toulon), 161
Fort Edward (formerly Fort Royal),
Martinique, 361
Fort Faron (Toulon), 161
Fort Fleur 'd'Epee (Guadeloupe), 364,
368
Fort La Malgue (Toulon), 160, 166, 172
Fort Louis (Martinique), 359-361
Fort Malbousquet (Toulon), 161
Fort Marabout (Egypt), 862
Fort Matilda (Guadeloupe), 382
Fort Monteciesco (Calvi), 192, 193
Fort Montserrato (Bastia), 185
Fort Mozzello (Calvi), 192, 193
Fort Mulgrave (Toulon), 162
Fort Royal (Martinique), 353, 355, 356,
357, 359
Fort San Gaetano (Bastia), 185
Fort St. Antoine (Toulon), 161
Fort St. Catherine (Toulon), 161
Fort St. Julien (Egypt), 850
Fort Straforello (Bastia), 185
Fouron le Comte, 290
Fox, Charles James, 54, 206, 208 j mis-
chievous speech of, in 1792, 54 5
how he kept Pitt in office, 523
VOL. IV
Fox, General Henry, his service in the
Netherlands campaign (1794), 263,
272-273, 296 j his retreat at Tur-
coing, 265 ; his service in command
at Minorca, 781, 784-785
France and the French :
French Army, 7 ; greatly demoralised
by Seven Years' War, 8 ; discipline
of officers bad, 8 ; Choiseul's reforms,
8 ; Prussian discipline adopted, 8,
9 ; system of purchase gradually
abolished, 9 ; Household Corps dis-
banded, 9 ; commissions confined to
the nobility, 9 j government of,
entrusted to Council of War, 10 ;
the militia, n ; town guards and
mounted constabulary, 12 j commis-
sions thrown open to all citizens,
1789, 1 6 j reforms of the National
Assembly, 17 ; their ill effects on
discipline, 18, 19 5 the mutiny at
Nanci, 195 further military reforms,
20 j military discipline reduced to
an impossibility, 24 j Household
troops abolished except Swiss
Guards, 23 j numbers substituted
for old titles of regiments, 23 ;
embodiment of volunteers into
National Guards, 34, 35 ; three
field armies formed (1791), 35 ; the
Legislative Assembly's mismanage-
ment of the Army, 36 ; discipline
and military spirit deteriorated, 37 ;
Ministers of War, 1789-1793, 37
n. $ invasion of Belgium, 1792,
37 j disgraceful behaviour of troops,
38 j consequent desertion of officers,
38 ; more volunteers raised, 38 ;
the Swiss Guards sacrificed to the
mob, 40 j remodelling of the
National Guard, 41 j fall of Longwy,
46 5 able-bodied citizens called out
for service, 46 ; age for service
lowered to sixteen, 47 ; Swiss troops
pass from armies of France. 47 j
surrender of Verdun, 48 ; the Sep-
tember massacres, 47 ; Dumouriez
ordered to the Argonne, action of
Valmy, 48 ; retreat of the Allies, 48,
49 ; Custine's invasion of Germany,
51, 52; Pache at the French War
Office, 6 1 j replaced by Beurnon-
ville, 62 ; volunteers and line placed
on equal footing, 62 ; Dumouriez
ordered to invade Holland, 62 ; his
first successes, 65 j his defeat at
Neerwinden, 68 j enormous desertion
of French troops, 68 ; flight of
Dumouriez, 68, 69 ; further deser-
tion in consequence, 69 j armies of
2 A
952
HISTORY OF THE ARMY
France and the French :
the Revolution driven from the
Austrian Netherlands, 69 ; Lazare
Carnot, 100, 101, 112; general
evasion of military service, 98 ;
camp formed at Peronne, 99 ;
Kellermann's scheme to preserve
regiments of the line, 100 ; posi-
tions of the French Army and the
Allies, April 1793, 102, 103 ; Dam-
pierre and the tactics of the French,
105 ; action of Famars, 108 ; Com-
mittee of Public Safety attempts to
improve army discipline, 115 j execu-
tion of generals, 1 1 6 ; revolt of the
south and of Corsica in arms against
the Convention, 1 16 ; action at Lin-
selles, 121 j operations about Dun-
kirk, 122-133 ; change in military
administration, 126 ; Committee of
Public Safety re-elected, loth August
1793, 126 j Carnot and Prieur elected
to, 126 ; Revolutionaries, High
Hands, and Workers, 126, 127 j
decree for a levy eh masse, 127 ;
uniform of National Guard adopted
for the whole army, 127 ; Prieur's
work, 127 j co'nstant defeats of the
Republicans in La Vendee, 139 j
Houchard's operations, 1793, 142 ;
his retreat, 143 ; defeat of the French
in Alsace at Pirmaserts, 143 ; troops
demoralised by continual change of
commanders, 143 ; Jourdan suc-
ceeds Houchard in the north, 146 ;
succession of reverses of the French
in the Netherlands, 148-150; the
campaign of 1793 ends, after severe
losses to the French, 150-151 ;
operations at Toulon, 158-172 j
operations in Corsica, 1793-1794,
179-199 ; Landau recaptured by the
French, 201 j progress of the French
Army towards improvement, 203 j
the levy en masse a failure, 203 ;
better recruits forced into the ranks,
203 ; reorganisation, 204 ; efforts to
improve the cavalry, 204 j execution
of the leaders of the Commune, 205 ;
execution of Danton, 205 ; work of
the Revolutionary agents in Europe,
205, 206 ; great defeat of the French
at Avesnes-le-Sec, 237 ; operations
in 1794 in Flanders, 231-272 ; great
improvement shown by the infantry,
249 ; mischief done by Robespierre,
Lebas, and St. Just, 274, 280, 294 j
Convention becomes the centre of
power, 388 j Carnot, Prieur, and
Lindet driven from office, 388 j con-
France and the French :
dition of France, 390 ; defeat of the
British expedition to Quiberon, 412-
416 ; the French armies on the
Rhine driven back, 1795, 498 ; the
French armies in the Riviera vic-
torious, 498 ; Bonaparte Minister of
War, 500 ; he suppresses the insur-
rection of Vendemiaire, 501 ; ex-
tinction of the great rebellion of La
Vendee, 502 ; Bonaparte despatched
to command in Italy, 504 ; his con-
tinued successes there, 505-506, 509-
512, 523-524, 532-5345 defeat of
the French armies in Germany, 1796,
5115 Heche's attempt to invade
Ireland, 524-526; the military
revolution of i8th Fructidor, 535 ;
the treaty of Campo Formio, 567 ;
Bonaparte's return to Paris, 579 ;
his policy of general aggression, 580 j
the expedition to Egypt, 582-585,
607, 637-638 j Humbert's landing
in Ireland, 591-594 ; Championnet's
conquest of Naples, 614 ; passing of
the law of conscription, 628 ; heavy
defeats 6f the French in Germany
and Italy, 629-633 ; Massena's vic-
tories in Switzerland, 636 ; the
British expedition to North Holland
defeated, 639-710; Bonaparte
becomes First Consul, 769 ; ^.the
Italian campaign of 1800, 780-785 ;
the German campaign of 1800, 787,
808 ; the French force in Egypt,
description of, 814; Kleber assas-
sinated and succeeded by Menou,
815 ; the engagements with the
British in Egypt, 817-843 ; de-
moralisation of the French troops
after their defeats, 851, 853, 855;
evacuation of Egypt by the French,
855
French Revolution, 12 ; causes, 13 ;
mutiny of French Guards, 13, 14;
fall ot the Bastille, 14 ; sovereign
power falls to the populace, 14 ;
flight of Princes of the blood, 14 ;
riots at Strasburg, 14, 15 ; new
militia formed, 15 ; the National
or Constituent Assembly, 16, 17;
and the Army, 17 ; dissolution of,
22 ; the King brought to Paris by
the mob (5th October 1789), 16, 17 ;
administrative re - distribution of
France, 18 ; Civil Constitution of
the Church decreed, 21 ; its effect
in Vended and Brittany, 21 ; King's
flight to Varennes, 22 ; Constitu-
tional Guard appointed for Sovereign,
INDEX
95
France and the French :
23; overthrow of monarchical Consti-
tution, 30; Girondists pick a quarrel
with Austria, 31, 325 overtures to
England and Prussia, 31 ; invasion
of the Tuileries by the mob, 395 the
Assembly declares country in danger,
39 ; Jacobins agitate for deposition
of the King, 40 ; Royal Family
imprisoned, 41 ; the September
massacres, 41 j invasion of France
by the Allies, 46 ; retreat of the
Allies, 49 ; spread of revolutionary
ideas in Italy, 50 ; Savoy and Nice
invaded, 50 ; German Bishoprics in-
vaded by Custine, 51 ; operations of
Dumouriez and Custine, 51, 52;
attitude of the British Government,
53 ; British Ambassador withdrawn
from Paris, 54 ; Talleyrand's mis-
sion to London, 54, 55 ; he is re-
placed by Chauvelin, 55 ; discontent
with France in Belgium, 58 ; Jacobins
triumph over Girondists, 60 ; the
King condemned to death, 60 ;
the Convention proclaim navigation
of the Scheldt free, 53 ; decrees that
France will help all nations that
desire liberty, 56 ; means of obtaining
funds, 58 j declares war against Eng-
land and Holland, 61 ; Dumouriez's
campaign in Holland, 65 ; his flight,
69 ; war upon Spain declared, 98 ;
Committee of Public Safety, 100 ;
execution of generals, 116 ; destruc-
tion of property in Vendee, 116;
disasters cause panic among Jacobins,
143 ; revival of the system of terror
(1794), 202 ; Robespierre and his
colleagues executed (28th July 1794),
294 ; the new Constitution of 1795,
500 ; names of the Directors, 501 ;
rejection of Pitt's overtures for peace
(1796), 519, 524 ; the revolution of
1 8th Fructidor, 536; the Directory's
quarrel with the United- States, 564 ;
its scheme of general aggression, 580 ;
the Egyptian expedition decided on,
582 ; desperate condition of France
(1799), 628 ; revolution of i8th
Brumaire, 769 (and see Napoleon)
Francis II., Emperor of the Holy Roman
Empire, his greed of territory, 43-44 ;
his treaty with the Empress Catherine
as to Poland, 44 ; his conference
with King Frederick William at
Mainz, 45 ; his designs for sharing
the partition of Venetia and Turkey,
219; takes personal command of
the army in Flanders, 229-230, 253 ;
his neglect to follow up his succes
at Cambrai, 243 ; his doubtful con-
duct at Turcoing, 258 ; decides to
abandon the defence of Belgium and
quit the army, 275 ; his designs on
Poland, 275 ; his tricky conduct as
to Belgium, 293 ; the partition of
Poland, 386 ; renews the alliance
with England (1795), 49^ 5 the
secret articles of the preliminaries of
Leoben, 533 j the treaty of Campo
Formio, 567 ; his vacillating policy
towards Naples (1798), 6135 joins
the alliance of Russia, Turkey, and
England, 627 ; gradual alienation of
Russia, 630, 636 j total rupture
with Russia, 772 ; the battle of
Marengo, 785; driven to sue for
peace at any price by the defeat of
Hohenlinden, 808
Fran9ois, Jean, a negro leader in St.
Domingo, 329
Frederick, Duke of York, his character,
96 j his operations in the Nether-
lands (1793), 118-125, 128-130,
144, 146 ; his operations in the
Netherlands (1794), 221-315 ; his
danger at Turcoing, 268-269 ; re-
called to England, 315 ; appointed
Commander-in-chief, 406-410 ; his
service in North Holland (1799),
665-701 ; his valuable service at
the Horse Guards, 876-879, 926-
929
Frederick William II., King of Prussia,
his negotiations with the Emperor
Leopold, 27 ; agrees to join Russia
in the partition of Poland, 33 ; his
readiness to combat the Revolution,
42 ; raises question of indemnities,
42 j his meeting with the Emperor,
45; his invasion of France (1792),
46 j his retreat from France (3Oth
September 1792), 49 ; he decides to
withdraw from the Coalition, 137;
agrees to provide an army by the
Treaty of the Hague, 223 ; throws
over the treaty and takes his troops
to Poland, 252 ; his continued
evasion of his obligations, 292-293 j
insolence of his troops to the British
in Westphalia, 323 ; comes to terms
with France by the Treaty of Bale,
, 386, 388-
his wrath at the
partition of Poland, 497 ; death of,
626
Frederick William III., King of Prussia,
his fatal decision not to join the
.Coalition of 1799, 626-627
Fresnes, 103
954
HISTORY OF THE ARMY
Freytag, Marshal, Hanoverian, 122 ;
marches upon and occupies Poper-
inghe, 122 ; drives the French from
Wormhoudt and Esquelbecque, 123 ;
surrounds Bergues, 123 ; wounded
and taken by the French, 129,
130
Friant, 14 ; in the ranks of the French
Guards, 14 5 a general in Egypt, 824,
825
Fromentin, General (French), 240
Furnes, 103
Galatz, Treaty of, 29
Ganteaume, Admiral, his abortive cruise
in the Mediterranean (1801), 854
Gardner, Admiral, 135
Geldermalsen, 309
Gembloux, 283, 287
Gennep, 307
Gertruydenberg, 65
Ghent, 279, 282, 284, 285, 287
Ghyvelde, 123
Girondists, their aims and opinions, 30 ;
design overthrow of monarchical
Constitution, 315 the true beginners
of the great war, 31, 37 5 trifle with
the discipline of the army, 36 5 their
responsibility for the outbreak of the
roth of August, 38-39 j they move
the deposition of the King, 40 5
their failure to recruit the army, 46-
47, 52 ; their recoil to a reactionary
policy, 60 j their fall, 115
Givet, 37, 38
Gonaives, 332
Gordon, Major-general Sir Charles, his
service in the West Indies, 354 .,
356, 363, 376
Graham, Colonel Thomas (afterwards
Lord Lynedoch), his service at
Toulon, 159, 161, 165 j raises
Ninetieth Foot, 210 ; his service on
the French coast, 416, 418, 419;
with the Austrians in Italy, 526 . 5
in the Mediterranean, 625
Graham, General, in command of the
camp at Berville, 375, 380-381
Grammont, 284, 285
Grant, Captain (Thirteenth Foot), 346
Grave, 301, 306, 310, 315
Gravina, Admiral (Spanish), appointed
commander at Toulon, 137} his
good service there, 164-1655 ap-
pointed Commander-in-chief of the
allied forces there, 166
Grenada (West Indies), the negro revolt
in 426-428, 437-441 5 subjugation
of the rebels in, 483, 494-496
Grenville, Thomas, sent Ambassador to
Vienna, 293 ; on a mission to Berlin,
626, 641 j Ambassador to the Hague,
669
Grenville, William, Lord, Secretaryof State
for Foreign Affairs, 54, 55, 60, 500 ;
character of, 72-73 ; his reluctance
to accept the principle of indemni-
ties, 84 ; he threatens Thugut with
the menace of a separate peace, 523 j
his reluctance to buy peace with
money, 536 ; gains the Tsar over to
an expedition to Holland, 632, 641 5
his undue confidence as to the success
of the expedition, 645 ; his efforts
to reconcile Russia with Austria,
771 ; his exaggerated energy in
rejecting Bonaparte's overtures,
770
Grey, General Sir Charles, his advice
asked as to Toulon, 138 5 sent with
a force to Ostend, 1505 starts for
the West Indies, 1575 trains up
light infantry, 352 ; his operations
in the West Indies, 350-3845 his
quarrel with Henry Dundas over
prize-money, 377-3785 advocates
the expedition to the Bruges Canal,
587 5 refuses the chief command in
Ireland, 576
Groningen, 321, 323, 649
Gros Morne (Martinique), 357
Guadeloupe, the British campaign in, 363-
382
Gustavus, King of Sweden, espouses cause
of Royalty in France, 28 5 assassin-
ated, 33
Haak, General (Dutch), his cowardly
behaviour, 313
Hague, Treaty of, 223
Halkett, Colonel, of the Scots Brigade,
209
Hamilton, Emma, Lady, 612
Hamilton, Sir William, British Am-
bassador at Naples, 623
Hammerstein, Count, his gallant sortie
from Menin (1794), 245
Hanover, its neutrality refused by Prussia,
3*3 388
Hanoverian troops, their quality, 95 5
fine performance of the cavalry at
Famars, 1105 their service in the
Netherlands campaigns of 1793-1794,
102-132, 141-150, 220-291 j their
severe trials before Dunkirk, 129-
31
Harcourt, Lieutenant-general, 314, 316,
317
Harris, Lieutenant - general (afterwards
Lord Harris), his campaign in
INDEX
955
Mysore, 723-745 j unrewarded for it,
747 ; his subsequent operations, 748 j
returns to Madras, 751
Harville, General (French), 102
Hawkesbury, Lord, his overtures to
Bonaparte for peace, 866, 868
Hedouville, General, 129, 556, 561
Helvoetsluis, 66, 67
Hermann, General (Russian), 673-676
Herzeele, 129
Hessian troops, character of, 94, 95 $
their gallant service before Dunkirk,
1315 at Turcoing, 2675 their
quarrel with the British Guards,
320
Hoche, Lazare, 14; a private in the
French Guards, 14} employed at
Dunkirk, 1793, 127 ; valued by
Carnot, 200 ; his zeal for invasion
of England, 206 ; commands one of
Souham's battalions at Dunkirk,
127 j drives back the Chouans at
Auray, 4145 crushes the royalists
at Quiberon, 414-416 j his abortive
expedition to Ireland, 524-526;
death of, 570
Hohenlohe, Prince of, succeeds Mack as
Chief of the Austrian Staff in
Flanders, 108
Holland. See Dutch Netherlands
Home, Mr., Governor of Grenada, 426,
438
Hood, Lord, Admiral, his fleet partly
manned by three British regiments,
116; sails for the Mediterranean,
1793, 116; occupies Toulon (26th
August 1793), J 33> I 3^} reinforced
by Langara, the Spanish Admiral,
136; appoints Admiral Gravina
commandant of Toulon, 137 j his
operations (nth September 1793),
158-172 ; appoints Lord Mulgrave
to command the British troops, 159 ;
his responsibility for the mishaps at
Toulon, 172-174 ; accepts Corsica's
proposal as to British protection,
179 ; his quarrels with David Dundas
at Corsica, 181-187 > his quarrels
with Colonel D'Aubant at Corsica,
188-191 ; his quarrels with Charles
Stuart at Corsica, 191 - 195 ; his
responsibility for friction between
Army and Navy, 198
Hoogstraten, 304
Hoorn, 671-673
Hope, Colonel John, his service in the
West Indies, 487-489, 491, 492 ;
in North Holland, 658 j in Egypt,
843
Houchard, General (French), commands
the army on the northern frontier
of France (1793), 127, 129, 130,
131 ; his attacks on the covering
army at Dunkirk, 129-131 ; de-
feated by Beaulieu, 142 ; his retreat,
143 ; guillotined, 141
Houtkerke, 129
Howe, Admiral, Lord, his victory of the
ist of June, 277
Hugues, Victor, Commissioner of the
Convention at Guadeloupe, 370 j
leader of the negro revolt in the
West Indies, 370, 375-376, 381,
425-427
Humbert, General, his invasion of Ire-
land, 591-594
Hunter, Major-general, 448
Huntly, Marquis of, raises Ninety-second
Highlanders, 210
Huskisson, William, Under-Secretary for
War, his zeal for the capture of
Spanish South America, 528 ; chief
inspirer of the expedition to the
Bruges Canal, 587 ; his position at
the War Office, 874
Hutchinson, General Hely- (afterwards
Lord Hutchinson), his service in
Ireland, 592 ; his service in North
Holland, 697-698 ; second in com-
mand of the Egyptian expedition,
807 j his service in the action of
Nicopolis, 828-829 ; succeeds Aber-
cromby in command in Egypt, 849 ;
his character, 849 ; his difficulty
with his brigadiers, 851, 854; his
operations in Egypt, 849-856, 861-
863
Huy, 289
Huysse, 283
Ilfracombe, French raid on, 527
Inchy, 240
India. See East Indies
Indian contingent sent to Egypt, 803 ;
its progress, 856-861
Ireland, rise of the United Irishmen, 515 j
and of the Orange Society, 517 ; in-
efficiency of the troops in, 518 ; the
Yeomanry formed, 519; Hoche's
expedition to, 524-525 j projected
Dutch expedition to, 569 ; Sir Ralph
Abercromby's tenure of the com-
mand-in-chief, 571-577 j outbreak
of the rebellion, 589 ; landing of
Humbert and his operations, 591-
594 ; failure of further French ex-
peditions to Ireland, 548 ; adminis-
trative improvements after the
Union, 886
Irois (St. Domingo), 331, 557
956
HISTORY OF THE ARMY
Irving, Major-general, his service in the,
West Indies, 451-453
Isle d'Yeu, the expedition to, 420-
422
Italy, French designs against, 51 ;
Austria's anxiety to get hold of the
Novarese, 139; and to obtain Venetia
219 j Bonaparte's first campaign in,
53-55> 59-5 ir > 5 26 '5 2 7, 5335
partition of at Peace of Campo
Formio, 567 ; designed by Stuart as
the sphere for British operations,
624 ; successes of Suvorof in, 630-
632 $ Bonaparte's second campaign
in, 783-785; and see Naples,
Sardinia, Papal States
Jacmel, 329, 333
jacobins, Jacques Danton, new leader of,
39 j Monciel wishes to put down,
39 ; agitate for deposition of the
King, 40 ; commissioners sent to
the French West Indies, 75, 76
Jaffnapatam, 404
Jamaica, 76, 82, 140 j the Maroon war
in, 458-465
Jean Rabel (St. Domingo), 332, 337
Jemappe, 53
Jeremie, 328, 330, 331-333, 335, 337.
457-458, 474
Jervis, John, Admiral, Lord St. Vincent,
his operations in the West Indies,
198, 354, 366-368, 375-378, 382-
3845 in the Mediterranean, 1796,
509-512 j his victory at St. Vincent,
529 j his opinion of Charles Stuart,
606 j his readiness to attack Spanish
ports, 606
Jodoigne, 289
Joseph II., Emperor of the Holy Roman
Empire, his league with Russia
against the Turks, 26 ; checked by
Pitt through the Triple Alliance, 26 j
death of, 26
Jourdan, General, 1 29, his services in the
Netherlands in 1793, 146-147 ; his
services in the Netherlands, 1794,
287, 289, 307, 310; his defeat at
Wurzburg, 51 1} his defeat at
Stockach, 629 ; introduces the law
of conscription in France, 628
Kaiserslautern, 274, 294
Kampen, 322
Kaunitz, Count, his service in the
Netherlands, 226, 251, 274, 276
Kehl, 51
Keith, Lord. See Elphinstone
Kellermann, General, 100, 115, 117
Kempt, Major James, 697 j
Kilmain, General (French), 118, 119,
127
Kina, Jean (a negro leader in St.
Domingo), 333, 347
Kinsky, Count (Austrian general), 251 j
his strange behaviour at Turcoing,
256-257, 259, 269
Kleber, General, 153, 203, 307 j in
Egypt, 638, 8155 assassinated, 815
Klundert, 65
Knobelsdorf, von, General (Prussian),
94, 103, 1 06
Knox, Colonel, his service in the West
Indies, 484, 491 ; his service in
North Holland, 677
Koedyck (North Holland), 679, 683
Koehler, Colonel, his service at Toulon
and Corsica, 172, 180, 181, 183,
197 ; Commissioner with the
Turkish army at Jaffa, 801-802 j
death of, 8 10
Kosciusko, his insurrection in Poland,
252 ; his hostility towards Prussia,
and its results, 253
Kray, General (Austrian), 281
La Croisette, 272
Lacy, Marshal, founder of the cordon
system, 91
Lafayette, Marquis de, 10, 1 1, 15, 16, 31,
35, 39
Laforey, Admiral Sir John, 486
Lake, Gerard, Colonel (afterwards Lord
Lake), his service in the Nether-
lands, 66 ; at Linselles, 121
Lamarliere, General, 103
Landau, 201
Landen, 288-289
Landrecies, siege and capture of, 234-
247 j recaptured by the French,
288, 304
Langara, Don Juan de, Spanish Admiral,
reinforces Lord Hood at Toulon, 136
Lannoy, 257-258, 262, 265
Lansdowne, Marquis of, 54
Lanusse, General, 833, 835-838
La Plume (negro leader in St. Domingo),
553, 55 6 > 559
La Pointe (mulatto leader in St.
Domingo), 337
Larochejaquelin, Marquis de, his success
at Laval, 153
Latour, General (Austrian), 103, 306
Lauderdale, Earl of, 208
Laval, battle of, 153
La Vendee, the revolt of, 12, 21, 99, 115,
116, 139 j Republican defeats, 139;
leaders of the revolt, 152, 153 ; their
successes, 152, 153; an emissary
sent to London to ask for arms,
INDEX
957
ammunition, and artillerymen, 1^3 ;
Dundas's promises, 153 ; Lord
Moira's abortive expedition to, 154-
156; the insurgents finally over-
thrown at Savenay, 156; Turreau's
infernal columns, 203 ; overtures
made to conciliate the leaders of,
389; hostility between royalists and
republicans in, 413 ; the abortive
expedition to Isle d'Yeu, 419-421
Lebas, 202, 274
Lebrun, French Foreign Minister, 55
Lecelles, 103
Lefebvre (afterwards Marshal) in the
ranks of the French Guards, 14
Legislative Assembly, first meeting of in
Paris, 30 ; its mismanagement of
the French Army, 36 ; and of the
French colonies, 75
Leigh, Major-general, 209, 453
Leoben, Treaty of, 533
Leogane (St. Domingo), 328, 333, 335,
337-339i 466, 47i
Leopold, Emperor of the Holy Roman
Empire, succeeds Joseph, 26 ; his
overtures to Frederick William, 27 ;
extends Austrian influence in Poland,
27 ; his suggested settlement of
Polish crown, 27 ; his treaty for
settlement of troubles in France, 28,
29 ; forbids French royalists in his
dominions, 29 ; rejects Artois' offer
to cede Lorraine to Austria, 29 ;
seeks Prussian support, 32 ; obtains
treaty of alliance with Prussia, 32 ;
his death, 32
Lewis XVI., King of France, 9, 16, 17,
22, 24 ; attempts to dissolve corps
of Emigrants, 3 i ; his weakness at
the attack of the Tuileries, 40 ; his
execution, 61
Liege, 63, 67
Lierre, 289
Lille, 37, 120,143,280; insubordination
of garrison at, 1792, 37
Lindet, Robert, member of the Com-
mittee of Public Safety, known as
one of the Workers, 126 ; driven
from office, 388
Lindsay, Colonel, his operations in
Grenada, 428
Linselles, action of, 120
Lombeek Ste. Catherine, 286
Longwy, captured by Brunswick, 46 j
evacuated, 49
Loughborough, Lord Chancellor, draws
up a plan for the siege of Dunkirk,
126
Louvain, 68, 99, 287-, 288, 289
L'Ouverture, Toussaint, negro leader in
St. Domingo, 344, 466, 467, 547-
549, 553, 556, 559, 560, 563,
564
Luckner, General, 35
Ludlow, Major-general, 819 .
Luxemburg, 304
Lyons, the revolt and fall of, 136, 157,
165
Lys (river), 280, 283
Maadieh, Lake, 825
Maastricht, 63, 290, 301, 307, 310
Macaulay, Major, 761-763
Macdonald, General (French), his service
in Flanders, 1794, 260, 323 ; his
service in Italy, 631
Mack, Colonel, Chief of Coburg's Staff,
his character, 92; resigns, 1793, 108 j
his part in the campaign of 1794,
220-221, 233, 255, 270; resigns
his post as Chief of the Staff, 273 ;
called to command of the Neapolitan
forces, 6 10, 614, 615
Mackenzie, Mr., President of Grenada,
428-429, 437-43 8
Madajee Scindia, 713, 714
Madoo Rao Narrain, 713
Mainz, 43, 51, 87, 114, 304
Maitland, Major and Colonel Thomas,
208 ; at Barbados, 1796, 486 (then
Colonel) ; his service in St. Domingo,
1797-1798, 548-549, 554-564; his
decision to evacuate St. Domingo,
561 sqq. ; commands expedition to
Belleisle, 777-779
Malacca, 404
Malartic, Mons., Governor of Mauritius,
717, 718
Malcolm, Captain, father of the West
India Regiments, 689-690
Malines, 68, 287, 288, 289
Mallavelly, action at, 731
Mallet du Pan, Mons., 17, 138, 390
Malmesbury, James, Earl of, his mission
to Berlin, 219, 223, 293 ; his mis-
sion to Paris, 524 ; his mission to
Lille, <35
Malouet, Mons., 17, 78
Malta, captured by Bonaparte, 607 ;
blockaded by the British, 609, 625 j
surrenders to the British, 794
Manaar, 404
Mannheim, 304
Manningham, Colonel Coote, maker of
the Rifle Brigade, 918
Mansel, Colonel, Third Dragoon Guards,
misconduct of his brigade at Villers-
en-Cauchies, 238 ; killed at Beau-
mont, 242-243
Mansfield, Lord, 207
958
HISTORY OF THE ARMY
Marchiennes, 120, 226
Maresches, 109
Maret, Mons., 60
Mariegalante, 79
Maroons of Jamaica, the story of their
rebellion, 460-465
Marseilles, the revolt of, 136, 157
Massena, General, his victory at Loano,
498 j his successful campaign in
Switzerland, 629, 630, 636 5 sent to
Italy, 770 ; his heroic defence of
Genoa, 783
Maubeuge, 102, 143, 144
Maulde, 103, 279
Maurois, 240
Melas, General, his operations in Italy,
1800, 780; defeated at Marengo,
785 ; concludes the convention of
Alessandria, 785 ; his projects re-
jected by Abercromby, 787
Menin, 103, 120, 122, 142, 143, 226,
245, 260, 277, 280
Menou, General, 815, 825, 834, 836,
837, 856, 862, 863
Meuron, de, M., his regiment taken into
the British service, 402-403
Militia, the British, used as a source of
recruiting for the line, 639-641 5 its
strength, 1793-1803, 888
Minorca, attack and capture of, 615-618
Miquelon, 134
Mirabeau, Gabriel Honor, Count, 13,
16, 17, 19-21
Miranda, General, 63
Mirebalais, 333
Moeletivoe, 404
Moerdyk, 65
Moira, Major-general, Earl of, appointed
to command the expedition in La
Vendee, 1545 complains of defici-
encies, 154 $ arrives too late to be of
service, 156 j embarks for Ostend,
281-283 j goes in command to
Quiberon to act as auxiliary to
Count of Artois' army, 416
Mole St. Nicholas (St. Domingo), capture
of, 327, 331, 338, 458 ; the Govern-
ment's project of holding it and
evacuating the rest of St. Domingo,
545
MBllendorf, Marshal (Prussian), 274,
275,292,293,312
Monciel, French Minister, advocates sup-
pression of Jacobins, 39
IV^on?, 37 j fall of, 285
]V orr.-en-Pevele, 279, 280
Moatalembert, Mons. de, 337, 342, 547-
548
Montesquieu, General, 50
Mont Faron, 163
Montfrault, General, 262, 263 ; in
command at Turcoing, 262-263
Montrecourt, 236
Moore, John (Colonel and Major-general),
his service in Corsica, 180, 182-190,
194-195, 197 j his service in the
West Indies, 487-488, 490-492,
495 ; his service in Ireland, 590 j
his service in North Holland, 654-
657, 671, 688-689; h' s service in
Egypt, 819-823, 827, 832-841, 852,
855
Moreau, General (French), his service in
the Netherlands, 254, 260, 301,
310, 315, 316, 318, 323; his re-
verses in Germany, 511; his victory
at Hohenlinden, 808
Morne Fortune, St. Lucia, capture of,
363 ; evacuation of, 436 ; recapture
of, 490-492
Mornington, Earl of (subsequently Mar-
quess Wellesley), his arrival in India
as Governor-general, 720 j his con-
ciliation of the Nizam and the
Mahrattas, 721-7225 his decision
and preparations to invade Mysore,
723-724 j neglected by the East
India Company, 747 ; orders his
brother to hunt down Doondia Wao,
753 ; his readiness to send help to
Egypt, 803
Mortagne, 279
Mounier, Mons., 17
Mouscron, 277
Mouveaux, 258
Mozzello Fort (Calvi), siege and capture
o f , i 9 3- 1 94
Mulgrave, Major-general, Earl of, his
mission to Italy, 117; his service
at Toulon, 159-162 ; his service at
Flushing, 302-303
Murray, Sir James (afterwards Sir J.
Pulteney), 97 j character and capacity
of, 97 ; Chief of the Duke of York's
Staff, 97 ; his service in the Nether-
lands, 1793, 103-132, 141-151 ; his
passage of arms with Henry Dundas,
146, 149 j his service in Holland,
1799, 654-656, 666, 679, 684, 692,
698 ; his attack on Ferrol, 790-
792 j in the Mediterranean, 799,
803, 804, 806
Murray, Colonel John, 858
Myers, Colonel, his service in the West
Indies, 354 ., 359, 444-447
Namur, 37, 67, 68, 144, 284, 287, 289
Nancy, 37
Nantes, 153
Naples and the two Sicilies, 510 ; alliance
INDEX
959
between Great Britain and, 1165
compelled to neutrality by Napoleon,
506 ; Austria seeks alliance with
(1798), 582, 610 ; Nelson's return to
Naples after the battle of the Nile,
610 ; the King and Queen of Naples
and Lady Hamilton, 614 j the King
takes the offensive by Nelson's
order, 6 1 5 j conquest of the country
by the French, and conversion into
Parthenopean Republic, 615 j re-
covery of the Neapolitan dominions
by Nelson and Cardinal Ruffo, 631
Napoleon Bonaparte, a spectator of the
attack on the Tuileries, 40 ; ap-
pointed by Carnot to take command
of the artillery at Toulon, 162, 163 j
his plan of attack, 167 ; saved from
ruin by Carnot, 203 j the 13th of
Vendemiaire, 501 ; sent to Italy by
Carnot, 504 ; Sardinia delivered into
the hands of the Republic, 505 ;
Lodi, 505 5 his supremacy in Italy,
505 ; presses the siege of Mantua,
506 ; organises a body of Corsican
refugees at Leghorn, 509 ; Lonato
and Castiglione, 510; Bassano,
5115 Caldiero and Arcola, 523 j
Rivoli, 526 j he advances into
Austria, 533 ; concludes the Treaty
of Leoben, 533 j conditions of
Treaty, 534 ; seizes Corfu, 534; his
aggression on all sides, 581, 582 j
his Egyptian expedition, 582-585,
607-608, 637-638 j his failure at
Acre, 637 ; he lands in France, 636,
638 j he becomes First Consul after
the 1 8th Brumaire, 769 ; his great
political sagacity, 770, 771 ; his
pacific overtures, 770 ; his Italian
campaign of 1800, 783, 785 j his
renewed overtures to the Emperor
Francis, 788 ; his diplomatic activity
after Marengo, 806, 848 ; his
anxiety to have his army in Egypt,
812-8135 he alienates the Czar
from England, 868 ; his schemes
upset in the Iberian Peninsula 868 ;
Peace of Amiens, 869-870
National or Constituent Assembly of
France and the Army, 16, 17, 22,
3 2 > 39> 4, 75
National Guard of France, 13-15, 18,
34-36; its uniform, 15; uniform
of, adopted for the whole Army,
127
Navy, the British, its demands upon the
Army, 82, 116 ., 277 ; its perfect
harmony with the Army under
Jervis, 383 ; its quarrels with the
Army under Hood, 195-196 ; its
devotion saves the Army at Isle
d'Yeu, 421 ; the mutinies at Spit-
head and the Nore, 529, 530 j its
outcry against the Army after
Ferrol, 791-792 ; Nelson's criticisms
of the Army, 797 ; and see Duck-
worth, Hood, Jervis, Nelson
Necker, Mons., 13
Neerwinden, battle of, 68
Nelson, Captain and Admiral Horatio,
his service in Corsica, 189 ., 192-
193, 197 ; his chase of Bonaparte,
1798, 607 ; battle of the Nile, 607 j
his return to Naples, 608, 611 ; his
anxiety to follow up his successes,
614 j escorts the Court of Naples to
Palermo, 615 ; begs Stuart to send
a battalion to Sicily, 623 ; his
success in the recovery of the
Neapolitan dominions, 631 j his
jealousy of the Russians in the
Mediterranean, 634 ; his extravagant
scheme for recovery of the Roman
States, 634 ; he leaves Naples for
Vienna, 786 ; his harsh strictures
on British generals, 797-798 , his
victory at Copenhagen, 866
Nice invaded by the French, 1792, 5
Nicolls, Brigadier, his service in the
West Indies, 438, 483
Nieuport, 226, 284-286 ; surrender of,
286
Nimeguen, 63, 301, 309, 311, 312, 315
Nivelles, 287
Nomain, 103
Nouvion, 234
Novarese, Austria's greed for the, 139
Nugent, Colonel, raises the Eighty-fifth
Foot, 210
Oakes, Brigadier-general, his service in
Egypt, 819 ., 822
O'Hara, General, Sir Charles, his service
at Toulon, 167, 168, 170
Onnaing, 103
Ooi, 312
Orange, the Prince of (Stadtholder), his
preternatural dulness and apathy,
64 ; takes refuge in England, 387
Orange, the Hereditary Prince of, his
part in the Netherlands campaign
of 1793, no, in, 120; of 1794,
300-302 ; his part in the North
Holland campaign of 1799, 668
Orchies, 103, 226, 279, 281
Osnabriick, 323
Ostend, 112, 113, 148-150, 279-282,
284
Osterhout, 301
960
HISTORY OF THE ARMY
Osterwyk, 305
Otto, General (Austrian), his brilliant
cavalry actions at Villers-en-
Cauchies and Beaumont, 236, 240
Oudenarde, 283, 284
Oudkarspel, action at, 6-79
Ourthe (river), 288
Pache, Jacobin Minister of War, 52, 99 ;
his myrmidons plunder Belgium,
58
Paget, Colonel Edward, 835
Paget, Lord (afterwards Lord Uxbridge
and Marquis of Anglesey), raises the
Eighteenth Foot, 209
Panjalamcoorchy, 762
Pannarden Canal, 315
Paoli, Pasquale, General, 116, 180
Papal States, the, mulcted by Bonaparte,
506 j occupied by Bonaparte, 1797,
533 j partly converted into the
Roman Republic, 567 ; again
plundered, 581 j recovered by Naples,
633
Parminter, Lieutenant, 767
Paul, Emperor of Russia, a half -crazy
creature, 610 j renounces Catherine's
warlike policy, 524 ; alarmed by
Austria's menace to France in 1798,
585 j moved to hostilities by Bona-
parte's capture of Malta, 6iij
joins an alliance with Turkey and
Russia, 625 j consents to employ
Russian troops in Italy, 627 ; his
wrath with Prussia for not joining
the Alliance, 626 j his rupture with
Austria, 636, 771, 772 , he consents
to a joint expedition with England
to Holland, 641 ; his rupture with
England, 773, 799, 807 ; gained
over by Bonaparte, 799, 802 ; he
prepares to march against India,
848 j alienated by Bonaparte and
reconciled with England, 868
Peel, the (swamp in Holland), 301, 304
Perron, Mons., officer in Scindia's service,
7H
Peronne, 99
Petite Riviere (Martinique), 333
Philippeville, 102
Pichegru, General, a non-commissioned
officer before the Revolution, 200 ;
his service in command of the French
in the Netherlands, 229, 232-234,
239, 248, 272, 283-284, 289, 308 ;
not present at Turcoing, 260 j leaves
the Netherlands owing to illness,
310
Picton, Major Thomas, 430
Pilnitz, Declaration of, 27, 29
Pirmasens, action at, 143
Piron, Mons., officer in the Nizam'?
service, 721
Pitt, William, a minister of peace, 53 ;
determined not to interfere with in-
ternal affairs of France, 54 ; pledges
himself to/give protection to Hollanc,
56 ; his efforts to preserve integrity
of Poland, 60 ; dismisses French
Ambassador upon execution of Lewis
XVI., 6 1 j his boundless confidence
in Henry Dundas, 71 ; his military
policy, 73-74 ; his attitude towards
the Bavarian exchange, 60, 84 ; his.
failure to adapt his military policy,
137 sq. consequences of his par-
simony towards the British Army,
216 ; his efforts to restore amity
among the Allies, 219-222 ; his reck-
lessness in promising troops, 220-
222, 641 j his futile endeavours to
obtain his money's worth from
Austria and Prussia, 293, 310, 3155
his unfair behaviour to Grey and
Jervis as to prize-money, 376-378 j
his share in the project of the ex-
pedition to Quiberon, 412 j his sub-
servience to the West Indies Com-
mittee, 43-2 ; reasons for his patience
with Austria's duplicity, 498 ; his
eagerness for peace with France, 500,
502, 524, 53,5 ; effect of Bonaparte's
victories in Italy upon him, 5135
his consciousness of his misconduct
of the war, 514; his responsibility
for the naval mutinies, 531, 532}
his unfair treatment of Abercromby
in Ireland, 576, 577 j his rudeness
to Abercromby over the North Hol-
land expedition, 645 ; his resignation,
848
Pocklington, Captain, 237
Poland, the Emperor Leopold's designs
for, accepted by Prussia, 27 j Prussia
repudiates them at the instance of
the Empress Catherine, 33 : the
Emperor Francis by treaty with
Russia repudiates Leopold's plans,
45 ; Prussian troops enter Poland
at the instance of the Empress
Catherine, 59, 60 ; Pitt's efforts to
save Poland, 60 $ the Emperor
Francis claims a share in Poland, 87 j
the King of Prussia leaves the Rhine
for Posen, 151 j Kosciusko's insur-
rection, 252 j it is repressed by
Suvorof, 309, 386 ; third partition
of Poland, 387 ;. still a factor in
Europe owing to Thugut's jealousy
of Prussia, 627, 629
INDEX
961
Polverel, Commissioner of the French
Convention in St. Domingo, 75,
326, 329, 33
Polygar War, the, 760-767
Pondicherry, attack and surrender of,
402
Pont-a-Chin, 272
Poperinghe, 129, 142
Popham, Captain Home, R.N., 587-588
Port-au-Prince, 328, 333, 335, 336, 466,
47', 548, 549. 554} capture of,
339 5 evacuation of, 556
Port-de-Paix, 32^8, 348
Portland, Duke of, his party joins Pitt's
Government, 206, 207 ; his agitation
over Abercromby's General Order in
Ireland^ 573
Portugal, British troops sent to give pro-
tection against Spain, 601-605 ; again
threatened by Spain (1800), 788,
799, 803, 806-8075 invaded by
Spain, 868
Prescott, Major-general, his service in
the West Indies, 357, 362, 376,
382-383
Preseau, 108
Prieur of the Cote d 'Or, joins the Com-
mittee of Public Safety, 1265 takes
charge of arms, ammunition, and
hospitals, 126 5 known as one of the
Workers, 127 ; sets up manufactories
for arms and ammunition, 127 j
driven from office, 388
Prisches, 240
Proven, 129
Provisional Cavalry, 523, 891, 893
Prussia, decay of discipline in, 42 ; the
army of, 94 ; and see Frederick
William II. and III., Kings of
Prussia
Pulteney, Sir James. See Murray, Sir
James
Pychy Rajah, the, 752, 761
Quesnoy, 102, 120, 285, 304
Quiberon, the expedition to, 417-419
Qui&vrain, 37
Rahmameh (Egypt), 850-851
Raismes, 103
Ramillies, 287
Rampon, General, 836, 837, 838
Ramsay, Captain George, 215
Reenen, 319
Regiments :
Cavalry
Royal Horse Guards (Blues), 112, 231,
236, 238, 241-242, 249
First Dragoon Guards, 231, 241 sq.,
249, 296 .
Regiments :
Cavalry
Second Dragoon Guards (Bays), 231,
249-250, 296 a.
Third Dragoon Guards, 231, 236, 238,
241-242, 249-250, 296 a.
Fourth Dragoon Guards, 416
Fifth Dragoon Guards, 231, 241, 242,
249-250, 296 .
Sixth Dragoon Guards (Carabineers),
231, 249-250, 296 .
First Dragoons (Royals), 112, 231,
236, 238, 239, 242, 249-250,
296 n.
Second Dragoons (Greys), 112, 231,
249-250, 296 .
Fifth Dragoons, disbanded for mutiny,
595-597
Sixth Dragoons (Inniskillings), 112,
231, 249-250, 296 .
Seventh Light Dragoons (Flanders,
1793), I0 7, i49i (i794) 2 42, 250,
257, 258, 261, 265, 269, 296 . j
West Indies, 1794, 355 . j (North
Holland, 1799), 665, 671, 683, 686
Eighth Light Dragoons (Flanders,
1794), 246, 279, 296 . ; (Egypt,
1801), 858
Tenth Light Dragoons (West Indies,
1794), 355 n.
Eleventh Light Dragoons (Flanders,
I 793) I0 75 (i794) 235, 242,
250, 296 . ; (W. Indies, 1794),
355 n. ; (North Holland, 1799), 660,
671, 683, 686 j (Egypt, 1801),
850 .
Twelfth Light Dragoons (Corsica), 191,
602 j (Egypt, 1801), 806, 850 .
Thirteenth Light Dragoons (West
Indies, 1795), 462, 464, 468 .,
472 .
Fourteenth Light Dragoons (Flanders),
282, 296 ., 418 j (West Indies,
1795), 462, 468 ., 472 .
Fifteenth Light Dragoons (Flanders,
>793 J 794), 107, 237, 239, 250,
257, 258, 261, 265, 269, 296 n. j
(Holland, 1794), 312, 3215 (West
Indies, 1794), 355 . } (North
Holland, 1799), 682, 683
Sixteenth Light Dragoons (Flanders,
1793-1794), 242, 250, 257, 258,
261, 264, 265, 269, 296 n.
Seventeenth Light Dragoons (West
Indies), 462, 464, 468 n., 472 .,
484, 587
Eighteenth Light Dragoons (West
Indies), 462, 463, 468 n. j 472 . j
(North Holland, 1799), 665, 671,
684.
962
HISTORY OF THE ARMY
Regiments :
Cavalry
'Nineteenth Light Dragoons, 402 5
(India, 1799-1800), 725, 753
'Twentieth Light Dragoons (West
Indies, 1795), 4.62
Twenty-First Light Dragoons (Beau-
mont's), 210, 468 ., 472 ., 559
Royal Artillery, growth of, 912-
916 ; services, ubique
Foot Guards, 38, 55, 121 ; despatch
of three regiments to Holland, 80
First Guards (Flanders), 85 ; (North
Holland, 1799), 6895 (Linselles),
121, 587
Coldstream Guards (Flanders), 85, 96,
106 j (Linselles), 121, 587, 7895
(Egypt, 1801), 819-821, 837,
841
Third Guards (Flanders), 85 ; (Lin-
selles), 121, 587, 7895 (Egypt, 1801),
819-820, 837, 841
Infantry of the Line
First Foot (Royals), at Toulon, 166 ;
in Corsica, 182, 183 j (West Indies),
334, 346, 472 ., 6025 (Egypt,
1801), 819, 850 .
Second Foot (West Indies, 1795), 433,
477 . j (Egypt, 1801), 819, 850 .
Third Foot (Buffs), 148 ., 282, 296
. } (West Indies, 1796), 477 .,
483', 484, 493
Sixth Foot (West Indies, 1794), 354 n.
Eighth Foot, 282, 296 . ; (Holland),
312 j (West Indies), 354 ., 477 .,
482,483} (Egypt, 1801), 8i 9 .
Ninth Foot (West Indies), 354 . j at
Houat, 789
Tenth Foot (West Indies), 477 ., 483,
719; (Egypt, 1801), 857
Eleventh Foot, 116, 159, 171, 182,
5875 (Egypt, 1801), 866 .
Twelfth Foot (Flanders), 246, 296 . ;
(West Indies), 354 n., 418 ; (India,
1801), 725 ., 765
Thirteenth Foot (West Indies), 330,
335 346 j at Houat, 789
Fourteenth Foot (Flanders), 189, 231,
257, 258, 261, 273, 296 ., 319;
(West Indies), 487, 541 n.
Fifteenth Foot (West Indies) 354 .,
449
Sixteenth Foot,' 462
Seventeenth Foot (West Indies), 354
., 468 ., 471 ., 472 ., 5595
(Mediterranean), 781
Eighteenth Foot (Toulon and Corsica),
171, 194; (Egypt, 1801), 819 .
Regiments :
Infantry of the Line
Nineteenth Foot, 282, 296 n. j
(Brittany), 416, 4 77 . } (India,
1801), 760, 761; (Egypt, 1801),
857
Twentieth Foot (West Indies), 333,
335 } (North Holland), 660, 664
Twenty-First Foot (West Indies), 182,
354 ., 449
Twenty - Second Foot (West Indies),
346, 354 n.
Twenty-Third Foot (West Indies), 354
., 587 n. ; (North Holland, 1799),
658} (Egypt, 1801), 820
Twenty-Fourth Foot (Egypt, 1801),
856
Twenty -Fifth Foot (Toulon and
Corsica), 159, 182, 183} (West
Indies), 439, 477 ., 483 } (North
Holland, 1799^689} (Egypt, 1801),
856
Twenty-Sixth Foot (Egypt, 1801),
856
Twenty-Seventh Foot (Flanders), 282,
296 ., 312, 319, 321 ; (West
Indies), 477 ., 490, 492 } at Houat,
789
Twenty-Eighth Foot, 148 n., 282, 296
., 3 I2 > 3 Z 9> 3 2I > 477 5 (Egypt*
1801), 820, 835-838
Twenty -Ninth Foot (West Indies),
439, 477 ., 483, 484
Thirtieth Foot, 116, 159, 166, 182,
602 ; (Egypt, 1801), 819 n., 850 .
Thirty-First Foot (Flanders), 302, 303 }
(West Indies), 354 w., 477 ., 492 .
Thirty-Second Foot (West Indies), 468
., 471 ., 472 .
Thirty -Third Foot (Flanders), 282,
296 ., 305 } (West Indies), 354 .}
(India), 726, 732, 735, 739, 743
Thirty-Fourth Foot (Flanders), 302,
303 ; (West Indies, 1794), 354 .,
433 493
Thirty-Fifth Foot (North Holland),
680
Thirty-Sixth Foot, 402, 778, 779
Thirty-Seventh Foot (Flanders), 109,
231, 257, 258, 261, 273} (West
Indies), 477 .
Thirty- Eighth Foot (Flanders), 246,
279 5 (West Indies), 354 ., 477 n.
Thirty-Ninth Foot (West Indies), 354
., 381 ., 468 . ,(1795), 471
(1796), 486
Fortieth Foot (Flanders), 282, 296 . ;
(West Indies, 1794), 354 ., 559 }
(Holland, 1794), 319; (West Indies,
J 795), 446, 448, 45 2 5 (Holland,
INDEX
963
Regiments :
Infantry of the Line
1799), 661, 6645 (Egypt, 1801),
850 //.
Forty-First Foot (West Indies), 339,
354
Forty-Second Foot (Highlanders), 4165
(West Indies), 477/1., 493-494,
541 ., 544; (Egypt), 819 ., 822-
823, 836, 838, 840
Forty-Third Foot (West Indies), 354
., 381 .
Forty-Fourth Foot (Flanders), 282,
296 . ; (West Indies), 354 ., 477
., 492 , ; (Egypt, 1801), 819 n.
Forty-Fifth Foot (West Indies), 433
Forty-Sixth Foot (West Indi.s), 441
Forty-Eighth Foot (West Indies), 477
., 487, 492 .
Forty-Ninth Foot (West Indies), 330,
33* 335 5875 (North Holland,
1799), 689
Fiftieth Foot, 182, 183, 184, 194, 335,
602 ; (Egypt, 1801), 819 n.
Fifty-First Foot, 1 8^184, 194, 335,
602, 720
Fifty-Second Foot (Ceylon), 402, 404,
789
Fifty-Third Foot, 109, 231, 257, 258,
261, 273, 296 . j (West Indies),
477 ., 487-489, 541 .
Fifty-Fourth Foot, 148 ., 282, 296
n. ; (West Indies), 446, 448, 452,
492 n. ; (at Houat), 789 5 (Egypt,
1801), 819
Fifty- Fifth Foot, 246, 279, 312;
(West Indies), 354 . ; (North
Holland, 1799), 658, 679
Fifty-Sixth Foot (West Indies), 354
., 381 ., 443 j 468 ., 471 .,
472 .
Fifty-Seventh Foot, 142,2825 (West
Indies), 477 ., 482, 487, 490
Fifty-Eighth Foot (West Indies, 1794),
354-j (Egypt, 1801), 850 .
Fifty-Ninth Foot, 148 ., 282, 296 . j
(West Indies, 1795), 446, 448,
452
Sixtieth Foot (West Indies), 354 .,
442, 443> 445> 54 1 544 J North
Holland, 682
Sixty-First Foot (West Indies), 433,
434, 435 ; (Egypt, 1801), 858
Sixty-Second Foot (West Indies), 312,
332, 462
Sixty-Third Foot, 282, 296 ., 312,
354 j (West Indies), 477 ., 483,
484, 779 ; (at Houat), 789
Sixty-Fourth Foot (Egypt, 1801), 866
Regiments :
Infantry of the Line
Sixty-Filth Foot (West Indies), 381 n.
Sixty-Sixth Foot (West Indies), 354 .,
468 n., 472 ., 559
Sixty-Seventh Foot (Flanders), 296 .,
4.68 n., 471 ., 472 ., 559
Sixty-Eighth Foot (West Indies), 434,,
435, 439
Sixty-Ninth Foot, 529, 559 .
Seventieth Foot (West Indies), 354 n.
Seventy-First Foot (Ceylon), 403, 404 ;
719
Seventy-Second Foot (Ceylon), 402,
403, 404
Se*enty-Thir<] Foot (Ceylon), 402, 403,
4045 (India, 1801), 725 ., 739,
760
Seventy-Fourth Foot (India, 1801),
725 > 733. 739, 7 6l 7 6 3> 7 6 4
Seventy-Fifth Foot, 726 ., 728, 739
Seventy-Seventh Foot, 404 ; (India,
1801), 728, 763, 764
Seventy - Eighth Foot, 83, 2ioj
(Flanders), 312, 318, 392; (Brit-
tany), 416, 418
Seventy-Ninth Foot, 209 ; (Flanders),
302, 303, 319 ; (West Indies), 452 j
(Egypt, 1801), 819 ., 850
Eightieth Foot, 209, 321, 418, 857
Eighty-First Foot, 209 j (West Indies),
458, 459, 472 n.
Eighty-Second Foot, 209, 472 ., 779
Eighty-Third Foot, 210; (West
Indies), 462
Eighty-Fourth Foot, 210 j (Flanders),
32, 33, 321, 3945 7 J 9
Eighty-Fifth Foot, 210 j (Flanders),
302, 303, 321, 394
Eighty-Sixth Foot, 210, 719 j (Egypt,
1801), 857
Eighty-Seventh Foot, 209, 282, 296
., 541 n.
Eighty-Eighth Foot, 209, 296 . j
(West Indies), 477 ., 481, 4835
(Egypt, 1801), 857
Eighty-Ninth Foot, 210, 282, 296 .,
(West Indies), 468 ., 623 j (Egypt,
1801), 819 ., 850
Ninetieth Foot, 210, 418 j (Egypt,
1801), 819 ., 826-827
Ninety-First Foot (Highlanders), 210 j
(Dutch Colonies), 394
Ninety-Second Foot (Highlanders),
210; (North Holland), 661, 689,
693 ; (Egypt, 1801), 819 ., 826,
827
Ninety-Third Highlanders, 890
Ninety-Fourth (not yet formed. The
Scots Brigade was numbered 94th).
964
HISTORY OF THE ARMY
Regiments :
Infantry of the Line
Ninety-Fifth (Rifle Brigade), (Ferrol),
791 ; 918-921
Hundred and First,
Hundred and Second, 402, 748
Hundred and Third, 726 ., 739
First West India Regiment, 453
Second West India Regiment, 453
Cavalry Regiments afterwards Disbanded
(and see Appendix A)
Twenty-Second Light Dragoons (Field-
ing's), 210
- Twenty-Third Light Dragoons (Ful-
larton's), 210
Twenty - Fourth Light Dragoons
(Loftus's), 210
Twenty - Fifth Light Dragoons
(Gwyn's), 210, 5p8 j (India, 1799-
1800), 725, 753;, 760
Twenty-Sixth Light Dragoons (Man-
ners 's), 409 ; (West Indies), 468 .,
472 ., 477;, 806 lt
Twenty - Seventh , Light Dragoons
(Blathwayt's), 409 .
Twenty - Eighth Light Dragoons
(Lawrie's), 409, 508
Twenty - Ninth Light Dragoons
(Heathfi eld's), (West Indies), 409,
468 ., 472 .
Thirtieth Light Dragoons (Garden's),
93 1
Thirty -First Light Dragoons (St.
Leger's), 931
Thirty - Second Light Dragoons
(Blake's), 931 .
Thirty-Third Light Dragoons (Black-
wood's), 93.1
Infantry Regiments afterivards Disbanded
(and see Appendix A)
Scotch Brigade, 209, 719, 725 ., 733,
739
Edmeston's (gjth), 395, 508
Balfour's (93rd), 468 .
Trigge's (ggth), 468 .
Irish Brigade, 473, 544, 559
Staff Corps, 88 1
Poole's Waggoners, 210, 299
Royal Waggon train, 703
Foreign Regiments
Castries's, 602
Charmilli's, 343 '"' i
Chasseurs Britanniques, 862
Choiseul's Hussars, 296 .'
Corsican Rangers, 819 ., 862
de Meuron's, 402, 725 ., 739
Regiments :
Foreign Regiments
de Roll's, 602, 819, 862
Dillon's, 331, 602, 819, 862
Hardy's, 468 n.
Hompesch's Hussars, 215, 468 ., 539
., 819
Irving's Hussars, 296 ., 468 .
Lewes's, 471 n.
LSwenstein's Rifles, 487, 494 n.
539 ., 862
Loyal Emigrants, 296 ., 602
Minorca, 819, 838, 840, 862
Mortemar's, 602
Ramsay's Foot, 215, 468 .
Rohan's Hussars, 296 ., 471 .
Salm's Foot, 468 n.
Salm's Hussars, 215
Watteville's, 856, 862
York Chasseurs, 215
York Rangers, 215, 296 ., 471 .,
493, 494 ., 559
Renaix, 283, 285
Rexpoede, 122, 129
Reynier, General (French), his service
in the Netherlands, 260, 323 ; his
service in the Egyptian campaign
(1801), 816, 817, 833, 838, 839
Ricard, General (Trench), 363
Ricar\los, General (Spanish), 159
Rigaud (mulatto leader in St. Domingo),
337, 345-348, 474, 475, 549, 553,
5"5 6 , 559-56i j his military talent,
555
Robespierre, Maxmilien, opposed to war
(1792), 38 j member of the Com-
mittee of Public Safety, 126 j seeks
supreme p&wer, 205 j execution of,
294
Rocham beau, 'General, 10, n, 35, 37,
, 353, 360-361
Rogers, Captain, R.N., 354
Rollin, General, 253
Roubaix, 257
Rousbrugge, 129
Roussillon, 136, 137
Royalists, French, 29 j and see Emi-
grants
Rozendahl, 290, 301
Sainghin, 259
St. Amand, 103
St. Domingo, 53 j sequestrated to the
'British Crown, 79 ; England com-
mitted to the protection of, 327 j
operations in 1793-1794, 326-343 ;
operations in 1795-1796,457-464;
operations in 1797-1798, 545-565 j
evacuated by the British, 563
Saint Florent le Vieil, 98
INDEX
965
St. Helen's, Lord, 319
Saint Just, member of Committee of
Public Safety, 126 ; his military
exploits, 202, 274, 294
St. Lucia, captured by Sir Charles Grey,
362-363 j the British driven from,
434-436 j recovered by Sir R. Aber-
cromby, 486, 492
St. Marc (St. Domingo), 328, 332, 333,
337
St. Vincent, revolt of the negroes in,
429, 441-449 ; subdued by Aber-
cromby, 493
Saltrou, 333
San Fiorenzo (Corsica), occupied by the
British, 184.
San Ildefonso, Treaty of, 799
Santhonax, French Commissioner in St.
Domingo, 75, 326, 329, 330, 333
Saorgio, 116
Sardinia, kingdom of, 28, 630 ; its alli-
ance with Greirt, Britain, 5 its dis-
pute with Austria as to"trre Novarese,
139 j its overtures to the Directory,
503 j humiliated by Bonaparte,
505
Scherer, General, 306 , superseded in
Italy by Bonaparte, 5045 defeated
at Magnano, 630
Sempill, Lord, $6 ; dismissed the Army,
57
Seringapatam, siege a*id storm of, 735-
746
Servan, Minister of War, 38, 39, 47 ;
and see French Army
Silly, Brigadier (French), 849
Simcoe, Major-general, in St. Domingo,
545 j iiis instructions, 545, 546 j
his measures in St. Domingo, 547-
551
Sluys, surrender of, 303
Smith, Captain Sir Sidney, R.N., defeats
Bonaparte at Acre, 637-638 ; con-
cludes Convention of El Arish, 774,
802 ; his service in Egypt, 802-803,
811, 820, 824
Smyth, Colonel George, 664
Soignies, 283, 285
Sombref, 287
Sombreuil, M. de, 416
Souham, General, 129 ; Commandant
at Dunkirk, 129 j his service in
the 'Netherlands, 245, 260, 275,
. 277 .
Spain, kingdom of, 28 ; alliance between
Great Britain and, 116; Treaty of
Peace between France and, 417}
engaged to declare war against
England by the treaty of igth
August 1796, 510; capture of
Trinidad by the British, 540 ; its
menaces to Portugal, 603 ; capture
of Minorca by the British, 615-618 j
British Government's policy of raids
on Spanish ports, 605 j Ferrol, 790 j
Cadiz, 793 j gained over by Bonaparte
to invade Portugal, 788, 799, 803,
806 - 807 ; invades Portugal, but
comes to terms with her, 868
Spencer, Brent, Major and Colonel, his
service in the West Indies, 335,
33 8 > 555 557 J his service in
North Holland, 664 ; his service in
Egypt, 849-850
Spencer, Lord, 207
Speyer, 51
Stanislaus, King of Poland, 27, 45
Steenbergen, 65
Stewart, General, 246
St. Florent le Vieil, 98
St. Maarten, 664
Stofflet, Royalist leader in La Vendee,
153, 203, 414, 418 ; his death, 502
Strasburg, riots at, 14, 15
Stuart, Charles, General, appointed Com-
mander-in-chief in the Mediter-
ranean, 1 9 1 j his operations in Corsica,
192-195 j his quarrel with Hood,
X 93 r 95 5 ms work in Portugal,
601-606 ; his capture of Minorca,
615-622; his occupation of Sicily,
and plans for its defence, 623-624 j
his plan of operations in the Medi-
terranean, 774 j his quarrel with
Dundas, 776 ; his death, 777
Stuart, Colonel James, 403
Stuart, Brigadier John, 819 ., 834, 838
Suvorof, General, suppresses the Polish
insurrection, 386 j his Italian cam-
paign, 630 ; Austria's interference
with his operations, 630, 631, 633 j
beats Macdonald at the Trebbia,
631 j beats Jourdan at Novi, 632 ;
defeated \ in Switzerland, 636; his
death, 772
Swiss regiments in the service of France,
19, 23, 628
Switzerland, invaded and plundered by
the French, 581 5 revolt of against
the French, 609 ; it turns against
France in 1799, ^3 > tne campaign
in, 631-632, 636
Symes, Brigadier, 371-374
Talleyrand, Charles Maurice de, his
mission to England, 54, 55 ; his
venality, 536
Tarleton, Banastre, Major-general, 208
Thielt, 277
Thompson, Commodore, R.N., 354
966
HISTORY OF THE ARMY
Thorn, 27
Thouront, 246
Thugut, Baron, becomes chief adviser of
the Emperor Francis, 86 ; his
tortuous policy respecting Poland,
87 j his.i trick to keep Prussian
troops on the French frontier, 222 ;
his jealousy of the Prussian Army's
presence in Poland, 252-253 ; his
consequent eagerness for the evacua-
tion of the Netherlands, 273, 275 ;
his persistent refusal to send troops
to the Netherlands, 303 ; extracts
money from England despite his
faithlessness, 309 j his continued
greed of territory, 499 ; joins
Austria to the Triple Alliance in
return for a loan, 499 ; military
operations marred by his jealousy of
Prussia, 1795, 503 ; welcomes the
Peace of Leoben, 533 ; his dissatis-
faction with the Treaty of Campo
Formio, 567 ; his negotiations with
Naples, 582, 6 10 ; he throws over
Naples owing to his jealousy of
England, 614, 615; under much
pressure he joins Austria to the
Coalition of 1799, 627 ; his jealousy
of Prussia wrecks the Archduke's
operations in Switzerland, 629 , and
ruins Suvorofs campaign, 632, 633,
636 j he alienates Russia by his
insolence, 636, 772 ; drives Suvorof
and Archduke Charles to resign,
772 j his resignation after Hohen-
linden, 808
Tiburon, Cape, 328 j captured by the
British, 335 ; attacked by Rigaud,
337; recaptured by Rigaud, 347,-
Maitland's failure to recapture it,
557
Tippoo Sahib, his unskilful policy, 713,
715 ; arrival of French adventurers
at Mangalore, 716-719; he trifles
with Mornington's negotiations,
724 ; his march against the Bombay
army, 726-728 ; his feeble resist-
ance to Harris, 729-735 ; siege and
storm of Seringa patam, 735 sq. ;
death of, 742
Tirlemont, 68, 288, 289
Tobago, captured from the French, 134
Toulor, revolts against the Convention,
116 ; occupied by Lord Hood, 133 ;
British troops landed for the protec-
tion of, 136; operations at, 158-
172 ; Austrians disinclined to furnish
troops for, 163 ; desertion of Nea-
politans and Spaniards, 171 ; aban-
doned by the Allies, 171
Tournai, 37, 226, 245, 247, 248, 251,
279, 281, 283; positions of the
armies near (i5th May 1794), 253-
255 ; the army of the Allies in
camp at, after Turcoing, 271 ; evacu-
ated by the Austrians, 285
Treves, Elector of, 27
Trigge, General, 193 ; his captures in
West Indies, 866
Trincomalee, 403
Troisvilles, 240
Tuileries, attack on by the mob of Paris,
39-40
Turcoing, 120, 129; battle of, 256-
269
Turreau, General, his infernal columns
in La Vendee, 202-203
Valenciennes, 38, 102, 112, 285, 288,
304 ; taken over in Emperor Francis's
name, 1 14
Valentin, General, 835, 837
Valmy, action at, 48
Vandamme, General, 129, 260, 663, 676,
691
Varennes, Billaud, member of the Com-
mittee of Public Safety, 126
Vaughan, Lieutenant-general, his service
in the West Indies, 383, 424-427,
43-433 43 6 > 441-442 J his death,
45 1
Venloo, 306-308, 310
Verdun, surrender and evacuation of, 48,
49
Vergniaud, Pierre, 40
Verrettes, 332
Vicoigne, 103
Villers-en-Cauchies, action of, 236-239
Vincent (a Jacobin official), 99
Volunteers, 217, 218 ; strength of, 892 j
volunteer cavalry, 218, 893 ; infantry
and artillery, 893 j Associations for
Defence, 893
Wageningen, 319
Walcheren, 284, 304
Waldeck, Prince of, 253, 273, 276, 289,
290
Walmoden, General (Hanoverian), his
service in the Netherlands, 130-132,
307, 312, 315-318, 322
Waremme, 288
Warren, Admiral Sir John, 790
Warsaw, capture by Kosciusko, 250 ; re-
captured, 386
Waterloo, 286, 287
Wattrelos, 263
Wavre, 287
Wellesley, Colonel Arthur, 282 ; under
fire for the first time, 305 ; his
INDEX
967
service in the Mysore campaign of
1799, 726-748 j in pursuit of
Doondia Wao, 753-758; his first
forest -campaign, 767 ; misses the
Egyptian campaign, 857
Wemyss, Lieutenant - colonel, 194 ;
Colonel, raises Ninety-Third High-
landers, 890
Werge, Mr. Oswald, 464
Werneck, General (Austrian), 311
West India regiments, the trouble over
the formation of, 425, 429, 432,
433, 45' 453, 54^544
West Indies. See Martinique, Barbados,
Dominica, Grenada, Guadeloupe,
Jamaica, St. Domingo, St. Lucia,
St. Vincent, Tobago, Trinidad
Whitelocke, Lieutenant - colonel John,
33, 335, 338
Whyte (i), Major-general, 247
Whyte (2), Major-general, sails to Port-
au-Prince, 339; in command at
Barbados, 351 ; his share in the
capture of Martinique, 354, 355,
480 ; sent to St. Domingo, 339 ; his
differences with General William-
son, 341-342 ; returns to England,
341 ; returns to St. Domingo, his
operations there, 472-474 ; left in
command at St. Domingo, 550, 551 ;
his trouble with Colonel Maitlaml,
554, 55 6
Williamson, Sir Adam, Governor of
Jamaica, his agreement to take over
the protection of St. Domingo, 326-
327 ; sends troops thither, 332-333 ;
his futile efforts to govern St.
Domingo from Jamaica, 340, 341 ;
befooled by the French proprietors,
342, 343 ; takes personal command
in St. Domingo, 458-459; his
operations there, 466-467 ; returns
home, 468
Willot (French royalist), 774
Windham, William, appointed Secretary
at War, 207 ; sent on a mission to
the Austrian headquarters, 306 ;
anxious to help the royalists in La
Vend6e, 418 ; responsible for the
disastrous expedition to Quiberon,
4125 his administration, 872-873,
904
Winschoten, 323
Wurmb, General (Hessian), 226
Yeomanry, creation of, 218, 894
Yonge, Sir George, Secretary at War,
211, 215; convicted of corrupt
dealing, 872
York, Duke of. See Frederick
Ypres, 277, 280
Zutphen, 321
Zwolle, 322
END OF VOL. IV
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Fortescue, (Sir) John William
A history of the British
army
